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Evolution and Devolution: The Dynamics of Sovereignty and Security in Post-Cold War Europe

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EVOLUTION AND DEVOLUTION: THE DYNAMICS OF
SOVEREIGNTY AND SECURITY IN POST COLD WAR EUROPE

by

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
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
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
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ABSTRACT

EVOLUTION AND DEVOLUTION: THE DYNAMICS OF SOVEREIGNTY AND SECURITY IN POST COLD WAR EUROPE

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Old Dominion University, 1999
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At a time when individual defense outlays are being significantly diminished, the national governments of Western Europe are confronted with the necessity of reforming and adapting their militaries to address new security concerns and undertake new missions. This study will examine multinational military integration as one possible approach whereby national governments can limit defense spending and still maintain military capabilities to meet the contemporary security threats faced by the nationstates of the continent. The first three chapters of the work will explore the broad patterns of change in the international system which have propelled states to reexamine how they define the functions and interests of the nationstate. The second group of three chapters will discuss the new security issues facing Europe. The final three chapters will present specific case studies which illustrate the trend toward integration. In the end, it can be demonstrated that the convergence of factors, the evolution of the nationstate, the change in contemporary security perceptions, fiscal constraints and the established progress in multilateral military cooperation, will continue to propel European military integration.

This dissertation is dedicated to my parents,
and my sister and brother.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter	Page
I. INTRODUCTION.....	1
II. REALISM AND LIBERALISM.....	28
III. SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MODERN NATIONSTATE.....	55
IV. WESTERN EUROPE'S SECURITY REGIME.....	82
V. NATIONALISM ON THE EUROPEAN CONTINENT.....	111
VI. THE SOUTHERN FLANK.....	143
VII. THE PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION....	175
VIII. SECURITY INTEGRATION AND THE MEMBER STATE.....	214
IX. EUROPEAN SECURITY INTEGRATION.....	243
X. EUROPEAN DEFENSE-INDUSTRIAL INTEGRATION.....	276
XI. RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS.....	310
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	331
VITA.....	371

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The end of the Cold War and the resultant dissolution of the Soviet Union essentially ends the threat of a direct, large-scale military attack on the states of Western Europe. Yet even as the hard military threats of the bipolar rivalry diminish, there has emerged a recognition that Europe still confronts a host of security hazards. Many of these concerns had been either overshadowed or contained by the dynamics of the Cold War, while others were created by the events surrounding the end of the conflict. In spite of the growing acknowledgment of the potential security issues which continue to threaten the peace and stability of Europe, most Western states have engaged in dramatic defense reductions. These cutbacks were initially seen as "peace-dividends" which, in an era of increasing constrained national budgets, could subsequently be used, for instance, to finance continuations in Europe's social welfare system and decrease America's federal budget deficit. The drive for European economic union (EMU) accelerated as a result of the Maastricht Treaty and the ensuing decision to set January 1999 as the target date for launching the "euro," created additional pressures to limit defense outlays in order to qualify for monetary union. Consequently, at a time when individual defense outlays were being significantly diminished, national governments were confronted with the necessity of reforming and adapting their militaries to address new security concerns and undertake new missions. One of the most pressing security questions faced by

The format for this dissertation follows current style requirements of Kate L. Turabian, *A Manual for Writers of Term Papers, Theses, and Dissertations*, 6th ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1996).

national governments then becomes how to address new and diverse defense needs in an age of increasingly limited resources.

This study will examine multinational military integration as one possible approach whereby national governments can limit defense spending and still maintain military capabilities to meet the contemporary security threats faced by the nationstates of the continent. The first three chapters of the work will explore the broad patterns of change in the international system which have propelled states to both reexamine how they define the functions and interests of the state. The second group of three chapters will discuss the new security issues facing Europe. The final three chapters will present specific case studies which illustrate the trend toward integration. In the end, it can be demonstrated that the convergence of factors, the evolution of the nationstate, the change in contemporary security perceptions, fiscal constraints and the established progress in multilateral military cooperation, will continue to propel European military integration.

This study will attempt to bridge a minor gap in the otherwise rich and diverse literature on post-Cold War European security. Previous works have concentrated on the transatlantic relationship or the intra-European dimension of the effort to create autonomous defense capacities or the ramifications of the changed defense market for arms manufacturers. This study will combine these themes and subjects, and integrate them against the backdrop of the current scholarly debate over international relations by examining the changing nature of sovereignty and the evolution of the nationstate.

In general, the literature on European security can be divided into three broad categories: first, those works which use Cold War and post-Cold War European history to explain advances in institutionalism; second, those studies which examine various

facets of the transatlantic alliance; third, and finally, pieces which explore the intra-European dynamics of security on the continent. Theoretical works on European security tend to focus on the existing structures as a means demonstrate the validity of institutionalism and regime theory. Works that deal with Transatlanticism focus on either bi- or multilateral themes and concentrate on the relationships between individual European states and the United States or on the broader context of the transatlantic alliance as it is manifested in NATO and the other institutions that form the framework of Europe's security architecture. Finally, intra-European studies also highlight bi- and multilateral relations, albeit between Europe's powers.

The literature can be further divided into the pre- and post-Cold War literature. Many of the seminal works that outline the main features of the transatlantic alliance were written before the end of the Cold War, yet their influence remains significant. One of the most influential works on the founding of NATO remains Robert Osgood's *NATO: The Entangling Alliance*.¹ Similarly, Timothy Ireland's *Creating the Atlantic Alliance* has yet to be surpassed by any contemporary works on the subject.² On the effort to establish a multilateral military force for Europe, the seminal work remains Edward Furdson's *The European Defense Community: A History* which traces the struggle to reintegrate West Germany into the security architecture of the West and

¹Robert Osgood, *NATO: The Entangling Alliance* (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1962).

²See, Timothy Ireland, *Creating the Atlantic Alliance: The Origins of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization* (Westport: Greenwood, 1981).

assemble a “European” army.³ The dean of French scholars in the United States, Stanley Hoffman, confronted the changing status of nationstates long before Maastricht.⁴ In 1968, Simon Serfaty laid out the main tenets of French policy toward integration that marked the immediate post-World War II years, but also served as the foundation for later policy.⁵ The burdensharing debate the eventual reassessment of the U.S. role in European security formed the central theme of David P. Calleo’s *Beyond American Hegemony* and foreshadowed the continuing controversy of the late 1980s and early 1990s.⁶ This work followed Calleo’s earlier criticisms of the transatlantic alliance and highlighted many of the inconsistencies in transatlantic relations.⁷

The Cold War literature on bilateral relations between the United States and various European states is also rich and diverse. Marvin R. Zahniser examined the foundation of Franco-American relations during the Cold War and Michael Harrison captured the essence of Franco-American relations in his book *The Reluctant Ally*.⁸

³Edward Furdson, *The European Defense Community: A History* (London: Macmillan, 1980).

⁴See Stanley Hoffman, “Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of Western Europe,” *Daedalus* (1966).

⁵Simon Serfaty, *France, De Gaulle, and Europe: The Policy of the Fourth and Fifth Republics Toward the Continent* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1968).

⁶David P. Calleo, *Beyond American Hegemony: The Future of the Western Alliance* (New York: Basic Books, 1987).

⁷Also see, David P. Calleo, *The Atlantic Fantasy: The U.S., NATO, and Europe* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1970).

⁸Marvin R. Zahniser, *Uncertain Friendship: American-French Diplomatic Relations Through the Cold War* (New York: Wiley, 1975); Michael Harrison, *The Reluctant Ally: France and Atlantic Security* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1981).

Likewise, Wolfram Heinreider's *Germany, America, Europe—Forty Years of German Foreign Policy* offers a rich account of the U.S.-German relations in the Cold War era.⁹ The Soviet “problem” and the U.S. reactions to the German policy of Ostpolitik form the basis for a number of works, including a rich edited piece by Uwe Nerlich and James A. Thomson.¹⁰ The foundation and evolution of the Anglo-American “special relationship” has been the basis for a number of very good works through the years. Ritchie Owendale's *The English-Speaking Alliance* traces the ultimate intertwining of U.S. and British goals in the period immediately following the end of the second World War.¹¹ Meanwhile Victor Rothwell's *Britain and the Cold War, 1941-1947* focuses on the difficult transition made by British policy makers as they accepted U.S. primacy and leadership.¹²

Much of the literature that examines intra-European relations and their impact on the establishment of the continent's security architecture was also written before the end of the Cold War. Franco-German relations, the driving force of European

⁹Wolfram F. Hanrieder, *Germany, America, Europe—Forty Years of German Foreign Policy* (New Haven: Yale University, 1989).

¹⁰Uwe Nerlich and James A. Thomson, eds., *The Soviet Problem in American-German Relations* (New York: Crane Rusak, 1985). On Ostpolitik and its impact on both U.S.-German relations and Germany's bilateral relations with its West European allies, see William E. Griffith, *The Ostpolitik of the Federal Republic of Germany* (Cambridge: MIT, 1978); Kenneth Myers, *Ostpolitik and American Security Interests in Europe* (Washington, D.C: Georgetown University, 1972); and Roger Tilford, ed., *Ostpolitik and Political Change in West Germany* (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1975).

¹¹Ritchie Owendale, *The English-Speaking Alliance: Britain, the United States, the Dominions, and the Cold War, 1945-1951* (London: G. Allen & Unwin, 1985).

¹²Victor Rothwell, *Britain and the Cold War, 1941-1947* (London: Cape Books, 1982).

institutionalism, was addressed by F. Roy Willis in *France, Germany and the New Europe*.¹³ Franco-German relations were also covered in detail in Simonian Haig's work *The Privileged Partnership* which detailed bilateral relations between the two nations and the impact of the partnership on the development of the European Community.¹⁴ John W. Young examined the often contentious relationship between France and Great Britain in *Britain, France and the Unity of Europe*.¹⁵

The end of the Cold War ushered in a period of debate over the future of European security. This debate extended to international relations theory as scholars questioned the discipline's inability to predict the end of the bipolar system. Adam Bronstone's *European Union--United States Security Relations* uses various Cold War examples to question the main tenets of Realism/Neorealism.¹⁶ Fred Chernoff, extends this line of reasoning further and contends that none of the major international relations theories, including neorealism, institutionalism or cybernetic theory, adequately explains alliance behavior in the pre- or post-Cold War era.¹⁷ Perhaps some the most notable

¹³F. Roy Willis, *France Germany and the New Europe: 1945-1963* (Stanford: Stanford University, 1965).

¹⁴Simonian Haig, *The Privileged Partnership: Franco-German Relations in the European Community, 1969-1984* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1985).

¹⁵John W. Young, *Britain, France and the Unity of Europe, 1945-1951* (Leicester: University of Leicester, 1984).

¹⁶Adam Bronstone, *European Union--United States Security Relations: Transatlantic Tensions and the Theory of International Relations* (New York: St. Martin's, 1997).

¹⁷Chernoff uses 21 examples to support his contentions and to test the key variables; Fred Chernoff, *After Bipolarity: The Vanishing Threat, Theories of Cooperation and the Future of the Atlantic Alliance* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1994).

works to address the end of the Cold War was written by the noted historian John Lewis Gaddis. Gaddis roundly criticized international relations scholars for their failure to predict or foresee the end of the Cold War.¹⁸ In his work, *The United States and the End of the Cold War*, Gaddis offers new interpretations about the end of the Cold War and the origins of such policies as containment and Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD).¹⁹ Gaddis's work builds on his monograph, *The Long Peace*, which develops the theme that subsystems of the bipolar system helped ensure the stability of the era and examines the length to which both superpowers went to ensure that their rivalry remained in check.²⁰

Much of the debate over post-Cold War European security has centered around the role that NATO will play in the future. George W. Downs's edited piece, *Collective Security Beyond the Cold War*, presents a variety of essays that examine collective security writ large and both the theoretical roots of such security systems and case studies that probe the future of collective security.²¹ In addition, Michael Hogan edited a significant piece which presents a variety of views on the influences of the bipolar

¹⁸John Lewis Gaddis, "International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War," *International Studies* 17, no. 3 (Winter 1992).

¹⁹Gaddis's work also serves as a companion to his original piece, *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War*. Taken together, the two books serve to trace the evolution of Cold War scholarship and diplomatic history. See, John Lewis Gaddis, *The United States and the End of the Cold War* (New York: Oxford University, 1992); and John Lewis Gaddis, *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947* (New York: Columbia University, 1972).

²⁰John Lewis Gaddis, *The Long Peace: Inquires into the History of the Cold War* (New York: Oxford University, 1989). Gaddis expands on his earlier work by incorporating newly released data and archival sources in John Lewis Gaddis, *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History* (New York: Oxford University, 1998).

²¹George W. Downs, ed., *Collective Security Beyond the Cold War* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1994).

struggle on the United States and the broader ramifications of the conflict on institutions and ideology.²² Works such as Simon Duke's *The New European Security Disorder* (1994) argued that, in light of the "new" security threats faced by Europe, NATO should be gradually phased out in favor of a pan-European security system.²³ One such institution was the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).²⁴ A number of other contemporary studies examine the recasting of Europe's security system in light of the continuing influence of the transatlantic alliance. The debate over NATO expansion provided particular fodder for proponents of a reduced U.S. role in European security. Barbara Conry's and Ted Galen Carpenter's edited piece, *NATO Enlargement: Illusions and Reality* offers no less than 18 essays which are critical of expansion and contend that enlargement would create new security divides in Europe and pledge the U.S. to undertake commitments that it cannot afford.²⁵ This theme is echoed by Hall Gardner who centers his opposition to expansion on the potential reaction of Russia and

²²Michael J. Hogan, ed., *The End of the Cold War: Its Meaning and Implications* (New York: Cambridge University, 1992).

²³Simon Duke, *The New European Security Disorder* (New York: St. Martin's, 1994); and David G. Haglund, ed., *From Euphoria to Hysteria: Western European Security After the Cold War* (Boulder: Westview 1993).

²⁴On the view of institutions such as the OSCE at the end of the Cold War, see, Hans Van den Broek, *Transatlantic Relations in the 1990s: The Emergence of New Security Architectures* (London: Brassey's, 1992); Christoph Bluth, Emil Kirchner and James Sperling, eds., *The Future of European Security* (Dartmouth: Aldershot, 1995).

²⁵Ted Galen Carpenter and Barbara Conry, eds., *NATO Enlargement: Illusions and Reality* (Washington, D.C.: CATO Institute, 1998). For an overview of the current debates, see also Michael E. Brown, *European Security: The Defining Debates* (Cambridge: MIT, 1998).

those Central European states which are not granted full membership.²⁶ Christoph Bertram reinforces Gardner's contentions by asserting that Russia formed the main bond that unified the transatlantic states and without an expansionistic for, the institutions of the West need to be recalculated in order to be more inclusive.²⁷

However, other authors including James Goodby, argue that expansion can actually improve relations between Russia and the West by establishing a new "logic of peace" which would provide innovative rules and norms to regulate Russo-European relations.²⁸ In this way, the transatlantic alliance could serve as a means to incorporate Russia into the broader security framework of the West and thereby alleviate the potential security threat to both Russia and the West posed by a revisionist Moscow. Jonathan Dean's *Ending Europe's Wars* promotes this line of argument and effectively uses the historical record to demonstrate the practicality of the West's institutionalism to

²⁶Hal Gardner, *Dangerous Crossroads: Europe, Russia, and the Future of NATO* (Westport: Greenwood, 1997); Jeffrey Simon also presents a good overview of the various factors impacting NATO enlargement and presents specific views from those associate states which are not likely to join the alliance; Jeffrey Simon, *NATO Enlargement* (New York: New York University, 1997).

²⁷Bertram suggests the development of a "variety" of institutions that would match the "diversity" of interests held by the major European powers and the United States; Christoph Bertram, *Europe in the Balance: Securing the Peace Won in the Cold War* (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment, 1995).

²⁸See James Goodby, *Europe Undivided: The New Logic of Peace in U.S.-Russian Relations* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, 1998); Sean Kay, *NATO and the Future of European Security* (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998); Colin McInnes, ed., *Security and Strategy in the New Europe* (New York: Routledge 1992); and Mary M. McKenzie and Peter H. Loedel, *The Promise and Reality of European Security Cooperation* (New York: Praeger, 1995).

counter past threats, but also champions the need to further develop new methods to contain emerging threats.²⁹

Transatlantic relations in the post-Cold War era form the basis for a variety of works which examine Euro-American relations in general and more specifically, security relations. A number of pieces combine the economic and security aspects of transatlantic relations in order to explain or predict trends.³⁰ Certain works offer innovative means to further strengthen Euro-American relations through the establishment of deeper institutional ties.³¹

Studies that examine institutionalism in Europe abound. One the first post-Cold War efforts was also one of the most significant: Robert O. Keohane, Joseph S. Nye and Stanley Hoffman's edited work *After the Cold War: International Institutions and State Strategies in Europe, 1989-1991*.³² This work offered a collection of essays which examined the role of nationstates and institutions in post-Cold War Europe, and the constraints and benefits that each actor provides to the other. The broader issues of nationstate-institutional cooperation and competition are explored in *Maastricht and*

²⁹Jonathan Dean, *Ending Europe's Wars: The Continuing Search for Peace and Security* (New York: Priority, 1995).

³⁰See Michael Smith and Stephen Woolcock, *Redefining the U.S.-EC Relationship* (New York: Council on Foreign Affairs, 1993).

³¹For instance, see the proposal for a NATO-EU Action Committee to coordinate the expansion of both institutions; Simon Serfaty, *Stay the Course: European Unity and Atlantic Solidarity* (Washington, D.C.: CSIS, 1997).

³²Robert O. Keohane, Joseph S. Nye and Stanley Hoffman, eds., *After the Cold War: International Institutions and State Strategies in Europe, 1989-1991* (Cambridge: Harvard University, 1993).

*Beyond: Building the European Union.*³³ Meanwhile the interplay between Europe's institutional framework and the individual nationstates of the West is the subject of Alan Milward's *The European Rescue of the Nation-State*.³⁴ The issue of state sovereignty in the European Union (EU) is further examined in a work by Michael Newman which analyses the impact of supranational structures on democracy and warns of the potential dangers inherent in surrendering elements of national governance to the bureaucracy of Brussels.³⁵ Terrence Guay similarly criticizes the EU for its role in European defense-industrial consolidation. Guay traces the need for restructuring of the EU's defense industries, but then suggests that Brussels needs to "broaden" its policy making agenda to develop strategies that will encourage the sector to become more competitive.³⁶ However, James Sperling and Emil Kirchner take a much more positive view of the role of institutions in promoting both security and economic cooperation and suggest that these structures are the most significant aspects of the West in its relations with the states of Central and Eastern Europe.³⁷ This theme is echoed in works that analyze EU

³³Andrew Duff, John Pinder and Roy Pryce, eds., *Maastricht and Beyond: Building the European Union* (New York: Routledge, 1994).

³⁴Alan Milward, *The European Rescue of the Nation-State* (Berkeley: University of California, 1992).

³⁵Michael Newman, *Democracy, Sovereignty and the European Union* (New York: St. Martin's, 1996). See also, Stephen Wood, *Germany, Europe and the Persistence of Nations: Transformation, Interests and Identity, 1989-1996* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998).

³⁶Terrence Guay, *At Arm's Length: The European Union and Europe's Defence Industry* (New York: St. Martin's, 1997).

³⁷James Sperling and Emil Kirchner, *Recasting the European Security Order: Security Architectures and Economic Cooperation (Europe in Change)* (Manchester: Manchester University, 1997).

relations with the East on a broader level, including the expansion of the Union to specific states of the former Warsaw bloc.³⁸

Security relations between the United States and Europe has also been the subject of numerous works in the post-Cold War period as scholars have endeavored to understand the implications inherent in the era. Michael Brenner edited a work that presented national perspectives of the major powers on multilateral efforts to ensure European security.³⁹ The U.S. military drawdown prompted many to call for increased and autonomous European security capabilities to compensate for the lower U.S. military presence, and in preparation for a possible U.S. withdrawal.⁴⁰ The issue also resurrected the burdensharing debate of the 1980s.⁴¹ The European Union and WEU became the preferred vehicles with which to achieve an independent European Security

³⁸On EU expansion, see Graham Avery and Fraser Cameron, *The Enlargement of the European Union* (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 1998). On the role of institutions in facilitating expansion, see Christopher Hill, ed., *The Actors in Europe's Foreign Policy* (New York: Routledge, 1996).

³⁹Michael Brenner, ed., *Multilateralism and Western Security* (New York: St. Martin's, 1995).

⁴⁰Holly Wyatt-Walker argues that pressure for an autonomous European security system came from a general sense of dissatisfaction with U.S. leadership in NATO, and the desire of Europeanist states, mainly France, to assume a leadership role in continental security; Holly Wyatt-Walker, *European Community and the Security Dilemma, 1972-92* (New York: St. Martin's, 1997).

⁴¹This issue is examined by Simon Duke, who identifies the main sources of contention among the allies and more significantly traces the methodologies used by each side in the debate over the proportionality of defense spending by the United States and its major Western allies; Simon Duke, *The Burdensharing Debate: A Reassessment* (New York: St. Martin's, 1993).

and Defense Identity (ESDI).⁴² G. Wyn Rees presents a thorough examination of the WEU and the major interests of powers such as Great Britain, France, and Germany. The work also assesses the current capabilities and potential future operational capacities of the organization.⁴³ Kim Edward Spiezio calls for an even greater recalculation of the current security system because of what he contends are the domestic constraints which prevent the successful implementation of a collective security regime on the continent.⁴⁴ Michael Mandelbaum also examines the durability of the transatlantic alliance and the U.S. commitment to Europe, and concludes that the post-Cold War transition has not yet been completed and that there needs to be further institutional development in order to complete the “common security order” sought by the members of the alliance and Europe in general.⁴⁵

Meanwhile, bilateral dealings between the U.S. and various European states also provide insight into the main issues of contemporary Euro-American relations. Changing German policies toward NATO and the U.S. are examined by Joyce M. Mushaben who uses the amorphous “German Question” as the basis for an analysis of the willingness of the nation’s political leadership and its populace to take on a role

⁴²There are a number of works on ESDI and the WEU written in immediate post-Cold War era. See, for instance, Werner J. Feld, *The Future of European Security and Defense Policy* (Boulder: Lynne Reiner, 1993); and Robert Jackson, ed., *Europe in Transition: The Management of Security After the Cold War* (New York: Praeger, 1992).

⁴³Wyn Rees, *The Western European Union at the Crossroads: Between Trans-Atlantic Solidarity and European Integration* (Boulder: Westport, 1998).

⁴⁴Kim Edward Spiezio, *Beyond Containment: Reconstructing European Security* (Boulder: Lynne Reiner, 1995).

⁴⁵Michael Mandelbaum, *The Dawn of Peace in Europe* (New York: Twentieth-Century Fund, 1996).

more in line with Germany's capabilities.⁴⁶ Timothy Garton Ash's colossal work, *In Europe's Name: Germany and the Divided Continent*, offers deep insights into Germany's relations with its neighbors and on Germany policy toward Europe.⁴⁷ Gregory Treverton adds a transatlantic dimension to these questions by incorporating U.S.-German relations into a broader study of Germany's place and role in the new Europe.⁴⁸

Franco-German relations have formed the basis of not only the economic integration of Europe,⁴⁹ but also efforts to develop intra-European security structures. The history of the relationship is traced with great insight in Julius Friend's work, *The Linchpin: French-German Relations, 1950-1990*.⁵⁰ The efforts at developing joint or European-wide security structures are examined in works by Philip Gordon and David Haglund who both conclude that Franco-German cooperation served as a means of

⁴⁶Joyce M. Mushaben, *From Post-War to Post-Wall Generations: Changing Attitudes Towards the National Question and NATO in the Federal Republic of Germany* (Boulder: Westview, 1997).

⁴⁷Timothy Garton Ash, *In Europe's Name: Germany and the Divided Continent* (New York: Random House, 1993). On German policies toward integration in general, see David Marsh, *Germany and Europe* (London: Heineman, 1994); Heinz Kurz, ed., *United Germany and the New Europe* (Brookfield, VT: Edwards Elgar, 1993); and Paul Stares, *The New Germany and the New Europe* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute, 1992).

⁴⁸Gregory Treverton, *America, Germany, and the Future of Europe* (Princeton: Princeton University, 1992).

⁴⁹See Collette Mazzucelli, *France and Germany at Maastricht: Politics and Negotiations to Create the European Union* (New York: Garland, 1997).

⁵⁰Julius Friend, *The Linchpin: Franco-German Relations, 1950-1990* (New York: Praeger, 1991). On Franco-German cooperation at all levels, see also Patrick McCarthy, ed., *France-Germany, 1983-1993: The Struggle to Cooperate* (New York: St. Martin's 1993).

maintaining French involvement in the transatlantic alliance, albeit one step-removed from integration with NATO.⁵¹ The transformation of French foreign policy has also been the subject of a number of works that examine the impact of the end of the Cold War and German reunification on the Gaullist legacy and French foreign policy in general.⁵²

One of the keys to European security, however, continues to be the bilateral relationship between France and the United States. The election of Jacques Chirac as President of France ushered in a era of increasing cooperation between the two nations. However, the initial promises of French reintegration into NATO and closes security ties between Washington and Paris have dissipated somewhat as the French have undergone painful defense reductions and reforms, while their self-perceived “status” has not been accorded the consideration by Washington that many in Paris had initially hoped. The perceived reduced importance of France led Steven P. Kramer to examine the subject in *Does France Still Count?*⁵³ Other works also stress the continuing, albeit changed, relevance of the Franco-American relationship to European security.⁵⁴

⁵¹Philip H. Gordon, *France, Germany and the Western Alliance* (Boulder: Westview, 1995); and David G. Haglund, *Alliance Within the Alliance? Franco-German Military Cooperation and the European Pillar of Defense* (Boulder: Westview, 1991).

⁵²See Philip Gordon, *A Certain Idea of France* (New York: St. Martin's, 1993); or Robbin Laird, *French Security Policy in Transition: Dynamics of Continuity and Change* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 1995).

⁵³Kramer concludes that, yes, France remains vitally important to the future success of any European security system; Steven P. Kramer, *Does France Still Count?: The Role of France in the New Europe* (Westport: Praeger, 1994).

⁵⁴See Robert P. Grant, *The Changing Franco-American Security Relationship: New Directions for NATO and European Defense Cooperation* (Arlington, VA: US-Crest, 1993); and Philip H. Gordon, *French Security Policy After the Cold War:*

Great Britain's relationship with the United States continues to differ from that of its continental neighbors. John W. Young examines the initial British policies toward integration and then traced the evolution of policy through the Cold War.⁵⁵ Modern British policy toward the EU is debated in an edited work by Jonathon Bradley and John Mawson.⁵⁶ A diverse overview of Anglo-American relations since 1939 is presented in an edited work by John Baylis,⁵⁷ while the changes in British policy toward the U.S. since the election of the Labour Party are examined in a book by Peter Jones.⁵⁸

The opening section of this study delves into current theoretical debates over the place and role of the nation state in the changed global community. The second chapter begins with an overview of the two main schools of international relations theory: Realism and Institutionalism. The realist school of international relations theory places the nationstate as the primary actor in the international system. However, the proliferation and increasing strength of international organizations and institutions has caused some loss of the individual state's power. Liberal Institutionalists contend that this loss of sovereignty has been significant and that states must now share the global

Continuity, Change, and Implications for the United States (Santa Monica: RAND, 1992).

⁵⁵John W. Young, *Britain and European Integration, 1945-1992* (New York: St. Martin's, 1993).

⁵⁶Jonathon Kingsley and John Mawson, *British Regionalism and Devolution: The Challenges of State Reform and European Integration* (London: Kingsley, 1997).

⁵⁷John Baylis, *Anglo-American Relations Since 1939: The Enduring Alliance* (New York: St. Martin's, 1997).

⁵⁸Peter Jones, *America and the British Labour Party: The "Special Relationship" at Work* (New York: Taurus Academic Studies, 1997).

arena with non-state actors such as international organizations (IOs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Not all IOs and NGOs have had a detrimental impact on the nationstate. Institutions and regimes facilitated the augmentation of power by small and medium states through practices such as bandwagoning and coalition-membership with powerful states.⁵⁹ States have found it practical to pool their sovereignty, even if it has meant some reduction in sovereignty in certain areas, as a means to reinforce sovereignty in other areas. This has led to the proliferation of regimes in the current international system. In spite of this proliferation, realists assert that nationstates remain the central actors in international relations since states avoid regimes that are not in their best interests. Instead, IOs and regimes act to reinforce behavior that states would utilize under certain given circumstances. The chapter will examine the central questions over IOs and regimes. Such questions include: What is the true role of supranational organizations in the current global system? Are IOs and international regimes supplanting the role traditionally associated with the nationstate? Or does the nationstate remain the sole significant actor in world politics?

In the third chapter the period of predominance by nationstates is examined. The increasing political centralization and the institutionalization of public authority is shown to be one of the characteristics of the period as nationstates eclipsed multinational political organizations such as the church or multiethnic empires to dominant world politics.⁶⁰ Nonetheless, the proliferation and enhanced influence of IOs and regimes

⁵⁹Stephen M. Walt, "Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power," *International Security* 9, no. 4 (Spring 1995): 225-41.

⁶⁰Robert Keohane, ed., *Neorealism and Its Critics* (New York: Columbia University, 1986), 143.

have challenged the accepted concepts of sovereignty associated with the nationstate. The chapter concentrates on the broad transformations of sovereignty and the power of the nationstate in the post-World War II era by addressing five broad themes. First, the rise of the nationstate is set against the backdrop of the formation of the global system which reinforced the primacy of that unit in international relations. Second, the formation of the “trading state” will be examined as nationstates endeavored to adjust to the changing global market.⁶¹ Third, the newfound political power of domestic constituents has led to the development of “two-level” games in developed democracies as statesmen have recognized the necessity of building domestic support in foreign policy.⁶² Fourth, the ever-increasing mobility of capital and labor have created what Richard Rosecrance terms the “virtual state,”⁶³ which has, in turn, created a new concept of national sovereignty and the role of the nationstate. Fifth, and finally, the transformations of sovereignty as a result of the increased power of IOs has led to the development of the “memberstate” as a means to access collective sovereignty.

Chapter IV examines collective security on a broad level, and the existing security regime in Western Europe. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

⁶¹See Richard Rosecrance, *The Rise of the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World* (New York: Basic Books, 1986).

⁶²Robert Putnam argues that existing state-centric theories of international politics fail to satisfactorily explain the linkages between foreign and domestic policy agendas. He argues that the two areas are closely linked, especially in terms of the increasing necessity to win ratification of foreign policy goals in national legislatures; Robert Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” *International Organization* 42 (Summer 1988): 427-61.

⁶³Richard Rosecrance, “The Rise of the Virtual State,” *Foreign Affairs* 75, no. 4 (July/August 1996): 46.

and the Western European Union (WEU) are judged to form the basis of a security regime for the nationstates of the region. The evolution of the regime coincided with the development of patterns of cooperation which have become institutionalized. Hence, there has been a reduced impetus for the pursuit of unilateral security policies. The rules and norms of the regime have become internalized.⁶⁴ This has resulted in an amelioration of traditional security threats by extending the public good of security to all of the memberstates.⁶⁵ This has freed states to concentrate on economic pursuits, and given rise first to the trading state, and then to the virtual- and memberstate. West European states have increasingly combined their security policies with their economic policies through actions such as weapons sales and arms transfers so that the line between economic and strategic interests has been significantly diminished. There has also developed a regional society of states. Hedley Bull asserts that an international society (or a society of states) “exists when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions.”⁶⁶ This society of states has a level of cooperation and interdependence that is unmatched elsewhere. This chapter will examine the main features that form the foundation of the current system of security in

⁶⁴Harald Muller, “The Internalization of Principles, Norms, and Rules by Governments: The Case of Security Regimes,” in *Regime Theory and International Relations*, ed. Volker Rittberger (New York: Oxford University, 1993), 383.

⁶⁵For the Western European states, this has meant the decline of a direct military invasion by neighboring states.

⁶⁶Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University, 1977), 13.

Europe, and what impact this regime has on the security policies of nationstates. Specifically, the major tenets of security regimes and the attributes of a collective security system, will be evaluated against the current security regime of the West. In addition, the role of the United States will be explored in its impact on European integration. The chapter concludes by examining the impact of the current system in light of the restraints and advantages that nationstates gain from the system.

The next section of this work provides an overview of the most pressing “new” security threats to Europe. The end of the Cold War and the demise of the bipolar era disrupted the accepted consensus over national security. Furthermore, a nation's economic stature became joined with issues of national security. This reconfiguration of security priorities transpired as new challenges to traditional security have confronted policy makers. Among these new concerns are factors such as the re-appearance of nationalism and ethnic strife on the European continent itself; the potential destabilization of Europe's southern flank; and proliferation issues, including both the spread, and possible spread, of weapons of mass destruction .

Nationalism reemerged as a security concern for Western Europe for a variety of reasons. Chapter V examines the potential threats posed by nationalism's new rise. In general, these new nationalistic challenges can be divided into two broad categories: ethno- and religious nationalism; and a renationalization of Russia. Initially, the end of the Cold War prompted some to assert that the end of the bipolar system would lead a renationalization of West European states as the unifying threat to the West dissipated and a reunified, and potentially resurgent, Germany would force other states to renationalize security policies in order to counter hegemony. Western European faced a

much more significant threat from the emergence of nationalism in Eastern and Central Europe since few of the emerging states of the region have homogenous populations and accepted borders—at a time when nationalism has increasingly been defined along ethnic and religious lines. Ethno- and religious nationalism has caused minority problems associated with self-determination movements.⁶⁷ The states of the former Eastern bloc, including those of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), have numerous minority problems that range from armed strife as in the case of the former Yugoslavia to questions of citizenship and status as in the Baltic states.⁶⁸ The as of yet unsettled nature of the majority of these minority questions and the geographic proximity of a number of such conflicts in Central and Eastern Europe necessitate that the West must develop a mechanism to deal with future Bosnias or Chechnyas. Western Europe must also be prepared for the possibility of a re-emergence of Russian nationalism and the potential spillover which might emerge from internal instability within the Russian Federation. West European nations must develop policies that maintain deterrence against a revisionist Russia, yet do not risk alienation of the former superpower. This chapter asserts that the means with which to accomplish these goals is the present security framework of Western Europe.

Chapter VI examines the potential threats emanating from Europe's southern flank. Political and economic instability in the Maghreb region and the broader Middle East have led to increased levels of immigration and refugee movement to Europe. High

⁶⁷Duke, *Security Disorder*, 57.

⁶⁸Stephen Iwan Griffiths, "Nationalism in Central and South-Eastern Europe," in *Security and Strategy in the New Europe*, ed. Colin McInnes (New York: Routledge, 1992), 64-65

levels of unemployment throughout much of Europe has caused immigration to become an increasingly factious political matter. Southern Europe, including France and Italy, have also faced periodic outbreaks of terrorism affiliated with regional conflicts in the Mediterranean. The most significant source of such unrest has been Algeria, but the potential for instability exists in a number of other states in the broader context of the Middle East region, including the Persian Gulf. Tensions have been exacerbated by the proliferation of advanced weapons systems and weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). Southern European states, including France, Spain and Italy, have called for increased or new security structures to counter these threats, especially in light of the militarization of the region. In addition to the proliferation of WMDs, the Middle East continues to be the largest arms market in the world.⁶⁹ This chapter examines European interests in the region, and the potential threats to such interests posed by national and subnational forces in the Mediterranean basin, the Persian Gulf, and the broader region of the Middle East.

The seventh chapter provides an overview of the potential threats to Europe posed by WMDs,⁷⁰ especially in light of the militarization of the Middle East and North Africa. For much of the Cold War era, and to a greater degree afterwards, a series of international regimes emerged which were designed to constrain the development of, and more importantly, prevent the use of WMDs. With the demise of the Soviet Union, however, questions arose over the capability of the Russian Federation to control its

⁶⁹See, International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), *The Military Balance, 1997/98* (London: Oxford, 1998).

⁷⁰WMDs are traditionally defined as nuclear, biological or chemical weapons.

nuclear hardware and the expertise capable of producing WMDs. These issues have become prominent as several states with less than stable or questionable political regimes have embarked on WMD programs. The efforts of these “rogue” or “pariah” states, including Libya and Iraq, to develop nuclear weapons or other WMDs have occurred simultaneously with several well-publicized efforts by international terrorist groups to attain WMDs. This chapter will examine the main proliferation threats faced by Western Europe: 1) The control and maintenance of the infrastructure of the WMDs of the former Soviet Union; 2) the acquisition of WMDs and the development of indigenous means of production of these weapons by pariah states; and finally, 3) the transfer of WMD technology, principally the sale of delivery systems, capable of targeting Western Europe, but also the trade in dual-use technology to produce WMDs.

In response to economic pressures caused by the continuing stagnant European economy and the drive and implementation of European Monetary Union, and in an recognition of the reconfigurations security and national interests, European states have engaged in a variety of ad hoc endeavors to preserve or augment their defense capabilities by combining national security assets and developing joint capacities. The majority of these efforts are bilateral and extend to both the uniformed services and to nations's defense-industrial complexes. However, increasingly, nations are attempting to develop multilateral institutions and structures to augment national defense. The final section of the work examines specific efforts at integration on both the military and defense-industrial level.

In Chapter VIII, the effort to generate a multinational, European army, the European Defense Community (EDC) is traced against the backdrop of the

contemporary balance of power system during the early Cold War era. During this period, a balance of power system emerged between the Western and the Soviet blocs. A notable feature of bipolarity was the stability that it produced. This period of equilibrium encouraged the development of the institutional framework that marked Western Europe. U.S. economic and military primacy compelled the European states to adopt policies that reflected American preferences for integration and collaborative engagement.⁷¹ This integration and the later economic interdependence of the states of the region may have abraded aspects of state sovereignty, however, they have also augmented the nationstate's access to public goods generated by the global economy. Integration has also increased the security of individual nationstates.⁷² Consequently, the bipolar balance of power system and American primacy combined to establish a framework which stimulated and sustained patterns of cooperation on security issues in Western Europe. This in turn led to the dramatic growth and proliferation of institutions and regimes. Although the EDC failed, it set the stage for the later successes of institutionalism on the continent.

The failure of the EDC marked a temporary pause in the drive for European military integration that was quickly overcome by the resurrection of the Western European Union (WEU). The enhanced Transatlantic Alliance that materialized from the ashes of the EDC was the means by which the states of West developed a

⁷¹On this theme see John G. Ruggie, "Third Try At World Order? America and Multilateralism After the Cold War," *Political Science Quarterly*, 109 (Fall 1994): 553-70.

⁷²See Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, *Power and Interdependence*, 2d. ed., (New York: Harper Collins, 1989), especially 245-57.

sophisticated security regime. This regime both developed and enforced the rules and norms that allowed for the denationalization of borders and the amelioration of the security dilemma between the nationstates of the region. By the 1980s, there was a renewed drive for the Europeanization of the Transatlantic Alliance. In order to obtain an autonomous European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI), the Europeans have worked along two tracks: 1) the establishment of increased capabilities through the WEU; and 2) the development of an integrated defense market through the Western European Armaments Group (WEAG). Chapter IX examines the post-Cold War development of these security structures in Europe. The chapter traces the evolution of the efforts to more fully develop the WEU into an operational organization, as well as the bid to have the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) assume a larger role in European security. It also demonstrates the need for continued U.S. involvement, and the centrality of NATO, in European security.

Chapter X outlines the effort to foster a unified defense market in Western Europe. There have been intermittent efforts toward this goal since the 1950s,⁷³ however defense cutbacks and declining arms transfers have added impetus to the development of such a market during this period of consolidation and excess capacity for the major European defense manufacturers.⁷⁴ In an effort to lessen reliance on American products

⁷³In October 1953, France (F), Italy (I), the Netherlands (N), Belgium (BE) and Luxembourg (L) formed FINBEL which promoted consultation and coordination among the member states, including the standardization of equipment.

⁷⁴In overall terms, defense outlays declined by an average of twelve percent between 1989 and 1994. In addition, between 1984 and 1992, some 410,000 defense related jobs were lost (out a total of just over a million), and it is expected that the West European defense industry will continue to lose some 30,000 jobs a year for the foreseeable future; WEU, Assembly of the WEU, *WEAG: The Course to be Followed*,

and preserve national industries, as well as to establish autonomous capabilities for the next generation of sophisticated weaponry, the Western European Armaments Group (WEAG) was formed in 1992 as part of the WEU.⁷⁵ Impetus for increased cooperation has occurred as the European states have lagged behind the United States in their transition to defense production in the post-Cold War era. This chapter will also review the contemporary directions in the defense industry and the impact of downsizing on European arms manufacturers. The growing influence of the private sector will be presented against the response of the Europeans to constraints on arms manufacture and the consequent multilateralism. The U.S. and France will be used to demonstrate the divergent responses to the changed environment in the defense sector as a means to demonstrate the contradictory approaches taken to adopt to the post-Cold War global arms market.⁷⁶ Finally, strategies to preserve Europe's defense-industrial base will be examined in light of the continuing constriction on the sector and the renewed bi- and multilateralism of the market.

The conclusion of this study will demonstrate that the changing nature of the nationstate, new definitions of national security, and economic pressures on individual

WEU Document 1483 (6 November 1995).

⁷⁵The purposes of WEAG include "the reduction of national research, development and production costs which overlap"; "creation of conditions for an integrated, rationalized and competitive European defense industry;" and "identification of conditions and measures which could improve market conditions for a more competitive approach to European, including intra-European, procurement;" Ibid., 13.

⁷⁶France and the United Kingdom are Europe's leading arms producers, and in 1997, France ranked second only to the United States in total arms sales. In addition, France has become the leading supplier of arms to developing nations. More significantly, France has pursued a very different strategy toward defense-industrial restructuring than has the United States.

states will drive further efforts at military integration in Europe. Most significantly, present attempts at collaborative military ventures are proving much more successful as the end-goals are significantly lower than past attempts, and thereby more attainable. Furthermore, the Cold War experiences of members of the transatlantic Alliance has fostered a culture of cooperation which has demonstrated the practical benefits gained through cooperation. Most significantly, there is a convergence around the utility of integrated military units. With reduced and changed security threats, there is no longer a need for large conventional armies. The new threats to European security are those that can best be met through collective responses. In addition, the economic realities have forced reductions in both equipment and standing troop strength. The policy pursued by European nations is the policy pursued during the Cold War, collective security through multilateral military structures and continued military integration.

CHAPTER II

REALISM AND LIBERALISM

This chapter begins an examination of the current theoretical debate over the place and role of the nationstate by contrasting the two main lines of international relations theory--realism and liberal institutionalism. While the realist school emphasizes the nationstate as the primary actor in the international system, the liberal institutionalist school asserts that the proliferation and increasing strength of international organizations and institutions have eroded a significant degree of the individual state's power. Yet, these institutions and regimes have also allowed smaller and medium states to augment their power through the practice of bandwagoning or through coalition-membership with more powerful states.¹ Hence, some states have found it practical to pool their sovereignty, even if it has meant some reduction in certain areas of sovereignty. These states have used collective structures as a means to actually increase their power and status in other spheres. This phenomenon has contributed to the growth and spread of international organizations (IOs) and regimes in the current international system. Nonetheless, realists contend that the nationstate remains the central actor in world politics, and that states rarely join or comply with regimes that are not in their best interests. Thus, realists contend, IOs and regimes merely reinforce behavior that states would adopt anyhow. In the midst of this debate, basic questions over the exact nature of the IOs and regimes remain: What is the true role of

¹Walt, "Alliance Formation," 231.

supranational organizations in the current global system? Are IOs and international regimes supplanting the role traditionally associated with the nationstate? Or does the nationstate remain the sole significant actor in world politics? In order to gain some insight into the possible answers of these questions, a review of the current debate in international relations theory is necessary.

The realist school of international relations theory has its roots in antiquity and can trace its modern form back to the post-World War I era where the failure of the League of Nations to deter or punish state aggression and the collapse of the world economic regime marked a retreat from the idealism prevalent at the war's end.² In ancient Greece, Thucydides laid-out the basic premises of realism in his treatise on the causes of the Peloponnesian War. Thucydides made three major assertions about the international system. First, that states (in the case of Thucydides, city-states) are the primary actors in the world's political system.³ Second, that states seek power as a means and as an end to ensure their survival in an anarchical world. In this context, power is defined in terms of the allocation of resources among the actors in the world's political system.⁴ The more resources an actor possesses, the more power it has, and this

²On the chronological shifts between realism and liberalism, see William C. Olson and A. J. R. Groom, *International Relations Then and Now: Origins and Trends in Interpretation* (London: Harper Collins, 1991).

³Early realists, such as Thucydides or Machiavelli, were less state-centric in their works than later proponents of realism; however, both recognized that city-states or feudal kingdoms were the dominant actors in international politics. The difference is tied to the distinctions between those political units that were prevalent in earlier times and the modern nationstate; R.B.J. Walker, *Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1993), 65-66.

⁴Power can also be defined "as the ability of an actor to get others to do something they otherwise would not do (and at an acceptable cost to the actor);"

leads actors to attempt to maintain their relative resource ranking.⁵ Third, states are rational actors, with ordered sets of preferences.⁶ As rational actors, states engage in cost-benefit analysis before initiating actions, and thus their actions are easily comprehensible by other actors in the international system.⁷ The Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, marked the emergence of the nationstate as the key political unit in the international system and realism held sway as the dominant philosophy in international politics until the end of the nineteenth century.⁸

The rapid diffusion of technology across Europe prevented any one state from having notable military advantages over another. This, combined with the geography of Europe, made political unification of the continent nearly impossible. The essentially simultaneous development of several nationstates prevented any one from gaining ascendancy over its neighbors, as balance of power systems developed. As a result,

Keohane and Nye, *Power and Interdependence*, 11. For a deeper analysis of the fungibility of power, see Kenneth N. Waltz, "Reflections on *Theory of International Politics: A Response to My Critics*," in *Neorealism and Its Critics*, ed. Robert O. Keohane (New York: Columbia University, 1986), 333-34.

⁵Joseph M. Grieco, *Cooperation Among Nations: Europe, America and Non-Tariff Barriers to Trade* (Ithaca: Cornell University, 1990), 10, 39-40.

⁶R. Harrison Wagner, "Deterrence and Bargaining," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 26, no. 2 (June 1982): 335-36.

⁷Robert O. Keohane, "Realism, Neorealism and the Study of World Politics," in *Neorealism and its Critics*, ed. Robert O. Keohane (New York: Columbia University, 1986), 7.

⁸Thomas Hobbes was one of the first scholars to emphasize the importance of the new nationstates. For a discussion of the differences between Hobbes and earlier writers, see Steven Forde, "International Realism and the Science of Politics: Thucydides, Machiavelli, and Neorealism," *International Studies Quarterly* 39, no. 2 (June 1995): 143-45.

attempts to unify Europe during this time period came to naught.⁹ With the emergence of the nationstate, political realism became the dominant paradigm in international relations, and efforts by authors such as Immanuel Kant¹⁰ to promote international law failed to gain significant support as balance of power politics and the emergence of the Concert of Europe confirmed the primacy of realist politics.¹¹

By the end of the nineteenth century there was a broad movement to supplant political realism as the dominant theme of international relations. Efforts such as the Hague Conferences or the Pan-American Congresses, were demonstrative of the belief that international law and supranational organizations could be established so as to restrain the power politics of the nationstate. However the onset of World War I dashed these hopes as power politics dominated the calculations surrounding the outbreak of the war.¹² Idealism, the attempt to apply legal and moral standards to state conduct, as exemplified by Wilson's proposals at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 and the Kellogg-Briand Pact, briefly resurfaced in the 1920s, but was again eclipsed by realism as international law and the League of Nations failed to deter aggressor states, and the

⁹Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (New York: Cambridge University, 1981), 121.

¹⁰Kant is usually placed in opposition to Hobbes; he is said to have written about the way things ought to be, rather than the way they actually were. As a result, his works were less useful to leaders engaged in power politics; Jean Bartelson, "The Trial of Judgement: A Note on Kant and the Paradoxes of Internationalism," *International Studies Quarterly* 39, no. 2 (June 1995): 263.

¹¹See Richard B. Elrod, "The Concert of Europe: A Fresh Look at an International System," *World Politics*, 28 (January 1976): 159-63; and more generally; Robert Axelrod, *The Emergence of Cooperation* (New York: Basic Books, 1984).

¹²James Joll, *The Origins of the First World War* (New York: Longmans, 1984), 154-57.

prelude to World War II began.¹³

The events surrounding the outbreak of World War II and the break up of the Allied coalition at the end of the war that was marked by the onset of the U.S.-Soviet rivalry reinforced the dominance of political realism, even as new efforts, mainly through the establishment of the United Nations (UN), were being made to develop international law and institutions to constrain the worst excesses of state behavior. The postwar era also witnessed the emergence of a new class of scholars who further codified and developed the realist school. Attempts were made to develop realism into a science that could be applied to the study of international relations.¹⁴ Traditional realists emphasized the role of the nationstate and asserted that security and power are at the core of state behavior and that all other issues (economic prosperity, human rights, environmental problems, and so forth) are secondary to the pursuit of these twin goals. To these principals Hans Morgenthau further delineated international politics as a struggle for power that was marked by the rise and fall of great powers.¹⁵ History is a recurring struggle for wealth and power among nations, and is thus cyclical. Morgenthau also emphasized the balance of power in international relations. For him, stability in the

¹³The 1920s were an era in which the major powers embarked on an ambitious course of disarmament and reliance on international law. Besides the League of Nations and the Kellogg-Briand Pact, other instances of the confidence in international treaties include the Nine Power Act, and the Washington Naval Treaties.

¹⁴Modern realism is based mainly on three seminal works; E.H. Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations* (London: MacMillan, 1939; reprint London: MacMillan, 1946); Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (New York: Knopf, 1948); and Raymond Aron, *Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations* (Malabar: Robert E. Krieger, 1966).

¹⁵Morgenthau, 5.

international system is created when equilibrium among competing states, or competing groups of states, was reached. This balance of power naturally occurred as states sought to prevent dominance by any single state or coalition, and thereby shifted allegiances and alliances in an effort to forestall such primacy.¹⁶

Kenneth N. Waltz expanded on traditional realism through the development of a theory that became known as neorealism or structural realism.¹⁷ For neorealists, the world is an anarchical, self-help system with no effective government above the level of the nationstate, and no real system of norms or laws.¹⁸ For Waltz the optimum method for a state to ensure its own survival is to “drive for universal domination.”¹⁹ To classic realism, Waltz added an emphasis on the structure of the international system or the world’s distribution of power, as a means to determine state conduct. Thus, states in a unipolar system would act differently than states in a bi- or multipolar system since diverse global systems tend to reward or punish states in different manners. For example, a unipolar system, with a hegemonic power, would tend to reward state

¹⁶Ibid., 161; other early works that more clearly defined the concept of the balance of power include; Morton Kaplan, *System and Process in International Politics* (New York: Wiles, 1957); Richard Rosecrance, *Action and Reaction in World Politics: International Systems in Perspective* (Boston: Little Brown, 1963); and Stanley Hoffman, *The State of War* (New York: Praeger, 1965).

¹⁷See Kenneth N. Waltz, *Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis* (New York: Columbia University, 1959); and Kenneth N. Waltz, *The Theory of International Politics* (Reading, MA: Addison Wesley, 1979).

¹⁸Paul Viotti and Mark Kauppi define anarchy as “the absence of any hierarchy of authority” in the international system; Paul Viotti and Mark Kauppi, eds., *International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism* (New York: MacMillan, 1993), 48.

¹⁹Kenneth N. Waltz, “Anarchic Orders and Balances of Power,” in *Neorealism its Critics*, ed. Robert O. Keohane (New York: Columbia, 1986), 117.

cooperation, while in a multipolar system, states might find that cooperation merely aids other states in their attempts to gain power²⁰. The four main structural elements that determine an international system include: 1) number of great powers in the system; 2) the allocation of capabilities in the system; 3) the number of alliances; and 4) the scale of polarization of competing alliances.²¹ The lack of an effective supranational body with the capabilities to develop and enforce codes of conduct on individual states, makes cooperation unusual, and means that IOs and regimes are meaningless since powerful states can ignore or even change the rules of the IO or regime if those rules do not suit the powerful state.

Furthermore, although states always seek to improve their own security and power, they essentially only have two broad strategies to enhance their security, internal and external: “States, or those who act for them, try in more or less sensible ways to use the means available in order to achieve the ends in view. Those means fall into two categories: internal efforts (moves to increase economic capability, to increase military strength, to develop clever strategies) and external efforts (moves to strengthen and enlarge one’s own alliance or to weaken and shrink an opponent one).”²² Internal methods, then, involve bolstering a state’s own capabilities, both in terms of economic and military power. Internal efforts to improve security, however, often result in a

²⁰For realists, cooperation can best be defined as “both formal and informal reciprocated restraint;” Charles L. Glaser, “Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help,” *International Security* 19 (Winter 1994): 378.

²¹Patrick James, “Structural Realism and the Causes of War,” *Mershon International Studies Review* 39, no. 2 (October 1995): 183.

²²Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 115-16.

“security dilemma”—a phenomenon in which states attempt to bolster their own security leads other states to respond with improvements in their military capabilities.²³ This often leads to arms races or at least increased tensions. As a result, the first state not only does not see increased security, but often is left with a net loss in overall security.²⁴ This is because both offensive and defensive military preparations have the same results. A nation’s efforts to improve its defensive military capabilities, in order to protect itself from potential aggression, may be perceived as a potential offensive build-up by another state.²⁵ In addition, since defensive capabilities enjoy an advantage over offensive capabilities in terms of required resources, the offense-defense balance becomes crucial in the calculation of state power. Defensive military preparations can thus be just as threatening to other states as offensive preparations, since significant defensive capabilities require even greater offensive capabilities in order to maintain a threat

²³One of the original, and best, definitions of the security dilemma is that of John Herz, who asserted that actors must be “concerned about their security from being attacked, subjected, dominated, or annihilated by other groups and individuals. Striving to attain security from such attack, they are driven to acquire more and more power in order to escape the impact of the power of others. This, in turn, renders the others more insecure and compels them to prepare for the worst. Since none can ever feel entirely secure in such a world of competing units, power competition ensues, and the vicious circle of security and power accumulation is on;” John Herz, “Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma,” *World Politics*, 2 (1950): 157.

²⁴This circumstance was first noted by John Herz, who termed the phenomenon “the security and power dilemma;” John Herz, *Political Realism and Political Idealism* (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1951).

²⁵This phenomenon, offense-defense distinguishability, is examined at length in George Quester, *Offense and Defense in the International System* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1977).

potential.²⁶

External endeavors to increase security involve coalition or alliance formation and moves to either enhance the power of one's own group or weaken other groups. These efforts can lead to "power-balancing" as opposing coalitions or alliances achieve rough parity or equivalence (balance of power systems) or they can just as easily lead to war. In general, states form alliances or coalitions for either balancing purposes or bandwagoning. States tend to balance against another power when they perceive that power to be gaining hegemonic potential. Waltz describes balancing tendencies in the following manner: "In international politics, success leads to failure. The excessive accumulation of power by one state or coalition of states elicits the opposition of others."²⁷ States usually balance in order to preserve power and relative shares of resources. Hence, balancing is most likely to occur in the face of an external threat. Bandwagoning, however, takes the opposite track of balancing: nothing succeeds like success. States join coalitions with more powerful states to gain a share of perceived relative gains by an expansionist power. The goal of bandwagoning, then, is usually self-extension. As Randall L. Schweller describes it, "balancing is driven by the desire to avoid losses; bandwagoning by the opportunity for gain. The presence of a significant external threat, while required for effective balancing, is unnecessary for states to

²⁶Robert Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma," *World Politics*, 30, no. 2 (January 1978): 188.

²⁷Robert I. Rotberg and Theodore K. Rabb, eds., *The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars* (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1989), 49.

bandwagon.”²⁸ Stephen Walt concludes that states usually balance and seldom bandwagon.²⁹ Alliance choices are driven by threat imbalances, not power capabilities. When one state or coalition is perceived to be particularly expansionistic, states tend to balance against that power, even if it is not the most powerful actor in a given system in terms of its relative resource capabilities.³⁰

The formation of a balance of power system can lead to cooperation as states work together to restrain potential hegemonic powers. For a balance of power system to develop, several criteria must be met. There must be at least two states of roughly equal power which seek to enhance their status. The actors within the system must not be constrained from switching sides by ideology. The system must work to ensure the survival of the major powers while at the same time preventing hegemony over the system by any one power.³¹ Furthermore, war should be seen as a legitimate instrument of policy.³²

Through coalition building and alliance formation, realism recognizes the

²⁸Randall L. Schweller, “Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In,” *International Security*, 19 (Summer 1994): 73.

²⁹Kenneth Waltz takes the opposite track and asserts that states often bandwagon, but only up to a certain point. If it becomes likely that a powerful state will achieve hegemony, even bandwagoning states will balance against it; Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 123-38.

³⁰Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca: Cornell University, 1987), 263-65.

³¹Edward Vose Gulick, *Europe's Classical Balance of Power* (Washington, D.C.: AHA, 1955), 3-29.

³²Robert Jervis, “From Balance to Concert: A Study of International Security Cooperation,” *World Politics*, 38, no. 1 (October 1985): 60.

possibility of cooperation in the global system. Cooperation often occurs under the auspices of a hegemon. Robert O. Keohane's work on hegemonic stability theory is an effort to explain such cooperation.³³ Keohane argued "that hegemonic structures of power, dominated by a single country, are most conducive to the development of strong international regimes, whose rules are relatively precise and well-obeyed."³⁴ The hegemon is necessary to both set and enforce the rules surrounding cooperation and to ensure the fair distribution of public goods, such as security and economic prosperity, in order to maintain satisfaction with the organization or regime.

Some scholars contend that states automatically balance against the hegemon.³⁵ They assert that since states seek power to ensure their own survival, they will constantly attempt to augment their power at the expense of the hegemon. In an anarchic world states must always be aware that other states and especially hegemonal powers might use superior capabilities against them. Consequently, states always seek to gain relative power which gives them a "double payoff"--increased security and more options in the

³³Hegemonic stability theory is the view that "concentration of power in one dominant state facilitates the development of strong regimes, and that fragmentation of power is associated with regime collapse;" Robert O. Keohane, "The Demand for International Regimes," in *International Regimes*, ed. Stephen Krasner (Ithaca: Cornell University, 1983), 142.

³⁴Robert O. Keohane, "The Theory of Hegemonic Stability and Changes in International Economic Regimes, 1967-1977," in *Change in the International System*, ed. Ole Holsti, Randolph Siverson and Alexander L. George (Boulder: Westview, 1980).

³⁵Christopher Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Arise," *International Security* 17, no. 4 (Spring 1993): 1-41; Kenneth Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics," *International Security* 18, no. 3 (Fall 1993): 44-79.

international arena.³⁶ The appeal of this payoff leads states to constantly seek improvements in their security which, in turn, leads to hegemonic decline as these states constantly seek to gain relative advantages and the hegemon consistently strives to maintain its own relative advantages.

Because states constantly seek to improve their security, international institutions are unable to develop truly meaningful capabilities, since states are unwilling to surrender power and therefore jeopardize their security. Instead, international organizations are more likely to simply reflect the distribution of power and the preferences of the great powers of the day. Hence, institutions are often created by the great powers simply as a means to either preserve or enhance their share of power in the world. What is important is the balance of power—which states or coalitions possess the most power, which states possess the least. The balance or distribution of power in the international system is the key to determining state behavior. For neorealists, “the balance of power is the independent variable that explains war; institutions are merely an intervening variable in the process.”³⁷

In addition to the realist conception of international politics with its emphasis on the anarchical nature of world politics and its dismal outlook for international cooperation is institutionalism.³⁸ From the 1960s onward, many have asserted that new

³⁶Gilpin, *War*, 86-87.

³⁷Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller, eds., *The Perils of Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and International Security* (Cambridge: MIT, 1995), 340.

³⁸See David Baldwin, ed., *Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate* (New York: Columbia University, 1993).

actors in the world have begun to exert an increasing amount of power in world politics.³⁹ Furthermore, scholars have asserted that many international institutions have become, in various ways, as important as nationstates in the international system.⁴⁰ Other critics have challenged the realist contention that states are unitary and rational actors.⁴¹ Still others have pointed to the dramatic increase in interdependence created by the increasingly global economy as evidence that the realist emphasis on anarchy is overdone.

The liberal institutionalist school emerged in the early 1980s as a hybrid which accepted the main tenets of realism, including the anarchical nature of the international system and the primacy of the nationstate, but which asserted that international institutions and regimes could promote lasting cooperation, even without the oversight of a hegemon.⁴² The key to lasting cooperation is institutions. IOs bolster cooperation in a

³⁹For liberal institutionalists, power is defined broadly: “power is more than military strength. It depends at least as much on economic strength, the attractiveness of one’s ideas and economic system, and one’s willingness to spend resources on foreign policy. For many purposes—securing cooperation from other advanced societies, ensuring growth in the world economy, cleaning the global environment—military strength is not very important at all;” Robert O. Keohane, “The Diplomacy of Structural Change: Multilateral Institutions and State Strategies,” in *America and Europe in an Era of Change*, ed. Helga Haftendorn and Christian Tuschhoff (Boulder: Westview, 1993), 44-45.

