

University of Denver

Digital Commons @ DU

Electronic Theses and Dissertations

Graduate Studies

11-1-2013

Bold Leader or Bully? Interpreting Chinese Regional Maritime Behavior

Harrison I. Fried
University of Denver

Follow this and additional works at: <https://digitalcommons.du.edu/etd>



Part of the [International Relations Commons](#)

Recommended Citation

Fried, Harrison I., "Bold Leader or Bully? Interpreting Chinese Regional Maritime Behavior" (2013).
Electronic Theses and Dissertations. 213.
<https://digitalcommons.du.edu/etd/213>

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate Studies at Digital Commons @ DU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ DU. For more information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu, dig-commons@du.edu.

Bold Leader or Bully?
Interpreting Chinese Regional Maritime Behavior

A Thesis

Presented to

The Faculty of the Josef Korbel School of International Studies

University of Denver

In Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements for the Degree

Master of Arts

by

Harrison I. Fried

November 2013

Advisor: Dr. Karen A. Feste

Author: Harrison I. Fried
Title: Bold Leader or Bully? Interpreting Chinese Regional Maritime Behavior
Advisor: Dr. Karen A. Feste
Degree Date: November 2013

Abstract

Since 2009, tensions have increased markedly between China and its maritime neighbors over disputed territories in the East and South China Seas. China's neighbors accuse it of acting like a bully, alleging that China engages in behavior that is aggressive, inappropriate, and oppressive. But can such accusations be substantiated through objective analysis, or is bullying truly in the eye of the beholder? Further, is China simply acting boldly, albeit in a manner that is justifiable, as it emerges as a leader in the region? The purpose of this thesis was to determine whether labeling China's behavior as "bullying" (as China's smaller and less powerful neighbors view it) is accurate, and whether any definitive conclusions can be drawn concerning the assertive nature of China's conduct. Moreover, given how China's neighbors perceive Chinese maritime policy, this thesis examined how the stability of East Asia might be impacted by smaller states' perceptions. A two-tiered methodological approach was employed that includes examining specific instances of conflict between China and its neighbors, and a content and trend analysis of regional media reporting on the disputed claims issue. Ultimately, the ongoing territorial disputes between China and its maritime neighbors were used as a case environment for exploring how smaller states perceive and react to the actions of great and/or aspiring powers. The case demonstrates that small states sometimes perceive themselves to be victims of great power behavior, whether or not such perceptions are accurate, and that the friction between great power conduct and small state perceptions can contribute to instability that endangers an entire region.

Acknowledgements

Writing a thesis is no easy task, and I would be remiss if I did not express my gratitude to the many friends, colleagues, and academic instructors who advanced this work through their friendship, insight, and encouragement. A few individuals deserve special mention. I would like to thank Professor Suisheng (Sam) Zhao for guiding me through the complexities of Chinese domestic and foreign policy; the courses he taught on these subjects inspired me to learn more about this great and growing nation, and the knowledge he passed along helped provide a foundation for my thesis. I would like to thank Professor Lewis Griffith for spending copious amounts of time, both in person and via email, interacting with me in the very early stages of this process as I struggled to identify a topic and develop a suitable methodological approach for addressing it. I would also like to thank the Chair of my oral defense committee, Professor Doug Allen, for leading a lively and intellectually stimulating discussion that resulted in some valuable recommendations for polishing the final draft of my thesis. Most of all, I would like to thank my advisor, Dr. Karen Feste. Her sound advice concerning development of the topic, endless patience through all stages of refinement, and genuine commitment to my success as a student were absolutely indispensable. Without her guidance, I would never have been able to navigate this challenging academic endeavor, and for this I will always be in her debt.

Table of Contents

Chapter 1 – Introduction	2
Background	6
Outline.....	12
Chapter 2 – China’s Contemporary Foreign Policy and Strategic Goals	14
Core Interests.....	15
Foreign Policy	18
Aspiring Powers	24
Summary	28
Chapter 3 – Bully Theory	31
What is Bullying?.....	31
Who Becomes a Bully?.....	36
Confronting Bullies.....	41
Victim Profile.....	43
Benefits and Costs of Bullying.....	46
International Bullies and Victims.....	49
Summary	55
Chapter 4 – Methodology	56
Conflict Event Data.....	58
Media Content and Trend Analysis.....	62
Summary	65
Chapter 5 – Analysis.....	67
Conflict Event Analysis	67
Evidence of Bullying Behavior	79
Conclusion	89
Media Content and Trend Analysis.....	89
Evidence of Bullying Behavior	94
Conclusion.....	106
Chapter 6 – Conclusion.....	108
Consequences of China’s Behavior	112
Limitations of Study.....	118
Future Research.....	120
Final Assessment.....	122
Notes	124
Bibliography.....	150


List of Tables

Table 1 – Characteristics of Bullying.....	35
Table 2 – Search parameters for identifying media reports.....	64
Table 3 – Significant Maritime Incidents in the East and South China Seas.....	69
Table 4 – Number and percentage of Chinese media reports critical of China’s neighbors.....	92
Table 5 – Number and percentage of Japanese media reports critical of China.....	98
Table 6 – Number and percentage of Philippine media reports critical of China.....	100
Table 7 – Number and percentage of Vietnamese media reports critical of China.....	102
Table 8 – Number and percentage of Taiwanese media reports critical of China.....	103

List of Figures

Figure 1 – Map of East and South China Sea Maritime Claims.....	1
Figure 2 – Public perceptions of China among selected Asian nations.....	4
Figure 3 – Vietnamese demonstrator protests against perceived Chinese aggression.....	5
Figure 4 – Bully Behavior Cycle.....	38
Figure 5 – Process Tracing to Analyze Conflict Events.....	60
Figure 6 – Number of Chinese media reports related to maritime disputes.....	91
Figure 7 – Number of media reports from China’s maritime neighbors, related to territorial disputes.....	91
Figure 8 – Editorial cartoons depicting China as a bully.....	107

Figure 1 – Map of East and South China Sea Maritime Claims



Source: Strafor 2012, <http://cogitansiuvenis.blogspot.com/2012/07/south-china-sea-graphics-update.html>.

Chapter 1 – Introduction

Disputes over territory in the maritime regions adjacent to China's eastern and southern coasts have fueled tensions in East Asia since the end of the World War II. During that time, relations between certain East Asian nations have been marked by a moderate degree of hostility as they compete for control of the region's many islands, shoals, reefs, banks, and other geographic features. The question of who controls those landforms and, more importantly, their adjacent waters, continues to be a matter of debate that shows few signs of abating. On rare occasions, competition over territory has been punctuated by spats of armed violence, though in general, nations have exercised restraint over resorting to such harsh measures. In the past several years, however, these long contentious, but previously manageable, disputes have escalated to an unprecedented level, increasing concern among world leaders that one slight miscalculation could turn a relatively minor incident into a full-blown international conflagration. For example, the January 19, 2013 incident in which a Chinese naval vessel illuminated its target tracking radar to track a Japanese surface vessel and helicopter¹ could easily have resulted in Japanese forces taking defensive measures that might have included the use of tactical weapons against the Chinese vessel.

The disputes over territorial claims in the East and South China Seas have evolved into one of the more pressing security challenges the region has observed since the end of World War II. Moreover, the strategic significance of these maritime zones


for global commerce has sparked concern among international leaders; a major disruption in a region that handles half of the world's maritime shipping traffic² and one third of the world's petroleum shipments³ would undoubtedly have far-reaching, adverse consequences for the world economy. Although the escalation of tensions in East Asia's maritime regions comes as a result of numerous countries' refusals to back down in pursuit of their territorial claims, such as Vietnam's claims over the Spratly Islands and the Philippines' claims to portions of the Paracel Islands, the expansion of tensions is in large measure attributed to the actions of China, the region's dominant power. Several states, including Vietnam, the Philippines, and Japan, accuse China of endangering the region's peace and security by engaging in provocative behavior at the tactical level and by taking inflammatory action at the strategic level. For example, Chinese vessels' deliberate cutting of cables towed by Vietnamese survey vessels in the South China Sea has sparked anger in Hanoi;⁴ more frequent flights by Chinese reconnaissance planes near the Japanese-claimed Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea are irritating Tokyo;⁵ the establishment of Chinese military garrisons in the South China Sea worry Manila;⁶ and alleged Chinese attempts to interfere with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) efforts to calm tensions in the region have been viewed with concern by other world powers, including the United States.⁷

Moreover, evidence suggests that within the East Asia region, public opinion of China has been declining over the past several years. Recent public polling conducted by the Gallup Organization indicates that perceptions among China's maritime neighbors concerning Chinese leadership have become increasingly negative. When respondents in these nations are asked whether they approve or disapprove of the job performance of the

leadership of China, approval ratings tend to be low, and in most cases the ratings have progressively decreased since 2010. (See Figure 1.)

Figure 2 – Public perceptions of China among selected Asian nations (Gallup Poll Results)⁸

Question asked: “Do you approve or disapprove of the job performance of the leadership of China?”



Clearly Japan, the Philippines, Taiwan, Vietnam, South Korea, and Indonesia all increasingly disapprove of China’s leadership over the past several years. The most precipitous drops in approval ratings appear to have occurred in Indonesia (a drop of 30 percentage points within four years), Vietnam (a drop of 17 percentage points over four years), and Japan (a drop of 15 percentage points in just three years). The decrease in approval among other nations is less pronounced, though the overall trend is downward. It is difficult to pinpoint from this data what is driving the downward trend in how China

is being perceived by its maritime neighbors. However, it is apparent that the overall trend coincides with the recent escalation in maritime disputes.

What *is* certain is that China's claims frequently conflict with those of its neighbors. Although the maritime territorial disputes is an undeniably complex issue involving overlapping claims of numerous countries, China's behavior feeds the perception that it is a bully in the region.

Figure 3: Vietnamese demonstrator protests against perceived Chinese aggression in the South China Sea

Source: Information Security Biweekly, May 2013. <http://biweekly.isvoc.com/category/south-china-sea>



But is it fair to label China a bully? The purpose of this thesis is to explore this question and to analyze Chinese activity in East Asia's disputed maritime regions in order to interpret China's conduct from the perspective of smaller states. Indeed, China's interaction with its neighbors provides a case environment for exploring how smaller

states perceive the actions taken against them by larger powers. Three specific issues will be addressed:

1. Is China bullying its maritime neighbors?
2. What are the benefits and costs for China of behaving like a bully?
3. What is the impact of Chinese behavior for the East Asia region?

The first question requires an examination of bullying theory and an analysis of China's interaction with its maritime neighbors. Answering the second and third questions, which are admittedly more interpretive in nature, requires an examination of China's strategic goals and its general approach to conducting foreign policy roughly since the time of Deng Xiaoping. In general, major powers and aspiring powers have been labeled as provocateurs whose actions and assertiveness endanger everyone, and this is grounded on the assumption that strong states always exploit weaker ones. But how smaller states perceive and react to the actions of more powerful nations is not the sole determinant for characterizing the behavior of aspiring powers. With respect to China specifically, a fair assessment can only be made after considering China's recent behavior in the context of contemporary Chinese foreign policy and China's strategic aspirations.

Background

In the East China Sea, the conflict between China and Japan over five tiny islands (known as the Diaoyu Islands in China, and the Senkaku Islands in Japan) stems from the late nineteenth century decision by Japan to annex the islands. In short, Japan argues that it annexed the islands in 1895 at a time when no other country claimed sovereignty over

them.⁹ China disputes this historical interpretation, contending that the islands have always belonged to China and that Japan annexed them unlawfully. The islands, taken into the possession of the United States at the conclusion of the Second World War, were returned to Japan in 1972.¹⁰ China began asserting its claim to the islands and the territory surrounding them in the late 1970s when armed Chinese fishing vessels staged nearby demonstrations. Since then, the islands have been a source of constant friction between the two nations, and occasional flare-ups have occurred. Most recently, in August 2012, in a move to prevent a prominent nationalist Japanese politician from exacerbating tensions by purchasing the islands himself, the Japanese government purchased the islands from their private owners and nationalized them.¹¹ Japan's official purchase of the island touched off a firestorm of anti-Japanese protests in China, culminating in attacks on Japanese property and resulting in some Japanese companies suspending their operations in certain Chinese cities.¹² Although the fever pitch of anti-Japanese sentiment expressed in the late summer and early autumn of 2012 has since subsided, bitter feelings persist and tensions over the issue remain high even today.

In the South China Sea, merely identifying a historical starting point for determining sovereignty claims is a matter of debate. A map, dubbed the "Nine Dash Line," purportedly first produced by China in 1947¹³ but never afforded much attention until the Chinese Communist Party reintroduced it in 1992,¹⁴ depicts the entirety of the South China Sea as belonging to China. Other Southeast Asian countries dispute China's assertion that the entire South China Sea falls within Chinese jurisdiction, and they cite maps drawn up during the Qing Dynasty in 1904 which depict China's southernmost border as Hainan Island (located at the very northern portion of the South China Sea – a

far cry from the claims made by the “Nine Dash Line” map).¹⁵ But China has crafted responses to this as well. In an attempt to refute other nations’ claims and to erase any doubt about who maintains sovereign rights to the region’s waters, the Chinese government has pointed to ancient maps that date back as far as the 13th century. According to Chinese government officials, such maps mention islands well south of Hainan Island, and China claims that these are evidence of its rightful sovereignty over the region’s vast maritime territories.¹⁶

Incidents of conflict between China and other nations over maritime territory have occurred since the 1950s, though conflict took on a new dimension in the 1970s as offshore petroleum exploration began in earnest and nations began to claim unsettled land features and their surrounding waters.¹⁷ Most frequently, incidents of conflict have included the occupation and occasional garrisoning of troops on contested islands, confrontations between civilian and naval vessels, the erecting of structures on disputed maritime outcroppings, arrests and detentions at sea, boat collisions, and the use of aircraft to intimidate ocean-going vessels. In some instances, China and its neighbors have resorted to the use of force to settle disputes. In early 1974, for example, Vietnam claimed the Paracel Islands of the South China Sea as a province of Vietnam, to which China responded by sending a small naval contingent to the area. A battle ensued in which 36 troops from both sides were killed.¹⁸ An armed clash between the two nations also occurred in 1988 over Johnson Reef in the Spratly Islands, during which Chinese gunboats sank a Vietnamese transport ship carrying Vietnamese soldiers.¹⁹ In addition to its occasional armed confrontations with Vietnam, China occasionally clashed with the Philippines. In 1996, for example, China engaged with the Philippines in a 90 minute

gun battle over Capones Island in the South China Sea.²⁰ Such clashes, however, have been rare and limited in scope, and although they have certainly contributed to tensions in the region, the disputes have ultimately remained manageable. Overall, between 1950 and April 2013, no less than 73 documented incidents of conflict have occurred between China and other states whose interests overlap in the maritime regions of East and Southeast Asia.²¹

Clearly, conflict and confrontation between China and others in the region over disputed territory is not a new development. However, it is worth noting that the number of incidents of confrontation has increased since 2009. Although the period from 1950 through 2008 saw a total of 46 incidents of conflict, the brief period January 1, 2009 – April 1, 2013 has seen a total of 27 significant incidents.²² Several reasons may explain why the period since 2008 has witnessed an increase in such incidents. For example, some China scholars argue that in the wake of the 2008 world financial crisis, many Chinese leaders were emboldened by the apparent financial fragility of the West, and may have interpreted it as an opportunity to advance Chinese interests.²³ Consequently, Chinese leaders deliberately embarked on a more assertive approach to interacting with the international community. China's bold behavior in the East and South China Seas, in particular, presumably reflects this more general, assertive Chinese foreign policy. Without question, securing access to energy deposits located beneath the seabed is another factor contributing to an increase in the number of conflict occurrences. Geological survey estimates suggest that as many as 160 million barrels of oil²⁴ and 290 trillion cubic feet of natural gas²⁵ are locked beneath the sea in these regions. As home of the world's second and third largest economies, and an additional number of rapidly

burgeoning economies, Asia has seen intense and increasing competition for these resources.²⁶ However, identifying and thoroughly examining the overarching reasons for the ongoing maritime territorial disputes is beyond the scope of this project. Rather, the purpose here is to analyze Chinese behavior in the disputed maritime regions in the context of bullying theory and to assess the consequences of Chinese actions.

Although in recent years there has been no loss of life related to events on the seas, there have been a number of recent developments that raise concern among those in the region and within the international community. In general, the concern is that as a result of China's recent policy, the heretofore seen pattern of low-intensity, occasional altercations between China and its neighbors may be moving toward a pattern of larger-scale, regular, and potentially violent confrontations with wide-ranging and adverse consequences. Fears persist about tactical level encounters quickly and uncontrollably escalating to strategic level crises.²⁷ China's increasing willingness to challenge other nations at the tactical level has raised concerns about prospects for regional stability. In addition to concerns over the increasing frequency of tactical level engagements, concerns have been raised over China's recent strategic level maneuvering. These maneuvers will be analyzed thoroughly in a later chapter, but given their significance in shaping the nature of the disputes, it is appropriate to introduce them here.

In June 2012, China announced that it had granted prefecture level status to a small city called Sansha located on Woody Island in the South China Sea.²⁸ China now claims that Sansha, a city of merely 1,100 non-indigenous residents on an island hardly large enough to accommodate an airstrip, has administrative jurisdiction over the territorial waters encompassing the Spratly as well as Paracel Islands.²⁹ The unilateral

move to extend Chinese control southward into the South China Sea has been viewed by others in the region as an absurd Chinese attempt to justify its claims of sovereignty.³⁰ In addition to upgrading Sansha's status to the prefecture level, China established a new military garrison on the island.³¹ Although a small garrison of Chinese soldiers located in Sansha poses no real military threat to other claimants in the region, some still find the development disturbing as it gives China a pretext for claiming sovereignty over a larger swath of maritime territory.

In November 2012, the Chinese Foreign Ministry began issuing passports to Chinese citizens that depicted a map of China including the "Nine Dash Line" boundary enveloping the entire South China Sea. The less-than-subtle suggestion of Chinese sovereignty over the entire sea was not well received by China's maritime neighbors. In Vietnam, border and customs officials were instructed not to recognize the new passports and to deny stamping them until a new visa had been issued and affixed to the passports. The new visas depicted a Vietnamese-approved map of the region.³² The move also elicited unfavorable reactions from the Philippines, Taiwan, and India.³³

China has also recently been engaged in what many consider to be a policy of interfering with regional multilateral efforts to settle the dispute in the South China Sea. Certain members of ASEAN, as well as outside observers, accuse China of meddling in ASEAN affairs in an attempt to keep the organization from reaching a consensus on a Code of Conduct for the South China Sea. Accusations have been made about China pursuing a divide-and-conquer strategy and wielding its influence over certain ASEAN member states in an attempt to fracture the organization over the territorial disputes issue.³⁴ In fact, in the summer of 2012, for the first time in its 45 year history, the

ASEAN Regional Forum failed to reach an accord and was unable to issue a joint communiqué due to its members' inability to agree on a proposed Code of Conduct.³⁵

Most notably, perhaps, in November 2012, it was announced that the Hainan Provincial police would be authorized to stop, board, and search foreign vessels "violating" Chinese territorial waters beginning in January 2013. The provincial police were granted authority to detain personnel and confiscate communications equipment of vessels suspected of "trespassing" in Chinese waters.³⁶ This announcement raised a chorus of concern from the international community.

These recent developments, as well as a number of tactical level conflicts occurring at sea, will be analyzed to determine what impacts they are having on China's relationship with its maritime neighbors. Likewise, they will be analyzed to explore what the consequences of these actions could spell for China's strategic, long-term aspirations. Whatever position one takes regarding these developments, what is undeniable is that China receives a great deal of criticism for its actions. China is often accused by its neighbors of being a bully, muscling its way around the region, and attempting to intimidate those who dispute its territorial claims.

Outline

In order to determine whether China is bullying its neighbors, to identify the benefits and costs for China of behaving like a bully, and to assess the impact of bullying in the East Asia region, I will take the following approach. Chapter 2 is an overview of Chinese foreign policy, strategy, and goals since 1978, and briefly examines basic theories about the behavior of aspiring powers and power-transition states. A review of these theories proves useful for explaining China's recent behavior and for assessing the

costs and benefits of such policy for China's greater interests. Chapter 3 examines the premises of bullying theory, outlines the key characteristics of bullying, discusses how bullying occurs among individuals and groups, and identifies the typical consequences of the behavior. Examining the premises of bullying theory provides a foundation for investigating how bullying applies to China in the context of the maritime territorial disputes. Chapter 4 discusses the methodology used to analyze China's behavior, consisting of evaluating contentious incidents occurring between China and its maritime neighbors at both the tactical level (on the seas), and at the strategic level (national policy level). A total of 27 incidents are investigated occurring between January 2010 and April 2013. A content review and trend analysis of media reporting on the disputes in various claimant states is also covered. Chapter 5 presents and analyzes the findings of the research that characterize China's behavior and its impact. The final chapter, Chapter 6, assesses the overall benefits and costs of China's behavior for its strategic interests, and how China's behavior impacts East Asia regional security and stability.

Chapter 2 – China’s Contemporary Foreign Policy and Strategic Goals

The purpose of this chapter is to identify China’s strategic goals or core interests, and to discuss how China has pursued those goals in the 1978 – 2012 period. In order to examine the costs and benefits of China’s behavior, especially in terms of its strategic interests, and to draw conclusions about the potential impact of China’s behavior for regional stability, it is essential to identify what those interests are and what China’s general approach to conducting foreign policy has been roughly since the time of Deng Xiaoping. Understanding China’s interests and how China has interacted with its maritime neighbors and the international community during this period may help shed light on why China is pursuing its current approach with regard to disputed maritime claims. Additionally, this chapter briefly examines the behavior of aspiring powers and the basic characteristics of power-transitions that prove useful for explaining China’s recent behavior and for assessing the potential consequences of its behavior. The interpretation of Chinese foreign policy in this thesis relies on the analyses of Western scholars, including works by Andrew Nathan and Andrew Scobell (2012), David Shambaugh (2012), Robert Sutter (2012), Odd Arne Westad (2012), and Suisheng Zhao (2004-2012). These scholars tend to agree that Chinese foreign policy from the Deng period until 2009 was marked by pragmatism, whereas a noticeable shift away from a pragmatic approach began to occur in 2009.

Core Interests

Every nation defines its core national interests, and a nation's foreign policy is in large measure driven by those interests. China is no different in this respect. As a geographically vast country and a rising power among the community of nations, China's interests are understandably diverse and have evolved over recent years as China's power has grown. However, China has maintained several key, fundamental "core interests" that have endured for the better part of the post-Mao and post-Cold War years. In 2009, State Councilor Dai Bingguo listed these core interests as: maintaining China's fundamental system and state security, protecting state sovereignty and territorial integrity, and ensuring continued stable development of China's economy and society.³⁷ Similarly, a 2011 white paper issued by China's official Information Office of the State Council described these core interests in terms of state sovereignty, national security, territorial integrity, national reunification, sustaining China's political system and overall social stability, and ensuring sustainable economic and social development.³⁸ Taken together, China's core interests can be summarized as follows:

1. Protect China's state sovereignty and territorial integrity.
2. Protect and maintain China's system of government.
3. Ensure stability for uninterrupted economic and social development.

For the past thirty years, the PRC has placed particular emphasis on economic and social progress --- a critical foundation upon which China's other two interests depend. Economic modernization and social development are perceived to be the way for China to realize its potential as a great power and to command respect within the community of nations after having suffered through what it considers a "century of humiliation" at the

hands of outside powers.³⁹ In fact, China considers economic and social development not only as a key to erasing a troubled past, but as a means for enhancing legitimacy for the Chinese Communist Party, thus strengthening the fundamental system of government and state security. Likewise, China perceives economic prosperity as a pathway to strengthening its military capabilities and, hence, its capacity to protect its sovereignty and territorial integrity. Overall, China's three core interests, accurately described as the nation's "bottom-line of national survival",⁴⁰ signal to the world what China considers absolutely essential for its existence and evolution as a great nation. Moreover, each of these overarching interests have remained consistent throughout the post-Mao era, and all three have had a substantial impact on how China has conducted its foreign policy during this period.

China has made clear that safeguarding its sovereignty and territorial integrity necessarily includes the question of Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang Province.⁴¹ Events in each of these regions have routinely generated a good deal of international controversy, and China has consistently reiterated that it considers these issues as internal, sovereign matters not to be interfered with by outside nations. Furthermore, China has indicated that it is willing to take action (i.e. use force) to protect its territorial interests in these areas. Some China experts contend that starting in 2010, China added the South China Sea to its list of core interests,⁴² or that in any case, the PRC began treating the South China Sea as a core interest in 2010.⁴³ However, others maintain that China never actually elevated the South China Sea to "core interest" status, and that this has been demonstrated by China's (as yet) unwillingness to use force to protect its South China Sea claims.⁴⁴ This contrasts with China's stated willingness to use force to protect its

claims to Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang Province. (The question of whether China intended to add the South China Sea to its list of core interests arose during high level, private meetings between the Chinese Foreign Ministry and U.S. State Department officials in 2010. The State Department eventually explained that the term “core interest” had never been used during the meetings, and that Chinese officials had used the term “national priority” to express China’s attitude toward the South China Sea.)⁴⁵ These experts argue that the South China Sea is simply not on the same level as Taiwan when it comes to China’s territorial interests. Nonetheless, Beijing has remained deliberately opaque on the issue, and has done nothing to dispel rumors that it might eventually use force to protect its interests in the region.⁴⁶

In addition to economic, political, and security related matters, a number of other factors have contributed significantly to shaping China’s world view. Demography, geography, and history have all had a substantial impact on how the PRC sees its role in global affairs today.⁴⁷ At 1.3 billion citizens, China must manage a population that is not only enormous, but that is ethnically diverse, largely poor, rapidly aging, and highly concentrated in specific regions within the country.⁴⁸ Such demographic characteristics create challenges for the PRC and place demands on Chinese leaders as they determine how to govern their country. Geographically, the PRC is surrounded by nations whose governments, cultures, world views, and interests contrast significantly with those of China. Arguably, China is exposed in all directions to instability and pressure, and the potential for conflict exists all along China’s periphery.⁴⁹ Thus China has been, and continues to be, acutely sensitive to its border security; this is especially true in the north and along its seacoasts.⁵⁰ With respect to history, China today is in many ways driven by

feelings of historic humiliation and wounded national pride.⁵¹ Scholars contend that China's experience with national humiliation, having endured such abasement at the hands of outside powers beginning in the 19th century, not only shapes how China views itself, but shapes its perception of strategic reality.⁵² China today continues to suffer from a sense of insecurity and vulnerability that stems from decades of mistreatment at the hands of outside powers. This insecurity and perceived vulnerability is certainly reflected in China's core interests, and it affects how China conducts its foreign policy.

Identifying China's core interests and the factors influencing China's world view provides an essential pretext for understanding how Chinese foreign policy has been conducted over the past three decades. With these core interests and underlying policy-shaping factors in mind, we now turn to a brief examination of how Chinese leaders have chosen to conduct their nation's foreign policy since 1978.

Foreign Policy

The death of Mao Zedong precipitated an end to what had been China's policy of seclusion and self-isolation from the international community. Under Mao, decisions regarding Chinese foreign policy were very much driven by ideology and often came at the expense of China's economic development. In the wake of Mao's death, however, and with the inception of Deng Xiaoping's market-oriented economic policies, a new era began in which the importance of ideology in making foreign policy began to wane. In December of 1978, Deng initiated a pragmatic "socialist modernization" agenda,⁵³ launching China on a trajectory of rapid economic development that remains unmatched in modern history for a country of China's size. Under Deng, ideology had "lost salience to the motivation of pragmatic power politics",⁵⁴ and Chinese leaders began to embrace

an alternative, ideologically agnostic, “pragmatic” approach to guide foreign policy formulation and implementation. Adopting a pragmatic approach meant that China’s conduct and pursuit of its strategic goals would be conditioned by historical experiences and the geostrategic environment,⁵⁵ and not by ideology.

Beginning in 1979, Deng instituted numerous reforms that ushered in a new era of openness. An official policy of “reform and opening” was announced, in which domestic economic and administrative systems were liberalized, and economic self-sufficiency was abandoned.⁵⁶ As a result, China enjoyed newfound access to world markets, investment opportunities, and technologies. Under Deng’s leadership, China began to experiment with a market-based economic approach, gradually introducing capitalist elements into what had previously been a closed socialist economy. This period of opening up also saw China express interest in becoming a more active participant in global affairs and multilateral institutions.

As China emerged from its isolation, Deng also made it a priority to forge closer diplomatic relations with other nations of the world, particularly with China’s neighbors in Southeast Asia.⁵⁷ During this period of normalizing relations, Chinese diplomacy was in large measure driven by the necessities of economic reform. In fact, relations with foreign states were evaluated almost entirely on their potential contribution to China’s modernization.⁵⁸ For Deng, the most important consideration for a China emerging from decades of isolation and economic deprivation was to modernize China and advance its economy. Deng’s deep-seeded desire to see China catch-up with the rest of the world and to pull China’s hundreds of millions of impoverished citizens from squalor became a key driving force behind Chinese foreign policy. Little else mattered, and to the extent

that relations with other nations offered an avenue for China's modernization, Deng encouraged leaders of China's Communist Party to reach out and establish positive relationships with China's neighbors and the global community.

At the same time that China began to forge ahead as a more active participant in the global forum, Deng counseled China's leadership to avoid getting ahead of world issues prematurely, and to avoid stirring up trouble. Rather, he advised that China should remain focused on taking advantage of opportunities, bide its time, and gradually build power and influence.⁵⁹ To move too quickly and to be too ambitious could be counterproductive as this would raise the fears and suspicions of other nations. In fact, China's leaders had good reason to worry about raising the suspicions of its neighbors. Many already resented China and viewed it as a threat given the PRC's sponsoring of communist opposition forces in their countries during the 1960s and early 1970s.⁶⁰

The premise behind adopting such a pragmatic approach was to foster a stable international environment conducive to promoting unrestrained economic growth. In the immediate post-Mao era, Chinese leaders, mindful of China's weakness relative to Western nations and to the United States in particular, sought to avoid confrontation with such nations. A policy of defending the national interest by conducting a shrewd diplomacy requiring "rationality and calmness"⁶¹ became China's preferred option. The overarching goal of pursuing unmolested economic development was best served by ensuring a secure and stable international environment. As such, a "periphery policy", or "good neighbor policy", was instituted in which China sought to keep or establish positive relations with other countries in the region. Maintaining good relations with its neighbors would demonstrate that China was interested in maintaining stability, and this

was inextricably tied with China's overarching objective of economic modernization.⁶² Hence, as far as economic development was concerned, China should push full speed ahead with modernizing as rapidly as possible. But China could afford to take its time, hide its light, and nurture its strength⁶³ before assuming a leading role in world relations. Presumably, China would eventually grow strong enough to flex its muscles and take on a new role in global affairs. But this notion was kept vague, and China's expected future role was unspecified.

