

Col. Arthur Kelly
Frankfort, KY

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Q. When did you go to Vietnam?

A. I went in August of 1966.

Q. That was early in the time of Lyndon Johnson's decision to increase American involvement in Vietnam. Did you go with an outfit?

A. No, I had just completed the Marine Corps Command Staff College and I got orders to the 1st Cav division which, at that time was located at Ankle. I took a thirty day leave and spent it in Springfield, KY. I left my family there and I was to go over and take over an artillery battallion. From Springfield I went to California. At that time most of the replacements were going to Vietnam via commercial air. The 1st Cav was operating in the II Corps zone with headquarters at Pleiku and 1st Cav Division was located in Ankle and they were using the Air Force transport planes. We left from an air base in California and landed in Pleiku. When I was in California there was an incident that frightened us a little bit. We were loading up and got on the aircraft and got on the end of the runway and the pilot gave it full throttle and pulled us back in our seats. About the time we should have been taking off he pulled the throttle back and gave it full brakes. We didn't know what was going on. He managed to get it stopped. What had happened was a light had indicated that a lock on the back door was not closed properly. They had had an incident where they were flying troops to Vietnam on this type of aircraft and the back door had come open and when the plane de-pressurized, it had killed a couple of troops. They went back and worked on it awhile and we started off and it did the same thing again. The third time we did get off. As we were crossing the ocean someone came back and told us an aircraft was down. We all thought it was loaded with troops and we were concerned about the news getting back to the families, because they knew we were en route to Vietnam. As a matter of fact I had called Ollie just before I left California.

Q. Do you remember what day this was?

A. I think it was the last of July or thereabouts. I don't remember the exact date.

Q. Was this all officers on the plane together?

A. NO, it was mixed. That's the way replacements went over at that time. There were three artillery battallion commanders on the plane. When we landed at Pleiku I was expecting it to be hot and raining. It was raining but it wasn't hot. As a matter of fact it was so cool I had

to dig down in my duffle bag and get out my field jacket. It was wet, muddy and cold. Not cold, but cool. Of course in the II Corps area, the elevation was higher and the temperature cooler. Much cooler than Saigon or the Delta Area. Most people thought of Vietnam as being hot, muggy and jungle, but most of our nights were cool in the II Corps area, and if you were in the mountains, it was downright cold sometimes. But in any event we landed there, and with all my preparation, which was considerable, you didn't know what to expect as far as the deployment of the troops, the enemy situation in that particular area, how the operations were going to be conducted and how the troops would be dispersed. We got on an army aircraft and flew from Pleiku to Ankle. Pleiku was in the Northwest part of the II Corp area and Ankle is in the center. We flew over a good size mountain and the pilot pointed out where the French had a brigade size unit ambushed and you could still see the tanks that had been destroyed.

Q. Were you familiar with any of the past history of the conflict between the Vietnamese and the French?

A. Yes, not completely. There were a lot of Japs but we had received a lot of information from the Advanced Officers course at Ft. Sill, Oklahoma on insurgency and counter-insurgency. We had read everything that you could get your hands on by the authors on the other side about the conflict.

Q. Were you familiar with the French conduct of the war, their strategy?

A. We had quite a bit of information about it. We were familiar with Dienbienphu, how the decision was made to go in there and what the consequences were. You didn't have detailed information because a lot of it was coming from the other side. You never know what the hell is going on in a closed society like the communists set up. All sorts of things could be going on and you don't know it. All you do know is when there is contact with the outside world and where that information is coming from. I was selected to go to the Marine Corp Staff College and part of the curriculum there was on this type of warfare. What you had in that preparation was study groups and each one was given a famous communist author. And he would be responsible for reading that book and getting the Major ideas out of it and putting them on a card.

Q. Had you read any French accounts?

A. Well yes. There were world-wide authors and when a group got together and exchange information, we were talking about any of the Major authors who written anything about it. Also we would have the person from the state department on that desk, from the major. For example we had the Intelligence Officer in the State Department on that desk and we had them on Southeast Asia or South America and along with them you would have the military commander from that area. You would also have a professor from a university who had a knowledge of the area.

- Q. So you do feel that you had a certain familiarity, first of all with the history of the country, you were acquainted with the culture. Do you feel that you had a good knowledge of those two aspects?
- A. Yes I did. I had quite a bit. Of course you never get enough.
- Q. One of the criticisms, not only of the army but our entire country, was our ignorance of the Vietnamese people and their culture. But you feel in your case, the army was making an effort.
- A. At my level there was a great deal of knowledge that was transmitted. Since then there has been a lot more that has come out that we didn't have at the time.
- Q. Some agree that in many respects the American army repeated the mistakes of the French army and in that respect we didn't learn very much, if anything at all, about the mistakes that led to the French defeat. Are you saying that you did understand the French Military history?
- A. Oh yes. I didn't have that feeling. Militarily, in the II Corp area, we didn't have that much trouble at all. What I was hearing on the news and what I was seeing was two different things. We need to comment on it from letters we received from back home. As far as dealing with counter-insurgency, that's a very difficult theory. The counter-insurgent has the advantage. It's a simple matter for a small unit, and there's different phases of an operation, you have to be aware of this. If I decide to come in and disrupt Franklin County as an insurgent, it's easier for me to destabilize this county. You could come in with a platoon and blow up the bridges, knock out the power, disrupt transportation and power, you put the fear of Jesus in all citizens, and get in the hills and it will take you a long time to find me if I'm organized, supplied and disciplined with this force, and have hiding places. You're not going to do it with the local police force or militia. Especially if you have open terrain. Most of Vietnam was like a National Park, you could go for miles and miles and never see a soul. You could hide a division in those hills. So what I'm saying is, when Ho Chi Minh said, when he refused the demand of the French a reporter asked him how he was going to fight a modern army who also had an air force, he said I have two secret weapons, the jungle and the impatience of the Western mind. And to me that was exactly what happened in Vietnam. When I went to Vietnam in 1966 at that time, I didn't feel any dissent from the American public. My hometown was for me, for winning in Vietnam, There was no particular dissent expressed at that particular time. They felt like we should be there, God bless you and good luck. That was the send-off I got.
- Q. On the strategy used by the Vietnamese, you can answer that by saying we were unfamiliar with the terrain and the language and we had an unreliable ally.
- A. Are you talking about the South Vietnamese?

Q. Yes. Would you agree with that?

A. No. As a matter of fact, I even resent that evaluation. It's overplayed. There were very serious problems with that group of people, the people of South Vietnam. And there were several different groups, the Montagnards, the Chinese, the South Vietnamese and also the large influx coming down from the North. When they came in there it was very disruptive. There was an economic and political crisis. And then you had the insurgents coming in and causing disruption. Given what they had, I was always amazed at what they did. I looked at it from an academic point of view, from a personal point of view, and I looked at it from a military point of view, and from talking with a lot of their high ranking officers.

Q. Let me put it to you this way then. In other words, you think the ARVNS fought well?

A. When you talk of it like this, there are two things that cause a unit to fight well, the state of training and cause. State of training probably more than the cause because you had mercenaries throughout history who fought well and they didn't give a damn about the cause.

Q. Do you think they fought well?

A. Yes. One of the most efficient battles I saw was fought by the ARVIN Unit that fought with us at Bong Song, near Pleiku. And I was with the brigade commander often because he worked with our brigade. In that particular operation, I believe it was before LZ Bird, which was a famous battle in our area. A North Vietnamese regiment attacked one of our landing zones near Quinhon in early 1967. They attacked after midnight and it ran till next morning. In that process there was just a company of our infantry who formed a perimeter around one artillery unit. That's how we operated. That's one of the differences between that and Korea. I'll go on with that battle and I'll tell you about Colonel Long in a minute, the former North Vietnamese who had migrated South and had become a brigade commander. In any event at LZ Bird they had penetrated that perimeter and were about to overrun it and one of the problems was that the weather was bad and visibility was almost zero. But our helicopter pilots came to the rescue and nearby artillery units were providing support. Of course there was no communication with the point so it was up to the helicopters to provide most of the support. They were flying in weather that was dangerous and finally toward the very end, we had a new artillery round that had metal flashettes. It would be like having an artillery round two feet long and four inches around filled with nails, that were designed to fly through the air with the point first. It would go out like a cone. It was either the first or second time that round had been fired in combat. They had overrun

almost all of the artillery positions and one of the artillery captains hollered to get down, I'm going to fire this round. Of course you lowered the tube to ground level. Your target is anything that is moving on the ground, and when he fired this round, at that time there were all kinds of noises from small arms fire, from movement, shouting. When he fired that flashette everything went silent. He told me it was eerie, because it went from all sorts of noises to silence. In any event that stopped the battle. I got there shortly after daylight the next morning and there must have been over two hundred dead North Vietnamese. By the time I got there our boys had been evacuated and there had been about seventy killed and several wounded. They almost overran one when I was there but that was the closest they came. There was a large size force in that area and we knew there was before that happened. We were operating with the ARVN unit that was responsible for the defense of that zone. And of course, you had different type units. You had the local militia, the ARVNS. In this case we were trying to find them and it was difficult to find them. We were deploying forces and conducting air mobile operations. An air mobile operation is a fast moving operation requiring a lot of co-ordination because you have all types of organizations and activities participating. If you want me to I'll give you an example of what I'm talking about.

Q. Are these the Eagle Flights?

A. Eagle Flights were similar, but we didn't call them that.

Q. I'd like to bring you back to where you talked about the insurgency situation, that type of tactic. The American response was the search and destroy tactic. How did you evaluate that? Was it effective? Was it the most effective way the army had to meet this insurgency?

A. In the immediate area of operation, yes. Because it was all we had. In other words, if I'm limited to Frankfort and they're going to attack me, what are you going to do? You're going to search and try to destroy them. What are your choices? That's part of it. The other part is to defend Frankfort. To put a cordon around Frankfort so nobody can penetrate it. To do that takes thousands of people, and you can't hardly do it. Say I wanted to get to a bridge up here. All I have to do is wait till about two o'clock in the morning when everybody is asleep except the people on outpost and with a surprise attack one point. I'm only going to have a platoon, but even though you have a division, I'm going to have you outnumbered at that one point. I'll penetrate that point and get down to that bridge and knock it out and probably get away. I may take some casualties and may not get out. It all depends on how fast I am and what you run into accidentally and how well the operation goes from both views. So I'm saying you can take a small force and create a lot of havoc. You have a big advantage and it doesn't have anything to do with anything else, except maybe numbers and the type of activity that's going on. You don't have well-trained troops on both sides and that's a fact of life. I can do that.

- Q. You're describing very well what the situation was in Vietnam. I wanted to go a little bit beyond that. From your actual experiences of being in Vietnam at that particular time and seeing this type of operation, did you think it was being effective? Was there progress? Did you have any feelings that this was not going to be the successful way in the long run to win this war?
- A. The military people, especially the senior officers, were having trouble with the restraint, understanding that there had to be restraint. There were other dangers and political consideration. Understanding the political considerations that were coming from the people who were supposed to be experts in their area, coming from the government side, the government point of view. We got those. Coming from the military point of view, from the experts in the area. We got those. Coming from the academic community, we usually got the opposite view.
- Q. Are we talking about the strategy?
- A. Yes, talking about strategy. We are aware of the fact that one of the things it takes for insurgency to succeed is for the insurgents to have hope. The other thing is to have discipline. We know about the Marxist system, their organization and discipline. The Marxist can fight. They can get power and maintain it. We know how they do that. We have heard that from people who have come out of Russia, from the Russians mouth. We have read the literature. We have gotten from their academic situations in the classroom and we've discussed it at length. We are not surprised at what the hell is going on is what I'm saying. We're not all-knowing either. I'm not claiming that.
- Q. Is this while you were there?
- A. Yes, this is while I'm there.
- Q. You're an exception. You're a career army officer. You've been in Korea and you see the way the army is fighting the war in Vietnam. What I'm asking you is do you think this is going to win the war?
- A. I know what you're asking. I'm not going to give you a yes or no answer. All you people want to oversimplify the war. You can't do it and the reason you can't do it is because it is a complex thing. We know and I know, and we've talked about it after that with officers of the highest level who were on the intelligence desk. What do guys know, what do we know, we would compare notes, you see. And read everything you could get your hands on about it. When I was there, militarily, our unit was a crack unit. I mean it was a hellacious fighting machine, that first cav unit. And the search and destroy tactics, we could do it. And we were highly successful at it. We had very serious restraints that caused crisis and problems for us. By the time I got there we weren't just fighting the insurgents, we were fighting the organized army of North Vietnam. They were there in force. We talked to them, I talked to them myself. Make no bones

about it, they were there. And they have a sanctuary and I've run in to this sanctuary and I'll give you some examples. The sanctuary is essential for the insurgent. And the sanctuary is the thing that gives you the domino effect. Now the domino is not the thing that gives you the domino effect that people talk about. Where you flip a domino and they all go down immediately. It's a protected thing. The insurgent has to have that area. You can't have thousands of insurgents and the North Vietnamese army in there without an area to store a lot of bullets and beans. You're talking about big activities and you can't hide those things. We ran into this several times. I got there one year after the major infiltration, when the war had changed. The public wasn't aware of that and a lot of them thought the military was lying about it.

Q. About what?

A. About the nature of the change in the Vietnam war at that time.

Q. You're saying that the Americans were restrained from attacking the sources and depots of supplies of the North Vietnam?

A. That's just part of it.

Q. Would this be in Cambodia?

A. In the immediate outlying areas. It might be Laos or Cambodia.

Q. What were some of the other restraints?

A. Let me go on with that restraint, that haven area they had. They also had that area to get back to, to regroup, refit and replenish. The first major battle that the First Air Cav got into was shortly after they got there in 1965. The North Vietnamese thought we would go in there and take them on. So they massed their forces and the First Cav came running. And to make a long story short, with the air mobile concept the First Cav was able to move their forces en mass, attack one one of their regimental forces and destroy it then move to another one and another one before they could mass their forces together so they would have enough combat power to destroy an American division. And in that process they went right across the border, this happened right on the Cambodian border. They went across the border and refitted in time and came back.

