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The People's War: Identification and the Logic of Good Reasons in British Propaganda in the U.S., 1939-1941

John T. Hetherington
Ithaca College

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**The People's War: Identification and the Logic of Good Reasons
in British Propaganda in the U.S., 1939-1941**

by

John T. Hetherington

An Abstract

**of a thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of Master of Science
in the Roy H. Park School of Communications at
Ithaca College**

May 2001

Thesis Advisors: Dr. Sandra Herndon

and

Dr. David Shapiro

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Abstract

This study examines the persuasive nature of British propaganda in the United States between the years of 1939 and 1941. Radio scripts, serialized publications and pamphlets produced for distribution during this period are examined for the use of Burke's (1969) concept of identification and their ability to meet to the standards of Fisher's (1989) logic of good reasons. The study concludes that British propaganda made extensive use of identification and meets the standards of the logic of good reasons. The study also identifies three phases of British propaganda in which slightly different persuasive approaches are used.

**The People's War: Identification and the Logic of Good Reasons
in British Propaganda in the U.S., 1939 –1941**

**A Thesis Presented to the Faculty
of the Roy H. Park School of Communications
Ithaca College**

**In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
Master of Science**

**by
John T. Hetherington**

May 2001

Ithaca College
The Roy H. park School of Communications
Ithaca, New York

CERTIFICATE OF APPROVAL

MASTER OF SCIENCE THESIS

This is to certify that the Thesis of
John T. Hetherington

submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree of Master of Science at the Roy H. Park School of
Communications at Ithaca College has been approved.

Thesis Advisor: _____

Thesis Advisor: ~~_____~~ _____

Candidate: _____

Chair, Graduate
Program in
Communications: _____

Dean of Graduate
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Chapter I: Purpose and Background

Purpose

This study will examine Great Britain's efforts to gain American sympathy, support, and assistance in its war effort through the use of propaganda. This analysis will be carried out by applying Burke's concept of identification and Fisher's logic of good reasons to materials produced by Great Britain for distribution in America between the years of 1939 and 1941.

Background

Introduction. Shortly after the United States entered the Second World War, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill gave an international radio address in which he referred to the United States' entry into the war. Churchill proclaimed, "this is a moment we have dreamed of, aimed at and worked for" (Cull, 1995, p. 3). Churchill's words alarmed the British Embassy in Washington, D.C., that feared the use of the words "worked for" would give Americans the "idea that a simple innocent people had been caught asleep by others cleverer than themselves" (p. 3).

Churchill's statement was perfectly truthful. In the years leading up to U.S. entry into the war, Britain had worked tirelessly to gain U.S. sympathy, support, and assistance. Central to these efforts would be an ongoing and evolving propaganda campaign that would make use of film, literature, radio and news to project a "people's war." The people's war emphasized themes of democracy, freedom, class equality, Christianity, individual and collective bravery and determination (Brewer, 1997; Calder, 1991; Cull, 1993, 1995, 1997; Taylor, 1990).

British propaganda would not only play a pivotal role in drawing America into the Second World War (Brewer, 1997; Cull, 1995), but it would also be pivotal influencing Anglo-

American relations following the war (Brewer, 1997). Yet despite the significance of its role, British propaganda would receive little serious attention from historians.

As early as 1937, with hostilities in Europe escalating and the threat of war growing, Great Britain realized it would not survive a prolonged war effort without American assistance (Brewer, 1997; Cull, 1993, 1995, 1997). However, several factors would prevent Britain from making a direct appeal to the United States for assistance. British propagandists would face an America firmly entrenched in an isolationist mindset that was reinforced by strict new Neutrality Acts. Additionally, American indifference or even negativity toward Britain, along with the legacy of Britain's propaganda tactics during the First World War would further complicate and impede efforts on Britain's behalf to build "a special relationship" (Brewer, p. 5, 1997). These factors would influence and at times govern British propaganda in the U.S. between 1939 and 1941.

British Propaganda in W.W.I. British propagandists of the Second World War were forced to deal with the legacy of their own efforts in the U.S. during the First World War. Between the years of 1914 and 1917, Britain engaged in an extensive and organized propaganda campaign designed to draw America into the war (Saunders & Taylor, 1982). The British propaganda campaign of World War I proved to be highly successful; this success, however, was achieved primarily through deception.

Recognizing that the U.S. would dislike any attempt to manipulate public opinion, the British campaign took great care to ensure that propaganda never appeared to emanate from any official British source. This covert effort was aided by the fact that, early in the war, Britain had "cut the direct subterranean cables linking Germany with the United States" (Taylor, 1990, p.

163) allowing Britain almost complete control of European news entering the United States (Brewer, 1997; Cull, 1995; Saunders & Taylor, 1982; Taylor, 1990).

Throughout WWI, the British depicted the war as a battle between civilization and barbarism (Brewer, 1997; Cull, 1995; Peterson, 1939; Squires, 1935; Saunders & Taylor, 1982; Taylor, 1981, 1990). News centered upon the sensational and featured “images of bloated Prussian ogres” and “bestly Huns violating women, mutilating children, desecrating and looting churches” (Taylor, 1990, p. 166). *The Report on the Committee of Alleged German Atrocities in Belgium*, otherwise known as *The Bryce Report*, went so far as to proclaim that German activities represented “murder, lust and pillage on a scale unparalleled in any war between civilized nations in the last three centuries” (Brewer, 1997, p. 14).

Atrocity stories, normally at least partially fabricated, proved to be a powerful tool in Britain's quest to capture the American conscience (Cull, 1995; Taylor, 1980, 1990). One such example came in early 1917 when the British press began reporting tales of a “Corpse-Conversion Factory” (Taylor, 1990, p. 166) in which the Germans melted human corpses to produce soap. Despite the fact that the British Foreign Office knew the story to be untrue, they still promoted it as facts (Taylor, 1990).

Germany's very real propaganda blunders and violations of international law also served to reinforce the image of barbarism set forth by Britain. The sinking of the passenger liner, *Lusitania* in 1915, resulting in the deaths of thousands of innocent passengers, provided Britain with some credibility in their portrayal of German savageness. The image was reinforced a year later when a gold medallion commemorating the sinking of the *Lusitania* was created. Pictures of the medallion quickly made their way from Germany to newspapers throughout Britain and the United States (Taylor, 1990).

While it would be impossible to ascertain the precise extent that British propaganda played in drawing the United States into the First World War, it did play a compelling role in stirring the American conscience (Taylor, 1990). Following the war, revelations that atrocity stories had been fabricated left many Americans feeling manipulated (Brewer, 1997; Cull, 1995; Taylor, 1990). Brewer (1997) contends that the British propaganda of the First World War affected the U.S. perception of the war and did not manipulate American behavior. However, the overriding belief of Americans that they had indeed been manipulated (Cull, 1995) was enough to create “a legacy of suspicion” (Brewer, 1997, p. 22) and helped to foster a sense of Anglophobia (Cull, 1995). Perhaps most importantly, the feeling of having been duped into participating in the war helped to justify the subsequent move to isolationism in the United States (Cull, 1995).

The Neutrality Acts and Isolationism. In 1935 America enacted a set of Neutrality Acts that would, in 1936, be amended to prevent all trade with belligerent powers (Brewer, 1997; Cull, 1995; Reynolds, 1983). These acts remained in place until November 1939 when, as the “first reward for British prudence” (Cull, 1995, p. 61), they were revised. The revised Neutrality Acts allowed belligerent powers to place orders for war materials but required that they “make full cash payment and take title before the goods left America” (Kennedy, 1999, p. 434). The “cash and carry” stipulation was indicative of the continued strength of isolationists in the House of Representatives and a sign that the revision of the Acts was still far from interventionism (Cull, 1995; Kennedy, 1999).

Britain was bound to the cash and carry stipulation of the Neutrality Acts until September 2, 1940 when President Franklin Roosevelt signed an executive order authorizing the destroyers-for-bases deal (Kennedy, 1999). This deal, presented as a means of increasing US security,

provided for the transfer of 50 naval destroyers in exchange for the deeds to British naval bases in Newfoundland, Bermuda, and the West Indies (Kennedy, 1999).

Britain's final step short of U.S. entry in the war in overcoming the neutrality laws came in the form of the lend-lease bill. Lend-lease permitted the "transfer of munitions and supplies for which Congress had appropriated money to the government of any country whose defense the President deems vital to the defense of the United States" (Goodwin, 1994, p. 210). The bill did not pass until after much of Britain's remaining U.S. investments had been publicly sold or liquidated (Kennedy, 1999). Like the destroyers-for-bases agreement, lend-lease was not without isolationist constraints. One clause of the bill stipulated that nothing contained in the Act should be seen as "authorization of convoying vessels of naval vessels of the United States" (Kennedy, 1999, p. 474).

The pervasive isolationist mindset of the United States was just as, if not more, serious an obstacle to Britain's efforts in the US as the legalities of the Neutrality Acts. In a 1937 memo, Britain's U.S. Ambassador Sir Robert Lindsay stated, "isolationism has pervaded every thought and taken complete possession of every American mind in every field" (Hachey, 1971-72, p.72). "This dynamic impulse to remain aloof from European politics" (Cull, 1995, p. 6) would remain a constant barrier to Britain's success in the United States. Any action perceived as an attempt to reverse isolationism threatened to further entrench it; however, given the urgency of their situation Britain could ill afford not to act.

Britain faced not only a prevailing isolationist mentality, but an extremely active isolationist movement as well. In the years preceding American entry into the Second World War, isolationist organizations were formed on local and national levels. Among the many isolationist organizations in the U.S. were the Keep America Out of War Congress, The Yanks

are Not Coming Committee, and the Women's League of Peace, Freedom and Fellowship (Reynolds, 1982). By far the largest and most prominent of the isolationist groups was America First, founded in September 1940 (Cole, 1983). The America First Committee gained support from a number of prominent Americans including aviation hero Charles Lindbergh, along with dozens of United States Senators and Congressman (Lavine, 1940; Reynolds, 1983).

Although the tone and methods of isolationists often differed, isolationist arguments typically centered on several points. First, isolationists claimed that America was safe from the events in Europe and had no reason or responsibility to become involved in the war (Brumback, 1941; Cole, 1953, 1974; Howe, 1937; Sargent, 1941; Stenehjem, 1976). Isolationists also pointed to the fact that U.S. involvement in the war could result in the deaths of Americans and pose a threat to American interests (Brumback, 1941; Page, 1939). Similarly, isolationists cautioned that U.S. democracy would be threatened by U.S. participation in the war (Cole, 1953, 1974). Isolationists also argued that support or involvement in the war was a contradiction of American Christian values (Brumback, 1941; Page, 1939; Sargent, 1941).

Other isolationist arguments were directed more specifically at Great Britain. Father Charles Coughlin, a popular radio evangelist, regularly targeted Britain in his broadcasts and weekly publication. For example, Coughlin regularly ran an advertisement in his newsletter that contended that Americans, not the British, had won Britain's last war. The advertisement claimed this fact was evident by the number of American soldiers who were been killed or wounded in the First World War (Lavine, 1940). Coughlin's claim was common of the isolationist rhetoric that suggested Britain was a weak classist society that was unable to defend itself and that it "did not have the slightest conception of democracy" (p. 119).

The Franklin Delano Roosevelt Administration. Countering the isolationist claims were American interventionists. Brewer (1997) argues that “the most important figure on the internationalist-interventionist side was President Roosevelt” (p. 339). The British Foreign Office and Ministry of Information (MOI) were aware that, while American Neutrality Acts and isolationism greatly restricted him, US President Franklin Roosevelt was sympathetic to the British war effort (Brewer, 1997; Cull, 1993, 1995, 1997; Goodwin, 1994; Kennedy, 1999). As early as 1938 Roosevelt had ensured Prime Minister Chamberlain that, in the event of hostilities, Britain would have full US support (Kennedy, 1999).

In the summer of 1939, Roosevelt was “eager to boost British stock” (Cull, 1995, p. 23) and helped to deliver them their first propaganda success. Roosevelt extended an invitation to King George VI and Queen Elizabeth to visit the New York World's Fair. The President further suggested the royal couple should “enjoy three or four days of very simple country life” (Cull, 1997, p. 335) at Roosevelt's home in Hyde Park, New York. The royal visit to Hyde Park, complete with a picnic of hot dogs and beer, helped to “put a human face” (p. 335) on the King. The visit ultimately found *The New York Times* proclaiming George VI “the people's King” (Cull, 1995, p. 28).

Roosevelt's efforts on behalf of the British continued throughout the early years of the Second World War. Despite the restrictions placed upon him by both public opinion and law, Roosevelt pushed for a revision of the Neutrality Acts in favor of Great Britain (Cole, 1983). The President also signed an Executive Order approving the destroyers-for-bases deal, despite the fact that such action could have led to impeachment (Kennedy, 1999).

The support of Roosevelt and his administration actually served to place further constraints on British propagandists. Recognizing Roosevelt's potential for securing U.S.

assistance, the Foreign office cautioned propagandists not to do anything that might disrupt Roosevelt's bid for reelection" (Cull, 1995, p. 65) as the President sought an unprecedented third term as president.

Phases of British Propaganda

This combination of factors prevented Britain from making an overt effort to win the sympathy, support, and assistance of their U.S. audience. The British propaganda campaign in the U.S., as depicted in Cull's (1995) *Selling War: The British Propaganda Campaign Against American Neutrality in World War II*, suggests that the campaign went through several phases. With each phase, both the tone and desired goal of the propaganda changed. For the purposes of this study, British propaganda will be considered in relation to three phases that are briefly described below.

Phase I: Introducing Great Britain (March 1939 to May 1940). At this stage, Britain was particularly mindful of its past propaganda mistakes and American isolationism. Fearing backlash from an overt or aggressive campaign, Britain relied upon a policy of "no propaganda" (Brewer, 1997; Cull, 1993, 1995). The "no propaganda" rule was first implemented in 1924 when the Foreign Office ordered that British policy in the United States was "to tell the truth" (Cull, 1995, p. 10). " 'No propaganda' would in itself be a propaganda gambit" (N.J. Cull, personal communication, November 13, 2000). Although Britain would enact a "strategy of truth" (Brewer, 1997, p. 4) it would be "entirely wrong to think of it as no propaganda, but rather as a self denying ordinance" (N.J. Cull, personal communication, November 13, 2000). This strategy of truth at least in part, helped Britain to live down the legacy of The First World War.

In the months leading to Britain's September 3, 1939, declaration of War on Germany, Britain began to take steps to cultivate a "special relationship" (Brewer, 1997, p. 5) with the

United States. The first of these steps came in the form of *Britain To-Day*, a twice-monthly publication produced by the British Council and distributed by the British Library of New York (BLINY). The second came in the form of the British Pavilion at the World's Fair in New York and the accompanying royal visit that June.

For the most part, however, Britain chose to rely upon news broadcasts, particularly those of Edward R. Murrow, to convey the events of the war to the American public (Brewer, 1997). Britain had hoped that the power of the events would make a compelling case for them (Cull, 1995). However, the relative calm that followed the declaration of war, a period known as "the phony war" (Goodwin, 1994, p.14), would help foster the idea that Britain was dormant (Brewer, 1997). That impression aside, Britain's "prudence" (Cull, 1995, p. 61) was rewarded with the revision of the Neutrality Acts.

Phase II: Britain Takes It and Carries On (May 1940 to December 1940). In May 1940 Germany invaded Holland, Luxembourg, Belgium, and France, putting an end to the "phony war." Although Britain faced several more months of inactivity before the Battle of Britain, a series of air battles between Germany and Britain began in August 1940. The Battle of Britain resulted in Germany's first significant loss of the war (Goodwin, 1994; Kennedy, 1999).

As the events of the war progressed, so too did British propaganda in the U.S. Britain began to stress themes of democracy, freedom, class equality, individual and collective bravery, heroism, and determination (Brewer, 1997; Calder, 1991; Cull, 1993, 1995, 1997; Taylor, 1990). These themes become unified to produce "The People's War," a concept designed to contradict some of the negative attitudes held by Americans towards Britain through narratives stressing the role of individuals in the war effort.

The projection of the People's War was aided by the introduction of the BBC's North American Service. In addition to news and music programming the BBC North American Service began airing *Britain Speaks* in May 1940. *Britain Speaks*, written and delivered by playwright J.B. Priestley, was homage to the elements central to the people's war.

Additionally, the Ministry of Information (MoI) Film Division, Crown Films, began producing and distributing documentaries and feature length films on both sides of the Atlantic. The MoI efforts first materialized in American theaters with Humphrey Jennings' *The First Days*, a film designed to present the people's war and appeal to "the democratically minded American audience" (Cull, 1995, p. 47).

On September 2, 1940, President Roosevelt signed an executive order providing Britain 50 much-needed destroyers in exchange for the deeds to naval bases in Newfoundland and Bermuda and the West Indies (Kennedy, 1999).

On September 7, 1940, the much anticipated Blitzkrieg began. For 59 nights German bombers attacked London "without mercy" (Cull, 1995, p. 97). The Blitz captured American sympathy at new levels (Calder, 1991; Cull, 1995, 1997). America found something to hate in Hitler and something to love in Britain (Cull, 1995). Moreover, the Blitz provided Britain the opportunity to demonstrate its strength and courage to Americans and demonstrate that they were a good investment for those who might have thought them a lost cause.

The horror of the Blitz was relayed to Americans by the broadcasts of Edward R. Murrow and other American correspondents along with Priestley's weekly talks on *Britain Speaks*. The BBC North American Service increased both its programming and its audience in the United States by introducing a broad range of programming including *Children Calling Home*, *Answering You*, and *When Stones Cry* (Briggs, 1979). Meanwhile, the Crown Film Unit

continued exporting films and documentaries to the U.S., most significantly, Jennings' *London Can Take It* that documented the Blitz. This period saw Britain rewarded with the passage of the lend-lease Bill allowing them the most significant U.S. aid to that point in the War (Cull, 1995; Kennedy, 1999).

