

Spring 2019

Hyperborean Habits and Melting Ice: The Normalization of Arctic Space and Resurgent National Identity

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Master of Arts (MA), thesis, International Studies, Old Dominion University, DOI: 10.25777/ckw7-q617
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**HYPERBOREAN HABITS AND MELTING ICE: THE NORMALIZATION OF
ARCTIC SPACE AND RESURGENT NATIONAL IDENTITY**

by

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B.A. May 2015, George Mason University

A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of
Old Dominion University in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

OLD DOMINION UNIVERSITY
May 2019

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ABSTRACT

HYPERBOREAN HABITS AND MELTING ICE: THE NORMALIZATION OF ARCTIC SPACE AND RESURGENT NATIONAL IDENTITY

Ian Birdwell
Old Dominion University, 2019
Director: Dr. Regina C. Karp

The Arctic Council has a robust history of fostering cooperation among its members on a host of environmental and scientific objectives. Yet, as the region has warmed the formerly inaccessible region has become ever easier to access, and Arctic politics are becoming of greater interest to the global community. In the midst significant change of this the network created by the Arctic Council continues to advance its cooperative agenda, though increasingly it seems to be experiencing setbacks due to the surges of nationalistic rhetoric on the part of its members. What best explains the transformation of national attitudes and how will such a transformation affect the future of Arctic politics? This paper argues the national identities of Arctic states limits the ability of the Arctic Council to create policy inroads into the national interests of its members in key identity-linked areas such as national defense, resource extraction, and territorial disputes. This propagates a normalization of Arctic politics, shifting the formerly unique hyperborean political system into something more readily resembling the interactions of Arctic states below the Arctic Circle. This is accomplished through a historiographical analysis of Arctic Council policy recommendations, domestic political developments, and international relationships since 1989 between the Arctic Council and the two most nationalistic Arctic states, Russia and Canada. Ultimately, Arctic Council recommendations on issues linked to traditionally cooperative areas such as scientific cooperation and conservation do experience successful

integration into member states; however, closely related to power national interests are neglected by states in favor of the pursuit of those interests.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to extend a hearty and well deserved thanks to everyone who assisted me in the creation of this document, and all those who listened to me work through the problems I had encountered. A special thank you to my mother, my father, Tom, Cathy, and especially to Starra for being the best sounding boards a graduate student could ask for, without you this would not be half the document it is.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

For nearly the whole of human history, the Arctic has lain as a frigid realm nearly impervious to most Ocean-going traffic. However, for the first time in human history that is changing. Climate change has begun to cause climate of the Polar Regions to warm, shrinking the sea ice serving as the primary impediment to travel at the poles, and states from all over the world first began to take action to study, mitigate, and ultimately prevent these kinds of regional transformation over thirty years ago.¹ After the discovery in the hole of the ozone layer above Antarctica, the international community rallied together to limit the production of CFCs and to prevent further harm to the Ozone Layer.² This effort culminated in the Montreal Protocol of 1989, cementing the efforts of the international community into a legally binding document. Though this work proved monumental in solving a problem for the whole of the global community, it also served to highlight a lack of action done to address ongoing problems and a lack of study of the unique Arctic environment much closer to home for several of the signatories of the Montreal Protocol. To this end, a series of international research agreements, cooperative arrangements, and collective effort created the Arctic Council.³

Today, the Arctic Council serves as the most prominent and important regional institution for Arctic issues, creating new habits of interaction among its members on topics such as human development, environmental management, scientific coordination, sustainable economic

¹ C. Keskitalo, "International Region-Building - Development of the Arctic as an International Region," *Cooperation and Conflict* 42, no. 2 (2007). 190

² United Nations Ozone Secretariat, "Handbook for the Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer," ed. United Nations Environment Programme (Nairobi, Kenya: United Nations Ozone Secretariat, 2018).

³ S. Knecht, "The Politics of Arctic International Cooperation: Introducing a Dataset on Stakeholder Participation in Arctic Council Meetings, 1998-2015," *Cooperation and Conflict* 52, no. 2 (2017).

development, and search and rescue operations.⁴ The most prominent acclaim the Arctic Council has to offer though comes in the form of its climate research, reports like the *Arctic Climate Impact Assessment* of 2004 and its later successor reports paint a picture of an Arctic continuing to warm with melting sea ice opening the region for commercial traffic and other economic activity.⁵ The publication of these reports has done more than highlight the ongoing issues of the Arctic region related to climate change though; those reports have served to reignite the discourse of the Arctic in every major Arctic state.

While the precipitation of discussions on the Arctic is important for the study and preservation of the Arctic climate, the Arctic represents a politicized region in the national identity in nearly every Arctic Coastal states fueling several of the ongoing Arctic Coastal state territorial disputes. Moreover, the national ideas on the Arctic range from a kind of manifest destiny regarding long desired trade routes and resource extraction rights, sometimes in those same disputed zones.⁶ As the ice has melted the contestations and disagreements of the Arctic have boiled to the forefront into the popular consciousness on the Arctic region, disrupting some of the established habits present within the Arctic region.⁷

Thus, given the amount of interest within the Arctic region throughout the global community, the nationalistic approaches advocated within several Arctic states, and the increasingly possible reality of an ice-free commercial Arctic layered on top of a region previously considered to be a geopolitical backwater it is important to examine the overall

⁴ The Arctic Council, "Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council: Joint Communiqué of the Governments of the Arctic Countries on the Establishment of the Arctic Council," (Ottawa, Canada: Arctic Council, 1996).

⁵ Klaus Dodds, "Flag Planting and Finger Pointing: The Law of the Sea, the Arctic and the Political Geographies of the Outer Continental Shelf," *Political Geography* (2010).

⁶ I. A. Medby, "Articulating State Identity: 'Peopling' the Arctic State," *ibid.* 62 (2018). 117

⁷ Kathryn Isted, "Sovereignty in the Arctic: An Analysis of Territorial Disputes & Environmental Policy Considerations," *Journal of Transnational Law and Policy* 18 (2008). 344

effectiveness of the Arctic Council in developing a community of states.⁸ Therefore, in order to examine the effectiveness of the Arctic Council in developing a cooperative community at the top of the world it is vital to propose the research question *under what conditions can the Arctic Council facilitate cooperative policy developments in its members?*

In order to answer the research query it is important to propose the hypothesis of *the national identity of member states limits the ability of the Arctic Council to affect cooperative policy change*. To adequately test this hypothesis we must analyze the null hypothesis of *the national identity of member states does not impact the ability of the Arctic Council to affect cooperative policy change*. The best course of action to analyze the null hypothesis is to first contextualize the Arctic region in global politics, next detail how the current literature has addressed the Arctic Council, third review the analytical methods, then scrutinize the policy decisions of Canada and Russia in interacting with the Arctic Council, before finally reconsidering the research question. Because, though it appears that the Arctic Council has successfully developed a community of states increasingly concerned with the environmental status of the region and willing to cooperate on conservation and scientific research critically important areas related to hard power development in the region are largely being ignored by the Council and its members. Instead it appears a normalization of relations is taking place, where the previously prevailing policy priorities of the Arctic states are being changed to become similar to those same states policy priorities to interstate relations outside of the unique environment of the Arctic region.

⁸ Ibid. 344; Dodds, "Flag Planting and Finger Pointing: The Law of the Sea, the Arctic and the Political Geographies of the Outer Continental Shelf."; Keskitalo, "International Region-Building - Development of the Arctic as an International Region." 200

CHAPTER 2

ARCTIC CONTEXTUALIZATION




Figure 1: Arctic Ice Melt

In 1818 there were two things on every Londoner's mind, the Ross expedition and *Frankenstein*.⁹ The narrative gripped Londoners with its portrayal of humanity and also for its relevance to public conscientiousness at the time. *Frankenstein* is bookended by chapters set in the Arctic and was published just weeks before the famous 1st Ross expedition for the Northwest

⁹ M. J. Ross, *Polar Pioneers : John Ross and James Clark Ross* (Montreal ; Buffalo: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1994).

Passage of Canada.¹⁰ Ross's expeditions cemented the status of the Arctic as a mysterious place where not even the mighty British navy could surmount the elements and left a profound impression on the British and European consciousness. The Ross expedition imparted a lasting impression of the Arctic as a realm of adventure, danger, scientific discovery, and exploration without the geopolitical significance to affect the politics among nations which had been imparted to other regions of the world.¹¹

This image of the Arctic would only begin to change during the 20th century with the development of the radio, nuclear deterrence, powerful icebreakers, and other specialized technologies.¹² Moreover, as the planet warms due to climate change the Arctic has begun to gain strategic significance for both the states with coastlines on the ocean and others. While potentially disastrous for the environment of the Arctic, the warming of the Arctic climate and the reduction of sea ice has led to a diversification of the activities which occur within the Arctic Circle. The broad diversification of Arctic activities has been driven by the expectations of the populations within the states of the region as they possess the strongest preconceived ideas about the Arctic. Therefore, it is important to confine a contextualization of Arctic activity to states within the region and in possession of a coastline on the Arctic Ocean as those states possess the strongest ideas about the Arctic in crucial areas ranging from climate research to reindeer farming.¹³ Thus, it is important to contextualize the Arctic within the following key areas of Arctic activity which have remained prevalent for states and impacted their populaces throughout the 20th century; the geographical limitations for trade, the Arctic as a scientific zone of

¹⁰ Mary W. Shelley, *Frankenstein, or the Modern Prometheus* (Oxford University Press, 1998).

¹¹ M. Ross, *Polar Pioneers: John Ross and James Clark Ross* (McGill-Queen's Press-MQUP, 1994).

¹² O. R. Young, "Whither the Arctic? Conflict or Cooperation in the Circumpolar North," *Polar Record* 45, no. 232 (2009). 73

¹³ Birger Poppel, "Interdependence of Subsistence and Market Economies in the Arctic" *The Economy of the North, Statistics Norway* (2006).; L. C. Jensen and P. W. Skedsmo, "Approaching the North: Norwegian and Russian Foreign Policy Discourses on the European Arctic," *Polar Research* 29, no. 3 (2010). 439

research, the economic capacity of the Arctic region, and finally the strategic aspects of the region.

Geographic Limitations on Trade




Figure 2: Arctic Trade Routes

The Arctic has always remained a difficult to traverse region even in the height of summer when sea ice is at its lowest in the year. The polar ice cap has prevented the Arctic Ocean from being utilized in any purposes other than for forces capable of flying above the

ground or below the ice for year-round transit.¹⁴ Yet, the Arctic has a strong history of being viewed as a potential trade route for significant amounts of global trade with the greatest impediment being the sea ice present in the region's waterways.¹⁵ The restrictions to travel created by sea ice have been ever present within the Arctic region and directly impacted how the region has been thought of throughout the globe and can be viewed as the single biggest impediment to Arctic. With this in mind, it is crucial to understand how the Arctic has been contextualized as a geographically limited region due to the unique constraints of Arctic ecosystem on travel. In fact, these impediments to travel permeate the whole of the Arctic space and are crucial to understanding how, why, and when new opinions on the Arctic develop. Therefore, it is critical to examine the role sea ice has played in limiting travel and trade in the Arctic over time by first detailing the how traditional sea travel was blocked by ice before exploring how the 20th century has transformed Arctic transit.

From a historical perspective, the Arctic never really had a large scale of activity within its seas because of the geographic limitations imposed by sea ice and the incapability of seafaring technology. Initially, Travel in and around the Arctic Ocean was limited to the summer months for seagoing vessels and even then the perils of navigating the shifting ice still persisted.¹⁶ Trade Routes, such as the Northwest and Northeast Passages, persisted as powerful motivating tool for the European powers to continue to probe the northern edges of North America to find a potential outlet into the Pacific Ocean and onto East Asia lasting well into modern times, unfortunately the discovery of such a route to pass through the ice proved

¹⁴ J. Dittmer et al., "Have You Heard the One About the Disappearing Ice? Recasting Arctic Geopolitics," *Political Geography* 30, no. 4 (2011). 201

¹⁵ Ross, *Polar Pioneers: John Ross and James Clark Ross*

¹⁶ S. G. Borgerson, "Arctic Meltdown - the Economic and Security Implications of Global Warming," *Foreign Affairs* 87, no. 2 (2008).63

continually elusive.¹⁷ The dangers of Arctic waters became common knowledge readily quickly and several expeditions from the British government alone turned back well before the sea had become too treacherous or the ships had become locked in ice due simply to the fear of becoming locked in ice.¹⁸ These fears persisted throughout nearly all of the explorations into the Arctic which were continually funded by the governments of Denmark, Great Britain, Norway, Russia, the United States, and the Netherlands dating back to the 1400's.¹⁹ Each of these expeditions brought back tales of ice sheets capable of sinking ships and fantastic landscapes caked in snow even in the middle of the summer months, establishing the Arctic as an inhospitable, desolate, and most importantly impossible place for any sailor. It is vital to note that here is where the limitations of the technological developments of the expeditions to explore the Arctic become shockingly clear. The oceangoing vessels utilized by sailors prior to the invention of the steam-powered icebreaker were ice strengthened wooden vessels which posed the danger of being too large to navigate through ice fields reliably, either ending up crushed by ice or damaged beyond repair within the region.²⁰ It was only following the development of modern icebreakers in the Gulf of Finland by the mid-1800s that a reliable, blue-water capable, large vessel would be able to successfully navigate ice fields, yet even then these icebreakers were only useful up to a certain thickness of ice which varied with each vessel.²¹ This is significant because though several of the historic expeditions returned with maps of the islands and coastlines of the Arctic; however, the ever-shifting nature of sea ice made such maps severely limited the usefulness of such maps as ice sheets ebb and flow with the tides.²² Thus,

¹⁷ Ibid. 70

¹⁸ J. Douglas Hoare, *Arctic Exploration* (Methuen & Company, 1906). 131

¹⁹ Ibid. 224

²⁰ Deinder S. Sodhi, "Northern Sea Route Reconnaissance Study: A Summary of Icebreaking Technology," (1995).

1

²¹ Ibid. 1

²² Borgerson, "Arctic Meltdown - the Economic and Security Implications of Global Warming."

sea ice remained an ever present issue for the traversing of the Arctic which only truly began to become mitigated with the invention of robust icebreakers in the mid-19th century.




Figure 3: Vessels Traversing through Arctic

Fortunately, the 20th century experienced some significant thaw in regards to a more traversable and tradable Arctic due to both technological innovation and the warming of the Arctic Ocean. Throughout much of the 20th century the old barriers to travel remained impeding traffic through the Arctic Ocean; however, the development of new, more powerful icebreakers alongside more modern ships enabled broader access across areas such as the northern coast of Asia.²³ It was now possible to have ships traverse the Arctic during certain periods of the year with icebreaker escort, and due to the extent of their Arctic territories the Soviet Union would

²³ Sodhi, "Northern Sea Route Reconnaissance Study: A Summary of Icebreaking Technology." 5

possess the largest fleet of icebreakers.²⁴ Thus, portions of the Arctic Ocean now became more open to trade and activity, notably taking the form of military bases, ports supporting the extraction of natural resources, and supporting Arctic communities. Moreover, as climate change has gone on the geographic limitations posed by sea ice have become less robust impediments than they were before. The strongest obstruction to Arctic transportation has been Arctic sea ice, but warming Arctic temperatures has been reducing the extent and thickness of the ice by nine percent annually over the past thirty years.²⁵ Thus, climate change has made the Arctic increasingly more traversable to ocean going traffic, making it easier to maneuver material via ship to various Arctic ports previously only open in the summer months and reduced the danger of sea ice to travel year-round. The new accessibility of the Arctic has prompted a new line of thinking from within the states with Arctic territories and states outside of the region as a new frontier for investment has become available. For a ready example of the ease of Arctic travel one can look at the Bahaman flagged *Crystal Serenity* which traversed the long sought Northwest Passage through the Canadian Arctic in the summer of 2017 while carrying 1400 passengers.²⁶ And that cruise company is not alone. However, in the midst of the latest opening up of new sea routes and the reduction of sea ice is seeing a dramatic effect on Arctic and non-Arctic states alike. The reduction of geographic limitations on the Arctic in terms of sea-ice melt has sparked various efforts from Arctic states to prepare for future access in the region as the planet warms. Policies have been adapted or crafted to prepare Arctic states for new traffic in Arctic regions, ranging from the refurbishment and deepening of port facilities in the United States, Canada, and Russia to the development of new ice-capable Naval vessels in Denmark, Canada, and the United

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Josefino C. Comiso, "A Rapidly Declining Perennial Sea Ice Cover in the Arctic," *Geophysical Research Letters* 29, no. 20 (2002). 1

²⁶ R. K. Headland, "Transits of the Northwest Passage to End of the 2018 Navigation Season Atlantic Ocean-Arctic Ocean-Pacific Ocean," (Scott Polar Research Institute, 2015).11

States.²⁷ Additionally, non-Arctic states have increasingly become active in examining Arctic politics with states like Singapore, China, India, and a slew of European states joining the Arctic Council as observer states, made significant investments into Arctic infrastructure, or are otherwise preparing for changes in the characteristics of the Arctic region which may make trade increasingly probable.²⁸

The Arctic's unique environment played a prominent role in ensuring that few oceangoing vessels were able to cross its waters and actively engage the region. Yet as time as gone on the historical limitations on Arctic travel have faded with the emergence of a new Arctic tamed in part by technology and rising temperatures. The new, emerging Arctic is one which is more accessible, rapidly changing, and garnering more interest for the potential it has been believed to have for hundreds of years as a trade route.²⁹ Therefore, though the Arctic has been a realm with geographic limitations climate change has transformed the Arctic Ocean from an ice-locked sea into a new highway for travel and trade.

A Scientific Region

Institutions like the Norwegian Polar Institute were founded early on in the 20th century to study the region's unique environment, climate, and the role it plays in the world system, and were joined later by a myriad of organizations focused on scientific endeavors in the region.³⁰ As time has gone on, those various public and private supported research groups have been the groups to identify the rapidness of sea ice retreat and distribute such knowledge to the global populace.³¹ As these reports have disseminated, more organizations, states, and institutions have

²⁷ Robert Neil Huebert; Heather Exner-Pirot; Adam Lajeunesse; Jay Gullede, "Climate Change and International Security: The Arctic as a Bellweather," (Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, 2012). 3

²⁸ Ibid. 21

²⁹ Dittmer et al., "Have You Heard the One About the Disappearing Ice? Recasting Arctic Geopolitics." 201

³⁰ Harald D. Jolle, "The History of the Norwegian Polar Institute."

³¹ Robert Corell, "Arctic Climate Impact Assessment," *Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society* 86, no. 6 (2005).

become interested in studying the Arctic for a variety of reasons. Even now the international community has continually updated and shared reports, with coordination from a variety of state researchers, scientists, and climatologists discussing the Arctic in a variety of forums. Thus, in order to grasp how the Arctic has been thought of in terms as a scientific region it is important to breakdown into two prominent pushes from the scientific community; the study of the global climate and the study of the arctic environment.

Initially, the Arctic has been a hotbed for climatologists studying the global climate through the research carried out in the Arctic region, both in present climate research and historic global climate. The Arctic may not seem to be the location to study current effects of items like climate change or even ongoing weather systems, yet the region has been host to weather installations and research stations since the early 20th century.³² It was believed during the 1930s and 1940s that the weather currently experienced in the Arctic would eventually hit or effect population centers in Europe, prompting the Germany army in the Second World War to establish weather monitoring stations in Greenland and the Svalbard Islands.³³ Additionally, the polar location of the region coupled with its environmental fragility makes it into an ideal region to study climate change. Essentially, the climate and environment of the Arctic region is sensitive to changes in the overall global climate and shifts in the climate, such as increased global temperatures of CFC pollution in the atmosphere can have a profound effect on overall global climates.³⁴ This atmospheric sensitivity of the Arctic region was first readily noticed in the Antarctic region with the hole in the Ozone layer and saw the first real international

³² Daniel Heidt, "Clenched in the Jaws of America? Canadian Sovereignty and the Joint Arctic Weather Stations, 1946-1972," in *Calgary Papers in Military and Strategic Studies, Occasional Paper No. 4: Canadian Arctic Sovereignty and Security: Historical Perspectives* ed. P. Whitney Lackenbauer (University of Calgary 2011). 148

³³ Frode Skarstein, "A Cursed Affair-How a Norwegian Expedition to Greenland Became the Usa's First Maritime Capture in World War II," *Polar Research* 26, no. 2 (2007). William Barr, "Wettertrupp Haudegen: The Last German Arctic Weather Station of World War II. Part I," *Polar Record* 23, no. 143 (1986). 143

³⁴ Annika E. Nilsson, *A Changing Arctic Climate: Science and Policy in the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment* (Linköping, Sweden: Linköping University, 2007).

agreement related to climate change with the establishment of the Montreal Protocol in 1989, which would then re-establish the Polar regions as an important area for the study of the global climate and lead eventually to the founding of the Arctic Council. Moreover, the Arctic region has also played a critical role in studying the historic global climate. few regions possess long lasting bodies of ice which trap sediment in their layers that remain credible to study historic climates, among the most popular regions for these coring expeditions is the Arctic region for the age of the glaciers in places like Greenland or Norway and the relative ease of access to the region.³⁵ The expeditions, research stations, and international cooperation on the study of the historic climate has provided a host of climate data which relates not just to the history of the climate of the Arctic region but has provided a window in time to a rough picture of the total global climate stretching back hundreds of thousands of years ago.³⁶ Thus, the arctic region today represents a critical zone to study the global climate and provide insight into how humans have affected the global climate. Today, the Arctic retains its importance to modern meteorology and climate studies with the most interesting recent developments have been the emerging study of permafrost locked methane gas and the role the Polar Regions play in reflecting solar radiation back into space.³⁷

As climate scientists and meteorologists study the Arctic region to enhance human understanding of the historic climate and the effects humans have had on the climate over time, a host of environmentalists, conservationists, and biologists have made their mark as well. The Arctic features a unique and fragile environment as previously mentioned, and the best way to examine how this has factored into the scientific perception of the region is to detail the conservation of the unique ecosystem and the severe concern for pollution in the region. Initially,

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Ibid.

in recent years the conservation of the Arctic ecosystem has become increasingly salient in the international community. The best indicator for such efforts is of course the humble polar bear, one of the largest and most visible creatures affected by the retreat of the ice sheets.

