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CHINESE INTELLECTUALS AND CHINA'S POLICY TOWARD JAPAN

A Dissertation

Presented to

The Faculty of the Josef Korbel School of International Studies

University of Denver

In Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements for the Degree

Doctor of Philosophy

by

Wen-ting Yang

August 2013

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation aims at integrating two scholarships: state-society relation studies and Chinese foreign policy analysis. I created Two-level Perception Gap Model to analyze different intellectual groups' relations with party-state by confirming Chinese intellectuals play a role in CFP making in general, China's Japan policy in particular. This model is an alternative approach, instead of conventional wisdom patron-client approach, to explain and analyze the pluralized intellectual-state relations in China. This model first analyzed the role of two intellectual groups, namely think tank scholars and popular nationalist, in China's Japan policy making, and then based on these analyses it explains the interactional patterns between these two intellectual groups and party-state. I used three case studies, which represented different types of issue, Chinese attitude toward the U.S.-Japan alliance and the Japanese defense policy, the controversy over the Yasukuni Shrine Visit, and the territorial dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, to examine this model.

First, I examined think tank scholar groups and the extent they influenced "core interest issue and sensitive issue (Issue 1)," Chinese attitude toward the U.S.-Japan alliance and the Japanese defense policy, and their interactional patterns with party-state. Chapter 3 compares the responses of Chinese officials to the changes in the defense policy of Japan to the analyses from the think tank scholars. As the model assumes, results show that think tank scholars' analyses are consistent with China's policy position;

nevertheless, it is difficult to confirm their analyses have influence on Chinese attitude toward the U.S.-Japan alliance and the Japanese defense policy. Based on the analysis of journal articles, most articles do not provide policy suggestions or simply provide suggestions that do not deviate from the policy. As Gu's theory of pluralist institutionalism and my hypothesis points out, most think tank scholars are establishment intellectuals so they tend to be self-disciplined.

Second, this model provide a new concept "patriotic dilemma" for analyzing the challenge and constraints brought by popular nationalist discourses and public mobilization to Chinese foreign policy decision makers. Chapter 4 investigated the cases study of the controversy over the Yasukuni Shrine Visit, defined as "major/minor interest issue/ sensitive issue (Issue 3)," and the discourses from the popular nationalist, mainly focusing on anti-Japanese activists. The chapter also observes their influence on nationalist public opinions and analyzes how the nationalist public opinions constrain the policy choices among decision makers. Results strongly supported the hypothesis of patriotic dilemma that, although the popular nationalist group and public opinions constrained the policy choices of Chinese decision makers in the short term, they were unable to change the fundamental policy direction. Third, chapter 5 also focuses on anti-Japanese activists and examines the model with the case of the territorial dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. The result supported that hypothesis that China's policy change was not because of the influence from popular nationalist's discourses or public opinions but because of the change of priority of this issue, from major/minor interest issue to core interest issue. These two chapters also indicate that the patron-client model is unable to

describe the popular nationalist. An alternative approach, such as the concept “patriotic dilemma” is needed to describe the relations between the popular nationalist and the government.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter One: Introduction	1
Literature Review.....	3
1. Intellectual-State Relations in China	4
2. Foreign Policy Analysis and Chinese Foreign Policy.....	14
3. Sino-Japan Relations.....	17
Theoretical Framework.....	21
1. Think Tank Scholar Group	22
2. Popular Nationalist Group	26
3. Two-level Perception Gap Model.....	29
Methodology.....	45
1. Methods.....	45
2. Selection of Cases	46
3. Source and Data	47
4. Limitation.....	48
Contributions.....	48
Overview of the Chapters	49
Chapter Two: Chinese Intellectuals and their Interactions with the Communist Government.....	52
Brief Description of Chinese Intellectuals.....	52
1. Who is a Chinese Intellectual?.....	52
2. Characteristics of Chinese Intellectuals	55
Relations between Chinese Intellectuals and the Communist Government	56
1. Thought Reform in the Early 1950s: Criticism and Self-criticism	58
2. Anti-rightist Campaign (1955 to 1958).....	61
3. Cultural Revolution (1966 to 1976).....	63
4. The Beginning of the Democratic Movements (1978 to 1980s).....	67
Categorizing the Chinese Intellectuals.....	76
1. Typology of Chinese Intellectuals	76
2. Typology and Interaction Pattern.....	80
Conclusion	83
Chapter Three: The Think Tank Scholar Group and How It Influences the Chinese Attitude toward the Japan-US Alliance and the Japanese Defense Policy	84
I. Summary of the Chinese Attitude toward the U.S.-Japan Alliance and the Japanese Defense Policy before 2000.....	84
II. Enhancement of the U.S.-Japan Security Cooperation and the Japanese Defense Policy in the 2000s.....	92
1. Advanced Security Cooperation with the United States.....	93
2. Advancements in the Japan Defense Policy	109
III. The Chinese Government Response	119
IV. Analyses of the Discourses of Think Tank Scholars	134
1. Intention of Japan to Change its Defense Policy	135

2. Function of the U.S.-Japan Alliance	137
3. The North Korea and China Factors	139
4. History.....	140
5. Position Suggestions	141
6. Threat Perception of Japan.....	144
V. Discussion	146
Government Policy	146
Think Tank Scholar Group	146
Relations between the Think Tank Scholar Group and the Government	148
The Patron-Client Model	149
Chapter Four: Patriotic Dilemma in the Case of the Yasukuni Shrine Issue	151
I. Why the Yasukuni Visit is a Controversial Issue	152
1985 Visit of Nakasone.....	154
Visits of Hashimoto	159
II. Yasukuni Shrine Visits of Koizumi and Responses of China	163
1. 2001 Visit of Koizumi	164
2. 2002 Visit of Koizumi	169
3. 2003 Visit of Koizumi	172
4. 2004 Visit of Koizumi	176
5. 2005 Visit of Koizumi	179
6. 2006 Visit of Koizumi	186
III. Discourse of the Popular Nationalist	191
1. Roots of Anti-Japanese Sentiment	193
2. Attitude of Wang toward History Disputes	195
3. “Post Resistance against Japan Activities” and their Influence on Public Opinion	197
4. Origin of the Anti-Japanese Sentiment.....	203
Chapter Five: Patriotic Dilemma in the Case of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Dispute	209
I. Claims of Both Sides	209
Claim of China.....	210
Claim of Japan	214
II. Chinese Policy toward the Diaoyu/ Senkaku Islands Dispute	218
1. 1970s.....	218
2. 1990s.....	220
3. 2000s.....	221
4. Reasons Why China Changed Its Diaoyu Policy.....	234
III. Mainland Baodiao Activists.....	239
1. Beginnings and the 2003 Attempt.....	240
2. 2004 Landing	244
3. Calling for Release of the Captain in September 2010.....	244
4. 2012 Baodiao Events	245
IV. Discussion.....	249
Case One: Yasukuni Issue	250

Case Two: Diaoyu/Senkaku Dispute	251
Relations between State and Popular Nationalist Activists	253
Chapter 6: Conclusion.....	260
Policy of China on Japan	261
General Policy Direction.....	261
Policy in Different Issue Arena.....	262
Intellectual Influence on the Policy of China toward Japan	264
Think Tank Scholar Group	264
Popular Nationalist Activists on History Issue and Territorial Dispute ..	265
Intellectual-State Relations	267
Think Tank Scholar Groups versus State.....	267
Popular Nationalist Activists versus State	267
Limitation.....	269
Concluding Remarks: Departing from the Patron-Client Model.....	269
References.....	272
English Articles and Books.....	272
Chinese Articles and Books	287
Japanese Articles and Books.....	289
Appendix A: Journal Analysis	290
I. Selection of Journals.....	290
II. Selection of Articles and Questionnaires	292
III. Results.....	294
Appendix B: Supplemental Tables	298

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: Two-Level Interpretation of Issues over Time	36
Table 2: Four Types of Issues Categorized by Two-Level Interpretation Model.....	40
Table 3: Interaction Patterns	43
Table 4: Visits of the Showa Emperor and Prime Ministers to the Yasukuni Shrine.....	155
Table 5: Basic Structure of Dissertation	261
Table 6: Articles from Journals.....	292
Table 7: Japan's Attitude toward US Demand of Strengthening US-Japan Alliance.....	294
Table 8: Constrains on Japan's Security Policy.....	294
Table 9: The Goal of Japan.....	295
Table 10: The US Attitude toward Japan's Security Policy	295
Table 11: The North Korea Factor in Japan's Altering Policy	295
Table 12: The Rise of China influences Japan's Altering Policy	296
Table 13: Security Dilemma	296
Table 14: Conservative Trend in Japan	296
Table 15: History	297
Table 16: Policy Suggestion	297
Table 17: Threat Perception of Authors toward Japan	297
Table 18: The History of Efforts for BMD Development in Japan	298
Table 19: The Multinational Exercises that Japan Joined from 2005 to 2012.....	299

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

“What is a Chinese intellectual?” When this question is asked, another important one arises: Who do you think is a Chinese intellectual? Do you think of establishment intellectuals like Zhou Yang (周扬) or dissidents like Wei Jingsheng (魏京生)? When considering the intellectual-state relations in China, do you think of suppressing dissidents or obedient intellectuals? This dissertation reveals a new portrait of Chinese intellectuals and argues that new kinds of intellectual-state relations cannot be explained by the patron-client approach alone.

The patron-client approach considers most intellectuals as clients of the establishment, either the party-state or the individual leader. The discourses of these intellectuals do not originate from their independent observation or opinion but are controlled or directed by their patrons. Intellectuals regained their establishment and academic autonomy in the 1980s. During the post-Mao era, with the relaxation of political control on intellectuals and the commercialization and pluralization of the intellectual community, the intellectual-state relations became more pluralized and the patron-client relations approach alone could no longer explain the changing intellectual-state relations.

Lipset defines intellectuals as “all those who create, distribute and apply culture, that is, the symbolic world of man, including art, science and religion,”¹ which emphasizes the cultural role of intellectuals.² This dissertation adopts this definition to observe the think tank scholar³ and popular nationalist.⁴ I argue that these two intellectual groups are no longer clients who simply explain and popularize the policy of individual patrons and the establishment. These two intellectual groups are able to influence government policy. Therefore, as supplement to previous research, this dissertation attempts to explore a new approach to explain the different types of intellectual-state relations by investigating the influence of intellectual discourses on Chinese foreign policy (CFP).

Existing studies that particularly focus on the influence of intellectual discourses on foreign policy either emphasize think tank scholars or nationalists. These studies concentrate on the increase in the number of participants in the foreign policy decision-making process and claim that the CFP decision-making process is no longer limited to a small circle. Instead, the main decision makers consult the research of think tank scholars

¹ Cited from Zhidong Hao, *Intellectuals at a Crossroads: the Changing politics of China's Knowledge Workers* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2003), 388. This research note provides a profound discussion on how to define intellectuals.

² Please refer to Chapter 2, where I provide more definitions of intellectuals and explain why I chose this definition.

³ Based on Xuanli Liao's classification, there are three kinds of foreign policy research institutions: government think tanks; academic specialized think tanks; and university-affiliated think tank. In this dissertation, think tank scholars refer to those who work for or offer researches for these three kinds of institutions. Xuanli Liao, *Chinese Foreign Policy Think Tanks and China's Policy towards Japan* (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 2006), 56-59.

⁴ The concept of popular nationalist came from Suisheng Zhao. Refer to Suisheng Zhao, “Foreign Policy Implications of Chinese Nationalism Revisited: the strident turn,” *Journal of Contemporary China*, 22:82 (March 2013): 535-553.

and are forced to consider the nationalist discourse in public opinion. Inspired by these studies, this dissertation discusses the circumstances and issues in which think tank scholars and popular nationalists influence or challenge the CFP. In previous research, the scope and importance of the influence of intellectual discourses on the CFP are still limited. A theoretical model to explain which issue and circumstance intellectual discourses influence the CFP is scarce.

In order to analyze the role of Chinese intellectuals in Chinese foreign policy making and intellectuals' relations with party-state, this dissertation provides a model called the two-level perception gap model to analyze which issue and circumstance intellectual discourses influence the CFP and to explain the interaction patterns between these two groups and party-state. This model integrates the studies of intellectual-state relations and intellectuals' role in Chinese foreign policy making. Through this model, this dissertation integrates the two scholarships: state-society relation studies and foreign policy analysis (FPA).

Literature Review

This section includes three parts: first, it provides the literature review on the studies of intellectual-state relations; second, based on the overview of FPA and CFP, I locate studies of “the role of intellectual on foreign policymaking” in the sub-field of FPA and pointed out it is a comparatively new trend in the recent studies in CFP; third, we provide the literature review on Sino-Japanese relations, the case studies in this dissertation. The literature review of the role of think tank scholars and nationalists in Chinese Foreign Policymaking is discussed in the next section.

1. Intellectual-State Relations in China

Research on the relationship between intellectuals and the state has three main approaches. The first approach, the patron-client model, emerged in the 1960s.⁵ Considering the particular social condition that most intellectuals were dependent on the party-state before 1980, some researchers used the patron-client model to describe the relation between the intellectuals and the party-state. Hamrin and Cheek found that intellectuals “provided expertise and buttressed the moral legitimacy of the governing group by explaining and popularizing its policies,” and that the ruling elite “in turn gave the intellectuals the opportunity to serve the country and engage in their professional pursuits, while enjoying a relatively affluent and culturally rich lifestyle.”⁶ During the Mao era, most intellectuals articulated ideas for certain political patrons and gained protection from these patrons because the party-state had the monopoly over career opportunities. The debates over important issues among intellectuals were analyzed in terms of power struggle. Goldman’s study on the political struggle between radical intellectuals and liberal intellectuals before and during the Cultural Revolution was a representative study.⁷ James Cotton further explained how the intellectuals were used as tools placed in front of the stage by their patrons and became spokesmen for different

⁵ Shu-Yun Ma provides the definition of clientelism by citing Caciagli: “Clientelism refers to a relation of exchange in which a ‘person with higher status (the patron) takes advantage of his or her authority and resources to protect and benefit somebody with an inferior status (the client) who reciprocates with support and services.” 448. Regarding the patron-client approach, Shu-Yun Ma provides a detail literature review. Refer to Shu-Yun Ma, “Clientelism, Foreign Attention, and Chinese Intellectual Autonomy: The Case of Fang Lizhi,” *Modern China*, 24: 4 (October 1998): 448.

⁶ Timothy Cheek and Carol Lee Hamrin, “Introduction: Collaboration and Conflict in the Search for a New Order,” in *China’s Establishment Intellectuals*, ed. Carol Lee Hamrin and Timothy Cheek (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1986), 4.

⁷ Merle Goldman, *China’s Intellectuals: Advice and Dissent* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981).

political factions during the power struggle between different groups; the winning faction would win the debate, and the losing faction and intellectuals would be suppressed.⁸ Hamrin and Cheek criticized Goldman's classification of radical and liberal intellectuals and considered liberal intellectuals to play only a minor role. They focused on China's "establishment intellectuals" and argued that all intellectuals have strong connections to the state. They developed a model of a concentric circle of intellectuals in which the innermost rings are closer to state power. They classified intellectuals into "Party Center" such as Peng Zhen (彭真), "Party Intellectuals" such as Deng Tuo (邓拓), and "Establishment Scholars" such as Wu Han (吴晗).⁹ Some studies in the 1980s revealed the personal relation between some Chinese intellectuals and leaders, such as Goldman's research on the members of the "democratic elite."¹⁰

This approach elaborates on how the institutional arrangements and constraints, both formal and informal, contribute to breed the particular intellectual-state relations as patron and client. For example, the formal institution that all professions were provided by party-state and the informal institution that intellectuals were traditionally taught to enter the establishment created a strong motivation for intellectuals to become the client. However, after the economic reform in the 1980s, the life of Chinese intellectuals underwent a dynamic change. The jobs of Chinese intellectuals were no longer provided

⁸ James Cotton, "The intellectuals as a group in the Chinese political process," in David S. G. Goodman ed., *Groups and Politics in the People's Republic of China* (Cardiff, UK: University College Press, 1984), 176-93.

⁹ Cheek and Hamrin, "Introduction," 3-20.

¹⁰ Merle Goldman, *Sowing the Seeds of Democracy in China: Political Reform in the Deng Xiaoping* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994).

by the party-state. Although the party-state owned the important research institutions and universities, the intellectuals were able to find their financial support from the emerging commercialized society. These changes challenged the patron-client approach. Although some scholars expanded the application for patron and client, and argue that the client is able to influence the policymaking process or becomes involved in mutually dependent relations. These expansions on the contrary narrow the explanatory ability of the patron-client model. The patron-client approach fails to explain why many establishment intellectuals in the 1980s, who are defined as clients, became dissidents and opposed the party-state.¹¹ I do not imply that client-patron relations do not exist in China nowadays but I simply want to point out that scholars who are preoccupied with the patron-client approach and allege that most Chinese intellectuals are clients usually ignore the fact that Chinese intellectuals now have choices. As a client, his/her position and status can be promoted or at least sustained, and his/her policy suggestions can be heard easily, although they may lose their reputation as independent scholars as well as the trust of academic colleagues and the society. Therefore, to protect their own academic autonomy, intellectuals who choose to separate themselves from the political elite have increased.

As the patron-client approach is no longer sufficient, Chinese intellectual studies diverted into two trends in the 1990s. The first trend focuses on the conflict relation between the Chinese intellectuals and the party-state, such as the dissident approach. It proposes that intellectuals should be the conscience of society, should insist on their critical spirit, and thus should supervise the government. The People's Republic of China

¹¹ In Ma's article, he doubts whether the patron-client approach can explain Fan Lizhi's case. Shu-Yun Ma, "Clientelism, Foreign Attention."

(PRC) has many critical intellectuals, such as Yu Luo (遇罗克) and Wei Jingsheng. These critical intellectuals carry the traditional spirit of *Shi* (士, scholar-official) and they consider amending the deficiencies in the current politics as their responsibility. Therefore, they are critical of the communist politics and are repressed by the party-state. These intellectuals are usually called dissidents; therefore, this approach is also known as the dissident approach. Moody first adopted this approach to examine the intellectual-state relations in China.¹² In the 1990s, the dissident approach emerged again. Its representative scholar is historian Merle Goldman.¹³ Goldman points out that, although intellectuals were silenced shortly after the Tiananmen incident, the pluralization of the society in the 1990s encouraged the emergence of different intellectual groups with different ideas. Among the intellectuals are two groups that play an important role in liberalization and democratization. The first group is composed of intellectuals who were involved in the political reform debate in the late 1990s. Although these intellectuals come from different groups of thoughts, such as the new left and neoconservative groups, which have different ideas on the political reform process, they all advocate that without political reform, the economic reform cannot continue. The second group is composed of intellectuals who cooperate with the unemployed workers and help these workers fight

¹² Peter Moody, *Opposition and Dissent in Contemporary China* (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution, 1977). Other representative works of the dissident approach are Mok Ka-ho, *Intellectuals and the State in Post-Mao China* (New York: St. Martin's, 1998) and Craig Calhoun, "The Ideology of Intellectuals and the Chinese Student Protest Movement of 1989," in *Intellectuals and Politics: Social Theory in a Changing World*, ed. Charles C. Lemert (Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage, 1991), 113-40.

¹³ Regarding Merle Goldman's contribution, Timothy Cheek provides a review and critique in Timothy Cheek, "New Chinese intellectual: globalized, disoriented, reoriented," in *China's Transformations: the Stories beyond the Headlines* ed. Lionel M. Jensen and Timothy B. Weston (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, c2007), 265-284.

for their rights against the local government.¹⁴ In her recent study, Goldman summarizes the development of the Chinese intellectuals since the 1980s. She acknowledges the pluralization of Chinese intellectuals. She claims that these intellectuals demand different things from the government in different ways. She believes that, although these demands are not welcomed by the Chinese government, they will lead China to liberalization and democratization.¹⁵

The problem of the dissident approach is that it overemphasizes intellectuals who confront the party-state and it does not represent the vast majority of the intellectual community. Therefore, the dissident approach cannot reflect the diversity of ideological orientations, thoughts, and world-views of Chinese intellectuals. Western scholars focus on dissidents who are liberal and who expect to change the existing political system to a liberal democracy. However, after the 1990s, the intellectuals split into different groups and they no longer considered Western liberal democracy as the only solution for China. The themes and issues that intellectuals are concerned about have expanded to include nationalism, ideology and national identity, role of China in the international system,

¹⁴ Here are some examples of Merle Goldman's works after 1989: Merle Goldman, "New Relationship between the Intellectuals and the State in the Post-Mao Period," in *An Intellectual History of Modern China*, ed. Merle Goldman and Leo Ou-fan Lee (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 499-538; Merle Goldman, "Emergence of Politically Independent Intellectuals," in *The Paradox of China's Post-Mao Reforms*, ed. Merle Goldman and Roderick MacFarquhar (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), 283-307; Merle Goldman, "Potential for Instability Among Alienated Intellectuals and Students in Post-Mao China," in *Is China Unstable?: Assessing the Factors*, ed. David Shambaugh (Armonk, NY : M.E. Sharpe, c2000), 112-124; Merle Goldman, "Politically-Engaged Intellectuals in the 1990s," *The China Quarterly* 159 (Special Issue: The People's Republic of China after 50 Years) (September 1999): 700-711; and Merle Goldman, "Politically Engaged Intellectuals in the Deng-Jiang Era: A Changing Relationship with the Party-State," *The China Quarterly* 145 (March 1996): 35-52.

¹⁵ Merle Goldman, "China's Beleaguered Intellectuals," *Current History* 108: 719 (September 2009): 264-269 and Merle Goldman, "Repression of China's Public Intellectuals in the Post-Mao Era," *Social Research* 76: 2 (Summer 2009): 659-686.

degree of westernization, cultural values, and the third way (i.e., social democracy).¹⁶ Most intellectuals favor the existing political system but expect political reforms within the government and the Party.

The other trend focuses on the pluralization of Chinese intellectuals. Cheek refutes the approach that centers on the dissident intellectuals and their conflicting relations with the party-state. He considers the more important questions: Who are the Chinese intellectuals today? What can these intellectuals do? What should they do? He considers the dissidents the minority, unable to represent most Chinese intellectuals. He focuses on the diversity of Chinese intellectuals and investigates how the commercialization and pluralization in the post-Mao society have changed their lives. In Cheek's portrait of Chinese intellectuals, their most important task is neither to criticize politics nor to attempt to influence the policies. Most intellectuals attempt to find balance between gaining recognition from their academic colleagues or fulfilling their professional goals in art and culture and supporting their own lives and their families. Chinese intellectuals want to sustain a relationship with the government, but they do not want to offend the government or want the government to interfere with their lives and professional goals.¹⁷ However, Cheek did not provide a systematic model or theoretical approach to explain the intellectual-state relations.

¹⁶ Suzanne Ogden, *Inklings of Democracy in China* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2002), 334-37.

¹⁷ These arguments are the from Cheek's works: Timothy Cheek, "New Chinese intellectual: globalized, disoriented, reoriented"; Timothy Cheek, "Historians as public intellectuals in contemporary China," in *Chinese Intellectuals between State and Market*, ed. Edward Gu and Merle Goldman (London; New York: Routledge Curzon, 2004), 204-222; Timothy Cheek, "Xu Jilin and the Thought Work of China's Public Intellectuals," *China Quarterly* 186 (June 2006): 401-420.