Phase III: The Assumed Alliance (January to December 1941). Britain began its final and most overt campaign for American assistance. Britain now openly requested and urged American aid, though hopes for U.S. entry in the War remained unspoken (Cull, 1995). As 1941 progressed, Britain saw the payoff to its efforts in an America that seemed ready to embrace war. Popular culture, from comic books and cartoons to best selling novels, reflected the shift to interventionism. Comic book heroes began battling Nazi villains while accounts of the War from Britain topped the U.S. best sellers list (Cull, 1995). The BBC introduced *Frontline Family*, their first serial, to American audiences via the North American Service. The program, depicting the lives of "people like ourselves but... facing the most terrible calamity that can befall the human race" (Colley & Colley, 1941) would become a bona fide hit in the United States (Cull, 1993, 1995).

In December 1941 the United States entered the war following the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor. Given the fact that the United States did not enter the war until after the Japanese attack and Germany's declaration of war, some might dismiss the significance of Britain's propaganda efforts in the United States. However, as Cull (1995) points out, the Japanese attack and German declaration of war were not made against "a sleeping giant, but a nation politically and industrially – if not quite militarily – prepared for war" (p. 201). Moreover, it was a nation that had seen the war through the eyes of the British and based many of its decisions on those images.

Summary

Between the years of 1939 and 1941 Great Britain sought to erode the pervasive isolationist mindset of the United States in order to gain America's sympathy, support, and assistance in its war effort. In order to achieve these goals, Britain would rely on a propaganda campaign centered on The People's War. This campaign would make use of film, radio, and printed materials to bring about a gradual change in American opinion toward both Britain and the war.

Despite the important role British propaganda in the United States played in the Second World War and Anglo-American relations, it has been the subject of a relatively limited amount of literature. These studies, along with an overview of general propaganda studies, will be examined in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 will provide the rationale and an explanation of the method of this study. Chapter 4 will apply Burke's notion of identification. The fact, consistency and transcendent issue dimensions of Fisher's logic of good reasons will be discussed in Chapter 5 with the remaining dimensions, consistency and consequences examined in Chapter 6. Finally, Chapter 7 will consider the results of this study.

Chapter II: Literature Review

Perspectives on Propaganda

Hummel and Huntress (1949) state that “ ‘Propaganda’ is a word of evil connotation” (p. 1). While this statement does not offer a definition or provide an understanding of propaganda, it does provide a clear indication of the negative views associated with propaganda. This view is confirmed by Drescher (1987) who notes that propaganda has come to be seen as what Cranston categorizes as a “‘boo’ rather than ‘hurrah’ word” (p. 88).

The two in–depth studies of British propaganda in the United States have defined propaganda in rather general terms. Cull (1995) and Brewer (1997) define propaganda simply as an organized form of mass persuasion. Brewer adds that her use of the term propaganda serves to differentiate from the neutral “information” and the negative “disinformation.” Cull also adds that Britain’s persuasive efforts in the U.S. should be seen independently of the pejorative connotations associated with propaganda.

Others have attempted to provide more developed definitions of propaganda. O’Donnel and Jowett (1989) suggest that propaganda is a “deliberate attempt to shape perceptions, manipulate cognition, and direct behavior to achieve a response” (p. 53). Doob (1935) defines propaganda as “a systematic attempt by an individual (or individuals) to control the attitudes of groups of individuals through the use of suggestion and, consequently, to control their action” (p. 99). Though not inaccurate, Doob’s definition does address the beneficiary of propaganda. Taylor (1992) points to the most recent NATO definition of propaganda which notes that propaganda is “Any information, ideas, doctrines or special appeals disseminated to influence the opinion, emotion, attitudes or behavior of a specified group to benefit the sponsors”

O'Donnel and Jowett (1989) examine the distinctions among, and uses of, the three types of propaganda commonly referred to as black, gray, and white by numerous propaganda studies. Considerable attention is given to both black and gray propaganda. Black propaganda can best be defined as being deceptive and credited to a false source. Gray propaganda may or may not be credited to its true source and typically combines elements of the truth with deception (O'Donnel & Jowett, 1989). Indeed, the majority of studies concerned with propaganda during wartime have focused on these forms of propaganda and their ability to erode enemy moral and create confusion and unrest. Such studies include Taylor's "Psychology of Warfare Operations" (1994), "Breaking the German Will to Resist" (1998), and Howe's (1988) *The Black Game*, to name a few.

For the purposes of this study, British propaganda in the United States during the Second World War should be viewed as white propaganda. The source of white propaganda is not concealed and is, for the most part, truthful. White propaganda seeks to present its views and ideologies as the best. The honest approach of white propaganda allows for it to be viewed as credible by its listeners (O'Donnel & Jowett, 1989). I would suggest that, within the context of this study, propaganda should be defined as an organized attempt to shape the perceptions of an audience in order to achieve a change in attitudes and behaviors through the use of truth or elements of the truth in order to benefit the sponsor.

Although the role of white propaganda during wartime has been largely overlooked, several studies are illuminating in understanding the role of this form of propaganda. Qualter (1962) examines the role of propaganda within democracies. He suggests propaganda in democracies is more difficult to direct effectively because it is presented in a highly competitive society and must overcome habits, prejudices, and irrational impulses. Subsequently, the

propagandist in a democracy has a greater challenge than one in a dictatorship who typically has a more compliant audience.

Additionally, both Hummel and Huntress (1949) and Lee and Lee (1979) consider the basic techniques and methods frequently used by propagandists. This includes what Lee and Lee describe as the seven most frequently used "tricks of the trade" (p. 22), including name-calling, glittering generalities, and testimonials. Hummel and Huntress (1949) discuss similar strategies while also examining the nature of the audience in the reception of propaganda.

British Propaganda in the United States

Literature dealing with Britain's use of propaganda in the United States during the Second World War is limited. Both Rhodes (1976) and Taylor (1990) provide overviews of Britain's use of propaganda in the U.S. as well as in Germany and on the home front. Both describe the projection of the People's War through the use of radio, film, and print materials and assert their belief that these efforts helped to influence American foreign policy in Britain's favor.

Cull's (1995) study, *Selling War: The British Campaign Against American Neutrality*, provides the only attempt at a comprehensive chronicle of Britain's efforts during the period prior to the U.S. entry into the war. Cull suggests that British propaganda in the U.S. went through several stages with both the tone of the propaganda and the nature of their requests changing with each phase.

Cull (1995) also establishes democracy, freedom and Christianity as well as individual and collective strength, bravery and equality, as the central themes of the People's War. He suggests that these themes allowed for a change in American attitudes and influenced foreign policy that helped lead to U.S. participation in the Second World War.

Brewer's (1997) *To Win the Peace* examines British propaganda throughout the Second World War. While Brewer's focus is on the use of propaganda to promote Anglo-American relations after the War, she does confirm Cull's (1995) assertion of the themes and importance of the People's War. Brewer also cites the importance of Britain's "strategy of truth" (1997, p. 34) in establishing its credibility in the United States allowing for their claims to be accepted.

Several studies have examined specific facets of Britain's efforts in the United States. Cull (1993) chronicles the development of British broadcasts in America, emphasizing several points as having been essential to the success of Britain's broadcasts in the U.S. Cull claims that the extensive cooperation offered to American correspondents, including Edward R. Murrow and Eric Sevareid by the BBC North American Liaison Unit, allowed the war experience to be opened to American listeners. Cull also describes the Americanization of British broadcasts through the use of Canadian broadcasters and American euphemisms.

Graves (1941) and Spence (1982) agree with Cull's suggestion that Britain attempted to Americanize its broadcasts to the U.S. Examining broadcasts of the period, including J.B. Priestley's *Britain Speaks*, Graves describes Britain's efforts as the "propaganda of optimism" (1941, p. 40) that focused upon themes of "Christianity, civilization, freedom, honor" and "democracy" (p.42).

Calder (1991) examines Britain's efforts to present the Blitz to the United States. Again, the use of American broadcasters and American euphemisms, such as the "London Can Take It" slogan, are emphasized. Calder claims that the projection of the Blitz was "a propaganda construct adopted because of its appeal to American opinion" (p. 212), and suggests that coverage of the Blitz increased sympathy for Great Britain and support for Winston Churchill, ultimately making America more receptive to Britain's appeals.

The propaganda value of the British pavilion at the 1939 and 1940 World's Fairs and the accompanying royal visit have been the subject of two studies. Both Cull (1997) and Rhodes (1981) discuss the symbolism of the King and Queen picnicking with the Roosevelts and the Hall of Democracy at the British pavilion as successful attempts to humanize the royal couple and Britain itself. Both suggest that these efforts did produce real but ultimately limited results with the American people.

Several studies provide limited insight into the foundations of Britain's efforts in the United States. Larson (1941) and Wilcox (1983) describe the creation of the Ministry of Information (MOI), which oversaw British propaganda in the United States and in neutral and allied nations, as well as home front propaganda. These studies provide confirmation of Britain's need to proceed cautiously in the U.S. but serve more as studies of organizational culture than of propaganda.

Hachey (1971-72) offers Sir Robert Lindsay's observations on U.S. opinion and suggestions for a British approach. Lindsay, the British Ambassador to the U.S., stresses that Britain needed to proceed with caution or face a serious backlash from American isolationists. Lindsay warned that any attempts to win American support must bear their "famous inferiority complex... and touchiness" (p.122) in mind. Lindsay also attempted to identify those regions of the US that would be most receptive to the British cause, adding, "I don't believe that the Middle West is capable of absorbing information about European politics" (p.126).

Studies of British Films as Propaganda

A number of studies have examined various aspects of the role of British films during the Second World War. Aldgate and Richards (1994), Coutlass (1989) and Rattigan (2001) have examined the ability of British films and documentaries to promote the concept of the People's

War in both the U.S. and Britain. Attention is also given to the ability of British films to dramatize the strength of the people and illustrate the threat posed to America by the Axis powers.

Other studies focused on individual themes of the People's War as depicted in British film. For example, Coutlass (1988) described the strength of the British people and their willingness to sacrifice as shown in British films. Coutlass emphasized the ability of film to present audiences with both the reality and brutality of war in a manner that radio and print media could not rival.

Stead (1988) emphasized the use of the English people in films and documentaries in an effort to capture British life during the war on film. Stead (1988) paid particular attention to the work of director Humphrey Jennings and his depiction of Britons of all classes joined together in the war effort. Elsewhere, Richards (1988) examined Britain's attempts to present an accurate depiction its national character.

Short (1988) considered the use of British films between 1939 and 1941 to promote and Anglo-American alliance, contending that the "question of whether Great Britain was a democracy" (p. 121) was the most pressing for British films to answer during this period. According to Short, British films were able to portray Britain as a democracy despite the trappings of the monarchy.

Summary

A limited number of studies have examined the role of British propaganda in the United States during the Second World War. While some attention has been given to the content and role of films as propaganda during this period, little attention has been given to the content of

radio broadcasts and printed materials. This study will attempt to fill that gap through the method described in the following chapter.

Chapter III: Rationale and Method

Rationale

This study is proposed to fill a gap in the literature on Great Britain's use of propaganda in the United States between 1939 and 1941. This goal will be accomplished by applying Burke's concept of identification and Fisher's logic of good reasons to British propaganda materials, including radio scripts, newsletters, articles, and pamphlets. Previous studies of British propaganda in the U.S. have not only failed to offer a substantive discussion of content, but have also neglected any application of these theories to these discussions.

Additionally, there appears to be no attempt to apply either the concepts of identification or the logic of good reasons to propaganda. Consequently, this study will provide a new approach to the understanding of propaganda as well a new application for these theories.

There are several reasons that I have elected to use the combination of identification and the logic of good reasons. First, as Brewer (1997) noted, Britain needed to cultivate a "special relationship" (p. 5) with the United States. The need for such a relationship meant that Britain needed to identify with its audience; the importance of which has already been suggested by those studies (Calder, 1991; Cull, 1993, 1995; Graves, 1941) that have reported Britain's efforts to Americanize its radio broadcasts. While little elaboration of the Americanization of British broadcasts has been provided, Cull (1993, 1995) notes that the BBC began making extensive use of Canadian broadcasters and British announcers who did not have the Oxfordian accents thought to be repellent to U.S. listeners. Additionally, the BBC shifted from its standard thirty-minute program format to the fifteen-minute format that Americans were accustomed to.

Identifying Britain with the United States, however, would not be enough to bring the assistance Britain desired. Because the United States was firmly entrenched in isolationism during this period (Brewer, 1997; Cole, 1953; Cull, 1995; Hachey, 1971-72; Kennedy, 1999; Taylor, 1990), it would take more than a recognition of likeness with Great Britain to bring about actions that could succeed in drawing the United States into war. Britain would need to reinforce its efforts with facts, that is, values that were relevant to its audience and consistent with the beliefs of that audience.

Method

This thesis will examine existing available materials, including radio scripts, pamphlets, and other publications, for the presence of those themes deemed primary to the presentation of The People's War: democracy, strength and courage, Christianity, equality and civilization. Materials will then be examined for the presence of identification and the role of the five dimensions of the logic of good reasons, as described below. Each chapter of analysis will be divided into the three phases of British propaganda described in chapter 1 to allow for the progression of British propaganda to be documented and considered.

Identification

This analysis will begin with the application of Burke's concept of identification. Burke (1969) describes identification as the process that takes place when B is identified with A and they become substantially one. In being identified with A, B is substantially one "with a person other than himself" (1969, p. 21). Burke suggests that identification is driven by our need to connect with others in an effort to overcome separateness. It is because of this genuine need to connect that identification can be a powerful tool for persuasion (Cheney, 1983; Quigley, 2000).

Burke (1969) offers three sources of identification: idealistic, materialistic, and formalistic. Identification through the idealistic is motivated by ideals, values, and beliefs, while materialistic identification revolves around properties. Burke's third source of identification, formalistic, is motivated by devices including the ethymeme and antithesis (Burke, 1969; Veitch, 1972). However, many of those who have interpreted Burke (Cheney, 1983; Olson, 1980; Perez, 2000; Quigley, 2000 Thompson & Thompson, 2000) suggest that these devices are less a source of identification than a means for accomplishing it.

Further interpretation of Burke's work has revealed several strategies commonly employed to accomplish identification. Cheney (1983) suggests three strategies: the common ground strategy in which the speaker associates him or herself with the audience. Identification through dissociation, or antithesis, that allows for the creation of a common enemy; and the use of the transcendent "we" "both a subtle and powerful strategy because it goes unnoticed" (Cheney, 1983, p. 154). Additionally, Quigley (2000) proposes identification through representation.

Others have added to the study of identification, including Marlan (1967) who suggests that consubstantiality is the result and desired goal of identification. Miller (1965) proposes that ethical relativism determines an individual's attitudes and predisposition and dictates the degree to which identification can occur. This notion is shared by Miller and Neilsen (1972) who conclude that the degree of identification is not limitless.

Criteria for evaluating identification. After materials have been examined for the presence of the previously identified themes, attention will be given to the use of identification. First, I will seek to determine the presence of identifications within individual scripts pamphlets, articles, and books. Once these attempts have been located, several questions will be posed.

First, is the source of the identification idealistic or materialistic? What is the strategy employed to make the identification? Finally, I will seek to determine the role identification plays in each individual piece. Consideration will also be given to the ways in which the use of identification changes from one phase of propaganda to another, if at all.

The Logic of Good Reasons. Fisher's (1989) *Human Communication as Narration: Toward a Philosophy of Reason, Action and Values* provides what the author calls the logic of good reason. The concept of a logic of good reasons is part of Fisher's narrative paradigm that contends that "humans are storytellers" (p. 64) who rely on a logic of good reasons as a mode of decision making. These good reasons, Fisher contends, provide a warrant for action.

Fisher's (1989) logic of good reasons consists of five elements or dimensions. First, fact: What are the values, both implicit and explicit, contained within the message? Second, relevance: Are the values presented appropriate for the decision being sought? Have relevant facts been omitted or distorted? Third, consequences: What effects are likely to result if the audience acts on the advice of the message? Fourth, consistency: Are the values presented consistent with the personal experiences and values of the audience? Fifth, transcendent values: Fisher refers to transcendent values as those of "ultimate value... generally taken for granted by the arguer, but when brought to the surface they reveal one's most fundamental commitments" (p.109).

The logic of good reasons has been applied to a number of topics including Smith (1989) studied the 1984 Democratic and Republican platforms. Bush and Bush (1994) applied the narrative paradigm to television advertising. Rowland (1989) applies the narrative paradigm to three works of non-fiction and suggested that the ambiguities of Fisher's narrative paradigm difficulty to apply universally.

Evaluation of the Logic of Good Reason

Facts, the Transcendent Issue, and Consistency. Articles, scripts, and other texts will be examined for the presence of the previously identified primary themes. The implicit and explicit values of these materials will then be identified. It should be noted that that the primary themes may prove indicative of the values offered. However, I will attempt to determine what, if any differences manifest between the primary themes and implicit and explicit values. I will also examine materials to determine if different values, or combinations of values, are presented from one phase of propaganda to another.

After having examined the values presented in the materials, attention will be given to transcendent value dimension. In addition to identifying the transcendent issue, or issues, their presentation and role throughout the phases of British propaganda will be examined.

Following the study of the values and transcendent issues, the issue of consistency will be addressed. In determining the consistency of the values presented by Britain with that of its audience, the findings of the previous chapters involving identification, values, and the transcendent issues will be recalled.

Evaluation of Consequences and Relevance. Attention will then turn to the dimensions of consequence and relevance. Here the British "story" will be contrasted with that of the isolationists. Given that the consequences of U.S. assistance to Britain or involvement in the war were of considerable importance to the isolationist case, the issues of consequence and relevance will be dealt with conjointly.

In examining the dimension of consequences, several questions will be posed. First, what did British propaganda suggest would be the consequences if America failed to provide support and assistance to the war effort? What did British propaganda suggest would be the

consequences if America did provide support and assistance? What other consequences might an audience have inferred from these messages? Do these additional consequences support or contradict the British position? Again, I will examine any changes in both consistency and possible consequences throughout the phases and mediums of British propaganda.

