

DECIPHERING FOREIGN ACTIONS:
A FOCUS ON RUSSIA'S FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES

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Presented to

the Faculty of the College of Business & Technology

Morehead State University

In Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements for the Degree

Master of Arts

by

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Accepted by the faculty of the College of Business & Technology, Morehead State University,
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Master of Arts degree.

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Morehead State University, 2016

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The shift of focus post-9/11 was immediate and swift. The Patriot Act was expeditiously passed by Congress and signed into law by President George W. Bush as a sign that the U.S. would not sit on the sidelines and wait for another attack. It was intended to reduce the law enforcement barriers that inhibited the investigation of suspected terrorists in the homeland. The next year the Homeland Security Act of 2002 was passed and created the Department of Homeland Security. This is a clear sign that a shift of focus is occurring within the federal government. Even the U.S. Department of State, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Drug Enforcement Administration are part of the Intelligence Community and have responsibilities that focus on counterterrorism. I do not contend that the rise of the Islamic State (ISIS) and the continued existence of other terrorist networks around the globe is not a serious threat. These are very serious threats to American national security and as such should receive substantial focus. I will, nevertheless, argue that the focus on non-state

actors has allowed nation-states—like Russia—to take significant steps in regaining power within the international system. State enemies, like Russia, seek to destabilize the United States by corrupting our core values, our government, and our economy. Suppressing such attacks is imperative to U.S. security.

The belief that Russian resentment for their loss in the Cold War is over, makes their aggressive actions seem more manageable and less threatening. This resentment and reassertion of power—left alone—could result in a more aggressive state that continuously seeks more control within the international power distribution and would be willing to assert more force as it deems necessary. In recent years the President of the Russian Federation has increased his anti-American rhetoric. In a recent speech at the Valdai Club forum, he asserted that the unilateral dictatorship established by the United States in the post-soviet era needs to be revoked in an effort to reestablish a “bi-polar” world with Russia as a key player.¹

It is evident that Russia is vying for more power. The question is: what does a stronger Russia look like? How will their power and influence progress in the coming years? These are questions that cannot be answered with certainty; though, an intelligence strategy based on a holistic assessment should provide a reliable set of outcomes on which to base future policy decisions. This paper will provide a qualitative content analysis arguing that policymakers can more effectively use the Intelligence Community to achieve foreign policy goals by identifying how our enemies are trying to change our national interest to suit their objectives. This paper will begin with a review of the practices of the IC. Then for context I will provide a brief history of the Russian Federation. Finally, there will be an analysis of U.S.-Russian relations, a brief

¹ Vladimir Putin, “Speech to the Valdai Discussion Club,” October 24, 2014, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zXh6HgJIPHo>.

review of the U.S. foreign policy strategy toward Russia, and recommendations to strengthen the U.S. strategy.

What can the U.S. do to counter the Russian threat and maintain a balance of power that will provide renewed stability within the international system? I propose there are three key steps the United States can and should take. First, the Intelligence Community (IC), foreign policy analysts, and politicians should work to better understand the Russian perspective and especially President Vladimir Putin. Second, the Intelligence Community should shift the focus of intelligence from a science back to an art and refocus resources toward state actors. Finally, U.S. policymakers should find a way to better utilize the intelligence presented to them.

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What is security? This word we use almost daily can refer to many things. It can refer to a feeling of safety or to the actions implemented for the physical protection of a structure or person. Most often, in the United States, the term is used in coordination with the term “homeland.” Homeland Security or National Security refers to the methods used by the U.S. to protect the citizens, leaders, infrastructure, and ideals of the Republic in which we live. Though the Department of Homeland Security was recently established, the idea of security has been prominent throughout the history of this country and of all nations around the world. Classic political philosophers were idealistic in their writings about humanity and government; however, Thomas Hobbes describes human nature as nasty and argues that it leads to the “continual fear of violent death, and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.”¹ It is this uncontrollable human nature, according to Hobbes, that lends the need for civil society since fear of violent death is the predominant passion.² It seems that this is the prevailing theory even living in civil society today where fear and survival dictates how a state operates. In most countries around the world, security is one of the most prominent issues. In general, most Americans, unlike many around the world, still feel safe in their “immediate communities.”³ However, any fear they do perceive is from terrorism committed by non-state actors. Most do not perceive a threat from other State actors. They have long since abandoned this fear due to the prominence of the U.S. around the world and the isolation from neighboring hostile powers. This is a mistake. State enemies, like Russia, seek to destabilize the United States by corrupting our core values, our government, and our economy. Suppressing such attacks is imperative to U.S. security.

¹ Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, edited by Edwin Curley, (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1994), 74.

² *Ibid.*, 74.

³ Gallup, “In U.S., 37% Do Not Feel Safe Walking at Night Near Home,” November 24, 2014, <http://www.gallup.com/poll/179558/not-feel-safe-walking-night-near-home.aspx>.

How is security achieved? There are many variations within the history of the U.S. security policy and the plan is variable depending on the geopolitical climate. On the most basic level, the U.S. utilizes a combination of military strength, diplomatic efforts and a robust intelligence community. These key components are always present within every Administration though the degree of focus fluctuates. The size of the military often changes depending on the goals of the current president. Diplomatic ties are always of importance as they help protect strategic advantage around the globe in case a military conflict arises. The U.S. would not have troops placed around the world without cooperative relationships. The third prong, the Intelligence Community (IC), has continued to grow in size and importance. Mention of the IC generally invokes images of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) or the National Security Agency (NSA) for most individuals. However, they comprise only a small portion of the entire puzzle. There are sixteen agencies within the IC.⁴ They work both independently and in coordination with the other components to provide actionable intelligence products to politicians so they can make foreign policy decisions. Policymakers must more effectively utilize intelligence to ensure that other states cannot disrupt and destabilize the U.S.

The IC uses a variety of methods to achieve their mission. There are four elements of intelligence: collection, analysis, covert action, and counterintelligence.⁵ Collection is the gathering of raw data from a plethora of sources. There are six basic intelligence sources: signals intelligence (SIGINT); imagery intelligence (IMINT); measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT); human-source intelligence (HUMINT); open-source intelligence

⁴ Office of the Director of National Intelligence, "Intelligence Community: Members of the IC," <http://www.dni.gov/index.php/intelligence-community/members-of-the-ic#dia>, Accessed April 6, 2016.

⁵ Abram N. Shulsky and Gary J. Schmitt, *Silent Warfare: Understanding the World of Intelligence*, (Washington, DC: Potomac Books Inc., 2002), 8.

(OSINT), and geospatial intelligence (GEOINT).⁶ Once the data is collected it must be analyzed because it is usually “fragmentary, ambitious, and susceptible to widely divergent interpretations.”⁷ Analysis of the collected data is an attempt to provide a judgment about the “capabilities, intentions, and actions of another party.”⁸ The analytical reports are used to advise the President and other policymakers. These have a significant impact on policy decisions. As a part of intelligence, covert action is used to “influence political actions directly.”⁹ In this way it is different from the other elements of intelligence. Finally, counterintelligence “seeks to protect a society (and especially its intelligence capabilities) against any harm that might be inflicted by hostile intelligence services.”¹⁰

The IC is a key component of the U.S. foreign policy strategy. They provide vital information to policymakers and have been important to the mission of protecting the homeland since its inception. Collecting information against your adversaries has been in practice in the United States since the Revolutionary War when General George Washington used spies to obtain a tactical advantage over British soldiers.¹¹ The IC became main stream after WWII when the U.S. and the Soviet Union used espionage to gain strategic gains during the Cold War.

The end of the Cold War brought a sense of peace to the American public. The dismantling of the Soviet Union in 1991 began the shift in the foreign policy of the United States; later the terrorist attacks perpetrated by Al-Qaeda on September 11, 2001 solidified the shift of focus to asymmetric non-state actors. That is not to say that the Intelligence Community does not collect information in all parts of the world or that Congress and the President do not

⁶ Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “Intelligence Community: Members of the IC,” <https://www.dni.gov/index.php/about/faq?start=2>, Accessed April 6, 2016.

⁷ Shulsky and Schmitt, *Silent warfare*, 8.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 8.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 8.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 9.

¹¹ Alexander Rose, *Washington’s Spies: The Story of America’s First Spy Ring*, New York: Bantam Books (2006), 14.

consider state actors when making foreign policy decisions; however, preventing the next terrorist attack reigns supreme.

The shift of focus post-9/11 was immediate and swift. The Patriot Act was expeditiously passed by Congress and signed into law by President George W. Bush as a sign that the U.S. would not sit on the sidelines and wait for another attack. It was intended to reduce the law enforcement barriers that inhibited the investigation of suspected terrorists in the homeland. The next year the Homeland Security Act of 2002 was passed and created the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). DHS is now the largest agency in existence.¹² This is a clear sign that a shift of focus is occurring within the federal government. Even the U.S. Department of State, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Drug Enforcement Administration are part of the Intelligence Community and have responsibilities that focus on counterterrorism. I do not contend that the rise of the Islamic State (ISIS) and the continued existence of other terrorist networks around the globe is not a serious threat. These are very serious threats to American national security and as such should receive substantial focus. I will, nevertheless, argue that the focus on non-state actors has allowed nation-states—like Russia—to take significant steps in regaining power within the international system.

I would argue that it is vital that American intelligence not lose focus on the world powers because they have not forgotten about the U.S. According to Henry A. Crumpton—former CIA Clandestine Service Officer—“[b]oth Russia and China probably have more clandestine intelligence operatives inside the United States now, in the second decade of the twenty-first century, than at the height of the Cold War.”¹³ It is important for the U.S. to realize

¹² Donald F. Kettle, *System Under Stress: Homeland Security and American Politics* (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2007) 55-120.

¹³ Henry A. Crumpton, *The Art of Intelligence: Lessons from a Life in the CIA's Clandestine Service* (New York: Penguin Press, 2012), Kindle Edition, 133.

that the threat from Russia did not expire at the end of the Cold War. The focus must be shared between the new terrorist threats and the long time threats from other established nations. The current Administration's fear of conflict and failure to follow through has crippled U.S. influence. Few U.S. officials believe that Russia is a great threat to security. While being interviewed during a Senate confirmation hearing to become the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joseph Dunford stated that Russia presents a potential threat to U.S. national security based on their capabilities and intent.¹⁴ In reaction to Russia's involvement in Ukraine he stated: "If you look at their behavior, it's nothing short of alarming."¹⁵ In response, a State Department spokesman stated that Secretary of State John Kerry does not see Russia as an existential threat" despite their recent aggression.¹⁶ This type of opinion must be reversed.

The belief that Russian resentment for their loss in the Cold War is over, makes their aggressive actions seem more manageable and less threatening. I believe that this resentment and reassertion of power—left alone—could result in a more aggressive state that continuously seeks more control within the international power distribution and would be willing to assert more force as it deems necessary.

In recent years the President of the Russian Federation—Vladimir Putin—has increased his anti-American rhetoric. In a recent speech at the Valadi Club forum, he asserted that the unilateral dictatorship established by the United States in the post-soviet era needs to be revoked

¹⁴ Matthew Rosenberg, "Joint Chiefs Nominee Warns of Threat of Russian Agression," *New York Times* (July 9, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/10/us/general-joseph-dunford-joint-chiefs-confirmation-hearing.html?_r=0.

¹⁵ Lamothe, Dan, "Who's an existential threat to the U.S.? In Washington, it depends who's Talkin.," *Washington Post* (July 13, 2015), <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2015/07/13/whos-an-existential-threat-to-the-u-s-officials-in-washington-dont-always-agree/>.

¹⁶ Ibid.

in an effort to reestablish a “bi-polar” world with Russia as a key player.¹⁷ The increasing propaganda and aggression outside Russian borders increase the importance of refocusing resources for a more comprehensive foreign policy strategy. Obviously, the United States Department of State is continuously interacting with the leaders of foreign states, but the slow progression of Russian aggression has made their actions seem disconnected and thereby less threatening. This has resulted in a U.S. response that is half-hearted and cautious.

It is evident that Russia is vying for more power. The question is: what does a stronger Russia look like? How will their power and influence progress in the coming years? These are questions that cannot be answered with certainty; though, an intelligence strategy based on a holistic assessment should provide a reliable set of outcomes on which to base future policy decisions. This paper will provide a qualitative content analysis arguing that policymakers—like the President—can more effectively use the Intelligence Community to achieve foreign policy goals by identifying how our enemies are trying to change our national interest to suit their objectives. This paper will begin with a review of the practices of the IC. Then for context I will provide a brief history of the Russian Federation. Finally, there will be an analysis of U.S.-Russian relations, a brief review of the U.S. foreign policy strategy toward Russia, and recommendations to strengthen the U.S. strategy.

¹⁷ Vladimir Putin, “Speech to the Valdai Discussion Club,” October 24, 2014, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zXh6HgJIPHo>.