Conservation efforts for the polar bear emerged in relation to their loss of habitat due directly to climate change.³⁸ A variety of international institutions like the World Wildlife Fund latched onto the polar bear as the most visibly impacted Arctic animal in the hopes of increasing public support for their conservation efforts and to a large degree it has proven successful with the governments of Canada, the United States, Denmark, Norway, and the Soviet Union signing onto the *International Polar Bear Agreement* in 1973.³⁹ The status of the polar bear is one which is continually looked to as the poster child of the status of the Arctic environment, but the region as a whole experiences a host of support for the study of the changes within the environment and those animals residing in its unique ecosystem. While Arctic animals reliant on sea ice are getting attention, the various commonly fished fish species call the Arctic home from Pollock to cod, and a host of international agreements, treaties, and organizations exist to help manage those fish populations to prevent overfishing in the region.⁴⁰ For instance, the status of fisheries has often factored into Norwegian-Russian relations in regards to the Barents Sea and the Svalbard Islands deep within the Arctic Ocean, in addition to contributing in part to historical animosity between various Arctic states.⁴¹ Thus, the establishment of new programs, treaties, and agreements to manage the Arctic population of fishes is not out of the ordinary and often discussed feature of politics at the top of the world, with the most recent being the Agreement to

³⁸ Rachel Slocum, "Polar Bears and Energy-Efficient Lightbulbs: Strategies to Bring Climate Change Home," *Environment and Planning Discourse: Society and Space* 22 (2004). 426

³⁹ Pal Prestrud and Ian Stirling, "The International Polar Bear Agreement and the Current Status of Polar Bear Conservation," *Aquatic Mammals* 20, no. 3 (1994). 113

⁴⁰ M. Byers, "Crises and International Cooperation: An Arctic Case Study," *International Relations* 31, no. 4 (2017). 381

⁴¹ Keskitalo, "International Region-Building - Development of the Arctic as an International Region."

Prevent Unregulated Commercial Fishing on the High Seas of the Central Arctic Ocean in October of 2018.⁴²

An important offshoot of the environmentalism and conservation previously discussed, preventing and responding to pollution has been increasingly important to Arctic states as time has gone on especially in hydrocarbon pollution and communal response goals. The most damaging type of pollution which can be experienced in a climate like the Arctic is that of an oil spill. Increased activity in the Arctic Ocean and the discussions of placing oil platforms, increasing shipping, and the shipping of oil via ship has brought up fears of the Exxon-Valdez Oil Spill to the front of several environmental discussions.⁴³ Essentially, no Arctic state wishes to see the fragile environment brought closer to the brink by something akin to an oil spill and has been actively working towards preventing such spills through regulation whenever possible in order to avoid the financial and political costs of addressing oil spills in the frigid region.⁴⁴ The communal push towards the regulation of oil extraction and other sources of potential hydrocarbon pollution has in turn empowered a communal response to such disasters in the region. Essentially, the public consciousness in regarding the Arctic is mostly determined to ensure the region remains as unspoiled as possible to help preserve the already threatened ecosystem.⁴⁵ Popular protests, non-governmental campaigns, and lobbying efforts related to oil extraction in the region are not uncommon in the domestic politics for members of the Arctic council, and often enjoy some success. Take for instance the efforts of a variety of organizations during the Obama Administration in the United States to prevent oil extraction in the Arctic Ocean and the subsequent executive order to ban oil exploration in the Arctic Ocean North of

⁴² Office of the Spokesperson, "U.S. Signs Agreement to Prevent Unregulated Commercial Fishing on the High Seas of the Central Arctic Ocean," news release, 2018, <https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2018/10/286348.htm>.

⁴³ Young, "Whither the Arctic? Conflict or Cooperation in the Circumpolar North." 79

⁴⁴ Ibid.80

⁴⁵ Medby, "Articulating State Identity: 'Peopling' the Arctic State." 119

Alaska.⁴⁶ The most visible demonstration of popular dissatisfaction regarding Arctic oil drilling which led to an international incident involved Greenpeace's protests over Russian Oil Platforms in the Arctic Ocean which impacted relations between Russia and the United States⁴⁷. Even today, the popular inclination to disapprove of Arctic oil exploration and extraction coupled with the costs of operating within the region have dissuaded several oil companies from engaging in the region or reduce their footprint within it.⁴⁸ Thus, the communal push towards hydrocarbon extraction in the Arctic has become a salient political issue for some Arctic Council members at best and at worst has become visible and disapproved of by the broader international community.

The Arctic region has always engaged the minds of scientists to study its unique insights into our planet's climate and the inhabitants. Overtime the visibility in terms of a realm of scientific study, information, and conservation has emerged, especially in the years since 1989's Montreal Protocol and the crisis of the hole in the Ozone above Antarctica. Climate change has only served to make such scientific issues more prominent for the region and much more salient within the Arctic states.

⁴⁶ Darryl Fears and Juliet Eilperin, "President Obama Bans Oil Drilling in Large Areas of Atlantic and Arctic Oceans," *The Washington Post* 2016.

⁴⁷ Pavel K. Baev, "Russia's Arctic Ambitions and Anxieties," *Current History* 112, no. 756 (2013).

⁴⁸ Erin McGroarty, "Protestors Take over Anwr Environmental Scoping Meeting," *Fairbanks Daily News-Miner*, February 5, 2019 2019.

Economic Capacity

Arctic Economic Overview

Estimated Regional Oil Reserves	89,983.21 Million Barrels ⁴⁹
Savings on Shipping Costs for Bulk Carrier Transportation	\$80,000 ⁵⁰
Distance Saved in Travel from Europe to Asia	5,000 Miles (Two Weeks travel compared to other routes) ⁵¹

Table 1: Arctic Economic Overview

Historically the arctic has been a region without a great deal of economic activity of any significance, due to inaccessibility and high costs to operate in the region. In spite of these limitations, there have been a few prominent industries above the Arctic Circle ranging from the extraction of natural resources to the previously mentioned fisheries.⁵² Ultimately, none of these industries save for the oil, gold and fishing industries have yielded significant returns for states and even those industries are much more expensive in the climates of the Arctic. As the sea ice recedes and the region warms, the Arctic is increasingly being declared to be “open for business” in every state bordering it. Speculative exploration for oil has occurred off the coasts of Canada, Russia, Greenland, Norway, and Alaska.⁵³ Additionally, the potential trade routes of the region have drawn a myriad of investors and attention from all over the globe, with thousands of nautical miles, man hours, resources, money, and time saved compared to other trade routes if

⁴⁹ Ronald R. Charpentier Kenneth J. Bird, Donald L. Gautier, David W. Houseknecht, Timothy R. Klett, Janet K. Putman, Thomas E. Moore, Christopher J. Schenk, Marilyn E. Tennyson, Craig J. Wandrey, "Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal: Estimates of Undiscovered Oil and Gas North of the Arctic Circle," ed. Peter H. Stauffer (United States Geologic Survey, 2008).

⁵⁰ Lawson Brigham Scott Borgerson, Michael Byers, Heather Conley, Marlene Laruelle, "The Emerging Arctic," (Council on Foreign Relations, 2014).

⁵¹ Rick Noack, "Climate Change Cuts the Shipping Route between China and Europe by 5,000 Miles," *The Washington Post* 2018.

⁵² Dittmer et al., "Have You Heard the One About the Disappearing Ice? Recasting Arctic Geopolitics." 206

⁵³ Christian W., "Oil for Ice Water? Greenland, China Lining up Co-Operation," *The Copenhagen Post* 2018; Ravenna Koenig and Elizabeth Harball, "Climate Change Slows Oil Company Plan to Drill in the Arctic," *NPR* 2018; Nerijus Adomaitis, "Norway Ready to Claim Share of Any Russian Arctic Oil and Gas Finds," *Reuters* 2019.

the Arctic can be suitable for shipping in the future.⁵⁴ This trade route speculation has firmly taken hold on states and corporations, for instance Chinese Premier Xi Jinping declaring a goal for a Polar Silk Road to connect the European and Chinese markets by utilizing the Russian Northern Route through the Arctic.⁵⁵ Essentially, the economic aspects of the Arctic region have several states chomping at the bit to exploit the new opportunities within the region. To better understand this relatively new phenomenon for the region, it is important to once again visit the status of hydrocarbon extraction in the region and the role climate change is playing regarding Arctic economic activity.

First, the Arctic has a great deal to offer state economies in terms of hydrocarbon extraction which is most readily understood through the examination of the Arctic's history regarding oil and the role large corporations have played in the region. Historically, the Arctic has played an important role in pushing the Arctic region into the economic spotlight. Following the 2nd World War, a series of oil exploration efforts underwent across the globe to determine where the global reserves of oil were located and the Arctic was predicted to hold a great deal of the globe's untapped oil reserves.⁵⁶ This prediction prompted a series of expeditions into the region to determine exactly where these deposits of oil were to be found and how accessible they were for extraction.⁵⁷ Ultimately, the predicted reserves have encouraged several oil companies from throughout the globe to pursue oil located within the Arctic region or nearby it, with the

⁵⁴ Borgerson, "Arctic Meltdown - the Economic and Security Implications of Global Warming."

⁵⁵ Trym Aleksander Eiterjord, "The Growing Institutionalization of China's Polar Silk Road," *The Diplomat* 2018.

⁵⁶ Kathrin Keil, "The Arctic: A New Region of Conflict? The Case of Oil and Gas," *Cooperation and Conflict* 49, no. 2 (2014). 163

⁵⁷ Kenneth J. Bird Donald L. Gautier, Ronald R. Charpentier, Arthur Grantz, David W. Houseknecht, Timothy R. Klett, Thomas E. Moore, Janet K. Pitman, Christopher J. Schenk, John H. Schuenemeyer, Kai Sorensen, Marilyn E. Tennyson, Zenon C. Valin, Craig J. Wandrey, "Assessment of Undiscovered Oil and Gas in the Arctic," *Science* 2009.

most readily accessible areas of oil having been tapped by Russia.⁵⁸ The harshness of the region though has led to a major concern for oil population for each state within the Arctic region due to the oil pipelines used for transport. The Arctic climate has continually been a thorn in the side for the companies seeking to extract Arctic oil as the extreme weather conditions makes maintaining any kind of infrastructure expensive and sea routes all but impossible for transporting oil. The persistence of this problem has led to some innovation regarding oil extraction technologies, yet there still remain the question of accessibility.⁵⁹ Nearly all of this innovation for Arctic oil operations has been pursued by oil companies and increasingly funding has been going towards more advanced forms of oil extraction. Essentially, the Arctic region has been viewed by oil companies as a massive opportunity for investment because of its relative untapped potential compared to other global regions.⁶⁰ The state with the most action regarding Arctic oil extraction is Russia due to the relative accessibility of the reserves of oil off its coast in the Arctic Ocean and Barents Sea, and the relationship it has with its major state-owned oil companies.⁶¹ Russian oil companies like Gazprom have continually viewed the Arctic as the means to continue their levels of oil extraction and have used the amount of predicted oil reserves to garner investment from throughout the world into Russian Arctic territories to extract and explore for oil.⁶² Thus it is apparent that oil is important for the Arctic economy and a major driver because of the importance of hydrocarbons for the global economy.

The effects of climate change become more apparent in the Arctic region yearly, and due to those changes the economy of the Arctic Ocean has been looked towards for a major

⁵⁸ K. Atland, "Russia's Northern Fleet and the Oil Industry-Rivals or Partners? Petroleum, Security, and Civil-Military Relations in the Post-Cold War European Arctic," *Armed Forces & Society* 35, no. 2 (2009). 367

⁵⁹ Donald L. Gautier, "Assessment of Undiscovered Oil and Gas in the Arctic."

⁶⁰ Borgerson, "Arctic Meltdown - the Economic and Security Implications of Global Warming."

⁶¹ Atland, "Russia's Northern Fleet and the Oil Industry-Rivals or Partners? Petroleum, Security, and Civil-Military Relations in the Post-Cold War European Arctic." 367

⁶² *Ibid.* 368

resurgence. Essentially, climate change is viewed as a major opportunity for the states with Arctic territory because of how sea ice retreat transforms oil transportation and relatively lessens technological reliance for economic activity. Initially, the largest change for the Arctic region's economy because of the effects of climate change is the transformation of hydrocarbon transportation. As previously mentioned the Arctic utilizes pipelines to transport hydrocarbons across vast swathes of territory, which is not the most cost efficient means of transporting oil.⁶³ Throughout the world it is usually much easier to transport oil and other goods via waterways, and climate change is making this a reality for the Arctic. As sea ice retreats it will be possible to construct oil terminals for tanker ships making it safer, easier, and more efficient to transport oil and other petroleum products.⁶⁴ Moreover, it is easier to refurbish ports in the region than to construct whole new pipelines stretching from Siberia to the Russian heartland, coming with the added benefit of being capable to berth vessels capable of transporting other good to and from the region as well.⁶⁵ Another boon to the Arctic economy is as climate change affects the region, it will become slightly less technologically intensive to operate within the region. In the first subsection of this chapter, there was a broad discussion on transportation in the Arctic and the role icebreakers played in making the region more accessible. This is a major benefit and indicative of the overall condition of the region, right now it is costly to operate any kind of facilities in the Arctic for economic gain. Transportation of goods in the Arctic is expensive due to the cost of infrastructure maintenance within the region, the region's geographic location away from main economic sectors, and the reduction of traditional regional transportation such as ice-

⁶³ Eurasia Group Report, "Opportunities and Challenges for Arctic Oil and Gas Development," (Washington, D.C.: Wilson Center, 2014).10

⁶⁴ Frederic Lasserre and Sebastien Pelletier, "Polar Super Seaways? Maritime Transport in the Arctic: An Analysis of Shipowners' Intentions," *Journal of Transport Geography* 19, no. 6 (2011). 1470

⁶⁵ Joshua Ho, "The Implications of Arctic Sea Ice Decline on Shipping," *Marine Policy* 34, no. 3 (2010).714-715

roads.⁶⁶ The versatility of port facilities in light of opening waterways varies from state to state in the Arctic region, but given the impact of climate change on other modes of transportation within the region the opening of maritime routes represents an opportunity for transportation improvements.⁶⁷ Bettering transportation to the region through the opening of waterways could prove critical in developing economic activity in the region and more efficiently connect the region to the global economy.

The economic realities of a new Arctic birthed by climate change are still unknown, though there are some promising forecasts from a variety of states, corporations, and municipalities within the region. The Arctic has had a historic role in providing energy to the global economy and it is very likely that role will only become more prominent as the ice once choking the Arctic Ocean abates.

⁶⁶ Laurence C. Smith Scott R. Stephenson, John A. Agnew, "Divergent Long-Term Trajectories of Human Access to the Arctic," *Nature Climate Change* 1, no. 3 (2011).1.

⁶⁷Ibid. 3

Strategic Purpose




Figure 4: Arctic Territorial Disputes

From a military perspective, the Arctic has featured prominently in the minds of politicians and military leaders for hundreds of years. As previously discussed the initial concerns of these individuals was in the Arctic as a region for trade and even then those inclinations varied from state to state. However, the strategic location of the Arctic as the shortest route between North America, Europe, and Asia has historically attracted a great deal of military interest, notably in during the Cold War.⁶⁸ As climate change lessens the frigid grip of sea-ice on Arctic waterways, the military dimensions of the Arctic are bound to continually

⁶⁸ M. Carlsson N. Granholm, and K. Korkmaz, *The Big Three in the Arctic: China's, Russia's, and the United States' Strategies for the New Arctic* (FOI, 2016).9.

resurface in domestic and international discourses of Arctic states; therefore it is important to contextualize the region as a strategic zone for military activity by examining traditional Arctic military operations and emerging Arctic military developments.

Traditionally, the Arctic has generally had a pacifying effect on the states interacting between it due to how difficult it was to operate within the region and its status as an area for nuclear deterrence. First, the sea ice which has been previously mentioned as a major block in transit within the Arctic has also impeded military operations by nearly all of the Arctic states in the region. As an impediment the sea ice and temperatures of the region has proven problematic in encouraging territorial disputes, yet also beneficial in inhibiting the escalation of territorial disputes into conflicts.⁶⁹ Moreover, operations within the region necessitate a higher level of training to operate within its seas and shores than other regions of the world with little cross application other than the Antarctic.⁷⁰ Thus, the presence of military forces in the region was determined by global issues causing the Arctic to be populated by token forces, military observers, and troops designated for operations elsewhere in the world in regions less restricted by environmental factors like sea-ice.⁷¹ Therefore the fungibility of capability in the region has led to a relatively pacific region in terms of generalized military activity, yet it is important to note the Arctic has played a significant role in the nuclear deterrence of the Cold War.⁷² The only way to maneuver through the Arctic region without impediments has continually been the usage of submarines, and following the implementation of mutually assured destruction policies for both the Soviet Union and the United States the Arctic gained new significance as a base for

⁶⁹ H. Gerhardt et al., "Contested Sovereignty in a Changing Arctic," *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 100, no. 4 (2010).995.

⁷⁰ Helga Haftendorn, "Nato and the Arctic: Is the Atlantic Alliance a Cold War Relic in a Peaceful Region Now Faced with Non-Military Challenges?," *European Security* 20, no. 3 (2011).349.

⁷¹ Oran Young, "Arctic Politics in an Era of Global Change," *The Brown Journal of World Affairs* 19, no. 1 (2012). 166.

⁷² Scott R. Stephenson, "Divergent Long-Term Trajectories of Human Access to the Arctic."1.

ballistic missile submarines.⁷³ Following the Cold War, the Arctic has played a role in nuclear weapons as well through missile defense systems.⁷⁴ Beyond these factors, a majority of the military involvement in the Arctic has traditionally been related to coast guard activities and intermittent training operations.

As climate change has affected the Arctic so too has it affected the military dimensions of the region. Climate change has served to reignite the passions of Arctic populations and also remedied the issue of white-water navies. Initially, as the Arctic has warmed it has increased the visibility of the region in the minds of politicians, military leaders, and citizens throughout the Arctic states.⁷⁵ Take for instance the Harper administration of Canada, Harper made his run for premiership on the basis of reasserting Canadian authority in the Arctic and maintained leadership for nine years.⁷⁶ The political saliency of the Arctic exists throughout the region as well, though its traction in the political sphere varies from state to state CITATION. Moreover, even in states where the Arctic remains on the relative fringes of the political discussions within capitals the transformation of the region and its resulting impact on the global economy has warranted a response from military planners, for instance in the US quickly shelved a plan for constructing a new icebreaker when the political debate moved elsewhere but the US military released several documents expressing the importance of the region to future US policy in the form of the US Navy's Arctic Road Map.⁷⁷ Furthermore, various governmental agencies across the Arctic region have sought to improve their military capabilities within the region, ranging

⁷³ Kristian Atland, "Interstate Relations in the Arctic: An Emerging Security Dilemma?," *Comparative Strategy* 33, no. 2 (2014).154.

⁷⁴ Ibid.151.

⁷⁵ Margaret Blunden, "The New Problem of Arctic Stability," *Survival* 51 (2009).126-127.

⁷⁶ Klaus Dodds, "We Are a Northern Country: Stephen Harper and the Canadian Arctic," *Polar Record* 47, no. 4 (2011).371.

⁷⁷ Courtney C. St. John David W. Titley, "Arctic Security Considerations and the Us Navy's Roadmap for the Arctic," *Naval War College Review* (2010). 35.; Carl Prine, "Is the Coast Guard's Icebreaker Project Doomed? ," *Navy Times* 2018.

from the refurbishment of existing port facilities, the purchasing of new Cold-Weather equipment, and the training of troops in extreme weather conditions.⁷⁸ In the midst of all of this though, most prominently is the discussion of naval operations within the region. As previously noted, the Arctic has hosted and continues to host naval forces from the nations inhabiting it; however, it is important to distinguish between the white-water forces and blue water forces of the region. An overwhelming majority of the fleets of the Arctic states are blue-water forces, yet it is important to note that as climate change reduces the thickness and extent of Arctic ice sheets more blue-water forces are building ice-capable ships for Arctic patrol.⁷⁹ Fundamentally, the retreat of sea-ice is encouraging militarization of the region through the construction of new patrol vessels, the refurbishment of ports for military usage, and new training operations for forces expected to operate regionally.⁸⁰ As the Arctic continues to warm the region will become more accommodating to regular blue-water navies, thereby becoming increasingly more able to be militarized as states will not require specific technologies for their forces like icebreakers to operate within the region.

While most of this militarization can be pointed towards to be the simple development of capabilities to adjust to changes in the region, it is still a militarization of the region which historically has had severe limitations to travel and military activity. The major response of the Arctic states has been to, as a community; ignore the transforming military dimensions which are emerging to the Arctic region within international institutions.

⁷⁸ M. Blunden, "The New Problem of Arctic Stability," *Survival* 51, no. 5 (2009). 125.

⁷⁹ Atland, "Interstate Relations in the Arctic: An Emerging Security Dilemma?."153, 155, 156.

⁸⁰ Haftendorn, "Nato and the Arctic: Is the Atlantic Alliance a Cold War Relic in a Peaceful Region Now Faced with Non-Military Challenges?."353.

