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CHINESE DEMOCRACY: HOW ELITE THINKING
ON CHINA'S DEVELOPMENT AND CHANGE
INFLUENCES CHINESE PRACTICE OF
DEMOCRACY (1839—THE CURRENT TIME)

A Dissertation

Presented to

the Dean and Faculty of the Josef Korbel School of International Studies
University of Denver

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Doctor of Philosophy

by

Rey-ching Lu

June 2009

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Title: Chinese Democracy: How Elite Thinking on China's Development and Change Influences Chinese Practice of Democracy (1839—the Current Time)

Advisor: Paul R. Viotti

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ABSTRACT

Will China become a multiparty democracy? This is the research problem of this dissertation. My hypothesis is this: the greater the extent that Chinese elite thinking on development and change reconciles the tension between Chinese nationalism and collectivist, family-like ethics on the one hand, and the western democratic ideals based on each self-seeking individual's subjectivity on the other hand, the greater the chance that China's political development will lead to a multiparty democracy. The dissertation includes two parts: Chapters two to five are historical analyses, and chapters six to eight are the interviews. It is my assumption that Chinese elite thinking on China's development and change has been influencing the Chinese practice of democracy since the Opium War (1839-1842), and will continue to have great impacts upon the Chinese pursuit of democracy in the next 20 years. I use chapters two to five of my dissertation, the historical analyses, to demonstrate the causal relationship between Chinese elite thinking on the development and change of Chinese society on the one hand, and Chinese historical practice of democracy (from 1839 till the current time, including "Leninist

democracy”) on the other hand, the former being the independent variable and the latter being the dependent variable. The method used in chapters two to five is historiography, I develop my causal analysis based on extensive reading of historians’ and social scientists’ works. And then I use chapters six to eight of my dissertation , the interviews, as the most current information that reveals Chinese social trends toward the next 20 years, and make an assessment of whether, in the next 20 years (2004-2024), China will become a western style, multiparty democracy—and if the answer is yes, what that democracy will look like.

For example, one could argue that such a democracy will be a combination of western democracy (based on the value of individualism) and Chinese culture (based on the value of collectivism). My judgment is based on chapters two to five, the historical analyses of the long-term trend, and chapters six to eight, the information gained from the interviewees. The method used in chapters six to eight is face to face, in-depth interviews. The interviewees come from the four elite groups in the current Chinese society: government officials, the enterprise people, media professionals, and intellectuals. The interview question does not directly ask question about democracy; rather, it asks the interviewee’s personal opinions about “the positive or negative factors that have been driving or limiting the development and change of X city (in the context of development and change of Chinese society since 1839), carrying it toward the next 20 years.” So the interviewees do not directly talk about democracy—they just express their views on positive and negative factors that might influence the development and change of the city that they are in. Because in urban development one can best experience the tension between traditional values and modern values, the development and change of a city (in

the context of the development and change of Chinese society since 1839) and how people deal with it in their thinking should reveal information about the social trends.

The major findings are these: 55.5 % of the interviewees are pro-democracy; 22.2 % of them are not pro-democracy; 16.6 % of them are not concerned about the issue of democracy in China; and 5.5 % of them are uncertain. I have found substantial evidence of favorable prospects for democracy. So my conclusion is: China has favorable prospects for becoming a multiparty democracy; any democratic system that emerges likely will be a Confucian democracy (communal or social democracy); the Chinese culture will become a combination of liberalism and Confucianism; the balance of traditional elements (Confucianism) and modern elements (liberalism) will depend on each individual's free will and free choice; the process of democratization will start with the intellectuals, and then spread to the whole nation. Finally, this democratization process will likely happen in the next 20 years (2004 to 2024), based on responses from the person I interviewed.

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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

(1) Research Question

Will China become a multiparty democracy? This is a topic for continuous debates. In a recent publication, scholars comment on Professor Pan Wei's proposal of a *consultative rule of law regime* and debate about whether China's political reform should and will finally lead to western style multiparty democracy or stay on a course of rule of law as Professor Pan suggests.¹ The former position is supported by the empirical events of the third wave of democratization,² and the latter position, Professor Pan's argument, is inspired by the developmental example from Singapore and Hong Kong, two Chinese societies that succeed in modernization without adopting democracy. Professor Pan rejects the possibility of multiparty, competitive electoral democracy for the direction of China's political reform by presenting a theory that would trace polity type to its social origins. Pan states: "A particular regime is rooted in a particular *social*

¹ Suisheng Zhao (ed.), *Debating Political Reform in China: Rule of Law vs. Democratization* (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2006).

² Samuel P. Huntington, "Democracy's Third Wave," in Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (eds.), *The Global Resurgence of Democracy* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996).

structure and a particular *value system*; and both are rooted in a particular *division of labor*, as well as a particular *mode of production*.”³ A regime type serves the need of social organization; different societies have different needs of social organization and this difference determines the choice of a particular regime type.

Chinese traditional society was composed of “scattered, free, equal,” “selfish,” and “self-sufficient” “small farm families” that are difficult to organize (interest groups or classes). Therefore, consciousness of social class or interest group is alien to Chinese people. In contrast to pre-modern western Europe where Estates formed social cleavage and the church became a source of checks and balances of political power, thus forming pluralistic sociopolitical power structure, pre-modern China lacked meaningful social cleavages and this fact had prevented the emergence of pluralism. Chinese people did not have the need to form an interest group or party to protect or promote their own interests. And because of this, Chinese people did not develop a belief in the *fairness* of open power competition and majority rule. In other words, the value system developed from Chinese traditional, agricultural society lacks an appreciation of power politics and checks and balances. Because there was no fundamental conflict of interests among the “scattered, free, equal,” “selfish,” and “self-sufficient” “small farm families,” the

³ Pan Wei, “Reflections on the ‘Consultative Rule of Law Regime,’” in Suisheng Zhao (ed.), *op cit.*, p. 247.

government they wanted was one that would represent the interests of *all the people*, and the *fairness* principle in such a collectivist value system required that their government (which was believed to be their father) must not lean to a particular interest—citizens (the peasant families) were like brothers and sisters, no one could enjoy more privilege over others.⁴

In addition to a lack of social cleavage among equal, free small farm families, there was also no basic conflict between the ruling elite (imperial civil service government officials) and the ruled peasant citizens (small farm families). The social division of labor was quite simple: the ruling group's job was to maintain order, peace and harmony in society without disturbing peasant citizens' ordinary life except by necessary taxation and modest levels of community services. The ruled peasant citizens enjoyed high levels of freedom as long as they fulfilled their duties regarding taxes and services and complied with the social order without committing criminal conduct such as theft, robbery, or murder. Social mobility between these two groups, in the longer term, was not very hard, and the chance was open to every citizen. Everyone, theoretically, had equal chance of social mobility by mastering Confucian scriptural knowledge and

⁴ Pan Wei, "Toward a Consultative Rule of Law Regime in China," in Suisheng Zhao, op cit., pp. 3-40. About the difficulty of social organization in traditional Chinese society, and the contrast between Chinese traditional ways of social organization and the ways developed in the western modernity, please see a useful overview of Chinese history: Ray Huang, *China: A Macro History* (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1988).

competing with others to pass qualification examinations for imperial Civil Service.⁵

Since there was basically equal chance for social mobility, there was no meaningful conflict of interest between the upper and the lower levels of the social stratum. One day you were the ruled citizen, and another day you might become a member of the ruling elite, depending on how hard you worked to master official Confucian knowledge. Thus, there was harmony between the ruling and the ruled groups, except for the excessive corruption of the political regime often seen at the latter end of one dynasty.

Another important reason for such harmony between the ruling elite and the ruled citizens was the ideas of Confucian teachings. Confucian teachings see the emperor-subject relationship as that of father-son; thus the family ethics of filial affection from son to father and merciful love from father to son were the moral basis of social order and were extended to political life, so that the emperor-subject relationship would reflect the family ethics and display such affection and love. Ethics in political life should reflect the ethics of social life based on family ethics, and it is in this way that politics is rooted in culture and social structure based on family, lineage, clan ties, and other social bonds of patron-client relationship that also simulated the ethics of father-son relationship.

⁵ One might be able to climb the ladder of social status via a conscious cultivation of patron-client relationships, but this was not a typical channel that an ordinary citizen was able to expect in his life unless members from his families, lineage or clan, or village community had been a member of the ruling group.

Therefore, the whole society is interpreted as a family: the ruling elite should display merciful love and bear the responsibility of taking good care of all the citizens like a father, and the citizens should extend their filial affection toward the ruling elite like a son or daughter. There were thus no clear divisions or meaningful boundaries between the ruling group and the ruled citizens. Thus state-society dichotomy did not appear in traditional Chinese society, and this social-political oneness, the whole society being one family where social-political harmony was seen as crucial for social-political life, has become the cultural-psychological basis of contemporary Chinese politics.⁶ One implication of this is a continuous debate over whether an independent and autonomous civil society, and later, a multiparty democracy, will be able to emerge and form in the reforming Chinese society.⁷ Scholars inspired by the third wave of democratization tend to give a positive answer to the above question, but most of them focus on the virtue of democratic institutions and few of them take serious the arguments from cultural and social structural perspectives, as evidenced by Pan Wei's critics.⁸ In contrast, scholars

⁶ Lucian Pye, *The Dynamics of Chinese Politics* (Cambridge: Oelgeschlager, Gunn & Hain, 1981), *Asian Power and Politics: The Cultural Dimension of Authority* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), and *The Mandarin and the Cadre: China's political Cultures* (Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies, the University of Michigan, 1988).

⁷ See Suisheng Zhao, op. cit.; Chih-yu Shih, *State and Society in Chinese Political Economy: The Cultural Dynamics of China's Socialist Reform* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995), *Zhongguo Wenhua Yu Zhongguo De Min* (Chinese Culture and Chinese Citizens) (Taipei, Fongyun Luntan Publishers, 1997), and *Shuping Zhongguo* (Book Reviews on China Studies) (Taipei: Hanlu Publishers, 1998).

⁸ Suisheng Zhao, op cit.

who argue from cultural and social structural perspectives tend to be skeptical about the positive answer. I find myself identifying with cultural and social structural perspectives, but less skeptical about a democratic outcome appearing in China in the years ahead.

Both Japan and Taiwan are Asian societies that have similar Asian values and patron-client social structures, and both have become multiparty democracies while staying very much Asian (a dialectical integration of modernity and tradition).⁹ So at least theoretically, one cannot exclude multiparty democracy as a possible outcome of China's political development. My research question, therefore, is: given this particular cultural psychology and patron-client social structure, will China's political development lead to a multiparty democracy?

(2) My Hypothesis

Chinese culture places great emphasis on the role of the elite in leading and educating the mass peasants¹⁰ to live a moral life that complies with the natural law of the universe. If you follow the natural law, not only at the micro-level you and your family will be blessed by heaven to succeed in farming production (reaping rich harvest) or climbing the social ladder (raising yourself to the upper level of the Civil Service), but

⁹ Chie Nakane, *Japanese Society* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1970). About the integration of modernity and tradition, please see chapter nine of this dissertation.

¹⁰ Elite-mass (intellectuals-peasants, or, rulers-citizens), patron-client, senior-junior, men-women, father-son, these are similar relationships in terms of the Confucian family ethics described in the first section: the mutual flowing of filial affection (from son to father) and merciful love (from father to son).

also at the macro-level the whole society and political regime will receive blessings from heaven so that peace and prosperity will be bestowed upon the whole civilization. If you live a life or govern the society against the natural law, there will be negative results. This knowledge has been conveyed through Confucian scripture and Confucianism-influenced historical writings. In real life, who is to convey such knowledge? The two most important sources of knowledge are the intellectual elite (Confucian students) through teachings and the political elite (the emperor and his imperial officials) through political practice.¹¹ Therefore, it is both intellectual and political elites that are responsible for the cultural life of a particular period of time.

When China first encountered the challenge of modernization through the material advantages of western weapons (a series of military defeats since the Opium War in 1839 by invading western powers who were driven by commercial interests), it was once again the intellectual and political elites that first felt the imposing pressure from the western powers, and the urgent need of modernization. Such a feeling of urgency to catch up with the West has since occupied Chinese elites' minds and hearts, and eventually spread to the whole civilization's citizens. Nationalism thus dominated

¹¹ The first four emperors of Qing dynasty (1644--1795) are sincere believers of these Confucian religious teachings on the natural law and heavenly blessings for the civilization. All four ruled the civilization by sincerely following the natural law, and had attained the highest achievements since the age of Confucius. All four are Confucian intellectuals themselves.

Chinese minds and became the most powerful driving force of the society's development and change. Up until now, generation after generation of Chinese intellectual and political elites have been thinking and practicing different prescriptions to save this country.¹²

National wealth and power has become the shared, collective goal for the whole nation to pursue.

How will China fulfill that goal of national wealth and power? This is the single most important issue that has been driving Chinese elites to seek answers, and different prescriptions and projects for China's development and change have been formulated, which lead to different practice of democracy in modern Chinese history. Such practice of "democracy" includes: late Qing dynasty's constitutional monarchy, multiparty parliamentary democracy in the early years of the Republic of China, Chiang Kai-shek's single-party dominated constitutionalism, Mao Zedong's version of Leninist democracy (including People's Democratic Dictatorship and Proletarian Dictatorship), and the socialist democracy plus rule by law in the reform era. Because Chinese cultural characteristics emphasize the role of the elite in leading the citizens in political, social, and cultural lives, all the historical practice of "democracy" has been significantly

¹² Chinese worldview and self-image has changed from being the center of human's civilization to being only a member of the international world composed of modern nation-states.

influenced by Chinese elite thinking on development and change, which has been driven by an aspiration to save China—in other words, nationalism. Now because of elite leadership and teachings, nationalism has spread across the whole population. Whether China's political development will lead to a multiparty democracy will depend on how Chinese elites reconcile the ideals of democracy and Chinese nationalism. I see culture as an ongoing process of social construction in which the ideas of the elite play the most crucial role--this is especially true in a Chinese cultural context that emphasizes top-down education or mobilization to carry out political-social-cultural civilization ideals. My hypothesis, therefore, is this: the greater the extent to which Chinese elite thinking on development and change reconciles the tension between Chinese nationalism and collectivist, family-like ethics on the one hand, and western democratic ideals based on each self-seeking individual's subjectivity on the other hand, the greater the chance that China's political development will lead to a multiparty democracy.

(3) Literature Review

The development of analytical models in China studies goes from the totalitarianism model in the 1950s and 1960s; to the pluralist approach in the 1960s

and 1970s which includes the factionalism model and structural-functionalism; and then to new institutionalism in the 1980s and 1990s. All three periods bear the imprint of liberalism and carry an expectation that China will someday become a liberal democracy. Therefore, the fourth category will include different versions of cultural and social structural perspectives that provide views different from the previous three categories.

1. The Totalitarianism Model¹³

In the 1950s and 1960s, it was the cold war atmosphere of confrontation between the free camp of liberal democracies and the communist bloc of totalitarianisms that influenced the researchers' perspectives. The totalitarianism model conveyed an image of China where individuals did not have any channel or space for political participation. All policies and institutions were decided by the communist party. Decision-making was top-down, and the communist regime was able to penetrate and to completely control the whole society. A typical research question was: through what kinds of means could the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) attain such total control of Chinese society?¹⁴ Analyses were devoted to the understanding of ideological control,

¹³ Most of the analyses and citations in the next paragraph, are from Chih-yu Shih, "The Faith in Individualism in University of California Press for Thirty Years," in Chih-yu Shih, *Shuping Zhongguo* (Book Reviews on China Studies) (Taipei: Hanlu Publishers, 1998), pp. 25-26. But the last sentence is a comment on this model from Yu-shan Wu, see footnote 18.

¹⁴ The most famous work is: Franz Schurmann, *Ideology and Organization in Communist China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963).

dogmatization of society, the scale of brainwashing,¹⁵ the purge and crackdown after the building of the People's Republic of China,¹⁶ and how peasant nationalism was exploited by Mao Zedong to help his rise to power in China.¹⁷ This model assumed that the CCP leadership was united, and policy was based on consensus.¹⁸

Despite its virtue, there are several problems with this model. Firstly, focusing on the means and skills that the communist regime used to attain the capability of total control of the citizens leaves one thing unexplained: why were people willing to be mobilized? Why did Chinese people choose the CCP during the civil war when they had an alternative, the KMT? The capability of control after the building of the PRC had to do with the CCP's great popularity among Chinese people even before it had won the regime. Chinese people wanted Mao and the CCP to lead them out of the hundred-year-long national humiliation that had taken place since the Opium War. It was this aspiration for national liberation that constituted the strong popular support for Mao

¹⁵ Some examples are: Robert Lifton, *Thought Reform and the Psychology of Totalitarianism* (New York: Norton, 1961); Rensselaer W. Lee III, "The Hsia Fang System: Marxism and Modernization," *The China Quarterly* 28 (October-December 1966): 40-62; Franklin Houn, *To Change a Nation* (Glencoe, III.: The Free Press, 1961).

¹⁶ Karl Wittfogel, *Oriental Despotism* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957); Ellis Joffe, *Party and Army: Professionalism and Political Control in the Chinese Officer Corps, 1949-1964* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965); Doak Barnett, *China on the Eve of Communist Takeover* (New York: Praeger, 1963).

¹⁷ Chalmers Johnson, *Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962).

¹⁸ Yu-Shan Wu, *Russian Transitions 1992—1999: A Political Economic Analysis* (Taipei: Wu-Nan Publishers, 2000), p. 48.

and the CCP, and it was because of such almost unconditional support that the CCP was able to carry out any of its projects, because the Chinese people believed that this was for the good of the whole nation. It might be brainwash, it might be propaganda, but the real reason for its success was much more than just means, skills, and excellent strategies.

One can imagine, if this aspiration and strong support turn to a belief in liberal democracy (through elite education) someday, what a blessing will this be to the democratic promise for China! In short, a belief in individualism had prevented the researchers from paying attention to the causal power of this strong collectivist aspiration for national liberation.

Secondly, the model implies that the CCP had fully penetrated Chinese society, thus the total control of it. If this was the case, why was it that during the Great Leap Forward many local cadres were able to fabricate production figures to cheat the center? And this cheating generated significant political outcomes since it misguided the leadership into believing in the correctness of this movement, which turned out to be a great disaster. Whether the CCP fully penetrates Chinese society was one of the heated debates of the 1980s.¹⁹ Thirdly, the model assumed that the CCP leadership was united, and policies were based on consensus. During some periods of time this might be the case,

¹⁹ See the third category of analytical model: new institutionalism.

whereas in other periods, factionalism prevailed. This leads us to the second category.

2. Pluralism (Factionalism Model, and Structural-Functionalism)

(1) Factionalism Model²⁰

In the 1960s and 1970s, cultural revolution and the open dispute between China and the Soviet Union made the totalitarianism model inapplicable. The assumption of a united leadership and consensual policies had been questioned. There seemed to exist serious conflicts within the ruling elite, and plural political forces competing in the power arena for self-interests seemed to be relevant; thus the factionalism model emerged to replace the previous totalitarianism model.²¹ Factions were seen as small groups, and therefore interest group analysis seemed to apply.²² The organizations and resource distribution of factions were analyzed; the power politics behind the shift of policies were presented.²³ And China's sudden change of foreign policy from pro-Soviet to pro-US was a good subject for analysis.²⁴

²⁰ Most of the analyses and citations in the next paragraph are from Chih-yu Shih, "The Faith in Individualism in University of California Press for Thirty Years," in Chih-yu Shih, *Shuping Zhongguo* (Book Reviews on China Studies) (Taipei: Hanlu Publishers, 1998), pp. 26-27.

²¹ Andrew Nathan's work could best represent this new turn to factionalism. See Andrew Nathan, "A Factionalism Model for CCP Politics," *China Quarterly*, no. 53 (January-March 1973), pp. 34-66.

²² Martin King Whyte, *Small Groups and Political Rituals in China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974).

²³ Andrew Nathan, "Policy Oscillations in the People's Republic of China," *China Quarterly* 68 (1976).

²⁴ See Thomas Gottlieb, "Chinese Foreign Policy Factionalism and the Origin of the Strategic Triangle," *Rand Report*, R-1902-NA (November 1977) (Santa Monica, Ca: Rand); Kenneth G. Lieberthal, "Sino-Soviet Conflict in the 1970s," *Rand Report* R-2342-NA (July 1978) (Santa Monica, Ca: Rand); John Garver, *China's Decision for Rapprochement with the United States, 1968-1971* (Boulder: Westview, 1983); Roger Brown, "Chinese Politics and American Policy," *Foreign Policy* 23 (Summer 1976): 2-24.

There are two problems with this model, and both relate to researchers' lack of cultural sensitivity. Firstly, the above pluralist factionalism model was based on individualism: it assumed that each self-seeking individual had his own policy position based on his self-interests, that those individuals who had similar policy positions would come together to form a faction, and because there existed plural conflicting interests, different policy positions based on different interests would conflict with one another and engage in power competition. In this model, the final policy outcome would reflect the outcome of such power competition behind policy disputes. Therefore, factions could be classified according to different policy orientations. In short, policy positions were prior to the formation of factions, and a particular faction reflected a particular policy position. *Policy position was the cause, and factional competition was the effect.*

However, because of Chinese collectivist culture, the reality in China seemed to be the opposite: the formation of factions was prior to policy positions, and policy positions were determined not by each individual's policy preference, but by the immediate leader of a faction to which each individual belongs. In Chinese culture, an individual does not see himself as an independent, self-seeking entity with a subjectivity

that cannot be penetrated by any collectivity; instead, each individual sees himself as a part of various social relationships that he enjoys being a part of and is ready and willing to make contribution by devoting himself to the collective good. Part of this devotion may come from social or collective pressure, and part of it may be out of sincerity.

Whether it is a moral pretension out of collective pressure or an affectionate enjoyment out of sincere heart, open pursuit of self interests and open competition for a particular interest is both embarrassing and uncomfortable, and in some occasions unbearable.

Therefore, factional competition is usually carried out in a very subtle, informal way, unless the highest central authority has lost its neutral status and involves itself in the competition. This would lead to open conflicts since the highest leader can no longer be a neutral arbitrator for the dispute. Therefore, policy positions are determined by a factional leader, or patron who competes with and defeats opponent factions, and the lower level followers or clients will comply. Even when an individual has not come to full understanding of the moral implications or material benefits of a particular policy position, in his heart he has already decided to support such policy position because of his trust in his leader or because he is willing to show his filial affection (loyalty) to his patron. And in return, his patron will take good care of him. Such mutual relationships

involve both material interests and adoring love, and are thus more than just rational cost-benefit calculations. In short, factional competition develops prior to policy positions, and instead of a particular faction reflecting a particular policy position, factions use policy positions to engage in power competition: *factional competition is the cause, and policy position is the effect.*

Secondly, the above pluralist factionalism model explains foreign policy by tracing the decision-makers' foreign policy considerations back to "domestic political ecology and balance of power."²⁵ Here the image of a decision-maker is a rational individual who is only engaged in a cost-benefit analysis of the domestic reality of relative power advantages; the moral principles stated in China's foreign policy were not taken seriously by the researchers cited above. Such analyses based on rationalism and individualism may only convey part of the truth and neglect that an important part of choice-making may come from identity. In the case of China's foreign policy, national identity and sub-national collective identity may offer rich accounts for the policy outcomes.²⁶

²⁵ Chih-yu Shih, "The Faith in Individualism in University of California Press for Thirty Years," in Chih-yu Shih, *Shuping Zhongguo* (Book Reviews on China Studies) (Taipei: Hanlu Publishers, 1998), p. 27.

²⁶ See Lowell Dittmer and Samuel Kim (eds.), *China's Quest for National Identity* (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993); also, Chih-yu Shih, *China's Just World: The Morality of Chinese Foreign Policy* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1993), and *The Spirit of Chinese Foreign Policy: A Psycho-cultural View*

(2) Structural-Functionalism

According to Harry Harding, the kinds of messages at hand will determine researchers' research content. Indeed, the lack of information available in the 1950s and 1960s contributed to an interpretation of China as under the total control of a totalitarian, united regime. In the 1970s academic interest in systems theory had turned researchers' attention to policy inputs, and such research interest coincided with the appearance of many refugees in Hong Kong, which offered researchers an unprecedented opportunity to carry out in-depth interviews and thus research the roles that individuals played in the policy input process.²⁷

Structural-Functionalism conveys an image of China as a system, and various phenomena in society as inputs to the system, which generates policies as outputs. In the general model, input functions include interest articulation and interest aggregation, the former being "the way interests are expressed typically in either spoken or written discourse by individuals and the groups or parties to which they belong,"²⁸ and the latter being "performed by political parties and other groups as structures, each

(London: Macmillan, 1990).

²⁷ Chih-yu Shih, "Pingjie The American Studies of Contemporary China" ("A Review on The American Studies of Contemporary China"), in Chih-yu Shih, *Shuping Zhongguo* (Book Reviews on China Studies) (Taipei: Hanlu Publishers, 1998), p. 80.

²⁸ Mark V. Kauppi and Paul R. Viotti, *Comparative Politics Theory* (New York: Longman, forthcoming), chapter 1.

grouping holding at least some interests in common.”²⁹ Then through political participation (competitive elections in democratic countries), these interests will be represented in the congress and compete with one another to become rules. So output functions include rule making, rule application, and rule adjudication, and they are “performed respectively by the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government.”³⁰ The political process is launched by atom-like, self-seeking individuals and is thus bottom-up participation, from society to state. But in the case of China, not only the input functions were carried out by a mono structure (communist party), but also the output functions. Political participation was usually through top-down mobilization launched by the elite, thus in this model China was seen as incompletely differentiated, and its participatory culture was categorized as subject culture which belonged to a less developed category.³¹

Critics of this model have long pointed out its weaknesses.³² Among them, ethnocentrism is the most severe criticism. In the case of China, just stating that

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ See Gabriel Almond and G. Bingham Powell, *Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach* (Boston: Little Brown, 1966), and *Comparative Politics: System, Process, and Policy* (Boston: Little Brown, 1978); Gabriel Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr. (eds.), *Comparative Political Studies* (Boston: Little Brown, 1984); and Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963).

³² Please see Howard J. Wiarda (ed.), *New Directions in Comparative Politics* (Boulder: Westview, 1991 & 2002), chapter 1; also, Howard J. Wiarda, *Introduction to Comparative Politics: Concepts and Processes* (Orlando: Harcourt Brace College Publishers, 2000), pp. 56-60.

China's political system is incompletely differentiated did not guide researchers to understand the real input functions (like, consultation function) and some subtle practice of output functions (like, the dilution or intentionally misinterpretation of the center's policy spirit at the local or lower working level instead of open resistance of a policy) that occurred under the current institutions of democratic-centralism. It did not help researchers to appreciate the pressure that decision-makers faced in a collectivist culture: for example, Mao had to pretend to keep a neutral moral position among the competing factions, but at the same time was able to promote the policy that he really wanted, like: the decision to shift from leaning to the Soviet Union to a pro-United States foreign policy, during cultural revolution when the aura of the time was still one that was filled with the extreme sentiment of anti-American imperialism. It did not direct researchers to be sensitive to China's usually subtle political language that may signal significant changes about to occur.³³ Finally it failed to bring researchers into close observation of

³³ For example, there is a subtle difference between the definition, in constitution, of China as "a socialist state of the dictatorship of the proletariat" and the definition of China as "a socialist state under the people's democratic dictatorship." When the latter expression replaced the former one in constitution, it signaled a big change of the central theme in the current era: it downgraded the importance of class struggle. See Suisheng Zhao, "Toward a Rule of Law Regime: Political Reform under China's Fourth Generation of Leadership," in Suisheng Zhao (ed.), *Debating Political Reform in China: Rule of Law vs. Democratization* (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2006), p. 238.

Other examples include: the different expressions of the "central work" usually signaled a new era in different time, see Pan Wei, "Toward a Consultative Rule of Law Regime in China," in Suisheng Zhao, *op cit.*, p. 36; The inclusion of Jiang Zemin's "Three Represents" into the constitution signaled the party has shifted from representing the mass to representing both the mass and the elites—a huge change since the establishment of the CCP in China.

changes in China's political development. Without the functions and plural structures listed in this model as necessary for an advanced, fully developed system, and without bottom-up political participation based on each individual's interests to be qualified as an advanced civic culture, the political system and participatory culture in China would be interpreted as underdeveloped and seen as static, with little change going.

Nevertheless, this model still had its virtue. Some scholar tried to refine this model and combine some of its elements with other conceptions (incentive types in sociology, and incentive direction in new institutionalism) to make it a useful design to account for the change of the communist regime to democratic institutions. This might have important implications for China's political development.³⁴

3. New Institutionalism³⁵

In political science, there are three versions of new institutionalism: rational choice institutionalism, historical institutionalism, and sociological

³⁴ See Yu-shan Wu, *Gongchan Shijie De Bianqian: Sige Gongdang Zhengquan De Bijiao* (The Transformations in the Communist World: A Comparison of Four Communist Regimes) (Taipei: Dongda Publishers, 1995).

³⁵ Most of the analyses, citations, and critiques in this section are from Chih-yu Shih, "The Faith in Individualism in University of California Press for Thirty Years," in Chih-yu Shih, *Shuping Zhongguo* (Book Reviews on China Studies) (Taipei: Hanlu Publishers, 1998), pp. 28-32, and "The Blind Spots of Contemporary New Institutionalism on China," in Chih-yu Shih, op cit., pp. 57-71, also, *Zhongguodalu De Guojia Yu Shehui* (The State and Society in China Mainland) (Taipei: Wunan Publishers, 1994), pp. 28-31.

institutionalism.³⁶ Most researchers in China studies who adopt new institutionalism as an analytical approach belong to the rational choice version. So in this section, when I refer to new institutionalism, it will mean rational choice institutionalism. Beginning from the 1980s, China's reforms had changed the academic impression of a totalitarian regime, and although the phenomenon of factional competition was still occurring, the main concerns in China seemed to be centering on economic and political reforms, both involving the prospect of institutional change. And at the same time, mainstream academic interest in the 1980s has turned from a pluralist approach (including group analysis and structural-functionalism, popular in the 1960s and 1970s) to a state-centered approach consisting of the state-society analytical model and new institutionalism. Therefore, in China studies, new institutionalism became popular. New institutionalism emphasized that institutional design could change, strengthen, or sustain a person's behavior and values, by the direction of incentive structure. It conveyed an image of Chinese politics based on the patron-client (cadre-citizen, or central cadre-local cadre) reciprocal relationship, instead of based on a one-way relationship of state's total control of citizens, as described by the totalitarian model. It did not assume that political flow

³⁶ Please see Thomas A. Koelble, "The New Institutionalism in Political Science and Sociology," *Comparative Politics* (January, 1995): 231-243; Peter A. Hall and Rosemary C. R. Taylor, "Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms," *Political Studies* (1996): 936-957.

was bottom-up (from citizens to state) and interest groups were necessary structure to perform input functions, as structural-functionalism depicted. The patron-client relationship described in this model was based on individualism and materialism where the superiors who had resources in their command reached out to the inferiors to build a patron-client relationship by a particular means of resource sharing. The unit of analysis is individual and the incentive for actions is material; the superiors and the inferiors depended on each other for their personal self interests, so both benefited from such a relationship. Researches of this kind were conducted in both industrial and agricultural sectors.

In the industrial sector, a research on factory political culture discovered such a relationship. A cadre and a worker searched for each other just like two individuals searching for each other in the market. The cadre wanted to develop his own relationship network with workers in the factory, and among workers there were some activists trying to become the chosen ones by performing well in carrying out production missions and especially in the factory's political learning sessions. The cadres relied on these activists to convey political message to workers and feedback message from workers back to the cadre; and the activists relied on the cadre to favor them with the

distribution of social, economic, and political welfare. So this was a reciprocal relationship based on mutual benefits, instead of a one-way, top-down total control; it was vertically structured rather than the horizontally structured interest groups in a pluralist model. It was unlike the traditional Chinese patron-client relationship which was based on ethical order, so such a decision-making culture was named “neo-traditionalism.”³⁷

Neo-traditionalism was criticized, however, by another researcher who offered a different image of the cadre-worker relationship. This was named “unit socialism.” In neo-traditionalism, the activist workers (the clients) were depicted as faithful followers of the state cadres (the patrons) in the factory, and such a relationship naturally strengthened and consolidated the political authority of the state. In contrast, “unit socialism” emphasized the autonomy and self protection of a factory (as a community) against the state. Workers in most cases were lifetime employees of a factory and their material welfare (the basic needs of life, including income, residence, marriage, and retirement fund) was dependent upon the factory. Factory cadres could not dismiss these lifetime employees, and cadres themselves usually had to stay at a factory for many

³⁷ See Andrew Walder, *Communist Neo-traditionalism: Work and Authority in Chinese Industry* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986)

years before transferring to another enterprise or being promoted to higher position, so they needed to develop a harmonious relationship with workers in order to attain effective management. A factory became a community and both state cadres and workers developed a collective identity of the factory; the most crucial political issue in the factory, therefore, was the collective income of this enterprise and bonus distribution. Any decision, thus, was attained by the consensus between cadres and workers. So the decision-making culture depicted in unit socialism is unlike the patron-client image in neo-traditionalism. The latter was criticized as a coating of the totalitarianism model since factory cadres' resources depended upon the communist party and ultimately it was the party that commanded the factory decisions.³⁸

In the agricultural sector, there was a parallel debate between new institutionalism and neo-classicalism. New institutionalist researcher Oi held a similar view of patron-client relationship between state cadres, village cadres, and peasant citizens. Before reform, village cadres and villagers needed to maintain good relationships with state cadres in a planned economy in order to gain favorable treatment regarding the quantity and quality of grains levied; in many occasions, villagers had to

³⁸ See Brantly Womack, "Transfigured Community: Neo Traditionalism and Work Unit Socialism in China," *The China Quarterly* 126 (June, 1991): 313-332.

sacrifice their interests to meet the state commissioned production mission. The village appeared weak and lacked any autonomy before the state. After reform, the property rights were transferred from the state to the village, and thus enhanced the bargaining power of village cadres when facing the state cadres. Therefore, a new type of patron-client relationship had developed where the villagers became loyal to their immediate village leaders. The role of the state began to withdraw, and village communities gained more autonomy.³⁹ Neoclassical scholar Shue, in contrast, saw village communities, before the reform, as autonomous from the state. Peasant cadres were always able to find ways to deceive the state and engaged in various economic activities that benefited the local village community. The Communist party, before, did not really penetrate Chinese society, and citizen peasants were still only loyal to traditional gentry now disguised as village cadres under communism. In short, traditional regional protectionism did not change under the communist state. But after reform, the penetration of the market was so powerful that it changed villagers' loyalty to the gentry. Now village peasants could themselves become free competitors in the market, and no longer relied on local gentry to raise their living standards. The state became more powerful in exerting its

³⁹ Jean Oi, *State and Peasant in Contemporary China: The Political Economy of Village Government* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989).

influence on village communities due to its ability to influence the market using financial policies as leverage tools. The role of the state began to rise, and the autonomy of village communities was weakened.⁴⁰ Later, Oi was criticized for neglecting the power of the market.⁴¹ In response to that critique, Oi argued that lots of non-market means (using social relationships, including “backdoor economy”) were being utilized, and she accounted for such phenomena by appealing to each individual’s rational considerations of material interests. This is a typical argument of new institutionalism in downgrading the market myth of neoclassicalism.⁴²

Despite their debates, all the above researchers did not question their assumption of individualism and materialism. In analyzing the formation of a patron-client relationship or the bargaining between state cadres and local village cadres, the unit of analysis was always individual, and the individual actor’s considerations were always about personal material interests: welfare, job promotion. What was neglected was that an individual might not be a self-seeking subject as assumed by rationalism. This is similar to the formation of a faction discussed previously in the factionalism

⁴⁰ Vivienne Shue, *The Reach of the State: Sketches of the Chinese Body Politic* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988)

⁴¹ Nee Victor, “A Theory of Market Transition: From Redistribution to Markets in State Socialism,” *American Sociological Review* 54, 5 (1989): 663-681.

⁴² Jean Oi, “Rational Choice and Attainment of Wealth and Power in the Countryside,” in Goodman and Hooper (eds.) (1994): pp.64-79.

model. Workers and cadres were not like individuals searching for each other in the market and forming a relationship based only on materialist concerns. Before the formation of the network in a factory, social relationships had already existed. Factory network, like factions, were an opportunity for the existing social relationship to utilize. Behind the formal factory network were private relationships coming from relatives, lineage or clan linkage, neighbors, or old factional acquaintance during the Cultural Revolution. It was after a worker had become a member of the formal network that he began to develop the kind of activism being observed by Walder, in order to honor the existing, informal, social relationship as an expression of his filial affection. This was in opposition to Walder's theory that he tried to be active, performing well in order to attract the attention from the cadres, for more material gains. Therefore, researchers' assumption of rational individualism created blind spots in the appreciation of the decision-making culture in the factory. Similarly, a research agenda of existing social relationships between the bargaining cadres was not included in Oi's research; thus the rich bargaining information collected was only interpreted in terms of two independent individuals' personal interests. The collectivity that the bargaining cadre represented, and the pressure generated from such collective identity, was absent in the analyses, which was pitiful in

terms of the time and energy devoted, and the rich information collected in the field work. Similar rationalist analyses had been presented in several other studies of the power-money exchange between state cadres and enterprise cadres,⁴³ or policy coordination between central and local cadres,⁴⁴ but again, each individual cadre was seen as representing himself and his personal considerations were limited to personal gains.⁴⁵ Still another researcher, Yang, sticking to the position of new institutionalism, interpreted the abolishment of the commune system in the village as liberalization, bottom-up development. But he actually understood the importance of political power struggles in launching reforms, which had little direct relationship with the transaction cost of the commune system. So he termed village reform as a path “rupture” from the previous path of the commune system to the current liberal one. The problem is, instead of a “rupture,” the reform is actually a return to a traditional collectivist path (the small farm system) where peasants’ concerns were usually based on another collective identity. In short, despite his good understanding of Chinese collectivist reality, his position of

⁴³ Susan L. Shirk, *The Political Logic of Economic Reform in China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992).

⁴⁴ Yaseng Huang, *Inflation and Investment controls in China: The Political Economy of Central-Local Relations during the Reform Era* (Cambridge: Cambridge University press, 1996).