Intelligence Community: Background

When discussing the IC, it is important to begin with the definition of intelligence. Intelligence is the “[i]nformation relevant to a government’s formulation and implementation of policy to further its national security interests and to deal with threats from actual or potential adversaries.”¹⁸ Further, intelligence as an activity also involves the collection and analysis of information and the act of denying information to foes.¹⁹ Data is collected using several methods. For example: espionage, aerial photography, communications interceptions, and the examination of open source communications (i.e. radio, television, and/or social media).²⁰ The information to be collected can range from military capabilities to social media posts of individual citizens. The methods used will always be dependent on the subject of the collection. For instance, open source collection from newspapers and other media outlets will be more effective in countries where the regime does not control the dissemination of information.

The scope of intelligence is vast and “remains unclear” since national security is a vague and adaptable term.²¹ In times of war the central mission for the IC becomes clearer because there is a central and imminent enemy. However, in times of peace “it is less clear which foreign nations, events, or circumstances threaten national security and therefore require the attention of the nation’s intelligence agencies.”²² The scope of intelligence is more complicated by the variations of the missions within the sixteen intelligence agencies. The IC includes the agencies set forth in the following chart.

¹⁸ Shulsky and Schmitt, *Silent warfare*, 1.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 2.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 2.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 3.

²² *Ibid.*, 3.

Figure 1: Members of the IC Community²³

Air Force Intelligence	Defense Intelligence Agency	Department of Treasury	Navy Intelligence
Army Intelligence	Department of Energy	Drug Enforcement Administration	National Security Agency
Central Intelligence Agency	Department of Homeland Security	Federal Bureau of Investigation	National Reconnaissance Agency
Coast Guard Intelligence	Department of State	Marine Corp Intelligence	National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency

As you can see there are military intelligence agencies, civilian intelligence agencies, administrative agencies, and law enforcement agencies. Though all of the entities listed have an overall goal of using their intelligence capabilities to secure the safety of the American public and infrastructure; they all have different specialties on which they focus. The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), for instance, has a primary focus on drug trafficking networks and the diversion of prescription medications. On the other hand, the Department of Energy’s Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence is focused on securing the Department of Energy complexes around the nation and focuses on threats to U.S. energy security. They have the same goal, but very different primary objectives. The importance of putting all of the pieces together cannot be overstated.

The Intelligence Community, as mentioned above uses six primary types of data collection. These six can be sorted into three distinct categories: human intelligence, technical intelligence, and open-source intelligence. As the name implies, human intelligence collection is the collection of information from human sources through espionage and the recruiting of foreign officials who have access to useful material and are willing to pass that on to an

²³ Director of National Intelligence, “Members of the IC.”

intelligence operative.²⁴ This method is risky for both the intelligence operative and the source providing the data. It is risky for the operative because they are working with individuals who have chosen to betray those around them. This person could be reliable or they could be a double agent working for both sides.²⁵ This is the method most individuals are familiar with as it has been popularized by the media and in spy movies. This was an extremely important method during the Cold War.

The second category of collection, technical intelligence (TECHINT), “refers to a group of techniques using advanced technology, rather than human agents, to collect information.”²⁶ It encompasses several of the methods listed above. TECHINT includes: signals intelligence, imagery intelligence, measurements and signatures intelligence, and geospatial intelligence. This type of collection resembles techniques used during a law enforcement investigation; however, it is more sophisticated and has a focus of prevention instead of prosecution.

Finally, open-source intelligence focuses on the collection of information that is available for public consumption. Common sources used for collection include newspapers, books, magazines, radio and television broadcasts, government statements, and social media.²⁷ It is also common practice to ask businessmen, scientists, and travelers to provide information when they are traveling to locations where it is difficult for an intelligence officer to operate. They are not collecting secret information; instead, they are asked only to provide information that is not readily available in the public media.²⁸ According to Abram Shulsky and Gary Schmitt, the “[i]mportance of open sources in the intelligence process is a matter of dispute and is ultimately

²⁴ Shulsky and Schmitt, *Silent warfare*, 11.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 19.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 22.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 37.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 40.

...tied to the basic questions about the nature of intelligence”²⁹ which until recently focused on the covert collection of data through primary sources. I believe that open-source information can be a vital part of the collection of intelligence because it can provide important contextual information. This is especially true in areas where operatives do not have the ability to move freely due to restrictive regimes. The internet is particularly helpful where media outlets are controlled by the state if individual citizens have access to social media sites. Where this type of information is not completely restricted, local information can be retrieved when it otherwise would be out of reach.

Data collection is only the initial step in the intelligence process. The next step is analysis of the collected information. Analysis “refers to the process of transforming the bits and pieces of information collected...into something that is usable by policy makers and military commanders.”³⁰ The result of analysis is an “intelligence product”³¹ that can be used to disseminate information quickly and efficiently. To get a finished intelligence product the data, despite collection method, must be reviewed, categorized, and organized to look for patterns and other useful information. Shulsky and Schmitt divide intelligence products into four broad categories which I find helpful in understanding how processed information is transmitted to policy makers and military commanders. The first category is scientific and technical intelligence. This category is more precise than the other categories as it requires the blending of intelligence with scientific and/or technical expertise as advanced technology must be managed from collection to interpretation.³² Second, there is military intelligence. This “deals with information about foreign military establishments and is needed for planning one’s own military

²⁹ Ibid., 38.

³⁰ Ibid., 41.

³¹ Ibid., 41.

³² Ibid., 53.

forces in peacetime or conducting military operations in time of war.”³³ The third category is economic and social intelligence. This is described as being similar to academic social science research because the data used is rarely from secret sources.³⁴ Finally, and most important in terms of this research, is political intelligence. Political intelligence “consists of information concerning the political processes, ideas, and intentions of foreign countries, factions, and individual leaders.”³⁵ It is similar to academic and journalistic writings on the topic; however, access to secret sources is limited groups outside the intelligence community.³⁶ This is important in the realm of political intelligence because access to internal information is very limited depending on the nature of the regime or group being studied.³⁷

Intelligence products can take several forms. Likely the most important is the President’s Daily Brief (PDB) which—as indicated—the President receives on a daily basis. It contains information from secret sources on the “intelligence items with the highest significance.”³⁸ Circulation is limited to the President, Vice President, and a handful of senior level executive officials chosen by the President.³⁹ There is also a Senior Executive Intelligence Brief (SEIB) with fewer limitations on circulation that is provided to and tailored to the needs of the senior government officials responsible for national security.⁴⁰ These two briefs represent one issue with the intelligence community; the issue of fulfilling the “current intelligence” functions. This problem was best outlined in a Senate report which dubbed the problem the “current events syndrome.” This report stated the following.

³³ Ibid., 54.

³⁴ Ibid., 56.

³⁵ Ibid., 55.

³⁶ Ibid., 55.

³⁷ Ibid., 55.

³⁸ Ibid., 57.

³⁹ Ibid., 57.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 58.

“The task of producing current intelligence—analyzing day-to-day events for quick dissemination—today occupies much of the resources of the DI [Directorate of Intelligence]. Responding to the growing demands for information of current concern by policymakers for more coverage of more topics [sic], the DI has of necessity resorted to a “current events” approach to much of its research. There is less interest in and fewer resources devoted to in-depth analysis of problems with long range importance to policymakers...

According to some observers, this syndrome has had an unfavorable impact on the quality of crisis warning and the recognition of longer term trends. The “current events” approach has fostered the problem of “incremental analysis,” the tendency to focus myopically on the latest piece of information without systematic consideration of an accumulated body of integrated evidence. Analysts in their haste to compile the day’s traffic, tend to lose sight of underlying factors and relationships.”⁴¹

Another type of intelligence product is Indications and Warnings (I&W) which is the analysis of the probable steps and enemy would most likely take to prepare for an armed attack.⁴²

The extent of the threat is based on the number of indicators present and the totality of those indicators.⁴³ The I&W product is more useful military matters; it is much more difficult when examining political matters.⁴⁴

The final set of reports I will discuss include, the basic intelligence report (BIR), periodic reports, and the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE). A basic intelligence report paints a picture of a specific situation of concern based on multiple forms or “all-source” intelligence.⁴⁵ For example, a BIR on a nation’s political system could include: “an account of all the major political forces and personalities, their traditional views and interest, and the ways in which they have related to each other.”⁴⁶ Periodic reports are more in depth and generally focus issues related to regional reviews, terrorism reviews, proliferation, arms trading, and narcotics.⁴⁷ The National Intelligence Estimate is the “most authoritative statement on a subject by U.S.

⁴¹ Ibid., 58.

⁴² Ibid., 59.

⁴³ Ibid., 59.

⁴⁴ Ibid., 59.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 60.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 60.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 60.

intelligence agencies collectively.”⁴⁸ It is intended to take a broad view of a subject and project the current situation into the future.

These intelligence products are used—as previously noted—to inform the decisions of policymakers. These reports are a key to the decisions that are made by the President and Congress. However, like the “current events syndrome” within the intelligence community, the policymakers are even more concerned with current events. They are often jumping from issue to issue and crisis to crisis; therefore, they are unable to obtain the area knowledge to make the best possible decisions. Most do not have foreign policy knowledge and experience; before they were congressmen they were doctors, farmers, or another field that would not lend the understanding necessary for effective foreign policy decision making. Congressman Will Hurd is a former intelligence officer for the CIA. In an interview in May 2015, he stated that he was shocked by the caliber of the policymakers understanding of the world.⁴⁹ The divide between information collection and policymaking is distressing. Those making decision should have a good working knowledge of the peoples of the world. With this in mind, this paper will move into a brief history of the development of the Russian Federation.

⁴⁸ Ibid., 61.

⁴⁹ William Hurd, “From CIA to Congress: An Interview with U.S. Congressman Will Hurd,” Interview by Vince Houghton. *Spycast*, podcast audio, May 12, 2015, <http://www.spymuseum.org/multimedia/spycast/episode/from-cia-to-congress-an-interview-with-us-congressman-will-hurd/>.

Historical Development of Russia

The historical origins of the Russian Federation are primarily the East Slavs.⁵⁰ The East Slavs were and “ethnic group that evolved into the Russian, Ukrainian, and Belarussian peoples.”⁵¹ The major pre-soviet states of the East Slavs were “medieval, Kievan Rus’, Muscovy, and the Russian Empire.”⁵²

Kievan Rus’—the first East Slavic state—“emerged along the Dneipr River valley.”⁵³ Here Kievan Rus’ “controlled the trade route between the Byzantine Empire and Scandinavia.”⁵⁴ From the Byzantine Empire, Kievan Rus’ adopted Christianity in the tenth century.⁵⁵ Between 980 and 1015, Prince Vladimir assisted in the conversion. He led the “forcible conversion of Kievan Russian to Orthodox Christianity.”⁵⁶ “Historians David MacKenzie and Michael Curran note that Vladimir’s emissaries were more impressed with the pageantry and glory of the Greek Orthodox ritual than with the philosophical depth of Orthodox beliefs.”⁵⁷ Orthodoxy was chosen over Judaism, Islam, and Catholicism because one was the “stateless religion of a defeated people,” one rejected alcohol, and one “lacked splendor.”⁵⁸ This synthesis of Byzantine and Slavic cultures defined “Russian culture for the next thousand years.”⁵⁹ Armed skirmishes between members of the princely family caused Kievan Rus’ to degenerate and later conquest by the Mongols in the 13th century was the decisive end.⁶⁰

⁵⁰ Glenn E. Curtis, ed. *Russia: a country study*, Washington, D.C.: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1998, 3.

⁵¹ Curtis, *Russia: a country study*, 3.

⁵² *Ibid.*, 3.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 3.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 3.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 3.

⁵⁶ Charles E. Ziegler, *The History of Russia. 2nd ed.* (Santa Barbara, California: Greenwood Press, 2009), 10.

⁵⁷ *History of Russia 2nd* Ziegler 10

⁵⁸ Ziegler, *The History of Russia*, 10.

⁵⁹ Curtis, *Russia: a country study*, 3.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 3.

After this disintegration, several states claimed to be the heirs of Kievan Rus'.⁶¹ One of these being Muscovy located at the northern edge of the "former cultural center."⁶² Gradually, Muscovy acquired neighboring territories forming the basis for the Russian Empire.⁶³ Muscovy traditions and beliefs were adopted by subsequent civilizations; most notably was the "subordination of the individual to the state."⁶⁴ The Slavic, Mongol, and Byzantine heritage of Muscovy provided the idea of the dominant state that later culminated in the ultimate power of the tsar.⁶⁵ Another characteristic of Russian history that finds its basis in Muscovy traditions is continual territorial expansion.⁶⁶ Expansion quickly went beyond ethnically Russian areas and by the eighteenth century the principality of Muscovy transformed into the Russian Empire.⁶⁷ It stretched from Poland to the Pacific Ocean and as Russia expanded west toward Europe they were forced to begin modernizing their army and adopting Western technologies in order to compete.⁶⁸ With the military modernization came an attempt to modernize the country as a whole which prompted competition between traditional Russian values and Western customs.⁶⁹

There was another push for modernization after Russia's defeat in the Crimean War fought from 1853 to 1856.⁷⁰ However, despite major reforms of the 1860s:

"agriculture remained inefficient, industrialization proceeded slowly, and new social problems emerged. In addition to masses of peasants seeking land to till, a new class of industrial workers—the proletariat—and a small but influential group of middle-class professionals were dissatisfied with their positions. The non-Russian populations resented periodic official Russification campaigns and struggled for autonomy. Successive regimes of the nineteenth century responded to such pressures with

⁶¹ Ibid., 3.

