

Winter 2004

Compellence: An Empirical Perspective

Michael G. Dziubinski
Old Dominion University

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/gpis_etds



Part of the [International Law Commons](#), and the [International Relations Commons](#)

Recommended Citation

Dziubinski, Michael G.. "Compellence: An Empirical Perspective" (2004). Doctor of Philosophy (PhD), dissertation, International Studies, Old Dominion University, DOI: 10.25777/k5k0-5w02
https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/gpis_etds/40

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate Program in International Studies at ODU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate Program in International Studies Theses & Dissertations by an authorized administrator of ODU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@odu.edu.

COMPELLENCE: AN EMPIRICAL PERSPECTIVE

by

Michael G. Dziubinski
B.S. May 1976, University of Wisconsin-Superior
M.P.A. August 1983, Northern Michigan University

A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of Old Dominion University
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirement for the Degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

OLD DOMINION UNIVERSITY
December 2004

Approved by:

~~Kurt Taylor Gaubatz~~ (Director)

~~Regina Cowen Karp~~ (Member)

~~Larry Filer~~ (Member)

ABSTRACT

COMPELLENCE: AN EMPIRICAL PERSPECTIVE

Michael G. Dziubinski
Old Dominion University, 2004
Director: Dr. Kurt Taylor Gaubatz

Compellence, the use of a contingent threat of force to get a target state to modify a behavior, is an understudied area of international relations. An empirical examination of this area reveals patterns of the frequency of attempted compellence and successful compellence that are not explained by current research or broader international relations theories. In the post-World War II period (1946-2001), the pattern is a rapid drop and continued suppression of success, but a continuation of compellence attempts at the historic level. Existing compellence research and international relations theory do not explain this puzzling disparity of low success and continued attempts at compellence. By comparing this pattern with a sample of the previous conditions (1914-1945), this study provides initial findings about the compellence puzzle. Key among them is the effects of the shift in the international system after World War II, the American policy of containment, norm formation and promulgation, shifts of compellence from the core to the periphery, and the domestic effects of compellence on the longevity of leaders.

© 2004 Michael G. Dziubinski. All rights reserved.

This work is dedicated to my smart and lovely wife, Debra, who has been the cornerstone of my life, and to my father, Richard, who taught me problem solving, and my mother, Sheila, who taught me persistence.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I thank my dissertation committee, Dr. Regina Karp, Dr. Larry Filer and especially Dr. Kurt Taylor Gaubatz, who provided substantial guidance, help, and direction. I am grateful for the support and intellectual engagement I have received from Steve Barneyback, Bob Fawcett, Jessica Todd, and Paul Gregory. For her insight and help in university matters, I thank Sandy Matthews. Further, I thank Joe Jackson and Spurge Norman of the MITRE Corporation for their encouragement and MITRE's financial support of my academic program.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter	Page
I. INTRODUCTION.....	1
Defining Compellence.....	4
The Compellence Puzzle.....	13
Significance of the Work.....	17
Results in Summary.....	21
Organization.....	23
II. EMPIRICAL PERSPECTIVE.....	25
Approach.....	25
Internal and External Validity.....	27
General Characterization.....	28
Data Processing and Perspectives.....	36
Description of the Phenomena of Compellence.....	39
Conclusion.....	46
III. INITIAL CONCEPTUALIZATION.....	48
Using Literature and Logic to Understand Compellence.....	48
Current Formulation of Compellence.....	48
The Diplomacy Dimension of Compellence.....	53
The Military Dimension of Compellence.....	61
Synthesis.....	62
Three Myths.....	64
Summary.....	81
IV. IMPROVED CONCEPTUALIZATION.....	82
Contributions of IR Theory.....	82
Synthesis of Theories.....	90
Elaboration.....	92
Summary.....	96
V. EXPLAINING POST-WORLD WAR II FALL IN COMPELLENCE SUCCESS.....	97
Narrowing the Examination.....	98
Changes in Time.....	102
Soviet Expansionism.....	108
Beginnings of Resistance.....	111
The Challenge.....	113
What Was Learned.....	114
The Truman Doctrine.....	117
China and Compellence.....	121

Chapter	Page
The U.S. Attempts to Compel.....	123
Minor Powers.....	124
Summary.....	127
VI. NORMS – THE REASON FOR RESISTANCE.....	129
Did the United States Act as a Hegemon?.....	133
Did the United States Promulgate Norms About Compellence?.....	135
Counter Arguments.....	152
Summary.....	155
VII. WHY ATTEMPT COMPELLENCE?.....	158
The Maintenance of Compellence Attempts.....	159
State Factors that may Correlate with Attempts.....	161
A Game Theoretic Approach.....	177
Domestic Benefits to Compellence Attempts.....	187
Summary.....	199
VIII. CONCLUSION.....	201
Describing the Compellence Puzzle.....	201
The Contributions of Theory.....	203
Three Myths.....	206
Addressing the Three Elements of the Compellence Puzzle.....	208
Implications.....	210
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	217
APPENDIX.....	227
VITA.....	244

LIST OF TABLES

Table	Page
1. Outcomes within Militarized Interstate Dispute Database.....	33
2. Recoded Outcomes from Militarized Interstate Dispute Database	35
3. Regional Distribution of Compellence Attempts, 1816-2001	38
4. Temporal Distribution of Compellence Target States, 1816 – 2001.....	39
5. Occurrence of Successful and Unsuccessful Single State vs. Single State Compellence, 1816-2001	44
6. Settlement Methods for Single State Compellence.....	74
7. Major Power Participation in Single State Compellence Attempts	77
8. Single and Multiple State Compellence Rates, 1816-2001	78
9. Success Rates of Major and Minor Powers with Number of Attempts	79
10. Success Rates in Two Time Periods with Number of Attempts	79
11. Detail of Success by Type of Power and Region, Single State.....	80
12. Minor and Major Power Comparison, 1914-1945 and 1946-2001	100
13. Major Powers and Status Changes	102
14. Major Power’s Single State Compellence Performance, 1914-1945	103
15. Military Expenditures (Thousands of Constant Dollars)	107
16. Soviet Initial Compellence Attempts After Truman Doctrine	118
17. Predictions of the International Interaction Game vs. Actual Outcomes	180
18. Regional Differences in the Compellence Effect on Longevity.....	191
19. Compellence Effect on Tenure in Office with Type of Government.....	193
20. Outcomes within Militarized Interstate Dispute Database.....	236
21. Recoded Outcomes from Militarized Interstate Dispute Database	240

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure	Page
1. Ten Year Moving Averages of Frequency of Attempted Compellence per Number of States and Success Rate has Percent, Superimposed	14
2. Single State vs. Single State Compellence Attempt Frequency by Year	40
3. Compellence Attempts per Number of States in International System.....	41
4. Ten Year Moving Average of Successful Compellence, Compromise Cases, and Attempted Compellence	43
5. Ten Year Moving Average Frequency in Percentage of Successful Compellence	44
6. Ten Year Moving Averages of Frequency of Attempted Compellence per Number of States and Success Rate as Percent, Superimposed	45
7. Frequency of Successful Compellence and Capability Difference	68
8. Frequency of Unsuccessful Compellence and Capability Difference.....	70
9. Frequency of Multiple States vs. Single States Successful Compellence and Capability Difference.....	71
10. Compellence Attempts, 1914-1945, by Region	99
11. Compellence Attempts, 1946-2001, by Region	100
12. Major Power Capabilities, 1935-1955	106
13. Capability Score for Major Powers, 1945-1965.....	135
14. Average Compellence Attempts and Success, 1946-2001	160
15. Attempted Compellence and Success Rates.....	161
16. Attempted Compellence by Region as the Percentage of Global Attempts.....	163
17. System Concentration of Military Capability over Time.....	168
18. Distribution of Autocracy and Democracy, 1816-2001	172
19. Comparison of Government by Type for Attempted Compellence, 1914-1945 and 1846-2001	173

Figure	Page
20. International Interaction Model.....	179
21. International Interaction Game, Compellence Version.....	182
22. Compeller vs. Non-compeller Survival Data	190
23. Survival Plot, 1946-2001, Autocrats	192
24. Survival Plot, 1946-2001, Democrats	193
25. Effect of Success or Failure of Compellence on Longevity.....	194
26. Ratio of Tenure vs. Start Compellence Attempt	196
27. Ten year Moving Averages of Frequency of Attempted Compellence per Number of States and Success Rate as Percent, Superimposed	202

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The rebellion of 1896 on Crete, fomented in part by a Greek nationalist society, appeared to present Greece with an opportunity to annex the island. The action took place against a background of growing Greek concern over the treatment of Christians by their Muslim rulers on Crete, which was under Turkish domination. By the beginning of 1897, large consignments of arms had been sent to Crete from Greece. On January 21st, the Greek fleet was mobilized and in early February Greek troops landed on the island. Union with Greece was proclaimed.

Britain, France, Italy, Russia, Germany, and Austro-Hungary were united in their opposition to this challenge to the prevailing international order. Acting in concert, they imposed a blockade upon Greece to prevent assistance being sent from the mainland to the island. This combination of states wielded over half of the military capability that existed in the world at that point; Turkey possessed about 2 percent of the total military capability, and Greece about 2/10s of a percent. Thwarted in their attempt to assist their compatriots in Crete, the Greeks instead sent a force, commanded by Prince Constantine, to attack the Turks in Thessaly. By the end of April, the Greeks had been overwhelmed by the Turkish military. The Greeks then yielded to pressure from the European powers, withdrew their troops from Crete, and accepted an armistice on the mainland. A peace treaty compelled Greece to pay Turkey an indemnity, to accept an international financial commission that would control Greek finances, and to yield some territory in Thessaly to

This paper follows the format requirements of *The Chicago Manual of Style 15th Edition* by The University of Chicago Press.

Turkey. Under pressure from the great powers, Turkish troops also left Crete, which became an international protectorate. There were no battle deaths on the part of the major powers nor any battle deaths inflicted on Greece and Turkey by the major powers.¹

In comparison, the U.S. and the UN had been demanding that the Taliban of Afghanistan deport Osama bin Laden since 1998. Then, on September 18, 2001, a week after the suicide attack on the World Trade Center, the UN Security Council, substantially at the behest of the U.S., demanded that Afghanistan turn over bin Laden immediately and unconditionally. Taliban leaders rejected the idea that Osama bin Laden had anything to do with the attack. At this point, the U.S. possessed approximately 15 percent of all military capability in the world, the Taliban, approximately 1/10 of 1 percent, an overmatch of 150 times. The following day United States ordered 100 military aircraft and the Theodore Roosevelt carrier battle group to the Persian Gulf. Various Afghan religious leaders threatened jihad if any attacks were conducted on Afghanistan. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees warned the U.S. that military actions would exacerbate an already bad refugee problem in Afghanistan. The UN World Food Program also highlighted the fragile conditions of the Afghan people cautioning against military action. The Iranian foreign minister and Hamas cautioned against military actions also. On September 20, 2001, President Bush addressed the U.S. Congress and issued a demand for Afghanistan to turn over Osama bin Laden and destroy

¹ Theodore George Tatsios, *The Megali Idea and the Greek-Turkish War of 1897: The Impact of the Cretan Problem on Greek Irredentism, 1866-1897* (Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 1984), 90-137; D. Scott Bennett and Allan C. Stam, "EUGene: A Conceptual Manual," *International Interactions* 26 (2000): 179-204, <http://eugenesoftware.org> (accessed 2 April 2004); Faten Ghosn and Glenn Palmer, "Codebook for the Militarized Interstate Dispute Data, Version 3.0," 2003, Correlates of War 2 Project, <http://cow2.la.psu.edu> (accessed 16 April 2003). Through the course of this work when numeric facts are communicated they have been derived from manipulation of data in the EUGene software program and associated databases. Details of that manipulation are found in the Appendix. Where data is from elsewhere it is so indicated with an appropriate cite.

terrorist camps in Afghanistan. After fruitless dialogue through various intermediaries, the U.S. began to conduct military operations on October 7, 2001. After initial strikes, on October 11, 2001, President Bush offered the Taliban a second chance to turn over Osama bin Laden. The offer was again rejected.

Despite the overwhelming capabilities of the U.S. and the relative international isolation of the Taliban, the U.S. ultimately had to use its military force directly in Afghanistan. A combination of forces under local warlords, U.S. Special Forces, and U.S. airpower with precision guided munitions destroyed most of the Taliban capability and structure. The country fell from Taliban control on December 6, 2001.² Osama bin Laden has yet to be captured and managing events in Afghanistan remains a difficult challenge for the U.S.

The Crete dispute of 1896 is an example of highly successful compellence. Afghanistan is a compellence failure. In the first, sovereign states, Greece and Turkey, ceased a behavior and took on other behaviors when threatened by a superior military force. In the second, a state refused to cease sheltering Osama bin Laden and eventually ended up in a disastrous, regime replacing war. The Afghanistan example highlights an important characteristic of compellence. The U.S. achieved a quick military victory over the Taliban, but the very fact that it had to use overwhelming military force was a result of the failure of its compellence threats before the war. This distinction between the threat of the use of force and the actual use of force points to the need to create a description from a broader understanding of the ideas behind compellence.

² Cable News Network, "Osama Bin Laden," 2002, <http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2001/trade.center/binladen.section.html> (accessed 25 Aug 2004); Cable News Network, "The History of Afghanistan," 2002, <http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2001/trade.center/afghanistan.timeline/index.html> (accessed 25 Aug 2004).

This work will establish a broader understanding of compellence than is available from current international relations research. By first providing an empirical base, current compellence research and international relations theory can be challenged and leveraged to build that understanding. This empirical examination will reveal a counterintuitive pattern of compellence after World War II. This pattern, with a sudden drop and continued suppression of success coupled with a continued historic level of attempts is puzzling, in that it is not easily explained using current theory or logic. By addressing this puzzle, we will increase our understanding of compellence as a phenomenon and chart a path for future research.

Defining Compellence

Thomas Schelling's *Arms and Influence* is widely recognized as the authoritative source for the initial formulation of this issue area.³ By contrasting the act of taking something from someone by force or convincing them to give it to you from fear, Schelling differentiates between what he calls "brute force" and coercion. Brute force is an act of controlling or seizing that the adversary has no choice in. The functional view of coercion is the communication of a threat to cause pain to the other party unless they comply and the subsequent decision to comply or resist. He further differentiates threats that deter and threats that compel. Deterrence is characterized by the threat of pain intended to ensure that an action is not taken. Compellence is characterized by a threat of pain intended to ensure that action is taken.⁴ In the case of the Greeks and Turks, the

³ Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966).

⁴ *Ibid.*, 3-4, 76.

threat of pain communicated by the major powers of Europe was sufficiently persuasive to both parties to take actions that they would otherwise not have taken.

Alexander George and William Simons divided Schelling's compellence into offensive and defensive aspects in their landmark book *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*.⁵ They use the term coercive diplomacy to describe a subset of compellence actions that are defensive in nature and exclude offensive uses. The differentiation is that in defensive uses the target state of the compellence has already changed the status quo, thus the compellence is an attempt to reverse that change, whereas offensive compellence would be to proactively changing the status quo via the threat of pain. Further, their conceptualization of coercive diplomacy rests on the proportions of diplomacy and force. This particular formulation is largely diplomatic, force being used only as an exemplar.⁶ In a later work, *Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War*, Alexander George shifts the proportions of diplomacy and force even further towards the diplomatic end, focusing on persuasion vice the use of military capabilities.⁷ Nevertheless, the activities that some scholars call coercive diplomacy appear to be a type of compellence that can provide insight to the larger topic.

Other scholars suggest other methods of linking diplomacy and force to accomplish objectives that is not compellence. In *Coercive Inducement and the Containment of International Crises*, Daniel, Hayes, and de Jonge Oudraat, leaning heavily on a recent U.N. experiences, suggest a set of actions that is between the U.N. tradition of impartial peacekeeping based on consent of the parties and simple

⁵ Alexander L. George and William E. Simons, eds., *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*, 2d ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994).

⁶ Ibid., 8.

⁷ Alexander L. George, *Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War* (Washington DC: U.S. Institution of Peace, 1991).

enforcement action on behalf of the attacked state.⁸ The primary focus of their conceptualization is diplomatic, using the change mechanisms of discussion, blandishments, appeals to emotions or conscience, rewards, threats, or punishments. The authors treat coercive inducement as a variant of coercive diplomacy. They call for less emphasis on the use of the military to threaten, instead emphasizing defensive military actions to hold aggressors' capabilities harmless, which provides room for suasion to be effective.⁹ This use of physical force to set conditions so that other capabilities, such as diplomatic means, can create change but is not compellence per se, as the writers do not suggest that the threat of punishment is the primary change mechanism. Since this approach is closely related to compellence, it may still provide usable insights.

These delineations are not universally accepted across the field of international relations. Lawrence Freedman, in an edited volume, *Strategic Coercion*, finds the idea of coercive diplomacy not to be analytically useful.¹⁰ As his title suggests, he forwards what he contends is an improved conceptualization that encompasses Schelling's and George's constructs. This conceptualization agrees with the general construct of coercion and includes a close regard for how strategic actors construct reality and how each actor understands how the other actor constructs reality.¹¹

Capturing ground closer to war, Cimballa in *Coercive Military Strategy* espouses the use of a broader range of action across the diplomatic – combat spectrum. He views this strategy as inclusive of coercive diplomacy, but open ended in terms of readiness to

⁸ Donald C. Daniel, Bradd C. Hayes, and Chantal de Jonge Oudraat, *Coercive Inducement and the Containment of International Crises* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1999).

⁹ *Ibid.*, 21-24.

¹⁰ Lawrence Freedman, "Strategic Coercion," in *Strategic Coercion: Concepts and Cases*, ed. Lawrence Freedman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 18.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 36.

escalate into full-scale warfare.¹² He agrees with Pape, in *Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War*, on characterizations of strategies for military coercion. These include punishment, risk, denial, and decapitation.¹³ Unlike the previous authors, Cimbala and Pape paint these strategies as linked to technological advances and modern times. Although more focused on the military dimension, these coercive military strategies can inform our understanding of compellence.

As suggested above, it is important to clarify how compellence is different from war, deterrence, or crisis. In the broadest sense, war-like acts could constitute part of the communication of the contingent demand or the punishment following non-compliance, or the environment in which compellence was attempted. For example, the bombing of Nagasaki and Hiroshima were certainly the ultimate war-like act, but were also a communication of potential future punishment. After the Taliban resisted the demands of the U.S., the first week of destruction provided a strong example of punishment before delivering the final ultimatum. Prior to the bombing of Nagasaki and Hiroshima, the U.S. had been conducting a vigorous island hopping campaign across the Pacific, providing the Japanese with the environment within which the compellence threat was delivered.

Nevertheless, the basic difference between war and compellence is the ability for the target to be able to decide. In war, control of land, people, and resources is the objective; a decision by the target is not necessarily required to be successful. Eventually, the target's physical capability to effectively resist can be destroyed. The objective in compellence is to get the target to decide to conduct an action that benefits the sender,

¹² Stephen J. Cimbala, *Coercive Military Strategy* (College Station: Texas A & M University Press, 1998).

¹³ Robert Anthony Pape, *Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996).

even while the target has the means to resist. Therefore, compellence can be an activity conducted within war, but neither war nor compellence is required to coexist temporally for the other to achieve its aims.

The difference between compellence and deterrence is small but significant. Both have a sender and a target, both have a punishment contingent demand, and operate in an environment, but the nature of the outcome is different. Successful compellence is marked by a behavior that is initiated, changed, or stopped. Deterrence, on the other hand is marked by a behavior that is not conducted, an action not taken, a continuation of the status quo.

Finally, crisis and compellence often seem to be incorrectly conflated. Many are familiar with the Cuban Missile Crisis, where perhaps the most famous compellence event occurred, but fewer are familiar with the thousands of other cases of compellence. Thus, it is understandable that these characterizations of political actions may be confused. To clarify this relationship it is helpful to review the meaning of the word "crisis." The etymologic root is normally rendered in the sense that affairs have progressed to the point of decision where the outcome could be strongly positive or strongly negative.¹⁴ Compellence can be used to influence the outcome, as was done by President Kennedy, but a crisis, i.e. a point of decision, existed for the U.S. before he decided to threaten the blockade and boarding of Soviet ships. Crisis and compellence can occur together or separately. A crisis can be created or resolved without the use of compellence, as the Soviet Union created a point of decision (crisis) for the U.S. by

¹⁴ "Oxford English Dictionary," in *Oxford English Dictionary. Additions Series*, ed. John Simpson and Edmund Weiner (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993).

moving missiles onto the island of Cuba. However, the use of compellence may cause a crisis for the target state, as the U.S. did for the Soviet Union.

Compellence in the Context of the Tools of Statecraft

The previous descriptive discussion implied that there are various types of statecraft. It may be useful at this point to place compellence in a broader framework of statecraft to clarify its boundaries. David Baldwin in *Economic Statecraft* provides a useful review and categorization of the means of statecraft that has been derived from multiple other works.¹⁵ The initial differentiation is between policy, power, and means. Policy studies focus on state goals and how those goals are selected. The study of power focuses on a relational construct, where one actor can influence the actions of another actor. Means are the tools that allow states to exercise that power to achieve the policy goals.

Baldwin presents a categorization of those means that includes propaganda, diplomacy, economic, and military as four types of statecraft. Propaganda is used to influence primarily based on manipulation of verbal or written symbols. This activity is a one-way transmission of information that may influence the recipients' belief structure and result in changed behavior. Diplomacy, in contrast, is a two-way exchange, a negotiation. There may be manipulation of verbal or written symbols, but the main function is to get the other party to agree to an action since he now sees that it is in his best interests. Part of that two-way negotiation may be to change the conditions of the proposed agreement to find a mutually beneficial solution. Economic statecraft is the manipulation of resources that have a market price to achieve policy aims. This

¹⁵ David A. Baldwin, *Economic Statecraft* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985), 9-28.

manipulation can influence other actors since it creates either advantages or disadvantages for the target entity within a market. The target entity may be willing to change some behaviors in exchange for re-establishing or improving favorable market conditions. The military statecraft category is not as well defined, but is of great interest to this work. Baldwin only indicates that military statecraft refers to influence attempts that involve primarily violence, force, or weapons.¹⁶ Although these categories were meant to be mutually exclusive and exhaustive, it is likely that states use a mixture of the four types of means for different situations and targets. Compellence, as outlined by Schelling and George, appears to have some characteristics of both the diplomatic and the military versions of statecraft as both the aspect of negotiation and the potential for use of force are inherent parts.

Individual versus State Perspective on Compellence

Understanding coercion, and specifically compellence, may appear to be easy since we all share an instinctive understanding of what it is to be threatened with the use of force. In a dyadic encounter, without the presence of a police authority to enforce rules of behavior, a person threatens the use of force by communicating by word or gesture that they have the capability and the willingness to injure you or take your life. Most commonly, at the individual level, this is linked to a demand to relinquish some material possession such as money, jewelry, or a car. In these cases, we act as if our internal calculus tells us that resistance is not worth the chance of injury or loss of life. Part of this calculus acknowledges loss of life is not a common outcome, but also understands how

¹⁶ Ibid., 13-14.

easily it might be accomplished.¹⁷ The result, much to the enrichment of the criminal element, is that individual level compellence, when attempted, is often successful, without having to actually resort to violence. At that level, in the U.S. in the year 2000, 320,000 out of 520,000 robberies were completed without injury to the victim.¹⁸ This means that over 60 percent of the time, at least for robbery in the U.S., individual level compellence is successful.

However, this commonsense understanding of compellence and likely lack of resistance at the individual level misleads when we attempt to explain or apply compellence at the state level. Given the substantially different outcomes, our understanding of state level compellence, and the attendant factors that make success difficult, need to be constructed differently in order to understand this oft used but seldom successful tool of statecraft.

In comparison to the individual level compellence example, there are a number of differences in the setting and transaction that may create different outcomes. A key difference in setting is that individual compellence is often attempted out of the public view, where the target cannot call on the larger community for assistance in resisting the sender, whereas in state level compellence demands and threats are often delivered in a public way with the understanding that other actors will be substantially aware of the exchange. Another key difference in setting is that the participants in an individual interaction likely believe that this is a onetime encounter, or that a long-term exchange is

¹⁷ Thomas Simon, James Mercy, and Craig Perkins, *National Crime Victimization Survey: Injuries from Violent Crime, 1992-98*, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention no. NCJ 168633 (U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs & U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2001).

¹⁸ Ann L. Pastore and Kathleen Maguire eds, *Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics 2001*. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, <http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/> (accessed 03 May 2003).

not critical to the sender's goal achievement. State level compellence stands in contrast, where it is understood that the target and the sender will continue to coexist within the international system for the foreseeable future. More broadly, other actors in the international system will have observed the interaction, have the opportunity to intervene, and themselves will have future contact with both the target and the sender. Unlike the individual level, at the state level the information content of a previous compellence attempt is available to impact future attempts. The outcome of state-to-state compellence attempts is not simply yielding a material object that likely could be replaced. The outcome, played out in public, has the potential for both informational and materiel content and subsequent repercussions that could have impacts on the long-term survival of the state, its leaders and how compellence is viewed.

Finally, the obvious difference is that the actors on either side in state level compellence are not truly unitary. The fact that there is a political leader and supporters on either side and that their interaction can be shaped by or may shape the behavior in the compellence episode makes this case much more complex in interactions. As is outlined by Jakobsen, George, and Schelling, substantial sender attention is focused on domestic political interests, decision-making process control along with considerations of the form and nature of the threatened punishment that might convince the target to be compelled.¹⁹

These differences between the state level and individual level compellence highlight the shortcomings of our instinctual understanding of compellence when we try to explain outcomes at the state level. Our understanding of the dynamic of individual

¹⁹ Peter Viggo Jakobsen, *Western Use of Coercive Diplomacy After the Cold War: A Challenge for Theory and Practice* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998), 36, 41; George, *Forceful Persuasion*, 33-37; Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, 90-91.

level compellence provides little leverage against the analytic problem of why state level compellence is difficult and even less leverage on why it has changed.

The Compellence Puzzle

Most know Thucydides' account of the Melian dialogue, where the Athenians argued with the leaders of Milos to surrender their city and submit politically to Athens. The Melians, trusting to allies, gods, and fate, did not comply. After a lengthy siege, the Athenians took the city, killing the men, enslaving the women and children, and resettling the island with colonists of their own. As is evidenced by the Melian dialogue, compellence is not just a modern phenomenon.²⁰

Figure 1 shows the more recent history of compellence. As we look across that history, the success and failure of compellence is not randomly distributed. From 1816 to 1907, on average, compellence attempt frequency was 6.9 percent of the number of states in the international system. Between 1908 and 1930, the rate increased to 12.6 percent, almost double the previous rate. Between 1931 and 1945, compellence attempt frequency was 17.2 percent, more than double the initial period and substantially more than the previous. In the period 1946 to 2001, despite the massive increase the number of states (68 to 191), compellence attempts fell only to 13.9 percent of the number of states in the international system. This is still twice the rate of compellence attempts per state than the initial period, and higher than the years surrounding World War I.

²⁰ Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War*, translated by Rex Warner (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1903), 13, 22-23, 25, 358-66.




Figure 1 Ten Year Moving Averages of Frequency of Attempted Compellence per Number of States and Success Rate as Percent, Superimposed

The change in the rate of successful compellence is even more dramatic. In looking at the rate of successful compellence, it is first important to note that out of the 1,558 attempts, very few, 105, were successful. Successful compellence is a fairly rare occurrence. Although the rate for successful compellence across the entire period is 6.7 percent, the pre-World War II rate for successful compellence is 16.8 percent, and post-World War II only 2.1 percent.

This data reveals a pattern of relatively more successful compellence between 1816 and 1945. The pattern changes after 1945. Looking across the period 1946 – 2001 compellence was attempted at a rate that equaled 17 percent of the number of states in each year and of those, approximately 2 percent of attempts were successful. In other words, although the rate of attempt per state increased slightly, the chance of success fell precipitously. Given the large increase in numbers of states after World War II, (1945-64 states, 1965-125 states, 1985-161 states), the number of compellence attempts increased

from an average of 5 a year prior to World War II to an average of 23.6 a year after World War II, while the chances for success became more remote.

In particular, immediately after World War II, the practice of state level compellence underwent a substantial shift that persists today. Before 1946, state level compellence was routinely conducted and had a moderate success rate. States could issue a demarche, or mass troops on a border, or conduct a cross border raid and achieve a change in behavior on the part of another state. After 1945, state level compellence attempts became more numerous, but the frequency of successful compellence dropped precipitously. In the later period states that issued threats, or massed forces, or destroyed training camps in a desert were unlikely to achieve a change in another states' behavior, and often only succeed at increasing tensions.

This is a significant puzzle. Military force has been and remains one of the key tools for a state to defend its interests and achieve its policy aims in an international system that consists of co-equal sovereign states. The use of military force has ranged from full-scale war, with unconditional surrender as its only goal, to verbal communications about the potential use of military force at some unspecified future date. Given the financial and human costs, it is not surprising that states would prefer to achieve their goals by communication of a threat instead of conducting major combat operations. Given the vast amounts of diplomatic and military energy expended by states that attempt compellence, it seems to be a low payoff activity. Surprisingly, this fact does not appear to dissuade potential practitioners.

This work will argue that the post-World War II compellence pattern of a substantial reduction in the compellence success rate, continued low rates of success, and

a historic level of compellence attempts was influenced by three factors. The first factor was a post-World War II shift in the international system, the second, the promulgation of an anti-compellence norm, and the third is the existence of domestic benefits for leaders that attempt compellence actions.

The fall in compellence success can be traced to the substantial re-ordering of the international system that was the result of World War II. States that had been successful compelling states were no longer in a position to do so. A critical aspect of the new order was the superpower competition and the U.S.'s containment policy. These resulted in treaties, organizations, and arrangements that bolstered states' abilities to resist compellence, Soviet or otherwise.

The continued repression of compellence success after the immediate post-World War II conditions had faded requires a different perspective. Compellence does not pit a significant portion of states' military forces against one another, but depends on pressures created by communication of threats. Lacking the finality of major combat operations, compellence depends substantially on beliefs of the sender and the target. If the sender does not believe force is an appropriate means for state-to-state discourse, compellence will not likely be a choice for problem solving. Further, if the target state believes that resistance, despite the eventual cost, is appropriate, demands are not likely to move them from their chosen course. The early years of the Cold War may have shaped these types of norms.

Finally, the persistence of compellence attempts that are not rewarded by success is more difficult to explain. A possibility is that the act of attempting to compel provides rewards other than those expected from modifying the behavior of the other state.

Significance of the Work

Whether successful or unsuccessful across the last 200 years, the practice of compellence remains popular. On more than 2,000 occasions, it appears that states would rather attempt to gain benefits through the communication of threats instead of the application of force. They then have a possibility of achieving their policy aims while avoiding the risk and the requisite expenditures of monetary and political capital to militarily removing an adversary's physical means of effective resistance. Nevertheless, resisting compellence did not end on Milos, despite the dismal outcome for the Melians.²¹ In fact, since the end of World War II, resistance has become the answer about 99% of the time.

If successful compellence does not happen often, and there is strong contention that military force is not an appropriate tool for political change, one may wonder why one would study compellence.²² There are two main reasons. The first reason is to address a substantial gap in our knowledge of international relations. The fact that we have not coherently explained this resource intensive, dangerous, ongoing, and ubiquitous process points to a substantial gap in our understanding of an aspect of international relations. The second reason is to address the policy aspects of the compellence phenomena. Compellence had, at one time, been a cost effective method that supported the maintenance of the international order. Today, compellence is often attempted but provides little obvious benefit. Policy makers have yet to adjust their

²¹ Thucydides, *Peloponnesian War*, 13, 22-23, 25, 358-66.

²² Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, *Power and Interdependence, 2nd Ed* (Boston: Scott, Foresman and Co, 1989), 27-29.

methods to the current realities and either cease attempting it or make it successful in the current environment.

The Gap in Understanding of International Relations

Our understanding of the compellence is more immature than deterrence but there are some similarities in the research that can help us analyze its weaknesses. There is a general lack of empirical approaches in deterrence, although some authors such as Huth and Russett have attempted to create a quantitative basis for theorizing.²³ In compellence, no substantive attempts have been made to create a quantitative basis that could assist in testing or developing theory. The most vigorous attempt at empirical analysis is Jakobsen's subdivision of his three cases into 13 sub-cases.²⁴ This lack of quantitative background leads to a focus on personality and the unique characteristics of each situation as causal factors of success or failure, instead of providing a framework to examine re-occurring factors.

In the area of deterrence, Lebow and Stein, in their various criticisms of the field, highlight the issue that many formulations of deterrence theory depend on rational actor theory, use exogenous motivations and characterize decision makers as risk tolerant and gain seeking, but lack a theoretic basis for those characterizations.²⁵ Here compellence research parallels deterrence research by using similar assumptions without a theoretic basis. They also highlight deterrence literature's lack of consideration of potentially significant factors such as misperception, miscalculation, and precursor determination of

²³ Paul Huth and Bruce Russett, "What Makes Deterrence Work? Cases from 1900 to 1980," *World Politics* 36, no. 4 (July 1984): 496-526.

²⁴ Jakobsen, *Western Use of Coercive Diplomacy*.

²⁵ Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, "Rational Deterrence Theory: I Think, Therefore I Deter," *World Politics* 41, no. 2 (Jan 1989): 208-24; Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, "Deterrence: The Elusive Dependent Variable," *World Politics* 42, no. 3 (Apr 1990): 336-69.

alternates, vice a singular focus on the decision between the alternatives.²⁶ In this area, compellence research records a multitude of factors such as these, but provides little in terms of ordering principles. Before we address these significant items as part of a research agenda, basic descriptions, such as regional distribution, frequency of the phenomenon, success rate, and variation in time need to be addressed.

As we examine compellence research, some aspects are obvious by their absence. Unlike deterrence research, compellence research routinely under-represents the target of the action. It is most often depicted as a reactor to the sender's messages, and little said about the target's interests. The target is occasionally noted as an active player if it tries to counter-compel the sending state. This shortfall may be a serious flaw. Although this concern is noted in research, no effort has been focused on the description and analysis of the actions of a key decision maker—the target.²⁷ Further, there does not appear to be any research that addresses the effects of the international system on compellence attempts and whether it enables or disables its success. Including system effects may account for the currently unexplained wide variance in compellence outcomes.

Compellence has received substantially less research attention than deterrence, most likely because researchers viewed deterrence as a widespread and frequent phenomenon that underpinned and influenced every day of the Cold War, while, compellence, with a few major exceptions such as the Cuba Missile Crisis, was not viewed as a key determinant of the international behavior of the superpowers. An important difference between the two is that with compellence, it is possible to directly identify a large number of individual cases of success and failure. With deterrence, it is

²⁶ Lebow and Stein, "Rational Deterrence Theory," 214-16.

²⁷ Jakobsen, *Western Use of Coercive Diplomacy*, 15-16.

not possible to know whether the target would have conducted the behavior that the sender had claimed to have deterred. Although we as analysts may not be able to trace all the steps in the causal chain, compellence offers the opportunity for clear evidence whether or not the policy, regime, or territory that was to be modified was actually modified. This provides the opportunity for clear empirical results. In other words, despite our current lack of research, the information resources are available to conduct a rigorous investigation of this phenomenon.

Policy Implications

Policy implications provide another reason to study compellence in the post-Cold War world. Considerable diplomatic and military resources are being routinely expended in compellence attempts that usually do not achieve their stated goals. If this phenomenon was sufficiently understood, these resources could be applied in some other fashion as to achieve the desired results. This could provide an improve set of options for senior policy leaders. Alternatively, if compellence is found to be structurally infeasible in the current international system, those diplomatic and military resources could be redirected to other tasks were the benefit to the state was higher. A greater understanding of this process could lead to more effective policies to directly use or defend against compellence. This may be particularly important if states want to reduce the use of brute force.

Focusing on the broader international system, as Callahan noted in 1998 in his *Unwinnable Wars*, nationalistic and ethnic violence has increased in the post-Cold War era, rather than decreased.²⁸ Although great powers may not conduct the compellence actions that are related to this violence, or even be the target, their interests will likely be

²⁸ David Callahan, *Unwinnable Wars: American Power and Ethnic Conflict* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1998).

affected.²⁹ Since states that are not a direct party may have their interests effected, they need to have an understanding of it so that they may effectively shape policies to address this threat. For example: Should the U.S. intervene in a compellence attempt against one of its Asian trading partners? If so, what is the set of methods that could most effectively diffuse the attempt? Although questions like these are currently answered, it is without the benefit a scientific understanding of the phenomenon. Informing those policy decisions with a firm basis of empiricism and theory could improve the workings of the international system.

Both the lack of rigorous research and fact of experientially based policy making about compellence provides motivation for its study. As we have seen, the phenomenon of compellence is a frequently practiced, real world application of diplomacy and the use of force. Its study provides the opportunity to make empirical and theoretical progress that would further inform our understanding of both diplomacy and the use of force.

Results in Summary

The pattern of compellence from 1816 to 1945 consisted of a fairly steady level of attempts per year per state in the international system coupled with a slightly declining success rate over the period. The pattern of compellence from 1946 to 2001 maintained historic levels of attempts per year per state, but success dropped almost to zero and remained very low throughout the period. The initial portion of this puzzle asks why successful compellence was reduced to almost zero immediately after World War II. The precipitous fall in the success of compellence was initially created by the new

²⁹ Richard N. Haass, *The Reluctant Sheriff: The United States After the Cold War* (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1997).

geopolitical realities after World War II. Some states that had previously been successful at compellence were exhausted, others were stalemated in the new bipolar international system, and others were constrained.

The second part of the compellence puzzle highlights the continued low level of compellence success, even after the initial Cold War conditions faded. The initial period of Cold War actions had created the conditions for the continued suppression of compellence success. U.S. actions to help Europe and contain Soviet expansion throughout the world were key in creating a set of expectations about armed aggression. These actions supported the creation, promulgation, and acceptance of an anti-compellence norm. Although this norm was accepted and adopted by international organizations, and re-echoed by Western powers, portions of it were not fully accepted across the international system.

The third portion of the compellence puzzle highlights that the rate of compellence attempts, adjusted for the growth in number of states, remains at historic levels despite the fall in success. Closer examination shows that although the rate remained the same, there was a geographic shift of attempts from the core to the periphery. The evidence seems to indicate that, all else being equal, state leaders who attempt compellence stay in office longer than those who do not. Further, as leaders that attempt compellence stay in office longer, they have more opportunity to attempt compellence. Therefore, what looks like the maintenance of a historic level of activity is actually a complex of interacting trends.

This conundrum of continued motivation to attempt to use compellence and continued opposition in the world to the use of compellence as an ordinary tool of

statecraft can resolve in two ways. Either the motivation to use this tool is reduced, resulting in fewer attempts each year, or the constraining forces that limit the acceptance of compellence in the international community are loosened leading to an increased number of successful compellence attempts. Since the level of attempts has remained at historic levels since World War II, despite low payback, it is more likely for the opposition to compellence as a valid tool of statecraft to decrease. In this case, an understanding of the past patterns of compellence would better prepare scholars and leaders to deal with the new realities of the international system.

Organization

The second chapter focuses on empirical data. It describes the characteristics of compellence and the behavior of sender and target states from 1816 to 2001. In addition to general characterization, this chapter provides specific data about the three part post-World War II compellence puzzle.

The third chapter charts current formulations of compellence from the specialized literature. By finding common elements within the specialized compellence literature this chapter finds a simple framework within which to discuss compellence. It also uses the previously discussed data to correct some misperceptions found in that literature. In doing so, it refutes three myths about compellence that would otherwise hinder effective examination of the phenomenon.

The fourth chapter investigates how leveraging aspects of international relations theory may provide a better conceptualization of compellence. By using the common elements from the specialized compellence literature and then broadening the perspective

by taking advantage of the more comprehensive field of international relations theory, the explanation of compellence is improved.