Gu addressed this deficiency by developing the third approach called “plural institutionalism,” which reflects the pluralized intellectual-state relations. Gu draws insights from new institutionalism,¹⁸ which analyzes how institutions shape the preferences and choices of social actors and the outcomes of social actions, and develops a new approach, plural institutionalism. Institution refers to the rules of the game in the society,¹⁹ such as formal rules, compliance procedures, and standard operating practices that structure relationships between actors in various social realms.²⁰ Institutions also include explicitly written formal institutions, such as constitutions, laws, and regulations, and informal institutions, such as conventions, customs, and codes of behavior.²¹ The plural institutionalism model examines a variety of institutional factors as independent variables.²² Gu examined how historically evolving institutional settings constrained intellectuals in the process of creating public spaces and restructuring the intellectual-state relations under communist rule.

¹⁸ Refer to two useful review articles, Vivien Lowndes, “Varieties of new institutionalism: a critical appraisal,” *Public Administration* 174: 2 (Summer 1996): 181-197; and Junko Karo, “Institutions and Rationality in Politics: Three Varieties of Neo-Institutionalists,” *British Journal of Political Science* 26:4 (October 1996): 553-582.

¹⁹ See Douglass North, *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 3-5.

²⁰ Kathleen Thelen and Sven Steinmo, “Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Perspective,” in *Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis*, ed. Kathleen Thelen and Sven Steinmo (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 2.

²¹ See North, *Institutions*, 36-53 and Peter A. Hall, *Governing the Economy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 19.

²² Gu argues that institutional factors are “from the macro-level operations of the party-state system, to intermediate-level ones such as existing institutional arrangements in different social sectors, and the micro-level conventions, like the importance of personal connections (*guanxi*) for doing everything in China.” See Edward X. Gu, “Plural Institutionalism and the Emergence of Intellectual Public Spaces in Contemporary China: Four Relational Patterns and Four Organizational Forms,” *Journal of Contemporary China* 7: 18 (July 1998): 271-301.

Moreover, this model reflects the pluralized intellectual-state relations by emphasizing that different segments in the intellectual community have divergent interests and preferences and that they are inclined to establish different relations with the party-state. Gu's model examines how different institutional arrangements and settings over different historical periods led to the different political choices of different intellectuals in the 1980s. The emergence of intellectual public spaces in the 1980s implied the change in existing institutional arrangements within the relationship between intellectuals and the state. To analyze how different intellectual groups approach the different social actions during the process of creating intellectual public spaces under the institutional constraints in the 1980s, Gu identified the four ideal-typical patterns as state-generated and establishment, society-originated and establishment, autonomous from the state, and confrontational with the state. In the first pattern, intellectuals who work in state-owned or semi-official institutions usually serve the party-state as a transmission belt. In the society-originated and establishment pattern, intellectual activists form their own organizations in society, but they are recruited by the state and integrate themselves into the establishment. In the third pattern, intellectual activists form their own organizations in society and do not enter into the establishment. Therefore, the organizations they establish are autonomous from the party-state. The last pattern characterizes the public space for dissident intellectuals, who usually have confrontational relations with the party-state.²³

²³ The definition of intellectual public spaces is "a space intermediate between state and society in which both participated," what Philip C.C. Huang calls the "third realm." Gu's four ideal-typical patterns are defined in terms of the roles of either state or society, or both, in the formation of intellectual public spaces and in terms of the structuring of their relations with the state. *Ibid.*, 276.

Furthermore, Gu views patron-client ties as one of the institutional factors in the 1980s. Gu argues that intellectuals cannot create new public spaces without the support of political elites; the support is given either formally, such as the signature on the application report, or informally, such as orally expressing concern or support for the application.²⁴ Nevertheless, Gu also recognizes some new changes in the 1990s. First, the de facto cultural pluralism continued to flourish, and various groups of thoughts emerged. Although the mainstream of intellectual ideas in the 1980s was western liberal, the intellectuals in the 1990s drew insights from different political thoughts. Some intellectuals considered the approach of market socialism as the solution to problems caused by economic reforms, whereas some intellectuals searched for answers from the Chinese traditional culture. Second, the party-state relaxed the regulations related to the formation of non-governmental organizations. This change gave intellectuals more autonomy to publish their own journals. However, the wake of commercialism increased the competition. The major task of intellectuals then was to determine how to sustain financial autonomy; for instance, some newly published journals turned to foreign foundation for financial sponsorship.²⁵

Gu's approach explains intellectual-state relations within the context of institutions and history, emphasizes particular characteristics of Chinese culture and special historical evolution which form institutions, and reflects the diversity of

²⁴ The other institutional factor is the "within-establishment principle," which is an informal (unwritten) Party discipline that requires intellectuals' viewpoints must be expressed through the proper party-state channels in accordance with proper procedure. See Edward X. Gu. "Cultural Intellectuals and the Politics of the Cultural Public Space in Communist China (1979-1989): A Case Study of Three Intellectual Groups." *Journal of Asian Studies* 58: 2 (May 1999): 389-431.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 428-429.

intellectual groups and relations with the party-state. However, the approach distinguishes different intellectual groups in terms of their positions, which cannot reflect the attitudes of intellectuals toward the party-state. Even those intellectuals who work in state-owned research institutions are not necessarily the mouthpieces of the state. Gu overemphasizes the fact that most intellectuals want to enter the establishment and are restrained by the institutional factor of patron-client ties. Intellectuals in the 1980s did not have much choice other than to enter the establishment and to seek a connection with the political elite if they wanted to publish their journals and establish an organization. However, if they had more choices, would they choose not to enter the establishment and remove their status as clients? Gu's arguments did not answer this question.

In sum, the relation between Chinese intellectuals and the government has three approaches. First, the patron-client approach shows that Chinese intellectuals express their discourses through the instructions of certain leaders, and thus the debate between different intellectuals implies the power struggle among different political factions in the communist party. This approach can also be applied to Chinese intellectuals who are loyal to the party-state or have personal relations with a particular ruling elite, and their discourses tend to simply interpret official policy. Second, the dissident approach focuses on conflict relations. Whereas the patron-client approach can only be applied to certain establishment intellectuals, the dissident approach only reflects the dissidents who some Chinese intellectuals actually oppose. Third, the pluralist institutionalism provides a comprehensive framework for different intellectual groups and their relations with the party-state, but the approach is more applicable to state-intellectual relations in the 1980s. Nevertheless, none of these three approaches can be applied to the popular nationalist

group. None of them focuses on how the pluralization of intellectuals increases the possibility that the opinions of intellectuals may influence government policies. Therefore, this dissertation intends to add this missing piece.

2. Foreign Policy Analysis and Chinese Foreign Policy

The second scholarship integrated in this dissertation is foreign policy analysis, to be specific, the role of the intellectual in Chinese foreign policymaking. In order to understand the substance and significance of the studies of the role of the intellectual in Chinese foreign policymaking, overviews of FPA and CFP are necessary. An overview of FPA will define the content of this study, while an overview of CFP indicates the importance of this study, as a comparative new trend in CFP.

Hudson and Vore categorized FPA into three, namely, comparative foreign policy, foreign policy decision making, and foreign policy context.²⁶ The foreign policy context is the most complicated one. Studies on this context are initiated by exploring the minds of foreign policymakers. Scholars believe that decision makers have different personalities and preferences. How decision makers process information and make decisions are related to their beliefs, attitudes, values, experiences, emotions, and perception of their nation and other nations. These beliefs and perceptions not only come from personal experiences but also from the social context of the society to which they belong. Therefore, such factors as culture, history, geography, political institutions, and ideology that shape their social contexts are important when foreign policy is analyzed.

²⁶ Valerie M. Hudson and Christopher S. Vore, "Foreign Policy Analysis Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow," *Mershon International Studies Review* 39: 2 (October 1995), 209-238. In Hudson's latter review of FPA field, he also introduces these three approaches, Valerie M. Hudson, "The History and evolution of foreign policy analysis," in *Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases*, eds. Steve Smith, Amelia Hadfield, Tim Dunne (NY: Oxford University Press, February 2008), 11-29.

These studies include the individual characteristics of decision makers, the national and societal characteristics of a country, the influence of perception and misperception on foreign policy, the influence of public opinions on foreign policy, and the role of societal groups in foreign policymaking. In this dissertation, I treat Chinese intellectual discourse as a societal force and examine their roles in foreign policymaking.

The research trends and approaches vary according to the trend in Chinese studies in the CFP area and the current situation in China. Before the Chinese area studies became a sub-field, Chinese studies were mostly contributed by distinguished Asian experts such as John K. Fairbank. The first-generation Chinese studies scholars appeared in the 1960s. Few scholars had the opportunity to observe the real situation in China after the PRC was established, and they could only rely on Taiwanese intelligence materials and interviews with refugees who escaped from China. The works of scholars in this period tended to focus on institutional and social dynamics of the communist system. The second-generation scholars focused on the Cultural Revolution and relied on the Red Guard materials. After the 1970s, with the rapprochement between the United States (U.S.) and China in 1972 and the normalization of the U.S.-China relations in December 1978, scholars had the opportunity to visit and observe China with their own eyes. The third-generation scholars conducted more field studies and focused more on detailed empirical observations. The research objects shifted from the political elite to the analysis of various factors, such as the state-society relation, the relation between the central and local governments and the civil society. After the Tiananmen incident, scholars reconsidered their optimistic imagination on Chinese reforms and created more works that concentrated on the social problems that followed the economic reform, such as

village elections, corruption, and protests in the rural regions.²⁷ The same direction was also reflected in the CFP studies. The factors were no longer limited to leadership, political institution, or political elite dimensions. Scholars began to focus on various factors that influence CFP, such as non-governmental organizations, newly popularized media, intellectuals, public opinion, and nationalism, among others. Scholars also focused on various CFP issues, such as multilateralism in international organization, economic and security cooperation in regional and global scale, energy resource, human rights, environmental protection, and so on. When reviewing the studies on the decision-making process of the CFP, Shambaugh mentioned the previous studies that focused on foreign policy institutions and decision makers but did not indicate the role of think tanks and research institutions, Chinese media, Internet, nationalism, influence of the civil society, and intellectuals until recently.²⁸ Thus, this dissertation follows the present trend and mainly focuses on Chinese intellectuals and their influence on the CFP.

In terms of the analytical approaches of the CFP, Johnston categorized them into history, historical memory, and identity; realism such as classical, structural, and neoclassical realism; Mao-centered revolutionary ideology; deterrence theory;

²⁷ Richard Baum provides a detail review of the studies of Chinese politics. He divides scholars and studies into five generations. The fourth generation is trained and graduated in the 1990s. The coming fifth generation just received their Ph.D.s in the 2000s. Richard Baum, "Studies of Chinese Politics in the US," in *China Watching: Perspectives from Europe, Japan and the United States*, ed. Robert Ash, David L. Shambaugh, Seiichiro Takagi (Hoboken: Taylor & Francis, 2007), 147-168.

²⁸ In his chapter on updating the studies on Chinese foreign and security policies, David Shambaugh reviews the books on CFP studies and categorizes them into eight: edited compendia and synthesized overviews of CFP; the rise of China; histories of CCP foreign policy; history of China and the Cold War; policy-making process of CFP; Chinese perceptions of international affairs in general and the United States in particular; China's role in international institutions and regimes; and China's bilateral and regional relationships. David Shambaugh, "Studies of China's Foreign Policy and Security Policy in the US," in *China Watching*, ed. Ash, Shambaugh, and Takagi, 213-240.

socialization theory and social learning; constructivism; and domestic politics.²⁹ Among these categories, domestic politics is an important factor used to analyze the CFP. Many scholars consider the CFP to be an extension of domestic politics; thus, they attempt to determine the explanations of foreign policy decisions from domestic political factors. They also deem domestic political factors, such as bureaucratic politics, factionalism, political culture, leadership, and nationalism, to influence the decisions of foreign policymakers. Therefore, this dissertation also discusses the domestic political factors, with emphasis on intellectual discourse.

3. Sino-Japan Relations

Since I will adopt Sino-Japanese relations as case studies, some recent studies on Sino-Japan relations are reviewed to obtain a general overview.

In the field of Sino-Japan relations studies, theoretical approaches are comparatively undeveloped. Although theory has been applied, the subfield is eclectic, which is a common phenomenon in area and CFP studies.³⁰ Some theoretical approaches have been used in the subfield of Sino-Japan relations. First, the realist approach, which involves geopolitics, structural realism, and neo-classical realism, has been adopted. It usually focuses on material capability and power struggle, and warns about the coming

²⁹ Alastair Iain Johnston, "Trends in Theory and Method in the Study of Chinese Foreign Policy," (Paper prepared for the conference on China Studies on the occasion of the 50th Anniversary of the Fairbank Center for East Asian Research, December 2005, Revised February 2006), accessed February 1, 2011, http://www.irchina.org/en/pdf/Johnston_CFP.pdf.

³⁰ In the conclusion of *New Directions in the Study of China's Foreign Policy*, the authors state that "[In the Chinese foreign policy field] one finds a theoretical eclecticism that often stretches the degree of compatibility or commensurability across theories. In is also safe to say that, in general, the subfield has been a consumer but not a producer of theory and methodology." Thomas J. Christensen, Alastair Iain Johnston, Robert S. Ross, "Conclusions and Future Directions," in *New Directions in the Study of China's Foreign Policy*, ed. Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross (Stanford University Press, 2006), 387.

conflict between China and Japan. For example, Hsiung used the security dilemma to explain the Sino-Japan conflict,³¹ and Yang Dong adopted the status dynamics.³² Second, some scholars use the liberal argument to examine the interdependence between China and Japan, and how the interdependence influences the relation. Some consider that the growing economic interdependence and economic interests will force the two governments to overcome the political conflict,³³ whereas the others consider, without the context of political and cultural exchange, interdependence alone cannot solve the problem of historical memories, reducing trust between the two governments.³⁴ Third, some scholars use social psychology and theories of perception, image, and belief systems to explain the effects of the rise of nationalism in both states in terms of Sino-Japan relations. Some focus on the rise of nationalism in China and explain its origin and effect on China's Japan policy.³⁵ Others focus on the rise of nationalism in Japan to

³¹ James C. Hsiung, "Introduction: Theory and the Long-Running Tussle?" in *China and Japan at odds: deciphering the perpetual conflict*, ed. James C. Hsiung (Palgrave Macmillan, September 2007).

³² Yong Deng states that Sino-Japanese relations should be "best understood in terms of the multiple, interrelated dimensions of respective notion of international status." Yong Deng, "Independent Rivalry with Japan," *China's Struggle for Status: The Realignment of International Relations* (Cambridge University Press, 2008), 167. Related to this, Linus Hagström also focuses on relational power analysis, Linus Hagström, *Japan's China Policy: a Relational Power Analysis* (Routledge, 2005).

³³ Mika M. Mochizuki, "China-Japan Relations: Downward Spiral or a New Equilibrium," in *Power Shift: China & Asia's New Dynamics*, ed. David Shambaugh (University of California Press, 2005) and Ohahi Hideo, "The Impact of China's Rise on Sino-Japan Economic Relations," in *The Rise of China and a Changing East Asian Order*, ed. Kokubun Ryosei and Wang Jisi (Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange, 2004).

³⁴ Michael Yahuda, "Limits of Economic Interdependence: Sino-Japanese Relations," in *New Directions in the Study of China's Foreign Policy*, ed. Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross (Stanford University Press, 2006).

³⁵ Ian Seckington, "Nationalism, Ideology and China's 'Fourth Generation' Leadership," *Journal of Contemporary China* 14: 42 (February 2005): 23-33; Peter Hays Gries, "Nationalism, Indignation and China's Japan Policy," *SAIS Review* 25: 2 (Summer-Fall 2005): 105-114 and Peter Hays Gries, "China's 'New Thinking' on Japan," *The China Quarterly* 184 (December 2005): 831-50.

explain the series of moves made by Japan in the 2000s.³⁶ Scholars also address the historical issue, especially textbook issues³⁷ and Yasukuni issues,³⁸ between Japan and China. Fourth, case studies that focus on the foreign policy analysis and foreign policy process are the most popular ones. Many studies have focused on Japan's China policy, for example, the development of the Japanese aid policy.³⁹ Some studies investigated the influence of Japanese domestic politics on Japan's China policy.⁴⁰ Studies that focus on China's Japan policy are comparatively scarce⁴¹ because of the limited information source on how Beijing shapes its foreign policy decisions. Although some scholars have

³⁶ Masaru Tamamoto, "How Japan Imagines China and Sees Itself," Japan Institute of International Affairs, 2006 and *World Policy Journal* 22: 4 (Winter 2005/06): 55-62 and Eugene A. Matthews, "Japan's New Nationalism," *Foreign Affairs* 82: 6 (Nov/Dec2003).

³⁷ Alexander Bukh, "Japan's History Textbooks Debate: National Identity in Narratives of Victimhood and Victimization," *Asian Survey* 47: 5 (October 2007): 683-704; Caroline Rose, "The Textbook Issue: Domestic Sources of Japan's Foreign Policy," *Japan Forum* 11: 2 (1999): 205-216; and Caroline Rose, *Sino-Japanese relations: facing the past, looking to the future?* (Routledge Curzon, 2005).

³⁸ Daiki Shibuichi, "The Yasukuni Shrine Dispute and the Politics of Identity in Japan: Why All the Fuss?" *Asian Survey* 45: 2 (April 2005): 197-215; Yongwook Ryu, "The Yasukuni Controversy: Divergent Perspectives from the Japanese Political Elite," *Asian Survey* 47: 5 (September/October 2007): 705-726; and John Breen, ed., *Yasukuni, the War Dead and the Struggle for Japan's Past* (Columbia University Press, c2008).

³⁹ For example, Takamine Tsukasa, *Japan's Development Aid to China: the Long-running Foreign Policy of Engagement* (London; New York: Routledge, 2006) and Mary M. McCarthy, "The Use of 'Carrots' and 'Sticks' in Japan Aid Policy toward China 1989-2001: How Electoral Politics Shapes Foreign Economic Policy," (PhD diss., Columbia University, 2007). Available from ProQuest dissertations and theses database. (UMI No. 3285132).

⁴⁰ For example, Quansheng Zhao, *Japanese Policymaking: the Politics behind Politics* (Oxford University Press/Praeger, 1993) and Sohma Katsumi, "The Process of Foreign Policy Making in Japan: the case of its relations with China," (Ph.D. diss., Boston University, 1999). Available from ProQuest dissertations and theses database. (UMI No. 9923989).

⁴¹ According to Xuanli Liao, "Apart from the studies done by Chae-Jin Lee, Ryosei Kokubun, and Quansheng Zhao, which mainly dealt with China's foreign economic decision making, little research on China's policy-making toward Japan has been published." Xuanli Liao, *Chinese foreign policy think tanks*, p.13. The scholars' works she mentioned are as follows: Chae-Jin Lee, *China and Japan: New Economic Diplomacy* (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1984); Ryosei Kokubun, "The Politics of Foreign Economic Policy-Making in China: The Case of Plant Cancellations with Japan," *The China Quarterly* 105 (March 1986): 19-44; Quansheng Zhao, *Interpreting Chinese Foreign Policy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).

attempted to form a model to explain Sino-Japan relations,⁴² analyzing the important factors has become the norm. Moreover, from the perspective of substantive issues, the recent investigations on Sino-Japan relations are mostly on the Japanese strategy toward a rising China,⁴³ the cooperation and competition between Japan and China in the East Asian region,⁴⁴ the military development and competition,⁴⁵ the relations between China, Japan, and the U.S.,⁴⁶ and the territorial disputes over the East China Sea.⁴⁷

⁴² Ming Wan, *Sino-Japanese relations: Interaction, Logic, and Transformation* (Stanford University Press, c2006).

⁴³ Michael Jonathan Green, "Managing Chinese Power: The view of Japan," in *Engaging China: the Management of an Emerging Power*, ed. Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross (London and New York: Routledge, 1999), 152-175; Akio Takahara, "Japan's Political Response to the Rise of China," in *The Rise of China and a Changing East Asian Order*, ed. Kokubun Ryosei and Wang Jisi (Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange, 2004), 157-174; and Robert G Sutter, "Relations with Japan," *China's Rise in Asia: Promises and Peril*, (Rowman& Littlefield, August, 2005).

⁴⁴ Suelo Sudo, "It Takes Two to Tango: The Sino-Japanese Conflict as Japan Sees It," in *China and Japan at Odds* ed. Hsiung, 43-58 and Ryosei Kokubun, "The China-Japan relationship, East Asia community, and the dynamics of trilateral relations," in *Getting the Triangle Straight: Managing China-Japan-US Relations*, ed. Gerald Curtis, Ryosei Kokubun, and Wang Jisi (Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange, c2010), 44-72.

⁴⁵ Dennis V. Hickey and Lilly Lu, "Japan's Military Modernization: The Chinese Perspective," in *China and Japan at Odds*, ed. James C. Hsiung (Palgrave Macmillan, September 2007), 95-112.

⁴⁶ Ezra F. Vogel, Yuan Ming, and Tanaka Akihiko eds., *The Golden Age of the US-China-Japan Triangle, 1972-1989* (Harvard University Asia Center, Harvard University Press, 2002); Quansheng Zhao, "Sino-Japanese Relations in the Context of the Beijing-Tokyo-Washington Triangle," Marie Söderberg ed., *Chinese-Japanese Relations in the Twenty-first Century: Complementarity and Conflict* (New York: Routledge, 2002); Elizabeth Economy, "China, the USA, and Japan: Reconfiguring Relations in Southeast Asia," in *China-US Relations Transformed: Perspective and Strategic Interactions*, ed. Suisheng Zhao (Routledge, 2008); and Curtis, Kokubun, and Wang eds., *Getting the Triangle Straight*.

⁴⁷ James C. Hsiung, "Sea Power, Law of the Sea, & a Sino-Japanese East China Sea 'Resource War'," in *China and Japan at Odds*, ed. Hsiung, 133-154 and Mark J. Valencia, "The East China Sea Dispute: Context, Claims, Issues, and Possible Solutions," *Asian Perspective* 31: 1 (2007): 127-167. For research on Diaoyu/ Senkaku dispute, Unryu Suganuma, "The Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, 1993-2006: A Hotbed for a Hot War?" in *China and Japan at odds*, ed. Hsiung, 155-172; Unryu Suganuma, *Sovereign Rights and Territorial Space in Sino-Japanese Relations: Irredentism and the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands* (Association for Asian Studies and University of Hawaii Press, c2000); M. Taylor Fravel, "Explaining Stability in the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands Dispute," in *Getting the Triangle Straight*, ed. Curtis, Kokubun, and Wang, 144-164; Chien-peng Chung, "Diaoyu/Tiaoyutai/Senkaku Islands Dispute," *Domestic Politics, International Bargaining and China's Territorial Disputes* (Routledge Curzon, 2004).

In the field of Sino-Japan relations, Allen Whiting's *China Eyes Japan* focuses on the perception approach and uses empirical evidence on comprehensive dimensions, including economic, military, nationalism, and political dimensions, to analyze the overall Sino-Japan relations in the 1980s. The book is analytical, theoretical, unbiased, and elaborately researched, and it provides readers many insights and inspirations. Although this dissertation is not particularly designed to analyze Sino-Japan relations, it examines the important military and political events and the territorial disputes in Sino-Japan relations in the 2000s from the perspective of Chinese policies and Chinese intellectuals.