⁶² Ibid., 3.

⁶³ Ibid., 3.

⁶⁴ Ibid., 3.

⁶⁵ Ibid., 3.

⁶⁶ Ibid., 3.

⁶⁷ Ibid., 3.

⁶⁸ Ibid., 4.

⁶⁹ Ibid., 4.

⁷⁰ Ibid., 4.

combination of halfhearted reform and repression, but no tsar was willing to cede autocratic rule or share power. Gradually, the monarch and the state system...became isolated from the rest of society.”⁷¹

Even so, Russia continued to play a major role in international politics. Defeat in the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905) “sparked a revolution” where “professional, workers, peasants, minority ethnic groups, and soldiers demanded fundamental reforms.”⁷² Nicholas II responded by providing a limited constitution that was quickly ignored resulting in autocracy again taking command in the last decade of the tsarist state.”⁷³ By World War I Russia was not ready for combat and there was an increase in revolutionary pressures.

⁷¹ Ibid., 4.

⁷² Ibid., 4.

⁷³ Ibid., 5.

Historical Outline

Kievan Rus' and the Mongols

Prior to Kievan Rus' there were other peoples who settled in much of the same territory. Present day Ukraine was occupied by Iranian and other ethnic groups; best known was the occupation from 600 B.C. to 20 B.C. by the Scythians.⁷⁴ Later, the Goths and nomadic Huns, Avars, and Magyars briefly occupied the region during migration between A.D. 100 and A.D. 900.⁷⁵ These groups did not leave a notable impact on the region. However, the Eastern Slavs who left a lasting impact on modern day Russia. Kievan Rus' was the first East Slavic state and it created a very "complex" and unstable political system."⁷⁶ There is little known about the origin of the Slavs, but it is clear that their two lasting achievements of introducing a variant of the Eastern Orthodox religion and bringing together the Slavic and Byzantine cultures shaped the future of modern Russia.

During the two century rule of Kiev by the Slavs, the Grand Prince of Kiev "controlled the lands around the city, and his theoretically subordinate relatives ruled in other cities and paid him tribute."⁷⁷ Prince Vladimir and Prince Yaroslav brought with them greater state power and dominance with steady expansion. Prince Vladimir married the sister of the Byzantine Emperor to extend Kievan reach.⁷⁸ It was Vladimir that brought Christianity to Kiev; this "reflected his personal ties with Constantinople" who dominated important trade routes.⁷⁹ "Adherence to the Eastern Orthodox Church had long-range political, cultural, and religious consequences." Since the church rituals were written in Cyrillic, which was a translation originally prepared for the

⁷⁴ Ibid., 5.

⁷⁵ Ibid., 5.

⁷⁶ Ibid., 5.

⁷⁷ Ibid., 6.

⁷⁸ Ibid., 6.

⁷⁹ Ibid., 7.

South Slavs, the East Slavs did not have to learn Greek or even latin; therefore, they were isolated from Byzantine and European cultures.⁸⁰ In his quest for expansion, Prince Yaroslav arranged for his sister and three daughters to marry the kings of Hungary, France, Norway, and Poland.⁸¹ It was Yaroslav who prepared and disseminated the first East Slavic law code, built cathedrals, and founded a school system.⁸²

The ruling clan was unable to maintain the mighty and successful Kievan state because the growing number of ruling members began to divide into smaller regional factions, they fought among themselves, and formed alliances with outside groups.⁸³ After the Fourth Crusade took Constantinople and the associated trade routes the Kievan decline accelerated and Kievan Rus' split into many principalities and regional centers.⁸⁴ These “evolved into three nationalities: Ukrainians in the southeast and southwest, Belorussians in the north and west, and Russians in the north and northeast.”⁸⁵

The Mongol invasion came at the height of the disintegration of Kievan Rus'. The impact of the Mongol invasion, beginning in 1223 and continuing until at least 1240 when they took the city of Kiev, is not completely clear.⁸⁶

“The Mongols have been blamed for the destruction of Kievan Rus', the breakup of the “Russian” nationality into three components, and the introduction of the concept of “oriental despotism” into Russia. But most historians agree that Kievan Rus' was not a homogenous political, cultural, or ethnic entity and that the Mongols merely accelerated a fragmentation that had begun before the invasion. Some historians argue that the Mongol occupation resulted in the combination of European and Asian cultures in Russia. “They claimed that this explained the Russian preference for a simple rural society over dehumanizing industrialization; for emotion over reason; for spiritual values over

⁸⁰ Ibid., 7.

⁸¹ Ibid., 7.

⁸² Ibid., 7.

⁸³ Ibid., 9.

⁸⁴ Ibid., 9.

⁸⁵ Ibid., 9.

⁸⁶ Ibid., 11.

materialism.”⁸⁷ Historians also credit the Mongol regime with an important role in the development of Muscovy as a state.”⁸⁸

Muscovy/Muscovite Russia (1240-1613)

Muscovy or Muscovite Russia “created a highly centralized and autocratic political system” and thereby “exerted a powerful influence on Russian society.”⁸⁹ The principality of Vladimir-Suzdal’ contained the trading post of Moscow which was at the time insignificant and surrounded by natural barriers that protected it from the Mongol invasion.⁹⁰ The development of Moscow trading post in the state of Muscovy can be attributed to a “series of princes who were ambitious, determined, and lucky.”⁹¹ The princes of Muscovy began gathering Russian lands to increase population and wealth under their jurisdiction beginning in the fourteenth century.⁹²

Ivan (III) the Great was by far the most successful at this. In 1478 he subdued Novgorod and Tver’ in 1485; Muscovy gained sovereignty over the ethnically Russian lands in 1480 when Mongol rule ended; he obtained part of the province of Ryazan’ through inheritance; and convinced the princes of Rostov and Yaroslavl’ to voluntarily surrender themselves to him.⁹³ Ivan III was the first to use the title tsar and he tripled the size of Muscovy during his rule.⁹⁴ He used his conquests to provide rewards for those loyal to him. Providing land to army officers helped him maintain a force for his military campaigns.⁹⁵ During the reign of Ivan the Great the

⁸⁷ Ziegler, *The History of Russia*, 19.

⁸⁸ Curtis, *Russia: a country study*, 11.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 11.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 11.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 11 .

⁹² *Ibid.*, 12.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, 12.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 12.

⁹⁵ Ziegler, *The History of Russia*, 24.

Muscovite princes' power grew substantially. He married the niece of the last Byzantine emperor and they adopted Byzantine titles and rituals.⁹⁶

However, “the development of the tsar’s autocratic powers reached a peak during the reign of Ivan IV” who was also known as Ivan the Terrible.⁹⁷ When Ivan IV was crowned tsar he was recognized by the Orthodox Church as emperor; he was considered the “legitimate Orthodox ruler” since Constantinople had fallen to the Ottoman Empire.⁹⁸ His reign was known for extreme violence, but he also “promulgated a new law code, revamped the military, and reorganized local government.”⁹⁹ In response to a fire that destroyed much of Moscow, Ivan IV implemented many changes because he believed the fire was “punishment for his transgressions.”¹⁰⁰ In 1550, he issued a new law code to “ensure that the same laws were applied equally throughout the newly acquired territories and to protect the lower gentry’s interests against abuses by regional governors.”¹⁰¹ He also made changes to the bureaucracy. To do this he created central chanceries to improve efficiency in resource mobilization.¹⁰² His final changes were to the Orthodox Church and were mostly frivolous. For example, he deemed several harmless hobbies as indecent.¹⁰³ However, he also modified rituals, put restraints on the Church’s wealth, and sought to control corrupt practices.¹⁰⁴ Later in 1565 he divided Muscovy into two parts: his personal realm and the public territory.¹⁰⁵ He confiscated land that he desired and destroyed his enemies; he continued to expand territory, but overreached and lost a desirable

⁹⁶ Curtis, *Russia: a country study*, 13.

⁹⁷ Ibid., 13.

⁹⁸ Ibid., 13.

⁹⁹ Ibid., 13.

¹⁰⁰ Ziegler, *The History of Russia*, 25.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., 25.

¹⁰² Ibid., 25.

¹⁰³ Ibid., 25.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., 25.

¹⁰⁵ Curtis, *Russia: a country study*, 13.

position on the Baltic Sea which drained Muscovy; and led it to a civil war.¹⁰⁶ This civil war was known as the Time of Troubles.

During the Time of Troubles Ivan the Terrible was succeeded by his son Fedor; however, due to disabilities the true power sat with Fedor's brother-in-law Boris Godunov.¹⁰⁷ During his reign the Russian Orthodox Church evolved into an independent entity and then he died without an heir in 1598; this ended the Rurik Dynasty and Godunov was proclaimed tsar.¹⁰⁸ He soon died in 1605 allowing a man known as the First False Dmitriy to be proclaimed tsar after Godunov's son was murdered.¹⁰⁹ Thereafter, Poland briefly occupied Moscow, but they were pushed out and soon after Mikhail Romanov was proclaimed tsar.¹¹⁰

The Romanovs

The Romanov family held a 300 year reign. In the beginning they were weak rulers who would have been unable to restore order without lower government employees who continued to work independently despite weak rule.¹¹¹ During this time the bureaucracy grew and new departments were formed. They did not function optimally as they often had "overlapping and conflicting jurisdictions," but they functioned just the same.¹¹² The provincial governors implemented a comprehensive legal code in 1649 which exemplified the extent of state power as it officially sanctioned serfdom attaching peasants to their domicile and increasing taxes and regulations.¹¹³ There was societal discontent during this time. Expansion continued to both the

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., 14.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., 15.

¹⁰⁸ Ziegler, *The History of Russia*, 32.

¹⁰⁹ Curtis, *Russia: a country study*, 15.

¹¹⁰ Ibid., 15.

¹¹¹ Ziegler, *The History of Russia*, 34.

¹¹² Curtis, *Russia: a country study*, 19.

¹¹³ Ibid., 18.

East and West. The expansion into Ukraine, who had more involvement with Western ideals, had unforeseen consequences. The Russian Orthodox Church's isolation from Constantinople had created an environment where differences in the church texts and practices developed.¹¹⁴ When these differences came to light and the Russian Orthodox patriarch decided to bring the texts into alignment it was viewed as "improper foreign intrusion" and subsequently the church divided.¹¹⁵ The tsar's court was also impacted by Western ideals emanating from Ukraine; there were cultural intrusions that undermined the Muscovite cultural synthesis and created a path to transformation.¹¹⁶

Imperial Russia

"In the eighteenth century, Muscovy was transformed from a static, somewhat isolated, traditional state into the more dynamic, partially Westernized, and secularized Russian Empire."¹¹⁷ After a series of conflicts eventually resulting in expansion into conquered territories of Livonia, Estonia, and Ingria, Peter the Great achieved the creation of the Russian Empire. He did this through a transformation of the military and the government. First, he created a naval force.¹¹⁸ Second, he reorganized the army to mimic European models.¹¹⁹ Members of the taxpaying population were drafted for lifetime service and officers were drafted from the nobility class, also for lifetime service; he implemented a system of acquiring rank based on service rather than birth.¹²⁰ Third, he reorganized the government structure where he created a senate to organize government policy and created a system that allowed the local

¹¹⁴ Ibid., 19.

¹¹⁵ Ibid., 19.

¹¹⁶ Ibid., 20.

¹¹⁷ Ibid., 20.

¹¹⁸ Ibid., 22.

¹¹⁹ Ibid., 22.

¹²⁰ Ibid., 22.

governments to collect taxes and increase state revenue.¹²¹ Finally, he created educational institutions for males in the nobility class; however, this and his requirement that the nobility mimic social customs and dress of Western cultures, created greater divisions between the peasants and nobility. “Peter’s reign raised questions about Russia’s backwardness, its relationship to the West, the appropriateness of reform from above, and other fundamental problems that have confronted many of Russia’s subsequent rulers.”¹²²

Following the reign of Peter the Great, there was a series of short lived rulers. The position of tsar passed around many times until it was assumed by Catherine II in 1762; she remained in power until her death in 1796.¹²³ Though she minimized them, Catherine II has strong ties to Europe. She drew “political inspiration from Voltaire, Didert, and Montesquieu.”¹²⁴ “She used Montesquieu’s writings...to justify exercising strong, centralized, and absolute authority in the extensive Russian Empire.”¹²⁵ During her reign there was great expansion to the south and west; the expansion brought more power and also more animosity. For example, though she gained a portion of Poland when it was divided up this also eliminated the natural barrier that Poland had provided to Russia.¹²⁶ Catherine II brought many changes to the bureaucracy within Russia. She divided Russia into provinces and districts and gave the provincial governments police, administrative, and judicial systems.¹²⁷ Catherine also experimented with social reforms of the Nobility by eliminating their mandatory service and of the townsmen, but she failed to eliminate serfdom making her reforms insufficient.¹²⁸ She was

¹²¹ Ibid., 22.

¹²² Ibid., 23.

¹²³ Ibid., 24-28.

¹²⁴ Ziegler, *The History of Russia*, 41.

¹²⁵ Ibid., 41.

¹²⁶ Curtis, *Russia: a country study*, 25.

