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The Relationship Between International Migration and Regional Integration

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THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION AND
REGIONAL INTEGRATION

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ABSTRACT

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This dissertation challenges prevailing assumptions of a strong connection between international migration and regional integration by arguing there is no substantial relationship between them and that these issues should not be conflated. International migration and regional integration are extraordinarily important forces shaping the current international system and the recent wave of globalization has brought with it a new level of fear and uncertainty surrounding these critical issues. Migration and integration are highly contentious and divisive subjects in and of themselves, but the relationship between them is largely misunderstood and tends to skew toward panicked hyperbole by publics and policymakers alike.

In an effort to address this gap in our understanding, this dissertation investigates the relationship between international migration and regional integration to determine if there is a causal link and, if so, the direction of causality. I use two major research strategies to investigate the relationship: (1) a quantitative analysis of country-level data including an objective measure of regional integration developed for this study and (2) two detailed case studies of the North American and European experiences in addition to a broad overview of the migration-integration relationship in other regions. The quantitative and case study analyses support my hypothesis that there is no substantial relationship between international migration and regional integration. In this perspective,

states can consider the benefits of regional integration policies without worrying about migration and can consider migration policies without concern for integration.

This dissertation is dedicated to my parents – Richard and Teri White – with much gratitude.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

In May 2004 the European Union added ten new member states and 75 million new citizens, a dramatic eastward expansion that signaled an end to the divided continent shaped by the Cold War. Although this enlargement was a momentous effort at regional integration and one of the most significant geopolitical events of the decade, it was accompanied by widespread fears and heated political rhetoric concerning migration – a “ripple of hysteria” to be sure.¹ The potential for hordes of East Europeans to “invade” the old EU-15 states was a source of serious anxiety, understandable in many respects due to the substantial differentials between the old and new members. Nervous publics were stoked by politicians aiming to score points over the migration panic.

However, the Western European countries also feared mass migration during an earlier expansion in the 1980s that included Greece, Spain, and Portugal, but these fears proved to be unfounded as significant migration did not occur. The majority of Western European countries imposed immigration restrictions on the new 2004 (and 2007) members that would expire after several years, but the fact remained that at some point in the future there would be free movement of people throughout the union. The richer countries anticipated a huge influx of low-cost laborers that would take jobs from natives and drain public coffers as they took advantage of generous welfare benefits in destination countries, a true nightmare scenario for those that did not want to see a change in the status quo.

¹ Mark Landler, "A Human Tidal Wave, or a Ripple of Hysteria?," *New York Times*, May 5, 2004.

A number of years have passed since the EU enlargement and we can now say, without a doubt, that significant migration failed to occur once again. Fears of mass east-west migration proved to be unfounded, as the “coming hordes” pretty much stayed at home.² Although some countries did experience a noticeable influx, these were overwhelmingly temporary in nature, more of a spike than a continuous flood. In fact, the proportion of citizens from the new member states living in the old EU-15 states increased from 0.2 percent of the population in 2003 to just 0.5 percent in 2008. These figures may seem counterintuitive when considering that the removal of immigration restrictions had little to no effect on intra-regional migration. What does this tell us about migration in the context of regional integration? In other words, what is the nature of the relationship between these forces?

International migration and regional integration are extraordinarily important forces shaping the current international system and the recent wave of globalization has brought with it a new level of fear and uncertainty surrounding these critical issues. This uncertainty has manifested itself in a variety of mostly negative aspects of public life ranging from heated political arguments to mass demonstrations and even violent social unrest. The stories are all too familiar – ethnic and religious tensions, attacks against migrants, panic over border security, criminality, and potential terrorism, building fences and walls, problems with immigrant integration and assimilation, overpopulation or depopulation, ultranationalism, “brain drain”, unemployment, inequality, questions of sovereignty, effective governance, and so on.

In nearly all corners of the world today, migration and integration are highly contentious and divisive issues in and of themselves, but the relationship between them is

² “The Coming Hordes,” *The Economist*, January 17, 2004.

largely misunderstood and has not been given the scholarly attention that it deserves. These issues are often conflated in the political sphere and anti-immigration politicians have been highly effective at combining them even when there is no apparent reason to do so. In contrast, there is a major disconnect in the academic literature, where scholars tend to focus on one issue or the other, but neglect the relationship between them. This inattention to the relationship between migration and regional integration has proved detrimental to the interests of the international community and has acted as a major obstacle to improving interstate relations and managing global migration effectively, which is unfortunate when considering migration and integration could be essential in helping states meet the challenges of the twenty-first century. In an effort to address this gap in our understanding, this dissertation investigates the relationship between international migration and regional integration and argues that there is no substantial relationship between the two, despite the political rhetoric that generates enormous fear and hyperbole surrounding these issues.

If the argument for a lack of a substantial relationship between international migration and regional integration is accurate, the examination should demonstrate that there is no apparent causal link. The disconnect between these issues means that states can consider regional integration without busying themselves worrying about migration and can consider migration without worrying about integration. Furthermore, by looking at the situation globally and then through a selection of specific regional case studies, I should be able to paint a clear picture of the relationship between international migration and regional integration.

Although it may be an overgeneralization, there is a pervasive assumption that international migration and regional integration are intimately connected, such that a change in one factor will somehow affect the other. This assumption is twofold as it involves both directions of causality between international migration and regional integration. If we think about the effect of international migration on regional integration, there is a perception that migration has a direct influence on integration efforts, where a state will become more or less regionally integrated in part as a result of migration. In other words, the movement of people across borders will be a significant factor in decisions made by national governments when they consider regional integration.

The movement of people has been a source of anxiety for many societies for centuries, but these feelings seem to be exacerbated in this age of rapid globalization. Mass immigration or emigration is viewed as destabilizing and billions of dollars are spent annually to control and regulate the mobility of people across borders, often with little to no result considering these enormous expenditures.³ Furthermore, if aggregate spending is taken into consideration, it is estimated that the 25 richest countries spend over \$30 billion a year on immigration enforcement and processing, a sum that is approximately two-thirds of what is spent on development assistance.⁴ Migration basically relates to the concept of new faces in new places and this has become a serious concern for most countries and their citizens. It is evident in concerns over state sovereignty, the economy, and the potential influence of changing demographics. There

³ Julia Preston, "Homeland Security Cancels 'Virtual Fence' After \$1 Billion Is Spent," *New York Times*, January 15, 2011.

⁴ Philip Martin, *Sustainable Migration Policies in a Globalizing World* (Geneva: International Labour Organization (International Institute for Labour Studies), 2003).

are obvious concerns about how these factors might affect cultural, religious, political, social, or other characteristics under the umbrella of *national identity*.⁵

The contentiousness over migration cannot be overemphasized and it has been difficult for the vast majority of nation-states to develop and implement effective policies. Doomsday scenarios are ever-present in the political sphere. Moreover, the ripple effects of migration have a huge influence over various aspects of public life. According to Hollifield, “Politically, socially, economically, culturally – migration bubbles up everywhere. We often don’t recognize it.”⁶ It is often the case that uncertainty and fear produce a climate where, even in the face of overwhelming evidence, it is commonplace for a state to maintain an irrational migration policy that, in reality, *harms* its overall interests. There are numerous examples of countries sticking to these misguided policies, such as the failure of the United States to effectively manage the recruitment of the global elite, which has been a major point of emphasis for business leaders like Microsoft’s Bill Gates. This reluctance to successfully adapt immigration policy prompted *The Economist* to opine that this is a “policy of national self-sabotage” seriously affecting US economic interests.⁷

Moreover, Japan has also stuck to an inefficient strategy involving multiple barriers that make it extraordinarily difficult for foreign healthcare workers to migrate there, which is all the more surprising in light of that country’s demographic challenge of an aging population coupled with low fertility.⁸ This demographic challenge is not

⁵ See for example, Samuel P. Huntington, *Who Are We?: The Challenges to America's National Identity* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004). See also Rabah Aissaoui, *Immigration and National Identity: North African Political Movements in Colonial and Postcolonial France* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).

⁶ Jason DeParle, "A World on the Move," *New York Times*, June 27, 2010.

⁷ "Help Not Wanted," *The Economist*, April 12, 2008.

⁸ Hiroko Tabuchi, "Despite Shortage, Japan Keeps A High Wall for Foreign Labor," *New York Times*, January 3, 2011.

limited to Japan, however, as countries that reach the top tier of economic development tend to exhibit similar problems of graying populations and low fertility rates, which leads to slow or even negative population growth if there is insufficient immigration to correct for the imbalance.⁹ Europe is experiencing this demographic challenge more than any other region. As Landler has commented, “If the scaremongers stop to think about it, the real danger for Europe, with its aging population and anemic birthrate, may be too little immigration, not too much.”¹⁰

This is not to say that immigration is a panacea for countries with aging populations, but it can at least act as a mitigating factor and slow the negative effects. Andres Solimano captures the core of this current global migration dilemma: “a vast, multidirectional movement of international migrants, spurred on by big differences in wages, living standards, degrees of economic security, and political stability across regions and countries, are butting up against policy barriers in wealthy countries that wish to stem the very tide that these countries are (perhaps unintentionally) creating.”¹¹ Although some states may exhibit an openness and tolerance for migrants, more often immigrants are met with varying degrees of intolerance, which may range from mistrust and resentment to blatant discrimination, racism, and xenophobia. This is not a new phenomenon as global migration has had a checkered history to say the least.

The perception of migration influencing regional integration is also related to a state’s external relations. People are scared about how other people coming or going

⁹ Nicholas Eberstadt, “The Demographic Future,” *Foreign Affairs* 89, no. 6 (2010). See also Jonathan Grant and others, *Low Fertility and Population Ageing: Causes, Consequences, and Policy Options* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2004).

¹⁰ Landler, “A Human Tidal Wave, or a Ripple of Hysteria?,” *New York Times*.

¹¹ Andrés Solimano, *International Migration in the Age of Crisis and Globalization: Historical and Recent Experiences* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 3.

might affect their own governments, and how their governments will then interact with other countries. Moreover, the migrants themselves have concerns over what kind of lives they can expect in destination countries and how their newfound migrant status will affect their relationships with the countries of origin. Changes in migration may, according to this perspective, encourage a state to lean toward isolationism and eschew integration efforts or become more internationalist (or at least “regionalist”) and embrace integration. In any case, the perception exists that the mobility of people across borders plays a significant role in regional integration efforts.

If we think about the reverse dynamic – regional integration influencing international migration – there is an overwhelming notion that a regional integration arrangement will have a corresponding effect on migration, which typically takes on one of two forms. On the one hand, regional integration is thought to result in greater emigration or immigration depending on the particular state. This perception is evident in concerns in both origin and destination countries that regional integration acts as a push or pull factor for migrants. In other words, if a country decides to enter into a regional integration agreement, we might assume that it will experience more or less migration as a direct result of this agreement. Alternatively, if a state chooses to leave a regional integration agreement, we might also expect that it will experience more or less migration as a result of that action. This assumed connection between regional integration and migration was conspicuous in the aforementioned EU enlargement of 2004, for example, as the richer Western European countries feared mass immigration

and the poorer Eastern European countries feared mass emigration.¹² As Casey explains, “Despite the relatively short history of what we now consider to be the norm, and despite the evident prejudice against the poor, the prospect of liberalizing immigration controls evoke visions of the nightmare of invading hordes of the poor flooding over the broken fence of their rich neighbors.”¹³ As stated earlier, new faces in new places can exert a powerful influence on the human psyche.

On the other hand, some states have explored regional integration arrangements as a mechanism to manage migration, such as the creation of NAFTA in the 1990s that was supposed to reduce the flow of migrants from Mexico to the United States by creating incentives for Mexicans to stay at home, primarily in the form of more American and Canadian businesses setting up shop in Mexico and providing jobs for the local population.¹⁴ The idea here is that through coordination and cooperation reached through regional integration, states can exert control over migration and manage it in a method they believe will be most effective with respect to their specific needs. Although NAFTA was a well-conceived and implemented integration agreement between neighboring states, the problem lay in the failure to take existing empirical observations into consideration. Policymakers did not realize that Mexicans would continue to migrate to the United States in the face of overwhelming wage disparities, persistent social ties, and overall economic opportunity in the destination country regardless of any regional agreement meant to curb migration.

¹² See for example, “The Coming Hordes”, *The Economist*. See also Landler, “A Human Tidal Wave, or a Ripple of Hysteria?”, *New York Times*. See also Thomas Straubhaar, “East-West Migration: Will it be a Problem?”, *Intereconomics* 36, no. 1 (2001).

¹³ John P. Casey, “Open Borders: Absurd Chimera or Inevitable Future Policy?”, *International Migration* 48, no. 5 (2010): 24.

¹⁴ Louis Uchitelle, “NAFTA Should Have Stopped Illegal Immigration, Right?”, *New York Times*, February 18, 2007. See also United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, *Regional Cooperation for Development* (New York: United Nations, 2007), 78.

As demonstrated in the NAFTA experience, this notion of exercising control over migration through regional integration has typically proved to be a fool's errand, which will be discussed in greater detail in the following chapter. It is apparent that while governments can indeed exert a certain amount of control over migration with regard to border security, issuing visas and passports, law enforcement, and so forth; regional integration efforts are largely unrelated to the management and regulation of migration. Nevertheless, fears of immigration and emigration often arise with respect to integration, regardless of the apparent lack of any significant relationship between these factors.

HYPOTHESIS AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The central hypothesis of this dissertation is that international migration and regional integration are actually quite distinctive in relation to each other and should not be conflated. In order to test this hypothesis, the linkage between international migration and regional integration will be examined utilizing quantitative and qualitative analysis to determine if there is a relationship and, if so, the nature and extent of the relationship.

The direction of causality between these factors is also an important piece of the puzzle, as it is important to look at these issues as a two-way street. Only looking at one issue without adequate attention to the other would be inappropriate and ineffective with respect to confirming or rejecting the central hypothesis. In order to capture both sides of the relationship, this dissertation will delve into a number of broad research questions: Does regional integration lead to more or less international migration? Or conversely, does international migration lead to more or less regional integration? If migration does have an effect on integration, to what extent does it do so, and vice versa?

RATIONALE FOR THE STUDY

The relationship between international migration and regional integration will be important for the twenty-first century global order. Although these are factors are highly significant with respect to the current international system, the relationship between them is largely misunderstood and tends to skew toward panicked hyperbole by publics and policymakers alike. This dissertation seeks to shed light on this relationship and make a valuable contribution to the existing literature by filling in some of the gaps in our understanding.

One of the keys to the study will be utilizing a clear scientific methodology to glean some general lessons about the migration-integration relationship. However, this is a major difficulty in light of the vast differences between nation-states and regions. There is a tendency by some observers that has become prevalent in the regional integration literature to use the incredible success of the European Union as a benchmark for comparison with other regions, but this approach has been widely criticized by those that argue that these comparisons are erroneous and misleading.¹⁵ For a variety of reasons, it follows that Europe is fundamentally different than areas such as sub-Saharan Africa and East Asia and policy prescriptions for the former will be ineffectual in the latter.

The quantitative component reflects the “two-way street” concept related to the central argument of the dissertation and is designed to demonstrate correlation, not causality, which is crucial to remember in a study like this one, and especially with

¹⁵ See for example, *Comparative Regional Integration: Europe and Beyond*, ed. Finn Laursen (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2010). See also Walter Mattli, *The Logic of Regional Integration: Europe and Beyond* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999). See also *The European Union and Regional Integration: A Comparative Perspective and Lessons for the Americas*, ed. Roberto Domínguez and Joaquín Roy (Miami, FL: Jean Monnet Chair, University of Miami; European Commission, 2005).

respect to a variable like migration that often has such an individualistic flavor to it. If we think about the study of migration, the uniqueness and unpredictability of people make it extraordinarily difficult as a field of study. Available data, however scant and imperfect, should nonetheless enable a successful general examination of the relationship between international migration and regional integration.

It might go without saying, but migration is the exception not the rule in the world today. Although total migration is substantial at some 214 million people, *billions* have decided to stay at home. It is obvious that people migrate for different reasons or decide not to migrate for different reasons. We might expect two families in a country of origin that look remarkably similar on paper – living in the same neighborhood of the same city with a similar household structure and socio-economic status – to nevertheless take completely opposite approaches to migration merely as a result of their own particular individual and families nuances and preferences. It is impossible to capture someone's hopes and dreams in a theoretical model. After all, the idiosyncrasies of a human being cannot be distilled to a laboratory experiment that should produce the same result every time. Moreover, by the end of 2011 world population will likely reach seven billion people. It would be ill-advised and even nonsensical to purport a theory of migration with anything close to exact certainty. However, there should indeed be general lessons that we can learn concerning migration and its influence on other factors.

Regional integration, on the other hand, is largely a recent phenomenon. Only since the early 1990s have we seen substantial movement in the direction of increased regional integration efforts. The bipolar order that characterized international politics from the conclusion of World War II until the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991

made it extraordinarily difficult for countries to engage in regional integration. Instead of regional integration, the vast majority of states in the international system fell under the sphere of influence of either the United States or the Soviet Union, or were members of the non-aligned movement. Thus, the Cold War was much more concerned with great power rivalry than regionalism. This rivalry cast an enormous shadow over world politics and global interdependence. The proliferation of regional agreements in the post-Cold War period has been referred to as “new regionalism” to reflect the emergence of these newfound linkages among states and the tendency to engage in these regional efforts as opposed to the multilateral Bretton Woods institutions that had dominated the global economic order since the end of World War II.¹⁶ This concept of new regionalism fits into the broader “second” wave of globalization – an effort to distinguish the current period from the pre-World War I period that witnessed tremendous growth in global trade and overall economic interdependence.

The scholarship on international migration and regional integration is extensive, but the relationship between them has received far less attention. Works on migration usually stick to migration and the same can be said for works on regional integration. However, this “stove piping” is noteworthy in light of the fear and uncertainty surrounding these critical issues. In the literature on migration, for example, it is rare to find a discussion of regional integration. There are numerous works of substantial length that discuss a range of issues related to migration without mentioning regional integration even once. The problem exists in the other direction, such that the existing regional integration literature tends to ignore migration. If we think about “mobility” in the

¹⁶ United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, *Regional Cooperation for Development*, 55.

international system, it relates for the most part to the movement of people, goods, and capital.

From my perspective, the divide in the existing literature has likely come about as a result of fault lines between these aspects of mobility. The migration literature tends to focus on people and the integration literature on capital and goods. This is understandable in many respects, as regional integration is still largely concerned with economic integration and the movement of capital and goods across borders – trade and customs agreements, economic cooperation, financial regulation, and so on – with far less attention to the mobility of people. In general, people arguably have less mobility in the current international system compared to money and goods.

The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) was developed out of ongoing WTO trade negotiations. Thus, the organization has looked into the mobility of people; it simply remains less of a priority than capital and goods. The WTO has also acknowledged that GATS provisions are in no way designed to circumvent national immigration laws and policies, and that any agreement under the WTO framework is explicitly temporary in nature.¹⁷ In other words, the WTO has no real stake in permanent, long-term migration, and is hesitant to get involved in guest worker programs or other efforts that might lead to long-term stays. Coordination efforts on non-temporary migration are neither a priority for states nor international regimes like the WTO. Again, the priority is on the mobility of capital and goods, not people. The ability of the international community to manage the movement of goods and capital evolved in a dramatic fashion over the course of the twentieth century with the development of global norms and institutions, but the movement of people remains largely unregulated,

¹⁷ Casey, "Open Borders: Absurd Chimera or Inevitable Future Policy?", *International Migration*: 39.

as states maintain ultimate control over this dimension and they have not engaged in significant formal negotiations on migration.¹⁸

In order to help fill this gap in the literature, the dissertation will examine the relationship itself most directly and devote less attention to the constituent factors, such that the focus on the *nature and extent of the relationship between international migration and regional integration* can be considered the primary contribution to the existing literature. One of the challenges with a study of migration and integration is that these factors are often thought of in conjunction with other issues. For example, discussions about international migration and regional integration might also involve elements of national security, economic policy, domestic politics, international law, or foreign affairs. These ancillary issues are obviously important elements of the broader discussion surrounding migration and integration. However, this dissertation will not address these issues specifically as they are outside of the scope of the study.

ORGANIZATION OF THE DISSERTATION

Following this introductory chapter, Chapter II provides an overall explanation of the current situation for both international migration and regional integration. It is important to have a solid foundation on these subjects before an examination of the relationship between them can proceed. This chapter will devote some attention to the historical background related to international migration and regional integration, which is designed to show how we arrived at the current situation.

¹⁸ See for example, Philip Martin, *Managing Migration: The Promise of Cooperation*, ed. Susan Forbes Martin and Patrick Weil (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2006).

Chapter III looks more deeply into the theoretical aspects of international migration and regional integration. How does the application of theory help explain the relationship between these factors? What should our expectations be going forward? This chapter provides the theoretical framework for the study that should aid in confirming or rejecting the hypothesis. Moreover, this framework acts as a foundation for moving forward with the quantitative and qualitative analysis and the rest of the dissertation.

Chapter IV presents a quantitative analysis utilizing an aggregate dataset to delve into the nature and extent of the relationship between the two main study components. Moreover, this includes a discussion and defense of the selected variables. This chapter is designed to be a general overview with the entire world as the level of analysis. It involves a significant data analysis component focused on the hypothesis. Does the data support or reject the central argument?

It is important to note the significant limitations of the available data on international migration and regional integration, which poses a challenge for a dissertation that seeks to investigate the relationship between them. Migration in particular is difficult to capture as a variable. As the IOM has written, “The multidimensional and multidirectional characteristics of migration today, as well as its temporary and circular patterns, require sophisticated data-collection systems and methodologies – which, in most cases, countries are not prepared to apply or lack the capacity to do so.”¹⁹ The international community and international organizations, more

¹⁹ International Organization for Migration, *World Migration Report 2010 - The Future of Migration: Building Capacities for Change* (Geneva: International Organization for Migration, 2010), 237.

specifically, have made tremendous strides in recent decades in improving the availability and reliability of migration data, but it remains less than ideal.

International migration in a general sense is concerned with a person's status in relation to (at least) two countries, one of origin and one of destination. Thus, national governments must play the most important role in maintaining this data, and as the IOM suggests, "Ultimately, the quality of migration data is determined by the quality of the population censuses of the different countries, many of which have not conducted censuses recently or regularly."²⁰ As a result of the limitations of international migration data, quantitative analysis alone is insufficient to investigate the relationship between migration and regional integration. If the available datasets were more reliable and thorough, it would allow for greater certainty with respect to confirming or rejecting the hypothesis.

Furthermore, including regional integration in a quantitative analysis also poses a challenge, especially since regional integration is a relatively new phenomenon in the international system and the forms these regional arrangements take vary widely. In an effort to address the apparent challenges inherent in the limitations of migration and regional integration data, this dissertation uses a mixed-methods approach to generate synergies. The quantitative analysis is bolstered by case studies that enable a greater overall understanding of the relationship between migration and integration in different areas and this mixed-methods approach allows me to make a more convincing argument for the lack of a substantial relationship between them.

The last section of chapter IV introduces the case study selections that comprise the next three chapters. Chapters V through VII look at particular regions and employ a

²⁰ Ibid., 240.

variety of sources including scholarly works, the global media, and those from NGOs and advocacy groups in order to provide a significant qualitative component to the study in addition to the quantitative component.

Chapter V is a case study of the European experience. The European Union is the preeminent regional integration arrangement, but other arrangements are also included as they are important to the overall study. The previous chapter was designed to look at the big picture while this chapter and the other case studies are designed to hone in on certain areas. What is the situation in Europe as far as the relationship between international migration and regional integration? How significant is migration in Europe, and how regionally integrated is it?

Chapter VI is a case study of the North American experience. This is a much different region than Europe and provides an excellent opportunity for comparison. The United States is the world's largest economy and is the top destination country for migration in the world today by far and should arguably be included in any study of the relationship between migration and integration. Although this region will have a smaller sample size compared to Europe as far as the countries involved, we should nevertheless be able to answer the main questions related to the focus of the dissertation. What is the situation in North America as far as the relationship between international migration and regional integration? How significant is migration in North America, and how regionally integrated is it?

Chapter VII looks at the situation more generally in a number of regions throughout the world. Instead of a more extensive focus on one region, this chapter contains brief sections on Latin America (includes the Caribbean, Central America, and

South America), sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and North Africa, Central Asia, East Asia, South Asia, and Oceania. In sum, this chapter is designed to be an across-the-board look at the relationship between international migration and regional integration in other areas of the world besides North America and Europe.

Chapter VIII, my conclusions, begins with a summary of the main research and findings of the dissertation. This chapter looks at how effectively the central argument was addressed and if the findings were sufficient to confirm or reject the hypothesis. Moreover, it provides some general thoughts and looks at how this topic may be expanded upon in future research.

CHAPTER II

INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION AND REGIONAL INTEGRATION

We now understand better than ever before that migration is not a zero-sum game. In the best cases, it benefits the receiving country, the country of origin and migrants themselves.

- Former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan¹

INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION

Migration is an enormously contentious issue in the vast majority of nation-states, as nearly every state in the world today is affected by the immigration and emigration of its citizens, or simply the dynamic of people coming and going. Some states experience far greater migration flows than others, but migration remains one of the most crucial issues for a state to manage, and to manage effectively. This ability to exercise control over the mobility of people is one of the core tenets of statehood and has been a significant challenge for many states. However, the idea that a state should be able to exercise complete control over migration has only been salient for about half a century and the inability of governments to maintain effective border security measures is a huge source of the contention surrounding international migration.

There is a pervasive argument that has seen growing acceptance in recent years regarding the management of migration, but the argument is counterintuitive considering the rise of technology, the marked increase in state capacity in many regions, and the general level of global interdependence in the current international system. Bhagwati explains this argument effectively, “Paradoxically, the ability to control migration has

¹ United Nations General Assembly, *International Migration and Development: Report of the Secretary-General* (New York: United Nations Publications, 2006), 8.

shrunk as the desire to do so has increased. The reality is that borders are beyond control and little can be done to really cut down on immigration.”² Labor markets in the developed world have a structural demand for migration that contradicts political rhetoric calling for greater restrictions.³ The difficulty in securing borders may engender fear and frustration in destination country societies in the face of “uncontrolled” migration. As Demetri Papademetrios of the Migration Policy Institute explains, “It basically tells people that government cannot do its job. It creates the anti-government rhetoric we see, and the anger people are feeling.”⁴

Migration, like a multitude of other issue areas, is often bitterly debated within destination countries (and origin in some instances), as some elements of society may view greater immigration as a positive while others see it as a negative. Moreover, the debate can be divided into concerns over the migration process, the migrants themselves, and migration policy.⁵ Destination countries are typically the focus of the debate over global migration, which speaks to the notion that people are more concerned with where migrants have gone rather than from whence they came. Thus, a fundamental challenge that arises in formulating effective migration policies is seeking to meet the needs of various domestic constituencies in destination countries. The liberal capitalist model produces winners and losers and some elements of society may perceive a change in the status quo as a result of migration.

² Jagdish Bhagwati, "Borders Beyond Control," *Foreign Affairs* 82, no. 1 (2003): 99.

³ James F. Hollifield, "The Emerging Migration State," *International Migration Review* 38, no. 3 (2004). See also Adrian Favell and Randall Hansen, "Markets Against Politics: Migration, EU Enlargement and the Idea of Europe," *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 28, no. 4 (2002).

⁴ DeParle, "A World on the Move," *New York Times*. See also Douglas S. Massey, "International Migration at the Dawn of the Twenty-First Century: The Role of the State," *Population and Development Review* 25, no. 2 (1999).

⁵ Gary P. Freeman, "Immigration as a Source of Political Discontent and Frustration in Western Democracies," *Studies in Comparative International Development* 32, no. 3 (1997).

International migration is incredibly complex and multifaceted as evidenced by the voluminous literature surrounding the issue, but this dissertation nevertheless attempts to make a unique contribution to the field by delving more deeply into the relationship between migration and regional integration. Moreover, the complexity of migration makes it a challenging field of study, as it covers a wide variety of subject areas including political science, economics, sociology, and law. As a result of its multidisciplinary nature, the study of migration looks at both macro and micro-level factors, which exist simultaneously and are mutually reinforcing. Both levels of analysis are crucial to furthering our understanding of migration, as a singular focus on one level of analysis without inclusion of the other would paint an incomplete picture. Thus, a multi-level approach is most effective for the study of migration since individual decisions are not made in isolation from state-level factors.

Migration has been one of the most salient factors shaping world politics and international relations for centuries, but it remains an extraordinarily contentious and divisive issue for political leaders and their respective domestic populations. Vehement disagreements over border controls and immigration policies are commonplace throughout the world. Globalization will continue to be a dominant feature of the twenty-first century, with changing migration flows as one of its fundamental components. Although many scholars have pointed out that globalization is nothing new, it is difficult to argue the notion that the “speed, reach, intensity, cost, and impacts of the current period of globalization are.”⁶ Furthermore, there is a sense that globalization and the way

⁶ Maryann K. Cusimano, *Beyond Sovereignty: Issues for a Global Agenda*, 3rd ed. (Belmont, CA: Thomson/Wadsworth, 2007), 3.

the international system manages migration are incompatible and that it will be increasingly difficult to maintain restrictive policies.

If globalization acts as a major enabler of change in the international system, then migration policies need to be considered in a thoughtful, pragmatic, and competent manner that effectively reconciles the needs and desires of migrants and states. Heated rhetoric does little to improve the likelihood that a state will reach a successful migration policy, but rather can serve to obfuscate important political, economic, and social realities concerning migrants and host-nation citizens. While there have been significant developments in international coordination and cooperation across a number of issue areas, problem-solving with regard to migration has not received the attention that it so badly needs.

Sovereignty is one of the central characteristics of the modern nation-state, where non-intervention in another state's internal affairs is seen as a bedrock concept of international relations. International migration is problematic with regard to sovereignty, as it often acts as a direct challenge to the notion of citizenship and an individual being a member of a particular nation-state. Thus, any discussion of migration issues is often accompanied by sovereignty concerns, which is understandable when considering that migrants will make an impact at some level in both origin and destination countries. As Solimano explains, "In a world of nation-states, individual rights are fundamentally tied to citizenship and nationality. The rise of migration poses obvious challenges to a world organized by sovereign states with a monopoly on nationality rights, but also in which territories of birth and people's current residence do not match one to one."⁷

⁷ Solimano, *International Migration in the Age of Crisis and Globalization: Historical and Recent Experiences*, 47.

International human rights organizations and even some nation-states have argued for a new conception of sovereignty that includes the responsibility of a state for the welfare of people within its territory, often expressed as the “responsibility to protect”, and this is directly applicable to international migration. Moreover, advocacy groups and other non-state actors have a major influence in global migration, particularly in richer destination country societies where citizens are largely uncomfortable with strict control mechanisms. Organizations like the International Red Cross, Amnesty International, and Human Rights Watch play an important role in encouraging government responsibility and accountability, providing a crucial voice to civil society.⁸ In addition, faith-based groups are heavily engaged in migration out of religious, moral, and humanitarian concerns. One such example is Humane Borders, a collaborative organization of churches and advocacy groups that has set up a number of water stations for migrants crossing the US-Mexican border in an effort to prevent deaths from dehydration and heat stroke, an unfortunate consequence of dangerous clandestine border crossings.⁹

While a number of scholars have argued that the primacy of the nation-state is eroding, especially with regard to migration, at present it remains the dominant political structure and the right of self-determination is a prized attribute of statehood.¹⁰ Thousands of people die every year trying to gain this right in politically fractious areas. States are generally reticent to cede sovereignty as a result of a myriad of concerns ranging from national security to potential negative economic effects.

⁸ See for example, Human Rights Watch, *"Tough, Fair, and Practical": A Human Rights Framework for Immigration Reform in the United States* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2010).

⁹ Wayne A. Cornelius, "Death at the Border: Efficacy and Unintended Consequences of US Immigration Control Policy," *Population and Development Review* 27, no. 4 (2001).

¹⁰ Christian Joppke, *Challenge to the Nation-State: Immigration in Western Europe and the United States* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998). See also Martin A. Schain, "The State Strikes Back: Immigration Policy in the European Union," *European Journal of International Law* 20, no. 1 (2009).

Historical Background

Migration has occurred for centuries, but for the purposes of this dissertation, a brief historical overview of the modern period is most appropriate and facilitates a general understanding of the factors that contributed to the current state of migration in the international system. International migration prior to the modern period was often involuntary and included human tragedies like the transatlantic slave trade. However, it is important to note that the contentiousness surrounding migration is nothing new. It is apparent that even prior to independence political leaders in the United States were wary of immigration. Benjamin Franklin expressed nativist sentiments regarding German immigrants, as he wrote in 1751, “Why should Pennsylvania, founded by the English, become a colony of Aliens, who will shortly be so numerous as to Germanize us instead of our Anglifying them, and will never adopt our Language or Customs any more than they can acquire our Complexion?”¹¹ Franklin’s anti-German rhetoric demonstrates that nativist fears of dramatic societal change brought on by immigration has persisted for centuries, and it seems “scapegoating foreigners for domestic problems real or imagined is something of an American tradition.”¹²

While this is interesting from a historical perspective, a focus on the modern period is necessary to successfully move into a discussion of regional integration. In 1900, there were only 43 sovereign states in the world, and it is therefore difficult to speak of regional integration at this point in time. The following political cartoon “Looking Backward” by Joseph Keppler appeared in *Puck* on January 11, 1893 and

¹¹ Benjamin Franklin and others, *The Papers of Benjamin Franklin* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1959), 234.

¹² Jason Riley, *Let Them In: The Case for Open Borders* (New York: Gotham Books, 2008), 221.

depicts the tendency for the native population in the US to forget their immigrant roots and advocate for restrictive policies.¹³



Figure 1. "Looking Backward", Joseph Keppler (1893)

In broad terms, there are four main phases that have characterized the modern world economy.¹⁴ The period from about 1870 until the beginning of World War I is often referred to as the first wave of globalization. During this phase there was a massive flow of Europeans, primarily Irish, Italians, Spanish, Poles, Russians, and Swedes to the New World economies of the United States, Canada, Argentina, Brazil, Australia, and

¹³ Joseph Keppler "Looking Backward" in *Puck* East Lansing, MI Michigan State University Museum, January 11, 1893

¹⁴ Solimano, *International Migration in the Age of Crisis and Globalization Historical and Recent Experiences*, 78-80

New Zealand. Like their counterparts from the Global South of today, the vast majority of these immigrants arrived poor and unskilled, and were seen as outsiders.

Although millions migrated to these New World economies, the world's financial centers remained in Europe, as Great Britain, Germany, and France became the main sources of financing for these emerging economies. Moreover, during this period and others there was a general tendency for capital and labor to flow in the same direction, which resulted in a degree of income convergence across countries.¹⁵ The Heckscher-Ohlin model, which is discussed at greater length in chapter III, suggests that capital and labor move in opposite directions, but this theory is less applicable during the expansionist period, as the New World countries lacked both capital and labor. They did possess available land with ample resources like forests, mineral reserves, and other "fixed factors" that are not mobile across borders and external capital and labor were needed to exploit these resources. Furthermore, on average real wages were much higher in the New World economies than in Europe, which also proved to be a pull factor for migration. In 1913, for example, per-capita income in Argentina was about 30 percent higher than in Spain and Italy.

In the current international system we think of migration as a fundamental component of statehood, but it is important to recognize that exercising control over borders is relatively recent phenomenon in human history. During the second half of the nineteenth century there were few international controls. Technological advances and improvements in rail and sea travel facilitated a level of global migration that was hitherto impossible.¹⁶ There was no legal barrier to entry into the United States until the

¹⁵ Ibid., 2.

¹⁶ Casey, "Open Borders: Absurd Chimera or Inevitable Future Policy?", *International Migration*: 21.

1880s, for example, such that we could even consider that the US had an informal open borders policy. If you were white, in decent health, and could afford the ocean passage, there was nothing to stop you from immigrating. Although this dissertation does not focus on the racial element of migration, it is definitely crucial to the story and has been a constant theme throughout human history.

The US had vast tracts of land without the workers to exploit it, and immigrants were seen as a viable method of expanding into the frontier. By the end of World War I, nearly 15 million of the 105 million people living in the US were foreign-born. Despite the political rhetoric that argues today's immigration is "unprecedented," the level of immigration in the decade prior to World War I has not been reached since. The proportion of foreign-born people was about 15 percent in 1890 compared to 12 percent today.¹⁷ It is important to note these early mass waves of immigrants faced intense nativist hostility in the US, in some ways greater than that faced by today's migrants from the Global South.

Twelve million immigrants came through Ellis Island in New York between 1892 and 1924 and over a million through Angel Island in San Francisco from 1910 to 1940.¹⁸ The "huddled masses" that arrived during this period precipitated national origin quotas that began in the 1920s, as the native population became increasingly wary of Southern and Eastern Europeans and implemented measures designed to protect America's (supposed) Anglo heritage. Estimates suggest that about one-third of European migrants to the US returned home prior to World War I, however, demonstrating the two-way

¹⁷ Roger Lowenstein, "The Immigration Equation," *New York Times Magazine*, July 9, 2006.

¹⁸ Vincent J. Cannato, *American Passage: The History of Ellis Island* (New York: Harper, 2009). See also Erika Lee, *Angel Island: Immigrant Gateway to America*, ed. Judy Yung (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010).

street nature of migration. Migration destinations are often presented as some sort of “promised land”, but many become disillusioned with life abroad when their dreams fail to come to fruition.

The second period of the interwar years (1914-1933) was marked by a reversal of globalization. As a result of tremendous global instability the interwar years were restrictive with respect to the mobility of capital and labor. Destructive wars, the Great Depression, and growing nationalism and isolationism were all negative forces that led to states eschewing internationalism and limiting free mobility. This backlash against globalization led to the adoption of passports and visas. Prior to World War I there was no international standard for identification. Political instability led to large-scale migrations in several countries including those fleeing the Bolshevik revolution in Russia, Franco’s regime in Spain, and Jews fleeing persecution in Central Europe.¹⁹

As a result of the failures of the international system, the architects of the post-war era were determined to move away from the problems of the interwar years. The problems of the interwar years provide valuable lessons for the international community moving forward, and the most important seems to be that despite the disadvantages, eschewing globalization and internationalization can easily result in global political and economic instability. This is also applicable in the domestic context. As former President George W. Bush explains, “There have been periods in our history where nativism had a strong appeal. Sometimes nativism, isolationism, and protectionism all run hand in hand. We have to be careful about that in the United States. The 1920s was

¹⁹ Solimano, *International Migration in the Age of Crisis and Globalization: Historical and Recent Experiences*, 106.

a period of high tariffs, high taxes, and no immigration. And the lesson of the 1920s ought to be a reminder of what is possible for future presidents.”²⁰

The Bretton Woods era, the third phase of the world economy, began in 1945 and concluded when the US terminated the convertibility of the dollar into gold in 1971. During this period, the international system was managed by a set of international institutions, although migration was not a primary component of this newfound regulatory spirit. Many countries experienced a substantial demand for labor as their economies boomed. Against this backdrop, the management and regulation of the world economy was essential as a multitude of states gained independence as a result of decolonization. The Middle East also became a migration destination during this time as the oil producers attracted foreign labor. Oil also proved to be a detriment to migration, however, when the crises of the 1970s and the 1980s contributed to greater restrictions on the mobility of people largely as a result of the tendency for states to eschew internationalism in the face of economic insecurity.

The fourth and current phase, known as the second wave globalization or the post-Bretton Woods era, is characterized by floating exchange rates, greater capital mobility, and a tilt toward neoliberal economics. There are several notable distinctions between the first and second waves of globalization with respect to migration. First, in general destination countries are more restrictive in this current phase, even if flows to richer OECD states remain substantial. Second, immigration to the United States is now overwhelmingly from Latin America, which has displaced European immigration that dominated the period from about 1870 to 1950. Third, as a result of more restrictive immigration policies, there is a growing trend toward illegal immigration to OECD

²⁰ Riley, *Let Them In: The Case for Open Borders*, 175.

countries. Fourth, the fall of the Soviet Union is an important component to global migration, as it precipitated migration in Central and Eastern Europe as well as the former Soviet republics. A fifth and final feature is the increase in migration among high-skilled and highly educated migrants from developing countries to OECD countries, which include scientists, IT experts, entrepreneurs, and physicians.²¹

The rise in low-skilled and high-skilled immigration is due to the fact that immigrants tend to be clustered at the extremes of employment as they fill labor niches in developed countries and play a complimentary role in the labor market instead of substituting for native workers. Empirical evidence suggests that rather than “taking jobs” and causing unemployment, immigrants generally stimulate developed world economies.²² Immigrants are a source of new economic activity in the destination country, and as they fill labor market shortages, productivity improves and the economy is more resistant to inflation. However, it is understandable for the native population to fear greater unemployment when immigration is at high levels. A number of scholars, but most notably George Borjas, have argued for this perspective. Borjas claims immigrant labor has a negative effect on the domestic economy because it reduces the prospects of the native population and the poorest citizens are the worst-affected.²³ In general, Borjas appears to be in the minority, as most scholars argue there is scant evidence that immigrants have harmed the opportunities available to the low-skilled

²¹ Solimano, *International Migration in the Age of Crisis and Globalization: Historical and Recent Experiences*, 113-14.

²² Riley, *Let Them In: The Case for Open Borders*, 56.

²³ Lowenstein, "The Immigration Equation," *New York Times Magazine*. See also George J. Borjas, *Heaven's Door: Immigration Policy and the American Economy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999).

segment of the native US population.²⁴ Moreover, other developments such as the enormous growth in high-tech jobs likely have a greater impact.

Some observers have argued that many of the perceived problems with the current phase, or the second wave of globalization, are a direct result of the system itself, as the relatively free movement of capital makes the world economy more susceptible to financial crises and has exacerbated the global income gap between developing and developed countries, which in turn provides powerful incentives to migrate. Recognizing the advantages of global migration and implementing policies that would be more effective for the world economy is a different story, however. According to Solimano, “In spite of the fact that that economic integration and globalization could be viewed, in theory, as a force toward the equalization of incomes and wages across countries, the reality is that this process has proven to be very elusive if it exists at all.”²⁵

It is remarkable that the international standardization of passports did not occur until 1980 under the auspices of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). Although passports themselves are now largely standardized, there are vast differences with respect to technology and enforcement. There are also enormous differences among states in the international system concerning the mobility of people ranging from complete restriction to open borders.

²⁴ See for example, David Card, "Is the New Immigration Really so Bad?," *The Economic Journal* 115, no. 507 (2005). See also Pia M. Orrenius and Madeline Zavodny, "Does Immigration Affect Wages? A Look at Occupation-Level Evidence," *Labour Economics* 14, no. 5 (2007).

²⁵ Solimano, *International Migration in the Age of Crisis and Globalization: Historical and Recent Experiences*, 193.

Migration in the World Today


There are an estimated 214 million migrants worldwide, accounting for over three percent of the world's population, such that the total population of migrants would constitute the fifth most populous country in the world. The United Nations estimates that the total stock of international migrants has more than doubled over the past four decades. Moreover, the total number of migrants rose dramatically in the first decade of the twenty-first century, increasing from 150 million in the year 2000 to 214 million in 2010, and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees has argued that this figure is likely to increase regardless of efforts to restrict immigration.²⁶ Looking ahead, the International Organization for Migration estimates the number of migrants could reach 405 million by 2050.²⁷

Although the recent growth in the number of migrants is an increase of nearly 43 percent, it is important to note that the percentage of migrants has remained relatively stable as a share of world population. In addition, more countries have become significant migration destinations, as the top ten destination countries receive a smaller proportion of migrants today than in 2000.²⁸ The following graph shows the top migration destinations in the world today.

²⁶ Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, *UNHCR Global Report 2009* (Geneva: UNHCR, 2009), 17.

²⁷ International Organization for Migration, *World Migration Report 2010 - The Future of Migration: Building Capacities for Change*, 3.

²⁸ International Organization for Migration, "Migration Facts & Figures."



Graph 1. Top Immigration Countries, 2010

Source: World Bank, *Migration and Remittances Factbook 2011*, 1

It is also readily apparent that the global landscape of origin and destination countries has changed dramatically, where some countries that used to be major countries of origin have now become destination countries. The concept of the “migration hump” is applicable here. Greece, Italy, Ireland, Spain, Malaysia, South Korea are countries that switched from net exporters to net importers of labor as they became more advanced economically.²⁹ This demonstrates that global migration is by no means a one-way street and it is almost certain that more countries will experience a reversal as they develop. There are two lines of causality when thinking about economic growth and migration,

²⁹ Hein De Haas, “International Migration, Remittances and Development: Myths and Facts,” *Third World Quarterly* 26, no. 8 (2005): 1271.

however. One line suggests that economic growth happens first through innovation, utilization of resources, improving human capital, and other factors, which in turn spurs immigration. The second line, in contrast, suggests that migration increases the labor supply, leading to wage increases, greater profits, and capital accumulation, which results in economic growth. Some observers have argued for mutual causality between growth and migration that is largely cyclical.³⁰

The economic component to migration remains hugely important. Most migration in the world today is from poorer to richer states, usually referred to as “South-North” migration, where people are moving in search of greater opportunity in destination countries.³¹ High-income countries host 57 percent of all migrants, a substantial increase from 43 percent in 1990.³² The notion of a “widening gap” is at the center of the globalization debate, as the existence of enormous disparities in wealth and living standards across nations provides a powerful incentive for people to migrate. However, some scholars have argued that global inequality has in fact slowed in recent decades, such that the “burst of world income inequality now seems to be over” and perceptions of continuing mass divergence are misleading.³³ In any case, there are marked differences across nations and regions and therefore obvious incentives to migrate. Migration in the current international system is an enormous source of wealth transfers among states, as the total amount of remittances totaled \$325 billion in 2010, which is approximately three times the total amount of foreign aid.