Theoretical Framework

As the Literature Review above indicates, Chinese intellectuals have more academic autonomy after 1990s in an increasingly professionalized, pluralized, and commercialized society. Intellectuals are able to receive financial supports from emerging commercialized society or even from foreign sector; thus, entering the establishment or becoming a client is not the only choice for them now. Even for those establishment intellectuals, like think tank scholars, they seek balance between sustaining their position in establishment and maintaining academic autonomy and reputation. Thus, the intellectual-state relation is no longer a relation as client and patron. Therefore, my puzzle is that although many scholars still use patron-client model to explain the relations between intellectual and state in China, this model cannot explain the pluralized intellectual-state relations. My research question is that is there a new theoretical approach can explain the pluralized intellectual-state relations? Moreover, the purpose of this dissertation is to analyze the role of the intellectual in CFP making process and based

on these analyses explain the pluralized intellectual-state relations in China. To show that the patron-client approach is no longer sufficient to explain the pluralized intellectual-state relations in China, this dissertation particularly focuses on two intellectual groups, namely, the think tank scholars and the popular nationalist groups.

Before I begin with the description of the framework, pointing out that this dissertation particularly emphasizes one important characteristic of intellectuals is critical. Intellectuals usually work as the bridge between elites, such as the policy makers and the public. According to Joseph Fewsmith and Stanley Rosen, opinions have three levels: the elite, sub-elite, and popular levels.⁴⁸ The intellectual that I refer to here is the sub-elite level. Their opinions are not only more likely to be accepted and acknowledged by the government but also influence the public.

1. Think Tank Scholar Group

In recent years, many studies have focused on think tank scholars and discussed their influence on the CFP. *The China Quarterly* journal published a special issue to discuss the increasing influences of Chinese think tanks on Chinese policy making.⁴⁹ Based on the literature, Xuanli Liao explored this subject in detail and provided empirical

⁴⁸ Joseph Fewsmith and Stanley Rosen, "The Domestic Context of Chinese Foreign Policy: Does 'Public opinion' Matter?" in *The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform*, ed. David Lampton (Stanford University Press, 2001), 158-172.

⁴⁹ This volume includes the following articles: Murray Scot Tanner, "Changing Windows on a Changing China: The Evolving 'Think Tank' System and the Case of the Public Security Sector," (pp.559-574); David Shambaugh, "China's International Relations Think Tanks: Evolving Structure and Process," (pp.575-596); Bonnie S. Glaser and Phillip C. Saunders, "Chinese Civilian Foreign Policy Research Institutes: Evolving Roles and Increasing Influence," (pp.597-616); Bates Gill and James Mulvenon, "Chinese Military-Related Think Tanks and Research Institutions," (pp.617-624); Barry Naughton, "China's Economic Think Tanks: Their Changing Role in the 1990s," (pp.625-635), *The China Quarterly* 171 (September 2002).

evidence on the cases in Sino-Japanese relations.⁵⁰ She presented three cases from different perspectives, namely, the security or the attitude of China toward the U.S.-Japan alliance, the political perspective or historical issue, and the economic perspective or the Baogang project. This research is based on two assumptions. First, CFP has become decentralized and professionalized that the external influences of the leading group have become possible. Second, the importance of think tanks has increased. Xuanli Liao referred to these changes as pluralist elitism. Although foreign policy decision making is still controlled by the political elites, the political elites accept more information and suggestions from other levels of society, especially from think tanks. This research provides significant insights for the studies on the CFP and on Sino-Japan relations.

However, these studies did not explain why Chinese intellectuals are able to transform themselves from clients of the party-state to independent scholars who regained academic autonomy. Confirming the assumption that intellectuals influence the CFP is difficult without explaining the changing intellectual-state relation. If intellectuals remain as clients, their discourses can be directed by their patrons, that is, either the party-state or the individual elite. Although these studies indicated that intellectual discourses appeared before the implementation of a certain policy, they omitted the possibility that these discourses simply aim to test the reactions of the public but the patron still directs them.

Therefore, in this dissertation, I apply and revise Gu's pluralist institutionalism to examine the think tank scholar group and to observe the degree to which this group influences the CFP. As mentioned previously, pluralist institutionalism adopts new

⁵⁰ Xuanli Liao, *Chinese Foreign Policy Think Tanks*.

institutionalism to examine four Chinese intellectual public spaces. One of these public spaces is the state-generated public space, in which the think tank scholars usually operate. Many influential academic institutions operate in this state-generated intellectual public space. Gu emphasized the “self-disciplinary behavior” of the intellectuals that operate in the state-generated public space. These intellectuals express their views with a “self-disciplinary behavior” because they face the long-term institutional restraints imposed by the party-state. The representative “intellectual networks” are the research institutions of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) and various media and publishing houses.⁵¹

Nonetheless, Gu’s approach focuses on the intellectuals in the 1980s. To apply for new transformations after the 1980s, revising some of the assumptions was necessary. The institutions and norms in China during the 1980s, whether formal or informal, remained an environment that shaped patron-client ties. The formal regulations on publishing and organization limited intellectual-state relations because the intellectuals required the support of political elites to establish organizations and publish journals. However, when the regulations eased in the 1990s, the intellectuals were able to pursue academic autonomy and independent relations with the party-state. Although they worked in state-owned research institutions, they did not serve as clients for certain political elites or the party-state. They could still work with a “self-disciplined behavior,”

⁵¹ In Gu’s words, “The CASS mainly serves the ideological-theoretical constructions necessary for the party-state’s rule, media and publishing houses serve to produce ideological propaganda and theoretical dissemination, and the research centers under the State Council serve (or served) as information collection and policy consultancy.” Edward X. Gu, “Plural Institutionalism,” 276-277.

but they cherished their academic reputation and strived to earn the respect of their Chinese and foreign colleagues.

Drawing from Gu's approach and from my observations, I emphasize several perspectives in analyzing the think tank scholar group. First, the institutional constraints encourage scholars to interpret official policy and to not express an opposing view. Second, the literary traditions provide intellectuals with the initiatives to enter the establishment and influence policy. The intellectuals want to sustain their academic autonomy and objective reputation. Therefore, they want to maintain a certain distance from the party-state. Most important research institutions and universities are still owned by the party-state; thus, entering an establishment in reality does provide better academic positions and professions for intellectuals. However, these think tank scholars are not necessarily the mouthpieces of the party-state. Third, aside from the long-term institutional restraints imposed by the party-state, the historical experiences of conflict relations between Chinese intellectuals and the party-state also have led them to adopt a self-disciplined behavior that they will remain silent on sensitive issues or that they will not express opposing views against the official views. They are afraid to cross the line because their careers and statuses are at stake.

Therefore, I assume that Chinese think tank scholars tend to create balance between academic autonomy and institutional constraints. They provide objective observations, but when they write about the implications for China or offer policy suggestions, either they avoid writing specific policy suggestions or they write according to the current policy orientation. In Chapter 3, this assumption is examined. These think tank scholars observe and describe the shifts in the U.S.-Japan alliance and the Japanese

defense policy objectively. However, they may avoid offering policy suggestions, such as how Beijing should change its attitude toward Japan. When they have to provide policy implications, they reveal their apprehensions on the deteriorating Sino-Japan relations before 2006 but they interpret Japan's move as a rational development when Sino-Japan relations restored after 2006.

This dissertation especially focuses on international political specialists and Japanese specialists operating in the Chinese state-generated intellectual public space. In Chapter 3, I examine how the discourses of think tank scholars influence the CFP and whether Gu's theory can explain their relations with the party-state.

2. Popular Nationalist Group

The popular nationalist group is the other intellectual group. In discussing this group, this dissertation specifically focuses on anti-Japanese activists.

Recently, many studies have focused on the rise of Chinese nationalism as well as on the anti-foreign sentiments and how these sentiments influence and challenge the CFP. The degree of anti-American sentiments in China displayed in an anti-American demonstration in 1999 astounded many scholars. Scholars also noticed that the Chinese government was not able to control and deal with the anti-American sentiments in the first stage. Another case that caught the attention of scholars is how anti-Japanese sentiments influence China's Japan policy. Most scholars consider that the anti-Japanese sentiment challenged the Chinese government and led to its persistence in pursuing the historical issue on Sino-Japan relations in the 2000s. Among these studies is that of Peter Hays Gries.⁵² He applied social-psychological and cultural approaches to explain the anti-

⁵² Peter Hays Gries conducted a series of studies on Chinese nationalism: Peter Hays Gries, "Chinese

foreign nationalism. He considered China's apology diplomacy to analyze how the national collective self-esteem of the Chinese people shaped their anger toward Japan and the U.S.. He pointed out that the persistent demand for apology is a way to regain self-respect.⁵³ These studies usually cite a wide range of evidence, including the radical works of popular intellectuals, such as the works of the "say-no club,"⁵⁴ radical online opinions, and the anti-foreign demonstrations. These studies usually lead to the conclusion that the Chinese government could not control the anti-foreign nationalism, which eventually forces the government to make irrational foreign policy decisions to please the anti-foreign nationalists.

However, this approach has some problems. First, although these studies seem persuasive, they lack the evidence to show that the anti-foreign public opinion is a general view to confirm their alarmist conclusions.⁵⁵ To confirm that the anti-foreign public opinions are the general view in China, more scientific evidence with a significant scale and multiple levels of social-economic analyses are necessary. Second, instead of giving the extremely radical anti-American or anti-Japanese public opinions as evidence,

Nationalism: Challenging the State?" *Current History* 104: 683 (September 2005): 251-56; Peter Hays Gries, "Nationalism, Indignation and China's Japan Policy"; Peter Hays Gries, "Nationalism and Chinese Foreign Policy," in *China Rising: Power and Motivation in Chinese Foreign Policy*, ed. Yong Deng and Fei-ling Wang (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005); and Peter Hays Gries, *China's New Nationalism: Pride, Politics, and Diplomacy* (University of California Press, 2004).

⁵³ Peter Hays Gries, "Apology Diplomacy," *China's New Nationalism*.

⁵⁴ The "China say-no club" refers to a group of Chinese nationalist writers. The group has published a series of "say no" books since the mid-1990s. Their statement usually includes strong nationalist thoughts and sometimes reveals a strong anti-foreign nationalism as well. Their representative books are: *Zhounguo keyi shuobu* (The China that can say no), *Yaomohua Zhongguo de beihou* (Behind the demonization of China), and *Quanqiu hua yinyingxia de Zhongguo zhilu* (China's path under the shadow of globalization).

⁵⁵ Although anti-foreign sentiment exists, only a small number of radical people would post criticismS on the Internet and participate in protests. Although the number may seem shocking to the world, it is a small number compared with the total number of the Chinese population. I wonder if it can represent public opinion.

more objective observations on the rise of Chinese nationalism should be given. The rise of Chinese nationalism can be observed in both positive and negative ways. Chinese nationalism shows that the economic growth and the increasing interaction with the international society have made many Chinese people more confident about their national identity. The limited understanding of foreign culture, the limited access to foreign information, the inevitable result of the Patriotic Education Campaign in the early 1990s, and the distortion of media reports cultivate anti-foreign sentiments. Third, many scholars who emphasize the inability of the Chinese government to deal with anti-foreign sentiment usually overlook the possibility that the Chinese government is using the anti-foreign sentiment as a bargaining chip when dealing with foreign governments. Moreover, these studies usually underestimate the ability of the Chinese government to control the media and public opinions and overestimate the importance of anti-foreign sentiment.⁵⁶ Fourth, although some studies view the nationalist public opinions on the Internet as evidence of the emergence of a civil society, these studies adopt the civil society approach to explain the changing state-society relations.⁵⁷ Studies that view the nationalist intellectual discourse as evidence to challenge the patron-client approach are scarce. Therefore, this dissertation attempts to explain the relation between the popular nationalist group and the party-state.

⁵⁶ Take the crisis management of the Chinese government in the EP-3 incident as an example. The Chinese government used the nuance of the translation between Chinese and English languages to create the illusion that the US government sincerely apologized to the Chinese people. Peter Hays Gries, "Nationalism and Chinese Foreign Policy," 105-109.

⁵⁷ For example, Alfred L. Chan and Paul Nesbitt-Larking, "Critical Citizenship and Civil Society in Contemporary China," *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 28: 2 (June 1995): 293-309; Guobin Yang, "The Co-Evolution of the Internet and Civil Society in China," *Asian Survey* 43: 3 (May-June 2003): 405-422; and Barrett L. McCormick, Su Shaozhi, Xiao Xiaoming, "The 1989 Democracy Movement: A Review of the Prospects for Civil Society in China," *Pacific Affairs* 65: 2 (Summer 1992): 182-202.

When discussing intellectual-state relations, the popular nationalists share some common characteristics with the dissidents. First, most popular nationalists do not belong to the establishment, and they are not clients protected by patrons in the party-state. Second, institutions do not restrain them, and their discourses and activities are barely institutionalized. Nevertheless, the fundamental difference between popular nationalists and dissidents is that popular nationalists do not oppose the party-state. They consider themselves patriots and loyal defenders of the interest of the nation. Most popular nationalists support the rule of the party-state and do not intend to change the political system, although they sometimes criticize the party-state for its too lenient foreign policy. Although the audiences of their discourses are mainly the public, when their nationalist discourses on foreign policy and foreign countries go too far and mobilize the nationalist public opinions, they place the party-state in a dilemma. The party-state could neither oppose their criticisms publicly nor suppress them as what is usually done to dissidents. Therefore, under these pressures, the party-state is forced to change their foreign policy according to their demands. This phenomenon is referred to as “patriotic dilemma.” This dissertation intends to develop this concept and attempts to show the relations between the popular nationalist group and the party-state through the manner their discourses influence the Japan policy of China.

3. Two-level Perception Gap Model

In this section, I introduce a model designed to examine the relation between Chinese intellectual discourses and foreign policy in China. The two-level perception gap model investigates the difference in perception between the public and the government in terms of the importance of subject issues and identifies the interactions on how different

intellectual groups influence foreign policy or are restricted by foreign policy when faced with different subject issues.

Step One: Two-level Interpretation of the Issue

The first part of this model aims to show that the Chinese government and the Chinese people usually interpret the importance of issues depending on different concerns. The Chinese government recognizes the importance of issues depending on its relevance to the **vital national interests** of China. However, the Chinese public regards the issue depending on whether **national pride** is the main concern and constantly identifies territorial and nationalism issues as the most sensitive issues.

Government level

At the government level, foreign policy issues can be categorized into two types, namely, “**Core interest issue**” and “**Major/Minor interest (MMI) issues**”. Core interest issues are those that relate to the vital national interests of China, and these issues are usually non-negotiable or only allow a limited concession. MMI issues are those not related to the vital national interests of China and are usually negotiable. One issue can shift between MMI and core interest issue over time and depend on whether the issue relates to the vital interest of China at that time.

In general, national interest is defined as “that which is deemed by a particular state to be a vital or desirable goal in its international relations.”⁵⁸ National interests are usually the foundation and guiding directions in policy formulation, that is, “statesmen

⁵⁸ G. R. Berridge and Alan James, *A Dictionary of Diplomacy* (Hampshire, UK: Palgrave-Macmillan, Second Edition, 2003), 181.

think and act in terms of interest.”⁵⁹ Determining the national interest assists policymakers to identify the main issue. Conversely, how much is the state willing to use its resources to determine the national interest priority? Will the state use force to protect its national interest?

There are disagreements about the national interest should be fixed or changing. According to some scholars, national interests should remain fixed and be defined by the international system. For example, Morgenthau considers interests to be “unaffected by the circumstances of time and place”⁶⁰ and that political process in domestic politics is not taken into account. However, this observation does not imply that national interests will never change. Interests will be adjusted or created when the international system changes. Conversely, some scholars argue that “[Interests are] a diverse, pluralistic set of subjective preferences that change periodically, both in responses to the domestic political process itself and in response to shifts in the international environment. The national interest therefore is more likely to be what the policymakers say it is at any particular time.”⁶¹

I think that either side has a point. Most nation-states have both changing and fixed national interests. Some national interests become more consistent over a long period of time, whereas other interests change according to the political preferences of

⁵⁹ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations: the Struggle for Power and Peace*, 2nd edition, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1954), 5, as quoted in Jack Donnelly, *Realism and International Relations* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press), 45.

⁶⁰ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations*, Fourth Edition, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967, p. 8.

⁶¹ Graham Evans and Jeffrey Newnham, *The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations* (London, UK: Penguin Books, 1998), 345.

decision makers or the shifting international politics. Therefore, determining the priority of interests is crucial.

In terms of the priority of national interest, scholars create a typology as a framework for the systematic analysis of national interests. Nuechterlein classifies US national interests in terms of the intensity of concern about the interest.⁶² Nuechterlein introduced a four-tiered scale of priorities to categorize national interest. (1) The first scale is survival interests. The very existence of the nation-state is in peril, and an imminent threat of overt military attack by enemies, foreign and domestic, to the homeland exists. According to Neuchterlein, the difference between a survival interest and a vital interest is “in the nature and imminence of a military threat” to the actor.⁶³ An example of a survival interest being at stake is the Cuban missile crisis in 1962. (2) The second scale is vital interests. Serious harm will likely occur in the security and well-being of the nation if strong measures, including the use of conventional military force, are not employed by the government to counter an adverse action by another state or to deter another state from undertaking a serious provocation. Vital interests “involve economic, world-order, and ideological issues as well as defense of the homeland ones and may ultimately be as crucial to a country as direct threats to its independence.”⁶⁴ An example of this category of interest is preventing the emergence of a regional hegemon in

⁶² Nuechterlein maintains, “It is the intensity of concern about any basic interest at a given period of time that forms the basis of policy-making in foreign affairs. These intensities, or degrees of interest, constitute a different category that we will call ‘transitory,’ because they are subject to change depending on the government’s perception of their urgency at any given time.” Donald E. Nuechterlein, *America Overcommitted: United States National Interests in the 1980s* (The University Press of Kentucky, 1985), 9.

⁶³ Donald E. Neuchterlein, *United States National Interests in a Changing World*, (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1973), 11.

⁶⁴ Neuchterlein, *America Overcommitted*, 11.

critical regions, promoting the well-being of allies and friends, and protecting them from external aggression.⁶⁵ (3) The third scale is major interests. The political, economic, and ideological well-being of the nation may be seriously harmed if no action is taken to prevent the events and trends in the international environment from turning into serious threats. Major interests differ from vital and survival interests in terms of how the actor perceives the degree of danger and the length of time available to search for a peaceful solution to the issue.⁶⁶ An example of an American major interest is “to promote pluralism, freedom, and democracy in strategically important state actors and to discourage massive human rights violations oversea.”⁶⁷ (4) The fourth scale is peripheral (minor) interests. The well-being of the state and the stability of the international system are not seriously affected, but the private interests of Americans conducting business in foreign nation maybe endangered. An example of an American peripheral interest is to promote the economic interests of private citizens abroad⁶⁸ and to preserve the territorial integrity or political constitution of other actors everywhere.⁶⁹ In most cases, survival interests are consistent, but the priority of other interests may be changed because of the preference of decision makers.⁷⁰

⁶⁵ The Commission on America’s National Interests, *America’s National Interests*, Cambridge, MA: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, July 2000, 6.

⁶⁶ Neuchterlein, *United States National Interests*, 22.

⁶⁷ Commission on America’s National Interests, 7.

⁶⁸ Neuchterlein, *United States National Interests*, 26-27.

⁶⁹ Commission on America’s National Interests, 8.

⁷⁰ Neuchterlein, *United States National Interests*, 9-10.

Neuchterlein also discussed the willingness of policy makers to compromise at different levels of national interest. Survival interest is an interest that cannot be compromised.⁷¹ For vital interest, the leadership can only compromise up to a certain point; beyond that, the potential harm to the actor may no longer be tolerable.⁷² For major interests, policymakers usually choose to settle problems through negotiation and compromise rather than through confrontation, although the results may be painful.⁷³ Decision makers are willing to compromise more on issues related to minor interests. I apply this category to this dissertation. The core interest issues are issues related to survival and vital interests, whereas the MMI issues are issues related to major and peripheral interests.

Table 1.1 shows the issues that the Chinese government and the public consider important over time. At the government level in the 1970s and 1980s, the Chinese government considered the economic and strategic cooperation with Japan as the most important issues, and it was willing to concede other issues. Economic growth and maintaining a peaceful external environment in East Asia was of vital interest to China in the 1980s. Thus, assuring the economic aid and investment of Japan in China and maintaining the strategic semi-alliance relations with Japan against the Soviet Union were the vital interests of China. The Chinese attitude toward the U.S.-Japan alliance and the strengthening of the Japanese defense capability became supportive. When Deng visited Japan in October 1978, he stated, “I understand Japan’s basic foreign policy

⁷¹ Donald E. Neuchterlein, *America Recommitted: A Superpower Assesses Its Role in a Turbulent World* (Lexington KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1991), 18.

⁷² Neuchterlein, *America Recommitted*, 19.

⁷³ Neuchterlein, *America Overcommitted*, 12 and Neuchterlein, *United States National Interests*, 20-21.

principle. US-Japan alliance and the strengthening of Japanese defense are reasonable.”⁷⁴ Therefore, the other issues, such as the historical issue and territorial disputes, can become MMI issues. For example, after Japan and China signed the Sino-Japan Treaty of Peace and Friendship in 1978, Deng publicly announced that the Diaoyu Island issue should be left to posterity.⁷⁵

In the early 1990s, the Chinese foreign environment still suffered from reputation damage and economic sanctions because of the Tiananmen incident. The Chinese government welcomed the removal of economic sanctions and the promise of continuous economic aid from the Japanese government in 1991. Thus, the Japanese economic cooperation in the early 1990s remained a vital national interest of China.

However, following the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the strategic environment around China changed. Russia was no longer the greatest threat, and maintaining a semi-alliance with the U.S. and Japan was unnecessary. In the mid-1990s, China made a series of military moves, for example, military conflict with Vietnam over South China Sea in 1994, a nuclear test in 1993, and missile exercises in Taiwan Strait in 1995 and 1996. Following these moves from China, Washington and Tokyo reaffirmed their US-Japan alliance in April 1996. Beijing perceived that Washington and Tokyo officially viewed Beijing as a strategic rival. Thus, although the Chinese government still considered the economic and strategic issues as vital interests, the change in the international system and international strategic environment in the

⁷⁴ *Asahi Shimbun*, October 24, 1978.

⁷⁵ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “The Senkaku Islands,” March 2013, accessed June 15, 2013, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/senkaku/pdfs/senkaku_en.pdf.

1990s compelled China to change its perception of Japan from a semi-ally to a regional rival. This perception changed the interpretation of issues. Beijing used to consider the U.S.-Japan alliance as a subterfuge for Japanese military power and that the U.S.-Japan alliance is consistent with Chinese interest. However, the Chinese attitude toward the U.S.-Japan alliance returned to apprehension, and the U.S.-Japan alliance became a core interest issue when China and Japan became strategic rivals.

Table 1: Two-Level Interpretation of Issues over Time⁷⁶

Time	Government Level	Public level
1970s to 1980s	<u>Core Interest Issue</u> : Assure Japanese economic aid and strategic cooperation, and so on. <u>MMI Issue</u> : Other issues (e.g., US-Japan alliance and Japan defense policy)	<u>Sensitive issue</u> : Historical issue, friction arising from nationalism (e.g., textbook issue in 1982 and Yasukuni issue in 1985)
1990s	<u>Core Interest issue</u> : Assure Japanese economic cooperation, protest against US-Japan alliance reaffirmation, and so on. <u>MMI issue</u> : Other issues (e.g., historical and territorial issues)	<u>Sensitive issue</u> : Historical and territorial issues
2000s	<u>Core Interest issue</u> : Assure the maritime interests and strategic presence of China in Asia, among others <u>MMI issue</u> : Other issues	<u>Sensitive issue</u> : Historical and territorial issues; almost all issues related to Japan became sensitive

In the 2000s, the economic cooperation with Japan became less important to Beijing when Japan decided to reduce its official development assistance for China because of the stagnant Japanese economics. Therefore, China does not need to concede to Japan in terms of economic and strategic concerns. Chinese military presence in East Asia also increased along with the rise of China internationally. To support the internal

⁷⁶ Here we provide a simple example of a how two-level interprets different issues. To determine whether an issue is MMI/core interest issue or sensitive/insensitive, we need to judge it case by case and through a timetable.

need for energy resources for economic growth, Beijing eagerly ensures its maritime interests. Assuring maritime interests became a vital national interest, whereas the economic cooperation with Japan was no longer a priority in the 2000s. Thus, issues such as the East China Sea dispute with Japan and the territorial dispute over the Diaoyu Islands became core interest issues⁷⁷, whereas the economic cooperation with Japan became a MMI issue.