⁴⁵ According to Chih-yu Shih, Huang actually displayed much richer understanding of Chinese social relationships and its crucial causal role in accounting for political phenomena, but he wanted to simplify the analyses and treat social relationship as a tool for rational individuals to use for personal job promotion, thus Huang’s position became closer to new institutionalism and sacrificing his rich understanding of social relationship.

new institutionalism guided him to claim that village reform was the achievement of the maximization of individuals' interests.⁴⁶

In addition to the issue of the patron-client relationship and path rupture, another important study concerns the issue of property rights. For new institutionalism, different arrangements of property rights offered different incentive structures, and thus different opportunities for each self-seeking individual to maximize his personal interests. Designing clear norms of property rights would enhance each individual's personal incentive to pursue efficiency, and thus enhance efficiency at the macro-level; the normative implication of this was, therefore, a call for democracy in the process to truly guarantee the protection of private property rights. In contrast, cultural and social structural perspectives would notice the crucial role of social relationships in accounting for an individual's concerns over his social relationships (moral incentive or moral pretension that generated pressure for upholding, or being not affordable to neglect, the collective identity and collective interests), and the resulting behavior of using the opportunities offered in different design of property rights to seek benefit for the collectivity that he represented, or to consolidate the relationship that he was a part of. So

⁴⁶ Dali Yang, *Calamity and Reform in China: State, Rural Society, and Industrial Change since the Great Leap Forward Famine* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996).

the same kind of behavior might have different interpretations from a new institutionalism perspective versus the cultural and social structural perspectives.

Granick thought that the difference in the arrangement of property rights would account for both the phenomena that Chinese enterprises had many “mothers-in-law,” and the extent that enterprises exceeded their quota of work in production missions.⁴⁷ That is, he used the change in property rights to explain the change both in the environment of enterprise administration, and in enterprise behavior. The problem was that he might have confused with cause and effect. Because his starting point was the change in property rights, he failed to analyze the policy negotiations among central agencies, local governments, and enterprises that had led to the existence of or a change in the property rights. When there was a change in property rights, a researcher should first discover who (the mothers-in-law: which central agencies, which local governments) had launched the change, and when the local government had obtained or returned a particular enterprise’s property right, it would mean that all parties in the policy negotiation had achieved policy consensus about how to distribute the production missions and interests, and how to define the responsibilities of administration

⁴⁷ David Granick, *Chinese State Enterprises: A Regional Property Rights Analysis* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1990).

and guidance. Therefore, change in property rights was an effect, and the agreed policy by all negotiating parties (mothers-in-law) was the cause. And how a particular enterprise would change its production behavior was also an effect of the policy that had determined the quota of production missions and left the room for extra-production. So researchers had to first discover who the negotiating parties were, and what collective interests each negotiating individual represented.

Another scholar, Lee, presented a three-layer patron-client relationship to analyze interactions among state cadres, enterprise cadres, and workers, and observed their behavioral adjustment under different property rights institutions. Lee understood Chinese social relationships (insiders' conspiracy for collective gains), but again, like Walder, he saw those social relationships only as tools for each individual to exploit when taking advantage of the unclear state of property rights. It was seen as a conspiracy between self-seeking individuals, the unit of analysis being each individual. Instead, a cultural and social structural view would see any such opportunity as a chance to be grabbed by an existing social relationship. Any activity, policy, or business would carry the imprint of interactions among many existing social relationships. The unit of analysis is each such relationship of which an individual sees himself as a part. Such a

collectivist spirit may or may not change in the future, but up until now it is still a very important source in accounting for Chinese people's behavior.⁴⁸

Adopting a purely analytical path (no normative implications involved), Wu tried to compare four Leninist-party led areas (Mainland China, Hungary, the Soviet Union, and Taiwan) and see their different developmental paths under the change in property rights.⁴⁹ In order to keep his commitment to a purely analytical attitude, he developed an abstract classification of three types of property rights. But in the real world the states of property rights were actually vague, so Wu claimed that his analysis would not be a structural analysis, but a process analysis, which emphasizes dynamics and details. But emphasizing dynamics and details caused further problems because it was very hard to build causal linkage between abstract classification (clear state of property rights) and the dynamic world in process (constant change of the states of property rights). So Wu attributed the change of property rights to four outside factors: ideology, national security, agricultural type, and international financial pressure. In this way Wu departed from the orthodox new institutionalist position. But he tried to return to an individualist position and said that each individual maximized his personal interests

⁴⁸ Keun Lee, *Chinese Firms and the State in Transition: Property Rights and Agency Problems in the Reform Era* (Armonk, N. Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1991).

⁴⁹ Yu-shan Wu, *Comparative Economic Transformations: Mainland China, Hungary, the Soviet Union, and Taiwan* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994).

under the restrictions structured by these four outside factors. Like other new institutionalists, Wu did not believe that social relationships accounted for people's behavior. Huang, Wu, and Lee all assumed that government officials, managers, and economists were all commissioned by the state, and that their personal interests lay in the fulfillment of state directives in raising productivity, and thus getting career promotions. But many of them took advantage of the unclear states of property rights for personal gains which would threaten the state interests. The problem is that such opportunism actually reflected both the unclear state of property rights and the ongoing operation of the existing social relationships. Without analyzing the operation of the existing social relationships, the interpretation would not get to a full understanding of the influence of change in property rights: that is, how these collective social relationships contribute to or restrict the direction of change in property rights, and how after the reform of property rights people used new arrangements of property rights to consolidate the existing social relationships. Institutions, in whatever type, new or old, changed or unchanged, are all opportunities for people to benefit and consolidate the existing social relationships. Therefore, one may well be skeptical about the claim that the introduction of democratic institutions would bring about the behavioral adjustment expected by new

institutionalism.

4. The Cultural Approach (Cultural-Psychological Model)⁵⁰

The above three categories of models are the mainstream models that have been popular in China studies since the 1950s. There have been very few scholars adopting a cultural psychological model in China studies. Here I will divide the cultural approach into two groups: the first group does not take a teleological view of China's political development, and therefore the position is closer to cultural relativism, on the issues of human rights, the appearance of a civil society based on pluralism, and the final transformation of China's political institutions to a multiparty democracy. In short, it rejects the modernization school, both the initial and sophisticated versions. The second group is from the modernization school that believes China's authoritarian culture will need to change to a democratic culture with economic development and differentiation of social interests. Here I will present Chih-yu Shih to represent the first group and Lucian Pye to represent the second.

Chih-yu Shih has long been reminding the academic circle that liberalist approaches (whether it is totalitarianism model, pluralism in the form of

⁵⁰ In this model, social relationships have been related to cultural psychology, and can actually be absorbed into this model. Therefore, I did not put *social structure* in the title, because the cultural psychological model has actually included it.

factionalism model or in the form of structural-functionalism model, state-centered approaches in the form of state-society analysis or in the form of new institutionalism) have all carried a cultural bias based on rationalism and individualism. A good study of China should be able to enter into the Chinese mindset and the Chinese people's hearts, which were formed in the millennia-long cultural tradition and in the century-long clash of civilizations between China and the West. Both collectivism (from cultural tradition in the past several millennia) and nationalism (from clash of civilizations in the past century) should be taken seriously. A collectivist perspective will need to start with the social relationships that an individual's identity has been rooted in, which will mean that an individual's cognition of "self" may not be independent from the social relationship that he belongs to. Nationalism should not be seen just as one element of national interests, because nationalism is a strong collective identity instead of a tool for rational calculation like the discourse of national interests would present it to be; also, it may not be pertinent to see nationalism as an antithesis of democracy, though in many occasions it appears so, which actually comes from clashes of civilizations between modern China and the West.

In his examination of the change in Chinese traditional political culture under the practice of a socialist economy, Shih argued that the change had been a

change in nature, not just a cyclical turn that would turn back after some time of departure, and this was because of the practice of socialist economic institutions. In a word, there had been a permanent decline, since the Production Great Leap Forward, in traditional cultural psychological belief in the *political regime as a moral regime*. The decline of such a belief was due to the regime's abuse of moral calling power (calling people to make tremendous sacrifice to pursue the moral goal of communism that turned out to be a fake image) to coercively develop communist economic institutions. After that attempt had failed, the regime still stayed in power and pretended that the moral goal of communism was still in process and was about to succeed, which made people, from cadres up to central leaders all become cognizant of the fact that the regime had been only pretending its moral teachings. The Cultural Revolution which aimed at saving the regime's legitimacy (as a moral regime pursuing communism for the benefit of the people) further led the society into moral bankruptcy, the result of which was the Three Credibility Crises (Sanxinweiji). Twelve years of reform had proved that the regime was unable to rebuild moral authority in the political domain. Therefore it seemed that the moral decline (both of the regime and of the political culture) since the Production Great Leap Forward had not been just a temporary phenomenon, but a continuous normalcy.

The proof was all the phenomena occurring in the reform era, which included the wane of the monoist value system, the openness of factional power struggle, the irrelevance of ideology, the maturity of regional economic forces, the universalization of market behavior, the establishment of enterprise identity, the relaxation of the plan system, the appearance of the local elite, and the loss of people's goal of life.⁵¹

In a work that questioned the effectiveness of the popular state-society analysis, Shih presented a theory of two "partial selves" to account for the seemingly cyclic turns of China's political-economic development. Each individual, especially the middle-level cadres (like the enterprise leadership or the village cadres), in current Chinese society had within his heart two conflicting "partial selves": one is a collective identity with the state and its interests, and the other is a collective identity with the enterprise community or village community that he was in. These two "partial selves" were in constant struggle within his heart. The way to reconcile such conflicts was to take turns to satisfy each "partial self" at different time, in different occasions, and on different issues. In one occasion, he might need to prove himself as a very spiritual person that had only the state interests at heart, and in another occasion he might just

⁵¹ See Chih-yu Shih, *Zhongguo Dalu Zhengzhi Jingji Yanli* (The Reason of Mainland China's Political Economy) (Taipei: Wunan Publishers, 1992).

forget his identity as a state official and turn to a citizen that very much cared about the material interests of his community or his personal social relationships. Thus the macro-level political-economic development would take turns to reflect the rotational expression of the two partial selves at the micro-level. So each individual in current Chinese society actually acted as the agent of the state at one moment, and as the agent of society at another moment, thus making the model of state-society analysis not an effective or relevant one. In the logic of such an analysis, the expectation of the appearance of a civil society, and later, democratization in China is groundless, and could be self-deluding, because people had their own way to pursue their private material interests (as described above), they would not need an autonomous civil society, let alone democratic institutions to protect their private interests.⁵²

Shih's other works center on similar concerns about the bias of liberalism in China studies. His cultural understanding of the Chinese mindset and Chinese heart made him very skeptical about the expectation of democratization in China's political development. In short, Shih emphasized the particularity of Chinese cultural psychology. China's political development, Shih argued, might lead to feudal

⁵² See Chih-yu Shih, *Zhongguodalu De Guojia Yu Shehui* (The State and Society in China Mainland) (Taipei: Wunan Publishers, 1994).

pluralism (plural social forces based on collective identity, instead of self-seeking individual's subjectivity) and collective democracy (under a single communist party).⁵³

Long famous in the circle of China studies, Lucian Pye interprets communist China's authoritarian political culture as an offspring of traditional imperial ideology coming from Confucianism. Even the subtle way of factional politics during Cultural Revolution could be successfully accounted for by Pye's political psychological analysis.⁵⁴ The reform in the 1980s did not change Pye's belief in the applicability of traditional Chinese collectivist culture.⁵⁵ For Pye, Chinese political culture of authoritarianism is rooted in the unique way Chinese saw power. Power was related to social status. Those who had higher status would not seek power openly, because that would be seen as selfish; rather, power was devoted to them automatically by those who had lower status. The leadership only needed to pretend to be moral, neutral, and representative of all the people without caring about their personal interests or leaning to one particular faction's interests. Harmony needed to be maintained on the surface, though factional politics might be going on heatedly. If factions engaged in open

⁵³ See Chih-yu Shih, op cit., chapter 1, and *Collective Democracy: Political and Legal Reform in China* (Hong Kong: The Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1999).

⁵⁴ See Lucian Pye, *The Spirit of Chinese Politics* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1968).

⁵⁵ See Lucian Pye, *The Dynamics of Chinese Politics* (Cambridge: Oelgeschlager, Gunn & Hain, 1981), *Asian Power and Politics: The Cultural Dimension of Authority* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), and *The Mandarin and Cadre* (Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies, the University of Michigan, 1988).

competition, it would have serious moral implications because that would mean the highest leader had lost his moral calling power to harmonize the competing interests. This would in turn cause anxiety across the whole society whose order was based on the harmonious relationships among citizens and between the moral ruling elite and the materialistic, selfish peasant citizens. Social mobility is actually moral mobility. Higher status usually implied higher moral knowledge. Thus the breaking of harmony is the most unbearable thing. Not only would open competition among citizens not be encouraged, open challenge to the leadership was something unthinkable-- the leadership represented the whole society, the whole civilization. Since factions would not engage in open competition, they would compete in all kinds of subtle ways, for example: hiding behind policy positions to pretend to compete for moral principles contained in each policy position. Similar patterns of behavior appeared in the reform era. Negotiation style was a reflection of social relationships, and material pursuit was an expression of collective identity and interests. In short, this was a collectivist society and collective identity needed to be taken seriously. Finally, Pye was a believer of the modernization school, though a sophisticated one. He expected a change of authoritarian culture would gradually happen with increasing differentiation of social interests. His interpretation of

democratization in Taiwan was this: Taiwan was a good example of the traditional thesis of the modernization school, that economic development would lead to the emerging of the middle class, which in turn would lead to increasing level of political participation, which was the process of democratization.⁵⁶ Obviously, this would be his expectation of China's political development.

(4) Methodology

The title of my dissertation is *Chinese Democracy: How Elite Thinking on China's Development and Change Influences Chinese Practice of Democracy (1839—the Current Time)*. It includes two parts: chapters two to five are historical analysis, and chapters six to eight are the interviews. The methodology is qualitative methodology, involving case studies based on historical methods for chapters two to five, and face-to-face, in-depth interviews in field research for chapters six to eight.

It is my assumption that Chinese elite thinking on China's development and change has been influencing the Chinese practice of democracy since the Opium War (1839) and will continue to have great impacts upon the Chinese pursuit of democracy in the next 20 years. I use chapters two to five of my dissertation, the

⁵⁶ From Pye's lecture in 1991 (citation to be checked)

historical analysis, to demonstrate the causal relationship between Chinese elite thinking on the development and change of Chinese society on the one hand, and Chinese historical practice of democracy (from 1839 till the current time, including “Leninist democracy”) on the other hand, the former being the independent variable and the latter being the dependent variable. The method used in chapters two to five, therefore, is historiography. I develop my causal analyses based on extensive reading of historians’ and social scientists’ works. And then I use chapters six to eight of my dissertation, the interviews, as the most current information that reveals Chinese social trends toward the next 20 years, and make an assessment of whether, in the next 20 years (2004 to 2024), China will become a western style, multiparty democracy—and if the answer is yes, what that democracy will look like. For example, one could argue that such a democracy will be a combination of western democracy (based on the value of individualism) and Chinese culture (based on the value of collectivism). The method used in chapters six to eight, therefore, is face-to-face, in-depth interviews.

Whether the argument given in the above example is true is subject to empirical examination of future events, but it is my job to make a judgment at the present time in my dissertation, and the judgment is based on chapters two to five, the historical

analyses of the long-term trend, and chapters six to eight, the information gained from the interviewees. Although the interviewees (in chapters six to eight) were not necessarily elites, they came from the four elite groups in current Chinese society: government officials, intellectuals, businessmen, and media professionals. Their views, I believe, could represent those views commonly shared by current Chinese elites, and therefore, according to my assumption, would have significant impacts upon the Chinese pursuit of democracy in the next 20 years. The interview question did not directly ask question about democracy; rather, it asked the interviewee's personal opinions about "the factors that have been driving or limiting the development and change of X city (in the context of development and change of Chinese society since 1839), carrying it toward the next 20 years." So the interviewees did not directly talk about democracy—they just expressed their views on positive and negative factors that might influence the development and change of the city that they were in. Because in urban development one can best experience the tension between traditional values and modern values, the development and change of a city (in the context of the development and change of Chinese society since 1839) should reveal valuable information about the social trends.

The interviewees were advised to follow the four-point guideline

included in the questionnaire: (1) general understanding (the general answer to the question asked); (2) state role (positive and negative) in the process of development and change; (3) self role (positive and negative factors for self fulfillment), including career role (positive and negative), with both roles placed in the bigger picture of the society's development and change; (4) expectations for the future (positive and negative). The talks were open-ended, and semi-structured as described above. From the talks, one could gain an understanding about the relative weight that an interviewee placed on the state and self (including his profession). From that, one could make judgments on the social trends: whether the society was moving toward a culture that will place more emphasis on individual rights, whether collectivist ethics would still strongly dominate Chinese people's minds, and if both individualism and collectivism were elements of the value system of this society, what would be the balance or combination between them? Such information would include very useful clues for one to judge on the future of the Chinese practice of democracy (Leninist democracy? western style democracy? or what alternative routes would emerge?)

The interviewees included four groups of people:

(1) Government officials: those who were employed by the government, worked at a

- government agency or department, and gained their regular income from the government because of their service in governmental office. This group included the party cadres.
- (2) Scholars (intellectuals): those who taught at universities, and conducted research as their regular activities besides teaching. This group included those who worked for research institutes and only conducted research without regular teaching obligations. This group also included graduate students.
- (3) Enterprise people (businessmen): those who owned a company, or worked for an enterprise. The enterprises included state-owned, collectively owned, privately owned enterprises, and joint ventures owned by Chinese and non-Chinese.
- (4) Media professionals: journalists and program broadcasters who worked for newspapers, magazines, televisions, or broadcasting networks. This group included dramatists.

These were face-to-face interviews. Each participant talked for about thirty minutes, or more if he or she so chose. The interviewee's responses were open-ended; I just took notes and did not intervene during his or her talks except in necessary situations or for the purpose of clarification (making sure what I had heard was the same as what he or she

had just said). It was the interviewee's thoughts and feelings that I wanted to learn from. I adopted a role like a student to humbly learn from the interviewees, with full respect to their expressed thoughts and feelings.

I have collected around 120 interviews, and in this dissertation, I present 18 of them⁵⁷ drawn from Shanghai as *representative cases*, based on my own judgment that these 18 persons' opinions can best represent the richness and diversity of the four groups I am examining. The reason for limiting my initial focus to Shanghai is that if democratic ideas are to take root in China as a whole, they likely will take hold first in major, cosmopolitan cities like Shanghai. Although this dissertation is limited to these 18 cases, I will continue this project in my post-doctoral research on the prospects of Chinese democracy using the data and other new information from other cities like Beijing and Guangzhou that are not included in this dissertation. In other words, this dissertation is only the first part of the project; there will be other parts in the days ahead.

Why do I choose Shanghai instead of Beijing or Guangzhou to represent China's future? Compared with Shanghai, Beijing has very little modern elements: its bureaucrats lean too much toward ideology and its people toward

⁵⁷ See chapters six to eight.

narrow-minded nationalism;⁵⁸ Guangzhou is more business-focused and is not concerned very much with the issue of democracy.⁵⁹ Democracy is less likely to begin in these cities. Shanghai is the most advanced and the most westernized city in the big cities of China. I believe that the future of China likely will be a *fusion* of Chinese culture (the traditional elements) and the western culture (the modern elements). So there are three reasons that I choose Shanghai. (1) Shanghai has a *character* that is able to include and intermingle all kinds of different elements; historically it has achieved a good *fusion* of Chinese culture and western culture, so the fusion of different cultures is not unfamiliar to this city. (2) The tension between traditional elements and modern elements is best represented in the development of this city, so this city's residents must learn how best to tackle such tension to achieve a balance. (3) The problems emerging in the process of modernization⁶⁰ in this fastest growing city are the most obvious, so its citizens

⁵⁸ See chapter eight, the talks from interviewee No. 15.

⁵⁹ Here is the reason why:

The Chinese academic field has been placing their greatest hope for social reformation on the class of private business owners. However, considering how business owners survive in China, one can easily see that they have developed a symbiotic relationship where their interests depend on the political elite. For many of them, instead of accumulating wealth through market competition, they become rich as a result of favors bestowed by government officials. The government officials who have the power to allot formally national or collectively owned resources have become the ones to 'create the rich.' The white-collar and high-tech elites who work in foreign enterprises regard 'staying away from politics' as their core value. They are only interested in becoming rich and having fun and do not want to endanger the very source of their income.

See He Qinglian, "The New Myth in China: China's Rising Middle-class Will Accelerate Democratization." In (<http://www.danke4china.net/ywwz/15.htm>).

⁶⁰ Like lacking concerns of the relationship between human beings and nature, lacking concerns of the relationship between development and stability, lacking concerns about health or quality of life, and lacking concerns about each individual's psychological maturity in the developmental process. See chapter 7, the

experienced those problems the most closely. From the above three reasons, I believe Shanghai likely could best represent the future of China as a fusion of Chinese culture and the western culture. From these 18 interviewees from Shanghai we can see how the people of Shanghai deal with such tension between tradition and modernity in their thinking, which may give us a clue about what the future of China (as a fusion of Chinese culture and western culture) will look like.⁶¹

talks from interviewee No. 13.

⁶¹ See chapter nine.

Interview Question

What are the factors that have been driving (or limiting) the development and change of this city, carrying it toward the next 20 years?

1. general understanding
2. state role (positive and negative)
3. self role (positive and negative), including career role (positive and negative)
4. expectations for the future (positive and negative)

The interviewees include four groups of people:

- (1) government officials
- (2) scholars (intellectuals)
- (3) enterprise people (businessmen)
- (4) media professionals

Each person can answer the question for about 30 minutes, or more if he or she so chooses. The question is open-ended and semi-structured, as shown above.

(5) *Outline of the Chapters*

Chapter One: Introduction

Chapter Two: The Qing Dynasty in Crisis (1839—1911)

Chapter Three: The Politics in the Republic of China (1912—1949)

Chapter Four: The Years under Mao Zedong (1949—1976)

Chapter Five: The Reform Years (1978—the current time)

Chapter Six: The Interview Cases in Shanghai (1)

Chapter Seven: The Interview Cases in Shanghai (2)

Chapter Eight: The Interview Cases in Shanghai (3)

Chapter Nine: Conclusion

In chapters two to five, I will demonstrate the causal link between the elites' views of China's development and change and the practice of democracy; both domestic and international contexts will be discussed, so that the formation and change of elites' thoughts (the evaluations of and prescriptions for China's challenges in face of the West) will become clear. Both collectivism (the elites' cultural ideals) and nationalism (the elites' aspirations to save China) will be included in the analyses. In chapter two, the late Qing dynasty's imperial officials and Confucian intellectuals were forced to face

the power of modernity imposed on them by the invading western powers. The intellectual and political elites' views of western advantages have changed from material weapons to political institutions. Constitutional monarchy was suggested, promoted with failure, and finally adopted by the late Qing regime. But the regime did not have chances to seriously practice it, because it was overthrown in just a few years. Before the final adoption of constitutional monarchy, there was a big debate between the elites about which path China should follow: keep the imperial system, or revolutionary change to a republic system? This will be discussed.

In chapter three, the practice of multiparty parliamentary democracy and the reason for its final failure will be analyzed. After the building of the republic, both the reformist and the revolutionary intellectual elites were engaged in party politics in the parliament. The Chinese were bent on democracy, and the spirit of republicanism dominated the intellectuals' minds. Then Yuan Shikai, with his personal, selfish ambition, destroyed this newly budding democracy by trying to bring the nation back to its old imperial path and becoming the Emperor himself. Both the reformist and the revolutionary intellectuals, cherishing the hard built republic and the enlightened spirit contained in it, actively devoted themselves to military revolts against Yuan, and finally

saved the republic. The subsequent politics, up until 1949, did not offer a chance for China to continue its practice of democracy, but the spirit of republicanism had been inherited by the intellectuals of the May Fourth Movement (1915-1923), and carried by generation after generation of liberal intellectuals.

In chapter four, Mao Zedong Thoughts and the Communist Party's practice will be analyzed. As argued before in this chapter (chapter one), the CCP had been popular and won the mind and heart of Chinese people. And it was because of such unconditional support from the Chinese people that communist party was able to carry out any project, as long as the Chinese people continued to believe that it would benefit the whole nation. Nationalism accounted for such strong support, which gave Mao an unprecedented opportunity to experiment with his utopian romanticism. It turned out to be a great disaster. How did history develop like this? The reason behind this will be analyzed.

Chapter five discusses the institutional origin of the major problems that China has been facing in the reform years. The problems will be classified into four categories: the economy, the social structure, the politics, and the culture. These problems have to do with the communist party's insistence on the one party dictatorial rule. Deng

Xiaoping Theory will be investigated, and Jiang Zemin's "Three Represent" discourse and Hu Jintao's ideas of "scientific development" and "the harmonious society" will be briefly discussed.

In chapters six to eight, the interview information will represent the most current views and attitudes on the social trend toward the next 20 years (2004 to 2024). How will an individual see himself? Is there a difference between generations? How will people reconcile nationalism and individualist values? How will people see the state's role? In chapter nine, I will try to detect whether there is a trend in elites' ideas to reconcile nationalism and democracy, and then make my own judgment of China's political development. From 1839 to the current time, and further to the next 20 years (2004 to 2024), there must be a trend, I assume, and the empirical information will give us the answer.

CHAPTER TWO: THE QING DYNASTY IN CRISIS (1839-1911)

As stated in chapter one, the Chinese intellectual elite, the educated stratum, has been both the political and/or cultural leaders of the society and the driving force of societal change. In traditional, dynastic China, an important part of the ruling elite--the imperial bureaucracy--had been composed of and recruited from intellectual elite who mastered in Confucian doctrine on how to govern a society based on a set of moral principles that was believed to be rooted in the natural law of the universe. Thus, traditionally an intellectual⁶² had two ways of *self fulfillment*: he could either join the imperial bureaucracy and become a member of the ruling elite (the political and cultural elite), or stay outside of the officialdom and become a member of the cultural elite by engaging in teaching or illuminating Confucian knowledge and spreading it to the whole society and generation after generation of Chinese to come. The role of the Chinese

⁶² Chinese intellectuals are always Confucian intellectuals. Some of them might be interested in Taoism and/or Buddhism, but for the most part they will still master in Confucianism, because that is the only way of social mobility, and because the whole society was built upon Confucian moral principles.

intellectuals, thus, has been to carry a *missionary spirit* of safeguarding and spreading Confucian teachings of civilization ideals for the whole of mankind. It is because of this *missionary spirit* that Chinese elite (both intellectual and political) had difficulty in modern time (i.e., from the Opium War onward) in coming to terms with the seeming superiority of the western civilization to the Chinese one.

(1) *The International Factors*

Traditionally China never faced a challenge coming from *the ocean*; its threats always came from the mainland, especially the northern nomadic tribes. Challenges from the ocean, posed by the western imperialist powers in the 19th century, seemed to be far more serious than the traditional ones. The threats contained three aspects: material, institutional, and cultural. Materially, the western powers were superior in national wealth and military power; institutionally, their constitutionalism with a parliamentary system seemed to operate better and more efficiently for the benefit of the citizens; and culturally, the doctrines and spiritual faith underpinning their civilization seemed to work better than the Confucianism that had been so central in the Chinese elites' spirit. These three aspects had in turn occupied the mind and heart of Chinese elites in the modern time--that is, since the Opium War (1839-1842).

Chinese elites, in their cause of “saving China,” had continually presented different types of prescriptions, respectively in different periods, to meet the challenges posed by the invading western powers. China had been militarily weak in the face of the advanced military technology of the West, so the first type of prescription, responding to the perceived material advantages of the west, focused on the military building with advanced weapons and gunboats.⁶³ This was the core of the Self-strengthening Movement (1860-1893), led by several famous imperial officials (the political elite who were also Confucian intellectual elite) who had successfully defeated the intractable Taiping Rebellion (1850-1864), and other rebellions.⁶⁴ The efforts of the Self-strengthening Movement proved to be a thorough failure in a series of humiliating defeats in the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895); the Northern Fleet that marked the military efforts of the past thirty years was totally destroyed. China, with its old ways, proved to be unfit for competition in the survival game in the new world.⁶⁵ Thus came

⁶³ The efforts also included railroad building and mining.

⁶⁴ They are the Nian Rebellion (1853-1868), the Southwest Muslim Rebellion (1855-1873), and the Northwest Muslim Rebellion (1862-1878)

⁶⁵ At the final stage of the determinant naval battle (in Feb., 1895), when Chinese commander-in-chief, with his high-ranking subordinates, was prepared to kill himself as a martyr for the Court, he even received a letter of persuasion of surrender from his Japanese counterpart that explained the reasons why China failed again and again in both land and naval battles. The reasons lay, according to the Japanese commander-in-chief, in the differences between China and Japan in the attitude in learning from the west, and therefore, China had to change its *old ways and institutions*, like Japan, in order to survive in the new world.

This letter, with its persuasion and mocking sarcasm. . . coming from the chief of the enemy

the second type of prescription: political reform (the institutional change).

The first effort at political reform was led by Kang Youwei and his student, Liang Qichao, both outstanding intellectuals from the southern intellectual group. Kang and Liang, inspired by the British model, wanted to change the Chinese imperial system to a *constitutional monarchy*. They sent their ideas (in the form of a petition) to the young Emperor in 1895 and organized a very powerful association, *Qiangxue Hui* (the Association of Learning on National Power) that won the support of several famous and powerful Court mandarins, including the teacher of the Emperor. The supporters of this association actually represented the intellectual elite of China at that time; this was because after the desperate defeat in 1895, the whole of the Chinese intellectual elite were aspiring to institutional change, seeing this as the only way to lead China to become a strong nation.⁶⁶

In 1898, Kang and Liang gained an opportunity to fulfill their dreams.

that had completely destroyed both Chinese army and its naval forces, was really a blow of ‘shock therapy’ to the *long paralyzed* Chinese political and intellectual elite, leading the defeated nation to awaken, to the message that ‘political reform’ was far more important than ‘technological reform.’ . . . And from then on, the call for ‘institutional reform’ was thus like an irresistible tempest, and thus emerged the environment for Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao.

For the citations here (italics by me) and the text of the letter of persuasion of surrender, See Degang Tang, *Wanqing Qishi Nian, San: Jiawu Zhanzheng Yu Wuxu Bianfa* (The Seventy Years in Late Qing Dynasty, Book 3: the War in 1894 and the Institutional Chang in 1898) (Taipei: Yuanliu Publishers, 1998), pp. 128-130.

⁶⁶ Unfortunately, Kang was not good at handling human relationship. Almost all Court mandarins were pushed away by his uncompromising dogmatism in Confucian knowledge, which seriously damaged the political base of the Association. The Association was impeached and forced to be dismissed in 1896. The collapse of the Association had sown the seed of failure in the Hundred Days Reform in 1898. See, Degang Tang, op cit., pp.179-189, 192-195, 199-200.

The international powers had recognized the internal weakness of the old Court after its defeat in 1895, and fearlessly, since 1897, engaged in carving up its territory into spheres of influence; China was facing the crisis of partition. The young Emperor was eager to save this country. Thus occurred the historic Hundred Days Reform. Both the Emperor and Kang were so eager to conduct a complete, radical, immediate change that it stimulated tremendous resentment among the old, obstinate bureaucrats, who brought their hatred to the Empress Dowager Ci Xi, the emperor's "mother" and the real powerful figure despite her recent retirement from the Palace, and strongly asked her to come back to the Palace. The factional politics thus undermined the Hundred Days Reform, with a tragic end that witnessed the Emperor being placed in confinement, Kang and Liang fleeing to Japan, and six figures related to the Reform getting killed⁶⁷.

Both Kang and Liang were unsuccessful in their efforts to build a new China. After fleeing to Japan, Liang became the most influential figure in bringing a whole generation of Chinese youth to enlightened thoughts by his tremendously attractive articles⁶⁸. From 1899-1901, Liang advocated constitutional monarchy and attacked the Court politics. But staying long in Japan gave Liang an opportunity to broaden his ideas.

⁶⁷ Kang's younger brother had nothing to do with the Reform, but he was among the six that were killed. For the story in this paragraph, please see: Degang Tang, *op cit.*, pp. 190-200.

⁶⁸ Liang started several publications sequentially to convey his ideas since 1899.

He contacted many Japanese, read extensively on western learning, and met Sun Yat-Sen and was moved by revolutionary ideas. From 1901-1902, Liang became an ardent advocate of revolution and therefore separate from his teacher Kang Youwei, though he did not leave *Baohuang Hui* (The Association of Protecting the Emperor)⁶⁹. But beginning in 1903, after his trip to America, Liang changed again and returned to the camp of constitutional monarchy. Liang was disappointed by American democracy and what he saw as the low quality of overseas Chinese in America. If overseas Chinese who had better economic and educational status were not qualified for a republic, how could the poorer and less-educated citizens back in China form a successful republic? Thus, until the successful revolution in 1912, Liang did not change his hope of a constitutional monarchy in China to save this country.⁷⁰

The second effort at political reform, initiated by Sun Yat-Sen, was revolution. Sun started this effort when he witnessed the Qing's incapacity, evidenced by the Sino-Japanese War in 1894, to deal with international challenges. Sun first started *Xingzhong Hui* (The Association of Reviving China) in 1894, with a slogan of "expelling

⁶⁹ Kang launched this association after fleeing to Canada, and then to Japan, in an effort to protect and save the Guangxu Emperor and continue the abortive political reform, so the association became the house of constitutional-monarchical faction, as opposed to Sun Yat-Sen's revolutionary faction.

⁷⁰ See, Gongquan Xiao, *Zhongguo Zhengzhi Sixiang Shi* (The History of Chinese Political Thoughts), Book II (Taipei :Lianjing Publishers, 1984), pp.782-783, 798-801. Also, Andrew Nathan , *Chinese Democracy*, Chinese translation (Taipei: Wu Nan Book Company, Ltd. ,1994) pp. 89-94. English version, (1985), chapter 3.

Tatar, reviving China,” so this was a revolution based on ethnic identity. In 1905, Sun organized *Tongmeng Hui* (the League of Associations) whose slogan expanded to “expelling Tatar, reviving China, establishing republic, equalizing land.” The political outline stated in its declaration was this: overthrowing the Manchurian government and returning a Han regime to Chinese; establishing a national government whose people enjoy the rights of political participation, and instituting the constitution of the Republic of China; reforming social-economic organization, and finally setting the price of land, attributing land to the state, and having it shared by all people. The polity had to be changed to a democracy, whose ethos was “freedom, equality, and fraternity.” The procedure to carry out such a political program was divided into three stages: first, *the military rule*; then, *the provisional constitutional rule*; and finally, *the constitutional rule*.⁷¹

After 1905, the revolutionary faction versus the constitutional-monarchical faction were engaged in a series of debates that lasted for more than two years; Sun Yat-Sen’s followers fought against Liang Qichao. The central concern was: how could China become a wealthy and powerful nation, in the face of the western

⁷¹ Please see, Tingyi Guo, *Jindai Zhongguo Shigang* (The Outline of Modern Chinese History), (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1980),pp. 374-380.

challenges?⁷² The debates centered on four areas. First, *on revolution*: Liang argued that revolution would lead to domestic disorder, which would invite international powers' interference and thus cause the partition of China, so China must improve the current government and perform constitution building. The revolutionary faction argued that revolution was an internal affair, not xenophobia; the international situation would not permit the partition of China, and even if it did cause interference, there was nothing to be afraid of, for this would just stimulate national indignation. There was no way to improve the current government, so the only way was to overthrow it. Second, *on excluding Manchus*: Liang argued that the political and legal equality between Manchus and Hans had been achieved, and we should engage ourselves in ethnic integration to become a nation capable of resisting foreign nations. For Liang, insistence on excluding Manchus was equivalent to "revanchism" and violence. Liang also expressed his concern that the Han people were not yet capable of building a nation. The revolutionary faction argued that excluding Manchus was to exclude the bad Manchurian government, and after Manchus stepped down, domestic ethnic groups would naturally integrate; excluding Manchus was the pre-condition of political revolution, and, once again, it's

⁷² See, Michael Gasster, "The Reform and Revolution in China's Political Modernization Movement," in Chinese abridged translation by Weiying Gu, in Nengshi Lin, and Pingsheng Hu (eds.), *A Selected Compilation of Papers on Chinese Modern History* (Taipei: Huashi Publishers, 1984), p.58.

futile to pin hopes on Manchus to institute a constitution.

Third, *on people's rights*: Liang presented his views that Chinese citizens were not qualified for a republic, not even for a constitutional monarchy, and managing to force its performance would only lead this nation to perish; ten years of enlightened autocracy would be appropriate. The revolutionary faction presented Rousseau's ideas of natural rights, arguing that people were inherently qualified for a republic and their capability would finally surpass that of the government; the spirit of freedom and equality were commonly shared by all human beings, and Chinese were not an exception. Fourth, *on state ownership of land*: Liang argued that Chinese economic and social organizations were better than those of the West; land annexation had not been very serious; if state ownership of land was performed during the period when a revolutionary army rose, the wandering rascals would grab the opportunity to rob all property of the rich people and cause overall national disorder, and if it was performed after the revolution, the ill effects also abounded. Liang said the priority should be resolving the issue of capital first, and then the issue of land, and rewarding the capital should override the protection of laborers; otherwise China would be filled with foreign capital and the Chinese would become slaves forever. The revolutionary faction argued

that revolution was for the welfare of poor people; when land was owned by the few, like in America, capital would also be owned by them, thus the gap between the rich and the poor would be huge. Therefore, the revolutionary faction argued, “to solve social problems, it was necessary to first resolve the issue of land,” and state ownership of land would prevent the land from falling into the hands of the few. When land was owned by the state, they said, capital would also be owned by the state; thus the state would become a great capitalist to produce for the benefit of all people.⁷³ In about six months, the revolutionary faction gained the upper hand over Liang, and after the building of the Republic of China in 1912, Liang totally changed his position and became one of the most faithful figures of the republic.⁷⁴

(2) *The Cultural Ideals*

The Chinese intellectual stratum is a group of people that carry the cultural ideals of Confucianism, which sees the *collective welfare of mankind* as the responsibility of each individual. Thus, an individual, well-schooled in Confucianism, tends to see his purpose of life as improving the lives of all human beings.⁷⁵ How will he be able to achieve that? Here comes the Confucian belief of human nature as basically

⁷³ The above four areas of debates were from Tingyi Guo, *Jindai Zhongguo Shigang* (The Outline of Modern Chinese History) (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1980), pp. 381-382.

⁷⁴ See, Gongquan Xia, op cit., p. 802; pp. 822-823.

⁷⁵ In Chinese term, it is called *Tianxia Shengmin*, means: all people under Heaven.

good. If an individual is sincerely and diligently engaged in cultivating his innate good nature, the benevolent love born of Heaven, he will then be able to take good care of his family, and next, be able to govern the country well, and finally, be capable of pacifying the world. Either being a teacher (a cultural leader) or being a ruler (a political leader) can fulfill the above goals. A teacher can assist others to cultivate their inner benevolent love and spread it to the whole human community, and a ruler can base his political practice on the same power of love and help people follow his example. The fundamental belief is that all men are born equal, with the same benevolent love in their heart.⁷⁶

People can love each other as they love their families. This is how a country can be governed well and the world can be pacified--through the power of love and mutual assistance.

