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**The LGBTQ Movement and Hate Crime Legislation:
The Role of Religious Traditionalism in Congressional
Districts**

Andrew Champion, Class of 2013

Introduction

In the past two decades, civil rights campaign to ensure equal rights for LGBTQ individuals has moved into public policy spotlight in the United States. This can be seen most recently in the debate **regarding** same-sex marriage. While there has been significant progress for the LGBTQ movement, there has also been significant resistance. One of the primary sources of discrimination towards LGBTQ individuals is based upon conservative and fundamentalist interpretation of religious scriptures, which label homosexuality as immoral or unnatural. These opponents of the LGBTQ movement seek to preserve their social order and way of life against what they perceive to be a sinful lifestyle. The conflict of ideals between religious traditionalism and equal rights takes place within the struggle of congressional policy sculpting. Given this information, these nagging questions remain: does the degree of religious traditionalism within a congressional district influence the voting behavior of its representative? Do higher rates of religious traditionalism result in greater opposition to LGBTQ legislation? Do representatives draw a distinction between ensuring equal rights for LGBTQ individuals and ensuring basic protections for LGBTQ individuals against hate crimes? Or, do representatives oppose all pro-gay legislation if their district has a high rate of religious traditionalism?

History and Background

Many mainstream religions maintain anti-gay doctrines and justification for homophobic views does not requires a basis ore reliance upon extremist or fundamental groups (Gerstenfeld 2004, 158). One of the largest religious traditions within the United States, Evangelical Protestantism, is especially prone to stigmatize homosexuality (Green 2000, 122).

Organized religion is the most potent source of opposition, and here social convention is reinforced by religious values. Simply put, most religious groups in the United States have long believed that homosexual behavior is morally wrong. These views are frequently rooted in sacred texts and codes of sexual conduct derived from those texts. There are, however, enormous differences on how these beliefs are defined and applied, with some religious groups attaching intense stigma to homosexuality and others adopting a more latitudinarian approach. (Green 2000, 122)

Religious institutions form one of the central supports of anti-gay sentiments by justifying homophobic belief through religious scripture (Green 2000, 122). There are elements of organized religion which are more tolerant of the LGBTQ community and gay rights, and liberal actors within organized religion have acted as some of the strongest advocates for LGBTQ rights (Green 2000, 123). However, the conservative element within organized religions is the root of opposition to gay rights, and much of this opposition has been advocated by the Christian Right (Green 2000, 122). Some conservative religious elements (fundamentalist Christianity, radical Judaism, and Islamic groups such as Nation of Islam) serve as an important basis for the belief systems of many hate groups (Gerstenfeld 2004, 123).

While conservative elements of multiple religions advocate anti-gay sentiments, Didi Herman in "The Gay Agenda is the Devil's Agenda: The Christian Right's Vision and the Role of the State" identifies the Christian Right as the predominant movement whose central tenets are based upon advocating and leading a public anti-gay agenda (Herman 2000, 140). Herman's focus is on connecting this public anti-gay agenda back to the ideological religious perspective of the Christian Right (Herman 2000, 140). The Christian Right's ideology is based upon pre-millennialism and the coming of the Christian Apocalypse referenced in the Book of Revelations (Herman 2000, 141). The overarching goal is to ensure that the events they believe will result in the end of days, and the utopia beyond, will come to pass (Herman 2000, 141-143). Those social



movements to which the Christian Right is opposed including: gay rights, feminists, environmentalists, and New Age Spiritualists are the forces of darkness that prevent the coming of the kingdom of God on Earth and the Gay Rights movement is no less than a part of a Satanic Conspiracy (Herman 2000, 145-146). They believe the role of the state is one which favors small government, and acts to support the moral values of the Christian Faith (Herman 2000, 149). According to the Christian Right, the Gay Rights movement, however, is an Anti-Christian drive for power which seeks to seize control of the state (Herman 2000, 144). Those of this conviction consider themselves to be on the front lines of their own Western jihad (Herman 2000, 145). Thus the Christian Right's responsibility is to prevent the spread of the gay rights movement in the public sphere and to lobby the state to uphold traditional Christian morality against this inherent threat. This struggle between conflicting social norms has become a matter of debate on public policy within Congress.