Deng's eventual successors saw value in continuing the policy of keeping a low profile while nurturing strength, and of minimizing resistance to China's rise by downplaying both its power and its ambition as much as possible.⁶⁴ In the mid 1990s, Jiang Zemin set policy guidelines to "enhance trust, reduce friction, develop cooperation, and avoid confrontation".⁶⁵ Slogans such as "peaceful rise" and "peaceful development" were adopted by Beijing, and hopeful if not gaudy language about countries of the world joining hands to "strive to build a harmonious world of lasting peace and common prosperity" was communicated by government leaders.⁶⁶ (Interestingly, the slogan "peaceful rise" was rather abruptly amended to "peaceful development" in order to avoid fostering the impression that China's growth in any way constituted a threat to other nations of the world.). Furthermore, China's leaders made frequent efforts to calm international anxiety by publicly pronouncing that China had no intention of overtaking the international order. "China never seeks hegemony" was a quote quite often cited by leaders in Beijing.⁶⁷

Hence, heeding the advice of Deng Xiaoping, Chinese leaders carried on with their pragmatic approach to foreign policy, ever mindful of not being perceived to

threaten China's neighbors or the existing international order. Such policy persisted through 2008 and was remarkably successful in terms of providing China the opportunity to pursue its core interests and achieve astonishing growth. Admittedly there were rough spots during this period, during which friction between China and its neighbors, and China and the West, was exposed. For example, the 1989 incident at Tiananmen Square was particularly harmful to China's renewed relations with the West. China's record on human rights and its alleged insensitivities toward specific ethnic groups within its borders (e.g. unrest in Tibet and Xinjiang province) strained relations between China and other members of the international community. Furthermore, the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait Crisis also brought to the surface conflicting interests and tensions between China and the international community. Concerns about China as a possible threat to the region began to mount.

By the late 1990s, China recognized that in spite of its many diplomatic achievements, the set-backs it experienced had bred mistrust among China's regional neighbors and tarnished China's reputation with the great nations of the world. Realizing this was problematic, and desiring to mitigate historical feelings of mistrust among its neighbors, China's leaders launched a conscious diplomatic effort to strengthen relations with its neighbors and to improve ties all around its periphery.⁶⁸ In 1997, in an attempt to mitigate the perception of a "China threat", China introduced its New Security Concept.⁶⁹ Implementing this concept included stepping-up efforts to engage diplomatically, economically, and militarily with its neighbors. This moderate foreign policy approach continued well in to the 2000s. The period saw a decline in Chinese criticism of Japan and of U.S. security cooperation with other states in the region.⁷⁰ China began to

demonstrate a new flexibility and willingness to engage in negotiations with the other claimants to South China Sea territories,⁷¹ going so far as to agree to a Declaration of Conduct (DoC) for the South China Sea in 2002, in which China pledged to resolve sovereignty disputes peacefully with other claimants.⁷² Likewise, China sought to establish influence with its Southeast Asian neighbors at the expense of the United States, attempting to build regional security forums that excluded the U.S. For instance, China steadily increased its trade with ASEAN countries throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, having reached a trade volume of \$41 billion by 2001.⁷³ By 2010, that number had increased to \$297 billion.⁷⁴ The overall effort lasted until 2008 and has been described as an excellent and effective period in Chinese diplomacy.⁷⁵

Nonetheless, an undercurrent of suspicion and wariness on the part of China's East Asian neighbors persisted, and concerns over what China's development meant for the region kept nations from growing too enamored with their large and ever-growing neighbor. Indeed, in 2009 China's leaders began to take a more assertive position to conducting foreign policy. Contrary to what Deng had counseled regarding keeping a low profile and avoiding disruption with outside nations, Chinese leaders began to engage in sharp rhetoric and policy disagreements both bilaterally and multilaterally. Perhaps most prominently, Beijing became much more vocal about challenging the United States' right to operate its military vessels in China's 200 mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ).⁷⁶ On three occasions in 2009, for example, China reacted to U.S. ships operating in waters near China in a manner that the U.S. Navy perceived as harassing. In March of that year, a Chinese Bureau of Fisheries vessel harassed the *USNS Victorious* in the Yellow Sea by shining a high-powered spotlight on it,⁷⁷ and later

that month five Chinese government vessels harassed the *USNS Impeccable* in the South China Sea.⁷⁸ Likewise, in June of 2009, a Chinese submarine trailed the *USS John McCain* in the South China Sea, and was suspected of colliding with and damaging the sonar equipment the *McCain* was towing.⁷⁹ Although this period of “Chinese assertiveness”⁸⁰ and its accompanying diplomatic missteps did not result in irreparable damage being done, it nonetheless had a significantly negative impact on China’s relations with some of its most important regional partners. In a very short period beginning in 2009, China’s relations with many of its neighbors (as well as with the U.S., EU, and ASEAN) deteriorated to uncharacteristic lows.⁸¹ Some scholars even consider the period beginning in 2009 as the most serious setback for Chinese influence in Southeast Asia since the end of the Cold War.⁸² It remains a matter of debate whether China’s change of diplomatic course has been a deliberate, systematic attempt to exercise power at the expense of straining relations with so many countries simultaneously. Nevertheless, departing with the traditional method of conducting foreign policy (i.e. maintaining harmonious relations with other nations) unquestionably has had a negative cumulative effect on China’s diplomatic image.⁸³

Aspiring Powers

In order to better understand China’s recent foreign policy in the East and South China Seas, it is worth briefly examining what international relations theory has to say about the nature of power relationships between states, the characteristics of power transitions, and the behavior of aspiring powers. Numerous theories of international relations have been proposed since the end of the Second World War, each seeking to explain the nature of state behavior and state-state interactions. One of the more widely

accepted schools of thought is realism. Advocates of realism (including renowned theorists such as Hans Morgenthau, George Kennan, and Kenneth Waltz) posit that all states within the international system act rationally, pursue their self-interests, and that the primary concern of all states is survival.⁸⁴ Although all realists subscribe to these underlying assumptions, in the past several decades two distinct sub-categories have evolved within the overarching framework of realism: “balance of power realism”, and “hegemonic realism”.⁸⁵ Ultimately, balance of power realist theory proposes that high concentrations of power in the system are destabilizing, whereas equal distributions of power among states tends to contribute to peace and stability.⁸⁶ Proponents of this school of thought argue that countries who enjoy a disproportionate degree of power will attempt to take advantage of their superior position to attack their weaker rivals.⁸⁷

The other school of realist thought, hegemonic realism, accepts basic realist assumptions about the role of power in international relations, but rejects balance of power theory. Contrary to balance of power theory, hegemonic realism posits that concentrations of power are inherently stabilizing and promote peace and stability rather than detract from it.⁸⁸ As with balance of power theory, hegemonic realism also consists of several sub-theories. Perhaps the most prominent among these, and the first of the hegemonic realist theories to develop, is A.F.K. Organski’s power transition theory. Originally proposed in 1958, this theory envisions global politics as a hierarchy of nations with varying degrees of cooperation and competition.⁸⁹ It acknowledges that power arrangements and power distribution among states will fluctuate over time. But it proposes that as states become more evenly matched in terms of strength, it is likely that relatively weaker states will challenge the status quo international arrangement. In 1980,

Organski and Jacek Kugler published their seminal work, *The War Ledger*, in which their research reveals that as aspiring states approach power parity with an established power, conflict often ensues.

Organski and Kugler examine historical instances of power transitions occurring between major states and discuss how such transitions have resulted in large-scale, international wars. Although their analysis is focused primarily on determining the origins, outcomes, and consequences of major wars,⁹⁰ they nonetheless provide some insightful discussion regarding the expected behavior of aspiring powers and the potential consequences of their behavior. A key observation is made concerning the link between a state's economic growth, its national power, its behavior, and the potential for conflict. They illustrate how the extent to which a state experiences economic growth directly impacts that state's level of national power. An increase in national power, defined as a nation's capacity to control the behavior of others in accordance with its own ends,⁹¹ can in turn be a key determinant of state conduct and, consequently, the occurrence of conflict. In general, as the power of aspiring states increases and power among nations becomes more evenly distributed, the likelihood of conflict also increases. Organski and Kugler demonstrate that this is so through their analysis of 19th and 20th century power arrangements, nations' economic growth, and the outbreak of major wars. Their research shows that changes in power structure within the international order, spurred by economic growth and associated competitive behavior by emerging states, is largely responsible for the outbreak of war.⁹²

In their analysis, Organski and Kugler also discuss historic relationships between dominant powers and challenger states who desire to modify the existing international

system. In short, aspiring powers are described as challengers who seek a new place for themselves in the international hierarchy. It is proposed that challengers are states who have acquired power through economic growth, but who feel a general sense of dissatisfaction with their position in the international system. Challengers desire to redraft the rules by which relations among nations work,⁹³ have reason to believe they can rival or even surpass the power of the dominant state, and ultimately act on their desire to elevate their position in the prevailing system.⁹⁴ Examples of this occurring throughout history include Prussia's challenge to France in 1870, Germany's challenge to the United Kingdom and Russia in 1914, and Germany's challenge to the United Kingdom once again in 1939. In each case, an emerging power overtook the dominant power economically (as measured by GNP) and challenged the dominant power's position within the international hierarchy.⁹⁵ The United States itself is known to have engaged in such behavior. President Theodore Roosevelt's corollary to the Monroe Doctrine (which in 1904 announced U.S. primacy in the Western Hemisphere and established a policy of preventive intervention in the Americas)⁹⁶ serves as a prime example of an emerging state challenging other powers within the system. What Organski and Kugler's analysis shows is that aspiring states' attempts to redraft the rules of the system and alter their position in the existing international order usually results in conflict, and often leads to full-scale war.⁹⁷ However, it must be noted that power transitions do not necessarily make war inevitable; Organski and Kugler admit that challengers may surpass the dominant nation without fighting it.⁹⁸

Additionally, Organski and Kugler argue that an aspiring power's challenge to the dominant power and the prevailing international system is a process that may unfold

gradually. Power transitions may occur over prolonged periods, perhaps decades in duration, punctuated by isolated, lower level armed conflicts.⁹⁹ Other scholars have come to similar conclusions, noting that aspiring powers posing a challenge to the existing order will seek to delegitimize the dominant power's authority over an extended period. The delegitimization phase may occur years before the critical inflection point of a power transition¹⁰⁰ and may include the implementation of cost-imposing strategies to gradually undermine the dominant power. Such strategies may include voting against the dominant power in international institutions, engaging in controversial uses of force against the dominant power's partners and allies, and making threats against pivotal states that affect regional and international security.¹⁰¹

In sum, history suggests that as nations grow economically, they grow more powerful generally. Hence, it is not uncommon for them to challenge the prevailing international system and to pose direct challenges to dominant powers. With this in mind, China's recent behavior in the East and South China Seas might be much less surprising.

Summary

This chapter has identified China's strategic goals, or core interests, and has discussed how China has pursued these goals since 1978. In general, China's foreign policy since the time of Deng Xiaoping has been focused on establishing conditions for China to pursue rapid, unhindered economic development. As such, Chinese leaders have generally opted for a pragmatic, non-confrontational approach to interacting with other nations. China's recent, more assertive stance with respect to the ongoing maritime disputes is interpreted by many in the West as a departure from a well-established, proven, highly successful foreign policy.

Moreover, the general consensus among Western scholars appears to be that China's efforts have been largely driven by a persistent Chinese fear of falling behind the rest of the world. The Chinese experience with what is considered to be a century of humiliation, a period during which China was weak and vulnerable, has contributed to China's sense of urgency in its pursuit of power. Contemporary Chinese leaders are determined to never again allow their country to be victimized at the hands of outside nations. Hence, China's recent behavior might very well come as a result of a persistent sense of insecurity.

Regardless of the underlying causes, China's recent behavior tends to be met with pessimism and disapproval by Western scholars. The general consensus is that China has been acting in a way that is not only unhelpful for the region, but that undermines China's own interests. While there is cautious optimism that China's leaders will ultimately return to a moderate, pragmatic approach to advancing China's interests, many admit that it is difficult to ascertain whether Chinese leaders will opt to pursue such a course. For now, what is certain is that Chinese pragmatic foreign policy has contributed substantially to the remarkable growth and increase in power China has experienced over the past three decades. What is also clear, as demonstrated by recent actions in East Asia's maritime regions, is that some within the Chinese political establishment now feel empowered by that growth and believe it is appropriate for China to exercise a more assertive stance in the region.

History and a review of international relations theory suggests that given the extent of China's economic growth and its associated increase in national power, its more assertive behavior is not entirely unexpected. But whether its more assertive

position is to be expected, how should China's behavior be characterized? The terms "bully" and "bullying" have been used recurrently by many in the region to describe China and its current maritime policy. But is it appropriate to label China as a bully? Before this question can be answered, it is necessary to examine the theory behind bullying behavior.

Chapter 3 – Bully Theory

Numerous East Asian nations have concluded that China is a bully in the region. In order to determine whether it is accurate to characterize China in such a way, it is first necessary to understand bully behavior itself. The purpose of this chapter is to explore bully theory as a pretext for better understanding China's recent behavior in the East and South China Seas. Sorting out the key characteristics of bully behavior, understanding how bullying occurs among individuals and groups, and identifying the typical consequences of bullying is helpful for assessing the extent to which China is bullying its neighbors and for understanding how China's behavior impacts its interests and the region in general.

What is Bullying?

Bullying is a worldwide phenomenon, and it has been suggested that it is a behavior rooted in human beings' biological and evolutionary impulses.¹⁰² It is a behavior that transcends cultures and political borders; one might encounter it anywhere. Definitions of bullying and descriptions of what constitutes bullying behavior have varied over the years. These definitions and descriptions continue to evolve as researchers endeavor to better understand the behavior. How bullying is defined and how it is perceived is often contextualized; definitions depend on the participants in a given situation and the types of specific behaviors that are in question.¹⁰³ History, time, and

location each contribute to the definition of bullying. Thus, generally speaking, bullying cannot be regarded in strictly black and white terms. There is rarely universal agreement about what bullying is or how it should be interpreted. What one *can* say with certitude is that attitudes toward violence and aggression are largely shared across cultures, and that the general consensus on such behavior is that it is socially destructive.¹⁰⁴

Literature on bullying contains certain themes that include: the intimidation of a relatively weak party, attempts to coerce that party, the intent of one party to exert power over another, the attempt to hide inadequacy, avoiding responsibility for behavior and its effects, and initiating action to induce fear, low self-confidence, and low self-esteem.¹⁰⁵ However, it appears it has not been easy to assign a specific definition to bullying behavior. Some experts bemoan the inadequacy of a number of existing definitions and point out that attempts to define bullying is a highly troubled process. To illustrate this point, consider this definition of bullying: “The willful, conscious desire to hurt another and put him/her under stress”.¹⁰⁶ Such definitions are incomplete, are slightly misleading, and therefore are insufficient for capturing what bully behavior entails. In this example, the assumption is that anybody who is intent on harming another is, by definition, a bully. Whether this is the case is questionable. Although disruptive, it is likely inappropriate to label a single, one-time harmful act “bullying”. Moreover, it is questionable whether a “willful, conscious desire to hurt” by itself is adequate for labeling one’s actions “bullying”. The mere *desire* to harm does not necessarily mean that harmful action is occurring. Rather, a willful desire to harm combined with a harmful *act* might be a more appropriate way to describe bullying.

What is generally accepted is that bullying involves obtaining, through force, that to which one has no right.¹⁰⁷ The common view also holds that bullying is behavior that injures repeatedly, over a span of time.¹⁰⁸ Likewise, the behavior can be blatant or subtle, and can cover a wide spectrum of behaviors and responses.¹⁰⁹ Bullying can come in the form of physical or psychological abuse, or a combination of the two. Bullies might use varying degrees of physical contact to intimidate a victim, or they might employ more subtle tactics such as name-calling and social isolation.

Subject matter experts have offered numerous definitions of bullying. These include:

1. Systematic abuse of power¹¹⁰
2. A willful, conscious desire to hurt another and put him/her under stress¹¹¹
3. Exposure, repeatedly over time to negate actions on the part of one or more other parties¹¹²
4. Longstanding violence, physical or psychological, conducted by an individual or a group against an individual who is not able to defend himself in the actual situation¹¹³
5. A special case of aggression which is social in nature¹¹⁴
6. Behavior which can be defined as the repeated attack – physical, psychological, social or verbal – by those in a position of power, which is formally or situationally defined on those who are powerless to resist, with the intention of causing distress for their own gain or gratification¹¹⁵
7. Repeated oppression, physical or psychological, of a less powerful individual by a more powerful individual¹¹⁶

The careful observer will note how certain themes (e.g. power, harm, repetition, coercion, and intimidation) recur throughout these definitions. At least one, and in some instances several of these themes can be traced to the individual definitions above.

Also crucial to understanding bully behavior is the element of relative power, or power differential. Researchers contend that bullying only occurs when an “imbalance of power” exists.¹¹⁷ In order for one to be bullied, the aggressor or group of aggressors must be more powerful than the party they are targeting.¹¹⁸ It is this power differential, or the uneven distribution of power, that contributes markedly to enabling the bully to engage in abusive action.¹¹⁹ Related to the concept of power differential is the absence of choice for the weaker party. If one party lacks the ability to negotiate or exercise any meaningful choice, an uneven distribution of power results.¹²⁰ This, in turn, tends to limit the options of the weaker party and, consequently, facilitates bullying.

Assigning a definition to bullying also requires accounting for another factor: how aggressive behavior is perceived by the target, or victim, of the behavior. Some scholars suggest that a sense of oppression is central to the concept of bullying. As such, it is imperative that one take in to account the perspective of the targeted party and whether that party actually interprets the behavior directed against it as oppressive.¹²¹ If behavior is not perceived by the target to be troublesome, perhaps it is inappropriate to define the behavior as “bullying”. At the same time, simply because a party considers itself to be a target of aggressive behavior does not necessarily mean this is so. Occasionally there are instances in which one party engages in behavior that is misinterpreted by another as aggressive. The targeted party’s sense of being oppressed is a necessary but not the sole determinant of whether bullying is occurring.¹²²

The foregoing discussion contributes to developing an understanding of what bullying is. However, none of the definitions listed above, or the additional aspects of bully behavior discussed thus far, succinctly capture what the behavior entails. Dennis Lines¹²³ attempts to capture the essence of bullying in one concise definition by combining other definitions and related components of bully behavior. He submits that bullying is “continual physical, psychological, social, verbal, or emotional methods of intimidation by an individual or group”. Such a definition appears to coincide with the definition provided by the American Psychological Association (APA), which describes bullying as: “a form of aggressive behavior in which someone intentionally and repeatedly causes another person injury or discomfort (and that) can take the form of physical contact, words, or more subtle actions”.¹²⁴ Drawing from each of the definitions provided thus far, the key characteristics of bullying can be summarized as follows:

Table 1: Characteristics of Bullying (derived from multiple sources)

Overall characterized by...	threats or the actual use of violence
Preconditions include...	a power imbalance between aggressor and victim
Aggressor desires...	to enhance power to inflict harm
Behavior is...	aggressive committed intentionally repetitive
Actions committed are...	harmful unprovoked unjustified
Consequences include...	aggressor derives a sense of gratification victim suffers a sense of oppression victim suffers adverse physical and/or psychological effects

The basic themes and characteristics of bullying having thus been identified, it becomes easier to consider bullying behavior in the context of state-to-state interactions. However, before examining such behavior at the international level, it is necessary to understand who bullies are, what the potential consequences of bullying are, and how bullying behavior can be confronted.

Who Becomes a Bully?

Critical to comprehending the essence of bullying behavior is understanding who the bullies themselves are. Who are the parties who engage in this destructive behavior, how do they tend to behave, and what motivates them to behave as they do?

Without question, a number of factors contribute to the development of a bully. Although researchers have identified a number of these factors, it is suggested that ultimately there is no way to pin down a definitive set of influences that contribute to the making of a bully. Under any definition of bullying, the causal factors for the behavior may be complicated and variable,¹²⁵ and most literature leans toward the notion that bullies are not simply born, but are created.¹²⁶ The environment in which one develops appears to be the overriding factor in determining whether an individual becomes a bully.

Some researchers have identified two types of bullies: reactive and proactive. Reactive bullies tend to see the world through a paranoid lens, feel constantly threatened, view accidental incidents as acts of provocation, and believe an aggressive response is justified whenever such perceived acts of provocation occur.¹²⁷ Proactive bullies tend to be more calculating about initiating harmful acts. They tend to behave in a non-emotional, controlled, deliberate manner, and are selective about their targets. Proactive

bullies act based on deriving a sense of enjoyment from coercing or dominating a victim as opposed to responding to some perceived external threat.¹²⁸


Bullies may engage in a variety of disruptive behaviors. Some rely on physical violence to impress their will on others. Such violence can be severe (e.g. beatings, kicking, choking) or less violent acts of intimidation (e.g. tripping and pushing). Some bullies may use verbal attacks as a method of intimidation; name calling, teasing, rumor spreading, threats of violence, and spreading false information about a victim for the purpose of embarrassing or hurting one's reputation are all tactics that might be employed. Additionally, bullying can entail socially isolating the victim and manipulating friendship relationships.¹²⁹

External circumstances can often impact how bullies behave. Many bullies start out as victims themselves, and learn that their best defense is to be aggressive.¹³⁰ Bullies tend to surround themselves with "friends" who look up to them. However, such friendships are rarely meaningful as those who associate with bullies tend to do so primarily for fear of being targeted themselves by the bully. Another trait common to bullies is that they have a dominant manner and cast blame on others for the unpleasant things that occur in their lives. There is widespread agreement that bullies dump "seething resentment, bitterness, hatred, and anger" onto others.¹³¹ Other experts have identified bullies as those who tend to embrace belief systems supportive of aggression and violence, and who suffer from feelings of depression, impulsivity, and a reduced sense of belonging.¹³² Having said this, it must be mentioned that while many psychologists believe that those who engage in bullying behavior do so as a result of low self-esteem, more recent research suggests that this might not be the case. Some bullies

tend to have very high self-esteem. Further, such individuals tend to have a sense of self-entitlement and superiority over others, lack compassion, lack an ability to control their impulses, and may have some difficulty with social skills that are positive or constructive in nature.¹³³ Far from being socially inadequate, and although bullying is clearly regarded as an anti-social, aggressive act, evidence suggests that bullies retain strong social skills. As such, it is perhaps most appropriate to describe bullies as manipulators with strong social skills.¹³⁴

Bullying has been described as a very durable behavioral style, largely because bullies get what they want, at least at first.¹³⁵ A review of the material examined thus far suggests that enhancing power is the ultimate aim a bully seeks to achieve, and that the bully is willing to inflict harm as a means to achieve this end. The bully commits aggressive acts, such as coercion, intimidation, and the threat or actual use of violence in order to achieve his goals. As his goals are achieved, the bully derives a sense of power. The process is ostensibly circular and self-reinforcing. Figure 4 shows how the cycle operates.

Figure 4: Bully Behavior Cycle



But what drives bullies to act as they do? The answer is that there are a number of possible motivators. A brief examination of these motivators is helpful for better understanding why bullies engage in bullying. Dennis Lines¹³⁶ lists a range of behaviors that have been associated with bullies. Bullies may display one or a combination of these behaviors.

1. *Heartless violence*: Characterized by a complete lack of remorse and feeling.

Individuals displaying this type of behavior lack anxiety, are utterly untroubled by events normally considered disturbing, and have the ability to kill in cold blood.

2. *Strategic bullying*: Characterized by a continual, systematic abuse of power.

Such abuse is not a single time, impulsive event, but a pre-planned and continual act of harassment in which the bully puts down a weaker subject, humiliates them, and torments them.

3. *Bullying for kicks*: Characterized by deriving pleasure from taking aggressive, hurtful action against others, whether such action is physical or psychological in nature.

4. *Bullying for approval*: Characterized by engaging in bullying as a means to increase one's popularity, to win self-approval (which is a trait hard-wired into the human system). Fulfills a desire to be recognized.

5. *Impulsive bullying*: Characterized by lashing out impulsively when annoyed, in a manner suggesting that one has a limited repertoire of responses for dealing with tension; acting without thinking, putting aside all other possible factors of causation (factors that might explain why someone engaged in behavior that the bully finds annoying).

6. *Reactive bullying*: Characterized by reflexive behavior which has no preconceived outcome other than one which is primarily defensive; behavior displayed when one has reached his/her tolerance threshold and reacts violently out of pent-up frustration.

This list illustrates that bullying behavior is clearly motivated by a desire to serve oneself at the expense of others. Given the selfish and harmful nature of such behavior, one might wonder what the consequences of bullying are and whether the behavior is sustainable.

Confronting Bullies

At the individual level, the presence of an authority figure is generally seen as the only effective way to address the imbalance of power between the bully and the victim.¹³⁷ It is questionable whether bullying can be halted in the absence of an authority who is willing to intervene and who has the power to dispense justice by applying sanctions to the bully. However, it is suggested that while an authority figure can prohibit bullying from occurring, a potential drawback to intervention by an authority is that such intervention might actually increase the bully's desire to continue bullying whenever the authority is absent. Further, the intervention of an authority figure might inadvertently endanger the victim. Bullies might perceive, rightly or wrongly, that the victim informed on them. Consequently, the bully might retaliate against the victim as soon as the authority is absent.¹³⁸ Moreover, in situations concerning a group of bullies acting in concert, intervention by an authority might have the unintended consequence of more strongly uniting the bullying group; as soon as the authority is no longer present, bullying will continue and may become more intense.¹³⁹

The concept of peer involvement has also been suggested as a mechanism for exerting authority and for preventing or even halting bullying.¹⁴⁰ With respect to childhood bullying, some schools have implemented programs in which peer groups are used to mitigate and discourage bullying behavior. In such programs, referred to as "bully courts", peers render judgment about the culpability of the bully or bullies, and recommend penalties for bullying behavior. Hence, the use of peer pressure can be an effective method of deterring and diminishing bullying behavior, though whether it is

ultimately as effective as intervention by someone in a position of authority remains less clear.

Certain experts recommend that if an authoritative body of some kind does exist, it is incumbent on the authority to communicate openly and directly with bullies about the importance of treating others fairly. Bullies should be made aware, in no uncertain terms, of the potential consequences of their behavior.¹⁴¹ The assumption is that bullies will curb their abusive behavior if they are aware that institutional monitoring and enforcement mechanisms are in place, and that bullying behavior will not be tolerated. Likewise, positive reinforcement is suggested as a means to mitigate bully behavior. Bullies might behave less disruptively if incentives are in place for good behavior.¹⁴²

A number of experts who have studied bullying in the workplace suggest that directly standing up to bullies is the most effective way to deal with them. Victims are encouraged to take command of the situation, to exercise confidence, to project courage, and to be proactive in dealing with bullies.¹⁴³ Naturally, however, effectively employing confrontational tactics can be hindered by the power differential that exists between bullies and their victims. As such, victims are advised to solicit help from outside sources such as friends, family, and coworkers. Victims also have the option of documenting the mistreatment they endure at the hands of their tormentors. It is recommended that whenever possible, those targeted with bullying should prepare a case against a bully citing evidence of mistreatment. Such evidence can then be formally presented to senior parties within the organization. If a victim feels the problem cannot be resolved internally, they always reserve the right to take the case to the public.¹⁴⁴

Victim Profile

While literature on bullying behavior naturally focuses on the characteristics, attitudes, and actions of the bully, it is well understood that no study of the behavior is complete without some level of consideration being given to the traits and actions of the victim. An awareness of who victims are and how victims respond to actions directed against them is essential for developing a thorough understanding of bullying behavior and its effects. Understanding the characteristics of victim behavior and appreciating the importance of victim perception is essential for analyzing any situation in which bullying behavior may be occurring.

To begin, much of the literature on bullying behavior reveals that many experts prefer to use the term “target” as opposed to “victim” in referring to someone who is subjected to bullying. Their rationale is that the term “victim” tends to imply helplessness and excludes the power of hopefulness, whereas “target” leaves room for the notion that those subjected to bullying can still be empowered to stop it.¹⁴⁵ For purposes of this study, the two terms will be used interchangeably.

A number of traits tend to define victims of bullying. Poor social skills is one such trait. These can include: appearing to be vulnerable (e.g. looking scared); being non-assertive (e.g. give-in too easily to the bully); having a tendency to act in a way that rewards, and thus reinforces, bullying behavior (e.g. cries when picked on); appearing to be withdrawn and solitary; and, occasionally being aggressive and annoying. Most victims do nothing actively to provoke their tormentors; their helplessness, or sense of helplessness, does it for them.¹⁴⁶ Victims often suffer from stress, adverse physical effects, poor performance at school or work, or may be fearful of going to school or work.

Likewise, friends may turn their backs on victims for fear of also being outcast or being targeted by the bully.¹⁴⁷ Occasionally, victims will pick on another person smaller and weaker than themselves, and target others for bullying just as they themselves have been targeted. In such cases, victims may vacillate between being a victim and being a bully.¹⁴⁸

Victims are generally lumped into two categories: *passive* and *provocative*. The victim's personality, passive or provocative, will affect the type of response one can expect to observe when the victim is confronted with aggressive, bullying behavior. Passive victims are generally submissive and respond to bullying behavior by seeking to assimilate rather than express any displeasure. They tend to be physically slight, unassertive, and too reticent to retaliate.¹⁴⁹ Confronting the bully is certainly not something a passive victim prefers to do. Provocative victims, on the other hand, are those who tend to react strongly, even aggressively to bullying behavior. Such individuals tend to be hot-tempered, highly emotional, and are likely to react hostilely when bullied. In some situations, they may lose complete control in responding to provocation from the perpetrator.¹⁵⁰ Whether victims are passive or provocative, they are generally ineffective in stopping bullying from occurring and often invite further bullying through their actions. If they do not retaliate, they inadvertently reward bullying behavior and risk exposing themselves to constant harassment.¹⁵¹ At the same time, if they overreact they risk receiving continued or even harsher treatment from their tormentors.

Given that bullying behavior necessarily implies the existence of a power imbalance, all victims are, by definition, weaker than those who bully them. Although

victims may choose not to respond at all to being bullied (passive response), or while they may choose to respond in a way that is counterproductive (provocative response), often victims will seek authority intervention to redress the imbalance of power between themselves and the bully.¹⁵² The type of outside assistance a victim seeks depends on the circumstances under which bullying occurs. At school, for example, redressing the imbalance of power may mean getting teachers, parents, siblings, or older students involved. At work, the victim may seek the involvement of management to address the issue. In other settings, victims sometimes choose to address the power imbalance and associated bullying behavior by seeking authority intervention from suitable tribunals or courts of law. Ultimately, an authority can put a stop to the bullying by applying sanctions, suspending, dismissing, or taking legal action against the bully.¹⁵³ In extreme cases, the authority might even choose to use physical, forcible measures to address the issue.