Chinese intellectuals in late Qing period (1839-1911) all carried such cultural ideals. In the face of western challenges, they aspired to save this country; they wanted to learn from the west, but at the same time they cherished their cultural ideals so much that they could not help presenting all kinds of prescriptions that would preserve Chinese cultural ideals as the core, and absorb Western advantages as they perceived

⁷⁶ See the classical Confucian scriptures; *Lunyu* (The Analects of Confucius) ; *Mengzi* (The Book of Mencius) ; *Daxue* (The Great Learning); *Zhongyong* (The Golden Mean); *Datong* (The Great Harmony). All could be found in (Taipei: Shangwu Publishers).

differently. Thus, the intellectual-political elite in the Self-strengthening Movement (1860-1893) only saw the material aspect of the West as worth learning: they thought that as long as they could be strong enough to repel the Western invasion, they would be fine. They never thought of changing the Confucian political institutions as an alternative. After the thorough, humiliating defeat in 1895, political reform was deemed necessary and urgent. Thus came Kang Youwei in 1898. But still, in Kang's ideas, the monarchy should be preserved, and Confucianism as the guiding principles (the national religion) of the political society should be maintained; what was needed was introducing constitutionalism, the western educational system, western military training, mining, and railroad building. After fleeing to Japan, Kang clearly opposed Sun Yat-Sen's revolution because, for Kang, the survival of a nation lay in its history, customs, and culture.⁷⁷

Liang Qichao changed his positions very often, but overall, he was "an enlightened patriot" close to British liberals.⁷⁸ Liang saw Confucius as the representative of Chinese civilization, and as the pivot upon which Chinese integration of oneness over the past two thousand years relied, and therefore, Confucian teachings should be the central principles of social education in the days ahead.⁷⁹ But at the same

⁷⁷ See Gongquan Xiao, *op cit.*, pp. 746-747.

⁷⁸ See, *ibid.*, pp.791-823, especially pp. 821-822.

⁷⁹ See, *ibid.*, p.821.

time, he emphasized the importance of independent thinking and reminded his readers not to become slaves of the ancient saint, Confucius. Sun Yat-Sen also carried such Confucian cultural ideals. Sun's ideas were best represented by his *Three Principles of the People*, which was an integration of Confucian doctrine and Western thoughts. In the first Principle, *Nationalism*, he extolled Confucian political philosophy: *governing the country and pacifying the world based on self moral cultivation and taking care of the family*, seeing it as the best in the world which had not been discussed by any foreign thinker. Then he asked the Chinese not to learn from the imperialism of the world powers, but to revive the old Chinese virtue of *peace-loving* and *helping the weak*, so that when China became strong, it could help the weak nations, extinguish world imperialism, and pacify the world. He said that this was the responsibility of China, and each individual Chinese should assume such responsibility and lead the world to "Great Harmony"--the ultimate ideal of Confucian politics.⁸⁰

⁸⁰ See, Sun Yat-Sen, "Nationalism," the sixth section, in *The Three Principles of the People* (Taipei: Liming Cultural Enterprise, Ltd., 1988), pp. 62-75, especially pp. 74-75.

CHAPTER THREE: THE POLITICS IN THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA

(1912-1949)

The building of the Republic of China (on Jan. 1st, 1912) did bring about a modern parliamentary democracy that lasted for only two years (1912-1913). During that period, with freedom of speech and association, Chinese were bent on democracy, and both the reformist and the revolutionary factions in late Qing China were now, continuing their competition, engaged in party politics in the parliament.⁸¹ Unfortunately, Yuan Shikai, the president at that time, totally destroyed this newly budding democracy by dissolving the parliament in 1914 and trying to restore the imperial monarchy from 1915 to 1916. The attempt foundered and Yuan died shamefully. That is to say, the republic won over autocracy in Chinese minds. This means the Chinese had turned to the road of modern civilization. Although politics in the subsequent years (1916-1928) were dominated by warlord politics that carried no concerns for democracy,

⁸¹ See Yufa Zhang, *Zhongguo Xiandai Shi* (The Modern History of China) (Taipei: Donghua Bookstore, 1982), pp. 85-93.

the spirit of republicanism did not die. Here came the third type of prescription: the cultural reform. A new generation of prominent intellectuals, gathering in Beijing University, launched an intellectual movement (1915-1923) that thoroughly questioned the value of old ethics, customs, and knowledge. The essence of this movement was democracy and science. It carried the spirit of the western Enlightenment Movement, and advocated individualism and liberalism. Its goal was to educate Chinese youth to become independent individuals free from any intellectual, religious, or political authority. When Chinese youth all modeled themselves in the new thoughts, they would change Chinese society: its culture, its social institutions and customs, and its politics. In other words, the movement aimed at building a new civilization for China through the power of education. Thus, Confucian ethics and institutions, the domestic warlord politics, the invasion of China by foreign powers, were all barriers for China to pursue progress and independence. Students educated in such thoughts were strongly patriotic and idealistic. On the one hand, they were independent individuals with liberalism as their value; on the other hand, they were ready to shoulder the whole nation and devote all they had for the good of it.⁸²

In the South, Sun Yat-sen's revolutionary efforts were inherited, after his death in 1925, by Chiang Kai-shek, who launched the Northern Expedition in 1926

⁸² Ibid., pp. 264-265.

and united the nation in 1928. Chiang built the nationalist government in Nanjing, and in the next several years Chiang was embroiled in civil wars both with the Nationalist Party's military factions (1929-1931) and with the Communist Party's army. To annihilate the communist army, Chiang launched five military operations,⁸³ which drove the communist forces out of their base in Jiangxi province, and forced them to flee to the north of Shanxi province to rebuild their base there. Chiang wished to continue his efforts to completely extinguish the residual communist army, but he was kidnapped in 1936 by Zhang Xueliang, head of the northeastern army, who did this to force Chiang to stop the civil war and begin to resist Japanese invasion. Chiang had to change his course, stopping the military operation against the communists and accepting their proposal of the "National United Front of Resistance against Japan." Then, with the Japanese increasing military aggression, the War of Resistance started on July 7th, 1937. Thus began the eight-year long national struggle. In 1945, China won the war and Chiang became the national hero of that time, but civil war soon followed. The civil war ended with communist victory all over the country in 1949, and Chiang fled to Taiwan.

Politics in the Early Years of the Republic of China (1912-1916)

⁸³ The first time: Dec. 19th, 1930--Jan. 3rd, 1931; the second time: Apr. 1st, 1931--May 31st, 1931; the third time: Jul. 1st, 1931--Sep. 20th, 1931; the fourth time: Jan. 1st, 1933--Apr. 9th, 1933; the fifth time: Oct. 17th, 1933--Oct. 14th, 1934. See, *ibid.*, pp. 424-426.

The success of revolution in October, 1911, was a chain reaction that caused many provinces to announce independence. Most of them were located in the South, and thus the situation was the South (the revolutionary forces) versus the North (the Qing Court). The Qing Court called Yuan Shikai, who used to be the head of the Northern Army and was removed from office due to factional politics, to come back to fight the revolutionaries with an offer of the premiership, and Yuan accepted.⁸⁴ Yuan's appearance brought hopes to the Qing Court, the revolutionary army, and the international powers. The Qing Court expected him to stop the revolutionary army; the revolutionary army expected him to dethrone the Qing Court, since he was a Han; the international powers, seeing Qing as a dead-end regime, expected him to be reconciled with the revolutionary army so that Chinese societal order could be restored and foreigners' life and property could be protected. Yuan seemed to satisfy all three sides: he sent an army to capture Hankou, a stronghold of the revolutionary army; at the same time, he sent people to promote reconciliation with the revolutionaries; and he communicated his determination to restore domestic order to the foreign powers.⁸⁵

The South was quick to elect Sun Yat-sen as the provisional President,

⁸⁴ Yufa Zhang, *op cit.*, p. 68.

⁸⁵ For the above analysis, see, *ibid.*, p.69.

on Dec. 29th, 1911, in Nanjing. Yuan was pretty unhappy about this because he wanted to be the head of the new China. But Sun had been clear in the reconciliation talks, saying that if Yuan approved of the republic and dethroned the Qing Court, he would resign and let Yuan assume the presidency. And so it happened; the provisional Senate elected Yuan as the second provisional President. Sun originally wanted Yuan to assume office in Nanjing so as to get him under control by the South. Yuan made an excuse⁸⁶ to avoid this and assumed office in Beijing, so the provisional Senate finally had to move to Beijing, and thus the South and the North achieved national unification in April, 1912.

Though the revolutionaries did not obtain the presidency, a group of them in the provisional Senate, led by Song Jiaoren, thought that they could still obtain *real* power if they could win the parliamentary elections to influence the parliament and organize a party cabinet. Thus, Song actively absorbed the old bureaucrats and the radicals, expanding the *Tongmeng Hui* to become the *Guomindang* (the Nationalist Party)⁸⁷, and Liang Qichao organized the *Jinbudang* (the Progressive Party) to compete with it. Thus China had party politics in the parliament in the early years (1912-1913) of

⁸⁶ There happened to be a mutiny in Beijing, which became a good excuse for Yuan to stay in Beijing to stabilize the situation there. See, *ibid.*, p. 70.

⁸⁷ This Nationalist Party was built in August, 1912, and ended in September, 1913. The other Nationalist Party, the Kuomintang (KMT), or the Guomindang (GMD), was built in October, 1919, and still exists now in Taiwan. See, *ibid.*, p. 88, and p. 356.

the Republic.⁸⁸

Before Yuan Shikai revealed his later intention to turn the nation back to the imperial monarchy, Liang Qichao thought Yuan to be someone that he could cooperate with. So the Jinbudang's position was to support the government's policy, and in contrast, the Guomindang stood in opposition to the government. The two parties competed in the following areas: the parliamentary elections and several significant bills; the composition of the cabinet and its relationship with the parliament; and the attitude toward the formation of the constitution.⁸⁹

Song Jiaoren advocated a parliamentary system, and Yuan Shikai wanted a presidential system. Song's leadership did win the parliamentary elections and gain majority seats in both Senate and House in early 1913. The implications of such results were threatening to Yuan. Now the Guomindang could not only organize a party cabinet, but it could also compete for the presidency because the president was supposed to be elected by both Senate and House. After the elections, Song saw himself in a position of the future premier and so actively promoted his political views, which proposed a parliamentary system and emphasized that the election of the president should

⁸⁸ For the story in this paragraph, see, *ibid.*, p. 71.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 93.

come *after* the formulation of the constitution, so that the presidential power would be constrained by the constitution. Yuan determined to assassinate Song, and so it happened in March, 1913.⁹⁰

After the incident, Sun Yat-sen swore that Yuan must be removed because of the assassination of the founding father. He gained little support from his fellow party members, however.⁹¹ But several other highly controversial bills further made Yuan's regime unbearable. Among them was the Big Loan. Because of Song's assassination, Yuan and the Guomindang were in a state of increasing conflict, and he needed a big sum of money to prepare for it. Thus in April, 1913, after a contract was signed, he was able to gain a big loan from a bank group of five nations (including Britain, France, Germany, Japan, and Russia), with Chinese salt revenues and the Customs surplus as security. The bank groups' people were permitted to be associate and assistant managers in the Audit Office, and its branches, of the Salt Sale. This loan further worsened the relationship between Yuan and the Guomindang, because after the assassination, Yuan's plot to militarily handle the Guomindang had become clear, and the loan would facilitate the matters.⁹²

⁹⁰ Ibid., pp. 95-96.

⁹¹ Ibid., p. 109, and p. 137.

⁹² Ibid., pp.109-110.

In May 1913, four Guomindang's provincial governors published an open telegram to denounce the government's involvement in the Song case and the Big Loan. Yuan immediately counter-attacked by removing three of them from their positions in June, and continually sent armies to the South. Thus Guomindang started the Second Revolution in July, 1913, in Jiangxi province. Unfortunately, within two months, the Second Revolution failed. The reasons for that were pretty clear. First, most military forces supported Yuan. Secondly, the nation had just restored order, people were tired of war, foreign powers would not like China to continue its chaos, and the Jinbudang led by Liang Qichao supported Yuan, expecting him to build a strong government. Thirdly, there had been division in the revolutionary camp about whether to use force, and after the war started, the fellow provinces did not reinforce each other to form a united power.⁹³

In the parliament, Yuan had been struggling for his power. Before the Second Revolution, Yuan had organized the Association of the Research of the Constitution to influence the formulation of the constitution in the parliament. The anti-governmental faction advocated a parliamentary system and decentralized authority, and the pro-governmental faction favored a presidential system and centralism. After the failure of the Second Revolution, the Jinbudang and the Guomindang agreed to elect the

⁹³ Ibid., pp.112-113; 114; 121-123.

president first, and then formulate the constitution. On Oct. 6th, 1913, Yuan was elected the president, and he continued to struggle for presidential power. Then, under the cooperation of the Guomintang and the Jinbudang, the legislators soon settled the draft of the constitution which stipulated that the polity was a unified democratic country; the parliament was made up of two Chambers; the government was a parliamentary system; the president would be elected by an electoral meeting organized by the legislators; and the amendment to and interpretation of the constitution was supposed to be conducted by a constitutional meeting organized by the legislators.⁹⁴

Yuan was very upset about such results, especially about the stipulations that the president's appointments and removals of administrators must be agreed to by the parliament, and that the president had no power to dissolve the parliament. He sent eight people to present his views but was rejected by the parliament. Thus, on Oct. 25th, 1913, Yuan published an open telegram to denounce the draft of the constitution as bad and the Guomintang as misleading the country. Soon governors, chiefs of civil affairs, and military commanders from every province published their open telegrams to advocate rescinding the draft of the constitution and discharging the Guomintang. The legislators still advanced to pass the draft of the constitution on Oct.

⁹⁴ Ibid., pp. 102-104.

30th, and present the constitutional meeting organized by both Chambers on Nov. 3rd.⁹⁵

On Nov. 4th, Yuan Shikai gave an order to discharge the Guomindang and cancel its legislators' qualification by retrieving their certificates. The purposes of this action were to remove his enemies in the parliament, and at the same time to stop the operation of the legislature. Up to 438 legislators were disqualified, and therefore both Chambers could not proceed due to lack of a quorum. Thus, the draft of the constitution had to be suspended. In addition, Senate on Dec. 3rd, and House on Dec. 17th both presented their interrogation on the issue of making up the quorum, only to get the answer that they could not perform their power of interrogation due to lack of a quorum. And again, governors and chiefs of civil affairs from every province published open telegrams to ask for the dissolution of the parliament. Thus on Jan. 10th, 1914, Yuan declared the termination of the legislators' duty.⁹⁶

The dismissal of the Guomindang and the closing of the parliament led to the dissipation of party activities in China. The parliament had been the locus for the parties to compete and associate with one another, and now it was gone. The utility of the Jinbudang for Yuan no longer existed since Guomindang was gone. The attitudes of

⁹⁵ Ibid., p. 104.

⁹⁶ Ibid., pp. 104-105.

the party members from all factions could be classified as three kinds. (1) Those who had lusted for fame and power originally joined a party as a stepping-stone of the path to success, and since the parties had dissipated, they left it soon. (2) Those who saw themselves as decent and clean and had from the very beginning taken little interest in the party activities, and whose membership of a party was mostly based upon the social relationships of relatives, friends, and subordinates, now found good reasons to escape. (3) Those who had political ideals in their mind and now found no channel to fulfill their dreams either were biding their time, like Liang Qichao and others, or turned underground to prepare for another military cause against Yuan, like Sun Yat-sen and the Guomindang people. For Sun and the Guomindang people, the hard built republic had been completely destroyed by Yuan, and the revolutionary cause had to be restarted.⁹⁷

Yuan Shikai's ambition to mount the throne under imperial monarchy did not emerge until late 1915. After the dismissal of the Guomindang and the closing of the parliament, Yuan was able to expand his power as he wished, and extended his forces deep to the South. Thus, in Feb. 28th, 1914, he gave an order to dissolve all the provincial councils. Now no forces could check his power. In March, 1914, a magistrate presented a proposal to change the tenure of presidency from a set term to lifetime, and Yuan gave

⁹⁷ For the above analysis, see *ibid.*, pp. 105-106.

instant response to refer it to every provincial governors and chiefs of civil affairs. Thus started Yuan's movement toward an imperial system.⁹⁸

The movement was disguised as bottom-up. At first, a Columbia University professor Frank J. Goodnow published an article arguing that monarchy was better than democracy. At that time Yuan had inspired Yang Du, then the counselor of the Presidential Palace, to find some associates to promote his ideas. On Aug. 15th, 1915, six figures, led by Yang Du, started the *Chouanhui* (the Association of Operation for Peace) in Beijing for this purpose. On Aug. 26th, Yang published the views of the Association: "Constitutional Monarchy to Save the Country," arguing that only constitution building could save the country, and only monarchy could achieve constitution building. Many regions sent open telegrams to approve of the views, and several provinces successively organized branch associations.⁹⁹

In addition, the imperial faction maneuvered people to present petitions for polity change, and Yuan gave an order, on Aug. 30th, to accept them. Thus in September, an organization, called the United Association of National Petitions, was formed to present petitions from every province. But Yuan wanted the show to appear to

⁹⁸ Ibid., p. 126-127.

⁹⁹ Ibid., p. 127.

come from public wishes, so the United Association of National Petitions asked for Conferences of Citizens' Representatives to resolve the issue of polity change. Thus the Conferences were built in every province. The fact was, the representatives in every province were those people who had already had relationships with the central government, the content of petitions had been written in advance by people commissioned by Beijing, and similarly, the content of the open telegrams of support sent by every province was written in the same way. People were silently in fear of Yuan's power; only Liang Qichao, disregarding personal security, voiced his disapproval openly on Sep. 3rd, fiercely denouncing all these hypocritical shows. Ministers of Britain, Japan, Russia, and France had twice, on Oct. 28th and Dec. 15th, presented warnings and tried to persuade Yuan to postpone the polity change. On Dec. 11th, votes from every province were gathered in Beijing; national representatives in total were 1,993, and exactly 1,993 votes were given in approval of both a constitutional monarchy and Yuan as the Emperor. With such a result, Yuan still pretended to be modest and rejected it, saying that he had taken an oath to honor the republic, and if he mounted the throne, he would be unfaithful to the oath, which would make him violate the moral principle of faithfulness. It took a second presentation of support on that same day for Yuan to feel comfortable and issue an

order the next day (Dec. 12th, 1995) to accept the throne.¹⁰⁰

There was an episode here during the movement of polity change. In September, 1914, Japan sent its army to Shandong province and took possession of all the rights and interests previously enjoyed by Germany in the province. Yuan was then engaged in the suppression of the revolutionaries, and thus tried to please Japan in the hopes that Japan could expel the revolutionaries staying in Japan. Japan grabbed the opportunity to present the notorious twenty-one clauses in January, 1915, asking China to permit Japan to succeed to all previous rights and interests enjoyed by Germany in Shandong province, which included that all harbors and islands in this region could not be ceded or rented to other countries, and which even required the Chinese government to engage the Japanese as political, military, and fiscal advisors, and to accept that Japan and China administered together the policemen in important regions in China. This caused intense anti-Japanese emotions and activities in China. But Yuan did not reject such unreasonable requirements, because he wanted Japanese support on the domestic issue of polity change. Japan also wanted to use its fake support to get Yuan to accept these clauses. Thus Yuan accepted most of the clauses, and soon Japan moved to the opposite position to be against Yuan's polity change, because if Yuan really built a strong

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., pp. 127-129; 143.

imperial country, Japan would no longer be able to obtain any interests in China.¹⁰¹

As Yuan's imperial movement proceeded, the political forces against Yuan were creeping up. The Guomindang people were the first to perceive Yuan's autocratic tendency. Although they failed in the Second Revolution, they never stopped their efforts. Sun Yat-sen reorganized the Guomindang for this purpose. The Jinbudang people felt that they were fooled and their ideals about democracy were destroyed. So they determined to revolt against Yuan. Since the Guomindang had reorganized itself for this purpose, the Jinbudang should not lag behind, considering its political future in this nation. For those from the Northern Army, being an official in a republic was far better than being a subject to Emperor Yuan, and in the days ahead they might have a chance to succeed Yuan as the President. For ordinary people, the days after the Second Revolution were hard because most local officials were corrupt remainders from the Qing Court; thus Yuan had lost the people's support.¹⁰² Therefore, the resistance against Yuan's imperial movement was nation-wide. This was totally beyond Yuan's expectation. It meant the spirit of republicanism was deeply ingrained in the Chinese heart; no one could destroy it because of his personal wish.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., pp. 130-132.

¹⁰² For the above analysis, see *ibid.*, pp. 134-135.

Immediately after the failure of the Second Revolution in September, 1914, Sun Yat-sen decided to revive the revolutionary spirit of the Tongmeng Hui, and reorganize the Guomindang, whose approach was a parliamentary one, and change it to the *Zhonghua Gemingdang* (the Chinese Revolutionary Party); it happened in September, 1913. This time, Sun required the participants to swear an oath to “be obedient to Mr. Sun”¹⁰³ to restart the revolution, and they had to sign with their fingerprints before they were accepted as the party members. One of the founding fathers, Huang Xing, expressed his objection to these two things; he thought such requirements were against the spirit of republicanism. Sun tried to explain that the party members of the previous two revolutions had not united well because they didn’t listen to him, and had thus missed the opportunities to succeed in several occasions. But he could only convince a part of the Guomindang leaders. Despite this, Sun continued his efforts and finally aroused a national revolt against Yuan.¹⁰⁴

Laing Qichao originally wanted to guide Yuan Shi-kai on a path to democratic constitutionalism. After Yuan’s imperial ambition emerged and became clear, Liang was among the few to publicly denounce Yuan’s attempts. Yuan had tried to terrify

¹⁰³ Ibid., p. 135.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., pp. 135-137; 139.

him or used material gains to tempt him, but Liang would not be moved. Liang stood for constitutional monarchy in Late Qing and was against democratic revolution; now he supported the democratic republic and opposed monarchy. Both positions contained a similar concern that radical change would upset the political situation and bring little benefit to the nation. Also, after the republic was built, as we discuss in chapter two, Liang's idealism and liberal spirit would make the imperial reversal unbearable to him.

With military revolts of both the Zhonghua Gemingdang and the Jinbudang, the whole nation soon entered into a sweeping movement of anti-imperial monarchy. Thus, Yuan's attempts had no chance in the newly built republic.

CHAPTER FOUR: THE YEARS UNDER MAO ZEDONG (1949-1976)

Mao Zedong's ideas were influenced by Kang Youwei, Liang Qichao, and the intellectuals' enlightenment movement (the May Fourth Movement, from 1915 to 1923) mentioned in chapter three. As stated in chapter three, the essence of this movement is democracy and science. The intellectuals in this movement wanted to create a new civilization for China by spreading liberal ideas of modern western civilization.¹⁰⁵ Unfortunately, after 1919, the leading intellectuals in this movement were divided into two camps: the leftist camp, represented by Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao, believing in the Russian path following its "October Revolution"¹⁰⁶ in 1917; and the liberal camp, represented by Hu Shi, believing in the western liberal path since the Renaissance. Hu Shi used the term "Chinese Renaissance" to introduce to the western world this Chinese intellectual movement.¹⁰⁷ Hu Shi's ideas did not gain a chance to be fulfilled until

¹⁰⁵ Tse-tsung Chow, *The May Fourth Movement: Intellectual Revolution in Modern China* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1960).

¹⁰⁶ For the Russian calendar, it's October, 1917; for the western calendar, it was November, 1917. See, Stewart C. Easton, *The Western Heritage* (1966), chapter 2, the part about Russia.

¹⁰⁷ Shih Hu, *The Chinese Renaissance* (Chicago: 1934).

Taiwan's democratization in the 1980's.¹⁰⁸ In contrast, Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao's Marxist-Leninist ideas got full opportunity to be experimented with in mainland China through Mao Zedong's efforts toward a communist movement in this country. In 1921, Chen Duxiu built the Chinese Communist Party (the CCP), and Mao Zedong was one of its earliest members. Mao did not assume true leadership of the communist party until 1935. After years of efforts, Mao successfully built the People's Republic of China (the PRC) in 1949, and the country became a laboratory for his utopian ideas.

Early in his life, Mao Zedong had formed most of the ideas that would influence the practice of the communist party in China.¹⁰⁹ Mao had a teacher, Yang Changji, who was a sincere Confucian scholar and guided his students to become Confucian practitioners. Under his influence, Mao became a worshiper of Confucius and wanted to become someone like Confucius. The most interesting part of this early romance with Confucianism was that Mao Zedong's understanding and practice of Marxism-Leninism carried an imprint of Confucianism.¹¹⁰ In what follows, I will present how Mao Zedong's approach and practice of Marxism-Leninism was tinted with

¹⁰⁸ Inspired by Hu Shi, the journals *Ziyou Zhongguo* (the Free China) and *Wenxing* (the Literary Star) were the intellectual center for spreading liberal ideas in the 1950's and in early 1960's, respectively, in Taiwan. Such intellectual heritage later extended its influence to the democratic movement in the 1980's in Taiwan.

¹⁰⁹ Li Rui, *Sanshi Sui Yiqian De Mao Zedong* (Mao Zedong Before Thirty Years Old) (Taipei, China Times Publishing Company:1993); also, Li Rui, *Mao Zedong De Gongguo Shifei* (Mao Zedong's Achievements and Mistakes, Right and Wrong) (Taipei, Xinrui Publisher: 1993).

¹¹⁰ Wang Shubai, *The Chinese Gene of Mao Zedong Thought* (Taipei, Rizhi Tang,: 1991); also, Li Rui, op cit.

Confucian ideas or a Confucian style of doing things.

Confucius believed that there was a linkage between earthly affairs and Heaven. If a person led a moral life in a heavenly way (i.e., merciful love in all kinds of human relationships), he would receive heavenly blessings and get promotion in social mobility or prosper in his agricultural harvest or through business. On the contrary, if he did the opposite, there would be bad results. Similarly, if a king ruled a country in a heavenly way, he and his country would receive heavenly blessings and the whole nation would prosper and even the whole earthly world would be in great harmony. For Confucius, the purpose of life was to cultivate one's spirit to become a saint, and if possible, to help others become saints, too. The way to attain such an ideal was either to become a moral statesman (i.e., a saintly king, or a saintly official) and lead the whole nation in a heavenly way, or to become a spiritual Master and guide disciples to become saintly people.¹¹¹ Therefore, Confucius believed in *voluntarism*: a person was able to change his own fate and even the whole world's fate by *spiritual* self-cultivation. *One could change history and one should!*

(1) *Ontology: Dialectics and the Philosophy of History*

¹¹¹ Chen Fangman, *Daxue Zhengshi* (The Testimony and Explication of The Great Learning) (Taipei: Yuzhen Bookstore Publisher, 1991); Cihui, *Zhongyong Zhengshi* (The Testimony and Explication of the Middle Way) (Taipei: Yuan-chen Publishing, 1993); Lin Qinghe, *Yijing Zhengshi* (The Testimony and Explication of the Book of Change) (Taipei: San Yang Printing Enterprise Co. Ltd.), Vol. I-VIII.

Confucian ideas about ontology overlapped with Lao-tze's ideas.

They both saw the creation of the universe as, "*One begets two, two begets three, and three begets all things.*"¹¹² This means *Heaven the Almighty* (the "One") creates *Yin* (the feminine force or the negative force) and *Yan* (the masculine force or the positive force); *Yin* and *Yan* are the "two"; *the interplay of Yin and Yan* is the "three"; *all things and all phenomena* are created by *the interplay of Yin and Yan* ("three begets all things"). This simple description has its scientific supporters in the quantum physics of the 20th century.¹¹³ *The interplay of Yin and Yan* creates everything and every phenomenon both in the natural world and in the social world. For example, in the social world, the father-son relationship is the prototype of Master-disciple (teacher-student), husband-wife (men-women), senior-junior, monarch-subject (ruler-citizens), elite-mass (intellectuals-ordinary, uneducated people), educated class-laboring class, and Chinese patron-client relationships. These relationships reflect Yan-Yin relationship (or Heaven-Earth relationship), and as described in chapter one, it is a relationship of mutual flowing (or interplay) of love: filial affection from the son to the father (or from Yin to

¹¹² See Lin Qinghe, op cit. Vol. I; and Lao-tze, *Daode Jing* (The Scriptures on Morality) (Taipei: Shangwu Publisher).

¹¹³ Fritjof Capra, *The Turning Point: Science, Society, and the Rising Culture* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1982), and *The Tao of Physics: An Exploration of the Parallels between Modern Physics and Eastern Mysticism* (Boston: Shambhala Publications Inc., 2000); Gary Zukav, *The Dancing Wu Li Masters: An Overview of the New Physics* (New York: Willam Morrow and Company, Inc., 1979).

Yan), and merciful love from the father to the son (or from Yan to Yin). If Yin and Yan love and respect each other, there will be a harmonious relationship between the pair of roles. Thus, role playing is crucial in Confucian ethics, with loving harmony as its essence.¹¹⁴

Then come Confucian and Lao-tze's understanding or teachings of dialectics. The relationship between Yin and Yan was either loving harmony (like that between lovers) or competitive rivalry (like that between enemies).¹¹⁵ It all depended on the situation. A man and a woman could fall in love with each other and get married; they could also fight each other bitterly and get divorced. Similarly, in the ethics of role playing, citizens were not always required to love and respect their king. If the king led the country in a heavenly way (i.e., with merciful love and wisdom in all things), and you revolted against him, then you would be seen as disgraced morally. On the contrary, if the king acted like a brutal beast (i.e., dictator), then you had both the responsibility to overthrow him and the honor to rebuild the country in a heavenly way. *Revolution* was justified in such a case: the relationship between you and your motherland was not always peaceful. In some cases, for the sake of love, you had to stand up to reproach your

¹¹⁴ Chen Fangman, op cit.; Cihui, op cit.; Lin Qinghe, op cit.

¹¹⁵ See Chen Fangman, op cit.; Cihui, op cit.

own government or even revolt against it. It all depended on the situation.

From the above explanation, Confucian philosophy of history becomes clear. An individual has the honor and responsibility to create history by his own spiritual cultivation and moral role playing. He may help his king to build a *heaven on earth* in his country or overthrow his king so that a *heaven on earth* will not be ruined by his king. His honor and responsibility is to cultivate himself *spiritually* and then lead and guide others well by setting a good example. Of course the opposite could happen: a person might be a bad guy but he happens to be smart enough to get to a high position; in this case, the hope will be that another person will obtain the *Mandate of Heaven* and deal with the situation. The proof that the *Mandate of Heaven* has been bestowed on somebody is the fact that the majority of people support this person. These ideas are basically Confucian teachings on history and politics.

Mao Zedong was a sincere believer of the above ideas before he became a Marxist-Leninist. He was a Confucian intellectual and believed in *voluntarism* which emphasized that an individual could change history by cultivating himself spiritually; if every individual was changed by moral self-cultivation, then the whole nation would be changed accordingly and the nation would be saved. It was Mao

Zedong's dream to save this country as soon as possible, and the most efficient way that Mao learned from Confucius was to devote himself to becoming a saint and then to lead and guide the whole nation to become a country full of saints. Moral cultivation, thus, was the best tool to save this country. This was why Mao placed great emphasis on mass movements in carrying out any of his projects. As long as the masses were mobilized with great moral enthusiasm (in Mao's understanding, it meant selfless sacrifice for the sake of all or for the sake of socialism), Mao believed, any miracle could happen. This explained the mass zeal in the Great Leap Forward and in the Cultural Revolution.

Everybody in the mobilized mass believed that he was engaged in something great and beneficial to this nation, and that his personal selfless sacrifice was worth the honor.

Everybody mobilized was carrying a spirit of heroism, which was called by Mao socialist activeness or revolutionary spirit. During the Great Leap Forward, Mao expected the mass to exert their socialist activeness to create miracles for this country, and during the Cultural Revolution Mao called the youth to overthrow the current party-state apparatus to embroil the whole nation in a revolutionary high tide so that every person's spirit would be changed to become fully revolutionary. Revolutionary spirit or revolutionary ethics required each individual to be a moral figure like a brave combatant to fight any

hint of selfishness emerging in one's mind and devote himself fully to serving the nation (or called "serving the people") and any goal that Chairman Mao pointed out for the nation. Mao believed that when each and every individual was well equipped with the revolutionary spirit, the whole nation could fight any enemy, achieve any engineering projects and any production mission, and overcome any challenge to *achieving national wealth and power* long pursued by generation after generation of national aspirants since the Opium War (1839-1842).

But Mao failed. His dream was not fulfilled, this nation was not saved, the goal of national wealth and power was not achieved, and people's lives did not improve. The reason lay in his belief in dialectics. In Confucian teachings, if one individual wanted to succeed in ruling a country and pacifying the world, he needed to be a king or a Master filled with love, and the essence of Yin-Yan dialectics was loving harmony; revolution was temporary and was done for the sake of love, and he needed to return to loving harmony once the goal of revolution was achieved. But Mao had become a Marxist-Leninist, and he believed that revolution (or class struggle) should be constant, and the essence of dialectics was *struggle* rather than loving harmony. Put it in another way, Confucius aimed at *perpetual peace* and Mao believed in *perpetual struggle*.

Confucius managed to achieve loving harmony in any human relationship, and Mao looked for struggle in any human relationship or social situation. Mao always emphasized that class struggle was *constant*, and peace and harmony were *temporary*; imbalance was *absolute* and *constant* and balance was *relative* and *temporary*.¹¹⁶ This was why Mao always launched mass movement to combat *class enemies*, seeing this as the way to achieve any goal. When the whole nation was embroiled in constant struggle and conflict, how could he achieve the goal of national wealth and power? How could people's lives be improved? From a Confucian point of view, Mao's failure had been foretold by his belief in *constant class struggle: there was no hope* for such ideas to achieve anything that would lead to *the fulfillment of Mao's dream*.

(2) *Epistemology: The Relationship between Knowledge and Practice*

Confucian ideas on epistemology were inspirational. Knowledge was delivered through ancient saintly king's examples on politics: their practice of governance, and the ethos of sacrificial rites, moral customs, and spiritual music instituted by them. On how to achieve good governance, although the military affairs were seen as necessary, Confucius would place the priority on sacrificial rites, spiritual

¹¹⁶ Mao Zedong, "On Contradiction," in *The Selective Works of Mao Zedong* (Beijing: Renmin Publisher, 1967), pp. 274-312.

music, and moral examples, moral teachings, and moral customs. A good disciple, in Confucius' eyes, would model himself on the ancient saintly kings, and cultivate himself *spiritually* to become someone like those kings or like Confucius. Therefore, the knowledge that Confucius wanted his disciples to learn was about the building of one's moral personality and the capability to rule a country and pacify the world. The way to obtain such knowledge was by studying the examples, institutions, and music of those ancient kings embodied in six books of scriptures edited by Confucius, and also by questions and answers between Confucius and his disciples.

The question of epistemology is: how does a Confucian follower (or an individual) know or acquire knowledge?¹¹⁷ The answer lies in the Confucian belief in ontology. All beings are created by Heaven the Almighty, and *all men are created equal*. Each and every individual was born with *the same innate* noble spirit. It was only through developed habits that people became different. In other words, each and every individual had *the same* chance to become a saint as long as he made that choice. *Any* individual could obtain the same knowledge as acquired by the ancient saintly kings *because all men are created equal, and every individual has the same cognizant capability as*

¹¹⁷ Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppy, *International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism, and Beyond* (Boston: Allyn & Bacon, 1999), p. 477.

acquired by those kings. Because everyone is created from the same origin (Heaven the Almighty), even an ordinary individual has the same cognizant capability that was born from Heaven. Such cognizant capability allows every individual, be they an ordinary person or a saint, to obtain the same spiritual understanding and moral knowledge, and thus to have the same opportunity to make his choice (under free will) to become a saint.¹¹⁸ It is clear that such a belief will serve as the intellectual seed for Chinese democracy in the future.

Mao Zedong's ideas on epistemology also had something to do with Confucianism. He believed in Confucian teachings on the relationship between knowledge and practice: knowledge is for the purpose of practice. Thus, knowledge should be rooted in social practice. Social practice, for Mao, included scientific practice, literary and artistic practice, the practice of labor, and the practice of class struggle. From social practice, one gained knowledge, and to complete the process of knowledge, one should use the knowledge that he obtained to return to social practice again. Without the latter step, the process of knowledge was seen as incomplete. Thus the sequence in Mao Zedong's epistemology was, first, you were engaged in social practice, and then, you obtained knowledge from that practice, and finally, you should use that knowledge to

¹¹⁸ Chen Fangman, op cit.; Cihui, op cit.; Lin Qinghe, op cit.

enter into social practice again. Only in this way (i.e., involving yourself in social practice) would you gain full knowledge.¹¹⁹ A person needed to do the same laboring job as peasants and workers in order for him to understand the mind and feelings of the proletariat. Only through that kind of social practice could one person develop sympathy with the exploited class, and then he had to enter into social practice again to stand on the side of the exploited class and fight the exploiting class. Only through social practice and class struggle could he identify the *right* versus the *wrong* (*good* versus *evil*), and be able to distinguish between “us” (*the good people*) and “the enemies” (*the bad guys*).

The intellectuals and the bourgeoisie, in Mao Zedong’s views, did not have more knowledge than peasants and workers, because their knowledge was not rooted in social practice— in labor. Thus Mao Zedong made the intellectuals and the bourgeoisie have a feeling of *original sin* because of their lack of social practice (i.e., labor) as peasants and workers: their souls were inferior to the souls of the peasants and workers (the proletariat). They needed to be re-educated by learning from the peasant mass and the worker mass. Therefore, when the situation of class struggle became bitter, their fate would be to be sent down to the labor camp to go through labor, which was

¹¹⁹ Mao Zedong, “On Practice,” in *The Selective Works of Mao Zedong* (Beijing: Renmin Publisher, 1967), pp. 259-273.

actually a punishment just because of their state of being—being an intellectual and being a member of the bourgeoisie meant carrying the *original sin* (defined by Mao's ideology) all through their life. Here one can see how Mao's knowledge brought suffering to the people. The intellectuals and the bourgeoisie were seen as inferior citizens, and they and their families were treated unfairly and on some occasions brutally. In the western countries, the intellectuals and the bourgeoisie were the most creative segment of the society; in Mao's China, they and their families were in constant insecurity and fear. Thus, the most creative segment of this society was constantly suppressed. How could this nation achieve anything that would lead to the fulfillment of its people's dream—national wealth and power, and the improvement of people's lives? This government was incapable of meeting its people's needs.