Issues regarding sexual orientation have a limited history within the United States Congress. During the 1950s, there was some debate within Congress stigmatizing homosexuals as security risks, based upon the arguments that such individuals lack moral purity, and were more easily blackmailed because of their sexual orientation (Campbell and Davidson 2000, 348). Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Congress utilized a variety of strategies to avoid discussing gay rights policies and to keep such discussions out of the public eye (Campbell and Davidson 2000, 348-349). The majority of legislation on gay rights passed during this period was anti-gay in nature (Campbell and Davidson 2000, 350). Three more recent issues which have come before Congress which were specifically LGBTQ-oriented were; the AIDS endemic, definitions of 'traditional' marriage, and civil rights protections for LGBTQ individuals in the workplace.

Dissatisfied with the responses of the Reagan administration to the AIDS epidemic, LGBTQ groups turned their attention towards Congress (Campbell and Davidson 2000, 351). One of their primary struggles with Congress was framing the issue. Those representatives who were in support of addressing the AIDS epidemic sought to frame the question as one of medical science, whereas con-



servative opposition saw the issue as one of moral deficiency and behavioral deviance (Campbell and Davidson 2000, 356). Opposition elements also warned against Congressional action as legitimizing and promoting the “dangerous” homosexual lifestyle (Campbell and Davidson 2000, 358). As members of Congress became more educated on the issue of AIDS and HIV and came to realize that it was a medical concern and an issue of life and death, more and more members came to support governmental action to the AIDS epidemic (Campbell and Davidson 2000, 352). Only four members of the Senate and fourteen members of the House of Representatives voted against the final bill addressing the AIDS epidemic (Campbell and Davidson 2000, 359-360).

The 104th Congress addressed the issue of same-sex marriage after three LGBTQ couples in Hawaii sued for the right to marry in 1996 (Campbell and Davidson 2000, 360). As a result, Congress passed the Defense of Marriage Act (or DOMA), which dictated that no state within the United States need acknowledge a same-sex marriage from another state and also inscribed into federal law the legal definition of marriage as the union between one man and one woman. This includes the denial of federal benefits to same-sex married couples in those states that recognize same-sex marriage (Campbell and Davidson 2000, 361-362). Those in opposition to DOMA challenged it as being unconstitutional, rushed, and intended to create divisiveness within the Democratic Party as part of pre-election tactics (Campbell and Davidson 2000, 361). Proponents of DOMA argued that it was in response to an extremist minority attempting to gain rights through the judicial process which they could not win through democratic legislation (Campbell and Davidson 2000, 360). They cited Judeo-Christian values and tenets as justification for DOMA (Campbell and Davidson 2000, 362). DOMA was described as, “a fundamental disagreement about the proper definition of marriage that involved an emotional clash over religious conviction and public morality” (Campbell and Davidson 2000, 361). This clash occurred between conservative elements defending ‘traditional marriage’ and liberal elements arguing that it was a matter of civil rights (Campbell and Davidson 2000, 361). DOMA was passed by the House of Representatives 342 to 67 and the Senate 85 to 14 (Campbell and Davidson 2000, 363).



While DOMA was being debated in Congress, a second piece of legislation was put forth, **regarding** the prohibition of discrimination based on sexual orientation within places of employment, known as the Employment Non-Discrimination Act (Campbell and Davidson 2000, 363). Opponents saw sexual orientation as a personal lifestyle choice and argued that since the majority of US citizens' religious backgrounds led them to see homosexual relations as immoral, it would be offensive to protect sexual orientation similarly to other protected groups in civil rights and nondiscrimination legislation (Campbell and Davidson 2000, 364). ENDA was ultimately defeated by a 50-49 vote in the US Senate (Campbell and Davidson 2000, 364).

There has been a shift within the United States over the past two decades, as public opinion towards the LGBTQ community has become more tolerant and accepting. The policy known as Don't Ask, Don't Tell, which banned LGBTQ individuals from serving openly in the US military, was repealed in 2011. President Obama recently announced his support of equality of marriage, and the Democratic Party has adopted marriage equality as part of its party platform. Same-sex marriage has been legalized in nine states (Connecticut, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Vermont, and Washington, in addition to the District of Columbia). Yet with this newfound freedom has come backlash and opposition against the LGBTQ community; the Republican Party opposes same-sex marriage as part of its party platform. As public cognizance of LGBTQ issues has risen, there has been an increase in research on the relationship between representatives in Congress and their constituencies in regards to LGBTQ issues and legislation. Religion has played a role in a variety of ways.