³⁰ Solimano, *International Migration in the Age of Crisis and Globalization: Historical and Recent Experiences*, 59.

³¹ Countries of the “South” are those classified by the World Bank as low- and middle-income countries; the countries of the “North” are the high-income countries.

³² United Nations Population Division, *Trends in Total Migrant Stock: The 2008 Revision* (New York: United Nations Publications, 2009).

³³ François Bourguignon and Christian Morrisson, “Inequality among World Citizens: 1820-1992,” *The American Economic Review* 92, no. 4 (2002): 742.

Estimates show that around \$200 billion is transferred annually from developed to developing countries in the form of remittances and these transfers have become an essential component of many developing countries' economies. In fact, remittances account for more than a quarter of gross domestic product in at least seven countries, but it is important to note that this money does not usually go toward major infrastructure projects or other large-scale investment.³⁴ There are clear advantages in these micro-transfers for people in developing countries; particularly if inefficient institutions and corrupt governments are left out of the picture. In general, migrants send remittances out of altruism, self-interest, repayment, and diversification.³⁵ Although these transfers are crucial for many developing world economies, they are only part of the puzzle. Hochschild suggests, "Remittances alone are not a solution to third-world development. If they were, the Philippines would look like South Korea today."³⁶

Migrants may target their remittances in different ways depending on their unique individual and family circumstances. Thus, remittances are an economic strategy at the micro level, where individuals and families utilize these transfers as a "co-insurance strategy" by sending the most economically viable members abroad to earn income and diversify risk for the entire family unit.³⁷ This notion of diversifying risk relates to a perspective called the "new economics of migration" or the "household theory of migration", which suggests that the family is the salient decision-making unit, not the

³⁴ DeParle, "A World on the Move," *New York Times*.

³⁵ Solimano, *International Migration in the Age of Crisis and Globalization: Historical and Recent Experiences*, 146.

³⁶ Katrin Bennhold, "From Afar, Moneymaker and Mother," *International Herald Tribune*, March 8, 2011. See also Barbara Ehrenreich and Arlie Russell Hochschild, *Global Woman: Nannies, Maids, and Sex Workers in the New Economy* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2003).

³⁷ Solimano, *International Migration in the Age of Crisis and Globalization: Historical and Recent Experiences*, 27.

individual.³⁸ In this perspective, the goal is risk minimization for the entire household instead of wage maximization for an individual family member.

It is important to note that this South-North distinction does not mean that all countries in the southern hemisphere are poor and all those in the northern hemisphere are rich. Australia and New Zealand, for example, are considered to be part of the global North due to their high levels of economic development and OECD membership. In addition, recent studies have shown South-North migration does not capture the entire story. In 2005, around 78 million of the total 191 million migrants in the world were living in developing countries, meaning that migration among poorer countries in the global South is nearly as large as South-North migration.³⁹ This migration is almost exclusively intra-regional, where people are crossing contiguous borders, which has obvious implications for the relationship between international migration and regional integration in the global South. It also demonstrates that “policymakers should pay attention to the complex challenges that developing countries face not only as countries of origin of migrants, but also as destinations.”⁴⁰ The magnitude of South-South migration shows that economic concerns may not be the sole motivator for migration, as migration occurs in these countries that often have small income differentials. Intentions bump into reality with respect to the decision to migrate for people in the global South, which helps to explain the substantial South-South migration. If we think about the trio of income, networks, and proximity – migrants in the South often lack resources, may not

³⁸ See for example, Edward J. Taylor, "The New Economics of Labour Migration and the Role of Remittances in the Migration Process," *International Migration* 37, no. 1 (1999).

³⁹ Dilip Ratha and William Shaw, *South-South Migration and Remittances* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2007).

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 2.

have access to necessary travel and visa documentation, and they may be unable to take advantage of a network, leaving proximity as the most significant factor.⁴¹

It is readily apparent that the poorest of the poor simply do not migrate internationally to a significant extent. There are usually far too many obstacles in place for any type of mass migration to become a reality. The majority of migrants are actually from middle-income households in the developing world because they have adequate resources to be able to emigrate, not those in the deepest poverty.⁴² Moreover, regional integration is unlikely to change this dynamic, particularly if we think about social stratification regardless of the strength of a nation's economy. Although there is significant South-North migration, there is little North-South migration, which is compatible with our expectation that people from richer, industrialized countries would likely migrate to the global South for short-term employment, other kinds of temporary stays, or perhaps retirement opportunities more related to playing golf and "fun in the sun."

A huge distinction exists between low- and high-skilled migrants and their respective relationships to countries of origin and destination, and also how they are managed by the international community. In general, elite migrants are perceived as much more desirable for destination countries, even if it is also the case that these economies badly need low-skilled labor. In the US for instance, illegal immigrants have a labor force participation rate over 90 percent in most years, which suggests they are necessary to fill shortages in the labor market and there is little to no employment among this group. Moreover, as Riley suggests, "Immigrants tend to be motivated people

⁴¹ Ibid., 19.

⁴² United Nations General Assembly, *International Migration and Development: Report of the Secretary-General*, 13.

looking to better their situation, not looking for hand-outs.”⁴³ Furthermore, available evidence demonstrates immigrants are more likely to accept low-skill jobs and remain employed for long durations.

Elite migration receives far less media attention, which instead “concentrates on the ‘scarier’ faces of migrants – the illegal, the undesirable, or criminal.”⁴⁴ The current wave of globalization has resulted in greater ease of mobility for elite migrants, as they can access favorable “circuits” and “professional ecosystems” that facilitate international mobility. Multinational corporations are at the forefront of encouraging the mobility of high-value migrants.⁴⁵ Elite migrants face fewer obstacles with respect to visa, work permits, entry requirements, and acceptance by the host society compared to low-skilled laborers. Governments and publics in destination countries also tend to believe that elite migrants will assimilate more quickly and easily than low-skilled migrants. In many respects, one could argue “it is already a borderless world for those who have the resources to exploit it.”⁴⁶ This situation for these “gold collar” workers is a far cry from the attention given to the mobility of poor and low-skilled migrants. Global business simply has not prioritized the movement of the masses.

The poor unskilled and low-skilled masses far outnumber high-value elite migrants, however, as the proportion of foreign-born people with a tertiary education

⁴³ Riley, *Let Them In: The Case for Open Borders*, 119, 124.

⁴⁴ Solimano, *International Migration in the Age of Crisis and Globalization: Historical and Recent Experiences*, 68.

⁴⁵ See for example, Andrés Solimano and World Institute for Development Economics Research., *The International Mobility of Talent: Types, Causes, and Development Impact* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008). See also João Peixoto, "The International Mobility of Highly Skilled Workers in Transnational Corporations: The Macro and Micro Factors of the Organizational Migration of Cadres," *International Migration Review* 35, no. 4 (2001).

⁴⁶ Casey, "Open Borders: Absurd Chimera or Inevitable Future Policy?," *International Migration*: 18. See also Solimano, *International Migration in the Age of Crisis and Globalization: Historical and Recent Experiences*, 13-14.

accounts for about 10 percent of international migrants. Moreover, approximately 90 percent of these high-value migrants are concentrated in OECD countries.⁴⁷ The demand for talent is largely in the developed world, but much of the supply comes from the developing world. There are a number of factors causing elite migration to OECD countries including income and development gaps, more complementarities among technology, capital, and opportunity in developed countries, nepotism and other non-merit based connections in the South that may be hard to overcome, and special immigration regimes in developed countries that facilitate talent recruitment.⁴⁸ Some countries like Canada have adopted point systems and other selective immigration regimes that give preferential treatment to high-value migrants, where there is an advantage for higher education, language proficiency, level of work experience, and other special skills. There is a consensus among economists that elite migrants contribute more to national income and tax rolls than lower-skilled migrants, which is an obvious preference for governments when considering immigration policy, even if it obscures the fact that low-skilled migrants can also be economically advantageous to destination countries.

Brain drain is a huge problem in many developing countries and the health sector is one of the hardest hit. There is a pervasive argument that this positive selectivity of high-skilled migrants is largely a negative for origin countries. However, there is an ongoing debate as to how brain drain promotes or hinders development and how to

⁴⁷ Solimano, *International Migration in the Age of Crisis and Globalization: Historical and Recent Experiences*, 157.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 174.

address potential problems that arise between origin and destination countries.⁴⁹ In any case, brain drain is a defining feature of global migration and it will persist as long as there are such powerful incentives to migrate. Brain drain from developing countries is a reflection of poor governance, lack of economic growth, and other state failures, such that it paints an incomplete picture to only criticize the pull from richer countries without addressing the push from poorer countries. Migration alone will not remedy these problems, but expatriates are crucial to the development of sending countries as they gain knowledge and skills abroad. Levitt's concept of social remittances is a key component of the transnational relationship between origin and destination countries as migrants abroad also "send" non-monetary social capital back home in the form of ideas, behaviors, norms, and identities.⁵⁰ These social aspects of the global migration process are arguably more important than the economic component.

Scholars like Bhagwati have argued that trying to keep high-skilled people in their countries of origin is nonsensical and that a model that builds a strong connection between the diaspora abroad and the home country society is far more likely to succeed.⁵¹ Mexico and other major sending countries are increasingly aware that severing the connection to their migrants abroad has significant political, economic, and social disadvantages.⁵² The connections between origin and destination countries have

⁴⁹ See for example, Anjali Sahay, *Indian Diaspora in the United States: Brain Drain or Gain?* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2009). See also *International Migration, Remittances, and the Brain Drain*, ed. Maurice W. Schiff and Çağlar Özden (Washington, DC: World Bank; Palgrave Macmillan, 2006). See also Graeme Hugo, "Best Practice in Temporary Labour Migration for Development: A Perspective from Asia and the Pacific," *International Migration* 47, no. 5 (2009).

⁵⁰ Peggy Levitt, "Social Remittances: Migration Driven Local-Level Forms of Cultural Diffusion," *International Migration Review* 32, no. 4 (1998).

⁵¹ Bhagwati, "Borders Beyond Control", *Foreign Affairs*: 101.

⁵² Rainer Bauböck, "Towards a Political Theory of Migrant Transnationalism," *International Migration Review* 37, no. 3 (2003). See also Nancy L. Green and François Weil, *Citizenship and Those Who Leave: The Politics of Emigration and Expatriation* (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2007).

significant implications for the global economy and there is growing evidence that brain drain will eventually lead to brain circulation, which is particularly important for emerging markets and states that heretofore were largely on the sidelines of the world economy.⁵³ A multitude of countries now recognize dual citizenship, which appears troublesome at first glance with respect to state sovereignty. However, allowing people to be citizens of more than one country may actually encourage them to maintain “loyalty” to both, instead of having to choose one or the other. Recognizing dual citizenship has obvious implications for developing countries in particular that might otherwise fail to maintain ties to their emigrants upon naturalization in the destination country, if this naturalization resulted in a loss of citizenship in the origin country. As a major sending country, Mexico has recognized the advantages in encouraging the formation of transnational communities instead of acting as a barrier, especially when considering the interdependence of Mexico and the US.⁵⁴ Some countries have attempted to use migration as an important sector of the economy. The Filipino government, for example, is actively involved with the international migration of its citizens. Over 110,000 Filipino nurses are working in OECD countries, more than twice the number from any other country.⁵⁵

⁵³ AnnaLee Saxenian, *The New Argonauts: Regional Advantage in a Global Economy* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006). See also Anne Gaillard and Jacques Gaillard, "The International Circulation of Scientists and Technologists: A Win-Lose or Win-Win Situation?," *Science Communication* 20, no. 1 (1998).

⁵⁴ See for example Michael P. Smith, *Citizenship Across Borders: The Political Transnationalism of El Migrante*, ed. Matt Bakker (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008). See also Robert C. Smith, *Mexican New York: Transnational Lives of New Immigrants* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006).

⁵⁵ International Organization for Migration, *World Migration Report 2010 - The Future of Migration: Building Capacities for Change*, 120. See also Robyn Magalit Rodriguez, *Migrants for Export: How the Philippine State Brokers Labor to the World* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010).

There are other important components to understanding the migration dimension such as the effect of war, natural disasters, and other sudden events that act as major push factors. Although it is less salient for the purposes of this dissertation, as it is primarily concerned with voluntary migration with respect to regional integration, involuntary migration as a result of these events is a major factor in global migration. Political events often serve as a major catalyst, or push for migration, as people flee authoritarian rule and crumbling regimes. The mass revolutions in North Africa during the first few months of 2011 are a case in point, as thousands of people have crossed national borders in an attempt to escape political upheaval. Moreover, this kind of political instability often leads to other instances where labor and capital flow in the same direction, as investors and workers are risk averse. It is often difficult to look at these situations from a legal perspective because people fleeing war and persecution are considered refugees whereas those fleeing environmental degradation of natural disasters are not.⁵⁶ Migrants from developing countries mostly end up in other developing countries when fleeing their countries of origin primarily as a result of proximity.

Moreover, many countries in developing regions are ill-equipped to deal with major shocks – political, economic, environmental, and so on – which has resulted in erratic migration flows as a result of their precarious situations. According to the UNHCR, more than two-thirds of the world's refugees are located in developing countries, and it follows that those that have left the country of origin would most likely migrate to a neighboring developing country. On a related note, world population is expected to surpass nine billion by 2050, with almost all of growth taking place in

⁵⁶ Susan Forbes Martin, "Averting Forced Migration," *Global Dialogue* 4, no. 4 (2002).

developing countries.⁵⁷ Again, this has implications for a number of future demographic trends including urbanization and regionalization.

There are marked differences between intra-regional and inter-regional migration in the world today. The following graph shows the tendency toward South-North migration, the significance of movement within Europe and Central Asia, and the paucity of inter-regional migration among most regions in the current international system.⁵⁸ South-North migration varied widely by region, however, as it represents 87 percent of total migration from Latin America and the Caribbean, 85 percent from East Asia and the Pacific, 80 percent from the Middle East and North Africa, 50 percent from South Asia, but just 31 percent from sub-Saharan Africa.⁵⁹

Table 1. Intra- and Inter-Regional Migration (millions)

Migrants from (below)	Migrants in									South-North as percent of total
	Latin America and the Caribbean	East Asia and Pacific	South Asia	Europe and Central Asia	Middle East and North Africa	Sub-Saharan Africa	High-income OECD	High-income non-OECD	Total	
Latin America and the Caribbean	3.4	0.01	0	0.01	0	0	22.3	0.2	25.9	86.8
East Asia and Pacific	0.06	2.54	0.11	0.04	0.01	0.02	9.7	5.3	17.7	84.4
South Asia	0.01	0.29	7.6	0.02	2.11	0.09	4.5	5.6	20.2	49.9
Europe and Central Asia	0.07	0.01	0	27.81	0.01	0	13.7	1.9	43.6	35.9
Middle East and North Africa	0.06	0	0	0.08	2.12	0.08	6.7	2.8	11.8	80.3
Sub-Saharan Africa	0.01	0	0.01	0.01	0.01	10.02	4	0.5	14.5	30.7
High-income countries	1.84	0.32	0.05	1.03	0.64	0.27	28.7	1.1	34	0
Total	5.5	3.2	7.8	29	4.9	10.5	89.6	17.3	167.7	

Source: University of Sussex and the World Bank in Ratha and Shaw, *South-South Migration and Remittances*, 6

⁵⁷ Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, *UNHCR Global Report 2009*, 17.

⁵⁸ Ratha and Shaw, *South-South Migration and Remittances*, 6.

⁵⁹ Solimano, *International Migration in the Age of Crisis and Globalization: Historical and Recent Experiences*, 5-6.

Inter-regional migration is usually perceived as a riskier undertaking as it entails greater costs, primarily related to geography but also cultural, and wage differentials in another region may not be seen as sufficient to overcome these costs.⁶⁰ Irregular migration refers to people living and working in destination countries without proper immigrant status and labor rights, and these migrants are estimated to represent between 10 and 20 percent of total migration, or somewhere between 25 and 40 million migrants worldwide. It is important to note that irregular migration is not synonymous with illegal entry. In the United States, for example, about half of all “illegal immigrants” in the country entered legally through tourist visas or other means and stayed on afterwards. Thus, the oft-touted figure of 12 million illegal immigrants grossly exaggerates the level of illegal border crossings into the US. Regardless of how migrants in the US end up with an irregular status, the fact they integrate quickly into the labor market is a indication that current limits on legal migration are too low and do not reflect actual labor demand. Many proposals for immigration reform recommend a fluctuating limit that would be able to respond more effectively to changing market forces.

Irregular migration is another crucial component to the divide between intra-regional and inter-regional migration, as it is far more prevalent in the former than the latter primarily due to the advantage of contiguous borders. Irregular migration is likely even greater in South-South migration because developing countries typically have less ability to control their borders effectively and it may be easier for people to migrate without official documents. Moreover, as Ratha and Shaw explain, irregular migration is paradoxically encouraged by migration policies in the developing world that are often

⁶⁰ Ratha and Shaw, *South-South Migration and Remittances*, 18.

“very restrictive, very burdensome (in terms of administrative requirements), or very costly.”⁶¹

There are advantages for employers in developed countries to use irregular labor because it reduces or eliminates transaction costs associated with visas, contracts, benefits, and so on. Moreover, irregular labor can respond to changing market forces differently than regular labor. In many developed countries, “governments both vigorously pursue irregular immigrants and simultaneously give them tacit approval.”⁶² Moreover, many policymakers in developed countries have acknowledged that attempting to curb illegal migration without effectively recognizing and addressing the factors that cause people to want to move in the first place is an exercise in futility.⁶³ As long as there are enormous differentials between countries, there will be powerful incentives to migrate, but differentials do not typically lead to mass migration. Migrants may also see advantages in having an irregular status even in the face of obvious legal barriers. In fact, immigration has increased substantially over the past four decades despite policies in high-income countries designed to prevent the entry and employment of foreign unskilled and low-skilled labor.⁶⁴

Immigrant Integration and Assimilation

In general, this paper is focused on the determinants of migration rather than its consequences and does not delve into issues of immigrant integration or assimilation. It should be noted that both aspects are extraordinarily urgent and integral to the study of

⁶¹ Ibid., 26.

⁶² Casey, "Open Borders: Absurd Chimera or Inevitable Future Policy?", *International Migration*: 24.

⁶³ Bhagwati, "Borders Beyond Control", *Foreign Affairs*.

⁶⁴ Solimano, *International Migration in the Age of Crisis and Globalization: Historical and Recent Experiences*, 17, 195.

international migration, however, as origin and destination countries are affected on short and long-term bases. Moreover, some observers would argue that a study that does not look into immigrant integration or assimilation misses a huge reason why these issues have become so contentious and divisive. It is often what happens after immigrants arrive that causes the greatest tension with the native population, not the fact that they came in the first place. The adjustment process is two-fold as it involves migrants and the host country population, but this process is highly asymmetrical with the onus falling on the migrants. People expect migrants to adjust to the host country, not the other way around. This is evident in concerns in Europe, for example, regarding the serious clashes between Moroccan and other North African migrants in France and the Netherlands or Turkish migrants in Austria and Germany.

A crucial question for many destination countries is how far immigrants should or need to go in becoming members of the host society, which relates to cultural norms and values. Is cultural relativism preferable to a universal perspective? The integration versus assimilation debate has been raging for many years and has taken on a fever pitch in a number of destination countries, and the aforementioned case of Turks living in Germany is one of the most contentious, with the political leadership from both countries becoming heavily involved. In a speech in Germany, the Turkish Prime Minister argued that assimilation was a “crime against humanity” and that it is acceptable for Turks to resist assimilating into mainstream German society.⁶⁵ There is some evidence that much of the Turkish population in Germany is uninterested in host country politics, which causes the native German population to feel that immigrants are unenthusiastic about integrating fully into German society.

⁶⁵ "Two Unamalgamated Worlds," *The Economist*, April 5, 2008.

Moreover, political cleavages in Turkey tend to follow migrants to Germany, such that they remain focused on politics in the origin country and not the destination country. As Ögelman explains, “When a sending country generates contentious political migrants in an ethnoculturally dissimilar, homogeneous democracy and the hosts fail to incorporate the foreigners, infighting focused on the homeland is likely to preoccupy the immigrant community.”⁶⁶ The integration versus assimilation debate is strongly influenced by deeply held conceptions of national identity, which often results in an “us” versus “them” orientation that is problematic when attempting to develop effective and sustainable migration policies. According to Dowell Myers, “Many of us assume, unwittingly, that immigrants are like Peter Pan – forever frozen in their status as newcomers, never aging, never advancing economically, and never assimilating...people who perpetually resemble newcomers.”⁶⁷

The impact of migrants on host societies remains a serious issue in Europe. German Chancellor Angela Merkel and British Prime Minister David Cameron have both argued that the idea of multiculturalism has failed. Cameron argues, “Under the doctrine of state multiculturalism, we have encouraged different cultures to live separate lives, apart from each other and the mainstream. We have failed to provide a vision of society to which they feel they want to belong.”⁶⁸ His argument has gained significant traction for much of British society and the situation is similar in many other Western Europe

⁶⁶ Nedim Ögelman, "Documenting and Explaining the Persistence of Homeland Politics among Germany's Turks," *International Migration Review* 37, no. 1 (2003). See also Eva Østergaard-Nielsen, *Transnational Politics: Turks and Kurds in Germany* (New York: Routledge, 2003).

⁶⁷ Dowell Myers, *Immigrants and Boomers: Forging a New Social Contract for the Future of America* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2007), 104-105.

⁶⁸ John Burns, "Prime Minister Criticizes British 'Multiculturalism' as Allowing Extremism," *New York Times*, February 6, 2011.

countries.⁶⁹ Populations in many developed countries are questioning the wisdom of cultural pluralism, or the “salad bowl” concept of incorporating immigrants into the host society. However, it is important to note that the debate over immigrant integration or assimilation is an ancillary issue to the broader dissertation topic of the relationship between international migration and regional integration.

Regional integration does influence the debate, to be sure, as it interferes with traditional notions of “us” versus “them”, as one of the main objectives for many policymakers, academics, and other observers is to transform this dynamic such that the “us” and “them” are merged into a regional identity instead of holding on to separate national identities. However, the development of a regional identity is an enormous challenge if the people in a certain region have widely disparate backgrounds. Moreover, integration alters traditional boundaries such that migration issues that may seem to be isolated to one state can easily spread throughout the entire arrangement, but this is related to extra-regional migration. For instance, in the earlier example of migrants entering the EU through the Turkish-Greek border, this is an obvious matter of concern to other EU states because there is a high likelihood that these migrants will continue on to other countries.

The aftermath of the January 2011 revolution in Tunisia is another concern for the EU, as thousands of Tunisians have migrated to Italy, prompting the Italian government to ask for \$84 million in aid and border security assistance from the EU. The Italian government has also been at odds with the EU over migrants arriving from Tunisia and elsewhere in North Africa, demonstrating the difficulty in managing migration at the

⁶⁹ See for example, Douglas Murray, "Cameron's Multicultural Wake-Up Call," *Wall Street Journal*, February 9, 2011. See also Jonathan Laurence and Justin Vaïsse, "The Dis-Integration of Europe," *Foreign Policy*, March 28, 2011.

supranational level as Italy has argued the EU has provided little assistance and that it continually pushes the issue back on individual member states.⁷⁰ Moreover, turmoil in Libya has raised serious questions about that country's ability to restrict migration to Europe and Libyan officials appear to have little interest in enforcement in light of the NATO bombing campaign. Italy pledged \$5 billion over 20 years to the Libyan government to keep its people from leaving, but political instability will likely result in significant emigration as people seek safety and better economic prospects abroad.⁷¹ Migrants from other countries may also utilize Tunisia and Libya as transit points on their way to Europe. The management of extra-regional migration in and out of regional arrangements is out of the scope of this dissertation, but it will continue to be an important issue and is worthy of further study.

The response of European countries to the sudden migration from North Africa is disproportionate to the situation. European political leaders have wasted little time exaggerating the problem and stoking anti-immigrant sentiments. Over 25,000 migrants arrived in Europe during a period of a few months, a substantial number for sure, but insignificant when considering the size of the EU and the past ability of the member states to handle hundreds of thousands of displaced people as a result of the Balkan wars in the 1990s. Although a serious disagreement over how to handle the influx of North African migrants developed between France and Italy, the two countries banded together to appeal to the European Commission for reform of the Schengen Agreement. This demonstrates the intersection of domestic and regional policy, as the letter to the

⁷⁰ Matt Cole, "Tunisia Migrants: Italy Seeks EU Cash over Lampedusa," *BBC News*, February 15, 2011. See also Rachel Donadio, "France to Help Italy Block Tunisian Migrants," *New York Times*, April 9, 2011.

⁷¹ Rachel Donadio and Suzanne Daley, "Revolts Raise Europe's Fear On Migration," *New York Times*, March 10, 2011. See also Scott Sayare, "Many Refugees From Libya Don't Want to Go Home," *New York Times*, March 10, 2011.

Commission proposed that the EU “examine the possibility of temporarily establishing internal border controls in the case of exceptional difficulties in handling common external borders.”⁷² Jean-Philippe Chauzy of the International Organization for Migration has suggested that this debate is pointless, “The truth is that border controls are an ineffective way of stopping migrants. Migrants will just come in through other channels, like smuggling networks.”⁷³

Empirical evidence suggests that the impact of migration is diminished for both migrants and the native population if there are smaller differences between the countries of origin and destination. South-South and North-North migration causes less of a “shock” compared to South-North migration, which accords with our general expectations that the native population will be less opposed to migrants with similar socio-economic backgrounds, where conceptions of integration or assimilation seem less relevant.⁷⁴ For example, we would expect it to be much easier for Canadian immigrants to acclimate to life in the United States than Mexican immigrants, and for Canadians to engender less opposition from the native US population than Mexicans. David Card puts it bluntly: “If Mexicans were taller and whiter, [immigration] would probably be a lot easier to deal with.”⁷⁵ Of course, there are obvious cultural, linguistic, and other factors involved in creating these assumptions. It will take sustained political will and thoughtful, pragmatic solutions to manage this dilemma effectively in the twenty-first century and beyond.

⁷² Rachel Donadio and Alan Cowell, “French and Italian Leaders Seek Tighter Controls on Migration,” *New York Times*, April 27, 2011. See also “France and Italy Push for Reform of Schengen Treaty”, *BBC News*, April 26, 2011. See also Stephen Castle, “The E.U.’s Balancing Act on Open Borders,” *International Herald Tribune*, May 4, 2011.

⁷³ Leo Cendrowicz, “Sorry, We’re Closed: Amid Migrant Fears, Europe May Bring Back Border Controls,” *Time*, May 4, 2011.

⁷⁴ Ratha and Shaw, *South-South Migration and Remittances*, 25.

⁷⁵ Lowenstein, “The Immigration Equation,” *New York Times Magazine*.

Gender and Migration

Women are a significant component in current international migration, as they comprise about half of all migrants and many have moved independently, often taking on breadwinner roles in destination countries.⁷⁶ In fact, Europe and Oceania are regions with a majority of females in migrant stocks.⁷⁷ Gender is therefore an extraordinarily important component of global migration, but it is largely overlooked. As Purnima Mane, Deputy Executive Director of the UN Population Fund explains, “It is one of the biggest untold stories of this century. These women make a huge contribution but their contribution doesn’t show up in an official database and so too often we ignore it.”⁷⁸

Gender is the primary factor in divergent migrant employment roles. Although it is far from a universal distinction, with respect to lower-skilled jobs men tend to work outside the home and women inside the home. The majority of men find work in agriculture, construction, landscaping, and so forth. Women, on the other hand, typically gain employment in domestic work and childcare. The feminization of migration is a global phenomenon and a number of scholars have examined the crucial, if overlooked, role of women as international migrants and the implications for countries of origin and destination.⁷⁹

In the developed world, the majority of migrant workers are women from poor countries and they tend to send a greater share of their earnings back home, even though

⁷⁶ DeParle, "A World on the Move," *New York Times*.

⁷⁷ International Organization for Migration, *World Migration Report 2010 - The Future of Migration: Building Capacities for Change*, 247.

⁷⁸ Bennhold, "From Afar, Moneymaker and Mother," *International Herald Tribune*.

⁷⁹ See for example, Paula L. Aymer, *Uprooted Women: Migrant Domestic Workers in the Caribbean* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1997). Ehrenreich and Hochschild, *Global Woman: Nannies, Maids, and Sex Workers in the New Economy*. Pierrette Hondagneu-Sotelo, *Doméstica: Immigrant Workers Cleaning and Caring in the Shadows of Affluence* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001). *Migration and Domestic Work: A European Perspective on a Global Theme*, ed. Helma Lutz, Studies in Migration and Diaspora (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2008).

they typically earn less than men.⁸⁰ Remittances tend to be used more for the education of children in the origin country when migrants are male rather than female.⁸¹ The idea here is that households with female migrants where males are left at home will be less concerned with the children's education and will spend remittance money elsewhere. There is a predominance of women migrants from Latin America, for example, and this may have secondary effects in the country of origin. The rise of women in the workforce has had a significant impact on labor markets. Now that more women are working full-time, many have turned to migrant labor to help with childcare and other responsibilities.

With respect to high-skilled migrants, women dominate the brain drain as they account for the majority of tertiary educated emigrants from most regions.⁸² In addition to financial gain, they are attracted by greater opportunity for independence and empowerment. Immigrant women have made an impact in host countries in the developed world that would be far more difficult in their countries of origin. For example, the German government outlawed forced marriage, mostly targeted at the country's huge Turkish population, in large part due to intense lobbying by immigrant women groups.

The ease of migration is often enormously different for men and women. A number of countries maintain policies to restrict if not totally forbid women from emigrating including Afghanistan, Algeria, Bangladesh, the Democratic Republic of the

⁸⁰ Bennhold, "From Afar, Moneymaker and Mother," *International Herald Tribune*.

⁸¹ Andrew R. Morrison, Maurice W. Schiff, and Mirja Sjöblom, *The International Migration of Women* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2007), 7.

⁸² United Nations Development Fund for Women, *Progress of the World's Women 2008-2009: Who Answers to Women? Gender and Accountability* (New York: United Nations Development Fund for Women, 2008), 58-59.

Congo, Gabon, Jordan, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Uganda, and Swaziland.⁸³

Moreover, the Middle East has the lowest proportion of female migrants in relation to the total population of any region at 38 percent, which reflects a combination of the undesirability of moving there and male-dominated nature of immigrant labor in the oil producing Gulf Cooperation Council member states. In Oman, for example, women account for just 21 percent of migrants.⁸⁴

REGIONAL INTEGRATION

The rest of this chapter switches from an overview of international migration to a discussion of regional integration. The first section defines the concept of a region to have a foundation for defining regional integration and the notion of a regional arrangement that is used in this dissertation. The final section looks at regional integration in the world today. This chapter facilitates a general understanding of the two main study components, setting the stage for the discussion of theoretical expectations related to migration and integration in chapter III.

Region as a Concept

Before moving to a discussion of regional integration, it is important to have a clear idea of what is meant by a *region*, as this can be a vague concept with multiple meanings and a working definition is essential for a general understanding of the dissertation topic. There are three main ways to think about a region. With respect to a

⁸³ David J. McKenzie, *Paper Walls are Easier to Tear Down: Passport Costs and Legal Barriers to Emigration* (Washington, DC: World Bank, Development Research Group, Growth and Investment Team, 2005), 18.

⁸⁴ International Organization for Migration, *World Migration Report 2010 - The Future of Migration: Building Capacities for Change*, 247.

nation-state, a region can either be at the macro (supranational) or micro (subnational) levels, or exist as a cross-border region.⁸⁵ Again, while other actors may influence regional integration, it is most appropriate to look primarily at cooperation among states for the purposes of this study.

When we think about the concept of a region, it is important to note that a macro region such as a regional integration arrangement among member states is not necessarily larger in geographic size compared to a micro region. For example, there are several Chinese provinces (micro regions) that, individually, have a greater land area and population than the entire Benelux area (macro region) of Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg.⁸⁶ Thus, one could argue that the governor of the Chinese province of Guangdong, with a population of nearly 100 million people, may have greater responsibilities than heads of state of much smaller countries. At the domestic level of analysis, there can be significant differences between “regions” even within sovereign borders. In the United States, for instance, several counties in Texas are larger than the state of Rhode Island, such that this may be confusing when we think of administrative boundaries and the responsibility and accountability of officials to the citizenry.

Furthermore, global cities will be a defining characteristic of the 21st century world order. These urban areas act as tremendous economic powerhouses, are attractive to migrants, and have developed their own transnational networks that operate outside the traditional nation-state framework.⁸⁷ The attraction of these global cities is readily

⁸⁵ Philippe De Lombaerde and others, "Problems and Divides in Comparative Regionalism," in *Comparative Regional Integration: Europe and Beyond*, ed. Finn Laursen (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2010), 22.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 24.

⁸⁷ Saskia Sassen, *The Global City: New York, London, Tokyo* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001). See also Richard Dobbs, "Mega Cities," *Foreign Policy* 181 (2010). See also Doug Saunders,

apparent in Europe, which is a major migration destination and has 30 cities (out of a total of 85 worldwide) with a population between 100,000 and one million foreign-born.⁸⁸ Immigrants help sustain the economic viability of many cities that might otherwise experience significant decline. The emergence of more megacities will likely have a significant impact on international migration and regional integration. More research is necessary on this interaction of cities, states, and regions; but at present it is outside the scope of this dissertation.

Regional Integration as a Concept

A more recent development in the international system since the end of the Second World War, and especially since the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s, is the emergence of various regional integration arrangements (RIAs), which are efforts at regional cooperation among states in various issue areas that typically involve an agreement (treaty), rules or guidelines, and an institutional framework. From a definitional standpoint, regional integration is “the process of providing common rules, regulations, and policies for a region.”⁸⁹ Moreover, the most appropriate conception of a regional arrangement for the purposes of this dissertation is as “a non-sovereign governance system involving territories or actors belonging to a few neighboring states.”⁹⁰

Arrival City: How the Largest Migration in History is Reshaping Our World (London: William Heinemann, 2010).

⁸⁸ International Organization for Migration, *World Migration Report 2010 - The Future of Migration: Building Capacities for Change*, 184.

⁸⁹ Mattli, *The Logic of Regional Integration: Europe and Beyond*, 44.

⁹⁰ Lombaerde and others, "Problems and Divides in Comparative Regionalism", 27.

Regional integration varies widely throughout the world and it is apparent that some states and regions are far more regionally integrated than others. In contrast to international migration that often seems messy and involves a myriad of actors, regional integration efforts should be totally under the purview of member states, as government officials at the highest level must be active participants in the decision to engage in such arrangements. One of the ongoing debates in the regional integration literature is concerned with the ability of non-state actors to influence integration processes. Civil society groups, multinational corporations, religious organizations, and a multitude of other actors may indeed have an important role in regional integration, but for the purposes of this dissertation, I am looking at regional cooperation and policy coordination among states. After all, if we think about the purpose behind regional arrangements, it makes sense to focus on states because they remain the most salient actors under the present global order. State-level regionalism can be considered formal and that of non-state actors as informal. Furthermore, the management of migration is a national-level matter, and a study on the relationship between migration and regional integration necessitates a greater focus on the systemic or structural level of analysis.

The concept of a regional arrangement used in this dissertation is broader than that of the traditional types of regional trading arrangements and follows the criteria developed by the Regional Integration Knowledge System (RIKS) developed by the United Nations University Comparative Regional Integration Studies institution (UNU-CRIS) located in Bruges, Belgium.⁹¹ The quantitative analysis in chapter IV utilizes the RIKS database list of regional arrangements. Criteria vary widely as to which

⁹¹ United Nations University-Comparative Regional Integration Studies (UNU-CRIS), Regional Integration Knowledge System: RIKS.

agreements should be considered regional integration arrangements, which is often related debates as to which region a particular state belongs, and it is appropriate to apply more than one regional designation for many states. In any case, the arrangements included in RIKS may not be an exhaustive list, and other organizations may wish to recognize others.

For the purposes of this dissertation, the arrangements included in RIKS meet the requirements for analysis of the relationship between international migration and regional integration. Moreover, it is doubtful that the inclusion of other arrangements would alter the main conclusions significantly. The regional arrangements included in RIKS meet four main criteria.

First, there must be a minimum of three member states, thereby excluding bilateral agreements/organizations. Moreover, there is no set limit as to how many states may participate in a regional integration arrangement. Several regional arrangements are comprised of over 50 member states, whereas other arrangements have only three.

Second, member states must belong to the same geographical sub-region or to neighboring geographical sub-regions used by the UN Statistics Division. Regional integration arrangements that span more than one sub-region are also included, such as the African, Caribbean, and Pacific Group of States (ACP) that covers much of the world and has over 70 members. However, the majority of arrangements do correspond to specific sub-regions and contiguous borders are an important component. One of the defining characteristics of a regional arrangement is exclusivity, where membership is limited based on various geographic concerns developed by the states in the arrangement. Regional arrangements are a stark contrast to global, universal organizations like the

United Nations and the World Trade Organization that are, in theory, open to all member states regardless of location. The United States is an interesting case, however, as it is involved in regional arrangements with states from widely disparate regions including Latin America, Europe, and Asia; which is a reflection of the importance of the American economy and the enormous influence of the US in world politics.

Third, the arrangement must entail regional integration as a part of its foundation, which should be defined explicitly in treaty texts or other such written agreements. Thus, it is important to note that other types of regional arrangements, such as those primarily concerned with collective security and defense, are not included in RIKS. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is an example of an arrangement that is well-known, has endured for many decades, but does not maintain specific measures related to regional integration processes. However, the exclusion of these types of arrangements does not mean they are irrelevant to general studies of cooperation among states. Military and collective security arrangements are often created as a response to some perceived dangerous or aggressive external force, such as the creation of NATO and the Warsaw Pact after the conclusion of World War II. Neither arrangement had regional integration as a core component, rather the *raison d'être* was greater security through alliance formation.

Finally, RIKS is concerned with arrangements that remain in force. Several regional arrangements are no longer in existence because the original purpose behind it was no longer relevant. Regional arrangements, like other institutions, are a reflection of their constituent members and can fall into desuetude if conditions have changed and there is a lack of support. Many arrangements have changed dramatically at one time or

another, through contraction, expansion, reform, or perhaps reengineered to adapt to new circumstances. Sometimes the arrangement title may persist, or a new one may be developed to reflect significant developments. For example, the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe existed from 1999 to 2008 when it was succeeded by the Regional Cooperation Council that exists today.

Regional arrangements are designed with different purposes in mind, as member states may have certain objectives for one arrangement and other objectives for another. Some arrangements includes in this study exhibit a focus on religion like the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), which is designed to promote Muslim solidarity in economic, social, and political affairs among the member states. Other arrangements are focused on economic cooperation and development such as the Organization of the Black Seas Economic Cooperation (BSEC) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). However, the most prevalent type of regional arrangement involves cross-border flows of capital, goods, and people – with trade as the primary component. Many states have concluded regional trading arrangements that range from sectoral cooperation to full economic unions. These cardinal types of trading arrangements will be discussed at length in chapter III under the stages of economic integration section.

Integration in the World Today

Many of the regional arrangements discussed in this dissertation are comprised of states that have a dubious regional commonality. For instance, the United States is a member of regional arrangements with a number of Asian and European states even

though it does not share contiguous borders with them and proximity appears much less important. A quick glance at the countries that have signed bilateral free trade or trade promotion agreements with the US shows incredible diversity and appears somewhat random as the list includes countries from around the world: Australia, Bahrain, the Dominican Republic and five Central American states (CAFTA-DR), Chile, Colombia, Israel, Jordan, Korea, Morocco, Canada and Mexico (NAFTA), Oman, Panama, Peru, and Singapore.⁹²

The US is also in negotiations to join the Trans-Pacific Partnership. There are also several instances of regional arrangements like the African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) group of states that are obviously inter-regional and include more than one sub-region. Although these arrangements may seem less regional, they are nevertheless important to include in the study, particularly since some states are isolated and do not share borders with other states.

⁹² Office of the United States Trade Representative, "Free Trade Agreements."



Figure 2. Selected Regional Arrangements in the World Today

The concept of sovereignty was discussed earlier and it is also directly applicable to the study of regional integration. The Montevideo Convention of 1933 stipulates that there are four main criteria for statehood: a permanent population, a defined territory, a government, and the capacity to enter into relations with other states. Thus, every state in the current international system that has been recognized, and even a few that have not, supposedly meet these criteria and are considered to be functionally similar. Regional arrangements do not have the cloak of sovereignty as states do.

Although the Westphalian model views each state in the international system as equals (in theory, but not in practice), it is important to note that this does not hold true for regional arrangements. In other words, there are no overarching expectations about what a regional arrangement should be as far as membership, scope, capability, and so on. The enormous diversity of regions is reflected in our lack of any particular

assumptions about regional integration arrangements, as they are designed to meet the specific needs of the constituent member states with respect to regional cooperation. What works for one might be completely irrelevant for another.

As stated earlier, there has been a tendency to look at every arrangement in comparison to the European Union, a widely criticized approach. Andrew Hurrell has pointed out this false universalism that may arise from concentrating on European integration: “the study of comparative regionalism has been hindered by so-called theories of regionalism which turn out to be little more than the translation of a particular set of European experiences into a more abstract theoretical language.”⁹³ However, this does not mean that comparing regional integration arrangements is a waste of time as commonalities do exist, and the success of European integration provides plenty of valuable lessons for other efforts at regional integration. Regional arrangements are highly complex and there are multiple points of inquiry, such that one or more arrangements can be studied in different ways. As explained by De Lombaerde and others with respect to the EU, “The EU is in some cases like *all* other regional organizations, in other cases like *some* other regional organizations and in certain ways like *no* other regional organization.”⁹⁴

⁹³ Andrew Hurrell, “The Regional Dimension in International Relations Theory,” in *Global Politics of Regionalism: Theory and Practice*, ed. Mary Farrell, Björn Hettne, and Luk van Langenhove (Ann Arbor, MI: Pluto Press, 2005), 39.

⁹⁴ Lombaerde and others, “Problems and Divides in Comparative Regionalism”, 33.

CHAPTER III

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND INSTITUTIONS

The liberal and realist perspectives of international relations both recognize the existence of anarchy in the international system, or the absence of a central authority above states. However, the liberal perspective suggests that anarchy can be tempered or overcome with respect to international politics, as opposed to the realist argument that anarchy is dominant and cannot be mitigated in the absence of a central authority above states. States that have traveled the path of increased integration, coordination, and cooperation have typically enhanced their future prosperity, but mistrust of others often prevents them from choosing this path. Realism has been the dominant international relations paradigm for centuries as a direct result of this persistent mistrust in international relations. John Mearsheimer, a prominent realist, has argued, "Realism will offer the most powerful explanations of international politics over the next century, and this will be true even if the debates among academic and policy elites are dominated by non-realist theories. In short, the world remains a realist world."⁹⁵

However, in a world that is witnessing the erosion of sovereignty and the salience of the nation-state, realism offers arguably weaker prospects for promoting international peace and security and improved relations among states, particularly in a twenty-first century environment that requires effective global governance to address a range of issues that remain outside of the ability of any one state to manage alone. While realists may criticize idealism and its variants as being overly naïve and holding a misguided

⁹⁵ John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: Norton, 2001), 361.

belief in a plausible utopia, it is difficult to completely disregard what has been happening in the world in general and in Europe in particular since the end of the Second World War. Globalization and economic integration has lengthened the shadow of the future for the vast majority of states in the international system as they have constructed various institutions that facilitate progress toward regional and global governance.

Nowhere is the great integration experiment more mature than in the European Union. Institutionalist point to the EU as the shining example of a break from the traditional Westphalian model that holds state sovereignty and the right of non-interference in internal matters as fundamental tenets. Through integration processes states become intimately familiar with the domestic conditions of other states in their particular club, blurring the line separating internal and external relations. In this respect, nation-states gradually transform into member states.

Institutions entail other benefits that may advance integration efforts. As Keohane and Martin explain, "Institutions can provide information, reduce transaction costs, make commitments more credible, establish focal points for coordination, and in general facilitate the operation of reciprocity."⁹⁶ These factors are crucial toward building effective institutions such as the EU, as they have performed the function of encouraging greater integration measures. Maintaining a successful and effective institution is no easy task, but there is a general framework where the constituent members must "widen in order to deepen, deepen in order to widen, and reform in order to do both."⁹⁷ Institutions that fail to adapt to new challenges typically disappear, as the

⁹⁶ Robert O. Keohane and Lisa L. Martin, "The Promise of Institutionalist Theory," *International Security* 20, no. 1 (1995): 42.