CHAPTER 3

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

Already there exists a host of literature related to the study of the Arctic, the Arctic Council, and national identity. Importantly though, there is not piece in the body of literature I have found which directly relates to the study of the overall effectiveness of the Arctic Council in fostering change within its member states over the course of its entire existence. Thus, it is important to briefly examine a small sample of relevant literature to this research before moving on. The literature currently in existence on the Arctic Council and the Arctic is best broken into NINE differing sections related to the following concepts; critical concepts for analysis, the Arctic Council, Arctic economics, national identity in political discourse, polar security, cooperation in the Arctic, Canada in the Arctic, and Russia in the Arctic.

Critical Concepts of Analysis

Initially, the most important pieces of the puzzle for examining the intersection of national identity, national interests, and the Arctic Council is the theoretical framework utilized within this research. To fit this end the critical frameworks utilized for this research is tripartite in its focus and including the following critical concepts; Mackinder's geopolitics, Copeland's trade security spiral, and Hopf's logic of habit.

First, in terms of developing critical areas of importance for the study of the Arctic region, it is critically important to begin with a brief examination of Hartford Mackinder's *Democratic Ideals and Reality*. Mackinder argues in this piece that the endowments of a state in terms of resources available are important, and in fact vital for the development of power for

states.⁸¹ Moreover, the geographic location of those states and the geography between the state and where their interests lie is vitally important in terms of approaching broader issues of international relations.⁸² Though Mackinder only truly mentions the Arctic in passing as an impediment to circumnavigation of Eurasia, the geopolitics Mackinder lays out in this piece are critical to examining how the scope and scale of the Arctic's transformation are so significant for the global community.

Next, for Copeland, one of the most important features of the international system is how each state relates to the other in terms of trade and economics. Copeland argues each state will seek to protect its own economic interests and to maintain monopolies on its trade routes whenever possible.⁸³ Copeland proposes the encroachment upon or destruction of the monopolies states possess on markets propagates wars between the states encroaching upon and the states controlling those markets.⁸⁴ Given the expressed importance of the Arctic as a commercial region for the states on its borders, Copeland's piece is significant as it directly examines how states seek to protect and exploit markets they perceive they have a unique claim upon.

Finally, in Hopf's view international relations can be broken down into a series of fundamental engagements between states which then set the tone for the overall interactions between those states.⁸⁵ Essentially, Hopf argues there are logics of habit which persists within the international community, particularly in the foreign policies of states in interacting on nearly

⁸¹ Halford Mackinder, *Democratic Ideals and Reality* (New York: Holt, 1919).

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ Dale C. Copeland, *Economic Interdependence and War*, Princeton Studies in International History and Politics (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2015).

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ Ted Hopf, "The Logic of Habit in International Relations," *European Journal of International Relations* 16 (2010).

every issue and event.⁸⁶ Hopf argues these logics create lenses by which states view the world and color their opinions of the actions of other states in certain situations.⁸⁷ Though Hopf argues these habits can be mutable, they are only mutable with great difficulty because to create a logic of habit within the international system takes time and effort.⁸⁸ Hopf's piece is important as it provides a means to examine how Arctic politics may change as the logics which have led to modern Arctic politics are transformed by climate change.

In terms of conjunction, the combination of Mackinder's concept of the world island and Copeland's insistence on the importance of trade route security offers an interesting framework for analyzing the interactions of Arctic militarization on interstate relations within the region. Meanwhile, the logic of habit offers interesting insights related to how the Arctic states, notably the coastal Arctic states, will interact as the region becomes increasingly viable for trade and travel. Thus, it is critical to not just include these pieces in this body of research but to combine them to develop a better idea of the progression of Arctic politics over the past thirty years.

The Arctic Council

It is impossible to have a discussion related to the ability of the Arctic Council to affect its members without including the body of literature currently regarding the Arctic Council. To this end it is important to examine how the region was initially constructed and how the unique problems of the Arctic are posing a challenge to the Council.

Initially, Young provides a wonderful examination of the Arctic Council, the fundamental structures of its cooperative frameworks, and the problems it faces within the

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ Ibid.

region.⁸⁹ Young details emerging problems such as the issue of developing legally binding regimes for the region and the question of a potential Arctic Treaty in line with the Antarctic Treaty.⁹⁰ Young concludes with an overview of the place of the Arctic Council in Arctic politics, proposing the Council should only focus on issues where it has a distinct advantage compared to other organizations and can therefore excel.⁹¹ Kesktialo builds off of Young's ideas regarding the Arctic Council through her study of how the Arctic has been constructed as a region both through the various projects of its international institutions and the preexisting region-building literature.⁹² Arguing the Arctic is a constructed region built by the interests of its principle actors within the Arctic Council and their according interests, stemming from historic interactions within the region.⁹³ To this end, Kesktialo comparatively examines Nordic and North American views, concluding North American views have been the dominant discourse for the Arctic in its construction as a regime.⁹⁴ It is critical to include both of these pieces within this research because of their ability to provide unique perspectives on the Arctic Council's construction and ability to create an international region of the Arctic.

Second, it is important to detail how the Council has reacted and responded to the ongoing challenges of interacting at the top of the world. Young examines the impact ongoing environmental changes have had on Arctic governance, cooperation, and the Arctic Council.⁹⁵ Young considers a variety differing solutions proposed to moderate the changing physical and political environment at the top of the world, arguing a tripartite solution to the problems of the

⁸⁹ Oran R. Young, "The Structure of Arctic Cooperation: Solving Problems/Seizing Opportunities," (Arctic Council, 2000).

⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² Kesktialo, "International Region-Building - Development of the Arctic as an International Region." 181

⁹³ Ibid. 201

⁹⁴ Ibid. 202

⁹⁵ Young, "Whither the Arctic? Conflict or Cooperation in the Circumpolar North." 73

Arctic is required.⁹⁶ In Young's view this tripartite solution relies on agreements regarding territorial disputes, a push to construct issue-tailored governmental regimes, and an expansion of the character of the Arctic Council to meet these emerging issues.⁹⁷ Byers builds off of Young's concerns regarding the Arctic Council's ability to respond to emerging issues in terms of encroachment of other international politics into the Arctic region's relationship by examining the impacts of the Ukrainian Crisis on the ability of the Arctic states to effectively cooperate within Arctic international relations.⁹⁸ Byers frames his study of the status of Arctic politics before and after the Crimean crisis through the lens of Keohane and Nye's image of complex interdependence.⁹⁹ Ultimately, Byers discovers the Ukrainian Crisis has caused a suspension of a variety of military and economic cooperative programs, the programs most closely related to the Arctic in environmental, research sharing, and search and rescue operations remain resolute because of the complexities of the interdependence Russia has on the international organizations tailored to the region.¹⁰⁰ Each of these pieces are important to include within my own research because of their ability to elucidate the capacity and capability of the Arctic Council to both weather and respond to Crises within and without the Arctic.

Coupled together, each of these four pieces patches together paints a picture of the Arctic Council's history of being shaped by the interests of its members and the broader interactions between the sub-blocs within it. Therefore, it provides an important angle to examine how the goals and objectives of the Council can ultimately be shaped by members and how each member responds to crises within the Arctic Community.

⁹⁶ Ibid. 81

⁹⁷ Ibid.82

⁹⁸ Byers, "Crises and International Cooperation: An Arctic Case Study." 375

⁹⁹ Ibid. 376

¹⁰⁰ Ibid. 394

Arctic Economics

Given the economic weight lent to the Arctic by the international community, it is vital to briefly review the importance levied towards Arctic economics by the scholarly community. This section is most efficiently divided into sections regarding how the Arctic community has reacted regarding Arctic economics and the domestic considerations of Arctic states regarding Arctic economics.

First, Keil notes the various aspects of significant schools of international relations, neorealist and neoliberal institutionalism, thinking in regards to institutionalist explanations of the Arctic region's cooperation on a variety of issues with a particular focus on economics.¹⁰¹ Keil argues the debate between these two schools concerning the Arctic's resource reserves has failed to adequately examine the varying motivations for Arctic states concerning Arctic resources, particularly oil and natural gas.¹⁰² In researching the interests of those Arctic states, Keil discovers a varying degree of interest related to those natural resources though there is nothing consistent or conclusive into the likelihood of confrontation among the Arctic states because a rush for Arctic rush is unlikely.¹⁰³ Building off of this idea of a rush for Arctic resources being unlikely, Jensen and Skedsmo detail the various foreign policy discourses describing the relationship Russia and Norway have to the Arctic, particularly related to official communications to other states.¹⁰⁴ To accomplish this Jensen and Skedsmo examine a host of official communications from both governments related to the Arctic, discovering the Norwegian approach is characterized by a discursive mobilization on Arctic issues while Russian approaches

¹⁰¹ Keil, "The Arctic: A New Region of Conflict? The Case of Oil and Gas." 162

¹⁰² Ibid. 163

¹⁰³ Ibid.180

¹⁰⁴ Jensen and Skedsmo, "Approaching the North: Norwegian and Russian Foreign Policy Discourses on the European Arctic." 439

are broadly characterized by assertiveness and relative gains problems.¹⁰⁵ Jensen and Skedsmo argue such a difference is related to the relative resource endowments within the European Arctic and how those resources factor into the national interests of the state.¹⁰⁶ With both of these pieces in mind, it is clear there are competing narratives regarding the Arctic's resource endowments and their impact on the politics of the region.

Along this line, Overland examines the domestic economic potential for the Russian Arctic. Overland asserts the view of Russian action in the Arctic as overly nationalistic and concerning is unfounded, instead she proposes Russian policy actions are completely in line with the broader region and the actions of other states.¹⁰⁷ Notably, Overland concludes the broader economic considerations of the Arctic region are causing some measure of cooperation among the various states as international corporations maneuver throughout the region.¹⁰⁸ Vladimirova builds off of these ideas related to broader spectrum cooperation among Arctic states in detailing the Russian approaches and beliefs related to sustainable economic development in the European Arctic.¹⁰⁹ Vladimirova reveals the political discourse on sustainable, green development is different depending on with whom politicians are interacting.¹¹⁰ Within the international system Russian politicians are willing to support communal objectives related to green development and environmentalism, yet at home those same politicians are far more concerned with high rates of poverty and unemployment.¹¹¹ Thus, domestically Russia is much more concerned with extracting resources in order to feed the needs of the economy and the people, rather than

¹⁰⁵ Ibid. 440

¹⁰⁶ Ibid. 448

¹⁰⁷ I. Overland, "Russia's Arctic Energy Policy," *International Journal* 65, no. 4 (2010). 865

¹⁰⁸ Ibid. 872

¹⁰⁹ V. Vladimirova, "Politics of the Green Economy in Russia's European North," *Journal of Political Ecology* 24 (2017). 296

¹¹⁰ Ibid. 298

¹¹¹ Ibid.

preserving or managing those resources for future usage.¹¹² Each of these pieces argues there is an almost paradoxical approach to economic development within the Arctic which almost pays lip service to the will of the international community.

Taken as a whole there is an interesting assertiveness related to the economic developments of the Arctic region. There is simultaneously not great rush for Arctic natural resources, yet there remains a significant amount of domestic interest in those resources in order to fuel the growth of national power. Thus, the Arctic is a realm of both intense economic focus from the international and domestic communities of Arctic states but there is no real way to significantly enrich Arctic investors.

Arctic Identity

An urgently important facet of studying the intersection of Arctic identity, national interests, and the Arctic Council is the concept of Arctic identity as it exists within the Arctic states as they currently lie. Therefore it is important to detail how identity affects regime adherence, then the conceptualization of the Arctic within state bureaucracies, before finally detailing how the Arctic space is carved out in national discourse.

First, Medby reviews the likelihood of regime adherence of Arctic states to the regimes created by the Arctic Council and the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Seas, utilizing Norway as a case study.¹¹³ Medby details the various pieces of Norwegian identity which factor into developing proper adherence to the regimes proffered within the international community and how those regimes in turn affect the identity of the state.¹¹⁴ Medby concludes the

¹¹² Ibid.298

¹¹³ I. A. Medby, "Big Fish in a Small (Arctic) Pond: Regime Adherence as Status and Arctic State Identity in Norway," in *Arctic Yearbook 2015* (Akureyri, Iceland: Northern Research Forum, 2016). 313

¹¹⁴ Ibid.315

national identity of Norway plays a significant role in determining the regime adherence of the Norwegian government.¹¹⁵

In another piece, Medby examines how the arctic is conceptualized as a region in the identity of various bureaucrats working for the governments of the eight states of the Arctic Council.¹¹⁶ Medby's discussion of the humanization of the Arctic by these bureaucrats offers an interesting introspection into how discourses related to national identity shape the individuals who assist in administering the state.¹¹⁷ This is critical because it offers insight into how the bureaucrats feel they should act in regards to the Arctic, or what they feel they should represent when administering the Arctic.¹¹⁸

Finally, Dittmer et al. detail how the space for Arctic geopolitics is carved out within the areas both within and without the Arctic Circle.¹¹⁹ The focus on the local and every day of the Arctic through the examination of the construction of Arctic geopolitics through the eyes of the people most closely experiencing them is used to offer a critique to the prevailing neo-realist identifications of emerging Arctic politics.¹²⁰ Ultimately, the researchers conclude with a call to action related to studying the construction of the Arctic both through the ethnography of the region but also through its geographic construction as a near or far space related to scientific study.¹²¹

Taken as a group, these pieces paint a picture of a national identity for Arctic states rooted in key concepts which are uniquely Arctic and poignant for the population of these Arctic

¹¹⁵ Ibid. 321

¹¹⁶ "Articulating State Identity: 'Peopling' the Arctic State." 116

¹¹⁷ Ibid. 117

¹¹⁸ Ibid.123

¹¹⁹ J. Dittmer et al., "Have You Heard the One About the Disappearing Ice? Recasting Arctic Geopolitics," *ibid.*30, no. 4 (2011). 202

¹²⁰ Ibid. 203

¹²¹ Ibid. 212

states. What's more is those identities play a significant role in outlining how the state government adheres to the tenants of institutional regimes and presents such information to the rest of its population, thereby creating salient issues related to the protection or preservation of the Arctic based on those same national identities. In this sense it is critical to include each of these pieces in this research on the Arctic Council's ability to affect state policies.

Polar Security

As the Arctic has warmed, an increasing number of newspaper outlets have become concerned about the securitization of Arctic space by the states on the coast of the Arctic Ocean. Thus, it is important to include the scholarly body's contribution to the study of polar security in the warming Arctic. The securitization of Arctic space is best considered in two parts; first the relationship between Arctic security and climate change and second the Russian-Western relationship in the Arctic.

First, it is important to understand the impacts of climate change on Arctic security. Gerhard et al. focus their piece on studying the impact of climate change on the regional politics of the Arctic related to the geographical spread of the Arctic region.¹²² The authors argue the Arctic is experiencing a host of impacts from climate change which may prove exacerbating to the ongoing regional tensions related to territorial disputes and intimacy.¹²³ The authors conclude though climate change possesses the potential to increase the likelihood of conflict in the region, the various institutions within the region hold the potential to actually increase cooperation on unique Arctic issues as the region's climate warms.¹²⁴ Building off of the ideas of changes within the Arctic sphere, Blunden examines the ongoing security developments of the Arctic Council

¹²² Gerhardt et al., "Contested Sovereignty in a Changing Arctic." 992

¹²³ Ibid. 993

¹²⁴ Ibid. 999

since the collapse of the Soviet Union.¹²⁵ Blunden argues the ongoing ice-melt within the Arctic poses the potential to transform ongoing Arctic relations from cooperation because of the amount of economic stakes within the region.¹²⁶ Ultimately, Blunden concludes the ongoing rhetorical actions of the various Arctic states serves to distort the relatively stable region, with the only true security risk being the potential the rhetorical vitriol among the Arctic states to increase feelings of distrust among the Arctic states.¹²⁷ Continuing the idea of economics being an Achilles heel to future Arctic relationships, Dodds analyzes how Arctic Coastal states utilize the international legal framework to reframe and justify their claims to exclusive economic zones in the midst of the Arctic Ocean.¹²⁸ Dodds recognizes and details the various irritations levied by various states and indigenous peoples institutions who are dissatisfied with the overall treatment of the ongoing Arctic territorial disputes.¹²⁹ Dodds concludes there is a rising concern the coastal Arctic states will seek to enhance their territorial claims as the overall region continues to warm and access improves.¹³⁰ Taken as a group, it is clear climate change is altering the formerly stable relationships at the top of the world by increasing access to historical territorial disputes while decreasing costs of access for the navies of the Arctic Ocean.

Second, the most important and ongoing facet of Arctic security relations is the historic dyad between the West and Russia. Atland and Pedersen examine the history of Russian-Western security policy interactions regarding the Norwegian Svalbard Archipelago.¹³¹ In order to examine these interactions and changes within Russian security policy, Atland and Pedersen

¹²⁵ Blunden, "The New Problem of Arctic Stability." 121

¹²⁶ Ibid. 122

¹²⁷ Ibid. 137

¹²⁸ Dodds, "Flag Planting and Finger Pointing: The Law of the Sea, the Arctic and the Political Geographies of the Outer Continental Shelf."

¹²⁹ Ibid.

¹³⁰ Ibid.

¹³¹ Kristian Atland; Torbjorn Pedersen, "The Svalbard Archipelago in Russian Security Policy: Overcoming the Legacy of Fear- or Reproducing It? ," *European Security* 17 (2008). 227

utilize a securitization framework in order to determine which issues hold the largest degree of importance to Russia.¹³² Ultimately, Atland and Pedersen reveal the great deal of concern the Russian government holds for Norwegian policies on the Svalbard Archipelago, leaving the Svalbard Islands a source of concern for Russian security policy.¹³³ While Russia still has ongoing security concerns in the Arctic as elucidated by Atland and Pedersen, in another article Atland studies the Arctic interactions between the Russian military and the Russian oil industry in order to examine Russian desecuritization in the European Arctic.¹³⁴ Interestingly, Atland unveils issues once solely pertinent to the Russian military are steadily becoming the realm of civilian economic activity in order to support the ongoing expansion of Russian Arctic oil extraction.¹³⁵ Atland concludes this trend has been ongoing since the early 1990's and will likely continue as desecuritization does not impede larger Russian security goals.¹³⁶ This duality of Russian policies in the region is further explored by Baev. Baev reveals it is simultaneously a zone for cooperation and an area of possible contention with the West following the 2014 Ukrainian Crisis.¹³⁷ Baev argues the ongoing development of Russian military capabilities in the Arctic and the development of new Arctic infrastructure are incoherent to broader Russian policy related to the Arctic.¹³⁸ Thus, Russia is left in a position of its military somewhat drawing down its capabilities in order to satisfy cooperative goals from the Russian foreign ministry despite the fact Russian military funding is what is financing the redevelopment of Soviet-Era settlements

¹³² Ibid. 228

¹³³ Ibid. 246

¹³⁴ Atland, "Russia's Northern Fleet and the Oil Industry-Rivals or Partners? Petroleum, Security, and Civil-Military Relations in the Post-Cold War European Arctic." 362

¹³⁵ Ibid. 363

¹³⁶ Ibid. 379

¹³⁷ Pavel K. Baev, "Examining the Execution of Russian Military-Security Policies and Programs in the Arctic," in *Russia's Far North*, ed. Shinichiro Tabata Veli-Pekka Tynkkynen, Daria Gritsenko, Masanori Goto (Routledge, 2018). 113

¹³⁸ Ibid. 113

and installations across Russia's northern coast.¹³⁹ All of these pieces together paint a picture of states seemingly confused as to how they would like to engage on another in such a strategically important region of the world.

Both of the security relationships examined reveal an Arctic which is simultaneously dynamic in its development and stalled in how it would like to proceed with its security objectives. In a security sense, the melting of sea-ice has increased the visibility of emerging security issues to national governments while the historic animosities of the region are both reinforced by this and tempered by it.

Canada and the Arctic

Canada is never really considered by the average person to be a vital player in international politics, but in the Arctic that is a different story. For Canada, the Arctic is a key part of national identity, security policy, and economic future. Thus, it is important to examine how Canada approaches the Arctic in terms of security, economics, and national policy.

First, Byers researches the military dimension of Canada in the Arctic, proposing climate change has played a role in revolutionizing Arctic security and facilitating non-military cooperation among the Arctic states.¹⁴⁰ However, Byers is sure to note the dimension of ongoing territorial disputes among the various Arctic states, particularly Canada.¹⁴¹ Yet, Byers remains hopeful the Arctic will retain its cooperative norms in the face of ongoing climate change due to the history among the Arctic states of cooperation on communal issues.¹⁴² Building off of the concern for territorial disputes mentioned by Byers, Griffiths reveals the upswing of nationalistic

¹³⁹ Ibid. 121

¹⁴⁰ M. Byers, "Cold Peace Arctic Cooperation and Canadian Foreign Policy," *International Journal* 65, no. 4 (2010). 899

¹⁴¹ Ibid. 899

¹⁴² Ibid. 899

sovereignty sentiment following the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001 related to the security of the Northwest Passage.¹⁴³ Griffiths seeks to dispel the myth that Canadian national sovereignty is at risk in the Arctic due to the relatively slow decline of sea-ice and there is already a strong set of regulations related to Canadian waterways.¹⁴⁴ Griffiths concludes the "...futile handwringing..." regarding the Northwest Passage is likely to continue, though he outlines several options for strengthening Canadian claims to the Northwest Passage by bolstering the Canadian relationship with the indigenous Inuit peoples.¹⁴⁵ Both Byers and Griffiths reveal critical Canadian feelings towards the Arctic and the importance attached to it.