Finally, one must not overlook the importance of victim perception. As noted earlier, the definition of bullying depends largely on how aggressive behavior is perceived by the target of the behavior. Dr. Denise Salin¹⁵⁴ points out that when experts define bullying, the perpetrator's intent is typically not part of the definition. Instead, the subjective perception of the victim is stressed. In general, the emphasis has been on the target's own perceptions, as it can be assumed that many of the reported consequences of bullying, such as ill-health, reduced commitment, and decreased productivity, are strongly associated with the target's own evaluation of the situation.¹⁵⁵ Hence, whether bullying is occurring or not depends largely on how behavior directed at the victim is interpreted by the victim. If the victim perceives actions directed against it as unwelcome,

inappropriate, and/or oppressive, then it is generally accepted that bullying is occurring. If behavior directed at the target is not perceived by the target to be troublesome, then it is less certain whether bullying is actually occurring.

Overall, the victim's perspective contributes significantly to the definition of bullying behavior. However, it must be reiterated that simply because a party considers itself to be a target of aggressive behavior does not necessarily mean this is so. There may be instances in which one party engages in behavior that is misinterpreted by another as aggressive. Some experts acknowledge that the legitimate use of power to persuade is a matter of perception and position. Coercive action intended to be benevolent can be perceived as hostile and unwelcome, but such action, while interpreted as bullying by those subjected to it, remains strongly defended by those who initiate it.¹⁵⁶ Ultimately, the targeted party's sense of being oppressed and of being bullied is a *highly significant* and *necessary*, but not the *sole* determinant of whether bullying is occurring.

Benefits and Costs of Bullying

Can bullying be in any way beneficial? The answer appears to be yes, though only from the perspective of the bully. Simply put, a bully's coercive behavior permits him to achieve his goals. A bully is able to attain and exert dominance through his aggressive acts, and this can result in access to social resources such as the power to persuade, increased friendships, increased popularity, and at the individual level, increased mating opportunities.¹⁵⁷ Studies have shown that bullying is positively correlated with peer nominations of power, social prominence, perceived popularity, and peer leadership.¹⁵⁸ As such, bullying permits the bully to derive some degree of respect from those around him. To be sure, such respect results from harmful acts and is based

on fear rather than genuine admiration. But the bully benefits from this nonetheless. Consequently, so long as the bully remains unchallenged, it appears he has incentive to continue engaging in aggressive behavior, and the bully behavior cycle discussed earlier is set in full motion.

The question concerning the potential benefits of bullying has also been approached from an evolutionary angle. In considering the natural evolution of human beings, Volk, Camilleri, Dane, and Marini contend that bully behavior is often associated with positive outcomes for the bully in terms of growth and survival. In a competitive environment in which resources are scarce and survival is the overriding concern, bullying can be quite valuable.¹⁵⁹ In such circumstances, bullies are not only better able to acquire material resources, but they can acquire physical protection for themselves and their resources by building a tough reputation, increasing their position in a dominance hierarchy, and gaining allies.¹⁶⁰ It is suggested that this, in turn, may help prevent future conflicts and may minimize certain costs such as physical injuries or loss of tangible resources.¹⁶¹

However, while bullying may derive benefits for the bully, the consensus among researchers is that the behavior is by-and-large costly, and even destructive. Bullying behavior's destructive consequences are most evident in the impact it has on the victims. Those targeted by bullies often suffer from severe stress resulting from persistent fear of being harmed. Depression often results from repeated public shaming. Victims are made to feel inadequate and worthless.¹⁶² Researchers debunk the commonly held misconception that bullying can be good for victims in terms of "toughening them up". Rather, it has been concluded that bullying is abuse, and that the degree of pain the victim

experiences far outweighs any benefit derived.¹⁶³ In short, the adverse psychological impacts of bullying on the victim cannot be understated.

In addition to the costs imposed on the victims of bullying, bullying can be costly for the bully. Although bullies may derive benefits from their behavior in the short term, in the long term their behavior can be a severe liability. Perhaps most prominently, bullies can end up being outcast by society, and especially harmful acts might be met with severe judicial punishment. School age bullies, for example, are four times more likely as non-bullies to be convicted of crimes by early adulthood.¹⁶⁴ Moreover, since bullies exercise control over others through instilling a sense of fear, the interpersonal relationships bullies maintain with others are often insincere and hollow. Friends of bullies may be friends only inasmuch as they perceive their interests are advanced by associating with the bully, and only insofar as they seek to remain off the bully's target list. Over time, such associates may elect to avoid the bully altogether, resulting in social isolation of the bully. Likewise, bullying can have harmful consequences for the bully if the victim chooses to take revenge. Fried and Blanche refer to the "cycle of pain, rage, revenge",¹⁶⁵ in which a victim's pain can lead to an outburst of victim rage accompanied by devastating acts of revenge directed against the bully. In fact, Fried and Blanche submit that the enormous pain bullying can cause feeds a cycle that can transcend the level of the individual and can escalate into larger, even global-scale conflicts.¹⁶⁶

In sum, although bullying may offer some advantages for the bully in the short term, the overall consensus among experts is that the behavior is harmful for both the bully and the victim. A review of the impacts of bullying suggests that the behavior is

ultimately self-defeating and self-destructive. When bullies engage in aggressive, abusive, harmful actions against others, they necessarily harm themselves.

International Bullies and Victims

The foregoing sections establish the groundwork for exploring bullying behavior in the context of China's relations with its neighbors. However, before thoroughly examining this case, it is necessary to call attention to one important caveat. Existing literature on bullying focuses overwhelmingly on such behavior at the individual level. A great deal of research has been conducted on bullying among school-age children, and researchers have examined bullying among adults in the workplace. However, it appears that virtually no research has been conducted on bullying behavior at the international level. Admittedly, a case can be made that aggressive and harmful actions committed by one state against another has been adequately addressed in the volumes of international relations literature that has been published concerning state-state interactions. However, while history is replete with examples of powerful states strong-arming weaker ones in a manner that could certainly be interpreted as bullying, current literature simply does not discuss interstate interaction in the context of "bullying behavior".

Admittedly, caution must be exercised in attempting to draw linkages between two very different levels of study. Extrapolating from findings on bullying behavior at the individual level and applying the results to the international domain is no simple matter. It may seem a bit of a leap to draw conclusions about state behavior from observations made on the playground or at the workplace. Naturally, interactions between states are inherently more complex. The multitude of variables that impact

interstate relations complicates the process of drawing parallels between bullying at an individual level and bullying on a global scale. Nonetheless, an exploration of bullying behavior occurring at the person-to-person level is warranted as it provides an opportunity to identify the fundamental characteristics of bully behavior. Familiarity with these characteristics can certainly contribute in some respect to better understanding the causes and consequences of aggressive nation-state behavior.

With the aforementioned caveat in mind, it is possible to examine the research done at the individual level and apply it to state-state interactions. As one examines the findings on bully behavior at the individual level, it becomes apparent that states, too, can exhibit many of the characteristics of both bullies and victims. States that bully other states engage in behavior that is ultimately characterized by the threat or actual use of violence against another state. As with individuals, it can be expected that for bullying to occur, there must first be a power differential that invites the bullying; states that bully others are expectedly more powerful than those they target. Furthermore, as with individual bullies, states engaging in bully behavior do so in ways that are aggressive, their acts are intentional, and the acts are repetitive. Certainly the acts are harmful, though whether they are unwarranted and unjustified is a matter often open to debate as states that engage in aggressive behavior often justify their actions as a necessary response to an action committed by the target state. States might be perceived as bullies if they challenge the status quo and attempt to overturn long-established norms. Unlike individual bullies, who are motivated by a sense of power derived from their actions, the motives for bullying at the international level likely transcend a basic desire to enhance one's own power. Certainly states seek to enhance their power, and bullying other states

might be one way to achieve that objective. However, it seems unlikely that in today's world, a state would engage in bullying simply to inflate its national self-esteem. Rather than acting disruptively and seeking power for power's sake, it is more likely that other factors (e.g. territory, natural resources, rectifying a perceived historical injustice) motivate aggressive behavior.

One might also find parallels between bully *victims* at the individual level and victims at the state level. Certainly in both cases the targeted party experiences a sense of being oppressed. A targeted state will likely experience adverse psychological effects from being bullied, and it may also incur various forms of physical punishment from the bullying state. In either case, one can expect that bullied states will react negatively to the actions directed against them. Unlike individuals, who may choose not to take any action at all and simply endure their misfortune, bully victims at the state level will likely respond by publicly protesting against the bullying. Targeted states might even actively seek help from authoritative international institutions or other states to protect themselves from bullying states.

Examples of Bullying

Whether bullying occurs on the playground, in the workplace, or on the global political stage, the fundamental characteristics of bullying (as discussed earlier) will always be present. The following examples illustrate how bullying can occur at different levels of human interaction.

Bullying at School. Perhaps the most familiar form of bullying is bullying that occurs among children in a school setting. The practice of schoolyard bullies picking on their

weaker classmates is a phenomenon that transcends cultures. The case of the “bashful kid” or “different kid” being repeatedly teased and mocked by his peers is a story that most everyone can relate to. In such instances, one or a small number of aggressors play the role of bully, while children acting as passive bystanders reinforce the bullying behavior by providing an audience for the bullies’ malicious acts. Bullies may psychologically attack their victim by verbally abusing them, usually through name-calling, poking fun at the victim’s physical characteristics or mental abilities, etc. Abuse often elevates to the physical level. The use of force, from physically removing and stealing a victim’s possessions, to mussing the victim’s hair, to pushing and tripping, to tackling and pinning, are tactics that are often employed by the aggressors. The threat and use of violence, the intent to cause harm, the existing power imbalance between aggressor and victim, the enjoyment derived by the aggressors, and the often very apparent pain such actions cause the victim all capture the essence of bullying.

Bullying in the Workplace. Bullying among adults is perhaps most common in the workplace setting. Although bullying at the adult level differs from childhood bullying in terms of tactics used (i.e. bullying among adults tends to be less physical and is predominantly psychological in nature), the overarching characteristics of bullying are still quite apparent. Tim Field¹⁶⁷ provides examples of the boss who bullies his employees. Such a boss may engage in constant nit-picking, trivial fault-finding, and occasionally undermining an employee either publicly or in private by expressing doubts about his or her performance are certainly techniques for inflicting psychological harm. Bullying might also consist of a supervisor engaging in belittling, degrading, ridiculing, overruling, ignoring, marginalizing, ostracizing, or isolating an employee. A boss

engaging in bullying behavior might set unrealistic goals and deadlines, or may change expectations at a moment's notice in order to irritate an employee.¹⁶⁸

Victimization in the workplace has few bounds. Other tactics of workplace bullying include keeping the victim in the dark about important issues by denying information. An employee might be overloaded with work, or work might be taken away and have menial jobs assigned as a means of inflicting injury. In some instances a bully might steal a victim's work, thus denying the victim credit for his/her labors, or a victim might be denied requests for time off even in cases of illness or family emergencies. Such tactics might rightly be labeled "oppression by management".¹⁶⁹ In such instances, the classic characteristics of bullying are all clearly on display. The aggressor exercises power by repetitively inflicting harm on someone less powerful, unwarranted and unjust acts are committed, the aggressor derives a sense of gratification, and the victim derives a sense of being oppressed.

Bullying on a Global Scale. Examples abound of states bullying other states, and of states being bullied by non-state actors. One example of the former is the 1982 incident between Britain and Argentina over the Falkland Islands---an incident that resulted in a brief war between the two countries. Although the citizens of the islands had been under British protection and administrative control since the early nineteenth century, a dispute raged over who should claim rightful ownership of the islands. In an attempt to wrestle control of the islands from Britain, the Argentine military dictatorship dispatched troops to overrun the islands' meager British garrison.¹⁷⁰ Such action was taken in spite of a warning provided by the Peruvian Ambassador to Argentine naval commanders that, "Margaret Thatcher won't let herself be bullied by a military government".¹⁷¹ Indeed

Prime Minister Thatcher's swift and harsh response, in which an Argentine naval cruiser was sunk and British Marines recaptured the islands in an amphibious assault, indicated that Britain would not tolerate what it considered unjustified and aggressive actions taken by the Argentine government. The Falklands have remained under British control since the war's conclusion, but even today tensions between the two countries remain high over the islands issue. As recently as 2011, the Argentine foreign minister labeled Britain "bully boy thugs",¹⁷² and in 2012 Falkland Islands administrators reciprocated by denouncing Argentina's renewed "bullying" tactics by resurrecting the issue of sovereignty.¹⁷³ Each side accuses the other of bullying and justifies their claims, in part, by raising the issue of power disparity. Argentina accuses the more economically and militarily powerful Britain of bullying Argentina, while Britain accuses Argentina of bullying a tiny, weak island neighbor. Although the issue is certainly more complex than a case of bullying on the playground or at the workplace, the key characteristics of bullying are nonetheless present. Threats of violence, aggressive behavior, a power imbalance, and a sense of being oppressed and victimized are all evident in this case.

While the Falklands incident provides an example of states engaging in bullying behavior, not all cases of bullying on a global scale occur uniquely between states. One need simply turn to the terrorism conflict between the United States and al Qaeda as an example of bullying behavior between states and non-state actors. This case is similar to the Falkland Islands incident in that both sides claim to be victimized by the actions of the other. The American perspective is that the U.S. has become the target of unwarranted and repeated harmful acts at the hands of al Qaeda terrorists, and that this must stop. Likewise, al Qaeda laments that Muslims have long been victimized and

humiliated by U.S. policy in the Middle East.¹⁷⁴ Each side claims that the other is the bully. Moreover, assigning the roles of “bully” and “victim” is complicated by the fact that a chief bullying characteristic (the “power imbalance” between the aggressor and victim) is not as clear-cut in this instance. Clearly the U.S. is a very powerful state, and one might wonder how it could ever be considered a victim. But al Qaeda’s ability to attack the US with devastating impact using asymmetric methods means that the “power imbalance” is not as apparent as it might first seem. What is certain is that in spite of the more complex nature of the interaction between the U.S. and al Qaeda, the characteristics of bullying are still very much present. Threats and the actual use of violence is prevalent on both sides, as is the intent to inflict harm. Actions are repetitive, and both sides view the others’ actions as unwarranted and unjust. Likewise, both sides experience adverse physical and psychological effects from the other’s actions.

Summary

The foregoing examples illustrate how bullying behavior can occur at various levels of human interaction. The examples reveal how bullying behavior is characterized by both objective and subjective features. To reiterate, bullying’s objective features include: a power imbalance between the perpetrator and victim; a desire on the part of the perpetrator to enhance power and inflict harm; the action is committed intentionally, is unprovoked, and is repetitive; and, the perpetrator derives a sense of fulfillment from his actions. But bullying behavior is also characterized by the subjective feature of victim perception. How perpetrators’ actions are interpreted by victims is a crucial component in determining whether bullying behavior is occurring. With this in mind, it is possible to

more adequately examine the specific case of territorial disputes involving China and a number of its maritime neighbors.

Chapter 4 – Methodology

The purpose of this chapter is to describe the data and present the methodological approach used to analyze China's recent conduct in the East and South China Seas, to establish whether and to what degree China has engaged in bullying its maritime neighbors, and to delineate the consequences of Chinese behavior in the region. Two forms of data gathering were used to conduct the analysis. The first involved individual conflict events related to disputed maritime territory occurring between China and its neighbors from January 2009 to April 2013. The second set of data consisted of the content of media reports related to the maritime disputes, and identifying trends in reporting on the disputes in China and in other claimant states.

An analysis of conflict events between China and its maritime neighbors is designed to identify evidence of Chinese attempts to intimidate or coerce its neighbors through the use of harsh and/or inappropriate tactics. Evidence of actions to induce fear, to obtain through force that to which China has no conceivable right, to apply physical and/or psychological measures to pressure neighboring states, and to do so in a way that is repetitive and injurious to its neighbors would all be indicative of bullying on China's part. On the other hand, the absence of such behavior would suggest that bullying is not occurring. Even more so, conflict event analysis is designed to examine how perceived victims respond to Chinese actions, as this is a critical part of determining whether bullying is occurring. Noting how China's neighbors perceive the actions directed

against them and observing how they have reacted is essential for analyzing the nature of Chinese behavior in the region. If it is noted that China's neighbors perceive the actions taken against them as unfair, unjust, and harmful, then this would suggest the presence of bullying behavior. If, however, China's neighbors do not express displeasure either through words or actions, this would suggest that bullying might not be taking place.

Analyzing the content of Chinese media reports, as well as the content of media reports from neighboring states, is also useful for determining whether China has engaged in bullying behavior. Here too, a window is provided offering a perspective on the nature of Chinese actions as well as reactions from China's neighbors. Media content and trends in reporting originating from China can be examined for evidence of bullying which may include: the presence of intimidation and coercion tactics; possible bids by country leaders to avoid responsibility, hide inadequacy, and blame others for unfavorable outcomes; attempts by leaders to justify otherwise unjustifiable actions; attempts to apply psychological pressure on others; and, sustained, deliberate, and injurious actions directed at weaker parties. Additionally, the content of media reports might offer some insight into the larger ramifications of Chinese conduct. Likewise, analyzing the content of media reports and noting trends in reporting from media outlets located in neighboring states may shed light on the victim perspective. Unfavorable responses on the part of China's neighbors would intimate the presence of bullying behavior, whereas fewer unfavorable reactions may suggest that bullying has not occurred. Moreover, noting how China's neighbors are reacting in their media may provide a foundation for interpreting the more far-reaching consequences of China's actions.

Taken together, the two-tiered data collection and analysis seeks to provide an accurate and, to the extent possible, objective assessment about the character and consequences of Chinese behavior. Ultimately, data gathered from the prescribed methodology will be analyzed in the context of bully theory, China's contemporary foreign policy, and theory on the behavior of aspiring powers to determine whether China has engaged in bullying and to explore the possible implications of China's conduct.

Conflict Event Data


The first method used to assess Chinese conduct in the East and South China Seas consisted of conflict event analysis. The primary purpose of this methodological approach was to identify evidence of bully and victim behavior in China's interaction with its neighbors. Specifically, the approach was designed to capture evidence of state confrontation, of threats or the actual use of violence, of repetitive, harmful actions intentionally committed, and of victim behavior to include a perceived sense of injustice and oppression. Overall, the approach was designed to help characterize the nature of China's behavior in the region. The approach was also used to unearth any information that might help interpret the broader impacts of China's policy in the region. The nature of the interaction between China and its neighbors may provide clues about the future state of affairs in East Asia.

For analytical purposes, a "conflict event" is defined as an incident in which China and at least one other state enter into dispute over maritime territory. The specific behavior ranges from physical violence and the use of force, to diplomatic maneuvering, to the introduction of policies resulting in friction between China and other nations.

Clashes at sea, incidents resulting in a harsh exchange of rhetoric between China and other nations, and implementation of policies that lead to public outcries and diplomatic protests are some examples of such incidents. Conflict event data were gathered from various news agencies' internet websites and from organizations devoted to tracking developments in Asia's disputed maritime zones. For example, the *Center for a New American Security* regularly posts information related to territorial disputes in East Asia's maritime regions and was particularly helpful for identifying specific conflict events involving China and neighboring nations. I selected January 1, 2009 as the starting point for my analysis since, as we have already seen, it was approximately at this point that an apparent shift occurred in Chinese foreign policy away from its historical, non-confrontational approach toward a deliberately more assertive approach. I included conflict events occurring through the end of March 2013, which appeared to be a logical termination point for the analysis given that China underwent a transition of national leadership during that month.

Conflict event data include incidents between China and East Asian nations that share a body of water: Brunei, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, the Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan, and Vietnam. Overall, I pinpointed a total of 27 conflict events that were significant based on the notable levels of media attention they generated, an appreciable degree of controversy involved, and discernible consequences of the incidents. I analyzed each of these events in terms of who initiated the action, the nature of the action taken by the initiator, the intended target of the action, and the target's reaction (the immediate effects of the initial action). My analysis is illustrated by the basic process model depicted in Figure 5 below.

Figure 5 – Process Tracing to Analyze Conflict Events



Admittedly, for every event analyzed, both parties to the conflict blame the other for having initiated the dispute. For example, China often cites its historical ties to the South China Sea, and blames the Philippines and Vietnam for initiating conflicts by engaging in activities there and failing to recognize China’s historical claims. As such, identifying the “initiator” of any given conflict event relies to some extent on subjective decision-making. However, in order to remain as objective as possible, I based my determination of who initiated each conflict event not on historical claims, but on recent developments that appeared to be outside the norm of usual events. Atypical action was generally considered an indicator of initiation. An example of atypical action would include a scenario in which a nation operating its vessels without incident for some time in a specific part of the South China Sea is suddenly ordered by another nation to halt its activities and withdraw its vessels. In this case, the order to withdraw would be considered outside the norm of usual events, and the nation giving this order would be considered the initiator.

After identifying both the initiators and apparent targets of each conflict event, specific attention was paid to target country reactions. In order to maximize objectivity in analyzing the data, I chose to focus as much as possible on official government reactions as opposed to more general, public reactions as reported in the media. Targeted country reactions, elicited from the initiator's original actions, were identified by conducting thorough online searches of official government websites as well as websites of reputable media organizations. For each event, at least two sources listed the event, and in some instances as many as six sources listed the event. For example, nations' foreign ministry websites and government web portals often provided original source, official government reactions to specific events. Media outlets also occasionally ran reports in which official government responses were provided. Official government reactions consisted of written statements, comments made by high ranking officials or spokespersons during press briefings, and transcripts of speeches given by government leaders. By examining official government reactions, it was possible to gain insight into the victim's perspective of each conflict event. This, in turn, proved valuable for characterizing the nature of the initiator's behavior. Specifically, it proved useful for determining whether the initiator's behavior can accurately be characterized as bullying. Further, official government reactions provided clues about the broader implications of the initiator's actions. Tying specific target reactions to distinct follow-on effects proved difficult. However, taken in sum, the targets' reactions provide a basis for interpreting events that occur after each original conflict event. As such, the analysis permits one to draw linkages between initiator actions, targets' immediate reactions, and events occurring some time later.

Media Content and Trend Analysis

In addition to analyzing individual conflict events to assess China's behavior and its effects, I conducted a review of media reports to identify how the maritime claims issue has been addressed in the media of various claimant states. Specifically, I investigated the extent to which maritime territorial disputes between China and its neighbors have received media attention in all countries directly involved in the disputes. In addition, I examined the content of individual media reports, noting the tone with which the issue was addressed in each report. The purpose here was to determine whether the number and content of media reports regarding maritime claims issues reveals any evidence of bullying behavior committed by China. The presumption was that a review of media content and trends would, at a minimum, offer insight into the victim perspective. Additionally, and perhaps more importantly, media content analysis might provide insight about the broader implications of China's maritime policy in East Asia; this methodological approach could be useful for interpreting how Chinese policy in the region impacts the future for China as well as for the entire region.

My examination includes surveying the content of reports from select news services in Brunei, China, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, the Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan, and Vietnam. Analysis was conducted by accessing the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) Open Source Center media database, which offers a collection of news reports produced by media outlets from around the world, translated into English. My method of analysis included selecting one of the most prominent print media sources from each country, and recording the extent of coverage these sources dedicated to the disputed claims issue. The selected news sources for each country were as follows:

Brunei (The Brunei Times), China (Xinhua), Indonesia (Kompas), Japan, (Asahi Shimbun), Malaysia (The Star), the Philippines (Philippine Star), South Korea (Chosun Ilbo), Taiwan (Taipei Times), and Vietnam (Vietnam News Agency). These sources were selected based on their high in-country level of readership and popularity ranking.¹⁷⁵

I chose to limit my searches to a single prominent print media source for each country as opposed to searching all possible media sources within that country (i.e. other print publications, television, radio, and internet sources) for two reasons. First, the sheer number of media reports provided when searching across all possible media sources would have made examining them all a daunting task for a single researcher. In some cases, my search using a *single* media source for each country produced well over several hundred search results. Sifting through each of these media reports to determine whether they were relevant proved to be a rather laborious task. Second, if I had searched more than a single media source for each country, I might have encountered repetition of original reporting. For example, a topic originally reported in one print publication might very likely have been picked up by another print publication, or by television, radio, and internet media outlets. Thus, I would have risked counting unoriginal reports, thereby skewing the results of the analysis.

The Open Source Center's media database permits a researcher to conduct advanced searches on specific topics of interest. The database allows users to select a specific country, time frame, media source, and key words or phrases. Table 2 shows the specific search parameters I used for individual countries.

Table 2: Search parameters for identifying media reports

Country	Source	Dates	Key Words/Terms
Brunei	“Brunei Times”	1/1/92 – 12/31/12	“south china sea”
China	“Xinhua”	1/1/92 – 12/31/12	“south china sea” or “east china sea” or “diaoyu” or “senkaku”
Indonesia	“Kompas”	1/1/92 – 12/31/12	“south china sea” or “spratly” or “dispute”
Japan	“Asahi”	1/1/92 – 12/31/12	“east china sea” or “senkaku”
Malaysia	“Star”	1/1/92 – 12/31/12	“south china sea” or “spratly” or “paracel” and “china”
Philippines	“Philstar”	1/1/92 – 12/31/12	“south china sea”
South Korea	“Chosun”	1/1/92 – 12/31/12	“yellow sea” or “east china sea” and “china”
Taiwan	“Taipei Times”	1/1/92 – 12/31/12	“south china sea” or “east china sea”
Vietnam	“Vietnam News”	1/1/92 – 12/31/12	“south china sea”

As Table 2 indicates, I originally set the timeframe for each search as January 1, 1992 to December 31, 2012. This timeframe was selected since it provides a sufficient period of time over which media trends can be tracked and any significant changes in trends can be noted. (Note: Unlike the conflict event analysis portion of the research, I did not include the first few months of 2013 for the media content and trend analysis portion of the research. Since tracking trends on an annual basis requires a full-year’s worth of data, it would have been inappropriate to include media data for a mere portion of 2013.) After conducting an initial search for each country, I combed through the results to ensure that only relevant reports would be included in the analysis. For

example, if the search for Japanese media reports returned an article that mentioned the East China Sea in a context completely unrelated to China and the maritime disputes, I discarded the report. Those articles addressing the disputes *and* China's role in them were counted as relevant. For example, articles addressing the following topics were counted as relevant: alleged sovereignty violations, continental shelf disputes, government pronouncements related to the disputes, jurisdictional claims, ship and airborne patrols of disputed areas, natural resource surveying, suggested methods of cooperating to resolve the disputes, actions taken to stake claims or build a legal basis for making claims, etc. In this manner, I created lists of relevant media reports for each country, and I noted the number of reports published for each year through 2012.

After generating lists for each country and recording the overall number of reports, I reviewed the content of each report. For articles generated in countries other than China, I noted whether the reports depicted China in a negative context, or whether the tone expressed regarding Chinese policy was more cautious or benign. For reports derived from within China, I noted whether each report expressed displeasure with the actions of neighboring nations, or whether the sentiments expressed were more moderate. For each country analyzed, I noted the percentage of "negative" (i.e. critical, disapproving, or accusatory) media reports. Conclusions about China's behavior and the consequences of its behavior were then based on the number and content of these negative media reports.

Summary

Conflict event analysis and media content and trend analysis help to characterize China's recent behavior in the context of bully theory. Moreover, this dual methodology

helps identify potential consequences of China's policy. To reiterate, the primary purpose of conflict event analysis is to illustrate how nations in the region have conducted themselves and how they have responded to each other's actions. The purpose of examining the content of media reports and noting trends in reporting is to determine whether such information might be useful for characterizing China's behavior (i.e. to determine whether there is evidence of China bullying its neighbors), and to discover what the broader implications of China's policy might be (i.e. how that policy affects China as well as the entire region).

Chapter 5 – Analysis

The purpose of this chapter is to present the overall findings of the research in order to accurately characterize Chinese behavior and to identify its consequences. The chapter begins by introducing the 27 recent conflict events occurring in the East and South China Seas that are significant for determining whether China has bullied its neighbors. Each event was dissected into four key components: the event initiator, the action taken by the initiator, the targeted party, and the targeted party's reaction. The events were then analyzed for evidence of bullying behavior. Following the analysis and discussion of these 27 conflict events, findings are presented from the media content and trend analysis portion of the research. Observations made during this phase of the research were analyzed to uncover evidence of bullying behavior and to identify possible consequences of such behavior.

Conflict Event Analysis

An analysis of conflict events was informative in terms of identifying specific instances in which China initiated action against other countries. Ultimately, I identified China as the initiator in 25 of the 27 conflict events observed. Although China would in each case consider its actions to be justified *responses* to the actions of other nations, and

while recent flare-ups stem from disputes that admittedly have been ongoing for some time, I concluded that China was the initiator in 25 of the observed instances given that no recent, discernible action was taken by the other parties to provoke China. Table 3, beginning on the next page, depicts a summarized version of the data gathered for each event.