⁹⁷ Simon Serfaty, "The Transatlantic Link Today: Lasting Liaison," *NATO Review* 49, no. 1 (2001): 6-8.

constituent members no longer see the advantages in maintaining it and the institution has lost its functional utility.

Moreover, institutional sclerosis has been one of the fundamental challenges toward implementing greater integrative measures in the international system. Even organizations that have endured for many decades are not immune to this problem. For example, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the United Nations (UN) have been in existence since the 1940s, but both organizations have gained new members, adapted, and evolved to meet new challenges. The following section turns to an overview of international migration, with specific attention to the application of international relations theories to the issue.

THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION

Migration involves a *selectivity* element, meaning that migrants are not a random sample of the population from which they come. In other words, they are not an ideal representation of the populations of origin countries. Instead, migrants are selected as a result of certain factors, which are typically operationalized as independent variables and act as positives or negatives with the decision to migrate (operationalized as the dependent variable). A multitude of factors may play a crucial role in the decision to migrate such as potential costs, geographic distance, personal safety, incidence of crime in urban areas, labor and human rights, access to housing, availability of social services (health, education, transportation, etc.), salary levels, career advancement, job security, environmental quality, capacity and willingness to adjust to a foreign culture, language differences, quality of social and workplace relationships, feelings of identity and

belonging, tolerance for diversity, and respect for the rule of law.⁹⁸ There may be a myriad of differentials between origin and destination countries that impact the decision to migrate.

The migration process itself is also selective, not a random process, where migrants must carefully consider the advantages and disadvantages involved. However, this cost/benefit analysis is not universal as certain factors will be more important to some people than others and these factors can easily change over time. Some migrants are more concerned about opportunities for their children, particularly in destination countries that maintain *jus soli* policies, or birthright citizenship, which grants citizenship to children regardless of parental nationality, including those that have arrived in the country illegally. These policies have become incredibly contentious in destination countries, as these children are sometimes labeled “anchor babies”, since parents may see their child’s citizenship as a means of access if they decide to return at a later date. Moreover, the emergence of “birth tourism” is another facet to the citizenship debate, and it appears to be a cottage industry in some areas for women to come to a destination country for a short period and then return to the country of origin after giving birth.⁹⁹ In the United States, for example, there is a national campaign underway to prevent birthright citizenship to children born to illegal immigrants.¹⁰⁰

Although the selectivity element of migration is widely accepted among scholars, research concerning the reasons why someone would decide to migrate to a certain

⁹⁸ Solimano, *International Migration in the Age of Crisis and Globalization: Historical and Recent Experiences*, 29.

⁹⁹ Jennifer Medina, "Arriving as Pregnant Tourists, Leaving With American Babies," *New York Times*, March 29, 2011.

¹⁰⁰ Julia Preston, "State Lawmakers Outline Plans to End Birthright Citizenship, Drawing Outcry," *New York Times*, January 6, 2011. See also "Amending the Amendment," *The Economist*, August 21, 2010.

country and avoid others is far less developed.¹⁰¹ However, migrants in a particular region will often share common characteristics. For example, numerous studies have concluded that post-enlargement immigrants in the EU are predominantly young, male, come from Poland or the Baltic states, have relatively high or medium skill levels and are concentrated in low-skilled sectors in destination countries.¹⁰² These attributes are related to the human capital theory of migration and correspond to factors that positively affect migration such as youth, education, previous migration experience, and independence (single without children).

In contrast, factors that usually impact migration negatively include greater age, lack of education, home ownership, marriage and children.¹⁰³ These variables or selection effects make sense intuitively, as *a priori* expectations concerning whether or not a person would choose to migrate maintains a high degree of validity. For instance, we would expect a highly-skilled, single, 23-year-old carpenter with no children to have a greater likelihood of migration compared to a low-skilled, married, 58-year-old assembly line worker with three children. Numerous studies support these positive and negative factors that influence the decision to migrate.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰¹ Marc Hooghe and others, "Migration to European Countries: A Structural Explanation of Patterns, 1980–2004," *International Migration Review* 42, no. 2 (2008): 477.

¹⁰² Anzelika Zaiceva and Klaus F. Zimmermann, "Scale, Diversity, and Determinants of Labour Migration in Europe," *Oxford Review of Economic Policy* 24, no. 3 (2008): 6.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, 8-9.

¹⁰⁴ See for example, Douglas S. Massey and others, "Theories of International Migration: A Review and Appraisal," *Population and Development Review* 19, no. 3 (1993). Miloslav Bahna, "Predictions of Migration from the New Member States after Their Accession into the European Union: Successes and Failures," *International Migration Review* 42, no. 4 (2008). George J. Borjas, "Economic Theory and International Migration," *International Migration Review* 23, no. 3 (1989). Barry R. Chiswick, "Are Immigrants Favorably Self-Selected?," *The American Economic Review* 89, no. 2 (1999).

Economic and Labor Theory

Theories of international migration have tended to stress economic factors as the primary impetus for migration. World system, dual market, and dependency theories are all structural-level theories that have at their very core the argument that people move from poorer areas to richer areas in the hope of improving their economic situation, as evident in the major migration flows over the past few centuries, such as the great transatlantic migration from Europe to North America, migration from North Africa into Europe, and the South-North migration from Latin America to the United States. While these migration patterns demonstrate a motivation for people to move from poorer to richer countries, an effective argument can also be made for the notion that areas undergoing rapid economic and social change tend to produce the majority of migrants, not regions that are simply the poorest.¹⁰⁵

Economic factors are thought to play the most significant role in the decision to migrate. Earnings differentials, costs of living, unemployment rates, public goods and public transfers are typically utilized as independent variables.¹⁰⁶ In richer destination countries immigration provides much needed workers across the employment spectrum, but particularly in low-skill service, agricultural, and construction work that native populations largely avoid. Some observers argue that higher wages would induce more Americans to work in these immigrant-dominated sectors. However, as *The Economist* suggests, "There is precious little evidence that Joe White, whatever the pay, is willing to

¹⁰⁵ Hooghe and others, "Migration to European Countries: A Structural Explanation of Patterns, 1980–2004", *International Migration Review*: 479.

¹⁰⁶ Zaiceva and Zimmermann, "Scale, Diversity, and Determinants of Labour Migration in Europe", *Oxford Review of Economic Policy*: 2-3.

toll alongside José Blanco picking fruit in California. Short of a big increase in legal immigration, illegal immigrants will continue to meet America's needs."¹⁰⁷

High-skilled migrants, on the other hand, fill important labor niches in the healthcare, technology, and professional sectors where there is often a lack of qualified candidates.¹⁰⁸ The state of the economy in general and employment in particular tend to shape attitudes toward immigrant workers. Favell explains, "Where there is conflict with the 'natives' over jobs and resources, the reaction gets expressed in populist and xenophobic terms. Where there is not, they slip into the background as an invisible but functional 'secondary' part of the economy."¹⁰⁹ Attitudes toward immigration and immigrants fluctuate and reflect prevailing trends.

Immigration affects a few particular sectors more than others. In the construction industry for example, it is estimated that the state private sector would be paying about \$2 billion more in wages in North Carolina if it were not for immigration.¹¹⁰ There are some clear shortcomings in having a singular focus on economic aspects, as economic concerns may only play a part of the decision to migrate. If economic concerns were always the primary independent variables in the decision to migrate, then we might expect an extremely high level of migration to the Scandinavian countries, as this region is known to have high wages, low unemployment, and a general high standard of living. However, available data does not show that the Scandinavian states have an overwhelming

¹⁰⁷ "Dreaming of the Other Side of the Wire," *The Economist*, March 10, 2005.

¹⁰⁸ Solimano, *International Migration in the Age of Crisis and Globalization: Historical and Recent Experiences*, 2.

¹⁰⁹ Adrian Favell, "The New Face of East-West Migration in Europe," *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 34, no. 5 (2008): 711.

¹¹⁰ Riley, *Let Them In: The Case for Open Borders*, 107.

attraction as an immigration destination.¹¹¹ Moreover, the poorest countries in the world are not among the highest sending countries, although there are other reasons that explain this situation.

Network Theory

Other theories have attempted to fill in these gaps, particularly with respect to “pull” factors that may attract a migrant to one country over another, and these factors are typically more functional since they relate to the individual. Massey’s network theory of migration, for example, focuses on human networks that develop between origin and destination countries where people will be far more likely to migrate when there is already an established network in the host country. The importance of networks in global migration cannot be overemphasized. Established links between origin and destination countries are essential to facilitating the mobility of people. The multitude of ethnic communities in urban areas of the United States during the first half of the twentieth century is a prime example of this network theory in action.

Moreover, the persistence of migration to the US from Latin America in recent decades is largely a result of these networks and it is apparent that these are far more influential for potential migrants than efforts at regional integration might be. Violence in Mexico related to the drug trade is another push factor for migration to the US, as Mexicans are frustrated by the inability of the state to maintain security and they are increasingly seeking safety north of the border. More than 35,000 people have died in

¹¹¹ Hooghe and others, "Migration to European Countries: A Structural Explanation of Patterns, 1980–2004", *International Migration Review*: 477.

Mexico as a result of drug-related violence since the government's offensive against the country's drug cartels began in 2006.¹¹²

The network theory and other non-economic explanatory models of migration attempt to address more of the human element that is involved in migration (individual or micro level), such as psychological costs that may arise as a result of separation from family, friends, and community. Moreover, the network theory helps to explain persistent migration patterns such as chain migration between countries in cases where the initial causes for migration no longer exist, particularly as "migration becomes institutionalized through the workings of various private and voluntary organizations active in the field."¹¹³ Massey has argued that these factors involve a kind of cumulative causation where a migrant culture develops and contributes to continual migration.

It is important to note that other scholars have argued that access to migrant institutions such as brokers is actually the most salient factor, but this conflicts with traditional network theory that has a focus on family members, friends, and other personal linkages.¹¹⁴ In any case, it is clear that brokers are now a crucial component to the migration process, and nowhere is this more apparent than on the US-Mexican border.¹¹⁵ Other factors that are also perceived as extremely influential in the decision to migrate include age, education level, and potential distance. In other words, youth,

¹¹² The Associated Press, "28 in Mexico Killed in Attacks," *New York Times*, February 28, 2011.

¹¹³ Hooghe and others, "Migration to European Countries: A Structural Explanation of Patterns, 1980–2004", *International Migration Review*: 479.

¹¹⁴ Jon Goss and Bruce Lindquist, "Conceptualizing International Labor Migration: A Structuration Perspective," *International Migration Review* 29, no. 2 (1995). See also Michael Collyer, "When Do Social Networks Fail to Explain Migration? Accounting for the Movement of Algerian Asylum-Seekers to the UK," *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 31, no. 4 (2005).

¹¹⁵ Fred Krissman, "Sin Coyote Ni Patrón: Why the "Migrant Network" Fails to Explain International Migration," *International Migration Review* 39, no. 1 (2005). See also David Spener, *Clandestine Crossings: Migrants and Coyotes on the Texas-Mexico Border* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2009).

higher education, and lesser travel distance travel should all contribute to a higher migration probability. Migration can be conceptualized as a calculated risk, such that factors that reduce this risk are correlated with a higher probability of migration.

Cultural and World Systems Theories

In addition to the economic (neoclassical) and network theories of international migration, cultural and world systems theory is also widely assumed to offer a great deal of explanatory power with regard to the decision to migrate. The cultural and world systems theory suggests that migration patterns reflect center/periphery patterns that exist in the international system where “migrants typically move from the periphery to the center, in terms of linguistic dominance or cultural hegemony.”¹¹⁶ This theory does encapsulate some economic aspects, however, as migrants in poorer/periphery regions are assumed to be attracted to the richer/center regions. Under the world systems theory it is assumed that the relative gains of the richer countries outweigh those of the poorer, such that while “a rising tide lifts all boats”, the richer countries nevertheless gain more in comparison.

World systems theory is strongly associated with dependency theory, as the periphery states are thought to become dependent on the core states. Moreover, this may also be a reflection of an asymmetrical bargaining relationship, where the capital of the Global North has much greater power than the interests of the people in the Global South.¹¹⁷ The argument against the core/periphery dynamic is that the core countries fuel

¹¹⁶ Hooghe and others, "Migration to European Countries: A Structural Explanation of Patterns, 1980–2004", *International Migration Review*: 477.

¹¹⁷ Solimano, *International Migration in the Age of Crisis and Globalization: Historical and Recent Experiences*, 12.

capital accumulation to favor themselves, such that it remains near impossible for the periphery to ever catch up. Although states on both sides may experience absolute gains, the core experiences far greater relative gains. Anti-globalization activists are deeply concerned with the center-periphery gap and oppose measures they argue contribute to global inequality, but regional integration efforts are viewed under the same spotlight.¹¹⁸

This dissertation focuses on migration with respect to regional migration. Thus, for the purposes of this paper the cultural and world systems theory might appear less salient, as this theory is often applied to a dynamic more like Indian migrants moving to the United States or the United Kingdom just to name an example. In a comparison of relative levels of economic development, however, Canada and the United States are part of the center, whereas Mexico is part of the periphery. The Western Europe versus Central and Eastern Europe dynamic is similar, as the EU-15 member states enjoyed far greater economic prosperity than their eastern neighbors before enlargement. Membership in the union was (and is) a huge attraction for Central and Eastern European states and they had to accept the demands that the Western European states put upon them. Explicit criteria for membership proved to be an essential bridge for integration between the old and new states. Moreover, this is important with respect to “regionness.” If two countries share a close proximity that does not necessarily mean they should be comparable economically, however, as demonstrated by Germany and Poland in Europe and the United States and Mexico in North America.

The cultural theory is often related to origin-destination dynamics that are apparent between former colonial powers and their colonies, but this is not directly

¹¹⁸ See for example, Joseph E. Stiglitz, *Globalization and Its Discontents*, 1st ed. (New York: W.W. Norton, 2002). See also Heather Gautney, *Protest and Organization in the Alternative Globalization Era: NGOs, Social Movements, and Political Parties* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).

applicable to migration within Europe or North America, particularly as the European powers typically had their colonies far from home.¹¹⁹ The British Commonwealth is the most obvious manifestation of continuous global colonial ties, as it currently comprises about one-third of the entire world population.¹²⁰ Taking this into consideration, it should not be surprising to see continued migration into the United Kingdom, especially with the internationalization of the English language. However, it should be noted that the vast majority of these migrants are non-EU citizens.

In sum, the three widely employed theories of international migration – economic and labor theory, network theory, and the cultural and world systems theory – offer explanatory power in a mutually reinforcing manner, such that these theories should be seen as complimentary and not in opposition to one another. These theories are directly applicable to the study of the role of migration with respect to regional integration arrangements.

THEORIES OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION

The rest of this chapter provides an overview of relevant theories of regional integration that are important for this study, particularly if we think about the international system forming the framework in which migration occurs. The initial section discusses how economic theory shapes our expectations of cross-border movements of capital, goods, and people. This section also covers the five main stages of economic integration and how they differ as far as facilitating the movement of people.

¹¹⁹ Douglas S. Massey and others, *Worlds in Motion: Understanding International Migration at the End of the Millennium* (New York: Clarendon Press, 1998), 41.

¹²⁰ Hooghe and others, "Migration to European Countries: A Structural Explanation of Patterns, 1980–2004", *International Migration Review*: 493.

The subsequent sections cover the most salient theories of regional integration – supranationalism and intergovernmentalism, neofunctionalism, and institutionalism. These theories provide important insights with respect to regional integration processes. The final section moves to a discussion of the political economy framework developed by Walter Mattli and its applicability to the study. This framework moves past traditional theories of regional integration and looks at why some states pursue regional integration while others do not and why some regional arrangements succeed and others fail.

Stages of Economic Integration

This section discusses the five main stages of economic integration and the saliency of economic theory with respect to regional integration and its potential impact on international migration. Economic theory provides a basic foundation for an examination of interactions between countries and helps to explain state economic behavior. Regional trading arrangements can be categorized according to their level of economic cooperation. Sectoral cooperation is most often the initial stage in integration and pertains to limited cooperation between countries in specific areas. These agreements typically do not involve a binding treaty, rather they are designed to encourage cooperation among the member states to enable a join-sum situation where all states gain from cooperation. The Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) is a good example as the member states cooperate in several areas including tourism, fisheries, and technology.

Free trade agreements (FTAs) are the second stage in integration, which are designed to remove tariffs and reduce non-tariff barriers (NTBs) such as fees, subsidies,

and taxes between member countries. Bilateral free trade agreements are common but are not included in this study because at least three states are required for a regional arrangement from the RIKS criteria. Before turning to customs unions, the third stage of integration, it is necessary to provide some background on how economy theory shapes our expectations of trade between countries.

The Heckscher-Ohlin (H-O) model is closely tied to the concept of comparative advantage and suggests that countries will use their available factor endowments (capital, labor, and land/resources) most effectively, which then leads to international trade. One of the key assumptions of the H-O model is that labor and capital do not move freely between the countries engaged in trade, although it is assumed that they do so within countries. Regional integration efforts may therefore conflict with this assumption, but this should not occur until the common market stage that facilitates mobility among member countries (discussed below).

When two countries move from autarky to engaging in free trade, it raises the aggregate welfare for both countries as the indifference curve shifts due to the increase in utility maximization. However, it is important to note that trade produces winners and losers in society. Everyone's welfare does not increase even though the aggregate welfare does. The uneven gains from trade is one of, if not the principal reason why it is incredibly difficult to conclude free trade agreements despite the theoretical and empirical evidence that trade raises welfare. Some groups in society may support freer trade if they expect to see gains as a result, while other groups will be vehemently opposed if they expect losses.

The H-O model predicts that countries will export products that involve resources they have in abundance and can therefore produce cheaply and will import products that are scarce and are more expensive to produce (referred to as the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem). Moreover, some factors obviously have greater mobility than others. Chapter II mentioned the fixed factors of the New World countries such as forests and mineral reserves that are not mobile across borders. As a result, capital and labor flowed into these countries to exploit these resources, which conflicts with the notion that these factors should flow in opposite directions. Countries that have a large supply of labor should have a comparative advantage in industries that are labor intensive, since a scarce labor supply would increase prices. For example, Fareed Zakaria has noted that Apple employs 50,000 people in the US, but the company that actually manufactures its products, Foxconn, employs nearly one million people in China, demonstrating the latter country's abundant and cheap labor supply and how Apple utilizes resources in both countries toward profit maximization.¹²¹

With respect to comparative advantage, member states of regional arrangements that involve free trade agreements may experience different outcomes depending on the general economic level of the group and their comparative advantage in relation to the rest of the world. Like other organizations, regional arrangements are a reflection of their constituent members. Venables has shown that free trade agreements among high-income countries will lead to convergence of their income levels, while agreements among low-income countries will cause divergence.¹²² His findings accord with our expectations that developed countries will have a higher ratio of capital to labor than

¹²¹ Fareed Zakaria, "The Future of Innovation: Can America Keep Pace?," *Time*, June 2, 2011.

¹²² Anthony Venables, *Regional Integration Agreements: A Force for Convergence or Divergence?*, World Bank Policy Research Paper No. 2260 (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1999), 20.

developing countries. Developing countries are often disadvantaged by scarce capital and labor, a problem particularly acute for many African nations.

The third stage of integration is a customs union, which involves a free trade agreement among the member states and a common external tariff on non-members. Examples of customs unions include the South African Customs Union and the Customs Union of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia. There is a tendency for customs unions to remain incomplete due to collective action problems among the member states, such as major disagreement over what the common external tariff should be. Countries may implement a customs union as a foundation for further integration, as this stage entails a certain loss of control over trade policy.

The fourth stage is the implementation of a common market, which involves a customs union but also entails *free movement of capital and labor* with some policy coordination such as the East African Community (EAC) Common Market and the European Economic Area (EEA). An economic union is the fifth and final stage of integration and involves a common market but also includes common economic policies and institutions that have binding authority over the member states. The European Union is the only regional arrangement at present that has reached this level of economic integration, where supranational institutions facilitate policy harmonization for member states. Most arrangements have serious difficulty reaching a common market let alone a full economic union. These latter stages involve a much higher degree of economic interdependence among the member states. The following table shows the five categories of regional integration and a brief description of how they differ from one another.

Table 2. Stages of Economic Integration

Category	Integration Level	Integration Description
1	Sectoral Cooperation (SC)	Limited cooperation between countries in specific areas
2	Free Trade Agreement (FTA)	Zero tariffs between member countries and reduced non-tariff barriers
3	Customs Union (CU)	FTA + common external tariff
4	Common Market (CM)	CU + free movement of capital and people, some policy coordination
5	Economic Union (EU)	CM + common economic policies and institutions

In thinking about the relationship between integration and migration, labor mobility is the key addition in the fourth and fifth stages because common markets and economic unions facilitate the movement of people as a factor of production, whereas sectoral cooperation, free trade agreements, and customs unions do not. Thus, economic theory suggests that we should see a marked change in migration as a result of the free movement of people provisions associated with these latter stages of regional economic integration. However, empirical evidence demonstrates that migration does not tend to result from greater integration, which supports the hypothesis of the lack of a substantial relationship between these forces.

It is important to note that although free trade agreements do not facilitate the mobility of people explicitly, there is a perception that they may nonetheless affect migration flows by lowering barriers to investment and goods. As mentioned briefly in chapter II, policymakers in the US believed that NAFTA would curb migration from Mexico by providing incentives for Mexicans to stay at home through the advantages that

the agreement would supposedly bring to the Mexican economy. A free trade agreement is two stages away from the common market level of regional integration where we expect movement of people to become an issue since a common market is designed to facilitate labor mobility. However, in the case of NAFTA and other agreements, policymakers believed that their efforts at regional integration would have a direct impact on migration.

The H-O model does not allow for free movement of capital and labor, but this does not reflect the reality of the twenty-first century economy where capital flows easily across borders, especially in the form of foreign direct investment. The growth of huge multinational corporations is also problematic with respect to the model. Turning to regional integration, member states of an arrangement should experience a convergence effect if capital, goods, and people are allowed to move freely – reducing price, wage, and other differentials between states.

This notion of convergence was developed by Samuelson in the factor price equalization theorem, which built upon the H-O model and states that factor prices tend to equalize as a result of trade and competition. Opponents of NAFTA were worried that wage differentials between Mexico and the US should have narrowed as a result of the agreement, but this did not occur as wage differentials have persisted since the mid-1990s. The concept of the “people paradox” relates to the fact that income differentials are larger than those for capital and goods in the current wave of globalization because people cannot move as freely, such that labor has less mobility between states and cannot equalize to the same extent.¹²³ Moreover, the Rybczynski theorem associated with the H-

¹²³ Solimano, *International Migration in the Age of Crisis and Globalization: Historical and Recent Experiences*, 57.

O model states that at constant prices, if the endowment of labor increases (e.g., more immigration) it will increase the production of labor intensive goods and decrease production of capital intensive goods. Thus, the increase in immigration to the US from Mexico in recent decades should have moved toward the production of labor intensive goods.¹²⁴

The application of economic theory to regional arrangements is part of the broader globalization debate. Although the concept of “mobility” with respect to regional integration is most often associated with the movement of capital and goods across borders, particularly in light of the current period of globalization, there is a perception that migration will be another dimension even if the regional arrangement does not contain migration provisions as one of its core objectives. In general, the H-O model is problematic when applied to the persistent gap in South-North trade and overall economic relations. It supposes trade and migration are substitutes instead of complements, which has been championed by those that argue for greater restrictions on foreign labor, a kind of protectionism for native workers and the economy.¹²⁵ However, this perspective challenges the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, which suggests that low-skilled workers in developed countries will have a disadvantage compared to low-skilled workers in developing countries when trade increases since their national economies are capital rather than labor intensive. Prices favor the good used most intensively and labor is the less abundant factor of production in developed countries and is therefore used less

¹²⁴ Gordon H. Hanson and Matthew J. Slaughter, *The Rybczynski Theorem, Factor-Price Equalization, and Immigration Evidence from U.S. States* (Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1999).

¹²⁵ See for example, Robert J. Carbaugh, "Is International Trade a Substitute for Migration?," *Global Economy Journal* 7, no. 3 (2007). See also Sule Akkoyunlu and Boriss Siliverstovs, "Migration and Trade: Complements or Substitutes? Evidence from Turkish Migration to Germany," *Emerging Markets Finance and Trade* 45, no. 5 (2009).

intensively. On the other hand, opponents of the current global economic order argue that richer countries have stacked the deck in their favor, such that flows of capital, goods, and people will not produce convergence as a result of bias or unfairness in the system.

Supranationalism and Intergovernmentalism

As in other areas of study, regional integration involves both structural and process level attributes. A simple way to make this distinction is to think of a card game, where the structural attributes are the hand that you are dealt and the process attributes are how you play your hand. Interdependence and power asymmetries are structural factors in explaining why some regional arrangements succeed in reaching their declared objectives while others fail, as these factors relate to both the demand and supply side of integration.¹²⁶ The structure versus process dynamic is extraordinarily important for this study, especially when looking at whether form follows function or vice versa. Moreover, if there are significant structural problems in a regional arrangement, for example, it is likely that process level problems will also occur. It is difficult to create and implement effective policies in the face of a weak or problematic structure.

While there may be a number of factors involved in regional integration, and even more factors when considering differences among regional integration arrangements, the process itself tends to be a bit simpler in that states employ one of two methods (or some sort of combination). This institutional choice is crucial for a regional arrangement because it will determine its path with respect to attempting to reach declared objectives.

¹²⁶ Finn Laursen, "Requirements for Regional Integration: A Comparative Perspective on the EU, the Americas and East Asia," in *Comparative Regional Integration: Europe and Beyond*, ed. Finn Laursen (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2010), 267.

On the one hand, member states may create a supranational institution with its own decision-making body, rules, guidelines, and most importantly – authority. The European Union is the best known example of this method, as it maintains a dedicated staff that works toward advancing the union as a whole, not merely the constituent member states. This approach can be considered as another level of analysis somewhere between the international (systemic) and a hypothetical world government, but this is a somewhat murky concept. In this perspective, the member states are, in theory, subservient to the broader institution.

On the other hand, states may be more comfortable with an intergovernmental decision-making body, where there is still an institutional order, but not a specific authoritative institution established to manage the goals and objectives of the regional integration arrangement. The heads of government of the member states are the most salient actors under intergovernmentalism and integration occurs as a result of bargaining among them.¹²⁷ Most international organizations in the world today use the intergovernmental approach instead of the supranational approach.

NAFTA is a perfect example of the intergovernmental approach as the agreement does not call for a dedicated institution; rather it is simply an agreement among the states of North America. The North American states opted for a complete contract approach where all the details were hammered out at the beginning, which is an alternative to the supranational approach of the EU that involves pooling and delegation of sovereignty.¹²⁸ There is no institutional body that is seen as above the constituent member states in the North American context. Some arrangements have utilized a combination method,

¹²⁷ Mattli, *The Logic of Regional Integration: Europe and Beyond*, 28-29. See also

¹²⁸ Laursen, "Requirements for Regional Integration: A Comparative Perspective on the EU, the Americas and East Asia", 239.

granting some authority to an institution while keeping some authority with the constituent member states. Interstate bargaining is at the core of intergovernmentalism as it should lead to a convergence of policy preferences among states. Moreover, the principle of subsidiarity is applicable in the case of the EU and other efforts at supranational union. Subsidiarity is an organizational method that stipulates issues should be managed at the lowest possible level. In other words, the highest court of the EU, the European Court of Justice, has no business handling traffic tickets and other issues that should be managed at the local level.

The distinction between the supranational and intergovernmental approaches forms the basis for the fundamental theoretical divide with respect to regional integration. There are numerous offshoots of these organizational models, but it is important to keep the overall umbrella concept of the supranational-intergovernmental divide in mind. In addition, theories of regional integration can be divided into two main competing camps related to perceptions of the relevant actors. The first camp is primarily focused on formal regional cooperation among states (statist model). The second camp also looks at formal elements, but also includes the informal sectors like the role of non-state actors, and this perspective has gained significant traction in this age of rapid globalization. The “informal” camp argues that looking only at states provides an incomplete picture and excludes other actors such as labor unions, business interests, advocacy groups, and religious organizations that may have a significant impact on the integration process.

International relations theory examines the concept of anarchy in the international system related to the lack of a central authority above states. Regional arrangements are a step in that direction toward more consolidated authority. Moreover, if regions

continue to develop and take on more responsibilities that used to be under the purview of constituent member states, then these arrangements could be considered an ill-defined level of analysis somewhere between the international (systemic) level and a hypothetical world government level. Regional integration entails many of the same challenges as the broader concept of globalization, or perhaps global governance is more appropriate, but the overarching distinction is that integration efforts often involve pooled or delegated sovereignty such that the regional arrangement superstructure becomes an entity in and of itself.

One of the core challenges of interstate relations is the collective action problem, which basically involves problems of defection and distribution.¹²⁹ As demonstrated in the Prisoner's Dilemma, the problem exists because each actor (a state in this example) will choose what it believes to be in its best interest, a perfectly rational decision that unfortunately leads to a suboptimal outcome overall. Hardin's "tragedy of the commons" is widely evoked with respect to environmental matters, but it is also applicable to interstate relations. Agreements among states are often fragile and unpredictable, where a state may choose to renege on its obligations as a member or it may leave the arrangement entirely if conditions change and the state no longer views membership as advantageous. There is an enormous temptation to cheat or defect for member states. Free trade is actually extraordinarily difficult to realize, for example, even though it is widely accepted that states benefit from these agreements.¹³⁰ Regional arrangements must grapple with the collective action problem just as the entire international system does, but the challenges may be more acute when considering that neighboring states may

¹²⁹ Mancur Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups* (New York: Schocken Books, 1971).

¹³⁰ Laursen, "Regional Integration: Some Introductory Reflections", 5.

be in great competition with one another in many respects if we think about natural resources or trade.¹³¹

A major challenge with the intergovernmental approach to integration is that the slowest member often determines the speed at which it occurs, sometimes referred to as the lowest common denominator in the equation. There are arguments for and against this slowest member concept. On the one hand, it seems to make sense that regional integration should only proceed at the speed and depth that all member states find acceptable, otherwise a policy may be ineffective or work at cross-purposes if a member state is unsatisfied with the situation. This may lead to a member reneging on its commitments or leaving the arrangement entirely. Developing a sense of commonality and “regionness” is difficult if members are frustrated with the integration efforts. On the other hand, there is a real risk that little to nothing will be accomplished in the face of consistent hesitancy and opposition from the slowest member. If the vast majority of members are on the same page, but they can be deterred by a single member, this dilemma results in a situation that is unfortunate for the group as a whole.

Supranational institutions like the EU, in contrast, have adopted rules and procedures in an effort to remedy this problem. The introduction of Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) was a huge step in this direction. The larger and wealthier member states exerted influence commensurate with their status instead of being restricted by opposition from smaller members. Some observers have noted that it is highly unlikely that certain legislation would have been enacted without the use of QMV, which has paved the way

¹³¹ See for example, Hidetaka Yoshimatsu, "Collective Action Problems and Regional Integration in ASEAN," *Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs* 28, no. 1 (2006). See also Katharina Holzinger, *Transnational Common Goods: Strategic Constellations, Collective Action Problems, and Multi-Level Provision* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008). See also Todd Sandler, "Global and Regional Public Goods: A Prognosis for Collective Action," *Fiscal Studies* 19, no. 3 (1998).

toward a common market.¹³² The single market, implemented from 1985 to 1992, enabled freer movement of goods and people among the EU member states.

Thus, in this perspective supranational entities can be utilized as a method of upgrading the common interest. It is apparent that it is more difficult to reach a degree of commonality and regionalism in the absence of a shared institution, but does not preclude it. Moreover, these institutions may eventually become actors in and of themselves, as “new regionalist analysts suggest that the effects of trans-border integration and new transnational institutions could prove extensive and self-sustaining.”¹³³ If there is sufficient buy-in from citizens of the member states, officials representing them at the regional arrangement level will find it easier to wear the “regional” hat in addition to the national.

It is important to reiterate the salience of structure in regional integration arrangements. Arrangements that fail to coalesce into a complete organization will experience difficulties on the process end in reaching objectives. With regard to the relationship between an institution and its members, it is important to note a significant theoretical distinction related to the concept of intergovernmentalism. Traditional intergovernmentalism focuses on states as the salient actors in regional integration efforts. In this perspective, heads of state play the central role and regional integration is seen as a response to their negotiating and bargaining.

¹³² See for example, Madeleine Hosli, "Coalitions and Power: Effects of Qualified Majority Voting in the Council of the European Union," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 34, no. 2 (1996).

¹³³ Robert Finbow, "The Evolving Labor Relations Dimension of the European Regional System: A Model for North America?," in *Comparative Regional Integration: Europe and Beyond*, ed. Finn Laursen (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2010), 103.

However, a major criticism of intergovernmentalism is that it often fails to take ongoing developments into consideration.¹³⁴ A leading alternative approach is Moravcsik's liberal intergovernmentalism, which involves the processes of national preference formation, interstate bargaining, and institutional choice.¹³⁵ This perspective argues that institutions may become a different animal than what was initially intended by the constituent states, such that liberal intergovernmentalism is a reaction against state-centric perspectives arguing that an institution is only as strong as the constituent states wish it to be. Caporaso and Mattli, among other scholars, find the liberal intergovernmental approach problematic because it incorporates many of the salient features of neofunctionalism.

Neofunctionalism

An alternative perspective is functionalism, a technocratic and rationalist approach to governance typically attributed to David Mitrany, which is concerned with the ideal *function* rather than the form of international society. Functionalism does not focus on the nation-state, but instead prioritizes human need and public welfare toward the aim of a lasting peace, following from the Kantian tradition. The overarching idea here is that “form follows function” and transnational institutions may be far more effective at providing public welfare than states. Functionalism suggests that international society is “more likely to grow through doing things together in workshop and marketplace than by signing pacts in chancelleries.”¹³⁶ The creation of these

¹³⁴ Mattli, *The Logic of Regional Integration: Europe and Beyond*, 10-11.

¹³⁵ Andrew Moravcsik, "Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 31, no. 4 (1993).

¹³⁶ David Mitrany, *A Working Peace System* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1966), 25.

institutions would transfer loyalty away from the state and reduce the potential for international conflict, which was extremely important to Mitrany in light of the enormous devastation of World War II.¹³⁷

Flexibility and specificity are crucial to this perspective, such that various task-oriented institutions would be able to respond to changing human needs more effectively. It is important to note that “functionalism is not really a theory of integration at all because the term ‘integration’ is suggestive of a particular institutional end stage.”¹³⁸ Functionalism is not a salient theoretical model for the purposes of this dissertation, therefore, as Mitrany argued *against* the concept of regional integration arrangements and focused on integration at the international level.¹³⁹ It follows that functionalism would be inappropriate in an examination of the relationship between international migration and regional integration.

Neofunctionalism, on the other hand, is directly applicable to this study as it is one of the foremost theories of regional integration. I included the brief section on functionalism because it seems that the prefix “neo” is attached to any and all manner of subjects and it is important to ask what exactly is new about it, or how does the new term differ from the older. Neofunctionalism maintains that economic integration leads to political integration and greater authority at the supranational level. Integration in one area creates incentives for integration in other areas, a process referred to as functional spillover, which is then accompanied by political spillover when more actors are involved

¹³⁷ Ben Rosamond, *Theories of European Integration* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000), 33-34.

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*, 34.

¹³⁹ See for example, David Mitrany, "The Prospect of Integration: Federal or Functional?," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 4, no. 2 (1965). See also Mitrany, *A Working Peace System*.

in the process, culminating with “upgrading of common interests.”¹⁴⁰ This final process component of upgrading common interests reflects a convergence of policy preferences among states and may differ significantly from the original preferences of the individual member states.¹⁴¹

The concept of spillover is important to this study as migration is often thought of as an essential component to developing a successful common market and a complete economic union. In this view, policy provisions aimed at the movement of people are a natural consequence of the adoption of measures aimed at the movement of capital and goods. However, this dissertation has stressed that capital and goods are given far greater attention in the international arena than the movement of people. With regard to integration, the neofunctionalist approach tends to focus on elements above the state, namely supranational institutions, and below the state, primarily looking at political parties and interest groups, reflecting Mitrany’s distaste of statist integration.

Neofunctionalism is a foundational theory of regional integration, but Mattli argues it does not go far enough in explaining the connection between welfare maximization and regional integration. He also questions the assertion that supranationality is the *only* method to secure maximum welfare and why it is deemed more efficient. Moreover, neofunctionalism does not address why many integration schemes have failed, why a country might seek to join an already existing arrangement, and what impact external events have in regional integration.¹⁴²

¹⁴⁰ Ernst B. Haas, "International Integration: The European and the Universal Process," *International Organization* 15, no. 3 (1961).

¹⁴¹ Mattli, *The Logic of Regional Integration: Europe and Beyond*, 26.

¹⁴² *Ibid.*, 28.

As a further critique of neofunctionalism and other classical theories of regional integration, Corbey argues for a new theoretical framework called dialectical functionalism that maintains the integration process is one of action and reaction, or “stop-and-go” instead of a continuous process toward greater integration.¹⁴³ Corbey’s framework captures the extraordinary difficulties member states experience in reaching consensus and policy convergence. In this perspective, it is misleading to think of integration as a linear process. Regional arrangements will experience setbacks in their integration efforts, but these challenges should merely be seen as bumps in the road instead of obstacles that cannot be overcome.

Institutionalism

The purported advantages of institutions that become self-sustaining and salient actors themselves are usually championed by scholars subscribing to the theory of rational choice institutionalism, which basically argues that institutions matter, actors behave in a strategic manner, and that these actors develop institutions to serve their interests.¹⁴⁴ Rational choice is one of three approaches to institutional development under the umbrella of neo-institutionalism alongside historical and sociological institutionalism, with the latter two more focused on the development of institutions over time. Historical institutionalism suggests that it is extraordinarily difficult to change prevailing institutions, which relates to the concept of path dependence, and instead

¹⁴³ Dorette Corbey, "Dialectical Functionalism: Stagnation as a Booster of European Integration," *International Organization* 49, no. 2 (1995).

¹⁴⁴ Ken Shepsle, "Rational Choice Institutionalism," in *The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions*, ed. Sarah A. Binder, R. A. W. Rhodes, and Bert A. Rockman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).

argues that institutions are far more likely to change under threats, challenges, and other “critical junctures.”¹⁴⁵

This historical perspective is particularly relevant when we look at regional arrangements like the EU that have existed for many decades, where it is difficult to compare them with an organization that was created much more recently. Many observers have argued that the EU processes are difficult to replicate in other regions “since the complex, consultative EU system took over 40 years to evolve and is based on a wider, mature integration project, anchored in strong roles for social partners in politics.”¹⁴⁶ In other words, we would have to have 40 years of evidence to make a truly accurate comparison between the EU and another regional arrangement. Even looking at the EU at a past point in time would not be as effective because conditions were radically different.

In contrast, sociological institutionalism looks at values, ideas, and identities. This has implications for regional integration with respect to developing a potential transnational identity, or perhaps a regional identity as opposed to traditional notions of identity centered on the nation-state. Europe has experienced the most success in developing a regional identity, although this is a lengthy process to be sure and some states may feel more invested in advancing a broader identity than others. Generational differences are also a salient factor in developing a regional identity, as younger people tend to accept such an identity much easier, particularly those that have traveled or lived abroad and formed relationships with nationals of other member states. Moreover, in the

¹⁴⁵ See for example, *Preferences and Situations: Points of Intersection Between Historical and Rational Choice Institutionalism*, ed. Ira Katznelson and Barry R. Weingast (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2005).

¹⁴⁶ Finbow, “The Evolving Labor Relations Dimension of the European Regional System: A Model for North America?”, 105.

European context shared values may be more important than geography, culture, or language.¹⁴⁷

Regionalization should lead to redundancies with respect to the dynamic between migration and integration as they interact in a new transnational space.¹⁴⁸ Political integration is a challenge to the traditional primacy of the nation-state in this respect. If people from different countries live under the same supranational umbrella, it follows that the concept of international migration changes to resemble intra-state migration in countries that have sub-national administrative divisions such as the federal systems of Germany and the United States.

The different facets of institutionalism add to our understanding of regional integration, particularly those aspects more concerned with *why* arrangements were created and have evolved to adapt to new conditions. A clear theoretical framework is required for effective comparative analysis as well. Neo-institutionalism, for example, “forces analysts to focus on how institutional configuration – formal and informal, national and transnational – affects policy constituencies and outcomes. Neo-institutionalism allows us to trace the dynamic effects of the introduction of new regional institutions like the NAFTA labor accord and the EU’s social dimension.”¹⁴⁹

¹⁴⁷ See for example, Katrin Bennhold, "Quietly Sprouting: A European Identity," *International Herald Tribune*, April 26, 2005. See also Berthold Rittberger, *Building Europe's Parliament: Democratic Representation Beyond the Nation State* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).

¹⁴⁸ Favell, "The New Face of East-West Migration in Europe", *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*: 706.

¹⁴⁹ Finbow, "The Evolving Labor Relations Dimension of the European Regional System: A Model for North America?", 103.

Political Economy Framework

As a contrast to the previous sections that discuss general theories of regional integration, Mattli developed a political economy framework linking political institutions and markets. He argues that traditional political science explanations do not address the importance of market factors and traditional economic theories do not address the importance of institutional factors. In this perspective, economic theories “overlook a key aspect of integration, namely the provision of common rules, regulations, and policies that govern regional economic areas.”¹⁵⁰

The political economy framework suggests that in order to have a greater chance of success, a regional arrangement must satisfy both supply and demand conditions, which explains why the majority of regional integration efforts have failed while only a few have succeeded. On the one hand, member states in a regional arrangement must see the potential for economic gains from market exchange. On the other hand, supply conditions must be met for integration to occur, which are the “conditions under which political leaders are willing and able to accommodate demands for regional institutions at each step of the integration process.”¹⁵¹ Thus, political leaders consider the potential payoff of integration and may be more likely to pursue deeper integration if it would improve their chances of retaining power. Political survival trumps concerns over national sovereignty that might accompany integration efforts.¹⁵² Leaders in countries facing economic difficulties may pursue integration in an effort to reverse the situation, while those leaders whose countries are in good economic shape will be unlikely to risk public (voter) discontent through further integration efforts. In fact, economic difficulties

¹⁵⁰ Mattli, *The Logic of Regional Integration: Europe and Beyond*, 11.

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 13.

¹⁵² *Ibid.*, 79.

typically act as a background condition for integration, when states are unsatisfied with the status quo and look for other avenues to economic prosperity.¹⁵³

Individual political leadership is insufficient, however, as there are numerous instances where popular, charismatic political leaders failed in their efforts to push regional integration. Regardless of their individual appeal, it may be difficult for political leaders to overcome collective action problems. Moreover, political leaders need demand from society, the market side, for integration to occur. The framework also maintains that “commitment institutions” (e.g., European Court of Justice) are useful to overcoming the collective action problem by channeling political will into credible, accountable, and ultimately successful integration.¹⁵⁴ These institutions can provide monitoring and enforcement mechanisms, which help address free riding that is inherent with collective action problems, particularly the Prisoner’s Dilemma.

Regional integration arrangements are a direct reflection of their constituent member states and the relationships among them. This is particularly important in instances where there are marked power asymmetries between member states, which often involve the existence of one (or more) dominant states in the region. Dominant states tend to take on one of two roles. On the one hand, they may spearhead or champion regional integration efforts, exerting a gravitational pull on the other members. On the other hand, they may eschew regional integration efforts out of fear of losing their dominant position in the regional hierarchy, especially if a state is perceived as the regional hegemon.

¹⁵³ Ibid., 51.

¹⁵⁴ Laursen, "Regional Integration: Some Introductory Reflections", 8.

The presence of an “undisputed leader” is extremely important in the political economy framework as Mattli argues it is a key supply condition for successful regional integration. Organizations that lack an undisputed leader, which typically acts as a sort of regional “paymaster”, will consistently face difficulties in reaching policy consensus and overcoming the Coordination Dilemma.¹⁵⁵ Distributional issues can easily lead to failed integration. Moreover, it is important to note that leadership is crucial in negotiations, bargaining, and other activities that may occur during regional integration processes.¹⁵⁶

For example, the United States is seen as the dominant regional player in North America and Brazil the dominant player in South America. These states are crucial to any efforts at regional integration. Without their support or leadership, it is unlikely for any policy to gain significant traction. Thus, the US is vital to NAFTA’s success or failure and the same can be said for Brazil with respect to MERCOSUR, USAN, or other integration attempts in South America. However, asymmetries and an uncertain hierarchy can also be problematic with respect to regional integration. This has been a recurring issue in Europe, as France, Germany, and the United Kingdom are the key regional players, although Germany would be considered the undisputed leader and regional paymaster as a result of its economic strength.¹⁵⁷ However, many observers have noted that Germany is not the dominant military power in Europe, leading instead through consensus building and addressing distributional problems among member states.¹⁵⁸

¹⁵⁵ Mattli, *The Logic of Regional Integration: Europe and Beyond*, 15.