Next, Ruel researches the interactions between national identity and the propensity to pursue natural resources within the Arctic region for Canada.¹⁴⁶ Ruel argues the melting of the Arctic ice-cap is refocusing certain aspects of Canadian policy and identity towards the Arctic region, and ignoring the various real costs associated with the development of the Canadian Arctic.¹⁴⁷ Ruel concludes the push to develop the Arctic region is one full of challenges and poses the risk to destabilize some of the relationships Canada has built with the indigenous peoples of the Canadian north.¹⁴⁸ In this sense, Ruel paints a picture of Canada simultaneously ignorant of and interested in creating economic opportunities for itself in the Arctic.¹⁴⁹

In terms of national identity, Landriault investigates how Canadian public opinion on Arctic issues and assesses the effect of government activism on those opinions.¹⁵⁰ Landriault examines polling over the course of the period from 2006-2015 related to circumpolar issues and

¹⁴³ F. Griffiths, "The Shipping News - Canada's Arctic Sovereignty Not on Thinning Ice," *ibid.* 58, no. 2 (2003). 257

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.* 264

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.* 282

¹⁴⁶ G. K. Ruel, "The (Arctic) Show Must Go on Natural Resource Craze and National Identity in Arctic Politics," *ibid.* 66, no. 4 (2011). 825

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.* 826

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.* 829

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid.* 833

¹⁵⁰ M. Landriault, "Public Opinion on Canadian Arctic Sovereignty and Security," *Arctic* 69, no. 2 (2016). 160

politics.¹⁵¹ Landriault concludes though Arctic issues do not overwhelm other significant issues for Canadians, they routinely receive a high level of support related to foreign policy and national defense.¹⁵² Landriault offers a caveat though in suggesting Canadian public opinion favors approaches to Arctic sovereignty prioritizing negotiations and international institutions.¹⁵³ Lackenbauer builds on the concept of prioritizing international institutions brought forth by Landriault in examining how the Canadian policy of “One Arctic” situates Canadian domestic policy in line with Canada’s chairmanship of the Arctic Council.¹⁵⁴ Lackenbauer provides a historical examination of Canadian policy related to sovereignty finishing out with a comparison of the Trudeau administrations differences and similarities to the Harper administration related to the Arctic.¹⁵⁵ Lackenbauer concludes the Canadian policy introduction of “One Arctic” fit into broader conceptions of the Arctic in a Canadian sense, and mark as another attempt to imprint a Canadian view of the Arctic onto the rest of the Arctic Council.¹⁵⁶ As a pair, these authors research suggests while Canada is interested in pursuing institutional solutions to its problems, there is still a strong spring of national identity which colors its perceptions and interactions with those same institutions.

Ultimately, all of these pieces together show a mosaic of Canadian beliefs related to the Arctic which are strongly held and in competition of Canadian policy goals. The propensity to view the Arctic as a realm in need of securitization despite the lack of tangible threats to Canadian national sovereignty is at odds with the desire to pursue institutional solutions to those

¹⁵¹ Ibid.162

¹⁵² Ibid.164

¹⁵³ Ibid.165

¹⁵⁴ P. Whitney Lackenbauer, "Conceptualizing "One Arctic" as the "Canadian Arctic"? Situating Canada's Arctic Council Chairmanship (2013-2015)," in *One Arctic: The Arctic Council and Circumpolar Governance*, ed. Heather Nicol P. Whitney Lackenbauer, and Wilfrid Greaves (Canadian Arctic Resources Committee). 46

¹⁵⁵ Ibid. 47

¹⁵⁶ Ibid. 65

same problems. In sum, Canadian policy on the Arctic is a mixed bag of national interests, normal Canadian policy pursuits, and fears of a weakened Canada bullied by its neighbors.

Russia and the Arctic

Finally, for the purposes of examining how the national identities of Arctic states jive with the general goals of the Arctic Council it is critical to examine the scholarly research on Russia in the Arctic. As the largest Arctic state, both in terms of economic activity and population above the Arctic Circle, for Russia the Arctic region holds a great deal of interest as recognized by the scholarly community.

Initially, Rowe and Blakkisrud seek to examine how the Arctic is uniquely conceptualized and constructed in terms of geopolitics by the Russian government.¹⁵⁷ To accomplish this goal Rowe and Blakkisrud analyze Russian media reporting on the Arctic and Arctic issues coupled with qualitatively approaches regarding interviews with policy makers from Arctic states.¹⁵⁸ Ultimately, the authors discover the most prominent methodology utilized by Russian policy makers in approaching the Arctic is to delineate the Arctic along lines related to cooperative measures and items more closely linked to national sovereignty.¹⁵⁹ Interestingly, Rowe and Blakkisrud discover there is a value placed on cooperation with the West on Arctic issues and approaches often are to distance Russia from geopolitical or geostrategic aims.¹⁶⁰

Providing more detail on the work carried out by Rowe and Blakkisrud, Gritsenko details the various Russian policy agendas regarding the Arctic that have been reported on in a variety

¹⁵⁷ E. W. Rowe and H. Blakkisrud, "A New Kind of Arctic Power? Russia's Policy Discourses and Diplomatic Practices in the Circumpolar North," *Geopolitics* 19, no. 1 (2014). 66

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.* 67

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.* 82

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.* 82

of Russian media outlets.¹⁶¹ In analyzing six different newspapers Gritsenko discovered there was a transformation in reporting on the Arctic before and after the Ukrainian Crisis.¹⁶² Before the crisis, the newspapers were concerned with the economic opportunities and exploitation of the Arctic region, but afterwards the papers were most concerned with the impact of sanctions and securitization.¹⁶³

Furthering this same effort regarding domestic perceptions of Russian political narratives, Khrushcheva and Poberezhskaya delve into how the Arctic has been categorically represented within Russian political narratives.¹⁶⁴ In order to operationalize this goal, the authors examine over a hundred various official documents available from the Russian president's website.¹⁶⁵ These documents reveal the focus of the Russian president in discussing the Arctic frame Russia as an "Arctic Great Power" in emphasizing the various resource endowments, geographical location, and resource endowments.¹⁶⁶ Khrushcheva and Poverzhskaya note this rhetoric does not correlate with broader Russian policy in cooperation with the West on the Arctic.¹⁶⁷

In terms of broader economic and policy development for Russia, Henry's detailing of environmental movements within Russia is interesting for the purposes of this research.¹⁶⁸ Overall, instead of drawing on domestic support for environmental objectives, environmentalist movements in Russia rely on transnational support to achieve their objectives as the constraints regarding domestic organization within the Russian Federation are so strict in prohibiting

¹⁶¹ D. Gritsenko, "Vodka on Ice? Unveiling Russian Media Perceptions of the Arctic," *Energy Research & Social Science* 16 (2016). 8

¹⁶² Ibid.9

¹⁶³ Ibid.11

¹⁶⁴ O. Khrushcheva and M. Poberezhskaya, "The Arctic in the Political Discourse of Russian Leaders: The National Pride and Economic Ambitions," *East European Politics* 32, no. 4 (2016). 1

¹⁶⁵ Ibid. 3

¹⁶⁶ Ibid. 20

¹⁶⁷ Ibid. 21

¹⁶⁸ L. A. Henry, "Between Transnationalism and State Power: The Development of Russia's Post-Soviet Environmental Movement," *Environmental Politics* 19, no. 5 (2010). 756

assembly.¹⁶⁹ Ultimately, the efforts of these groups to enact change within their governments have been linked to rhetorical change unless there is congruence between economic and environmental goals.¹⁷⁰

Finally, in terms of looking towards the future for Russia, Antrim inspects the impact of Arctic climate change on the geopolitics of Russia.¹⁷¹ Historically, the Russian northern coastline was an area with very little importance for the international community and Russian policy objectives.¹⁷² Antrim contends as the Arctic climate warms and the sea-ice recedes the Russian northern coastline will become one of the most important trade routes in the world, serving as the means to catapult Russia from its status as a regional, landlocked power into a more conventional power.¹⁷³ Antrim concludes her discussion of the potential future of the Russian Arctic with a variety of policy proposals for the United States in order to meet and mitigate this prospective future.¹⁷⁴

Each of these varying pieces paint a picture of a political system which is focused on making the most economically for their constituents and developing the Arctic to improve the status of Russia in the international system in terms of power and capability. However, simultaneously to that drive has been the drive for the Russian cooperation with the West in order to secure necessary support to make those dreams of an Arctic springboard to increase power a reality. Thus, for Russia the Arctic becomes a mixed bag of cooperative policies and nationalistic aims.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid.757

¹⁷⁰ Ibid. 777

¹⁷¹ Caitlyn L. Antrim, "The Next Geographical Pivot: The Russian Arctic in the 21st Century," *The Naval War College Review* 63, no. 3 (2010). 15

¹⁷² Ibid.16

¹⁷³ Ibid. 15

¹⁷⁴ Ibid. 34-35

CHAPTER 4

METHODOLOGY

The Arctic has steadily gained prominence in the minds of scholars, policymakers, scientists, and businessmen alike. Historically there was a significant degree of fascination with the Arctic though the region was essentially closed off, and today the region is becoming increasingly open due to climate change.¹⁷⁵ Thus, it is important before delving into the case studies of Russia and Canada to outline the methods utilized in the case studies, then to review the Arctic Council, before finally justifying the timeframe of study.

Initially, from a methodological perspective it is vital to utilize a qualitative approach to studying the Arctic region. The qualitative approach is the best methodological route to study the region because avoids the current limitations on Arctic data, circumvents the pitfall of temporality, and is more accommodating to unquantifiable aspects of the region. First, the Arctic region possesses a host of interesting data related to variables relevant to a myriad of emerging issues in the Arctic. However, there simply isn't enough data related to key issues such as Arctic developmental spending, surface military operations in the region, and Arctic ocean-going traffic. This is of course due to either the classified nature of the data or small sample sizes with only a few years of data collected. Moreover, the fact the Arctic Council has eight member-states further limits the data even more from a statistical analysis perspective. Therefore, statistical testing of datasets will not be pursued in this research and instead a qualitative approach is necessary. Next, with temporally sequential or linked data there are often glaring skews within statistical analyses. Given the relatively recent bump in Arctic interest, data on Arctic issues or interests may be skewed even further on a year-to-year basis, thus causing further issues for

¹⁷⁵ Borgerson, "Arctic Meltdown - the Economic and Security Implications of Global Warming."

statistical analyses of emerging Arctic phenomena. With this in mind, it is possible even if enough data was available to carry out a statistical analysis of the Arctic region and the issues most pertinent to it, then those results may not be as accurate to what is happening within the region. Accordingly, it is best to then pursue a qualitative analysis for the best analytical results. Finally, the Arctic is a region with a great degree of nuance and importance to the states which have territory within its bounds. Though some of this nuance has been explored in surveys, even more of the importance of the Arctic to the peoples of states like Russia, Canada, and Norway has yet to be operationalized or simply cannot be quantified. With such a crucial piece of the analytical puzzle outside of the reach of scholars for the purposes of statistical analysis, the only recourse is to adopt a qualitative analysis to delve into the significance of the region in the identity of the peoples and states calling the region home. Consequently, the best course of action to study the region is to pursue qualitative studies into the Arctic.

As the premier international institution for the region, in addition to being one of the primary mechanisms studied in the context of altering state behavior, it is important to briefly explain the Arctic Council's role in Arctic politics. Essentially, the Arctic Council operates as a forum and an advisory body for its member-states, through its various meetings and its working groups. Initially, the most prominent meetings of the Arctic Council are aptly termed the Arctic Council Ministerial Meetings. Every two years the leading diplomats of the Arctic Council, including observer states, meet to discuss the variety of reports, developments, and important issues of the region which developed in those two years.¹⁷⁶ The Arctic Council Meetings always conclude with a declaration, though not legally binding to member-states, outline future goals of

¹⁷⁶ The Canadian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Development for the People of the North: The Arctic Council Program During Canada's Chairmanship 2013-2015," (The Arctic Council, 2013).

the Arctic Council and the means to achieve those goals.¹⁷⁷ Other meetings often occur with other, lower level diplomats throughout the year and are often related to specific reports, news, or developments. Meetings like these enables states to stay on the same page on the issues researched and studied by the Arctic Council's Working Groups. The Arctic Council's Working Groups are tailor made departments mandated and funded by the Arctic Council to address specific issues as they develop and to provide information to the Arctic Council's member-states and the public in the form of detailed reports.¹⁷⁸ These reports then form the basis of Arctic Council policy recommendations within Arctic Council Meetings following their publication, and have historically formed the basis of the three legally binding Arctic Council resolutions on issues such as Search and Rescue Operations and Fisheries Conservation. Both the Arctic Council Meetings and the Arctic Council Working Groups form the two most important features of the Arctic Council as the primary interactive portions of the Arctic Council with its member-states, serving as vehicles to unify member-state policies throughout the region.

Given the historic interests within the region, notably territorial disputes and Arctic based-national identities, it is important to identify a proper timescale for studying Arctic relations and interactions. For the purposes of this research though, it is important to begin with the enforcing of the Montreal Protocol which began in 1989.¹⁷⁹ This timeframe enables a ready examination of the development of scientific diplomacy related to the environment between the United States and the Soviet Union, the founding of the Arctic Council, and the new way forward on climate protection which saw its foundation within the Protocol. For the purposes of the analysis in the case studies, this period of nearly thirty years will be divided into decades

¹⁷⁷ Young, "The Structure of Arctic Cooperation: Solving Problems/Seizing Opportunities."

¹⁷⁸ The Arctic Council, "Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council: Joint Communique of the Governments of the Arctic Countries on the Establishment of the Arctic Council."

¹⁷⁹ United Nations Ozone Secretariat, "Handbook for the Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer."

based around pivotal events in regards to the relationship of Arctic Council member-states; the 1996 founding of the Arctic Council, the 2004 publication of the first Arctic Climate Report, and the 2014 Ukrainian Crisis. As explored within the following case studies, each of these events was precipitated with specific policy goals rooted in the inclinations and national identity of each state. Moreover, these events affected member-states on key issues related to the Arctic and prompted a relative transformation of those affected policies. Thus, defining the three decades since 1989 along the lines of these Arctic-critical events is both imperative and justified for the study of the Arctic Council's capability to alter its member-state policies.

CHAPTER 5

THE TRUE NORTH STRONG AND FREE: CANADA AND THE ARCTIC COUNCIL

Of the most militaristic and nationalistic concerning the Arctic Region, it is appropriate to begin first with the nation where the idea of the Arctic Council was first incepted; Canada. The Arctic has held a paramount role in developing Canadian national identity, the most readily available place to observe such importance is in the Canadian National Anthem which labels the state as the “true North, strong a free.”¹⁸⁰ The oddity when concerning politics in Ottawa and other provinces south of the Arctic Circle though is the percentage of Canadians who have visited the Canadian Arctic is shockingly low given this Arctic importance.¹⁸¹ Therefore, before delving into the various periods of interest to this case study it is vital to contextualize the importance of the Arctic in Canadian politics both within the consciousness of the Canadian Government and the Canadian Populace as a whole.

Historically, the Canadian Government has pursued policies to support Arctic ambitions resonant with their constituents mainly in line with the view of the Arctic as a potential wealth generator and the declaration of the Northwest Passage as an internal Canadian waterway. Throughout Canadian history, the regions surrounding the Arctic Circle have drawn in citizens and government officials to exploit natural resources. Discoveries in the northern reaches of Canada of profitable goods such as furs, gold, timber, and oil ripe for the taking by enterprising entrepreneurs have continually provoked Canadian policies regarding the Arctic region.¹⁸² And just as was the case historically, today the Arctic region holds a great degree of promise as a realm to make Ottawa wealthy from resources extracted from under the seabed to making other

¹⁸⁰ Sir Adolphe-Basile Routhier Calixa Lavallee, Robert Stanley Weir, "Anthems of Canada," The Government of Canada.

¹⁸¹ Medby, "Articulating State Identity: 'Peopling' the Arctic State." 122

¹⁸² Borgerson, "Arctic Meltdown - the Economic and Security Implications of Global Warming."

regions of provinces accessible for trade year-round for the first time in Canadian history.¹⁸³

Thus, the Arctic for the Canadian government can in part be viewed as a new revenue stream to finance other Canadian ambitions. Besides the draw of the potential natural riches of the Arctic, the Arctic holds prominence to the Canadian government due to the declaration of the Northwest Passage as an internal Canadian Waterway and Canada's history of territory disputes with its neighbors in the Arctic region.¹⁸⁴ Shockingly few of these disputes have been resolved with several of them being placed on the backburner simply due to the inaccessibility of the Arctic. Oddly enough, Canada's great relationship with its immediate neighbors of the United States and Greenland is quite warm on dozens of other issues. Yet, in terms of Canadian politics these territory disputes are galvanizing for the government, having historically propelled Canadian political parties to success in national elections.¹⁸⁵ In short, the restatements of Arctic territorial disputes have served to galvanize Canadian national sentiment or otherwise securitize a central aspect of Canadian national sentiment to increase buy-in from constituents into new policies. Thus, Ottawa and Canadian political parties hold the Arctic in high esteem as a realm central to its ambitions, either as fuel for the fires of the economy or as a means to increase popular support for political ideas.

As previously mentioned the Canadian Arctic features quite heavily in Canadian national identity; however, in terms of the average Canadian citizen it is important to note aspects more usually readily divorced from conventional aspects of state power. Predominantly, this relates to the Canadian northern wilderness as a place for conservation. Most Canadians, though they have not visited the Canadian Arctic, can express an appreciation for the Wilds of Canada's northern

¹⁸³ Ho, "The Implications of Arctic Sea Ice Decline on Shipping."

¹⁸⁴ Isted, "Sovereignty in the Arctic: An Analysis of Territorial Disputes & Environmental Policy Considerations."

¹⁸⁵ Dodds, "We Are a Northern Country: Stephen Harper and the Canadian Arctic."

reaches.¹⁸⁶ This idea of the Canadian frontier has featured strongly in Canada historically, and today is mostly made up of vacationers visiting more rural, often forested parts of Canada. This coupled with pushes towards conservation of species like the Polar Bear and Arctic Seal, has led to a strong desire to preserve the Arctic environment and conserve its species as best as possible within the Canadian populace.¹⁸⁷ The push towards conservation began in the 1970's and today has led to the entrenchment of an identity of stewardship for the northern reaches of North America, including the Arctic, among the Canadian population.¹⁸⁸

Both the Canadian government and the Canadian population have entrenched ideas about the Arctic region. While oddly competing with each other, these ideas are central to the policy pursuits of Canada. Having briefly examined how the Arctic factors into Canadian identity for the Canadian government and populace it's now possible to delve into the case study in regards to the interactions and effectiveness of the Arctic Council in altering Canadian national policies since 1989. This period of nearly 30 years shall be divided into three sections based around the central issues and watershed events for each decade; the 1996 Founding of the Arctic Council, the 2004 Publication of the Arctic Climate Report, and the 2014 Ukrainian Crisis.

The Founding of the Council

The late 1980's quickly developed into a whirlwind of events, one specific set of events for the relationship of the Soviet Union and the West was within scientific research and action to prevent the expansion of the hole in the Ozone Layer. The Montreal Protocol, the final agreement related to this discussion among the global community, set the tone for the rest of the 1990's alongside the collapse of the Soviet Union as a time for new connections between the

¹⁸⁶ Medby, "Articulating State Identity: 'Peopling' the Arctic State." 184

¹⁸⁷ Lackenbauer, "Conceptualizing "One Arctic" as the "Canadian Arctic"? Situating Canada's Arctic Council Chairmanship (2013-2015)." 65

¹⁸⁸ Landriault, "Public Opinion on Canadian Arctic Sovereignty and Security." 163

former Eastern Bloc and the West.¹⁸⁹ Particularly, the idea of an international organization principally concerned with the Arctic region stemmed from the various scientific agreements launched during the period of the late 1980's and would become the Arctic Council in 1996.¹⁹⁰ Therefore, it is important to detail Canada's major concerns for the region before 1996, next examine how the Arctic Council's Founding affected those concerns, before finally detailing the new policy direction for Canadian foreign policy for the remainder of the decade.

Initially, one of the primary concerns of Canadian foreign policy leading into the 1990's was maintaining the momentum on scientific research and conservation from the 1980's prompting Canada to propose eventually propose the Arctic Council. Canada's willingness to support such an initiative was simultaneously an attempt to further conservation goals, especially in the adoption of the *Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy* by the Canadian Government in 1991, yet it also served to fulfill other national objectives for Canada.¹⁹¹ The discussions related to the Strategy began in September 1989 directly as a result of the Montreal Protocol, focusing on the study of the Arctic environment and conservation of the unique species calling the region home.¹⁹² Domestically, in 1991 Canada established the Canadian Polar Commission via the *Canadian Polar Commission Act* of 1991 to assist the Canadian Ministry of Indigenous and Northern Affairs develop policy recommendations for the Canadian government, disseminate information related to Canadian Arctic affairs, and collecting information related to the Canadian

¹⁸⁹ Frank Grundig, "Patterns of International Cooperation and the Explanatory Power of Relative Gains: An Analysis of Cooperation on Global Climate Change, Ozone Depletion, and International Trade," *International Studies Quarterly* 50, no. 4 (2006). 796

¹⁹⁰ Evan T. Bloom, "Establishment of the Arctic Council," *The American Journal of International Law* 93, no. 3 (1999). 712

¹⁹¹ Mark Stoller, "Environmental Imperatives and International Relations Canada's Challenge to Environmental Diplomacy," *The Journal of International Relations, Peace Studies, and Development* 1, no. 1 (2015).

¹⁹²

Arctic.¹⁹³ This high level of concern for the Arctic environment fits into overall Canadian identity as stewards of the Northern Reaches of North America while also fitting into international cooperative agreements like Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy.