Table 3 – Significant Maritime Incidents in the East and South China Seas (January 1, 2009 – March 31, 2013)

Date	Initiator	Action	Target(s)	Target Reaction	Sources
Apr 22, 2010	China	Conducts anti-submarine warfare exercise near Japan; 8 destroyers, 2 submarines transit through Miyako Strait; Helicopter flies close to Japanese Coast Guard vessel	Japan	Lodges formal diplomatic protest; Defense Minister expresses displeasure that Japan wasn't notified in advance of passage of such a large naval contingent	Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Asia Times
May 3, 2010	China	Warns Japanese Coast Guard vessel against conducting survey	Japan	Lodges formal diplomatic protest	Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs
May-July 2010	China	Seizes several Indonesian fishing vessels using armed Fisheries Management vessels; Accuses Indonesian vessels of illegal fishing	Indonesia	Confronts Chinese vessels; No official government reaction; Media criticizes China	Jakarta Post
Sept 7, 2010	China	Accuses Japan of violating Chinese sovereignty after Chinese fishing vessel and Japanese Coast Guard vessel collide; Lodges diplomatic protest; Threatens to withhold shipments of rare earth metals to Japan; Demands apology and compensation from Japan	Japan	Arrests Chinese fishing crew; Charges captain with criminal act; Releases captain after two weeks; Issues statement dismissing China's demand for an apology as "completely groundless and utterly unacceptable"	Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mar 3, 2011	China	Orders Philippine survey vessel near Reed Bank (Spratly Islands) to cease activities	Philippines	Lodges formal diplomatic protest; Sends Coast Guard vessels to protect survey ship; Commander of Philippine Western Command states, "It's clearly our territory. If they bully us, well even children will fight back."	Philippines Official Gazette: Office of the President, The Jamestown Foundation

Date	Initiator	Action	Target(s)	Target Reaction	Sources
Mar 7, 2011	China	Flies helicopter near Japanese destroyer near natural gas field where China and Japan claim exploration rights	Japan	Calls incident "an extremely dangerous act" and notes government is working through diplomatic channels	Japan Ministry of Defense
May 21, 2011	China	Unloads building supplies near Likas and Patag islands on contested Iroquois Reef	Philippines	No official government reaction; Media criticizes China	Philippine Star
May 26, 2011	China	Severs exploration cables of Vietnamese vessel conducting seismic survey	Vietnam	Lodges formal diplomatic protest	Vietnam Ministry of Foreign Affairs
June 9, 2011	China	Severs exploration cables of Vietnamese seismic survey vessel	Vietnam	Lodges formal diplomatic protest; Accuses China of "premeditated and carefully calculated attack"; Announces live fire ammunition drills off coast of Quant Nam Province on June 10, 2011	Vietnam Ministry of Foreign Affairs, BBC
Aug 21, 2011	China	Patrol boats enters 12 nautical mile zone around Senkaku Islands	Japan	Lodges formal diplomatic protest; Refuses to recognize navigation of Chinese vessels as innocent passage	Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Feb 19, 2012	China	Warns two Japanese Coast Guard vessels conducting activities in international waters to leave the area	Japan	Lodges diplomatic protest; Argues Coast Guard activity was legal; Calls Chinese action "unacceptable"	BBC
Feb 22, 2012	China	Denies Vietnam fishing vessel right to land while seeking refuge from storm approaching Parcel Islands	Vietnam	Lodges official protest; Foreign Ministry spokesman says Chinese action "seriously infringed" on Vietnam's sovereignty and "gravely threatened lives and property"	Vietnam Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Date	Initiator	Action	Target(s)	Target Reaction	Sources
Mar 2, 2012	Japan	Names 39 uninhabited islands near Senkaku / Diaoyu Islands	China	Criticizes Japan's "unilateral", "illegal" and "invalid" action; Foreign Ministry issues statement maintaining Diaoyu Islands belong to China; Issues own names and descriptions of 70 islands near Diaoyu / Senkaku Islands	Xinhua, Agence France Presse
Mar 23, 2012	China	Detains 2 Vietnamese fishing vessels and 21 Vietnamese fishermen near Parcel Islands	Vietnam	Asks China to immediately and unconditionally release all fishermen; Lodges official diplomatic protest	Vietnam Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Apr 10, 2012	China	Sends 8 fishing vessels to disputed Scarborough Shoal; Sends surveillance ships and warns Philippine Navy to leave the area	Philippines	Deploys largest warship to Scarborough Shoal; Searches Chinese vessels, finds illegal catches; Accuses China of serious violation of Philippines sovereignty and maritime jurisdiction; Presents official position on Scarborough Shoal and associated waters	Philippines Official Gazette: Office of the President
Apr 19, 2012	China	Implements "national plan of island protection" in South China Sea to "strengthen protection and rationalize exploration of China's island resources"; Promotes establishing tourism on uninhabited islands	Vietnam	Submits strongly worded statement; Says plan violates Vietnamese sovereignty; Urges China to scrap plan	Vietnam Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Date	Initiator	Action	Target(s)	Target Reaction	Sources
June 21, 2012	China	Unilaterally raises administrative status of Xisha, Zhongsha, and Nansha islands from county level to prefectural level; Permits city of Sansha to administer the three island groups and their surrounding waters; Announces plan to establish military presence at Sansha	Philippines, Vietnam	Philippines: President rebukes China's move in State of the Union address on July 23, 2012; States, "If someone entered your backyard and told you he owned it, would you agree? Would it be right to give away that which is rightfully ours?" Vietnam: Sends note of protest to Chinese Foreign Ministry; Calls development a violation of Vietnamese sovereignty and "strongly opposes" establishment of Sansha City.	Philippines Official Gazette: Office of the President, Vietnam Ministry of Foreign Affairs
July 13, 2012	China	Pressures Cambodia at ASEAN summit to keep Code of Conduct and territorial issues off the table; Insists settling territorial disputes is a bilateral matter between individual nations	Philippines, Vietnam	Philippines: Issues statement deploring ASEAN non-issuance of joint communique Vietnam: Issues statement expressing regret over failure to issue joint communique United States: Issues statement criticizing China's "divide and conquer" strategy	Philippines Department of Foreign Affairs, Vietnam Ministry of Foreign Affairs, U.S. State Department

Date	Initiator	Action	Target(s)	Target Reaction	Sources
Sept 11, 2012	Japan	Purchases Senkaku / Diaoyu Islands from private Japanese owner	China	Issues official statement saying China will not be "subject to bullying and humiliation from others"; States it will not back down on territorial issues following nationalization of the islands; States, "The Chinese government will not sit idly by watching its territorial sovereignty being infringed upon."	Chinese Government Official Web Portal
Nov 1, 2012	China	Issues new passports with a map depicting the entirety of the South China Sea belonging to China	Philippines, Vietnam	Philippines: Refuses to stamp new passports; Stamps a separately issued visa; Reasserts position that 9-dash line is inconsistent with international law Vietnam: Issues diplomatic protest; Says action violates Vietnamese sovereignty; Refuses to stamp to new passport, stamps separately issued visa	Philippines Department of Foreign Affairs, Vietnam Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Nov 28, 2012	China	Extends authority to Hainan province police to search, board "territory violating" vessels	Philippines, Vietnam	Philippines: Releases statement, calls action "gross violation" of international law; Says new law deserves international condemnation Vietnam: Issues diplomatic protest; Says action violates Vietnamese sovereignty	Philippines Government Archives: Department of Foreign Affairs, Vietnam Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Date	Initiator	Action	Target(s)	Target Reaction	Sources
Nov 30, 2012	China	Severs seismic survey cables of Vietnamese ship near Con Co Island (same ship that had cables cut in May 2011)	Vietnam	Lodges diplomatic protest; Urges all countries to abide by the U.N. Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)	Vietnam Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Dec 13, 2012	China	Flies maritime surveillance aircraft near Senkaku Islands into Japanese airspace; Four State Oceanic vessels enter Japanese territorial waters on same day; Two additional incidents occur (Dec 22, 24) in which Chinese aircraft fly within Japan's Air Defense Identification Zone, though not into Japanese airspace	Japan	Scrambles F-15 fighter jets on each occasion; Lodges formal diplomatic protest	Japan Ministry of Defense
Jan 12, 2013	China	Flies maritime surveillance aircraft near Senkaku Islands into Japanese airspace; Three additional incidents occur in Jan 2013	Japan	Scrambles F-15 fighter jets on each occasion; Considers authorizing Air Force to fire warning shots at Chinese planes entering Japanese airspace	Japan Ministry of Defense
Jan 19, 2013	China	Directs fire control radar (used for weapons targeting) at Japanese Maritime Self Defense Forces helicopter	Japan	Lodges diplomatic protest; Ministry of Foreign Affairs says China not in line with the facts of the matter; Advocates Maritime Communication Mechanism between Japan and China defense authorities	Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan Ministry of Defense

Date	Initiator	Action	Target(s)	Target Reaction	Sources
Jan 30, 2013	China	Directs fire control radar at Japanese Maritime Self Defense Forces destroyer	Japan	Lodges diplomatic protest; Ministry of Foreign Affairs says China not in line with the facts of the matter; Advocates Maritime Communication Mechanism between Japan and China defense authorities	Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan Ministry of Defense
Mar 13, 2013	China	Chases two Vietnamese fishing vessels from disputed waters near Parcel Islands	Vietnam	Publicly affirms Vietnam's sovereignty over islands; States Vietnam is resolutely opposed to any infringement on its sovereignty	Vietnam Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Sources: Agence France Presse, Asia Times, BBC, Chinese Government Official Web Portal, Jakarta Post, Jamestown Foundation, Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan Ministry of Defense, Philippine Star, Philippines Department of Foreign Affairs, Philippines Government Archives: Department of Foreign Affairs, Philippines Official Gazette: Office of the President, Philippines Official Gazette: Department of Foreign Affairs, U.S. State Department, Vietnam Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Xinhua.

A review of the 27 events listed in Table 3 reveals numerous items of interest. First, it is important to note that the number of conflict events occurring between China and its neighbors has progressively increased over the past several years. A total of four significant conflict events occurred in 2010, followed by six in 2011. But in 2012 alone, the region saw thirteen such events, and in the first three months of 2013, four events occurred. It is apparent that the trend in the occurrence of conflict events is increasing.

Second, it is worth noting that a majority of conflict events resulted in highly unfavorable official government reactions. In 24 of the 27 cases, governments of targeted nations issued diplomatic protests or strongly worded statements. Given that a majority of the 27 conflict events were initiated by China, the high number of negative official responses underscores how seriously and unfavorably nations have reacted to China's recent actions.

Additionally, analysis clearly indicates that Chinese actions are primarily directed at three nations: Japan, Vietnam, and the Philippines. Although China's history with Japan has undoubtedly been contentious, what is surprising is the degree to which China has recently been challenging Japan over claims in the East China Sea. Between 2000 and 2009, only eight documented conflict events occurred between the two countries. From 2009 to 2013, however, Japan has been the target of Chinese action on at least ten occasions, of which four have occurred in the past year alone. Also surprising, perhaps, is the frequency of recent conflict events occurring between China and Vietnam, and between China and the Philippines. China has taken action against Vietnam on eleven occasions since 2009, and against the Philippines on seven occasions during the same period. It appears that action taken against China's other maritime neighbors has been

negligible overall. Research uncovered no instances of conflict between China and Malaysia or Brunei, although these nations do have competing territorial claims with China in the South China Sea. China and Taiwan have not had any public disputes over territory in the past several years, presumably attributable to the two parties' attempts to build a more congenial relationship. One notable incident with Indonesia occurred in early summer 2010, during which armed Chinese Fisheries Management vessels escorting Chinese fishing boats near Indonesian waters seized several Indonesian fishing vessels accused of "illegal fishing". Interestingly, in this instance China appears to have initiated conflict with a nation that has no directly overlapping claims with China.

Analysis also indicates that a majority of conflict events took place at the tactical level (between lower echelon military units, ships belonging to government civilian maritime enforcement agencies, and/or civilian fishing and survey vessels). Twenty of the 27 events involved the use of aircraft and/or ships on the seas. The other seven events occurred at the strategic level, involving decisions made at the highest levels of government. Notably, all seven of these strategic level events have occurred in the past year alone. The Japanese government's decision to name uninhabited islands and to nationalize the Senkaku / Diaoyu Islands are two of these events. In both instances, it was determined that Japan was the initiator. The other five strategic-level conflict events were initiated by the Chinese government. China's implementation of a national plan of island protection in the South China Sea, its unilateral decision to raise the administrative status of Sansha prefecture in the South China Sea, its alleged role in preventing the signing of a joint communiqué at ASEAN's 45th regional summit, its decision to issue passports with maps depicting China's claims to territory in the South China Sea, and its

granting of authority to Hainan Province police to search and board vessels determined to be violating Chinese territory all took place between April and December of 2012.

Clearly the trend in conflict events occurring at the strategic level is upward.

Moreover, analysis indicates that conflict events involving the use of military assets are occurring more frequently. Whereas in the past China and its neighbors have primarily relied on civilian assets to address the disputes, in the past year alone (March 2012 to March 2013), there have been five instances in which nations used military assets to initiate or respond to provocative action. These include the Philippines use of its largest naval vessel to respond to the standoff at Scarborough Shoal, Japan's responding to Chinese reconnaissance flights by sending F-15 fighter jets to intercept Chinese aircraft, and China's use of ship-borne target tracking radar against Japanese naval and air assets. This recent, deliberate use of tactical military hardware contrasts with just one prior event involving the use of such forces, which occurred in 2010 when China conducted an unannounced anti-submarine warfare exercise near Japanese waters.

As mentioned earlier, two events were identified in which China appeared not to be the initiator, and in which China was apparently targeted by the action. These events include the March 2012 incident in which Japan named 39 uninhabited islands in contested waters near the Senkaku / Diaoyu Islands, and the September 2012 incident in which the Japanese government purchased the Senkaku / Diaoyu Islands from their private Japanese owner. In both cases Japan argues that the islands have historically belonged to Japan, and that the actions taken were legitimate. Additionally, Japan argues that its actions were taken in response to China boosting the number of its maritime patrols in the region. In any event, because Japan took these actions in contested waters

during a period of heightened tensions, and because the actions were out of the ordinary, it seemed appropriate to identify Japan as the initiator in these instances.

Evidence of Bullying Behavior

What do the findings of the conflict event analysis suggest about China bullying its maritime neighbors? Before answering this question, it is worth briefly reviewing what we know about bullying behavior. First, we have seen that in order for bullying behavior to occur, a power imbalance of some kind must exist between the aggressor and the victim. Additionally, we know that bullying entails threats or the actual use of violence, and that the aggressor desires to enhance power and inflict harm. We have also learned that bullying behavior is aggressive, repetitive, committed intentionally, includes acts of coercion and intimidation, that the actions committed are harmful, unprovoked, and unjustified, and that the aggressor derives a sense of gratification from his actions. Similarly, we have learned that victims, or targets, of aggression may be either passive or provocative in their response, and that they may seek intervention by an authority (someone more powerful than the perpetrator) to redress the existing power imbalance. It has been established that victims interpret the action directed against them as oppressive, and importantly, it has been shown that the victim's perception is a highly significant factor in determining whether bullying is occurring. Addressing evidence of both bully behavior and victim behavior in the context of China's interaction with its maritime neighbors is essential for determining whether China has bullied its neighbors.

Power Imbalance

Before examining what conflict event data suggests about China bullying its neighbors, it is important to recognize that a precondition for bullying behavior (i.e. the existence of a power imbalance between parties) does exist. It is well established that China is East Asia's largest nation both in terms of geography and population. More importantly, however, China outmatches its neighbors in terms of both military capacity and economic strength. China currently maintains East Asia's largest military force, and it ranks third in the world in terms of overall conventional military capability.¹⁷⁶ Among China's maritime neighbors, South Korea is the next most militarily capable nation, ranking eighth overall in the world, though South Korea's military capacity remains dwarfed by that of China.¹⁷⁷ China's other maritime neighbors clearly come nowhere close to matching Chinese military strength. Military power world rankings for these nations are as follows: Indonesia (15th), Japan (17th), Taiwan (18th), Vietnam (25th), the Philippines (31st), Malaysia (33rd).¹⁷⁸ Likewise, China's economy is now East Asia's largest, and is the world's second largest.¹⁷⁹ China certainly has the economic capacity to fund continued growth of its defense establishment. Moreover, China is able to leverage its economic strength to apply pressure to other nations in the region. Clearly a power imbalance exists between China and its neighbors. With this power imbalance in mind, it is possible to sift through the data to determine whether evidence exists of China bullying its maritime neighbors.

Threatening Behavior and the Use of Violence

The analytical findings indicate that China has engaged in threatening behavior. This has certainly been observed at the tactical level. Chinese maritime enforcement

vessels have warned foreign vessels to cease their activities and to stay out of “Chinese” waters. Likewise, China has participated in unannounced and unusual passage of sizable naval flotillas close to neighboring states, it has used helicopters to fly within close proximity of foreign maritime vessels, it has conducted incursions of its neighbors’ airspace, and it has used weapons-targeting radar against other nations’ ships and airborne assets. Each of these actions can certainly be, and in fact have been, interpreted as threatening.

Threatening behavior has also been observed at the strategic level. Chinese national authorities granting the government of Hainan province the authority to stop and search foreign vessels transiting international waters is certainly a bold move, and it has been interpreted as threatening not only by China’s maritime neighbors, but by all nations whose vessels transit the South China Sea. With respect to the July 2012 ASEAN conference, China’s interference with the regional institution’s efforts to reach an agreement governing conduct in the South China Sea has torpedoed hopes for a swift resolution to the claims issue and can certainly be regarded as a threat to ASEAN. Another example of intimidating or threatening behavior at the strategic level includes the issuing of passports with a map depicting a non-internationally recognized maritime boundary around disputed waters. Similarly, nations have interpreted as threatening China’s unilateral decision to elevate the administrative status of a small island city, granting it authority to govern over a widely contested maritime area, and simultaneously establishing a military presence on the island. In each instance, China has exhibited bold behavior that can reasonably be interpreted as intimidating. In fact, some scholars argue

that actions such as these are indicative of expansionist intentions and, as such, are *inherently* threatening.¹⁸⁰

Furthermore, although it appears China, in recent years, has not engaged in any actions that might be considered “violent”, it can certainly be argued that actions such as warning foreign vessels against conducting surveys and ordering them to cease their activities in internationally recognized waters, chasing vessels out of disputed waters, detaining ships and their crews, causing physical damage to equipment being towed by foreign vessels, and deliberately conducting maneuvers in other nations’ territorial waters and airspace are examples of intimidating and inappropriate behavior. Such behavior certainly meets the criteria for bullying behavior.

Intentional and Repetitive Behavior

In instances where it has been determined that China initiated action against specific targets, the actions appear to have been committed intentionally. Examples of actions committed intentionally include: the three cable severing incidents committed against Vietnamese survey vessels, the unloading of supplies on disputed islands with the intent of building permanent structures, denying Vietnamese sailors the right to land and seek refuge during a storm, detaining foreign vessels and their crews, and promoting tourism to uninhabited, disputed islands. There is no mistaking that such incidents are done with intent and are sanctioned by the Chinese government. Moreover, the sheer number of times China has taken action against its neighbors over the past several years calls attention to the fact that this type of behavior has been repetitive. Further still, the number of China-initiated conflict events having occurred in 2012 represents a twofold increase over the number of events that occurred in 2011. This underscores how already

repetitive behavior is becoming even more frequent. The repetitiveness and frequency with which China is taking action against its neighbors is indicative of the bully behavior cycle that was described in Chapter 3. China's desire for power promotes its willingness to inflict harm on its neighbors. This, in turn, leads to aggressive action being taken. As China perceives that its actions are producing the desired results, its desire for power is reinforced and increases, and so the cycle continues. By establishing a greater physical presence in the South China Sea, for instance, and by issuing unilateral pronouncements claiming that the entire region is China's sovereign territory, China believes it is expanding its span of control throughout the region. As China perceives its power in the region is increasing as a result of its assertiveness, the stage is set for further aggressive action. Overall, the repetitive nature and increasing frequency with which China is engaging in aggressive behavior against its neighbors points to evidence of bullying behavior. Additionally, the intimidating nature and repetitiveness of Chinese actions against its neighbors suggest that China is engaging in a specific form of bullying behavior referred to as "strategic bullying". Strategic bullying, a type of behavior outlined by Dennis Lines and introduced in Chapter 3, is characterized by a continual, systematic abuse of power. The abuse does not occur as a single time, impulsive event, but is a pre-planned and continual act of harassment in which the bully puts down a weaker subject.¹⁸¹ A review of the 25 events in which China was determined to be the initiator certainly suggests that strategic bullying is precisely the type of behavior China has engaged in.

Unprovoked/Unjustified Behavior

Determining whether China's actions were completely unprovoked and unjustified is a matter that is much more controversial. China has always argued that its actions are justified based on history, and that it is merely responding in a tit-for-tat manner to protect what it claims is its rightful territory.¹⁸² In fact, Chinese leaders have accused other nations of bullying China. For example, in responding to the September 2012 Japanese nationalization of the Senkaku / Diaoyu Islands, the Chinese government released an official statement affirming that China "will not be subject to bullying and humiliation from others".¹⁸³ Indeed in the case of Japanese nationalization of the Senkaku / Diaoyu Islands, China has a legitimate point, and in the analysis of conflict events, Japan was designated the initiator in this instance. Nonetheless, the analysis of recent conflict events between China and its maritime neighbors reveals that in 25 of 27 recent instances, China deliberately initiated action against other nations who appear to have done little at all to provoke their larger, more powerful neighbor. In fact, it could be argued that in each of these instances, rather than being provoked, China itself acted in a provocative manner. Examples of provocative Chinese action include deliberately cutting the cables being towed by seismic survey research vessels, hastily establishing new prefectures and unilaterally granting them jurisdiction over disputed territories, unilaterally declaring sovereignty over disputed territories and distributing government-endorsed maps with territorial boundaries unrecognized by the international community, and claiming the right to search and seize vessels operating in waters traditionally recognized as part of the international domain. Clearly, such actions can be interpreted as provocative and meet the definition of bullying behavior.

It is also worth noting that China's actions appear to be centered around denying its neighbors a choice in shaping the future of territorial claims in the region. As discussed in Chapter 3, the more powerful party's attempts to create an absence of choice for the victim is a tell-tale sign of bullying behavior. This is what appears to be occurring in the South China Sea. China's actions indicate that it is pressing full speed ahead with plans to establish its influence in the region. It seems that China is focused on a strategy of shaping the geopolitical reality of the region before its neighbors have an opportunity to react in any meaningful way. If China moves quickly enough, it may succeed in achieving a veritable *fait accompli*, claiming enough territory to more forcefully defend its position to the international community. For example, China's encouraging tourism of uninhabited islands, raising the administrative status of Sansha Island, granting the Hainan Island provincial authority the right to stop and inspect foreign vessels, and increasing the number of maritime patrols in the region is all done absent the choice of China's neighbors. Likewise, denying its neighbors the ability to hammer out an agreement concerning conduct on the seas by interfering with ASEAN's internal processes, also removes the power of choice from China's neighbors. What's more, China's neighbors are virtually powerless to stop China from taking such actions and denying them a say in the matter. In the end, the impacts on China's neighbors are not only physical (in terms of losing control of disputed territory), but they are psychological as well. By acting swiftly to try and deny others a choice in shaping events, Chinese actions are clearly frustrating its neighbors. This frustration is clearly visible in the official, and adverse, reactions of neighboring governments. Taken together, China's

apparent attempts to deny its neighbors a choice suggests that it is engaged in bullying behavior.

Victim Perspective/Response

How have China's maritime neighbors responded to Chinese actions? This question is central to characterizing Chinese behavior as the definition of bullying depends largely on how targets, or victims, of the behavior react. In short, analysis indicates that reactions to China's recent conduct have been overwhelmingly unfavorable. Governments of countries with whom China is engaged in ongoing maritime territorial disputes have expressed their displeasure via direct diplomatic channels (for example, lodging official diplomatic protests with the Chinese government), and they have occasionally expressed displeasure by making official public statements through the media. As Table 3 indicates, of the 25 instances in which it was determined that China was the initiator, targeted countries lodged official protests with the Chinese government on fifteen occasions, and on seven occasions, high ranking government officials and spokespersons issued strongly worded statements condemning China's actions. For example, Japan's Defense Minister publicly expressed displeasure in April 2010 after China sailed a flotilla unannounced through the Miyako Strait near Japan's southwest islands and conducted an anti-submarine warfare exercise.¹⁸⁴ Japan's Defense Ministry also publicly rebuked China for what it interpreted as "an extremely dangerous act" when in March 2011 a Chinese State Oceanic Administration helicopter flew near a Japanese destroyer while the destroyer conducted operations near a gas field where both China and Japan claim exploration rights.¹⁸⁵ Another incident that occurred in March 2011, in which China and the Philippines engaged in a row over Reed Bank in the Spratly Islands,

led to the Philippine Western Command commander publicly chiding China by stating, “It’s clearly our territory. If they bully us, well even children will fight back”.¹⁸⁶ After China severed exploration cables being towed by Vietnamese survey vessels in May and June of 2011, the Vietnamese Ministry of Foreign Affairs accused China of premeditated and carefully calculated attack.¹⁸⁷ In February 2012, after Chinese Marine Surveillance vessels issued warnings to Japanese Coast Guard vessels to leave the area and cease conducting surveillance activities in international waters, Japan’s chief cabinet secretary responded by calling China’s actions “unacceptable”.¹⁸⁸ Later that same month, when China denied Vietnamese fishermen the right to land while seeking refuge from a storm that was approaching the Paracel Islands, the Vietnamese Foreign Ministry spokesman lamented that China’s actions “seriously infringed” on Vietnamese sovereignty and “gravely threatened lives and property”.¹⁸⁹ In April 2012, when China implemented its “national plan of island protection” in the South China Sea and began to promote tourism on uninhabited islands, Vietnam again complained that the action violated Vietnamese sovereignty and urged China to scrap the plan.¹⁹⁰ Finally, when China raised the administrative status of key islands in the South China Sea to the prefectural level and announced that one of the islands would administer all surrounding waters, the President of the Philippines rebuked the move in his State of the Union address, stating, “If someone entered your yard and told you he owned it, would you agree? Would it be right to give away that which is rightfully ours?”.¹⁹¹ Clearly China’s neighbors perceive Chinese behavior as unjust, inappropriate, and oppressive.

Literature on bully theory suggests that victims tend to react to bullying in a manner that is either passive, allowing the bully to continue his tormenting unpunished,

or provocative, reacting strongly to the bully's provocative actions. As Chapter 3 points out, whether the victim's reaction is passive or provocative, bully theory suggests that victims are generally ineffective at halting the bullying behavior directed at them. Does conflict event data suggest anything about whether the targets of Chinese actions are responding in a way that is either passive or provocative, and whether their reactions are effectively dissuading China's behavior? Certainly it appears that those targeted by Chinese actions are not reacting passively. In each of the 25 instances in which China has initiated action against its neighbors, those neighbors have responded by protesting in some manner. In some instances, displeasure was expressed in more subtle terms. For example, when the 2012 ASEAN summit resulted in ASEAN's first-ever failure to reach an agreement, the Philippines issued a statement deploring the non-issuance of a communiqué (source: Philippines Department of Foreign Affairs), and Vietnam publicly expressed regret over the failed summit (Vietnam Ministry of Foreign Affairs); neither the Philippines nor Vietnam issued an official diplomatic protest over perceived Chinese meddling resulting in the failure. In other instances, target nations' protests were much more pronounced. For example, in response to China's actions near the Scarborough Shoal in April 2012, the Philippine government not only released its official position on the shoal and its associated waters, but it harshly and publicly rebuked China for violating Philippine sovereignty and maritime jurisdiction. Moreover, the Philippines sent its largest warship to the shoal to protest Chinese actions there. Certainly China's neighbors are not responding passively to the actions directed against them. In fact, it could be argued that reactions among China's neighbors have in some instances bordered on provocative victim behavior. However, in none of the 25 instances does it appear that

the reactions of China's neighbors are having any substantial effect on curbing Chinese policy. Ultimately, China continues to engage in assertive behavior against its neighbors, and it appears that its neighbors, at least individually, are virtually powerless to stop it. This is just as bully theory would predict: victims, on their own, are generally ineffective at stopping bullying from occurring.

Conclusion

An analysis of conflict events shows how China's actions in recent years can certainly be perceived by its neighbors as bullying behavior. A review of the 27 identified exchanges between China and its neighbors reveals evidence of bullying as defined by bully behavior theory. Such behavior includes: threatening and intimidating behavior, unprovoked, unjustified, and harmful actions intentionally directed against weaker parties, and the recurrence of such behavior over a prolonged period. Furthermore, it is clear that China's maritime neighbors have not taken kindly to China's policy. Given that the target/victim perspective weighs heavily in determining whether bullying is occurring, and given that the analysis shows how *multiple* nations have lamented the behavior directed against them, it is certainly reasonable to conclude that since 2009, and from the perspective of its smaller neighbors, China has engaged in bullying.

Media Content and Trend Analysis

A review of media reporting on the maritime claims issue reveals that the issue has been garnering higher levels of public attention in key claimant states since 2009.

This is especially so in China, as Figure 6 illustrates. The amount of reporting from China's Xinhua news service increased over ten-fold between 2009 and 2012, and the raw number of reports in China was the highest among any country in the region in 2012 (595 reports addressing the issue). Among China's neighbors, the increase in reporting has been most pronounced in Japan, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam. As Figure 7 illustrates, in 2012 Japan's Asahi Shimbun reported on the disputed claims thirty-four times more often than it did in 2009. Data also show that by 2012, the Philippine Star's reporting on the issue had increased more than twenty-fold over 2009 levels. In Taiwan, the Taipei Times addressed the issue seventeen times more often than it had in 2009, and in Vietnam, by 2012 news coverage had more than tripled. It should be mentioned that although data were collected for the years 1992 – 2012, Figures 6 and 7 only depict results for the period 2007 – 2012. I elected to trim the period of data displayed in Figures 6 and 7 and begin in 2007 primarily as a matter of convenience for viewing the data; for each country, year-by-year reporting levels *prior* to 2007 were comparable to the number of reports in 2007. Likewise, I elected not to display results for some countries at all. The number of media reports for Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, and South Korea were negligible, and plotting the results from these countries would only have cluttered Figure 7.

Figure 6: Number of Chinese media reports related to maritime territorial disputes
(Data compiled from Open Source Center: *Xinhua* news service.)





Figure 7: Number of media reports from China's maritime neighbors, related to maritime territorial disputes
(Data compiled from Open Source Center: *Philippine Star*, *Vietnam News Agency*, *Asahi Shimbun*, and *Taipei Times*.)



Media Reporting in China

An analysis of Chinese media reports reveals that the Chinese press has been highly critical of China's maritime neighbors in recent years. Of the 988 media reports analyzed for the period 2007-2012, on average 60% portray the actions of outside nations in a negative context. Japan, the Philippines, and Vietnam, in particular, have been the subjects of condemning news articles, although the United States has also been the recipient of a fair amount of criticism. The percentage of reports pointing a critical finger at other nations has fluctuated year-by-year since 2007. In 2008 and 2011, for example, relatively low percentages of negative reporting was observed, while in 2009, 2010, and 2012, substantial spikes were witnessed in the percentage of chastising reports. The high percentage of negative reports in 2012 seems particularly significant given that the total number of reports for that year jumped dramatically to nearly 600 (a six-fold increase from 2011).