⁴⁰See Ernst B. Haas, *Beyond the Nation-State: Functionalism and International Organization* (Stanford: Stanford University, 1964).

⁴¹For instance, state leaders often inaccurately judge the actions of other world leaders, and often engage in what might be termed “irrational” behavior at the international level in order to satisfy domestic audiences, see Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University, 1976).

⁴²For liberal institutionalists, cooperation can best be defined as “goal-directed behavior that entails mutual policy adjustments so that all sides end up better off than they would otherwise be;” Helen Milner, “International Theories of Cooperation Among

number of ways. They increase the flow of information and the transparency of states. They provide peaceful forums for conflict resolution. They also help states identify common interests.⁴³

As a whole, neoliberal institutionalism accepts the basic tenets of realism. States are acknowledged to be “crucial actors” in international politics.⁴⁴ Anarchy in the international system and its ability to constrain cooperation is also recognized.⁴⁵ Furthermore, states are also seen to be rational actors that engage in cost-benefit analysis and act only to further their interests. Participation in regimes and IOs results from states’ perception that these institutions can further their interests. If involvement in international institutions produces relative gains for states, those states will continue and even expand participation in such organizations.⁴⁶ Realism also accords some room for the role of international institutions. Joseph M. Grieco points out that “International institutions *do* matter for states as they attempt to cooperate. Indeed realists would argue that the problem with neoliberal institutionalism is not that it stresses the importance of institutions but that it *understates* the range of functions that institutions must perform to

Nations: Strengths and Weaknesses,” *World Politics* 44, no. 3 (April 1992): 468.

⁴³Peter Van Ham, “Can Institutions Hold Europe Together?” in *Redefining Europe: New Patterns of Conflict and Cooperation*, ed. Hugh Miall (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1994), 189.

⁴⁴Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton: Princeton University, 1984), 25.

⁴⁵Robert Axelrod and Robert O. Keohane, “Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions,” in *Cooperation Under Anarchy*, ed. Kenneth A. Oye (Princeton: Princeton University, 1986), 226.

⁴⁶Robert Powell, “Anarchy in International Relations Theory: The Neorealist-Neoliberal Debate,” *International Organization* 48, (1994): 318.

help state work together.”⁴⁷ Thus, realists will concede that IOs can facilitate cooperation, but in order to be successful, these institutions must be able to produce gains for all states involved, and not unbalanced gains whereby only certain states benefit from a regime. Furthermore, since regimes and institutions only reflect state preferences, realists contend that they are not “an independent force facilitating cooperation.”⁴⁸

However, the main difference between neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism centers around the relationship of states with one another. For neorealists, states measure their status both in terms of their absolute as well as their relative gains or losses. Relative gains by another state are perceived as dangerous. For the neoliberals, states’ “utility functions are independent of one another: they do not gain or lose utility simply because of the gains or losses of others.”⁴⁹ Hence, for the neoliberals, cooperation is possible because the relative gains of one state do not automatically translate into relative losses by another.

For liberal institutionalists the keys to the international system are regimes and IOs. The consensus definition of regimes is that they are “sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations.”⁵⁰ Institutions are

⁴⁷Grieco, *Cooperation Among Nations*, 233.

⁴⁸Joseph M. Grieco, “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism,” *International Organization* 42, (1988): 494.

⁴⁹Keohane, *After Hegemony*, 27.

⁵⁰Stephen Krasner, “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables,” in *International Regimes*, ed. Stephen Krasner (Ithaca: Cornell

formalized versions of regimes.⁵¹ One of the most significant differences between regimes and institutions is that regimes do not have the ability to act since they are made up of norms and principles.⁵² Instead, regimes rely on institutions to carry-out enforcement measures.⁵³ For instance, the complex issue of free trade has developed into a regime in Europe, with tacit and explicit rules, which is characterized by institutions that formalize rules and employ multilateral decision making processes.⁵⁴ Institutions can be defined more narrowly as “persistent and connected sets of rules and principles that prescribe behavioral roles, constrain activity, and shape expectations.”⁵⁵

University, 1983), 2.

⁵¹Charles A. Kupchan, "The Case for Collective Security," in *Collective Security Beyond the Cold War*, ed. George W. Downs (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1994), 48.

⁵²Andreas Hansenclever, Peter Mayer, and Volker Rittberger, "Interests, Power, Knowledge: The Study of International Regimes," *Mershon International Studies Review* 40, no. 2 (October 1996): 179.

⁵³Robert O. Keohane combines principles, norms and rules into a single category with his definition of regimes: "institutions with explicit rules, agreed upon by governments, that pertain to particular sets of issues in international relations;" Robert O. Keohane, "Neoliberal Institutionalism: A Perspective on World Politics," in *International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory*, ed. Robert O. Keohane (Boulder: Westview, 1989), 4. However, Keohane's narrow definition has been subject to much criticism, especially over its inability to account for the relationships between the factors within a regime.

⁵⁴In addition, this regime has allowed for non-security expansion, or economic augmentation, for nation-states, which has ameliorated the security dilemma, and hence prevented security rivalries by channeling economic competition through regime norms; Randall L. Schweller, "Neorealism's Status-Quo Bias: What Security Dilemma?" *Security Studies*, Special Issue, Realism: Restatements and Renewal, 5, no. 3 (Spring 1996): 92.

⁵⁵Robert O. Keohane, Peter Haas, and Marc Levy, eds., *Institutions for the Earth: Sources of Effective International Environmental Protection* (Cambridge: MIT, 1993), 4-5.

Norms are the “standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations:”

Common international norms include sovereignty, collective security, and free trade.⁵⁶

Hence, norms are about behavior, not ideals.⁵⁷

In the international system, norms serve four significant functions. First, they demarcate boundaries. They not only delineate a nationstate’s territory, but establish buffer zones and spheres of influence.⁵⁸ Examples of norms being used in this type of function include the 1885 Congress of Vienna which established spheres of influence in Africa or the Root-Takahira Agreement of 1908 in which the United States and Japan recognized each other’s possessions in the Pacific.⁵⁹ Since territorial disputes are the primary cause of war, these norms can help promote peace. Second, norms can discourage cheating on international agreements by clearly signaling under which circumstances other actors are prepared to act.⁶⁰ Modern examples of this type of norm

⁵⁶Andrew P. Cortell and James W. Davis, Jr., “How Do International Institutions Matter? The Domestic Impact of International Rules and Norms,” *International Studies Quarterly* 40, no. 4 (December 1996): 452.

⁵⁷Andrew Farkas, “The Evolution of International Norms,” *International Studies Quarterly* 40, no. 3 (September, 1996): 362.

⁵⁸Gregory A. Raymond, “Problems and Prospects in the Study of International Norms,” *Mershon International Studies Review* 41, no. 2 (November 1997): 214.

⁵⁹On the Root-Takahira Agreement, see Robert Bacon and James Brown Scott, *The Military and Colonial Policy of the United States, Addresses and Reports by Elihu Root* (Cambridge: Harvard, 1916).

⁶⁰Norms can determine prearranged courses of action for transgressions of international agreements: if state A violates agreement B, then the other signatories to B pledge that C course of action will result.

include the various global treaties on nuclear, biological and chemical weapons (NBC).⁶¹ Third, norms codify the procedures for international transactions. This has been especially apparent in the realm of global economics. Arrangements such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) have significantly reduced the cost of “doing business” for individual nations.⁶² Fourth, norms provide incentives for collective action. They provide justification for states to act as a group for implementation purposes.⁶³ Rules are the application of individual norms to specific circumstances. Examples of rules include practices established under GATT to outlaw certain subsidies, product dumping and other discriminatory economic policies.

While liberal institutionalists accept international anarchy, they argue that such anarchy can be alleviated by IOs and regimes which help states work toward common interests and share information and develop habits of cooperation, all the while providing means to peacefully settle disputes. In general, liberal institutionalism rests on three broad assumptions. First, it is more difficult to establish IOs and regimes than it is

⁶¹For instance, these treaties provide mechanisms that prompt multilateral action against violators of the norms, as well as encourage compliance through incentive programs. U.S., Department of Defense, *Weapons of Mass Destruction: Reducing the Threat From the Former Soviet Union*, NSIAD-95-7 (Washington, D.C.: GAO, 1995); U.S., House of Representatives, C. Bruce Tarter, testimony, “Stemming the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction,” *The Department of Energy’s Budget Request for FY 1996: Hearing of the Subcommittee on Military Procurement* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1995), 1.

⁶²As an example, the Tokyo round of the GATT negotiations in the mid-1980s, linked trade and monetary policy in such a way as encourage exports to the United States following a decision by the Reagan administration to weaken the dollar; Charles Pearson and Nils Johnson, *The New GATT Trade Round*, FPI Case Studies, no. 2 (Washington, D.C.: Johns Hopkins, 1986), 22-23.

⁶³For examples of this type of behavior see Axelrod, *Cooperation*.

to maintain them, since, once established, these organizations often take on a life of their own. Thus, contrary to realism, liberal institutionalism maintains that cooperation can continue and even flourish without hegemonic compulsion. Second, IOs and regimes encourage cooperation between nationstates that extends beyond the original mandate of the organization. Once patterns of collaboration and interaction are established between governments, these linkages facilitate further bargaining. In addition, nationstates have fewer incentives to attempt to “cheat,”⁶⁴ or gain unlawful advantages because of the “shadow of the future”—that is knowledge that nations will have to interact with other states again and again over time.⁶⁵ Finally, while institutions may not be able to force policies on nationstates, they do provide a forum for states to pursue their national interests by working with other states. Hence, nations are less likely to adopt unilateral policies that may undermine the institution since that “institution may be required again in the future, and destroying them because of short-term changes may be very costly in the long run. Institutional maintenance is not, then, a function of a waiving calculation; it becomes a factor in the decision calculus that keeps short-term calculations from becoming decisive.”⁶⁶

In his seminal work, *After Hegemony*, Robert Keohane presents a detailed probe

⁶⁴Cheating implies either observed or unobserved non-compliance with a regime’s norms or rules; it can thus be considered a “breach of promise.” In most institutionalist literature, defection, is the term used to describe cheating; John J. Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” *International Security* 19 (Winter 1994), 344.

⁶⁵Kenneth Oye, “Explaining Cooperation Under Anarchy,” in *Cooperation Under Anarchy*, ed. Kenneth A. Oye (Princeton: Princeton University, 1986), 14-15.

⁶⁶Arthur A. Stein, *Why Nations Cooperate: Circumstance and Choice in International Relations* (London: Cornell University, 1990), 52.

of the effect that regimes and IOs have on cooperation, and how cooperation can be organized in the world political economy. He also examines whether or not such cooperation can take place without a hegemon. Keohane uses a case study of postwar American practices to arrive at his conclusions. He deduces that cooperation can take place without a hegemon, if IOs and regimes are able to step-in and fill the role of the declining hegemon in maintaining that cooperation.⁶⁷ Consequently, as the world grows more interdependent and IOs become increasingly strengthened, hegemons will be less important in providing stability in the world.

This theme of interdependence and the lessening need for hegemons to provide stability is more deeply and fundamentally examined in Keohane's collaboration with Joseph Nye, *Power and Interdependence*. This work rebuts many of the traditional realist arguments about power by focusing on the growing importance of economic interdependence which they define as mutual dependence.⁶⁸ From this mutual dependence in given area-issues, there has now evolved complex interdependence. Complex interdependence “refers to a situation among a number of countries in which multiple channels of contact connect societies (that is, states do not monopolize these contacts); there is no hierarchy of issues; and military force is not used by governments toward one another.”⁶⁹ It also presupposes the presence of transnational and transgovernmental actors in international relations. In practical terms, interdependence

⁶⁷Keohane, *After Hegemony*, 24, 39.

⁶⁸More specifically, they define interdependence in international relations as “situations characterized by reciprocal effects among countries or among actors in different countries;” Keohane and Nye, *Power and Interdependence*, 8.

⁶⁹Ibid., 24-35.

means that all states, even great powers, cannot act on their own.

Keohane and Nye present a persuasive case about how smaller states can gain on more powerful states through the use of "linkage strategies" and by using IOs to set their own agendas and form coalitions.⁷⁰ In this way, IOs serve as platforms for smaller states to pool their resources and power, often at the expense of the more powerful states. IOs also serve as vehicles for smaller states to gain the world media stage and make their views known. Hence, hegemons may be necessary for *initiating* cooperation, but not for continuing cooperation. The hegemon is needed to set international "rules" and reward or punish states by those rules. It initially distributes public goods such as security or free trade. But, cooperation can survive and even strengthen as a hegemon declines. Indeed, once formalized in a regime or IO, patterns of cooperation may compel compliance even by great powers. As Keohane notes "interdependence means that even great powers cannot act effectively on their own. To regain some influence over events, governments and firms have to collaborate with one another; they have to sacrifice their unilateral freedom of action for some degree of mastery over transnational flows of goods, capital, technology, ideas, and people."⁷¹

Most important, regimes and IOs contribute to the preservation of state power for small and medium nations. First, regimes facilitate burden-sharing. This allows for the aforementioned distribution of public goods. In this way, regimes and IOs allow states to husband their resources. Second, regimes aid the transfer of information between states. In a broad sense this fosters cooperation and discourages states from acting

⁷⁰Keohane and Nye, *Power and Interdependence*, 35-36.

⁷¹Keohane, "Diplomacy," 48.

unilaterally, thus helping nations maintain stability. Third, international institutions can actually *limit* the ability of states to form linkage strategies by enforcing uniform rules and preventing varied interests from getting in each other's way. Perhaps, most important, the international system forces the democracies to act with some self-discipline in foreign affairs. By tying itself to regimes, the national government can prevent domestic constraints from exerting undue influences.⁷² By aiding continuity in international affairs, IOs and regimes facilitate the formation of broad, transnational coalitions over issues such as free trade or democratization.⁷³

A regime's effectiveness is measured in several ways. To begin with, a regime is considered to be effective if its members abide by its rules and norms. In addition, to be considered effective in the long term, a regime must achieve the goals and objectives for which it was created.⁷⁴ If nothing else, a regime must reinforce states' ability to cooperate in a given area.⁷⁵ A regime's potency is further measured by its resilience or robustness. This is the regime's staying power; its ability to survive in the face of either external or internal threats. It is also a measure of the extent to which "institutional history matters"—whether or not previous choices can constrain collective behavior in the

⁷²Keohane and Nye, *Power and Interdependence*, 271-72.

⁷³Joseph S. Nye, "Patrons and Clients: New Roles in the Post Cold War Order," in *America and Europe in an Era of Change*, ed. Helga Haftendorn and Christian Tuschhoff (Boulder: Westview, 1993), 102.

⁷⁴Oran R. Young, *International Governance: Protecting the Environment in a Stateless Society* (Ithaca: Cornell University, 1994), 72-77.

⁷⁵Arild Underdal, "The Concept of 'Regime Effectiveness'," *Cooperation and Conflict* 27 (Fall 1992): 227-240.

future.⁷⁶

Nationstates can gain three other major benefits from multilateralism in the form of participation in international organizations: it can lessen the transaction costs between states; it can parry challenges from potential rival states; and it can help maintain stability during periods of relative power change.⁷⁷ Few would dispute the assertion that multilateral institutions lower the costs of transactions between states. As previously mentioned, IOs can serve as forums to cut tariffs or to facilitate information sharing. IOs also expedite coordination among states. These factors allow the nationstate to spend fewer resources in its interactions with other states.

The relationship between nationstates and regimes is not “unidirectional,” that is power and constraints do not simply flow from the state to the IO. Instead, there is a mutual exchange. Membership in an international institution presents a significant factor for the development and implementation of domestic policies. Multilateral organizations provide support and opportunities for national policymakers. For instance, in the United States, membership in the GATT-based trade regime has served as the basis for the nation’s trade policies. Most foreign economic legislation has either initiated negotiations dealing with GATT or has centered around the implementation of GATT proposals. In this manner, IOs and regimes provide legitimacy for the policies of national governments.

For individual states, membership in regimes amplifies the impact of decisions

⁷⁶Powell, “Anarchy,” 341.

⁷⁷John G. Ruggie, ed., *Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis of an Institutional Form* (New York: Columbia University, 1993), 109.

because the norms, rules and principles of a regime do not apply to a single case, but are spread over a number of particular actions or cases. In addition, individual regimes are joined with or encompassed by larger regimes, thus creating a broad framework of principles and norms, and linkages between specific issues. Hence, violations of a particular norm, can have impacts far beyond that issue, and can impact the actor's ability to achieve goals in other issue-areas.⁷⁸ In this way, regimes have reputational effects. They "help to assess others' reputations by providing standards of behavior against which performance can be measured, by linking these standards to specific issues, and by providing forums, often through international organizations, in which these evaluations can be made."⁷⁹ Hence, regimes increase the cost of noncompliance by shaping the reputations of member-states. Actors that are perceived as trustworthy are more likely to be chosen as partners by other actors. While regimes cannot ensure compliance based on reputational effects, rational actors, sensitive to the long-term opportunities of conformity, are much more likely to comply with a regime's norms and principles than to violate them.

Furthermore, institutions can actually reinforce state sovereignty. Although institutions may modify and constrain state's autonomy, they also tend to reinforce legitimacy in the international arena. Here it is important to differentiate between legal and operational sovereignty. Keohane, Haas and Levy assert that while some degree of autonomy may be lost on specific issues, in overall terms, the formal sovereignty of nationstates is bolstered since the nationstate is "validated" as the sole legitimate

⁷⁸Axelrod and Keohane, 234.

⁷⁹Keohane, *After Hegemony*, 106.

members of IOs and regimes.⁸⁰ In addition, functional sovereignty is also strengthened as the single nationstate gains access to greater capabilities through the IO or regime. Participation in international organizations also tends to legitimize the current regime in a particular nationstate.

Multilateralism in the form of IOs can also legitimize the status quo in global politics if the hegemon is willing to divert some of the decision making to the organization. Such a diffusion of power empowers lesser states and partially ties them to the future of the IO (and by extension, to the continuation of the status quo). This diffusion of power usually leads to a more balanced distribution of gains which benefits both the dominant power and the lesser states. Hegemons can create a semi-voluntary allegiance which, over time, strengthens the stake that states have in the preservation of the present order, and thus, lessens the amount of resources the hegemon must use to maintain that order. At the same time, lesser states gain more than they otherwise could expect. This combination of benefits promotes stability in the system. It helps preserve the primary power, while at the same time it offers incentives for weaker powers to remain compliant. A good example of this behavior is the European compliance on the status quo in regards to security arrangements. The transatlantic alliance, with its institutions, NATO and the WEU, form Western Europe's security regime and provide to its member-states the various benefits outlined. As the regime has evolved and patterns of cooperation have been institutionalized, there has consequently been less need for states to pursue their own unilateral security policies. States have internalized not only

⁸⁰Keohane, Haas, and Levy, 415-17.

the specific rules of the regime, but also the regime's norms.⁸¹

Realism emphasizes the presence of anarchy in the international system and the primacy of the nationstate as the main actor in international relations. However, in the post World War II era there has been a proliferation of institutions and regimes which have become increasingly important in global politics. Liberal institutionalism accepts the basic premises of realism, anarchy and the importance of individual states, but then incorporates the presence of international institutions and regimes into a synthesis that more accurately reflects the current world system. Nationstates remain the prime actors in international relations, but IOs and regimes have been formed which reflect the preferences of these actors and which allow nationstates to extend their interests through collective actions. In this manner, IOs and regimes temper global anarchy.

International regimes and institutions have proved beneficial to both great powers and to small states. For the great powers, IOs and regimes offer a means to preserve resources and to institutionalize the norms and principles of the primary powers. For small and medium states, IOs and regimes give access to greater capabilities and help maintain influence through the phenomenons of linkage strategies and coalition-building. For all states, IOs and regimes facilitate cooperation by increasing the relative gains for actors participating in the institutions, and promoting current cooperation in order to participate in future gains. In addition, IOs and regimes create a broad framework for implementing or maintaining international rules and norms, since these principles do not apply to a specific case, or a specific country, but are employed over a

⁸¹Muller, "Internalization," 383.

number of cases and a number of states.

IOs and regimes can reinforce individual state sovereignty in a period of increased multinational actors. They legitimize domestic policies that comply with international norms and rules. Also, participation in international institutions can help legitimize a government. Externally, these organizations strengthen state sovereignty by legitimizing the status quo and reinforcing the authenticity of national governments within the international community. For small or medium states, participation in international institutions provides them access to greater resources and to collective capabilities, all the while lessening the transaction costs associated with international interactions and reinforcing cooperative behavior. Regimes can also be used for the pursuit of a nation's idiosyncratic goals, even if those goals run counter to the interests of other states. They then become a means for reconciling divergent interests. Hence, the gains provided by international institutions provide incentives for continued cooperation and interdependence that create a self-perpetuating international system in which nationstates learn that participation in such organizations and collaboration with other states augments potential gains while reinforcing the power of individual states.

CHAPTER III
SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MODERN NATIONSTATE

The period of predominance by nationstates in the modern international system began with the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. The rise of the nationstate was marked by increasing political centralization and the institutionalization of public authority.¹ Nationstates eclipsed multinational political organizations such as the church and various multiethnic empires to become the central actors in world politics for much of the past three hundred years. However, the proliferation and increasing influence of international organizations (IOs) and regimes have begun to challenge the traditional notions of power and sovereignty associated with the individual nationstate. The realist school of international relations maintains that nationstates remain the primary actors in the global system and that international institutions are little more than “window dressing” that reflect the preferences of the great powers of the day.² Nonetheless, nationstates are increasingly constrained in the individualistic pursuit of policy objectives by the spread of IOs and regimes and the internalization of international

¹John G. Ruggie, “Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity: Toward a Neorealist Synthesis,” in *Neorealism and its Critics*, ed. Robert O. Keohane (New York: Columbia, 1986), 143.

²For instance, Susan Strange suggests that the current debate over the power of regimes is “a rehash of old academic debates under a new and jazzier name—a sort of intellectual mutton dressed up as lambs—so that the pushy new professors of the 1980s can have the same old arguments as their elders but can flatter themselves that they are breaking new ground by using a new jargon; Susan Strange, “*Cave! Hic Dragones: A Critique of Regime Analysis*,” in *Neorealism and its Critics*, ed. Robert O. Keohane (New York: Columbia, 1986), 341.

norms and rules.³ This is especially true in light of the proliferation and spread of IOs and regimes.

This chapter will examine the broad transformations of sovereignty and the power of the nationstate in the post-World War II era. First, the development of the modern nationstate will be appraised in conjunction with the formation of the global system which reinforced the primacy of that unit in international relations. Second, the evolution of the nationstate in its efforts to adjust to a rapidly changing market economy will be shown to lead to the formation of the “trading state.”⁴ Third, traditional notions of state sovereignty have undergone significant transformations as nationstates have matured and domestic politics have increasingly impacted on foreign policy. The growing political power of the middle class in developed nationstates has subsequently led to the development of “two-level” games as national leaders have been forced to recognize the necessity of securing domestic support for foreign agendas.⁵ Fourth, the combination of the increased power of international regimes and domestic forces, when combined with the increased mobility of capital and labor which have led to the formation of what Richard Rosecrance terms the “virtual state,”⁶ has created a new concept of national sovereignty, and a new role for the modern nationstate.

³On this theme, see Keohane and Nye, *Power and Interdependence*.

⁴See Rosecrance, *Rise of the Trading State*.

⁵Robert Putnam argues that existing state-centric theories of international politics fail to satisfactorily explain the linkages between foreign and domestic policy agendas. He argues that the two areas are closely linked, especially in terms of the increasing necessity to win ratification of foreign policy goals in national legislatures; Putnam, “Diplomacy,” 427-61.

⁶Rosecrance, “Rise of the Virtual State,” 46.

The formation of the nationstate as the primary political unit in the global system has been the most significant feature of modern international relations.⁷ Before the Treaty of Westphalia and the emergence of nationstate as the principle actor in international affairs, the world was dominated by multiethnic empires, city-states, tribes, and various feudal organizations, such as fiefs or principalities. Each of these entities had varying degrees of political control and legitimacy. They consisted of “chains of lord-vassal” relationships, based on a combination of dependent property and private political authority.⁸ Property was dependent on the fulfillment of feudal obligations and political authority was based on the individual ruler. This system was further complicated by the multiple allegiances that many rulers had, with fidelity often owed to multiple kings and princes. The result was “a patchwork of overlapping and incomplete rights of government.”⁹ This system proved to be international by its very nature since the distinctions between internal and external politics were meaningless in light of the transborder power structure.¹⁰ Absolute rulers of one area might find themselves vassals of another ruler in other lands that they held title to. As Joseph R. Strayer recounts, the king of France “might send letters on the same day to the count of Flanders, who was definitely his vassal, but a very independent and unruly one, to the count of Luxembourg, who was a prince of the Empire but who held a money-fief (a regular, annual pension) of

⁷The modern nationstate was originally a European phenomenon, hence this study will concentrate on developments on the European continent.

⁸Ruggie, “Continuity,” 142.

⁹Joseph R. Strayer, *On the Medieval Origins of the Modern State* (Princeton: Princeton University, 1970), 115.

¹⁰Ruggie, “Continuity,” 142-43.

the king of France, and to the king of Sicily, who was certainly a ruler of a sovereign state but also a prince of the French royal house.”¹¹ Hence the concept of national boundaries was of little use in an era in which political authority often spread across geographic space with little regard to individual political units.

The medieval system contained an even higher degree of anarchy than modern politics since political structures had fewer capabilities.¹² However, As Hedley Bull points out, the most significant difference between the Medieval period and the modern era had less to do with differentiations between the political units and more to do with the principles of organization of these units.¹³ While there was commonality in the form of customs and religion, the variations in political institutions precluded the development of a single coherent political unit which could bind its citizenry to the state.

Before the Treaty of Westphalia, multiethnic empires, city-states, tribes, and various feudal organizations, were the principal actors in world politics. Each of these entities faced significant problems. Empires were able to develop considerable military power, but were only able to maintain the loyalty of a small fraction of the empire’s population. Over time, the failure of an empire’s citizens to identify with the empire caused weaknesses in the face of either internal revolts or external pressure, since

¹¹Strayer, 83.

¹²Waltz, *International Politics*, 88.

¹³Bull asserts that the “fundamental constitutive principle or criterion of membership was clearly enunciated. When the conception of the state as the common political form of all kingdoms, duchies, principalities, and republics of modern Europe was itself not yet established, the idea of a society made up of principally or exclusively of a single kind of political entity called ‘states’ could not take shape,” Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 29.

citizens were often unwilling to sacrifice private objectives for the greater political body. This was also true of feudal systems. On the other hand, city states were able to develop strong bonds of loyalty among their citizens, but they were not able to project power. They could not acquire new territories or populations without weakening the bonds of loyalty. Hence, city states often either became the foundation for an empire (such as Rome) or were overrun by empires (Athens) since they could not match an empire's military capabilities.¹⁴ In addition, the military innovations and the emergence of a market economy between 1100 and 1700, increased the necessary size of political units. Small feudal systems could not generate the resources needed to take advantage of the revolution in military technology since these systems were unable to compete with market economies, and were thus at a relative disadvantage against emerging large states such as France or Prussia.¹⁵

The modern nationstate solved these problems by establishing a means with which to reconcile scale and loyalty. The nationstate was able to secure a population large enough to project significant military power, and the means with which to incorporate new land and peoples into the framework of the political unit. Furthermore, the nationstate was able to secure the loyalty of its citizenry and to take advantage of the

¹⁴Strayer, 11-12.

¹⁵Joseph Schumpeter, "The Crisis of the Tax State," *International Economic Papers* no. 4, (London: Macmillan, 1954), 4; Schumpeter later expanded on this theme; see Joseph Schumpeter, *The History of Economic Analysis* (New York: Oxford University, 1954).

new economic systems.¹⁶ Hence the nationstate was able to combine large scale and loyalty for the

states which emerged after 1100 combined, to some extent, the strengths of both the empires and the city-states. They were large enough to have excellent chances for survival—some of them are approaching the thousand-year mark, which is a respectable age for any human organization. At the same time they managed to get a large proportion of their people involved in, or at least concerned with the political process, and they succeeded in creating some sense of common identity among local communities. They got more out of their people, both in the way of political and social activity and in loyalty than the ancient empires had done, even if they fell short of the full participation had marked a city such as Athens.¹⁷

Geography and economics propelled the development of the nationstate in Europe. The continent's broken geography precluded the establishment of a unified empire.¹⁸ Instead small feudal systems developed. These smaller systems were better able to secure and maintain the loyalty of their citizenry.¹⁹ However, attempts to acquire new territories or populations usually weakened these bonds and prevented significant hegemonal bids by the feudal powers of Medieval Europe.

¹⁶Douglass C. North and Robert Paul Thomas, *The Rise of the Western World—A New Economic History* (New York: Cambridge University, 1973), 17.

¹⁷Strayer, 12.

¹⁸As Paul Kennedy notes about Europe, “there were no enormous plains over which an empire of horsemen could impose its swift dominion; nor were there broad and fertile river zones like those around the Ganges, Nile, Tigris and Euphrates, Yellow, and Yangtze, providing the food for masses of toiling and easily conquerable peasants. Europe's landscape was much more fractured, with mountain ranges and large forests separating the scattered population centers in the valleys; and its climate altered considerably from North to South and West to East;” Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict From 1500 to 2000* (New York: Random House, 1987), 17.

¹⁹Strayer, 11-12.

Interstate rivalry also propelled continuous advancements in military technology, which were in turn propelled by the development of market economies and the resultant technological advances that the market mandated. The diverse geography of Europe led to the cultivation of diverse products. These products were easily transported by the immense system of navigatable waterways and searoutes in and around Europe.²⁰ Regular exchanges of goods and products led to the development of credit and banking practices which set the stage for the market economy by establishing a “predictability” in trade that was unmatched elsewhere in the world. These patterns of trade were relatively unchecked by governmental interference or suppression, since local rulers usually profited well from trade, and those who exploited merchants too greatly found that trade routes often moved outside of their control, thereby increasing the incentives to at least tolerate a merchant class. Over time, a symbiotic relationship developed between the political units of Europe and the market economy. These regimes provided a stable domestic order and the rudiments of a nondiscriminatory legal system for merchants in exchange for a share of the profits garnered by trade.²¹

The nationstate proved to be the ideal unit for political organization against the evolving military and economic condition of Europe. Most important, the nationstate solved the financial crisis of feudalism since the nationstate was large enough to take advantage of the economic growth of the era to collect the revenues necessary to acquire

²⁰See, Carlo M. Cipolla, *Before the Industrial Revolution: European Society and Economy, 1000-1700*, (New York: W. W. Norton, 1994).

²¹Kennedy, 19-20.

and field the new military technologies.²² The modern nationstate, unlike its predecessors, is integrated and organized internally in a manner that allows it to increase its power externally. As Robert Gilpin points out, “through its taxation and conscription policies, the modern state has the capacity to mobilize the wealth and services of its citizenry to advance the power and interests of the state.”²³ In addition, the modern nationstate is distinguishable from its predecessors in three significant ways. First, authority is centralized and is distinct from other social institutions. This central authority exercises power over a defined territorial space and has a monopoly over the legitimate use of force within the society.²⁴ Second, the nationstate is characterized by an intricate class structure that extends beyond a ruling elite and a vassal or peasant class. Third there is a cohesion among the populace and intense loyalty to the state that is a result of nationalism and self-identification by the citizens of the state.²⁵

The most distinguishing characteristic of the modern nationstate however, is that it is a geographic construct. The overriding function of the nationstate is the organization of space.²⁶ The nationstate exerts its control over populations and economic actors through its exclusive control of territory. As John Ruggie contends, “the distinctive feature of the modern system of rule is that it has differentiated its

²²Schumpeter, “Crisis,” 14.

²³Gilpin, *War and Change*, 122.

²⁴Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 57.

²⁵Gilpin, *War and Change*, 121-22.

²⁶Joseph Camilleri and Jim Falk, *The End of Sovereignty?* (Hants, UK: Edward Elgar, 1992), 238.

subject collectively into territorially defined, fixed and mutually exclusive enclaves of legitimate dominion. As such, it appears to be unique in human history.”²⁷

The triumph of the nationstate as the world’s primary political organization has been the most significant feature of the modern international system. However, during the height of Cold War bipolarity, the nationstates of western Europe developed a series of economic, political and security relationships that can be termed an *institutional complex*.²⁸ The growth of this complex was a result of two factors. The Soviet threat spurred nations to put aside their historical disputes in order to work together in an alliance against the Soviet bloc. In addition, American primacy worked to propel European integration in order to forestall a recurrence of past conflicts. Concurrently, the American willingness to bear a significant proportion of the burden of European defense, allowed states to devote more resources to economic growth. Hence, external factors encouraged cooperation to a degree not thought possible in the past.²⁹

One of the most significant features of the institutional complex in Europe has been the relative stabilization of territorial borders. West European states do not seek power aggrandizement through territorial expansion. This marks a momentous break with the past. The proliferation of regimes and IOs has reduced the need for nationstates to seek unilateral means to ensure security and promote national interests. States have increasingly begun to measure their well-being in economic rather than geopolitical

²⁷John Gerard Ruggie, “Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations,” *International Organization* 47 (Winter 1993): 151.

²⁸Van Ham, “Institutions,” 190.

²⁹*Ibid.*, 191.

terms. Historical means for the advancement of the state, mainly through territorial conquest, gave given way to attempts to augment wealth through control of an increasing share of the world's wealth. As goods became more mobile than capital or labor, the trading state arose.³⁰ Germany and Japan were the best illustrations of the trading state, nations whose power was measured in economic importance, rather than in traditional geo-military terms. Hence economic policy supplants or at least rivals security policy, especially in states that have no or very few, direct military threats.³¹

The trading state has several important characteristics. To begin with, the trading state does not seek power through military conquests, but through economic development centered around foreign trade. As Richard Rosecrance points out, in the past "it was cheaper to seize another state's territory by force than to develop the sophisticated economic and trading apparatus needed to derive benefit from commercial exchange with it."³² Now the reverse has become true. The costs associated with the use of force in the modern world have increased dramatically. Nuclear escalation, the proliferation of modern weapons and the potential for the use of force to disrupt economic systems, all have combined with increased resistance by domestic audiences to costs associated with conflict.³³ Furthermore, these states seek economic development

³⁰On the rise of the trading state, see Rosecrance, *Rise of the Trading State*.

³¹See Aaron Friedberg, "The Changing Relationship Between Economics and Security," *Political Science Quarterly* 106 (Summer 1991): 256-276; and Richard Rosecrance, *Cooperation in A World Without Enemies: Solving the Public Goods Problem*, Working Paper, no. 2 (Berkeley: University of California, 1992).

³²Rosecrance, *Rise of the Trading State*, 160.

³³Keohane and Nye, *Power and Interdependence*, 246.

based on free market principles and not on the mercantilist model with its emphasis on trade and balance of payments surplus.³⁴ As a result, trading states have adjusted their domestic markets and structures to conform to the international market.³⁵ The rise of the market in Europe led to a fundamental shift in state authority, and “redefined” the role of the state in regards to the economy. Increasingly, the function of the state became to organize and protect the “self-regulating” market.³⁶ In liberal democracies, where the welfare of the consumer and autonomy in the market are valued, the role of the state is usually minor, but the main responsibility of the central authority is perceived to be that of providing public goods and rectifying market failures, all the while, promoting economic growth and stability.³⁷ Over time, this led trading states to develop different political and economic interests than traditional nationstates. By concentrating on trade rather than military expansion, trading states can devote more resources to the development and manufacture of new products and achieve a higher level of relative gains in the international marketplace. Conversely, states which concentrate their energies and resources on military power and territorial expansion, generally constrain

³⁴Robert Gilpin, “The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism,” in *Neorealism and its Critics*, ed. Robert O. Keohane (New York: Columbia, 1986), 309.

³⁵For an exploration of this process, see Peter Katzenstein, *Small States and World Markets* (Ithaca: Cornell University, 1985).

³⁶John G. Ruggie, “International Regimes, Transactions and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order,” in *International Regimes*, ed. Stephen Krasner (Ithaca: Cornell, 1983), 202.

³⁷Robert Gilpin, “Economic Evolution of National Systems,” *International Studies Quarterly* 40, no. 3 (Spring 1996): 415.

their economic growth.³⁸ Those states that are most fully immersed in the global market have experienced remarkable economic growth, no matter how scarce their natural resources. Singapore and Taiwan provide examples of this. Conversely, states that have pursued autarky, no matter what their resource base, have lagged behind those connected to the global economy. The Soviet Union was the prime example of this.³⁹ Most significantly, trading states are much more likely to cooperate and collaborate with each other and thereby produce institutions and regimes which temper international anarchy. This is because trade alone cannot ensure cooperation or a mutuality of interest, especially if there are other markets for a state's goods. Trading states also acquire interests in the economic success and well-being of their trading partners.⁴⁰ These interests develop as states invest significant resources in the form of direct foreign investments (DFI) within the territory of another. Since these DFI are often in the form of infrastructure improvements, that is factories or manufacturing plants, they are illiquid and cannot be easily sold in the local market. Studies have shown a correlation in cooperation between nations with significant DFI in each other.⁴¹ The greater the DFI

³⁸See Kennedy, especially pages 444-46; also see Robert DeGrasse, Jr., *Military Expansion, Economic Decline* (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1983).

³⁹Robert Putnam, "Two-Level Games: The Impact of Domestic Politics on Transatlantic Bargaining," in *America and Europe in an Era of Change*, ed. Helga Haftendorn and Christian Tuschoff (Boulder: Westview, 1993), 77.

⁴⁰Richard N. Rosecrance, "The U.S.-Japan Trading Relationship and Its Effects," *Global Legal Studies Journal* 1, no. 1 (Fall 1993): 6.

⁴¹Rosecrance cites two studies, Brian Healy, "Economic Power Transition in the International System: The Translation of Economic Power into Political Leverage in the International Monetary System" (Ph.D. diss., Cornell University, 1973); and William Gutowitz, "The Interrelationship of Economic Factors and Political Relations Among Nations: A Quantitative Analysis" (M.A. thesis, Cornell University, 1978).

one state has in another, the greater the cooperation offered to it. This reinforces the need for states to work for relative gains that can be shared by all partners within a system.

The phenomenon through which nationstates moved from the observance of international reciprocal economic obligations, such as recognition of the most favored nation status and commitments to agreed upon exchange rates, to the acknowledgment that national economic policies could impact other states, and thus the effects of such policies have to be taken into account before they are adopted was dubbed “policy harmonization” by Robert W. Cox. Cox contends that not only do states attempt to harmonize economic policies so as not to negatively impact trading partners, but that states are willing to accept short-term losses as a trading partner adjusts to new policies.⁴² In this manner, cooperation becomes both institutionalized at the domestic level and internationalized.

This emphasis on cooperation by trading states is a result of three major factors. First, by their very nature, trading states rely on an open international trading system. Impediments to trade, such as tariffs, quotas or price supports are an anathema to such a system. Instead, the system must have free and open trade and provide for the free movement of capital. This allows states to invest in each other’s markets and profit.⁴³ Second, trading states seek security through collective efforts, not autarky. The states of

⁴²Robert W. Cox, “Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory,” in *Neorealism and its Critics*, ed. Robert O. Keohane (New York: Columbia, 1986), 231.

⁴³Richard N. Rosecrance, “Trading States in a New Concert of Europe,” in *America and Europe in an Era of Change*, ed. Helga Haftendorn and Christian Tuschhoff (Boulder: Westview, 1993), 128-29.

Western Europe over the past forty years have been able to economize on defense efforts because no one single nation had to prepare for the entire range of military threats by itself. Instead, these nations developed collective responses to security threats. Third, trading states recognize that in an interdependent world, they are unable to withdraw from IOs and regimes they have participated in without serious economic and political damages. As Rosecrance contends, “full independence and freedom of action is not a realistic possibility for trading states in international politics.”⁴⁴

Instead these nations are constrained by the evolution of “settled norms” in international relations. Settled norms are those which require special justification to violate. In the international market economy, Gregory A. Raymond cites the norms, “contracts ought to be kept,” and “debts ought to be paid,” as settled norms.⁴⁵ These norms are accepted voluntarily by actors that perceive the norms and rules of regimes as the optimum means by which to accomplish goals. If states can achieve their goals individualistically, with little costs, they avoid involvement in regimes.⁴⁶ Hence the payoffs for acceptance of the constraints imposed by regimes must be considerable.

The results of trading state cooperation are strengthened trade relations in Western Europe. In 1957 when the Treaty of Rome was signed, 37 per cent of the exports of the European Union at twelve (EU 12) were intra-EU. By 1970 that percentage had risen to 53 per cent; and by 1991, it stood at 61 per cent. In addition,

⁴⁴Ibid., 129.

⁴⁵Raymond, “Problems and Prospects,” 224.

⁴⁶Arthur A. Stein, “Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World,” in *International Regimes*, ed. Stephen Krasner (Ithaca: Cornell, 1983), 117.

since 1980, while the GDP of EU 12 states has risen some 2.1 per cent per year, and growth for export outside the region has risen 1.1 per cent, intra-EU trade has increased at a rate of 4.2 per cent.⁴⁷ Most significantly, through economics, the EU has managed to accomplish what it set out to do politically: “bury war.”⁴⁸ Yet, these accomplishments have come with a price: increased constraints on autonomy.

Modern states derive their sovereignty in the international system from other states. Hence, “sovereignty is not an attribute of the state, but is attributed to the state by other states or state rulers.”⁴⁹ Hedley Bull asserts that the principles of sovereignty rest on “the rule of non-intervention, the rule of the equality of states in respect of their basic rights, and the rights of states to domestic jurisdiction.”⁵⁰ The modern international system is unique in that all states are recognized as having equal degrees of sovereignty. In the past, most international systems revolved around hegemons and client states. However, in the current system, despite differences in size, military power or economic capabilities, all states are granted exclusive authority to use coercion within

⁴⁷Vincent Cable, “Key Trends in the European Economy and Future Scenarios,” in *Redefining Europe: New Patterns of Conflict and Cooperation*, ed. Hugh Miall (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1994), 90.

⁴⁸*Ibid.*

⁴⁹Janice E. Thomson, “State Sovereignty in International Relations: Bridging the Gap Between Theory and Empirical Research,” *International Studies Quarterly* 39, no. 2 (June 1995): 219; see also R. Ashley, “The Poverty of Neorealism,” *International Organization* 38 (1984): 225-286; and J. Miller, “Sovereignty as a Source of Vitality for the State,” *Review of International Studies* 12 (1986): 284-301.

⁵⁰Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 37.

territorial borders.⁵¹ As such, state sovereignty can be defined as “the recognition by both internal and external actors that the state has the exclusive authority to intervene coercively in activities within its territory.”⁵²

State sovereignty in the modern era has two components; an internal element and an external element. The internal component of sovereignty refers to the relationship between the state and civil society.⁵³ It is the legitimation of the central authority against competing domestic claimants. It gives the state a practical monopoly over the use of coercion and force over a specific territory and a given population. The state has “the undisputed right to determine the framework of rules, regulations and policies within a given territory and to govern accordingly.”⁵⁴ A government has internal sovereignty if it has a monopoly of power over a range of social interactions, including the internal components of the state’s economy. This monopoly of power is expressed through the domestic political structures that develop and enforce public policy. In economic terms,

⁵¹Thomson, 219.

⁵²Ibid..

⁵³Arthur A. Stein cites the internal dynamics and relationships of a nationstate as the most common form of regime: “A regime exists when the interaction between the parties is not unconstrained or is not based on independent decision making. Domestic society constitutes the most common regime. Even the freest and most open societies do not allow individualism and market forces full play; people are not free to choose from among every conceivable option—their choice set is constrained. . . . Domestic society, characterized by the agreement of individuals to eschew the use of force in settling disputes, constitutes a regime precisely because it constrains the behavior of its citizens; Stein, *Why Nations Cooperate*, 117.

⁵⁴David Held and Anthony McGrew, “Globalization and the Liberal Democratic State,” *Government and Opposition* 28, no. 3 (Summer 1993): 265.

internal sovereignty is expressed through state actions such as the collection of taxes or the regulation of the private sector.⁵⁵

External sovereignty centers around the recognition of a state by other actors in the international system. It is based on delineated territory and mutual respect and recognition of other's territory. As such, it centers around the relationships between actors in the international system. In an anarchical system, these relationships are defined by the absence of a central authority and any effective governmental structure above the level of the nationstate. Realists concentrate on the *environmental* dimensions of anarchy and contend that this absence of international authority means that there is "no overarching authority to prevent others from using violence, or the threat of violence, to dominate or even destroy them."⁵⁶ Liberal institutionalists concentrate on the *process* of international relations as the context for interpreting interests and state behavior. As Keohane notes, realism "fails to pay sufficient attention to the institutions and patterns of interaction created by humans beings that help to shape perceptions and expectations, and therefore alter the patterns of behavior that take place within a given structure."⁵⁷ Hence, the existence of anarchy does not entail "a denial that an

⁵⁵Wolfgang H. Reinicke, "Global Public Policy," *Foreign Affairs* 76, no. 6 (November/December 1997): 129.

⁵⁶Grieco, *Cooperation Among Nations*, 38.

⁵⁷Robert O. Keohane, "International Liberalism Reconsidered," in *The Economic Limits to Modern Politics*, ed. J. Dunn, (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1990), 175.

international society--albeit a fragmented one--exists," since "clearly, many international relationships continue over time, and engender stable expectations about behaviour."⁵⁸

External sovereignty is expressed in economic terms by the collection of tariffs and the manipulation of exchange rates.⁵⁹ It can also be expressed through the use of economic coercion.⁶⁰ Interdependence constrains the economic component of external sovereignty. As states become interdependent, they "recognize that the attempt to provide every service and fulfill every function of statehood on an independent and autonomous basis is extremely inefficient, and they prefer a situation which provides for specialization and divisions of labor among nations."⁶¹ However, this division of labor among nations also increases the dependency of states, just as it dampens unilateralism. This reinforces state preferences for cooperation, and overtime, states pursue policies that increase cooperation. State preferences for cooperation, in turn, reinforce and propagate interdependence, so that the system moves closer to integration.

Over the past few years, an impressive body of literature has surfaced which challenges the neorealist notion that states are unitary actors. These works assert that domestic considerations affect foreign policy decisions, and that the two are often

⁵⁸Axelrod and Keohane, 226.

⁵⁹Reinicke, 129-30.

⁶⁰Economic coercion can be defined as "the imposition of economic pain by one government on another in order to attain some political goal. It is implemented, or at least initiated, by political authorities who thus intervene in the 'normal' operation of economic relations (whether those involve market, centrally planned, or mixed economies), and is often, but not always expressed through sanctions on imports or exports; Miroslav Nincic and Peter Wallensteen, eds., *Dilemmas of Economic Coercion: Sanctions in World Politics* (New York: Praeger, 1983), 3.

⁶¹Rosecrance, *Rise of the Trading State*, 24.

intertwined. Thus, there is an intersection between the manifestation of internal and external sovereignty. Peter Katzenstein asserts that “the main purpose of all strategies of foreign economic policy is to make domestic policy compatible with the international political economy.”⁶² David A. Baldwin contends that “economic statecraft” or “foreign economic policy” has begun to supplant the traditional emphasis on security-based diplomacy, as states promote their domestic economic interests.⁶³ Robert Putnam best summarized the connections between foreign and domestic economic policy as a “two-level” game:

The politics of many international negotiations can usefully be conceived as a two level game. At the national level, domestic groups pursue their interests by pressuring the government to adopt favorable policies, and politicians seek power by constructing coalitions among those groups. At the international level, national governments seek to maximize their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures, while minimizing the adverse consequences of foreign developments. Neither of the two games can be ignored by central decision makers, so long as their countries remain interdependent, yet sovereign.⁶⁴

Hence, modern statesmen do not formulate policy in a vacuum. They have been increasingly constrained in their policy options by domestic groups that can bring significant political pressures and resources to the promotion of their interests. Policymakers have also had to balance the potential costs of security policies and

⁶²Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., *Between Power and Plenty: Foreign Economic Policy and Advanced Industrial States* (Madison: University of Wisconsin, 1978), 4.

⁶³David Baldwin, *Economic Statecraft* (Princeton: Princeton University, 1985), 29-50

⁶⁴Putnam, “Two-Level Games,” 434.

programs in regards to national economies and social spending.⁶⁵ As a result, actions which may appear irrational will occur because endeavors which are rational at the international level may be “impolitic” at the domestic level, and thus may not be taken.⁶⁶

The increasing importance of the global economy and global interdependence, combined with the heightened power of domestic interests have forced developed states to abandon territorial expansion and military conquest as a means of accumulating relative gains. Instead these trading states have concentrated on increasing their share of the world economy. Only in those states where economic output is based on the production of goods from land is territorial ambition still present. In states where capital, labor and technology are mobile and where they dominate the economy, market share has supplanted territorial acquisition. These states have become “virtual states.”⁶⁷

The rise of such states is partially attributable to the emerging global economy. In many industries, the complexity of technology and both the costs and risks of production, have driven the scales of the markets beyond the scope of a single nationstate and thus beyond national borders. The confines of a single nationstate are now too small to facilitate the competitive development and production of new technologies and new products.⁶⁸ The scale of new technologies and the mobility of the

⁶⁵Paul A. Papayoanou, “Economic Interdependence and the Balance of Power,” *International Studies Quarterly* 41, no. 1 (March 1997): 117.

⁶⁶Putnam, “Two-Level Games,” 436.

⁶⁷A virtual state is a “state that has downsized its territorially based production capability;” see Rosecrance, “Rise of the Virtual State,” 45- 46.

⁶⁸Stephen J. Kobrin, “Beyond Symmetry: State Sovereignty in a Networked Global Economy,” *Carnegie Bosch Institute: Working Paper 95-8* (New York: Carnegie Bosch Institute, 1995), 8.

means of production are consolidating national markets into ever-expanding entities.

Peter Dicken describes this phenomenon as a global economy which is based on “a degree of purposive functional integration among geographically dispersed activities.”⁶⁹

For most of this century, trade was the primary means whereby the international economy was integrated. Beginning in the 1960s, the emergence of multinational corporations (MNCs) accelerated the rise of the trading state by internationalizing the means of production. Increasingly, however, transnational networks have replaced MNCs as the mode of organization of international trade.⁷⁰ These networks are based on collective action where actors cease the pursuit of individualistic gain at the expense of other actors in exchange for access to collective gains. The linkage between actors in the network extends over time and is not based on individual or “spot” transactions.⁷¹ Hence, by their very nature, networks are interdependent and involve some degree of loss of individual control.

The gains from the development of such networks have come at the cost of lost autonomy for states. As Keohane and Nye point out, “From the foreign-policy standpoint, the problem facing individual governments is how to benefit from

⁶⁹Peter Dicken, “The Roepke Lecture in Economic Geography. Global-Local Tensions: Firms and States in the Global Space-Economy,” *Economic Geography* 70 (April 1994): 106.

⁷⁰These networks usually take the form of corporate alliances or collaborative agreements between firms. These arrangements often operate outside of market forces as corporations attract foreign capital through long-term contracts, licensing of products and franchising. The result is an development of an increasingly global economy that operates with little regard for national borders. Presently, over 70 per cent of world trade is “intra-industry or intra-firm;” Reinicke, 128.

⁷¹Kobrin, 6.

international exchange while maintaining as much autonomy as possible.”⁷² As these states compete to acquire relative gains by taking advantage of the international system, a problem arises for the global economic system: How can the international system “generate and maintain a mutually beneficial pattern of cooperation in the face of competing efforts by governments (and non-governmental actors) to manipulate the system for their own benefit?”⁷³

The relationship between a state’s public and private sectors has been altered by the emergence of global networks. Globalization has meant that national governments no longer monopolize the legitimate power over territories in which networks operate since the networks encompass multiple territories and respond to rules and norms that are arrived at a supranational level.⁷⁴ In order to conduct multilateral trade arrangements on a reciprocal basis, states must “harmonize” domestic laws with international norms and practices. As such states have increasingly evolved into memberstates, in which they have traded traditional concepts of sovereignty for access to greater collective goods through participation in institutions and international regimes. The evolution of the memberstate is most pronounced in Europe. As Miles Kahler points out, “whether defined as nation-states pooling sovereignty or a proto-federation, institution-building in the EU is more advanced than any other regional entity.”⁷⁵ For

⁷²Keohane and Nye, *Power and Interdependence*, 249.

⁷³Ibid.

⁷⁴Reinicke, 130.

⁷⁵Miles Kahler, *Regional Futures and Transatlantic Economic Relations*, (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1995), 4.

European states, this has occurred in both the economic and security fields as nationstates have subordinated individual autonomy to the pursuit of collective goods that national governments perceive can be gained from multilateral institutions.⁷⁶

The memberstate is one that has subordinated aspects of autonomy to the international norms and rules through efforts to harmonize relationships with international regimes.⁷⁷ The drive for harmonization can cause a regime's norms and rules to be internalized by a state. This can occur in one of two ways. First, the IO's or regime's rules and norms can become fused with the ideals and values of various actors within the state.⁷⁸ Domestic actors can use international norms to justify their own actions or to question the actions of another actor. Government's may also use international rules to legitimize an unpopular decision. Second, a regime's rules and norms can become amalgamated with a nation's domestic political processes by being codified in domestic law. For instance, most American trade laws were developed in coordination with the evolution of GATT tenets.⁷⁹

⁷⁶Joanne Gowa asserts that trade patterns and economic integration usually follow military relationships and alliances; Joanne Gowa, *Allies, Adversaries and International Trade* (Princeton: Princeton University, 1994).

⁷⁷On the ramifications of harmonization, see Axelrod, *Emergence of Cooperation*, or more recently, Samuel Barkin and Bruce Cronin, "The State and the Nation: Changing Norms and Rules of Sovereignty in International Relations," *International Organization* 48 (Winter 1994): 107-30.

⁷⁸John S. Duffield, "International Regimes and Alliance Behavior: Explaining NATO Counter Force Levels," *International Organization* 46 (Fall 1992): 838.

⁷⁹Andrew P. Cortell and James W. Davis, "How Do International Institutions Matter? The Domestic Impact of International Rules and Norms," *International Studies Quarterly* 40, no. 4 (December 1996): 453.

The ability of domestic actors to utilize international regimes and norms is but one advantage of the memberstate. In exchange for constraints on individual autonomy, the state has much greater access to the public goods provided by international institutions. Thus, regimes provide incentives to modify behavior.⁸⁰ In Western Europe, the economic regime (the EC/EU) which began as a means to facilitate economic cooperation has established norms that have transcended the market and emerged in the political, social and security aspects of the memberstates of the organization.⁸¹ In addition, organizations like the EU have substantially lowered transaction costs for individual states, and formalized the methods of interaction.⁸² These regimes have also increased the amount of information available to all actors, and thus expanded the overall transparency of the international system.⁸³ Regimes have also allowed states to take issues that were once considered to be domestic matters, such as immigration and social policies and internationalize them by establishing system-wide codes of conduct and uniform standards.⁸⁴ Nonetheless, these benefits have come at a cost, and force a

⁸⁰Farkas, 362.

⁸¹The EU has allowed for not only economic augmentation for memberstates, but it has also ameliorated the security dilemma. In this manner the regime has prevented security rivalries by directing economic competition into a set of regime norms; Schweller, 92.

⁸²Raymond, 214.

⁸³Frederick Bonkovsky, *International Norms and National Policy* (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmens, 1980), 53-79; also Edna Ullmann-Margalit, "The Revision of Norms," *Ethics* 100 (July 1990): 756-67.

⁸⁴Kahler, 64-65.

reappraisal of the state's traditional role. Rosecrance offers a good summation of the state's changing role

The flow of international factors of production—technology, capital and labor—will swamp the stock of economic power at home. The state will become just one of many players in the international marketplace and will have to negotiate directly with foreign factors of production to solve domestic economic problems. Countries must induce foreign capital to enter their domain. To keep such investment, national economic authorities will need to maintain low inflation, rising productivity, a strong currency, and a flexible and trained work force. These demands will sometimes conflict with domestic interests that want more government spending, larger budget deficits, and more benefits.⁸⁵

In the post World War II era, nationstates have been increasingly curbed in their individualistic pursuit of goals and payoffs by the proliferation of IOs and regimes and the internalization of international norms and rules into domestic societies. The modern nationstate that arose after the Treaty of Westphalia to dominate international relations has begun to undergo significant evolutions in purpose and sovereignty. States have traditionally been based on territorial factors. Increasingly, however, state participation in the global economy has led to integration with that economy and, consequently an increased degree of interdependence among states. The result has been the rise of trading states which measure themselves by their relative shares of the global economy and not territorial size or military power.

The pervasiveness of economic interdependence has constrained both internal and external state sovereignty. States must harmonize internal policies to conform with the expectations needed for participation in international institutions and regimes. In addition, the growing power of domestic actors has forced decision makers to be more

⁸⁵Rosecrance, "Rise of the Virtual State," 60.

cognizant of the domestic audience, and has led to the phenomenon of two-level games, in which domestic considerations impact on international relations and vice-versa.⁸⁶ At the same time, participation in IOs and regimes constrain a state's external sovereignty by limiting policy choices and enforcing compliance with international obligations.

This erosion of the traditional conceptions of state sovereignty has been accelerated by a combination of the increased power of international regimes and domestic forces, and the increased mobility of capital and labor. These factors have led to the development of what Richard Rosecrance has termed the virtual state.⁸⁷ Yet even as this combination of factors has constrained state sovereignty in several areas, it has also augmented the power of the state in other spheres. The memberstate has evolved as an enhanced nationstate that has access to greater resources than any political unit had in the past, with the exception of the empire. Significantly, unlike the empire, the memberstate has the means to retain the loyalty and favor of its citizenry. In addition, the memberstate has an enhanced variety of capabilities that it has accrued as a result of pooling its sovereignty and resources with other members of international bodies. In exchange for the constraints placed upon individual states by international regimes and the global economy, states have greater access to private goods, capital and labor, and public goods such as the free market. In addition, cooperative or collaborative efforts between states produce enhanced capabilities and greater relative gains. The process of

⁸⁶For example, Italy and Great Britain left the European exchange rate mechanism (ERM) in 1992 in response to domestic currency considerations; Peter B. Kenen, *Economic and Monetary Union in Europe: Moving Beyond Maastricht* (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1995), 6.

⁸⁷Rosecrance, "Rise of the Virtual State," 46.

harmonization between states' domestic norms and rules and international norms and rules, has provided domestic actors with justification to pursue what might otherwise be unpopular domestic programs.

In the end, the states that suffer the most in the increasingly interdependent global system are those states that attempt to maintain autarky and do not pursue multilateralism. These states risk being shutout of a variety of gains, and losing the potential benefits accrued by the mobility capital and labor in the global economy. For those states integrated in the new economy, the nationstate itself is actually taking on increasing importance, albeit in new ways. For it is only the nationstate that has the resources and capabilities to set and enforce the policies necessary to attract foreign capital and industry or technology. It is also only the nationstate/memberstate that the power to pursue favorable economic policies abroad. Through participation in IOs and regimes, the nationstate gives a voice in the international economy to domestic interests, and can attempts to influence the establishment of rules and norms that benefit those interests. Hence, the nationstate continues to occupy a central role in international politics, but it is a changing role that requires national governments to more effectively combine the internal and external elements of sovereignty in the pursuit of national interests.

CHAPTER IV

WESTERN EUROPE'S SECURITY REGIME

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Western European Union (WEU) collectively form a security regime in Western Europe. As this regime has evolved and patterns of cooperation have been institutionalized, there has consequently been less need for states to pursue their own unilateral security policies. States have internalized not only the specific rules of the regime, but also the regime's norms.¹ In Western Europe, the existing security regime has ameliorated traditional security threats, that is direct military invasion or attack, by extending the public good of security to all of the memberstates. These states have increasingly concentrated on economic well-being, to the point that even those states with security interests outside of Europe, mainly Great Britain and France, have combined their security policies with their economic policies through weapons sales and arms transfers so that the line between economic and strategic interests has been significantly diminished. As a result, of their economic pursuits, most of the states of Western Europe have evolved into trading states, and begun the transformation into virtual states.

On a collective level, there has also developed a regional society of states. Hedley Bull asserts that an international society (or a society of states) "exists when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules

¹Muller, "Internalization," 383.

in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions.”²

The society of states that developed in Western Europe has created a degree of cooperation and interdependence that is unmatched elsewhere in the world. This chapter will examine the main features that underlie the current system of collective security in Europe, and what impact this regime has on the security policies of nationstates. Specifically, the main characteristics of security regimes, such as alliances, and the attributes of a collective security system, will be measured against the current security system in Europe. In addition, the role of the United States will be explored in its impact on European integration. Finally, the effects of the current system will be examined in light of the constraints and benefits that nationstates gain from membership.