Q. The americans are chasing them, they run across the border and the Americans stop. There's a restraint.

A. Right. That's a major restraint.

- Q. Of course you know, if I could lead you on this way, another restraint was the supplies that the North Vietnamese were receiving from China and the Soviet Union. And the restraint there was that the American military were forbidden to go into North Vietnam and seal off, first of all the Chinese border and also close down Haiphong Harbor where a lot of supplies came in. That's another restraint, isn't it?
- A. Yes. I'm going to tell you how I felt, how the emotions effected me. You're sitting at a landing zone called Oasis and you're only ten to fifteen miles from the border. And intelligence builds up, you're getting information they're massing up their division and that they're going to attack somewhere in this area. But one night's march from where you are sitting, they are sitting over there safe. And you're concerned about yourself, supporting the infantry, your artillery unit, the men's welfare, about their security. And you are thinking that those bastards are going to come across that border and wipe us out. We were searching for them in that area, which was about the size of three counties. In one operation right on the border, we had air assaulted into position. We had a platoon size force and the North Vietnamese swept across that border and almost wiped them out. We called in artillery support and that's all that saved them. And the NVA go back across that border. And we have rules of engagement and one of them is that you can't pursue them across the border with forces. You can with fire support. I was the fire support co-ordinator for the brigade, that was one of my additional duties. So I was working with the Brigade Commander, the S-3 and the Air Force. The commander wanted to pursue them with fire across that border. We didn't have the authority to do it at that level so I had to call II Corps to get permission. But they did give us permission and I directed fire over the border. I can't see them but I fire where I think they are. I'm firing eight inch artillery, 105 howitzers and 155's. And I'm firing a lot. You're limited to your range and I suppose we were firing about a mile in there, maybe less.
- Q. You were in charge of how many?
- A. At that particular time I had my own battalion plus about two more in reinforcement. At that time I'm thinking that our troops are right down there on the border and they're bringing them out in ponchos. You're aware that they can run across that border and kill you and then run back. That sanctuary gives them two things, it gives them that logistical base, a place to refit, and safety. I can pursue them with fire just for a short period of time. They are back home and safe. So, another thing an insurgent has to have is hope because it's going to be a long, painful, dangerous ordeal for the, . That was one of the things they were getting eventually from us that hurt us. Any protest, and they were keenly aware of it. They would have plans to start an offensive on a certain date, and some political incident would happen in the United States and they would change their plans. They were getting the conservation. And they were getting hope from that. But one of the biggest things, and I understood why the restraints were in there, I wouldn't even say that I wouldn't agree with it.

Q. Why did we restrain our troops?

A. Your fear of expanding the war. You're trying to limit the war. You don't know what the Chinese attitude is going to be or what they are going to do. This is no time to be fighting the Chinese on the Mainland of China.

Q. You understood this?

A. Yes. From a military point of view you don't need to be doing this. As it turns out I don't think the Chinese were ready. It was probably like Korea if we had crossed a certain line it might have created a reaction. We made some big mistakes that we didn't have to make, that wouldn't have endangered that expansion. And I'm pretty keenly aware of it and I'll give you an example. We made it known for political purposes that we were not going to invade North Vietnam. I think it was more for political purposes than to assure China. We had no business doing that because that released all their forces in the North to infiltrate to the South, with some limitations. Because when they came down the Ho Chi Minh trail we did bomb the hell out of them. They did take some casualties.

Q. This was a mistake?

A. It was a mistake to tell them that because we felt those forces immediately. They were coming down there in droves. Now, if we don't tell them. . .

Q. What do you mean by "Tell them?"

A. You say we're not going to invade North Vietnam. I'm the commander of North Vietnam. I've got to look at the military situation and evaluate it and I've got to say what is the threat and what is the capability of the other guy and what do I have. If I have a major border that I've got to have forces there to defend in the event of an amphibious assault, I've got to have a large force there to defend against this threat.

Q. That's a mistake. You put this decision against the assessment not to cross this border. You're saying the reason we did all this was this China threat. How could you reconcile the two of them, restraint so as not to enlarge the war along with threats to invade the North?

A. If you should invade and it becomes clear that you intend to destroy North Vietnam's fighting force and occupy the entire area, that's another thing that would require a response from the other side, China and Russia. That's a different ballgame from the fact that you may do it. In other words, you don't have to respond with whether or not you may or may not do it until the event occurs. Until it becomes a threat or a reality. Then you have to do something. When we said we're not going in there it freed their combat forces and

made a big change in their combat power in the south. I think it was mostly political.

Q. What made it political?

A. The impatience of the Western mind beginning to mobilize a political force to threaten the person in power. Some of their decisions were made to address the political ramifications. And in that process there were two problems for the military. It made us fight more people and it gave them hope.

Q. I'm not disagreeing. I think that it's a valid point that our forces had to fight under severe handicaps. Every war is political, what's in the back of mind, and you might be thinking the same thing, is that there was the American leaders and the military for that matter, were conditioned to think that the Chinese might come across that border because you remember what happened when MacArthur sent his forces up to the Yalu. And there had been his promise that the Chinese would not come into the war and they did. I think that there was a determination by the American government that they didn't want to repeat that mistake.

A. That's valid. I don't have any problem with that. It's a chess game. With hindsight I think we could have gone.

Q. You're saying you would have taken the gamble?

A. I think on the sanctuaries on the border. And we did later on.

Q. I think what you are saying is a clear explanation of the frustration that was generated in American military leaders that they're having to fight these wars under restraints. Number one the Cambodian sanctuaries and number two, no American forces can cross over into North Vietnam. That was the rules of the game that we set for ourselves which obviously favored the enemies tactics. A lot of the men that were in Vietnam, the grunt, the GI, complain. He resented the restraints the same way his officers did. Somehow or other we came to fight a war that put him under these handicaps and he came to resent it. They felt a tremendous amount of frustration.

A. When I was there the morale of our fighting forces was very high. The efficiency of the military operations was exceedingly good, I'll give you some examples, and I'm speaking of one period of history August 1966-August 1977. At that time, let me just give you an example of what happened to me, and some of the things that were said and done. I go into Pleiku, An khe. An khe is the biggest heli-pad in the world at that time. There were 400 or more helicopters in that area

then, it's a circular area, it's a large area. It's kind of like a city. It has a division force in it, it has quonsut huts and bunkers. It's nice, it has clubs for the men and the officers. But we're not in there most of the time, we're out in the jungles. But that's our base.

It's kind of like wholesale as far as logistics are concerned. Things come in there first and then they send them to us out in the field. We're operating in an area as big as several Kentucky counties. We're operating on the Cambodian border and we're operating on the China coast in between that area. We may be on the China coast one day and the Cambodian border the next. I've done that. I come in as a new bataillion commander and I'm skilled in several areas. I'm skilled as an artilleryman, I'm skilled as an artillery commander. I'm skilled as a fire-support co-ordinator, I'm skilled in tactics at the small unit level and at the major unit area. I've had all that training and schooling. I've fired a lot of artillery rounds so I understand that. But this air mobile thing is new to me. So to acquaint me and the new bataillion commanders, this is an unfortunate thing of course this rotation, because we almost got a new division when I came in there. It's hard to fathom that big.

Tape II
Side 1

- A. When you're fighting with spears it's one kind of formation, when the machine guns came in it was one kind of formation. In fighting with thi Indians there were different formations. Korea was essentially a World War II type action where you were roped down and where you moved by vehicle and foot and where there was generally speaking but not always, and the situation was different there so you have to be careful how you speak for Korea in totality. For when they first invaded there we put a task force Smith there, it was just a battalion and they were facing the whole North Vietnam army. We had one of them there at the University that was captured, the geography teacher, John Gardner. For them, they're out there all alone in an island and then you had the cusan perimeter and at that time the state of the training of the army was almost zero because they'd demoblized and equipment was in bad shape.
- Q. But you could look at a map of Korea that you see in History books now and there would be the Cusan perimeter, then came the landings along with the in-run by MacArthur and then you'd see another map and there the American forces had moved up the Korean peninusla back to capture _____, so that becomes the front line. So you can see three or four maps that would be a typical history story of the Korean war, then the line would move up and up until it finally got to the yellow river and then eventually there would be the counter-attacking.

- A. Well not quite. I was trying to use that to make a point, the point is that the landing, the front eventually collapsed. The North Vietnamese began to get out of there and not in good order. So then there was a pursuit. There was a pursuit by the tent corp, by the eighty army and by the Rock Corps and in that process when they passed the forty-eighth parallel there was not a continuous run across the peninsula.
- Q. Yes, but there was a front.
- A. No, some of those maps and newspapers won't tell you the story, all I'm saying is that you'd have one arm going up one coast and one going up another and there would not be any forces going in between them. There'd be voids and gaps. And when the Chinese hit they were in between some of those forces, they were south of some of those forces and there were some perimeters being formed in the Northern area. So, there wasn't a continuous front across but the difference was the force was there and you could see them and you were in contact with them. I mean not initially, the Chinese were there a long time before we came in contact with them. But there was a front and it was continuous. It would stay from day to day, the contacts in Vietnam were sporadic and non-continuous. So, that's a big difference and the second big difference was that you moved mostly, you were much more mobile in Vietnam. The targets were fleeting, the enemy was in and out.
- Q. In Korea you knew who were the good Koreans, who were the bad Koreans. You knew who was on your side, you could depend on the Korean army that was fighting with you to defend their country, which you couldn't really do in Vietnam.
- A. Eventually in Vietnam there was a force coming down there just like there was. It was a force moving in mass at the very end.
- Q. I've never seen any maps of the fighting of the Vietnam war which would say, now here the area at this particular point when Colonel Kelly moves in in 1966 and this is what we defended and a year later this is what we defended.
- A. That's the difference in the wars.
- Q. Yes, that is a difference. Now, here's the question, do you think that the charge is true that it's typical of the Generals to fight the war they're in the way they had fought the previous war?
- A. No, I don't.
- Q. You do know, for example, that that's the way the French were anticipating fighting World War I. They remembered the Franco-Russian war and the effectiveness of the Cavalry and so forth and they didn't take into

account , in World War I, the new technology of the machine guns and the tanks and so forth. So, they were slow. Then when World War II comes along you find the French Army not able to respond to the new tactics of the Germans so they're fighting world war I instead of World War II. It's generally thought, by the critics anyway, and I just want to get your reaction to it, that the American command was using the tactics of the Korean war in attempting to fight the Vietnam war.

A. No, and not only that they knew the difference. As far as the way those people were operating, I mean we knew the difference before we went in there and it doesn't matter how you're fighting, if you're fighting Indians with bow and arrows or what you're fighting, eventually when the contact comes it's maneuvering fire and it's who has the most at the point of contact at the critical time and how you get there and if you're at the right place, is part of the military mission and task.

Q. Some have said that if we'd had more . . .

A. Well, who said that?

Q. Well, I'll give you all kinds of sources of that. I guess the major source that I find most credible is the book by Colonel Harry Summers Called _____ Strategy and that's the impression I have received from reading his book.

A. His is a good book, I've read it some.

Q. Yes. He may not be putting it quite as bluntly as I have but he seemed to feel that maybe we needed different command leadership at the top, that specifically West Morlen was wedded to this search and destroy strategy, progress would be determined by body count and that he persisted in this long after it was realized that this was not effective.

A. So, what did he say the choices were? The choices were expanding the war essentially.

Q. Okay, the military knew what the constraints were and we've gone over all of those and Summers says okay we've got to work on the restraints. Now of course he does not attempt to offer what he thinks we should have done as much as what he goes over, as a historian is, what was the command and the politicians and the military in the administration, what were they recommending and the alternative which was not followed out was some kind of, like the DMZ line the strategy would have been effective if there had been a defense line across all of South Vietnam held by the Americans and then the ARVN would be turned loose to destroy the Viet Cong.

A. I looked at it hard, the . They had a contract together, research they had sociologist, It was in Columbus, a real famous place, they invented the Xerox. They're still operating. Some guy left them a fortune for a trust fund. They gathered information from all sources, compiled, consolidated, analyzed and we had access to it and I went to it when I was at Limited World Laboratories. At Limited World Laboratory I was studying from a technical point of view -- from the technical problems of solving it. And whether it was storing rice or wheat or even from an economic point of view to some extent and we had experts selected from all disciplines. The sociologist, the human behavioralist expert, the biologist, the chemist, the physicist, optics, engineering fields covered.

Q. What was their objective?

A. Their objective was to solve the technical problems, quickly.

Q. Of the search and destroy?

A. Of Vietnam, not search and destroy.

Q. But they had to apply this to that?

A. Yes, that was part of it.

Q You say that was the major?

A. Yes that was probably most of it. All I'm saying is they looked at the line and John, from a tactless point of view it's like I'll give you two divisions and if you can keep me from coming into Frankfurt I'll buy you a steak dinner. You can't do it.

Q. Apparently that's what they said at the time and one of those that proposed it was Macnamara.

A. I know it. And it would also be expensive today.

Q. It couldn't have been more expensive could it than what they were doing?

A. Oh yes.

Q. Well, the cost in terms of your results . . .

A. Well, if it was a hundred percent fine, stick it across there and pay for it, but I'll guarantee you you couldn't do it and not only that you had the Cambodian thing, in other words if you could have extended it over . . .

- Q. All you want to do is keep them out of the South.
- A. That's what I'm telling you, you've got a whole coastline John.
- Q. Well see you would have cut off that Hoo Chi Minh trail.
- A. No, you wouldn't. If you cut off the Hoo Chi Minh trail they'd move it to the next one. You can't do it, I mean you couldn't box that thing in. You couldn't put a wall like the wall around China.
- Q. Well, it's not quite the same.
- A. You couldn't it, you still can't do it. Now I tell you one thing, they'd have a lot more trouble trying to operate in the jungle now then they did then, with the technology we have.
- Q. To move large numbers of North Vietnamese across the lines, you know company strength . . .
- A. They don't move in company strength. They infiltrate. You know, you dig under it John, you just dig a tunnel, you know it takes you forever to do it and you don't care that it takes forever. You just keep digging and digging and digging.
- Q. One of the strengths of this strategy we're talking about is that it would have given the American army a mission, it would have also given the ARVN a clear mission and they would have been able to perform a lot better. This is an argument now, obviously they knew the language, they knew who the enemy was and would have been able to identify and move against them more effectively than the Americans ever could. So they would have had the sense then of defending territory, or defending their own land and probably would have been more motivated than the way it turned out.
- A. I'll tell you John, in South America today, that sanctuary is what we're going to get with Nicaragua and El Salvador, and that's going to give them the power to move it, North and South, and it will be moved. And it won't be done over night. It'll be protracted, and if it isn't dealt with, then eventually you're going to have a mass movement of people into North America and it's going to be a serious crisis for us.
- Q. And to you this is one of the lessons of Vietnam?
- A. That's the lesson. The lesson of Vietnam is that the domino theory is not a precise enough definition, but the things that it takes. First of all it takes the doctrine that offers a change and hopefully betterment and a discipline and then it takes forces, and it takes in the evolution of this force business, money and support from large

Nations that have to have resources to that extent. You have to Stockpile the stuff, you have to have the base, the base is critical and when you get the base and you get the sanctuary and you have the discipline and you have the gun, then you can create havoc, destabilization. In the destabilization part of the mission the goal is to get a reaction that causes people to turn against the people that are there and in that process too, corruption becomes more and more acute. You always have corruption in any government because of the corruptible nature of man. So with that destabilization you get more corruption, and you get a turning of the heads away from the major problems. They get to concentrating on the response. In other words the doctrine is to get a response that causes people to go out and have or whatever and this creates lack of confidence of the people in power, of protecting them and also fear of them, eventually. So, it's sort of a ram robin, it's a very serious thing, it wouldn't be serious if communism was a good idea, if democracy was not a good idea, if liberty and freedom were not important things it would not make any difference. But because it is then it's a crisis. Have you read this last book written about China called Broken Earth, the author was a sociologist on the early exchange that got to go to China and he was one of the few, if not the only one, that got to go out into a province and operate without being directed as to where he could go, without being limited to where he could go. In 1980-91. He does a good job of painting the evils of living under that system, one of the big things of course that you're getting out of it is you're getting a bigger bureaucracy. It practically controls everything in your life. You can have two kids and after that you're told to have an abortion and on and on. You want to get your drivers license you have to go to three or four different places and you have to pay some people. Corruption becomes more rampant there than it is in a democracy because you have more people influenced.