The next three chapters look for explanations to the compellence puzzle. The fifth chapter addresses the first element of the compellence puzzle by documenting possible causes for the initial suppression of successful compellence immediately after World War II. The sixth chapter discusses the second portion of the compellence puzzle. It suggests possible causes for the continued suppression of compellence success, even after the forces that led to the initial suppression have faded. The seventh chapter focuses on the final portion of the compellence puzzle. It discusses possible causes for the continued level of attempts at compellence, which rival previous periods.

The eighth chapter provides general conclusions, highlights some policy implications, and outlines potential for future research in the area of compellence. An appendix provides details on data sources and methodologies.

At the close of this work, we will have developed a clearer understanding of compellence, its empirical basis, past and current levels of attempts and success, and some possible reasons for the current patterns of compellence. Further, scholars will also be equipped with an outline for future research in compellence. We will now turn to building the empirical basis that is critical to coherently discuss compellence.

CHAPTER II

EMPIRICAL PERSPECTIVE

Approach

This chapter will provide the empirical basis to accomplish two significant tasks. The first task is to provide a general understanding of the data related to compellence. The second will be to illustrate the main points of the post-World War II compellence puzzle. To accomplish these tasks, empirical data that describes compellence over a significant time span is required. This data will provide insight into the elements of the basic framework of compellence comprised of actors, action, environment, and outcomes. For the actors, data required includes the states involved, measures of the type of government in power, capability measures, the leaders of those states, and inclusive dates of incumbency. To describe attempted compellence actions, the objective, levels of violence offered by either side, number of states, and inclusive dates of action are required. To understand the environment, the number of states in the world at the time of the action, number of great powers, and system concentration of capabilities are needed. To establish the status of the pattern of compellence, data is needed to describe the outcome of the combined actions, casualties, and method of settlement. There are no ready-made, large repositories of data specifically about compellence. However, a number of extant databases, established for purposes other than the study of compellence, makes it possible to derive data appropriate for the task of examining compellence. Incumbent with the use of this data is a sufficient explanation of the sources of data and how it was interpreted to arrive at conclusions. An abbreviated discussion of this process

will be provided in this chapter, with a detailed discussion of the databases and the manipulation of the data reserved for discussion in the Appendix.

A significant source of this type of data noted above is provided by the Correlates of War (COW) Project.¹ Focused on the examination of variables associated with the outbreak of war, this project compiles multiple international relations data sets and relates them by use of a few common variables. Frequently cited in international relations and peace research literature the data in the COW data has been refined, analyzed, and improved repeatedly.² Many researchers have used this data in testing hypotheses and models associated with the initiation, escalation, and outcome of conflict.³ Beyond this robust examination of the path to conflict and its causal factors, this data is also been used to establish policy pertinent positions for then current problems.⁴

However, this database does not address all of the data requirements specified above. A necessary addition to the COW databases, which highlights the interactions between states, are the Polity databases, which provide information on the internal characteristics of states.⁵ This data, appropriately connected to data about external activities, can provide insight into the often-ignored linkage between domestic conditions

¹ Correlates of War 2 Project, Dept. of Political Science, The Pennsylvania State University, 1 March 2003. <http://cow2.la.psu.edu/> (accessed 1 March 2003).

² Pat McGowan et al., "International Data as a National Resource," *International Interactions* 14 (1988): 101-13.

³ J. David Singer and associates, *Explaining War: Selected Papers from the Correlates of War Project* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1979); J. David Singer, ed., *The Correlates of War II: Testing Some Realpolitik Models* (New York: Free Press, 1980); Alan Sabrosky, ed., *Polarity and War: The Changing Structure of International Conflict* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985); Charles Gochman and Alan Sabrosky, eds., *Prisoners of War?: Nation-States in the Modern Era* (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1990).

⁴ J. David Singer and Michael Wallace, eds., *To Augur Well: Early Warning Indicators in World Politics* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1979); J. David Singer and Richard Stoll, eds., *Quantitative Indicators in World Politics* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1984).

⁵ Monty G. Marshall, *Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2002*. 16 December 2003, <http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/index.htm> (accessed 23 January 2004).

and international behavior. These multiple databases are integrated using the EUGene data management program developed by Bennett and Stam.⁶ Its primary value in this study is to provide an automated method to integrate several different sets of data. It does so by taking various individual databases and creating country year dyads to which data values are assigned. This dyadic orientation, although necessary for the functioning of the program, creates another set of data challenges since states act in different ways than pure dyads would suggest. As noted above, this and other specific data manipulation methods are addressed in the Appendix.

As comprehensive as it is, the EUGene program and its associated databases does not contain information on state leaders. For this critical aspect, this work will depend on the data compiled for *The Logic of Political Survival* by Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, and Morrow.⁷ This dataset provides states' political leaders names and dates in office. Through these two sources of data, we now have the wherewithal to describe the actors, the actions, the environment, and the outcome.

Internal and External Validity

After securing the requisite data, it is necessary to select and organize the various data elements to create a cogent description of compellence to ensure that resultant conclusions have internal validity. Further, in order to generate support for useful real world results, the data must also be representative of a wide range of cases across a significant span of geography and time to create conclusions with external validity. To

⁶ Bennett and Stam, "EUGene: A Conceptual Manual."

⁷ Bruce Bueno de Mesquita et al., *The Logic of Political Survival* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003).

address the perennial challenges of internal and external validity, three critical aspects were considered when selecting data.

The first aspect, specificity, addresses using data from cases that provide clear indications that compellence was attempted and that a quantifiable result occurred. In order to generate useful conclusions, specific factors that identify a compellence action and an outcome were identified in each case. Secondly, in the context of interstate compellence, external validity requires that the initial data not be limited to a narrow set of states for the results to be generalizable to all states within the international system. Thirdly, just as the data cannot be selective in terms of which states are included, the time frame from which the data is drawn extends from 1816 through 2001 in order to capture a variety of conditions in the international system. This also allows the analysis to contrast the outcomes in one era to outcomes in another. Detailed discussion of the methodology of choosing cases, selecting, and processing the data are provided in the Appendix.

General Characterization

To aid in comprehension of the empirical aspects of this analysis there are some characterizations of the data that would be useful to understand. Within the previously discussed data generated by EUGene, the Militarized Interstate Disputes database provides key information about the actions and outcomes of compellence attempts. To understand how this analysis has operationalized "compellence", it is helpful to review the operational definitions that were used within that original database. In *Militarized Interstate Disputes, 1816-1992: Rationale, Coding Rules, and Empirical Patterns*, Jones, Bremer, and Singer indicate that the term "militarized interstate dispute" refers to a united

historical case in which the threat, display, or use of military force short of a war by one member state is explicitly directed towards the government, official representatives, official forces, property, or territory of another state.⁸ This original definition is particularly important to compellence, as it focuses on actions undertaken by the target based on the threat, display, or exemplar use of force. This perspective is also important, as this study will focus on disputes short of war to learn about compellence. As discussed in the introduction of this work, cases where the participants transition to war will be viewed as failures of compellence. In these cases, the initial compellence effort did not accomplish the revision objective. As was noted in the previous chapter, this does not indicate that compellence cannot happen within a war; only that data is not available to separate compellence activities and forcible defeat within wars. This analytic bounding will allow for conclusions specifically about compellence separate from general warfare and perhaps its usefulness as a political tool short of warfare. Fortunately, there are thousands of militarized interstate disputes that fall short of war from which to draw conclusions.

Nature of Actors

Additionally, the underlying data is focused on the interstate dimension of interaction, limiting them to diplomatically recognized member states of the global system and excluding interactions involving non-state actors. Further, this data excludes routine military training exercises, nation building, foreign internal defense support, or even intervention on behalf of the recognized government. Other exclusions reduce the possibility that alleged or dubious actions and incidents could be counted as a dispute.

⁸ Daniel M. Jones, Stuart A. Bremer, and J. David Singer, "Militarized Disputes, 1816-1992: Rationale Coding Rules and Empirical Patterns," *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 15 (1996): 6.

Specifically, if either the target state responds, militarily or diplomatically or the action is verified by an impartial observer an incident can be considered a dispute. Further, the acts are required to be overt actions taken by official military forces or government representatives of the state. Covert or non-regular force operations are also excluded unless the target state responds militarily or diplomatically to the act in question. Further technical exclusions are discussed in the Appendix. These exclusions provide a narrowing to ensure the data used in analysis will reflect compellence and not some other phenomena.

During data selection, there were some key data manipulation choices not predetermined by the underlying data. One of these, available in EUGene, was that the cases were generated with an orientation keyed to the revisionist state vice the initiator state. This means that each dyad in the database has, as its leading member, the state that was attempting to change the regime, policy, or territory of the second member of the dyad. This selection was key to ensure generation of cases linked to compellence and not deterrence or other phenomena. As the cases required an attempt to change some aspect of a target state instead of maintaining the status quo the possibility of mistakenly analyzing deterrence cases is reduced.

Type of Actions

Within the initial data, militarized incidents were grouped in three general categories, threat of force, display of force, and use of force. The threat of force was identified by contingent speech or print and usually took on the form of an ultimatum. The second broad category is a display of force. The Militarized Interstate Dispute database coded this selection when there was a military demonstration but no combat

interaction. These nonviolent military acts serve as ways to signal capability and intent to the target state. It is possible that these signals could be more persuasive than verbal threats because the state that is attempting to compel has invested materiel and political resources to communicate this signal.⁹ The third broad category of the use of military force almost entirely represents activities that have a direct effect on a target state such as blockades, clashes, or the occupation of territory. The exceptions to the physical manifestation in this category are official declarations of war and cases that joined ongoing wars. The actions within this category are still only state-to-state communications of capability and intent, although because they are an application of military force, they can be deadly for those individuals directly engaged in them. Previously, researchers set the threshold of 1,000 total battle deaths as the dividing line between militarized interstate disputes and interstate wars.¹⁰

Nature of Actions

Having described the different types of militarized incidents and offered a classification that ranks them, Jones, Bremer and Singer grouped these incidents into coherent historical episodes that constitute militarized interstate disputes. It is important to note that this record of dispute is actually an incomplete and skeletal record of the interactions between the states. For example, only the highest level of hostility is reported for each state involved. Repeat exchanges at a given level will not be apparent from the data, therefore, in this data set, escalation is more valued than persistence. Further, de-

⁹ James D. Fearon, "Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes," *The American Political Science Review*, 88, no. 3 (Sept 1994): 585-86.

¹⁰ Charles S. Gochman and Zeev Maoz, "Militarized Interstate Disputes, 1816-1976: Procedures, Patterns, and Insights," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 28, no. 4 (December 1984): 589.

escalatory steps are not directly reflected either, although the method by which a dispute is settled is recorded within the database.

Jones, Bremer and Singer used a set of coding rules to ensure that the facts about incidents encoded in their database reflected coherent disputes. The complete version of these coding rules is captured in the Appendix. In summary, these rules include:

- 1) All incidents must involve the same or an overlapping set of interstate members.
- 2) Each incident must involve the same issue or set of issues, and occur within the same geographic area—unless there was information provided by diplomatic historians that linked them.
- 3) The start date of a dispute is defined by the initiation of the first militarized incident, but the end date is determined in several ways. Based on the clarity of the condition, the expiration of up to six months with no incidents marks the end of the dispute. With a clear demarcation such as a formal resolution, a new action can occur within a month and be considered a separate dispute.
- 4) When two states go to war, all other ongoing disputes between these two states cease. Any dispute that erupts between a war belligerent and a non-belligerent state is treated as a separate dispute.
- 5) In cases of militarized interstate disputes within the context of a civil war, the side that controls the pre-war capital controls the government.
- 6) Wars and sub-war disputes of independence are included in the data only if there are interstate system members on both sides of the dispute.¹¹

These start and stop rules provide the boundaries to what may seem to be the constant ebb and flow of statecraft and military operations. Since we cannot directly observe the actors' decision making process, these artificial boundaries serve as objective markers of where one compellence episode ends and others begin. Particularly important to describing the compellence puzzle are the outcomes of compellence attempts. In order to discern the outcome it is necessary to examine how the original data was coded within

¹¹ Jones, Bremer, and Singer, "Militarized Disputes," 174-77.

the Militarized Interstate Dispute database and reinterpret them based on a conceptualization of compellence. Table 1 provides the operational definition used in the database.

Table 1. Outcomes within Militarized Interstate Dispute Database

Victory	Alteration of the status quo by one state through the use of militarized action which imposes defeat upon the opponent
Yield	One state capitulates by offering concessions which appease the demands of another state before the militarized forces of either state has secured any substantial tactical gains on the battlefield
Stalemate	Lack of any decisive changes in the pre-dispute status quo and is identified when the outcome does not favor either side in the dispute
Compromise	Each side in the dispute agrees to give up some demands or make concessions with regard to the status quo
Released	Only for situations in which a seizure of material or personnel defines the context of the dispute. Seizure of material or personnel culminates with their release from captivity
Unclear	Historical sources provided either conflicting interpretations or ambiguous information about post-dispute status quo

In order to illuminate the complexities of compellence it will be necessary to recode some of the data, and in some cases, exclude some data. Starting with the most straightforward set of cases, a "yield" outcome assigned to the target state aligns most clearly this study's conceptualization of successful compellence. Of course, a "yield" by the sending state would be the opposite, a failure of compellence. However, the next category to be examined, "victory", is not as clear. On its face, this definition requires imposition of military defeat, without specifying the defeat mechanism. However, within the same database the highest level of action taken by the sending state is recorded. Upon examination, some of the cases that are coded as victory have reached the revisionist's goal without using force. In other words, the highest level of activity is recorded as a

threat or display followed by the desired change in behavior on the part of the target state without a military clash. These cases will be considered successful compellence for this study. Alternatively, those cases coded "victory" that have action levels beyond threat or demonstration will not be considered successful compellence.

In the bulk of the cases, stalemate is the outcome when the target state decides not to comply with the sending state demands, and neither side is overcome by direct military force. Since the sending state did not achieve its goal to get the target state to act in a particular fashion this outcome constitutes unsuccessful compellence.

To this point, the differentiations between successful and unsuccessful compellence have been fairly clear. The next outcome, compromise, could be viewed from either perspective. The sending state achieves some of its desired objective and the target state does likewise. One could contend that the sending state, acting in a strategic fashion, could initially demand more than it actually desired and its "compromise" actually constitutes a successful event. Conversely, one could also contend that the target state, concerned with the potential for a costly and drawn out dispute, could cede some unimportant token to allow the sending state to gracefully withdraw. However, there is no information in the database that would support either explanation. Therefore, in order to provide an initial stringent test for compellence, compromise will be considered an unsuccessful effort at compellence. Later in the analysis, this assumption will be relaxed to gauge its effects on our understanding of compellence.

Another special case, "released," indicates the release of seized territory, items, or people. This is only applicable to special cases where the substance of the dispute was the seizure, for at least twenty-four hours, of material or personnel of official forces from

another state, or the detention of private citizens operating within contested territory.

Since the cases that constitute this outcome area are, by definition, resolved by reversing the seizure, these cases lack information to inform compellence. Therefore, these cases will not be considered in this study.

“Unclear,” indicates that the coders did not have sufficient data to make a differentiation, therefore this will also be excluded as it does not provide indicative information. Also fairly obvious, "joins ongoing war", is a failure of compellence as the dispute has moved past the stage of threats and exemplar use of violence to join with an ongoing war. The final category, “missing data” does not provide insight into successful compellence or resistance so will be excluded from the analysis. Table 2 below captures the coding that will be used to support the study of compellence for this work.

Table 2. Recoded Outcomes from Militarized Interstate Dispute Database

Victory - Sending State	Based on revisionist’s highest level activity, successful or unsuccessful compellence
Victory - Target State	Unsuccessful compellence
Yield - Sending State	Unsuccessful compellence
Yield - Target State	Successful compellence
Stalemate	Unsuccessful compellence
Compromise	Initially unsuccessful compellence for a strict test of compellence
Released	Discarded as not indicative of response to compellence
Unclear	Discarded as not indicative of response to compellence
Joins Ongoing War	Unsuccessful compellence
Missing data	Discarded as not indicative of response to compellence

Data Processing and Perspectives

The initial data extracted from EUGene provided 2,945 dyadic cases for militarized interstate disputes for the years 1816 to 2001, inclusive.¹² The first data manipulation was to remove the cases where a state was identified as “revisionist,” but not issuing a threat, displaying military forces, or using force. This left 2,814 dyadic cases. The second manipulation was to remove the cases whose outcome did not inform compellence. As discussed above, cases with seizure, unclear, and missing data results were deleted, leaving 2,613 cases. Of these, 1,558 were cases where a single state attempted to compel a single state. Because the data is presented in a dyadic fashion, when a sending state attempted compellence and the target state responded in-kind, two compellence attempts were recorded. This is appropriate as each of the states had similar decisions to make as a sending state and as a target state. The data that describes the one state vs. one state cases can be directly manipulated and create meaningful results.

The 1,055 dyadic cases that are subcomponents of larger compellence events involving multiple states on either side require additional processing before we can draw conclusions from them. Participation in these cases is not as straight forward as the single state vs. single state. For example, the 1897 compellence case of Greek and Turkey by the major powers of Europe consists of two target states each making independent decisions based on the combined threat of the major powers. Of the 1,055 dyadic cases that involve multiple participants some had multiple states involved as sending states, target states, or both. Simplifying them for the purpose of examining compellence, these were resolved to 335 cases of attempted compellence by associating the sender and target

¹² A copy of the EUGene input parameters is included in the Appendix.

data across by MID dispute numbers. After the data from the multiple participants has been appropriately aggregated and combined with the single state cases, 1,893 episodes of attempted compellence can inform our understanding of this phenomenon. Initially, this analysis will use the single state vs. single state data as it provides the simplest interactions to analyze. Later, the more complex multiple state interactions will be included to more fully represent the range of compellence activities. Before we turn to analysis of the compellence puzzle, we need to review the previously highlighted issues of validity, geographic, and temporal distribution. Examining the data derived from the categorization developed above, we will first focus on the geographic perspective.

Regional Perspective

To better understand compellence as a global phenomena it is useful to example it across multiple regions. Further, to support later claims of external validity of results it is important that the initial data do not exclude a significant portion of states or a specific region of the world. Using the Correlates of War regional groupings of Europe, Middle East, Africa, Asia, and North and South America, table 3 provides the number and percent of MID cases recoded as attempted single state vs. single state compellence cases by regional representation.

Table 3. Regional Distribution of Compellence Attempts, 1816-2001

	Sending States		Target States	
	Attempted Compellence Occurrences	Percent	Attempted Compellence Occurrences	Percent
Europe	425	27.3%	403	25.9%
Middle East	341	21.9%	302	19.4%
Africa	142	9.1%	148	9.5%
Asia	317	20.3%	368	23.6%
North and South America	333	21.4%	337	21.6%
Total	1558	100.0%	1558	100.0%

From both the sender's and target's perspective, there seems to be a fairly even distribution of cases across geographic regions, with the exception of Africa. Africa is underrepresented because this study is about state-to-state compellence and most of the political units in Africa did not become independent Westphalian states until after World War II. Since the major focus of this analysis is not about regional causes of compellence, this data anomaly is not significant to the overall conclusions. Africa contributes slightly less than 10 percent of both senders and targets, but still provides more than 142 senders and 148 targets in the sample. For the period after World War II there are numerous states in Africa, and this data collection anomaly will be even less of a concern.

Chronologic Perspective

The compellence puzzle suggests that the nature and outcome of compellence are influenced by the characteristics of the specific time period. Therefore, it is necessary to examine the data to ensure that this difference is not caused by insufficient data collection

or faults in the data selection process at a particular point in time. Table 4 provides a chronologic view of the frequency of attempted compellence.

Table 4. Temporal Distribution of Compellence Target States, 1816-2001

	Attempted Compellence Occurrences	Percent	Approximate Attempts Per Year
1816-1913	238	15.28%	2.4
1914-1945	255	16.37%	7.9
1946-1989	806	51.73%	18.3
1989-2001	259	16.62%	21.6
Total	1558	100.00%	8.4

Although the apparent increase in frequency of compellence attempts is striking, each of the periods is sufficiently represented in the data for a rich study of single state vs. single state compellence attempts.

Description of the Phenomena of Compellence

As noted above, initial descriptions of the facts of compellence will be drawn from the 1,558 cases where a single state attempted to compel a single state. The 335 cases that involve multiple states on either or both of the sides of the interaction will be included later.

A starting point for understanding compellence is to look at how compellence attempts distributed in time. Are they focused in times of great uncertainty or across periods of relative calm? Are they becoming more or less frequent? Figure 2 below

provides the frequency of compellence attempts by single states against single states for the time period 1816 – 2001 inclusive.




Figure 2. Single State vs. Single State Compellence Attempt Frequency by Year

Compellence attempts do not appear to be distributed evenly across time.

Following a somewhat flat distribution from 1816 to about 1907, attempts begin to increase in the period surrounding World War I. They seemed to peak sharply right before World War II, rapidly falling off for two years after the War. The number of attempts then rises rapidly and stays at a level not previously sustained.

These variations may not be meaningful until we consider the number of states that could conduct compellence events. In figure 3, the same sample of attempted compellence cases have been divided by the number of states in international system in each year.




Figure 3. Compellence Attempts per Number of States in International System

The graph in figure 3 controls for the effects of the growth of the number of states after World War II. It provides a clearer perspective on the compellence behavior of states and allows a comparison of historic periods of activity. This figure is expressed as the number compellence attempts in a specific year as a percent of the total number of states. This provides a factor that is directly comparable across time periods. From 1816 to 1907, on average, compellence attempt frequency by the number of states was 6.9 percent. Between 1908 and 1930, the rate increased to an average of 12.6 percent, almost double the previous rate. Between 1931 and 1945, average compellence attempt frequency was 17.2 percent, more than double the initial period and substantially more than the previous. In the period from 1946 to 2001 despite the massive increase the number of states (68 to 191), compellence attempts fell only to 13.9 percent of the number of states in the international system. This is still twice the rate of compellence

attempts per state than the initial period (1816-1907) and higher than the years surrounding World War I (1931-1945). With the control for number of states in place, it can be observed that not only is the distribution not even, peaking near the two World Wars, but that attempts continue very strongly even during both the Cold War and Post Cold War periods.

If compellence attempts remain high, the next logical question focuses on the results of those attempts. Is success increasing or decreasing? Was success higher in some particular periods? To address these questions it is first striking to note that out of the 1,558 attempts, very few, 105, were successful. Totally successful compellence is a very rare occurrence. However, the reader will recall that compromise as an outcome was initially held as a failure of compellence to be re-examined later. If we redefine compromise as partially successful compellence, we would still add only 127 cases. This is approximately 8 percent of the 1,558 cases of attempted compellence. As shown in figure 4, the cases that end in compromise follow a similar trend as the more strictly defined successful compellence cases. The increase in number of cases does not change the temporal relationship of attempts versus success, but their inclusion could weaken conclusions about the mechanisms of compellence. In other words, redefining cases of compromise as successful compellence could increase the number of “successful” cases but may distract from the clarity of conclusions about compellence. For this reason, the study will continue using the strict definition of successful compellence.




Figure 4. Ten Year Moving Average of Successful Compellence, Compromise Cases, and Attempted Compellence

Returning to the strict definition of compellence, in table 5, the cases of successful and unsuccessful compellence attempts are noted across the entire sample period and within two portions of that sample. Although the rate for successful compellence across the entire period is 6.7 percent, the pre-World War II rate for successful compellence is 16.8 percent, and post-World War II only 2.1 percent.

Figure 5 shows that the period 1816 to 1946 had significantly higher rate of successful compellence attempts (16.8%) when compared to the period 1946 to 2001 (2.1%). Figure 5 graphically represents successful compellence over the entire time period under study, by providing a ten-year moving average to highlight the trend. It indicates that the rate of successful compellence decreased over time and that it fell precipitously after World War II.

Table 5. Occurrence of Successful and Unsuccessful Single State vs. Single State Compellence, 1816 – 2001.

	1816-1945		1946-2001		1816-2001	
Successful Compellence	83	16.8%	22	2.1%	105	6.7%
Unsuccessful Compellence	410	83.2%	1043	97.9%	1453	93.3%
Total Attempts	493	100.0%	1065	100.0%	1558	100.0%




Figure 5. Ten-Year Moving Average Frequency in Percentage of Successful Compellence

The Puzzle of Compellence

When the rate of attempted compellence, adjusted for the number of states in the international system, and the percentage of successful attempts are superimposed as in Figure 6, an interesting shift in compellence patterns emerge. The attempts at compellence continue on a generally upward trend throughout the period even when adjusted for the growth of the number of states in the international system. However, at

the end of World War II, the number of successful compellence attempts falls dramatically. This shift in pattern constitutes the main concern in this work.




Figure 6. Ten year Moving Averages of Frequency of Attempted Compellence per Number of States and Success Rate as Percent, Superimposed

Explaining this shift with the understanding of compellence provided in the current literature will be difficult, because the current understanding of compellence is not well grounded empirically or theoretically. In order to be able to directly address the shift in the pattern of compellence, other facts about compellence will need to be established. The same set of data that has been used to describe the pattern of successful compellence will be used to correct some of the significant myths about compellence that are contained in the current literature. After those myths are banished and an empirical based understanding is established, this study can return to explain the significant shift in inter-state compellence.

The empirical discussion above indicates some stability in the rates of successful compellence from 1816 through 1945. Although compellence was slightly less successful, on average, as the Concert of Europe decayed, other than post World War II there were no other eras when successful compellence was suppressed across the globe for 50 years. Yet, despite the relative stability in the level of compellence success, there were substantial changes throughout the international system; Germany underwent unification, the U.S. became a power to be reckoned with, China shifted from the imperial system, Russia underwent a revolution and the world became more connected by technologies that improved communication and movement.. Although there is no single date in which all of these substantial changes occurred, it is apparent that the beginning of World War I marked the existence of a changed international system. The international system continued to evolve, but there are more similarities between the 1914-1945 international system and the system of 1946-2001, than there are commonalities between the pre-World War I system and the post-World War II system. To minimize the potential disruptive effects that a large number of system changes may create, this analysis will use the 1914-1945 period as the baseline against which to compare the 1946-2001 conditions.

Conclusion

It is unlikely that all the major powers became less effective at compellence and remained so for more than fifty years from internal or idiosyncratic causes. This suggested that we look for systemic causes for the reduced effectiveness by examining the phenomena through a broad set of empirical data. This chapter provided the empirical

basis to accomplish two tasks in that examination. First, it outlined data that comprises the post-World War II compellence puzzle. By describing the puzzle in empirical terms, it makes it more susceptible to analysis. The same data will help to clarify the actual activities that are going on. In doing so, this chapter has equipped our analysis with data to test the current literature and has laid the groundwork to address a number of potential answers to the compellence puzzle outlined earlier.

To improve our understanding of compellence, it will be helpful to provide a intellectual framework to frame the empirical perspective. This examination now turns to avail ourselves of conceptualizations used in previous research to explain the phenomenon of compellence.

CHAPTER III

INITIAL CONCEPTUALIZATION

Using Literature and Logic to Understand Compellence

To be able to engage in a coherent discussion about a compellence puzzle it is necessary to establish two things. The first is a clear understanding of the term ‘compellence’ and its implications. The second is an appreciation of the conceptual tools that can be applied to solve the puzzle posed by the record of compellence patterns outlined in the previous chapter. This chapter will examine the existing conceptualizations of compellence, looking specifically for ideas that would help systematically explain or predict the temporal variations seen in the compellence puzzle. It will then test some of the common claims by use of the data introduced in the previous chapter. This examination will start to develop a set of similarities that can be useful in discussing compellence, despite the differences in various conceptualizations. These similarities exist in five areas: actors, actions, tools, environment, and outcomes. The examination will also show that the current conceptualizations can not fully explain the facts of compellence in the post-World War II era.

Current Formulation of Compellence

Thomas Schelling’s *Arms and Influence* is widely recognized by most other compellence scholars to be the authoritative source for the formulation of the issue area.¹ By contrasting the act of taking something from someone or forcing them to give it to

¹ Schelling, *Arms and Influence*.

you from fear, Schelling starts to differentiate between what he calls “brute force” and coercion. Brute force is the controlling or seizing that the adversary has no choice in. Schelling's conceptualization of coercion is communication of a threat to cause pain to the other party unless they comply and the subsequent decision to comply or resist. He further differentiates threats that deter and threats that compel. Deterrence is characterized by the threat of pain intended to ensure that an action is not taken. Compellence is characterized by a threat of pain intended to ensure that action is taken. Schelling asserts that there are five necessary conditions for successful compellence.

1. The threat conveyed must be sufficiently potent to convince the adversary that noncompliance is too costly.
2. The threat must be perceived as credible by the adversary, that is, he must be convinced that the coercer has the will and the capability to execute it in case of noncompliance.
3. The adversary must be given time to comply with the demand.
4. The coercer must assure the adversary that compliance will not lead to more demands in the future.
5. The conflict must not be perceived as zero-sum. A degree of common interest to avoid full-scale war must exist. Each side must be persuaded that it can gain more by bargaining than by trying unilaterally to take what it wants by force.²

Given the central place of Schelling's work in the literature, these five conditions bear some examination. The first condition: The threat conveyed must be sufficiently potent to convince the adversary that noncompliance is too costly, introduces three ideas. The first is the “threat conveyed.” There is a variety of ways to convey a threat, from verbal communications to display of forces to exemplar use of force. Schelling does not indicate that one method of conveyance is superior to another, whereas other authors

² Ibid., 3-4, 76.

have claimed higher efficacy for some preferred methods.³ The second idea is potency. The axiom indicates that the threatened action must be severe enough to cause the threatened damage. Threatening blockade with a minuscule or inefficient navy would not meet the test of potency. Schelling does not indicate in this passage how one would determine the required strength, but it is logical to assume that the threaten use of a capability that was incapable of causing the threatened damage would cause compellence to fail. The third idea is to convince the adversary that noncompliance is too costly, i.e. the damage is too great to bear. This approach focuses the point of effect at the adversary's mind and makes cost estimation the underlying decision logic. Therefore, if the adversary does not calculate a large cost relative to the demand, compellence will fail.

The focus of Schelling's second condition is the target's perception of the sender's credibility, divided in two elements; will and capability. Of these two, capability, being comprised primarily of physical things, seems to be the most easily perceived and its credibility most readily judged. However, if the sending state and the target state have wide variances in capabilities, the target state may not recognize that the claimed capability exists.

Will is even more difficult for decision makers to correctly perceive. Decision makers often receive benefits from inaccurately portraying their own will, so their declarations may be discounted.⁴ Adding to this difficulty is the possibility that decision makers, elites, and the public may change their positions over time. Even if the sending

³ Pape, *Bombing to Win*, 18-20.

⁴ Kenneth A. Schultz, *Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 39-40.

state attempts to accurately communicate its will and capability, clarity is not automatic.⁵ As with the other variables above, failures to perceive either will or capability will result in failure of compellence.

The third condition is about providing the adversary sufficient time to comply. This inclusion of time as a factor in compellence appears to be one-sided. That is, it appears to be counseling patience on the side of the sending state rather than addressing the use of deadlines as a method of exerting pressure on target state decision makers. This condition would seem to be particularly apropos if the desired action had a substantial physical component. One would assume from the statement of this condition that compellence will likely fail if given insufficient time to work.

The fourth condition deals with the adversary's perception of future behavior on the part of the sending state. It requires the sending state to provide assurances to the adversary that compliance will not result in additional demands, reminiscent of a long-term blackmail scheme. There is no mention of the mechanism required for the target state to believe those assurances nor does it seem likely that the sending state will forswear all future compellence based on a single acquiescence. However, logically, the target state must possess some belief that compliance will not be met with incessant demands lest it would assume an infinite cost, reject compliance, resulting in a failure of compellence on every occasion.

The fifth condition is about the perceptions that must be shared commonly by the participants. Schelling includes three underlying issues in this condition, zero-sum, common interest, and efficacy of bargaining. The first issue expressed is that the conflict

⁵ Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 219-21.

must not be perceived as zero-sum. The reference to zero-sum calls on game theory to communicate the idea that both the sender and the target state need to believe that the solution will not come wholly at their cost. This idea seems to indicate that compellence attempts that appear to be focused on relative gains will fail. The second idea of common interest introduces the basic ingredient for negotiation. It specifies a very basic common interest: avoidance of massive death and destruction characterized by full-scale war. The introduction of avoidance of full-scale war as the common interest implies that it is the ultimate threat that underwrites all compellence. Further, this implies that states that are in a war cannot be compelled. This may be generally true; however, the example of Japan's acquiescence based on the promise of further nuclear destruction in World War II provides one countervailing example. The final sentence of this condition indicates that both states must possess the belief that bargaining will provide more value or higher benefits than the unilateral use of force. Alternatively, it is possible that those benefits are not direct benefits from negotiation, but instead the benefits may be derived from upholding a norm of limited use or proportionality of force. However if a belief in the potential value generated through bargaining does not exist, compellence will fail.

Although Schelling provides a substantial base for theorizing, the five conditions and the remainder of his work present compellence as set of actors conducting actions, but with no significant mention of external conditions such as era or geographic location or outcomes other than success or failure. From this perspective, Schelling provides very important underpinnings to the body of compellence work but does not directly contribute to the resolution of the post-World War II puzzle. Before wholly dismissing the potential contributions of Schelling's work to addressing the compellence puzzle,

once a larger conceptual and theoretic base is established, we will synthesize elements from this and other works to more fully explain the compellence puzzle.

The Diplomacy Dimension of Compellence

In another foundational work in conceptualizing compellence, *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*, Alexander George and William Simons divide compellence into its offensive and defensive aspects and identify coercive diplomacy with the defensive aspects of compellence.⁶ The differentiation within compellence between offense and defense is the reason that motivates its use. Generally, if compellence is a method to get a decision maker to stop, start, or modify an action, offensive compellence would be the activities to convince a target decision maker to start an action and defensive compellence would be the activities to convince a target decision maker to stop or modify an action. These are not absolute categories, but served as an initial guideline.

Offensive compellence then is the case where the sending state desires the target state to provide some benefit such as surrender of land, favorable trading relations, or some other thing of value. The sending state could use a threat of force, demonstrations of force, or a threat of the escalating use of force in the future to get the target state to comply with their desire. In common parlance, the sending state would be considered the aggressor, creating the reason for the dispute.

Defensive compellence would hold that the motivating force is that the target state is engaged in some kind of behavior to which the sending state objects. In response, the sending state, desiring these acts to be stopped or modified, threatens the use of force,

⁶ George and Simons, *Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*, 7-8.

conducts demonstrations of force, or threatens an escalating use of force in the future to get the target state to comply with their desired condition. In this case, the target state could be considered the aggressor, certainly by the sending state, and possibly by other actors, as this logic indicates that the target state has created the motivation for the dispute.

The difference between offensive and defensive compellence appears primarily to be one of viewpoint. In the case of defensive compellence, the target state may be conducting activities that are beneficial to that state and considered by its regional standards to be neutral or even positive forms of behavior. Since the discussion has not included a universal referent that was held to be violated, one state's defensive compellence appears as another state's offensive compellence. The characterization of offensive and defensive may become useful if the motivating behavior for the compellence is compared to a universal norm such as of abhorrence of genocide, but does not appear to be intellectually useful in the context of two states or groups of states with differing standards of behavior.

George and Simons provide a conceptualization of coercive diplomacy but indicate that operationalizing the concept is difficult and perhaps impossible to achieve. Deriving a requirement for rationality on the part of the target state and specifying three key variables, magnitude of the demand, magnitude of the opponent's motivation not to comply, and a threshold factor of whether the opponent will feel the threatened punishment is sufficiently credible, the authors indicate that this is, at best, a quasi, incomplete deductive theory.⁷

⁷ Ibid., 13-15.

After detailed examination of 7 case histories, the authors of *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy* continue to reflect the attendant uncertainties of compellence in conditional generalizations akin to those used by Schelling.⁸ They indicate that if a state decides that those conditions are met the success of the outcome is largely dependent on “skill in improvisation” and will not constitute a high confidence strategy in many cases.⁹

The question, once again, centers on the usefulness of the formulation established by George and Simons to address the puzzle of variation in compellence patterns in the post World War II era. Their differentiation of offensive and defensive compellence may be interesting, but after examination above, it appears to be a subjective difference that does not help solve the puzzle. This discussion has echoed the previous in terms of actors and actions, but suggests that the tools for successful compellence are diplomacy instead of military force. Nevertheless, their emphasis on the quotient of diplomacy to military force may offer an avenue of investigation. If it could be shown that diplomatic interaction was highly correlated to success of compellence attempts, we could then look for variations in that quotient. If a change in the quotient was correlated with the pattern of behavior, these quotients could be indicators of a causal mechanism. As mentioned earlier, after a larger conceptual base has been established we will revisit this potential.

Daniel, Hayes, and de Jonge Oudraat, leaning heavily on UN experiences in the 1990s, suggests a set of actions that is between the UN traditional impartial peacekeeping and simple enforcement action on behalf of the attacked state in *Coercive Inducement and the Containment of International Crises*.¹⁰ The primary focus of their

⁸ Ibid., 268-90.

⁹ Ibid., 293.

¹⁰ Daniel, Hayes and de Jonge Oudraat, *Coercive Inducement*, 4.

conceptualization is also diplomatic. Coercive inducement deals explicitly with improving the quality of consent that United Nations operations need to conduct peacekeeping. The authors indicate that coercive inducement is a variant of coercive diplomacy with less emphasis on the use of the military to threaten, but with increased emphasis on defensive military actions to hold aggressors' capabilities harmless, which provides room for the previously mentioned suasion to be effective.¹¹ The idea is that even compelled action limits inhumane or destabilizing behavior. It assumes that any consent is provisional at best and the subjects of the peacekeeping operation will test the limits of the United Nations' will. Minimum military force is used in order to enable the diplomatic change mechanisms of discussion, blandishments, appeals to emotions or conscience, rewards, threats, or punishments.

This discussion depends primarily on the same actors and tools as the previous but suggests a different application of those tools in action. Although the formulation specified here may be novel, we come again to the question whether there is some aspect of this formulation that would help us explain the compellence pattern change phenomenon noted in the introduction. Although the authors are forwarding this formulation as a proposal vice recording common practice, this work emphasizes a similar concern as George and Simons as to the need for pre-eminence of diplomacy in the area of coercive actions. Although this is not a unique insight, this formulation, coming from a non-state perspective emphasizes the potential importance of the mix of diplomacy and to military action as an indicator for successful or non-successful compellence.

¹¹ Ibid., 21-24.

A Proposed "Ideal Policy" for Compellence

Peter Viggo Jakobsen in *Western Use of Coercive Diplomacy After the Cold War: A Challenge for Theory and Practice*, although solely focused on the problem of countering other nations' military adventurism after the Cold War, provides some conceptual clarification and logical comparisons of Schelling's and George and Simons' work.¹² A key aspect that Jakobsen mentions but does not develop as a central theme is the fact that all coercion leaves the decision of whether or not to comply to the target of the action. Drawing from the previous work, he continues by creating an "ideal policy" from the U.S. or other Western power perspective for coercive diplomacy success. The question becomes, is this ideal framework useful in explaining the changes in compellence patterns?

The ideal policy has four elements: 1) a threat of force, backed by the necessary capability to defeat the opponent or deny him his objectives quickly with little cost, 2) a deadline for compliance, 3) an assurance to the adversary against future demands, and 4) an offer of "carrots" to replace losses created by the target's compliance.¹³

The first element conforms to the previous theorizing by Schelling and George and Simons but adds the dimension that the threatened operation to inflict damage on the target state should be of little cost to the sending state. The first elements also adds the possibility that the threatened military action would be aimed at the target state's capability to achieve its objectives instead of merely punishing in a general sense. The second element introduces time as a strong factor necessary for compellence. This agrees in a general sense with previous formulations. Although a deadline for compliance was

¹² Jakobsen, *Western Use of Coercive Diplomacy*, 11-24.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 30.

not identified as one of the key conditions for compellence, other authors have described compellence demands linked to an ultimatum or tacit ultimatum as a possible tactic.¹⁴ Jakobsen's third element, assurance of the target state that further demands are not forthcoming also is consistent with Schelling's formulation, and therefore offers no unique insight. The fourth element, offering carrots for compliance appears to be an operationalizing of Schelling's admonition against apparent zero-sum games.