Materials will also be examined for their relevance to the isolationist argument against U.S. aid and support. Again, the issue of relevance will be considered in each of the three phases of British propaganda by posing several questions. Which point, or points, of the isolationist argument have been addressed? How have these issues been addressed? Did Britain avoid or distort any of the issues raised by isolationists?

Materials

Cull (1995) suggests that “after the war, Britain seems to have tried to destroy evidence of its war propaganda in the United States” (p. 4) in an effort to avoid the embarrassment that followed their efforts in World War One. With that in mind, I have attempted to gather examples of any existing available materials with the exceptions of films. Films have been excluded from this study because they were the topic of numerous studies as was indicated in the Chapter 2. The study of British propaganda in the United States will benefit more from the examination of previously ignored materials.

The materials to be reviewed in this study will include: articles taken from *Britain Today*, produced by the British Council; scripts from J.B. Priestley's *Britain Speaks* and Edward R. Murrow's broadcasts from London; selections from *Bulletins from Britain*, produced by the British Library of Information in New York (BLINY); as well as miscellaneous pamphlets, scripts and audio recordings produced by Britain for American consumption between 1939 and 1941. These materials have been gathered from the British Library in London, England; the

BBC Written Archives Centre in Reading, England; The Franklin Delano Roosevelt Library in Hyde Park, NY; the Radio Archives of the University of Memphis, Tennessee; and various private collectors.

Britain To-Day. I have examined one article from each issue of the first three volumes of *Britain To-Day*, published by the British Council between March 17, 1939, and December 19, 1941. This publication's self stated-purpose was to "bring the friends, and, for that matter, the critics of Great Britain into closer touch with the happenings in our country" (Foreword, 1939, p. 1).

It should be noted that, due to copyright restrictions imposed by the British Library, only one article from each issue of *Britain To-Day* could be photocopied for analysis. In selecting articles from *Britain To-Day*, pieces were chosen that appeared to represent the major themes of the People's War without being atypical of the issue's content as a whole.

Britain Speaks. Also included in the analysis will be scripts from J.B. Priestley's *Britain Speaks*. The program was broadcast weekly via the BBC North American Service beginning in May 1940. Scripts from the period of May 30 to September 24, 1940, are contained with the 1940 publication *Britain Speaks*. In addition to the *Britain Speaks* scripts, this collection also includes scripts of Priestley's domestic *Postscript* broadcasts. Because *Postscript* was available to U.S. audience's via the BBC North American service and were published in the U.S. along with *Britain Speaks* scripts, they are eligible for inclusion.

Additional scripts, from October 1, 1940, to December 28, 1941, have been acquired from the BBC Written Archives Centre (WAC) in Reading, England. Two scripts from each month between October 1, 1940, and December 15, 1941, half of the scripts produced during this period, were provided by Susan Knowles of the BBC WAC at my request. Given the

consistency of the content and use of themes in Priestley's work this seems to be an adequate representation of program.

Britain Speaks could most easily be described as a celebration of the heroism of the average Briton at war, epitomizing the "People's War" concept (Brewer, 1997; Calder, 1991; Cull, 1993). Moreover, Priestley represented a conscious decision on the part of the BBC to move away from the dry content and "Oxford" accents thought to be repellent to a U.S. audience as well to the appearance of editorial freedom (Brewer, 1997; Briggs, 1979; Cull, 1993).

Edward R. Murrow scripts. Transcripts of 134 of Murrow's broadcasts from London, as collected in *This is London* and *In Search of the Light*, beginning with August 19, 1939, will be included for analysis. Although not employed by the British government or the BBC, Edward Murrow, as director of CBS European services, is widely regarded as having been one of the more potent propaganda tools employed by Great Britain (Briggs, 1997; Calder, 1991; Cull, 1993, 1995). Murrow's contribution to the British cause was not accidental, but rather his support was carefully courted by BBC officials who took efforts to provide him and other American journalists with access to sites and information denied the British press. The reality of Murrow's role in British propaganda may be illustrated by his participation in an "unofficial" conference held by members of the Ministry of Information regarding possible methods of cultivating favorable U.S. opinion (Cull, 1993).

Bulletins from Britain. The 1941 issues of *Bulletins from Britain*, produced and distributed by the British Library of Information in New York (BLINY), will also be included. The Franklin D. Roosevelt Library has made fifteen of the twenty-one issues produced during this period available in their entirety. This publication was distributed to those parties who identified themselves as interested in the British cause as well as those visiting or making inquiries at

BLINY. The newsletter “intended to give an intimate knowledge of the Empire’s war effort... and its impact on the war on the daily lives of its people” (*Bulletins from Britain*, 1941, p. 1).

Miscellaneous pamphlets. In addition to *Bulletins from Britain*, BLINY produced a number of pamphlets also distributed upon request and mailed to identified interested parties and opinion makers (McKenzie, 1942). The following have been gathered for consideration: *British Farmers at War*; *Jack Jones, British Miner-Novelist-Playwright Addresses a Gathering at the U.M.W.A. at Pittsburgh, PA, September 18, 1941*; *Wales in War-Time*; *My America, Labour's Achievements and the Goal*; and *Peace Aims: Official British Statements*. The Ministry of Information also produced several texts that will be included within this work: *The British System of Government*, *The Battle of Britain*, and *The British Farmer at War*.

Additional scripts and broadcasts. In addition to these sources, some discussion may be made, largely for the purpose of providing context, of the programs *Front-line Family* and *Answering You*. The National Sound Archives of the British Library contains three episodes of *Front-line Family* and two of *Answering You*, materials that cannot be duplicated. Additionally, two *Front-line Family* scripts have survived at the BBC Written Archives Centre. Although it would be impossible to determine, based on such a limited sampling, whether the available materials are indicative of the series as a whole, they are, nonetheless worth discussing for the ability to lend context to the tone of British propaganda in 1941.

Selection of Materials

Given the large number of individual scripts and articles represented by these materials, it would be impossible for all of them to be represented in the analysis. Consequently, I have selected a limited number of articles, scripts and pamphlets for analysis using the following process. First, all materials were examined for the presence of the major themes of the People’s

War. The absence of such themes resulted in the exclusion of two pamphlets: *Labour's Achievement and the Goal*, and *Peace Aims: Official British Statements*, which appear to have been created to provide background information for journalists, rather than address the general public. The remainder of the materials were then examined first for identification and then for the standards of the logic of good reasons applied to them. This process revealed tremendous consistency within the materials. Since every article, script, and pamphlet could not be included in the analysis, I have selected items that illustrate the use of identification and the dimensions of the logic of good reasons throughout that particular source. These illustrative examples provide insight into the role these theories play in each phase of each source.

Chapter IV: Identification

Identification and Consubstantiality

Burke (1969) contends that humans are driven by a need to overcome their separateness created by being biological beings and members of different classes. As such we attempt to identify with others through communication. Burke explains that while two colleagues are not identical, "Insofar as their interests are joined, A is identified with B" (p. 20). Burke also offers that A "may identify himself with B even when their interests are not joined" (p. 20) if he assumes or is persuaded their interests are joined.

The result of this overlapping, or joining, of interests is what Burke (1969) refers to as consubstantiality. Once consubstantiality has occurred, the two parties are joined, becoming "substantially one" (Burke, 1969, p. 21) with someone other than themselves. However, despite being joined through their shared substance, the parties still remain unique individuals. This can be likened to a child who, despite being consubstantial with its parents, remains a unique entity. Identification, then, is not an identity, but rather a commonality (Perez, 2000).

The fact that identification is made possible precisely because of a human need to overcome our separateness through communication (Burke, 1969) enables it to be used as an effective tool of persuasion (Cheney, 1983; Quigley, 2000). However, success in creating identification with its audience is limited in that identification can only be accomplished "insofar as you can talk his language" (Burke, 1969, p. 55). This language is not limited to spoken words and can include "gestures, tonality, image, attitude and idea" (p. 55). Miller (1965) also notes that an individual's attitudes and beliefs determine the degree to which identification can occur. Simply stated, "the more violent your opposition, the weaker your surrender" (Burke, 1969, p. 55).

Sources of Identification

From Burke's writings, three sources of identification have been distinguished: idealistic, materialistic, and formalistic (Littlejohn, 1999; Perez, 2000; Quigley, 2000). Idealistic identifications can be seen as those relating to attitudes, beliefs, or ideas (Quigley).

Identification through property or materialistic identification can pertain to any form of economic property the appeal of that common or coveted (Burke, 1969). For example, in an analysis of identification in relation to Diana, Princess of Wales, Quigley (2000) suggests that material identification took place between the Princess and her female audience. These individuals identified with Diana's clothing and belongings not because they themselves possessed them, but because they reflected what they would have liked to possess.

Burke's notion of formalistic identification is somewhat less clear. Burke (1969) offers a number of formal devices ranging from antithesis to the ethymeme, as means of accomplishing formal identification. This form of identification can help in "awakening an attitude of collaborative expectancy" (Burke, 1969, p. 55). However, many of those who have expanded on Burke's work (Cheney, 1983; Olson, 1980; Perez, 2000; Quigley, 2000; Thompson & Thompson, 2000) have interpreted these devices as a means of accomplishing identification. For example, antithesis might be used within an idealistic identification.

Identification Strategies

Understanding the sources, or motives, of identification is useful, but it does not permit a full understanding of the process. In order to gain such an understanding, it is also necessary to examine the strategies employed to accomplish identification. Several identification strategies can be inferred from Burke's works. Cheney (1983) points to three such strategies that are

prominent in the identification process: the common ground strategy, identification through the assumed or transcendent “we,” and identification through dissociation or antithesis. Quigley (2000) adds to this list identification through representation.

The common ground strategy, best described as identification through association, is the most overt form of identification. Here the speaker links him or herself with the audience through a shared interests or attitudes (Cheney, 1983). Burke provides the example of “the politician, who, addressing an audience of farmers says, ‘I was a farm boy myself.’” However, this strategy may also be applied in a much more implicit fashion.

The transcendent “we” is “both a subtle and powerful strategy because it goes unnoticed” (Cheney, 1983, p. 154). Burke (1972) illustrates the point: “My prime example is the word ‘we’ as when the statement that ‘we’ are at war includes under the same head the soldiers who are getting killed and the spectators who are making a killing in war stocks” (p. 28). The assumed “we,” along with its surrogate forms, can convey a commonality between the message sender and the audience.

Identification through dissociation, or antithesis, allows the speaker to unite with the audience against a common enemy (Burke, 1969) by highlighting the ways in which they are unlike that enemy. In other words, by dissociating with a party, new associations can be made. For example, Britain frequently highlights the ways in which Germany or Nazism differs from them and, in turn, from America.

Quigley (2000) offers the strategy of identification through representation. In this instance the audience identifies with an individual or party that are doing things that the audience would like to do, but are unable to. Quigley again offers Diana, Princess of Wales, as someone many identified with because she was able to stand for issues or visit places on their behalf in a

way that they would be unable to. While not as prominent as the previously mentioned strategies, identification through representation was used with some effect by Great Britain in the efforts to identify with American audiences.

Identification and British Propaganda

At the start of their war effort Great Britain faced numerous and considerable obstacles in gaining American assistance. In addition to the presence of Neutrality Acts and a pervasive isolationist mindset, U.S. public opinion was divided on the matter of aid to Britain and Britain in general (Brewer, 1997; Cull, 1993, 1995, 1997; Taylor, 1990). In its effort to gain American assistance Britain needed to present their case in such a way that it would be relevant to its U.S. audience. Subsequently, Britain endeavored to establish that it was “substantially one” (Burke, 1969, p. 20) with the United States. In doing so the British cause would, eventually, become the American cause.

The decision to present the war as “a people’s war” was one designed specifically to appeal to a U.S. audience (Cull, 1995) through themes they could identify with including democracy, freedom, Christianity, and courage (Brewer, 1997; Cull, 1993, 1995; Graves, 1941; Taylor, 1990). The use of identification, combined with a presentation of good reasons, to be discussed in later chapters, would prove a persuasive tool in Britain’s efforts to secure U.S. support.

It is important to understand that British propaganda was an ongoing and evolving process. Its success or lack thereof, could not be attributed to any one broadcast, pamphlet, or publication. Burke (1969) explains that “often we must think of rhetoric not in terms of one particular address, but as a general body of identifications that owe their convincingness much

more to trivial repetition and dull daily reinforcements” (p.26). It is this method, one of daily reinforcements and repetition, that Britain employs as it attempts to identify with its audience.

Method of Analysis

This chapter will explore the use of identification in British propaganda in the United States within the themes deemed central to the depiction of the People's War by numerous studies (Brewer, 1997; Cull, 1993, 1995, 1997; Taylor, 1990): democracy, strength and courage; Christianity, civilization, and class equality. In analyzing materials these themes have been given a liberal interpretation to allow a full exploration of each theme and its application. Materials classified under the category of democracy may make explicit references to democracy, or may present associated concepts such as freedom and liberty. Strength and courage includes military, national, and personal strength as well as heroism and sacrifice. The theme of Christianity may include not only overt references to the Christian faith, but also references to faith and religious symbols. The theme of civilization may include references to education, the arts and humanities, and other similar concepts. Class and equality will involve any concepts related to social or economic disparity. As these themes have been derived from overviews of British propaganda in the U.S. (Brewer, 1997; Cull, 1993, 1995, 1997; Graves, 1941; Taylor, 1990), it is possible, if not likely, that every theme will not be represented in each phase or by all of the materials being considered.

Materials will then be examined for the presence of identifications and the following questions will be asked: (1) What is the “source” of identification? Is it idealistic or materialistic? A review of the materials has shown no evidence of formalistic identifications. In some instances, formal devices are applied with materialistic and idealistic identifications, but in

these instances they serve only as devices. (2) What strategy is being employed? (3) In what context is the identification made?

Phase I: Introducing Britain (March 1939 to April 1940)

Britain's initial propaganda efforts in the United States focus upon the shared ideals of democracy, freedom, and liberty. British propaganda, in the form of the *British Council's Britain To-Day* stressed Britain's dedication to democratic ideals in an effort to identify with Americans. Meanwhile, the broadcasts of Edward R. Murrow provided Americans with the opportunity to see a country on the verge of and at war. However, emphasis on news and information as propaganda was hindered by the fact that "there isn't much news" (Murrow, 1941, p.36).

Democracy

Britain To-Day. The first article of *Britain To-Day's* premier issue derives its source of identification from the ideal of democracy. The opening paragraph of "Democracy in a Changing World" (1939) establishes an association with America through its proud "boast" (p.1) of a tradition of democracy. This tradition has provided Britain with "ordered change" and "free enterprise."

The author invoked the United States Constitution and the advantages of "liberty" and "the rights of free speech, the freedom of the press, the freedom of public meeting and association" ("Democracy in a Changing World", 1939, p. 3). Having assumed the very foundation upon which American democracy was built as Britain's own, the article went on to imply that it was the responsibility of those who have benefitted from the tenets of democracy to defend them from any who might threaten them.

The article used democracy both to associate itself with the U.S and dissociate both from the non-democratic Germany. "A Test of Nerves" (1939) linked Britain again to the freedom of speech doctrine as it reminded the reader that Britain is a land of "free expression" (p. 2). In this democratic land, "truth and confidence" (p.3) are paramount.

In addition to identifying with the U.S. through democratic principles, Britain contrasted itself against the tactics of Germany and German propaganda. As tensions in Europe escalated, the German propaganda machine had begun stressing its supposed strength and Britain's alleged weaknesses (Taylor, 1990). According to this article, these tactics were out of place in a democratic society and, more importantly, they could not be believed.

As Britain continued to dissociate itself from Germany, it also took the opportunity to place a spin on its own past and present propaganda efforts. As the article expressed its contempt for the grotesque "exaggerations" ("A Test of Nerves", 1939, p. 2) of Germany's propaganda, it offered its own overstatement, claiming that Britain itself had been "slow to realize" the power of propaganda and would be "loathsome [*sic*] to use it" (p. 2). The statement, when applied in conjunction with the association with America and dissociation from Germany, attempted to begin the process of vanquishing the legacy of Britain's World War I propaganda (Brewer, 1997; Cull, 1995) and help promote Britain's current claims of "no propaganda."

A similar approach was taken shortly after Britain's declaration of war on Germany. In a November 12, 1939 article, "The Right to Grumble," Britain again called upon the ideal of democracy to identify with its U.S. audience. The article, which opened with the words "In a democratic nation like ours" first seeks to squelch stories of British discontent with the fledgling war movement and the "inconveniences" (p. 1) that accompanied it.

After it associated with readers through democracy, the article proceeded to invoke the principle of freedom of speech. Dissociating from Germany to further identify with the U.S., this article suggests the lack of free speech and expression in totalitarianism regimes. The “average Englishman” (“The Right to Grumble,” 1939, p.1) might grumble, but that is because they are permitted to. In addition to identifying through its association with democracy and freedom of speech, and dissociating with Germany ideology, this article addresses the charge of “confusion and disorder” (p. 2) in a manner with which many Americans would likely be familiar. Aside from the lofty ideological notion of free speech, the scenario of complaining about governmental policies is likely to be one most readers would be familiar with.

Strength and Courage

Britain To-Day. In the early stages of the war strength and courage were typically conveyed by the depiction of a British people ready and willing to defend their nation. In this phase of British propaganda, the theme of strength and courage was promoted through the identification but was not the source of the identification. For example, “Democracy in a Changing World” (1939) established its common ground with the U.S. through the ideals of democracy and then proceeded to offer that these ideals provide the citizens of democratic nations with the “courage, loyalty and will” (p. 3) to defend the principles they treasure.

British propagandists had recognized women as an untapped resource in the battle for public opinion (Cull, 1995). The role of women was frequently emphasized as a means of identifying with American housewives through representation. Though its strategy is far less direct than other materials discussed to this point, “British Women in War-Time” (1940) attempted to appeal to the women of America by presenting the pivotal role British women would have in securing the strength and security of her country.