¹⁵⁶ Jonas Tallberg, *Leadership and Negotiation in the European Union* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

¹⁵⁷ Laursen, "Regional Integration: Some Introductory Reflections", 6.

¹⁵⁸ See for example, Hanns W. Maull, "Germany and Japan: The New Civilian Powers," *Foreign Affairs* 69, no. 5 (1991). See also Henning Tewes, *Germany, Civilian Power and the New Europe: Enlarging NATO and the European Union* (New York: Palgrave, 2002). See also *Rethinking Germany and Europe*:

Some regional organizations include members from disparate areas, but nevertheless share common interests and a rationale for membership, and this may also lead to tension among members. The United States and Japan are both perceived as dominant states in the international system and are members of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, resulting in rivalry between them related to status within the organization. In contrast, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) may have continued problems as it lacks an undisputed leader.

In general, the political economy framework suggests “areas with strong market pressure for integration and undisputed leadership are most likely to experience successful integration; ‘commitment institutions’ help to catalyze the process.”¹⁵⁹ Business interests play a key role in creating demand for integration by lobbying national governments, which demonstrates that non-state actors can influence integration efforts. Moreover, firms seek the most conducive business environment, and tend to shy away from areas that are unstable. European firms, for example, wanted to work with policymakers to enable a better business climate in the EU where they could reach economies of scale, reduce transaction costs, and take advantage of trade and investment opportunities across the member states. The demand for integration is a crucial part of the equation as governments usually behave reactively rather than proactively and will therefore have greater difficulty in adapting to changing circumstances than the business community.¹⁶⁰

Democracy and Diplomacy in a Semi-Sovereign State, ed. Simon Bulmer, Charlie Jeffery, and Stephen Padgett (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).

¹⁵⁹ Mattli, *The Logic of Regional Integration: Europe and Beyond*, 43.

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 77.

The framework also looks at how outsiders become insiders. States that are negatively affected by regional integration may either join the arrangement, if accepted, or create their own regional group in response.¹⁶¹ Outsiders may experience losses in market access, trade, aid, investment, or other negative effects that lead to a performance gap, which will likely precipitate action. On the other hand, there is little impetus toward further integration in the absence of a significant performance gap. As Mattli explains, “Ironically, a successful regional process of internalization of externalities can create external effects (i.e., externalities) on countries that do not participate in the process...they are asymmetric (or spillover) externalities, that is, externalities that arise from the effort of creating an integrated governance structure and affect only outsiders.”¹⁶² Furthermore, a successful regional arrangement may create strong pressure for outsiders to join, and the accession of one country will often lead to the accession of others. Baldwin described this phenomenon as the “domino effect” of regionalism, which is particularly evident in the case of the EU.¹⁶³

Many countries have attempted to start counter arrangements after rejection by an already existing arrangement or when the membership cost is too great. However, these counter arrangements are subject to the same supply and demand conditions as other regional integration arrangements. The vast majority of counter arrangements have ended in failure because they lack the supply condition of an undisputed leader and the demand condition of strong market pressure for integration. It is important to note that

¹⁶¹ Ibid., 14.

¹⁶² Ibid., 59.

¹⁶³ Richard Baldwin, “A Domino Theory of Regionalism,” in *Expanding Membership of the European Union*, ed. Richard Baldwin, Pertti Haaparanta, and Jaakko Kiander (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995).

no arrangement that satisfies these two strong conditions for integration has ever failed.¹⁶⁴

Furthermore, successful regional integration usually depends on the ability of an arrangement to meet multiple conditions. The political economy framework argues “regional groups that meet both demand and supply conditions stand the greatest chance of succeeding, whereas groups that fulfill neither set of conditions are least likely to match their stated integration goals with subsequent achievements.”¹⁶⁵ In this perspective, the level of success for each arrangement as far as reaching its declared objectives can be operationalized as the dependent variable and the factors that determine its success or failure as the independent and intervening variables.¹⁶⁶

A comparison of the EU, NAFTA, MERCOSUR, and ASEAN – four the main regional arrangements in the world today – demonstrates the importance of supply and demand conditions for successful integration. However, it is apparent that an arrangement can be successful through a combination of different factors, such that there is no one-size-fits-all recipe for integration. The EU and NAFTA are characterized by high interdependence and high achievement, for example, but NAFTA has greater power asymmetry as a result of undisputed US leadership and is based on a complete contract, intergovernmental model while the EU has less power asymmetry and is based on an evolving incomplete contract, supranational model. The leadership role of the US in NAFTA is more pronounced than that of Germany in the EU. In contrast, ASEAN and MERCOSUR are less interdependent and have experienced difficulty achieving declared

¹⁶⁴ Mattli, *The Logic of Regional Integration: Europe and Beyond*, 65.

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 190.

¹⁶⁶ Laursen, "Requirements for Regional Integration: A Comparative Perspective on the EU, the Americas and East Asia", 255.

objectives. Both arrangements are based on an incomplete contract, intergovernmental model, but lack leadership and have greater power asymmetry.¹⁶⁷

BRIDGING THE GAP

Scholars have devoted little attention to the relationship between international migration and regional integration, which is surprising in light of the intense political rhetoric surrounding these issues. A substantial body of literature exists on each of these subjects, but there is a stunning lack of scholarship on the relationship between them. The central argument of this dissertation is there is no substantial relationship between international migration and regional integration. This argument is shaped by theoretical expectations and empirical evidence. Therefore, to “bridge the gap” between theories of international migration and regional integration, this section juxtaposes the two study components to enable an effective application of theoretical expectations as a framework for the quantitative analysis in the following chapter. In other words, what do our theoretical expectations of international migration suggest about regional integration and what do theories of regional integration suggest about international migration?

Theories of international migration focus on push and pull factors at the macro and micro levels. Neoclassical economics, network, dual labor, cultural, world systems, and dependency theories look at the forces that influence the decision to migrate and cover different levels of analysis. Moreover, it is important to note these theories are not in opposition to one another; rather they exist simultaneously and are mutually reinforcing. This is one of the most intriguing elements of global migration.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid.

The decision to cross international borders is extraordinarily complex and the reasons for doing so vary widely from person to person. Migration involves a multitude of salient factors including potential costs, geographic distance, personal safety, incidence of crime in urban areas, labor and human rights, access to housing, availability of social services (health, education, transportation, etc.), salary levels, career advancement, job security, environmental quality, capacity and willingness to adjust to a foreign culture, language differences, quality of social and workplace relationships, feelings of identity and belonging, tolerance for diversity, and respect for the rule of law. Looking at the big picture, we can say that the significant factors related to migration tend to focus more on economic and social aspects rather than high-level political aspects.

Although factors at both the macro and micro levels contribute to the decision to migrate, it is ultimately an *individual* decision. Thus, concerns that may be more relevant to an individual's daily life will tend to outweigh any macro-level political concerns. A potential migrant will consider a number of questions in making the final decision on whether to move: How much will it cost me? Will it be difficult to get there? Do I know anyone living there and can they help me? What are my job prospects? How is the host country economy doing? Will I be accepted by the native population? How well do I speak the language? Is it safe? Can I handle moving away from my friends and family? If I decide to move, how long do I plan to stay? These questions are just a sample of the potential considerations someone will have to think about when deciding whether to migrate and relate to social networks, market forces, demographics, and other factors that may not exhibit a strong connection to international relations.

Regional integration, on the other hand, does not fit into this overall migration decision picture. It is highly unlikely the level of regional integration between countries of origin and destination would be a key consideration for a potential migrant. For example, as mentioned earlier it was erroneous for policymakers to believe that NAFTA would curb migration from Mexico to the United States, particularly in the short term. Moreover, migrants' interaction with elements of the host country government, when it does occur, is predominantly at the sub-national level. In contrast, regional integration involves heads of state, supranational institutions, and other such high-level political entities.

Theories of regional integration are utilized to describe, explain, and predict the process of providing common rules, regulations, and policies for a region. Although migration may be in the toolbox of policies that member states and their associated regional arrangements must consider, this dissertation argues there is no substantial relationship between international migration and regional integration, and that it is a mistake to conflate them. In general, theories of regional integration look at political and economic cooperation among states, with specific attention to the latter concerning trade and other cross-border transactions. Intergovernmentalism, supranationalism, and neofunctionalism add to our understanding of interstate behavior. In particular, they shed light on how states overcome collective action problems related to defection and distribution.

The political economy framework adds to existing theories of regional integration by taking a broader view of integration that focuses on how a group of countries seek to internalize externalities that cross borders. It also looks at successes and failures and why

a country may pursue membership in an existing regional arrangement. Regarding migration, it is apparent that countries will differ widely as far as how migration intersects with the supply for integration from political actors and the demand for integration from market forces. Are policymakers concerned with the movement of people? What gains or losses might market actors experience as a result of increased immigration or emigration?

With respect to regional integration and enlargement, the current members of an arrangement will have an interest in accepting poorer countries when the cost of exclusion is greater than the cost of inclusion. Although it may seem counterintuitive, the incentive comes when “negative externalities originating in these outsider countries threaten to disrupt the union’s stability, security, and prosperity.”¹⁶⁸ Thus, the political, economic, and social problems in outsider countries provide a rationale for *inclusion* as a method of ameliorating these problems before they negatively impact the member states.

Immigration into a region from external states, and illegal immigration in particular, is a common negative externality faced by member states of an arrangement. Mattli has written, “Economic inclusion through integration rather than exclusion, goods rather than people, trade instead of migration may become an expedient integrative formula for defusing the threat of social disruption caused by illegal immigration – especially when a union’s labor market is saturated.”¹⁶⁹ Using the North American example, Canada and the United States have viewed immigration from Mexico, and specifically illegal immigration, as a negative externality. However, Mattli’s statement above is similar to the thinking of policymakers that believed NAFTA would curb illegal

¹⁶⁸ Mattli, *The Logic of Regional Integration: Europe and Beyond*, 95.

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

immigration through encouraging greater intra-regional trade and providing Mexicans with more incentives to stay at home – but this did not occur. The notion of ameliorating negative externalities through regional integration is intriguing, but it seems more likely to be an effective strategy in the long-term. Chapter VI is a case study of the situation in North America and it is evident that after fifteen years, NAFTA has not resulted in reducing Mexican emigration.

In sum, theories of international migration and regional integration are applicable to this dissertation that examines the relationship between these forces. Moreover, these theories cover multiple levels of analysis ranging from the individual to the international system. The theoretical expectations discussed in this chapter will be readily apparent in the following chapter designed to provide a base explanatory foundation through a quantitative analysis of the migration-integration dynamic.

CHAPTER IV

EXPLAINING THE RELATIONSHIP

METHODOLOGY

In order to investigate the empirical evidence with respect to the relationship between international migration and regional integration, a brief discussion of the methodology employed in this study helps to provide a general foundation for the rest of the dissertation. Social scientists examining these issues either use idiographic research, focusing on single case studies and mostly qualitative approaches, or nomothetic research, looking at multiple cases with an emphasis on finding general explanations that account for all the phenomena studied, which often entails the use of quantitative approaches. Moreover, other scholars use a comparative case study methodology that lies somewhere between these research methods.

This dissertation utilizes a combination of idiographic and nomothetic research, a mixed-method approach to generate synergies, as the quantitative overview provided in this chapter sets the foundation for the more qualitative-oriented analysis in subsequent chapters. Scholars writing on these subjects, and especially those looking at regional integration, have recognized that there is an incredible complexity in the international system, but relatively few cases with which to study it effectively, otherwise known as the *many variables/small-N* problem.¹ Although this problem is readily apparent in a study involving the relationship between international migration and regional integration, there is still sufficient available empirical evidence to make some general conclusions with respect to the hypothesis of an insignificant relationship between these factors.

¹ Lombaerde and others, "Problems and Divides in Comparative Regionalism", 31.

The previous chapters have laid out the main argument of the dissertation of the lack of a substantial relationship between international migration and regional integration and provided some historical background and theoretical context. This chapter examines the relationship and the hypothesis test will show the lack of correlation between them. The hypothesis test will be twofold, as international migration will be the dependent variable for one test and regional integration for the other. The determinants of both factors, migration and integration, will be essential components to the study. First, using international migration as the dependent variable, it will be matched against a set of independent variables that relate to a country's economic situation, governance, trade, geography, political orientation, and demographics. This quantitative analysis should demonstrate which factors are most significant with respect to international migration, and should also show whether each independent variable (such as GDP per capita) has a positive or negative effect on migration.

The other key study component – regional integration – is tricky in that it may seem a bit subjective. Integration does not have a clear unit of measurement like migration. How do we determine if one country is more regionally integrated than another? The assessment, measurement, and evaluation of regional integration may refer to different elements under the “integration” umbrella such as trade, governance, or environmental regulation.² In an effort to translate this subjectivity into an objective measure, I developed an aggregate regional integration score for each country in the study and this variable will be included with the initial set of independent variables in order to test the significance of regional integration as a determinant of international

² *Assessment and Measurement of Regional Integration*, ed. Philippe de Lombaerde (New York: Routledge, 2006). See also, Ariane Kössler and Martin Zimmek, *Elements of Regional Integration: A Multidimensional Approach* (Baden-Baden, Germany: Nomos, 2008).

migration. This part of the quantitative analysis should show which factors are the most important with respect to international migration. It should help answer questions as to which countries have experienced the most migration, and why.

Second, using regional integration as the dependent variable, it will be matched against a set of independent variables that relate to a country's economic situation, governance, trade, geography, political orientation, and demographics. This quantitative analysis should demonstrate which factors are most significant with respect to regional integration, and should also show whether each independent variable (such as GDP per capita) has a positive or negative effect on integration. This part of the quantitative analysis should show which factors are the most important with respect to regional integration. It should help answer questions as to which countries are more regionally integrated, and why.

PROVING A NEGATIVE?

Before turning to a discussion of the data sources and selection, it is important to include a note on demonstrating the absence of correlation, which is a crucial component to this study. Most studies that use regression analysis and other quantitative techniques are designed to show correlation, *not the absence or lack of correlation*. It is more desirable to show a connection between variables than the lack of a connection, or what is influential as opposed to what is not. For example, a researcher examining success in sports will want to determine what is most important to that success – teamwork, coaching, training, and so on – instead of determining which factors are irrelevant. However, there is obvious benefit in ruling out potential indicators and this may also lead

to an interesting result. In this case, the objective is to determine if there is a substantial relationship between international migration and regional integration. Thus, if there is a lack of correlation between them, and if the models are robust, we can say there is no substantial relationship between the two.

The quantitative analysis in this chapter, as in other studies that seek to demonstrate a lack of correlation, will always remain vulnerable and can be challenged because of the fact that the analysis only shows *absence* of correlation, which in this case refers to a connection between international migration and regional integration. The study includes the most applicable data sources and corresponding variables and should meet our expectations as far as demonstrating what is most significant with respect to these two factors. While the list may not be exhaustive, this is irrelevant for the purposes of the study. To address this vulnerability, the following chapters turn to specific case studies to provide robust evidence of the lack of a substantial relationship between international migration and regional integration. This brief section may seem abstract, but it is important to address the limitations of the study.

DATA SOURCES AND SELECTION

This study involves a twofold hypothesis test because of the “two way street” conceptualization of the relationship between international migration and regional integration. In order to conduct the hypothesis test, I created an aggregated dataset from a number of established sources for use in the study. This section is divided into three parts that briefly discuss the data sources and selection for international migration, regional integration, and the general country-level panel data. The aggregate dataset

covers a wide range of country characteristics that relate to its economic situation, governance, trade, geography, political orientation, and demographics. As mentioned earlier, if the argument for a specious link between international migration and regional integration is accurate, then other factors must offer greater explanatory power with respect to these two forces.

International Migration

It is well-recognized that migration data is often scant and imperfect, particularly in developing countries that typically lack the capacity and resources to maintain accurate records on immigration and emigration. This is especially problematic given recent statistics that demonstrate nearly half of all migrants from developing countries reside in other developing countries.³ However, this is slowly getting better and a number of international organizations including the World Bank, the International Organization for Migration (IOM), and a number of agencies under the umbrella of the United Nations have been instrumental in improving the availability and reliability of migration data.

International migration data reflect flows and stocks of people. A migrant flow is the number of people migrating within a specific time frame, whereas stock data refers to the foreign-born population in a country. For the purposes of this dissertation, stock data provides greater insight into the *long-term* situation concerning the relationship between international migration and regional integration. In contrast, short-term migration – such as students traveling abroad, tourism, or temporary work assignments – is less salient to the central argument of this dissertation.

³ Ratha and Shaw, *South-South Migration and Remittances*, 1-2.

Although this dissertation argues there is no substantial relationship between international migration and regional integration, there is a growing body of evidence that suggests that integration efforts can have a positive effect by encouraging the development of transnational communities and may ultimately facilitate circular migration. Furthermore, immigrant integration or assimilation into the host society is one of, if not the central theme related to anti-immigrant political rhetoric. Migrant flow data does not reflect this situation to anywhere near the same extent as stock data, although it is important to keep in mind that stock data merely reflects the cumulative results of past flows.⁴ Migrant stock data, on the other hand, is usually what we think of with respect to “immigration” – people that are from one country (origin) and reside in another (destination). Emigration is the opposite side of the same coin and is most salient in the migration literature with respect to brain drain and countries that lose a significant proportion of their population to other countries. A country’s emigrant population is often dispersed across a multitude of other countries, such that referring to an emigrant stock for a country of origin may seem a bit more abstract compared with an immigrant stock for a destination country.

The United Nations Population Division maintains a migration database and publishes a “Trends in Total Migrant Stock” report that is widely-used and referenced in the existing literature.⁵ According to Ratha and Shaw, however, this database likely underestimates global migrant stocks to a large extent as a result of definitional differences of a migrant across countries (foreign born versus foreign nationality), reporting lags in census data, and an inability to adequately capture irregular migration,

⁴ International Organization for Migration, *World Migration Report 2010 - The Future of Migration: Building Capacities for Change*, 237.

⁵ United Nations Population Division, *Trends in Total Migrant Stock: The 2008 Revision*.

and some states do not maintain rigorous adherence to existing standards.⁶ In any case, the UN data is appropriate for this study. Moreover, stock data was selected over flow data because it is typically more complete and I also wanted to focus on the big picture with respect to the relationship between international migration and regional integration for states in the international system. Stock data does not include return or repeat migration, nor does it include figures for migrant mortality. Gross migration is another applicable variable to the study as it refers to the total volume of migration (immigration plus emigration). Some countries have far greater migrant outflows than inflows, or vice versa, but some states have large numbers of both immigrants and emigrants and this is captured by gross migration.

The World Bank *Migration and Remittances Factbook* is another invaluable resource for this study.⁷ The most significant contribution is the bilateral migration data based on migrant stocks as reported by national governments, which takes into consideration the different census methods of either looking at the foreign-born population or those with foreign nationality. Moreover, the World Bank group also compiled data for a handful of countries that was estimated indirectly using various assumptions. The most applicable migration data for each country in the study are immigrant stocks, immigrant stocks as a percentage of the population, emigrant stocks, and emigrant stocks as a percentage of the population. The gross migration variable is also included and represents the addition of immigrant and emigrant stocks. On this note, net migration statistics are widely used in other studies, but this is far less effective for the purposes of this dissertation. Furthermore, through the use of both emigration and

⁶ Ratha and Shaw, *South-South Migration and Remittances*, 4.

⁷ World Bank, *Migration and Remittances Factbook 2011* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2011).

immigration data, net migration is captured indirectly. There are numerous instances where a country might have significant immigration and emigration, but the net migration statistic would be close to zero because these stocks would largely cancel each other out.

The variables concerning emigrants may seem a bit abstract, but what is important here is that these variables provide a good idea of which countries are high exporters of people. For example, Mexico is considered a nation of emigrants and this is readily apparent in the migration statistics.⁸ Moreover, the available data recognize that many states with smaller populations are also major emigration states, which makes the inclusion of emigrants as a percentage of the population an important variable, as stock data would only tell part of the story.

Through the use of both UN and World Bank sources, we can see a pretty clear picture of international migration. Again, while the data may be far from perfect, it is nevertheless sufficient to show where people are coming and going, and to what extent. This is crucial to the central argument of the dissertation, to be sure, as a clear objective measure of migration between countries is a necessity for the inclusion of regional integration as the second component of the study.

Regional Integration

Regional integration is usually perceived subjectively since it is difficult to pinpoint the exact level of integration a country or region has attained. In other words, regional integration lacks a simple numeric measure like gross domestic product or

⁸ See for example, David Fitzgerald, *A Nation of Emigrants: How Mexico Manages Its Migration* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009). See also Douglas S. Massey, Jorge Durand, and Nolan J. Malone, *Beyond Smoke and Mirrors: Mexican Immigration in an Era of Economic Integration* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2002).

population. However, various factors can be combined in an effort to determine the level of regional integration in a more objective manner by producing a “score” for each country. For the purposes of this study, the actual score is less important than the rankings and disparities between regional integration scores among countries and the general picture we can glean concerning a specific region’s integration level. Although the scores can be challenged as a reliable and accurate method of capturing regional integration, the scores demonstrate that some countries and regions are highly integrated while other countries and regions are largely isolated. Countries in Europe received some of the highest scores and states like Belarus, Israel, and Mongolia that tend to be more isolated from their neighbors (and much of the international system in general) received some of the lowest.

The regional integration scores are a reflection of four key factors. First, each country was coded with a categorical variable representing its highest level of regional economic integration ranging from sectoral cooperation (1) to economic union (5).⁹ This coding system follows the basic stages of economic integration discussed in chapter III. A country may be a member of multiple regional arrangements, but this factor refers to the deepest arrangement in which it is a member, such that a country that has free trade agreements with some countries and is in a customs union with others would be coded a 3 to reflect the deeper level of integration.

The European Union states are the only ones considered to be category 5 because the EU is the only regional integration arrangement that has reached this level of economic integration. This categorical variable provides a general snapshot of the

⁹ This coding system is adopted from Jennifer Pédussel Wu, “Measuring and Explaining Levels of Regional Economic Integration,” in *Assessment and Measurement of Regional Integration*, ed. Philippe de Lombaerde (New York: Routledge, 2006).

country's level of regional economic integration, which is concerned with the *depth* of its most significant arrangement, but this does not account for the *breadth* of regional integration. A country that participates in ten free trade agreements is coded the same as a country that participates in only one. Taking this into account, the other factors included in the weighted regional integration score add explanatory power to address this shortcoming.

Second, the total number of regional integration arrangements a country participates in provides another lens through which to gauge integration. The total number of RIAs is another categorical variable and ranges from 0-9, but there is often massive overlap among regional arrangements, such that the same few countries might be involved in several arrangements. It should be noted that many countries may be limited as far as the number of regional arrangements in which they could reasonably be expected to participate due to geographic location. We would not expect a small Caribbean island state to have any sort of regional ties to European or Asian states, although this notion is not set in stone as evidenced by several cross-regional arrangements.

As stated earlier, there may be significant overlap of member states in regional arrangements. For example, several states are members of the African, Caribbean, and Pacific Group of States (ACP), the Association of Caribbean States (ACS), the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), and the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS). This overlapping nature of regional integration can be thought of as another method of deepening as opposed to widening, where the same members have multiple regional ties through concomitant institutions. Instead of participating in only one arrangement with

an all-encompassing scope, these states have opted for numerous arrangements that may have different foundational aspirations and objectives. However, the third variable included in the regional integration score is the total number of countries with which each country is regionally integrated, removes duplications, and this provides a snapshot of the other governments that each state has chosen to join with in regional integration efforts. One could argue that removing the duplications discounts the concomitant institutions aspect of overlapping arrangements, but for the purposes of this dissertation the important takeaway is to look at how many other actors a country has decided to integrate with regionally.

The final variable included in the regional integration score is the total number of regional trade agreements (RTAs) for each country as reported by the WTO. These four factors are weighted and combined to produce a regional integration score: Regional economic integration level (10%), number of regional integration arrangements (30%), number of other countries (20%), and number of RTAs (40%).¹⁰ The number of RTAs is given the greatest weight, as this is a better indicator of actual economic/political integration. Regional integration arrangements vary dramatically with respect to actual concrete measures, where some arrangements appear far more substantial on paper than they do in reality. Many poorer states lack the capacity to translate integration efforts into actual successes.

The resultant regional integration score is then multiplied by three for all countries to move the highest scoring countries closer to 100, which facilitates a scale that is easier to understand. France has the highest score of 95.7 while numerous small

¹⁰ I worked with other coding schemes for regional integration and they did not substantially change the results in the quantitative analysis.

island states, Greenland, and North Korea received the lowest score of 1.2. The regional integration scores fit with our *a priori* expectations of regional integration for the vast majority of states. The European states are well-represented at the top of the rankings, for instance, whereas other states that are largely isolated from their regional neighbors are well-represented at the bottom.

General Panel Data

To recap, international migration data for this study comes from the UN Population Division and the World Bank. The regional integration data is primarily from the RIKS database, but also included information provided by the WTO. However, these data sources are insufficient in an examination of the relationship between these two factors. As mentioned earlier, if there is no substantial relationship between international migration and regional integration, then other factors should be able to offer explanatory power for each independently. In other words, we should be able to determine the most significant factors with respect to international migration and regional integration. Furthermore, if the hypothesis is correct, the migration variable should be insignificant with respect to integration and vice versa.

The general panel data included in the study look at a wide range of factors related to a country's economic situation, governance, trade, geography, political orientation, and demographics. The inclusion of these other factors in the quantitative analysis allows me to control for country-specific characteristics, which is essential considering the enormous differences among states in the international system. It is important to note that a number of states were not included in the study because of their

tiny populations or lack of available data. However, the sample size appears sufficient without them and it is highly doubtful that their inclusion would make a significant impact. The following paragraphs provide a brief description of the variables included in the six categories of economics, governance, trade, geography, political orientation, and demographics.

Economic situation: Economic data are the most widely used in the study of regional integration because most analyses on the subject are concerned with the mobility of goods and capital, not of people. The most effective indicator of a country's economic situation for the purposes of this dissertation is its level of national wealth and therefore the dual variables of gross domestic product (GDP) and GDP per capita are included. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is another key indicator with respect to a country's economic situation and, like the migration variables, FDI stock data is used in the quantitative analysis rather than flow data to provide a clearer picture of the total amount of investment over time. The Human Development Index (HDI) is also included as it represents the general standard of living for citizens in each country, which is important as some states actually have a decent level of national wealth, but this wealth is concentrated in a small segment of the population. Finally, wealth transfers are an important component related to international migration (and regional integration). Thus, to capture the importance of these transfers, I have included remittances as a percentage of GDP as another variable looking at the economic situation. As mentioned earlier, there are several countries that maintain economies where over a quarter of GDP comes from remittances from their migrants abroad. The GDP and remittances data is provided

by the World Bank, FDI data by the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), and the HDI data by the UN Development Program (UNDP).¹¹

Governance: With respect to a country's governance, a useful objective measure is the set of six World Governance Indicators – Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of Violence, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption.¹² Instead of using each of the indicators as separate variables, I took the average of the six, which provides a good impression of a country's level of governance, particularly as countries tend to have similar scores across all indicators. Moreover, these indicators are often intertwined, such as respect for the rule of law and control of corruption. Highly corrupt states typically have weak judicial mechanisms, for example, and states that are strongly committed to the rule of law usually recognize the importance of rooting out corruption. Thus, it is duplicative to include other variables like the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), as any explanatory power it might offer should be covered by the governance indicators.

Trade: In multiple studies of regional integration, trade is at the forefront of salient indicators, as this is perceived as one of the most significant aspects of interstate cooperation. Free trade agreements are usually seen as an essential component of regional arrangements, as demonstrated in the basic levels of regional integration discussed in a previous chapter. The most appropriate variables include trade as a

¹¹ World Bank, *World Development Indicators* (Washington, DC: World Bank Publications, 2010). United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, UNCTADstat. United Nations Development Programme, *Human Development Report 2009 - Overcoming Barriers: Human Mobility and Development* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).

¹² Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzzi, "World Governance Indicators," ed. Brookings Institute and the World Bank Washington, DC: 2010.

percentage of GDP, trade in services as a percentage of GDP, and the total number of regional trade agreements (RTAs) as reported to the WTO. This combination of trade-related variables should give a decent indication of how important total trade is to a particular country, how the mobility of people is incorporated in its overall trade profile, and its efforts with respect to regional trade. The total number of RTAs is also included as a weighted variable in the regional integration score, but it seems appropriate to list it again here as a separate indicator.

Geography: There are obvious geographical aspects that have a direct influence on international migration and regional integration, and several variables are relevant for this study. Land area is important because we might assume that very large countries might have less migration and be less motivated to pursue regional integration efforts. If a country is landlocked is also important to migration and integration, and this is operationalized as a dummy variable in the analysis. Finally, the number of land borders for each country is also significant as expectations would be that more shared borders would lead to more migration and integration.

Political orientation: It is difficult to have an objective measure of a country's political orientation, or the political rights that people enjoy and the overall responsiveness of the government to citizen demands, as this may seem to be more of a subjective concept. However, there are a couple of factors that are appropriate for this study. One is the polity score produced by the Polity IV Project group that ranges from strongly democratic to strongly authoritarian. However, the polity data covers a limited set of countries and it would negatively impact the study to include it in the analysis. The other variable is the Freedom House rankings that represent a country's overall level of

freedom through a combination of scores for political rights and civil liberties. The Polity IV and Freedom House scores are similar in that more democratic countries score higher in political rights and civil liberties. It should be noted that these variables could also be categorized as governance indicators, but this distinction is largely irrelevant for the purposes of the quantitative analysis. The idea here is to capture the level of repressiveness of a state, as there are some states like Singapore that are more repressive, but nevertheless have effective governance.

Demographics: A clear picture of demographic trends is highly relevant to the relationship between international migration and regional integration. Total population and the percentage of the population between the ages of 15 and 64 are included to have an idea of the entire population compared to the working age population. The emigration rate of tertiary education people is often utilized as an indicator of “brain drain” and it is applicable to this study as well. Brain drain may hinder economic development in poorer countries and therefore make an impact with respect to migration and integration.

Table 3. Variables

Migration	Immigrant stock, immigrant stock as a percentage of the population, emigrant stock, emigrant stock as a percentage of the population, gross migration
Integration	Regional integration score
Economics	GDP, GDP per capita, FDI stock, HDI, remittances
Governance	World Governance Indicators (average)
Trade	Trade as percentage of GDP, trade in services as percentage of GDP, total RTAs
Geography	Land area, landlocked, land borders
Political	Freedom House combined rating
Demographics	Population, emigration rate of tertiary educated people, percentage of the population ages 15-64

As indicated in the table above, the quantitative analysis includes variables related to emigration and immigration, the regional integration score, and disparate variables from six broad categories that should help to shed additional light on the relationship between international migration and regional integration. There are several variables that were not included in the analysis due to the problem of incomplete data. Unemployment, education spending, and military spending are also indicators that would likely add explanatory power, but the available data is spotty and the inclusion of these variables would actually weaken the analysis because so many countries would then be excluded from the study. The following table shows the correlations between the study variables.

Table 4. Correlations

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	
1 Human Development Index	-																						
2 World Bank Indicators Average	0.75	-																					
3 Total RTAs	0.59	0.66	-																				
4 Regional Integration Score	0.06	0.28	0.53	-																			
5 FDI Instock	0.35	0.40	0.39	0.21	-																		
6 Immigrant Stocks	0.21	0.20	0.16	0.08	0.83	-																	
7 Emigrant Stocks	0.09	-0.06	0.16	0.02	0.26	0.33	-																
8 Gross Stocks	0.20	0.13	0.19	0.07	0.76	0.92	0.67	-															
9 Emigrant Stocks (% of Population)	0.20	0.14	-0.05	0.07	-0.12	-0.12	-0.07	-0.12	-														
10 Emigration Rate Tertiary Educated	-0.05	0.04	-0.20	0.14	-0.17	-0.19	-0.21	-0.24	0.62	-													
11 Land Area	0.08	-0.01	-0.04	-0.05	0.40	0.54	0.51	0.63	-0.17	-0.24	-												
12 GDP Per Capita	0.65	0.76	0.61	0.26	0.46	0.28	-0.04	0.20	-0.05	-0.16	0.05	-											
13 Remittances (% of GDP)	-0.15	-0.26	-0.27	-0.21	-0.20	-0.15	-0.07	-0.15	0.42	0.36	-0.18	-0.29	-										
14 Percentage Population 15 to 64	0.83	0.59	0.47	-0.02	0.25	0.17	0.18	0.21	0.14	-0.12	0.12	0.51	-0.15	-									
15 Landlocked	-0.26	-0.18	-0.07	-0.17	-0.13	-0.10	-0.09	-0.11	-0.05	-0.23	-0.08	-0.12	0.08	-0.17	-								
16 Population	-0.01	-0.04	0.06	-0.07	0.23	0.24	0.59	0.43	-0.15	-0.16	0.46	-0.04	-0.10	0.09	-0.10	-							
17 Immigrant Stocks (% of Population)	0.40	0.36	0.07	-0.14	0.12	0.16	-0.12	0.07	0.00	-0.12	-0.03	0.52	-0.09	0.48	-0.10	-0.11	-						
18 GDP	0.24	0.26	0.23	0.11	0.85	0.88	0.24	0.79	-0.12	-0.16	0.43	0.33	-0.15	0.16	-0.11	0.32	0.03	-					
19 Land Borders	-0.19	-0.27	0.08	0.08	0.07	0.16	0.43	0.30	-0.28	-0.45	0.44	-0.15	-0.23	-0.09	0.24	0.40	-0.15	0.07	-				
20 Trade (% of GDP)	0.26	0.26	0.15	-0.03	0.00	-0.12	-0.22	-0.19	0.14	0.13	-0.23	0.22	0.06	0.31	0.01	-0.17	0.39	-0.18	-0.28	-			
21 Trade in Services (% of GDP)	0.08	0.20	0.02	0.05	-0.10	-0.14	-0.25	-0.21	0.24	0.35	-0.21	0.21	0.10	0.10	-0.05	-0.16	0.31	-0.15	-0.33	0.52	-		
22 Freedom House Rating	-0.51	-0.79	-0.56	-0.32	-0.28	-0.11	0.03	-0.08	-0.23	-0.20	0.06	-0.44	0.13	-0.35	0.18	0.06	0.00	-0.19	0.26	-0.01	-0.14	-	

The table indicates that GDP is highly correlated with immigrant stocks at 0.88 and FDI stocks at 0.85. Moreover, as a key indicator of national wealth, GDP subsumes a number of other variables, and especially those that look at health and the environment.

Richer countries simply have more money to spend on the health of their citizens and also have greater technology, expertise, and public concern to address environmental issues more effectively. In contrast, the poorest countries are found at the bottom of these rankings as they lack the capacity to manage these problems successfully.

RESULTS

In order to conduct the twofold hypothesis test alluded to at the beginning of the chapter, the regression analysis involves both directions of causality between international migration and regional integration. We should hopefully be able to determine the most salient indicators for each factor. Which variables have the greatest positive impact on migration and regional integration? Which have the greatest negative impact? Furthermore, if the central argument of the lack of a substantial relationship between these factors is correct, the variables directly related to migration and integration should not be significant with respect to each other.

First, in looking at international migration as the dependent variable, there are five different statistics that, when combined, should provide substantial explanatory power as to the determinants of migration – what is significant and what is not. It is important to examine migration through different lenses and the analysis looks at migration in both absolute and relative terms, as larger countries may have significantly more migrant stocks (absolute) but considerably fewer migrants as a percentage of the population (relative).

The outputs show the regression results for these different perspectives. In order to have the most complete results, I used data from the year 2005, which should not differ

dramatically from more recent statistics because we would expect a country that had large numbers or a high percentage of immigrants in 2005 to have similar figures today. This is not to say that the year 2005 is in some way unique, merely that it allows for a more complete dataset. National census data, for example, are not available for every year. The dataset used in the study contains 181 countries as units of observation, but 42 observations were deleted due to missingness in the models. The countries excluded as a result of missing data are primarily small states or states that are not highly integrated into the international system. The omission of these states should not have a serious impact on the model results.

Overall, the models have more explanatory power than we might have anticipated and a closer look at each of the four models separately shows some interesting results. With respect to immigrant stock, the model has a robust adjusted R-square of 0.84 and is significant with respect to GDP, FDI, land area, population, and emigrant stock. In other words, from the model we would expect larger, wealthier, and less populous states with lots of people living abroad and with high investment from other countries to have greater numbers of immigrants. The coefficient for population is negative unlike the other significant variables, which makes sense if we think about the fact that some of the most populous states in the international system such as China do not have a large immigrant population.

Table 5. Regression Outputs

Independent Variables	Dependent Variable					
	Immigrant Stock	Immigrant stock (% of population)	Emigrant stock	Emigrant stock (% of population)	Gross Migration	Regional Integration
Immigrant stock (thousands)	-	-	0.28**	0.00	-	0.00
Immigrant stock (% of the population)	-	-	-20.56	0.04	-	-0.41
Emigrant stock (thousands)	0.29**	0.00	-	-	-	0.00
Emigrant stock (% of the population)	11.88	0.05	-	-	-	0.21
Gross migration	-	-	-	-	-	-
Regional integration score	-2.71	-0.02	2.51	0.10	1.92	-
GDP (billions)	2.04***	0.00	-0.99***	0.00	1.47***	0.00
GDP per capita (thousands)	-4.08	0.16*	7.34	-0.07	-1.09	0.45*
FDI Instock	0.01**	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01**	0.00*
HDI	-16.06	0.14	6.99	0.34**	-11.32	-0.86***
Remittances (% of GDP)	-8.53	0.04	18.07	0.56***	20.62	-0.27
World Governance Indicators (average)	10.91	0.41*	-83.74*	-0.03	-113.70	1.12*
Trade as % of GDP	6.60	0.03	-6.91	0.00	-1.18	0.08
Trade in services as % of GDP	2.45	0.06*	-2.04	-0.01	-1.15	-0.02
Total RTAs	-21.83	-0.15	26.75	-0.13	8.78	-
Land area (thousands)	0.26**	0.00	0.17	0.00	0.61***	0.00*
Landlocked	-318.30	-1.15	-150.90	4.76*	-551.70	-13.29**
Land borders	98.37	0.80**	-5.09	0.12	110.30	3.26***
Freedom House combined rating	2.83	1.23*	-84.74	-0.38	-154.80	-0.34
Population (milions)	-5.08***	-0.01	5.89***	0.00	1.34	-0.03*
Emigration rate of tertiary educated	-5.92	-0.03	-1.54	0.26***	-5.50	0.13
Population ages 15 to 64 (% of pop)	6.57	-0.19	59.62	0.11	99.48	0.61
<i>Adjusted R-square</i>	<i>0.84</i>	<i>0.33</i>	<i>0.52</i>	<i>0.48</i>	<i>0.76</i>	<i>0.41</i>

Signif codes 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 '.' 1

The significant independent variables change dramatically when looking at immigrant stock as a percentage of the population, however, as GDP per capita, the World Bank governance indicator, trade in services as a percentage of GDP, total RTAs, number of land borders, and the Freedom House rating are most significant. Thus, from the model it follows that states with a higher GDP per capita, better governance and political rights/civil liberties, multiple borders, and economies more reliant on trade in services tend to have more immigrants as a share of their populations. The adjusted R-square for the model looking at immigrants as a percentage of the population is much lower at 0.33 compared to 0.84 for total immigrant stock. However, a model with immigrants as a percentage of the population is arguably less relevant.

Many of the top countries are not really key migration states even if they host a large share of immigrants with respect to the native population. According to the World Bank, the top five countries in 2010 were Qatar (86.5%), Monaco (71.6%), the United Arab Emirates (70%), Kuwait (68.8%), and Andorra (64.4%).¹³ These are overwhelmingly small states such as Monaco with a population of 33,000 and Andorra with 85,000 or oil producers recruiting foreign labor for that sector and it is therefore misleading to think of these states as significant migrant destination countries. Moreover, it is problematic to look at these states in a study of the relationship between international migration and regional integration. In the oil-producing Gulf countries, the vast majority of foreign labor comes from Asian states far outside the region as result of a myriad of factors, but mostly due to wages and cultural sensitivities.¹⁴

Moving to emigrant stocks, the results are quite similar to the output for immigrant stocks, although the adjusted R-square is 0.52. A comparison of the two models looking at immigrant stock and emigrant stock suggests the selected independent variables explain more of the variance with respect to the former, meaning they appear to be a better predictor of migration with respect to destination countries rather than origin countries. GDP, population, and immigrant stocks are highly correlated, but the coefficient signs are reversed, such that GDP is negative and population is positive. The model indicates that poorer states with larger populations tend to have more people abroad, which is readily apparent with respect to a country like India. The significance of immigrant stocks is unexpected, however, as it suggests that countries that have many

¹³ World Bank, *Migration and Remittances Factbook 2011*, 2.

¹⁴ See for example, *Asian Labor Migration: Pipeline to the Middle East*, ed. Fred Arnold and Nasra M. Shah (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1986).

people abroad also tend to host migrants. Middle-income states may account for this dynamic because they send people to richer states but receive people from poorer states.

If we look at emigrant stock as a percentage of the population (again, this may seem somewhat abstract), the most significant indicators are remittances as a percentage of GDP and the emigration rate of tertiary educated people. This points to the concept of brain drain, as countries that have sent many people abroad have lost a large percentage of their best educated. In the year 2000, for example, a group of 46 small states had a skilled emigration rate of over 43 percent compared to 15 percent of the average emigration rate (skilled and unskilled).¹⁵ Although on average empirical findings suggest that brain drain has a negative effect on growth, especially in small states, emigrants send substantial remittances and this may in turn correspond to higher levels of human development as indicated by the significance of HDI in the model. The regional integration score is also significant at the 0.05 level and this is the only model where regional integration shows any relationship to the migration dependent variable. The adjusted R-square for this model is 0.48, which is close to the 0.52 adjusted R-square for total emigrant stock.

Finally, when looking at gross migration, the most significant variables are GDP, FDI, and land area. All three represent an increase in gross migration (positive coefficient), meaning that larger, wealthier states with high investment from other countries should experience the greatest total migration. The adjusted R-square for this model is robust at 0.76.

¹⁵ Solimano, *International Migration in the Age of Crisis and Globalization: Historical and Recent Experiences*, 61.

From the direction of migration to integration, the results support the hypothesis of the lack of a substantial relationship between international migration and regional integration. In four of the five models, the regional integration score was insignificant. Interestingly, it was only significant with regard to emigrant stock as a percentage of the population. This result accords with the fact that many smaller states, Caribbean island nations for example, have enormous expatriate communities abroad as compared to the population that has remained at home. However, as mentioned previously, looking at relative versus absolute figures on migration can be misleading.

The migration component involved five different variables as different lenses through which to view potential significant indicators. In contrast, the integration component only involves the one variable, such that the regional integration score is set as the dependent variable. The entire set of migration indicators is included with the other general independent variables in the analysis of regional integration.

This model looking at regional integration has an adjusted R-square of 0.41 and the results show a correlation to several independent variables. Population is negative, such that regional integration decreases as population increases. Landlocked countries also tend to be less regionally integrated. The most surprising independent variable is human development because the model suggests it has a *negative* effect on regional integration. However, this is likely due to the fact that many states in Africa with low HDI scores are involved in numerous regional integration arrangements. In contrast, regional integration should increase with greater GDP per capita. Although national wealth plays a central role in human development, it is not as strongly correlated as we

might believe. In fact, HDI has a 0.65 correlation with GDP per capita and only 0.24 with total GDP.

Other positive independent variables are the number of land borders, FDI, the World Bank governance indicator, and trade as a percentage of GDP. It is interesting to note that neither immigrant stocks nor immigrants as a percentage of the population is significant in the model. Moreover, neither of the variables related to emigration are significant. Thus, the results support the hypothesis of a lack of a significant relationship between these factors in the direction of integration to migration.

This chapter has provided a general overview with the entire world as the level of analysis. The study demonstrates that certain factors influence international migration and certain factors influence regional integration. The variables were carefully selected and cover a wide range of indicators related to a country's economic situation, governance, trade, geography, political orientation, and demographics. When these variables are set against migration and regional integration data, we can clearly see which factors are influential with respect to international migration and which are influential with respect to regional integration. The lack of available data in other areas is unfortunate, but is highly doubtful the inclusion of additional variables would have impacted the study.

For the purposes of this dissertation, the important takeaway is there is no substantial relationship between international migration and regional integration as demonstrated in the quantitative analysis. On the one hand, people migrate as a result of push and pull factors at the macro and micro levels as indicated in the significance of several independent variables such as national wealth, population, and size. Regional

integration efforts by states appear to be largely irrelevant in the decision to migrate. On the other hand, a country's regional integration efforts do not have a substantial effect on its level of migration.