- Q. There may be some disagreement on whether those that we're supposed to be defending in Vietnam or El Salvador believe themselves to be a democracy. I have a lot of questions about that. But I think the basic point you're making is that it is a threat. We don't want communism in the Western Hemisphere. I wanted to come back to the Vietnam experience once more and say to you that I've heard constantly the viewpoint of soldiers who served in Vietnam that the reason we lost was the politicians wouldn't let the Generals fight the war.
- A. Well that's an oversimplification and you can't do that anyway.
- Q. Then why is it that they believe this? When you say it's an oversimplification you're saying that these people have a simple understanding of what you and I would consider a very complex matter, why are they persistent in believing in this oversimplification. I hear this constantly. Who's to blame?

A. Well first of all people feel bad if there's a failure, that's one of the problems.

Q. Well, I'm talking about the men who fought in Vietnam.

A. Well, you're going to get a reaction, and then the second thing was-- and the threat continues and it moves and it grows.

Q. What amazes me is the experiences of Vietnam did not destroy their faith in the military. They just felt that the military as a whole was frustrated by the politicians that if they had to do it over again, many of them say they'd do it and many of them are still in the reserves, they're still very patriotic and they have not lost their faith in the military. So, in looking for an explanation of why we lost they blame the politicians. But as you say it's oversimplified.

A. I think with some accuracy you can say that the political pressures put on the administration and the response to that political pressure was a response that caused some decisions to be made that should not have been made in hindsight, that's rather easy to see.

Q. What specifically are you talking about?

A. Well to bomb or not bomb is an example.

Q. And all the rest of the restraints. Can I put it to you this way. This is Summers position and as an army officer he should have some credibility, and he says that Johnson ran the war, that unlike the Korean war, unlike World War II, where there was continual almost daily communication between General Marshall and Roosevelt on the military strategy of the war, that Roosevelt was listening to the Generals. It's a historical fact that Roosevelt was close to Marshall. He made him his secretary of state. So in many ways, though the president makes the final decision he's seeing Marshall and Admiral King and all the rest of the commands on a daily basis and the same with Truman and the Korean war. However the access that the American Generals, West Morlen, the joint chief of staff and all the rest of them had with Johnson was occasional. This was a war run by the civilians. There was what they called the Tuesday Cabinet meeting, and very often the Generals weren't even invited to the meetings or if they had advice--ment to give it would be given to Macnamara or somebody on that level who would then present their views, but they never really had the opportunity to run the war. Now in a certain way when you stop to think of that argument, I think the American GI is right in blaming it on the politicians. And if the Generals had . . .

A. It's kind of like a football game though.

Q. Well, we're seeking for answers, right? So, maybe it's not quite oversimplified.

A. I would say there is an element of truth in there but I would be hesitant to turn it over to the military.

Q. I'm not going to that extreme. The argument here is more co-ordination more direct contact. Such as, For example, Reagan today . . .

A. That was one of the points I was trying to make awhile ago, that political pressure was primary, and I can't say with absolute assurance that this is so, but from what you can read and what you can gather and what you can discern and infer, political forces were causing military decisions on both sides . . .

Q. What do you mean both sides?

A. The communist, the North Vietnamese. In other words they were responding to these political forces there and General Story talked about that to some length, I can't remember the specifics.

Q. What point are you wanting to make

A. The point, the thing occurring in the United States, a demonstration or something, causing plans to be changed by the communist, in order to maximize political support in the United States against the war.

Q. I would like to keep the focus, in this part of the conversation, on the point that I'm making that Roosevelt and the Generals got along fine, Truman and the Generals, Reagan sees this General Vessey everyday.

A. Truman and the Generals didn't get along fine either.

Q. But you know it is true that Johnson fought this war, that he made the strategy, he was the one who put those targets on there and said this is what you do. He made all the decisions.

A. Yes, more so that the . . .

Q. To the extreme that he all but had the Generals shu out.

A. Yes and perhaps to the extreme. On the other hand too, in the Korean war, you know Bradley let McArthur, when he was the chairman of the joint chief of staff, have more freedom than he in hindsight would have given him and regretted it. And MacArthur made some serious tactical errors.

Q. Some very serious ones, which goes to show you that if you let a General go unbridled . . .

A. After the highly successful he regretted that he didn't exercise more control. However he appreciated while he was in Europe that Marshall wasn't telling him how to manage the battlefield so there is some need for reorganization in the government to account for the new problems and dangers that are there because of

the nuclear capability and because of the guerrilla war.

- Q. Do you know what Summer says? If this was the situation with the Generals being shut out, why didn't the Generals protest, why didn't they, if they knew that what Johnson was doing, was not going to win the war, why didn't they resign? Now, this is Summers. That's their responsibility, this is the high command, this is the West Morlen and that group. The joint chief of staff. That's an interesting point isn't it.
- A. To an extent but who had a clearcut idea on how to solve a problem.
- Q. Well Johnson thought he did.
- A. No, he didn't. I don't think so.
- Q. Well what was the problem, to prevent the communist from taking over South Vietnam. Of course what Johnson was doing in some aspects was repeating the mistakes of Truman or what turns out to be the mistakes of Truman in the Korean war, that the American people aren't going to accept committed war. This holding the line business just does not go down. Truman leaves in 1953, he was very unpopular, people had turned against the war, Eisenhower says, I'll go to Korea . . .

Tape II
Side 2

- A. Well their hooks are on the ground and I'm concerned that they're going to be damaged and cut off that vital resource so I made the decision. On the artillery I've got three choices, leave it on the ground, fire it up or try to blow it up and I do have maybe an engineer section there that has the skills to do it. But it's dangerous and it's hard to do so I made the decision to fire it up and I fire it out at the maximum rate of fire and get it out of there in short order. I make arrangements to land at LZ Oasis and the meantime sort of a Typhon comes through there and water and rain is everywhere. This came all of a sudden, it had been a pretty sunshiny day. It's a downpour--monsoon. Before it comes the clouds fill up and it's almost dark. I'm looking around at that and I'm concerned about that and then I sent , I said go find us a place to go. We decided to go into LZ Oasis. I told him to find us an artillery position and to make arrangements at the other end to get them in as they come. From this end I was getting them out, heading them back that way and he's getting them in .
- Q. Who was this getting them in?
- A. My S-3. Well actually, not the S-3 at that time. I got another unit from another battalion to do it. My S-3 is still at the rear, he's still at the rendezvous area. I got a call from him, he's supposed to be coming in there and he says, you know a funny thing happened, Just

as the hooks came in to pick us up, they turned around and took off. In other words you move in an _____ as you go on these things. You have a jump control fire direction center and I went in with the jump control center and my operations officer stayed back near Pleiku in that general area, where we started from and they were supposed to pick him up and bring him into that area where I'd gone forward. And he should have been in there pretty soon to help co-ordinate all these other activities.

- Q. In this LZ Oasis area you were going to, right? The picture I see then, is this, it's about six o'clock and it's starting to rain heavily and darkness is coming on and all the hook's are on the ground and you're firing off artillery to get rid of the shells and then you're getting ready to pull out and then this guy, your S-3 calls you and what did he tell you?
- A. He tells me a funny thing happened, just as the hooks were coming in they turned around and took off. What they were doing was responding to my order to get me some hooks and he was getting them wherever he could get them and he took them from the one's that were scheduled to pick up my S-3.
- Q. So that's why he wasn't with you, because the hooks never landed to pick him up because your orders were to come to you.
- A. My orders were to get me some hooks, I didn't know where he was going to get them but he got some of them from me, some not all. Some of them came from other places too. That left out a vital part of my organization.
- Q. Now where should he have been?
- A. He would have been coming in there with me and that would have been putting more people in there to co-ordinate the fire and the continuation of the assault into the general area.
- Q. Do you remember this fellow, this S-3?
- A. No, because he left shortly thereafter. He was a good one. So then, as I get the last one down in the next area it's dark and I'm concerned about getting out of there before it gets dark. Now later on I do get to where we can move at night because we have a contingency where we might have to go out and reinforce one of those little special forces defensive zones area or fortress. But at this time I never thought about it and it is dangerous. Watching those polots come in there, the skill that they had to get in those formations and get in that tight, it was impressive. And also the skills that those artillery men operated in getting all those things done was mind boggling. By darkness we were in the other position and when you get in there you've got to try to unsort things and find out what is going on. At that time there was a lot of firing going on around that LZ, on the perimeter.

Machine guns going off, and pings and artillery were being fired. At this time the co-ordination of the fire is with the other Brigade and I'm just primarily getting my unit in. But in this process also, my S-3 says to me, and I need him, I've got plans and I don't know what's going to happen the next minute and it's a vital part of my operation to provide support, and he says to me, what'll I do, he'd been there awhile and I said what do you suggest, and he said I think we can make it by a road movement. You see, it's not a combat formation, it's mostly a headquarters and I'm very concerned about ambush and I said do you know the roads, are you familiar with them. He said, yes. Do you know the general situation between here and there? He said, I think so. I think we can do it.

Q. How many people is he going to have with him?

A. Oh, he's going to have thirty. He said I recommend that we move by road. I am at a point of decision, there's danger, there's danger of not getting him where he ought to be, there's also danger of leading him out there because it's getting down to where he's about the only thing left there, there's not much security left for him at that end. And it's very dangerous, moving him on the road. There is an element of surprise, they don't expect you, you could just luckily, haphazardly you might drive right by them before they realize you're going. But, if you happen to be moving as you go there, they may take it as a target opportunity and engage it or they might be afraid of it and keep moving. So, I'd just got through doing that with the ammunition, so I said move it. Well the next day the Brigade commander, the division artillery commander came to see me. They'd talked about it at higher levels. They said, Kelly shot up all the ammunition and he moved the force on the road. Dangerous.

Q. They were critical, they didn't like what you did?

A. Well, he came to find out, of course their heads are all turned the other way. He walks up to me and he said, why did you shoot up all the ammunition. I said, well, here's the situation. Three choices, shoot it, leave it, or try to destroy it and maybe not get it done, and at some risk to the engineers being the last to come out and with the problem of co-ordinating it without shooting down our helicopters or something else. Without shooting up our own forces. I did control that see, and he said that's the right decision, I'd have done the same thing myself. Then he said how did you move your forces on the road. I said same explanation I just gave you. He said, risk but right.

Q. It did work then? They did make it?

A. Yes. We were in fighting formation and ready to provide support.

Q. What you're also saying is this Colonel really had control of the situation, he knew what was going on all the time.

A. He knew what was going on in the other area primarily.

Q. But somebody was giving him this information about your decision?

A. Oh yes. Those things are getting around.

Q. Well, how did it get around?

A. Well, they have _____ people out there and they go back in and have a tactical operations center and everything comes into that information center.

Q. Did you have to report your decision? You made two decisions, one on this ammunition and one on this S-3, so how did that get out to them? You didn't tell them did you?

A. No, I was too busy. He got it before I reported it. But like I say, there are _____ people out there and they report back to their commanders and these commanders and staff officers, especially staff officers primarily, go into the tactical operations center and all the heads are coming together and communications are coming from everywhere.

Q. There's somebody in your group who's reporting this?

A. Yes, it's probably been reported to several people and they're wondering about it. Because they knew I was out there and they knew I had some problems and they were probably wondering how I was doing. But their heads were all turned to the live target, so to speak.

Q. So now you're in this new landing zone.

A. Now I'm in there and that's the way I started off.

Q. And this was your birthday?

A. That was my birthday and also my first day in combat.

Q. How old were you then?

A. That was in 1966 and I was born in 1925, so I was forty-one.

Q. You won't forget that birthday. Tell me did you do this type operation any number of times?

A. We never had a change of direction while in air. We changed from the East Coast to the West Coast and from the West Coast to the East Coast and to where you were supporting extractions and lifting out and depopulating, taking out your combat power and moving it over to another force.

Q. You were there for a year. How often did you do that?

A. Constnatly, almost. We were out in the operations almost all the time.

Q. Chasing the enemy then?

A. Yes. Brigades would rotate in and go back to _____ and be responsible for the defense of that.

Q. How effective do you think that all of that was, when you look back on it now? What effect did this have on the course of the war. You're chasing the enemy, you make your contact, there is some fighting. Does this give you a sense of just accomplishment. You're defeating the enemy, you're wearing him down or what? Is that the way you felt about it?

A. Well, you can't put it in prospective at that particular point in time. As far as going in that _____ and taking out that NV force we could do it and did it, did it effeciently. As a matter of fact there was a New Zealand Lieutenant Colonel that was observing higher operation at Paul Revere II. After it was over the Brigade had gone bace to Omkei and he was a guest at the officers mess. He was a very professional military person, had been through all the appropriate schools and so forth and he was leaving and we were syaing goodbye to him, he'd kind of been to different headquarters out in our area and he got up and said I want to tell you that this has been a very enlightening experience for me and he said the respect that I have for that unit, the first CAV division, can't be put into words, he said I can't imagine a training base that's so effective that you can train all these specialties, throw them together as you all did and jump off on a major military operation with that precision.

Q. He was tremendously impressed wasn't he?

A. He was impressed, I was too.

Q. What did you get our of it. Did you gain control over anymore territory or did you think that you had killed a lot of the enemy and that was warranted, what you did?

A. If he came into an area and threatened an are we could destroy him and get him out, he'd come back. Now we're not going to know to what extent he's going to be able to reinforce and for how long.

Q. So you go after him, you hit him, he leaves?

A. Well, in many cases he'd go across, depends on where he was. You see John, you have to be very careful about the way you speak for the whole thing.