IOs and regimes can temper international anarchy by establishing rules and norms which constrain a state’s individualistic pursuit of power by promoting cooperation and collaboration.³ This is especially significant in the security sphere.⁴ In an anarchical world, a state’s primary goal is survival.⁵ In order to secure this goal, states seek power, both as a means and as an end, and often pursue military means to

²Bull, *The Anarchial Society*, 13.

³See Keohane and Nye, *Power and Interdependence*, 5, 42-47.

⁴D. Scott Bennett describes security as “the drive for self preservation,” and asserts that “true security is obtained by ensuring that the territorial and political boundaries of the homeland and ‘vital’ territory cannot be changed by others;” D. Scott Bennett, “Security, Bargaining and the End of Interstate Rivalry,” *International Studies Quarterly* 40, no. 2 (June 1996): 163.

⁵See Waltz, *International Politics*, chapter 4.

secure or increase relative power and ensure security.⁶ This pursuit of security through enhancements of power are complicated by the security dilemma. Since it is difficult to distinguish between offensive and defensive military preparations, any sort of military build-up can be perceived as threatening to neighboring states, thus leading to the security dilemma in which improvements in one state's military capabilities prompt reciprocal improvements in other state's capabilities causing either a net loss in security or at least no real increase, for the original state. This is especially significant if actors believe that the key to victory is a first or preemptive strike.⁷ For a security regime to be successful, several preconditions must be met. First, the great powers must want it. Second, mutual security and cooperation must be a value or norm shared by all actors involved. Third, actors must not believe that security is best achieved through expansion of territory. Fourth, the individualistic pursuit of security must be seen as costly.

In addition to the security dilemma, security regimes are especially difficult to establish and maintain for several reasons. First, security matters comprise a much higher level of competitiveness than do other areas, including economics. In the economic realm, one state's gains do not necessarily translate into another state's losses. In fact, economic gains by one state can prove beneficial to others. In security matters, however, one state's gains usually come at the expense of another's, whether it be in terms of direct territorial loss or through losses in relative security. Second, as pointed out, the inability to effectively distinguish between offensive and defensive motives

⁶Hedley Bull, "The State's Positive Role in World Affairs," in *Toward a Just World Order*, ed. Richard Falk, Samuel S. Kim, and Saul Mendlovitz (Boulder: Westview, 1982), 64.

⁷Jervis, "Cooperation," 186-214.

leads states to respond to both types of behavior in the same manner. Third, small errors in security matters can have much larger consequences than minor errors in economic or geopolitical terms. Fourth, in the security realm, measuring one's own security and detecting what others are doing is difficult. This leads to a much greater sense of uncertainty in the security realm. As Robert Jervis asserts, "The primacy of security, its competitive nature, the unforgiving nature of the arena, and the uncertainty of how much security the state needs and has, all compound the prisoners' dilemma and make it sharper than the problems that arise in most other areas."⁸

Balance of power systems and military alliances can encourage states to work together to achieve common gains, usually either the prevention of, or the maintenance of hegemony, or the preservation of the current international system.⁹ Such cooperation usually takes one of two forms: bandwagoning or balancing.¹⁰ Bandwagoning refers to the phenomenon by which lesser states ally themselves with potential hegemons if it appears these actors will "win": hence the lesser powers attempt to acquire a portion of the gains. Balancing, is the tendency of states to form alliances to prevent hegemony or to "balance" against it.¹¹ By balancing, states are more capable of preventing the

⁸Robert Jervis, "Security Regimes," in *International Regimes*, ed. Stephen Krasner (Ithaca: Cornell University, 1983), 175-76.

⁹See Stephen R. Rock, *Why Peace Breaks Out: Great Power Rapprochement in Historical Perspective* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1989); or Alexander George, *Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1991).

¹⁰Schweller, 72-73.

¹¹See Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, chap. 5; John Gerard Ruggie argues that states will bandwagon only up to a certain point. If it becomes apparent that a potential hegemon will succeed in its hegemonal bid, even bandwagoning states will balance

emergence of a hegemonic power. States join or defect to the weaker coalition in order to stifle attempts at universal hegemony.¹²

Alliances are the most common form of state cooperation on security issues. They form when states find it in their interests to collaborate for security reasons, and there is no external body which can otherwise ameliorate conflict. Alliances permit states that have a power or territorial inequality to compensate for that deficiency through cooperation. In other words, “security arrangements between states are mechanisms for aggregating the capabilities of states in situations in which individually the states have inadequate capability to deal with threats that confront them. In fact, the scale required to generate the capability to assure survival often exceeds that of anyone state, so that cooperation becomes necessary.”¹³ As Edward Gulick summarized, “States A and B might each be smaller and weaker than C, but allied they might well be equal to, or greater than, C.”¹⁴ Stephen Walt defines alliances as “a formal or informal arrangement for security cooperation between two or more sovereign states.”¹⁵ Glenn Snyder refines this definition by describing alliances as “formal associations of states for

against it to prevent world domination; Ruggie, “Continuity,” 42.

¹²Richard K. Betts, “Systems for Peace or Causes of War? Collective Security, Arms Control and the New Europe,” *International Security* 17, no. 1 (Summer 1992): 12.

¹³Katja Weber, “Hierarchy Amidst Anarchy: A Transaction Costs Approach to International Security Cooperation,” *International Studies Quarterly* 41, no. 2 (June 1997): 326.

¹⁴Gulick, 61.

¹⁵Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, 12.

the use (or non-use) of military force, intended for either the security aggrandizement of their members, against specific other states.”¹⁶

What is central to alliance formation and performance is the degree of external threat allayed against the alliance. Alliances focus almost exclusively on external security threats. The total security threat balanced against an alliance is known as the “threat quotient.”¹⁷ This measures the sum total of the threat that the alliance is balanced against. Alliances are much more likely to retain cohesion and survive against larger threat quotients, than against small or inconsequential threats. In addition, the stronger the threat quotient, the more resistant the alliance is to member shifts and defections. Alliances which face weak threat quotients are subject to diplomatic revolutions which significantly alter the complexion of the alliance, and often the balance of power of the international system itself.¹⁸

Alliances benefit states in several ways. Robert Jervis argues that states can become “positively” linked through participation in an alliance, as opposed to becoming “negatively interdependent.”¹⁹ Common goals lead these states to cooperate over a wide range of issues, and give each state a stake in maintaining the relative well-being of other

¹⁶Glenn H. Snyder, “Alliance Theory: A Neorealist First Cut,” *International Affairs* 44 (Spring 1990): 104.

¹⁷Michael W. Doyle, “Balancing Power Classically: An Alternative to Collective Security?” in *Collective Security Beyond the Cold War*, ed. George W. Downs (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1994), 158.

¹⁸Doyle cites as examples, the shifts in the 1750s of alliances between London and Vienna to London and Paris, and between Paris and Berlin to Paris and Vienna; Doyle, 159.

¹⁹Jervis, “From Balance to Concert,” 67.

states within the alliance. Decision makers may develop significant ties with their opposites in alliance memberstates so that they wish their opposites to remain in power and, in fact, work towards that goal.²⁰ In addition, transactions between states may become institutionalized, thereby lowering transaction costs.²¹ Most often, this cooperation is the result of a successful war against a hegemonic power, and the alliance members perceive it to be in their mutual interest to continue cooperation in order to ensure that the hegemonic power does not reassert itself.²² Which leads to the most significant benefit that alliances provide—they give states the collective ability to check hegemony.²³

The nature of alliances, with their focus on external security threats, led these types of structures to be relatively short-lived and is subject to simple disruptions. Individual states begin to value cooperation less and relative gains more and may therefore defect from the alliance in order to maximize power. A state may make its own hegemonal bid, or may use coercion on weaker partners.²⁴ A state may also be tempted to undertake a war of territorial expansion against a former partner. Peter Liberman asserts that states may be tempted to engage in a war of aggression because of

²⁰Jervis describes this as being one form of “altruism,” through which “each of the allies come to value its partners’ well being—not only for the greater contribution to the common good, but as an end in itself;” *ibid.*

²¹Gilpin, *War and Change*, 27.

²²Jervis, “From Balance to Concert,” 67.

²³Gulick, 61.

²⁴On the benefits of using coercion to exploit weaker states, see Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven: Yale University, 1966): 1-34.

three factors: 1) increased economic surpluses; 2) modernization has increased the coercive resources of states and therefore eases the implementation of a centralized authority; and 3) repression of modern societies is relatively low cost because of the threat of economic losses.²⁵ In addition, if a state perceives that one or more of its alliance partners may defect, that state will often defect first in order to forestall relative losses.²⁶

The further a state moves away from autonomy in security matters and the closer it moves toward structured relationships with other states, the more restrictive that state's security options become. Katja Weber defines this phenomenon as "bindingness"--"the curtailment of sovereignty in exchange for greater institutionalization."²⁷ Bindingness occurs because as states surrender autonomy in security matters to a regime, exiting or defecting from that regime becomes increasingly costly. Alliances are the security regimes that are least binding, and confederations are

²⁵Liberman uses the German occupation of Europe during World War II and the Soviet actions during the Cold War to support his contentions over the potential gains of conquest. For instance, Germany was able to extract some 30 percent of French GNP; over 40 percent of Belgian, Dutch, and Norwegian GNP, and 25 percent of Czech GNP during the war, at a relatively minor cost. In addition, the Soviets were able to extract initially 33 percent of East Germany's GNP, although this figure later fell to 18 percent. Even when the costs of maintaining the 400,000 Soviet troops in East Germany are factored in, the total costs of occupation for the Soviet Union were only one quarter of the gains; Peter Liberman, "The Spoils of Conquest," *International Security* 18, no. 2 (Fall 1993): 136-39.

²⁶Robert Axelrod and Robert O. Keohane use game theory to probe this issue. They conclude that if all states continue cooperation they would be better off, however, if defection occurs, the first state to defect gains the most. This creates incentives for individual states to be the first to defect if they perceive weaknesses in the structure of the alliance; Axelrod and Keohane, 229.

²⁷Weber, 322.

regimes that are the most binding. Examples of alliances include ententes and nonaggression pacts. An example of a confederation would be the failed European Defense Community (EDC) of the 1950s or the current proposals for a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) for the EU. While alliances are “a formal or informal arrangement for security cooperation between two or more sovereign states,”²⁸ confederations involve “a deliberate banding together of states to create a central, permanent, statelike political structure that is capable of acting like a state, yet is not a single state but a union of states.”²⁹ The major differences between alliances and confederations involve the degree of sovereignty that the individual state is willing to relinquish to the security regime. Under both types of regimes, states retain some degree of autonomy, but they possess far more in an alliance than they do in a confederation. Between the constraints of the confederation and the looseness of the alliance lies the formal alliance. A formal alliance entails the institutionalization of the security regime and the implementation of formal norms and rules. An example of a formal alliance would be NATO or the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). The range of security regimes thus resembles a continuum with alliances at one end, formal alliances in the middle, and confederations at the other.³⁰

In order for a security regime of any type to succeed, several preconditions must be met. First, the great powers must want to establish it, and then must work to maintain the system. This means that the major states must be relatively satisfied with the status

²⁸See Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, 12.

²⁹Weber, 322.

³⁰Ibid.

quo. Otherwise the risk of defection increases and often coercion is needed to maintain the regime. Second, states must believe that other actors value cooperation and mutual security. More often than not, this is not possible because of the tendency of decision-makers to *overestimate* the aggressiveness of other states.³¹ Third, states must not believe that security is best secured through expansion. Fourth, and finally, states must perceive that military conflict and the individualistic quest for security is costly, and that the most efficient means for securing stability and preserving the status quo is through cooperation.³²

These conditions existed in Western Europe during the Cold War and continue to be present currently. By the 1950s, the security relationship between the superpowers had evolved into a stable system that spurred the creation of a security regime in Western Europe that met the security requirements of the individual memberstates and was able to withstand a number of crises. Many, led by Kenneth N. Waltz, also point to the bipolar nature of the European system during the Cold War as an indicator of stability. Waltz argues that multipolar systems are themselves inherently unstable. The greater the number of actors within a system, the greater the uncertainty about actors' intentions. This uncertainty increases tensions since states usually assume the worst about others' actions and intentions.³³ In addition, Waltz contends that the simplicity within a bipolar system increases cooperation by making it easier for the two blocks to cooperate by

³¹Jervis, *Perception and Misperception*, 73-75.

³²Jervis, "Security Regimes," 177-79.

³³Kenneth N, Waltz, "The Stability of a Bipolar World," *Daedalus* 93 (Summer 1964): 890.

lessening the complexities of negotiations. By facilitating cooperation, the simplicity of bipolar systems prevents misunderstanding that could potentially lead to conflict.³⁴

However, evidence also demonstrates that multipolar systems are stable. The more actors that are in a given system, the greater the ability to shift alliances and form counterbalances to potential hegemon. In addition, in a multipolar system, states are not locked into two rigid, opposing blocks that may go to system-wide war over minor incidents.³⁵ In addition, the uncertainty created by a greater number of actors within a given system may actually decrease the potential for conflict since such uncertainty will lead to increased caution by all actors.³⁶ In the end, the most significant determinant about a system's stability is the degree of relative change over time.³⁷ If there is continuity in the system, and states are able to form lasting relationships with other states, then the degree of uncertainty is lessened whether the system is bipolar or unipolar.

Hence the European system that evolved after World War II was stable, not because it was bipolar, and not solely because of the presence of nuclear weapons, but because there was little change among the states within the system.³⁸ In addition, the

³⁴Ibid.

³⁵John Lewis Gaddis uses the First World War to illustrate this point; Gaddis, 23.

³⁶Michael Howard, "1989: A Farewell to Arms?" *International Affairs* 65, no. 3 (Summer 1988): 412-13.

³⁷Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, "Systemic Polarization and the Occurrence and Duration of War," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 22, no. 2 (June 1978): 247.

³⁸Alan James, "The Equity of States: Contemporary Manifestations of an Ancient Doctrine," *Review of International Studies* 18, no. 3 (October 1992): 390.

two rival blocs could be viewed as essentially defensive alliances designed to ensure the status quo. The presence of nuclear weapons made both sides risk averse, hence the states involved undertook efforts to preserve the status quo, rather than attempting to achieve relative gains through territorial expansion.³⁹

Alliance systems focus almost exclusively on outside threats and concentrate on cooperative measures to promote security that external to the members of the alliance. In contrast to alliances, collective security regimes promote internal security, that is security within the regime or system. Collective security can be defined in a number of ways, but the consensus definition is “the collective commitment of a group to hold its members accountable for the maintenance of an internal security norm.”⁴⁰ For collective security systems, the emphasis is self-regulation. Hence, collective security can also be conceptualized thus: “a group of states attempts to reduce security threats by agreeing to collectively punish any member state that violates the system’s norms.”⁴¹ It rests on the principle of all against one and deters aggression by ensuring that states which defect from the regime or violate the regime’s norms will be met by a coalition that has preponderant force.⁴² This internal focus of collective security systems is one feature

³⁹For an examination of whether offensive or defensive alliances are more likely to go to war, see *Ibid.*, 194-99.

⁴⁰George W. Downs, “Beyond the Debate on Collective Security,” in *Collective Security Beyond the Cold War*, ed. George W. Downs (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1994), 2.

⁴¹George W. Downs and Keisuke Iida, “Assessing the Theoretical Case Against Collective Security,” in *Collective Security Beyond the Cold War*, ed. George W. Downs (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1994), 18.

⁴²Kupchan, “Collective Security,” 43.

that differentiates them from alliances. In addition, alliances are much less likely to have self-regulatory measures to prevent conflict among member states. Collective security regimes usually have provisions which limit the size of members' military forces and arms production in an effort to ameliorate the security dilemma and forestall conflict within the regime.⁴³

The failure of the League of nations to stop Japanese or Italian aggression in the 1920s and 1930s, cast a pall over the concept of collective security and led many realist critics to dismiss the idea as unworkable.⁴⁴ In general, critics have posited three major reasons why collective security organizations cannot work.⁴⁵ The first major criticism of collective security is that it necessitates a relatively equal distribution of power in a system with no hegemon.⁴⁶ Such diffusion of power is almost impossible since the economic and military power of states grows at differing rates. As some states gain economic and military power, in relative terms, other states lose it. This leads to basic realignments within the system, and to the growth of hegemonic powers.⁴⁷ States that

⁴³Downs and Iida, 18.

⁴⁴See, for instance, Betts, 5-43.

⁴⁵George Downs and Keisuke Iida identify six theoretical arguments against collective security: "1) Collective security requires a substantial diffusion of power; 2) Variation in assessment of threats dramatically limits the range and efficacy of collective security; 3) The free-rider problem jeopardizes any collective security agreement; 4) Collective security cannot survive in the absence of an outside threat; 5) Collective security requires states to commit themselves to an inflexible course of action that is insensitive to context and self-interest; and 6) The logic of collective security is circular in the sense that its establishment requires that its consequence already exist; Downs and Iida, 36.

⁴⁶*Ibid.*

⁴⁷Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion," 10. See also Kennedy, especially the introductory chapter.

gain relative advantages over other states in the system are likely to increase their ambitions and attempt to increase their control over their external environment.⁴⁸ The dynamics of the security dilemma further compound this problem, since relative gains by one state can be perceived as potential threats by another.

The second leading criticism of collective security, is that variations in threat assessments by different states constrain the effectiveness and range of options of collective security systems. Threat discrepancies are especially significant since states can perceive actions differently. Actions which appear threatening to one state may be perceived to be of no consequence to another state. As George Downs points out, "What is a vital interest for one state may be of no concern for another."⁴⁹ States which perceive a threat to be of significant importance will be willing to undertake much more substantial actions than states that perceive a threat to be relatively minor. This discrepancy in threat perception may prevent unanimity in action, or general agreement on action. This is especially crucial since the principle of "all for one" upon which collective security is based, demands that all states consider aggression of the threat of aggression as the ultimate transgression, against which all other values and interests are overshadowed. However, if states do not value the norms of the regime above their own interests, they will be tempted to defect from the regime rather than subsume their national interests for the sake of the system. In a moment of truth, states may not line up

⁴⁸Gilpin, *War and Change*, 94-95.

⁴⁹Downs and Lida, 24.

against an aggressor state, but may instead “bipolarize” and ally themselves with whichever state is most likely to afford them relative gains and further their interests.⁵⁰

The final argument against collective security revolves around the problem of free-riders. In a collective security arrangement, states may be inclined to allow other states to assume the responsibility, and therefore the costs, of dealing with or guarding against threats and thus “free-riding.”⁵¹ These states are able to share in the public good of security without incurring the costs associated with producing it.⁵² Since some states tend to overpay to maintain these public goods and the status quo in general, free riders are able to devote a higher degree of their resources in the pursuit of individual goals and interests. This produces relative gains for the free-riders and may initiate the security dilemma, or, if a single powerful state has been responsible for the distribution of public goods, it may lead to an “imperial overstretch.”⁵³ Paul Kennedy asserts that hegemonic

⁵⁰Josef Joffe, “Collective Security and the Future of Europe,” *Survival* 34, no. 1 (Spring 1992): 39.

⁵¹Michael Hechter summarized the phenomenon of free-riders from a utilitarian perspective in the following manner: “Rational self-interest actors will not join large organizations to pursue collective goods when they can reap the benefit of other people’s activity to pursue those ends. This means that the rational actor in the utilitarian model will always be a free rider whenever given the opportunity;” Michael Hechter, “Karl Polanyi’s Social Theory: A Critique,” *Politics and Society* 10, no. 4 (Fall 1981): 403.

⁵²Public goods are those commodities that can be consumed on a universal basis without individual contributions or control. Paul A. Samuelson defines them as goods “which all enjoy in common in the sense that each individual’s consumption of such a good leads to no subtraction from any other individual’s consumption of that good;” Paul A. Samuelson, “The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure,” *Review of Economics and Statistics* 36 (1954): 387. Examples of public goods would include free trade or security. The seminal work on public goods is; Mancur Olson, Jr., *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups* (Cambridge: Harvard University, 1965).

⁵³Kennedy, 515.

or primary powers inevitably develop an imbalance. This theory held that hegemony inevitably develops an imbalance between their commitments and capabilities. Since hegemony provides the world with stability, they unintentionally allow other states to rise to challenge the dominant power. As these rising states seek to secure their own security by enlarging or improving their capabilities, they inevitably gain against the hegemon in relative terms because they are not forced to shoulder the same commitments that the hegemon does. The result is hegemonic decline. As the hegemon spends more on defense, it takes resources away from its economy which causes further relative losses versus potential challengers.⁵⁴ The hegemon is doomed to continue its overstretch because as it attempts to maintain its lead over its rivals, it continues to spend significantly more on defense in order to maintain its dominant world position. The result is not only instability within the system or regime, but the potential for break up.

Proponents of collective security refute these arguments and assert that collective security offers states far more benefits than other forms of security regimes, including alliances and balance of power systems. Collective security systems provide both the incentives and the means by which cooperation can take place in an anarchical world. In this way, collective security ameliorates the security dilemma, and hence provides additional benefits which balancing or bandwagoning do not. To the contention that collective security requires a diffusion of power, Downs and Lida point out that the presence of a hegemonic power, while not meeting the archetypical assumptions of collective security, can in fact facilitate the formation and maintenance of such a

⁵⁴Ibid., 515.

system.⁵⁵ Hegemons improve the outlook for a collective security system because these powerful states are able to assume a leadership within the system. Hegemons increase the probability that a state that violates the system's norms will be punished, and that memberstates that refuse to punish violators will themselves be punished.⁵⁶

While some assert that collective security exists only when it is not needed, that when the conditions of a state system are such that cooperation is valued and anarchy is mitigated through international norms, collective security systems can in fact aid in the formation of the conditions which make its existence less necessary. As Charles Kupchan contends, "a collective security system, by building on and promoting the political compatibility that makes such an institution possible, may perpetuate and make more durable a peaceful and desirable international setting."⁵⁷ IOs and regimes, including collective security systems, foster cooperation by established the norms and rules that direct, and in some cases constrain, state behavior, all the while increasing collaboration and coordination of policy among states. These institutions also provide predictability about other state's future behavior based on past compliance or noncompliance with regime norms. In this way, states develop patterns of cooperation because they assume other states will reciprocate.⁵⁸

⁵⁵Downs and Iida, 22-23.

⁵⁶Downs and Iida cite these factors as examples of how hegemonic powers can aid collective security systems; Ibid. Their arguments echo Robert O. Keohane's work on hegemonic cooperation and hegemonic stability theory; see Keohane, *After Hegemony*, especially Chapter 8, "Hegemonic Cooperation in the Postwar Era."

⁵⁷Kupchan, 49.

⁵⁸Robert Axelrod and Robert O. Keohane, "Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions," *World Politics* 38 (1985): 234.

Charles Kupchan, writing about the potential for collective security systems to promote cooperation cites four specific ways in which this occurs. First, these systems improve the flow of information between memberstates, thereby increasing the transparency of the system. By distributing information on individual nations' military forces and structures, collective security systems ameliorate the security dilemma by differentiating between defensive and offensive military preparations and by encouraging mainly defensive military preparations. Second, institutions intensify the costs of defection from a regime by formalizing the measures that are taken in the event of such an action.⁵⁹ Third, these systems increase the potential for international agreements to be reached by providing linkage forums to bring together disparate issues. Since IOs and regimes lower the transaction costs of bargaining, they reduce the cost associated with future negotiations. Fourth, "institutions hold the potential to promote interstate socialization, to transform a "minimum of political solidarity" into an international community in which states share similar values and normative orientations."⁶⁰

Through the promotion of cooperation, collective security has two main advantages over balancing. It strengthens the likelihood a coalition will form to resist aggression since states commit themselves to a specified course of action to be

⁵⁹Kupchan defines defection as taking one of two forms: either an act of formal aggression against another memberstate; or the refusal to engage in collective action against aggression. The measure taken in the event of defection are detailed by a "punishment regime" which formalizes the responses to defection by outlining the specific punishments that defectors face; Kupchan, 50.

⁶⁰Ibid, p. 51; see also John G. Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchan, "Socialization and Hegemonic Power," *International Organization* 44 (1990): 283-316.

undertaken in the event of such aggression. Because of punishment regimes and developed patterns of cooperation, states are more likely to fulfill their commitments to the regime.⁶¹ In this way, regimes can “lock-in cooperation” and intensify the cooperative habits that led to their development.⁶² Hence, collective security reduces the uncertainty associated with balancing under anarchy. Collective security’s other major advantage over balancing is that it enhances the identification of potential aggressor states. Since collective security facilitates transparency, states have much less of an ability to develop significant offensive capabilities without being detected. Furthermore, since collective security systems usually involve some limitations or mutually arrived at force limitations, any military build-up could be detected before it reached a level by which the aggressor state could overpower the system’s collective response.⁶³ This further ameliorates the potential for the development of the security dilemma.

In the spectrum of security regimes, which range from informal alliances to confederations, collective security organizations emerge as the institutions which offer states the greatest potential benefits, while still maintaining a considerable degree of autonomy. When threats emerge in the international system, states usually adopt one of

⁶¹Under collective security systems, states have both rewards and potential punishments as incentives for cooperation. Punishments are implemented by the punishment regime, while rewards come in the form of payoffs from cooperation and the potential for future cooperation; Anatol Rappaport and Albert Chammah, *Prisoner's Dilemma: A Study in Conflict and Cooperation* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1965), 235.

⁶²Joseph S. Nye, Jr, “Nuclear Learning and U.S.–Soviet Security Regimes,” *International Organization* 41 (1987): 385.

⁶³Kupchan, 45-46.

three responses: 1) “hiding”–withdrawing into isolation and avoiding confrontation; 2) Balancing against the threat by forming alliances or coalitions; and 3) “Co-option”–persuading the potential aggressor state to return to the normal pattern of behavior or the status quo.⁶⁴ Hiding is a suboptimal response since a state relinquishes any ability to influence future events. Balancing may be the efficient response to direct aggression, but after the defeat of the threat, these coalitions often lose their cohesion. Co-option provides a means by which to prevent conflict and promote future cooperation, all the while rehabilitating aggressor states into the status quo. Collective security provides the most efficient means with which to co-opt states into international systems. Some of the more notable examples of co-option include the rehabilitation of France after the Napoleonic Wars and the reintegration of the Federal Republic of Germany into the West after World War II.⁶⁵

The current security regime in Western Europe had its genesis in a defensive alliance against Germany. It then evolved into a coalition, based on balance of power principled and arrayed against an external threat to the continent, and has culminated in a collective security system. For West Europe three issues have formed the core of security concerns in the Cold War era: 1) The place of Germany in the European state system; 2) The Soviet threat; and 3) The role of the United States in European security.

⁶⁴Richard Rosecrance and Chih-Cheng Lo, “Balancing, Stability, and War: The Mysterious Case of the Napoleonic International System,” *International Studies Quarterly* 40, no. 4 (December 1996): 480.

⁶⁵It should be noted that in both cases the co-option of these states involved the “rehabilitation” of the states after their defeat in hegemonic bids. These efforts were undertaken in order to avert future conflict and maintain the relative stability of the contemporary system of states.

The current security system in postwar Europe began with the Dunkirk Treaty in 1947, an essentially anti-German, Anglo-French alliance. The formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization formalized an anti-Soviet transatlantic coalition of the West's democracies. Through the machinations of the European Defense Community (EDC), this coalition would evolve into an arrangement which both brought the Federal Republic into the fold of Western Europe and which firmly tied the United States into the framework of European security through the West European Union (WEU)/NATO relationship.⁶⁶ By 1955, the central questions of European security, which revolved around German rearmament, the potential for Soviet aggression and America's commitment to the continent, had been settled as a result of two institutions, NATO, and the WEU which provided the bridge for German entrance into NATO.

European institutionalism also developed along economic lines. Beginning with the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and preceding with the European Community (EC), West European nations developed an "economic alliance" to help them fend off the external threat posed by Soviet communism, and to manage the potential internal threat posed by a resurgent Germany.⁶⁷ The genesis for European economic integration was the Marshall Plan which called for the Europeans to collectively develop a thorough recovery plan that was based on shared responsibility. It also called for the establishment of permanent institutions to oversee the implementation of the plan. The United States played a coordinating role in these efforts through the

⁶⁶On the negotiations surrounding the failed EDC and the ramifications of the proposals, see Furdson.

⁶⁷Van Ham, 191.

offices of the European Recovery Program (ERP) and its country missions and the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA).⁶⁸ Hence the United States assumed a leadership role in prompting European integration, both on the economic and security spheres.

In the post-World War II era, multilateralism has been a consistent feature of American foreign policy--a feature that has handsomely rewarded the United States.⁶⁹ In establishing the institutions that laid the framework for postwar multilateralism, the United States only pushed for the creation of IOs and regimes which reflected or served American interests. Most of the major postwar institutions reflected the U.S. interest in either free and open trade or collective security. Moreover, the United States often limited the independence of these institutions by giving itself either veto power, as in the case of the UN, or disproportionate voting power, as in the IMF.⁷⁰ Furthermore, these postwar IOs helped establish the legitimacy of the American hegemony. John Ikenberry and Charles Kupchan contend that "rightful rule emerges if the hegemon is able to induce smaller powers to buy into its vision of international order and to accept as their own--in short, to internalize and embrace--the principles and norms espoused by the hegemon."⁷¹ This is exactly what the United States has been able to accomplish in the postwar period. American hegemony was in most ways by invitation. With the

⁶⁸See Charles S. Maier, "Hegemony and Autonomy Within the Western Alliance," in *The Cold War in Europe*, ed. Charles S. Maier (New York: Markus Wiener, 1991), 158.

⁶⁹Ruggie, *Multilateralism Matters*, 28-29.

⁷⁰*Ibid.*, 25-26.

⁷¹Ikenberry and Kupchan, 151.

exception of some very glaring aberrations, most notably in Latin America, the states that fell under American hegemony found themselves much better off in comparison to those states under Soviet hegemony. This preference for American hegemony was reflected by the institutionalization of U.S. interests--again, free trade, democracy and collective security.

Through the proliferation of IOs and regimes that reflect its preferences, American primacy is secure because the United States does not need as much power as it did.⁷² By promoting the pillars of the present major systems in the world, America has made sure its interests coincide in many ways with the broad interests of most major IOs and regimes: free trade; democracy; and multilateralism. This offers the United States the ability to share some of its hegemonal burdens without a significant loss of power. This is especially true in those international organizations in which the U.S. assumes a large proportion of the costs of the body.⁷³

In fact, the current strength and diversity of international organizations are a direct result of U.S. foreign policy choices at the end of World War II. American choices reflected an attempt to limit the anarchical nature of international relations by prodding the world to be more like the United States.⁷⁴ Americans have always associated democracy and free trade with peace; consequently, after containment, the

⁷²Henry Nau, *The Myth of America's Decline: Leading the World Economy into the 1990s* (New York: Oxford University, 1990), 9-10.

⁷³On the tendency for states which carry a large percentage of the burdens of an international institution to press their strategic preferences and use the organizations to their advantage, see Snyder, 113.

⁷⁴See Maier.

three broad goals of American foreign policy in the postwar era were the promotion of free trade, democracy and collective security.⁷⁵ These were seen originally as means to prevent a third world war and to promote stability. The pursuit of this stability opened up vast markets for U.S. products at the same time that it provided economic benefits for the states that fell under America's sway. All of the states that embraced the main U.S. tenants of free trade, democracy and collective security experienced phenomenal economic growth during the Cold-War period.⁷⁶

At the same time, America allows considerable leeway in its hegemony. Simply examine the case of Franco-American relations during the Cold War. The United States allowed France to gain considerable benefits from the U.S. security presence in Europe, without the French from 1963 on, having to "pay" the costs associated with this hegemony through participation in NATO's integrated military structures. The United States also accepted France's considerable autonomy in conducting an independent foreign policy which often worked against American foreign policy goals, especially in the third world. Even during NATO's supreme test, the potential defection of one of its members, the United States continued to play the role of the *benevolent* hegemon. Instead of "punishing" France, the United States patiently "waited-out de Gaulle."⁷⁷ In fact, France's withdrawal from NATO was actually more an issue of free-riding, than a full defection. France merely exploited the willingness of the United States to allow

⁷⁵Richard J. Kerry, *The Star-Spangled Mirror: America's Image of Itself and the World* (Savage, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1990), 14.

⁷⁶Jeffrey D. Sachs, "Consolidating Capitalism," *Foreign Policy* 98 (Spring 1995): 53.

⁷⁷Frank Costigliola, *France and the United States: the Cold War Alliance Since World War II* (New York: Twayne, 1992), 126.

free-riders. She adopted a "privileged position and an ungrateful stand" under de Gaulle.⁷⁸ Even during this period French forces continued to be involved in joint programs with NATO. De Gaulle's successors even returned France, more or less, back into the folds of NATO.⁷⁹ One can find numerous other examples in which the United States has allowed nations to work at cross-purposes with American interests if the costs to the United States are relatively minor. The United States has been able to play the benevolent hegemon by acting more as "a senior partner, rather than as an adversary," in IOs.⁸⁰ The United States operates out of the assumption that public goods such as free trade or security are not zero-sum variables. One state's gain in the economic arena does not necessarily entail a relative loss by another state since "the amount of wealth is not fixed, so that all nations can prosper simultaneously."⁸¹

By assuming a leadership role, the United States has ensured the credibility of regime and allowed the development of a broad collective security system. NATO was formed as an alliance with the Soviet Union as its external threat. However, with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, NATO has lost its original *raison d'etre*, yet it still survives as a viable military organization. The continued existence of NATO qualifies it as an iterated game which makes future cooperation all the more likely. There is no doubt that the member states will continue to "play" the game in the near future. The

⁷⁸Michael Harrison, *The Reluctant Ally: France and Atlantic Security* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1981), 115.

⁷⁹*Ibid.*, 170; Ronald Tiersky, *The Mitterrand Legacy and the Future of French Security Policy*, McNair Papers, no. 43 (Washington, D.C.: INSS, 1995).

⁸⁰Axelrod and Keohane, "Achieving Cooperation," 102.

⁸¹Stein, 120.

Alliance increases confidence among member states that others will not defect, and the lengthy nature of the relationships among NATO's memberstates also increases the ability of states to form linkage strategies.⁸² This is important because the stronger, and more complex the interdependence that can be forged between nations the less likely that single issues can break those nations apart--even if the single issue is the original reason behind the formation of the alliance. Thus, the longer that NATO survives, the stronger the organization becomes, and the more likely that it will assume functions outside of its original mandate as separate issues become increasingly intertwined.

The nationstates of Western Europe have internalized the patterns of cooperation and collaboration that have marked their interactions in the post World War II era. On both the economic and security levels, cooperation through formal institutions has become the preferred and most accepted means by which individual states pursue goals. States have been willing to trade a certain amount of legal freedom of action in exchange for a greater degree of realistic influence over the policies of partner states.⁸³ As Peter van Ham contends: "Consensus has gradually been built that the "New Europe" will be based on many institutions, of which the EU and NATO are likely to become the main pillars. The WEU, as the organization responsible for defence within the EU, is to

⁸²Keohane and Nye, *Power and Interdependence*. 36.

⁸³Andrew Hurrell, "Explaining the Resurgence of Regionalism in World Politics," *Review of International Studies* 21, no. 4 (October 1995): 336-37. While states have engaged in multilateralism in order to reinforce state power, the "institutional enmeshment" may constrain some elements of state sovereignty as regionalism rises; see Mark W. Zacher, "The Decaying Pillars of the Westphalian Temple: Implications for Order and Governance," in *Governance Without Government: Order and Change in World Politics*, ed. James N. Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1992).

function as the bridge between both organizations. Over time, WEU may develop into a fully fledged European defence organization taking responsibility for handling some problems Europeans can no longer expect the United States to solve for them (either directly or working through NATO). Institutions like the United Nations, the CSCE and the Council of Europe will, of course, remain essential frameworks for preserving international peace and security, managing essential European and global problems, and – perhaps most importantly – for developing a regional society based on law which can be monitored and enforced.⁸⁴

For the states of Western Europe, integration and regional cooperation has provided a number of benefits to individual states. During the Cold War, the security regime served as a means of coordinating responses to the external challenge of the Soviet Union. It also served as a mechanism through which regional interests could be promoted with the enhanced capabilities of IOs. The regime also led to the establishment of confidence-building measures between the states and established a forum to address issues arising from increased interdependence. The regime was also instrumental in furthering regional cohesion and de-nationalizing public policy on a number of issues including control of borders and certain aspects of social and economic policy.⁸⁵

⁸⁴Van Ham, 197.

⁸⁵Andrew Hurrell asserts that regional cohesion occurs if two conditions are met: “(a) when the region plays a defining role in the relations between the states (and other major actors) of that region and the rest of the world; and (b) when the region forms the organizing basis for policy within the region across a range of issues; Hurrell, 337.

The major European and transatlantic security organizations, NATO and the WEU, form a security regime that encompasses the states of Western Europe. Under the hegemonic leadership of the United States, this regime has ameliorated the security dilemma among individual states by extending the public good of security to all memberstates and ensuring the survival of individual states. The regime has also increased the transparency and the level of communication and integration among all the memberstates. The regime has also effectively dealt with the issue of free riders, because of the willingness of the United States to assume a leadership role.

The regime has been able to accomplish these feats by incorporating and implementing the main elements of a collective security system on the continent. Specifically, the regime served to rehabilitate Germany into the society of states, while providing an alliance structure against the external Soviet threat, and providing a forum for American participation (and leadership) in European security.

The evolution of the European security regime has occurred concurrently with the broader growth of institutionalism and multilateralism. The external threat of the Soviet Union and the hegemonic leadership of the United States helped create the conditions favorable to creation of the institutional framework that has come to symbolize Western Europe. As NATO has served as the pillar of regional security cooperation, the EU has developed into the pillar of economic and political integration. Through the pursuit and internalization of institutionalism, the states of Western Europe have developed a degree of integration and interdependence that is unequalled elsewhere in the global system, and cultivated a society of states which is unmatched by any other region of the world at this point.

Significantly, the memberstates have internalized the system's norms and rules, thereby lessening the potential for future conflict. For the individual nationstates, the present system has provided a means to augment their security capabilities and produced gains that could be shared by all without a corresponding increase in the threat potential, and without profound costs. In this way, the regime has provided incentives for continued cooperation and integration and has facilitated the potential for further integration and collaboration.

CHAPTER V
NATIONALISM ON THE EUROPEAN CONTINENT

The end of the Cold War effectively removed the immediate risk of a direct, large scale, military attack on Western Europe. There was also a corresponding decline in the risk of a massive nuclear exchange on the continent. Yet even as the hard military threats of the bipolar rivalry diminished, there was a recognition that Europe still faced a host of security concerns, some of which had been overshadowed by the Cold War and others that were created by the very end of the conflict. Nationalism emerged as a security concern for Western Europe for a variety of reasons. There was concern that the end of the Cold War would lead to a renationalization of West European states as the conformity forced by the bipolar system evaporated and the reunified Germany would attempt to assert itself in security matters which would force other states to renationalize defense policy in response. To the East, the post-Cold War emergence of nationalism is of particular concern to the West since few of the emerging states of Central and Eastern Europe have homogenous populations and settled borders, and nationalism has increasingly been defined along religious or ethnic lines which often cross national borders. The result of such ethno- and religious nationalism has been wide scale minority problems associated with self-determination movements.¹ For example, by 1991, all of the states of the former Eastern bloc, including those of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), had pressing minority problems that ranged from armed

¹Duke, *Security Disorder*, 57.

strife as in the case of the former Yugoslavia to questions of citizenship and status as in the Baltic states.²

This chapter will examine the most significant challenges posed by resurgent nationalism to Western Europe. These challenges can be categorized into two broad areas: 1) Ethnic and religious strife and the breakdown of national states; and 2) potential threats from a renationalized, expansionistic Russia. The as of yet unsettled nature of the majority of the minority questions and the geographic proximity of a number of such conflicts in Central and Eastern Europe necessitate that the West must develop mechanisms to deal with future Bosnias or Chechnyas. Concurrent with the continuing ethnic and religious strife on the European continent, the community of Western European states must also maintain security guarantees that will enable them to effectively manage either a renationalization of Russia or further fragmentation of the former Soviet Union. What links these issues is that they present broad threats that cannot be effectively addressed by single states. With growing constraints on the defense outlays of individual nations, and because of the norms of cooperation already established, the states of Western Europe are increasingly willing to use the established security framework to deal with broad matters of national security that used to be the domain of the nationstate. These states are also increasingly amenable to relinquishing decision-making authority in order to avoid the necessity of unilateral action. In the end,

²Stephan Iwan Griffiths, "Nationalism in Central and South-Eastern Europe," in *Security and Strategy in the New Europe*, ed. Colin McInnes (New York: Routledge, 1992), 64-65.

the multiplicity of these threats can only be effectively addressed through collective action by the existing security structures in Europe.

The end of the Cold War and the demise of the Warsaw Pact effectively removed the restraints that had constrained numerous conflicts throughout the continent. The collapse of authoritarian regimes in Central and Eastern Europe was accompanied by an outbreak of ethnic violence which tore apart even supposedly cosmopolitan and multiethnic states such as Yugoslavia. One of the most striking features of the post-Cold War era has been that internal conflicts vastly outnumber external conflicts. Of the thirty contemporary conflicts around the world none can be classified as a major war where battle deaths exceed 1,000 per annum.³ Many of these conflicts were exacerbated by the failure of multinational organizations, including the UN and the EU, to effectively manage third party intervention efforts. Even in nations that managed to avoid outright bloodshed, tensions between ethnic minorities continue to simmer, and have resulted in events such as the "velvet divorce" between the Czechs and Slovaks.⁴ Even in this overall amicable break up, the EU found it necessary to eventually intercede and mediate the split.

³Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, *Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict: Second Progress Report* (New York: Carnegie Corporation, 1996), 2.

⁴This relatively tranquil split did little to enhance regional stability and presented a number of problems for both of the new nations. The effort to maintain a common currency quickly faltered, with notable consequences for both economies. The split also heightened tensions between the new state of Slovakia and Hungary over the rights of the substantial Hungarian minority. That the Czech Republic will be in the first wave of NATO expansion has also added to tensions between the two states.

The factors that contribute to the outbreak of ethnic conflict are many and varied, but in general five there are main determinants responsible for most internal strife.⁵ The first of these factors is demographic pressure, especially the wide scale movement of refugees or rapid increases in ethnic populations due to higher birthrates. The second determinant is uneven economic development along ethnic lines where one or more ethnic groups perceives itself to be shut out of a state's economic gains. The third cause of strife is a legacy of vengeance seeking behavior. The fourth factor is the criminalization of the regime which occurs when segments of the population are able to exploit minority or ethnic groups with the support of the government. The fifth and final underlying cause for ethnic conflict is the collapse of the regime accompanied by a suspension of the rule of law⁶.

As the states of Central and Eastern Europe have democratized, many of the old ethnic disputes have reemerged as ethnic minority parties, long-suppressed under communist rule, have come to play an increasingly important part in national politics.⁷ In addition, as these states have emerged from under the shadow of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw bloc, nationalistic themes have reasserted themselves. Such themes include

⁵The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) cites only three determinants to forecast potential conflicts: "a) Minority populations in b) economically depressed areas along c) borders with kin states"; Carnegie Commission, *Second Progress Report*, 4.

⁶Pauline H. Baker and John A. Ausink, "State Collapse and Ethnic Violence: Toward a Predictive Model," *Parameters* 26, no. 1 (Spring 1996): 19-31.

⁷This is especially true as market reforms have failed in many cases to meet public expectations about the free market and nationalist and former communist parties have gained increased political ground in Central Europe; Wojciech Gebicki and Anna Marta Gebicka, "Central Europe: A Shift to the Left?" *Survival* 37, no. 3 (Autumn 1995): 136-38.

the expansion of territory to include ethnic nationals presently outside of national borders and the redrawing of borders to reflect historical precedents. Hence, the rise in nationalism has the potential to lead to both internal and external conflicts in the region.

The ramifications of internal strife in the form of ethnic and religious conflict can spread beyond the borders of any one state and thus become a security concern even for those Western states that lack contiguous borders with strife-torn areas. With the end of the Cold War, human rights issues have become increasingly relevant to European security as the rise in ethnic conflict has led to larger numbers of refugees.⁸ In response to the number of conflicts and rise in refugees, European security institutions such as NATO and the WEU have been called upon to conduct an ever expanding number of humanitarian operations. From Bosnia to Iraq, Alliance forces have been deployed in a wide range of peace-keeping and peace-enforcement operations. In general, the states of Western Europe have three principal concerns for preventing ethnic and religious strife. First, internal conflicts can prompt the wide scale movement of refugees. This issue is especially significant in Europe at a time of increasing anti-immigrant sentiments in several countries, most noticeably France, Germany and Italy. For France, the ongoing strife in Algeria has prompted a wave of immigration that brings with it the possibility for increased terrorism and social unrest.⁹ Unemployment among Arabs and North

⁸In 1983, there were approximately twelve million refugees and displaced persons in the world. By 1994, that figure had risen to over forty million; Lionel A. Rosenblatt and Larry Thompson "Humanitarian Emergencies: Saving Lives and Resources," *S&S Review* 15, no.2 (Summer 1995): 92.

⁹In France, immigrants make up some 6.3 % of the total population, and of these, some 40% are from North Africa. Of this number, some 600,000 are Algerians who have migrated to France since 1990, bringing France's Algerian population to some 800,000; William Drozdiak, "Fleeing Kurds Cause Alarm in Europe," *Washington Post* (7 January

Africans living in France is close to 33 per cent and has been accompanied by increased tensions among the immigrant community. In 1997, France experienced more than 15,800 incidents of urban violence, with several significant periods of rioting in French suburbs during December of 1997 and January of 1998 after police killed two youths of North African descent.¹⁰ Partially as a result of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, Germany now accounts for some 3 per cent of the world's total asylum seekers.¹¹ It is estimated that there are some 7.3 million foreign residents in Germany or approximately 9 per cent of the nation's total population.¹² Germany is home to approximately 70 per cent of the refugees from the former Yugoslavia and has spent over DM 17 billion on their care.¹³ The resettlement of refugees has been a major priority of Germany and the EU in general, especially in light of the large number of refugees that remain in the states of the former Yugoslavia.¹⁴ The collapse of the government of Berisha regime in

1998). Of France's immigrant population, *The Economist* states, "A formidable number of black and brown people, mostly of North African origin, mostly without qualifications and many of them unemployed, are growing up not as Frenchmen but as a sullen, excluded minority;" *The Economist, France Survey* (November 25, 1995), 11.

¹⁰"France, Belgium: Suburbs , Algeria," *Migration News* 5, no. 2 (February 1998).

¹¹U.S. Committee for Refugees, *World Refugee Survey, 1997* (Washington, D.C.: Immigration and Refugees Services of America, 1997), 4-5.

¹²While Germany is home to approximately 350,000 refugees from the former Yugoslavia, the fastest growing segment of the nation's foreign population come from states such as Afghanistan, Iran and Iraq; "Germany: Data, Ethnic Germans, Asylum," *Migration News* 5, no. 5 (February 1998).

¹³Helmut Kohl, "Security in Tomorrow's World," speech at the 34th Munich Conference on Security Policy, 7 February 1998.

¹⁴The EU estimates that some 200,000 refugees remain unsettled in the territory of the former Yugoslavia; European Commission, *Annual Report on Humanitarian Aid, 1995* (Brussels: European Commission, 1996), 3-4.

Albania prompted the exodus of thousands of refugees from that country to neighboring Italy.¹⁵

Immigration is especially contentious in Europe because of the EU's liberal freedom of movement laws. For instance, Article 48 gives EU nationals the right to seek work anywhere in the Union on an equal basis with natives. However, both Germany and Austria have called for lengthy transition periods before foreign workers can enjoy such benefits.¹⁶ The two EU members are especially interested in preventing the citizens of new EU states such as the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovenia from gaining the freedom to move and acquire jobs at a time of rising unemployment among German and Austrian nationals.¹⁷ Hence the possibility that refugees can acquire the right to compete with EU nationals has led to calls for even tighter restrictions.¹⁸ Even as former German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and French President Jacques Chirac called for the lifting of internal restrictions on EU citizens, they also called for increased controls on the EU's external borders to prevent illegal workers from entering the EU.¹⁹

¹⁵Italy had for some time already been faced with large numbers of Albanian refugees seeking economic opportunities and the internal strife surrounding the collapse of the Berisha government accelerated this trend; Human Rights Watch, *Democracy Derailed: Violations in the May 26, 1996 Albanian Elections* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1996), 10-15; Andrea Stefani, "Gazeta Shqiptare," in *Balkan Media and Policy Monitor* 3 (July 1997): 18.

¹⁶Michael Specter, "Population Implosion Worries a Graying Europe," *New York Times* (10 July 1998).

¹⁷"Europe," *Migration News*, vol. 5, no. 8 (August 1998).

¹⁸For instance, the Christian Social Union Party in Germany has called for increasing the waiting period for workers from seven years to fifteen years; Specter.

¹⁹Helmut Kohl and Jacques Chirac, letter to John Bruton, 13 December 1996, Press Release, Office of Information and Press, Federal Republic of Germany.

The second major concern of the European states in preventing or ameliorating internal conflicts is economics. The demise of the Soviet bloc and the resultant collapse of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) led to a dismantling of the system which had given artificial preferences for goods from other CMEA states.²⁰ As a result, EU exports to the states of the former Soviet bloc have increased by some 50 per cent so that they now make up some 10 per cent of the EU's total exports.²¹ The EU remains the main trading partner for the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Some 37 per cent of the CIS's exports and 46 per cent of its imports came from the EU, and the Union has a trade surplus with the region of some \$10.3 billion.²² EU imports from the states of Central and Eastern Europe (excluding the states of the former Soviet Union) continue to increase each year, rising some 8.9 percent in 1998.²³

²⁰"Trade at administered CMEA prices expressed in non-convertible monetary units was replaced by trade at world prices expressed in convertible currencies, which put an end to the discrimination against non CMEA Markets;" EU, Commission of the European Communities, "EC Trade with Central and Eastern Europe," *The European Economy* (Brussels: OOPEC, 1993), 27-45.

²¹EU exports to the region have risen from 5.7 per cent of total EU exports in 1987 to 10.7 in 1995; EU, European Commission, *1997 Annual Economic Report*, COM(97)27, (Brussels: OOPEC, 1997), 38.

²²The Union's main trading partners with the CIS were Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Great Britain; EU, "EU the Main CIS Trading Partner," *Eurostat*, no. 998 (May 1998), 2.

²³EU, *1997 Annual Economic Report*, 38.

In addition, trade between the EU and the Visegrad states (the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland) now accounts for almost half of these countries total foreign trade.²⁴ EU nations have also placed a large amount of direct foreign investment (DFI) into specific nations. For instance, Italy has some 400 companies operating in Albania and employs some 30,000 Albanian workers.²⁵

The third major concern for West European states involves the potential for internal conflicts to spread. With Central and Eastern Europe's diversity and mix of ethnic populations, the potential for ethnic violence to cross national borders is immense. For instance, in the Balkan region there exist some 6 million ethnic Albanians. Of this number, only 3.5 million actually live in Albania. This is especially significant in areas such as the Serb controlled Kosova region in which Albanians make up over 40 per cent of the region's total population, while Serbs only make up 2 per cent.²⁶

At present there are a number of states that face underlying problems that bear the potential of escalating into either intrastate or interstate conflict. The three most explosive potential intrastate conflicts in Europe are the well-publicized disputes

²⁴In the Czech Republic and Hungary, EU imports now account for approximately 40 per cent of each nation's total imports. In Poland, EU imports account for over 50 per cent of total imports. Meanwhile, exports to the EU account for approximately 50 per cent of total exports from the Czech Republic and Hungary, and some 58 per cent of Poland's total exports; EU, CEC, *The Czech Republic's Foreign Trade, Statistics in Focus: External Trade*, no. 7 (Brussels: OOPEC, 1997); EU, CEC, *Hungarian Foreign Trade, Statistics in Focus: External Trade*, no. 5 (Brussels: OOPEC, 1997).

²⁵Marcella Favretto and Tasos Kokkinides, "Anarchy in Albania: Collapse of European Collective Security," *Basic Paper*, no. 21 (June 1997), 4.

²⁶Gazmend Pula, "Self-Determination: A Non-Confrontational Option for the Kosova Crisis," *Balkan Forum*, 4, no. 3 (September 1996): 202-3.

between Greece and Turkey, Bosnia and Serbia and Croatia and Serbia.²⁷ However, a number of other potential conflicts also exist. Romanian nationalists have called for a "Greater Romania" that would include areas now populated by Romanian minorities and a reunification with Moldova. Serb attempts to develop a "Greater Serbia" have been at the heart of the Yugoslav crisis. Calls for territorial expansion and a redrawing of Balkan frontiers have come from nationalists in states such as Bulgaria, Greece, and Russia. In addition, both Slovakia and Romania contain large ethnic Hungarian minorities (10.8% and 8.9% respectively).²⁸

The most significant source for potential conflict in eastern Europe remains the troubled Balkans. The large ethnic Albanian population in the Kosova region, and as well as in Sanjak and Tetovo have prompted Albanian calls for a "Greater Albania." Ethnic conflict has once again engulfed Serbia over the largely Albanian province of Kosovo. Conflict will continue in the region especially in light of Serb treatment of ethnic Albanians in Kosova.²⁹ Already the conflict in Kosovo has produced 100,000 displaced persons and 20,000 external refugees since the Serbian launched their major

²⁷Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, *Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict: Final Report* (New York: Carnegie Corporation, 1997), 27.

²⁸One of the preconditions for Hungarian membership in NATO was the settlement of minority issues with Slovakia and Romania through bilateral treaties. Despite these treaties, however, there remain a number of contentious issues between Hungary and these two nations over minority rights; Alistair Millar and Tasos Kokkinides, "NATO Expansion and the Excluded Countries: A New Division of Europe?" *Basic Notes* (July 1997), 2.

²⁹Serbian atrocities in Kosovo have been well documented and reported and have escalated as the fighting as increased in the region. See for instance, Amnesty International, *Crisis Report: Kosovo*, EUR70/48/98 (21 July 98).

effort to suppress the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA).³⁰ In addition, Serbian actions mirror those undertaken in the ethnic cleansing campaigns of the Bosnian conflict.³¹ Meanwhile, the KLA refuses to participate in peace negotiations with the Serbs.³² The possibility of the conflict spreading is exacerbated by the willingness of Albania to come to the aid of the ethnic rebels and to supply groups like the KLA with weapons.³³ Serb atrocities also threaten to prompt NATO retaliatory action.³⁴ Even Germany has pledged military support for such an action.³⁵

While Kosovo provides an example of the potential ethnic and nationalist conflict in Europe, multilateral efforts elsewhere demonstrate means to prevent such outbreaks of violence. With its combination of internal minority problems and external threats, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) is illustrative of the potential dangers facing the newly independent states of Central and Eastern Europe. After it declared its independence from Yugoslavia in September of 1991, the FYROM

³⁰Fred Abrahams, "The West Winks at Serbia Atrocities in Kosovo," *International Herald Tribune* (5 August 1998).

³¹Mary Robinson, *Statement by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights On the Situation in Kosovo* HR/98/14 (9 June 1998).

³²"KLA Guerillas Elect to Stay Out of Kosovan Talks," *The Irish Times* (14 August 1998).

³³For instance, the Albanians have allowed KLA soldiers to seek sanctuary in Albania and there have been minor border clashes between Serbian and Albanian troops on the border between the two nations; R. Jeffrey Smith, "Hundreds Flee Kosovo Fighting," *The Washington Post* (14 August 1998), A27.

³⁴"Serbs Said to Commit 2 Massacres in Kosovo," *International Herald Tribune* (1 October 1998).

³⁵Andrew Gimson, "Germany Will Send Jets to Kosovo," *Daily Telegraph* (1 October 1998).

faced four significant sources of likely conflict. Externally, the FYROM was threatened by both Greece and Serbia, both of whom refused to recognize the new state.³⁶ In addition, the nation faced the potential of a spillover of the conflict in the Kosova where Serb repression of ethnic Albanians sparked a civil war and a resumption of the ethnic cleansing tactics previously witnessed in Bosnia.³⁷ Internally, the FYROM faced considerable interethnic problems because of its large Albanian minority which constituted some 23 per cent of the population.³⁸ Ethnic Albanians demanded greater autonomy, especially in terms of politics and education. The FYROM also faced severe economic problems as a result of the embargo on the states of the former Yugoslavia and an ongoing Greek embargo.³⁹ The Greek embargo forced the FYROM to trade with Yugoslavia, in spite of the international embargo against that nation. A WEU report concluded that "considering that the trade embargo Greece has imposed on the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia is placing this country in such a difficult economic situation that, in order to survive, it is forced to maintain some commercial relations with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in violation of United Nations sanctions against

³⁶Greece refused to recognize the state because of name, Macedonia, which was also the name of a Greek province, and Athens cited this name choice as evidence of possible territorial ambitions. Serbia refused to recognize the state because it wished to retain the territory as part of Yugoslavia.

³⁷See, for instance, Philip Smucker, "Serb Forces in Kosovo 'Tortured and Shot' Villagers," *Daily Telegraph* (1 October 1998).

³⁸Pula, 202.

³⁹Alice Ackerman and Antonio Pala, "From Peacekeeping to Preventative Deployment: A Study of the United Nations in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia," *European Security* 5, no. 1 (Spring 1996): 84.

the latter.”⁴⁰ The external trade of the FYROM was reduced by some 60 per cent because of the two embargos.⁴¹

In spite of the likelihood of conflict in the FYROM, actions taken by the international community helped forestall strife and, hence, demonstrated the potential for preventive diplomacy and peacekeeping in the region. In 1992, the Secretary General of the UN Boutros Boutros-Ghali introduced the concept of preventive diplomacy to UN operations. Preventive diplomacy was designed to fulfill four main objectives: 1) prevention of armed conflicts; 2) prevention of conflict escalation; 3) containment of conflicts; and 4) the amelioration of the underlying sources of potential conflicts.⁴² He called for the implementation of five specific means to accomplish these objectives: 1) confidence-building measures, including cultural and military exchanges; 2) fact-finding missions; 3) the establishment of early warning networks through UN or regional intergovernmental organizations (IGOs); 4) preventive diplomacy to forestall conflicts; and 5) the formation of demilitarized zones between potential combatants.⁴³

The year that Boutros-Ghali issued his report, the UN authorized the deployment of military observers and a battalion of peacekeepers to monitor the border between the FYROM and Yugoslavia. In 1993, the Security Council approved the deployment of

⁴⁰WEU, International Secretariat, *The Situation in the Former Yugoslavia*, WEU 1467 (Brussels: WEU, 1995).

⁴¹U.S., Department of State, “Country Reports: The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,” *Implementation of the Helsinki Final Act: The President’s 35th OSCE Report to the Congress* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1997), 8.

⁴²Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace: Preventative Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping* (New York: UN, 1992), 11-13.

⁴³Ibid.

1,000 additional American troops. These troops were originally deployed under the auspices of the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR), the UN peacekeeping mission to the former Yugoslavia. However, in 1995, the FYROM requested that the UN mission be separated from UNPROFOR. The Security Council accepted this request and on March 31, 1995, through Security Council Resolution 983, the UN renamed its contingent in the FYROM as the UN Preventative Deployment Force (UNPREDEF). By the end of March 1995, UNPREDEF numbered some 540 American troops, 556 troops from a Nordic peacekeeping battalion and 53 other observers.⁴⁴

The deployment of UNPREDEF marked the first successful use of preventative peacekeeping. The relatively small size of the ethnic Serbian population, combined with the presence of American peacekeeping troops prevented an outbreak of the sort of ethnic violence seen elsewhere in the states of the former Yugoslavia.⁴⁵ Despite minor border clashes, and internal disputes between ethnic Albanians and the Macedonian majority, UNPREDEF served as a framework for the sort of preventative diplomacy envisioned by Boutros-Ghali. Under the auspices of the OSCE, negotiations between the Greeks and Macedonians led to the signing of an interim accord in 1995, and the exchange of liaison offices in January of 1996. With the subsequent removal of its

⁴⁴UN, *Report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations*, S/1995/222/Corr. 1 (29 March 1995).

⁴⁵The ethnic Serb population of the FYROM only accounts for some 2.2 per cent of the total population, while ethnic Albanians make up some 23 per cent, and ethnic Macedonians comprise 67 per cent of the total, with the remaining population made up of ethnic Turks, Vlachs and gypsies; *Ibid.*

embargo on the FYROM, Greece has now become the primary investor in the nation.⁴⁶ In addition, the UN continues to sponsor negotiations between the two nations over the name issue. The FYROM is now a member of the Council of Europe, the OSCE and NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) program.