Public Level

At the public level, foreign policy issues can be categorized into two types, namely, **sensitive and insensitive issues**. The sensitive issues related to Japan are usually those that are related to **national pride**, such as historical and territorial dispute issues. These issues constantly provoke furious reactions from the Chinese public. The government official statement usually claims these issues are non-negotiable issues while it allows concession in the implement of foreign policy. However, sometimes the issues that are not directly related to national pride can become sensitive issues, and the variables that influence the increase in sensitive issues usually relate to the tumultuous Sino-Japan relations and how Chinese citizens perceive the attitude of the Japanese government. That is, when friction exists in Sino-Japan relations, Chinese citizens are intolerant about issues related to Japan so more issues become sensitive. For example, when the Sino-Japan relations were constrained in the 2000s, the number of sensitive issues increased in almost all dimensions, such as the high-speed rail between Shanghai

⁷⁷ If we analyze Beijing's response to the Diaoyu Islands in the 1990s, it clearly allowed concession. In the 1990s, Beijing viewed this issue as a MMI issue. For example, although disputes over Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands were led by citizens from Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Japan, the Chinese media did not cover the issue. Refer to Chapter 4 for more details.

and Beijing, the inappropriate conduct of Japanese businessmen in Zhu Hai, and the behavior of a Japanese student in Xian.⁷⁸ If Chinese citizens perceive the position taken by the Japanese government as arrogant or ignorant, then the issue could become a sensitive one, even if the issue is insignificant. However, the perception of Chinese citizens on Japanese attitudes may be influenced by the Chinese media. Therefore, the Chinese government can control public sentiment by guiding the media coverage on certain issues. As observed, when friction in Sino-Japan relation catches the attention of the public, the issue becomes sensitive. Before an issue is reported or mentioned, only a few are aware of the issue. Therefore, media coverage and its tone toward the issues are important variables for the public to identify whether an issue is sensitive or not.

At the public level, immediately after normalization, the relations between China and Japan remained friendly, and the cultural and people exchange progressed smoothly. The first friction between the two countries was over a historical issue, that is, “the history textbook issue,” in 1982. The issue reminded the Chinese people of the anti-Japanese war and aroused anti-Japanese sentiments. Then Japanese Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone paid an official visit to the Yasukuni Shrine in 1985, causing an even more severe response: an anti-Japanese demonstration. The historical issue became a sensitive issue in the 1980s because of the Japanese domestic controversies and the extensive coverage of the Chinese media, which attracted the attention of the Chinese

⁷⁸ In July 2003, nationalist activists organized a Web-based petition to deny Japan a Beijing-Shanghai high-speed rail link contract. In September, the Chinese media revealed a sex party involving hundreds of Japanese businessmen and Chinese prostitutes in the southeastern city of Zhu Hai, sparking another flurry of anti-Japanese invectives on the Internet. In October, three Japanese students and one of their teachers performed arisqué skit in Northwestern University in Xian that offended the Chinese and led to a 7,000-strong demonstration on campus and nationwide condemnation. Peter Hays Gries, “‘New Thinking’ on Japan,” 843-4.

people. Both the history textbook and the Yasukuni issues became a continuous nightmare for the Sino-Japan relation. In the 1990s, the territorial dispute over the Diaoyu Islands caught the attention of the Chinese people. The row started from the popular nationalist activists from Hong Kong, Taiwan, and the Japanese right wing (for a detailed discussion, refer to Chapter 4). In the 2000s, the Chinese market-oriented media painted a negative portrait of Japan because of the friction, such as the visits of Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi to the Yasukuni Shrine.

Several factors explain why the number of sensitive issues suddenly increased and the anti-Japanese sentiments intensified in the 2000s. On the Chinese sides, the Chinese market-oriented media were interested in reporting radical and negative news on Japan because of the commercialization of the Chinese media and because these types of reporting would sell. Moreover, the Patriotic Education Campaign in the early 1990s stimulated the rise of nationalism and anti-Japanese sentiments. On the Japanese side, compared with the previous administrations, the Koizumi administration adopted a stronger position toward China's demand in terms of the Yasukuni and historical issues. Thus, this position aroused the negative responses of the Chinese public.

Table 1.2 shows the four different types of issues categorized by two-level interpretation. 1) The issue is considered a core interest issue at the government level and a sensitive issue at the public level. 2) The issue is considered a core interest issue at the government level and insensitive at the public level. 3) The issue is considered a MMI issue at the government level and sensitive at the public level, such as the historical and territorial issues in the 1980s. 4) The issue is considered a MMI issue at the government level and insensitive at the public level. When the public considers certain issues as

sensitive but the government considers them as MMI issues (both sides are controversial), conflict may arise between the government and the public. In this case, intellectual discourse may play an important role. On one hand, the government can use the think tank scholars' discourse to persuade the public; on the other hand, popular nationalist can mobilize the public to protest against the government. This situation can be observed in the second step.

Table 2: Four Types of Issues Categorized by Two-Level Interpretation Model

Gov./Public Level	Public level-Sensitive	Public level-Insensitive
Government level-Core Interest Issue	Issue 1	Issue 2
Government level-MMI	Issue 3	Issue 4

Hypothesis

Based on the abovementioned observations, I created several hypotheses and examined them in the following case study chapters.

Hypothesis 1 (National Interest Priority): *When the state changes its national interest priority and considers an issue as core interest issue, which is originally sensitive at the public level and MMI at the government level (Issue 3), the state changes its foreign policy. Public opinion appears to influence foreign policy.*

I examine this hypothesis in Chapter 5. This hypothesis explains the strong attitude of the Chinese government on the Diaoyu Islands conflict in September 2010. Some scholars argue that this position shows how the anti-Japanese public opinion limited the policy choice of China and compelled the government to choose a tougher attitude toward Japan. However, I argue that the tough stance is attributed to the view of Beijing on maritime interests as vital national interests in the 2000s. The Diaoyu Islands

mattered not because of the territorial disputed issue but because of their relation to the maritime interests and naval power struggle of Beijing with Japan.

Step Two: Intellectual Groups and Interactions with the Party-State

This model combines the two intellectual groups and four interactions,⁷⁹ as shown in Table 1.3. The first type of issue is when the government considers an issue as core interest and the public considers the same as sensitive (Issue 1), intellectuals are free to write and criticize Japan and the issue but not the policy, as long as the intellectual discourses do not challenge the official view. Chinese decision makers can absorb the professional analysis of the think tank scholar group for the core interest issue, which can influence the future decision of decision makers on that issue. Therefore, the analyses of the think tank scholar group influence government policy (Interaction C). However, this process is long, and confirming that this process exists is difficult. Some studies focus on this approach, such as the research on think tank scholars. The popular nationalist group, which usually follows public interest, chooses to criticize Issue 1 as well. Thus, the popular nationalist group appears to interpret the government policy (Interaction A). Usually, the Chinese government uses domestic public opinion and the discourse of the popular nationalist group to negotiate with the foreign government (the Japanese government in this case) to strengthen its position (Interaction B).

The second type of issue is when the issue is considered core interest at the government level and insensitive at the public level (Issue 2). Although the think tank

⁷⁹ These four interactions are: A) Intellectual discourses simply interpret the foreign policy of the government. B) The government elite has already decided on its foreign policy and simply used intellectual discourses to explain the policy or gain theoretical support. C) Intellectual discourses influence the crafting of the foreign policy of the government (whether to restrict, challenge, or support the policy). D) The government restricts and suppresses intellectual discourses. For detail, please refer to Chapter 2.

scholar group does not provide policy suggestions that contradict the previous policy, its analysis may influence future policy. The popular nationalist group usually pays scant attention to this issue because the public does not show much interest on it.

The third type and the most controversial is when the issue is MMI at the government level and sensitive at the public level (Issue 3). The think tank scholar group contributes their professional analyses, and the government adopts their analyses to persuade the public (Interaction B). The relations between the government and the popular nationalist group are the most complex. When their discourses are comparatively under control, the government may use these negative protest discourses to negotiate with the foreign government (Interaction B). When the discourses mobilize radical public opinions, the government may be forced to assume a tougher position toward the foreign government. I explain this situation as a popular nationalist discourse influencing government policy “Patriotic Dilemma.” (Interaction C). However, when the situation of mobilizing public opinion is completely out of the government control or when the domestic political situation is not stable, the government may adopt restriction measures toward the popular nationalist group (Interaction D), such as blacklisting or imprisoning the author and banning the journal, among others.

Fourth, when the issue is MMI at the government level and sensitive at the public level (Issue 4), the government may choose to adopt the professional analysis and policy suggestion of the think tank scholar group because the substance of the issue is not that important for both the government and the public. Thus, discourses of the think tank scholar group influence government policy (Interaction C). The popular nationalist group

shows less interest in this kind of issue, and even if it chooses to write something about the issue, it will not take a risk but instead comply with the official position.

Table 3: Interaction Patterns

Issue Type/ Group	Think Tank Scholar Group	Popular Nationalist Group
1) Gov. level- Core/ Public level-Sensitive	A)C)	A)B)
2) Gov. level- Core/ Public level-Insensitive	A)C)	A)
3) Gov. level- MMI/ Public level-Sensitive	B)	B)C)D)
4) Gov. level- MMI/ Public level-Insensitive	C)	A)

With this model, I assume that in most cases, intellectuals do not challenge the foreign policy decision of the government; that is, foreign policy influences and restricts intellectual discourses (Interaction A). Moreover, intellectuals only influence foreign policy in three situations (Interaction C). First, the analysis of the think tank scholar group on the core interest issue may influence the future policy of the government. This influence is indirect and difficult to observe and confirm. Second, the discourse of the popular nationalist group mobilizes public opinion and then influences and restricts the interpretation of the government on Issue 3. Thus, the Chinese government was forced to take a tougher position on the Japanese government. Third, the Chinese government adopts the policy suggestion of the think tank scholar group on Issue 4.

Hypotheses

Using this model, I develop several hypotheses to explain the interaction patterns between the Chinese intellectuals and the party-state.

Hypothesis 2 (Self-Discipline): *The Chinese government adopts the observations and analyses of the think tank scholar group because this group provides an*

objective analysis of the Sino-Japan relations (the analyses influence the Japan policy of China). However, as pluralist institutionalism reveals, under conventional institutions, think tank scholars usually do not choose to challenge the official position on core interest issues (Issue 1 and 2) (refer to Chapter 3).

Hypothesis 3 (Patriot Dilemma): When the popular nationalist group and the party-state disagree on a certain issue (Issue 3), the discourses of the popular nationalist group irritate the anti-foreign public opinions and public mobilization, challenging the official foreign policy and limiting the policy choice of decision makers. When the government reluctantly changes the policy under these pressures, I define this situation as a patriot dilemma. However, foreign policy changes are limited to rhetoric revisions, and the government adopts a tougher attitude but does not change the substance of the policy.

Chapter 4 presents an approach to explain the relations between the popular nationalist intellectuals and the party-state. Regardless of the patriotism of the popular nationalist intellectuals, their overheated discourses challenge the foreign policy of the state. For example, when the Chinese media revealed the possibility that Beijing would consider the adoption of the *Shinkansen* system of Japan for the high-speed rail between Beijing and Shanghai, the popular nationalist activists objected this decision and collected petitions on the Internet. This act forced Beijing to abandon the original plan. However, I argue that the influences are limited and sustains in a short time. In Chapter 4, I provide more evidence to examine this hypothesis.

Methodology

1. Methods

The main analysis of this dissertation is to create a new model as a theoretical framework. Moreover, in this section, the method “journal analysis” is introduced. As Johnston, Ross, and Christensen point out, the increasing publications in China, including journals and books, and the information revolution facilitate easy access to Chinese journals. Therefore, the quantitative analysis on Chinese journals becomes possible. They also emphasized the need for a more scientific, quantitative analysis in Chinese studies and suggested that future studies should use a wider range of methods, such as computer-based context analysis and text-analysis programs. For example, context analysis programs are used for frequency counts, keyword-in-context analysis, dictionary-based discourse analysis, and semantic space analysis, among others.⁸⁰ In this dissertation, I follow this new trend of analyzing Chinese journals.

In this dissertation, I select several representative Chinese journals and search for articles related to subject “US-JP alliance” from 2001 to 2010.⁸¹ After examining the contents of these articles, I analyze the articles through a series of questionnaires to categorize their discourses on Japan. These questionnaires can help us understand the basic tendency of the articles. For example, does this article provide a policy suggestion or a positive analysis, or does it overemphasize the possible future conflict between

⁸⁰ Thomas J. Christensen, Alastair Iain Johnston, Robert S. Ross, “Conclusions and Future Directions,” Johnston and Ross eds., *New Directions*, 392.

⁸¹ The source that I used is the CNKI database. This database is maintained by Tsinghua University in the PRC. This database indexes the contents of over 6,600 core Chinese and English journals published in the PRC from 1994 onwards. It covers various subjects, such as science, engineering, agriculture, medical science, humanities and social sciences.

China and Japan? Journal analysis aims to provide evidence to our assumptions. For example, does the scholar group provide objective analysis but avoid providing policy suggestion? The results and details of the journal analysis are provided in the Chapter 3 and Appendix A.

2. Selection of Cases

Using the case of Sino-Japan relations to examine my hypothesis is appropriate for several reasons.

First, observing a case with dramatic “ups and downs” within a decade is easier. The Sino-Japan relations were tense from 2001 to 2006. The visits of Japan’s Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi to the Yasukuni Shrine offended China. China construed these visits as Japan’s intent to revive militarism. China was apprehensive that, with the military and foreign policies of the Koizumi administration, Japan intended to become a political and military power. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership continued to refuse visits from high-level Japanese officials while anti-Japanese sentiments in Chinese society flourished in online public opinions, media reports, and mass demonstrations. The situation seemed to be out of control, particularly in April 2005, when demonstrations occurred in major Chinese cities. However, after Prime Minister Shinzo Abe came to office at the end of 2006, the Sino-Japan relations were restored and went through several stages: *Pobing* (破冰break the ice), *Rongbing* (融冰melt the ice), *Yingchun* (迎春welcome the spring), and *Nuanchun* (暖春warm spring). The dramatic changes, such as the “ups and downs” in the Sino-Japan relations, are good cases that can demonstrate the circumstances in which intellectuals have more influence on the Japan policy of China.

Second, the CFP is usually an arena for high-level leadership where public opinion is insignificant. However, the CCP government became more sensitive to public opinion in formulating its foreign policy toward Japan, as anti-Japanese sentiments in China were strong after 2001. Any preference to a friendly gesture could be interpreted as being “too soft toward Japan,” and the criticism would turn toward the CCP leadership. Using the most sensitive bilateral relations as a case study, the attitude and behavior of both intellectuals and government should be more apparent. Thus, I can closely observe that discourses of intellectuals matter in the crafting of the Japan policy of China.

Third, although both Japan and China are very important countries in East Asia, they have not caught enough attention from the Western academic world until recently. Despite the anti-Japanese nationalism in China and the series of changes in the military and political policies of Japan in the 2000s, articles that focus on Sino-Japan relations are comparatively scarce in the early 2000s. Moreover, not many systematic, theoretical, and unbiased studies on Sino-Japan relations have been conducted. Although this dissertation is not designed for analyzing all the factors in Sino-Japan relations, it can bring some insights into Sino-Japan relations.

3. Source and Data

Aside from using a substantial number of Chinese journals as sources, I also used government statements and archives from the Japanese and Chinese governments and consulted a large amount of primary and secondary materials in Chinese, Japanese, and English languages. I also refer to some memoirs, diplomatic histories, document collections, monographs, social surveys (e.g., public opinions polls), and popular literature, among others.

4. Limitation

The most challenging task in CFP analysis is that the actual decision-making process is not transparent. Therefore, directly proving that intellectuals influence the crafting of foreign policy is almost impossible. When an intellectual writes a certain policy position, which becomes foreign policy, I assume that the Chinese government adopted the policy position of this intellectual. However, determining the important role of intellectuals in the last decade may take several decades. For example, many government archives and documents in the 1970s were only made public in recent years. Moreover, in the research of social actors, popular nationalist and nationalist public opinions in particular, it is difficult to collect scientific materials to confirm the casual relations, I can only focus on the correlation to show the casual relations between the popular nationalist discourses and public opinions or between the popular nationalist and the policy.

Contributions

The major contribution of this dissertation is it introduces a systematic model integrating two scholarships, state-society relation studies and FPA. To be more specific, this model integrates the studies of intellectual-state relations in China and Chinese intellectuals' role in CFP, in the policy toward Japan in particular. This model not only analyzes the circumstances and issues that intellectual discourses influence China's Japan policy, but also explains the different interaction patterns between different intellectuals groups and party-state.

Moreover, this dissertation supplements the previous studies on intellectual-state relations in China. It also provides a new approach to analyze the relation between the

nationalist intellectual group and the party-state. The patron-client approach indicates that the intellectual, as client, tends to interpret the policy position of party-state, as patron. However, a patron-client approach cannot explain the pluralized intellectual-state relations. For example, popular nationalist and public mobilization activated by them play a role in challenging and constraining the policy choices of decision makers. Therefore, this model focuses on think tank scholars and popular nationalists. I consider the patron-client approach is no longer applicable, and their interaction patterns with party-state.

Third, this work also offers a systematic analysis to explain the influence of the rising popular nationalism on the CFP. Fourth, the study empirically cites many Chinese intellectual discourses on Japan and helps to understand the perceptions of Chinese intellectuals on Japan. Finally, the dissertation provides many empirical materials to understand the Sino-Japan relations in the 2000s.

Overview of the Chapters

This dissertation has two parts. The first part focuses on the theoretical approach and two-level perception gap model, and the second part examines the model with three case studies on the Sino-Japan relations.

In Chapter 1, I review previous scholarship and introduce the two-level perception gap model. This model develops the interaction model to explain the circumstances in which intellectual discourses may influence foreign policy or policy may constrain intellectual discourses. Moreover, I develop several assumptions to describe the dynamics of intellectual-state relations in China by analyzing the different interaction patterns. Based on this model, I created three hypotheses which are examined in chapter 3, 4, 5.

Chapter 2 focuses on Chinese intellectuals. I present the definitions, history, and typology of the intellectual-state relation in China. It is important to understand the history of intellectual-state relations for explaining intellectuals' self-discipline and its relations with party-state now.

In Chapter 3, I adopt pluralist institutionalism to examine the think tank scholar group and its influence on the Chinese attitude toward the U.S.-Japan alliance and Japanese defense policy. First, I briefly discuss the Chinese attitude toward the U.S.-Japan alliance and Japanese defense policy before the 2000s. Then, I describe the main developments that occurred in the 2000s. Second, I discuss how the Chinese government responded to these developments and determine if the discourses and analyses of think tank scholars influence their policy. Finally, I expound on whether pluralist institutionalism can explain the interaction between the think tank scholar group and the party-state.

In Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, I examine the interaction between the popular nationalist group and the party-state. I choose two sensitive issues, namely, the historical issue and the Diaoyu Islands dispute, because the popular nationalist discourses on these issues are more likely to influence the Japan policy of China, and patriotic dilemma is more likely to appear. The difference between these two issues is that, whereas the state still considers the historical issue as a MMI, the state has changed its priority on Diaoyu Islands from MMI to core interest issue because maritime interests became vital national interests in the 2000s. Although popular nationalist discourses were fervent and seemed to affect the Japan policy of China in both cases, the state adopted very different policies. On the historical issue, Beijing simply adopted a tougher position toward Japan. However,

on the Diaoyu Islands issue, Beijing was not willing to concede regardless of the high price to pay. I use the “patriotic dilemma” concept to analyze the relation between the popular nationalist group and the party-state. I conclude my findings and present the future direction of related research in the last chapter.

CHAPTER TWO: CHINESE INTELLECTUALS AND THEIR INTERACTIONS WITH THE COMMUNIST GOVERNMENT

Chapter 2 focuses on the Chinese intellectuals, the research subject of this dissertation. In this chapter, the Chinese intellectuals are described, and the conflict relations between the Chinese intellectuals and the communist government are presented.

Brief Description of Chinese Intellectuals

1. Who is a Chinese Intellectual?

I adopt a broad definition of intellectuals for this dissertation.

Intellectuals can be defined from several dimensions. According to some definitions, only people who have a certain level of education and a certain profession can be defined as intellectuals. For example, Manniheim has the following to say about intellectuals: “Participation in a common educational heritage progressively tends to suppress differences of birth, status, profession, and wealth, and to unite the individual educated people on the basis of the education they have received.”¹

Some definitions emphasize the critical characteristics of intellectuals and consider only those who have social responsibility and critical thinking as intellectuals. According to Confino, intellectuals have four characteristics: concern about public affairs,

¹ Karl Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia: an Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge* (New York: Harcourt, 1936), 155.

the belief that the resolution of the country's problems is their responsibility, the belief that political and social problems are morality issues, and a belief in social justice.² Intellectuals should be the conscience of the society and should represent the people who have no capability to speak up. According to Said,

The intellectual's representations—what he or she represents and how those ideas are represented to an audience—are always tied to and ought to remain an organic part of an ongoing experience in society: of the poor, the disadvantaged, the voiceless, the underrepresented, the powerless.³

This dissertation adopts the definition that emphasizes the cultural role of intellectuals.⁴ Weber defines intellectuals as “a group of men who by virtue of their peculiarity have special access to certain achievements considered to be ‘cultural values,’ and whom therefore usurp the leadership of a ‘cultural community.’”⁵ The cultural definition transcends different classes and different professions but embraces the common characteristics of intellectuals. I also adopt the broader definition of Lipset; that is, intellectuals are all those who create, distribute, and apply culture and includes many professions, such as scholars, artists, philosophers, authors, newspaper and journal editors, journalists, art performers, teachers, reporters, physicians, and lawyers, among others.

² Michael Confino, “On Intellectuals and Intellectual Traditions in Eighteenth- and Nineteenth-Century Russia,” *Daedalus* 101: 2, *Intellectuals and Tradition* (Spring 1972): 117-149.

³ Edward W. Said, *Representations of the Intellectual* (New York: Pantheon, 1994), 113.

⁴ Regarding the definition of culture, Geertz defines culture as “a system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of which men communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and attitudes toward life.” Clifford James Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays* (New York: Basic, 1973), 89.

⁵ Max Weber, *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, edited by HH Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), 176.