(3) Political Ideal: the Great Harmony

Confucius described his political ideal in one of his scriptures:

When Tao is fulfilled, the wealth of the world belongs to all people. Selected will be the moral; elected will be the capable. Respected will be the faithfulness; cultivated will be the harmony. Therefore, people will not just adore their parents,

and will not just love their children. The old will enjoy their days, the men in their prime will contribute what they can offer, and the young will be nurtured and educated. The widows and the widowers, the orphans and the childless, the disables and the sick, will all be taken good care of. Men will have their professions, and women will settle down in their marriage. Goods will be shared, and services will be devoted. Thus tricks will stop, thefts, banditry, and rebellions will disappear, and therefore, the doors of people's houses need not to be closed. This is called the Great Harmony.¹²⁰

Mao Zedong believed in this Confucian political ideal and saw this as his career goal.¹²¹ As one can see, this Confucian ideal revealed a spirit of sharing and fraternity, with love, mutual help, and a concern for the collective welfare. After becoming a Marxist-Leninist, Mao's image of such Confucian ideals turned into a Marxian communist heaven. During the Great Leap Forward in 1958, Mao described his political ideal of the People's Commune:

At that time there will be many communist communes in the rural areas of our country, and each commune will have its own agriculture and industry, will have

¹²⁰ Confucius, "The Great Harmony," in *Liji Jinzhu Jinyi* (The Current Notes and Translations of *Liji*) (Taipei: Shangwu Publisher, 1970).

¹²¹ Wang Shubai, op cit., p. 149.

universities, high schools, and elementary schools, will have hospitals, will have scientific research institutes, will have commercial stores and service businesses, will have traffic businesses, will have nurseries and canteens, will have clubs, and will have police force, etc.; several villages enclose a city to further become a bigger communist commune.¹²²

In another occasion, Mao's ideas were published:

Our direction is, step by step, in much order, to organize a big commune that is made up of industry, agriculture, commerce, culture and education, and militia, and make the commune the basic unit of our society.¹²³

So Mao's political ideal was to integrate industry, agriculture, commerce, culture and education, and militia to become one unit, in which all kinds of human needs will be provided for, and all types of discrimination and inequality will be extinguished, thus building a just, equal, and pure society.¹²⁴ This ideal was Mao Zedong's dream, even after tens of millions of people had died because of the Great Leap Forward, he never changed his faith in and adoration of such kind of socialism.¹²⁵ At the beginning of the Cultural Revolution in 1966, "he once again displayed such an ideal blueprint before the whole

¹²² Li Rui, *Mao Zedong De Gongguo Shifei* (Mao Zedong's Achievements and Mistakes, Right and Wrong) (Taipei, Xinrui Publisher: 1993), p. 280.

¹²³ *Ibid.*

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 308.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*

nation,”¹²⁶ only adding to it “drastic class struggle.”¹²⁷

It looked like Mao was very determined in his pursuit of a *humanitarian* political ideal like the Confucian one; then, why did he fail? The reasons for Mao’s failure were clear when one compares the Confucian teachings and Mao Zedong’s practice. Firstly, in the pursuit of the Confucian political ideal—the Great Harmony—one needs to be patient. The most efficient way and the *only* way is to first cultivate oneself spiritually to become a saint to set an example for the whole nation to follow. It takes time and *free will* for people to make their choice to follow a spiritual path and to succeed on that path. When many people are determined to follow that path, it becomes possible for such an ideal (i.e., the Great Harmony) to be fulfilled. Mao did not follow the above principle. He pushed it so hard and made it so urgent, wanting to achieve a big goal in just a few years, and disregarding people’s capability and *free will*. Such a lifestyle as in the People’s Commune might be tolerable for people in a period of time, but would not last for too long, because it was against humans’ basic need of family life and family love. In the People’s Commune, family life and family love was suppressed, traditional village life-style of human connections was destroyed, and the

¹²⁶ Ibid., pp. 308-309.

¹²⁷ Ibid., p. 309.

normal desire for material wealth was suppressed. So this practice of the People's Commune was against people's will, which meant it was against Mao's *mass line* that he emphasized so much: *every policy needed to correspond with people's concerns and people's interests*. Such a *mass line*, if fully followed, could be *to some extent* similar to the Confucian emphasis on the ancient saintly king's politics, as long as it *reflects the principle of merciful love*. When you violate people's will, people's concerns, and people's normal desires for material needs, how can you and your policy succeed?

Secondly, as stated above, a Confucian path is a path of love and harmony, and it takes time to convince people that these are the correct ways which will benefit all. But Mao's way of pursuing ideals was through class struggle¹²⁸ instead of convincing logic. Although the ends contained elements of humanitarianism, the means were too savage, too brutal, too anti-humanitarian. When the means do not reflect the spirit of the ends, ultimately, the ends will not be realized. When the means are totally opposite to the spirit of the ends (i.e., humanitarianism), *there is no hope* for success in any way. Mao's disregard of human cost and lack of sympathy toward innocent lives morally disgraced his ideal, no matter how noble it was. Many intellectuals or idealists that once adored Mao and Mao's path found themselves alienated in the process of

¹²⁸ Ibid., pp. 312-335.

following Mao. They just could not believe the things that were happening before their eyes.¹²⁹

*(4) Class Struggle: The Way to Attain Political Ideal*¹³⁰

In the 22 years (1927-1949) of political struggle with the KMT, Mao Zedong had seen competition of power between the CCP and the KMT as the political reflection of class struggle in Chinese society at that time, with the KMT seen as representing the bourgeois interests, and the CCP representing the people's (or the worker masses' and the peasant masses') interests. Since the revolt of the revolutionary forces (the CCP) against the reactionary forces (the KMT) was seen by Mao as *good* versus *evil*, of course in his eyes the *good* had to and would finally win over the *evil*. Even after the KMT had been defeated in China completely, the class struggle (a struggle of life-and-death) would continue to exist, only adopting different forms. According to Mao in 1959, such life-and-death struggle not only existed during the previous ten years (1949-1959), but would also continue to exist and last for at least 20 years (1959-1979), and maybe for half of a century (1959-2009). Mao said the philosophy of the communist party is *the philosophy of struggle*. In 1966, which was the beginning of the Cultural

¹²⁹ One of them was Dr. Li Zhisui, Mao Zedong's private doctor. See Li Zhisui, *The Private Life of Chairman Mao* (Random House, 1994).

¹³⁰ The title is from Li Rui, op cit., p. 312, the subtitle of section 8.

Revolution, Mao emphasized that one “should see everything and analyze everything from the point of view of class struggle, and from the method of class analysis.”

Therefore, the whole history of the PRC under Mao Zedong was seen by him as within constant class struggle, which was seen as the basis of everything and every phenomena in society.

Each individual in that society, according to Mao Zedong’s method of class analysis, would be given a class attribute. Those who were defined as the middle or poor or employed peasants, the workers, or the urban poor, would be seen as *good people* who were laboring masses; those who were *defined* as landlords, rich peasants, reactionaries, bad guys (usually the criminals), and the rightists (bourgeoisie and its intellectuals)—called “the black five classes”—would be seen as *the people’s enemies* who had exploited *the people*, the laboring masses. The communist party represented the interests of the laboring class and practiced proletarian dictatorship toward *the people’s enemies*. Thus the laboring masses belonged to the class to be protected, and “the black five classes” were subjected to dictatorship. These class attributes not only followed a person all through his lifetime and would be passed on to whatever work unit he moved to, but they also disgraced his families and his offspring. This led to serious social

discrimination in which a person could be treated like social trash once he was born into a family of “the black five classes,” and to make things worse, there was no way for a person to change his attribute of black class.¹³¹ Thus, all through your lifetime, you had to carry the burden of disgraceful identity wherever you went. In serious situations of class struggle, these black-classed persons would have to go through severe physical violence and mental insults; in less serious situations, their load of work distributed to them was heavier than others and their payment was the lowest in an urban work unit or a rural production team. Would this situation change? Not during Mao’s years.

Mao’s method for conducting class struggle was through mass movement. Confucian ways of carrying out political ideals were as follows: you had a saintly king or a spiritual Master (*charisma*), you had spiritual knowledge (*ideology*), and you had a group of followers (*spiritual practitioners* or *vanguards*), and the mass (*the people*); when the king or the Master called, the followers, well equipped with spiritual knowledge, would come to the mission, setting examples for the people to follow, and thus carry out a mission or a project. In pretty much the same way, Mao Zedong carried out a project through the political movement of class struggle. There was *charisma*

¹³¹ Very rare cases did happen when Mao Zedong wanted to change somebody’s class attribute; it usually happened on those people who had personal relationships with him. In Mao’s years, Mao was the only one in China who had the power to change a person’s class attribute. For example, the class attributes of Dr. Li Zhisui’s parents-in-law were changed because Li was the private doctor of Mao Zedong. See Li Zhisui, *op cit*.

(Chairman Mao), there was *ideology* (the Mao Zedong Thoughts), and there were communist practitioners or vanguards (the party cadres), and *the people* (the masses); when Chairman Mao called, the party cadres, well equipped with the Mao Zedong Thoughts, would come to the political mission, and mobilized the people (i.e., provoked the political activeness from the people) to carry out a project. Class struggle required people to become political activists in a political movement; if you were not active enough, you would be seen as a laggard. Being a laggard would place you in an unfortunate situation of political or social discrimination, or even mean becoming subject to dictatorship; therefore, no one wanted to be seen as a laggard in a political movement. Thus, whenever there was political movement, you would see people doing many things in whatever they could to demonstrate their zeal and to show that they were political activists. This is why there were 90 million people advancing to the mountains to chop down the trees, which caused very serious damage to the Chinese natural environment. Magic (but fake) production figures were reported to Mao during the Great Leap Forward, and this is why the whole generation of national youth responded to Chairman Mao's call to come to the mission of revolution, creating national chaos. In short, everyone wanted to become an activist, so that he would gain respect in that social aura: I am a brave guy!

I am not a coward! This also led to personal worshipping of Chairman Mao, since it was Chairman Mao who called them to the truth, who led them to the revolutionary Holy land, and who guided them to become heroes.

(5) *The Problem of “Democracy”*

Since Mao had divided people into two groups: *the people* and *the people’s enemies* (or *the proletariat* and *the bourgeoisie*), the “democracy” defined by Mao was equal to dictatorship. Democracy, for Mao, meant *the people* became the masters of this country. But *the people* were an uneducated mass, and they needed to be educated and guided by the vanguard (the party member); this led to the claim of leadership of the communist party. Therefore, in the final analysis, who would be the master of this country? The party! Whose will would be the basis of any policy? The party’s! Who would shoulder the “burden” of educating *the people*? The party! Who would point out the right direction for *the people* and help them correct their errors and blindness? The party! Who would give *the people* jobs? The party! Who would be *the people’s* mother or father that nurtured them to become mature? The party! Who would be the one that *held the truth* and was therefore able to guide *the people* to communist Heaven or the revolutionary Holy land? Still, the Party!

But, what's wrong with that if the communist party really represents the interests of *the people*? The problem lay in our above discussions of social discrimination, plus the so-called "*people's* democratic dictatorship." If you belonged to "the black five classes," you would be subject to dictatorship. If your son did not want to be a laggard in a political movement, he would have to draw a clear line, politically and publicly, between you and him, and in some occasions he would publicly insult you or physically attack you to demonstrate his political activeness or revolutionary pureness. Thus, during the Cultural Revolution, cases of children attacking their parents, students attacking their teachers, workers attacking their leaders or managers, and husbands and wives drawing a clear line between each other were not rare. What kind of society was this? Also, when you participated in such behavior, you even had to feel grateful for the grace of the party's leadership or encouragement, because without the party, you would not be so brave to attack your loved ones. And "healthy" love only existed between you and Chairman Mao. Your love toward your parents or teachers or managers, if not filtered by so-called "class feelings," was something to be criticized and to be discarded. This was a beastly society.

Then comes the problem of mass line. In Confucian teachings, "the

people” meant all individuals except the king. In Mao’s mass line, “*the people*” meant the laboring masses (i.e., the peasant masses and the worker masses); it excluded *the people’s enemies* (i.e., the bourgeois rightists, and national bourgeoisie and its intellectuals, or “the black five classes”). Thus any policy would correspond with the interests of the laboring masses (*the people*) rather than the interests of the black classed persons and their families (*the people’s enemies*)—the number of the latter amounted to hundreds of millions¹³² during the history of Mao’s PRC.

Another problem was democratic centralism. Because Mao’s central concern was class struggle, and most of the time he saw struggle as life-and-death struggle, he believed that if the socialist forces did not win, the capitalist forces would win in that society. Thus, class enemies were seen as being everywhere in all fields of daily life; any criticism to Mao’s policy would be read by him as crazy attacks from class enemies, or as wavering of class position and leaning to the enemies’ side. Both were not tolerable for Mao. Thus, dictatorship toward “the people’s enemies” was seen as crucial for the life-and-death struggle. Witch-hunts for the counter-revolutionaries or the right-leaning opportunists were a serious part of every political movement. In order to

¹³² Chen Yizi, “Zhongguo Gaige Sanshinian Ji—Jianlun Mao Zedong De ‘Sige Chuangzao’ ” (A Memorial Ceremony for China’s Thirty Years of Reform—Also on Mao Zedong’s “Four Creations”), see(<http://www.cgarden.net/StubArticle.asp?issue=080302&total=102>).

guarantee victory in each political struggle, Mao naturally centralized political power to his hands, because even the party cadres and the central party leaders were seen as possibly reactionaries, right-leaners or revisionists that would stand on the way of Mao's fulfillment of his utopian dream. Those local followers (party secretaries at the local levels) of Mao also centralized political power to be able to carry out the mission from Mao's calls. Only by centralizing power could the dictatorship toward "the people's enemies" succeed, and only by such practice could Mao be confident that he could freely fulfill his ambitious ideals without any barrier from "the people's enemies." Thus democratic-centralism was always geared toward the central side, both in the relationship between him and other party leaders and cadres, and in the relationship between the party (under Mao's will) and the people. The lack of true democratic practice was an important reason why Mao could make such serious mistakes in pursuing his dreams. There was only top-down command and control, and no reasonable check and balance, and no tolerance for criticism or even mild views of disapproval. Under such kind of "democratic dictatorship," how could Mao succeed in any way in his pursuit of the fulfillment of his dreams?

(6) The Problem of Mao Zedong's System: A Summary

Class struggle was the essence of Mao Zedong's worldview. The purpose of life, for Mao, was to fight against the bourgeoisie for the interests of the proletariat, and to build and consolidate a regime of proletarian dictatorship (so that China would be on the road of socialism). A person had to choose to stand on the proletarian side; otherwise he would be subject to dictatorship. The problem was: who had the right to decide which person belonged to which class? In China, in Mao Zedong's years, only Mao and his trusted followers had this right. Once you were classified as the object of dictatorship, you were subject to severe physical and mental suffering, or even death. Only in very rare cases could a person or a family change their *attribute of class*, which would follow a person all through his lifetime wherever he went. People were thus terrified to speak from their heart. So many people suffered severely in Mao's China. And Mao saw such suffering as nothing in comparison with the ideal world that he was going to build. As stated before in this chapter, when the means did not reflect the spirit of the ends, the ideals that one pursued would be corroded, and when the means was totally against humanitarianism, nothing noble could be achieved.

(7) Prescription: A Suggestion of How to Fix Mao Zedong's

System—the Building of Liberal Democracy

Confucius proposed a noble ideal that carried a spirit of *sharing and fraternity for all people in the world*, which was the Great Harmony. The means to achieve such a noble ideal was through following the principle of *love and respect for each individual*. “*All men are created equal*”—this was the firmest and the most basic belief in Confucian teachings. Everybody was born equal and had the same capability and opportunity to become a saint; this was a belief beyond the division of class, gender, race, and religion. Once an individual decided for himself, *under the principle of free will*, to follow the Confucian spiritual path, he would be able to become a saint as long as he worked hard toward that goal. Nobody could make the decision for him except he himself. This was about a person’s *self fulfillment* and it was a totally *free choice*. Once a great number of people decided to follow the spiritual path, things became easier for the fulfillment of “*Great Harmony*.” The method was to cultivate oneself spiritually and set a good example for others to follow. When enough people acted as vanguards at many corners of the world to lead people toward the same ideal, “*Great Harmony*” would be fulfilled and each individual’s highest dream of *self fulfillment* would be achieved.

Here in Confucian teachings, the means did reflect the spirit of the end: the end was “*Great Harmony*,” and the means was through *following the principle*

of love and respect for each individual, through the recognition of each individual's inner nobility, and through the respect of each individual's free will. This was, from Confucius' point of view, how an ideal of noble spirit could be achieved. The farther one stood away from the above principles (i.e., *love and respect for each individual; the recognition of each individual's inner nobility; the respect of each individual's free will*), the greater the failure of one's *self fulfillment*—the fulfillment of one's highest, noblest dream. From such point of view, *there was no chance* for proletarian dictatorship to achieve anything noble, or anything beneficial to humans. Thus, the answer is clear to the question of how Mao Zedong's system could be fixed. First, an individual's *inborn value* (i.e., his *inner nobility*) must be honored, and this implies *the respect of human rights*; secondly, an individual's *free will* must be respected *all the time*, and this implies the building of a civil society in *the spirit of the western liberalism*; thus the building of a *liberal democracy* would be just a question of time. Do leaders in the reform years follow these principles? The answer will be clear in the next chapter.

CHAPTER FIVE: THE REFORM YEARS (1978—THE CURRENT TIME)

After 30 years of reform (1978-2008), many Chinese intellectuals became disillusioned with China's reform.¹³³ This is a system of political dictatorship plus market economy.¹³⁴ China could have achieved a great success in the building of democracy if its leaders (Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao) had that in mind. But from the very beginning, Deng Xiaoping had made it clear that the reform should insist on economic reform on the one hand, and political dictatorship (*the four cardinal principles*) on the other hand. The whole purpose of reform, for Deng Xiaoping, was to rebuild political legitimacy for the communist governance and consolidate its rule of China—to save the party from the disastrous situation resulting from Mao Zedong's Cultural Revolution.¹³⁵ *The four cardinal principles*, proposed by Deng Xiaoping in March 1979, were: “*firstly, we must insist on the socialist road; secondly, we must insist*

¹³³ See He Qinglian, *Zhongguo Xiandaihua De Xianjing* (China's Descent into A Quagmire) (Sunnyvale: Broad Press Inc., 2003); also, He Qinglian and Cheng Xiaonong (eds.), *Zhongguo Gaige De De Yu Shi* (The Gains and Losses of China's Reform) (Hong Kong: Broad Press Publisher, 2007).

¹³⁴ He Qinglian, op cit.

¹³⁵ He Qinglian, “Daixu: Gaige Shenhua De Zhongjie Yu Chongsu Shehui Rentong De Kunjing” (The Preface Substitute: the Termination of the Myth of Reform and the Difficult Situation of Reconstructing Social Identity), in He Qinglian and Cheng Xiaonong (eds.) op cit., pp. 1-24.

on the proletarian dictatorship; thirdly, we must insist on the communist party's leadership; fourthly, we must insist on Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thoughts."¹³⁶ Deng saw these four principles as *prerequisite* to the four modernizations: modernizations of agriculture, industry, national defense, and technology.¹³⁷ This meant, in the pursuit of China's economic development (i.e., the four modernizations), China would always be a socialist country, which would be characterized by the proletarian dictatorship, which in turn would be guaranteed by the leadership of the communist party, and the communist party would be ideologically well equipped with Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thoughts to be able to lead China to maintain its proletarian dictatorship to pursue the socialist goal.¹³⁸ The most important thing in the four cardinal principles was *the communist party's leadership; only* with its leadership could China maintain its nature of *socialism*. Liberal democracy was seen as a *bourgeois* political institution, the building of which would *bury* the current institution of *proletarian* dictatorship, and thus the possibility of liberal democracy *should be guarded against all the time*. So Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thoughts would continue to be the

¹³⁶ Gao Hui, *Shehuizhuyi Zai Renshi—Zhonggong “Chujie Lun” Zhi Yianjiou* (The Re-understanding of Socialism—A Study of the Chinese Communist Party's “the Initial Stage of Socialism”) (Taipei: Yongye Publisher, 1991), p. 130.

¹³⁷ Gao Hui, op cit., pp. 129-130.

¹³⁸ I was inspired by Zhao Xianyun about this interpretation of the internal logical relation of the four cardinal principles.

ideological guide-lines to lead the party and the whole country.

From the four cardinal principles, one can see that it is impossible for liberal democracy to take root in China as long as the communist party is still in power. So one would expect to see economic development on the one hand, and communist dictatorial rule on the other. There would be no such things as freedom of speech and publishing, freedom of assembly and association, let alone multi-party competitive elections for political power in the political field.¹³⁹ And because of this insistence on political dictatorship, China's economy became a *predatory* economy,¹⁴⁰ its social structure became an elite-dominating social stratification which sacrificed the interests of the peasants and workers and other people at the bottom, who has little chance for upward social mobility,¹⁴¹ and its culture became a bureaucrat-based culture that was deeply involved with institutional corruption.¹⁴² In what follows, I will divide my discussion into four areas: the economy, the social structure, the politics, and the culture.¹⁴³ All four areas were filled with serious problems that came with the institution

¹³⁹ China does have competitive elections at the village level, but has nothing similar beyond that level.

¹⁴⁰ He Qinglian, *op cit.*

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁴² See Cheng Xiaonong, "Fanrong Conghe Erlai—Zhongguo Jingji Xianzhuang He Qushi De Fenxi" (Where Does Prosperity Come from—An Analysis of China's Current Economic Situation and Trend), in He Qinglian and Cheng Xiaonong (eds.), *op cit.*, especially pp. 204-210.

¹⁴³ These four areas could be expressed as a model pictured like a baseball field, with economy representing the home base, social structure the first base, politics the second base, and culture the third base. For detailed explanations of the model, please see Mark V. Kauppi and Paul R. Viotti, *Comparative Politics Theory* (New York: Longman, forthcoming), chapter one.

of a one-party dictatorial rule which carried the ideas of the four cardinal principles.

(1) The Economy

The whole point of economic reform was to stimulate each individual's or enterprise' production activeness to increase productivity. This was because under the original planned economic system, the individuals or enterprises had lost the zeal for production since they did not produce for themselves. Mao Zedong's way of stimulating *revolutionary zeal* or using moral incentive proved to be ineffective. People had to *work for themselves* in order for them to be active economically. Therefore, the People's Communes were dismissed one after another, and each peasant family was allowed to produce for themselves if they simultaneously accomplished the quota of production mission distributed to them. Such a system did boost agricultural production and brought about rural prosperity. Then the communist leaders wanted to transplant the rural successful experience to the urban economy.

Under the original planned economic system, the state-owned enterprises were obliged to perform the production directives issued by the administrative bureaucrats. Institutionally, the enterprise was only an affiliate to the governmental administrative apparatus. It was not an autonomous organization independent from the

government. Therefore, before the reform years, instead of looking to the market for guidance of their investment or production behavior, the state-owned enterprises looked to their governmental administrative superiors for guidance of production mission. They did not have the power to decide on which products to produce, how to produce them, where the raw materials would come, and where the products should go. They did not decide on the price and amount of the things they produced. The administrative superiors would make all the decisions and give directives to the enterprises, and the enterprises only listened to their superiors and accomplished the production mission. Thus, market behavior was totally alien to the enterprises. Most of the state-owned enterprises were in constant economic loss because, once again, *they did not produce for themselves*. The reform aimed at activating their productivity with material incentive. Thus, it was required by the central leader that the administrative superiors should loosen their control over or interference with the enterprises, and should release the enterprises from the heavy load of tax and profit which was originally supposed to be paid to the government. But the reform of the state-owned enterprises was a very difficult job.

The difficulty was both internal and external. *Internally*, there were two problems. The first problem was about the heavy reliance of the workers on the

enterprise for their income and welfare; the workers had been accustomed to the *iron rice bowl* that guaranteed their economic security (i.e., their wages) and social welfare, including housing, medical care, and old-age pension. But because there were too many redundant workers in an enterprise, which had become a huge burden for the enterprise, many of the workers, for the sake of reform, had to leave their long protected employment and welfare. Huge population under unemployment thus became a serious social problem both for the cities and the nation as a whole. The second problem was about the short-sighted economic behavior of the state-owned enterprises. The state-owned enterprises were short-sighted in their investment behavior; most of them pursued either unnecessary expansion of infrastructure or careless investment on goods popular in the market at a certain time. This led to redundant construction and over-production, and thus led to waste of the investment money. But the state-owned enterprises would never change such short-sighted investment behavior, because they did not spend their own money--it was money from national finances, or national banks. Even if they owed debts to the banks, they would not bother to pay the debts since the state would not let them go bankrupt because they were both the ideological and the fiscal pillar of the *socialist* state. Their significance for the economy was also because the

employees of the state-owned enterprises and the state apparatus were the main body of urban residents; the state had to constantly raise their wages and level of welfare so that these residents would make a big urban consumption market to attract the investment of foreign capital. Social stability was also easier to maintain when the urban residents received higher payment and higher welfare than the rural areas because the urban unrest would be harder than the rural unrest to deal with.¹⁴⁴ Therefore, the state-owned enterprises, with their significant role in the economy and social stability, could always gain a loan from the national bank (under the directives from the state) even if they were in constant or even serious economic loss. That's why the state-owned enterprises would not change their short-sighted economic behavior. So, *internally* the above two problems made the reform of state-owned enterprises a most tough job.

Externally, there was one problem and it had to do with government-enterprise relationship. There had been too much administrative interference from the enterprise' "mothers-in-law" (i.e., administrative superiors). Both the central departments and the local governmental agencies could exert their power to interfere in the internal affairs of state-owned enterprises. They could interfere in the personnel arrangement or production projects. They could also impose on the enterprises

¹⁴⁴ Cheng Xiaonong, *op cit.*, pp. 196-204.

unreasonable fees, fines, and share of payments by many excuses (e.g., the enterprises might be required to pay some money in a public event). The reform gave a green light to central departments and local governmental agencies to create their own “second fiscal channel.” Thus all kinds of “mother-in-law” bureaucrats (i.e., the superiors of the enterprises) focused on the enterprises for money.¹⁴⁵ And this was only about asking for money. If the enterprise wanted to initiate or perform a project, sometimes it would need hundreds of stamps for permission.¹⁴⁶ So the system was very ineffective. That was why the state-owned enterprises had been in constant economic loss and was very hard to cure.¹⁴⁷ The root of the problem lay in the government-enterprise relationship. If the government did not change its behavior of constant interference in the affairs of the enterprises, there would be no hope for the state-owned enterprises to improve themselves and become profit-making enterprises. The government had to change its practice of paternalism, which had to do with its nature of dictatorial rule.

(2) *The Social Structure*

China’s social structure, on the distribution of wealth, was a pyramid.

In an article written in 2000, He Qinglian said,

¹⁴⁵ Yang Huiming and Tang Buyun, *1992: Zhongguo De Beishue zhizhan* (1992: The Last Battle of China) (Taipei: Fengyun Shidai Publishing Inc. Ltd., 1993), pp. 121-132.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 122.

¹⁴⁷ See Yang Huiming and Tang Buyun, *op cit.* Also, see Su Ya and Jia Lusheng, *Baimao, Heimao* (White Cats, Black Cats) (Taipei: Xinchao She, 1993).

I developed two criteria. . . to evaluate the income level and professional acknowledgement. . . I estimated that the upper-class-level constitutes four percent of China's population; the middle class counts for 11 percent; and the lower class including marginalized groups counts for about 85 percent.¹⁴⁸

In 2004, her analysis stated “that the middle class in China including the upper middle class totals about 15-16 percent of the population,”¹⁴⁹ and the social structure was still a pyramid one¹⁵⁰ where a small part of the people occupied a huge amount of national wealth, and about 80 percent of the population lived at the bottom. China's economy is a *predatory* economy dominated by a coalition of political, economic, and a small part of intellectual elite. The reform does not bring everybody to wealth as the party promised; rather, it winks at corruption and lets a powerful elite group “rob money” from most of the people in that society.¹⁵¹

How did this happen? As He Qinglian points out, “the reality of the reform was in fact to gradually change the *state of possession of social resources* through the adjustment of interests.” And she continues,

¹⁴⁸ He Qinglian, “The New Myth in China: China's Rising Middle-class Will Accelerate Democratization,” see (<http://www.danke4china.net/ywwz/15.htm>).

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., p.3.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid., p.2.

¹⁵¹ He Qinglian, “Dangqian Zhongguo Shehui Jiegou Yianbian De Zongtixing Fenxi (A Total Analysis of the Evolution of the Current Chinese Social Structure), in He Qinglian and Cheng Xiaonong (eds.), op cit., p.352.

The change of the state of possession of resources in China's reform took the road of *the privatization of the power of political elite* starting with *the marketization of the power*.¹⁵²

In other words, as long as a bureaucrat had power to allot economic resources, he would use the power to engage in rent-seeking activities, illegally giving out policy favors, prerogatives, or special permission to the economic elite and obtaining material gains in return, thus making China a rent-seeking society. A coalition of political, economic, and a part of the intellectual elite (to justify such activities with academic theories) had formed in China's society that had a very powerful ability to dominate and monopolize the allocation of public resources in their favor. And because this elite group had overly monopolized social resources, not only the growth of the middle class in China was impeded, but also the interests of other social strata.¹⁵³ This was why about 80 percent of the people lived at the bottom, and a small part of the people (about 5 percent¹⁵⁴) enjoyed a high standard of living.

One noteworthy thing is that most of the economic elite *either*

¹⁵² Ibid., pp. 326-327.

¹⁵³ Sun Liping, "Jiuling Niandai Zhongqi Yilai Zhongguo Shehui Jiegou Yianbian De Xin Qushi" (The New Trend of the Evolution of Chinese Social Structure since the Middle of the 1990's), in He Qinglian and Cheng Xiaonong (eds.), op cit., p.369.

¹⁵⁴ He Qinglian, "Dangqian Zhongguo Shehui Jiegou Yianbian De Zongtixing Fenxi" (A Total Analysis of the Evolution of the Current Chinese Social Structure), in He Qinglian and Cheng Xiaonong (eds.), op cit., p. 352.

originally were the party bureaucrats or had bureaucratic backgrounds,¹⁵⁵ *or* were closely intertwined with the party so that they could get rich.¹⁵⁶ Don't forget this is a rent-seeking society: the political elite are the ones who can make you rich or poor. Therefore, businessmen will not be the class promoting democracy in China as many people expect. Another noteworthy thing, pointed out by He Qinglian, is as follows:

Chinese middle class is the beneficiary of economic reform and the current political order. The main body of the middle class is still the Chinese Communist Party staff and government agencies. They are not only the defenders of the current political system, but also the beneficiaries of the system.¹⁵⁷

He Qinglian also points out, the middle class people, like other Chinese people, do not have any channel to voice their opinions; without any institutional protection of their rights and interests, they can not even fight for themselves; therefore, the expectation that a rising middle-class will accelerate democratization in China is just a “new myth.”¹⁵⁸

She further points out,

The white-collar and high-tech elites who work in foreign enterprises regard ‘staying away from politics’ as their core value.” They are only interested in

¹⁵⁵ Ibid., p. 329.

¹⁵⁶ He Qinglian, “The New Myth in China: China’s Rising Middle-class Will Accelerate Democratization,” see (<http://www.danke4china.net/ywwz/15.htm>), p. 4.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid.

becoming rich and having fun and do not want to endanger the very source of their income.¹⁵⁹

The *bureaucrat-based* social structure in China also has a serious problem. According to Cheng Xiaonong, being a “state cadre” enjoys high social status and “special socioeconomic identity.” “Before the reform,” “there had formed” “a stable socioeconomic structure” “in the urban society,” Cheng continues,

The socioeconomic status of each individual member of this society was determined and controlled by the party and the government, and was protected by a whole set of socioeconomic institutions. Whether one could live in the city, get promotion, get housing was determined by the party and the government according to one’s political performance, work years, and educational level.¹⁶⁰

According to Cheng, the “promotion of socioeconomic status was not necessarily the result of fair competition, but was often possibly just the reward by the party for one’s political loyalty.” Cheng continues,

Since the socioeconomic status of social member had to be endorsed by the government, this ensured that the government had control over the social member’s

¹⁵⁹ Ibid.

¹⁶⁰ Cheng Xiaonong, “Fanrong Conghe Erlai—Zhongguo Jingji Xianzhuang He Qushi De Fenxi” (Where Does Prosperity Come from—An Analysis of China’s Current Economic Situation and Trend), in He Qinglian and Cheng Xiaonong, *op cit.*, pp. 226.

behavior. As long as he would not offend the government, his status would be protected.¹⁶¹

Also, according to Cheng, “the government often guaranteed that each social member” “would get promotion” “once he achieved a certain educational level or work years.”

Therefore, according to Cheng, “the social mobility” “was usually one way”: only moving upward and very rarely moving downward. Thus, the bureaucrat-based “social structure” “gradually became an inverted pyramid structure.” Cheng continues,

For example, there were more and more public agencies and work units, each becoming bigger and bigger; in the enterprises, the proportion of managerial persons became too large and there were not sufficient front line workers; among the workers, the proportion of high-ranked workers was too large, and there were not enough non-technical workers who would do the heavy-labor jobs.¹⁶²

Cheng said that most urban residents had been accustomed to such stiff social structure, and up until the time being (1996), the government never wanted to *change the social-political institutions* to change such a stiff structure.¹⁶³

This bureaucrat-based social structure caused serious problems. The

¹⁶¹ Ibid.

¹⁶² Ibid, pp. 227.

¹⁶³ Ibid.

bureaucratic system became too huge and there were too many bureaucrats who relied upon the government's fiscal capability to feed them. Not only was the fiscal burden heavy, but the government's efficiency was low. For example, to run a business, you might need to go through many governmental agencies for permission; if you did not have a special relationship with some insider officials, you might need to wait for a long time while your perfect business timing slipped away. Another big problem was that the peasants' economic burden was unreasonably high even just to pay all kinds of taxes to feed the rural bureaucrats, let alone the unreasonable extra fees, fines, and share of payments under different excuses. The behavior of many rural base-level regimes became more and more like underworld gangsters; some of them even hired bully-boys to enforce the unlawful tax and payment "laws" to the peasants .¹⁶⁴ Again, all these problems had to do with the communist party's dictatorial rule which created the bureaucrat-based social structure.

(3) The Politics

Development and stability (i.e., social-economic-political stability)

have been two pillars of China's reform, but without the sincere pursuit of human rights,

¹⁶⁴ He Qinglian, "Guojia Jiaose De Shanbian: Zhengfu Zuowei De Fei Zhengdanghua Qushi Fenxi" (The Evolution of the State Role: An Analysis on the Trend of Illegitimization of the Government's Behavior), in He Qinglian and Cheng Xiaonong (eds.), *op cit.*, pp. 397-434.

freedom, and *western style* democracy, these two pillars may not be sustainable.

One-party dictatorial rule has been the institutional origin of most of the problems emerging in the process of China's reform in the past 30 years (1978-2008). Why was the coalition of political, economic, and a part of intellectual elite able to occupy unreasonably huge amounts of national wealth? Because the monopoly of political power by the communist party bureaucrats made them able to use their power of allocation of social resources, to be engaged in rent-seeking activities with the economic elite who were adept in collusion with the party bureaucrats. The elite coalition did this at the sacrifice of the interests of most people (about 83% of the people¹⁶⁵) who were disadvantaged or marginalized in the society.¹⁶⁶ If there had been sound democratic institutions, the disadvantaged or marginalized would have a channel to appeal for or represent their interests in the process of policy-making; the media might have performed the function of supervision of the policy-making process. If that had been the case, there would not have been the policies of so called "housing reform," "medical reform," "educational reform," and "reform on social protection" that seriously undermined the interests of people at the bottom. By the same token, there might not have been the

¹⁶⁵ Ibid., p. 428.

¹⁶⁶ He Qinglian, "Dangqian Zhongguo Shehui Jiegou Yianbian De Zongtixing Fenxi" (A Total Analysis of the Evolution of the Current Chinese Social Structure), in He Qinglian and Cheng Xiaonong (eds.), *op cit.*, pp. 350- 352.

suppression of Falun Gong in 1999, the cracking down on Tibet in 2008, or the completely predatory requisition of the peasants' land in the rural area or the gangster-like tearing down of people's houses in the urban area. In recent years, there have been many events of mass protest or confrontation due to unjust land requisition or forced house demolition.¹⁶⁷ And obviously, if there had been multi-party competition, there would have been more reasonable and flexible policies toward Taiwan. Democracy may not be the answer to all problems, but it could help policy deliberation, and without it, a wrong policy could go so far and deep as the Cultural Revolution and the Great Leap Forward during Mao's years. Chinese leaders of the reform years still have not learned the lessons.

The injustice in China's reform leads to further social instability. The feud between the people on the one hand, and the local government and housing estate merchants on the other hand in the case of land requisition or house demolition has led to mass protests as stated above. There are also crimes committed against the rich people by the poor and hopeless people who become criminals to either vent their feelings of

¹⁶⁷ Here are the surprisingly large numbers of mass protest events (to protect their rights on land or housing or their other rights): 58,000 in 2003, 74,000 in 2004, and more than 87,000 in 2005. See He Qinglian, "Guojia Jiaose De Shanbian: Zhengfu Zuowei De Fei Zhengdanghua Qushi Fenxi" (The Evolution of the State Role: An Analysis on the Trend of Illegitimization of the Government's Behavior), in He Qinglian and Cheng Xiaonong (eds.), *op cit.*, p. 398.

imbalance about the gap of wealth distribution or plunder wealth from the rich.¹⁶⁸

Chinese local governments' way of dealing with mass protest had been unwisely using public violence to suppress the mass; in many cases, the behavior of local governments was close to or the same as the Mafia or gangsters.¹⁶⁹ How could a political regime keep its legitimacy when behaving like that? This behavior led to "structural tension"¹⁷⁰ between the disadvantaged and the government, and was thus not good for the future of the regime. In short, China's lack of democracy led to a power monopoly, which in turn led to power abuse in almost all fields of daily life. Although revolution may not happen because of the regime's social control, the regime is neither in security nor exempt from social unrest within the next decade.

(4) *The Culture*

The guideline for the reform was Deng Xiaoping Theory that was generalized as "one center, two basic points." The "one center" meant economic development: the central job of the party and the state would shift from Mao Zedong's *class struggle* to the reform government's *economic development*. The party would specifically focus on modernizations in four areas: agriculture, industry, national defense,

¹⁶⁸ Ibid., p. 429.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid., pp. 397-430.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid.

and technology. The “two basic points” are: on the one hand, to insist on the four cardinal principles (as explained in the beginning of this chapter), and on the other hand, to insist on reform and openness.¹⁷¹ Deng Xiaoping emphasizes that both basic points were crucial for China’s socialism. Therefore, Deng’s attempt is to develop an economy without changing the one-party dictatorial rule. This Deng Xiaoping Theory has been upheld until the present time, and will continue to be followed, according to Deng, for a total of a hundred years (1978-2078).¹⁷² Jiang Zemin added the “Three Represents” to the Deng Xiaoping Theory: the communist party represents the interests of the broadest range of the people, it represents the most advanced productivity, and it represents the direction of the development of the most advanced civilization. Jiang Zemin’s purpose was to justify the existing coalition of the political elite and the economic elite, and to include the capitalists in the party. This “Three Represents” may not be as positive as some people think, seeing it as a sign that the Chinese communist party has turned its direction from socialism to capitalism. It aims at a justification of the predatory coalition of the elite in China.¹⁷³

Hu Jingtao adds to the Deng Xiaoping Theory, too. He advocates

¹⁷¹ For a useful research of this guideline, see Gao Hui, *op cit.*

¹⁷² This came from Deng’s words, which said the guideline will dominate for a hundred years. See *Ibid.*

¹⁷³ He Qinglian, “Dangqian Zhongguo Shehui Jiegou Yianbian De Zongtixing Fenxi” (A Total Analysis of the Evolution of the Current Chinese Social Structure), in He Qinglian and Cheng Xiaonong (eds.), *op cit.*, pp. 325-360.