The success of the UN mission in the FYROM and mirrors smaller, but nonetheless equally successful OSCE preventative diplomatic missions in Moldova and Georgia. In Moldova, an eight-member OSCE team mediated the crisis in the Transnistria and negotiated a constitutional settlement of the dispute. The OSCE also negotiated the terms of the withdrawal of Russian troops from Moldova.⁴⁷ In Georgia, an eighteen-member OSCE team was involved in monitoring and mediating a dispute in Southern Ossetia. The OSCE team also helped draft a new constitution for Georgia. The OSCE has also been instrumental in negotiating the Chechnyan crisis in Russia and drafting a new constitution for Tajikistan, all the while maintaining missions throughout Central and Eastern Europe. Finally, the OSCE played a key role in the Albanian crisis.⁴⁸

The Carnegie Commission offers four keys for successful conflict prevention: 1) a key player to provide leadership; 2) a coherent political-military approach; 3) adequate

⁴⁶U.S., Department of State, "Macedonia," 7.

⁴⁷Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), *Chairman's Summary: Decisions of the Budapest Ministerial Council Meeting* (Vienna: OSCE, 1996), 2.

⁴⁸For an overview of the OSCE's efforts in Albania, see Favretto and Kokkinides.

resources for a settlement; and 4) a plan for the restoration of host authority.⁴⁹ The OSCE provides a forum to fulfill all of these criteria. The OSCE provides both leadership and a comprehensive framework for negotiations which can address both political and military concerns. The OSCE also brings with it resources in the form of international aid. Finally, OSCE missions work to either support the host nation's national authority or to oversee elections to transition to a legitimate government.

In those areas where the OSCE has been successful there are several key characteristics. First, the OSCE uses small teams of international professional diplomats who are familiar with the region and peoples in conflict. Second, the OSCE deploys its missions to the conflict area, and does not attempt to mediate settlements at international conference centers. Third, these missions are long term and do not attempt to pressure factions into quick settlements. Fourth, the OSCE negotiators have a broad mandate and far-reaching powers. Fifth, and finally, the OSCE missions have the weight of the international community behind them and come with the promise of increased international aid or assistance.⁵⁰

In this manner, the OSCE provides a unique mechanism for conflict resolution and prevention that supplements the capabilities of Europe's main security organization, NATO, and the more diffuse diplomatic abilities of the UN. Because of its broad geographic mandate, and the fact that it lacks the Cold War legacy of NATO, the OSCE provides an inclusive forum to address the wider ethnic and internal disputes in areas of

⁴⁹Carnegie Commission, *Preventing Deadly Conflict*, xix.

⁵⁰Hans-Ulrich Seidt, "Lessons Learnt From the Crisis in the Balkans," *European Security* 5, no. 1 (Spring 1996): 70.

the former Soviet Union that are clearly outside of the framework of NATO. In addition, that all states have equal participatory rights gives the OSCE a greater degree of legitimacy to groups that might otherwise perceive bias in international organizations. Finally, the absence of a "rigid" legal structure allows the OSCE to respond quickly and with a greater degree of flexibility than other security organizations.⁵¹

Significantly, the OSCE has been the principle security organization that has established a visible presence in the states of the former Soviet Union. While the states of Western Europe must find a means with which to practice effective conflict management and prevention when dealing with the states of the former Soviet bloc, on a broader level, the West also be prepared for the possibility of a re-emergence of Russian nationalism--to the point that Moscow would attempt to reassert itself as a potential hegemon on the European continent.⁵² Concurrently, the West must also be prepared for any spillover which might emerge from internal instability within the Russian Federation and the Commonwealth of Independent States. The sheer size of the Russian nuclear and conventional forces demands a measure of respect from the West Europeans, especially in an era of dramatic cuts in defense expenditures. This is not to suggest that the West should risk alienating the Russians by condemning them to be a perpetual enemy, but it is clear that the presence of Russia on the Eurasian continent requires an equal military counterweight as the best guarantee for future stability, and that at the

⁵¹Miriam Sapiro, "The OSCE: An Essential Component of European Security," *Insight* 15 (March 1997), 2-3.

⁵²For a good overview of the effort by Russia to reassert itself as a global power, especially on issues such as arms control, NATO and the Russian pursuit of "balance" in international relations, see Leszek Buszynski, "Russia and the West: Towards a Renewed Geopolitical Rivalry?" *Survival* 37, no. 3 (Autumn 1995): 104-125.

very least, Russia needs to be included on a consultative basis in the evolution of Europe's security architecture. The need for collaboration between the West and Russia is especially important as many of the states of Central and Eastern Europe find themselves pressured to choose between a reorientation to the West or the maintenance of traditional ties with Russia as the former hegemon attempts to retain what elements of its former sphere of influence it can.

Russia has undertaken a number of steps to attempt to maintain its influence in Central and Eastern Europe. This is partially a result of economics. With few markets for Russian products, Moscow has attempted to rely on arms sales as a means of securing foreign currency. Russia has been one of the world's major arms exporters, but since the end of the Cold War, the nation has seen its share of the world's arms market and the total value of its arms exports dramatically decline. Nonetheless, while Russia's share of world arms exports fell from some 32 per cent in 1984 to 6 per cent in 1994, Russia was able to dominate weapons sales to Eastern Europe with 69 per cent of the market share (for a total of some \$1.3 billion in 1994).⁵³ With the reality of NATO expansion or at the very least closer ties to the West by those states not in the first round of expansion, many states which were large consumers of Russian products have demonstrated a desire to replace aging Soviet hardware with Western equipment. In one recent example Finland decided to replace its MiG-21s with 64 F-18 fighters in 1995. Analysts in the Russian defense sector interpreted this as Western encroachment on one of their traditional markets.

⁵³U.S., Arms Controls and Disarmament Agency, *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1995* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1996), 16-19.

This comes at a time when Russian foreign policy formally encourages arms exports as a means to accomplish a variety of goals. Russia needs the hard currency of weapons exports to pay for the conversion of defense industries and the dismantlement of existing weapons systems. Even under the revised Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE) limits that were approved in June, Russia still has to drastically reduce the number of weapons systems in its flank areas.⁵⁴ In addition, exports would both pay for further military research and for the development of new weapons systems. Finally, Moscow believes weapons exports are necessary in order to maintain the capabilities and means of production of existing systems and to maintain the "social guarantees" for Russians involved in weapons production.⁵⁵

In an effort to increase weapons sales, Russia has reorganized its defense industry by combining the three agencies that had formerly managed arms exports into a single entity—*Rosvooruzhenie*. The relative price advantages of Russian weapons and more aggressive marketing have doubled sales since 1994.⁵⁶ Russia's share of the world's arms market fell from 35.3 per cent in 1989 (worth some \$18.9 billion) to 11.7 per cent in

⁵⁴For instance, Russia has to reduce the number of tanks from 1,897 to 1,300; the number of armored vehicles from 4,397 to 1,380; and the number of artillery pieces from 2,422 to 1,640; Sarah Walkling, "CFE's Russian Flank Issue is Solved," *Jane's Intelligence Review & Sentinel Pointer* (August 1996), 3.

⁵⁵Charles Dick, "Russian Military Doctrine," *Jane's Intelligence Review--Special Report* (January 1994), 12.

⁵⁶Edwin Bacon, "Russian Arms Exports--A Triumph for Marketing?" *Jane's Intelligence Review* 6, no. 6 (June 1994), 268; Sarah Walkling, "U.S. Arms Sales Continue Decline, Russia Top Exporter in 1995," *Arms Control Today* 26, no. 6 (August 1996), 33.

1994 (\$1.5 billion) and then rebounded to 31.6 per cent (some \$3.1 billion) in 1995.⁵⁷ In particular, Russian sales to Central and Eastern Europe have continued for three main reasons: 1) Russian equipment is less expensive; 2) it is interoperable with existing weapons; and 3) Russia has used arms exports as a means to address its debts with states in the region.

Since the end of the Cold War, "arms-for-debt" agreements have made up the overwhelming majority of Russian arms deliveries within the region. Through 1996, of the ten arms agreements in effect between Russia and states in the region, six were arms for debt arrangements and one was financed by German military assistance in an effort to shed former East German equipment.⁵⁸ As debt issues are settled through arms transfers, Moscow has worked to maintain its market share so that it can eventually have access to hard currency, especially as the pace of economic reform accelerates in many of the states of the region. The emphasis on interoperability for potential NATO members is particularly troubling for Russian arms manufacturers as these states buy or contemplate purchases of Western equipment and consequently close markets to the Russians.

In addition to its interest in the arms trade, Moscow also has significant economic interests in the Central Asian republics. For instance, in Azerbaijan, foreign companies have signed five offshore oil deals worth some \$18 billion.⁵⁹ Russia hopes to

⁵⁷Richard Grimmett, *Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 1988-1995* (Washington, D.C.: CRS, 1996), 80-81.

⁵⁸International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance, 1996/97* (London: IISS, 1997), 47-48.

⁵⁹U.S., Department of State, "Country Reports: Azerbaijan," in *Implementation of the Helsinki Final Act: The President's 35th OSCE Report to the Congress* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1997), 6.

reap some of the profits from these deals since the Azerbaijan government has decided that one of the two pipelines that will initially carry oil from the first of these offshore fields will go to the north through Russia. This pipeline is expected to carry some 5 million tons of Azeri oil per year.⁶⁰ In order to further strengthen its relationship with Azerbaijan, Russia has also signed a series of bilateral cooperation agreements with the country, which range from economic cooperation to military collaboration.⁶¹ Azerbaijan also provides a good example of Russia's strategic problems in the area. Russia considers Armenia its closest ally in the region and Russian support for Armenia in the ongoing dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the Nagorno-Karabakh region has soured relations between Russia and Azerbaijan, and prevented closer ties.⁶²

Besides economic interests, Moscow also has geopolitical interests in maintaining influence in the region. Many of the states of the former Soviet Union have developed a Western orientation that is particularly troubling for Moscow since it has prevented Russian designs for a greater institutionalization of the CIS. By 1993, only seven of the original eleven members of the CIS were willing to ratify the Charter of the

⁶⁰Robert Corzine, "Relief as Oil Shipment Deal Signed in BAKU," *Financial Times* (17 February 1996), 2.

⁶¹Elmira Akhundova, "Caspian Becomes Stormy Sea of Differences Between Russia and Azerbaijan," *Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press*, no. 21 (21 February 1996).

⁶²While Armenia was able to quickly capture the Nagorno-Karabakh region in 1993, Azerbaijan has been joined by Turkey in a blockade of the country and only the presence of a large Russian military force has prevented the Azeris from resuming the war; Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, "Azerbaijan and Armenia," *Report on Armenia's Parliamentary Elections and Constitutional Referendum* (Washington, D.C.: CSCE, 1995).

CIS.⁶³ Most troubling for Moscow was Ukraine's attempt to formalize closer ties with the West. Moscow responded by attempting to shore up its influence in Central Asia with a series of bilateral military agreements and promoting the development of the CIS at variable speeds in order to satisfy the concerns of the organization's individual states. In addition, Moscow maintains a large troop deployment in and around the central Asian states, including sizable deployments in Armenia, Georgia, Moldova and Tajikistan.⁶⁴ Since the break up of the Soviet Union, Russia had consistently pushed for the right to protect its citizens in the "Near Abroad," and Moscow has pressed the West for endorsement of a special role for Russian peacekeeping forces in the region.⁶⁵

The expansion of Western influence in the region in general, and NATO expansion in particular, seem to confirm the worst post-Cold War fears of Russian policymakers. These fears revolve around the movement of what is perceived as an anti-Russian alliance closer to Russia's borders. As Yevgeny Primakov wrote in *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, "we are, of course, far from [believing] that the widening of NATO is especially designed for a strike at Russia However, we firmly proceed from the fact that the moving of NATO's infrastructure closer to Russia's territory

⁶³The four states that dropped out were Azerbaijan, Moldova, Turkmenistan and Ukraine, although Azerbaijan would later rejoin the Commonwealth.

⁶⁴Russia has some 4,300 troops in Armenia (including a squadron of Mig-23s); 8,500 troops in Georgia; 6,400 in Moldova; and 18,000 in Tajikistan (including 6,000 "border guards"); IISS, *Military Balance, 1997/98*, 115.

⁶⁵Buszynski, 121.

worsens both the purely military and geopolitical situations as far as we are concerned."⁶⁶

NATO expansion is seen as duplicity on the part of the West. When Moscow agreed to withdraw its troops from East Germany, NATO pledged not to station troops on East German territory. Now, however, through expansion NATO will "leapfrog" Germany and move some 500 miles closer to Russia.⁶⁷ The fact that NATO expansion would place NATO ground troops within striking distance of Russia is a historical first that has not gone unnoticed by Moscow. NATO pledges to not station nuclear weapons on the territory of new members are seen by many Russian policymakers, including the former Minister of Defense Igor Rodinov, as being temporary and vague.⁶⁸

Moscow fears that NATO expansion will not stop with the Visegrad states, but might ultimately bring the Baltic states and Ukraine within the sphere of influence of the West. This is especially troublesome to the Russians since NATO refuses to exclude any state from future expansion plans. The presence of 25 million ethnic Russians in the near abroad and the nation's own troubled history propel policymakers in Moscow to maintain a firm sphere of influence in the region. Russian primacy in the region is not interpreted as "imperialistic" by state leaders, but as legitimate defense of Russia against a variety of potential threats, including radical Islam and the potential spread of ethnic

⁶⁶Quoted in Viktoria Tripolskaya-Mitlyng, "Eastern Cheers, Russian Jeers, American Silence," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 53, no. 1 (January 1997): 5

⁶⁷Anatol Lieven, "A New Iron Curtain," *The Atlantic Monthly* 277, no. 1 (January 1996): 20-25.

⁶⁸Aleksei Pushkov, Vladimir Abainov, Leonid Gankin, Vasily Safronchuk, Mikhail Pogorely and Tomas Kolesnichenko, "Russia vs. NATO Expansion: The Latest Round," *Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 48, no. 51 (January 15, 1997): 1-5.

conflicts along Russia's borders. In addition, Moscow fears a renewal of the Russo-Turkish rivalry for influence with the states of Central Asia. Russian elites point to the Monroe Doctrine or the preservation of French influence in Africa through the Francophone system as justification for their concerns.⁶⁹

NATO expansion could thus sow the seeds of instability in the region in several ways. Expansion of the Alliance is likely to garner further support for Russian ultranationalists and hardliners who argue both for the preservation of Russian influence and the protection of Russian minorities abroad.⁷⁰ This would, in turn, make matters more difficult for Russian reformers. Inclusion of Poland in NATO might prompt a pre-emptive bid to preserve its influence in the region by reintegrating Ukraine or other areas into the Federation. Outside of Russia, insecurity in the region would promote instability in several ways. First, those states that were not included in the first wave of expansion risk being defined as outside of the institutional framework that has come to be Europe. This is especially true of states such as Ukraine which might be propelled to seek closer ties to Russia in order to compensate for perceived exclusion from the West. The Romanian Foreign Minister, Teodor Melescanu has hinted that if Romania is not admitted at the same time as Hungary, it might propel Romania closer to Russia.⁷¹ Second, states that are not in the first round, such as Bulgaria, can attempt to extract the maximum advantages from both Moscow and Brussels. A recent quote from a Bulgarian

⁶⁹Lieven, "A New Iron Curtain," 20.

⁷⁰John Gerald Ruggie, "Consolidating the European Pillar: The Key to NATO's Future," *The Washington Quarterly* 20, no. 1 (Winter 1997): 109-125.

⁷¹Adrian Severin, "America! America! (Romania: Article Examines 'Turn' in U.S. Policy)," *FBIS: EEU* (August 22, 1996), 34.

deputy is telling, "Our country must utilize the dividends it has in the ping-pong game with Moscow and Brussels."⁷² Third, and perhaps most significantly, expansion has also led to disputes between states who are "in" on the first round, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, and those who were not invited to join the Alliance in this round of enlargement. For instance, the Slovaks lobbied hard to be included either in the initial expansion, or at the very least, to obstruct Czech entry into NATO (the Slovaks claim that the Czechs refuse to discuss outstanding issues between the two states and have thus not settled their territorial and ethnic issues as required by NATO before inclusion).⁷³

Nonetheless, enmeshment in the West's web of institutions provides the most efficient means for binding Russia and the states of Central and Eastern Europe into the broad society of states of Western Europe and ensuring compliance with the norms of the West's security system. While Russia opposes a broad expansion of NATO, it has formally accepted the entry of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland into the Alliance in exchange for a number of concessions from the West. In mid-May of 1997, NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana was able to negotiate an agreement between Russia and the Alliance which cleared the way for NATO enlargement by offering a number of concessions to the Russians.⁷⁴ First, Russia would be included in the Alliance through a "NATO Russian Permanent Joint Council," which is to be jointly chaired by the NATO

⁷²Quoted in Ivo Indzhev, "Bulgaria: Country's Position Between NATO, Russia," *FBIS: EEU* (August 23, 1996), 8.

⁷³Vincent Boland, "Slovaks Object to Czech NATO Entry," *Financial Times* (April 4 1997), 2.

⁷⁴Javier Solana, "Preparing for the Madrid Summit," *NATO Review*, vol. 45, no. 2 (March 1997): 3.

Secretary-General, a Russian envoy and a NATO ambassador. This body would be tasked to study and coordinate action on issues such as peacekeeping, terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and so forth. Significantly, the council would have some decision-making authority, but would lack the power to enforce decisions against the will of either NATO or the Russian Federation.⁷⁵ Second, NATO declared that it had "no intention, no plan, and no reason" to station nuclear weapons on the territory of new member states, nor to deploy substantial numbers of combat units. Third, Russian concessions over NATO expansion have been repaid by American support for inclusion of Russia in the G-7, with an immediate reformulation of the group at the Denver meeting as the "Summit of the Eight." President Bill Clinton also pledged both American support for Russian inclusion in other international economic bodies such as the World Trade Organization and increased American economic assistance in exchange for reforms in the Russian tax system. Fourth, Russia was given an additional four years, until 2007, to complete dismantling of missile systems covered under the START II Treaty, and Clinton pledged not to develop or deploy space-based missile systems.⁷⁶ Finally, Russian President Boris Yeltsin was promised American support in accelerating the ongoing negotiations over amending the CFE Treaty to allow for greater Russian troop deployment than was

⁷⁵Specifically, the Act states the "provisions of this Act do not provide Russia or NATO, in any way, with a right of veto over the actions of the other nor do they infringe upon or restrict the rights of Russia or NATO to independent decision-making and action;" NATO, *Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between the Russian Federation and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization*, Brussels (1997).

⁷⁶Casper Weinberger, "The Helsinki Summit: Fact vs. Fiction," *Forbes* 159, no. 9 (5 May 1997): 37.

initially agreed upon, especially in regards to limits in the so-called "flank areas."⁷⁷

Thus, Yeltsin was able to extract a number of significant concessions for acquiescing to a process that the United States had claimed would proceed by 1999, with or without Russian consent. Cooperation in Bosnia also demonstrates the easing of tensions between Russia and the Alliance. The joint mission to Bosnia did not subordinate Russian troops to NATO officially, but it did establish a unity of command whereby the Russian contingent served under NATO's supreme commander of the mission.⁷⁸ In addition, NATO has developed a structure, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), to replace the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) in order to increase cooperation among the Alliance and its partners to "a qualitatively new level."⁷⁹ This was followed by an agreement to establish a NATO military liaison mission in Moscow.⁸⁰

While Russian support or approval for NATO is tenuous at best, Russia had been extremely supportive of the OSCE. In 1990, in an effort to contain several conflicts in the states of the former Soviet bloc, European states, including Russia, attempted to turn

⁷⁷Essentially, Yeltsin wants to be allowed to shrink the areas covered by the CFE. This would result in a larger military presence as Russia would be allowed to maintain the same troops limits in a much smaller area. Yeltsin also wants extend the timetable for reductions in other areas; Sarah Walkling, "CFE's Russian Flank Issue is Solved," *Jane's Intelligence Review & Jane's Sentinel Pointer* (August 1996): 3.

⁷⁸Leontiy P. Shevtsov, "Russian-NATO Military Cooperation in Bosnia: A Basis for the Future?" *NATO Review* 45, no. 2 (March 1997): 18.

⁷⁹See NATO, "The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council," *NATO Fact Sheet*, no. 19 (July 1997).

⁸⁰NATO, Public Information Advisor, "Further Progress on Military Cooperation Between NATO and Russia," Press Release 10.98 (22 June 1998).

the CSCE into a regional collective security organization that would be able to intervene in substate conflicts and through collective actions such as peace-keeping or peace enforcement, manage and contain such conflicts from spreading. One of the driving forces behind the CSCE was the notion that the organization, because of its broad membership, would be able to overcome the East-West divide in security by replacing both NATO and the Warsaw Pact.⁸¹ Thus, Russia would have been guaranteed inclusion into the security architecture of Europe and the loss of influence in Eastern Europe could be supplemented on a far grander scale.

It soon became apparent in fact that the wide membership (some fifty-three states) of the CSCE made it too bulky and cumbersome to effectively deal with many of the new conflicts which broke out across Eastern Europe. Specifically, the CSCE, with its emphasis on diplomatic measures and negotiations, found itself unable to deter or counter "committed aggressors." A 1994 Russian initiative to streamline the institution by establishing a ten-member security council was rejected.⁸² Despite its promising beginnings, it became quickly apparent that the West European states and the United States did not have the political will to implement the views and or enforce the decisions of the organization. The failure of the CSCE to maintain peace in either Bosnia or Chechnya confirmed its inability to coerce warring parties to the peace table since, in the end, the organization can only seek voluntary compliance.⁸³ The OSCE has established

⁸¹Philip Zelikow "The Masque of Institutions," *Survival* 38, no. 1 (Spring 1996): 11.

⁸²*Ibid.*, 11.

⁸³Marten H.A. Van Heuven, *Russia, the United States, and NATO: The Outlook for European Security* Atlantic Council Occasional Papers (Washington, D.C.: Atlantic Council 1994), 22-23.

a niche for itself in the diplomatic realm and has proven productive in negotiating between warring parties on more than one occasion.⁸⁴ The OSCE has emerged as an important component in building multilateral coalitions to transfer concepts such as liberal democracy from the West.⁸⁵ Nonetheless, it clearly has failed to develop into the broad pan-European collective security organization that could ensure stability on the continent and adequately address the larger framework of European security, albeit the element best able to meet the security concerns of Russia without alienating the former superpower.

The need to enmesh Russia in the institutional framework of the West has become all the more important in light of that nation's deteriorating economy.⁸⁶ Even before the fall of the ruble, the Russian economy was in trouble and the growing financial crisis only worsened an already bad situation.⁸⁷ The collapse of the ruble and

⁸⁴OSCE monitoring missions have been particularly useful in several ongoing conflicts in Central Asia. Besides the mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina, there are ten permanent OSCE missions in the states of the former Soviet bloc; U.S., Department of State, *Implementation of the Helsinki Final Act: The President's 35th OSCE Report to the Congress* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1997), 2-3.

⁸⁵Emanuel Adler, "Seeds of Peaceful Change: The OSCE as a Pluralistic Security-making Institution," Paper presented at the Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs, Merrill House Program in New York City (December 1-2, 1995).

⁸⁶The Russian ruble has lost 80 percent of its value, and many Russian companies have found their net worth reduced by some 70 percent. In addition, according to one Russian economist, the Russian middle class has shrunk from 25 percent of the population to 2 percent; Marcus Warren, "Rouble Crisis is Wiping Out the 'New Russians'," *Daily Telegraph* (23 September 1998).

⁸⁷Even before the collapse of the ruble, some 500 Russian banks went out of business in the last year and inflation peaked at around 50 percent, while now it approaches 300 percent. For an overview of Russia's economic problems see Michael Camdessus, "Russia and the IMF: Meeting the Challenges of an Emerging Market and Transition Economy," address at the U.S.-Russian Business Council in Washington, D.C. (1 April

the resultant deterioration in the Russian middle-class has led to an environment that may lay the seeds for the re-emergence of Russian nationalism and expansionism. For instance, recent polls show that a third of Russians favor a government by dictatorship.⁸⁸ In addition, the current Russian government has begun to roll back economic reforms and print rubles in order to provide short term relief for the Russian population with seemingly little concern for the future economic stability of the nation.⁸⁹ The government of Yevgeny Primakov has also attempted to use the potential inflationary risks of printing more rubles and the threat of the renationalization of key industries as a means to pressure the West into providing more relief.⁹⁰ These examples demonstrate the potential for Russian renationalization, although they by no means foreshadow an expansionist state. They do dramatize the need for continued cooperation between the West and Russia and the imperative to deepen Russia inclusion in the institutional framework of the West.

1998); or Grigory Yavlinsky, "Russia's Phony Capitalism," *Foreign Affairs* 77, no. 3 (May/June 1998): 67-79.

⁸⁸Some 34 percent of Russians surveyed said that a dictator with "supreme power" would be the only figure able to get Russia out of its current economic crisis. In addition, of those polled, most (19 percent of the total) cited former general Alexander Lebed, an avowed nationalist, as the figure best suited to lead Russia; "Russia Poll: Bring on Dictatorship," *Associated Press* (23 September 1998). Meanwhile Lebed has publically called for Yeltsin's resignation; "Lebed Calls for Yeltsin to Resign," *Associated Press* (24 September 1998).

⁸⁹Daniel Williams, "Plan to Print More Rubles Draws Fire," *Washington Post* (29 September 1998), A14.

⁹⁰Mitchell Landsberg, "Russia Threatens Unpopular Measures," *Associated Press* (1 October 1998).

The intensification of ethnic strife and conflict in and around Europe in the wake of the Cold War has led to a recognition that future security threats to the states of Western Europe will not likely come from direct, large-scale military invasions, but more likely come from internal conflicts that have the potential to either spread beyond national borders or disrupt trade and stability. On the continent itself, the most serious of these new risks is the growth of ethnic and religious strife in Central and Eastern Europe. The dispersion of ethnic minorities throughout the region, whose presence is usually unconnected with established national boundaries, creates the potential for transnational efforts to unify these groups, especially as nationalist forces use this issue to garner public support in nascent democracies. The crisis in the former Yugoslavia is the prime example of this, but calls for a "Greater Albania," or a "Greater Romania" demonstrate that the drive for territorial expansion has not entirely left the political landscape in the region.

Concurrent with the proliferation of these conflicts, has been a recognition that the place and status of Russia in the European architecture has yet to be formalized. The military potential of Russia, especially in strategic terms, still gives that state hegemonic potential over some areas of its near and abroad. Herein lies the prospect for future confrontations between Russia and the West as Russia works to retain and maintain some influence over states formerly within its sphere of influence, and the West works to reorient those states away from Russia through increased economic and security ties. At the same time, the West must also be concerned over ethnic and separatist clashes within Russia, such as Chechnya, and the potential spillover effect of conflicts in the states of the former Soviet Union, such as that in the Nagorno-Karabakh region. These disputes

could undermine Russia's democratic processes and lay the foundation for an increase in an already strong nationalist movement. This is especially significant in light of the fragility of Yeltsin and the lack of a clear successor to ensure Moscow's continued commitment to reform and incremental integration with the West. Russia's economic crisis further exacerbates these trends and tends to erode support for Western-style economic and democratic reform efforts and those Russian politicians who espouse such liberalization attempts.

During the Cold War, the nationstates of Europe found that collective security and the Transatlantic Alliance provided the means with which to counter the Soviet threat, and the emergence of new threats must also be met through the institutional framework of European security. For the states of Western Europe, security in the post-Cold War world has come to be defined collectively, and states have looked to institutions and regimes to develop policies that protect and defend national interests which themselves are increasingly expressed through the development of international norms and rules.

CHAPTER VI

THE SOUTHERN FLANK

Nationalism outside of the continent of Europe has increasingly become a significant factor in security equations for the nations of the West. Ethnic strife in various regions around the globe can impact the specific national interests of EU states or, more broadly, have wide ramifications for Europe as a whole. This is especially true of Europe's southern flank. Political and economic instability in the Maghreb region have led to increased levels of immigration and refugee outflows to Europe. Concurrently, the states of southern Europe, including France and Italy, have faced increased risks from terrorism associated with conflicts in the region. Algeria has been the main source of instability in the area, but the potential for unrest also exists in a number of other states along the Mediterranean coast and in the broader context of the Middle East region, including the Persian Gulf. The proliferation of advanced weapons systems and weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) have added to tensions and prompted calls by states such as France, Spain and Italy for increased or new security structures to counter threats from the south. Concurrent with the proliferation of WMDs, the Middle East continues to be the largest arms market in the world. In 1997, the region accounted for some 40 percent of the world's total arms imports at a value of some \$15 billion.¹ This chapter will examine Europe's interests in the region, and the potential threats to European interests posed by national and subnational forces in the Mediterranean basin.

¹See, IISS, *The Military Balance, 1997/98*. (London: Oxford, 1998).

the Persian Gulf, and the broader region of the Middle East. Particular attention will be focused on the pivotal states of Algeria, Iran, and Iraq during the period from 1991 to 1997. These states may pose the most significant immediate sources for future instability, however, consideration will also be given to the potential for the spread of radical Islam throughout the region and its ability to be a destabilizing source.

Outside of the continent, the states of Western Europe face their most significant threat from nationalism from the Middle East region, including the Maghreb and the Mediterranean rim.² This is especially true in the case of the religious nationalism associated with radical Islam. Three states with significant ties to Europe and significant European interests in them, Algeria, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia, face some level of threat to the current regimes from radical Islam. Of these, the regime in Algeria has stabilized its control over the nation, but continues to face the potential for a resurgence of the rebellion. Meanwhile the Mubarak regime in Egypt faces an ongoing low-intensity conflict, even as the regime in Saudi Arabia faces the potential for instability mainly over ties with the United States. The rapid growth in population and the growing inequity in wealth in these states has produced a populace that may respond to the message of radical Islam.³ For instance, the population of the Persian Gulf region rose from 45 million in 1980 to 100 million in 1995 and is expected to surpass 162 million by

²The Maghreb region includes the states of northwest Africa--Algeria, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia.

³For example, in Saudi Arabia in 1980, the per capita income was \$19,000. It had fallen to \$6,900 by 1996; Gary S. Sick, "The Coming Crisis," in *The Persian Gulf at the Millennium: Essays in Politics, Economy, Security, and Religion*, ed. Gary S. Sick and Lawrence G. Potter (New York: St. Martin's, 1997), 20.

2010.⁴ The potential collapse of the regime in Algeria was of most immediate concern to moderate Islamist states since this could signal a spillover effect, but the regime seems to have stabilized the civil war in Algeria. The potential for a widespread “wave” of radical Islamist takeovers appears unlikely as the various national groups have been unable to form transborder movements or united opposition groups. In addition, many of the secular regimes in the region have successfully exploited the divisions among Islamic groups within their borders as a means to remain in power. Nonetheless, the increasingly transnational language and ideology of radical Islamic movements threaten to increase confrontations between these groups and their nation’s regimes.⁵ The perception of an Islamist threat to existing regimes was the focus of the antiterrorism code of conduct adopted at the 1994 Casablanca Islamic Conference and of subsequent meetings of the Arab ministers of the interior at conferences such as the 1995 Tunis conference.⁶ Furthermore, even with its moderate government, Iran continues to promote its revolutionary version of Islam.⁷

When the Islamic fundamentalist Front Islamique du Salut (FIS) won the first round of parliamentary elections in December of 1991, the Algerian military canceled the second round of elections, forced the president to resign and installed a military

⁴Ibid., 19-20.

⁵On the lack of cohesion among radical Islamic groups and the likelihood for various regimes to retain power, see Ibrahim A. Karawan, “The Islamist Impasse,” *Adelphi Paper*, no. 314 (November 1997).

⁶IISS, *Strategic Survey 1994/95* (London: IISS, 1995), 139.

⁷Anthony S. Cordesman and Ahmed S. Hashim, *Iran: Dilemmas of Dual Containment* (Boulder: Westview, 1997), 4.

controlled government. Since that time, the Algerian military has been engaged in a counterinsurgency struggle against the FIS and the even more radical Groupe Islamique Armé (GIA).⁸ These groups have staged stunning terrorist acts, including the assassination of prominent government figures and numerous car bombings. The military has been able to keep the insurgency under control through a series of notably brutal offensives against the Islamists. Since 1994, the situation in Algeria has been a military stalemate with the Islamists unable to topple the government and the government unable to completely stamp out the insurrection.⁹ In spite of the government's fierce campaign of repression against the GIA,¹⁰ the military-backed government has maintained support, albeit somewhat tepid, from the international community.¹¹ Most significantly for the Europeans is the possibility that the GIA might

⁸In addition to the GIA, one of the largest armed Islamist groups is the *Armée islamique du salut* (Islamic Salvation Army) or AIS which is the armed wing of the FIS. However, the AIS claims to only attack military and government targets, not civilian groups. Other groups include the *Ligue islamique de la daawa et le djihad* (LIDD), the Islamic League for Preaching and Holy War and the *Front islamique pour le Djihad armé* (FIDA), the Islamic Front for Holy War.

⁹While the conflict is essentially in a military stalemate, it continues to take its toll on the population, both pro- and anti-Islamist. Casualties are estimated to be between 30,000 and 40,000 over the period from 1992 to 1995; IISS, *The Military Balance, 1995/96* (London: Oxford, 1995), 124. By 1998, Amnesty International estimates that the conflict had produced some 80,000 casualties; Amnesty International, *Algeria: Civilian Population Caught in a Spiral of Violence* (New York: Amnesty International, 1998).

¹⁰On this point, see the above cited Amnesty International report or for instance UN, *Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child: Algeria*, CRC/C/15/Add.76, (18 June 1997).

¹¹The most visible sign of this support came in 1998, when a UN commission offered its support to the government of President Liamine Zeroual stating that "Algeria deserves the support of the international community in its efforts" to end the civil war; Charles Truheart, "U.N. Panel Backs Algerian Drive to Crush Terror Campaign," *Washington*

resume its campaign against foreigners that it initiated in September of 1993. This campaign resulted in the killings of several European diplomats, business figures and tourists.¹² Between 1992 and 1997, 133 foreigners have been killed by extremist groups in Algeria.¹³ Attacks against foreigners, however, paled in comparison with the widespread terror campaign against the nation's civilian population. Among the more spectacular of these incidents was the August 28, 1997 attack on the village of Sidi Rais, just south of Algiers. In this attack some 300 people were massacred, many of them women and children. In another attack, on the night of September 23, of the same year, more than 200 civilians were massacred at Baraki.¹⁴ These attacks were followed by raids on four villages on the first day of Ramadan (the first week of January) in which some 400 civilians were killed.¹⁵ The atrocities committed by the Islamic groups have ended any support they may have had from the outside world and have led to condemnation by both the UN and the EU.¹⁶ The attacks also prompted the Arab League

Post (17 September 1998), A28.

¹²U.S., Department of State, *Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1997*, no. 10535 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1998).

¹³*Ibid.*

¹⁴Amnesty International, 7-8.

¹⁵"Hundreds Murdered in Widespread Algeria Attacks," *ICT News* (6 January 1998).

¹⁶For instance, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan called for the GIA to "affirm the sanctity of human life and cease their terrorist attacks;" UN, "Secretary-General Deplores Continuing Loss of Life in Algeria," Press Release SG/SM/6434 (12 January 1998). Meanwhile the Presidency of the EU declared that "terrorists must stop this mindless violence against innocent people. No motive can justify these atrocities. The European Union supports and encourages all efforts of the Algerian authorities, within the rule of law and consistent with human rights, to protect their citizens from terrorism;" EU, "Declaration by the Presidency on Behalf of the European Union:

to sign an antiterrorist accord on April 22, 1998.¹⁷ While the Ramadan violence abated somewhat in 1999, attacks continued albeit on a lesser scale. Pre-Ramadan attacks in December of 1999, claimed the lives of at least 100 villagers and followed the patterns of attacks in previous years.¹⁸ These attacks preceded the massacre of 81 villagers and the kidnaping of 20 women in three mountain villages near Tadjena. By the start of Ramadan on December 20, 1999, some 200 Algerians had been killed by extremists.¹⁹ Furthermore, the GIA increased attacks on military targets in Algeria in January of 1999.²⁰

Algeria is important to European policy makers for a variety of reasons. The historical ties to France make the nation of particular concern to Paris. France is home to some 800,000 Algerians, who form part of a larger Muslim community of some 4 million. With unemployment hovering around 11%, the French government is concerned over the possibility of a flood of new immigrants at a time when a significant portion of the French population blames France's economic problems on foreign

Massacres in Algeria," Press Release (5 January 1998).

¹⁷While negotiations behind the accord had been ongoing for two years the Algerian massacres seemed to galvanize the Arab states; "Arab League States Sign an Accord to Fight Terrorism and Extremism," *ICT News* (23 April 1998). Among other things the accord calls for states to extradite suspected terrorists. Already Syria has handed over sixteen suspected terrorists whom it had been harboring since 1992 to Algeria and Saudi Arabia has extradited a prominent follower of Osama bin Ladin to Egypt; "First Fruits of Arab League Accord to Fight Terrorism," *ICT News* (9 July 1998).

¹⁸"Death Toll Hits 100 in Algeria's Pre-Ramadan Violence," *CNN Interactive* (9 December, 1998).

¹⁹"Militants Massacre 81 and Kidnap 20," *Sydney Morning Herald* (12 December, 1998), 1.

²⁰"Upsurge in Algeria Killings," *BBC News* (2 January, 1999).

workers.²¹ France, which is home to an estimated 350,000-500,000 illegal immigrants, continues the process of tightening immigration controls.²² A measure approved in 1997, makes it easier to locate and remove illegal immigrants.²³ Polls showed that 59 percent of the French people supported the government's tougher immigration policies.²⁴ During the parliamentary elections, the Socialists pledged to repeal these tough laws, however once in power they settled for a softening of the restrictions which now allows easier asylum and the government granted amnesty to some 76,000 immigrants, although it rejected the amnesty bids of some 64,000 asylum-seekers.²⁵

Other southern European states have similar concerns over the impact of immigration from the Mediterranean.²⁶ In December and January of 1998, suburbs in both France and Belgium were wracked by violence after two youths of North African descent were killed by French police in Strasbourg and a suspected drug dealer of Moroccan descent was killed by Belgium authorities. Tensions in Belgium between French speaking North Africans and the native Flemish and Dutch speaking in Brussels

²¹Andrew J. Pierre and William B. Quandt, "Algeria's War on Itself," *Foreign Policy*, 99 (Summer 1995): 138-40.

²²Andrew Jack, "French Planning Tougher Curbs on Immigration." *The Financial Times* (April 21, 1996), 2; "French Parliament Debates Immigration Laws," *BBC News*, (5 December 1998).

²³"France: Immigration Reform Approved," *Migration News* 4, no. 3 (March 1997).

²⁴*Ibid.*

²⁵"France: Amnesty Controversy," *Migration News* 5, no. 10 (October 1998), 9.

²⁶In fact, areas of southern Italy and Spain have the EU's highest unemployment rates at close to 30 percent at a time when the EU average unemployment rate is 10.7 percent; EU, "Unemployment in EU Regions," *Eurostat*, no. 7598 (24 September 1998).

are exacerbated by the refusal of the Belgium government to give the North Africans voting rights for fear of upsetting the nation's political balance between French and non-French speakers.²⁷ The violence in Belgium was the worst since 1992.

With the history of Arab extremist-sponsored terrorist attacks in France, there remains a concern that a deterioration in Algeria would lead to an escalation of terrorist attacks in response for French support of the government in Algeria.²⁸ The year 1995, proved to be the most significant one for such attacks, but 1996 also witnessed a number of spectacular attacks including the December 3 bombing of a Paris subway which killed 4 and injured 86.²⁹ Other European states have also been impacted by terror attacks committed by Islamist groups including the Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK).³⁰ In addition, in May of 1998, Scotland Yard arrested eight men in Great Britain while Belgian authorities arrested seven additional suspects in part of a three-way operation between Belgian, British and French officials in an effort to foil a bomb plot against the World Cup matches held in France. The suspects were all linked to the GIA.³¹

²⁷"France, Belgium: Suburbs, Algeria," *Migration News* 5, no. 2 (February 1998).

²⁸During a three month period in the late summer and fall of 1995, the GIA carried out eight bombings in France which killed seven and wounded over 160, and then demanded that Chirac convert to Islam. All of which led the French to deploy an additional 12,000 police and troops in major metropolitan areas: Fred Coleman, "Toujours la guerre: Algerian Fanatics Unleash a Terrorist Wave in France that could Escalate," *U.S. News and World Reports* (30 October, 1995), 44-47.

²⁹No group claimed responsibility for the subway bombing, but French authorities blame Algerian fundamentalist groups.

³⁰For an overview of Islamist terrorism, see Reuven Paz, "Is There an 'Islamic Terrorism'," *ICT Policy Briefs* (7 September 1998).

³¹"Islamic Fundamentalists Arrested in England," *ICT News* (13 May 1998).

In general the West European states have been able to maintain sound economic and political relations with most of the Arab world.³² Nonetheless, specific cases such as Algeria or Libya point to the potential for instability to affect European interests.³³ In addition, the militarization of both the Gulf region and North Africa could pose serious risks to European economic interests, especially energy imports, and even to the continent itself.³⁴ For instance, France still has significant economic interests in Algeria. France has been able to diversify its trading patterns in the region, but Algeria still supplies France with some 30 per cent of its natural gas and significant amount of oil. In addition, French exports account for some 31 per cent of Algeria's imports and 13 percent of Algeria's exports go to France.³⁵ Spain and Italy have concluded agreements with Algeria to more than double their imports of Algerian natural gas.³⁶ In 1997, Algeria provided Italy with 18.4 billion cubic meters of natural gas or roughly the nation's total imports of the energy source. That same year, Algeria provided Spain with

³²See, for instance, Enzo Grilli, *The European Community and the Developing Countries* (New York: Cambridge 1993), 180-211.

³³As a region, the Mediterranean constitutes the EU's third largest partner with an annual volume of trade approaching \$65 billion a year; Andrés Ortega, "Relations With the Maghreb," in *Maelstrom: The United States, Southern Europe and the Challenges of the Mediterranean*, ed. John W. Holmes (Cambridge: World Peace Foundation, 1995), 35.

³⁴See Ian O. Lesser, *Security in North Africa: Internal and External Challenges* (Santa Monica: RAND 1993).

³⁵Pierre, 131-32.

³⁶Ortega, "Relations," 35.

4.2 billion cubic meters of natural gas or three-quarters of Spain's imports.³⁷ The Maghreb will continue to be important as an energy source as European consumption of petroleum and natural gas continues to grow.³⁸ In 1997, Algeria exported some .68 million barrels of oil to the EU per day, while Libya exported 1.27 million barrels per day. Only Saudi Arabia exported more than Libya and only Saudi Arabia and Iran exported more to the EU than Algeria.³⁹ Of the EU's four major oil importers, France, Germany, Italy and Spain, three are in the Mediterranean region.⁴⁰ While falling oil prices have hurt the Middle East economies, they have increased European consumption of petroleum. Crude oil prices have fallen by \$2 dollars a barrel over the last year, with no end in sight to the decline.⁴¹ The increased consumption in major European states has had the effect of providing an impetus for oil-producing states to maintain their excess production which continues to depress prices.⁴² Low petroleum prices have also led some governments, notably Germany, to implement plans to cut nuclear energy production.

These ties mirror the overall economic bonds that exist between Europe and its neighbors to the south. Geographic proximity alone would lead to close economic ties

³⁷British Petroleum, *BP Statistical Review of World Energy: 1998* (London: BP, 1998).

³⁸European consumption of petroleum was grown steadily since 1981, from 390 million tons per year to 480 million tons per year in 1997; *Ibid.*

³⁹U.S., Energy Information Agency, *International Petroleum Statistics Report: 1998* (Washington, D.C.: GPO 1998).

⁴⁰*Ibid.*

⁴¹"Oil Prices Wilt as Refiners Cut Runs," *Reuters* (26 January 1999).

⁴²"Saudi Oil Minister Says No Excess Oil Supply" *Reuters* (26 January 1999).

and the potential markets of the south are highly prized by the European states. These ties reflect close cultural ties between the states of southern Europe and the region. The contemporary primacy of the U.S. in the region is something of an exception created by the Cold War. The EU states are now the third largest consumers of natural gas, after the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the United States, and unlike the CIS and the United States which are not only self-sufficient in natural gas but are net exporters, Western Europe is almost wholly dependent on natural gas imports. The EU accounted for some 87 percent of Arab natural gas exports in 1992.⁴³ In 1997, that figure remained relatively constant.⁴⁴ In addition, Arab oil exports from the Maghreb to the EU accounted for 14 percent of the EU's total oil imports.⁴⁵ As demand for energy supplies rises in Asia, it becomes increasingly important for the EU to secure its base source for these resources. By the year 2000, Asia is expected to surpass Europe in total energy consumption by some 300,000 barrels per day.⁴⁶ Forecast models predict that the Maghreb will continue to expand production capabilities and could thus provide a greater share of energy exports to the EU if Asian nations secure a greater share of Persian Gulf oil exports.⁴⁷ Since the end of the Persian Gulf War, India has also

⁴³OAPEC, *Secretary General's Twentieth Annual Report: 1993* (Safat, Kuwait: OAPEC, 1994), 30.

⁴⁴British Petroleum, 374.

⁴⁵EU, Commission of the European Communities (CEC), *European Economy: The European Community as a World Trade Partner, 1993* (Brussels: CEC, 1993), 88.

⁴⁶U.S., Energy Information Agency (EIA), *International Energy Outlook: 1996, With Projections to the Year 2000* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1996), 3.

⁴⁷Ibid.

undertaken notable steps to secure market share in the Persian Gulf.⁴⁸ This is especially significant in light of the fact that the Persian Gulf region accounts for 64.9 percent of the world's proven oil reserves.⁴⁹

On the other hand, the Mediterranean and Middle East states provide tremendous trading opportunities for the EU. Trade between the EU and Middle East has doubled since 1975. The EU provides the largest share of direct foreign investment to the Persian Gulf, some 32.6 percent.⁵⁰ Also, the EU is by far the largest supplier of products to the Middle East in general, providing some 36 percent of the region total imports--compared to the 13 percent of both the United States and Japan, respectively.⁵¹

In the Persian Gulf, much of the focus of EU trade relations continues to be on Iran and Iraq. The French continue to see Iran as strategically important which has been enhanced by the emergence of the Central Asian States.⁵² Paris' commercial interest is no less important. The French import about 8 billion francs worth of oil and export roughly 5 billion francs worth of its goods to Iran. The Chirac government has rescheduled Iranian debt and has extended additional official credits at preferential rates.⁵³ Indeed,

⁴⁸Since 1995, India has embarked on a number of ventures which include a potential oil pipeline from Iran and deals with Oman and Qatar; Geoffrey Kemp and Robert E. Harkavy, *Strategic Geography and the Changing Middle East* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute, 1997), 373-374.

⁴⁹Sick, "Crisis," 15.

⁵⁰*Ibid.*, 27.

⁵¹EU, *European Economy*.

⁵²Cordesman, *Iran*, 20.

⁵³IMF, *Islamic Republic of Iran: Recent Economic Developments*, Report SM/95/240 (19 September 1995), appendix 5, table 55.

the absence of American industries, because of the nation's "Dual Containment" policy, has opened the door to French engineering and petroleum firms.

Engaging Iran has not been limited to France, however. Germany has also taken a dim view of isolating the Islamic Republic. Forty-two German banks jointly offered Iran unlimited long-term loans to assist in its second five-year development program. The German government has also agreed to finance \$700 million worth of loans to Iran's five leading banks. Meanwhile, even Turkey has embarked on a number of ventures with Iran, including a deal to import \$23 billion in Iranian natural gas.⁵⁴

In the Middle East, the Maghreb region has the greatest economic ties with Europe. It is the third largest trading partner of the EU with a volume of trade over \$65 billion a year and it is a region which promises continued market growth.⁵⁵ Many of the nations in the region post significant growth in Gross Domestic Product (GDP).⁵⁶ In 1995, the Mediterranean region accounted for 8.2 percent of the EU's exports and 5.7 percent of its imports.⁵⁷

In the overall Mediterranean region, Turkey is the EU's most significant trading partner and accounts for 24 percent (approximately ECU 9.2 billion) of the total imports from the region. Turkey is followed by Algeria and Libya, each of whom provide 15

⁵⁴Cordesman, *Iran*, 16.

⁵⁵The EU's balance of trade with the region provides the Union with a significant export surplus. By 1995, that surplus had risen to ECU 13.7 billion; EU, "EU Trade with the Mediterranean Countries, Results for 1995." *Eurostat*, no. 13/96 (January 1996).

⁵⁶*Ibid.*

⁵⁷EU, "Step Forward in Euro-Mediterranean Statistical Cooperation," *Eurostat*, no. 397 (15 April 1997), 1.

percent of the EU's imports (ECU 6 billion).⁵⁸ While some 60 percent of both the imports from and exports to the region come from just three nations, Germany, France and Italy, all EU members with the exception of Portugal have trade surpluses with the region.⁵⁹ The majority of EU exports go to just three nations in the region, Turkey (26 percent), Israel (16 percent), and Algeria (12 percent).⁶⁰

The Maghreb region is also a major destination for EU tourists. For instance, in 1995 the region played host to some 26 million tourists from the EU.⁶¹ For many nations in the region tourists from the EU members provide at least half, and in many more than half, of the total number of tourists each year.⁶² The region provides a close and inexpensive destination for many Europeans and also forces the EU governments to pay close attention to political stability in the region in order to safeguard their citizens. The threat of terrorism has also led to calls for collective responses among the EU members.⁶³ An example of the potential for catastrophe occurred in Egypt in November

⁵⁸EU, "EU Trade Surplus with Mediterranean Hits 13.7 Bn ECU," *Eurostat*, no. 797 (28 January 1997).

⁵⁹France had the largest surplus with some ECU 3.7 billion, followed by Germany with ECU 2.7 billion. Even Portugal's deficit was minor at ECU 2 million; *ibid*.

⁶⁰*Ibid*.

⁶¹EU, no. 397.

⁶²Turkey is the most popular destination with some 7.7 million EU tourist each year, while Tunisia and Egypt come in second and third at 4.1 million and 3.1 million respectively; *Ibid*.

⁶³For instance, in 1997 former German Chancellor Helmut Kohl stated that "alone, we [Germany] will not be able to bring international criminality, the drugs Mafia and the threat of terrorism under control." He went on to call for increased Europeanization to deal with such issues; Federal Republic of Germany, Office of Press and Information, Helmut Kohl, Speech Given on 3 November 1997 in Berlin, Press Release no. 19621 (3

of 1997 when Islamist militants attacked a group of tourists in Luxor, killing 64 and wounding 25. This incident followed a number of attacks including the September 1997 shooting on a Cairo bus and an April 1996 attack when gunmen opened fire on tourists outside the Hotel Europa near the Pyramids.⁶⁴ In the summer of 1998, Egyptian authorities foiled a plot by the anti-government Islamist group, al-Jihad, to kidnap American tourists in Egypt.⁶⁵

There has also been an increasing amount of industrial relocation of European manufacturing concerns to the Maghreb region as European companies have tended to view the region as a "European Mexico."⁶⁶ In response to the expanded economic opportunities, there has been a dramatic increase in EU economic aid to the Maghreb (an increase of some 370 per cent).⁶⁷ This economic interaction forces the EU to take potential instability in region very seriously.

The EU must also factor in the impact of Arab immigration in policy considerations. In overall terms, the EU is home to some 5 million people from the Mediterranean region. They account for some 1.3 percent of the total population and 8

November 1997).

⁶⁴For an overview of Egypt's struggle against armed opposition terrorist groups, see Jon B. Alterman, "The Luxor Shooting and Egypt's Armed Islamist Opposition," *Policywatch* 279 (17 November 1997).

⁶⁵Al-Jihad is the same group that staged the 1981 assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat. The group planned to use the Americans hostages in an effort to gain the release of imprisoned comrades; "Islamic Militants Planned to Kidnap Americans in Egypt," *ICT News* (28 June 1998).

⁶⁶Ortega, 35.

⁶⁷Ibid, p. 53; for a detailed examination of the economic policies of the EU towards the Maghreb see Grilli.

percent of the EU's total immigrant population and 27.6 percent of the non-nationals living in the various EU countries.⁶⁸ Germany and France were home to most of these immigrants--45.5 percent were in Germany and 33.6 percent were in France.⁶⁹ Of the immigrant population, the overwhelming majority in Germany were of Turkish descent, while in France most were from the Maghreb region. The potential for terrorism among the Mediterranean immigrant population has led to calls to enhance the police powers of the EU to stop transborder migration within the EU and prevent the movement of suspected terrorists.⁷⁰

Algeria is not the only potential source of instability in the region. At present territorial disputes continue in Morocco, Libya and in several states in the eastern Mediterranean. In Morocco the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) continues its mission to monitor the cease-fire agreement between the Moroccan government and the *Frente Popular para la Liberacion de Seguia el-Hamra y de Rio de Oro* (POLISARIO) and progress toward a political settlement of the conflict continues to elude UN negotiators.⁷¹ Meanwhile, Libya faced a significant Islamic uprising in the eastern section of the nation in 1996, but government troops were able to

⁶⁸EU, "Populations and Social Conditions: Migration Between the Mediterranean basin and the EU in 1995," *Eurostat*, no. 3/98 (March 1998).

⁶⁹EU, "EU Has Nearly 5 Million People From 'Med 12'," *Eurostat*, no. 498 (16 April 1998), 1.

⁷⁰Federal Republic of Germany, Press Release no. 30487.

⁷¹IISS, *The Military Balance, 1996/97* (London: Oxford, 1997), 120.

suppress the movement.⁷² While both Morocco and Tunisia have been spared significant terrorist activity, both governments have been especially concerned over the potential for such actions and have taken the lead in sponsoring multilateral antiterrorist efforts, including the aforementioned Arab League accord.

In addition, several states have the capacity to cause significant instability in the region. Egypt, a critical state for maintaining stability in the region and an important actor in the Arab-Israeli peace process, has been engaged in a struggle against Islamic radicals for some time and domestic problems would only seem to exacerbate this struggle.⁷³ While the regime of President Hosni Mubarak has thus far been able to contain the insurrection through repeated military offensives against rebel groups such as the Takfir and Higura groups, it has not been able to completely crush the insurgents.⁷⁴ If the Mubarak regime were to fall, the consequences could be extremely damaging to peace in the region.

In addition, Libya's sponsorship of terrorism, its aggressive armament program and its adventurism in Chad, also make it a source of deep concern for European, and especially French, policy makers. The possibility of another Libyan intervention in Chad was particularly worrisome for the French who have some 800 troops in Chad. France also has a bilateral defense treaty with the Central African Republic directly to the south

⁷²Ibid.

⁷³On the various potential sources for domestic unrest in Egypt, such as a growing urban poor and a population surge, see Robert S. Chase, Emily B. Hill and Paul Kennedy, "Pivotal States and U.S. Strategy," *Foreign Affairs* 75, no.1 (January 1996): 40-41.

⁷⁴During a 1996 crackdown, the Egyptian Army captured some 245 suspected insurgents in 17 different provinces; "Crackdown on Islamic Militants," *Financial Times* (April 11, 1996), 4.

of Chad, besides the numerous other military missions in the Francophone states of central Africa.⁷⁵ Hence, containment of Libya is a major concern for the French. In response, Paris has attempted to utilize the collective powers and capabilities of the West's institutions to achieve these goals.

The EU states must also concern themselves with other conflicts in the region including the Kurdish problem and the question of Cyprus. WEU assets were used in the humanitarian relief operations in northern Iraq, and a small contingent remains under the auspices of the UN. Furthermore, Turkey, a full member of NATO and an associate member of the WEU, brings its ongoing war with Kurdish separatists into the forum of both institutions. The Assembly of the WEU cited Turkey's actions in eastern Anatolia against the Kurds in 1995, as one of factors limiting Turkey's ability to be "integrated into Europe's intergovernmental and supranational structures."⁷⁶ This is in addition to Turkey's excursions into Iraq which create further complications for the EU, especially at a time when the French and Germans are pressing hard for a constructive engagement with Iraq.⁷⁷

Syrian support for the rebel group the Kurdish Worker's Party (PKK) led to the 1996 Military Training and Cooperation Agreement between Turkey and Israel which allows for Israeli use of some Turkish airfields for training and reconnaissance missions.

⁷⁵IISS, 1995, 238-39; France, Ministry of Defense, *White Paper on Defense, 1994* (Paris: SIRPA, 1994), 64-65.

⁷⁶WEU, Assembly of the WEU, *Parliamentary Co-operation in the Mediterranean*. WEU Document 1485 (6 November 1995).

⁷⁷See Anthony H. Cordesman and Ahmed S. Hashim, *Iraq: Sanctions and Beyond* (Boulder: Westview, 1997), 206-208.

The Turkish military pressed hard for this arrangement as a means to pressure Syria into ending its support for the PKK.⁷⁸ Syrian support for the PKK has led to heightened tensions between the two nations. Turkey has bolstered its troop presence on the border between the two nations and Turkish military aircraft have violated Syrian airspace. The crisis has reached a point that both the United States and the Arab League have attempted to mediate tensions and develop a diplomatic solution to the issue.⁷⁹

The Cyprus question carries the problem of ethnic strife between two Alliance partners, Turkey and Greece, into considerations over the future of the region. At present the European powers are pressuring Turkey to withdraw its troops in exchange for the deployment of a UN sponsored peace-keeping force.⁸⁰ However, Greece and Turkey remain engaged in an arms race and both regard the other as their main security threat. The Greeks plan to spend some \$24 billion over the next eight years while the Turks plan to spend \$31 over the next decade in order to modernize their forces.⁸¹

All of the southern European nations have grave concerns over the militarization of the region. There have been significant increases in the defense budgets of most of the Maghreb states and Egypt.⁸² Most alarmingly, these increases have been spent on the

⁷⁸IISS, *Military Balance 1995/1996*, 121.

⁷⁹“U.S. Urges Restraint in Turkey-Syria Standoff,” *CNN Interactive* (6 October 1998).

⁸⁰IISS, *Military Balance 1995/1996*, 121.

⁸¹Tasos Kokkinides, Lucy Amis and Nino Lorenzini, “Diplomacy and Arms: West Sends Mixed Messages to Aegean Adversaries,” *BASIC PAPERS*, no. 29 (August 1998), 1-3.

⁸²For instance, Algeria's defense budget increased by 48% to \$1.3 billion, while Egypt's defense spending increased by \$200 million a year since 1993 to an estimated \$2 billion a year in 1995; IISS, *Military Balance 1995/1996*, 127.

acquisition of advanced military hardware, including missiles capable of reaching Europe.⁸³ Algeria now possesses ten SU-24 strike bombers, 2 Soviet Kilo-class submarines, and 18 launching pads for its FROG-7 and FROG-4 tactical missiles. Meanwhile both Egypt and Libya's arsenal includes SCUD-B and SCUD-C missiles.⁸⁴

Furthermore, the European states are particularly concerned with the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction in the region. This concern is especially relevant now that several countries, including Algeria and Libya, have the aforementioned delivery systems. In 1989, Algeria built a nuclear research reactor at Quera, and a second, larger reactor is under construction, with Chinese collaboration. Although a signatory of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, International Atomic Energy Agency safeguard agreements are not in place yet. More alarming in the immediate sense is Libya. Colonel Muammar Kadhafi has publicly called for an "Islamic bomb," and has attempted to obtain a nuclear weapon for years. Libya presently has a Soviet-built nuclear reactor at Tajora, and construction has begun a larger reactor. In addition, Libya embarked on a massive campaign to develop chemical weapons (CWs) in 1985 with the construction of CW plant at Rabta. After discovery of this plant, most of Libya's CW research seems to have been transferred to a partially constructed plant at Tarhuna. It is estimated that Libya

⁸³Algeria, Libya and Iran are actively pursuing negotiations with China and Iran to purchase missile systems with ranges that exceed 1,000 kilometers--which would put them well within range of southern Europe; Graham E. Fuller and Ian O. Lesser, *A Sense of Siege: The Geopolitics of Islam and the West* (Boulder: Westview, 1995), 67.

⁸⁴WEU, 1485; IISS, *Military Balance 1995/96*, 129.

spends several hundred million dollars a year on its CW program, besides its \$960 million defense budget.⁸⁵

Since his election in May 1995, Chirac has tried to revive what the French perceive as a “great Arab policy”, better known as Charles de Gaulle’s *politique arabe*. One of the features of this strategy is its marked independence from American policy. In general terms, as Chirac himself points out, French policy emphasizes the need for the EU to develop into “an active and powerful center, the equal of the United States.”⁸⁶ This strategy was illustrated in recent years by Chirac’s whirlwind tour of the Middle East in which he demonstrated French autonomy from U.S. policy. While in the region, he took steps to improve relations with the Arabs, even at the expense of Franco-Israeli relations. Exacerbating tensions further with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Chirac refused to recognize a unified Jerusalem under Israeli control and met with PLO officials at Orient House in East Jerusalem.