Table 4: Number and percentage of Chinese media reports critical of China's neighbors

	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	Total Reports / Average Percent
Number of Reports	41	42	58	143	109	595	988
Percent Critical of Neighbors	49%	23%	57%	62%	30%	70%	60%

Media reports disseminated by China's official news agency, Xinhua, have several fascinating characteristics. First, unlike what is observed in the media of certain neighboring nations, there is absolutely no questioning of Chinese government policy on the territorial claims. No opposing views on policy are expressed, and no sympathy is

offered for the other claimants. The impression one is left with is that China is convinced of the rightness of its position on the disputes. Given that Xinhua is a direct extension of the Chinese government, such one-sided reporting is not entirely surprising. Second, Chinese media reports refer frequently to China's official stance on questions of sovereignty. Examples include a report published in September 2012, in which Chinese representatives reiterate China's position on the Diaoyu Islands to Japan,¹⁹² and another published in April 2012, in which a background paper provides "basic facts on Chinese sovereignty over Huangyan Island".¹⁹³ Moreover, the topic of China's right to maritime territory is addressed in absolute terms. Chinese press reports often refer to China's "indisputable sovereignty" and its legal right to administer areas that in fact remain heavily disputed. China has touted its "indisputable sovereignty over the Paracel Islands",¹⁹⁴ its "indisputable sovereignty" over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands,¹⁹⁵ and its "indisputable right" to gas exploration in the East China Sea.¹⁹⁶ Such language indicates the degree to which Chinese officials are absolutely convinced of the rightness of their claims. Third, there is an unmistakable pattern of Chinese media honing in on specific incidents in which China and other nations butt heads over territorial matters. Ample, perhaps excessive, media coverage is then dedicated to these incidents. For example, Japan's purchase of the Senakaku / Diaoyu Islands in September 2012 triggered a deluge of media reports in which Japan was repeatedly and harshly criticized. Articles and columns routinely leveled accusations, such as Japan's "theft" of the islands¹⁹⁷ and of Japan "forsaking pacific principles".¹⁹⁸ When China was embroiled in a tense dispute with the Philippines over Scarborough Shoal in the spring of 2012, similar accusations were made. Articles chastising the Philippines for its "illegal claims",¹⁹⁹ and warnings

issued to the Philippine government not to “exacerbate tensions” in the South China Sea²⁰⁰ were regularly published. Fourth, there are numerous instances in which Chinese media attempt to demonstrate that China has international support for its position and policy. A number of articles mention how international scholars from various corners of the globe (for example, Kenya,²⁰¹ Belgium,²⁰² Germany,²⁰³ Spain,²⁰⁴ and Austria²⁰⁵ argue that China’s position is steeped in international law and is completely legitimate. Likewise, reports about Chinese communities around the world publicly supporting China’s position often are present. Articles discuss demonstrations among Chinese supporters living in Los Angeles,²⁰⁶ Houston,²⁰⁷ Canada,²⁰⁸ Angola,²⁰⁹ and Indonesia,²¹⁰ for example. Finally, a number of reports address China’s insistence that territorial matters be handled only by those nations directly involved in the disputes, and that outside nations should remain distanced. China accuses the U.S. specifically of “meddling” in the region’s maritime affairs, and laments how such outside interference is “detrimental to Asia-Pacific peace”.²¹¹

Evidence of Bullying Behavior

Do Chinese media reports reveal any evidence of bullying behavior on China’s part? A thorough examination of the reports shows that some do contain certain characteristics that can be linked to bullying. The message that China appears to be sending in some articles can certainly be interpreted as threatening in nature. For example, a report concerning China sending an “advanced” patrol ship to monitor the situation in the South China Sea after China’s standoff with the Philippines over the Scarborough Shoal appears to send an ominous message to the Philippine government.²¹² Another article, which states “Maritime Authority says PRC to stop Japan’s illegal survey

activities” suggests a certain degree of threat directed at Japan.²¹³ Yet another, explaining that the “PRC sends patrol ship to East China Sea on bid to guard territorial rights”²¹⁴ could be interpreted as an attempt to intimidate other nations in the region. And a threat is certainly implied in a report that warns other nations of “due consequence if they make serious strategic miscalculations in the South China Sea”.²¹⁵ Although China in no instance advocates the use of violence against its neighbors or any other nation as a method of settling the disputes, the tone conveyed in these articles is unmistakably stern and can certainly be interpreted as threatening. However, other reports in which China criticizes its neighbors use language that is less intimidating. Articles such as those that “urge” the Philippines not to escalate tensions,²¹⁶ that “ask” Japan to stop causing new disturbances,²¹⁷ and that say the U.S. “should” cease stoking tensions²¹⁸ might be insulting and patronizing, but it is difficult to argue that such language is threatening.

As previously mentioned, media reporting reflects that China takes an inflexible position when it comes to territorial disputes. Reports of how China “vows absolutely no concession” on the Senkaku / Diaoyu Islands issue²¹⁹ and how China “never accepts Japan’s ‘control’ of waters” near the Islands²²⁰ suggest a certain obstinacy and absolutism that might be interpreted as threatening. Maintaining its position while rejecting any possibility of compromise implies that China may be willing to resort to extreme measures if its neighbors push their agendas too hard. However, it may be a stretch to conclude that such apparent inflexibility necessarily signals threatening behavior.

Without question, China’s criticism of its maritime neighbors and other nations is done intentionally and is highly repetitive. The stream of insults directed at Japan, the

Philippines, and Vietnam is consistent throughout the timeframe analyzed. Certainly there is a concerted effort among Chinese leaders to point the finger at these nations and accuse them of causing all the trouble that has occurred in the East and South China Seas. Moreover, the oftentimes harsh language that is used to describe these nations' actions (e.g. accusations of engaging in "banditry",²²¹ and charges of acting with "duplicity"²²²) is harmful. As theory on bullying behavior makes clear, bullying involves behavior that is harmful, intentional, and repetitive in nature. The harmful words used in Chinese media reports and the intentional and repetitive manner in which the reports are disseminated suggest that bullying may be occurring.

We have also learned that bullying behavior is often driven by attempts to hide inadequacy and avoid responsibility for behavior and its effects.²²³ Indeed, there are instances in which Chinese media reports reflect attempts by China to avoid responsibility. For example, every time China "urges" its neighbors not to cause trouble, or implores them not to deliberately create disputes in the East or South China Seas, China absolves itself of all responsibility and shifts responsibility to other parties. In China's view, it is clearly always the other party that is at fault for existing tension. Such unwillingness to accept any responsibility for the numerous quarrels that have occurred supports the notion that China is engaging in bullying behavior.

Finally, an analysis of Chinese media reports suggests that China is engaging in a particular type of bullying behavior, discussed in Chapter 3, known as "bullying for approval". This type of behavior is characterized by engaging in bullying as a means to increase one's popularity, or to win self-approval.²²⁴ The very one-sided reporting that China disseminates is meant not only to signal to outside nations what China's position is

on the territorial disputes, but is meant for audiences inside China's borders. Indeed, it seems that a primary purpose of the reporting is to shape domestic attitudes on the issue. In essence, it appears that China's leaders are using their control of the media to win the Chinese public's approval for their actions. Shaping public attitudes and securing public approval is certainly consistent with China's core interest of protecting and maintaining the current system of government. Doing so permits the Chinese Communist Party to derive public support for its actions and helps the Party maintain legitimacy. Reports in which China vows never to give concession on disputed territories,²²⁵ frequent reporting about Chinese maritime vessels patrolling disputed waters to fight illegal exploration,²²⁶ harsh language used to describe the acts of other nations, and frequent calls for other nations to respect China's indisputable sovereignty all project an image of strength and of a government protecting the interests of its citizens. Hence, it certainly appears that the concept of bullying for approval applies.

Media Reporting in Neighboring Countries

Content analysis of media reports originating in Japan, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam shows that a significant proportion of the reporting from each country tends to paint China in a less than favorable context. Chinese policy concerning disputed territory was regularly criticized, and neighboring nations often lamented Chinese actions on the seas. Somewhat surprising, however, was that in some instances, the articles published took an introspective approach, questioning whether home-government policy on the territorial disputes has been appropriate.

Japanese Media Reporting

Of the 272 Japanese media reports analyzed, approximately 57% express anger, irritation, frustration, or concern over Chinese policy and cast China in a negative context. Significantly, the vast majority of negative reporting occurred between 2010 and 2012, with the highest number (136 reports) published in 2012.

Table 5: Number and percentage of Japanese media reports critical of China

	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	Total Reports / Average Percent
Number of Reports	5	6	4	79	42	136	272
Percent Critical of China	40%	33%	25%	68%	49%	54%	57%

One recurring theme of Japanese media reports concerns Chinese violations of Japanese territorial waters and airspace. Reporting includes allegations of Chinese ships “illegally” entering Japan’s maritime territory.²²⁷ Some reports even argue that China has elevated the disputes to a new level by expanding territorial violations beyond the seas and into the air above the seas.²²⁸ In all such reports, China is depicted as the aggressor. Other reports, too, make it clear who the finger is being pointed at. Japanese reporting is replete with accusations of China acting like a “spoiled child”²²⁹ and of China engaging in “provocative acts”.²³⁰ China’s acts are characterized as “unacceptable”,²³¹ references are made about “Beijing’s maritime aggression”,²³² and Chinese policy is labeled as “hard-line and counterproductive”.²³³ Moreover, reports sometimes lament how China has handled the disputes issue poorly. For example, one article accuses a “newly assertive China” of condoning island-landing stunts by Chinese activists,²³⁴ another

report suggests that PRC patrol boats spotted near Japanese islands is “demonstrative behavior”,²³⁵ another claims that China is far from being a sensible power with respect to handling island disputes,²³⁶ and yet another accuses China of acting “outrageously”.²³⁷ In some instances, even more colorful language is used to portray China as an aggressor. For example, one column refers to China as a bird of prey “spreading its talons” against Japan in the Senkaku dispute,²³⁸ and another recommends that Japan must “keep a close eye on what the bully will do”.²³⁹

Although a majority of the reports published tend to level criticism at China, a good number of them take a more moderate approach to addressing the disputes. These articles address the ongoing disputes with China, but they do not portray China in such a negative context. For example, reports addressing plans by Southeast Asian nations to unite for talks with China in no way point a finger at China.²⁴⁰ Likewise, articles addressing how experts from Japan and China have made calls to establish a private sector forum to resolve the Senkakus dispute,²⁴¹ and of the Chinese Embassy’s attempts to thaw ties with Japan²⁴² certainly do not assign blame to China. Some articles penned by Japanese editors even discuss what *Japan’s* role should be to ensure that the disputes are resolved peacefully, and in some instances, articles appear to point the finger at *Japanese* leaders for poor policy regarding the disputes. For example, themes that often arise include the need for Japan to seek careful diplomacy with China over the Senkakus dispute,²⁴³ the utility of pursuing a calm approach to resolving the matter,²⁴⁴ and the necessity of pursuing “wise diplomacy”.²⁴⁵ Some reports offer alternative solutions that Japan might pursue, to include taking the dispute to the International Court of Justice.²⁴⁶ Other reports suggest that Japanese politicians should work to defuse the disputes and not

exacerbate them,²⁴⁷ that the “provocative” acts of some Japanese politicians must be met with a mature response,²⁴⁸ and that territorial flare-ups should be handled with “cool professionalism”.²⁴⁹

Media Reporting in the Philippines

Of the 327 relevant Philippine media reports analyzed for the period 2007 – 2012, approximately 46% portray China as the party responsible for an increase in tensions. Perhaps significantly, in 2012 (the year in which the highest number of reports were published), an even higher percentage (54%) painted China in unfavorable terms.

Table 6: Number and percentage of Philippine media reports critical of China

	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	Total Reports / Average Percent
Number of Reports	4	14	8	8	127	166	327
Percent Critical of China	0%	8%	77%	25%	39%	54%	46%

A number of reports express displeasure over many of China’s policies in the South China Sea. For example, articles address irritation over Chinese maps depicting disputed territory as belonging to China,²⁵⁰ some object to Chinese patrols in disputed areas,²⁵¹ and others express anger over Chinese passports depicting the South China Sea as Chinese territory.²⁵² Several articles describe Chinese “muscle-flexing” as disruptive and resulting in undesirable outcomes such as the ASEAN 2012 debacle.²⁵³ Resentment is also expressed over Chinese plans to bring tourists to the South China Sea,²⁵⁴ and some reports reiterate the Philippines’ “exclusive right” to explore and exploit the South China Sea.²⁵⁵ The language used in many reports clearly expresses the Philippine attitude that

China's behavior is in many respects abrasive. For example, China is urged to stop its "provocative acts",²⁵⁶ China is charged with "tightening its grip" on the Spratly Islands,²⁵⁷ and China is accused of "incursions"²⁵⁸ and "intrusions"²⁵⁹ into Philippine territory. Likewise, reports bemoan China's "imperialistic" behavior,²⁶⁰ its "harassment" of research ships,²⁶¹ its attempts to "deprive" the Philippines of sea resources,²⁶² and its intention "to grab" Philippine territory.²⁶³ Moreover, some reports suggest that China is a nation that cannot be trusted. An article discussing how the Reed Bank incident of 2011 "belies Chinese reassurances of peaceful rise"²⁶⁴ and paints China as a nefarious actor. Further still, some reports depict China as a nation with behavioral problems. China must "learn the ways of neighborly behavior" according to one article,²⁶⁵ China shows its true nature as a "neighborhood bully" according to another,²⁶⁶ and on several occasions, China is explicitly referred to as a bully in the Spratly Islands region.²⁶⁷

As with Japanese media reporting, many Philippine reports treat the disputes issue objectively and do not assign blame to China in any way at all. For example, one report proposes an information-sharing system to monitor the disputed waters and to avoid confrontation,²⁶⁸ and other discuss how the Philippines wants a peaceful settlement to its disputes with China.²⁶⁹ Similar to some Japanese reports, certain Philippine articles take an introspective look at Philippine behavior. For example, one column airs concern over what is viewed as the Philippines' "confrontational diplomacy" with China.²⁷⁰ Another report disapproves of Philippine President Aquino's move to rename part of the South China Sea, stating that such policy simply is "adding fuel to the conflict",²⁷¹ and yet another article warns against the Philippines making "war noises" over the Spratly dispute with China.²⁷²

Vietnamese Media Reporting

As a percentage of overall reporting, Vietnam takes the harshest stance toward China. Of the 184 reports analyzed from the Vietnam News Agency, approximately 66% portray China in an unfavorable context.

Table 7: Number and percentage of Vietnamese media reports critical of China

	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	Total Reports / Average Percent
Number of Reports	6	9	19	27	58	65	184
Percent Critical of China	43%	50%	80%	66%	64%	68%	66%

One recurring theme concerns anger over new Chinese maps depicting the entirety of the South China Sea as belonging to China. In particular, a number of articles express exasperation over China's issuance of passports with the controversial maps printed on them.²⁷³ Reports argue that such claims on China's part are "totally illegal".²⁷⁴ Other recurring themes include frustration over China's unilateral declarations of fishing bans,²⁷⁵ of China seizing Vietnamese fishing vessels,²⁷⁶ and of China's maltreatment of Vietnamese fishermen.²⁷⁷ Vietnam has complained about China's plans for tourism in the Paracels,²⁷⁸ reports have raised concern about the development of uninhabited islands,²⁷⁹ and numerous articles affirm Vietnam's sovereignty over portions of the South China Sea.²⁸⁰ Overall, the language used by the Vietnamese press is not as colorful or as biting as some of the language found in the Philippine and Japanese media, but the number of complaints leveled against China is certainly larger in percentage terms.

Not all Vietnamese media reports point a finger at China, and some address the maritime disputes in terms that tend to be more moderate. More benign reports tend to flaunt Vietnam’s commitment to UNCLOS,²⁸¹ its support of an ASEAN-endorsed Code of Conduct for the South China Sea,²⁸² Vietnam’s desire to resolve the disputes peacefully,²⁸³ and its desire to bring peace and security to the region.²⁸⁴ Occasional, more upbeat reporting discusses Vietnam and China reaching consensus on resolving the South China Sea disputes peacefully.²⁸⁵ Interestingly, unlike the Japanese and Philippine cases, the list of Vietnamese media reports contain no reports questioning Vietnamese leadership’s policy on the disputes. Such a lack of introspection or self-criticism is not surprising given that the Vietnamese News Agency is a state-run media organization.

Media Reporting in Taiwan

Reports originating from Taiwan are generally easier on China than those originating from Japan, the Philippines, and Vietnam. Overall, the tone of reporting is less harsh. Moreover, fewer reports (as an overall percentage of reporting) portray China in an unfavorable context. Of the 111 Taiwanese reports analyzed, only 31% tend to point a finger at China for the problems occurring in the South and East China Seas.

Table 8: Number and percentage of Taiwanese media reports critical of China

	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	Total Reports / Average Percent
Number of Reports	2	8	4	5	22	70	111
Percent Critical of China	0%	0%	25%	20%	25%	36%	31%

Those articles that do portray China in negative terms express concern over China's potentially hawkish stance,²⁸⁶ discontent over China's new passports,²⁸⁷ and uneasiness over China's plans to invest massive amounts of funding into building infrastructure on islands in disputed territory.²⁸⁸ Some reports urge that China exercise restraint and respect internationally-recognized freedoms of navigation in the South China Sea,²⁸⁹ while other reports discuss the need for China to earn respect and not throw fuel on the fire of growing tensions in the South China Sea.²⁹⁰ Other reports express concerns related to China's increasing maritime surveillance capabilities, its threatening of Japan, its detaining of Vietnamese fishermen, and its claim to the South China Sea in its entirety.²⁹¹ Taken together, however, the concerns expressed in the Taiwanese media are done in a manner that is much less accusatory than what is observed in Japanese, Philippine, and Vietnamese media.

It was determined earlier, through an analysis of specific conflict events, that China's neighbors are expressing their displeasure through official government channels. But indications of unfavorable reactions to China's maritime policy do not stop at statements from government officials. Media analysis also reveals that Chinese conduct is generally perceived by the public to be unjust and inappropriate. But to what extent does the content and trend analysis of media reports from sources outside China provide evidence that China is bullying its neighbors? The findings certainly suggest that China's neighbors perceive themselves to be victims. First, it is evident from the sheer volume of reports painting China as an aggressor that China's neighbors are upset with its behavior. It certainly cannot go unnoticed that one out of every two reports in Japan and the

Philippines, and two out of every three reports in Vietnam, portray China in an unfavorable context. Moreover, considering that the number of reports in each country has increased substantially in recent years, these results are even more striking. Although the percentage of negative reports originating from the Taiwanese press is lower than that of other countries, it is still significant that one out of every three Taiwanese media reports discusses China's maritime policy in an unfavorable context. Clearly, such high numbers reflect a sense of being subjected to wrongful treatment at the hands of China.

Second, the language used in a number of reports to describe China's policy reflects a sense of having been victimized. The choice of language varies by country. In some instances, the language is quite pointed, even biting. In other instances, the language is more subtle, but nonetheless condemning. Unhappy and dissatisfied attitudes are captured in words such as "illegal" and "imperialistic" (in describing China's activity). Likewise, referring to "Beijing's aggression", China's "muscle-flexing", its "hard-line and counterproductive" stance and "demonstrative behavior", and directly labeling China a "bully" all illustrate how China's policy is being interpreted as oppressive by its neighbors. The use of such language in media reports indicates that, at least to some degree, China is perceived to be a threat to stability and an aggressor inappropriately and unjustly pursuing its agenda.

Moreover, media reports providing open criticism of China's behavior reflect evidence of non-passive victim behavior. Those opposed to China's policy are choosing not to remain silent in their opposition. In fact, it could be argued that in some instances, the harshness of tone expressed through the reporting and the use of specific language might be indicative of a *provocative* victim response. Referring to China as a "spoiled

child” and inferring that China is some kind of beast ready to “spread its talons” supports the notion that the response is at times provocative. Whether or not these types of responses should be interpreted as provocative, arguments made via the media criticizing China’s maritime policy and characterizing Chinese behavior clearly reveal a sense among China’s neighbors of having been victimized. Reports such as those that accuse China of dividing ASEAN over the South China Sea,²⁹² that complain about Chinese unilateral enforcement of fishing bans in waters claimed by other nations,²⁹³ and that decry Chinese violations of sovereign airspace²⁹⁴ indicate a prevailing sense of being unjustly targeted by inappropriate and aggressive Chinese action. Such perceptions on the part of China’s neighbors support the assertion that China has engaged in bullying behavior.

Conclusion

In sum, media content and trend analysis illustrates that disputes over maritime territory have become increasingly contentious since 2009, at a point when China is known to have implemented a more assertive foreign policy. The substantial increase in reporting both in China and among neighboring claimant states demonstrates that the issue is high in the minds of the region’s public. Moreover, a general increase in the number of reports in which China and its neighbors paint each other in a negative context suggests that the issue is becoming increasingly contentious. As with conflict event analysis, a review of media content demonstrates why China is perceived by its neighbors as a bully. Characteristics of bullying behavior consistently surface in Chinese media

reports, and characteristics of victim behavior are manifest in a number of media reports disseminated by China's neighbors.

Figure 8: Editorial cartoons depicting China as a bully



Source: *The Philippine Star*, March 8, 2011. "Editorial: Peaceful rise?"



Source: *The Philippine Star*, March 18, 2009. "China Must 'Learn the Ways of Neighborly Behavior' to Earn Respect".

Chapter 6 – Conclusion

The purpose of this thesis was to analyze Chinese activity in East Asia's disputed maritime regions in order to interpret China's conduct from the perspective of smaller states. In doing so, three specific questions were asked: Is China bullying its maritime neighbors?; What are the benefits and costs for China of behaving like a bully?; and, What is the impact of Chinese behavior for the East Asia region? Conflict event analysis, as well as media content and trend analysis, demonstrate why China's smaller, less powerful neighbors believe China has engaged in bullying behavior. A close examination of how China has interacted with other parties to the disputes reveals key characteristics of bullying behavior. China has engaged in intentional, repetitive, intimidating, and harmful behavior. Evidence suggests that such behavior has been committed by the Chinese government in an attempt to derive power and enhance its position in the region. Some evidence suggests that such behavior has been committed, at least in part, to seek approval from a domestic audience. China has not yet taken violent action against its neighbors, but its increasingly assertive conduct in recent years has raised concern across the region that violence may eventually ensue. Furthermore, and importantly, evidence illustrates that China's behavior is perceived by its neighbors to be oppressive, unjust, and inappropriate.

Naturally, the view from the Chinese side of the debate differs dramatically. China dismisses the allegation that it has bullied its neighbors. From its perspective, the

country has simply exercised its rightful claims to territory that has always belonged to China. For others to judge China's behavior as bullying is unjust and represents a gross misreading of history. To be fair, China has endured historic injustice at the hands of more powerful nations. But whether such treatment excuses China's current behavior is debatable.

It is prudent to at least briefly examine China's behavior from the perspective of an aspiring state. Such an examination is important for arriving at a final assessment of China's behavior. Realist theory posits that all states within the international system act rationally, pursue their self-interests, and that the primary concern of all states is survival. China is no exception in this regard, and there is no doubt that Chinese leaders justify their actions as necessary for ensuring national survival. From China's perspective, its policy in the East and South China Seas is not a matter of pushing around other nations simply because it can. Rather, it is about establishing conditions for sustained economic growth and social development, one of China's three core interests. In addition, as economic growth enhances China's national power, Chinese leaders are able to advance China's other core interests: protecting national sovereignty and sustaining the current political establishment (i.e. maintaining the ruling status of the Chinese Communist Party). Consequently, Chinese leaders, mindful of the need to establish conditions for continued economic growth, act with little regard for how other nations perceive their actions.

One might justify China's behavior by arguing that it has simply conducted itself in a manner that is typical of aspiring powers. As nations grow more powerful and influential, their actions are bound to eventually be interpreted by less powerful states as

intrusive, and perhaps even as unjust and oppressive. In some instances, this can result in conflict. Does this mean that aspiring states should be penalized for endeavoring to advance their position in the international hierarchy and for trying to improve the quality of life for their peoples? Perhaps the answer lies in the *methods* aspiring powers use to advance their interests. China appears to have made a conscious decision in 2009 to replace a policy of non-confrontational pragmatism with a much more assertive, arguably *abrasive* approach to foreign policy. Analysis suggests that this new policy has certainly contributed to the increased tensions that now afflict the East and South China Seas. The *method* China has chosen to advance its interests has attracted a great deal of enmity within the region, and it is therefore reasonable to question whether the approach has been suitable.

Two lines of thought might explain China's behavior in its role as an aspiring state. Balance of power theory and power transition theory both accept the notion that nations act rationally, but they differ in their explanation of the onset of conflict. (Balance of power theorists submit that a wide discrepancy in the balance of power results in conflict, whereas power transition theorists argue that a more equal distribution of power leads to conflict.) Curiously, both theories might explain China's behavior in East Asia's maritime regions. China's emergence as the region's dominant power has provided its leaders incentive to pursue their nation's interests without having to account for the concerns of other nations in the region. In essence, given that the balance of power in the region has shifted to China's favor, Chinese leaders are empowered to pursue their interests as they see fit, even if their actions risk increasing tensions and the potential for conflict. This is just as balance of power theory would predict. At the same

time that balance of power theory might explain the recent increase in regional tensions, the power transition theory may explain what is happening on a more global scale. There is no denying that China views the United States as its chief competitor and potential adversary. Although China clearly still trails the U.S. in terms of military power and power projection capability, its economic power is quickly reaching parity with the U.S. (According to some estimates, China's economic capacity is set to surpass that of the U.S. as early as 2018.)²⁹⁵ Chinese leaders may have calculated that increased economic strength places China in a position to challenge the U.S. as the world's dominant power. As Organski and Kugler's power transition model reveals, when aspiring powers reach economic parity with dominant nations, they begin to challenge those nations and the potential for conflict increases. To be clear, there is currently no hard evidence that China aspires to replace the U.S. as the world's dominant power. But as we have seen, the process of challenging the dominant power can occur gradually, long before the critical inflection point at which a power shift occurs.²⁹⁶ It is reasonable to conclude that China is using the maritime disputes as a proxy for challenging the United States. Conflict event analysis and content and trend analysis of Chinese media reporting supports such a claim. By challenging its regional neighbors (some of whom are U.S. allies), China is able to indirectly defy U.S. global dominance.

Whether or not China's behavior is justified on the grounds that it is simply acting in a manner that is typical of aspiring powers, evidence clearly indicates why China's neighbors accuse it of acting like a bully. Moreover, although China's conduct is driven by its national interests, its more assertive approach in the East and South China Seas has certainly contributed to the recent, elevated tensions with other claimant states.

Consequences of China's Behavior

Chapter 3 outlined some of the benefits as well as costs that are generally associated with bullying behavior. It was discussed that benefits of bullying include enhanced social prominence, peer leadership, perceived popularity, and respect; the ability to acquire material resources in a competitive environment; and, the ability to achieve goals through aggressive acts. Costs of bullying can include judicial punishment, isolation, and being targeted for revenge by victims.

Chinese leaders may have calculated that acting assertively provides the government and the Chinese Communist Party an opportunity to enhance its image. By taking a strong stand on the matter of territorial claims, and by refusing to budge in spite of hefty criticism from abroad, the government is able to project strength, build legitimacy, and elicit support from its citizens. Projecting strength and building legitimacy is especially important in light of the numerous domestic challenges China's leaders currently face (e.g. public anger over political corruption, economic inequality, environmental pollution). Hence, an assertive policy in the East and South China Seas is beneficial for Chinese leaders in that it permits them to shape the public discourse and divert attention away from internal matters that could potentially destabilize the current establishment.

At the same time that China might be benefitting at home by portraying itself as strong, it is evident that China's behavior strains and jeopardizes its relations with other nations. As the research indicates, it appears that Chinese policy in the East and South China Seas has contributed to an erosion of trust between China and others in the region. Such mistrust, in turn, could ultimately upend China's ability to advance its core interests

over the long term. That China's actions could result in unfavorable consequences for China itself is not too surprising. As Chapter 3 explained, research on bullying suggests that the behavior is ultimately self-defeating and self-destructive; parties that engage in aggressive, harmful actions against others ultimately harm themselves.

While conflict event analysis was most useful for identifying evidence of bullying behavior, media content and trend analysis provides some specific examples of how perceived bullying might be costly for China. Analysis suggests that the ongoing disputes have had a detrimental impact on economic relations between China and neighboring nations. In Japan, for example, articles express concern about how the ongoing Senkaku / Diaoyu Islands dispute is affecting negotiations for a free trade agreement with China.²⁹⁷ Concerns are also expressed over how Chinese tourism to Japan has suffered as a result of the ongoing row.²⁹⁸ In China too, articles examine the detrimental economic consequences of increased tensions with Japan. By late 2012, a number of articles were published addressing the negative impacts on China-Japan tourism,²⁹⁹ shrinking Japanese auto sales in China (and the impacts to Chinese dealers),³⁰⁰ and concerns over how soured relations with Japan have taken a toll on trade ties in general.³⁰¹ In fact, some press reports cite concerns of Chinese store managers who lament that the hit to sales of Japanese products does no good for anyone.³⁰² It is uncertain whether the adverse economic impacts addressed in the media are indicative of possible larger economic troubles to come; the adverse economic consequences encountered thus far may be isolated and short-lived. However, such consequences are nonetheless harmful and represent how the disputes have real and unwelcome consequences for all those in the region.

Perhaps a more significant consequence, and one that could be more costly for China, is that nations within the East Asia region appear to be allying with one another and strengthening partnerships with nations from outside the region in an apparent attempt to counterbalance a perceived threat from China. Media reports in Japan, the Philippines, and Vietnam certainly suggest that these nations are more actively seeking cooperation with other states in the region, and that they are developing stronger ties with the United States. Japanese media discuss more active cooperation between Japan and the U.S. on military drills, including island landing campaigns.³⁰³ Japan is also reportedly boosting ties with ASEAN over wariness of China.³⁰⁴ Likewise, attention has been given to recent first-ever joint military drills conducted by Japan, the U.S., and Australia in the South China Sea.³⁰⁵ Japan is also strengthening ties with Indonesia; in 2011 the two countries agreed to annual meetings amid rising tensions in the East and South China Seas.³⁰⁶ In the Philippines, media reports indicate that the Philippines and Canada recently signed a memorandum of understanding on defense procurement.³⁰⁷ In addition, the Philippines and Australia have vowed to strengthen defense relations³⁰⁸ and reports discuss how in 2010, the Philippines and Vietnam signed a defense cooperation agreement.³⁰⁹ In Vietnam, the Vietnam News Agency has published a number of reports on discussions between Vietnam and other nations concerning the need to deal with regional security challenges (i.e. mitigate the threat posed by China). Articles discuss, for example, how Vietnamese and Japanese scholars have met to discuss regional security issues and have stepped-up cooperation between the two nations.³¹⁰ Measures are reportedly being taken to increase cooperation³¹¹ with Malaysia³¹¹ and the Philippines³¹² as well. Reports even suggest that tensions with China over the South China Sea are

resulting in warming relations between Vietnam and the United States. Columns describe how Vietnam and the U.S. have asserted the need to maintain freedom of navigation in the South China Sea,³¹³ and the U.S. has even been referred to in the Vietnamese press as a “leading partner of strategic importance”.³¹⁴ Clearly, such agreements on maritime security matters come as a result of perceived Chinese aggression, and these agreements may provide convenient leverage for nations in the event of future conflict with China. In addition, and as the research shows, strong reactions from China’s neighbors and challenges to perceived Chinese aggression have been the norm. In some instances, reactions have moved well beyond diplomatic protests and media statements expressing displeasure. For example, beginning in December 2012, Japan has reacted to Chinese sea and air patrols near the Senkaku / Diaoyu Islands by directing Coast Guard vessels and military fighter aircraft to intercept Chinese ships and aircraft operating in the vicinity.³¹⁵ Japan is also responding by boosting its military presence in the region. Plans are in the works, for example, to build a new military installation on Yonaguni Island, merely 80 miles from the Senkaku / Diaoyu Islands.³¹⁶ Developments such as these certainly illustrate how bullying behavior can be costly for China. Moreover, such developments raise some level of concern for the future of the region. The apparent aligning against China and a perceptibly more active role for military elements in responding to the disputes poses risks for regional peace and stability in the months and years ahead.