The Strategy would go on to be critical to the development of the Arctic Council, as the Council was declared in AEPS's Inuvik Declaration in 1996.¹⁹⁴ Founded under the leadership of Ottawa, the Arctic Council was essentially viewed by the Canadian government as the means to achieve several critical policy objectives in line with how Canadians viewed the Arctic since the Montreal Protocol.¹⁹⁵ As outlined in the Ottawa Declaration of 1996, the Arctic Council was principally established as an international forum to fulfill the broader environmental and development objectives of AEPS while simultaneously providing a research forum for the eight Arctic states to discuss issues wholly unique to the High North.¹⁹⁶ Moreover, with the signing of the Ottawa Declaration Canada was enshrined as the first of Chairman of the Arctic Council, giving Canada the ability to set the agenda of the Arctic Council for its first two years.¹⁹⁷ Given the Canadian feeling of environmental stewardship in the Arctic domestically, these various actions of Canada within its foreign environmental and conservation policies are not surprising. At the conclusion of Canada's first tenure as Chairman of the Arctic Council Canada oversaw the first expansions of the Council into a variety of working groups geared towards specific issues ranging from environmental protections, climate research, and conservation.¹⁹⁸ Beyond this, the Canadian tenure prioritized developing the Arctic region sustainably in both terms of the

¹⁹³ Parliament of Canada, "Canadian Polar Commission Act," ed. Parliament of Canada (Justice Laws Website 1991); Canadian Polar Commission "About the Canadian Polar Commission," Canadian Polar Commission, <http://www.polarcom.gc.ca/eng/content/about-canadian-polar-commission>.

¹⁹⁴ The Arctic Council, "Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council: Joint Communique of the Governments of the Arctic Countries on the Establishment of the Arctic Council."

¹⁹⁵ Bloom, "Establishment of the Arctic Council."

¹⁹⁶ The Arctic Council, "Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council: Joint Communique of the Governments of the Arctic Countries on the Establishment of the Arctic Council."

¹⁹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁹⁸ The First Ministerial Meeting of the Arctic Council, "The Iqaluit Declaration," (The Arctic Council, 1998).

general Arctic economy to the human capital of the region.¹⁹⁹ As Ottawa has a history of viewing the Arctic as a potential economic bolster this is unsurprising, and the pursuit of these environmental policies is wholly in line with Canadian Arctic thinking. Therefore, for Canada this pivotal period of the 1990's with the inception of the Arctic Council is an evolution increasingly in favor of conservation, environmentalism, and scientific research to make them both happen.

Following the conclusion of the first Canadian Chairmanship, Canada maintains and supports the various environmental objectives of the new American Chairmanship from 1998-2000. The US policies coincided with nearly all of the Canadian policy objectives related to environmental concerns and the propagation of human capital developments in the region, prompting a somewhat steady amount of Canadian support for the Council and its objectives.²⁰⁰ The end of the 1990's saw several reaffirming actions within Canada domestically to support the various environmental and conservation initiatives of the Arctic Council with legislation like the *Canadian Environmental Protection Act of 1999*.²⁰¹ Furthermore, Canada had taken a vested interest in maintaining the overall health of the Arctic region through the publication of various reports and recommendations like the *Canadian Arctic Contaminants Assessment Report* in 1997 by Environment and Climate Change Canada and the passage of the *Mackenzie Valley Resource Management Act of 1998* by the Canadian Parliament²⁰². Moreover, the intensifying environmental provisions and positioning of Canadian policy during this period made a lasting

¹⁹⁹ The Arctic Council, "Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council: Joint Communique of the Governments of the Arctic Countries on the Establishment of the Arctic Council."

²⁰⁰ U.S. Department of State Arctic Council Team, "United States Chairmanship 2015-2017 Program Highlights," (The Arctic Council, 2015).

²⁰¹ "Canadian Environmental Protection Act, 1999," ed. Canadian Parliament (Environment and Climate Change Canada, 1999).

²⁰² K. Adare J. Jensen, and R. Shearer, "Canadian Arctic Contaminants Assessment Report: Northern Contaminants Program," (Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, 1997); "Mackenzie Valley Resource Management Act," ed. Canadian Parliament (Justice Laws Website, 1998).

impression, empowering the Canadian government to address pollution and preserve the environment of Northern Canada.

For Ottawa, the 1990's represented the culmination of several policy goals fitting in line with Canadian national opinion and identity as stewards of the Arctic environment. Having examined how this pivotal decade served to promote Canadian environmental policy while providing for a larger international framework geared towards conservation oriented policy. The undercurrent of conservation, environmentalism, and climate research has remained, for Canada other areas of Arctic Policy have pushed their way to the forefront in Ottawa.

A Council of Action

The 2000's were viewed as an opportunity for Canada to continue on its environmentalist trajectory and to continue to support its ongoing projects. While those projects continued and expanded throughout the 2000's, this decade was also marked with significant shifts and changes to other aspects of Canada's Arctic policies. The primary event for this period for interactions between Canada and the Arctic Council was the publication of the 2004 *Arctic Climate Impact Assessment* and therefore it is critical to detail the general policy trend of Canada before 2004, the immediate impact of the 2004 Arctic Climate report, and how Arctic policies transformed after 2004.

Initially, Canadian policies related to the Arctic region prior to 2004 were similar to the previous decade and coincided with broader Arctic Council goals. Canadian policy continued a trajectory towards environmental sustainability and conservation through the enactment of several pieces of legislation and the subsequent founding of new regulatory administrations. Of particular note for the Canadian Arctic and sub-Arctic regions, are several Annual Reports from the *Nunavut Land Claims Agreement* of 1993 and the 2003 *Yukon Environmental and Socio-*

economic Assessment Act.²⁰³ Both of these items discuss various items of devolved power from Ottawa to the local indigenous peoples and the provinces respectively on issues like human development, sustainable development, and environmental management, fitting in line with broad goals from the Arctic Council related to indigenous representation and environmental management. Other than these environmental ambitions, Canada as a whole was growing increasingly concerned with its economic sovereignty within the warming Canadian Archipelago, due to its ongoing disputes related to the status of the Northwest Passage as a Canadian Waterway.²⁰⁴ Beyond this growing concern, Canada maintained its various cordial territorial disputes with its neighbors and its military readiness for Arctic operations through a variety of training operations.²⁰⁵ All of these various policies and actions stayed true to the national perceptions of the Arctic in Canada; however, the visibility of the Arctic in Canadian politics was soon to be transformed.

2004 was a dramatic year for the Arctic Council and its relationship with its members and the international community. For Canada it was a time period where Canadian territorial disputes made international headlines. Canada's ongoing territorial disputes with its neighbors never had a great degree of international attention, having a relatively minor impact on its relationship with them and amounting to no true concerns among policy makers as other Arctic issues continually superseded them.²⁰⁶ However, in March of 2004 the Canadian government and populace began in earnest to discuss the status of Canada's military and those territorial disputes. March ended with debate in the Canadian Parliament over budgetary allotments to the Canadian Military, with Conservative MP Stockwell Day making note of Arctic Territorial Disputes as a means of

²⁰³ "Annual Report for 2001-2004," in *Nunavut Annual Report* (Nunavut Implementation Panel, 2004); "Yukon Environmental and Socio-Economic Assessment Act," ed. Canadian Parliament (Justice and Laws Website, 2003).

²⁰⁴ Griffiths, "The Shipping News - Canada's Arctic Sovereignty Not on Thinning Ice." 277

²⁰⁵ M. Byers, "Cold Peace Arctic Cooperation and Canadian Foreign Policy," *ibid.* 65, no. 4 (2010). 904

²⁰⁶ Landriault, "Public Opinion on Canadian Arctic Sovereignty and Security." 164

highlighting the incumbent government's lax military spending following the 9/11 Terrorist Attacks.²⁰⁷ By the end of the month, the Canadian military would have made international headlines for carrying out training operations surrounding Hans Island, a center of Canada's ongoing territorial dispute with Denmark and the only real dispute regarding land in the Arctic.²⁰⁸ Operation Narwhal 04 took a small contingent of the Canadian military into the Arctic as a simple annual drill to maintain military readiness and familiarity with Arctic conditions; however, within a week it had made international headlines which termed the dispute the Hans Island "Whisky War" with Denmark.²⁰⁹ Though the Whisky War was a conflict which consisted of the placement of flags and alcohol by the Danish and Canadian militaries, it brought to light the ongoing territorial disputes Canada held with its neighbors to the international community. This event would achieve more significance in just a few short years to come as an indication of the politicization of the Arctic for the Conservative Party of Canada. By November 2004 the publication of the *Arctic Climate Impact Assessment* put the Arctic Council and the state of the Arctic climate into the households of states all around the globe.²¹⁰ The ACIA described the ongoing climate issues within the Arctic region and the dangers a warming Arctic posed to the various species calling the region home. This was one of the first reports which broadcast the effects of climate change to the world at large and succeeded in garnering the attention of the international community to the problems and tribulations facing the Arctic and how the Arctic Council was attempting to regulate, monitor, and confront those issues. Importantly, the Assessment made sure to note the retreat of Arctic Sea Ice and how it was projected to continue

²⁰⁷ Hansard, "37th Parliament, 3rd Session," (Canadian House of Commons 2004).

²⁰⁸ Byers, "Cold Peace Arctic Cooperation and Canadian Foreign Policy." 904

²⁰⁹ Rob McKenzie, "Cold War? This One Is Downright Chilly," *Orlando Sentinel* 2004.

²¹⁰ Nilsson, *A Changing Arctic Climate: Science and Policy in the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment*.

to decline in the midst of a warming regional climate.²¹¹ By and large, the ACIA would attract a great deal of concern related to environmentalism within Canada and thereby promote a further commitment to environmental policy goals, it also served as an early sign that the Arctic may become economically viable in the years to come.

The events of 2004 marked a significant turning point for Canadian public policy and perception of the Arctic, but the more significant developments for the region would be to come in just a few years. By and large the Canadian government continued its large pushes towards the development of its northern provinces as economically viable zones with continual support to bodies like the such as Nunavut Implementation Panel and Yukon Environmental and Socio-economic Assessment Board which were founded under prior legislation and continually published significant reports related to the conservation, health, and development efforts of the Canadian government.²¹² In terms of how Ottawa would begin to approach the Arctic question in other areas though, it is important to acknowledge the transformative election of 2006. Stephen Harper campaigned successfully for the Conservative Party in Canada in part on a platform concerned with the Arctic region and the territorial disputes Canada had within it, marking sure to reiterate those campaign promises of the defense of Canadian Sovereignty in the North in speeches in 2007, 2008, and 2010.²¹³ This marks a significant turn for Canadian Arctic policy as while the environmental objectives were pursued the Canadian military began to prepare itself for more regular Arctic operations and patrols to reassert Canada's claims, showing a divorce from prior action regarding policy priorities in the region.²¹⁴ While not game changing within the region or for Canada's relationship with its neighbors, the militarization of the Arctic is a policy

²¹¹ Ibid.

²¹² "Nunavut-Final Agreements and Related Implementation Matters," Government of Canada.; "Annual Reports," Yukon Environmental and Socio-economic Assessment Board.

²¹³ Dodds, "We Are a Northern Country: Stephen Harper and the Canadian Arctic."

²¹⁴ Landriault, "Public Opinion on Canadian Arctic Sovereignty and Security." 161

shift for Canada in the midst of the Arctic Council's stressing of cooperation across several different Arctic Council Chairmanships. Moreover, this militarization and the notes of the ACIA regarding sea ice coverage reinforced economic perceptions of the Arctic. This opening up of the region to oceangoing travel potentially year-round attracted a great deal of interest both within the hydrocarbons industry but also from the prospective trade route which could be considered to be nearly wholly within Canadian waters.²¹⁵ The insistence of the Northwest Passage being a Canadian waterway is significant especially in light of ongoing preparations to make ready the Canadian military for Arctic operations as part of the *Canada First Defense Strategy of 2008*.²¹⁶ As odd as these competing goals seem for Canada, each fits very well into Canadian national identity as both a steward of the Arctic environmentally and assert territorial claims regarding the Arctic.

2004 represented a year of shifts for the Canadian people and government, and in fact the Arctic region as a whole. Prior to 2004, the Arctic Council was relegated as an organization not readily looked towards by the rest of the global community, and following 2004 the Arctic Council made waves regarding the progression of climate change in the most vulnerable environments of the world. By and large, Canada's goals for the 2000's fit into the broader context of the Arctic Council's policy objectives by supporting the sustainable development of the Arctic Region's human resources and continually studying the Arctic environment, yet there was still the reassertion of nationalistic identity within the militarization of the Canadian Arctic and the use of the region as a rallying cry for electoral purposes.

²¹⁵ Byers, "Cold Peace Arctic Cooperation and Canadian Foreign Policy." 901

²¹⁶ Adam Lajeunesse, "The Canadian Armed Forces in the Arctic: Purpose, Capabilities, and Requirements," (Canadian Defense & Foreign Affairs Institute: University of Calgary: Centre for Military and Strategic Studies, 2015). 2

The Council in Crisis

As the scientific community began to recognize the severity of the warming in the Arctic region and informed the world about it, the amount of interest in the Arctic region increased. This crescendo of interest in the Arctic was punctuated with a defining moment for the Arctic Council during this period being the Ukrainian Crisis of 2014. Though this event occurred outside of Arctic territory, it led to the boycott of that year's Arctic Council meeting by both the United States and Canada.²¹⁷ Thus, it is important to examine the interactions between Canada and the Arctic Council during this period in order to determine how national identity influenced Canadian policy first by detailing how the start of the decade began, then examining the immediate impact of the 2014 crisis on Canadian-Arctic Council relations, before finally detailing how the relationship has progressed following 2014.

The opening of the 2010's was the beginning of a new relationship between Canada and the Arctic Council, therefore it is important to discuss how Canadian policies gelled with broader Council goals and how Canada began its second tenure as Council Chair. Initially, throughout the Norwegian, Danish, and Swedish terms of Arctic Council Chair the council was committed to the environmental goals of years past.²¹⁸ Each of these tenures saw major reports issued for the whole of the Arctic on environmental research, including the *Arctic Biodiversity Trends Report* of 2010.²¹⁹ Moreover, the Swedish Chairmanship saw two of the three legally binding agreements of the Arctic Council issued, those two agreements being *the Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic* of 2013 and the *Agreement on Cooperation in Aeronautical and maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic* of

²¹⁷ The Canadian Press, "Canada Boycotts Arctic Council Moscow Meeting over Ukraine," *Canadian Broadcasting Centre*, April 16, 2014 2014.

²¹⁸ Norway The Foreign Ministries of Denmark, and Sweden,, "Common Objectives and Priorities for Norwegian, Danish, and Swedish Chairmanships of the Arctic Council," (The Arctic Council, 2006).

²¹⁹ The Arctic Council Secretariat, "Kiruna Declaration," (The Arctic Council, 2013).

2011.²²⁰ In the meantime, Canada signed onto both of these agreements and began to issue new laws and regulations related to improving environmental conditions above the Arctic Circle. Notably, Canadian protected areas both on land and at sea began their largest expansion during this period, with most of those expansions occurring above the Arctic Circle.²²¹ Moreover, Canada improved its environmental regulations with the *Canadian Environmental Assessment Act* of 2012 in the midst of this time.²²² Furthermore, Canada also continued the process of devolving governmental authority in the northern provinces of Canada in line with Arctic Council objectives of indigenous representation with the *Nunavut Planning and Project Assessment Act* of 2013.²²³ For the 2nd Canadian Tenure as Arctic Council Chair, the host of environmental programs begun previously were continued or expanded upon, with the implementation of the *Framework for Action on Enhanced Black Carbon and methane Emissions Reductions* and the creation of the *Arctic Marine Strategic Plan for 2015-2025* being major highlights.²²⁴ However, the Canadian tenure differed on two key areas from prior Chairmanship plans in that it specifically makes reference to the development of “responsible arctic resource development” and the “establishment of safe arctic shipping.”²²⁵ While neither of these objectives are particularly surprising for the Arctic Council to focus on, their meshing with overall Canadian Arctic ambitions, identity, and the spike in interest within the region is something rather new. All of this broadly fits into the aspect of Canada as an environmental steward to the Arctic, but it also coincides with military spending and economic development projects for the Canadian Arctic. Of greatest controversy was the announcement of the awarding

²²⁰ The Arctic Council Secretariat, "Kiruna Declaration," (The Arctic Council, 2013)

²²¹ Environment Canada, "Canadian Protected Areas: Status Report 2006-2011," (Environment Canada, 2015). 24

²²² "Nunavut-Final Agreements and Related Implementation Matters".

²²³ "Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, 2012," ed. Canadian Parliament (Justice Laws Website, 2012).

²²⁴ The Canadian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Development for the People of the North: The Arctic Council Program During Canada's Chairmanship 2013-2015."

²²⁵ Ibid.

of contracts for a small fleet of Arctic Patrol Vessels in 2011.²²⁶ While these vessels were argued to be necessary under the Harper Administration, their ballooning cost of construction attracted a phenomenal amount of ire from the opposition party and the Canadian populace.²²⁷ Additionally, the Canadian military maintained its annual Arctic exercises without as great a deal of attention as in 2004.²²⁸ While the economic development of the Arctic for this time was linked to generalized Arctic Council objectives, the Canadian government pursued no expansions of ongoing policies.

The Russian Federation's actions in Ukraine are interesting especially in the context of Arctic Council relations. The destabilization of Ukraine through Russian action in Eastern Ukraine brought about a host of criticism from the globe, including Canada.²²⁹ Shortly following the immediate start of the crisis in March of 2014, there was to be a brief meeting of the Arctic Council to be held in April by Russia in Moscow.²³⁰ In response to the beginning of the Crisis, the Harper Administration of Canada announced Canada, then the Chair of the Council, would be boycotting the meeting to protest Russian action in Ukraine.²³¹ Shortly thereafter, the United States announced it would be boycotting the meeting as well in solidarity with Canada. While not groundbreaking as far as policy has been concerned for the Arctic Council, the two most powerful Western states on the council first boycotting a meeting in Russia did serve to put the Arctic Council in the news again. While this was the first time in which a member state did boycott a meeting of the Council, ultimately there was no dramatic effect to Council relations.²³²

²²⁶ Lajeunesse, "The Canadian Armed Forces in the Arctic: Purpose, Capabilities, and Requirements." 8

²²⁷ David Pugliese, "Twice the Price and Just as Nice: Irving's Arctic Patrol Ship Double the Cost of Previous Five," *National Post* 2018.

²²⁸ Lajeunesse, "The Canadian Armed Forces in the Arctic: Purpose, Capabilities, and Requirements." 3

²²⁹ Steven Chase and Kathryn Blaze Carlson, "Harper to Rally G7 Allies on Condemning Russia's Ukrainian Adventure," *The Globe and Mail* 2014.

²³⁰ The Canadian Press, "Canada Boycotts Arctic Council Moscow Meeting over Ukraine."

²³¹ Byers, "Crises and International Cooperation: An Arctic Case Study." 381

²³² *Ibid.* 381

Yet, it serves as an interesting example of when broader Canadian policy influenced its relationship with the Council while it was Council Chair.

The aftermath of the 2014 Ukrainian Crisis served to highlight how Canada's relationship with the Arctic Council interacts with broader Canadian policy and Canadian identity as a whole, and this is relevant in the years after 2014. Most notably, Canada continued to pursue nationalistic policies in line with Canada's *Northern Strategy: Our North, Our Heritage, Our Future* published in 2009.²³³ This strategy outlines four central pillars in terms of how Canadian policy will be organized to engage the Arctic region in the following order of importance; sovereignty assertion, economic development, environmental protection, and northern governance.²³⁴ This essential roadmap of Canadian policy follows the objectives laid out by the Arctic Council in terms of including terms of development for the economic, environmental, and representation for indigenous peoples; however, the prioritization of sovereignty issues for Canada is not surprising given the level of international interest within the region. Since 2010 the number of observer states on the Arctic Council has grown to include China and India, with a great deal of interest being levied towards the Northwest Passage as an international trade route.²³⁵ Canada has maintained a host of policies geared towards the latter three pillars of its Arctic Strategy, including new environmental protect legislation and signing the *Agreement to Prevent Unregulated High Seas Fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean* to preserve the Arctic environment as much as possible.²³⁶ Though environmental programs progress as they had for Canada before, new programs emerged to support the economic development of the northern Canadian provinces. In 2018 Ottawa launched *Strategic Investments in Northern Economic Development*

²³³ "Canada's Northern Strategy: Our North, Our Heritage, Our Future," (Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development and Federal Interlocutor, 2009).

²³⁴ Ibid.

²³⁵ "Crises and International Cooperation: An Arctic Case Study." 379

²³⁶ Office of the Spokesperson, "U.S. Signs Agreement to Prevent Unregulated Commerical Fishing on the High Seas of the Central Arctic Ocean."

(SINED), a program designed to bolster the economic growth, diversity, and activity of northern Canada by offering governmental support for those endeavors committed to economically develop Canada's Northern provinces.²³⁷ Though all of this complies with Canadian ideas about the Arctic region from stewardship to exploitation, the nationalistic aspects of Arctic sovereignty for Canada have steadily gained ground. While Canada and Denmark did announce in 2018 to meet in order to resolve the Hans Island dispute, Canada has continued to maintain strong policies related to rebuilding the Canadian Armed Forces to more effectively operate within the Arctic region in order to protect Canadian Arctic sovereignty.²³⁸ The principle objectives of the 2010 *Arctic Integrating Concept* from the Harper Administration was held over by the Trudeau Administration, including the bolstered readiness of Canadian Armed forces to act within the Arctic region.²³⁹ While not completely militaristic as with increased Arctic traffic there will be a need to carry out more search and rescue operations in the region and to support scientific research. This duality is most clearly observed within the 2016 expansion of the Nunavut Training Centre to become a hub for Canadian Arctic operations potentially year-round, which coincides with the announcement for the hope of opening more training locations and military bases within the Canadian Arctic by the Canadian Armed Forces in accordance with the opening of several other Arctic facilities by Russia.²⁴⁰ While the overall goals of the troops does fit within the broader context of Arctic Council goals, the increased support for Canadian Arctic operations does fit within the broader context of Canadian national identity and the securitization of Arctic sovereignty, specifically related to the defending powerful identity markers like the Northwest Passage. In sum, the period following the 2014 Ukrainian Crisis has been full of diverse actions

²³⁷ "Strategic Investments in Northern Economic Developments (Sined)," Canadian Northern Economic Development Agency.