Many assert that the “exception” of American domination in the region will be relatively short lived. Europe will eventually grow impatient and frustrated with the present phase, in which Europe so clearly lacks the influence that it had for centuries. Compounding this lack of influence is the feeling that for the first time in contemporary history the Middle East could constitute a threat to European security.⁸⁷

⁸⁵R. Jeffrey Smith, “Germ, Nuclear Arms Top Pentagon’s List of Threats,” *Washington Post* (April 12, 1996), A32; on the Libyan defense budget, see IISS, *Military Balance 1995/96*, 140.

⁸⁶Jacques Chirac, “Pour un modèle européen,” *Liberation* (15 March 1996).

⁸⁷Southern Europe in particular is vulnerable to ballistic missile attack. In 1986, two Libyan SCUD missiles fell short of the target in Italy. Today, the advances in ballistic missile technology would allow for a more precise strike against southern Europe from

The Persian Gulf provides an illustration of the European bid for increased regional influence. The EU is interested in maintaining influence in the region for many the same reasons that propel engagement in the Mediterranean. In economic terms, the Persian Gulf is more significant than the Maghreb when it comes to energy imports. The region provides between 40 and 50 percent of the EU's total imports of oil.⁸⁸ This is especially significant in the case of France where energy imports have grown dramatically after declining for several years in the 1980s.⁸⁹ France's dual engagement policy reflects an effort to establish Paris as a present and future player in the region, while acknowledging the inability to supplant US dominance. Specifically, constructive engagement is a series of policies that ultimately seek dialogue without significant concession. In return for changes in behavior or policy, the target state is granted improvements in political and economic relations in what may be described as a "carrot" and "stick" policy which does not offer acquiescence. In the Mediterranean, Libya provides a qualified example of the success of engagement policies. The nation provides a significant amount of energy resources to Italy, which in turn, exports a variety of products to that nation. As the Libyan government has worked to maintain access to

as far away as Iran and Iraq.

⁸⁸In 1997, the Persian Gulf accounted for 45 percent of the EU's oil imports compared with 43 percent in 1992 and 43 percent in 1987. The high level point in the last fifteen years occurred in 1993 when the region supplied the EU with 50 percent of its oil imports; U.S., Department of Energy, Energy Information Agency, *Persian Gulf Oil Export Fact Sheet* (February 1998).

⁸⁹From 1994 to 1997, French energy imports grew from 99.6 billion francs per year to 129.7 billion francs per year; France, Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques (INSEE), *L'Économie française-édition 1998-1999*, abridged English ed., (Paris: INSEE, 1998).

Western capital, there has been a corresponding decrease in that nation's support for international terrorism.

France's difficulties with the American dual containment range from the philosophical to the financial. Eric Rouleau made the point clearly in a *Foreign Affairs* article when he described Europe as having a "skeptical" view of American Middle East policy. This is especially true in discussions of "rogue" or "pariah" regimes. Rouleau asserts that the majority of European states have no equivalent phrase in their political lexicon for "pariah" or "backlash" states.⁹⁰ Hence, they are much more likely to consider tactics of engagement toward rogue regimes.

This penchant for engagement is reinforced when significant economic interests are at stake. Germany and France are Iran's largest trading partners. Their economic interests developed as the US tightened its controls on US investment in Iran. In Iraq, Paris has already signed agreements which commits French industries to join oil industry products as soon as UN sanctions are lifted. In both cases there is a sense that Chirac is making good on his promise to transform French policy in the Middle East to be "more active and more ambitious." In this effort, Chirac has followed the traditional French tactic of utilizing institutional relationships in an effort to achieve national goals.

The British and French have signed defense accords with all of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states. In part as a result of these defense accords, British and French military personnel have been involved in a number of joint exercises in the region such as maritime reconnaissance training, communications exercises, and

⁹⁰Eric Rouleau, "America's Unyielding Policy Toward Iraq: The View from France," *Foreign Affairs* 42, 3 (January-February 1995): 59.

combined naval and air exercises with the GCC states.⁹¹ Examples of such operations include the joint Anglo-Omani Swift Shield exercise and the two Franco-Qatari bilateral operations titled Pearl Gathering.⁹²

The Europeans have also stationed their own forces in the region. Great Britain and France, for instance, continue to station naval units in the Gulf, the most significant being the British Armilla Patrol.⁹³ The British and French also have formal agreements with all of the GCC states that allow them to use the naval and air stations of the various GCC countries. They also have various independent ground and air units in the GCC states, as well as forces involved in the United Nations contingent monitoring the Kuwaiti-Iraqi border (UNIKOM).⁹⁴

The European military presence in the region has also increased simultaneously with the increasing European share of arms transfers to Gulf states. These sales have often paved the way for closer military cooperation and training, and access to GCC military facilities. For instance, the sale of 48 *Tornado* jets to Saudi Arabia in 1988 included an invitation to Britain to construct new airbases and train Saudi pilots.⁹⁵

⁹¹UK, Ministry of Defense, *Statement on the Defense Estimates, 1994*, (London: HMSO, 1994), 49.

⁹²J. de Lestapis, "Oman's Armed Forces Keep up the Standard," *Jane's Defence Weekly* 24, no. 13 (June 1995), 35; Ibid., "Qatar Shops Around," *Jane's Defence Weekly* 24, no. 13 (June 1995), 38.

⁹³UK, Ministry of Defense, *Statement on the Defence Estimates, 1995*. (London: HMSO, 1995), 22-23, 48.

⁹⁴For instance, the British military has some 1500 officers and NCOs serving with the Omani armed forces.

⁹⁵IISS, *The Military Balance, 1988/89* (London: IISS, 1989), 94.

In addition to the bilateral links between the Gulf states and various European powers, there has also been an increasing amount of intra-European cooperation and force deployment in the region. The Iran-Iraq War marked the beginning of this trend as naval units from five nations (Belgium, France, Great Britain, Italy and the Netherlands), acting under the auspices of the WEU, began routine minesweeping and tanker escort duties, separate from and independent of American naval forces in the region.⁹⁶

WEU ships stopped some 16,000 out of the 21,000 ships searched during the period of the embargo.⁹⁷ From this experience, the WEU has continued regular consultation with Gulf states on three levels: Political (through bilateral governmental contacts or EU contacts through groups such as the EU's Parliamentary Association for Euro-Arab Cooperation); Ministerial (Ministry of Defense contacts); and Local (at the level of the individual base or naval unit commander).⁹⁸ Through these actions, the EU states have started to institutionalize their relations with the GCC.

The potential sources of instability emanating from the Mediterranean have prompted several attempts to develop a comprehensive, collective response. Individual European states have turned to the collective framework of the West's institutions to develop and implement policies that are beyond the scope of any one single nation. NATO, the EU and the WEU have all been tasked by memberstates to attempt to

⁹⁶Ibid., *Strategic Survey, 1987-88* (London: IISS, 1988), 130.

⁹⁷Willem Van Eekelen, "Defence and Security in a Changing World--WEU: The European Pillar?", *Defense Yearbook, 1992* (London: Brassey's, 1992), 72.

⁹⁸Willem Van Eekelen, "The Western European Union, European Security Interests and the Gulf," in *Global Interests in the Arab Gulf*, ed. Charles E. Davies (New York: St. Martin's, 1992), 176.

implement dialogues with the Mediterranean states in order to build a framework to deal with future instability.⁹⁹ As a report by the North Atlantic Assembly (NAA) notes: “Mediterranean stability requires not only a military approach but, even more importantly, a comprehensive security approach that includes economic, social, and even historical considerations. In fact, most of the countries in the southern Mediterranean basin consider that security is equivalent to social stability which can only be achieved through development, in turn the base for democracy.”¹⁰⁰ With the exception of the aborted “Euro-Arab” dialogue of the 1970s, the Mediterranean policy of the EU has been essentially an economic cooperation policy. The Renovated Mediterranean Policy (RMP), begun in 1990, has led to significant increases in EU aid to the region. From 1992-1996, the EU provided some 4 billion ECU, three times as much as the period from 1987-1991.¹⁰¹ However, in 1994 the EU has recognized the need for increased security collaboration in the region. In June of that year, the European Council mandated that the Council of Ministers “evaluate, together with the Commission, the global policy of the European Union in the Mediterranean region and possible initiatives to strengthen this policy in the short and medium term.”¹⁰²

⁹⁹On the various efforts to develop cooperation initiatives for the Mediterranean, see NATO, North Atlantic Assembly (NAA), Sub-Committee on the Mediterranean Basin, *Interim Report of the Sub-Committee on the Mediterranean Basin*, AM 87 CC/MB (95) 5 (May 1995).

¹⁰⁰NATO, NAA, Sub-Committee on the Southern Region, *Draft Interim Report*, AM 295 PC/SR (95) 2 (October 1995).

¹⁰¹NATO, NAA, Sub-Committee on the Mediterranean Basin, *Frameworks For Cooperation in the Mediterranean*, AM 259 CC/MB (95) 7 (October 1995).

¹⁰²EU, European Council, “Corfu Summit,” *Agence Europe*, NX 6260, (June 1994), 10.

In 1992, the WEU began attempts to develop contacts with states in the region. The WEU approach, however, has been limited to diplomatic contacts between the WEU presidency and secretariat and the foreign ministries of Mediterranean states.¹⁰³ The failure of the WEU to develop a more comprehensive program has stemmed from the inability of WEU memberstates to agree on a common framework.

Momentum passed from the WEU to NATO where the six Mediterranean members of the Alliance, France, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and Turkey, pushed for the establishment of a comprehensive and systematic approach toward the both Maghreb and the Mediterranean region in general. As early as 1991, NATO's new Strategic Concept recognized the importance of the region and declared that "the stability and peace of the countries on the periphery of Europe are important for the security of the Alliance"¹⁰⁴ NATO's commitment to the peace of the region was reaffirmed at the 1993 ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council (NAC) held in Athens, and again at the 1994 Brussels summit.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰³These states initially included Algeria, Morocco, Mauritania, and Tunisia. To these were added Egypt in 1994 and Israel in 1995; NAA, AM 259 CC/MB (95).

¹⁰⁴NATO, *The Alliance's Strategic Concept*, (8 November 1991), paragraph 12.

¹⁰⁵The declaration issued at the end of the summit reiterated NATO's stance that security in Europe was impacted by the southern flank. It also stated that the Alliance welcomed the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, and that the breakthrough was instrumental in "opening the way to consider measures to promote dialogue, understanding and confidence-building between the countries in the region," and called upon the permanent council to "review the overall situation" and "encourage all efforts conducive to strengthening regional stability;" NATO, *Declaration of the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council Held at NATO Headquarters, Brussels* (11 January 1994), paragraph 22.

In 1994, a combination of three factors led NATO to begin to address the security concerns of the region. The deteriorating situation in Algeria and the unwillingness of several states in the region to renew the Non-Proliferation Treaty, when combined with the determination of the Alliance's southern states to establish some balance in what was seen as a Eastern-centric focus on the part of NATO, led to the establishment of a dialogue that initially embraced Egypt, Israel, Morocco, Mauritania and Tunisia.¹⁰⁶ In late 1995, the dialogue was extended to include Jordan. The Alliance's Mediterranean Initiative centers around a series of bilateral political discussions which are held on a biannual basis. These meetings are conducted between NATO and the individual Mediterranean state. Each of the nations are also invited to participate in programs that emphasize exchange of information on issues such as science and peacekeeping, and reciprocal visits.¹⁰⁷ However, NATO's attempted southern dialogue, like that of the WEU and the EU, has yet to develop into a broad framework, like that of the OSCE, that would encompass both the security concerns of the states in the region and provide the means with which to engage in conflict prevention and resolution. Proposals have been made to extend the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program into the Mediterranean region, or to develop a new initiative based on the PfP concept specifically for the Mediterranean. Neither proposal has yet to be seriously considered by NAC, but cooperation between NATO and PfP states with Morocco, Egypt, Tunisia and Jordan in

¹⁰⁶This dialogue involved meetings between representatives of individual states and NATO officials, including the International Secretariat, and members of the Ad Hoc Group on the Mediterranean; North Atlantic Council (NAC), *Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council: Final Communiqué* (1 December 1994).

¹⁰⁷Raymond C. Ewing, "NATO and Mediterranean Security," *Atlantic Council of the United States, Bulletin* 8, no. 4 (March 1997), 3.

Bosnia in first the implementation force (IFOR) and now the stabilization force (SFOR) point to the potential for future cooperation between the Alliance and the states of the region.¹⁰⁸

Led by France, several southern European states have developed force structures, under the auspices of the WEU, to deal with humanitarian crises in the region. France, Italy and Spain agreed to create ground (EUROFOR) and naval reaction (EUROMARFOR) units in order to respond to security concerns in the Mediterranean. Soon afterwards, Portugal also agreed to participate in both forces.¹⁰⁹ But the long sought after goal of developing a Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean (CSCM) that would mirror the OSCE, remains elusive.

Meanwhile NATO has worked to develop its own strike force in the Mediterranean. Although the principal military force in the region remains the U.S. Sixth Fleet, the Alliance has established its own multilateral amphibious unit for the Mediterranean. Developed in 1991 and approved in 1995, the Combined Amphibious Force Mediterranean (CAFMED) was designed to provide a structure under the auspices of NATO's Striking and Supporting Forces Southern Europe (STRIKFORSOUTH) headquarters in Naples that could deploy an amphibious brigade with supporting air and

¹⁰⁸Ibid., 5.

¹⁰⁹The land component of these forces is the EUROFOR. EUROFOR is designed to be a division size rapid reaction force, made up of pre-assigned units from the participating nations. The sea component of the new forces is the EUROMARFOR which is essentially an amphibious assault landing group centered around a French aircraft carrier WEU, Defense Committee, *Draft Recommendation on European Armed Forces*, WEU Document 1468 (12 June 1995).

sea assets.¹¹⁰ CAFMED is not a standing force but one that would be raised to deal with particular crises. Forces from four NATO members, Italy, Greece, Spain, and Turkey could be bolstered by units from the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands to undertake operations. There have been a number of CAFMED exercises and the concept was tested during operation "Silver Wake" in 1997 which involved the evacuation of U.S. citizens from Albania during that nation's political crisis.¹¹¹

NATO has also worked to develop systems to counter the proliferation of missile technology and WMD proliferation by conducting exercises and through multilateral efforts to develop effective theater missile defense (TMD) technologies. The United States has led a number of multilateral military exercises to test TMD defense systems.¹¹² The lead that the United States commands in TMD technology has lead European states such as Italy and Germany to collaborate with the U.S. in an effort to develop anti-missile systems through the Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS).¹¹³ The inability of the European states to match the U.S. in research and development has meant that the EU states continue and will continue to rely on the

¹¹⁰CAFMED is part of NATO's southern command (AFSOUTH) which encompasses Italy, Greece, Turkey and the Mediterranean Sea from Gibraltar to Syria, and the Black Sea and Sea of Marmara; NATO, *NATO Handbook: Partnership and Cooperation* (Brussels: NATO, 1995), 171.

¹¹¹Paolo Valpolini, "Mediterranean Partnership for NATO Amphibious Forces: CAFMED Brings Together Assets From Six NATO Countries," *Jane's International Defence Review* (July 1998).

¹¹²These exercises include both bilateral and multilateral operations in both the United States and Europe; Joris Janssen Lok, "NATO Exercises Prop Up TMD Pillars," *Jane's International Defence Review* (July 1998), 58-59.

¹¹³On U.S. efforts to develop TMD systems, see Bryan Bender, "Cruise Control," *Jane's Defence Weekly* (22 July 1998), 22.

Americans both for their nuclear deterrent and for the development of weapons systems to defend against potential cruise missile attacks. This point also reinforces the continuing need for U.S. involvement in European security.

The sanctions in place against Iraq and the unilateral sanctions against Iran demonstrate the ability of the U.S. to tolerate, though not endorse, divergent policies by its allies in the region, while the Middle East peace process confirms the centrality of the United States to regional security. Barcelona and the Oslo accords set the stage for the rebirth of Palestinian authority in areas of the former nation, but it remained for the United States to pressure the two sides into implementing the agreements. When an impasse was reached, it fell to Washington to endeavor to force the resumption of the process through the Wye River Memorandum.¹¹⁴ Furthermore, the Clinton Administration pledged to both act as the intermediary for the later permanent status discussions between the two sides and offered to make available the assets of the Central Intelligence Agency to act as a facilitator of security cooperation and a guarantor of reciprocity by the two sides.¹¹⁵

While much of the focus of preventative diplomacy and conflict resolution by the institutional framework of the West has been directed towards the east, there has been a growing realization, especially by those states in the southern tier, that the Mediterranean

¹¹⁴Among other things, the agreement called for Israel to transfer an additional 13 percent of land to the Palestinian Authority, while the Palestinians pledged greater security cooperation and stricter enforcement of measures to deter anti-Israeli terrorism. The concord also called for the resumption of permanent status talks in May of 1999; "The 'Wye River Memorandum:' Full Text," *Arabic News*, (24 October 1998), 1-7.

¹¹⁵"CIA to Have Active Role in Implementing Anti-Terror Measures," *ICT News* (26 October 1998), 1.

region poses profound challenges for Europe in the years ahead. Radical Islam, while not necessarily a direct threat to the West itself, has the potential to undermine and even topple regimes with important politico-economic ties with Europe. This is especially true in the case of the Maghreb region and states such as Algeria and Egypt. Most ominously for the West is that this possible instability comes at a time of notable arms acquisitions and a general militarization of the region. To compound matters, the Mediterranean is the region that Europe has the least means with which to exercise influence. The West has yet to develop the institutional mechanisms that have garnered some success in conflict prevention and resolution elsewhere. For in the end, it will only be through collective action and institutionalism that these threats and challenges to European security can be adequately addressed.

CHAPTER VII

THE PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

The growing militarization of the Middle East and North Africa point to one of the most pressing security concerns for Western Europe--the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs).¹ During the Cold War, the American nuclear umbrella seemed to preclude the possibility of an attack on Europe by the Soviet bloc using WMDs. Furthermore, both during the Cold War and to a greater degree afterwards, there has emerged a series of international regimes designed to constrain the development of, and more importantly, prevent the use of WMDs. The end of the Cold War and the resultant reductions in the nuclear stockpiles of the two superpowers seemed to diminish the dangers of nuclear war. However, with the demise of the Soviet Union questions have arisen over the ability of Moscow to control both its nuclear hardware and its nuclear software, in the form of the knowledge and expertise capable of building nuclear weapons. These issues have become prominent as several states around the globe have embarked on programs designed to produce nuclear weapons and thus extend the world's nuclear club, in many cases to states with less than stable or questionable political regimes. The attempts of these rogue or pariah states, such as North Korea or Iraq, to develop nuclear weapons have occurred concurrently with several well-publicized efforts by international terrorist groups to attain nuclear weapons. Along with these nuclear issues, the potential for the development and use of certain chemical or

¹WMDs are traditionally defined as nuclear, biological or chemical weapons.

biological weapons has garnered the world's attention after state use of chemical weapons by Iraq against the Kurds, and the substate use of biological weapons by the Japanese Aum Shinri Kyo religious sect in an attack on a Tokyo subway in March of 1995. While nuclear weapons are expensive and difficult to develop, especially without the knowledge of other states, biological and chemical weapons can be developed with relatively little expense and often without the knowledge of other states or international organizations. The acquisition of chemical, biological or nuclear weapons (NBC) is especially troublesome in the case of terrorist groups. These groups might be more willing to use such weapons since retaliation against them would be more difficult, and such weapons would be convenient tools to use for political blackmail or to destabilize the current regime or government in power.

With escalations in ethnic and substate conflict in and around the European continent, the potential for the use of WMDs in a terrorist attack has increasingly become a concern for European governments. For the Europeans, proliferation threats revolve around three main areas: 1) The control and maintenance of the biological, chemical, and nuclear stockpiles, and the management of the infrastructure connected with the WMDs of the former Soviet Union; 2) the development of indigenous means of production of WMDs by so-called rogue or pariah states; 3) the sale of WMD technology, especially the sale of delivery systems, i.e., ballistic missiles, capable of hitting Western Europe, as well as the trade in so-called dual-use technology which involves the transfer of seemingly innocuous materials and equipment that can actually be used to generate WMDs. While notable progress has been made in the development of control regimes to address these issues, in many cases these regimes have

incorporated only those states whose governments pursue non-proliferation as a matter of national policy. Nonetheless, the frameworks provided by international regimes such as the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) do establish international norms and rules for the governance of WMDs. To overcome the threats associated with WMDs and to better ensure protection for themselves, the states of Western Europe must continue to pursue policies that emphasize collective responses to the development or the potential use of WMDs in much the same fashion as these states have traditionally relied on NATO's Article V guarantee to provide an American nuclear response to a WMD attack by the former Soviet Union during the Cold War and thus, with the exception of Great Britain and France, preclude the need for these states to develop significant NBC capabilities.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, concerns about the control and accountability of the former superpower's WMD arsenal have been paramount for European security. During the Cold War, the Soviets employed some 30,000 scientists and engineers just in their biological weapons program, named Biopreparat.² Despite some progress in the dismantling of its existing nuclear stockpile and the completion of the collection of warheads from the other former Soviet republics, the Russian Federation retains the world's second largest nuclear arsenal. The deteriorating moral and low pay of the state's strategic rocket forces raises serious questions about the Kremlin's ability to adequately control its inventory. The tight export controls promised

²Joseph D. Douglass, Jr., "Chemical and Biological Warfare Unmasked," *The Wall Street Journal* (2 November 1995), 2.

by Russian President Boris Yeltsin in 1991 have yet to be implemented.³ To further complicate matters, the loss of employment and prestige for the estimated three to seven thousand scientists and engineers who worked on the design and production of Soviet nuclear weapons may tempt many to sell their services to those states in the process of developing their own nuclear weapons.⁴

At present, there are approximately 950 sites in the former Soviet Union in which enriched uranium and plutonium exist.⁵ These sites include research institutes, power plants, weapons laboratories, naval fuel depots and nuclear waste storage facilities. In total, it is estimated that Russia possesses some 1,000 tons of enriched, weapons-grade uranium and 170 tons of plutonium.⁶ The states of the FSU are still the world's largest producers of uranium. In total the FSU produces some 13,500 tons of the material annually with some 50 per cent coming from Kazakstan, 20 per cent from Russia, 20 per cent from Uzbekistan, and 7 per cent from the Ukraine.⁷ While security under the Soviet regime was tight, the collapse of the KGB triggered a collapse of the nuclear control

³Duke, *Security Disorder*, 52.

⁴Ibid., 52-53.

⁵Canada, Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), *Smuggling Special Nuclear Materials, Commentary No. 57* (Ottawa: CSIS, 1995), 3.

⁶R. Jeffrey Smith, "U.S.-Russian Anti-Smuggling Effort Largely in Disarray," *The Washington Post* (28 August 1994), 3.

⁷Renee Pruneau, "WMD Proliferation From the Southern Tier of the Former Soviet Union," paper presented at the International Security Studies Section of the International Studies Association Conference on October 31, 1996 in Atlanta, Georgia.

system.⁸ Since 1991, there have been more than 1,000 reported cases involving attempts to smuggle nuclear materials.⁹ The overwhelming majority of these cases involved either minute amounts of nuclear material or actual nuclear fraud.¹⁰ Overall, only eleven cases have involved significant amounts of fissile material.¹¹ Nonetheless, the sheer number of incidents is troubling since it only requires as little as three kilograms of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) to make a nuclear weapon.¹² Since three kilograms of HEU is roughly the size of a golf ball, the potential for smuggling such amounts is great. More troubling are computer simulations which have shown that primitive nuclear

⁸Phil Williams and Paul N. Woessner, "The Real Threat of Nuclear Smuggling," *Scientific American* 274, no. 1 (January 1996): 40-44.

⁹U.S., Senate, "Appendix: U.S. Government Chronology of Nuclear Smuggling Incidents," *Testimony of John Deutch Before the Senate Permanent Investigations Subcommittee on Global Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Illicit Trafficking of Nuclear Materials* (21 March 1996).

¹⁰Many cases of nuclear smuggling have involved efforts by illicit traffickers to defraud buyers by selling them nuclear materials that are unusable in weapons manufacturing. The production of nuclear weapons requires either enriched uranium or plutonium, and may involve the use of Lithium 6, Polonium or the use Beryllium as the neutron reflector in the bomb. Traffickers have attempted to sell other radioactive materials such as Americium 241, Cesium 137, Cobalt 60 and Zirconium to unwary buyers; Williams and Woessner, 42-43.

¹¹Four of these have involved seizures of fissile material outside of the FSU, and three involved the seizure of fissile before it had left the FSU. The remaining four cases centered around the diversion of fissile material, "but not as clearly meet the standard of unambiguous evidence with respect to either independent sources to corroborate the diversion, or the size or enrichment level of the material;" U.S., Congress, Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, William C. Potter, "Nuclear Leakage From the Post-Soviet States," oral presentation before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (13 March 1996).

¹²Thomas B. Cochran and Christopher E. Paine, "The Amount of Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium Needed for Pure Fission Nuclear Weapons," Paper for the Natural Resources Defense Council, Washington, D.C. (22 August 1994).

weapons, with an explosive yield of 100 tons of TNT, could be produced with only one kilogram of HEU.¹³ The present stocks of plutonium and HEU in Russia have the potential for yielding some 60,000 nuclear weapons.¹⁴

In 1994, there were two notable seizures of nuclear materials which highlighted the deficiencies in the nuclear control regime of Russia. In May of that year, in Tengen Germany, officials seized 5.6 grams of weapons grade plutonium (99.75 per cent Pu-239) mixed with 50 grams of a metallic alloy. In December, Czech officials apprehended 2.72 kilograms of highly enriched uranium (87 per cent HEU) which were believed to be from stockpiles of fuel for the Russian Navy.¹⁵ The Czech case is especially troubling since the amount of HEU recovered was roughly enough necessary to construct an atomic weapon.¹⁶

Within Russia, security at sites storing nuclear materials was until recently wholly inadequate. Most facilities had no inventory controls, external monitoring systems, or adequate fencing. Poor accounting practices meant that many officials were unable to keep accurate records of the amount or the nature of those materials in their

¹³Steven Dolley and Paul Leventhal, "Highly Enriched Uranium Seized in Czech Republic Reveals a Growing Risk of Nuclear Terrorism," Nuclear Control Institute (NCI) *Czech HEU Issue Brief, 1* (Washington, D.C.: NCI, 1994), 2.

¹⁴CSIS, 6.

¹⁵International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), *Strategic Survey, 1994/95* (London: IISS, 1995), 17.

¹⁶The amount of HEU seized was enough for a nuclear weapon, and the level of purity of the HEU (87 per cent) was also sufficient for construction, since the level of purity required for nuclear weapons is approximately 80 per cent; Rick Atkinson, "Prague Says Uranium Found in Czech Auto Could Trigger Bomb," *The Washington Post* (21 December 1994), A27.

possession.¹⁷ In March of 1994, Russian authorities arrested three people in St. Petersburg for attempting to sell 3.5 kilograms of HEU.¹⁸ In July of that same year, three Russian naval officers were arrested after authorities discovered that they had stolen some 4.5 kilograms of HEU from their base.¹⁹ In one of the most extraordinary cases, in November of 1993, a thief climbed through a hole in the fence surrounding the Sevmorput shipyard near Murmansk and used a hacksaw to cut through a padlock on a storage compartment that contained fuel for nuclear submarines. He stole three fuel assemblies, each of which contained 4.5 kilograms of HEU. The FSB official who conducted the investigation, Mikhail Kulik, criticized the lax security measures at the storage facility and specifically cited the facility's lack of an alarm system and exterior lightening, as well as the minuscule number of guards. He concluded that "even potatoes are probably much better guarded today than radioactive materials."²⁰ As proof of the need to employ or retain in some many the scientists involved in the nuclear program of the FSU, a Russian scientist, using his own laboratory in the Siberian city of Krasnoyarsk, produced some 2.2 kilograms of a nuclear material used in weapons construction and attempted to smuggle the material out of Russia.²¹ Russian officials

¹⁷CSIS, 3.

¹⁸Michael Gordon, "Russian Aide Says Gangsters Try to Steal Atom Material," *The New York Times* (26 May 1994), A5.

¹⁹U.S., Senate, "Appendix: U.S. Government."

²⁰Oleg Bukharin and William Potter, "Potatoes Were Guarded Better," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 51, no. 3 (May 1995): 46-50.

²¹The head of the Krasnoyarsk Federal Security Branch (FSB), Anatoly Samkov stated that the material "was not plutonium or uranium or anything of the sort. . ." but was "a

were further embarrassed by the November 1994 discovery of a container of 32 kilograms of Cesium-137 in a Moscow park. The container was placed there by Chechen separatists and turned out to be relatively harmless, but the incident did illustrate the potential for nuclear terrorism.²²

In response to these and other incidents, Yeltsin has attempted to tighten security at nuclear facilities with some modest degree of success. Seizures of nuclear material believed to have originated in the FSU peaked with some 267 apprehensions in 1994 and had declined since then.²³ In August of 1994, Yeltsin established an inter-agency commission to deal with the issue. Headed by the director of Russia's counterintelligence service, Sergei Stepashin, the commission titled the State Committee for Nuclear and Radiation Safety or Gosatomnadzor (GAN), the organization was supposed to be the supreme agency in charge of nuclear security issues. However, intra-agency disputes between GAN and the variety of Russian agencies, from the Ministry of Atomic Energy (MINATOM), the defense ministry and even the ministry of shipbuilding, with some degree of control over nuclear facilities, has prevented the implementation of many of GAN's reforms.²⁴ MINATOM has actually been the biggest obstacle to significant reforms within the Russian nuclear system. Comprising some 151 different enterprises, MINATOM lacks the fiscal resources necessary to implement

substance that might be used as a component of nuclear devices – coating, pie or something like that;” “Russian Arrested for Alleged Nuclear Smuggling,” *Reuters* (7 May 1996).

²²U.S., Senate, “Appendix.”

²³Williams and Woessner, 42-44.

²⁴CSIS, 5.

GAN's reforms, and, in an era of extreme budget constraints, the central government has not allocated the resources to support GAN's efforts.²⁵ For instance, MINATOM has agreed to shut down three plutonium-based reactors, in exchange for American aid in building two uranium-based reactors, but the new reactors will be not completed until the year 2000, and MINATOM needs the energy produced by the three older reactors. Consequently, the older reactors are kept on line and are not officially scheduled to be shut down until well after the year 2000. Other Russian agencies also continue to delay GAN's reform efforts, fearing a loss of prestige and power.²⁶ For example, MINATOM does not have the facilities to store all of the fissile material that will be generated from the dismantlement of Russia's nuclear weapons, so GAN has attempted to get MINATOM to store these materials at Russian Ministry of Defense (MOD) sites. However, MINATOM, refuses to cooperate with the MOD, fearing encroachment on its functions by the MOD.²⁷

The most promising developments in Russia's endeavors to control its nuclear facilities have been the degree of multilateral cooperation afforded the nation. Both the United States and the EU have implemented a number of programs to assist the Russians their anti-proliferation efforts. In overall terms, the United States has taken the lead in publicizing the issue and attempting to develop programs to deal with Russia's nuclear woes. The American Department of Energy (DOE) has initiated a number of programs

²⁵IISS, *Strategic Survey, 1994/1995* (London: IISS, 1995), 18-19.

²⁶Bill Gertz, "Yeltsin Can't Curtail Arms Spread; Bureaucracy Too Powerful CIA Believes," *The Washington Times* (27 September 1994), A3.

²⁷U.S., Department of Defense, NSIAD-95-7, 6.

designed to aid the Russians. Specifically, the DOE's initiatives are designed to facilitate nuclear disarmament in Russia and aid in fissile material control.²⁸ The DOE also sponsored a laboratory-to-laboratory effort which matched Russian facilities with American ones. The American laboratories have worked with the Russians in converting plants that develop HEU into plants that produce low-enriched Uranium (LEU) for commercial uses. This has been one of the more successful efforts in retaining nuclear trained specialists in Russia and preventing potentially jobless nuclear scientists from emigrating. The program has also involved exchanges between American and Russian laboratories. In addition, the FBI and the U.S. Customs service have launched cooperative programs with the Russians to prevent the illicit trafficking in nuclear materials.²⁹

In 1992, the United States initiated the Cooperative Threat Reduction, or Nunn-Lugar, program. The CTR provided the umbrella agreement for the distribution of American aid for Russian denuclearization and nuclear-industrial conversion. Overall, the United States has allocated some \$1.2 billion for the CTR program, but the effort has been mired by criticisms over its slow start and waste of funds by Russian agencies.³⁰ Nonetheless, by 1995, CTR had provided some \$38 million in aid for 23 different programs in the states of the FSU, and by 1996, the program had succeeded in removing

²⁸U.S., House of Representatives, C. Bruce Tarter, 1.

²⁹U.S., White House, *Arms Control and Nonproliferation: The Clinton Administration Record*, Press Release (20 May 1996).

³⁰U.S., Department of Defense, *Weapons of Mass Destruction: Reducing the Threat From the Former Soviet Union: An Update*, NSIAD-95-165 (Washington, D.C.: GAO, 1995), 3.

all nuclear weapons from the states of the FSU and placing them under Russian control, thereby concentrating the weapons and precluding the potential for smuggling in states with even less regulatory control than the Russia.³¹ By May of 1998, the CTR had obligated some \$1.7 billion to the FSU.³² The United States also undertook efforts to directly remove fissile material from the states of the FSU. For instance, in 1994, the United States purchased some 600 kilograms of HEU from Kazakhstan and flew the material directly to the United States for dilution to reactor-grade fuel.³³ By 1998, the CTR had removed 3,810 metric tons of propellant fuel and assisted in the disposal of some 100,000 tons of the material, as well as delivering some 25,000 containers to store nuclear waste and materials to Russia.³⁴

The CTR also provided funds for the destruction of chemical and biological weapons in the states of the FSU. In 1994, Russia declared its chemical weapons stockpile to be some 40,000 metric tons.³⁵ In 1996, the U.S. Department of Defense

³¹Ibid., U.S., Department of Defense, *Weapons of Mass Destruction: DOD Report Accounting for Cooperative Threat Reduction Assistance Needs Improvement*, NSIAD-95-191 (Washington, D.C.: GAO, 1995), 7; IISS, *The Military Balance: 1996-97* (London: IISS, 1997), p. 286.

³²U.S., Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *CTR Program: Accomplishments* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1998), 4.

³³The Kazakh HEU was being stored in a facility where the only security measure was a large padlock on the building where the HEU was stored, NATO, NAA, *Nuclear Proliferation*, AM 310 STC (95) 10 (October 1995), paragraph 49.

³⁴U.S., *CTR*, 2-4.

³⁵U.S., Department of Defense, *Arms Control: Status of U.S.-Russian Agreements and the Chemical Weapons Convention*, NSIAD-94-136 (Washington, D.C.: GAO, 1994).

gave Russia some \$104 million in support for eliminating chemical weapons.³⁶ The United States provided Russia with a technical support office and professional support for planning purposes. In addition, the United States funded the Russian government's development of a comprehensive plan to destroy its chemical weapons.³⁷ Foreign aid is critical for the destruction of Russia's chemical stockpiles, since it is estimated that Russia can only pay about half the costs associated with the disposal.³⁸

In 1994, MINATOM agreed to cooperate with the United States and opened six facilities to American teams for planning and implementing improvements in physical security and inventory control.³⁹ Also, in 1993, Russia agreed to sell the United States some 500 metric tons of HEU for \$11.9 billion. The Russian HEU comes from dismantled warheads and American firms will convert the HEU to LEU and sell the material on the open market.⁴⁰

On a broad level, one of the most significant anti-proliferation efforts undertaken by both the United States and Russia has been the ongoing Strategic Arms Reduction Talks/Treaties (START). The START I Treaty was signed in 1991 and ratified in 1994. It called for both nations to reduce their nuclear weapons stockpiles to 6,000 strategic warheads and deploy no more than 1,600 delivery systems within seven years of the

³⁶Ibid., U.S., NSIAD-95-165, 5

³⁷U.S., NSIAD-95-7, 9.

³⁸U.S., NSIAD-95-165, 13.

³⁹CSIS, 6.

⁴⁰PISS, *Strategic Survey, 1994/95*, 22.

Treaty's ratification. The START II Treaty requires both nations to further reduce their strategic warheads to between 3,000 and 3,500 by the year 2003.⁴¹

The Treaty also limits the number of submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) to 1,750 and bans multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles (MIRV) by only allowing one warhead per missile.⁴² START II was signed on January 3, 1993 and approved by the U.S. Senate in 1996, but remains unapproved by the Russian Duma, despite repeated promises by Yeltsin to push the measure through. The failure of the Russians to ratify START II further reveals the difficulties Yeltsin faces in efforts to both limit Russian stockpiles of nuclear weapons and materials and address proliferation issues.⁴³

European efforts to aid Russian nuclear control and anti-proliferation efforts have come both on a bilateral level, and through programs of the EU. In August of 1994, Russia and Germany signed a cooperation agreement to collaborate on anti-nuclear smuggling efforts. The agreement calls upon the two nations to share intelligence and to cooperate on law enforcement measures and operations. In addition, Russian and

⁴¹IISS, *The Military Balance, 1996/97* (London: IISS, 1997); SIPRI, *SIPRI Yearbook: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, 1991*, (Stockholm: SIPRI, 1991); U.S., Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *Annual Report to the President and Congress* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1996); "U.S. and Soviet/Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces: Past Present and Projected," *Arms Control Today* (October 1996), 29; U.S., Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *Annual Report: 1998* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1997).

⁴²U.S., Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *Start II Treaty: Report*, (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1995).

⁴³See Vladimir Abarinov, "Russian Ratification of START II is Problematic," *Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* (21 February 1996), 21; and Maria Katsva, "Disarmament Will be Difficult," *Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* (31 January 1996): 21.

Germany will jointly analyze all potential nuclear material seized in Germany in order to aid officials in determining points of origin.⁴⁴ Germany has also provided some \$5.5 million to Russia to aid in the disposal of chemical weapons and plans to provide an additional \$4.5 million.⁴⁵ Other states, particularly the Scandinavian states such as Norway and Sweden have offered considerable aid to Russia for improvements in nuclear safety. France is also providing Russia with \$5 million in equipment to aid in nuclear disarmament.⁴⁶ France and Great Britain have also developed a joint plan to supply the Russians with 350 supercontainers, valued at \$35 million, to transport and temporarily store WMDs.⁴⁷

As early as 1991, the EU initiated programs to aid the states of the FSU in nuclear conversion and safety. To address the problems of the Central and East European states, the EU launched the Concentration on European Regulatory Tasks (CONCERT) and to provide assistance to the states of the CIS, the EU established the Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS). Both of these organizations work to develop links and exchange programs between EU memberstates and states of the former East bloc. In addition, CONCERT is working to develop pan-European nuclear safety and storage standards. These organizations

⁴⁴Yekaterina Filippova, "Smuggling of Nuclear Materials: A New International Problem," *Eco-Chronicle*, 16, no. 4 (July 1994): 1.

⁴⁵U.S., NSIAD-95-165, 14.

⁴⁶*Ibid.*, 9.

⁴⁷U.S., NSIAD-95-7, 7.

conduct safety inspections of Soviet era reactors and work closely with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).⁴⁸

Nonetheless, Russian control over its nuclear facilities continues to be problematic. Fiscal constraints and both inter- and intra-agency fighting have diminished the potential benefits of foreign assistance. While most of the world's nuclear powers view plutonium as waste, Russia plans to continue using the material in fast reactors. This creates a problem since plutonium-based breeder reactors can actually produce more plutonium as a byproduct of their operation.⁴⁹ In addition, the dismantling of Russia's strategic nuclear weapons also generates more plutonium and HEU from the discarded warheads.⁵⁰ While the United States and most other nuclear powers have ceased the production of fissile materials, Russia continues to produce some 900 tons of HEU and 190 tons of plutonium per year.⁵¹ This additional plutonium further strains Russia's already overloaded control system and increases the potential for nuclear smuggling. Meanwhile, the black market in nuclear technology and material continues to be a lucrative venture as "rogue" or "pariah" states attempt to develop their own nuclear programs.⁵² In response the United States has pressured Russia to sign a fissile

⁴⁸IISS, *Strategic Survey, 1994/95*, 20.

⁴⁹Ibid., 23-24.

⁵⁰NAA, *Nuclear Proliferation*, paragraphs 52-53.

⁵¹Alexander Bolsunovsky, "How to Utilize Fissile Materials After Dismantling Russian Warheads," *The Monitor: Nonproliferation, Demilitarization and Arms Control* 2, no. 4 (Fall 1996): 1.

⁵²See, for instance, U.S., Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *Annual Report: 1998*.

material production cutoff treaty (FMCT), but negotiations have yet to produce an agreement.⁵³

The possible transfer of nuclear technology and secrets is especially troubling since several states in North Africa and the Gulf region have ongoing programs to develop WMDs. In 1995, Russia and Iran signed a deal for the Russians to supply the Iranians with 1,200 megawatt reactor and a second 880-megawatt reactor in Bushehr.⁵⁴ The Russians also agreed to assist Iranian research facilities and to provide technicians and engineers to aid Iran's nuclear program. The United States has steadfastly maintained that this assistance will be used by the Iranians to build facilities that are capable of producing HEU for use in a nuclear weapons program.⁵⁵ The American view of Iran was summarized by Peter Tarnoff, the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs in 1995, when he asserted that Iran "is pursuing the development of weapons of mass destruction—that is, nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and the missile systems to deliver them."⁵⁶ Libya operates a Soviet-supplied nuclear research facility near Tripoli, but seems to have abandoned its effort to acquire nuclear weapons. Iraq and Libya's nuclear programs seem to have halted for the time, but both nations still

⁵³U.S., White House, *Fissile Material Production Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) Negotiations*, Press Release (27 March 1997).

⁵⁴"Iran Nuclear Scheme Raises Temperatures in Washington," *The Middle East*, no. 248 (September 1995), 21.

⁵⁵Evan S. Medeiros, "Clinton, Yeltsin Continue Debate Over Russian-Iran Nuclear Deal," *Arms Control Today* 25, no. 5 (June 1995): 20-21.

⁵⁶U.S., Congress, House of Representatives, House International Relations Committee, "Containing Iran: Statement by Peter Tarnoff, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs" (9 November, 1995), 2.

possess considerable capabilities in producing chemical weapons (CWs).⁵⁷ For instance, Libya has the third world's largest chemical weapons factory already operating at Rabta, and is in the process of completing what would be the world's largest chemical weapons factory at Tarhunah.⁵⁸ Iraq has an extensive arsenal of biological and chemical weapons (BCWs) that include anthrax, botulinum toxin and mustard gas.⁵⁹

While there are a wide variety of chemical and biological weapons readily available, in general the major biological agents are anthrax, botulin toxin, and ricin. Among the chemical agents, there are six general categories. Nerve agents which are the most lethal. These chemicals include sarin, tabin and VX.⁶⁰ Blister agents or vesicants are less toxic than nerve agents and work by destroying tissue when they come into contact with skin or are inhaled. The most common form of blister agent is mustard gas. Blood agents block the flow of oxygen to the blood which causes oxygen starvation. Cyanogen chloride and hydrogen cyanide are the most used blood agents. Choking

⁵⁷See, for instance, R. Jeffrey Smith "Germ, Nuclear Arms Top Pentagon's List of Threats" *The Washington Post* (12 April 1996), A32.

⁵⁸U.S., Congress, House of Representatives, House International Relations Committee, "Developments in the Middle East: Statement by Robert H. Pelletreau, Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs," (25 September 1996), 9; U.S., Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, *Background Notes: Libya* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1994), 8.

⁵⁹Joachim Krause, "The Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Risks for Europe," in *Europe and the Challenge of Proliferation, Chaillot Papers*, no. 24, ed. Paul Cornish, Peter Van Ham, and Joachim Krause (Paris: Institute for Security Studies of the WEU, 1996), 7.

⁶⁰Robert Purver, "The Threat of Chemical and Biological Terrorism," *The Monitor: Nonproliferation, Demilitarization and Arms Control* 2, no. 4 (Fall 1996), 7; Seth Carus and Karl Lowe, "Chemical and Biological Terrorism: Threat and Reponse," *Policywatch*, no. 247 (12 May 1997).

agents attack the respiratory system. Chlorine, which was first used in World War I, is a choking agent. Less lethal CWs, include harassing agents such as tear gas. Finally, psychological agents impair thinking. Common psychological agents include LSD and BZ.⁶¹

The true extent of Iraq's BCW program was not discovered until after the defection of Saddam Hussein's son-in-law, Husayn Kamil, at which time the Iraqis turned over some 700,000 pages of WMD-related documents.⁶² Since then it has been learned that Iraq had an extensive biological weapons (BW) program and had obtained some 8,500 liters of anthrax, 19,000 liters of botulinum toxin and 2,200 liters of aflatoxin. Iraq had also prepared BW-filled munitions, including 25 Scud missile warheads and artillery shells, as well as a MiG-21 drone. Iraq initially resisted dismantling the Al Hakam BW factory after it was discovered that the plant had produced more than 500,000 liters of BWs from 1989 to 1990, however, the plant was eventually destroyed under pressure from the UNSCOM in 1996. Recently, it has been discovered that Iraq has also tested and produced the biological toxin Ricin.⁶³ Iraq may still possess 16 Scud missiles, on mobile launchers, armed with biological warheads.⁶⁴ In addition, UNSCOM still cannot account for some 17 tons of the material used to

⁶¹Maria Bowers, *The Disposal of Surplus Chemical Weapons* (Bonn: Bonn International Center for Conversion, 1995), 2-3.

⁶²U.S., Department of Defense, "Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs," *U.S. Government White Paper*, 3050, EUR 205 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1998), 2.

⁶³*Ibid.*, 3.

⁶⁴"U.N. Says Iraq May Have 16 Biological Missiles," *Associated Press* (22 March 1996).

create BWs that Iraq purchased in 1990.⁶⁵ Recent revelations of Iraqi-Russian negotiations over the sale of a Russian-produced factory to produce single-cell proteins, a factory that was similar to one Iraq has admitted was used for the production of biological weapons in the early 1990s, further highlights the potential proliferation dangers of biological weapons facilities.⁶⁶

While Iraq may still possess BWs, the nation's CWs program has been essentially destroyed. Over the course of a two-year operation, UN inspectors destroyed more than 480,000 liters of CW agents, including mustard gas and the nerve agents sarin and tabun. The UN also destroyed more than 1,040,000 kilograms of 45 different materials used in the production of CWs. In addition, some 28,000 chemical munitions, which ranged from missiles to artillery shells to airdropped bombs, were eliminated. The main Iraqi CW facility at Al Muthana was also closed.⁶⁷

The United States estimates that at present ten countries are continuing efforts to develop biological warfare capabilities.⁶⁸ Syria also has a significant CWs program.

⁶⁵“Editor’s Note,” *The CBW Chronicle* 2, no. 1 (January 1996), 2.

⁶⁶After initially denying reports about the negotiations, which surfaced after UN inspectors discovered documents detailing the meetings in 1994 and 1995, Russian officials have now acknowledged the meetings, but still maintain that no formal contracts were signed and no equipment was delivered to the Iraqis. The proposed plant would have had a capacity of some 50,000 liters of fermentation vessels, ten times larger than the plant that the Iraqis previously used to produce biological weapons, including anthrax and botulinum; R. Jeffrey Smith, “Russians Admit Firms Met Iraqis: Plant that Could Make Germ Weapons at Issue,” *The Washington Post* (18 February 1998), A16.

⁶⁷UN, UNSCOM, “UN Says All Iraqi Chemical Weapons Destroyed,” Pol406/94062306 (23 June 1994).

⁶⁸U.S., Department of Defense, *Fact Sheet: Biological Warfare Threat Analysis*, EUR 508 (20 February 1998).

The major impetus for Syrian development of WMDs has been Israel's nuclear capability. Syria first acquired CWs from Egypt in 1973, and presently has at least one production facility, located north of Damascus. This plant produces mustard gas and Sarin and is in the process of developing VX. In order to counter Israel's nuclear capability, Syria began an effort to develop a nuclear program. The Syrians established a nuclear research facility, sent engineers abroad to be trained and purchased nuclear equipment from the Europeans. Syria also signed a contract with China for a 30-kilowatt research reactor and made inquiries about the purchase of a 10-megawatt reactor. However, fiscal problems have prevented any significant progress in the nation's nuclear program.⁶⁹

In addition, in 1991, Algeria was discovered to have a secret nuclear research facility near Oussera and was accused by the Central Intelligence Agency of attempting to develop a nuclear bomb with the aid of China and Iraq.⁷⁰ Although Algeria has since consented to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, doubts continue about the direction of the nation's nuclear program, especially with the construction of a second reactor with Chinese collaboration.

Proliferation concerns are exacerbated by the transfer or sale of delivery systems. Algeria and Iran now possess **Kilo-class** submarines. In addition, Algeria, Egypt, Libya, and Syria have **FROG-7** missiles, and Egypt, Iran, Iraq, and Libya have **Scud-B/C**

⁶⁹Andrew Rathmall, "Syria's Insecurity," *Jane's Intelligence Review* (September 1994): 419.

⁷⁰Mark Stenhouse "The Maghreb: The Rediscovered Region," *Jane's International Defense Review* (February 1995): 86.

missiles.⁷¹ These missiles could be modernized to extend their present ranges but it is unlikely that any could have ranges in excess of 600 kilometers.⁷² At present, it is known that Iran and Syria have **Scud C** missiles with a range of 500 kilometers and a payload of some 700 kilograms. Furthermore, it is suspected that Syria has acquired CSS-6/M-6 missiles that have a range of 600 kilometers and a 500-kilogram payload.⁷³ Many of these states, especially Iran, are interested in acquiring either Chinese or North Korean produced **Nodong** missiles (which are modernized versions of the **Scud-C**). The **Nodong 1** has a range of 1,000 kilometers and the **Nodong 2** has an estimated range of 1,500 kilometers.⁷⁴ China has already proven that is willing to sell advanced missile systems to Middle East states with its 1988 sale of 40 CSS-2 missiles to Saudi Arabia.⁷⁵ Some 15 to 20 nations are presently working on developing missile systems with ranges in excess of 1,000 kilometers.⁷⁶

Most of these states also have acquired Russian **SU-24** strike bombers. By the year 2000, it is possible that several North African states, including Algeria and Libya will have missiles or air delivery systems capable of targeting **all** of the major Southern

⁷¹WEU, Assembly of the Western European Union, Document 1485.

⁷²On potential missile modifications, see *Jane's Strategic Weapons*, no. 18 (May 1995).

⁷³IISS, *The Military Balance, 1995/96* (London: IISS, 1995), 281.

⁷⁴Krause, 11.

⁷⁵The CSS-2 has a range of 2,700 kilometers and a payload of 2,500 kilograms; IISS, *The Military Balance, 1995/96*, 281.

⁷⁶Peter Van Ham, *Managing Non-Proliferation Regimes in the 1990s: Power, Politics and Policies* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1994), 24.

European cities.⁷⁷ In addition, at present the naval forces of the Western European powers already face the potential of being fired upon by missile systems with ranges of 200-300 kilometers. This potential threat could severely limit the ability of Western naval forces to maneuver and to carry out tasks such as international blockades or the implementation of international sanctions.⁷⁸ Western naval units in the area are also increasingly at risk from cruise missiles. In February of 1996, Iran placed Chinese C-802 cruise missiles on board naval platforms, mainly on **Kaman** and **Houdong** patrol boats.⁷⁹ In addition, the Iranians have three missile frigates which, with the twenty or so patrol boats, give them some or 23 launch platforms.⁸⁰ Most ominously, the Iranians have successfully tested an air launched anti-ship cruise missile, the Chinese manufactured C-801K. These cruise missiles have a range of about 20 miles which gives the Iranians, in the words of a senior Department of Defense official, a “360 degree threat” since “an attack could now come from any direction.”⁸¹

The continued proliferation of WMDs and their delivery systems, especially to states with known ties to terrorist organizations, has created an impetus for collaborative

⁷⁷See Lesser, *Security in North Africa*; IISS, *The Military Balance, 1997-1998* (London: Oxford, 1998).

⁷⁸Krause, “The Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction,” 8.

⁷⁹U.S. Information Agency (USIA), “DOD Briefing on Iranian Cruise Missile Launch,” *U.S. Policy in the Middle East* (20 June 1997): 1-2.

⁸⁰The Iranians have 10 **Kaman** patrol boats and 10 **Hudong** patrol boats, in addition to their three frigates; IISS, *The Military Balance, 1996/97*, 132.

⁸¹USIA, “DOD Briefing,” 1.

defense planning and intelligence exchanges to counter such risks.⁸² The March 1995, nerve gas attack on a Tokyo subway has demonstrated the potential of terrorists using CWs, and the ongoing struggle of groups such as the IRA or the Basque separatist movement raise the possibility of terrorist groups using WMDs or the threat of WMDs to accomplish politico-military goals.⁸³ Within the United States, the recent arrest of two men for possession of anthrax in the United States further demonstrates the potential for terrorist use of chemical and biological weapons.⁸⁴

Of notable concern in the area of proliferation are so-called dual-use technologies-- materials and equipment that are sold for commercial purposes, but may have military applications. Dual-use technologies exist in all three areas of NBC weapons considerations. For instance, in the nuclear field, Russia continues to sell plutonium 238 as a power source for space programs, including satellites, despite evidence that the material can easily be converted for use in nuclear weapons.⁸⁵ The Iraqi purchase of the Osirak experimental reactor from France in 1976 was supposedly

⁸²Of those states that the United States designates as sponsors of international terrorism, Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan and Syria, four are in the Middle East or North Africa, and Sudan's proximity to and support of anti-government factions in Egypt necessitate its inclusion in discussions of terrorism in the region; U.S., Department of State, *Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1996* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1996), 1.

⁸³For an overview of proliferation issues affecting Europe, see Krause, 19. For the U.S. see Carus and Lowe.

⁸⁴The two who had ties to white supremacist organizations were reported trying to arrange an attack on an American city in a copycat attack of the Aum assault; William Claiborne, "Two Men Charged With Possessing Anthrax," *The Washington Post* (20 February 1998), A3.

⁸⁵Tariq Rauf, "Cleaning Up With a Bang," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* (January 1992): 9.

for commercial purposes, but it has since been discovered that the Iraqis used the reactor to produce HEU. Commercial nuclear reactors are especially troubling since even IAEA guidelines allow for a detectable “loss” of as much as 263 kilograms of plutonium per year (enough plutonium to make 33 large nuclear weapons a year).⁸⁶ Also, Iraq acquired most of the materials used to produce mustard gas which it used against Kurds from Germany and Switzerland, and Great Britain continued to sell Iraq “growth mediums,” ostensibly for use in growing hospital cultures, but also used to produce biological weapons, even after it was discovered that the amount of materials being sold to Iraq far exceeded the needs of Iraqi hospitals.⁸⁷

The proliferation of dual-use technologies is likely to only increase in the coming years. As competition in the defense industry continues to increase as markets decline, military producers are increasing the amount of material that they produce which can have civilian applications. While he was still Deputy Secretary of Defense, John Deutch estimated that by the turn of the century, 70 per cent of the products manufactured by

⁸⁶This “loss” results from the tendency for nuclear material to become “stuck” inside the reactor. While this stuck material can be measured, the technology used produces results that are inaccurate by as much as 30 per cent. In addition, the IAEA allows reactors up to a 5 per cent error margin in reporting quantities of fissile material; Paul Leventhal, “Safeguards Shortcomings--A Critique,” *NCI Brief* (Washington, D.C.: NCI, 1994), 3-4.

⁸⁷Paul Taylor, “Western Governments Draw Veil Over Aid to Saddam,” *Reuters* (19 February, 1998). The United States also aided Iraq in its efforts to develop biological weapons by selling the Iraqis fourteen different consignments of biological agents between 1985 and 1989, including nineteen batches of anthrax and fifteen batches of botulinum; “US Helped Iraq Develop Bio, Chemical Weapons,” *Reuters* (13 February 1998).

defense companies will have commercial or dual-use capabilities.⁸⁸ The only effective means of preventing the sale of potentially dangerous technologies and materials is through increased export controls. The European states have incorporated the broad concerns over WMD proliferation and export controls into a series of framework regimes which seek to establish and enforce international norms forbidding the development or transfer of WMDs. As a WEU report summarized:

The proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery means continues to constitute a threat to international and European peace and security. A European priority in this field has been to pursue universal participation in and compliance with, multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation conventions such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Biological Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) and, at the same time to continue to strengthen export control regimes such as the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the Zangger Committee, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and the Australia Group.⁸⁹

In general, the EU states have attempted to contain the proliferation of WMDs along two tracks. The first is through support of WMD control regimes, such as the NPT. The second has been close collaboration with the United States through existing security structures.

For Western Europe, the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime is the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM). EURATOM's non-proliferation functions are based on the principle that all fissile material within the EU is

⁸⁸John Deutch, "Transatlantic Armaments Cooperation: The United States' Point of View," *International Defense and Technology* (November 1994): 15.

⁸⁹WEU, Council of Ministers, *European Security: A Common Concept of the 27 WEU Countries* (Brussels: WEU, 1995), paragraph 36.

nominally owned by the EU.⁹⁰ EURATOM also acts as the agent for the EU for external nuclear negotiations and treaties. Finally EURATOM established the first multilateral nuclear inspection and verification system. EURATOM has access to all commercial nuclear sites within the EU, and has the power to levy fines and other sanctions, including the removal of nuclear material from a site.⁹¹ Article III, section 4 of the NPT calls for a partnership between the IAEA and EURATOM whereby EURATOM carries out most of the inspection and verification functions of the IAEA in Europe. The relationship between EURATOM and the IAEA proved especially significant in the negotiations on Spain's entry into the EU. While Spain was initially unwilling to accede to the NPT, because of the EURATOM–IAEA partnership, the EU was able to convince Spain to join the NPT regime.⁹²

The NPT itself has proven to be a major factor in the denuclearization of Europe. The United States and the EU provided financial incentives for the states of the FSU to join the NPT and relinquish their nuclear arsenals to Russia. The NPT works both to discourage states from seeking to acquire nuclear weapons and to control the supply of

⁹⁰EURATOM was able to successfully challenge the French practice of not notifying it of transborder purchases and sales of fissile material. The result was a “gentlemen’s agreement” whereby EURATOM does not assert its property rights over French fissile material in exchange for notification of all movements of fissile materials imported to or exported from EU members; Harald Muller, “European Nuclear Non-Proliferation After the NPT Extension: Achievements, Shortcomings and Needs,” in *Europe and the Challenge of Proliferation, Chaillot Papers*, no. 24, ed. Paul Cornish, Peter Van Ham, and Joachim Krause (Paris: Institute for Security Studies of the WEU, 1996), 34-35.

⁹¹*Ibid.*, 35-36.

⁹²See, Katlyn Saba, “Spain and the Non-Proliferation Treaty,” in *A Survey of European Nuclear Policy, 1985-1987*, ed. Harald A. Muller (London: Macmillan, 1989), 111-130.

fissile material in order to prevent proliferation. The main instrument of the NPT regime is of course the IAEA, but another organization, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) has worked to control and restrict the trade in fissile materials. While the NSG works to control the supply of nuclear materials and the IAEA works to ensure compliance with international norms and prevent proliferation, neither organization has the means to enforce compliance or to mete out punishment. Here the role and place of the United States becomes critical. As the world's primary power, only the United States has the capabilities to force compliance with the NPT or to enforce sanctions.⁹³ However, the inconsistency of American policy towards proliferation does act to weaken American credibility, as well as that of the NPT.⁹⁴

The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) is the first multilateral disarmament treaty that bans a whole category of WMDs. In 1993, some 130 nations attended the signing ceremony of the convention which required 65 nations to ratify it in order to go into effect.⁹⁵ Since that time, the number of nations that have signed the treaty has risen to 167. Despite some initial concerns over the means and place of disposal, as well as the confirmation details, 106 states have ratified the convention.⁹⁶ The CWC bans all

⁹³On this theme, see Michael Mandelbaum, "Lessons of the Next Nuclear War," *Foreign Affairs* 74, no. 2 (March/April 1995): 31-3.

⁹⁴For instance, compare American policies towards Israel and Pakistan and those towards Iran and Iraq.

⁹⁵"Ratification Round-Up," *The CBW Chronicle* (January 1996), 2.

⁹⁶After initial delays, China, India, Russia and the United States ratified the CWC in 1997. Despite some domestic opposition to the CWC, especially in Congress, it is important to note that the United States has actually been in the forefront of the effort to restrict CWs. In 1989 the United States and the former USSR signed a memorandum of understanding which opened each nation's CW stockpiles to inspections, and in 1990,

chemical weapons and provides significant verification procedures including on-site inspections. Signatories to the CWC have ten years to destroy their CW arsenals and close their production facilities.