¹²⁷ Ibid., 26.

¹²⁸ Ibid., 26.

also able implement many of Peter the Great's policies in a more effective and useful manner. During this time Russia "became a power capable of competing with its European neighbors on military, political, and diplomatic grounds" and the system she created remained unchanged until the end of serfdom in 1861.¹²⁹

Catherine's son Paul briefly succeeded her as tsar. One of his primary accomplishments for Russia was the acquisition of Alaska.¹³⁰ His reign abruptly ended when he was assassinated in 1801 by a coup after he abandoned Britain and Austria in the war against France.¹³¹ His son Alexander I succeeded him.¹³² Alexander had an eye toward foreign policy and he rejoined the battle against Napoleon, but having been overwhelmed by him signed the Treaty of Tilsit and became Napoleon's ally in 1807.¹³³ He used this alliance to expand Russia's territory. As any relationship between expansionist leaders continues the two became suspicious of one another which strained the alliance. Eventually Napoleon invaded Russia with 600,000 troops, but he was not adequately prepared for the Russian winter and he returned home with only 30, 000 troops.¹³⁴ This defeat gave Alexander great power at the Congress of Vienna when the lines of Europe were redrawn as he was known as the "savior of Europe."¹³⁵ It is important to note that "[h]istorians have generally agreed that a revolutionary movement was born during the reign of Alexander I. Young officers who had pursued Napoleon into Western Europe came back to Russia with revolutionary ideas, including human rights, representative government, and mass democracy."¹³⁶

¹²⁹ Ibid., 26.

¹³⁰ Ibid., 28.

¹³¹ Ibid., 28-29.

¹³² Ziegler, *The History of Russia*, 45.

¹³³ Curtis, *Russia: a country study*, 29.

¹³⁴ Ibid., 29.

¹³⁵ Ibid., 30.

¹³⁶ Ibid., 30.

Just after Alexander's death, his successor and brother Nicholas I squashed an uprising in support of a Russian constitution. This led Nicholas to create the Third Section, which was a secret police charged with restraining Russian society through censorship and other controls "over education, publishing, and all manifestations of public life."¹³⁷ Despite this, Russian literature and ballet flourished during this time.¹³⁸ His reign was conservative and repressive. Questioning the tsar's authority was not tolerated.¹³⁹ Those of Russian nationality were favored as the preferred culture which "implied that Russian civilization was superior to that of the much-emulated Western nations."¹⁴⁰ The cultural growth and Russia's power were diminished after Nicholas moved against the Ottoman Empire over control of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits; Nicholas miscalculated his support from the British and French who joined the Ottomans to defeat Russia.¹⁴¹ The coming centuries were wrought with crisis for Russia.

Revolution 1855-1921

In 1855 the reign of Alexander II began. He instituted reforms in education, government, military and judiciary because there was no other option after defeat. It was Alexander II who emancipated the serfs. His plan provided the serfs with land which they were intended to pay for over a fifty year period and the former owners were issued bonds for their loss.¹⁴² The new peasants were unable to make the payments because the land they received was inadequate for farming and the former owner often lost their land because they couldn't work the land without

¹³⁷ Ibid., 31.

¹³⁸ Ibid., 32.

¹³⁹ Ziegler, *The History of Russia*, 48.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., 48.

¹⁴¹ Curtis, *Russia: a country study*, 33.

¹⁴² Ibid., 35.

the serf workers and the value of the bonds declined.¹⁴³ Though this was a step forward for Russia it created additional unintended economic strife. The collapse of the landlords' control over the serf population also created a need for new local authorities to attend to the needs of the people.¹⁴⁴ The local councils provided medical, educational, and infrastructure services, but law enforcement remained a function of the central government.¹⁴⁵ According to Ziegler, this introduced a limited version of the concept of self-governance to the peasants.¹⁴⁶

Alexander's local government reforms created an elected city council system, established limited Western-style courts with jury systems, established a State Bank, made negligible attempts to lift censorship, and attempted reform of the military to a reserve system.¹⁴⁷ This system remained in place until the Revolution of 1917.¹⁴⁸ Though many changes were obstructed after his assassination and his son Alexander III became tsar. During and following the reign of Alexander the III, radical political parties developed. The most talented of the radical party leaders was Vladimir L. Lenin who quickly gained traction with his theories of a worker-peasant alliance.¹⁴⁹ Lenin welcomed Russia's involvement in World War I, beginning in 1914, as he thought it would assist in his revolution and lead to a civil war that would weaken the regime.¹⁵⁰ It was in 1917 when the November coup was a success for Lenin and his Bolshevik Party.¹⁵¹

¹⁴³ Ibid., 35.

¹⁴⁴ Ziegler, *The History of Russia*, 53.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid., 53.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid., 53.

¹⁴⁷ Curtis, *Russia: a country study*, 36.

¹⁴⁸ Ziegler, *The History of Russia*, 53.

¹⁴⁹ Curtis, *Russia: a country study*, 43.

¹⁵⁰ Richard Pipes, *A Concise History of the Russian Revolution*, (New York: Vintage Books, 1995), 110-111.

¹⁵¹ Ziegler, *The History of Russia*, 56.

It was during this period that Russia built the Trans-Siberian railroad and sold Alaska to the U.S. Withdrawing from North America was a sign that Russia was overextending itself.¹⁵² The railroad was an attempt for Russia to consolidate its Eastern territories. Russia's efforts to consolidate interfered with Japan's imperial expansion of the Meiji Restoration as both sought control of Manchuria, which was a Northern Province of China, leading to conflict between the two.¹⁵³ The Russo-Japanese War "was a turning point in Russian history" because it led to "a popular uprising against the government."¹⁵⁴ The internal turmoil and war on multiple fronts weakened the regime leading to the end of tsarism by 1917 near the end of WWI and beginning of a new phase in Russian history.¹⁵⁵

1922-1991

The Soviet Union, made up of Russia, Ukrainian, Belorussian, and Transcaucasian republics, was established in December of 1922 by the Bolshevik or the Russian Communist Party.¹⁵⁶ The Bolsheviks, led and created by Lenin, quelled the original provisional government which intended to establish a democracy.¹⁵⁷ After Lenin's death in 1924, Joseph V. Stalin became the leader of the Soviet Union.¹⁵⁸ The premise of Communist beliefs were that "the capitalist system, driven as it is by private profit, is not only unjust but irrational and hence inherently unproductive."¹⁵⁹ He quickly implemented government control over existing industry

¹⁵² Ibid., 57.

¹⁵³ Ibid., 57.

¹⁵⁴ Curtis, *Russia: a country study*, 43.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid., 45.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid., 55.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid., 55.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid., 55.

¹⁵⁹ Pipes, *A Concise History of the Russian Revolution*, 192.

and agriculture and developed a powerful industrial economy despite the starvation of many peasants due to poor agricultural practices on the land they were forced to communally farm.¹⁶⁰

In the post-WWII USSR, Stalin expanded the economy and sought to exert his influence of the spread of communism around the world eventually helping bring about the Cold War with the United States.¹⁶¹ Until his death in 1953, Stalin ruled with an iron fist through centralized power. After his death, Nikita Khrushchev won leadership and denounced Stalin's use of force.¹⁶² However, Khrushchev's policies produced few gains for the Soviet Union and he was removed from power in 1964.¹⁶³ A period of collective governance and shifting power followed. Eventually Mikhail S. Gorbachev was unanimously chosen to lead the Soviet Union. It was his "policy of glasnost that freed public access to information after decades of government repression."¹⁶⁴ However, he did not address the fundamental weaknesses in the Soviet system and by 1991 the Cold War was nearing its end.¹⁶⁵

Modern Day Russia

The Russian Federation was established on August 24, 1991 after the dissolution of the Soviet Union.¹⁶⁶ As suggested by its' name, Russia is structured as a federation. According to the CIA World Factbook, a federation is a "form of government in which sovereign power is formally divided - usually by means of a constitution - between a central authority and a number of constituent regions (states, colonies, or provinces) so that each region retains some management of its internal affairs; [it] differs from a confederacy in that the central government

¹⁶⁰ Curtis, *Russia: a country study*, 56.

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 56.

¹⁶² *Ibid.*, 56.

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*, 56.

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 56.

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 56.

¹⁶⁶ The World Factbook, "Russia," <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/rs.html>.

exerts influence directly upon both individuals as well as upon the regional units.¹⁶⁷ Russia's capital is situated in Moscow which is located in European Russia and covers an area of 970 square miles.¹⁶⁸ Depending on the source, Russia is considered to either be part of Asia or combination of Europe and Asia. The U.S. State Department classifies Russia as part of, what they refer to as, Europe and Eurasia.¹⁶⁹ However, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) considers Russia to be in the Central Asian region; along with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Either way, Russia is the world's largest country; it covers 17,098, 242 square miles and is bordered by Ukraine, Poland, Norway, Mongolia, Lithuania, Latvia, North Korea, Kazakhstan, Georgia, Finland, Estonia, China, Belarus, and Azerbaijan.¹⁷⁰ To put this into perspective, it is twice the size of Canada, which is the second largest country.¹⁷¹ Below you will find a chart outlining the distance of each border shared with Russia.

¹⁶⁷ The World Factbook, "Definitions and Notes: Government Type," <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/docs/notesanddefs.html>.

¹⁶⁸ MadhuMadhavi Singh, ed., *Eyewitness Travel: Russia*, (London:Dorling Kindersley Press, 2013), 50.

¹⁶⁹ U.S. State Department, "Europe and Eurasia," <http://www.state.gov/p/eur/ci/index.htm>.

¹⁷⁰ The World Factbook, "Russia," <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/rs.html>.

¹⁷¹ *Encyclopedia Britannica Online Library Edition*, s.v. "Russia," accessed December 10, 2014, <http://library.eb.com/levels/referencecenter/article/109504>.

Table 2: Length of Russian Border Divided by Neighboring Country¹⁷²

Country	Distance (km)	Country	Distance (km)
Azerbaijan	284	North Korea	19
Belarus	959	Latvia	217
China	3,645	Lithuania	227
Estonia	290	Mongolia	3,441
Finland	1,313	Norway	167
Georgia	723	Poland	432
Kazakhstan	6,846	Ukraine	1,576

The Russian coastline is 37,653 kilometers; it borders the Arctic, Atlantic, and Pacific oceans.¹⁷³

Below you will find a map depicting Russia and its neighboring countries.

Figure 1: Russia: Political Map¹⁷⁴



¹⁷² Library of Congress-Research Division, “Country Profile: Russia,” (October 2006): 1, <http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/Russia.pdf>.

¹⁷³ Ibid., 3.

¹⁷⁴ Geography of Russia, “Political Map,” Last modified May 7, 2012, <http://novaonline.nvcc.edu/eli/evans/his241/notes/geography/geography.html>.

The Russian landscape varies greatly from West to East. Eastern and Western Russia are divided by the Ural Mountains. West of the Ural Mountains, European Russia is covered by a wide plain with low hills.¹⁷⁵ To the East of the Ural Mountains is the West Siberian Plain, then the Central Siberian Plateau, and the Lena Plateau.¹⁷⁶ “Russia’s southern border with Mongolia and its entire Pacific coast are marked by mountain ranges. The border with China is defined by the Amur River valley. Siberia contains vast coniferous forests, to the north of which is a broad tundra zone extending to the Arctic Ocean. The southwestern border is marked by the uplands of the northern slope of the Caucasus Mountains. In Russia’s southernmost extremity, flat, fertile steppe extends between its borders with Ukraine on the west and Kazakhstan on the east. About 10 percent of the country is swampland; about 45 percent is forested.”¹⁷⁷

The climate varies as much as the terrain. It ranges from Arctic to temperate.¹⁷⁸ Similarly, during the summer it will be cool along the Arctic coast and warm near the steeps.¹⁷⁹ During the winter, temperatures are cool along the Black Sea, but bitterly cold in Siberia.¹⁸⁰ For at least six months of the year, most of Russia is covered with snow and the “weather is often harsh”.¹⁸¹ As in other locations around the world, the climate in Russia has an effect on all aspects of life. “The average yearly temperature of nearly all of European Russia is below freezing, and the average for most of Siberia is freezing or below. Most of Russia has only two seasons, summer and winter, with very short intervals of moderation between them.”¹⁸² However, the Kaliningrad Oblast differs from much of the rest of the country. Located on the Baltic Sea, Kaliningrad has a

¹⁷⁵ Library of Congress-Federal Research Division, “Country Profile: Russia,” (October 2006): 4, <http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/Russia.pdf>.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid., 4.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid., 4.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid., 4.

¹⁷⁹ The World Factbook, “Russia.”

¹⁸⁰ Ibid.

¹⁸¹ Library of Congress, “Country Profile: Russia,” (2006): 4.

¹⁸² Ibid.

climate similar to the American Northwest, which is a moderate maritime climate.¹⁸³ Another exception to the harsh Russian climate is the Far East. The Russian Far East has a monsoonal climate; the directions of the winds change from summer to winter resulting in “sharply differentiating temperatures.”¹⁸⁴ Special requirements are necessary in regions of permafrost where “buildings must be constructed on pilings, machinery must be made of specially tempered steel, and transportation systems must be engineered to perform reliably in extremely low and extremely high temperatures. In addition, during extended periods of darkness and cold, there are increased demands for energy, health care, and textiles.”¹⁸⁵ The excessively cold winters also determine where citizens live and how crops are grown.¹⁸⁶ Everything from energy usage, population centers, and the food supply must work around the harsh Russian climate.