Literature Review

In "Race, Religion, and Opposition to Same-Sex Marriage," Darren Sherkat, Kylan Mattias de Vries, and Stacia Creek examine the effects of religious affiliation on African-American's support of LGBTQ issues. The motivation for this research was the accreditation of the passage of Proposition 8 in California to the African-American vote (Sherkat, de Vries and Creek 2010; 80). They found

that African-Americans that identified as conservative Protestants were significantly less likely (52%) to support same-sex marriage than the control group, but there was no significant difference between Roman Catholics and the control group (Sherkat, de Vries and Creek 2010; 89). Respondents without religious affiliation were more likely to support same-sex marriage (Sherkat, de Vries and Creek 2010; 89). When examining religious participation by measuring church attendance, researchers discovered that as church attendance increased, support of same-sex marriage decreased (Sherkat, de Vries and Creek 2010; 89).

African-American religion is overwhelmingly sectarian Protestant and denominational ties play a strong role in producing black-white differences in support for same-sex marriage. While fewer than 30 percent of white Americans identify with conservative Protestant denominations, over 63 percent of African Americans affiliate with Baptist or other sectarian groups. About half the difference between whites and African Americans in their support for same-sex marriage is explained by differences in religious affiliation, while high rates of religious participation among African Americans accounts for the remainder of the gap. Indeed, African-American nonaffiliates are also less supportive of same-sex marriage than whites with no religious affiliation. (Sherkat, de Vries and Creek 2010; 94)

African Americans are just as likely as whites to support LGBTQ issues of civil rights in speech and employment, yet even though liberally identifying African-Americans are more informed by religion than ideology on issues of same-sex marriage, which is seen as a religious, not a civil rights, issue (Sherkat, de Vries and Creek 2010; 94).

Elizabeth Oldmixon and Brian Calfano in "The Religious Dynamics of Decision Making on Gay Rights Issues in the U.S. House of Representatives, 1993-2002" examine the question of sup

port for LGBTQ issues by members of the House of Representatives, and the influence of religion within their districts. The question is framed in terms of a cultural conflict that has entered the political arena as traditional and progressive elements seek to legitimize



their own cultural norms in the public sphere (Oldmixon and Calfano 2007, 55). The focus of this paper is upon Congressional members' support for pro-LGBTQ issues and legislation (Oldmixon and Calfano 2007, 57). The independent variables used were partisanship, ideology, and religion. Partisanship acknowledged the political party affiliation of the legislator and determined the partisanship of the district by examining voter percentages for the Democratic candidate in the most recent presidential election (Oldmixon and Calfano 2007, 58). Ideology focused on the ideology of the legislator as either liberal or conservative, using DW-NOMINATE scores (Oldmixon and Calfano 2007, 58). For the measure of religion, Oldmixon and Calfano only examined Roman Catholicism and conservative Protestantism (Oldmixon and Calfano 2007, 58). They were interested in whether the legislator identified with either of these religious backgrounds and also the percentage of constituents that identified with these religious affiliations within each district (Oldmixon and Calfano 2007, 58). They found that representatives were 90% less likely to support pro-gay legislation if their districts possessed large conservative Protestant communities and 80% less likely if their districts were home to large Roman Catholic communities (Oldmixon and Calfano 2007, 64). It should be noted that Sherkat, de Vries, and Creek found no significant difference when examining Roman Catholicism, whereas Oldmixon and Calfano found a large disparity in their study. The difference is that Oldmixon and Calfano examined the influence of Roman Catholicism in general, whereas Sherkat, de Vries, and Creek examined the influence of Roman Catholicism comparatively between African-Americans and their control group. Thus while Roman Catholic communities are less likely to support pro-gay legislation, there is no significant racial difference to Roman Catholic influence. The results show that on LGBTQ issues, the district level variables significantly shaped the decision-making process of Congressional members (Oldmixon and Calfano 2007, 66). While Roman Catholic and conservative Protestant legislators are less likely to vote in favor of LGBTQ issues, there was no consistent significance, and they found that legislators' religion had little measurable effect on decision-making (Oldmixon and Calfano 2007, 64). One interpretation posited is that on this issue, legislators are more concerned with district concerns

than affirmation of their own moral codes (Oldmixon and Calfano 2007, 65).