- Q. Well you're here, you're chasing them down and you handle that artillery and those men in this magnificent impressive way, just beyond tremendous adverse conditions of the weather and communication. The tremendous skill of the pilots and the whole thing. It's a great display of American . . .
- A. Well, the fighting machine was there. And the air mobile concept was very effective.
- Q. So, what do you wind up with at the end of the year?
- A. At the end of the year, from the time the first Cav forces had gone in there originally a lot of those forces had been taken out of there and were across the border. So that these little villages were reasonably secure and they could go on about their business. There were some insurgencies, small unit things in that general group population where they might come out at night and fight. But generally speaking you'd see people out in the fields working, working their crops, harvesting their crops, which would be subject to being in danger by either side coming in and out or tangling in their midst.
- Q. Did you think at the end of your year that we were going to win the war?
- A. No, I didn't feel like . . .
- Q. That there was something else to be done?
- A. Yes I did. Their capability to get out and get back, to replenish and refurbish was significant.
- Q. You and others talk about this basically not working despite how efficient the army was. Was there any talk at all about changing the tactics among your fellow officers, did they realize that something wasn't working well here or what?
- A. John not that much at that time in history.
- Q. You were still optimistic, generally, that it was going to work out?
- A. Yes, at that level the division had an immediate job. It was to protect those people primarily from those larger forces, NVA forces, and it was very difficult to do. Now progress was being made on how to use technical means to locate them and I got into that at Limited World Laboratory. It was one of the most complex technical problems facing our Nation as a scientist told me at Limited World Laboratories, which I worked there in the Research Development Activity. I had a job trying to deal technically with those problems in dealing with a counter-insurgency or an insurgency, The purpose --they brought the best minds they could from the army and the science community of the civil service.

- Q. Well what do you think after your experience, either then or since, should have been done to change the tactics that could have won the War? I mean given the restraints, not change the mistakes, not change going after the sanctuary, but the way you were battlefield, what would you have done?
- A. Search and destroy was the best thing you had at the moment to clear the area of hostile forces, that's the only thing you had.
- Q. It was not clearing the enemy.
- A. It wasn't completely effective. I'm saying to you there is a technological problem of locating a dug-in force camouflaged in the jungle, that is, as a scientist told me, more complex than putting a person on the moon by far. We tried several techniques, we tried electronics, laser beams, pressure, chemical, on and on. I'm talking about means of finding out where these guys are. So what you had was a company formation moving through the jungle and usually the NVA decided when they were going to engage them and it would be quite often in an L-shaped formation.
- Q. So the initiative was with the enemy?
- A. Yes, and we'd be walking and we'd go right into that thing and they'd engage us and there'd be heavy casualties there initially. I've got a paper on it that explains it in some detail and I'll try to get that for you. Even though they were dug in and would surprise our company, the company essentially ended up being a target acquisition force.
- Q. What does that mean?
- A. It means locating the enemy, finding him. We had artillery going with them so to speak, I mean artillery fires, support. A lot of times we'd have the artillery just kind of leaking down in front of them, just a hundred or two hundred yards in front of them as they moved. So if they got hit we'd have _____ . For example, one of the company commanders I thought a lot of had gotten caught in that situation and I don't want him to get killed or hurt and I'm right there over top of him observing what's going on and listening to it on the radio and he grabs the fire observers radio and a bold hit in artillery which is dangerous when it's that close to you. And fortunately enough made good judgement so that he pulled it right back on that line where they were. There was a mortar getting ready to fire and he said that artillery rammed, looked like it went right down the tube, it didn't of course, and destroyed that mortar. It was done in seconds. Of course when those machine guns go off they're on the ground and that initial fire gets a bunch of people. Once they are on the ground they can take a lot of fire. You can get down, in and around, and over for protection. Of course you have to keep those guys from maneuvering against them and they do maneuver. So on their

flight position they start a squatter platoon against their plane and again he was able to move that artillery right on that movement and knock them out so that seconds are critical.

- Q. This is all a technique that developed out of this and trying to solve this problem?
- A. Yes. So then they bring in, I'm bringing in more and more artillery, that's my job and I'm getting it in there and that's pinning these people down, and giving him more security and eventually he can get to where he can move a little bit. Then we start supporting an air assault and troops come in there and pretty soon we're going to surround and take those guys and they're going to take heavy casualties and they're going to get out of there--some of them. That was one of the things that amazed me, how they could get out while we were there. It was really difficult to do.
- Q. First of all, as an Army Officer, you're given your orders that these are the tactics we're going to use. And you're trying, within the strategy, to find all kinds of means to make the strategy work. Is that what you're saying to me?
- A. I'm saying that you've got a problem and you've got resources and that's all you've got to do. Unless you do other than and also unless you bring in technology. And I was going to tell you at Limited World Laboratory there was a lot of progress made in solving the location of these forces. One of them was what we called a people sniffer.
- Q. Did you think that if you had more time then, is that what you're saying?
- A. Yes I'm saying that he was correct, that jungle was a secret weapon. And I'm saying that if you had devices and these devices were making great progress when I was there and all sorts even biological, bed bugs, microorganisms.
- Q. What were bed bugs?
- A. A bed bug will detect persons and react. But we couldn't keep them alive. And dogs trained to find mines, I mean there were . . .
- Q. Just trying to find these things then?
- A. Yes. Well these operations. There were things going on to solve these problems and like I say, with time it would get to where it would be difficult for him to move around in that jungle.

- Q. They say that there was a so called eye and triangle right outside of Saigon, that the Americans never discovered in all the time that they were there, you know that the NVA and the Viet Cong were underground.
- A. Yes there was. They were underground everywhere. Survival was one of their most vulnerable points.
- Q. Did you ever say that well the top command should be doing something different rather than this particular strategy? Did you ever get to that point of saying well you're working your hardest in it to try and make it work as you're describing it. Did you ever say to yourself or to others that isn't there some other strategy that could be tried? I know there were proposals.
- A. Oh yes. They were looked at from every angle.
- Q. For example, there was the whole idea of putting a defense perimeter from the sea to the Cambodian border. Did you talk about that?
- A. We didn't, we were too busy fighting, we're not going to have time to think about that.
- Q. I'm talking about, you leave there and you're thinking and all of the rest of it.
- A. There are things going on see, ideas and searching for ideas and you're bringing in the best of minds from all over and listening to people. But the jungle is a serious problem, the sanctuary is a serious problem and the determination of the Marxist.
- Q. That's true. And that was underestimated.
- A. No it was not underestimated. We knew it was there. We pretty well knew how they operated and you can see it right now going on in El Salvador.
- Q. I've talked to a lot of GI's, the guys that you were ordering to go on these search and destroy missions. I have a feeling that they were doing their very best to work here, good soldiers but what it really came down to was the combination of this rotation system and the search and destroy missions that for them it was just a matter of personal survival. They couldn't understand, it was not working, the harassment of the enemy was very effective in pinning down large numbers of Americans and they couldn't see any progress, and so the whole from their perspective was to spend their time and come out of there alive.

- A. But of course anybody'd want to do that. To come out alive is the goal of everybody in there.
- Q. That's a goal of any war. But let me ask you this, it became the overriding objective. I mean there wasn't anything in the way of we're going to win this, what they were saying was we're not fighting to win, we're fighting to live.
- A. No, not when I was there. I think it came later. To what degree, it kind of depends on the leadership, the organization, and the state of the training. During those anti-war things and when the political decisions were made to where there was doubt, I always wondered how they did hang in there. When I was there morale was high and the combat efficiency was exceedingly high. And I think it was beyond even what you'd expect it to be. See, by this time the guys that are going over there have seen all this stuff in here. They were--Kent was there at this later stage and also the drug thing had got to be a problem in the military, when I was there it wasn't there.
- Q. I have found that talking to the fighting men, those who were in the combat area that even at the height drugs were minimal. They realized that the worst thing they could do was to be stoned, that they were going to come out in a poncho.
- A. I think that's probably true.
- Q. And they claim that most . . .
- A. The availability out in the jungle too was a problem.
- Q. Yes, but it was at a minimal amount because they knew that would just endanger their survival. Most of them said that where the drugs took place was off the line, in the rear areas.
- A. In the rear areas, Saigon and places like that, yes.
- Q. Of course I've talked only so far, with a small number of men. I want to change the subject a little bit. You were in Korea, how would you--What are the basic differences between the Korean fighting, the strategy we used in Korea and those that you encountered in Vietnam?
- A. Well it's not even . . . I don't believe it's a good question John. It's not appropriate.

- Q. Well first of all let me review what I think was on this GI's mind about the war. First of all he was highly critical of the search and destroy strategy, he was critical of the rotation system. He was critical of the restraint, particularly the one one permitting the North Vietnamese to use Cambodian sanctuaries and he felt that most of those decisions that supported that came from the politicians and therefore he tends to blame the politicians for losing the war, that if they had left it up to the Generals we would have the war. He says the reason we persisted in these mistakes was that the politicians, the Lyndon Johnson administration, had no clear political objectives. And had made these clear to the public and then had turned to the Generals and said to them now I want you to fight the war to achieve these objectives. Instead what you had was simply a vague notion that somehow or another the American security was in danger. They talked about the eventuality through the domino theory and all. If we lose Vietnam, lose Indo-China then eventually we're threatened. So, they believed that this was a serious mistake, that the politicians did not set out the political objectives clearly to the American people and adapt a military means to achieve these objectives so that the American people didn't know why we were fighting this war and it was the basic cause of why there was so much dissent about the war. That's what they're saying to me. These are patriotic guys that are saying to me, and I can't believe it, we'd do it all over again. Amazing, these are great Kentuckians to my way of looking at it. I would like you to address that.
- A. Well you're said an awful lot there John.
- Q. I sure did, part of it we've gone over haven't we?
- A. On the one on the sanctuary I can feel that that is a correct assessment, that he felt it because the threat was there. In other words if you knew a division was forming over there and you got that word and you went out to sort of bolster up your defenses. Then you felt that. And also that platoon being attacked and then running across the border, then that became obvious to everybody that was there. On the clearcut political objective. With the Military mission, I have a little trouble with that one because in hindsight you could say yes that was so, and to a degree it was but you were having -- first of all we go into this thing we don't know what's going on and if you knew what you know now it would be one thing. Also you have different phases.
- Q. Well certain assumptions were made back at that time. About the importance for example, of Vietnam to American security.
- A. Well no, that changed too with time.

- Q. All I'm saying is it wasn't clearcut to anybody in the world including the politicians because of what was going on. The situation changed and responses changed. Decisions were made when situations changed. It changed because of the nature of the thing and also another factor in the think personally I think that the biggest factor there was that most people didn't understand the protracting nature of the war. An insurgency is not something that is won over night and the insurgent is not in a hurry to win it overnight, he knows that's impossible.
- A. To continue answering your question John, on the getting the public 100% behind the war as I said I think the _____ nature of the war was the factor more so than other things. And having the American public 100% behind you would require leadership that I don't know would ever be available. Perhaps a better job could have been done. On the sanctuary, and I discussed that earlier, that was felt by the GI's because the threat was across the border and they could get the reports filled up, that were subject to being attacked and they were concerned with their own well being. That was something they didn't like. As to the rotation policy, I would think that when a war is going to be drug out over a long period of time, and I wouldn't see any fast solution to it, to have them stay there two years, three years, I don't know that they would have done better. Morale might have been such that it might have been worse. On the point of the politicians versus the Generals, we talked about that a little. I didn't feel that so much at my level and I wasn't so concerned about it, I thought things were progressing reasonably well when I was there. I knew that we were doing a good job. We were operating as a military unit that could be proud of it's military accomplishments. I'll just quickly summarize my feelings of when the war came to an end. I was at Fort Knox at that particular time and the way it ended was a hurtful thing for me. I grieved over it. I grieved for the South Vietnamese and I did work with some of them closely, mostly the military, Colonel Long being one of them. We talked about the conditions in North Vietnam and the reasons he left North Vietnam. I was aware of the brutality that the Marxist system brings when they are forcefully, through-the barrel of the gun, imposing their will on a society with the assumption that they know how a society ought to be organized and if something is going to interfere with that organization then it has to be destroyed. Brutally destroyed. To the extent that there were millions of people in Russia that were killed after the revolution, the military part of the revolution. I was aware of the fact that there would be a bloodshed in Vietnam, there would be horrors for the people. I saw those people fighting those battles and I knew that I'd be going in a year and he wouldn't be, his people wouldn't be. I remember one time seeing a soldier that was in one of those fortified positions. special forces position on outpost and his wife was bringing him dinner and his gun, with the kids and I thought that's a tough way to have to live, to be fighting something and doing it over this prolonged period of time. And to all of a sudden abandon them, and set them up through congressional action, we in essence at the end cut off their

bullets and their spare parts, their gasoline and at the time that we did that the North Vietnamese were mobilizing, moving, supply equipping and making ready for the all out assault for the final victory. They had no intention of adhering to the cease fire and the agreements that we worked out in Paris. And of course at the time it ended the assistant secretary of defense was in Fort Knox and we were touring something, I remember I was grieving as if I'd lost a friend and I asked him, what is the reaction in Washington at your level, I said I'm grieving over this thing, I'm suffering from it and he said we; we're all doing it. Then of course the _____ people thing came to pass and that was your blood and your brutality. You know when the communist take over they get very concerned about the counter revolutioners so they get brutal with those people, they go through the education program, they break them up from their families, they get a response and then they get out the sword and start chopping off ears. To me that is a horror story and to me that is not humanistic. To me the emphasis on the humanistic aspect of getting us out of there because of the balance that is involved and the civilians on the perferes (of the battles over a long period of time which had taken heavy tolls, that is a dehumanizing thing but it si nothing compared eith what the population is subjected to if you don't perclude it. All you have to do is look at Cambodia and what happens and I was aware of that through studies, through talks and through talking with people who were on the perferes (sp) of the systems of the kinds of systems who've been in it. Getting the information first hand, I wasn't surprised when they went into Cambodia and slaughtered what a fourth of their population, two million or something like that.

Q. Well the Cambodians did that to themselves.

A. The Marxist did it. It's a brutal system. As _____ said, he was one of the scholars that wrote a couple of books. He said one time that when he was in prison in there--the system itself, his writing are brutal. It's not something that Lennon did to it or Ball, somebody else in later times that betrayed his, not his theory, but his doctrine, his truths which they're not as far as I'm concerned. But what happens is you'd have this power that is consolidated into the hands of a few so that they can come to the capitol of Cambodia and say, we can't feed you, everybody out. And when the people resist off come the heads, as the heads start coming off more and more resistance, more and more heads so you can get that bloody brutal thing.

Q. This is what we left them in?

A. This is what we left them in and that hurt me. I didn't see that as humanistic, I didn't see that as being right. I saw us abandoning them after we assured them that was not going to be the case.