Building on this general analysis, Chapters V through VII look at particular regions and employ a variety of sources including scholarly works, the global media, and those from NGOs and advocacy groups in order to provide a significant qualitative component to the study in addition to the quantitative component. Chapter V is a case study of the European experience. The European Union is the preeminent regional integration arrangement in the world today and the only one that has reached the level of a full economic union. Thus, the depth and breadth of European integration provides an excellent case study to investigate the relationship between migration and integration. Chapter VI is a case study of the North American experience. This is a much different region than Europe and provides an excellent opportunity for comparison. The United States is the world's largest economy and is the top destination country for migration in the world today by far and should arguably be included in any study of the relationship between migration and integration. Although this region will have a smaller sample size compared to Europe as far as the countries involved, we should nevertheless be able to answer the main questions related to the focus of the dissertation.

North America and Europe together generate about half of global economic output and the lion's share of wealthy countries in the world is located in these two regions. We would therefore expect these regions to be the strongest magnets for global migrants as indicated in the quantitative analysis in this chapter and the trend of migration from developing countries to high-income OECD countries. Moreover, both

regions have made significant efforts at regional integration. Detailed case studies on North America and Europe will enable a better understanding of the dynamic between international migration and regional integration in disparate regions.

Chapter VII follows the in-depth case studies and looks at the situation more generally in a number of regions throughout the world. Instead of a more extensive focus on one region, this chapter contains brief sections on Latin America (includes the Caribbean, Central America, and South America), sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and North Africa, Central Asia, East Asia, South Asia, and Oceania. In sum, this chapter is designed to be an across-the-board look at the relationship between international migration and regional integration in other areas of the world besides North America and Europe.

CHAPTER V

CASE STUDY: EUROPE

DEVELOPING THE EU

The EU is the most ambitious integration experiment since the dawn of the modern nation-state system and marks a fundamental change from previous attempts at political and economic cooperation and collaboration. Historically, states have had more of an inclination toward empire-building in the hopes of gaining advantages from mercantilism and the exploitation of human capital. Richard Rosecrance has eloquently divided the history of the nation-state into three distinct periods – the rise of the territorial state, followed by the rise of the trading state, and culminating with the rise of the virtual state.¹ These three distinctions demonstrate how the major concerns for nation-states have transformed over time and have evolved from the traditional orientation toward territorial domination.

The most technologically progressive or “virtual” states in the current international system have eschewed the acquisition of material resources in favor of high-level industries that center on research and development. Moreover, one of the more interesting aspects of Rosecrance’s analysis is that states that fail to transition to the next stage remained mired in the past and may suffer enormous consequences as a result, particularly in economic matters. The EU is somewhat unusual with respect to Rosecrance’s framework, however, as numerous states coexist within a defined supranational structure in various stages of economic development. They have also

¹ Richard N. Rosecrance, *The Rise of the Virtual State: Wealth and Power in the Coming Century* (New York: Basic Books, 1999).

become increasingly interdependent as a result of the common market. In fact, Moravcsik argues that economic interdependence has been the primary force driving European integration.²

European states waged brutal wars for centuries, resulting in the deaths of millions, making the development of the EU that we know today all the more remarkable. After the devastation of World War II, marked by over fifty million deaths worldwide, the states of Western Europe gradually began the integration process that has evolved over time to the current union. Many observers claim that security concerns were the primary motivation for continued EU development. However, this assertion should be questioned in light of the fact that different regional arrangements emerged in Europe following World War II and most had economic concerns as their primary rationale. Not all European states were involved in peace-building efforts from the onset and some even developed a rival arrangement in the form of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). Moreover, it is doubtful the states that acceded to the EU subsequently were driven primarily by security concerns, as the United States provided a security umbrella for the continent.³ European political leaders were wary of the decline of European states as major powers, however, especially in light of the rise of the two superpowers of the United States and the Soviet Union.⁴

The EU has eschewed integration by force for integration by attraction, which is often why the institution is listed as one of the top, if not the preeminent entity in the

² Andrew Moravcsik, *The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998).

³ Geir Lundestad, *The United States and Western Europe since 1945: From "Empire" by Invitation to Transatlantic Drift* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003).

⁴ Mattli, *The Logic of Regional Integration: Europe and Beyond*, 70.

current international system with regard to the exercise of soft power.⁵ Power through attraction, not coercion, has led to an organization of 27 member states, with many more countries desiring to be a part of the club.⁶ Developing a common “European” identity has been one of the principal objectives of this great experiment in integration, resulting in a post-modern concept of the nation-state, where the various nation-states of the EU have transformed into member-states. It is important to note that states wishing to join the union “invite” themselves when they feel that the performance gap between them and the EU is substantial enough to pursue membership. Acceding to the EU is a way to counter the negative effects from not participating in the arrangement. In fact, the majority of states seeking membership submitted applications after several years of growth rates substantially below the average growth rates of EU countries.⁷ The negative asymmetric externalities that these countries experienced as outsiders no doubt contributed to their weaker economic situations.

Furthermore, the EU has socialized state behavior through the integration process, such that the disparate nation-states have transformed into functionally similar member states in an attempt to achieve greater economic prosperity and to overcome problems like the security dilemma that resulted in numerous conflicts on European soil. This socialization has also occurred before states have actually acceded into the EU: “Even before seeking formal membership Europe’s neutral countries went a long way down the road of unilateral adaptation to EC law and policies to avoid being effectively left out.

⁵ See for example, Joseph S. Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (New York: Public Affairs, 2004). See also *The Foreign Policy of the European Union: Assessing Europe's Role in the World*, ed. Federiga M. Bindi (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2010).

⁶ As of January 1, 2011.

⁷ Mattli, *The Logic of Regional Integration: Europe and Beyond*, 66.

Their national sovereignty remained intact *de jure*, but *de facto* it had lost much of its value.”⁸

The EU has continually evolved through enacting a number of substantive legislative measures that have fundamentally changed the purview of the nation-state, as the constituent members cede part of their sovereignty to the overarching supranational structure. The Montevideo Convention of 1933 stipulates that there are four main criteria for statehood: a permanent population, a defined territory, a government, and the capacity to enter into relations with other states. As stated earlier, one of the primary challenges that arise with integration processes is the blurring of some of these traditional characteristics, such that in the modern EU system it becomes increasingly difficult to speak about the individual member states as having a distinct population or territory.

Moreover, the architects of this European integration experiment have largely proceeded with integration measures in the hope of eroding these lines even further. In other words, the European Commission and other organizations involved in EU integration have stated explicitly that they are working toward the goal of a common EU citizenship, which is a complete contradiction to the Westphalian model. The EU has worked diligently to adjust to changing conditions, as Walby explains, “The development of these powers of the EU stands as a corrective to arguments that globalization necessarily weakens the capacity of states to act; that states are the passive victims of the development of global markets. The renewal of the European Union project since the early 1980s has been an aggressive response to perceived globalization. Arguments that

⁸ Ibid., 88. See also Philippe G. Nell, "EFTA in the 1990s: The Search for a New Identity," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 28, no. 4 (1990): 352.

states are the passive victims of globalization are contradicted by the proactive response of the EU.”⁹

The Treaty on European Union, informally known as the Maastricht Treaty, entered into force in 1993 and codified a multitude of unique attributes that were pioneering at the time, and remain so to this day. One of the groundbreaking elements of Maastricht was the development of the so-called “Four Freedoms” that were designed to ensure the free movement of goods, persons, services, and capital as essential components of the common market. Nationals of one EU member state should be able to enjoy the same freedoms in other member states.

Any person who is a national of a Member State of the European Union is a European citizen. EU citizenship complements national citizenship but does not replace it. An integral part of the Treaty establishing the European Community since 1992, citizenship of the Union confers a series of rights including freedom of movement and residence within the territory of the EU, the right to vote and to stand as a candidate in municipal and European elections, and diplomatic and consular protection.¹⁰

Under the provisions of EU law, for example, a citizen of France is able to move freely to Germany and gain employment and residency. This is a level of “open borders” that has been extraordinarily difficult to replicate in other regional integration arrangements, even if member states desire to adopt free movement of people provisions. In the context of the EU, it is important to note that when a country accedes the status of its citizens transforms to reflect their newfound membership in the union. Thus, as Favell explains, “East European migrants are in fact regional ‘free movers’ *not* immigrants and, with the borders open, they are more likely to engage in temporary circular and transnational

⁹ Sylvia Walby, “The New Regulatory State: The Social Powers of the European Union,” *The British Journal of Sociology* 50, no. 1 (1999): 119.

¹⁰ European Commission, “Citizenship of the Union.”

mobility, governed by the ebb and flow of economic demand, than by long-term permanent immigration and asylum seeking.”¹¹ The OECD has found that when economic conditions and employment opportunities in destination countries decline to a greater extent than in origin countries, return migration facilitated through EU free movement provisions increases as migrants seek to take advantage of better conditions back home.¹² The openness of the EU is a source of heated debate and the adoption of any new EU-wide migration policy is no simple task. Moreover, greater integration measures also meant that EU states had to eventually disregard previous immigration arrangements with former colonies as they became more internalized.¹³

The EU has made considerable progress toward standardizing professional and other types of qualifications in an effort to reduce bureaucratic inefficiency and encourage the free movement of persons. In fact, the European Commission makes no qualms about promoting migration within the EU and there has been significant progress since Maastricht. According to the Commission:

Free movement of persons is one of the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by Community law and includes the right to live and work in another Member State. Initially, this freedom was essentially directed towards economically active persons and their families. Today the right of free movement within the Community also concerns other categories such as students, pensioners and EU citizens in general. It is perhaps the most important right under Community law for individuals, and an essential element of European citizenship (COM/2002/0694 final).¹⁴

¹¹ Favell, "The New Face of East-West Migration in Europe", *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*: 703. See also Mehmet Ugur, "Freedom of Movement vs. Exclusion: A Reinterpretation of the 'Insider'-'Outsider' Divide in the European Union," *International Migration Review* 29, no. 4 (1995). See also Thomas Straubhaar and Klaus F. Zimmermann, "Towards a European Migration Policy," *Population Research and Policy Review* 12, no. 3 (1993).

¹² International Organization for Migration, *World Migration Report 2010 - The Future of Migration: Building Capacities for Change*, 198.

¹³ Casey, "Open Borders: Absurd Chimera or Inevitable Future Policy?," *International Migration*: 23.

¹⁴ European Commission, "Free Movement of Workers: Achieving the Full Benefits and Potential (COM/2002/0694 final)."

A worker does not need to possess a residence permit as a requirement to seek employment elsewhere, which is a vital component in enabling internal EU migration. Some domestic constituencies in the old EU member states have been frustrated with the European Commission's promotion of free movement because they fear an influx of low-wage labourers and increased competition for jobs.

EU ENLARGEMENT

Before legislation concerning the free movement of persons was set to take effect, there was widespread fear in many Western European countries that they would experience massive migration inflows from their less developed neighbors. The enlargements during the first decade of the twenty-first century would be the most significant demographic change in Europe since the end of World War II. These fears reappeared in 2004 when the EU expanded from 15 to 25 member states, particularly as many of the ten new member states were significantly weaker economically.¹⁵ The addition of Bulgaria and Romania in 2007 did not help matters. Although these accessions occurred three years apart, the European Commission considered them to be part of the same enlargement, the fifth in the history of the EU. These enlargements of 2004 and 2007 added over 100 million new citizens to the EU, which helped push the total population of the EU to over 500 million today. Labor and capital tend to flow in opposite directions, which was a major concern of many European countries. Moreover, as Favell suggests, people in Western Europe (the "old" EU states) tend to be "far less keen on the movement of people westwards than they are on the gold rush of Western

¹⁵ "The Coming Hordes", *The Economist*.

capital moving East.”¹⁶ With respect to the addition of so many new member states, there were questions on both sides of the continent. Would states in the West gain people, but lose money? Would those in the East lose people, but see a major influx of capital?

It therefore came as a real surprise when these fears of the “coming hordes” proved to be largely unfounded. Although many people did indeed take advantage of their newfound freedom of movement, the anticipated mass migration within the EU zone failed to come to fruition. The capital flows moving eastwards were far greater than the migration flows moving westwards. Actual migration flows as a result of the free movement of people provisions were far below the level that government officials had envisioned, or even encouraged as a mechanism for promoting deeper and wider integration. Prior to enlargement, some observers estimated between three and four million people would to migrate from east to west, but this would only increase the population of EU-15 countries by a mere one to two percent.¹⁷ It seems that these voices were successful in helping to temper fears among some policymakers that enlargement would precipitate mass migration westwards. Migration into the EU from external countries is actually far greater than migration within the EU, as less than two percent of EU working age citizens live in another EU member state, with most of these migrants originating from the “old” EU-15. While intrastate mobility remains high in the EU,

¹⁶ Favell, "The New Face of East-West Migration in Europe", *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*: 702.

¹⁷ Straubhaar, "East-West Migration: Will it be a Problem?", *Intereconomics*.

migration flows between member states are low. At present, only about 0.1 percent of EU-15 citizens move to another state annually.¹⁸

Fears concerning mass migration as a result of wider or deeper integration efforts by member states for the most part fail to come to fruition, as people do not migrate to the extent that destination nations anticipate even in the face of significant push and pull factors. Each set of factors provide limited explanatory power in and of themselves. Migrants make their decisions to stay or leave as a result of a combination of push and pull factors at the macro and micro levels, which involves a “complex interaction between external forces (whether at the national or international level) and individual preferences (whether at the personal or family level).”¹⁹ Some regional integration arrangements have adopted free movement of people provisions, but these policies alone will not be the overarching rationale in the decision to migrate. Moreover, these provisions demonstrate that the decision to migrate is more complicated than simply for economic gain. Scholars have recognized that intentions to migrate often go unrealized. Several scholars in Germany and Austria used survey data of migration intentions and predicted post-enlargement migration flows that were much larger than what actually occurred.²⁰ This theme of non-action on intentions is found in other areas such as the realization of fertility intentions.

¹⁸ Zaiceva and Zimmermann, "Scale, Diversity, and Determinants of Labour Migration in Europe", *Oxford Review of Economic Policy*.

¹⁹ Solimano, *International Migration in the Age of Crisis and Globalization: Historical and Recent Experiences*, 23.

²⁰ See for example, Agata Górny and Paolo Ruspini, *Migration in the New Europe: East-West Revisited* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004). See also Thomas Bauer and Klaus F. Zimmermann, *Assessment of Possible Migration Pressure and Its Labour Market Impact Following EU Enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe* (Bonn: IZA, 1999). See also Elmar Hönekopp, *Migratory Movements from Countries of Central and Eastern Europe: Causes and Characteristics, Present Situation and Possible Future Trends - The Case of Germany and Austria* (Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 1991).

With respect to the connection between migration and integration, the EU was uniquely positioned to handle enlargement and transitioning nation-states into member-states. As explained by Finbow, “Formal institution-building has been accompanied by informal social institutional networks, supporting a degree of coordination and collaboration on labor and social issues not evident in any other instance of new transborder regionalism.”²¹ Accession to the EU has affected policy in new member states and convergence across the EU and an emerging European identity with a sort of “multi-level, ‘nested citizenship.’”²²

The EU maintains a number of distributional regimes designed to assist the economically disadvantaged member states including the Cohesion Fund, European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), and the European Social Fund (ESF). These redistribution mechanisms are a significant effort at advancing integration and policymakers hope these funds contribute to convergence in the region and help to strengthen the union. Member states with struggling economies in a regional arrangement like the EU have an obvious advantage as the arrangement facilitates wealth redistribution and richer states may feel more inclined to engage in such redistribution schemes on a regional basis as opposed to on a global scale. In this perspective, “donor” countries may favor this type of development instead of experiencing the frustrations that often accompany official development assistance. Unfortunately, the poorest states in the international systems would see far less of a benefit, as their neighbors tend to be other poor states and it is difficult to speak of any sort of redistribution when there is little to nothing to distribute. If we think about the vast majority of poor states in the

²¹ Finbow, "The Evolving Labor Relations Dimension of the European Regional System: A Model for North America?", 122.

²² Ibid.

international system, there is no regional paymaster available to spur integration and development.

Although we would expect wealth redistribution to contribute to curbing emigration from poorer states as their economies improve and there are more employment opportunities, the fact remains that there was never mass migration in the first place. In general, enlargement seems to have had a positive effect on creating a more complete and inclusive union. As Jan Figel, former European Commissioner for Education, Training, and Culture explained, "In many ways enlargement has made Europe more European. Before last May [of 2004], the European Union really was Western Europe."²³

EVOLVING MIGRATION IN EUROPE

European migration after World War II can be divided into five phases. The first phase covers the years from 1945 to the early 1960s and is marked by post-war adjustment and decolonization, which resulted in increased migration flows among European states. Two mass migrations occurred as people fled devastated areas in Europe and thousands of people from former colonies sought to immigrate to Europe. The post-war economic boom in Europe covers the second phase and ends around the time of the 1973 oil crisis. Labor shortages in Western Europe led to many states actively recruiting guest workers (*Gastarbeiter*) from Southern European countries as well as Turkey.

Although these programs were designed to be temporary in nature, many immigrants chose to remain in the host country indefinitely and chain migration often

²³ Bennhold, "Quietly Sprouting: A European Identity," *International Herald Tribune*.

increased immigration even further. For example, the Turkey-Germany migration corridor remains the fifth largest corridor in the world today (third largest excluding the former Soviet Union), accounting for 2.7 million migrants, despite the fact that Turkey is not an EU member state.²⁴ The massive influx of foreigners into Western Europe resulted in the majority of states adopting restrictive immigration policies, which marks the third phase of migration. However, as the massive flow of migrants from Turkey to Germany indicates, these policies have had limited success. *The Economist* explains, “When the miracle ended, Germany tried to get rid of them. It shut the door to new guest-workers in 1973, which had the unintended effect of encouraging migrants to import their families.”²⁵

The fourth phase began in the late 1980s and was characterized by East-West migration, with an increase in refugees and asylum seekers. The Balkan conflicts during the 1990s were a major push factor for migration, as thousands fled war-ravaged areas in search of safety and new opportunities. States remained largely closed to mass immigration after the conclusion of these conflicts, however, and this fifth and final phase has been termed “Fortress Europe” as the EU states overwhelmingly adopted more restrictive immigration measures.

The southern European states such as Greece and Spain that had previously been origin countries of migration gradually became destination countries as their economies improved, they became more integrated into the EU, and many northern Europeans wanted to take advantage of the warmer Mediterranean climate.²⁶ Although mass

²⁴ World Bank, *Migration and Remittances Factbook 2011*, 5.

²⁵ “Two Unamalgamated Worlds”, *The Economist*.

²⁶ Zaiceva and Zimmermann, “Scale, Diversity, and Determinants of Labour Migration in Europe”, *Oxford Review of Economic Policy*: 2.

migration was anticipated from these poorer European states in the South to richer states in the North when barriers to migration were removed, it failed to come to fruition, which is further evidence of the lack of a substantial relationship between migration and regional integration. This section has provided an overview of migration policies in the European context. A more detailed discussion of who migrated within the EU and why is addressed in the following section.

RECENT EUROPEAN MIGRATION PATTERNS

In general, migration within the EU has been incredibly low, although the majority of migrants from Western and Central European countries move to other EU countries or to North America. According to Zaiceva and Zimmermann, a number of macro and micro level factors have contributed to this situation including “the rise of dual earner households (joint mobility decisions being more difficult for such households), the rise in homeownership, the limited portability of social security entitlements, lack of recognition of foreign qualifications, the lack of innovation dynamics in the EU resulting in fewer job opportunities, the lack of jobs due to poor economic growth, the aging of the working population, and poor EU-wide information flows about job markets.”²⁷

Linguistic and cultural affinities are also key factors in determining migration decisions. However, it is important to note that these are influential factors with respect to the decision to migrate in the vast majority of both developing and developed states.

In the EU context, the Eastern enlargement further complicates evaluating internal migration trends. The EU added the ten new member states of Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia in

²⁷ Ibid., 3.

2004 and Bulgaria and Romania joined three years later in 2007. The current union now stands at 27 member states and this integration process has been a tremendous undertaking, as the EU has nearly doubled in member states in a relatively short amount of time. Although the EU has had some recent difficulties, particularly over the adoption of the Treaty of Lisbon and the financial crises in Greece and Ireland, it nonetheless remains a strong institution today. Only the most pessimistic observers predict a collapse of the EU in the coming years.

There has been a slight increase in migration for the EU-15 (pre-2004 enlargement members), while it is stagnant for the EU-12 (states that acceded in 2004 and 2007). However, one of the most surprising aspects of internal EU migration is that, of the countries that are currently receiving the most immigrants, the majority are not the traditional economic powerhouses. The states that experienced a substantial increase in the foreign percentage of the overall population from 2000 to 2006 are Cyprus, Spain, Portugal, Italy, Ireland, and the United Kingdom. Moreover, from 2005 to 2010 the southern European states had an average annual growth rate in migrant stock of over five percent.²⁸ As far as differentiating between EU and non-EU nationals, there are also some unexpected results. Ireland and Austria rank the highest for non-EU foreigners, while Luxembourg and Belgian are first for other EU nationals.²⁹

The Eastern enlargement of the EU proved to be a serious institutional test, as the new member states brought a number of significant challenges with them. There was widespread skepticism, if not outright paranoia, concerning the ability of the EU to

²⁸ International Organization for Migration, *World Migration Report 2010 - The Future of Migration: Building Capacities for Change*, 184.

²⁹ Zaiceva and Zimmermann, "Scale, Diversity, and Determinants of Labour Migration in Europe", *Oxford Review of Economic Policy*: 4.

integrate these new member states into the union. Moreover, the EU-15 states also questioned the value added in bringing these states into the EU, particularly as there appeared to be strong economic incentives to migrate to the richer states. As Zaiceva and Zimmermann explain, “These enlargements were unprecedented: income differentials between the Central and Eastern European countries (CEEC) and EU-15 were large, unemployment was high, migration from these countries was restricted, and they had undergone a transition from socialist to market economies.”³⁰ In other words, fears of the “coming hordes” were not without merit.

In fact, as a method of preventing mass migration into the EU-15, those member states devised staggered transitional arrangements built around a “2+3+2” formula. Under this schedule immigration policies needed to be reviewed two years after enlargement, and again three years after this initial review. The EU designated a period of five years after enlargement for concluding any existing transitional arrangements, although a final two years could be implemented if states were experiencing severe problems with their labor markets, where mass immigration could deteriorate the situation further. The vast majority of the EU-15 took advantage of these transitional arrangements, as the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Sweden were the only states to open their labor markets immediately after the new members acceded in 2004, although other states have done so since then.³¹ The transitional arrangement policies provide further evidence that states are exceedingly cautious with respect to migration concerns and are timid in adopting bold, dramatic policy changes. The 2007 accession states of Romania

³⁰ Ibid., 4.

³¹ Ibid., 5.

and Bulgaria were set to join the Schengen zone in October 2011, but opposition from other EU countries makes their full accession at that time highly unlikely.³²

Migration is still a defining feature of Europe as it is home to one-third of all international migrants, who represent nearly nine percent of the total European population and account for over 40 percent of global remittance outflows.³³ Of these immigrants, about one-third of them come from other EU member states. Today, the overwhelming concern for EU states, and even those states with liberal immigration policies, is immigration from outside the union. For example, Sweden is wrestling with immigrant integration and assimilation and how to manage a growing nativist movement that has manifested itself in greater electoral gains for the far-right party.³⁴ This xenophobia from the native Swedish population is directed at immigrants from Bosnia, Iraq, Somalia, and elsewhere – not at other EU nationals. Migrants from these states may feel that they can never be full-fledged members of the host society in states like Sweden that are overwhelmingly ethnically homogenous. As Riley says, “Even in Scandinavia, where political correctness is even more strenuous than in Germany, you’re either Swedish or you aren’t.”³⁵ Regional integration does not play a significant role in Swedish immigration, as the state is far more concerned with refugees and involuntary migrants than it is with the voluntary economic migrants we would associate with intra-regional migration.

³² Suzanne Daley and Stephen Castle, "Bloc's New Conservatism Impedes Two European Nations," *New York Times*, September 4, 2011.

³³ International Organization for Migration, *World Migration Report 2010 - The Future of Migration: Building Capacities for Change*, 183, 188.

³⁴ Suzanne Daley, "Swedes Begin to Question Liberal Migration Tenets," *New York Times*, February 27, 2011.

³⁵ Riley, *Let Them In: The Case for Open Borders*, 153.

Although many of the EU-15 states did experience immigration increases as a result of opening up to the new member states, the scale of this migration was far smaller than expected. Poland was the main origin country while the United Kingdom was the main destination country. Although thousands of Poles migrated throughout Europe, the majority of them flocked to the UK. As discussed earlier, there are a multitude of factors that go into the decision to migrate. However, perhaps this decision is sometimes not as complicated as we might imagine. One Polish migrant to the UK explains, “The papers back home are talking about how so many people have come to England to work. But people also want to live a little – that’s what I am here to do.”³⁶ Migrants were obviously attracted to the greater employment opportunities and higher wages available in the UK combined with its traditionally migrant-friendly government and society compared to other EU member states. The UK also implemented a Highly Skilled Migrant Program (HSMP) in an effort to compete more effectively for global talent, although this program was eventually phased out with the adoption of a new points-based immigration system. Business interests in Great Britain have been staunch supporters of fewer restrictions for elite migrants, such as a cap on the number of high-income workers, also known as “high-flyers.”³⁷

Of the nearly 430,000 immigrants that traveled to the UK from May 2004 to June 2006, approximately 62 percent were Polish.³⁸ Many of these migrants were skilled and understood English well enough to find employment quickly. The Polish immigrants were able to integrate into the British economy with little to no disruption to the native workforce. As a British employment recruiter explains, “I must admit it; I have never

³⁶ Dominic Casciani, "So You're Polish and Want a Job..." *BBC News*, September 25, 2006.

³⁷ James Boxell, "High-Flyers to Escape Migration Cap," *Financial Times*, February 16, 2011.

³⁸ Casciani, "So You're Polish and Want a Job..."

seen a workforce like the Poles. They want to work; you can see it in their eyes. But here's the thing – they're not in competition with the British workforce – they are finding ways of fulfilling a need that just wasn't being met and that's why they are being welcomed.”³⁹ This captures one of the central arguments in favor of less restrictive immigration policies. Migrants tend to occupy untapped or under-resourced sectors of the labor market and cause little hardship for the native population. Moreover, there is substantial migration into the EU of health care workers from outside the region, particularly from Africa and Asia, and they are essential in filling shortages in sectors where there simply is inadequate supply of workers from the native population.⁴⁰

Contrary to what many euroskeptics and integration opponents might argue, the EU Commission “Employment in Europe 2008” report found that these immigrants neither depressed wages nor took jobs from the native population:

Recently arrived immigrants have made a significant contribution to overall economic growth and employment expansion (around a quarter) in the EU since 2000, with only limited impacts on domestic wages and employment. They have clearly helped to alleviate labour and skill shortages, tending to be employed in those sectors where demand has been greatest, in particular at the low-skill end of the jobs spectrum. Evidence suggests they have generally been complementary to EU-born workers rather than substitutes and have contributed to greater labour market flexibility.⁴¹

The notion that the influx of migrants after EU enlargement did not contribute to increased unemployment has been echoed in other studies, as there is no statistically

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Stephen Bach, *International Mobility of Health Professionals: Brain Drain or Brain Exchange?* (Helsinki, Finland: United Nations University, World Institute for Development Economics Research, 2006).

⁴¹ European Commission, “Employment in Europe 2008 Report,” (Luxembourg: European Commission, 2008)

significant link between the two even when there are a high number of immigrants.⁴² It is important to note the complementary nature of immigrant workers in destination countries and it is generally problematic to think of them as perfect substitutes for native workers. Other observers have noted that wages have increased and working conditions have improved in the new member states, no mass migration has occurred, and the majority of businesses that relocated from the old member states have moved to non-EU states, not the new member states.⁴³

Ratha and Shaw explain that, even in developed countries, it is difficult to assess the effect of migration on destination countries: "In industrial countries, estimating the relationship between migration and wages is difficult principally because it is hard to control for other factors affecting wages and for endogeneity – migration affects wages, but wage levels also affect migration decisions."⁴⁴ While it is apparent that some native citizens may have been affected negatively by the influx of immigrants, the recent EU enlargement has been extremely positive overall for the destination countries. Many of the EU-15 states are dealing with a serious demographic challenge of graying populations coupled with low fertility, a population implosion instead of a population explosion.⁴⁵ European demographic trends are particularly troubling for many observers as these states also tend to have some of the highest taxation rates and generous pension systems. Policymakers are increasingly aware that public coffers are in jeopardy without

⁴² Zaiceva and Zimmermann, "Scale, Diversity, and Determinants of Labour Migration in Europe", *Oxford Review of Economic Policy*: 6.

⁴³ Finbow, "The Evolving Labor Relations Dimension of the European Regional System: A Model for North America?", 117.

⁴⁴ Ratha and Shaw, *South-South Migration and Remittances*, 23.

⁴⁵ Paul Demeny, "Population Policy Dilemmas in Europe at the Dawn of the Twenty-First Century," *Population and Development Review* 29, no. 1 (2003). See also Eberstadt, "The Demographic Future", *Foreign Affairs*. See also S. Philip Morgan, "Is Low Fertility a Twenty-First-Century Demographic Crisis?," *Demography* 40, no. 4 (2003).

significant immigration, but they also realize that allowing mass immigration (at this point it would be from outside the EU) would be socially untenable.

The EU Commission report points to economic factors as the primary reasons for migration, with the law of supply and demand as the overarching principle driving migration in the European context. Moreover, it is readily apparent that when the economies of the richer countries begin to decline, migration flows slow in response. Migration is a risk activity, and the greater that risk, the lower the probability of migration. In other words, potential migrants will likely stay home if they are faced with dismal employment opportunities in potential destination countries.

In addition to this risk concept, those that have already migrated often decide to return after spending a certain amount of time abroad, most likely when economic conditions in the destination country become less favorable.⁴⁶ The UK Institute for Public Policy Research discovered that nearly half of the one million immigrants from Central and Eastern Europe that had migrated to the UK since 2004 have already returned home.⁴⁷ This is a fascinating statistic and suggests that the fear of temporary workers becoming permanent workers may be overstated. Bilateral migration flows will likely be more circular than permanent in the current European context, particularly as migrants are able to take advantage of free movement of people provisions and develop transnational communities, enhancing regional integration from below the state level. A migrant that has been abroad for a number of years will more than likely still have significant pull factors with respect to returning to the country of origin including family connections and cultural affinity. Turkish and Polish communities throughout Germany

⁴⁶ European Commission, "Free Movement of Workers is Good for Europe's Economy."

⁴⁷ Harry de Quetteville, "Polish immigrants leaving Britain: What the Poles did for us," *The Daily Telegraph*, October 23, 2008.

are a clear example of this influence from below on regional integration, although their effect in the German political arena appears less pronounced.

In recent years there have been only a few major migration destinations in Europe for both EU and non-EU nationals. Spain, Germany, and the United Kingdom received over sixty percent of all foreign immigrants into the EU.⁴⁸ These are three of the largest and most populous states in the EU; therefore it is no surprise that they should also be the top migrant destination countries. Spain is somewhat of a surprise, however, as both France and Italy maintain larger economies in terms of total GDP. Spain benefits from its historical legacy and cultural affinity with its former colonies, as it attracts migrants from Central and South America that share Spanish-language ability. France also receives a large share of migrants from outside the EU as a result of its colonial heritage and the existence of various Francophone areas outside of Europe where most people can speak and understand French in addition to their native language.

One of the lasting images that emerged during the enlargement wave was the “Polish plumber”, which came to symbolize cheap labor migrating to the EU-15 countries and taking jobs from natives. Fears of the coming hordes were also related to the concept of social dumping, as some observers at the time argued that the free movement of people would lead to downward convergence or a “race to the bottom”, depressing wages throughout the union, but there is scant evidence this has occurred.⁴⁹ In fact, the economies of destination countries seem to have benefitted from less restrictive labor mobility. Although France was not a top destination for Polish migrants, French politicians nevertheless adopted the “Polish plumber” as a catchphrase in their efforts

⁴⁸ "EU Thumbs-Up for 'Polish Plumber'," *BBC News*. November 18, 2008.

⁴⁹ See for example, Jon Kvist, "Does EU Enlargement Start a Race to the Bottom? Strategic Interaction among EU Member States in Social Policy," *Journal of European Social Policy* 14, no. 3 (2004).

against the EU constitution in 2005, sparking controversy both domestically and in other EU states. The Polish tourism board produced a clever advertising campaign featuring a young male plumber with the caption, "I'm staying in Poland – do come over" in an attempt to simultaneously encourage French visitors and counter the negative political rhetoric.⁵⁰

Migration into the European Union from non-EU states has developed into a cottage industry. Migrants have to be smart and constantly adapt to stay one step ahead of border enforcement officials. Moreover, points and methods of entry have changed to meet new circumstances. As *The Economist* remarked, "Like a river seeking the easiest path to the sea, immigration that once flowed to Spain and Italy now courses to Greece."⁵¹ This is a serious concern for every potential receiving state, as EU law dictates that the country where immigrants arrive is responsible for determining their status, which is extraordinarily difficult in many instances such as the flow of migrants fleeing political instability in North Africa.⁵² Thus, the sole responsibility for detaining, processing, or returning migrants is placed on the arrival country even if the vast majority of them plan to move on to other EU countries. At present, there is no central authority in Europe to handle immigration issues. Italy and Malta, Mediterranean states that serve as points of entry, argue other EU countries should share more of the burden.⁵³

Turkey is a key point of entry for non-EU nationals as a result of the weakly patrolled border it shares with Greece and its attractiveness as a transit point with a major

⁵⁰ "'Polish Plumber' Beckons French," *BBC News*, June 21, 2005.

⁵¹ "The Unstoppable Flow," *The Economist*, February 19, 2011.

⁵² Rachel Donadio, "Fleeing North Africa and Landing in an Italian Limbo," *New York Times*, March 31, 2011.

⁵³ Rachel Donadio, "Fears about Immigrants Deepen Divisions in Europe," *New York Times*, April 13, 2011.

international airport in Istanbul. Irregular migration is a major concern of the Greek government and the entire EU. The Greek government has requested assistance from the EU's border management agency to combat illegal immigration.⁵⁴ Moreover, Greece has announced that it will build a wall at the busiest transit point with Turkey. Christos Papoutsis, Greece's secretary of citizen protection, has argued, "Greece is not actually the El Dorado of Europe, and we must make it clear that it is not an option when entering Europe. Especially at this point in time; we just can't handle it."⁵⁵

Although efforts at combating illegal immigration are understandable in light of Greece's recent financial crisis, this wall at the Greek-Turkish border will likely have little effect in curbing immigration into the EU. A far more probable scenario is that migrants and smugglers will simply find new points of entry – "trying to stop the flow of immigrants to the European Union is much like playing a game of whack-a-mole. When one entrance is cut off, another emerges."⁵⁶ The EU has become increasingly concerned with irregular migration into the region, which led to the 2008 approval of a "return directive" designed to standardize procedures for dealing with illegal non-EU nationals across all 27 member countries.⁵⁷ The Schengen area contains 25 member states as of 2010 including three non-EU countries (Iceland, Norway, and Switzerland). The framework for free movement of persons is definitely there, it only remains to be seen if people in the region will take advantage of it. The Schengen area covers a population of

⁵⁴ Suzanne Daley and Niki Kitsantonis, "Greece Tries to Shut a Back Door to Europe," *New York Times*, February 1, 2011.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

⁵⁷ European Parliament, "Migration Policy: Return Policy as a Part of the Fight Against Illegal Immigration, Common Standards and Procedures in Member States for Returning Illegally Staying Third-Country Nationals."

over 400 million people and the potential addition of four countries will include about 30 million more.

Some observers have a tendency to look at migration as a one-way street as opposed to a circular dynamic where people are constantly coming and going, and they argue destination governments will be unable to control mass inflows once the gate is open. However, market forces will often resolve this issue independently of any governmental intervention.⁵⁸ Enforcement measures in some destination countries may actually serve to keep immigrants in once they have arrived, making circular migration exceedingly difficult.⁵⁹ In other words, once an immigrant has moved past the gatekeeper, there is little motivation to try and do so again. However, in the case of EU, the mobility of people does facilitate circular migration if migrants are so inclined to take advantage of it.

A pervasive argument related to enforcement is that the best place to enforce immigration policies is at the workplace, not at the border, but powerful push and pull factors that lead to migration also make enforcement extraordinarily difficult.⁶⁰ Studies on the efficacy of employer sanctions in Germany and Switzerland concluded they had failed. The legal systems in both states were reluctant to impose harsh penalties on employers that hired illegal immigrants.⁶¹ This is also the case in the US – “bosses point out they cannot be expected to be experts on forged documents, and in any case few

⁵⁸ See for example, Hania Zlotnik, "International Migration 1965-96: An Overview," *Population and Development Review* 24, no. 3 (1998). See also Pew Hispanic Center, *Indicators of Recent Migration Flows from Mexico* (Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, 2007).

⁵⁹ See for example, Douglas S. Massey and Fernando Riosmena, "Undocumented Migration from Latin America in an Era of Rising U.S. Enforcement," *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 630, no. 1 (2010).

⁶⁰ Robert A. Pastor, "The Future of North America," *Foreign Affairs* 87, no. 4 (2008). See also Aristide R. Zolberg, *A Nation by Design: Immigration Policy in the Fashioning of America* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006).

⁶¹ Bhagwati, "Borders Beyond Control", *Foreign Affairs*: 103.

politicians want to alarm the very businessmen who finance their election campaigns.”⁶² Empirical evidence pointing to the difficulty of enforcing employer sanctions lends support to the argument that host countries are equally complicit in encouraging illegal immigration. It is far easier to blame the migrants themselves instead of the employers that hire them illegally in the absence of effective control measures.

The ability of migrants to enter a destination country in the face of more restrictive immigration policies and greater attention to border security is not a new development. As Chew and Liu have demonstrated, not only did migrant inflows from China into the United States continue in the face of greater US government enforcement around the turn of the twentieth century, they even increased during this period.⁶³ Significant numbers of Chinese migrants came to the US despite the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act (“Yellow Peril”) that finally changed with the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act, which also put an end to national-origin quotas that had been in place since the early 1920s.⁶⁴ The US Border Control was founded in 1924 in part as a method of enforcing these immigration laws by preventing illegal entries into the country.

As stated earlier, the decision of some migrants to leave may be more related to the network theory of migration, as they are not only seeking better economic opportunities, but may also reconnect with relatives or friends that have already

⁶² "Dreaming of the Other Side of the Wire", *The Economist*. See also B. Lindsay Lowell and Zhongren Jing, "Unauthorized Workers and Immigration Reform: What Can We Ascertain from Employers?," *International Migration Review* 28, no. 3 (1994).

⁶³ Kenneth S. Y. Chew and John M. Liu, "Hidden in Plain Sight: Global Labor Force Exchange in the Chinese American Population, 1880-1940," *Population and Development Review* 30, no. 1 (2004).

⁶⁴ See for example, Roger Daniels, *Guarding the Golden Door: American Immigration Policy and Immigrants Since 1882* (New York: Hill and Wang, 2004). See also Robert F. Zeidel, *Immigrants, Progressives, and Exclusion Politics: The Dillingham Commission, 1900-1927* (DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press, 2004).

migrated.⁶⁵ However, it should be noted that the network theory of migration also works in the opposite direction. When wage differentials and living standards become more comparable, many migrants return home to benefit from the increased prosperity in the origin country, and to reconnect with friends and relatives that remained at home. Furthermore, many governments have implemented programs in conjunction with the IOM to assist migrants who wish to return to the country of origin.⁶⁶ Spain and the Czech Republic offer a subsidy to encourage migrants to return home, but only a small percentage of potential migrants have taken advantage of these programs.⁶⁷ The IOM and other institutions are instrumental in the management and regulation of international migration.

So what will likely be the end effect of migration in Europe? Once the borders have been open to the “free movement of persons” for many years, will the demographic landscape of Europe look significantly different? In general, various studies suggest that between two to four percent of the population of Central and Eastern Europe will migrate to the West, which would account for approximately one percent of the EU-15 population. This level of intra-regional migration is by no means unmanageable or somehow out of control. Europe has undoubtedly become more diverse and currently hosts a greater migrant population than ever. In 2004 about 5.3 percent of the population of Europe held foreign citizenship, which depicts a significant increase from the 3.3 percentage of 1980.⁶⁸ However, it must be noted that the majority of these foreigners are

⁶⁵ Massey and others, "Theories of International Migration: A Review and Appraisal", *Population and Development Review*: 448-450.

⁶⁶ International Organization for Migration, "Return Assistance to Migrants and Governments."

⁶⁷ Solimano, *International Migration in the Age of Crisis and Globalization: Historical and Recent Experiences*, 15.

⁶⁸ Hooghe and others, "Migration to European Countries: A Structural Explanation of Patterns, 1980–2004", *International Migration Review*: 485.

non-EU nationals and, if the history of the EU over the past few decades is any indication, migration into the union will be the focus of expanding markets in need of low-skilled labor, not intra-regional migration.⁶⁹

The concept of social stratification is applicable to this situation. In the future, it is unlikely that EU nationals will flock to low-end employment niches in other member states regardless of income levels in their countries of origin. The EU states will need extra-regional migrants to work in these sectors when they are no longer able to rely on internal migrants. Favell suggests that the richer countries are currently able to exploit a “relatively skilled, hard working, ethnically unproblematic and highly available labor source for low wages and little or no job security.”⁷⁰ However, this situation is likely short-lived. If the EU continues to promote regional development and convergence, the “exploitable” labor source in the East will soon disappear. Furthermore, extra-regional migrants may face greater hostility from the native population compared to migrants from accession countries.

The recent migration experience in Europe demonstrates that fears of the “Polish plumber” simultaneously ruining the economy of the destination country by displacing native workers and the origin country by contributing to the “brain drain”, or at least the “motivated drain”, were largely overstated. In fact, a recent EU Commission publication states that “there is still much more migration from non-EU nationals than new to old member states” as the proportion of Eastern Europeans in old EU member states rose

⁶⁹ Favell, “The New Face of East-West Migration in Europe”, *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*: 704.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 710.

from 0.2 percent of the population in 2003 to just 0.5 percent by 2008. The EU average of foreign immigration per head of population was a mere 6.2 per 1,000 in 2006.⁷¹

Host country attitudes toward migrants are another significant factor.

Eurobarometer data suggests that regions that have a higher concentration of foreigners also exhibit more anti-immigrant attitudes, as the native population tends to associate greater immigration with any perceived negative changes in their standard of living. Moreover, there is a direct correlation of natives that might be the most negatively affected by migration exhibiting the most intense anti-immigrant attitudes. The higher skilled, better-educated, and left-leaning population of the EU-15 is by far more pro-immigrant, as they do not perceive greater migration inflows as a threat to the extent that lower skilled, less-educated, and right-leaning natives will.⁷²

Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, regional integration may entail the bringing together of people from widely disparate backgrounds and this is a definite concern for the current states of the EU as they consider Turkey as a candidate for membership. Turkey has a large population that is predominantly Muslim and many traditionally-Christian EU states are enormously concerned about what might occur with respect to religion in Europe if Turkey is added to the union. Moreover, fears of Islamic radicalism are readily apparent throughout Europe. In Germany, for example, "Religiosity arouses two fears: that the devout will create 'parallel societies' incompatible with German culture and democracy and that a few of their number will become recruits to extremism and violence."⁷³

⁷¹ "EU Thumbs-Up for 'Polish Plumber'".

⁷² Zaiceva and Zimmermann, "Scale, Diversity, and Determinants of Labour Migration in Europe", *Oxford Review of Economic Policy*: 12.

⁷³ "Two Unamalgamated Worlds", *The Economist*.

There are some definite parallels between the EU-15 and the EU-12 in the European context and Canada/US and Mexico in the North American context. The recent enlargement of the EU to 27 members has arguably brought the experiences of both continents into closer alignment. As Favell explains, “The new East-West migration finally provides scholars with a European context comparable to the Mexican-US scenario that has inspired the largest and most sophisticated body of migration theory and research available in the social sciences.”⁷⁴ While there are similarities to be sure, the fact remains that North America and Europe are far different places and the relationship between international migration and regional integration reflects these vast differences and the unique attributes of each continent. Moreover, this does not mean that these different contexts should be kept in isolation. On the contrary, there are numerous lessons learned that can inform the debate in both locales.

The free movement of people in Europe in particular provides clear empirical evidence on what can occur when a regional arrangement adopts a policy that reduces migration restrictions substantially. In this perspective, the EU can be seen as a “concentric, territorial project in regional integration.”⁷⁵ The supranational quality of the EU should facilitate a consensus-based, rational, and pragmatic approach to migration in contrast to the North American states that rely on a seemingly haphazard and informal intergovernmental approach. The lack of a coordinating supranational body in the North American example puts the onus on political leaders that are hesitant to engage in serious discussions on how best to manage migration, preferring summits that often look like bread and circuses as opposed to concrete efforts at reform, and focusing on other issues

⁷⁴ Favell, “The New Face of East-West Migration in Europe”, *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*: 702.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 705.

that may seem easier to address, particularly in the face of election cycles.⁷⁶ However, as this dissertation argues, the lack of a substantial relationship between international migration and regional integration means that policy developments should have little effect on the movement of people.