In their research, Oldmixon and Calfano examined the religious background of legislators and the presence of religion within Congressional districts. Their examination of both measures allows for the analysis of different theories **regarding** representation and how representatives behave as actors. Hannah Pitkin offers a fundamental understanding of the theories **regarding** the behavior that representatives should adopt in their actions. Pitkin's delegate theory of representation is one in which representatives serve as the conduit to act in accord with the constituent views (Dovi 2011). In contrast, Pitkin's trusteeship theory puts forth the idea that elected representatives are trusted by the constituents to act in the manner they perceive to be the best course of action based upon the representative's informed view (Dovi 2011). Oldmixon and Calfano found that on LGBTQ legislation, members of Congress were more likely to act as delegates than as trustees.

David Lublin also examined the question of Congressional members' voting behavior on LGBTQ issues and what influences their voting behavior in, "The Strengthening of Party and Decline of Religion in Explaining Congressional Voting Behavior on Gay and Lesbian Issues." His focus was on the declining influence of religion in determining the voting behavior of members of Congress and the strengthening of party ideology and partisanship as the primary signifier that informed voting behavior on LGBTQ legislation (Lublin 2005, 241). Lublin examined a variety of variables to best determine what influenced voting behaviors including: partisanship, race, religion, gender, region, urbanism, and education. The research showed that Democratic representatives were more supportive of LGBTQ issues than Republican representatives (Lublin 2005, 243). Region also played a role in representatives from the South were less supportive than the norm, and representatives from New England were more supportive than the norm (Lublin 2005, 243). In regard to race, Latino and African-American representatives were more supportive than Caucasian representatives, and the gendered examination showed female representatives as more supportive than their male counterparts (Lublin 2005, 243-244). The research also showed



that more urbanized congressional districts, were more supportive of LGBTQ issues, as were those congressional districts with higher concentrations of college graduates (Lublin 2005, 244).

The data on religion varied greatly depending on denomination and faith, as different religions have different stances on the morality of LGBTQ relations (Lublin 2005, 244). The measure of religion used by Lublin differed from the measures used by Oldmixon and Calfano. Lublin only examined the religious identity of representatives and argued that the religion of the representative is likely to reflect the religion of their constituents (Lublin 2005, 242). Thus, it is difficult to determine if the religious influence originates from the representative or from the constituents (Lublin 2005, 242). Furthermore, Lublin only examined the religious identification of Caucasian representatives positing that African-American and Latino representatives would be more liberal regardless of religious background (Lublin 2005, 242). Lublin's research determined that party partisanship was the primary influence upon voting behaviors of Congressional members (Lublin 2005, 244). There was a shift from the 106th Congress to the 108th Congress where religion became less important in decision-making and partisanship became more prominent to LGBTQ issues (Lublin 2005, 244).

While Oldmixon and Calfano examined the relation of religious impact on Congressional support of LGBTQ issues, they limited their research to whether or not Congressional members were supportive of pro-LGBTQ legislation. Furthermore, when examining the question of religion the focus was solely upon conservative Protestant and Roman Catholic faiths to the exclusion of all others. Sherkat, de Vries, and Creek also examined the influence of religion on LGBTQ issues but focused solely upon the issue of same-sex marriage to the exclusion of other LGBTQ issues. Furthermore, the focus was on the disparity between African-Americans as a demographic versus mainstream views and how religion was the sole influence that accounted for the disparity between voting trends with this demographic. Lublin puts forward a contrasting argument that there is a shift away from religion in favor of partisanship and party ideology as the primary motivator behind voting behaviors of Congressional members on LGBTQ issues. Research has accredited both reli-

gious background and political partisanship as the primary influences on the decision-making of members of Congress. My research is focused upon the influence of religion at the district level upon Congressional representatives' voting, but through the course of this study, I will be able to better determine what is truly most influential to representative voting on LGBTQ issues.