Q. But it wasn't all our fault?

- A. Well we decided to wash our hands of them . . .
- Q. We left them in fairly good shape.
- A. No, the essence of it is at the very end when it counted they didn't have beans and bullets because we cut them off with congressional legislation in the allocation of funds.
- Q. Well that's true but we didn't cut them off with nothing, after all . . .
- A. It amounted to as much because it gave the North Vietnamese the military advantage at a time when we'd pulled out, so that they were able to bring it off. It was a foregone conclusion. People can say well they broke and run.
- Q. I know but there is also the side that 57,000 Americans lost their lives trying to defend this country and it didn't work out. You're putting every responsibility on this country and it's true but I don't believe the South Vietnamese were through when we left them in 1973 or that they really made the right kind of decisions to keep their country together. But I can appreciate your views and I appreciate your telling me how you feel about it all. Have you, in educating the American public as to what was going on, did you see the series about Vietnam on television?
- A. Yes, most of it. It was pretty good, but there were some things that were left out and some important things that were left out and I didn't know if it was deliberate or wasn't deliberate.
- Q. Such as what?
- A. Well one thing that business of cutting off their bullets and beans at the end, I don't think you'd discern that if you weren't aware of it.
- Q. What was the other?
- A. Also the fact that they overplayed the Nationalistic part of the conflict, which I agree was there, but essentially Ho Chi Minh was a Marxist and he was one to establish a Marxist regimen. He wasn't going to be any national, democratic system and I think that was sort of inferred. And I think it is strong and I think you can go back in history and see. It's just like the El Salvadorans when they all got together in a coalition to fight that rotten regimen that was down there. And as soon as that other force got there, they with their discipline and organization threw all those other forces out, all those other elements out. And those other elements are the ones that are fighting them now. It's not all the one that the CIA are supporting because they were betrayed in their revolution. I think the same thing would have gone on there because it's their doctrine, it's what they say they're going to do, it's in their writings.

Q. Each of the men that I've talked to about the war, I've asked them one question. I'd like to ask you that question as a final part of this before we come back to your experiences at Morehead and that is, Why do you think we lost the war? The politicians lost the war according to a lot of these guys, now, how do you stand on that? How is your analysis of it?

A. Well I think there are three big factors that were significant. The first one was awareness of the nature of the war.

Q. We didn't recognize this?

A. Right.

Q. Who's we?

A. Our Nation. I think the government and the Media both did a poor job of saying what's going on over there. The media I fault in two ways and one is bringing the sensational into the living room that would make it obscene, that really distracted from what was there, distracted from the inhumane threat that was made to that organization. In fact John, there was a chaplain in South Vietnam that could visit all the religious, the Bhuddist, the Protestant, the Catholics and all of those religious people. They were saying that to discontinue it would be immoral, not the war itself, but to discontinue it would be a greater lie, which would mean if you chose it would be an immoral choice and I agree with that. I don't think people felt that and there was that claim by the anti-Vietnamese people that is was immoral. The immprality of the war and I think the media contributed to that after the battle they'd go in and find things that were abominations and bring them into the living room. And I don't know if that was deliberate or whethe it was to get rated number one over the competing station.

Q. Whose going to be the more sensational in order to get the audience.

A. Right, for example, there was one time when they showed a GI cutting off ears of a group of dead North Vietnamese. Another thing they were little too and there were some people that actually got to feeling sorry for the little Vietnamese. That was a terrible act, it was gruesome and it was terrible and it wasn't right and it wasn't the thing that was normally done. It was an exception but it's not to say those kind of things didn't occur, they did occur and even those kind of things were occurring in Morehead at that same time, not to that extent but I mean some brutal, nasty, rotten, things. So the image of Vietnam was that those guys over there are baby killers. That image was eventually shifted so that the military guy was a baby killer and the little Viet Cong was a good guy being beat up on by a bully. I think that was felt out there in the public and caused a swelling of the Anit-Vietnam thing, that coupled with a lot of other things.

So our heads were turned from what the problem was and what was being done and there were a lot of good things being done in Vietnam by our forces, by our doctors, by our GI's, by the military, by the civilian activities that were going on. There was corruption and that part was played big-- here you are fooling with a corrupt regime, why are you helping a corrupt regime. I would say given the situation, that they handled it well, that the corruptible nature of man when you pour millions of dollars into a place there are people who're going to get their hands on it and there's going to be some corruption. The corrupt elements in our society are going to always be operating. I remember some of the scene's where they showed some of the prisoners, where they were being mistreated. Now, if you go into our prisons you can get scenes where our prisoners were being mistreated, and some of them were being mistreated. The scene where the Chief Intelligence officer shot that fellow in the street, it was a famous picture. You see, you didn't understand that, it was a brutal thing and it was murder, you couldn't condone it under the Geneva conventions of war but if you go into what happened, this guy had shot one of his immediate kinfolk. I don't know if it was brother, sister, there'd been two or three things that had just occurred and _____ was going on. So you don't understand this guy's feelings, all you see is a mean son of a gun with a pistol shooting a guy and it was brutal to see it. Now I don't get upset about the 57,000 casualties as a lot of people do because that is an attitude. We in our society say in order to get from point A to point B faster, we'll accept 50,000 death's on the highway and take the car, one year. So that's an attitude more than that it is a fact. And I'm not saying that was a good thing to have 'casualties, that's a sad thing and if you see them and know them it's a sadder thing. I've seen it, I've seen them bring them out in the poncho and I recall seeing one fellow one time where they brought him out to this airport and left him there and he was there all by himself wrapped up in a poncho, nobody knew him and I didn't know who he was but I felt it, I wondered who is he, what are his mother and father going to think when they get the word. So, yes that part is ugly and it's hurtful but the struggle is something that you have to decide if it is going to be a struggle or isn't going to be a struggle. I say then that the News Media turned our heads and did not focus on things that were proper. I think they did a poor job and to some extent I think that they made a decision that the war was wrong and planted their news to prove it. To some extent I think that was done, you can't say that with absolute certainty but I felt like that was there to some extent. I think that the open society and the press is essential because the fidderece is what you get in the closed society.

The other point that I was going to make is about why we lost. You mobilize a big force and you're not in support of it. You were mobilizing a political force that was saying come out and the media was a factor in that. At the same time they were doing that they were giving the other side hope. Now, if you're going to be an insurgent, one of the things you need is hope and if you have people like Jane Fonda who went to Vietnam, I'll never forgive her, forgiveness is absolutely essential and I can't do it with everything but her, in that respect. She hurt our prisoners immediately.

I mean when she came in there there were some that were tortured because of her presence, according to their own testimony. And she gave them hope and was saying good things about them and bad things about us. So what you're doing see was influencing the public to say this is nasty, you've got to get out, it's immoral and you were giving the other side hope. So that was a bad thing and that was a factor. So the media, the nature of the war, I think those were the big factors. Those were the big things.

Q. What about the politicians which is the GI. . . Well you've already addressed yourself to that.

A. Yes. I don't think the Generals did a rotten job.

Q. No, I said politicians.

A. Even the politicians had a tough struggle I'd say. It's not an easy thing to struggle with right now. In our own back yard I see essentially the same reactions coming and I fear that they're going to be distracted and they're not going to follow the Bly Parsons commission report and say yes it is Russian and Cuban impact and there in a significant kind of context and we ought to prevent it. We'll get side tracked on the little side issues, on the death squads and I'm not saying those death squads are not a very evil thing, they are, but we'll be distracted that people will say it's immoral to go in there and then justify the action. Well to turn to Morehead . . .

Q. Yes. You were the professor of Military Science, head of the Reserve Officer Training Corp at Morehead from 1969-1973. This was an interesting time in the history of the University because of the reaction of the student body to the Vietnam War. I'd like for you to tell me, relate to me how you saw the scene at Morehead in those four years beginning with, I think you mentioned the other day the instructions that your commanders were giving you before you came to Morehead. Do you want to start at that point?

A. Well by 1969 the Anti-Vietnam movement was growing and during that period I was there it blossomed out until the end of the war. Of course Kent came during that time and that was sort of a high point in the student participation in the Anti-Vietnam, Anti-military movements. So throughout our Nation, even in the deep south, even in Morehead, a relatively conservative university, there was a lot of Anti-Vietnam actions by various student groups. There was a student mobilization committee at Morehead. The most militant one was the SDS and we didn't have any of those at Morehead but we did have the student mobilization committee.

Tape III

Side 2

Q. Well they were already established, the mobilization committee had been formed. What did you anticipate as you came to Morehead. What

did you think was going to be the situation that you would have to deal with?

A. I was aware of the fact that there was a large segment of the student population that were Anti-Vietnam.

Q. One of their targets was . . .

A. The PMS and ROTC. I was aware that there was a serious threat to our whole system through this drive to get ROTC off campus.

Q. Had that begun already? Elsewhere? Was ROTC on the campus before you came?

A. Yes it'd been there about a year.

Q. Who was the previous PMS?

A. Tom Harris

Q. He was there for just one year?

A. Yes I think so, thereabouts.

Q. He had established it on campus?

A. Yes.

Q. So, one of the things that you're concerned about was that the ROTC would be the target of the student mobilization is that it?

A. Yes. Not only that but other things too. The danger to our society was, if they were effective and able to move ROTC off the campus, then that would exclude the military from getting their future leaders from the academic world. That would be a serious threat, not that you couldn't commission your people through other systems such as West Point, but the value with ROTC in our system was that it kept the military in step with the civilians and it did that through bringing men and women that were commissioned as second Lieutenant that would be the future leaders. They would be getting an education from a variety of disciplines and this was important because an engineer is generally more conservative than a guy that's majoring in Social Sciences.

Q. So you're really trying to protect the ROTC system? And specifically in Morehead that was your mission. When you came there now -- of course the President was Adrian Doran and I would assume almost immediately this man was a man of conversation with you, am I correct?

A. Yes he was.

Q. Tell me something about your relationship with Dr. Doran.

- A. My relations with Dr. Doran were good and his leadership and attitude about this whole thing made my job much easier and two of the things he did that allowed us to succeed in having one of the best programs in the Nation, we were number four in the MS3's, the cadets that chose to go into an advanced program who had made a decision and commitment to go into service.
- Q. Well he reviewed this situation with you then as you took command. What was the nature of the conversation?
- A. Well the jest of it was that fine, ROTC is here. It's necessary, it's good for our Nation. That was his attitude. Now he accepted this thing and he also said that there are students and they have the right to pursue their interest and take the offering the same as any other student. The student has a right to dissent and express his dissension as long as he doesn't interfere with you and your guys. I can go and tell the cadets that see. In the meantime I tell the cadets also that in this sensitive situation their action is to be such that it will not create a bigger problem and because of that you may have to endure some inputs and some suffering you wouldn't normally be expected to take. It wasn't too long before one of the guys came in and told me that one of the hippies, as they call them, spit on him when he was wearing a uniform.
- Q. Was there much of that?
- A. No there was only that one incidence, but there were some things that were done and I'll go into them in a minute. He accepted that responsibility and I told Dr. Doran that and if he could have found the guy he'd have expelled him and he told me so. We knew that and the cadets knew that, so those guys couldn't arbitrarily perpetuate a wrong. Now at some universities they did allow it.
- Q. Do you think Doran was trying to drive these guys off the campus?
- A. Well, he'd have been happy if they had left, the student mobilization committee.
- Q. Do you think he was deliberately putting pressure on them?
- A. No. we did not take any definite actions to get them off campus. And we never discussed it. So that was the basis. I'm in concrete, you see, he said, 'you're here, you're needed here, what you're doing is right and needed for our society and you have some rights in the process'. So I passed that on to the cadets and the cadets responded to it. They also told me you have to be careful, that they try to disrupt and insult and embarrass and even destroy ROTC property. They had some instances that they knew this was happening out in this new world and here is the information for you and it's best for you not to get involved in a debate with them, in a public debate with them

because part of their goal is to embarrass you in that process and maybe throw a tomato at you and hit you in the face. So, as I took over the job, a week after I was there I guess, there was a group that came out and put crosses on the campus.

Q. What kind of crosses?

A. Crosses representing a burial, it looked like a cross you'd find in a military cemetery. They drove them into the ground right out front.

Q. Oh, they represented death? The death of the soldiers in Vietnam?

A. Yes. They were long haired and they had the bands, the black band with a peace symbol on it and I was watching this out of the window and some of the other students came and took exception to it and were kicking those things down.

Q. Where were they putting them?

A. In that little spot by Button Auditorium and there was a Vietnam Veteran there that didn't use good judgement and he was a person that I would say normally wouldn't exercise good judgement, he was going to clear their pile, he was taking it as a personal insult.

Q. Did you have much of that, the Vietnam Veteran is on campus now and he's confronted with this.

A. Well yes they were upset about it and I talked to them and encouraged them not to kick it down and get hostile because that was not their purpose.

Q. Did you meet with them as a group at all?

A. I met with them some, yes. And had them over to my shop quite frequently and talked to them at some length about it. They were concerned about it and didn't like it and felt it was contributing to the possibility of losing the war.

Q. Did you remember any of those guys?

A. I don't remember their names right off the top of my head. Of course on the student mobilization committee I remember their names. Mike Green was the number one guy. I'll think of another name or two in a minute.

Q. How many were there do you know?

A. About seventy I would say, seventy to a hundred.

Q. Which would be what percentage of the total population?

A. Well there was about 7,000 plus students, so not much.

Q. About one percent.

A. Now there were a lot of people that were sympathetic with them, these were the radical elements.

Q. How many do you think were sympathetic?

A. I'd say probably over twenty-five percent and that's just a wild guess. Then there were twenty-five percent on the other side that were hard-necked, what they would call rednecks, that would beat them up if they could. And that was one of the dangers. One of the things that I kept saying was if you're not careful in dealing with this thing you could create an incidence that would bring evil elements out on both sides that would cause a serious evil event, somebody getting killed.

Q. Did you see much conflict between the extreme groups?

A. I counseled the extreme groups quite often because . . .

Q. Which group?

A. Well they're organized.

Q. The rednecks you mean?

A. Yes. They were sort of the red birch type, the right of right.

Q. Of course you met with the radicals too?

A. Oh yes. Well I'll tell you a little story about that. My feeling, generally, was to stay away from them from what I'd been told but after this cross incidence I decided . . .