Despite the harsh climate, Russia enjoys a variety of natural resources. The country has “thousands of rivers and inland bodies of water” providing a substantial water supply and access to waterway travel across the country.¹⁸⁷ Most of the urban populations can be found along the rivers; four of the largest cities in Russia can be found on the banks of the Volga River which is the most important commercial waterway.¹⁸⁸ However, the population centers are poorly distributed in relation to the water supply since most of the surface water is located east of the Ural Mountains and the majority of the population lives in the warmer climates.

¹⁸³ Ibid.

¹⁸⁴ Ibid.

¹⁸⁵ Ibid.

¹⁸⁶ Ibid.

¹⁸⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid.

Table 3: Major Rivers in Russia¹⁹⁰

River	Length (km)	Length (miles)	Drainage area (km ²)	Outflow	Countries in the drainage basin	Russian Regions in the drainage basin
Lena River	4,400	2,734	2,418,000	Arctic Ocean	Russia	Irkutsk Oblast, Sakha republic
Yenisei River	5,539	3,442	2,707,000	Yenisei Gulf, Kara Sea, Arctic Ocean	Russia, Mongolia	Krasnoyarsk Krai, Zabaykalsky Krai, Khakassia, Irkutsk Oblast, Buryatia, Tyva
Ob River	3,650	2,268	2,972,497	Gulf of Ob	Russia	Khanty–Mansi Autonomous Okrug, Tomsk Oblast, Yamalia, Altai Krai, Novosibirsk Oblast
<u>Volga River</u>	3,530	2,193	1,380,000	Caspian Sea	Russia	Astrakhan Oblast, Volgograd Oblast, Saratov Oblast, Samara Oblast, Tatarstan Republic, Ulyanovsk Oblast, Nizhny Novgorod Oblast, Yaroslavl Oblast, Tver Oblast
Amur River	2,824	1,755	2,824,000	Strait of Tartary	Russia, China	Amur Blast, Khabarovsk Krai
Ural River	2,428	1,509	237,000	Caspian Sea	Russia, Kazakhstan	Chelyabinsk Oblast, Orenburg Oblast, Bashkortostan
Kolyma River	2,129	1,323	644,000	East Siberian Sea	Russia	Sakha Republic, Chukotka Autonomous Okrug, and Magadan Oblast
Don River	1,950	1,220	425,600	Sea of Azov	Russia	Volgograd Oblast, Rostov Oblast, Tula Oblast, Voronezh Oblast, Lipetsk Oblast
Indigirka River	1,726	1,072	360,000	East Siberian Sea	Russia	Sakha Republic
Pechora	1,809	1,124	327,000	Arctic Ocean	Russia	Nenets Autonomous Okrug, Komi Republic

The above outlines the specifications on ten of the major rivers in Russia. It should provide a better understanding of the waterway system. This system supported a considerable fishing industry, but it is now threatened by pollution due to poor regulation.¹⁹¹

Water is not the only resource in abundance in Russia. Russia maintains one-sixth of the world's petroleum supply and one-third of the natural gas supply.¹⁹² Despite the large supply,

¹⁹⁰ Ibid.

¹⁹¹ Library of Congress, "Country Profile: Russia," (2006): 5.

much of the supply in European Russia has been depleted making it necessary for Russia to rely on the deposits located in Siberia.¹⁹³ Russia also possesses “rich deposits of most valuable metals, diamonds, and phosphates.”¹⁹⁴ Finally, Siberian Russia holds fifty percent of the coniferous forests found in the world; however, the forest stock is being reduced due to lack of forest management.¹⁹⁵

People and Society

The people of the Russian Federation are known as Russians. The total population of Russia, as of July 2013, was 142,500,482; the majority of the population is between the ages of 25-54.¹⁹⁶ 73.8 percent of the total population lives in one of Russia’s major urban centers.¹⁹⁷

Table 4: Population by City¹⁹⁸

City	Moscow	Saint Petersburg	Novosibirsk	Yekaterinburg	Nizhniy Novgorod
Populaiton (millions)	10.523	4.575	1.397	1.344	1.267

According to the 2002 census there were five primary ethnic groups in Russia: Russian, Tatar, Ukrainian, Bashkir, and Chuvash.¹⁹⁹

¹⁹² Library of Congress, “Country Profile: Russia,” (2006): 4.

¹⁹³ Ibid.

¹⁹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁹⁶ The World Factbook, “Russia.”

¹⁹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹⁹ Ibid.

Table 5: Ethnic Groups as Percentage of Total Population²⁰⁰

Ethnic Group	Russian	Tatar	Ukrainian	Bashkir	Chuvash	Other
Percentage of Total Population	79.8	3.8	2	1.2	1.1	12.1

Ethnic Russians are overwhelmingly the predominant ethnic group. The official language is Russian; however, there are many other minority languages spoken throughout the country.²⁰¹ Russian Orthodox is the predominant religion; followed by, Muslims and Christians.²⁰²

In the early 1990's, "Russia began experiencing a negative population growth rate" due to an increase in infertility, a drop in life expectancy, poor nutrition and health care, and environmental pollution.²⁰³ As of 2013, males have a life expectancy of sixty-four years and females have an expectancy of seventy-six years.²⁰⁴ The birth rate is 12.11 births for every 1,000 persons and the death rate is 13.97 deaths for every 1,000 persons.²⁰⁵ The birth rate is lower than the death rate; the population is still likely declining.

Economy

According to the World Bank, Russia's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was 2.097 trillion dollars in 2013.²⁰⁶ During the same year, eleven percent of the total population was at the national poverty line.²⁰⁷ As of 2012, the unemployment rate was 5.7 percent.²⁰⁸ The Russian economy has changed drastically since the Soviet Union's collapse. They have moved to a

²⁰⁰ Ibid.

²⁰¹ Ibid.

²⁰² Ibid.

²⁰³ Britannica, s.v. *Russia*.

²⁰⁴ The World Factbook, "Russia."

²⁰⁵ Ibid.

²⁰⁶ World Bank, "Data by Country: Russian Federation," <http://data.worldbank.org/country/russian-federation>.

²⁰⁷ Ibid.

²⁰⁸ The World Factbook, "Russia."

“more market-based and globally-integrated economy” from the “globally-isolated, centrally-planned economy” it was during the Soviet era.²⁰⁹ The 1990’s brought economic reform that privatized many sectors; however, energy and defense remain under state control.²¹⁰ As of 2012, the GDP was comprised of three sectors: agriculture, industry and services.²¹¹ The service sector is the largest and makes up 60.1 percent of the GDP.²¹² The industrial sector is second as it makes up 36 percent of the GDP and the agriculture sector comprises 3.9 percent of the GDP.²¹³ The agriculture sector produces grain, sugar beets, vegetables, sunflower seeds, beef, milk, and fruit.²¹⁴ The industrial sector includes: coal, oil, gas, chemical and metal extraction and production; machine building (aircraft and space vehicles); defense industries (radar, missile production, shipbuilding, agricultural machinery, tractors, and construction equipment, medical instruments, textiles, handicrafts, and electric power generating and transmitting equipment).²¹⁵

The country’s primary export partners are The Netherlands, China, Italy, and Germany.²¹⁶ Russia exports petroleum and petroleum products, natural gas, wood and wood products, chemicals, metals, and a wide variety of civilian and military manufactures.²¹⁷ Primary import partners include China, Germany, and Ukraine.²¹⁸ Primary imports include: steel, iron, vehicles, plastic, meat, fruits and nuts, optical and medical instruments, and semi-finished metal products.²¹⁹

²⁰⁹ Ibid.

²¹⁰ Ibid.

²¹¹ Ibid.

²¹² Ibid.

²¹³ Ibid.

²¹⁴ Ibid.

²¹⁵ Ibid.

²¹⁶ Ibid.

²¹⁷ Ibid.


²¹⁸ Ibid.

²¹⁹ Ibid.

Infrastructure

As of 2013, Russia had 1,218 airports; 594 with paved runways and 624 with unpaved runways.²²⁰ There are also 49 heliports, 87,157 kilometers of railway, and 982,000 kilometers of roadway.²²¹ There are ports and terminals at Kaliningrad, Kavkaz, Nakhodka, Novorossiysk, Primorsk, Saint Petersburg, and Vostochnyy.²²² Below you will find maps of the railway and road systems across Russia.

Figure 3: Russia Railway Map²²³



²²⁰ Ibid.

²²¹ Ibid.

²²² Ibid.

²²³ Maps of the World, "Russia Railway Map," <http://www.mapsofworld.com/russia/russia-railway-network-map.html#>.

Figure 4: Russia Roadway Map²²⁴



Military

Russian Federation military branches include: Ground Forces, Navy, Air Forces, Airborne Troops, Strategic Rocket Forces, and Aerospace Defense Troops.²²⁵ Russian Ground Forces have the following combat arms: motorized-rifle troops, tank troops, missile and artillery troops, and air defense of the ground troops.²²⁶ Males between the ages of eighteen and twenty-seven are eligible for compulsory or voluntary military service.²²⁷ There is a one year obligation of service and reserve obligations to the age of fifty.²²⁸ Russia spends approximately 3.9 percent of its GDP on military expenditures.²²⁹ Russia requires that all males register for the draft at age seventeen.²³⁰

²²⁴ Maps of the World, "Russia Roadway Map," <http://www.mapsofworld.com/russia/russia-road-map.html#>.

²²⁵ The WorldFactbook, "Russia."

²²⁶ Ibid.

²²⁷ Ibid.

²²⁸ Ibid.

²²⁹ Ibid.

²³⁰ Ibid.

Government

As noted above, Russia is a federation; it has a central government and several administrative divisions. Russia has 46 provinces, 21 republics, 4 autonomous okrugs (regions), 9 krais, 2 federal cities, and 1 autonomous oblast.²³¹ On the next page you will find a map that displays all of the administrative divisions of Russia. The krais are salmon color, oblasts are orange, autonomous oblasts are light pink, autonomous okrugs are yellow, and republics are green. Oblasts are the most prominent type of administrative division and are primarily located in western Russia; however, much of Russian territory is part of the kray of Krasnoyarsk and the Sakha Republic. Both are located east of the Ural Mountains.

²³¹ Ibid.

Figure 5: Federal Districts of the Russian Federation



The current Russian Constitution was adopted on December 12, 1993.²³² The country has a civil law system with judicial review of legislative acts.²³³ The government is comprised of three branches: executive, legislative, and judicial. The Executive Branch is led by a

²³² Ibid.

²³³ Ibid.

president (head of state) who appoints the prime minister (head of government), the chairman of the Constitutional Court, and the head of the Central Bank of Russia.²³⁴ The lower house of parliament, or the State Duma, is required to confirm these presidential nominations; however, if they fail to confirm the nomination for prime minister three times, the president can dissolve the Duma.²³⁵ Many presidential nomination do not require approval by the legislature.²³⁶ The president also has the power “to issue decrees that go into effect without the parliament’s approval.”²³⁷

The legislative branch is made up of a bicameral Federal Assembly which has an upper and a lower house; the upper house is the Federation Council and the lower house called the State Duma.²³⁸ The Federation Council consists of 166 seats; the “members are appointed by the top executive and legislative officials in each of the 83 federal administrative units.”²³⁹ The members of the State Duma are elected by popular vote and both houses serve four-year terms.²⁴⁰

The judicial branch consists of three high courts: the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, the Constitutional Court, and the Superior Court of Arbitration.²⁴¹ The members of all three courts are appointed for life and are appointed by the president and confirmed by the Federation Council.²⁴² Russia also has an extensive lower court system. This includes a Higher Arbitration Court, provincial and regional courts, city courts in Moscow and St. Petersburg, autonomous provincial and district courts, and independent court systems in the republics.²⁴³

²³⁴ Library of Congress, “Country Profile: Russia,” (2006): 18.

²³⁵ Ibid., 19.

²³⁶ Ibid., 19.

²³⁷ Ibid., 19.

²³⁸ Ibid., 19.

²³⁹ The World Factbook, “Russia.”

²⁴⁰ Ibid.

²⁴¹ Ibid.

²⁴² Ibid.

²⁴³ Ibid.

The judicial branch is not independent in the same way as the American Court system. However, according to a Library of Congress report the “judicial branch has moved very slowly toward an independent role in the post-Soviet era.”²⁴⁴ It took many years for the U.S. Supreme Court to establish its dominance in the American system; therefore, it is possible that the Russian courts could move toward greater independence in the future, but it is much less likely due to the differing political climate. It is also less likely because the Russian constitution does not call for three equal branches of government as the U.S. Constitution does.

²⁴⁴ Library of Congress, “Country Profile: Russia,” (2006): 20.

