


Spring 2014

Ritualized Rhetoric and Historical Memory in German Foreign and Security Policy

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RITUALIZED RHETORIC AND HISTORICAL MEMORY IN GERMAN FOREIGN AND SECURITY
POLICY

by

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A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of
Old Dominion University in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

OLD DOMINION UNIVERSITY

May 2014

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ABSTRACT

RITUALIZED RHETORIC AND HISTORICAL MEMORY IN GERMAN FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY

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Old Dominion University, 2014
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Recent changes in German foreign policy behavior have led to questions about Germany's European vocation. At the center of this inquiry is Germany's struggle to resolve the intersection between historical memory and present day international responsibility, especially in cases involving the use of force. This dissertation examines *how* and *when* historical memory has influenced, shaped, and informed contemporary German foreign and security policy and rhetoric by examining cases within two policy areas: out of area operations and nuclear nonproliferation. Focusing on the case of Libya, this dissertation also considers the cases of Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Nuclear nonproliferation, a global policy issue, highlights Germany's role as an international actor by focusing on Germany's voice and actions during the negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program. This dissertation hypothesizes that Germany has a ritualized foreign and security policy and rhetoric determined by historical memory. The argument is made that historical memory and ritualized rhetoric is used depending on policy area, allowing Germany to present reason, argument, and justification to a variety of international security challenges, either to support or oppose military involvement. This dissertation finds support for questions regarding Germany's European vocation. However, Germany exercises self-interests precisely within the

institutions of the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. What has changed is that Germany is increasingly using rhetoric of memory and guilt in order to obscure that it is actually acting in its self-interests. German policy choices, as they relate to the future use of force will be critically guided by this rhetoric.

Für Oma

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First and foremost, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my advisor and dissertation chair, Dr. Regina Karp, for her continuous encouragement, expertise guidance, and mentorship. Dr. Karp has immensely influenced my intellectual development, especially in the areas of security studies, arms control, and nuclear nonproliferation. I sincerely appreciate all the support and assistance I received from my committee members, Dr. Simon Serfaty and Dr. Peter Schulman. I am indebted to Dr. Simon Serfaty for helping me refine my topic choice after several discussions during the beginning stages of my research. I would also like to thank Dr. Dieter Dettke who influenced my arguments by commenting on an early draft of my dissertation prospectus and pointed me to invaluable literature after a conference in 2012.

I am forever grateful to my father, Joachim Hoff, who instilled in me the importance of order, persistence, and hard work (*“von nix kommt nix”*). This dissertation is dedicated to my grandmother, Waltraud Hoff. Everything I am or ever will be is due to my grandmother’s resolve in raising me and teaching me everything I know about life. There is not enough room on this page to explain the enormous impact she had and still has in shaping my path and daily thoughts. *Danke, Oma.*

The process of researching and writing this dissertation has truly been lonely and isolating at times; my internal state swayed from feelings of doubt to sheer panic overcome only by daily doses of green tea and the eternal wisdom of my Weimaraner,

Lizzy. I could not have completed this task without her unconditional love, support, and relentless optimism.

I am also grateful for my fellow group of 'dissertators'; our weekly e-mails, text messages, and conversations kept me on my toes and motivated me to finish on schedule. I would like to thank my family and friends scattered across four continents for their patience and encouragement throughout this process. Last but not least, completing this dissertation would have been impossible without the love and support of my partner-in-crime, Tommy Worden.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES.....	x
LIST OF ACRONYMS.....	xi
Chapter	Page
I. INTRODUCTION.....	1
INTRODUCTION.....	1
RESEARCH DESIGN.....	4
RESEARCH QUESTION AND HYPOTHESES.....	7
DISSERTATION ORGANIZATION.....	9
II. HISTORICAL MEMORY, RHETORIC, POWER, AND IDENTITY IN GERMAN FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY.....	11
INTRODUCTION.....	11
RHETORIC AND GERMAN FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY.....	11
HISTORICAL AND COLLECTIVE MEMORY AND GERMAN FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY.....	14
POWER AND GERMAN FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY.....	29
IDENTITY AND GERMAN FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY: EUROPEAN AND NATIONAL IDENTITY AND EU EXPANSION.....	35
III. EXPLAINING GERMAN FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY: THE THEORETICAL DEBATE.....	43
INTRODUCTION.....	43
THEORIES OF GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY.....	65
SUMMARY.....	80
IV. ANALYZING CHANGE IN GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY: OUT OF AREA OPERATIONS AND THE USE OF FORCE.....	82
INTRODUCTION.....	82
OUT OF AREA MILITARY OPERATION: A HISTORY OF THE USE OF FORCE IN GERMANY'S STRATEGIC CULTURE.....	83
THE USE OF FORCE: LIBYA.....	108
GERMANY'S BEHAVIOR: MEDIA AND SCHOLARLY RESPONSES TO LIBYA.....	119
SUMMARY.....	128
V. ANALYZING CHANGE IN GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY: NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION, SANCTIONS, AND DIPLOMACY: THE CASE OF IRAN.....	130
INTRODUCTION.....	130

GERMANY'S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD IRAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM: TRADE, RHETORIC, ACTION, AND THE MEDIA.....	155
SUMMARY.....	162
VI. ANALYSIS, FINDINGS, AND DISCUSSION	164
INTRODUCTION	164
CASE I: OUT OF AREA OPERATIONS AND THE USE OF FORCE: LIBYA	165
CASE II: NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION, SANCTIONS, AND DIPLOMACY: THE CASE OF IRAN	204
COMPARISON OF CASES OF GERMAN FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY	220
APPLICATION OF THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS	228
VII. CONCLUSION.....	246
SUMMARY	246
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH	251
THE FUTURE OF GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY.....	254
BIBLIOGRAPHY	258
VITA.....	270

LIST OF TABLES

Table	Page
1. Germany's Status Quo	93
2. Application of Variables: Case I	166
3. Application of Variables: Case II	208
4. German Exports to Iran	213
5. German Exports and Imports	214
6. Theoretical Analysis of German Foreign Policy	238

LIST OF ACRONYMS

CDU - German Christian Democrats
CFSP - Common Foreign and Security Policy
CSU - Christian Social Union in Bavaria
EC - European Commission
EMU - European Monetary Union
EU - European Union
FCC - Federal Constitutional Court
FDP – Free Democratic Party
FRG - Federal Republic Germany
ICC – International Criminal Court
IAEA – International Atomic Energy Agency
ISAF - International Security Assistance Force
KLA – Kosovo Liberation Army
NAM – Non-Alignment Movement
NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NPE – Normative Power Europe
NPT – Non-proliferation Treaty
OEF – Operation Enduring Freedom
PDS – Party of Democratic Socialism
R2P – Responsibility to Protect
SIT- Social Identity Theory
SPD – Social Democratic Party of Germany
TNW – Tactical Nuclear Weapons
UN – United Nations

UNSC – United Nations Security Council

WEU – Western European Union

WMD – Weapons of Mass Destruction

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

*“Neither memories nor histories seem objective any longer. In both cases we are learning to take account of conscious or unconscious selection, interpretation and distortion. In both cases this selection, interpretation and distortion is socially conditioned.”*¹

INTRODUCTION

This dissertation is positioned within the international relation and political science literatures’ continued focus on explanations of German foreign and security policy, diplomacy, and political rhetoric. More than twenty years after the end of the Cold War and German unification, and more than ten years after the September 11 attacks, theoretical frameworks and analyses struggle to fully explain German foreign policy choices, continuity and change, national interests, and the use of power. Scholars not only disagree over explanations of German policy behavior but further diverge on analyses of the current state of Germany’s role in Europe and Germany’s use of institutional power. This research will address this gap in the literature by using a detailed analysis of the current German foreign policy behavior and rhetorical action used to achieve goals in two selected policy areas: out of area operations and the use of force and nonproliferation and multilateral negotiation. This research addresses two important aspects of the German foreign policy debate: Germany’s use of power and the continued influence of historical memory by connecting theoretical explanations to

¹ Peter Burke, "History as Social Memory," in *History, Culture, and the Mind*, ed. Thomas Butler (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1989), 98.

policy choices and ritualized rhetoric through evaluations of positions employed by German policy makers. Germany's recent behavior, to include the abstention from the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) vote on military intervention, has called to question Germany's role as a responsible actor while highlighting Germany's continued reluctance to use force, even in humanitarian based interventions. Germany's increased power and continued foreign policy since unification has led to an ongoing theoretical debate, seeking to understand and predict Germany's policies. The 'German question' has resurfaced once more, focusing on Germany's national and economic interests. This study will analyze and detail these changes by examining how and when changes occur and what variables shape and influence policy outcomes. Further, this dissertation outlines which norms and interests are placed before the interests of the European Union (EU) in the selected policy areas. This dissertation contributes to both the theoretical and policy geared literature on Germany's foreign policy and the use of power as it focuses on recent policies and rhetorical action while considering the continual path of Germany's foreign policy behavior despite changes in the international security environment.

The three theoretical frameworks selected for this research are structural realism, utilitarian/liberalism, and constructivism; they are used in order to combine explanatory variables for case analysis in describing and understanding German foreign policy choices. Further, these theories will be used to categorize scholars who discuss and analyze German foreign and security policy into comprehensive frameworks to determine *how* contemporary German foreign policy and rhetoric is studied. These

theories, as well as frameworks specifically geared toward explaining and understanding Germany's foreign policy behavior, are outlined and discussed in chapter three of this dissertation, and eventually applied to the case studies selected in the analysis portion of this dissertation within chapter six. Each case selected for this dissertation will be analyzed in terms of Germany's foreign policy behavior based on four selected variables known to be pillars of German foreign policy: Multilateral alliance solidarity, historical memory and WWII legacy, domestic influence, and national interests. The cases will be analyzed by using primary and secondary source data. Primary sources include speeches and statements, voting documents, parliamentary documents to include plenary records, government reports, and public opinion polls. Secondary data includes German and English language newspapers and other media, policy evaluations, and a wide-ranging literature analysis including scholarly articles and books in both German and English. These sources were used to understand why rhetoric in German foreign policy is important, and what determinants contribute to differences in rhetoric and action. This will add to an overall understanding and interpretation of patterns of German foreign policy behavior and will analyze cases in which Germany is willing to lead and or to shape and influence the international environment (*Gestaltungswille*).

Although past research has focused on the puzzle of continuity and change in German foreign policy, present research does not strategically analyze Germany's ritualized rhetoric within a foreign policy discursive framework with the goal of linking continuous rhetoric to action and policies. Ritualized rhetoric based on WWII legacy will be analyzed in order to understand *when* and *how* historical memory enters political

debates in order to explain, justify, or excuse policy action. German foreign policy rhetoric is highly politicized and rarely neutral, and used in an instrumental way by both government officials and scholars. Therefore, research on how rhetoric is used to serve and support policy goals poses an important inquiry for the field of international relations. More broadly, this research provides a unique perspective on the current state of German foreign policy while taking into consideration the extensive research accomplished during the two decades following German unification.

RESEARCH DESIGN

This dissertation will analyze the relationship between Germany's foreign policy rhetoric and action based on an analysis of historical and collective memory, socialization, learning processes, domestic interests and influence, and Germany's role concept, or the relationship of identities and social structures in relation to Germany's history. Scholarly analyses in the past have focused on Germany's role concept of civilian power and 'normal' action. The goal and purpose of this dissertation is to analyze which foreign policy roles employed by Germany, or different modes of action, guide actual foreign policy behavior in each selected case and what factors explain changes and continuity in rhetoric and action. Further, this study will analyze how rhetoric and action has been perceived by German security studies and how rhetoric and historical memory has been used to make arguments about German foreign policy behavior. The contribution to the field of international relations will include an examination of the importance of rhetoric and historical memory in German foreign

policy, the framework in which this action, or *inaction* is interpreted, and how this rhetoric is used to serve German scholars. The theoretical frameworks selected will aid in describing patterns of behavior, especially the use of the constructivist notion that patterns of behavior can change by identifying rhetoric and action that appear to diverge from previously observed continuous foreign policy behavior.

Germany's current foreign policy choices, rhetoric, and behavior, especially those surrounding the European financial crisis, have been viewed as a partial return to great power politics. Taking a leadership position in Greece's bailout but refraining on the UN Security Council vote on military intervention in Libya, and opposing stronger sanctions for Iran has posed questions about Germany's current and future role in Europe and in the international security environment. This recent behavior called into question Germany's role as a responsible actor and Germany's prioritizing of national goals and interests over those of the EU. This puzzling observation, and other breaks with multilateralism in the past ten years, reaffirms the difficulty in explaining current German foreign policy choices; on the one hand Germany's continued commitment both rhetorically and practically to antimilitarism and indicators pointing to Germany as a civilian power, and in juxtaposition, foreign policy choices based on calculated pursuits of national interests through the use of institutional power. Has German foreign policy behavior changed and transformed from a structured to an agency-based approach? How then can Germany's use of rhetoric be understood in influencing and prescribing foreign policy choices? This dissertation will test and search for corroboration and congruence of several overarching hypotheses that derive from the research question.

Focusing on Germany's policy behavior and rhetoric within the last decade and the analyses by German scholars and media in regards to Germany's use of rhetorical action, the research questions and hypotheses will be applied to two policy areas in order to examine Germany's foreign and security policy and rhetoric and to determine when or how change occurs. Out of area operations as a policy area will provide a framework for understanding Germany's continued behavior for cases involving the use of force as a regional, internal, and multilateral issue, and an important pillar of German foreign policy. While the main focus is on Germany's abstention from UNSC Resolution 1973 for Libya in 2011, an argument is made that places the Libya case in a sequence with three other cases within the same policy area: Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan. This span of cases provides for a linear inquiry into Germany's foreign policy behavior and covers international and internal periods of change to include different coalition movements while allowing for a comparison of influencing variables. The second policy area under review, nuclear nonproliferation and Iran's nuclear program, provides an insight into Germany's behavior internationally towards a global and structural issue. While the influence of historical memory is the focus of this dissertation, the independent variables selected for all cases provide a variation to account for causal influences in each case. Finally, this study will analyze the frameworks used to explain German foreign and security policy behavior while providing for a comparison of each case.

RESEARCH QUESTION AND HYPOTHESES

This dissertation will examine variation in policy behavior and determine how Germany views, understands, and uses power. Currently, the three pillars of German foreign policy are economic interests, rethinking of nuclear power, and continued reluctance to use military force. An argument will be made of the enduring importance of historical memory in all issue areas of German foreign policy and action. Historical and collective memory is widely defined and is explained in depth in chapter two of this dissertation. Conceptually, historical memory, in this study, refers to Germany's World War II (WWII) legacy as it relates to Germany's culture of restraint, commitment to antimilitarism, and inability to project power. Thus, the research question that guided this study is: does historical memory determine German foreign policy behavior and rhetoric? In order to concentrate on the gaps in analyses and literature previously mentioned, this dissertation will examine under what circumstances historical memory influences German foreign policy and which expectations, or role concepts, ultimately guide Germany's behavior. Further, this study will determine whether German foreign policy rhetoric aligns with German policy action and what factors contribute to the process of change. As such, this dissertation includes a null hypothesis that analyzes the influence of historical memory on contemporary German foreign policy. This hypothesis addresses the argument that Germany has a ritualized foreign policy and rhetoric determined by historical memory, while the counter to the null hypothesis in turn supports an argument that Germany does not have a ritualized foreign policy and rhetoric that is determined by historical memory. These hypotheses offer a descriptive

case study geared towards explaining the use of policy and rhetoric based on historical memory, norms, culture, and identity. The four variables, used for two policy areas and within five cases total, account for instances of perceived change over time.

Additionally, this study will analyze which theoretical framework is used by scholars to explain German foreign policy while highlighting in which policy areas Germany is willing to lead and or shape the international security environment. The importance of the concept of power in this study will be used to address how Germany understands and uses its power and whether Germany's new foreign policy is more 'realist' than rhetoric lets us assume. This dissertation argues that Germany's previous foreign policy behavior involving out of area operations can be seen as a pattern consistent with German understanding of power; showing a gradual rather than sudden change, due to a reaction to the external security environment. Further, this study does not argue *that* historical memory informs German foreign policy but rather examines *how* and *when* historical memory influences norms, interests, and rhetoric. In which framework are out of area operations discussed? Which factors, normative or material, have the most influence and why? In order to theoretically understand the context of this study and to support the argument that Germany uses institutional power to strengthen the environment in which policy decisions are made, a theoretical comparison of frameworks will be included in the analysis portion of this dissertation.

DISSERTATION ORGANIZATION

The second chapter of this dissertation provides the context for understanding important factors and variables for the analysis of both issue areas: Germany's role as a participant in out of area operations, and as a negotiator with the international security environment towards Iran's nuclear program. More specifically, chapter two will define and explain historical memory, rhetoric, power, and identity in German foreign policy.

Chapter three will address the theoretical debate about the validity of international relations theories. Structural realism, liberalism, and constructivism are outlined and defined, while a literature review on an application of theories and frameworks to German foreign policy is used to highlight the difficulty in accounting for Germany's continuity and change since unification. Further, chapter three will review how interests, norms, contextual change, and transformation complicate theoretical analyses of power and German foreign and security policy while examining the current state of theoretical debates within the field.

Chapter four then analyzes Germany's foreign policy behavior during out of area operations by first reviewing historical factors and concepts to explain Germany's difficulties for cases involving the use of force. Beginning with Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan, this chapter details the facts, policies, rhetoric, and consequences of Germany's behavior, ending with the abstention in the case of Libya. Similarly, chapter five uses the same criteria to detail the facts surrounding Germany's behavior during the negotiations towards Iran's nuclear program.

Chapter six analyzes both policy areas and cases by applying the variables, detailing the findings, and providing a discussion of the selected cases in order to examine the process of change. Further, this chapter also compares and contrasts both policy areas in order to account for variance in influential variables, outcomes, and behavior by providing alternative explanations. The theoretical frameworks are then applied to all five cases to analyze whether Germany's foreign policy behavior can be explained and understood through theories, while accounting for change and continuity. Finally, chapter seven includes a conclusion of the study along with a discussion detailing the limitations of this dissertation while suggesting future research.

CHAPTER II

HISTORICAL MEMORY, RHETORIC, POWER, AND IDENTITY IN GERMAN FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY

INTRODUCTION

The literature on German foreign policy, power, and identity is extensive and points to several challenges when seeking to explain how security challenges are discussed, handled, and met. A few themes emerge, mainly surrounding the debate of Germany's use and understanding over power, especially in regards to the concept of 'civilian power'. Germany's security culture is inevitably bound to its past; in order to understand how and when historical memory enters political debates, several concepts have to be taken into consideration. Rhetoric, in German foreign and security policy, is used to explain, defend, and justify policy behavior, while normative values such as culture, identity, and history, inform policy choices. Further, Germany continues to struggle with power and its use thereof. This chapter will provide the context for the analysis of the selected variables for this study in order to determine whether changes in German foreign policy can be categorized as an adjustment to policy, a reconstruction to policy, or a continuation of learned behavior and norms.

RHETORIC AND GERMAN FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY

Political rhetoric has not been used prominently by scholars of international relations to explain or understand political phenomena or behavior. Instead, rhetoric is

often treated as a secondary phenomenon with no causal influence itself, but accompanied by a physical phenomenon. Political rhetoric, therefore, is viewed in relation to material action, especially in regards to foreign and security policy. With the rise of constructivist approaches and analyses to international relations, the power of ideas, beliefs, and culture were included in contemporary arguments of their influence on political outcomes. Some political scientists included analyses of how memory and ideas influence actors, while others included ideas and beliefs into foreign policy and political change analyses.¹ While material power and resources dominated theoretical analyses of foreign policy behavior, the continuation of power requires legitimacy through rhetorical action.² This rhetorical action serves as an explanation and justification of political agendas and can aid in understanding policy behavior, directly influencing political outcomes. In the past, scholars within the rationalist school of thought have pointed to the outcomes in cases where rhetorical promise was met with policy inaction, evident thought domestic and international costs.³

In more recent analyses, and predominately through European scholars, persuasive political rhetoric is viewed as influencing and internalizing new beliefs resulting in social constructs and norms. These scholars often refer to Jürgen Habermas' explanation of 'communicative action' to examine the influence of rhetoric, or, more

¹ Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, 1976). Judith Goldstein and Robert. O Keohane, *Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993).

² Ronald R. Krebs and Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, "Twisting Tongues and Twisting Arms: The Power or Political Rhetoric," *European Journal of International Relations* 13, no. 1 (2007).

³ *Ibid.*

recently, Frank Schimmelfennig's analysis on 'rhetorical action'.⁴ According to Schimmelfennig, rhetorical action "provides one way of disentangling rational choice and ontological materialism and theorizing the context conditions of strategic action".⁵ State actors in an international community setting within an institutional environment can then use norms and values to strengthen community identity in order to validate "self-interest".⁶ It is important to note that actors' strategic behavior and choices may be contained in the 'community trap' as the identification with ideas can lead to a commitment of community values and identity in order to ensure legitimacy and credibility. Rhetoric, especially for Germany, is at the center or the roof of politics, often controversial and rarely one-sided. Germany professes to stand for many things; showing rhetorical commitment to its allies and international causes. On which issues is Germany willing to lead and follow up this rhetorical promise with realized policies and action? For German foreign and security policy, rhetorical debates shape and influence political outcomes by directly involving identity, ideas, and norms. Historical memory directly plays into the rhetoric employed by policy makers in Germany; it is used to justify and explain political action and behavior.

⁴ Ibid. For more on communicative action, see Jürgen Habermas, *The Theory of Communicative Action*, trans. T. McCarthy (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1984). Thomas Risse, "'Let's Argue!': Communicative Action in World Politics," *International Organization* 54, no. 1 (2000).

⁵ Frank Schimmelfennig, "The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union," *ibid.* 55(2001): 77.

⁶ Ibid.

HISTORICAL AND COLLECTIVE MEMORY AND GERMAN FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY

How does our past inform our cultural identity? How is the past remembered, defined, analyzed, and shared? A differentiation between collective memory and history must be made, whereby the collective memory “manifests itself in the actions and statements of individuals” and is understood as a shared representation of the past by a given community or group.⁷ Memory, especially in conjunction with historical events, differs from individual to individual; collective (historical) memory is then ‘remembered’ under the shared premise of accepted versions of history. The concept of historical or collective memory is certainly not unique to Germany; disagreements of remembering or retelling the past exist in several forums: from small communities and villages, to entire countries, and over global events. Entire journals, books, studies, and courses have been dedicated to the study of collective memory, but historians or scholars of collective memory generally use French sociologist Maurice Halbwachs’ theoretical argument to define collective memories as “collectively shared representations of the past”.⁸ While Halbwachs’ general definition is widely accepted, historians stress the importance of individual objectives and memory in shaping the collective, an aspect that was dismissed by Halbwachs. Instead, the French sociologist argued that individual memory was socially determined.⁹

⁷ Wolf Kansteiner, "Finding Meaning in Memory: A Methodological Critique of Collective Memory Studies," *History and Theory* 41, no. 2 (2002): 180.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 181. For more on Maurice Halbwachs, see *Les Cadres sociaux de la mémoire* (Paris: Alcan, 1925), or a review on Halbwachs’ work by Patrick Hutton, *History as an Art of Memory* (Hanover, N.H.: University Press of New England, 1993), 73-90.

⁹ *Ibid.*

Wulf Kantsteiner explains that the unique combination of social significance and intellectual challenge gave rise to the increase in the study of memory in the humanities and social science, also referred to as 'popular consciousness'.¹⁰ An important aspect of the study of historical and collective memory is the *voice* of the storyteller; traditionally this voice belongs to the group or people in power whereby versions of the story may differ to promote agendas and interests of the power holder. A common theme throughout most analyses and definitions of the concept is the plea to collective memory, by a community or individual, during times of crisis and insecurity. Historical memory is especially analyzed in light of WWII. Scholars have analyzed the ways the events of WWII have been remembered, debated, negotiated, and given meaning. Collective memory can be divided between communicated memory, which refers to orally communicated memory, and cultural memory, which can be in the form of texts, art, architecture, and symbols that were created to remember the past.¹¹

The study of collective or historical memory is also referred to by scholars in different terms, such as: "public memory", "national memory", "vernacular memory", and "countermemory".¹² At the center stage of the study of historical, collective, and cultural memory is the nation-state, from which memory is produced, reproduced, and constructed in the form of language, architecture, and monuments. These productions and memories by the powerful class were used in ensuring the survival of the nation-

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Ibid, 182

¹² Ibid, 181

state, ideologies, and traditions.¹³ Closely tied to the study of cultural and collective memory is the study of identity in the social science to include cultural identity and political identity; yet literature discussing the link between memory and identity is rare. While most scholars agree that identity is influenced by historical or collective memory, academics insist on proof and facts in historical studies while historical events and representations of the past are remembered differently by individuals and groups; therefore, posing a theoretical challenge in analyzing the relationship between history and memory.¹⁴

While discussing traumatic experiences, such as the Holocaust, Kansteiner argues that trauma and repression in collective memory by survivors only shapes national memory “if their vision meets with compatible social or political objectives and inclinations among other important social groups, for instance, political elites or parties”.¹⁵ In other words, historical (individual) pasts can only be remembered in a group setting when negotiated with an agenda that fits current (political and social) interests.¹⁶ Further, collective memory, especially historically-based memory, involves agency by individuals in negotiating meaning of the past through shared communicative practices. Such agency can result in collective memory of small groups, entire communities, nations, or larger geographic areas.¹⁷

¹³ Ibid, 183

¹⁴ Ibid, 184

¹⁵ Ibid, 187

¹⁶ See also: Yael Zerubavel and Robin Wagner-Pacifici, "Recovered Roots: Collective Memory and the Making of Israeli National Tradition," *The American journal of sociology*. 102, no. 1 (1996).

¹⁷ Kansteiner, "Finding Meaning in Memory: A Methodological Critique of Collective Memory Studies," 189. The author here gives the example of a “European collective memory”, referring back to works about

Again, the example of the shared experiences about the Holocaust and WWII are frequent subjects in collective memory analysis, as these memories have 'survived' time and have been shaped collectively through individual memory in varying degrees. Therefore, the events and history of WWII have become part of a global dialogue, shaping the identity, world view, culture, memory, and rhetoric of individuals who may not actually have a direct personal relationship with the events.¹⁸ As such, the study of collective or historical memory directly aids in understanding and analyzing social change while also providing knowledge and insight about discursive formations and limits to historical memory which have formed lasting, continuous paradigms. Within a theoretical framework, historical memory study is most often analyzed through a constructivist understanding of history, positioning collective memory as the independent variable, or object, of study.

When analyzing how or if historical memory can shape the mindset of citizens, and ultimately influence foreign policy, constructivism outlines that "state behaviour is first and foremost shaped by the particular set of normative and cognitive beliefs which a society and its leaders hold about the nation, its role in the international system, and the utility of military force in the realisation of national goals".¹⁹ Although ultimately providing a different prediction, the realist and (neo)liberal schools of international

the validity of this concept by Luisa Passerini, *The Question of European Identity: A Cultural Historical Approach*. (Florence: European History Institute, 1998) and several others.

¹⁸ Ibid, 190

¹⁹ Thomas Berger, "The Past in the Present: Historical Memory and German National Security Policy " *German Politics* 6, no. 1 (1997): 41.

relations both assume that foreign policy is influenced and driven by “rational calculations of objective national interests”, outlined by international structures; not by values and beliefs as the constructivist school would argue.²⁰ While realists focus on the distribution of capabilities (i.e. military capabilities), neoliberals place value on the power of international institutions to influence foreign policy and pursue national interests; whereby both schools accept the view that state behavior changes when the international system or structure changes.²¹

Unlike realists and neoliberalists, constructivists argue that the political culture of a particular nation, to include the paths chosen to reach national goals, is “reflective of the broader collective consciousness of a nation”.²² This political culture stems from an institutionalized, continuous process of remembering, analyzing, interpreting, and understanding history. For Germany, WWII posed a decisive event, first changing foreign and security policy following the war, while having a lasting influence and shadow on policy makers that continues to this day. The collective historical memory of WWII resulted in the rejection of traditional views towards power, military force, defense, and security. The next chapter will elaborate on the three theories commonly used to analyze German foreign policy, while also introducing other frameworks to understand the complexity of German foreign policy. Further, chapter two of this dissertation will explain and define the key concepts of rhetoric, historical memory, and application of these concepts to the study of German foreign and security policy.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Ibid.

The study of the influence of historic memory on German foreign and security policy and rhetoric is not new. Scholars have analyzed the 'shadow of the past' and its power to influence contemporary German policies and behavior while continuing to define German culture, beliefs, society, and norms. This observation, or phenomenon, is different from other countries' conceptions and behaviors surrounding historic memory as the intersections of guilt and responsibility are conceptualized, processed, and presented differently in countries such as Japan, the United States (U.S.), and Russia. The historic memory about Germany's Nazi past directly shapes the German mindset, identity, and consciousness of not only the German people but the international community as a whole. When analyzing and discussing historical memory and Germany, the issue areas most prominently examined within the academic debates surround foreign policy, national security, out of area operations, and the use of force. Germany's slow but evident changes since the end of the Cold War are viewed and analyzed in terms of Germany becoming a 'normal' actor. While realist and liberal scholars place no value on the influence of historical memory on foreign policy, instead arguing that state behavior changes with the changing structure, scholars within the constructivist school emphasize the importance of normative beliefs on a state's and society's behavior.

Germany's defense and security culture can be separated into two, perhaps three, distinctive periods, all marked by changes within the international system: Germany's defense culture immediately following WWII, Germany's defense culture after the Cold War, and perhaps the defense culture observed after the September 11 attacks through the present. While subtle changes have occurred throughout these

periods, scholars who do not focus their analysis on the impact of historical memory have instead attempted to analyze, predict, and understand German foreign policy theoretically. These analyses have been grouped under the puzzle of 'change and continuity', focusing on the observation that aspects of Germany's foreign and security policy (and rhetoric) have remained the same as changes in the system occurred. While this observation is partially correct, liberalism and realism fail to fully predict and explain this puzzle by omitting the importance of norms and historical memory. Thomas Berger most prominently discussed this importance and argued that while observable changes occurred in 1989-1991, with an increased freedom to shape and influence its environment, Germany has also staunchly preserved the 'newly' adapted military culture values of the post WWII area to include multilateralism, antimilitarism, and aspects of civilian power while considering the influence of Germany's domestic society.²³ Scholars therefore argue that historical memory will continue to shape German ideas and perceptions of the international environment, and act and change accordingly while defining its national interests.

Although the concept of historical memory is sometimes used as a blanket statement to account or explain German behavior, the term 'historical memory' itself, in scholarly debate and analyses and for this dissertation, directly corresponds to Germany's adopted values and norms towards security and defense policy during the reconstruction period following WWII. These values and norms, initially articulated and used in rhetoric, have entrenched themselves into the German mindset and have

²³ Berger, "The Past in the Present: Historical Memory and German National Security Policy " 56.

become a socially learned norm shared among German society and political actors. This mindset extends to ideas about the expansion and reconstruction of the *Bundeswehr* and Germany's security role abroad while considering Germany's responsibility to its allies and obligation towards the cause of peace.²⁴ Historically, Germany foreign and security policies have been greatly influence by Germany's geopolitical position within Europe. After WWII, Germany's security policies underwent radical changes shaped by multilateral cooperation, focused on economic growth, and above all, a desire to show the international community that Germany had abandoned its *Sonderweg*. These changes in policy are evident through the core principles of 'never again', 'never alone', and 'through peaceful means'; collectively comprising Germany's post WWII culture of restraint. Perhaps most prominently, 'never again' reflected Germany's commitment to pacifism and complete rejection of the militarization of its foreign policy. This principle meant no more war, no more genocide, and no more human rights abuses, and was reflected through several legal, political and constitutional statues.²⁵ Further, Germany relinquished acquisition of nuclear weapons, joining the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) while also accepting further restriction on which conventional weapons could be developed by Germany.

Germany's unilateral Nazi past, and rejection thereof, is reflected in the 'never alone' principle, pointing to a continued commitment to multilateralism and integration. While Germany received sovereignty in 1955, the postwar constraints placed upon the

²⁴ "The Past in the Present: Historical Memory and German National Security Policy " 54.

²⁵ Hanns Maull, "Germany and the Use of Force: Still a 'Civilian Power'?", *Survival* 42, no. 2 (2000): 66.

German military simultaneously ensured an American security umbrella and a contained West German and *Bundeswehr* under North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) command.²⁶ The values and norms taken from 'never alone' further translate into a complete rejection of military interventions not sanctioned and legitimized by international institutions, such as the UNSC and NATO. 'Through peaceful means' emphasizes Germany's focus on diplomatic approaches to foreign and security policy and further points to Germany's opposition for military options and the use of force. During the Cold War, this translated into a "delicate, highly complex and dynamic strategy of war-avoidance through nuclear deterrence" with the American-German security relationship.²⁷ Through German diplomatic efforts, such as *Ostpolitik*, tensions between the blocs reduced. The three core principles have guided Germany foreign and security policies during the Cold War and continue to shape Germany's approach to international relations. The values and norms articulated through these principles influenced and defined Germany's interests, identity, and foreign and security policy objectives. Historical memory, at the core of these principles, points to the critical intersection of guilt and the projection of power, memory and responsibility, and commitment and practical ability.

Historical memory is viewed as deeply imbedded in German culture and identity, thus difficult to change or adjust and rhetoric and political behavior is ritualized and perpetuated in German foreign and security policy. While historical or collective

²⁶ "Germany and the Use of Force: Still a 'Civilian Power'?", *Survival* 42, no. 2 (2000): 67.

²⁷ "Germany and the Use of Force: Still a 'Civilian Power'?", 69.

memory is sometimes used broadly within contemporary analysis, scholars within the field of international relations explain that using an approach based on cultural and historical analysis will uncover the political reasoning that eventually led to constructing the behavior, beliefs, and institutions that contributed to Germany's antimilitarist culture emerging after WWII and continuing into contemporary policy.²⁸ Authors predict that Germany will continue to adhere to its already established pattern of behavior unless a "major shock", such as an ending of Germany's alliance system, occurs; however, even in such a case, Germany's behavior would not align with the structuralist approach prediction of rational behavior.²⁹

While also emphasizing the importance of history for Germany's foreign and security policy, scholars argue that German historical memory contributed to role conflicts. Stepping away from the normalization debate about Germany in international relations, Germany has placed "its rhetorical commitment to exercising a leadership role and its practical ability to deliver such, especially in terms of military interventionism".³⁰ The renunciation of the past marked the majority of Germany's post WWII reconstructive period, embedding itself into German identity and culture. During this period (1945-1989), Germany established much of what is now referred to as the 'civilian power' concept, focusing on a "value-based" foreign policy model, with a strong commitment to multilateral approaches and national interests based mainly on an

²⁸ Thomas Berger, *Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1998), 7.

²⁹ "The Past in the Present: Historical Memory and German National Security Policy " 56.

³⁰ Steve Marsh, "The Dangers of German History: Lessons from a Decade of Post-Cold War German Foreign and Security Policy 1," *Perspectives on European Politics and Society* 3, no. 3 (2002): 389.

overall acceptance of its allies and international community.³¹ Most prominently, the concepts of 'never alone' and 'never again' paved the way for norms-based approaches to out of area operations and military actions, while an emphasis on collective identity, rather than national identity, allowed Germany to align its interests with those of Europe.

These "historically socialized" principles and preferences of German foreign policy no longer completely aligned with German national interests after the end of the Cold War, yet the rhetoric continued to be based on commitments to multilateral approaches.³² Subtle changes were observed in the late 1990s with Chancellor Schröder's statements about Germany's national self-interests and in the economic realm, but ultimately Germany's overall foreign policies remained true to its initially reconstructed principles. Scholars detail how these traditional values continued past the structural changes of the end of the Cold War by analyzing Germany's key post-Cold War relationships and its checkbook policy and role. The disjuncture between Germany's adherence to its norm-based approaches in the past, and the changing climate of the international system, became evident with Germany's refusal to use force and participate as a responsible actor and exporter of security alongside NATO, the EU, and the U.S. Germany's involvement in Kosovo was viewed as Germany's change

³¹ "The Dangers of German History: Lessons from a Decade of Post-Cold War German Foreign and Security Policy 1," *Perspectives on European Politics and Society* 3, no. 3 (2002): 391.

³² "The Dangers of German History: Lessons from a Decade of Post-Cold War German Foreign and Security Policy 1," 394.

towards a 'normal' actor, and analyses by scholars within the field of international relations began the normalization debates.

Perhaps the initial and radical change observed in Germany's foreign and security policy in the Kosovo case, which also critically reinterpreted Germany's attachment to the 'never again war' concept, enabled scholars and politicians to question Germany's role as an international actor. The changes and policies expected of Germany following Kosovo simply did not align with Germany's continuous guidance by historical memory, therefore allowing somewhat 'inconsistent policies'. Further, the importance and impact of historical memory was certainly placed upon Germany by the international community immediately following reunification, generally in rhetorical discussions by the international community marked by undertones of mistrust and mention of the 'German Question'.³³ Furthermore, while historical memory shapes German foreign policy, and Germany's future path and place in Europe; domestic politics were and continue to be highly influenced by history. Specifically, the 1998 Walser-Bubis debate and the 1999 *Ostermärsche*, both events directly corresponding to the intersections of guilt, remembrance, and normalcy, can be seen as an example of the continued influence of historical memory.³⁴ The red-green government's break from Cold War policies, along with rhetorical breaks from Germany's international and national interests, resulted in push backs from scholars as well as the international community; responses which can be contributed to historical legacies and memories. It

³³ Ibid, 405.

³⁴ Ibid, 406.

is therefore evident that historical and collective memory has an impact on both Germany as a nation, inclusive of its domestic culture and outward foreign policies, as well as the international community's view of Germany and reaction to Germany's behavior following unification.

The expectations of Germany by the international community after unification to contribute and commit to multilateral efforts beyond FRG's checkbook diplomacy and Germany's national interests at the time produced a dilemma and responsibility which Germany was unable to fulfill, thus impacting Germany's credibility.³⁵ Scholars contributing to this debate also detail Germany's *Bundeswehr* reform, specifically the von Weizsäcker Commission report and initial post-Cold War interventionism as examples of observed changes. Despite the possibility of these reforms to change Germany's participation and commitment in multilateral approaches, historical memory severely influenced such progress in terms of "defense expenditure, the mismatch between promises and commitments, and the nature of the reforms themselves".³⁶ Similarly, John Duffield, discussing structural realists' prediction and advocacy of building nuclear weapons, argues that historical memory prevents any rejection of institutionally learned principles and desire to civilize the *Bundeswehr*.³⁷

While the use of force analysis after Germany's involvement in Kosovo dominated the academic debates, the past twenty years prove that no substantial shifts

³⁵ *Ibid*, 407.

³⁶ *Ibid*, 408. Defense budget halved from 1990 to 2000 to around 1.4 percent of the GDP

³⁷ John S. Duffield, "German Security Policy after Unification: Sources of Continuity and Restraint," *Contemporary Security Policy* 15, no. 3 (1994): 179.

in Germany's attitude towards the use of force have occurred. "Moral imperative" continues to trump national interests in policies regarding out of area operations as well as constitutional constraints, domestic influence, and continuous rhetorical references to the past.³⁸ Germany's progress has been influenced and dictated by historical memory and socially learned norms; policies adopted during the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) have transcended well beyond unification.³⁹ Germany's past has emerged in contemporary policies and rhetoric, both from within Germany as well as the international community, often using history as a stark reminder for controversial policy areas. While Germany's national interests have changed, from Germany's traditional relationship and alliances to global orientations and especially Germany's trade relationships, Germany's foreign policy rhetoric has remained mostly the same. Expectations of Germany were not met with increased responsibility physically, but rather history and historic memory have proven to be a burden in Germany's progress towards change, while reminders of Germany's troublesome past continue to be used for and against Germany and German foreign and security policy.⁴⁰

Combing aspects of the normalization debate surrounding the concept of power in German foreign policy while viewing change through a historical memory lens,

³⁸ Marsh, "The Dangers of German History: Lessons from a Decade of Post-Cold War German Foreign and Security Policy 1," 412.

³⁹ While FRG remains the official name of Germany since 1949, the abbreviation is commonly used to describe Germany's history as West Germany, from 1949 until 1990.

⁴⁰ Ibid, 414. The author, quoting P.V. Jakobsen explains that the international community remained unwilling to bestow 'normal' status upon Germany, instead realizing that "Beating Germany over the head with her past or questioning her loyalty to the West with *Drang nach Osten* rhetoric worked well....when they wanted to persuade her to back down from policies they disliked" For more, see P.V. Jakobsen, 'Myth-making and Germany's Unilateral Recognition of Croatia and Slovenia', *European Security* 4 (1995): 411

Markovits and Reich examine the impact of collective memory on German foreign policy by providing a detailed memory map containing 'memory clusters', or historically separated events. These clusters are more prominently analyzed after 1945 and detail how memory, culture, and identity enter the foreign policy arena. The authors argue that a principal collective memory exists in contemporary Germany which continues to influence and shape in which framework policies are formulated.⁴¹ As discussed earlier, this is a general challenge, or contestation, to structural approaches which focus on the influence of power relations. The normalization debate, which is separate from scholars discussing change and continuity in German foreign and security policy, enters analyses about the influence of historical memory when examining the changes from the Bonn to the Berlin Republic. While Germany was 'not normal' immediately in 1989, analysts began to debate and examine German behavior parallel to normal action in the early 1990s in light of *Bundeswehr* reform and German troop deployment.⁴²

The early 1990s were marked by changes towards a more capable, responsible Germany, evident by statements of Germany's Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel who explained, "Making Germany a partner capable of assuming a full range of duties is a priority task aimed at providing for the future. Our citizens understand that the time when we were in an exceptional situation is over. We have no need to demonstrate our ability for normality both at home and abroad if we do not want to sustain severe

⁴¹ Andrei S. Markovits et al., "The Contemporary Power of Memory: The Dilemmas for German Foreign Policy," *Communication Review* 2, no. 1 (1997): 89.

⁴² "The Contemporary Power of Memory: The Dilemmas for German Foreign Policy," *Communication Review* 2, no. 1 (1997): 91.

political damage."⁴³ As Germany was becoming more *normal*, scholars argued that German leaders should therefore act according to realist assumptions.⁴⁴ The academic debate, at this time, was dominated by questions as to Germany's potential future trajectory and use of power, while few took into consideration the importance of the historical memory-identity-foreign policy nexus.⁴⁵ Historical or collective memory, which also informs ideology, contributes to understanding and explaining German foreign policy choices. The norms and values, informed by historical memory, were institutionalized by Germany, thus creating a social learning process which changed societal memory and practices and contributed to German national identity.

POWER AND GERMAN FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY

In order to put into context Germany's foreign and security behavior, the use of power has to be analyzed as well. Especially after Kosovo, scholars began to debate Germany's status as a normal actor within a civilian power framework, most prominently outlined by Hanns Maull. Germany's identity as a 'civilian power' meant a continuous promotion of multilateralism, integration, institution building, and to contain the use of force by advocating international law and norms.⁴⁶ Germany, as a 'tamed power' though institutional constraints has aligned its interests and developed

⁴³ Ibid, 91. Klaus Kinkel (1993). Responsibility, realism: Providing for the future German foreign policy in a world undergoing a process of restructuring. *Statements and Speeches*, XVI, 5. New York: German Information Center.

⁴⁴ At the time these arguments were first made in 1997, this was not the case. Whether Germany is acting "more realist" in its current foreign policy choices is a central debate of this dissertation

⁴⁵ Markovits et al., "The Contemporary Power of Memory: The Dilemmas for German Foreign Policy."

⁴⁶ Maull, "Germany and the Use of Force: Still a 'Civilian Power'?", 56.

its political identity parallel to the integration of Europe. While Germany participated in the Kosovo War, which sparked scholarly debate over Germany's status as a 'civilian power', analysts argue that Germany's behavior and policies during the armed conflict reflected the principles of a civilian power state, emphasizing Germany's involvement based on humanitarian assistance. Throughout the conflict, Germany took in the majority of the refugees and led the dialogues to reconstruct the area while strengthening alliance solidarity.⁴⁷ The 'normalization' debate about Germany's use of power and foreign and security policy began with Germany's presumed change and shift in policy and apparent deviation from previously held approaches.

Scholars in the field analyze Germany's path toward normalcy by examining whether Germany acts according to its level of power. Here, the assumption is that as Germany's power has increased due to unification and changes in the system, changes in Germany's national interests should follow. According to some scholars, due to the restraints of responsibility, a lack of understanding in defining its national interests, and its power, German foreign policy will not be 'normal'.⁴⁸ Scholars also point to the rhetorical promises made by Germany which were not met with political action. Instead, scholars point to Germany's use of 'soft balancing' approaches in order to influence the international environment.

⁴⁷ "Germany and the Use of Force: Still a 'Civilian Power'?"

⁴⁸ Christian Hacke, *Die Aussenpolitik Der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Weltmacht Wider Willer?* (Berlin, Germany: Ullstein, 1997).

Soft Balancing

Soft balancing is a relatively new addition to the balance of power theory, defined by non-military forms of intervention or balancing evident since the end of the Cold War, but more specifically since the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Within the literature surrounding the balance of power, soft balancing is discussed in connection with hard balancing and bandwagoning. The concept itself has sparked a debate within the field in terms of its validity as an actual theory. Several political actions and policies by the EU to balance U.S. hegemonic power have been described as soft balancing practices; however, other authors in the field have dismissed such claims stating that the reasoning behind certain policies are not meant to balance the U.S. as the EU is attempting to build an alliance partnership.