²³⁸ Lajeunesse, "The Canadian Armed Forces in the Arctic: Purpose, Capabilities, and Requirements."

²³⁹ Ibid.

²⁴⁰ David Pugliese, "Canadian Forces to Expand Nunavut Training Centre as Russia Plans More Bases in the Arctic," *National Post* 2016.

by Canada in both putting forth policies to protect the Arctic environment while supporting its economic development and pursuing cooperative policies in the international community in the midst of developing the military capabilities to protect territorial sovereignty.

The 2010's have been a whirlwind for Canadian Arctic Policy. The Ukrainian Crisis of 2014 clearly demonstrates the Canada's policy concerns in other areas of foreign policy can influence its interactions within the Arctic Council. Throughout this whole decade, as in the previously examined decades, Canadian policy has conformed to the general thrust of Canadian national identity which prioritizes environmental stewardship, preservation of national sovereignty, and economic development.

Case Study Conclusions

Since 1989 Canadian policy has shown a ready prioritization of Arctic Climate concerns, readily meeting the various touch-points of Arctic Council goals. The general trend of Canadian policy does heartily coincide with Canadian national identity, but over time Canadian national policies have become increasingly concerned with Canadian objectives related to traditional hard power related to economic development and military power is rising to the top of Canada's policy hierarchy. In the midst of these policies, Canada has remained an ever supportive member of the Arctic Council and done its due diligence to meet the Council goals related to environmentalism, conservation, and climate research.

CHAPTER 6

THE POLAR BEAR: RUSSIA AND THE ARCTIC COUNCIL

The state with the most significant Arctic Coastline and the largest amount of people living above the Arctic Circle is naturally the Russian Federation. For Russians, the Arctic is an important symbol of national identity, expansion, and bold exploration, which all harkens back to the periods of expansion from throughout Russian history and tradition.²⁴¹ The Arctic has lain on the thoughts and minds of modern Russian politicians, scientists, and military professionals because of the power possibilities and options provided by the region.²⁴² Today, those territorial claims persist in the Arctic Ocean and the Arctic holds a special place in the minds of both Russian policy makers and the Russian populace as a critical realm for the future of the Russian state because it is simultaneously an access point to the rest of the world, a means of economic development, and a realm of cooperation.

Initially for Russia and Russians, the Arctic represents a lifeline to the rest of the world. The ports of call Russia has on the Barents Sea are capable of handling a range of vessels from Russia's blue-water navy to merchant fishing vessels, representing some of the most robust port facilities in the region.²⁴³ Moreover, the Russian northern coast remains open for longer than the other coastlines of the Arctic Ocean, enabling for a longer traveling season in the Northeast Passage than the Northwest Passage.²⁴⁴ This interaction between Russians and the Arctic Ocean stretches back in time as well; the modern deep U-shaped hull design of modern icebreakers was first brought into being from Russian adaptations of the vessels of indigenous northern

²⁴¹ Pavel Devyatkin to The Arctic Institute: Center for Circumpolar Security Studies, February 7, 2018, <https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/russias-arctic-strategy-aimed-conflict-cooperation-part-one/>.

²⁴² Khrushcheva and Poberezhskaya, "The Arctic in the Political Discourse of Russian Leaders: The National Pride and Economic Ambitions." 3

²⁴³ Antrim, "The Next Geographical Pivot: The Russian Arctic in the 21st Century." 19

²⁴⁴ William Booth and Amie Ferris-Rotam, "Russia's Suez Canal? Ships Start Plying a Less-Ice Arctic, Thanks to Climate Change," *The Washington Post* 2018.

peoples.²⁴⁵ With the introduction of global warming into the equation and the reduction of sea-ice thickness, the Arctic is readily being viewed as the next critical means for global economic transportation and is being hyped as such within the Russian government.²⁴⁶ In sum, for Russia and Russians the Arctic Ocean was, is, and is becoming a highway to transport goods from one part of the country to the other.

Just as was the case with Canada, for Russia the Arctic has become increasingly viewed as the means towards economic prosperity and development. As previously mentioned the Arctic holds vast reserves of oil and natural gas, and there are several states with significant interests in tapping into those deposits with Russia essentially leading the charge.²⁴⁷ The geologic morphology of the Arctic seabed has a great deal of the oil and natural gas reserves squarely within Russian territory, and Russia has been willing to exploit those resources for their own gain.²⁴⁸ Surprisingly, such action is applauded by Russians as a means to restore Russia to the status of a superpower in the international arena, much like the challenging of the United States on international issues.²⁴⁹ To that end, the Kremlin has made it a priority to develop the Russian Arctic into an economically active region to the benefit of the Russian economy and to further propagate their on popularity at home.

Finally, there is still a great deal of scientific interest for Russia and Russians in regards to the Arctic, related to conservation and environmentalism. During the Soviet Period, Russia and Russians approached environmentalism as an unnecessary luxury or inhibitor on the

²⁴⁵ Pelletier, "Polar Super Seaways? Maritime Transport in the Arctic: An Analysis of Shipowners' Intentions."

²⁴⁶ Gritsenko, "Vodka on Ice? Unveiling Russian Media Perceptions of the Arctic." 8

²⁴⁷ Overland, "Russia's Arctic Energy Policy." 869

²⁴⁸ Jensen and Skedsmo, "Approaching the North: Norwegian and Russian Foreign Policy Discourses on the European Arctic." 448

²⁴⁹ Rowe and Blakkisrud, "A New Kind of Arctic Power? Russia's Policy Discourses and Diplomatic Practices in the Circumpolar North." 67

economic progress of the state.²⁵⁰ Today, those same beliefs largely hold true. Though there has been some push towards environmental consciousness on the part of Russian policymakers, domestic organizations, and local people, unfortunately environmental concerns are not nearly as important to Russians as with other members of the Arctic Council as a great deal of the Russian environmentalist movement requires outside support.²⁵¹ However, the acknowledgement of the desires of other states within the region related to environmentalism has led Russian policy to primarily push for cooperation with the West on such issues in order to build critical cooperative bridges.²⁵² Thus, though there is some importance within the region in regarding environmental efforts and study, for Russia and Russians there simply is not the same push for environmentalism as within other states.

The Arctic remains an integral part of Russian identity, though it fundamentally differs in its approach to the region compared to other Arctic states. Regardless though, the perspectives of the Kremlin and the Russian people serve to frame the policy approaches of the region and can offer unique insights into the Russian relationship with the Arctic Council.

Cooperation of the Post-Cold War

For the Russian Federation, the Arctic represents an interesting area of cooperation with the West. This stretches back to the Soviet period prior to 1989, with the settlement of the maritime border between the United States and the Soviet Union in the Bering Strait.²⁵³ In a speech in Murmansk in 1987, Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev set the tone for the interactions between the West and the Soviet Union in relation to the Arctic as a region of cooperative study

²⁵⁰ Vladimirova, "Politics of the Green Economy in Russia's European North." 314

²⁵¹ Henry, "Between Transnationalism and State Power: The Development of Russia's Post-Soviet Environmental Movement." 777

²⁵² Khrushcheva and Poberezhskaya, "The Arctic in the Political Discourse of Russian Leaders: The National Pride and Economic Ambitions." 2

²⁵³ Griffiths, "The Shipping News - Canada's Arctic Sovereignty Not on Thinning Ice." 264

and research by outlining the Soviet Union's Arctic Policy.²⁵⁴ This spirit of goodwill towards mutual climate research set a tone for environmental cooperation between the West and the Soviet Union which is best explored centered around the 1990's and the founding of the Arctic Council in 1996. In order to explore this period it is critical to first outline the general Russian and Soviet policies related to the Arctic Council before 1996, then detail how 1996 led to immediate changes within those policies, before finally looking to the impact the Council had on Russian policy following the immediate effects of 1996.

As the Soviet Union wavered and then collapsed, an important part of its legacy to the newly formed Russian Federation came in the form of its engagement in Arctic agreements related to climate study and conservation. The Soviet Union, and the Russian Federation, supported the ideas related to the Montreal Protocol, applying those rules within its borders to help facilitate the preservation of the ozone layer.²⁵⁵ The Soviet Union joined other Arctic states in signing onto the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy spearheaded by Finland to further study the impacts of climate change and pollution on the Arctic Ocean.²⁵⁶ For the Russian and prior Soviet government, this continual interaction and cooperation in the Arctic space was viewed as a major cooperative boon to the overall relationship between itself and the West. To further this end, Moscow engaged in the Barents Euro-Arctic Council and the Barents Regional Council in 1993 in order to facilitate cooperation to develop the Barents Sea region, which is one of the most populous and economically active portions of the Russian Arctic.²⁵⁷ Furthermore, in 1993 Russia and Norway negotiated to increase the scope and scale of the Joint Norwegian-

²⁵⁴ Mikhail Gorbachev, "Mikhail Gorbachev's Speech in Murmansk at the Ceremonial Meeting on the Occasion of the Presentation of the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star to the City of Murmansk," ed. Barents Info (1987).

²⁵⁵ United Nations Ozone Secretariat, "Handbook for the Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer."

²⁵⁶ Young, "Whither the Arctic? Conflict or Cooperation in the Circumpolar North." 79

²⁵⁷ "Cooperation in the Barents Euro-Arctic Region," Barents Euro-Arctic Cooperation.

Russian Fisheries Commission to include long-term fishery conservation as part of a broader effort of cooperation and conservation in the Arctic.²⁵⁸ All of these actions coincide with how the Russian people and government approached the Arctic region, as a realm necessary to interact with in order to cooperate with their neighbors and to engage on advancing scientific knowledge of the Arctic.

With this in mind, 1996 becomes a continuation of this engagement with the West over the Arctic, especially with the founding of the Arctic Council. For Moscow, the Arctic Council represented an opportunity to engage with the West to simultaneously achieve several goals related to its Arctic policies. As previously mentioned, the Murmansk Speech of 1987 outlined Soviet Arctic policy and Russian Arctic policy by 1996 were quite similar, the most important issue areas for the Russian government and people concerning the Arctic were the economic development of the Russian Arctic, the fostering of cooperation between Russia and the West, and the sharing of scientific research across members.²⁵⁹ To this end, the Arctic Council was a major boon to Russia as it enabled a clear road forward on each of these issues through the various working groups of the Council. Therefore, for the Russian government and to a degree the Russian people the Arctic Council represented a means to better develop, access, and interact with both the West and their northernmost regions as a continuation of prior, successful policies.

The latter half of the 1990's were a continuation of previous policies enacted by the Russian federation, with a continued focus on developing a cooperative relationship with Western states and some rising usage of international institutions to resolve territorial disputes. Initially, Russia remained committed to cooperating with the West at nearly every opportunity

²⁵⁸ A. Krickovic, "When Interdependence Produces Conflict: Eu - Russia Energy Relations as a Security Dilemma," *Contemporary Security Policy* 36, no. 1 (2015).

²⁵⁹ Rowe and Blakkisrud, "A New Kind of Arctic Power? Russia's Policy Discourses and Diplomatic Practices in the Circumpolar North." 67

afforded to it by joining the Northern Dimension in 1999 alongside Iceland, Norway, and the European Union to facilitate cooperation among European Arctic States by engaging in a midst of policy areas through its own working groups similar to the same objectives pushed by the Arctic Council in areas such as environmental issues, public health and well-being, transportation logistics, and culture.²⁶⁰ This correlation to Arctic Council objectives is not without warrant as every state signing onto the Northern Dimension is also a member of the Arctic Council, save the European Union, thereby enabling Russia to institutionally double dip on areas of major concern for policy objectives. In the midst of this re-engagement period between Russia and the West, Moscow also ratified the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas in 1997 to more effectively interact with its neighbors and the international community at large regarding Russia's coastal waters.²⁶¹ Each of these policies coincided with pushes towards furthering traditional policy views of the Arctic region and how the region could be used as a means of cooperation with the West on key issues.

Thus, having examined the 1990's it is clear the overall theme for Russian policy engagement with the Arctic Council remained continual cooperation with the West on key issues related to the Russian Arctic. By and large the traditional ideas of economic exploitation and a hyperborean manifest destiny remained prominent in the minds of Russian policy makers and citizens, yet those ideas were pushed to the side in favor of utilizing the Arctic as a broader means of engagement with the West on communal issues.

²⁶⁰ "The Northern Dimension (Nd)," The Northern Dimension.

²⁶¹ "Declarations and Statements: Russian Federation," Oceans & Law of the Sea: United Nations.

A New Millennium for a New Russia

The Russian Federation entered into the 21st Century with a relatively new President with a new vision for the future. Despite the change in leadership and century, overall policy objectives for Moscow remained congruent with the policies of previous years. As the 2000's advanced and the impacts of climate change became more apparent with the publication of the *Arctic Climate Impact Assessment*, the ordering of the priorities of the Russian Federation began to change. To best examine this transformation of Russian policy in the first decade of the 21st Century it is critical to examine what how Russia interacted with the Arctic Council prior to 2004, how 2004 altered Russian policy approaches to the Arctic, and finally consider how Russian policy changed in the latter half of the decade.

The start of the 21st Century can be described as a mixture of a continuation of the policy decisions from the previous decade and new concerns related to the restoration of economic authority. First, within the international community Russia remained committed to the utilization of international institutional frameworks to facilitate the cooperative opportunities with former rivals. Notably, Russia remained committed to the variety of institutions it had joined in years previously, while also beginning to utilization of institutional frameworks to resolve ongoing issues. Particularly, in 2001 the Russian government submitted case documents to UNCLOS in order to resolve its territorial claims in the Arctic Ocean.²⁶² This action in particular leads into the next important development for Russian foreign policy for the early 2000's. The Russian economy had been in shambles throughout the 1990's and the primary focus of Moscow in the early 2000s was to regain lost economic ground. As a consequence of this, items like

²⁶² Russian Federation Foreign Ministry, "Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf Outer Limits of the Continental Shelf Beyond 200 Nautical Miles from the Baselines: Submissions to the Commission: Submission by the Russian Federation," Oceans & Law of the Sea: United Nations, http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/submission_rus.htm.

environmental policy began to languish under the weight of the decentralization of the 1990's with no real domestic environmental code enforcement due to continual governmental reshuffling.²⁶³ Fortunately, this period also began to see the tide turning on this environmental issue with the passing of the 2002 *Federal Law on Technical Regulation* in actually creating the start of an adequate framework for the enforcement of environmental regulations.²⁶⁴ Though this seems off in comparison to the traditional objectives of the Russian people and government, during the early 2000's the quality of the environment of Russia degraded to the point where 80% of Russian citizens began to implore their government to take action to combat pollution and environmental degradation.²⁶⁵ Therefore, though there was not a significant amount of interesting interaction with the Arctic Council during this period, broader Russian policy was congruent with Arctic Council goals.

For Russian policy, the most significant year in the 2000's was by far the year 2004 because it represented the first time Russia would be the Chair of the Arctic Council and the publication of the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment. Of all of the actions of the early 2000's, the Russian Chairmanship of the Arctic Council stands out as a significant event due to the almost copy and pasted nature of several of Russia's policy objectives. Notably a great deal of the objectives for the Russian Chairmanship were similar to previous chairmanship objectives related to increasing cooperation, council visibility, and scientific research with the introduction of events such as the International Polar Year.²⁶⁶ However, the initial Russian objectives also included several new clauses related to economic development and preparing the region for

²⁶³ "Environmental Policy and Regulation in Russia: The Implementation Challenge," (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 2006). 12

²⁶⁴ Ibid.

²⁶⁵ Ibid.

²⁶⁶ The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Program for the Russian Federation Chairmanship of the Arctic Council in 2004-2006," (The Arctic Council, 2004).

international, transarctic shipping.²⁶⁷ The inclusion of the trade route objective in particular is a groundbreaking event as it represents the direct inclusion of policy objectives beneficial primarily to a single state into the council goals. Nevertheless, all of the policy objectives expressed by Russia during their chairmanship did fit with Russian ideas related to the Arctic and the broader developmental goals of the Arctic Council. Moreover, the publication of the *Arctic Climate Impact Assessment* of 2004 was a groundbreaking publication for the Arctic Council's international visibility and in the case of Russia was of no exception. For Russia, the Assessment represented an opportunity to re-engage with environmental policy and to begin to prepare for the economic exploitation of the Arctic. These paradoxical goals were relatively quickly seized upon, given the problems Russia faced earlier in the decade. In response to environmental concerns, Moscow began to rectify problems with its environmental regulatory framework by strengthening water management, forest codes, and improving resource protections related to the marine environment.²⁶⁸ In regards to beginning to examine the economic opportunities of the Arctic, Russia began to more readily consider oil exploration in the region to further bolster the Russian economy within its declared Arctic policies.²⁶⁹ All of this is again wholly congruent with the nationalistic approaches of Russia in regards to the Arctic as a region. 2004 highlighted the paradoxes of Russia's actions regarding the Arctic and overall Arctic Council objectives, yet more changes and challenges for Russia were to come.

Following 2004's publication of the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment and the start of Russia's Arctic Council Chairmanship had lasting impacts on the policies concerning the Arctic region. In the latter half is best broadly characterized by the continuation of cooperation and the resurgence of economic nationalism. First, the continued institutional cooperation pursued by

²⁶⁷ Ibid.

²⁶⁸ "Environmental Policy and Regulation in Russia: The Implementation Challenge."

²⁶⁹ Gritsenko, "Vodka on Ice? Unveiling Russian Media Perceptions of the Arctic." 9

Russia was extremely telling during this time, and in no other area is it best observed in the Salekhard Declaration. The Salekhard Declaration concluded the Russian Chairmanship of the Arctic Council, describing the success of the various Arctic Council initiatives pursued during its tenure including the establishment of the Arctic Contaminants Action Program, the successful integration of Barents Euro-Arctic Council's Working Group on Environment into Arctic Council activities related to environmental protections, and the successful gathering of the Moscow Symposium on Prevention and Mitigation Of Emergency Situations in the Arctic.²⁷⁰

The most important exclusion from the Salekhard Declaration was the item related to preparing the Arctic region as a hub for trade which was included in the Chairmanship Priority paper from 2002, instead the only mention of maritime activity in the Arctic strictly relates to working group projects studying the possibility of pollution in the region in the *Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment* draft.²⁷¹ Removing such an important and long-lasting piece of Russian policy goals shows a significant development to fulfill communal goals as Council Chair instead of individual ones by the end of Russia's Council Chair tenure. However, such inclinations were not completely absent in general Russian policy. In 2008 Russia engaged in the Arctic Ocean Conference, a meeting outside of the Arctic Council, alongside every other Arctic coastal state held in Greenland.²⁷² Ultimately, this meeting decreed unanimously in the Ilulissat Declaration every state with territorial disputes should pursue bilateral negotiations in order to resolve their disputes instead of pursuing multilateral resolutions to often longstanding territorial claims.²⁷³

These policies are completely in line with how the Russian government and people have approached the Arctic region, and the idea of Arctic as a tool to achieve great power status once

²⁷⁰ The Arctic Council, "Salekhard Declaration on the Occasion of the Tenth Anniversary of the Arctic Council, the Fifth Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting," (Salekhard, Russia: The Arctic Council, 2006).

²⁷¹ Ibid.

²⁷² Arctic Ocean Conference, "2008 Ilulissat Declaration," (Arctic Ocean Conference, 2008).

²⁷³ Ibid.

more. In the years after 2004, Russia began to seriously pursue undersea exploration within the Arctic region and pursuing oil exploration off of the Russian northern coast. This led to the publicized Russian flag planting on the Lomonosov ridge in 2007 by the Arktika 2007 expedition, correlating with modifications to Russian submissions to UNCLOS regarding Russian territorial claims.²⁷⁴ Furthermore, Russia continued support its development of Arctic Oil reserves during this period to enhance these strategic resources for Russia. Following 2004 China began to develop interests in the Arctic, partnering with Russia to finance oil exploration in off of the northern coast of Siberia.²⁷⁵ Each of these events received some international outcry related to the potential pollution of oil into the delicate Arctic environment and the inflammatory possibilities of Russian flag planting on the Arctic seabed; however, on a whole these actions were popular domestically and not breaking stride with the Arctic Council's broader objectives of conservation, scientific research, and economic development.

The first decade of the 21st century was a significant one for the Russian Federation. Russian policy ideas related to cooperation with the West were pursued concurrent with policies to enrich the Russian state and people. Ultimately, this was a decade of paradoxes for Russia, beginning with strengthening environmental protections and ending with the beginning of the exploitation of a unique, fragile environment it had pledged to protect. Yet, these actions were applauded by Russians and fit snugly with Russian national identity in relation to the Arctic.

²⁷⁴ Rowe and Blakkisrud, "A New Kind of Arctic Power? Russia's Policy Discourses and Diplomatic Practices in the Circumpolar North." 67

²⁷⁵ F. Lasserre, L. Huang, and O. V. Alexeeva, "China's Strategy in the Arctic: Threatening or Opportunistic?," *Polar Record* 53, no. 1 (2017).

A Self-Inflicted Crisis

By the early 2010's the Russian Federation had continued to engage in the same manner of agreements it had always pursued in regards to the Arctic. Unfortunately though, its actions in Eastern Europe would come back to haunt Moscow's Arctic ambitions. To best examine how these actions in Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea impacted Russian Arctic policy it is critical to first detail how the decade began for Moscow in the Arctic, then the immediate impacts of 2014's Ukrainian Crisis, before finally investigating Russia's policies following the crisis.