“human-based development,” “scientific development (or sustainable development), and “the harmonious society.” “Human-based development” was only a slogan or lip service since so many people were in difficult situation because of the predatory nature of the development. “Scientific development” or “sustainable development” placed emphasis on the issue of environmental protection, but this also had little use since the environmental situation in China have become worse and worse.¹⁷⁴ The slogan of “constructing a harmonious society” is beautiful, but in dealing with mass protest events, Hu himself still believed in state violence. The use of state violence to suppress the so called “unstable factors in its budding state” was the real practice to keep citizens silent and made them comply with the state policy or state position. What kind of “harmonious society” is this?

Besides the ideology, Hu Jintao also tried to come close to Confucianism, which had always been misused historically to justify the ruler’s supremacy and to require the subjects to be loyal to the emperor and the Court unconditionally. In other words, Hu borrowed from Confucianism in order to reject the western democracy. Therefore, once again, Confucianism becomes the tool of dictatorial governance for the ruler—a constant tragedy that happened repeatedly in Chinese history.

¹⁷⁴ He Qinglian and Cheng Xiaonong, “Yi Zoudao Jintou De Xiaonong Jingji—Guanyu Zhongguo Nongcun, Nongmin Yu Nongye De Duihua” (The Small Peasant Economy that Has Gone to Its End--A Dialogue about Chinese Village, Peasants, and Agriculture), in He Qinglian and Cheng Xiaonong (eds.), *op cit.*, pp. 271-322.

CHAPTER SIX: THE INTERVIEW CASES IN SHANGHAI (1)

In what follows, I will present the interview cases in Shanghai. There are 18 cases that I am going to present, including three government officials, six enterprise people, four media professionals, and five intellectuals. The interviews were conducted from late April to the middle of June, 2004. I use these interview cases to obtain data that will reveal a long-term trend in the development or evolution of Chinese democracy. This long-term trend started with the Opium War (1839-1842) when Chinese civilization first encountered the modern, western civilization, and was forced to start its long process of modernization. China today is still in that process. Shanghai is one of the most modernized cities in China. How did these interviewees see the positive factors and the negative factors that drove or impeded the development and change of the city that they lived in? What were their evaluations of the roles of self and state in Shanghai's development and change? What were their expectations of the future, including their own future and the city's future?

(1) The Government Officials

Interviewee No. 1 was a party cadre; his age was slightly over 50. He first explained the characteristics of the Chinese political system, saying that the party and the state were not separate. Even if currently China was in the reform years, it was still the party that had the final say in everything. The government was the accessory of the party. Now in China there were discussions on the separation of the government from the party, saying that the party should change its role from the role of management to the role of service, and let the government assume the responsibility of governance; originally the government's role was absent. Chinese traditional government was different from the government in the western political science. Then he said that the above description was context; anything that he was going to say was all within this context.¹⁷⁵

Then, he discussed the currently-hot topic of institutional change regarding the separation of the party-government. He explained that the main body of the government was still the party members, so even if the party and the government were separate, [the political system after] such governmental transformation was different from the west: it was one-party rule. Then he turned to another hot topic: the legitimacy of the

¹⁷⁵ Talks from interviewee No. 1.

[communist] party's rule. There were legal legitimacy and political legitimacy. Regarding *legal legitimacy*, the birth of Chinese Communist Party was different from the situation in the west. China had the party first, and then came the state. In the west, they had the state first, and then came the party. The legal legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party was sure because it had passed, in the procedure, the negotiation of the Council of Political Negotiation and the agreement of the Congress of People's Representatives. This meant it had gained the support from the people. Further, the Congress of People's Representatives instituted the constitution that admitted the legal status of the Chinese Communist Party's rule. So legally, there was no problem. Regarding *political legitimacy*, the Chinese Communist Party represented the people and was supported by the people. "Now we say 'Three Represents'": the party represented an even bigger part of the people. The party kept a close relationship with the people and was pragmatic, and this further resolved the issue of political legitimacy. [If] a party wanted to rule successfully, it needed to win the heart of the people.¹⁷⁶

The interviewee then gave a short theory of the difference between Chinese and western political culture. He said that Chinese civilization was a "big river" civilization, and western civilization was an "oceanic" civilization. "Big river"

¹⁷⁶ Ibid.

civilization meant agricultural society, which depended on water for living. In that case, it needed a chief [as the authority] to allocate water areas, and rules [as the authority] would not work. The civilization depended on the leader's will to make the allocation. In the "oceanic" civilization, each individual rented a boat to plunder things for allocation; thus rules and institutions were crucial. So the difference between China and the west was determined by such cultural background. He continued,

We have a joke. . . if you enter into China's inland areas and ask the peasants about what they need, the answer will be a good leader. And in the United States and the Western Europe, it is institutions that are crucial, [and] it will be fine if a leader is a fool. But in China, the leader cannot be a fool.¹⁷⁷

He further continued,

No matter how the government will change, it's impossible to change to be like the western style [because] the cultural tradition is functioning, the popular base, the people's cultural psychology.¹⁷⁸

His expectation of the future was that even after 20 years of change, such traditional culture would still play a determinative role, and he said that even if Shanghai was

¹⁷⁷ Ibid.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid.

characterized by its power to contain different kinds of culture, in essence, it was still Chinese traditional culture that would dominate: People would follow individual persons, not institutions. People's knowledge about government was via specific persons [officials]. His emphasis implied that Chinese people would not know the government by a set of rules or institutions.¹⁷⁹

Another important point he made was about his self role in driving the city's development and change. He said that he was 52 years old, and his life goals were to be diligent and sincere, acting as a bolt in the machine of the party. He said that Maslow talked about an individual's value fulfillment, "people in our generation do not have such [desire], as long as our family is in harmony, our income is stable, we will be satisfied. We are more realistic."¹⁸⁰ The younger generation thought differently. His child said that he would never did a job like his father's job as a party cadre, which did not carry significant social status; he wanted to be a big boss and be able to travel around the world. The interviewee said that there was a generation gap involved: the value direction was different. For him, the greatest joy was to serve the people, but for his son, if he had the same attitude as the interviewee, it would influence his personal development within

¹⁷⁹ Ibid.

¹⁸⁰ Here "realistic" means that they are not pursuing idealistic things such as self value fulfillment talked about by Maslow.

the peer group, and would make him discordant with the current society. Here the interviewee expressed an important point. People in his generation held a value of self sacrifice for the benefit of the collectivity (the work unit or the nation as a whole). Now the social values had changed to more self-centric, focusing more on earning money and becoming rich rather than on collective interests. But still, his way of leading the younger party members was that they should learn from his occupational attitude (i.e., self sacrifice for the collective interests), and in other aspects they could just follow each one's own character as long as they would not violate morality and law. Speaking of *spirit civilization*¹⁸¹ and how to develop a young party member, once again he emphasized the difference between the western way and the Chinese way. The western way, in his views, was by institutions, laws, credit, and punishment, and the Chinese way was by education. "Confucius opposed most punishment without education first," he said. So he emphasized education. To awaken the people's moral consciousness (common ideas or ideals, common morality, and common spirit aspiration) was the content of *spirit civilization*. He saw this as the political mission of the party.

On how the party worked (i.e., the political process), he explained

¹⁸¹ *Spirit civilization* is a term used by the CCP to distinguish non-material values from *material civilization* which means economic development or earning money. The CCP emphasized that both *material civilization* and *spirit civilization* were important. For example, corruption is a serious problem in the category of *spirit civilization*.

that, first the party made the decision, and then mobilized the people. The crucial part was the party members; they should play a leading, vanguard role in the mobilization.¹⁸²

What if the people did not like the policy made by the party? He said that the policy ideas should come from the people, and then shift to public policy or norms to manage public affairs. In other words, his words implied that the party should always know what people thought and what their concerns were, and the policy should always reflect the interests and concerns of the people—this is *mass line* advocated by Mao Zedong. He continued to explain this point of *mass line*, though he did not mention the term. How would the party know what people thought or what their concerns were? The way to attain such purpose was through the connection between upper-level and lower-level party members. The lower-level party members should express their viewpoints to the highest party leader. And the highest leader of the party should spend a long period of time with the people, to investigate and research people's wishes, and this had been institutionalized within the party. If people's wishes were normal and reasonable, those wishes will be

¹⁸² This meant that the party members should set an example for the people to follow in any policy. They should be the first ones to uphold and carry out the policy which had been made by the party. If the policy required the people to sacrifice their self interests, then the party members, as the vanguard of people, should go first to sacrifice their interests for the people to follow. This had become a traditional way of doing things for the CCP—using political mobilization to call the people to a mission, whether it was economic development, one-child policy, suppression of Falun Gong, or house tearing and resettlement. This way of carrying out policies had been created by Mao and had been inherited by the reform party-government. That's why being able to be accepted to become a party member was sometimes seen as an honor. The party cadres were to serve the people, not to serve their own interests or any concerns about self.

institutionalized; if their wishes were not reasonable, the party would persuade them into giving up those wishes. Here lay a problem that the interviewee did not raise: Who decides which wishes are reasonable and which are unreasonable? Of course it is the party that decides! If the party “persuades” you into giving up your concerns and interests, you will have no choice but to listen to the party and comply with the policy that has been made by the party. So this is the problem of *mass line*: In the final analysis, it is not *mass line*; rather, it is the *party line*—the party decides everything, rather than the people.

Then he gave an example of house demolition and resettlement of people. Why did the party want you to follow and move? It was because, the party would tried its best to persuade you, that such movement would raise everybody’s living quality. Why should you move? It’s for your own long-term interests, and for your children and grandchildren and later generations’ interests which you might not be able to see during your life. So the party would reason with you, and then required every household involved to sign the contract. Using a “reasonable” way of counting the loss-- counting heads or counting bricks, depending on the situation-- the party-government would compensate you for the loss in the resettlement with a distribution of space of your new

residence. If 60% or 70% of the households expressed their view that the distribution was unreasonable, then the institution would be seen as unreasonable and the party and government would reconsider the whole thing. If some part of the households expressed their views which were unreasonable, then the government would have to do it anyway.¹⁸³

Finally, he referred to the principles of the communist party's discipline for all party members. (1) The individual should obey the organization (i.e., the party). (2) The lower level cadres should obey the upper level cadres. (3) The whole party [members] should obey the central [party], for example, if things involved overall considerations. (4) The minority should obey the majority, for example, if things involved different views. At last, he said, *the party played a determinative role in everything*.¹⁸⁴

Interviewee No. 2 was a government official who was responsible for propaganda. He first gave a general talk on the factors that drove the development and change of this city. He said that development and modernization was about progress, so there were three aspects in modernization. (1) The material aspect: this had to do with technological innovation; (2) the sociological aspect: this referred to values and concepts,

¹⁸³ From talks of interviewee No. 1.

¹⁸⁴ Ibid. Italics for emphasis by me.

and it had to do with concept innovation; (3) the human factor: this had to do with talent innovation. All three came down to humans and centered on humans. The interviewee was very positive, self-confident and optimistic about himself, about Shanghai, and about this country. He said that the requirement of the development of human civilizations was progress, and the requirement of the society was that it wanted progress. Therefore, no one should be anti-human beings or anti-society, and this meant that everybody should pursue progress. If human history diverted from progress, it would need to return to the normal track. He gave an example on Hitler, saying that Hitler was anti-human civilization, so he had to fail and human history needed to turn its track back to progress.¹⁸⁵ And the appearance of Hitler was because everybody cultivated the situation for him to appear; without the policy of Appeasement and other factors, he would not be able to appear. In general, a country should not impose its own values upon other countries. Development should not be just caring for one's own area, one's own nation, or one's own country. There should be harmony, communication and cooperation. The subject of this era was peace and progress.¹⁸⁶

¹⁸⁵ Here I suspected that even if his example was on Hitler, the real example he wanted to mention was Mao Zedong. I guessed what he wanted to express was that Mao's Cultural Revolution was anti-human or anti-society, so Mao finally had to fail, and Chinese history had to turn its rail back to the normal track, which was reform. But because he was a government official, it was inconvenient for him to raise Mao Zedong as a negative example. So he chose Hitler as a substitute.

¹⁸⁶ From talks of interviewee No. 2. Here he meant the US should not impose its democratic values on China. There should be harmony, communication, and cooperation between countries that had different

The interviewee then related his above talk to the state role in driving the development and change of Shanghai. He said that since the human civilization and the society wanted progress, and development and modernization were people's desire, the government should follow such a normal track and pursue progress. The government had the most resources in its hands, so it was the most important organization in a society. The government's role was to guide, to coordinate, and to organize the development. If the development went too fast, the government should slow it down; if it went too slowly, the government should make it faster. He mentioned that the government's role in planning should not be discarded; it should make plans and guide a whole area to advance to the positive side. The government should serve the people to meet their demands, and it should be responsible not to be anti-society or anti-humans; otherwise it would be discarded by the people.¹⁸⁷

Based upon the above ideas, the interviewee then talked about his self role. He put his self role in the bigger picture of the area development. He said that he had witnessed the development of this area: this area had played a leading role for [the development of] Shanghai, and Shanghai had played a leading role for [the development

values, for example, between China and the US.

¹⁸⁷ Talks from interviewee No. 2

of] other places. And in this process, his self value was raised, his material life became better, his knowledge became more advanced, and his capability improved. So his understanding of self role was placed under the whole framework of collective development: when the collective development ran high, his self value ran high; because there had been such an aura of progress in the society and in the reform years, he as an individual could then gain an opportunity for the advancement of his self value. So he was very positive. The future, he said, would be positive and bright.¹⁸⁸ That was his expectations of the future.

Interviewee No. 3 was also a government official whose job was to coordinate information and communication between the city and the central party. He analyzed three factors that drove or impeded the development and change of Shanghai. (1)Normative: the government in Shanghai was very normative, always following the rules. In the area of social order, the Shanghai government did a good job. Therefore, it was very secure in Shanghai. But because it was too normative, it lacked dash. (2)Crystal of wisdom: Shanghai was a city full of domestic immigrants, and just as the interbreeding children were smarter by 9 percent than other children, so the level of people's quality as a whole in this city was raised by the intermingling of different elements. (3)The drive of

¹⁸⁸ Ibid.

innovation: the drive of innovation in the government of this city was very strong. It was a pattern of “small government, big society.” The government here was to offer service, not to directly participate in the socio-economy. In contrast, in the inland areas, often the party secretary was the president of the board in a company, and the socio-economy depended on the government to pull it up. Here in Shanghai the government’s role was like a judge, not a sportsman. The office that he worked in was to propagandize the image of the development of this area. The western society might not understand this area, and the office would hold news conferences periodically to help other provinces and the western media to understand more about this area. The interviewee said that he enjoyed his current job because he could contact different people and at the same time he could serve people.¹⁸⁹

I asked him about his child to get a clue of his expectations of the future. About the child, the interviewee said that he would not set a goal for him to attain, but rather, he would create an environment for him to pursue his own life. However, he would teach his child on three things. First, be loving: think of others and respect others. Secondly, cultivate a consciousness of competition. The society would not center on you, [so] you must raise your capability to fairly compete with others. Thirdly, behave yourself.

¹⁸⁹ Talks from interviewee No. 3.

More people placed emphasis on freedom, but he would stress the importance of norms.

You must inherit the norms of the previous generation, and the Chinese traditional virtues like respecting the old people, loving the young, and no picking up of things other people lost on the road. The interviewee was confident in himself, in the development of this area, and in the development of Shanghai. There was a kind of work zeal and positive aura around his working place (i.e., the government team). The drive, he said, came from a goal stimulation in the government that by 2010 they would build Shanghai to become an outward, modern, and multi-functional city—the prospect was very beautiful and everybody had been working toward such a beautiful common goal. The drive also came from his personal wish to make great progress and improve his own quality and capability.¹⁹⁰

To sum up, government officials in this sample were all very positive and optimistic about themselves and the future of Shanghai. They saw their self value in the framework of the collective development of Shanghai. They all emphasized the importance of the quality of government officials, including knowledge and capability to do things and to communicate with others. They all emphasized the importance of the state role in driving the city's development and change. None of them talked much about

¹⁹⁰ Ibid.

the negative factors that impeded the development and change of Shanghai. Their expectations of the future and the younger generations were positive; they enjoyed their jobs very much, and they saw their jobs as serving the people and serving the collective interests of Shanghai's development and positive change.

(2) The Enterprise People

Interviewee No. 4 worked at a foreign company that provided the parts of cars to car companies. He was in a position of high-level management . The company started its business in China very early (1993-1994), and developed very fast. Shanghai was a very easy environment, he said, for investment on the hardware and software facilities. Now the company's major opponents had entered into Shanghai, so the situation for the competition was very fierce. The company planned to keep its original leading position with its advantage on research and development (R&D). This was not about traditional parts whose profit was not high; it was about high technology. It's a German company that defined itself as a high-tech company. The R&D was focusing on electronic technology to meet three big trends: safety, environmental protection, and fuel saving. It had three strategies in the competition. First, it would focus on new fields to provide value for the customers and thus earning profit for itself.

Secondly, it would pay much attention to the Asian-Pacific, Chinese market. Thirdly, it planned to enter into non-vehicle fields globally like that of the motorcycle, and medical field.¹⁹¹ The interviewee said that Chinese market size was big because of its large population. Chinese purchasing power grew very fast. As long as in one year there emerged several new cities whose GDP per capita was more than 3,000 or 4,000 US dollars, there would be a promising market for high growth rate. So it was promising in the next three to five years; after five years, it was hard to say. The future was promising, but he said usually a company would not see as far as 10 years or 20 years (as stated in my interview questionnaire); it usually saw the next five years. For the parts of the cars in the European or American market, if there was a 1 % growth, it would be very good already. So the company paid great attention to the Asian-pacific, Chinese market.¹⁹²

About the self role, the interviewee showed a high degree of self-confidence. He said that in the next five years, the most promising area was in Shanghai; his job would be here, and he did not want to leave here. He had got an Australian permanent resident qualification which was due in 2003, and he gave it up. He had had some advantages in his career: he worked in MNC (multi-national corporation),

¹⁹¹ Talks from interviewee No. 4.

¹⁹² Ibid.

he had an EMBA degree, and he had overseas work experience. So he told his boss that he did not want to leave here. The place and timing for him was just perfect. Especially people at such level [like him], having five to ten years of senior management qualification were now the hottest in the employment market. People having qualifications like him received telephone calls from talent-hunting companies every few days.¹⁹³

About the government's role, the interviewee had a high evaluation of the Shanghai government, saying that the Shanghai government's character was efficiency and transparency. Their work was pro-business, and "we have a deep feeling on this," "the [Shanghai] government supports us very much." "It very much meets our needs." Especially to the top 500 companies, the Shanghai government had many favoring policies and support, and it was transparent. Because this was a foreign company, I raised the question of Chinese nationalism. He said, the company had a policy of promotion of indigenous talents, it did many things for China, and its development in China and training of indigenous talents had long-term benefit for the Chinese national car industry. Therefore, nationalism would not be a

¹⁹³ Ibid.

problem.¹⁹⁴

Interviewee No. 5 was also working at an American top MNC and was also in a high management position. He looked about 40 years old or less. He first gave a general talk on the factors that drove the development and change of Shanghai. In general, Deng Xiaoping's Southern-tour talks [in 1992] played a role of liberation from the conservative forces within the government: thus the general aura of turning to pragmatism. Specifically, (1) Shanghai originally had a strong industrial foundation. (2) The Shanghai people had a very deep complex of aristocratic decline. It used to be the Far Eastern "little Paris," and was the earliest area of westernization [in China]. It had a strong character of intermingling different elements, and it accepted new things very fast. So when China decided the nation wanted reform and openness, it absorbed new things very fast—the fastest in the country. (3) Shanghai had gained support from the [central] government, especially in the recent 10 years. After 1989, Jiang Zemin was in power and had a policy leaning toward Shanghai. It had very high level radiation [effect]: its development was able to bring along the adjacent inland regions. Also, its city administration, infrastructure, and cadres were all of high quality. (4) Shanghai had a plural structure of industries. (5) Shanghai had contained talents from all regions. (6) The

¹⁹⁴ Ibid.

foreign investment in Shanghai had brought consumption, trained talents, and brought in advanced ideas and management models.¹⁹⁵

The state role was very important as stated above at point (3). About the self role, the interviewee thought that an individual's power [to drive a city or a society] was very small. Since he was not able to control the whole society and he could only control himself, the only thing he could do was to do his job well. He wanted to act as an instrument of communication to share with his friends and acquaintances new ideas, new concepts, and new ways of management, because not everybody had had the opportunity like him to enter into a big foreign company. In the future he also hoped that after he learned [new] knowledge, he would jump into national industries to help the development of Chinese national industries. He also worried that once China joined WTO, when the tariff went down, many Chinese national industries would fall. But he was optimistic about this. The time was short. Within five to ten years, the national industries must catch up to avoid being ousted in the competition. I asked him about the role that Chinese nationalism played in driving the economy, which was totally different from the American capitalists' individualism. He said that this was also an area where the difference between China and the US lay. He said that because the US did not have

¹⁹⁵ Talks from interviewee No.5

history,¹⁹⁶ and did not have a hundred years of national humiliation like China did since the Opium War, it would not have strong nationalism to play an important role in driving the national development. He said that China's government officials had very strong ambition and aspiration to drive national development. I think he touched an important point that China's development was to a great extent due to its officials' will to pursue national wealth and power. This was the same as my assumption and my previous knowledge of Chinese nationalism. Finally he talked about himself. Though he wanted to enter into the national industries, the national industries could not afford to pay the salary that he was paid in the foreign company.¹⁹⁷

Interviewee No. 6 was a young lady; she worked at a foreign pharmacist company. Her job was about communication and public relations. She first gave a general talk on the factors that drove the development and change of Shanghai. (1) Shanghai, for a hundred years, was the commercial port. The western culture first came to Shanghai, so the Shanghai people had the earliest contact with the western culture and industrialization. (2) Many of the old generation who received the western education were still alive; they were not unfamiliar with western culture and customs. After 1978,

¹⁹⁶ I think what he meant was that the US did not have long history and strong historical pride in many dynastic glory as China did.

¹⁹⁷ Talks from interviewee No. 5.

the reform began, and the city people got along with people from outside of the country very fast. People from Hong Kong, Taiwan, and overseas Chinese had connections of friendship, family relationships, investment, and cooperation [with the Shanghai people]. Globally, the trade began, and here in Shanghai, the labor was cheap, the level of knowledge and culture was high, the transaction was efficient, and business norms, courtesy, fax, and e-mail were all present. In the early 1990's, foreign trade, export of processing products, capital from Hong Kong and Taiwan all came to Shanghai, and the city people's self-confidence rose. Capital from America and Europe also came, adopting the form of a joint venture. At first the Chinese side opened slowly, occupying 51% of capital share. Both sides were testing the way of cooperation. Again, the Shanghai people accepted the business culture very fast. And the work manner influenced the manner of life. Originally the western way of dealing with jobs and the modern business manner was absent in the Chinese pattern. (3) The culture influenced Shanghai's government officials, and the officials thus had richer and broader views, experiences, and understanding. They were more capable of dealing with things. (4) Also, the Shanghai people were far away from the central government, so they were more practical, not counting too much on ideology.¹⁹⁸

¹⁹⁸ Talks from interviewee No. 6.

About the self role, the interviewee mentioned the similarity of cultures: the world was becoming an integral whole. Shanghai or other big cities had more opportunities to experience the fusion of foreign things with indigenous things. She emphasized that it was a fusion, not a total copy. So the government's talk on nationalism and spirit civilization made sense. In her case, the more she contacted foreigners, the more she loved her own country. Foreigners did have their advantages, and if there was a process of progress [for the Chinese], she was willing to play a role in helping her countrymen [to become modern]. This would take a long time of education on modern philosophy and modern culture. This would require a fusion of Chinese and western knowledge of philosophy and history.¹⁹⁹ In other words, the interviewee believed that the global culture had become an integral culture, and Chinese philosophy and history would be able to make contributions to the fusion of the western culture and the Chinese culture.

The interviewee's expectations of the future were positive. She said that the enterprise' future depended on the government's policy. If the policy became more open, joining WTO, then the next five to ten years would be good; it would still be an "economic culture," which was good for their enterprise. The problem lay in the areas of intellectual property right, public hygiene, and the medical system. The policy of

¹⁹⁹ Ibid.

public hygiene could not be controlled by the ministry of foreign trade. I asked her about the political process. (1) *“How would the enterprise influences the government’s policy?”*

The interviewee answered, “It’s hard.” (2) *“Is there any lobby group?”* She said only the children of high level cadres or the retired old cadres could use personal relationships to affect policy-making in some grey areas. (3) *“How about the media’s role?”* She said that it was said that the media would act as the third side and play the role of supervision of the government and its policies, but the media were controlled by the government and belonged to the government. The media in America could criticize their government about the policy toward Iraq; here in China such thing was just impossible. (4) *“Is there any informal channel to try to influence the government’s policy?”* She said that in America the government and the academic circle could hold a forum to discuss issues on public hygiene; the European government was less active than the American government; and here in China their company depended more on themselves and very little on the government. I asked, “So the company could only passively wait for the policy and comply with it?” She said, “Yes.” Finally I asked her, “If you had a child, how would you guide him or her?” She answered, “Education. Not the school education, but he or she must understand Chinese philosophy and history, and the world philosophy and history.

Some people were sent overseas for study, but it was pathetic that they know very little about their own country's philosophy and history."²⁰⁰ So her expectations of the future were a fusion of Chinese culture and the western, modern culture to become a global culture, and she wanted to play the role of bridge through education—this was a long-term view and it would be a long-term process.

Interviewee No. 7 was a Taiwanese businessman. He was the boss of a small company and was less than 40 years old. He first gave a general talk on the positive or negative factors that drove or impeded the development and change of Shanghai. He first talked about the positive side. (1) Shanghai had strong power of consumption. (2) It had strong acceptability of foreign, new things, and it was very fast in absorbing new things. (3) It had geographical advantage: it was located in the center of coastal provinces, where there were no earthquakes; it was a plane, and it had a big deep-water harbor that was easy to enter and exit. Then he talked about the negative side. (1) The employees lacked activeness in work. They were self-protective, and did not take initiative to serve the customers. (2) It was hard to get money you needed from the bank. The institutions were complete, but the way of thinking lagged behind.²⁰¹

²⁰⁰ Ibid.

²⁰¹ Talks from interviewee No. 7.

About the government's role, the interviewee highly praised the Shanghai government. The Shanghai government had high efficiency in enforcing the laws. Living in Shanghai was very secure. And the government's administrative efficiency was very high. They were really doing their job well. People in Shanghai only wanted stability. Living here was very comfortable. So he said that we should give them time, and should not demand things too much. In 200 years,²⁰² they could make progress to such an extent; it was great already. Five years later, when the software construction and the construction of the humanistic environment were completed, it would become better. They were using 15 years to catch up with what should be completed within 50 years. He gave the crisis of SARS as an example. Within one week, the spreading of SARS was under control; this really showed their administrative efficiency.²⁰³

About the self role, the interviewee was very positive. He emphasized initiative, service, and relationship. It was not necessary to be greedy, just step by step, [and he would succeed.] Next year (2005) his business would extend from domestic trade to foreign trade. He said he had the Taiwanese spirit of business, but did not look down

²⁰² From 1840 (the Opium War) to 2004, it should be 164 years, not 200 years.

²⁰³ Talks from interviewee No. 7.

upon the mainland Chinese people as some Taiwanese did. He would train the mainland employees, and once they had learned, everything could just follow the institutions of the company, and he would become relaxed and could just travel everywhere. It would take three to five years for this process to be done. After three to five years, he would have created his world.²⁰⁴

Interviewee No. 8 was a Taiwanese businesswoman, who opened a teashop and sold tea in Shanghai. She came here because her husband wanted to come here to sell tea, and she liked to drink tea, so, she followed her husband; originally she was not a businesswoman. She first talked about her self role: how she ran a successful business. “Doing business in Shanghai is fine.” “You have to deal with officials of the Customs, tax affairs, agency of industry and commerce, public security, fire-fighting, and hygiene.” Not only did one need to deal with upper-level officials, but one also needed to deal with base level officials like public security people [i.e., the policemen]. There was a Taiwanese saying: “The little official was intractable.” As long as one did not violate the law or did bad things, it was very free [doing business in Shanghai]. Public security in Shanghai was the best in this country. But although the economy ran so high, the level of people’s knowledge did not catch up. In restaurants you saw poor dining etiquette; in

²⁰⁴ Ibid.

traditional markets you saw people spit casually; in the bus station, nobody lined up.

Running business here, first, one needed to avoid other people's attention; secondly, one needed to know where one might encounter what, so that one would not fall somewhere.²⁰⁵

Taiwanese businessmen who came here had a high rate of failure.

Only three out of ten could make it even, earning little, or earning a lot. The reasons for failure included ex-marital relationships, playing too much, and alcoholic addiction.

Those who succeeded worked very hard, like 24 hours a day. Then she analyzed the reasons for business success. One had to work hard. The interviewee said that she worked 355 days a year, only taking ten days off during the lunar New Year holidays. She was here to make money, not to play. Besides, if one came here to run a high-tech production, one should keep some part of the technology and should not share it all. Dealing with people was another important point. It took a clear mind to deal with other Taiwanese businessmen, the people around you, and the mainland Chinese. You must know how to reject something that you did not want, like alcohol; avoid being a "yes-man" in every situation. She also said sometimes when she had a good feeling about people, she would give a lower price, and thus she won a good reputation in the business circle. People

²⁰⁵ Talks from interviewee No. 8.

would introduce other customers to her, and that was an important reason for her success in business. The interviewee then gave several other examples to show that people's level of knowledge had not caught up. So even if she had been here for five to six years, she had not accommodated her life well with the life style here. Because her business was successful, she was self-confident and positive about the future. She said she would close the business here after five to eight years, and then returned to Taiwan. She did not have traditional cultural ideas of leaving her business to her children.²⁰⁶

The interviewee said that Taiwanese businessmen came here to educate the mainland people. Somebody told her that she was good at teaching the employees, because they were very polite in answering the phone. She told her employees that telephone etiquette was the first thing to learn, because it was crucial in doing business. Young ladies should not sit with their legs wide open. Here lay the difference in education between mainland [China] and Taiwan. Taiwan's education included etiquette lessons. The interviewee also made some comments about the Shanghai people. People from Shanghai liked to show off. They wore valuable things [pearls, rings, necklace, etc.] on their body, but would not let you go to their house lest it reveal the fact that they were not that rich. Now the economy had risen, the Shanghai

²⁰⁶ Ibid.

people could buy a house with 400,000 *yuan*, and spent 800,000 *yuan* in house decoration and adornments. They installed air-conditioners not for use, but more for showing off.²⁰⁷

About the government's role, the interviewee mentioned several points. She said foreign capital kept coming in, and even if some Taiwanese enterprises did not want to come here, they had to. Beijing and Shanghai were two cities that foreign enterprises had to come to. So here lay the government's role: they made use of foreign businessmen to build their own cities and inland areas. Another role that government played was macro adjustment and control of the economy. Still another role was promoting the rise of the consciousness of environmental protection in government. Finally she made some comments on the future of Shanghai and China. Shanghai's modernized appearance was propped up by the government; the city was not mature enough. Again, it was because of the people's level of knowledge or cultural upbringing. China might be good in some professional field, like launching the navigation satellite. But that was not something to boast of; when people would not spit casually, that was really an achievement. So unless China developed the talents of its people and sent a good number of students overseas to learn, things would not change. But for a country with a population of 1.3 billion, how many new talents and students would China need to

²⁰⁷ Ibid.

improve itself?²⁰⁸

Interviewee No. 9 was a partner of a small company which had only nine employees. The capital was only 500,000 *yuan*.²⁰⁹ He and his partner each share half of the capital (i.e., 250,000 *yuan*). Their business was about logistics (i.e., material circulation) management. Their jobs included warehousing, transporting and distributing goods. He came to Shanghai because Shanghai was a big modern city, the relevant industries were well developed, and it was the center of the Yangtze River Delta, so there would be more business here. He said that he wanted to enter into a foreign company, but he was limited by his English proficiency. In 2001, he stayed in a logistics company named Menlo for one year. Now (2004) his company had signed a contract with a customer company. The contract was for one year, and it had only been nine months so far. The contract stipulated that the customer could break off business relations without giving notice. Though this was unfair to them, they had to tolerate it, because in the future there were still chances that they would have business relations with this company. He said that it was hard to open the markets of foreign enterprises or big enterprises, which meant it was hard to expand their business. Their company was too small; big

²⁰⁸ Ibid.

²⁰⁹ About 62,500 US dollars.

customers did not have trust in their services.²¹⁰

About the expectations of the future, the interviewee mentioned three points. (1) He hoped that this company could grow to become big so that his marriage, housing, and children would be supported. (2) The other partner was now in a foreign enterprise which had closed the logistics department. (When the foreign investors merged the enterprise, what they saw was sea transport and air transport, not land transport; that's why they closed the logistics department.) So he hoped that his partner would come to their own company and he himself could leave, because if he stayed, his salary was 15,000 *yuan*,²¹¹ which was a high cost for their company. He hoped that he could go out and find a job in logistics; then it would be convenient for him to introduce some business to their own small company. He said that the reason was that he had an academic degree and his partner did not have one, and therefore it would be better if he went out. (3) He expected that someday they could open the markets of foreign enterprises or big enterprises. He would not give up, and would keep trying.²¹²

I asked him a question about “spirit civilization” which was propagandized by the communist party. He said that it was just responsibility, faithfulness.

²¹⁰ Talks from interviewee No. 9.

²¹¹ About 1,875 US dollars.

²¹² Talks from interviewee No. 9.

The company must be responsible to the customer, and the employee must be responsible to the company. I asked him about the spirit strength to sustain his pursuit, and he said that it's quite simple: they just wanted to survive. Seven or eight years ago, those who entered into this field were all doing well because the profit rate was 40%. And he just entered this field when he came to Shanghai last year (2003); now the profit rate was 20%. About the state role, he said that it was just about applying for the license and paying taxes. That's it. The government disregarded them. They did not deal with the government much, and there was no party organization in their company. "Now the party organization was very slack. My girlfriend is a party member. I sometimes see her not join the party meetings or activities." And in Shanghai the government did not impose unreasonable fees or payment shares like in other places.²¹³

About his self role (or occupational drive/-motivation), he said that he felt that this field was proper for him. In general, the goods transport services had very low quality. For example, if the customer needed two trucks for their goods, the truck company would send two trucks. But after they left the customer, they would put all the goods in just one truck to save their cost, and thus the goods would be damaged; or they might be dishonest and stored the goods in their warehouse and told the customer that

²¹³ Ibid.

their trucks were broken and needed to be fixed, thus impeding the arrival of goods in time. Some of them even scolded the customer; this was a buyer's market: [when] you scolded the customer, of course he would not come to your business. The main concern for the interviewee was to survive and develop. The biggest source of pressure was to enter the markets of foreign enterprises or big enterprises.²¹⁴

The way to do business was about commission and human relationships. The interviewee did not buy trucks. He was a middleman. The truck company did not need to find business. He would find it for them. He was able to do so because he stayed in Menlo, the logistics company, for one year and was in the position of director in some area, and therefore he knew some people. So it was crucial to cultivate human relationships. The method he utilized was an old Chinese one: giving the potential customers dinner treats. The first treat was just to make friends, and there would be little discussion of business; usually the potential customers were introduced by someone he knew, so the first treat would include several persons. The second treat was only two persons: the potential customer and him. This time both could open their hearts and get into direct discussion, including the commission. If you gave me one million *yuan* of business, I would give you 2% of commission. If you requested 10%, that was

²¹⁴ Ibid.

also fine—then I would need 15% of profit, so in total there had to be 25% of profit. The interviewee said that there were many competitors; other people (the competitors) also knew how to use human relationships and commission to elicit business, so if it were not for the relationships [between me and the potential customers], why was I able to get the business?²¹⁵

The interviewee also mentioned the relationships between him and the employees. Sometimes he would give some lectures to them, and share business experiences. The Shanghai government had regulations about employees' rights, so he would buy medical insurance and financed other welfare needs for them. He said that if you treated people sincerely, in most cases people would treated you the same way. This was a private enterprise, so the employees worked hard. Finally he mentioned the newly-passed law of traffic safety had an influence on them. In the past, if the regulation said that a truck could carry five tons of goods, it was fine to carry ten tons, thus earning money. Now when the newly-passed law said that a truck was allowed to carry five tons, then you could carry only five tons. This had increased the cost.²¹⁶

To sum up, in this sample, the business people all had a positive view

²¹⁵ Ibid.

²¹⁶ Ibid.

of the state role in driving the development and change of Shanghai. The mainland Chinese who worked in the MNCs (multi-national corporations) did not see Chinese nationalism as a negative factor for the business. They even wanted to act as a bridge to help their countrymen learn modern culture: modern ideas, modern concepts, and modern business manner. Working in the MNCs had not only given them higher salaries, but had also made them pioneers of the global culture. They expected the Chinese national industries to catch up with the modern way of management, especially within five to ten years when Chinese industries needed to compete with the global MNCs after joining the WTO. Taiwanese business people noticed that currently (2004) the mainland Chinese were lagging behind on the way of thinking or the way of doing things. One of them wanted to allow them more time to make progress and not to demand things too much. The other (the businesswoman) saw that it was hard for them to catch up unless there were lots of trained talents and overseas students (who had learned from the west) to lead this country and educate the people. The last case was a partner of a small company, and therefore, the biggest concern for him was to survive, to open the markets of the foreign or big enterprises. As a small, private enterprise, they did not deal with the government much. All interviewees in the business circle in this sample were self-confident, diligent,

and positive about their own future.

CHAPTER SEVEN: THE INTERVIEW CASES IN SHANGHAI (2)

(3) The Media Professionals

Interviewee No. 10 and No. 11 were interviewed together, and interviewee No. 10 went first. During the interviews, each of them sometimes interrupted in the other person's talks to make some comments on the same issue. They were both young, unmarried, and just entering into media business, working for newspapers.