US-Russian Relations

Even during the best of times when the United States and Russia, as part of the former USSR, were fighting together to defeat Hitler during World War II (WWII), the relationship was strained and skepticism prevailed. This distrust stemmed from distinct differences between the ideologies of the two states despite some similar characteristics. As John Gaddis notes, there are several similarities. Both were born out of revolution, both had advanced across vast frontiers as continental states, both entered the war as a result of surprise attack, and both embraced ideologies with global aspirations.²⁴⁵ Upon closer examination, even these similarities represent stark differences in the U.S. and the former USSR. The American Revolution represented a break from concentration of power in a single executive. Conversely, the Bolshevik Revolution was a concentration of power. Based in the theories of Karl Marx, it “involved the embrace of concentrated authority as a means of overthrowing class enemies and consolidating a base from which a proletarian revolution would spread throughout the world.”²⁴⁶

At the end of WWII, the two nations had fought very different wars. The U.S., being so far from their own shores, fought a calculated war that allowed for minimal casualties.²⁴⁷ The former USSR was not so lucky. They suffered mass casualties along with excessive property damage.²⁴⁸ The former Soviet Union and the United States were fighting a common enemy, but held very different views of how the world should look post-war. The Soviet Union and Stalin, its ruler since 1924, believed that wartime expenditures should determine how territory was divided after the war.²⁴⁹ Since the Soviet Union had clearly expended a disproportionately greater amount of “blood and treasure”, Stalin believed that the USSR should and would get a

²⁴⁵ John Lewis Gaddis, *Cold War: A New History*, (New York: Penguin Books, 2005), 7.

²⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 8.

²⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 8.

²⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 9.

²⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 11.

greater proportion.²⁵⁰ However, the disproportionate losses had “robbed that country of the power required to secure those benefits unilaterally.”²⁵¹ Stalin wanted “security for himself, his regime, his country, and his ideology, in precisely that order.”²⁵² As a leader he was jealous, cruel, ambitious, and power hungry; he eliminated his rivals.²⁵³ With such a powerful Soviet Union at his disposal he was more dangerous to the world order than one would expect. He sought “domination of Europe” just as Hitler had.²⁵⁴ He also hoped that the U.S. and Great Britain would eventually destroy one another as Karl Marx had predicted that capitalist societies would do. As Gaddis eloquently stated, this meant that for the U.S. and the U.K., WWII “was a victory over fascism only—not over authoritarianism and its prospects for the future.”²⁵⁵

Stalin had hoped that his post-war gains could be made peacefully and with the support of the Americans. Until this point the U.S. had avoided becoming involved in influencing the state of affairs in Europe. However, Roosevelt had alternative plans for America’s post-WWII influence in world affairs. He did not plan on shrinking back into isolationist tendencies of times past. Instead, he sought to influence and to control the balance of power.

There were four primary wartime goals for Roosevelt. First, he hoped to maintain allies in order to achieve victory as he knew that the U.S. could not defeat both Japan and Germany alone.²⁵⁶ Second, he hoped to “secure allied cooperation in shaping the postwar settlement” in order to secure lasting peace.²⁵⁷ Third, Roosevelt hoped that the allies would endorse a post-war settlement that “would remove the most probable causes of future wars” which included a

²⁵⁰ Ibid., 11.

²⁵¹ Ibid., 11.

²⁵² Ibid., 11.

²⁵³ Ibid., 10-11.

²⁵⁴ Ibid., 14.

²⁵⁵ Ibid., 9.

²⁵⁶ Ibid., 17.

²⁵⁷ Ibid., 17.

“collective security organization with the power to deter and punish aggression.”²⁵⁸ The fourth and final goal was to create a post-war settlement that would be approved by the American people which would mean there would be “no reversion to isolationism.”²⁵⁹ The differences in the post-war visions of the U.S. and the Soviet Union, the basic differences in the central ideologies of the two, and the failure to resolve the differing political objectives is at the heart of the beginning of the Cold War which lasted until the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991.

When Communism expanded to the East it increased fear and doubt in the United States. When the Chinese Communists won the battle over the Chinese Nationalists fear was initially contained because there was no prediction that China would become subservient to the USSR. The Chinese Communist Party defeated the U.S. sponsored Nationalists without help so the foreign policy analysts in the U.S. did not foresee the pact between China and the Soviet Union.²⁶⁰ This did not stop Mao, the leader of the Chinese Communist Party, from pledging his loyalty to Joseph Stalin and recognizing him as the international leader of the Communist Party.²⁶¹ This loyalty from Mao led to the Sino-Soviet Treaty which was a pact between the two nations to come to the other’s aid in the event of an attack.²⁶² This event caused the United States to change its thinking. The realization that the Soviet Union and China were united in their fight for communism severely impacted the U.S. position and actions taken in the years following.

During the same time period there were two high profile espionage cases that became public. There was always rumor of espionage on both sides; however, this confirmed the fear and the extent of Soviet espionage. It created the realization that spying made it possible for the

²⁵⁸ Ibid., 17.

²⁵⁹ Ibid., 17.

²⁶⁰ Ibid., 17.

²⁶¹ Ibid., 17.

²⁶² Ibid., 17.

USSR to create the atomic bomb so quickly.²⁶³ The extent of the infiltration was a terrifying prospect.

By June 1950, Joseph Stalin had provided his blessing for North Korea to invade South Korea with guaranteed reinforcements from China as needed.²⁶⁴ This calculated risk was taken because the then U.S. Secretary of State had indicated that the U.S. would not come to the aid of South Korea; however, Stalin's blatant disregard for the boundaries set up by the United Nations (UN) at the 38th parallel was such a direct "challenge to the post-war collective security" that the U.S. took action.²⁶⁵ This was an outcome not foreseen by Stalin before waging his proxy war. The Korean War provided no benefit to either the United States or the USSR. Despite this, it is clear that President Truman's actions—or restraint—in not deploying the greatest weapon the U.S. had in its arsenal set a tone for future wars.²⁶⁶ He is the reason that nuclear weapons have not been used since they were dropped on two Japanese cities as a way to bring WWII to a close. However, the precedent set by Truman that weapons developed do not always have to be deployed, was not immediately realized. Even today there is fear that rogue nations or groups will not abide by this unwritten doctrine.

The Cold War was a time of uncertainty and fear for the American people. The threat of a nuclear attack always at the front of their thoughts. Both nations employed all manner of reconnaissance to gather secrets and gain the upper hand. The fight of ideals, the battle between communism and democracy, reigned for many years, but a shattered Soviet Union dissolved into a damaged Russia which provided a sense of security to the U.S. However, current President Vladimir Putin is shifting the West's complacency toward Russia into curiosity. He is pushing

²⁶³ Ibid., 17.

²⁶⁴ Ibid., 17.

²⁶⁵ Ibid., 17.

²⁶⁶ Ibid., 17.

boundaries as far as he sees feasible and then backs off until the West's discomfort with his actions subsides and then he tests the waters again. He has been doing this for many years.

In 2008, Russia used force outside its own borders for the first time in the post-soviet era. They became involved in the conflict between Georgia and rebels in South Ossetia—an independent Georgian territory.²⁶⁷ Russia stated that their actions in Georgia sought to restore stability, but Russian troops entered undisputed Georgian territory making this claim less than genuine.²⁶⁸ Further, Russia is forward thinking and patient. During the years preceding the 2008 conflict, Russia was maintaining a “peacekeeping force” in South Ossetia—which operated primarily as an independent territory—and they issued passports to Ossetians.²⁶⁹ This allowed them to claim they were intervening on behalf of their own citizens.²⁷⁰ According to Marsha Lipman, political analyst for the Carnegie Moscow Center, “the vast majority of the Russian people” approved of “Russia’s behavior” and the action in Georgia.²⁷¹ This public approval reflects the overall attitudes of the general Russian population who also seek a stronger place in the world. It reflects the national pride and desire for more power for Russia. The events in Georgia are significant because Georgia was an ally of the U.S. Their ability to act with no retaliation set a precedent.

In 2013, despite pleas from President Obama, Russia provided asylum to former National Security Agency (NSA) contractor Edward Snowden who leaked classified information to the press. Snowden was a systems operator working for Booz Allen Hamilton—a technology

²⁶⁷ Corey Flintoff, “Russia-Georgia Conflict has Deep Roots,” *NPR* (August 12, 2008), <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=93525210>.

²⁶⁸ Ibid.

²⁶⁹ Ibid.

²⁷⁰ Ibid.

²⁷¹ Lippman, Masha, “What Russia Hopes to Gain From Conflict: Interview with Masha Lippman,” By Andrea Seabrook, *NPR* (October 10, 2008), <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=93483527>.

consulting firm.²⁷² He downloaded and released over 200,000 documents relating to U.S. eavesdropping activities; many of the documents were designated as “top secret” and the even more restrictive “special intelligence.”²⁷³ In several statements Snowden claimed to be a whistleblower helping to expose unconstitutional practices used by the intelligence community.²⁷⁴ The U.S. government has found no evidence that he attempted to go through the proper channels to raise concerns and Snowden has offered no evidence to support this theory.²⁷⁵ Even after Snowden was indicted for stealing and exposing state secrets, he is still currently residing in Russia where he was granted additional asylum.²⁷⁶ Russia granted Snowden a three year residency extension in August 2014.²⁷⁷ Russia again skated by with little resistance. It is clear that President Putin has no intention to cooperate with the United States in this matter. Russia has chosen to harbor a fugitive to prove they have power and are not subject to U.S. control.

Later in 2014, when Russia decided to take control of the Crimean peninsula in Ukraine, Putin could be confident that the West would not react militarily. The Russians understand the U.S. fear of being in another war. It was again easy for Putin to claim protection of ethnic Russians in Crimea as many ethnic Russians reside there. Crimea was part of Russia “for centuries before Soviet Leader Nikita Khrushchev gave it to Ukraine as a gift in 1954.”²⁷⁸ This

²⁷² Mark Hosenball, “NSA Chief: Snowden Leaked up to 200,000 Secret Documents,” *Huffington Post* (November 14, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/11/14/nsa-snowden-documents_n_4276708.html.

²⁷³ *Ibid.*

²⁷⁴ Matt Sledge, “NSA Released Edward Snowden Email To Push Back At Whistleblower Claim,” *Huffington Post* (May 29, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/05/29/nsa-edward-snowden-email_n_5412579.html.

²⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁷⁶ Vivienne Walt, “Greenwald on Snowden Leaks: The Worst is Yet to Come,” *Time.com*, October 15, 2013. EBSCOhost (91264945).

²⁷⁷ Isabel Gorst, “Russia gives Edward Snowden asylum for three more years,” *Los Angeles Times* (August 7, 2014), <http://www.latimes.com/world/europe/la-fg-russia-snowden-asylum-20140807-story.html>.

²⁷⁸ Greg Myre. “Russia’s Goal in Ukraine: Three Scenarios,” *NPR* (March 8, 2014), <http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2014/03/08/280765533/russias-goal-in-ukraine-three-scenarios>.

provides a limited amount of cover for Putin as he ventures outside his own territory. The economic sanctions placed on Russia by the U.S. and members of the European Union (EU) have had little to no success. Putin even retaliated with an embargo on food imports from the U.S., EU, Canada, Australia, and Norway.²⁷⁹ Putin is protecting his image of power; he will not look weak in the face of Western attempts to control his actions.

In another act of overt intimidation against the United States, Vladimir Putin sent two Russian bombers close to U.S. airspace last July 4th. The Russian pilots, intercepted by U.S. fighter jets, are quoted as saying: “Good morning, American pilots. We are here to greet you on your Fourth of July Independence Day.”²⁸⁰ This is a clear taunt and an attempt to reestablish a presence in the international community. I believe, it is also Putin’s way of showing that he is not afraid of the U.S. This is not an insignificant event. These types of actions are meant to test his boundaries. Like a child tests a parent to determine how far they can go without punishment, Putin is testing the international community and in particular the United States to see what will be tolerated.

Then in late 2015, Russia joined the conflict in Syria. Russia offered to execute air strikes against the terrorists. Initially, Putin’s bombers targeted areas controlled by the Islamic State (ISIS); however, they quickly began campaigns in parts of Syria with little ISIS control.²⁸¹ It was evident that he was targeting the U.S. backed Syrian rebels fighting the Bashar al-Assad regime. Outwardly, Putin states that he has no loyalty to Assad, but their meeting in October

²⁷⁹ Gorst. “Russia gives Edward Snowden asylum for three more years.”

²⁸⁰ Laura Smith-Spark, “Why is Russia sending bombers close to U.S. airspace?,” *CNN* (July 27, 2015), <http://www.cnn.com/2015/07/27/world/us-russia-bombers-intentions/index.html>.

²⁸¹ “Russia joins war in Syria: Five key points,” *BBC News* (October 1, 2015), <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-34416519>.

2015 was front page news for the Kremlin.²⁸² Early 2016 brought a Russian withdrawal from Syria. News of the withdrawal was quite abrupt, but was clearly strategic in nature. Russia has achieved three goals with its involvement in Syria. First, they have shown that Russia is willing and able to be a player on the international stage. Second, they have put themselves in a position to be an important part of any future negotiations in Syria. Third, they aided the Assad regime who is a Putin ally, meaning if Assad does not lose power Putin has a hold in Syria. Most importantly the strategic withdrawal is allowing Putin to do all three without overextending Russia's resources.