Quigley (2000) explained that audiences can identify with a representation of what they or what they would like to be. In this instance the depiction of the “young women” of Britain making a valuable contribution to their nation’s war effort could have appealed to young American women. This was particularly true in a period when America’s First Lady, Eleanor Roosevelt, was demonstrating the extent of feminine strength and ability (Goodwin, 1994).

Edward R. Murrow. Britain’s reliance on Murrow to convey their situation to American audiences was, in itself, a form of identification through association. Britain carefully cultivated its relationship with Murrow and other U.S. correspondents and it would pay off – in time (Cull, 1993, 1995). However, at the start of the war Murrow viewed Britain’s attempts at appeasement with “disgust” (Persico, 1988, p. 142). Murrow also regarded Britain as an “unimportant museum piece” (Cull, 1995, p. 15) with little chance of winning the war.

Murrow gradually became convinced of the strength and resolution of the British people and his transformation is noticeable within transcripts of his broadcasts from London. The fact that the people, and events that surrounded him (Cull, 1993, 1995) changed Murrow’s opinion made him an even more effective witness. Perhaps most important, Murrow was already trusted by his audience (Cull, 1993; Graves, 1941; McKenzie, 1942; Persico, 1988). Unlike Britain, his credibility had never been impugned.

Murrow’s broadcast of August 31, 1939, employed the ideal of family as its source of identification. On that day the announcement was made that children, as well as the disabled, would be evacuated from a number of English cities including London, Liverpool and Manchester. Murrow asked his listeners to “imagine” (1941, p. 6) that they are a member of a family hearing such an announcement. He described children carrying gas masks. The story used what Burke (1969) referred to as “commonplaces” (p. 58), those things or notions that we

are all familiar with, to make its identification. Any listener, whether a parent or not, can understand the concept of familial love and the horror of separation. The identification was made more powerful as the image of the gas mask helps to dissociate England from Germany – which implicitly became the enemy of family.

In another broadcast, the source of identification is materialistic. On October 15, 1939, Murrow described the sites of London in the weeks immediately following the declaration of war. Shops that once carried men's suits now had window displays of soldiers' uniforms. Throughout the city houses were abandoned or are for sale. Automobile showrooms have closed down and fashionable women's attire replaced with one-piece suits with zippers and hoods that can be worn to the bomb shelters. Murrow's description of these scenes was neither sentimental nor dramatic. Instead, he merely recounted the scene and allowed the listener to make his or her own determinations.

Christianity

Britain To-Day. Just as it had done with democracy, *Britain To-Day* provides an overt association with its audience using the ideal of Christianity. Even while at war Christmas in Britain remains a "family festival and season of good fellowship" ("The English Christmas, 1939, p. 1). The association with the U.S. was followed by dissociation with Germany as the article presented Britain as a "Christian country" (p. 2) that had faith they would prevail over Germany's "advance of paganism" that threatens them.

Phase II: Britain Takes It and Carries On (May to December 1940)

The end of the "phony war" provided Britain with the opportunity to begin demonstrating its strength and resolve to American audiences. The Battle of Britain saw England deliver

Germany its first significant defeat in air battle (Hart, 1971). Shortly thereafter, London withstood the unprecedented bombing during the Blitz (Cull, 1995) and lived to tell about it.

The introduction of the BBC North American Service in May 1940 would provided U.S. listeners with greater access to Britain through an array of entertainment and news programs (Cull, 1993). Included in these broadcasts was *Britain Speaks*, hosted by Yorkshire playwright J.B. Priestley. Priestley's broadcasts presented a "dynamic picture of a united Britain engaged in a People's War" (Cull, 1995, p. 81).

Throughout this period, Britain continued to use identification relating to theme of democracy. However, the depiction of strength and the ability to carry on despite the odds became increasingly important.

Democracy

Britain To-Day. As the "phony war" came to a close, Britain prepared for a much-anticipated German blitzkrieg. England began taking steps to "baffle the possible parachute soldier" ("War and Rural Britain," 1940, p.1). Throughout the country landmarks were covered and road signs were taken down. Elsewhere, it is reported that two million acres of grassland had been sowed for food production. This Herculean task was done "in the democratic way of doing things" (p. 2). Once Britain's efforts were identified with democracy we are reminded that democracy carries a price: responsibility.

Britain Speaks. Priestley was much less subtle in his invocations of democratic themes to identify with his audience. In a May 1940 broadcast Priestley addressed the issue of Americans who had chosen to leave England since the outbreak of the war: "Americans leaving England at this critical time are deserting their own cause – Freedom and Liberty. The American Frontier is

the English Channel” (Priestley, 1940, pp. 3-4). The passage may also be construed as a condemnation of those Americans who were prepared to abandon or ignore the British cause.

Priestly (1940) followed this overt identification by dissociating England from the “gigantic, insane gangsterism” of Nazism. This is followed by the declaration that there are “two ways of life: theirs and ours” (p. 4). “Ours” employs a form of the transcendent “we” that served to reinforce the shared substance between British and American ideals while pointing to Germany as the common enemy.

One hundred and sixty-four years after the United States declared independence from Britain, Priestly claimed America's Independence Day as Britain's own. Speaking on July 4, 1940, Priestley first alleged threats of violence toward the families of French troops by Nazis: “Can you imagine Britain or the United States... resorting to foul racketeer methods of this kind?” (p. 81). The common enemy had been established, and Priestley went on to wed the very foundations of the United States to the British cause: “Today is Independence Day. It is a good day to realize all over again that we mean what we say just as Americans meant what they said nearly one hundred and seventy years ago. Our aim is the independence of Europe – and indeed the whole world...” (p. 81).

The System of British Government. This 1940 pamphlet took a textbook approach to explain the British government to American readers. As in the past the democratic system and principles of Britain were stressed. The British can select their government, speak and assemble freely and are immune from arbitrary prosecution. Strictly speaking, the pamphlet meets the criteria for identification in that it sets forth shared values and provides the reader with the ability to recognize this shared substance. However, when compared with other examples it is weaker for two reasons. First, the formal tone and scholarly approach are not particularly inviting.

More importantly, Robson's pamphlet presents facts without a story or narrative that the reader might find compelling.

My America. Another of the BLINY pamphlets distributed during this period came in the form of a chapter of Lord Tweedsmuir, otherwise known as John Buchan's (1940) *Pilgrim's Way*. The chapter reflected Buchan's impressions of America including religion and democracy. Buchan explicitly linked the nations through the shared values of democracy. However, Buchan followed this by saying of American democracy, "This she owes to her history... the British tradition" (p. 15). The reader who has accepted the identification based on shared democratic principles may then proceed to accept the claim that American owes its democracy to Britain. Assuming the readers have made this connection, they may also conclude that they have a responsibility to Britain.

Strength and Courage

Britain To-Day. With the Battle of Britain imminent, *Britain To-Day* sought to accomplish its identification with American readers by dissociating themselves from the "intimidation, deception, intrigue and treason" ("The Will to Victory," 1940, p.1). This treachery is contrasted with the "unflinching morale of the British people" (p. 2)

A similar approach was used during the Blitz. "The Battle of London" offered the courage of Londoners whose homes and businesses are being destroyed against the "weak" (1940, p.1) enemy that attacks civilian targets. Though the piece used homes and property to provide a materialistic source for the identification, it failed to establish Germany as a common enemy to Britain and the United States.

Edward R. Murrow. Following the fall of France on June 17, 1940, Britain "stood alone" (Murrow, 1941, p.127) in the fight against Hitler. In describing Britain's situation, Murrow

refereed to a speech given by Churchill two weeks prior saying: "they might have to fight alone, that there would be fighting on the beaches, the landing grounds, in hills and the streets. That prophecy is near to being fulfilled" (p. 129).

Having identified with Murrow by association, the audience received a warning from him via *The Daily Herald* (Murrow, 1941). The Labour Party papers cautioned that Americans "should not be lulled until almost too late by... the splendid slogans of isolationism" (p.131). The words were not Murrow's own, but by choosing to use them he effectively made them his own.

Murrow (1941) provided another example of the materialistic source of identification, this time in the form of the destruction of property. With the Battle of Britain now raging he documented the damage done to civilian areas. Murrow objectively explained that the German targets were likely military in nature, but also described the damage inflicted to working class districts. A bomb left one house nothing more than "just dust and rubble" (p.144). Another hit a home and took the bathroom off it. Still another hit a fence along side a church, smashing the stain-glassed windows.

The scene used "commonplaces" (Burke, 1969, p. 56), in the form of properties, that any member of the audience can identify with and places them in a situation most could not identify with. After the identification is made Murrow described the people involved as "calm and courageous" (1940, p. 145). We learn that Sunday services were held on schedule at the bombed church just hours after it was struck. Others involved were relaxing outdoors reading the Sunday newspapers shortly after the all clear. The courage of the people was established, and the normalcy of their routines again served as a means for identification.

In examining Murrow's broadcasts from London during the Blitz, it is important to recall Quigley's (2000) concept of identification through representation. Here the audience identified by experiencing a situation vicariously through an agent. In many ways Murrow's role during the Blitz was dangerous, perhaps even adventurous to some. He frequently delivered his broadcasts from the roof of the broadcasting house (Persico, 1988). Just as in previous instances, Murrow's broadcasts emphasized the resolve of the British people in the midst of extraordinary situations.

Murrow's September 10, 1940, broadcast told his listeners that Germany expected Londoners to rise up against their government after a few more nights of bombing. However, Murrow believed that they were more likely to "rise up and murder a few German pilots" (1940, p. 163). He also added that those who have "called this a 'people's war' were right... I've seen some terrible sights in this city during these days and nights, but not once have I heard man, woman or child suggest Britain should throw in her hand" (p.163).

For Murrow (1941) a "routine night" (p. 171) was one in which intermittent bombing took place beginning at nine in the evening and lasted for at least eight hours. According to Murrow the worst part was the silence between the bombs and air raid sirens because it offered a chance to "imagine things" (p.171).

On September 18, 1940, Murrow informed his listeners that the greatest problem in reporting the situation in London was not one of courage or danger. According to Murrow, the most difficult part of reporting the Blitz was one of language. "There are no words to describe the thing that is happening" (p. 76).

Murrow's broadcasts allowed American listeners to live through the Blitz. They were hearing it from "one of their own" in a way that no British reporter could have conveyed simply

because of their Britishness. Additionally, Murrow's perceived heroism made his message all the more appealing and provided the listener with a greater incentive for wanting to identify with him.

Christianity

Britain To-Day. The use of the theme of Christianity by *Britain To-Day* during this phase of the war is exemplified in "The Will to Victory" (1940). First the reader was told explicitly that as a "Christian nation" (p. 1) Britain had the will to overcome "the savagery of blind, indiscriminate bombardment" (p. 1). Having linked itself to its Christianity and, in turn, Christian readers, the piece concluded by noting that the war will not be decided by quantitative factors, but by Britain's great "spiritual asset" (p. 3) and the moral "rightness" (p. 3) of their cause.

Britain Speaks. Priestley's June 16, 1940, broadcast is indicative of his use of Christian themes, or religion, to identify with his listeners. Priestley began by noting that the British are a religious people with "profound faith in the order of the universe" (p. 54). He then explicitly identified Britain with God: "... it is not so much that God is on our side, but that we are on God's side" (p. 54). The implicit message was that anyone on the side of Germany – or in fact anyone not on Britain's side – was not on the side of God.

Priestley's (1940) other frequently used approach applied the less direct strategy of dissociation. For example, he explained that Germany's actions demonstrate "how men can behave when they lost all hope of the Kingdom of Heaven" (p.70). However, while Nazism has been born from "utter despair" (p.72) producing an "evil doctrine" of hate, Britain was "communing with our souls, strengthening our faith" (p. 73).

Priestley described the bomb-induced fires that burned behind St. Paul's Cathedral. He again juxtaposed the "unreason and savagery" of Nazism against the enduring symbol of reason and Christian ethics" (1940, p. 229) of St. Paul's Cathedral against a sea of bomb-inflicted flames. The symbolism of a Nazi-inflicted hellish backdrop against the symbol of British religion further dissociated Britain from their pagan enemy.

My America. Buchan (1940) linked "the United States and the British Empire" (1940, p. 7) through the tenets of Christianity. Buchan suggested that these beliefs have fostered a genuine interest in "the human race" (p.7) that cause neighbors to rally around each other in times of distress" (p.7). If readers had accepted Buchan's identification, they could have concluded that not rallying around their neighbors would be to abandon their Christian values.

Civilization

Britain Speaks. The use of civilization as a means of identification was typically done in a manner that dissociates Britain from Germany. While it is possible to see a statement like "in a civilized nation like ours" as a means to associate with America, it is too ambiguous to form a strong identification. However, by expressing values, beliefs, and traits that are common with the two civilized nations, the shared substance can be effectively designated (Burke, 1969).

In his June 16, 1940, broadcast Priestley targeted students at American universities where pacifist and isolationist movements were becoming increasingly popular (Reynolds, 1983). The broadcast began with praise for the ideal of "America's magnificently democratic educational system" (1940, p. 49). Beyond Priestley's description of education in America as "democratic," this passage introduced the concept of flattery. "Flattery can serve as your paradigm when you see conditions of identification behind it" (Burke, 1969, p. 55). So in this instance we see

identification through the shared ideals of democracy and education combined with Priestley's flattery.

With the identification made, Priestley dissociated from the Nazis who have "destroyed the educational system and indeed all real cultural life" (1940, p.49) in Germany and the nations it has occupied. In Paris, we are told, "learning, culture and wit are in the grip of men" (p. 50) who are devoid of these qualities. Subsequently, it may be inferred that anyone using an American university to encourage pacifism or isolationist sentiment was on the side of the Germany – the very country that would destroy the "magnificently democratic educational system" (p. 49).

Class and Equality

Britain Speaks. It has been noted that Britain had been criticized for class disparity. It was claimed that England was a land of the ruling class (Brewer, 1997; Cull, 1995). Priestley's approach in addressing the issue to dissociate the "ordinary man" from the ruling the ruling class. "The real English people, not a small ruling class are now taking charge" (1940, p.31). Priestley's approach of separating the "people" from the ruling class might have provided listeners with the opportunity to feel for the British people regardless of their opinion of the British government. However, Priestley did not provide any real basis for identification. The repeated use of phrases such as "the ordinary man" or "the man on the street" reinforced the concepts of the people's war, but shows no genuine presence of shared substance (Burke, 1969).

The British System of Government. The issue of equality was handled with a somewhat more obvious use of the common ground strategy in this pamphlet. The matter of class and economic equality came only after the virtues of democracy have been fully expressed. Having associated the two countries by the ideals of a democratic system and a democratic spirit, Robson

(1940) acknowledged that Britain's progress in areas of social and economic equality has been unsatisfactory.

The admission was likely intended to add to British credibility. A deficit in their democracy has been admitted and steps would be taken to address that. However, it is also possible that the reader saw this only as a deficit in British democracy.

Phase III: The Assumed Alliance (January to December 1941)

In January 1941 President Roosevelt pledged publicly for the first time his "full support" (Cull, 1995, p. 126) to the Allied cause. The announcement, followed by the passage of the lend-lease bill, brought a "new dawn in Anglo-American relations" (p. 126). The transition in public opinion was reflected in polls showing that 61 percent of Americans supported lend-lease when Congress approved it in March, compared with 50 percent when it was proposed in January.

This new dawn in Anglo-American relations was duly reflected in Britain's propaganda efforts. Propaganda now focused on friendship and alliance. Even though the United States contribution to the Allies remained material and financial until December 1941, the presumption of an alliance was used to further that very alliance. The repeated refrains of "Britain and America" recall Burke's (1969) demonstration of the transcendent "we" used to include soldier that are being killed along with those on the sidelines profiting from the war.

The union fostered by democracy was stressed significantly less in this phase. Instead, strength and courage was emphasized, but in a different manner than was seen in the previous phase. Now strength and courage was demonstrated through simpler acts such as coping with rationing. This change in direction indicated a Britain that is once hoping not to scare away American support while also preparing them for war.

Democracy

Britain To-Day. "The New Year" began with *Britain To-Day* celebrating its ally, the United States. Even though the U.S. was still a "non-belligerent" ("The New Year," 1941, p.1) it still stood behind Britain in the preservation of democracy. Together the two would preserve "freedom, justice and humanity" (p.2). The repeated pairing of "Britain and the United States" established a link between the two countries through a form of the transcendent we, stressing a team mentality. This link was reinforced by the continued references to those ideals shared by both nations.

"Britain and America" (1941) engaged in the same strategy, beginning with its very title. Again, the repeated pairing of the "Britain and American" served to reinforce the notion of unity. The identification was furthered through the article's use of President Roosevelt's words claiming that Britain is "the spearhead of resistance to world conquest" that are used to imply "the British cause is their cause" (p.1). Unlike Britain, Germany could not count on such goodwill. Instead, Germany had to rely upon fear and intimidation to gain material and financial support.

Bulletins from Britain. A similar strategy was seen throughout issues of *Bulletins from Britain*. For example, in "Hitler's Peace Aims" (1941) Germany was established as the common enemy of democracy as it sought to "render the democratic world impotent" (p. 6). Following the identification, the article reminded its readers that "only the faint hearted" (p.6) will succumb to the "propaganda of German peace offers" (p. 6). Again, in the "Britain Acquires a New Set of Values" (Webster, 1941), Britain and the U.S. was associated as "peace loving democracies" (p.1) engaged in a "struggle that is recognized by all as life or death" (p.1). It was telling that now the struggle was recognized by "all" as life or death. Despite the fact that U.S. isolationism

had not been eradicated, Britain either downplayed or overlooked it in an attempt to create a bandwagon mentality.

Strength and Courage

Britain Speaks. Priestley's February 9, 1941, broadcast began with a warning that German propaganda was "attempting to create distrust and suspicion and a lack of trust between us." Britain and the U.S. were identified through the assumed we (Cheney, 1963) and were confronted with the tactics of their common enemy. Since Britain has had the courage to stand up against Nazi attacks, Germany was been forced to use what Priestley described as the "bogey bogey machine" to scare America they way it had – unsuccessfully – tried to scare Britain.