Progress on the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) which was originally signed in 1972, has been far more problematic than the CWC.⁹⁷ For instance, at the 1994 special conference of the BWC, which was supposed to establish the guidelines for BWs verification guidelines, the delegates could only agree to establish another ad hoc group to design verification measures and to incorporate them into a legally binding framework.⁹⁸ Another area of contention over the BWC is Article X which states that parties to the convention “. . . undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the use of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins for peaceful purposes.”⁹⁹ Several developing nations, including China and India have used this article

the two nation's signed the *Bilateral Destruction Agreement* which called for an end to production of CWs and a reduction in existing weapons to no more than 5,000 tons by the year 2002. Russia, however, unilaterally withdrew from the Agreement in 1996, because of fiscal constraints which prevented the Russians from completing their commitments. It is estimated that the destruction of Russia's CWs program will cost between \$3.3 and 5 billion; WEU, Assembly of the WEU, *The State of Affairs in Disarmament (CFE, Nuclear Disarmament)*, WEU 1590 (Brussels: WEU, 1997).

⁹⁷This is in spite of the fact that 157 nations have signed the convention and 140 nations have ratified the convention.

⁹⁸The Verification Expert Group, VEREX, which was itself an ad hoc group, presented its findings to the conference, but there were concerns over inspections of research facilities which are not prohibited by the CWC or the BWC; IISS, *Military Balance, 1995/96*, 280.

⁹⁹Article X, section 1, *Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (The Biological Weapons Convention)* Geneva (10 April 1972).

to press for greater information exchanges between themselves and nations with developed BWs capabilities—something which is intensely opposed by the United States and the EU on the grounds that such exchanges might lead to greater proliferation.

While the BWC has been essentially stalled at the international level, in 1992, Great Britain, Russia and the United States undertook a separate agreement to curtail the production of BWs and begin reductions in current stocks, and to provide aid to Russia in its effort to dismantle its BWs facilities and stockpiles. In exchange for this aid, Russia pledged to allow inspections of existing BW facilities and to cease all offensive research and begin dismantling experimental and weapons testing facilities.¹⁰⁰

While the NPT, the CWC and the BWC, attempt to ban categories of weapons and prevent the future development of such systems, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) attempts to prevent the transfer of missile technology that could be used to deliver WMDs. Similar to the now defunct Cold War Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM), the MTCR is not based on any treaty or convention, but on nations' willingness to unilaterally control their exports of sensitive technology. The MTCR was originally formed in 1987 by the G-7 nations and has now expanded to 28 nations, including the sixteen members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) as well as Russia and China.¹⁰¹ The missiles included in the MTCR are those capable of carrying NBCs with a payload of at

¹⁰⁰Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, *Joint Statement on Biological Weapons by the Governments of the United Kingdom, the United States and the Russian Federation*, Moscow (11 September, 1992).

¹⁰¹Although a member of the MTCR, China has thus far not complied with the regime's norms, because of its sales of missiles and missile technology. Joachim Krause contends that China represents the "greatest challenge for the MTCR;" Krause, 11.

least 500 kilograms and a range of 300 kilometers. The MTCR also covers dual-use equipment that could be used for the direct development of missile systems or the development of guidance systems for these weapons. While Hungary is the only state in Central and Eastern Europe that belongs to the MTCR, all the associate partners of the WEU must abide by the guidelines of the regime. Hence, the potential for EU membership provides an incentive for states to at least comply with the MTCR.¹⁰²

In addition to the MTCR, the demise of COCOM led to the development of several other ad hoc international agreements designed to prevent the proliferation of WMDs through export controls on advanced or sensitive military technology. After COCOM disbanded in 1994, twenty-eight states, the seventeen COCOM states, the six COCOM cooperating states, the Visegrad nations and Russia reached an agreement known as the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual Use Goods and Technology.¹⁰³ The Wassenaar Arrangement covers two broad categories of exports, conventional weapons and dual-use technologies. It calls upon signatories to report conventional arms transfers on a biannual basis, and while it gives national governments discretion over what to export, it also requires that they provide information on sensitive exports and report any attempts to purchase sensitive

¹⁰²WEU, Council of Ministers, *European Security*, paragraph 52.

¹⁰³The 17 COCOM states were Australia, Japan, and the NATO members, with the exception of Iceland. The six COCOM cooperating nations were Austria, Finland, Ireland, New Zealand, Sweden and Switzerland. The Visegrad states include the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. After the Agreement was signed in 1994, Argentina, Romania and South Korea joined the regime, and in 1996, Bulgaria and Ukraine ascended.

technologies by other states.¹⁰⁴ Hence the Wassenaar Arrangement only increases the transparency of transfers, but lacks any real control mechanisms or enforcement capabilities.

In order to supplement the CWC and aid in the formation of a BWC regime, the Australia Group of nations has harmonized the various national restrictions on exports of materials and technologies that can be used in chemical or biological weapons. The Group has produced a list of fifty-four chemical agents and more than fifty biological agents whose export is banned. The Group also provides a warning list of items that have commercial applications, but can be used in the production of BC weapons.¹⁰⁵ While many individual EU memberstates belong to the various control regimes, the EU itself has also moved to adopt controls on the export of sensitive materials. In 1994, the EU adopted two measures designed to coordinate export controls among its member states. The first measure removes individual differences on intra-community trade within the EU, and the second measure establishes mechanisms to control the export of dual-use technologies. The EU also has developed a list of controlled dual-use technologies and materials which compliments that of the Australia Group and the MTCR.

NATO has also undertaken steps to address proliferation issues. For example, at the Brussels summit, Allied leaders agreed to increase efforts aimed at stopping the proliferation of WMDs. Subsequently, two groups were established to deal with the

¹⁰⁴IISS, *The Military Balance, 1996/97*, 288-89.

¹⁰⁵Australia Group, *Australia Group Export Controls on Materials Used in the Manufacture of Chemical and Biological Weapons, Control List of Dual-Use Chemicals: Commercial and Military Application* (7 November, 1996).

issues of WMDs—one to deal with the political aspects of proliferation, the other to confront the military considerations of WMDs.¹⁰⁶ To address the proliferation of WMDs, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) established the Senior Politico-Military Group on Proliferation (SGP) to study the political dimensions of WMDs and the Senior Defense Group on Proliferation (DGP) to deal with military issues involving defense against WMDs. These groups are overseen by the Joint Committee on Proliferation which reports directly to the NAC.¹⁰⁷ While the SGP has worked on issues such as the extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and consultations with Russia through NACC and the "16+1" meetings, the DGP embarked on a two-year study to redefine Alliance defense strategies against WMDs. The SGP meetings with Russia were soon broadened through the development of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program, while the NACC was superseded by the creation of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) in 1997.¹⁰⁸ One of the tasks of the EAPC was to increase consultations on arms control and the proliferation of WMDs.¹⁰⁹ Meanwhile, NATO's Council of Ministers agreed to establish "permanent mechanisms for political consultations" between NATO and Russia to address issues such as proliferation.¹¹⁰ The SGP has continued to focus on

¹⁰⁶These groups were established at the NATO Ministerial in Istanbul in June of 1994.

¹⁰⁷Gregory L. Schulte, "Responding to Proliferation: NATO's Role," *NATO Review* 43, no. 4 (July 1995): 15.

¹⁰⁸On the creation of the EAPC see, NATO, "The Transformation of NATO's Defence Posture," *NATO Fact Sheet*, no. 22 (July 1997).

¹⁰⁹NATO, "Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council."

¹¹⁰The contemporary American Secretary of Defense, William J. Perry, called for Russia to open permanent liaison offices at NATO headquarters in Brussels and at the Alliance's strategic commands. In exchange, NATO would establish reciprocal liaisons

political issues and has “underscored the importance of creating a climate of confidence and security that contributes to alleviating regional tensions and reducing possible incentives for would-be proliferants to acquire WMDs. Important consultations are held with Partner countries, including Russia and Ukraine in a 16+1 format, with the aim of fostering a common understanding of and approach to the proliferation problem.”¹¹¹

While the SGP has concentrated on political initiatives, the DGP developed specific recommendations to improve the Alliance’s defensive capabilities against WMDs. These recommendations were subsequently adopted at the 1996 Brussels Summit. The DGP also presented three broad policy recommendations to the Alliance’s political leadership. First the DGP called for the maintenance of “robust” military capabilities to devalue WMDs by “raising the costs of acquiring or using them.”¹¹² Second, the DGP asserted the need to develop a mix of defensive capabilities, including intelligence and surveillance resources. Third, and finally, the DGP, called for the deployment of six core capabilities.¹¹³

Some states have attempted to develop their own WMD defensive capabilities. For instance, the British MOD has proposed the establishment of a joint Army/Royal Air

with the Russian General Staff; William J. Perry, Speech, Moscow (17 October 1996); IISS, *Military Balance, 1996/97*, 35.

¹¹¹NATO, “NATO’s Response to Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction,” *NATO Basic Fact Sheet*, no. 8 (April 1997): 2.

¹¹²*Ibid.*, 3.

¹¹³These capabilities include: “strategic and operational intelligence; automated and deployable command, control and communications; wide area ground surveillance; stand-off/point biological and chemical agent detection, identification and warning; extended air defences, including tactical ballistic missile defence for deployed forces; individual protective equipment for deployed forces,”; *ibid.*

Force defense unit to provide operational capability against WMD. The purpose of such a unit would be to provide rapid capabilities for deployed units. In addition, France has entered into an agreement with Italy to develop a ground-launched air defense missile system, known as the SAMP/T, Aster Missile.¹¹⁴ In the meanwhile, the gradual French re-integration into Alliance moved forward as France returned to some of the NATO structures it left in 1966. After the Brussels Summit, France agreed to participate in the DGP and it was decided that France would serve as the first European co-chair of that Group.¹¹⁵ In 1995, France announced that it would return to the North Atlantic Military Committee and begin attending meetings of the Defense Planning Committee. The rewards of re-integration were apparent at the June 1996, Berlin Summit where France was able to gain concessions from the United States which allowed European states to have "political control and strategic direction" of CJTF missions that the European states control.¹¹⁶ By the Brussels Summit, there was a recognized convergence of interests around the future of European Security. NATO would remain the cornerstone of the continent's security architecture, but it would be a vastly different NATO than the Cold

¹¹⁴Jan Dirk Blauuw, "WEU's Views on Theatre Missile Defence," speech, Eilat (12 June 1997).

¹¹⁵Robert Joseph, "Proliferation, Counter-Proliferation and NATO," *Survival* 38, no. 1 (Spring 1996): 120.

¹¹⁶Bruce Clark, "Europe Secures Greater Role in NATO Operations," *Financial Times* (4 June 1996), p. 1. In addition, at the Berlin Summit it was decided to reduce the number of standing NATO headquarter elements and establish mobile headquarters that would form the nuclei of future CJTF missions; Bruce Clark, "NATO Seeks to Bridge Ambiguity Gap," *Financial Times* (6 June 1996), 2.

War alliance. At the June 1996 summit, the Alliance endorsed the DGP's findings on WMDs.¹¹⁷

Concurrent with NATO's activities, there has been a multilateral effort to develop a missile defense system for Europe. Such a system, although developed by individual nations or through joint procurement, could provide the foundation for NATO's core ground to air anti-missile system. While outside of the auspices of NATO, the Medium Extended Air Defence System (MEADS) was a transatlantic effort between the United States, France, Germany and Italy to replace the Patriot and Hawk missile systems with a mobile anti-missile system capable of intercepting ballistic missiles with nuclear, biological or chemical warheads. This effort followed calls by the WEU for transatlantic cooperation in missile defense systems.¹¹⁸ However, in 1996, France withdrew from participation in the MEADS project in order to develop its own aforementioned capability.¹¹⁹ Although there has been some progress made in the

¹¹⁷The DGP produced a risk assessment which stressed the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons on the periphery of Europe and the importance of monitoring states that were developing WMDs. The DGP also defined the Alliance's main policy guidelines in defense against WMDs, including conflict control and prevention, and the establishment of a "mix" of capabilities to deter would-be aggressors. Finally, the DGP identified the military needs of the Alliance with a focus on intelligence and extended air defenses. To carry-out these findings, the DGP developed thirty-nine Action Plans to implement its recommendations; Ashton B. Carter and David B. Omand, "Countering the Proliferation Risks: Adapting the Alliance to the New Security Environment," *NATO Review* 44, no. 5 (September 1996): 10-15; Joseph, 121-29.

¹¹⁸See, for example, the report by the WEU, *Transatlantic Cooperation on European Anti-Missile Defence, Part I*, WEU 1435 (9 November 1994).

¹¹⁹The primary reason behind the French withdrawal was budgetary restrictions; Blaauw.

development of the Franco-Italian SAMP/T initiative, it is clear that any substantial progress in theater wide missile defense systems necessitates U.S. involvement.

American participation in the WMD defense systems is necessary because of the tremendous advantages enjoyed in terms of both spending on R & D and in technological advances.¹²⁰ The U.S. leads the world in both kinetic and energy weapons and in both exoatmospheric and endoatmospheric programs.¹²¹ In addition, the US is able to bring an immense amount of fiscal resources to such projects. For instance, in the MEADS program, the US pays for some 60 percent of the cost of the initiative, while Germany contributes 25 percent and Italy 15 percent.¹²²

The technological advantages held by the U.S., when combined with the nation's immense fiscal resources, have allowed it to take a leadership role in the development of anti-WMD defenses. With the exception of France and in spite of the rhetoric calling for the development of autonomous capabilities, the European states seem willing to allow the US to continue that role. Even the foremost proponent of ESDI, France, has been forced to severely curtail expenditures on R & D which ensures US dominance in fields such as anti-ballistic missile defense. Meanwhile, because of US participation in NATO, the Europeans can assure themselves of access to American technology through the Alliance's integrated military commands. For instance, Europe's main airborne early

¹²⁰Eliot Cohen argues that, in fact, the United States is leading the "revolution" in modern warfare; see Eliot A. Cohen, "A Revolution in Warfare," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 75, no. 2 (March 1996): 37-54; see also, "Defense Technology," *The Economist* (10 June, 1995). This technological lead is bolstered by American leads in resources.

¹²¹WEU, *Transatlantic Cooperation on European Anti-Missile Defence, Part II*, WEU 1435 (9 November 1994).

¹²²*Ibid.*

warning system is the Alliance's NATO Airborne Early Warning Force (NAEWF). NAEWF is commonly funded and made up of multilateral elements, including British and US forces and is based in the United Kingdom and Germany.¹²³ For the foreseeable future, the Europeans will continue to rely on the US to provide the bulk of both the forces and the equipment to counter WMDs. Finally, in the end, the U.S. nuclear potential continues to be one of the West's main deterrents, especially in light of reports that show U.S. military doctrine allows for the use of nuclear strikes against "non-state actors" that engage in terrorism using WMDs.¹²⁴

The complexity and diversity of the issues raised by the proliferation of WMDs, necessitate joint and collaborative measures to counter the risks posed by these weapons. The plethora of regimes that has emerged over the past decades, provides the foundation for nations to collectively work to prevent the spread of both WMDs and the materials and technology used to create them. By establishing regimes which commit all memberstates to either eliminate their WMDs or pledge not to acquire them, measures such as the CWC or the BWC provide the most effective means by which to ameliorate the security dilemma which would otherwise prompt states to seek to procure these weapons as the ultimate guarantees of national security. Instead, most nations are willing to comply with international norms precluding the development of WMDs in

¹²³NAEWF is made up of 18 E-3A aircraft and 7 E-3D aircraft. The forces "provide both air surveillance and early warning capability which greatly enhances effective command and control of NATO forces by enabling data to be transmitted directly from Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACs) aircraft to command and control centers on land, sea or in the air;" NATO, *NATO Handbook*, 173-74.

¹²⁴Bryan Bender, "Terrorists Using WMD Could Face US Nuclear Attack," *Jane's Defense Weekly* (2 September 1998): 10.

exchange for the regime assuming responsibility for both monitoring and sanctioning those states outside of the regime or those states that defect from the regime.

Furthermore, export regimes can limit the ability of those states outside of the regime to acquire the technologies and materials needed to develop WMDs. Export regimes also increase the transparency of the international system so that the international community can monitor those states that are suspected to be transgressing against international norms.

Nonetheless, the overall effectiveness of the various WMDs regimes continues to rest on the willingness of primary powers to take the lead in non-proliferation efforts and to use their resources to aid these endeavors. As aforementioned, the United States was the most significant force in convincing the states of the FSU to return their nuclear weapons to Russia. The United States has also been the largest contributor to Russia in its efforts to destroy its chemical and biological facilities and weapon stockpiles. The United States has also assumed an enforcement role. American actions to force Iraqi compliance with UN mandates to destroy that nation's WMDs capabilities are but one example of this. Hence the United States has played a pivotal role by both rewarding states, through financial assistance or other aid, for compliance with WMDs norms and by selectively punishing states that violate those norms.

Efforts to develop a nuclear free zone in the Mediterranean or to more fully develop the BWC require a primary or hegemonal power to set and enforce the rules and norms of such a regime. Only a powerful entity can set the rules and enforce the norms of a non-proliferation regime. In Europe, that hegemonal power is increasingly expressed in the institutional framework of the West. Individual nations are willing to

relinquish aspects of national sovereignty to institutions and regimes in exchange for access to the increased levels of public goods, such as security. In addition, through participation in these organizations, national governments are able to avoid action on contentious issues, such as immigration, by making them the domain of the institution or regime. For these reasons, specific institutions have been granted hegemonal power by their memberstates. National governments turn to the EU or NATO to manage issues that otherwise would overwhelm the capabilities of the individual state, and in doing so, abdicate a portion of those powers that have been traditionally reserved only for the nationstate.

CHAPTER VIII
SECURITY INTEGRATION AND THE MEMBER STATE

One of the more enduring features of international relations has been the development of balance of power systems. Throughout history various actors, whether city-states or nation-states, have banded together to prevent hegemony. In fact the most identifiable aspect of the European state system in the nineteenth century was the complex balance of power that maintained peace between the major powers for a century. During the Cold War, a rough balance of power system developed between the West and the Soviet bloc. One of the most significant features of this system was the stability that it engendered, for this period of equilibrium allowed the development of the institutional framework that has come to characterize the West. The American economic and military hegemony of the immediate post-War years compelled the European states to adopt policies that reflected American preferences for integration and collaborative engagement.¹ While integration and the subsequent economic interdependence occasioned by institutions such as the EU have eroded aspects of individual state sovereignty, especially in areas of national economic policy, they have also enhanced the nationstate's to the greater public goods provided by the global economy and increased the security of individual states.² Hence, the balance of power system of the bipolar era and of American primacy in the Western bloc combined to establish a framework which encouraged and supported the general patterns of

¹On this theme see Ruggie, "Third Try," 553-70.

²See Keohane and Nye, *Power and Interdependence*, especially pages 245-57.

cooperation on security issues in Western Europe that led to the dramatic growth and proliferation of institutions and regimes.

One problem faced when dealing with the concept of balance of power systems is to precisely define what the term balance of power. For instance, balance of power can mean the specific, historical European system that held sway during the late eighteenth century or it can denote the distribution of power in the international system (is the world bi-polar, tri-polar, multi-polar, and so forth) in any given period. However, as Michael Doyle points out, most scholars agree that “the single most frequent definition of the balance of power portrays it as the system of interaction among states that assures the survival of independent states by preventing the empire or hegemony of any state or coalition of states.”³ Thus, the key functions of a balance of power are: 1) the prevention of hegemony; 2) the establishment of cooperation through the “interaction” that occurs as states strive to prevent hegemony; and 3) the “survival” of the states within the system.⁴ These functions mirror the goals of the United States in the post-War period, as the nation worked to prevent the emergence of hegemony on the European continent by either the Soviet Union or a resurgent Germany by ensuring the survival of individual states and enhancing the capabilities of those states through cooperation and integration.

The central tenant of balance of power theory holds that arrangements of states, known as balances, will naturally occur as states strive for power and attempt to either

³Doyle, 134.

⁴Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 106.

maintain the status quo or overthrow it.⁵ Those who apply balance of power theory to the Cold War era, assert that the states of Western Europe joined together with the United States in an attempt to “balance” against the Soviet Union in order to prevent Soviet hegemony on the European continent.⁶ While balance of power theory goes far in explaining such factors as cooperation between nations in an otherwise anarchical world, and it does have predictive value, balance of power theory fails to adequately address several factors such as the difference between "equilibrium" and balance of power.⁷

Balance of power theory is a subtheory of realism and incorporates all of the principal elements of realism. To begin with, realism stresses that states are the principal actors in international relations. Realism downplays the importance of non-state actors. Realism also emphasizes that states seek power as end goal and as a means to accomplish that goal. The third major tenant of realism is that the state is a rational actor. It has ordered sets of preferences, and it engages in cost-benefit analysis in order to meet those preferences. Lastly, realism sees world politics as a cyclical struggle for power, with national security as the top priority in the hierarchy of international issues.⁸ Besides these basic realist components, neorealism also adds the importance of anarchy to balance of power theory. The presence of anarchy, which holds that there is no

⁵Greg Russell, *Hans J. Morgenthau and the Ethics of American Statecraft* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University, 1990), 122.

⁶See Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, 232.

⁷Equilibrium refers to the preference states have for the status quo; Robert O. Keohane, "Realism, Neorealism and the Study of World Politics," in *Neorealism*, ed. Keohane, 13.

⁸Viotti and Kauppi, 5-7.

effective government beyond the state level, means that balances become the principal means through which states maintain the status quo, and, thus, their independence.⁹

In addition to the realist underpinnings, four basic assumptions underlie any balance of power system. First, that there exist a number of actors that possess roughly equivalent power. Of course, there must be at least two actors for the system to develop. Second, all actors must at the very least promote their own survival, and most probably seek to enhance their status. Third, actors need to possess the ability to form shifting alliances. In other words, they cannot be too tightly constrained by factors such as ideology. Finally, war is accepted as a legitimate means to ensure the maintenance of the system. That is not to say that war is seen as a "good" thing, but that it be seen as a sometimes "necessary" part of statecraft.¹⁰

As a subset of realism, balance of power theory concentrates on states as the primary actors. In addition, power is the driving force behind both concepts, while the neorealist notion of anarchy provides the stage for balance of power theory. Within a hierarchical world government, there would be little reason for balance of power systems to emerge.

In order for a balance of power system to have this fluidity within alliances, it is critically important that factors such as ideology or nationalism do not form major impediments to shifts in alliances. In the nineteenth-century, this presented no problem.

⁹Kenneth Waltz, "Anarchic Orders and the Balance of Power," in *Neorealism*, ed. Keohane, 117.

¹⁰Robert Jervis, "From Balance to Concert: A Study of International Security Cooperation," in *Cooperation Under Anarchy*, ed. Oye, 60.

There was a "relative homogeneity" among the main actors.¹¹ This was expressed in a common core of norms among the diplomatic corps of the principal powers that maintained the system. There was also a similarity in governments themselves. The autocratic nature of the regimes allowed the leaders to exercise relatively unrestrained control in ally selection.

Critics argue that such homogeneity is lacking today. That states often have far differing ideologies which lessen the ability of states to shift alliances. However, realists assert that as long as a state rationally "sees" it in its best interest to shift alliances, it will. A modern example of this behavior would be America's willingness to cross ideological lines and attempt to form an anti-Soviet alliance with China.¹²

There is a debate among proponents of balance of power theory over the cause of alliance shifts. Some, such as Kenneth Waltz, see the system as providing an "invisible hand" that regulates the system—"the system restrains the actors rather than the actors being self-restrained."¹³ On the other hand, scholars such as Morton Kaplan or Henry Kissinger, see states taking actions to preserve the system itself. In other words, Kaplan and others like him contend that there are times when states put the balance of power above their own self-interest.¹⁴ They propose that balances are usually the creations of statesmen, who create and operate these systems for their own advantages (a theme

¹¹Gulick, 19-23.

¹²Stephen Walt asserts that Henry Kissinger championed the opening of relations with China as an act of balancing, since in a "triangular relationship, it was better to align with the weaker side;" Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, 211.

¹³Robert Jervis, "Security Regimes," 185.

¹⁴Ibid.

known as volunteerism).¹⁵ This approach certainly applies to the classical European balance of power, but it runs counter to realism¹⁶. Under realism, states may make sacrifices on matters of self-interest if they perceive the potential for a greater pay-off in the long run, however they certainly would not sacrifice or neglect national interests over a long period of time. Volunteerism seems to be an attempt to take the tenants of the classical balance of power and apply them too broadly. After all, other aspects of the classical system such as reciprocal compensation are hardly seen as playing an important role in the broad spectrum of international balances.

In addition to forming and shifting alliances and coalitions, the second major instrument in preventing hegemony under the balance of power system is war. War is seen as a necessary means to accomplish certain objectives. This leads to a whole host of criticisms over the role that balances play in starting conflicts. Balance systems do often feature minor conflicts that help preserve the balance of the system, but the purpose of the system is to preserve the independence of the states and prevent hegemony--not to prevent conflict. At least in the foreseeable future, war appears to be an inevitable aspect of international relations (Hedley Bull asserts that it is even an "institutionalized . . . built-in feature of our arrangements),¹⁷ and balance systems actually seem to, at the very least, delay major wars. In sum, it is probably more realistic

¹⁵Viotti and Kauppi, 51.

¹⁶Gulick, 67-9.

¹⁷Bull, "The State's Positive Role in World Affairs," 64.

to blame warfare on humanity in general rather than on institutions or regimes that are created by mankind.¹⁸

The second major function of the balance of power system is to generate cooperation as a result of the efforts of states to prevent hegemony. By establishing order and a structured system for international politics, balance of power systems foster the growth of international institutions. International law itself cannot function in complete anarchy, but the balance system provides some degree of stability in which international law can manifest itself.¹⁹ Especially since a balance system preserves the key states within the international arena, it, by its very nature, promotes cooperation between states.²⁰ Furthermore, the formation of alliances tends to increase cooperation between states. Robert Jervis asserts that "common goals give each state a stake in the well-being of others."²¹ Jervis contends that present cooperation leads to future cooperation. In addition, the very alliances that form within the system tend to decrease the vulnerability of individual states which, in turn, lessens the potentially negative effects of the security dilemma.

While this emphasis on cooperation seems contradictory since war is a key feature of the system, historical evidence demonstrates that the balances that form after

¹⁸On this theme, see Robert Holt, Brian Job and Lawrence Markus, "Catastrophe Theory and the Study of War," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 22, no. 2 (June 1978): 172.

¹⁹Ian Harris, "Order and Justice in the 'Anarchical Society'," *International Affairs* 69, no. 4 (October 1993): 730; and Terry Nardin, "International Ethics and International Law," *Review of International Studies* 18, no. 1 (January 1992): 28.

²⁰Bull, "Society," 106-8.

²¹Jervis, "Balance," 67.

major hegemonic wars are capable of providing long periods of relative peace. This was certainly true after the Napoleonic Wars and after World War II. An even more obscure case would be the peace that resulted from the balance that developed in South America after the War of the Pacific (1879-1883).²² The point is not that balances always promote peace, but that they have the capability to do so.

The third major function of a balance of power system is to preserve the independence of the states within the system.²³ Simply put, the system should operate in such a manner that even minor states are guaranteed their continued existence.²⁴ This promotes confidence in the system, and more importantly, may provide a greater degree of stability since the greater number of actors there are in the system, the greater the ability to shift alliances and form counter balances against potential hegemons. A multipolar balance of power system does not find itself locked into two rigid, opposing blocs that might go to war over minor incidents (such as was the case in the First World War).²⁵ In addition, the greater number of actors involved in a multipolar system increases the uncertainty of the system, thereby increasing each individual actors' caution.²⁶

²²Robert N. Burr, *By Reason or Force: Chile and the Balancing of Power in South America, 1830-1905* (Berkeley: University of California, 1974), 262-3.

²³Thomas J. Christiansen and Jack Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity," *International Organization* 45, no. 3 (Spring 1990): 145.

²⁴Doyle, 136.

²⁵Gaddis, "International Relations Theory," 23.

²⁶Howard, 412-13.

That multipolar balances are more stable than bipolar systems is a matter of significant contention among scholars. Many, such as Kenneth Waltz assert that multipolar systems are themselves more unstable and while bipolarity offers a greater degree of equilibrium and stability. Waltz contends that more actors increase uncertainty, since under the security dilemma, states assume the worst case scenario.²⁷ In addition, Waltz argues that the simplicity of a bipolar system, in terms of the number of principle actors involved, eases negotiations and increases the likelihood of cooperation, since conflicts become easier to avoid.²⁸

Bruce Bueno de Mesquita rejects the contention that multipolar systems increase uncertainty. He ties a systems uncertainty to its relative change over time. If there is continuity in the system and states are able to form lasting relationships with other states, then the degree of uncertainty is lessened whether the system is bipolar or multipolar.²⁹ Hence the bipolar system that evolved after World War II was stable, not necessarily because it was bipolar, but because there was little change among the states within the system.³⁰ This was especially true in Europe where American primacy was reflected by the policies adopted by those states which joined with the United States to balance against the Soviet Union. By adopting principles which encouraged collaboration, the European states initiated a period of unparalleled interstate cooperation that in turn

²⁷Waltz, "Stability of a Bipolar World," 890.

²⁸Ibid., Waltz, "The Emerging Structure," 45-7.

²⁹Bueno de Mesquita, "Systemic Polarization," 247.

³⁰The presence of nuclear weapons was also a major factor in preventing system wide wars; Waltz, "Structure of International Politics," 44.

altered the very nature of the nationstate as national governments became increasingly willing to merge aspects of sovereignty within the framework of international institutions and regimes—institutions and regimes which reflected American preferences.

During the late 1940s and through the 1950s, the United States dominated both the economic and military arenas of the globe. The United States held a clear preponderance of military force through its nuclear arsenal and the nation accounted for over half of the world's economic output.³¹ The traditional world powers of Europe were exhausted economically and militarily by the Second World War and by their ongoing colonial disengagements. This predominance of power and the initial lack of a clear hegemonal rival, gave the administration of President Harry S. Truman the opportunity to attempt to construct a new world order that would reflect and embody American preferences. Hence, the Bretton Woods regime, with its twin institutions, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) was created to promote free and open trade and overall world economic progress. Politically, the United States attempted to develop institutions, such as the UN, that would promote world peace through collective action. The Truman administration also attempted to develop collective structures to address security concerns.

The onset of the Berlin blockade gave impetus to the preliminary negotiations that began in July of 1948 over the Washington Treaty which established the North

³¹With only 6 per cent of the world's population, the Gross National Product (GNP) of the United States in 1945 was \$355.2 billion, or half the world's total economic output. The United States led the world in agricultural production, industrial production; and controlled some 59 per cent of the world's proven oil reserves; U.S., Department of Commerce, *Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1970* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1975), 228, 464.

Atlantic Treaty Organization. Concurrent with these negotiations, American military observers and planners began close cooperation with the Western European states in the development of long-range military plans.³² The signing of the Washington Treaty on April 4, 1949 confirmed American participation in European security, although the degree of commitment was unclear.³³ At the first meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington on September 17, 1949, the representatives established the basic structure of NATO, with a Defense Committee, Military Committee and Military Standing Group, in addition to five regional planning groups. As evidence of the centrality of American involvement, the United States was placed in each of the five regional groups.³⁴

By the end of 1949, the United States and Western Europe had accomplished several significant feats. Because of American security guarantees and economic aid, Western Europe had begun the process of political, economic and social recovery necessary after World War II. In addition, a firm military relationship had been established between the Americans and the West Europeans. The first tentative steps had been taken towards West European integration. Even so, however, there were still

³²Bernard Law Montgomery, *The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery* (New York: World Publishing, 1958), 455.

³³Under Article 5 of the Treaty, the memberstates agreed the “. . . an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area;” NATO, “Article 5,” *The North Atlantic Treaty*, Washington, D.C., 4 April, 1949. Hence, while the Treaty does pledge the United States to the defense of its NATO partners, it does not specify an American military presence in Europe.

³⁴NATO, NAC, “Final Communique,” (17 September, 1949), 6.

vital questions to be addressed in regards to West European security and the two most prominent issues to be resolved revolved around the exact nature and timetable of the American military presence in Europe and the contentious matter of Germany's place and role in continental security.

In response to its European allies' economic difficulties, the United States initiated a series of programs, ranging from the Marshall Plan to Mutual Defense Assistance Act, designed to stabilize these nations and bolster their capabilities. 1950 alone, the United States through the Mutual Defense Assistance Act 1949, gave the West European Allies some \$1 billion in military aid. By June of that year, some 134,000 tons of military equipment, including small arms, artillery and combat vehicles had been supplied to Alliance partners.³⁵ The advent of the Korean War in 1950 caused the Truman administration to even further emphasize the need for an increased conventional force in Europe as a counter to the Soviet bloc.³⁶ For despite the ongoing Korean conflict, the administration continued to accentuate a "Europe-first" policy.³⁷

For the Europeans, there were anxieties over the true extent of America's military commitment to the continent. This was especially significant at a time when there existed a perception that NATO conventional forces could not stand against Soviet forces. French forces, which would have to serve as the backbone of NATO's troop

³⁵U.S., Department of Defense, *Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Defense*, 1950 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1950), 2.

³⁶Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs: Years of Trial and Hope* (New York: Doubleday, 1956), 380.

³⁷*Ibid.*, 397-98.

strength in Germany, were seen as being wholly unprepared for that task.³⁸ Meanwhile Great Britain seemed bent on maintaining its traditional aloofness from continental affairs. After having donated military equipment that ranged from fighter jets to small arms to its Alliance partners, Great Britain increasingly pushed for limits on new defense outlays and was successful in ensuring that the principle of economic recovery was to have priority in the negotiations that surrounded the Mutual Defense Assistance Act whereby the United States agreed to provide military supplies to the Alliance.³⁹

In addition, the other major West European powers were also under a number of economic constraints that seemed to bode ill for their future military preparedness. Europe continued to see a significant deterioration in its terms of trade caused by inflationary pressures at the same time that it was presented with sharp reductions in American financial assistance. Furthermore, the costs of empire, especially for the British and French continued to drain national resources.⁴⁰ In 1951, both Great Britain and France were forced to reduce long range military procurement programs.⁴¹

³⁸Irwin M. Wall, *The United States and the Making of Postwar France, 1945-1954* (New York: Cambridge, 1991), 195.

³⁹U.S., Department of State, "Mutual Defense Assistance Act," *Department of State Bulletin*, no. 22 (6 February, 1950), 198-211.

⁴⁰For example, by 1951, the war in Indochina was estimated to cost Paris some \$1 billion a year; U.S., Department of State, *Department of State Bulletin*, no. 25 (8 October 1951), 570.

⁴¹In Great Britain, economic woes led to the fall of the Labour government and the election of Winston Churchill and the Tories in October of 1951. By December, Churchill was forced to concede that the government's three year armament program could not be completed on time; *Hansard's Parliamentary Debates: House of Commons* (6 December 1951), 2611-2613.

The Eisenhower Administration continued to be concerned over the Soviet build-up in Europe. By 1953, the Soviets had strengthened their conventional forces in Europe from 1,000,000 troops in 65 divisions in 1952 to 1,300,000 troops in 70 divisions. Overall, the Soviets had some 20,000 frontline aircraft and a total of 175 divisions.⁴² Most ominously, the Soviets had begun to build the nucleus of an East German Army by converting police and paramilitary units into a formal military structure which numbered some 100,000. The Soviets also initiated the formation of an East German air force and navy.⁴³ These actions added weight to the calls for West German rearmament as a countermeasure against Soviet actions in their zone.

For the United States a recurring theme in its relations with Europe since the end of World War II has been the periodic American reassessments of its contributions to European security. Usually prompted by domestic concerns that range from a general and longstanding isolationist bend among the American public to broader concerns over the fiscal costs of the American security presence in Europe, the debate over burdensharing among the Atlantic Alliance has, in fact, waxed and waned since the immediate post-World War II era. Under the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, in exchange for American military equipment, there was supposed to be a loose division of labor within the Alliance. The United States would be in charge of strategic and most tactical bombing, as well as the majority of naval operations, and would provide limited

⁴²U.S., State Department, "The New Framework for the Mutual Security Program: Report to Congress on the Mutual Security Program, August 17, 1953," *Report to Congress on the Mutual Security Program for the Six Months Ended June 30, 1953* (Washington, D.C.: Foreign Operations Administration, 1953).

⁴³NATO, SACEUR, *Annual Report of the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, 1953* (30 May, 1953), 36.

ground forces. But the Europeans were to supply the bulk of the conventional, ground forces and Great Britain and France were specifically charged with supplying the majority of the "short-range attack bombardment, and air defense."⁴⁴

With the beginning of the Korean War, the United States was particularly interested in drawing the defense line of Europe as far to the east as possible and reinforcing the American troop presence in the region in order to reemphasize American priorities in the face of the Asian conflict, while at the same time seeing a greater European stake in defense of the Continent to forestall Soviet aggression should the USSR perceive an opportunity for action.⁴⁵ As early as 1950, at the North Atlantic Council Meeting in New York, the NATO foreign ministers had endorsed the concept of an "integrated military force adequate for the defense of freedom in Europe."⁴⁶ At the same time, the conflict in Korea cast doubts upon the ability of the United States to deter Soviet aggression merely by its atomic strike ability. Truman noted that "the attack upon Korea makes it plain beyond all doubt that communism has passed beyond the use of subversion to conquer independent nations and will now use armed invasion and war."⁴⁷ American military planners began to consider the possibility that the Soviets might launch a conventional attack in Europe, if the Soviets perceived they could overrun

⁴⁴U.S., House Foreign Relations Committee, "Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949," Hearings on H.R. 5748 and H.R. 5895, 81st Congress (Washington: GPO, 1949), 71, 82.

⁴⁵Furdson, 114-15.

⁴⁶NATO, NAC, "Final Communique" (September 18, 1950).

⁴⁷Harry S. Truman, "Statement on June 27, 1950," *U.S. Department of State Bulletin*, no. 22 (July 3, 1950), 5.

NATO's minuscule conventional forces. As a result, the Truman administration began prodding its European Allies to increase their defensive capabilities. The North Atlantic Council (NAC) had already established a Defense Financial and Economic Committee and a Military Production and Supply Board to coordinate military production and cooperation.⁴⁸ At the May, 1950 London meeting, with American prompting, the NAC ministers "... urged their governments to concentrate on the creation of balanced collective forces in the progressive build-up of the defense of the North Atlantic area, taking at the same time fully into consideration the requirements for national forces which arise out of commitments external to the North Atlantic area."⁴⁹ This statement embodied both the American emphasis on the need for more substantial European resources in defense of the continent and the desire of the colonial powers to maintain a balance between European defense and preservation of their empires.

The Truman administration set 1952 as the year of "maximum danger"—the date at which Soviet nuclear capabilities would converge with their already substantial conventional forces to such a degree as to overwhelm Western Europe's defenses.⁵⁰ In

⁴⁸Among other tasks the Military Production and Supply Board was to "... work in close coordination with military bodies on the promotion of standardization of parts and end products of military equipment, and provide them with technical advice on the production and development of new or improved weapons." The Board thus became the body primarily responsible for standardization between the NATO allies; NAC, "Final Communique," Washington Conference, (18 November, 1949), 3.

⁴⁹NATO, NAC, "Final Communique," London Conference, (18 May, 1950), 2.

⁵⁰The year 1952 was initially set as the Joint Chiefs of Staff's (JCOS) target date, while NSC 68 set the date as 1954, but for planning purposes, the JCOS continued to use 1952 as the date at which the Soviet threat would be the greatest, U.S., Senate Committee on Appropriations, *Hearings, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1953* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1953), 332-35, 385.

response, the United States embarked on an ambitious military build-up and shifted the focus of American aid to Western Europe from economic assistance to military aid.⁵¹ The administration was willing to increase the number of American troops stationed in Europe, but only if there was a corresponding increase in the Allies contributions to Continental defense. By 1952, American military planners had shifted strategy in a number of areas to reflect a more confrontational approach to the Soviet Union. For instance, in that summer, American planners reversed themselves and adopted the notion that an attack on Berlin would lead to a general war. The United States took the pragmatic approach that emphasized the need for the Federal Republic to be included in the development of a European security system in order to forestall any German movements to unilaterally rearm. Even though West Germany remained outside of NATO, the United States and the West Europeans had incorporated West Germany into the so-called defensive framework of the Alliance in 1950 by pledging to "treat any attack against the Federal Republic or Berlin from any quarter as an attack upon themselves."⁵² The United States proposed at meetings of the North Atlantic Council in September of 1950 that Germany be allowed to raise ten divisions which would be under the direct auspices of NATO. In his first annual report as the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, Eisenhower concluded that ". . . even with the maximum potential

⁵¹For instance, in 1951 France was awarded some \$600 million in economic assistance, but half of that came from funds designated under the Mutual Security Act. Meanwhile Great Britain was given \$300 million in American aid to maintain defense-industrial production; U.S., Congress, "For a Strong and Free World," *Quarterly Reports to Congress on the Mutual Security Act*, no. 1, (Washington, D.C.: 1951).

⁵²U.S., Department of State, "Communique of the U.S., U.K. and French Foreign Ministers," (19 September 1950), *Department of State Bulletin*, no. 23 (2 October 1950), 530-31.

realized through collective efforts of member nations, there is little hope for the economical long-term attainment of security and stability in Europe unless Germany can be counted on the side of the free nations.”⁵³

Meanwhile, France continued to resist German rearmament throughout the summer and early fall of 1950. During the meetings of the North Atlantic Council in New York, France found itself isolated by the British and the Americans, yet the French delegation, headed by the venerable Robert Schuman, continued to oppose the reestablishment of a German Army and instead began to insist that the military problem be solved in the same "spirit" as the European Coal and Steel Community.⁵⁴ French policy makers were obviously interested in ensuring against a repeat of the previous two wars, and unlike their British or American counterparts held Germany to be as significant a potential future threat as the Soviet Union. Hence, the three major powers, the United States, Great Britain and France were working almost at cross purposes. The Americans wanted the Federal Republic rearmed as a means to alleviate the need for massive American ground deployments in Europe at a time when the nation was involved in an Asian war. The British were working to ensure continued American participation in continental defense in the face of a perceived increase in a Soviet threat to European security, all the while limiting their own contributions to continental security. Meanwhile French policymakers wanted to confirm both American and British participation in continental defense and prevent a resurgence in German power.

⁵³NATO, SACEUR, *First Annual Report* (Brussels: NATO, 1951), 2.

⁵⁴Furdson, 87.

Concurrent with French opposition to rearmament, the West Germans themselves obstructed the issue by trying to extract as many concessions as possible in exchange for rearmament, although German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer enthusiastically supported the EDC.⁵⁵ While Adenauer clearly saw the Federal Republic's future lay with the West, he carried an ambitious agenda designed to ensure that Germany became a full member of the West into rearmament negotiations.⁵⁶ Specifically, Adenauer wanted the Allies to revoke the "Occupation Statute" and regard the Federal Republic as an equal in future talks, as well as protect Germany from any future deals between the West and the Soviet Union.⁵⁷ Adenauer also wanted assurances that Germany would continue to receive financial assistance in order to "sustain the burden" of rearmament and that German troops would be treated on an equal basis as other Allied forces.⁵⁸ The European Defense Community proposal was designed to be the means with which to reconcile the divergent interests of the West's major powers.

The burdensharing debate became especially contentious in the early years of the Eisenhower administration as the President and his Secretary of State demonstrated their resolve to cut defense expenditures for conventional forces and increasingly rely on

⁵⁵Adenauer described the EDC as both central to integration and an "indispensable prerequisite for peace in Europe;" Federal Republic of Germany, *Government Declaration by the German Federal Chancellor, Dr. Konrad Adenauer, Before the German Bundestag on 20 October 1953* (Bonn: Press and Information Office, 1953).

⁵⁶See Konrad Adenauer, *Memoirs, 1945-1966* (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1966).

⁵⁷U.S., Office of the High Commissioner for Germany, Office of the Executive Secretary, *History of the Allied High Commission for Germany* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1951).

⁵⁸Richard P. Stebbins, *The United States in World Affairs, 1951* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1952), 63.

America's nuclear deterrent. With his election in 1952, President Dwight D. Eisenhower brought with him the fiscal conservatism of the "Taft wing" of the Republican Party and his administration would ultimately push for European military cooperation and integration as a means to alleviate the need for a substantial American conventional military presence on the continent.⁵⁹ Hence as Paris worked to solidify American commitments to Europe, and to tap into the fiscal and military resources of the Atlantic superpower, Washington increasingly looked to alleviate its substantial outlays for European defense by constructing a strong, autonomous European security structure within the broader framework of the nascent transatlantic Alliance. One result was that American support for the European Recovery Program (ERP) increasingly was subordinated to security concerns and military aid.⁶⁰ Another development was the so-called "New Look" which emphasized nuclear weapons over large conventional deployments.⁶¹ For Washington, the EDC, would integrate European national military forces into a broad European army was the preferred vehicle for the development of such a security structure.⁶² Eisenhower summed up the American policy towards European

⁵⁹Eisenhower also initially hoped that improved relations with the Soviets could alleviate American military commitments; Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Mandate for Change: The White House Years 1953-1956* (New York: Doubleday, 1963), 149.

⁶⁰Osgood, 70-71.

⁶¹Eisenhower, 149-51.

⁶²This policy was part of the "New Look" strategy of the Administration called for by NSC 162/2. The "New Look" did not envision a large American conventional presence in Europe as a deterrent to Soviet aggression, but rather an reliance on America's nuclear capabilities as a deterrent against the Soviets. In keeping with this strategy American troops in Europe deployed tactical nuclear weapons, including artillery, bombs and short range missiles; U.S., Department of Defense, *The 'New Look' in Defense Planning: Address by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Before the National Press Club*,

integration in general as such: "Our policy will be designed to foster the advent of practical unity in Western Europe. The nations of that region have contributed notably to the effort of sustaining the security of the free world. . . But the problem of security demands closer cooperation among the nations of Europe than has been known to date. Only a more closely integrated economic and political system can provide the greatly increased economic strength needed to maintain both necessary military readiness and respectable living standards."⁶³ The origins of the EDC had their genesis in the first concrete stirrings of European security integration soon after the Second World War. Through the Dunkirk Treaty, Great Britain and France already joined together in a military alliance, albeit one primarily designed against future German aggression, but the failure of the wartime Allies to reach an agreement over the future of Germany and with increasing Soviet aggressiveness in Czechoslovakia, the two nations proposed a multilateral defensive alliance of the Western powers. The Brussels Treaty of March, 1948, joined Belgium, France, Great Britain, Luxembourg and the Netherlands together in a collective defense arrangement which came to be known as the Western European Union (WEU). While the Treaty itself only established a framework for joint security and called for cooperation in other fields, it was significant for several major reasons. To begin with, it tied Great Britain into the broader framework of continental security. The British were willing to commit to continental defense for London perceived the

Washington, D.C., December 14, 1953, Press Release 1163 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1953).

⁶³Dwight Eisenhower, *The Principles of American Foreign Policy: Message of the President to the Congress on the State of the Union*, February 2, 1953, House Document no. 75, 83d, Congress (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1953).

Treaty as the first step towards a wider Atlantic alliance that would include the United States.⁶⁴

For the United States the Brussels Treaty marked a major step forward for the Europeans in that it was the first significant step taken by the various Western European states in cooperative security, and thus, partially alleviated American concerns that the United States would have to remain the bulwark of European security. More importantly, the Treaty also set the stage for the subsequent North Atlantic Treaty, and the resultant military alliance, by strengthening Truman's domestic hand through substantiating his plans to aid Western Europe in security matters. For instance, in response to the Brussels Treaty, the American Senate passed the Vandenberg Resolution in June of 1948 on a vote of 64 to 4. This resolution confirmed American support for the collective security measures that the European states were taking and signaled to the Truman Administration that it had Senate support for the subsequent steps taken to aid those efforts.

What emerged from the French was the Pleven Plan which called for the creation of an integrated European Army. In this way, the problem of German rearmament would be solved by having German troops subordinate to and fully integrated with troops from other European states. The plan won passage in the French National Assembly by including clauses which, for instance, forbade the establishment of a German general staff. This European Army would be under the direction of a Minister of Defense chosen by the members of a European Assembly and would be integrated "*on the level of the*

⁶⁴Montgomery, 447.

smallest possible unit" (for the French, this meant at the battalion level).⁶⁵ In addition, German troops would not be allowed to undertake independent action.⁶⁶ The costs of such a force would be born by the member states, who would still be able to utilize their own national defense forces for their international needs and interests. The Pleven Plan also formally invited Great Britain to participate in the proposed security system and thus, attempted to draw Great Britain into the process of European integration.

The development and ultimate failure of the EDC revolved around a series of bilateral relations. For the United States, the EDC was seen as a means to accomplish a number of goals based on its relations with West Europe's democracies. The EDC would provide a benign environment in which to rearm the Federal Republic of Germany and reintegrate and rehabilitate that nation into the fold of the West. Simultaneously, the EDC would allay French concerns over German rearmament, bolster what were seen as deficiencies in France's armed forces, all the while providing a vehicle for French leadership in European security without compromising American dominance of NATO. For Anglo-American relations, Washington initially viewed the EDC as a method through which to tie Great Britain into the fabric of continental security. The integrated military structure of the organization was also presented Washington with an instrument through which it could blunt criticisms from the smaller European states over dominance by their larger neighbors.

For the three major West European states, France, the Federal Republic and Great Britain, the formation of the EDC and its ultimate unraveling also revealed a series of

⁶⁵Furdson, 89.

⁶⁶Osgood, 78-79.

dynamic relationships that were evolving from their postwar origins into their Cold War patterns. For Paris, the failure of Atlanticism, albeit on French terms, would necessitate a turn to Europeanism and attempts to construct a Europe that would allow Paris to draw upon the capabilities needed to maintain France's status and perceived special role in the world. For the Federal Republic, the EDC confirmed the importance of bilateral relations with both the United States and France. Meanwhile, for the British, the willingness of Washington to acquiesce to London's demands on the EDC, both solidified and substantiated the "special relationship" between the two nations. The British diplomatic efforts which transformed the EDC into the WEU demonstrated both the necessity of British inclusion in the broad pattern of European security and the strong Atlanticism that would prove representative of British security policy, especially after the Suez Crisis in 1956. The reluctance of the British to join the EDC proved characteristic of policy that would continue to isolate Great Britain from the rest of the continent.

For the French, the EDC marked the last notable effort at reviving the World War II Atlantic Alliance as a triumvirate of the three major Western powers, the United States, Great Britain and France itself. From the end of the Second World War into the early 1950s, Paris embarked on a course designed to reaffirm its position as a great power through association with the United States which offered the promise of immense resources at a time when the European powers lacked the capabilities to preserve their empires and their status. The Pleven plan which laid the foundation for the EDC proposals of the 1950s came during a time of American preponderance in the world and reflected American preferences.

On May 27, 1952, the United States, France and Great Britain concluded an agreement which formally ended the Allied occupation of the Federal Republic and launched the EDC. The EDC would initially be six nations, France, the Federal Republic, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. The Treaty called for Germany to contribute twelve divisions to an international army of some forty-three national divisions which would be under the initial command of the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe. In order to assuage French concerns over rearmament, both the United States and Great Britain pledged continued troop deployment in Europe, and specifically pledged continued deployment in the Federal Republic.⁶⁷ EDC forces would also continue to be under the authority of the SACEUR and the North Atlantic Council, thereby ensuring some degree of American involvement and interaction with the organization.

Through the Richards Amendment, the American Congress made approximately half of all American military aid to individual European countries contingent on their ratifying the EDC.⁶⁸ In the end, though, no amount of cajoling from the United States or the other European powers could save the EDC which went down in defeat in the *Assemblée Nationale* in August of 1954 because the plan failed to adequately address French concerns over German rearmament. However, the issues which had destroyed the EDC (German rearmament and British participation in Continental defense) were resolved at the diplomatic instigation of the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Anthony Eden who invited the major players of the EDC drama to London for the Nine Power

⁶⁷Osgood, 92.

⁶⁸John Foster Dulles, "Statement to the NAC" (14 December, 1953), 20-21.

Conference of September, 1954. This began a process that culminated in the signing of the Paris Accords in October of 1955.

Under the terms of the Paris Accords, France, Great Britain and the United States ended their occupation of West Germany which, along with Italy, was invited to join the Brussels Treaty (which then became the WEU) and was invited to join NATO. In exchange, Germany agreed not to manufacture certain types of weapons, i.e, biological, chemical, nuclear, etc. In addition, it was agreed that NATO would oversee the "operational aspects" of the German military, while the WEU supervised the political and legal steps necessary for German rearmament.⁶⁹ In order to ensure French approval of the Accords, Great Britain formally pledged to maintain a military presence on the Continent of a specified number of troops, and not to withdraw those troops without the consent of the other members of the WEU. This step was unheralded for the British and it demonstrated a new British commitment to European security.⁷⁰ In a further concession to the French, the Federal Republic pledged to pursue a peaceful foreign policy and, in particular, never "have recourse to force to achieve the reunification of Germany."⁷¹

The Paris Accords were able to satisfy the major concerns of all the parties involved. The French government had its concerns over German rearmament soothed

⁶⁹Arie Bloed, and Ramses A. Wessel, eds. *The Changing Functions of the Western European Union (WEU): Introduction and Basic Documents* (London: Martinus Nijhoff, 1994), xv-xviii.

⁷⁰Alfred Cahen, *The Western European Union and NATO: Building a European Defense Identity Within the Context of Atlantic Solidarity* (London: Brassey's, 1989), 3.

⁷¹U.S., Department of State, *Documents on Germany, 1944-1985*, no. 9446 (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Public Affairs, 1986), 420-24.

while at the same time it received concrete guarantees of a prolonged British military presence on the Continent. Germany was allowed to rearm and join the community of Western nations with the end of occupation and its ascendance into NATO. German rearmament helped satisfy Anglo-American concerns for the defense of the Eastern flank of Europe. In addition, the Paris Accords also confirmed NATO as the primary security organization for European defense, thus, preserving the primacy of American influence in European security. Hence, the very failure of the EDC helped set the stage for the longterm success of NATO by replacing a potential rival security organization, the EDC, with an essentially subordinate organization, the WEU. The success of the Transatlantic Alliance became based on the organization's ability to both reconcile the national security interests of its memberstates, while developing and enforcing the norms and rules that have characterized the regime.

For the Western European states, the bipolar system of the Cold War compelled them to bandwagon with the United States in the system's balance against the Soviet bloc by joining the Transatlantic alliance.⁷² That the Western bloc was dominated by the United States meant that the states of the West developed a regional system that echoed American preferences for institutionalism and integration. This system was based on cooperation and collaboration among nationstates.⁷³ More significantly, this cooperation

⁷²Although the states of Western Europe balanced against the Soviet Union, they did so by bandwagoning with the stronger power, the United States; Waltz, "Emerging Structure," 74-79.

⁷³Here cooperation can be defined as ". . . actions of separate individuals or organizations—which are not in preexisting harmony—which are brought into conformity with one another through a process of policy coordination;" Keohane, *After Hegemony*, 51. In addition, cooperation requires that ". . . each party changes his or her behavior contingent on changes in the other's behavior;" Robert O. Keohane, "International

would eventually lead to changes in national policy in exchange for perceived benefits from membership in such institutions and regimes. The failure of the EDC demonstrated the unwillingness of states to suborn national interest to supranational organizations, if the perceived pay-offs from membership did not out-way the costs. Ideally, regimes and institutions facilitate cooperation by “. . . affecting patterns of costs. Specifically, institutions reduce certain forms of uncertainty and alter transaction costs.”⁷⁴ Writing specifically about security institutions, John Duffield asserts that these organizations constrain state behavior by providing incentives for compliance, even if non-compliance might benefit the state in the short run.⁷⁵

The original EDC proposal which bound Great Britain into the framework of continental security satisfied the necessary requirements to reduce uncertainty about German rearmament by both providing a preponderance of force capable of constraining Germany and preventing independent action by German troops through integration of German forces.⁷⁶ Without British participation, the uncertainties surrounding German rearmament led the French to balk at their own proposal. In spite of the growing, and the potential growth, of the Soviet threat, the French were unwilling to allow German rearmament without the involvement of the British or ready support from the United States within the institutional framework of any supranational security structure in

Institutions: Two Approaches,” *International Studies Quarterly* 32, no. 4 (December 1988): 380.

⁷⁴Ibid., 386.

⁷⁵John S. Duffield, *Power Rules: The Evolution of NATO's Conventional Force Posture* (Stanford: Stanford University, 1995), 22-25.

⁷⁶Federal Republic of Germany, *Government Declaration*, 70-71.

Europe. Only when German rearmament was fixed within a collective security structure whereby the military capabilities of both Great Britain and, more importantly the United States, could be brought to bear against the potential for a German resurgence, did Paris agree to place itself in a security institution along with its former enemy. The WEU was able to provide a bridge for German entry into NATO and safeguard the stability of the nascent security system. In this manner, the United States was able to fulfill a continuing role as the security structure's hegemonic power and ensure both compliance with the regime, and equal access to the collective goods provided by the regime.

CHAPTER IX

EUROPEAN SECURITY INTEGRATION

The failure of the EDC marked a pause in the drive for European military integration. The strengthened Transatlantic Alliance that emerged from the ashes of the EDC became the vehicle through which the states of Western Europe were able to develop a strong security regime which both developed and enforced the rules and norms that allowed for the denationalization of borders and the amelioration of the security dilemma between the nationstates of the region.

The decade of the 1980s witnessed a drive for the Europeanization of the Transatlantic Alliance. The Maastricht Treaty called for the establishment of an autonomous European security capability and the 1987 relaunch of the Western European Union (WEU) was seen by many as the vehicle with which to reach this goal. The end of the Cold War and the resulting American drawdown of forces in Europe only seemed to confirm the need for a European Defence Identity (EDI) distinct from NATO. However, differences over the scope and nature of the European pillar quickly derailed significant progress towards EDI as Atlanticist states, such as Great Britain or the Netherlands, insisted on the retention of NATO as the prime element of any European security structure while Europeanist states, mainly France, insisted on a Euro-centric security system.

Even as concrete steps, such as the formation of the Eurocorps, were taken to provide the European Union (EU) with independent military assets, the Atlanticist states, with the backing of the United States, were able to bring the WEU into the fold of

NATO as forces that were "separable, but not separate" from the transatlantic Alliance. The advent of the Gulf War and events in the former Yugoslavia demonstrated to many Europeans the need for a strong Atlantic component in the framework of any European security structure, and, more importantly, the need for American leadership in security matters and access to American military capabilities, particularly in intelligence and strategic lift. In an effort to satisfy the legitimate needs for an EDI and yet ensure American involvement in European security, a series of compromises emerged which brought together the divergent Atlanticist and Europeanist viewpoints and which led to a strengthening of the transatlantic Alliance, even as it opened the door for the establishment of the European pillar.

While there emerged considerable optimism over the future of broad, multilateral organizations such as the United Nations or the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the end of the Cold War initiated a period of considerable debate and even pessimism within the Western Alliance. The lack of a direct military threat to the continent led to a dramatic drawdown of American forces as Washington attempted to take advantage of the so-called "peace-dividend."¹ Concurrent to the declining American military presence was a drive for the Europeanization of NATO. Beginning in the 1980s, this movement aimed at creating a more balanced relationship within the security framework which would allow the Europeans to play a more important role in shaping

¹Total American forces in Europe, including those attached to the Mediterranean 6th Fleet, declined from 321,300 in 1990 to 139,200 in 1995. Furthermore, in the early 1990s, there were proposals put forth to reduce American strength even further; IISS, *The Military Balance, 1990/91* (London: Brassey's 1991), 25; IISS, *The Military Balance, 1995-1996*, 30.

and defining the goals and policies of the Alliance.² This seemed especially important as concerns of a renewed isolationist America surfaced even as European leaders began to grapple with the new security threats emerging across the region.

NATO initially suffered from two major impediments to its ability to continue as one of the main elements of European security. The first was the lack of a clear mechanism to allow the Alliance to address so-called out-of-area issues. Since most of the new security threats that affected Europe were actually outside of the borders of the Alliance members, NATO needed to develop a means to allow its member states to deploy NATO resources outside of member territory. The second major question facing the Alliance was the issue of expansion. Since NATO was primarily perceived as an anti-Soviet alliance, any expansion might be viewed with hostility by Russia which was, itself pushing for the establishment of a broader, more inclusive security architecture for Europe, much as it had done in the face of the EDC in the 1950s. In addition, if NATO was to become the primary institution for European security it would establish a means to incorporate the traditional neutral states such as Austria or Sweden. NATO expansion could conceivably create an organization that, like the CSCE, was too unwieldy to be effective in a military sense. Finally, there was the question of how to establish criteria for the new members.³ These factors led to considerable debate over whether or not NATO should even enlarge.

²For a detailed examination of the history and the impetus behind this effort, see Robbin Laird, *The Europeanization of the Alliance* (Boulder: Westview, 1991).

³This was especially important in order to address concerns about degree of democratization, civil military relations, military interoperability, and the possibility of bringing ongoing ethnic or border disputes into the Alliance.