This ideal policy appears to be designed to specify the elements of action that satisfy the conditions that Schelling and George and Simons require. However, Jakobsen reports that this ideal policy is designed for use against aggressors only and much like the previous work constitute a minimum of actions vice all required actions. He indicates that following the ideal policy will not guarantee success; only that not meeting its minimum requirements will lead to compellence failure. He specifically notes that the possibility of misperception or miscalculation on the part of the opponent is not captured in the ideal policy framework.¹⁵

Jakobsen's approach refers to a set of Western states matched against militarily adventurist states and emphasizes the amount of military capability difference between them. We return once again to the question, does this particular construct offer a way to address the puzzle posed by the change in compellence patterns since World War II? As is indicated in the above discussion, the ideal policy framework specified by Jakobsen appears to be a way, with a particular set of target states, to address the requirements for compellence specified by earlier authors. The one difference this approach seems to pose is the requirement that the sending state be able to successfully conduct its military

¹⁴ George and Simons, *Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*, 18.

¹⁵ Jakobsen, *Western Use of Coercive Diplomacy*, 32.

operations quickly with little cost. This approach requires that the sending state not only enjoy a significant military superiority, but that he must also be capable of denying the opponent the ability to retaliate.¹⁶ If it can be shown that this significant military superiority with the ability to deny the possibility of retaliation in the future is an actual requirement for compellence, this could provide leverage to understand the change in compellence patterns after World War II.

Alternate Perspectives

These delineations and definitions encapsulated above are not universally accepted. Lawrence Freedman in an edited volume, *Strategic Coercion*, argues that the idea of coercive diplomacy is not analytically useful.¹⁷ As his title suggests, he forwards what he contends is an improved conceptualization that encompasses Schelling's and George's constructs. This conceptualization agrees with the general construct of coercion but also includes a close regard for how strategic actors construct reality and how each actor understands how the other actor constructs reality.¹⁸ Inclusion of the echo of strategic interaction in the base formulation of coercion includes the possibility of making learning, culture, and norms part of the compellence construct.

Although not intended to explain compellence, Daniel Drezner in *The Sanctions Paradox* illustrates a parallel set of ideas in the economic realm.¹⁹ This literature reflects the same logic of a contingent demand in order to get the target state to change some behavior. A key focus is on strategic behavior. Drezner's discussion highlights that state leaders act to maximize the regime's utility and interest more than achieving specific

¹⁶ Ibid., 28-29.

¹⁷ Freedman, "Strategic Coercion," 18.

¹⁸ Ibid., 36.

¹⁹ Daniel W. Drezner, *The Sanctions Paradox: Economic Statecraft and International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

outcomes. Further, those leaders fashion preferences in reaction to the capabilities and intentions of other states in the international system.

Combining these two points, the decision makers would be concerned about concessions that can be used later to threaten their security especially in relation to states whom they believe may someday pose a threat. In other words, concern for relative gain is variable depending on the decision makers' perception of future threat. Given this concern for future threats, decision makers also prefer to have a reputation for tough bargaining. The literature highlights a similar caveat that this concern for reputation is conditioned by expectations of future demands. The desire for a tough reputation is high when facing states that are judged to have the potential for making future demands.²⁰ Another interesting factor from the economic sanctions literature is a perspective about the balance of the capabilities. Although states must keep the aggregate distribution of capabilities in mind, they will be more concerned about the local correlation of capabilities, since it may not be possible to redirect capabilities towards the target without excessive cost or time delay.²¹ This idea of local superiority in the correlation of capabilities may help explain situations where the aggregate capability balance would have suggested the opposite outcome. These two alternative perspectives introduce the idea of a larger context or environment with the inclusion of strategic interaction and relative gains discussions.

²⁰ Drezner, *The Sanctions Paradox*, 28-33.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 31.

The Military Dimension of Compellence

In contrast to George and Simons and others who emphasized diplomacy, there is also a part of the literature that has focused more on the military end of the spectrum. For example, Cimbala in *Coercive Military Strategy* espouses the use of a broader range of action across the diplomatic – combat spectrum. He views this strategy as inclusive of coercive diplomacy, but open-ended in terms of readiness to escalate into full-scale warfare.²² Pape, in *Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War*, similarly characterizes the strategies for military coercion, differentiating them by the type of target selected.²³ However, unlike the previous authors, Cimbala and Pape paint these strategies as linked to technological advances and modern times. The discussion here reiterates the same actors, similar actions, but highlights the potential of a set of military tools as a critical aspect to understand the compellence puzzle. Does an increased capability to selectively punish difference sectors of a state help us understand the change in patterns of compellence? The answer does not appear to support their model. As success in compellence has dropped severely after World War II and the technology to strike with more precision has increased, there appears to be a negative correlation in the rise of technology that provides the ability to precisely deliver punishment and the level of success in compellence. Increasing the accuracy of punishment is not related to increased compellence success.

²² Cimbala, *Coercive Military Strategy*.

²³ Pape, *Bombing to Win*.

Synthesis

It is apparent from the preceding discussion that there is little agreement as to the mechanisms of compellence. Most writing on compellence has been focused on improving its effectiveness for policy makers. This approach has failed to include an empirical base, find agreement on the causal factors, or to clearly describe the phenomenon over time. However, it is possible to improve the understanding of compellence by finding similarities that can be synthesized across the differing accounts. Similarities can be characterized in five areas: actors, actions, tools, environment, and outcomes.

Across the writing, it seems to be a consistent understanding of compellence as having two primary actors: a sender and a target. This orientation does not exclude multiple participants on either side of the transaction but instead identifies the roles on either side. The role of the sender is to achieve a desired outcome through use of communications that informs a target of a desired condition or behavior on the part of the target and the potential for future punishment should that condition not be attained or behavior not conducted. The role of the target then is to decide to comply or not with the demand. The target has the opportunity to perform acts that achieve the outcome condition that the sender desired and also has the opportunity to not react to the communication. Further, the target has the opportunity to attempt to become a sender in its own right, i.e. counter-compellence.

Less unanimity is found regarding the appropriate tools to communicate the potential for future punishment. Some writers and practitioners prefer to communicate the potential for future punishment by various practical demonstrations of the same; others

seem to prefer a minimum amount of physicality, allowing for written or verbal communications as the primary means.²⁴

Another commonality is the potential of the environment. The sending and target states are likely already intermeshed in some relationship as part of the international environment. This previous relationship may be friendly or adversarial. Existing adversarial relationships such as being a party to a larger conflict, war, or participation in a series of communications on the subject could reinforce or mitigate the content of the communication. Further, as part of that environment, third parties, such as other states or international organizations could also reinforce or mitigate the content of the communication without becoming part of the sending or target entity.

The final similarity is the idea of outcomes. For compellence to occur the sending state has to be able to enunciate a desired outcome or a change in current conditions and the target state has to be able to perceive and act to create that outcome. Further, both the sending state and the target state have to be able to agree that the expressed outcome has been achieved or not. If the sending state cannot express the desired change in conditions, the chances that the target state will achieve it are nil. If the target state cannot perceive or act on the required condition the chances of compellence occurring is also nil. Likewise, although a target state may take action, if both parties cannot perceive that the outcome has been achieved, either party may conduct itself as if it had not.

To recapitulate – A model of compellence is comprised of a sender, a target, and a punishment contingent demand. It operates in an environment that can enhance or disable the transaction. A compellence episode ends with an outcome. The senders intended

²⁴ Cimbala, *Coercive Military Strategy*; George and Simons, *Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*.

outcome is to change an existing condition without having to actually resort to the threatened use of force to achieve its aims. The target's preferred outcome is no change in the status quo.

These are the general outlines of compellence that are available through the specialized literature. Although the literature is informative on the subject of compellence and provides a general model within which to further develop explanations, it is apparent that none of the specialized literature directly addresses the puzzle of the change in compellence patterns over time.

Three Myths

Discussion of compellence, by and large, has been comprised of policy relevant studies to inform decision makers of the pitfalls and promises of compellence. In doing so, the writers of these relevant studies have focused on aspects the decision makers can affect. Studying a subject such as compellence from within the process or mechanism has led to a literature that has focused on the internal aspects, with little regard for the connection of compellence to the broader set of literature. The level of analysis remains at the individual or state level and does not contain a systemic perspective of why compellence is attractive or un-attractive to decision makers and states, but attempts to solve what makes compellence succeed or fail. While focusing on aspects that the decision makers may control, the writers highlights those factors as controlling within the mechanism. Another selection effect, created by writing policy relevant literature that depends on case studies, is the selection for cases with generally positive results and with characteristics comparable to the target audience for the subject of discourse. Although

these focusing mechanisms make the literature more comprehensible to the target audience, they may result in an incomplete and inaccurate portrayal of the efforts in this field.

This phenomenon has resulted in three myths being perpetrated in the current compellence literature. One key aspect a decision maker can factor into his compellence decisions is the balance of the military capabilities between the sending state and the target state. Further, researchers have developed methods to estimate capabilities across various states. As researchers could manipulate this variable it became part of the explanation of compellence. Nevertheless, since a broad empirical base was not established, a myth has developed about the amount of military capabilities required to successfully conduct compellence. Another key aspect that a decision maker can affect is the use of the diplomatic tools of statecraft as part of compellence. Use of case studies of familiar attempts at compellence and a selection effect by authors more familiar with diplomatic methodologies highlighted diplomatic action as an important independent variable in the compellence equation. Like the myth of the primacy of capability, the opposing myth has developed: diplomacy, with a bare whisper of military force, is the only effective method to conduct compellence. Logically, both cannot be true, and empirically, neither is. Finally, since compellence literature is largely case studies written from a major powers viewpoint, a selection effect for familiar cases has created a narrowly focused literature. This has led to a myth that compellence is conducted only by major powers. The existence of these myths penetrate and color writing and thinking about compellence, impeding a coherent understanding of the phenomenon.

To recapitulate, the three myths are: vastly superior military capability is required for successful compellence, the maximum of diplomacy and minimum military is required for successful compellence, and compellence is a major power only endeavor. Therefore, it is necessary to disprove these myths before moving to a better understanding of the factors that animate the post-World War II compellence puzzle.

The Myth of Military Superiority

A core aspect of current writings on compellence is the communication of the willingness and ability to use military force in a way that would create unacceptable damage to the target or its interests unless it conducts a desired action or ceases conducting actions that are not desired. Within this broad construct a number of variations are captured in the extant literature. As a portion of compellence is about the use of military capabilities, some approaches stress the relative amount of capabilities between the sender and the target. Many writers in the field of compellence stress the idea that the threat conveyed must be of sufficient potency that the adversary is convinced that noncompliance is too costly to bear.²⁵ This perspective is probably most strongly expressed by Peter Viggo Jakobsen in *Western Use of Coercive Diplomacy After the Cold War*. Jakobsen indicates that the state that is attempting to compel must be able to defeat the adversary rapidly and without much cost to the compeller. He argues that threats that would require lengthy and costly endeavors do not support compellence. He indicates that in practice this requires a significant military superiority.²⁶ Further, he indicates, the compelling state also requires the ability to deny the opponent the ability to

²⁵ Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman, *The Dynamics of Coercion: American Foreign Policy and the Limits of Military Might* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 85-105; Jakobsen, *Western Use of Coercive Diplomacy*, 39-41; Cimbala, *Coercive Military Strategy*, 81-85; Freedman, "Strategic Coercion," 21, 28-29.

²⁶ Jakobsen, *Western Use of Coercive Diplomacy*, 28-29.

retaliate. This is a very high standard, which by extension, requires the compelling state to be able to present a *fait accompli* currently and for some indeterminate time in the future. In fairness to Jakobsen, he was attempting to build an ideal policy by which to conduct compellence, which he proceeds to test against case studies. However, as he tests that ideal policy, he finds that predicted outcomes of the policy correlates well with actual outcomes.²⁷ If a more comprehensive sample of compellence attempts negates a portion of the proposed “ideal policy” the entire policy should be re-examined. This requirement for overwhelming military capability will be tested with empirical data.

The expectation, if vastly superior military capability is needed to compel, is that states that are successful in their compellence attempts will have substantially higher capability scores in the Militarized Interstate Dispute database, as compared to their targets. If the first expectation is borne out, a second expectation is that the senders’ capabilities scores will remain higher, for at least a few years, than its target of compellence.

The empirical fact is that successful compellence does not require the sort of superiority in military capability specified by Jakobsen, and implied by much of the other compellence literature. Within the 1,558 occurrences of single state versus single state attempted compellence, 1816 to 2001, approximately 24 percent of the 105 successful compellence states had composite state capability scores lower than their targets. In other words, almost one quarter of the successful compellence was achieved by a “weaker” state. This does not support the requirement for preponderant capability as a precursor to successful compellence. On the positive side of the capability balance sheet, where the

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 130-33.

compeller's military capability was greater than the target's capability, there were many cases where the advantage was marginal at best as reflected by the central tendency as seen in the figure 7.

The capability scores here, extracted from the Correlates of War data, depict combined scores that take military personnel, military expenditures, energy production, iron and steel production, urban population and total population into consideration. The total score of world capability is 1.0. The difference score is calculated by subtracting the target state's capability score from the sending state's capability score. A positive value indicates that the sending state had more capability than the target state. A preponderant state, such as the United Kingdom in 1826 may have as high as a .338 military capability, possessing more than one third of all of the possible capability in the world.




Figure 7. Frequency of Successful Compellence and Capability Difference

The common understanding that to be successful the state attempting to conduct compellence must be substantially more militarily capable than its target is obviously mistaken. The data show that superior military capability is not a prerequisite for successful compellence. Although the data indicates a slightly larger number of successful compellers have some advantage than those operating with a capability deficit, both states with little advantage and states that have less capability than their target have been successful. Given that the idea of substantially more military capability as a necessary condition for successful compellence is not supported by data and the observation of a wide distribution of capabilities for successful compellers, one could theorize a dynamic where actual capability is only marginally related to success or failure of compellence. A number of logical questions immediately present themselves; do those states that attempt and fail to compel have a like distribution of capabilities? If superior capability is not required to succeed, what capability is related to failure?

In the case of failures of compellence, the most common case seems to be where the prospective compeller and its target are closely matched in capabilities. Although a very substantial number of cases display this characteristic, there remains a number of cases of compellence failure where the prospective compeller substantially overmatched his intended victim and those where a large undermatch of capability existed as seen in figure 8.




Figure 8. Frequency of Unsuccessful Compellence and Capability Difference

From the chart in figure 8, it can be observed that failures of compellence are most common when capability is closely matched, with approximately 58 percent of sending states that failed at compellence possessing a composite capability score higher than the target state. However, the data does not rule out failure for other configurations, even attempts with seemingly preponderant capabilities. Comparing the successful and the unsuccessful samples, the distributions do not match exactly, there is a slight advantage in having more capability than your target, but Jakobsen's requirement "that the coercer ... needs to enjoy a significant military superiority" as part of minimum requirement for compellence is certainly not supported.²⁸

A possible insight into how the myth came about is provided in figure 9. It captures the successful cases of compellence when multiple states compelled a single state, 1816-2001. The capability differential score is strongly positive in all 13 cases. In

²⁸ Ibid., 29.

11 of the 13 cases, the sending states were European. If there was a selection bias to examine European states' activities, which has included many alliances and entente, and one examined primarily successful compellence attempts; a logical conclusion may be that preponderant capability was a requirement for successful compellence. However, this observation is not supported by the data across time for all regions.

Although capability is an integral part of the compellence mechanism, it is apparent that neither great capability nor weaker capability guarantees success or failure at compellence, nor does it ensure stout resistance. Therefore, we must examine other tools and aspects of compellence to clarify the relationship.




Figure 9. Frequency of Multiple States vs. Single States Successful Compellence and Capability Difference

The Myth of Diplomacy

The second understanding that may hamper the effective study of compellence is one that is offered in counterbalance to the use of strong military force as the key action

that creates the desired compellence effect. Some authors stress diplomatic actions as the key tool of compellence almost to the exclusion of military force. In a large portion of the literature, as illustrated by *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*, edited by Alexander L. George and William Simons to *Strategic Coercion: Concepts and Cases*, edited by Lawrence Freedman, the bargaining, conferences, consultations, and thoughtful but exhaustive discussion appears to be a central feature of successful compellence.²⁹ Most literature portrays this process as give-and-take between two sovereigns and subsequently structures analytic processes on a move and counter-move basis to mirror that understanding. From empirical data we will be able to assess the impression we gain from the literature that successful compellence requires substantive diplomatic activities. If this perspective is accurate, the expectation is that we should observe that almost all cases of successful compellence will have diplomatic solutions. The aforementioned Militarized Interstate Dispute database records the method of resolution for each dispute and therefore it will be fairly easy to determine if diplomatic actions are actually the sine quo non of successful compellence.

The method of settlement is assigned one of four categories: negotiated, imposed, none, and unclear.³⁰ From this data we will be able to examine the impression we gain from the literature that successful compellence requires substantive diplomatic activities. Of the four methods of settlement, the first category of "negotiated" would seem to support a view of bargaining and the importance of diplomatic interchange as a key factor in success. The second category of imposed, with its key indicators of unconditional surrender or adversary's occupation of territory and failure to withdrawal would not

²⁹ George and Simons, *Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*; Freedman, "Strategic Coercion."

³⁰ Jones, Bremer, and Singer, "Militarized Disputes," 181.

indicate lack of negotiations, but suggest a supporting role to the physicalities of the situation. The third category of none, still would not indicate that negotiations were not attempted, just that they were not significant to the outcome. Of course, the fourth category does not provide any insight into the central significance of negotiation in compellence. To support the centrality of diplomatic actions in compellence we would expect "negotiated" to be the predominant method for successful compellence cases.

Comparing the forms of settlement with successful compellence outcomes we find that negotiations are not the linchpin to the success of compellence as indicated in table 6. Thirty seven percent of the cases of successful compellence were recorded as having had "none" as a settlement method. Further, approximately 19 percent of the successful episodes of compellence were reflected in the "imposed" category where military capabilities seem to be more useful than diplomacy. About 42 percent of the cases of successful compellence were marked with "negotiated" as the settlement method. This indicates that more than 50 percent of successful compellence occurs without the benefit of leaving a public trace of a negotiated settlement. For comparison, unsuccessful cases are also listed. Not surprisingly almost eighty percent of unsuccessful cases had no evidence of a settlement mechanism. Interestingly, 233 cases where negotiations did occur ended in unsuccessful compellence in comparison to the 44 successful cases that had evidence of negotiation.

Table 6. Settlement Methods for Single State Compellence

	Successful		Unsuccessful	
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent
Negotiate	44	41.9	233	16.0
Impose	20	19.0	78	5.4
None	39	37.1	1130	77.8
Unclear	2	1.9	9	0.6
Missing	0	0.0	3	0.2
Total	105	100.0	1453	100.0

Returning to the MID codebook, examining the coding rules for an outcome of yield, which is the strictest definition in this study to be considered a successful episode of compellence, along with the coding rules for the settlement category provides a clearer perspective. The definition of yield is that “a state offers concessions that alter the status quo in exchange for not being militarily threatened or to stop further military attacks...” Further, the definition for none as a settlement method includes “none of the conditions of negotiated settlement are present ... denotes the lack of any formal or informal effort which successfully resolves...” the dispute. Conditions of a negotiated settlement include a “written agreement”, “joint communiqué”, “exchange of letters”, “formal acceptance of cease-fire”, “existence of a verbal or tacit understanding by official representatives.”³¹ In other words, the MID researchers found that in more than 50 percent of the cases of successful compellence, no tangible output of diplomatic negotiation was in evidence. It would seem then that compellence can and does frequently occur without the specialized exchange of views that is commonly called diplomacy, and that it can operate at a more visceral level, where actions provide the essential vocabulary to denote the threat and

³¹ Ibid.

acquiescence. Therefore, diplomacy, in the sense of ministerial consultations in the tradition of Mitternich is not an absolute pre-requisite for successful compellence and is not even required the majority of the time.³²

This approach stands in contrast to the diplomatic and bargaining focus of the majority of current compellence literature previously mentioned. This mismatch between expectation and practice indicates a need to conceptualize the process of compellence differently than current literature obtains. Where literature portrays this process as give-and-take between two sovereigns and subsequently structures analytic processes on a move and counter-move basis to mirror that understanding, the data suggests that a number of different ways are used to achieve political aims. Specifically, the interaction could include a number of instances of not applying diplomatic means or resolving the situation via violence, but stand pat on a position and achieving policy aims via resistance.

The Myth of Major Powers

Since superiority of military capability is not a necessary condition to succeed at compellence, and adroit diplomacy may not be necessary, how true might the perception be that compellence is the province of major powers? When international relations scholars discuss the use of the threat of force or exemplar use to get a second party to act in a certain way, many think of “gunboat diplomacy” as practiced by the UK and U.S. Foundation works such as *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy* by Alexander George and William Simons and *Forceful Persuasion* by Alexander George, discuss compellence

³² Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), 87-88.

almost as the sole province of major powers.³³ Within *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy* all seven case studies focus on the U.S. as the compeller, with various target nations throughout the world. *Forceful Persuasion* follows the same pattern. In a more recent work, *Western Use of Coercive Diplomacy After the Cold War*, Peter Viggo Jakobsen, as implied in his title, derives cases from compulsion actions by the U.S. and other Western nations, which includes the majority of major powers in the world.³⁴ This sample of literature would seem to indicate that attempted compulsion actions are conducted predominantly by major powers, and that a study of these actions provides a firm foundation for the understanding of this global phenomenon. If true, the expectation is that compulsion attempts by major powers should be a high proportion of all compulsion attempts. If the actual ratio of major power attempts to minor power attempts in the literature matches the major to minor power attempts ratio in the historical record, this will indicate that the literature has correctly depicted compulsion as a major power activity. As the Militarized Interstate Dispute database captures the major power status for each state involved in each compulsion attempt, this expectation will be easily tested.

However, the data, as captured in table 7, indicates that the major powers compulsion attempts comprise a little more than one quarter of all single state vs. single state compulsion attempts. In the period 1816 to 2001, the major powers, as a group, conducted 429 compulsion attempts of the total of 1558.

³³ George and Simons, *Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*; George, *Forceful Persuasion*.

³⁴ Jakobsen, *Western Use of Coercive Diplomacy*.

Table 7. Major Power Participation in Single State Compellence Attempts

	Frequency	Percent
Minor Power	1129	72.5
Major Power	429	27.5
Total	1558	100.0

It does appear that major powers, which have never totaled more than nine, participate in more attempts than their sheer numbers would tend to indicate, but almost three-quarters of single state vs. single state compellence attempts are conducted by minor powers. However, as implied earlier, major powers may focus on compellence attempts that include allies or partners. When the 76 cases of multiple states attempting compellence against a single state are examined, almost 80 percent of those involved at least one major power. Further, when the cases of multiple states attempting to compel multiple states are examined, more than 60 percent of the 23 cases involve major powers as sending states.

To review, table 8 below captures all cases, both single and multiple state activity, where outcomes that could be readily identified as compellence or failure of compellence. As was previously noted, less than 10 percent of the attempts were successful.

Table 8. Single and Multiple State Compellence Rates, 1816-2001

	Success	Failure	Total	Success Percent
Single State	110	1527	1637	6.71
Multiple States	24	232	256	9.35
Totals	134	1759	1893	7.07

To understand how that small percentage is distributed in regard to major power status we will need to examine the various combinations of major power and minor powers that were involved in compellence or as a target. Table 9 provides a summary of successful compellence by sender and target.

Immediately obvious is that minor powers are responsible for the greater number of compellence attempts and fewer numbers of successes. However, given nine major powers, in their various incarnations, have conducted about 600 attempts at compellence, and the minor powers, growing from just under twenty to approximately 180 states conducted about 1300, major powers are, on an attempts per state basis, much more active than the minor powers. In addition, the major powers have a much higher success rate than minor powers.

Table 9. Success Rates of Major and Minor Powers with Number of Attempts

	Target States			
		Major Power	Minor Power	Total
Sending States	Major Power	10.23% n=176	16.95% n=419	595
	Minor Power	4.29% n=210	3.31% n=1088	1298
	Total	n=386	n=1507	1893

Although the myth that only major powers attempt compellence is shown not to be true, the examination of this myth leads us to an interesting observation about the major power vs. minor power proportion of successful compellence. Major powers are generally more successful than minor powers when viewed across the entire period under examination. However, the compellence puzzle is inherently about changes over time. To illuminate possible differences over time, all cases were coded as either before and during World War II or after World War II. Table 10 highlights the changes in success from one period to the next.

Table 10. Success Rates in Two Time Periods with Number of Attempts

		1816-1945	1946-2001	Total
		Sending States	Major Power 23.42% n=333	4.38% n=262
Minor Power	9.93% n=292	1.62% n=1006	1298	
Total		625	1268	1893

The change over time perspective illustrates a significant set of information in relation to the compellence puzzle. As previously implied, the substantive increase in numbers of attempts is related to the growth in the number of minor powers. After we control for that growth, compellence attempts levels continue at nominally historic levels. Interestingly, the major powers have more of a drop in the rate of compellence success (23.42% to 4.38 %) than minor powers (9.93% to 1.6%). To better understand these reductions, similar data can be examined from a regional perspective. To ensure clearer regional specification, we must momentarily return to data that reflects single state against single state compellence attempts. Although there may be some slight variation from preceding figures, the trends remain clear.

Table 11. Detail of Success by Type of Power and Region, Single State in Percent

		1816-1945	1946-2001	
Sending States	Major Power	Europe	22.00%	1.19%
		Middle East	N/A	N/A
		Africa	N/A	N/A
		Asia	25.00%	0.0%
		Americas	40.00%	8.33%
	Minor Power	Europe	11.11%	1.19%
		Middle East	0.00%	1.56%
		Africa	0.00%	2.84%
		Asia	26.32%	1.89%
		Americas	9.49%	0.84%

As seen in table 11, major powers in all regions, but slightly less so in the Americas, became ineffective compellers, as did the once successful minor powers in Asia. Minor powers in the Middle East and Africa became slightly more effective but remained

largely ineffective. Although these interesting variations exist across regions they are not quite sufficient to explain the causes of the patterns we see in the compellence puzzle. We will return to that portion of the puzzle for discussion in a later chapter. The point here is that compellence is not just a major power activity, but instead an activity pursued by majors and minor powers alike.

Summary

This chapter discussed compellence from the perspective of the conceptualizations available in the specialized compellence research for two purposes. The first was to improve our understanding of the term ‘compellence’ and its implications. The second was to achieve an appreciation of the conceptual tools available to address the compellence puzzle posed in the previous chapter. Through this examination, it was possible to detect some commonalities in the actors, actions, tools, environment, and possible outcomes of compellence. This examination also led to rejection of some of the commonly held myths about compellence. However, modern science prefers that critiques of existing explanations be followed by an alternate explanation that more fully explains the facts at hand.³⁵ By finding some commonalities in the conceptualizations of compellence in the specialized literature and discarding other explanations, this chapter has formed a starting point to broaden the discussion of compellence. In the next chapter, we will avail ourselves of some selected portions of international relations theory to establish a more coherent understanding.

³⁵ Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave, eds., *Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970).

CHAPTER IV

IMPROVED CONCEPTUALIZATION

Contributions of IR Theory

The previous chapter presented conceptualizations based on the specialized compellence literature and addressed three common myths. The framework derived from the compellence literature and addressing these three myths is still insufficient to fully understand how compellence has changed over time. To move closer to solving this puzzle, we must avail ourselves of the broader international relations literature. In this next section, some of the predominant international relations theories will be examined to determine if and how they illuminate compellence and more specifically, increase our understanding of the puzzle of changed compellence patterns. After review of applicable theory creation of a synthesis framed by the previously discussed similarities actors, actions, tools, environment, and outcomes will provide the ingredients to create a useful description of compellence.

Realism

Hans Morgenthau encapsulate the realistic approach in his argument that the central motivation for action between states is their pursuit of interest expressed as power. He provides a rich vision, enumerating multiple factors that may indicate a state's potential to influence others to exercise or gain more power.¹ Morgenthau highlights the threat of military force as a method to impress upon other states the demonstrator's military preparedness and capabilities. Beyond demonstrations of capability, he notes the

¹ Hans J. Morgenthau and Kenneth W. Thompson, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, 6th ed. (New York: Alfred A Knopf, 1985).

partial or total mobilization provides a strong tool to communicate strength and resolve to other states. However, as these demonstrations serve to impress potential adversaries and keep the allegiance of current allies, the highest use being to give a state such a reputation for power as to enable it to forgo the actual employment of the capabilities. This idea comports directly with compellence.² Nevertheless, Morgenthau cautions that even with these demonstrations it is very difficult to correctly assess, through power calculations that include allies, opponents and various possible alliances, the balance of power and states' likely actions.³ The central thoughts of communication, uncertainty, and calculation remains critical in compellence, however noting them is not sufficient, by itself, to explain when and where it has been and is likely to be unsuccessful. The aspect of realism that provides the threat of force as a potential tool appears to agree more with the version of compellence as envisioned by Schelling than by Alexander George. However, realism provides little traction to understand specific variations over time. Understanding the alternatives to traditional realism may inform the variations of compellence we see in the puzzle.

Kenneth Waltz parsimoniously and pragmatically envisions a system that is comprised of states, operating in a condition of anarchy, with no superior entity, differentiated only by the level of capabilities, operating in a self help fashion. He argues that these system dynamics give rise to automatic balancing where states will join to counter a more powerful state that threatens them and the system.⁴ His framework acknowledges the use of force between states, but provides little direct leverage to the

² Morgenthau and Thompson, *Politics Among Nations*, 93-97.

³ *Ibid.*, 224-26.

⁴ Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York: Random House, 1979).

practitioner or student of compellence. One could view attempted compellence and resistance to it as an expression of the anarchic and survival focused nature of the system, but this level of formulation provides little insight into the facts of many compellence attempts and few successes in the post-World War II era.

In Waltz's neorealism balancing is the essential activity that maintains the system. Applying this aspect of neorealism, we would expect that states would frequently come to the aid of a state that was a target of a compellence attempt. However, the data does not bear out that expectation. Only about 16 percent of the militarized interstate disputes between 1816 and 2001 were characterized by having another state join the dispute after its initiation. Therefore, overt balancing does not provide leverage to explain the variation seen in the compellence puzzle.

However, some balancing may not be as overt as movement of troops or launching of ships. Since the action of the sender is to transmit a punishment contingent demand, appropriate balancing actions may be to issue contingent assurances of future support to the target in such a way that they are known to the sender. Announcing a future delivery of military hardware to a target state as a sign of support may allow the target state to more confidently resist the demands of the sending state. This idea of balancing via the communication of interest or intent, enabled by the ability to rapidly move combat forces throughout the globe may take place of overt declarations of support or physical deployment of military forces. No longer tied to the techniques of railroad and road marches seen in the preparations to World War I, the ability to rapidly deploy and redeploy forces across the globe provides a built-in presence without generating the types of evidence that would be captured from troop movements. Thus, balancing may

have evolved from physically aligning the military forces of many against the strongest, to a new form. This form consists of a combination of the expression interest or intent and a rapidly responding global force presence. Unlike the initial form of balancing of the many versus the strong, this form of balancing requires a state with global reach capabilities, such as the U.S. to strike a balance.

Constructivism

Other theorists address changing perspectives of the impact of communication of ideas or intent. For example, Alexander Wendt, like Waltz, highlights the importance of the system, but identifies social interaction as the force that constructs both the system and the actors.⁵ His discussion allows for states to be constructed in three general types, Hobbesian, Lockean, and Kantian. These cultures become self fulfilling prophecies that perpetuate themselves.⁶ A constructivist could venture that Hobbesian states attempt compellence as a cultural expression of appropriate state-to-state intercourse, and resistance as a proper Hobbesian response. Further, Lockean states may attempt compellence, and resist, applying the logic of competition, but would avoid escalation to the point that would destroy the other competitor state. Kantian states would not attempt to use compellence, but would resist and join with others in their resistance.⁷ Wendt suggests that evolution of states in the Kantian direction is a possibility although not predicted.⁸ Logically, if such an evolution occurred it would result in decreased compellence attempts over time, as Kantian states would have no use for compellence. However, the data show that attempts at compellence range across democracies and

⁵ Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

⁶ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 308-9.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 257-58.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 311-12.

autocracies, in all geographic regions, and across all religious groupings, and that compellence is practiced increasingly often, and commensurately resisted. Therefore, Wendt's overall formulation may not be the appropriate answer to the puzzle. However, other aspects of constructivism that reinforce the idea that social structures, that is, shared ideas, acquired logics, and tendencies that persists through time may prove useful. Although the logic of anarchy may generally hold, a system change may create the conditions for a modification and internalization of a new logic, resulting in a different pattern of compellence. The caesura that was the end of World War II, with the immediate competition between the U.S. and the USSR, but also with the transformation of what was normal international discourse, could be such a shock.

Complex Interdependence

Other writers such as Keohane and Nye provide intricate interactive visions of complex interdependence, with webs of vulnerability and susceptibility and multiple channels, multiple issues, and reduced utility of military force.⁹ Although this theory was developed in opposition to the realist school, the ideas of interconnectedness and the possibility that multiple channels and multiple issues may influence state action are aligned with the compellence authors' description of the environment in which compellence operates.¹⁰ However, a central idea within the complex interdependence is the minor and diminishing role of military force. The authors allow for the threat of force to deter attacks, and allow for a desire for military protection to support issue linkage

⁹ Keohane and Nye, *Power and Interdependence*, 2nd Ed.

¹⁰ Keohane and Nye, *Power and Interdependence*, 2nd Ed, 1-27; George, *Forceful Persuasion*.

bargaining, but suggest that the use of force has costly effects on non-security goals and domestic policy support that constrains the use of military force.¹¹

Domestic Influences

The idea of international and domestic costs of using force can provide some insight into the low success rate of compellence. If the sending state's decision makers did not initially understand the possible international and domestic costs of their compellence attempt, target state actions that communicate those costs to the sender's elite and to their domestic audience may be helpful in resisting compellence. Beyond merely communicating what those costs might be, the target state also has the option to generate some of those costs for the sending state through linkage strategies. Complex interdependence also highlights the role of international organizations as an outgrowth of multiple channels and lack of hierarchy between issues. These international organizations allow small and weak states to pursue those linkage strategies. The existence of these international organizations and their ability to enhance the practice of linkage allows for different political patterns than one might expect in a strict balance of power or cost benefit analysis model.¹² Complex interdependence also indicates the multiple channels that create connections among societies blur the distinction between domestic and international politics. It suggests that attitudes and policy stands of domestic groups are likely to be affected by a communications, organized or not, between them and their counterparts abroad and that this influence will not be limited to nongovernmental actors. These multiple channels and the communications across them may make it difficult to

¹¹ Keohane and Nye, *Power and Interdependence*, 2nd Ed, 24-29.

¹² Keohane and Nye, *Power and Interdependence*, 2nd Ed, 35-37.

coherently define a state's interests.¹³ The rapid advances since World War II in telecommunications technologies have allowed a more rapid flow of information to and from more locations than previously thought possible. It is not surprising that information can form the basis of decisions or can influence others within the network. Although the reduced utility of military force under conditions of complex interdependence does not explain the continued high level of threats to use force, it comports with the low success rate of those threats since World War II.

As Putnam illustrates in his discussion of two-level games, states' negotiators have a vested interest in influencing the opposing sides' domestic constituency.¹⁴ Although Putnam's example focused on expanding the opposing negotiators win set, and notes the difficulty of truly understanding another state's domestic politics, it communicates the ideas of "suasive reverberation," where communications at the international level can have substantial positive or negative effects at the domestic level.¹⁵ This work offers the idea to compellence that targets or third parties can directly interact with senders domestic constituencies and can create effects within the senders polity. This may explain part of the causal mechanism that led to the dramatic decrease of success in compellence.

Implication of Hegemony

Still other works highlight the issue of hegemonic power, current and past, the establishment of converging expectations for state behavior, the value and capability of

¹³ Ibid., 33-34.

¹⁴ Robert D. Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games," *International Organization* 42, no. 3 (Summer 1988): 451.

¹⁵ Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games," 456.

institutions.¹⁶ These connective discussions indicate that institutions and organizations that are operating today are at least partly a result of the U.S. operating as a hegemonic power. The rise of a norm that held that the use of force to compel is illegitimate and the growth of a set of institutions to nurture norm growth and enable its spread may have been created, or at least enabled, unwittingly, by U.S. hegemony. Even if the U.S. may attempt to use compellence, the norms and institutions continue to operate, without hegemonic backing. These norms and institutions may have become key to the post World War II trend of successful resistance.

Individual Leaders' Contributions

Finally, there is an extensive literature that focuses on the personality and accomplishments of individual statesmen, limning them as the motive force for states' behavior.¹⁷ This perspective provides a potential for understanding the reasons to comply or resist in a particular case study, however in its pure form, runs in contradiction to the previous systemic perspectives. In order to comprehend the results of thousands of compellence attempts, the actions of many more thousands of political leaders would have to be studied and put into a framework or system. As Kenneth Waltz states about the insights of behavioral scientists, "...the insights of the behavioral scientists are like a number of pearls, or glass beads, lying around loose. Their value may be great, but their use is slight unless they can either be placed in a setting or put on a string."¹⁸ A work by

¹⁶ Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984); Robert O. Keohane and Lisa L. Martin, "Promises, Promises: Can Institutions Deliver?" *International Security* 20, no. 1 (Summer 1995): 39-51.

¹⁷ Seyom Brown, *The Faces of Power: Constancy and Change in United States Foreign Policy from Truman to Clinton* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994); George Perkovich, *India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999).

¹⁸ Kenneth N. Waltz, *Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), 78.

Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, and Morrow, *The Logic of Political Survival*, may be sufficient to fulfill Waltz's intent. Their construct holds that political leaders shape their policies and allocation of benefits in such a way as to reward and thereby influence the particular constituency they need to stay in office. Politicians' policy choices are selected because they are compatible with maintenance of office.¹⁹ Although their study highlights leaders' choices in the broader areas of taxing, spending, policy choices and war behavior, the logic should remain valid for the narrower subject of compellence. Therefore, politicians' policy choices about compellence should be affected by their desire to maintain office. If domestic forces are to be accepted as part of the explanation of the compellence puzzle, we should see a relationship between the level of compellence activity and leaders' longevity in office. In fact, a strong relationship exists between leaders that attempt compellence and increased longevity in office, *ceteris paribus*.

Synthesis of Theories

From this brief review, it is obvious that many of the international relations theories have aspects that can improve our understanding of compellence and specifically of the puzzle of post World War II patterns. The discussion to this point provides us with three major areas. The first is the general structure of compellence harvested from the earlier discussion of the specialized compellence research. This structure consists of a sending state, the target state, a punishment contingent demand, and an outcome. The second major area comes from review of extant international relations theories, which then helped explain the behavior within the above structure. The final area is elements of

¹⁹ Bueno de Mesquita et al., *The Logic of Political Survival*, 7-9.

the compellence literature that appear to be represented as at least partial causal factors. To have a coherent explanation of the patterns we see in post World War II compellence we will have to relate the first two, structure and theory, and account for the previously offered causal factors.

Realism provides the underpinning idea of compellence that demonstrations of capability or varying levels of mobilization are a robust tool to communicate strength and resolve. It characterizes the highest use of this activity being that the state can achieve its goals without the actual employment of the capabilities. Neorealism and constructivism provide the first tools to counteract the demonstrations or mobilization suggested by realism. Conditioned, educated, and informed by the calamity of World War II and the behaviors shortly before and after, states to deal with compellence within the bipolar system. Complex interdependence provides the ideas of interconnectedness and multiple channels over which individuals and international organizations can bring attention and pressure to bear. Both complex interdependence and other works on the international and domestic overlap highlight a possible change mechanism to deflect the pressure of threatened military actions. Robert Keohane in *After Hegemony* provides for the possibility that the structures initially grown with U.S. assistance can survive system changes and lack of subsequent support from the hegemon.²⁰ In the case of compellence, those structures to support resistance could continue to exist and may even be used in reaction to the hegemon's efforts at a later date. These theories all provide building blocks to help understand why compellence is almost always successfully resisted in the post World War II era. However, they do not appear to inform our understanding of why

²⁰ Keohane, *After Hegemony*, 49-51.

compellence then would continue to be attempted at historic rates. Borrowing from Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, and Morrow the reason could be related to the fact that these attempts, successful or not, are compatible with the maintenance of office by political leaders.