Moscow's policies related to the Arctic followed the same broad policy objectives from past decades, thus the start of the 2010's can be considered to be a continuation of prior policy which is best observed within the maintained institutional cooperation for Russia and the continued focus on economic progress. The start of the 2010's experienced a great degree of groundbreaking institutional norm creation with the Arctic Council passing two new legally binding resolutions for its members. The *Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic* of 2011 and the *Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic* of 2013 established new ground for the Arctic Council in regards to its members, as prior to these agreement the Council had no real authority to coerce its members into action one way or another.²⁷⁶ Russian compliance and participation with these two legally binding resolutions is significant, and when coupled with Moscow's other policy expeditions into the Arctic highlight a cooperative streak in Russian policy. For instance, in 2010 Russia and Norway finally concluded their longstanding territorial dispute in the Barents Sea with the *Barents Sea Treaty* of 2010, a significant development and success of bilateral negotiations to resolve just one of the many territorial disputes Russia

²⁷⁶ The Arctic Council Secretariat, "Kiruna Declaration."

possesses with its Arctic neighbors.²⁷⁷ Though Russia successfully settled that territorial dispute, her financing of various expeditions to serve other claims on the disputed Lomonosov Ridge and the expansion of the Russian Exclusive Economic Zone under UNCLOS adds fuel to the fire for ongoing Arctic Ocean territorial disputes.²⁷⁸ Each of these actions and events fits within the broader context of Russian policy and identity, serving to further highlight the cooperative objectives of Moscow and engage within power seeking behavior in line with previous Russian approaches to the region. This secondary focus on the Arctic as an area of power acquisition comes into much greater prominence during this period for the Russian government due to Russian oil extraction efforts and the action taken to secure the Northeast Passage. Initially, Moscow sought to increase the amount of oil extracted within the Arctic region by providing support for the efforts of state-majority-owned oil company Rosneft. Beginning in 2010 Rosneft sought to increase the amount of oil it produced within the region by funding the construction of the Obkaya-Bovanenkovo Pipeline and partnering with Exxon Mobile to secure increased funding for oil exploration in the Russian Arctic.²⁷⁹ In the midst of these efforts to secure access to the natural resources of the Arctic region, the Russian military also committed to developing the assets needed to secure economic prosperity in protecting the Northeast Passage such as the reopening of Soviet-era Naval installations throughout the Russian Arctic.²⁸⁰ Furthermore, the Russian navy resumed naval air patrols over the northern coast of Russia in order to more efficiently patrol the waterway alongside other activity to support the safety of the Northeast

²⁷⁷ Tore Henriksen and Geir Ulfstein, "Maritime Delimitation in the Arctic: The Barents Sea Treaty," *Ocean Development and International Law* 42 (2011).

²⁷⁸ Valery Konyshchev and Alexander Sergunin, "Russia's Policies on the Territorial Disputes in the Arctic," *Journal of International Relations and Foreign Policy* 2, no. 1 (2014). 77

²⁷⁹ Keil, "The Arctic: A New Region of Conflict? The Case of Oil and Gas." 180

²⁸⁰ Atland, "Russia's Northern Fleet and the Oil Industry-Rivals or Partners? Petroleum, Security, and Civil-Military Relations in the Post-Cold War European Arctic." 370-371

Passage.²⁸¹ These actions are helping to facilitate the transformation of the Russian Arctic Coast into a region regularly monitored and made safe for oceangoing traffic in order to secure what is perceived to be an avenue of economic prosperity in the eyes of the Russian government and people.²⁸² Both sides of the duality of Russian action in the Arctic region during the early years of the 2010's speak to actions pursued in order to meet the policy goals of the Russian Federation, with congruence to the broader goals of the Arctic Council.

2014 served as a hallmark that Russia could not act with impunity without the West imposing sanctions upon them. Though the Ukrainian Crisis served to derail a great deal of the ongoing relationship between the West and Russia, the Arctic Council was insulated from this sanctioning process beyond the initial boycott by Canada and the United States.²⁸³ In order to more efficiently explore this it is critical analyze where the policy breakdowns were between the West and Russia over the Ukrainian crisis and where there were continuations in spite of the disagreements related to Ukraine. Initially, the most visible breakdown between the West and Russia was over the status of an Arctic Council Meeting to be held in Moscow just scant days following the beginning of the Ukrainian Crisis.²⁸⁴ Beyond this visible backlash against Russian action there was no immediate response from the Arctic Council in regards to the Crisis itself, yet it is critical to not that several key programs Russia had been previously preparing for floundered due to the implementation of sanctions against Russia from the West. Of greatest significance to Russia was the ceasing of much of the Western support for Russian oil exploration including the canceling of the previously mentioned Exxon-Rosneft discussion, the removal of Norwegian technological support for the construction of Arctic Off-shore oil rigs, and

²⁸¹ Baev, "Examining the Execution of Russian Military-Security Policies and Programs in the Arctic." 117

²⁸² Khrushcheva and Poberezhskaya, "The Arctic in the Political Discourse of Russian Leaders: The National Pride and Economic Ambitions." 19

²⁸³ Byers, "Crises and International Cooperation: An Arctic Case Study." 375

²⁸⁴ The Canadian Press, "Canada Boycotts Arctic Council Moscow Meeting over Ukraine."

overall Western coordination in regards to military readiness for Arctic operations.²⁸⁵ In the midst of this breakdown between Russia and the West, the Russian military continued to increase the militarization of the Russian Kola Peninsula in the Barents Sea to protect Russian Arctic interests.²⁸⁶ Though not solely for Arctic Operations, Moscow's military build-up for the Arctic represented a major sticking point for Western relations which were amplified by the rest of Russia's actions throughout Eastern Europe in 2014.²⁸⁷ Oddly enough though, other aspects of the relationship Russia held with the Arctic Council and with other Council members concerning the Arctic region remained unchanged beyond the sanctions. Of most shocking instance of continuation of cooperation between the Russian coast guard and their western counterparts over search and rescue in order to comply with pre-existing Arctic Council agreements.²⁸⁸ Beyond this particular highlight, there was continuing of the energy trade between Russia and European states, ongoing fishery negotiations with Norway, ongoing discussions related to Danish submissions to UNCLOS in regards to territorial claims on the Lomonosov Ridge, and the adopting of the Polar Code by the International Maritime Organization under the recommendation of the whole of the Arctic Council.²⁸⁹ So, though the Ukrainian Crisis derailed some of Russia's more self-serving programs and policies it does not appear to have derailed the longest-lasting and most successful policy for the Arctic region: Arctic Cooperation. Thereby, the preservation of the overall Arctic vision of the Russian Federation and people is preserved in their actions with the West during the Ukrainian Crisis, because though there was significant pushback against Russia's actions in Ukraine there was not a detrimental amount of derailment to Russia's Arctic engagements.

²⁸⁵ Byers, "Crises and International Cooperation: An Arctic Case Study." 386

²⁸⁶ Baev, "Examining the Execution of Russian Military-Security Policies and Programs in the Arctic." 115

²⁸⁷ Ibid. 115

²⁸⁸ Byers, "Crises and International Cooperation: An Arctic Case Study." 381

²⁸⁹ Ibid. 381

The Russian Arctic Policy post-Ukrainian crisis is still a work in progress, but it has all of the trappings which have previously characterized the Arctic policies of Russia for both good and ill. For Moscow the Arctic remains as it ever has been in the 21st century, a tool to return Russia to the might of bygone days and a means to facilitate cooperative engagement with the West.²⁹⁰ The Russian government has continually held the view the Arctic would become a means to redevelop the Russian economy to its Soviet-period heights, and to this end Moscow has continued to support the exploration of off-shore oilfields and other natural resources to exploit in the Arctic region just as it always has.²⁹¹ Moreover, the Russian military has continued to expand its presence above the Arctic Circle by reopening continuing to reopen Soviet-era naval installations in order to provide berths for the vessels projected to utilize the Russian Northeast Passage.²⁹² Thus, the preparations of the Russian government has been making to transform their northernmost provinces into an economically active region have continued only slightly been setback by the events of 2014. As these nationalistic policies continue, Russia has also contributed to three significant developments of international cooperation which has been fostered by the Arctic Council. First, the Joint Russian-US funded and third legally binding Arctic Council resolution, the *Agreement on Enhancing International Arctic Scientific Cooperation* of 2017, which Russia signed with all other Arctic Council members.²⁹³ Next, Russia continued its cooperation on search and rescue operations in line with its prior commitments to the Arctic Council both with its immediate neighbors and those further afield by

²⁹⁰ Khrushcheva and Poberezhskaya, "The Arctic in the Political Discourse of Russian Leaders: The National Pride and Economic Ambitions." 3

²⁹¹ Rowe and Blakkisrud, "A New Kind of Arctic Power? Russia's Policy Discourses and Diplomatic Practices in the Circumpolar North." 69

²⁹² Baev, "Examining the Execution of Russian Military-Security Policies and Programs in the Arctic." 121

²⁹³ "Scientific Cooperation Agreement Enters into Force," news release, 2018, <https://arctic-council.org/index.php/en/our-work/2/8-news-and-events/488-science-agreement-entry-into-force>.

contributing to the establishment of the Arctic Coast Guard Forum in 2015.²⁹⁴ Finally, the actions bearing the most recent fruit from the relationship between the Arctic Council and Moscow have been regarding a variety of work related to fisheries management, from *the Declaration on the Central Arctic Ocean* in 2015 preventing the exploitation of the Arctic Ocean fisheries to the *Agreement to Prevent Unregulated High Seas Fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean* signed in October 2018 furthering the 2015 declaration.²⁹⁵ This focus on cooperation in the midst of preparing for military action in the Arctic is striking, and wholly in line with Russian views on the Arctic and broader Russian government policy towards its rivalry with the West.

Though the end of the 2010's at the time of writing is still somewhat far-off, the implementation of policies throughout this period reinforces the complexities of Russian action in the Arctic. On one hand Moscow habitually assists in communal goals and institutions while focusing on how it can best exploit the Arctic region to serve its own ends. One thing is seemingly certain throughout these policies; Russia will continue to pursue such policies it believes best serve its own interests as is the case with all states.

General Trend

Since 1989 Russia has experienced several extremes of instability, uncertainty, and crises; however, the Arctic policies of the Russian Federation have remained stable and consistent since they were first announced by Gorbachev in Murmansk in 1987. The push for cooperation with the West on scientific issues, environmentalism, and conservation have proven successful time and time again, with a variety of international institutions, laws, and norms

²⁹⁴ Byers, "Crises and International Cooperation: An Arctic Case Study." 386

²⁹⁵ Office of the Spokesperson, "U.S. Signs Agreement to Prevent Unregulated Commercial Fishing on the High Seas of the Central Arctic Ocean."

having been pushed forward by Russia and the West together. In the midst of it all, Russia still remains committed to restoring itself at least to its former might by utilizing the Arctic as a tool to achieve those aims by the exploitation of its natural resources, geographic location, and size.

CHAPTER 7

THE NEW ARCTIC NORMAL

The general trends of both Russia and Canada point towards two states moving towards Arctic Council objectives in areas related to conservation and environmentalism while intensely pursuing national interests in other important areas of concern closely linked to their respective national identities. Therefore, with the completion of the reviews of the case studies of Russian and Canadian interactions with the Arctic Council since 1989, it is now possible to return to the null hypothesis of *national identity does not limit the ability of the Arctic Council to alter state policies*. Given the propensity of both Russia and Canada since the Cold War to continually pursue their own national interests in line with the popular conceptions of the Arctic as a region continually over the near entirety of the thirty year period, it is possible to reject the null hypothesis. This rejection is possible because conditions of national identity establish “untouchable” areas of interests for states; thereby, making it difficult for the Arctic Council to create inroads to alter policies affecting those interests.

Thus, it is possible to return to the research question of *under what conditions can the Arctic Council facilitate cooperative policy developments in its members?* Utilizing the framework offered by the logic of habit and the importance of identity discourses related to international politics, it is clear national identity does play a role in influencing the effectiveness of the Arctic Council in propagating cooperative policies among its members. Conditions of strong national identity related to key interests cultivate “untouchable” zones for states, making it difficult for the Arctic Council to create inroads to alter policies affecting those interests. Essentially, the more closely held the specific national interest is to the identity of the state the less likely it is to be transformed from Arctic Council interactions if the transformation would

leave the state in a weaker position than had not pursued the self-serving policy. This roadblock stems from the developed habits both on the part of government interactions with their constituents and government approaches to those same issues within the international community under the prevailing conditions of uncertainty.

Together, the increase in fungibility with the propagation of untouchable areas of national policy by Council members causes the decline of the uniqueness of Arctic politics in critical areas of engagement between and among states. The encroachment of non-Arctic policies into the Arctic realm propagates zones of normalization between members of the Arctic Council despite the ongoing cooperation in areas where dissimilar national identities converge. Thus, in this case it is necessary to adopt Copeland's framework for analyzing trade routes and the security of those routes impacts interstate relations in terms of geopolitics and continual ice decline.²⁹⁶

The normalization of Arctic politics serves to also shed light on the motivations of the usage of national identity discourses as a framing device for national interests. Essentially, the nationalistic appeal towards the identity of their constituents serves as a legitimizing factor for the pursuit of national interests within the Arctic region. Observed within the context of the case studies, both Canada and Russia used domestic appeals towards national identity related to Arctic sovereignty in order to purposely propagate policy areas which could not be infringed upon by the Arctic Council. Thus, identity has become a ruse for national interests and is used to create untouchable zones closely affiliated with the national interests of the state. Given its widespread success in cultivating policy sticking points for international relations among Arctic states, governments have been falling back on national identity in order to justify not bowing down to the suggestions or agreements and in order to increase domestic support for incumbent

²⁹⁶ Copeland, *Economic Interdependence and War*.

governments.²⁹⁷ Moreover, the creation of untouchable zones of policy for the Arctic Council is correlated to increased fungibility of national power related to decreases in the coverage of Arctic Ocean sea ice. As the ice has retreated, arguments regarding national identity have gathered steam and clout within their respective states, fueled in some cases by governmental rhetoric, while those same states have continued to act in their own best interests regarding the region. Therefore it is critical to acknowledge the usage of national identity as a means to increase popular support for the state pursuit of national interests.²⁹⁸

To better understand how the influence of national identity couple with increased fungibility generates a normalization of Arctic regional politics it is critical to first offer a more in-depth exploration of the creation of untouchable policy zones, next detail how the process of normalization is usurping traditional Arctic habits, then examine the impact of normalization on critical areas, before finally offering a forecast for the future of international relations in the Arctic.

The Creation of Untouchable Zones

The coupling of closely held national identity with the hard power interests of states, in areas such as economics and national security, presents a major roadblock for cooperative processes. Essentially, the blending of these two ideas creates zones of untouchable policy areas, where it is difficult to foster communal inclinations within the domestic political space of states. However, these zones are not spontaneously generated within states or communities; instead they grow over time from the interactions between the national identity of a state and the habits states develop within the international community. Therefore, in order to understand how the Arctic

²⁹⁷ Dodds, "We Are a Northern Country: Stephen Harper and the Canadian Arctic."; Khrushcheva and Poberezhskaya, "The Arctic in the Political Discourse of Russian Leaders: The National Pride and Economic Ambitions."

²⁹⁸ Griffiths, "The Shipping News - Canada's Arctic Sovereignty Not on Thinning Ice."

Council has failed to create significant inroads to foster cooperation on a broad spectrum of issues it is important to understand how these untouchable zones are generated within Russia and Canada.

In the case of Russia and Canada in the Arctic, the primary driver of the generation of untouchable zones is a combination of the desire for a reward in capability and a strong national identity related to attaining such capabilities. Fundamentally, this power seeking behavior inhibits the ability of policies identified by the national identity of the state and enshrined in the policies of the state to be able to be shifted by organizations. For the Arctic region, such untouchable areas have emerged due to the reduction in sea-ice and the increasing fungibility of power in the region. The inclusion of the ability to act upon these emerging national interests fueled by nationalistic rhetoric on these key states cultivates a desire to stick to their policy guns on those same interests.

Thus, for the states in the Arctic Council who now have the ability to act upon their interests in a region they once could not these policy avenues have now opened. Policies related to economic development, trade route monitoring, Arctic securitization, and resource extraction all intensified with the introduction of fungibility in both Canada and Russia, quickly becoming untouchable and more entrenched by the state as the international community to look more promisingly upon the Arctic.²⁹⁹ The construction of new Arctic military capabilities with the objective of monitoring and securing coastal trade routes alongside agreements to resolve territorial disputes bilaterally signal to other states and domestic populations the overall national interests of the state are being taken to heart and will not be encroached upon. It is important to note such signaling is occurring within the Arctic waters of every coastal Arctic state and is

²⁹⁹ Dittmer et al., "Have You Heard the One About the Disappearing Ice? Recasting Arctic Geopolitics." 210

reminiscent of a developing security dilemma in the region, though it is far removed from being an arms race as argued by media outlets.³⁰⁰

The development of hardline areas of untouchable policies poses a problem for the inclusion of broader policies proposed or implied by the Arctic Council. The imposition of barriers on certain issues for the Arctic Council is not an important issue, as the organization was founded primarily to serve as a regional forum and cooperative scientific framework. Rather, it inhibits the future growth of the Arctic Council into a true regional forum capable of addressing every issue within the region while simultaneously reinforcing the nationalistic push towards certain policy areas seeped in power politics. As the region warms it becomes increasingly apparent several important issues within the region will become untouchable areas due to their strong linkages to the national identity of its members.

Arctic Normalization and Its Impacts

Due to its inaccessibility and frigid environment, the Arctic developed its own policy dynamics and interactive norms in part built off of the other interactions between Arctic states outside of the region. This is most clearly observed in the policies outlined by Gorbachev in Murmansk touched upon the Arctic as a unique realm for positive interaction between the Soviet Union and the United States.³⁰¹ In this sense, the Arctic cultivated a unique set of policy habits on the part of the states of its region which at times seem paradoxical, for instance the cooperation of climate issues and research sharing by states historically diametrically opposed to one another. Yet, the Arctic Council did not spring fully formed from the head of Zeus, it was instead the product of a long list of cooperative agreements on the part of every member of the

³⁰⁰ Young, "Whither the Arctic? Conflict or Cooperation in the Circumpolar North." 73

³⁰¹ Gorbachev, "Mikhail Gorbachev's Speech in Murmansk at the Ceremonial Meeting on the Occasion of the Presentation of the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star to the City of Murmansk."

Council with the other members and those relationships formed the basis of habit for Arctic policies.³⁰² Yes, most of the ongoing Arctic territorial disputes were not resolved heading into 1996's Ottawa Declaration, but the lack of resolution of maritime exclusive economic zones did not impact the Council's formation or central goal.³⁰³ The development of several other international institutions which would go on to partner with the Council on its objectives related to cooperation and environmental study is a testament to the uniqueness of the politics of the Arctic, and the Council members ability to form cooperative habits with one another on communal issues.

However, the introduction of sweeping changes in the Arctic environment related to the reduction of inaccessibility and environmental challenges represents a transformation for the interactive habits of the Arctic states. Essentially, the inability to act on territorial disputes due to high costs of Arctic operations and general inaccessibility decreased both the fungibility of power within the region and international interests within the region. These two factors decrease on a year to year basis as the Arctic's sea ice declines, thereby resolving the question of fungibility and increasing international interests within the Arctic region. Thus the easing costs of access to the Arctic are serving to alter the fundamental habits which have historically defined interactions within the Arctic region.

While the creation of these untouchable policy zones is closely tied to the national identity of the state, the reasoning they are pursued on the governmental level stems from the overall national interests of the government. In the case of Russia for instance, the creation of untouchable zones related to its militarization and oil extraction efforts in the Barents Sea are

³⁰² Young, "The Structure of Arctic Cooperation: Solving Problems/Seizing Opportunities."

³⁰³ The Arctic Council, "Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council: Joint Communique of the Governments of the Arctic Countries on the Establishment of the Arctic Council."

closely linked to the desire of the state and populace to return to great power status.³⁰⁴

Meanwhile, in the case of Canadian untouchable zone creation related to disagreements regarding the nature of the Northwest Passage are much more closely associated with feelings of the exploitation of Canadian national sovereignty.³⁰⁵ These feelings from these states create bulwarks which make it difficult for the Arctic Council to effect changes within those states to be more community oriented, therefore enabling the encroachment of outer-Arctic habits into Arctic spaces and leading to a normalization of Arctic relationships.

The transformative effects of normalization on the established habits of interaction among the states of the Arctic region since 1989 have been profound in some areas and more measured in others. Over the past thirty years those habits most affected by normalization have been challenged and replaced by new habits of interaction framed by the national identities, characteristics, and histories of the states calling the Arctic region home. This leads to the following four implications regarding the Arctic Council and its institutional effectiveness in the face of resurgent national identity in a more traversable Arctic; the fungibility of security, habit-forming of scientific cooperation, the resource-driven Arctic, and the mythic routes.

Fungibility of Security

As a space for the military operations, the Arctic has only been amenable to ballistic submarines, monitoring stations, and coast guard operations. However, these habits of limited military operation are changing as Arctic sea ice shrinks and its thickness lessens. As evident in the case studies of both Russia and Canada, the operational space in the Arctic is opening wider with every passing year and this will only continue given the projected temperature increases in

³⁰⁴ Khrushcheva and Poberezhskaya, "The Arctic in the Political Discourse of Russian Leaders: The National Pride and Economic Ambitions." 3

³⁰⁵ Landriault, "Public Opinion on Canadian Arctic Sovereignty and Security." 164

the region.³⁰⁶ Initially, the habits of the states surrounding the Arctic Ocean in the early years of the Arctic Council continued to view the Arctic as a strategic space similar to how it was approached during the Cold War. This meant that the Arctic was used for the stationing of ballistic submarines and other small scale military support activity due to the prevailing conditions of significant ice cover making it nearly impossible or costly for other, traditional military operations.³⁰⁷ The ice sheet further reinforced the costliness of Arctic operations as it required specialized military equipment to be stationed within the region, further increasing the costs of Arctic operations and training. However, as the ice sheet has receded the prevailing habits of Arctic interaction in the 20th century are becoming progressively less applicable.