T.V. Paul argues that since the end of the Cold War, second tier major powers have pursued indirect balancing through diplomatic bargaining “intended to constrain U.S. power” which constitutes soft balancing.⁴⁹ One of the most powerful tools is the veto power states hold in the UN Security Council which could deny legitimacy during U.S. led interventions. The author also outlines specific conditions under which soft balancing occurs:⁵⁰

- (1) the hegemon’s power position and military behavior are of growing concern but do not yet pose a serious challenge to sovereignty of second tier powers; (2) the dominant state is a major source of public goods in both the economic and security areas that cannot simply be replaced; and (3) the dominant state cannot

⁴⁹ T.V. Paul, “Soft Balancing in the Age of U.S. Primacy,” *International Security* 30, no. 1 (2005): 58.

⁵⁰ These conditions were first introduced in T.V. Paul, “Introduction: The Enduring Axioms of Balance of Power Theory and Their Contemporary Relevance,” in Paul, Wirtz, and Fortmann, *Balance of Power*, pp. 1-25.

easily retaliate either because the balancing efforts of others are not overt or because they do not directly challenge its power position with military means. While pursuing soft balancing, second tier states could engage the hegemon and develop institutional links with it to ward off possible retaliatory actions.⁵¹

Soft balancing has become a strategy specifically observed during the past ten years when second tier powers challenged the legitimacy of U.S. policies, not only internationally but also by influencing U.S. domestic public opinion. This also affects the legitimacy of humanitarian interventions as these missions warrant the approval of the United Nations or other multilateral institutions. For example, the invasion of Iraq in 2002/3 can be seen as a soft-balancing effort. The veto stages during the United Nations Security Council debates constitutes a soft balancing act at the diplomatic level resulting in the invasion by the U.S. without international approval and legitimacy. During the events leading up to the invasion, France, Germany, Russia, and China demanded additional time for the weapons inspections, and argued in front of the Security Council. Germany and France also used NATO to block the U.S.'s attempt to use the alliance in the invasion, therefore engaging in soft balancing tactics. Throughout this process, France and Germany were the most outspoken, but France's position mirrored that of its own foreign policy with a goal of a multipolar system "in which Europe acts as a pole to balance against the U.S."⁵²

According to scholars, Germany has engaged in soft balancing measures by using international institutions such as the UN Security Council, NATO, and the EU, to restrain U.S. power. Despite major opposition by second tier major powers, the invasion of Iraq

⁵¹ Paul, "Soft Balancing in the Age of U.S. Primacy."

⁵² Ibid, 67.

by the U.S. did not result in hard balancing against the U.S.; however, the soft balancing practices employed Germany and other countries make it difficult for the U.S. to gain peacekeeping personnel and support. Soft balancing efforts resulted in a unanimous approval of UN resolution 1546/2004 which outlined that the U.S. would end its occupation of Iraq before June 30, 2004.⁵³ On the other hand, other security scholars directly question the concept of soft balancing, stating that the soft balancing argument has “no traction”.⁵⁴

The soft balancing argument initially became known at the end of the 1990s when scholars articulated the difference between the traditional balancing involving military action and the softer forms of balancing.⁵⁵ While analyzing the policies of Germany, France, and Russia in regards to Iraq, proponents of the soft balancing approach argued that the purpose was to “constrain American power, now liberated from the ropes of bipolarity.”⁵⁶ The soft balancing argument combines aspects of Kenneth Waltz’s structural theory and Stephen Walt’s theory, and, according to other scholars, has to be linked to show a causal relationship to the systemic power of the U.S. Soft balancing measures should be aimed at implicating U.S. capabilities rather than simply aggravating U.S. policies, otherwise the argument itself becomes illogical. The

⁵³ Ibid, 70.

⁵⁴ Robert J. Art et al., “Striking the Balance (Correspondence),” *International Security* 30, no. 3 (2005): 106. Other authors who have extensively discussed soft balancing and have been reviewed but not directly included in this research paper are: Robert A. Pape “Soft Balancing: How States Pursue Security in a Unipolar World”, annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, Illinois, September 5, 2004; Stephen M. Walt, “Keeping the World Off Balance,” in Ikenberry, *America Unrivaled* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2004).

⁵⁵ The authors cited early work by Joffe and Walt which included Josef Joffe, “Defying History and Theory: The United States as the ‘Last Superpower,’” in Ikenberry, *America Unrivaled*.

⁵⁶ Originally cited in Joffe, “Gulliver Unbound.”

soft balancing argument is continuously placed, by all authors, into a greater debate surrounding the application of balance of power theory and the current international system. Authors who argue against the validity of the soft-balancing approach point to the lack of transparency by governments in regards to decision making processes in foreign policy matters.⁵⁷ The soft balancing argument has also been used to explain EU defense cooperation and defense policies, yet the increased EU military capability is also due to the U.S.'s decreased presence in Europe. In regards to the invasion of Iraq and opposition by states to the U.S. position, some scholars argue that the soft balancing argument misinterprets and oversimplifies what actually happened. According to some authors, the positions taken by Germany, France, Turkey, and Russia can be explained based upon policy preferences and domestic and European politics, not stemming from the power of the U.S. Further, an argument is made for the Iraq case in regards to bargaining, rather than soft balancing. A distinction has to be made between policy bargaining and normal diplomatic friction; "Policy bargaining" refers to behavior designed to obtain the best outcome for a state on a given issue or set of issues by deploying the most effective manner to the power assets that the state currently possesses. "Balancing" refers to behavior designed to create a better range of outcomes for state vis-à-vis another state or coalition of states by adding to the power assets at its disposal, in an attempt to offset or diminish the advantages enjoyed by that other state or coalition.⁵⁸ Assets include military forces, economic power, formal and informal

⁵⁷ Brooks & Wohlforth here refer to France, Russia, and China.

⁵⁸ Art et al., "Striking the Balance (Correspondence)," 184.

alliances, and voting and veto power in international organizations, whereby the first three are considered hard assets and the last two soft assets. Therefore, when the first three are used it constitutes hard balancing; the last two, soft balancing.

IDENTITY AND GERMAN FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY: EUROPEAN AND NATIONAL IDENTITY AND EU EXPANSION

German identity since the end of WWII was developed and constructed parallel to European identity, as Germany was the driving force behind integration; aligning its national interests with the goals and interests of Europe. This alignment has resulted in Germany being called “The Good European” in scholarly analysis. Identity and culture certainly influence domestic and international politics, and it is therefore important to include identity construction and European identity in order to understand and explain German foreign policy choices.

First, a distinction has to be made for the terms “Europe” and “European Union”. When referring to “Europe” or “European”, especially in the political sense, “Europe” here implies a collective action by an organization, different from individual national actions. The European Commission’s map includes 34 European countries (not including Turkey or the Ukraine) while the European Union consists of 27 member states, some other lists even count 40 states.⁵⁹ Identities are ever changing with interests, preferences, and loyalties, and can be viewed in relation to others as well as a sense of

⁵⁹ James A. Caporaso, “The Possibilities of a European Identity,” *Brown Journal of World Affairs* 12, no. 1 (2005).

belonging to a society. This means that “identities are less concrete than interests but more substantial than preferences” in that interests have no real existence separate from our collective understanding of them.⁶⁰ Preferences differ from identity as preferences can change quickly. Further, an individual can have several identities nested within another; for example “I am a Rhinelander, a German, and a European “.⁶¹

In order to analyze identity within a European context, the concept of democracy has to be considered and analyzed. Further, a common identity among the governed is necessary in order for democratic forms of government to work; however, some scholars argue that democracy in all of Europe is impossible as no ‘true’ European identity exists. Several factors contribute the construction of the ‘new’ European identity, to include the completion of a single market and European Monetary Union (EMU), the Single European Act, and the Maastricht Treaty which resulted of a borderless union with freedom of the movement of goods, services, and capital. Beyond this, the EU has a flag, symbol, motto, and hymn. The question here remains whether further integration requires a common European identity.

Another common way to construct identity is by identifying “the other”. Recent debates within identity studies show that this ‘other’ is no longer the Soviet Union, but has become the U.S. Despite U.S. support of the European project since the end of WWII, the U.S. has been an economic competitor to the EU. Further, the U.S. and the EU

⁶⁰ Ibid, 66. The author here uses the theoretical framework used by Thomas Risse in “European Institutions and Identity Change: What have we learned?” in Richard Hermann, Thomas Risse, and Marilyn Brewer, *Transnational Identities: Becoming European in the EU* (Boulder, CO: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004), p. 148.

⁶¹ Caporaso, “The Possibilities of a European Identity,” 67.

are different in military capabilities, political structures, and ideological opposition over the International Criminal Court (ICC), capital punishment, the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the Kyoto Treaty, and the Iraq war.⁶² Such differences have been particularly evident since September 11th and the positions held by the EU and the U.S. in regards to Middle East policies surrounding Israel and Palestine.

What is Europe and who does the EU claim to represent? These questions come up in conjunction with scholarly analysis about enlargement and integration. The most recent EU enlargement has created a golden curtain divide between a West of “wealth, affluence, a large middle class, democracy, hope, progress, the Enlightenment, Christianity, human rights, and civilization” whereas to the East in Russia, Ukraine, and Central Asia lies “poverty, backwardness, authoritarianism, stagnation, grayness, lack of hope, Orthodoxy, often dismal human rights record, and lack of civilization”.⁶³ Although the EU membership criteria was laid out in the 1993 Copenhagen criteria, it appears that another crucial criteria has become an important aspect in enlargement policies: culture, identity, and, essentially “Europeanness”. How do we define Europe? What is Europe and who is allowed to call themselves European? Scholars discuss the question of legitimacy and justification within the EU’s enlargement policy. From these analyses, three different analytical reasons can be drawn to explain enlargement: pragmatic,

⁶² Ibid, 72.

⁶³ Howard Wiarda, "Where Does Europe End Now? Expanding Europe's Frontiers and the Dilemmas of Enlargement and Identity," *Brown Journal of World Affairs* 12, no. 1 (2005): 90. Also adopted from Samuel Huntington's *Clash of Civilizations*

ethical-political, and moral.⁶⁴ The pragmatic explanation here refers to the approach where policy is justified by the result of expected outcome (utility based calculations); the ethical-political approach relies on the idea of a “collective us” and the values attributed to a given community; the moral approach would justify enlargement based on universal standards of justice.⁶⁵

When considering European identity and analyzing the rhetoric used by politicians in discussions towards EU membership applicants, arguments can be grouped on either rights-based approaches, referring back to the Copenhagen Criteria, or value based approaches, referring to cultural and identity factors. This is particularly true in the case of Turkey; cultural arguments brought forth against Turkish accession suggests that due to religion, history, and tradition, Turkey does not pass as ‘European’. The German Christian Democrats (CDU) and the Austrians, along with several political leaders in France, have argued for a privileged partnership agreement between the EU and Turkey instead. The British, to include a very outspoken Tony Blair, have been in favor of granting Turkey EU membership. The importance of identity as an explanatory variable has been analyzed by scholars in both international relations as well as psychology, and is interesting to consider when using Germany as a case study. While German identity is certainly unique, Germany has constructed its goals and interests in line with those of the EU in the past. German identity is further complicated as patriotic feelings have been suppressed and viewed negatively due to Germany’s Nazi past.

⁶⁴ Helene Sjursen, "Why Expand?: The Question of Legitimacy and Justification in the Eu's Enlargement Policy.," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 40(2002).

⁶⁵ *Ibid*, 494.

Symbolisms of German specific identity are therefore difficult to pinpoint in present times; flags, anthems, and patriotic behavior most likely occur during sporting events and are completely absent in daily activities. Despite this, identity has been used widely as a variable that influences foreign policy behavior.

Social Identity Theory (SIT) has been used to show that identity is the most important factor that influences policies which either oppose or support EU enlargement. According to SIT, identity is the explanatory variable in understanding policy preferences toward applicant countries.⁶⁶ More specifically, SIT has been applied to analyze the mechanism of identity and rhetoric used by Germany, France, and Great Britain in the case of Turkey. Here, decision makers' support for or against accession in 1999, 2002, and 2005 is examined. The study showed that the traditional theory of rationalism currently used to explain EU expansion has not sufficiently addressed enlargement comprehensively.⁶⁷

In the literature, expansion is often explained by way of cost-benefit analysis from economic standpoints. Some authors analyze EU enlargement from a more constructivist standpoint of member states' understanding of applicant states' identity and how such applicant states fit into their own identity. This debate has been coined the "great debate" within EU expansion as the relationship between rhetorical action

⁶⁶ Tyler M. Curley, "Social Identity Theory and E.U. Expansion," *International Studies Quarterly* 53, no. 3 (2009). The author also discusses other aspects of social psychology and its focus on the scientific study of human behavior. For more on this, see Michael A. Hogg and Daniel Abrams, *Social Identifications: A Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations and Group Processes* (London: Routledge, 1988).

⁶⁷ Curley, "Social Identity Theory and E.U. Expansion," 649.

and identity is examined.⁶⁸ According to the SIT, individuals with a strong group identity are inclined to oppose applicants based on “identity and likeness to the group” whereas individuals with a weak group identity are supportive of allowing new applicants as long as they meet membership criteria.⁶⁹ Using SIT to examine EU enlargement and Germany’s response and behavior, scholars attempt to combine the shortcomings of the constructivist approach by supplementing aspects of the rational approach and emphasizing Alexander Wendt’s idea that “identities are the basis of interests” in regards to EU enlargement and policy preferences.⁷⁰

The rationalist approach towards assessing foreign policy choices assumes that actions are taken in order to produce the best outcomes, treating individuals as the basic units of the analysis. Within rational choice theory, utility is defined in material terms, which would result in an argument that EU decision makers would prefer candidates whose membership would bring the most security and economic gains in the future. The inclusion of the identity variable in regards to foreign policy choices of decision makers then allows for an analysis of motives and influence for EU enlargement. When considering Germany’s behavior towards Turkey’s EU membership application in terms of national vs. group identity, differences from Britain’s and France’s national identity are distinct.

⁶⁸ Schimmelfennig, "The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union."

⁶⁹ Curley, "Social Identity Theory and E.U. Expansion," 650.

⁷⁰ Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," *International Organization*, no. 2 (1992): 398.

Germany's national identity has been reconstructed to overcome the nationalistic Nazi past of WWII. Germany's new identity, however, is not necessarily a direct result of EU integration, but rather complementary, overcoming "the other" and "a failed past" while building a "civilian power" within the framework of the EU.⁷¹ Policy makers within Germany have supported further integration, which has included support of the single currency. For example, when analyzing Germany's position on Turkey's membership application, rhetoric shows that Gerhard Schröder was strongly supportive of granting membership in hopes of creating a relationship that would overlook identity, cultural, and religious differences between Turkey and Europe. Despite Angela Merkel's ties to the German Christian Democrats (CDU), which does not support accession negotiations with Turkey, the German Chancellor has stated that she will continue EU-Turkey talks.⁷² German identity is based on a variety of constructs, shaped and influenced by historical memory. For over seventy years, Germany has balanced the delicate relationship between guilt and responsibility, especially in regards to foreign policy. While portraying the role of a security exporter on one hand, Germany also held on to its culture of restraint in both political rhetoric and action.

Summary

This chapter has outlined important concepts in order to understand German foreign and security policy. Political rhetoric in Germany is an important instrument

⁷¹ Curley, "Social Identity Theory and E.U. Expansion," 658.

⁷² Ibid, 658. Curley also analyzes statements by German foreign Minister Joschka Fischer in 2005.

used to explain, justify, and show Germany's actions, while historical memory forms the basis of my argument in this dissertation. More specifically, the cases examined later within this dissertation detail how and when historical memory enters German rhetoric while explaining in which ways historical memory shapes the course of German foreign policy behavior. The importance of power in international relations is a theoretical given. The increase in Germany's power, both economically and within an institutional setting, especially after unification, shows that Germany has not developed a distinct political identity that accounts for this increase in power. While Germany's political identity evolved parallel to EU enlargement, a distinctively complicated intersection of power, guilt, and responsibility remains constant in German foreign and security policy, especially in light of Germany's changes in interests.

CHAPTER III

EXPLAINING GERMAN FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY: THE THEORETICAL DEBATE

INTRODUCTION

Before discussing specific theoretical applications and arguments to the examination and understanding of German foreign policy, it is important to define the three international relations theories used in the analysis portion of this dissertation to understand German foreign and security policy: rhetoric, the influence of historical memory, and the frameworks in which scholars position their analyses and arguments. Structural realism or neorealism is used as a framework of analysis in order to provide a systemic analysis of German foreign policy with a focus on power and military capability to reach foreign policy goals. Liberalism, or Moravcsik's liberal theory of international politics, will aid in understanding how domestic politics and institutions influence foreign policy, while constructivism will provide a framework to incorporate and emphasize how German foreign policy is shaped and constructed socially and historically through identity, ideas, norms, and culture. Each theoretical framework will contribute to understanding and analyzing how or if historical memory influences German foreign policy choices and rhetoric during the selected case studies and under which lenses scholars analyze political culture in Germany.

Structural Realism

Kenneth Waltz' theory of neorealism focuses on international politics and assumes that state behavior can be explained and understood by the distribution of power in the international system. Realism, a theory of international relations, makes three major assumptions: 1. Actors are rational units within an international structure of anarchy; 2. State preferences are fixed and conflicting goals lead to continuous bargaining among states;¹ 3. Material capabilities influence state behavior.² Neorealism differs from classical realism, which is focused human nature, in that it is concerned with the structure of the international system. This structure is assumed to be anarchic and perpetual conflicts among states exists. Further, power is measured in terms of military and economic capabilities which determine the relationship among states.

In his influential article, *Structural Realism after the Cold War*, the author defends the theory and addresses critics of the theory who called for an end, or death, of realism. Waltz stresses the importance of differentiating between "changes of the system" and "changes in the system", whereby only the former would constitute an end to realism.³ Changes in the international system are of particular importance to the analysis of German foreign policy, as the end of the Cold War and German unification are both seen as changes within the system, which should then result in a changed foreign policy objective or execution. Discussions on changes of the structure of the

¹ According to Waltz, state "at a minimum, seek their own preservation and, at a maximum, drive for universal domination". Kenneth Neal Waltz, *Theory of International Politics / Kenneth N. Waltz* (Boston, Mass. : McGraw-Hill, 1979), 118.

² Jeffrey W. Legro and Andrew Moravcsik, "Is Anybody Still a Realist?," *International Security*, no. 2 (1999): 14-18.

³ Kenneth N. Waltz, "Structural Realism after the Cold War," *ibid.* 25, no. 1 (2000): 5.

system versus changes at the unit level guide Waltz' central questions in search of the factors that could change the international system and politics entirely, which, according to the author, is unlikely despite influential factors such as the spread of democracy and international institutions. Realism, to Waltz, remains the "basic" theory for international relations, accounting for both historic as well as current events, and also predicting the future of the international system. Waltz structures his defense of realism by analyzing scholarly literature, competing theories, and colleagues' claims, while injecting historic facts and explanations. In regards to democratic peace theory, which assumes that democracies do not wage war against one another, Waltz states that it is easier to explain war than to analyze and understand the conditions under which peace flourishes. Emphasizing the changing international system which operates without guarantees of alliances (today's friend, tomorrow's enemy), Waltz stands by his early arguments of structural realism, which outline the anarchic system and its survival in the event of democratic states globally.⁴

Waltz' criticism of democratic peace theory, in support of structural realism, continues when the author reviews the effects of interdependence, which he refers to as "weak"; stating that "with zero interdependence, neither conflict nor war is possible. With integration, international becomes national politics".⁵ This central argument further sets up Waltz' defense of realism in conjunction with institutionalism and the role of institutions in shaping international politics. Institutions, according to Waltz,

⁴ Ibid, 10.

⁵ Ibid, 15

have little effect on the international system. Using the case of NATO, the author shows the difference in explaining international institutions and alliances through institutional theory, differentiating between functions that fluctuate as structure changes. The end of the cold war becomes part of Waltz' analysis, when he explains why institutions, such as NATO, are still around despite the initial purpose for NATO appearing to be no longer needed. Discussing the function of NATO, and its purpose as a "vehicle for the application of American power and vision to the security order in Europe", Waltz dismisses institutionalist interpretations and instead argues that "international institutions serve primarily national rather than international interests".⁶

One of the central aspects of realism, balance of power theory, argues that balancing against the strongest state will occur eventually, although realist theory is unclear *when* such balancing will happen. With a focus on the structure of the international system, Waltz discusses the potential of future great power candidates such as Germany and the EU, China, and Russia, adding that "for a country to choose not to become a great power is a structural anomaly".⁷ Structural changes, such as the end of the Cold War, are then predicted to affect the behavior of states and the foreign policy choices made without actually changing the international system.⁸ A major flaw of realist theory then is its ability to explain the EU and how the structural changes of going from a bipolar system to a multipolar system resulted in international institutions and cooperation on the European continent. Similarly, realism cannot account for the

⁶ Ibid, 20-21

⁷ Ibid, 33

⁸ Waltz, "Structural Realism after the Cold War," 39.

case of Germany: a great power economically but not in terms of military capability; instead Germany has adopted an anti-militaristic political culture since the end of WWII.⁹ Critics of structural realism also point to the absence of balancing against the U.S. by European countries.¹⁰

Centrally positioned in neorealist theory is the concept of anarchy and survival. According to Waltz, "In anarchy, security is the highest end. Only if survival is assured can states safely seek other goals as such as tranquility, profit, and power".¹¹ Although accepting Waltz' system level theory, Keohane argues that the structural definition of the system itself excludes the role institutions play in shaping and influencing the international system.¹² Other scholars also emphasize the shortcomings of neorealism and theory's ability to explain change in global politics, pointing to the fallacy of presenting a theory as universally applicable. Reviewing and comparing neorealism and historical materialism, scholars argue that both pay attention to conflict without adequately including human practices.¹³ Overall, critics of structural realism point to the theory's denial of the social basis and limits of power, the lack of neorealism to account for both change and continuity, and its failure to include history.

⁹ The case of Germany in regards to structural realism and theoretical applications will be further discussed within this chapter.

¹⁰ Although several scholars argue that balancing by European countries against the U.S. has occurred through *soft balancing*, such as Germany's and France's position during the 2003 invasion of Iraq.

¹¹ Kenneth N. Waltz, "Anarchic Orders and Balances of Power " in *Neorealism and Its Critics*, ed. Robert O. Keohane (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 127.

¹² Robert O. Keohane, *Neorealism and Its Critics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 194.

¹³ Robert Cox, "Social Forces, States, and World Orders " in *Neorealism and Its Critics*, ed. Robert O. Keohane (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 215.

In a response to the rising attractiveness of institutional theories after the end of the Cold War, John Mearsheimer discusses and defines the approach for three theories that emphasize institutions as a crucial factor in promoting world peace: liberal institutionalism, collective security, and critical theory.¹⁴ Mearsheimer addresses the basis of disagreement between these approaches and realism, namely whether institutions “affect the prospects of international stability”.¹⁵ Realists assume that institutions are a reflection of the distribution of power, calculated by powerful states, and arise by calculated self-interest, whereas institutionalists assume that institutions can affect state behavior, are independent, and can directly influence whether states pursue war.¹⁶ Mearsheimer defines institutions as “a set of rules that stipulate the ways in which states should cooperate and compete with each other”, outlining mutually accepted and negotiated forms and laws of state behavior.¹⁷ To realists, the international environment is a continuous struggle for power and security competition, therefore constraining cooperation between states, whereby the state is anarchic, states have military capability and are uncertain about the intentions of other states, and state behavior is driven by a desire for survival.¹⁸ Realists assume that cooperation is possible, but argue that states first weigh profits and gains by thinking in either absolute gains or relative gains, whereby power balancing forces states to focus on relative gains when contemplating cooperation. Scholars point to the limitations of

¹⁴ John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," *International Security*, no. 3 (1994).

¹⁵ *Ibid*, 7

¹⁶ *Ibid*

¹⁷ *Ibid*, 8

¹⁸ *Ibid*, 10

cooperation, such as concerns of cheating, before discussing cooperation in the form of alliances that occurred historically, such as NATO.

Some realists argue that liberal institutionalism ignores security issues by focusing on economic issues, pointing to flaws in Keohane's causal logic and analyzing the central threat of cheating when states cooperate; the prisoner's dilemma.¹⁹ Some scholars therefore partially dismiss this theory, noting relative-gains concerns before offering several counter-arguments in reviewing cases for institutionalism, but essentially finding no evidence that liberal institutionalism succeeds in answering central questions. Opponents of the institutionalist approach conclude that the theory and its practical application is bound to fail, offering the league of nations as a historic example and the war in Bosnia as a recent example.

Liberalism

Liberalism encompasses several schools of thought, concepts, and theories which generate several strands of liberalism. International relations theorists differentiate between four strands of post-war liberalism: Sociological Liberalism, which focuses on transnational relations; Interdependence Liberalism, surrounding the idea of mutual dependence; Institutional Liberalism, a theory that outlines the importance and impact of international institutions on cooperation among states; and Republican Liberalism, outlining the argument that liberal democracies are more peaceful and law-

¹⁹ Ibid, 17

abiding than non-democratic countries.²⁰ The main concern liberalist theorists have with realism is that although realism offers prediction into future state behavior (conflict), the theory does not outline “*when, why, and under what circumstances*” such conflict occurs.²¹ Unlike realism’s focus on the distribution of material power and capabilities to drive and influence state behavior, liberalism focuses on preferences, norms, institutions, ideas, and perceptions to explain the international system.

Although different forms of liberalism as they apply to the study of German foreign policy will be discussed in detail later in this chapter, for the purpose of the case study analysis part of this dissertation, Andrew Moravcsik’s framework of liberal theory of international politics will be applied. This framework outlines ways to explain and understand state behavior based on the argument that state behavior is directly influenced by the relationship between states and the domestic and transnational civil society.²² According to liberal theory, state preferences have the most significant impact in world politics, whereby Moravcsik’s framework further emphasizes how interests, institutions, and societal ideas impact state behavior by influencing state preferences through three core assumptions of liberalism: 1. The primary actors in international politics are individuals and private groups; 2. States represent domestic society; 3. The pattern of interdependent state preferences establishes state behavior.²³ This

²⁰ Robert H. Sørensen Georg Jackson, *Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches* (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2003).

²¹ Legro and Moravcsik, "Is Anybody Still a Realist?," 27.

²² Andrew Moravcsik, "Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics," *International Organization* 51, no. 4 (1997): 513.

²³ "Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics," *International Organization* 51, no. 4 (1997): 515-20.

framework therefore seeks to show how state preferences are influenced by societal interaction and change through “transnational social context”.²⁴ The liberalist framework can explain units of analysis that include foreign policy goals and choices of individual actors but also the systemic results of interactions among states by focusing on domestic theories of preferences. According to Moravcsik, liberal theory suggests an explanation for change in the international system based on historical circumstances, such as the influence of global economic development on social and political change.

State preferences are central to liberal analyses and differ greatly from strategies employed by states. State preferences, when analyzed from a liberal framework, can be studied through “decision-making documents, trustworthy oral histories and memories, patterns of coalition support, and the structure of domestic institutions”.²⁵ Similarly, Volker Rittberger outlines how utilitarian liberalism focuses on “subsystemic determinants of foreign policy behavior” by examining how the preferences and interests of domestic actors shape foreign policy choices.²⁶ This is in line with the overarching focus of liberalism of citizens in global politics, due to interdependence issues and technological advances, advancing the inquiry beyond the state, and instead analyzing the relationship between groups, societies, and private individuals.²⁷

In summary, liberalism, unlike neorealism, theoretically focuses on how the individual and groups of individuals, influence and shape state behavior and global

²⁴ Ibid, 522

²⁵ Ibid, 544

²⁶ Volker Rittberger, *German Foreign Policy since Unification: Theories and Case Studies* (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2001), 4.

²⁷ Jackson, *Introduction to International Relations : Theories and Approaches*, 111.

politics. Further, the liberalist framework assumes that several concepts (such as conflict and cooperation) have an impact on international relations whereby a differentiation between sociological, interdependence, institutional, and republican liberalism can be made. Within the liberal framework, scholars may focus their analyses on actor-centered inquiries, which examines how domestic actors and their interests influence foreign policy and state behavior, or the structure-centered approach which emphasizes how institutional aspects of states influence international behavior.²⁸

Constructivism

The constructivist framework primarily seeks to show how core concepts of international relations are socially *constructed* through a continuous process of social practice, learning, and interaction. Constructivism as such, provides a framework to analyze the influence of non-structural variables on state behavior, such as identity, ideas, norms, culture, and history. The basic assumption of constructivism is that actors in the international system follow the logic of appropriateness, a behavior shaped and learned through social norms. International and societal norms are therefore the main variable for foreign policy analysis within the constructivist analysis.²⁹ Perhaps most prominently, Alexander Wendt argues “that the structures of human association are determined primarily by shared ideas rather than material forces, and that the identities

²⁸ Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki, and Steve Smith, *International Relations Theories. Discipline and Diversity* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2007), 105.

²⁹ For more on logic of appropriateness, refer to James G. March and Johan P. Olson, *Rediscovering Institutions* (New York, NY: New York: Free Press, 1989).

and interests of purposive actors are constructed by these shared ideas rather than given by nature".³⁰

Constructivist scholars generally critique the focus on material-based assumptions of international relations theory, instead focusing on how the social elements in world politics can aid in understanding change at the international level.³¹ Responding to the emphasis on structure-based analysis of the realist school, constructivists first used the concept of 'agency' in international relations analysis, with an underlying argument that world politics are "a world of our making".³² The concept of rationality, which in realist theory is a function of individual interests, is viewed by constructivists as a utility of legitimacy based on shared norms within social structures.³³ As such, norms shape and constrain human behavior, and directly construct identities, which then have the *agency* to influence their environment.

Summing up the major arguments of social constructivism and the debate between structure and agency, Alexander Wendt outlines how actors in social relationships are dependent on and influenced by each other's choices and responses, resulting in a mutually constituted environment.³⁴ Although not dismissing the emphasis on interests in major international relations theories, constructivists continuously tie the predominant concepts back to the identity of actors, as the subjects, or objects, studied

³⁰ Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics / Alexander Wendt*, Cambridge Studies in International Relations: 67 (Cambridge, UK ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 1999., 1999), 1.

³¹ Dunne, Kurki, and Smith, *International Relations Theories. Discipline and Diversity*, 168.

³² This idea was first brought forth by Nicholas Onuf. For more see: Nicholas Greenwood Onuf, *World of Our Making : Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations*, Studies in International Relations (Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press, 1989).

³³ Dunne, Kurki, and Smith, *International Relations Theories. Discipline and Diversity*, 170.

³⁴ Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," 404.

in international relations are constructed and given cultural, social, political, or historical meaning.³⁵ The goal and main emphasis of constructivism is to understand the social meaning of human reasoning and behavior, focusing on the social (rather than the individual), encompassed in the Weberian concept of *Verstehen*.³⁶ Further, constructivism focuses on the process of interaction and language among actors in the international system based on legitimacy and social learning.

German Foreign Policy theories and Frameworks

The end of the WWII changed German identity forever both nationally and internationally. Since then, the German government has taken steps to repair German culture by advocating a foreign policy that is aligned with international law and norms. Power politics, in its traditional sense, has therefore been absent from policies, and Germany's heavy involvement in European integration further showed an overall commitment to community goals. The unification of Germany in 1990 has raised several questions by scholars as to the future role Germany will play in Europe, and how Germany will utilize power through foreign policy choices. In analyzing these questions, James Sperling asks, "What is the best conceptual framework for explaining and predicting the future trajectory of German foreign policy?"³⁷ The factors of changes or

³⁵ Dunne, Kurki, and Smith, *International Relations Theories. Discipline and Diversity*, 171.

³⁶ Ibid

³⁷ James Sperling, "The Foreign Policy of the Berlin Republic: The Very Model of a Post-Modern Major Power? A Review Essay " *German Politics* 12, no. 3 (2003): 2.

continuity that have occurred since unification are important to analyze, while also reflecting to what extent they affect German foreign policy.

Reviewing Germany's foreign policy choices in 2003, Sperling investigates scholars who have answered these questions by applying different theoretical frameworks, all concluding that Germany acts as "something other than a realist power"^{38, 39}. Further claims made by the authors under review argue that German foreign policy has been marked by normative goals instead of material-based interest goals, while others emphasize the issue of continuity.⁴⁰ Almost all authors under review reject neorealist claims and predictions, to include arguments brought forth by John Mearsheimer.⁴¹ Neorealist theory predicts that with the change in the balance of power that occurred in 1989, changes in German foreign policy would also be observed, which has not been the case. Neorealists therefore ask how this change in relative power presents the opportunity for a more aggressive German foreign policy that includes (nationalized) changes to its security policy and whether a new defense identity will decrease German dependence on the U.S. Scholars explain that in order to analyze these questions, and the institutional and normative restraints placed on German autonomy, the environment that shaped German foreign policy has to be carefully

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ The books mentioned here are Bulmer, Jeffery, and Paterson's *Germany's European Diplomacy*, Harnisch and Maull's *Germany as a Civilian Power*, Hide-Price's *Germany & European Order*, and Rittberger's *German Foreign Policy since Unification*.

⁴⁰ Sperling here mentions Schneider, Jopp, and Schmalz, *Eine neue deutsche Europapolitik*, Eberwein and Kaiser's *Germany's New Foreign Policy*, and Newnham's *Deutsche Mark Diplomacy*.

⁴¹ John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: Norton, 2001).

examined.⁴² Similarly, Beverly Crawford explains that realist interpretations have viewed policy decisions as an “exercise of self-interested behavior”, especially in regards to military participation in Afghanistan, which is taken as a sign that the former unchanged foreign policy vision of Germany has ended.⁴³

Almost a decade later, William Paterson asked, “Does Germany still have a European vocation?”, referring to an observation of stricter foreign policy choices by Germany that reflect national interests and uses institutional (and unintentional) power to benefit Germany’s goals.⁴⁴ Debates within scholarly circles in the literature about German foreign policy within the past ten years show a transformation from Germany’s structured (and bound) post war policy choices, to a more agency-actor based approach to national interests, whereby Germany’s economic power and size play a major role in bargaining processes. Germany, often defined as the “good European”, aligning its interests with European interests, has altered its trajectory and a “de-Europeanisation” in policy and discourse has been observed.⁴⁵

Contextual Change and Continuity

The authors included for the review completed an outline of seven categories of change that occurred in German foreign policy. These changes are observed in the overall structure of the international system, in Germany’s status, in a geopolitical

⁴² Sperling, "The Foreign Policy of the Berlin Republic: The Very Model of a Post-Modern Major Power? A Review Essay " 2.

⁴³ Beverly Crawford, "The Normative Power of a Normal State. Power and Revolutionary Vision in Germanys Postwall Foreign Policy " *German Politics and Society* 95, no. 25 (2010): 168.

⁴⁴ William Paterson, "Does Germany Still Have a European Vocation?," *German Politics* 19, no. 1 (2010).

⁴⁵ *Ibid*, 51

context, in the rules that govern the EU, in the international economy, in the ongoing relationship with the U.S., and in political restraints that translated to change in domestic policy.⁴⁶ Overall, one of the strongest changes could be seen in Germany's status while the contextual change that occurred due to the modified relationship with both the EU and the U.S., specifically in regards to EU enlargement and the lack of a security threat by the Soviet Union, resulted in strong changes that, according to neorealist theory, should have caused a change in German foreign policy.⁴⁷

While thematically analyzing change and its potential effects on German foreign policy, scholars address Germany as a relative power in Europe and reject the claim that Germany is a realist state. Rather, Germany is viewed as a post-modern state. According to Robert Cooper, post-modern states integrate with other states and are marked by the orderly and voluntarily erosion of sovereignty while a decline in the collective is observed as the state is liberated and the nation-state becomes less of an identity.⁴⁸ Post-modern states practice neutral interference in foreign policy and openness, transparency, and the rule of law are crucial attributes. Such states advocate human rights and support organizations such as the ICC. In regards to foreign policy, post-modern states act on behalf of the greater good rather than acting for national

⁴⁶ Sperling, "The Foreign Policy of the Berlin Republic: The Very Model of a Post-Modern Major Power? A Review Essay " 2.

⁴⁷ While discussing the change that occurred due to the impact of the domestic political process, Sperling addresses the addition of the five eastern Länder and the notion that the change in government from the Kohl era to the newly formed red-green alliance "promised" foreign policy choices that were not as bound to *Westbindung* and more towards national interest goals that includes economic partners in the east (p. 6)

⁴⁸ Mary N. Hampton, "Living in a World of Dangers and Strangers," *German Politics and Society* 29, no. 3 (2011).

interests. The concept of civilian power aligns with the attributes of the post-modern state: conflicts are resolved peacefully and the use of force is not an option in regards to foreign policy unless an intervention is warranted on the basis of humanitarian efforts.

In analyzing Germany's role in Europe, Hyde-Price offers six roles of German grand strategy: civilian power, tradition-nation, motor of European integration, loyal transatlantic partner, advocate of pan-European cooperation, and "mediator between East and West".⁴⁹ Other authors, who also discuss Germany's roles, agree that Germany will assume a leadership role in Europe, citing Germany's role in the European project. Scholars place focus on roles but may differentiate among them according to perceived power capabilities and interests.⁵⁰ The change observed in relative power and continuity in German foreign policy has sparked the search for alternative explanations for observed policy choices. The author explains that Germany is viewed as mainly an economic power, yet economic strength has not necessarily increased since unification. Further, Germany has remained committed to multilateral operations in regards to policy preferences, to include NATO and EU matters.

While analyzing continuity and change in regards to Germany's use of power, Beverly Crawford questions whether the bid for a permanent seat on the UN Security council can be interpreted as the Republic's way of seeking recognition as a great power (rather than showing an increased commitment to multilateralism). Germany's foreign

⁴⁹ Adrian Hyde-Price, *Germany and European Order: Enlarging Nato and the Eu.* (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2000), 44.

⁵⁰ In this section, Sperling also addresses vertical and horizontal contexts of decision making, the European Monetary Union (EMU), and re-visits bargaining between the Federal Government and the Länder governments.

policy choices can be interpreted and explained through various theoretical frameworks.⁵¹ Some analysts have viewed this as a break with multilateralism, while others have used the refusal of participation in the invasion of Iraq as evidence for soft power balancing (against U.S. legitimacy), while constructivists have argued for a sign of a deepened commitment to antimilitarism.⁵²

Twenty years after unification, Bulmer & Paterson analyze continuity and change in Germany's use of power, guided by the question most dominant across all the literature under review: would the changes of unification and the end of the Cold War eventually lead to a change in German (European) policy? Authors approach this question by examining specific criteria of structural continuity to see whether a shift in the exercise of power occurred, focusing on the impact of German domestic policy on the EU. Similarly, Crawford argues that although factors such as domestic politics, political culture, and international institutions contribute to foreign policy behavior in Germany, power (and the economy) is the driving force that defines policy choices. The author approaches the future of Germany's foreign policy and potential contextual changes from an interesting perspective: through the lens of the German Chancellor, elected in 2015, pointing to weaknesses in NATO's ability to adequately address security threats.

⁵¹ This has been done extensively in regards to Germany's refusal to contribute to the invasion of Iraq in 2002 and the overall analysis of the use of force.

⁵² Crawford, "The Normative Power of a Normal State. Power and Revolutionary Vision in Germany's Postwar Foreign Policy " 168.

While addressing historic continuity in foreign policy, Crawford exclaims that “Germany has changed, must change, and will change”, examining the driving forces behind these potential changes.⁵³ Here, the debates in the past decade largely reflect such change in the future, and scholars have analyzed several aspects of the new ‘German Question’.⁵⁴ One of these questions includes a debate surrounding whether international regimes provide a “veil behind which Germany exercises self-interested dominance, both in Europe and on the international state”.⁵⁵ These questions have guided scholarly debates in regards to continuity and change in German foreign policy since the end of the Cold War and unification. While some analysts, such as Günther Hellmann, John Measheimer, and Volker Rittberger, caution against self-interest and dominance, many other authors argue that a commitment to multilateralism and the rise of ‘civilian power’ have put aside fears of the ‘German Question’.⁵⁶

Interests, Identity, and Norms

The majority of the authors who fall under this category are part of the Manchester University Press series titled *Issues in German Politics* and address the intersection of interest, identity, and norms. Here, an argument is made for the pursuit of milieu goals rather than possession goals by both the Bonn and Berlin Republics. Here, possession goals include those actions that aim at the “preservation of one or

⁵³ Beverly Crawford, *Power and German Foreign Policy: Embedded Hegemony in Europe* (Pasingstoke Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 11.

⁵⁴ The ‘German Question’ refers to the growth of German power that led to the provocation of World War I and World War II.

⁵⁵ Crawford also lists several other questions, which are used throughout the entire book (p. 14).

⁵⁶ Crawford, *Power and German Foreign Policy: Embedded Hegemony in Europe*, 15.

more of the things to which a country attaches value", such as territory, membership in the UN Security Council, or tariff preferences.⁵⁷ Milieu goals include those objectives with results that influence international politics beyond a given country. Peace, international law, or the creation of international organizations fall under such goals and are concerned with concepts other than a country's possessions. However, such milieu goals are often pursued with the intention of gaining a desired possession goal at some point (increasing security), although a nation might, at times, simply be concerned with improving the overall international environment.

Scholars analyze foreign policy goals by the Berlin Republic and categorize each as falling either into milieu goals or possession goals. The results show that Germany has indeed pursued possession goals. Authors place Germany's NATO membership under a self-preservation possession goal and Germany influence in international economy as a self-extension possession goal. Other scholars analyze these goals by using three different theories: neorealism would argue that states pursue influence and autonomy, while utilitarian-liberalism would advocate a maximization of utilizing private and state actors, and constructivism outlines that the state eventually conforms to norms.⁵⁸ Further, some scholars place Germany as an embedded hegemony within Europe, describing how German national interests take precedence over European interests.⁵⁹

⁵⁷ Arnold Wolfers, *Discord and Collaboration; Essays on International Politics* (Baltimore,; Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), 74.

⁵⁸ Rittberger, *German Foreign Policy since Unification: Theories and Case Studies*, 11.

⁵⁹ The idea 'embedded hegemony' can be applied to the fact that Germany did not adhere to the Stability Pact rules whilst stressing to tighten the rules initially. Crawford, *Power and German Foreign Policy: Embedded Hegemony in Europe*.

The discussion of norms in relation to German foreign policy is prevalent in most of the literature, whereby some scholars differentiate between two sets of norms: norms that govern civil societies and norms that govern interstate relations.⁶⁰ Connecting this argument to constructivist theory, when societal and foreign relation norms form a junction, constructivist theory can indeed explain and predict state behavior. However, when both norms are either absent or oppose each other, the theory lacks explanation. Scholars also argue that Germany's pursuit of power has been strategic and systemic (empowerment within the EU), while continuously striving for international cooperation and multilateralism. Therefore, most scholars under review argue that Germany is not a realist state. In regards to strategy, Hyde-Price analyzes what he refers to as the three aspects of German grand strategy; this includes the enlargement security community to the eastern neighborhood, the fusion of the Atlantic system, and the European security system that includes Russia. Crawford adds to this analysis by showing how Germany's efforts in the European integration process is viewed as a continuity of the Bonn Republic's vision.

Harnisch & Maull outline six different objectives that make Germany a civilian power. Here, the main definition calls for an active path to replace politics that are based on power, with socially accepted norms, or politics based on legitimacy.⁶¹ The objectives used by the authors include strengthening international law, creation of

⁶⁰ Simon & Paterson Bulmer, William "Germany and the European Union: From 'Tamed Power' to Normalized Power?," *International Affairs* 86, no. 5 (2010).

⁶¹ Sebastian & Maull Harnisch, Hanns, *Germany as a Civilian Power?: The Foreign Policy of the Berlin Republic* (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2001), 4.

democratic security communities, facilitating democratic legitimacy between states, the encouragement of interdependence, and the international division of labor.⁶² When discussing theoretical frameworks to explain the whether the Berlin Republic has pursued milieu or possession goals, scholars examine a common debate within German foreign policy arguments about the intersection of norms and identity and the parallels of German and EU policy choices. One main argument here is that it is difficult to separate German national goals from European goals as Germany has aligned its interests with those of the European project, often being referred to as a “good European”.⁶³ Identity is used throughout the literature to explain enlargement and policy choices by Germany toward integration and enlargement reform of the EU, blurring the lines between German identities and European identities.⁶⁴

Schröder’s and Joschka Fischer’s initial stance to continue Germany’s traditional ‘pro-European’ course is used to analyze the changes that led to differing interests in foreign policy choices, resulting in scholars referring to Germany’s new European policy and interests as “weaker, leaner, meaner”.⁶⁵ Here, some scholars point out that the case previously made for continuity in policy is weak; instead explaining that Germany’s European policy has changed significantly. Throughout their analysis the authors refer

⁶² Sperling, "The Foreign Policy of the Berlin Republic: The Very Model of a Post-Modern Major Power? A Review Essay " 14.