Methodology

There is an arguable relation between religion and discrimination against LGBTQ individuals and the LGBTQ community. Conservative and fundamental interpretations of a variety of faiths, or sects within those faiths, have religious beliefs that living as an LGBTQ individual is morally wrong. Does the degree of religious traditionalism within congressional districts influence the voting behavior of the district's representatives on LGBTQ legislation? To assess this question I will be focusing on voting by members of the United States House of Representatives as reported by the Congressional Scorecard reports by the Human Rights Campaign. I will be specifically examining the 108th, 109th, 110th, and 111th Congresses. The first dependent variable Total LGBTQ Vote examines the percentage of votes a legislator casts in favor of LGBTQ legislation that was being tracked by HRC. Legislation is then divided into two separate categories both of which served as additional dependent variables, Total Hate Crime Vote and Total Non-Hate Crime Vote. Total Hate Crime Vote is composed solely of hate crime legislation protecting individuals based upon sexual orientation, and the voting behavior of representatives on these pieces of legislation. Total Non-Hate Crime Vote is comprised of all remaining pieces of legislation excluding hate crime legislation; which test for general support for the LGBTQ movement. The reason for distinguishing between these types of legislation is to determine if there is a distinction between ensuring basic protections against hate crimes and support for the overall LGBTQ movement in voting behavior of members of the House of Representatives. The primary independent variable being tested is the degree of religious traditionalism within Congressional districts, using Christopher Hare's "Religious Traditionalism Index of Congressional Districts (2002-2010)." Hare creates a measure of religious traditionalism for each congressional district through



factor analysis of four separate measures. These measures include, frequency of church attendance, frequency of prayer, whether or not an individual identifies as a "born-again" Christian, and importance of religion in one's life.

My theory is that representatives from congressional districts with high rates of religious traditionalism will not vote in support of LGBTQ legislation, to better represent the traditional religious views of their constituents. Oldmixon and Calfano found that representatives were more heavily influenced by cues from their district, rather than their own religious or ideological views. When considering LGBTQ legislation Oldmixon and Calfano, as well as Sherkat, de Vries, and Creek, found that certain religious ideologies and the presence of these religious communities within congressional districts (such as conservative or Evangelical Protestantism and Roman Catholicism) negatively correlates with the voting behavior of representatives. By negatively influencing voting behavior, Casual representatives are less likely to support pro-LGBTQ legislation. Thus, where there are high rates of religious traditionalism present within a congressional district, representatives from that district will not support pro-LGBTQ legislation. However, members of the House of Representatives are more likely to vote in favor of hate crime legislation protecting individuals based upon their sexual orientation, than other types of legislation furthering the LGBTQ human rights movement. There is a greater and less controversial distinction to create basic protections for the LGBTQ community from hate crime, than to pass legislation that furthers rights and liberties for LGBTQ individuals. Sherkat, de Vries, and Creek found that while liberal African-Americans supported anti-discrimination legislation, they were opposed to equality of marriage legislation based upon religious views. Furthermore, when Congress addressed the AIDS epidemic, there was a shift in Congress away from opposition as representatives became aware that AIDS was a matter of life and death. These trends imply a subtle logic in which there are different influences and value systems utilized during the decision-making process for differing types of LGBTQ legislation. While there may exist strong opposition against the securing of additional rights and liberties for the LGBTQ community, opposition may not present itself as strongly in regards to hate crime legislation which is to ensure basic protection

and safety.

H1: Representatives of congressional districts with high rates of religious traditionalism will be significantly less likely to vote in favor of LGBTQ legislation.

H2: Members of the House of Representatives are more likely to vote in favor of anti-hate crime legislation protecting sexual orientation than other pro-LGBTQ legislation.