⁷⁶ See for example, "The Ghost at the Conference Table," *The Economist*, April 11, 2009.

CHAPTER VI

CASE STUDY: NORTH AMERICA

MIGRATION IN NORTH AMERICA

“At times, there has been fear and resentment directed towards newcomers, especially in hard economic times. And because these issues touch deeply on what we believe, touch deeply on our convictions – about who we are as a people, about what it means to be an American – these debates often elicit strong emotions.”¹ President Barack Obama said these words in a speech in El Paso designed to galvanize support for comprehensive immigration reform and he appears well-aware of the contentiousness and divisiveness surrounding the issue. The immigration question has been a long-standing hot-button political issue in the United States and it has been difficult for any serious effort at reform to gain significant traction.

In earlier decades, Canada and Mexico maintained stricter border controls as they sought to insulate themselves from dominance by the United States. Mexico also leaned toward isolating its economy from the rest of North America for most of the twentieth century as it feared asymmetric influence from its larger neighbors. However, this dynamic has reversed over the past couple of decades, such that the United States has become far more insular and isolationist with respect to its neighbors. In 2002, the US spent \$1.6 billion on border patrol, a tenfold increase from 1986 levels (passage of the

¹ Barack Obama, "Remarks by the President on Comprehensive Immigration Reform in El Paso, Texas." The White House See also Laura Meckler, "Obama Recasts Border Issue," *Wall Street Journal*, May 11, 2011.

Immigration Reform and Control Act), but this massive increase in spending did not correspond to a reduction in illegal immigration.²

The tragic events of September 11, 2001 exacerbated this situation, as border security became even more of a hot-button issue, with a particular focus on how best to prevent terrorists from entering the country either legally or through clandestine methods. The ongoing drug war in Mexico has also contributed to calls for stricter border enforcement. Some observers have even suggested that in some respects Mexico could be considered a failed state as a result of its inability to maintain a monopoly on the use of force, persistent corruption, and the potential for institutional collapse.³

This chapter is designed as a case study of the relationship between international migration and regional integration in North America. However, it would be a glaring omission to not address the fact that the United States is the overwhelming destination country in the world today, as over one-fifth of all global migrants currently reside in the US. Moreover, out of 44 developed countries, the US now receives one out of every six new asylum claims (nearly 56,000 of 359,000 requests), one-third submitted by asylum seekers in China.⁴ The US is also the largest source of remittances in the world, accounting for 17 percent of all remittances outflows, although it is interesting to note that this is less than the 28 percent share it maintained in the year 2000.⁵

² Douglas S. Massey, *Backfire at the Border: Why Enforcement without Legalization Cannot Stop Illegal Immigration* (Washington, DC: Cato Institute, 2005), 5. See also Sherrie A. Kossoudji, "Playing Cat and Mouse at the U.S.-Mexican Border," *Demography* 29, no. 2 (1992).

³ See for example, George W. Grayson, *Mexico: Narco-Violence and a Failed State?* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2010). See also Adam Thomson, "Mexico Rebuffs 'Failed State' Claims," *Financial Times*, January 18, 2009.

⁴ Reuters, "U.N. Reports Major Drop In Asylum Seekers in West," *New York Times*, March 28, 2011.

⁵ International Organization for Migration, *World Migration Report 2010 - The Future of Migration: Building Capacities for Change*, 153.

The character of immigration to the US changed dramatically over the course of the twentieth century with a marked transition from predominantly European migrants to those from Latin America (and Asia) since the 1960s. The immigration restrictions in the US reduce the supply of labor contributing to unmet demand from the labor market. Family reunification is the primary consideration for legal immigration, such that of the 675,000 visas for permanent residence allowed per year, nearly 500,000 are made available to family members of American citizens (no limit on immediate family members) compared to 140,000 employment-based visas. An additional 50,000 Diversity Immigrant (DV) visas are available to people from countries with low immigration to the US.⁶

Although the US has been a major migration destination for decades, reaching a consensus on immigration has been extraordinarily difficult as a result of tremendous internal and external pressures. According to Solimano:


As events in recent years show, the United States is finding it difficult to agree on comprehensive new legislation that satisfies that various players – companies that need migrant labor to moderate wages and enhance profit margins; labor unions that see immigrants as competing for jobs and potentially displacing local workers (although other unions can be pro-immigration, perceiving that immigrants will take jobs that Americans do not want anymore, and that they are a new group of labor that can be organized and mobilized); conservative groups that are afraid of the cultural consequences of massive immigration for national identity and sovereignty; public opinion that tilts between pro and con; and policymakers and politicians who are concerned about the pressures of immigration on the costs of housing and public finances and its impact on voters. Still another important actor is, of course, the immigrant community itself – its economic interests, legal status, and social demands.⁷

⁶ "Dreaming of the Other Side of the Wire", *The Economist*.

⁷ Solimano, *International Migration in the Age of Crisis and Globalization: Historical and Recent Experiences*, 8-9.

It is well-recognized that Mexico is a nation of emigrants, not of immigrants.⁸ Almost 12 million Mexicans, nearly 11 percent of the population, have left for destination countries, making it the top emigration country in the world. This enormous diaspora has made subsequent emigration for other Mexicans much easier, particularly those wishing to move to the US, as there are extensive networks that help to inform potential emigrants about local conditions in the host country. The following graph demonstrates the scale of Mexican-US migration, which is almost triple that of the next largest migration corridor. Furthermore, the United States is the destination country for seven of the 20 countries of origin listed in the migration corridors below.

⁸ See for example, Fitzgerald, *A Nation of Emigrants: How Mexico Manages Its Migration*.



Graph 2. Top Migration Corridors (excluding Former Soviet Union), 2010
 Source: World Bank, *Migration and Remittances Factbook 2011*, 6

Mexicans abroad send substantial remittances back home, totaling \$23 billion in 2006, and these transfers are an important component to the Mexican economy, second only to oil exports as a source of external revenue. The average Mexican sends about 41 percent of his or her pay back home.⁹ Mexicans in the US have a significant education deficit and corresponding wage disparity compared to the overall native population, but their income level is still far higher than those that did not emigrate.

⁹ Riley, *Let Them In: The Case for Open Borders*, 124.

In contrast, there are about 725,000 migrants living in Mexico, which is less than one percent of the population.¹⁰ Mexico is by far the largest country of origin for migration to the United States and the Pew Hispanic Center estimates that Mexicans account for 32 percent of all immigrants.¹¹ Nearly 174,000 Mexican immigrants entered the United States legally in 2006; nearly double the number of immigrants from China. With respect to regional integration, a fundamental difference in the character of migration to the US in recent decades compared to earlier waves is the proximity of Mexico and the potential ease of migration. However, the area close to the US border is sparsely populated and the majority of Mexicans are concentrated much farther south in and around Mexico City. Thus, for millions of people, reaching the US is not exactly a short trip. Mexico City is about 1,800 miles from Los Angeles and 2,100 miles from Chicago.

Chapter II provided a description of different periods in the global economy with a specific focus on the US and also discussed how politics and economics affected migration trends. To be sure, fear, resentment, and even outright hostility toward immigrants is nothing new and there remains a vocal anti-immigrant component in the US today. As Riley comments, “The targets have changed in the past century, but the concerns have not. Today, we’re being told that when immigrants aren’t busy depressing wages; displacing workers; and overrunning our schools, hospitals, and jails, they’re compromising our national security.”¹² Although both sides of the political spectrum display anti-immigrant tendencies, the political far right has been the most forceful in arguing against immigration and championing more restrictive policies, often

¹⁰ World Bank, *Migration and Remittances Factbook 2011*.

¹¹ Julia Preston, "Mexico Data Say Migration to U.S. Has Plummeted," *New York Times*, May 15, 2009.

¹² Riley, *Let Them In: The Case for Open Borders*, 2.

accompanied by wording designed to incite fear and encouraging nativism such as “mortal danger”, “invasion”, and “state of emergency.”¹³

There is also significant migration of Central Americans through Mexico en route to the United States, which has resulted in US pressure on Mexico to strengthen its southern border.¹⁴ However, this would appear to be less of a priority compared to migration into the US over Mexico’s northern border. Furthermore, as a nation of emigrants, debates over migration are focused on what is happening in the United States, and this concern is echoed in Central America, but these governments are attempting to take a more active role in the formulation and implementation of effective migration policies.

Migration between the United States and Canada is very low, although the US accounts for over 70 percent of Canadian emigrants. In 2007 a mere 8,750 Americans moved to the Canada, while about 20,000 Canadians were granted permanent resident status that year.¹⁵ Canada is still a high immigration country as over 20 percent of its total population is foreign born. It is interesting that both Canada and the United States receive a large share of immigrants from Asia every year. China, India, Philippines, and Pakistan were the top four sending countries to Canada in 2006, which demonstrates that geographic proximity has little to do with migration in the Canadian context. Moreover, the Canadian point system is designed to be merit-based and migrants from these origin

¹³ See for example, Thomas G. Tancredo, *In Mortal Danger: The Battle for America's Border and Security* (Nashville, TN: WND Books, 2006). See also Michelle Malkin, *Invasion: How America Still Welcomes Terrorists, Criminals, and Other Foreign Menaces to Our Shores* (Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing, 2002). See also Patrick J. Buchanan, *State of Emergency: The Third World Invasion and Conquest of America* (New York: Thomas Dunne Books/St. Martin's Press, 2006).

¹⁴ Manuel Ángel Castillo, *Mexico: Caught Between the United States and Central America* (Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2006).

¹⁵ United States Office of Immigration Statistics, *Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, 2007* (Washington, DC: US Department of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Statistics, 2008).

countries are typically high-value as a result. The following table reflects legal immigration to the US and Canada in 2006.

Table 6. Top Sending Countries to the United States and Canada in 2006 (legal immigration)


Top Sending Countries to United States			Top Sending Countries to Canada		
Country	Total	Percent	Country	Total	Percent
Mexico	173,753	13.7	China/Hong Kong	35,093	13.9
China/Hong Kong	87,345	6.9	India	33,737	13.4
Philippines	74,607	5.9	Philippines	18,315	7.3
India	61,369	4.8	Pakistan	12,424	4.9
Cuba	45,614	3.6	United States	8,891	3.5
Colombia	43,151	3.4	Iran	7,596	3.0
Dominican Republic	38,069	3.0	Colombia	6,553	2.6
El Salvador	31,783	2.5	South Korea	6,202	2.5
Vietnam	30,695	2.4	Great Britain	5,932	2.4
Jamaica	24,976	2.0	Algeria	4,806	1.9
All other countries	654,902	51.7	All other countries	112,094	44.5
Total	1,266,264	100	Total	251,643	100

There are some striking similarities in the relationships between Canada/US and Mexico on the one hand, and the EU-15 and the EU-12 on the other. Wide economic disparity is a defining characteristic of both relationships, as the former enjoy far more robust economies and comprise the majority of the richest states in the world, whereas the latter are still largely considered as developing countries with weaker economies. The following graphic shows the similarities in initial differences between Canada/US

versus Mexico and EU-15 versus the CEEC1-10 at the turn of the new millennium using OECD and World Bank data compiled by Tito Boeri.¹⁶

Similarities in Initial Differences

Canada/US vs. Mexico and EU-15 vs. EU-10



Graph 3. Similarities in Initial Differences – North America and Europe

Fears of the “coming hordes” are substantiated if one looks at the nearly three-fold average in terms of PPP-GNP per capita that the more developed countries had over the lesser-developed countries in 2001. At that time, the ratios were approximately 125/40 for Canada/US (per capita income in Mexico is currently one-fourth to one-fifth that of the US) versus Mexico and 100/30 for the EU-15 versus the CEEC-10, which in a

¹⁶ Tito Boeri, “The Impact of Eastern Enlargement on Employment and Wages in the EU Member States,” in *Seminar on the Impact of Enlargement on the EU Labour Market* Brussels: March 15, 2001.

purely economic sense provides ample incentive for those in poorer countries to migrate to more economically robust areas. Moreover, it would be extraordinarily difficult if not impossible for the US to remedy illegal migration through taxation and other economic means.¹⁷

NAFTA was designed to implement a number of economic integration measures among the three countries. There were widespread fears in all three countries before the implementation of NAFTA, which in many respects are similar to the fears that were present in Europe before the major enlargement of 2004, but these fears did not come to fruition just as in the European context. As Robert Pastor explains, “Canada and Mexico feared US investors would take over their industries, and Americans feared that Canadians and Mexicans would take their jobs. None of this happened.”¹⁸


One of the most striking contrasts between the European and North American cases is the comparative level of education or years of schooling between the EU-15 and CEEC-10. In terms of educational attainment, these regions are far more similar than the US/Canada region is to Mexico. One might expect it to be much easier for CEEC-10 migrants to learn new skills in the EU-15 than it would be for their Mexican counterparts in the North American context. However, others would argue that the low-skilled employment sector in the US and elsewhere typically does not require a higher education level and that migrants from Mexico and elsewhere in Latin America are filling labor

¹⁷ Michael P. Todaro and Lydia Maruszko, "Illegal Migration and US Immigration Reform: A Conceptual Framework," *Population and Development Review* 13, no. 1 (1987).

¹⁸ Pastor, "The Future of North America", *Foreign Affairs*.

niches US citizens find undesirable or that would not exist otherwise, primarily in so-called “3D jobs” (dirty, dangerous, and difficult).¹⁹

Mexican-Born Population Entering the US in 1990 or Later (Measured on a Quarterly Basis)



Graph 4. Increase in Mexican-Born Population Entering US (Quarterly, 2005-2007)
Source: Pew Hispanic Center. *Indicators of Recent Migration Flows from Mexico* (Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, 2007), 4

There is often a clear correlation between current migration flows and economic trends. A two-year snapshot of Mexican migration into the US demonstrates that the “floodgate” concept is misleading, as quarterly migration does not exhibit a linear

¹⁹ April Linton, "Immigration and the Structure of Demand: Do Immigrants Alter the Labor Market Composition of U.S. Cities?," *International Migration Review* 36, no. 1 (2002)

trajectory, although inflows did increase throughout 2006. Even if economic concerns may play the most crucial role in Mexico-US migration, a Pew Center report cautions that, “a wide variety of factors, ranging from political conditions in sending countries to enforcement efforts by US immigration authorities, can also affect the pace of immigration.”²⁰ There is also a strong probability that Mexican migration to the US has already reached its highest level, as demographic trends show the proportion of young people and the overall population growth rate in Mexico have declined dramatically.²¹ The population growth rate in Mexico is now lower than Canada’s.

Migration decisions are not made in isolation, such that numerous theories of international migration exist simultaneously and are often mutually reinforcing. In other words, economic concerns related to the dual market system (formal and informal sectors) at the macro level interact with social concerns related to the network theory of migration at the micro level. Economic recessions in the United States result in a reduction in Mexican immigration. Migration inflows have declined following the economic downturn after 9/11, the global credit crisis, and greater emphasis on border security and preventing illegal immigrants from entering the US. It is interesting to note that illegal migration into the US peaked in 2000 and has declined since then. According to the Mexican government, emigration declined by 25 percent for the year ending August 2008 compared to the previous year, which amounted to about 226,000 fewer migrants.²² In addition to economic concerns, there may be other issues related to migrant’s overall sense of well-being including perceived comfort level in the destination country and feelings toward the host society. This exemplifies the “threshold of

²⁰ Pew Hispanic Center, *Indicators of Recent Migration Flows from Mexico*, 2.

²¹ Riley, *Let Them In: The Case for Open Borders*, 142.

²² Preston, "Mexico Data Say Migration to U.S. Has Plummeted," *New York Times*.

tolerance” notion postulated by DeJong, where migrants will decide to return home if their tolerance level for the host country declines too far.²³

Wage differentials are typically perceived as one of if not the primary pull factor for migrants that wish to come to the United States from Mexico, as a ten to one wage ratio has existed between the countries for some time, although it is closer to five to one with regard to low-skilled employment. However, it should be noted that the northern region of Mexico has experienced significant economic development in recent decades, far outpacing the southern region of the country that remains mostly impoverished. The southern Mexican states are home to a greater proportion of Amerindians that face discrimination and difficulty obtaining employment in higher-skilled areas. In this respect, the dynamic between the population native to the United States compared to that of Mexican immigrants has some similarities to the dynamic between northern Mexicans compared to southern Mexicans (and even poorer Guatemalans and other Central Americans).

Economic growth rates over the past few decades have diverged markedly with respect to the northern versus the southern region of Mexico. Although the core/periphery dynamic is typically utilized to compare nation-states on a global scale, where the income gap between more developed and less developed regions is the primary focus (world systems theory), this dynamic can also be readily apparent within a country. For example, the gap between the richer northern states and the poorer southern states of

²³ Gordon De Jong, F. and others, "International and Internal Migration Decision Making: A Value-Expectancy Based Analytical Framework of Intentions to Move from a Rural Philippine Province," *International Migration Review* 17, no. 3 (1983).

Mexico has grown significantly since the mid-1980s.²⁴ It will be exceedingly difficult for the southern region to make significant economic gains to “catch up” to the north. There are two overarching concerns with regard to the southern region of Mexico if regional integration efforts were to deepen in North America. First, as the point of entry from Central America (bordering Belize and Guatemala), it would need significant border control improvements. Second, as the most impoverished area anywhere in Canada, Mexico, or the United States, it would require much greater support from all three nations to ensure that it would not end up as a persistent burden on the overall North American economy.

If the US and Canada are serious about promoting economic growth in Mexico, they should consider a type of redistribution regime like those in the EU designed to assist the economically disadvantaged member states. Although the US has provided substantial financial assistance to Mexico in the past, such as in the 1990s during the Mexican economic crisis, this type of aid is not comparable to structural and cohesion funds. Mexico received over \$150 billion in foreign direct investment from its NAFTA partners between 1993 and 2008.

It is doubtful that Mexico will produce a never-ending supply of low-skilled labor for the US market, and that migration levels will stabilize at some point. Many observers point to the example of Puerto Rico as a comparison. As an unincorporated territory of the United States, Puerto Ricans have no barriers to travel, but emigration to the US has been almost nonexistent for many years. Barone suggests, “At some point immigration from Mexico and other parts of Latin America will likely fall, as immigration from

²⁴ Daniel Chiquiar, “Globalization, Regional Wage Differentials and the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem: Evidence from Mexico,” *Journal of International Economics* 74, no. 1 (2008).

Germany and Britain and Ireland fell in the late nineteenth century as those countries' economies grew."²⁵

It is important to note that there can be significant intra-regional differences within a nation-state, and Mexico is a prime example. Moreover, these differences may have consequences with respect to regional integration arrangements among nation-states. This dissertation largely refers to nation-states as unitary actors, which is crucial for international relations and the implementation of potential regional integration arrangements. However, this does not imply a rejection of arguments questioning the unitary nature of statehood and the importance of non-state actors. In general, a unitary perspective appears to be more appropriate for a paper concerning the role of migration in regional integration arrangements.²⁶ At the moment, these remain by and large state-level issues managed and regulated by national governments. Recent legislative efforts by several US states, most notably Arizona, are an intriguing development as these subnational elements have attempted to address the perceived immigration problem themselves, which has caught the ire of the federal government and led to legal challenges.²⁷ This notion of competing authority centers within a sovereign territory is largely the exception in the international system, however, as non-federal political systems would not allow for such a challenge to national authority.

The effect of an economic downturn on a bilateral migration relationship is apparent in recent Canadian/US trends as well. Fewer Canadians have migrated to the

²⁵ Riley, *Let Them In: The Case for Open Borders*, 143.

²⁶ See for example, Joppke, *Challenge to the Nation-State: Immigration in Western Europe and the United States*. See also Margaret E. Keck, *Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics*, ed. Kathryn Sikkink (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998).

²⁷ Julia Preston and Charlie Savage, "Justice Dept. Sues Arizona Over Its Immigration Law," *New York Times*, July 7, 2010.

United States as a result of the weakened US economy, as the pull factor to greater employment opportunities to the south has been reduced significantly. Furthermore, immigration to Canada hit a 30-year high in 2006, which may also correlate to dissatisfaction with the Bush administration at the time.²⁸

NORTH AMERICAN INTEGRATION AND MIGRATION

While the member states of the EU have integrated to an astounding degree, the three largest and most populous states of North America have proceeded far more slowly in their integration efforts largely as a result of the contractual nature of NAFTA. The North American member states have seen a tremendous increase in trade, however, since the inception of NAFTA. Trade among the three member countries doubled from \$306 billion in 1993 to \$621 billion in 2002, and Mexico experienced the largest relative increase of the three.²⁹ By 2008 intra-regional trade was almost \$950 billion.

NAFTA satisfies both supply and demand conditions for integration under the political economy framework. The member states have complementary economies that can realize economic gains, market actors are actively engaged and provide demand for integration, and the United States is the arrangement's undisputed leader.³⁰ Although the US is the undisputed leader, regional integration efforts have often struggled because of this dynamic. Instead of a comprehensive North American approach, "the main obstacle

²⁸ Tim Harper, "More Americans Heading North," *Toronto Star*, August 6, 2007.

²⁹ Laursen, "Requirements for Regional Integration: A Comparative Perspective on the EU, the Americas and East Asia", 248.

³⁰ Mattli, *The Logic of Regional Integration: Europe and Beyond*, 179.

to trilateral cooperation is that Canada and Mexico are much more interested in their relations with the United States than they are in each other.”³¹

The arrangement has enforcement mechanisms for dispute resolution that serve as a kind of commitment institution that can also help address coordination and distribution problems, but these mechanisms are less robust compared to those in the EU. The single market of the EU has enabled its member states to move closer economically than the North American states since the introduction of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994. The structure of NAFTA is completely different than the EU’s, however, as Finbow suggests that NAFTA, “blended a global hegemon with two trade-dependent states.”³² Moreover, NAFTA is unique in that two developed countries integrated with a developing country. Integration in Europe also played a role in encouraging integration in North America. Business interests in particular were wary of negative externalities in the form of potential losses from exclusion from the European market. Thus, NAFTA is in large part a counter-arrangement to the EU.

Although NAFTA may address some of the “four freedoms” of the EU including the free movement of goods and capital, it does little to address the movement of persons and services. This is particularly interesting in that illegal immigration from Mexico was the most intense negative externality faced by the United States before the introduction of NAFTA. The North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation has been nowhere near as successful as integration efforts in Europe largely as a result of the lack the institutional authority: “notably the absence of a ‘shadow of hierarchy’ with the lack of

³¹ “To Each His Own,” *The Economist*, February 26, 2011.

³² Finbow, “The Evolving Labor Relations Dimension of the European Regional System: A Model for North America?”, 101.

supranational decision-making or real enforcement powers.”³³ Over the past fifteen years, the NAALC has not strengthened and has produced few results.

Instead of working toward greater integration measures regarding migration, Canada, Mexico, and the United States have for the most part enacted increasingly stricter border controls. Immigration was a hotly debated issue during the development of NAFTA in the early 1990s and it remains so today, particularly as the agreement does little to address the movement of persons and services. However, if the EU case is employed as an example, a regional integration arrangement that included migration as a major component would enable a standardization of policy across the North American states. Moreover, this would increase transparency and would likely provide an aggregate benefit for all member states, particularly in the long-term. A group of eleven states from North and Central America formed the Regional Conference on Migration (RCM) or Puebla Process in 1996, a multilateral regional forum “devoted to sharing information and promoting dialogue on migration.”³⁴ The RCM could be a foundation for a more authoritative regional arrangement to address migration.

Mass immigration primarily from Mexico, but also from the Philippines, India, and other major sending countries, has allowed the United States to so far avoid the demographic pitfalls that other advanced industrialized countries are beginning to experience and that will likely be a significant challenge for decades to come.³⁵ As Zaiceva and Zimmermann argue in the European context, “Skills shortages combined

³³ Ibid., 120.

³⁴ Regional Conference on Migration, “Regional Conference on Migration.”

³⁵ Eberstadt, “The Demographic Future”, *Foreign Affairs*.

with demographic challenges call for more mobility, especially of the highly skilled.”³⁶ The power of the law of supply and demand cannot be underestimated with regard to migration. Furthermore, it is important to note that empirical evidence suggests that migrants demonstrate significant progress and many of them transition out of unskilled and low-skilled jobs after a certain amount of time in the destination country. In addition, the second-generation demonstrates even greater economic gains.³⁷ The employment status of migrants, just like that of natives, is by no means static. As Kofi Annan has suggested, migration should not be viewed as a zero-sum game. Migrants enable greater fluidity in labor markets, particularly those in developed countries with liberal economies.

The three North American countries would do well to work toward greater integration measures, particularly as many of the same challenges that exist in Europe are also present across the Atlantic. Although the United States is the only superpower at present, it is not immune from future challenges. Moreover, as Robert Pastor argues, “no two countries in the world have a greater impact economically, socially, and politically on the United States than its neighbors.”³⁸ It is important to note that adopting measures that would deepen regional integration efforts in North America is not the same as proposing a replica of the EU, but rather to suggest that there may be some integration measures that have proved highly effective in the European context that would also be successful in North America. Migration appears to be one of them.

³⁶ Zaiceva and Zimmermann, "Scale, Diversity, and Determinants of Labour Migration in Europe", *Oxford Review of Economic Policy*: 13.

³⁷ See for example, Joel Perlmann, *Italians Then, Mexicans Now: Immigrant Origins and Second-Generation Progress, 1890 to 2000* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2005).

³⁸ Pastor, "The Future of North America", *Foreign Affairs*.

If the European example provides any indication, one can speculate that the implementation of a framework enabling freedom of movement between Canada and the United States would not result in substantial migration between these states. In general, the utter lack of interest in migration between these states demonstrates that the vast majority of Canadians are content with remaining in Canada and the vast majority of Americans are content with remaining in the United States. However, free movement of people provisions would benefit many families and those that might have an interest in migrating in the future, producing a joint sum situation benefitting both countries that would encourage further market integration and social ties. In other words, this policy agreement would seem to benefit those that would be affected directly (e.g., a married couple where one spouse is a citizen of the United States and the other a citizen of Canada), but would remain largely irrelevant for the general populations of both countries. Greater integration measures between Canada and the United States would be advantageous for families that experience needless difficulties as they seek to navigate through the maze of bureaucratic obstacles.

Another argument for deepening integration measures relates to the most obvious problem confronting the movement of people in a North American context. There are an estimated twelve million undocumented people living in the United States, primarily from Mexico, which demonstrates that the current system is far from ideal. The overarching goals of the United States Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 have failed miserably. Migration from Mexico was a serious negative externality for the United States, but regional efforts like NAFTA and domestic efforts like the ICRA have

done little to ameliorate it.³⁹ In his statement on signing the ICRA in November 1986,

President Reagan wrote:

We have consistently supported a legalization program which is both generous to the alien and fair to the countless thousands of people throughout the world who legally to come to America. The legalization provisions in this act will go far to improve the lives of a class of individuals who now must hide in the shadows, without access to many of the benefits of a free and open society. Very soon many of these men and women will be able to step into the sunlight and, ultimately, if they choose, they may become Americans.⁴⁰

Over 20 years later the immigration question persists in the United States and the issue has become incredibly divisive, especially with regard to illegal immigration. As President Obama said in a 2011 speech, “We’ve seen a lot of blame and a lot of politics and a lot of ugly rhetoric around immigration. But we’ve seen leaders of both parties who try to work on this issue, but then their efforts fall prey to the usual Washington games. And all the while, we’ve seen the mounting consequences of decades of inaction.”⁴¹ In somewhat of a historical irony, there was actually nothing in US labor law that prohibiting businesses from hiring illegal aliens from 1965 to 1986, but immigration actually *increased* in the decades following the passage of the 1986 legislation largely as a result of family connections with the ICRA-legalized population.⁴² In fact, in 1970 there were fewer than one million Mexicans in the US, residing almost exclusively in

³⁹ Uchitelle, "NAFTA Should Have Stopped Illegal Immigration, Right?," *New York Times*.

⁴⁰ Ronald Reagan, "Statement on Signing the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986." Ronald Reagan Presidential Library

⁴¹ Obama, "Remarks by the President on Comprehensive Immigration Reform in El Paso, Texas."

⁴² Susan Gonzalez Baker, "The "Amnesty" Aftermath: Current Policy Issues Stemming from the Legalization Programs of the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act," *International Migration Review* 31, no. 1 (1997). See also Katharine M. Donato, Jorge Durand, and Douglas S. Massey, "Stemming The Tide? Assessing the Deterrent Effects of the Immigration Reform and Control Act," *Demography* 29, no. 2 (1992).

Texas and California.⁴³ This is surprising given the lack of immigration enforcement at that time.

The broad “amnesty” given to undocumented immigrants that were living in the United States at that time has perhaps set a precedent for migrants that arrived afterwards, such that the millions of undocumented migrants currently living in the US may simply be waiting for the next round of amnesty to occur. After all, the US labor market quickly absorbs illegal immigrants regardless of their status in the country. Since governments in developed countries often recognize that certain segments of their labor markets need irregular migrants, other countries like Spain have also taken to granting periodic amnesties when they lack recruitment mechanisms.⁴⁴

From a legal perspective, the fact that approximately one-third of the migrant population in the United States is irregular speaks to the notion that any method of bringing these people out of the shadows would be advantageous. Adopting an immigration policy that addresses the future labor needs of the US is extraordinary challenge, and most legislation tends to respond to current circumstances with little concern for the long-term. The Bracero Program was in place from 1942 to 1964 and facilitated the legal entry of thousands of seasonal farm workers into the US, and as Riley argues, “The program worked because it acknowledged human nature and economic reality.”⁴⁵ Instead of pretending that it could exercise total control over Mexican immigration, the US government instituted this program that responded to labor needs and took advantage of the reality of cross-border flows. The Bracero program facilitated

⁴³ Lowenstein, "The Immigration Equation," *New York Times Magazine*.

⁴⁴ Casey, "Open Borders: Absurd Chimera or Inevitable Future Policy?," *International Migration*: 24.

⁴⁵ Riley, *Let Them In: The Case for Open Borders*, 185.

circular migration by reducing the incentive to stay permanently in the US.⁴⁶ The role of irregular migration in regional arrangements is a difficult subject, as data remains sparse and unreliable.

In any case, there are obvious lessons from the European experience that policymakers in North America should investigate in order to formulate more effective, efficient, and sustainable policies as regional integration efforts continue. However, this will necessitate more creative and pragmatic thinking, which is often hard to come by in a charged political climate where reaching consensus is extraordinarily difficult. There needs to be a greater recognition by policymakers that the futures of all three countries are intimately connected, such that successes in one country can easily lead to positive outcomes in others, and the same is true for problems in one country resulting in problems in the others. Moreover, it could be argued that as the “middle country” that shares a border with two neighbors, the United States feels these ripple effects the most. Moreover, officials with the US Department of Homeland Security have acknowledged that “economic migrants are not a threat to national security” and that it would be far more efficient to concentrate limited resources on people seeking to enter the country for nefarious purposes.⁴⁷ Echoing Reagan’s 1986 standpoint, former President George W. Bush captured the necessity for immigration reform in his 2005 State of the Union

Address:

America's immigration system is also outdated – unsuited to the needs of our economy and to the values of our country. We should not be content with laws that punish hardworking people who want only to provide for their families, and deny businesses willing workers, and invite chaos at our border. It is time for an

⁴⁶ "Dreaming of the Other Side of the Wire", *The Economist*.

⁴⁷ Riley, *Let Them In: The Case for Open Borders*, 202.

immigration policy that permits temporary guest workers to fill jobs Americans will not take, that rejects amnesty, that tells us who is entering and leaving our country, and that closes the border to drug dealers and terrorists.⁴⁸

The countries of North America do share some commonalities that are quite different than their European counterparts, primarily a far greater mistrust of government and more confidence and reliance on market forces.⁴⁹ Thus, any integration measures in the North American context should reflect these values. As discussed in an earlier section, institutions can only be as effective as their constituent members allow them to be. Creating an institution that receives only lukewarm support from all three countries, and does not address their concerns in an effective manner is doomed to failure.

In the US case, further integration measures that would regulate the mobility of people more effectively are hamstrung from both sides of the political spectrum. On the one hand, the political left in the US is fearful of job losses, unfair trade instead of free trade, and general economic decline as a result of greater integration. Moreover, organizations that would be considered more liberal like the Sierra Club and Planned Parenthood have also been involved with immigration restrictions, but more out of concern for population control and environmental issues. On the other hand, the political right tends to be more concerned with cultural issues and a perceived loss of American sovereignty. Voters that lean toward the political right in the US are usually more vocal regarding immigration issues and are more likely to list immigration as a key policy issue.

⁴⁸ George W. Bush, "State of the Union Address."

⁴⁹ Pastor, "The Future of North America", *Foreign Affairs*.

However, these concerns from both sides are exaggerated, particularly if one employs the European integration experience as a benchmark. Moreover, citizens in Canada and Mexico often find it unusual that the US is more apprehensive with regard to its neighbors than vice-versa. As Pastor argues, “The idea that the United States should fear being taken over by its weaker neighbors is bizarre, but it is becoming a staple of the populist critique.”⁵⁰ Greater integration measures need not correspond to a loss of national identity or substantive state sovereignty.

After the adoption of free movement of people through the Schengen accords and other such measures, it remains exceedingly difficult to argue that Germans are no longer German; French are no longer French, and so forth. On the contrary, it is perfectly acceptable for a citizen of Germany to simultaneously think of herself as German and European. There appears to be few disadvantages to maintaining this duality of national and regional identity, as it contributes to a sense of shared problems and discourages “us versus them” rhetoric. Furthermore, it has undoubtedly made travel on the European continent far easier with the adoption of an EU-wide passport. If transnationalism and the erosion of the nation-state are becoming aspects of a new dominant global paradigm, then the states of North America would do well to embrace this new paradigm and make it work toward their advantage.

Migration and integration, while considered under the purview of the nation-state, are also influenced by various constituencies from above and below the domestic level of analysis. The United States has often been more averse to working through international organizations, especially in comparison to a country like Canada, but it nevertheless is an active member of several regional and international organizations that may play a role in

⁵⁰ Ibid.

influencing policy. For example, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), an autonomous organ of the Organization of American states (OAS) has criticized US immigration policy, particularly the treatment of detainees and some areas of immigration enforcement.⁵¹ Although this international body has no direct authority, the US certainly does not want to be seen as a human rights violator, which demonstrates that external actors can perform an important function even in the absence of enforcement powers.

Moreover, organizations have additional credibility if there is criticism of a member state, as membership means that each state in the “club” has bought in to the overarching goals, objectives, and ideals of the organization. For example, member states of the EU must abide by rulings of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), although enforcement occurs from within the state in question as it will not want to be seen as a human rights violator in breach of the norms and ideals of the union. The ECHR denounced the squalid conditions in Greek immigrant detention centers, prompting other EU countries to stop sending asylum-seekers back to Greece.⁵² In contrast, the IACHR cannot influence US immigration policy directly, but may play an important role indirectly through monitoring, assessment, and acting as a conduit for NGOs and other constituencies to express their concerns.

In sum, the relationship between international migration and regional integration in North America centers on the United States as the world’s top migration destination. Canada, for its vast territory, has a smaller population than the state of California and the

⁵¹ Kirk Semple, "Immigrant Detentions Draw International Fire," *New York Times*, March 18, 2011. See also Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, *Report on Immigration in the United States: Detention and Due Process* (Washington, DC: Organization of American States, 2010).

⁵² "The Unstoppable Flow", *The Economist*.

overwhelming majority resides near the US border. Immigration to Canada is significant, but is only about one-sixth that of the United States. Moreover, as a result of its more liberal immigration policy, immigrants come to Canada from all over the world such that regional mobility is less relevant. Mexico, on the other hand, is fundamentally a nation of emigrants and there is scant migration from Canada and the US to Mexico. In this perspective, migration among the three North American states is largely unidirectional.

As Mexico transitions from a developing country to a developed, increasingly industrialized country its citizens will have less incentive to migrate to the US. This dissertation argues there is no substantial relationship between international migration and regional integration, but other scholars have suggested that NAFTA can play a role in reducing the undocumented flow of Mexicans into the US – in the long term.⁵³

The Mexican government hoped that NAFTA would spur economic development through free trade and foreign direct investment. When Mexican President Carlos Salinas signed NAFTA, he hoped it would help his country “export goods, not people.”⁵⁴ After fifteen years, Mexican exports have increased dramatically, but emigration is still a huge issue. Moreover, the economic ties created by NAFTA were insufficient to reverse the tendency for cheap labor from Mexico to go to the US and Canada, where the jobs, better wages, and capital are located, instead of the opposite direction of capital going toward labor. As mentioned earlier, not only did NAFTA fail to reduce migration from Mexico, it actually increased substantially after its inception.

⁵³ Dolores Acevedo and Thomas J. Espenshade, "Implications of a North American Free Trade Agreement for Mexican Migration into the United States," *Population and Development Review* 18, no. 4 (1992). See also Sidney Weintraub, "North American Free Trade and the European Situation Compared," *International Migration Review* 26, no. 2 (1992).

⁵⁴ Elisabeth Malkin, "NAFTA's Promise, Unfulfilled," *New York Times*, March 24, 2009.

NAFTA has benefitted Mexico in many respects, but enduring structural problems, the lack of economic reform, and increased global competition from other manufacturing countries have resulted in weak economic growth.⁵⁵ China is the main country of origin for merchandise imported into the US and has taken a greater share of the US import market at the expense of several countries including Canada, Japan, and Germany. The emergence of China as the top exporter to the US is all the more remarkable considering it must face import tariffs that the other NAFTA's countries do not. Mexico's share, on the other hand, has grown to its highest level since NAFTA came into force, at slightly over 12 percent in 2010. Despite this increase, there may be untapped potential in NAFTA that Mexico has yet to realize. If the Mexican economy can continue to develop and engage in other "virtual" industries more concerned with creativity and innovation, increase its global competitiveness by challenging entrenched oligopolies, and improve the relationship between the government and the private sector, it will then be able to take full advantage of NAFTA.⁵⁶

NAFTA is struggling mightily and its future is in question. Although there are obvious advantages in deeper integration comparable to the EU, the circumstances of North America are radically different. *The Economist* has opined, "A North American version of the European Union was always a long shot. Having one giant dealing with two relative dwarves is unlikely to produce a deal acceptable to all parties."⁵⁷ This dynamic has helped contribute to an integration project in North America that is less robust compared to Europe. Deeper integration in North America is unlikely under NAFTA's current structure. Returning to the stages of economic integration discussed in

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ "Bringing NAFTA Back Home," *The Economist*, October 30, 2010.

⁵⁷ "To Each His Own", *The Economist*.

chapter III, North America remains at stage 2 (free trade agreement) while Europe has advanced to stage 5 (economic union). Political leaders in Mexico called for the introduction of a customs union, but this is highly unlikely in the near term. The United States, on the other hand, has chosen to pursue bilateral free trade agreements with extra-regional countries and appears to have little interest in further integration with its neighbors.

The lingering effects of the financial crisis and economic recession, most evident in higher unemployment levels, have also contributed to the American apathy toward regional integration. This is contrary to the political economy framework that argues regional integration occurs during troublesome economic periods, when political leaders may feel they have nothing to lose if the status quo is undesirable. Canada has also been less than engaged in regional integration, instead pursuing more restrictive immigration measures with Mexico and concentrating on domestic concerns. The demand for integration from Canadian firms is also much lower in recent years, as they have instead pursued closer bilateral ties with the United States and more involvement in Asian markets.⁵⁸

⁵⁸ Ibid.

CHAPTER VII

CASE STUDIES: REST OF WORLD

INTRODUCTION

The previous two chapters were developed as expansive case studies focused on the relationship between international migration and regional integration in Europe and North America. These are two of the wealthiest regions and are comprise a huge share of the global economy. In North America, the United States is by far the world's top migration destination and Canada is also host to a significant immigrant population. Across the Atlantic, Europe has engaged in the most substantial regional integration efforts and has adopted free movement of people as one of the core concepts of the EU. It was therefore necessary to include these regions as the primary case studies for this dissertation.

But what is the situation elsewhere? In order to provide a comprehensive global analysis and as a contrast to the preceding chapters, this chapter is designed to be an across-the-board look at the relationship in other areas of the world. Instead of detailed case studies, the relationship between international migration and regional integration will be discussed with respect to seven broad regions: Latin America (includes the Caribbean, Central America, and South America), sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and North Africa, Central Asia, East Asia, South Asia, and Oceania. It is important to note that this across-the-board examination is not meant to minimize the importance of these regions, rather that the North American and European contexts are most salient in the study of the relationship between migration and integration.

The seven regions discussed in this chapter are quite disparate, but together they should provide valuable additional insights into the situation globally, with a particular focus on developing regions. Less developed regions will obviously have unique challenges compared to richer areas like North America and Europe and will have different concerns related to migration and integration. As mentioned previously, a defining feature of global migration is movement from developing countries to developed countries. Thus, we can expect that the situation in many of the regions discussed in this chapter will involve significant extra-regional migration, when there is much migration at all. The poorest of the poor simply do not migrate and we can also expect to see far less international migration in the least developed regions such as sub-Saharan Africa. Moreover, we might also expect regional integration efforts to be less substantive in areas where existing arrangements have had little success in reaching their stated objectives. Each region includes three sections on regional integration, migration, and the relationship between them.

LATIN AMERICA

The regional categorization of countries to the south of the United States varies depending on the organization. For example, Mexico can either be grouped with its North American neighbors (Canada and the United States) or its Latin American neighbors (the Caribbean and Central American states). This section divides Latin America into the Caribbean, Central America, and South America. The same country may appear in more than one section, however, as many states are members of regional

arrangements that span more than one sub-region. Thus, the distinctions between these regions are meant to be flexible.

The Caribbean

Regional Integration

The connection to former colonial powers in Europe and elsewhere is a further complication to regional integration in the Caribbean, where integration efforts may be influenced by extra-regional actors with different motivations. Again, this concern is largely absent in the developed world. Moreover, developed nations that maintain ties to colonial powers tend to do so out of choice rather than coercion, such as Canada's connection to the United Kingdom. The success of the European integration experiment serves as a model of what is possible in the region, although the circumstances in Latin America are far different and attaining this level of regional integration would be an extraordinary challenge. The end of the Cold War precipitated the emergence of many regional integration arrangements and Latin America was no exception as more than half a dozen arrangements began in the early 1990s. The integration efforts underway at that time in Europe undoubtedly played a key role as well. Latin American policymakers were wary of exclusion from the European market and the increased presence that Europe would have in world politics.

Regional integration arrangements also provide opportunities for inter-regional cooperation and coordination as there are perceived benefits in greater integration. There has been an agreement between CARICOM and the Association of Caribbean States (ACS) for over a decade, for example, designed to facilitate closer ties between these

organizations. Moreover, according to Rubén Silié Valdez, former Secretary General of ACS, “For CARICOM countries, their close relations with Latin America are of great strategic interest as they share quite an affinity with many of them and there is a series of issues which, in order to be addressed, will have to be tackled in conjunction with them.”¹ CARICOM allows for the free movement of selected workers, but this is only applicable for a small proportion of people in the region. Bharrat Jagdeo, President of Guyana, has argued for greater regional integration and the free movement of people in the CARICOM area with fewer impediments in general to intra-regional travel, “I don't think we could move to a single economy without dealing with this issue.”²

The Latin American and Caribbean regions produce significant and persistent emigrant flows, primarily to the United States. In addition to individual concerns at the micro level, these regions face significant structural challenges that have led to a growing development gap between them and wealthier states in the Global North. A broad explanation is that the “average rate of economic growth in Latin America in the post-1980s period *declined* compared to the 1950-80 period and the *frequency of growth crises* and financial crises increased in several Latin American countries.”³ Thus, instead of “catching up” to developed countries, slow or stagnant economic growth coupled with financial shocks and political instability has actually widened the gap.

¹ Rubén Silié, “The Rio Summit reinforces Regional Integration.” March 15, 2007.

² “CARICOM: Free Movement of People Vital to Single Economy, Says Guyana President,” *Guyana Chronicle Online*, July 8, 2010.

³ Solimano, *International Migration in the Age of Crisis and Globalization: Historical and Recent Experiences*, 155.

Migration

In general, the majority of countries in the Latin America and the Caribbean region are net emigration nations and there is a huge flow to developed countries largely as a result of stagnant economic growth and lack of opportunity. Moreover, the emigration rate is even higher in the Caribbean at 15.5 percent compared to the rest of Latin America at 3.5 percent, and many countries have emigration rate that are over a quarter of their total population.⁴ Although past colonial ties account for some of this emigration, the overwhelming migration destination is the United States. Nearly 85 percent of migrants from the region live in the US compared to 3.8 percent in Spain and 3.1 percent in Canada.⁵ This is understandable given the US appetite for low-wage labor to fill labor market niches that natives largely avoid. The situation in Canada is similar, but on a much smaller scale. Moreover, the US maintains the largest economy in the world and it is an enormous magnet, or pull factor, for migrants from the Global South, and especially those in Latin America that have the advantage of proximity.