However, this amalgamation cannot be accomplished by merely alluding to the building blocks of theory, they must be ordered. An ordering that begins to illuminate the observed patterns is that leaders conduct activities that tend to be compatible with their maintenance in political office. One of those behaviors is threatening the use of force from a realist paradigm to defend and promote state interests. However, in a highly connected and interdependent environment, those actions are actually constrained by the environment. The activity of other states, their domestic constituents, and international organizations, whose beliefs have been constructed by a World War II and post World War II experiences, intercede regularly. These intercessions, directed at either the sending state or the target state, may be sufficient to allow the target state to successfully resist the demands of the sending state. This pattern and structure, constructed early in the Cold War, has been included and maintained as part of the international operational code by international organizations such as the U.N., global media, and encoded in the domestic law of some states. This inclusion allows the phenomenon to continue although the original conditions for its construction no longer exist.

Elaboration

A brief elaboration of this potential compellence framework of actors, actions, environment, and outcomes, motivated and given shape by the applicable portions of

international relations theory can provide some important insights that may be helpful later in coming to a conclusion about its usefulness. The first area for elaboration is the actors. The actors are the leaders of the opposing states. Their function is to make policy decisions, which are then carried out by the state mechanisms. Although it is recognized that the state mechanisms; military, diplomatic, economic, and information, can introduce variations in the process of carrying out the policy decisions, their effect over time and across the multiple states is nominal for the purposes of this study. Given that there are at least two state leaders in the model it is appropriate to examine both perspectives.

Initially, before the sending state leader is aware that he needs to attempt to change a behavior, the target state's leader has made a decision to take an action that, as Bueno de Mesquita et al argues, is calculated to optimize maintenance of political office.²¹ The leader likely believes that this action creates some benefit for himself or an important constituency.²² In other words, the target state leader chooses to embark on a course of action that will result in more power or a more secure position for themselves, better access to natural resources for the industries owned by the selectorate, reduction of some perceived threat to the state, or some combination of the above.

The leader of the sending state decides that this action is somehow detrimental to his political well-being or is in violation of his state's interests. This provides the motivation to send a demand that the target state stop, start, or modify its actions. Depending on the environment, if the sending state's leader determines that a request not linked to potential use of force, or some other form of suasion cannot motivate the change in activity by the target state, he or she may then decide to issue a punishment contingent

²¹ Bueno de Mesquita et al., *The Logic of Political Survival*, 7-9.

²² Yaacov Y.I. Vertzberger, *Risk Taking and Decisionmaking: Foreign Military Intervention Decisions* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998), 49.

demand. As outlined in Pape, the threatened punishment could be aimed at a number of different types of targets.²³

For example, in Haiti, October 1993, armed mobs and gunboats manned by police confronted the U.S. amphibious ship Harlan County, which was there to disembark initial U.S. troops under the UN brokered Governor's Island accord. This activity caused President Clinton to withdraw the USS Harlan County and not put forces ashore in Haiti at that time.²⁴ The Haitian leaders had decided that to allow the U.S. forces, even few as they were, into Haiti was not compatible with continued maintenance of their political power.

The USS Harlan County situation caused U.S. domestic repercussions. Attacked by both liberals and conservatives within the U.S. Congress and in liberal society for his lack of resolve, President Clinton's eventual action was to issue a demand for the Cedras regime to step down or to suffer an airborne invasion and forcible removal from office. This threat was linked to vigorous on-scene diplomatic activity.²⁵ The Haitian regime was isolated from any form of support in the broader international environment by a U.S. enforced UN blockade and abhorred by the region's leaders. The outcome, in this case, was that regime leaders complied with demands to step down and to direct their military and paramilitary not to forcibly resist U.S. forces when they landed.

This example appeals to the realist tradition where the threat of force is a viable tool to exercise power. However, the constructivist and neo-realist perspectives are also informative. Given the illegitimate and brutal nature of the Haitian regime, any states that

²³ Pape, *Bombing to Win*, 18-19.

²⁴ Mark Peceny, *Democracy at the Point of Bayonets* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999), 164.

²⁵ Peceny, *Democracy at the Point of Bayonets*, 165-68.

would have attempted to intercede and provide support in opposition to U.S. demands would have done so at the risk of appearing to support the barbaric methods used by Cedras' supporters. International organizations such as the UN supported removal of Cedras' regime. In this environment, no intercession occurred against the U.S. threat of the use of military force.

The features lacking in this example can be illustrated by review of an additional example. Since the signing of the Dayton agreement, Slobodan Milosevic attempted, through various seizures of territory to convince the Croat leadership to cede further territory. This exemplar use of force was "balanced" by President Clinton meeting with President Mesic and Prime Minister Racan.²⁶ This meeting yielded an announcement of \$21 million in developmental aid, \$4 million for foreign military financing, from the U.S., reiteration of Croatian membership in the NATO Partnership For Peace program, and \$4.5 million contribution to non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to help returning refugees and internally displaced persons in Croatia.

The environment that Milosevic was operating in had been developed during the various episodes of violence and ethnic cleansing in the Balkans. At this point, Milosovic had no external international partners and was about to lose an election inside Serbia. The Croat leadership conducted a show of force and negotiated a return of the seized areas. The outcome was a failure of compellence on the part of Milosevic.

The realist will recognize Milosevic's threat via exemplar use of force as a method to increase Serbia's power, and the constructivist will note that the recent Balkan conflicts left lasting impressions that helped create Milosevic's isolation. With all states,

²⁶ U.S. Department of State. "Transcript: Clinton Meets Croatian President, Prime Minister." In *International Information Programs*. 9 August 2000. <http://usinfo.org/usia/usinfo.state.gov/topical/global/refugees/archive/00081004.htm> (accessed 17 Oct 2004)

even including Serbia's traditional ally Russia, unwilling to support Milosevic's continued use of military force to acquire territory, and the U.S. and the international community, represented by the resettlement NGOs, actively supporting the target of compellence, the Croats could more easily resist, resulting in a failure of compellence.

Summary

This chapter provides a possible explanation of how compellence may operate. In this conceptualization, action is motivated by the leader's desire to conduct activities that are compatible with maintenance of political office. A second leader, also motivated by maintenance of political office, decides the best way to get the target state leader to change the offending behavior is to issue a demand with a linked threat of the use of military force. The political environment, which includes international organizations, norms about use of force, and political allies, is likely to mitigate the sender's threats, especially in the post World War II era. Unlike previous conceptualizations that stress calculations of levels of pain, the central deciding factor in this conceptualization is the leader's perspective of how the actions will affect his or her political longevity. Since World War II the most common outcome of this process is a stalemate, where the target state continues to execute the actions that started the sequence and the sending state does not carry out its threats.

By linking commonalities in the conceptualizations of compellence in the specialized literature and the broader international relations theoretic base this chapter has synthesized an explanation of the mechanisms of compellence. This possible explanation may be useful to address the post-World War II compellence patterns.

CHAPTER V

EXPLAINING POST-WORLD WAR II FALL IN COMPELLENCE SUCCESS

Previous chapters have clarified compellence from an empirical perspective, outlined the existence of the compellence puzzle, provided a conceptualization of compellence, and dispelled some common compellence myths. Equipped with both empirical and conceptual tools, we now turn, in the three succeeding chapters, to examine and attempt to address the three aspects of the compellence puzzle. The first portion of the puzzle to be examined is the precipitous drop in compellence success immediately after World War II.

In a well-understood science, a researcher could state the basic laws of a phenomenon and then proceed to discuss the modifications or special factors that pertain to a particular situation. However, in compellence the difficulties are manifold. As previously revealed in the discussion of theory, basic laws and causal factors for success and failure of compellence are unclear. Schelling indicates that there are five necessary conditions for successful compellence.¹ George and Simons identify five contextual variables; global strategic environment, type of provocation, image of war, unilateral or coalition coercive diplomacy, and the isolation of the adversary---to ascertain whether coercive diplomacy is a viable strategy in a given crisis. After a decision is taken to use coercive diplomacy, the authors highlight nine conditions that favor success for coercive diplomacy.² Others highlight variants with less emphasis on the use of the military to threaten, but with increased emphasis on defensive military actions to hold aggressors'

¹ Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, 3-4, 76.

² George and Simons, *Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*, 8, 211-15, 279-88.

capabilities harmless so that suasion can be effective.³ Still others highlight strategic actors and a constructivist approach.⁴ In short, the existing compellence literature does not provide a clear guide to understanding the variation seen in compellence success and failure. Nevertheless, to move forward, it might not be necessary to understanding the entire cluster of compellence related behaviors but only to identify the factors that reduced the success rate at a particular time. By assuming that each of the theoretical observations illuminates some portion of compellence, but does not characterize the whole, we can simplify our task by focusing on the changes that are associated with the end of World War II. This way progress can be made on understanding the variations and the underlying principles at the same time.

Narrowing the Examination

Our previous empirical discussion indicted that to minimize the potential disruptive effects that a large number of system changes may create, this analysis will use the 1914-1945 period as the baseline against which to compare the 1946-2001 conditions. In addition to focusing the investigation on eras that are as much alike as possible, it is important to examine the change in compellence outcomes from two perspectives. The first perspective is a direct examination to determine the possible causes of the sharp drop in compellence success. The second perspective is need to illuminate the fact that compellence success remained suppressed for a more than 50 years from that drop. As the continuation of a low success rate is unusual within the historic record, it is possible that factors other than those that created the initial suppression are responsible. This

³ Daniel, Hayes, and de Jonge Oudraat, *Coercive Inducement*, 21-24.

⁴ George and Simons, *Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*, 36.

chapter will focus on the first perspective, the immediate drop, the following chapter the issue of continuing low success.

A change previously highlighted in the post-World War II timeframe was the region of the sending states that were attempting to conduct compellence. In the period 1914-1945, Europe had the largest number of compellence attempts, as seen in figure 10.




Figure 10. Compellence Attempts, 1914-1945, by Region

As the number of states grew in the Middle East, Africa, and Asia they took on a larger percentage share of compellence attempts, while the previous main contributors, Europe and the Americas, continued to attempt compellence, but had reduced proportions of the total compellence effort as depicted in figure 11.




Figure 11. Compellence Attempts, 1946-2001, by Region

As the regional proportions shifted, so did the nature of the states that were attempting to compel. The states that came into being after 1945 were not major powers, but minor powers. The major powers, long established, had just fought an exhaustive, bloody world war. In table 12, attempts and the success for single state vs. single state for major and minor powers can be seen for both periods.

Table 12. Major and Minor Power Comparison, 1914-1945 and 1946-2001

		Total Attempts	Succeed	Fail	Attempts per Year	Percent Success
1914-1945	Major Power	147	25	122	4.6	17.0
	Minor Power	108	5	103	3.4	4.6
1946-2001	Major Power	189	7	182	3.4	3.7
	Minor Power	876	15	861	15.6	1.7

To narrow the field of possible sources of the reduced success at compellence, one can test to determine if there is continuity in the performance of these two groups. In

terms of continuity, there are four possible outcomes. One outcome is that both major powers and minor powers perform after World War II much like they did in the previous era. By looking at the reduction in the overall rate of compellence success, we know that this cannot be true, so this option is discarded. Another outcome would be that both types of powers suffer a reduction in success. The other two outcomes are that either the minor powers or the major powers suffer the reduction in success. Using the record of single state vs. single state compellence for the period 1914 through 1945 and the period 1946 through 2001 success means were examined to see if their success distribution remained the same between the two periods. An independent samples t-test, equal variance not assumed indicated that the means differences are statistically significant for the major powers.⁵ The difference in the means indicates that it is statistically improbable that the reduction in means for major power success rates was random. A second independent samples t-test, equal variance not assumed indicated that the means differences are statistically insignificant for the minor powers.⁶ The difference in the means indicates that it is within statistically probability that the reduction in means in minor power success rates was random. From a statistical perspective, the fall in compellence success after World War II is related to a change in major powers' performance, and cannot be attributed to minor powers' performance. Therefore, the first element of explaining the suppression of successful compellence will examine major power attempts in the post-

⁵ Major powers' success means from 1914-1945 and 1946-2001 were subject to an independent samples t-test, equal variance not assumed. It indicated that the means differences are statistically significant, $t(202.856) = 3.912$, $p = .000$. The pre-1946 era ($M = .17$, $SD = .377$) was substantially higher than the 1946 and after era ($M = .04$, $SD = .189$).

⁶ Minor powers' success means from 1914-1945 and 1946-2001 were subject to independent samples t-test, equal variance not assumed. It indicated that the means differences are statistically insignificant, $t(117.176) = 1.404$, $p = .163$. The pre-1946 era ($M = .05$, $SD = .211$) was slightly higher than the 1946 and after era ($M = .02$, $SD = .130$).

World War II environment and why they failed so much more often than in the past.

Although the change in performance of minor powers was not found to be statistically significant, these cases will be reviewed later to gain additional insight.

Changes in Time

In order to focus on major power attempts, we will first review the performance changes from one period to the next to further identify where the change occurred.

Selecting states that were major powers in both periods provides a continuity of comparison. Table 13 shows states that were major powers in either time frame.⁷ We will drop Austria-Hungary from this part of the analysis since it did not conduct any single state compellence attempts in the first period and did not exist as a state for most of the first and all of the second period.

Table 13. Major Powers and Status Changes

	1914-1945	1946-2001
United States	Continuous	Continuous
United Kingdom	Continuous	Continuous
France	1914-1940, 1945	Continuous
Germany	1914-1918, 1925-1945	1991-2001
Austria-Hungary	1914-1918	Dissolved
Italy	1914-1943	Minor Power
Russia / USSR	1914-1917, 1922-1945	Continuous
China	Minor Power	1950-2001
Japan	1914-1945	1991-2001

Table 14 shows the major powers and their compellence performance in the two time periods under discussion. A visual examination reveals substantially varying

⁷ Melvin Small and J. David Singer, *Resort to Arms: International and Civil Wars, 1816-1980* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1982).

performance for each state. The U.S., although not prolific, was fairly successful in the first period, whereas in the second period its success rate dropped severely. The United Kingdom's rate of success increased substantially in the 2nd period, but it attempted single state compellence only four times, negating the significance of that increase.

Table 14. Major Powers' Single State Compellence Performance, 1914-1945

	1914-1945			1946-2001		
	Attempts	Success	Percent	Attempts	Success	Percent
U.S.	10	4	40.0	36	3	8.3
UK	14	1	7.1	4	1	25.0
France	3	0	0.0	14	0	0.0
Germany	46	5	10.8	0	0	0.0
Italy	20	1	5.0	1	0	0.0
Russia/USSR	38	9	23.7	69	3	4.3
China	6	1	16.6	64	0	0.0
Japan	20	5	25.0	3	0	0.0
Totals	157	26	16.5	191	7	3.6

France was more prolific in attempts, moving from 3 to 14, but was completely unsuccessful in each era. Germany had been a solid performer at 46 attempts with about a 10 percent success rate in the first time frame, but after World War II, Germany did not make any solo attempts at compelling other states. Italy has a similar pattern with 20 early attempts and a five percent success rate, but only 1 attempt since World War II with no successes. Russia, in its various incarnations, increased its attempts a great deal, but its successes dropped even more substantially. China had not been an aggressive attempter of compellence and had little success in the first period. In the second period, China increased its attempts dramatically, was never successful. Japan, in the first period was a

solid user of compellence, with 20 attempts and five successes. After World War II, it attempted compellence only three times and was not successful. To make use of these data elements it will be helpful to put them into the context of the political environment.

Before World War II, the international system was relatively stable, but both fascism and communism were nascent threats to that order. Britain, France and other European countries continued to play the great power game, much as they did during the Concert of Europe. In the Pacific, the U.S. along with the Dutch, French, and British controlled islands, much of Indochina, and India, Burma, Hong Kong, and Malaya. Japan was aggressive, but lacked critical natural resources and was engaged with China. Russia was relatively weak and not expansive at this time. In the Middle East and Africa, European colonialism dominated and in the Western Hemisphere, American economic actions guaranteed cheap raw materials and dependable markets.⁸

At the end of World War II, the United States was the preponderant power on the planet. It had gone to the ends of the earth to defeat the evil that was Nazism, and the Japanese empire. The American nuclear monopoly offered the opportunity to destroy any enemy within days. The U.S., with the atomic bomb, the requisite delivery devices, and required infrastructure, was in a different category when it came to measuring capability. With the totalitarian powers destroyed, America had begun to bring her boys home, demobilize them and reconvert its economy and society back to a peacetime footing. Nevertheless, all was not well. The USSR with its large land mass, substantial armies, and its demonstrated will to sacrifice millions of men in defense was also in a different league than most states. The Soviet Union, an erstwhile member of the Alliance,

⁸ Stephen E. Ambrose and Douglas G. Brinkley, *Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy Since 1938* (New York: Penguin Books, 1997), 1.

continued to occupy and consolidate territory. Areas that they did not occupy were subject to having their institutions undermined by various Soviet agents. While the U.S. atomic capability could obliterate thousands of people at a time, the Soviet capability was immediately applicable to seizing and controlling people, land, and resources. The distribution of relative capabilities had now changed. Many of the European state's capabilities had dropped substantially, as did Japan's. Alternatively, the U.S. and the Soviets both had risen dramatically,

The post-World War II era was marked by a new international system. As Waltz highlights, a system is comprised of a set of interacting units at one level and a structure at another.⁹ In the international system, the ordering principle is generally anarchic and the units are normally considered states. These states are substantially undifferentiated, insofar as they execute the same functions. Waltz argues that they are distinguishable by distribution of capabilities across units.¹⁰ Through the process of World War II substantial capability was destroyed and created. The destruction, noted in figure 12, although perhaps not as horrific as the battlefield slaughter of World War I, was considerable.

⁹ Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 48.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 100.




Figure 12. Major Power Capabilities, 1935-1955

For example, as the Soviet Union's population dropped from 196,659,000 in 1941 to 177,300,000 in 1945, while iron and steel production dropped from 15,584 to 12,252 tons for the same period, its warmaking capability dropped from about 18 percent of the world's capacity in 1935 to near 12 percent in 1945. At the same time, the United States moved from about 19 percent in 1935 to almost 40 percent of the world's warmaking capability.¹¹ However, capability is not just based on raw materials. Capability is also based on the ability to organize, train, and equip elements of the state to accomplish the various required functions such as military and security functions. As the principle of entropy indicates, energy is needed to create that organization. For states, energy is often expressed in terms of money. As we examine the drop in post World War II expenditures, in table 15, we can get a feeling of the loss of post war capability from an organizational

¹¹ J. David Singer, Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey, "Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820-1965," in *Peace, War and Numbers*, ed. Bruce Russett (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1972).

perspective and note with interest that the Soviet Union and China do not decline by this measure.

Table 15. Military Expenditures (Thousands of Constant Dollars)

	1945	1949
United States	90,000,000	13,503,000
United Kingdom	17,002,048	3,137,333
France	1,230,509	1,246,614
Germany	10,648,000	*
Italy	305,412	523,478
USSR	8,589,076	13,964,622
China	228,612	2,030,000
Japan	4,002,481	*

* = Occupation ends in Germany in 1949, Japan Self Defense Force established in 1954

This systems and capabilities perspective provides two insights that are important to the reduction of success part of the puzzle. The data in table 15 provides a perspective on the condition of the states that would have attempted compellence after World War II. There no longer appears to be a set of major powers, but at least three types of states at this point, conquered states, exhausted states, and artifacts of a bipolar international system. The conquered state portion is fairly straightforward, Germany and Japan were occupied, their affairs of state and military under the control of foreign powers, they did not have the political capability nor perhaps the will to threaten other states. Italy, did not suffer a like occupation, but dropped from major power status and was constrained nonetheless from military adventurism. Great Britain clearly falls in the category of exhausted state, with severely reduced military expenditures and rapidly dwindling imperial holdings, realizing their situation, they impose constraints on themselves. France had an analogous position to England, although it took some more time for it to lose its

colonial holdings. China had been mauled by Japan and was occupied with a civil war but was eventually able to recover.

This post World War II major powers configuration leaves just the two superpowers able to attempt compellence. Although they both attempted compellence on a regular basis, they were consistently unsuccessful. Between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, they account for slightly over 50 percent of the great power compellence attempts. Before we turn to the particulars of the compellence attempts and the mechanics of how they were frustrated, a brief review of a few precipitating events will help establish the logical underpinnings of the failures of superpower compellence. In the next chapter, as the exhausted states regain their strength and the occupied powers regain their sovereignty, we will examine why compellence success remains low throughout the Cold War and beyond. But for now, this examination will focus on the superpowers.

Soviet Expansionism

With relatively greater capability than the conquered or exhausted powers, the Soviets started to act on the principle that territory is a necessary ingredient to security. This approach was not new, the Soviet Union acted on this principle from the beginning of World War II. Poland had stood alone through days of blitzkrieg and ruthless air bombardment by overwhelming German forces. On the 17th day, 1 September 1939, she was informed by the Soviet government that the Red Army was crossing her eastern frontier to ostensibly protect the population of Western Ukraine and Western White Ruthenia. Warsaw surrendered to the Germans on 27 September. The eastern part of Poland was under Russian occupation for twenty-one months and was violently

Sovietized. On 22 October 1939, after mass arrests and executions, elections under the Soviet system were held. The delegates to the local Soviets were forced to apply for incorporation into the Soviet Union, and parts of Poland were annexed by the Ukrainian and the Byelorussian Soviet Republic. Mass deportations to distant parts of the U.S.S.R. followed and continued throughout the occupation period. Toward the end of the war, the Soviet Union's actions against Poland provided more indicators of their intent. Ensuring the massacre of Warsaw through inaction, murdering 15,000 Polish officers, annexing Eastern Polish territory, creating their own provisional government, the Soviet Union inexorably continue its advance to secure territory across Eastern Europe.¹² The Soviet actions in Poland illustrates Schelling's idea of brute force and the lengths that the Soviets were willing to go to increase its security. Brute force was not the only method that the Soviets understood, they also used compellence as a tool in pursuit of their security goals.

Even while applying brute force in Poland, the Soviets were practicing compellence against the Baltic States. Immediately after the signature of the Ribbentrop-Molotov agreement, the Soviet government influenced Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania to sign "mutual assistance pacts" that included granting the Soviets military, naval, and air bases on their territories. Red Army forces moved into the territories of the three small countries. Despite their submission, under the pretext that the three small countries had made a secret military alliance directed against the U.S.S.R., the Soviets issued ultimata requiring the formation of new governments friendly to the Soviets and the admission of an unlimited number of Red Army forces. The three Baltic states conducted questionable

¹² Oscar Halecki. "Borderlands of Western Civilization: History of East Central Europe." *Historical Text Archive Europe* (1952). <http://historicaltextarchive.com/books.php?op=viewbook&bookid=1&cid=23> (accessed 25 Aug 2004).

elections and were then named the fourteenth, fifteenth, and sixteenth Soviet Republics.¹³ Unlike the Polish experience, the Soviets were able to expand their control with contingent threats of force and did not have to conduct the type of behavior that was used in Poland; invasion, annexation, massacre, and deportation. This type of action is more representative of the post World War II compulsion attempts of the Soviets.

Nearer to the end of World War II, Romania was rapidly converted to a satellite state after its "liberation" by Soviet soldiers. The Romanian Communist Party at first attracted little popular support, and its rolls listed fewer than 1,000 members at the war's end. Recruitment campaigns soon began netting large numbers of workers, intellectuals, and others disillusioned by the breakdown of the country's democratic experiment and hungry for radical reforms. King Michael, a figurehead monarch, was offered an ultimatum by the Soviets—either to appoint a Communist sympathizer to run the government or lose Romania's continued existence as an independent nation. Red Army tanks surrounded the king's palace, and Soviet soldiers disarmed some Romanian troops and occupied telephone and broadcasting centers. The king, lacking outside support, yielded. Communists were named to head the army and the ministries of interior, justice, propaganda, and economic affairs. In May 1945, the Soviet Union took control of Romania's major sources of income, including the oil and uranium industries. When the U.S. and UK protested after the fact, the regime ignored their objections and protested against outside "meddling" in Romania's internal affairs.¹⁴ Romania was not the last victim of Soviet expansion. The Soviets, supported by a belief in history, were prepared to apply the lessons of Romania and the Baltic. Their potential targets were any state,

¹³ Halecki, "Borderlands of Western Civilization: History of East Central Europe," 423-24.

¹⁴ Library of Congress. "Romania - A Country Study." In *Library of Congress Country Studies Series*. 10 October 2000. <http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/intoc.html> (accessed 25 August 2003).

starting at an expanding periphery. The Romanian experience made it clear to the U.S. that the Soviets were not yet satisfied and that more vigorous measures were necessary to resist the Soviet's course of compellence

Beginnings of Resistance

During World War II, the United Kingdom, the U.S., and the Soviet Union sent forces to Iran to protect vital oil supplies.¹⁵ Traditionally, Iran had been within the United Kingdom's sphere of influence; however, the Soviet Union indicated that it was ready to impinge on that traditional influence. Instead of withdrawing troops on a timely basis from Iran after the war, the Soviet Union prepared to continue their occupation..¹⁶ Iran, dissatisfied with the Soviet occupation, complained to the United Nations. The Soviet Union blocked Iran's appeal in the Security Council. U.S. and United Kingdom had withdrawn their forces on schedule and so fell back on diplomatic measures to pressure the Soviet Union to withdraw. Iran complained again to United Nations about the Soviet occupation. Finally, after a month of occupation the Soviets announced that they would withdraw their forces within six weeks, while extracting an agreement for establishment of the Soviet Iranian oil company and creating a Communist movement in northern Iran.¹⁷ The Iran experience showed that the Soviet Union could be influenced to shift a course of compellence once begun and prepared the U.S. administration for the next challenge.

¹⁵ William E. Pemberton, *Harry S. Truman: Fair Dealer & Cold Warrior* (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1989), 87.

¹⁶ Fraser Harbutt, "American Challenge, Soviet Response: The Beginning of the Cold War, February-May, 1946," *Political Science Quarterly* 96, no. 4 (Winter 1981-2): 638.

¹⁷ Harbutt, "American Challenge, Soviet Response," 638.

Soviet expansionist policy had perhaps the most potential for impact on Americans' security concerns in Turkey. As early as 1944, the Soviets started to demand control over portions of the Black Sea straits and eastern provinces of Turkey that bordered on the Soviet republics of Georgia and Armenia. They urged establishment of a new system of joint Soviet-Turkish control of the Dardanelles and threatened Turkey with the termination of existing friendship treaties between the countries. The Soviets moved 25 divisions of ground forces into position in nearby territories. Although the United Kingdom and U.S. were willing to discuss internationalization of the straits, the Soviets rejected the concept. The Turkish government resisted all the demands from the Soviet Union. The U.S. showed its support by ordering a naval task force to Istanbul to join the U.S. battleship that was there returning the body of the recently deceased Turkish ambassador. Both the U.S. and the United Kingdom followed this military maneuver with diplomatic notes indicating that the Dardanelles were of international interest and threats to the straits would be handled by the United Nations Security Council. Additionally, the U.S. decided to maintain a permanent naval presence in the eastern Mediterranean Sea. Eventually, the Soviets ceased their demands and efforts to destabilize Turkey.¹⁸ This was another successfully resisted compulsion threat. Like earlier attempts, the Soviets used the traditional tools of politics, military and diplomatic capabilities. The U.S. was able to provide countervailing support by employing the same tools.

¹⁸ Howard Jones, *"A New Kind of War": America's Global Strategy and The Truman Doctrine in Greece* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 7-8.

The Challenge

In Greece, the pattern was different. Here it was neither Soviet infantry divisions, nor Soviet tanks as the force of choice; it was partisans conducting cross-border guerrilla warfare combined with political actions within Greece, which threatened to bring it into the Soviet fold. Greece's monarchist government had been restored after German forces left in 1944. It encountered difficulty in establishing its authority due to both chaotic conditions and the efforts of Greek Communist groups to gain power.¹⁹ Fighting soon broke out between the monarchist and Communist elements. The Communists began to use Albania and Yugoslavia as staging areas for guerrilla attacks. The scale of the fighting increased and reached the proportions of a civil war. As the United Kingdom's traditional capability to support military operations in Greece had dwindled, it requested that the U.S. take full charge, politically, economically, and militarily of the Greek situation.²⁰ The Prime Minister of Greece and his Minister of Foreign Affairs specified in a letter to the President of the United States their perception of the situation and their needs. Citing the systematic devastation of Greece in the war, the letter appealed to the Government of the United States and through it the American people for financial, economic, and expert assistance. The appeal outlined four categories of assistance; aid for sustenance, aid for security measures, aid for capital investment, and technical personnel to advise and train in administration and economics. The Prime Minister's letter did not

¹⁹ Stephen G. Xydis, "America, Britain, and the USSR in the Greek Arena, 1944-1947," *Political Science Quarterly* 78, no. 4 (Dec 1963): 588.

²⁰ Donald R. McCoy, *The Presidency of Harry S. Truman* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1984), 118-20; Xydis, "America, Britain, and the USSR in the Greek Arena, 1944-1947," 590-92.

specifically ask for U.S. military forces to be involved on Greek soil, nor did it identify the Soviet Union, or any particular dissident group as the cause of Greek difficulties.²¹

U.S. policy was not primed for this request. As recently as 6 January 1947, in his State of the Union address, President Truman indicated that the U.S. would rely substantially on negotiation in its foreign policy towards the Soviet Union. His speech outlined the importance of a rapid return to peace in which all peoples could return to productivity and reconstruction. He highlighted the importance of collective security and upholding the principles underlying the United Nations. In budget discussions with the military and Congress, President Truman was determined to decrease government expenditures in general and military expenditures specifically, while making the Armed Forces more effective.²²

What Was Learned

Because of wartime needs, the executive branch of the U.S. government had developed substantial intelligence and analysis capabilities. The Central Intelligence Group concluded in September 1946 that the Soviets would probably refrain from outright military actions in the near future. They also reported that the Soviets sought worldwide Communist revolution by means other than war. Strikes, sabotage, and other means were to be used to discredit capitalist governments.²³ In February of 1946, George Kennan wrote his now famous Long Telegram. Viewed as the seminal encapsulation of

²¹ Paul Economou-Gouras, "Document 4 - No. 1340, Greek Government Appeal of Assistance, 3 Mar 1947," in *The Truman Doctrine and the Beginning of the Cold War 1947-1949*, vol. 8, *Documentary History of the Truman Presidency*, ed. Dennis Merrill, ([Bethesda, MD]:University Publications of America, 1996).

²² McCoy, *The Presidency of Harry S. Truman*, 115-16.

²³ Jones, "A New Kind of War," 11.

the underlying principles of U.S.--Soviet conflict, Kennan stresses the basic Russian national security tendencies and repressive governance, which required the image of a hostile international environment as the root cause. This was a shift in understanding, as previous efforts assumed that the tools of democracy, *quid pro quo* and compromise, would be effective to deal with the Soviets.²⁴

White House and congressional delegation discussions on providing aid to Greece provide insight into the perception of Soviet action as coercion. Dean Acheson is noted reviewing the Soviet aggression in Turkey, Iran, Greece, Hungary, Italy, France, and Austria. His analysis used the analogy of Athens and Sparta and Rome and Carthage to describe the extreme polarization of power, directly linking the situation in Eastern Europe with the security of the U.S. From a military perspective, General Hap Arnold provided an assessment that without military aid Greece would fall, then Turkey. With this change, he posited that the eastern Mediterranean with its oil supplies would become untenable to U.S. and its allies.²⁵ A background memorandum developed to support the drafting of a speech on aid to Greece, placed blame for the Greek difficulties squarely on Communists supported by the Soviet Union. This memorandum indicates that their activities are part of a "master plan to separate Macedonia from Greece and to make untenable any Greek government not subservient to Soviet aims."²⁶

²⁴ John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), 19-21; Pemberton, *Harry S. Truman: Fair Dealer & Cold Warrior*, 89.

²⁵ Joseph M. Jones, "Document 3 - Comments on Draft Statement Regarding Situation in Europe, 28 Feb 1947," in *The Truman Doctrine and the Beginning of the Cold War 1947-1949*, vol. 8, *Documentary History of the Truman Presidency*, ed. Dennis Merrill, ([Bethesda, MD]:University Publications of America, 1996).

²⁶ Joseph M. Jones, "Document 5 - Description of Greek Political and Economic Situation, 3 Mar 1947," in *The Truman Doctrine and the Beginning of the Cold War 1947-1949*, vol. 8, *Documentary History of the Truman Presidency*, ed. Dennis Merrill, ([Bethesda, MD]:University Publications of America, 1996).

As the situation in Greece was brought to a head by the United Kingdom's cutbacks in economic and military support, various committees to study U.S. assistance to Greece in Turkey were formed. One result of the analysis of these committees was that assistance would eventually be required in numerous countries, not just Greece and Turkey. The logical corollary of that thought was that the U.S. needed a global approach that addressed psychological, political, economic, and military factors.²⁷ One of the concerns was that people might misperceive the U.S. response as regionally focused and overly aggressive. The President's cabinet recommended that intervention be presented as vital to American interest to counteract Communist subversion.²⁸ Given American domestic conditions caused by demobilization and reconversion it would be difficult to justify expenditure of \$400 million and reverse the drawdown of involvement on the continent of Europe. Therefore, the President and his key advisers met with congressional leaders of both political parties. The congressional delegation was eventually impressed with the analysis and promised to support whatever measures should be necessary, on the condition that the President should explain his reasoning fully to Congress and the people of the U.S. Their rationale was that they could support such a program only if the public were fully informed. The President agreed to this approach.²⁹

²⁷ Jones, *"A New Kind of War,"* 37-38.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 41-42.

²⁹ Joseph M. Jones, "Document 15 - Record Summarizing Primary Events and Persons in Drafting the President's Message to Congress, 12 Mar 1947," in *The Truman Doctrine and the Beginning of the Cold War 1947-1949*, vol. 8, *Documentary History of the Truman Presidency*, ed. Dennis Merrill, ([Bethesda, MD]:University Publications of America, 1996).

The Truman Doctrine

On 12 March 1947, President Truman delivered an address before a joint session of Congress. The address was titled "Recommendation for Assistance to Greece and Turkey," and broadcast via radio to the nation. He opened this address by indicating that there was a broad, serious situation that confronts the world today. He stated that he wanted to present one aspect of the present situation for their consideration and decision. He continued by outlining the urgent appeal from the Greek government for financial and economic assistance. He indicated that Greece must have assistance if it is to become a self-supporting and self-respecting democracy. He said, "I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures." He discussed the geopolitical aspects of Greece and Turkey vis-à-vis the Middle East, and its potential impacts throughout the world. As he closed his delivery he stated, "The free peoples of the world look to us for support in maintaining their freedoms. If we falter in our leadership, we may endanger the peace of the world-and we shall surely endanger the welfare of our own Nation."³⁰

These actions and the other provision of assistance that followed in its wake created that the world's largest anti-compellence program in history. Not only was U.S. political might on call to support beleaguered states, the U.S. provided capabilities worldwide. The most powerful state became a potential partner for any other state that

³⁰ Joseph M. Jones, "Document 16 - Recommendation for Assistance to Greece and Turkey (Truman Doctrine), 12 Mar 1947," in *The Truman Doctrine and the Beginning of the Cold War 1947-1949*, vol. 8, *Documentary History of the Truman Presidency*, ed. Dennis Merrill, ([Bethesda, MD]:University Publications of America, 1996).

could claim Communist aggression. The challenge of Soviet expansion became a reason for resistance across the globe.

As highlighted in table 16, the Soviets mostly shifted to attempting compellence to influence the policies of other states instead of regime change, as was the case for the Baltic countries and Romania. Still, two attempts were related to regime change rather than policy. Its initial compellence foray after the declaration of the Truman Doctrine occurred in 1949, with an attack on Changshan Island as an exemplar use of force to put pressure on Nationalist China. This attack had no discernable effect on the Nationalist regime. The other regime related compellence attempt also was failure. The initial effort against Hungary in 1956 turned out to be a prelude to use of brute force and subsequent invasion, ergo a failed compellence attempt.

Table 16. Soviet Initial Compellence Attempts After Truman Doctrine

State	Year	Revision Type Sought	Outcome
Taiwan	1949	Regime	Stalemate
United Kingdom	1950	Policy	Stalemate
Japan	1953	Policy	Stalemate
Japan	1955	Policy	Stalemate
Sweden	1955	Policy	Stalemate
Hungary	1956	Regime	Victory
Poland	1956	Policy	Victory
Japan	1958	Policy	Stalemate
United States	1958	Policy	Stalemate
Denmark	1959	Policy	Stalemate
Iran	1959	Policy	Stalemate
Japan	1959	Policy	Stalemate

The Truman Doctrine was not the only modality that made the U.S. a source of capability to counter Soviet actions. The most popular topic for militarized threats by the

USSR the next ten years was Japan's policy on the Sakhalin and the Kurile islands. Even after signing a Soviet-Japanese Joint Declaration in 1956, the Soviets continued to threaten the use of force in an attempt to get Japan to relinquish its claims to some of the islands. For most of this period Japan did not have a military force, it therefore would have been impossible to resist this attempted compulsion based on a bilateral calculation of a favorable military outcome. But, the U.S. had a military force in the area that could serve as a counter. Further, the U.S. was obligated to do so, as the U.S. had demilitarized Japan by demobilizing its Army and deactivating its Navy. The U.S., as an occupying power and as the drafter of a constitution that denied the Japanese recourse to force, assumed the burden of guaranteeing its sovereignty.³¹ It is logical to conclude that Japanese decision makers believed that the US would resist Soviet attempts to conduct military operations against the main islands over a disagreement about outlying islands.

The remaining attempts that were not focused on maintaining order within its own empire were aimed at the UK, Sweden, the U.S., Denmark, and Iran. Those efforts all included employment of Soviet forces. The decision makers in the target states, based on the earlier Polish, Baltic, and Romania examples, had every reason to believe the Soviets were serious in their threats. Each, with the exception of the Poles and Hungarians, ended in stalemate. That is, the Soviets made demands, deployed forces, and the opposing side did not respond with military capabilities but also did not accede to the Soviet demands. The situation did not escalate and after a minimum of six months, no further demands or threats were issued.

³¹ "Convention IV." In *Geneva Convention Resources*. Article 27. 12 August 1949. <http://www.genevaconventions.org/> (accessed 25 August 2004).

By 1950, NSC 68 had been written and reinforced by the outbreak of the Korean War. Although the U.S. felt limited in the amount of capabilities they could field, they were committed to containment of the Soviet Union. Although U.S. forces did not deploy in response to each Soviet action, each of the target states were aware of the U.S. policy. This provided a powerful political edge when resisting Soviet actions.

An overt example was the American response to Soviet compulsion attempts in the Middle East. Through the formation of the Middle East Treaty Organization, the United States linked with Turkey, Iraq, Pakistan, and Iran. The governments of these states benefited from the enunciation of the Eisenhower doctrine in 1957, which indicated that the United States would employ American forces to protect the independence and integrity of any nation in the Middle East requesting such aid against overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by communism.³² This organization transformed itself into the Central Treaty Organization with the departure of Iraq. The new organization increased the depth and breadth of the U.S. commitment to maintain their collective security and to resist aggression, direct or indirect. In pursuit of the principles enunciated in the treaty organization charter, the United States negotiated a bilateral agreement with Iran to provide increased military and economic aid. After meeting with Prime Minister Eqbal of Iran, President Eisenhower reaffirmed United States support for the collective efforts of Iran and other free nations to maintain their independence. He stressed the gravity with which the United States viewed the threat to the territorial

³² Brown, *Faces of Power*, 62.

integrity and political independence of Iran, recalling the then recently signed Bilateral Agreement of Cooperation with Iran.³³ Soviet border violations ceased shortly thereafter.