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ Sperling also explains in detail the how German identity is shaped, explaining the concept of *Selbstbeschränkung* (Germany’s limitation on national interests despite a relative power advantage), *Westbindung* (the concept of being a transatlantic partner as well as a partner to France), and *Selbstbindung* (voluntary limitation of German power in multilateral frameworks) p. 15.

⁶⁵ Hanns Maull, *Germany’s Uncertain Power : Foreign Policy of the Berlin Republic* (Basingstoke [England]; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 95-108.

back to German interest driven behavior in policies relating to enlargement and the constitutionalization of Europe, noting a shift in the structural changes of the policy processes and a weakening of Germany's "traditional European role".⁶⁶ The arguments for changes in policy based on self-interest refer back to Sperling's initial analysis of Wolfer's milieu and possession goals, showing that Germany indeed pursues possession goals, or, at the least, milieu goals that benefit interests and eventually lead to possession goals.

Almost immediately after unification, Chancellor Helmut Kohl promised a foreign policy which continued a focus on global partnerships and the "peaceful balancing of interests" while years later Chancellor Schröder declared that Germany is willing to face its history and would pursue policies that "reflect its own enlightened self-interests".⁶⁷ Scholars in the field have linked statements by politicians and policy makers to identity-based interests, while arguing that German identity has been constructed in parallel with European identity. Here, identity accounts for the main source of preferences, whereby a state's identity is shaped through ideas and beliefs instead of "objective material conditions alone".⁶⁸ The liberal argument, supported by several scholars, is that

⁶⁶ Ibid, 105

⁶⁷ Helga Haftendorn, *Coming of Age: German Foreign Policy since 1945*, Lanham Md (Rowman & Littlefield., 2006), 351,53.

⁶⁸ Crawford, *Power and German Foreign Policy: Embedded Hegemony in Europe*, 25. For an in-debt discussion of state identity, please refer to Peter Katzenstein, *Tamed Power: Germany in Europe* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997).

Germany's participation in institutions shaped its (European) identity and interests and can therefore account for its foreign policy preferences.⁶⁹

Other scholars take issue with this argument, explaining that Germany's core identity has not been shown to be European, referring to Germany's exclusive citizenship rules and restrictive immigration policies.⁷⁰ These scholars explain that the generation of political elites who initially connected German identity to European identity will soon be gone.⁷¹ The most compelling argument scholars bring forth in opposition of identity-based interests, is that methodologically, no examples exist where "Germany's European identity shaped preferences that clearly ran counter to its exclusive national identity, or its material interests".⁷² Crawford, referring back to Katzenstein's argument that Germany's identity has become European, explains that this could simply be demonstrated in that member states that are set to gain from a stable EU will automatically identify with Europe. This is also true for milieu goals, as powers with interests in a stable political environment will often pursue interests and goals and identify with their region.

THEORIES OF GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY

German security scholars point to the difficulties in analyzing German foreign policy theoretically as a differentiation between national, systemic, and supranational

⁶⁹ Simon Bulmer, Jeffery, C., & Paterson, William *Germany's European Diplomacy: Shaping the Regional Milieu* (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2000); Katzenstein, *Tamed Power: Germany in Europe*.

⁷⁰ Crawford, *Power and German Foreign Policy: Embedded Hegemony in Europe*.

⁷¹ *Power and German Foreign Policy: Embedded Hegemony in Europe*, 26.

⁷² *Ibid*, 27

levels of analysis has to be made. Once again, the scholars under review analyze German foreign policy from the neorealist, utilitarian-liberalist, constructivist approaches, as well as the Birmingham school. In regards to foreign policy, neorealism analyzes the system-level variables and follows the assumption that states respond to shifts in the balance of material power while utilitarian-liberalism emphasizes the subsystem variables.⁷³ Constructivism focuses on both variables while assuming that the state will follow the "logic of appropriateness" in regards to societal and international norms.⁷⁴ The Birmingham school, which is comprised of several authors under review, analyzes both variables, but also assumes that states will follow the logic of consequentiality in combination of appropriateness. Here, an emphasis is put on the limiting role that international and domestic institutions have on state action.

Each author has different predictions about the future of German foreign policy. John Mearsheimer predicted, in neorealist fashion, that a unified Germany would separate itself from previous commitments to NATO and the EU. This prediction was based on the balance of power change that occurred after the Cold War, to include the absence of threat from the Soviet Union, therefore shifting the security arrangements. The neorealist position was that Germany would take full advantage of the increased power position and ultimately pursue power politics. The predictions under the utilitarian-liberalism framework is that changes only occur if the preferences of domestic actors changes. Here, scholars explain that the preferences of private

⁷³ Sperling, "The Foreign Policy of the Berlin Republic: The Very Model of a Post-Modern Major Power? A Review Essay " 16.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

domestic actors remained unchanged after unification, and therefore conclude that the foreign policies of the Bonn and Berlin Republics should not change.⁷⁵

The central assumption of the constructivist theory is that identity construction occurs and then creates interests and norms. Further, constructivism assumes that the international system is both material and social, whereby material structures are assigned meaning the environment. This assigned meaning then provides the normative component to the analysis and explanation.⁷⁶ In the case of Germany, constructivism predicts no change in foreign policy from the Bonn Republic to the Berlin Republic. The explanations and predictions made by the Birmingham school focus on three variables. An emphasis is given to the analysis of the strategic (milieu) goals and draw attention to the limitations placed on states by institutional patterns while also examining interest and identity (also finding a Europeanized identity).⁷⁷ Further, the Birmingham school analyzes the relationship between power and the exercise thereof, differentiating between tangible and intangible power, and deliberate or structural exercise of power. German economic and financial power has been structural, while offering financial support for states that are in compliance with German preferences is viewed as deliberative power.⁷⁸

⁷⁵ Rittberger, *German Foreign Policy since Unification: Theories and Case Studies*.

⁷⁶ *Ibid*, 17

⁷⁷ Sperling, citing Bulmer, Jeffery & Paterson (2000), explains that the Birmingham School, in examining German foreign policy, pays particular attention to the impact of German federalism, the sectorization of policy making, and the impact observed by the EU in constructing German interests while simultaneously limiting Germany's freedom (p. 18).

⁷⁸ Hyde-Price, *Germany and European Order: Enlarging Nato and the Eu*.

Crawford compares and contrasts the realist and constructivist view of German foreign policy and offers her own approach which claims that “Germany has changed the way it has pursued its original vision as its power position in Europe and in international politics has grown”.⁷⁹ The author’s main argument here is that changes in uses of power before unification were largely ignored and not viewed as power politics, whereas deviations from foreign policy choices after unification, and with increased overall power, were interpreted as a departure of Germany’s “unique vision of cooperation and antimilitarism”.⁸⁰ Further, Crawford argues that the shifts in power that occurred after the end of the Cold War have turned Germany into a “regional hegemon” (in Europe) and a “great power” globally, whose power is used to guide the original vision that was in place before unification. Through this increased power, and continued vision, Germany has become a “normative power”, focusing on civilian measures and diplomacy backed by material resources.⁸¹ Crawford then argues that Germany’s foreign policy choices are appropriate for the current international environment, filled with new threats that disregard sovereignty and cannot be met with traditional uses of national power.

Scholars discuss post-unification changes in foreign policy, arguing that ‘post-Wall’ behavior differs greatly from that of previous decades. Theories that address this puzzle of policy shifts and changes include a theoretical analysis of structural realism,

⁷⁹ Crawford, "The Normative Power of a Normal State. Power and Revolutionary Vision in Germany's Postwall Foreign Policy " 169.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ Ibid, 170. Crawford here refers to Ian Manner’s articulation of normative power in *Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?* (2002).

intergovernmentalism, liberal institutionalism, sociological/cultural explanations, political party structure, and domestic explanations. Scholars approach this examination by asking, “Are international or domestic pressures primarily responsible for German foreign policy decisions?”, whereby the answer to this question should include a theory that is able to predict and explain policy preferences.⁸² Crawford finds that although structural realism is able to explain certain policy behavior, it lacks in accounting for Germany’s sacrifice of self-interest in certain cases.⁸³ Similarly, the other theories and explanations under review by scholars all yield valid explanations in regards to some foreign policy choices by Germany since unification and in the past decade, but not one single theory accounts for all questions and changes. Liberal institutionalism is unable to account for a state’s desertion of alliances and coalitions, identity-based arguments remain vague, and domestic explanations only account for part of policy variances observed.⁸⁴

The Birmingham School – The Ideal Model?

Out of all theoretical frameworks under review, the Birmingham school directly analyzes German specific foreign policy choices, especially in regards to security. Germany’s strategic goals (milieu goals) are at the center of investigation in relation to European security order. The Birmingham model mainly seeks to examine where German foreign policy is headed and what elements of change and continuity are

⁸² Crawford, *Power and German Foreign Policy: Embedded Hegemony in Europe*.

⁸³ *Power and German Foreign Policy: Embedded Hegemony in Europe*, 22.

⁸⁴ *Ibid*, 21-34. Identity based arguments refer to “identity” as being the driving force behind policy choices

present in Germany since unification. An assumption of the model is that German interests are shaped by the configurations of institutions which also limit Germany's freedom while Germany is viewed as having a Europeanized identity. The Birmingham school's treatment of power (tangible, intangible, structural, or deliberate) results in four contending types of power explained by German security scholars: power that intends to reach maximum relative gains (realist power), power that shapes institutional rules (indirect institutional power), power that results from domestic policy decisions (unintentional power), and power to shape the EU agenda to maximize German influence (systematic empowerment).⁸⁵

In analyzing the Birmingham model for its ability to explain and predict German foreign policy choices, Sterling uses several categories of analysis and a focus on Germany as a security actor in Europe. The author accomplishes this by examining policies of prevention and assurance and German compliance and contributions to EU missions and programs. While assessing Germany as a military actor, Sperling lists German defense expenditures (in comparison to those of France, Italy, and the UK) in an EU context as well as German participation in UN, EU, and NATO-led military operations. When comparing these analyses to the predictions and assumptions of the Birmingham model, Sperling shows Germany's Europeanized identity in regards to interests, Germany's reserved approach to the projection of military force, and the power used by

⁸⁵ James Sperling, "Germany and European Security Governance: How Well Does the Birmingham Model Perform?," *European Security* 18, no. 2 (2009): 127.

Germany to reach its goals.⁸⁶ The evidence used further shows assumptions about foreign policy choices that reflect milieu goals as well as Germany's continued preference toward multilateral approaches.

When analyzing Germany as a security actor, the Birmingham model argues that Germany will act in line with its European identity, pursuing "European" goals and a "multilateral statecraft".⁸⁷ This assumption does not account for the importance of the distribution of power and the relevance of power in German foreign policy. Scholars explain that the end of the Cold War, and the end of a Soviet security threat, combined with lowered U.S. influence, allowed Germany to seek foreign policy security goals that differed from those of the U.S. The author concludes that the Birmingham model lacks an explanation in regards to preferences and interests but does explain the reasons and path of German foreign policy in conjunction with policies of assurance and prevention.

In the past decade, several authors and analysts have questioned Germany's European vocation. Although strongly observed during the Bonn Republic, Germany's European policies have been "contingent, contested, and circumscribed".⁸⁸ Now, the pursuit of "European" goals predicted by the Birmingham model have not been chosen exclusively in recent years, and German national goals have taken precedence. The post-Kohl era has been difficult to categorize by authors in the field. While some scholars in defense of the Birmingham model and theory to explain German foreign policy stress a

⁸⁶ Ibid, 143

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ Paterson, "Does Germany Still Have a European Vocation?," 41.

contingency factor in contemporary policy rather than the structured multilateral approaches, others refer to this period as “de-Europeanisation”.⁸⁹

Peterson groups Germany’s European vocation into three stages: the first stage involves European integration, the second stage refers to a close union to the EU under Chancellor Kohl in the early 1990s, and the third stage is referred to as the post-Kohl stage.⁹⁰ Here, the author explains that European identity and policy choices were gradual processes, whereby concepts such as security and “actorness” were essentially dictated by the political environment, leaving Germany little room to act independently.⁹¹ Scholars of the Birmingham school argue that contingency in German foreign policy occurs in the form of “restoring the goodness of fit” between the German domestic level and the European level, therefore arguing that Germany still has a European vocation.⁹² Here, the argument is made that Germany continues to have fundamental interest in European integration, and while less emphasis is put on multilateral institutions, Germany’s agenda includes supportive choices for European foreign policy.⁹³

Addressing arguments about clashing German and European interests, the Birmingham school scholars refer to this leveling as a potentially long period of

⁸⁹ Gunther . Hellmann, *Germany’s Eu Policy on Asylum and Defence: De-Europeanisation by Default*. (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2006), 48.

⁹⁰ Paterson, "Does Germany Still Have a European Vocation?."

⁹¹ Paterson here compares and contrasts *Ostpolitik* to *Europapolitik*, noting that *Ostpolitik* “could take on a leadership role and also be seen manifestly to be making its own decisions” (p. 43).

⁹² Paterson, "Does Germany Still Have a European Vocation?," 49.

⁹³ For a more in-debt discussion, please refer to S. Harnisch and S. Schieder, ‘Germany’s New European Policy: Weaker, Leaner, Meaner’, in Maull, H. (2006), *Germany’s Uncertain Power: Foreign Policy of the Federal Republic*. Basingstoke: Palgrave.

'equilibrium'; however, Paterson et al. also note that the school takes a "binary" view towards Germany supporting "both more and less Europe".⁹⁴ In contrast to this view, others list changes in public opinion and coalition structures to show a deviation of German foreign policy to previous European interests, whereby the author accounts for the changes observed in German policy by relating them to changing "opportunity structures at the European level".⁹⁵ Although the Birmingham school shares most of this analysis, Paterson argues that despite the changes observed, Germany continues to have a Europeanized identity, although governmental policy show less European driven interests. Paterson agrees that Germany's European vocation is "shrinking and will continue to do so", but adds that Germany will continue to be committed to the European project, which continues to benefit German interests.⁹⁶

Taking into account the shortcomings of the Birmingham model, and the fact that every other theory used to understand German foreign policy behavior lacks explanatory power in certain aspects, Beverly Crawford's articulation of Germany as an 'embedded hegemony' may yield the most parsimonious approach yet. This approach combines the strong points of several theories under review and directly challenges claims that Germany is unwilling to take on a leadership role in Europe. Crawford's main argument is that Germany's foreign policy preferences are a reflection of its position as the 'regional hegemon', possessing institutional power, and the "need to protect that power position and satisfy dominant domestic interests" (p. 34). The author then lays

⁹⁴ Paterson, "Does Germany Still Have a European Vocation?," 49.

⁹⁵ Hellmann, *Germany's Eu Policy on Asylum and Defence: De-Europeanisation by Default.*, 50.

⁹⁶ Paterson, "Does Germany Still Have a European Vocation?," 51.

out a compelling argument for Germany's ability and willingness to lead which includes aspects of cooperation, capabilities, and economy, and ends with the prediction that Germany is likely to drop many of its international burdens over the next decade, especially if economic stagnation continues.⁹⁷

Power, Security, and Transformation

The post-war period shaped Germany's foreign policy by way of occupation, division, and defeat, and eventually merged with European institutions and multilateral regimes.⁹⁸ Military power and means were viewed as a last resort to resolve conflict, and emphasis was given to civilian actions to foreign policy, such as peacekeeping, international law, human rights, foreign aid, culture, and environment. This linkage of concepts, referred to as "cooperate security", was based on confidence building, whereby German society was committed to liberal democratic practices and collective security. This combination, along with an obligation towards human rights and antimilitarism, "reshaped German political identity".⁹⁹ Germany's power is often assessed in economic terms, but also in exercising power that contributed to shaping the European integration process. The Berlin Republic asserted power in pursuing policy

⁹⁷ Crawford, *Power and German Foreign Policy: Embedded Hegemony in Europe*, 55. The entire approach can be found on pages 34-55, although the author uses her argument to guide the reader throughout the remainder of the book.

⁹⁸ Crawford, "The Normative Power of a Normal State. Power and Revolutionary Vision in Germanys Postwall Foreign Policy " 171.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

goals, and acting as a bridge between actors during Cold War disputes while also rebuilding old friendships with European partners.¹⁰⁰

Germany's relative power increased after the end of the Cold War and unification while its economy became the strongest in Europe. Although Germany has decreased defense spending, its military is the largest in Europe and only the U.S. has more troops deployed worldwide.¹⁰¹ Germany has since been referred to as an "institutional power", contributing to European integration while giving up parts of its independence and sovereignty. Germany's exercise of power has been continuously described as "normative", backed by material power, whereas Germany's military's purpose is territorial defense rather than the projection of power.¹⁰² Despite Germany's increase in power, foreign policy choices have remained the same, holding on to the vision of civilian and normative power.

The debate of Germany's use of power emerged due to assumption that Germany would eventually return to power politics. After unification, Germany could have made foreign policy choices that were based on national interests, especially in regards to European integration but German leaders have continuously been committed to a vision of diplomacy and growing normative power.¹⁰³ Beverly Crawford, after outlining Germany's normative power practices in regards to twenty-first century challenges, asks, "Can the exercise of normative power alone reduce human rights

¹⁰⁰ Crawford, "The Normative Power of a Normal State. Power and Revolutionary Vision in Germany's Postwar Foreign Policy ". The author here also discusses *Ostpolitik*, adding examples of policy initiatives that deviated from traditional power politics.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid*, 174

¹⁰² *Ibid*, 176

¹⁰³ *Ibid*, 180

abuses and manage ethnic and sectarian conflict?”, then adding that a commitment to antimilitarism may call into question the fact that Germany is the third largest arms exporter in the world.¹⁰⁴ These questions, along with the aspects of cooperation, international governance, and the feasibility of security arrangements by German foreign policy choices may have to be asserted in another decade.

The discussion of Germany as a normative power, in conjunction with an overall discussion of the EU as a normative actor, became a trend in the literature in the early twenty-first century, and has remained a topic of debate ever since. Ian Manners, along with several other authors, analyzes the EU and Germany through normative theory focusing on ideational aspects rather than material or physical power. Here, a normative power is the ideal type of international actor. Studies and literature surrounding the concept seek to understand and interpret the causal and constitutive effects. Here, scholars ask whether Germany has shifted from a ‘tamed power’ to a normalized power, referring back to Peter Katzenstein’s assessment of Germany as a tamed power, arguing that this characterization of Germany is no longer adequate.¹⁰⁵ In discussing power, and Germany European diplomacy, these scholars explain that Germany would proceed alone and seek alternatives in order to reach policy interests and goals.

Scholars also outline the criteria under which power of member states within the EU can be exercised in the policy cycle. Germany has been influential at the agenda-

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵ Bulmer, "Germany and the European Union: From ‘Tamed Power’ to Normalized Power? .”Katzenstein’s initial analysis of Germany’s use of power focused on soft power, placing importance of Germany’s norms and identity that became parallel to European norms and identity.

setting stage, advocating policy and eliminating issues off the agenda.¹⁰⁶ Although Germany's power position within Europe economically is unquestioned, especially in Germany's role in the EU integration process, several authors discuss the lack of Germany's power in the defense and security policy arenas.¹⁰⁷ Discussing the relationship between Germany and the EU, scholars distinguish between Germany's use of agent power as a member-state, and the power given by the EU as a structure of governance.¹⁰⁸ Traditionally, Germany has made use of indirect institutional power rather than hard bargaining aspects of power politics. Although resources would have allowed such practices, Germany's history dictated a focus on diplomatic and multilateral foreign policy choices and uses of power. Here, power was used to shape the direction the EU was headed.¹⁰⁹

Power and normalization differs from previous multilateral policy choices to the unilateral steps taken by Germany, especially in regards to the construction of alliances.¹¹⁰ This has become increasingly possible in the past decade as member-states increased in the EU and small coalitions of countries may be more appropriate to address specific policy issues. Bulmer and Paterson stress that normalization does not refer to a return to realist assumptions of balance of power, but to a "balanced

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷ This is particularly true in comparison to the U.K. and France, and reviewing the lack of public support in the intervention in Afghanistan.

¹⁰⁸ Bulmer, "Germany and the European Union: From 'Tamed Power' to Normalized Power?," 1058. This notion of power was described as "dyadic power" by Stefano Guzzini (1993) in *International Organizations*.

¹⁰⁹ Bulmer and Paterson also discuss 'unintentional power', which refers to the impact of German economy on other European countries.

¹¹⁰ Bulmer, "Germany and the European Union: From 'Tamed Power' to Normalized Power?," 1059.

approach in exercising power in the EU".¹¹¹ The authors do not contest the overall argument by other scholars that Germany's foreign policy choices have remained unchanged, but explain that changes occurred in Germany's role in the EU. This is particularly true for the way Germany will conduct diplomacy in a greater European context in line with other major European powers.¹¹²

Scholars base their argument about the continuity and change of Germany's foreign policy strictly on the importance of power and the role power plays in shaping policy behavior. Germany's use of power has translated by ensuring cooperation in the EU and fostering institutions, taking on "the role of local patron and leader".¹¹³ This assumption and explanation of Germany's exercise of power goes back to the authors initial statement of defining Germany as an 'embedded hegemony', whereby Germany provides institutional stability but now will also act in line with national interests, which may, at times, be in opposition to those of its allies. Scholars support this argument of policy shifts and deviation from previous policy patterns on three cases of diplomacy, security, and foreign economic policy.¹¹⁴

An argument for the move from structure to agency can be made in Germany's use of power in the past decade. Germany has used institutional power to influence outcomes to benefit national interests, and political leadership has been more

¹¹¹ Ibid, 1060

¹¹² Examples of this include Germany's (and Angela Merkel's) responses to the Greek crisis and the Stability Pact.

¹¹³ Crawford, *Power and German Foreign Policy: Embedded Hegemony in Europe*, 15.

¹¹⁴ These three cases include Germany's decision for diplomatic recognition of Croatia and Slovenia, Germany's transformation of technology export control, and Germany's decision to support the EMU. For an in-depth discussion see *Power and German Foreign Policy: Embedded Hegemony in Europe*, 17-19.

“purposeful in defending” these interests in Brussels.¹¹⁵ These changes in the use of power are the results of different political leadership approaches and decisions that emphasize domestic and national interests over a European agenda.¹¹⁶ Although Germany’s multilateral approaches with the EU are still in place, they largely show a calculation of which outcomes best benefit German interests.¹¹⁷ Bulmer & Paterson argue that indirect institutional power used by Germany is, at this point, limited as the development of the EU has plateau. The authors question whether Germany can actually become a normal power without simultaneously having negative effects on the EU, especially in regards to Germany’s economic power.

Although minor, Germany’s security policies have also shown changes from the Bonn to Berlin Republic. After unification, German politicians have kept with the security policy continuity imbedded in the long standing foreign policy that outlined a deep commitment to multilateral action and an obvious dislike to the use of military force. Since the end of the Cold War, Germany has continued to look to both the U.S. and NATO as a security provider, therefore sometimes being referred to as a ‘taker’ of security. Before unification, German security policy cautiously avoided national interest goals that could be interpreted as veering away from multilateral framework commitments to the greater European Community, the United Nations, and Atlantic

¹¹⁵ Bulmer, "Germany and the European Union: From 'Tamed Power' to Normalized Power? ," 1072.

¹¹⁶ Bulmer and Paterson here give examples of Chancellor Schröder’s discursive use of national interests in regards to bilateral energy agreements with Russia and Chancellor Merkel’s decisions to put domestic and national policy before German European policy.

¹¹⁷ Bulmer, "Germany and the European Union: From 'Tamed Power' to Normalized Power? ," 1073.

Alliance.¹¹⁸ In recent years, German security policies have been heavily influenced by German popular opinion, especially in regards to military forces' support for Iraq and Afghanistan. German security policy continues to reflect multilateralist approaches to security threats, which include conflict settlement, crisis stabilization, and nonproliferation efforts. Discussing security and transatlantic policies in Germany, some scholars note a change in German EU policy in regards to EU enlargement and market integration under Chancellor Merkel.¹¹⁹ Although future expansion (to the Western Balkans) has not been ruled out, Merkel has called for stricter membership requirements and has been viewed as a skeptic for granting Turkey membership; offering a privileged partnership as an alternative.

SUMMARY

Taking into consideration the various theories and school of thoughts, the authors under review seem to disagree on the explanations of the current stage of German foreign policy. The Birmingham school authors continue their argument that Germany indeed still has a European vocation, aligning German interests with European interests in a combined German European policy, although noting that policies have become 'leaner and meaner'. Other scholars make an argument to show a deviation from the previously observed policy cycle and rhetoric of continuity in German foreign

¹¹⁸ Paul Belkin, "German Foreign and Security Policy: Trends and Transatlantic Implications," *Current Politics and Economics of Europe* 21, no. 2 (2009): 216.

¹¹⁹ "German Foreign and Security Policy: Trends and Transatlantic Implications," *Current Politics and Economics of Europe* 21, no. 2 (2009). The author refers to current EU policies as a "tempered enthusiasm", and notes a "skepticism" toward European market integration (p. 221).

policy, and instead argue for a new 'agency based' approach of German foreign policy with precise calculation to best serve national interests. While the neorealist explanations, assumptions, and predictions about German foreign policy have certainly not been able to account for reality, it is important to note that the other schools lack the emphasis and analysis of power and how it applies to Germany. Beverly Crawford overcomes this problem by making the concept of power a focus point in her theoretical analysis of German foreign policy, creating her articulation of 'embedded hegemony'. Germany has used power, both institutionally and unintentionally, to serve national interests and shaping the 'regional milieu goals'. An argument can be made of a gradual transformation from structure to agency within German foreign policy. This gradual transformation and change will be analyzed in the next three chapters of this study, by focusing on how change occurs, what variables determine and shape this change, and how this change can be explained theoretically.

CHAPTER IV

ANALYZING CHANGE IN GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY: OUT OF AREA OPERATIONS AND THE USE OF FORCE

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this case study and chapter is to provide an overview of what perspectives explain out of area operations and security policies, specifically the use of force, and how the concept has contributed to Germany's changing foreign and security policy. The case of Libya was selected to highlight the policy area involving the relationship among allies and multilateral operations. I argue that cases involving use of force discussions are sequential and fit into Germany's pattern and understanding of power, security, and identity. In order to analyze the policy area of out of area operations and the critical political dialogue in which the use of force is debated in German politics, three historical cases, Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan, will also be analyzed based on the same criteria. The rhetoric, action, and behavior of German policy makers in all cases will be examined to determine which independent variables influence and explain Germany's behavior. Alliance solidarity stands for Germany's ties and commitment to multilateral approaches within a NATO and EU framework, and specifically Germany's history of aligning with the U.S. Historical memory accounts for Germany's culture of restraint and adherence to WWII legacy and constructs. The domestic influence variable reflects the importance of public political opinion in Germany to influence Germany's foreign and security policy while national interests

account for Germany's possession and milieu goals, sometimes parallel to the EU and sometimes separate from the EU, to include economic interests. I argue that the selective use of historical memory has become instrumental to explain, inform, and justify German foreign policy for out of area operations. In order to understand and explain Germany's somewhat puzzling behavior in the case of Libya, comparisons between previous use of force analyses in Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan are made to provide additional insight and to link theoretical speculation to empirical evidence. Each selected point of crisis involving German debates and consensus reaching about the use of force is then categorized in terms of change and continuity while identifying the most influential variables. Again, these variables are: domestic influence, alliance solidarity, historical memory, and national interests. Beyond the primary analysis on the case of Libya, this study will guide in understanding how change occurs in German foreign policy and how this change is studied and understood in broader applications. The selected preceding cases involving use of force discussions provide the context for identifying under which circumstances historical memory influences German foreign policy and whether rhetoric supports observed policy behavior.

OUT OF AREA MILITARY OPERATION: A HISTORY OF THE USE OF FORCE IN GERMANY'S STRATEGIC CULTURE

Over the past two decades, security scholars and scholars of German foreign and security policy have extensively researched, analyzed, and interpreted Germany's out of area military operations after WWII. The "use of force" dialogue fits under the umbrella

of NATO alliance responsibility and out of area operations, but is also bound to perpetuated rhetoric and explanations based on historical memory and collective ideas of Germany's reinvention after the holocaust. German military culture has resulted in an antimilitary stance towards foreign and security policies advocated by politicians and legitimized by German society. The use of force debate emerged strongly in early 2000 after Germany's involvement in Kosovo; Germany's role as a civilian power was questioned by some while others argued for Germany's position on the 'right side of history'. Since then, the use of force debate has fallen into an overall puzzling observation of the continuities and changes; sometimes described as "inconsistent" policies involving foreign affairs and security. From Kosovo and Iraq to Afghanistan and now Libya, Germany has adopted a strategic culture linked to restricting the use of force more closely related to the old status quo: the policy style of the Bonn Republic.

This strategic culture, which highlights and emphasizes how the past influences and shapes current policy behavior, has been used as a framework to analyze specific security policies and behavior within the past twenty years. Analyzing change or continuity by examining how Germany's strategic culture evolved over time allows an in depth look at security and defense behavior specific to Germany's national identity based on norms, values, and historical memory. These changes in German strategic culture began with the newly constructed culture after WWII which included a legally restricted role, conscription, full integration with multilateral institutions, and democratization of civil-military relations. Further, in 1989-1990, a newly-emerged

Germany began exporting security.¹ This “radical” change after the Kosovo involvement directly contributed to the continuous influence of strategic culture on the *Bundeswehr*, out of area operations, and the debates over the invasion of Iraq in 2002-2003. Scholars have argued that Germany’s historic past, as well as its strategic culture, binds policy makers to a set of predisposed options.²

This strategic culture, while marked with continuity over the decades, underwent several (small) changes or shifts, especially surrounding the consensus on the use of force. The 1990’s were marked by split party views on the use of force. The Social Democrats (SPD) and the Green Party advocated and promoted pacifism while the CDU attempted to change legal barriers that forbade German deployment of forces.³ Kosovo changed and reconstructed how the use of force was viewed, discussed, and implemented for German foreign and security policy and was sanctioned by the Red-Green coalition. The rhetoric surrounding Kosovo, which will be analyzed in much greater detail in another section of this dissertation, was marked by constant references to the humanitarian efforts under which Germany operated in Kosovo. The consensus that was reached before Kosovo differed greatly from the rhetoric and policy surrounding Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya, although Libya appears to have all the “right” preconditions to warrant the use of force based on humanitarian efforts to prevent genocide.

¹ Kerry Anne Longhurst, *Germany and the Use of Force* (Manchester, UK.: Manchester University Press, 2004), 2.

² *Germany and the Use of Force* (Manchester, UK.: Manchester University Press, 2004).

³ Brian C. Rathbun, "The Myth of German Pacifism," *German Politics & Society* 24, no. 2 (2006): 69.

The CDU, immediately following unification, argued for a *Bundeswehr* capable of increased military operations in connection to NATO, under the concept of *Handlungsfähigkeit*.⁴ These calls to increase influence, by political leaders such as then Defense Minister Volker Rühle, were discussed by scholars in the field under the normalization debate, referring to an overall 'normalization strategy' to increase German influence and to become a 'normal' actor along other European countries. Chancellor Helmut Kohl argued that Germany should assimilate to the responsibilities of other 'normal' state powers, but the realization of an increased international role in peacekeeping missions would prove difficult due to party conflicts and consensus about the use of German military forces.⁵ Instead, Germany contributed financially to out of area peace operations, a policy that has since been referred to as 'Germany's checkbook diplomacy'.

The 1994 Federal Constitutional Court's (FCC) decision to reinterpret the previously accepted constitutional clause that forbade the deployment of military forces for out of area operations unless fulfilling obligations under NATO Article V was monumental for the use of force discourse.⁶ The FCC ruled that out of area deployment of German troops and participation for peace keeping missions was legal under mandates of collective security organizations such as the UN, WEU, and NATO. This

⁴ The term itself means "ability to act", referring to Germany's capability to take on military operations. For more on this, please refer to "The Myth of German Pacifism," *German Politics & Society* 24, no. 2 (2006).

⁵ During these initial debates, the FDP rejected a call to send German forces in support of out of area operations without a constitutional amendment, the SPD agreed only to humanitarian purposes, and the Greens rejected any use of the German military beyond its borders.

⁶ Article V outlines that members of the NATO alliance are required to aid any member that is attacked.

meant that the court decision directly dictated the multilateral context in which such missions must be assumed, further contributing to the establishment, legitimization, and construction of rules and norms. The rhetoric, at the time, carefully distinguished between the terms 'intervention' and 'humanitarian efforts'. Most importantly, the constitutional court decision effectively moved the concept of the use of force from a legally forbidden act to a politically debated policy. Politicians were no longer able to hide behind the curtains of legality and were forced to debate, analyze, and come to a consensus on German troop deployment outside of Germany's borders and beyond territorial or alliance defense.

The details surrounding deployment and participation of the *Bundeswehr* in such efforts had to be approved through a majority vote by the German *Bundestag*. Despite the appearance of a consensus on this issue, stark disagreements among the political parties of Germany were observed as the concept of the use of force underwent this constitutional transformation. The German Left opposed the constitutional court decision while other European countries at the time (i.e. France and England) advocated for stronger humanitarian interventions. These early years of consensus reaching surrounding the use of force by German military forces reflected a collective attitude when met with historical memories and interpretations of war and the purpose thereof. The rhetoric, especially by SPD leaders, showed a lack of distinction between "war for self-interest or selfless aims", prominently argued for by Katrin Fuchs (SPD) who said, "Military interventions are not humanitarian actions," and cabinet minister Heidemarie

Wieczorkek-Zeul who added that “peace enforcement means fighting wars.”⁷ This early rhetoric was marked by pacifism, and the struggle to redefine and reconstruct previously held norms and beliefs was evident throughout.

Also of importance to note are the initial criteria outlined by the German government after the FCC’s decision on out of area military deployments. According to these criteria, missions were limited to Europe and had to include a UN mandate. Further, missions including the *Bundeswehr* had to be characterized through public support while a convincing threat to Germany, Europe, and international peace had to exist in order for military missions beyond defense of the alliance.⁸ While these criteria were only used initially, the German parliament developed The Parliamentary Participation Act (*Parlamentsbeteiligungsgesetz*) in 2005, which officially required the consent of parliament for out of area missions involving the *Bundeswehr*. Germany’s strategic culture after WWII was marked by antimilitarism. The norms developed during this time carried over to the period past German unification and reflected the overall reluctance, and sometimes refusal “to consider military means as a legitimate instrument of foreign policy”.⁹ Pacifism and rejection of the use of military force are therefore apparent concepts of security and strategic culture which Germans hold in

⁷ Rathbun, "The Myth of German Pacifism," 72-73. Katrin Fuchs, "Militäreinsätze sind keine 'humanitäre Aktionen'," *Socialdemokratischer Pressedienst*, 48(115). 1993, 1-3 and "Das Nein War Deutlich: Interview Mit Der Spd-Vizechefin Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul Über Bundeswehreinsätze," *Der Spiegel*, March 7, 1994, accessed October 8, 2013, <http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-13685344.html>.

⁸ Franz-Josef Meiers, "Germany: The Reluctant Power," *Survival* 37, no. 3 (1995): 92.

⁹ Harald Müller, "German Foreign Policy after Unification," in *The New Germany and the New Europe*, ed. Paul B. Stares (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1992), 162.

combination with the tendency to rationalize military operations based on cost.¹⁰ These views, and consequently norms, towards the use of force resulted in Germany's continued restriction of its military role in the international environment, instead focusing on economic, political, and diplomatic measures to resolve issue areas within the security realm. Along with the continued views towards antimilitarism, Germany's strategic culture was also marked by commitments to multilateralism and adamantly rejected unilateral approaches. Germany's focus on nationalism and unilateralism in the past, and the consequences thereof, resulted in a fear of pursuing a *Sonderweg*, or special path. The past few years of Germany's foreign policy, especially in light of the economic crisis and the abstention of the vote on military intervention in Libya, has led skeptical scholars to refer to Germany's *Sonderweg* once again, pointing to the more unilateral approaches based on national interests observed in recent German policies.

Continuity and Change since Unification in German Foreign and Security Policy

Scholars within the field have widely analyzed and examined continuity and change of German foreign policy since unification, focusing on the puzzling phenomena of structural changes that were not preceded with power political policies geared toward self-interest. As explained in the theoretical section of this dissertation, numerous frameworks are used to understand and predict Germany's past choices in behavior, none of which can fully grasp and account for Germany's policies in the past twenty years. Since unification in October 1990, several policy changes occurred that fall

¹⁰ Duffield, "German Security Policy after Unification: Sources of Continuity and Restraint."

into the realm of security, defense, and foreign affairs. Germany's effort to recognize Slovenia and Croatia in 1991 was viewed as the first true departure from policy, raising questions about unilateral behavior. Germany encouraged its European Commission (EC) partners to consider diplomatic relationship with both countries despite resistance from other European countries, the U.S., and the UN. Germany's immediate recognition and violation of the EC agreement resulted in media and scholarly speculation about Germany's potential independent and unilateral approach to foreign policy in the future.¹¹ Germany's decision was influenced by several factors to include a desire to end conflict in the area, decrease Germany's risk of increased war refugees, and to act on domestic pressures. German society, especially the southern region, is marked by historical, cultural, and political ties to Slovenia and Croatia, thus sympathizing with Croatia while the German media focused on Serb violence.¹²

Examining the frameworks and arguments by scholars in the field, the fundamental determinant and variable for these initial changes in policy can directly be attributed to the changes in the external environment, resulting in new demands on Germany as an exporter of security. Germany's central position resulted in an increased expectation by its Western allies to act on ethnic and territorial conflicts, refugee migration, and military conflicts in the former Communist countries as well as on crises outside of Europe, to include Iraq and Somalia.¹³ Despite these changes in the

¹¹ "German Security Policy after Unification: Sources of Continuity and Restraint," 185.

¹² "German Security Policy after Unification: Sources of Continuity and Restraint." For more information about the factors that led Germany to recognize Slovenia and Croatia, see pages 185-189.

¹³ "German Security Policy after Unification: Sources of Continuity and Restraint," 172.

international environment, Germany's post-war political culture was marked by continuity and restraint, especially in regards to its security policy. This culture of restraint can be explained through the historical legacies of Germany's Nazi past. Further, Germany's foreign policy past WWII and before unification was considered "successful", thus constructing norms and rules which have been accepted, legitimized, and internalized by German political leaders, as well as domestic society.¹⁴

Additionally, Germany continued to stress the importance of integration into institutional structures of international and multilateral cooperation among its allies. This firm integration in the post-war and post-unification years served to fulfill Germany's goal of strengthening and integrating Europe, as well as lessening the fears of neighbors towards potential special, unilateral approaches in the future. Institutional theorists here refer to the shadow of the future in predicting peace and stability among countries which are integrated into such structures and agreements. Germany's relative continuous foreign policy, especially for out of area operations and involving the *Bundeswehr*, can be partially attributed to the balancing effect of the coalition politics of the *Bundestag*, resulting in a centering effect of Germany's foreign policy. This moderate, or center, approach by Germany has continued with a high degree of coherency throughout the 1990's and 2000's, with the exception of the use of force in Kosovo. Germany's strong tendencies to multilateral approaches in the last twenty years has began to alter slightly, depending on the issue area, but certainly with some breaks in multilateralism in 2002.

¹⁴ Ibid.

Germany's desire after unification to fulfill its broadened obligation and responsibility to the international community appears to have altered slightly as national interests and economic goals are pursued. John Duffield argued twenty years ago that "continuity in German security policy is partly contingent on the maintenance of a relatively benign and supportive external environment," and warned that hostile developments could trigger a divergence in security policy areas by Germany.¹⁵ Some changes in German foreign and security policy were observed from the Bonn to Berlin Republics. The old status quo was marked with passive involvement, noninterventionism, and refusal on the use of force. The principles under the Berlin Republic after unification showed a responsible Germany, willing to support out of area operations and a desire to reestablish long held principles. While these changes after unification could be categorized as a reconstruction of policies and establishing a new status quo, an analysis of the sequential points of crises may offer a different, more consistent view. This is also true when considering other foreign policy areas, which will be discussed in chapter five of this dissertation.

¹⁵ "German Security Policy after Unification: Sources of Continuity and Restraint," 191.

Table 1: Germany's Status Quo

Old Status Quo-Bonn Republic	New Status Quo-Berlin Republic
<i>Respect</i> international law and human rights	<i>Defend</i> international law and human rights
<i>Never</i> use military force other than for self-defense	Use military force <i>responsibly</i> for good causes
<i>Be peaceful</i> and antimilitarist	<i>Protect</i> peace and restore it, if necessary
<i>Be committed</i> to democratic ideals	<i>Promote</i> democratic ideals abroad
<i>Not harming</i> allies and politically <i>supporting</i> them	<i>Aid</i> allies and militarily support them
"Never again War"	"Never again Genocide"

(Source: Leithner, Anika. *Shaping German Foreign Policy: History, Memory, and National Interest*. Boulder, Colorado: FirstForumPress, 2009:46)

The above chart shows how Germany's understanding and application of responsibility has changed, or appeared to have changed, from the Bonn Republic to the Berlin Republic. While this table depicts how lessons of history influence Germany's democratic commitment, the table can also be used to assess current commitment to engagement and responsible behavior as observed during the two selected case studies for this dissertation and the analysis in this chapter about the use of force. Taking into consideration the past four years of German foreign and security policy, especially in light of the economic crisis, may alter the projected and previously observed change in policy; instead showing a reversal, or continuance, of previously held ideas about responsible behavior. The choice to abstain during the voting process in the case of Libya, thus siding with China and Russia, certainly questions several tenets of Germany's responsibility to its allies and the international system. This behavior, change, or reversal should therefore be analyzed and grouped to determine whether policy and action are representations either a) an adjustment to policy; b) a learning process/norms, or c) a reconstruction or direct change in foreign policy. The case of

Libya will therefore be analyzed in order to examine whether policy actions were informed by historic memory, thus directly connecting guilt and responsibility, whether a direct change occurred, whether Germany's behavior falls into a norms based framework for explaining and understanding policies and rhetorical actions around Libya, and how this case was understood and categorized by scholars. In order to provide a context for an analysis surrounding the use of force consensus in the Libya case, the cases of Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan are briefly discussed using the same framework and variables.

The Use of Force: Kosovo

While the use of force even during peacekeeping operations was still highly opposed by the Left, the civil wars of the 1990's contributed to an overall acceptance that diplomatic efforts were unable to resolve the bloody conflicts in both Bosnia and Rwanda. The events in Bosnia changed how politicians, especially the Greens and the SPD, viewed the compatibility of the concepts of 'never again war,' and 'never again Auschwitz'; questioning and weighing the impact not to intervene militarily would have on their responsibility to protect people and prevent horrific humanitarian cost.¹⁶ The rhetoric at the time, especially from Leftist politicians who initially opposed the use of force, showed a gradual change in reaction to the international environment, and the

¹⁶ Rathbun, "The Myth of German Pacifism," 73.

intersection of responsibility and guilt was publicly discussed.¹⁷ This intersection, the previously held consensus, and the changed which peaked in 1994, showed a gradual learning process that resulted in policy advocacy of approaches which made exception in cases and conflicts where human rights violations occurred.

The intersection of responsibility and guilt, or, responsibility and historic memory, eventually turned into a fear of new guilt of the consequences of not consenting to intervene forcefully. While the CDU made this change faster and more collective, the SPD and the Greens still differed internally on exactly which cases required the use of force. While the importance of Germany's history was considered by some, the SPD revolted and opposed against proposals by the CDU to provide Tornado aircraft air defense support in Bosnia in May 1995.¹⁸ The SPD eventually found consensus on the issue, being confronted with the aftermath of the massacre in Srebrenica, and voted in support of deployment of a NATO peace operation that included the use of Tornado aircraft.¹⁹ The disagreements among the political parties internally during Bosnia influenced by previously held norms about pacifism and noninterventionism, due to historical and collective memory, met with new considerations of responsibility, necessity, and potential guilt. The learning process and

¹⁷ "The Myth of German Pacifism." The author quotes Walter Kolbow, defense spokesperson for the SPD who recalled that it became "increasingly difficult to stand by and watch murders take place".

¹⁸ "The Myth of German Pacifism," 74. Most notably, defense expert Norbert Gansel argued that "our duty to help and to militarily protect the peacekeepers now weighs more heavily than any history that forbids us from forcing others to their knees."

¹⁹ Rathbun discusses in detail the specifics about the differing opinions on the use of force and intervention in Bosnia between the SPD and the left wing of the party, in particular the public exchange of letters between Joschka Fischer and the left wing. Scholars have since analyzed this difference between the Red/Green parties and argued that differing stances on consent on the use of force were electorally driven.

critical discussions of the mid 1990s directly contributed to the left wing's approval of German contribution in the NATO air war against ethnic cleansing in Kosovo in 1998.