Russian Objectives

In 1962, Cyril E. Black wrote that Russia's policy decisions could have been said "to have been based primarily on considerations of security."²⁸³ He divided the security considerations into four components: stabilization of frontiers; assurance of favorable conditions for economic growth; unification of territories considered to be Russian by virtue of dynastic, religious, or national claims; and participation in alliance systems and international institutions.²⁸⁴ I believe these can still be—in part—used as a relevant guide to understand Russian policy objectives.

Black noted that the stabilization of frontiers was "less a question of geography than of coming to terms with the political power on the other side of the border."²⁸⁵ The goal was to gain stability by eliminating the political power of a neighboring territory. This is the least relevant component of the foreign policy considerations; however, Russia's annexation of Crimea was a way to reduce the political power of Ukraine because there was a push for stronger

²⁸² Andrew Osborn, "Putin uses Assad visit to talk up Kremlin role as Syria broker," *Reuters* (October 21, 2015), <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-assad-putin-idUSKCN0SF0I020151021>.

²⁸³ Andrew Osborn, "Putin uses Assad visit to talk up Kremlin role as Syria broker," *Reuters* (October 21, 2015), <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-assad-putin-idUSKCN0SF0I020151021>.

²⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 6.

²⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 6.

ties with the West in the form of joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union. Since NATO was created to curb the spread of Soviet communism, this was viewed as a direct threat to Moscow because the West was inching closer to their borders.²⁸⁶ Also, Russia has a naval base in the Crimean port city of Sevastopol.²⁸⁷ Ukraine's alliance with NATO or the EU could have jeopardized this strategic base. In this context, Russia's actions could have been more easily anticipated and much less surprising to those in the West.

Secondly, Black notes that the theory for best achieving economic growth has varied among Russian leaders; however, there is agreement that economic strength is a necessity for national security.²⁸⁸ The current strategy reflects the importance of economic strength as well. In the midst of animosity with the United States and the West, President Putin has turned to the East seeking economic partnerships. Russia and China signed an economic deal and financing agreement in May 2015.²⁸⁹ Putin is quoted as saying, "Today, China is our key strategic partner."²⁹⁰ Reducing reliance on Europe for exports reduces the impact of Western sanctions.

The third key component of Russia's foreign policy strategy is the "unification of territories considered to be Russian by virtue of dynastic, religious, or national claims."²⁹¹ This strategy is manifested in Russia's involvement in both Ukraine and Georgia. In both instances Russia argued their actions were to protect ethnic Russians. In anticipation of this argument they issued passports to the citizens of both independent territories prior to becoming entangled in the

286 United States Department of State: Office of the Historian, "Milestones: 1945-1952; North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 1949," <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/nato>.

287 Alia E. Dastagir, "Ukraine, Russia, Crimea: How the story evolved," *USA Today* (April 24, 2014), <http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2014/03/20/ukraine-crisis-explainer/6610749/>.

288 Black, "The Pattern of Russian Objectives," 14.

289 Andrey Ostroukh, "Russia, China Forge Closer Ties With New Economic, Financing Accords: Moscow turns to Asian investors to reduce reliance on Europe and the U.S. amid standoff over Ukraine," *Wall Street Journal* (May 8, 2015), <http://www.wsj.com/articles/russia-china-forge-closer-ties-with-new-economic-financing-accords-1431099095>.

290 Ibid.

291 Black, "The Pattern of Russian Objectives," 18.

conflicts. A greater understanding of the nature of the Russian foreign policy strategy and what is driving its leader would have helped to better shape the U.S. response.

The final element of Russian foreign policy, as discussed by Black, is participation in alliance systems. Historically, Russia has been involved in short-term alliances of opportunity.²⁹² A perfect example is the alliance with the U.S. and Great Britain during WWII. These relationships are based solely on the need for assistance. The only example of long-term alliances is with the “Communist states of Europe and Asia after 1945.”²⁹³

U.S. Strategy

Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. has been the only superpower. Russia seeks to end this reign. The United States’ place as the primary de facto world leader has been centered on three central missions:²⁹⁴

1. To manage and guide power relationships in a “world of shifting geopolitical balances” so a “more cooperative global system can emerge.”
2. To contain civil and regional conflicts, prevent terrorism, and prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
3. To address the inequalities of the human condition and to “prompt a common response to new environmental and ecological threats to global well-being.”

U.S. policy makers work tirelessly to influence nations around the world and to maintain the balance of power in a regional setting for U.S. benefit and to ensure strategic advantage around the globe. This is achieved through mutual agreements and even by providing financial incentives. However, unlike other states around the globe, expansionist policies are a thing of the past. The new world view is in favor of maintaining the boundaries as they are drawn. The

²⁹² Ibid., 19.

²⁹³ Ibid., 20.

²⁹⁴ Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Second Chance: Three Presidents and the Crisis of American Superpower*, (New York: Basic Books, 2007), 6.

same sentiment is not ingrained in Russian culture. Russia still aims, at a minimum, to regain lost territory. Modern Russia, like imperialist Russia, sees expanding boundaries as expanding power. “For four centuries, Russia has subordinated the well-being of its own population to this relentless, outward thrust threatening all its neighbors. In the Russian mind, the centuries of sacrifice have been transmuted into a mission, partly on behalf of security, partly in the service of a claimed superior Russian morality.”²⁹⁵ Failure to understand and fully grasp this sentiment could result in failed U.S. policies.

In lieu of taking control of new territory, the United States believes that spreading democracy around the globe is the best way to maintain a peaceful world. A liberal democracy is a unique form of government. The explanation can be found in part in the Democratic Peace Theory. Liberal democratic countries are more peaceably disposed to their neighbors.²⁹⁶ They behave differently for several reasons. First, liberal democracies do not seek to alter the balance of power by expanding because stability is extremely important. The best way to protect the things most valued in a liberal democracy—life, liberty, and property—are through peace. Historically, the four most common reasons states go to war are religion, honor, money/resources, and self-defense.²⁹⁷ Liberal democracies rarely initiate war for resources or for honor, and they do not go to war with regard to religion because liberalism fosters tolerance of others and their beliefs. Elected leaders are constrained by the people who endure the negative aspects of war—loss of life, liberty, and property.²⁹⁸ Third, war in the United States no longer seeks to obtain new resources or territory; therefore, war costs more than the rewards that are

²⁹⁵ Henry Kissinger. *Does America Need A Foreign Policy?: Toward a Diplomacy for the 21st Century*, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001), 71.

²⁹⁶ John M. Owen, "How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace," MIT Press. *Int'l Security*, Vol. 19, No. 2 (Fall 1994) , accessed 29-03-2016, <http://www.JSTOR.org/stable/2539197>, 89.

²⁹⁷ Owen, "How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace," 95.

²⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 89.

gained and as a result this motivation of war is contained within a liberal democracy. Finally, self-defense can lead liberal democracies to war, but as history shows, generally only with non-liberal democracies and other forms of government. “Non-democracies may be dangerous because they seek other ends.”²⁹⁹ If anything, late intervention into a necessary conflict or war is more common in a liberal democracy than unnecessary intervention.

The policy of spreading democracy to reduce the risk of war has largely failed leaving a Mid-East ripe for Russian influence. As noted by Zbigniew Brzezinski, former National Security Advisor for President Jimmy Carter, left alone, Russia “could again become a source of tension and occasionally even a security threat to some of its neighbors.”³⁰⁰ As the world has seen they have already become a threat in Georgia and Ukraine. No Western response to these actions will likely result in more of the same.

“Putin’s vision of that future is a backward-looking combination of assertive nationalism, thinly veiled hostility toward America for its victory in the Cold War, and nostalgia for both modernity and super power status.”³⁰¹ It is vital to understand the Russian position for the U.S. to properly construct a useful foreign policy and military strategy with regard to Russia and the rest of the world. In a 2001 article in the Los Angeles Times, a poll revealed that 55% of Russians still view the United States as a serious security threat, but only 8% of Americans still view Russia as a top concern for U.S. national security.³⁰² Illusions that cause Americans to lose sight of real threats can only bring troubling surprises.

²⁹⁹ Ibid., 89.

³⁰⁰ Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Strategic Vision: America and the Crisis of Global Power*, (New York: Basic Books, 2012), 144

³⁰¹ Ibid., 145.

³⁰² Wright, Robin. “East-West Mistrust Hasn’t Crumbled, as Arrest Shows.” In *The Reference Shelf: U.S. Foreign Policy Since the Cold War*, ed. Richard Joseph Stein, (Hackensack, NJ: The H.W. Wilson Company, 2001), 162.

Les Gelb, former president of the Council on Foreign Relations, once said that “[i]f we treat them as enemies they become enemies, especially because Russia, China and North Korea are in transition. By keeping Russia at arm’s length we do not encourage them to cooperate on foreign policy.”³⁰³ This sentiment is reflected in the Obama Administration’s current policy as they work with Russia in Syria and Iran. Though this is a logical policy on the surface it is not clear that this will provide any change in Russian attitudes or provide stability for Russia’s neighbors. Without a deterrent, Russia will continue to threaten its’ neighbors. The U.S. must be seen as not only the peacekeeper, but also as the superpower who will not back away from commitments with its’ allies. Though the transplantation of democracy has not been successful in all instances it should be supported where it has begun to thrive. The U.S. needs a strong and “stable geopolitical balance in Eurasia promoted by a renewed America. America’s failure to pursue an ambitious transcontinental geopolitical vision would likely accelerate the decline of the West and prompt more instability in the East.”³⁰⁴

Brzezinski argues that U.S. success as the guarantor of a renewed West might require embracing “a truly democratizing Russia into the West.”³⁰⁵ I agree that it would be ideal to bring Russia into the West, but they have been fighting this for centuries and despite changes in the government structure they are far from being a democracy. In spite of the federal system of government, most of the power still lies in the head of state. The current president has no intention of falling in line with U.S. constructs. In a statement in March 2014, the Russian President stated: “They [U.S.] have come to believe in their exclusivity and exceptionalism, that

³⁰³ Barber, “Back to the Cold War?,” 96.

³⁰⁴ Brzezinski, *Strategic Vision*, 184.

³⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, 185.

they can decide the destinies of the world, that only they can ever be right.”³⁰⁶ Neither Eastern nor Western, Russia will not willingly come into the West while the U.S. remains in control.

The distorted view of Russia as a “state pursuing traditional national interests” is bound to result in more Russian disregard for the international norms set forth by the West.³⁰⁷ Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, many foreign policy analysts who viewed communism as the basis of all of Russia’s challenges began focusing on the internal changes happening within Russia.³⁰⁸ Following the rule of Stalin, Mikhail Gorbachev introduced a policy of openness and restructuring.³⁰⁹ This shift captivated the foreign policy experts; however, the shift back toward and authoritarian state masquerading as a constitutional federation has largely been ignored. Russia’s totalitarian tendencies were present long before communism appeared as the predominant ideology among the Russian people. Tsars of Russia and its preceding civilizations ruled most often with an iron fist; oppression of the lower classes has been a central theme in Russian history. Also a central theme is a shying away from Western values. A change in the structure of the political system has not changed the power dynamic within the system.

United States foreign policy since the changes began has also largely focused on the internal stability of Russia as the primary component for peace. “As a general proposition, when foreign policy toward Russia is:

identified with shaping Russian domestic politics, the ability to influence the external conduct of the Russian state is weakened. Yet, it is precisely the external actions of Russia that have historically presented the greatest challenge to international stability. Indeed, the Western democracies, by making themselves so much a party to Russia’s

³⁰⁶ Vladimir Putin, “Address by President of the Russian Federation,” Presented to the State Duma deputies, Federation Council members, heads of Russian regions and civil society representatives in the Kremlin, Moscow, Russia, March 2014, <http://eng.kremlin.ru/transcripts/6889>.

³⁰⁷ Kissinger, *Does America Need a New Foreign Policy?*, 73.

³⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 73.

³⁰⁹ The World Factbook, “Russia: Background,” <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/rs.html>.

domestic drama, provided an incentive for Russia's leaders to escape present-day frustrations by evoking visions of a glorious past."³¹⁰

The increasing concern "about Russian weakness, possible state collapse, and loose nuclear material" rather than about any new aggression initiated by Moscow is a problem in the U.S. and the West more broadly.³¹¹

The questions remains: what can the U.S. do to counter the Russian threat and maintain a balance of power that will provide renewed stability within the international system? I propose there are three key steps the United States can and should take. First, the Intelligence Community (IC), foreign policy analysts, and politicians should work to better understand the Russian perspective and especially President Vladimir Putin's motivations. Second, the Intelligence Community should shift the focus of intelligence from a science back to an art and refocus resources toward state actors. Finally, U.S. policymakers should find a way to better utilize the intelligence presented to them. I will discuss each in turn.

A new strategy is needed within the IC and political community on how to evaluate Russian motives and actions. There are two important elements to keep in mind with regard to a new strategy. You must consider both how Russia developed into the state it is today and understand Vladimir Putin as a man and leader. The development of both can allow better prediction of future Russian actions. Former CIA Director Michael Hayden said it best. More important than even throwing more resources toward Russia is combatting the "analytic challenge of understanding Putin's mindset."³¹² For ease of analysis, most international relations theories assume that states are rational actors. This allows for a baseline to be in place when

³¹⁰ Kissinger, *Does America Need a New Foreign Policy?*, 74.