Despite these questions, support for a strong Transatlantic alliance as the cornerstone of European security remained very strong in certain nations on both sides of the Atlantic. Great Britain was very consistent in its staunch support for NATO remaining the centerpiece of European security. Michael Clarke captures the essence of Britain's policy towards NATO: "NATO's role in European security should remain central and that, therefore, nothing should be done to undermine NATO in either the short or the long term. NATO is an alliance which has proved its worth and it must not be compromised in the guise of reformism for the sake of reform."⁴ This emphasis on NATO is reflected on an official level by the Defence White Papers:

NATO is the only security organization with the military means to back up its security guarantees. It secures the vital link between Europe and North America: vital in political terms because of our shared fundamental values and common interests, and in military terms because no other European country or group of countries is likely to be able to field the intelligence capabilities, sophisticated firepower or strategic lift supplied by the United States. We believe that the Alliance remains the best vehicle through which to ensure that, were a strategic threat to the United Kingdom to re-emerge, our interests could be effectively defended.⁵

For Great Britain, the central issue in European security is the preservation of the American commitment as a means to counterbalance any potential hegemon on the European continent (including both Germany and Russia). Because of this emphasis on the transatlantic link, the paramountcy of NATO has in many ways become the defining characteristic of British defense policy.⁶ Atlanticism was also a means of preventing any

⁴Michael Clarke "British Policy Options," in Bluth, 58.

⁵UK, Ministry of Defense, *Defense Estimates, 1994*, 9.

⁶Even as Great Britain has acknowledged the importance of military integration and collaboration, London has steadfastly promoted NATO as the main institution through

surrender of autonomy in foreign policy to the European Community (EC). In this Atlanticist camp, Great Britain was joined by a number of other European states, including Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, and Portugal, and, of course, the North American states.

For the United States, NATO provided the best means to continue American influence in European security matters. For fifty years one of the overriding and consistent goals of American foreign policy has been peace and stability in Europe. While this goal began as an attempt to prevent the outbreak of a third world war emanating from the continent, the goal soon became the interest as the transatlantic links, on the economic, military and political level, intensified and broad American foreign policy goals, including democracy, free trade and collective defense became cooperative goals shared by both the Americans and the West Europeans. The end of the Cold War seemed to offer the opportunity to expand these shared goals into the East and for the United States, NATO was the security vehicle to do so.

Nonetheless, there were calls in the United States for a reappraisal of the Alliance relationship as a result of the burdensharing debate. In 1990, the United States supplied 61 per cent of NATO's total military expenditures, while the Europeans

which to develop multilateral military structures. The 1996 British White Paper on defense stated: "On some issues, the pursuit of our interests can only sensibly be carried out through multilateral organizations and alliances. The most potent example of this is NATO, where we have seen how military integration has allowed us to reap benefits for both our defence and more recently in the promotion of international order;" UK, Ministry of Defense, *Statement on the Defence Estimates, 1996* (London: HMSO, 1996), paragraph 108.

accounted for 38.9 per cent of that total (the remainder was supplied by Canada).⁷

Although military disengagement from Europe was never seriously considered at the policy level, the debate itself occurred at a time of renewed calls by some European states for the establishment of an autonomous European military capability or the European Defence Identity (EDI).

The leading proponent of the Europeanization of the Alliance was France. The traditional French emphasis on independence in foreign policy and its sense of *grandeur*, have propelled French governments to stress the need for independent military capabilities for the EC.⁸ For the French the development of EDI would satisfy two concerns. EDI would enrich French capabilities and aid France in its pursuit of international objectives by pooling the resources and influence of the EC.⁹ In addition, the French political leadership believed that the United States had fundamentally different security goals than did the Europeans. For instance, it was widely assumed that the United States would not want to become militarily involved in the local and regional conflicts which were emerging as the main threat to the stability of the continent. There were also broader French concerns about the firmness of the American commitment to

⁷James Sperling, "Burden Sharing Revisited," in Bluth, et al., 170.

⁸For an assessment of French foreign policy goals and an overview of the concept of *grandeur* in world affairs, see Gregory Flynn "French Identity and Post-Cold War Europe," in *Remaking the Hexagon: The New France in the New Europe*, ed. Gregory Flynn (Boulder: Westview, 1995).

⁹Robbin Laird points out that EDI would also allow France involvement in the transatlantic alliance without having to re-enter NATO's military structure; Laird, *French Security*, 21.

Europe. As such, the French wanted firm institutional constraints to contain a potentially assertive Germany and to counterbalance Russia.

For some time, cooperation between France and Germany had formed the core of French security policy in regards to Europe. Beginning with the Franco-German Friendship Treaty of 1963, the fate of the two nations had become ever more intertwined. The Treaty itself was far more important for its symbolism than for its practical steps, nonetheless it created a pattern of regular meetings between the heads of state of the two nations and the major governmental ministers, including foreign affairs and defense. In addition, the Treaty stated that

The two governments shall consult before any decision on all important questions of foreign policy and primarily on questions of common interest with a view to reaching as far as possible parallel positions. This consultation shall apply, among others, to the following subjects: Problems relating to the European Communities and European political cooperation; East-West relations both in the political and economic fields; Matters dealt with in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; In the field of strategy and tactics, the competent authorities of the two countries shall endeavor to bring their doctrines closer together; Exchanges of personnel between the armed forces shall be increased.¹⁰

Franco-German military cooperation reached its apex in the mid-1980s. For some Germans, most notably former chancellor Helmut Schmidt, the proposed Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty between the Americans and the Soviets would leave Germany more vulnerable to nuclear exchanges between the shorter range missiles of both superpowers which were already deployed in both East and West Germany. Schmidt advocated the creation of a "Franco-German conventional army under the command of a French general" since "the two classical military nations of Europe are a

¹⁰U.S., Department of State, *Documents on Germany*, 833-5.

conventional force which no Soviet marshal would ever dare take on."¹¹ Under Schmidt's vision such a force would ultimately serve as the foundation for a defense arm of the EU and render NATO unnecessary by building European conventional forces to point that American nuclear deterrence was no longer needed to forestall Soviet aggression.

On the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Franco-German Friendship Treaty, German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and French President François Mitterrand agreed to create bilateral, standing committees to coordinate military and economic policy and to better advise the two heads of state during their biannual summits. The Security Council was to be made up of both nation's defense ministers and the military chiefs of staff of both nations. Most significantly, the leaders also announced a proposal for a joint Franco-German military brigade. The 4,200-man Brigade was to be stationed in Germany and to be initially commanded by a French general.¹²

For France, this initiative was designed as a means of further securing the Federal Republic into the framework of the West at a time when there were serious divergences between the two nations over Germany's relations with the Soviet Union. This was especially significant in light of the French perception, as expressed by Pierre Lellouche, then an official of the French Institute for International Relations, that "West Germany is playing for the long term . . . It believes it can get East Germany back without falling

¹¹Robert Keatly, "Schmidt Would Disband NATO, Establish a Franco-German Force," *Wall Street Journal* (16 June 1987).

¹²IISS, *Strategic Survey, 1987-1988*, 83.

under Soviet domination itself."¹³ The prospect of a reunified Germany propelled the French to revive efforts at military integration in an attempt to maintain meaningful influence over German security policy. France would also launched efforts to increase defense cooperation with Great Britain and other European states.¹⁴

For the West Germans military integration was a method to preserve force structures in the face of defense cutbacks and limited personnel. The Kohl government instituted a long military program, "Army Structure 2000" which called for cuts in manpower of some thirty per cent by the 1990s. The Federal Republic's Territorial Army was slated to have all ten of its Home Defense Brigades disbanded. With the establishment of the Franco-German Brigade, however, the Bundeswehr saved one of these units by making it the German contribution to the bilateral force.¹⁵

Concurrent with its efforts to increase security cooperation and collaboration with the Federal Republic, Paris continued to lead the drive for greater autonomy in European security. The French choose the moribund WEU as the vehicle for the development of the European pillar. The organization was reactivated by a French initiative in 1984. In its efforts to initiate a separate security identity, France was supported by Belgium, Italy, Germany, and Spain.¹⁶ For the Atlanticists, the WEU came

¹³Philip Revzin, "French Fight to Anchor Germany in West," *Wall Street Journal* (21 January 1988).

¹⁴For instance, France granted the British permission to use French ports to transport British troops during a crisis and initiated a number of discussions over nuclear policy and the development of new weapons systems.

¹⁵IISS, *The Military Balance, 1988/89* (London: Brassey's, 1989), 55-6.

¹⁶For Italy and Spain, support for the development of an autonomous European pillar was based on an attempt to gain recognition of their particular national concerns, mainly

to be seen as the means with which to create a European pillar, but one that was firmly wedded to NATO. By 1987, the two sides seemed deadlocked over the exact nature of the WEU and it took personal consultations between the then-Prime Ministers Jacques Chirac and Margaret Thatcher to settle the issue.¹⁷ In the end, the WEU reflected more of the Atlanticist model than the Europeanist.

While the French did gain the establishment of a European security organization that encompassed the major West European powers, its powers clearly left NATO as the central component of European security. The WEU initially had no operational responsibilities and no forces attached to it, nor was the WEU formally affiliated with the EC. Hence, the WEU was duly relaunched as a consultive body with a council at the ministerial level, working staff and parliamentary assembly.

The WEU soon showed, however, that unlike NATO, it would address out-of-area issues. In 1987, the WEU launched **Operation Cleansweep** to clear shipping lanes in the midst of the Iran-Iraq War. During the Gulf War, the WEU coordinated the naval blockade against Iraq. After the war, the WEU initiated **Operation Safe Haven** to provide humanitarian relief to the Kurds. The organization would eventually coordinate the military side of the UN efforts aimed at restoring peace in the former Yugoslavia.

focused on North Africa. Meanwhile, Germany supported the WEU as a means to bring the French back into the fold of the Alliance by using the French participation in WEU discussions as a substitute for French involvement in NATO forums.

¹⁷Laird, *French Security*, 25-26.

These actions added impetus for NATO to develop its own structures to deal with out-of-area operations.¹⁸

By 1990, the Bush administration had signalled a willingness to consider reforms to the existing European security architecture, although it was determined to keep NATO as the main element of European security. Within a relatively short period of time, NATO planners began to address the out-of-area debate, the security and stability of Central and Eastern Europe, and the Europeanist desire for a separate European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI). In July of 1990, during NATO's London Conference a Senior Review Group was established to redefine the Alliance's operational doctrines and strategic concepts and to allow for a greater European identity within the Alliance.¹⁹ In addition, the London Declaration outlined NATO's plans to begin to develop regular contacts with the states of the former Warsaw Pact. By June, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) agreed to a restructuring of NATO forces so that the Alliance would be able to address out-of-area issues. This was especially important in light of the aforementioned WEU actions.

The NAC decision resulted in the creation of a rapid reaction force titled the Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) and comprised of forces from the two most staunch Atlanticist states, Great Britain and the Netherlands. The creation of ARRC was important for two reasons. It demonstrated that NATO was able to adapt

¹⁸It should be noted that in each of these operations, WEU actions took place only after lengthy and often tortuous consultations since the WEU had no standing forces and had to make arrangements on an *ad hoc* basis; Diego A. Ruiz Palmer, *French Strategic Options in the 1990s*, Adelphi Papers 260 (Summer 1991), 47.

¹⁹See Michael Legge, "The Making of NATO's New Strategy," *NATO Review* 39, no.6 (December 1991): 9-13.

to changing circumstances after the Cold War, and thus, the Alliance was not simply a relic of the bi-polar conflict. ARRC also gave NATO the means, at least on paper, to address out-of-area issues.

Not to be outdone, EC leaders accelerated the drive for the creation of a common foreign and security policy (CFSP), and in February of 1991, the French and German governments formally proposed the creation of CFSP and called for the WEU to become the military arm of the EC. The two governments then increased the stakes with the "October surprise"--the October 1991, Francois Mitterrand-Helmut Kohl initiative to turn the Franco-German brigade into a multinational force, dubbed the Eurocorps. Such a force was seen as a nucleus that could eventually give the EC military operational capabilities and the ability to conduct military operations which NATO would be "neither willing nor able to intervene."²⁰ Eventually several nations, including Belgium, Spain, and later Luxembourg, pledged to contribute forces to the new structure.²¹

Nevertheless, NATO continued to reform ahead of the challenges presented by proponents of ESDI. The New Strategic Concept developed at the 1991 Rome Conference abandoned the strategic doctrine of flexible response, while it also called for

²⁰Federal Republic of Germany, Federal Press Office, "Eurocorps Will Strengthen European Pillar of NATO," press release, (22 July, 1992), 15.

²¹The Eurocorps consists of some 50,000 land troops, whose stated mandate is to perform peacekeeping and peace-enforcement operations under the auspices of the WEU. For background on the formation of the Eurocorps, see Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), *Topic A: European Defense Identity* (Vienna: OSCE, 1996); and Jonathan G. Clarke, "The Eurocorps: A Fresh Start in Europe," *Foreign Policy Briefing*, no., 21 (Washington, D.C.: Cato Institute, 1992).

the development of a European pillar within the framework of the Alliance.²² The North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) was established as a forum for the former Warsaw Pact states and NATO members to discuss security concerns and for NATO members to pass on experience and expertise in matters such as civil-military relations and defense conversion.²³ The establishment of NACC began the process of addressing the security concerns of the Central and East Europeans at the same time that it attempted to broaden NATO's role from a defensive alliance into a "loosely-constructed collective security organization" which would give the Alliance greater flexibility in responding to the national interests of the member states.²⁴

During the 1990-1991 negotiations that resulted in the Maastricht Treaty, it was agreed that the EC, henceforth the European Union (EU), should develop a CFSP and that the WEU would be responsible in the interim as the EU's security organization until CFSP was implemented.²⁵ The sections of the Treaty dealing with the WEU owe more to the Atlanticist view of the WEU as "bridge" between NATO and the EU, than to the concept of the WEU as the embodiment of ESDI. In the Treaty, NATO was recognized as a "key element" in European security. French proposals to firmly establish the WEU as the foundation for ESDI failed because many states, including Denmark, Great

²²NATO, *The Alliance's New Strategic Concept* (8 November 1991).

²³On the initial functions of the NACC, see NATO, NACC, *Work Plan for Dialogue and Cooperation 1993 Issued at the Meeting of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council M-NACC-2(92)110*, (18 December, 1992).

²⁴Michael J. Brenner "A United States Perspective," in *Multilateralism and Western Strategy*, ed. Michael J. Brenner (New York: St. Martin's, 1995), 155.

²⁵See the *Maastricht Treaty*, Single European Act, "Provisions on a Common Foreign and Security Policy," Title V, Article J.4 (1991).

Britain, Italy, and the Netherlands were uneasy about surrendering national sovereignty in the realm of foreign and security policy. Most importantly, the French argument that an autonomous ESDI would create a "hedge" against American withdrawal from Europe, fueled concerns in Bonn that such actions might make, as Roy Rempel states, "a self-fulfilling prophecy"²⁶ in which the development of ESDI would convince Washington that it could withdraw from Europe. Hence, while the Maastricht Treaty called for the development of CFSP, the Treaty's view of the WEU owed more to the British viewpoint than to the French.²⁷ Nonetheless, the WEU did proceed to lay the foundation for an eventual CFSP and many advocates of autonomy in European defense structures saw the WEU as the interlocutor between the EU and NATO.

In June 1992, the Petersburg Declaration tasked the WEU to designate military units answerable to the organization and to establish a policy planning cell. The Declaration established three types of membership for the WEU and an associate status for the states of Central and Eastern Europe (similar to concept behind NACC).²⁸ It also

²⁶ Roy Rempel, "German Security Policy in the New European Order," in *Disconcerted Europe: The Search for a New Security Architecture*, eds. Alexander Moens and Christopher Anstis (Boulder: Westview, 1994), 180.

²⁷For specific details, see WEU, Council of Ministers, *The Role of the Western European Union and its Relationship With the European Union* (10 December 1991).

²⁸The three types of membership are: Full membership, for states that are members of both the EU and NATO; associate membership for states that are members of NATO, but not of the EU; and finally observer status for states that are members of the EU but not NATO (with the exception of Denmark which is a member of NATO but chooses to retain observer status in the WEU). In addition, Central and Eastern European states were offered associate partner status; WEU, Council of Ministers, *Petersburg Declaration* (19 June 1992).

allowed WEU forces to participate in CSCE or United Nations (UN) peace-keeping operations.

By 1992, it was clear that NATO and the WEU were engaged in overlapping, often repetitive functions. Both organizations had offered their military capabilities to the UN and the CSCE for peace-keeping and humanitarian operations. Both organizations had developed reaction forces—ARRC for NATO, and the Eurocorps for the WEU. Both organizations were also engaged in a dialogue with the Central and East European states—through the NACC and the associate partner status of the WEU. In addition, the WEU was attempting to develop independent capabilities that rivaled existing NATO capabilities.²⁹ It was becoming increasingly difficult to argue for the continued development of the WEU when it was also clear that NATO's reform efforts over the previous two years had alleviated many earlier concerns about the Alliance's ability to adjust to the post-Cold War world. Furthermore, it was also clear that NATO assets and capabilities would far exceed the WEU's for the immediate future.

In 1992, the euro-phoria surrounding European integration came crashing to a halt against the Danish and French referendums on the Maastricht Treaty. In addition, the worsening Bosnian crisis brought into question the ability of the EU to act without American leadership. Meanwhile, beginning in 1992 and continuing to the present, the

²⁹This was especially apparent in the intelligence sphere through WEU actions such as the establishment of a satellite center at Torrejon, Spain, and the attempts to develop satellite intelligence potential through the French-led **Helios** satellite program.

German government has made a major effort to ensure that the development of ESDI and CFSP was compatible with the Atlanticist emphasis on NATO.³⁰

This effort on the part of the Kohl government came partially as a result of the EU experiences in Bosnia and partially as a result of initiatives by the new pro-Atlantic, German Foreign Minister, Klaus Kinkel, replacing the more Euro-centric Hans-Dietrich Genscher. The Kohl government also decided that NATO offered the surest security guarantees for the Central and East European states, and began to push for NATO and EU expansion to the east, especially for Visegrad states of Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland.³¹ The result of the renewed German emphasis on the transatlantic dimension of European security has been a drive to ensure that developments towards ESDI were compatible with NATO military structures.

This effort at compatibility resulted in the "double-hatting" arrangement whereby multinational and even national forces could be assigned to both the WEU and NATO. This would allow forces to act as either NATO units or WEU units depending on the mission. If NATO was prevented from going out-of-area because of the Washington Treaty, the same units could be deployed under the auspices of the WEU.³² This system also allowed WEU forces access to NATO command and control structures and capabilities. One of the first tangible results of the double-hatting system was an

³⁰Rempel, 181-82.

³¹Volker Rühle, "Europe and the Alliance: Key Factors for Peace and Stability," *NATO Review*, no. 41 (June 1993): 12-15.

³²The 1992 Oslo Agreement allowed NATO members to collectively participate in out-of-area peace-keeping operations on a case-by-case basis, if requested by the CSCE or the UN and approved by the NAC.

agreement signed in January 1993 that allowed the Eurocorps to be deployed under NATO authority.³³

This agreement signaled a dramatic, though slowly evolving, policy shift by France to move closer to the transatlantic Alliance. While France has remained the most vocal proponent of ESDI, the governments of first Mitterrand and later Jacques Chirac have demonstrated an interest in being involved in the future direction and evolution of the Alliance.³⁴

In an area of shrinking defense budgets and dwindling force structures, the double-hatting arrangement allowed European governments to commit forces to the WEU without detracting from their NATO obligations.³⁵ Moreover, the arrangement marked a continuing effort on the part of NATO to formulate an ability to address out-of-area concerns. Since national forces retained their principal commitments to the Alliance, double-hatting eased reservations about committing forces to the WEU so that even the most ardent Atlanticist states, such as Great Britain and the Netherlands, were willing to pledge forces to the WEU. In May 1993, the double-hatting concept was formalized when the WEU adopted the concept of Forces Answerable to the WEU

³³The link between the Euro-Corps and NATO came out of the June 1992 WEU ministerial meeting at La Rochelle. The La Rochelle communique outlined the basic tasks of the Eurocorps, including defense under either Brussels or NATO treaties, but left the question of the Eurocorps relationship with NATO's command structure unresolved; Catherine McArdle Kelleher, *The Future of European Security: An Interim Assessment* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute, 1995), 59-60.

³⁴Tom Lansford, "The Question of France: French Security Choices at Century's End," *European Security* 5, no. 1 (Spring 1996): 55.

³⁵NATO, NAC, *Final Communique of the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council*, M-NAC-2(92)106, (17 December 1992).

(FAWEU). FAWEU initially included the Eurocorps (made up of French and German troops and bolstered by contingents from Belgium and Spain and later Luxembourg), the Multinational Division (made up of Belgian, British, Dutch and German troops), and the Anglo-Dutch amphibious force.

Concurrent with the evolution of the WEU, NATO continued to attempt to clarify its structures and missions.³⁶ NATO's three major commands were consolidated into the Allied Command Atlantic and the Allied Command Europe. The European command was then organized into three sub-commands: Southern, Central and Northwest. At the Brussels Summit, Allied leaders agreed to increase efforts aimed at stopping the proliferation of WMDs.³⁷ Subsequently, two groups were established to deal with the issues of WMDs—one to deal with the political aspects of proliferation, the other to confront the military considerations of WMDs.³⁸ Most importantly, at the Summit NATO launched two new initiatives, the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program and the Combined and Joint Task Force (CJTF) mechanism to further address the questions of

³⁶The foundations of these reforms efforts were established at the 1992 Brussels Ministerial; NATO, NAC, *Final Communique of the Ministerial Session of the Defence Planning Committee*, (11 December 1992).

³⁷NATO, NAC, *Final Communique of the Defense Planning Committee and Nuclear Planning Group*, M-DPC/NPG-2(94)126 (15 December 1994).

³⁸These groups were established at the NATO Ministerial in Istanbul in June of 1994; NATO, NAC, *Alliance Policy Framework on Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction*, M-NAC-1(94) 45 (9 June 1994).

enlargement and out-of-area issues.³⁹ These initiatives were proposed by the United States as an attempt to firmly secure NATO's place at the center of European security.⁴⁰

By 1993, there was widespread disillusionment with NACC. NACC provided a forum for discussion of security concerns, but it lacked the ability to take action in regards to security matters. Furthermore, NACC did not provide the former Warsaw states with any substantial security guarantees. The PfP proposal was designed to increase direct military contacts between the East and West and thus make the Central and East European states feel more secure, yet not alienate Russia by direct NATO expansion. PfP was in fact touted as a precursor to NATO membership.

The PfP concept was approved at the January 1994, Brussels Summit and offered the states of the East tangible security benefits. For instance, PfP states were allowed to participate in NATO peacekeeping exercises and UN or OSCE sponsored NATO humanitarian operations. In addition, PfP states were given offices at NATO headquarters and allowed to take part in the new planning and coordination cell of NATO's European Command.⁴¹ Finally, PfP states were allowed regular consultations with NATO over military planning and procurement, military restructuring and civil-

³⁹See NATO, NAC, *Partnership for Peace: Invitation Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council*, M-1(94)2, (10 January 1994); and NATO, NAC, *Partnership for Peace: Framework Document*, annex to M-1(94)2 (10 January 1994).

⁴⁰The PfP and CJTF proposals were launched by then Secretary of Defense, Les Aspin, at the NATO ministerial at Travemuende in October of 1993.

⁴¹NATO, NAC, *Partnership for Peace*.

military relations.⁴² The requirements to join PfP were left deliberately vague, but states were required to work towards interoperability with NATO forces, and to share the cost of any peacekeeping or humanitarian operations. Most significantly, PfP did not come with any firm security guarantees. Nonetheless, PfP accomplishes two major goals. It provides a means for all of the OSCE states, including the Central and East European states, as well as the traditional neutral states such as Austria or Finland, to be involved in NATO. PfP also provides functional programs to meet specific needs instead of simply providing a forum for consultation.⁴³

The second major American initiative of 1993 was the CJTF concept. The CJTF concept allows for the use of NATO resources in out-of-area operations without changing the Washington Treaty.⁴⁴ CJTF permits the use of NATO military resources in operations outside of NATO territory; for operations under the auspices of the WEU; and for operations with non-NATO states, including PfP members. As such, CJTF establishes the relationship between forces of NATO and the WEU as "separable but not separate."⁴⁵ Thus, CJTF allows the WEU access to NATO resources and partially alleviates the need for the development of rival capabilities. It also allows the PfP states to utilize NATO resources and participate in NATO-backed humanitarian and

⁴²British American Security Information Council (BASIC), *NATO, Peacekeeping and the United Nations*, Report 94.1 (September 1994), 26.

⁴³Nick Williams, "Partnership for Peace: Permanent Fixture or Declining Asset?" *Survival* 38, no. 1 (Spring 1996): 102.

⁴⁴NATO, "NATO's New Force Structures," *NATO Basic Fact Sheet*, no. 5 (Brussels: NATO, 1996).

⁴⁵NATO, NAC, *Declaration of the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council*, M-1(94)3 (11 January 1994), 1.

peacekeeping operations. By its very nature, CJTF provides a mechanism for "coalitions of the willing" which would permit those NATO states which do not want to be involved in a specific out-of-area operation, the ability to opt out without challenging the cohesion of the Alliance. CJTF contributes to ESDI by endowing the WEU with assets and capabilities that it otherwise has not developed.⁴⁶ However, the NAC must approve each CJTF and this raised concerns about the ability of the United States to "veto" operations. Further concerns were raised about the influence of the United States since American staff officers would theoretically have to be involved in CJTF exercises at various levels to oversee the use of American assets. France was particularly disturbed over the possibility that the Americans would thus be able to exert significant influence over the direction of operations, without principal involvement.

In the meanwhile, the gradual French re-integration into Alliance moved forward as France returned to some of the NATO structures it left in 1966. After the Brussels Summit, France agreed to participate in the DGP and it was decided that France would serve as the first European co-chair of that Group.⁴⁷ In 1995, France announced that it would return to the North Atlantic Military Committee and begin attending meetings of the Defense Planning Committee. The rewards of re-integration were apparent at the June 1996, Berlin Summit where France was able to gain concessions from the United

⁴⁶WEU, International Secretariat, *Structure and Functions: European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) and Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF)* (October 1995), 15.

⁴⁷Joseph, 120.

States which allowed European states to have "political control and strategic direction" of CJTF missions that the European states control.⁴⁸

Concerned that the impetus for CFSP was draining as NATO moved forward to address the problems of Central and East Europe, the French offered a proposal designed to rival PfP at the June 1993, Copenhagen meeting of the Council of Europe. The Balladur initiative was an attempt to prevent the spread of ethnic conflict. The initiative called for states to settle minority problems and grant the OSCE the right to oversee the implementation minority rights. The Balladur plan also called for existing borders to be considered inviolable. The plan also offered military assistance and associate status in the WEU. The Balladur initiative became the European Stability Pact, and states that desired entrance into the EU were required to sign it.⁴⁹ However, far from taking away from PfP, the European Stability Pact became another means for Central and East European states to further integrate themselves into the institutional framework of the West, albeit through associate status.

By the Brussels Summit, there was a recognized convergence of interests around the future of European Security. NATO would remain the cornerstone of the continent's security architecture, but it would be a vastly different NATO than the Cold War

⁴⁸Bruce Clark, "Europe Secures Greater Role in NATO Operations," *Financial Times* (4 June 1996), 1. In addition, at the Berlin Summit it was decided to reduce the number of standing NATO headquarter elements and establish mobile headquarters that would form the nuclei of future CJTF missions; Bruce Clark, "NATO Seeks to Bridge Ambiguity Gap," *Financial Times* (6 June 1996), 2.

⁴⁹BASIC, 29-31.

alliance. At the June 1996, the Alliance endorsed the DGP's findings on WMDs.⁵⁰

Through CJTF and PfP NATO has further adapted to meet the new security challenges facing Europe, and it has adjusted itself to more adequately address the national interests of the major powers involved in West European security, including the development of a European defense pillar. NATO will provide the framework for the development of ESDI and the WEU will provide the means. Towards the end-goal of ESDI, the Europeans have worked along two tracks: 1) the establishment of increased capabilities through the FAWEU; and 2) the development of an integrated defence market through the Western European Armaments Group (WEAG).⁵¹

With the development of CJTF, it was widely recognized that the WEU needed to develop force structures that went beyond the three existing bodies (the Eurocorps, the Multinational Division and the Anglo-Dutch Amphibious Group) in order to allow the WEU to effectively control and staff future CJTF operations. At the Lisbon WEU Ministerial in May of 1995, the ministers approved the creation of a Situation Center and an Intelligence Section in the WEU's Planning Cell.⁵² More significantly, the WEU

⁵⁰The DGP produced a risk assessment which stressed the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons on the periphery of Europe and the importance of monitoring states that were developing WMDs. The DGP also defined the Alliance's main policy guidelines in defense against WMDs, including conflict control and prevention, and the establishment of a "mix" of capabilities to deter would-be aggressors. Finally, the DGP identified the military needs of the Alliance with a focus on intelligence and extended air defenses. To carry-out these findings, the DGP developed thirty-nine Action Plans to implement its recommendations; Carter and Omand, 10-15; Joseph, 121-29.

⁵¹WEAG was created from the Independent European Programme Group (IEPG) in December of 1992. In 1993, the national armaments directors of WEAG began meeting on a regular basis with WEU officials.

⁵²Jose Cutileiro, "WEU's Operational Development and Its relationship With NATO," *NATO Review* 43, no. 5 (September 1995): 8-11.

approved the creation of additional force structures for the WEU.⁵³ France, Italy and Spain agreed to create ground and naval reaction units in order to respond to security concerns in the Mediterranean. Soon afterwards, Portugal also agreed to participate in both forces.

The land component of these forces is the EUROFOR. EUROFOR is designed to be a division size rapid reaction force, made up of pre-assigned units from the participating nations. The sea component of the new forces is the EUROMARFOR which is an amphibious assault landing group centered around a French aircraft carrier.⁵⁴

In addition to the EUROFOR and EUROMARFOR, WEU capabilities have been further expanded by the creation of the Franco-British Euro Air Group (FBEAG). FBEAG was created to enhance the capabilities of the two air forces to undertake humanitarian and peacekeeping or peace enforcement operations. The Group does not have permanent forces attached to it, but would draw on national assets as needed.⁵⁵ With the creation of these new units and with a number of agreements in place that commit various national units to the WEU, the organization has acquired significant operational capabilities. The FAWEU now include the Eurocorps, EUROFOR and EUROMARFOR, the Anglo-Dutch Amphibious Force, the Multinational Division,

⁵³WEU, Council of Ministers, *Lisbon Declaration* (15 May 1995).

⁵⁴WEU, Defense Committee, Document 1468.

⁵⁵IISS, *Military Balance, 1995/96*, 35.

FBEAG and separate national units including the 1st UK Armoured Division, the Danish Reaction Brigade and the Belgian-Netherlands Deployable Air Task Force.⁵⁶

A number of other joint European military units also exist at the bilateral level and are for the most part within the framework of NATO's SACEUR. For instance, in 1993, Germany and the Netherlands decided to combine a Dutch Army corps (1 NL Corps) and a German corps (I GE Corps) into a bilateral unit, the First German Netherlands Corps, headquartered in the German city of Munster, and under NATO's Central Region command.⁵⁷ The development of joint military structures is exemplified to an even greater degree by Belgian-Dutch cooperation. The navies of the two states were already linked together in NATO's Combined Belgium-Netherlands, Northwest command (COMBENENORTHWEST), but on March 28, 1995, the two states signed a comprehensive cooperation agreement which essentially combines the two forces.⁵⁸ There is an integrated command center, Admiral Benelux (ABNL) at Den Helder in the Netherlands, and the two nations share training facilities for all naval personnel, as well as operate a joint Mine Warfare School (EGUERMIN).⁵⁹ These integrated units allow the Europeans to eliminate overlapping and repetitious functions, thereby reducing

⁵⁶WEU, Defense Committee, Document 1468.

⁵⁷For both the Germans and the Dutch, this new unit allowed the individual governments to reduce manpower and defense expenditures, all the while maintaining their commitments to NATO; Federal Republic of Germany, Ministry of Defense, *Fact Sheet: First German Netherlands Corps I (GE/NE) Corps*, (Munster: 1 (GE/NE) Corps, 1994).

⁵⁸The Netherlands, Ministry of Defense, *Admiral Benelux* (Dan Helder: Dutch Ministry of Defense, 1997).

⁵⁹Belgium, Ministry of Defense, *Who Are We? Organization of Our Navy* (Brussels: Ministry of Defense, 1997).

defense expenditures, among their militaries since the essential denationalization of borders has all but eliminated the need for national defense against neighboring memberstates.

Hence, since 1992, the WEU has evolved from a consultive body into a security organization with significant military forces and some operational experience. Nonetheless, serious problems remain for the WEU. Unlike NATO, the WEU lacks an integrated military command. This necessitates ad hoc command arrangements. Despite some force structures, the WEU does not have collective assets (such as the NATO AWACS fleet) which forces the organization to rely almost wholly on either national assets or to "borrow" assets from NATO. The member states have yet to work out a codified system to procure funding for operations. In the end, as Catherine McArdle Kelleher points out about the WEU, "the value of the organization lies in its potential, not in its present achievements or basically nonexistent capabilities."⁶⁰

While the WEU has made several important steps towards the development of ESDI, it is clear that the organization still has a number of obstacles to overcome. The WEU's continued reliance on NATO resources (necessitated by a lack of assets in the intelligence, theater lift and command and control fields) presents a dichotomy.⁶¹ On the one hand, for the immediate future all major WEU operations will be subject to American approval through the NAC. Conversely, it also means that future WEU

⁶⁰Kelleher, 62-63.

⁶¹Specific military assets in which the United States has a clear preponderance include: "satellite surveillance; command, control, communication and intelligence; logistics; long-range airlift and sealift; all-weather aviation; amphibious capabilities; large deck aircraft carriers; and missile defenses;" John Duffield, "NATO's Functions After the Cold War," *Political Science Quarterly* 109 (Winter 1994-95): 781.

operations *will be possible* through either CJTF actions or the release of national forces from NATO obligations. At the same time, the lack of an integrated military command structure forces the WEU to tie its potential headquarters to established NATO headquarters, again with the same results--the ability to conduct operations, but with substantial NATO influence. CJTF operations thus offer the opportunity to satisfy both the Atlanticist and the Europeanist stance on European security. American influence is preserved through CJTF, but there is now also a mechanism in place to allow for greater European autonomy in security matters.

In an era of declining defense expenditures, CJTF is attractive to the Europeans because through its access to American assets it lessens the need for WEU states to develop autonomous capabilities that would replicate those same American resources. The WEU also gains access to NATO's established communications, and command and control infrastructure.⁶² At the same time, CJTF establishes a mechanism to allow the Americans to provide assets and support, but not necessarily troops for out-of-area operations in which Washington wishes to avoid involvement.

Through the double-hatting system, the CJTF concept allows forces to be answerable to both NATO and the WEU. This has bolstered the number of units committed to the WEU. As a result, states have a greater range of options to address national concerns. For example, the Southern European NATO states of Portugal, Spain,

⁶²For instance, in October of 1995, NATO agreed to provide the WEU with communications connections which would provide plain and encrypted communications between NATO and the WEU and between the WEU headquarters in Brussels and WEU capitals; "Signature of a Memorandum of Understanding between NATO and WEU," *NATO Review* 44, no. 1 (January 1996): 19.

France and Italy were able to establish EUROFOR and EUROMARFOR to address potential instability in the Mediterranean.

The CJTF concept also has the added benefit of establishing a means for military operations involving NATO and both the WEU and PfP states. This provides another concrete step to increase cooperation between the nation-states of Europe. Hence, the PfP and neutral states, such as Austria or Sweden, have moved from being limited to a security dialogue with the West through the NACC, to participating in joint exercises with the NATO members and conducting humanitarian and peace enforcement operations such as the ongoing Implementation Force (IFOR) operation in Bosnia.⁶³ Membership in PfP and WEU observer status serve as complimentary means to allow NATO non-member states to integrate themselves into the broad framework of Western European security through joint exercises, training, and consultation.⁶⁴

At the same time PfP also serves as a stepping stone for NATO membership. Through expansion of the Alliance, NATO provides a mechanism to extend the security sphere of Western Europe to the east. Furthermore, since enthusiasm for EU expansion was waned as the general "euro-phoria" has faded against the economic pains of EMU, NATO expansion will almost certainly proceed EU expansion. The first wave of Central and East European states, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, have generally met the basic requirements involving minority and border issues, and civil-military relations,

⁶³IFOR includes contingents from the following PfP members: Russia, the Ukraine, Poland, Romania, Sweden, the Czech Republic, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Austria, Finland, and Hungary. In addition, Hungary also provided staging areas for NATO forces.

⁶⁴Anthony Cragg, "The Partnership for Peace Planning and Review Process," *NATO Review* 43, no. 6 (November 1995): 23-25.

to qualify for NATO membership and should enter the Alliance by the turn of the century.⁶⁵ In addition, NATO has also moved forward to address the concerns of those states in Pfp that are unlikely to join the Alliance within the near future. Several proposals have been put forth in an effort to include these states within the framework of the Alliance. One such recommendation is the development of a "super-Pfp" which would grant states practically all the rights of full-NATO membership except the Article V guarantee.⁶⁶

Steps have also been taken to alleviate Russian concerns over NATO expansion, and additional steps are in the works. At a "16 + 1" meeting following the Berlin Summit, Russia acknowledged the "inevitability" of NATO enlargement and proposed a more meaningful system of "16 + 1" meetings to address issues such as proliferation and disarmament. In response, NATO's Council of Ministers agreed to establish "permanent mechanisms for political consultations" between NATO and Russia.⁶⁷ This has been followed by American calls for a direct charter between NATO and Russia.⁶⁸ The

⁶⁵See Gebhardt Von Moltke, "NATO Moves Towards Enlargement," *NATO Review* 44, no. 1 (January 1996): 3-6.

⁶⁶The Super-Pfp proposal is aimed, in particular, at the Baltic states as a means to alleviate their security concerns without unduly provoking a backlash from Russia; "Baltics May Have to Take 'Second Best'," *Financial Times* (22 November, 1996), 2.

⁶⁷The contemporary American Secretary of Defense, William J. Perry, called for Russia to open permanent liaison offices at NATO headquarters in Brussels and at the Alliance's strategic commands. In exchange, NATO would establish reciprocal liaisons with the Russian General Staff; Perry, Speech; IISS, *Military Balance*, 1996/97, 35.

⁶⁸The contemporary American Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, called for a formal charter between NATO and Russia which would "create standing arrangements for consultation and joint action" as well as establishing "a permanent mechanism for crisis management." Christopher went on to call for joint training between NATO and Russian troops in order to prepare for joint exercises; Warren Christopher, Speech,

Alliance has also pledged that "NATO countries have no intention, no plan, and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members."⁶⁹ NATO has also offered concessions to Russia over the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty.⁷⁰

In these ways, NATO has alleviated much of the demand for an autonomous ESDI, distinct from the transatlantic Alliance. PfP, while admittedly less than the hard security guarantees sought by most Central and East European states, provides a mechanism for security engagement between NATO and non-member states. PfP also prevents a vacuum from forming in the geographic space between the West and Russia and helps dampen the emergence of ethno-nationalistic strife in this region. Meanwhile, CJTF allows for the development of a European pillar within the framework of the Alliance—a pillar that is "separable, but not separate". This is critically important since the reluctance of Great Britain, Italy, the Netherlands and the neutral states to give the EU direct political authority over the WEU seems to preclude the development of ESDI under the auspices of the EU for the immediate future,⁷¹ and no other institution could credibly foster ESDI. Even France has gone "in four short years from NATO's denigrator

Stuttgart (6 September 1996).

⁶⁹The strong wording of the statement reflects the Alliance's desire to defuse the nuclear issue with Russia; see NATO, NAC, *Final Communique, Ministerial Meeting of the NAC*, M-NAC-2 (96) 165, 10 December 1996.

⁷⁰These concessions are in response to Moscow's desire to update the CFE treaty to better reflect the post-Cold War world; Bruce Clark and Peter Wise, "NATO and Russia Plan Arms Talks," *Financial Times* (3 December 1996), 1.

⁷¹For elucidation of this point, see John Goulden, "The WEU's Role in the New Strategic Environment," *NATO Review* 44, no. 3 (May 1996): 21-24.

to its supporter."⁷² NATO has become an essential part of the "community-building" process of Western Europe by complementing the economic links of the region with security measures. With its reform process, NATO has met the three main challenges facing the organization at the end of the Cold War: NATO has adapted itself to new missions; it has inaugurated the process of enlargement and engagement of Central and East Europe; and the Alliance has begun to develop a new, post-Cold War relationship with Russia. The Cold War Alliance was thought by many to be unable to adapt to the changing security requirements of the new Europe, and the drive for greater European autonomy in security matters propelled new initiatives designed to speed the development of ESDI. Within a few short years, it has become clear that far from being a "Cold War relic," NATO remains the cornerstone of Europe's security architecture.

Concerns over the renationalization of Western Europe have dissipated as Germany has remained firmly committed to the institutional course it developed during the Cold War. In Central and Eastern Europe, with the glaring exception of Bosnia, states have in fact worked towards the resolution of minority issues and the acceptance of established borders as preconditions for inclusion in the security and economic structures of the West. NATO expansion will also precede EU expansion into Central Europe, thus tying the Visegrad states into the fabric of the West through the security architecture of the West before these states join the economic system. The recent decision by Switzerland to join PfP, and thereby erode that country's vaunted neutrality, is demonstrative of the growing recognition of the centrality of NATO as the foundation

⁷²On this issue, see Robert J. Art, "Why Western Europe Needs the United States and NATO," *Political Science Quarterly* 111, no. 1 (Spring 1996): 34.

of Europe's security architecture. Meanwhile, until and unless the WEU develops significantly more capabilities, NATO remains West Europe's best security guarantee against the re-emergence of an assertive or expansionistic Russia, and the best vehicle to prevent such a possibility. NATO's nuclear deterrent also provides the most effective detriment to the use of WMDs against Western Europe. Through the work of NATO's nuclear planning groups, the Alliance has begun to develop multi-layered and multi-faceted methods to deter against WMD attack, including anti-missile systems. NATO has established regular consultations with Russia in the "16+1" negotiations to work towards the effective control of Russia's nuclear arsenal and, through the PGP, begun to address the political means to counter proliferation of WMDs.

The Alliance has been able to adopt a compromise position which, for the Atlanticist states, maintains the centrality of the American commitment to European security while, for the more Eurocentric states, fosters a greater degree of European influence and direction over potential operations, and in doing so, promotes the development of ESDI within the framework of the existing transatlantic relationship. The success of NATO in evolving to meet most of the post-Cold War security concerns of Europe has prevented the WEU from growing into a more substantial organization and has preserved the main foundations that led to the success of the Transatlantic Alliance.

Both the EDC and the revived WEU were initiatives that were proposed by France in an effort to prevent a resurgent Germany from becoming a hegemonal power in central Europe. For France, the EDC offered a means by which to engage the Federal Republic into a broad European security system. By pooling the military resources of

the continent and Great Britain, French policy makers saw the EDC as the only means through which Germany could be safely rearmed in the face of the Soviet threat, without a return of German militarism or nationalism.

The failure of the EDC demonstrated the importance of the involvement of the "big four" of West European security—the United States, France, Germany, and Great Britain. The EDC also demonstrated the inability of Washington to force its will on its European allies, and offered a foreshadowing of later divergences between the United States and France. The debate over German rearmament also offered a preview of many of the issues that would ultimately arise over German reunification. With the failure of the EDC, the WEU became the vehicle with which to rescue the Transatlantic Alliance. The Federal Republic's entrance into the WEU allowed for German rearmament, while British participation involved that nation in continental security, all the while assuaging French concerns over Germany.

Many of the main issues surrounding the EDC would later surface in the relaunch of the WEU in the 1980s. The EDC, the revived WEU was initially proposed primarily as a means to supplant NATO and lessen the influence of the United States in European security. Some saw NATO as a relic of the conflict and advocated the creation of new structures to respond to new security concerns. Nonetheless, the WEU became the means to develop a European pillar within the Transatlantic Alliance and thereby the means to allow the United States to underwrite European security concerns by granting access to American assets. The WEU allows for greater autonomy within the Alliance without detracting from NATO itself. In the end, the main direction of European military integration continues to be within the framework of the Transatlantic Alliance.

CHAPTER X

EUROPEAN DEFENSE-INDUSTRIAL INTEGRATION

Parallel with the effort to develop operational capabilities for the WEU, there has been an effort, spurred mainly by France and Germany and joined as of late by Great Britain, to cultivate a unified defense market in Western Europe. While there have been sporadic efforts towards this end since 1953,¹ defense cutbacks and declining arms transfers have led to a period of consolidation and excess capacity for the major European defense manufacturers.² In an effort to save these industries and to establish autonomous capabilities for the next generation of sophisticated weaponry, and thereby lessen reliance on American products, the Western European Armaments Group (WEAG) was formed in 1992 as part of the WEU.³ In general, the European states have lagged behind the United States in their transition to defense production in the post-Cold War era. While the United States has already gone through a period of consolidation and mergers in its domestic defense industries, the Europeans have yet to make significant

¹In October 1953, France (F), Italy (I), the Netherlands (N), Belgium (BE) and Luxembourg (L) formed FINBEL which promoted consultation and coordination among the member states, including the standardization of equipment.

²In overall terms, defense outlays declined by an average of twelve percent between 1989 and 1994. In addition, between 1984 and 1992, some 410,000 defense related jobs were lost (out a total of just over a million), and it is expected that the West European defense industry will continue to lose some 30,000 jobs a year for the foreseeable future; WEU, Assembly of the WEU, Document 1483.

³The purposes of WEAG include "the reduction of national research, development and production costs which overlap"; "creation of conditions for an integrated, rationalized and competitive European defense industry;" and "identification of conditions and measures which could improve market conditions for a more competitive approach to European, including intra-European, procurement;" WEU, 1483, 13.

similar market adjustments. In addition, the governments of many European nations continue to support and subsidize costly and inefficient defense manufacturers.

Concurrently, European producers face a variety of problems that range from repetition and redundancy of effort to disadvantages associated with the small economies of scale of the militaries of these nations.

In response to these problems, European defense firms have become the driving force behind integration efforts in the defense-industrial sector. While certain governments, particularly France and Germany, had previously pushed joint ventures and collaborative defense projects, they have now been superseded by Europe's private sector in its efforts to remain competitive with the United States. This is especially true in an age when national marketplaces can no longer provide security to the state. Instead, national security has to be provided by international or transnational markets. As national borders become less important, efficiency has become the main focus of state governments as they attempt to retain both some element of defense-industrial capability and to preserve market share. The role of the state in Europe has been transformed so that now the state defines national priorities, but the market is the driving force behind policy development. Hence the new spirit of defense-industrial cooperation in Europe is driven by the private sector and is manifested in a renewed level of both bilateralism, in the form of joint projects and multilateralism in the form of multinational, collaborative ventures that are structured to benefit both national firms and national governments.

This chapter will review the current trends in the arms industry and the effect of military downsizing on the European defense manufacturers. The increased influence of

the private sector will be detailed against the reaction of the European states to constraints on arms production in the post-Cold War era and the resultant multilateralism. The response of France to the changed environment in the defense sector will be compared with that of the United States in order to illustrate the opposite ends of the spectrum of actions taken to adapt to the new global arms market.⁴ Finally, strategies to preserve Europe's defense-industrial base will be examined in light of the continuing constriction on the sector and the renewed bi- and multilateralism of the market.

From 1990 through 1995, total global arms exports declined by 73 percent.⁵ In 1997, the value of major arms transfers was approximately \$25 billion or about 62 percent of the volume of 1986.⁶ This drop occurred as nations have dramatically cut defense expenditures since the end of the Cold War. Of the five regions which spent the most (93 percent) on defense outlays, East Asia, Eastern Europe, the Middle East, North America, and Western Europe, only East Asia has posted continuous positive growth since the end of the Cold War.⁷ In Europe, all of the major powers, with the exception of

⁴France and the United Kingdom are Europe's leading arms producers, and in 1997, France ranked second only to the United States in total arms sales. In addition, France has become the leading supplier of arms to developing nations. More significantly, France has pursued a very different strategy toward defense-industrial restructuring than has the United States.

⁵U.S., Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers (WMEAT), 1995* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1996), 15.

⁶See, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), *SIPRI Yearbook: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, 1998* (London: Oxford, 1998).

⁷East Asia posted positive growth of some 3.3 percent, while Eastern Europe declined by 24.1 percent, the Middle East dropped by 18.0 percent, North American fell by 3.0 percent and Western Europe declined by 3.3 percent; U.S., ACDA, *WMEAT, 1996*

Greece and Turkey have dramatically cut military spending.⁸ Since 1987, world military expenditures have declined at an average yearly rate of 4.5 percent. Worldwide military spending has declined from its peak in 1987 of some \$1 trillion to \$668 billion in 1996 (at 1993 constant dollars).⁹ This translates into an overall reduction of some one third.

Since 1990, the West European states saw their share of the world's arms export market decline from 67 percent to 43 percent.¹⁰ These trends have led to a significant period of downsizing and consolidation in the global defense industry, and among the Western arms firms. These changes have been exacerbated as major Western nations themselves have dramatically reduced their defense spending, hence putting added pressure on national arms manufacturers who were already reeling from declining export markets. From 1994 to 1997, defense spending by the EU memberstates declined from \$168 billion to \$157 billion.¹¹ A study by the Statistical Office of the European Communities showed that the eight nations of Europe that represent 80 percent of the

(Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1997), 2.

⁸Greece has expanded defense outlays since 1990 by approximately 5.8 percent. Turkey has increased spending by 1.7 percent, but the nation has increased its procurement budget by 20 percent, while cutting personnel costs by 15 percent; Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *SIPRI Yearbook: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, 1997* (London: Oxford, 1997), 165.

⁹Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC), *Conversion Survey 1998: Global Disarmament, Defense Industry Consolidation and Conversion* (Bonn: BICC, 1998), chapter 6, 2.

¹⁰US, ACDA, *WMEAT, 1996*, 22.

¹¹IISS, *The Military Balance, 1996/97*, 34.

EU's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) reduced their defense budgets from an average of 3.18 percent of GDP to 1.88 percent over a ten-year period.¹²

Significantly, much of this decline in defense expenditures came in the form of reductions in procurement of new weapons systems. From 1987 to 1997, procurement by European states declined by an average of 10 percent per year.¹³ The dynamics of this environment has created a highly competitive "buyer's market" which has given arms consumers increased purchasing power and arms manufacturing states less inhibitions about their distribution. Representatives from Western defense firms have already spent considerable time and effort in attempts to gain footholds around the world—even what would normally be viewed as small-scale purchases may be critically important as states continue to procure ever-increasing numbers of the same equipment. This is especially significant when the total number of states is considered and even small states such as Latvia look to procure Western arms.¹⁴

In response to the present budgetary constraints of these states, and yet with a determination to secure their places in the export markets of these same states, Western defense manufacturers have devised a number of strategies to capture market shares in new markets such as Eastern Europe or Latin America.¹⁵ New markets are especially

¹²European Union, *Eurostat*, no. 4298 (11 June 1998), 3.

¹³SIPRI, *SIPRI Yearbook, 1997*, 185-87.

¹⁴"Latvian Army Changes," *Jane's Military Exercise & Training Monitor* (January 1996): 2.

¹⁵Estimates put the potential market in East Europe to be worth some \$35 billion over the next decade; "Military Build-up in Central and Eastern Europe: NATO Membership for Sale," *BASIC Papers*, no. 22 (July 1997), 4. In addition, studies predict that the markets in Latin America may be worth as much as \$80 billion over the next ten years

important in light of the declines in the existing markets. For instance, the total value of arms exports to the Middle East declined from \$8.3 billion in 1988 to \$5.04 billion in 1997, while European purchases fell from \$11.82 billion to \$4.87 billion over the same period.¹⁶ Middle East purchases of new equipment have fallen to about half what they were immediately following their peak during the Gulf War.¹⁷ Nonetheless, the Middle East remains the world's largest export market, followed closely by East Asia.¹⁸ Meanwhile most of the decline in European sales occurred in Eastern Europe—a market which has contracted by dramatically since the end of the Cold War.¹⁹

New strategies that states have adopted to promote arms sales include options that range from joint manufacturing offers to "rent to own" deals. Specifically, in addition to attempts to persuade states to purchase new arms and weapons systems, Western efforts have revolved around four main approaches: leasing equipment options; collaborative manufacturing; offset deals; and incentives centered around the transfer of "free" equipment.

with three states, Brazil, Chile and Columbia purchasing the majority of new equipment; "Study Reveals Latin America Defense Markets Worth Nearly \$80 Billion," *Defence Systems Daily* (5 June 1998).

¹⁶Ian Anthony, Pieter D. Wezeman, and Siemon T. Wezeman, "The Volume of Transfers of Major Conventional Weapons, 1988-97," *SIPRI Arms Transfers Project Report* (17 July 1997), 2.

¹⁷ACDA, *WMEAT, 1996*, 13.

¹⁸The Middle East and East Asia accounted for 92.5 percent of total arms imports during the period from 1994 to 1997; Wade Boese, "U.S. Remains Largest Supplier to a Shrinking Arms Market," *Arms Control Today* (June/July 1998).

¹⁹Arms exports to Eastern Europe dropped from a peak of 9.2 percent of the world's total in 1985 to 2.6 percent of the world's total in 1995; *Ibid.*, 12.

Much of the focus of these new efforts has been in Central and Eastern Europe. NATO expansion to the nations of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, have enticed Western arms manufacturers attempting to sell equipment as these states and other future Alliance candidates such as Romania. These states seek to acquire Western arms in order to both achieve interoperability and to gain favor with the West.²⁰

American defense firms have centered their tactics around the lease option. With some 350 used F-16 aircraft on hand, the United States Air Force has signaled its willingness to allow numbers of these planes to be leased in the hopes that lessees will in the future purchase new F-16s. If states are still unable or unwilling to acquire new fighters, then those states would have the option to buy the used planes. Besides F-16s, the Americans have also made similar proposals for C-130 transport aircraft and E-2 AWACs early warning aircraft.²¹ American defense firms, following well-established practices used elsewhere, have also made significant offers in the context of joint manufacturing of weapons systems. For instance, the American defense firm, Lockheed Martin Corporation, has offered to allow between 50 and 100 percent of the manufacturing of new F-16s to be done domestically in new markets.²² The 1995 F-18

²⁰This is especially true in regards to advanced fighter aircraft which all three new NATO members are planning to purchase, yet for which there is little comparable threat to provoke such purchases; BASIC, "Military Build-up," 3.

²¹Daniel T. Plesch and Sam Fournier, "East Embraced in NATO's Arms," *The Nation* (December 25, 1995): 827.

²²"US-Polish F-16 Deal May be Worth \$1.5 BLN-Lockheed," *CET On-Line*, no. 357 (May 29, 1996)

sale to Finland included a provision for the domestic manufacture of 57 of the planes.²³

In addition, the United States government has granted Romania a license to domestically manufacture ninety-six Cobra Attack helicopters.²⁴ This deal alone is worth \$3 billion to U.S. manufacturers.²⁵

While American firms have centered their efforts on the lease options and collaborative manufacturing, the European states have concentrated their efforts on offset deals and incentives. The primary focus of the European offset strategy centers around offers to invest in the export countries infrastructure, both in military and civilian terms.²⁶ For example, Swedish companies have pledged to invest some \$100 million in Hungary to "modernize" factories and improve the technological base of the nation if that state purchases the Saab/British Aerospace-built JAS 39 Gripen fighter.²⁷ When Hungary agreed to these terms and signed an agreement to purchase some 30 Gripens for an eventual \$1 billion, American companies such as Lockheed and McDonnell Douglas sent teams to the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland in an effort to find companies

²³IISS, *Military Balance*, 1996, 47.

²⁴Plesch and Fournier, 827

²⁵Jorgen Dragsdahl, "NATO Resists Pressures to Militarize Central Europe," *BASIC Papers*, no. 28 (July 1998), 1.

²⁶The European use of offsets reflects the region's own preference for its arms transfer agreements. European states regularly demand offset deals in exchange for the purchase of American equipment. In 1995, the Europeans accounted for some 86 per cent of all U.S. offset arrangements; Barbara Starr, *Jane's Defence Weekly* (September 24, 1997): 19.

²⁷Raymond Bonner, "Central Europe is Newest Arena for Arms Race," *New York Times* (July 15, 1996): A-1; "Hungary's Fighter Deal Ready to Take Off," *CET On-Line*, no. 348 (May 14, 1996).

that the American firms could invest in.²⁸ In the realm of incentives, Sweden has offered Poland the free use of a squadron of AJS 37 Viggen fighters if the Poles purchase Gripens.

Both American and European governments have taken additional actions which should aid their respective defense industries. The United States has used its military training programs to familiarize and train Eastern European military officers on American weapons systems. In the Pentagon's International Military Education and Training Program (IMET), Czechs, Hungarians, Poles and Romanians make up the largest contingents from Europe (surpassing even traditional American allies such as Turkey or Greece) and the largest dollar figures.²⁹ The U.S. also shifted \$7.8 million away from economic assistance programs to defense assistance programs in the new NATO members.³⁰ In addition, the American government supplied Hungary with American radio equipment to use on Hungarian MiG-21s until the aircraft are replaced and funded a study of Poland's command and control system.

The cessation of Cold War hostilities has mostly benefitted the conflict's primary protagonists by abrogating their massive procurement efforts. Government attention and resources that were once funneled into the military sector, have now turned towards long-neglected economic and social issues. However, the sudden disruption of

²⁸Bonner, A-6.

²⁹This pattern began in 1994, and by 1997, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland were given \$1.3 million, \$1.5 million and \$1.5 million under IMET; U.S. Department of Defense, *Defense Almanac*, '95, no. 5 (Fall, 1995), 36-37; U.S., Department of Defense, *Defense Almanac*, '97, no. 5, (Fall 1997), 38.

³⁰BASIC, "Military Build-up," 4.

large defense expenditure has created a dilemma for industries within arms producing states, and therefore a dilemma for the governments of these states—how to reduce government expenditure, yet maintain their defense industrial base.

The dilemma created by defense downsizing is twofold, with domestic and strategic dimensions. On the domestic side, post-Cold War domestic restructuring in arms producing states has led to reduced profit for corporations in the domain of defense production.³¹ It has led many manufacturers to take on increased debt levels in order to finance new programs and research and development.³² This trend has resulted in growing dislocation and unemployment for defense sector workers. From 1987 to 1996, 8.3 million of 17.5 million jobs in the global defense industry were lost. This corresponds to a decline of some 47 percent.³³ Defense procurement declines have led to domestic restructuring in arms producing states as well. Within the context of these domestic determinants arms sales have become the focus of states who are seeking to preserve the vitality of their industrial base which is perceived at risk by all concerned. The strategic dimension involves the state motivation to protect the talents of arms producing corporations, because these corporations are uniquely endowed with technological abilities not easily recreated once lost.³⁴ This makes parent states less willing to allow defense corporations to simply dissolve overnight.

³¹Defense profits peaked in 1987; Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *Yearbook, 1997*, 244.

³²“Soaring Debt May Tether Industry,” *Defense News*, (15 January 1996), 9.

³³BICC, 1.

³⁴On this theme, see U.S., Office of Technology Assessment, *Defense Conversion: Redirecting R & D* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1993).

Defense corporations across the globe have not fared equally during the current era of reduced global defense expenditure.³⁵ Corporations located in Western states have similarly eliminated positions and also developed the tactic of government-sponsored consolidation.³⁶ Industries of former Soviet bloc states have mostly ceased production, their home countries being burdened with the task of selling the inventory they already possess.

The exception to this trend among the states of the former Soviet Union is Russia. Russia military doctrine formally encourages weapons exports as a means to accomplish a variety of goals. Russia needs the hard currency of weapons exports to pay for the conversion of defense industries and the dismantlement existing weapons systems. Even under the revised Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE) limits that were approved in June, Russia still has to drastically reduce the number of weapons systems in its flank areas.³⁷ In addition, exports would both pay for further military research and for the development of new weapons systems. Finally, Moscow believes weapons exports are necessary in order to maintain the capabilities and means of

³⁵Reduced global defense expenditure can be demonstrated by the decline of the arms trade in general. In 1987 the value of arms trade deliveries totaled \$78.6 billion which decreased to \$29.6 billion by 1994; IISS, *The Military Balance 1996/97*, 274.