Priestley used humor to further diminish Nazi claims of strength as he described reports of "tanks that swim, guns that climb trees, fog attacks, and Lord knows what else" (Priestley, 1941, February 9). In doing so he attempted to give assurance to an America that was on the verge of approving – or disapproving – the lend-lease bill, that German claims of superiority are nothing more than talk (Goodwin, 1994).

The use of the assumed "we" was prominent again in Priestley's July 16, 1941, broadcast describing the "V is for Victory" campaign to his listeners. After describing the use of "V" to show resistance throughout occupied Europe, Priestley discussed the role "we" – the United States and Britain would play in this mighty struggle against Germany. "We have to remember this, that although these people will sure crack and their whole crazy empire will vanish like smoke, we can no more afford to lean back and wait than we could if we were in a house with a wounded tiger" (Priestley, 1941b). Priestley concluded that "we are dealing with outlaws" (Priestley, 1941b).

Bulletins from Britain. *Bulletins from Britain* took two approaches to presenting the resolve of the British people to American readers. The first was through news articles dealing with military maneuvers and campaigns. These pieces will be discussed in later chapters. The second approach was through more light-hearted means. *Bulletins from Britain* appears to confirm Priestley's approach of displaying strength through humor as was evident in one short piece that appeared in the April 2, 1941, edition. "Mother Always Wins" uses a letter from a 12-year-old to prove British victory is inevitable. "Most people think we will win the war because Germany is a Fatherland and England is a Motherland. When mother and father fight, mother always wins" (p. 3). The piece relied upon "commonplaces" (Burke, 1969, p.58) to make its identification. Motherhood, fatherhood, the battles of the sexes, were all things that any reader could identify with on some level. More over, it was typical of the publication's attempts to draw female readers.

Further attempts were used to attract female readers through the columns of Marion Slater. Slater, we are told, was "everyhousewife" (Slater, 1941, p.13). Thus Marion Slater identified with all housewives, British and American. The source of Slater's identifications was materialistic, including food, cosmetics, clothing and other "commonplaces" (Burke, 1969, p. 58) that every housewife could appreciate.

In her November 12, 1941, column she dealt with the problems of grocery shopping – a typical act, under the atypical conditions of rationing. Basic items like macaroni, fruit, cheese and butter were coveted treasures. While Slater admits these are not the "Big Things of the war" (p.13), she could not deny her frustration. The following week, November 19, 1941, Slater's readers were given insight as to how she managed to make a meal with the materials she had been able to purchase. At the end of the column she wistfully mentioned that she was going to

“look at American food advertisements and see if wishful thinking can satisfy our stomachs” (Slater, 1941b, p. 5).

Slater's columns made use of a form of identification through representation. Slater was the self-proclaimed “everyhousewife.” True, most American housewives would not have envied her position, but they might admire her ingenuity. Moreover, the columns, and others like them, attempted to demonstrate that war presented inconveniences, but nothing that couldn't be overcome.

Frontline Family. Only the May 23 and June 5, 1941, recordings and two additional scripts from December 1941 of *Frontline Family* exist. This limited amount of material made it impossible to make any general observations regarding the program. However, the program's introduction, which remained the same throughout the course of these episodes, can provide some insights into this program's ability to identify with its audience.

Like the Marion Slater columns, this serial was designed to appeal to a female audience (Cull, 1993). Everyday listeners were provided the opportunity to live the war vicariously through the Robinson family. According to the introduction, the Robinsons were “people like yourselves, but living very different lives – thinking very different thoughts. To this simple family, War – the most terrible calamity to befall the human race is a close, ever present reality. We bring you this story so that you may share, to some extent, their problems, their heartaches and their joys” (Colley & Colley, 1941).

Notice that the Robinson were a family “just like yourselves” (Colley & Colley, 1941). Though it is ambiguous, the statement allowed the Robinsons to provide a link that encouraged listeners to identify with them throughout their exploits. Just as Marion Slater was “everyhousewife” (Slater, 1941, p. 13), the Robinsons become “everyfamily.”

The British Farmer at War. This BLINY pamphlet detailed the considerable efforts of the British farmer to make England self-sufficient. According to Easterbrook, “The real heroes are the farmers. As in America, the British farmers are strong” (1941, p.1). Though the statement identified American and British farmers in favorable terms, the identification was problematic in two ways. First, the statement was made in a section of the pamphlet entitled “A Tribute to Democracy” (p.1). The title clearly intended to serve as further means of identification, but nothing that follows within the section appeared to relate to democracy in any way. Additionally, the likening of British and American farmers seemed to be used gratuitously and without context.

Christianity

Bulletins from Britain. Christianity played only a minor role during this period in the materials being considered. Only *Bulletins from Britain* incorporated themes related to Christianity, the Church, or faith on a regular basis. Downey’s (1941) “Put an End to This Terrorism!” was indicative of the approach used by the publication.

The ideal of religious freedom was used as the source of identification in Downey’s (1941) piece. Downey, the Archbishop of Liverpool, recounted the sweeping religious oppression that has accompanied Nazism noting that “There can be few men left on five continents who do not tremble for their legitimate liberties,” (p.1). Downey’s observation served to define Germany and its Nazi regime as an enemy to one religious freedom, one of the United States’ more closely held tenets.

Later Downey employed the assumed “we” as he told readers that “As Christians it is not the Nazi or any other blood we should boast. It is the redeeming blood of Christ which we

should glory” (1941, p. 2). Subsequently all Christians are united in the common goal of preserving freedom of religion.

Civilization

Britain Speaks. Priestley's March 24, 1941, broadcast of *Britain Speaks* was his first following Congressional approval of the lend-lease bill. Priestley began by telling listeners how pleased he was that we now “stand solidly” (Priestley, 1941, March 24) with England. The phrase recalled Burke's example of saying, “ ‘we’ are at war “ (1972, p.28) to include both those fighting and those on the sidelines. Based on Priestley's statement, the U.S. had, for all intents and purposes, joined the war.

Priestley used rural England as an example of English civilization. The choice of rural England may reflect efforts of Britain to increase their popularity in rural America (Cull, 1995). The portrait Priestley painted is one of a hard working people, who do their jobs without complaint and for little reward. However, we learn, that these were not a disinterested people, they have many “questions and know how to put them” (Priestley, 1941, March 24). They are the “very foundation stones” (Priestley, 1941. March 24) of English civilization. Priestley used the farmers and laborers of rural England to construct a portrait of civilization that is not built on intellectualism or arts, but decency and hard work. It is a civilization that rural American allies could likely identify with.

Bulletins from Britain. In contrast, “Her Monuments Still Stand” relied upon the materialistic as a source for its identification. The May 14, 1941, article described “barbarism” of German attacks upon London's most renowned symbols including Big Ben, the British Museum, House of Commons and Westminster Abbey. These symbols of Britain's culture and civilization still stood despite Nazi attempts to “drag humanity into slavery again” (p.1). Here

Britain dissociated itself from Germany by contrasting its “enlightenment” and Germany’s “barbarism” (p. 1).

Readers were told that: “all good men of good will must be heart sick” (“Her Monuments Still Stand,” 1941, p.1) at these attacks. This attempt to link with the audience is broad; however, it served as effective reinforcement to the concept that Germany is the common enemy; the destruction they wreak is indiscriminate and not limited to military targets.

Class and Equality

Britain Speaks. Priestley’s January 26, 1941, broadcast was addressed to friends in the United States from whom he had received a belated Christmas gift. The gift was a box of Romeo and Juliet cigars that arrived mostly intact. Priestley had associated himself with friends in New York and applied the “commonplaces” of Christmas, gifts, and cigars.

Following this somewhat weak identification, Priestley described the “social revolution” (Priestley, 1941, January 26) that has come to Britain. As in other instances, the issue of class and economic disparity was not denied. However, the war had changed all that. Priestley described the hostel for evacuated women in children of “different backgrounds and classes” (Priestley, 1941, January 26). Everyone at the hostel ate the same food and helped with the various chores.

Throughout his description, Priestley injected humor as he discussed being the only male at the hostel. He feared that it might suddenly strike the women that “this vast idiocy of war... was due to the pride and stupidity of the male. They could tear me to pieces in two minutes” (p.2). Although most in his American audience could not relate to communal living, Priestley used a humorous scenario that his audience could identify with to present it. Additionally, the

broadcast suggested that war can help to cure social ills, not only on an international level, but a domestic as well.

Summary

This chapter demonstrated the ways in which Great Britain successfully presented messages laden with themes and values with which its American audience could identify with. Through the presentation of these messages, and the repetition of the values and themes within them allowed the two countries to become “substantially one” (Burke, 1969, p. 21). Following the passage of the lend-lease bill 1941, Britain used the transcendent ‘we’ to seize upon America’s offer of aid and perpetuate an Anglo-American alliance.

Britain also used identification as a means to dissociate itself and, in turn, America, from Germany, allowing for the creation of a common enemy and a common threat to the values and beliefs held by Britain and the U.S.

Chapter V: Fact, Consistency, and the Transcendent Value

The Narrative Paradigm

Fisher's (1989) *Human Communication as Narration: Toward a Philosophy of Reason, Value and Action* proposes what the author refers to as the "narrative paradigm." Central to Fisher's theory is the assumption that "humans are storytellers" (p. 5) who perceive life as a series of "narratives, conflicts, characters, beginnings and endings" (p. 24). We must perpetually attempt to evaluate and choose from these stories so that we can "live life in a process of continual re-creation" (p.5).

It is important to understand that Fisher's (1989) definition of a narrative is not limited to conventional "stories" but may incorporate "any kind of discourse" (p. 86) or words and deeds (Rowland, 1989). According to Rowland, Fisher's broad definition would allow anything from Darwin's *Origin of the Human Species* and Einstein's *Relativity: The Special and General Theory* to a presidential address or a popular film to be interpreted by the narrative paradigm.

The narrative paradigm provides an alternative to the rational world paradigm in two important regards. First, unlike the rational world paradigm that contends humans are reasoning animals, the narrative paradigm suggests that "humans are as much valuing animals as they are reasoning" (Fisher, 1989, p. 58). Secondly, whereas the rational world paradigm prescribes argumentation as the paradigmatic mode of decision making, the narrative paradigm contends that decisions are made through the application of a "logic of good reasons" (p.57) that are innately applied to the test the narrative fidelity of a story.

The Logic of Good Reasons. In an effort to choose between an array of often conflicting stories, audiences continually apply a "logic of good reasons" to establish the narrative fidelity of a story. Fisher (1989) sets forth five elements, or dimensions, to his logic of good reasons: First,

fact: What are the values, both implicit and explicit, contained within the message? Second, relevance: Are the values presented appropriate for the decision being sought? Have relevant facts been omitted or distorted? Third, consequences: What effects are likely to result if the audience acted on the advice of the message? Fourth, consistency: Are the values presented consistent with the personal experiences of the audience? Fifth, transcendent values: Fisher refers to transcendent values as those of “ultimate value... generally taken for granted by the arguer, but when brought to the surface they reveal one’s most fundamental commitments” (p.109).

The logic of good reasons is intended to be “less narrowly constructed” (Fisher, 1989, p. 107) than simply “good reasons.” Rather than viewing a good reason as a statement that supports an ought statement, the logic of good reasons views them as “those elements that provide warrants for accepting or adhering to the advice fostered by any form of communication that can be considered rhetorical” (p.107). Additionally, Fisher contends that the test of narrative fidelity through the application of the logic of good reasons is one that does not have to be learned. Rather, the testing of narrative fidelity is an innate process acquired through experience. It is, then, a natural process.

British Propaganda and the Logic of Good Reasons

The application of the logic of good reasons to British propaganda in the United States is both appropriate and useful for several reasons. First, Fisher (1989) suggests that the logic of good reasons is best used in matters of public moral arguments or debates. Such discourse deals with matters of life and death and are publicized and available for wide consumption to “untrained thinkers” (p. 71). This lay audience consists of “active irrepressible

participants”(p.72) who instinctually test the narrative fidelity of these competing stories.

Clearly, British propaganda meets these criteria.

If we assume that “people have a natural tendency to prefer what they perceive to be true and just (Fisher, 1989, p. 71), the process of isolating, weighing, and contrasting the dimensions of the logic of good reasons will provide a means of understanding why American audiences preferred the British story.

Method

This chapter will explore three of the five dimensions of the logic of good reasons: fact, transcendent value, and consistency with the remaining dimensions, consequence and relevance to be dealt with in the following chapter. This approach will allow for the value-driven and logical dimensions of the logic of good reasons to be segregated and examined more fully. As in the previous chapter, materials have been examined for the presence of the primary themes of the people's war: democracy, strength and courage, civilization, Christianity and class equality (Brewer, 1997; Cull, 1993, 1995, 1997; Graves, 1951; Taylor, 1990). Materials were then examined for the presence of both implicit and explicit values. Often, the specified themes also serve as values; however, attention has also been given to the presence of additional values.

Once the presence of values has been identified, attention will be given to the role they play. Values within these materials typically serve one or more of the following purposes. First, they may address criticisms or misconceptions of Britain by American audiences. Values also provide motives or reasons for an implied or stated action. Values are also employed to justify Britain's war efforts or change American perceptions of the war. Finally, as was demonstrated throughout chapter 4, Britain also relies upon the use of values to establish the presence of shared substance with its American audience.

Phase I: Introducing Britain, March 1939 to April 1940

Democracy

Britain To-Day Throughout the first phase of Britain's propaganda in the United States, democracy was often presented as a source of other values, or reasons. This approach can be seen in "Democracy in a Changing World" in which democracy was shown to be responsible for the values of "liberty and... free speech, freedom of the press, freedom of public meeting and association" (1939, p. 3). Similarly, "Britain and the Neutrals" (1939) offered democracy as the source of "independence and freedom" (p. 1). Democracy was also shown to provide "security" ("The Right to Grumble, 1939, p.1)

Once democracy was established as the source of other values, it was presented as a responsibility. "Democracy in a Changing World" (1939) suggested that those who have benefitted from democracy and the liberty and freedoms that accompany it must defend it against those who decry its virtues. In this particular instance it was suggested that this defense can be accomplished by simply remaining faithful to democratic principles, a rather vague notion the article fails to fully elaborate.

However, in both "Britain and the Neutrals" (1939) and "Britain in Europe" (1939) the responsibility of the democratic nation was more clearly defined. Each of these pieces contended that defending democracy required taking an active role in global events. We are told that the British democracy cannot "dissociate herself from Europe" ("Britain in Europe," 1939, p. 2). "Britain and the Neutrals" contended that, while neutral nations have the right to remain neutral, they also had a "responsibility" (p. 2) not to help the totalitarian regime threatening British democracy. This responsibility was reinforced by the fact that Britain is "fighting for all free nations" (1939, p. 1).

Phase I: Introducing Britain, March 1939 to April 1940

Democracy

Britain To-Day Throughout the first phase of Britain's propaganda in the United States, democracy was often presented as a source of other values, or reasons. This approach can be seen in "Democracy in a Changing World" in which democracy was shown to be responsible for the values of "liberty and... free speech, freedom of the press, freedom of public meeting and association" (1939, p. 3). Similarly, "Britain and the Neutrals" (1939) offered democracy as the source of "independence and freedom" (p. 1). Democracy was also shown to provide "security" ("The Right to Grumble, 1939, p.1)

Once democracy was established as the source of other values, it was presented as a responsibility. "Democracy in a Changing World" (1939) suggested that those who have benefitted from democracy and the liberty and freedoms that accompany it must defend it against those who decry its virtues. In this particular instance it was suggested that this defense can be accomplished by simply remaining faithful to democratic principles, a rather vague notion the article fails to fully elaborate.

However, in both "Britain and the Neutrals" (1939) and "Britain in Europe" (1939) the responsibility of the democratic nation was more clearly defined. Each of these pieces contended that defending democracy required taking an active role in global events. We are told that the British democracy cannot "dissociate herself from Europe" ("Britain in Europe," 1939, p. 2). "Britain and the Neutrals" contended that, while neutral nations have the right to remain neutral, they also had a "responsibility" (p. 2) not to help the totalitarian regime threatening British democracy. This responsibility was reinforced by the fact that Britain is "fighting for all free nations" (1939, p. 1).

The reader was shown that democracy fosters other values and that these values carry with them responsibilities. A reader who has accepted these claims was also able to accept that Britain is fighting to defend democracy and that neutrality and isolationism are contrary to the purposes of democracy .

Strength and Courage

Edward R. Murrow. Murrow's broadcasts during this phase of British propaganda typically provided listeners with examples that suggested a British people who are strong, courageous and determined to fight for their country. Examples of these values were typically seen in the form of either military strength or personal strength. Occasionally these approaches were combined as Murrow reports on the valor of individuals in the military.

As the situation in Europe worsened, Murrow reported that Britons "are amazingly calm, they still employ understatement and they are inclined to discuss the prospects of war with oh, a casual 'bad show' or 'if this is peace give me a good war'" (Murrow, 1941, p. 4). Murrow added, "I have heard no one say... 'I hope Mister Chamberlain can find a way out'" (p.4).

By September 3, 1939, Britain declared war on Germany. Murrow (1941) reported that "the crowds... greeted the news with a rousing cheer" (p.18). Even the imminent fall of France was incapable of "creating any panic" but rather created a sense of "urgency" (p.102).

During the "phony war" the opportunities to present Britain's military strength were limited. However, Murrow's considerable access to the military sources and sites (Cull, 1993, 1995) allowed him to provide his listeners with insight into Britain's military efforts. For example, on November 27, 1939, he reported on the "first naval activity of this war" (Murrow, 1941, p. 44). Although the German attack on the British merchant ship *Rawalpindi* ended in the sinking of the British vessel, Murrow's description of the encounter provided at least a glimpse

of British heroism. The Rawalpindi is confronted by not one, but two German vessels of significantly larger size. Despite being outnumbered, the ship continued to fight for nearly an hour until its last gun was shot out. Eventually all of those on board went down with the burning vessel (Murrow, 1941).