The Central Treaty Organization was not a unique tool in the conduct of containment. NATO, SEATO, and ANZUS all included similar purposes, although some were broader in membership and purpose. Despite their differences, they all served to provide support to states that were subject to Soviet compulsion attempts.³⁴ Even minimal success at building these support structures gave target state decision makers sufficient confidence that U.S. capability could be brought to bear to counter the Soviet pressure. Perhaps more importantly from the recipient states perspective, structures built to support the U.S. policy of containment also serve the partners purposes to resist compulsion, no matter the source. These structures had varying levels of durability, witness NATO's longevity and METO's volatility, but they communicated in concrete terms that the U.S. was willing to support resistance to Soviet pressures throughout the globe.

China and Compulsion

Although China was not a frequent practitioner of compulsion between 1914 and 1945, in the period 1946 to 2001, China attempted compulsion 66 times, just a few times less than the Soviet Union. These two states attempted compulsion accounts for almost 70 percent of all great power compulsion attempts in this period. In China's case, all attempts met with failure.

³³ White House. "White House Statement Following the President's Discussion With Prime Minister Eghbal of Iran." In *The American Presidency Project*. 9 October 1959. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/site/docs/pppus.php?admin=034&year=1959&id=251> (accessed 25 August 2004).

³⁴ Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*, 179-181.

As we specifically examine the drop in the success rate immediately after World War II, China's unsuccessful attempts provide a substantial number of events that are part of the low rate of performance. While other major powers that had been somewhat successful in the pre-World War II era no longer provided the bulk of the major power compellence attempts, China's large number of unsuccessful attempts drove the success rate down.

Its first attempt after the declaration of the Truman Doctrine and establishment of the People's Republic of China on October 1, 1949 was in 1950, against India, which remained a favored target over the next ten years with four more attempts at compellence. Territory change was the reason that motivated these five cases of attempted compellence against India in the early years of the Cold War. Another favorite target was Nepal, targeted three times for changes to policy. A final favorite was Japan, targeted twice for changes to policy. Of the 11 attempts in the first 10 years of new statehood, 1949 to 1958, China achieved a stalemate in 10 attempts and a compromise in the remaining attempt. Some attribute China's political approach to a culture perspective that takes a long view of international relations, so what may be viewed as compellence failure in this study may be intended as astute political maneuvering by the Chinese decision maker at that time.³⁵

Although the new revolutionary state attempted compellence more often than its pre-World War II incarnation, China's failures to compel in this period were not surprising, as they conformed to China's previous practices. While China was not exhausted like some states in Europe, nor was it occupied like the former Axis powers,

³⁵ Alastair Iain Johnston, "Cultural Realism and Strategy in Maoist China," in *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 256-57.

nor was it actively contained like the Soviet Union, it was in the midst of consolidating its power and grasp on an enormous population and landmass. Given China's previous poor record of success and the challenge of consolidating a new state, it is not surprising that success in compellence was hard to find. To address the precipitous fall in the success rate of compellence immediately after World War II, China's multiple unsuccessful efforts to compel drove down the compellence success rate, while the more competent compellers were either exhausted, occupied, or contained.

The U.S. Attempts to Compel

Other than the Soviet Union and China, the U.S. was the next substantial contributor to the low levels of successful compellence immediately after World War II. Across the period 1946 to 2001, the U.S. participated in 38 single state vs. single state compellence attempts, with an 8.3 percent success rate. The U.S. did not start as early as the Soviet Union in this type of attempt after World War II, its first recorded single state to single state compellence attempt was against Chile in 1957. Concerned about the rise of Communist forces in Chile and a set of political alliances called the Popular Action Front, the U.S. communicated a threat of what might happen if the Communists came to power. Chile was not swayed. The U.S. was more successful in the Dominican Republic in 1961. During the Trujillo succession crisis, the U.S. managed to force out the former dictator's relatives and temporarily calmed the situation by a show of naval force and a very small presence ashore.³⁶ Although there were a substantial number of interventions and other military activity by the U.S. in Latin America, these do not fall within the strict

³⁶ Barry M. Blechman et al., *Force Without War: U.S. Armed Forces as a Political Instrument* (Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 1978), 294-97.

definition of compellence used here, but instead would be characterized as brute force, from Schelling's perspective.

For the next ten years, U.S. compellence attempts were focused on the Soviet Union and China. The Soviet Union was the target three times during this period and China four times. None of these attempts was successful. All attempts involved at least a show of force and many of them included exemplar uses of force. Many of the efforts were attempts to reduce the support of China and the Soviet Union for North Vietnam. Each of these attempts failed, possibly because of U.S. concern with the potential of China's entry into the Vietnam War, a la Korea or the possibility of escalation with the Soviets.³⁷ The U.S. contribution to the drop in successful compellence shortly after World War II then was largely tied to superpower caution and unwillingness to risk escalation via attempted compellence.

Minor Powers

Although the change in performance for the minor powers did not appear to be statistically significant when comparing success in 1914 to 1945 and success in 1946 to 2001, there may be some insights to be gained from examining this data. One interesting aspect of the data is that in single state vs. single state compellence attempts in the 1914-1945 period about 66 percent of the 108 compellence attempts were part of a pattern of repeated dyads. In the 1946-2001 period, this rose to about 80 percent of 876 attempts. Examining these repeating patterns, where a sending state attempts to compel the same

³⁷ Yuen Foong Khong, *Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, And The Vietnam Decisions Of 1965* (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991), 142-43; Allen Lynch, "The Soviet Union: Nuclear Weapons and Their Role in Security Policy," in *Security with Nuclear Weapons? Different Perspectives on National Security*, ed. Regina Cowen Karp (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 100.

target state more than once over time, reveals that the most active 10 percent of compellence pairs conducted about 48 percent of the 105 attempts in the 1914-1945 period and the most active 10 percent conducted about 62 percent of the 876 compellence attempts in the 1946-2001 time period.

Given the large numeric impact of a small percentage of minor power compellers, that specific 10 percent from 1946 to 2001 merit further examination. Within this group minor power compellence pairs can be divided in two different categories, those directly affected by the new international system in both compellence and resistance, and those who were less directly affected by the superpowers. Pairs such as Argentina and Chile, Turkey and Greece, Somalia and Ethiopia, Ethiopia and Sudan were less affected by the bipolar structure. Their compellence interactions were not predicated on superpower interaction, and most had long-standing historic disputes that were merely continued during the Cold War. Since their compellence relationship was not affected by the change in the international system, we did not observe a significant change in their level of compellence success.

Other states that could be more directly affected by the change in the international environment had at least one member's compellence capabilities enhanced by a superpower. Example dyads include Pakistan and India, Syria and Israel, Jordan and Israel, Egypt and Israel, Iran and Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan, Taiwan and China. For Pakistan and India, although the underlying source of tension, Kashmir, cannot be traced to either the U.S. or the Soviet Union, the U.S. provided military capabilities to Pakistan based on its strategic location vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. India, although the head of the nonaligned movement, received assistance from the Soviet Union. More so for Pakistan

than India, the military assistance provided capabilities that would not otherwise have been attainable by that state.³⁸

Israel has been the target of compellence attempts more than any other state in this category with 55 attempts recorded. Syria accounted for 27 of these attempts. The robust support that the United States has provided to Israel, done in part to counteract the support that the Soviet Union provided to Jordan, Syria, and Egypt, has been key in allowing Israel to continue to resist despite the hostility of its neighbors.³⁹ Similar to Israel, but from a different religious persuasion, the United States has provided support to Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan by some method during the Cold War.⁴⁰

The Taiwan-China pairing provides an example of a minor power being enabled by the sponsorship of a superpower. Although Taiwan attempted to compel mainland China 13 times in the post war period, the U.S. aid did not provide the level or type of capability required to conduct successful offensive operations. Instead, the U.S. support improved capabilities to resist Chinese compellence attempts.

Although the change in minor power performance did not appear to be statistically significant, the change to a bipolar system appeared to be an important force that shaped minor powers' capabilities to resist. The emphasis on resistance instead of a widespread effort to enable minor powers to conquer their peers may have also contributed to the initial post-World War II low level of compellence success.

³⁸ Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*, 179-80, 341; Perkovich, *India's Nuclear Bomb*, 62, 218, 227.

³⁹ Nikki R. Keddie, "The End of the Cold War and the Middle East," in *The End of the Cold War: Its Meaning and Implications*, ed. Michael J. Hogan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 151-52.

⁴⁰ John Lewis Gaddis, *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 169.

Summary

In this chapter, we addressed one part of the compellence puzzle, the rapid drop in compellence performance shortly after World War II. In the statistical analysis, it appears that minor powers performed poorly at compellence in the period from 1914 to 1945, and continued to perform poorly in the period 1946 to 2001. The increasing number of sovereign states was associated with the increased number of unsuccessful compellence attempts while the major powers performed differently. The major powers appear to have suffered a statistically significant reduction in the rate of success from 17 percent between 1914 and 1945 to 3.7 percent between 1946 and 2001. Examining states that were either a great power during the first period or during the second period, it became apparent that some states that had had relative success at compellence were now in no position as conquered powers to attempt compellence. It was also obvious that some powers, such as England, were too exhausted after World War II to attempt compellence. Other states such as France and China had previously been unsuccessful at compellence and continued to be unsuccessful, although more frequently. American compellence effectiveness was reduced in the early part of the post World War II time frame as it shifted its efforts toward countering the Soviet Union and China instead of its previous focus on small Latin American states. Finally, the Soviet Union's success rate dropped from about 24 percent to about 4 percent because of the effectiveness of American containment. Containment provided materiel and political support to states that may have otherwise succumbed to the pressure like those trapped behind the Iron Curtain. The same containment efforts had an effect on some minor powers that were involved in multiple compellence attempts. The containment policy provided some states better

capabilities to resist and gave others the confidence to continue to attempt compellence even when outmatched in military capability.

Occupation, exhaustion, containment, and superpower competition coupled with a new distribution of capabilities and perennially ineffective minor powers are the key elements that explain the rapid fall of compellence success.

While the immediate effects of World War II go far in explaining the drop in success, the explanation for the continued suppression of success rates through the post World War II era is lacking. Since the effects of World War II fade over time, the elements that created the initial depression in compellence success rates do not stay constant through the entire Cold War and post-Cold War period. The next chapter will look to different explanations to that may explain the continued low level of compellence success through 2001.

CHAPTER VI

NORMS – THE REASON FOR RESISTANCE

To understand the compellence puzzle, this paper has examined data about compellence and provided a conceptualization of compellence. This was followed by a search for the causes of the precipitous fall in the success rate of compellence after World War II. When closely examined, the precipitous fall appears to be caused by the post-World War II geo-political realities and the shift to a bipolar international system with the resultant U.S. policy of containment. Since neither of those geopolitical realities nor the bipolar international system continued unchanged through the next 50 years these factors cannot explain the continued low rate of successful compellence. Not only had the U.S. given up occupying Germany and Japan soon after the war, the U.S. approach to containment varied substantially over time. From an initial strategy of the maintenance of political regimes in areas that were at least favorable to the continued power and independence of United States, to the denial of Soviet expansion at every possible turn to maintain the perception of U.S. supremacy, to a refocusing on vital interests, increasing flexibility, moving to détente, mixing with human rights, moving back to confrontation, and finally watchful waiting as the Soviet Union came apart, this strategy was highly variable.¹ Much like containment, bipolarity progressed through an evolutionary process, ending in a unipolar moment.² Despite the variations in containment and evolution of

¹ Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*; Richard A. Melanson, *American Foreign Policy Since the Vietnam War: The Search for Consensus From Nixon to Clinton*, 3rd ed. (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2000).

² Charles Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment," *Foreign Affairs* 70, no. 1 (1990/1991).

bipolarity, compellence success did not vary in a similar fashion. It remained at a very low overall success rate, despite continued compellence attempts.

Since the success rate maintains a steady level of performance, other factors recorded in the Correlates of War database were examined to see if a correlation existed. There seems to be no regular pattern of compellence success that can be related to region, government type, capability, or any of the many factors that describe states and their interactions.³ Although the data describing the new environment after World War II was helpful in understanding the initial low success rate, it has not helped to understand the maintenance of that rate. Further, expected utility approaches such as those used by Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman and Drezner were applied against the cases from 1945 to 2001 but they did not illuminate why compellence success would be suppressed over the time period.⁴

A more promising explanation is suggested by Robert Keohane in *After Hegemony*. He proposes a model of system learning and behavior after World War II that may provide analytic leverage for this part of the puzzle. In short, Keohane explains the growth of hegemony, which can create cooperation, and how cooperation continues to survive after the decline of the hegemonic condition. Enabled by the hegemonic capacity, patterns of asymmetric cooperation were built and cooperation institutionalized. These patterns were institutionalized in formal international regimes that helped regulate

³ A binary logistic function was applied to the variables resident in the Correlates of War database. After coding for compellence success and failure as noted in the empirical chapter, numerous variables such as capability of each party, capability difference between parties, region, level of violence, method of settlement, nature of political system, and other descriptors of the internals of each state were tested. No single variable or combination of variables provided a sufficient model to differentiate cases of compellence success. Cox and Snell pseudo-R²s were in the .004 range.

⁴ Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and David Lalman, *War and Reason: Domestic and International Imperatives* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1992); Drezner, *The Sanctions Paradox*.

monetary relations and trade in manufactured goods. Although the hegemony faded, cooperation did not do so in equal measure. International regimes adapted and cooperation persisted in the areas of money and trade.⁵ The reaction to compellence attempts may have undergone an analogous process.

Ann Florini, in *The Evolution of International Norms*, suggests a mechanism for how this condition could have been created. Using a biological analogy, she indicates that norms are a subset of information called memes, ideas that provide instruction on appropriate behavior which compete within an environment for survival. Norms that are accepted and further espoused survive and those that are not accepted, perish. She highlights the vertical and horizontal reproduction of norms, key to their survival in a competitive belief environment. Vertical reproduction is accepting norms from political predecessors, whereas horizontal reproduction is receiving and accepting norms from political contemporaries.⁶ A norm that relates to the appropriate reaction to compellence attempts would have used both the horizontal and the vertical modality.

It appears then that norms can be created and promulgated, but is their effect limited to market and economic sectors? Various scholars have indicated that norms can have a controlling effect over the use or threat of force.⁷ In Christopher Gelpi's construct, where norms were found to constrain and enable state actions, it appeared that the norm, as expressed in a post-conflict agreement, had substantial effect on the behaviors of two contending states. By examining state behaviors after the violation of a norm, described

⁵ Keohane, *After Hegemony*, 182-83.

⁶ Ann Florini, "The Evolution of International Norms," *International Studies Quarterly* 40, no. 3 (September 1996): 372, 378.

⁷ Christopher Gelpi, "Crime and Punishment: The Role of Norms in Crisis Bargaining," *The American Political Science Review* 91, no. 2 (June 1997): 339-60; Herbert K. Tillema and John R. Van Wingen, "Law and Power in Military Intervention: Major States After World War II," *International Studies Quarterly* 26, no. 2 (June 1982): 220-50.

in an legitimate agreement signed by each of the states, Gelpi was able to capture, based on probit and logit analysis, the likely state reactions while controlling for potential epiphenomenal effects of capability balance, possession of the nuclear weapons, interests at stake, concurrent involvement in other disputes, history and behavior in previous conflicts, and change in balance of conventional military capability. Gelpi does not discard the importance of the realist body of theory, but suggests a modification to include the contribution of norms.⁸

Kegley and Raymond provide insight to how this may work in *When Trust Breaks Down: Alliance Norms and World Politics*. They argue that norms exert influence because they enter the diplomatic discourse and become part of the thought process and vocabulary of decision makers. The norms are embedded in those decision makers' understanding of appropriate behavior within international society. Kegley and Raymond subsequently provide statistical proof that norms about states' behavior to uphold or violate alliances have a strong positive correlation with the number of serious militarized disputes, major power involvement, and level of destruction.⁹

Since states act as if durable learning, including norms, can take place under hegemonic conditions, as Keohane and Florini argue, and norms can shape state behavior in regard to the use of force, as Gilpi and Kegley and Raymond argue, then the norms formed during the post-World War II hegemony of the United States may be a causal factor for the reaction to compellence attempts well after that hegemony has faded. To satisfy the conditions of this proposition, it must be shown that the U.S. acted as a

⁸ Gelpi, "Crime and Punishment," 348-49, 355.

⁹ Charles W. Kegley, Jr and Gregory A. Raymond, *When Trust Breaks Down: Alliance Norms and World Politics*, Studies in International Relations, ed. Charles W. Kegley, Jr and Donald J. Puchala (Columbia: University of South Carolina, 1990), 19-20, 195-202.

hegemon, that it attempted to create and promulgate norms about appropriate responses to compellence, and that the observed behavior aligns with the espoused norm.

Did the United States Act as a Hegemon?

There is common agreement that the U.S. acted as a hegemon after World War II.¹⁰ Keohane and Nye's definition is useful to outline the characteristics of a hegemon: "... when one state is powerful enough to maintain the essential rules governing interstate relations, and willing to do so." They also specify the prerogatives of the hegemon, "... such a state can abrogate existing rules, prevent the adoption of rules that it opposes, or play the dominant role in constructing new rules."¹¹ American willingness to act as a hegemon was demonstrated in a number of ways, some of which have already been alluded to. One example was the American move to bring economic order to Europe. The Marshall Plan set the rules by which Europe, home to what had been the most powerful states in the world a few years earlier, rebuilt and reconstituted itself. Another demonstration of willingness was its creation of the Bretton Woods system, which eventually resulted in the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, and General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). This initiative created the institutions and procedures for global trade and monetary exchange.¹² Despite its limited support to the French in Vietnam, America's emphasis on decolonization created another set of rules for

¹⁰ Terry Boswell and Mike Sweat, "Hegemony, Long Waves, and Major Wars: A Time Series Analysis of Systemic Dynamics, 1496-1967," *International Studies Quarterly* 35, no. 2 (June 1991): 137; Bruce Russett, "The Mysterious Case of Vanishing Hegemony; or, is Mark Twain Really Dead?" *International Organization* 39, no. 2 (Spring 1985): 210-11; Susan Strange, "The Persistent Myth of Lost Hegemony," *International Organization*, 41, no. 4 (Autumn 1987): 565-71.

¹¹ Keohane and Nye, *Power and Interdependence*, 2nd Ed, 44.

¹² Gaddis, *We Now Know*, 192-94.

the global body politic.¹³ The U.S. was certainly willing to exert itself to make and maintain the essential rules of a new international system. Not only did the U.S. create these rules, it also established a worldwide military network with unmatched capabilities to create a secure environment within which to operate.¹⁴

In terms of capabilities the U.S. certainly qualifies for hegemon status for the early part of the post World War II era, as seen in figure 13. The combined capabilities score is from the Militarized Interstate Dispute database. It is an index with the maximum value of 1.0 for all capability in the world. Each state gets a fraction of that total. The index includes total population, urban population, iron and steel production, military expenditures, men under arms, and energy production. The U.S. ended World War II with almost 40 percent of the total world capability. Ten years later, it still controlled more than 30 percent. Its nearest competitor, the Soviet Union had increased to around 18 percent by 1955. Apparently, the U.S. was powerful enough, but was it willing to act as a hegemon?

¹³ Robert A. Pastor, "Looking Back and Forward: The Trajectories of Great Powers," in *A Century's Journey: How the Great Powers Shape the World*, ed. Robert A. Pastor (New York: Basic Books, 1999), 342-43.

¹⁴ Ambrose and Brinkley, *Rise to Globalism*, 178.




Figure 13. Capability Score for Major Powers, 1945-1965

Did the United States Promulgate Norms About Compellence?

The question then becomes: did this hegemon lead the creation and promulgation an anti-compellence norm? To see if the U.S. meets this test we will review the mechanisms by which norms are created and promulgated to determine if the U.S. conducted these actions. It will be helpful to first capture a statement of the norm in question.

The anti-compellence norm is the idea that the appropriate reaction to the threat or use of military force to compel is resistance. This norm goes beyond putting up a face saving struggle and beyond tactical actions to create opportunities for negotiations off the battlefield. This norm encapsulates the idea that aggression should not be rewarded by acquiesce. It can be viewed as a shared belief in the analogy of “no more Munichs,”

enhanced by the lessons of early post-World War II Soviet expansions.¹⁵ Further, it indicates that it is appropriate for target states to ask other entities for assistance against the threat. It encourages those other states and international institutions to provide moral, political, and military support to the target state to negate the sending states' efforts. Interesting, this norm does not deny the threat of use of force for other purposes, such as self-defense. It is not a general prohibition on the use of force, but outlines the appropriate reactions to what may be viewed as the aggressive use of force.

The acceptance and further promulgation of this norm by some states does not guarantee equal acceptance by all states. Western states and other states that benefited from the U.S. leadership likely absorbed the norm more rapidly than states that were not directly affected by it. Since the U.S. was an adversary to the Soviet Union and China for substantial parts of post World War II era, these states were not necessarily influenced through hegemonic actions and therefore may not have fully accepted all aspects of the norm. Where Western Europe may have fully absorbed this norm, Eastern Europe, Asia, the Middle East, and Africa may have adopted specific aspects of the norm, especially where it reinforced existing predilections.

This norm is different from declarations of the declining utility of the use of military force outlined in complex interdependence approaches and counter-argued by others.¹⁶ This norm is a narrower idea relating to the reaction to a particular use of the threat of military force and does not speak to the use of force for other purposes, such as humanitarian intervention or the ejection of an invader. Although it is possible that the narrow application would be affected by a broader declination in the perception of the

¹⁵ Khong, *Analogies at War*, 175, 184, 189.

¹⁶ Keohane and Nye, *Power and Interdependence*, 2nd Ed, 27-29; Freedman, "Strategic Coercion," 33-34, are two representative samples in the debate of the utility of military force.

utility of force, this norm does not depend on it as a precondition. In essence, since the method by which compellence works, if at all, is through creating fear of future pain via threat, the anti-compellence norm elevates the importance of resisting aggression above the potential of pain as a political instrument. In essence, it indicates that it is better to suffer the threatened pain than to negotiate with an adversary that is likely to be insatiable. At the same time, this norm does not speak to the broader issues of the appropriateness of physically controlling or destroying an adversary's capabilities.

Norm Formation

Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink in *International Norm Dynamics and Political Change* introduce a useful framework to explain the formation and spread of norms.¹⁷ This framework takes a systemic perspective to explain a three-stage process of norm creation and promulgation process. The first stage is "norm emergence," the second stage involves broad norm acceptance, which they term a "norm cascade," and the third stage involves internalization of the norm. A threshold or "tipping" point divides the first two stages, at which a critical mass of relevant state actors adopt the norm. The authors cite independent discovery of this pattern in work on social norms in U.S. legal theory, quantitative research by sociology's institutionalists or "world polity" theorists, and various scholars of norms in international relations.¹⁸ The authors indicate that the pattern is important as norm formation and spread leverage different social processes and logics of action at different stages in a norm's "life cycle." Thus, this pattern may serve as a useful tool to examine development and spread of an anti-compellence norm.

¹⁷ Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," *International Organization* 52, no. 4 (Autumn 1998): 887-917.

¹⁸ Finnemore and Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," 896.

Norm Emergence. Within Finnemore and Sikkink's work, they offer a method of norm origin or emergence. Two elements are necessary, norm entrepreneurs and organizational platforms from which they act. Norm entrepreneurs are critical for norm emergence because they call attention to issues or even create issues by using language that names, interprets, and dramatizes them. As the entrepreneur frames the issues, they create a logical or emotional structure that resonates with broader public understandings. These new structures are adopted as new ways of talking about and understanding these issues. In constructing their frames, norm entrepreneurs face firmly embedded alternative norms and frames that create other perceptions of both appropriateness and interest.

In other words, new norms do not enter a normative vacuum but instead emerge in a contested normative space where they must compete with other norms and perceptions of interest. This normative contestation has important implications for those who would act as norm entrepreneurs. To frame an issue and achieve acceptance of the new perspective over the old one is to participate in a normative struggle. Thus, at this emergent stage of a norm's life, norms do not appear out of thin air; they are actively built by agents that have strong notions about appropriate or desirable behavior in the international community and are willing to participate in the struggle.

Given the potential costs of the normative struggle, Finnemore and Sikkink enquire into possible motivations for norm entrepreneurs. Their explanation highlights empathy and empathetic interdependence, where actors "are interested in the welfare of others for its own sake, even if this has no effect on their own material well-being or security."¹⁹ They also recognize altruism -- "action designed to benefit another even at

¹⁹ Ibid., 895-905.

the risk of significant harm to the actor's own well being" -- as a motivation. Further, they include ideational commitment as the main motivation when entrepreneurs promote norms or ideas because they believe in the ideals and values embodied in the norms.²⁰

They appear to overlook the possibility that a norm entrepreneur promotes a specific norm because they believe in the ideals and values and as importantly, it benefits them directly when other entities also believe in those ideals and values. In other words, there may be a non-altruistic ideational commitment that provides the motivation for expenditure of resources to pursue a normative struggle.

Since the Soviet Union used the threat and application of force to achieve political re-alignments during and at the end of World War II and was seen as likely to continue to use these methods, creation and acceptance of a norm that limited the effectiveness of this tactic supported the U.S. policy of containment. The U.S., while attempting to blunt the Cold War tools of Soviet expansion, was, in actuality, supporting the creation of a much larger, anti-compellence norm. U.S. actions, motivated by political competition, promulgated a norm initially intended as an anti-Soviet norm, but was accepted as a norm that spoke to the appropriate reaction to any state's compellence attempt. Therefore, it is possible that the norm was not created for purely altruistic purposes as is suggested in the Finnemore and Sikkink scenarios. The creation and promulgation of a norm that could reduce the Soviet's chance for unchallenged expansion was beneficial to the U.S. policy of containment. Altruism or moral judgments about the use of force were not necessary to motivate the creation of this norm.

²⁰ Ibid., 898.

Finnemore and Sikkink also highlight the need for some kind of organizational platform from and through which to promote norms at the international level. Sometimes these platforms are constructed specifically for the purpose of promoting the norm, as are many nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), such as Greenpeace, the Red Cross, and Transafrica and the larger transnational advocacy networks of which these NGOs become a part. Transnational advocacy networks conduct activities such as promoting human rights, environmental norms, a ban on land mines or earlier, the end of apartheid in South Africa. They note that entrepreneurs also work from standing international organizations that have purposes and agendas other than simply promoting one specific norm. Those other agendas may significantly shape the content of norms promoted by the organization.²¹ Of course, the U.S. after World War II had a significant platform for promotion of its ideas as a democratic world power. Dixon in *Democracy and the Peaceful Settlement of International Conflict* argues that democracies have an internal norm of bounded competition. Further, that this norm discourages the use of force within the political process, so long as contingent consent, the agreement that the process is fair and that the losers in the competition continue to have access to the process is in force. Dixon further indicates that democracies have applied this internal norm to external situations, especially dealing with other democracies.²² Therefore, as Finnemore and Sikkink suggest is likely, the anti-compellence norm was shaped by the democratic nature of the U.S., where elections and compromise are the appropriate proactive change mechanisms and threats of force would be resisted.

²¹ Ibid., 899.

²² William J. Dixon, "Democracy and the Peaceful Settlement of International Conflict," *The American Political Science Review* 88, no. 1 (March 1994): 14-32.

Finnmore and Sikkink imply that powerful states and their leaders are not norm promoters but are more often targets of norm promoters.²³ Still, their advice to non-state norm promoters is also pertinent for great powers. The key aspect that they highlight is that the promoter must take what is seen as natural or appropriate and convert it into something perceived as wrong or inappropriate. This process is not necessarily or entirely in the realm of reason, though facts and information may be marshaled to support claims. Affect, empathy, and principled or moral beliefs may also be deeply involved, since the ultimate goal is not to challenge the “truth” of something, but to challenge whether it is good, appropriate, and deserving of praise. In these cases, what the organizational platform provides is information and access to important audiences for that information, especially media and decision makers.²⁴

To more closely examine this process, borrowing again from Ikenberry and Kupchan’s *Socialization and Hegemonic Power*, socialization can occur through three mechanisms: normative persuasion, external inducement, and internal reconstruction.²⁵

Normative persuasion. Normative persuasion is based on elite contact via diplomatic channels, cultural exchanges, and foreign study. These contacts provide the venue for ideological persuasion and transnational learning either as part of an overt program or as an inherent part of the dialogue. The elites then internalize these norms and move to adopt new state policies, which are compatible. In this approach, socialization occurs prior to changes in policy. That is, policy changes because underlying beliefs have changed. When the socialization of norms occurs through normative persuasion, shifts in

²³ Finnmore and Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," 900.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ G. John Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchan, "Socialization and Hegemonic Power," *International Organization*, 44, no. 3 (Summer 1990): 283-315.

the values and norms held by elites occur and those elite choose to enact commensurate policies by their free will. The cost of this approach is low, as material sanctions or inducements do not play a role in the exchange.²⁶

It does not appear that this was the primary change mechanism for an anti-compellence norm in the post-World War II era. Although some ideological persuasion may have occurred, it is not apparent that elites decided to enact new policies because of earlier socialization and internalization of a new norm. The activities that preceded the adoption of the norm were not a debate about the appropriateness of the use of compellence, instead it was the attempt on the part of many states to use combinations of brute force and compellence to achieve political ends. It appears that policies of non-compellence were borne on the exigency and survival needs predominant at the end of World War II and the beginning of the Cold War. Norm acceptance was preceded by establishing the new set of facts on the ground, not the reverse that would be required by normative persuasion.

External inducement. When socialization occurs through external inducement, a state initially uses economic and military incentives to induce smaller states to change their policies. This manipulation of the preferences of elites is materially based. It is only after those elites have adjusted their policies to accord with those of the other state's that the normative principles underlying the new policies come to be embraced as rightful by the elites. Belief in the normative underpinnings of the system emerges gradually as elites seek to bring their policies and value orientations into line. Material influence can lead to socialization for three main reasons.

²⁶ Ikenberry and Kupchan, "Socialization and Hegemonic Power," 290.

First, elites may embrace and espouse the norms articulated by the providing state for instrumental reasons, either to minimize the potential domestic costs or to take advantage of elite restructuring to gain domestic support. Second, elites in recipient states may feel some degree of cognitive dissonance because the policies they implement do not correspond fully with their beliefs. This dissonance can be reduced if the norms that guide the policies come to correspond more closely with those policies. Third, a form of normative inducement may take place within the web of interactions created by the provision of material assistance, through a gradual process of learning and adjustment.²⁷

President Woodrow Wilson's efforts after World War I could be considered an example of an attempt at external inducement. The material engagement of the U.S. in World War I created a standing with European powers that provided it some leverage for the acceptance of norms suggested by Wilson's 14 points. Although not specified in any single point, an underpinning idea is that the use or threat of force to resolve political, territorial, and ethnic tensions should be resisted. During his address to Congress on the 8th of January 1918, he characterized the rejection of the aggressive use of military force, "the day of conquest and aggrandizement is gone by," and then later, "What we demand in this war, ... is that the world to be made fit and safe to live in; and particularly that it be made safe for every peace-loving nation." Although he did not overtly state that he was ready to return to war to secure this, he did indicate that the people of the United States were "ready to devote their lives, their honor, and everything they possess" to vindicate this principle.²⁸ President Wilson was attempting to establish the "rightness" of

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Woodrow Wilson, "President Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points." In *Avalon Project*. 8 January 1918. Yale Law School. <http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/wilson14.htm> (accessed 25 August 2004).

using any possible resource to resist the threat of force or aggression. We know he was not wholly successful, which provided a later president, Harry S. Truman, an opportunity to promote similar ideas during his enunciation of what became known as the Truman doctrine. At the end of World War II, the U.S. had developed more standing with Europe and other states throughout the world. During his articulation of the need for support to Greece and Turkey on the 12th of March 1947, President Truman is overt in his description of the desired normative state. "One of the primary objectives of the foreign policy of the United States is the creation of conditions in which we and other nations will be able to work out a way of life free from coercion." He highlights the formation of the United Nations as a means to "ensure the peaceful development of nations, free from coercion"²⁹ Although neither one of these attempts were wholly successful by themselves to create a norm that guaranteed resistance to compulsion, each of these efforts of external influence added to the effort to build such norm.

Internal reconstruction. Socialization and the acceptance of norms can also occur through internal reconstruction. In this formulation, a state directly intervenes in the recipient state and transforms its domestic political institutions. Such extensive intervention can occur only in the aftermath of war or as a result of the existence of a "formal" empire. It occurs when the victorious state occupies the defeated state and assumes responsibility for its reconstruction or when an imperial power colonizes a peripheral state. In either case, the victor imports normative principles about domestic and international political order, often embodying these principles in institutional structures and in constitutions or other written proclamations. The process of

²⁹ Joseph M. Jones, "Recommendation for Assistance to Greece and Turkey (Truman Doctrine).

socialization takes place as elites in the secondary state become accustomed to these institutions and gradually come to accept them as their own.³⁰

There are no obvious examples of internal reconstruction that resulted in the adoption of the specific anti-compellence norm previously discussed. The closest examples of internal reconstruction related to an anti-compellence norm are grounded in the U.S. and Allied occupation of Germany and Japan. Wanting to forestall a recurrence of World War II the U.S. wrote and negotiated a new constitution for Japan. Article Nine of this constitution stated:

Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes.

In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.³¹

Although there is some debate about how involved the Japanese were in creating the wording of their constitution, it is unlikely that any state would have taken on the idea of renouncing the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes, had it not been occupied by a foreign power. Although the Federal Republic of Germany's Basic Law was written, debated, and voted on by German Laender representatives on May 8, 1949, their efforts started at the direction of the Occupying Powers, via the Frankfurt Documents. This initial direction was reinforced by regular consultation with the three military governors of the occupying powers about the contents and

³⁰ Ikenberry and Kupchan, "Socialization and Hegemonic Power," 292.

³¹ "Text of the Constitution and Other Important Documents." In *Birth of the Constitution of Japan*. 3 May 1947. <http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/c01.html> (accessed 25 August 2004).

interpretation of the Basic Law.³² The result, in reference to a norm about compellence, was reflected in Article 24 and 26. Article 24, International organizations, indicates in part, “For the settlement of disputes between nations, the Federation shall accede to agreements providing for general, comprehensive and obligatory international arbitration.” Although not as strict a renunciation of the threat or use of military force as the Japanese, Article 26 provides a further distancing from the use of force. “Activities tending to and undertaken with the intent to disturb peaceful relations between nations, especially to prepare for a war of aggression, are unconstitutional. They shall be made a punishable offense.”³³ Much like the Japanese example of internal reconstruction, the idea that a sovereign power would renounce the “intent to disturb peaceful relations between nations...” would have been unthinkable prior to the defeat of World War II and occupation.

Again, these examples depict internal reconstruction, but not of the specific norm under discussion. These are offered to indicate that the U.S. was actively promulgating norms across the international environment. It seems unlikely that a norm to resist could be promulgated through internal reconstruction, as the technique requires the norm activist to have seized control of the target state.

Ikenberry and Kupchan’s three socialization mechanisms offer a number of ways that the elites can be convinced of a particular norm. As was seen, there are a number of likely ways that the socialization of key elites could have taken place. However, for

³² Library of Congress. "Germany - A Country Study." In *Library of Congress Country Studies Series*. Eric Solsten, ed. frds@loc.gov. August 1995. <http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/detoc.html> (accessed 25 August 2004).

³³ *Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany*. 20 December 1993. <http://www.iuscomp.org/gla/statutes/GG.htm> (accessed 25 August 2004).

norms to be accepted as a possible reason of continued suppression of compellence success, it will be helpful to look beyond those elites.

The importance of institutions for an anti-compellence norm. In most cases, for an emergent norm to reach a threshold and move toward the second stage, it must become institutionalized in specific sets of international rules and organization. Finnemore and Sikkink indicate that since 1948 emergent norms have increasingly been institutionalized in international law, in the rules of multilateral organizations, and in bilateral foreign policies.³⁴ Such institutionalization contributes strongly to the possibility for a norm cascade, both by clarifying what, exactly, the norm is and what constitutes proper exercise of the norm. Further, it often takes material forces to develop and communicate ideas. As Kathryn Sikkink indicates in *Ideas and Institutions: Developmentalism in Brazil and Argentina*, even ideas that are held by state policymakers fare better if they have been adopted or incorporated into governmental structures.³⁵ In a case where broad based societal consensus was required to carry out an idea, the leaders needed to root them in state institutions where they find support mechanisms and a constituency that have the capacity to carry out policies built on those ideas and therefore affect the physical world.³⁶

President Wilson's enunciation of his 14 Points, the Atlantic Charter that President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill's signed at Placentia Bay on August 9, 1941, and the United Nations creation in 1945 were all instances of norms being encoded in institutions. The ill-fated League of Nations, the partnership that became NATO, and

³⁴ Finnemore and Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," 900.

³⁵ Kathryn Sikkink, *Ideas and Institutions: Developmentalism in Brazil and Argentina* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991).

³⁶ Finnemore and Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," 199.

the UN all absorbed and re-transmitted the anti-compellence norm. As recorded in Article 2 of the UN Charter, “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state...” and reserves the right in Article 39 to “determine the existence of threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression.” And finally in Article 42 the Security Council “may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security”³⁷ This sequence codifies the norm to resist the threat of the use of force, and in this case makes it the job of the most powerful states in the world to participate in the resistance. Despite having the vast majority of the then existing states join the UN and avow the aforementioned principles, the tipping point for the anti-compellence norm had not occurred.

Norm Cascade

Finnemore and Sikkink capture the idea of a norm cascade, after a critical mass of states have adopted new norms, where the norm reaches a threshold or tipping point. They cite quantitative empirical support for the idea of a norm tipping point and norm cascades and provide two hypotheses about what constitutes a “critical mass” and when and where to expect norm tipping. Noting that it is not possible to predict exactly how many states must accept a norm to “tip” the process, they note that because states are not equal when it comes to normative weight, empirical studies suggest that norm tipping rarely occurs before one-third of the total states in the system adopt the norm. They also note that it matters which states adopt the norm. Some states are critical to a norm’s adoption; others are less so. What constitutes a “critical state” will vary from issue to

³⁷ United Nations. *Charter of the United Nations*. 26 June 1945. <http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/> (accessed 3 October 2004).

issue, but one criterion is that critical states are those without which the achievement of the substantive norm goal is compromised.³⁸

Up to the tipping point, Finnemore and Sikkink suggest that domestic concerns are the primary motivating factor for norm adoption. After the tipping point has been reached, they suggest a different dynamic exists. More states begin to adopt new norms more rapidly even without domestic pressure for such change. Empirical studies suggest that, at this point, often an international or regional demonstration effect or “contagion” occurs in which international and transnational norm influences become more important than domestic politics for effecting norm change. They argue that the primary mechanism for promoting norm cascades is an active process of international socialization intended to induce norm breakers to become norm followers. In the context of international politics, this promotion involves diplomatic praise or censure, either bilateral or multilateral, which may be reinforced by material sanctions and incentives.³⁹

What happens at the tipping point is that enough states and enough critical states endorse the new norm to redefine appropriate behavior. In the case of resistance to compellence, adoption of the norm by numerous entities may not have been the critical step to cause the cascade. Given that this norm marked an increased level of resistance to compellence and not an entirely new behavior, many states were already pre-disposed to resistance. What was lacking in this case was the leadership of a critical state, the U.S. Set in the context of President Truman’s March 1947 broadcast that encapsulated what became to be known as the Truman Doctrine, the American show of naval force in support of Turkey, and its substantial investment in stabilizing Greece were key triggers

³⁸ Finnemore and Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," 901.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 902.

in strengthening the anti-compellence norm. The overt commitment of U.S. resources and political capital to an international policy of non-compellence set the conditions for states across the world to accept and act on this norm. Although the adoption of the norm across the world was not instantaneous, the effect was significant. From 1816 through 1945, Greece and Turkey were successfully compelled 10 times out of 32 single state attempts. After the U.S. reinforcement of Turkey and Greece, these states resisted all 36 single state compellence attempts that occurred in the post-World War II era. The U.S. continued to preach the gospel of resistance to the use or threat of force through word and deed. Although not a compellence event by this work's definition, the Korean War served to reinforce the norm by highlighting American willingness to provide support even in a very costly situations.