³¹¹ Clifford Gaddy and Michael O'Hanlon, "Toward a "Reaganov" Russia: Russian Security Policy after Putin," *The Washington Quarterly* (Summer 2015): 206, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2015.1064718>.

³¹² "Ex-CIA Chief: Why We Keep Getting Putin Wrong," *The Daily Beast* (March 2, 2014), <http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/03/02/ex-cia-chief-why-we-get-putin-wrong.html>.

trying to predict what a state will do or how they might react to a specific situation. However, it is imperative that the IC stop assuming that Putin is a rational actor and that he will react in a way similar to U.S. leaders put into similar positions. There is a “failure to absorb that Putin does not assess his own interests in a way American’s believe he should.”³¹³ They also fail to see that Putin does not see America as a “friend or partner.”³¹⁴ He sees the U.S. as the superpower stopping Russia from regaining its’ glory. Putin’s personal history is important to consider because his time in the KGB shaped him as a leader. It trained him to be both patient and misleading. This leads to a “foreign policy comparable to that during the tsarist centuries, grounding popular support in a sense of Russian mission seeking to dominate neighbors where they cannot be subjugated.”³¹⁵

It is just as important to view Russia’s foreign policy from inside the Russian perspective which is rooted in centuries of beliefs and a shared national history. “[A]n understanding of the Soviet past is pivotal.”³¹⁶ As Henry Kissinger stated, “[t]he Atlantic allies owe it to Russia to acknowledge that it is undertaking a historic transition [to adjust to the loss of its empire even as it builds historically unfamiliar institutions]...but they do themselves no favor by pretending that Russia has already accomplished a process of reform that is only in its infancy, or by celebrating Russian leaders for qualities they have yet to demonstrate.”³¹⁷ This is a failure of U.S. foreign policy that emerged during the Gorbachev era. When the Soviet Union fell, the West had hoped that “the momentum of freedom and democratization would help to institutionalize civil society

³¹³ Ibid.

³¹⁴ Ibid.

³¹⁵ Kissinger, *Does America Need A Foreign Policy?*, 75.

³¹⁶ The state and civil society in post soviet Russia 155

³¹⁷ Kissinger, *Does America Need A Foreign Policy?*, 78.

as an autonomous sphere.”³¹⁸ However, this did not happen. The minimal institutional changes achieved were reversed after Putin came into power. “The Russians profess to share these values [sanctity of the individual, civil rights, and rule of law in a constitutionally defined democratic state] but their political system does not reflect them.”³¹⁹ Putin’s presidency has been defined by an increase in state influence over the lives of Russian citizens and an increase in military and security service control over his administration.³²⁰ According to Sergei Ljubownikow, “little has changed since the end of the Soviet Union.”³²¹ I argue that a foreign policy based on substantial domestic changes in Russia—as mentioned above—will not produce positive outcomes for the U.S. when, in reality, little has changed. The U.S. is operating on a set of assumptions, but they are not in line with the reality of the Russian state.

It has been noted that “[f]or the last 13 years, the way you got ahead in America’s intelligence services was to specialize in stopping terrorists.”³²² Focusing on Russia and Russian intelligence became old news. The best and brightest have not had incentive to put their skills to use for anything other than terrorism. Reallocating resources and talent within the IC toward Russia is a necessary move. This would provide more insight into what is happening in Russia and provide more data points for analysts to work with. If the intelligence community could provide better analysis it would assist U.S. leaders in making better decisions toward the foreign policy strategy.

According to Robert D. Steele, “we [U.S. IC] are unwisely spending 75 billion dollars a year on global secret technical collection efforts, while spending relatively nothing on

³¹⁸ Sergej Ljubownikow, Jo Crotty, and Peter W. Roders, “The state and civil society in Post-Soviet Russia: The development of a Russian-style civil society,” *Progress in Development Studies* 13, no.2: 157, *Academic Search Complete*, EBSCOhost (accessed February 26, 2016).

³¹⁹ Brzezinski, *Strategic vision*, 133.

³²⁰ Ljubownikow, “The state and civil society,” 160.

³²¹ *Ibid.*, 164.

³²² “Ex-CIA Chief: Why We Keep Getting Putin Wrong,” *The Daily Beast*.

processing, or interagency sharing of data, or on decision support.”³²³ Intelligence has become a scientific process; however, the reliance on technology to find patterns within collected data removes the most important part of the equation—the human element of the analyst who possesses a deep understanding of the region or culture in which they are evaluating. The importance of a cultural and situational understanding cannot be overstated.³²⁴ Intelligence collection might be mostly a science, but analysis must be mostly an art. This also means that there should be a more comprehensive methodology to the intelligence process. It is imperative to realize that nothing in a system is “isolated”—it is all interconnected in some way.³²⁵ Analysis should focus not only the infrastructure, the land, and the individual actors within a system, but on the people and the communities in which they live and exist. Several areas of study are needed to obtain a comprehensive view: geography, anthropology, psychology, economics, religions, demography, criminology, political affairs, and archeology.³²⁶ In his book, Kerry Patton is arguing for the formalization of a new specialty in the intelligence community—sociocultural intelligence (SOCINT) which would include the above specialties in the analysis and collection processes. He argues that SOCINT needs to be formalized so that SOCINT operatives can be trained.³²⁷ However, I would argue that it is more important to equip all operatives and analysts with the training needed to collect and analyze data in a more comprehensive method. Better intelligence products equal better policy.

Finally, I argue that it is important to revitalize the U.S. economy and improve itself domestically to regain the international authority that has diminished in recent years. The best

³²³ Robert D. Steele, “Human Intelligence: All Humans, All Minds, All the Time,” *United States Army War College Press*, PDF e-book, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=991>, xiv.

³²⁴ *Ibid.*, xiii.

³²⁵ Kerry Patton, *Sociocultural Intelligence: A New Discipline in Intelligence Studies*, (New York: Continuum, 2010), 13.

³²⁶ *Ibid.*, 10.

³²⁷ *Ibid.*, 21.

way to do that is for policymakers to gain a greater understanding of world affairs so they can more effectively utilize the intelligence community in all aspects of foreign policy. According to Congressman Will Hurd who is a former CIA officer he was “shocked by the caliber of the policymakers’ understanding of other parts of the world.”³²⁸ Congressman Hurd has a unique perspective as he is the only member of congress to ever serve in the intelligence community.³²⁹ All congressmen have a unique background. There are lawyers, doctors, and farmers. While these professions lend expertise in other necessary policy areas it creates a gap between the knowledge needed to make foreign policy decisions and their understanding of the world. If the IC would work to produce unclassified comprehensive cultural studies for policymakers that would serve as a source of basic familiarity and awareness, I believe it would be beneficial in the decision making process.

³²⁸ William Hurd, “From CIA to Congress: An Interview with U.S. Congressman Will Hurd,” Interview by Vince Houghton, *Spycast*, podcast audio, May 12, 2015, <http://www.spymuseum.org/multimedia/spycast/episode/from-cia-to-congress-an-interview-with-us-congressman-will-hurd/>.

³²⁹ Ibid.

Conclusions

Russia—and other rogue nations—achieve their strategic interests by destabilizing the United States. The U.S. emphasis on the threat of terrorism and the wars in both Iraq and Afghanistan since 2001 has provided Russia with the opportunity to regain regional strength. While the U.S. was distracted, Russia took the time to exert itself in the former Soviet states and to begin building stronger economic relationships outside of the West. Russia also hopes to continue to keep the United States “distracted” in the near future. For example, Russia’s involvement in Syria and Iran are attempts to prolong the “U.S. obsession with Iran.”³³⁰ The Assad regime in Syria is supported by Iran; therefore, a “pro-Iranian Syria” would be in the Russian interest because it would serve as a U.S. distraction from Russian affairs.³³¹ The U.S. must avoid being sidetracked as it allows Russia to evolve into a stronger and more powerful state.

Destabilization of the U.S. government has been a tactic of Russia for decades. In 1948, Whittaker Chambers--one of the most important Communist Defectors--testified before the House Committee on Un-American Activities. At the hearing he stated that he had assisted in organizing a small group of Communist Party members to infiltrate the U.S. government in Washington, D.C.³³² Specifically, he revealed that Alger Hiss--principal advisor to the Secretary of State--was a Soviet spy that had been turning over confidential State Department documents and handwritten notes to the Soviets.³³³ The knowledge of confirmed infiltration allowed the Soviets to not only gain valuable intelligence from inside the U.S. government, but it allowed them to incite fear in the American public and disrupt society even if this was not the original intention. In 1950, Senator Joseph McCarthy claimed he had a list of 205

³³⁰ George Freidman, “Russia’s Strategy,” *Geopolitical Weekly* (April 24, 2012), <https://www.stratfor.com/weekly/russias-strategy>.

³³¹ Ibid.

³³² "Whittaker Chambers," *Encyclopedia of World Biography* 2004, *Encyclopedia.com*. (April 27, 2016), <http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1G2-3404701228.html>.

³³³ Ibid.

people who were known members of the Communist Party that worked in the State Department.³³⁴ During this period in U.S. history, American citizens were unfairly accused and tried for being communist supporters despite a lack of evidence most of the time.³³⁵ McCarthyism reigned for several years and veered the American belief in justice off course. Russia succeeded in disrupting the government and society. They seek to do the same today.

Despite this my research did not reveal any U.S. government agents who were talking or writing about the threat from Russia; except for the new Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff--General Joseph F. Dunford. As previously noted, he outlined his concerns over Russian behavior during his confirmation hearing before the Senate. The news media and those in academia are the only ones raising the issue in a public forum. It is possible that there are government employees who are researching and discussing this threat internally; however, these employees would not have the authority to speak on behalf of the government. Lower level government employees are not allowed to speak on behalf of the government or voice concerns to the public. Administrative employees serve at the pleasure of the President and generally fall in line with the President's policies. The current Administration does not acknowledge that the U.S. has enemies. Instead, they seek only diplomacy with hostile nations.

Further, Russia is being served by the current foreign policy strategy which has failed to see an emerging Russia as a threat. For example, President Obama's Executive Orders "authorizing sanctions on individuals and entities responsible for violating the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine" have placed economic sanctions on Russia to disrupt financing of exports, banks, and energy companies.³³⁶ These have caused damage to the Russian economy by limiting the exportation of oil to the U.S. and EU

³³⁴ "Senator Joseph McCarthy, McCarthyism, and the Witch Hunt," The Cold War Museum, Accessed April 27, 2016, <http://www.coldwar.org/articles/50s/senatorjosephmccarthy.asp>.

³³⁵ Ibid.

³³⁶ United States Department of State. "Ukraine and Russia Sanctions." <http://www.state.gov/e/eb/tfs/spi/ukrainerussia/>.

nations; most of Russia's oil exports go to the West.³³⁷ Though sanctions have had the intended effect of hampering the Russian economy, Putin has retaliated in an attempt to also destabilize the U.S. economy. As mentioned above, Russia initially placed an embargo on imports from several Western nations. Then, he turned to China for financing cooperation. If the two nations continue seeking closer ties they could alter the geopolitical climate. This might also disrupt U.S.-China relations; this would be a disturbing issue for the U.S. since China holds much of the U.S. debt through financing. Russia's lack of reliance on the West for improving their economy would severely limit the usefulness of sanctions as a deterrent for Russian aggression. This would reduce the capacity of the U.S. and Europe to limit Putin's power without a use of force.

Current domestic political initiatives that drain the system and increase federal debt also serve Russia in its race to the top. It is important to revitalize the U.S. economy and improve itself domestically to regain the international authority that has diminished in recent years. Increases in entitlement spending on healthcare, housing, etc. will unsurprisingly reduce spending on the military, intelligence community, and other security related endeavors required to protect the Homeland. The emerging socialist and liberal ideologies that focus on dismantling the business infrastructure of the United States will bankrupt the economy leading to a state that will no longer have the ability to curb aggression or stabilize the international system. Before the U.S. loses its place as the de facto leader of the international community policymakers must take control of both domestic and foreign concerns and "place greater emphasis on other dimensions of national power such as innovation, education, the ability to balance intelligently force and diplomacy, and the quality of political leadership."³³⁸

³³⁷ "How far do EU-US sanctions on Russia go?" *BBC News* (September 15, 2014). <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-28400218>.

³³⁸ Brzezinski, *Strategic vision*, 185.

Appendix A

Preamble to the Constitution of the Russian Federation

We, the multinational people of the Russian Federation, joined by a common destiny on our own land, establishing human rights and freedoms, civic peace and accord, preserving historically developed state unity, proceeding from the universally recognized principles of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, revering the memory of ancestors, who have conveyed to us the love for the native land, belief in goodness and justice, reviving the sovereign statehood of Russia and asserting the inviolability of its democratic basis, seeking to ensure the well-being and prosperity of Russia on the basis of responsibility for our Fatherland to present and future generations, considering ourselves a part of the world community, adopt the CONSTITUTION of the RUSSIAN FEDERATION.³³⁹

³³⁹ Translation by Stephanie A.W. King.

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