Although the economic situation has improved in some areas, the region remains significantly impoverished, which acts a major push factor for migrants seeking better economic opportunities. According to ECLAC, in 2006 about 37 percent of people in the region were living in poverty with 13 percent living in extreme poverty.⁶ Many of these countries do not have sufficient resources for education, resulting in a significant difference in years of schooling between migrants and the native populations of destination OECD countries. However, emigrants from the region have more years of

⁴ Ibid., 127-128.

⁵ Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, *A Profile of Immigrant Populations in the 21st Century: Data from OECD Countries* (Paris: OECD, 2008), 15.

⁶ Simone Cecchini and Andras Uthoff, "Poverty and Employment in Latin America: 1990-2005," *CEPAL Review* 94 (2008): 42.

schooling than the average among those that chose *not* to migrate. Although the native populations of the Global North may deride migrants from the Global South as poor, low-skilled, and uneducated, it is important to remember that these migrants are on average better educated, more skilled, and more educated compared to those that stay at home. In addition to the emigration of lower-skilled workers, the region is also concerned with losing their best and brightest to developed countries. For example, the Caribbean region in particular has an extraordinarily high rate of emigration among people with a tertiary education at 43 percent.⁷

In 2010, there were about 30 million people from the region living abroad, and of those, nearly 85 percent were living in OECD countries, with intra-regional migration at 13 percent.⁸ Economic differentials are strongly associated with intra-regional migration in the Caribbean, which adds further support to the main argument of the dissertation.⁹ For example, Haitian and Dominican migrants would expect to earn greater wages in the service and hospitality industry in the wealthier Caribbean islands such as St. Martin and Aruba. In fact, emigration is crucial for many of these island nations, as remittances account for 33 percent of GDP in Haiti and 23 percent in Jamaica. For the region as a whole, remittances have increased from 3 percent of GDP in 1990 to 13 percent in 2002, but these transfers have done little to reduce poverty.¹⁰ However, the argument could be made that these countries would be in even worse shape were it not for substantial remittance flows.

⁷ Solimano, *International Migration in the Age of Crisis and Globalization: Historical and Recent Experiences*, 135-136.

⁸ World Bank, *Migration and Remittances Factbook 2011*, 27.

⁹ Deike Fuchs and Thomas Straubhaar, *Economic Integration in the Caribbean: The Development Towards a Common Labour Market*, International Migration Papers 61 (Geneva: Social Protection Sector, International Migration Programme, International Labour Office, 2003).

¹⁰ Solimano, *International Migration in the Age of Crisis and Globalization: Historical and Recent Experiences*, 148-150.

The Integration-Migration Relationship

Regional integration is largely unimportant in the Caribbean because most migrants see the United States as their migration destination. However, the member states of CARICOM and other arrangements are working toward facilitating greater mobility of people in the region. There are marked differences among Caribbean states (culture, language, etc.) that have made the formation of a pan-Caribbean identity a definite challenge. The Caribbean contains a large number of weak states, many of which are far more dependent on tourism than trade or manufacturing, and it appears unlikely that further integration efforts would change this dynamic. The countries of the Caribbean do not have complimentary economies and there is no obvious undisputed regional leader, such that the political economy framework would suggest the chances for successful integration in the region are less than ideal.

Many of the key arguments presented in this dissertation are readily applicable to the Caribbean, as it is unlikely that further integration in the region will have a substantial effect on migration. Most people in the region lack the resources to take advantage of international migration. Furthermore, the vast majority of migrants will likely continue to move to the United States, which should remain the top migration destination for many years. Immigrants from Caribbean countries have formed influential diaspora communities that facilitate continued migration to the US.

Central America

Regional Integration

As stated previously, regional integration is largely a recent development in interstate relations. In 1900, there were 43 nation-states in the international system, making it difficult to think about serious efforts at integration at that time. However, there are early examples of regional cooperation. Central America was briefly a unified state called the United Provinces of Central America in the 1820s, but it soon dissolved into constituent member states as a result of civil war.

This changing notion of sovereignty and statehood has implications for regional integration arrangements, as it demonstrates how states in various regions have gone through a process of integration and disintegration throughout history. Moreover, if we think about the role of institutions, they tend to reflect current conditions. If an institution no longer serves a purpose, or is no longer effective, it is likely that its days are numbered. In some instances, states have eschewed agreements if they do not see an obvious necessity, such as the lack of a regulatory mechanism for seasonal migration between Mexico and Central America, particularly Guatemala which is the main point of entry into Mexico.¹¹

The Central American Common Market (CACM) was established in the 1960s and was one of the most significant efforts at integration in the region, proving highly successful in its first decade as intra-regional trade increased dramatically. CACM was primarily a counter-arrangement to the common market in Europe, but was also a response by political leaders that were wary of Castro's rise in Cuba and potential

¹¹ Castillo, *Mexico: Caught Between the United States and Central America*.

revolutions in their own countries.¹² The early success of CACM was unusual because the member states lacked an undisputed leader and complimentary economies. However, the United States backed the Central American integration project in large part because of its hostility toward the Castro regime and the potential spread of communism in the region.¹³ It therefore acted as an adopted regional leader and helped to address distribution and coordination problems among the CACM member states through its financial involvement. The brief “Football (Soccer) War” in 1969 between El Salvador and Honduras led to the demise of CACM, as lingering hostilities between these countries hampered further integration efforts. The arrangement was suspended for over twenty years until it was revived at the Central American Integration System (SICA) that came into force in 1993.¹⁴ By that time, intra-regional trade had declined to levels similar to that of CACM’s implementation in the early 1960s.

Migration

The enormous pull of the United States as a migration destination extends to Central America, which has had a ripple effect on Mexico as well. A substantial number of migrants have either stayed in Mexico long-term or short-term en route to the US.¹⁵ The US government has granted Temporary Protected Status (TPS) to a large proportion of migrants from Honduras, Nicaragua, and El Salvador. The “temporary” nature of the status has become much more long term. For example, Hondurans and Nicaraguans

¹² Mattli, *The Logic of Regional Integration: Europe and Beyond*, 143.

¹³ See for example, Michael D. Gambone, *Capturing the Revolution: The United States, Central America, and Nicaragua, 1961-1972* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001). See also Walter LaFeber, *Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central America* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1993).

¹⁴ See for example, Vincent Cable, "The 'Football War' and the Central American Common Market," *International Affairs* 45, no. 4 (1969). See also Rafael A. Sánchez Sánchez, *The Politics of Central American Integration* (New York: Routledge, 2009).

¹⁵ Castillo, *Mexico: Caught Between the United States and Central America*.

received this status in 1999 following Hurricane Mitch and it has been extended consistently since then (does not apply to migrants entering the US after 1999). A majority of families in Central American countries receive remittances from relatives abroad and they are now largely dependent on these transfers as a proportion of household income. Remittances account for about 20 percent of GDP in Honduras and El Salvador. Central American has the greatest disparity between emigrants and immigrants of any sub-region in Latin America and the Caribbean with a net emigration of nearly 7 million people.¹⁶ Because the vast majority of these migrants live in the US, the economic recession hurt Central America the most of any sub-region. Intra-regional migration in Central America is largely related to demand in agribusiness sector, primarily for coffee, sugar, and fruit exports.¹⁷

The Integration-Migration Relationship

The relationship between integration and migration in Central American is much the same for the Caribbean. Moreover, these states also lack complimentary economies and there is no obvious undisputed regional leader, such that the political economy framework would suggest the chances for successful integration in the region are less than ideal. It is unlikely that further integration in the region will have a substantial effect on migration as most migrants will likely continue to move to the United States, which should remain the top migration destination. Immigrants from Central American countries have formed influential diaspora communities that facilitate continued migration to the US.

¹⁶ United Nations Population Division, *Trends in Total Migrant Stock: The 2008 Revision*.

¹⁷ International Organization for Migration, *World Migration Report 2010 - The Future of Migration: Building Capacities for Change*, 161.

*South America***Regional Integration**

Regional integration in South America varies considerably with respect to the specific member countries in each arrangement. We would expect there to be major differences in international migration and regional integration perspectives between a country like Brazil with 190 million people, making it the fifth largest country in the world, and Suriname with a population of less than half a million. Furthermore, Brazil's size and dominance in South America is a crucial component to understanding regional integration in the region. Laursen argues that intra-regional trade is a major indicator of a state's interest in and commitment to regional integration, "The more you trade with your regional partners, the more you pay attention to integration in your region. The fact that Brazil exports more goods to Europe than to its South American partners is an important structural determinant of Brazil's foreign economic policy."¹⁸ Thus, MERCOSUR does not appear to be a top priority for Brazil, and it has opposed any substantial efforts at pooling or delegating sovereignty as in the EU.

The Common Market of the South, or MERSOCUR, is a well-known regional arrangement, but it has arguably been less effective than its founders had envisioned. Today, the arrangement can be described as a customs union with a common trade policy, but this customs union is largely incomplete and it has a long way to go if it is to reach the stated goal of a common market, the next stage of economic integration.¹⁹ Using the aforementioned indicator of intra-regional trade, in 2007 MERCOSUR had a trade share of 14 percent while the EU had a share of 68 percent. The member states of

¹⁸ Laursen, "Requirements for Regional Integration: A Comparative Perspective on the EU, the Americas and East Asia", 240.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 250.

MERCOSUR – Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay – have developed an arrangement utilizing the intergovernmental approach to regional integration instead of the institutional or supranational approach.

The Treaty of Asunción that established the arrangement did not call for the creation of an autonomous supranational institution, meaning that there is no real delegation of sovereignty. The intergovernmental approach has made it difficult for the MERCOSUR states to overcome collective action problems and the legal acts of the arrangement are seen as incomplete because they “have neither immediate applicability nor direct effect.”²⁰ These states have made progress toward streamlining immigration policy, as nationals of any MERCOSUR state should have access to legal residence in the other states.²¹

The overwhelming majority of regional arrangements begin with free trade agreements or some means of linking the economies of the member states. The Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (ALBA) is a unique arrangement in the Western hemisphere backed by Hugo Chávez and Fidel Castro based on “21st century socialism” instead of trade liberalization or other more common regional integration efforts.²² ALBA includes Caribbean, Central American, and South American states. Cuba and Venezuela, the two most influential states in the arrangement, have acrimonious relationships with the US and their political leaders view ALBA as an alternative to involvement with the US and the proposed Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (the FTAA, designed to include all states but Cuba). Therefore, the free trade agreements the

²⁰ Ibid., 254.

²¹ Ratha and Shaw, *South-South Migration and Remittances*, 16.

²² Shannon K. O’Neil, “The End of ALBA: Latin America’s Market-Based Integration,” in *Latin America’s Moment* New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2011.

US has with other states in the region including Peru, Colombia (pending approval), five Central American states, and the Dominican Republic act as a serious aggravation for Chávez.

Regional arrangements, like other institutions, can fall into desuetude if the member states no longer perceive a benefit in the organization. The Andean Community (CAN), previously the Andean Pact, was created in 1969 and currently has four members and five associate members, all in South America, plus two North American observer states. Citizens of the Andean Community states have visa-free access to other member states and these states have also adopted an Andean passport to facilitate greater ease of travel. CAN and MERCUSUR concluded a cooperation agreement in 2004 that led to the establishment of the Union of South American Nations (USAN or UNASUR) in 2008, designed to merge the two customs unions.

Modeled on the European Union, USAN came into force in March 2011 and seems to be the most likely path for future regional integration in South America as it includes all twelve states on the continent with a total population of some 400 million people and involves political, economic, and social integration. USAN is designed to eventually supersede CAN and MERCOSUR through the formation of a broader supranational union, which is a departure from the intergovernmental approach of the previous arrangements. However, the broad membership of USAN will likely make it difficult for states to reach consensus and achieve its objectives. MERCOSUR is troubled by structure and process-level aspects. With respect to power asymmetries, Bouzas and Soltz explain, “The ensuing rapid rise in interdependence was not strong enough to alter one basic feature of MERCOSUR, namely structurally asymmetric

interdependence produced by large differences in size.”²³ Problems related to coordination and distribution hamper the ability of MERCOSUR member states to reach their stated objectives.

The development of USAN, like other attempts at regional integration in Latin America, fits with Mattli’s framework of a counter-arrangement in response to external actors. However, the Andean Community is an exception in that it was more of a response to the failure of LAFTA than to challenges posed by extra-regional actors. The South American states perceive that they are falling behind compared to other regions, particularly Europe and North America, and have sought new avenues to boost their competitiveness in the global economy. Economic losses due to the emergence of other regional arrangements have been a source of real concern for South America for decades. In 1961, the President of Uruguay argued, “The formation of a European Common Market...constitutes a state of near-war against Latin American exports. Therefore, we must reply to one integration with another one, to one increase of acquisitive power by internal enrichment by another, to inter-European cooperation by inter-Latin American cooperation.”²⁴ The region responded with the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA), a failed attempt at integration that was eventually succeeded by the Latin American Integration Association (LAIA). Although LAFTA existed for twenty years, the member states were only actively engaged in the early years, and by 1980 only 14 percent of trade among member states was attributable to the arrangement.

²³ Roberto Bouzas and Hernán Soltz, "Institutions and Regional Integration: The Case of MERCOSUR," in *Regional Integration in Latin America and the Caribbean: The Political Economy of Open Regionalism*, ed. V. Bulmer-Thomas and Studies University of London. Institute of Latin American (London: University of London, Institute of Latin American Studies, 2001), 115.

²⁴ *The Observer* (London, July 30, 1961) cited in Mattli, *The Logic of Regional Integration: Europe and Beyond*, 16.

The EU Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) has disadvantaged agricultural exports from Latin America, one of the primary industries of the region. Colombia, Peru, Chile, and Mexico are working to establish a new trading bloc and common stock market to take advantage of their access to the Pacific Ocean and increase exports to Asia. Moreover, this new arrangement can be seen as a response by South American states that are largely unsatisfied with Brazil's leadership, as it seems more interested in its emerging global power status than advancing regional integration. These countries have intentions for a common market with free movement of capital and people in addition to goods. Business interests have created substantial demand for integration in a number of key sectors including agriculture, transportation, construction materials, and energy services.²⁵

In part as a result of the emergence of these new arrangements, Peruvian President Alan Garcia has argued that the Andean Community and other integration attempts are finished, "I guess they had their time. The Andean Community, born in 1969, was based on production distribution criteria, which are not applicable at this time and it demonstrates the ineffectiveness that has had its run for a long time. The Andean Community has not been effective."²⁶ The Andean Pact had enormous difficulties from the onset. For example, the member states could not agree on a common external tariff, a fundamental component of an effective customs union, which demonstrates a serious lack of leadership in the arrangement.²⁷

In general, Latin America has experienced difficulties in regional leadership, sustaining demand for integration, and developing commitment institutions, which has

²⁵ "The Pacific Players Go to Market," *The Economist*, April 9, 2011.

²⁶ "Colombia, Peru, Chile and Mexico Will Be Economic Bloc," *El Tiempo*, March 27, 2011.

²⁷ Mattli, *The Logic of Regional Integration: Europe and Beyond*, 64.

resulted in numerous failed attempts at regional integration. However, the region has learned from these failed integration attempts and may have greater success in the future by not repeating mistakes from earlier efforts.

Migration

South America has traditionally experienced significant immigration from outside the continent. Thousands of Germans migrated to Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay over the course of the twentieth century, but primarily before World War II. Japan boasts a substantial diaspora across a number of countries, and those living in Brazil comprise the largest community outside Japan. The financial crisis spurred tens of thousands of ethnic Japanese Brazilians, or “Nikkei Brazilians”, to migrate from Japan to Brazil and these migrants took advantage of money offered by the Japanese government to return home.²⁸ Chinese immigrants are commonplace in the small northeastern state of Suriname and are heavily involved in the economy, but concerns over a “Chinese invasion” are exaggerated.²⁹ As mentioned in chapter II, there is relatively little migration today from developed countries into South America, except for immigration into Brazil.

A profound change occurred in recent decades in South America, as the continent transitioned from a net importer of labor to a net exporter, where most countries now have larger emigrant stocks compared to immigrant stocks. Political instability in the form of coup d'états and military juntas sparked emigration in the 1960s and 1970s in the Southern Cone, but the region has made a successful transition to democracy. Although there is significant emigration to the United States, it is readily apparent that South

²⁸ Lindsay Whipp and Jonathan Wheatley, "Sun Sets on Migrants' Japanese Dreams," *Financial Times*, August 27, 2009.

²⁹ Simon Romero, "In Suriname, Tendrils of China," *International Herald Tribune*, April 12, 2011.

America is not producing the level of high-skilled workers found in other regions, as the continent accounts for just 6.5 percent of H1-B visas (temporary employment for high-skilled foreign workers, created in 1990) to the US compared to 65 percent for Asia.³⁰

As in other regions, it is important to note that there is significant migration from low- to mid-income countries, which is often perceived as a less risky endeavor compared to migrating a further distance to a high-income country. In the case of South America, there is substantial migration from the poorer countries of Bolivia, Paraguay, and Peru to the (comparatively) richer countries of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Venezuela.³¹ Other countries in the region have developed programs to aid return migrants. For example, Colombia and Ecuador have implemented “Welcome Home” programs that might include aid packages, help with social reintegration, legal and employment assistance, and health services.³²

The Integration-Migration Relationship

The South American states are working toward improving cooperation and cohesion and there is a sense that countries in the region have learned from mistakes of the past. A relatively recent effort at managing migration is the South American Conference on Migration, founded in 1999 and comprised of twelve member states, which promotes “regional integration based on the construction of the free mobility of persons and South American citizenship.”³³ Although integration efforts in South

³⁰ Solimano, *International Migration in the Age of Crisis and Globalization: Historical and Recent Experiences*, 137.

³¹ Emilio A. Parrado and Marcela Cerrutti, “Labor Migration between Developing Countries: The Case of Paraguay and Argentina,” *International Migration Review* 37, no. 1 (2003).

³² International Organization for Migration, *World Migration Report 2010 - The Future of Migration: Building Capacities for Change*, 162.

³³ Kent Paterson, “The Battle for World Public Opinion,” *Frontera NorteSur*, November 19, 2010.

America have largely proved unsuccessful, the success of USAN or other endeavors will depend on sustained political will. Moreover, Brazil's status as an emerging world power is crucial to future integration efforts and also to migration. If the Brazilian economy continues its growth trend, it may result in more immigration from neighboring states. However, Brazil seems to be more interested in becoming a global player than a major regional player.

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Regional Integration

It is apparent that regional integration arrangements in Africa typically have more efficacy with respect to travel as opposed to migration, meaning that regional-based documents and legislation is designed to ease border crossings and facilitate regional travel, but this is not the same as advancing immigration and emigration policies. For example, the East African Community (EAC) comprised of Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda, and Burundi implemented an East African passport for their citizens, but it is only valid as a travel document with the region. In addition to the EAC, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) are involved in regional integration efforts, which include movement of people initiatives in an effort to promote development through migration and integration. For example, the IGAD regional consultative process (IGAD-RCP) has the declared objective of a common regional migration policy among the member states

of Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, and Uganda.³⁴ This goal is unlikely to be realized in the near future, however, as IGAD is having serious difficulties due to the myriad challenges confronting its member states.

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) adopted a freedom of movement protocol that stipulates that refugees from member states are entitled to work, residency, and other rights. The implementation of these measures varies across the 15 member states, however, but ECOWAS has made significant strides in facilitating the mobility of people in the region.³⁵ In addition to economic migrants, several thousand refugees from Sierra Leone were assisted by the UNHCR and by the destination government of the Gambia in gaining access to these rights afforded by the ECOWAS protocol.³⁶ Refugees are involuntary migrants, however, and it is therefore problematic to include situations like the Sierra Leoneans in the Gambia in the general scope of the dissertation. However, it does represent an innovative combination of domestic, regional, and international elements.

The Southern African Development Community (SADC) is dominated by South Africa, which is the economic powerhouse of the region and hosts the vast majority of international migrants. The SADC produced a Draft Protocol on Facilitation of Movement of Persons in 2005, but the organization has yet to agree upon an implementation framework.³⁷ Many of the SADC member states are involved in other regional arrangements such as the aforementioned EAC and COMESA in addition to the

³⁴ Intergovernmental Authority on Development, *Inter-State and Intra-Regional Cooperation on Migration Management in the IGAD Region: A Workshop Report, 12th-14th May 2008* (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: Intergovernmental Authority on Development, 2008), 62.

³⁵ See for example, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, *Regional Challenges of West African Migration: African and European Perspectives* (Paris: OECD/SWAC, 2009).

³⁶ Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, *UNHCR Global Report 2009*, 19.

³⁷ International Organization for Migration, *World Migration Report 2010 - The Future of Migration: Building Capacities for Change*, 140.

Southern African Customs Union that includes Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, and Swaziland. These overlapping arrangements may result in unintended challenges by spreading already scarce resources increasingly thin.

The overwhelming majority of global cities are found in big countries, but Africa has mostly small countries and, as a result, Africa lacks the megacities that have become such enormous engines of economic growth in other regions. Moreover, it is unlikely that Africa will develop these cities in the near future, although urbanization is projected to increase from 38 percent of the population in 2006 to 68 percent by 2050.³⁸ Without megacities as a means to compete with other global regions, Page argues that “integration that permits the free movement of goods, capital, and people across national borders allowing the formation of regional cities across Africa is essential.”³⁹ Africa has the most landlocked countries of any continent and regional integration can help these countries gain access to global markets. In this perspective, “For exporters in these economies, poor infrastructure in neighboring coastal economies, incoherent regulations, inefficient customs procedures and ‘informal’ taxes in transportation corridors slow transit times and raise costs.”⁴⁰

African regional integration arrangements typically lack many of the key conditions of the political economy framework including an undisputed leader, demand for integration from firms and society, supply from political leaders, and commitment institutions. Thus, although many African states are members of several regional arrangements, these arrangements have produced little tangible progress. There is a lack

³⁸ Ibid., 127.

³⁹ John Page, “Debilitating Borders: Why Africa Cannot Compete without Regional Integration,” in *Foresight Africa: The Continent’s Greatest Challenges and Opportunities for 2011*, ed. Brookings Institution Africa Growth Initiative Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2011), 26.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

of effective mechanisms to address collective action problems. African leaders are overly ambitious in working toward EU-style regional integration at present. Instead, as Page suggests, “regional leaders need to start at the beginning with common power pools, trans-border infrastructure, improved regional institutions and working arrangements for the movement of goods.”⁴¹

In an effort to reduce duplication and to enable the continent to have a greater voice in international negotiations, the leaders of COMESA, EAC, and SADC agreed to an African Free Trade Zone in 2008. This trading zone would involve 26 countries and stretch from Egypt to South Africa. In a statement at the 2008 summit, Kgalema Motlanthe, former President of South Africa and SADC Chairman said, “The process we embark upon today marks a historic step towards fulfilling our obligations under the African Union and the Abuja Treaty framework of Continental integration, which recognizes that Regional Economic Communities are the building-blocs for the African Economic Community.”⁴² African leaders have worked toward moving past smaller regional arrangements to a more all-encompassing EU-style arrangement under the auspices of the African Union.

Migration

African countries maintain some of the most persistent push factors for migration including ongoing conflicts, political instability, poor economic prospects, food insecurity, and environmental change. A large proportion of these migrants do not cross

⁴¹ Ibid., 26-27.

⁴² Kgalema Motlanthe, "Statement by the Honourable Kgalema Motlanthe, President of South Africa and Chairperson of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) at the COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite Summit in Kampala, Uganda." Office of the Presidency

borders, however, and they are instead categorized as internally displaced persons (IDPs). Due to these enormous challenges and difficulty in migrating extra-regionally, migration in sub-Saharan Africa is dominated by intra-regional migration at 63 percent and many states are countries of origin, destination, and transit simultaneously as a result. Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria and South Africa are the top receiving countries, while top sending countries include Burkina Faso, Mali, and Nigeria.⁴³ Migration to high-income OECD countries is next at 25 percent, whereas migration to other developing countries and high-income non-OECD countries is much less substantial at 1.8 and 2.5 percent respectively.⁴⁴

The Integration-Migration Relationship

The relationship between migration and integration in Africa is noteworthy in that many countries are highly regionally integrated, but are overwhelmingly poor and lack capacity to implement integration measures that will have a meaningful effect, and migration policy is no exception. As stated earlier, people in the poorest countries do not migrate to a significant extent as a result of the multiple barriers that confront them. Moreover, the differences between countries in the region are rather small, such that there may be little incentive to migrate if people do not believe the grass will be greener on the other side.

Although a number of regional integration arrangements are committed to reducing barriers to immigration for their citizens, even going so far as adopting free movement of person provisions, they have been far less successful compared to

⁴³ United Nations Population Division, *Trends in Total Migrant Stock: The 2008 Revision*.

⁴⁴ World Bank, *Migration and Remittances Factbook 2011*, 33.

arrangements among richer states like the EU and the agreement between Australia and New Zealand which basically allows for the free flow of people. According to Reitzes, whether a migration regime was implemented with immediate effect or phased in over time, “In terms of adherence to and implementation of their own rules and regulations, sustainability, and the achievement of their intended aims and objectives, all have failed.”⁴⁵

This experience of African countries speaks to the extraordinary difficulties inherent in attempting to manage regional migration. As in other developing regions, remittances and brain drain will be salient features of African migration for decades to come. African countries have seen many of their best and brightest leave for opportunities in developed countries. Ghana, for example, has experienced extensive emigration of professionals, particularly in the health care sector, and the government has implemented policies in an effort to stem the flow and encourage return migration. In 2005, nearly half of college-educated Ghanaians lived abroad. However, these professional communities abroad tend to maintain strong ties to countries of origin and send substantial remittances back home.⁴⁶ The figures are striking in other countries as well. About 75 percent of Mozambican doctors and 81 percent of Liberian nurses are currently working abroad.⁴⁷

⁴⁵ Maxine Reitzes, *Regionalizing International Migration: Lessons for SADC* (Kingston, Ontario: Southern African Migration Project, Queens University, 2000), 9.

⁴⁶ "Ghana Gets Tough on 'Brain Drain'," *BBC News*. July 4, 2008. See also Jonathan Zimmerman, "Brain Drains and Blame Games," *International Herald Tribune*, March 14, 2008.

⁴⁷ International Organization for Migration, *World Migration Report 2010 - The Future of Migration: Building Capacities for Change*, 120.

MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

Regional Integration

The states of the Middle East and North Africa have not engaged in significant regional integration efforts. The prevalence of authoritarian regimes and enduring monarchies in the region has not provided supply for integration as political leaders have little interest in upsetting the status quo. The region also lacks an undisputed leader, although Saudi Arabia is often seen as the central player in the Arab region. In any case, no country is well-positioned to address collective action problems that arise among the member states. Demand for integration is also weak as a result of continued economic dependence on energy reserves.

The most visible regional arrangement is the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) that includes the six Persian Gulf states of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. The GCC is a free trade area, but also has elements of a customs union and a common market. These latter stages are incomplete, however, as the organization has yet to complete the customs union. Although the GCC is primarily involved in economic issues, the organization has made efforts, albeit unsuccessfully, to intervene in the political instability in neighboring Yemen.⁴⁸ In addition to the GCC, the League of Arab States (LAS), or the Arab League, is a much larger organization with 21 current members stretching from Mauritania to Oman. The Arab League is more concerned with political cooperation is therefore comparable to the Organization of American States or the Council of Europe since it does not involve elements of economic integration. Moreover, all GCC and LAS countries are also members of the Organization

⁴⁸ Abigail Fielding-Smith, "GCC Suspends Bid to Solve Yemen Crisis," *Financial Times*, May 22, 2011.

of the Islamic Conference, a religion-focused arrangement with 57 current member states on four continents.

Migration

Migration in the Middle East and North Africa is not characterized by any one dominant destination. Most migrants have left for high-income OECD countries (40 percent), although a substantial number have gone to high-income non-OECD countries (23 percent). Intra-regional migration is also significant at 32 percent and most of the top migration corridors are between states in the region.⁴⁹

Primarily as a result of economic growth and labor shortages, the GCC countries are significant destinations for extra-regional migrants, particularly from Asian states including Bangladesh, Pakistan, and the Philippines. From 2005 to 2010, it is estimated that the GCC countries will have gained 2.4 million migrants and immigrants are a majority of the population in several countries including Qatar (87 percent), the United Arab Emirates (70 percent), and Kuwait (69 percent).⁵⁰ This growth in immigration has resulted in a substantial increase in remittances transfers. Saudi Arabia is the top remittance-sending country in the region (\$26 billion in 2009) and second worldwide behind the United States.⁵¹ Moreover, the North African states of Algeria, Morocco, Sudan, and Tunisia have received substantial remittances flows in recent years, largely from neighboring Libya.⁵²

⁴⁹ World Bank, *Migration and Remittances Factbook 2011*, 29.

⁵⁰ United Nations Population Division, *Trends in Total Migrant Stock: The 2008 Revision*.

⁵¹ World Bank, *Migration and Remittances Factbook 2011*, 15.

⁵² International Organization for Migration, *World Migration Report 2010 - The Future of Migration: Building Capacities for Change*, 136.

The increased emigration from the region as a result of political instability in Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya will likely produce greater remittances flows from migrants that have managed to travel to Europe and gain employment there. These states are now destination countries and transit points for migrants from sub-Saharan Africa on their way to Europe and elsewhere. The region is also home to large numbers of involuntary migrants, mostly Iraqi and Palestinian refugees.

As in other areas with a legacy of colonialism and external interference, borders in the region are somewhat artificial and may not reflect clear differentiations between peoples. Furthermore, people in the region often identify themselves by religious preference, cultural or tribal affinity, and other such non-state centered characteristics. The Kurdish people are a prime example, as they are concentrated in an area referred to as Kurdistan, parts of which are located in Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and Iran. These transnational communities may be problematic with respect to allegiance to the nation-state.

Israel is also an important migration destination in the Middle East, hosting nearly three million immigrants in 2010, which represents 40 percent of the total population. It also has the most feminized immigration of any state in the region at 56 percent. As the world's only predominantly Jewish state with a migration policy regulated by the 1950 Law of Return, Israel attracts migrants from a wide range of origin countries including Russia, Romania, Poland, Iraq, Uzbekistan, and Ethiopia.⁵³ However, Israel's poor relations with neighboring states have been problematic with respect to intra-regional migration.

⁵³ World Bank, *Migration and Remittances Factbook 2011*, 144. See also International Organization for Migration, *World Migration Report 2010 - The Future of Migration: Building Capacities for Change*, 211.

The Integration-Migration Relationship

Although the states of the Middle East and North Africa share some commonalities, they are quite disparate with respect to demographics, economic situations, and political orientations. Political leaders in the region have maintained tight control over their populations in large part through bribery, coercion, or a combination of the two. States that use bribery have tended to be less affected by the trend of popular uprisings in the Middle East. The political instability in the region has implications for international migration and regional integration in the Middle East and North Africa. Tunisia, a state with a weak economy, has produced far more migrants in search of greater opportunity in Europe compared to Egypt, a larger country with a GDP nearly five times the size of Tunisia's.

Continued unrest in the region may therefore lead to changes in migration. Chapter II mentioned the migration out of Tunisia and Libya. In addition, Syrians are fleeing into neighboring Turkey and other states to escape government violence, but it is important to note they would not be considered voluntary economic migrants.⁵⁴ Moreover, unrest in the region also impacts integration, such as the Arab League suspending Libya's membership after Gadhafi's harsh crackdown on protesters. In the near term, it is likely that most migrants will continue to leave for high-income OECD countries, while the oil-producing states will continue to import labor from Asia.

⁵⁴ Delphine Strauss and Abigail Fielding-Smith, "Syrians Flee to Turkish Border," *Financial Times*, June 8, 2011.

CENTRAL ASIA

Regional Integration

The five Central Asian states of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan have been independent states since the collapse of the former Soviet Union in 1991. It is difficult to speak about migration and regional integration in the region since these states have been independent for just two decades. However, Roy argues that the Soviet system was actually decentralized to a large degree, which facilitated a transition to nationhood and institution-building in these countries.⁵⁵ The transition to democracy has not come easy for these states. In 2010, Freedom House categorized all five as “not free”, demonstrating authoritarian tendencies have been difficult to overcome.

Central Asia lacks key supply and demand conditions for successful regional integration. These are poor states with weak economies that are not complimentary and market forces remain largely under the purview of the state. Although Kazakhstan has a total GDP more than double that of the next country, there is no obvious undisputed leader because it is still very much a developing country and cannot play the role of regional paymaster. In other words, Kazakhstan would be unable to mediate distributional collective action problems. It would also be difficult for Uzbekistan, with a population of 28 million, to defer to Kazakhstan as a regional leader since it has a much smaller population of 16 million.

The political economy framework suggests that authoritarian political leaders whose hold on power is unthreatened would have little interest in upsetting the status quo

⁵⁵ Olivier Roy, *The New Central Asia: The Creation of Nations* (New York: New York University Press, 2000).

through the pursuit of regional integration, which has also hampered integration efforts in the Middle East and elsewhere. However, Nazarbayev has held the presidency of Kazakhstan since the country's independence in 1991, but he nevertheless proposed a Central Asian Union (CAU) in 2007. In this case, we can assume Nazarbayev believed his hold on power in Kazakhstan would not change and that he might even attain a kind of "regional leader" status. The CAU was yet another counter-arrangement modeled after and designed to compete with the EU. Moreover, the CAU was likely an effort at countering Russian dominance of the Eurasian Economic Community (EURASEC), which entered into force in 2001. Russia's population of 142 million people is more than five times that of the largest Central Asian country of Uzbekistan with 28 million and its total GDP of \$1.23 trillion is nearly 11 times that of Kazakhstan. The brief war in 2008 between Russia and Georgia, and its spillover tensions with the United States, the EU, and NATO, has also contributed to unease in the region. Although the CAU proposal was supported by a few of the potential member states, the arrangement failed to materialize, which is not surprising in light of the absence of the necessary supply and demand conditions.

After the failure of the CAU, the three neighboring states of Russia, Kazakhstan, and Belarus implemented a customs union in 2010, which is expected to become a single market in 2012. Russia devotes most of its energy with respect to regional integration to EURASEC and the customs union is under the organization's umbrella. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan also plan to join the customs union. These countries are attempting to grow

their economies that are heavily dependent on remittances at present, accounting for 35 percent of Tajikistan's GDP and 15 percent of Kyrgyzstan's.⁵⁶

The Central Asian countries are key energy suppliers and trading partners with Russia.⁵⁷ Although these states tend to favor close ties with their big neighbor to the north, they are wary of Russian dominance and may be reluctant to create an arrangement where it would be the undisputed leader and regional paymaster. The booming economies of China and India have led these Asian powers to become more competitive in Central Asia, as the region's vast energy reserves, primarily in the form of oil and natural gas, are especially attractive.⁵⁸ In many respects, the region is still seen as under the thumb of more powerful actors, by no means on equal footing.⁵⁹

Other notable efforts at regional integration in Central Asia are the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) with ten current member states spanning from Turkey to the west, Pakistan to the east, and Kazakhstan to the north, and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), which includes 11 countries of former Soviet Union countries including Russia. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) includes China, Russia, and the Central Asian states minus Turkmenistan. The Central Asian countries remain highly connected to Russia through these regional organizations.

⁵⁶ World Bank, *Migration and Remittances Factbook 2011*, 14.

⁵⁷ "An Old Sweet Song," *The Economist*, August 30, 2008.

⁵⁸ See for example, *China and India in Central Asia: A New Great Game?*, ed. Marlène Laruelle (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).

⁵⁹ See for example, *Engaging Central Asia: The European Union's New Strategy in the Heart of Eurasia*, ed. Neil Melvin (Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, 2008). See also Rein Mullerson, *Central Asia: A Chessboard and Player in the New Great Game* (London: Kegan Paul, 2007). See also "An Old Sweet Song", *The Economist*.

Migration


With the continued ties between Russia and other former Soviet states, people in the region are more likely to migrate intra-regionally (55 percent) than they are to high-income OECD countries (31 percent).⁶⁰ Russia is the primary destination country with 12.3 million immigrants.⁶¹ Citizens of the EURASEC member states of Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Russia do not need a visa for entry into other member states. Uzbekistan left the organization in 2008 in large part due to its exclusion from the customs union among Russia, Kazakhstan, and Belarus. Migration in the region has become increasingly feminized with several countries maintaining high proportions of female migrants close to 60 percent.

The following table shows the extent of migration between the countries of the former Soviet Union. The top migration corridor between Mexico and the United States, at 11.6 million, has been removed to provide a clearer picture of the other main corridors. As the graphic demonstrates, there are substantial migration flows between Russia and the other former Soviet republics. During the Soviet era, ethnic Russians were encouraged to populate other regions and many have returned since the breakup of the union. However, people living in Russia from the former republics have also returned. It is interesting to note that the number of Russian migrants in the Ukraine (3.7 million) is nearly identical to the number of Ukrainian migrants in Russia (3.6 million). Russia has also experienced huge inflows of migrants from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan as people seek to escape poverty and poor economic prospects.⁶²

⁶⁰ World Bank, *Migration and Remittances Factbook 2011*, 25.

⁶¹ International Organization for Migration, *World Migration Report 2010 - The Future of Migration: Building Capacities for Change*, 190.

⁶² "An Old Sweet Song", *The Economist*.



Graph 5. Top Migration Corridors (including Former Soviet Union), 2010
 Source: World Bank, *Migration and Remittances Factbook 2011*, 5

The Integration-Migration Relationship

The Central Asian states will likely continue to be seen as countries to exploit rather than countries with which to partner. Three of the BRIC countries – China, India, and Russia – are close by and these emerging markets will crave the vast energy reserves available in Central Asia. Moreover, Europe and the United States are also heavily involved in the region. In general, the relationship between international migration and regional integration is difficult to ascertain in Central Asia. The transition to democracy has not come easy for this region and it is hard to imagine that serious integration efforts

can proceed without greater transparency, respect for the rule of law and human rights, government accountability and other aspects associated with democratic states. Without democratization, it is unlikely that Central Asia will be able to satisfy the supply and demand conditions of the political economy framework.

EAST ASIA

Regional Integration

The most prominent integration arrangement in this region is the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, founded in 1967 with a current membership of ten countries. A November 2007 blueprint sounded similar to the four freedoms concept of the EU, but the goals fall far short of what has been accomplished in Europe. The declared goals of a single market and production base are from being realized. As in the case of NAFTA and MERCOSUR, there is no pooling or delegation of sovereignty. Improving the institutional capacity of ASEAN has proved to be an enormous challenge, primarily as a result of power asymmetries. According to Mattli, “With ASEAN, there is no obvious ‘paymaster’, no regional leader to ease the distributional problem. Absence of leadership also implies absence of a normative focal point. This, in turn, raises the cost of coordination. Whose standards, tax structure, regulations, and policies could ASEAN members agree upon if they were to deepen integration among themselves?”⁶³

At present, Indonesia may be seen as the leader of ASEAN in some circles, but it is far from a regional paymaster. The member states of ASEAN have been unable to develop effective commitment institutions and it is difficult for the organization to speak with one voice. Moreover, the lack of a central authority is evident in the ongoing border

⁶³ Mattli, *The Logic of Regional Integration: Europe and Beyond*, 170.

clashes between Cambodia and Thailand and the inability of ASEAN to mediate the situation has threatened the credibility of the organization. As a result of this ongoing security situation, Sukma has argued, “ASEAN would be hard-pressed to gain international respect if it cannot even gain respect from its own members.”⁶⁴

In addition, with respect to the demand condition for integration, many of the economies of ASEAN target similar countries for their exports, such that they find themselves in competition instead of complimenting one another. The United States, European Union, and Japan are the primary export targets, while intra-regional trade among ASEAN member states accounts for about one quarter of total trade. The member states have set a goal date of 2015 for the creation of a single market called the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), but it is doubtful this goal will be achieved. In general, market actors have not encouraged integration in Asia to the same degree they did in Europe.

ASEAN is an exception to the political economy framework since it was not developed as a counter-arrangement in response to negative externalities from other actors. However, the security threat posed by Vietnam and the accompanying threat of the spread of communism were further catalysts for integration after the arrangement had already been in existence for several years.⁶⁵ The member states also hope to realize the ASEAN Security Community (ASC) by 2020, which would be another pillar of the organization alongside the aforementioned ASEAN Economic Community and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community.

⁶⁴ Rizal Sukma, "ASEAN's Credibility at Stake," *The Jakarta Post*, April 26, 2011.

⁶⁵ Mattli, *The Logic of Regional Integration: Europe and Beyond*.

Another significant arrangement in the region is the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), but it is mostly involved with economic cooperation through trade and investment, and does not have a significant interest in migration issues.⁶⁶ In general, the organization does not wade into political waters. APEC was designed as a counter-arrangement to integration efforts in other regions, primarily in the EU and NAFTA, but is interesting to note that Canada and the United States are member states of NAFTA and APEC. These states are involved in arrangements in multiple regions, which suggests they are trying to attain the “insider” benefits of regional integration membership and do not see a conflict in joining more than one arrangement.

The organization makes decisions by consensus and cooperation is voluntary, which corresponds to a lack of pooled or delegated sovereignty and institutional authority. APEC is a broad, diverse arrangement that includes extra-regional Pacific Rim states like Australia, the United States, and Mexico. In fact, APEC member states are located on four continents surrounding the Pacific Ocean. Moreover, the ASEAN member states are also heavily involved in APEC, and Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva of Thailand has argued the organizations should be seen as complimenting, and not competing with each other.⁶⁷

Both organizations provide Asian states with greater negotiating power with respect to international trade, particularly against the EU. APEC offers greater prospects for gains from intra-regional trade compared with ASEAN and the member states of ASEAN may ultimately decide to put the brunt of their integration efforts into APEC. However, it has been difficult for the organization to define its purpose through clear

⁶⁶ See for example, *Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC): The First Decade*, ed. Werner Draguhn, Eva Manske, and Jürgen Rüländ (London: Routledge Curzon, 2002).

⁶⁷ ASEAN Secretariat, "ASEAN and APEC: Complementing, not Competing."

objectives and some observers have argued APEC has amounted to little more than annual talk-shop summits that produce few tangible results, despite the fact that the member states comprise about three billion people and account for half of world trade.⁶⁸

APEC has the problem of meeting the supply condition of an undisputed leader since China, Japan, Russia, and the United States are all involved in the organization. Furthermore, as long as the organization produces only non-binding resolutions, it will lack the teeth to implement substantial regional integration measures. It is hard to imagine that these major global players would conclude a free trade agreement for example. APEC does have the advantage of more demand for integration from business interests that champion free movement of capital, goods, and people.⁶⁹ The political economy framework casts doubts the long-term ability of APEC and ASEAN to engage in successful regional economic integration because of their inability to satisfy key supply and demand conditions, but does suggest these arrangements may serve a role with respect to political and security cooperation.⁷⁰

Besides APEC and ASEAN, another regional arrangement is ASEAN+3, which includes the ten ASEAN countries plus Japan, China, and South Korea. China seems most comfortable in ASEAN+3 since the United States is not involved. Another arrangement is the East Asia Summit, which at present includes the thirteen ASEAN+3 countries plus India, Australia, and New Zealand. Russia and the United States have been invited to join the East Asia Summit since they are key trading partners and play important roles in regional security, and their inclusion in the organization is also likely

⁶⁸ "APEC - A Pretty Empty Chatter," *The Economist*, September 12, 2007. See also Elizabeth Keenan, "Talking Shop," *Time International (South Pacific Edition)*, September 10, 2007.

⁶⁹ Mattli, *The Logic of Regional Integration: Europe and Beyond*, 172.

⁷⁰ See Mark Beeson, *Institutions of the Asia-Pacific: ASEAN, APEC, and Beyond* (New York: Routledge, 2009). See also Mattli, *The Logic of Regional Integration: Europe and Beyond*, 174.

in an effort to counter China's growing influence. It is important to note that ASEAN takes the lead role in these additional regional forums since both follow the main ASEAN Summit.

Japan has proposed an East Asian Community since it is still reliant on trade for economic growth and seeks to push closer economic ties with China and South Korea, demonstrating a newfound willingness to pursue regional integration.⁷¹ In addition, Australia has proposed an Asia-Pacific Community. There is a degree of fatigue with respect to new regional integration arrangements, however, and it appears that the majority of states in the area would rather work through existing organizations and it is unlikely that these proposals will gain significant traction. However, the overlapping regional groupings demonstrate obvious redundancies and have not kept pace with changing circumstances, particularly the rise of China and India as global powers, and these institutions must adapt if they are to remain relevant.

Migration

East Asia is characterized by migration to higher income countries, both OECD at 55 percent and non-OECD at 26 percent, while intra-regional migration (including the small Pacific island states) is much less at 15 percent. Overall, the region is marked by extremely low migration with respect to the total population, although most countries have seen an increase in migrant stock in recent years. East Asia is host to 5.4 million immigrants, a mere 0.3 percent of the population, and 1.1 percent or 21.7 million people live outside their countries of origin.⁷² Women play a key role in East Asian migration,

⁷¹ "Come Together," *The Economist*, December 12, 2009.