I will also be controlling for several other variables which have also been known to influence the voting of members of the House of Representatives. Four independent variables are controlled for at the representative level; these variables are the gender, ethnicity, ideology as measured by DW-Nominate scores, and political party affiliation of each member of the House of Representatives. For ideology, I will be using the DW-Nominate scale between liberal and conservative I expect liberal representatives to be more likely to vote in favor of LGBTQ legislation whereas conservative representatives to be less likely to vote in favor of LGBTQ legislation. I expect representatives of the Democratic Party to vote in favor of LGBTQ legislation, and representatives of the Republican Party to be opposed to LGBTQ legislation. I expect representatives that identify as female, African-American, Hispanic, or Asian-American to be more likely to vote in favor of LGBTQ legislation. Additional independent variables that are controlled at the congressional district level are median income in thousands, median age, percentage with college education, percentage married, percentage Hispanic (of the population), percentage ethnic minority (of the population), and percentage of the district that voted for Barack Obama in the 2008 presidential election. At the congressional district level, I will be measuring education based on the percentage of the district that possesses college diplomas and posit that the higher this percentage the more likely the representative of the district will vote in favor of LGBTQ issues. I believe that districts with higher Latino and ethnic minority populations will be more likely to elect representatives that will vote in favor of LGBTQ legislation. I posit that the percentage of the district married will not significantly influence representatives votes furthermore, the lower the median age of a district the more likely the representative of that district will be supportive of LGBTQ issues. The



percentage of the district to vote for then Senator Obama during the 2008 presidential election serves as an indicator for the degree a district is liberal. I expect districts with higher percentages that voted for Barack Obama to have representatives more likely to vote in favor of LGBTQ legislation. To test the relationship between these variables, bivariate regression is first used to test the relationship between Mean Religious Traditionalism, Total LGBTQ Vote, Total Hate Crime Vote, and Total Non-Hate Crime Vote. However, to control for other influences, three linear regression models are used to test each of the dependent variables against all of the independent variables.

Analysis

With the collected data, analyses can be utilized to examine the relationship between religious traditionalism and the voting of representatives on LGBTQ issues, and whether there exists correlation between these variables. The first degree of analysis was a bivariate regression of the independent variable Mean Religious Traditionalism against the three dependent variables Total LGBTQ Vote, Total Hate Crime Vote, and Total Non-Hate Crime Vote. The results can be found below in Table 1.

Table 1: Correlation of Religious Traditionalism on LGBTQ Legislation

		Total LGBTQ Vote	Total Hate Crime Vote	Total Non-Hate Crime Vote
Mean Religious Traditionalism	Pearson Correlation	-.432**	-.357**	-.437**

** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

The analysis shows that there is a surface level significant relationship between the variables and that as there is a rise of religious traditionalism in congressional districts, representatives are less likely to vote in favor of LGBTQ legislation. There is also a weaker

relationship between religious traditionalism and voting to hate crime legislation as compared to the stronger relationship between religious traditionalism and the non-hate crime variable. This supports both hypotheses, there is a negative correlation between religious traditionalism and support for LGBTQ legislation but religious traditionalism does not have as strong an impact on voting support for hate crime legislation.

However, a bivariate analysis does not account for other factors which may influence and affect the voting trends of representatives on LGBTQ legislation. To better account for the influence of additional independent variables, each dependent variable was incorporated in a linear regression model.



Table 2: Influences on Voting in Regards to LGBTQ Legislation

	Total LGBTQ Vote	Total Hate Crime Vote	Total Non-Hate Crime Vote
r-square	.789	.756	.736
Constant	.464*	.425*	.451*
	(.127)	(.145)	(.141)
Mean Religious Traditionalism	-.161*	-.034	-.197*
	(.033)	(.037)	.037
Median Income in Thousands	.002*	.003*	.002*
	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)
Median Age	.005*	.008*	.003
	(.002)	(.003)	(.003)
Percentage with College Education	.130	-.001	.212*
	(.097)	(.110)	(.108)
Percentage Married	-.653*	-.506*	-.700*
	(.173)	(.197)	(.193)
Percentage Hispanic	.257*	.272*	.256*
	(.044)	(.050)	(.049)
Percentage Minority	-.110*	-.151*	-.085
	(.056)	(.063)	(.062)
Percentage Obama Vote	.100*	.058	.099*
	(.045)	(.051)	(.050)
Political Party	-.186*	-.178*	-.177*
	(.032)	(.037)	(.036)
DW-Nominate	-.529*	-.631*	-.505*
	(.036)	(.041)	(.040)
Gender	0.13	-.007	.025
	(.015)	(.017)	(.017)
Ethnicity	.010	.005	.012
	(.008)	(.009)	(.009)