China’s perceived bullying behavior may also be adversely impacting regional stability in that it is fueling public animosity in China as well as abroad. At home, Chinese media reports have fostered anger that occasionally results in violent mass

demonstrations. The most recent example of this was the demonstrations against Japan that broke out in the Fall of 2012 as the Chinese media ratcheted up its reporting of Japan's purchase of the Senkaku / Diaoyu Islands. These demonstrations resulted in significant damage to Japanese businesses and property in China. It appears that China is playing off of nationalist sentiment to advance its cause. Indeed, it has been suggested that as socialism's influence over Chinese politics wanes, nationalism acts as the new preferred glue; the Chinese government uses nationalistic issues such as sovereignty over the South China Sea and portions of the East China Sea as a way to reassert itself.³¹⁷ Media analysis illustrates how the Chinese government has engaged in inciting nationalism to push its agenda on the disputed claims issue. This is underscored by the noticeable spike in the number of Chinese news reports dedicated to the territorial claims issue, and the degree to which these reports champion the Chinese position while portraying China's neighbors in a highly negative context. By consistently and frequently feeding the public such one-sided information, the government generates disenchantment and focuses public anger on neighboring nations and other members of the international community, including the United States. The problem with this policy, however, is that the forces of nationalism are often unpredictable, and its consequences can be quite harmful even for those who would use it for their own purposes. Every time China stirs up nationalist sentiment, it runs the risk of igniting a situation that may grow beyond its control. Likewise, it risks not being able to meet the expectations of the Chinese public and runs the risk of painting itself as weak and incompetent. In the wake of the 2012 anti-Japanese protests, for example, some demonstrators expressed dissatisfaction with the Chinese government for not having done enough to punish Japan.

Some protestors even accused the Chinese government of being weak. As one demonstrator put it, “When other countries insult the United States, America strikes back with force. But when China is actually attacked...all we do is insult the attacker. I’m ashamed to be Chinese”.³¹⁸ Clearly nationalism is a double-edged sword. If the Chinese government does not exercise caution, uncontrolled nationalist sentiment could force the government to act in ways it might not prefer, to include using military force against its neighbors. Such actions would be profoundly detrimental for East Asian peace and stability.

Animosity abroad has been stoked by China’s conduct on the seas. In Japan, for example, a poll conducted by the Asahi Shimbun in June 2012 revealed that 84% of Japanese citizens had a negative view of China.³¹⁹ (Such results concur with results of the Gallup poll referenced in Chapter 1.) Moreover, by late 2012, interest for the Japanese Coast Guard had surged to new heights as the disputes over the Senkaku / Diaoyu Islands intensified and young Japanese began applying for positions with the agency.³²⁰ Further, certain Japanese groups and members of government have called for beefing up Japan’s Self-Defense Forces to respond to Chinese conduct,³²¹ and indeed Japanese leaders appear to be responding to such calls by publicly considering using Japan’s Self-Defense Forces to protect Japan’s territorial waters against Chinese incursions.³²² Philippine and Vietnamese media, too, warn of looming militarism in the region,³²³ and government leaders have been contemplating upgrading their militaries to meet the perceived Chinese threat.³²⁴ It is difficult to determine whether such reactions necessarily hint at intensified conflict looming on the horizon, or whether public animosity and the associated pressure placed on governments will eventually subside.

What is certain is that China's policy sows the seeds of discontent and mistrust among its neighbors and among the Chinese people, and this certainly does not contribute to East Asian security and stability.

Limitations of Study

All academic studies have their limitations, and this one is certainly no exception. The conclusions arrived at in this study might be challenged in several ways. For example, it is possible that the full range of interaction between the parties in dispute was not captured. If this is true, the analysis would inherently be flawed, at least to some degree. It is possible that in some instances, informal arrangements were made between parties that were not made visible to outside observers. It is well known that nations negotiate behind the scenes, occasionally threatening each other, extending olive branches, or searching for middle ground. It might very well be the case, for example, that nations who appear to be neutral on the territorial disputes, or whose criticism toward China is muted, are actually much more upset with China than their public statements suggest. The desire to maintain constructive relations with China might dissuade nations from publicizing existing tensions. The converse might also be true. Nations who publicly chastise China might be more willing to cooperate with Chinese leaders behind the scenes. In either case, a lack of complete information on official government positions may skew the results of the analysis. The only conceivable way to circumvent this issue would be to employ less-traditional data collection methods, such as the use of investigative journalism techniques or intelligence collection.

The conclusions of this study might also be challenged in that the study does not include a thorough historical analysis of territorial claims within the region. Such an

analysis was not included as it would have been beyond the scope of the study. However, a better understanding of the historical claims to key territories may have provided a proper context for more accurately interpreting the data.

The findings of the media content and trend analysis might be disputed in that only a single newspaper from each country was selected from which to draw data. Admittedly, noting the number and tone of articles published by a single news source might not be the most accurate approach for drawing conclusions on an admittedly complex issue. However, given that the most popular news source from each country was selected, the method still provides a window for examining, at least to a fair degree, how the issue is perceived by the public.

One might argue that the study unfairly singles out China, painting it as an instigator and irresponsible actor in its relations with other nations. To reiterate, the intent of this thesis was to explore China's behavior *from the perspective of smaller, weaker states*, and to use the ongoing disputes over territory between China and its neighbors as a case environment for examining how smaller states perceive the actions of aspiring ones. The intent was not to single out or assign blame to any particular nation.

Finally, although the study was carried out with a mind toward *objective* data collection and analysis, exercising subjectivity was at times unavoidable. For example, identifying the initiator of a conflict event and the target of the action required exercising a degree of subjectivity. Likewise, identifying relevant media reports and gauging the tone expressed in the reports required some subjective decision-making. Devising a more scientific approach for identifying and interpreting media reports might enhance objectivity in the research process. In addition, linking China's actions with the

consequences of those actions was a process that left room for interpretation. One method that might help establish a link between China's actions and consequences would be to conduct a public survey each month within nations neighboring China. Questions could be designed to capture views about specific events and how these events impact attitudes toward China.

In spite of these limitations, I am confident that any objective-minded researcher would be able to use my methodology to reproduce the same or very similar results to those I have generated in this study. Moreover, I am confident that the same methodology could be applied to other nations and circumstances to determine whether bullying is occurring at the international level.

Future Research

The nature of China's interaction with its maritime neighbors has undoubtedly been contentious in recent years. A bold approach to foreign policy has left many of China's neighbors uneasy about the prospects for long-term peace and stability in the region. Yet it is difficult at this stage to ascertain how China's relationship with its maritime neighbors will play out. As a nation that has historically secluded itself from the rest of world, an ascendant China flexing its geopolitical muscles is a relatively new phenomenon. Among the great "unknowns" is whether China's new leaders, having taken office within the past year, will continue to pursue the assertive policy of their predecessors with respect to the maritime claims issue. Future research, using the techniques employed in this study, may help answer this question. Tracking conflict events and media trends throughout 2013 and beyond should provide indications of

whether China has toned down its approach, or whether the assertive trend continues.

Moreover, China is currently experiencing a rapid shift in its social landscape as its economy continues to boom. How this ultimately impacts China's foreign policy in the region remains to be seen. Well-designed studies that examine China's social transformation and relations with neighboring nations (especially in the context of bully behavior theory) might be helpful for predicting future Chinese foreign policy.

Furthermore, this study focused on disputes between China and its maritime neighbors. Follow-on research, employing the same methodology, might be useful for determining whether the approach China is pursuing in the East and South China Seas is also being pursued in its interaction with land-bordering nations such as India, Laos, Myanmar, Russia, and Mongolia. Do these nations perceive China as a bully too, and if so, what are the potential consequences? Ultimately, such research might help determine whether China's policy in the East and South China Seas is isolated to that region, or whether it is part of a larger, more general foreign policy.

Finally, future research might include applying the model proposed in this thesis to other instances in which smaller states accuse larger ones of bullying them. This thesis applied bully theory to state-level interaction in one specific case, and assessed how smaller states react when confronted with the bold policy of an aspiring state. A broader application of this model might offer some insight into the effectiveness of small state responses when their interests conflict with those of rising powers, and some important conclusions might be drawn about whether bullying theory is truly applicable at the international level. This, in turn, might even open the door to research on whether states, like individuals, experience emotions that stem from a perceived sense of being bullied.

Final Assessment

Since March of this year, when China's new president Xi Jinping took power, a period of relative calm seems to have settled over East Asia's maritime regions. Although none of the claimants has modified its position on maritime claims, and although no real progress has been made on addressing the underlying issues that feed the disputes, no major incidents of conflict between China and its neighbors have occurred in recent months. Whether this trend will continue is questionable. It is likely that China's new leaders, early in their tenure, have decided to temporarily dial down the level of assertiveness in China's maritime policy. However, if past trends are any indication of future events, the region is likely to encounter choppy waters before too long. It must be said that historical grievances, persistent mistrust among neighbors, nationalist sentiment, and disputes over maritime territory have bedeviled the East Asia region for decades. Assigning blame to any one nation for the region's enduring volatility would be unfair, as all claimants have contributed to the tensions that persist.

Insofar as China's recent conduct and the reactions of its neighbors in the East and South China Seas is concerned, it is clear that little is happening to mitigate existing tensions. China continues to grow and continues to pursue a policy that serves its core interests, but its maritime neighbors perceive that policy as disruptive. These small states continue to perceive themselves as victims of unfair treatment and accuse China of being a bully, even though China considers its actions as appropriate based on history and national interest. Unfortunately, the friction between great power conduct and smaller state perceptions and reactions appears to have harmful consequences for all those involved. Without question, both great powers and smaller states contribute to that

friction. However, as states accumulate power and enhance their ability to shape relationships and outcomes, perhaps they incur a responsibility to more carefully consider the positions of smaller states. The challenge, it seems, is for great and aspiring powers like China to find a proper balance between exercising bold leadership and implementing policy in a way that mollifies the fears of weaker members of the international community.

Notes

Chapter 1

¹ Sieg, Linda, and Kiyoshi Takenaka. "Japan protests to China after radar pointed at vessel," *Reuters*, February 5, 2013. Accessed February 11, 2013, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/05/us-china-japan-idUSBRE9140IY20130205>.

² Cronin, P. "Contested Waters: Managing Disputes in the East and South China Seas," *Center for a New American Security, East & South China Seas Bulletin 6* (December 2012).

³ Chang, Gordon G. "China and the Biggest Territory Grab Since World War II," *Forbes*, June 2, 2013. Accessed June 5, 2013, <http://www.forbes.com/sites/gordonchang/2013/06/02/china-and-the-biggest-territory-grab-since-world-war-ii/>.

⁴ Vietnam Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Regular Press Briefing by MOFA's Spokesperson Nguyen Phuong Nga*, June 9, 2011. Accessed March 11, 2013, http://www.mofa.gov.vn/en/tt_baochi/pbnfn/ns110610145220#tr5qmcP0xVB6.

⁵ Japan Ministry of Defense, *Press Conference by the Defense Minister*, December 25, 2012. Accessed January 2, 2013, <http://www.mod.go.jp/e/pressconf/2012/12/121225.html>.

⁶ Philippines Office of the President, *Benigno S. Aquino III, Third State of the Nation Address*, July 23, 2012. Accessed March 2, 2013, <http://www.gov.ph/2012/07/23/english-translation-benigno-s-aquino-iii-third-state-of-the-nation-address-july-23-2012/>.

⁷ U.S. State Department, *Daily Press Briefing*, August 14, 2012. Accessed February 21, 2013, <http://translations.state.gov/st/english/texttrans/2012/08/20120814134677.html#axzz2bFNVaKbX>.

⁸ Gallup Organization. Results compiled from polls conducted 2008-2012. April 2008 <http://www.gallup.com/poll/106858/chinas-leadership-better-regarded-outside-west.aspx>; November 2010 <http://www.gallup.com/poll/144269/leadership-popular-asia-china-india.aspx>; March 2011 <http://www.gallup.com/poll/146771/worldwide-approval-leadership-tops-major-powers.aspx#1>; November 2011 <http://www.gallup.com/poll/150830/leadership-approval-ratings-top-china-asia.aspx>; April 2012 <http://www.gallup.com/poll/153965/germany-tie-highest-approval-among-top-powers.aspx#2>; Gallup Worldview for 2012 data, Accessed March 11, 2013: <https://worldview.gallup.com/>.

⁹ Fackler, Martin. "Chinese Patrol Ships Pressuring Japan Over Islands," *New York Times*, November 2, 2012. Accessed January 27, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/03/world/asia/china-keeps-up-pressure-on-japan-over-disputed-islands-with-patrols.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.

¹⁰ Global Security. "Senkaku / Diaoyutai Islands." Accessed March 31, 2012. <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/senkaku.htm>.

¹¹ Ryall, Julian. "Japan agrees to buy disputed Senkaku islands," *The Telegraph*, September 5, 2012. Accessed April 11, 2013. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/japan/9521793/Japan-agrees-to-buy-disputed-Senkaku-islands.html>.

¹² McCurry, Justin. "Japanese firms close offices in China as islands row escalates." *The Guardian*, September 17, 2012. Accessed March 23, 2013, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/sep/17/japanese-firms-close-offices-china>.

¹³ Dutton, Peter. "Three Disputes and Three Objectives." *Naval War College Review*, Autumn 2011, Vol. 64, No. 4, 44.

¹⁴ Nathan, A.J. and Andrew Scobell. *China's Search for Security*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2012, 143.

¹⁵ Tuan, Joang Anh. "Chinese Strategic Miscalculations in the South China Sea," *East-West Center, Asia Pacific Bulletin*, September 27, 2012.

¹⁶ "Solid evidence supports China's sovereignty claim over Huangyan Island," *Xinhua*, May 10, 2012. Accessed March 19, 2013. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/indepth/2012-05/10/c_131580634.htm.

¹⁷ Fravel, M. Taylor. *Strong Borders, Secure Nation: Cooperation and Conflict in China's Territorial Disputes*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008, 8.

¹⁸ Garver, John W. "China's Push through the South China Sea," *The China Quarterly*, No. 132 (Dec 1992), 999-1028.

¹⁹ Symon, Andrew. "China, Vietnam churn diplomatic waters," *Asia Times*, Dec 20, 2007. Accessed April 2, 2013. <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/IL20Ad01.html>.

²⁰ Greene, Marilyn. "Gunboats Clash in Philippines," *USA Today*, Jan 26, 1996.

²¹ Center for a New American Security, Flashpoints Timeline. Accessed February 12, 2013. <http://www.cnas.org/flashpoints/timeline>.

- ²² Center for a New American Security, Flashpoints Timeline. Accessed Mar 15, 2013. <http://www.cnas.org/flashpoints/timeline>.
- ²³ Shambaugh, David. "Center for China United States Cooperation: China Forum". Lecture, Josef Korbel School of International Studies, Denver, Colorado, February 7, 2013.
- ²⁴ U.S. Energy Information Administration Report: *East China Sea*, Sep 25, 2012. <http://www.eia.gov/countries/regions-topics.cfm?fips=ECS>.
- ²⁵ U.S. Energy Information Administration Report: *South China Sea*, Feb 7, 2013. <http://www.eia.gov/countries/regions-topics.cfm?fips=SCS>.
- ²⁶ Chakraborti, Tridib. "China and Vietnam in the South China Sea Dispute: A Creeping 'Conflict-Peace-Trepidation' Syndrome," *China Report 2012*, Vol. 48, 283.
- ²⁷ "China raises dispute over Senkakus into airspace above," *Asahi Shimbun*, Dec 14, 2012. Accessed Apr 3, 2013. http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/politics/AJ201212140079.
- ²⁸ "China raises administrative status of South China Sea islands," *Xinhua*, June 21, 2012. Accessed May 2, 2013. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-06/21/c_131668568.htm.
- ²⁹ Cronin, Richard and Zach Dubel. "Sea of Absurdity: Sansha, China's New Island 'City'," *Stimson Center*, Aug 14, 2012. Accessed Feb 25, 2013. <http://www.stimson.org/spotlight/sea-of-absurdity-sansha-chinas-new-island-city/>.
- ³⁰ Ibid.
- ³¹ U.S. State Department Press Statement, "South China Sea," Aug 3, 2012. <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/08/196022.htm>.
- ³² "'Imperialist' map in China's new passport angers Hanoi and Delhi," *AsiaNews.it*, Nov 26, 2012. Accessed May 3, 2013. <http://www.asianews.it/news-en/Imperialist-map-in-China's-new-passport-angers-Hanoi-and-Delhi-26458.html>.
- ³³ Ford, Peter. "China's passport propaganda baffles experts," *The Christian Science Monitor*, Nov 27, 2012. Accessed January 3, 2013. <http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-Pacific/2012/1127/China-s-passport-propaganda-baffles-experts>.
- ³⁴ Stearns, Scott. "China Bashes Western 'meddling' Over South China Sea," *Voice of America*, Aug 15, 2012. Accessed May 3, 2013. <http://blogs.voanews.com/state-department-news/2012/08/15/china-bashes-western-meddling-over-south-china-sea/>.

³⁵ Haddick, Robert. "Foreign Policy: Salami Slicing in the South China Sea," *National Public Radio*, Aug 6, 2012. Accessed Mar 23, 2013. <http://www.npr.org/2012/08/06/158191473/foreign-policy-salami-slicing-in-the-south-china-sea>.

³⁶ Auslin, Michael. "Will China go to war in January 2013?" *American Enterprise Institute*, Nov 30, 2012. Accessed Feb 23, 2013. <http://www.aei.org/article/foreign-and-defense-policy/regional/asia/will-china-go-to-war-in-january-2013/>.

Chapter 2

³⁷ Zhao, Suisheng. "Hu Jintao's Foreign Policy Legacy," *E-International Relations*, Dec 8, 2012. Accessed Dec 15, 2012. <http://www.e-ir.info/2012/12/08/hu-jintaos-foreign-policy-legacy/>.

³⁸ "China's Peaceful Development," *China Information Office of the State Council*, Sep 6, 2011. Accessed Feb 27, 2013. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-09/06/c_131102329_4.htm.

³⁹ Friedberg, Aaron. "Hegemony with Chinese Characteristics," *The National Interest*, June 21, 2011. Accessed Jan 25, 2013. <http://nationalinterest.org/article/hegemony-chinese-characteristics-5439>.

⁴⁰ Zhao, Suisheng. "Hu Jintao's Foreign Policy Legacy," *E-International Relations*, Dec 8, 2012. Accessed Dec 15, 2012. <http://www.e-ir.info/2012/12/08/hu-jintaos-foreign-policy-legacy/>.

⁴¹ "Stirring Up the South China Sea," *International Crisis Group, Asia Report*, Apr 23, 2012, No. 223, 4.

⁴² Nathan, A.J. and Andrew Scobell. *China's Search for Security*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2012, 145.

⁴³ Heydarian, Richard J. "The South China Sea Conundrum," *Foreign Policy in Focus*, Sep 8, 2011. Accessed May 11, 2013. http://fpif.org/the_south_china_sea_conundrum/.

⁴⁴ "Stirring Up the South China Sea," *International Crisis Group, Asia Report*, Apr 23, 2012, No. 223, 4.

⁴⁵ Bader, Jeffrey. *Obama and China's Rise: An Insider's Account of America's Asia Strategy*, Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2012, chapter 7.

⁴⁶ "Stirring Up the South China Sea," *International Crisis Group, Asia Report*, Apr 23, 2012, No. 223, 4.

- ⁴⁷ Nathan, A.J. and Andrew Scobell. *China's Search for Security*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2012, 7.
- ⁴⁸ Ibid, 7-8.
- ⁴⁹ Ibid, 15.
- ⁵⁰ Shambaugh, David. *China Goes Global: The Partial Power*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2013, 53.
- ⁵¹ Zhao, Suisheng. *Chinese Foreign Policy: Pragmatism and Strategic Behavior*. New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2004, 70.
- ⁵² Nathan, A.J. and Andrew Scobell. *China's Search for Security*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2012, 33.
- ⁵³ Kissinger, Henry. *On China*. New York: The Penguin Press, 2011, 335.
- ⁵⁴ Dreyer, June T. *China's Political System: Modernization and Tradition, 3rd ed.* New York: Longman, 2000, 305.
- ⁵⁵ Zhao, Suisheng. *Chinese Foreign Policy: Pragmatism and Strategic Behavior*. New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2004, 4.
- ⁵⁶ Nathan, A.J. and Andrew Scobell. *China's Search for Security*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2012, 12.
- ⁵⁷ Westad, O.A. *Restless Empire*. New York: Basic Books, 2012, 418.
- ⁵⁸ Shambaugh, David. *China Goes Global: The Partial Power*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2013, 49-50.
- ⁵⁹ Sutter, Robert. *Chinese Foreign Relations: Power and Policy Since the Cold War*. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2012, 37.
- ⁶⁰ Westad, O.A. *Restless Empire*. New York: Basic Books, 2012, 418.
- ⁶¹ Jiru, Shen. *Zhongguo Budang Bu Xiansheng: Dangdai Zhongguo de Guoji Zhanlue Wenti (China Does Not Want to Be Mr. No: Problems of International Strategy for Today's China)*. Beijing: Jinri Zhongguo Chubanshe, 1998, 62.
- ⁶² Zhao, Suisheng. *Chinese Foreign Policy: Pragmatism and Strategic Behavior*. New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2004, 18.

- ⁶³ Nathan, A.J. and Andrew Scobell. *China's Search for Security*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2012, 29.
- ⁶⁴ White, Hugh. *The China Choice*. Collingwood, Australia: Black Inc., 2012, 114.
- ⁶⁵ Nathan, A.J. and Andrew Scobell. *China's Search for Security*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2012, 29.
- ⁶⁶ "Hu Jintao calls for building harmonious world," *Xinhua*, Oct 15, 2007. Accessed Mar 23, 2013. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-10/15/content_6884160.htm.
- ⁶⁷ Nathan, A.J. and Andrew Scobell. *China's Search for Security*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2012, 28.
- ⁶⁸ Shambaugh, David. *China Goes Global: The Partial Power*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2013, 51.
- ⁶⁹ Sutter, Robert. *Chinese Foreign Relations: Power and Policy Since the Cold War*. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2012, 210.
- ⁷⁰ Ibid, 211.
- ⁷¹ Ibid, 211.
- ⁷² "Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea," *Association of Southeast Asian Nations*, Nov, 4, 2002. Accessed Mar 25, 2013. <http://www.asean.org/asean/external-relations/china/item/declaration-on-the-conduct-of-parties-in-the-south-china-sea>.
- ⁷³ Sutter, Robert. *Chinese Foreign Relations: Power and Policy Since the Cold War*. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2012, 212.
- ⁷⁴ Ibid, 213.
- ⁷⁵ Shambaugh, David. *China Goes Global: The Partial Power*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2013, 51.
- ⁷⁶ Glaser, Bonnie. "Armed Clash in the South China Sea," *Council of Foreign Relations*, April 2012. Accessed Mar 27, 2013. <http://www.cfr.org/world/armed-clash-south-china-sea/p27883>.
- ⁷⁷ Starr, Barbara. "Chinese boat harassed U.S. ship, officials say," *CNN*, May 5, 2009. Accessed June 9, 2013. <http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/asiapcf/05/05/china.maritime.harassment/index.html?s=PM:WORLD>.

⁷⁸ “Pentagon says Chinese vessels harassed U.S. ship,” *CNN*, Mar 9, 2009. Accessed June 9, 2013.
<http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/03/09/us.navy.china/index.html?s=PM:POLITICS>.

⁷⁹ Starr, Barbara. “Sub collides with sonar array towed by U.S. Navy ship,” *CNN*, June 12, 2009. Accessed June 9, 2013.
<http://edition.cnn.com/2009/US/06/12/china.submarine/index.html>.

⁸⁰ Swaine, Michael. “Perceptions of an Assertive China”, *China Leadership Monitor*, No. 32; retrieved from the Carnegie Endowment website. Accessed Mar 2, 2013.
<http://carnegieendowment.org/files/CLM32MS1.pdf>.

⁸¹ Shambaugh, David. “Center for China United States Cooperation: China Forum”. Lecture, Josef Korbel School of International Studies, Denver, Colorado, February 7, 2013.

⁸² Sutter, Robert. *Chinese Foreign Relations: Power and Policy Since the Cold War*. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2012, 227.

⁸³ Shambaugh, David. *China Goes Global: The Partial Power*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2013, 51.

⁸⁴ Donnelly, Jack. *The Ethics of Realism*, from the Oxford Handbook of International Relations. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 2008, 150.

⁸⁵ Dacicco, Jonathan M. and Jack S. Levy. ”Power Shifts and Problem Shifts: The Evolution of the Power Transition Research Program,” *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Dec 1999, 43:6, p. 679.

⁸⁶ Ibid, p. 679.

⁸⁷ Organski, A.F.K. & Kugler, J. *The War Ledger*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), p. 15.

⁸⁸ Dacicco, Jonathan M. and Levy, Jack S. ”Power Shifts and Problem Shifts: The Evolution of the Power Transition Research Program”, *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Dec 1999, 43:6, 679.

⁸⁹ “Power Transition Theory,” from *Oxford Bibliographies*. Accessed Apr 5, 2013.
<http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199743292/obo-9780199743292-0038.xml>.

⁹⁰ Organski, A.F.K. and Jacek Kugler. *The War Ledger*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980, 204.

- ⁹¹ Organski, A.F.K. *World Politics*. California: Knopf, 1968, 104.
- ⁹² Organski, A.F.K. and Jacek Kugler. *The War Ledger*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980, 59.
- ⁹³ *Ibid*, 23.
- ⁹⁴ *Ibid*, 19-20.
- ⁹⁵ *Ibid*, 59.
- ⁹⁶ Leffler, Melvyn P. "911 in Retrospect", *Foreign Affairs*, Sep/Oct 2011, Vol. 90, Issue 5, 33-44.
- ⁹⁷ Organski, A.F.K. and Jacek Kugler. *The War Ledger*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980, 23.
- ⁹⁸ *Ibid*, 206.
- ⁹⁹ *Ibid*, 28.
- ¹⁰⁰ Schweller, Randall L. and Xiaoyu Pu. "After Unipolarity: China's Visions of International Order in an Era of U.S. Decline," *International Security*, Vol. 36, No. 1, Summer 2011, 44.
- ¹⁰¹ *Ibid*, 48-49.

Chapter 3

- ¹⁰² Lines, Dennis. *Bullies: Understanding Bullies and Bullying*. London: Jessica Kingsley Publishers, 2007, 25.
- ¹⁰³ *Ibid*, 76.
- ¹⁰⁴ *Ibid*, 80.
- ¹⁰⁵ Vanhoutte, Kristof and Melanie Lang. *Bullying and the Abuse of Power*. Oxford, UK: Critical Issues Inter-Disciplinary Press, 2010, 12.
- ¹⁰⁶ Tattum, D.P. and E. Tattum. "Bullying: A Whole-School Response", in N. Jones and E. Baglin Jones (eds) *Learning to Behave*. London: Kogan Page, 1992.

- ¹⁰⁷ Vanhoutte, Kristof and Melanie Lang. *Bullying and the Abuse of Power*. Oxford, UK: Critical Issues Inter-Disciplinary Press, 2010, 4.
- ¹⁰⁸ Rigby, Kenneth. *New Perspectives on Bullying*. Philadelphia, PA: Jessica Kingsley Publishers, 2002, 29.
- ¹⁰⁹ Vanhoutte, Kristof and Melanie Lang. *Bullying and the Abuse of Power*. Oxford, UK: Critical Issues Inter-Disciplinary Press, 2010, 14.
- ¹¹⁰ Smith, P.K. and Sharp, S. (eds). *School Bullying: Insights and Perspectives*. London: Routledge, 1994.
- ¹¹¹ Tattum, D.P. and E. Tattum, E. “Bullying: A Whole-School Response”, in N. Jones and E. Baglin Jones (eds) *Learning to Behave*. London: Kogan Page, 1992.
- ¹¹² Olweus, D. *Bullying at School: What We Know and What We Can Do*. Oxford: Blackwell, 1993.
- ¹¹³ Roland, E. and Munthe, E. (eds). *Bullying: An International Perspective*. (London: David Fulton, 1989.
- ¹¹⁴ Bjorkquist, K., K. Eckman and K. Lagerspetz. “Bullies and victims: Their ego picture, ideal ego picture, and normative ego picture,” *Scandinavian Journal of Psychology*, No. 23, 1982, 307-313.
- ¹¹⁵ Besag, V. *Bullies and Victims in Schools*. Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1989.
- ¹¹⁶ Farrington, D. “Understanding and Preventing Bullying”, in M. Tonry (ed.) *Crime and Justice: A Review of Research*, Vol. 17, 1993, 381-459.
- ¹¹⁷ Olweus, D. *Bullying at School: What We Know and What We Can Do*. Oxford: Blackwell, 1993.
- ¹¹⁸ Rigby, Kenneth. *New Perspectives on Bullying*. Philadelphia, PA: Jessica Kingsley Publishers, 2002, 32.
- ¹¹⁹ Vanhoutte, Kristof and Melanie Lang. *Bullying and the Abuse of Power*. Oxford, UK: Critical Issues Inter-Disciplinary Press, 2010, 15.
- ¹²⁰ Ibid, 15.
- ¹²¹ Rigby, Kenneth. *New Perspectives on Bullying*. Philadelphia, PA: Jessica Kingsley Publishers, 2002, 49.