The importance of Germany's participation in Kosovo for its foreign and security policy, especially the significant reinterpretation of 'the use of force', has to be viewed and analyzed in connection to humanitarianism. The most critical aspect of Kosovo (and Bosnia before) that allowed Germany to reach a consensus on forceful intervention lies directly in the disastrous humanitarian consequences if no action were taken. Ethnic cleansing, genocide, and the death of innocent women and children were too familiar and too drastic to ignore, thus trumping the previously held "never again" norm towards war. While Kosovo was certainly a multilateral effort under the NATO umbrella, both parties of the German government sought guarantees from NATO that the intervention in Kosovo was not driven by territorial conflict, oil, or other self-interest motives.²⁰

While the *Bundeswehr's* involvement in Bosnia's peacekeeping operation was significant, Kosovo would mark the first time German forces were deployed and participated in military operations outside German borders since WWII. The significance of Kosovo, and the consensus on the use of force is multifaceted: not only did the German public widely support the mission, the execution of the mission occurred without a UN mandate and under a Left governing political coalition. Although UN Resolution 1199 called for an immediate cease fire, military action under an official UN

²⁰ Winfried Nachtwei, "Nato-Luftangriffe: Antiserbische Agression Oder Einzige Rettungchance Für Den Kosovo," (Positionpaper 26 March 1999), accessed October 9, 2013, <http://www.muenster.org/frieden/luftangriffe.htm>.

mandate was impossible due to Russia's opposition, yet intervention on the basis of gross human rights violations and humanitarian catastrophes provided the option for Germany's Red-Green coalition to act.²¹ In October 1998, NATO authorized airstrikes against Serbian military targets. Discussions among NATO members initially involved capability determinations in which Germany offered military support without committing combat troops for the mission in Kosovo.

While the internal debates over the consensus reaching process of the use of force between the Reds and Greens offers an interesting inquisition of change within the German government, the importance of this process to the overall change to German foreign policy lies within Germany's desire to be viewed as a responsible partner. The new coalition was tasked with a difficult decision which would define Germany's continuity while increasing calculability and showing commitment to multilateral alliance solidity.²² Internal differences on the question of German military participation continued, especially among the Green party led by Joschka Fischer. During debates at the Bielefeld Party Congress in May 1999, Fischer publicly explained that Germany's conflicting post-war political culture concepts of 'never again war' and 'never again Auschwitz' meant Germany, its citizens and politicians, had to take a stand to end genocide in Kosovo. These calls, and the overall argument by Fischer, showed the

²¹ Paul Hockenos, *Joschka Fischer and the Making of the Berlin Republic. An Alternative History of Postwar Germany* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 110.

²² Joachim Krause, "Die Deutsche Politik in Der Kosovo-Krise," in *Humantiäre Intervention Und Kooperative Sicherheit in Europa*, ed. Joachim Krause (Opladen: Leske+Budich, 2000).

intersection of guilt and responsibility, while uncovering Germany's obligation to the international community.

The case of Kosovo for Germany is interesting for several reasons. Germany's intricate history with the region and continued involvement and relationship certainly contributed to speculations and analysis of Germany's strong behavior. To begin, Albania was backed by the German government through the German-Albanian agreement signed in 1995, which, although generally worded, was intended to apply to Kosovo as well. Also, a German Information Service was set up in Tirana in order to assist Kosovar²³ militia at the time. Germany assisted the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), an ethnic-Albanian paramilitary organization, in acquiring weapons and equipment from Albania.²⁴ Germany's continuous financial support for secessionist movements and veto to a weapons supply cut-off request to the KLA, placed Germany on a clear side from the onset of the conflicts. Rhetorically, defense minister Volker R  he explained that any actor who agreed to the resolution to strengthen the borders is essentially siding with Milosevic, and called on the U.S. to act against Yugoslavia during pre-war diplomatic talks. Further, R  he strengthened Germany's official position that Milosevic was carrying out ethnic cleansing. While the official rhetoric of Germany was often perceived as a collective consensus on the conflict in Kosovo, internally, discussions were marked by "incoherence, intra-coalition wrangling, and bureaucratic rivalries".²⁵

²³ Albanians of Kosovo

²⁴ Adrian Hyde-Price, "Germany and the Kosovo War: Still a Civilian Power?," *German Politics* 10, no. 1 (2001).

²⁵ "Germany and the Kosovo War: Still a Civilian Power?," *German Politics* 10, no. 1 (2001): 25.

The Rambouillet Agreement, a proposed peace agreement between Kosovar Albanians and Yugoslavia drafted by German foreign minister Joschka Fischer and U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, was accepted by the American, Albanian, and British delegations and rejected by Russian and Serbian delegates. The failed and rejected agreement contributed to a strengthened German position which resulted in the first military intervention since WWII, with Chancellor Schröder arguing for exclusively humanitarian reasons to explain Germany's involvement. Until then, Germany's foreign policy choices were marked by pursuing normative goals, to include the universal right of self-determination. This concept, during the Kosovo crisis, was then used to justify the forceful intervention in Kosovo while emphasizing Germany's commitment and responsibility to NATO allies. Both Schröder and Fischer felt that involvement was necessary, yet Germany's involvement, at first, was difficult to explain to the German public. Germany also continued its commitment to diplomatic efforts to end conflicts by convincing Russia to withdraw support from Belgrade.

Later reports showed that the KLA was encouraged by Germany to declare a humanitarian crisis in order to give legitimacy to a NATO intervention. Germany's behavior, action, and policies during the Kosovo crisis put Germany on the map as an active participant in the international community and world affairs. After the intervention, German politicians pushed for independence for Kosovo and contributed to the reconstruction of Kosovo through development of Kosovo's economy and infrastructure. Germany had a continuous commitment of over 2,000 *Bundeswehr* troops, under NATO in Kosovo, while Germany supported the privatization of Kosovo's

industrial enterprise with heavy involvement by the German businesses such as Deutsche Bank and Siemens.²⁶ Kosovo was recognized by Germany in 2008 and holds an embassy seat in Pristina while Kosovo has an embassy in Berlin and consulates in Frankfurt and Stuttgart.

The Use of Force: Iraq

The mission in Kosovo also differed greatly from the war in Iraq, which was marked by aggression and focused on weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The multilateral aspect of the war in Iraq therefore did not convince Germany to support and participate in an intervention in Iraq. While initially seen as a break with multilateralism for Germany from its major ally, the U.S., the decision was made on the basis of moral legitimacy and responsibility to the international community. Initial examinations and comparisons between Kosovo and Iraq led scholars in the field to assert that the Franco-German solidarity observed during Iraq showed an almost multilateral European approach to antimilitarism and intervention, which was solidified by Germany's stance. While domestic opposition to the war in Iraq was certainly evident during and after the invasion, the importance of political party opposition became clear with the Left strictly advocating against the U.S.'s rhetoric. Statements by political leaders during the Iraq war showed and reflected the overall antimilitarist culture in Germany, driven partially by domestic influences, but analyses also explained the importance of political goals to include securing a re-election of the Red-Green coalition.

²⁶ "Germany and the Kosovo War: Still a Civilian Power?."

Perhaps most notably evidenced by Joschka Fischer's remarks of 'Excuse me, but I am not convinced' to Donald Rumsfeld, Germany's behavior, action, and rhetoric during the discussions leading up to the invasion of Iraq showed Germany's 'newly'-oriented foreign policy. While breaks with multilateral approaches were evident in Kosovo, the anti-American undertone and behavior by Germany was certainly 'new'; however, the policy of noninterventionism certainly fell directly into Germany's established norm. Therefore, to argue that a direct change in policy occurred during and after Iraq would be a gross overstatement. Breaks with multilateralism occurred during Kosovo, under the importance of humanitarian intervention. This principle of humanitarian intervention and its connection to Germany's concept of 'never again Auschwitz' provided a base line to assess out of area operations involving the use of force. The case of Iraq provided neither a humanitarian catastrophe argument nor was Germany alone in its refusal to support the U.S.'s mission in Iraq.

Germany took the position that the UN inspections for WMDs in Iraq should be completed before any other decisions were made, stressing the importance of the diplomatic process. Besides Fischer, Chancellor Gerhard Schröder's rhetoric was strongly marked by opposition against the invasion of Iraq and the use of military force. Schröder, first speaking out against the invasion, added that Germany would not support military operations in Iraq even if the war was supported and legitimized through a UN Security Council mandate. His position largely reflected the overall anti-war sentiment of the German population. During 2003, polls showed an 80% opposition

to the war by the German population, highlighting the importance of domestic influences on political policies.²⁷

Germany eventually joined forces with Belgium and France to block NATO for the planning of a possible war in Iraq. This break in alliance with the U.S. would mark the first time Germany opposed an American foreign policy choice since WWII. This division of interests can also be seen as the division in norms and beliefs which inform strategic culture and the use of force. The rhetoric by the U.S. at the time grouped France and Germany into the 'old Europe', while countries in the Baltic region supported the Bush doctrine and deployment to Iraq. Despite Germany's opposition and refusal to send troops to Iraq, Germany continued to support U.S. foreign policy in other parts of the world, and would eventually publically, although just rhetorically, support efforts in Iraq. While relations with the U.S. weakened, the relationship between Germany and Russia became stronger. The decision by the U.S. to invade Iraq posed several challenges to international order. First and foremost, the western allies disagreed about the war itself, its reasoning and legitimacy, and outright opposed it. As with most cases in this dissertation, the element of economic interests has to be raised in the case of Iraq, as Germany exports goods to Iraq.²⁸ Despite Schroeder's public stance against the war, Germany was bound to support a UN decision for international

²⁷ Dieter Dettke, *Germany Says "No". The Iraq War and the Future of German Foreign and Security Policy* (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009).

²⁸ According to the German Department of State, bilateral trade has continued to grow in recent years, and were at €1.3 billion in 2011.

law purposes. A German court later ruled that the invasion of Iraq violated international law.²⁹

The Use of Force: Afghanistan

Afghanistan is an important case, both in terms of Germany's continued progression for use of force discussion and consensus reaching, as well as Germany's role as a security exporter. Germany's commitment to the mission in Afghanistan marked the first time of *Bundeswehr* deployment outside of European borders. Initially presented to the German public as a mission focused on development and reconstruction under the humanitarian aid umbrella, operations in Afghanistan changed with the security environment to a more conflict intensive mission requiring critical input and analysis on the role of Germany in Afghanistan. When Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) went into effect in October 2001, the chance of German combat troop deployment was under discussion by members of the *Bundestag*.³⁰ While the CDU/Christian Social Union in Bavaria (CSU), SPD, and Free Democratic Party (FDP) reached consensus and supported the U.S. mission in Afghanistan, the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS) strongly opposed it, with the Green party being internally divided.

During the *Bundestag* hearing on the vote for German deployment of forces to

²⁹ Although a case involving a German soldier's refusal to obey and order after the invasion of Iraq did not receive much attention internationally, it reflects the German understanding and belief in the importance of legitimacy through international law (perhaps partially due to the history surrounding the concept of *Rechtsstaat*)

³⁰ "Einsatz Deutscher Soldaten in Der Anti-Terror Allianz Rückt Näher," *Die Welt*, October 8, 2001.

Afghanistan with the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) under UN Security Council Resolution 1368 and 1373, and in coalition with NATO, Chancellor Schröder stressed that specific deployment caveats would apply to the allowed 3,900 troops. The initial mandate allowed for a mission of twelve months with a required renewal vote by the *Bundestag*. Further, the mandate outlined full control over German forces by the *Bundestag* and stressed the humanitarian aspect of the mission. The chancellor's statements emphasized the need for Germany to show commitment and responsibility to its partners and added that participation in the mission in Afghanistan would be proof that the German *Sonderweg* was an illusion.³¹ This precise rhetorical linking of a WWII legacy term to the possible consequences of Germany's foreign policy behavior shows the influence of historical memory on contemporary political discussions.³²

Chancellor Schröder promised "unlimited solidarity" in both a press conference and to the *Bundestag*, to support the U.S. in finding the terrorists responsible for the attacks of September 11, 2001.³³ This strong rhetorical support showed Germany's commitment to take on more responsibility and a bigger international role, while continuing to advocate its alliance solidarity and obligations toward global security. While both Schröder and Fischer articulated continued support of Germany's commitment to its allies, internally the Red-Green coalition did not consent on the

³¹ "Government Statement by Chancellor Gerhard Schröder to the German Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 14/198/19283.", accessed October 20, 2013, <http://dipbt.bundestag.de/doc/btp/14/14198.pdf#P.19283>

³² "Mit klarem Verstand und Ueberzeugung muessen wir sagen, dass ein deutscher Sonderweg, ein sich-Heraushalten in unserer Welt eine Illusion ist. Deutschland traegt Verantwortung wie andere Staaten dieser Welt auch." Ibid.

³³ Steven Erlanger, "U.S. Quietly Chides German for His Dissension on Iraq," *New York Times*, August 17, 2002.

mission and use of force in Afghanistan. Similar to debates and discussions during the Kosovo war, as images and reports of the aftermath of civilian casualties due to the air strikes came pouring in, the pacifist camp of the Greens began to voice their dissent for continued support.³⁴ The majority of the *Bundestag* voted in November 2001 to contribute German forces to the OEF mission in Afghanistan. Chancellor Schröder supported the war on terror post 9/11 and deployed forces to Afghanistan as part of NATO operations. When Schröder left office in 2005, over 2,000 German troops were still deployed in Afghanistan, making Germany the second largest troop contributor to deploy its people after the U.S.³⁵

The newly established UN mission to contribute and assist the Afghan government in security efforts as well as civil reconstruction support under International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was established under the concept of security assistance. The German government committed 1,200 soldiers but emphasized the difference between the OEF mission and the ISAF mission. While the OEF mission was publicly viewed in connection with the U.S.'s efforts to fight terrorism, the ISAF mission, under the umbrella of developmental assistance, was easier to explain and justify to the German public. Further, reports of the targeted killings of Germans through suicide bombings resulted in public demands to end Germany's mission in Afghanistan. By 2008, the German government rejected U.S. demands for increased German forces to

³⁴ It is important to mention that the debates surrounding German force deployment for the mission in Macedonia in August 2001, which failed to result in a consensual vote by the governing coalition, contributed to the rocky discussions in the case of Afghanistan.

³⁵ Currently, Germany is the third largest country to commit troops to Afghanistan, behind the U.S. and the U.K.

Afghanistan, but agreed to provide 200 soldiers to relieve Norwegian forces per NATO's request.³⁶ Throughout these levels of demands, the discussions and votes within the government and coalition remained diverse, without a clear consensus on the use of force and German combat troop deployment to Afghanistan.

An important incident relating to the political and theoretical discussion of the use of force in the case of Afghanistan involves Germany and the Kunduz airstrike that occurred in September 2009. An American fighter jet, per request by German forces stationed in the Kunduz province in northern Afghanistan, struck fuel tanks thought to be captured by Taliban insurgents. The airstrike killed over 100 civilians, and resulted in several political consequences, including restitution payments to the victims, the resignation of then German defense minister Franz Josef Jung, and the investigation and prosecution of *Oberst* (Colonel) Georg Klein, the commander who called in the airstrike. While Germany was in the midst of election after the airstrike, the aftermath was marked by an influx of debates, analyses, controversial discussions, and public outcry over the mission in Afghanistan.

The Kunduz affair is interesting for several reasons. First, the consequences and action of the airstrike in Kunduz changed the perception of Germany's involvement in the mission in Afghanistan, which was believed to be for reconstruction and development purposes. This diverging understanding of the mission by the German public, mixed with the engagement and fighting on the ground, resulted in rhetorical

³⁶ "Nato Bittet Um Deutsche Kampftruppe," *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, May 17, 2010, accessed October 22, 2013, <http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/afghanistan-nato-bittet-um-deutsche-kampftruppe-1.263484>.

changes in descriptions of the mission, and paved the way for a critical look into the German forces on the ground in Afghanistan at the time. Secondly, the reaction of Germany's domestic public which included anti-war protests with references to Colonel Klein as a war criminal and mass murderer, an opinion shared by several authors, scholars, and analysts, shows a stark difference to the treatment of similar cases where responsibility falls on the U.S. Thirdly, the Kunduz affair resulted in a critical analysis into the conduct of German soldiers and 'what a soldier is allowed to do during war', amidst the legal process and criminal prosecution of Colonel Klein as well as the compensation process for the victims of the airstrike.³⁷ Finally, the legacy of the Kunduz affair resulted in the contribution to the discourse on the use of force, the concept of 'civilian casualty', and the diverse analyses of the media, analysts, and security scholars. The affair was broadcasted on national television in a movie titled "A murderous decision" (*Eine Mörderische Entscheidung*), while remaining the subject of political debates. German magazines heavily published analyses on the affair, most notably an extensive research project by the major German newspaper *Der Spiegel*, titled "A German Crime" (*Ein Deutsches Verbrechen*), which referred to the incident as a 'war crime'.³⁸

Breaking a taboo in German political rhetoric, the word "*Krieg*" (war) was used to describe Germany's involvement in ISAF after three German soldiers were killed during ground fighting with the Taliban. Then defense Minister Karl-Theodor zu

³⁷ Joerg Diehl, "Kunduz-Prozess: Was Darf Ein Offizier Im Krieg?," *Spiegel Online*, March 20, 2013, accessed October 25, 2013, <http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/bundeswehr-in-afghanistan-prozess-zu-luftangriff-von-kunduz-beginnt-a-890034.html>.

³⁸ Ulrike Von Demmer et al., "Ein Deutsches Verbrechen," *Der Spiegel*, February, 1, 2010, accessed October 22, 2013, <http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-68885074.html>.

Guttenberg, publicly spoke of “war” and “warlike circumstance” instead of the usual language of ‘armed conflict’ as previously argued for by German foreign minister Guido Westerwelle.³⁹ This rhetoric, by both Guttenberg and Westerwelle, reflects how political rhetoric is used to justify, interpret, and influence votes within political debates, simultaneously seeking to change previously held convictions by Germany’s domestic society. Westerwelle, while not using the term ‘war’, was adamant in conveying the importance of Germany’s involvement in an armed conflict situation “within the parameters of international law” in order to allow German soldiers in Afghanistan to engage forcefully without fear of potential prosecution, adding that “we owe it to those who are exposing themselves to danger on the front lines.”⁴⁰

THE USE OF FORCE: LIBYA

The Arab spring movements experienced in Tunisia and Egypt eventually reached Libya, resulting in a full civil war on February 17, 2011 when the Armed Forces of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya shot at demonstrators in Benghazi.⁴¹ The armed conflict, a conflict between the military and civilian forces that supported Colonel Muammar Gaddafi and opposition forces seeking to overthrow the Gaddafi regime, spread to

³⁹ "Tabu-Bruch: Guttenberg Spricht Von Krieg in Afghanistan," *ibid.*, April 4, 2010, accessed on October 21, 2013, <http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/tabu-bruch-guttenberg-spricht-von-krieg-in-afghanistan-a-687235.html>.

⁴⁰ "The World from Berlin: 'New Evaluation on Afghanistan Long Overdue'," *Spiegel Online*, February 11, 2010, accessed October 22, 2012, <http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/the-world-from-berlin-new-evaluation-on-afghanistan-long-overdue-a-677289.html>.

⁴¹ These armed forces were comprised of the Libyan Navy, Army, Air Force, and the People’s militia. The International Institute for Strategic Studies’ annual assessment of global military capabilities and defense economies estimated total Libyan armed forces personnel to be around 76,000.

Tripoli a few days later. This resulted in the establishment of the National Transitional Council, the *de facto* government of Libya, formed in Benghazi by the opposition to govern over Libya during the conflict and to map out the transition of the country. The council was officially recognized by France in March 2011 and viewed as a legitimate body representing the Libyan people by also holding the Libyan UN seat during the revolution. The initial resolution (1970) of the UN Security Council condemned the use of lethal force by the Gaddafi regime against protesters during the revolution, and resulted in several sanctions against Gaddafi and his supporters, to include the freezing of international assets and travel bans.⁴²

Gaddafi forces were able to counterattack militarily through western Libya, eventually bombing planes and tanks held by opposition forces near Benghazi. After reports of the brutality exercised by pro-Gaddafi supporters reached the international community, Libya's UN delegation, France, and the United Kingdom proposed a UN Security Council resolution to establish a no-fly zone and to authorize military force in order to protect civilians in Libya. Further, the Arab League also directly requested that the UNSC impose a no-fly zone over Libya. Resolution 1973 was adopted on March 17, 2011, with a 10-0 affirmative vote, no oppositions, and five abstentions. While France, the United Kingdom, and the U.S. voted for the resolution, Brazil, China, Germany, India, and Russia abstained from the official vote. The resolution authorized 'all necessary

⁴² Resolution 1970 United Nations Security Council, "In Swift, Decisive Action, Security Council Imposes Tough Measures on Libyan Regime, Adopting Resolution 1970 in Wake of Crackdown on Protesters," February 17, 2011, accessed October 25, 2013, <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/11/sc10187.doc.htm>.

measures' and effectively approved the use of force in the Libyan conflict to protect civilian populated areas under attack by the Gaddafi regime.⁴³

During the EU summit in Brussels in March 2011, which was marked by "annoyance", the validity of the newly formed council in Libya was discussed with several EU states questioning France's instant recognition.⁴⁴ According to one report, the eastern and southeastern Europeans were "appalled at how ruthlessly France and Great Britain attempted to push through their policies", resulting in the prevention of the no-fly zone clause for the initial resolution on March 11, 2011.⁴⁵ After the escalation of violence and after the Arab League officially requested a military intervention, internal statements show that Germany, Russia, and the U.S. initially questioned the problems attributed to the establishment of a no-fly zone. More specifically, U.S. Defense minister Robert Gates relayed his skepticism to Thomas de Maizière during a meeting, as it would "require air strikes against Libyan anti-aircraft batteries".⁴⁶ The U.S. decision to support the no-fly zone given on March 15, 2011 was influenced through arguments brought forth by President Obama's advisors, UN Ambassador Susan Rice, and Samantha Power, who argued in line with the UN concept of "responsibility to protect". According to interviews, the German government was not made aware of this

⁴³ "Security Council Authorizes 'All Necessary Measures' to Protect Civilians in Libya," *UN News Centre*, March 17, 2011, accessed October 25, 2013, <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=37808#.UoU1r9JDvTo>.

⁴⁴ Andreas Rinke, "Screbrenica or Afghanistan? Why Germany Abstained on the Libya Vote-Tracing the History of a Decision," *IP Journal* (2011).

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

changed position and decision, and no attempt was made to “explain the astonishing turnaround in Washington” which took German politicians “by surprise”.⁴⁷

While the possibility of a German “no” in the form of a veto was dismissed quickly, Chancellor Merkel’s remarks to the *Saarbrucker Zeitung* (newspaper) on March 17, 2011, outlined Germany’s skepticism towards military interventions. The chancellor stated, “I cannot get us involved in a mission with an extremely uncertain end”.⁴⁸ After her address at a plenary session of the *Bundestag*, heated internal debates ensued about issues surrounding Germany’s alliances and how the protection of the civilian population could be ensured. It is interesting to note that some anonymous interviews show the conversations and dialogue between de Maizière and NATO Secretary General Andreas Fogh Rasmussen, in which Germany’s commitment to the alliance was ensured despite German abstention: Germany would provide German soldiers for the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) mission in Afghanistan which left Rasmussen “satisfied”.⁴⁹ Perhaps, these internal exchanges are to account for the official statements by German politicians detailing Germany’s out of area mission support after the news of Germany’s abstention broke.

Resolution 1973, under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, called for a ceasefire and end to the violence and brutal attacks by the Gaddafi regime, imposed a no-fly zone over Libya, restricted all flights besides humanitarian aid flights, and strengthened a previous arms embargo imposed by the Security Council. Under an allied

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

coalition, French military jets entered Libyan airspace to enforce and secure the no-fly zone imposed by the resolution on March 19, 2011. By August 2011, rebel opposition forces stormed Tripoli, eventually taking control of the area. The fighting ended in October 2011 in the city of Sirte where Gaddafi was first captured and eventually killed by rebel forces, resulting in the official liberation of Libya on October 23, 2011.⁵⁰ While initial reports estimated that 30,000 people were killed and 50,000 were wounded during the six months of civil war, official numbers are not available. These estimates were eventually reduced by the National Transitional Council to about 25,000, and an unfinished Libyan government reported an even lower estimate in January 2013 of 4,700 rebel fighters killed and another 2,100 missing, and no reports of civilian casualties.⁵¹ The September 2012 attack on the American consulate in Benghazi, which killed the American ambassador to Libya and resulted in the resignation of the American UN ambassador, had severe political repercussions for the U.S. While Libyans voted for the first time in parliamentary elections in July 2012, the country remains unstable and insecure.

⁵⁰ Thomas Erdbrink and Liz Sly, "Gaddafi's Rule Crumbling as Rebels Enter Heart of Tripoli," *The Washington Post*, August 21, 2011, accessed October 23, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle-east/libyan-rebels-converging-on-tripoli/11/08/21/gIQAbF3RUJ_story.html.

⁵¹ Ian Black, "Libyan Revolution Casualties Lower Than Expected, Says Ne Government," *The Guardian*, January 8, 2013, accessed October 25, 2013, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/13/jan/08/libyan-revolution-casualties-lower-expected-government>.

The German Response to Libya

Germany's abstention to the vote on UNSC resolution 1973 was met with surprise, shock, and anger from the international community. The conflict in Libya appeared to have all the 'right' preconditions to warrant a legitimized approval for the use of force based on humanitarian intervention in a multilateral coalition, and within the normative framework of international law. Germany's official choice to align itself with China and Russia, knowing the consequences such inaction would have, left analysts and reporters wondering whether Germany's foreign policy is significantly changing. Germany's behavior, understanding, and justification of said behavior during the crisis may be viewed as a reconstruction or new path for its foreign and security policy objective; however, when viewing cases in which the use of force was debated in German policy within the past twenty years, the case of Libya falls within a sequential path. Among the dominant variables that influence German foreign and security policy, multilateral alliance solidarity was certainly at the forefront of the conflict in Libya, with France, the United Kingdom, and the U.S. leading the charge in seeking a legitimized intervention in Libya with an authorization on the use of force. Why then did Germany abstain from the vote to intervene in the civil war in Libya?

The German UN Ambassador, Peter Wittig, addressed the Security Council during a debate for Resolution 1973, giving Germany's official reasoning and explanation for abstention:

Decisions on the use of military force are always extremely difficult to take. We have very carefully considered the option of using military force — its implications as well as its limitations. We see great risks. The likelihood of large-scale loss of life should not be underestimated. If the steps proposed turn out to

be ineffective, we see the danger of being drawn into a protracted military conflict that would affect the wider region. We should not enter into a militarily confrontation on the optimistic assumption that quick results with few casualties will be achieved. Germany therefore decided not to support a military option, as foreseen particularly in paragraphs 4 and 8 of the resolution. Furthermore, Germany will not contribute to such a military effort with its own forces. Germany therefore decided to abstain in the voting. (Peter Witting, March 17, 2011)⁵²

Germany's abstention was immediately noted, in both scholarly and media circles, as a clear 'NO', drawing parallels to the invasion in Iraq and Germany's support of humanitarian interventions in the Balkans. References of the past to Germany's potential *Sonderweg* were mentioned by scholars and journalists alike. After the vote on resolution 1973, German politicians continuously articulated full support for the mission in Libya, yet this rhetoric proved that talk indeed is *not* cheap. Given the legal qualifications and legitimacy of the UNSC resolution and the multilateral facet of the vote, backed by humanitarian reasoning, along with the support of the Arab league, Germany's behavior, in the Libyan case, was influenced by different variables. In order to explain and understand this potential variation in norm-consistent policy, it is crucial to examine the official rhetoric and statements of policy makers while also considering the international security environment.

On March 18, 2011, Guido Westerwelle explained the German government's position on the Libyan crisis at the parliament. During his speech, Westerwelle was clear in Germany's opposition, stating that "German soldiers will not participate in combat

⁵² "S/Pv.6498," ed. United Nations Security Council (March 17, 2011), accessed November 2, 2013, <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Libya%20S%20PV%206498.pdf>.

mission in Libya”, adding that this decision was not easy for Germany.⁵³ Continuing his explanation, Westerwelle explained that, despite some differences about domestic political issues, the constructive debates resulted in a collective consensus against the dictator Gaddafi and were on the “side of international law”.⁵⁴ After explaining and outlining Germany’s position in regards to the Libyan population and against Gaddafi, Westerwelle makes a distinct break in his speech to separate the questions on military interventions and German participation in such missions. While Germany rhetorically supported the elements of resolution 1973, stressing the importance of sanctions and Germany’s support thereof, the break with the alliance is due to Germany’s understanding of the concept on the use of force.

Explaining that the decision to sanction the use of force and deciding over the lives of German soldiers is the most difficult one to be debated over politically, Westerwelle details the German choice to abstain from the UNSC vote, adding that there is “no such thing as a surgical strike”.⁵⁵ German soldiers would therefore not participate in military operations in Libya. Despite Germany’s abstention from the vote, which was viewed and analyzed as a “No” rather than a refraining from voting, Westerwelle outlined the ways in which Germany was currently acting “responsibly” though the contribution of 7,000 German soldiers to out of area operations worldwide.

⁵³ "Regierungserklärung Bundesminister Westerwelle Vor Dem Deutschen Bundestag Zur Aktuellen Entwicklung in Libyen - Plenarprotokoll 17/97," *Auswärtiges Amt*, March 18, 2011, accessed September 2, 2013, http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/DE/Infoservice/Presse/Reden/11/110318_BM_Regierungserkl%C3%A4rung_Libyen.html.
(translated)

⁵⁴ "Regierungserklärung Bundesminister Westerwelle Vor Dem Deutschen Bundestag Zur Aktuellen Entwicklung in Libyen - Plenarprotokoll 17/97," *Auswärtiges Amt*, March 18, 2011.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

While the importance to remove Gaddafi from power was stressed throughout Westerwelle's speech, the German government did not offer a solution or alternate route to reach this goal besides strengthening sanctions and focusing on diplomatic efforts. While this position may be difficult to understand in light of Germany's continued emphasis on humanitarian-based interventions and multilateral approaches, the decision falls in line with previous attitudes towards German participation in out of area operations involving the use of force. Libya, while difficult to analyze based on the legal and factual aspects, is therefore a continuous, sequential case in German consensus reaching on the use of force; influenced, shaped, and constructed through historical memories.

It is important to note that the internal debates, and the debates following Westerwelle's speech, did not show a clear consensus among politicians internally in Germany. Dr. Rolf Mützenich (SPD) accused Westerwelle of being influenced by domestic politics, arguing that the UN resolution is the "right consequence" based on the events in Libya.⁵⁶ Policy makers who opposed the abstention from the vote argued that Westerwelle owes an explanation on the behavior to the international community. To them, abstaining from the vote painted a poor picture of Germany to those countries who voted for Germany to have a high position within the Security Council and to the people of the Arab world who recently supported Westerwelle on Tahir square. On the other hand, members of the Left party (Jan van Aken) accused the SPD of

⁵⁶ "Keine Beteiligung an Kampfeinsätzen," *Deutscher Bundestag Web and Text Archive* accessed November 5, 2013, http://www.bundestag.de/dokumente/textarchiv/11/33798136_kw11_de_lybien/.

“warmongering”, explaining that forceful interventions in Libya would lead to further bloodshed. The Left viewed the abstention on the UNSC resolution as advancement from previous decisions under the Red-Green coalition government who “blindly” committed to military deployment in Afghanistan.⁵⁷ The CDU/CSU supported the decision, with Ruprecht Polenz explaining that both the UN resolution and Germany’s abstention are justified, as “too many unexplained risks exist”, adding that abstaining eliminates suspicion of Germany only committing troops due to the oil in the region.⁵⁸

Given the statements made during debates after the decision was announced by Westerwelle, those party members who supported Germany’s official decision agreed that the uncertainty of the resolution’s end point contributed to the abstention, emphasizing the importance to consider not only NATO advice, but also that of the EU. While the decision was fiercely debated afterwards and included accusations and interruptions, parliamentary members such as Dr. Rainer Stinner (FDP) emphasized that while German soldiers may not participate in combat missions in Libya, Germany would participate in the “mission to deprive Gaddafi of power” through stronger sanctions and taking on Libyan refugees.⁵⁹ The Green party supported the UN resolution, stressing the importance of the humanitarian aspect in Libya based on the concept of human rights and the responsibility to protect (R2P). Renate Künast (Green Party) referred back to a UN resolution of 2005, which under the headline of “Responsibility to Protect” outlined

⁵⁷ "Keine Beteiligung an Kampfeinsätzen," *Deutscher Bundestag Web and Text Archive*

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

⁵⁹ "Interview with Dr. Rainer Stinner," *Deutscher Bundestag*: accessed November 5, 2013, http://www.bundestag.de/dokumente/textarchiv/11/33929101_kw23_interview_stinner/index.html.

the responsibility of states to protect its people. Failure to abide by this principle therefore warrants engagement and action by the international community. Künast argued that Germany must show clearly that human rights are important to Germany and its foreign policy.⁶⁰ While differing in internal consent on the vote is evident when considering the statements made by German politicians, the official German stance to abstain was reached by the majority vote.

The importance of WWII legacy, specifically the concept of the culture of restraint, is certainly evident in the Libyan case based on official rhetoric references to memory and experience; however, the ways in which other factors influenced the decision making must also be included. The importance of humanitarian preconditions, multilateral alliance based-approaches, responsible behavior, and legitimized/UN sanctioned efforts did not sway the German vote to an affirmative “yes”. Further, *Bundeswehr* reform, cost, and German soldiers currently in Afghanistan also influenced the decision. As Angela Merkel noted in a speech before the parliament after the abstained vote, instead of contributing crew members for AWACS flights over Libya, Germany would increase participation in Afghanistan. The chancellor commented to media outlets that Germany was not neutral, and, like the international community, aims to bring an end to the Gaddafi regime.

National or domestic interests may have influenced the decision to abstain from the Libya vote, specifically Germany’s general opposition to military interventions. According to a poll, 85 percent of the German population opposed German soldiers’

⁶⁰ "Keine Beteiligung an Kampfeinsätzen."

participation in a Libyan intervention and two thirds of Germans agreed with the abstention of UNSC resolution 1973.⁶¹ While over 60 percent of Germans supported a forced military intervention against Gaddafi, the majority of those asked rejected participation in such an intervention in Libya by the *Bundeswehr*.⁶² Further, another 65 percent of Germans agreed with the official behavior of Germany not to participate in the intervention. The results of the domestic polling on the use of force debate over Libya, is a reflection of the overall struggle for Germans to define and settle the conflict of responsibility and guilt. Germans recognized that Gaddafi 'must go', but most were unwilling to do so themselves. This attitude can be explained through a variety of variables, mostly influenced by Germany's continued antimilitaristic outlook shaped and constructed through WWII legacy.

GERMANY'S BEHAVIOR: MEDIA AND SCHOLARLY RESPONSES TO LIBYA

Germany's official position and abstention from the vote was met with criticism by both international and domestic media outlets. The German press ran headlines pointing to the "Catastrophic Signal" to the Arab world (*Der Spiegel*), Richard Herzinger in *Die Welt* commented on the "shameful" way in which Germany showed that it had "learned nothing", and *Die Zeit* outlined how Germany "sugar coated" the damaging

⁶¹ "A 'Catastrophic Signal' to the Arab World: Berlin Divided over Security Council Abstention," *Spiegel Online*, March 21, 2011; Rinke, "Screbrenica or Afghanistan? Why Germany Abstained on the Libya Vote-Tracing the History of a Decision."

⁶² "Krieg Gegen Libyen: Über 60 Prozent Der Deutschen Befürworten Den Angriff," *Bild*, March 20, 2013, accessed November 17, 2013, <http://www.bild.de/politik/11/libyen-krise/aber-mehrheit-lehnt-beteiligung-ab-16933388.bild.html>.

consequences of its isolating behavior.⁶³ Across Europe, *The Guardian*, described how Germany marginalized itself over the abstention from the vote while on the other side of the Atlantic, Roger Cohen in *The New York Times*, outlined the ways in which Merkel “shunned” her allies, lost her credibility, and erased Germany’s predictability.⁶⁴ The theme across the majority of the media coverage shows a clear consensus: Germany made a wrong and ‘puzzling’ decision to abstain from the vote on a Libyan intervention.

Interviews and comments given by German politicians after the abstention were filled with sharp critiques of the decision. Ruprecht Polenz (CDU) commented on the “wide operational gap” within the decision, Heidemarie Wiecek-Zeul called the abstention of the intervention a “disgrace”, while some politicians with the SPD and Green Party supported the decision.⁶⁵ Rainer Stinner (FDP) explained that Germany made the right decision as the majority of the *Bundestag* agreed not to participate in military action in Libya. Further, he explained that while Germany is not committing ground troops to Libya, 40 percent of the AWACS operations are manned by German soldiers.⁶⁶ Other official interviews and commentary on German television showed a thematic explanation used by politicians to justify Germany’s abstention. More specifically, in regards to the argument for humanitarian intervention and the

⁶³ "A 'Catastrophic Signal' to the Arab World: Berlin Divided over Security Council Abstention; JÖRG Lau, "Macht Mal - Ohne Uns!," *Zeit Online*, March 24, 2011; Richard Herzinger, "Nichts Dazugelernt," *Die Welt*, March 18, 2011.

⁶⁴ Severin Weiland and Roland Nelles, "Germany Has Marginalised Itself over Libya," *The Guardian*, March, 18 2011; Roger Cohen, "Merkel in Miniature," *The New York Times*, April 18, 2011.

⁶⁵ "Krieg Gegen Libyen: Über 60 Prozent Der Deutschen Befürworten Den Angriff."

⁶⁶ "Interview with Dr. Rainer Stinner."

responsibility to protect, some policy makers explained that if one was to intervene in Libya, the same should go for Yemen and the Ivory Coast.⁶⁷

The ways in which German domestic opinion influences foreign policy choices are evident by Germany's 'representative democracy' and Chancellor Merkel's operationalization of the concept. Several analysts and scholars commented in the media on Merkel's "soft" approach based on "popular mood" rather than confronting difficult decisions, the Libyan intervention being one of them.⁶⁸ Rhetorically, Chancellor Merkel has responded to debates with "there is no alternative", as outlined in an unflattering article in *Der Spiegel*, which argued that the chancellor lacked confidence and assertiveness to rule Germany. Guido Westerwelle's behavior during the Arab Spring movements was severely attacked in the media upon Germany's abstention from the Libya vote. While Germany pushed for harder sanctions during the movements in Tunisia and Egypt, France remained in the background. In previously accepted policies, Germany 'dealt' with issues in the East, while France was responsible for the south of Europe. After Westerwelle's public display of support for the movements in Egypt and Tunisia and declaring that "we are on the side of the freedom movements in the Arab world", his official position to abstain was contradictory.⁶⁹ Perhaps Germany's strong

⁶⁷ These comments were made by Ulrich Deppendorf (March 21, 2011) and by the minister for economic cooperation and development Dirk Nebel on two different television segments on German TV.

⁶⁸ Dirk Kurbjuweit, "A Germany of 82 Million Chancellors: Why Angela Merke's Failures Continue to Multiply," *Spiegel Online*, April 13, 2011, accessed November 16, 2013, <http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/a-germany-of-82-million-chancellors-why-angela-merkel-s-failures-continue-to-multiply-a-756543.html>.

⁶⁹ Lau, "Macht Mal - Ohne Uns!."

initial support in the region towards freedom and democracy contributed to the confusion, surprise, and anger felt by the international community and media.

While some reporters and newspapers were extremely critical of Germany's decisions, others, while also pointing to the damaging results, appear to have a difficult time assertively arguing against Germany's abstention, instead posing questions and focusing on the aftermath of Germany's behavior. The official responses by politicians, which often included details of Germany's continued support and mission in Afghanistan, is also thematically included by journalists and described as a "bartered transaction".⁷⁰ The fact that the abstention placed Germany alongside China and Russia is also widely analyzed and discussed in the media. *Die Zeit* explains that no foreign minister before Westerwelle allowed for Germany to be grouped with China and Russia, while focusing on Westerwelle's statements and behavior.⁷¹ According to some journalists, Westerwelle made flawed comparison's to Iraq in 2003 by assuming that potential air attacks in Libya will undoubtedly lead to ground fighting within in a bloody civil war.⁷²

In the German speaking media and through popular political blogs, Germany's isolating behavior is discussed in parallels to Germany's irresponsible past. From Germany's refusal to commit more troops to Afghanistan to the handling of the Euro crisis, the Libyan abstention only further contributed to the murmurs about Germany's new German foreign policy approach marked by individualism. Interestingly, both

⁷⁰ The German term, or concept for this is "*Kompensationsgeschäft*"

⁷¹ Lau, "Macht Mal - Ohne Uns!."

⁷² Ibid.

international commentators and internal German journalists continuously question how Germany will be viewed by the international community. Analysts worry and wonder to what extent the aftermath of the Libya case will contribute to the uncertainty felt by Germany's partners and neighbors. Many German writers point to Germany's economic power as an export nation, and calling for an end to Germany's assumption that other nations will contribute to the security umbrella which kept Germany safe.⁷³ While Germany's abstention from the vote did not prevent military intervention, journalists predicted dire consequences and lasting effects. To most analysts from Germany's allies, the move essentially showed that Germany was unwilling to help, while Westerwelle was described as "Germany's pacifist-in-chief".⁷⁴ Westerwelle's stance, previous behavior, and arguments are thematically analyzed throughout the media's analysis of Germany's abstention, with journalists explaining Westerwelle's position as "out of touch with reality", but understanding that Germany's official position will be accepted by the electorate.⁷⁵

Like the scholarly analysis of Germany's abstention shows, the broad media almost exclusively described, analyzed, and understood Germany's abstention from the vote as a clear "Nein". This differentiation from reality, while interesting, also gives insight into the international community's own understanding and conceptualization of Germany's behavior. To discuss German behavior within a political context, it seems

⁷³ Clemens Wergin to Flatworld - Der Aussenblog von Clemens Wergin, 2011. Accessed November 12, 2013, <http://flatworld.welt.de/11/04/20/die-selbstverzwergung-der-deutschen-ausenpolitik/>.

⁷⁴ Weiland and Nelles, "Germany Has Marginalised Itself over Libya."

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

impossible to forget or omit history and past experience. From Germany's *Sonderweg* to the clear "Nein" that was blasted all over the media after the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the media judges quickly while struggling to truly explain Germany's special position. Instead of attempting to understand Germany's official reasoning, journalists point to the embarrassment Berlin should have felt, decisions Merkel did not make, and statements Westerwelle was supposed to leave out.

While drawing parallels to the invasion of Iraq, journalists also discuss the impact of the Libya abstention for the elections in Germany. Much has been debated of Chancellor Schröder's motives in 2002 in the midst of his national election campaign. Similarly, the media points to Westerwelle's potential considerations for the FDP. Given Merkel's tendency to vote along the populist opinion, it comes to no surprise that Westerwelle takes domestic positions into consideration. The continued skepticism held towards forceful military engagements by the German public, especially the upper middle class who often support the FDP, may have influenced Westerwelle's staunch comments even after the abstention.⁷⁶ Most journalists rightly point to the crucial difference in Schröder's position in 2002 and Westerwelle's position after Libya: the former had France and the UNSC on his side, while the latter may have dented the German-French relationship.

While some journalists in the German media remained neutral in reporting the facts and listing potential consequences of the Libyan abstention, others detailed the "shameful" behavior exhibited by Germany, whereby the focus was once more on

⁷⁶ Ibid.

Westerwelle. Placing Germany on the side of Gaddafi by abstaining, Richard Herzinger in *Die Zeit* dismisses Westerwelle's attempt at selling his decision in the framework of 'Realpolitik', instead arguing that the decision is merely a reflection of the isolationist sentiment of Germany.⁷⁷ Instead of comparing Libya to Iraq, Herzinger points to the missed intervention in the Balkans in 1992, which resulted in two massive military interventions that were hastily executed, as well as Afghanistan. According to the journalist, Germany's prolonged wait to act in the past resulted in involvement in unmanaged conflicts. Herzinger also includes Afghanistan in his comparison, arguing that Germany, after observing disinterest from afar, only acted once the Taliban became a deadly threat. The inaction detailed by some media experts led analysts to predict that similar consequences would occur in the case of Libya.

While some scholars critique Germany's behavior, most have a difficult time theoretically explaining and justifying Germany's behavior. The majority of journal articles and opinion pieces authored by scholars include an argumentative judgment mainly focusing on the aftermath of the German decision. Some, however, remain neutral, instead attempting to explain by chronologically detailing the facts which led to Germany's abstention. In Berlin, scholars, through anonymous interviews, tried to detail the internal EU debates that took place at the EU summit in Brussels. A political scientist at Berlin's Free University said that "Germany is no longer a credible partner in the Atlantic alliance", while Joschka Fischer called Germany's foreign policy a "farce".⁷⁸

⁷⁷ Herzinger, "Nichts Dazugelernt."

⁷⁸ "Germany, Russia Learn High Cost of Abstaining from Libya Un Vote," *The Australian*, March 25, 2011.

Hanns W. Maull, in a German journal article published in 2011, referred to German foreign policy as “disoriented”, detailing the problems associated with the case of Libya. In the excellently detailed argument, the scholar compares the case of Libya to the Kosovo of 1998-1999, but argues, as do most scholars under review, that the abstention positioned Germany against its two closest allies, France and the U.S. while isolating itself in the EU.⁷⁹ In order to compensate for this shift in alliance, Germany adopted, as observed before in Iraq in 2003, the “politics of the guilty conscious” by committing soldiers to AWACS missions in Afghanistan.⁸⁰ On top of discussing the importance of the concepts “never alone” and “never again war”, which both were fulfilled in the Libyan case, Maull attributes the concepts of “politics before force”, or Germany’s emphasis on diplomatic efforts, for Germany’s abstention in the Libya case. Both journalists and scholars pointed to the importance of the elections in Baden-Württemberg and Rheinland-Pfalz, which motivated the FDP to push the position of non-intervention through military force as well as German domestic opposition towards the intervention. Besides this, German scholars question Germany’s role concept as a responsible actor in the EU. In the past, Germany has greatly benefited from the EU while enjoying the security umbrella provided by the transatlantic alliance. In recent years the cost-benefit scale has leveled out, and Germany therefore views the role concept and the increased responsibility as burdensome.⁸¹

⁷⁹ Hanns W. Maull, “Deutsche Aussenpolitik: Orientierungslos,” *Zeitschrift fuer Politikwissenschaft* 1(2011).