The Rawalpindi aside, Britain had enormous faith in its navy. On April 8, 1940 Murrow reported that Britain was prepared for a German attack. Noting that the attack might not be the much talked about Blitzkrieg, he added that the "Sitzkrieg" (1941, p. 79) had come to an end. Rather than upsetting the British people, the threat of attack was greeted with confidence. "No one is particularly worried about this new phase of the war. It's a job for the Navy and the confidence of the British in their Navy is supreme" (p.79).

Within this context the role of strength and courage as values served more to paint Britain and the British people in a positive light than to provide a clear call to action as the value of democracy did. Murrow's audience heard of a people who had the courage to fight for their country, a value that most Americans would likely have shared had they faced a similar threat.

Civilization

Britain To-Day. Civilization was most typically presented by *Britain To-Day* through symbols of other values. For example, "The English Way of Life" (1939) focused on several symbols of British civilization. Each symbol provided the reader with additional values. The reader was introduced to Oxford, the symbol of education, Canterbury, a symbol of religion, and Parliament, the symbol of democratic liberties. Just as democracy had produced a range of equally appealing values, so, too had British civilization. However, it is interesting to note that while democratic liberties are offered as value produced by British civilization, we are later reminded these values were the result of a "democratic civilization" (1939, p.2). Here again we

find an attempt to provided a reason to support Britain. The reader who valued education, religion, or democracy was able to find inherent worth in Britain.

“Arms and the Man” (1939) also presents a democratic civilization that took great pains to preserve peace and will only resorted to force when that civilization and its people were threatened. In this instance, the article began what will be an ongoing effort to address Britain’s attempts at appeasement with Germany under the Chamberlain government. These early efforts to placate Germany and avoid war became a source of continued criticism for Britain throughout the years leading up to the United States’ entrance into the war (Hart, 1970). As we see in the phase of British propaganda, Britain frequently attempted to justify its reluctance to oppose Germany.

Christianity

Britain To-Day. Although the role of Christianity is limited, its presence served as another means to contrast England with Germany and to illustrate other values held by the English people. “The English Christmas” (1939) not only supplied readers with the value of Christianity but also presented it as the source of “family” and “fellowship” (p.1). However, more important was the implicit suggestion that these values were afforded to England because it is a land with religious freedoms that would not be found under a totalitarian regime.

Phase II: Britain Takes It and Carries On (May to December 1940)

Democracy

Britain To-Day. Ashley (1940) offered readers a behind the scenes look at the training and routines of British soldiers. “The British Army from Within” brought together the themes of democracy and strength. The latter will be discussed below. The article marked the first of

many instances in which democracy was overtly offered as a cause worth fighting for. Ashley explained that the painful transition from civilian life was made worthwhile for the young British soldier by the knowledge that he was fighting for both “the corner of Britain that is his home” and the “democratic principle upon which the British Commonwealth is built” (p. 15). Thus we see the British soldier preparing to fight for the values of democracy and home; the only thing apparently left out by Ashley in his attempt to appeal to American readers was apple pie.

The value of democracy was also shown to foster ingenuity and determination as exemplified in Brown's (1940) “War and Rural Britain.” Here we see the “democratic way” enabling defense volunteers to accomplish the “impossible” (p.2). The value of democracy also united a community as “everybody” (p.2) worked for the same goal – the defense of democracy.

Britain Speaks. Priestley's July 11, 1940, broadcast once again offered democracy as the source of other values, including freedom. Priestley juxtaposed the free British society against that of totalitarian Germany. The approach allowed him to refute German propaganda while simultaneously highlighting the freedoms that democratic Britain has produced. Priestley told listeners that Germany was claiming newspapers in England are to be abolished and that criticizing the British government was punishable by deportation. However, listeners were told such “comic fairy tales” (Priestley, 1940, p. 98) were contrary to everything that British democracy stands for.

In addition to providing the people of England with “liberties” (Priestley, 1941, p.126) democracy has also fostered a “sense of community” (p.126). Indeed, it was the very need to preserve the liberties afforded by democracy that brought the people of England together “to destroy the Nazis but also to build up a far nobler Britain than the world has yet seen” (p. 126).

War was not only justified, it was a means of producing positive values including nobility and stronger communities.

Strength and Courage

Britain To-Day. As previously mentioned, "The British Army from Within" (Ashley, 1940) stresses the themes of both democracy and strength. Having established that the British soldier was fighting for both his hometown and the democratic principles of England, the article also documented the sacrifices required of the soldier. Not only did he leave his home for less comfortable settings and less palatable food, he also engaged in strenuous physical training.

The citizens of England were just as willing as its soldiers to sacrifice for their country. This was seen in both "The Will to Victory" (1940) and "The Battle of London" (1940). In both articles, the strength of the British people was attributed to their "morale" ("The Will to Victory," 1940, p. 2) and "determination" ("The Battle of London," 1940, p. 2) which were fostered by the "resources" ("The Will to Victory, 1940, p. 2) of democracy.

Edward R. Murrow. By May 1940, German forces were moving through Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands (Hart, 1970). However, as their European neighbors fell, Murrow (1941) reported that "Britain is pledged to victory, victory at all costs" (p. 98) even though they would likely need to spend the coming months simply avoiding defeat. Murrow also noted that there is "no tendency to underrate the difficulties or create hopes of an early or easy victory" (p.98).

Murrow was frequently given access to the British military as well as scenes of battle that were denied the British press (Cull, 1993, 1995). This was the case on June 2, 1940, when Murrow was given access to members of the Royal Air Force (R.A.F.) who would eventually serve as Britain's first line of defense in the southeast coast (Murrow, 1941). Murrow described

the casual way in which the “boys” (p.122) discussed their last battle against German forces. While he said that they showed “no nerves”(p. 122), the gravity of the situation was clearly reflected as the conversation turned to the loss of British life that day. The piece also illustrates the obstacles the R.A.F. faced against substantially larger German forces. On this day, Murrow reported that six British fighters were confronted with twelve German. Such facts could only help to make the confident British seem all the more courageous and admirable in this David versus Goliath scenario.

Although Murrow's broadcasts reflected the objectivity that had allowed him to be seen as a credible observer, he did occasionally offer his opinions on both the war in general and Britain's efforts. In his July 21, 1940 broadcast, for example, Murrow (1941) offered his assessment of Britain by saying they possess, “ the necessary unity, determination, fervor and, if you will, fanaticism” (p. 135) to persevere in what is destined to be a long fight. Such comments provided an invaluable counter to the claims of some in the U.S. that Britain had neither the will nor the strength to succeed in their battle against Germany (Cull, 1995; Hart, 1970). As mentioned in chapter 4, Murrow allowed the U.S. listener to “experience” the war in Britain in their own living rooms and to hear of Britain's plight from an American voice. His depiction of the values held by Britons might not have provided Americans with a motive for action, but it helped to establish a reason for choosing the British story.

Britain Speaks. Priestley's (1940) heroes were most often “the average man, the man on the street” (p. 26) who dedicated themselves to volunteer work after a full day at their job. Such was the case in Priestley June 14, 1940, broadcast when he took the listener along to a night watch with the local defense volunteers. The men who joined Priestley at the sentry post were farmers and laborers. These men came even though “the odds are likely to be against them”

(1940, p. 27) because they could not face the exasperation of civilian life. They were a people “who are, whatever their faults, psychologically tougher and more resourceful than the Germans” (p.35). Without ever using the word courage, Priestly provided a simple portrait of it.

Similarly, “the ordinary folk of Britain” (Priestley, 1940, p. 169) were “the people who stand out from this dark welter of cowardice, treachery and panic like a Gibraltar” (p.169). The courage of these people, we are told, was “magnificently high” (p. 170). This was illustrated by a maid who announced, “Please, madam – bombs” (p.170) to her employer at the start of an air raid or the mother who had to order her daughter to put down her book and pay attention to the air raid. However exaggerated these examples may be, they managed to present the strength of the British conviction and the calm that accompanies it.

Civilization

Britain Speaks. In the previous phase it was noted that *Britain To-Day* used its depiction of the value of civilization to contend with criticisms lodged at Britain for its efforts to appease Germany under the Chamberlain Government. Priestley (1940) frequently took a similar approach. “It takes an awful lot to rouse the ordinary English folk. They’re apt to be easy, sleepy, good natured crowd, but once they’re roused... they’ll wade in and never stop” (p. 11). Civilization in Britain meant that the “tolerance” of the British “democracy” (p.47) mandated they not rush into war. But this tolerance and good humor (Priestley, 1940) provided the Nazis with “superb opportunities” (p. 67). The evil Germans had taken quick advantage of the genuine goodness that civilization had created.

Priestley not only depicted a civilization that is dominated by decency, but also addressed the slowness of Britain’s response to the Nazi threat. At the same time, he managed to address U.S. isolationists as he spoke of those that are slow to rouse. Priestley employed this technique often. For example, on one occasion Priestley (1940) criticized the way in which some of his

countrymen had slowed the preparations for war because they believed they lived on a “magic island” (p. 5) and that “disasters and tragedies, fire and slaughter, treachery and invasions, are things that only happen over the seas” (p. 11). The statement served as an indirect jab at U.S. isolationists, who clearly share these views,

Class Equality

Britain Speaks. The value of equality was seen most often within Priestley's scripts as one that Britain must still strive to obtain. Priestley (1940) conceded that “the divisions between classes – always England's weakness,” but then explained that the war was changing things and that the divisions are being “rubbed out” (p.127). He predicted that “something grand” will come out of it all and added, “if it doesn't, then we deserve all that we get” (p.127).

The changes that war has brought to the class divisions were elaborated upon by Priestley and other sources in the next phase of British propaganda. However, we can already see the technique that is being employed. First, by acknowledging the problem, Priestley and other propagandists were able to bolster their credibility. Secondly, they demonstrated the value of equality as one they appreciated, and strove to achieve. Finally, by presenting the war as at least a partial answer to inequality they provided a reason for an America that was itself facing the problems of inequality (Goodwin, 1994) with one less reason to fear war.

Phase III: The Assumed Alliance (January to December 1941)

Democracy

Britain To-Day. Democracy continued to be presented as the source of liberty, freedom and independence (Barker, 1941; “Britain and America,” 1941; “The New Year,” 1941).

However, Roosevelt's pledge of U.S. assistance brought several changes. First, democracy was now even “stronger”(“The New Year, 1941, p. 2) thanks to the alliance between the two great

democracies. Although America had pledged only financial and material assistance, they were joined with Britain for the continued “evolution” (Barker, 1941, p. 2) and betterment of democracy.

Just as democracy produced freedom, liberty and independence, we now learn that it was responsible for producing “friendship” (“The New Year,” 1941, p. 1) and “goodwill” (“Britain and America,” 1941, p. 1). The friendship, born of democracy, could supercede “hesitation, distrust, faint-heartedness” (p.1) as its “ideals are converted into action” (p.2). This friendship, based on “a common view of life and shared values” (“Britain and America,” 1941, p. 3) were directed at a common cause as “the British cause is the American cause” (“Britain and America, 1941, p.1).

Strength and Courage

Bulletins from Britain. During the previous phases of British propaganda, strength and courage were frequently illustrated by the willingness of the British people to sacrifice for the war effort. Britons were depicted as suffering great material losses throughout the Battle of Britain and the Blitz, but they responded with courage and confidence. Having shown their American audience the peril of their situation, their approach changes. The sacrifices of the British people are presented in a more light-hearted manner, as was demonstrated by the columns of Marion Slater (1941) discussed in chapter 4. These features allowed sacrifice to be seen more as a nuisance that can be solved through ingenuity. The approach allowed the British people to remain in a sympathetic light with Americans, while not appearing to face such odds so as to render them a lost cause.

Meanwhile, the value of strength was illustrated most frequently in the form of military strength and heroism. One example of this can be found in the “In the Fighting Line” column

that appears regularly in *Bulletins from Britain*. Consisting of a series of short pieces, the column provided readers with news of British victories and German defeats. "Ferrying the Planes" (1941) described the activities of the Air Transport Auxiliary (A.T.A) that is responsible for taking aircraft from the manufacturing plant to the airfield. The individuals in the A.T.A. came from "every walk of life" and piloted crafts through "skies thick with enemy aircraft" and "through every type of weather" (p. 5).

Similarly, "Britain's Night Fighters" (1941) provided readers with updates on the latest in military technology, the "Cat's Eyes," a high-endurance, twin-engine aircraft that that allowed the R.A.F. fighter to become "master of the dark skies of night" (p. 4). The article gloried in the "fire of death that comes spurting without a word's warning" (p.4) at the German enemies.

Not only did these accounts stress present military strength and heroism as enviable battles to its audience; they were placed amid articles emphasized the values of democracy, education, religious freedom, and personal sacrifice. Subsequently, the value of military strength was placed within the context of the values that motivate it.

Christianity

Britain To-Day. Throughout this examination of values in British propaganda, we have seen democracy as a source for other values including freedom, liberty and independence. In Barker's (1941) "The Progress of British Democracy" we are told that religion was the source of democracy. According to Barker, "it was by the way of religion, of religious experience, of religious thought... that the English people came to the practice of... democracy" (p.5).

Democracy was been produced by faith and, in turn, produced it.

Bulletins from Britain. Religion and democracy were similarly paired in both "Put an End to This Terrorism!" and "Hitler Insults the Muslims." Although the latter of these pieces did

not pertain specifically to Christianity, along with the former it did stress the value of religious freedom. According to "Hitler Insults the Muslims," Nazism was scornful of all religion "Christianity and Islam alike" (Schacht, 1941, p. 6). Both pieces attempted to illustrate that the religious freedom provided by democracy would be non-existent under a toleration regime.

Class and Equality

Britain To-Day. As we have seen before, Britain continued to deal with the problem of inequality by demonstrating the progress they were making in achieving it. The pursuit of equality is, again, helped by the war, as is demonstrated by "Londoners in the Country" which described the shift in social divisions brought by the communal living of the evacuees. Although these evacuees were brought together from disparate backgrounds and under the worst of conditions the article suggested that the playing field was leveled resulting in a sense of community between the poor country peasant and the more affluent city dweller ("Londoners in the Country," 1941).

Britain Speaks. Priestley also made use of the evacuee hostels to suggest that war had brought England closer to social equality. Priestley often spoke of the goings on at one of his country houses that was converted into a hostel for women and children. Here, "women and children from very different backgrounds" including the "intensely respectable suburban to the dockside slums" lived and worked together. Priestley suggested that this new communal living helped to create a "social revolution" (Priestley, 1941, January 26) that will mostly benefit the children who will grow up free of the classism that had plagued England.

Bulletins from Britain. War's ability to foster equality was presented again in a variety of short pieces in *Bulletins from Britain* including "A Visit to a Day Nursery" (1941). Again, children from all classes were placed together in a nurturing environment while their mothers,

who are, of course, also from vastly different backgrounds, did their part for the war effort. This and other pieces like it suggested that war accomplished what years of attempts at social reform could not by bringing all of England's citizens together for a common goal regardless of their socioeconomic background.

The Transcendent Issue Dimension

According to Fisher (1989), transcendent issues are those of ultimate value. Such issues are of paramount importance that impinges on the "nature, the quality and continued existence of human life" (p. 109). These issues are often "taken for granted by the arguer, but when brought to the surface, they reveal one's most fundamental commitments" (p. 109). In the case of British propaganda in the United States, democracy clearly emerged as the transcendent issue.

The role of democracy throughout Britain's propaganda campaign is ubiquitous. Democracy was the source for other values including freedom, liberty and independence (Barker, 1941; "Britain and America," 1941; "Britain in Europe," 1939; "Britain and the Neutrals," 1939; "Democracy in a Changing World," 1939; "The New Year," 1941; Priestley, 1940,). In the final phase of Britain's efforts in the U.S. democracy was the source of "friendship" ("The New Year," 1941, p.1) and "goodwill" ("Britain and America," 1941, p. 1) as a means to reinforce and perpetuate of the Anglo-American alliance.

Strength and courage were also direct descendants of democracy. The British soldier and the British people were fighting to preserve democracy and all that it has provided them. It was democracy that gave the British soldier the motivation to leave home and train strenuously to defend his country (Ashley, 1940). It provided the motivation for the British people join together across class lines to accomplish the "impossible" (Brown, 1940, p.2) and withstand unbearable circumstances.

Though it is not derived from Christianity, democracy has provided religious freedom that has allowed it, and other religions, to flourish (“The English Christmas,” 1939; Downey, 1941; Schacht, 1941). Democracy was also shown to be a direct product of, if not Christianity, then religion (Barker, 1941).

Democracy was also interwoven into the very fabric of civilization. It governed the actions of British civilization, causing it to exercise tolerance before entering into a state of war (“Britain and Europe,” 1939) and provided the motive for entering into that war (Priestley, 1940). Indeed, democracy would make England worth protecting (“Arms and the Man,” 1939).

Clearly, the invocation of democracy was not accidental. In their effort to persuade the United States that their cause was worth supporting, Britain relied upon the cornerstone of American civilization. The importance of democracy in the United States was indisputable and Britain's use of democracy ultimately means “the British cause is the American cause” (“Britain and America, 1941, p. 1).

Consistency

Fisher (1989) suggested that in applying the test of narrative fidelity, audiences seek to determine whether the values presented to them are confirmed or validated either by their own experiences or the experiences of those they know. The consistency of the values presented by Britain with those held by its U.S. audience was demonstrated in three ways. First, as was shown in Chapter 4, Britain provided its American audience with values they could identify with. Second, Britain presented values that could address the criticisms of Americans. Finally, the consistency of the values presented within British propaganda helped to show Germany as a clear enemy whose values were not consistent with those of Britain and America.