The U.S. actions were designed to create an expectation of resistance to Soviet domination. But, when an expectation of resistance became the rule, the political character of the sending state mattered little. Finnemore and Sikkink capture the spread and reinforcement of ideas like this. As states resist compellence, even if with the support of the U.S., elites in other states are motivated by the forces of conformity and esteem to do no less than their peers. These elites need to maintain the respect of other states and of their own fellow citizens in order to maintain their position and ability to operate in government. This leads to generalization of the norm.⁴⁰ What started as a containment measure against the Soviets expands and reinforces a more general norm to resist any state's threat or exemplar use of military force as a political change mechanism.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 902-3.

Internalization

Finnemore and Sikkink note that at the extreme of a norm cascade, norms may become so widely accepted that they are internalized by actors and achieve a “taken-for-granted” quality that makes conformance with the norm almost automatic. For this reason, internalized norms can be both extremely powerful (because behavior according to the norm is not questioned) and hard to discern (because actors do not seriously consider or discuss whether to conform). Since they are not controversial, these norms are often not the centerpiece of political debate and tend to be ignored in debate and research. A related mechanism may be iterated behavior and habit. More than 50 years of resistance will likely create certain levels of expectation. Broadly, this idea suggests that internalization of normative change is indirect and evolutionary.⁴¹ These types of changes leave little in the way of documentary evidence. Some indirect evidence such as the previously noted change in Greece and Turkey’s resistance behavior from acquiescing to compellence 10 out of 32 times in 1816 through 1945, to resistance in all 36 single state compellence attempts that occurred in the post-World War II era, does exist. Since it is not possible to directly measure the presence of internalization, nor necessarily establish a logical link from norm promulgation to possible internalization it is difficult to demonstrate that internalization occurred with the anti-compellence norm. It is useful to further research to understand that norms may be encoded deeply within states operational codes and affecting policy decisions on a daily basis.

⁴¹ Ibid., 905.

Counter Arguments

Despite the discussion above, normative explanations are not readily accepted by all scholars. One particular example is Andrew Moravcsik in *The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht*. His logic poses a particularly strong test for normative explanations as he rejects a normative explanation as the cause of the integration of Europe. This is a strong test in that the normative explanation had been widely accepted within the community of those that study European integration.⁴² He does so in favor of an explanation that highlights commercial interests, relative bargaining power of important governments, and incentives to enhance the credibility of interstate agreements.⁴³ By rejecting normative explanations, he rejects the influence of ideals to explain converging economic policies in favor of the causal power of a commercial environment in which this convergence makes economic sense. Further, he rejects the explanation of the outcomes of interstate bargaining that hinges on the centrality of supranational entrepreneurs in favor of an explanation of outcomes underpinned by a notion of state-centric asymmetric interdependence. Finally, he dismisses ideological commitment or the desire to reduce transaction costs to accept the efforts to constrain and control other governments as the explanation for a tendency for governments to delegate and pool sovereignty in international organizations.⁴⁴ In short, where norms-focused scholars had seen ideals, ideology, and the actions of entrepreneurs at work to create an integration of states into an ever-perfecting union, other scholars saw interstate competition in an alternative setting. The three elements of Moravcsik's

⁴² Andrew Moravcsik, *The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998), 4.

⁴³ Moravcsik, *The Choice for Europe*, 3.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 5-9.

explanation, economics, bargaining power based on asymmetric interdependence, and efforts to constrain other states, are not unique to the question of Europe, but could be applied to many issue areas.

This highlights an important consideration: why would not some portion of the three element economic-realist style explanation that Moravcsik uses to explain European integration apply to this part of the compellence puzzle? If a widely accepted normative explanation of a phenomenon as significant as European integration can be challenged by return to realism, interdependence, and economic realities, is it possible that a reaction to force-centric activity like compellence is better explained by these same factors?

Before we give up on a normative explanation for low compellence rates, we should examine Moravcsik's counter-norm construct. There are a number of factors to be considered as we examine it. Firstly, the integration of Europe and the continued low level of success rate of compellence efforts are substantially different types of phenomena. For example, the continued low level of success rate of compellence is a global phenomenon of resistance, where a somewhat successful behavior, compellence, was first diverted from its historic frequency range by the realities of World War II and now maintains a new low level of frequency despite changing conditions. Conversely, the integration of Europe is a continuing series of cooperative events that occur aperiodically within a regional framework. These cooperative events are the opposite of behaviors required to exercise resistance against a compeller. Secondly, none of Moravcsik's three-part explanation appears to be strongly related to compellence success or failure. As we examine the economic reasoning, it indicates that the potential for positive economic outcomes may be the motivation for European integration behavior. If a behavior would

appear to a decision maker to increase their or their state's commercial wellbeing, it would be logical to conduct that behavior. In contrast, logically, resistance to demands reinforced by threat of force does not directly result in commercial gains and might result in immediate losses. A related method, expected utility, as applied by Bueno de Mesquita in *War and Reason*, which includes various international and domestic cost factors of using or having force used on a state, was examined.⁴⁵ The examination indicated that expected utility did not provide good explanatory power for when resistance to compellence would occur. If expected utility is not a good indicator of resistance to compellence, a logic based on the possibility of economic gains as a reward for resisting compellence seems unlikely.

The second cause of integration cited by Moravcsik was bargaining power created by asymmetric interdependence.⁴⁶ Here states were able to influence other states since they were able to leverage asymmetries. If asymmetrical interdependence exists between states that are in a compellence situation, it could be used to resist compellence as well as supporting compellence. But, naming interdependence as a cause of suppressed compellence is incorrectly conflating motivation and means. Leveraging an interdependence may be a means of resistance, but provides no inherent motivation to resist in the first place. The sense of appropriate behavior provides the cause to resist, various means or methods, to include those offered by asymmetric interdependence can be used to resist.

⁴⁵ Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman, *War and Reason*. Equilibria from the *War and Reason* model and equations were established with EUGene software and compared to the actual outcomes of compellence attempts. The model predicted more than half of the cases would result in a negotiated settlement as that would maximize utility. Instead slightly less than 10 percent were. Stalemate was most often the real world result, at approximately 65 percent. A fuller discussion of this expected utility approach is offered in Chapter VII.

⁴⁶ Moravcsik, *The Choice for Europe*, 3.

The third cause highlighted by Moravcsik, efforts to constrain other nations, is argued as a competitive reason to explain cooperative behavior. For example, state “A” would cooperate with state “B” in order to limit the opportunity for state “C” to compete with state “A.” In the case of this part of the compellence puzzle, the behavior we are trying to understand, resistance, is the opposite of cooperative behavior. Similar to the interdependence discussion, to privilege this argument as causal misidentifies means and motives. More narrowly, this work has suggested that the U.S. has pursued opportunities to cooperate with target states against sending states. From this perspective, Moravcsik’s contention about cooperation to constrain other states may be technically accurate. However, this cooperation is a tactic or method used to achieve a desired level of resistance, not the cause of resistance.

In short, Moravcsik’s rejection of normative explanations for European integration may be correct, but his rationale for rejection do not as readily apply to the elements of the compellence puzzle. Therefore, his particular objections to European integration normative answers do not disable a normative exploration of part of the compellence puzzle. Conversely, although Moravcsik’s particular arguments may not be more helpful than the normative approach, the short exposition above does not dismiss many other possible causes of the continued low level of compellence success.

Summary

This chapter has argued that the norm formation and acceptance was the tool that made the suppressed levels of successful compellence last for more than 50 years. Borrowing from hegemonic regime theory and normative theory, this chapter contends

that the conditions of the early post World War II era and U.S. actions in support of containment resulted in norms of almost total resistance to compellence. These norms, once adopted, became more powerful than any single state's influence, lasting throughout and beyond the end of the Cold War. Proving the existence and efficacy of a norm, a form of an idea, is difficult. Arguments that highlight results quickly become tautological. Nevertheless, given President Wilson's, Roosevelt's, and Truman's enunciated positions, the preponderance of American power, the American expenditure of blood and treasure in support of other states, and strong initial support for the U.N. it is reasonable to claim that the U.S. executed adequate actions to create and promulgate a norm of anti-compellence. Further, given the record of post-World War II state activity captured in the Militarized Interstate Dispute database, it is also fair to say that states act as if there is a general agreement to resist compellence attempts. Since the precipitous fall in compellence success occurred shortly after the U.S. rise to superpower status and its efforts to contain the Soviet Union the time order is appropriate for causality. Yet it is too early to claim a full understanding of this part of the compellence puzzle. Since norms cannot be directly observed, further specialized research and analysis in the area of an anti-compellence norm needs to be accomplished to secure a greater level of assurance prior to a declaration of causality. Recommendations for further research will be discussed in the final chapter.

The third aspect of the compellence puzzle also provides a challenge to our understanding of how international relations work. If the anti-compellence norm drives down the frequency of successful compellence, logically, sending states should have reduced the number of attempts they made, as they saw that compellence did not provide

positive results at a low cost. To explain the actual results we have to shift the examination to a different level of analysis and focus on compellence attempts.

CHAPTER VII

WHY ATTEMPT COMPELLENCE?

This chapter will examine the third aspect of the compellence puzzle: states continue to attempt compellence at about the same frequency after World War II as they did before World War II, despite the dramatic fall in the success rate of compellence. As we saw in chapter 2, this conundrum remains even when we adjust the attempted compellence rate for the number of states in the international system. This chapter will examine three approaches in a search for answers to the level of continued compellence attempts.

The first approach, borrowed from the Correlates of War project, is to look for factors that correlate with the maintenance of the compellence rate.¹ This is a useful approach in that correlation can be a pre-cursor to causation. If correlation can be established, the causal influences may be deduced or observed. The second approach, borrowed from the game theoretic community in international relations, will be an attempt to apply Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and David Lalman's International Interaction Game to see if the expected utility and move structure it provides will inform the reason to attempt compellence.² This approach, using a game theoretical perspective, has provided insight to other security topics that were not amenable to correlation analysis and may likewise be useful with this puzzle.³ The third approach, borrowing from Bruce Bueno de Mesquita et al. in *The Logic of Political Survival* will be to see if the pattern of

¹ Jones, Bremer, and Singer, "Militarized Disputes"; Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey, "Capability Distribution."

² Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman, *War and Reason*.

³ Thomas C. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1960).

compellence attempts can be explained as the resultant of a set of individual decisions based on the desire to maintain public office.⁴ The third approach is a somewhat novel explanation of foreign policy behavior suggested by work on emergent behavior in international relations.⁵ This three-part examination will accomplish two things. First, it will provide an increased understanding of the specific elements of this part of the compellence puzzle. Secondly, it will provide a set of possible explanations for this final element of the compellence puzzle.

The Maintenance of Compellence Attempts

Why is compellence attempted at historic levels even though success of those attempts is dramatically reduced? To be able to answer this question we must first more closely examine some of the elements of compellence, both before and after the apparent change in pattern. Looking at the basic pattern of compellence attempts and success, we can see in figure 14 the continuation of the level of compellence attempts, controlling for the number of states in the international system. Although there is some variation in the level of attempted compellence within the time period 1946-2001, the rate for this period is generally the same or higher than the period of 1914-1946. The average attempted compellence rate for both 1914-1945 and 1946-2001 was approximately 17 percent of the number of states in the international system.

⁴ Bueno de Mesquita et al., *The Logic of Political Survival*.

⁵ Robert M Axelrod, *The Complexity of Cooperation: Agent-Based Models of Competition and Collaboration* (Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press, 1997); Lars-Erik Cederman, *Emergent Actors in World Politics: How States and Nations Develop and Dissolve* (Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press, 1997); Stephen Wolfram, *A New Kind of Science* (Champaign, IL: Wolfram Media, 2002).




Figure 14. Ten Year Moving Averages of Frequency of Attempted Compellence per Number of States and Success Rate as Percent, Superimposed

For clarity, figure 15 provides a simplified perspective of both the attempt and success rates. The rate of attempts prior to 1914 is slightly lower, 1870-1913, approximately 12 percent, and before that, 1816-1869, about 7 percent. When one examines the hundreds of compellence attempts juxtaposed with a success rate of approximately 2 percent since 1946, it is counterintuitive that states continued to invest time, prestige, and effort into what was likely to be an unsuccessful endeavor.




Figure 15. Attempted Compellence and Success Rates

State Factors that may Correlate with Attempts

There are a number of factors that might help explain the seemingly anomalous pursuit of compellence despite its apparent futility in the post War era. Some authors suggest that specific states or regions may be predisposed to use military force as a tool.⁶ Another possibility is that hegemonic states may use the threat of force to maintain their position in the system.⁷ Still another possibility is that some states that have built a reputation for intervening in humanitarian situations may need to threaten the use of force regularly as part of that intervention.⁸ States that have an aggressive policy of worldwide

⁶ Callahan, *Unwinnable Wars*; Haass, *The Reluctant Sheriff*.

⁷ Boswell and Sweat, "Hegemony, Long Waves, and Major Wars: A Time Series Analysis of Systemic Dynamics, 1496-1967."

⁸ Martha Finnemore, "Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention," in *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 153-54.

engagement, such as the U.S. did during the Cold War, may have a continuing level of military operations that could appear as a large number of compellence attempts.⁹

In order to test these possible explanations for the continued level of attempted compellence, it will be helpful to divide the compellence attempts into the two time periods and determine their geographic distribution. If the attempts at compellence appear to emanate from a set of regions or a single region over time it may indicate that geographic explanations require further investigation. The expectation is that if any of the conditions noted above are true, we should immediately detect a geographic trend. If no geographic nexus is found, none of the motivations above can be true.

Regional Examination

By regional examination, it becomes apparent that the simple continuation of compellence attempts levels is not simple. As shown in figure 16, there were wide variations in regional compellence efforts between the first and second half of the 20th Century.

⁹ Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*, 92.




Figure 16. Attempted Compellence by Region as a Percentage of Global Attempts

Europe was the source of a significantly reduced portion of compellence attempts whereas the Middle East, Africa, and Asia all experienced substantial increases in proportion.¹⁰ The Americas show a small reduction in percentage as the source of attempted compellence. Since what appears like continuity on the surface is actually a shift of compellence attempt frequency from the center to the periphery, the previously proffered explanations are not supported. The idea that a single region or hegemonic power, or state dedicated to humanitarian intervention or even one that used compellence to support a policy of worldwide engagement as the cause of a continuation of the level of attempted compellence do not assist our understanding in this area.¹¹

¹⁰ Gochman and Maoz, "Militarized Interstate Disputes, 1816-1976," 604. It is important to note that the Militarized Interstate Dispute database includes Russia, when it existed, the Soviet Union, and Eastern European states as a part of "Europe."

¹¹ Callahan, *Unwinnable Wars*; Haass, *The Reluctant Sheriff*; Boswell and Sweat, "Hegemony, Long Waves, and Major Wars: A Time Series Analysis of Systemic Dynamics, 1496-1967," 131;

The fact that the continued high frequency of compellence attempts is actually a shift from the center to the periphery requires a further examination of the phenomenon at the regional level to clarify the subordinate activities. First, we will examine the evolving situation in Europe, to understand the substantial drop in proportion of compellence attempts. Secondly, we will examine the trend in the other regions that experienced an upsurge in the proportion of compellence attempts.

Immediately after World War II, Churchill characterized Europe as, "a rubble heap, a charnel house, a breeding ground of pestilence and hate."¹² U.S. intervention with the Marshall Plan rehabilitated the economic systems of 16 European countries, increasing agricultural and industrial output above prewar levels, alleviating inflation, and stabilizing national currencies. Simon Serfaty in *The Elusive Enemy* indicates that the character and success of this plan were shaped by a few key decisions.¹³ Important to the regional drop in compellence attempts is that the Europeans had to initiate aid requests that the U.S. then would only address in a multinational form. This inherently multilateral approach tied the wellbeing of each state to the wellbeing of all, focusing on absolute gains instead of relative gains. The all-European approach did not allow separate national demands that may have prompted a return to competition between the states. Serfaty argues, however, that the Marshall plan was only a small step in creating a level of unity in Europe that negated the attractiveness of compellence. He characterizes the development of the North Atlantic Treaty and its organization as the main motive force

Finnemore, "Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention," 153-4; Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*, 92.

¹² Winston S. Churchill, "Churchill on European Unity," in *Europe Unite, Speeches by Winston S. Churchill 1947 and 1948*, ed. Randolph S. Churchill (London: Cassell & Co., 1947).

¹³ Simon Serfaty, *The Elusive Enemy: American Foreign Policy Since World War II*. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1972), 64.

that created the bonds among the European countries, to finally include West Germany in 1955.¹⁴ These bonds, enabled by the economic and agricultural improvements fostered by the Marshall Plan, were brought into sharper focus by the evolution toward the Treaty of Rome, and eventually the European Union. Here, the idea that the threat or use of exemplar military force was not an appropriate tool to resolve political differences within Western Europe was finalized. Although the strongest portion of this idea was oriented toward fellow European states, it has made European states less likely to make such threats outside of Europe as well. European states were responsible for 60 percent of compellence threats world wide in 1914-1945, but only responsible for 16 percent of the threats in 1946-2001. For Western Europe states, that equals a reduction from 2.75 attempts per year in 1914-1945 to 1 attempt per year in 1946-2001.¹⁵ From the conditions of exhaustion and occupation in 1946, the intervention of the Marshall plan and the building of a great military alliance created a set of conditions that made compellence attempts much less likely.¹⁶

The Western Europeans were not prohibited from making militarized threats against the Communist bloc of Europe, and in fact were sometimes encouraged to do so in support of allied positions.¹⁷ The Communist bloc had a similar structure, with one significant difference. Whereas the U.S. led the Atlantic alliance based on mutual need, the Soviet Union led the Warsaw Pact through, in part, the use and threat of force.¹⁸ In single state versus single state compellence attempts in 1946-2001, most were attempted

¹⁴ Serfaty, *The Elusive Enemy*, 64-68, 72-75.

¹⁵ Western European states used for this example are: UK, Ireland, Belgium, Netherlands, France, Spain, Portugal, Germany, Italy, Greece, Norway, Denmark, and Iceland

¹⁶ Geir Lundestad, *Empire by Integration: The United States and European Integration, 1945-1997* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 36-37.

¹⁷ John Lewis Gaddis, *We Now Know*, 139.

¹⁸ Ambrose and Brinkley, *Rise to Globalism*.

between the states of the Soviet Union or its successor states, with 24 attempts, while intra-western Europe compellence numbered only six attempts. There were 12 attempts from the Soviet Union or successors aimed at Western states with only five attempts in return. This combination of reduction of threats within Western Europe and continued attempts by the Soviets resulted in a reduction from 4.8 compellence attempts per year from 1914 to 1945 to 3.0 attempts in the 1946-2001 timeframe.

As figure 16 denotes, in the same timeframe, states in other regions of the world substantially increased their proportion of compellence attempts. Much of this increase in proportion can be directly attributed to the increase in number of recognized states in those regions. For example, in Africa, three sovereign states had been recognized before the end of World War II, the remainder of the land and people being subject to colonial claims, or not yet established in such a fashion that it would be involved in compelling other states. In the period 1946 through 2001, 45 African states were founded and subsequently recognized by the international community. This more than tenfold increase provided many potential new actors in the compellence arena. Asia tells a similar story, starting with nine recognized sovereign states prior to 1946, and developing 37 new states in the post-World War II era. The Middle East pattern was not as dramatic with 8 states established before 1946 and 17 states established in the period after. In the Americas 26 states existed prior to 1946 and 13 new states came into existence after. Many of these new states were small island nations, such as Bermuda, or other colonial remainders, which became sovereign when colonial powers relinquished the last of their protectorates.¹⁹

¹⁹ Small and Singer, *Resort to Arms*.

Yet, despite the increase in the number of states, the global rate of attempted compellence remained the same, while the regional proportions shifted. Largely, the proportion of attempted compellence by region shifted because the proportion of number of states by region has shifted, along with the suppression of compellence attempts between Western European states. Still, the shift in proportion of compellence attempts does not answer the question of why these now greater number of states would view compellence as attractive, even while successful compellence became more rare.

Possible Correlations - Capability Levels and Attempts

One part of the explanation could be that the capabilities that were inherent in colonies or protectorates were previously concentrated in a smaller number of colonial powers and as new states became sovereign, they were able to claim the wherewithal to conduct their own foreign policies to include the use of threats of force. To a greater or lesser degree, France and other European powers relinquished significant capabilities during the decolonization period after World War II. This diffusion of capability equipped the newly sovereign states while removing some inhibitions on the threat or actual use of those capabilities.²⁰ The diffusion of capability is illustrated in figure 17.

²⁰ Steven R. David, "Explaining Third World Alignment," *World Politics* 43, no. 2 (Jan 1991): 254.




Figure 17. System Concentration of Military Capability over Time

Some leading theorists of international relations have discussed the distribution of capabilities as a causal factor in determining state behaviors.²¹ Since compellence is a type of state behavior, this would imply that the distribution of capabilities could be a causal factor in compellence attempts. Figure 17 illustrated the concentration of military capabilities in the international system with a consolidated measure across all aspects of military expenditures, standing forces and potentials such as population, energy, iron, and steel production.²² Although this diffusion puts more capabilities in the hands of more different decision makers, by itself it cannot account for the level of attempts seen in those regions that formerly did not include sending states. Once those capabilities are available and a leader is facing the situation where the threat of use or exemplar use of

²¹ Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 97-98.

²² Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey, "Capability Distribution."

force could possibly support achievement of his or her policy aims, recourse to attempted compellence may be logical. Therefore, although not causal, the diffusion of capability may be an enabling factor for the maintenance of historic levels of compellence.

As previously discussed, there is a common myth about the capability required for compellence. In chapter three, we found that states that attempted compellence did so with varying levels of capability and we found that capability scores are not good predictors of successful compellence. Instead, capability distribution may play a different role. It is possible that a certain level or range of capability is conducive to compellence attempts. States below a certain level of capability would not attempt compellence, whereas those above this level would, given other motivations. Although not causal, if the level of capability for sending states remained the same from one period to the next we would increase our insight into the necessary conditions for this phenomenon.

Although it has been demonstrated that the diffusion of capability generally increased, the specific level of capability related to compellence attempts has not been addressed. If the capability available for compellence attempts remained nominally the same, across the periods we could then theorize that the level of attempts is prompted or regulated by the level of capabilities in individual states. The question becomes: does the level of capability for sending states remain the same from one period to the next? Or do states in the current era attempt compellence at different levels of capabilities than states in the previous era?

Using the same combined scale of capability discussed previously, in which the total world capability equals 1.0, the mean capability of pre-World War II sending states were compared with the mean capability of post-World War II sending states to see if

their capability distribution remained the same. An independent samples t-test, equal variance not assumed, indicated that the means differences are statistically significant, with the pre-1946 mean higher than the post-1946 mean.²³ The difference in the means indicates that we cannot depend on the continuation of sending states level of capabilities as a causal factor for the maintenance of compellence attempts in the post-World War II era.

Further, when the difference in capability between the sending and target states was also examined in a independent samples t-test, equal variance not assumed, the pre-1946 differences were significantly larger than the post-1946 differences.²⁴ The reduced differences in capabilities combined with the earlier examination of means differences in capability distribution, seems to indicate that the overall level of compeller's capability is reduced from one period to the next and that the difference in capability between the two states become smaller also.

As noted earlier, some leading theorists of international relations have discussed the distribution of capabilities as a causal factor in determining state behaviors.²⁵ This examination shows that, globally, capabilities have become more diffuse and the difference in capabilities between the sending and target states more closely match than previously. It does not appear that these changes in distribution of capability have explanatory power for the observed pattern of compellence attempts. Although the

²³ The independent samples t-test, on general capability difference between two time periods, equal variance not assumed, indicated that the means of 1914-1945 states and the means of 1946-2001 states differences are statistically significant $t(309.964) = 10.043$, $p = .000$. The pre-1946 era ($M = .0769$, $SD = .004$) was substantially higher than the 1946 and after era ($M = .027$, $SD = .0498$).

²⁴ The second independent samples t-test, on the capability difference between the sending and target states between two time periods, equal variance not assumed, indicated that the means differences between 1914-1945 states and the means differences between 1946-2001 states differences are statistically significant $t(302.601) = 6.4$, $p = .000$. The pre-1946 era ($M = .0424$, $SD = .0902$) was substantially higher than the 1946 and after era ($M = .0046$, $SD = .0561$).

²⁵ Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 97-98.

distribution of capability may have explanatory value in other aspects of international relations, it does not appear to provide analytic leverage to this part of the compellence puzzle.

Government Type and Attempted Compellence

Various authors have found high correlations between the government types and their choices regarding warfare.²⁶ This suggests that a similar relationship between government types and choices regarding compellence may exist. If government type was critical to maintaining the same level of attempted compellence, we would expect to see continuity in the type of governments between the 1914-1945 era and the 1946-2001 era. To examine this notion, we used the Polity 4 database, specifically the Polity2 variable, which provides an aggregate score of autocracy and democracy. If the mix of autocratic and democracy entities attempting compellence remained constant one could theorize that a particular mix of government types results in a certain level of attempted compellence. To serve as a baseline for comparison, figure 18 provides the distribution of government types, 1816-2001.

²⁶ Bruce M. Russett and John R. Oneal, *Triangulating Peace* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company Inc, 2001); Spencer R. Weart, *Never at War: Why Democracies Will not Fight One Another* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998). These works are representative examples from a large democratic peace literature.




Figure 18. Distribution of Autocracy and Democracy, 1816-2001

Given the distribution of all states' scores for autocracy and democracy in figure 18 and the distribution of attempts in the two periods of interest in figure 19, we find that the entire range of governments participate in attempts at compellence. It also appears that neither autocrats nor democrats, as indicated by the Polity2 variable, are especially responsible for any specific rate of attempts. This indicates that government type is not generally a good indicator of the rate of attempted compellence. The question remains if the number of attempts by type of government stayed constant from one period to the next.




Figure 19. Comparison of Government by Type for Attempted Compellence, 1914-1945 and 1946-2001

Figure 19 does show some variation from one era to the next. The states attempting to compel are slightly more democratic, with a small increase of states in the middle third of the scale. Therefore, using the Polity2 scores noted above, both the sending and target states' government type were examined to see if their distribution remained the same between the two time periods. An independent samples t-test, equal variance not assumed, showed that the means differences were not statistically significant for sending states but the t-test was statistically significant for the target states.²⁷ The mean for the sending states shifted very slightly from a -2.96 to a -2.1. On the target side of compellence, the means shifted from a -1.46 to a 0.34. This indicates that the sending

²⁷ An independent samples t-test, equal variance not assumed, showed that the means differences were not statistically significant for sending states, $t(386.849) = -1.857$, $p = .064$. The pre-1946 era ($M = -2.96$, $SD = 6.523$) was slightly lower than the 1946 and after era ($M = -2.10$, $SD = 6.920$) but not significantly so. The t-test for target states indicated that $t(458.997) = -4.042$, $p = .000$. The pre-1946 era ($M = -1.46$, $SD = 5.783$) was substantially lower than the 1946 and after era ($M = .34$, $SD = 7.856$).

states were generally the same mix of autocracies and democracies, with a slight move toward democracy while the target states were slightly more democratic in the second period.

As we examined what looked to be a relatively steady pattern of attempted compellence, we have detected substantial regional variations on the part of the sending states, but continuity in the mixture of types of governments pursuing compellence with a slight shift in the nature of the governments of the target states. Further, the concentration of capabilities in the world and specific levels of capabilities on the part of the sending states do not seem to be related to the level of compellence attempts. Since we now know these more specific facts about the states related to the compellence attempts, we can logically make some statements about the maintenance of the level of attempts in the post World War II era. First, the maintenance of the level of compellence is not based on a specific set of states, as the region percentages have shifted. Further, the increases were in areas where there was a substantive growth in the number of Westphalian-type states, and the reduction of attempts was in an area strongly affected by World War II. Further still, the sending states mix indicated that compellence was being attempted by the same type of states as previously, as it continued to be a tool for autocrats and democrats against a slightly more democratic set of target states in the second period.

Risk Acceptance as a Factor

In addition to the location, capability, and the form of government, some researchers have emphasized that attitude towards risk may be a factor that drives decisions about the use of military force.²⁸ It is possible, taking into account the shifts in

²⁸ Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman, *War and Reason*, 42-3.

region and capability, that states' frequency of compellence attempts is related to the level of risk they are willing to assume. If this is true, we would expect risk acceptance to decrease in Europe and increase in the Middle East, Africa and Asia. If the data supports this expectation, risk acceptance may help explain the frequency of compellence attempts. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and David Lalman in *War and Reason* provide a risk calculation, which can help us test the possibility that changes in attitude toward risk matches the changes in the distribution of compellence attempts.²⁹ This calculation determines a state's safest possible set of policies, that same state's most dangerous set of policies, and determines its actual policies. The location along that continuum establishes a factor, which is used within expected utility functions as an representation of a state's willingness to assume risk. Here we will use the risk acceptance measure as a comparison tool to measure between one time period and the next. The expectation is, if risk acceptance is correlated to the steady level of compellence attempts, the risk acceptance level for sending states would remain the same.

Sending states' risk acceptance scores were examined to see if their distribution remained the same between the two time periods. This examination was done by region to determine if there were similarities between risk acceptance and distribution of compellence attempts. A set of independent samples t-test, equal variance not assumed, showed a statistically significant shift in Europe, the Middle East, Asia and Americas regions to accept less risk.³⁰ Africa did not have enough cases before 1945 to create a

²⁹ Ibid., 292-3.

³⁰ A set of regional independent samples t-tests, equal variance not assumed for risk scores showed that the means differences were statistically significant for: Europe, $t(172.489) = 8.614$, $p=.000$. The pre-1946 era ($M = -.1226$, $SD = .3236$) was substantially higher than the 1946 and after era ($M = -2.7565$, $SD = 3.9840$). Middle East, $t(322.611) = 4.719$, $p=.000$. The pre-1946 era ($M = -.0044$, $SD = .1955$) was substantially higher than the 1946 and after era ($M = -.8572$, $SD = 3.1039$). Asia, $t(290.681) = 7.987$, $p=.000$.

statistically significant result. This means that we cannot depend on the idea that the states that attempt compellence are doing so at a similar frequency because of a similar attitude about risk. If risk attitude was an indicator or perhaps causally related to compellence attempts, these risk values would indicate that we should have a statistically significant decrease in the number of compellence attempts in all regions. We do not. Therefore, risk attitude is not likely to be a determinant of the level of compellence. This finding does not entirely discard the idea of risk acceptance as a contributing factor in the decision to attempt compellence. Europe does have a larger decrease in risk acceptance than the other regions, just not a change in risk attitude that is proportional to the change.

So far, we have reviewed five variables related to the sending states and the level of compellence attempts. Two of those appear to help to better describe the phenomenon, the apparent movement of compellence attempts from the center to the periphery and the more even distribution of capability. Three other variables seem not to have strong explanatory power, specific levels of capability of the sending states the form of government and attitude toward acceptance of risk, Although we cannot explain the level of compellence activities from this portion of our examination, our understanding of the contributions of these five variables exclude many related potential explanations. As suggested earlier, where direct correlations do not appear to obtain the required insights, other techniques to work through counterintuitive situations may be helpful.

The pre-1946 era (\bar{M} = -.0623, \underline{SD} = .1946) was substantially higher than the 1946 and after era (\bar{M} = -1.7726, \underline{SD} = 3.5207). Americas, $t(160.511) = 6.111$, $p = .000$. The pre-1946 era (\bar{M} = .0796, \underline{SD} = .3469) was substantially higher than the 1946 and after era (\bar{M} = -1.8863, \underline{SD} = 3.962).

A Game Theoretic Approach

In *War and Reason: Domestic and International Imperatives*, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and David Lalman captured the idea of an international interaction game, based on the expected utility of various actions that could help decipher the choices between peace and war. This interaction game focuses on decision makers assessing the desirability of outcomes according to various costs and benefits that the outcomes are anticipated to generate.³¹ Drawing on the idea of strategic interaction, this model claims that decision makers choose their strategies with an awareness of how the countervailing actions available to their opponents may alter their preferred course. Although the model assumes the existence of a unitary rational actor, it is insensitive to whether the decision is actually made by a single actor or group, or through interaction of a plurality. The model is dependent on the rationality of the decision maker, as a key function of the decision-maker in the model is transitive ordering of future options. Additionally, the model provides the opportunity to include some domestic concerns in what have been considered quintessentially foreign policy decisions.

More importantly, the model abstracts decision processes that may or may not be conscious on the part of the decision-maker. The model depicts these as future sequential decisions as they might be assessed by one set of decision makers or the other. The result of these decisions range from a peaceful acceptance of the status quo to resolution of the issue by warfare. Decision makers from both sides conduct a process that has them consider the expected utility of various actions as they might be responded to by the adversary. This early consideration informs the decision process, so that they maximize

³¹ Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman, *War and Reason*, 25.

their expected utility from that stage of the game onward. The actors in this model cannot commit themselves to a single course of action from an early understanding of the expected utility, but can act in anticipation of their adversary's actions. This model indicates that the state's decision makers are forward-looking at least into the midterm, limiting the actors' vision to the end of a sequence of moves that constitute a single play in the international interaction game and allowing behavior to only affect the current choice. Therefore, the modeling approach assumes that the state decision makers do not knowingly act contrary to medium or longer-term interest of their state, but that their actions have only an immediate effect. However, the model does not currently allow decision makers to be influenced by the long-term through repeated play or iteration. The outline of the international interaction game that provides the framework to apply these rules is captured in figure 20.




Figure 20. International Interaction Model

If this model adequately emulates some version of the decision-makers logic, it is possible that it can help explain why leaders continue to make compellence attempts despite the low success rate. Applying the international interaction model for this series of real world state-to-state interactions yields the results in table 17, compared to the actual outcomes for compellence attempts. For example; the model predicted “Acquiesce by B”, the nominal goal of compellence, for 278 cases. The actual outcome for those 278 cases are recorded across the categories provided by the Correlates of War database, with only 15 real world occurrences of “Yield B”. Immediately striking is the substantially lower performance of the model in the area of negotiated outcomes. Whereas the international interaction game would lead one to believe that there is about a 50 percent

chance for negotiated settlement, actual experience indicates a much lower outcome. A condition that is not predicted by the international interaction game is stalemate, which, as we saw in chapter two, is the preponderance of the outcomes in the real world.

Table 17. Predictions of the International Interaction Game vs. Actual Outcomes

		Actual							
		Victory A	Victory B	Yield A	Yield B	Stalemate	Negotiate	War	Totals
Predicted	Status Quo	32	22	11	30	183	22	6	306
	Negotiate	139	95	37	101	670	91	19	1152
	Acquiesce by A	13	1	2	6	75	7	0	104
	Acquiesce by B	27	19	9	15	172	35	1	278
	War by A	9	21	8	13	270	20	1	342
	War by B	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	2
	Totals	220	158	67	165	1372	175	27	2184

The area of status quo is particularly important. Since all cases had been pre-selected for the occurrence of compellence, none of the sending state decision makers actually chose status quo. This is significant since the model predicts that the choice would be status quo for 306 cases when the actual course of action in the real world was to make a demand. Further, despite some minor variation in the definition of war between the two data sources the difference between actual occurrence of war and the predicted

was substantial.³² Where the model called for an outcome of war 344 times, the actuality is near 30. These two errors are critical. Since the model over-predicts status quo and recourse to war, it cannot serve as a good method to explain the maintenance of a historic level of compellence attempts.

Before immediately rejecting expected utility and more specifically the international interaction model for its miscalculation of the chances for various approaches in compellence, it may be helpful to examine some key features of the model to see if it provides insight to this apparent miscalculation. The international interaction game captures the interaction between two theoretically equal players. It is instantiated in the EUGene software and populated with real world data, according to the specifications within *War and Reason* equation variables and rule sets.³³

The model depends heavily on probabilities based on comparative military capability and includes a domestic cost of war. The game begins with a move by nature that enables one state or another to attempt to influence the development of events. This state has the choice to make a demand of the other state or not. This highlights the first difference between a description of compellence and the broader set of international interactions.

Compellence begins when the status quo is found to be unsatisfactory by the sending state, which then makes a demand of the target state, based on the belief that compliance by the target will modify the status quo and result in a condition that is acceptable to the sending state. In the case of compellence, this demand is coupled with a

³² Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman, *War and Reason*, 69; Jones, Bremer, and Singer, "Militarized Disputes," 171.

³³ Bennett and Stam, "EUGene: A Conceptual Manual," 179-204; Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman, *War and Reason*.

threat, display, or demonstrative use of military force. Compellence, by definition in this research, does not allow for a non-demand by the sending state as the initial step of interaction. This renders the leg that allows a target state the initiative, to include the subordinate sub-game, moot. The game is re-drawn below in figure 21 without the moot leg, for clarity.




Figure 21. International Interaction Game, Compellence Version

At the next step of the model, where the target state can decide to acquiesce or issue a counter-demand, examination of the empirical data has shown that few states, less than 10 percent, acquiesce at this point. The vast majority communicate a counter-

demand that the sending state not interfere in the target state's actions. This counter-demand may or may not include the threat of military force. The next steps open to the sending state are, in reality, not as stark as immediately implied by the game structure. The game allows for the sending state to attack the target state resulting in either war or capitulation on the part of the target state. Alternatively, it allows for a sending state to start negotiations with the target state, which still has the possibility of ending in a negotiated resolution, war started by the target state, or capitulation the sending state, after use of force by the target state. As compellence, at its core, is an economy of force measure, we would not expect a sending state to choose to attack the target state at this juncture as there is some probability that it will still be able to achieve its desired end state by threatening or by a demonstrative use of military force instead of conducting expensive "brute force" operations.³⁴ At this point, the model structure provides for only one other choice for the sending state, negotiation with the target state. The most common occurrence captured in the empirical data is that the target state does not comply and that the sending state ceases to make repeated demands. If no action is accomplished by either side for the next 6 months, the episode is recorded as a stalemate, in the *Militarized Interstate Disputes* data.³⁵ This end state does not comport with a common implication of the phrase "negotiated resolution" highlighted by the expected utility model.

Despite the limited model choices after negotiation between the sending state and the target, the sending state must, in order to make its military threats believable, retain the ability to move from negotiation to execute its threat, up to and including war if that

³⁴ Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, 2-3.

³⁵ Jones, Bremer, and Singer, "Militarized Disputes," 175.

was part of the threatened outcome for non-compliance. Without that ability, the sending state's negotiation position is untenable, as the target state will detect the empty threat. From one perspective, during compellence the sending state is at the beginning of the crisis sub game, attempting to negotiate with the target state, but not yet past the point where it might use the full force of its military and start a war with the target. The target state is not, as the model structure might imply, awaiting a decision by sending state, but instead is actively seeking to negate the sending state's threat using conciliation, pressure, linkage, balancing, and sometimes non-communication to attempt to achieve its initially desired endstate, simultaneously with the sending state's actions. For example, starting in March of 1999, NATO forces conducted bombing raids as an exemplar use of force along with diplomatic demands that Slobodan Milosevic cease his campaign of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. Milosevic did not wait passively after he issued his counter demand that NATO not interfere with his security operations, he continued to attempt to both diffuse the NATO threats and achieve the utilities of his initial objectives. In addition to issuing the counter-demand, he reached out to the UN and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and tried to use the International Court of Justice to get the bombing to stop, while continuing to execute operations in Kosovo.³⁶ Alternatively, the target state may interpret a sending state's compellence threats to be the early indicators of an attack and not negotiation, interpreting the exemplar use of force as a signal that the sending state has already decided to go to war.