Q. When did that take place?

A. Spring F'd-say, probably of 1970.

Q. So you met with some of them?

A. I went over and talked to Dr. Doran about it. I said, I think I want to mingle with them and get to know them. They were going to have a meeting and they advertized it all over campus. And I said I think I'll go to one of their meetings and he said, I don't know if you want to do that or not, there is some risk in it. I said yes I believe there is but I don't want them to refer to me as the PMS, I want them to know me as Colonel Kelly and I believe ~~it~~ would be to my advantage if they know me as Colonel Kelly. So he said, whatever you think. They were having a meeting in Ginger Hall and it was on the ground floor. They advertized the time and place so I went. I was in my uniform and as I got there the classroom was full, standing room only. There was

a chair up front and that chair was facing the crowd so I decided I'd go up there. I went up there and sat down and of course all eyes were on me and I wasn't enjoying that and I didn't do it for that reason but I felt like I had to get in there and become Colonel Kelly and not PMS because they were meeting to decide what to do at our parade and awards ceremony what was coming up. That was the purpose of the meeting. And I also knew that they'd done at some of these things, they'd thrown tomatoes at them while they were in formation, they'd laid on the ground in front of them as they were marching (at different universities). So they were going to organize and decide what to do. I went in there and set down and faced them and they went back to business, there was sort of a pause. Well, before they went back to business a dog followed me in and it was raining and he was wet and he walked right up to me and shook himself off, he shook water all over me. I had to take my glasses off and clean them and I just looked out at the group and I said I bet that dog is a member of the student mobilization committee and they all laughed and that broke the ice. Then, I believe Mike Green was the Master of Ceremonies, they were using the Roberts rules of procedure so one of them would get up and make a motion and then a discussion, lets get some tomatoes and throw tomatoes at them and lets do essentially what they had done before, that's all. They weren't that creative. But my presence being there you know, somebody else would get up and say well that doesn't see; quite right and there'd be some debate and they'd eliminate it. So they kept eliminating them. And finally they got down to where ,ok, we'll go there in mass formation, we'll be in the stands and we'll have our signs. That was what they were going to do. Then they brought up the issue, they're always trying to get at the quality of the instructions and quality of the curriculum. They were trying to say that that wasn't worthy of a college students efforts and used that on some campuses to get the administration or the academics to declare it not worthy of credit. And if you knocked the credit out that would reduce your chances of attracting the type people in there you want. And also they tried to get them to deny the rank of professor to the head of the ROTC Department. And had done this on some campuses and had even eliminated it on some campuses, including Harvard. When you take Harvard out of the thing you're taking a slice of an important academic institution. You're taking that out of the services, you aren't going to get those people out of there in the army any more. You add that up, then it becomes a serious loss. So we've got to fight this particular thing. They wanted to do a survey on those topics, quantity and quality of both the instruction and the curriculum. I had done one and I knew the results and it was good. We were rated above the _____ Institution I didn't fear it at all on the content of the curriculum or on the quality of that instruction. So they were going to do a survey and what they were going to do was take the instruments and just scatter them around campus, so I held up my hand and got the floor and said, if you want to do it, and I recommend that you do it, then I suggest that you do it in a way that it would be valid so they couldn't challenge you as being invalid. I said I think if you scatter the instrument around a case could be made against you that it wasn't valid survey and research effort. Because I said, anybody could come and fill out a form and one guy might fill out a hundred, that would be what I would say decounered. And I said, I'll

give you an opportunity to do a valid survey, I'll make the classrooms available to you. Mike Green jumped up and said we're not going to do that, he said you would bias the students and you'd control it and I said, I'll tell you what we'll do, we'll turn the classroom over to you, leave it and you can give them the survey and you can collect it. We won't have a hand in it. Then there was a lot of argument between them and finally it carried the day and they did the survey and the results were essentially the same thing we already had and they were favorable for us.

Q. Where did the survey go around? To the whole student body?

A. It went to the cadets and it was required at that time.

Q. Oh I see, this is the survey among the cadets to see what they thought of the program they were in.

A. Right, and all the freshman were involved so a hundred percent of the freshman male were there except the ones that had physical disabilities.

Q. It was obligatory at that time?

A. Yes, it was required.

Q. So that actually was your first confrontation with this group?

A. Yes. So, they are knowing me and I'm knowing them. I know their names and they know mine. I invite them over and I also told them I'd help them prepare the survey instrument or if they didn't want me to do that I suggested they get over to the research center and get some professionals to prepare the instruments.

Q. But they actually went through with it?

A. Yes they did, they got it consolidated and put the results out in the public.

Q. It was very favorable?

A. Yes.

Q. I would probably see that in the Trail Blazer at that particular time, would you think so?

A. It might be some of those things were there.

Q. That would be in the Spring of 1970?

- A. I believe it was the spring of 1970.
- Q. One of the things I plan to do is go through old issues of the Trail Balzer and see how they recorded all of this.
- A. I also as I departed invited them to come and see me one on one any time they wanted to. To talk about anything they wanted to talk about and particularly Vietnam. I made it a point to invite the number two guy, I'll think of his name in a minute, he came later on.
- Q. Who, Mike Green?
- A. Well yes Mike and I had several debates, we had one on the Radio, he invited me to debate him. Of course I had talked to him and I knew his feelings from the inside, I'd sort of, as the saying goes, been inside his head. And I knew he was a passivist to the extreme and he was a militant passivist but not a violent passivist. He was on the verge of a Marxist, he used the Marxist language when he talked about insurgencies and Vietnam and all those things. You know you can't be a passivist and be a Marxist, that's a contradiction and that was a problem for him. I saw him later on at the University, 1976, he was at the University of Kentucky, he worked there and he had moved over into the hard Marxist idea and he had become violent and he'd moved away from his passivism.
- Q. Do you know anything else about Mike Green, what kind of a background did he come from?
- A. He came from a reasonably good family. I knew a lot about him at the time, I can't remember all the details now. But he had a bad family situation, there were a lot of things there that would create problems for a young man growing up. And he was involved in drugs, I knew that and quite a bit. One student who knew him very well told me he was unpredictable as to what he would do. He would do things that were dangerous and fool with drugs. But he was pretty bright, he'd read Karl Marx and he knew what he had to say, knew his ideas and that sort of thing. He knew a good deal about what was going on in Vietnam but most of it was coming from the slanted version, the leftest, the liberal extreme, that side. And the language was used, Karl Marx language was used in a lot of his conversation.
- Q. Well trying to keep this chronological you had this meeting and you had this survey come out. What do you recall next?
- A. Well the radio debate. And in that process the first thing I asked him was, I said Mike are you a passivist and he said yes.
- Q. Were these debated the spring of 1970?
- A. I think that's later on, 1971 maybe or at least in the latter part of 1970.

Q. In the fall maybe?

A. Yes. It would be even later than that probably.

Q. Was he a senior at the time, do you recall?

A. No he was about a sophomore. His answer was, yes I'm a passivist, I don't believe in killing. I said can you ever justify killing and he said never. So I asked him a question, I said what would you do if you were in Texas when that fellow went beserk on top of the building and killed about seventeen people in one wild terroistic action and you were a law enforcement officer, I asked him first if he could be a law enforcement officer and he told me he could, anyway, would you shoot him? And he said no I couldn't do it that would be immoral, that killing. So I said to him then, Mike that being the case you ought to be against ROTC and you ought to be trying to get it off campus as you are. And we talked a little about that. Then the next thing that occurred was Kent coming up and things were getting tight.

Q. This was the invasion of Cambodia, it had taken place in April of 1971, and Cambodia came right after that. That effected our campus a lot.

A. Right, so campuses were going on a rampage all around the United States and being closed.

Q. Did you talk with Doran this time?

A. Oh yes.

Q. What do you recall talking to him about, was this after Kent that you talked to him?

A. Oh I talked with him through the whole thing, constantly.

Q. How often do you think you met with him?

A. Daily practically, well more or less, not to talk about that one thing specifically but usually we were in contact daily. And Cooper said that that was on all of our minds his included.

Q. What was his relationship with this group, did he talk with them at all, meet with them?

A. Yes I believe he did talk with some of them. I was never with him. He did talk to a whole group one time, there was a group when a parade was coming through the street and I think John Kleber was in the parade and they had the candlelight thing.

Q. But this is ahead of the story isn't it? You're up to the point of

April 1971 of the Kent killing after Cambodia. Up until that time do you think Doran had any personal relationship at all of talking with Green, to your knowledge?

A. I'm not aware of it personally.

Q. You met Green but don't recall the President . . .

A. Oh, I think he did, I don't know that he called him to his office but I think he talked to him at various places at different times in fleeting contacts.

Q. How about other members of the faculty and administration, first of all, did any of them get involved with you, did you feel that, of course Dr. Doran was with you.

A. Well Kleber and I talked frequently about things. You know, the issue of whether ROTC should be required and the National Security course, that all came out of this thing and John was involved actively in that.

Q. How was that? Tell me that story about you and Kleber. Do you think you were on the opposite side of the fence about this issue?

A. No, by the time I got to Kleber we were pretty much on the same side of the fence. He was a little concerned about ROTC and the military being on campus.

Q. He was opposed to it?

A. Well, he was opposed to the required aspects of it and I think he was probably opposed to the war.

Q. Did he talk with Green?

A. Yes he knew him. I think he talked to him.

Q. Did he attend the meetings, was he one of the more activist?

A. No, he didn't attend the meetings, no he wasn't in those meetings that I'm aware of. I don't believe he was. And he wasn't one of their advisors, not the student mobilization committee.

Q. Well, how did he get involved in this issue then with you? Did he represent a different viewpoint of the presence of the ROTC on campus than you did? He was opposed to it?

A. Well I don't believe he was totally opposed to having ROTC on campus, he was opposed to having it required.

Q. I see. That part in which he was trying . . .

A. And he wasn't comfortable with Vietnam at that particular time and

I think he became more comfortable with it in his relationship with me and what I did too. I made it a point to talk with most of the faculty on the subject of ROTC and its importance and trying to keep it viable and going. So I had inputs from many of them and I had some of them that were a lot of help to me.

- Q. I just want to pursue your relationship with Kleber, I want to talk with him about this too.
- A. He and I had some talks and I don't remember how it first came about we got involved. I was trying to address solving a problem that was a problem to the administration for the Army and for the student. I did a lot of soul searching as to how you would do it and one of the problems in this business of trying to weaken the ROTC, it is an anti-military thing and a passivist thing was mixed in with it and a Marxist thing was mixed in there with it too.
- Q. Now was this a cooperative relationship with John?
- A. Yes. John and I were cooperating all the time.
- Q. In what sense were you cooperating?
- A. Well the problem was ROTC was being weakened on the campuses and the University of Michigan had 40,000 students and forty cadets. . . .

Tape IV
Side 1

- Q. Well he was associated with many of the students perhaps more than any of the other professors did and he was probably in a position talking with them a lot more and was this something that gave you the entree to him to get some understanding of what was going on, is that it?
- A. Yes. He was a source of information on what's going on with the students and it was necessary for me to know their feelings and understand their positions and I feel like I got to do that pretty well and he was a valuable source.
- Q. And you understood him as being opposed, not to the presence of ROTC on campus but the fact that freshman were required to take this course their first year?
- A. And wear the uniform.
- Q. He was opposed to that? So in that sense he and Mike Green saw eye to eye and you were not in the same camp on that obviously that's where your conflict came in?
- A. I wouldn't say it was conflict because like I say I have to study that

question and I was getting ready to tell you that there were three problems as I just mentioned and how do you address them. The student didn't like to wear a uniform and I understood that because the attitude was very anti-military and that was in a large segment of the student population and I understood their feeling. So to wear the uniform was a humbling experience. My attitude was keep them out of uniforms as much as you could. Now the department of defense had decided, now they'd give on a lot of things and they were being pushed and pushed, they gave up on the issue of getting credit for ROTC.

Q. That eventually takes place in Morehead doesn't it?

A. No not credit. And they gave up on one place where they required them not to give the professorship rank. So they keep _ _ _ _ until you're playing into the hands of the guys that are trying to get it killed militarily or at least get it off campus. So weaken the military. The idea, because of anti-Vietnam feelings to kill a military is a very dumb thing to do and some people were caught up in that that were not necessarily passivist in nature. So the question then is how do you get them out of the uniform. The department of defense said we will go no further., they will wear the uniform and there will be weapons on campus or there will be no ROTC program on your campus. And some of the institutions said take it, about five of them. Harvard being one of them. That was a big loss. Also about this time the lottery system was coming in and so the young freshman was coming in and he had the opportunity to go into ROTC and delay his entry into the military and go in active duty as an officer. If you have a college education and you get your military education as you go then you're in a good position to offer more to the military. You've got junior leaders coming out of college. It was to their disadvantage to get a low lottery number and get dragged and go out and be taken out of college and go in as a private. That was a problem for the student, a problem for the Army was the uniform and a problem for me and the university was attracting them into the program so the program would be viable. Then it dawned on me, why not have a course offering that would be of the nature that you could give Military Science credit for it, it wouldn't be ROTC, and have it for half a semester and have it so that they could go from that into ROTC and get military credit for it and go right on.

Q. Would this be in place of the freshman program?

A. Yes. Initially see, you're not taking ROTC, you go in there and you don't have to come with a uniform on. Now at first I wanted them to ...

Q. They still have that don't they?

A. Well they did away with it just recently because of financial constraints. They shouldn't done it anyway, it was a mistake. But also with that idea was to address some of the problems that needed to be addressed to the people of that age. And one it do you need a military, why do

need a military, what's the economics of it, what's the moral issues of war and peace.

Q. You're talking with John, I'm assuming at this point. You're talking with him about these things too, right?

A. Not yet, I haven't brought him into it yet. So finally, I get a document together that comes up and the idea is to bring in people that have experience in these areas. Bring in a philosopher on the moral issue of war and peace. Get them from other campuses. And bring in the different military to talk on the different military aspects of it. And bring in academic specialist in Marxism and the unsurgent threat. There's a professor at New York that's one of the most noted.

Q. What was the name of that program you finally established?

A. National Security. So then I went to Dr. Doran with the paper one day.

Q. Do you recall when it was?

A. No I don't. I can get those dates for you. Anyway I sat down and talked with him and tried to convince him that we ought to try and do it. He agreed to do it. We were going to have them in Uniform at the time because it was still a requirement of the Department of defense. I suggested he form a committee and study, I think a committee was being formed at that time to study whether or not these issues remained required. And maybe John Kleber, that was Dr. Doran's initiative and other administrators initiative.

Q. Kleber was on that committee? Do you remember who else?

A. Yes he was. There was a cadet and a student that was anti-military at the time and later went into the military. He got a commission and was glad that he was a part of it because he got to be drafted and finally got a commission. Not through ROTC though, it was another, the Navy program. And, I invited them all to go to Fort Knox and took them to Fort Knox with me and showed them the lifestyle of an officer and the military installation and it was a good thing for them.

Q. So as a result of the committee this decision was born ?

A. Then I recommended to Dr. Doran that John be made the Chairman.

Q. Of that committee?

A. Yes. He at first said no, then he said o.k. and did. So the essence of it, they went in and met and decided it was a good thing and decided to do away with ROTC as required and also to initiate the National Security.