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

⁸¹ *Ibid.*

Security scholars further point to several problems in Germany's foreign policy, evident by the Libya case. Specifically, while the international environment drastically changed after the end of the Cold War, Germany's foreign policy approach has not. Germany relies on cooperating partners, and, in the past, has matched its foreign policy approach to those of other allied nations and declaring the behavior as "normal". Hence, debates and discussion in scholarly circles have resulted in questioning whether Germany has become a 'normal actor'; however, Germany is not, and has not been, like any other country within the EU. According to Hanns Maull, Germany's abstention, which was widely viewed as yet another 'Nein', showed that Germany chose another *Sonderweg*, damaged its hard earned trust and reliability, and broke off from its closest partners.⁸² Most prominent German security scholars agree: Germany's abstention and behavior during the Libya crisis was a disaster. Harald Müller called Germany's behavior a "moral and political mistake", and added that while he was against the intervention in Kosovo and the continued missions in Afghanistan, one "must intervene when one should, can, and is allowed to".⁸³ Scholars also address the clichés used by Germany in justifying the abstention; mainly the fear for a war over oil, which most scholars dismiss on the basis of official numbers detailing Libya's trading partners.

Scholars who analyze Germany's behavior, both theoretically and in practice, are puzzled by the abstention. Some note that Germany could have 'symbolically' participated by voting "yes" to the no-fly zone while still ensuring no German soldiers

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ Harald Müller, "Ein Desaster. Deutschland Und Der Fall Libyen," *Hessische Stiftung Friedens-und Konfliktforschung. Standpunkte* 2(2011).

would participate in on-ground engagements in Libya. Scholars also point out the damaging image Germany exudes by being grouped with the BRIC-states (Brazil, Russia, India, and China). Three of the four BRIC states have political reservations about humanitarian-based interventions due to their own controversial movements internally.⁸⁴ According to Müller, these states abstained, fearing that a development of norms can positively influence secession movements. While Brazil does not have the same political interests as the remainder of the BRIC nations, the scholar suggests that Brazil was asked to abstain.⁸⁵ Security scholars also focus on Germany's continued emphasis on diplomatic efforts, specifically the use of sanctions. In the Libya case, most scholars agree that sanctions, even increased sanctions, were not useful. Further, consensus among German scholars shows that Germany's position contradicts its role as a civilian power.

SUMMARY

This section has detailed Germany's behavior, rhetoric, and action during four selected cases where the use of force was discussed politically. Each case was controversial and highly publicized and resulted in changes in German policy. This chapter focused on the factual data in each case, while simultaneously presenting the evidence used by security scholars to argue for or against Germany's position as a global actor. The cases of Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan were historically analyzed in order to

⁸⁴ Russia (Chechnya), India (Kaschmir), China (Tibet).

⁸⁵ Müller, "Ein Desaster. Deutschland Und Der Fall Libyen."

place the case of Libya on a linear path in Germany's foreign policy pattern. Chapter six will then apply the variables to the evidence presented in this chapter in order to analyze and determine which variable affected the outcome in each case with the goal of pinpointing when and how historical memory enters German foreign and security policy debates.

CHAPTER V

ANALYZING CHANGE IN GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY: NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION, SANCTIONS, AND DIPLOMACY: THE CASE OF IRAN

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this case study and chapter is to provide an overview of what perspectives explain Germany's varied behavior towards a global issue: nuclear nonproliferation. Specifically, this chapter will analyze Germany's policies, rhetoric, and behavior during the negotiations with Iran, in light of Iran's nuclear program. This study will begin with a historical overview of the case, inclusive of detailing facts surrounding the ten year span of negotiations. This chapter will further explain the EU-Germany-Iran relationship, Iran's nuclear program, and German responses and behavior in the case.

The relationship between Iran and Europe, and Germany particularly, has been long and marked by difficulty in diplomatic and political processes since the Iranian revolution of 1979. These difficulties are in the areas of economic trade and agreements as well as human rights based issues, political relations, and most recently, the Iranian nuclear program. The efforts by Germany, the EU-3 (Germany, France, United Kingdom), the EU, and the international community to handle the potential acquisition of nuclear weapons by Iran has been challenging and oriented towards short-term goals. Germany has approached this issue in line with national nonproliferation rhetoric based on an argument for peace and stability in the Middle East, which can be understood through Ian Manner's concept of Normative Power Europe (NPE), focusing on diplomacy,

democracy, freedom, and human rights. Parallel to this, Germany's own rethinking of its nuclear power poses an important pillar of German foreign policy objective. Germany's past experience with the international community regarding nuclear power informs Germany's behavior and choices towards the Iranian nuclear project and Germany's central role in establishing accountability guidelines for Iran. While Germany has been vocal about its opposition toward Iran's nuclear program in the past, critiques have highlighted Germany's inconsistent behavior towards sanctions and policy avenues for Iran. Nuclear weapons, as the ultimate currency of power, and possession and acquisition thereof, are certainly linked to realist arguments on structurally-based international relations. How can Germany's behavior towards nuclear power and Iran's nuclear program be explained and understood? This case study hypothesizes that historical memory and WWII legacy has an effect on Germany's nuclear history while informing Germany's policy choices towards the Iranian nuclear program. Germany's multilateral alliance solidarity, domestic influence, and national and economic interests are variables that also may explain Germany foreign policy in this policy area. Germany's behavior is then analyzed to determine whether this case is an example of an adjustment in policy, a reconstruction of policy, a learned policy, or a norms-based continuation of previously employed policy.

An argument can be made that Germany's and the EU's approach to convince Iran to halt its uranium enrichment program is linked to the nonproliferation rhetoric employed by Germany which connects norms and ideas in order to strengthen international security through policy practice. This case study will focus on Germany's

rhetoric and action in combination with the EU to highlight Germany's foreign policy based on multilateral approaches within a global issue area. Germany's and the EU's effectiveness in dealing with Iran's nuclear program is difficult to assess without considering historic relationships, theoretical analyses, and recent developments to prevent Iran from advancing its nuclear program. After analyzing Germany's nonproliferation approach in order to understand the diplomatic relationship in the past ten years between the EU and Iran, this study examines scholarly literature as well as news media to explain the EU's approach toward Iran's nuclear program, once again emphasizing Germany's specific role. Germany's role will be analyzed based on the aforementioned variables to determine the influence on historical memory on German foreign policy in the analysis, chapter six, of this dissertation. This chapter will conclude with a summary of arguments and findings about nonproliferation norms, the German and EU voice, and the effectiveness of sanctions in light of historic relationships.

The EU-Iranian Relationship

Europe's relationship with Iran is long and diverse. Iran has several relationships to countries within the union, including a long-standing colonizer/imperialist relationship to Great Britain, or relationships rooted in long-standing friendship and economic ties, such as the relationship between Germany and Iran. Rather than outlining the relationship in terms of trade and treaties, which vary too much to elaborate in this chapter, I will first outline the EU's role as a mediator and global actor in light of Iran's nuclear program, and focus on an in-depth analysis of the German-

Iranian relationship. Sebastian Harnisch describes the relationship between the EU and Iran as that of a 'mediator', with a "critical and constructive dialogue with Tehran" in place before Iran's nuclear fuel cycle program was exposed in 2002.¹ According to some scholars, the EU's role as a mediator partially failed as Iran's program did not constitute a threat to international stability and peace, yet was approached by the EU as such. Several policy offers outlining multiple, comprehensive approaches 'lacked credibility', as these offers did not include a security guarantee by the U.S.² Although the EU initially took the lead in negotiations with Iran, the U.S.'s role and actions were central to Iran's reactions and diplomatic processes and directly contributed to a halt in the negotiations. The institutional design of the EU and its actions are in line with a theory-based approach on norms that directly links to the policy advocated towards Iran. According to Harnish, without the U.S., Iran would have not first accepted the EU as a mediator, and eventually discontinued relations with the EU.

The German-Iranian Relationship

Germany's prolonged and continuous relationship with Iran has been a "sore point" for German-American relations during the 1990's and has been attributed to a conflict in national interests.³ The historical relationship between Germany and Iran began before World War I when Iran began the relationship in order to counterbalance

¹ Sebastian Harnisch, "Minilateral Cooperation and Transatlantic Coalition-Building: The E3/Eu-3 Iran Initiative," *European Security* 16, no. 1 (2007): 8.

² "Minilateral Cooperation and Transatlantic Coalition-Building: The E3/Eu-3 Iran Initiative," *European Security* 16, no. 1 (2007): 18.

³ Jacob Heilbrunn, "Bonn Mots," *New Republic* 216, no. 20 (1997): 17.

British and Russian influence in the area.⁴ The relationship extended throughout the 1920's and 1930's, with extensive student exchange programs and military equipment supplied by Germany to Shah Reza Khan. After WWII, West Germany continued the relationship with Iran and became a close ally to the Shah. Even after the Iranian Revolution, German firms and businesses have shared and supplied technology to Iran, eventually becoming Iran's main trading partner.⁵ In the 1990's, before the recent elevation of Iran's nuclear program, over 170 German firms operated in Iran, to include Krupp, Daimler-Benz, and Siemens. Despite international political incidents, the German-Iranian business relationship remained strong, with Iran extending this relationship to former East German businesses.⁶ The German and Iranian intelligence services have also shared information and cooperated closely in the 1990's, to include several personal visits between the German intelligence chief Bernd Schmidbauer and Iranian cleric and chief of intelligence Ali Fallahian.

The German-Iranian relationship was justified to Germany's western allies under the approach of 'critical dialogue', also referred to as 'constructive engagement', and explained as an opportunity for Germany to promote western values in Iran including reforming domestic politics in Iran. In the past, policy makers argued that this critical dialogue contributed to Iran's adoption of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1968; however, some scholars conclude that Germany's policy of détente as well as the U.S.

⁴ For the purpose of this brief overview, I have focused on the recent relationship between Germany and Iran, but first German missions to Persia were reported in the 16th Century.

⁵ Heilbrunn, "Bonn Mots," 18.

⁶ Such international political incidents include the 1979 seizure of the American Embassy in Tehran and the 1992 assassination of Kurdish exiles at a restaurant in Berlin; the German business community reacted with "keep political matters out of business"

policy of containment has not changed or affected the Iranian regime during that time.⁷

German news magazines, as well as interviews with German analysts, point to Germany's promotion of a softer approach which includes less economic sanctions. According to German reports in 2009, Iranian imports to Germany almost doubled, with German exports to Iran also increasing steadily. German media therefore reflects the idea of keeping business and politics separate, with commentators criticizing German policy makers for focusing on foreign policy without taking into consideration the overall relationship, the economy, and the impact of the business and domestic relationship. On the other hand, German security scholars are outraged by Germany's continued economic relationship with Iran, calling Germany's foreign policy 'damaging' and 'inconsistent' by opposing stronger sanctions.

According to the German Federal Foreign Office website, German exports fell by 19 percent in 2011, with German businesses in Iran not renewing business contracts since the initial sanctions began in 2007. Between 2007 and 2013, German exports to Iran increasingly dropped (except during 2010), from 3.6 billion Euros in 2007 to one billion Euros in 2013. Similarly, imports from Iran also steadily dropped from 583 million Euros in 2007 to 157 million Euros in 2013, with the exception of 2010 where both imports and exports were at a record high.⁸ Beyond trade relationships and the overall historic relationship between Germany and Iran, German citizens still travel to Iran very

⁷ Heilbrunn, "Bonn Mots."

⁸ "Beziehungen Zu Deutschland," ed. Auswärtiges Amt, accessed December 5, 2013, http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/sid_DCD155D9AB53D25911F278B439796DEB/DE/Aussenpolitik/Laender/Laenderinfos/Iran/Bilateral_node.html#doc337586bodyText2.

frequently. Germany has a language institute, a diplomatic school, an archeological institute, and a Christian community establishment in Iran, as well as a long-standing relationship in educating Iranian scientists in Germany, whereby official diplomatic relations have been established since 1952.⁹

Iran's Nuclear Program

Scholars and historians who analyze recent developments in Iranian foreign policy, and especially Iran's nuclear program, emphasize Iran's resources and history as a powerful empire. Themes of pride, privilege, and international standing can explain Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons. The privilege and benefits from civilian nuclear power can be used to strengthen Iran's standing as a great civilization, contribute to political regime resilience, and influence regional and international allies. Further, civilian nuclear power could be used by Iran to level and tame Europe and the U.S., making the acquisition thereof rather lucrative.¹⁰ Iran's nuclear program has its origins in the 1970's due to Iran's strategic position during the Cold War. Initially signing the Agreement for Cooperation Concerning Civil Uses of Atoms in 1957 with the U.S., Iran received pool-type reactors and fuel from the U.S. in 1967, while Iranian scientists were trained at prestigious institutions such as the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.¹¹ Throughout

⁹ A German-Persian agreement of friendship, trade, and shipment was established in 1873, with an article outlining foreign policy that states Germany would support Persia in the case of potential war between Persia and another power.

¹⁰ Ruth Santini, "European Union Discourses and Practices on Iranian Nuclear Programme," *European Security* 13, no. 3 (2010): 471.

¹¹ Mustafa Kibaroglu, "Good for the Shah, Banned for the Mullahs: The West and Iran's Quest for Nuclear Power," *Middle East Journal* 60, no. 2 (2003).

the Cold War, the U.S. administration visited the Shah who eventually announced plans to develop nuclear power capability in 1974 and initiated contracts to build water reactors with France. By 1975, mutual investment contracts between Iran and the U.S. for uranium enrichment facilities in the U.S. and spent fuel reprocessing facilities in Iran were set into action, along with an agreement with Germany to establish six nuclear reactors. Germany began construction on the Buser reactor in 1976.¹²

The coup d'état, organized by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the British Secret Intelligence Service (MI6), which overthrew then prime minister of Iran Mohamed Mossadegh in 1953, along with the events immediately before and during the Iranian revolution of 1979, led to the beginning of the continuously strained and often non-existent relationship between the U.S and Iran. The U.S. stopped cooperating with Iran in regards to their nuclear program and urged other countries to do the same. Meanwhile, the Islamic Republic began an overall rejection of all things "Western" and eventually reduced oil exports and cancelled all nuclear projects. Ayatollah Khomeini's views towards nuclear technology and the effects on Iran's dependence on the West contributed to the interruption of the program, but also his ethical opposition to the concept and idea of WMDs.¹³ The energy crisis and the Iran-Iraq war caused Iranian clerics to change their stance toward the nuclear program and eventually turned to 'new' suppliers which included Pakistan, Argentina, Spain, China, and the Soviet Union. In 1987, Iran and Pakistan signed an agreement for nuclear cooperation and opened the

¹² An agreement to exchange nuclear technology and cooperate in nuclear safety between the U.S. and Iran was signed in 1977, as well as the signing of the U.S.-Iran Nuclear Energy Agreement in 1978.

¹³ Santini, "European Union Discourses and Practices on Iranian Nuclear Programme," 472.

Esfahan Nuclear Research Center. By 2002, the U.S. revealed secret nuclear projects administered by Iran, which included a uranium enrichment facility in Natanz and a water production facility in Arak.¹⁴

Upon this discovery, the U.S. reacted by declaring a violation of Article II of the NPT, followed by Iran's denial and invoking of Article IV. In 2003, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) called on Iran to sign the Additional Protocol, which set into motion visits and diplomatic efforts by Germany, France, and the United Kingdom who visited Tehran and urged Iran to sign and comply. By 2005, Iran informed the IAEA of the decision to resume uranium conversion in Esfahan, halting negotiation between Iran and the EU-3. An important aspect to note is that in 2005, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei, as Khomeini before him, rejected the idea of nuclear weapons, and pronounced a "fatwa against the development, production, stockpiling, and use of nuclear weapons".¹⁵ The literature surrounding Iran's nuclear program, from both theoretical as well as strategic analyses, differ in terms of Iran's right to establish a nuclear program. While some authors argue that Iran has the right to maintain a nuclear program for civilian purposes outlined under the NPT, with the added obligation to claim these activities to the IAEA, other scholars warn against the devastating balancing effects a potential nuclear Iran would have on the Middle East.¹⁶

¹⁴ Kibaroglu, "Good for the Shah, Banned for the Mullahs: The West and Iran's Quest for Nuclear Power."

¹⁵ "Good for the Shah, Banned for the Mullahs: The West and Iran's Quest for Nuclear Power," 472.

¹⁶ Tom Sauer, "Struggling on the World Scene: An over-Ambitious Eu Versus a Committed Iran," *European Security* 17, no. 2 (2009): 274.

Iranian views and motivations

Iran's motivations and reasoning behind pursuing nuclear weapons include prestige, global respect, national pride, the perception of threat, and a 'quest for recognition'.¹⁷ Further, pressure from Iran's public contributes to the development of Iran's nuclear program for use of collective and national defense. According to a recent survey, 90 percent of Iran's population is in favor of nuclear power.¹⁸ Iran's nuclear program is also supported by several Islamic nations, Non-Alignment Movement (NAM) countries, as well as some European countries which support Iran's nuclear program on the basis of enrichment.¹⁹ Internal Iranian views on nuclear proliferation differ and are separated by scholars into four categories: 1. Iran does not need nuclear weapons or nuclear capability, 2. Iran is entitled to peaceful nuclear technology, 3. Iran needs to develop nuclear weapons capability, and 4. Iran should develop nuclear weapons immediately.²⁰ The major implication seen by some scholars and political analysts is the potential domino effect of nuclear programs in the Middle East should Iran acquire nuclear weapons.

¹⁷ Kibaroglu, "Good for the Shah, Banned for the Mullahs: The West and Iran's Quest for Nuclear Power," 219.

¹⁸ "Good for the Shah, Banned for the Mullahs: The West and Iran's Quest for Nuclear Power."

¹⁹ NAM countries here further make an argument that the development of nuclear weapons would stand for all Muslims in the world, whereby a level of expectation exists that Iran would eventually share their nuclear technology with other NAM countries.

²⁰ Kibaroglu takes these views from Dr. Nasser Hadian, and Associate Professor in the Faculty of Law and Political Science at the University of Tehran.

Germany and Iran's Nuclear Program: Germany's theoretical approach

Although France and the United Kingdom possess nuclear weapons capability, the EU's articulation towards Iran's nuclear program has mostly been in line with rhetoric employed by German policy makers based on nonproliferation theory. Statements made by Joschka Fischer in 2005 and German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier in 2006 point to Iran as only one of the cases which undermine the global nonproliferation regime, urging an increase in disarmament practices.²¹ Germany's rhetoric, and statements made by Angela Merkel, has consistently included an aspect of approaches that work toward a world without nuclear weapons by reducing nuclear arsenals. Despite this, in recent years, Germany's, as well as the EU's approach, has not only focused on Iran's nuclear program but mostly presented nuclear issues along with regime change without taking into consideration the Iranian perspective, especially in regards to national security. The literature about the EU's theoretical approach and link of policies toward Iran's nuclear program shows the EU's role as a global actor in influencing behavior by using concrete policies in line with norms such as human rights and political freedoms.²²

The European approach, which has numerous times been referred to in terms of Ian Manners' 2002 articulation of NPE, has strong aspects of asymmetry and unilateral direction on securitizing the issue of Iran's nuclear program by only considering the

²¹ Harnisch, "Multilateral Cooperation and Transatlantic Coalition-Building: The E3/Eu-3 Iran Initiative," 423.

²² Lynne Dryburgh, "The European Union as a Global Actor: Exploring EU Policy Towards Iran," *ibid.* 17, no. 2 (2008).

European or 'Western' view on security, and essentially ignoring Iranian concerns.²³

Referring back to statements made by Joschka Fischer in 2005 about his hopes for Iran to return to 'rational policy', scholars outline an argument for depictions and constructions of double standards of how nuclear and non-nuclear states are dealt with. Here, a clear construction of 'we' and 'they' is observed in the dialogue between the EU and Iran, as well as overall international rhetoric describing Iran's nuclear program.²⁴ The EU, as the 'good citizen', backed by the international community, has therefore established a "power asymmetry" that allows for a "more decisive coercive diplomacy" action by the EU.²⁵ Securitization occurred by portraying, outlining, and exposing the behavior of an actor who violated international law and norms; an actor unwilling to change and comply despite numerous changes, offers, and communicative efforts. This view is also supported by surveys conducted on members of the European Parliament as well as European citizens, who despite viewing Iranian actions as irrational, reject a military option using force against Iran.

Ian Manners' articulation of NPE and the elements of the concept theoretically explain and describe German and EU approaches toward the Iranian nuclear program. The idea of civilian power, with a focus on economic prowess rather than military capabilities, provided the building block for Manners' argument of the ideational impact

²³ Ruth Santini, "European Union Discourses and Practices on Iranian Nuclear Programme," *ibid.* 13, no. 3 (2010).

²⁴ "European Union Discourses and Practices on Iranian Nuclear Programme," 477.

²⁵ *Ibid.*

of the "EU's international identity and role as a representative normative power".²⁶

Here, a focus is given to the power of ideas and norms through cognitive processes that essentially shape 'normal' international relations and construct an identity for the EU. This normative approach includes a strong commitment to human rights, peace, liberty, the rule of law, democracy, and social solidarity, concepts found in the EU's *acquis communautaire* (European Union Law), and diffused through contagion, information, official process, transference, and culture.²⁷ Although Manners argues for this concept by applying the abolition of the death penalty, NPE can explain the current views and approaches toward Iran's nuclear program in that policies are constructed on a normative basis and with an emphasis on multilateral action in order to 'civilize' international relations through ideas and norms. This means that the factor which shapes Germany's and the EU's role as an international actor is based upon what the actor *is*, rather than how it *acts* and what it *says*. Therefore, the EU can be viewed as a 'changer of norms' in the international system through the exercise of normative power, which has evolved from the previous concepts of civilian and military power as a categorization. This theoretical understanding and explanation of 'actorness' is important when analyzing Germany's will and desire to influence, shape, and change the international environment, and can contribute in understanding Germany's norms-based policy approaches.

²⁶ Ian Manners, "Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 40, no. 2 (2002): 238.

²⁷ For specific references to these concepts in the articles and an explanation of the process of diffusion for these norms, please refer to "Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 40, no. 2 (2002): 242-45.

On the other hand, some scholars focus on the negative effect of the EU's 'coercive diplomacy approach' towards the Iranian nuclear weapons crisis.²⁸ Here, diplomacy is the main instrument, whereby coercive diplomacy has three distinct characteristics: a demand, a threat, and time pressure. The demand has to be formulated with the opponent and has to be supported by a threat that requires time pressure or a deadline. The theoretical underpinnings of this approach present the concept as a way to persuade the opponent and to avoid war, whereby several questions and aspects have to be taken into consideration before linking theory to policy. Legitimacy of demands, credibility of the threat, credibility of time pressure, and motivation of actors all contribute to decisions within coercive diplomacy as an alternative between going to war and doing nothing. It is important to note that not all individual countries within Europe articulate their opposition to the Iranian nuclear program in line with nonproliferation rhetoric. Scholars have pointed to double-standards and legitimacy issues under the NPT as early as 2003, especially in regards to the argument of the acquisition of nuclear weapons in order to protect national interests. Some scholars highlight this legitimacy issue by presenting France's argument for national interests. National interests-based arguments for nuclear weapons acquisition emphasizes the difficulty in convincing a state such as Iran to forgo proliferation despite being geographically situated in an unstable region.²⁹

²⁸ Tom Sauer, "Coercive Diplomacy by the Eu: The Iranian Nuclear Weapons Crisis," *Third World Quarterly* 28, no. 3 (2007).

²⁹ Scholars often discuss this in combination to some of the *de facto* weapon states (Israel and Pakistan), who are allowed to keep their nuclear weapons.

The European Union's approach towards Iran's nuclear program

Since the elevation of Iran's nuclear developments, but also since Iran signed the NPT Additional Protocol in October 2003, the EU has taken a constructive diplomatic approach; advocating diplomatic measures and offering various carrots to Iran while also taking into consideration both cultural and as strategic goals. This approach is referred to by scholars as an example of non-politicized governance.³⁰ After the initial signing in 2003, Iran along with the EU-3, signed the Paris agreement in 2004 before the EU-3 made a comprehensive offer to Iran in Vienna (Vienna proposal) in 2006. What followed after the proposal is the period currently under examination which began with several rounds of sanctions: UNSC Resolution 1737 (2006), UNSC Resolution 1747 (2007), and UNSC Resolution 1803 (2008). The EU's foreign policy and diplomatic approach toward Iran and its nuclear program has gradually evolved from the initial format consisting of only Germany, the United Kingdom, and France (E3) who advocated diplomacy combined with the threat of sanctions, to the EU-3, consisting of the E3 and High Representative Javier Solana in order to give the group EU legitimacy, and eventually resulting in the EU3+3, adding Russia, China, and the U.S. to the process to show multilateral security governance.

When analyzing the relationship between the EU and Iran, some scholars take a poststructuralist approach to examine the relationship between identity, ideas, and policy in order to understand the foreign policy choices of each actor.³¹ The main

³⁰ Santini, "European Union Discourses and Practices on Iranian Nuclear Programme," 471.

³¹ "European Union Discourses and Practices on Iranian Nuclear Programme."

argument is that in order to make sense of diplomatic efforts and policy, analyses have to include an understanding of identity and perception and the discourse thereof, which directly ties into constitutions of security.³² This discourse refers to the language and rhetoric used between actors and contributes to constructing concepts such as power, ideology, threats, and cooperation. The argument and analysis fall in line with general views of constructivism in the establishment of knowledge, norms, and identity outlined by Alexander Wendt, in opposition to traditional realist balance of power explanations. Securitization, or the process of uncovering and understanding rhetoric structures that eventually become accepted as international concepts and practices, can be used to examine the complex relationship and diplomacy between the EU and Iran. Moreover, the case of Germany's relationship and foreign policy approach to Iran's nuclear program further underlines the importance of identity, norms, and knowledge as Germany's foreign policy is marked by constructed discourses.

An important aspect in understanding this relationship is the view and image held by Europeans and Germans of Iran, and vice versa. Here, the historic relationship between Europe and Iran, going back to the Persian Empire, is widely discussed by scholars who try to explain the current foreign policy choices made by each actor. Perspectives by French, British, German, and ancient historic documents paint a complex picture of Persians, ranging in their descriptions from 'barbarians' to 'peoples

³² Ibid. The author here refers back to an argument made by Lene Hansen (2006) in *Security as practice, discourse analysis and the Bosnian War*: "Foreign policy discourses are analytical constructions through which the construction and linking of identity and policy can be studied" (p. 51).

committed to principles such as truth and justice'.³³ Throughout several analyses, a thematic examination by historians detail the resemblance between Persia and Europe. Iran's complex transformation by several authoritarian regimes within the past century, combined with domestic practices and policies, contribute to the current negative view held by Europeans of Iran. This view transcends into rhetoric employed by policy makers and leaders, therefore directly constructing an 'Other' into international narratives.³⁴ This 'othering' of the Iranian regime translated to a distrust of Iran and its foreign policy by the West, whereas the EU is viewed as acting within their normative narrative and approach in an effort to provide stability and security within the region.³⁵

Sanctions, recent developments, and the EU/German Voice

The EU WMD strategy eventually became the 'manifesto' of the official EU approach to non-proliferation and Iran's nuclear program. In 2004, the EU3 proposed a deal with new negotiations and economic benefits, which was signed in Paris in November 2004 with Iran agreeing to freeze its uranium enrichment program until a long-term agreement was reached. This offer, which included various carrots such as cooperation in trade, technology exchange, and security, coincided with Ahmadinejad's electoral victory of 2005, and the European offer was rejected and Iran's enrichment

³³ "European Union Discourses and Practices on Iranian Nuclear Programme," 469.

³⁴ This construction, rhetoric, and narrative is not only employed by European leaders and actors. An argument can certainly be made of an elevated occurrence of 'othering' by the United States within the past ten years which has directly contributed to current views and relationships between 'The West' and Iran (most notably President Bush's categorization of Iran as part of the 'Axis of Evil')

³⁵ The dichotomies of 'us' and 'them' become part of the securitization discourse through portrayal of values, norms, and identities internationally.

program was re-started.³⁶ The EU put forth another comprehensive proposal, using a 'softer' rhetoric by Joschka Fischer, who asked Iran to 'be reasonable' but declaring that "if Iran were to go nuclear, it would jeopardize stability in the entire region. This is not only Israel's concern, but also of all of Iran's neighbors".³⁷ After an elevation of talks between the IAEA and Iran in 2005, a nuclear dossier was referred to the UNSC in 2006, along with a statement by the EU-3 detailing their diplomatic efforts with Iran. In 2006 the EU-3 became the EU3+3, adding China, Russia, and the U.S. to the negotiation team, eventually formulating a proposal in Vienna with a focus on economic sanctions, which were believed to be most feared.³⁸

What the EU (EU-3) have said in regards to Iran's nuclear development has been presented as a collective European view, backed by policy makers and politicians, and in line with policy recommendations and choices. Statements made by Javier Solana at the European Parliament, as well as press releases by German, French, and British policy makers, were presented as justifications when discussing the European relationship with Iran. Here, the lack of trust and transparency is cited as a reason why a preservation of international law is essential when dealing with Iran. In 2006, the EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), Javier Solana,

³⁶ Sauer, "Struggling on the World Scene: An over-Ambitious Eu Versus a Committed Iran," 276.

³⁷ "Interview with Federal Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer in the *Süddeutsche Zeitung* (Sz) on 6 August 2005 on Iran, Europe and Un Reform," ed. Auswärtiges Amt (2005), accessed December 10, 2013, <http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/EN/Infoservice/Presse/Interview/Archiv/05/050808-FischerIranEuVn.html>.

³⁸ The German foreign minister made this argument publicly, citing Iran's economic dependency with the West

expressed this concern in clear terms, explaining the root problem and cause of the strained relationship between Iran and the EU:

The problem with Iran is essentially a problem of confidence. For many years, Iran, a signatory to the NPT, carried out nuclear activities with a total lack of transparency. This is a legitimate source of concern for the international community as recognized by the Iranians themselves...The six countries have followed a two track approach: dialogue and referring the case to the UNSC. Dialogue could not last forever. It is up to them to decide whether the time has come to follow the second track. But the door to negotiations is always open (Javier Solana, October 4, 2006).³⁹

While the U.S. was part of the negotiations at the time of this statement, a clear distinction can be made between the predominately diplomatic approach of the EU. Although EU representatives also employed rhetoric of 'othering', the tone of Solana, and his closing comments for the above statements shows a deep understanding of the complex relationship in place between Iran and Europe. The lack of response by the Bush Administration to Ahmadinejad's May 2006 letter was criticized by the EU, and created friction between the EU and the U.S.⁴⁰ After Iran officially and publicly rejected the Vienna proposal, the EU announced it was considering sanctions based on its coercive foreign policy, backed by the UNSC framework, and declared it would only negotiate if Iran suspended the enrichment program.

The initial rounds of sanctions in 2006 proved somewhat difficult with Russia and China resisting firmer measures which were advocated by the EU and the U.S. In 2007, the EC External Relations Commissioner gave a speech to the European Parliament in

³⁹ "Remarks by Javier Solana, Eu High Representative for the Cfsp, on the Latest Developments Concerning Iran to the European Parliament Foreign Affairs Committee . Brussels, 4 October 2006 ", ed. European Union (2006), accessed December 4, 2013, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/discours/91168.pdf.

⁴⁰ Sauer, "Struggling on the World Scene: An over-Ambitious Eu Versus a Committed Iran," 278.

regards to final findings and approaches towards Iran's nuclear program. The Commissioner expressed his concern about the overall state and future of non-proliferation globally. This delivery, which timely referred to North Korean nuclear developments, was based on non-proliferation globally and broadly, rather than in securitization terms towards Iran, as observed in the past. The Commissioner did not outline the various security threats posed by Iran or Iran's future nuclear program, but instead focused on a technical analysis and framework of non-proliferation.⁴¹ Sanctions in 2007, backed by France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, included a ban on arms sales, whereby British and French policy makers employed stronger language and rhetoric further advocating harsher sanctions similar to those sanctions proposed by the U.S., which included the Iranian banking and economic system.⁴²

These sanctions were partially enacted in 2008 with UNSC Resolution 1803, which called for a financial freeze to individual assets of people believed to be involved in the nuclear program, as well as travel bans and increased inspections of cargo bound to and from Iran. By 2008, even Solana used language and rhetoric that pointed to cultural differences between Iran and the West, focusing on the destabilizing effect a nuclear Iran would pose to the Middle East. Solana's articulation emphasized that the punishment in the form of sanctions was not the primary objective, but rather an increased effort and avenue for potential negotiations with Iran. Although the EU

⁴¹ Ruth Santini, "European Union Discourses and Practices on Iranian Nuclear Programme," *ibid.* 13, no. 3 (2010): 481.

⁴² Although he later corrected this statement slightly, French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner declared that "France needed to prepare for the prospect of war with Iran" (Santini, 2010, p. 482 and Baldwin, 2007).

backed the UN resolutions, policy makers advised the U.S. to reduce rhetoric that included military action and the use of force, while advocating diplomacy as the only possible approach. By March 2008, Ahmadinejad declared that Iran would no longer deal with the EU and instead communicate only with the IAEA.⁴³

In June 2009 the EU3+3 offered an updated version of the initial Vienna proposal to Iran, which has not been acted upon. After meetings with Tehran in Geneva, and several statements made by EU policy makers as well as President Obama, the possibility of Israel striking Iranian nuclear facilities was made known internationally, therefore reopening the securitization debate including the use of force. The role of the EU since 2009 has therefore been two-fold and rather complex; on the one hand, the EU's (and Germany's) commitment to its allies such as Israel is continuously reiterated publicly, while also balancing and 'patrolling' the Middle East in order to avoid possible military conflicts.⁴⁴ Throughout the process in the past decade, an articulation of Iran's complex and interrelated domestic and foreign policy approach has been absent in international discussion about Iran's nuclear program, painting the picture of an irrational actor and securitizing the issue in order to legitimize future action. Some scholars make this argument by chronologically analyzing the language and rhetoric employed by European policy makers on the basis of a discursive examination of the concept of security and perceived threat.

⁴³ To international surprise, the U.S. sent Under Secretary of State William Burns to talk with the EU and Iran in July 2008, a policy shift which was accredited to EU pressure. Sauer, "Struggling on the World Scene: An over-Ambitious Eu Versus a Committed Iran," 282.

⁴⁴ Ruth Santini, "European Union Discourses and Practices on Iranian Nuclear Programme," *ibid.* 13, no. 3 (2010): 484.

The legitimacy and double-standard issues raised in the early 2000s in regards to dealing with Iran's nuclear weapons program did not help the overall relationship between the EU and Iran, since France and the United Kingdom are both nuclear weapons states. As several scholars point out, Iran has never disputed that it is not allowed to have nuclear weapons; however, Iran has been very clear throughout the negotiations that the enrichment of uranium is allowed according to Article 4 of the NPT.⁴⁵ Drawing similarities between North Korea's nuclear program to the process of Iran's nuclear program, analysts argue that although Iran can simply withdraw from the NPT and announce possession of nuclear weapons, the intention of the acquisition of nuclear weapons worry the West, while the size of the civilian nuclear program that Iran should be allowed to have was also under debate. In analyzing the EU's coercive diplomacy approach toward Iran, some scholars conclude that articulated threats do not always reach goals; however, the EU's, and specifically Germany's negotiations can be seen as elevating the EU's role as a global actor. The EU, and Germany, as a global actor, balances the differing advocated approaches by the U.S., Russia, and China, while acting in line with European identity, norms, and promoting collective, multilateral actions.

Other scholars examine the effectiveness of dealing with Iran by assessing a realization in objectives, namely the prevention of the acquisition of nuclear weapons. Analyzing the EU's strategy in terms of cost and benefits analysis, an important aspect of nonproliferation logic has been neglected by EU policy makers: the prestige associated

⁴⁵ Sebastian Harnisch, "Minilateral Cooperation and Transatlantic Coalition-Building: The E3/Eu-3 Iran Initiative," *ibid.* 16, no. 1 (2007): 624. Sauer, "Coercive Diplomacy by the Eu: The Iranian Nuclear Weapons Crisis." Sauer (2007)

with the acquisition of nuclear weapons and the symbolism and popularity at home for countries acquiring nuclear weapons. This symbolism and understanding of the underlying motives by Iran is entirely absent in EU policy makers' conception of the problem.⁴⁶ This is partially explained by the EU's attempt to become a global actor, visible and powerful in world politics beyond traditional diplomatic initiatives and in opposition to the U.S.'s unilateral and militaristic approach. The internal divisions within the EU over policies and sanctions toward Iran also contributed to the stalled or 'ineffective' outcome of the halted negotiations. According to a convincing argument by Tom Sauer, during the entire negotiation process, the EU "changed from being a mediator to being a coercer" without offering new proposals for Iran, while 'softer' approaches advocated by Germany and other EU member states were shut down immediately by the U.S.⁴⁷

A review of the scholarly debates surrounding the effectiveness of the EU's approach in dealing with Iran's nuclear program, taking into consideration long standing relations and historic events, scholars and analysts disagree about the results and interpretations of the negotiating process. Some point to the problem of double-standards while others explain the importance of considering Iranian domestic politics, while yet another group highlights the lack of the EU (and others) to consider the national security threats articulated by Iran. Analysts critically examine the aftermath of the EU's negotiation process with Iran, arguing that the EU has tried to push Iran to

⁴⁶ "Struggling on the World Scene: An over-Ambitious Eu Versus a Committed Iran," 284.

⁴⁷ "Struggling on the World Scene: An over-Ambitious Eu Versus a Committed Iran," 288.

commit to rules beyond those outlined by the NPT with an approach of ‘misguided demand’, essentially denying Iran the development of a national nuclear fuel cycle.⁴⁸ Part of these criticisms fall under the double-standard argument, but the underlying conclusion is that unlike the U.S.’s approach of counter-proliferation arguments, which advocate a reshaping or replacing of the existing regime, the EU lacks a clear and consistent strategy. Scholars suggest a full return to diplomatic institutions combined with an articulation and adoption of what John Herz called “Realist Liberalism”.⁴⁹ Similarly, Suzanne Maloney questions the sanctions, and carrot-and-stick policies, which have been more focused on the latter, and strongly urges the Obama Administration to focus on the diplomatic process.⁵⁰

Policies, agreements, and recent developments

The policies employed by the EU can be categorized as a securitized foreign policy approach marked by coercive diplomacy. Coercive diplomacy has been defined as backing “one’s demand on an adversary with a threat of punishment for non-compliance that he will consider credible and potent enough to persuade him to comply

⁴⁸ Sten Rynning, "Peripheral of Powerful? The European Union’s Strategy to Combat the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons," *ibid.* 16, no. 3 (2007).

⁴⁹ According to Rynning (2007), Herz’, ‘realist liberalism’ would entail a doctrine that must “weave together the EU’s multilateral ambition and its penchant for singling out illiberal regimes for special treatment. More on the concept can be found at John Herz, "Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma," *World Politics* 2, no. 2 (1950).

⁵⁰ Suzanne Maloney, "Sanctioning Iran: If Only It Were So Simple," *Washington Quarterly* 33, no. 1 (2010): 145.

with the demand".⁵¹ Scholars who categorize the EU's approaches towards Iran in line with coercive diplomatic measures show that Iran's nuclear program is an example for securitization. Europe and other 'Western' countries have stopped explaining why Iran's nuclear ambitions are a severe security problem which may have dangerous impacts on the international community, instead accepting this as a security issue on a *de facto* basis. This is partly due to the images of the Iranian regime held by the West, marked by authoritarianism, human rights violations, and absence of the civil liberties enjoyed by Europeans. Europe then becomes an agent seeking peace and security in international politics, based on normative foreign policy choices and a focus on democracy promotion; concepts that seem to directly contradict and compromise Iran's foreign policy.

After the 2002 shock that Iran had a secret nuclear weapons program for almost two decades in violation of the NPT, negotiations between Iran and Europe officially began. Most importantly, this discovery led to the EU's categorization of security over economic interests, creating a stronger foreign policy approach as an alternative to the approach employed by the Bush administration. This foreign policy approach had to encompass a comprehensive and multilateral policy, representative of the entire union in order to be viewed legitimate, but also serve as a parallel to perceived American hegemony for initiatives in the Middle East at the time.⁵² The European unified and

⁵¹ Alexander George, *Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War*, Institute of Peace (Washington, D. C.1997), 4.

⁵² This alternative approach was also put into place in response to the EU internal crisis of the Iraq war. Sauer, "Struggling on the World Scene: An over-Ambitious Eu Versus a Committed Iran," 275.

proactive approach, spoken with “one voice”, declared in October 2003 that they “would make everything possible in order to avoid Iran becoming a nuclear state”.⁵³ Throughout these initial negotiations, and the rhetoric employed by EU-3 representatives Dominique de Villepin, Jack Straw, and Joschka Fischer, a clear distance between the European approach and the approach of the U.S. was present. More specifically, the European approach was based on concepts, aspects, and beliefs of non-proliferation rhetoric and theory with an initial rejection of the use of force. The EU formulated this approach as a strategy of ‘preventative engagement’ with an emphasis on international law on the basis of United Nations mandates.⁵⁴

GERMANY’S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD IRAN’S NUCLEAR PROGRAM: TRADE, RHETORIC, ACTION, AND THE MEDIA

As with all areas of German foreign policy, the concepts of ‘never again war’, ‘never alone’, and ‘with peaceful means only’ have to be taken into consideration in order to understand the relationship between Germany and the Middle East. These concepts refer to WWII legacies and describe Germany’s commitment to multilateral approaches and Germany’s role as a civilian power.⁵⁵ Bearing these principles in mind, Germany’s foreign policy in the Gulf region has historically been value-based and interest driven and focused on economic issues. Foreign policy choices by Germany

⁵³ Ruth Santini, “European Union Discourses and Practices on Iranian Nuclear Programme,” *ibid.* 13, no. 3 (2010): 474.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵⁵ Eberhard Sandschneider, “German Foreign Policy Towards the Gulf Region,” *Emirates Lecture Series* 86(2010): 1.

became domestically debated with the rise of *Ostpolitik* and approaches based on the ideas of 'Wandel durch Handel' (change through trade), including bilateral agreements with Germany's eastern neighbors.⁵⁶ Germany has several strategic priorities in the Middle East to include an interest in political stability, cooperation towards the fight of terrorism, improvement and extension of Germany business, and preventing Iran from becoming a nuclear power.⁵⁷

It is important to include the sometimes controversial policies for the period of 1993 to 1998 throughout the Clinton-Kohl era. During this time, sanctions and diplomatic pressure due to Iran's potential nuclear program were heavily debated. While the Clinton administration supported and advocated for economic sanctions, the German government refused sanctions and supported Iran's nuclear program in terms of its legality under the NPT.⁵⁸ This analysis and stance has since changed with the 2003 discovery of Iran's nuclear weapons program. Since then, Germany has continuously emphasized the principle of multilateralism when dealing with Iran or other states within the Gulf region, including issues beyond Iran's nuclear program.⁵⁹ Despite this, Germany, in recent years, has placed national interests before those of the EU, while taking a separate position from other EU member states. This can certainly be said for Germany's policies towards Iran, as Germany has often suggested softer approaches with less severe economic sanctions. While literature about the German-Iranian

⁵⁶ These trade agreements include countries such as Russia, Poland, Czechoslovakia and the GDR

⁵⁷ Sandschneider, "German Foreign Policy Towards the Gulf Region."

⁵⁸ Matthias Küntzel, "Berlin, the Ayatollahs, and the Bomb," *The Journal of International Security Affairs* 18, no. 39-45 (2010).

⁵⁹ Such as human rights policies

relationship in regards to trade is extensive, the more recent emphasis in scholarly analysis surrounds Germany's foreign policy toward Iran and the relationship between the two countries in light of Iran's nuclear program.

With a long standing diplomatic and trade relationship, Germany has taken a 'softer' approach in the past ten years to prevent nuclear proliferation by Iran. Although German foreign policy, opinions, and statements by politicians can be, at times, singled out as a German 'voice' or 'view', the multilateral approaches with France and the United Kingdom, and more recently China, Russia, and the U.S., make it difficult to separate German diplomatic efforts from those under the umbrella of EU dialogue. In the past six years, friction between Germany and the United Kingdom and France occurred over Germany's consideration of Russia's proposal for Iran which included an allowance of limited enrichment.⁶⁰ The U.S. blocked this proposal immediately and rounds of UNSC resolutions and sanctions began. In 2007, Germany again proposed a "softer approach", which was shut down by the U.S., France, and the United Kingdom, and contributed to disagreements among EU member states later that year. Austria was also in support of a softer approach, once again rejected by France and the United Kingdom to which Germany reacted publicly in the media.⁶¹

In September 2007, German Minister of Foreign Affairs Steinmeier accused the U.S. and France of hypocrisy about earlier accusations of German firms' prolonged business with Iran while the U.S. and France secretly also engaged in business deals with

⁶⁰ Sauer, "Struggling on the World Scene: An over-Ambitious Eu Versus a Committed Iran," 278.