Interviewee No. 10 was a female. She first gave a general talk on the driving force that was carrying Shanghai forward. She said that it was tension: the Opium War as the contact point between modernization and pre-modernization. Originally country and country, continent and continent were separate and had distance [from each other].

Europe and America needed overseas trade market, needed connection, so there was tension. Such tension would burst when it reached a certain degree. Thus the geographic plates that were originally not relevant to each other had inter-continental contact because of economic-political development. China was forced to know the existence of another

world. Once it started, it became an irresistible power.²¹⁷

About the self role (or occupational drive/- motivation), she said that becoming a news person was quite natural. By chance her university entrance exam brought her to the department of news, and her major in the university thus determined the job that she was in now. When she finished her master degree, it was time for a job. The media was fitting for her. The reason for her choice of Shanghai was a combination of Shanghai's attraction, her ideas for a job, and family factors. She explained such a choice. There were two aspects for such a choice. On the bigger aspect, the media's market would become larger in the later time; now in Shanghai, the media was regulated very tightly because of politics—it had huge limitations presently. On the individual aspect, personal capability and professional capability would have more chance for development.²¹⁸

I asked her a question: “Somebody asked that why Guangzhou and Beijing were able to have newspapers that could lead the whole country, why was Shanghai not able to do so.” She said that from the perspective of [political] forces, Guangzhou and Beijing had cracks. There was competition between political forces. In

²¹⁷ Talks from interviewee No. 10.

²¹⁸ Ibid.

Beijing, it was the central government competing with the local government (i.e., the city government of Beijing); in Guangzhou, it was the provincial party committee competing with the city party committee. Another factor was that Guangzhou was at the front of the trend of reform and openness, so it was filled with business consciousness. Still another factor had to do with the Shanghai people's character: they were more practical, more compliant, not like the Beijing people who liked to talk about politics. Guangzhou had a brave, pioneering spirit; Shanghai was milder. That's why *the South Weekend*²¹⁹ pleased neither the government nor the market. A year ago, it was the society's public channel to supervise the government, but not anymore. Interviewee No. 11 interrupted here, saying that it had to do with the retirement of Premier Zhu Rongji—*the South Weekend* devoted 20 pages to express their respect to the Premier. Interviewee No. 10 continued to say that it involved intra-party factional struggle.²²⁰

She said that this newspaper did not sell well in Shanghai; the Shanghai people did not have enough humanistic concerns with the disadvantaged. *The South Weekend* had a famous slogan: "Let the powerless become powerful; let the pessimistic advance." Journalists of the South newspaper system were from the Beijing

²¹⁹ *The South Weekend* was a famous newspaper in China, which had been very brave in many areas, like exposure of the government's corruption, or on the issue of public health; it was especially so on speaking for the disadvantaged in China. It was published in Guangzhou.

²²⁰ Talks from interviewee No. 10 and No. 11.

University, so they were cultivated in a city that was filled with political concerns. The Shanghai people were concerned more about earning money and living their lives; the Beijing people were concerned more about how to make the nation powerful. The South newspapers also did not sell well in Guangzhou.²²¹

Interviewee No. 10 then returned to the topic of self role. She said that Hangzhou (the city that she lived in during her university and graduate work) was too quiet, too boring, and Shanghai was the only city around that had city air. You would be free here, and you could be exposed to different information, and meet more prominent people, and richer people. But Shanghai was too far away from nature; there was no place to play around. It was more tolerant, and had more uncertainty. Hangzhou was very certain; you could predict the next 10 years of it. Beijing and Guangzhou was too far away, and Hangzhou was too boring, so she chose to go to Shanghai. In general, Shanghai was very good, but she had anxieties: her level of personal development in her career and English proficiency, her love relationship, and whether she was living a life that she wanted. I asked, “What is that (the life that she wanted)?” She said, “a job that I love much, a man who loves me, health, money, being able to take good care of my family, and more experiences.” I continued to ask, “What are the barriers for you to

²²¹ Talks from interviewee No. 10.

achieve that goal?” She said, “On career, my characters, my English proficiency, competition, and talents—I am not very intelligent. On love relationship, good men are rare. The female group now has a lot of changes. A woman has to take care of the family, and has to be good in her profession: she has to be both tender and capable. I want to meet an interesting and faithful man.”²²²

The interviewee continued to express her anxieties. She worried that the social development in Shanghai would be in a mess. Shanghai was westernized but not open, pursuing fashion but not tolerant, especially the middle-aged men—they were very stingy. This was a society where those in power did not have enough wisdom. What if the buildings collapsed? There were not many trees and grassland, the air was becoming worse, and the culture was also in a mess. There were no traditional things, like folklore or hand-made products. Traditions were crucial for the cultivation of a person’s personality. The government did not know what traditions were, and where the good points of traditions lay. The government might understand modernization, but they lacked an understanding of traditions.²²³

About the government’s role, the interviewee said that whether the

²²² Ibid.

²²³ Ibid.

government team could fulfill the job of modernization would depend on a mechanism of conscience that could bring about some people to use norms to manage the city. The government was the steering person of the boat; it needed a professional, modernized team. The individual's ideals were dependent upon the grand environment, which depended on the government. Things as small as jobs, the media's development, space for free market competition, and as big as the living environment, all depended on the government.²²⁴

About the expectations of the future, she said: health, positive development, norms, and nature. Shanghai's development was at the sacrifice of nature; in the 1980's, Shanghai was very beautiful; now all the beauty was gone. She thought that excellent planners and designers should be included in the government's urban planning department. And she expected that the city would become more plural, tolerant, and warmer in human relationships.²²⁵

Interviewee No. 11 first made general comments about Shanghai. He had complex feelings about Shanghai, and did not very much see himself as a Shanghai person. But he said wherever he stayed, he did not develop a special sense of identity. He

²²⁴ Ibid.

²²⁵ Ibid.

stayed in Beijing for half of a year, and saw many strange, crazy guys who were poor but culturally active—it was culturally plural and rich. Shanghai, in this respect, was culturally monotone. In Beijing, if you wanted to do something in a cultural circle, you had to belong to this circle. When there was a circle, there was trouble. In Shanghai, there were [cultural] circles, too. But an individual did not have to rely on a certain [cultural] circle. You could have your own world. The big difference between Beijing and Shanghai was that Beijing was culturally active, and Shanghai was culturally monotone. He studied philosophy in Germany for six years, and he felt that in Shanghai people's way of dealing with people and things, their way of life, their speech and behavioral manners were similar to those in Europe. When he stayed in Beijing, he had cultural shock: he was not very much adaptable to the Beijing way of speaking and communication. His way was when he talked with friends, the talks went slowly and were about ideas; he had a habit of serious discussion. But most of the Beijing people talked about interesting things and nobody was serious; it was hard to direct the talks to such a serious track—conversations would not have to do with your profession. In contrast, in Shanghai, the way of life, food, drinks, and buildings were similar to coffee shops, internet bars, and street districts in Europe. So he had little psychological distance and felt comfortable in Shanghai.²²⁶

²²⁶ Talks from interviewee No. 11.

About the self role, he said that he studied phenomenology, Heidegger, etc. Media was not his major, and in his high school days, he thought that he would spend his life in the university. Then gradually he learned that profession and life aspirations could be separate. Originally he saw them as one thing. His pursuit of knowledge started very early. During high school days, he read Russell's *The History of Philosophies*, studied analytical philosophy and Nietzsche, and later cultural anthropology. He summed up his studies in three parts: the theoretical physics, philosophy, and literature. So it was a process of self-education. Then he entered into the department of German in the university, and then studied overseas in Germany. He said that German philosophy was detailed and deep, and Chinese philosophy did not ever match its quantity and quality. He got lots of joy from his studies, and he began his study of Chinese philosophy in Germany. Later on, he became doubtful about whether he should stay in the academy. If he wanted to study Heidegger to the doctoral degree, it would take seven to eight more years. Both time and economy did not allow him to do so. So he began to think seriously about the path of his life.²²⁷

At this time, by coincidence, he had a chance to enter into the media.

²²⁷ Ibid.

For him, the income in the media was fine, but how would the job in the media related to his life aspiration? During this period, he was studying neo-Confucianism in which the value of life lay in two things: internally becoming a saint and externally directing politics to the goal of the Great Harmony. He thought that working in the media might be relatable to the external goal of neo-Confucianism; thus he attained a solution for how to relate profession and life aspiration. He said that he was not placing great faith and hope in the media's work. Some people thought that the media could rebuild China, and direct Chinese political change; he himself was not that optimistic. Yes, the media had great power, but it was not controllable by the individual. The only thing that he could hope was that people who worked in media were mostly good people, but even so things directed by good people might not necessarily be good. The media had its own regularity, and was not controllable by the individual. Then he gave two recent events as examples on how the media operated which was clearly against justice. One of them was that the general manager of the newspaper *The South City* was wrongly and unjustly condemned to be corruptive; in truth, he insisted on a just and correct report of an event which exposed the government's injustice and wrongdoings. In other words, the general manager was put into jail because of his insistence on news conscience. Therefore, the

media was in a situation of absurdity. It was not controllable by an individual or a group of people who insisted on conscience.²²⁸

The interviewee continued to say that this did not mean that one was unable to do anything, as long as you played your role well and did a good job in your position, doing your best and leaving the result to heaven. You should not give up your ideals, but you should not have too high expectations and made the mistake of political childishness. The difference between life aspiration and profession was that the former was where your life enthusiasm lay and the latter was how you got your income and leisure. Maybe someday the media's work could be related to the external goal of the Great Harmony. He had just entered into the media, so he still needed to observe and learn the complex situations. He had not set a goal, and did not hold high faith, just step by step; when there were opportunities, he would not give up, and if there were not, he would not be in despair.²²⁹

About the state's role, I asked him that how the state role related to his profession and life aspiration. He explained that the government was very important. In appearance, the media seemed to be affected by the market; in reality, the

²²⁸ Ibid.

²²⁹ Ibid.

government's administrative order could destroy a media outlet. For example, due to factional struggle, if the minister of the ministry of propaganda was changed, or if the general manager of a media was changed, the whole personnel that followed the previous person would change accordingly. Then a media outlet could die or change its nature. The reason was that the newspaper was defined [by the communist party] as the voice of the government, of the party. Such a position seemed to be neglected in ordinary times, but when there was a change of high-level personnel, everything changed.²³⁰

Since the media was positioned as the voice of the party and the government, I asked that what those things were that were not permitted to report. Interviewee No. 10 interrupted at this moment; she said that there was a propaganda pamphlet that specified the propaganda taboo: religion and ethnic affairs were surely not to be touched upon, and recently the forced demolition of the houses by the [housing estate] merchants could not be reported; that the launch station of a cell phone would influence people's health could not be reported. Then she gave an extreme example: in the *News Morning Post*, you could not find the word "pig," because it had to do with the Muslim faith. So, the meat of "pig" (i.e., pork), "pig" head would have to disappear, and Mr. "Pig" would have to be changed to Mr. "Cow." She said that smart and politically

²³⁰ Ibid.

sensitive leaders were very cautious on these places. Interviewee No. 11 continued to say that in China the way of doing things was not straightforward; you needed to beat about the bush or circumvent something. This was the most challenging thing to the intellectuals. In ancient times [in China] there were also such things as hiding between the lines. So he mentioned his life aspiration here, since it had to do with the capability to see into the nature or core of things, to penetrate between the lines. He said that young people easily made the mistake of political childishness.²³¹

About his expectations of the future, he said that he would not expect too highly, just hoping that people working with him would be easy to communicate with, and the job would be stable. He would stay in the media. Finally I asked him to add something more. And he added a point that in Germany, in Europe, or in America, the real places that intellectuals were able to exert their influences were, first, in the think tank or acting as policy advisors of the political elite, and second, in the media, and the media was the most direct public channel that one could make use of. Like Habermas said, “public space.” This was more influential than teaching in the university. In the current Chinese environment of the media, it was very difficult for the intellectuals to make use of the media to exert their influences. He said that he was gambling. The media

²³¹ Talks from interviewee No. 10 and No. 11.

had a process of development. In the west, the people who occupied the media were those who had doctorates or those who were professionals. And in contrast, here in China those who worked in the media lacked seriousness, capability, understanding, and high levels of knowledge.²³²

He then said that his wish was to retire at the age of 45, and devoted himself to writing books. I asked that if he had a model author in mind. He said, first, Mou Zongsan (a neo-Confucianist in Hong Kong), and second, writing novels. I asked if the novels were to carry “Tao”? He said that they would be about history, like the reminiscences of the Roman Emperors. About carrying “Tao,” he mentioned that he wanted to re-explore the ethos of the neo-Confucianist intellectuals (about what issues they were thinking about, and what state of being they were in) in the late Ming dynasty and South Song dynasty, the two turning points of Chinese intellectual history. He finally said again that because of the outside (i.e., political) factors, intellectuals’ power could not be manifested in the media. Now the voice in the media was monotone. The media should be clear that all kinds of voices should be manifested.²³³

Interviewee No. 12 (also in a newspaper) was a typical idealist

²³² Talks from interviewee No. 11.

²³³ Ibid.

journalist who had always stuck to news conscience and cared about the disadvantaged and the true benefit of the country, and saw the media as a public channel to supervise government; that was what interviewee No. 10 (the female one) told me in advance. After I explained my interview questions, he first told me that he would remind me [to be cautious in writing] if during the talks we touched upon the sensitive things since in my questionnaire I had referred to the government's role. He, as others, first gave a general talk on the factors that drove or impeded the development and change of Shanghai. He said that in appearance the general answer, for a modern man, seemed to be the power of the market, the power of economy. But as far as Shanghai was concerned, if we traced back to the 1980's, the early 1990's to the middle of 1990's, in fact, the change still had much to do with the state's ideology, the political change. Shanghai was a core city of the planned economy after China's liberation (i.e., after 1949); it did not enter into development in the reform years until the middle of the 1990's. In the process of transition, political factors had to be considered besides the market factor. Chinese modernization had been going on for 150 years, but for the recent 50 years, up until now (2004), the market and the state were still the two most influential factors that existed. This also had its historical reasons. Shanghai, compared with other cities, did not have

much sense of history. It was a city that did not appear until the days of [western] colonization. So it was a young city. In the 1920's and 1930's, it further formed its own Shanghai culture,²³⁴ occupying its own [glorious] position in finance and shipping. It was a young city and had had a prosperous past like that. So in the mindset of the Shanghai people, there was a deep-rooted sense of the good old dream of prosperity, and this had led, in their mind, to an illusion of what this city should have been like. Therefore, though this city was young, the influence of the potential psychology, culture, and the city dwellers' characters could not be underestimated. Shanghai's history, from the views of a cross section, also reflected the reversals and zigzags of Chinese history of modernization.²³⁵

About the self role, the interviewee said that he represented a kind of people who, in the recent 20 years in China, were born in the rural area, and entered into the city through the university entrance exam and settled in the city. He called such a group of people "two sections people," with the upper half of the body stretching in the air of the city and the lower half section of the body buried under the [rural] soil. I asked

²³⁴ The term "Shanghai culture" was used as opposed to the "Beijing culture." Shanghai was the most westernized and modernized city, and Beijing was the city where the Emperors and the Court (the central government) were located, so it was the center of politics. The Shanghai people were more practical: they were concerned more about their daily lives; the Beijing people were more political: they concerned more about politics. The Chinese intellectuals were more like the Beijing type people; they concerned about how to make China a great nation.

²³⁵ Talks from interviewee No. 12.

him when were such a group of people born. He said around the end of 1960's to the end of 1970's; those who were born in the 1980's had a good environment of urbanization, so it was easy to enter the city, and it's hard for the generation earlier than his to enter into the city because of the strict household register system and the tough university entrance exam; so his generation lay between those two generations described above. He continued his talk on the "two sections people." Their blood affinity and relative affinity were all in the village, but their society, human relationships, and career were all in the city. Another name for this group of people was, "the generation that cannot return to their home countryside," which meant that there was no turning back, and there was not a piece of grass or tree familiar to them in the city. They were the domestic immigrants, and there was a sense of alienation for them in the city. Except using the same writing characters [with the city people], there was [sheer] blankness in other areas.²³⁶

Under such circumstances, these people were strongly goal-oriented, working harder, and assuming a color of material utilitarianism; but this was the reality. The pressure from material drive was the greatest. This group of people had been under heavy material pressure since their early days: from the family life to the school days, to the job and to the present time (2004). For the tuition, their families and they themselves

²³⁶ Ibid.

had to think of many ways to raise money. And buying a house and living in the city, the living cost was very high. The only way to resolve all these issues was to work very hard in their career. That's why they devoted themselves much more than others. So the major driving force for their personal development (i.e., the self role) was the huge material pressure.²³⁷

In another aspect, when he opened the door of the media, it really had great temptation for him. This was a career that changed fast, had huge space for the market, and carried many social ideals. He advanced from knowing nothing about it to loving it to being unable to stop. So this was the second driving force for his self development (or professional motivation). If there were some barriers that impeded his self development or self fulfillment in the career, it would be the fact that the media that he was in was still under the control of politics. He said that in current China the media was not a profession of high profit; neither was it the best way for climbing up the bureaucratic ladder. If your heart was burdened with ideals, conflict and confusion would be immense. Another impeding factor for self fulfillment was that Chinese society had lost faith and values; now the society centered on money. This was a strong, invisible magnetic field that surrounded every individual, making the individual have to consider it

²³⁷ Ibid.

when making decisions--these problems might be for the purpose of survival. The interviewee then said, under the appearance of prosperity, there hid something which caused worries. And this had to come to the government's role.²³⁸

About the government, last week he talked with an American. The American said that since the building of the PRC, the Chinese had been in constant revolutions, had been constantly engaged in reform by [political] movement. The interviewee asked the American, "In your views, has China now settled down?" The American answered, "No. Now it is still under movement: movement for capitalism." The interviewee (No. 12) said he himself was confused, and he thought that the American must also have felt confused. The red China in foreigners' eyes now was seen as capitalistic. The interviewee was himself within it (i.e., within China's development), and was confused about how the government would reconcile the [socialist] institutions built by the government with the institutions of market operation and with the cultural values and notions, how the government would explain something contradictory or how to maintain a positive operation. He said that as far as the Shanghai government was concerned, these questions were suspended; they could not be discussed. The method the government adopted was like that of Singapore: big government, small society. Some

²³⁸ Ibid.

officials believed that as long as the economy went up, and the government and the people had money, these questions would all become pseudo-questions. The interviewee said that the media and the intellectual circle of course would not be willing to admit that these were pseudo-questions. And when the ordinary people saw that such methods which the government adopted gave them material benefit, they supported it.²³⁹

Now the problem most raised was Shanghai's strong government.

The power of this government was everywhere: it was in big public policies, it entered into the field of market, and it also entered into the field of private thought. He said that as far as an ideal society was concerned, this was not a perfect method. Now in media and the intellectual circle, many people were making efforts, through laws, to restrict the government's power, and this had formed a covert game relationship between the government on the one hand, and the media and intellectuals on the other hand. I asked him to explain. He said that publicly the current media outlets were all led by the party, but after leaving the government's conference, privately everybody was talking about how to supervise, restrict, criticize, and regulate the operation of the government. But for the time being, the hardships of such a process had made most of the people feel tired both physically and mentally. "Just see how many events have happened between the

²³⁹ Ibid.

media and the government in recent two or three years.” Despite all the above situations, he still felt “this is the best age, and this is the worst age.” These were the best words to summarize his feelings, he said.²⁴⁰

The interviewee still thought that currently China was in a time full of potential. At least now the factors such as big war, big natural disaster, and domestic chaos did not exist. Although some covert pressures did lurk in the market and in the government institutions, at least opportunities were greater than the pressure. The question was: “Are we able to arrange a fast operating machine (i.e., the government institutions) on a track to make it transform from rule of person to rule of law, from closure to openness, and from irrationality to rationality. Are we able to get rid of, since the recent time, bleeding and bleeding, suddenly turning left and suddenly turning right, opening and then closing, closing and then opening, and walk out of such state of constant turn-around and uncertainty, and go to a hopeful direction that we can devote all our efforts to; otherwise history may once again turn around.”²⁴¹

The interviewee then stopped for sometime as if the interview had ended. Then he said, “I will add something more on Shanghai.” “Do not isolate it as a

²⁴⁰ Ibid.

²⁴¹ Ibid.

Shanghai; Shanghai is China's Shanghai. Behind the surprising prosperity, don't forget that what kind of soil, factors had been left until today, don't forget that if it were not for the opening of the rules, if it were not for the market power of the whole Yangtze River Delta, it would have been impossible for Shanghai to have its prosperity today." He continued, "Shanghai is just Shanghai; it cannot represent the whole China. There still exists imbalance in the whole China. The economic imbalance and the imbalance between people's ideas are huge. It will be very biased if one takes Shanghai as equal to the current China. More radical views will be that, such imbalance will lead to the situation that the strong become stronger and the weak become weaker, or the weak and the strong confront each other because of the loss of balance." He said that now the state emphasized those underdeveloped areas such as the west and the north-east, but it was useless just the government called. Only when the rules of the game, the concepts of sustainable development and scientific development now much discussed, were institutionally arranged, from ideas to actions, could the problems be resolved. At present, there were over-heated investments in Shanghai, which had made Shanghai, in many respects, to become a mirage in China's east coast. "Is this a universal sample to represent the whole China? I doubt it."²⁴²

²⁴² Ibid.

Here the interviewee expressed his worry that I might take Shanghai as a universal sample to represent the whole China, when serious imbalance was everywhere in China. I did not mean to use Shanghai to represent the whole China, which would be a big mistake. My thinking was as follows. Shanghai was at the front of China's modernization. I tried to place it in the long-term trend of China's modernization since the Opium War (1839-1842). The ideas of the elite in Shanghai could not represent the disadvantaged (who were just struggling for survival), but they could reveal how the elite saw Shanghai's development and change--its culture, its driving forces, its impeding factors, and its positive and negative aspects--in the broader picture of modern Chinese history since the Opium War. Their evaluations of the self role and the state role (in driving/impeding the city's development and change) could tell us the relative weight that they placed for the state (the influence or control that the state had on personal life and on the city's development) and the self (the degree of self fulfillment). And such information may guide us to the understanding of the individual's self efficacy in the control of his own life, and in the contribution that he felt he could make to improve the society that he was in. Such self efficacy, in relation to the state role, allows us to evaluate the possibility of China's democratization in the next 20 years (2004—2024). The information that

revealed in the Shanghai sample was about the long-term trend of China's democratization, not about the current situation (especially not the prosperous or seemingly glorious appearance) in the whole China in the year of 2004.

Interviewee No. 13 also worked in a newspaper, and was less than 25 years old. He first gave an analysis on the positive or negative factors that drove or impeded the development and change of Shanghai. "Looking outside from this cafeteria, you can feel what factors they are that are driving the development and change of this city. It is a force of growth—I travel globally very often—such kind of vigor is rare in any other place in the world." If he would choose among the US, Japan, Russia, Europe, Africa, Asia, and Southeast Asia, Shanghai would be the one that was the most powerful in its force of growth. Its growth was displayed in the increasing quantity, not in the existing quantity. The force of growth became a very big characteristic. There were several factors for this. (1) Because there was a gap, there was leaping forward. There was a Chinese saying which said, "The knowledge of shamefulness makes one brave." After the reform and openness, people have chances to make comparison. With comparison came the knowledge of the gap. With the knowledge of the gap came the knowledge of shamefulness. With the knowledge of shamefulness came bravery. Thus

came the force of growth. The feeling of shamefulness was: such a great country, with its 5,000 years of history, now lagged behind other countries to such an extent! The world had developed to such an extent! (2) There was self-confidence hard to find in any other places; it was a determination and belief that we could make this city become one of the top cities in the world. (3) Currently this city had a kind of very huge containing power. It reflected in the fact that in many respects it was at the top of the world. It broadly adopted the strengths of other nations and places. Combining these three factors, the interviewee found that this city displayed an unusual force of life rarely seen in the world. It had been 160 years since the Opium War, and this was the first time in this place that there existed such force of life like the growing power of the bamboo after the spring rain. It could not be suppressed; it could not be resisted!²⁴³

About the self role, in the final analysis, it had much to do with the above three factors. (1) You had opened your mind and views, so you knew the international requirements, the international talents, and the international rules of the game. You saw the gap, and you would work hard to improve yourself. (2) You had self-confidence. During this range of age (from the university days to now, or from age 18 to 25), you were able to attain the international requirements, the level of the

²⁴³ Talks from interviewee No. 13

international talents, and the international rules of the game. (3) You were brave to adopt all others' strengths. Therefore, both the individual [development] at the micro level, and the city development at the macro level, the interviewee said, were all about these three factors.²⁴⁴

His self role, the interviewee said, was a media worker. Entering into the media was more a coincidence, not a choice. Recently, in just a few years, the growth of the media and this newspaper was very huge like a hurricane, and with it he found his self role, a career merging with this newspaper, a career relying upon this newspaper to carry it forward. The enthusiasm for the career also had much to do with the above three factors. (1) Currently in Shanghai the media was in a state of underdevelopment, on the attitudes, on the contents, and on gathering and editing news materials. (2) He had self confidence in the prospect of market, in the aspect of audience, and in the quantity of growth. (3) He would imagine his newspaper as a Chinese *New York Times* or Shanghai's *New York Times*, or Chinese *USA Today* or Shanghai's *USA Today*. The column, the model of operation, the model of industry operation, and the innovative ideas, all these strengths could be contained broadly so that his newspaper could adopt all others' strengths! Therefore, the interviewee continued; the career, the individual (the self), and

²⁴⁴ Ibid.

the city development were compatible with one another to create a powerful, ever-lasting driving force for growing upward.²⁴⁵

About the barriers that impeded Shanghai's development and change, he said that the individual, the city's development, the current generation (i.e., his generation), and the career all had the same big weakness. The current generation meant those who were born in the middle of 1970's when the Gang of Four was crushed. They had had very good fortune [in personal development], but their characteristic was impetuosity. This was a big weakness and it was reflected in the city's development, in how the individual deal with things and people: they only permitted or hoped that they could constantly make progress with a certain speed, and it's very hard for them to tolerate developmental stagnation or backwardness. I asked that this sounded like a driving force, why he saw it as a barrier. He said that the coin had two sides. On the one side, it drove development; on the other side, it caused impetuosity. You could see that in the city development: the urban planning, the developmental speed, the over-heated construction or redundant construction. For the city, it used three to five years to move and resettle a huge population that originally took 50 years to complete; it involved rearrangement of the city's construction and industry concentration. The mentality of the

²⁴⁵ Ibid.

city was that this was a good opportunity that was never seen before, so everybody wanted to add a piece of timber upon the fire [to make it even more glorious.] Nobody ever had time to stop to care about the relationship between human and nature, the distribution of the industries, the proper growth on GDP (now growing too fast), and the balance between development and stability.²⁴⁶

This was also reflected in the individual. When the current young men graduated and joined the people, they had super-high expectations about their profession. They could not tolerate something like that the previous two years they had a fine development and the third year their development became stagnant. Usually it was normal that one might have progress and regress. But the city, the work units, and the individual could not tolerate regress. I asked that since they could not tolerate regress, what would happen when there was stagnation. He said when there was regress, nobody was well prepared psychologically. Shanghai could not always have two-digit growth rate of GDP; someday some industries would reach their saturation point; it's impossible for Shanghai to grow so fast year after year. It was reflected in career (the newspapers) also. Once they had success, the profit requirement every year would be higher. This year you completed the quota, next year the quota would be raised. They just could not tolerate

²⁴⁶ Ibid.

slowness, or regular progress. Thus there occurred a kind of overdraft.²⁴⁷

It was even more so for the individual. Many young people had grand plan for themselves when they graduated. Once they encountered some barrier, they would have sense of frustration and could not adjust themselves well. Therefore, on the one side this was the driving force of development, on the other side there were more and more mental problems because of the huge work pressure. European cities were mature, the mentality of the individual, the city, and the enterprises were stable, and relaxing. To make it clearer, the generation of these young men's parents did not possibly have planning on their career; they were just chosen [to a career]. In the interviewee's generation, it was the first time the individuals could have choices, and they thought that they could have choices on everything—this had become an inborn ideology. They did not have such idea of being distributed [on the career]; there existed huge sense of activeness, and no sense of passiveness. Once they encountered contrary situation in the reality, there would be huge amount of psychological imbalance. Some research found universally that 70% to 80% of young people were unsatisfied with their current job, but they had no choice but to accept it. There was a gap between the psychological expectations and the reality. The career did not match their ideas, and they could not calm

²⁴⁷ Ibid.

down about that. Their concerns about wealth, social status, and power were much greater than their concerns about the contents of life, health, and the quality of life. The coin had two sides. The cities, individuals, and enterprises that concerned more about the contents of life, health, and quality of life could not possibly have great force of life; this was the situation of European cities, individuals, and enterprises. Under such circumstances in China, the media were impetuous and not calm; they were creating an environment for the force of life: wealth, social status, and power. Every year the hottest topics for the media were the publication of the Forbes rich people, the silk fabric, the products for high-level consumption, and the famous cars, and this further aroused young people's emotions.²⁴⁸

About the government's role, the interviewee said that the government more hoped to see that Shanghai would for a long time keep such pulse that was never seen in the past 150 years, and for this purpose, they tried all they could to maintain such force of growth. This was also right. When a city was just in its adolescence, it did need the government to support and protect its vigor to maintain its life of growth; this was not the time for coordination. In the future, when the city's development reached the saturation point, maybe the government would adopt an overall

²⁴⁸ Ibid.

perspective and care about the equilibrium such as the distribution of the industries, the public facilities, and whether the development should be based on GDP or humanistic concerns. Now the government's role was a protector, an advocate, and a guide of such force of growth.²⁴⁹

About the expectations of the future, the interviewee first continued his comments on the current generation (i.e., the young people). Compared with last generation, both the advantage and the disadvantage of the current generation were that there were no historical burdens for them. Therefore, young people now inherently lacked many concepts, those moral norms or coercive things that imposed upon their parents' generation. They did not have such concepts as sent-down to the mountain or to the countryside, work unit distribution of one's career, and the "big-pot meal." That's why young people felt confused about the state policy to protect old workers—they took it for granted that economy should be distributed according to the labor devoted. They took it for granted for lacking all the above concepts. In correspondence with that mentality, since they lacked historical burden, they thought that they should have rights for choice, and should be able to control their own development. And [as stated above], once they encounter specific reality, they would have sense of frustration and resistance—they had

²⁴⁹ Ibid.

much lower capability than last generation who had went through unimaginable hardships and was able to shoulder much more pressure.²⁵⁰

About the future, the interviewee said that he was concerned about how the impetuous generation could have a calm mentality to make a reasonable arrangement for the future of the career. He never doubted the city's future or prospect. But when the city no longer had big numbers of growth rate, both the city and the individual should be well prepared. For the city, what would it have to maintain the power of competition? What was its core competitive power: what would come to people's mind when they spoke of this city? For New York, it was financial center; for London, it was a conservative, serious city; for Tokyo, its price of goods was the highest; for Hong Kong, it was the most open society; and for Shanghai, what was it? The interviewee said, if it was the great containing power—being able to include and intermingle many differences, then Shanghai was successful. He told me that my concern [in the interview] was about the driving force (reasons, factors) for Shanghai's development and change, and his concern was about what kind of problems would happen in the process of [Shanghai's] development, that was to say: what were those things that the city, the individual, and the enterprises should pay attention to? Of course

²⁵⁰ Ibid.

his expectations for the future was that the city, the individual's capability, the profession, would become better and better day after day, but these needed not to be discussed; these [promising prospects] had become common sense. What needed to be discussed was: balance among the city, the enterprise, and the individual. Every adolescent city should answered the question about the bottleneck [of development], not the speed [of development].²⁵¹

I asked him about what the city, the enterprise, and the individual should do for the bottleneck. He said that for the individual, the key question was to control the rhythm of the individual's development, and this had to do with the city. For the individual's development, he should clearly recognize his own core competitive power, and transform his core competitive power in different time. For example, when you were young, you had the impulse, physical strength, and the spirit of disregard of everything; you could do your job well as a journalist. But people younger than you had the same advantages: impulse, physical strength, and the spirit of disregard of everything, and they could achieve what you could achieve with less time than you. Then your mentality would be different. You would want to be someone irreplaceable. So you might examine yourself, "Why am I a good journalist?" The answer could be: (1) the ability for

²⁵¹ Ibid.

communication; (2) insights and analysis; (3) writing skill. Then you might extend these three qualities to different fields: (1) the ability for communication could make you competent on the job of public relationship, so you could be a good PR (i.e., public relationship person); (2) the ability of insights and analysis could make you competent as an analyzing person or an occupational manager; (3) the ability of writing skill could make you competent as a writer or a novelist or as an owner of a studio of writing books. Thus, you might transform your core competitive power and not to be replaced by people younger than you as journalists. Similarly, the city and the enterprise could transform their core competitive power and become irreplaceable.²⁵²

In the case of the city, Shanghai's buildings or other advantages were not the nature or nucleus of its real core competitive power. It was easy to find a piece of land in the big cities of Japan or South Korea to build buildings or produce similar advantages that Shanghai currently had, then Shanghai would be easy to be replaced. Then, where would Shanghai's real core competitive power lie? If it was economy, then Shanghai would be the eastern New York; if it was cultural buildings, then it would be the eastern Paris. Therefore, it could be Shanghai's indigenous characteristic that it had great containing power: being able to include and intermingle many differences and never

²⁵² Ibid.

rejecting any foreign culture. Whenever it needed to absorb others' strengths, it would do so. Such characteristic was reflected everywhere. Its style of building was like the European style, its subway system was like that of German, its mechanic-electronic integration was like that of Japan, and its urban planning and design was like that of Britain and America. So Shanghai was never stingy in contact and communication with other cultures, and thus producing its own qualities. Shanghai's culture, containing power, and qualities could be further traced back to 1930's when it was the biggest city of the Far East, at that time Tokyo was just very small, Hong Kong was just a small fish beachland, and Seoul was just a colony. So what made Shanghai ever-lasting was not its tall buildings, coastline or productions, but its city's core culture: what made Shanghai Shanghai was its Shanghai culture, its containing power; it was world-class, international-class metropolis, and the way of construction and development was to make it a global, world-class great city.²⁵³

To sum up, the media professionals in this sample felt strongly about the characteristics of the *strong government* in Shanghai; it was "big government, small society." The power of the government was everywhere, from the big public policy to the market, and even to people's private thinking. There were many things that were seen as

²⁵³ Ibid.

taboo that were not allowed to be reported, so the media professionals saw the state as a force of restriction or an impeding factor for the true benefit of both the city's development and the development of the nation as a whole. An individual who had ideals in his heart had to go through hardships in their attempt to restrain the power of the government. This was because the media belonged to the government and was defined as the voice of the government's policies and positions. An individual either reminded himself not to expect highly about the media's function to bring progress to China, or had to be cautious not to offend the government. Too many unjust events had happened to the media professionals who held the news conscience. But even so, for someone who had ideals in his heart still saw this age as having hopes and positive prospects that still surpassed the negative possibilities. "This is the best age, and this is the worst age." If the media could enjoy freedom of speech, then it was the best place for an intellectual to exert his influence and ideals. Although now the media still have many restrictions, the media professionals did not give up their hopes and ideals. The last interviewee talked a lot on the weaknesses of his generation, paying much attention to the problems that emerged in the process of Shanghai's development. His hope was that young people of his generation could calm down and pay more attention to a reasonable plan for the future

when the growth rate slowed down and when the problems of imbalance in many areas needed to be resolved. Finally he gave examples to show that how an individual, the Shanghai city, and the enterprise could redefine its own core competitive power so that they would not be replaced in the competition. In general, the media professionals saw the government's role as negative, and were making efforts to change the situation, though there were lots of difficulties.

CHAPTER EIGHT: THE INTERVIEW CASES IN SHANGHAI (3)

(4) The Intellectuals

Chinese intellectuals are a special group of people. They will never isolate a city as a city, and will always see a city from the point of view of national development. In other words, their concerns are about this country, about what the correct way is to make this country wealthy and powerful, and to improve the people's life. In their eyes, city development is only an example, a case, of national development. Such a mentality is the tradition of Chinese intellectuals: they are always concerned about the true benefit of this country and its people.

Interviewee No. 14 was a professor of a university. He first gave a general talk on the positive or negative factors that drove or impeded Shanghai's development. He said that 50 years ago, Shanghai was the cultural center and economic center of the whole country. And before 1949, it was also a "shadow" political center of the country: although the [central] government was in Nanjing, the prominent political

figures had residence in Shanghai; decision-making [of important policies] was done in Shanghai in the weekend, and Nanjing was only for practice. After 1949, Shanghai lost its status of cultural center of the nation; now only Beijing was the cultural center.

Originally both Beijing and Shanghai were the cultural center. But Shanghai always kept its status of economic center. It was the area that produced the most profits, so it was the [important] fiscal point for the state. Before the Cultural Revolution, Shanghai was able to pay 600 billion *yuan*. Even such a big figure like Mao Zedong who dominated the overall situation could not let Shanghai be in chaos. So since the liberation (i.e., 1949), Shanghai was the area that had the most planned economy, having the most socialism. For the Cultural Revolution, you must have food, money, and fiscal income, so that the revolution could be carried out. Many people did not understand this point that Shanghai had the most planned economy, the most socialism.²⁵⁴

After the reform, the situation changed, but changed very little. It was in 1993 that Shanghai started to change a lot. There was the distribution of resources between the central government and the local areas, and Shanghai thus had more resources to develop itself. It became the area that developed the fastest. Deng Xiaoping said it was a big mistake that he did not let Shanghai become an economic special zone to

²⁵⁴ Talks from interviewee No. 14.

develop. This was just the political language. In fact, in the beginning, Deng dared not take a risk on Shanghai lest it become chaotic and the state would lose huge fiscal income. Now Shanghai enjoyed very great extent of openness; [whether] it was an economic special zone was just not important. So the driving force of Shanghai's development and change was what Deng said, "Development is of paramount importance." That's the driving force.²⁵⁵

China had not developed for too long. From the highest leader to the ordinary people all knew the importance of development. If we did not develop and stayed backward, we would be beaten [again.] The modern history of China was a history of being beaten for more than a hundred years. That's why the policy of reform and openness gained so much support from the people. Some people said Mao's age was better, but such voice was weak; everybody wanted development. That's one side. The other side was corruption, moral decline, and the society became not secure. But everybody thought that it was wrong to quit development just because there were these problems. The driving force was that everybody wanted development. In the past, the biggest challenge for the communist party was how to resolve the problem of food for so many people. Mao Zedong's old way did not work. Now the new way (i.e., the policy of

²⁵⁵ Ibid.

reform and openness) had resolved this problem in just a few years. Why was it that in the past it was a big problem and now it was no longer a problem? Because in the past the way was wrong: in those days everything needed a ration ticket, and now that was gone. The trend of Shanghai's development was still going on, and Shanghai would continue to develop. 20 years ago, Taipei's development was much better than Shanghai; now Taipei lagged far behind Shanghai.²⁵⁶

About the self role, the interviewee said that he was more special; he saw scholarship as life, and were not concerned too much about its utility. He worked on history: rebuilding the original historical facts, and not caring whether or not it would have some utility for real life. Scholarship had its own inner logic, so he pursued scholarship for its own sake, just like pursuing art for the sake of art; he pursued purely academic knowledge. I asked that if he felt satisfactory about his goal. He said that he was satisfactory. He used to be an engineer, majoring in science and engineering. Later he transferred to liberal arts and found that it suited his interest. The university did not interfere in their research objects and methods. He had stayed in the university for more than 20 years. He said that surely they wasted 10 years of time in the Cultural Revolution, but it also depended on one's determination. If one was determined to pursue knowledge,

²⁵⁶ Ibid.

one could always find books to read; otherwise his major was science and engineering, how could he turned to liberal arts? It's all about self-education. He said that his academic focus was on Chinese historical geography, more specifically, political geography and cultural geography; it was about the administrative planning. It was when he was a graduate student that he found that he could do this. In his generation, those who were good in science were all good in liberal arts, but those who were not good in liberal arts were also not good in mathematics, physics, and chemistry. So it was easier to transfer from science and engineering to liberal arts, but it was difficult to transfer from liberal arts to science and engineering.²⁵⁷

About the government's role, I asked him if there were some areas or views that were sensitive and could not be discussed. He said that it was much better now. He could publicly express his ideas of administrative planning that advocated dividing China into 50 provinces. Especially his university had free academic aura: giving lectures in class was free, and students were free too; the school did not interfere. Then I asked him about his expectations for the students. He said that academically they should play a role of a milestone. Dissertation should be something that others could not circumvent; people had to refer to it; at most people could supplement it on the basis it had built.