³⁶ Sadler et al. "Milosevic Tells Citizens to Defend Yugoslavia." In *CNN.Com* 24 March 1999 *Focus on Kosovo*. <http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/europe/9903/24/kosovo.04/> (accessed 23 July 2004); "World Court Opens NATO 1999 Bombing Campaign Case." *Reuters Foundation* 19 April 2004. <http://www.google.com/search?q=cache:Yl6m4Q-lGDsJ:www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L19571896.htm+1999+milosevic+ICJ+bombing&hl=en> (accessed 25 Aug 2004).

This phase of compellence can be confusing. After the sending state has made a demand and the target state has refused to acquiesce, the sending state can progress no further than the beginning of the crisis sub game, remaining at a point of decision. The sending state would rather not execute an attack on the target state as it is a costly venture with uncertain payback, but it still is not sure if it can rely on negotiation with the target state, as full commitment to that approach may disable preparations for war. While the sending state is trapped in this schizophrenic position, the target state continues to accrue benefits from its original policy. Further, the target state has the opportunity to engage in the full range of negotiation with the sending state, or it can preemptively attack the sending state to realize the benefits of having the initiative if it appears that the sending state is about to attack. Unlike war, compellence requires the sending state to simultaneously negotiate and make the threat of war believable. These activities generate costs to the sending state. This limits the sending states activities to those which it is willing to pay the price for and enables the target state that increase the cost to the sending state by manipulating the situation. This increasing cost of attempted compellence may cause the sending state to reconsider its demands. Further, consider the illustrative case where targets state's initial policy that the sending state found objectionable was time definite. That is, the target state's policy was to accomplish a particular goal within a set time. If the target state accomplishes its goal before it succumbs to the sending state's threat, its original policy becomes moot, as does the demand and counter-demand. A new demand to reverse the new condition may be issued by the sending state to the target state or it may not. This partial repetitive interaction is not directly reflected in the international interaction game.

The international interaction game, although useful for framing the broad sweep of possible interactions, does not inform at the point of critical interaction where the sending state has made a demand and the target state a counter demand. The model would make it appear that the sending state now has initiative when in fact substantial initiative still belongs to the target state. Further, as the target state exercises that initiative it can change the terms of the debate, as Nicaragua did on April 9, 1984 when it initiated proceedings against the United States of America in the International Court of Justice. That action was based on the allegation that the United States had supported, by its policy and actions, a mercenary army, the Contras, in launching attacks on the territory of Nicaragua, with the purpose of overthrowing the Sandinista government.³⁷ The debate then became one of public exposure of U.S. covert methods and the unwillingness of the U.S. to submit its actions to the judgment of an international organization. This shifts the elements of the expected utility discussion from one underpinned by the comparison of military capabilities to one focused on the loss of international prestige.

In actual practice, states are really playing two separate but connected games. Unlike the interaction game, each can continue to take actions that improve their expected outcomes, without waiting for the input of the other. Further, the players can re-define the factors of expected utility during the engagement as Nicaragua did, making the interactions much more fluid than this particular game structure would imply. This makes the expected utility approach, at least as expressed through the International Interaction Game, insufficient to explain the continued historic level of compellence attempts.

³⁷ International Court of Justice. *Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America)*, Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 14. 27 June 1986. <http://www.gwu.edu/~jaysmith/nicus3.html> (accessed 25 August 2004).

This chapter started by highlighting a part of the compellence puzzle, the maintenance of the rates of compellence attempts controlled for the number of states that continued at a historic rate despite the substantial reduction in successes. In attempting to uncover a pattern to explain this continuation of the historic level of compellence, we determined it is, in actuality, a rapid increase in the level of attempted compellence in three regions and a reduction in the level of compellence attempts in two regions. Since the initial measure of attempted compellence rates already controlled for the number of states, the simple answer of post World War II decolonization and state growth was not supportable. Further, we have examined location, the distribution of capability, the specific level of capability of the sending states, the form of government, and the risk propensity of the sending states. Further still, we have also more closely examined the pattern of attempted compellence in those regions where the increase has taken place and specifically highlighted substantial spikes in compellence attempts, where they exist. This examination did not reveal any significant patterns of sending states, of target states, or cross regional similarities that may provide an independent basis for explanations for the observed behavior.

Domestic Benefits to Compellence Attempts

Emergent Behavior

Stephen Wolfram, Robert Axelrod and Lars-Eric Cederman have used complexity theory to examine and explain a wide range of activities and behaviors.³⁸ The leverage complexity theory provides is the idea that complex outcomes and results may be

³⁸ Axelrod, *Complexity of Cooperation*; Cederman, *Emergent Actors*; Wolfram, *A New Kind of Science*.

explained by the interaction of a small set of actors and a few simple rules. Instead of grounding the analysis in multi-variable correlations or a multi-path game, complexity theory posits simple rules and actors. How the actors interact with other actors and the environment and the adaptation within those rules creates the outcome – emergent behavior, not dependent on a specific formula, but created through adaptive goal seeking.

In *The Logic of Political Survival*, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson, and James D. Morrow develop a rich theory on a fairly simple rule: that leaders want to remain in office as long as possible. They contend that, “The desire to survive motivates the selection of policies and allocations of benefits; it shapes the selection of political institutions and the objectives of foreign policy; it influences the very evolution of political life.”³⁹ The above actions taken by political leaders can be interpreted in the context of their desire to retain power. The authors use this axiom to construct theories of institutions, leadership incentives, governance, taxing and spending decisions, policy choices, and war behavior. In the last category, the authors attempt to use an elaborated theory to explain whether leaders choose to attempt to seize territory, oust a foreign leader, or to install a puppet government. The contention in this chapter is much simpler: leaders want to remain in office as long as possible and attempt compellence because their attempts are compatible with increased longevity. This results in attempted compellence rates, when adjusted for the growth of the number of states in time, that reflect a continuation of historic rates.

³⁹ Bueno de Mesquita et al., *The Logic of Political Survival*, 8-9.

Compellers and Non-compellers

Using the data associated with the research for *The Logic of Political Survival* along with the data from the previous sources, we will first demonstrate the relationship between attempted compellence and longevity in office, look at possible intervening variables, and then discuss the implications. The first example will consider leaders from 1816 through 2001 who have left office prior to the end date of the data. Leaders with 90 days or less in office will not be considered in order to provide for a sufficient time for the leader to have established themselves in office and taken control of the mechanisms of government. This reduces the sample size from 2,743 executives to 2,456. The examples will compare the tenure in office for compellers and non-compellers using a survival plot. If the leader has been involved in any form of attempted compellence, from verbal threats through declaration of war (the declaration is assumed to be a contingent threat) they will be identified as a compeller. If there is no evidence that a leader has attempted to use compellence as a tool of statecraft they will be placed in a group of non-compellers. The leader data remains connected to other data about form of government, region, time period, state capabilities, and compellence success for later testing. There are 1,802 leaders that are non-compellers and 654 leaders that are compellers. The initial diagram in figure 22 indicates a considerably better survival rate for officials that attempt compellence over those who do not.

Using a Kaplan – Meier test, the mean survival value for the compellers is 2,772 days with a median value of 1,665 days, the mean survival value for the non-compellers is 1,411 with a median value of 729 days. The log rank test of significance (156.68 with 1 df) shows the results to be statistically significant (.0000). This difference supports the

contention that leaders that are compellers and leaders that are non-compellers have significantly difference probabilities for staying in office.




Figure 22. Compeller vs. Non-compeller Survival Data

Other factors could be influencing the time in office. Those factors could include geographic location and form of government. These characteristics are of interest as it is possible that the strength of a single region's variation could affect the entire result or the strength of a type of government could do likewise. Examining regional difference first, we see in the table 18 that there are some regional variations.

Table 18. Regional Differences in Compellence Effect on Longevity

		Europe ^a	Middle East ^b	Africa ^c	Asia ^d	Americas ^e
Non-Compeller	Mean	1197	2843	2233	1659	1276
	Median	381	1600	1343	919	1142
Compeller	Mean	2967	3552	4881	2685	1843
	Median	1470	2083	3947	1580	1461

^a Log Rank 118.44, df=1, p=.0000; ^b Log Rank 1.00, df=1, p=.3167; ^c Log Rank 21.61, df=1, p=.0000; ^d Log Rank 11.50, df=1, p=.0007; ^e Log Rank 25.13, df=1, p=.0000

In every region, the mean time in office for compellers is greater than the mean time in office for non-compellers. This relationship is significant in four of five regions. In the Middle East the compeller enjoys a longer time in office but the difference in the survival curves is not statistically significant. However, if we limit the sample to just the post-World War II actions, the Middle East portion of the sample gains in statistical significance, moving from p=.3167 for the entire period to p=.0123 for the post-World War II period.⁴⁰ The fact that the survival scores are significant indicates that the relationship between compellence and longevity in office is not likely to be caused by random chance, especially in the post-1945 era.

Another variable that could be masking the actual performance of the compellence variable is the nature of the government. Across the entire group, 1,064 of the states had Polity scores of 0 to -10 and 1,254 states with at least a minimal level of democracy, 1 to 10 on the Polity score. It is possible that one type of government or another may hold office much longer than the other.⁴¹ By re-running the Kaplan-Meier

⁴⁰ Sample limited to post World War II data. Log Rank=53.14, df=1, p=.0000; Middle East: Log Rank=6.27, df=1, p=.0123; Africa: Log Rank=23.09, df=1, p=.0000; Asia: Log Rank=20.36, df=1, p=.0000; Americas: Log Rank=11.03, df=1, p=.0009

⁴¹ Henry Bienen and Nicolas van de Walle, *Of Time and Power: Leadership Duration in the Modern World* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1991), 90-92.

test with controls for autocracy and democracy, we can determine if those characteristics are correlated to the effect observed. The survival plots for autocrats and democrats are contained in figure 23 and figure 24.




Figure 23. Survival Plot, 1946-2001, Autocrats

It is apparent that autocrats that use compellence survive much longer in office than do not. At the same time, it is also evident that democrats that use compellence also survive longer in office.




Figure 24. Survival Plot, 1946-2001, Democrats

Table 19. Compellence Effect on Tenure in Office with Type of Government

		Autocrats ^a	Democrats ^b
Non-Compeller	Mean	1699	945
	Median	909	517
Compeller	Mean	3760	1682
	Median	2191	1461

^aLog Rank 103.29, df=1, p=.0000; ^bLog Rank 80.06, df=1, p=.0000

In table 19, the mean and median times in office for non-compeller and compeller leaders are captured in numeric form. Both the Autocrats and Democrats groups are statistically significant.

One clarification is needed. Some scholars refer to domestic audience costs for failure to carry out threats or that domestic punishment for poor performance in

diplomacy that may reduce longevity.⁴² In the case of compellence, there is no apparent punishment from the domestic audience for trying and failing. Figure 25 provides a visual depiction based on the same data used in the previous discussion of survival rates.




Figure 25. Effect of Success or Failure of Compellence on Longevity

Although longevity for “failures” is slightly lower than successful compellers, both survival rates are higher than those that do not attempt to compel at all. The challenge remains that correlation is not causation. Compellence behavior, whether successful or not, is related to greater longevity in office, even when region and form of government are controlled for. This does not mean that our search for an explanation for this part of the puzzle is over. It is possible that longevity causes compellence behavior. More precisely, the office holder may have massed the right type of political wherewithal

⁴² Fearon, “Domestic Political Audiences.” 577; Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman, *War and Reason*, 41, 46.

over time to conduct compellence operations and that a lesser time in office does not provide those opportunities. If true, the expectation would be that compellence attempts would only start after a certain interval, or that compellence attempts would be skewed to occur late in the incumbents' tenure. That is, if longevity were causally related to compellence one would need to observe a certain amount of longevity prior to compellence attempts. If compellence attempts supported longevity one would observe some level of compellence attempts prior to achievement of longevity. To test this expectation, a variable was created that established the ratio of the number of days total in office vs. the number of days from entering office to starting a compellence attempt. In this ratio, 0.5 would indicate that the leader first attempted compellence half way through his or her tenure and a 1.0 ratio would indicate that the first compellence attempt on the last day in office.⁴³ Figure 26 contains a plot of this ratio. It clearly shows that compellence attempts often come at the beginning of a leader's tenure.

⁴³ The test data previously had all cases with 90 days or less total time in office removed, to censor those cases where a leader is almost immediately removed from power.




Figure 26. Ratio of Tenure vs. Start Compellence Attempt

The expectation of establishment of longevity prior to compellence is not supported for the 622 cases, $\underline{M}=.374$ and $\underline{SD}=.287$. Therefore, we can reject the possibility of reverse causation. Longevity is not necessary for compellence. Further, given approximately 70 percent of compellence users start compellence prior to the midpoint in their tenure, this establishes appropriate directionality between compellence attempts and tenure.

Compellence attempts are positively correlated with longevity. Controlling for government type and region, the relationships remains statistically significant. When testing for directionality between compellence and longevity, longevity is not a necessary condition for compellence and further, compellence often occurs in the first half of a compelling leader's time in office. Given all other conditions remain equal, leaders that attempt to compel remain in office longer. This result for attempted compellence satisfies the motive force specified in *The Logic of Political Survival*. In short, the compellence

attempt level remains high because political leaders conduct actions that achieve a longevity benefit for them and compellence is among those actions.

Steve R. David in *Explaining Third World Alignment* provides similar insight, in an attempt to explain third world states' policies, writ large. He coined a term "omnibalancing" that highlighted the state leaders' need to counter internal and external threats against personal and political survival.⁴⁴ A key observation was that this need drove behaviors that did not comport with actions that we would expect from a realist or neorealist approach, much as we see in compellence behavior.⁴⁵ From this perspective David's basic unit of analysis, the state's leader, matches the focus of analysis that Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, and Morrow use in *The Logic of Political Survival*.⁴⁶ Accepting the idea of an anarchic environment at some level within the state as suggested by David, the logical extension is that the leader values and is even further motivated by individual political or personal survival, as envisioned by Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, and Morrow. Therefore, in this context, compellence attempts could be viewed as a tool or measure that supports political or personal requirements without the actual need to get the other state to acquiesce for the exchange to be successful for the leader. This is not meant to imply that all compellence attempts are only shams unintended to shift other states behavior, but that some portion could be selected to serve purposes other than the explicitly stated ones. An explanation of the portion of the compellence puzzle concerning the fact of attempts continuing at historic levels may be that the rate is partially established by survival needs of individual leaders.

⁴⁴ David, "Explaining Third World Alignment," 235.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 237-8.

⁴⁶ David, "Explaining Third World Alignment."; Bueno de Mesquita et al., *The Logic of Political Survival*.

Compellence behavior is obviously not the sole determinate of longevity. Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson found that going to war created a hazard for the leaders' longevity. Authoritarian leaders were affected less, while costly war and defeat increased the hazard.⁴⁷ Others have indicated that the possibility that a leader will be punished at the polls for poor performance allows some leaders to make strong commitments, but that domestic conditions and institutional arrangements enable or constrain the punishment.⁴⁸ Bienen and van de Walle determined that the current length of time in office was the best predictor of how long a leader was likely to remain in office.⁴⁹ Others have examined longevity in regard to homogenous ethnicity, regime types, participation in international war, a notion of inevitable decline, connection to macro-features of the political landscape, political drama, and participation in an International Monetary Fund program.⁵⁰ This list is probably not exhaustive. The larger picture that these studies draw is that longevity is more affected by actions of the leader, than external conditions, such as homogenous ethnicity or the idea of inevitable decline. The use of war appears risky from the longevity standpoint if it is either costly or if it ends in defeat. Compellence, on the other hand appears to be rewarded if attempted. It appears, all other things remaining

⁴⁷ Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Randolph M. Siverson, "War and the Survival of Political Leaders: A Comparative Study of Regime Types and Political Accountability," *The American Political Science Review* 89, no. 4 (Dec 1995): 852-53.

⁴⁸ Alastair Smith, "International Crises and Domestic Politics," *The American Political Science Review* 92, no. 3 (Sept 1998): 623-38.

⁴⁹ Bienen and van de Walle, *Time and Power*.

⁵⁰ Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson, "War and the Survival of Political Leaders: 841-55; John Londregan et al., "Ethnicity and Leadership Succession in Africa," *International Studies Quarterly*, 39, no. 1 (March 1995): 1-25; Michael D. Wallace and Peter Suedfeld, "Leadership Performance in Crisis: The Longevity-Complexity Link," *International Studies Quarterly* 32, no. 4 (Dec 1988): 439-51; Robin F. Marra, Jr., Charles W. Ostrom, and Dennis M. Simon, "Foreign Policy and Presidential Popularity: Creating Windows of Opportunity in the Perpetual Election," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 34, no. 4: 588-623; Alastair Smith and James Raymond Vreeland, "The Survival of Political Leaders and IMF Programs: Testing the Scapegoat Story," in *Conference on The Impact of Globalization on the Nation-State from Above: The International Monetary Fund and The World Bank*. (Yale University: 25-27 April 2003), Yale Center for International and Area Studies.

equal, leaders who are willing to attempt compellence remain in office longer. The contention is not that compellence is the sole determinant of longevity, but leaders who attempt to compel are more likely to remain in office longer than the equivalent leader who does not. Therefore, compellence attempts remain at a high level since they generate some value in maintenance of the office.

Summary

This chapter examined three approaches to look for explanations for the continuation of compellence attempt rates despite the dramatic decline in compellence success. The first approach, borrowed from the Correlates of War project, looked for correlations of factors to the maintenance of the compellence rate. This approach examined a number of factors such as regional increases of compellence activity, the diffusion of capabilities, and state decrease in acceptance of risk, that could have contributed to the regional increases of compellence attempts. While there were interesting changes in the regional distribution of compellence behavior, no clear correlations were found with which to establish a causal relationship.

A second approach from the international relations game theoretic community was tested. It was an attempt to apply Bruce Bueno de Mesquita's International Interaction Game to the phenomenon of continued compellence attempts. It did not provide specific insight into compellence behavior as it routinely predicts activities other than compellence attempts and incorrectly indicates negotiation as the most frequent outcome. This may be because its variables were specified for peace and war and not

conceptualized or operationalized for compellence. It did provide a valuable framework to characterize the sending and target states interactions and potential choices.

A third approach, borrowing from the logic of complexity, examined the maintenance of compellence attempts as a phenomenon that appears because of individual state leader's choice of actions that are compatible with continued survival in office. Leaders who attempted compellence were found to have a statistically significant higher longevity in office than leaders who did not use compellence. This, of course, does not mean that attempted compellence is the only behavior that contributes to longevity, only that actions taken by leader's attempts to maintain their grip on office are also reflected in the maintenance of the historic frequency of compellence attempts.

The statistical fact that compellence attempts are at historic levels may be the result of multiple leaders applying a simple rule set that includes personal and political survival within their own individual situations. As captured by Steve R. David in *Explaining Third World Alignment*, leaders accomplish actions that they see as compatible with maintenance in office from both an international and domestic perspective.⁵¹ This, coupled with an increase in capabilities in the Middle East, Africa, and Asia may have created an increase in compellence attempts in those regions. This increase in compellence attempts compensated for the proportional decrease in compellence attempts in the rest of the world where capabilities were not increased. These two trends combined to give the appearance of a sustained level of compellence attempts, adjusted for the increase in the number of states.

⁵¹ David, "Explaining Third World Alignment."

CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSION

Although this work started with the discussion of two interesting cases of attempted compellence, the substantive discussion has focused on trends of a large number of states over time. This empirical approach, not previously entertained by compellence researchers, provided insight into patterns of compellence across almost 200 years of statecraft. Additionally, it provided a global perspective that previous researchers have neglected.

Describing the Compellence Puzzle

The early portions of this analysis indicated that compellence, when examined from a global perspective, over time, is a fairly unsuccessful method to achieve the announced goals. Using a strict definition of success, less than ten percent of the attempts have been successful. Even when the definition of success was relaxed to include compromises, the rate increased to less than 20 percent. One variation to that dismal record was in Europe during the early 1800s where the major powers, both singularly and acting in concert were able to compel fellow European states as well as Asian and Middle Eastern states with modest success. Yet, more often states across the globe continued to exert substantial effort in fruitless attempts to compel each other with about 1,800 well documented attempts between 1816 and 2001.

Some of this empirical examination reflected the underlying growth in the number of states after World War II. Even though compellence attempts statistics were corrected for

the increasing number of states, compellence attempts showed a shift from Europe to Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. After controlling for the effects of the growth of the number of states, a fairly stable picture emerged as seen in figure 27.




Figure 27. Ten Year Moving Averages of Frequency of Attempted Compellence per Number of States and Success Rate as Percent, Superimposed

About 5 percent of the states in the international system attempted compellence in the early 1800s. This increased between 1875 and 1945 where about 15 percent of the states were attempted compellence. After World War II, 1946 to 2001 as the number of state increased (68 to 191), compellence attempts fell to 13.9 percent. This was still more than twice the rate of compellence attempts per state than during the initial period. In general, the frequency at which compellence was attempted has been moderate in its variations, without extremes of activity.

As we arrived at a sense of the frequency and geographic distribution of compellence attempts, we turned to the level of compellence success, once again from a global

perspective, across time. As we examined the success rate of compellence, it demonstrated more variation than the frequency of attempts. Examining those successes from a temporal perspective, a substantial variation occurs simultaneously with the end of World War II. Although the rate for successful compellence from 1816 to 2001 is 6.7 percent, the 1816-1945 rate for successful compellence is 16.8 percent, and 1946-2001 rate only 2.1 percent. Unlike other variations in the success rate, which rebounded after a brief dip, the post-World War II drop in success became a fixed feature for more than 55 years.

The puzzle of compellence is apparent, as seen in figure 27. Compellence success dropped precipitously after World War II and remained substantially lower than any period in the preceding 130 years. At the same time compellence attempts continued at a rate that was comparable to, or slightly higher than the previous period. This apparently illogical pattern posed three questions. What drove the success rate sharply down after World War II? What forces maintained that low rate through the post-World War II and into the post-Cold War period? What factor maintains the historic rate of compellence attempts despite the lack of success?

The Contributions of Theory

Early conceptualizations of compellence focused on a calculus of pain. The functionality of compellence was based on the idea that if a state threatened enough pain on another state, that second state would modify its behavior to meet a demand.¹ Failure of this theory to routinely work in practice encouraged scholars to postulate various

¹ Schelling, *Arms and Influence*.

intervening factors. The target state's image of war, the importance of the contended issue, clarity of the demand, and vagaries of perception were among the nominated intervening variables. Nevertheless, these conceptualizations do not provide the leverage to address the compellence puzzle.

Other scholars claimed success was predicated on the suasive powers of diplomats more than the actual applications of exemplar force.² Some took the opposite position and claimed that success will be linked to a specific type of application of force that communicates a threat of further damage.³ Neither the focus on diplomacy nor the focus on the choice of type of force has provided a repeatable explanation of actual events.

A different approach included the idea of expected utility. Grounded in the strategic interaction of the players as they examine their likely outcomes, its associated utility and the likely action of the other player, compellence is one of many possible solutions within a decision tree.⁴ The opportunity for success here is always tied to the trap of war. Yet, this perspective does not provide the insight into the three elements of the compellence puzzle.

Aside from these specific concerns, the broader vista of international relations theory provides a different set of perspectives. Compellence seems to be very much related to realism, with its emphasis on military capabilities and the use of force as a means of exercising and gaining more power.⁵ Neo-realism, with its stress on structure and balancing provides a good model of how some states may expend resources to assist

² George and Simons, *Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*.

³ Pape, *Bombing to Win*.

⁴ Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman, *War and Reason*.

⁵ Morgenthau and Thompson, *Politics Among Nations*.

a target state, to counteract the influence of a sending state.⁶ A constructivist construct provides some tools for the sending states, the target state, and other entities involved in a compellence attempt.⁷ Since this approach identifies social interaction as the force that constructs both the system and the actors, it reinforces the idea that social structures, that is shared ideas, acquired logics, and tendencies that persist through time, may prove useful.

Complex interdependence provides a perspective of structure with webs of multiple channels, multiple issues, and some level of vulnerability or susceptibility, which when asymmetric may produce the ability to influence others' actions.⁸ Complex interdependence also blurs the distinction between domestic and international politics and highlights the role of international organizations.

The idea of a two level game provides a perspective of close connection between the international and the domestic and provides an important idea and "suasive reverberation," where communications at the international level can have substantial positive or negative effects at the domestic level.⁹ This idea elaborates a mechanism that may be occurring within the network of actors that is postulated in complex interdependence.

Still other works highlight the issue of hegemonic power, current and past, the establishment of converging expectations for state behavior, the value and capability of institutions.¹⁰ This work provides an important idea that institutions and organizations

⁶ Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*.

⁷ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*.

⁸ Keohane and Nye, *Power and Interdependence, 2nd Ed.*

⁹ Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games."

¹⁰ Keohane, *After Hegemony*; Keohane and Martin, "Can Institutions Deliver?"

that are operating today are at least partly a result of the U.S. actions as a hegemonic power. This implies that it is possible that the U.S. could create a global anti-compellence norm robust enough to last until current times.

Three Myths

To address the three questions that are central to the compellence puzzle three erroneous impressions propagated by the literature had to be debunked. To recapitulate, the three myths were the myth of military superiority, the myth of diplomacy, and the myth of major powers. Each of these myths claimed that successful compellence depended on a key attribute, massively superior military power, adroit diplomacy, or major power status.

The empirical fact is that successful compellence does not require superior military capability. Within the 1,558 occurrences of single state versus single state attempted compellence, 1816 to 2001, approximately 24 percent of the 105 successful compellence states had composite state capability scores lower than their targets. In other words, almost one quarter of the successful compellence was achieved by a “weaker” state. Alternatively, 58 percent of the unsuccessful cases had more military capability than their targets. Disarming the military superiority myth helps avoid fruitless study of capability balances as a causal factor in the compellence puzzle.

In counterbalance to the importance of possession of massive military capabilities as the key to creating the desired compellence effect, some have stressed diplomatic actions as the key tool. Examining the empirical record, the study focused on evidence that would test whether negotiation was the key method of successful compellence.

Comparing the forms of settlement with successful compellence outcomes, we find that negotiations are not the linchpin to the success of compellence. About 42 percent of the cases of successful compellence were recorded as having a “negotiated” settlement.

Thirty seven percent of the cases of successful compellence were recorded as having had “none” as a settlement method. The empirical definition for “none” as a settlement method was quite strict. It includes “none of the conditions of negotiated settlement are present ... denotes the lack of any formal or informal effort which successfully resolves...” the dispute.

Further, in addition to the 39 percent where no settlement process was specifically noted, approximately 19 percent of the successful episodes of compellence were “imposed” via military capabilities. In other words, in more than 50 percent of the cases of successful compellence, there was no tangible evidence of a diplomatic negotiation. Exposing the diplomatic myth enabled the remainder of the research to avoid a study of variations of diplomatic methods as a main cause of the compellence puzzle.

Examining the myth that only major powers attempt to compel we found that the minor powers, conducted about 1,300 compellence attempts from 1816 through 2001 as they grew from just under twenty to approximately 180 states. The nine major powers, in their various incarnations, conducted about 600 attempts at compellence in the same time. Since major powers were more often involved in multiple state attempts than minor powers these attempts were included to provide the best chance for the myth to be borne out. Thus, minor powers, as a category, are more prolific than the major powers, but, on an attempts per state basis, major powers are much more active than the minor powers.

When examined across time, the major powers suffered a more substantial drop in the rate of compellence success (23.4% to 4.4 %) than minor powers (9.9% to 1.6%) when comparing the pre and during World War II and the Post World War II performance. Exploring this myth points to the importance of examining major power compellence behavior as part of the post-World War II drop in success, and also cues us to examine the minor power record for the sustained compellence attempts.

Addressing the Three Elements of the Compellence Puzzle

The first element of the puzzle was the rapid fall in success of compellence after World War II. Success dropped to approximately two percent of attempts. Examining the major powers, as they had been more successful at compellence we found that these powers had, for the most part, become occupied, exhausted, or contained. Previously successful compellence states such as Germany or Japan were now in no position as conquered powers to attempt compellence. Other powers such as the United Kingdom were too exhausted to be successful at compellence. The U.S. compellence effectiveness was also reduced as it shifted its compellence efforts toward the Soviet Union and China. Finally, the Soviet Union's success rate dropped from about 24 percent to about 4 percent because of the containment efforts taken by the United States. The same containment efforts helped some minor powers not only to resist the Soviets but also other minor power's compellence efforts.

Prior to the end of World War II a norm that called for strong resistance to compellence had been building. President Wilson's 14 Points, President Roosevelt's Atlantic Charter, and the UN Charter all had expressions of this anti-compellence norm.

As the U.S. formulated its containment strategy, and moved to the support of Iran, Turkey, and Greece, President Truman's enunciation of support crystallized this norm. Wielding its hegemonic power, the U.S. cemented the understanding through a series of treaty organizations and aid to potential targets of Soviet compellence. The norm of resisting compellence, even superpower compellence, once adopted, became more powerful than any single state's influence, lasting throughout and beyond the end of the Cold War. Yet it is too early to claim a full understanding of this part of the compellence puzzle. Since norms cannot be directly observed, further specialized research and analysis in the area of an anti-compellence norm needs to be accomplished to secure a greater level of assurance prior to a declaration of causality.

Given the drop in success and acceptance of an anti-compellence norm, the final element of the puzzle is put in focus. Despite this drop in success rates, states continued to conduct compellence attempts at about the same rate. Viewed in a geographic fashion we know that the continuity in the level of attempts was actually a combination of decreased attempts in Europe and increases in Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. Associated with this shift was a diffusion of military capabilities and a general increase in states' acceptance of risk. These factors describe a changed environment but do not provide a motivation for attempting to use compellence.

A possible motivation was revealed when we examined compellence attempts and leaders' longevity. A statistically significant relationship exists between the use of compellence and how long leaders stay in office. Compellers survive in office about twice as long as their more pacific counterparts. This relationship remains valid for democracies and autocracies in all regions of the world. It appears that leaders may be

using compellence as one of their tools of foreign policy, which, in combination with other actions, assists in maintaining their office. We must view this interpretation as an initial observation as the mechanism by which the domestic audience values this activity remains for further study.

Implications

Two levels of insights may be gained from the discussion of compellence. The first is about compellence as a political activity. This perspective is pertinent to policy considerations and also is theoretically important. The other set of insights relates to what the study of compellence tells us about the broader study of international relations. This perspective is also interesting to international relations theory and leads to potential areas of future research.

Compellence and Its Future

An important policy question is: will the trends described in the puzzle continue? This question can be addressed in two parts. The first part is about the historic level of compellence attempts. The data on the continuing level of attempts shows variation but no substantial sign of a downward trend over the past 50 years. Therefore, it is unlikely to fail of its own weight. Further, if a motivation for attempting compellence is that it has a domestic appeal that supports state leader longevity, compellence will be selected, consciously or unconsciously, by leaders. Conversely, if leaders were punished by removal from office by their constituencies for attempting compellence then the rate would drop. Anecdotally, this seems to be the developing trend in the European states, but not so in Africa, the Middle East, or Asia. This domestic influence on international

behavior should not be surprising in democracies where the electoral mechanisms are overt, and it seems plausible in autocracies where some level of public support for the regime is required for continuation in power. It is likely that the historic rate will continue, mitigated only by each leader's domestic audience's reaction to the transmission of compellence threats.

The second part of question is: Will compellence success remain low? Given that the recent low rate of success is possibly dependent on an anti-compellence norm, that answer hinges on the stability of that norm. The answer is also affected by the condition of the international system that allows the norm to be exercised. If a competing norm was created and promulgated or if the international system, including organizations and institutions, was significantly changed, then the low success rate could change. Given that neither norm creation nor restructuring the international system is an overnight task, it is unlikely in the short term that significant change will occur in the low rate of compellence success. Alternatively, if other research shows that the low level of success was caused by ineptitude or lack of analytic capability on the part of the sending states, these things may be ameliorated with concomitant change to the success rate.

The possibility of the existence of an anti-compellence norm raises another question: Will another norm, such as an opposing pro-compellence norm, as widespread and having such an impact on an international phenomenon ever be created and promulgated again? Given that the confluence of the end of World War II, the level of hegemony exercised by the U.S., the rise of the superpower competition, the choice of a policy of containment, and the norm development that preceding the anti-compellence norm was an unlikely series of events, it is not probable that equivalent actions would be

repeated. This type of question highlights a set of insights about the study of international relations.

The Study of International Relations

The second set of insights is about the structure of the field of international relations as a discipline. In this examination no single set of theories were sufficient to provide a complete set of guidelines to explain a fairly commonplace international occurrence. Preponderance of capabilities did not provide an explanation of the outcomes, expected utility likewise did not, and the idea of constructing an intersubjective understanding that eventually becomes a norm was intriguing but not a definitive answer to the entire puzzle. To advance the study of compellence, advances in the broader understanding of international relations is required.

A central difficulty in explaining this worldwide phenomenon was that the majority of the theoretical work in international relations in this area is based on a Western perspective and is primarily supported by case history. The Western perspective is rich in some ways but is limited in others. Europe is rich in examples and data because of its centrality to the modern civilized world, its many conflicts and wars, and its variety of modes of governance. Despite these advantages, it is limited by the fact that the same logic, as expressed in *War and Reason* expected utility equations, which explained European war and peace behavior did not explain the rest of the world's compellence behavior.¹¹ The fact that Europe was the home to a great concert, was comprised of colonial powers, has progressed through two world wars, has served as contested ground between the two superpowers, and is now in the midst of a great experiment in federation

¹¹ Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman, *War and Reason*.

makes European decision makers, approach international politics differently than an American, an Asian or African leader. To make progress in compellence, peace, or war, it is important to the study of international relations to improve the connection to real world activities. A step toward that improved connection is to test our theories against data from across the world and across time that describes the phenomenon under study.

The other implication of this world for the broader field of the study of international relations is the mix of domestic and international aspects of the compellence puzzle. Although scholars such as Putnam provide us perspective on the interplay of international and domestic factors and Keohane and Nye provide the web of connections that reach across and through states, our leading theory treats domestic motivations as a black box.¹² The compellence puzzle highlights an area that is important to the study of international relations, the threat and use of force, where the domestic realm may carry significant weight. Further work to bring the domestic perspective into the discourse would be useful to address this and similarly connected issues.

Future Research

In order to bring about a more complete understanding of compellence further research is required. Two concentrations of research are needed to make substantive progress. The first concentration has been alluded to above. It relates to broader international relations framework in which compellence operates. It requires further development of our understanding of norms, domestic and foreign policy interactions, ensuring that theories are based in a world view instead of a Western perspective, and above all a focus on empirical approaches. As these actions are critical to advances in

¹² Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*.

many areas of international relations, they will likely occur as part of the natural maturation of the field.

The second concentration is internal to the subject of compellence. In parallel with work on the larger framework, a number of technical details of compellence success and failure need to be developed.

One method to develop those details may be country studies that examine successful and unsuccessful users of compellence to look for specific traits or methods. This is different from a case study that may examine a single compellence event. This approach would examine a large number of compellence events by a state. Of particular interest would be use or reuse of specific successful tactics, the international environment at the time of successful and unsuccessful attempts, and any patterns of choice of target state. Of particular interest is the UK, whose compellence reach was global, and compellence success record was one of the best. Alternatively, a study of France from 1853 to 2001 may be especially informative due to their consistent record of single state compellence failure. Likewise, a comparative study that includes states from each region of the world may be helpful.

Another area of research internal to the area of compellence could be the focused study of compellence events that had multiple states involved, such as those related to Europe in the early 1800s. These are particularly interesting in that this was a nexus of substantial compellence success. Initial results would need to be compared to an appropriate set of compellence events not centered in Europe to ensure a balanced perspective. A possible outcome may be the understanding of region system effects that could be applied to the global perspective.

Another key area for investigation is impact of the level of interest or pertinence a state has to a specific topic at question on success of a compellence attempt. This is difficult to measure, unlike physical capabilities cannot be overtly counted. Simply measuring the level of threat is also insufficient, as the level of threat may be limited or inflated by other factors. This research may require a combination of empirical and case study approaches. If the researcher resolves a way to robustly operationalize “pertinence” this factor may clarify much of compellence success and failure.

A final area for study may be an approach that places the tool of compellence in context with other tools of statecraft. It is possible that when viewed in context of the full use of public and private diplomacy, economic and trade policy actions, and the actions of allies and international organizations compellence attempts during the post-World War II period will take on a different complexion. A possible outcome may be that statesmen have allowed compellence attempts to appear to fail as policy goals have shifted and different venues have been chosen to pursue alternative goals.

This set of basic research tasks may appear to be daunting because of the immature understanding of state level compellence that currently exists within the field of international relations. This is a place that the study of international relations can help create an understanding that makes a difference in how states interact. For that reason, as research is conducted, frequent surveys of the area of study should be conducted and published to synthesize current compellence knowledge and to remain connected to the overall field of international relations.

The Future of Compellence

Compellence will not likely disappear as a tool of foreign policy, despite its lack of recent success. The Western political and military milieu is populated with memories of events where compellence did work and its failures have been forgotten. Decision makers will continue to be guided by the lessons of compellence a lá the Cuban Missile Crisis until a different event provides a more powerful example.¹³ Leaders in other parts of the world have adopted the tactic of compellence even as they have adopted the form of the Westphalian state, but with even less success. Each compellence attempt, successful or not, generates massive military and political costs. But the alternatives to deal with aggressor states that have gone beyond the ken of normal diplomacy may be no better. Economic measures suffer from a similar lack of success and are less precise in application.¹⁴ War costs far more than compellence and possesses even more uncertainties. Within the range of statecraft, the success of the other tools, the volatile nature of the international environment and ability to precisely apply compellence pressure may make it the best possible tool for a situation despite its low payoff probabilities. Equipped with the understanding provided by this and future research, decision makers should no longer be blinded by the myths of compellence as they choose their tool. If compellence is still the choice, they should be able to plan and execute it with a clearer understanding of the method and its shortcomings in the crises of the future.

¹³ Khong, *Analogies at War*, 35-37.

¹⁴ Baldwin, *Economic Statecraft*, 371.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Ambrose, Stephen E. and Douglas G. Brinkley. *Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy Since 1938*. New York: Penguin Books, 1997.
- Axelrod, Robert M. *The Complexity of Cooperation: Agent-Based Models of Competition and Collaboration*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997.
- Baldwin, David A. *Economic Statecraft*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985.
- Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany*. 20 December 1993.
<http://www.iuscomp.org/gla/statutes/GG.htm> (accessed 25 August 2004).
- Bennett, D. Scott and Allan C. Stam. "EUGene: Expected Utility Generation and Data Management Program Documentation." 11 October 2003.
<http://www.eugenesoftware.org/> (accessed 2 April 2004).
- . "EUGene: A Conceptual Manual." *International Interactions* 26 (2000): 179-204. <http://eugenesoftware.org> (accessed 2 April 2004).
- Bienen, Henry and Nicolas van de Walle. *Of Time and Power: Leadership Duration in the Modern World*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1991.
- Blechman, Barry M., Stephen S. Kaplan, David K. Hall, Willaim B. Quandt, Jermone N. Slater, Robert M. Slusser, and Philip Windsor. *Force Without War: U.S. Armed Forces as a Political Instrument*. Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 1978.
- Boswell, Terry and Mike Sweat. "Hegemony, Long Waves, and Major Wars: A Time Series Analysis of Systemic Dynamics, 1496-1967." *International Studies Quarterly* 35, no. 2 (June 1991): 123-49.
- Brown, Seyom. *The Faces of Power: Constancy and Change in United States Foreign Policy from Truman to Clinton*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1994.
- Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce and David Lalman. *War and Reason: Domestic and International Imperatives*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1992.
- Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce and Randolph M. Siverson. "War and the Survival of Political Leaders: A Comparative Study of Regime Types and Political Accountability." *The American Political Science Review* 89, no. 4 (Dec 1995): 841-55.
- Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson, and James D. Morrow. *The Logic of Political Survival*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003.
- Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, Alastair Smith, Randolph Siverson, and James Morrow. *The Logic of Political Survival Data Source*.

<http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/politics/data/bdm2s2/Logic.htm> (accessed 23 January 2004).

Byman, Daniel and Matthew Waxman. *The Dynamics of Coercion: American Foreign Policy and the Limits of Military Might*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.