⁶¹ Spain also publicly disagreed with further sanctions.

Iran.⁶² American companies such as Microsoft, Caterpillar, and Coca-Cola operate in Iran, while French exports include Peugeot and Renault.⁶³ Germany openly voted against new economic sanctions by the UN in 2007, which was certainly noticed by the international community. The influence of domestic opinion in German foreign and security policy is distinctively evident throughout several issue areas. A 2013 PEW Research on Global Attitudes Project shows that 96 percent of Germans are against Iran acquiring nuclear weapons; however, only 50 percent of those asked would support possible military action to prevent Iran from nuclear weapons acquisition.⁶⁴ The media coverage and domestic reaction to the Iranian nuclear program over the past ten years has not been as involved and outspoken as foreign policy involving out of area and use of force debates.

While Germany's rhetoric towards Iran has been mostly strong and in line with the EU voice, opposing nuclear weapons acquisition in Iran, Germany's allies have criticized Germany for the softer measures advocated by the Federal Republic. Specifically, Germany's economic ties with Iran have been scrutinized heavily in the media and through official political statements. Scholars point to Germany's policy of noninterventionism in regions such as Libya, Syria, and Mali, and argue that Germany's position as the third-largest exporter of arms creates a conflict for Germany's foreign policy directive. In the realm of nonproliferation, Germany's economic weight does not

⁶² "Iran Sanctions: Berlin Says Us and France Guilty of Hypocrisy," *Der Spiegel*, September 27, 2007, accessed December 2, 2013, <http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/iran-sanctions-berlin-says-us-and-france-guilty-of-hypocrisy-a-507443.html>.

⁶³ "Iran Sanctions: Berlin Says Us and France Guilty of Hypocrisy," *Der Spiegel*, September 27, 2007.

⁶⁴ "Pew Research Global Attitudes Project," (2013), accessed December 8, 2013, <http://www.pewglobal.org/13/06/11/global-views-of-iran-overwhelmingly-negative/>.

translate to the responsible behavior expected by the international community. Germany's relationship and ties to Israel further complicate Germany's ability to level its foreign policy choices. In 2011, Shaul Mofaz, the chair of the Israeli Foreign Affairs and Defense committee, advised Germany to adopt "a clear policy towards Iran" and to advocate "tough sanctions".⁶⁵ In an article written by Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg in *The Wall Street Journal*, the former defense minister noted Germany's "historical and moral responsibility to support Israel against an Iranian threat", while Merkel, in 2008, publicly declared that "Israel's security is part of Germany's *raison d'être* and cannot be negotiated".⁶⁶ It is interesting to note that opinion polls show that the German public views Israel as an "aggressive country that pursues its interests without consideration for other nations".⁶⁷

On the other hand, some analysts argue that from an economic trade perspective, Germany's economic sanctions with Iran have only hurt the German industry. The "strategy of discouragement" adopted by the German government resulted in major German economic trade partners including Deutsche Bank, Linde, and ThyssenKrupp to withdraw from Iran. The market gaps occurring from German business withdrawal were then filled by Chinese and Russian companies. In this case, the sanctions imposed by Germany did not contribute to the prevention of Iran's nuclear weapons acquisition, but hurt the German economy while providing business gaps to

⁶⁵ "Berlin Considers Stronger Sanctions: Us and Israel Demand Greater Measures against Tehran," *Spiegel Online*, November 14, 2011.

⁶⁶ Karl-Theodor Zu Guttenberg and Ulf Gartzke, "Germany Must Have Israel's Back," *The Wallstreet Journal*, April 2, 2013, accessed December 5, 2013, <http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887323296504578396113845689862>.

⁶⁷ "Germany Must Have Israel's Back," *The Wallstreet Journal*, April 2, 2013.

the competition. Machines and systems with German origin are used by two thirds of Iranian industrial enterprises and three quarters of small and medium sized firms, making Germany Iran's number one importer.⁶⁸ Furthermore, Iran's dependency on German suppliers was confirmed in 2008 by the German-Iranian Chamber of Industry and Commerce, adding that China or Russia could not easily replace this export gap.⁶⁹ Historically, the controversy surrounding the German-Iranian trade relationship dates back to the Kohl-Clinton era, when the U.S. imposed sanctions which were undermined by Germany. The period from 2006 to 2007 was marked by resistance from Germany to the economic sanctions proposed by the U.S. While the U.S., France, and the United Kingdom supported stronger economic sanctions, Germany, along with China and Russia, rejected harsher sanctions. Germany's economic and trade interests in Iran certainly impacted the initial years of negotiating stronger sanctions. Further, independent EU sanctions were also opposed by Austria and Italy and the economic sanctions during this period were imposed under the UN umbrella. Moreover, Germany's refusal to support stronger sanctions during the EU3+3 negotiations grouped Germany alongside Russia and China.

Rhetorically, Germany's position has been in line with alliance solidarity, condemning a potential nuclear Iran and advocating sanctions over military interventions. In November 2009, Chancellor Merkel addressed the U.S. Congress, stating that "a nuclear bomb in the hands of an Iranian president, who denies the

⁶⁸ According to the German-Iranian Chamber of Industry and Commerce in Tehran and affirmed in 2007 by Berlin's Federal Agency for Foreign Trade. Küntzel, "Berlin, the Ayatollahs, and the Bomb," 40.

⁶⁹ "Berlin, the Ayatollahs, and the Bomb."

Holocaust, threatens Israel, and denies Israel the right to exist, is not acceptable” and needs to be met with “tough economic sanctions”.⁷⁰ While the chancellor’s rhetoric is certainly strong and shows support and alliance solidarity, the initial rhetoric observed by German leaders was quite different. Even upon discovery of Iran’s clandestine nuclear program some 18 years in the making, European and German exports to Iran increased while Joschka Fischer explained that, “We Europeans have always advised our Iranian partners that it is in their considered self-interest to regard us as a protective shield.”⁷¹ Beyond Germany’s view towards nuclear weapons, the nuclear disaster in Fukushima, Japan prompted Germany to rethink the nuclear energy program. According to Westerwelle, he realized that “it was simply impossible to return to business as usual” after the events in Japan.⁷²

After some controversial accusations by the Mossad, Israel’s foreign intelligence agency, Germany banned the export of specific goods to Iran which have been modified and used in questionable ways, including the conversation of German trucks to rocket launchers.⁷³ While cases like these call for obvious sanctions of specific goods, the German government was also concerned with the hardship that sanctions could impose on the Iranian people, especially in regards to medical and pharmaceutical export sanctions. After the official report of the IAEA was released in November 2011, revealing alarming details about Iran’s nuclear program, the international community reacted

⁷⁰ “Berlin, the Ayatollahs, and the Bomb,” 39.

⁷¹ “Berlin, the Ayatollahs, and the Bomb,” 41.

⁷² “Spiegel Interview with German Foreign Minister,” *Der Spiegel*, March 21, 2011, accessed December 5, 2013, <http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/spiegel-interview-with-german-foreign-minister-gadhafi-must-go-there-s-no-question-a-752164.html>.

⁷³ “Berlin Considers Stronger Sanctions: Us and Israel Demand Greater Measures against Tehran.”

with renewed concerns but little action. The reports showed that Iran actively worked on developing a nuclear device with a possible military element. Guido Westerwelle said that unless Iran “conducts serious negotiations on its nuclear program, new, more severe sanctions would be inevitable”.⁷⁴ Despite this strong rhetoric on the one hand, Westerwelle also emphasized Germany’s opposition to military action, adding that Germany rules out “all discussion on a possible military option”.⁷⁵

SUMMARY

The most recent developments in light of the election of Hassan Rouhani prompted Chancellor Merkel to call for a rekindling of the deepened relationship between Germany and Iran, opening the door for renewed constructive cooperation in order to promote international stability and security. Scholars and journalists continue to point to the inconsistencies in Germany’s foreign policy behavior, categorizing Germany’s inaction and unwillingness to impose more severe sanctions on Iran with Germany’s unwillingness to participate in a military intervention in Libya. Specifically, the German media has focused on Germany’s economic interest-based policies. In a highly critical German article published in *Die Zeit* in April 2013, journalists point to Germany’s willingness to export arms to dictators and unwillingness to discuss human

⁷⁴ "Iaea Lambasts Iran Nuclear Program: Israel Hails Report as Turnaround for Atomic Watchdog," *Der Spiegel*, November 9, 2011, accessed December 5, 2013, <http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/iaea-lambasts-iran-nuclear-program-israel-hails-report-as-turnaround-for-atomic-watchdog-a-796849.html>.

⁷⁵ "Iaea Lambasts Iran Nuclear Program: Israel Hails Report as Turnaround for Atomic Watchdog," *Der Spiegel*, November 9, 2011.

rights with China and Russia as this is “bad for business”.⁷⁶ Throughout the scholarly and media responses to Iran’s nuclear program and Germany’s behavior, analysts continuously point to Germany’s role as the third largest arms exporter behind the U.S. and Russia as reported by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). This chapter presented a historic overview of the German-Iranian relationship while focusing on the factual data surrounding the approach of the EU3+3 towards Iran’s nuclear program. Further, scholarly analysis and theoretical arguments were taken into consideration to understand Germany’s varied behavior. The evidence presented in this chapter will be analyzed and applied to the selected independent variables in chapter six of this dissertation in order to determine whether Germany’s foreign policy and rhetoric is determined by historical memory.

⁷⁶ Jochen Bittner et al., “Wir Tun Doch Nix...” *Die Zeit*, March 21, 2013, accessed December 5, 2013, <http://www.zeit.de/13/13/Deutschland-Aussenpolitik>.

CHAPTER VI

ANALYSIS, FINDINGS, AND DISCUSSION

INTRODUCTION

This chapter will analyze the presence and strength of the selected variables in each case in order to understand and explain Germany's foreign policy behavior. Alliance solidarity and multilateral approaches, historical memory and WWII legacy, domestic influence, and national interest will be examined in two policy areas, out of area operations and nuclear nonproliferation. While the central focus of the analysis for out of area operations is on Germany's abstention in the case of Libya, the cases of Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan are also included in this analysis in order to present a linear, sequential case for continuity and change in Germany's behavior. For the policy area involving nuclear nonproliferation, Germany's behavior during the EU3+3 negotiations with Iran were examined based on the same criteria to look for corroboration of the importance of historical memory in German foreign and security policy and rhetoric. The analysis will show whether, according to the hypotheses selected for these case studies, Germany has a ritualized foreign policy and rhetoric, determined by historical memory and identity or not. This analysis is separated into four sections. The first two sections will present the variables and findings for the cases for out of area operation and nuclear nonproliferation respectively. The third section will compare both policy areas for the cases of Iran and Libya, highlighting whether Germany's recent change can be categorized as an adjustment, reconstruction, learning

process, or norms-based continued behavior. The theoretical debates and analysis thus far have focused on Germany's continuity in policy despite an increase in power. The fourth section of this chapter will apply the three international relations theories, structural realism, liberalism, and constructivism, to the selected cases in order to detail each framework's ability to explain the change or continuity in Germany's foreign policy behavior.

CASE I: OUT OF AREA OPERATIONS AND THE USE OF FORCE: LIBYA

The question introduced at the beginning of this case study guided this research in determining what consensus has to be reached in order to authorize the use of force. The hypothesis of this dissertation is that German foreign policy and rhetoric is either determined, or not determined by historical memory. An assumption is made that Germany has undergone a transformation from an old status quo towards a potential new status quo in German foreign policy execution. Who then has to be on board to authorize the use of force? What are the main variables that influence this decision? Under which circumstances does historical memory influence German foreign policy, and how important is memory in the Libya case? Does German political rhetoric support policy action? While the majority of this case study focuses on the Libya case, the use of force debate for Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan were also included in the application of the variables to compare and contrast among each case briefly, and to set the context of the argument.

The following table shows the presence of the selected variables and evidence in recent cases where the use of force was debated. Further, the chart depicts and explains additional indicators for outcomes in policy choices. For use of force cases in German foreign policy, four variables were selected: 1) Multilateral Alliance Solidarity, 2) Historical Memory, 3) Domestic Influence, and 4) National/Economic Interests. Additional behavioral descriptors include: Engagement/Responsibility, Consent, Rhetoric, Deployment Caveats and Humanitarian Arguments, and the International Environment. Each case is then categorized by an observed change as either an adjustment to policy, reconstruction of policy, learning of policy, or norms-consistent policy.

Table 2: Application of Variables: Case I

	Kosovo	Iraq 2003	Afghanistan	Libya
Humanitarian Argument	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Use of force approved based on humanitarian crisis • consequence s of inaction • Ethnic cleansing 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Main difference to Kosovo. Not based on humanitarian argument • Outside of Europe • Based on ideology 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reconstruction/development support • Humanitarian support (main domestic understanding) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Humanitarian Argument made (not influential enough)

Table 2: Continued

	Kosovo	Iraq 2003	Afghanistan	Libya
(V1) Multilateral Alliance Solidarity/ NATO/EU	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Showing commitment to partners and Int'l community (although arguably a little too late) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Break with alliance (France, Russia) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> External pressure to expand mission Showed continued commitment 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> No actual commitment/grouped with China/Russia/Brazil Rhetorical commitment to fully support resolution Commitment of German soldiers manning AWACS missions in Afghanistan
Engagement/ Responsibility	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Becoming a responsible, predictable actor (begins the Germany as a 'normal' actor debate) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> NO Consequences: break with U.S.; asking of 'the new German Question' 	<p>Yes, but caveats</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> External pressures to commit Based on civil reconstruction Need for alliance solidarity, responsibility <p>Consequences: voiced frustration by allies</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> No. Break with alliance. "Inconsistent foreign policy"
Categorization of Change	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Reconstruction (of 'never again war'; use of force and Norms based humanitarian intervention) First use of force since WWII Pushing for independence of Kosovo 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Norms consistent (antimilitarism, pacifism, culture of restraint) No change in actual policy but can be categorized as newly oriented/Shifted 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Norms consistent as soldiers were deployed with caveats. Change: elimination of draft (professionalize /competence/ capability) First German troop deployment outside European border 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Norms consistent: Anti-intervention norm trumped humanitarian norm/No change Adjustment (learning after Kunduz)

Table 2: Continued

	Kosovo	Iraq 2003	Afghanistan	Libya
(V2) Domestic Influence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Broadly supported after massacres were reported 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strongly opposed • Election influence 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Domestic discontent/opposition • Different understanding of Germany's role in Afghanistan 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Majority strongly opposed German military intervention but felt that Gaddafi must go • Election influence
(V3) National Interests/Economic Interests/cost	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cost of integrating East Germany played a role • Proximity to war, cost of refugee influx 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • "Nein" was viewed as new orientation for national interest based policy • Cost of integrating East/EU integration • Lack of capability • Cost of war 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cost of reconstruction • Cost of war 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Too expensive. No plan for future • Economic interests in the BRIC countries • No interest in foreign policy or to take leadership role in Europe • Refugee cost • Cost of <i>Bundeswehr</i> Reform; troops in Afghanistan; cost of war

Table 2: Continued

	Kosovo	Iraq 2003	Afghanistan	Libya
(V4) Historical Memory/WWI Legacy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Prominent Presence. Historical memory enters discussion /rhetoric (discussion of “never again Auschwitz” “never again war”) Intersection of guilt/responsibility 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Emphasis on peaceful resolution and diplomatic efforts Pacifism/ antimilitarism Culture of restraint 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Change after Kunduz 2010 engagement on ground Discussion of civilian casualties/ norms/values 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Could not guarantee no civilian casualties Emphasis on diplomatic efforts Antimilitarism Culture of restraint Past history/memo ry of no-fly zone resulting in hostile, lengthy interventions
Consent (dominant attitude of political leaders)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> (internally not: Red-Green, CDU-yes) externally eventually strong consent-vote 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Elite consensus, domestic consensus 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Consensus until 2009 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Majority consensus Internal disagreement throughout debates
Rhetoric	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Strong (Fischer) Rhetoric matched action 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Strong (Fischer/ Schröder) 	Von Gutenberg. Use of the word <i>Krieg</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Strong (Merkel, Westerwelle/ Party members) Rhetoric did <i>not</i> match action
Deployment caveat	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> No troop deployment 	N/A	Bundestag limitations, no on ground engagement, different mission	N/A
Int'l Setting/ Institutional Restraints	No UN mandate/NATO setting	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> NO UNSC support/illegal Support from other states (France, Canada, Russia) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ISAF vote 2001 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Split over EU goals Influence of economic crisis Siding with BRIC countries

The evidence selected for this analysis shows that variable 1, Multilateral Alliance Solidarity, was not present in the Libya case as Germany decided to abstain and instead side with China and Russia. References to historical memory and WWII legacy (variable 2) were also observed throughout several speeches, interviews, and statements given by policy makers. Domestic influence (variable 3), although strong throughout Germany in opposing a military intervention in Libya by the *Bundeswehr*, can also be attributed to Germany's culture of restraint and norms-based behavior adopted after the WWII. The potential influence of the local elections on rhetoric and action adopted by Westerwelle and other policy makers may have contributed to the abstention; however, the importance of domestic opinion and influence of elections only further reinforces the argument of the cyclical and continuous influence of historical memory. The ongoing financial crisis, *Bundeswehr* reform, and the continued mission in Afghanistan may also have had minor factors in influencing the decision to abstain, falling into the realm of national and economic interests.

Another variable, specific to German foreign and security policy relating to out of area operations, is the concept of humanitarian-based interventions. While this concept was crucial in the reconstruction and reinterpretation of 'never again war' in the use of force debates during the Kosovo intervention, human rights-based offenses in Libya were considered but not influential enough to warrant a vote for resolution 1973. While Germany officially condemned Gaddafi's human rights violations and publicly called for an end to the suffering of civilians, 'responsibility to protect' and 'humanitarian intervention' arguments did not measure against Germany's culture of restraint, based

on historical memory and norms-based behavior. The concept of 'responsibility', which has been at the forefront of debates throughout Germany's post-WWII years, was once again highlighted in the Libya case. Although Germany has proven to be a responsible actor and reliable partner in the past, the abstention prompted the international community to question and doubt Germany's responsibility as a regional security exporter.

While majority consent was reached by the *Bundestag* for Germany's abstention on the resolution, the internal differences among members of the parliament was no surprise. The debates before, during, and after the vote were marked with controversial opinions and argumentative statements. Despite this internal struggle to reach a consensus, the majority of Germans opposed German troop deployment for an intervention in Libya. Further, the three other cases considered for this analysis were also marked by strong consensus, despite differing outcomes. The rhetoric employed by policy makers for all cases under review is strong and often controversial. While political rhetoric, in Germany, is often strong and influential, these four cases show the importance of rhetoric in cases involving the use of force. Germany's pacifist convictions post-WWII, continuously interfere with contemporary 'calls to action' by the international community, especially in cases involving human rights violations, beginning with Kosovo. Fischer, in 1995 in front of the *Bundestag*, most clearly articulated the German struggle of leveling values and beliefs:

We are in a real conflict between basic values. On the one hand, there is a renunciation of force as a vision of a world in which conflicts are resolved rationally, through resources to laws and majority decisions, through the constitutional process and no longer through brute force; a world in which

military means are rejected, and in which the aim is to create structure to replace them and make them redundant. On the other hand, there is a bloody dilemma that human beings may be able to survive only with the use of military force. Between solidarity for survival and our commitment to non-violence - that is our dilemma.¹

This struggle to, on the one hand construct a foreign policy based on Germany's collective norms and values, yet on the other, Germany's responsibility to act as a security exporter was certainly evident in the Libya case, where supporters of the UNSC resolution urged for Germany's support on the basis of humanitarian intervention. While Germany's population was largely in favor of Kosovo, the data shows that domestic opinion in Germany in regards to potential military operations in Libya were different.

In both the Kosovo and Libya case, an argument can be made of the influence on domestic opinions on the vote and debates due to ongoing and upcoming elections. The rhetoric in all cases involving use of force debates were strong, and filled with references to antimilitarism, historic memory, and past experiences. An argument can therefore be made that Libya is another instance of norm-consistent foreign policy involving military interventions, whereby the norm is informed by several variables. Selective use of historical memory has become instrumental to explain, inform, and justify foreign policy for out of area operations by the *Bundeswehr*. This is evident by the continuous reference to past memory, and continued policy choices which were constructed and shaped immediately after WWII. German cases involving the use of

¹ This quote was translated by Hanns Maull in Maull, "Germany and the Use of Force: Still a 'Civilian Power'?", 63. The original, German speech, can be found at *Archiv der Gegenwart: Deutschland 1949 bis 1999*, December 14, 1995, pp. 49.711-49.722.

force are therefore sequential and no major changes have occurred. This is not to say that all cases are marked by the same continuity. Germany, and especially the red-green coalition, has emphasized a continued commitment to European integration and alliance solidarity, especially toward the U.S. The September 11th attacks therefore also proved to be a 'defining moment' in Germany's political history as, then more than ever, Germany's commitment and responsibility as an alliance partner to the U.S. was crucial. While Germany's break with the U.S. for the invasion of Iraq can be explained and justified merely by the illegitimacy surrounding the case, shying away from responsibility for Afghanistan would have been nearly impossible. Joschka Fischer in his German memoir in 2007 explained that Germany's past continuous foreign policy would now, post-September 11, merely serve as "a difficult to detect guideline in the mist of the new world disorder".² He correctly argued that Germany would have to explore new and dangerous paths in order to meet the challenges of the new security environment through engagement and responsibility. The case of Afghanistan has, is, and continues to stand for Germany's continued commitment to its alliance. While specific deployment caveats were put in place before participating in out of area operations in Afghanistan, Germany's ISAF involvement has been used heavily, even during the aftermath of Libya, to highlight and present Germany's actions as a responsible actor.

Beyond WWII legacy, the Kunduz civilian aftermath only further influenced and propelled Germany's policy of noninterventionism in the Libya case. The intersection of

² Joschka Fischer, *Die Rot-Grünen Jahre. Deutsche Aussenpolitik Vom Kosovo Bis Zum 11. September* (Cologne, Germany: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 2007), 433.

guilt and responsibility, whereby guilt and memory appears to be more influential, translate into Germany's continuous commitment to pacifism by keeping Germany's horrific past strongly engrained in today's consciousness. For example, beyond conceptualizations of the use of force, historic guilt is continuously processed and recognized by Germany.³ This processed guilt is also included in the analysis of some journalist and scholars, whereby some were quickly to point to Germany's shameful past and shameful present behavior in the Libya case. Some scholars make comparisons to the Iraq war, while others focus on the similarities to the Kosovo case. The media and scholarly response for the Libya case was broad and approached through different theoretical frameworks, mainly focusing on the consequences of Germany's abstention for Germany as a civilian and 'normal' power.

Findings

Power, Rhetoric, and Domestic Influence

The case of Libya in 2011 marked the first time that Germany 'voted' differently from its NATO and EU allies within the UN Security Council setting. This fact alone calls for greater analysis on the issues surrounding Germany's behavior in the Libya case. Surely aware of the impact the abstention may have, especially when considering the transatlantic crisis that occurred in 2003, the consensus that was reached in the

³ This is referred to in German as *Vergangenheitsbewältigung* (a way of dealing with the past). This is evident by the numerous museums, monuments, and public events geared towards Germany's confrontation with its Nazi past. It is interesting to note, that Germany is unique in processing this guilt intensively and continuously in comparison to other nations.

Bundestag shows that cases involving the use of force remain highly controversial, complex, and difficult to understand. Germany with its dark political history comes to decisions about combat missions outside its borders and those of Europe by considering its past failures. Germany's risk-averse culture mixed with constructed, norms-based behavior can account for the foreign policy stance taken in the Libya case. While domestic factors certainly influence German political debates, the historical memory argument can be made for Germany's population as well: Germans, politicians and citizens alike, are continuously (perhaps subconsciously) influenced by Germany's WWII legacy and constructed culture of restraint, which shapes the German mindset on military intervention and the use of force. The intersection of responsibility, guilt, and memory is clearly reflected in the Libya case, whereby newer memory was also included in the justification for the abstention. The aftermath and shock of the Kunduz incident in Afghanistan, combined with Germany's aversion to "wars" and military force, place the Libyan case in a sequential line of cases of crises parallel to Germany's evolving foreign and security policy.

The inclusion of historical pasts is evident in the international community's reaction to Germany's abstention. Historical memory shapes the sensitive issue of a somewhat fundamental fear towards that 'special path' Germany appears to have taken once more, but this time not only against its transatlantic partner the U.S., but its closest European ally, France. The intersection of responsibility and guilt is also evident by two opposing concepts in the debates over military interventions: on the one hand, the responsibility to protect and on the other the opposition to the prominence of

forced intervention over diplomatic avenues to resolve international conflict. While the responsibility to protect points to previous cases such as Srebrenica, Rwanda, and Kosovo, forced intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq have not necessarily led to initially desired goals which creates conflicting arguments.

Germany's behavior and adamant opposition to an intervention in Libya falls in line with Germany's understanding of power. While power is theoretically understood in a multitude of ways, Germany has taken severe steps to move from its WWII fixation on power to a reconstructed forgetting and neglecting of power. This constructed understanding of power, based on historical memory and German identity, has become a basis for collective consensus by Germany, while specific aspects of the use and exercise of said power are, at times, still conflicted. This view towards power, and, in this case, intervention by means of military force, became a dominantly accepted outlook of foreign policy since the Iraq invasion of 2002. The deployment caveats of Afghanistan, mixed with the horrific experience in Kunduz, further contributed to the continued policy choices made by Germany, dominated by WWII legacy and strict opposition to military interventions. The Libya case therefore falls directly into an almost linear path of policy choices based on norms-consistent behavior, influenced by domestic attitudes, historical memory, and economic considerations, trumping the framework of multilateral alliance solidarity and humanitarian-based arguments.

Germany's abstention on Resolution 1973 was reached by a majority consensus within the German Parliament. Germany's petition for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council was viewed by some analysts as a return to power politics and

explained theoretically through structural realism. Dr. Rainer Stinner (FDP) explained that aligning with Brazil and India, and Germany's abstention from the vote on Libya, does not lessen Germany's chance of a permanent seat.⁴ This position and conviction of rightful behavior for Germany shows a clear understanding of Germany's use of power, its influence, execution, and consequences. Further, as Westerwelle explained, due to his conviction that the resolution had 'significant dangers and risks', it would not have been 'honest' for Germany to vote for the resolution but then to refuse to commit ground troops. While German policy makers often stress and highlight Germany's responsible behavior worldwide, the official position in the Libya case illustrates Germany's lack of interest in taking up a leadership role in Europe, especially in regards to foreign security policy choices.

National interests-based choices, and the pursuit of possession goals are certainly characteristics of a nation aware of its power. Whether the case of Libya falls into a calculated choice based on national and economic interests, or one that can be described as falling in line with historical pasts, all result in the same conclusion: Germany's understanding of its power is different from its neighbors and allies. While today's security environment requires increased responsibility from Europe, Germany chose a rather luxurious path of self exemption. While not only abstaining from the vote, Germany's inevitable 'siding' with Russia and China, showed that Germany was no longer a 'team player' by positioning its voice directly against its allies. Although Germany's behavior may have been irresponsible and continues to be difficult to

⁴ "Interview with Dr. Rainer Stinner."

understand, Germany can certainly afford to make such decisions and has quickly recovered from the temporary outpour of outrage by the international community.

During Westerwelle's speech after Germany's abstention from the resolution, he explained the failure of surgical strikes to prevent civilian casualties, adding that Germany has learned this through experience: "There is no so called 'surgical intervention'. Each military mission will also result in civilian casualties. We know this from painful experience ...I must therefore ask and remind you, that we learned these lessons from recent history, from recent military missions, and must consider this when we stand before a decision".⁵ This painful experience was most recently felt after the civilian casualties due to the controversial decisions surrounding the Kunduz affair in Afghanistan. The immensity of the political repercussions, mixed with domestic attitudes and international judgments, directly add to Germany's memory of and experience with use of force missions. Kunduz only further contributed to the German discourse and understanding of out of area operations and constructed a sequential attitude of antimilitarism and lack of support for military interventions (and "war") based on old and new memories.

The Libya case also highlights an unfortunate clash between rhetoric and action by Germany. Germany's rhetorical commitment as a responsible global partner did not translate into actual policy to act in such a role. Westerwelle's continued mentioning of the importance to end the Gaddafi regime certainly clashed with the lack of solutions

⁵ "Regierungserklärung Bundesminister Westerwelle Vor Dem Deutschen Bundestag Zur Aktuellen Entwicklung in Libyen - Plenarprotokoll 17/97," (translated).

offered by Germany, short of increased sanctions and refusal to participate in legitimized, multilateral approaches. Westerwelle's active support of the Arab Spring uprising further complicates the ability to understand and comprehend his and the German position. The internal differences among parliamentary politicians, ranging from calling the decision a 'disgrace' to supportive explanations of coherency in German policies, were also evident in the numerous interviews given to national and international newspapers and magazines.⁶ Journalists also pointed to Westerwelle's comparison to the invasion in Iraq of 2003, arguing that such a comparison is a "sham" as the 2003 invasion was based on ideological beliefs and fabricated evidence without a UNSC resolution.⁷ The rhetoric surrounding the abstention was complex and controversial and marked by references to the terms 'war', most prominently mentioned by the Leftist party, but also by German journalists for newspaper headlines hinting at a Germany's potential involvement in another war.

Also interesting to note is the odd position held by the German public. According to an opinion poll by *Bild Zeitung* in 2011, while the majority supported a forceful military intervention against Gaddafi, 71 percent opposed the contribution of German troops to such an intervention.⁸ These somewhat competing opinions highlight the continuous and evident struggle by Germans to show responsible behavior when military interventions are necessary. While Germans were seemingly convinced that

⁶ "A 'Catastrophic Signal' to the Arab World: Berlin Divided over Security Council Abstention," accessed November 13, 2013, <http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/a-catastrophic-signal-to-the-arab-world-berlin-divided-over-security-council-abstention-a-752259.html>.

⁷ Lau, "Macht Mal - Ohne Uns!."

⁸ "Krieg Gegen Libyen: Über 60 Prozent Der Deutschen Befürworten Den Angriff."

Gaddafi must go, and appalled by the human rights abuses occurring in Libya, the opinion polls, and arguably the official abstention, show that Germans do not want to take, quite literally, matters into their own hands. The old concept of 'never again', which was momentarily reinterpreted by Joschka Fischer during the Kosovo crisis, certainly remains strong in the German psyche. WWII legacy, historical memory, and interpretations of the past, has led to a continued and active view of antimilitarism and opposition to the use of force in German foreign and security policy, despite cases that call for humanitarian intervention. The German public's opinion further highlights Germany's understanding of power, in a narrative on non-military capabilities, yet is marked by an obvious discomfort in the areas of military operations, the use of force, and war. Unlike in the United Kingdom or France, the German public has a long history of opposing German deployment of forces even for peacekeeping missions, and the loss of lives during such missions are extremely sensitive.⁹ While polling trends before the mission in Afghanistan showed that two thirds of all Germans desired a foreign policy closely resembling Switzerland's neutrality, the current state of domestic opinions varies.¹⁰ In 2013, an extensive report on transatlantic trends conducted by the German Marschall Fund of the U.S. found the majority of Germans polled were against any military involvement internationally. Specifically, 75 percent of Germans were adamant

⁹ Reimund Seidelmann, "Germany's Security Policy," in *The New Germany. History, Economy, Policies*, ed. Reimund Seidelmann (Baden-Baden, Germany: Nomos, 2011).

¹⁰ Paul Hockenos, *Joschka Fischer and the Making of the Berlin Republic* (New York, New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 294.

about Germany not getting involved in a military intervention in Syria, with 61 percent condemning the use of drones to kill enemies.¹¹

Germany's domestic attitude towards armed conflict and the *Bundeswehr's* participation in out of area operations involving the use of force continuously influences policy makers. While Chancellor Merkel and the *Bundestag* collectively supported the mission in Afghanistan, it is important to mention that the chancellor's first visit to Afghanistan did not occur until 2009. Further, at this point in the mission, although there is little domestic support, withdrawal from Afghanistan would result in an international backlash and attack Germany's credibility, especially in light of the Kunduz aftermath. Germany's questionable behavior during the Libyan crisis officially, internally, and through statements made by Chancellor Merkel, show an almost comprehensive response geared toward satisfying all requests and demands placed upon Germany. Namely, the German public opposed the mission in Libya while the international community looked to Germany to participate. While Merkel opposed the use of German aircrafts during the Libyan conflict, she favored German soldiers in Libya under the framework of humanitarian relief.¹² On the other hand, Frank-Walter Steinmeier (SPD) argued that Germany made a mistake in focusing on elections, hoping that the allies somehow end up on Germany's side, instead of actively working to prevent the decision of the security council.¹³ The debates and voting for the security

¹¹ "Transatlantic Trends," (German Marschall Fund of the United States, 2013), 19, accessed January 5, 2014, <http://trends.gmfus.org/files/13/09/TTrends-13-Key-Findings-Report.pdf>.

¹² Kurbjuweit, "A Germany of 82 Million Chancellors: Why Angela Merke's Failures Continue to Multiply."

¹³ Frankfurter Allgemeinen Sonntagszeitung March 27, 2011

council resolution 1973 was immediately preceding local elections (March 27, 2011), and since over 61 percent of Germans opposed the decision to militarily intervene in Libya, politicians may have been influenced by these domestic factors.¹⁴

The various commentary and debates in both Germany and in the international media in regards to Germany's abstention also highlighted the differences of EU goals both within Germany's leadership and in coalition with Germany's allies. Alexander Graf Lambsdorff, an FDP member of the European Parliament, argued that Germany's behavior and vote weakened the EU.¹⁵ The Libya case also highlights Germany's disinterest in certain areas of foreign policy or to take on leadership roles in the EU and globally. The observed disagreements among members of the EU, especially in regards to the Arab Spring movements, were highlighted once more in the aftermath of Germany's abstention. While France dominated the Mediterranean policies, evident by the creation of the Union for the Mediterranean in 2008 and headed by then President Sarkozy, who argued that Germany and other non-Mediterranean states should not be able to fully participate in issues concerning Mediterranean states, Germany's foreign policy did not focus on Tunisia and Egypt during the Arab Spring.¹⁶ The fact that the agendas of the Union for the Mediterranean and the European Neighbourhood Policy are similar in nature, may also account for Germany's lack of concern for the region. Germany's defensive behavior showed in the aftermath of the abstention. Several politicians, including Westerwelle and Merkel, continued to detail Germany's role as a

¹⁴ The CDU was defeated in an all time low and lost its support in Baden-Württemberg to the Green Party.

¹⁵ "A 'Catastrophic Signal' to the Arab World: Berlin Divided over Security Council Abstention."

¹⁶ "Interview with Dr. Rainer Stinner."

responsible, predictable partner to its allies by commenting on Germany's increased role in the mission in Afghanistan.

It is interesting to note that even German security scholars make historical references to Germany's shameful past in order to underline and strengthen their argument. For example, esteemed scholar Harald Müller, in a German article published in 2011, heavily criticized Germany's abstention and decision, especially the position held by members of the *Bundestag* who belong to the Left party (*Die Linken*). In response to the "no war" shouting by the party, Müller argues that not only was a civil war going on in Libya at the time of the debates, but this behavior of "silently observing the war yet morally condemning the rescuer" is reminiscent of a time "when Germans turned their heads left while the Gestapo¹⁷ picked up their neighbors on the right".¹⁸ While the comparison sounds and looks intriguing, a direct link or parallel is hardly established, and the two instances are entirely different, historically and factually. Arguments and references to Germany's historical past certainly underline strong statements, provide controversial shock appeal, and are easily 'remembered' when Germany does not behave 'according to the norm', or in this case, according to its allies. References to Germany's horrendous past behavior have been brought forth in light of the Libya case as well as during the economic bailouts for Greece by scholars, journalists, and politicians. The British press participated in "German-bashing" while

¹⁷ *Geheime Staatspolizei*-The Secret police of Nazi Germany and German occupied Europe, administered by selected officers of the SS (*Schutzstaffel*-the German defense paramilitary organization under Adolf Hitler)

¹⁸ Müller, "Ein Desaster. Deutschland Und Der Fall Libyen."

French journalists continued to ask whether Germany really shares the same community values.¹⁹

Germany's national and strategic interests must also be included for a comprehensive analysis on the Libya case. While milieu and temporary goals may have been important to the decision making progress, Germany's economic interests in China and India, and ongoing relationship with Russia, may have also contributed to Germany's abstention. This variable, or argument, would theoretically fall into a realist prediction or explanation as this may show Germany's pursuit of possession goals, acting based on national interests rather than community based values. In the past, realists have argued that Germany's petition for a permanent seat in the UNSC can be seen as the pursuit of possession goals. Ironically, Germany's abstention and behavior in the Libya case may have serious consequences both in terms of Germany's fight for a permanent seat as well as for the relationship with the U.S. The case of Libya highlighted Germany's insecure view towards its role in the international community. While being a powerful nation by most definitions, Germany's behavior once more highlighted how uncomfortable Germans truly are in projecting and exerting power. While this notion stems from yesteryear's 'German question', which should be resolved through Germany's responsible behavior since WWII, the most recent puzzling observations in German foreign policy, termed "deviations" and "inconsistencies", may also be attributed to a potential disinterest by Germany to be a foreign policy leader. Either way, the case of Libya, along with the ongoing European economic crisis and exchanges

¹⁹ Ibid.

with Greece, on top of Germany's rethinking of nuclear power, severely contributes to a loss in predictability and credibility. While analysts and scholars criticize Germany's problematic relationship to the concept of power, the fact that Germany perhaps calculatedly decides not to take on a leadership role is left out of the discussion. Based on Germany's foreign and security policy choices in the past, which were still part of shaping and constructing a normative framework based on historical memory, today's foreign policy choices are also influenced by national interests.

The Use of Force Debates: A Sequential Case

Taking into consideration security arrangements, such as collective defense organizations (i.e. NATO), states form coalitions in order to balance against threats collectively. The definitions of threats hereby vary greatly and although multilateral action with deployed NATO troops occurred before Kosovo, the intervention in Kosovo marked the first time that this collective defense organization used force in order to intervene in a sovereign country's internal affairs. The intervention itself sparked discussion in the field of international relations surrounding the question of legitimacy, international law, and security norms. A liberalist explanation of the intervention of Kosovo emphasizes the concept of cooperation by way of military coalition in order to preserve and enforce peace and order while emphasizing the importance of international law and norms. NATO members agreed, in part, to commit and respond collectively to threats to the system in place, and while Kosovo did not have full support, the idea of responsibility to the system was evident through support by several

member-states. Unfortunately 'the hour of Europe' did not translate as such, and Kosovo proved that the EU could not address the problem without the support of the U.S. This was much later recalled by Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, in his memoirs, when he wrote that Europe learned it could not solve conflicts on this scale alone.

The case of Kosovo certainly brought forth a new form of interventionism, sometimes referred to as liberal interventionism as articulated publicly by Tony Blair. Here, the main justification for this collective intervention was based on humanitarian reasons and the ethnic cleansing carried out by Milosevic. In terms of collective security, Kosovo also showed that two powers, Russia and China, disagreed with the justification that the war was necessary in order to enforce peace and human rights. Kosovo also showed that state-practiced military action, though multilaterally executed, can be presented as supporting community interest and security, to include human rights. After the international community's failure to respond and protect in the gross atrocities and genocide in Rwanda, an intervention in Kosovo was crucial and necessary. Both in theory and practice, the intervention and the use of force was justified collectively through coalitions of security arrangements, under the concept of "collective will". The aftermath of Kosovo for collective security shows that the intervention was largely dominated by western actors, with China and Russia opposing intervention. NATO's use of force has been viewed as a landmark decision to intervene in humanitarian issues, although other arguments have been made that outlined NATO's decisions based upon enforcing international security in the Balkans region.

The heavy influence of public opinion, combined with the traditional 'culture of restraint' employed by German policy makers, clearly shows that in the case of Afghanistan, Germany did not actively pursue policy input, instead *acting* only upon requests by its allies. Further, in order to separate from the combat heavy, terrorist seeking missions of the U.S. under OEF, Germany focused on the reconstruction efforts within ISAF. This alignment of, and behavior of policy choice and focus, shows Germany's understanding of their use of power and security. Emphasizing the importance of contributing to the development mission in Afghanistan and explaining Germany's troop contribution as such to the German public shows how domestic opinion drives and influences German foreign and security policy. The rhetoric and statements employed by policy makers, the focus on humanitarian efforts and reconstruction, and the continued focus prominence of the rejection of direct use of force, highlights Germany's interests and approaches, in line with soft power theoretical explanations. The aftermath of the Kunduz affair is still relevant to contemporary German political discussions and continues to inform and influence the use of force debate.

The extensive study in *Der Spiegel (Ein deutsches Verbrechen)*, combined with a movie and several television segments and talk shows surrounding the air strike that resulted in over one hundred civilian casualties in Afghanistan, contributes to the construction of new memories and experiences which are used to make foreign policy decisions. The bombing of Kunduz remains the "bloodiest German military operation since WWII", and the controversial political repercussions which still dominate the

media are certain to contribute to the dialogue of *Bundeswehr* deployment indefinitely.²⁰ After German federal attorneys did not charge Colonel Klein in 2009 with the murder of civilians, the district court in the city of Bonn in December 2013 rejected a lawsuit brought forth by the victims of the attack. The attorneys of the victims sued the Federal Republic of Germany for 90,000 euro in compensation per victim of the attack.²¹ Thus far, Germany has paid over half million Euros in reparations due to the Kunduz attack. While the excusal of Colonel Klein's call was met with different reactions nationally and internationally, it is important to note that the reason given was due to the rules of engagement which "allowed an attack in this case".²² This ruling directly contributes to the use of force dialogue in furthering the German understanding of out of area operations, armed conflict, and the legality of military action. The ruling and the dismissal for additional compensation to the victims of the Kunduz affair, combined with the ongoing debates in Germany surrounding the attack, emphasizes the important repercussions and effect of the event on German foreign and security policy.

Germany's behavior and shift from its allies' position seemed all too familiar, and comparisons between the Iraq invasion in 2002-2003 and the Libya vote were inevitable. The striking and important difference though is the legitimacy and multilateral support of the latter. While rhetorically, and in print, referring to the 'Nein' of Iraq during the headlines of the Libya case, journalists attempted to find parallels of the two in order to strengthen the position that Germany, yet again, has abandoned its

²⁰ Von Demmer et al., "Ein Deutsches Verbrechen."

²¹ "Prozess in Bonn: Gericht Weist Klage Von Kunduz-Opfern Ab," *SpiegelOnline*, December 11, 2013.

²² Ibid.

allies under the pretense of enduring pacifism. While the internal and external debates surrounding the use of force in both cases may have similar aspects, the factual data and variables involved in the decision making process is quite different. This differentiation and prerequisite of influential variables in the Libya case precisely confuses scholars who struggle with explaining Germany's behavior both theoretically and practically. The Iraq case showed Germany's commitment to its role concept as a civilian power most distinctively, by voting "No" on the basis of multilateral approaches and legitimacy and using soft power approaches to influence international relations and foreign policy diplomatically.

Discussion

Historical memory is deeply imbedded in German culture and identity, thus difficult to change or adjust and rhetoric and political behavior is therefore ritualized and perpetuated in German foreign and security policy. How then exactly can the changes be explained? The change and continuity debate has been ongoing for decades; the recent developments of Libya and Germany's Iran policy has resulted in German security scholars calling Germany's policy "inconsistent", pointing to drastic changes. While these recent developments appear to be inconsistent on the surface, this study argues that there is no new status quo. Perhaps Germany hovers between old and new ideas depending on the issue area; sometimes acting "more realist", but always considering the importance of the past. Germany's decision to abstain from the vote can be explained under the umbrella of memory comprised of WWII legacy and recent

memory surrounding military operations. The uncertainty of how an established no-fly zone would affect and influence the Libyan crisis was monumental in the German decision. Historically, the same scenario has resulted in military interventions using force and ground troops. Germany simply did not feel comfortable with this potential scenario which could easily result in more civilian casualties, prolonged commitment to reconstruction efforts, and bloodshed of German soldiers involved in Libya's civil war. German domestic opposition to the ongoing war in Afghanistan, and the horrendous aftermath of the Kunduz affair, further contributed to the government's resistance to actively engage in a potential out of area military mission in Libya. The ruling coalition therefore had a motivation to abstain (or oppose) as an affirmative vote may have resulted in an electoral defeat.