Rather than creating a new status quo based upon the unique interactions and intense national identities within the Arctic region though, this has caused a slow spread of extra-Arctic behaviors to filter into the interactive habits of states in the region. For example, though Russia possesses the most capable and largest Arctic military forces in the Northern Fleet, the renovations and expansion of the Northern Fleet can be pointed to as part of the general military modernization programs Russia has pursued in recent years.³⁰⁸ The fact these forces are capable in projecting Russian authority into territory currently embroiled in disputes and protecting the Northeast Passage is propagating traditional security dilemma and trade security spirals normally observed outside of the Arctic region.³⁰⁹ This build-up of forces on the northernmost coast of Russia has served as the justification of similar strengthening of Arctic military capabilities by the Danish, Norwegian, Canadian, and US militaries.³¹⁰ The purchasing of new military

³⁰⁶ Borgerson, "Arctic Meltdown - the Economic and Security Implications of Global Warming."

³⁰⁷ Baev, "Examining the Execution of Russian Military-Security Policies and Programs in the Arctic." 116

³⁰⁸ Ibid. 115

³⁰⁹ Copeland, *Economic Interdependence and War*.

³¹⁰ Blunden, "The New Problem of Arctic Stability." 125

hardware for Arctic operations represents the ongoing force of habits from interacting with other states where power is much more fungible than it is in the Arctic Ocean.

A common thread of the ongoing normalization of militarization is that it has come on in waves precipitated by the publication of major Arctic climate reports published by the Arctic Council and its working groups. Yet, it is important to note the states in the Arctic region are not the only states cultivating interests within the Arctic. Over the past 30 years, several states including China, India, and Singapore have begun to develop interests in the Arctic region for the very same reason the Arctic states have, as a consequence they have joined the Arctic Council as observer states.³¹¹ Alongside these actions though, some states have begun to prepare their militaries for Arctic action or declared the Arctic to be critical to their national interests in the future, such as China's declaration of constructing a Polar Silk Road across the Northeast Passage to access European markets and the development of a small fleet of Chinese Icebreakers.³¹² In short, several states from around the globe are beginning to interact within the Arctic region; thereby, making it increasingly akin to non-Arctic regions where national identities are present and tempered by institutional effectiveness, mutual dependence, and clever statesmanship. The clearest current example of such behavior has been the years following the 2014 Ukrainian Crisis. Russian action was met with punitive measures from the West in the form of boycotts from Canada and the United States in line with how the West habitual interacts with these kinds of operations.³¹³ Later, sanctions were also applied to Russia as well, yet the complexities of the relationship between the Arctic states in the Arctic generated cooperation on critical areas for the Arctic region.³¹⁴

³¹¹ Blunden, "The New Problem of Arctic Stability." 124

³¹² Lasserre, Huang, and Alexeeva, "China's Strategy in the Arctic: Threatening or Opportunistic?."

³¹³ Byers, "Crises and International Cooperation: An Arctic Case Study." 389

³¹⁴ Ibid. 389

In sum, as the Arctic has warmed over the past 30 years it has been ever easier for the states interested in the region to operationalize their interests. As the case studies have shown though, the transformative effects of increasing fungibility has only precipitated normalization in line with other areas of the world in which these states interact, thereby enabling those habits to begin to intrude on the relationships in the Arctic. Coupled with the increasing nationalistic rhetoric and continued ice decline it is clear as the region becomes increasingly normalized the Arctic will shift from a realm of friendly cooperation into a zone of competition similar to other regions of the world where the competing interests of powerful states collide.

Habitual Scientific Cooperation

The Arctic Council was born from the desire to share scientific resources in order to gain a better idea about a fragile environment. Over the past 30 years, this scientific cooperation has remained steadfast in its approach to the region for both of the member states examined in the case studies. Given the most recent successes of the conservation cooperation in the fall of 2018, it stands to reason that a new habit for interaction has developed between the Arctic states related to the Arctic environment. The formation of the habit of scientific cooperation is strongly linked to the national identities discussed for both Canada and Russia, and scientific cooperation may be the most robust area of traditional Arctic policy in the face of ongoing regional normalization.

Though for differing reasons, scientific cooperation has remained popular among all of the members of the Arctic Council, continually leading to improvements within the international community regarding scientific study of the climate and conservation of unique ecosystems. Since the founding of the Arctic Council the levels of scientific cooperation have increased across the whole of the Arctic space and an increased frequency of environmental discussions

have taken place in order to assist in preserving the Arctic environ.³¹⁵ It has been the research of these endeavors, funded by a conglomerate of nations, which produce the research indicating the shrinking of Arctic ice cover and the need of further action related to conservation, environmentalism, and regional stewardship.

The national identities of both Russia and Canada in broad congruence with Arctic Council objectives on conservation in light of ongoing study into the changing Arctic climate, as the publication of the *Arctic Climate Impact Assessment* in 2004 served to jumpstart several domestic programs related to environmental conservation in the fragile Arctic environment. In Russia's case the cultivation of new environmental laws, legal regimes, and standards pushed forward state-wide, but a great deal of focus to the Arctic was placed on the Arctic in terms of fisheries management in the immediate aftermath of the publication of the Assessment.³¹⁶ For Canada, the Assessment served to push forward an overhaul of the primary environmental protection laws and extend Arctic protected areas.³¹⁷ In this sense, the immediate realization of shrinking ice sheets prompted a response from state governments to do a more efficient job in conserving their local environments in line with communal objectives and previously developed habits.

Given the thirty years of scientific cooperation it stands to reason as ice levels continue to decline the commitment of the Arctic states to study and conserve the Arctic environment will either remain steady or increase to meet the challenge. As mentioned previously, the adoption of the Polar Code by the International Maritime Organization, the continued strengthening of the environmental laws of Canada and Russia, and the establishment of legally binding resolutions

³¹⁵ Henry, "Between Transnationalism and State Power: The Development of Russia's Post-Soviet Environmental Movement." 776

³¹⁶ "Environmental Policy and Regulation in Russia: The Implementation Challenge."

³¹⁷ "Canada's Northern Strategy: Our North, Our Heritage, Our Future."

like the aforementioned 2018 *Agreement To Prevent Unregulated Commercial Fishing on the High Seas of the Central Arctic Ocean* by Arctic Council members have all been predicated by the actions, research, and coordination offered by Arctic Council members and the working groups funded by members.³¹⁸ The persistence of this habit in the face of competing national goals of Arctic Council members has been due to the congruence of national identity related to cooperation and conservation efforts within Russia and Canada to broader Arctic Council objectives. Therefore, it stands to reason as the Arctic continues to warm in the midst of climate change, so too will the commitment of the states of the Arctic Council to studying and responding to such changes even if the encroachment of normalization deteriorates other cooperative opportunities.

The Resource-Driven Arctic

The Arctic has been known to possess a significant amount of reserves of oil and natural gas capable of enriching the state and investors funding such operations. Thus, the Arctic has grown to in importance for these resources as it has become less costly to operate in the Arctic region.³¹⁹ Importantly though, the intersection of oil extraction and the status of the Arctic as a realm most readily conceptualized as environmentally fragile leaves commercial efforts to extract such resources in an interesting position especially in conjunction with ongoing Arctic normalization.

Historically, there was a significant level of interest in the extraction of oil and natural gas resources from the Arctic Circle, and this effort to extract resources from the region has been simmering on the backburner of several states for years. Interest in this kind of develop existed from a governmental perspective in Russia as early as Gorbachev's Murmansk declaration and

³¹⁸ The Arctic Council, "Fairbanks Declaration: On the Occasion of the Tenth Ministerial Meeting of the Arctic Council," (The Arctic Council, 2017).; "Scientific Cooperation Agreement Enters into Force."

³¹⁹ Keil, "The Arctic: A New Region of Conflict? The Case of Oil and Gas." 180

Canada has continually pursued policies along similar lines related to approaching the Arctic as an area for economic exploitation.³²⁰ What has prevented the large scale development of oil extraction facilities has been a combination of the costs of operation, the technological developments necessary to extract oil from the Arctic Ocean, and the inability to have oil tanks travel through the Arctic Ocean. Despite these impediments, interest in gaining power and influence from the extraction of Arctic natural resources fueled discussions within the capitols of Arctic states, oftentimes outweighing environmental concerns or being tempered by other environmental legislation or studies from the Arctic Council.³²¹

As previously mentioned, *the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment* of 2004 made waves within the international community, because of the interest generated related to the extraction of offshore oil and natural gas deposits in the region. Essentially, the Assessment proposed the continuing warming of the Arctic Ocean would reduce costs of operation over time for the companies willing to extract the resources in the region.³²² This sparked a host of government sponsored or greenlit programs to hunt for oil in the Arctic Ocean from nearly every state with Arctic coastlines; however, the most significant of these programs would be in Russia's extraction efforts in the Barents Sea.³²³ As previously, Rosneft's Arctic Oil extraction sites have garnered a great deal of international disdain and condemnation from environmental groups, yet instead of developing a truly untouchable area for the Arctic Council given these strong national interests there were considerations regarding marine oil pollution which were utilized in regards

³²⁰ Gorbachev, "Mikhail Gorbachev's Speech in Murmansk at the Ceremonial Meeting on the Occasion of the Presentation of the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star to the City of Murmansk."; Griffiths, "The Shipping News - Canada's Arctic Sovereignty Not on Thinning Ice." 257

³²¹ Borgerson, "Arctic Meltdown - the Economic and Security Implications of Global Warming."

³²² Atland, "Russia's Northern Fleet and the Oil Industry-Rivals or Partners? Petroleum, Security, and Civil-Military Relations in the Post-Cold War European Arctic." 367

³²³ Jensen and Skedsmo, "Approaching the North: Norwegian and Russian Foreign Policy Discourses on the European Arctic." 443

to the extraction of raw resources.³²⁴ Therefore as the deterrents for states to extract Arctic oil melts away it becomes increasingly normalized to attempt to extract such oil despite the confrontation of condemnation along environmental grounds.

As the Arctic continues to warm, it becomes increasingly probable for the states surrounding the region to continue to weigh the costs and benefits in favor of extracting Arctic Oil. With the decline of the unique environmental barriers and the resurgence of national interests related to exploiting the Arctic Ocean's resources, it stands to reason such extraction attempts will continue despite international condemnation from environmental organizations. In the case of Russia's Arctic oil extraction, the only reason its plans for expansion have slowed have been from the sanctions related to the Ukrainian Crisis limiting investments and technological assistance from Western firms like Exxon-Mobile.³²⁵ Therefore, as the ease of access in the region grows so too will it become increasingly normalized in relation to the extraction of oil, and the effects of other areas of global interaction among Arctic States.

As the Arctic continues down its path of normalization and ever-increasing access, the desire for oil companies to exploit Arctic resources will likely only continue to grow. Though at odds with other critical areas of national identity for the coastal states of the Arctic, this has not developed into an untouchable zone for the Arctic Council, instead the Council has remained dedicated to preparing its members for the possibilities of oil pollution and management in the High North. This tacit blessing from the Arctic Council regarding oil exploration in the Arctic region is likely to continue, especially in regarding the amount of national interests on the line for Arctic Coastal States.

³²⁴ Vladimirova, "Politics of the Green Economy in Russia's European North." 304

³²⁵ Baev, "Examining the Execution of Russian Military-Security Policies and Programs in the Arctic." 115

The Mythic Routes

In the past unresolved territorial disputes have deterred investment into the Arctic region as investors wish to avoid being embroiled in international incidents where it is unclear.³²⁶

Therefore, as the Arctic becomes easier to access then it becomes increasingly necessary for those disputes to be resolved in order to readily facilitate economic development. Given the impact of national identity regarding the Arctic over the past 30 years, particularly in areas like territorial disputes and national sovereignty, it is important to detail how emerging commercial interests and the habits of the states of the Arctic have meshed together as the sea ice retreats.

There has always been some interest in the Arctic from a commercial shipping perspective, yet it is important to not though this interest has been dissuaded by costs of operating in the extreme Arctic climate.³²⁷ Nevertheless, companies and states pursued interests in Arctic trade routes to potentially open them for business.³²⁸ For the states themselves, the potential value of Arctic territory as a trading hub fuels some of the territorial disputes of the region, despite the difficulty of travel into and out of the region reducing the importance and visibility of those disputes.³²⁹ Thus, the habitual logic of almost ignoring territorial disputes prevailed and the region was left to its own limited economic devices because of its inaccessibility.

As sea ice has melted though, the importance of the potential geographic wealth of the Arctic has been thrust into the limelight of international politics. The continued assessment of the international community of the value of the trade routes of the region has increased the interest

³²⁶ Isted, "Sovereignty in the Arctic: An Analysis of Territorial Disputes & Environmental Policy Considerations."

³²⁷ Ho, "The Implications of Arctic Sea Ice Decline on Shipping."

³²⁸ Borgerson, "Arctic Meltdown - the Economic and Security Implications of Global Warming."

³²⁹ Griffiths, "The Shipping News - Canada's Arctic Sovereignty Not on Thinning Ice." 276

of the national governments of Canada and Russia within the region.³³⁰ Given the potential profits to be made for both corporations and state governments, the continued melting of the ice sheets of the Arctic is correlating with increased ocean travel and increased financing to support Arctic expeditions for corporate gains.³³¹ Since the publication of the *Arctic Climate Impact Assessment*, the Russian government has done its best to help prepare vessels to traverse the Northeast Passage and projects significant increases in the years to come.³³² Meanwhile, Canada has grown concerned about the national sovereignty of Canadian waterways as the Northwest Passage becomes increasingly viable for shipping traffic.³³³ For both of these states, the prevailing habits of interaction regarding these trade routes running along their northern coastlines are causing those routes to achieve increasing political gravitas for the future their power and putting new life into ongoing territorial disputes.³³⁴ As noted within the case studies the five Arctic Coastal States agreed to resolve their territorial disputes bilaterally instead of multilaterally in 2008 during the Arctic Coastal Conference.³³⁵ Thus, there is a hearty connection between the ongoing territorial disputes of the region and the economic interests of the states surrounding it which the Arctic Council has done little to address.

The economic veracity of the Arctic region as a trade hub remains largely unknowable, due to the costs Arctic operations would continually incur compared to other regions even after significant portions of sea-ice have receded. As the ice continues to recede, interest in the region is likely to continue to grow which could exacerbate ongoing territorial disputes.³³⁶ As the ice

³³⁰ Byers, "Crises and International Cooperation: An Arctic Case Study." 381

³³¹ Blunden, "The New Problem of Arctic Stability." 137

³³² Ferris-Rotam, "Russia's Suez Canal? Ships Start Plying a Less-Ice Arctic, Thanks to Climate Change."; Khrushcheva and Poberezhskaya, "The Arctic in the Political Discourse of Russian Leaders: The National Pride and Economic Ambitions." 3

³³³ Landriault, "Public Opinion on Canadian Arctic Sovereignty and Security." 164

³³⁴ Isted, "Sovereignty in the Arctic: An Analysis of Territorial Disputes & Environmental Policy Considerations."

³³⁵ Arctic Ocean Conference, "2008 Ilulissat Declaration."

³³⁶ Isted, "Sovereignty in the Arctic: An Analysis of Territorial Disputes & Environmental Policy Considerations."

continues to melt, these territorial disputes could become exacerbated or serve as the means to provoke a ready resolution to the territorial issue in order to facilitate increased investment and commercial stability for states seeking to invest within the Arctic region.

Normalization and the Future of the Arctic Council

The future of the Arctic in the midst of normalization of Arctic relations is one characterized by the other aspects of the interstate relationships of Arctic states. In other words, it will be one defined by the already ongoing relationships present in the international community outside of the Arctic. The Arctic Council has always remained steadfast on its commitment to limiting its scope of interests to issues relevant to members and where it can succeed, such as conservation issues and scientific diplomacy yet there are a host of emerging issues where the Council may be pushed to act.

As normalization continues to affect the relationships of Arctic states and how achievable the various national interests of those states, the question emerges as to what role would the Arctic Council have in that new Arctic. The most likely outcome is a similar role to the one it has now, a regional forum dedicated to heightening Arctic issues and coordinating Arctic climate, environmental, and conservation research. Ultimately, the fate of the Arctic Council lies with its member states and their interactions on the issues the Council feels are important. The 2nd Finnish Chairmanship's opening statements regarding policy priorities, it is likely the ongoing direction of the Arctic Council will remain in cooperation on environmental concerns with a sprinkling of attempts to heighten the visibility of the organization.³³⁷ Put differently, Finnish objectives are not dissimilar from the objectives of previous Chairs including both Canada and Russia. Still the risk of surges of interest within the domestic politics and identity of Arctic states

³³⁷ The Arctic Council, "Finland's Chairmanship Program for the Arctic Council 2017-2019," (The Arctic Council, 2017).

could transform Arctic relations in to be either more confrontational or more cooperative than outer-Arctic relations.

Initially, in both case studies, there was a significant amount of nationalistic pushes related to utilizing Arctic resources on the part of both Canada and Russia to benefit themselves while maintaining conservation goals related to common goods. The prioritization of national interests over common goods in the region, especially with the amount of speculation related to economic profits to be made in the region speak to the possibility of an Arctic as unstable as the projected sea ice cover.³³⁸ Building up military forces alongside rhetoric centered on an Arctic manifest destiny on the part of Arctic states with competing territorial ambitions could hold the potential for conflict.³³⁹ At least these build-ups of military capability could lead to a destabilizing effect on Arctic politics especially with the ongoing build-up of economic interests in the region alongside nationalistic rhetoric.³⁴⁰ This though, seems unlikely at the moment and at any point over the past 30 years of both case studies. As noted in the case studies, these build-ups of forces have been related to overhaul programs of the national militaries of the Russian and Canadian militaries.³⁴¹ Given these programs reflect global relationships between Russia and the West, it becomes likely a conflict or contention between the Arctic Coastal States is less likely than initially believed or considered. Moreover, the continued heightened status of the Arctic Council in the whole of global politics with its expanding observer status and rotating chairmanship pushes a cooperative purgative onto the members of the Council, enabling a discussion of important Arctic objectives on a two year basis involving top ministers from Arctic states. This reinforces the possibility of a normalization of the Arctic space relative to what it has

³³⁸ Blunden, "The New Problem of Arctic Stability." 121

³³⁹ Baev, "Examining the Execution of Russian Military-Security Policies and Programs in the Arctic." 121

³⁴⁰ Copeland, *Economic Interdependence and War*.

³⁴¹ Baev, "Examining the Execution of Russian Military-Security Policies and Programs in the Arctic." 115; Lajeunesse, "The Canadian Armed Forces in the Arctic: Purpose, Capabilities, and Requirements." 3

experienced in the past which will not lead to an international conflict or new Cold War, because those things have not happened since 1989 in the whole of global politics.

On the other end of the spectrum in terms of possible futures for the Arctic and the Arctic Council is the possibility of a new set of cooperative opportunities for the region because of the long history of cooperation among members of the Council. As evident in the case studies though, this cooperation with other Council members is often relegated to one specific set of issue areas which excludes significant parts of the national interests of states.³⁴² Furthermore, domestic pressures can force the hands of states to behave in certain ways regarding the Arctic, from Harper's statements to protecting Arctic Sovereignty to declarations of the Arctic being the means to superpower status by Medvedev, thus limiting the cooperative impacts of the Arctic Council.³⁴³ Essentially, there are too many factors pointing to cooperation on some issues while competition and disagreement prevails in other areas. In essence, what is likely to occur as the region warms and becomes more accommodating to travel is the transference of habits from outside of the Arctic, into Arctic politics. For the Arctic Council this bodes rather well, as cooperation based on environmental factors is popular among its members, and those same members do not hesitate to engage one another on issues it declares are outside of its jurisdiction, such as territorial disputes. Thus, while cooperation will persist on issues like conservation, climate study, pollution management, and search and rescue operations it is unlikely such cooperation will become the hallmark of every Arctic issue into the future.

With this in mind, the only real option for continued success for the Arctic Council is to stick to its most successful cooperative programs related to conservation and scientific

³⁴² Byers, "Crises and International Cooperation: An Arctic Case Study." 395

³⁴³ Dodds, "We Are a Northern Country: Stephen Harper and the Canadian Arctic."; Khrushcheva and Poberezhskaya, "The Arctic in the Political Discourse of Russian Leaders: The National Pride and Economic Ambitions." 1

cooperation; thereby, leaving other areas more closely linked to national interests untouched.³⁴⁴

Thus, the future of the Arctic Council likely looks very similar to the present and immediate past of the Arctic Council, the facilitation of cooperation on certain issues and the ongoing avoidance of issues which could cause cooperation to breakdown.

³⁴⁴ Young, "The Structure of Arctic Cooperation: Solving Problems/Seizing Opportunities."

CHAPTER 8

CONCLUSIONS

Over the past 30 years, the Arctic Council has proven itself to be an institution focused on developing a community of environmentally conscious states working together in order to better study and preserve one of the most fragile and unique ecosystems on the planet. To this end, the Arctic Council has successfully enabled countless opportunities of research coordination across its eight member states, indigenous people's organizations, observer institutions, and observer states leading to new international norms related to environmental protection within the Arctic Ocean.³⁴⁵ The success of these objectives is astounding, and as the case studies regarding Canadian and Russian policies go to show, likely linked to overall inclinations of the national identities of the states participating within the Arctic Council.

Yet, national identity also plays a role in limiting the cooperative pushes of the Arctic Council, holding it back from being a full regional forum to discuss broad spectrum issues within the region which appear to be becoming increasingly relevant. The encroachment of relations from outside of the Arctic region perhaps will be able to increasingly normalize the region as the overall fungibility of national power increases in correlation to the decreases of ice-sheet thickness. Regardless of how the Arctic will be transformed, it is clear since 1989 the Arctic Council has had its successes be based upon the national identity and interests of its members just as it has had its limitations imposed upon it by those same forces.

³⁴⁵ Knecht, "The Politics of Arctic International Cooperation: Introducing a Dataset on Stakeholder Participation in Arctic Council Meetings, 1998-2015."

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