⁷² World Bank, *Migration and Remittances Factbook 2011*, 23.

accounting for 55 percent of all international migrants in the region. Filipino women in particular are heavily engaged in international migration.⁷³ Moreover, while the global economic recession hindered migration flows from many countries, the Philippines maintained a stable outflow despite the downturn.

It is important to keep in mind that China's enormous population of over 1.3 billion is close to 20 percent of total world population. There are around 10 million emigrants from East Asia with six million coming from China alone. China is a close second to India with respect to receiving remittances with \$51 billion in 2010.⁷⁴ Canada, the United States, Australia, and Saudi Arabia are some of the main extra-regional migration destinations.⁷⁵ Hong Kong and Macau are also significant migration destinations, primarily characterized by migration from the Chinese mainland.

Several states in the region are experiencing a similar demographic challenge to that of Western Europe, namely slow or stagnant population growth coupled with a rapidly aging population, which may lead countries like Japan and Korea to consider raising immigration levels as a means of addressing labor force and social welfare costs associated with their current demographic situations.

The Integration-Migration Relationship

The East Asian states are widely disparate and this had led to numerous challenges with respect to cooperation and coordination. The region lacks many of the

⁷³ International Organization for Migration, *World Migration Report 2010 - The Future of Migration: Building Capacities for Change*, 169. See also Bennhold, "From Afar, Moneymaker and Mother," *International Herald Tribune*.

⁷⁴ World Bank, *Migration and Remittances Factbook 2011*, 13.

⁷⁵ International Organization for Migration, *World Migration Report 2010 - The Future of Migration: Building Capacities for Change*, 170.

key supply and demand conditions under the political economy framework for successful integration to occur. There are efforts to push ASEAN toward a common market, but with the current paucity of intra-regional migration, it is doubtful that people in East Asia would take advantage of free movement provisions to a significant extent.

However, the notion of integration as a means of internalizing externalities is readily applicable in East Asia. In Malaysia, for instance, the government is considering a proposal to grant broad amnesty to some two million illegal immigrants living in the country.⁷⁶ If ASEAN or other organizations became more involved in the management of migration, it would be a method of addressing such irregular migration in member states and provide standardized procedures for facilitating legal migration. In other words, through regional integration migrants from neighboring states like Indonesia and Myanmar would be incorporated under the larger institutional superstructure comparable to citizens of one EU state living and working in another.

SOUTH ASIA

Regional Integration

The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), established in 1985, is the main regional arrangement in South Asia with eight current members: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. India is the key player with 75 percent of the region's population and 80 percent of regional GDP. Moreover, the trio of Bangladesh, Pakistan, and India account for about 95 percent of the region's population. Historical context is extraordinarily important and it is

⁷⁶ Liz Gooch, "Malaysia Considers Amnesty for Illegal Immigrants," *International Herald Tribune*, June 8, 2011.

directly applicable to the story of migration and integration in South Asia. These states were under British rule (British India) until independence in 1947 when the territory was partitioned into India, a majority Hindu state, and Pakistan, a predominantly Muslim state divided into West and East sections on either side of India. Bangladesh, formerly East Pakistan, eventually gained independence in 1971. Regional integration in this case is intriguing since these countries were under colonial rule for decades, gained independence, and are now working to reintegrate by breaking down political, economic, and social barriers.

Although India would be considered the undisputed leader in the South Asian region, its ongoing tensions with Pakistan over the Kashmir region and the 2008 terrorist attack in Mumbai are obstacles to closer relations and significant integration efforts. Although it is not a Pacific Rim country, India has sought membership in APEC in an effort to seek the gains from inclusion as it is unlikely it would reach such gains from integration with its immediate neighbors. Moreover, India has rejected Chinese membership in SAARC since it would upset India's dominance in the organization.

SAARC has tended to focus on economic cooperation and growth, while avoiding contentious political issues between member states. The SAARC member states created the South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA), which came into force in 2006, but the member states can go much further in strengthening economic cooperation.⁷⁷ Paul argues that the state capacity for South Asian countries is weak and this makes regional security extraordinarily difficult to attain.⁷⁸ The same can also be said for regional integration

⁷⁷ See for example, *Promoting Economic Cooperation in South Asia: Beyond SAFTA*, ed. Sadiq Ahmed, Saman Kelegama, and Ejaz Ghani (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage/The World Bank, 2010).

⁷⁸ *South Asia's Weak States: Understanding the Regional Insecurity Predicament*, ed. T. V. Paul (Stanford, CA: Stanford Security Studies, 2010).

efforts because weak states typically lack the capacity for successful integration.

According to a World Bank report on South Asia, “Poor connectivity, cross-border conflicts, and concerns about security, have all contributed to South Asia being the least integrated region in the world.”⁷⁹ These countries have weak market demand since the economies are not complimentary and most states in the region are poor and lack robust economies. Moreover, they also lack supply from political actors. The South Asian states, like most regional organizations, have adopted the intergovernmental approach to integration.

Migration

South Asia is unique because it has significant extra-regional migration to other *developing* regions. The most likely destination for South Asian migrants is high-income non-OECD countries (34 percent) including Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates. Over five million migrants from South Asia are currently working in Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries and they send substantial remittances to their countries of origin.⁸⁰ Intra-regional migration in South Asia accounts for 28 percent of migration, which is approximately three times more common than migration to countries in other developing regions. High-income OECD countries are still a major migration destination, however, at nearly 24 percent.

India is the top remittance receiving country in the world today with over \$55 billion in 2010, which demonstrates the importance of emigrants to the national

⁷⁹ *South Asia: Growth and Regional Integration*, ed. Sadiq Ahmed and Ejaz Ghani (Delhi: Macmillan, 2007), 4.

⁸⁰ International Organization for Migration, *World Migration Report 2010 - The Future of Migration: Building Capacities for Change*, 174.

economy.⁸¹ Several states in South Asia have negative net migration rates between 2005 and 2010 including Sri Lanka, Myanmar, and Pakistan. Moreover, the IOM and other organizations that have looked at migration in South Asia suggest that undocumented migration is commonplace in the region and migration flows may be far more substantial than official figures would indicate.

The poorest of the poor simply do not migrate and the South Asian region is home to about half of the world's impoverished people. India is a major migration country in the region with 11.3 million people living abroad and hosting nearly 5.5 million immigrants, which makes it the main destination country in Asia. These figures are relatively small though when compared to India's huge population of 1.1 billion, however, as they account for just 0.9 and 0.4 percent of the population respectively.⁸²

Borders in South Asia are arguably somewhat artificial as a result of colonial intervention and do not reflect clear divisions among peoples. The Bengali people, for example, are concentrated in the Bengal region that includes Bangladesh and the Indian state of West Bengal. This division of the Bengali people has been problematic for the governments of India and Bangladesh. Thousands of Bangladeshis cross into India every year in search of greater economic opportunities, forming one of the largest migration corridors in the world today.⁸³ Migration from India into Bangladesh is also significant. Bangladesh has the least feminized migrant stock of any country at 14 percent of all migrants. Nepal, on the other hand, is the most feminized at 68 percent.⁸⁴

⁸¹ World Bank, *Migration and Remittances Factbook 2011*, 31. See also Ratha and Shaw, *South-South Migration and Remittances*, 7.

⁸² World Bank, *Migration and Remittances Factbook 2011*, 138.

⁸³ Ramesh Trivedi, *India's Relations with Her Neighbours* (Delhi: Isha Books, 2008), 14.

⁸⁴ International Organization for Migration, *World Migration Report 2010 - The Future of Migration: Building Capacities for Change*, 247.

The Integration-Migration Relationship

South Asia is home to a huge proportion of the world's impoverished people and many states have been plagued by political and economic instability for decades. Afghanistan, for example, has faced tremendous challenges after the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001 and the state remains politically fractious today. Thus, it is difficult to speak of successful regional integration in an area where most states lack significant capacity and effective national governance is not easy to come by. The Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan is problematic for the national government as people in this area are largely outside the nation-state framework and wish to be semi-autonomous.

It would be extraordinarily difficult to include areas like FATA and the disputed Kashmir region in any significant integration arrangement. Moreover, hostility between countries persists in the region, such as the continued tensions between Pakistan and India, and these tensions must be addressed before substantive integration can truly occur. However, if the South Asian states can ameliorate these problems and work toward further integration measures, it would likely help national governments in the region to manage the movement of people, especially in cases like the Bengal region where there is substantial cross-border movement.

OCEANIA

Regional Integration

Oceania is unique in that nearly every state in the region is an island, which adds a further complication to a discussion of regional integration and international migration.

Travel among these South Pacific states involves long distances and is therefore far more costly in comparison to other regions where cross-border migration is possible. The primary regional arrangement is the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) with 16 members and includes Australia, Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Republic of Marshall Islands, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu. Most of these states have very small populations. Australia is the dominant state in the region and is home to about 22 million of the region's 33 million people. It also maintains an economy five times larger than the other states combined.

This section will concentrate on Australia and New Zealand since a discussion of regional integration and international migration with respect to the other small island states seems largely irrelevant given their populations. The Cook Islands, Nauru, Niue, Palau, and Tuvalu have populations of less than 25,000 people.⁸⁵ The PIF members have made significant progress on the Pacific Island Countries Trade Agreement (PICTA), although the agreement has not yet entered into force. It is designed to be a free trade agreement and there is potential for the region to eventually move to a common market.

With respect to regional integration outside of Oceania, Australia and New Zealand in particular are heavily involved with their Asian neighbors, although they are often seen as ancillary countries to the core member states of ASEAN. Moreover, as New World immigrant countries, many Asian countries consider them to be part of the West and outsiders in the Asian sphere. It has been difficult for Australia to bridge this

⁸⁵ United Nations Population Division, *Trends in Total Migrant Stock: The 2008 Revision*.

divide largely as a result of its close ties to the United States and preference for EU-style regional integration.⁸⁶

Migration

With a total population of 33 million, the Oceania region does not play a major role in global migration, accounting for just three percent of all international migrants. However, it is interesting to note that it has the highest proportion of migrants of any region at 17 percent and this increase in migration has contributed to population growth in recent years. Australia and New Zealand are attractive destinations for international migrants, especially from the United Kingdom, and the region has net immigration as a result.⁸⁷

Migrants account for over a fifth of the total national population in both states, although New Zealand is much smaller with a population of four million and experiences less migration than its larger neighbor. New Zealand received 82,600 immigrants in 2006, but 77,100 people emigrated, resulting in a net immigration of just 5,500.⁸⁸ Intra-regional integration is also significant in Oceania, as New Zealand receives 20 percent of all migrants from the Pacific Islands followed by Australia with 17 percent, but North America (Canada and the United States) is the top destination receiving 36 percent.⁸⁹ Furthermore, intra-regional migrants are a greater share of the population in New Zealand at 25 percent than Australia at 11 percent.⁹⁰ Both of these larger countries have

⁸⁶ "G'day Asia," *The Economist*, June 28, 2008.

⁸⁷ International Organization for Migration, *World Migration Report 2010 - The Future of Migration: Building Capacities for Change*, 219-220.

⁸⁸ Statistics New Zealand, *External Migration: December 2007 Year* (Christchurch, 2007).

⁸⁹ International Organization for Migration, *World Migration Report 2010 - The Future of Migration: Building Capacities for Change*, 227.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 221-222.

implemented temporary seasonal worker programs with the smaller Pacific Island countries in an effort to spur economic development in the countries of origin.⁹¹ Brain drain has occurred from the Pacific Islands as skilled workers are the majority of emigrants and most have migrated to OECD countries.⁹²

Australia and New Zealand concluded the Trans-Tasman Travel Arrangement, which has created an “open border” between them by enabling visa-free travel and residency. The agreement is informal and is applied through immigration procedures, not a bilateral treaty.⁹³ However, these countries are separated by more than a thousand miles of ocean, such that traversing the Tasman Sea is a far greater undertaking than a normal border crossing. Nevertheless, almost 70 percent of New Zealand emigrants move to Australia and their entry is facilitated by the arrangement.⁹⁴ In contrast to the relative ease of movement for New Zealanders, Australia has maintained a much more restrictive policy toward Papua New Guinea, which has been a point of contention for the latter as it would be a boost to that country’s development.⁹⁵ However, Papua New Guinea is now included in the Pacific Seasonal Worker Pilot Scheme (PSWPS), a signal that Australia is lowering its immigration restrictions, although the program’s implementation has been slow in large part due to the economic recession.

Australia has traditionally been more comfortable with migration from the United Kingdom, New Zealand, and other predominantly “Anglo” countries. Race has arguably

⁹¹ Hugo, "Best Practice in Temporary Labour Migration for Development: A Perspective from Asia and the Pacific", *International Migration*: 35. See also Australian Government Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations, "Pacific Seasonal Worker Pilot Scheme."

⁹² International Organization for Migration, *World Migration Report 2010 - The Future of Migration: Building Capacities for Change*, 229.

⁹³ New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, "The Trans-Tasman Travel Arrangement."

⁹⁴ International Organization for Migration, *World Migration Report 2010 - The Future of Migration: Building Capacities for Change*, 222.

⁹⁵ Casey, "Open Borders: Absurd Chimera or Inevitable Future Policy?", *International Migration*: 17.

played a central role in Australian politics and has manifested itself in xenophobic views toward non-white outsiders. Burke argues that political leaders have often embraced anti-immigrant rhetoric for political gain, grossly exaggerating actual threats to the country.⁹⁶ Moreover, this has impacted Australia's efforts at integration in the Asia-Pacific region. According to Burke, the country is "bounded by a power which seeks to enforce sameness, repress diversity, and diminish the rights (and claims to being) of those who live outside its protective embrace."⁹⁷ However, a new generation of political leaders seems to be embracing a different perspective on immigrant labor. Prime Minister Julia Gillard, herself an emigrant from Wales, has made recruitment of high-skilled immigrants a top priority, arguing labor shortages in Australia are a "problem unmatched anywhere in the industrialized world."⁹⁸

The case study chapter on North America provided a brief discussion of the ability of non-state (from below) and intergovernmental or supranational actors (from above) to influence policy in states with respect to the criticism leveled against the US concerning its immigration enforcement, particularly the treatment of detainees. Australia has also received harsh criticism from human rights advocates and international organizations for its treatment of detainees.⁹⁹ Immigration and asylum issues have been a constant in the Australian headlines, demonstrating that even a nation with no contiguous land borders can experience significant challenges on these issues.

⁹⁶ Anthony Burke, *Fear of Security: Australia's Invasion Anxiety* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 20.

⁹⁸ Peter Smith, "Immigrants Needed to Plug Skills Gaps," *Financial Times*, February 17, 2011.

⁹⁹ See for example, Anne Barrowclough, "Australia Detention Centre 'Breaches Human Rights'," *The Times*, December 16, 2009. See also Russell Skelton, "Human Price of Immigration Detention Centres 'Too High'," *The Sydney Morning Herald*, September 22, 2010.

The Integration-Migration Relationship

Australia and New Zealand are wealthy developed countries while the vast majority of the small island states in the Pacific Islands Forum are relatively poor and underdeveloped. These small states are focused on regional integration as a means of advancing development. Moreover, with their continued ties to Europe, Australia and New Zealand are working to improve access to the EU for all PIF member states, which would be a major boost to development. Largely as a result of structural attributes of the region, it is likely that current dynamics with respect to migration and integration will persist. The future of regional integration in Oceania is most likely dependent on the leadership of the largest states and Australia in particular. The importance of an undisputed leader is readily apparent in this region and integration efforts will largely depend on the degree to which Australia casts its lot with neighboring states or looks outside the region.

CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSIONS

International migration and regional integration will be significant in the twenty-first century and beyond, but they remain highly contentious and divisive subjects. As this dissertation has shown, the relationship between them is largely misunderstood and tends to skew toward panicked hyperbole by publics and policymakers alike.

Furthermore, heated political rhetoric over migration and integration obfuscates the potential advantages for the international community in realizing the benefits of greater cooperation and coordination of global migration and regional integration processes.

This chapter provides a summary of the key findings from the quantitative analysis and case studies of various world regions, then moves to a discussion of the theoretical implications that can be derived from this study. Next, what are some policy implications that arise if political leaders and publics accept the argument for the lack of a substantial relationship between international migration and regional integration? The final section includes some thoughts on future developments with respect to the migration-integration dynamic.

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

In order to investigate the apparent gap in our understanding with respect to the relationship between international migration and regional integration, I examined the connection between these factors to determine if there is a causal link and, if so, the direction of causality. The quantitative analysis provided a general survey of significant

factors that influence international migration and regional integration in the world today. The variables were carefully selected and cover a wide range of indicators related to a country's economic situation, governance, trade, geography, political orientation, and demographics.

When these variables are set against migration and regional integration data, we can clearly see which factors are influential with respect to international migration and which are influential with respect to regional integration. The lack of available data in other areas is unfortunate, but is highly doubtful the inclusion of additional variables would have impacted the study and the overarching goal of the dissertation. The table on the following page shows each dependent variable used in the quantitative analysis, the significant independent variables, and what the connection between them means.

Table 7. Quantitative Analysis Summary

Dependent Variable	R-square	Significant Independent Variables	What the Model Suggests
Immigrant Stock	0.84	GDP, FDI, land area, population (-), and emigrant stock	Larger, wealthier states with more foreign investment and lots of people living abroad have higher numbers of immigrants; stocks decrease as population increases.
Immigrant Stock as Percentage of the Population	0.33	GDP per capita, the World Bank governance indicator, trade in services as a percentage of GDP, totals RTAs (-), number of land borders, and the Freedom House rating	States with more GDP per person, better governance and political rights/civil liberties, multiple borders, and economies more reliant on trade in services tend to have more immigrants as a share of their populations.
Emigrant Stock	0.52	GDP (-), population, and immigrant stocks are highly correlated	Poorer states with larger populations tend to have more people abroad.
Emigrant Stock as Percentage of the Population	0.48	Remittances as a percentage of GDP, the emigration rate of tertiary educated people, HDI, the dummy variable for landlocked, and the <i>regional integration score</i>	Brain drain is a salient feature of global migration.
Gross Migration	0.76	GDP, FDI, land area, and the World Bank governance indicator (-)	Larger, wealthier states with high foreign investment should experience the greatest total migration.
Regional Integration	0.41	GDP per capita, FDI, land borders, trade in services as a percentage of GDP, land area (-), landlocked (-), HDI (-), population (-)	Regional integration should increase with greater GDP per capita, more land borders, foreign investment and trade in services. Landlocked states, those with larger populations, and those with higher human development tend to be less regionally integrated.

With respect to *immigrant stock*, the significant independent variables in the model accord with our general expectations related to international migration and what factors make some countries so attractive to migrants. Larger, wealthier countries that do not have serious population pressure usually boast strong economies that provide a myriad of opportunities for immigrants and also attract foreign investment. Moreover, wealthier states tend to be less corrupt and provide a climate conducive to immigrant labor, even if they maintain more restrictive immigration policies – hence the paradox discussed in chapter II. Regional integration, on the other hand, is insignificant with respect to immigrant stocks.

The significant independent variables change dramatically when looking at *immigrant stock as a percentage of the population*, however, and the adjusted R-square for the model looking at immigrants as a percentage of the population is much lower at 0.33 compared to 0.84 for total immigrant stock. However, a model with immigrants as a percentage of the population is arguably less relevant. Many of the top countries are not really key migration states even if they host a large share of immigrants with respect to the native population. For example, many of the states that have a large share of immigrants as a percentage of the population are small states such as Monaco with a population of 33,000 or oil producers recruiting foreign labor for that sector and it is therefore misleading to think of these states as significant migrant destination countries. Moreover, it is problematic to look at these states in a study of the relationship between international migration and regional integration. In the oil-producing Gulf countries, the vast majority of foreign labor comes from Asian states far outside the region as result of a myriad of factors, but mostly due to wages and cultural sensitivities. Furthermore, the

immigrant population is segregated from the native population, such that there is no debate about immigrant integration and assimilation because there is no expectation that immigrants would blend into the mainstream culture.

Moving to *emigrant stocks*, the results are quite similar to the output for immigrant stocks, although the adjusted R-square is lower, which suggests the independent variables are to be a better predictor of migration with respect to destination countries rather than origin countries. The significance of immigrant stocks is unexpected as it suggests that countries that have many people abroad also tend to host migrants. Middle-income states may account for this dynamic because they send people to richer states but receive people from poorer states. Moreover, it is apparent that a handful of sending countries account for a large proportion of emigrants. There are currently about 43 million migrants from Mexico, India, Russia, and China living abroad today.

Emigrant stock as a percentage of the population and immigrant stock as a percentage of the population have a similar problem in that the figure looks at relative versus absolute figures on migration. Again, some of the top countries are extraordinarily small states with large expatriate communities abroad as compared to the population that has remained at home, many of them island nations, and it is therefore misleading to think of them as major sending countries. However, it does point to a correlation with brain drain. The regional integration score was insignificant in four of the five models. Interestingly, it was only significant in this model, but it would be misleading to argue that this indicates a strong connection between international migration and regional integration. For example, the Caribbean states of Grenada, St.

Kitts and Nevis, Antigua and Barbuda, and Barbados have emigrant populations over 40 percent of the total population, but this has nothing to do with regional integration efforts. Finally, the model looking at *gross migration* shows that larger, wealthier states with more foreign investment have the greatest total migration.

The migration component involved five different variables as different lenses through which to view potential significant indicators. In contrast, the *regional integration* component only involves the one variable, such that the integration score is set as the dependent variable. Formulating an objective measure of regional integration is an enormous challenge considering the diversity of states and regions in the international system. However, the model results support the hypothesis of a lack of a significant relationship between these factors in the direction of integration to migration.

For the purposes of this dissertation, the important takeaway is there is no substantial relationship between international migration and regional integration as demonstrated in the quantitative analysis. On the one hand, people migrate as a result of push and pull factors at the macro and micro levels as indicated in the significance of several independent variables such as national wealth, population, and size. Regional integration efforts by states appear to be largely irrelevant in the decision to migrate. On the other hand, a country's regional integration efforts do not have a substantial effect on its level of migration. In this perspective, states can consider migration and integration as distinct policy areas, resisting the urge to conflate them.

International migration and regional integration are extraordinarily complex and it is difficult to capture all of the salient aspects of these subjects through quantitative analysis. However, the quantitative analysis provides an excellent foundation for further

case study research on specific regions to generate synergies using a mixed-method approach. The more extensive case studies on Europe and North America demonstrate the enormous differences between regions, but this is not to say there are no lessons to glean that are applicable from region to region.

Europe has undergone the most substantial regional integration efforts primarily through the development of the European Union. The EU has adopted free movement of people as one of its core principles and the member states take this principle seriously. Despite the contentiousness over the Schengen zone in Denmark, Italy, and France concerning extra-regional migrants, these states are not arguing for a return to restricted movement, but rather more effective EU-wide measures to address infrequent or rare migration events like the recent influx of migrants from North Africa. Intra-regional migration did not occur after the expansion of the EU to anywhere near the level that many people in the “old” EU-15 countries feared, now the overwhelming concern for the union is how to manage migration from external states into the union.

Migration and integration in North American, on the other hand, has been characterized by mass emigration from Mexico to the United States, forming the largest migration corridor in the world today. However, it is interesting to note that this mass migration has slowed to a trickle. A combination of factors has contributed to this decline. First, the Mexican fertility rate decreased markedly in recent decades from 6.8 births per woman in 1970 to about 2 births per woman in 2010. Second, the US has spent considerable efforts on enforcement, which has affected the ease of migration even if the vast majority of migrants, 92 to 98 percent according to some estimates, do reach the US

eventually.¹ Third, improvements in the Mexican economy have made staying at home a better option for young people, although irregular migration remains a salient characteristic of the Mexico-US migration corridor. Of the nearly 12 million undocumented people in the United States, about sixty percent are Mexican-born. Furthermore, Canada is also a major migration destination, particularly from Asian states such as China, India, and the Philippines. Unlike the US, migration to Canada is overwhelmingly from outside North America.

The other regions of the world provide additional insight into the relationship between international migration and regional integration. Migration is still largely viewed as a problem rather than an opportunity. Some states have utilized migration as a means to advance economic development and political relations, but most are extremely hesitant to adapt migration policy in any way that might appear to cede some level of control over the movement of people. Free movement of people is the exception not the rule.

THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS

Chapter III provided an overview of the major theories of international migration and regional integration. The final section of the chapter was designed to “bridge the gap” between these theoretical disciplines and discussed how expectations about international migration should influence regional integration and vice versa. But what theoretical implications arise in light of the lack of a substantial relationship between these two components? Migration and integration are complex and multifaceted and it

¹ Damien Cave, "Better Lives for Mexicans Cut Allure of Going North," *New York Times*, July 6, 2011.

seems clear that any single theory will be insufficient to explain these phenomena individually or to explain the connection between them.

A focus on economic theory, for example, would suggest that further integration measures should result in a change in migration, especially once an arrangement has reached the common market stage of integration where people can move freely. However, empirical evidence points to the fact that economic concerns are usually only part of the story and other factors may play a far greater role in explaining the decision to migrate. This dissertation supports the notion that theories of international migration cover a multitude factors at the macro and micro levels that exist simultaneously and are mutually reinforcing. Moreover, the complexity of migration is obvious when looking at it through the lens of regional integration. As the previous chapters have demonstrated, the relationship between international migration and regional integration varies widely in different areas of the world because of the different circumstances for each factor.

It is also important to note that regional integration arrangements can take on many different forms. Although most are concerned with trade and economic cooperation, they still vary dramatically as far as membership, goals, capacity, and so on. Using the European Union as a universal model is therefore problematic. Europe is fundamentally different than North America or the Middle East or East Asia. However, this does not mean there are no lessons from the experience of one region that are applicable to another. A key theoretical implication is that theories related to migration and integration should be parsimonious, but also be comprehensive enough to account for the differences between regions.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Demographic Challenges

Populations are growing older throughout the world and developed countries are experiencing this demographic trend more acutely.² One of the most significant challenges facing the vast majority of developed countries is population aging coupled with low fertility. Although the stock of migrants has increased in many developed countries, the decline in the native-born population has also contributed to an increase in the percentage of migrants in the total population. Furthermore, over the past half century these states have adopted generous welfare provisions for their citizens, but they are mostly static and reflect circumstances from decades ago instead of adapting to changing societal needs.

Thus, many of these programs are unsustainable in their present form. For example, social security in the United States is a “pay-as-you-go” program, which means that people currently working pay for those that receive benefits. In 1950, the ratio of workers per retiree was 16 to 1, today it is just 3.3 to 1 and the number of workers per retiree is projected to decline further over the coming decades. The UNDP projects dramatic changes in the size of the working-age population in various regions by 2050, most notably substantial increases in the developing world, particularly Africa. However, the working-age population in Europe is expected to decline by nearly one quarter from the 2010 level.³

² Kevin Kinsella and David Phillips, "Global Aging: The Challenge of Success," *Population Bulletin* 60, no. 1 (2005).

³ United Nations Development Programme, *Human Development Report 2009 - Overcoming Barriers: Human Mobility and Development*, 44.

Immigration can help to ameliorate problems associated with demographic trends faced by developed countries, but it can never be a complete panacea. Moreover, if immigration was used as a remedy for the trend of low fertility coupled with population aging, it would require massive levels of immigration which would not be supported by destination countries as it would result in a tremendous demographic shift. Regional integration, and greater ease of mobility among member states that might accompany it, could be a part of the solution. As Kofi Annan suggested, migration is not a zero-sum game and, if managed effectively, should enable a joint-sum situation benefitting countries of origin and destination and migrants themselves. It would therefore behoove advanced industrialized countries to consider the advantages of migration instead of continuing to focus on the perceived disadvantages.

Changing Identities and Attitudes

This dissertation argues there is no substantial relationship between international migration and regional integration. An intriguing side note is the notion of changing identity through regional integration. If citizens of member states are under the same supranational umbrella, it becomes increasingly difficult to think of people migrating *intra-regionally* as “immigrants” when a central authority is involved as it changes the insider versus outsider dynamic. At present, the overwhelming majority of states in the international system maintain individual national policies regarding the movement of people, but coordinated policies under a successful integration arrangement alters the relationship between an individual and the nation-state and this has obvious implications for how we view ourselves in relation to others.

Changing identities may go hand-in-hand with changing attitudes. In the United States, attitudes toward immigrants typically reflect the ebb and flow dynamic that corresponds to the prevailing mood of the country, which is largely shaped by the status of the economy (labor market hypothesis). The campaign slogan “It’s the economy, stupid” may be a political cliché, but it is nevertheless a straightforward indicator of the importance people assign to immigration. These sentiments are often transient, however, as people tend to care much less about immigration when the economy is strong. As Riley says, “What we have in America is periodic grumpiness, short-lived sniffing about the most recent arrivals, a vague and ambivalent disdain that doesn’t settle too deeply into the psyche.”⁴

The Hispanic population in the United States exceeded 50 million people according to the 2010 census and estimates suggest this figure could rise to one-quarter of the US population by 2050. This is a serious concern for nativists who feel threatened by the perceived cultural shift of a growing Hispanic population coupled with a declining Caucasian population, particularly when whites are no longer the majority.⁵ The face of Hispanic immigration is overwhelmingly Mexican, which has obvious implications for regional integration and also touches on issues related to the multiculturalism versus assimilation debate as seen in the earlier European example. Samuel Huntington argued, “There is no Americano dream. There is only the American dream created by an Anglo-Protestant society. Mexican-Americans will share in that dream and in that society only if they dream in English.”⁶ His argument harkens back to earlier periods of migration to the United States associated with WASP (White Anglo-Saxon Protestant) conformity and

⁴ Riley, *Let Them In: The Case for Open Borders*, 157.

⁵ See for example, Jason DeParle, “The Anti-Immigration Crusader,” *New York Times*, April 17, 2011.

⁶ “Dreaming of the Other Side of the Wire”, *The Economist*.

the Weberian spirit. However, this model of immigrant assimilation has transformed over time into the melting pot of today, where immigrants intermingle with the mainstream culture.

Although political leaders may be able to ride an anti-immigrant wave into office, they tend not to stay in office for very long and may encourage a backlash that does long-term harm to their party, even if anti-immigrant rhetoric remains a steadfast method of energizing nativist elements of society. Many conservative leaders in the US that support greater immigration restrictions also recognize the risk in alienating such a huge demographic and have attempted to shift focus away from the immigration debate.⁷

Global Migration Framework

A number of influential scholars of international migration have called for a global migration framework that can address the needs of origin and destination countries and the migrants themselves.⁸ States have made considerable efforts in recent years to address the movement of people and the impact of global migration on the international system. Instead of treaty-level integration arrangements such as those that are discussed in this dissertation, the international community has developed several forums and global commissions to enable a better understanding of the causes of global migration and its effects. The International Organization for Migration lists 16 principal Regional Consultative Processes (RCPs) currently in operation as shown in the table below.

⁷ See for example, Stephanie Kirchgaessner, "Migration Rhetoric Strips Republicans of Key Latino Vote," *Financial Times*, December 23, 2010. See also Peter Slevin, "Republican Party Looks to Rebuild Support Among Hispanics," *The Washington Post*, February 21, 2010.

⁸ Solimano, *International Migration in the Age of Crisis and Globalization: Historical and Recent Experiences*, 18. See also Amanda Klekowski von Koppenfels, *The Role of Regional Consultative Processes in Managing International Migration* (Geneva: International Organization for Migration, 2002).

Table 8. Regional Consultative Processes

Region	Regional Consultative Process (RCP)	Long-Form Title
Europe and the Former Soviet Union	IGC	Inter-Governmental Consultations on Asylum, Refugee and Migration Policies
	Budapest Process	
	Söderköping Process	Cross-Border Co-operation Process
	CIS Conference	Regional Conference to Address the Problems of Refugees, Displaced Persons, Other Forms of Involuntary Displacement and Returnees in the Countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States and Relevant Neighbouring States) and Follow-up Process
Americas and the Caribbean	Puebla Process (or RCM)	Regional Conference on Migration
	South American Conference on Migration	Lima Declaration Process a/k/a South American Meeting on Migration, Integration and Development
Western Mediterranean	MTM	Mediterranean Transit Migration Dialogue
	5 + 5 Dialogue	5 + 5 Dialogue on Migration in the Western Mediterranean
Africa	IGAD-RCP	Inter-governmental Authority on Development - Regional Consultative Process on Migration
	MIDSA	Migration Dialogue for Southern Africa
	MIDWA (or Dakar Follow-up)	Migration Dialogue for West Africa
Asia and Oceania	Abu-Dhabi Dialogue	Ministerial Consultations on Overseas Employment and Contractual Labour for Countries of Origin and Destination in Asia
	Manila Process	IOM Regional Seminar on Irregular Migration and Migrant Trafficking in East and South-East Asia
	APC	Inter-Governmental Asia-Pacific Consultations on Refugees, Displaced Persons and Migrants
	Bali Process	Bali Ministerial Conference on People Smuggling, Trafficking in Persons and Related Transnational Crime
	Colombo Process	Ministerial Consultations on Overseas Employment and Contractual Labour

Source: International Organization for Migration, *RCPs by Region*

(<http://www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/policy-research/regional-consultative-processes/rcps-by-region>)

Although they contribute knowledge and expertise to the debate, the primary downside of these forums and commissions is they do not actually change policy and instead produce non-binding recommendations that are difficult to translate into concrete migration policies. Scholars have bemoaned the immigration policy of the United States

for decades, for instance, but they have little influence on policymakers that are wary of appearing too lenient. One of the primary challenges of these organizations has been to bridge the formal-informal divide.⁹

These various organizations have recognized that in order to meet the needs of all constituencies involved in the global migration process, it is necessary to move past the traditional viewpoint that focuses on problems instead of opportunities associated with migration. Governments in the developed world in particular are far more concerned with restricting the movement of people instead of acknowledging the realities of global migration and adopting policies that manage it effectively, benefitting the host society. However, putting the recommendations of these migration-related organizations into practice has been an extraordinary challenge as public pressure tends to argue for more rather than less restrictive immigration policies.

At present, there is no international organization with the authority or capacity to address the needs of both low and high-skilled labor, while simultaneously addressing the needs of origin and destination countries. Migration is typically seen as a domestic issue, even though by its very nature this is an international issue as there are at least two countries involved. Perhaps this will change as global governance continues to develop as countries cooperate to handle a myriad of issues that are outside of the purview of any individual state. Regional integration arrangements, in some respects a stepping stone toward global governance, will likely play an important role in the management of migration. This is already evident in areas like the EU, where the member states are supposed to maintain similar policies toward non-EU nationals. In any case, it seems that

⁹ Randall Hansen, *An Assessment of Principal Regional Consultative Processes on Migration* (Geneva: International Organization for Migration, 2010).

there will always be a perceived rationale for exclusion and restriction, the challenge is overcoming it.

The lack of cooperation and coordination with respect to migration is a systemic problem that seems to be entrenched in the current international system. If we look at the tremendous concern over immigration in North America for example, it is remarkable how little policymakers in the US and Mexico have worked together in recent decades. Robert Pastor argues no two countries are more important to the US than Canada and Mexico, although it pays little attention to its North American neighbors. States tend to adopt immigration policies largely in isolation and fail to address the push and pull realities for migration in origin and destination countries. Moreover, it is crucial to address the needs of the migrants themselves, as it is important to remember that they are not merely pawns traveling between countries. The Swiss economist Max Frisch was on to something when he quipped, “We wanted a labor force, but human beings came.”

The international community has made significant organizational strides toward more effective management and regulation of migration including the creation of the Global Commission on International Migration, the UN High-Level Dialogue on Migration and Development, and the Global Forum on Migration and Development. Although it may be an enormous challenge, these organizations should work with states to address the mobility of people, just as global institutions were essential in promoting the mobility of goods and capital.

The International Organization for Migration (IOM) is an extraordinarily important institution and has made a positive impact in the lives of thousands of international migrants. However, the organization does not have the authority and

resources to address global migration effectively, particularly as states are hesitant to cede any amount of control in such a cherished policy area. The dilemma faced by the IOM today echoes Bhagwati's paradox from two decades earlier when he argued, "Because immigration restrictions are the flip side of sovereignty, there is no international organization today to oversee and monitor each nation's policies toward migrants, whether inward or outward bound."¹⁰ Despite its limitations, the organization's role does appear to be increasing and this is most obvious in developing countries that tend to lack the capacity to manage migration without external assistance. William, Swing, Director-General of the IOM, has said, "I haven't made it to a country yet where migration hasn't been high on the list of priorities."¹¹

Regional Cooperation

With respect to regional integration, states should consider advantages and disadvantages associated with migration. Potential opportunities may exist that would enable a mutually beneficial situation for member states. For example, if circular migration leads to the emergence of significant transnational networks among countries of origin and destination, this may have unintended but positive impacts for both, particularly if migrants fill labor market niches and boost economic productivity throughout the region.¹² Moreover, it would likely improve diversity and social cohesion.

¹⁰ Bhagwati, "Borders Beyond Control", *Foreign Affairs*: 104.

¹¹ Jason DeParle, "Surge in Global Migration Expands Scale of an Aid Group's Influence," *New York Times*, August 31, 2011.

¹² See for example, Luis Eduardo Guarnizo, "The Economics of Transnational Living," *International Migration Review* 37, no. 3 (2003).

Returning to the idea of regional arrangements as a stepping stone toward global governance, Casey has used the term “comfort zones” to describe “existing structures of international relations that reflect geographic proximity and the historical, cultural, and economic ties that constitute the basis of formal bilateral and multilateral agreements as well as informed patterns of trade and immigration flows.”¹³ These comfort zones are directly applicable to regional integration efforts, although it is readily apparent that states are far more comfortable with the movement of capital and goods than they are with the movement of people. Regional integration arrangements therefore tend to reflect an emphasis on trade, not migration, especially at their inception. The lack of a substantial relationship between international migration and regional integration demonstrates that states in regional arrangements should include the mobility of labor as a core policy pillar instead of treating it as a peripheral issue. Moreover, as seen in the EU context, regional arrangements have the potential to form new economic social agendas.¹⁴

Politics and Immigration

There is an ongoing debate over the efficacy of anti-immigration rhetoric in a political campaign or as part of a broader political platform. However, we do not see the opposite in action, namely a debate over pro-immigration rhetoric. Politicians may favor less restrictive immigration policies, but would never think of openly campaigning for anything remotely close to an open borders policy. Like many issues, migration policy involves structure and process level attributes, both of which are difficult to change, as

¹³ Casey, "Open Borders: Absurd Chimera or Inevitable Future Policy?", *International Migration*: 45.

¹⁴ Stephen Castles and Mark J. Miller, *The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World*, 4th ed. (New York: Guilford Press, 2009).

any radical departure from the status quo is usually met with stiff resistance by some elements of society.

The paradox of a greater desire to control migration despite the increasingly difficulty in doing so is readily apparent in the political sphere. As Favell argues, “The political rationality in the meantime hangs in the balance: national politicians are tempted by populist rhetoric towards hostility, while all the economic, demographic, and geopolitical arguments point in the opposite direction.”¹⁵ Major policy changes like the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act in the United States are few and far between. Moreover, this case appears to be a “Nixon goes to China” moment in that Ronald Reagan, a popular conservative, was in a better position to affect such a change than had a more liberal politician held the presidency. This is not always the case to be sure, as George W. Bush championed immigration reform including a guest worker program, but failed to galvanize enough support from either party.

The global financial crisis has contributed to increasing pressure on policymakers to reform migration policies, and governments have responded by adopting new measures designed to protect labor markets for native workers, impose greater immigration restrictions, and encourage return migration.¹⁶ Some estimates claim that completely opening borders would add an incredible \$39 *trillion* over 25 years to the global economy.¹⁷ Political leaders would be wise to keep this in mind when formulating migration policy.

¹⁵ Favell, “The New Face of East-West Migration in Europe”, *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*: 705.

¹⁶ International Organization for Migration, *World Migration Report 2010 - The Future of Migration: Building Capacities for Change*, 124.

¹⁷ “The Future of Mobility,” *The Economist*, May 28, 2011.

Migration and Integration for Development

The paradox of the inability of governments to control borders while the desire to do so has increased is a consistent theme throughout this dissertation. Thus, many observers have argued that governments should shift the focus from controlling to managing migration. Globalization provides powerful incentives for people to move. It is therefore extraordinarily difficult to stop brain drain. Developing and developed countries need to work together to manage the flow of people, both low and high-skill migrants. As Page suggests, “For countries at either end of the migration chain, viewing migration as part of the solution to the development problem – rather than as a symptom – offers considerable promise.”¹⁸

FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS

To conclude the dissertation, this section offers some final thoughts on potential future developments related to international migration and regional integration. This is not meant to be a comprehensive list, but rather a selection of key aspects of these dynamic forces in the international system. The following sections also suggest some potential areas of inquiry for future research.

Technology

Technological advances have dramatically improved the mobility of capital and goods, and even people to a lesser extent. Innovations in high-speed rail, highway/interstate travel, and the emergence of more low-cost airlines such as the Irish

¹⁸ John Page, "Moving Toward Opportunity: Managing Migration for Development," in *Foresight Africa: The Continent's Greatest Challenges and Opportunities for 2011*, ed. Brookings Institution Africa Growth Initiative Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2011), 9.

carrier Ryanair will play a major role in facilitating international migration. The EU cohesion funds targeted for the environment and transportation will assist the poorer member states in improving infrastructure and meeting their future transportation needs.

For example, the EU has committed to a trans-European high-speed rail network, which, if properly utilized, will enable far greater ease of travel and may encourage circular migration. Nine EU countries with high-speed rail networks plan to spend a combined \$200 billion for additional track over the next decade. Business interests are also heavily involved in advancing the European rail network, taking advantage of deregulation and challenging state monopolies.¹⁹ The EU Commission published a recent white paper that included the following as a core objective for future transportation: “By 2050, complete a European high-speed rail network. Triple the length of the existing high-speed rail network by 2030 and maintain a dense railway network in all Member States. By 2050 the majority of medium-distance passenger transport should go by rail.”²⁰ The EU has already made tremendous strides in advanced rail transport technology, but these ambitious goals for the future will improve transit efficiency and facilitate a closer union.

Economic Development

The previous section on policy implications included regional cooperation as a salient theme. In addition to cooperation in the political sphere, regional arrangements and circular migration that may occur as a result of free movement of people provisions can serve as a method of economic development, particularly for poorer member states

¹⁹ Bruce Crumley, "Working on the Railroad," *Time International (Atlantic Edition)*, June 8, 2009.

²⁰ European Commission, "Roadmap to a Single European Transport Area: Towards a Competitive and Resource Efficient Transport System," (Brussels: European Commission, 2011)

that benefit from redistribution mechanisms. The EU cohesion funds are a perfect example of richer states helping poorer states toward the goal of realizing the region's full economic potential. "Regional trade agreements can serve as building blocks rather than stumbling blocks on the path to global free trade. The reason is that the cost of such agreements to outsiders, namely trade diversion due to discriminatory market access, can trigger a dynamic sequence of bargaining steps that ushers in a period of freer trade."²¹

The Long View

Immigration, like many issues at play in the international arena, is largely viewed through a short-term instead of a long-term lens. Historians tend to focus on the latter, however, which is instructive and adds a crucial perspective to the subject. If we look at the "New World" countries such as Canada, the United States, Australia, New Zealand, and Argentina, immigration has played a central role in shaping and reshaping these societies over time.²²

Immigrants contributed to the transformation of American society and the development of the modern welfare state, particularly in the 1930s and 1960s with the beginning of the social safety net and the redistribution of wealth. Furthermore, issues surrounding immigrant integration and assimilation appear far less salient when taking the long view. Successive generations increasingly identify with the destination country as opposed to the origin country. As Hirschman writes, "The evolution of American society as an immigrant society, with moderately high levels of social mobility and

²¹ Mattli, *The Logic of Regional Integration: Europe and Beyond*.

²² Charles Hirschman, "Immigration and the American Century," *Demography* 42, no. 4 (2005). See also Philip Martin and Elizabeth Midgley, "Immigration: Shaping and Reshaping America," *Population Bulletin* 61, no. 4 (2006).

intermarriage, as created a population of blended ancestries, united with a common civic identity. Although unintended, the American example of nationhood, open to all peoples, may be the real legacy of the American Century.”²³

Diversity helps a society engage a globalized world. The vast majority of advanced industrialized countries are experiencing a trend toward greater diversity, particularly in their metropolitan areas. Japan, on the other hand, seems to be an outlier for a developed state in the twenty-first century as it remains for the most part a homogenous society, as immigrants account for a mere 1.7 percent of the population.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

International migration and regional integration are extraordinarily complex and divisive subjects, but the global community is gradually learning more about the importance of both and how they influence and shape the international system. This dissertation has made the argument that there is no substantial relationship between these factors and that states should resist conflating them. In this perspective, states can consider the benefits of regional integration policies without worrying about migration and can consider migration policies without concern for integration. However, migration and integration will be key features of the twenty-first century and it would benefit the international community for states to be more proactive and focus on opportunities related to the movement of people and regional cooperation.

²³ Hirschman, "Immigration and the American Century", *Demography*: 615.

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