While UNSC resolution 1973 was created as a measure to protect civilians in Libya, the actual formulation extends beyond the no-fly zone to several military measures allowed under Article 4. This precise formulation, despite the fact that the operation was not rhetorically referred to as 'war', significantly contributed to Germany's decision. The inclusion of possible militarily and forceful interventions translated into a fear by German politicians of aerial bombing missions with potential collateral damage.²³ Rainer Stinner (FDP), in defending Germany's position and behavior, argued that the use of force in the Libya mission would mean a forceful intervention of a civil war, and while Germany collectively agrees that Gaddafi must go, not "everyone who fights against Gaddafi on the streets" can be seen as protector of

²³ "Interview with Dr. Rainer Stinner."

democracy and human rights.²⁴ Addressing the criticism that Germany, through Westerwelle, rhetorically supported the freedom movements observed in the Arab world, including in Libya, yet refused to vote on contribution of troops to the area, Stinner argues that Germany never promised to intervene in a civil war. The Libyan case showed that not only WWII legacy influences decision making for out of area operations, but also more recent memory and experience. The drawn out war in Afghanistan (and Iraq), with diverging missions of humanitarian efforts and reconstruction and development, paved the way for arguments against military intervention mission in Libya. German policy makers feared that the lack of plans for Libya's future would result in costly and lengthy missions similar to those in Afghanistan.²⁵

The question of where German foreign policy is headed in light of the Libya case arises when taking into consideration the other two important pillars of German foreign policy: Germany's economic position against bailouts, and the rethinking of nuclear power. While leaving the Euro or the EU is unthinkable, Germany's abstention from the vote calls into question Germany's responsibility and predictability as a security exporter and reliable partner for the transatlantic security relationship. Considering the evidence in the Libya case, and examining the statements, justification, and factual data, history is too compelling for Germany to have a new status quo on its foreign and security policy. Motives of self-interest are evident, which complicates previously held views of

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ The German minister for economic cooperation argued that the coalition of the willing does not have a concept of the future for Libya.

Germany as a civilian power. The willingness to use force unilaterally, without international legitimization, as arguably observed during the Kosovo case, was an isolated decision which followed a number of mismanaged inactions leading up to Germany's use of force. While important concepts in Germany's strategic culture were critically reinterpreted rhetorically during that time, the more recent cases, and especially the case of Libya, shows a reversal and emphasis on previously held norms. The reinforcing of the role of historic memory-norm culture in the rhetorical analysis shows a continuity of previously held policy norms. Germany's behavior in the Libya case is certainly less multilaterally oriented than previous instances involving the use of force; however, this does not constitute a role change. The Libya case simply highlighted which norms are most influential for German foreign policy in this given policy area. Germany's willingness to act (*Gestaltungswille*), in the policy area surrounding out of area operations was most evident during the Kosovo case.

Despite the shift observed in the abstention, most evident with Germany's siding along the BRIC countries, the Libya case is not an instance of change in German foreign policy. Rather, it shows continued and sequential action, marked by few adjustments and learning processes. Namely, Germany's reaction to its external environment can account for slight shifts in policy orientations. The importance of domestic issues over foreign policy issues is also evident when analyzing instances of use of force debates. In several cases, and arguably in most foreign policy issue areas, domestic opinion plays a vital role in influencing and shaping policy makers. This analysis of causal elements of historical memory on German foreign policy behavior highlights the influential

importance of Germany's WWII legacy on contemporary domestic politics, international structures, and institutions, by informing choices, positions, and rhetoric in instances where the use of force is debated politically. The media analysis shows an overall struggle and difficulty to adequately explain and understand Germany's behavior.

A common framework in which Germany's abstention can be discussed and debated theoretically does not exist. This confusion and complexity led to the argument that German foreign policy is, at worst, undergoing an "identity crisis" and marked by "inconsistency", and at best, has simply "changed". While Germany can certainly afford to act based on national interests, the Libya case may simply highlight Germany's disinterest to take a leadership role in regional and global security policies. This disinterest or assumption that Germany can somehow escape its responsibilities can further be attributed to the changing international security environment. While Germany eagerly focused on showing responsibility and predictability during and immediately after the Cold War, today's environment does not forcefully 'ask' of Germany to act. This case was certainly not marked by shockingly different and changing positions, but simply highlighted the enduring importance of historical memory on contemporary policy. The only true change observed in Germany's security policy in recent years is the change in conscription, which can be categorized and explained as assimilation to the policies of other EU members.

Consensus was reached not to intervene militarily in another state's internal conflict. In the past, Germany decided exactly that, and Kosovo was seen as a new orientation of German foreign and security policy. Kosovo led to the scholarly debate of

'Germany as a normal actor', in which Germany's power and responsibility to act was highlighted and analyzed. In the case of Kosovo, the variable of committing to partners and the international community may have been crucial, but Germany's allowing of the use of force in the Kosovo case remains an anomaly. To show responsibility, in the Kosovo case, was the determining factor, whereby historical memory informed this decision by reinterpreting the concept of 'never again' in terms to *never again* allow genocide. The similarities between the Kosovo case, on the grounds of humanitarian intervention, and Libya, has led to a multitude of discussions, drawing comparisons and concluding that Germany's abstention for Libya is not only unforgivable but also unexplainable. The findings above show that historical memory significantly influenced the Libya decision, whereby the concept of 'never again' was interpreted in its traditional meaning; to not commit German troops to military interventions. The other determining factor, the influence of Germany's domestic opinion, has been constructed, shaped, and formed through the prominence of Germany's WWII legacy in the contemporary German mindset. The norms and beliefs that dominated in Kosovo and Libya are therefore not conflicting, but were ranked differently, in order of importance for each case at the time. Further, Kosovo was viewed as part of Europe, therefore allowing a NATO operation, while the remaining cases under review are outside of the borders of Europe.²⁶ Another plausible explanation for the variation between Kosovo

²⁶ While Afghanistan is also outside of European borders, Germany's troop deployment to the area was marked by specific and strict deployment caveats.

and Libya is that Germany may simply treat foreign policy issues on a case by case basis, whereby the Libya case occurred during a time of *Bundeswehr* reform.

While there are obvious deviations from the rhetoric used in each case under review, the strongest articulation of Germany's choices, position, and behavior can be found in the Kosovo and Iraq cases. Also stemming from historical memory, the rhetoric employed by Joschka Fischer during Kosovo was detrimental in justifying and explaining the obvious shift in German foreign policy. Here, Germany's strong rhetoric of commitment, responsibility, and predictability matched Germany's action and policies. Similarly, Chancellor Schröder's and Joschka Fischer's strong rhetoric against an invasion of Iraq matched Germany's policy choices. While the rhetoric in all cases was relatively strong, Germany's rhetorical commitment to alliance solidarity in the Libya case was not matched with actual support. The National/Economic Interests variable, especially in the Libya case, highlighted Germany's cost analysis during a time of *Bundeswehr* reform, when Germany's military professionalized. True to checkbook diplomacy of the past, German policy makers highlighted the 5,000 Syrian refugees taken in by Germany, more than any other country in the EU, and over 12,000 more political asylum seekers from Syria and Libya.

The shift in policy through Kosovo, represented a reinterpretation of Germany's use of power, understanding of power, and role in the international community. Scholars, while debating Germany's status as a 'civilian power' argued that Germany's norms, traditionally defined Germany's interests. Despite this shift, some scholars, shortly after Kosovo, predicted Germany's continuity and adherence to post-WWII

norms and values: "Germany will continue to be guided by its old principles, and it will continue to try to reconcile them as much as possible with the new exigencies of radically different security environment. Policies on the use of force will continue to be cautious and restrained..."²⁷ This struggle to reconcile old principles with new demands has continued to be problematic in contemporary German foreign policy debates, and points to Germany's unique position and need to fully analyze, discuss, and act upon today's security environment. Cases involving out of area operations and the use of force also highlight how Germany views its responsibility to its alliance partners. While showing solidarity and commitment is an important pillar of Germany's post-war identity, the Iraq case highlights in which areas Germany is willing to oppose its (major) allies. While peaceful disarmament procedures and the overall fighting of terrorism are reconcilable with German interests, the national interest terms under which the U.S. policy makers framed their arguments for the invasion of Iraq, proved to be problematic and conflicting with Germany's commitment to ideationally based policy choices.

Scholarly Findings and Opinion

Germany's use and understanding of power is an important aspect of an overall analysis to German foreign and security policy. The cases selected to highlight one policy area, the use of force debates in German politics, account for a variation in results, behavior, and environment. The Kosovo case, during a Red-Green coalition, dramatically changed how out of area operations were viewed, discussed, and subsequently

²⁷ Maull, "Germany and the Use of Force: Still a 'Civilian Power'?", 77.

analyzed, providing an example of restructure, reinterpretation, and increased responsibility. The Iraq case emphasized Germany's commitment to legitimized, sanctioned approaches backed by the UN, while Afghanistan solidified Germany's assurance to multilateral approaches. Libya initially throws off the trajectory of Germany's foreign policy evolution, but after closer examination, several variables and calculations can account for Germany's behavior. Security scholars have debated the puzzle of Germany's changing, yet stagnant, foreign policy over the past two decades, beginning with the Kosovo case. Since then, two argumentative themes of analyses have emerged: explanations focused on domestic influence and policy driven by electoral concerns, or behavior bound and dictated by Germany's continued 'culture of restraint'.

According to German security scholars, Germany's policy choices during the Iraq case showed an increased "self-centeredness", not adequately explained by the two themes.²⁸ According to Harnisch, Germany's policies during the out of area operations debates for Iraq reflect that of a status quo power; a reaction to a drastic change in the international security environment, but not dramatically different to the Kosovo and Afghanistan cases, during which the Schröder government took steps to direct domestic consensus in order to fulfill international expectations of Germany to include responsibility and alliance solidarity.²⁹ Iraq here differed in that the coalition government at the time was unable to combine the influence of domestic opinion and alliance expectations, while Germany's other military commitments abroad contributed

²⁸ Sebastian Harnisch, "German Non-Proliferation Policy and the Iraq Conflict," *German Politics* 13, no. 1 (2004): 23.

²⁹ "German Non-Proliferation Policy and the Iraq Conflict," *German Politics* 13, no. 1 (2004): 24.

to the “No” vote as did the lack of consensus among EU members in the case. Iraq, according to some authors, should therefore be seen as a case that reflects Germany’s struggle to bridge its external and internal pressures, not one that presented and unprecedented vote. Similarly, scholars argue for nearly twenty years that Germany’s foreign policy choices involving the use of force have, and will continue to be, influenced by a mixture of both Germany’s political tradition, the culture of restraint, and budget constraints.³⁰

On the other hand, Germany’s abstention from Libya appears to throw off analytical examination of Germany’s foreign policy trajectory. Representing a ‘puzzling’ phenomena, Germany’s abstention was certainly not presented, viewed, and treated as just an abstention; Germany’s behavior, while initially questionable and shocking, *can* be explained. Germany *did not* decide to block UNSC Resolution 1973, but instead chose to abstain, based on strategic and political incentives.³¹ Initial scholarly reaction from Germany detailed the path to the establishment of the no-fly zone by emphasizing the initial opposition by the U.S.; especially by defense minister Robert Gates. While the reactions from Berlin focused on the lack of solidarity and resulting international isolation rather than Germany’s refusal to militarily participate in “protecting Libyan civilians”, this case certainly highlighted Germany’s need to fully debate and rethink its foreign policy choices involving the use of force.³² The startling facts surrounding an

³⁰ Carl Hodge, "Germany and the Limits of Soft Security," *European Security* 7, no. 3 (1998).

³¹ Patrick Keller, "Germany in Nato: The Status Quo Ally," *Survival* 54, no. 3 (2012): 106.

³² Svenja Sinjen, "Der Preis Der Freiheit. Fall Libyen: Was Wir Neu Denken Müssen," *Internationale Politik* 3(2011): 82. Own translation.

intervention in Libya, which, on the surface, appear to present the ideal case to warrant German *Bundeswehr* participation: sanctioned by the UNSC, international and regional support, alliance solidarity and multilateral approaches, and most importantly, human rights abuses, were simply not enough to convince the majority that the possibility of civilian casualties and consequences of a military intervention in Libya outweigh the benefit of the "chance of a democratic process".³³ While the choice not to participate in Operation Unified Protector resulted in isolation from Germany's closest allies, overall only fifteen NATO states supported UNSC Resolution 1973.³⁴ While disagreeing on the variety of reasons behind Germany's abstention, most scholars agree that the decision reflects Germany's lack of "strategic orientation" and lack of interests in foreign policy, calling for a critical need to "rethink, discuss, and revive" Germany's foreign policy role concept.³⁵

Scholarly examination on contemporary German foreign and security policy usually focuses on strategic security, political behavior, and policy action in light of the changing security environment. Theoretical focus here emphasizes the use of power, specifically Germany's use of institutional power to shape and influence its external environment. In the field of international relations, analyses pointing to constructivist notions of collective memory, cultural identity, and norms-based behavior in German foreign policy are grouped in an outlier of sorts, with publications appearing in

³³ August Pradetto, "Der Andere Preis Der Freiheit," *ibid.* 4: 59. Own translation.

³⁴ Keller, "Germany in Nato: The Status Quo Ally," 106.

³⁵ Hanns Maull, "Deutsche Aussenpolitik: Orientierungslos," *Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft* 21, no. 1 (2011): 117. own translation.

Germany-specific journals, or weaved amongst themes of historic and identity studies. While the aforementioned research is important, WWII history undoubtedly affects German foreign policy approaches, especially areas involving the use of force. As such, inquiries into history should yield results and arguments detailing *how* and *when* history informs German foreign policy, not *that* it does. Reviewing Germany's behavior over the four selected cases, Kosovo directly conflicted with Germany's traditional role concept, while Iraq sparked debates of a renewed 'German Question' and Germany's *Sonderweg*. Some German scholars have therefore argued that collective memory of WWII has changed into two strands used to explain and justify Germany's behavior: on the one hand providing a reason for restraint (Iraq and Libya) and on the other hand a justification for Germany's increased role as a responsible partner (Kosovo and Afghanistan).³⁶ Policy makers have used WWII references in a non-linear way since Kosovo, depending on the context, to justify, instrumentalize, and "as a convenient tool to lend argumentative force to a variety of positions".³⁷ Furthermore, Germany's commitment to diplomatic approaches will continue to dominate Germany's behavior in cases involving the use of force. Germany's allies need to understand that military action will remain a last resort, "by choice, not by default".³⁸

Power, and Germany's rejection of national power, is detailed in scholarly analyses interpreting how security and threat is perceived by Germany. Germany's

³⁶ Ruth Wittlinger and Martin Larose, "No Future for Germany's Past? Collective Memory and German Foreign Policy," *German Politics* 16, no. 4 (2007).

³⁷ "No Future for Germany's Past? Collective Memory and German Foreign Policy," *German Politics* 16, no. 4 (2007): 492.

³⁸ Regina Karp, "The New German Foreign Policy Consensus," *The Washington Quarterly* 29, no. 1 (2005): 79.

security interests have been pursued within an institutional framework in order to shape and direct EU security identity while remaining 'true' to the culture of restraint in terms of the projection of power.³⁹ From Germany's 'policy of responsibility', 'tamed power', and 'Germany as a civilian power', scholars have focused on how Germany's use and understanding of power has changed and transformed over the past four decades. Others focus on 'the German way' and the 'German question', detailing the consequences of how the 'NO' during Iraq has shaped, influenced, and prevented Germany's exercise of power; however, the observed 'changes' in Germany's foreign policy in regards to out of area operations point to sequential cases within Germany's traditional foreign policy pattern. According to some authors, controversial and much discussed cases such as Iraq may simply be at odds with one or more core concepts of German foreign policy: multilateral frameworks, civilized international order, and no use of force.⁴⁰

Summary

The operationalization of this case study included explanatory variables to account for variance among the selected cases, with a focus on Libya. This study examined the deviation from rhetoric and policy and found that rhetoric, for the most part, remained continuous across time while policies changed gradually but remained sequential. The variable of historical memory can account for matching and continuous

³⁹ Hampton, "Living in a World of Dangers and Strangers," 86.

⁴⁰ Peter Rudolf, "The Myth of the 'German Way': German Foreign Policy and Transatlantic Relations," *Survival* 47, no. 1 (2005): 145.

rhetoric and policy, while domestic opinion and alliance solidarity further influenced foreign policy choices involving out of area operations. The variables selected further highlight the importance of rhetoric in German foreign and security policy by providing a comprehensive framework to analyze, understand, and predict Germany's behavior. Kosovo, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya are not cases of temporary impacts; they are consistent within a pattern of German foreign and security policy and clearly show Germany's understanding and use of power (soft power, through institutions) which, at times, is heavily influence by historical memory and guided by norms-based approaches. This is especially accurate in instances of the use of military force. Instead, Germany has continuously advocated out of area operations guided by legitimacy, cooperation, and multilateralism; however, policy is also influenced and shaped by aspects of national interests as may be the case for Iran. In analyzing how or whether Germany's foreign policy is changing and examining this process of change from the old status quo to a potentially new one, the possibility that Germany's behavior is a mere reaction to its external environment must be considered. The current economic problems observed in Europe, and elsewhere in the world, directly strengthen Germany's relationship with Russia and China, thus also influencing Germany's security-related policy in issue areas involving both countries. Germany's strong economic ties to Libya in the past (as well as Iran) may account for what has been called Germany's "inconsistent" foreign policy behavior. As Duffield notes, German foreign policy behavior greatly depends on the international environment and the German response to it.⁴¹ Progress and change in

⁴¹ John S. Duffield, *World Power Forsaken : Political Culture, International Institutions, and German*

German foreign and security policy has, is, and will continue to be tied to past experience and emphasize the enduring power of historical memory.

Beyond the intricate details that influenced Germany's abstention, and beyond justification and explanation, this case highlights the lack of agreement among the EU's regional powers, especially in the realm of foreign and security policy. This shifting and disagreement of major political issues, including economic measures pertaining to the EU financial crisis, demonstrate Germany's focus on domestic and national goals. While this may be viewed as a change in Germany's foreign policy approach, it is neither sudden nor drastic and can be explained and understood through several variables. Historical memory, domestic factors, and national interests have always contributed to Germany's foreign and security policies. The Libya case, as a sequential case of use of force debates, simply categorized some variables over others, while demonstrating Germany's strategic reaction to the international environment. Undoubtedly, norms continue to guide and direct German foreign policy. This case study showed which norms and interests dominated the use of force debate and are ranked higher by policy makers in decisions that call for German troop deployment. Historical memory enters use of force discussions before, during, and after major policy decisions, and influences, confirms, and informs the status quo. Further, an action from Germany in regards to military interventions and the use of force, will continue to be present in political debates, requiring time, analysis, and fully cooperated diplomatic discussions with

Germany's allies. It is unlikely that Germany will drastically change its view toward use of force cases, especially when pressured to act quickly. Germany's historic past is simply too relevant not to shape the future of German foreign policy. Future constraints on Germany's ability to project and exercise power are on the horizon as the international security environment continues to change.

CASE II: NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION, SANCTIONS, AND DIPLOMACY: THE CASE OF IRAN

The question that directed the analysis of this case study was also guided by the hypotheses that German foreign policy either is or is not determined by historical memory. Applying the same variables to examine Germany's behavior during the negotiations towards Iran's nuclear program will not only highlight a different area of Germany's foreign policy but also detail and account for variance in rhetoric and action. While the case of Iran presents a single observation, the period of negotiations spanned over several years accounting for a variance of relationships, alliances, and an ever-changing security environment. Germany's rhetorical commitment to its allies condemning a nuclear armed Iran was not met with policy action. Specifically, Germany refused and opposed stronger sanctions, siding with Russia and China. Which variables can explain Germany's foreign policy behavior in this case and account for the obvious conflict of rhetoric and action?

After the EU3+3 negotiations and the UN resolution in 2008, the election of President Obama initially lessened the focus on sanctions and opened the doors for new diplomatic efforts by Germany. In 2009, Gerhard Schröder visited Tehran and renewed

German-Iranian relations, especially in the economic realm.⁴² By June of 2009, Basell Polyolefine, a German firm, signed a €825 million contract, supported by Schröder who believed in “seizing and not missing” business opportunities with Iran.⁴³ While the numbers appear high and Germany certainly has economic interests in Iran, arguing that Germany’s refusal for stronger sanctions is only based on the German-Iranian business relationship would be an overstatement. The highest German exports to Iran were in 2005 and 2010 and have since been steadily declining. Energy security and Germany’s gas relationship with Iran and Russia also influences Germany’s behavior, which would fall into the variable of national/economic interests.

It is also important to review Germany’s stance towards nuclear weapons in general. While Germany is legally forbidden to acquire nuclear weapons, Germany has a long history of using nuclear energy. Beyond this, several tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) are positioned in Germany, which has resulted in controversial calls for their removal in recent years. Interestingly, a 2006 survey showed that only 12 percent of the German population was aware of the U.S. nuclear weapons positioned in Germany.⁴⁴ Further, a 2005 poll by the German newspaper *Der Spiegel* showed that 76 percent of the German population would support the removal of tactical nuclear weapons

⁴² "Iran-Germany Ties Entering New Chapter, Especially in Gas Sector," *Tehran Times*, February 22, 2009, accessed December 10, 2013, <http://www.imra.org.il/story.php3?id=42919>.

⁴³ Reiner Hermann, "Deutsch-Emiratische Dynamic," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, June 10, 2009, accessed December 10, 2013, http://fazarchiv.faz.net/document/showSingleDoc/FAZ__FD1200906102302074?

⁴⁴ "Nuclear Weapons in Europe: Survey Results in Five European Countries," *Greenpeace International*, May 26, 2006.

stationed in Germany.⁴⁵ Several German non-governmental organizations have continuously campaigned for a Germany without nuclear weapons, with some civil society groups pressuring the German government to call for the removal of American tactical nuclear weapons.⁴⁶ This pressure was first evident within the government in 1998, when Joschka Fischer proposed a 'no first use doctrine' as a pathway to remove tactical nuclear weapons from Germany; a proposal not well received with the U.S. and the United Kingdom. In 2005, a petition was issued to the German *Bundestag* which called for the withdrawal once more in order to strengthen the nonproliferation regime.⁴⁷ Beyond the tactical nuclear weapons stationed in Germany, the German government is currently rethinking its own nuclear power program. The Fukushima catastrophe has affected Germany's views towards nuclear energy. Chancellor Merkel has closed 41 percent of Germany's nuclear energy reactors and proposes a complete closure within a decade. This move is supported by the vast majority of Germans and all political parties.

This case study of Germany's foreign policy behavior in the case of the Iranian nuclear program sheds light on how historical memory enters German political debates in a global policy issue area, nonproliferation. While historical memory is revisited by politicians in this case rhetorically, it is not the strongest influential variable that determines Germany's policy behavior. Historical memory and WWII legacy was only

⁴⁵ "Atomwaffen: Ausstieg Ankündigen," *Der Spiegel*, May 2, 2005.

⁴⁶ www.atomwaffenfrei.de, "Unsere Zukunft - Atomwaffenfrei."

⁴⁷ "Glaubwürdigkeit Des Nuklearen Nichtverbreitungsregimes Stärken - Us-Nuklearwaffen Aus Deutschland Abziehen-15/5257," ed. Deutscher Bundestag.

introduced in context of potential military action in the case of Iran. Specifically, the concepts of 'never again war' and 'with peaceful means only' have been used to justify, explain, and advocate for sanctions instead of military actions, therefore strengthening the diplomatic process proposed by Germany. Alliance solidarity, another variable selected for analysis, was present in that Germany initially aligned itself along with the EU voice and its coalition partners. Despite this, Germany continuously advocated a softer approach, eventually opposing the stronger sanctions which were suggested by Germany's allies. This prompted international partners to call on Germany to show more responsible behavior. Furthermore, Germany's refusal for stronger sanctions also placed Germany on the side with Russia and China. While domestic opinion strongly affects German foreign and security policy, the case of Iran's nuclear program did not result in the outpour of significant domestic opinion. An overwhelming majority of Germans opposed a nuclear-armed Iran, yet only half would support possible military action to prevent a nuclear-armed Iran. Even in this case, it is doubtful that the German public would support said military actions by committing German soldiers and resources. This can partly be explained by Germany's long standing history and relationship with Iran. The below table shows the variables selected for analysis in this case and details the strength, presence, and ability to influence and shape German foreign and security policy towards Iran's nuclear program of each.

Table 3: Application of Variables: Case II

	German Foreign Policy towards Iran's Nuclear Program. 2003-2013
Historical Memory/WWII Legacy	<p>Slightly Present.</p> <p>Rhetorical mention of '<i>never again war</i>' and '<i>with peaceful means only</i>' which can account for Germany's emphasis on diplomatic measures.</p>
Alliance Solidarity/NATO/EU/EU3+3	<p>Slightly Present.</p> <p>Solidarity in terms of aligning along with EU voice initially/Rhetorical commitment.</p> <p>Eventually: advocacy of softer approach and opposition to severe sanctions.</p> <p>"New Constellation" of Russia-China-Germany</p>
Domestic Influence	<p>Slightly Present.</p> <p>Cultural history and tourism with Iran and domestic opposition against any form of military option for Iran (yet 96 % of Germans oppose a nuclear-armed Iran).</p>
National/Economic Interests	<p>Present.</p> <p>Economic ties and interest through trade and export (although steadily declining). Germany argued that imposed sanctions did not harm the mullahs, instead only German business suffered as the gaps left by sanctions were filled by China and Russia. National and economic interests through a strengthened relationship with Russia (and China), especially in regards to energy security.</p>
Rhetoric	<p>Present but varied.</p> <p>German leaders advocated severe sanctions rhetorically while emphasizing no military actions. Rhetoric was met with inaction.</p> <p>"<i>Wandel durch Handel</i>" and "Keeping business and politics separate" was used rhetorically against stronger sanctions.</p> <p>Overall, rhetorical commitment to alliance solidarity, condemning nuclear-armed Iran.</p>

The strongest variable for influencing German foreign policy towards Iran's nuclear program appears to be the importance of the German-Iranian trade relationship in the realm of national interests. This importance further increases due to the Russia-

Germany-Iran energy security nexus. Germany continuously advocated for a softer approach to sanctions, pointing to the fact that sanctions did not harm Iran directly as market gaps were filled by China, Russia, and other countries. Instead, the sanctions hurt the German business industry, although not severely, resulting in some domestic responses towards the economic sanctions. More specifically, slogans such as “Change through Trade” and “Keep business and politics separate” were used to show opposition to the sanctions imposed on Iran. Although national and economic interests are not the sole explanatory variable for Germany’s foreign policy behavior towards the Iranian nuclear program, differences between the Iranian and Libyan case show Germany’s discontent with economic sanctions for Iran. While refusing strong sanctions and working through legal loopholes in the Iran case, Germany publicly called for stronger sanctions for Libya, perhaps because Germany does not have the same economic interests in Libya.

Findings

Rhetorically, German politicians articulated a varied position towards a nuclear Iran. While the IAEA report in 2011 prompted Guido Westerwelle to argue that severe sanctions were inevitable unless cooperation occurs, he simultaneously emphasized that Germany would not support any military action. Chancellor Merkel similarly commented that a nuclear bomb in Iran would be unacceptable and met with tough economic sanctions. Over the past ten years, German policy makers showed alliance solidarity and consensus by rhetorically condemning Iran’s nuclear program; however,

Germany's rhetorical commitment did not match Germany's policy *in*actions. When possible sanctions were discussed in coalition settings such as the UNSC, Germany publicly refused and opposed stronger sanctions. This inaction has resulted in several scholarly and media critiques, mainly pointing to Germany's inconsistent foreign policy. The international community points to Germany's failure to show alliance solidarity through responsible behavior and questions Germany's role as a global power. This has contributed to the overall debate within international relations on how to explain Germany's continued and changed foreign policy behavior theoretically while establishing a predictable pattern for future German policy choices.

Germany's behavior in the case of Iran's nuclear program did not show a significant change in policy or shift towards a new status quo. Germany's inaction and disinterest with foreign policy-related issue areas has been constant, while the multilateral and diplomatic approach taken at the beginning aligns with Germany's norm-consistent behavior. Scholarly and media analyses group Germany's behavior, specifically opposing stronger sanctions and voting along Russia and China, as irresponsible and problematic. In recent years, and examining Germany's foreign policy behavior comprehensively, scholars question Germany's role as a civilian power, particularly due to policies based on national interest. Taking into consideration Germany's business interest in Iran and Germany's role during the economic crisis in Europe, analysts have pointed to Germany's policies based on national interests and overall changing towards a geo-economic power. Some analysts have even argued that

Germany's national interests-based behavior in recent years shows a gradual change in policy and is in line with realist explanations for foreign policy choices.

Taking into consideration the variables chosen for this case study, motives of self-interests, specifically national and economic interests, can account for Germany's behavior, inaction, and advocacy for softer approaches towards Iran's nuclear program. While the majority of scholars and media experts grouped German inaction as 'surprising' and 'shocking', this case is certainly not an instance of direct change in policy behavior. Germany's policy behavior in the Iran case has been continuous and partially adjusted, based on national interests and the external security environment, while the rhetoric towards alliance solidarity, antimilitarism, and diplomatic approaches has remained unchanged. Domestic opinion, while strong, was not as evident in this case as within the policy area involving the use of force. However, in relation to the use of force, a 2013 domestic opinion poll showed that Germany and Slovakia had the lowest approval rate for the use of force for Iran in all of Europe at 32 percent, while an option of accepting a nuclear Iran if military force was the only alternative action was favored the most by Germany with 51 percent.⁴⁸

While historical memory was used rhetorically to push diplomacy over potential military intervention, historical memory did not directly shape German foreign policy choices in the case of Iran. Further, while Germany's emphasis on economic interests, especially during the Greece bailouts, was analyzed as a return to realist policy behavior by some analysts, historical memory may have constrained Germany's ability to project

⁴⁸ "Transatlantic Trends," 33.

and exercise power only in regards to potential military interventions. This rhetorical and policy commitment to WWII legacies and culture of restraint does not limit German power; it serves German policy makers in justifying and explaining policy choices in all realms of foreign policy where Germany may or may not have interest. Historical memory enters the discussion once potential military action is debated. Historical memory then assumes the role of restraining policy action, therefore confirming the status quo. Historical memory has the most impact on German foreign and security policy when dealing with use of force situations, which is not the case for Iran. Despite the somewhat restraining side-effect, Germany's refusal for stronger economic sanctions and constant advocacy of softer and constructive diplomatic approaches is in line with Germany's idea of power.

Economic and National Interest

It is important to consider the German-Iranian economic relationship in greater detail. During the first half of 2013, German exports to Iran fell by 33 percent in comparison to previous years while imports from Iran to Germany decreased by 26 percent.⁴⁹ The bilateral trade volume for 2012 considered of €2.528 billion in exports to Iran and €710 million in imports from Iran.⁵⁰ According to the German Department of State, German banks operating in Iran have not taken on new business since 2007. The below table details the bilateral trade between Germany and Iran from 2007-2013.

⁴⁹ "Beziehungen Zu Deutschland," own translation.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

Table 4: German Exports to Iran

	Exports to Iran	Imports from Iran
2007	€3.604 Billion	€583 Million
2008	€3.924 Billion	€593 Million
2009	€3.714 Billion	€537 Million
2010	€3.804 Billion	€916 Million
2011	€3.087 Billion	€712 Million
2012	€2.528 Billion	€313 Million
2013 (1st ½)	€1.040 Billion	€157 Million

(Source: Data taken from the German Department of State website)⁵¹

This table reflects a strong decrease in German exports to Iran since the sanctions in December 2006, and a second round of UN and EU sanctions in June and July of 2010. The EU sanctions were then further increased in 2011. While the historical high in German exports to Iran, before sanctions, in 2005 reached €4.4 Billion, this number only accounts for 0.6 percent of the total value of German foreign exports that year (€720 Billion). The more recent years of the German-Iranian trade relationship paints a similar picture in comparison to Germany's total exports and imports, depicted in the table below.

⁵¹ Ibid.

Table 5: German Exports and Imports

	Total German Exports (Billion)	German Exports to Iran (Billion)	Total German Imports (Billion)	German Imports from Iran (Million)	Value of exports to Iran to total German exports	Value of imports from Iran to overall German imports
2009	€803	€3.71	€664	€537	0.462%	0.081%
2010	€952	€3.8	€797	€916	0.399%	0.115%
2011	€1,061	€3.0	€902	€712	0.283%	0.079%

(Source: German Department of State and German Federal Statistic Office, Ministry of Finance)⁵²

While the overall exports to Iran in comparison to Germany's total foreign trade only accounted for a relatively small percentage, Germany has been Iran's main trading partner for over a decade, closely followed by China. After the initial rounds of sanctions, German businesses widely critiqued the German government for supporting UN sanctions, arguing for a separation of politics and business. During this time, the Director of the Federation of German Wholesale and Trade, publicly spoke out against unilateral sanctions against Iran, adding his concern that German companies were increasingly losing business to Asia.⁵³ Other officials, to include Jürgen Thumann, head of the Federation of German Industries, cautioned against the sanctions, arguing that German companies lost lucrative Iranian contracts established over long-standing business relationships due to the political pressure of the EU. Specifically, medium sized German companies were most affected by the sanctions against Iran. As echoed by other political officials, the majority of the business industry argued that conflicts over

⁵² "Beziehungen Zu Deutschland; "Economic Overview Germany: Market, Productivity, Innovation," ed. Germany Trade and Invest (2013).

⁵³ "German-Iranian Trade up 7.8 Percnt," *Payvand Iran News*, December 2, 2008.

Iran's nuclear program should be solved through diplomatic and political means, not economic sanctions. China's exports to Iran have steadily risen with the sanctions, while Germany decreased exports since 2006. Further, the United Arab Emirates has increased its exports to Iran, surpassing Germany in 2008/2009. In 2007, Germany announced the desire to offer carrots to Iran, a proposal which was shut down. Internally within the EU, soft approaches took a majority hold, but were dismissed when the U.S. intervened.⁵⁴ The EU's decision in July 2010 to make sanctions mandatory across entire sectors further complicated internal EU division. This, combined with the EU's gradual change from negotiator to the right-hand 'body' of the U.S. eventually stalled negotiations.

Discussion

As previously mentioned, the economic interest variable for Germany's behavior in regards to the German-Iranian trade relationship is not significant enough to argue that Germany's policies have been influenced greatly. German exports to Iran were at a high in 2005 with € 720 billion, just 0.6 percent of Germany's total export.⁵⁵ Therefore, to make an argument solely on this trade relationship would be flawed. Some analysts argue that Germany's adherence to policies that are opposed by the U.S. falls into the category of soft balancing; an attempt to level or balance American power. Others take a more cynical position and explain that by aligning with Iran, Germany secures a

⁵⁴ Sauer, "Struggling on the World Scene: An over-Ambitious Eu Versus a Committed Iran."

⁵⁵ Küntzel, "Berlin, the Ayatollahs, and the Bomb."

potentially important position in the future of a nuclear hegemonic Iran. Despite these possible explanations for Germany's behavior, the most plausible explanation is a combination of norms-based behavior and national interests-based behavior. On the one hand, Germany has an established foreign policy, continued and constructed over the past sixty years and marked by non-confrontational approaches. These approaches, to-date, are "fool proof" policy approaches, used in the past without significant repercussions or push backs. On the other hand, Germany, as an economic super power in Europe, has a high interest in remaining economically strong. Thus, securing future alliances and relationships with countries such as China and Russia, enables Germany to 'play the field' while remaining somewhat neutral in controversial situations. Economic and national interests in this case, and arguably possession goals, have an overwhelming effect on Germany's foreign and security policy.

While Germany's initial involvement in the negotiations with Iran in 2003 were certainly a sign of assuming a leadership role, even showing willingness to act (*Gestaltungswille*), the progression of the negotiations over the years resulted in 'old policies' and consistent behavior. The change observed was merely a shift of orientation, or the new constellation of China-Russia-Germany, which can be explained as a reaction to the external environment. The changing security environment and international structure, with the U.S.'s pivot to Asia and slow withdrawal from the European continent, resulted in Germany also refocusing its interest and goals. Beyond this, Germany, as most other countries, may simply treat foreign policy issues on a case by case basis. The questions asked of Germany's behavior by the international

community, to include Germany's ability to project and use power and Germany's ability to act responsibly, are not asked of other regional powers. Germany's need to show responsible behavior and WWII guilt are brought into contemporary foreign policy discussions continuously due to a desire to categorize Germany, hopefully as a normal, responsible actor. Germany's unwillingness to support U.S. policies, refusal to consider military action, and focus on economic interests while adhering to WWII legacy approaches, may also point to Germany's disinterest in foreign and security policy-related issues beyond 'checkbook diplomacy'. Germany simply does not have the desire to assume an international leadership role.

The economic data which shows the trade relationship and Germany's total exports to Iran cannot fully account for Germany's strong opposition for sanctions against Iran. While German businesses and economic experts warned against increased sanctions, Germany has traditionally adopted a different political approach not focused on sanctions, while the U.S. uses sanctions as a default policy tool. Deviation from policy occurred when Germany opposed stronger sanctions while rhetorically continuing to condemn a nuclear-armed Iran and vowing to support and defend Israel. In the case of Iran, Germany's continuous rhetoric did not necessarily match policy approaches, yet sanctions do not fit into Germany's role concept. Beyond this, Germany's historical legacies in the Gulf regions have resulted in a leadership role for over thirty decades. Specifically, Germany negotiated several bilateral agreements with Russia in the 1970's, focused around the concept of *'wandel durch handel'*. As such, Germany has become a global actor in economic terms, having interests in political stability in the Middle East.

Beyond this, due to Germany's own prescribed nonproliferation stance on a global scale, Germany has condemned Iran's nuclear weapons acquisition. Consolidating long-term strategic cooperation in the region with Iran, and with Russia and China, is at the forefront of Germany's foreign policy interests, thus making stability in Iran a crucial factor. Germany's behavior during the negotiations with Iran, exemplify Germany's value based and interests driven foreign policy choices.

Summary

The recent relationship between the EU and Iran can be summarized as an evolving dialogue that includes a constructive dialogue of securitization of the issue while employing a policy of diplomacy and sanctions, whereby the option of military action was discussed. The possibility of war does not fall into Europe's normative power approach, and EU policy makers therefore tried to avoid this escalation at all cost, instead implementing strong sanctions under the coercive diplomacy framework. Throughout the process, the E3, EU-3, and EU3+3 have shown a collective *voice* by condemning a nuclear armed Iran, outlining strategic decision approaches on the basis of justifications through Iran's actions. The EU's identity as a foreign policy actor and global power has been elevated through the negotiations with Iran while staying true to its principles of transparency, normative rules and goals, and mostly non-proliferation rhetoric. According scholars, the EU's actions within framing the coercive approach as part of a normative path, has made the EU exclusivist while failing to address the

security concerns of regional actors and portraying a asymmetric picture of threat analysis.

By examining how alliance solidarity, historical memory, national interests, and domestic influence shape German foreign policy in the case of Iran, this case sheds light on an area of German foreign policy involving global issues. In hopes of a global zero, Germany's constructed nonproliferation identity contributes to Germany's norms-based approach in both advocating diplomatic measures as well as opposing a nuclear weapons program by Iran. Despite Germany's rhetorical commitment, Germany has openly opposed stronger sanctions, siding with Russia. While Germany's trade relationship with Iran presents the potential to influence Germany's decision in this case, Germany's export to Iran in relation to Germany's total foreign trade is not significant enough to make a strong argument for economic based reasons. However, Germany's economic relationship with Russia and China may account for Germany's overall behavior in both the case of Libya and Iran. National interests, including energy security and similar possession goals, contribute to Germany's overall foreign policy strategy while rhetorically committing to continuous and previous patterns of norms-based approaches. This case added to an understanding of Germany's foreign policy choices and rhetoric used in regards to Germany's own prescribed nonproliferation commitments and norms. Further, this analysis highlighted which factors determine rhetorical action and practices in regards to nuclear proliferation issues by Germany while emphasizing the importance of economic and national interests, especially when such interests conflict with components of German foreign policy norms, such as

alliance solidarity. Unlike in foreign policy issue areas involving the use of force, this case illustrates that historical memory alone does not have the strongest affect of policy decisions.

COMPARISON OF CASES OF GERMAN FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY

The two policy areas under review, out of area operations and nuclear nonproliferation, present two different cases that are shaped and influenced by several variables. While obvious variations exist, both policy areas highlighted the international community's expectation of Germany in critical situations. In the more recent cases of Libya and during the past few years of the Iranian nuclear program, Germany's abstention from the vote and opposition for stronger sanctions resulted in a multitude of media arguments and analyses referring to Germany's foreign policy as irresponsible, unpredictable, and inconsistent. While the Kosovo case was significant in reinterpreting Germany's approach to the cases involving the use of force, Iraq, Libya, and Iran all stand for instances in which Germany ultimately chose a path different from Germany's traditional alliance members. While Germany's contribution in the Afghanistan war has been used to emphasize alliance solidarity, deployment caveats, domestic opposition, and controversial political debates within Germany hardly make Afghanistan an example of Germany's full commitment to the alliance. Rhetorically, German policy makers showed commitment in all cases, except Iraq. Unfortunately, the Iraq case resulted in a distanced relationship between Germany and the U.S., also 'paralyzing' European security strategy and policy. The Libya case highlighted this aftermath clearly as did the

latter half of the negotiations with Iran among the EU3+3. Further, Germany's position aligned with Russia's position in the cases of Iraq, Libya, and Iran, prompting the description: 'the new constellation of Russia-China-Germany'. While Germany's employed rhetoric was strong across all cases, rhetoric was more controversial and more prominently debated in cases involving the use of force. In all cases, rhetorical references to WWII legacy was used to explain and justify policy action. Similarly, in the cases involving out of area operations and direct implications for Germany's *Bundeswehr*, domestic opinion and opposition was strong and certainly contributed to Germany's behavior. Although the cases involving the use of force were rhetorically placed under the umbrella of historical memory, economic factors including the cost of war and benefit analyses of military intervention were present across all cases.

The major variation in the analysis of these two policy areas lies in the central focus of Germany's interests. Or, perhaps, the presented central focus of interests. While Germany's behavior in all cases was explained through norms-based approaches that directly fall within Germany's prescribed pattern of foreign policy, a national and economic interest argument is certainly valid in cases where Germany showed breaks with alliances, instead aligning with Russia. Although Germany has always interpreted its powerful position in economic terms, Germany's national interest and economically focused behavior during the abstention in Libya and opposition to stronger sanctions in Iran has confused some scholars and analysts. According to some scholars, this recent behavior shows Germany's lack of responsibility. While this may be accurate in terms of Germany's position as a security exporter, Germany's behavior can be seen as a reaction

to the ever-changing international security environment. With Germany's long-standing relationship with Russia present throughout the majority of these cases, and in light of Germany's energy dependency on Russia in the future, it is important to analyze this factor in more detail.

Germany's siding with Russia and China in both cases, during the abstention from the Libya vote and by opposing tougher sanction on Iran, has resulted in much criticism and debate. On the forefront of critique is Germany's acceptance of Russia's authoritarian tactics and China's human rights abuses. Often referred to in scholarly analyses as either 'bear-huggers' or 'bear-hunters', Germany views and accepts Russia's and China's unfortunate regime traits as "a temporary price for stability" by focusing on change through trade towards a liberal free market democracy.⁵⁶ While the Libya case highlighted Germany's relationship with Russia, prompting analysts, journalists, and scholars to focus on Germany's betrayal of its past allies, the German-Russian relationship has been critical for Germany's foreign policy choices for several decades. During the Schröder government, Germany supported a much critiqued treaty on the North Stream gas pipeline, while also building the German-French-Russian opposition to the 2003 invasion of Iraq.⁵⁷ While supporting a more reserved approach towards Russia, Chancellor Merkel has a known "special relationship" with Russia. Beyond Germany's dependence on Russia as an energy exporter, Germany is also Russia's largest trading

⁵⁶ Keller, "Germany in Nato: The Status Quo Ally," 104. Also discussed in: Constanze Stelzenmüller, "Germany's Russia Question: A New Ostpolitik for Europe," *Foreign Affairs* 88, no. 2 (2009).

⁵⁷ Keller, "Germany in Nato: The Status Quo Ally," 104.

partner.⁵⁸ This puts Germany in a difficult position in navigating political issues with Russia, acting as a mediator between Russian and NATO interests further complicated by military “threats” as observed in the 2008 war between Russia and Georgia. Germany has adopted an approach of ‘*Annäherung durch Verflechtung*’, or “Rapprochement through economic interlocking” in order to engage, shape, and influence Russia-EU-NATO relations.⁵⁹ At the forefront of Germany’s policy makers, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Frank-Walter Steinmeier emphasized the significance of a ‘strategic partnership’ with Russia, advocating continued engagement with Russia and emphasizing the importance of cooperation with Russia. This approach has resulted in policies geared towards “democracy transfer, energy cooperation, and conflict resolution for Central Asia and the Caucasus”.⁶⁰ Similarly, Germany’s trade relationship with China has steadily increased over the past five years. While the majority of German foreign exports, 60 percent remain in the Eurozone, German exports to China increased by over 70 percent between 2009-2010.⁶¹ Experts predict that exports will continue to rise, especially as EU enlargement policy has posed problems in coordinating and implementing trade agreements with France. These hurdles to international trade in turn motivate Germany to pursue “special relationships” with China and Russia.⁶²

Beyond Germany and Russia’s combined energy and trade interests, Russian-German cultural history further contributes to this special relationship in which

⁵⁸ Stelzenmüller, "Germany's Russia Question: A New Ostpolitik for Europe," 90.

⁵⁹ "Germany's Russia Question: A New Ostpolitik for Europe," 94.

⁶⁰ Alexander Rahr, "Germany and Russia: A Special Relationship," *The Washington Quarterly* 30, no. 2 (2007): 141.

⁶¹ Hans Kundnani, "Germany as a Geo-Economic Power," *ibid.* 34, no. 3 (2011): 36.

⁶² "Germany as a Geo-Economic Power," *The Washington Quarterly* 34, no. 3 (2011).