²⁵⁷ Ibid.

Scholarship should not follow what others had achieved; your ideas should be innovative.

About his child, he said that he did not have any specific expectation for his child. He wanted his child to be independent and autonomous—it's more like the western way of education.²⁵⁸

His expectations for Shanghai were the balance of the hardware and the software. Here the software meant human's quality. In the daytime or at night, Shanghai had little difference from Tokyo; it attained the standard of an international metropolis. But people's quality lagged behind. People would not line up when waiting for the bus. Some young men had cars, and when they found somewhere in the car was dirty, they mobbed it clean and then just threw the mobbing paper away through the car window. Such behavior made him feel bad. He said [if] the educated persons behaved like that, needless to say, the uneducated persons would be worse. He said that to improve the people's quality needed one or two generations of incessant efforts. I asked him about the academic circle of history. He said that in the recent 10 or 20 years, the circle of history was basically healthy. Now China had become wealthy and powerful, so there were chances for scholars to do some research that looked irrelevant to the national economy and people's welfare. But still, there were some people repeated the topics that

²⁵⁸ Ibid.

others had done, doing some mainstream scholarship that could bring them fame.²⁵⁹

Interviewee No. 15 and No. 16 joined the interviews together. No. 15 was a professor, and No. 16 was a graduate student who was going to advance to the Ph.D. in about 3 months. They interrupted the other person's talks several times.

Interviewee No. 15 first gave a general talk on the positive or negative factors that drove or impeded Shanghai's development and change. He said that Chinese modernization was a stimulation-response model. It was pushed by external factor; it was not originating in the internal factor. That was to say: it would not go on the path since the Opium War if it just followed its internal development. The external factor was the western powers' invasion of China. Then the intellectuals gradually waked up to the crises, and the intellectuals' efforts further awakened the industrial-commercial circle. In this process, the government played the roles of an organizer, an obstructionist, a protector, and a destroyer.²⁶⁰

The interviewee (No. 15, the professor) said that Chinese modernization went a long curve on its road. From the Opium War to the 1911 revolution, it was the correct road. Then learning from the Soviet Union, China diverted itself from

²⁵⁹ Ibid.

²⁶⁰ Talks from interviewee No. 15.

the mainstream of world development, and went to the least promising road in the Cold War—the Soviet Union’s road was a road leading to the dead-end. Then he said Deng Xiaoping’s role in history was to move the country back to the track of modernization, so he thought Deng Xiaoping, despite his unforgivable errors on the June Fourth incident [in 1989], was still greater than Mao Zedong. Almost at the same time, the KMT in Taiwan walked on the mainstream road (i.e., democratization).²⁶¹

The interviewee said that Shanghai was the most typical case in view of more than 400 years of colonization history in the world. France, Portugal, and Spain did not leave healthy heritage for the colonized country. But England left the institution of civil service and legal institutions; when the [British] suzerain was gone, the local land’s transition of modernization all went more smoothly. So Shanghai’s strengths today were mostly because England had left its legacy during its half-colonization age. The quality of Shanghai’s people and cadres, the legal institutions, and the civil service, legal-rational bureaucratic system, in spite of going through distortion in Mao Zedong’s age, still played its role [on Shanghai’s modernization]. Shanghai’s transition to modernization, compared with other cities, [was still the best]. In addition to the policy favor [from the central government], the Shanghai cadres’ and people’s innate rationality,

²⁶¹ Ibid.

the aura of city life, British rational attitude, not tending to violent resolution, not win-lose game, compromise, and win-win approach all came from the England's legacy. The interviewee (No. 15) said that he did not completely oppose colonial history. Colonization surely had its negative side, and this had been much discussed in the mainland's textbooks, but it had left [positive legacy] to the underdeveloped areas. He said that in China the term "colonial" had carried negative connotation, but originally "colonial" was a neutral term; it should be neutralized.²⁶²

Then the interviewee (No. 15, the professor) mentioned Beijing. He did not like Beijing; Beijing was always bureaucrat-dominating, and the citizens, and the society, contained very little proportion of modernization. Beijing's bureaucrats had very strong tendency towards ideology, and its citizens had narrow-minded nationalism; Shanghai also had this aspect, but this city had different historical heritage. What else could Beijing have except bureaucrats? When Beijing's intellectuals came to Shanghai, they felt that Shanghai was still the best in dealing with western affairs.²⁶³

Then interviewee No. 16 (the student) spoke. He was born in a village in 1978 (the year the reform began), and felt very deeply about the huge change

²⁶² Ibid.

²⁶³ Ibid.

that the reform brought to people. The reform had very great influence on ordinary people's life in both the material aspect and the aspect of spirit and notions. There were many factors involved: the government permitted people to do things that were originally inhibited; the people spontaneously sought survival and wealth. [The most important factor was] the power of market. Many things formerly unimaginable now became organized. Then he gave three examples. (1) In Shandong province, the products like oranges now were transported by the big truck. Formerly the peasants never thought of such ways; now things became organized. (2) In the place he came from, there was no need for the government to promote one-child policy, because the economic pressure had caused people to automatically bear one child and then stop. It's difficult already for a family to support one child on education. (3) His father told him that he would work harder on the agricultural work so that he and his wife could buy insurance. In the past, people's notion was raising a son to take care of them when they became old; now they had the notion of insurance! So all these examples demonstrated the power of the market: its influence on people's life in the rural area.²⁶⁴

Then he turned his talk to Shanghai. The life of the citizens in Shanghai was different from the life in the inland area (that he came from), and this was

²⁶⁴ Talks from interviewee No. 16.

because of modernization. What he felt deeply was legal-rational bureaucratic system: systematic way of doing things, and following the regulations when doing things. In the inland area, it was still the old manner: human warmth and human relationship. But, the interviewee (No. 16) said, in the process of [Shanghai's] modernization, the officials who carried ideology and who were conservative were not different from the cadres in their place. Here in Shanghai, the party discipline and the party mission were stricter and tighter than those in their place. He said that doing things by following the regulations agreed with modernization, but this system of the party's work conflicted with modernization²⁶⁵—this was an interesting contradiction that he pointed out.

Interviewee No. 15 (the professor) spoke at this moment to further explain such a *contradiction*. He said the historical tradition of Shanghai was better than other cities. Dealing with the western affairs was smoother in this city. On the other hand, for 50 years, Shanghai had been following the extreme leftist line. After 1949, whenever there was leftist political movement, Shanghai was the starting place. So Shanghai was a very strange place: on the one hand, it was the most modernized place; on the other hand, for 50 years, the communist party had made the most efforts in this city, so there was leftist legacy. Why? Because Mao Zedong thought that Shanghai was the headquarters of

²⁶⁵ Ibid

the capitalists, the cadres Mao sent here was ideologically leftist. Therefore, Shanghai's cadres all had two colors: they were both westernized cadres and leftist party cadres—the former agreed with modernization, and the latter was against modernization and was irrational. For generations, the Shanghai cadres all carried two colors. I asked, “Don't they conflict with each other?” The interviewee said, “merging, and harmonious.” He also said, from developmental point of view, the party part, which came from the party's ideological control of the cadres, was weakening, and the westernized part was strengthening. He further said, such *contradiction* had to do with Deng Xiaoping's thinking on reform: economically, open, open, and more open—economically turning right; politically, tight, tight, and tighter—politically turning left. These two opposite factors, for more than 30 years, were always in internal tension. The coastal cities all had such phenomenon, like Shenzhen, and Guangzhou.²⁶⁶

The interviewee (the professor) continued to say that somebody even thought that the leftist ideology was used to protect the economic rightness. In other words, the leftist ideology was just for putting on a face for Beijing to see, and in essence there was less and less identity with it. Some seemingly leftist cadres spoke very different words in other occasions. So the ideology was weaker and weaker day by day. The

²⁶⁶ Talks from interviewee No. 15.

interviewee then said to me, “Give mainland more time! Give mainland more time!”²⁶⁷

By this he meant that the mainland would become democratic with time, but if Taiwan went the independence route, the war would be unavoidable and it would destroy all the progressive elements that were currently happening in the mainland China; all mainland needed was time—it would become a democracy like the mainstream road of world development, like what happened in Taiwan in the 1980s.

About the self role, the interviewee (No. 15, the professor) said that an intellectual like him, the role of life was made by the experiences of the previous 30 years, and the most important among them was the Cultural Revolution, which had molded his characters: on the positive side, he had a sense of responsibility towards the nation, the world, and the fate of human beings; on the negative side, it was easy for him to be politicized. For the reform and openness, his most urgent wish was that Chinese nation could successfully pass the challenges of modernization. This included two things: economically, the privatization of property rights, and politically, constitutionalization and democratization. I asked, “The reform is now called *the initial stage of socialism*; if the property rights become privatized, could it still be called as *socialism*?” He said, “So this [theory] does not make sense; every step was against [socialism].” That’s why Deng

²⁶⁷ Ibid.

Xiaoping advocated “No debate.”²⁶⁸

The interviewee (No. 15) continued to say that since the Cultural Revolution, he began to be concerned about the country, so he majored in the history of the western political thoughts to seek for the prospects of China’s democratization. Then interviewee No. 16 (the student) spoke about his self role. He said he was still young and had not joined the society yet; the big issue [like democratization] also concerned him, but the urgent self pursuit was the personal economic problem, which was big pressure on his shoulder. He was concerned more about completing the Ph. D. degree and found a teaching job in the university so that he could be filial toward his parents. In order for him to be able to complete his academic pursuit, his sister stopped to go to school in the third year of junior high school. So the whole family had made great sacrifice for him. He said that as a student of liberal arts, surely he was concerned about public issues, but personal issue concerned him more. He wanted to repay the love that his families had for him.²⁶⁹

Interviewee No. 15 spoke. He said that his career was a teacher, not a statesman. He used his profession to serve the process of [Chinese] democratization.

²⁶⁸ Ibid.

²⁶⁹ Talks from interviewee No. 16.

There were two ways to achieve this. First, leading students; secondly, writing articles and books. In the process, he went through several times of ups and downs. When he contacted the side of modernization, he became confident; when he was suppressed by the ideology, he had to go through troubles. About the relationship between his self pursuit and the government's role, he said that he insisted on independence: not confrontation, not cooperation [with the government]. This would surely bring troubles to him, and he could undertake all these troubles. The government sometimes suppressed him, and sometimes also wanted to hear his views through some channels. He said there were two sides of the reform: politically, the reform of political institutions lagged behind; economically, the reform brought about some social progress and some social space, and this was mostly due to the economic reform. I asked, "So you are satisfied with your life pursuit?" He said, "Yes and No." "Yes, if I had a second time of life, I would still make the same choice. Of course there were times that I made mistakes when I was young. [But] the profession [will stay the same]." "No, because the age that we live in is an ambiguous age. There is no freedom of speech; we should have been able to talk freely. I always have a feeling of dancing with shackles on." I asked, "Then, should you push the edge?" He said, "Yes, I have been pushing the edge."²⁷⁰

²⁷⁰ Talks from interviewee No. 15.

About the expectations of the future, the interviewee (No. 15) said that China would have two kinds of prospects. The first one was more optimistic. If the situation outside [it meant Taiwan's independence] did not worsen, the irrational [events] inside did not happen, the economic reform would clear up the dated institutions. The second one was more pessimistic. It was hard to guarantee that there would not be irrational conflict. It would happen in the social-political field: there was contradiction between the government and the intellectuals for modern constitutionalism and modern democracy; there was only economic reform and no political reform; there was the polarized socioeconomic division. The disadvantaged group might grab Mao Zedong as their symbol to conflict with the direction of economic reform. There could be small scale of conflicts or great scale of confrontations. This was a hidden danger.²⁷¹

Interviewee No. 16 (the student) spoke. He said, the trend would become well. The inland area did not have open knowledge. The rural economy was backward, and some peasants felt that Mao Zedong's age was better: there would not be such socioeconomic division in Mao Zedong's years. In his views, the market institution was in general successful. The lack of reform in political institutions was something to be worried about. But the great direction should be carefully optimistic; it should be going

²⁷¹ Ibid.

upward.²⁷² Then interviewee No. 15 (the professor) spoke. Once again he said, “Give mainland more time.” Now the ideology is weakening. If mainland could have some more time, [it would democratize.] He said, all his life witnessed that China moved backward for 70 or 80 years, and then backed to the original starting point, and then restart again. Then he said, another hidden danger was Taiwan’s independence. If there was war, not only Taiwan’s 23 million people, but also mainland’s South-eastern coastal area, the most advanced areas in mainland, would once again be damaged. Then the mainland would once again regress for many years. So the next 20 years could destroy the process of Chinese modernization. In his mind, in 20 years, the inhibition on speech and the control of newspapers would open; if not, there would be chaos. One-party rule would be more difficult to change; this was purely Leninist party, not like the KMT which was partially Leninist party, so it was more conservative. There should be a sequence: first, the opening of the inhibition on speech, then the opening of the control of newspapers, and finally, the opening of the party system. If all three were open at the same time, the society might not be able to bear it.²⁷³ Interview No. 16 (the student) said that at most we could only deal with two things at the same time, and we should do that.

²⁷² Talks from interviewee No. 16.

²⁷³ Talks from interviewee No. 15.

As to specifically how to operate such things, now mainland and overseas Chinese did not have enough thinking on this: how to conduct the first step; how to operate.²⁷⁴

Interviewee No. 17 was a professor in a university. He first gave a general talk on the factors that drove the development and change of Shanghai. He said that it had to do with Shanghai's history and its current state. Compared with other big cities, Shanghai was more orderly, and this was an obvious characteristic. It was closer to the western type of society. There were two factors for this. The first one is about the history. Shanghai was opened since the middle of the nineteenth century, so the western cultural, economic, and political influence spread into this city very early, and thus Shanghai was able to get into a fusion of cultures. It was at the front of the trend [of modernization.] Also, Shanghai had a tradition of Concession (i.e., the leased territory). The Concession area was totally different from non-Concession area. The western way of city management, the operational aspect and experiences [were influential.] In addition, not only the outer appearance such as the western buildings, but also the cultural aura had its influence. The style of Shanghai's dialect carried English homophony, and the western culture had influence on the citizens. So these experiences had made very good historical preparations for Shanghai. Although decades had passed, such influence did not disappear.

²⁷⁴ Talks from interviewee No. 16.

The above factor was on the relationship with the west.²⁷⁵

Another factor was that Shanghai had been a city of immigrants. The immigrants came from all areas in China. There were overseas students, and university graduates from outside areas. In Shanghai's company, there was a high proportion of people from other parts of the country. So there were activeness, educational background, creativity, and individual's goal pursuit. Under such cultural background, Shanghai's officials had broader views, acute thinking, and sensitivity to new things. Their decision-making reflected the characters of the new age, and thus was different from the fixed pattern of the inland areas.²⁷⁶

About the self role, the interviewee said that his job was academic work and teaching; he identified with such a role. His interest and characters made it fitting for him to play such a role. In the academic research, he had a feeling of achievement; this area enabled him to exert his strengths. He said that not only in natural science, but also in liberal arts, there was no ideological interference, and he himself would not let his research be interfered by the ideology. Since the latter part of the 1990's, the ideological interference became less active; even criticizing Marx was no problem.

²⁷⁵ Talks from interviewee No. 17.

²⁷⁶ Ibid.

[It's important] to have freedom in research so that the academic work could be deepened. So he could say what he wanted to say, and could have critical response and critical transcendence to the western questions. His professional field was philosophy, including Chinese philosophy and the western philosophy. He thought that philosophy was about the pursuit of wisdom, so there should be no boundary to distinguish between Chinese philosophy and the western philosophy. His goal was not just on history of philosophy; he wanted to be a philosopher. He said that in every age there should be constructed views on the old questions. So he wanted to, as stated above, have critical response and critical transcendence to the western questions.²⁷⁷

Another positive factor for his life pursuit was about income, especially after the latter part of the 1990's. He said that without economic freedom, there could not be freedom of thought. His income was so good that buying a car or a house was easy for him. There were negative factors for his life pursuit, too. There were different kinds of administrative work and many conferences that would occupy his time and energy. He disregarded 80% of them, but still, some of them could not be rejected, for the sake of human relationships; he had to accept some work that he was unwilling to

²⁷⁷ Ibid.

do.²⁷⁸

About the government's role, he mentioned two points. First, there was too much management. This was not about ideology, but the government offered research fund, putting it in a plan, so it was still a planned management. It could be hundreds of thousands or millions *yuan* in a plan, and the plan needed to organize scholars to be engaged in collective research. Although as an individual, he could disregarded it altogether, sometimes it was the school that mobilized scholars to compete for it, and as a member of the school, it's not good that you did not cooperate. Secondly, there was insufficient communication between the people and the government. When one saw the problems of the city's real life, like the city traffic problem and the pollution problem, one did not know how to communicate with the decision-makers. There was no channel, no way to do that.²⁷⁹

About the expectations for the students, he thought that philosophical training was a resource to the students' job in the future. About his influence on the society, he said that publishing articles was the major way; he was also concerned about real problems, not just on studies.²⁸⁰ But most of his time was on his professional

²⁷⁸ Ibid.

²⁷⁹ Ibid.

²⁸⁰ Ibid.

academic field. About the expectations of the future, he focused on the issue of democracy. He said that no doubt there should be development on democratization. But he doubted that whether Taiwan's democracy was fitting for the mainland. He said that Chinese modern history had lots of lessons. Now in Chinese village elections, there were underworld factor and money politics. If China totally let go of the control, what result would it be? Nobody had the answer. In addition, confrontation like Bush versus Gore [in America], or Chen Shuibian versus Lian Zhan [in Taiwan] was not good; in China, during the Cultural Revolution, there were factional confrontations which evolved into wars. Nobody had the answer [whether or not this would be the result of China's democracy.] This was a question of [different] historical environment. In the America, however disorderly it might seem to be, it could always be in orderly state; in China, when the Qing dynasty collapsed, and Yuan Shikai died, the result was warlords fighting one another, and finally it needed a man like Mao Zedong to take care of the situation. So China at that time had paid a great cost [for its pursuit of democracy and lack of a strong, powerful central government to maintain the order]. So could China let go of the control completely? He doubted it. This could become a disaster for the international society because China was not North Korea, it had a population of 1.3 billion. Once it plunged

into chaos, nobody [in the international society] could bear it. If China tried it, and once again it became a situation of the warlords fighting one another, [what would this be like?]

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He raised Iraq as an example: everyday there were explosions. Once China let go of the control, the situation would be hundreds of times of that in Iraq. Some said that it had been 21st century already. [But in] the 21st century, brutal and barbarous behavior was still happening. So he said China should adopt the approach of gradual improvement. Then he criticized the [overseas] democratic movement people. He said that they were pursuing their interests [, not for the benefit of China.] They were mean; they were nothing. The American government valued them, but they lacked understanding of Chinese reality. These people were engaged in power struggle, competing for who the true representative of the [democratic] movement was. They pursued their individual interests, and disregarded of the national interests. They demanded that the America should apply economic sanctions against China. Economic sanctions meant that millions of people would face unemployment! They supported Tibetan independence and Taiwan's independence. If these people were in power [in China], China's prospects would be really poor. He said, "We can't let history repeat

²⁸¹ Ibid.

itself.” He argued that before the 1911 revolution, if the Qing government adopted [Kang Youwei’s] reform line, it would be more fitting for the current situation, and the cost would be lower.²⁸²

Then he said Eastern Europe and Russia had their long cultural traditions; they were not like China after 1911 revolution and the whole country plunged into warlord conflicts. The Cultural Revolution was also grand democracy; you let go of the control completely, and then you had chaos! Just a little interest competition, and the power struggle would be intense. Then he gave two examples. In Taiwan, the green camp versus the blue camp, and overseas, the power struggle within the democratic movement, all these were under the flag of democracy and happened in the background of China. By this the interviewee was arguing that China’s cultural background was very different, so it could not have democracy as Eastern Europe and Russia, and his examples of both Taiwan’s democracy and the overseas Chinese democratic movement conveyed the message that democracy in China would become intense factional struggle for power, or even brought about the situation of warlords fighting one another, so it was not fitting for China’s current situation.²⁸³

²⁸² Ibid.

²⁸³ Ibid.

The interviewee continued his argument, saying that the current level of democracy in China was absolutely and clearly not enough; it lacked channel of communication [between the people and the government.] But an immediate letting go of control like Europe and America or Taiwan would absolutely cause big problems. He mentioned social harmony, equality, and freedom, saying that the general goal for China should be healthy democracy and freedom, but the way should be discreet improvement, instead of bombastic talks that disregarded the reality. He said, in the final analysis, when the economy developed, democracy had to come. If China now changed to become a democracy, it would bring about counter-effect: [the reform] would move backward.²⁸⁴

He continued to say that now was the most relaxed time in China since 1949. Then he said that the Voice of America had its bias: It said that China saw Taiwan as a renegade province; it did not understand that this was the outcome of civil wars between the KMT and the CCP. If China had had sufficient sea and air forces, Taiwan would have been unified. This was the outcome of the Cold War; it had nothing to do with the anti-fascist war in the world. The western countries did not follow the fact [, seeing China like a fascist power on the Taiwan issue.] The fact was not that simple.²⁸⁵

²⁸⁴ Ibid.

²⁸⁵ Ibid.

Then he turned to the current situation about Chinese intellectuals.

He divided Chinese intellectuals into two groups: the leftists versus the rightists. The rightists were singing the bombastic words, very much idealistic. For them, China had better move the American presidential system to China now! Everybody hoped that this would be fulfilled, but considering China's reality, was this feasible? What should be its possible outcome? Yes, the goal was democracy, but the key question was about the path and the way. Some said that Chinese society was dictatorial historically, but Liang Qichao said that historically it was also serious that the society was like a dish of sand. If there was not a relatively powerful central government to consolidate the society, there would not just be Taiwan's independence; there would be serious factional politics: the society would be separated as several factions and each of the factions would be a military-business-political coalition; this was totally possible! Then he gave Afghanistan and Iraq as examples. China was a big country, and the peasants had low-level of education and lacked class consciousness—they lacked a strong self identity as a group. So it was very easy that they were used by any political force as long as there were attractive slogans that touched their heart. By this he meant that the factional politics or civil conflicts might happen to divide this nation into several parts like what happened in

Afghanistan or Iraq.²⁸⁶

Finally I asked a question about his expectations for the intellectuals. Again, his talk centered on democracy. He said, that intellectuals had different views was a good thing; it's really bad to have only one voice. But the focus of the intellectuals should be placed on cultural construction which included academic work, science, and liberal arts. Intellectuals should not be engaged in bombastic talks and beautiful words to arouse the people. One should conducted solid learning, not just borrowed some ideas from Heyek or Rawls, and talked about positive freedom and negative freedom; one should have solid learning, not just shallow learning. And they should take into serious consideration the Chinese real situation. Hu Shi said, "More research of real problems, less talk of Isms." Philosophy, politics, economy all had specific problems. So the intellectuals should conduct solid research, and should not misguide the society. They should be responsible to express their ideas, both on Chinese current situation and on theories.²⁸⁷

Interviewee No. 18 was also a professor of a university who taught history. He first gave a general talk on the factors that drove Shanghai and China. First he

²⁸⁶ Ibid.

²⁸⁷ Ibid.

emphasized *external* factor. He said that without the stimulation of foreign powers, China would not have marched on the path of modern market economy. Although, like Weber said, commodity economy, trade, market, and consumption had been present in the old time, many characteristics of western market economy were still absent in Chinese [traditional] society. He expressed the central concern of his scholarship as follows: China had thousands of years of glory, its agricultural efficiency, compared with [historical] Europe, was not low, and the development of its small peasant agriculture was very delicate, why did it fall in the recent hundred years? The answer he found was the relationship between power and money; that is, the absence of separation between power and money, or between the government and the enterprises, which characterized the western market economy. Traditional Chinese society was characterized by a political institution which concentrated power in the central government; the central government had total control of the whole economy. Such an institution inhibited the growth of modern market economy, and thus China lagged behind the western powers in the recent history. The Opium War, especially the second Opium War stimulated Chinese elite stratum. Thus China started its process of modernization.²⁸⁸

Then he also emphasized the *internal* factor. He said he did not

²⁸⁸ Talks from interviewee No. 18.

approve of the ideas which saw traditional China as a feudal society in which the natural, agricultural economy inhibited Chinese [economic] development. He said that there were two errors in such ideas: (1) [Traditional] Chinese commodity economy always occupied a not-low proportion in the economy and had been very active. (2) Agricultural economy was not the natural enemy of capital economy. He explained why Chinese commodity economy was active: it was because Chinese had special tax system which required the people to pay the tax by money, and therefore agricultural products and services had to be exchanged with money. This was different from the situation in Europe. Then he emphasized that Chinese economic rationality and economic capability were not a problem [for economic development;] the problem lay in the political institution. In the recent 500 years (i.e., since the Ming and Qing dynasties), Chinese commodity economy had developed very well. Silver kept coming into China. In 1843, Shanghai was opened, and this was the fundamental turn for Shanghai; with its geographical advantage, Shanghai was engaged in trade. Thus, it was a natural historical process that Shanghai turned from a port city to an industrial-commercial city, and then to a financial city. So he emphasized again that Chinese economic rationality and economic capability was not a problem; the problem was that China had a political institution of highly-centralized

concentration of power, which controlled the power of economic revenue: it totally controlled the economy. The institution could never resolve the power-money relationship, [or] power-money combination: using power to gain money and using money to gain power. Such an institution that power and money could not be separate led to the situation that the government and the enterprises could not be separate. He said that such an institution was against modernization. Some people thought that it was culture, but he thought that it was political institution that inhibited China's development.²⁸⁹

Shanghai's development, in general, started with the opening of it in 1843. It was a window for the international economy and world cultures to enter into China. The Concession areas were free from the governance of Chinese government; therefore, they had become laboratories for [the western] institutions and cultures. So Shanghai became both the economic and cultural center of the whole country. After 1949, it was still the domestic economic center, complying with the planned economy; but in the world, it had lagged behind. It was not seriously damaged during the Cultural Revolution because it was the base for the Gang of Four. In the reform years, Shanghai was late for change. For a long time, it operated according to the original political institution, daring not to do things that went beyond the socialist line. After Deng

²⁸⁹ Ibid.

Xiaoping's Southern tour in 1992, it began to change and changed very fast. This was a fundamental turn from the planned economy to the market economy. Once it shifted to the market economy, the market economy had its own logic.²⁹⁰

Then he emphasized the importance of government policy and institutions: when they changed, everything changed. Foreign capital and foreign bank came in, and Shanghai revived its vitality like in the 1930's. Then he said Shenzhen did not have the technological and cultural advantages that Shanghai enjoyed. There were universities, research institutes, engineering technological workers in Shanghai. Also, the Shanghai people had brain power for running business. Therefore, such historical legacies made Shanghai different from other cities; the Shanghai people were very practical, very pragmatic. So both internal factor (the technological and cultural advantages that it had) and external factor (foreign capital, and talents from all parts of this country) played a key role in Shanghai's development.²⁹¹

About the self role, the interviewee said that he was an intellectual: all his life was dealing with books. That's his career. He happened to be distributed, under the planned economy, to a field that he was interested in: he liked to study history, and he

²⁹⁰ Ibid.

²⁹¹ Ibid.

liked to be a teacher. Then he said the greatest change after reform was that there was no more political movement. Deng Xiaoping was very great on this. The recent 20 or 30 years were the best time in [the PRC's] history. He no longer had too much fear. The degree of freedom on research and publishing was greater. Intellectuals should be free and independent intellectuals. He said he also had the traditional spirit of intellectuals: being concerned about the fate of this nation, and the history, and he had a sense of social responsibility. So he distinguished himself from more westernized intellectuals; he was more critical of the development of this nation, and he thought that this was true patriotism. Intellectuals could not cure [the society's] disease, but could diagnose the illness. He said that the government should welcome the diagnosis. Now it was better; the government might not listen or might not be happy, but it's no problem to speak it out. He said that only because one had deep love of the country would one criticize it; if one felt that one did not care, there was no love in one's heart. So he still had the traditional intellectual's spirit.²⁹²

Then he said that the intellectual's role and the government's role should be clearly defined. The intellectual could not replace the government, whose role was about feasibility and operationalization. The government might not listen, but the

²⁹² Ibid.

intellectuals had their role and function: to comment. This was especially true for the profession of liberal arts. Economics and technology might have operationality, but the function of liberal arts was to comment. The government should not interfere in or suppress the scholar's speech; the responsibility of the government was to listen and choose: if the contents of the speech were usable, the government could use them; if not, the government could neglect them. If both roles were clearly defined, there would be no confrontation or conflict between the government and the intellectuals. The interviewee said that in class he would say whatever he wanted to say, but in newspapers and journals he would refrain. He said it was the most important thing for the intellectuals to speak honestly. So his role was to comment. Then he said no matter what, all intellectuals must be concerned about the society.²⁹³

About the expectations of the future, I asked him three things: the expectations for the intellectuals, the expectations for his children and students, and the expectations for China. He expected that the intellectuals could be open-minded to contain and accept the [rich] resources of all kinds of thoughts and cultures in the world, and then coming back to indigenous characteristics. In other words, he advocated indigenous scholarship, but this would need the rich stimulation from all kinds of

²⁹³ Ibid.

thoughts and cultures in the world. He said that Chinese modernization was a very special case in the world; the current modernization theory could not fully explain it. [The experience of] Chinese modernization was never seen before in the world history, and there must be a lot of scholarship to conduct. It would make contribution to sociology, political science, and economics. He said that Taiwan's experience of success might not be applicable to the mainland because the mainland was a big country, and there was serious imbalance in the development. It would not be difficult for Shanghai and the coastal regions to develop, but it would be hard for the whole country to develop. Another point was that development had to be continuous; in the past China's development had been seriously damaged, now the reconstruction should not break the previous basis, it should adopt an approach of gradual change, and it should not use a revolutionary way. The revolutionary way might just change a group of people, and did not change the institutions, and such change could not achieve anything.²⁹⁴

Then he pointed out that the current academic circle had too much utilitarianism, but this was oriented by the government. The government used a system of evaluation and assessment to define the levels of scholarship; this had led to utilitarianism. Scholarship needed deep thinking, but the system of evaluation and

²⁹⁴ Ibid.

assessment just regulated the quantity of words and articles published in the core journal.

In order to pursue the quantity to complete the mission, scholars might give up deep thinking, and then good works became less. The reason for the existence of such a system was that there were too many technical officials or leaders, and these leaders used the way of managing technology to manage liberal arts. He said that there were different characters between technology and liberal arts. When scholars pursued quantity, the quality lowered down.²⁹⁵

About the expectations for his children, he said that he was open on that: let the children go their own way. This was because he found that, in today's society, if you regulated the children too much, it might cause antipathy. He raised one point: the training of psychological quality was absent in the education. Young men today were very weak; they could not bear frustration. This was because they had good conditions of life, not like the interviewee's generation. In the old days of their generation, conditions of life were worse, so the individuals needed to struggle, thus they became strong. His attitude towards his children was American way: after the children worked, they should be independent economically and lived their own life. The interviewee had the same attitude towards his students: He would teach everything he knew without any reservation,

²⁹⁵ Ibid.

but they should go their own way. Each student had his own individual personality, characters, and quality. He respected each one's characters, and especially considered their differences. They should have their own opinions, daring to question what they were taught. They should ask "why" in everything. He expected the students to work hard in the three years (for Ph. D.) Learning history would surely benefit them, for it was a special way of thinking.²⁹⁶

About the expectations for China's future, the interviewee said that viewing from the aspect of optimism, the road of gradual change had good prospects: continuous change, no turning back. Rush would surely not work. But if it had reached the critical point of change, there should be no hesitation. So [on democracy] rush would not work, it took [mature] conditions. On the other hand, viewing from the aspect of difficulty, there were hidden dangers. The interviewee mentioned two things. (1) Especially for such a big country as China, there were still many poor people. Peasants were 50%, or 60% of the population, and underdeveloped areas were still large. The complete modernization [of China] was an exceptional case in the world history. He said that we should see the existing contradictions and problems; the western countries spoke well of us, but we should keep our mind clear and awake. The division in the income

²⁹⁶ Ibid.

level was a source of vitality, but high differentiation and polarized division in the income level would lead to social instability. And if you wanted to solve this problem, you had to slow down the speed of development—this had become a special situation in China’s development. The problem of social welfare, and the social welfare in the large rural areas, needed economic strength to solve it.²⁹⁷

(2) This was also a big problem; it’s about the restriction of [government’s] power. The people were poor, so they were unhappy about the corruption. Illegitimate and illegal incomes were serious. The government needed to expand the legitimacy of the regime by the restriction of power. “How did we do that? It needed exploration. This problem needed to be taken seriously. It still had to do with the big size of population. But it still needed to be done; there should be no fear of it.” [Should it be] direct election or universal election of the leaders? For China, the way should be step by step. It needed [mature] conditions.²⁹⁸

The interviewee then mentioned Taiwan. He said that he had two points on that. (1) Taiwan had democracy, but it was not orderly. (2) Having democracy was better than not having it, but one should not idealize it. The western philosophy said,

²⁹⁷ Ibid.

²⁹⁸ Ibid.

you could not have the best government; you could only expect the government was not the worst. He then turned back to China. For China, there were both hopes and hidden dangers. He did not hope that the situation became chaotic, but you needed to do it so that there would not be chaos. He said that in the past China had many lessons on this. For the huge gap in the income level and government corruption, there should not be slowness; for democracy, there should not be rush. If the situation needed to be resolved and you did nothing, it would lead to problems after sometime of accumulation, but rush would also cause problems. Finally he mentioned his worry on Taiwan's independence. He said nobody wanted to go into war. Whoever on the position of leader could not bear the responsibility of letting Taiwan go the independence route. So he worried about war, and this was one of the hidden dangers. He concluded the interview by saying that history was unpredictable; there were many rational and irrational factors, so history was unpredictable.²⁹⁹

To sum up, in this sample, Chinese intellectuals all carried a spirit of social responsibility, and all were concerned about the fate of the nation. That was why they were honest in pointing out the problems or hidden dangers of the nation. Their self role was to do their best to teach students, spread ideas, and make comments for the

²⁹⁹ Ibid.

government's references. They all stressed the importance of independent scholarship; the government should not interfere in or suppress the thoughts and comments of the intellectuals. They see reform as much better time for the intellectuals than Mao Zedong's years. But for the liberal intellectual, self pursuit was still like "dancing with shackles on." They used their profession to pursue their ideals. They all see democracy as the future of this nation, but had very different opinions on the way to achieve it. Because China is a big country, the change should be step by step. Liberal-minded intellectual used the profession to serve the prospects of Chinese democratization.

Non-liberal –minded intellectual had serious criticism on the rightist's attitude and the overseas democratic movement. In general, they upheld intellectual independence, supported democratic prospects, and worried about the tendency of Taiwan's independence, especially its outcome: war.

CHAPTER NINE: CONCLUSION

Will China become a multiparty democracy? My hypothesis in this dissertation is this: the greater the extent that Chinese elite thinking on development and change reconciles the tension between Chinese nationalism and collectivist, family-like ethics on the one hand, and the western democratic ideals based on each self-seeking individual's subjectivity on the other hand, the greater the chance that China's political development will lead to a multiparty democracy. As stated in chapter one, since the Opium War, the Chinese (intellectual and political) elite have been driven by an aspiration to save this nation, so they educated and mobilized Chinese people to awaken them to the crises that China was facing, and to rise up to save China. Nationalism thus dominated the Chinese mind and heart and became the most powerful driving force of the society's development and change. Up until now, generation after generation of Chinese elite have been thinking and practicing different prescriptions (or paths) to save this country. National wealth and power has become the shared, collective goal for the whole

nation to pursue.