I prefer to adopt the broader definition to avoid disregarding the many other important intellectuals. The narrow definition requires all dimensions to be present. Intellectuals should have a certain education level and a certain profession. They should also perform certain cultural and social roles, be critical of authority, and show concern about social problems. However, this definition may disregard other important intellectuals, such as public intellectuals who only have one or two characteristics of these four characteristics but play very important cultural and social roles. The public intellectual refers to that “group of cultured people who with an independent status and relying on the strength of knowledge and spirit express a fervent public concern towards society and embody a sort of public conscience and spirit of public participation.”⁶ For example, Hanhan is a young writer, car racer, and, in my opinion, a public intellectual. He has written several bestsellers but is not a member of the Chinese Writers’ Association. He quit high school. If I adopt the narrow definition of an intellectual, he will not be considered as one. Nevertheless, millions of people read his blog, in which he comments on social problems, such as social inequality, and advocates the importance of freedom of expression. Some of his articles were deleted by the Internet censor as soon as they were published because they were related to freedom of expression, such as his criticisms on “Wu Mao Dong” (五毛党 50 cent party), which refer to the Internet commentators hired by the Chinese government. Indeed, a broader definition should be adopted because many anti-Japanese movement activists will be excluded if I use the

⁶ Timothy Cheek, “Xu Jilin and the Thought Work of China’s Public Intellectuals,” *China Quarterly* 186 (June 2006): 401-420.

narrow definition. The ideas of these people are rapidly spreading to the public and are even mobilizing people to act.

2. Characteristics of Chinese Intellectuals

Chinese intellectuals have three characteristics, namely, interest in politics, critical character, and are active in social movements. The first characteristic is discussed from two aspects. On one hand, traditional Chinese intellectuals (i.e., Literati/ Wenren 文人) have limited choices in professions because of the social structure. In the traditional society, the best option for literati was to participate in the imperial examination and then enter the government to become an official. The other choices of professions were limited, and usually provided for those who did not pass the imperial examination. However, today, intellectuals can choose to become a scholar, scientist, lawyer, reporter, and so on. In the past, almost all the important professions for literati were provided by the government. Thus, intellectuals, whether they would like to participate in politics or not, had to enter the government service first and wait for their job assignments. On the other hand, most intellectuals were taught Confucianism and believed that Wenren/shi (士) should assume the responsibility of taking care of the entire nation and the people. Therefore, becoming a public official and assisting the emperor to govern the nation should be his vocation (zhiye 志业). Most Chinese intellectuals wanted to become an official and enter the government and this legacy is still evident in modern-day Chinese intellectuals.

The second characteristic is related to the influence of Confucianism. In the past, most intellectuals were educated to be critical and to rectify the errors of the emperor.

They admired those who would sacrifice their lives and insisted on doing and saying the right thing. They considered that this principle protected their vocations. These intellectuals were described as people with strong characters (fenggu风骨). Moral values were highly valued at that time. The public expected the intellectual to be the moral model of the nation. Thus, conflict between the government and the intellectuals was common, such as the burning of books and burying of scholars (Fenshu Kengru焚书坑儒) during the Qin Dynasty.

The third characteristic is more evident in modern China. Compared with traditional Wenren, modern Chinese intellectuals are more willing to act on their advocacies and join social and political movements. This characteristic can also be explained from two aspects. The social structure was transformed after the collapse of the Qing Empire. The intellectuals had comparatively more professional choices not necessarily connected to the government. Moreover, most intellectuals devoted themselves to either the republic or the communist revolutions. The intellectuals were all ready to be involved in political mobilizations and movements. For example, the criticism and self-criticism campaign in the early 1950s actually started from the intellectuals. Furthermore, many campaigns were heated because of the mutual criticisms between intellectuals who had different thoughts.

Relations between Chinese Intellectuals and the Communist Government

The first conflict between the CCP and the intellectuals occurred before the establishment of the PRC. The Rectification Campaign of 1942 was a political and cultural campaign in Yanan that began on February 1942 and lasted for three years. Many

intellectuals who were disappointed with the corrupt nationalist government and doubted its resolve to resist the Japanese entrusted their hopes on the CCP and considered the party as “the savior of the nation.” However, the party classified these intellectuals as those who had petit bourgeois origins and required them to have a thorough political re-education before they could devote themselves to the revolution. In his *Talks at the Yanan Forum, on Literature and Art*, Chairman Mao Zedong pointed out the following:

Proletarian literature and art are part of the whole proletarian revolutionary cause; they are, as Lenin said, cogs and wheels in the whole revolutionary machine. Therefore, Party work in literature and art occupies a definite and assigned position in Party revolutionary work as a whole and is subordinated to the revolutionary tasks set by the Party in a given revolutionary period. Opposition to this arrangement is certain to lead to dualism or pluralism, and in essence amounts to “politics -- Marxist, art -- bourgeois”, as with Trotsky.⁷

However, some intellectuals disagreed with this idea and even criticized the CCP and the problems in Yanan. Wang Shiwei (王实味) was a journalist and an intellectual who wrote essays, such as “Wild Lilies” (Ye bai he hua野百合花), “Arrow and Target” (shi yu di矢与的), and “Politician, Artist” (Zhengzhijia, Yi Shujia政治家•艺术家), to denounce the hierarchy, bureaucracy, and inegalitarian distribution of resources in Yanan. On October 23, 1942, Wang was expelled from the CCP on the charge that he was one of the “Five Member Anti-Party Gang” of Trotskyites (托派份子). He was arrested by the Social Section of the Communist Party in 1943 and was secretly executed in 1947. He was rehabilitated in 1991.

⁷ Mao Zedong, “Talks at the Yanan Forum, on Literature and Art,” from *The Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung Vol. III* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, Second Edition 1967), 86-87, accessed August 28, 2012, <http://www.marx2mao.com/Mao/YFLA42.html>.

The political effect of the Rectification Campaign of 1942 was the consolidation of the leadership of Mao and the control of the party over the party members. The effect of the cultural dimension was the establishment of cultural and art policies, which stipulated that culture and art should serve politics. According to Goldman, “[i]t marked the start of suppression of independent and critical intellectuals and the extension of Party control to intellectual activity.”⁸ Furthermore, the methods of struggle session (Pi Dou Da Hui批斗大会), criticism and self-criticism, and confession became the original models for later political campaigns, such as the Anti-Rightist campaign and the Cultural Revolution.

1. Thought Reform in the Early 1950s: Criticism and Self-criticism

In the beginning, the calls for self-criticism came from the intellectuals. Ma Yinchu (马寅初), principal of Beijing University, suggested the re-education movement. Chu Anping (储安平), chief editor of *The Observer* (Guancha 观察), also wrote articles that advocate self-criticism and criticism. In September 1951, the CCP started the official thought reform movement when Premier Zhou Enlai delivered a speech that called for intellectuals to reform their thoughts. The aim of this campaign was to transform Chinese citizens into believers of Marxism-Leninism and the Mao Zedong Thought. The reform employed such methods as indoctrination, struggle sessions, propaganda, and criticism and self-criticism, among others. Zhidong Hao considered that this process could turn

⁸ Roderick MacFarquhar and John King Fairbank eds., *The Cambridge History of China, Vol. 14: The People's Republic, Part 1: The Emergence of Revolutionary China, 1949-1965* (Cambridge University Press, 1987), 227.

critical and unattached intellectuals into good organic intellectuals.⁹ Many intellectuals were forced to criticize their own petit bourgeois origins and experiences, such as studying abroad. After this campaign, several political campaigns that attacked particular intellectuals and cultural works ensued. Examples are the campaign on the film “The Life of Wu Xun,”¹⁰ the campaign on Yu Pingbo (俞平伯),¹¹ and the campaign on Hu Shi (胡适).¹² Although these intellectuals were criticized and forced to write self-criticisms, these campaigns did not develop into political campaigns on a national scale until the campaign on Hu Feng (胡风) Clique broke out.

⁹ Zhidong Hao, *Intellectuals at a Crossroads: the Changing politics of China's Knowledge Workers* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2003), 78.

¹⁰ “The Life of Wu Xun” was a movie directed by Sun Yu. It tells the story of Wu Xun (1838-1896), a beggar who established free schools for the poor. The campaign started from May 20, 1951, when *People's Daily* published an editorial entitled “Yingdangzhongshidianying Wu Xun zhuan de taolun” [Give Serious Attention to the Discussion of the Film ‘The Life of Wu Xun’], which was revised by Mao. Following this editorial, a wave of criticism appeared. Director Sun Yu, actor Zhao Dan, and others related to this film were forced to write a self-criticism. Although they were under serious political pressure, they did not lose their jobs or were punished. On September 6, 1985, politburo member Hu Qiaomu published an article on *People's Daily* and admitted that the criticism on “The Life of Wu Xun” could not be said to be correct.

¹¹ Yu Pingbo (1900-1990) was a professor at Beijing University and famous for his research on a Chinese Novel “A Dream of Red Mansions.” In 1952, Yu republished his research result in *HonglouMeng yanjiu [Dream of the Red Chamber]*. In 1954, two young graduates of Shandong University, Li Xifan and Lan Ling, published two articles accusing Yu's book of using a bourgeois idealist's point of view and bourgeois methods of textual research. Mao supported the views in these two articles, and then a campaign against Yu Pingbo was launched. Followed by this campaign, the criticisms were turned into a nationwide struggle against the “Hu Shi School of bourgeois idealism.” Yu Pingbo was rehabilitated in 1986.

¹² In 1954 and 1995, a campaign against Hu Shi's “reactionary ideological system” launched. Hu Shi (1891-1962) was an important scholar and public figure in early twentieth century and was famous for his studies on several fields, such as literature, history, textual criticism, and pedagogy. At the end of the campaign against Yu Pingbo's studies on *Dream of the Red Chamber*, the target of criticisms gradually turned to Hu Shi's thinking. On December 2, 1954, the Chinese Academy of Sciences and Presidium of the Chinese Writers' Association made a joint decision to hold a conference criticizing Hu Shi's “reactionary pragmatism” and “bourgeois idealism” in the fields of politics, philosophy, history, literature, education, and the natural sciences. This campaign continued for several months, and it gradually came to the end as the campaign against Hu Feng's clique reached its climax in May 1955.

Hu Feng was a Chinese writer and a literary theorist. He criticized the policy of the party on art and literature, emphasizing that art and literature should serve the political need. He soon became a target of criticism. Demand from the intellectual community to criticize his literary thoughts was made in 1951. On July 22, 1954, Hu refused to accept the criticisms and submitted “A Report on Literary and Artistic Practices since Liberation (关于解放以来的文艺实践情况的报告 Guan yu jie fang yi lai de wen yi shi jian qing kuang de bao gao),” a 300,000-word report, to the party. When the CCP Central Committee approved the report of the Central Committee Propaganda to launch a campaign against Hu Feng, a nationwide campaign to criticize Hu Feng’s thoughts on literature and art was launched on January 26, 1955. On February 5 and 7, 1955, the Chinese Writers’ Association convened a general meeting, in which a decision was reached to launch criticisms against Hu Feng. In the beginning, the criticisms were directed at his thoughts on literature and art, but they soon became a political campaign. On April 13, 1955, Shu Wu (舒芜), a friend of Hu Feng, published an article in the *People’s Daily* to criticize Hu Feng. Later, his correspondences with Hu Feng were made public. These correspondences were viewed as the anti-party and counterrevolutionary positions of Hu Feng. On May 18, 1955, Hu Feng was arrested and imprisoned for 24 years. This campaign became the first wide-ranging political and purging campaign against the intellectual community. According to a 1980 party document on the rehabilitation of Hu Feng, over 2,100 people were involved in the case, and among the 93 people arrested, 78 were convicted for being a “Hu Feng Clique” member. Hu Feng was released in 1979 and rehabilitated thrice in 1980, 1985, and 1988.

2. Anti-rightist Campaign (1955 to 1958)

In his speech entitled “On the Correct Handling of the Contradictions among the People” at the Eleventh Session (Enlarged) of the Supreme State Conference on February 27, 1957, Mao elaborated on the slogans “Let a hundred flowers blossom, a hundred schools of thought contend” and “Long-term Coexistence and Mutual Supervision,” and encouraged intellectuals and small democratic party members to articulate their thoughts.¹³ This speech marked the beginning of the Hundred Flowers Movement. The criticisms, which began to question the party and the leadership, gradually escalated. Some intellectuals disapproved of the literature and art policies of the party. The party line and ideology restricted their research and literature creation. For example, aesthetician Zhu Guangqian (朱光潜) said that he was afraid to conduct research because his work might become the target of criticism. Qin Zhaoyang (秦兆阳), the chief editor of *People’s Literature*, considered the party ideology to restrict creativity, similar to the criticism of Hu Feng. Some intellectuals censured the high-level cadres and CCP leadership. For example, Zhang Bojun (章伯钧), a member of the Democratic League and the Minister of Communications, suggested the idea of having a “political planning council” that would allow the Democratic League to offer policy suggestions. Luo Longji (罗隆基), a member of the Democratic League and the Minister of the Timber Industry, considered the contradiction to originate from the sole control of the CCP over the state.

¹³ Mao Zedong, “On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People (关于正确处理人民内部矛盾的问题),” *Speech at the Eleventh Session (Enlarged) of the Supreme State Conference*, February 27, 1957, accessed August 28, 2012, http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-5/mswv5_58.htm.

Chu Anping, editor-in-chief of *Guangming Daily*, denounced the control of the party members over all units in the government and used the term “Dang tian Xia (the party is the entire world)” to describe this situation.

In July 1957, Mao ordered a halt to the campaign and started the anti-rightist campaign to purge alleged “rightists.” Many intellectuals, officials, students, artists, and dissidents were labeled as “rightists.”¹⁴ Zhang Bojun, Luo Longji, and Chu Anping were listed as some of the most prominent rightists. They were removed from the original position and their working treatments and living benefits were degraded, because of their respective political influence and reputation. Compare to these prominent rightists, other rightists suffered from various penalties. In 1958, the CCP decided the penalties for “rightists.” Some “rightists” were sent to a labor camp located in an isolated village or to a prison, whereas some remained in their positions but suffered severe discrimination. Even their children were implicated and became “five black categories” (Hei wu lei 黑五类). These children were deprived of the opportunity to be accepted in higher education and better professions. This movement gradually ended when the Great Leap movement became the central campaign in 1958. Many “rightists” were rehabilitated in 1978 through the efforts of Hu Yaobang, the General Secretary of the CCP back then. The official status of the anti-rightist campaign is that the campaign itself was correct, but “the scope of this struggle was made far too broad and a number of intellectuals, patriotic

¹⁴ The result is 552,877 people, whether within or outside of the Party, were identified as rightists. Hao, *Intellectuals at a Crossroads*, 86.

people and Party cadres were unjustifiably labeled ‘Rightists,’ with unfortunate consequences.”¹⁵

3. Cultural Revolution (1966 to 1976)

The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution was a political movement that politically paralyzed the country and significantly affected the country in all dimensions. The Revolution was launched in May 1966 and lasted for a decade. Mao Zedong, the State Chairman then, alleged that capitalist roaders (bourgeois elements) were entering the government and the society and that these “revisionists” should be removed through violent class struggle. Responding to Mao’s appeal, Chinese youths formed Red Guard groups around the country. Mao praised the slogan of the Red Guard “to rebel is justified” (zao fan you li 造反有理). Other officials were afraid that restricting the radical actions of the Red Guard could be construed as a repression of the revolution. The Red Guards gradually went out of control and grew increasingly violent. The movement spread to the entire nation including the military, workers, and the Communist Party leadership, aside from the students. Public security in China deteriorated rapidly. Millions of people were persecuted in the violent session struggles and suffered various kinds of abuses, including public humiliation, physical torture, verbal insult, imprisonment, sustained harassment, seizure of property, denial of medical attention, erasure of social identity, and murder.

¹⁵ “In the rectification campaign, a handful of bourgeois Rightists seized the opportunity to advocate what they called ‘speaking out and airing views in a big way’ and to mount a wild attack against the Party and the nascent socialist system in an attempt to replace the leadership of the Communist Party. It was therefore entirely correct and necessary to launch a resolute counter-attack.” Refer to “Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party Since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China” (关于建国以来党的若干历史问题的决议), adopted by the Sixth Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on June 27, 1981, accessed August 28, 2012, <http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shizheng/252/5089/5103/20010428/454968.html>.

The entire nation was thrown into chaos. This revolution resulted in leadership shifts. Although Mao took major responsibility for the failure of the Great Leap Forward, he resigned as the State Chairman and withdrew from economic policy decision making. The revolution allowed Mao to purge senior officials, notably Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping, by accusing them as “capitalist roaders” and brought Mao back to a position of absolute power.

After Mao’s death on September 9, the revolution ended. On October 10, 1976, the Gang of Four was arrested. After Deng Xiaoping seized power in 1978,¹⁶ all Maoist reforms in the Cultural Revolution were abandoned, and many political leaders who had been purged during the Cultural Revolution, such as Peng Zhen, were politically rehabilitated. On June 27, 1981, the Sixth Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee adopted the “Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China.” It boldly commented on Mao’s leadership role in the movement, stating that “[C]hief responsibility for the grave ‘Left’ error of the ‘Cultural Revolution,’ an error comprehensive in magnitude and protracted in duration, does indeed lie with Comrade Mao Zedong.” According to the Resolution, “History has shown that the ‘cultural revolution’ initiated by a leader laboring under a misapprehension and capitalized on by counter-revolutionary cliques, led to domestic

¹⁶ The pivotal Third Plenum of the Eleventh CCP Congress on December 18, 1978 officially marked the beginning of Deng’s dominant leadership and the economic reform era. In this Plenum, Hua Guofeng engaged in self-criticism and called his “Two Whatevers” a mistake.

turmoil and brought catastrophe to the Party, the state, and the whole people.”¹⁷ Since then, the Cultural Revolution has been treated officially as a negative movement.

The Cultural Revolution brought disastrous results and influences in almost all dimensions.¹⁸ Intellectuals particularly suffered because of the revolution. The Red Guards considered academic authority and intellectuals as an exploitative class, personifications of the Four Olds, or counter-revolutionary, and thus they started serious attacks on most intellectuals. Many prominent intellectuals suffered severe physical abuse and verbal insults. Some intellectuals could no longer bear the insults and committed suicide, such as Deng Tuo, Lao She (老舍), Jian Bozan (翦伯赞), and Zhao Jiuzhang (赵九章).¹⁹ Some of them were persecuted to death, such as Yao Tongbin (姚桐

¹⁷ “Resolution on Certain Questions.”

¹⁸ In humanitarian dimensions, many people died because of non-natural causes. Some people were publicly criticized because they had relatives in foreign countries. Many children and youths were discriminated because of their family background. Overall, many people were beaten to death or died from the denial of medical attention. In the educational dimension, the party announced the cancellation of the university entrance examination in 1966. For 10 years, schools and colleges in the whole nation were not able to function, and most of them were attacked by the Red Guards. Library books were burned, teachers were publicly insulted and attacked, and academic research was ceased. In December 1968, CCP began the “Down to the Countryside Movement,” which sent the youths to the countryside. Some of them died because of the heavy labor and the inability to adjust to a difficult natural environment. Overall, most youths in the Cultural Revolution were not able to gain access to education. Some of them revealed their regret in the “wounded literature.” In the cultural dimension, during the “Destruction of Four Olds campaign” (i.e., Old Customs, Old Culture, Old Habits, and Old Ideas), the Red Guards destroyed ancient buildings, artifacts, antiques, books, and paintings. Many historical sites suffered devastating damage. Moreover, religious persecution intensified because Marxist-Leninist ideology opposed religion. During the “Destruction of Four Olds campaign,” religious affairs of all types were discouraged by Red Guards. Many nuns, monks, priests, clergy, and practitioners were persecuted, and temples, churches, mosques, monasteries, and cemeteries were closed down or looted, and destroyed. Furthermore, the Cultural Revolution also wreaked havoc on minority cultures. Tibetan monasteries and mosques were destroyed, and the minorities in Tibet, Inner Mongolia, Yunnan Province, and Xinjiang were persecuted.

¹⁹ Deng Tuo (邓拓) was a Chinese poet, intellectual, and journalist. At the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, he was accused of being “the head of anti-Party, anti-socialism” because of his political critiques published in *Yanshan Yehua* [Evening Chats in Yanshan] (燕山夜话) and *Sanjiacun zhaji* [Notes from a Three-Family Village] (三家村札记). He committed suicide in 1966. Lao She (老舍) (his pen name; his real name was Shu Qingchun) was a notable Chinese writer. During the Cultural Revolution, he was

斌), Zhang Linzhi (张霖之), and Bian Zhongyun (卞仲耘).²⁰ Some of them died in the prison, such as Wu Han and Tian Han (田汉).²¹ Some were imprisoned in cowsheds, such as Ba Jin (巴金) and Ji Xianlin (季羨林).²² Some were executed without proper legal

accused of being a counterrevolutionary by the Red Guards. After being subjected to severe mental and physical humiliation, he committed suicide by drowning himself in Beijing's Taiping Lake in 1966. Jian Bozan (翦伯赞) was a prominent Chinese Marxist historian and the vice-president of Beijing University from 1952 to 1968. During the Cultural Revolution, Jian also suffered from severe torture. He overdosed on sleeping pills and died on December 18, 1968. The three were rehabilitated posthumously in 1979. Zhao Jiuzhang was a Chinese meteorologist, geophysicist, space physicist, and engineer. He was a pioneer of Chinese space technology. He was persecuted in the Cultural Revolution. He overdosed on sleeping pills and died on October 25, 1968. He was rehabilitated in 1978 and was awarded posthumously the "Two Bombs, One Satellite" Achievement Medal in 1999.

²⁰ Yao Tongbin (姚桐斌) was a Chinese scientist and an expert in missile and aerospace materials and technology. He was awarded posthumously the "Two Bombs, One Satellite" Achievement Medal in 1999 for his significant contribution to China's astronautical materials and technology. Yao was persecuted during the Cultural Revolution and was beaten to death on June 8, 1968. He was posthumously accepted as a martyr in 1978. Bian Zhongyun (卞仲耘) was the vice-president of the Experimental High School affiliated with Beijing Normal University. She became the first victim of the Cultural Revolution when she was beaten to death by her students in August 1966. She was rehabilitated posthumously in 1978. Zhang Linzhi (张霖之) was the Minister of Coal Industry during the Cultural Revolution. He was persecuted for more than one month and was eventually beaten to death. He became the first victim from the minister level of the Cultural Revolution. He was rehabilitated posthumously in 1975.

²¹ Tian Han was a Chinese drama activist, playwright, translator, and poet. He wrote the lyrics of "March of the Volunteers," the national anthem of the People's Republic of China, in 1934. He was persecuted and sent to prison in 1966 at the beginning of the Cultural Revolution. He died in prison in 1968. During the Cultural Revolution, the lyrics of the national anthem were forbidden to be sung in public assembly because the author was accused of being a counterrevolutionary. He was rehabilitated posthumously in 1979. Wu Han was a notable historian who later became a politician. He was a member of the Democratic League in the 1940s and was Deputy-Mayor of Peking after 1949. In November 1965, at the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, he came under attack for his play "Hai Rui Dismissed from Office (海瑞罢官)." Yao Wenyuan (姚文元), later one of the Gang of Four, accused this play of being a metaphor: the outspoken Ming official Hai Rui refers to Peng Dehuai (彭德怀) and the unapproachable Ming emperor refers to Mao. Peng Dehuai criticized Mao's policy in the Great Leap Forward campaign and was purged from all influential positions for the rest of his life. After severe persecution, Wu Han was jailed in 1968 and died in prison in 1969. He was rehabilitated posthumously in 1979.