Cable News Network. "The History of Afghanistan." 2002.
<http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2001/trade.center/afghanistan.timeline/index.html> (accessed 25 Aug 2004).

———. "Osama Bin Laden." 2002.
<http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2001/trade.center/binladen.section.html> (accessed 25 Aug 2004).

Callahan, David. *Unwinnable Wars: American Power and Ethnic Conflict*. New York: Hill and Wang, 1998.

Cederman, Lars-Erik. *Emergent Actors in World Politics: How States and Nations Develop and Dissolve*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997.

Churchill, Winston S. "Churchill on European Unity." In *"Europe Unite," Speeches by Winston S. Churchill 1947 and 1948*, Edited by Randolph S. Churchill. London: Cassell & Co., 1947.

Cimbala, Stephen J. *Coercive Military Strategy*. College Station: Texas A & M University Press, 1998.

"Convention IV." In *Geneva Convention Resources*. Article 27. 12 August 1949.
<http://www.genevaconventions.org/> (accessed 25 August 2004).

Correlates of War 2 Project. Dept. of Political Science, The Pennsylvania State University. <http://cow2.la.psu.edu/> (accessed 1 March 2003).

Daniel, Donald C., Bradd C. Hayes, and Chantal de Jonge Oudraat. *Coercive Inducement and the Containment of International Crises*. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1999.

David, Steven R. "Explaining Third World Alignment." *World Politics* 43, no. 2 (Jan 1991): 233-54.

Dixon, William J. "Democracy and the Peaceful Settlement of International Conflict." *The American Political Science Review* 88, no. 1 (March 1994): 14-32.

Drezner, Daniel W. *The Sanctions Paradox: Economic Statecraft and International Relations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

- Economou-Gouras, Paul. "Document 4 - No. 1340, Greek Government Appeal of Assistance, 3 Mar 1947." In *The Truman Doctrine and the Beginning of the Cold War 1947-1949*. Vol. 8 of *Documentary History of the Truman Presidency*. Edited by Dennis Merrill. [Bethesda,MD]: University Publications of America, 1996.
- Fearon, James D. "Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes." *The American Political Science Review*, 88, no. 3 (Sept 1994): 577-92.
- Finnemore, Martha. "Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention." In *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, Edited by Peter J. Katzenstein, 153-85. New York: Columbia University Press, 1996.
- Finnemore, Martha and Kathryn Sikkink. "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change." *International Organization* 52, no. 4 (Autumn 1998): 887-917.
- Florini, Ann. "The Evolution of International Norms." *International Studies Quarterly* 40, no. 3 (September 1996): 363-89.
- Freedman, Lawrence. "Strategic Coercion." In *Strategic Coercion: Concepts and Cases*, Edited by Lawrence Freedman, 15-36. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998.
- Gaddis, John Lewis. *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982.
- . *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997.
- Gelpi, Christopher. "Crime and Punishment: The Role of Norms in Crisis Bargaining." *The American Political Science Review* 91, no. 2 (June 1997): 339-60.
- George, Alexander L. *Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War*. Washington DC: U.S. Institution of Peace, 1991.
- George, Alexander L. and William E. Simons, eds. *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*. 2d ed. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994.
- Ghosn, Faten and Glenn Palmer. "Codebook for the Militarized Interstate Dispute Data, Version 3.0." 2003. Correlates of War 2 Project. <http://cow2.la.psu.edu> (accessed 16 April 2003).
- Gochman, Charles S. and Zeev Maoz. "Militarized Interstate Disputes, 1816-1976: Procedures, Patterns, and Insights." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 28, no. 4 (December 1984): 585-616.
- Gochman, Charles and Alan Sabrosky, eds. *Prisoners of War?: Nation-States in the Modern Era*. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1990.

- Haass, Richard N. *The Reluctant Sheriff: The United States After the Cold War*. Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1997.
- Halecki, Oscar. "Borderlands of Western Civilization: History of East Central Europe." *Historical Text Archive Europe* (1952).
<http://historicaltextarchive.com/books.php?op=viewbook&bookid=1&cid=23>
(accessed 25 Aug 2004).
- Harbutt, Fraser. "American Challenge, Soviet Response: The Beginning of the Cold War, February-May, 1946." *Political Science Quarterly* 96, no. 4 (Winter 1981-2): 623-39.
- Huth, Paul and Bruce Russett. "What Makes Deterrence Work? Cases from 1900 to 1980." *World Politics* 36, no. 4 (July 1984): 496-526.
- Ikenberry, G. John and Charles A. Kupchan. "Socialization and Hegemonic Power." *International Organization*, 44, no. 3 (Summer 1990): 283-315.
- International Court of Justice. *Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 14*. 27 June 1986. <http://www.gwu.edu/~jaysmith/nicus3.html>
(accessed 25 August 2004).
- Jakobsen, Peter Viggo. *Western Use of Coercive Diplomacy After the Cold War: A Challenge for Theory and Practice*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998.
- Jervis, Robert. *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976.
- Johnston, Alastair Iain. "Cultural Realism and Strategy in Maoist China." In *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, Edited by Peter J. Katzenstein, 217-68. New York: Columbia University Press, 1996.
- Jones, Daniel M., Stuart A. Bremer, and J. David Singer. "Militarized Disputes, 1816-1992: Rationale Coding Rules and Empirical Patterns." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 15 (1996).
- Jones, Howard. *"A New Kind of War": America's Global Strategy and The Truman Doctrine in Greece*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1989.
- Jones, Joseph M. "Document 3 - Comments on Draft Statement Regarding Situation in Europe, 28 Feb 1947." In *The Truman Doctrine and the Beginning of the Cold War 1947-1949*. Vol. 8 *Documentary History of the Truman Presidency*. Edited by Dennis Merrill. [Bethesda, MD]: University Publications of America, 1996.
- . "Document 5 - Description of Greek Political and Economic Situation, 3 Mar 1947." In *The Truman Doctrine and the Beginning of the Cold War 1947-1949*.

- Vol. 8 *Documentary History of the Truman Presidency*. Edited by Dennis Merrill. [Bethesda, MD]: University Publications of America, 1996.
- . "Document 15 - Record Summarizing Primary Events and Persons in Drafting the President's Message to Congress, 12 Mar 1947." In *The Truman Doctrine and the Beginning of the Cold War 1947-1949*. Vol. 8 *Documentary History of the Truman Presidency*. Edited by Dennis Merrill. [Bethesda, MD]: University Publications of America, 1996.
- . "Document 16 - Recommendation for Assistance to Greece and Turkey (Truman Doctrine), 12 Mar 1947." In *The Truman Doctrine and the Beginning of the Cold War 1947-1949*. Vol. 8 *Documentary History of the Truman Presidency*. , Edited by Dennis Merrill.[Bethesda, MD]: University Publications of America, 1996.
- Kanwisher, Nancy. "Cognitive Heuristics and American Security Policy." *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 33, no. 4 (December 1989): 652-75.
- Keddie, Nikki R. "The End of the Cold War and the Middle East." In *The End of the Cold War: Its Meaning and Implications*, Edited by Michael J. Hogan, 151-73. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.
- Kegley, Charles W. Jr and Gregory A. Raymond. *When Trust Breaks Down: Alliance Norms and World Politics*. Studies in International Relations, Edited by Charles W. Kegley, Jr and Donald J. Puchala. Columbia: University of South Carolina, 1990.
- Keohane, Robert O. *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984.
- Keohane, Robert O. and Lisa L. Martin. "Promises, Promises: Can Institutions Deliver?" *International Security* 20, no. 1 (Summer 1995): 39-51.
- Keohane, Robert O. and Joseph S. Nye. *Power and Interdependence, 2nd Ed.* Boston: Scott, Foresman and Co, 1989.
- Khong, Yuen Foong. *Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, And The Vietnam Decisions Of 1965*. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991.
- Kissinger, Henry. *Diplomacy*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994.
- Krauthammer, Charles. "The Unipolar Moment." *Foreign Affairs* 70, no. 1 (1990/1991).
- Lakatos, Imre and Alan Musgrave, eds. *Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970.
- Lebow, Richard Ned and Janice Gross Stein. "Deterrence: The Elusive Dependent Variable." *World Politics* 42, no. 3 (Apr 1990): 336-69.

- . "Rational Deterrence Theory: I Think, Therefore I Deter." *World Politics* 41, no. 2 (Jan 1989): 208-24.
- Library of Congress. "Germany - A Country Study." In *Library of Congress Country Studies Series*. Edited by Eric Solsten. frds@loc.gov. August 1995. <http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/detoc.html> (accessed 25 August 2004).
- . "Romania- A Country Study." In *Library of Congress Country Studies Series*. 10 October 2000. <http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/intoc.html> (accessed 25 August 2003).
- Londregan, John, Henry Bienen, and Nicolas van de Walle. "Ethnicity and Leadership Succession in Africa." *International Studies Quarterly*, 39, no. 1 (March 1995): 1-25.
- Lundestad, Geir. *Empire by Integration: The United States and European Integration, 1945-1997*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998.
- Lynch, Allen. "The Soviet Union: Nuclear Weapons and Their Role in Security Policy." In *Security with Nuclear Weapons? Different Perspectives on National Security*, Edited by Regina Cowen Karp, 100-23. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991.
- Marra, Robin F., Jr. Charles W. Ostrom, and Dennis M. Simon. "Foreign Policy and Presidential Popularity: Creating Windows of Opportunity in the Perpetual Election." *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 34, no. 4: 588-623.
- Marshall, Monty G. *Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2002*. 16 December 2003. <http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/index.htm> (accessed 23 January 2004).
- McCoy, Donald R. *The Presidency of Harry S. Truman*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1984.
- McGowan, Pat, Harvey Starr, Gretchen Hower, Richard Merritt, and Dina Zinnes. "International Data as a National Resource." *International Interactions* 14 (1988): 101-13.
- Melanson, Richard A. *American Foreign Policy Since the Vietnam War: The Search for Consensus From Nixon to Clinton*. 3rd ed. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2000.
- Moravcsik, Andrew. *The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998.
- Morgenthau, Hans J. and Kenneth W. Thompson. *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*. 6th ed. New York: Alfred A Knopf, 1985.
- "Oxford English Dictionary." In *Oxford English Dictionary. Additions Series*, Edited by John Simpson and Edmund Weiner. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993.

- Pape, Robert Anthony. *Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996.
- Pastor, Robert A. "Looking Back and Forward: The Trajectories of Great Powers." In *A Century's Journey: How the Great Powers Shape the World*, Edited by Robert A. Pastor, 333-63. New York: Basic Books, 1999.
- Pastore, Ann L. and Kathleen Maguire eds. *Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics 2001*. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics.
<http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/> (accessed 03 May 2003).
- Peceny, Mark. *Democracy at the Point of Bayonets*. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999.
- Pemberton, William E. *Harry S. Truman: Fair Dealer & Cold Warrior*. Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1989.
- Perkovich, George. *India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation*. Berkley: University of California Press, 1999.
- Putnam, Robert D. "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games." *International Organization* 42, no. 3 (Summer 1988): 427-60.
- Russett, Bruce. "The Mysterious Case of Vanishing Hegemony; or, is Mark Twain Really Dead?" *International Organization* 39, no. 2 (Spring 1985): 207-31.
- Russett, Bruce M. and John R. Oneal. *Triangulating Peace*. New York: W. W. Norton & Company Inc, 2001.
- Sabrosky, Alan, ed. *Polarity and War: The Changing Structure of International Conflict*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985.
- Sadler, Brent, Tom Mintier, The Associated Press, and Reuters. "Milosevic Tells Citizens to Defend Yugoslavia." In *CNN.Com* 24 March 1999 *Focus on Kosovo*.
<http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/europe/9903/24/kosovo.04/> (accessed 23 July 2004).
- Schelling, Thomas C. *Arms and Influence*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966.
- . *The Strategy of Conflict*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1960.
- Schultz, Kenneth A. *Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.
- Serfaty, Simon. *The Elusive Enemy: American Foreign Policy Since World War II*. Boston: Little, Brown, 1972.

- Sikkink, Kathryn. *Ideas and Institutions: Developmentalism in Brazil and Argentina*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991.
- Simon, Thomas, James Mercy, and Craig Perkins. *National Crime Victimization Survey: Injuries from Violent Crime, 1992-98*. Bureau of Justice Statistics, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention no. NCJ 168633. U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs & U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2001.
- Singer, J. David, ed. *The Correlates of War II: Testing Some Realpolitik Models*. New York: Free Press, 1980.
- Singer, J. David and associates. *Explaining War: Selected Papers from the Correlates of War Project*. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1979.
- Singer, J. David, Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey. "Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820-1965." In *Peace, War and Numbers*, Edited by Bruce Russett. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1972.
- Singer, J. David and Richard Stoll, eds. *Quantitative Indicators in World Politics*. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1984.
- Singer, J. David and Michael Wallace, eds. *To Augur Well: Early Warning Indicators in World Politics*. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1979.
- Small, Melvin and J. David Singer. *Resort to Arms: International and Civil Wars, 1816-1980*. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1982.
- Smith, Alastair. "International Crises and Domestic Politics." *The American Political Science Review* 92, no. 3 (Sept 1998): 623-38.
- Smith, Alastair and James Raymond Vreeland. "The Survival of Political Leaders and IMF Programs: Testing the Scapegoat Story." In *Conference on The Impact of Globalization on the Nation-State from Above: The International Monetary Fund and The World Bank*. Yale University: 25-27 April 2003. Yale Center for International and Area Studies.
- Strange, Susan. "The Persistent Myth of Lost Hegemony." *International Organization*, 41, no. 4 (Autumn 1987): 551-74.
- Tatsios, Theodore George. *The Megali Idea and the Greek-Turkish War of 1897: The Impact of the Cretan Problem on Greek Irredentism, 1866-1897*. Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 1984.
- "Text of the Constitution and Other Important Documents." In *Birth of the Constitution of Japan*. 3 May 1947. <http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/c01.html> (accessed 25 August 2004).

- Thucydides. *History of the Peloponnesian War*. Translated by Rex Warner, 13, 22-23, 25, 358-66. Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1903.
- Tillema, Herbert K. and John R. Van Wingen. "Law and Power in Military Intervention: Major States After World War II." *International Studies Quarterly* 26, no. 2 (June 1982): 220-50.
- U.S. Department of State. "Transcript: Clinton Meets Croatian President, Prime Minister." In *International Information Programs*. 9 August 2000. <http://usinfo.org/usia/usinfo.state.gov/topical/global/refugees/archive/00081004.htm> (accessed 17 Oct 2004).
- United Nations. *Charter of the United Nations*. 26 June 1945. <http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/> (accessed 3 October 2004).
- Vertzberger, Yaacov Y.I. *Risk Taking and Decisionmaking: Foreign Military Intervention Decisions*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998.
- Wallace, Michael D. and Peter Suedfeld. "Leadership Performance in Crisis: The Longevity-Complexity Link." *International Studies Quarterly* 32, no. 4 (Dec 1988): 439-51.
- Waltz, Kenneth N. *Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1959.
- . *Theory of International Politics*. New York: Random House, 1979.
- Weart, Spencer R. *Never at War: Why Democracies Will Not Fight One Another*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998.
- Wendt, Alexander. *Social Theory of International Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
- White House. "White House Statement Following the President's Discussion With Prime Minister Eqbal of Iran." In *The American Presidency Project*. 9 October 1959. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/site/docs/pppus.php?admin=034&year=1959&id=251> (accessed 25 August 2004).
- Wilson, Woodrow. "President Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points." In *Avalon Project*. 8 January 1918. Yale Law School. <http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/wilson14.htm> (accessed 25 August 2004).
- Wolfram, Stephen. *A New Kind of Science*. Champaign, IL: Wolfram Media, 2002.
- "World Court Opens NATO 1999 Bombing Campaign Case." *Reuters Foundation* 19 April 2004. <http://www.google.com/search?q=cache:Y16m4Q-1GDsJ:www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L19571896.htm+1999+milosevic+ICJ+bombing&hl=en> (accessed 25 Aug 2004).

Xydis, Stephen G. "America, Britain, and the USSR in the Greek Arena, 1944-1947."
Political Science Quarterly 78, no. 4 (Dec 1963): 581-96.

APPENDIX

Compellence Statistics Sources

The data required to present an empirical perspective on the phenomena of compellence includes the identity of the participants, chronologic data, the methods used to attempt compellence, and other data depending on the choice of independent variables. Currently, there is not a specific database designed to address the phenomenon of compellence. Therefore, this work is based on existing databases with data about states, their militarized interactions, internal political structure, and leadership. Through manipulation of these databases it is possible to derive data appropriate to the task. Incumbent with the use of that data is an explanation of the sources of that data and how it was interpreted to arrive at conclusions.

There are five major data sources and a specialized data manipulation software program that support this work. The first source was the Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) database.¹ In addition to the basic identifying data for each dispute such as country code, abbreviation, and year, the MID included start and end dates of disputes, number of states on each side, levels of threat or force, fatalities, outcome, and type of resolution. These facts provided the key data to identify each compellence attempt and its outcome. A second and third sources of data were the State System Membership and National Material Capabilities databases.² This data included number of states in the international system, system capability concentration, major power status, region, and number of major powers. Further, it included state capability scores with sub-elements of military

¹ Jones, Bremer, and Singer, "Militarized Disputes."

² Small and Singer, *Resort to Arms*; Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey, "Capability Distribution."

personnel and expenditures, energy and iron and steel production, urban and total population. These database and others are hosted within the Correlates of War Project.³

To pull these sources together, this study used the Expected Utility Generation and data management program, commonly referred to as “EUGene.” This program brings multiple databases together in a comprehensive and manipulable data set. EUGene combines data from the Correlates of War 2 (COW2) project noted above and the expected utility data based on calculations of Bueno de Mesquita’s international interaction game specified in *War and Reason*.⁴ These data elements includes a state’s readiness to assume risk, expected utility for various courses of action and equilibrium condition for those courses of action.

EUGene was initially designed to generate data to examine an expected utility theory of war associated with Bueno de Mesquita works, *War and Reason* and *War Trap*, within the broader confines of international conflict.⁵ More importantly to this study, it provides an automated method to integrate and interrogate the aforementioned databases. A key feature of this program is its ability to create dyadic data sets from source data that is monadic in construction. However, as will be discussed later, this dyadic orientation, although necessary, creates a second set of data challenges.

Polity 4 was the fourth major source of data, providing a well-accepted rendering of the domestic political conditions. The Polity 4 data was downloaded from the Internet from the Polity 4 site.⁶ It was then imported into the EUGene program with its organic

³ Correlates of War 2 Project, <http://cow2.la.psu.edu/> (accessed 1 March 2003).

⁴ D. Scott Bennett and Allan C. Stam, "EUGene: Expected Utility Generation and Data Management Program Documentation," 11 October 2003, <http://www.eugenesoftware.org/> (accessed 2 April 2004).

⁵ *Ibid.*, 87.

⁶ Marshall, *Polity IV Project*.

ability to import appropriately formatted data. This allowed ready examination of the level of democracy or autocracy that existed in any state at the time of a militarized dispute.

The data harvested from EUGene consisted of 2,945 observations in a directed dispute dyad format spanning 1816 to 2001 capturing one case per dyadic dispute initiation, with 100% of available data written to a file. The directed dispute dyad format is a directional case entry where, by selection, the state that is attempting to change policy, territory or a regime is listed first and the state that is being acted on is listed second. These cases list only two states. Disputes that have multiple participants are represented by multiple dyadic cases.

The fifth source of data was leader longevity data assembled for *The Logic of Political Survival*. This data was accessed from Bruce Bueno de Mesquita's Internet site in electronic form.⁷ This data identifies individual chief executives with states and dates of incumbency. Although this data is readily available, unlike the Polity data there was no automated method to import it into EUGene. The cases were cross-referenced by means of common reference elements, specifically, date comparison and Correlates of War country codes. Leaders then could then be identified as having attempted compellence or not having attempted compellence. This also provided a method to determine where within an incumbency compellence attempts occurred.

In formatting cases, EUGene offers the ability to select if each initiation of the dispute should be considered a case or if each year of a dispute should be considered a case. In order to capture the number of successful and unsuccessful attempts at

⁷ Bruce Bueno de Mesquita et al., *The Logic of Political Survival Data Source*.
<http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/politics/data/bdm2s2/Logic.htm> (accessed 23 January 2004).

compellence, data was formatted on one case per initiation rule and not on one case per dispute year, as the study's proposition does not highlight length of the attempted compellence action as an important factor.

Since EUGene expresses interstate disputes in terms of dyads, a key data selection decision is that of inclusion or exclusion of joiners. Joiners are participants on either side of compellence action that were not parties on the first day of initiation. Joiners are not casual partners, mere affiliates, or even allies, but instead are actively cooperating participants as evidenced by frequent consultations on the threatened or actual military action or the creation of a unified chain of command.⁸ One approach to joiners is to select only the very first participants in each dispute as to the subjects of the analysis. This approach has the strength of being able to arrive at insights about decisions to start compellence, when no other states have. Alternatively, being first chronologically may not be a significant factor in addressing the compellence puzzle, nor does it recognize later involvement by a state may be decisive in determining whether to resist or to comply. In selecting data for this study joiner dyads were created. This means that for some disputes there are multiple cases to reflect the all active participants and their dyadic relations, not just the earliest participants.

The fourth source of data was leader longevity data assembled for *The Logic of Political Survival*. This data was accessed from Bruce Bueno de Mesquita's Internet site in electronic form.⁹ This data identifies individual chief executives with states and dates of incumbency. Although this data is readily available, unlike the Polity data there was no automated method to import it into EUGene. The cases were cross-referenced by means

⁸ Jones, Bremer, and Singer, "Militarized Disputes," 175.

⁹ Bueno de Mesquita et al., *The Logic of Political Survival Data Source*.

of common reference elements, specifically, date comparison and Correlates of War country codes. Leaders then could then be identified as having attempted compellence or not having attempted compellence. This also provided a method to determine where within an incumbency compellence attempts occurred.

The data acquired provided a robust perspective on states participating in compellence attempts. It still required some ordering before it could be used to help to understand the phenomenon of compellence.

Data Manipulation

This section will explain how the set of dyadic cases produced by EUGene were used to accurately and usefully describe compellence. First, critical aspects of the initial data coding will be reviewed and recoding or other dispositions for this study will be established. This procedure will show the movement from the initial available 2,945 cases to 1,893 cases.

To understand this process, the original operational definition that were used within the MID must first be reviewed. In *Militarized Interstate Disputes, 1816-1992: Rationale, Coding Rules, and Empirical Patterns*, Jones, Bremer, and Singer indicates that the term "militarized interstate dispute" refers to a unified historical case in which the threat, display, or use of military force short of a war by one member state is explicitly directed towards the government, official representatives, official forces, property, or territory of another state.¹⁰ This initial portion of the definition is particularly important to

¹⁰ Jones, Bremer, and Singer, "Militarized Disputes," 6.

compellence, as compellence focuses on decisions undertaken by the target based on threat, display, or exemplar use of force.

This does not indicate that compellence does not occur simultaneous to full-scale warfare, as might be the case with Hiroshima and Nagasaki within World War II, only that it is analytically difficult to separate the effects created by physically capturing or destroying military capabilities with the intent to obliterate and effects created by threats, displays, and exemplar uses of military force with the intent to convince. The militarized interstate disputes, as operationally defined by Jones, Bremer, and Singer provide a sample of activities that are not mixed with the intricacies of a broader war. This will focus conclusions specifically on compellence separate from general warfare and its uses as a tool short of warfare.

The database captures the interstate dimension of the cases, limiting them to diplomatically recognized member states of the global system and excluding interactions involving non-state actors. This portion of the operational definition will limit the conclusions of this study specifically to state actors. Dispute also excludes militarized actions when they are provided for by treaty or occur at the invitation of the target state, unless they clearly exceed the bounds spelled out within the treaty or invitation. The initial operationalization that guided the population of this database limits cases to state-to-state actions that reflect the position of the duly constituted government and disallow allegations of dispute or even routine military training exercises, nation building, foreign internal defense support, and intervention on behalf of the recognized government from

consideration.¹¹ These strong limitations ensure that the data extracted from the MID reflect compellence vice some other type of activity.

Type of Actions

This database also characterizes militarized incidents in three general and 20 specific categories. The three general categories include threat of force, display of force, and use of force. The researchers characterize threats as verbal indicators of hostile intent. As the data was coded, threats were identified by contingent speech and usually took the form of an ultimatum; the intention is to take a certain action against another state if the other state acts, fails to act, or does not stop acting in a specified manner.

Some may interpret these threats as deterrence instead of compellence. To guard against this confusion, the cases were selected based on the “initiator” also being a “revisionist.” This means that first state in each case was coded to have issued a threat for the purpose of requiring a change in the second state’s policy, territory, or regime status quo. Since the goal of deterrence is to ensure that an entity does not conduct a particular behavior and the cases here are about attempting to force a change to policy, territory, or regime the data supports examination of compellence, and not deterrence.

The second broad category is a display of force. The authors coded this selection when there was a military demonstration but no combat interaction. These nonviolent military acts serve as ways to signal capability and intent to the target state. It is possible that these signals could be more persuasive than verbal threats because the state that is attempting to compel has invested materiel and political resources to communicate this

¹¹ Ibid., 169-70.

signal. As military forces deploy in an emerging crisis, domestic politics can increase the pressure for an executive to succeed. Target states can be aware of this pressure and their behavior may be more readily modified based on greater knowledge of their opponent's investment.¹²

Unlike the previous category, the category of the use of military force almost entirely represents activities that have a direct effect on a target state such as blockades, clashes, or occupations of territory. The exception in this category is official declarations of war. The actions within this category are still only state-to-state communications of capability and intent, although because they are an application of military force, they can be deadly for those individuals directly engaged in them. The physical acts within this category can escalate to an intensity that is no longer distinguishable from war.

Previously, researchers set the threshold of 1,000 total battle deaths as the dividing line between militarized interstate disputes and interstate wars.¹³ Most militarized interstate disputes never reach this threshold, however there are two codings within this database that indicates this outcome. One of the codings is "interstate war" to indicate the start point of a war growing from a dispute and the other coding is "join interstate war" to indicate that a state engaged in the dispute joined an ongoing interstate war that the other state is already involved in.

Nature of Actions

Having described the different types of militarized incidents and offered a classification that categorizes them, Jones, Bremer and Singer grouped these incidents

¹² Schultz, *Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy*, 17-18.

¹³ Small and Singer, *Resort to Arms*.

into coherent historical episodes that constitute militarized interstate disputes. It is important to note that this record of disputes is actually an incomplete and skeletal record of the interactions between the states. For example, only the highest level of hostility will be reported for each state involved. Repeat exchanges at a given level will not be apparent from the data; therefore, in this data set, escalation is more obvious than persistence. Further, de-escalatory steps are not directly reflected either, although the method by which a dispute is settled is recorded.

The authors indicate that coders and compilers of the database paid particular attention to the continuity of location and issues by first isolating and coding specific incidences using the rules noted above and then aggregating related incidences into larger militarized interstate disputes. The project used six rules for aggregation that help ensure the coherency of the incidents and subsequent lessons for compellence.

- 1) same or an overlapping set of interstate members.
- 2) same issue or set of issues and occur within the same geographic area.
- 3) start date of a dispute is defined by the initiation of the first militarized incident, but the end date is determined in several ways, ...
- 4) When two states go to war, all other ongoing disputes between these two states cease.
- 5) In cases of militarized interstate disputes within the context of a civil war, the side that controls the pre-war capital controls the government. When effective control of the capital shifts so does the government.
- 6) Wars and sub-war disputes of independence are included in the data only if there are interstate system members on both sides of the dispute.¹⁴

Another key area of demarcation is determining the end a compellence attempt.

This set of rules uses expiration of 6 months after the last codeable incident, restarts of the attempt within a short period of the end, if activity increases, and recognizes formal endings, 3 months after treaties or other negotiated instruments. These indicators of

¹⁴ Jones, Bremer, and Singer, "Militarized Disputes," 174-77.

incident endpoints provide a technique to divide what otherwise might appear to be a continuous stream of state actions and make it susceptible to empirical analysis.

Particularly important to this study are the outcomes of attempts at compellence. In order to discern these it is necessary to examine how the original outcome data was coded within the Militarized Interstate Dispute database and reinterpret these outcomes based on an understanding of compellence. The initial coding of disputes is seen in table 20.

Table 20. Outcomes within Militarized Interstate Dispute Database

Victory	Alteration of the status quo by one state through the use of militarized action which imposes defeat upon the opponent
Yield	One state capitulates by offering concessions which appease the demands of another state before the militarized forces of either state has secured any substantial tactical gains on the battlefield
Stalemate	Lack of any decisive changes in the pre-dispute status quo and is identified when the outcome does not favor either side in the dispute
Compromise	Each side in the dispute agrees to give up some demands or make concessions with regard to the status quo
Released	Only for situations in which a seizure of material or personnel defines the context of the dispute. Seizure of material or personnel culminates with their release from captivity
Unclear	Historical sources provided either conflicting interpretations or ambiguous information about post-dispute status quo

In order to use this data to illuminate the complexities of compellence it will be necessary to exclude some of it, and in some cases, recode it so as to be useful. Specifically, victory for either side (code 1, 2) is, by definition, imposition of military defeat upon the opposing state, whereas “yield”, by comparison, is a condition achieved without gaining tactical advantage on the battlefield. The "victory" definition continues

by indicating that it is attainment of the goal of revision, territory, policy, or regime by force.

The data provides the ability to determine the actual highest level of threat, display, and use of force within the dyad, and the same data by each state. Upon examination it appears that some of the cases that are coded as victory a, but that they have reached the revisionist's goal without using force. In other words, the highest level of activity is recorded as a threat or display followed by the desired change in behavior on the part of the target state without recourse. The apparent inconsistent coding of "victory a" and the condition where the highest level of activity that state a conducted did not include application of force will be considered successful compellence for this study. Alternatively, those cases coded with war as the highest level of activity could be considered to be failures of compellence if the sending state attempted to use threats, displays, and exemplar uses of force to convince the target state prior to moving to war. Although the database does not contain direct information on precursor activities, a "bolt out of the blue" war is very unlikely.¹⁵ Notwithstanding Japan's attack on Hawaii, the wars that are recorded in this database were preceded by some attempt on the part of the revisionist state to gain its goals at cost less than war. For this reason, cases that are scored as "victory" and have an activity code that indicates war will be considered failed compellence attempts.

This leaves the actions within the "victory a" that could have created a physical difference that led to be assignment of victory as the outcome, e.g. blockade, clash, attack, etc. As these cannot be reasonably proven to be dependent solely on threat or

¹⁵ Nancy Kanwisher, "Cognitive Heuristics and American Security Policy," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 33, no. 4 (December 1989): 656.

demonstration, but involve some level of physical application of force, they will be coded as unsuccessful compellence attempts.

A more straightforward site of cases it is yield by side a (code 3). As the database is arranged so that side a is the initiator of a revision to the then status quo, this outcome represents successful resistance to compellence by side b and scored as failed attempt at compellence. However, yield by side b (code 4) is a successful compellence attempt for side a and a failure for side b.

The bulk of the cases are coded stalemate (code 5), which is the outcome when side b decides not to comply with side a demands, but does not either get side a to capitulate, nor is overcome by direct military force. Since side a has not achieved its goal to get side b to act in a particular fashion this outcome constitutes unsuccessful compellence.

To this point, the differentiations between successful resistance and successful compellence have been fairly clear. The next outcome, compromise (code 6), could be viewed from either perspective. Side a achieves some of its desired objective and side b does likewise. One could forward a number of scenarios that led to the compromise; however, the information in the database does not provide that level of detail. Therefore, in order to provide an initial stringent examination of compellence, compromise will be coded as an unsuccessful effort at compellence. Later in the analysis, this assumption will be relaxed to gauge its effects on our understanding of the data.

Another special case, “released” (code 7), indicates, according to the MID code book, the release of seized territory, items or people. This is only applicable to special cases where the substance of the dispute was the seizure, for at least twenty-four hours, of

material or personnel of official forces from another state, or the detention of private citizens operating within contested territory. Since the cases that constitute this outcome area are, by definition, resolved by reversing the seizure that defines the dispute these cases are not coded in a way it is clear if this is a “victory,” “yield,” or “compromise” outcome. Further, examination of the activity codes in the database indicate that almost 90 percent of the cases of "seizure" are resolved via a "seizure" by the aggrieved party. This therefore does not illuminate the success of compellence or effective resistance, as the objects that constitute the subject of the actions in this category, materiel or personnel, are seized and re-seized. Therefore, these cases will not be considered in this study. These cases constitute approximately eight percent of all the available cases.

More obvious, unclear (code 8), indicates that the coders did not have sufficient data to make a differentiation – therefore these cases will also be excluded as they does not provide indicative information for the proposition. Also fairly obvious, "joins ongoing war" (code 9), is a failure of compellence and an indicator of successful resistance as the dispute has moved past the stage of threats and exemplar use of violence to join with an ongoing military operation that substantially depends on the ability to physically control the adversary. As previously noted, some level of compellence can occur during major combat, however, the data in this category describes disputes where compellence efforts have substantially failed and the target of compellence resists to such a level that 1,000 or more battle deaths occur. The final category, missing data (negative 9) about outcomes does not provide insight into successful compellence or resistance so will be excluded from the analysis. Table 21 recapitulates these treatments.

Table 21. Recoded Outcomes from Militarized Interstate Dispute Database

Original Coding	Modified Coding	Number of Cases
Victory A	Either successful and unsuccessful compellence, based on revisionist's highest level activity	280
Victory B	Unsuccessful compellence	158
Yield by A	Unsuccessful compellence	92
Yield by B	Successful compellence	228
Stalemate	Unsuccessful compellence	1751
Compromise	Initially included unsuccessful compellence for a strict examination of compellence	200
Released	Discarded as not indicative of response to compellence	151
Unclear	Discarded as not indicative of response to compellence	44
Joins Ongoing War	Unsuccessful compellence	27
Missing Data	Discarded as not indicative of response to compellence	14
Total		2945

Data Processing

The initial data extracted from EUGene provided 2,945 dyadic cases for militarized interstate disputes for the years 1816 to 2001, inclusive. The program settings that yielded these cases are attached as the last page of this appendix. The first data manipulation was to remove the cases where a state was identified as "revisionist," but did not issue a threat, displaying military forces, or using force. This left 2,814 dyadic cases. The second manipulation was to remove the cases whose outcome did not inform compellence. As discussed above, cases with seizure, unclear, and missing data results were deleted, leaving 2,613 cases. Of these, 1,558 were cases where a single state

attempted to compel a single state. In the circumstance where the data indicated that each state was attempting to compel the other, compellence and counter-compellence, 2 cases were recorded. The data set describing the one state vs. one state cases can be directly manipulated and create meaningful results.

Some dyadic cases that are subcomponents of larger compellence events with multiple states involved on either side requires additional processing before we can use them effectively. Participation in these cases is not as straight forward as the single state vs. single state cases. Of the 1,055 dyadic cases that involve multiple participants some had multiple states involved at differing levels of activity. Simplifying them for the purpose of examining compellence, cases that were assigned to categories based on activities that involved actual communication of threat, demonstration of forces, or exemplar use of force were retained. This resulted in a new set of 79 single state versus single state cases where the database indicated the involvement of a multitude of states, but compellence related actions were only indicated for single states.

Likewise, 478 line items of a single state attempting to compel multiple states, 308 line items where multiple states attempted to compel a single state, and 190 line items where multiple states attempted to compel multiple states were created. These were resolved to 335 cases of attempted compellence by associating the sender and target data across the identification numbers of the line items. After the data from the multiple participants has been appropriately aggregated and combined with the single state cases, 1,893 episodes of attempted compellence will be available to inform our common understanding.

These additional manipulations open these cases to methodological concerns that the initial one state vs. one state do not face. Therefore, these derived cases were not used to establish the initial conditions of compellence and its puzzle, but were used to illuminate aspects that are specific to multiple state compellence.

Extract from EUGene 3.04 Command File

Below is an extract from the EUGene command file that was created when data for this study was processed in EUGene. It provides the key variables used to create the initial data set for this work. It is provided to aid researchers that may want to replicate this work. In its full form the command file enables movement of data to a preferred statistics software package. This study used SPSS 11.0.

Start of Extract

Number of observations in this data set: 2945

- * Data set specifications:
- * Base Format: Directed Dispute Dyad
- * Time Span: 1816 to 2001
- * Selected Subset: One case per dyadic dispute initiation
- * Sampling: None (100% of available data written to file)
- * Variables included:

cocode1	cocode2	year	abbrev1	abbrev2	cap_1	cap_2
milper_1	milex_1	energy_1	irst_1	upop_1	tpop_1	milper_2
milex_2	energy_2	irst_2	upop_2	tpop_2	majpow1	majpow2
rlregion	region1	region2	alliance	numstate	numGPs	syscon
riskT1	riskT2	wrTu1v1	wrTu1v2	wrTu1vsq	wrTp1win	wrTstk1
wrTu1sq	wrTu1ac1	wrTu1ac2	wrTu1neg	wrTu1cp1	wrTu1cp2	wrTu1wr1
wrTu1wr2	wrTu2v2	wrTu2v1	wrTu2vsq	wrTp2win	wrTstk2	wrTu2sq
wrTu2ac2	wrTu2ac1	wrTu2neg	wrTu2cp2	wrTu2cp1	wrTu2wr2	wrTu2wr1
cwongo	cwongonm	cwinit	cwinitnm	cwhost1	cwhost2	cwhostd
cwkeynum	cworig1	cworig2	cwjoanyi	cwjoanyt	cwjomidi	cwjomidt

cwmidnme	cwstmo1	cwstday1	cwstyr1	cwstmo2	cwstday2	cwstyr2
cwendmo1	cwenddy1	cwendyr1	cwendmo2	cwenddy2	cwendyr2	cwsideA1
cwsideA2	cwrevis1	cwrevis2	cwrevt11	cwrevt21	cwrevt12	cwrevt22
cwfatal1	cfatex1	cfatal2	cfatex2	cwhiact1	cwhiact2	cwhiactd
cwoutcm	cwsettle	cfatald	cwrecip	cwnumst1	cwnumst2	cwnmmdnw
cwnmmdal	cwpcyrs	cowrolea	cowroleb	polity21	polity22	durable1
durable2	exec1	exec2	exconst1	exconst2	polcomp1	polcomp2
wovers1	wovers2					

Selected settings for variables with multiple output options:

- * Alliances taken from COW dyadic alliance file
- * Peace years calculated using Werner peace year adjustment
- * Conflict exclusions based on COW MID data
- * Dispute characteristics:
 - * When two or more disputes occur in a year, data is from the highest intensity dispute
 - * Originators and all states on initiating side coded as initiators
 - * Initiator defined as "Revisionist State(s)"
 - * Ongoing dispute years not considered new initiations
 - * Target vs. Initiator directed dyads dropped if no new MID
 - * Joiner Dyads included

End of extract

VITA

Michael G. Dziubinski
 Graduate Program in International Studies
 Old Dominion University
 621 Batten Arts and Letters Building
 Norfolk, VA 23529-0086

EDUCATION

Ph.D.	2004	International Studies Old Dominion University Norfolk, VA
MPA	1983	Public Administration Northern Michigan University Marquette, MI
BS	1976	Psychology University of Wisconsin – Superior Superior, WI

FIELDS
OF SPECIALIZATION

Conflict and Cooperation
 U.S. Foreign Policy

POSITIONS HELD

Researcher, MITRE Corporation at US Joint Forces Command.....	1998-Present
Combatant Command Planner, US Joint Forces Command.....	1995-1998
Commander, 39 th Intelligence Squadron	1993-1995
Intelligence Planner, Central Electronic Security Division.....	1990-1993
Director of Operations, 6919 th Electronic Security Squadron.....	1987-1990
Combatant Command Support Officer, National Security Agency	1984-1987
Emergency Action Controller and C ² Trainer, 410 BMW	1981-1984
Electronic Warfare Officer, B-52H, 644 th BMS.....	1978-1981