As has been discussed, democracy served as the transcendent issue within Britain's messages to the United States. In presenting itself as a democracy Britain carefully crafted its message to reflect the values that are embodied in American democracy. Democracy in Britain consisted of freedom of the press and public meeting, liberty and independence (Barker, 1941; "Britain and America," 1941; "Britain in Europe," 1939; "Britain and the Neutrals," 1939; "Democracy in a Changing World," 1939; "The New Year," 1941; Priestley, 1940). In making this argument, Britain appealed to the very values that made Americans Americans.

American audiences were also offered a depiction of British civilization comprised of an array of values including culture, education, hard work and decency. Such values are sufficiently broad to appeal to many different demographics groups without threatening to alienate anyone.

As has been noted, Britain also portrayed itself as possessing values that Americans had criticized it for lacking. This was particularly true of charges that Britain was not strong enough to maintain a prolonged war effort or lacked the will to see the war through to completion (Brumback, 1941; Cole, 1953, 1974; Cull, 1995; Stenehjerm, 1976). Britain was able to show itself as willing to withstand the horror of the Blitz and the sacrifice inherent with war in order to defend itself.

Similarly, Britain was able to show its American audience that it recognized the value of equality as one that it was seeking to achieve. Despite the fact "class division" had been "England's weakness" (Priestley, 1940, p. 127) Britain was now embracing the erosion of class divisions brought by the war.

The consistency of the values presented by Britain with those of its U.S. audience also allowed Germany to be depicted effectively as a common enemy. As was seen in the

examination of identification through dissociation, Britain portrayed Germany as being devoid of the values shared by themselves and the United States. While Britain and the United States were democratic nations who valued freedom and liberty ("Democracy in a Changing World," 1939), Germany was totalitarian. Britain was on the side of God (Priestley, 1940) while Germany was opposed to religious freedom and planning to replace the cross with the swastika ("The Cross Will Disappear," 1941; Downey, 1941).

Throughout the period of 1939 and 1941, Americans were presented with values that were consistent with their own. This consistency, combined with the repetition of these values through a variety of media, allowed the British war effort to be seen as worthy of American support because it was being fought to defend American values.

Conclusions

Britain's use of values in its efforts to gain American sympathy, support and assistance served several purposes. Not only had values established Britain as a democratic nation fighting for the very ideals upon which the United States was fighting for, they helped to address misconceptions about Britain and show Britain to be a worthy ally.

Those who believed that Britain "did not have the slightest conception of democracy" (Lavine, 1940, p. 119) were rebuffed by Britain's presentation of itself as a nation committed to democracy, freedom and liberty. Similarly, questions of Britain's ability to withstand a prolonged war effort were addressed by repeated examples of Britain's strength and military prowess even in the face of insurmountable obstacles. This view was reinforced by the broadcasts of Edward R. Murrow who had himself doubted Britain's strength, only to be convinced by his firsthand experiences (Cull, 1993, 1995; Persico, 1988).

Americans who were wary of war were shown that, in spite of the horrors, war could produce profound and positive changes. War could not only promote social cohesion but could also help bring about social and economic reform. This was a significant message for an audience that is still feeling the effects of the Depression and the disparity that accompanied it.

Perhaps most importantly, within the themes of the People's war, Britain expressed a broad range of values that could appeal to an American audience on a number of levels. These values appeared both explicitly and implicitly throughout the years of 1939 and 1941, providing a positive image of Britain to be created, reinforced and maintained. Just as was seen in the discussion of identification, Britain's use of value cannot be viewed in terms of a single piece of rhetoric or grand oratory, but rather as a body of values from which Americans could chose.

Chapter VI: Consequence and Relevance

In chapter 5, the fact, transcendent issue, and consistency dimensions of Fisher's (1989) logic of good reasons were addressed. The exploration of these dimensions revealed that Britain relied upon the transcendent issue of democracy along with other values consistent with those held by its American audience to present its message effectively. This chapter will continue the application of Fisher's concept of a logic of good reasons, examining the dimensions of consequence and relevance.

Method of Analysis

As in previous chapters, materials have been examined for the presence of the primary themes of the people's war: democracy, strength and courage, civilization, Christianity, and class equality. Materials were then examined to determine what consequences were suggested by the messages and whether the messages offered were relevant to the competing story - that of the isolationists.

In examining consequences, several questions will be posed. What are the implicit and explicit consequences offered by Britain should the U.S. provide assistance to the war effort? What does Britain suggest the consequences will be if the U.S. fails to provide aid? Beyond those consequences offered by Britain, what other consequences can be inferred? For example, in its attempts to portray itself as strong and courageous, Britain also reminded its American audience of the death and destruction that accompanied war. Such negative consequences played a significant role in America's evaluation of Britain's story.

Because the possible consequences of U.S. assistance to Britain were pivotal to the isolationist argument, the dimensions of consequence and relevance will be addressed conjointly.

In addition to considering the consequences of U.S. aid, the discussion of relevance will ask how Britain addressed the other major points of the isolationist argument.

Phase I: Phase I: Introducing Britain (March 1939 to April 1940)

Democracy

As we have seen, democracy provided a powerful means of identifying with American audiences while also serving as the transcendent value of British propaganda. The depiction of Britain as a democratic nation also served to refute isolationist claims that Britain was “not fighting for democracy” (Stenehjem, 1976, p. 20) and that America should “not be fooled into thinking... liberty, democracy or progress” (p. 19) was its cause. Moreover, Britain needed to demonstrate a real threat to democracy that isolationism and neutrality could not address.

Britain To-Day. *Britain To-Day* lost no time in addressing isolationist charges that Britain was not a democracy. The publication's premier issue began with “Democracy in a Changing World,” noting that Britain was proud to “boast that she is a democracy with a tradition of free institutions and of ordered change” (1939, p. 2). As it continued to stress the beliefs in “liberty... the rights of free speech, freedom of the press and freedom of public meetings and association,” (p. 2) it displayed an understanding of democracy that is synchronous with America's.

In addition to using the U.S. Constitution to define British democracy and the role it played in the lives of Britons, the article also attempted to address the notion of isolationism itself. The piece contended that the governments of democracies must safeguard the democracy and the privileges it has afforded its citizens. However, the means that should be used to defend democracy were never articulated. The American isolationist could argue, as they did, that the

best defense for American democracy was remaining uninvolved in European affairs (Cole, 1953, 1974; Stenehjem, 1976).

“Britain and Europe” suggested that the freedom of press provided by democracy would also provide its citizens with the news and information that would force them to confront the threat to their democracy. The article suggested that, just as Britain could no longer “dissociate herself from Europe” (1939, p.2) thanks to the information given by the BBC, a free flow of information would force Americans to abandon their isolationist stance.

The importance of the freedom of press was also emphasized in “A Test of Nerves.” However, in this instance it was offered as one of the privileges that could be lost in a world indifferent to Germany totalitarianism. In the face of German treachery it was only those who recognized the threat and “adapt themselves to the facts who will best stand the strain” (1939, p. 1). And while “there may be some who would prefer not to know the worst and object to any disturbance of their peace,” (p. 3) the protection of democracy hinged upon facing one’s fears. Although the article never mentioned America by name, the inference was as unmistakable as the message: isolationism, not interventionism, was the real threat to democracy.

The message was reiterated immediately following Britain’s declaration of war. Although Britain, like America, had been reluctant to enter the war, “there is no better answer” (Britain at War, 1939, p. 1). The “average Englishman” (p.1) had chosen not to “dwell in twilight” (p.1) but instead decided to “embark on what he knew to be a long and tremendous struggle” (p. 2). The article clearly sought to imply that Americans would be condemned to dwelling in the twilight as long as they choose to maintain their isolationist stance.

Strength and Courage

Throughout the war, Britain walked a tightrope in its depiction of the strength and courage of the British people and military. While on one hand there was a need to address charges that Britain “had neither the spirit or ability needed for a modern war” (Cole, 1970, p. 26), on the other hand, Britain had to proceed with caution knowing that too dramatic a presentation of the horrors of war and the strength needed to cope would only further the isolationist argument that by remaining out of war the U.S. could be spared the devastation that accompanied it (Page, 1939).

Edward R. Murrow. As we have seen in previous chapters, Britain was limited in its ability to project the strength and courage of its citizens and military during the relative calm of the first phase of British propaganda. However, Murrow’s broadcasts provided listeners with insight into Britain’s preparations for war, and their willingness to make needed sacrifices. He also brought the seriousness of the situation facing Britons home to Americans.

Such was the case on August 31, 1939, just days before Britain’s declaration of war. Murrow described plans to evacuate 650,00 of “the children, the halt, the lame and the blind” from London (Murrow, 1941, p. 6). Murrow’s broadcast might have elicited sympathy from listeners, but the thought of mothers packing a small hand bag – including a gas mask – for their children was a reminder that war brings serious consequences even for the innocent.

However, despite the sacrifice that war may entail, Britain appeared ready to embrace it. This was demonstrated on September 3, 1939, when news of Britain’s declaration of war against Germany was greeted with a “rousing cheer” (Murrow, 1941, p. 18). Weeks later Murrow reported that “ no one minimizes the gravity of the situation, but I haven’t seen any sign of fright” (p. 28).

Such dramatic portraits of life in London were tempered by what can best be described as the inconvenience of war. For example, Murrow's October 15, 1939 broadcast allowed listeners the opportunity to tour wartime London. He described a city of closed shops and boarded up windows, of taxicabs with fire pumps attached to them, and of "house for lease or sale" signs (Murrow, 1941, p. 32). Though the scene might not be pleasant, it was still one of tranquility.

Christianity

Britain To-Day. The most typical response to isolationist claims that the "the irreconcilable contrast between the way of the sword and the way of the cross" (Page, 1939, p. 7) mandated that the U.S. stay out of the war can be seen in "The English Christmas" (1939). While the article focused on the traditions of Christmas, including family, fellowship, and Christian worship, it also inferred that these are freedoms that would not be provided under a German regime. Though the article only inferred the connection between the war and the freedom of religion, it did manage to make at least a tentative step towards addressing the isolationist argument while offering the loss of religious freedom as a possible consequence of a German victory.

Civilization

Both "Arms and the Man" (1939) and "Nineteen Forty" (1940) attempted to provide the reader with examples of the civilization that Britain was fighting for. In "Arms and the Man" civilization was represented by "material and social progress" (p. 1) while in "Nineteen Forty" civilization was represented by the music and arts that Britain refused to abandon despite its circumstances. The reader could infer that both models of civilization, each rich in values important to American readers, could be jeopardized by a British defeat.

In addition to depicting the civilization at stake, "Arms and the Man" (1939) addressed the isolationist notion that America is safely removed from the hostilities in Europe by admitting that Britain had once held the same belief. "War was unthinkable... the storm caught Britain unprepared" (p. 2). The "don't make the same mistake that we did" technique was employed frequently throughout Britain's propaganda efforts in the United States, effectively using Britain's own mistakes as a cautionary tale for its American audience.

Phase II: Britain Takes It and Carries On (May to December 1940)

Democracy

Britain Speaks. Of all the sources of propaganda being considered in this study, none was more forthright in addressing isolationist arguments than J.B. Priestley. In the June 15 broadcast of *Britain Speaks* Priestley first addressed the foundations of British democracy. Having done so, he began to address systematically key arguments against U.S. interventionism. Priestley began with same cautionary approach noted in "Arms and the Man" (1939) in the previous phase. "We've made our usual mistakes, we've been too complacent; we've underestimated the enormous preparation and ruthlessness of the enemy" (Priestley, 1940, p. 31).

Priestley (1940) warned that Hitler cannot be stopped "by holding a meeting and passing a resolution saying that you don't approve of him" (1940, p. 31). Moreover, he cautioned that the threat of Nazism was as real to the United States as to any of the European countries: "Hitler has no interest in America, eh? Then why all the elaborate network of espionage in the United States? The Nazis don't spend money and take time and trouble on something in which they are not interested..." (p. 33).

Elsewhere, Priestley (1940) provided listeners with a less direct view of the liberties that could be lost if Britain is defeated. Focusing upon German propaganda, or “comic fairy tales” (p. 100), Priestley provided listeners with sharp contrasts between the well informed citizenry of the democracies and those living under Hitler’s lies. In drawing the distinction between England, a country in which everyone “is perfectly free to any broadcasting station he chooses” or read any newspaper they chose, and a Germany in which one is treated like “a credulous child” (p. 100), Priestley offered his listeners with a subtle example of the liberties that are at stake.

Strength and Courage.

Britain To-Day. Both “The Will to Victory” (1940) and “The Battle of London” (1940) offered readers further examples of Briton’s willingness and determination to fight for their country. “The Will to Victory” centered on the irrepressible British “morale factor” (p. 2) that would overcome Germany’s “immediate advantage in land and air force that might possibly enable her to deal a deadly blow to Britain’s security” (p. 3).

Similarly, “The Battle of London” (1940) sought to demonstrate the strength of Britons by contrasting it with the weaknesses of a “determined and ruthless” Germany (p. 2). Both articles appeared to make a concerted effort to emphasize that, while Britons are willing to sacrifice they have had few sacrifices to make. In those instances in which “ordinary citizens” (p. 1) have faced material losses, they simply carried on. For example, “If his house is destroyed by a bomb dropped at random in the dark, he will sleep elsewhere to-morrow, and pursue his normal activities” (p. 1).

Each of these articles addressed the isolationist claim that Britain is lacking in the ability and will to see the war through to victory (Brumback, 1941; Cole, 1953, 1970; Page, 1939;

Stenehjem, 1976). It is interesting to note that while seriousness of war was addressed, it was also downplayed. Most would imagine having their house destroyed by a bomb to be a devastating event, yet in *Britain To-Day* it was dealt with characteristic British understatement (Cull, 1995).

Edward R. Murrow. One might suspect that that the image of Britons simply wiping off the dust and carrying on with their regular activities to be a wild exaggeration or distortion of events offered merely to reassure Americans of the Britain's ability to persevere. However, the trusted American correspondent, Edward R. Murrow, verified the perspective offered in *Britain To-Day*.

Prior to the start of the Blitzkrieg, the fall of France marked England's greatest challenge to that point of the war. On June 17, 1940, Murrow (1941) reported of an England that stood alone. Listeners were told that France's decision to cease hostilities would "not in any way affect the British determination to carry on the war alone and to the end" (p. 129).

This determination remained intact even during the merciless bombing of the Blitz. Despite continued bombing, Murrow (1941) reported that those "who called this a 'people's war' were probably more right... I've seen some horrible sights in this city during these days and nights, but not once have I heard man woman or child suggest that Britain throw in her hand" (p. 161).

Despite the fact that a "routine night" (Murrow, 1941, p. 171) consisted of intermittent bombing from nine o'clock at night until dawn, Murrow offered praise of the spirit of Londoners. According to Murrow, if the purpose of the German attack was to "strike terror to the hearts of the Britishers, then the bombs have been wasted" (p. 175).

Murrow confirmed that the determination of the British people to see the war through to completion, but he also brought the horror of war into sharper focus. Isolationist claims of British weakness might be countered, but the argument that U.S. involvement in the war on any level would “result in terrible loss of life and destruction of property” (Page, 1939, p. 7) was reinforced.

Britain Speaks. Priestley's May 30, 1940, broadcast stressed the calm in England. Despite rumors to the contrary, he informed listeners that “everybody's as cool as a cucumber” (p. 1) and that he had seen more “more fuss and excitement” (p.1) trying to collect his luggage at the airport. However, he acknowledged that the temper of “the ordinary easy-going English people is rising” (pp. 5-6). Listeners were informed that any attempt at invasion would only increase the resolve of the British people.

Priestley (1940) also addressed isolationist claims that the war was strictly a European affair. The Germans will either “be destroyed or they will dominate the world” (1940, p. 3). Unlike previous wars, Priestley contended that this one was not a battle between certain nations, but rather “a desperate battle in which the future of the whole world is involved” (p. 4). This battle was between “two ways of life” (p. 4) and the fight to allow men woman and children to “lead a full and happy life” (p. 4).

Priestley's (1940) argument against the isolationist belief that an ocean will protect America was furthered as he acknowledged the flawed thinking of his own countrymen that had impeded preparation for the war: “You can't persuade a lot of English that they don't live on a magic island. They believe, these nice comfortable stupid folk, that disasters and tragedies, fire and slaughter, treachery and invasion are things that only happen overseas to those strange excitable beings called “foreigners”” (p. 5).

A similar approach can be seen in the June 24, 1940, broadcast of *Britain Speaks*. Priestley attempted to demonstrate that isolationists are empowering Nazism, which he contended relied upon the tolerance of democracies to provide it with the opportunity to spread. He then pointedly added that Germany was relying on the belief that they “can’t underestimate the stupidity of the world” (p. 47).

The broadcast stressed the enormity of what is at stake in this war as Priestley (1940) claimed that “we may be lost, and civilization lost with us” (p. 46). With civilization at stake, Priestley contended it was not unreasonable for Britain to ask “not for men, but every possible kind of offensive and defensive weapon” (p. 46). It is significant, though not wholly truthful, that Priestley confirmed that Britain was not seeking American manpower. While full U.S. participation in the war effort was always Britain’s great unspoken goal (Cull, 1995), acknowledging this could have reversed any success Britain’s efforts in the U.S. had had. Instead, Priestley gave his audience with a rationale for providing aid while minimizing concerns that Britain sought to draw its audience into the war.

Christianity

Britain Speaks. The August 5, 1940, broadcast of *Britain Speaks* combined the themes of civilization and Christianity as Priestley replied to a letter from a listener in Glens Falls, New York. The broadcast provided Priestley with an opportunity to directly address isolationist concerns and also offered an excellent illustration of the techniques Priestley employed throughout his broadcasts.

Priestley’s (1940) response to the letter, which will be further discussed in the following section, addressed the belief of both the letter’s author and isolationists, that American involvement in the war would prove detrimental to the spiritual well being of America. Priestley

contended the opposite, that “pretended indifference to one of the profoundest conflicts in the history of man” (p. 147) would only deprive America of the very spirituality it was founded upon.