²² The "cowshed" (牛棚 Niupeng) was an informal prison that every "unit," including school, college, factory, and town, set up for imprisoning counterrevolutionaries in 1966. It did not have to be a genuine cowshed: it could be a classroom, a storehouse, or a dark room. Li Yaotang, better known for his pen name of Ba Jin (巴金), was a notable Chinese writer. During the Cultural Revolution, like many famous writers, Ba Jin was persecuted as a counterrevolutionary. He was sent to the "cowshed" and was subjected to humiliation and heavy labor. He was rehabilitated in 1977. In his later work "Random Thoughts" (Suixiang Lu), he recalled his attitude and experience in various campaigns from the 1950s and the Cultural Revolution. He advocated the necessity of building a Cultural Revolution Museum to be set up as a

procedures, such as Yu Luoke.²³ Many others were sent to rural labor camps, lost their jobs, lost their personal belongings, or were criticized and attacked by their own children or students.

4. The Beginning of the Democratic Movements (1978 to 1980s)

After a decade of turbulence, many intellectuals began to contemplate what went wrong and what should be done to save the people and the country. Some young intellectuals began to question the leadership and political system by criticizing the Cultural Revolution and Mao's policies and by advocating their democratic ideas. The most famous cases were the democracy wall movement and the People's Congress election in Beijing University in the 1980s.

After the reform and opening to the West, CCP shifted their policy toward intellectuals. The bourgeoisification and professionalization of intellectuals enabled them to resign from the jobs assigned by the government, and thus they gained more freedom of speech. The party remained apprehensive toward the arguments advocating Western thought and reforms of the political system. The cycles of easing restrictions and suppression were observed in the 1980s. Examples of suppression are the campaign of

deterrent for future generations. Ji Xianlin was a Chinese Indologist, linguist, paleographer, historian, and writer. During the Cultural Revolution, he suffered from endless session struggles, and then he was sent to the cowshed in Beijing University. In 1998, Ji published *Memoirs from the Cowshed* (Niupeng Zayi 牛棚杂忆), in which he recorded and reflected his experience during the Cultural Revolution. He was rehabilitated in 1977.

²³ Yu Luoke (遇罗克), a worker turned intellectual, published the article "On One's Family Background (出身论)." The article criticized how the society would judge a person based on one's family background and prevent those whose family background is a black five element from having access to better education and finding a good job. He also published the article "Hejixie weiwulun jinxing douzheng de shihou dao le" [It is time to struggle with mechanical materialism] (和机械唯物论进行斗争的时候到了)" in *Wenhui Daily*. It questions Mao's motivation for the Cultural Revolution, which is not at class struggle but a power struggle in the CCP. His articles spread to the whole country. He was later arrested and executed.

criticizing Bai Hua in 1981, eliminating spiritual pollution campaign in 1983, and anti-bourgeois liberalization campaign in 1987.

In 1978, Deng started the debate on “seeking truth from facts” and encouraged intellectuals to point out the problems in the Cultural Revolution. In November 1978, some democratic activists started to post big-character posters (dazibao大字报) on the walls of Xidan Street, Xicheng District, Beijing, which was later called the Democracy Wall. Initially, the criticisms focused on the Gang of Four and previous failed government policies. However, the criticisms escalated to include the leadership and political rule, and some even criticized Deng, who gained absolute power in December 1978. In March 1979, the party began to suppress political dissents, demonstrations, magazines, and democratic organizations. Many political dissidents were arrested or escaped to foreign countries. One of the famous dissidents was Wei Jingsheng. He posted an article “The Fifth Modernization: Democratization and Others” on December 6, 1978 on the Democracy Wall in Beijing, and he considered freedom and democracy to be more important than living standards. He demanded the necessity to reflect on Mao’s dictatorship and democratization. Wei posted another article entitled “Democracy or New Dictatorship?” on March 25, 1979, in which he accused Deng of being a dictator as well. Wei was arrested on March 29, 1979 and accused of the crime of “selling military intelligence to foreigners.” The wall was closed in December 1979.

However, the suppressions abated in 1980. In May 1980, the CCP started to discuss political reforms within the party. In October 1980, the party gathered 4,000 people to discuss the “Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party since

the Founding of the People's Republic of China." Unofficial journals and organizations suppressed in 1979 were revived. Moreover, the People's Congress approved the Election Law in 1979 and allowed competitive elections. These conditions enabled the students of Beijing University to join the election and become candidates for the Haidian District People's Congress. On October 6, 1980, Beijing University started the election campaign for the Haidan District People's Congress. The college and graduate students of Beijing University were residents of the Haidian electoral district. On November 3, 1980, Sha Shen (夏申) from the Economics Department, Fang Zhiyuan (房志远) from the International Politics Department, and Wang Juntao (王军涛) from the Department of Technical Physics posted their campaign declarations. Then, Hu Ping (胡平), a graduate student from the Philosophy Department and others declared their candidacies as well. During the election campaign, the candidates expressed their ideas on the political system and policies. Some criticized Mao's false policies that resulted in the Cultural Revolution, and others advocated democratic ideas such as the freedom of expression. Hu Ping pointed out that the important aspect of the exercise of suffrage was not in being elected or in what they would do if elected but in the process itself. On December 11, 1980, Hu Ping was elected. Nevertheless, on February 20, 1981, the state department published "The Order Regarding Handling Illegal Journals and Related Problems." The order disowned the election in Beijing University in 1980 because it alleged that some liberalists used the election to conceal their illegal activities. Following the release of the order, the founders of the unofficial journals were arrested in April. Although Hu Ping,

who was the elected representative of the National People's Congress, was not arrested, he was not assigned to any position after graduating from graduate school.²⁴

Some literary works were banned in the early 1980s, but no political campaign or overwhelming criticism on certain works or authors were conducted. These banned literary works usually questioned the political system or described the dark side of the society and the party, such as Sha Yexin's (沙叶新) play "If I Were For Real." (假如我是真的 *Jia ru wo shi zhen de*)²⁵ However, in 1981, the party launched the first campaign on anti-bourgeois liberalization. The focus was on writer Bai Hua (白桦) and his screenplay "Bitter Love" (Ku Lian 苦恋).²⁶ This screenplay was published in the literature journal *October* in the fall of 1979, and it became a motion picture "Sun and the Man" in 1980. On March 27, 1981, Deng announced the necessity of criticizing this work.²⁷ On

²⁴ Qian Liqun, "Buneng Yiwang de sexing: 1980nian zhongguo xiaoyuan minzhu Yundong shuping" [Thought cannot be forgotten: Critique of Chinese University Democratic Activities in the 1980s], *Modern China Studies* (In Chinese) 100:1 (2008), accessed August 27, 2012, <http://www.modernchinastudies.org/us/issues/past-issues/99-mcs-2008-issue-1/1034--1980.html>.

²⁵ This play was co-written by fellow playwrights Li Shoucheng, and Yao Mingde. This play was inspired by a real story. It is a story about a swindler who pretends that he is a son of a high-level cadre and takes advantage of people who want to flatter him. In the end, he was arrested. He said, "The only problem is that I am not really a son of a high-level cadre. If I were, all I did was tolerable." In the fourth Congress of the China Federation of Literary and Arts Circles in October 1979, this meeting discussed many literature works criticizing the dark side of society, including "If I were for real." From January 23 to February 13, 1980, the Conference of Script Creation discussed this work again and asked Sha Yexin to revise this work. Sha rejected the suggestion. This play became forbidden. Refer to "taolun beijin huaju kaiminzhuzhifeng" [Sha Yexin: Discuss the banned Play, Open a way to democracy and rationalism (in Chinese)], *Xinjing Bao [The Beijing News]*, 166, August 2, 2008, accessed May 30, 2012, <http://www.thebeijingnews.com/news/reform30/2008/08-02/011@125016.htm>.

²⁶ This screenplay depicts a patriotic painter who has a successful career in the United States but chooses to come back to China to contribute his talent to this newly established nation. However, after several political campaigns, he suffers ill-treatment. When he tries to stop his daughter from leaving China, his daughter asks him, "You love this country but does it love you?" In the last scene, he dies in a snowy landscape; the path he walked on looks like a question mark. It is sometimes translated as "Unrequited Love."

²⁷ "[I]t is necessary to criticize the film script Unrequited Love because the issue involved is the upholding

April 20, 1981, *Liberation Army Daily* (Jie fang jun Bao 解放军报) published a commentary that accused Bai Hua of violating the four cardinal principles and considered the screenplay an example of “bourgeois liberalization.”²⁸ Over the next few months, the criticisms came from the main newspapers. Again, Deng criticized this screenplay and other speeches supporting the “bourgeois liberalization” in July.²⁹ Eventually, Bai Hua wrote a self-criticism.³⁰ Unlike the previous campaigns, the condemnation of Bai Hua’s screenplay “Bitter Love” did not extend to his other works. In May 1981, Bai Hua was given a national prize by the Chinese Writers’ Association for a poem praising the party, “The Torrents of Spring is in Sight (Chun chao zai wang 春潮在望),” which he wrote in 1979.

of the Four Cardinal Principles. Of course, when engaging in criticism, we should present facts, reason things out, and guard against being one-sided.” This is from a talk with leading comrades of the General Political Department of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army. Deng Xiaoping, “On Opposing Wrong Ideological Tendencies, March 27, 1981” from *Selected Works from Deng Xiao Ping* Vol. 2, p382, also can be accessed from [peopledaily.com](http://english.peopledaily.com), accessed Aug. 28, 2012 <http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/dengxp/vol2/text/b1500.html>.

²⁸ Special Guest Commentator, “sixiang jiben yuanze burong weifan” [The Four Cardinal Principles Must Not Be Violated (in Chinese)], *Liberation Army Daily*, April 20 1981. The work was accused of expressing hatred toward the Party, its leader, and socialist China, and of violating Deng’s “four cardinal principles” (sixiang jiben yuanze).

²⁹ Deng first mentioned “Bitter Love” and then pointed out that other works like it existed. He stated, “To put it in a nutshell, these people want to abandon the road of socialism, break away from Party leadership and promote bourgeois liberalization.” He came back to criticized “Bitter Love”: “I have seen the movie Sun and Man, which follows the script of Unrequited Love. Whatever the author’s motives, the movie gives the impression that the Communist Party and the socialist system are bad. It vilifies the latter to such an extent that one wonders what has happened to the author’s Party spirit. Some say the movie achieves a fairly high artistic standard, but that only makes it all the more harmful. In fact, a work of this sort has the same effect as the views of the so-called democrats.” This was from a talk with leading comrades of the central propaganda departments. Deng Xiaoping, “Concerning Problems on the Ideological Front, July 17, 1981,” *Selection Works from Deng Xiao Ping* Vol. 2, pp.391-2. Can also be accessed from [peopledaily.com](http://english.peopledaily.com), Accessed August 28, 2012, <http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/dengxp/vol2/text/b1530.html>.

³⁰ Bai Hua wrote a self-criticism in the form of an open letter in which he admitted that his world outlook had “contradictions.” Bai Hua, “A letter regarding ‘Bitter Love,’ to the editorial boards of the Liberation Army Daily and Literary Gazette,” *Liberation Army Daily*, December 23 1981.

After the Cultural Revolution, many intellectuals reflected on such questions as “Why did this tragedy happen?” and “What went wrong?” Some intellectuals focused on humanism. Humanism was considered a bourgeois idea and was rejected by the party. Many writers were labeled revisionists because their writings emphasized human nature and humanism.³¹ In the early 1980s, the discussion reverted to reflecting on the context of the Cultural Revolution. Intellectuals such as RuXin (汝信), Wang Ruoshui (王若水), Ba Gin, and Zhou Yang wrote articles to emphasize the importance of humanism.³² Meanwhile, the party feared the spread of Western liberal ideas and bourgeois liberalism among the Chinese populace and launched political campaigns to counter them. In October 1983, during the Second Plenum of the Twelfth Party Congress, Deng pointed out two major tasks: the rectification of party organization and the spiritual pollution problem.³³ Regarding the spiritual pollution problem, Deng particularly focused on the discussion of humanism and alienation.³⁴ Although the main task of the plenary session

³¹ For a discussion on the history of humanism and its advocates in PRC, refer to Wang Ruoshui, “Ren de nanchan: rendaozhuyizaizhongguo de mingyun he qingwuhudong” [Dystopia of Human: Humanism’s fortune in China and Removing Spiritual Pollution Campaign], *Discovery* (trans), 101 and 102 (May/June, 1992).

³² Zhu Zhirong, *xinshiqi zhongguo zhishifenzi yanjiu [Study of New Era Chinese Intellectuals (in Chinese)]* (Taipei: Showwe Information Publishing, April, 2010).

³³ Spiritual pollution means “the spread of the corrupt and decadent ideas of the bourgeoisie and other exploiting classes and the spread of distrust of socialism, communism, and leadership by the Communist Party.” Deng Xiaoping, “The Party’s Urgent Task on the Organizational and Ideological Fronts, October 12, 1983.” Can be accessed from peopledaily.com, accessed August 28, 2012, <http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/dengxp/vol3/text/c1160.html>.

³⁴ Deng pointed out that some theorists “have only been interested in discussing humanism, the value of the human being, and alienation and in criticizing socialism, not capitalism.” Although he did not oppose discussing humanism, he considered the following: “What we should do is make a Marxist analysis of it, disseminate and practice socialist humanism (which we used to call ‘revolutionary humanitarianism’ during the years of revolution) and criticize bourgeois humanism.” Moreover, he considered the theorists’ arguments on the alienation within a socialist society “will only lead people to criticize, doubt and negate socialism, to consider it as hopeless as capitalism and to renounce their confidence in the future of

of the Central Committee was to conduct party organization reforms, the political campaign later mainly targeted the spiritual pollution of bourgeois liberal ideas. Spiritual pollution took many forms such as the Western ideas of humanism, individualism, and Western pop culture (e.g., hairstyle, clothing, and music). These actions caused anxiety among the intellectuals and the public. Some people considered the campaign a revival of the Cultural Revolution,³⁵ and others were worried that the campaign would disrupt their daily lives. Although this campaign successfully removed Wang Ruoshui from his position as deputy editor-in-chief of *People's Daily* and publicly criticized Hu Jiwei (胡绩伟), Ba Jin (巴金), Xia Yan (夏衍), and Wang Ruowang (王若望), the campaign only lasted for less than two months. Moreover, during the election of the Fourth National Committee of the Chinese Writers' Association in 1984, writers such as Ba Jin, Bai Hua, and Liu Binyan (刘宾雁), who were criticized in previous campaigns, were elected chair (Ba) and vice-chair (Bai and Liu), whereas those who had criticized them, such as Liu Baiyu (刘白羽) and He Kingzhi (贺敬之), lost their positions as vice-chair.³⁶

socialism and communism.” Deng Xiaoping, “The Party’s Urgent Task on the Organizational and Ideological Fronts, October 12, 1983,” accessed August 28, 2012, <http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/dengxp/vol3/text/c1160.html>.

³⁵ “Friends told me that ‘there won’t be that kind of things [means Cultural Revolution] and wipe your tears and look forward to the future.’ I doubt. I have been thinking ‘just wait and see,’ until the propaganda of Removing Spiritual Pollution campaign began.” “I seemed look very clam but every night when I came back to my room, I cannot help but recalling the situation during 1966, the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, I cannot help to think that ‘a storm is coming and a big disaster is coming.’ I had no fear and was not afraid of death but just cannot understand that do we need another cultural revolution to put the whole nation to hell? No one can give me a clear answer.” Ba Jin, “Cultural Revolution Museum,” *Sui Xiang Lu 5 [Random Thoughts Vol.5 (in Chinese)]*, (Hong Kong: Joint Publishing, 1999).

³⁶ Hao, *Intellectuals at a Crossroads*, 105-106.

At the end of 1986, student demonstrations spread to the main cities in China; thus, the party decided to launch an anti-bourgeois liberalization campaign. On December 30, 1986, Deng held a discussion with Hu Yaobang, Zhao Ziyang, Wan Li (万里), Hu Qili (胡启立), Li Peng, and He Dongchang (何东昌). He emphasized that the student demonstrations were serious and that they were the results of the ambiguous, infirm attitude adopted by Hu Yaobang and other party leaders in the last few years toward opposition to bourgeois liberalization.³⁷ This campaign caused serious repercussions, such as the expulsion and purging of Fang Lizhi (方励之), Wang Ruowang, and Liu Binyan from the party and the resignation of Hu Yaobang. Zhang Xianyang (张显扬), Su Shaozhi (苏绍智), Sun Changjiang, Wu Zuguang (吴祖光), and Wang Ruoshui were expelled from the party as well. The position of Zhu Houze (朱厚泽) as director of the PCC Propaganda Department was taken over by Wang Renzhi (王忍之), an associate of Deng Liqun (邓力群). Journal publications, such as *The World Economic Herald*, were pressured, and *Modern People's News* and *Society News* were closed down. The situation settled down in May mainly because of the efforts of Zhao Ziyang.

Intellectuals in the 1980s enjoyed more freedom of expression than those during the Mao era. The intellectuals contemplated on the lessons from the Cultural Revolution and concluded that the centralization of the power and wrong policy could result in tragedy. Many intellectuals began to advocate for reforms in the political system. The radical demands of democracy eventually led to the Tiananmen incident in 1989. The

³⁷ Deng Xiaoping, "Take a Clear-cut Stand against Bourgeois Liberalization, December 30, 1986," accessed August 28, 2012, <http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/dengxp/vol3/text/c1630.html>.

Tiananmen incident turned the actions of the society and the government into a more pragmatic approach. Moreover, along with the bourgeoisization, intellectuals had more choices in their profession and could opt to be unattached to politics. Accordingly, more intellectuals abandoned the vocation on public affairs and politics.

Recalling the relations between intellectuals and the party-state, many intellectuals were passionate about their ideals, arts, and the nation, but several tragedies awaited them. These characteristics of intellectuals remained after the establishment of the PRC. Thus, intellectuals have fragile relations with the Communist government. Many intellectuals found that telling the truth could put them into trouble based on their experiences in previous campaigns. Nevertheless, they would still opt to point out the errors without conceding to the powerful leadership. The Cultural Revolution became the zenith of all conflicts. The intellectuals who detached themselves from politics to protect themselves were affected. Some intellectuals recalled these experiences, and after many instances of self-and public criticisms, they no longer knew which one was correct.³⁸ How many frustrations could one endure to maintain one's principle? After repeated self-criticism and public criticism, could one still believe in oneself instead of thinking maybe he/she was wrong? How many people would start to adjust to coexist with the party, either to be unattached and not touch the sensitive issues or to simply follow the party line? Intellectuals are of different types, and they follow different patterns when they face conflicts. Some intellectuals insist on their principles and do not surrender to the party

³⁸ In Ba Jin's essay, he describes his feeling that maybe he was wrong and maybe those friends who were criticized were wrong, so they deserved these fierce criticisms. However, after he regained his sense, he realized that he must have been bewitched to lose the ability to distinguish right from wrong. Ba Jin, "Ershi Nianqian" [Twenty Years Ago], *Random Thoughts Vol.5*.

line, such as Hu Feng. Others discovered that following the party line could restrict personal creativity. After several rounds of campaigns, some of them changed their positions, such as Zhou Yang. Even after the purge, public criticism, and other types of repression, some still believed in the party line, such as Ding Ling (丁玲). Young intellectuals who criticized and questioned the leadership were executed, such as Yu Luoke. Other intellectuals would frequently change their targets of criticism according to the party line to save themselves from purge, such as Feng Youlan (冯友兰). Historical factors influence the interaction patterns of intellectuals with the party-state. Intellectuals yearned for cultural and academic freedom but were also in fear of their safety; thus, they struggled between these two, especially those who were within the establishment. However, different intellectuals interacted differently with the state. To explain the different patterns, I need to classify the intellectuals first. The next section discusses the typology of intellectuals.

Categorizing the Chinese Intellectuals

1. Typology of Chinese Intellectuals

Coser divided intellectuals into four types, namely, “those who hold power,” such as the Jacobins and the Bolsheviks; “those who advise those in power,” such as ideologues under Napoleon, the Polish revisionists under Golulka, the Fabians, and the members of Roosevelt’s “Brain trust;” “those who criticize the powers,” such as the “Old Testament prophets;” and those who uphold “art for art’s sake” and “have no relationship whatever with things political.”³⁹

³⁹ Lewis A. Coser, *Men of Ideas: a Sociologist's View* (New York: Free Press, 1965).

According to Goldman and Cheek, Chinese intellectuals have three roles: ideological speakers for the state, academic and professional elites, and critical intellectuals. Ideological spokesmen refer to those who are the loyal followers of a leader and who usually play the role of interpreting and defending the policy. An example of an ideological speaker is Ai Siqi (艾思奇), a loyal follower of Mao in philosophy up to the 1960s. The academic and professional elites refer to those who focus on their professions and attempt to avoid any involvement in politics. However, intellectuals were afraid to lose their privileges and status, and they wanted to preserve their careers. This fear enabled the state or the party to control the independence of academic intellectuals in China. Thus, these academic intellectuals were unable to detach themselves from politics. Different from Coser's definition of critical intellectuals, Goldman and Cheek argue that even the critical Chinese intellectuals were not dissidents. They functioned more like loyal officials in the imperial era than dissidents. Some examples of philosophers and advocates of Marxist humanism are Wang Ruoshui, writers Liu Binyan, Bai Hua, and Wang Ruowang. Overall, the study suggests that these three types of Chinese intellectuals were more or less connected to the political leadership.⁴⁰

Hao Zhidong adopted the typology of Coser and others and classified Chinese intellectuals into four types, namely, revolutionary, organic, critical, and unattached intellectuals and professionals.⁴¹ Revolutionary intellectuals refer to those who were

⁴⁰ Merle Goldman, Timothy Cheek, and Carol L. Hamrin, eds., *China's Intellectuals and the State: In Search of New Relationship* (Cambridge, MA: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University Press, 1987).

⁴¹ Refer to "Introduction: Toward a Political Sociology of China's Intellectuals," in Hao, *Intellectuals at a Crossroads*.

critical of the old regime and then joined the revolution and eventually held leadership, such as, Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, and Zhou Enlai. Hao compared Chinese revolutionary intellectuals with the Jacobins of the French Revolution and the Bolsheviks of Soviet Union and attempted to understand why revolutionary intellectuals became dictators and adopted a fierce policy toward other intellectuals.

Organic intellectuals refer to those who are connected to political leadership, work for the government, or have a personal relationship with politicians. They usually function as advocates, organizers, and administrators of a dominant group. Chinese traditional literati have characteristics that tend to engage in politics so Chinese intellectuals have higher tendency to become organic intellectuals. During the Mao era, most intellectuals were assigned to state-owned institutions, making it difficult for them to avoid becoming organic intellectuals. Therefore, Goldman and Cheek considered most Chinese intellectuals as organic intellectuals and used the client-patron model to explain the relations between Chinese intellectuals and the state.

The third type is critical intellectuals. Both Chinese intellectuals and intellectuals from other countries have the tradition of becoming watchmen and the conscience of society. Traditional Chinese literati believe that they are obligated to speak out when the government deviates from Confucian ideals. However, Chinese critical intellectuals have the higher possibility of becoming organic intellectuals. The classification became more complicated; for example, in the 1980s, Wang Ruoshui should have been classified as an organic intellectual with critical spirit. Chinese critical independent intellectuals who criticize the powers from the outside are more likely to appear when the leadership is

unstable. For example, during the nationalist government period, intellectuals were more willing to be critical of the government policy from the outside instead of from the inside as officials or organic intellectuals because the government was not able to gain the support of the intellectual community. The most notable examples of these intellectuals are Wen Yiduo (闻一多) and Li Gongpu (李公朴). After the establishment of the PRC, critical independent intellectuals seldom appeared or were imprisoned or persecuted because almost all established intellectuals became organic intellectuals. This observation explains why Goldman and Cheek considered China to have no dissidents.