Q. So when was that first offered?

- A. It was 1972 I believe. Fall of 1972 was when it was started.
- Q. Now before that time there was an incident in which John Kleber participated in a protest parade against ROTC wasn't there?
- A. I think so.
- Q. Do you recall the particulars of that?
- A. No, I don't and I never did talk to him about it.
- Q. I was wondering did that take place before or after he was appointed chairman of the committee?
- A. Before.
- Q. It didn't seem to have discredited him with the administration?
- A. No, they wondered about it, they were concerend.
- Q. What did they say, what did Doran say about it.
- A. Well they didn't want this thing to spread to the faculty and have a lot of protest and oppoisition.
- Q. Was he the only member of the faculty that . . .
- A. No, there was one guy in there with him, he was the advisor of the Student Mobilization Committee.
- Q. Who was that? Was he a history department insturctor?
- A. No, he was in psychology, I don't remember his name, a little short fellow.
- Q. Kind of curley haired?
- A. No kind of bald. Well let me tell you one more thing about Dr. Doran. When I initiated that thing I knew that it made both people mad. The administration and the Army. But I felt like it was going to go because it was advantageous to the Army, the University, and the cadet.
- Q. Why would it make the Army mad?
- A. Well it'd make the Army mad because we're going to say you can't wear uniforms.
- Q. Oh, you don't have to wear a uniform to take this course?
- A. Right. In other words it was an order from the Department of Defense.

it was not just Army, so Navy, Airforce and Army required you to wear a uniform.

Q. Did you have to get this cleared with them at all?

A. Well that's what I'm going to tell you. Dr. Doran as far as I'm concerned was a good leader and had a great mind as far as seeing the essence of things and then being persuasive in getting taken care of so when I ran it up to the Army channels they come back with me and they are mad and my immediate boss would have killed it but I had it in such language that he couldn't dare kill it by himself, he had to take it to his boss, General _____. Colonel White was my boss, First Army. So General _____ was the head of the ROTC programs throughout First Army area, a fifteen state area.

Q. He looked at it then?

A. Yes, he looked at it and he thought it had some merit and Dr. Doran bought the idea but at one time in the process of debate he got so mad he got up and walked out of a meeting, he got mad at me. Because I presented the Army side of the thing and some of them he disagreed with and one of them is that uniform thing.

Q. He wanted to continue the Uniform is that what you're saying?

A. No, he wanted to take it off, get it off, no uniform.

Q. Doran wanted the thing off, well I thought you wanted to take the uniform off?

A. Well I did but I couldn't.

Q. You weren't publically advocating that?

A. Yes.

Q. Well give me a little more detail on this walkout incident that took place, what was the background, what occurred there? This was the fight over whether or not this program of yours was going to go through?

A. Yes. Ray Hornback was in it, he was there. Ray got up and left too.

Q. They both got miffed at you?

A. Yes, I figured he would, see I wasn't suprised, it was one of the few. Dr. Doran and I got along well, and he never said another word about it afterword he just got up and walked out.

Q. Well why did he get angry and walk out as you understand it, or Hornback for that matter?

A. Well, it was a sensitive issue and there were some disagreements.

Q. What were the disagreements?

A. I don't remember specific ones, essentially over the uniforms, I don't remember what was said.

Q. He wanted to keep the uniform?

A. To take the uniform off. And he wanted to make a few other little changes in the curriculum, I can't recall them. Not much, but essentially he bought the curriculum because I showed that to him before I went over there.

Q. Where was this meeting held?

A. Different places, different times. We had more than one meeting, but this specific meeting seems to me it was held in one of the rooms in the presidents, not his office.

Q. Who else was there?

A. Well John Glen was there and I believe the dean of students was there.

Q. Who was that?

A. Wilson, maybe Buford Crager.

Q. Was any faculty there?

A. Yes, there was a faculty member there, it may have been the Philosopher, what's his name.

Q. Frank Mangram?

A. Frank, I'm not sure, I've got a list of who was present in my files. So anyway the Army was mad at me and the President was mad at me, but there was movement see. At the next meeting everything went well, they bought it and decided on no uniforms. I told Dr. Doran you're going to have to bring my boss down here and sell him on the idea I don't have any authority and he said get _____ down here. So I called him and said can you get down here and gave him the background information and he came down. Dr. Doran sat down with him knee to knee, kind of leaned over and I'm telling you he'd talked him out of that uniform before General _____ - knew what was going on. Now General _____ was smart and he told me many times he was impressed with him. He'd got his masters, I believe he was a West Pointer I'm pretty sure he was. What he said when he left there was we'll do it without the uniforms and I won't say anything to anybody if you won't

Q. About what, the agreement?

A. Yes, about the uniforms.

Q. So it was really under the table?

A. Well he had orders not to do it. I mean the defense said no further that's as far as we go we're drawing the line. You can understand that, somewhere you have to draw a line or they'll water it down to where it's nothing, which is one of their goals.

Q. But he didn't want this generally known?

A. Well actually after it was over it went Army wide and there was a lot of publicity, it went in the army times, it was very successful.

Q. Do you have copies of that by any chance?

A. Yes, I've got results of it. I've got a survey of all the students that participated in int and a lot of them went into ROTC. In fact, so many of them went into ROTC that in some cases, that came out of National Security, there was more than some people had in their whole program. So PM's wrote me from all over. Sent me that program, tell me about it, we're going to try to do something similiar. People knew about it. I had officer friends that found out about it in Europe, they said we know what's going on over there in Morehead, things are moving along pretty well. So National Security went in and this was actually after Kent. As Kent evolves, this time tension is already very high and I'm getting reports -- I go to PMS meetings at the Army level, all of them would get together and some of the things they'd bring in there are horror stories. For example in New York one of the PMS was up there-- there was a group of longhaired people that were trailing his wife and child all the time, wherever she went. If she got in her car they'd follow her, if she went to the drugstore they went in the drugstore. He went to the FBI and the FBI said you better get her out of here, you better send her home, we can't gurantee you we can protect her. So he sent her home. There was another example where a PMS was sent and of course I talked to a PMS that was at Kent, they were saying that there were one or two students of SDS that had a bomb and were coming to bomb their ROTC building in the day time when people were in there, but the bomb went off before they got there.

Q. They actually planted the bomb?

A. No they didn't get it in there, it went off before they got there.

Q. But they knew that this was going to take place?

A. Yes. Well they didn't know it but they found out about it.

Q. Was he positive about this?

A. He said it like it was an absolute fact. I don't know whether it was or not, it was second hand to me. Then of course, at the University of Michigan I believe they set fires in the trash cans, at another University they went in and pulled all the drawers out and emptied the things in the floor and threw the furniture around and broke it. There was just a lot of things like that that were done after Kent. And of course they burned some of the buildings down and closed some of the Universities. So I was tense at the time, the Cadets were tense and of course the student body was tense, the faculty was tense. The tension was there. They burned down a U.K. building so it wasn't something you couldn't be concerned about, they called up National Guard for U.K. One of my faculty members reported to me that a student had told him that there was a group planning to assassinate one of the ROT faculty members and a cadet told me that.

Q. Did you take that seriously?

A. Yes, I took it seriously. But I decided and maybe not rightly so, that, well the first thing that went through my mind, I was already tired because of all the efforts to try and keep the lid on.

Q. Did they have a particular target?

A. No, they were just going to assassinate.

Q. Was there anybody that knew this report that could identify the people? Was this the Mike Green crowd?

A. I don't know who it was, it was just reported to me that someone was planning to assassinate a member of ROTC. And I decided that there wouldn't be anything anybody could do. Two different sources reported this to me.

Q. Was this after Kent? This would be the reaction on our campus?

A. Yes. And I decided there wouldn't be anything the faculty could do, the police could do, or I could do. And I didn't want to create anymore turmoil within my own faculty. I thought wouldn't this be a terrible way to die, to get shot on campus after being to Vietnam.

Q. This would be one of the officers being assassinated, but you didn't talk with them at all about it?

A. No I didn't tell them.

Q. Did you tell anybody?

A. No and I told this student, don't say a word to a soul, it's a rumor, leave it at a rumor.

Q. Did it leave?

- A. Yes, it dried up and I never heard another word from it. And I had told this other person, don't say a word to anybody.
- Q. So it's possible that it's no more than a remark of some guy that was out of his mind at the time and had no intention of doing this, but it could have been the kind of thing that circulated around could have created higher tension and temperatures of tempers and all the rest of it. Is that what you're saying? And you thought the best thing was to not encourage this and keep quiet and hopefully, as it did, it'd die out.
- A. I didn't tell Dr. Doran. Ordinarily I'd tell him everything, I trusted him and I shared things with him and he shared things with me but I didn't tell him because I didn't want to put that burden on him I didn't want him to be concerned, I thought that would be too much because things were very tense. I did tell him at that time, I said I've never felt more tense than I do now, even in Vietnam when they told you that they were going to attack your position, in one particular case where we were really isolated, he said, well the difference is in Vietnam you'd done everything you could do, you'd put out the perimeter and you had things taken care of and here you don't know what to do, it's so vague it's hard to deal with and that's true.
- Q. But you were kind of anticipating something was going to happen.
- A. Oh yes.
- Q. Mostly on what kind of evidence?
- A. Well evidence was just kind of popping around.
- Q. Just on the rest of the country was as you described it and you knew there was an activist group on campus and you thought well the first thing you know they're going to try something. Is that what you were anticipating?
- A. Yes.
- Q. That's logical and you're uptight about it?
- A. Yes and I sent in for the number two man, I can't think of his name and anyway he came over. I figured he would.
- Q. Who, among their group?
- A. Among the student mobilization committee. Anyway I sent for him thinking he would come over. And you know that student mobilization committee used to make a big thing of it, they were anarchist. They'd make a big thing out of a chain command or leadership or order. But

I knew that there was a chain of command and I knew who was number one and I knew who was number two. I knew that much about them, I knew a whole lot about their families and I'd gotten the information through different source

Q. Oh you had a profile on them?

A. I didn't have files but I made it a point to find out what made them tick.

Q. This was not written down?

A. No.

Q. You inquired about them?

A. Yes.

Q. Where were the sources of information?

A. Well from people that knew them in their home town and people that knew their families.

Q. What did you do call them up or what? How did you get this information?

A. Well didderent ways, I'd ask different people and ask some people to get some information for me. I'd say what's his background, where's he coming from, what is it that's causing these problems?

Q. How many of these guys did you try to understand?

A. Well I tried to understand all of them. I talked to a lot of them. I mean I didn't get information on any of them but Green and this other fellow.

Q. They were the two that you concentrated on?

A. Yes. I really wanted to get inside their head and know where they were coming from. And I did pretty much.

Q. Did you think pretty much that they were in control of the whole group and whatever they said -- that they were strong leaders?

A. They were leaders. Mike Green was one of the leaders.

Q. And this other guy?

A. Hansel Lewis. So anyway I sent for Hansel and he came over and this was right after Kent. He came over and we started talking and in the course of the conversation he said tome, I asked him, I said Hansel if you were in a position to destroy all the military goods, if it was all stacked up in a field, and gasoline was poured on it and all you had

to do was strike a match and burn it up, and you'd get rid of all the United States of Americas military equipment in one strike would you do it? He said, no I wouldn't do that. And I said why not? He said well you need some. And I said well Hansel the only difference between you and me is that you know how much we need and I don't, I don't know exactly how much military power is enough.

Q. What was the purpose of that question, what were you trying to say to him?

A. Well I was just trying to see to what degree he was a passivist. I mean are you going to defend anything at all. So then I say to him, if you could get rid of ROTC would you get rid of it and he said yes. It was the elements. If you could get rid of the elements to the right side of the spectrum, the rednecks would get rid of them and he said yes, it's like a cancer, if you had a cancer on your knee what would you do? And I said I'd get rid of it, he said that's the answer you see. I said do you mean that? He said, yes I mean it. I said well let me ask you this. I said if some other group on campus decides that all people, and I described what he looked like, that have a beard, long hair, jeans, sandals without socks were evil and should be gotten rid of, what would you think about that? And it dawned on him that that was too much anarchy. There was another kid that was with him that wasn't quite as hostile as he was and he said to him, yeah Hansel answer that one, let me hear you answer that one. He couldn't answer it. So then he says to me, I'll tell you what we're forming up on the outside of ^Button Auditorium right now and I'd like for you to come out and talk to them. Well that was contrary to what I'd been advised to do but they're there, and I've got to make a decision. So I said to him, Hansel, I'll tell you what, if you'll go out there and talk to that group and if they will invite me as a group to speak to them I'll speak to them. Well the danger of it is if you open your mouth on Vietnam and it hits a headline and you say something that's contrary to the policy in your discipline in the military, you've done damage.

Q. To what?

A. To the policy, to the planners. You've just agitated and reinforced the Anti-Vietnam thing and that would be a problem. So we had to be very careful about what we said and to speak for anyone, to speak for the military you've got to be cleared. I can't just get up for the military and speak for the military policy of Vietnam or speak for the Department of defense. He goes out there and comes back and says they want to talk to you, he said we've got a PA set up out there.

Q. Where was this, right on the steps?

A. Right on the steps of Button Auditorium. So as I go out there I think O.K. I'm not going to speak for the President of the United States or the Secretary of Defense or Secretary of State or General West Morlen. I'll speak as a person who's had experience and I'll be Colonel Kelly of Morehead State University.

* TAPE IV
Side Two

Q. There were a hundred people there?

A. More than that I'd expect and as time went on there was quite a few more than that. They started filtering in. So the hostiles were sitting right off the the immediate left and I recognized most of them. Mike Green included. When I take the microphone I tell them I'm not speaking for anybody, I'll give you my experience and I'll tell you what I know and what I saw and what I felt. And I'll answer your questions. I told them who I was, where I was from, about my family, about my children because I wanted them to see me as a human being, not one of those terrible baby killers. Then I said I'll take your questions. The bad guys were raising their hands and Mike was about to have a fit to get the first question in. So I went right straight to him, zap. I figured if they insulted me which I figured they would, that that crowd would move to my side, and I wasn't going to take it personal. I wasn't going to fire back at him or I wasn't going to insult him, so the first thing he says to me, he says are you a Christian? That was his question. And I said well I preport to be, I want to be and I think you should be, or something like that. Then he has a follow up question, he's setting me up for thi kill, he says how can you be a Christian and be a soldier? So I said to him I don't have any trouble at all, I've never lost a minutes sleep over it. I said there has been a military force throughout recorded histry, there must be a need for it and it has been debated on a moral ground by all the major religions and with exception of a very few and in the minority, at least small inatitutions, they've all said there can be just wars. So then he says to me, how about that mistreatment of the prisoners in Vietnam and he told me about an incident, he told the crowd, he's trying to paint his picture of how nasty it is over there and how nasty the military is. So he said how about the time that they took this guy, this little Viet ong, cpatured him, tried to get him to talk, put an electric shock to him and he wouldn't talk, put him in a well, hanging over the edge of the well by his fingers, he wouldn't talk, beat on his knuckles, he wouldn't talk, until he dropped in the well, he wouldn't talk, and they shot him. I said I don't know but I can tell you this, it might of happened, but I'll tell you this, in the unit I was with, I was a fire support cooridnator with a Brigade and whenever there was a major action I was usually there and if a person was captured I was around there, I said as a matter of fact the tactical operations center had a little prison compound where they brought the prisoners snd interrogated them.