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

When accounting for other variables, religious traditionalism continues to show a negative impact on support for LGBTQ legislation, and maintains significance to Total LGBTQ Vote and Total Non-Hate Crime Vote. The relationship between religious traditionalism and voting on hate crime legislation persists as there is a dis-

tinctly weaker relationship. Furthermore, once additional variables are accounted for the relationship between religious traditionalism and hate crime legislation is no longer significant. These findings support both hypotheses. Religious traditionalism at the congressional district level negatively impacts representative support for LGBTQ legislation. However religious traditionalism does not affect the voting of representatives on hate crime legislation based on sexual orientation. Other variables which possessed significant relationships at the congressional district level included Median Income in Thousands, Median Age, Percentage with College Education, Percentage Married, Percentage Hispanic, Percentage Minority, and Percentage Vote for Obama. The only variables significant at the representative level were Political Party and DW-Nominate.

Median Age is surprising as there is a positive relationship when median age of the congressional district increased, so did support for LGBTQ legislation. While there is a positive relationship in all three models, age is not significant to Total Non-Hate Crime Vote. Median Age is significant to Total Hate Crime Vote, the variable where it has the strongest relationship. One explanation for this relationship is that older generations are closer to the era of the Civil Rights movement and are therefore more cognizant of the issues surrounding hate crimes. They are informed by a period when hate crimes were arguably more proliferate and a matter of public policy and national debate. A second interpretation of the data, contrary to popular opinion, is that the positive correlation to Median Age could serve as an indicator that older generations are growing more accepting of the LGBTQ community.

The percentage of the district with a college education is only significant when looking at Total Non-Hate Crime Vote and does not have significance to hate crime legislation. This finding supports the idea that individuals with college educations are generally more supportive of the LGBTQ movement.

Median Income in thousands is interesting in that even when religion and education are accounted for, it is still significant in all three models with a positive relationship, meaning as median income increases, so too does support for LGBTQ legislation. One explanation would be that lower income communities are more con-



servative and traditional in their values and thus less supportive of LGBTQ issues. However this engenders the need for further research.

When examining the variable for Percentage Married it should be noted that the strength of the relationship is exaggerated as it is reflecting the difference that would be apparent between two districts being purely hypothetical in nature, with 0% of the population married and 100% of the population married. However, it does show that districts with a larger percentage of the population married are less supportive of LGBTQ legislation, though the relationship is weaker in relation to hate crime legislation. One explanation is that the married population is comprised almost entirely of heterosexual relationships with only a minority of states having legalized same-sex marriages. Thus, in most cases marriage excludes LGBTQ individuals. Furthermore, marriage is a traditional institution, and much of the dialogue against the LGBTQ movement is focused upon defending the sanctity of marriage.

The variables of population percentages in congressional districts, Hispanic and ethnic minority reflect results that are at odds. Latin-Americans are an ethnic minority and it is significant in all three models that congressional districts with larger Hispanic populations are more likely to have representatives vote in favor of LGBTQ legislation, with a slightly stronger relationship to hate crime legislation. One explanation for the slightly weaker relationship between Hispanic populations and the Total Non-Hate Crime Vote could be the strong Roman Catholic influence in Latin-American communities, and the issue of equality of marriage. However, when examining ethnic minorities as a whole, there is a negative relationship, particularly in regards to hate crime legislation. This counters the idea that one minority is concerned with the rights of other minorities. It is not significant in the Total Non-Hate Crime Vote model, which includes legislation on marriage, which is counter Sherkat, de Vries, and Creek. They had found that African-Americans were supportive of LGBTQ issues except on the issue of marriage, where they were influenced by religious views. One potential conclusion is that ethnic minorities already protected by hate crime legislation are resistant to sexual orientation gaining equal pro-

tections, due to lessening the exclusivity and special status of protected groups.

The Percentage Obama Vote variable used the percentage of each district that voted for Senator Obama in the 2008 Presidential election as a watermark measure of how liberal or conservative each district is. As was expected, there is a positive relationship, as districts that voted for Barack Obama are also more supportive of LGBTQ legislation. It is interesting that this is not significant to Total Hate Crime Vote, further supporting that districts do not have to have more liberal populations to support hate crime legislation protecting sexual orientation.