- ¹²² Vanhoutte, Kristof and Melanie Lang. *Bullying and the Abuse of Power*. Oxford, UK: Critical Issues Inter-Disciplinary Press, 2010, 15.
- ¹²³ Lines, D. *Bullies: Understanding Bullies and Bullying*. London: Jessica Kingsley Publishers, 2007, 19.
- ¹²⁴ “Definition of Bullying”, *American Psychological Association*. Accessed Feb 21, 2013. <http://www.apa.org/topics/bullying/index.aspx>.
- ¹²⁵ Lines, Dennis. *Bullies: Understanding Bullies and Bullying*. London: Jessica Kingsley Publishers, 2007, 77.
- ¹²⁶ Zarzour, K. *The Schoolyard Bully*. Toronto: Harper Collins, 1999, 57.
- ¹²⁷ Fried, S. & E. Blanche. *Banishing Bullying Behavior: Exploring the Culture of Pain, Rage and Revenge*. Blue Ridge Summit, Pennsylvania: Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, 2009, 27.
- ¹²⁸ Ibid, 28.
- ¹²⁹ Center for the Study and Prevention of Violence, Institute of Behavioral Science, University of Colorado-Boulder (2001). <http://www.colorado.edu/cspv/publications/factsheets/safeschools/FS-SC07.pdf>.
- ¹³⁰ Fried, S. and E. Blanche. *Banishing Bullying Behavior: Exploring the Culture of Pain, Rage and Revenge*, Blue Ridge Summit, Pennsylvania: Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, 2009, 25.
- ¹³¹ Vanhoutte, Kristof and Melanie Lang. *Bullying and the Abuse of Power*. Oxford, UK: Critical Issues Inter-Disciplinary Press, 2010, 12.
- ¹³² Safran, Elysa. “Bully Behavior, Bully Prevention Programs, and Gender”, *Journal of Emotional Abuse*, Vol. 7(4), 2007, 48.
- ¹³³ St. Clair, Jane. “What Causes Bullies?”, *By Parents for Parents*, 2011. Accessed Feb 15, 2013. <http://www.byparents-forparents.com/causesbullies.html>.
- ¹³⁴ Safran, Elysa. “Bully Behavior, Bully Prevention Programs, and Gender”, *Journal of Emotional Abuse*, Vol. 7(4), 2007, 51.
- ¹³⁵ Psychology Today, 2002. Accessed Feb 15, 2013. <http://www.psychologytoday.com/basics/bullying>.
- ¹³⁶ Lines, Dennis. *Bullies: Understanding Bullies and Bullying*. London: Jessica Kingsley Publishers, 2007, 62-71.

- ¹³⁷ Rigby, Kenneth. *New Perspectives on Bullying*. Philadelphia, PA: Jessica Kingsley Publishers, 2002, 256.
- ¹³⁸ Ibid, 257.
- ¹³⁹ Ibid, 256.
- ¹⁴⁰ Ibid, 257.
- ¹⁴¹ Daniel, T.A. *Stop Bullying at Work: Strategies and Tools for HR and Legal Professionals*. Virginia: Society for Human Resource Management, 2009, 95.
- ¹⁴² Hornstein, H. *Brutal Bosses and their Prey: How to Identify and Overcome Abuse in the Workplace*. New York: Riverhead Books, 1996, 121-126.
- ¹⁴³ Daniel, T.A. *Stop Bullying at Work: Strategies and Tools for HR and Legal Professionals*. Virginia: Society for Human Resource Management, 2009, 92.
- ¹⁴⁴ Ibid, p92-93.
- ¹⁴⁵ Fried, Suellen and E. Blanche. *Banishing Bullying Behavior: Exploring the Culture of Pain, Rage and Revenge*. Blue Ridge Summit, Pennsylvania: Roman and Littlefield Publishing, 2010, 23.
- ¹⁴⁶ “The Effects of Bullying for Victims,” *Dealing with Bullies, an online resource*. Accessed Feb 16, 2013. <http://www.dealingwithbullies.org/the-effects-of-bullying-for-victims>.
- ¹⁴⁷ “Resources about bullying”. *Pacer.org, National Bullying Prevention Center*. Accessed Feb 21, 2013. <http://www.pacer.org/bullying.resources/whybullying.asp>.
- ¹⁴⁸ Mount, George R. “Bullying: Characteristics, Consequences and Interventions,” *Journal of Police Crisis Negotiations*, Vol.5(2), 2005, 2.
- ¹⁴⁹ Schwartz, D., L.J. Proctor, and D.H. Chien. “ The aggressive victim of bullying”, in J. Juvonen & S. Graham (Eds.), *Peer harassment in school. The plight of the vulnerable and victimized*. New York: Guildford Press, 2001, 147-174.
- ¹⁵⁰ Safran, Elysa. “Bully Behavior, Bully Prevention Programs, and Gender”, *Journal of Emotional Abuse*, Vol. 7(4), 2007, 18.
- ¹⁵¹ Bernstein, J.Y. and M.W. Watson. “Children who are targets of bullying,” *Journal of Interpersonal Violence*, 12(4), 1997, 483-498.
- ¹⁵² Rigby, Kenneth. *New Perspectives on Bullying*. Philadelphia, PA: Jessica Kingsley Publishers, 2002, 256.

¹⁵³ Ibid, 259.

¹⁵⁴ Salin, Denise. "Ways of explaining workplace bullying: A review of enabling, motivating and precipitating structures and processes in the work environment," *Human Relations*, Vol. 56(10), 2003, 1213-1232.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid, 1215-1216.

¹⁵⁶ Vanhoutte, Kristof and Melanie Lang. *Bullying and the Abuse of Power*. Oxford, UK: Critical Issues Inter-Disciplinary Press, 2010, 15.

¹⁵⁷ Volk, A., J. Camilleri, and Z. Marini. "Is Adolescent Bullying an Evolutionary Adaptation?," *Aggressive Behavior*, Vol. 38, 2012, 227.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid, 224.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid, 225.

¹⁶¹ Ibid.

¹⁶² Center for the Study and Prevention of Violence, Institute of Behavioral Science, University of Colorado-Boulder (2001).
<http://www.colorado.edu/cspv/publications/factsheets/safeschools/FS-SC07.pdf>.

¹⁶³ Fried, S. and E. Blanche. *Banishing Bullying Behavior: Exploring the Culture of Pain, Rage and Revenge*. Blue Ridge Summit, Pennsylvania: Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, 2009, 11.

¹⁶⁴ Center for the Study and Prevention of Violence, Institute of Behavioral Science, University of Colorado-Boulder (2001).
<http://www.colorado.edu/cspv/publications/factsheets/safeschools/FS-SC07.pdf>.

¹⁶⁵ Fried, S. E. Blanche. *Banishing Bullying Behavior: Exploring the Culture of Pain, Rage and Revenge*. Blue Ridge Summit, Pennsylvania: Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, 2009, 2.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid, 2-3.

¹⁶⁷ Rigby, Kenneth. *New Perspectives on Bullying*. Philadelphia, PA: Jessica Kingsley Publishers, 2002, 135.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid, 79.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid, 80.

¹⁷⁰ Burns, John F. “Vitriol Over Falklands Resurfaces, as Do Old Arguments”, *New York Times*, Jan 5, 2013. Accessed Mar 17, 2013. <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/06/world/americas/argentinas-call-for-return-of-falkland-islands-causes-a-stir.html?pagewanted=all&r=0>.

¹⁷¹ Khan, Urmee. “The English are like bulldogs and Mrs. Thatcher won’t be bullied: How Argentine ambassador warned Junta not to invade Falklands”. *The Daily Mail*, Oct 13, 2011. Accessed Feb 17, 2013. <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2048382/Julta-warned-invade-Falklands-Margaret-Thatcher-wont-bullied.html#axzz2Jyil7cWV>.

¹⁷² Drury, Ian. “Britain branded ‘bully boy thugs’ for still refusing to allow Argentina to reclaim the Falkland Islands”. *The Daily Mail*, June 22, 2011. Accessed Feb 19, 2013. <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2006888/Britain-bully-boy-thugs-refusing-allow-Arentina-reclaim-Falkland-Islands.html>.

¹⁷³ Khan, Urmee. “The English are like bulldogs and Mrs. Thatcher won’t be bullied: How Argentine ambassador warned Junta not to invade Falklands,” *The Daily Mail*, Oct 13, 2011. Accessed Feb 17, 2013. <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2048382/Julta-warned-invade-Falklands-Margaret-Thatcher-wont-bullied.html#axzz2Jyil7cWV>.

¹⁷⁴ Feste, Karen. *America Responds to Terrorism*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011, 4.

Chapter 4

¹⁷⁵ *4International Media and Newspapers*, 2013. Accessed Mar 29, 2013. <http://www.4imn.com/>.

Chapter 5

¹⁷⁶ Globalfirepower.com. “Countries ranked by military strength.” Accessed July 18, 2013. <http://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing.asp>.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid. “China vs. South Korea.” Accessed July 18, 2013. <http://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-comparison-detail.asp?form=form&country1=China&country2=South-Korea&Submit=Compare+Countries>.

- ¹⁷⁸ Ibid. “World Military Power Rankings 2013.” Accessed July 13, 2013. <http://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing.asp>.
- ¹⁷⁹ CIA World Fact Book. “Country Comparison: GDP (Purchasing Power Parity).” Accessed July 23, 2013. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2001rank.html>.
- ¹⁸⁰ Trubowitz, Peter. *Politics and Strategy: Partisan Ambition and American Statecraft*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2011, 11.
- ¹⁸¹ Lines, Dennis. *Bullies: Understanding Bullies and Bullying*. London: Jessica Kingsley Publishers, 2007, 65.
- ¹⁸² Perlez, J. “China Steps Up Pressure on Japan in Islands Dispute,” *New York Times*, December 15, 2012. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/16/world/asia/china-steps-up-pressure-on-japan-in-island-dispute.html?_r=0.
- ¹⁸³ China government web portal. “Full text of Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China.” September 10, 2012. Accessed April 11, 2013. http://english.gov.cn/2012-09/10/content_2221417.htm.
- ¹⁸⁴ Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “Protest Regarding the Issue of Proximate Flights by Military Helicopters Near the Escort Ship ‘Asayuki’ by the People’s Republic of China.” April 21, 2010. Accessed Feb 10, 2013. http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2010/4/0421_04.html.
- ¹⁸⁵ Japan Ministry of Defense. “Press Conference by the Defense Minister,” March 8, 2011. Accessed Feb 21, 2013. <http://www.mod.go.jp/e/pressconf/2011/03/110308.html>.
- ¹⁸⁶ Gomez, J. *The Washington Post*, “Philippines sends warplanes near disputed islands.” March 3, 2011. Accessed April 3, 2013. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/03/03/AR2011030301080.html>.
- ¹⁸⁷ Vietnam Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “Regular Press Briefing by MOFA’s Spokesperson Nguyen Phuong Nga on June 9th, 2011”. June 9, 2011. Accessed March 11, 2013. http://www.mofa.gov.vn/en/tt_baochi/pbnfn/ns110610145220#tr5qmcP0xVB6.
- ¹⁸⁸ “Japan lodges protest with China over East China Sea”. *BBC*. Feb 20, 2012. Accessed March 7, 2013. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-17093549>.
- ¹⁸⁹ Vietnam Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Press News, Spokesperson’s Statement. “Viet Nam protests China’s acts against Fisherman”. February 2012. Accessed March 17, 2013. http://www.mofa.gov.vn/en/tt_baochi/pbnfn/ns120301165106.

¹⁹⁰ Vietnam Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “Chinese ‘national plan of islands protection’ a serious violation of Viet Nam’s sovereignty.” April 2012. Accessed March 23, 2013. http://www.mofa.gov.vn/en/tt_baochi/pbnfn/ns120425175634.

¹⁹¹ Philippines Office of the President, Official Gazette. “Benigno S. Aquino III, Third State of the Nation Address, July 23, 2012”. July 23, 2012. Accessed June 23, 2013. <http://www.gov.ph/2012/07/23/english-translation-benigno-s-aquino-iii-third-state-of-the-nation-address-july-23-2012/>.

¹⁹² “China reiterates Diaoyu Islands position to Japanese diplomat”. *Xinhua*. Sept 12, 2012. Accessed Feb 27, 2013. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-09/12/c_123708231.htm.

¹⁹³ “Backgrounder: Basic facts on China’s sovereignty over Huangyan Island”. *Xinhua*. April 14, 2012. Accessed March 23, 2013. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2012-04/14/c_122980075.htm.

¹⁹⁴ “China enjoys ‘indisputable sovereignty’ over Xisha Islands and adjacent islands: FM spokesman.” *People’s Daily*. January 4, 2007. http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200701/04/eng20070104_338270.html.

¹⁹⁵ “China reiterates its ‘indisputable sovereignty’ over Diaoyu Islands”. *People’s Daily*. January 4, 2012. Accessed March 23, 2013. <http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90883/7695194.html>.

¹⁹⁶ “China’s gas exploration in East China Sea ‘indisputable’, says FM spokesperson”. *People.com*. February 7, 2007. Accessed March 21, 2013. http://english.people.com.cn/200702/07/eng20070207_347977.html.

¹⁹⁷ “Japan’s ‘theft’ of Diaoyu Islands risks China-Japan economic, trade ties”. *Xinhua*. Sept 24, 2012. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-09/24/c_131870020.htm.

¹⁹⁸ “Xinhua Commentary Says Japan Forsaking Pacifist Principles with Island Purchase”. *Open Source Center*, from *Xinhua*, Sept 14, 2012. Accessed July 23, 2013. https://www.opensource.gov/portal/server.pt/gateway/PTARGS_0_0_200_203_0_43/content/Display/PPP20120914075005.

¹⁹⁹ “Philippines’ Huangyan Island sovereignty claim ‘illegal’: spokesman”. *Xinhua*. April 27, 2012. Accessed March 27, 2013. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-04/27/c_131556588.htm.

²⁰⁰ “China urges Philippines not to exacerbate South China Sea situation”. *Xinhua*. June 25, 2012. Accessed March 23, 2013. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-06/25/c_131675090.htm.

- ²⁰¹ “Historical facts show Diaoyu Islands belong to China: Kenyan paper”. *Xinhua*. Oct 15, 2012. Accessed April 3, 2013. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/indepth/2012-10/15/c_131907883.htm.
- ²⁰² “New discovery in Brussels reinforces China’s sovereignty over Diaoyu Dao”. *Xinhua*. Oct 25, 2012. Accessed April 3, 2013. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-10/25/c_131929628.htm.
- ²⁰³ “Japan attempts to tamper history through Diaoyu Islands “purchase”: German expert”. *Xinhua*. Sept 19, 2012. Accessed March 27, 2013. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-09/19/c_131858772.htm.
- ²⁰⁴ “‘Purchase’ of Diaoyu Islands big mistake by Japanese gov’t: Spanish expert”. *Xinhua*. Sept 18, 2012. Accessed April 3, 2013. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/indepth/2012-09/18/c_131858746.htm.
- ²⁰⁵ “Diaoyu islands belong to China: Austrian international law expert”. *Xinhua*. Oct 6, 2012. Accessed March 29, 2013. <http://english.sina.com/china/2012/10/06/513545.html>.
- ²⁰⁶ “Chinese in LA support China’s resolve to defend Diaoyu Islands”. *Xinhua*. Sept 19, 2012. Accessed April 23, 2013. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-09/19/c_131860934.htm.
- ²⁰⁷ “Chinese in Houston present written protest over Diaoyu Islands to Japanese Consulate General”. *Xinhua*. Sept 19, 2012. Accessed March 11, 2013. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-09/19/c_131860577.htm.
- ²⁰⁸ “Chinese Canadians rally against Japan’s encroachment to Diaoyu Islands”. *Xinhua*. Aug 25, 2012. Accessed March 11, 2013. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/photo/2012-08/25/c_131807370.htm.
- ²⁰⁹ “Chinese chamber of commerce in Angola condemns Japan’s ‘purchase’ of Diaoyu Islands”. *Xinhua*. Sept 15, 2012. Accessed March 15, 2013. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/world/2012-09/15/c_123718773.htm.
- ²¹⁰ “Overseas Chinese protest Japan’s illegal ‘purchase’ of Diaoyu Islands”. *People’s Daily*. Sept 19, 2012. <http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90883/7953920.html>.
- ²¹¹ “Commentary: U.S. meddling in maritime disputes detrimental to Asia-Pacific peace”. *Xinhua*. July 27, 2012. Accessed June 3, 2013. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/indepth/2012-07/27/c_131743216.htm.
- ²¹² “PRC Sends Advanced Patrol Ship to Islet After Recent Spat with Philippines”. *Open Source Center*, from *Xinhua*. April 20, 2012. Accessed June 3, 2013. https://www.opensource.gov/portal/server.pt/gateway/PTARGS_0_0_200_203_0_43/content/Display/PPP20120420338004.

- ²¹³ “China moves to stop Japan’s illegal maritime surveying”. *People’s Daily*. March 3, 2012. Accessed March 23, 2013. <http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90883/7746487.html>.
- ²¹⁴ “China sends leading patrol ship to East China Sea on maiden voyage”. *Xinhua*. Dec 13, 2011. Accessed March 23, 2013. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2011-12/13/c_131304219.htm.
- ²¹⁵ “People’s Daily warns of consequences over South China Sea issue”. *Xinhua*. Aug 2, 2011. Accessed March 27, 2013. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-08/02/c_131025164.htm.
- ²¹⁶ “China urges Philippines not to escalate tensions”. *Xinhua*. July 13, 2012. Accessed Feb 11, 2013. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-07/13/c_131714453.htm.
- ²¹⁷ “China asks Japan to stop causing new disturbances over Diaoyu Islands”. *Xinhua*. June 26, 2012. Accessed Feb 27, 2013. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-06/26/c_131677614.htm.
- ²¹⁸ “U.S. should cease to stoke tensions over Diaoyu Islands.” *Xinhua*. Aug 21, 2012. Accessed March 11, 2013. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/indepth/2012-08/21/c_131798350.htm.
- ²¹⁹ “‘Absolutely no concession’ on Diaoyu Islands: PLA Daily”. *Xinhua*. Sept 12, 2012. Accessed April 3, 2013. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-09/12/c_131846121.htm.
- ²²⁰ “China never accepts Japan’s ‘control’ of waters near Diaoyu Islands”. *People’s Daily*. Nov 23, 2012. Accessed March 11, 2013. <http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90883/8031237.html>.
- ²²¹ “Xinhua Commentary Criticizes Japan’s ‘Deal’ Over Disputed Islands as Banditry”. *Open Source Center*, from *Xinhua*. Sept 5, 2012. Accessed March 11, 2013.
- ²²² “Xinhua Commentary Accuses Japan of Duplicity in Managing Island Dispute.” *Open Source Center*. Sept 2, 2012. Accessed March 23, 2013. https://www.opensource.gov/portal/server.pt/gateway/PTARGS_0_0_200_203_0_43/content/Display/ CPP20120902136004.
- ²²³ Vanhoutte, Kristof and Melanie Lang. *Bullying and the Abuse of Power*. Oxford, UK: Critical Issues Inter-Disciplinary Press, 2010, 12.
- ²²⁴ Lines, Dennis. *Bullies: Understanding Bullies and Bullying*. London: Jessica Kingsley Publishers, 2007, 69.

- ²²⁵ “China says ‘no concessions’ on sovereignty issue”. *Xinhua*. Nov 5, 2012. Accessed Feb 23, 2013. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-11/05/c_131952506.htm.
- ²²⁶ “China patrols S. China Sea to fight illegal exploration”. *Xinhua*. March 20, 2012. Accessed March 23, 2013. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-03/20/c_131476435.htm.
- ²²⁷ “Chinese patrol ships near Japan territorial waters again”. *The Asahi Shimbun*. Oct 25, 2012. Accessed March 17, 2013. http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/politics/AJ201210250060.
- ²²⁸ “China raises dispute over Senkakus into airspace above”. *The Asahi Shimbun*. Dec 14, 2012. Accessed March 11, 2013. http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/politics/AJ201212140079.
- ²²⁹ “Vox Populi: China should stop behaving like a spoiled child”. *The Asahi Shimbun*. Oct 11, 2012. Accessed Feb 25, 2013. <http://ajw.asahi.com/article/views/vox/AJ201210110072>.
- ²³⁰ “China must rein in provocative acts around Senkaku Islands”. *The Asahi Shimbun*. Jul 9, 2012. Accessed June 3, 2013. <http://ajw.asahi.com/article/views/editorial/AJ201207090078>.
- ²³¹ “China’s provocative acts unacceptable around Japanese territory”. *The Asahi Shimbun*. Jul 13, 2012. Accessed June 1, 2013. <http://ajw.asahi.com/article/views/editorial/AJ201207130033>.
- ²³² “Asahi: Japan, China Set Sail on Beijing’s Maritime Aggression”, *Open Source Center*, from *The Asahi Shimbun*, July 6, 2012. Accessed June 1, 2013. https://www.opensource.gov/portal/server.pt/gateway/PTARGS_0_0_200_203_0_43/content/Display/JPP20110706969012.
- ²³³ “China’s hard-line response on Senkaku issue counterproductive”. *The Asahi Shimbun*. Sept 13, 2012. Accessed May 21, 2013. <http://ajw.asahi.com/article/views/editorial/AJ201209130072>.
- ²³⁴ “Newly assertive China wanted the Senkaku stunt to succeed”. *The Asahi Shimbun*. Aug 16, 2012. Accessed May 21, 2013. http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/politics/AJ201208160065.
- ²³⁵ “Government’s Senkakus purchase aims to end dispute flare-up”. *The Asahi Shimbun*. Sept 6, 2012. Accessed May 21, 2013. <http://ajw.asahi.com/article/views/editorial/AJ201209060033>.
- ²³⁶ “Japan: Daily Says China ‘Far From Sensible Major Power’ on Senkaku Incident”, *Open Source Center*, from *The Asahi Shimbun*, Sept 25, 2010. Accessed May 21, 2013.

https://www.opensource.gov/portal/server.pt/gateway/PTARGS_0_0_200_203_0_43/content/Display/JPP20100927164007.

²³⁷ “Asahi: Vox Populi: China Acted Outrageously in Senkaku Standoff”. *Open Source Center*, from *The Asahi Shimbun*. Oct 4, 2010. Accessed May 23, 2013.

https://www.opensource.gov/portal/server.pt/gateway/PTARGS_0_0_200_203_0_43/content/Display/JPP20101004969097.

²³⁸ “China spreading talons against Japan in Senkaku Islands issue”. *The Asahi Shimbun*. July 1, 2012. Accessed May 23, 2013.

<http://ajw.asahi.com/article/asia/china/AJ201207010015>.

²³⁹ “Asahi: Vox Populi: Keeping a Close Eye on What the Bully Will Do”. *Open Source Center*, from *The Asahi Shimbun*, Nov 30, 2010. Accessed May 23, 2013.

https://www.opensource.gov/portal/server.pt/gateway/PTARGS_0_0_200_203_0_43/content/Display/JPP20101130969020.

²⁴⁰ “Southeast Asia calls for talks with China on sea dispute”. *The Asahi Shimbun*. Nov 18, 2012. Accessed May 23, 2013. <http://ajw.asahi.com/article/asia/AJ201211180030>.

²⁴¹ “Experts from Japan, China call for private-sector forum to resolve Senkaku dispute”. *The Asahi Shimbun*. July 3, 2012. Accessed May 23, 2013.

<http://ajw.asahi.com/article/asia/china/AJ201207030047>.

²⁴² “Asahi: Chinese Embassy Tries to Thaw Ties”. *Open Source Center*, from *The Asahi Shimbun*, Dec 29, 2010. Accessed May 23, 2013.

https://www.opensource.gov/portal/server.pt/gateway/PTARGS_0_0_200_203_0_43/content/Display/JPP20101229969018.

²⁴³ “Ex-ambassador says Japan needs careful diplomacy with China over Senkakus”. *The Asahi Shimbun*. Dec 21, 2012. Accessed May 27, 2013.

http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/politics/AJ201212210070.

²⁴⁴ “A calm response is needed in isles disputes”. *The Asahi Shimbun*. Aug 21, 2012.

Accessed May 23, 2013. <http://ajw.asahi.com/article/views/editorial/AJ201208210082>.

²⁴⁵ “Asahi: Point of View/ Yuichi Hosoya: Senkaku Row a Wakeup Call for Wise Diplomacy”. *Open Source Center*, from *The Asahi Shimbun*, Nov 2, 2010. Accessed May 23, 2013.

https://www.opensource.gov/portal/server.pt/gateway/PTARGS_0_0_200_203_0_43/content/Display/JPP20101102969024.

²⁴⁶ “Japan, China should consider taking isles dispute to ICJ”. *The Asahi Shimbun*. Sept 28, 2012. Accessed May 23, 2013.

<http://ajw.asahi.com/article/views/editorial/AJ201209280038>.

- ²⁴⁷ “Politicians should defuse isles disputes, not exacerbate them”. *The Asahi Shimbun*. Aug 29, 2012. Accessed May 23, 2013. <http://ajw.asahi.com/article/views/editorial/AJ201208290032>.
- ²⁴⁸ “Ishihara’s provocative act demands mature response from Japan, China”. *The Asahi Shimbun*. April 27, 2012. Accessed May 27, 2013. <http://ajw.asahi.com/article/views/column/AJ201204270076>.
- ²⁴⁹ “Territorial flare-ups should be handled with cool professionalism”. *The Asahi Shimbun*. Aug 23, 2012. Accessed May 27, 2013. <http://ajw.asahi.com/article/views/opinion/AJ201208230102>.
- ²⁵⁰ “Ancient Chinese Maps”. *The Philippine Star*. Dec 28, 2012. Accessed June 1, 2013. <http://www.philstar.com/opinion/2012-12-28/890777/ancient-chinese-maps>.
- ²⁵¹ “Phl Objects to China’s New Patrol Boat in Disputed Sea”. *The Philippine Star*. Dec 29, 2012. Accessed June 1, 2013. www.philstar.com/.../phl-objects-chinas-new-patrol-boat-disputed-sea.
- ²⁵² “Phl won’t stamp new China passport”. *The Philippine Star*. Nov 29, 2012. Accessed June 1, 2013. <http://www.philstar.com/headlines/2012/11/29/876001/phl-won%E2%80%99t-stamp-new-china-passport>.
- ²⁵³ “Miriam: China dividing ASEAN”. *The Philippine Star*. Dec 3, 2012. Accessed June 1, 2013. <http://www.philstar.com/headlines/2012/12/03/879255/miriam-china-dividing-asean>.
- ²⁵⁴ “China’s plan to bring tourists to West Phl Sea feared”. *The Philippine Star*. Sep 12, 2012. Accessed June 1, 2013. <http://www.philstar.com/headlines/2012/09/12/848055/chinas-plan-bring-tourists-west-phl-sea-feared>.
- ²⁵⁵ “DFA reiterates Phl sea rights”. *The Philippine Star*. Dec 31, 2012. Accessed June 1, 2013. <http://www.philstar.com/headlines/2012/12/31/891731/dfa-reiterates-phl-sea-rights>.
- ²⁵⁶ “China urged to stop provocative acts in West Phl Sea.” *The Philippine Star*. July 14, 2012. Accessed June 3, 2013. <http://www.philstar.com/headlines/2012/07/14/827689/china-urged-stop-provocative-acts-west-phl-sea>.
- ²⁵⁷ “China tightening grip on Spratleys”. *The Philippine Star*. June 23, 2012. Accessed June 1, 2013. <http://www.philstar.com/disputed-seas/2012/06/23/820462/china-tightening-grip-spratlys>.
- ²⁵⁸ “Dispute taking toll on Phl growth.” *The Philippine Star*. May 4, 2012. Accessed June 3, 2013. <http://www.philstar.com/headlines/803095/dispute-taking-toll-phl-growth>.

- ²⁵⁹ “Phl accuses China of maritime intrusions.” *The Philippine Star*. Jan 9, 2012. Accessed June 5, 2013. <http://www.philstar.com/headlines/765819/phl-accuses-china-maritime-intrusions>.
- ²⁶⁰ “China’s stance imperialistic.” *The Philippine Star*. June 13, 2011. Accessed June 3, 2013. <http://www.philstar.com/opinion/695381/chinas-stance-imperialistic>.
- ²⁶¹ “Maritime expert off to Beijing.” *The Philippine Star*. Mar 6, 2011. Accessed June 3, 2013. <http://www.philstar.com/headlines/663162/maritime-expert-beijing>.
- ²⁶² “China to deprive Phl of food, fuel.” *The Philippine Star*. Apr 18, 2012. Accessed June 3, 2013. www.philstar.com/opinion/797707/china-deprive-phl-food-fuel.
- ²⁶³ “China out to grab Zambales shoal.” *The Philippine Star*. Apr 16, 2012. Accessed June 3, 2013. www.philstar.com/opinion/797147/china-out-grab-zambales-shoal.
- ²⁶⁴ ”Peaceful rise?”. *The Philippine Star*. Mar 8, 2011. Accessed June 3, 2013. <http://www.philstar.com/opinion/663817/editorial-peaceful-rise>.
- ²⁶⁵ “China Must ‘Learn the Ways of Neighborly Behavior’ to Earn Respect”. *Open Source Center*, from *The Philippine Star*, Mar 18, 2009. Accessed June 3, 2013. https://www.opensource.gov/portal/server.pt/gateway/PTARGS_0_0_200_203_0_43/content/Display/SEP20090323093005.
- ²⁶⁶ “China misreads Manila’s silence over stuck frigate”. *The Philippine Star*. July 18, 2012. Accessed June 3, 2013. <http://www.philstar.com/opinion/2012-07-18/828887/china-misreads-manilas-silence-over-stuck-frigate>.
- ²⁶⁷ “Expect Bullying From China Over Spratlys – Miriam”. *The Philippine Star*. May 30, 2011. Accessed May 29, 2013. <http://www.philstar.com/headlines/690913/expect-bullying-china-over-spratlys-miriam>.
- ²⁶⁸ “Phl Proposes ASEAN Info-Sharing to Better Watch Disputed Waters”. *The Philippine Star*. Oct 5, 2012. Accessed June 5, 2013. <http://www.philstar.com/headlines/2012/10/05/856203/phl-proposes-asean-info-sharing-better-watch-disputed-waters>.
- ²⁶⁹ “Phl also wants sea row settled peacefully”. *The Philippine Star*. Sept 28, 2012. Accessed June 5, 2013. <http://www.philstar.com/headlines/2012/09/28/853725/phl-also-wants-sea-row-settled-peacefully>.
- ²⁷⁰ “Wang-wang”. *The Philippine Star*. Nov 24, 2012. Accessed June 1, 2013. <http://www.philstar.com/opinion/2012-11-24/872143/wang-wang>.