The consequences of isolationism, according to Priestley (1940), posed a serious threat to the American way. “I don’t want to see American becoming Byzantium, but behaving like America, where men went to become free and equal where men went to become free and equal, where democracy and liberty, for which we are fighting, found its great home” (p. 148).

Civilization

Britain Speaks. As previously mentioned, Priestley’s August 5, 1940, broadcast, in which he replied to a letter from a listener in Glens Falls, New York, combined the themes of Christianity and civilization. This particular broadcast provided an excellent capsulation of his approaches to addressing the competing isolationist story throughout his broadcasts.

Priestley’s (1940) reply to the listener began with a refutation of the claim that the war was a European affair. Priestley called this line of thinking “out-of-date and dangerous” (p. 143) and argued that the war against Nazism involves “the old family homestead of the whole wide world” (p. 143). To illustrate his point, Priestley connected the 1929 Wall Street crash to the Nazi rise to power. The example provided the listener with a powerful illustration of the interconnectedness of global events.

As he had done in the past, Priestley (1940) informed listeners that, even if they were not interested in European affairs, Germany was interested in the United States and had an extensive “network of Nazi intrigue and espionage” extending into the United States. “The facts” suggest that “this is a plan for world domination or nothing” (p. 145).

The portrait Priestley (1940) provided his listeners showed a battle for the civilization that both Britain and the U.S. treasured. It was this civilization that was threatened by the “vehemence” of the Germans, the battle to ensure that “something good and not something evil” comes from the war (p. 142).

While this broadcast embodied many of Priestley’s responses to American isolationists, it also provided one atypical response. American isolationists had frequently cited Britain’s outstanding war debts from the First World War, along with the perception that America had fought the war for Britain. Priestley (1940) replied by informing listeners that both nations were left with a mass of unpaid war debts and that Britain suffered an even more significant loss in the form of “one million dead” (1940, p. 142) nearly three times that of American losses (Reynolds, 1983). Priestley’s reply was the only such of its kind within the materials gathered for this study.

Class and Equality

Britain Speaks. As noted in Chapter 5, Britain most frequently responded to criticism of class inequality by acknowledging its presence and suggesting that it was actively seeking methods to correct the situation. This approach was demonstrated in a July 1940 broadcast of *Britain Speaks*. Priestley (1940) acknowledged that “divisions between classes” (p. 127) had always been “England’s weakness” (p. 127). However, the listener was informed that that the war was causing these divisions to be “rubbed out” (p.127). Britons of all classes were finding that a “sense of community was being deeply felt” (p. 126) as they rallied together to fight for democracy and liberty.

This broadcast and others like it, were significant for two reasons. First, the acknowledgment of class division provided Britain with the opportunity to appear credible. While isolationists had criticized Britain’s rigid class system (Brumback, 1941; Cole, 1953),

these claims were largely peripheral. Subsequently Britain likely did more good than harm by confessing the class disparity. Second, listeners were able to see that there could be positive consequences associated with the war.

Phase III: The Assumed Alliance (January to December 1941)

Democracy

Britain To-Day. President Franklin Roosevelt's January 1941 public pledge of assistance to Britain (Cull, 1995; Goodwin, 1994) was greeted with a number of changes in British propaganda. While Britain was still fighting to preserve democracy and the liberties and freedoms it had produced, we see that the new alliance had strengthened democracy ("The New Year," 1941). This new optimism set the standard for British propaganda throughout 1941.

However, "The New Year" (1941) suggested that democracy had been empowered by the new alliance which served to reinforce the notion that democracy was at stake and must be protected. America might have been "non-belligerent but potent in sympathy and capacity to give material aid," (p.1), but Britain was the implicit defender of a democracy under attack.

The "spearhead of resistance" ("Britain and America," 1941, p. 1) was also able to be more forthright in its requests for aid from the United States. Roosevelt's pledge of aid and words of praise for Britain's fight provided Britain with the ability to present itself openly as the protector of the American way. According to "Britain and America" (1941) "the British cause is their cause, the British people may be counted on to sustain it worthily" (p. 1). Such claims, that suggested Britain was prepared to defend American interests and values, sought counter claims that Britain wanted the U.S. to fight the war on their behalf.

Just as was seen in Britain's depiction of the war as a means to remedy class disparity, the war also provided for a new union. Additionally, the cumulative effect of Britain fighting on behalf of "the American cause" ("Britain and America," 1941, p. 1) proved an effective counter for the claims that America had fought for the benefit of Britain in the First World War (Brumback, 1941; Cole, 1953, 1974; Stenehjem, 1976).

"Freedom from Want" (1941) drew from President Franklin Roosevelt's January 1941 "Four Freedoms" speech in which the President looked toward a world bound by four essential human freedoms: freedom of speech, freedom from want, freedom from fear, and freedom of worship (Goodwin, 1994). The article proposed that, with its newly gained U.S. backing, Britain would be able to bring Roosevelt's vision to fruition by helping those who "exist in darkness under Nazi rule" (p. 2) to be freed.

Britain Speaks. *Britain Speaks* also celebrated the new alliance of the democracies. Priestley's June 4, 1941 broadcast centered on the positive consequences the new union would bring. Quoting William Blake, Priestley suggested that "we may yet... build a Heaven in Hell's despite."

Bulletins from Britain. "We Don't Call This Britain's War" (Casey, 1941) provided American readers with the perspective of the Australian Minister to the United States. While the article emphasized Australia's commitment to democracy and confirmed that democracy is what is being fought for, it also covered several other worthwhile points.

First, Casey (1941) informed readers that, as a commonwealth, Australia was under no obligation to Britain in war or peace. Australia had chosen to fight with Britain and the Allies because it recognized the "world-wide nature of Germany's ambitions" (p. 5). This is especially significant given that Australia was "most remote in the world from great centers of population"

(p. 5). These facts clearly supported Britain's contentions that no one, including the United States, was safe from German attack or invasion. The piece made an additional, though subtle point. The presence of the Australian army, as well as those of other commonwealths, helped to mitigate concerns that Britain was hoping to have the United States fight the war for them (Brumback, 1941; Cole, 1953; Page, 1939).

Strength and Courage.

Bulletins from Britain. Throughout this phase the theme of strength and courage was offered in a less dramatic fashion than previously seen. Britons now appeared to be facing a series of inconveniences that likely appeared more palatable to American audiences. For example, "The British Rationing System Strict, but Fair" (Evans, 1941) provided readers with an account of food rationing in Britain by the U.S. Administrator of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration. The author reported that "being used to the variety of an American diet, I was hungry all the time" (Evans, 1941, p. 4) suggesting the sacrifice of Britons. One farmer, he said, had 200 dairy cows that he milked each day. However, the farmer himself rarely had a drop of milk as it was reserved for the women and children. Such pieces allowed the British to be seen in a sympathetic light while simultaneously presenting their sacrifices as manageable.

The use of rationing was one of two methods used in *Bulletins from Britain* to convey the strength and courage of Britons to Americans. The second was to present sacrifice in an adventurous or heroic fashion. This was well illustrated in "Courage Has Many Colours" (1941) a semi-regular column in *Bulletins from Britain* documenting the "heroes and heroines" (p. 5) of the war effort. Readers heard of a team of demolition experts who died while bravely defusing bombs and British soldiers in Libya celebrating the capture of a German with a bottle of

champagne. The brief anecdotes did not deny the severe consequences of war, but dwelled upon the adventurous and heroic aspects instead of the true sacrifice.

Christianity

Britain To-Day. Barker's (1941) "The Progress of British Democracy" combined the themes of Christianity and democracy. Barker's assertion that "it was by way of religion, of religious experience that the English people came to the practice of... democracy" effectively refuted the isolationist argument that war would violate the tenets of Christianity. If it was to be believed that Britain is fighting to preserve a democracy created through the religious experience, religion must also be protected by the war effort.

This concept was elaborated upon by Barker who stressed the religious freedom that has been afforded to democratic nations. Implicit in Barker's message was the notion that the religious freedom protected by democracy would be lost if democracy were to perish. The reader who valued religious freedom was led to the conclusion that it can only be protected by preserving democracy.

Bulletins from Britain. "Put an End to This Terrorism Now!" (Downey, 1941) found the Archbishop of Liverpool addressing the isolationist claim that assistance to, or participation in, the war effort would be detrimental to the spiritual life of Americans. Downey's article emphasized the religious persecution perpetrated by the Nazis demonstrating that Christianity, or any form of spirituality, would be threatened by a Nazi victory.

Downey's approach was repeated in numerous other pieces in *Bulletins from Britain*, including "The Cross Will Disappear" that reports on "the anti-Christian movement in Germany" (1941). The article cited German pamphlets that claimed the cross would be replaced by the

swastika and the “public will be forbidden to read the Bible or any books dealing with the Christian faith” (1941). The recurrences of pieces like this helped to depict the war as a war for Christianity and religious freedom.

Civilization

Britain To-Day. The positive consequences of war were offered again in “The Remaking of Britain,”(1941). The reader was informed that German bombs were credited with accomplishing the demolition of more condemned buildings than social reformers had been able to accomplish. This destruction, the reader was told, would provide an impetus for the creation of new and better housing for the people of London. While the possible good of German bombings appears ludicrous, the article presented the reader with a vision of a post-war world that featured better transportation, health care and “amenities of life” (“The Remaking of Britain,” 1941, p. 3).

Britain Speaks. In the September 11, 1941 broadcast of *Britain Speaks* Priestley focused on the destruction caused by the Nazis. This broadcast was typical of Priestley’s approach to continue to remind his audience Germany’s attempts to destroy “the intellectual and cultural life” of all they encounter. This is not to say that Priestley ignored the Anglo-American alliance that he believed has been brought “by the people, for the people” (Priestley, 1941, September 11) but he continued to caution that barbarism has been “brought nearer to civilization” (Priestley, 1941, September 11). The broadcast and others like it tried to create a balance between optimism and caution showing that, while the Anglo-American alliance was cause for hope, the Nazi threat remained real.

Class and Equality

Britain Speaks. Equality continued to be presented as a value that Britain was striving to achieve and one that was being well served by the war. As was seen in the previous phase, Britain offered the war as a means of bringing about social reform. On a number of occasions, including his January 26, 1941, broadcast, Priestley pointed to communal living as a means of bringing together Britons of different classes and backgrounds under one roof. The biggest beneficiary of these new living arrangements were "our future citizens," the children who are living free of class ideologies.

Priestley's presentation of life in hostels was significant for several reasons. First, as I have already discussed, it suggested that war can bring about positive social reform. Second, it placed the decidedly negative matter of displaced families into a positive light. Priestley's depiction of the mothers and children living in hostels was one of people living and working together in harmony and "carrying on the fight for the right of the ordinary decent man and woman everywhere to a full and satisfying life" (Priestley, 1941, January 26). Subsequently, another of war's horrors, the loss of one's home and the accompanying upheaval was not denied, but presented in a less horrifying manner.

Bulletins from Britain. H.G. Wells' "A Common Brotherhood is Being Realized" (1941) reflected the way in which the war was helping to alleviate class divisions in England, replacing it with a new "social order" (p. 3). According to Wells, the British were brought together as one by the war, realizing that "we are all going to be poor together or we are all going to be rich together" (p. 3).

Wells' article confirmed the idea that readers were presented with in numerous other articles that sought to demonstrate the positive changes taking place in England as a result of the war. A new sense of community had found Britons of all classes joining together for the

common good. Britons were reaping the fortune and sharing the misfortune of the war equally and preparing for a post-war period dominated by a "classless society" (Wells, 1941, p.3).

Summary

Throughout the first and second phases of British propaganda, Britain sought to establish what could happen if the United States failed to provide aid to the war effort. As was noted in chapter 5, democracy served as the transcendent issue in British propaganda; accordingly the threat to democracy appears to receive the most attention. The focus on democracy provided a counter to isolationist claims that American democracy would be threatened by aid to or participation in the war (Brumback, 1941; Cole, 1953, 1974; Page, 1939; Sargent, 1941; Stenehjem, 1976).

Britain also sought, throughout all three phases, to counter American isolationist claims that the U.S. was safe from the events in Europe and, as such, should remain isolated from them (Brumback, 1941; Cole, 1953, 1974; Kennedy, 1999; Page, 1939; Sargent, 1941; Stenehjem, 1976). Britain's efforts centered upon two approaches. First, Britain acknowledged its own flawed thinking in this regard, demonstrating how their belief that a body of water could keep them out of European affairs impeded their war effort. Second, British propaganda focused upon the global ambitions of Hitler and the Nazi forces.

British propaganda throughout 1939 to 1941 presented a realistic depiction of the dire consequences of war, but also attempted to counter these consequences so as not to further isolate their U.S. audiences. Again, several approaches figured prominently. First, Britain

attempted to demonstrate that the loss of life and personal property was outweighed by the loss of democracy, and, indeed, civilization as it was known.

Second, Britain attempted to illustrate the positive results of war. War was shown to have provided Britain with social reform and an erosion of class divisions. Britons had become a community working toward a better future. These ideals would likely have been appealing to an America that had suffered through one of its worst economic crises ever (Goodwin, 1994).

By the third phase, British propaganda focused more heavily upon these positive consequences. In addition to accentuating the positive, Britain attempted to show the negative consequences of war as being more inconvenient than devastating. Britons were faced with rationing, which, though bothersome was certainly tolerable. Audiences were also shown that war, even with its hardships, could be adventurous, allowing ordinary men and women to become heroes.

Ultimately, British propaganda provided Americans with cause to believe that they were not safely isolated from the events in Europe, no matter how hard they might have tried to be. Americans were shown that their aid and assistance could produce positive results that outweigh even the more serious consequences of war.

Chapter VII: Conclusions

Results

This study focused on the persuasive powers of British propaganda in the United States between the years of 1939 and 1941. This was accomplished by examining pamphlets, serialized publications, radio scripts and transcripts for the presence of identification as defined by Burke (1969) and their ability to meet the standards of Fisher's (1989) the logic of good reasons. In addition to demonstrating that these materials made extensive use of identification and could meet the standards of the logic of good reasons, several other interesting points are revealed through the application of these theories.

First, this study demonstrated considerable connection between Burke's (1969) concept of identification and Fisher's (1989) logic of good reasons. America was only able to identify with Britain because Britain provided its U.S. audience with values consistent with its own. Britain's repeated presentation of shared values, beliefs, and ideals allowed Americans to be more receptive of Britain's attempts to counter isolationist arguments against interventionism.

This study also revealed three distinct phases of British propaganda in the U.S. between 1939 and 1941. In each of these phases Britain relied upon slightly different persuasive approaches to meet its needs. Britain's persuasive efforts in the first phase began cautiously but would soon become more aggressive in both tone and intention during the drama of the Battle of Britain and the Blitz. The most marked change took place during the third phase following Roosevelt's January 1941 public pledge of assistance to Britain. Throughout that period British propaganda attempted to promote the fledgling Anglo-American alliance while it simultaneously

sought to present the war in a manner that could counter the serious consequences that could accompany U.S. involvement.

Finally, this study revealed that Britain did in fact rely upon a “strategy of truth” (Brewer, 1997, p. 4) in its campaign against U.S. neutrality. This approach was markedly different than British propaganda in the U.S. during the First World War. Rather than fabricating atrocities (Taylor, 1990) focused instead on the way in which Germany’s actions differed from the shared values, beliefs and ideals of Americans and Britons.

Strength and Limitations

This study examined radio transcripts and scripts, pamphlets and serialized publications. While these materials have been recognized as playing a significant role in the British campaign against American neutrality (Brewer, 1997; Cull, 1993, 1995; Graves, 1941; Rhodes, 1976; Taylor, 1990), there has been a dearth of material examining the persuasive abilities of these materials.

Additionally, this study provided insight into the changes British propaganda went through from one phase to the next. While previous studies (Brewer, 1997; Cull, 1995) suggest that Britain’s persuasive efforts went through stages, these studies have not provided an explanation of the nature of these changes and the ways in which they furthered Britain’s efforts in America.

This study would have benefited from the availability of additional serialized publications, pamphlets and broadcasts from the BBC North American Service. However, “after the war, Britain seems to have tried to destroy evidence of its war propaganda in the United States” (Cull, 1995, p. 4). This has resulted in the destruction of recordings and scripts and the classification of the British Information Service’s directory of British publications in the U.S.

between 1939 and 1945 (N.J. Cull, personal correspondence, November 20, 2000). In spite of the dearth of materials, this study benefits from the inclusion of four major sources: *Britain To-Day*, *Bulletins from Britain*, and the written records of J.B. Priestley and Edward R. Murrow's broadcasts.

Final Thoughts

The war that the United States entered on December 7, 1941, was one that it had seen almost entirely through British eyes. Given the fact that the U.S. did not enter the war until after Japan had attacked Pearl Harbor and Germany had declared war, it would be easy to negate Britain's efforts to lead America from isolationism to interventionism. However, despite the fact that it would be impossible to quantify the effects of Britain's efforts in the U.S., British propaganda helped to bring about a marked transformation in American attitudes and opinions (Brewer, 1997; Cull, 1995).

British propaganda in the United States between 1939 and 1941 must be understood as a cumulative process. At each stage of the process British propagandists would achieve "considerable success" (Cull, 1995, p. 198). First, in 1939, Britain would benefit from a revision in the Neutrality Acts. By 1940 Roosevelt had signed an executive order approving the destroyers-for-bases deal which was followed by the passage of the lend-lease bill in 1941. While Britain clearly benefited from Franklin Roosevelt's pro-interventionist stance, Cull (1995) argues that the importance of British propaganda cannot be underestimated in its ability to help foster the public opinion that allowed Roosevelt to provide this aid. Given the tremendous isolationist opposition to foreign aid, "no component of securing that aid – let alone British propaganda – can be dismissed" (Cull, 1995, p. 201).

By the late summer of 1941 comic book heroes like Captain Marvel and Captain America

Were battling Nazis and the best selling books in the nation dealt with the war from a British perspective (Cull, 1995). By the time America entered the war, American popular culture had turned away from isolationism and began embracing interventionism (Brewer, 1997; Cull, 1995).

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