The final two variables focus on the representative as opposed to the represented congressional district. The variable for Political Party is consistent that members of the Democratic Party are more likely to vote in favor of LGBTQ legislation with no distinct variation between hate crime legislation and non-hate crime LGBTQ legislation. The negative relationship for DW-Nominate indicates that more liberal representatives are more likely to vote in favor of LGBTQ legislation. However, contrary to expectations, the relationship is stronger to Total Hate Crime Vote in comparison to Total Non-Hate Crime Vote. The first assumption is that more liberal representatives would be more likely to support pro-LGBTQ legislation, and the relationship would be weaker to hate crime legislation which would also be supported by less liberal representatives. One explanation is that more liberal representatives may operate in the role of delegate as opposed to trustee on general LGBTQ legislation and vote more in line with their constituencies' views as opposed to their own ideological view. Despite taking into account a variety of other factors, there is a correlation between higher rates of religious traditionalism within a congressional district, and a district's representative being less likely to vote in favor of LGBTQ legislation. However, that relationship is not a factor in the voting of representatives on hate crime legislation which protects based upon sexual orientation.

Conclusion

Religious scripture has been interpreted by some conserva-



tive adherents within various faiths to justify discrimination against LGBTQ individuals. The basis of this justification is that homosexuality is immoral, unnatural, and sinful. The rise of the human and civil rights movement for LGBTQ individuals within the United States has caused a clash between these religious ideologies and the ideology of equality for all, including for individuals of non-normative sexual orientations and gendered identities. Religion has been used as a justification for both individual and institutional discrimination and as a defense of homophobia. Is there reification of conservative and fundamental religious ideology on sexual orientation in the public policy of the United States? To examine this question, the degree of religious traditionalism at the congressional district level and the voting of each district's representative in the US House of Representatives on LGBTQ legislation were examined for correlation, or whether the opposition of religion against the LGBTQ movement is pure rhetoric. Through statistical analysis correlation was determined to exist between religious traditionalism and representative votes, where an increase in religious traditionalism correlates with a decrease in representative voting in favor of LGBTQ legislation. Religious traditionalism is not the sole variable to possess strong correlation with the voting of representatives on LGBTQ legislation. Religious traditionalism at the district level and political party of the representative possess equal explanatory power in regards to influences which affect the voting behavior of representatives, the strongest relationship is the ideology of the representative as measured by the DW-Nominate score. The weaker relation between ideology and Non-Hate Crime Vote could be explained by representatives' votes being influenced by the representative voting in accord with constituent ideology as opposed to the representative's personal ideology. If ideology is the strongest influence on the voting trends of representatives, what informs that ideological view? Future research can focus upon what informs a liberal or conservative ideology within an individual and what variables influence an individual's ideological perspective. A second branch of research could examine the influence which ideology has upon the actions of an individual or representative.

Appendix 1: Legislation

108th Congress

1. Marriage Protection Amendment, H. J. Res. 106 Roll Call Vote 494
2. Pelosi Motion to Instruct Conferees, Department of Defense Authorization. H.R. 4200
3. Marriage Protection Act of 2004, H.R. 3313
4. Policy Pledge of Non-Discrimination

109th Congress

1. Federal Marriage Amendment (H.J. Res. 88)
2. Conyers Amendment to Child Safety Act (H.R. 3132)

110th Congress

1. Local Law Enforcement Hate Crimes Prevention Act (H.R. 1592)
2. Local Law Enforcement Hate Crimes Prevention Act Motion to Recommit (H.R. 1592)
3. Employment Non-Discrimination Act (H.R. 3685)
4. Employment Non-Discrimination Act Motion to Recommit (H.R. 3685)
5. Souder Amendment to Financial Services Appropriations Act (H.R. 2829)
6. Improving Head Start Act Motion to Recommit (H.R. 1429)

111th Congress

1. Local Law Enforcement Hate Crimes Prevention Act (H.R. 1913)
2. Local Law Enforcement Hate Crimes Prevention Act Motion to Recommit (H.R. 1913)
3. Murphy Amendment to National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 5136)
4. "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" Repeal Act of 2010 (H.R. 2965)
5. Souder Amendment to the Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act (H.R. 3293)



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