The problem is this: how can the Chinese fulfill the *common goal* of national wealth and power? Different elites at different times gave different answers, and there were three approaches sequentially. The nature of the approaches was related to the elite recognition of the advantages that the western powers had. Because of a series of military defeats, at first the Chinese elite thought that the western advantages were just in technology, so the Chinese began the Self-strengthening Movement (1860-1893). The goal of this movement was to improve Chinese military technology and build a strong naval force. After 30 years of efforts, it seemed that China had successfully built a strong, modern naval force. But the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895) totally destroyed the naval force and the self-confidence of the Court. The Self-strengthening Movement that took 30 years of efforts thus collapsed. The technological approach proved insufficient.³⁰⁰

Then came the second approach: the institutional approach. Kang Youwei and his student Liang Qichao proposed a constitutional monarchy whereas Sun Yat-sen advocated revolution to overthrow the Qing Court and build a republic. Both Kang and Sun were shocked and disappointed by China's defeat in the war with Japan because Japan had previously been viewed as China's younger brother who learned many

³⁰⁰ See chapter 2.

things from the elder brother, China. Now even “little Japan,” learning from the west, could defeat China. This was a big shock, realizing how weak China had become. So both Kang and Sun recognized that the western powers’ advantages were not just on military technology. The true advantages were in the political institutions. Kang wanted to be engaged in a Confucian Reformation, retaining the imperial monarchical system but adding constitutionalism to the imperial monarchy. Sun, modeling on the American system, wanted to build a republic. Kang and Sun thus competed with each other for which way China should go. Kang’s efforts ended up with a failure in the Hundred Days Reform (1898), and he and Liang Qichao fled overseas to continue their movement promoting a constitutional monarchy for China. Sun Yat-sen’s efforts finally succeeded in 1911, and thus China built the first republic in Asia. Nevertheless, the Northern warlord Yuan Shikai tried to terminate the republic and revert to the imperial monarchy in which he assumed the throne as Chinese emperor. Such efforts caused huge opposition nationally, and Yuan failed and died. After Yuan’s death, the whole nation plunged into warlord politics and wars. Therefore, both Kang’s and Sun’s institutional approach failed and proved insufficient.³⁰¹

Then came the third approach: the cultural approach. A group of

³⁰¹ See chapters 2 and 3.

prominent intellectuals, gathering in the Beijing University and led by Hu Shi and Chen Duxiu, launched a new cultural movement. They thought that the reason why Sun Yat-sen's efforts to build a republic could not succeed was that the Chinese people's thoughts were not awakened, and the success of building a republic should be based on the change of people's ideas, especially the ideas of the youth. Hu and Chen believed in the power of education, so they pinned their hopes on Chinese young people. The essence of the new cultural movement was democracy and science. They spread the ideas of liberalism and individualism, and relentlessly attacked Confucianism for its social ethics and customs, on the issues of women's rights, and as an obstacle to the growth of an individual's independent personality constrained by the long-established family system. In short, they wanted to build for China a new civilization based on democracy and science, and urged the Chinese to discard Confucianism; their central concerns were modern civilization and its humanitarianism.³⁰² Hu Shi raised a slogan of "complete westernization," later changing it to "sufficient merging into the world culture."³⁰³

Unfortunately, since the May Fourth incident (May 4th, 1919), the new cultural movement was diverted to assume a political color, and the leading

³⁰² Hu Shi called this new cultural movement or the May Fourth movement as the *Chinese Renaissance*.

³⁰³ The former American President Bill Clinton also mentioned Hu Shi's ideas to the students of Beijing University when giving a lecture to advocate democratic ideas in the Beijing University in 1997.

intellectuals of this enlightenment movement divided into two groups: the leftist camp and the liberal camp. The leftist camp, represented by Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao, advocated that China follow the Russian path, learning from the proletarian revolution then happening in Russia. The liberal camp, represented by Hu Shi, continued to advocate the western or the American path. The leftist ideas led to Mao Zedong's China and later to the reform China, and the liberal camp brought its ideas to Taiwan after 1949, contributing to Taiwan's democratization in the 1980's.³⁰⁴ Mao's way proved to be a failure to bring national wealth and power to China.³⁰⁵ Nevertheless, Deng Xiaoping's reform still retained Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thoughts as ideological guidelines. And Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao have had no interest in bringing the country to the path of democratization.³⁰⁶

Returning to my hypothesis, Hu Shi was a very good example of a patriotic intellectual driven by nationalism. His career was to save China by education. He advocated liberalism and individualism, and at the same time, he guided his readers, students, and friends to build a life purpose that defined self value as being *a useful person to the society*. He believed that if people were good, the society and the nation

³⁰⁴ Taiwan's democratization in the 1980's had several sources. Hu Shi's liberal ideas was one of these sources.

³⁰⁵ See chapter 4.

³⁰⁶ See chapter 5.

would be good. He encouraged Chinese young men who aspired to save this country to train themselves to become a useful talent first, and then they would be able to contribute their talents to the society and the nation. So in Hu Shi's thinking, we find that he could successfully reconcile the tension between Chinese nationalism and collectivist, family-like ethics (i.e., social concerns) on the one hand, and western democratic ideals based on each self-seeking individual's subjectivity (i.e., self fulfillment) on the other hand. He had the spirit of Chinese traditional intellectuals' characters of being concerned about the society, the fate of the nation, and the fate of human beings. This was the *collectivist, family-like ethics* that saw the society as a family, and as the central concerns of one's life purpose. And because of modern Chinese history of being invaded, such *collectivist, family-like ethics* in one's mind and heart naturally turned to nationalism: an urgent concern of how to save China in a social Darwinist international world.

Hu Shi's thinking or his prescription was: train yourself first, and then someday you would be able to make a contribution toward the situation of China. Therefore, *self-seeking subjectivity* or *self fulfillment* was defined as benefiting others' life, benefiting the society, and benefiting the country. But even so, the essence of Hu Shi's thinking was still liberalism and individual's independent personality. *Collectivist*

concerns did not have to conflict with liberalism and individualism. Thus the tension between collectivist, family-like ethics and each individual's self-seeking subjectivity disappeared! The tension between nationalism and democratic ideals was reconciled successfully as well. This is the best example supporting my hypothesis.

In what follows, I will divide my interviewees in Shanghai into four groups of elite, and focus my discussion on how each interviewee reconciles the tension between nationalism and democratic ideals, or between collectivist, family-like ethics (i.e., social concerns) and self-seeking subjectivity (or self fulfillment). As I said in chapter 7, the ideas of elite in Shanghai could not represent the disadvantaged (who were just struggling for survival), but they could reveal how the elite saw Shanghai's development and change in the broader picture of modern Chinese history since the Opium War. Their evaluations of the self role and the state role (in driving or impeding the city's development and change) could tell us the relative weight that they placed for the state (the influence or control that the state had on personal life and on the city's development) and the self (the degree of self fulfillment). And such information may guide us to the understanding of the individual's self efficacy in the control of his own life, and in the contribution that he felt he could make to improve the society that he was

in. Such self efficacy, in relation to the state role, allows us to evaluate the possibility of China's democratization in the next 20 years (2004-2024).

(1) The Government Officials

Interviewee No. 1 was a party cadre. He said it very clearly: people in his generation (he was 52 years old in 2004) did not have such ideas of self value fulfillment, his pursuit of life goal was to be diligent and sincere, acting as a bolt of the party (the party being a machine). His generation had a value of self sacrifice for the benefit of collectivity. Collective interests were much more important than self interests and concerns. So in this case, the interviewee did not have democratic ideals, and did not play the role of individualist self-seeking subjectivity. His self fulfillment was to serve the people by serving the party; his concern was not about "self," but about the benefit of the whole nation or the collectivity. There were no individual's interests; there were only the people's interests, which should be defined by the party. This was the typical mentality of a sincere party cadre. But he mentioned the generation gap. His son would never do a job like his; his son wanted to be a big boss. There were different value directions between the two generations. Young men today had stronger "self."³⁰⁷

Interviewee No. 2 was a government official whose job was about

³⁰⁷ From talks of interviewee No. 1.

propaganda. He placed his self role under the whole framework of collective development. He said that the society and the people wanted development and modernization, so the government should meet their needs, that is: development and modernization. In the process of collective development, his self value was raised, his material life became better, his knowledge became more advanced, and his capability improved. So his self fulfillment was dependent on collective development. He was very positive, self-confident, and saw the future as positive and bright. In this case, the interviewee's self role totally merged into collective development. Since collective development did not include democracy as a goal, the interviewee did not have democratic ideals as his value. For him, the self-seeking individual's subjectivity (i.e., his self fulfillment) was to serve the process of collective development.³⁰⁸

Interviewee No. 3 was also a government official whose job was about propaganda. He also enjoyed his current job very much. His self role or self fulfillment also depended on collective development. He was also very positive and self-confident. There had been a kind of work zeal and positive aura around his working place. The drive of work came from a goal stimulation that by 2010 they would build Shanghai to become an outward, modern, and multi-functional city. Because the

³⁰⁸ From talks of interviewee No. 2.

prospects were so beautiful, everybody had been working toward such a beautiful common goal.³⁰⁹

In short, government officials in this sample enjoyed their jobs very much. Their self fulfillment had merged into collective development. They did not experience tension between nationalism and democratic ideals because democratic ideals were not included in their value system. For them, the individual's self-seeking subjectivity had merged with the collective common goal.

(2) The Enterprise People

Interviewee No. 4 worked at a foreign company. He showed a high degree of self-confidence about his self role. He had a high degree of self fulfillment and self efficacy: he could completely control his life. He had a high evaluation of the Shanghai government, saying that they were pro-business, efficient, and transparent. And he said that nationalism would not be a problem for his company because his company's development in China and training of Chinese indigenous talents had long-term benefit for Chinese national car industry. He did not show any sign of nationalist feelings; he just enjoyed very much his current job, his talents and experiences, and the prospects for his career. This was a man of high degree of self fulfillment. There was no tension between

³⁰⁹ From talks of interviewee No. 3.

nationalism and the western business culture: He had successfully merged these two aspects, though he did not mention democratic ideals. He just enjoyed his self fulfillment very much, but did not mention his social concerns. So in this case, there was no tension between nationalism and democratic ideals, and there was no tension between the self-seeking individual's subjectivity (the self fulfillment) and the collectivist, family-like ethics (the social concerns).³¹⁰

Interviewee No. 5 worked in a big foreign company. He showed strong nationalist feelings; he even thought of jumping into national industries to help his country, so that Chinese national industries would be able to compete with world industries. In other words, he was patriotic even if he worked in a foreign company. He wanted to play a role of communication to share with his friends and acquaintances new ideas, new concepts, and new ways of management that he learned from the big western company. He was in a position of high-level management, so the degree of self fulfillment was high. So in this case, the interviewee successfully merged his nationalism with western ideas, concepts, and ways of management, and his self fulfillment or self-seeking subjectivity included collectivist social concerns, wanting to exert his talents to help Chinese national industries. He did not mention democratic ideals, but he saw the

³¹⁰ From talks of interviewee No. 4.

western ideas, concepts, and ways of management as new knowledge that his countrymen should learn.³¹¹

Interviewee No. 6 also worked in a foreign company. She emphasized the *fusion* of Chinese culture and western culture. She said that one should understand Chinese philosophy and history and the world's philosophy and history. She also wanted to play a role of bridge to help her countrymen catch up with the west and understand the modern business manner, and more broadly, the world culture. On nationalism, she said the more she contacted foreigners, the more she loved her own country. So she wanted to help her countrymen to become modern. So in this case, the interviewee's nationalism merged with the western culture, or western business manner. Her self fulfillment or self-seeking subjectivity merged with her social concerns that her countrymen still lagged behind the modern, global business manner, or modern, global culture. She expected the future as a *fusion* of Chinese culture and the western culture.³¹²

Interviewee No. 7 was a boss of a small company, and was a Taiwanese. He had a high evaluation of Shanghai's government for its administrative efficiency. He said that they were doing their job well, and we should give them time and

³¹¹ From talks of interviewee No. 5.

³¹² From talks of interviewee No. 6.

should not demand things too many from them. He enjoyed his self fulfillment very much since he was a successful businessman. Because he was from Taiwan, he did not have Chinese nationalism. So in this case there was no problem of reconciliation of the tension between nationalism and democratic ideals (or, western culture); also, his self fulfillment or self-seeking subjectivity was to become a successful businessman, so he did not have social concerns (or, collectivist, family-like ethics that saw the society as a family) extending to the mainland Chinese society.³¹³

Interviewee No. 8 was a successful businesswoman from Taiwan; she opened a teashop and sold tea in Shanghai. She was very good in dealing with people and things; she was capable in business. Because she was from Taiwan, she did not have nationalism for China. Therefore, the problem of reconciliation between the tension of nationalism and democratic ideals (or western culture) did not exist for her. She had many opinions about the Shanghai people and about China, and she said it was hard for China to catch up on modern concepts and modern culture, unless China sent a lot of students and talents overseas to learn from the west. So her self fulfillment or self-seeking subjectivity was to earn money and had little to do with Chinese social

³¹³ From talks of interviewee No. 7.

improvement.³¹⁴

Interviewee No. 9 was a partner of a small logistics company. His concerns were to survive economically and be able to open the market from foreign enterprises or big enterprises. He did not deal with the government much except applying for the license and paying the tax. He did not show any sign of nationalism or any concern about democratic ideals. His pressure came from economic survival and opening the market. His self fulfillment was to succeed in logistics business, and he showed no sign of collectivist spirit. So in this case, nationalism or collectivist, family-like ethics was just irrelevant. All his concerns centered on business success because his company was small and needed to survive first.³¹⁵

In short, the enterprise people in this sample can be divided into two groups. The first three interviewees (No. 4, 5, and 6) all worked in a foreign company, and they merged nationalism and *the western culture* (new concepts, new ideas, and new ways of management) very well: they loved their country and hoped that their countrymen could catch up with a *new, modern, and global business manner*. Their self fulfillment also merged with their social concerns very well. For this group of enterprise

³¹⁴ From talks of interviewee No. 8.

³¹⁵ From talks of interviewee No. 9.

people, *western culture was not the enemy of their nationalism*; rather, they saw the western strengths and wanted to help their countrymen to absorb and learn these strengths to become modern or be able to compete globally. The second group of interviewees (No. 7, 8, and 9) did not have Chinese nationalism in their mind and heart either because they were from Taiwan or because the problem of survival surpassed other concerns. Also, their self fulfillment was about business success, and they did not show social concerns or collectivist, family-like ethics toward this society. None of the six enterprise people ever raised democratic ideals for discussion. Most of them evaluated highly the quality, capability, and efficiency of the Shanghai government.

(3) The Media Professionsls

Interviewee No. 10 was a young lady working in a newspaper. She expressed her anxieties about three things: personal development, her expectations about future love relationships she might have, and the city's development. She was very clear about what her life pursuits were and the barriers for her to attain those pursuits. She also mentioned the government's role, that an individual's ideals were dependent on the grand environment, which depended on the government. She did not show strong feelings of nationalism, but talked about the negative role that the government played in restricting

the reporting of news. She was concerned about the development of society, thinking that those in power did not have enough wisdom to govern the city well: they might understand modernization but lacked the knowledge about the good points of traditions. So in this case the interviewee loved her country and the society (natural nationalism and collectivism), but saw the government as a negative factor for the development of both the media and the media professionals. Though she did not talk about democratic ideals directly, she would expect that in the future the restrictions on the media should be dismissed. Certainly she would welcome democracy. Also, the problems that she mentioned in her social concerns could only be resolved when the media became a public voice channel rather than a voice channel for the party-government. She belonged to the young generation, so she saw *self fulfillment* and *life pursuit* as *natural*, and the government's restrictions as unnatural which should be dismissed in the future. In short, the interviewee had a *natural* reconciliation of the tension between nationalism and democratic ideals, and between the collectivist, family-like ethics (i.e., social concerns) and self-seeking subjectivity (i.e., self fulfillment or self efficacy).³¹⁶

Interviewee No. 11 also worked in a newspaper. He said that he would not expect too highly of the media because of outside (i.e., political) factors. The

³¹⁶ From talks of interviewee No. 10.

media was under the control of the government and was in a situation of absurdity: Some people were put into jail because of their insistence of news conscience and correct reporting. Therefore, one should not make a mistake of political childishness and expect too highly of the media. Yes, the media was powerful, but it was not controllable by the individual or a group of people who insisted on news conscience. Nevertheless, this did not mean that there was nothing one could do. One should not give up one's ideals, and should do one's best in one's position and leave the result to heaven. So in this case, the interviewee certainly loved his country and would embrace democracy if that was possible, and this meant that the interviewee had a *natural* reconciliation of the tension between nationalism and democratic ideals, and between the collectivist, family-like ethics (i.e., social concerns) and self-seeking subjectivity (i.e., self fulfillment or self efficacy).³¹⁷

Interviewee No. 12 worked in a newspaper. He said that now (2004) the problem most raised [by the media professionals] was Shanghai's strong government. The power of this government was everywhere: it was in big public policies, it entered into the field of market, and it also entered into the field of private thoughts. Now privately everybody was talking about how to supervise, restrict, criticize, and regulate

³¹⁷ From talks of interviewee No. 11.

the operation of the government. But the hardships of such a process had made most people feel tired both physically and psychologically. Nevertheless, the interviewee still felt that “this is the best age, and this is the worst age.” At least opportunities were more than the pressure. He still felt that the current China (2004) had hopes and positive prospects that still surpassed the negative possibilities. So in this case, though the interviewee did not have strong feeling of self efficacy (to change the society), he had attained a reconciliation between his nationalism (love of this country) and democratic ideals (to supervise and restrict the government’s power), and between the collectivist, family-like ethics (i.e., social concerns for the disadvantaged) and self-seeking subjectivity (i.e., self fulfillment or self efficacy as a media worker.)³¹⁸

Interviewee No. 13 paid much attention to the weakness of his generation, and the problems that would emerge in the process of Shanghai’s development. In short, young people today were impetuous; they were concerned about wealth, social status, and power, and could not tolerate developmental stagnation or slowness. They were less concerned about the quality of life, health, and the balance between development and contents of life. The government had similar problems: they were concerned only about the speed of development, and lacked the concerns of the

³¹⁸ From talks of interviewee No. 12.

relationship between human beings and nature, the distribution of industries, and the balance between development and stability. Therefore, the individual, the media profession, and the city development were all in a state of rush, impetuosity, and overdraft. The interviewee was concerned about how the individual, the media profession, and the city development could calm down and think of a reasonable plan and find the core competitive power that would be irreplaceable. He said, one should answer the question of the bottleneck of development instead of the speed of development. So in this case, the interviewee's social concerns and self fulfillment had attained a reconciliation. Though he did not mention nationalism and democratic ideals, he had praised highly the quality of containing power (i.e., the power of being able to include and intermingle all kinds of differences or absorb all others' strengths.) Such quality would make him see democratic ideals as one of many things that Chinese had to learn. Thus, democratic ideals would be seen as benefiting China, and a reconciliation between nationalism and democratic ideals would be attained by the interviewee.³¹⁹

In short, the media people all saw the government as a negative factor that impeded the development of the media and the media professionals. None of them mentioned democratic ideals, but they all acknowledged that the government needed to

³¹⁹ From talks of interviewee No. 13.

be supervised, criticized, restricted, and regulated in its use of power. The four cases of the media professionals all reconciled the tension between nationalism and democratic ideals, and between collectivist, family-like ethics (i.e., social concerns) and the self-seeking individual's subjectivity (i.e., self fulfillment.)

(4) The Intellectuals

Interviewee No. 14 was a professor of a university. He said that from the highest leaders to the ordinary people, everybody knew the importance of development because China had not developed for so long a time. If China would not develop and stayed backward, China would be beaten [by the strong powers] again. The modern history of China was a history of being beaten. That was why the policy of reform and openness could gain so much support from the people. Everybody wanted development, and that was the driving force of national and Shanghai's development and change. In other words, he was saying that nationalism was the driving force of national development and change. He enjoyed a great deal of the feeling of self fulfillment, saying that the school did not interfere in their research object and research method. So in this case the interviewee enjoyed his self fulfillment very much, and at the same time his social concerns revealed that he had the spirit of traditional Chinese intellectuals: He

loved his country, was concerned about the society's problems (the people's quality) and saw that development had brought national wealth and power to this country. He did not mention democratic ideals, but praised highly the freedom he enjoyed in doing research. He had natural feeling of nationalism, enjoyed the current state of the government since there was no interference in his research. From his talks we might not be able to say that he had attained a reconciliation of the tension between nationalism and democratic ideals, but we can say that the reconciliation was between nationalism and independent, free scholarship. Also, he had attained the reconciliation between the tension of collectivist, family-like ethics (i.e., social concerns, and love of this society) and his self-seeking subjectivity (i.e., self fulfillment and self efficacy-- the feeling that he could control his life and make contributions to the academic field.)³²⁰

Interviewee No. 15 was a professor in a university. He said that Chinese modernization went a long curve on its road. From the Opium War to 1911, the road was correct. Then China diverted from the mainstream of world development and went to the least promising road during the cold war: the Soviet Union's road which would lead to a dead-end. He said Deng Xiaoping's historical role was to move China back to the track of modernization. All his life witnessed that this country move

³²⁰ From talks of interviewee No. 14.

backward for 70 or 80 years, and then back to the original starting point and restart again. He said that for the reform and openness, his most urgent wish was that China could pass the challenges of modernization, and this included two things: economically, the privatization of property rights; politically, constitutionalization and democratization. If externally Taiwan did not go the independence route, and internally irrational conflicts and confrontations did not happen, then the economic reform would clear up the dated institutions and mainland China would become a democracy. So in this case, the interviewee had attained a reconciliation of the tension between nationalism and democratic ideals, and between collectivist, family-like ethics (i.e., social concerns, and love of this society) and self-seeking subjectivity (i.e., self fulfillment, or self efficacy.)³²¹

Interviewee No. 16 was a graduate student and would advance to the Ph. D. program in three months. He said that as a student of liberal arts, of course he was concerned about public issues, but the most urgent need for him was to resolve personal economic pressure. He wanted to complete the Ph. D. degree and find a teaching job in the university so that he could repay the love and sacrifice from his families. He said that from his experiences in the inland area and Shanghai, the market institution was in general successful, and that although the lack of reform in political institutions was

³²¹ From talks of interviewee No. 15.

something to worry about, the great direction of the reform should be carefully optimistic and should be going upward. So in this case the interviewee had attained a reconciliation of the tension between nationalism (love of his country) and democratic ideals (the expected reform of political institutions), and between the collectivist, family-like ethics (social concerns, and love of this society) and self-seeking subjectivity (self fulfillment, or self efficacy.)³²²

Interviewee No. 17 was a professor of a university who taught and worked on philosophy. He said that although the goal for China should be democracy, the way to achieve the goal should be gradual improvement. It was very important for China to have a strong central government to maintain order; for without that, the pursuit of democracy would make China plunge into warlord conflicts like the years after 1911 revolution, or plunge into national chaos like during the Cultural Revolution. His argument centered on this point that if China let go of control now (2004), the whole country would be in chaos. So in this case the interviewee did not reconcile the tension between nationalism (love of his country) and democratic ideals; rather, he saw democracy more as a source of chaos, a source of factional conflicts that might lead to war! He criticized those intellectuals who advocated democratic ideals in China as

³²² From talks of interviewee No. 16.

singing bombastic words and disregarding Chinese reality. He was the defender of the current Chinese political system. His self fulfillment or self-seeking subjectivity was about academic work; he saw himself as a philosopher and teacher and enjoyed such a role very much. At the same time, from his strong criticism towards the liberal intellectuals, he showed very strong collectivist spirit (i.e., social concerns) and the family-like ethics (love of this society.)³²³

Interviewee No. 18 was a professor of a university who taught history.

On the role of intellectuals he said that intellectuals should be free and independent intellectuals; the government should not interfere in or suppress the scholars' speeches. The responsibility of the government was to listen and to choose, and the role of intellectuals was to comment. On his self fulfillment he said that he also had the spirit of traditional [Chinese] intellectuals: being concerned about the fate of this nation, and the history, and he had a sense of social responsibility. So he distinguished himself from more westernized intellectuals: he was more critical of the development of this nation, and he thought this was true patriotism. So in this case we saw clearly that the interviewee successfully integrated his self fulfillment and the social concerns. His self-seeking subjectivity had merged with his collectivist, family-like ethics. He did

³²³ From talks of interviewee No. 17.

mention democracy and democratization of China. He said China should not rush on democracy; it should adopt a path of gradual change because it needed the conditions to become mature. It [also] needed exploration on how to democratize. His self fulfillment was to comment on the problem of Chinese development, and to educate students. So for him, true patriotism (or, nationalism) was to criticize the problems of this nation's development, and one of the problems was the restriction of the government's power. So here he attained a reconciliation of the tension between nationalism and the democratic ideals.³²⁴

In short, the intellectuals in this sample all carried the spirit of the traditional Chinese intellectuals: being concerned about the fate of this nation, its people, and the society. Their self fulfillment, besides professional academic pursuit, was to serve those collectivist concerns by education or writing articles or books. Except for one of them, their nationalism made them see that democratic ideals would benefit this nation, and the way to build democracy in China needed further exploration. In other words, their nationalism merged with the democratic ideals, and their self fulfillment merged with their collectivist, social concerns: they used their profession to serve development, the process of modernization, and the prospects of democratization in China.

³²⁴ From talks of interviewee No. 18.

(5) The Conclusion

In this sample, except two persons, both the media people and the intellectuals all could naturally attain a reconciliation of the tension between nationalism and the democratic ideals, and between collectivist, family-like ethics and the individual's self-seeking subjectivity. Even one of the exceptional persons (interviewee No. 17) expected that China would become a democracy when economic development reached a certain level. Another person (interviewee No. 14) was uncertain; we can only say that he had attained a reconciliation between nationalism and independent, free scholarship because he did not mention democratic ideals or western culture. So we have here seven out of nine persons in the media group and the intellectual group who were pro-democracy. In addition, three out of six persons in the enterprise group could successfully reconcile the tension between nationalism and the western business manner or the world culture; we can count these three persons as pro-democracy in the long-term (20 years: 2004 to 2024). Another three persons in the enterprise group either were from Taiwan or focused on the economic survival, so they lacked Chinese nationalism and democratic prospects for China in their mind and heart. And all three of the government officials did not include democratic ideals in their value system. So finally we can only

say that 10 out of 18 persons (55.5 %: three enterprise persons, four media professionals, and three intellectuals) were pro-democracy. Four out of 18 persons (22.2 %: three government officials and one intellectual) were not pro-democracy. Three out of 18 persons (16.6 %: the three enterprise persons) were not concerned about the issue of democracy in China, and one out of 18 persons (5.5 %: the intellectual) was uncertain. Again, the Shanghai sample was used by me to represent a long-term trend towards democracy, not to represent China's overall situation in 2004. So if this small sample is representative of the larger populations from which they are drawn, we can now say that the prospects of democratization (to a multiparty democracy) in China in the next 20 years (2004 to 2024) are good.

What might this democracy look like? Here we may change the question to: Is the nature of this democracy a system based on each self-seeking individual's subjectivity? My answer to that question is: Yes, but not based on individualism. In the above sample, only four persons (22.2 %: interviewee No. 4, 7, 8, and 9) in the enterprise group did not show obvious social concerns, the other 14 persons (77.7 %) all merged their self-seeking subjectivity with the collectivist, family-like ethics. In other words, their self fulfillment was to use their profession to make a contribution to

the society that they were in, whether it was the Shanghai society, or more broadly, the Chinese society. So if China achieves successful democratization, such democratization likely will lead to a *communal* or *social* democracy³²⁵ because of the collectivist nature of Chinese culture.

This will be a democratic system that combines traditional elements (communal spirit) and modern elements (based on an independent individual's self-seeking subjectivity). Under such democratic system, a free, independent individual will not just be concerned about himself or his interests, he will also, under his free will, be concerned about other people's welfare. *On the macro level*, the Confucian ideal of "Great Harmony" will be the political and cultural goal of such a democratic system, so the culture likely will be a democratic form of Confucianism, and the political system likely will be a Confucian democracy that both respects each individual's free will and self-seeking subjectivity, and has Confucian spirit of sharing, fraternity, love, and mutual support. *On the micro level*, the balance in the combination and integration of traditional elements and modern elements will depend on each individual's free will and free choice, so it will be different from person to person, and it may fall on a point on a spectrum with

³²⁵ I was inspired by my advisor of this dissertation, Professor Paul R. Viotti, to use the term "*communal* democracy" or "*social* democracy" to describe such a democratic system emerging in Chinese cultural background.

liberalism at the one end, and Confucianism at the other end. We can expect most individuals to incorporate that balance in their personal value systems.

How will democratization happen? In the above sample, the government officials did not include democratic ideals in their value system, so the process of democratization likely will not start from the government. The business group foresaw the fusion of Chinese culture with the western culture as the Chinese future, but their development relied on the government's policy, so they could be the supporters but not the starters of the democratization process. The media belonged to the government and was under the strict control of the government, so the media group could not start the process. Only the intellectuals enjoyed a certain degree of independent scholarship, and all intellectuals in the sample displayed a spirit of traditional Chinese intellectuals: being concerned about the fate of this nation, the development of this society, and the welfare of the people. Just like Hu Shi, they had the power and tool of education in their hands; they can help students and readers change their worldviews. Since the Opium War, this has always been the case: the first group to awaken (to the crises) has always been the intellectuals, and then their efforts help awaken other elite strata and, following them, the whole nation could be mobilized. In the above sample, the intellectuals did demonstrate

understandings that are supportive of democratic outcomes over the long term. I have found substantial evidence of favorable prospects for democracy. So my conclusion is: China has favorable prospects for becoming a multiparty democracy; any democratic system that emerges likely will be a Confucian democracy (communal or social democracy); the Chinese culture will become a combination of liberalism and Confucianism; the balance of traditional elements (Confucianism) and modern elements (liberalism) will depend on each individual's free will and free choice; the process of democratization will start with the intellectuals, and then spread to the whole nation. Finally, will this democratization process likely happen in the next 20 years (2004 to 2024)? I will give a positive answer based on responses from the people I interviewed.

(6) The Theory of Deep Democracy and the

Difference It Will Make to Chinese Democracy

(A) The Concept of Deep Democracy

In this section I am going to introduce a novel theory of “deep democracy” developed by Haider Khan and see what difference it can make to Chinese democracy. There is important distinction between deep democracy and the formal democracy. Haider Khan explains:

Khan (1994, 1998, 2007) presents deep democracy as a *structure* in addition to formal democratic apparatus such that the practice of such democratic life can be reproduced with the basic values intact. Change is not precluded. But all such changes should deepen democracy, not weaken it. Deep democracy in this sense is intimately connected with *economic* and *social* justice. Ultimately, it calls for a transition to a culture of creativity, diversity and tolerance.³²⁶

Such a concept of democracy emphasizes “*full* economic and social justice,” and becomes possible when a cluster of conditions is fulfilled. These conditions fall into three categories: economic, political, and social-cultural.³²⁷

(B) Three Categories of Broad Conditions for Deep Democracy

Khan explains these three categories as follows:³²⁸

1. At the *economic* level an adequate conceptualization of the relationship between the market and non-market processes in the context of high technology is necessary in order to promote what Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum have called capabilities (Sen, 1992; Crocker, 1995; Nussbaum, 1995). It is important to be aware of the role that differences such as gender, regions (ethnicity), etc. can play

³²⁶ Haider A. Khan, “Democracy in Bangladesh: From Crisis to Sustainability,” *Journal of Bangladesh Studies* (April-May, 2008): 6.

³²⁷ Haider A. Khan, *Technology, Development and Democracy: Limits of National Innovation Systems in the Age of Postmodernism* (Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing Company, 1998), p. 98.

³²⁸ *Ibid.*

here. Different (types of) people may have different needs. A democratic economy must address those needs as adequately as possible, given the productive capacity.

Technology would need to be conceptualized anew in democratic terms. . . .

2. At the political level, adequate means and resources must be provided in order to ensure free deliberation and participation by all the *different* groups in society. This must apply to the development and evaluation of technology system as well. . . .

3. At the social-cultural level valuing differences by promoting social and cultural relations that display freely a radical heterogeneity in society can be seen as the crucial cultural condition. No single determination of human capacity but a free play of all the social forces necessary to bring about the active, participatory, emancipated human culture is what is implied by this set of requirements. To use Felix Guattari's phrase only a 'molecular revolution' at the level of *small* groups and individuals can bring this about. . . .

As stated above, at least a cluster of conditions (that fall into these three categories) needs to be fulfilled for the concept of deep democracy ("with full economic and social justice") to be "tenable." Thus Alan and Khan offered the following

cluster of conditions.³²⁹

(C) Cluster Conditions for Deep Democracy

1. Ending of economic and other status inequalities;
2. Public emphasis on furthering democratic autonomy, internationalism, and individuality;
3. Adequate incomes for all socially recognized work, as well as for children, the handicapped, the aged, and others not able to work in order to promote *equality of capability*;³³⁰
4. Respect for and articulation of differences in public life and within parties;
5. Downward democratic congruence of and within ordinary social institutions, including work place democracy;
6. Debate over the history and future of the movement-the nature of deep democracy-in neighborhood assemblies and schools;
7. Cultivation of respect for civil disobedience, strikes, and other acts of protest on major public issues;
8. Integration of local and national leaders into features of ordinary economic and

³²⁹ Ibid., pp. 101-102.

³³⁰ Italics by me.

- political life and creation of arenas for criticism;
9. Curtailment of all direct political intervention in the arts, religion, and personal life;
 10. Establishments of independent judicial, policy, communication and electoral review bodies;
 11. Diversity of perspective in communications and education;
 12. Use of differential, serial referenda on central issues;
 13. Public funding of issue-oriented committees as well as parties;
 14. Takeover of some security and civil judicial functions by neighborhood or regional democratic associations; abolition of centralized, especially secret police powers and units;
 15. Universal public service, military or community; restructuring of armed forces in a defensive, civilian-oriented direction; removal of authoritarianism of rank and status, and institution of policy;
 16. Proportional representation of parties;
 17. Abolition of patriarchy;
 18. Adoption of democratic child-rearing practices;

19. Full freedom of social intercourse of diverse groups;
20. Full freedom of diverse cultural expression;
21. Encouragement of the arts and varying modes of expression so that every individual can experience and struggle with the challenge of non-dominating discourse;
22. Practice of radical forms of individual and group subjectivity leading to what Guattari has termed the molecular revolution;
23. Adoption of technology and innovation systems which will reinforce the conditions above, rather than undercutting them.

Khan further emphasizes the complete nature of deep democracy: “Deepening democracy is thus an integrated process where *all* the dimensions of social life are implicated. These diverse processes must work together and reinforce one another.”³³¹

In condition 3, the *equality of capability* is important and is to be promoted. Khan thinks it “useful to clarify and elaborate upon the idea of social capabilities,” and “summarize following Nussbaum and Sen and give a social interpretation of all the capabilities.”³³² This social capability approach focuses on the

³³¹ Haider A. Khan, “Democracy in Bangladesh: From Crisis to Sustainability,” *Journal of Bangladesh Studies* (April-Mat, 2008): 7.

³³² Ibid.

micro-level: each individual should have equal capabilities to live his life “up to the limit permitted by natural possibilities.”³³³

(D) Summary of Social Capabilities³³⁴

1. Being able to live to the end of a complete human life, as far as possible.
2. Being able to be courageous.
3. Being able to have opportunities for sexual satisfaction.
4. Being able to move from place to place.
5. Being able to avoid unnecessary and non-useful pain and to have pleasure experiences.
6. Being able to use the five senses.
7. Being able to imagine.
8. Being able to think and reason.
9. Being acceptably well-informed.
10. Being able to have attachments to things and persons outside ourselves.
11. Being able to love, grieve, to feel longing and gratitude.
12. Being able to form a conception of the good.

³³³ See capability item No. 26.

³³⁴ Haider A. Khan, “Democracy in Bangladesh: From Crisis to Sustainability,” *Journal of Bangladesh Studies* (April-May, 2008): 7-8.

13. Capability to choose; ability to form goals, commitments, values.
14. Being able to engage in critical reflection about the planning of one's own life.
15. Being able to live for and to others, to recognize and show concern for other human beings, to engage in various forms of familial and social interaction.
16. Being capable of friendship.
17. Being able to visit and entertain friends.
18. Being able to participate in the community.
19. Being able to participate politically and being capable of justice.
20. Being able to live with concern for and in relation to animals, plants and the world of nature.
21. Being able to laugh, to play, to enjoy recreational activities.
22. Being able to live one's own life and nobody else's.
23. Being able to live in one's very own surroundings and context.
24. Capability to have self-respect.
25. Capability to appear in public without shame.
26. Capability to live a rich and fully human life, up to the limit permitted by natural possibilities.

27. Ability to achieve valuable functionings.

As Khan points out,

These capabilities are distinct and of central importance. One cannot easily trade off one dimension of capability against another. They cannot be reduced to a common measure such as utility.³³⁵

Also, following Croker,³³⁶

‘Capability ethic’ has implications for freedom, rights, and justice going far beyond simple distribution of income considerations. If one accepts the capability approach as a serious foundation for human development, then it follows that going beyond distributive justice is necessary for a complete evaluation of the impact of economic policies.³³⁷

Khan further points out,

In evaluating any policy regime. . . from this perspective, not only do we wish to pose the question of efficiency but also the whole set of questions regarding human freedom, in particular, the positive human freedom to be or to do certain things.³³⁸

³³⁵ Ibid., p. 8.

³³⁶ Ibid.

³³⁷ Ibid.

³³⁸ Ibid.

(E) What Difference Does Deep Democracy Make to Chinese Democracy?

The theory of deep democracy, together with the social capability approach is consistent with Confucian political ideal (“Great Harmony”) and the ideal of political liberalism. The most urgent problems for China today are corruption of government officials and social injustice on the distribution of income. The institutional origin of all the problems in China is its one party dictatorial rule. Deep democracy and the social capability approach, with its nature of completeness, do address these problems *both* in the immediate need of overcoming corruption and seriously unjust social division *and* in the long-term need of overcoming political dictatorship. The immediate problems need to be solved as soon as possible, and the long-term problem of democracy needs to be solved in a gradual, step-by-step way. If we see it from the perspective of the three categories of the conditions for deep democracy, it will become even clearer. At the economic level, a democratic economy addresses the needs of different types of people as adequate as possible. Thus, social injustice will be overcome. At the political level, free deliberation and participation by all the *different* groups is to be achieved for sure. Thus, political dictatorship will be overcome. At the social-cultural level, “a free play of all the social forces necessary to bring about the active, participatory, emancipated human

culture is what is implied by this set of requirement.” Thus, not only the fusion of Confucianism and political liberalism can be achieved naturally, but also different cultures of ethnic groups will be able to be expressed freely and completely. In short, deep democracy and social capability approach is exactly what China needs: Chinese democracy, under the practice of deep democracy and social capability approach, will be rich, active, flourishing, and emancipated. The practice of deep democracy in China will be able to lead this country to overcome domination and control in any form.³³⁹

³³⁹ Haider A. Khan, “Value, Social Capabilities, Alienation: The Rights to Revolt,” CIRJE Discussion Paper, in (<http://www.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/cirje/research/03research02dp.html>)

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APPENDIX

访谈的问题

是什么样的力量在驱动着 (或限制着) 这个城市的发展与变迁 推动着它向未来二十年迈进?

1. 总的 一般性的了解
2. 国家的角色 (正面的与负面的)
3. 自我的角色 (正面的与负面的)
包括行业的角色 (正面的与负面的)
4. 对未来的期待 (正面的与负面的)

访谈的对象包括四种群体的人:

- (1) 政府官员
- (2) 学者 (知识份子)
- (3) 企业人员 (商人)
- (4) 媒体人员

每一个人可以谈大约 30 分钟, 或者更多, 如果他 (或她)这样选择的话。这个问题是开放式的, 而且是半结构式的, 如以上所示。 这个研究是在

由丹佛大学的「人作为研究主体之保护的制度审查委员会」所通过。