- ²⁷¹ “Our Toughest Diplomatic Challenge in Decades.” *The Philippine Star*. Sept 15, 2012. Accessed June 3, 2013. <http://www.philstar.com/opinion/2012-09-15/849162/our-toughest-diplomatic-challenge-decades>.
- ²⁷² “Are we being led to war? Batanes interlude.” *The Philippine Star*. Apr 21, 2012. Accessed June 3, 2013. <http://www.philstar.com/opinion/798846/are-we-being-led-war-batanes-interlude>.
- ²⁷³ “Old map proves China’s claims are worthless.” *Vietnam News Agency*. Aug 1, 2012. Accessed June 5, 2013. <http://english.vietnamnet.vn/fms/government/25220/old-map-proves-china-s-claims-are-worthless.html>.
- ²⁷⁴ “Vietnam attends 21st meeting of UNCLOS states parties”. *Vietnam News Agency*. June 19, 2011. Accessed June 7, 2013. <http://en.vietnamplus.vn/Home/Vietnam-attends-21st-meeting-of-UNCLOS-states-parties/20116/19064.vnplus>.
- ²⁷⁵ “East Sea fishing ban violates VN’s sovereignty.” *Vietnam News Agency*. Jan 20, 2012. Accessed June 7, 2013. <http://en.vietnamplus.vn/Home/East-Sea-fishing-ban-violates-VNs-sovereignty/20121/23762.vnplus>.
- ²⁷⁶ “Vietnam demands China release seized vessel.” *Vietnam News Agency*. Oct 6, 2010. Accessed June 7, 2013. <http://www.saigon-gpdaily.com.vn/National/Politics/2010/10/86181/>.
- ²⁷⁷ “Vietnam demands release of vessels seized by China”. *Vietnam News Agency*. May 25, 2012. Accessed June 7, 2013. <http://english.vov.vn/Politics/Vietnam-demands-release-of-vessels-seized-by-China/234874.vov>.
- ²⁷⁸ “Vietnam demands an end to China’s tourist development on Hoang Sa islands”. *Vietnam News Agency*. Jan 5, 2010. Accessed June 7, 2013. <http://english.vov.vn/Politics/Vietnam-demands-an-end-to-Chinas-tourist-development-on-Hoang-Sa-islands/111432.vov>.
- ²⁷⁹ “Spokesman responds to East Sea claims.” *Vietnam News Agency*. Jan 9, 2009. Accessed June 7, 2013. <http://www.saigon-gpdaily.com.vn/National/Politics/2009/1/67683/>.
- ²⁸⁰ “Vietnam affirms sovereignty over archipelagoes”. *Vietnam News Agency*. Apr 8, 2011. Accessed June 9, 2013. <http://en.vietnamplus.vn/Home/Vietnam-affirms-sovereignty-over-archipelagoes/20114/17432.vnplus>.
- ²⁸¹ “VN stresses int’l law compliance in dispute settlement.” *Vietnam News Agency*. Oct 2, 2012. Accessed June 7, 2013. <http://en.vietnamplus.vn/Home/VN-stresses-intl-law-compliance-in-dispute-settlement/201210/28968.vnplus>.

- ²⁸² “ASEAN, China talk on East Sea.” *Vietnam News Agency*. June 26, 2012. Accessed June 7, 2013. <http://vietnamnews.vn/politics-laws/226599/asean-china-talk-on-east-sea.html>.
- ²⁸³ “ASEAN, partners discuss defence, security.” *Vietnam News Agency*. Apr 27, 2012. Accessed June 9, 2013. <http://en.vietnamplus.vn/Home/ASEAN-partners-discuss-defence-security/20124/25786.vnplus>.
- ²⁸⁴ “20th ASEAN Summit makes further progress.” *Vietnam News Agency*. April 4, 2012. Accessed June 9, 2013. <http://en.vietnamplus.vn/Home/20th-ASEAN-Summit-makes-further-progress/20124/25305.vnplus>.
- ²⁸⁵ “VN, China agree on peaceful East Sea solution.” *Vietnam News Agency*. Aug 3, 2011. Accessed June 5, 2013. <http://en.vietnamplus.vn/Home/VN-China-agree-on-peaceful-East-Sea-solution/20118/20027.vnplus>.
- ²⁸⁶ “The nation must mend trust with Japan, US.” *Taipei Times*. Dec 29, 2012. Accessed June 9, 2013. <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2012/12/29/2003551236>.
- ²⁸⁷ “KMT legislators vote down protest to China.” *Taipei Times*. Dec 29, 2012. Accessed June 11, 2013. <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2012/12/29/2003551244>.
- ²⁸⁸ “China to invest US\$1.6bn in disputed islands.” *Taipei Times*. Dec 26, 2012. Accessed June 11, 2013. <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2012/12/26/2003551011>.
- ²⁸⁹ “Minister urges restraint over South China Sea spat.” *Taipei Times*. Dec 1, 2012. Accessed June 11, 2013. <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2012/12/01/2003549066>.
- ²⁹⁰ “Editorial: Respect needs to be earned.” *Taipei Times*. Dec 1, 2012. Accessed June 11, 2013. <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2012/12/01/2003549033>.
- ²⁹¹ “China’s fragile rise starts to show.” *Taipei Times*. Mar 14, 2011. Accessed June 11, 2013. <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2011/03/14/2003498119>.
- ²⁹² Mendez, Christina. “Miriam: China dividing ASEAN”. *Philstar*. Dec 3, 2012. Accessed May 21, 2013. <http://www.philstar.com/headlines/2012/12/03/879255/miriam-china-dividing-asean>.
- ²⁹³ “East Sea fishing ban violates VN’s sovereignty.” *Vietnam News Agency*. January 20, 2012. Accessed May 23, 2013. <http://en.vietnamplus.vn/Home/East-Sea-fishing-ban-violates-VNs-sovereignty/20121/23762.vnplus>.

²⁹⁴ “Insight: China increased belligerence after U.S. aircraft deployment near Senkakus.” *The Asahi Shimbun*. Feb 6, 2013. Accessed June 17, 2013. <http://ajw.asahi.com/article/asia/china/AJ201302060077>.

Chapter 6

²⁹⁵ “The dating game.” *The Economist*. Dec 27, 2011. Accessed June 17, 2013. http://www.economist.com/blogs/dailychart/2010/12/save_date.

²⁹⁶ Schweller, Randall L. and Xiaoyu Pu. ”After Unipolarity: China’s Visions of International Order in an Era of U.S. Decline,” *International Security*, Vol. 36, No. 1, Summer 2011, 44.

²⁹⁷ “How will Senkaku dispute affect 3-nation FTA?.” *The Asahi Shimbun*. Oct 22, 2012. Accessed June 17, 2013. <http://ajw.asahi.com/article/asia/china/AJ201210220004>.

²⁹⁸ “Chinese tourists skip Japan over Senkakus dispute.” *The Asahi Shimbun*. Oct 19, 2012. Accessed June 17, 2013. http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/AJ201210190081.

²⁹⁹ “Reservations for over 52,000 seats canceled on Japan-China flights.” *Xinhua*. Sept 25, 2012. Accessed June 17, 2013. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-09/25/c_131872661.htm.

³⁰⁰ “China’s Sept. auto sales shrink as consumers shun Japanese cars.” *Xinhua*. Oct 10, 2012. Accessed June 17, 2013. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-10/10/c_131898446.htm.

³⁰¹ “China Focus: Diaoyu Islands rift takes toll on China-Japan economic, trade ties.” *Xinhua*. Sept 25, 2012. Accessed June 17, 2013. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/indepth/2012-09/25/c_131872368.htm.

³⁰² “Soured China-Japan ties bring chill to Tokyo stores.” *Xinhua*. Sept 23, 2012. Accessed June 11, 2013. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-09/23/c_131868271.htm.

³⁰³ “Japan, U.S. plan 1st drill in Japan to retake occupied isle.” *The Asahi Shimbun*. Oct 14, 2012. Accessed June 11, 2013. http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/politics/AJ201210140045.

³⁰⁴ “Japan, wary of China, boosts ties with ASEAN.” *The Asahi Shimbun*. Nov 18, 2011. Accessed June 17, 2013. <http://ajw.asahi.com/article/asia/AJ201111180081>.

- ³⁰⁵ “Asahi: Japan, U.S., Australia Navies to Drill in South China Sea”. *Open Source Center*, from *The Asahi Shimbun*, July 9, 2011. Accessed June 17, 2013. https://www.opensource.gov/portal/server.pt/gateway/PTARGS_0_0_200_203_0_43/content/Display/JPP20110709969014.
- ³⁰⁶ “Asahi: Japan, Indonesia Agree to Annual Meetings.” *Open Source Center*, from *The Asahi Shimbun*, June 19, 2011. Accessed June 17, 2013. https://www.opensource.gov/portal/server.pt/gateway/PTARGS_0_0_200_203_0_43/content/Display/JPP20110620969037.
- ³⁰⁷ “Phl, Canada ink defense MOU.” *The Philippine Star*, Nov 11, 2012. Accessed June 19, 2013. <http://www.philstar.com/headlines/2012/11/11/865305/phl-canada-ink-defense-mou>.
- ³⁰⁸ “Phl, Australia to boost defense ties.” *The Philippine Star*. Oct 12, 2012. Accessed June 19, 2013. <http://www.philstar.com/headlines/2012/10/12/858705/phl-australia-boost-defense-ties>.
- ³⁰⁹ “Philippines, Vietnam Ink MOA on Defense Ties.” *The Philippine Star*. Nov 10, 2010. Accessed June 19, 2013. <http://www.philstar.com:8080/headlines/628337/philippines-vietnam-ink-moa-defense-ties>.
- ³¹⁰ “Japan, Vietnam scholars meet for regional security talks.” *Vietnam News Agency*. Mar 1, 2012. Accessed June 19, 2013. <http://english.vov.vn/Politics/Japan-Vietnam-scholars-meet-for-regional-security-talks/234703.vov>.
- ³¹¹ “Vietnam aims to boost ties with Malaysia.” *Vietnam News Agency*. July 20, 2011. Accessed June 19, 2013. http://cpv.org.vn/cpv/Modules/News_English/News_Detail_E.aspx?CN_ID=469557&CO_ID=30253.
- ³¹² “Vietnam, Philippines seek ways to boost ties”. *Vietnam News Agency*. Oct 26, 2010. Accessed June 19, 2013. <http://en.vietnamplus.vn/Home/Vietnam-Philippines-seek-ways-to-boost-ties/201010/13370.vnplus>.
- ³¹³ “Vietnam, US talk bilateral and regional security.” *Vietnam News Agency*. June 18, 2011. Accessed June 21, 2013. <http://en.vietnamplus.vn/Home/Vietnam-US-talk-bilateral-and-regional-security/20116/19051.vnplus>.
- ³¹⁴ “Vietnam considers US as leading partner.” *Vietnam News Agency*. Aug 23, 2011. Accessed June 21, 2013. <http://en.vietnamplus.vn/Home/Vietnam-considers-US-as-leading-partner/20118/20446.vnplus>.
- ³¹⁵ “SDF jets scrambled again to Chinese aircraft near Senkakus.” *The Asahi Shimbun*. Dec 23, 2012. Accessed June 21, 2013. http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/social_affairs/AJ201212230053.

- ³¹⁶ “Military Base Planned for Tiny Japanese Island.” *The Wall Street Journal*. Dec 12, 2012. Accessed June 21, 2013. <http://live.wsj.com/video/military-base-planned-for-tiny-japanese-island/2FC0387F-B407-4F0D-A64E-4C6A00A97EB3.html#12FC0387F-B407-4F0D-A64E-4C6A00A97EB3>.
- ³¹⁷ Valencia, M.J., J.M. Van Dyke, and N.A. Ludwig. *Sharing the Resources of the South China Sea*, The Hague, Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 1997, 85.
- ³¹⁸ Perlez, Jane. “China Accuses Japan of Stealing After Purchase of Group of Disputed Islands”. *The New York Times*, Sept 11, 2012. Accessed June 23, 2013. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/12/world/asia/china-accuses-japan-of-stealing-disputed-islands.html?_r=1&.
- ³¹⁹ “Survey: 84% of Japanese have negative view of China.” *The Asahi Shimbun*. June 21, 2012. Accessed June 23, 2013. <http://ajw.asahi.com/article/asia/china/AJ201206210056>.
- ³²⁰ “Interest in Japan Coast Guard career suddenly surges.” *The Asahi Shimbun*. Oct 1, 2012 Accessed June 23, 2013. https://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/social_affairs/AJ201210010063.
- ³²¹ “Asahi: Dpj Panel: Beef up Forces Facing China”. *Open Source Center*, from *The Asahi Shimbun*, Nov 19, 2010. Accessed June 29, 2013. https://www.opensource.gov/portal/server.pt/gateway/PTARGS_0_0_200_203_0_43/content/Display/JPP20101119969010.
- ³²² “Noda hints at using SDF to defend Senkaku Islands”. *The Asahi Shimbun*, July 27, 2012. Accessed June 29, 2013. http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/politics/AJ201207270060.
- ³²³ “Militarized.” *The Philippine Star*, Apr 28, 2012. Accessed June 29, 2013. <http://www.philstar.com/opinion/801106/militarized>.
- ³²⁴ “Chairman urges Navy to master technological advances,” *Vietnam News Agency*, May 7, 2010. Accessed June 29, 2013. <http://en.vietnamplus.vn/Home/Chairman-urges-Navy-to-master-technological-advances/20105/8774.vnplus>.

Bibliography

- Agence France Presse. "China, Taiwan slam Japan over disputed islands," Mar 3, 2012. Accessed May 25, 2013. <http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALEqM5hO3O18htnYr1yYV7WQJLUIWunRLg?docId=CNG.7190a44d169f734923070785c525aa40.121/>.
- Auslin, Michael. "Will China go to war in January 2013?" *American Enterprise Institute*, Nov 30, 2012. Accessed Feb 23, 2013. <http://www.aei.org/article/foreign-and-defense-policy/regional/asia/will-china-go-to-war-in-january-2013/>.
- Bader, Jeffrey. *Obama and China's Rise: An Insider's Account of America's Asia Strategy*, Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2012, Chapter 7.
- BBC. "Vietnam plans live-fire drill amid South China sea row," June 10, 2011. Accessed June 13, 2013. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-13727822>.
- BBC. "Japan lodges protest with China over East China Sea," Feb 20, 2012. Accessed May 31, 2013. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-17093549>.
- Bernstein, J.Y. and M.W. Watson. "Children who are targets of bullying," *Journal of Interpersonal Violence*, 12(4), 1997, 483-498.
- Besag, V. *Bullies and Victims in Schools*. Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1989.
- Bjorkquist, K., K. Eckman and K. Lagerspetz. "Bullies and victims: Their ego picture, ideal ego picture, and normative ego picture," *Scandinavian Journal of Psychology*, No. 23, 1982, 307-313.
- Brown, Peter J. "China's navy cruises into Pacific ascendancy," *Asia Times*, Apr 22, 2010. Accessed Jun 3, 2013. <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/LD22Ad01.html>.
- Burns, John F. "Vitriol Over Falklands Resurfaces, as Do Old Arguments", *New York Times*, Jan 5, 2013. Accessed Mar 17, 2013. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/06/world/americas/argentinas-call-for-return-of-falkland-islands-causes-a-stir.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
- Chakraborti, Tridib. "China and Vietnam in the South China Sea Dispute: A Creeping 'Conflict-Peace-Trepidation' Syndrome," *China Report 2012*, Vol. 48, 283.
- Chang, Gordon G. "China and the Biggest Territory Grab Since World War II," *Forbes*, June 2, 2013. Accessed June 5, 2013, <http://www.forbes.com/sites/gordonchang/2013/06/02/china-and-the-biggest-territory-grab-since-world-war-ii/>.

- Chinese Government Official Web Portal. "Full text of Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China," Sept 10, 2012. Accessed June 27, 2013. http://www.gov.cn/english/2012-09/10/content_2221417.htm.
- Cronin, P. "Contested Waters: Managing Disputes in the East and South China Seas," *Center for a New American Security, East & South China Seas Bulletin* 6, December 2012.
- Cronin, Richard and Zach Dubel. "Sea of Absurdity: Sansha, China's New Island 'City'," *Stimson Center*, Aug 14, 2012. Accessed Feb 25, 2013. <http://www.stimson.org/spotlight/sea-of-absurdity-sansha-chinas-new-island-city/>.
- Daniel, T.A. *Stop Bullying at Work: Strategies and Tools for HR and Legal Professionals*, (Virginia: Society for Human Resource Management, 2009).
- Dicicco, Jonathan M. and Jack S. Levy. "Power Shifts and Problem Shifts: The Evolution of the Power Transition Research Program," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Dec 1999, 43:6, p. 679.
- Dreyer, June T. *China's Political System: Modernization and Tradition*, 3rd ed. New York: Longman, 2000, 305.
- Drury, Ian. "Britain branded 'bully boy thugs' for still refusing to allow Argentina to reclaim the Falkland Islands". *The Daily Mail*, June 22, 2011. Accessed Feb 19, 2013. <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2006888/Britain-bully-boy-thugs-refusing-allow-Argentina-reclaim-Falkland-Islands.html>.
- Dutton, Peter. "Three Disputes and Three Objectives." *Naval War College Review*, Autumn 2011, Vol. 64, No. 4, 44.
- Fackler, Martin. "Chinese Patrol Ships Pressuring Japan Over Islands," *New York Times*, November 2, 2012. Accessed January 27, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/03/world/asia/china-keeps-up-pressure-on-japan-over-disputed-islands-with-patrols.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
- Farrington, D. "Understanding and Preventing Bullying", in M. Tonry (ed.) *Crime and Justice: A Review of Research*, Vol. 17, 1993, 381-459.
- Feste, Karen. *America Responds to Terrorism*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011.
- Ford, Peter. "China's passport propaganda baffles experts," *The Christian Science Monitor*, Nov 27, 2012. Accessed January 3, 2013. <http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-Pacific/2012/1127/China-s-passport-propaganda-baffles-experts>.

- Fried, S. & Blanche, E. *Banishing Bullying Behavior: Exploring the Culture of Pain, Rage and Revenge*. Blue Ridge Summit, Pennsylvania: Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, 2009.
- Friedberg, Aaron. "Hegemony with Chinese Characteristics," *The National Interest*, June 21, 2011. Accessed Jan 25, 2013. <http://nationalinterest.org/article/hegemony-chinese-characteristics-5439>.
- Fravel, M. Taylor. *Strong Borders, Secure Nation: Cooperation and Conflict in China's Territorial Disputes*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008, 8.
- Garver, John W. "China's Push through the South China Sea," *The China Quarterly*, No. 132 (Dec 1992), 999-1028.
- Glaser, Bonnie. "Armed Clash in the South China Sea," *Council of Foreign Relations*, April 2012. Accessed Mar 27, 2013. <http://www.cfr.org/world/armed-clash-south-china-sea/p27883>.
- Greene, Marilyn. "Gunboats Clash in Philippines," *USA Today*, Jan 26, 1996.
- Gomez, J. *The Washington Post*, "Philippines sends warplanes near disputed islands." March 3, 2011. Accessed April 3, 2013. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/03/03/AR2011030301080.html>.
- Haddick, Robert. "Foreign Policy: Salami Slicing in the South China Sea," *National Public Radio*, Aug 6, 2012. Accessed Mar 23, 2013. <http://www.npr.org/2012/08/06/158191473/foreign-policy-salami-slicing-in-the-south-china-sea>.
- Heydarian, Richard J. "The South China Sea Conundrum," *Foreign Policy in Focus*, Sep 8, 2011. Accessed May 11, 2013. http://fpif.org/the_south_china_sea_conundrum/.
- Hornstein, H. *Brutal Bosses and their Prey: How to Identify and Overcome Abuse in the Workplace*. New York: Riverhead Books, 1996.
- Jakarta Post. "South China Sea Dispute a Potential Rift," May 25, 2010. Accessed June 3, 2013. <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2010/05/25/south-china-seadispute-a-potential-rift-richina-ties-envoy.html>.
- Japan Ministry of Defense. <http://www.mod.go.jp/e>.
- "Press Conference by the Defense Minister," Mar 8, 2011.
- "Press Conference by the Defense Minister," Dec 25, 2012.
- "Extra Press Conference by the Defense Minister," Jan 16, 2013.
- "Extra Press Conference by the Defense Minister," Feb 5, 2013.

Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs. <http://www.mofa.go.jp>.

“Protest Regarding the Issue of Proximate Flights by Military Helicopters Near the Escort Ship ‘Asayuki’ by the People’s Republic of China,” Apr 21, 2010.

“Protest Regarding the Issue of a Chinese Ship Approaching a Japanese Survey Ship,” May 6, 2010.

“Statement by the Press Secretary/Director-General for Press and Public Relations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on the Collision Between Japn Coast Guard Patrol Vessels and a Chinese Fishing Trawler in Japan’s Territorial Waters off the Senkaku Islands,” Sept 25, 2010.

“Mr. Takeaki Matsushita, Minister of Foreign Affairs, lodges a protest against Mr. Cheng Yonghua, Ambassador of the People’s Republic of China to Japan,” Aug 25, 2011.

“Protest lodged by Mr. Chikao Kawai, Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, to H.E. Cheng Yonghua, Ambassador of the People’s Republic of China to Japan,” Feb 8, 2013.

“Protest lodged by Mr. Chikao Kawai, Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, to H.E. Cheng Yonghua, Ambassador of the People’s Republic of China to Japan,” Feb 8, 2013.

Jiru, Shen. *Zhongguo Budang Bu Xiansheng: Dangdai Zhongguo de Guoji Zhanlue Wenti (China Does Not Want to Be Mr. No: Problems of International Strategy for Today’s China)*. Beijing: Jinri Zhongguo Chubanshe, 1998, 62.

Khan, Urmee. “The English are like bulldogs and Mrs. Thatcher won’t be bullied: How Argentine ambassador warned Junta not to invade Falklands”. *The Daily Mail*, Oct 13, 2011. Accessed Feb 17, 2013. <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2048382/Junta-warned-invade-Falklands-Margaret-Thatcher-wont-bullied.html#axzz2Jyil7cWV>.

Kissinger, Henry. *On China*. New York: The Penguin Press, 2011.

Leffler, Melvyn P. “911 in Retrospect”, *Foreign Affairs*, Sep/Oct 2011, Vol. 90, Issue 5, 33-44.

Lines, D. *Bullies: Understanding Bullies and Bullying*. London: Jessica Kingsley Publishers, 2007.

McCurry, Justin. “Japanese firms close offices in China as islands row escalates.” *The Guardian*, September 17, 2012. Accessed March 23, 2013, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/sep/17/japanese-firms-close-offices-china>.

Mendez, Christina. “Miriam: China dividing ASEAN”. *Philstar*. Dec 3, 2012. Accessed May 21, 2013. <http://www.philstar.com/headlines/2012/12/03/879255/miriam-china-dividing-asean>.

- Mount, George R. "Bullying: Characteristics, Consequences and Interventions," *Journal of Police Crisis Negotiations*, Vol.5(2), 2005, 2.
- Nathan, A.J. & Scobell A. *China's Search for Security*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2012.
- Olweus, D. *Bullying at School: What We Know and What We Can Do*. Oxford: Blackwell, 1993.
- Organski, A.F.K. *World Politics*. California: Knopf, 1968.
- Organski, A.F.K. & Kugler, J. *The War Ledger*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980.
- Perlez, Jane. "China Steps Up Pressure on Japan in Islands Dispute," *New York Times*, December 15, 2012. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/16/world/asia/china-steps-up-pressure-on-japan-in-island-dispute.html?_r=0.
- Perlez, Jane. "China Accuses Japan of Stealing After Purchase of Group of Disputed Islands". *The New York Times*, Sept 11, 2012. Accessed June 23, 2013. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/12/world/asia/china-accuses-japan-of-stealing-disputed-islands.html?_r=1&.
- Philippines Government Archive: Department of Foreign Affairs. Dec 1, 2012, <http://archive-ph.com>.
- Philippines Official Gazette: Department of Foreign Affairs. <http://www.gov.ph/>.
 "Philippines deplores non-issuance of 45th Asean Foreign Minister's Meeting Joint Communique," July 13, 2012.
 "Philippine statement on the 9-Dash Line Map on the new Chinese e-Passport," Nov 28, 2012.
- Philippines Official Gazette: Office of the President. <http://www.gov.ph/>.
 "Press briefing by President Benigno S. Aquino III in Bacolod City, Negros Occidental on March 4, 2011," Mar 4, 2011.
 "Philippine position on Bajo de Masinloc (Scarborough Shoal) and the waters within its vicinity," Apr 18, 2012.
 "Benigno S. Aquino III, Third State of the Nation Address, July 23, 2012," July 23, 2012.
- Philippine Star. "Manila daily berates China over violation of South China Sea code of conduct," June 4, 2011. Retrieved from *Access My Library*. Accessed Mar 15, 2013. <http://www.accessmylibrary.com/article-1G1-258125900/manila-daily-berates-china.html>.

- Rigby, Kenneth. *New Perspectives on Bullying*. Philadelphia, PA: Jessica Kingsley Publishers, 2002.
- Roland, E. and Munthe, E. (eds). *Bullying: An International Perspective*. London: David Fulton, 1989.
- Ryall, Julian. "Japan agrees to buy disputed Senkaku islands," *The Telegraph*, September 5, 2012. Accessed April 11, 2013. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/japan/9521793/Japan-agrees-to-buy-disputed-Senkaku-islands.html>.
- Safran, Elysa. "Bully Behavior, Bully Prevention Programs, and Gender", *Journal of Emotional Abuse*, Vol. 7(4), 2007, 48.
- Salin, Denise. "Ways of explaining workplace bullying: A review of enabling, motivating and precipitating structures and processes in the work environment," *Human Relations*, Vol. 56(10), 2003, 1213-1232.
- Schwartz, D., L.J. Proctor, and D.H. Chien. "The aggressive victim of bullying", in J. Juvonen & S. Graham (Eds.), *Peer harassment in school. The plight of the vulnerable and victimized*. New York: Guildford Press, 2001, 147-174.
- Schweller, Randall L. and Xiaoyu Pu. "After Unipolarity: China's Visions of International Order in an Era of U.S. Decline," *International Security*, Vol. 36, No. 1, Summer 2011, 44.
- Shambaugh, David. *China Goes Global: The Partial Power*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2013.
- Shambaugh, David. "Center for China United States Cooperation: China Forum". Lecture, Josef Korbel School of International Studies, Denver, Colorado, February 7, 2013.
- Sieg, Linda and Kiyoshi Takenaka. "Japan protests to China after radar pointed at vessel," *Reuters*, February 5, 2013. Accessed February 11, 2013, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/05/us-china-japan-idUSBRE9140IY20130205>.
- Smith, P.K. and Sharp, S. (eds). *School Bullying: Insights and Perspectives*. London: Routledge, 1994.
- St. Clair, Jane. "What Causes Bullies?", *By Parents for Parents*, 2011. Accessed Feb 15, 2013. <http://www.byparents-forparents.com/causesbullies.html>.
- Starr, Barbara. "Chinese boat harassed U.S. ship, officials say," *CNN*, May 5, 2009. Accessed June 9, 2013. http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/asiapcf/05/05/china.maritime.harassment/index.html?_s=PM:WORLD.

- Starr, Barbara. "Sub collides with sonar array towed by U.S. Navy ship," *CNN*, June 12, 2009. Accessed June 9, 2013. <http://edition.cnn.com/2009/US/06/12/china.submarine/index.html>.
- Stearns, Scott. "China Bashes Western 'meddling' Over South China Sea," *Voice of America*, Aug 15, 2012. Accessed May 3, 2013. <http://blogs.voanews.com/state-department-news/2012/08/15/china-bashes-western-meddling-over-south-china-sea/>.
- Storey, Ian. "China and the Philippines: Implications of the Reed Bank Incident", *The Jamestown Foundation, China Brief*, Vol. 11, Issue 8, May 6, 2011. http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=37902.
- Sutter, Robert. *Chinese Foreign Relations: Power and Policy Since the Cold War*. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2012.
- Swaine, Michael. "Perceptions of an Assertive China", *China Leadership Monitor*, No. 32; retrieved from the Carnegie Endowment website. Accessed Mar 2, 2013.
- Symon, Andrew. "China, Vietnam churn diplomatic waters," *Asia Times*, Dec 20, 2007. Accessed April 2, 2013. <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/IL20Ad01.html>.
- Tattum, D.P. and E. Tattum. "Bullying: A Whole-School Response", in N. Jones and E. Baglin Jones (eds) *Learning to Behave*. London: Kogan Page, 1992.
- Trubowitz, Peter. *Politics and Strategy: Partisan Ambition and American Statecraft*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2011.
- Tuan, Joang Anh. "Chinese Strategic Miscalculations in the South China Sea," *East-West Center, Asia Pacific Bulletin*, September 27, 2012.
- U.S. State Department. Daily Press Briefing, Aug 14, 2012. Accessed June 23, 2013. <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2012/08/196459.htm#CHINA2>.
- Valencia, M.J., Van Dyke, J.M. & Ludwig, N.A. *Sharing the Resources of the South China Sea*. The Hague, Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 1997.
- Vanhoutte, Kristof and Melanie Lang. *Bullying and the Abuse of Power*. Oxford, UK: Critical Issues Inter-Disciplinary Press, 2010.
- Vietnam Ministry of Foreign Affairs. <http://www.mofa.gov.vn/en>.
 "Regular Press Briefing by MOFA's Spokesperson Nguyen Phuong Nga on June 9th, 2011," June 9, 2011.
 "Viet Nam protests China's acts against Fishermen," Feb 22, 2012.
 "Viet Nam asks China to immediately and unconditionally release all fishermen," Mar 23, 2012.

- “Chinese ‘national plan on islands protection’ a serious violation of Viet Nam’s sovereignty,” Apr 19, 2012.
- “Remarks by Foreign Ministry Spokesman Luong Thanh Nghi on July 24, 2012,” July 24, 2012.
- “Viet Nam regrets non-issuance of AMM-45 Joint Communiqué,” July 13, 2012.
- “Regular Press Briefing by MOFA’s Spokesman Luong Thanh Nghi on November 22, 2012,” Nov 22, 2012.
- “Remarks by Foreign Ministry Spokesman Luong Thanh Nghi on December 4, 2012,” Dec 4, 2012.
- “Report on Vietnam’s implementation of the 1982 UN convention on the Law of the Sea as a responsible party of the Convention,” accessed Jun 7, 2013.
- “Regular Press Conference by Foreign Ministry Spokesperson on March 7, 2013,” Mar 13, 2013.
- Volk, A., J. Camilleri, and Z. Marini. “Is Adolescent Bullying an Evolutionary Adaptation?,” *Aggressive Behavior*, Vol. 38, 2012, 227.
- Westad, O.A. *Restless Empire*. New York: Basic Books, 2012.
- White, Hugh. *The China Choice: Why America Should Share Power*. Collingwood, Australia: Black Inc, 2012.
- Xinhua. “China opposes Japan’s naming Diaoyu Islands,” Mar 3, 2012. Accessed May 25, 2013. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-03/03/c_122784453.htm.
- Zarzour, K. *The Schoolyard Bully*. Toronto: Harper Collins, 1999.
- Zhao, Suisheng. *China-U.S. Relations Transformed: Perspectives and Strategic Interactions*. New York: Routledge, 2008.
- Zhao, Suisheng. *Chinese Foreign Policy: Pragmatism and Strategic Behavior*. New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 2004.
- Zhao, Suisheng. “Hu Jintao’s Foreign Policy Legacy,” *E-International Relations*, Dec 8, 2012. Accessed Dec 15, 2012. <http://www.e-ir.info/2012/12/08/hu-jintaos-foreign-policy-legacy/>.