The fourth type is unattached intellectuals and professionals, which refer to intellectuals who play no part in formulating or implementing policy. In Imperial China, some notable intellectuals chose to stay away from politics and lived in the countryside, such as Xie Lingyun (谢灵运), Tao Yuanming (陶渊明), Meng Haoran (孟浩然), and Chu Guangxi (储光羲). They detached themselves not because they were not interested in politics but because the Emperor did not give them important positions. Most intellectuals followed the path of becoming officials, and they focused on the humanistic studies instead of science and technology. The emergence of a capitalist class and the rise of independent scholarship in the late Qing Dynasty changed this tendency and enabled the emergence of unattached intellectuals and professionals. Intellectuals could earn from writing articles, academic research, and creating artistic works, which gave them independence from politics. Famous examples of those intellectuals who only wanted to be scholars are Yan Fu (严复) and Wang Guowei (王国维). Intellectuals such as Lin Yutang (林语堂), Zhou Zuoren (周作人), and Shen Congwen (沈从文) focused on

literature critics and creation. Although almost all intellectuals were involved in the political movement and campaign during the Mao era, the unattached and the professional intellectuals re-emerged in the Deng era.

These typologies of Chinese intellectuals are based on their political roles and their attitudes toward the state. In the next section, I adopt some of these ideas and describe the think tank scholar and popular nationalist groups in terms of their attitude toward Japan.

2. Typology and Interaction Pattern

I chose two groups from among Chinese intellectuals, namely, the think tank scholar and popular nationalist groups, and classified them in terms of their policy positions toward Japan. The think tank scholar group particularly refers to international political and Japanese specialists. They are assumed to hold a more objective policy position toward Japan, and their analyses are usually based on theory. Based on the typology discussed in the previous section, intellectuals in the think tank scholar group should be organic intellectuals but hold an unattached attitude. Most are from the establishment, such as organic intellectuals, similar to Cheek's description that they prefer to be unattached and are often part of institutions. Based on Gu's research, this dissertation assumes that the think tank scholar group tends to be self-disciplined and avoids deviating from the framework of the official Japan policy.

The popular nationalist group refers to those who embrace anti-Japanese sentiments and are critical of Japan. It is mostly focused on historical and territorial issue. Some members of this group are critical of the government's Japan policy. This group is

radical and can mobilize public opinions that restrict or challenge government choices in foreign policy decisions. In this dissertation I focused on popular nationalist, activists in particular. They come from all kinds of professions, such as scholar, journalists, or writers, and they can be from the establishment or outside of it. As dissidents, most are not institutionalized.

This dissertation focused on the think tank scholar and popular nationalist groups. Although intellectual discourses have difficulty in directly influencing the CFP, these two groups were selected because they have many opportunities to influence the CFP. Although I selected these two groups and discussed their discourses for convenience, I have no intention to label any intellectual. Certain intellectuals may have different views toward Japan at different periods. The purpose of this typology is to indicate that various perceptions, attitudes, and views toward Japan exist among Chinese intellectuals. Focusing solely on either the nativist view or scholars' view would be wrong.

Regarding the interactions between Chinese intellectuals/discourses and government/ foreign policy, I can categorize them into four ideal types. A) Intellectual discourses simply interpret the foreign policy of the government. B) The government elite has already decided on its foreign policy and simply used intellectual discourses to explain the policy or gain theoretical support. C) Intellectual discourses influence the crafting of the foreign policy of the government (whether to restrict, challenge, or support the policy). D) The government restricts and suppresses intellectual discourses. These four kinds of interactions coexist with the different relations between the government and different intellectual groups. Among these interactions, two of them indicate the causal

relations between intellectual discourse and foreign policy, such as interactions A) and C). The foreign policy decision is the independent variable, and it influences the intellectual discourse as the dependent variable. Conversely, the intellectual discourse is the independent variable, which may influence, restrict, and challenge foreign policy as the dependent variable.

When we think about Chinese intellectuals, our attention may be caught by the rebelliousness and aggressiveness of nativists. However, they do not represent all intellectuals. Different intellectuals have different acknowledgements of the nature of the Chinese nation, the status of China in the international society, and the different future prospects of China. Thus, they form different views on nationalism, the CFP, and the strategic principle for the rising China. Different intellectuals also express their ideas and thoughts with different channels, attitudes, and purpose. Some deliver their thoughts through academic research, whereas others express their ideas through the newly emerging commercialized media. Some articulate their policy positions with caution and never test the tolerance of the government, whereas some test the patience of the government and dare to voice what they think or what the public wants. As intellectuals do not risk their careers and lives for nothing, they may write for many purposes, such as for idealism, patriotism, sales volume, the public good, and livelihood. In sum, illustrating the overall characteristic of the Chinese intellectual community is impossible. I can only focus on several prominent groups and observe their relations with the party-state as well as how influential they are to foreign policy or how they are influenced by the foreign policy decision of the government.

Conclusion

The second chapter focuses on the strained intellectual-state relations in PRC history. The basic historical background is important for two reasons: First, this background distinguishes between past and modern-day intellectuals. Second, this tragic history still influences the behavior of modern-day intellectuals. After reviewing the definition, characteristics, typology, and relations between the intellectuals and the party-state in the history of PRC, we can see why intellectuals choose self-discipline, as indicated by Gu's plural institutionalism, when it comes to the core interest issue on the Japan policy of China.

The next chapter discusses the think tank scholar group and examines the degree of their influence on the official policy toward the U.S.-Japan alliance and the Japanese defense policy. It found supports for the assumption that the think tank scholar group tends to be self-disciplined.

**CHAPTER THREE: THE THINK TANK SCHOLAR GROUP AND HOW IT
INFLUENCES THE CHINESE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE JAPAN-US
ALLIANCE AND THE JAPANESE DEFENSE POLICY**

This chapter aims to examine the policy position of the think tank scholar group toward core interest issues, such as the U.S.-Japan alliance and the Japanese defense policy in the 2000s and how its discourses influence China's Japan policy. First, I briefly explain the post-war Chinese official position toward the U.S.-Japan alliance and the Japanese defense policy. Then, I compare the policy of the Chinese government in 2000s and the discourses of the think tank scholar group. Finally, I examine the hypothesis on how the think tank scholar group is restrained by institutions and to what degree it can influence foreign policy.

**I. Summary of the Chinese Attitude toward the U.S.-Japan Alliance and the
Japanese Defense Policy before 2000**

The U.S.-Japan Security Treaty was signed in 1952 based on the agreements between the U.S. and Japan. Considering the apprehensions from neighboring countries and anti-remilitarization thoughts among the Japanese, Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida invited the U.S. to deploy its troops in Japan. This offer not only addressed the Japanese need to defend their country, as Japan only had a minimum force according to the strict restrictions on Japanese forces in the post-war constitution of Japan, but also

gave the U.S. the rationale to maintain its presence in East Asia.¹ Although the Japanese Self-defense Force (SDF) was created in 1954, its development was heavily restricted by domestic pacifist public opinion and civilian control over defense institutions.²

The Chinese attitude toward the U.S.-Japan alliance in the 1950s and the 1960s was more on condemning US imperialism and military threat than on condemning Japan. For example, the Chinese Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai pointed out on September 18 1951 that the purpose of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty “is to pave the way to rearming Japan and changing Japan into a complete military base for the United States.”³ The criticism indicates that Japan should not assist the U.S. imperialist in carrying out aggressive policies in East Asia. Vice-Foreign Minister Zhang Hanfu (章汉夫) criticized the Yoshida letter, which was addressed to Dulles on December 24, 1951. The letter revealed

¹ The outbreak of the Korean War led the United States to change its Asian strategy and its design for Japan from a peaceful and non-militarized Japan to a remilitarized country as “a partner in order to win the Cold War.” Refer to Richard L. Armitage, Joseph S. Nye, and Haruhara Tsuyoshi, *Nichibeï Domei vs. Chugoku, Kita choson: Armitage and Nye kinkyu teigen* [The US-Japan Alliance vs. China and North Korea: Armitage and Nye Urgent Proposal (in Japanese)], (Tokyo: Bunshun Shinsho, 2010), 161-165.

² During the Korean War, US troops deployed in Japan were sent to war. In July 1950, American occupation authorities asked the Japanese government to establish a National Police Reserve. In January 31, 1952, Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida first declared his idea at the Diet the need to establish an SDF to replace the National Police Reserve. His idea caused a serious political struggle. The other political parties objected to any sort of armed force based on the Constitution. In October 1952, the National Police Reserve was renamed the National Safety Forces. Through the negotiation and agreement between the major political parties, the Liberal party and the Kaishinto Political Party, the Self-defense Force Law and the establishment of the Defense Agency Law were declared on June 9, 1954 and the Self-defense Force and Defense Agency was established on July 1, 1954. Regarding the formation and development of the SDF, refer to Tanaka Akihiko, *Anzen hoshō: Sengo 50 nen no mosaku* [National Security: Post-War 50 Year Searching (in Japanese)], (Tokyo: Yomiuri Shimbunsha, 1997).

³ “This is irrefutable evidence showing that the United States government is preparing a larger scale aggressive war in Asia and the Far East.” Zhou Enlai, “Statement on the United States and its Vassal Countries Signing San Francisco Peace Treaty with Japan,” September 18, 1951, in *Zhanhou Zhong-Ri guanxi wenxianji 1945-1970* [Collected Documents on Post war Sino-Japanese Relations 1945-1970 (in Japanese)], edited by Tian Huan (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1996), 103. Regarding the Chinese attitude toward the US-Japan Security Treaty before the 1970s, please refer to Xuanli Liao, *Chinese Foreign Policy Think Tanks and China's Policy towards Japan* (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 2006), 103-111.

that the Japanese government would recognize the nationalist government in Taiwan, that the Japanese government “expressed its willingness to continue assisting the U.S. imperialist in carrying out aggressive policies towards Korea and China,” and that “it made the Japanese government an instrument of the U.S. imperialist and their aggression in Asia.”⁴

In the mid-1950s, Beijing softened its attitude toward Japan and explored the possibility of trade and normalization.⁵ In a meeting with the chairman of the Japanese Peace Promotion Committee Ikuo Oyama on September 28 1953, Zhou Enlai stated, “We believe that as an independent, democratic, peaceful and free country, Japan should have its own armed defensive forces.”⁶ However, with the establishment of the Nobusuke Kishi Administration, which emphasized anti-communism and determined to extend the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, China toughened its attitude again. Before the new treaty was signed on January 19, 1960, the Chinese Foreign Minister issued the following statement on January 14: “This is a serious step for the Japanese reactionaries to collaborate with the American imperialists, in preparing for a new aggression and war to threaten the peace in Asia and the world.”⁷

⁴ *Collected Documents on Post war Sino-Japanese Relations 1945-1970*, 118-19.

⁵ Liao, *Chinese Foreign Policy Think Tanks and China's Policy*, 107.

⁶ Zhou Enlai stated, “Unfortunately, however, Japan is currently occupied by US troops and controlled by the United States, and it has followed the will of the US aggressors in rearming its military forces and reviving Japanese militarism.” *Collected Documents on Post war Sino-Japanese Relations*, pp. 151 and Gaimusho Ajiakyoku ChukokuKa [China Section, Asia Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs] ed., *Nicchu Kankei Kihon Shiryoshu 1949-1969* [The Fundamental Data Collection of Sino-Japan Relations 1949-1969 (in Japanese)], (Tokyo: Kazankai, 1970), 50-2. Available at “The World and Japan” Database Project, accessed October 31, 2012, <http://www.ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/>.

⁷ According to the statement, “Chinese government seriously warns that the signing of the Treaty has indicated the revival of Japanese militarism and Japan's participation in the US aggressive military bloc.”

Although the Chinese attitude toward the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance did not alter, the tone and degree of criticisms changed according to the perception of the Chinese on the Japanese leader and the tumultuous Sino-Japan relations. After Japanese Prime Minister Hayato Iketa came to office in July 1960 and held a more friendly policy toward China, Beijing softened its criticism. After the L-T (Laio Chengzhi and Tatsuya Takasaki) memorandum was signed in 1962, trade relations rapidly advanced and even superseded the trade relations of Japan with the Republic of China (Taiwan) from 1964 to 1967.⁸ Nevertheless, following the entry of China in the Cultural Revolution period and Japanese Prime Minister Eisaku Sato's advancement of Tokyo's ties with the U.S., Beijing highlighted the criticisms on "the revival of Japanese militarism." The *People's Daily* even stated the following: "Japanese militarism has been revived through a military alliance with the U.S. imperialists since the post-war era."⁹

After the U.S.-China rapprochement and its normalization of relations with Japan, Beijing's attitude toward the U.S.-Japan alliance has shifted dramatically from apprehension to tolerance. Two reasons explain this change. First, China expected that the U.S.-Japan alliance could balance the Soviet military threat. Second, China considered the U.S.-Japan alliance to play the role of "cork of the bottle" to prevent Japanese militarization. China even sought to establish semi-alliances with Japan and the

Collected Documents on Post war Sino-Japanese Relations, 478 and *The Fundamental Data Collection of Sino-Japan Relations*, 174-5. Available at "The World and Japan" Database Project, accessed October 31, 2012, <http://www.ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/>.

⁸ Regarding the trade relations between China and Japan in the 1960s, refer to Chapter 3 to 5 in Yoshihide Soeya, *Nihon gaikou to chuugoku 1945-1972* [Japan Diplomacy and China 1945-1972 (in Japanese)], (Tokyo: Keio gijyu kudoigaku shuppankai [Keio University Press], 1995).

⁹ *Renmin Ribao* [People's Daily], September 7, 1970.

U.S. in the late 1970s. The negotiation of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship in 1978 was stalled because China insisted on putting the Anti-Hegemon Article referring to the Soviet Union but Japan opposed the Article.¹⁰

The positive attitude of China toward the Japanese defense development peaked in the 1980s. Chinese leaders and military officials even publicly encouraged Japan to increase its military power. During his visit to Japan in November 1983, General Secretary Hu Yaobang stated, “Japan holds that a defense force that defends its own is reasonable. Although Japan is expanding its defense force, I trust Japan will never invade China.”¹¹ In a meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone, Premier Zhao Ziyang gave the following statement: “China understands the Nakasone Administration’s defense policy. We are not worried about it. We don’t think the Nakasone Administration is pursuing a militarism policy.”¹² In the 1980s, Tokyo took a more active position toward its defense and security policy. Japanese SDF underwent military modernization and increased its number of equipment. Tokyo also enhanced its security cooperation with the United States. The factors that caused these shifts on defense policy are mainly the

¹⁰ Regarding the negotiation of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship, refer to Chapter 4 and Chapter 6 in Sadako Ogata, *Normalization with China: A Comparative Study of U.S. and Japanese Processes* (California: Institute of East Asia Studies, University of California, Berkeley, 1988).

¹¹ *Asahi Shimbun*, November 24, 1983.

¹² *Asahi Shimbun*, March 23, 1984. Except for these, during his visit to Japan, Defense Minister Chang Aiping said, “Regarding the issue of US-Japanese collective defense, we agree with this policy. Any state has her right to protect her own state. In order to do so, a strong defense force is important.” Regarding the US-Japanese security treaty, he remarked, “In order to strengthen Japanese defense, it is necessary.” *Asahi Shimbun*, July 9, 1984.

growth of the Soviet threat, the pressure from the U.S., and the initiative of Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro.¹³

The Chinese attitude shifted back to opposition and apprehension after the U.S. and Japan reaffirmed their alliance in April 1996. In February 1995, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Joseph S. Nye Jr. submitted a report entitled “United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region.” In this report, Nye argued that the U.S. should strengthen its security cooperation relations with Japan.¹⁴ This idea brought about the revision of the U.S.-Japan alliance. On April 17, 1996, US president Clinton and Japanese Prime Minister Ryotaro Hashimoto affirmed the “US-Japan Joint Declaration on Security Alliances for the 21st Century.” This declaration redefined and continued the U.S.-Japan security cooperation treaty alliance. First, both countries agreed that the most effective framework for the defense of Japan is “the combination of appropriate defense capabilities for the SDF of Japan and the Japan-US security arrangements,” and they concurred that the “continued US military presence is also essential for preserving peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region.” Second, Tokyo and Washington agreed to undertake efforts to advance cooperation.¹⁵ Third,

¹³ Richard C. Bush, “Navies, Air Forces, Coast Guards, and Cyber Warriors,” *The Perils of Proximity: China-Japan Security Relations* (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2010), 41-42.

¹⁴ Joseph S. Nye Jr., *United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region* (Washington DC: Department of Defense, Office of International Security Affairs: Asia and Pacific Affairs, USDP/ISA/AP, February 1995).

¹⁵ Both agree with the advance cooperation in the following areas: further enhance the exchange of information and views on the international situation and consult closely on defense policies and military postures; initiate a review of the 1978 Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation and the necessity to promote bilateral policy coordination, including studies on bilateral cooperation in dealing with situations that may emerge in the areas surrounding Japan; enhance mutual exchange in the areas of technology and equipment; cooperate in the ongoing study on ballistic missile defense; and both governments will make every effort to deal with various issues related to the presence and status of US forces.

concerning the regional cooperation, they emphasized the importance of the role of China and stressed the interest of both countries in furthering cooperation with China.¹⁶ Fourth, regarding global cooperation, both agreed to strengthen their cooperation to support the United Nations (UN) and other international organizations through activities, such as peacekeeping and humanitarian relief operations, and to coordinate their policies and cooperate on issues, such as on arms control and disarmament.¹⁷

Beijing considered the April 1996 US-Japan Joint Declaration on Security a restraint on China for two reasons. First, after the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, no obvious enemy was present and therefore no rationale to maintain the cold war mechanism. Second, China felt that the target of the U.S.-Japan alliance had shifted to China. The Chinese military had a series of activities in the early 1990s, such as the South Sea conflict in 1992, the nuclear bomb test in 1993, and the missile exercises in Taiwan Strait in 1995 and 1996. The U.S.-Japan alliance declaration was publicized in April 1996 immediately after the missile test exercise in March 1996.

Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Shen Guofang (沈国放) gave an official response to the U.S.-Japan United Declaration: He first pointed out the bilateral defense arrangement between Japan and the U.S. will not go beyond its bilateral nature and will not touch on any third party. He said “Any attempt to have a security arrangement going

¹⁶ They further stressed the importance of the reform in Russia, the stability on the Korean Peninsula, and developing multilateral regional security dialogues and cooperation mechanisms, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum.

¹⁷ Refer to Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Japan-US Joint Declaration on Security, Alliance for the 21st Century,” April 17, 1996, accessed June 30, 2012, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/security.html>.

beyond its bilateral character would certainly be cause for vigilance and concern by other Asian nations.” Concerning the Taiwan issue, he said, “How to resolve the Taiwan problem is an internal Chinese matter.” If the Japan SDF increased its military power or enlarged its defense area, the increase would cause some concern to Asian states. China hoped that the Japanese government would adopt a cautious attitude on this issue.¹⁸

On September 23, 1997, Prime Minister Hashimoto and President Clinton signed the New Guidelines for US-Japan Defense Cooperation. The most controversial revision in the guideline was Article 5, that is, “Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan.” Although the guideline clarified that “the concept, situations in areas surrounding Japan, is not geographic but situational,”¹⁹ how to define the areas surrounding Japan became the center of attention. Beijing protested the new guideline for one main reason: this guideline revised the applied area from the Far East areas to those surrounding Japan and China, including the Taiwan Strait.

Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Shen Guofang announced the official response to the new guideline: “Including Taiwan Strait into the scope of the U.S.-Japan security cooperation, whether directly or indirectly, would be infringing upon and interfering in China’s sovereignty... This is unacceptable to the Chinese government and

¹⁸ Steven Mufson, “U.S.-Japan Accord Fans China’s Fears,” *Washington Post*, April 19, 1996.

¹⁹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “The Guidelines for US-Japan Defense Cooperation,” accessed June 19, 2012, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/guideline2.html> and “Joint Statement U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee Completion of the Review of the Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation,” September 23, 1997, accessed June 19, 2012, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/defense.html>.

people.”²⁰ In an interview with *the Washington Post* before his visit to the U.S., Chinese President Jiang Zemin mentioned, “To be frank, we are on very high alert regarding this Japan-US military treaty, and we hope that this treaty is not directed at China.”²¹ In a meeting with the Japanese Prime Minister who visited China on September 4 1997, Chinese Prime Minister Li Peng protested the inclusion of the Taiwan Strait in the defense area of the new US-Japan security guideline.²²

In sum, the attitude of China toward the U.S.-Japan alliance and Japan defense policy was consistently apprehensive, except in the 1970s and 1980s because of the existence of a common enemy (i.e., the Soviet Union). As China and Japan are two important Great Powers in East Asia and China suffered enormously from the Japanese invasion in the Second World War, the anxiety of China regarding the military development of Japan and its cooperative security relations with the U.S. was not surprising.

II. Enhancement of the U.S.-Japan Security Cooperation and the Japanese Defense Policy in the 2000s

On April 26, 2001, Junichiro Koizumi became prime minister and he brought about a series of changes in the foreign and defense policies of Japan. He advocated the advanced security cooperation within the U.S.-Japan alliance, causing a sharp shift in

²⁰ “Under current circumstance in Asia-Pacific region, the way that US and Japan strengthen military alliance and increase military cooperation runs counter to the trend of the times.” He also demanded that the “US and Japan should keep their promise to China on Taiwan issue and respect Beijing’s stance.” *Renmin Ribao*, September 25, 1997.

²¹ Steven Mufson and Robert G. Kaiser, “Chinese Leader Urges U.S. to Seek ‘Common Ground’; Jiang Wants to Smooth Tensions At Upcoming Summit With Clinton,” *Washington Post*, October 19, 1997.

²² *Yomiuri Shimbun*, September 5, 1997.

overseas activities of the Japan SDF after the 911 incident in 2001 and the Iraq war in 2003. Since then, the U.S.-Japan alliance and the Japanese defense policy underwent many transformations. In this section, I focus on the apparent changes to this aspect in the 2000s.

1. Advanced Security Cooperation with the United States

Since the Bush administration came to office, Washington sought to enhance its security cooperation with Japan and encouraged Tokyo to discard the restrictions on undertaking collective defense functions. For example, according to the Armitage Report of October 2000, “Japan’s prohibition against collective self-defense is a constraint on alliance cooperation. Lifting this prohibition would allow for closer and more efficient security cooperation.”²³ Although unable to lift its ban on collective security, Japan managed to enhance its security cooperation with the U.S.. The breakthroughs of the U.S.-Japan security cooperation in the 2000s are the research and development in collective ballistic missile defense (BMD), Japan’s position in the U.S. force posture realignment, and the increase in joint military exercises.

Ballistic Missile Defense

According to Japanese Defense Whitepaper in 2011, Japan started to develop the BMD system because of the buildup of ballistic missiles in neighboring countries, such as North Korea, China, and Russia.²⁴ North Korea launched the No dong medium-range

²³ One of the main authors Richard Armitage later became the Deputy Secretary of State in 2001. “The United States and Japan: Advancing Toward A Mature Partnership,” INSS Special Report, *Strategic Forum*, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, October 11, 2000, 3.