I said I have even talked to them and one of the things I noticed was first of all we wanted them and we wanted them alive and secondly we were suprised at the number of them that would surrender and we were suprised at what they'd tell us after they surrendered and I was never aware of it being a problem of getting information from them. I was only aware of one incident where they captured one of them and there was a hostile reaction where the Seargent Major offered the guy a drink out of his canteen and he took the canteen and hit the Seargent Major with it and said I don't want any of your captilistic water. That's the only incident I know of and I said as a matter of fact in one incident a prisoner came in and told us where his forces were and got in a helicopter and showed us where they were and watched us assault that unit. I said I was sort of dumb founded by it to think that he'd do it and I went down and talked to the G-2 who was responsible for intelligence in our division and said why did this guy do that? And his answer was well they're told if you're captured you're going to be persecuted and tortured and you're not to be captured and furthermore they have people assigned to them to see that they don't leave and even if they do they take the responsibility, so to me I'm not aware of any of those problems. And besides that I say who's over there, who's over there, they are people just like from this group right here. I said essentially most of them have warm feelings toward the Vietnamese and don't want ot see them hurt. And then I told him about one of our little doctors who was a Battallion Surgeon, he was a small man, he used to go out to the villages to treat those people and one time he took me to one of the villages and showed me a young kid about ten years old, good looking little guy, who'd been born with his hands stuck together and he'd made arrangements to get him evacuated to one of our hospitals and they operated on him and he had use of the hand. I said we were out in the jungles and that mother brought me a coca-cola, I know it must have been a precious thing for her and she must have felt like I had something to do with it which I didn't, the doctor is the one that did it, but she gave it to me and I wasn't going to be rude and turn it down. But he'd gone in some of those villages where there were cholera epidemics , at risks of stepping on a mine, of being sniped and so yes there were some instances where there were some evil things done but essentially, and we kept going on from there.

Q. Did no one else have questions?

A. Well there were other questions but it simmered down. I guess it went on for about an hour.

Q. You talked an hour?

A. Yes, I'd say so. And finally you could see the group move towards me and afterwards some of them came up and apoligized to me for the insults they were throwing at me. I didn't consider them insults. I didn't take it as something personal so it didn't hurt me. When that broke up it sort of calmed things down around there. Then I went home shortly after that, my dad was about eighty-two or three years old.

Q. I remember him, was he there?

A. No. But he was a great man, had a lot of wisdom. He was a great infamous person, you know there are famous people that are not great and there are famous great people but he was not famous but he was a great person. Anyway he offered me a beer . . .

Q. Oh he was there, he was at home?

A. Yes. Anyway I was exhausted. The _____ had occurred and I had faced these guys. They'd burnt the University of Kentucky. So as he was pouring that beer for me he looks over to me and he says you know Author there's evil in the world but essentially it's good. And I almost dropped the beer because I'd been dealing with the other elements. And there's one of the contradictions in that student mobilization committee. They were the ones saying that they trusted humanity and mankind and they didn't, they did not. That was one of their crosses, they couldn't trust them. So that was the reason why they would expect anarchy, anything's better than what we've got. So I went back and had a leadership laboratory and the whole corp was there. I called them together and told them that stay and they really did appreciate it because they were going through this too. And feeling this pressure. It was a tough time.

Q. So he said that there's a lot of evil in the world but that essentially it's a good place. Was he responding to your situation?

A. No, he did not, just out of the clear he brought it up.

Q. He didn't even know?

A. No, he didn't know I'd been through this stuff. He was aware of the Vietnam thing because he watched the news.

Q. It seemed to hit your mood didn't it?

A. Yes and then it wasn't significant in itself, the statement but when you think of who it came from, here he is, he's about eighty percent deaf and he's got cancer on his face and has had these spots taken off his face and they bother him, and he's operating on one lung, so when you get a person that's in that condition and can see the beauty in the world in those times that's a pretty big thing, it takes a pretty big person to do that. That's the thing that impressed me.

Q. So you had this meeting them with the corp and you went over this with them.

A. It jolted them. One of them came around and told me.

Q. Is it this time that Doran spoke to the group?

A. I think that was a little later. It was about the same time though during the Kent thing and it was one thing after another. Now he wasn't on campus at the time, I don't believe. It was late in the afternoon when it occurred. So there weren't many faculty people there. There were some around.

Q. Were there some at the talk?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you remember who was there?

A. Yes. What was his name there, the Iranian, or Saudia Arabian.

Q. _____, the man who coaches soccer, he was there?

A. Yes.

Q. Who else do you remember?

A. Russell _____ was there, Dean Davis I think was there, I'm not sure. It's hard when there's a crowd out there.

Q. Doran's not around?

A. No.

Q. Was it over this same tension that Doran talked to them?

A. Yes.

Q. Were you there at his talk?

A. No, I wasn't, that was a seperate time. I believe he had them praying you know before it was over he lead them in prayer. I give Dr. Doran a lot of credit. As far as I was concerned, and I know some people felt that he was a little too domineering maybe or dictatorial. He used to say that he'd like to think of himself as being _____ . But I was in a lot of hot spots with him.

Q. Could you think of any other, was there anything after that? Was that the high point?

A. Yes that was the high point. There was a lot of talk going on a lot of meetings and there were some other incidences. But I saw him as exercising good judgement, good leadership and one of the better leaders that I've run into and I've run into some great leaders. Some of the very best, General Johnson was a tremendous leader. I always thought at the committees Dr. Doran was able to get the ideas out of that committee group, if there was any in there he'd get them and he would latch onto them and he would use them. I was proud of him and the PMS's were proud of him, there weren't very many like him.

Q. Did they meet him?

A. Oh yes I took him around to as many places as I could. Not all of them but some of them. He came to summer camp at _____ Gap and of course the PMS's, we interchanged information because we're looking for solutions and we were all faced with--it was a very challenging thing, there was a lot at stake and there was danger. Not physical danger necessarily, but danger of serious harm done to the ROTC program. So at noon time I said do you want to go over to the Officers Club and go first class or do you want to go over and have a peanutbutter sandwich in the BLQ and meet a lot of the PMS's. He said I believe I'll go to the BLQ and meet the PMS's. We went over there and they all gathered around him and he shared things with them, it was reassuring to them, they needed to be reassured because in some cases, some of the leadership you know was extremely liberal and very Anti-Military and those guys, that was kind of a gloom situation for them. So having that power, that force, that leadership behind me, even though it was a burden to carry at that time and a challenge and a lot of responsibility, it made it so much easier. So they knew him throughout the system. _____ and that was with General West Morlen, have you heard about that?

Q. I might have heard it but I'd like to hear it again.

A. Well just as I took over the PMS General West Morlen was scheduled to come and be the commencement speaker, so that was June of 1970.

Q. Did Doran Invite him?

A. Yes. These incidences were occurring where they were pouring pain on these military speakers that appeared on campus. A senior officer went someplace and there was a serious incident, made the headlines Nationally.

Q. Wlsewhere?

A. Yes. So Dr. Doran didn't want that to occur at the university and he Wondered about the wisdom of bringing him there at that particular time. I was of the conclusion that it was best not to bring him there that it would have been contrary to what some PMS's would have said, at least I think it surprised him that I felt that was too, supported his decision, agreed with it, concurred with it.

Q. You thought it would be a probalication?

A. Yes. But to change it would be a delicate thing.

Q. Was it already publicized?

A. Oh yes, and arranged and the General was scheduled to come. You've got the President of the institution and you've got the General that was

Chief of Staff and you're going to back down and one side of the coin goes why are you backing down are you going to let a bunch of hippies back you off, you know why don't you be yourself, who's in control and all those such of things and I'm the middle man, I've got to talk to Dr. Doran and General West Morlen.

Q. So you're the middle and Dr. Doran had already made up his mind that you . . . ?

A. Yes, I had to go notify General West Morlen that under the circumstances Dr. Doran's concerned that maybe it's not a wise idea to move forward.

Q. He wants you to go see him personally?

A. No, I just notify with General West Morlen that this is coming and Dr. Doran's going to call and talk to him.

Q. What did you say to West Morlen?

A. Well I just said that's the feeling and he's going to call and talk to you. And Dr. Doran calls and talked to him and General West Morlen said I'm not going to back down and Dr. Doran said I'm not going to ask you to back down and I'm not going to say anymore. General West Morlen said, I'm not going to say anymore, a little face saving exercise there. They got somebody else, Frank Mangrum spoke in his place.

Q. I thought they were leaving it at an impasse.

A. Well it was understood that he wasn't going to come see.

Q. He wouldn't say that he wasn't going to come though?

A. Anyway later on in the Pentagon I stopped General West Morlen and introduced him to Dr. Doran. When General _____ was killed in that-airplane crash I took Dr. Doran to the funeral, and I took him to the Pentagon. General West Morlen was there, he was walking down the hall and I said General West Morlen, Sir. He stopped and I said I want you to meet a distinguished educator, Dr. Adron Doran. He said, Dr. Doran, and they chit chatted back and forth for awhile.

Q. They didn't talk about the incident?

A. They kind of laughed about it I believe. I don't remember exactly what they said. I'll tell you one thing, in the National Security course I brought General Johnson down, the Chief of Staff. He's a very eloquent man. And to get him to come I told him, I'll make it an exciting day for you, I can't pay you. I told him, I'll let you speak to a group of the hostiles, I'll let you speak to a group of the educators and I'll let you speak to anyone on the academic community that comes to the lecture.

Q. What was his full name?

A. Harold K. Johnson. So he came down and we had him with little Cadet groups, we worked him all day.

Q. I was with them at a meeting. Where was it held.

A. In the senate room.

Q. Yes. I was setting next to him.

A. Anyway, when he left he wrote me a letter afterwards and he said that he thought the National Security course was a great thing. He said it was a very exciting day for him, this was he was leaving, he said we made a mistake and he said we decided after this incidence we were going to minimize the exposure on the campuses. And he said we should have been having the exchange, we should have faced the hostiles. At one time I just had a little hostile group, I just had Mike Green and his cronies.

Q. This is a result of his experience here?

A. Yes.

Q. Did he meet with Mike Green?

A. Yes.

Q. Well that's interesting. Now you've mentioned Dr. Doran and you've mentioned other people who are involved in this story. Lets see you've mentioned Ray Hornback, Buford Crager, John Kleber. Who else would you say? I was involved in the sense that you used to talk to me about it and I remembered that about you. One of the things that very much impressed me was the openness that you had with the faculty as a whole. You know you were there with them and probably more successful than anybody that I've seen there in your position in the way you could carry on a relaxed conversation with the faculty and get your points across and so forth. Many is the talk I can remember having with you about these things. Who were some of the others that you talked with, that you feel were a part of the story that maybe I could talk with? How about Ed Hicks?

A. I talked to Ed Hicks some. I talked to Dr. Mangrum some. I talked to Dr. Grody a lot. Dr. Grody had a lot of good judgement.

Q. He was a good friend of yours.

A. I was talking to the administration all the time. Dean Davis, Buford Crager, and Dr. Doran on a continuing basis, Ross McClure, Bill _____ and Playforth.

Q. You talked to Playforth?

- A. Yes, and talked to him in a number of situations. I talked to him one on one and I talked to him in groups and sometimes at activities or whatever. I got a lot of input from him.
- Q. These are the ones that you can recall?
- A. Yes, and I even wrote letters to them sometimes you know, on certain things.
- Q. Do you have any of that correspondence?
- A. I don't have any of it at Morehead because after a certain age they get rid of most of it.
- Q. How about some of your fellow officers, did you have much consultation with them at the time?
- A. Yes. I had a great staff, had an enthusiastic group. Their dedication and hard work was noteworthy.
- Q. Did they help you with the strategy of what you were trying to do?
- A. Yes, I consulted with them, consulted with Cadets, consulted with student with everything on campus, all the different events. So where different people stood on things, I wasn't surprised.
- Q. Did you ever talk to Dr. Reeser?
- A. Yes, not a lot, some.
- Q. Did you think that there was any faculty that were in active opposition to you in any way? You mentioned one guy that was an advisor to this group?
- A. Well there were some that were counter productive I thought. Not many.
- Q. Who were they?
- A. I'd rather not say. There were one or two administrators I felt that their judgement would create problems for us. And their judgement was coming from protecting the President, protecting him from incidence. There was some of that, not much.
- Q. How about Elmer Anderson?
- A. There weren't liberal elements on that campus that created the crisis that were being felt in some places. For example, at the university of Kentucky there was one professor there that was considered a Marxist, I don't know whether he was or not. He told group one time if there's a Cadet in my class and I find out, he's flunked. We didn't have any

of that kind of stuff. There were some liberal elements on campus that were , there were passivist elements , anarchist elements, and there were some Marxist elements and one of the things that confounded me I would say was how people in higher education could see any value in Marxism. I understood their concern about the evils of the private system and I used to search for an answer from higher education through talking with these people. One of them, I can't think of the professors name from New York University and others

A. Well just talking about our own campus you didn't have anybody in that category?

A. No.

Q. Well what else can you say about it?

A. Well it was a good experience I enjoyed it. I thought the University did a good job of dealing with it. I thought the faculty were responsible, I thought they used good judgement and debated and I thought they were free debate. I didn't feel like they couldn't debate.

Q. So you do think you have some written records that you might make available to me?

A. Yes I have a few. There might be some over in the ROTC. We published a ROTC paper and the library has the copies of them. They discontinued that after I left.

Q. Do you remember the name of the paper?

A. No I don't. It was sort of a one page thing written on front and back, and it was printed in color. We sent it off first Army day. It's got a good bit of information in there about what was going on.

Q. Do you think the library might have held copies of that?

A. Yes, they did, I asked them to. I gave it to them.

Q. Wonder where that would be, what's the name of it, was there any kind of archives at the ROTC on campus?

A. I don't know you could check with Mrs. Davis. I don't know if she'd have any copies of it or not.

Q. Mrs Davis, is she still here?

A. Yes she's the continuity.

Q. Oh, she was there? I don't know her.

A. Well I tell you one thing she was at some of those meetings and she took down some of my letters.

Q. Is she the secretary?

A. She's an administrative assistant, a fine woman.

Q. She's not related to Dean Davis is she?

A. No, her husband works in communications on campus.

Q. Well I think we've come to the end of it.

A. We've covered quite a little bit of territory.