³⁶For more concerning the consolidation trend see, Jeff Cole, "Defense Consolidation Rushes Toward an Era Of Only 3 or 4 Giants," *Wall Street Journal*, (December 6, 1996), A-1; Thomas Kamm and Matt Marshall, "Global Forces Push Europe's Firms, Too, Into a Merger Frenzy," *Wall Street Journal*, (April 4, 1997), A-1

³⁷For instance, Russia has to reduce the number of tanks from 1,897 to 1,300; the number of armored vehicles from 4,397 to 1,380; and the number of artillery pieces from 2,422 to 1,640; Sarah Walking, "CFE's Russian Flank Issue is Solved," *Jane's Intelligence Review* (August 1996): 3.

production of existing systems and to maintain the "social guarantees" for Russians involved in weapons production.³⁸

In an effort to increase weapons sales, Russia has reorganized its defense industry by combining the three agencies that had formerly managed arms exports into a single entity—*Rosvooruzhenie*. The relative price advantages of Russian weapons and more aggressive marketing have doubled sales since 1994.³⁹ Russia's share of the world's arms market fell from 35.3 per cent in 1989 (worth some \$18.9 billion) to 11.7 per cent in 1994 (\$1.5 billion) and then rebounded to 31.6 per cent (some \$3.1 billion) in 1995.⁴⁰ In particular, Russian sales to Central and Eastern Europe have continued for three main reasons: Russian equipment is less expensive; It is interoperable with existing weapons; and Russia has used arms exports as a means to address its debts with states in the region.

Reduction of defense expenditure has had a cascade effect of forcing industry-wide consolidation, with the result of exacerbating unemployment. A contrast of the French and U.S. experiences illustrates different approaches taken to the current trends in the defense industry. Substantial unemployment and government involvement with the major defense firms in France have prevented meaningful reforms and consolidation in the nation's defense sector. Meanwhile U.S. firms have dramatically downsized and

³⁸Charles Dick, "Russian Military Doctrine," *Jane's Intelligence Review--Special Report* (January 1994): 12.

³⁹Edwin Bacon, "Russian Arms Exports--A Triumph for Marketing?" *Jane's Intelligence Review* 6, no. 6 (June 1994): 268; Sarah Walkling, "U.S. Arms Sales Continue Decline, Russia Top Exporter in 1995," *Arms Control Today* 26, no. 6 (August 1996): 33.

⁴⁰Grimmett, 80-81.

consolidated, eliminating repetition and increasing efficiency through economies of scale and reduced labor costs.⁴¹ In this way, U.S. firms have reacted much more successfully to the changed global arms market than have the Europeans.⁴² In fact, with the exception of 1995, for the past eight years, the U.S. has been the world's leading arms supplier.⁴³

In general, defense contractors have adopted a variety of responses to the changed marketplace. As new military technologies have emerged, two broad trends have influenced weapon development.⁴⁴ First, the development of "revolutionary" technologies has led to vast increases in capital investments in national armed forces, all the while manpower numbers have declined. This trend has been accelerated by the move toward integrating electronics into weapons systems.⁴⁵ Second, companies have increasingly turned to the creation and production of dual-use technologies that have applications in both the civilian and defense sectors. Dual-use technologies allow firms to spin-off military technology to the private sector and thereby recoup research and development expenditures and diversify into the commercial market. The development

⁴¹For a concise overview, see Berkeley Planning Associates, *Evaluation of Defense Conversion Adjustment Demonstration* (Oakland: Berkeley Planning Associates, 1995).

⁴²See Norman R. Augustine, "Reengineering the Arsenal of Democracy," *Atlantic Council of the United States: Bulletin 9*, no. 6 (August 1998); and for a more detailed picture of the changes in the U.S. defense industry, see U.S., Department of Defense, *100 Companies Receiving the Largest Volume of Prime Contract Awards* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1995).

⁴³Boese, "U.S. Remains Largest Supplier," 1.

⁴⁴BICC, 3.

⁴⁵On electronic warfare and digitization in the military, see U.S., Department of Defense, *Defense Almanac*, 97.

of dual-use technologies is estimated to have created 500,000 new jobs in the defense sector which has otherwise seen the aforementioned dramatic losses.⁴⁶ The increased costs of new weapons systems is one reason for the spread of dual-use technologies. A result of the combination of the reduced expenditures by states and the increased costs of newer electronic and digital systems has been the creation of a dichotomy wherein states wish to buy and deploy state of the art equipment, but are prevented from doing so by fiscal constraints.

One result is a widening technological gap, first between the United States and Europe, and second between the larger states of Europe and the small nations. As a Defense Science Board report pointed out, “US and allied military commanders and other officials have expressed concern that with the USA’s unmatched ability to invest in next-generation military technologies, it runs the risk of outpacing NATO and other allies to the point where they are incapable of operating effectively with US forces on future battlefields.”⁴⁷ For instance in the field of digitization, the U.S. military has moved from a “formative phase” of development and experimentation to one of “consolidation” and application.⁴⁸ While the U.S. is deploying new electronic warfare systems on the battlefield and testing them in exercises, most other nations have slowed or eliminated their digitization programs. France, the Netherlands and Sweden have all dramatically scaled back their programs due to budgetary concerns while Great Britain

⁴⁶BICC, 10.

⁴⁷As reported by Bryan Bender, “US Worried by Coalition ‘Technology-Gap’,” *Jane’s Defence Weekly* (29 July 1998): 8.

⁴⁸Rupert Pengelley, “Digitization Hits a Rocky Road,” *Jane’s International Defence Review* (July 1998): 53.

has yet to develop a long-range concept of how to integrate these new technologies into their conventional ground systems. Alone among the U.S.'s Atlantic allies, Germany is the only other nation besides the U.S. to test a battle management system at the battalion level during military exercises.⁴⁹

Much of the reductions in European defense expenditures have come at the expense of research and development and in weapons procurement. Between 1995 and 1997, NATO's European members cut expenditures on research and development from a total of \$13.5 billion to \$11.2 billion. Non-NATO European states, including the "neutral states" of Austria and Sweden, cut their spending from \$186 million to \$172 million⁵⁰ European expenditures on procurement and research and development illustrate the gap between the large and small states of the continent. The vast majority of spending on new weapons and technology was by just three countries: France, Germany and the United Kingdom.⁵¹ While the U.S. has also cut research and procurement expenditures, it still spends three times as much on research and development of new weapons as all of the NATO states combined.⁵²

⁴⁹Ibid., 53-54.

⁵⁰International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), *The Military Balance, 1997/98*, (London: IISS, 1997), 34.

⁵¹For example, in 1997, France spent \$4.6 billion on R & D, while Germany spent \$1.7 billion and the United Kingdom spent \$3.5 billion. Taken together, the three nations routinely account for more than half the European defense outlays for R& D; *ibid.*

⁵²See SIPRI, *Yearbook, 1998*; and IISS, *The Military Balance, 1997/98*.

The differences between U.S. and European military expenditures extend beyond issues of scale and scope. The Defense Minister of Norway, Dag Fjaervoll, summed up the differences in the following manner:

The European efforts [in defense expenditures and procurement] appear to be directed generally towards improvements to existing systems and concepts, with rich duplication of efforts and lack of coordination. The technology gap is now evident in several critical areas such as high energy lasers, imaging and remote control technologies. Novel American applications of these advanced technologies are found in intelligence systems, simulation systems, command systems, unmanned aircraft and other vehicles, and a variety of lethal, and non-lethal weapons.⁵³

Unemployment on the European continent has continued to remain stubbornly in the double-digit category, with military-industrial concerns continuing the downsizing process. Hence, French policy makers have been under pressure to limit cuts in the defense sector. For example, one of the largest French military suppliers, Thomson-CSF, released 2,300 employees in 1996, and cut an additional by cutting 2,700 jobs in 1997.⁵⁴ After acquiring Dassault Electronique, Thomson-CSF merged the company with two of its affiliates and announced an additional 4,000 job cuts in 1998.⁵⁵ Of the 252,000 defense jobs in France in 1990, only 193,00 remained in 1996.⁵⁶ Further cuts can be expected as France continues to rework its 1997-2002 defense spending program. The

⁵³Dag Fjaervoll, "Military Technology—The Transatlantic Gap," in *Europe and the US: Partners in Defense*, ed. Jacqueline Grapin (Washington, D.C.: European Institute, 1998), 31.

⁵⁴"French Military Supplier Plans 2,700 Job Cuts," *New York Times*, (November 26, 1996), D-5.

⁵⁵J.A.C. Lewis, "Thomson-CSF Plans to Cut 4,000 Jobs," *Jane's Defence Weekly* (6 January 1999), 16.

⁵⁶SIPRI, *Yearbook, 1997*, 171.

original program, passed in 1996, called for reductions in defense spending by some 14 percent. Included in the plan was a restructuring of the nation's defense industries which was designed to produce a 30 percent reduction in the sector.⁵⁷ However, the original plan has been reduced even further and instead of the FF92 billion per year figure, the Ministry of Defense (MOD) now plans to spend FF85 billion per year.⁵⁸ Furthermore, a number of programs were canceled by the MOD including the HORUS radar satellite, the TRIGAT LR antitank missile, and the MACPED antitank mine. In addition, a number of other programs were cut back including the delay of the third and fourth submarines of the *Le Triomphant* class and delays in the acquisition of new M51 missiles.⁵⁹

Nonetheless, pressure from the defense industry forced the government to soften the planned cuts. For instance, the Rafale fighter program was suspended in 1996, but under pressure from Dassault the government signed contracts for 48 new aircraft in a measure designed to keep the company alive. In addition, existing orders for new aircraft were moved forward so that the first deliveries would be in 2001 instead of 2005.⁶⁰ Yet, the government has also used the aircraft program in a bid to promote consolidation in the defense sector. One French journalist described the relationship between Dassault and the MOD as such: "It is nowadays completely clear that the

⁵⁷Ibid., 169.

⁵⁸Jean-Marc Tanguy, "France's Program Review: In the Middle of the Rubicon," *Defense Systems Daily* (28 May 1998).

⁵⁹Ibid.

⁶⁰SIPRI, *Yearbook, 1997*, 170.

RAFALE programme is completely hostage to the French government's stated goal of enforcing a merger between Dassault and Aerospatiale."⁶¹

Within the French government, however, there has emerged a clear understanding that France cannot be autonomous in its defense procurement. While in the past joint and collaborative projects were seen as means to share costs and ensure or expand market share, it has become clear that the nation must look to other suppliers to meet some equipment needs. In an editorial, the French Minister of Defense, Alain Richard, admitted that "France can no longer autonomously conceive and produce at a world class level 95% of its equipment needs."⁶² He went on to state that the current level of costs forced states to seek a true sharing of costs and a sharing of roles. However, Richard also stated that France only wanted to participate in broad initiatives that met three criteria: 1) that national governments be involved in the decision-making framework; 2) that industry restructuring be done through a "harmonized regulatory structure;" and 3) that all equipment programs be based on cooperative armament programs.⁶³

Paris recognizes the necessity of developing a consolidated, transnational defense industry in order to compete with the United States which has 15 of the world's 30 largest defense contractors.⁶⁴ Both French policy makers and industry leaders would like

⁶¹Tanguy, 4.

⁶²Alain Richard, *L'Armement* (March 1998); reprinted by FED- CREST (1 June 1998).

⁶³Ibid.

⁶⁴Marvin Leibstone, "The U.S. Defense and Aerospace Industry," *Defense Systems Daily* (5 October 1998): 4.

to develop a multinational base with German and British firms. Unfortunately, the French are constrained by two major factors. First, the defense industry in France is fragmented and rivalry between domestic firms is intense. French firms have yet to develop the type of clear mission or niche that defense companies in other states have established. This makes domestic cooperation difficult, to say nothing of transnational collaboration. Second, and more significant, the heavy involvement of the French government in individual companies prevents firms from other nations, including Great Britain's Aerospace and Germany's Daimler, from merging or creating joint subsidiaries with French firms. Also, Paris cannot expect to hold the same type of public ownership it currently does in future multinational firms.⁶⁵ Hence, until Paris is able and willing to make necessary adjustments in its industrial policy, it will continue to be eclipsed by U.S. firms since the United States has already turned the corner in its efforts to restructure its domestic defense industry.

Much of the pressure to reform and consolidate within France has come from the defense manufacturers themselves. In December of 1998, France's leading defense firms, Thomson-CSF, Aerospatiale, Alcatel, and Lagardère concluded an agreement designed to reduce redundancy and national competition. The accord set out each companies areas of expertise in avionics, missile systems and satellites. The agreement also pledged the companies to cooperate with other European firms through the Eurosam consortium.⁶⁶ This comes on the heels of an April 1998 concord between Alcatel,

⁶⁵Gabriel Voisin and Charles Voisin, "Breaking Taboos in European Defense Industry Consolidation," *TTU* (17 July 1997); reprinted by FED-CREST (28 October 1997), 1.

⁶⁶"Agreement in Avionics, Missile Systems and Satellites," Joint Press Release by Aerospatiale, Alcatel, Lagardère, and Thomson-CSF, December 9, 1998.

Dassault Industries and Aerospatiale to cooperate on a range of projects in order to shed redundant branches and capacities. However, these companies must go along way to convincing the French government to adopt the policies necessary to further consolidate the sector and to bring French firms to the level of competitiveness of their U.S. counterparts.

U.S. defense procurement has declined from an apex of \$134 billion in 1985, to \$40 billion in 1997. Analysts predict that 700,000 jobs could be lost by 1998, with the industry having already eliminated 1.2 million jobs since 1987. Nonetheless, steps taken which have caused the U.S. defense industry to essentially turn the corner and become much more competitive. Since 1993 there have been twenty-one mergers in the U.S. defense industry alone, and this process has not reached its completion.⁶⁷ In 1993, the Pentagon began serious efforts to promote consolidation in the U.S. defense industry.⁶⁸ In order to facilitate such mergers, the Department of Defense offered subsidies to companies which ranged from \$133 million for four mergers from 1992 to 1995, to the estimated \$1.8 billion subsidy offered for the Lockheed Martin merger.⁶⁹ Between 1992 and 1997 there were more than \$100 billion in mergers in the U.S. defense sector and the result was a consolidation from 14 major defense firms to four.

Beyond subsidies, the U.S. government has initiated a number of programs to both encourage consolidation and to generally aid defense firms. From 1990-1997, the

⁶⁷Jeff Cole, "Defense Consolidation Rushes Toward an Era of Only 3 or 4 Giants," *Wall Street Journal* (December 6, 1996): A-1.

⁶⁸Augustine, 3.

⁶⁹SIPRI, *Yearbook, 1997*, pp. 242-43.

U.S. spent \$17.1 billion to aid defense manufacturers. Of this sum, \$7.3 billion went to encourage the development of new technology initiatives and \$4.9 billion went to “stimulate” new technology industries.⁷⁰ Hughes Electronics has been the most successful U.S. defense firm in developing dual-use technologies and has reduced its defense related business from 75 percent of the companies business in 1990 to 40 percent in 1995. The company did layoff some 14,000 workers, but has produced real revenue growth since its restructuring.⁷¹

The Clinton Administration has also spent an additional \$16.5 from 1993 to 1997 in direct assistance to defense companies.⁷² The centerpiece of the Administration’s efforts was the Technology Reinvestment Program (TRP) which received \$1.3 billion to promote dual-use technologies. The Administration also attempted to preserve the sector through the Manufacturing Technology (ManTech) program which matched federal dollars with that of private companies in order to develop new technologies. The ManTech program alone, allocates more for research and development (\$145 million in 1998) than many of the smaller European states.⁷³ This is especially significant since 64.5 percent of U.S. exports are high technology missile and missile launchers.⁷⁴ The

⁷⁰BICC, “US Conversion After the Cold War, 1990-1997: Lessons for Forging a New Conversion Policy,” *Brief 9*, (Bonn: BICC, 1997), 6.

⁷¹Greg Bischak, *Defense Conversion*, National Commission for Economic Conversion and Defense (NCECD) Fact Sheet (Washington, D.C.: NCECD, 1997), 2.

⁷²BICC, *Brief 9*, 6.

⁷³U.S., Department of Defense, *ManTech: Program Funding Overview* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1998).

⁷⁴“U.S. 1997 Data for the UN Conventional Arms Register,” *Arms Control Today* (June/July 1998).

May 1998 U.S.-United Arab Emirates F-16 C/D deal, worth \$7 billion, was cemented only by the U.S. pledge to also sell advanced missile technology along with the fighters.⁷⁵ This support for private industry has allowed U.S. firms a degree of shelter that stability, while still encouraging efficiency and consolidation.

Some of the main reasons for the concentration in the U.S. defense sector include the ability of companies to assume greater responsibility financial risks associated with the major weapons programs and the prospect of establishing integrated capacities to produce total weapons systems.⁷⁶ The result has been dramatic cuts in both weapons systems costs and downsizing. For instance, Lockheed-Martin shut down three major headquarters and four major research labs and sold 13 subsidiary companies—with the result being the loss of 125,000 jobs. Nonetheless, the downsizing resulted in savings of \$2.5 billion per year and the company now boasts profits of some \$18 billion per year.⁷⁷ Lockheed now ranks only behind Boeing as the world's largest and most profitable defense manufacturer.⁷⁸ Nonetheless, U.S. firms have also been the beneficiaries of privatization as the Defense Department has downsized and shed functions to private industry. These plans have produced as much as \$30 billion in savings and initiatives for further privatization may dramatically increase savings by the year 2002. These programs will also further integrate private firms into areas of operation that were

⁷⁵The Clinton Administration also touted the deal as a means to create new jobs—15,000 in Texas alone; Wade Boese, “UAE to Purchase 80 F-16 C/Ds, Arms in Deal Worth \$7 billion,” *Arms Control Today* (May 1998).

⁷⁶SIPRI, *Yearbook, 1997*, 242.

⁷⁷Augustine, 4; Leibstone, 1.

⁷⁸SIPRI, *Yearbook, 1998*, 245.

previously the domain of uniformed troops or employees of the Department of Defense.⁷⁹ By 1998, the Administration hopes to increase the civilian-oriented share of government-funded military research to 50 percent.⁸⁰ The Administration has also signaled, through its opposition to the proposed Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman merger, that it perceives the era of consolidation in the U.S. defense sector to be over and that any further consolidation may result in reduced competition.⁸¹

U.S. firms have the additional advantage of having a ready source of revenue for contracts because of the size and scale of domestic military outlays. The Pentagon's Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) calls for spending on procurement to rise from \$45 billion per year in 1997 to \$50 billion by the year 2002.⁸² In addition, many analysts predict that this figure falls far short of the Defense Department's needs and will have to be revised by as much as \$15 billion per year.⁸³ For instance, Secretary of Defense William Cohen has called for the procurement budget to be increased to \$60 billion.⁸⁴ Already the Clinton Administration has increased defense spending for fiscal year 2000 by \$12 billion, and there would have to be continuous increases to meet the requirements

⁷⁹On the specific savings, see U.S., Defense Science Board, *Achieving an Innovative Support Structure for 21st Century Military Superiority* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1996).

⁸⁰Bischak, 1.

⁸¹Augustine, 2.

⁸²U.S., Department of Defense, *Defense 97: Special Issue: the Quadrennial Defense Review*, no. 4 (June 1997): 4-5.

⁸³Michael O'Hanlon, "The Pentagon's Quadrennial Defense Review," *Brookings Policy Brief*, no., 15 (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute, 1997), 1.

⁸⁴Douglas J. Gillert, "Secretary, Senator Call for More Defense Dollars," *DefenseLink* (23 October 1998).

for the QDR.⁸⁵ As part of the pledged increase, Clinton has promised to increase procurement spending to the level called for by Cohen (\$60 billion).⁸⁶

The Pentagon is following the pattern of many European states and endeavoring to maintain and acquire new weapons and technology even as it reduces troop strength and civilian personnel. By 2003, the Department of Defense expects to reduce civilian personnel by some 33 percent and to further reduce troop strength by 9 percent, all the while increasing the procurement budget by 5 percent.⁸⁷

The failure of the WEAG to develop policy guidelines led France and Germany to create a new joint procurement agency, the Joint Armaments Cooperation Organization (JACO), which was launched in 1996. Great Britain and Italy have made renewed efforts at collaborative projects with France and Germany, and both have joined JACO⁸⁸ while a 1998 British White Paper stated that “wherever possible, European governments should harmonize the requirements of their Armed Forces and pursue cooperative solutions.”⁸⁹ In November of 1996, ten WEU states also formed a new armaments procurement agency to promote collaborative projects, the Western European Armaments Organization (WEAO). WEAO provides a forum for those states that are

⁸⁵Some estimates predict the shortfall on procurement spending to be as much as \$160 billion during the period from 1999-2003; “Clinton’s Defense Increases Look More Like Political ‘Triangulation’ Than a Cure for the Hollow Military,” *Decision Brief*, no. 99-D 3 (4 January 1999), 2.

⁸⁶Jim Garamone, “Clinton Pledges Defense Spending Increase,” *DefenseLink* (5 January 1999).

⁸⁷U.S., Department of Defense, *Defense Almanac*, '97, no. 5, 33-35.

⁸⁸IISS, *Military Balance*, 1997/98, 35.

⁸⁹UK, Ministry of Defence, *Strategic Defense Review* (London: HMSO, 1998), 167.

either unable or unwilling to join JACO. Such states include Turkey, Denmark and Norway. Unlike JACO, WEAO focuses more on research and development than on actual joint production and has the ability to contract out research projects.⁹⁰

In the end, however, these efforts are unlikely to bear meaningful results since European defense spending in general, and expenditures on research and development, will continue to decline behind that of the United States as the nationstates of Europe are forced to maintain the criteria necessary for EMU.⁹¹ For instance, in 1997, the United States spent some 3 times as much on R & D as all of the Western states of Europe combined.⁹² The contemporary fiscal constraints and the need for both U.S. leadership and access to U.S. military resources, necessitate American involvement in future European security systems to ensure both interoperability and technological parity. This is especially true when European expenditures on defense do not match returns that U.S. expenditures offer. As the former Italian Deputy Defense Minister, Massimo Brutti, stated, “we know that Europe has to face a serious challenge in the field of its military.

⁹⁰IISS, *The Military Balance, 1997/98*, 35.

⁹¹In 1996, the United States and Canada devoted some fourteen percent of their military budgets on research and development (R & D) while the European NATO states budgeted only seven percent. The states under the most pressure to limit their R & D spending, France and Germany, also happen to be the leading champions for the single currency. The result has been drastic cuts in equipment purchases; IISS, *The Military Balance, 1996/97*, 41.

⁹²In 1997, the U.S. spent \$38.5 billion on R & D compared with \$11.4 billion for all of Western Europe; IISS, *Military Balance, 1997/98*, 34.

Our military capabilities do not match with the financial resources we devote to the defense sector."⁹³

Progress towards a unified defense market has been impeded by a series of well-publicized problems, including cost-overruns and delays in production, in joint, collaborative efforts such as the Future Large Aircraft (FLA) or the Tiger helicopter. Moreover, the Europeans have found themselves often unable to compete with American defense firms.⁹⁴ In 1994, the WEU went so far as to denounce what were termed "discriminatory [business] practices" by the United States.⁹⁵ On the other hand, the Atlanticist states, especially Denmark, Great Britain and the Netherlands, have demonstrated a clear preference for American equipment.⁹⁶ These states assert that more centralization and protectionism are only likely to decrease efficiency in an increasingly competitive industry, and that anti-American measures would deny European contractors access to American markets, capital and technology transfers.⁹⁷ While both Great Britain and Italy have made renewed efforts at collaborative projects with France and

⁹³Massimo Brutti, "The Development of the European Security and Defense Identity Within a Renewed Transatlantic Partnership," in *Europe and the US: Partners in Defense*, ed. Jacqueline Grapin (Washington, D.C.: European Institute, 1998), 35.

⁹⁴On the aggressive marketing by U.S. defense firms, see Craig Covault, "U.S. Export Push Challenges Europeans," *Aviation Week & Space Technology* (27 May 1996), especially pages 20-23.

⁹⁵Quoted in Pierre Sparaco, "Europeans Advocate Unified Defense Market," *Aviation Week & Space Technology* (25 July 1994): 54.

⁹⁶See Craig Covault, "European Politics Burden Weapon Procurements," *Aviation Week & Space Technology* (13 March 1995): 57-61; and for a detailed examination of Anglo-American cooperation in defense procurement see "The Currency of Cooperation," *Jane's Defense Weekly* (3 September 1994): 54-6.

⁹⁷IISS, *The Military Balance 1995/96*, (London: IISS, 1995), 40.

Germany, these efforts are unlikely to bear meaningful results since European defense spending in general, and spending on research and development in particular, will only continue to decline and lag behind the United States as the states of Europe their implement single-currency plans.⁹⁸

The EU has undertaken a number of projects to aid in defense conversion, but the most significant of these, the KONVER I and KONVER II programs, focus more on aid for economic restructuring and easing the loss of defense-industrial jobs than on industrial consolidation or conversion.⁹⁹ While KONVER I was aimed at helping those communities hurt by military downsizing, KONVER II aims to help communities dependent on defense expenditures diversify their economies in order to preempt economic problems. The original KONVER program allocated some ECU 500 million and that some has been raised to a total of ECU 744.3 million through 1999.¹⁰⁰ The KONVER programs have funded a variety of programs which range from the

⁹⁸In 1996, the United States and Canada devoted some fourteen percent of their military budgets on research and development (R & D) while the European NATO states budgeted only seven percent. The states under the most pressure to limit their R & D spending, France and Germany, also happen to be the leading champions for the single currency. The result has been drastic cuts in equipment purchases; IISS, *The Military Balance, 1996/97*, 41.

⁹⁹The EU began these effort in 1991 with the Perifra I measure which allocated aid to areas hurt by defense downsizing. KONVER I was initiated in 1993 and provided aid to regions within the EU that had lost at least 1,000 jobs due to defense cutbacks. From 1993-1997, some ECU 500 million was allocated to the program; EU, for an overview of KONVER see, EU, European Commission, "KONVER (1993-1997) Guide to Community Initiatives" (Brussels: EC, 1998).

¹⁰⁰Jörn Brömmelhörster, "KONVER II: Fostering of Conversion by the European Union," *BICC Report*, no. 9 (Bonn: BICC, 1997), 2.

establishment of a naval museum in Cherbourg to the “rehabilitation” of former military bases in Bremen to the retraining of workers in Denmark and Great Britain.

The efforts by individual European states to protect their national industries have further impeded collaborative efforts. Since many of these companies have no domestic competition, they have adopted monopolistic policies which further erode efficiency and at the same time often preclude effective transnational cooperation. This is exacerbated by ongoing policies which seek to preserve a range of autonomous capabilities within each nation. As a report by the Bonn International Center for Conversion points out, “A major obstacle to cooperative development, production and procurement is now, as in the past, the overarching goal of maintaining the highly developed scientific, technological and industrial capability for the full range of conventional weapons at the national level and often-short sighted-policies to protect jobs in the defense industry.”¹⁰¹ The report goes on to criticize national governments for their failure to recognize the “contradiction” in seeking to maintain a broad array of these minimum capabilities while they endeavor to overcome fragmented markets and end redundancy of effort by preserving companies that are too small to thrive in the contemporary environment, but are too large to allow them to fail or be swallowed up without a noticeable domestic economic impact.¹⁰²

More than any other European state, Great Britain has attempted to diversify its defense industry and support a commercialization of the sector. Nonetheless, it was not until the election of the Labour government that the Parliament initiated government-

¹⁰¹BICC, *Conversion Survey*, 17.

¹⁰²Ibid.

sponsored efforts to aid diversification. Tony Blair's government is seeking policies that would extend the benefits of diversification to the maximum number of firms.¹⁰³ In its election manifesto, the Labour Party stated that "we support a strong UK defence industry, which is a strategic part of our industrial base as well as our defence effort. We believe that part of its expertise can be extended to civilian use through a defense diversification agency."¹⁰⁴ Specifically, the government has proposed a Defence Diversification Agency within the Defence Evaluation and Research Agency (DERA). DERA is tasked to maintain a database on capabilities and market trends. The agency would also expand the ability of small and medium-sized companies to gain access to procurement and research projects.¹⁰⁵

Blair has also worked to promote intra-European defense-industrial cooperation. The Prime Minister supported a proposed merger between British defense giant British Aerospace (BAe) and Germany's DASA (the aerospace subsidiary of Daimler-Chrysler). When BAe instead announced that it would acquire GEC-Marconi (another British firm), Blair criticized the merger as being "too British."¹⁰⁶ The deal would create a company that would be the third largest aerospace contractor behind Boeing and Lockheed-Martin of the U.S. Despite the national merger, Blair continues to support European-wide

¹⁰³"UK Reveals Defense Industry Diversification Proposals," *Defense Systems Daily* (9 March 1998).

¹⁰⁴UK, Ministry of Defense, *Defense Diversification: Getting the Most Out of Defence Technology* CM3861 (London: GPO, 1998), paragraph 3.

¹⁰⁵Ibid., paragraph 17.

¹⁰⁶"British' Defence Deal Under Fire," *Daily Telegraph* (21 January, 1999).

consolidation and has now announced support for a merger between the new company and DASA.¹⁰⁷

Germany has also undertaken efforts to both diversify their defense sector and concurrently to promote arms exports. For instance, in 1997, German Ministry of Defense and industry leaders attended for the first time an international aerospace exhibition in an effort to promote German firms such as Daimler Benz Aerospace and BGT.¹⁰⁸ In general, the efforts of Great Britain and Germany, and to a lesser extent Italy and the Netherlands, foreshadow the potential for consolidation within the continent's defense sector as European firms, and especially British companies, and forge links with U.S. firms. Examples of this trend include the increasingly close links between Lockheed Martin and British Aerospace and the merger between Daimler and Chrysler.¹⁰⁹ In addition, states such as Denmark and Norway also continue to insist that cooperative projects should be developed through the framework of NATO.¹¹⁰ Transatlantic cooperation in the defense sector is also promoted by the United States. Under Secretary of Defense, Jacques Gansler, asserted that he thought it would be

¹⁰⁷“BAe's Defence Deal 'Too British:' Blair,” *The Australian* (21 January 1999).

¹⁰⁸“German Government Delegation at Dubai 97,” *Defense Systems Daily* (7 November 1997).

¹⁰⁹While the British continue to maintain close ties with U.S. firms, Germany continues to both support an official policy of encouraging an autonomous European defense sector and placating the French by maintaining involvement in projects that could be better served through Transatlantic cooperation; Heinz Schulte, “Germans Ponder Options After UK Satellite Pull-out,” *Jane's Defence Weekly* (26 August 1998), 20.

¹¹⁰Norway has even called for the incorporation of guidelines for joint and collaborative projects within the Alliance's Strategic Concept; Fjaervoll, 32.

“unwise” for Europe to develop a single large conglomerate to supply weapons systems and instead suggests the development of Transatlantic “teams” of companies to develop and produce weapons systems to ensure interoperability and ensure technological parity.¹¹¹

In order to foster transatlantic cooperation, the U.S. has embarked upon a significant diplomatic effort. In November of 1998, at a NATO conference in Norfolk, Virginia, the U.S. Secretary of Defense called for increased cooperation in the development of logistics and core capabilities.¹¹² Cohen also called for NATO allies to “share technological innovations.”¹¹³ On a more concrete level, the U.S. has proposed a “defense capabilities initiative” in order to better delineate the needs and capabilities of the alliance partners for the future and thereby reduce redundancy and repetition of function and production.¹¹⁴

However, increased defense-industrial cooperation between the U.S. and its European allies faces a number of hurdles. The same factors which have worked to thwart consolidation either within or among European states will cause friction with the larger U.S. firms. In addition, states will be reluctant to surrender national capabilities in the interest of efficiency and consolidation. Nonetheless, in the increasingly

¹¹¹Atlantic Council, *Third Party Arms Transfers: Requirements for the 21st Century*, Atlantic Council Policy Paper (September 1998), 3.

¹¹²U.S., Department of Defense, “NATO Nations Hold Talks to Plan for 21st Century Security,” Press Release, no. 593-98 (13 November 1998).

¹¹³Linda D. Kozaryn, “Cohen: NATO Needs More Mobility, Better Commo,” *DefenseLink* (19 November 1998).

¹¹⁴U.S., Department of Defense, “Background Briefing,” *DefenseLink* (11 December 1998).

transnational market, it remains imperative that defense companies become more competitive. In the end, national governments must promote consolidation. For Europe, the choice then has become whether to endeavor to retain autonomous capacities and compete with the United States, and thereby hazard a continuing loss of marketshare, or to risk both a short-term loss of capabilities and jobs in order to gain a more secure future by merging and collaborating with U.S. firms. By adopting the latter course, the Europeans potentially gain access to the lucrative U.S. market, and to superior R & D capabilities of U.S. firms.

As European defense manufacturers attempt to maintain both market share and preserve or enhance their competitiveness, they often find themselves working at cross-purposes with their national governments. The U.S. defense sector has demonstrated that consolidation and the elimination of repetition produce companies whose economies of scale and whose ability to produce whole, integrated weapons systems leads to increased efficiency and lower costs. Small and medium companies that cannot replicate such capabilities find themselves swallowed or driven from the market. These trends also produce downsizing and the elimination of jobs. Through governmental support for mergers and programs designed to augment the research capabilities of domestic firms, the U.S. government has established patterns of conduct that have led European firms to attempt to emulate them. This is true as U.S. firms utilize new strategies to export products in which governmental support aids private firms and in efforts to develop offset arrangements which provide economic benefits through joint manufacturing and production for states purchasing new equipment.

The major European defense firms are increasingly pressuring national governments to allow transnational mergers and to increase joint and collaborative projects. Only in this way can many of these companies hope to survive by working together to establish the economies of scale and the ability to develop integrated weapons systems for future customers. However, such consolidation results in a loss of control that many national governments oppose.

Various European defense firms have also demonstrated clear preferences for increased cooperation with U.S. firms. This preference is most marked in the “Atlanticist” states such as Great Britain or Denmark in which there is a long-established history of collaboration. However, even firms in states such as France and Germany support closer Transatlantic cooperation for several reasons. To begin with, cooperation with U.S. firms offers the promise of increased access to the U.S. defense market which remains the largest in the world. Furthermore, Transatlantic teamwork can provide European firms access to the greater resources of U.S. firms, both in terms of economy of scale, but also in defense technology and research and development.

While individual firms may promote or desire increased transborder and Transatlantic cooperation, national many national governments retain a preference for maintaining a wide-range of autonomous defense capabilities. Hence, problems of repetition and inefficiency continue and are exacerbated as state governments also endeavor to preserve defense-related jobs. In addition, heavy public investment in inefficient firms precludes efforts to enact meaningful reforms or consolidations in domestic industries. More than any other state, France exemplifies these negative trends in the defense industry.

As national governments struggle to develop policies to both protect domestic industries and encourage regional cooperation, the driving force behind bilateral and multilateral collaboration has become the industries themselves. While France and Germany have previously endorsed a range of joint ventures and collaborative defense projects, the private sector has superceded national governments in its support for transborder consolidation as a means to stay competitive with U.S. defense firms. As national marketplaces find themselves unable to provide security to the state in an era of technological advances, firms look to develop broad bases of capabilities through shared resources. Hence, national security must increasingly be provided by transnational markets that have the economies of scale and the research and development capabilities to keep up with the advances in military technology. This trend has been accelerated as national borders have become less meaningful to national security. Efficiency has replaced size as the primary goal of governments in their attempts to maintain defense-industrial capability and to preserve market share. In Europe, the state has been transformed into the instrument that defines national priorities, while the market has become the instrument of development for national industrial policies. The private sector has become the driving force behind the contemporary drive for increased transnational cooperation. The expression of this drive is a renewed level of bilateralism through joint projects and multilateralism through multinational, collaborative ventures which are structured to benefit both national firms and national governments by maintaining both market share and capabilities.

CHAPTER XI

RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS

The changed nature of the nationstate and recast concepts of sovereignty, when combined with the evolving security threats and the contemporary economic pressures on the individual nations of West Europe, will further accelerate endeavors to integrate the defense structures of the continent. Already joint and collaborative efforts in both the civilian and national security organizations of Europe's nationstates have shifted from the unique to the commonplace practice. This is a result of the higher payoff that present attempts at collaborative military ventures provide. In terms of national military units, efforts at integration have much lower end-goals are significantly lower than past attempts such as the EDC, and thereby they are more attainable. In addition, the atmosphere and patterns of interaction which provided nationstates with enhanced security and economic stability that were developed and sustained by the Cold War experiences of members of the transatlantic Alliance has fostered a culture of cooperation which has been accepted by national governments as the most efficient means to reconcile interests and capabilities. Institutionalism has also demonstrated the practical benefits gained through cooperation outweigh the costs of reduced sovereignty. Most significantly, there is a convergence around the utility of integrated military units and a transnational defense sector. The end of the Cold War reduced and transformed the perception of security risks to European states. National capitals realized that there is no longer a need for large conventional armies and that the emerging security threats to Europe are those that can best be met through collective responses. Meanwhile, the

economic realities of reduced military expenditures and shrinking global arms markets have forced reductions in both equipment production and troop strength. Nonetheless, the basic policy adopted by European states in response to these changes is the policy pursued during the Cold War: collective security through multilateral military structures and continued security integration

As the nationstates of Europe have evolved into first trading states and now memberstates, cooperation has become an accepted norm as the security institutions of the West have ameliorated the security dilemma and allowed states to magnify their capabilities by combining resources. The neorealist conception of the world as an anarchical, self-help system with no effective government above the level of the nationstate, and no real system of norms or laws, has to be reexamined in the light of the increasing power of institutions and regimes which temper the individualistic pursuit of interests. West European nationstates no longer “drive for universal domination”¹ in order to ensure their own security. Nonetheless, the neorealist emphasis on the world structure continues to be important since states in a unipolar system behave differently than states in a bi- or multipolar system.²

Realism continues to downplay the importance of cooperation.³ However, cooperation has become an essential aspect of the state system that exists in Western

¹To Kenneth Waltz this drive formed the essence of state interaction; Waltz, “Anarchic Orders,” 117.

²Different global systems reward and punish state behavior in different manners depending on factors such as hegemony and the level of interstate cooperation.

³Realists define cooperation as “both formal and informal reciprocated restraint;” Glaser, 378.

Europe. Through such collaborative actions as coalition or alliance formation, realism accepts the potential for cooperation. Hegemonic stability theory is one manner in which such cooperation can be explained.⁴ Keohane argued “that hegemonic structures of power, dominated by a single country, are most conducive to the development of strong international regimes, whose rules are relatively precise and well-obeyed.”⁵ A hegemonic power sets or establishes and enforces the rules and norms surrounding cooperation and maintains satisfaction with the organization or regime.

In the immediate post-World War II era, the United States fulfilled this role in regards to Western Europe. But as time progressed the features of hegemony were transferred to the Franco-German tangent which served as the engine of integration. German economic primacy and French political leadership combined to serve the national interests of each state through access to the collective resources of the emerging institutions. Concurrently, these organizations met the interests of American primacy, which promoted multilateral cooperation as a means to counter hegemonic bids by any single European state. Multilateral structures were established which fostered joint action and collaboration and which compelled states to internalize the norms and rules of the economic and security regimes which developed. As these regimes developed, they began to promote cooperation even without the intervention of a primary power.⁶ The

⁴Hegemonic stability theory is the view that “concentration of power in one dominant state facilitates the development of strong regimes, and that fragmentation of power is associated with regime collapse;” Keohane, “The Demand for International Regimes,” 142.

⁵Keohane, “The Theory of Hegemonic Stability.”

⁶Cooperation can be defined as “goal-directed behavior that entails mutual policy adjustments so that all sides end up better off than they would otherwise be;” Milner,

states of Western Europe began to adopt national policies which converged around the acceptance of common interests and the willingness to reconcile national interest against the interests of the region's regimes and institutions.⁷ The free trade regime in Europe is one such regime that combines tacit and explicit rules and is characterized by institutions that formalize rules and employ multilateral decision making processes.⁸ This regime has both encouraged economic elaboration and it has ameliorated the security dilemma through the adoption of various norms. Common norms which characterize the present regime in Europe include sovereignty, collective security, and free trade.⁹ This series of economic, political and security relationships can be termed an *institutional complex*.¹⁰ What is significant is that the regimes and institutions of the region have reached a point that they no longer require a primary power to promote cooperation (hegemons may be necessary for *initiating* cooperation, but not for continuing cooperation).

The main ramifications of these regimes has been that traditional methods for pursuing power (territorial conquest) have evolved into attempts to enhance wealth and power through control of an increasing share of the world's wealth. The result has been the rise of first the trading state, and as capital and labor has become even more mobile, the virtual state. Germany and Japan in the Cold War and immediate pos-Cold War era

468.

⁷Van Ham, 189.

⁸Schweller, 92.

⁹Cortell and Davis, 452.

¹⁰Van Ham, 190.

were illustrations of the trading state: nations whose power was measured in economic importance, rather than in traditional geo-military terms, and whose economic policy supplants or at least rivals security policy since they have few no or very few, direct military threats. The policies of these states tend to reinforce cooperation as they acquire interests in the economic success and well-being of their trading partners.¹¹

The evolution of the nationstate has continued past the virtual state into a new phase, that of the memberstate, in Europe. This new entity is one that subordinates significant amounts of autonomy to international norms. The memberstate also internalizes the rules that epitomize the regimes it belongs to. This is done through the implementation of policies and programs which harmonize domestic programs and interstate relationships with the main tenets of the international regimes of which the memberstate has joined.¹² The process of harmonization is deeper and more lasting in Europe than in any other region as the states have already pooled a sizable degree of their national sovereignty on issues ranging from currency to immigration and the control and maintenance of borders.¹³ No other region has effectively denationalized borders, the former main function of the nationstate being the preservation of borders, as the states of the EU have. European states have pursued cooperation in both the economic and security fields as the individual nationstates have subordinated national autonomy in the search for collective goods. The EU memberstates have realized that

¹¹Rosecrance, "U.S.-Japan," 6.

¹²Barkin and Cronin, 107-30.

¹³Kahler, 4.

they can only garner this increase in collective goods through the enhancement and augmentation of multilateral institutions.¹⁴

Along with their transatlantic partners, the United States and Canada, the member states of Western Europe have formed a security regime embodied by institutions such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Western European Union (WEU). This regime has institutionalized patterns of security cooperation and collaboration to the point where states have had little incentive to pursue their own unilateral security policies. Memberstates internalized both the specific rules of the regime and the regime's norms. In this fashion, the security dilemma has been neutralized among the EU memberstates.

The United States has ensured the credibility of this security regime by assuming a leadership role in its development, and acting first as a hegemon and then as the regime's primary power, to ensure compliance and to set the rules of the regime. NATO was as an alliance to counter the external threat posed by the Soviet Union, but also to reintegrate the former enemy powers of World War II into the broader context of continental security, and to prevent the reemergence of the security dilemma among the memberstates of NATO. The continued existence of NATO after the demise of the Soviet threat should have come as no surprise since many of its main functions continue to exist. NATO remains the principle means with which to deter external threats to the EU and Western Europe. NATO also continues to ameliorate the security dilemma. This combination of functions makes future cooperation all the more likely. The

¹⁴See Gowa.

Alliance increases confidence among memberstates that partners will not defect, and the long term relationships also increases the ability of states to form linkage strategies such ensure collaboration across a range of issues.¹⁵ The more complex the interdependence that exists between nations means it is less likely that single issues can lead to the dissolution of the regime—even if the single issue is the original reason behind the formation of the alliance. The longer the regime exists, the more powerful the organization becomes. In addition, the longer it exists the more likely that it will assume functions outside of its original purpose as memberstates use the regime to address separate issues or new threats that are perceived as intertwined with security concerns.

As memberstates have reexamined security policies in the wake of the demise of the Soviet threat, they seek to use the contemporary security structures of Europe to address threats that seemed minimal or nonexistent during the Cold War. In the immediate post-Cold War era, the re-emergence of nationalism seemed to pose the most serious risks to the security of individual states. As the conformity enforced by the bipolar system evaporated at the end of the Cold War there were concerns that a reunified Germany would attempt to assert itself in security matters or that Russia might endeavor to regain its hegemony over the states that formed the former superpower's near and abroad. This would force other states to renationalize defense policy in response.

The post-Cold War emergence of nationalism proved to be of particular concern for the West in its dealings with the states of Central and Eastern Europe. Many of these

¹⁵Keohane and Nye, *Power and Interdependence*, 36.

nations do not have homogenous populations and settled borders. Ethno- and religious nationalism has been the source of a variety of minority problems in the region. The potential spread of ethnic and religious conflict has become a security concern even for those Western states that lack contiguous borders with strife-torn areas. This is especially true since human rights issues have become increasingly relevant to European security. European security institutions such as NATO and the WEU have been called upon to conduct an ever expanding number of humanitarian operations and have been deployed in a wide range of peace-keeping and peace- enforcement operations. In addition to the problems in Central and Eastern Europe, the potential for a re-emergence of Russian expansionism must also be countered. Further exacerbating problems has been the collapse of the Russian economy. This may led to an environment which would prompt a resurgence of Russian nationalism and a rejection of Western ideals and institutions.

European interests also face threats from the EU's southern flank. The proximity to Europe alone necessitates a close scrutiny of events in areas such as the Maghreb and the Persian Gulf. The region remains one of the few areas of the world that can threaten the states of Europe with direct military action. Furthermore, instability in the region can impact the states of Europe because of refugee outflows and the potential for terrorist acts taking place in those European states with large Arab populations such as France and Germany. The proliferation of sophisticated weapons systems and weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) in the Middle East has increased tensions and encouraged states such as France, Spain, and Italy, to call for new security structures to counter such threats. EU states have also called for tighter migration

controls and police powers within the Union in order to prevent the movement of suspected or potential terrorists.¹⁶

The Middle East and the broader Mediterranean region continue to be the largest arms market in the world. In an era of declining arms sales, this makes the region important to nations with large defense industries and arms exporters. However, this defense-industrial interaction is overshadowed by Europe's other significant economic ties with the region. The EU remains the largest exporter of goods and services to the region. Meanwhile the greater Middle East is the EU's third largest trading partner. Nonetheless, the most significant economic interest of the EU continues to be energy. EU states have long been dependent on Middle East oil and natural gas, and the recent decline in oil prices has served only to increase European dependency on energy imports from the Persian Gulf and Maghreb. This trend will be exacerbated by the planned policies of several nations to reduce the use of alternative energy sources such as atomic power.

In response to both the close economic ties between the region and the EU and to the broader security concerns, the Europeans have undertaken a number of initiatives to maintain and expand relations between themselves and the Arab states. Individual states such as France and Germany have engaged in trade and other diplomatic tactics to preserve relations with states that are under sanctions by the United States, including Iran and Iraq. The West's main institutions, the EU, the WEU and NATO, have all initiated dialogues with nations in the regions. Memberstates have tasked these

¹⁶On this theme, see Federal Republic of Germany, Office of Press and Information, Press Release no. 30487.

organizations with devising means with which to build a framework to deal with future instability. NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue is an example of a multilateral effort to improve relations between West and the states of Egypt, Israel, Morocco, Mauritania and Tunisia, and Jordan after 1995. The Initiative involves biannual, bilateral political discussions on issues such as immigration, proliferation and terrorism.

Since the end of the Second World War, the American nuclear umbrella has served as a deterrent against the possibility of an attack on Europe by WMDs. In the post Cold-War era, the possibility that a rogue state or that a substate actor might acquire WMDs has prompted the major powers of the West to reconsider the means to counter nuclear, biological and chemical attacks and work to develop autonomous capabilities. The WMD threat is especially significant since the proliferation of ballistic missile technology and the willingness of several states to trade in such weaponry, have combined to produce a class of weaponry capable of threatening several European states.

Although atomic weapons are expensive and difficult to manufacture, and the presence of numerous international regimes which monitor the use of fissile materials and highlight potential weapons programs, the spread of nuclear knowledge and the capabilities to manufacture such weapons has been facilitated by the end of the Cold War. Nuclear weapons reductions have resulted in the unemployment of thousands of scientists and personnel with the knowledge and ability to design and build these weapons. Concerns over the proliferation of WMDs are exacerbated by the fact that some biological and chemical weapons can be covertly produced with minor expense. The trade in dual-use technology which involves the transfer of seemingly innocuous

materials and equipment that can be used to generate WMDs, only further enhances the potential development of WMDs..

The potential procurement or development of WMDs is a concern not just at the state level, but also at the level of the substate actor. This is especially troublesome in the case of terrorist groups. Past experiences have shown that retaliation against these groups is difficult. Substate actors might be tempted to use WMDs as tools to use for political blackmail, such as gaining the release of prisoners, or to destabilize regimes or governments in power.

Regimes have been developed to control and address proliferation issues, however, in many cases these regimes are only comprised by those states who pursue non-proliferation as a national policy and hence would not embark on WMD programs. The frameworks provided by international regimes such as the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) do establish international norms and rules for the governance of WMDs and prompt states to internalize the norms and rules of the regime. In this way, they encourage states to adopt nonproliferation policies and maintain such policies. To counter the direct threats posed by WMDs and their potential proliferation, the states of Western Europe need to proceed on the course that they have already begun, which is a collective response to the development or the potential use of WMDs. This broad policy follows the multilateral manner these states have relied on during the Cold War period which emphasized NATO's Article V guarantee, and its promise of an American nuclear response to a WMD attack, as the cornerstone of defense against attack. The states should, therefore, continue efforts to develop inclusive security structures which facilitate cooperation

among the major European powers and involve the United States. In this manner the expertise and capabilities of all the powers can be combined in such a fashion as to enhance the overall effectiveness of efforts to thwart the proliferation of WMDs and related technology. This combination of resources would both reinforce the individual capacities of the memberstates and augment deterrence.

In the changed security atmosphere of the post-Cold War era, few states can afford the defense expenditures necessary to match interests with capabilities. The patterns of cooperation and collaboration developed by the West European states have allowed these nations to concentrate resources on economic policies since the joint nature of their security regime both lessened the direct threats from states with contiguous borders, while at the same time bolstering individual defense structures by granting states access to pooled resources. Institutionalism ameliorated the security dilemma and prompted the transformation of the nationstate in an entity which increasingly concentrated on the individual well-being of its citizens instead of the preservation of national boundaries. Institutionalism remains the preferred means to counter the emerging security threats of the post-Cold War era. Ethnic and religious nationalism that crosses traditional state borders can most effectively be countered through multi-state structures that allow for united and consistent policies, and which allow the memberstates of Europe to augment their own power through the collective resources of the institutions and organizations that make up the security framework of Europe. Hence, NATO provides a military solution which involves the United States in European security, while CJTF operations and the WEU provide military options that do not necessitate the United States. Finally, the broad and inclusive nature of the OSCE

provides an experienced diplomatic outlet to oversee a range of activities including the monitoring of elections and the supervision of minority arbitrations.

The first efforts at security integration in Europe in the Cold War era had less than optimum results. The emergence of the Soviet Union as a potential hegemon in Europe and the potential for a re-emergence of Germany as a primary power, prompted the other states of West Europe to construct a broad coalition which sought to counter the Soviet threat and to restrain German power. This alliance was encouraged by the United States as a means to promote U.S. interests and to conserve American resources (and placate the nation's domestic audience). There developed a rough balance of power which engendered a high degree of stability and equilibrium. Even when the bipolar balance eroded with the demise of the Soviet Union, the system remained in place to restrain the actors both through the habits and patterns of cooperation and the internalization of the system's norms.

The West's security regime had its beginnings in the Anglo-French, anti-German Treaty of Dunkirk. The Treaty of Washington and the establishment of NATO marked the once and future involvement of the United States as a major actor in Europe's security architecture. However, even with NATO, the central question over the role and place of Germany in European security remained. For the French the United States initially served as a counterweight to the Soviet threat and the British served as a counterbalance to a potential threat from Germany. The effort to develop a broad and highly integrated European army without the Great Britain was therefore ultimately doomed when the British refused to participate.

The European Defence Community (EDC) was initially endorsed by NATO in 1950 as a modification of a French proposal. However, the initiative ultimately failed as France was unwilling to allow for German rearmament without the institutional reinforcement that British participation would have provided for the EDC. In 1954, the breakdown of the EDC demonstrated the necessity for both U.S. and British involvement in continental security. The compromise that emerged from the EDC, whereby Germany was integrated into the security system of the West through the WEU and NATO, established the principles that would guide future efforts at military integration and indeed serve as a model for the integration of a reunited Germany at the end of the Cold War.

At the end of the Cold War, the anti-Soviet coalition did not dissipate, for the main tenets that undergirded the transatlantic alliance remained in place. NATO and its sister organization, the WEU, provided a means to incorporate the reunited Germany in the security architecture of the West without creating security dilemmas for the nation's smaller, less powerful neighbors. In addition, the nationstates of the West had been transformed into the memberstates of institutions like NATO and the EU, and there emerged convergence over the utility of NATO's institutionalism as a means to continue the security regime of the West. Potential rival organizations such as the WEU and the OSCE were unable to develop the broad consensus and acceptance that NATO enjoyed.¹⁷

¹⁷The WEU could not eclipse NATO since it would not initially involve U.S. participation, while the OSCE was seen by most as too large and unwieldy to allow for consensus and significant military power to counter threats to the organization's memberstates.

The main security issues that Europe faced at the end of the Cold War included the problem of how to incorporate the newly emerging states of Central and Eastern Europe into the fabric of European security. European states also promoted an enhanced role for themselves within the framework of the alliance. Finally, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, questions emerged over NATO's future role and mission. In particular, questions arose over whether or not NATO could address so-called "out-of-area" issues and operate outside of the alliance's national boundaries.

The debate over the future of European security in the immediate post-Cold War period also exposed the divergent views of Europe's major powers. The Atlanticist states such as Great Britain and Denmark continued to emphasize the importance of NATO and substantial U.S. involvement in Europe's security architecture. Europeanist states led by France, promoted the development of a European Security and Defense Initiative (ESDI) with autonomous military capabilities outside of the frame of NATO. Meanwhile, Russia and several of the neutral states called for the OSCE to become Europe's paramount security organization. The failure of rival institutions to address the new security threats faced by Europe merely reinforced the importance and centrality of NATO.

In order to both facilitate cooperation between NATO and the former Warsaw bloc states, the alliance embarked on a number of initiatives which included actual expansion to several states of the former Warsaw Pact and the formation of a consultative role for Russia within the auspices of NATO. NATO alleviated the demand for an autonomous ESDI by developing structures such as the Combined and Joint Task Force (CJTF) which allowed for the establishment of a European pillar within the

framework of the Alliance—a pillar that is "separable, but not separate." This overcomes the reluctance of Great Britain, Italy, the Netherlands and the neutral states to give the EU direct political control or authority over the WEU.¹⁸ In addition to the expansion of the Alliance to include the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, the Partnership-for-Peace initiative PfP, provides a mechanism for security interaction and consultation between NATO and nonmember states. PfP does not provide the same firm security guarantees that actual membership would entail, but it does prevent a vacuum from forming in the geographic space between the West and Russia. In this manner it can alleviate the potential emergence of ethno-nationalistic strife in this region.

In this manner, NATO has become an essential part of the "community-building" process of Western Europe by complementing the economic links of the region with security measures.¹⁹ It extends the institutional framework of the West into the East and initiates the regime-building process. NATO has met the three main security challenges currently facing Europe. The alliance has adapted itself to new missions and been able to deploy outside of its traditional areas of operation; NATO has begun the process of enlargement, and the engagement of Central and East Europe through institutions such as PfP and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council; and finally, the Alliance has endeavored to cultivate a new, post-Cold War relationship with Russia. NATO remains the cornerstone of Europe's security architecture and will continue to be for the immediate future.

¹⁸Goulden, 21-24.

¹⁹Ruggie, *Winning the Peace*, 85-106.

Within the security regime of Europe, apprehensions over the renationalization of Western Europe have largely evaporated. Germany is firmly committed to the institutional course it embarked on during the Cold War. Central and East European states have worked towards the resolution of minority issues and the acceptance of established borders as preconditions for inclusion in the security and economic structures of the West.²⁰ Bosnia remains the glaring exception to this trend. Expansion of NATO will precede EU expansion into Central Europe. The Visegrad states have already been tied into the fabric of the West through the security architecture of the West, and this before these states join the West's economic system.

NATO remains West Europe's best security guarantee against the re-emergence of an assertive or expansionistic Russia. In addition, NATO's nuclear and conventional force deterrents also provide the optimum detriment against the use of WMDs or ballistic missiles against Western Europe. The alliance worked toward developing multilayered and multifaceted methods, including anti-missile systems, to deter against the use of WMDs. Through increasing joint efforts and multilateral consultations with Russia, NATO has established the foundation of a forum by which the former superpower can be included in the broad framework of European security. Multilateral efforts have been initiated, and have achieved notable success, toward the effective control of Russia's nuclear arsenal. Through the establishment of various multinational groups, attempts have begun to develop the political means to counter proliferation of WMDs.

²⁰Besides the alliance's role in the former Yugoslavia. The Polish acceptance of borders with Germany and Russia, and both the Hungarian and Romanian attempts to settle minority and border issues, are examples of NATO's influence in promoting stability.

The drive for the development of ESDI has been paralleled by a broad effort to produce a more unified defense market in Europe by consolidating national arms manufacturers and increasing transnational cooperation and collaboration in defense research and production. This movement is the consequence of declining arms transfers and the resultant period of amalgamation and excess capacity for the major European defense manufacturers. The importance of these firms to the economies of nations with significant arms exports has led national governments to pursue policies to protect and support these firms. Nonetheless, European states have followed behind the United States in their transition to the changed market of the post-Cold War era. While most American firms gone through a period of consolidation and mergers, the Europeans are only now in the process of making similar market adjustments. The willingness of certain European governments to continue to support and subsidize costly and inefficient defense manufacturers further retards the process. European governments also continue to support policies that would maintain a variety of defense capabilities and resources by maintaining the ability to produce a variety of weapons systems, even if less costly or more efficient systems are available on the market. Many European producers also confront problems that range from redundancy to the disadvantages that small economies of scale entail.

In Europe the market has taken the lead in instrumenting necessary reforms. European defense firms have themselves become the driving force behind integration efforts in the defense-industrial sector. While joint ventures and collaborative defense projects were previously promoted by certain governments, they have now been superseded by Europe's private sector in its efforts to remain competitive with the larger

firms of the United States. As these mergers and consolidations occur, national marketplaces can no longer provide complete security to the state. Instead, security has to be provided by international or transnational markets. This trend is accelerated in Europe as national borders become less important. Hence, efficiency of production and profitability have become increasingly important to national governments as they attempt to retain both some element of defense-industrial capability and to preserve market share. The state still defines national priorities, but the market is the driving force behind policy development in the defense-industrial sector. The new spirit of defense-industrial cooperation in Europe is driven by the private sector and is manifested in a renewed level of multilateralism in the form of multinational, collaborative ventures that are structured to benefit both national firms and national governments. Increasingly, this multilateral effort will also span across the Atlantic as corporations continue to ignore national boundaries and use the ease of transference of capital and labor in order to further secure market share and to bolster competitiveness by forming joint and collaborative ventures with North American firms.

In the end, economics has become the driving force behind European military and defense integration. Declining defense expenditures and increasingly rigid fiscal policies have prompted national governments seek methods and means to maintain military capabilities by pooling resources and developing specialized niches for national militaries. This trend follows the general inclination toward greater institutionalism in Europe as the role and power of Brussels continues to expand into spheres that were once the sole domain of the nationstate. The patterns of cooperation and joint efforts that were initiated in the security sphere at the end of World War II, have now come full

cycle. Economic cooperation, in the form of the Common Market and later the EU, which arose from the failure of deep military integration, caused a redefinition of the role of the nationstate as it was transformed into the trading state and ultimately the memberstate.

As the drive of monetary union succeeds, the memberstates must turn to the revived effort at security integration in order to complete the institutionalism of the modern state. Economic imperatives continue to force national governments to trim defense expenditures and the most effective means with which to continue to maintain the necessary military capabilities to pursue national or in the case of the EU supranational interests, remains multilateral military structures. These structures allow nations to burdenshare major initiatives and multilateral efforts on a variety of fronts, including procurement and research and development. They also permit memberstates to take advantage of the specialized resources and functions of other nation's individual national military units. Hence, again the pendulum swings in the continuing effort toward European political, military and economic integration and states turn to the development of CFSP as a means to further tap into the pool of resources and sovereignty provided by the institutional framework of the West.

Europe's memberstates now view military integration as the optimum means to preserve capabilities and meet security concerns all the while constraining military expenditures. The drive for ESDI has been renewed, but renewed within the institutional framework that developed through the course of the Cold War. By its nature, this security architecture maintains the role of the United States as a European power, all the while it provides for an increased political and decision-making role for the Europeans

within the broader context of the transatlantic alliance. Meanwhile, events in Kosovo and other strife-torn regions, continue to confirm the validity of institutions which reinforce the centrality of the United States as a European power that is not in Europe. The continuing redefinition of security to focus on the well-being and safety of individual citizens parallels the efforts of Europe's states as they endeavor to devote more resources to economic and personal security than to traditional aspects of national security such as the defense of static borders. These economic imperatives will continue to prompt the memberstates of Europe to continue the course toward integration through institutional means.

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




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