Germany continuously accepts and considers Russia's interests in several foreign policy areas over the past decade. This consideration is evident through several policy issue areas to include nuclear strategy and missile defense.⁶³ Historically, Willy Brandt's *Ostpolitik* aided in progressing and developing the relationship of the West to East Germany, Poland and the Soviet Union during the 1970's while Helmut Kohl, during the 1990's similarly looked to Russia's role in Europe.⁶⁴ The relationship between Russia and the EU took a turn in 2006 when Russia did not ratify the Energy Charter, raising gas prices, and using Europe's reliance of Russia's energy to influence political outcomes. Russia has therefore presented a much debated factor in EU politics, resulting in diverging positions from traditional policies of containment to constructive engagement.⁶⁵ Despite this, political analysts are convinced that "there is no realistic scenario available in which Russian natural gas is not a dominant feature of European energy supply", especially for Germany due to Nord Stream, the pipeline running from Russia to Germany through the Baltic Sea.⁶⁶ Critics within the EU have pointed to the problems surrounding the launch of Nord Stream in 2011, specifically the fear that the EU may become too dependent on Russian energy imports, in turn giving Russia political leverage over important disputes. Former Chancellor Schröder, in an interview with the German newspaper *Handelsblatt* addressed these critiques arguing that while 25 percent of EU gas imports come from Russia, 60 percent of Russia's total gas exports are

⁶³ Keller, "Germany in Nato: The Status Quo Ally."

⁶⁴ Rahr, "Germany and Russia: A Special Relationship."

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Tim Boersma, "European Energy Security and the Role of Russia," *The German Marshall Fund of the United States*, July 2013, 2.

received by the EU, making Russia dependent on the EU.⁶⁷ In January 2014, the EU and Russia agreed on another gas pipeline, South Stream, set to fulfill 15 percent of Europe's natural gas requirement by 2018.⁶⁸ As previously argued, Germany's focus on costly renewable energy sources combined with recent approaches of rethinking and reducing Germany's nuclear energy, further contributes to Germany's interests in energy security and continued partnership with Russia. Despite this, Germany is far from depending on Russia for energy. At this point, the Russian-German energy relationship can be understood as almost symmetrically interdependent and mutually beneficial, especially with new and emerging energy markets globally.

As most countries, Germany considers cost-benefit analyses and risks associated with military action. This was especially true for the Libya case, during which German politicians expressed fear of prolonged engagement and commitment similar to Afghanistan. Unfortunately, most of these cases also contribute to Germany's partners expecting the 'Nein' from the onset of new foreign policy issue areas, especially surrounding the use of force. This stance is then interpreted by German critics as well as the international community as a continuous refusal to support out of area operations militarily, regardless of the case; also recently evident in the cases of Syria and Mali.⁶⁹

⁶⁷ "In Der Energiepolitik Sind Große Fehler Gemacht Worden"-Interview with Gerhard Schröder," *Handelsblatt*, August 1, 2011, own translation. Accessed January 21, 2014, <http://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/deutschland/altkanzler-schroeder-im-interview-in-der-energiepolitik-sind-grosse-fehler-gemacht-worden/4452406.html>.

⁶⁸ "Eu Gives Gazprom Preliminary 'Ok' for South Stream Gas Pipeline," *RT News*, January 20, 2014, accessed January 22, 2014, <http://rt.com/business/eu-gazprom-south-stream-881/>.

⁶⁹ Germany opposed military intervention in Syria and only agreed to engagement with Mali once ensured that no military commitment from Germany was necessary. Bittner et al., "Wir Tun Doch Nix..." own translation.

Germany's abstention from the vote for Libya can be seen as a sequential case of a commitment to non-intervention. Germany's position aligned with Russia's; Russian President Vladimir Putin condemned any military intervention of Libya and threatened to veto UNSC sanctions against Syria.⁷⁰ Beyond this constellation, some scholars have attributed Germany's recent behavior in these cases to a lack of strategic consideration. In the past, Germany acted as a negotiator within NATO and the EU, striving for consensus and agreement, whereas the Germany of the past decade turned into a "nay-sayer", choosing the status quo "strategy by default" within NATO.⁷¹ The more controversial cases of Iraq, Libya, and Iran also highlight the internal struggle in Germany to consolidate and clarify Germany's strategy within the international world order. This further reflects on and transcends to disagreements within the EU over either supporting a more "pluralist world of multiple and sometimes competing sets of values or a liberal world of democracy".⁷²

Overall, while domestic issues in Germany have trumped foreign policy issues in the 2000s, including the pension system, federalism, and the labor market, domestic influence on controversial foreign policy areas involving the use of force directs Germany policy makers' position. Germany's policies reflect the lack of domestic, financial, and political support combined with an ever increasing unwillingness to take

⁷⁰ "Putin: Libya Intervention Is Like 'Crusades'," *Huffington Post*, March 21, 2011. It is important to note that Russia and Syria have an important trade relationship; over the span of ten years, Russia exported \$1.5 billion in arms to Syria. For more on this, please see "Why Russia Supports Assad," *The New York Times*, February 9, 2012.

⁷¹ Keller, "Germany in Nato: The Status Quo Ally," 106.

⁷² Sten Rynning, "Peripheral or Powerful? The European Union's Strategy to Combat the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons," *European Security* 16, no. 3-4 (2007): 284.

financial and military risks. Especially in the case of Libya, Germany's contribution to an intervention would have resulted in a potentially heavy burden for the purpose of fulfilling a foreign policy objective, regardless how imperative this objective may be to alliance solidarity and international peace. This consideration is a combination of factors, beliefs, and norms, which have survived the structural changes of the past two to three decades. John Duffield's argument, made over ten years ago, still holds true in spite of Germany's recent political behavior: "German society as a whole and German political elites in particular, can be characterized as possessing a distinctive, widely shared, and rather elaborate set of beliefs and values of potentially great relevance to national security policy, which were little altered by unification. The existence of this political culture has contributed to a high degree of consensus on security issues since 1990".⁷³

On a side note, and within the overall theme of historical memory on which this dissertation is based upon, it is important to mention that Germany's historical memory is not only used by Germany to justify and explain foreign policy behavior, but has also been used by the international community to point to and remind Germany of its horrendous past. This was most recently evident during the Greek debt crisis and Angela Merkel's behavior during the bailout. According to some scholars, historical memory-based rhetoric has been employed to direct and influence German policy while also

⁷³ Duffield, *World Power Forsaken : Political Culture, International Institutions, and German Security Policy after Unification*, 61. This consensus is certainly not evident internally, especially the *Bundestag* debates during and after the Libya abstention. Despite this, a majority vote was reached in all cases, therefore arguable reflecting an overall consensus for Germany towards these security issues.

presenting Germany as an unreliable partner. While 'the German question', at one point, was resolved with the help of the U.S., the case of Libya and the opposition to stronger sanctions for Iran resulted in a renewed asking, inquiry, and analysis of whether Germany can be trusted to be a responsible ally. Thematically throughout these analyses, the domestic influence variable is present, especially in relation to German elections. Scholars wonder whether Germany's behavior in some cases is a direct result of the Merkel government pressure to conform to electorate demands. Parallels of foreign policy behavior to German elections are certainly evident. More specifically, during the height of the Greek sovereign debt crisis of 2010, Chancellor Merkel focused on the election in the state of North Rhine-Westphalia, while the elections of Baden-Württemberg in March 2011 coincided with the case of Libya.⁷⁴ Despite this potential factor, Germany's behavior involving the use of force, and even the potential for military action in the Iran case, is rhetorically explained through Germany's adherence to post-WWII legacy of restraint, antimilitarism, constructive engagement, and the diplomatic dialogue. Economic and national interests reasons are not given to justify policy choices.

APPLICATION OF THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS

Despite the structural changes of the end of the Cold War, German foreign policy has been marked by a large degree of continuity. This has puzzled scholars and resulted in an ongoing debate about Germany's use of power, Germany as a civilian power, and

⁷⁴ Cohen, "Merkel in Miniature."

Germany as a *normal* power, while attempting to group Germany's foreign policy approaches into theoretical frameworks. As discussed in chapter three of this dissertation, scholars within the field of international relations continue to struggle to analytically explain, account, and predict Germany's behavior. I argue that this is mainly due to Germany's history, which continues to guide foreign policy choices despite structural changes. German identity and culture directly shape and influence the perception and interests of policy makers and the domestic population, and in turn, the external environment. As Germany has entirely reconstructed its identity and policy approach after WWII, a distinct set of values and beliefs within political culture emerged. More specifically, and mostly relevant to this analysis is Germany's culture of restraint which poses an important aspect and obstacle to Germany's national security policy. This culture of restraint has, is, and continues to limit and influence Germany's ability to project and use power internationally. As such, instead of focusing on traditional projection of power through military capabilities, Germany placed great value on continuity, transparency, and restraint while advocating multilateral approaches.⁷⁵ How then can Germany's recent behavior, breaking the alliance solidarity of previous years, be explained theoretically? Is Germany pursuing possession goals and national interests as explained by realism? This section will address the scholarly input of theoretical analyses described in the third chapter and apply the concepts for the selected theories, structural realism, liberalism, and constructivism, to the cases

⁷⁵ Of course, some of these restraints are due to the aftermath of WWII and limits placed on Germany by the alliance.

selected for this dissertation in order to further an understanding of Germany's foreign policy role concept.

The interaction of structure and agency is evident when analyzing Germany's behavior in a variety of foreign and security policy areas. Germany as a 'civilian power', has worked within these structures and through institutional approaches to shape its external environment. While the historical institutional approach points to Germany's path-dependency, sociological institutionalism outlines Germany's 'logic of appropriateness' within a civilian power framework.⁷⁶ The first decade after unification, scholars focused on conceptions of Germany's use of power, explaining and understanding the use thereof within a civilian power and institutional framework. Kosovo called for a reinterpretation on the use of force, while Iraq resulted in debates of soft-balancing and changed national interests. Constructivism can highlight for the importance of historical memory, identity, culture, and norms in shaping German foreign policy behavior, but does not fully account for variations in cases, such as Libya. Scholars have therefore struggled to apply theoretical frameworks to the political culture of Germany, resulting in the continuous emergence of 'the German question'. While structure has appeared to dictate and direct German behavior in military policy areas, agency, especially in the realm of shaping the development of the EU, is also evident. Germany's *Ostpolitik* is an example an example of agency in that, while *Ostpolitik* also aligned with *Europapolitik* of the time, specific Eastern Treaties

⁷⁶ Tom Dyson, "Civilian Power and 'History-Making' Decisions: German Agenda-Setting on Europe," *European Security* 11, no. 1 (2002).

eliminated Germany's reliance on interlocutors when engaging Eastern European countries, while simultaneously giving West Germany a decision-granting leadership role.⁷⁷ Beyond structure and agency, the crucial importance of the external environment, inclusive of constraints, has a causal effect on how Germany operates, behaves, and votes internationally.

Scholars theoretically explain and understand the majority of German behavior through the evolution of Germany's role concept as the 'good citizen' based on the 'rule of appropriateness'.⁷⁸ Also focusing on the influence of the external environment and structure on German foreign policy, some scholars theoretically examine Germany's policy in relation to those of the U.S., explaining Germany's 'bandwagoning' and 'soft-balancing' adjustments in the past while pointing to the inherently conflicting identity and role concepts in the direction of U.S. and German leadership approaches. Most scholars agree that a shift in course to return to traditional power politics by Germany is highly unlikely. Moreover, within a theoretical framework, a review of the cases selected for this dissertation further emphasizes the inability of international relations theories to fully explain and account for the observed variance in German foreign and security policy. Understanding and exclaiming Germany's behavior in Iraq, Libya, and during the economic crisis as a 'sudden change' in Germany's foreign policy would be highly overstated. Theoretically, Germany's behavior can be understood through an examination of how closely Germany matches its prescribed role concepts.

⁷⁷ Paterson, "Does Germany Still Have a European Vocation?," 43.

⁷⁸ Harald Müller, "Germany and Wmd Proliferation," *The Nonproliferation Review* (2003): 18.

Constructivism, by emphasizing the importance of identity, norm, and constructed patterns of foreign policy, can account for several cases. First and foremost, the Iraq case did not show a return to traditional power politics and (soft) balancing measures, but serves as a prime example of Germany acting based on historically established norms, marked by a more independent foreign policy approach. More specifically, the concept of 'never alone' and to operate within a multilateral framework of allies combined with the role of the UN in legitimizing the use of force, emphasizes Germany's traditional pattern of foreign policy application and importance thereof for policy areas involving military operation.⁷⁹

The EU's approach to Iran's nuclear program, theoretically explained through the concept of coercive diplomacy, along with nonproliferation theory and the idea of 'normative power Europe' further contribute to the explanation of the EU's and Germany's action toward Iran, with an underlying urgency to avoid cost at all times while also staunchly opposing nuclear proliferation by Iran. Several scholars analyzing the EU's policies, point to issues of legitimacy, especially in regards to NPT agreements and the double-standards applied to certain countries. Tom Sauer's analysis of coercive diplomacy practices by the EU toward Iran's nuclear program provide a theoretical framework for understanding and explaining the EU's foreign policy choices over the past ten years in regards to Iran. Germany's relationship with Russia, and aligning of position with Russia in the cases of Iraq, Iran, and Libya, can be understood through economic and liberal institutionalist terms. Namely, Keohane and Nye's articulation of

⁷⁹ Dettke, *Germany Says "No". The Iraq War and the Future of German Foreign and Security Policy*.

interdependence, the “relationship among economics, politics, and patterns of institutionalized cooperation” in combination with power and interests, can shed light on Germany’s and Russia’s mutual dependency on each other.⁸⁰ The cost of hurting and severing this relationship would result in major economic and political losses for both countries, while continued cooperation and engagement can prolong the shadow of the future, as outlined by institutionalism. While Germany certainly has several such relationships, Libya, Iraq, and Iran showed Germany’s will to break with long-term alliance members. Germany’s use of constructive diplomacy and emphasis on trade can be seen as tools to shape politics by having leverage in specific policy areas. As such, Germany has been able to assume the role of negotiator and mediator while shaping its external environment, specifically the EU, through strategic diplomacy and economic influence in line with Joseph’s Nye theoretical articulation of ‘soft power’ approaches.⁸¹

Most scholars who theoretically examine Germany’s foreign policy agree that Germany confounds neorealism.⁸² As discussed previously, scholars attempt to combine approaches or formulate news schools of thought geared at accounting for the variance between the changing international environment and Germany’s prescribed continuity, in both rhetoric and action. In recent years, Germany has altered its policy approach gradually while political rhetoric remained unchanged. Frank Schimmelfennig discusses and explains this phenomenon, for the enlargement of the EU, through the concept of

⁸⁰ Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition*, 3rd ed. (New York: Longman, 2001).

⁸¹ Joseph S. Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, 1st ed. (New York: Public Affairs, 2004).

⁸² John S. Duffield, "Political Culture and State Behavior: Why Germany Confounds Neorealism," *International Organization* 53, no. 4 (1999).

the 'community trap' of liberal norms and rhetorical action'.⁸³ Once political elites have committed to community through rhetoric, outlined identity, ideas, and norms have to remain constant. As such, policy makers vote and behave within this community in order to ensure legitimacy and protect reputation. Whether or not German policy makers at this point internalize the components that constitute German identity, strategic culture, and WWII legacy is almost irrelevant to the theoretical explanation of these cases, as causality extends to collective community values for all German citizens. Indeed, German identity has been constructed for several years and a denial of the influence of such identity and linking to the culture of restraint would critically undermine any plausible explanation for Germany's foreign policy behavior. The importance of the cultural approach in international relations theories is exemplified by the case of Germany.

The continuity in rhetoric, as a critical discourse, is employed by German policy makers to justify and explain behavior based on the normative principles adopted after WWII. In previous years, and in the cases under review for this dissertation, this rhetoric has not matched Germany's policy action entirely. While rhetorical commitment to alliance solidarity occurred in all cases except Iraq and is part of Germany's constructed norms, other norms, such as Germany's domestically accepted norm of antimilitarism, resulted in a conflict in norms, causing 'inconsistent' policies. According to some

⁸³ Frank Schimmelfennig, "The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union," *ibid.* 55, no. 1 (2001).

scholars, these sets of beliefs trump any drive for leadership, or great power relevance in foreign and security policy.

Germany's behavior opposing any military commitment and the use of force by German soldiers has been the norm for over ten years, regardless of location and case. While the reasons given by German policy makers differed in each case slightly, the underlining tone refers back to political decisions far preceding the cases in question.⁸⁴ While this may be frustrating and difficult to understand and explain, Germany's behavior, German politicians' mindset, and Germany's domestic opinion continues to be influenced and guided by pacifism and military culture of restraint due to fears of militarizing foreign policy. The gradual transformation of Germany's foreign policy, regardless of influential variable, can also be explained through the constructivist notion that norms and prescribed patterns of behavior can change: patterns of rhetoric, policy, or behavior that seem to differ from continuous foreign policy that has traditionally been in line with Germany's norms are, over time, reinterpreted. This can be measured by Germany's willingness to use force unilaterally and without international legitimacy in the Kosovo case. Further, in order for Germany to agree and adopt the policies of its allies, especially in the case of Iran, Libya, and Iraq, Germany's approaches have to make a realist turn which conflicts with Germany's role concepts. A problem within the constructivist theory of international relations has been explaining why, how, and when political norms emerge. Further, it is difficult to analyze why certain actors conform to

⁸⁴ Bittner et al., "Wir Tun Doch Nix...".

constructed norms despite material constraints.⁸⁵ Other scholars argue that for Germany, these constraints are not material or structural, rather normative only, as Germany's Nazi past became an example of violating norms, which can be analyzed theoretically through system level variables.⁸⁶

Germany's recent international behavior has prompted a valid question: Is Germany becoming more 'realist'? Germany's relationship with Russia and China, Germany's position as the third largest arms exporter, and Germany's behavior during Iraq, Libya, Iran, and the European economic crisis all pose interesting cases to Germany's focus on national interests. Moreover, while Germany has traditionally pursued milieu goals, it most specifically served German interests over those of Europe, especially within the economic realm.⁸⁷ Further, a realist notion of balancing or soft balancing approaches employed by Germany is flawed. Germany is not focused on balancing U.S. power, rather, Germany's policies are an adopted reaction to the changing platform of alliances in order to continue Germany's role and ability to negotiate its interests. The variable of 'alliance solidarity' is therefore a preference route, but far from unconditional, as exemplified by the cases selected for this dissertation.

Scholars using the neorealist, or structural realist approach explain and predict Germany's foreign policy behavior in relation to its power, through power politics while

⁸⁵ Krebs and Jackson, "Twisting Tongues and Twisting Arms: The Power or Political Rhetoric."

⁸⁶ James Sperling, "Neither Hegemony nor Dominance: Reconsidering German Power in Post Cold-War Europe," *British Journal of Political Science* 31, no. 2 (2001).

⁸⁷ Sperling, "The Foreign Policy of the Berlin Republic: The Very Model of a Post-Modern Major Power? A Review Essay".

the liberalist theory of international relations focuses on sub-systemic determinants to foreign and security policy behavior.⁸⁸ The underlying argument of the school of liberalism is that the interests of domestic actors shape and influence policy, while constructivism claims that behavior is shaped by social norms, more specifically, value-based collective ideas about 'appropriate behavior' rather than a logic of consequentiality.⁸⁹ In order to evaluate each theory's ability to explain, account, and predict Germany's foreign policy behavior, the below table will depict the theoretical argument and prediction and the weaknesses in relation to the cases selected for this analysis.

⁸⁸ Rittberger, *German Foreign Policy since Unification: Theories and Case Studies*.

⁸⁹ *German Foreign Policy since Unification: Theories and Case Studies*, 105.

Table 6: Theoretical Analysis of German Foreign Policy

	Kosovo (Combat troops)	Iraq (Opposition)	Afghanistan (Participation with caveats)	Libya (Opposition)	Iran (Varied)
<p>Structural Realism <i>Emphasis on Germany's power position</i></p> <p><u>Prediction/Expectation:</u> autonomy, lowering Bundeswehr integration into NATO, hard balance, strengthening of national military capabilities. Out of area troops should remain under German command.</p>	<p>Would predict no participation (German security not affected, no territorial attack)</p>	<p>Would predict no participation (autonomy, no repercussions for Germany's security, no threat, not close in proximity)</p>	<p>Would predict no participation (autonomy, lowering integration in NATO, only few repercussions for German security, no threat, not close in proximity)</p>	<p>Would predict no participation (autonomy, reduce NATO integration, German security is not affected, no threat on territory)</p>	<p>Would predict opposition to use of force but would predict pursuit of power politics and influence on other international actors</p>
<p>Liberalism (Utilitarian Liberalism/Institutional Liberalism) <i>Emphasis on domestic interests/cost analysis</i></p> <p><u>Prediction/Expectation:</u> Integration into NATO, no increase in national military capabilities, defining Germany's security interests</p>	<p>Would predict no participation (support only)</p> <p>Influenced by prospect of re-election/domestic interest/high cost. Instead financial support-checkbook diplomacy</p>	<p>Would predict no participation (support only)</p> <p>Influenced by prospect of re-election/domestic interests/high cost</p>	<p>Would predict no participation (support only for alliance solidarity and to strengthen institutions)</p> <p>Influenced by prospect of re-election/domestic/interest/high cost. Instead, financial support-checkbook diplomacy</p>	<p>Would predict no participation (support only)</p> <p>Influenced by prospect of re-election/domestic interest/potentially high cost. Instead financial support-checkbook diplomacy</p>	<p>Cost-benefit analysis, participation in negotiation, non-participation in military operation</p>

Table 6: Continued

	Kosovo (Combat troops)	Iraq (Opposition)	Afghanistan (Participation with caveats)	Libya (Opposition)	Iran (Varied)
Constructivism <i>Emphasis on social norms and beliefs</i> Prediction/Expectation Socialization process, collective identity which can lead to security communities	Would predict no participation (violation of international law; but norms allowed for humanitarian intervention)	Would predict no participation (violation of international law)	Would predict participation based on norms: alliance solidarity, legitimacy and if strong peacekeeping mission.	Would predict participation based on norms of international law and humanitarian intervention (peacekeeping vs peace-enforcing)	Would predict participation in negotiation. Would not predict military intervention.

(Source: The prediction criteria was adopted from a 2001 publication by Volker Rittberger focusing on Kosovo).⁹⁰

Structural realism cannot account for Germany's readiness to participate in out of area operations (Kosovo and Afghanistan) while further integrating the *Bundeswehr* into NATO. Liberalism can also not fully explain Germany's participation in Kosovo and Afghanistan. Constructivism would predict German participation in Libya, fulfilling the norms for human intervention and the legitimacy of law; however, constructivism would also account for the socially-constructed German identity of antimilitarism that would prevent domestic support from committing German soldiers to an operation in Libya. As such, constructivism focuses on norms-consistent policies influenced by societal norms, liberalism emphasizes the causal effect of domestic interests and preferences on gain-seeking policy approaches, while structural realism focuses on how Germany's power

⁹⁰ *German Foreign Policy since Unification: Theories and Case Studies*, 176.

position influences an autonomy seeking-based foreign policy.⁹¹ Similarly to *Ostpolitik*, policies involving the use of force, reflects a continuous social process influenced by the norms adopted by policy makers and domestic population and theoretically explained by constructivism.⁹²

Structural realism fails almost entirely in explaining and correctly predicting German behavior, while liberalism also cannot account for Germany's participation in out of area operations. Liberalism correctly emphasizes Germany's focus on foreign trade policy and the influence of domestic interests on foreign and security policy. Constructivism can largely account for the cases under review by emphasizing Germany's distinctive political culture and norms-based behavior. For the case of Libya, constructivism would predict participation of German troops based on the strong peacekeeping character of the mission based on human rights violations, combined with international legitimacy through UNSC Resolution 1973, and multilateral participation. The majority of the cases under review fall into the pattern of value-based and interests-driven foreign policy behavior explained theoretically through norms-consistent foreign policy approaches. This behavior can be understood through the constructivist notion of appropriate behavior based on shared values and domestic expectation. Further, constructivist scholars use non-material factors, such as culture, ideas, and values, to explain and predict Germany's foreign policy behavior, succeeding

⁹¹ *German Foreign Policy since Unification: Theories and Case Studies*.

⁹² For more on *Ostpolitik*, continuity, and the constructivist approach, see Joost Kleuters, "Between Continuity and Change: *Ostpolitik* and the Constructivist Approach Revisited," *German Politics* 18, no. 4 (2009).

in most cases under review. This, combined with the influence of domestic interests, not the distribution of power, can theoretically account for some of Germany's policy approaches. Falling under the constructivist notion of norms, culture, and identity, historical memory continues to shape and influence both rhetoric and action. Despite some initial changes in Germany's foreign policy beginning with the out of area operations in Kosovo, and most recently, when Germany abolished conscription in 2011, the majority of the cases under review were marked by continuity with slight changes, whereby none of the theories selected can fully account for Germany's behavior.⁹³

Summary

Germany's recent behavior in international politics has led some scholars to suggest that a de-Europeanization has occurred in Germany's approach to foreign and security policy. For both policy areas, out of area operations and nuclear nonproliferation, the cases under review highlight Germany's approach of value-based and interests-driven foreign policy. The methodology applied to the cases focused on the importance of four selected independent variables: alliance solidarity, historical memory and WWII legacy, domestic influence, and national and economic interests. The values that drive and shape German foreign policy can be attributed to Germany's difficult past, directly resulting in a continuous commitment to the culture of restraint. Values, culture, and norms are difficult to compromise, especially when involving

⁹³ Conscription was suspended in July 2011. Per Germany's constitution, conscription may be legally reintroduced.

domestic opinion, and further prove to be non-negotiable at times. This is specifically evident in cases involving German *Bundeswehr* participation for military intervention. As such, Germany has largely adhered to its policy approaches of antimilitarism, shying away from participating in out of area operations while simultaneously only strengthening alliance solidarity through rhetorical commitment. These case studies further highlighted Germany's singularity and distinctive intersection of guilt and responsibility in relation to the demands of the current international security environment.

What then does this mean for Germany as a potentially 'normal' actor and how can we theoretically understand Germany's actions? Germany's behavior can certainly not be compared to France or Great Britain. Some scholars argue that to Germany and Germans, the definition of security is "inconsistent with even the weakest form of the realist argument" while others explain that the shifts in German foreign policy after Kosovo have been political and symbolic rather than militarily.⁹⁴ Germany's view and understanding of its power is still heavily debated; on the one hand some scholars declare that Germany is not 'normal' due to Germany's past and German elites' unwillingness to act on national interests while on the other hand scholars argue that Germany's behavior has become indeed 'normal' as part of the institutionalization

⁹⁴ Andrei S. Markovits and Simon Reich, *The German Predicament : Memory and Power in the New Europe* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1997), 11. Maull, "Germany and the Use of Force: Still a 'Civilian Power'?"

within the EU.⁹⁵ As such, the theoretical debate about Germany's foreign policy after unification addressed how Germany's changing power position influences international politics. Scholars wondered whether Germany's approaches could still be understood in 'civilian power' terms, or whether Germany would become a 'normal' power. The cases reviewed for this dissertation showed that German power is still defined largely in terms of its post-WWII norm including a commitment to multilateral approaches and adherence to the culture of restraint. However, Germany's abstention in the Libya case, opposition to stronger sanctions for Iran, and recent behavior during the bailout crisis in Europe, show instances where national and economic interests were considered and prioritized, therefore acting more 'normal', especially due to Germany's relationship with Russia.

Germany's relationship with Russia and China and 'siding' with Russia in three cases, Iraq, Libya, and the opposition to stronger sanctions for Iran, highlight Germany's economic consideration when debating foreign policy areas. While Germany's foreign and security behavior show definite changes, which are likely to continue, these changes should not be attributed to Germany practicing or exercising power in realist terms. Germany's 'changed' and 'surprising' behavior in recent issue areas can be explained as a reaction to changing external security environment. This is also reflected by the changing environment within the EU, to include the EU Growth and Stability Pact and

⁹⁵ Mary N. Hampton, "The Past, Present, and the Perhaps. Is Germany a 'Normal Power'?", *Security Studies* 10, no. 2 (2001). Katzenstein, *Tamed Power: Germany in Europe*. Regina Karp, "Germany: A 'Normal' Global Actor?", *German Politics* 18, no. 1 (2009).

the strengthened relationship to Russia and China due to economic problems.⁹⁶ Germany has therefore examined its foreign policy approaches based on economic considerations and defined its national interests in economic terms while justifying the lack of military participation internationally through historical memory-based explanations. Some analysts have pointed to these economic considerations, especially when detailing the difficulty in explaining and understanding Germany's foreign policy theoretically in recent years. Germany's pursuit of national and economic interests both internationally and in Europe, combined with a continued unwillingness to use force, were summarized as an example of "a geo-economic power".⁹⁷ The reciprocal manipulation between the German state and the business world in which German firms directly lobby to the government for policies which advance their interests and then contributes to economic growth, shed light on Germany's geo-economic power approach towards international politics.⁹⁸

While Germany's civilian power identity was particularly strong during the 1990's, the breaks with multilateralism in the past decade along with Germany's use of its institutional power to reach national interests based goals weakened the civilian power concept as a framework to understand German foreign and security policy. Germany's special relationship with Russia and China, Germany's focus on national interests outlined in economic concepts, and Germany's careful choosing of

⁹⁶ Marco Overhaus, "German Foreign Policy and the Shadow of the Past," *SAIS Review* 25, no. 2 (Summer-Fall 2005).

⁹⁷ Kundnani, "Germany as a Geo-Economic Power."

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*

multilaterally-based policies continue to emphasize that Germany may indeed be changing into a 'normal' actor, with the one exception of Germany's refusal to participate in out of area military operations. The analysis and application of the selected variables shows that alliance solidarity is important and evident through rhetorical commitment. Further, while historical memory can account for Germany's rhetoric and action during several cases involving the use of force, the historical memory variable was only present rhetorically during the case of Iran. Moreover, historical memory entered the political discussion in the Iran case when military options were debated, thus not determining all areas of German foreign policy. A comparison of both cases highlighted Germany's national interests, specifically Germany's focus on economic goals. Moreover, Germany understands and exercises power through an institutional framework with a focus on maintaining and growing economic power through previous alliances or newer relationships. Theoretically, German foreign policy is difficult to analyze and understand. Constructivism, with a focus on normative explanations, can account for Germany's emphasis of culture, beliefs, and norms in foreign policy approaches, but lacks in explaining the case of Libya fully.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

SUMMARY

This dissertation examined *how* and *when* historical memory has influenced, shaped, and informed contemporary German foreign and security policy and rhetoric by examining cases within two policy areas. The first policy area, out of area operations and the use of force, showed that cases are still largely explained and justified based on the culture of restraint, referring back to historical memory and WWII legacy. This is evident in policy makers' use of rhetoric as well as policy action, which has remained antimilitaristic in nature. While this dissertation hypothesized that Germany has a ritualized foreign and security policy and rhetoric determined by historical memory, several other independent variables besides historical memory were included in the research. Alliance solidarity and commitment to multilateral organizations was evident in Kosovo and Afghanistan while rhetorical commitment to Germany's alliance occurred in Libya. The case of Iraq proved to be the first case with a clear break with Germany's alliance. The domestic influence variable accounted for the importance of German public opinion, especially during political debates surrounding use of force cases. Germany's national interests, in both policy areas, were marked by economic strongholds, reflecting Germany's view and use of institutional power to serve German goals. The cost and benefit of committing German troops was certainly included in all cases, especially in light of current *Bundeswehr* reforms. The research into out of area

operations also included an analysis of Germany's engagement and responsibility. Here, the case of Afghanistan was used to highlight Germany's involvement in international conflicts. Furthermore, rhetoric was analyzed and examined in all cases, while the policy action in each case was grouped into categories of change.

This dissertation argued that use of force cases are sequential and fall into Germany's prescribed pattern of foreign and security policy and reflects Germany's and understanding of power. Germany's behavior can be explained as a reaction to its external environment whereby selective use of historical memory has become instrumental in explaining, informing, and justifying foreign policy choices for out of area operations. Historical memory was not the most influential variable in the policy area involving nuclear nonproliferation in the case of Iran. Here, historical memory was only considered in relation to potential military options. Domestic influence, although not as strong as during cases involving the use of force, was influential in the Iran case by focusing on the separation of politics and business. While similarities between the policy areas and cases are evident, German policy makers may simply treat foreign policy issues on a case by case basis. Furthermore, Germany's relationship with Russia, and China, was highlighted in the cases of Iraq, Libya, and Iran and falls into the category of national and economic interests. Here, an argument can be made for an adjustment to policy in order to serve Germany's interests. The evidence in all cases showed that there are certain ritualized recourses, often informed by historical memory and other times influenced by national interests.

An argument was made that Germany may not be interested in taking a leadership role in foreign policy issue areas, especially in use of force cases. Germany uses institutional power to shape the outcome of policies and to influence behavior in cases of interests to Germany, usually within the economic realm. This dissertation also examined the validity of international relations theories to explain and predict German foreign policy, and found that no theory entirely encompasses the state of German politics. Constructivism, with its focus on norms-based behavior, can account for the influence of historical memory on contemporary German foreign and security policy, but lacks in explaining Germany's abstention on the vote of Libya. This research included an examination of scholarly and media analysis about Germany's continuity and change in each case. While the majority of scholars criticize Germany's recent behavior, referring to recent policies as an 'identity crisis', others argue that Germany can afford to act based on national interests.

The cases of Libya and Iran further showed the difficulty over EU policy, reflecting an overall split over EU goals. The most recent discontent with Germany's behavior was catapulted with Germany's abstention from Libya, arguably the most controversial of all decisions under review. The Libya case also showed the potential effects of insufficient diplomatic dialogue. More specifically, Germany's decision to abstain was made before, and unknowingly of, the United State's changed position to establish a no-fly zone. As such, it is important to remember that Germany certainly continues to consider its Western alliances. Whether Germany would have changed its vote in light of new information is up to debate; however, Germany, more than any

other country, needs the ability to fully debate and weigh its options in cases involving the use of force. Historical memory, the culture of restraint, and the intersection of responsibility and guilt are sure to remain in place when out of area operations are debated within the *Bundestag*.

This dissertation argued that an understanding of German foreign and security policy, especially in regards to out of area military operations, must include the element of historical memory. Germany's history is simply too compelling to ignore. The issue of historical memory is very much alive in contemporary German culture and politics, evident through the multitude of television shows, movies, and book releases.¹ In most cases, the holocaust is treated as a singularity. This study emphasizes that the enduring influence of Germany's shameful past results in certain ritualized recourses in political behavior. Therefore, there is no new status quo in German foreign and security policy. Rather, the slight change that German foreign policy is undergoing is still in process. German foreign policy is headed towards an era of self-serving interests while keeping within the framework of the European Union. German interests are sure to remain economically driven while policies involving the use of force are destined to result in lengthy debates, marked by past experiences. Germany's difficulty in resolving its guilt with the demands of responsibility are also likely to continue, especially for out of area operations. Here, domestic opinion and influence certainly affect how policy makers

¹ Most recently, in 2013, the three parts, widely viewed, TV miniseries, "Our mothers, our fathers" (*Unsere Mütter, Unsere Väter*) resulted in much controversy, praise, and criticism. The series tells the story of five German friends during their time in Nazi Germany and WWII. The series was released in the U.S. in January 2014 under the title *Generation War*.

behave internationally. This is highlighted by the lack of rhetorical descriptions of war in German political commentary, inclusive of the rare use of the word 'war' (*Krieg*) itself. Instead, German policy makers refer to operations in Afghanistan and elsewhere as 'armed conflict' and 'humanitarian intervention' while focusing on Germany's development and peace keeping role. As such, this study showed and argued that cases involving the use of force, namely Kosovo, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya fall into a linear sequence of foreign policy pattern, not marked by significant changes or revolutionary alteration of previously held ideas.

Historical memory and ritualized rhetoric is used depending on policy area, allowing Germany to present reason, argument, and justification to a variety of international security challenges, either to support or oppose military involvement by German soldiers. As such, political necessities may be converted into and explained by normative beliefs. Germany's use of force, beyond ability and capability, is sure to remain a question of political will and required to be debated thoroughly. This demands time and cooperation among allies, transparency, and continued multilateral communication. Furthermore, WWII legacies are no longer solely owned by Germans, but have become an international historical memory, held and remembered differently worldwide. It is important to note that 'German questions' have been raised precisely in moments when Germany's policies were marked by slight changes, rather than continuity. Beginning with unification, refusing military action in Iraq and Libya, deployment caveats in Afghanistan, opposition to tougher sanctions for Iran, and Germany's behavior during the Greek debt crisis, all contributed to international

criticism for Germany's European vocation and international responsibility. Medal award ceremonies for German soldiers and Germany's patriotic presence during the 2006 World Cup were further critiqued and analyzed as 'nationalistic'. These 'changes' in policy or behavior, although slight, resulted in the questioning of several important political concepts: Germany's responsibility, predictability, and reliability. These questions, critiques, and analyses are certainly not asked of other nations; evidence of Germany's complex political existence.

LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH

With a focus on historical memory, culture, and normative behavior, path dependency may limit research on Germany's foreign and security policy. Specifically, path dependency outlines that certain decisions, or behaviors, often affect subsequent decisions. Path dependency can therefore aid in explaining the costs of a reversal in policy, especially when specific institutional arrangements are in place.² Within the chapter detailing Germany's behavior and policy towards Iran's nuclear program, difficulties arose when separating the German voice from the EU voice. Distinct German policies only became evident when open opposition to stronger sanctions occurred. Similarly, consensus in this dissertation meant an official consensus of German policy makers reached after *Bundestag* debates. At times this dissertation considered the conflicting internal political debates, especially over the use of force; however, the

² Margaret Levi, "A Model, a Method, a Map: Rational Choice in Comparative and Historical Analysis," in *Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure*, ed. Mark Irving Lichbach and Alan S. Zuckerman (Cambridge University Press: 1997).

influence of norms and ideas on political decision-making remains difficult to measure. To overcome this limitation, this study focused on political rhetoric and statements directly relating to Germany's culture of restraint.

International relations theories have struggled to fully understand, explain, and predict German foreign policy behavior, resulting in a lengthy and active debate about Germany's use and projection of power after unification. The Kosovo case marked an important point in Germany's political history, when consensus was reached to militarily intervene in another country's internal conflict without the legitimacy of the United Nations. This action temporarily redefined the important concept of 'never again', while propelling Germany's status as a security exporter and responsible actor. The breaks with the alliance in the case of Iraq and Libya showed that the use of force remains a highly controversial topic that must be debated thoroughly within the *Bundestag* before a consensus is reached. Even then, internal differences within each case further complicate Germany's voice. Throughout all cases where the use of force was politically debated, Germany faced the critical intersection of guilt and responsibility in both accommodating Germany's traditions while balancing the security demands of the 21st century. In these cases, historical memory influenced and shaped foreign policy as part of the socially constructed norms that guide and inform domestic opinion while serving as an explanation and validation of policy *inaction*.

Apart from this analysis, it is also interesting to note the entirely separate examination of guilt and responsibility in use of force debates when examining generational changes within the *Bundestag*. While Schröder noted that his generation

was not plagued with the guilt of his parents' generation, the actual debates and votes within the *Bundestag*, especially for the cases of Iraq and Libya, show just how strongly historical memory continues to affect younger generations of policy makers. This precisely demonstrates how historical memory has contributed to the construction of a distinct German culture and identity, marked by antimilitarism, guilt, and firm norms. Despite this, German foreign policy is certainly undergoing changes, evident by stronger rhetoric and policy behavior that places German interests before those of the EU. This dissertation searched for information and corroboration while presenting the academic debate and then provided for a link to policy. Further, this research highlighted the difficulty in explaining Germany's foreign policy behavior theoretically. Rather than arguing *that* historical memory influences German foreign policy and rhetoric, this dissertation focused on *how* historical memory accomplishes this.

The importance of historical memory is evident in politicians' continued mention of history and history's lessons, congruent across all cases under review. This is partly due to Germany's feared militarization of foreign policy. Unfortunately, Germany's tension between identity and role complicates German foreign policy. Germany's political and cultural identity, combined with a demanding role as a responsible security exporter has resulted in stagnant or inactive policy choices. While this dissertation explained and showed why and how Germany's policy behavior is marked by inaction at times, the purpose of this research was not to judge policy behavior. Instead, this research offers alternative explanations to the puzzling and shocking responses from the international community of analysts and scholars in light of Germany's recent behavior.

Germany's recent behavior should not prompt analysts and journalists to wonder whether Germany has intentions of returning to traditional conceptions of *Machtpolitik*; however, an inquiry into Germany's intentions behind interest-based behavior resulting in a decreased role in responsibility in Europe is valid and necessary.

THE FUTURE OF GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY

During the initial stages of this dissertation research, in the spring of 2012, no scholarly research provided a detailed analysis on the case of Libya. Now, three years after Germany's abstention from UNSCR 1973, it would be interesting to research how precisely this policy inaction affects Germany both internally within the EU and internationally as a global power. What does the Libya case mean for the future of Germany, NATO, and the EU? An initial inquiry offers no 'real' consequences of Germany's abstention besides an influx of criticism from both sides of the Atlantic. The Libya case also propelled the idea of the 'new constellation' of Germany-China-Russia. Further research into the economic effects and benefits of this relationship may serve in answering questions about the trajectory of Germany's foreign policy. While this dissertation considered identity and identity studies as a crucial tool to understanding and explain German foreign policy, the fluidity of identity and culture is, of course, difficult to measure. Throughout the analyses of political rhetoric and official statements, this analysis reflected the statements made based on references to historical and collective memories. The field of international relations, and specifically German politics would benefit greatly from an in-depth study of ideational and cultural

influences on rhetoric, policy action, and political practice. While the past decade provided much research and analysis for scholars to examine Germany's political parties, specifically the red-green dynamic, future research should certainly include a more comprehensive analysis to political debates.

In recent years, analyses about German foreign policy have veered from a focus on the puzzling continuity despite changes of increased power, to a 'change through continuity'. Further, Germany as a 'normal' actor continues to be an unresolved area of discussion, especially in light of Germany's recent national interests-based behavior. Political rhetoric in Germany remains an important element to explain, advocate, and justify Germany's foreign policy choices. As such, future research should provide insight into the continued influence of historical memory, and other factors, on political rhetoric which serves as a vehicle for Germany's continued, or changing, strategic culture. In 2010, twenty years after German unification, several journals, to include *German Politics* and *German Politics & Society*, published articles that addressed this change through continuity in light of German identity and foreign policy. One of the articles within this special issue by William Peterson, adequately asked, "Does Germany still have a European Vocation?" The author concludes that governmental policy is "less European than in the past" and that Germany's European vocation is decreasing and will continue to do so while also maintaining a commitment to the basic frameworks of the EU.³

³ Paterson, "Does Germany Still Have a European Vocation?," 51.

In closing, it is interesting to note the various statements made about Germany's responsibility and guilt during the Munich Security Conference in early 2014 by German President Joachim Gauck and Germany's new defense minister Ursula von der Leyen. Both politicians stressed the importance for Germany to play a more decisive role in resolving international conflicts. Gauck also mentioned the importance of shaking off Germany's "sense of guilt stemming from WWII", stating that "Germany will never support any purely military solution, but will also approach issues with political judiciousness and explore all possible diplomatic options. However, when the last resort, of sending in the *Bundeswehr*, comes to be discussed, Germany should not say 'no' on principles, nor should it say 'yes' unthinkingly."⁴ Similarly, Ursula von der Leyen argues that "to sit and wait" is not an option, adding that if Germany has the means and capabilities to act; Germany has an obligation and responsibility to engage. On the other hand, the defense minister, in an interview with German newspaper *Der Spiegel*, explained her support for the Libya decision, outlining the lack of the European voice. While arguing for the need of closer EU cooperation and a defined defense and security strategy, von der Leyen explained that Germany is engaged in a dozen missions worldwide, which demands both a military and financial effort, yet Germany's allies "only remember Germany's reluctance, the product of Germany's restraint".⁵ Echoing these expressions, in an interview in January 2014, foreign minister Frank-Walter

⁴ "Gauck Opens Munich Security Conference with Call for More German Engagement," *Deutsche Welle*, January 31, 2014, accessed February 5, 2014, <http://www.dw.de/gauck-opens-munich-security-conference-with-call-for-more-german-engagement/a-17399048>.

⁵ Rene Pfister and Gordon Repinski, "German Defense Minister: 'We Can't Look Away'," *Spiegel Online*, January 28, 2014, accessed February 2, 2014, <http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/interview-with-german-defense-minister-ursula-von-der-leyen-a-945818.html>.

Steinmeier explained that the international community rightly expects Germany to intervene.⁶ These recent statements not only emphasize the lack of understanding of Germany's parliament-controlled military by the international community, but further highlighted the internal differences within the EU. Germany's attempt and difficulty in resolving the intersection of guilt and responsibility is likely to persist as previously held norms continue to contextualize contemporary security demands. Similarly, comparative analysis involving historical memory can explain current foreign policy choices of other states. While Germany's history is certainly special, it is not unique. Countries have suffered humiliations which are evident in contemporary foreign policy choices. As such, successes and failures of the past will continue to play an import role in current policy choices.

⁶ "Es Wird Zu Recht Von Uns Erwartet, Dass Wir Uns Einmischen," *Süddeutschen Zeitung*, January 30, 2014, accessed February 2, 2014, http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/DE/Infoservice/Presse/Interviews/14/140130-BM_SZ.html.

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