²⁴ Regarding the background of the ballistic missile defense development in a Japanese Whitepaper, it was only mentioned because of the proliferation of ballistic missiles in international society. It added the threat of the North Korean ballistic missile in 2007 and the fact that China and Russia both owned ballistic

ballistic missile (MRBM) in May 1993, the Taepo Dong intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) in August 1998, the multiple missile launches in July 2006, the satellite rocket and missile launches in 2009, and the satellite rocket launch in 2012. These activities particularly heightened the perception of the Japanese government and the public on ballistic missile threats.²⁵

In 1995, the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) conducted a “Comprehensive Survey on National Air Defense System” from 1995 to 1998 to advance the study of the technological potential of BMD. At that time, Washington and Tokyo signed a memorandum of understanding for the exchange of the information and intelligence on BMD. In August 1998, the North Korean launch of the Taepo Dong ballistic missile strongly influenced the policies of both countries on their joint study on BMD. In the same year, the Security Council of Japan and the Cabinet approved the joint technology study of the Navy Theater Wide Defense (NTWD) with the U.S..²⁶ This Japan-US Joint Technological Study mainly focused on four aspects of the NTWD SM-3 interceptor missile: nose cone, kinetic warhead, infrared seeker, and second stage rocket.²⁷

missiles capable of carrying nuclear weapon in 2009.

²⁵ According to Japan’s Defense whitepaper, North Korea’s missile launches caused the public to be aware of the threat of missile attacks and to support the missile defense system. Japan Defense Agency, *Boei Hakusho 16-nen* [Defense of Japan 2004 (Annual White Paper) (in Japanese)] (Tokyo: Kokuritsu Insatsukyoku, 2004), p.335, accessed June 19, 2012, http://www.clearing.mod.go.jp/hakusho_data/2004/w2004_00.html.

²⁶ Regarding the development of BMD system in Japan, refer to Hideaki Kaneda, Kazumasa Kobayashi, Hiroshi Tajima, and Hirofumi Tosaki, *Japan’s Missile Defense: Diplomatic and Security Policies in a Changing Strategic Environment*, (Tokyo: The Japan Institute of International Affairs, March 2007), accessed June 19, 2012, http://www2.jiia.or.jp/en/pdf/policy_report/pr200703-jmd.pdf .

²⁷ Japan Defense Agency, *Boei Hakusho 15-nen* [Defense of Japan 2003 (Annual White Paper) (in Japanese)] (Tokyo: Kokuritsu Insatsukyoku, 2003), 125-6, accessed June 19, 2012, http://www.clearing.mod.go.jp/hakusho_data/2003/w2003_00.html.

After the U.S. decided to deploy an initial MD capability in December 2002, the Security Council of Japan and Cabinet approved the deployment of the BMD system in December 2003.²⁸ The same Chief Cabinet Secretary statement²⁹ revealed the decision to develop and deploy a multi-layer defense system, including the Aegis BMD³⁰ and Patriot PAC-3 systems.³¹ The cabinet secretary also announced that Japan would develop a new National Defense Program Guideline and Mid-term Defense Program.

The concept of how to defend against an approaching ballistic missile attack is as follows. Sensors should detect and track ballistic missiles that approaching Japan. Command, control, and communication systems should effectively link the weapons and sensors for a systematic response to ballistic missile attacks. A multi-layered BMD system should then intercept the ballistic missiles using Aegis ships in the mid-course phase and Patriot PAC-3 in the terminal phase.³² According to the National Defense Program Guideline adopted in December 2004, the core units with major equipment

²⁸ Japan Defense Agency, *Boei Hakusho 17-nen* [Defense of Japan 2005 (Annual White Paper) (in Japanese)] (Tokyo: Kokuritsu Insatsukyoku, 2005), 147-157, accessed June 19, 2012, http://www.clearing.mod.go.jp/hakusho_data/2005/w2005_00.html.

²⁹ Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, "Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary," December 19 2003, accessed June 19, 2012, http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/tyokan/2003/1219danwa_e.html.

³⁰ Aegis ships refer to ships equipped with the Aegis Combat system, which uses powerful computers and radars to track and guide weapons to destroy enemy targets. The missile that Aegis BMD system uses is Standard Missile 3 (SM-3). SM-3 is designed to intercept ballistic missiles in outer space during mid-course flight. SM-3 is a three-stage missile with a range of over 1000 km and is capable of intercepting up to 200 km or higher altitude. Aegis BMD upgrades were installed in Japan's four Aegis ships for deployment at the end of 2011. Kaneda et al., "Japan's Missile Defense," 62.

³¹ The Patriot Air defense missile system is a surface-to-air missile system. Patriot PAC-3 is design to intercept ballistic missiles at the terminal phase of their flight within the atmosphere. JDA planned to add PAC-3 capabilities to 17 Patriot Fire Units (with one additional compared with the original plan in "National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2005"). The US has been deploying PAC-3s to Okinawa since 2006. Ibid., 62-3.

³² *Defense of Japan 2005 (Japanese Version)*, 148-150.

applicable for BMD are four Aegis ships and three ground-based Anti-ballistic Missile Groups.³³ Regarding the sensor, the U.S. and Japan started to develop a new radar, FPS-5,³⁴ to detect both traditional aircraft and ballistic missiles.

The launch of ballistic missiles by North Korea in July 2006 accelerated the original plan of the Japanese to deploy BMD. Japan was able to successfully track most of the trajectories of the fired ballistic missiles of North Korea using the Aegis ships. Japan also tested FPS-XX radars, EP-3 electronic intelligence aircrafts, P3-C patrol aircraft, and YS 11-E electronic reconnaissance aircrafts.³⁵ However, Japan did not have intercept capability. In response to the North Korean missile launches, Fukushiro Nukaga, the JDA Director-General at that time announced several changes to advance the completion of the overall plan to introduce the BMD system to FY 2011.³⁶ The deployment of the BMD system in 2012: Marine SDF deployed SM-3 in four Aegis ships, namely, Kongo, Chokai, Myoko, and Kirishima; and Air SDF deployed PAC-3 to 16 Patriot fire units in several bases completed the goal of the planned guideline for FY 2005. According to the National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) for FY 2011 and the Mid-term Defense Program for FY 2011, SDF planned to equip another two Aegis ships with the BMD system and add another patriot fire unit with PAC-3 capability, four

³³ Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, "National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2005," Japanese Ministry of Defense, December 10, 2004, accessed June 19, 2012, http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/policy/2004/1210taikou_e.html#2.

³⁴ FPS-5, used to be called FPS-XX, is a three-dimensional active-phase array radar with capability against ballistic missile and stealth aircraft targets. This radar was developed and tested from 1999 to 2003 by JDA's Technical Research and Development Institute. Four sets have been deployed since FY 2006. Kaneda et al., "Japan's Missile Defense," 61.

³⁵ *Defense of Japan 2007*, 229-231.

³⁶ *Yomiuri Shimbun*, July 8, 2006; *Yomiuri Shimbun*, August 5, 2006.

sets of FPS-5 units (already deployed), and seven FPS-3 Mod (with improved capability) units (already deployed). Another goal was to create a command, control, battle management, and communications system, such as the Japan Aerospace Defense Ground Environment, to integrate all these elements.³⁷ (Please refer to Table 18 in Appendix B)

Overall, the deployment of the BMD system is significant in three aspects. First, Japan developed interception capability against missile attack and gained deterrence against states with missile capability in this region. Second, the U.S. and Japan strengthened their security cooperation, such as a joint research on the SM-3 Block II A and radar system, intelligence and information sharing, and integration of command system.³⁸ Third, Tokyo consolidated its relations with the U.S., which is the first alliance to decide on deploying the U.S. BMD.

US-Japan Alliance in a Global Context

In the 2000s, Japan and the U.S. advanced their security cooperation to another level to “deal with the changing security environment and new forms of threats in the world.”³⁹ The transformations enabled these two countries to deal with new crises collectively. The transformations underwent three stages. The first stage established the common strategic objectives. The second stage clarified the roles, missions, and

³⁷ Ministry of Defense of Japan, *Defense of Japan 2012 (Annual White Paper)*, 187-9, accessed June 19, 2012, http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/2012.html.

³⁸ Moreover, “in 2005, the Security Council of Japan and Cabinet Meeting approved the joint research of the technology of SM-3 Block II A with the US, which started from 2006 until now. In the 2011 stage, they were still working on the last stage, design, building, and test of the missile for launching from the sea.” *Ibid.*, 190-193.

³⁹ Ministry of Defense of Japan, *Defense of Japan 2010 (Annual White Paper)*, 279, accessed June 19, 2012, http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/2010.html.

capabilities. The third stage realigned the force position, such as the U.S. Force Japan (USFJ). The subsequent sections provide a detailed description of the alliance.

Background

Several reasons led to the consultation ideas on the transformation of the U.S.-Japan alliance. First, the U.S. and Japan decided to intensify their collaboration and strengthen the role of the U.S.-Japan alliance in the global context. Both countries agreed to put the U.S.-Japan alliance in the global context and to enhance their collaboration to respond to global problems. Accordingly, their cooperation became present in different areas of international activities, such as the fight against terrorism, humanitarian and reconstruction assistance in Iraq, and assistance to the earthquake and Indian Ocean tsunami victims. Second, the international security environment underwent some changes. The emergence and globalization of new threats (e.g., international terrorism) and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles as means to deliver these weapons brought challenges to the international community. The modernization of military forces in the Asia-Pacific region caused unpredictability and uncertainty, which require special attention.

Third, the changes in security policies and strategies of Japan and the U.S. also led to their decision to transform the alliance. Japan adopted new NDPG, which acknowledged the importance of the Japan-US defense arrangements. The arrangements were indispensable, and Japan recognized that the “cooperation with the United States as alliance partner is one of the three approaches to the realization of security objectives.”⁴⁰

⁴⁰ Japan Defense Agency, *Defense of Japan 2006 (Annual White Paper)*, 218-9, accessed June 19, 2012, http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/2006.html.

Washington planned to transform its security strategy in Quadrennial Defense Review Report of 2001 and presented a Global Posture Review. The purpose of this policy is to manage the new forms of threat in the post-Cold War era. This strategy seeks sufficient mobility and flexibility in the forces to respond to aggression from any region. This policy involves the redistribution of forces and equipment as well as the creation of a new base system that increases the number of bases and stations beyond Western Europe and Northeast Asia.⁴¹

Thus, the Japan-US Security Consultative Committee (SCC or 2 plus 2)⁴² of December 2002 confirmed that the bilateral security consultations should be intensified to continue the progress on bilateral defense planning and to explore areas of cooperation to reinforce their national efforts effectively.⁴³ The purpose of the U.S. forces realignment in Japan was to maintain deterrence and capabilities and to reduce the burdens of the local communities.

⁴¹ Department of Defense, "Reorienting the U.S. Military Global Posture," *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, September 30, 2001, 25-8, accessed June 19, 2012, <http://www.defense.gov/pubs/qdr2001.pdf>.

⁴² Washington and Tokyo have several channels to discuss security issues, such as Security Consultative Committee (SCC), Security Subcommittee (SSC), and Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation (SDC), among others. Among these channels, SCC is an important channel involving foreign ministers and defense ministers from both sides. The decision for its establishment was made on January 19, 1960, and its first meeting was held in September 1960. It functions as an important channel for discussing agreements based on the US-Japanese alliance and the US-Japanese cooperation in the security field. The frequency of the meeting was not fixed. Initially, the members of the 2 plus 2 were the US ambassador to Japan as the representative of the foreign ministry and the Pacific Command as the representative of the defense ministry from the US side. In 1990, Secretary of State James A. Baker suggested the US representatives to be upgraded to the Secretary of State and the Defense Minister. Through this, the head of foreign ministry and defense ministry from both sides can exchange ideas directly and strengthen the SSC. About the origin and evolution of SCC, refer to Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, "2+2 kaigo: Nichibei Domei no 'tsugi no 50 nen' he" [2+2 Meeting: Look forward to "Next 50 Years" of the U.S.-Japanese Alliance], September 13, 2011, accessed June 19, 2012, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/press/pr/wakaru/topics/vol77/index.html>.

⁴³ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, "Joint Statement U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee," Washington, DC December 16, 2002, accessed June 19, 2012, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/scc/joint0212.html>.

First Stage: Common Strategic Objectives

On February 19, 2005, the joint statement of the 2 plus 2 meeting confirmed the outline of the common strategic objectives to be pursued by the U.S. and Japan. The common strategic objectives in the region were

maintenance of security in Japan, strengthening peace and stability in the region, peaceful unification of the Korean Peninsula, peaceful resolution of issues related to North Korea, welcoming China's responsible and constructive roles and development of a cooperative relationship with China, peaceful resolution of issues concerning the Taiwan Strait, improvement of transparency of China's military affairs, constructive involvement by Russia, assistance to peaceful, stable and vibrant South East Asia, etc.⁴⁴

The common global strategic objectives were

promotion of fundamental values such as democracy in the international community, engagement in international peace cooperation activities etc., reduction and nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction and means to transport these weapons, prevention and eradication of terrorism, improvement in effectiveness of the UN Security Council, etc.⁴⁵

In the "Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee Alliance Transformation: Advancing U.S.-Japan Security and Defense Cooperation" issued on May 1, 2007, the SCC members reconfirmed their commitment to these common strategic objectives and highlighted other strategic objectives that advanced the interests of both countries.⁴⁶

⁴⁴ Ohno Director General of Japan Defense Agency, Donald Henry Rumsfeld Defense Minister, Machimura Foreign Minister, and Condoleezza Rice Secretary of State participated in 2+2 meeting. Please refer to *Defense of Japan 2005 (Japanese Version)* and *Defense of Japan 2006*, 221-222 and Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, "Joint Statement U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee," Washington, DC February 19, 2005, accessed June 19, 2012, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/scc/joint0502.html>.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ The objective related to China is "Recognizing the importance of China's contributions to regional and global security, further encouraging China to conduct itself as a responsible international stakeholder, improve transparency in its military affairs, and maintain consistency between its stated policies and

Second Stage: Roles, Missions, and Capabilities

In the second stage, the two countries examined the roles, missions, and capabilities of the SDF and US Forces required to achieve the strategic objectives established in the first stage and to effectively respond to diverse challenges. The SCC document of October 2005 entitled “US-Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future” summarizes the result of the investigation. Emphasis was placed primarily on two areas, namely, the defense and responses of Japan to situations in areas surrounding Japan and the efforts to improve the international security environment.

The basic concepts of Japan’s defense and responses to situations in areas surrounding Japan are the U.S. strike capability, the importance of nuclear deterrence, and the strengthening of Japan’s defense posture in accordance with the 2004 NDPG.⁴⁷ The efforts to improve the international security environment should be evidenced by the contributions of Japan and the U.S. based on their respective capabilities. Both countries

actions.”The other objectives are solving the problems in North Korea and Iran; increasing and supporting regional institutions such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum and ASEAN; cooperating with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Australia; and ensuring the stability in Afghanistan and Iraq, among others. The participants in this meeting were Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Minister for Foreign Affairs Taro Aso, and Minister of Defense Fumio Kyuma. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee: Alliance Transformation: Advancing United States-Japan Security and Defense Cooperation May 1, 2007,” accessed June 19, 2012, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/scc/joint0705.html>.

⁴⁷ “For both sides, bilateral defense cooperation remains vital and the Japanese and US operations must be consistent to ensure appropriate responses. Moreover, the United States will maintain forward-deployed forces, and Japan will continue to provide host nation support, such as facilities and areas for US forces.” Ibid.

should intensify cooperation with other partners, including regular exercises, among others.⁴⁸

The SDF and US Forces should take the following essential steps. First, in the area of improvement of interoperability, the SDF and US forces should strengthen the connectivity between their respective headquarters through continued cooperation in planning for bilateral operations and exercises to ensure smooth cooperation under diverse contingencies.⁴⁹ Second, to improve interoperability and capability, enhance readiness, and equitably distribute training effects among local communities, both sides should not only increase the mutual use of US and SDF training facilities and areas throughout Japan but also expand the training of SDF personnel and units in Guam, Alaska, and Hawaii. Moreover, both sides should consider that participation in multinational training and exercises would advance their contributions to a better international security environment. Third, both sides should expect that the shared use of facilities between the SDF and the U.S. Forces would bring closer bilateral operational coordination and improved interoperability.⁵⁰

⁴⁸ “Japan and the United States contribute their appropriate capabilities based on their respective capabilities and take necessary measures to establish effective posture; the SDF and the US forces will intensify cooperation with other partners in order to contribute to international activities; flexible capabilities are necessary for rapid and effective response and regular exercises, whether bilateral or multilateral ones, can improve these capabilities; both states will develop their respective defense capabilities and to maximize the benefits of innovations in technology.” The participants were Secretary of State Rice, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Machimura Minister of State for Defense Ohno. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Joint Statement U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee: US-Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future,” October 29, 2005, accessed June 19, 2012, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/scc/doc0510.html>.

⁴⁹ “Based on the examination of roles, missions, and capabilities, both sides further identified the following essential steps. Essential steps should be taken including not only those related to the cooperation between the SDF and US Forces but also those that should be addressed as government-wide efforts.” Ibid.

⁵⁰ *Defense of Japan 2006*, 228 and “U.S.-Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future.”

The two governments as a whole should also take the following steps. First, close and continuous coordination is not only required between Japan and the U.S. but also at every level of both governments, such as the closer cooperation between defense and other pertinent authorities.⁵¹ Second, according to the guidelines, both countries should study bilateral defense planning for an armed attack situation against Japan and mutual cooperation planning for any situation in areas surrounding Japan. For this purpose, the coordination between relevant government agencies and local authorities is necessary.⁵² Third, to enhance information sharing and intelligence cooperation, both sides should take additional necessary measures to protect shared classified information. Therefore, broader information sharing should be promoted in pertinent authorities.⁵³

After implementing these steps at the 2 plus 2 meeting held in May 2006, the SCC members highlighted the areas that should be improved and the importance of examining

I did not include the BMD part because we mentioned it in a previous section of this chapter.

⁵¹ “Both sides recognize that regular policy and operational coordination will improve the alliance’s timely and effective response to future changes in the strategic environment and to contingencies. Development of a common operational picture shared between US forces and the SDF will strengthen operational coordination and should be pursued where possible. Closer cooperation between defense and other pertinent authorities is also increasingly necessary. In this context, both sides reaffirmed the need to improve the effectiveness of the comprehensive mechanism and bilateral coordination mechanism under the 1997 Guidelines for US-Japan Defense Cooperation by streamlining their functions.” “US-Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future.”

⁵² “Both sides will expand their planning by adding specificity, coordinating closely with relevant government agencies and local authorities, enhancing bilateral mechanisms and planning methods, enhancing bilateral mechanisms and planning methods, conducting detailed surveys of civilian and SDF air and seaports, and validating their planning work through strengthened bilateral exercise programs.” *Defense of Japan 2006*, 227-8.

⁵³ Ibid.

security and defense cooperation.⁵⁴ The SCC members reviewed the progress in updating roles, missions, and capabilities at the 2 plus 2 meeting held in May 2007.⁵⁵

Third Stage: Force Posture Realignment Including the USFJ

To finalize the result of the realignment of US forces in Japan and the Japan SDF, the document entitled “United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation” was approved by the SCC members at the 2 plus 2 meeting held on May 1, 2006.⁵⁶ The realignment was reviewed from the viewpoints of the reduction of burdens on local communities and the maintenance of deterrence and capabilities. The initiatives to reduce the burden on local communities in Okinawa were the relocation and return of Futenma Air Station, the relocation of US marine personnel and their dependents stationed in Okinawa to Guam, and the return of significant land in the densely populated areas south

⁵⁴ The statement says, “The effectiveness of bilateral security and defense cooperation in the field of bilateral contingency planning, information sharing and intelligence cooperation, and international peace cooperation activities should be enhanced or improved. In addition, the two countries emphasized the importance of examining security and defense cooperation so that the two countries may solidify the alliance relationship in changing regional and international security environments and improve the alliance’s capabilities in responding to various challenges.” Ibid.

⁵⁵ Regarding the reviews, the document pointed out: first, “the redefinition of the SDF’s primary mission to include international peace keeping operations, international disaster relief operations, and responses to situations in areas surrounding Japan, which reflects growing attention to the importance of Japan’s contributions to improving the international security environment.” Secondly, in the area of information sharing and protection, both sides achieved a substantive agreement regarding security measures for the protection of classified military information, also known as a General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA). Third, both sides established a bilateral Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Defense Working Group to improve readiness and interoperability of U.S. and Japanese forces against CBRN weapons and ensure sustained operational capability when facing an attack by weapons of mass destruction. Fourth, in the area of interoperability and coordination, some progress was made such as the establishment of a flexible, bilateral interagency coordination mechanism, the execution of joint, bilateral training exercises, and the development of more specific planning. “Alliance Transformation: Advancing United States-Japan Security and Defense Cooperation.”

⁵⁶ The participants were Secretary of State Rice, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, Minister of Foreign Affairs Aso, and Minister of State for Defense Nukaga. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Joint Statement US-Japan Security Consultative Committee: United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation,” May 1, 2006, accessed June 19, 2012, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/scc/doc0605.html>.

of Kadena Air Base. The other initiatives (not in Okinawa) were the relocation of the Carrier Air Wing from Atsugi Air Facility to Iwakuni Air Station in consideration of the densely populated areas, the partial return of Camp Zama and the U.S. Forces Sagami General Depot, and the initiatives related to airspace and air traffic control, such as the partial return of Yokota airspace.⁵⁷

The initiatives to maintain deterrence and capabilities are as follows. First, the most important initiative is the realignment of the U.S. Army headquarters in Japan. The U.S. Army command and control structure in Camp Zama would be transformed into “a joint task force-capable headquarters with high mobility and readiness”⁵⁸ in US Fiscal Year 2008. One of the transformations was the establishment of I Corps (Forward). On December 19, 2007, the I Corps (Forward), a forward element of I Corps, was activated in Camp Zama, Japan. The I Corps (Forward) was merged with the U.S. Army Japan (USARJ), which became USARJ/I Corps (Forward). USARJ remained headquartered in Camp Zama and served as the Army Component Command of the USFJ. The headquarters of the Ground SDF Central Readiness Force would be subsequently located in Camp Zama by Japan Fiscal Year 2012 to strengthen the coordination with the U.S. forces. This initiative improved the U.S. Army Command and Control capability and coordination with SDF. Second, the collocation of the headquarters of two countries in Yokota Air Base and Camp Zama of USFJ would improve the coordination between the SDF and USFJ headquarters. Air SDF Air Defense Command relocated to the Yokota Air

⁵⁷ *Defense of Japan 2006*, 231.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 243.

Base in Japan Fiscal Year 2010. A bilateral joint operations coordination center established in Yokota Air Base performed a collocated air and missile defense coordination function.⁵⁹ Third, the relocation of air training from the U.S. Kadena Air Base to the Air Self-defense Force (ASDF) bases would improve interoperability. In Japan Fiscal Year 2007, both sides developed annual bilateral training plans. Both sides also worked toward expanding the use of SDF facilities for bilateral training and exercises in the future.⁶⁰ The fourth initiative is the shared use of facilities and areas of Camp Hansen and Kadena Air Base in Okinawa between Japan and the U.S.. The number of SDF facilities in Okinawa is limited, including Naha Base. Most of the facilities are located in urbanized areas and operate with some restriction. Therefore, the shared use of US facilities and areas in Okinawa would not only greatly enhance the training environment for SDF's units in Okinawa but also facilitate joint training and interoperability between the SDF and US Forces.⁶¹

The adjustment of the U.S.-Japan alliance in the U.S. force posture realignment is significant. First, the U.S. put more emphasis on the Asia-Pacific region. Second, the role of the U.S.-Japan alliance was highlighted in the U.S. force posture realignment. Third, the integration and coordination of a command and control structure and the enhancement of interoperability further intensified the U.S.-Japan security cooperation. Why did the U.S. choose Japan over other alliances in East Asia? First, the location of Japan is crucial

⁵⁹ Ibid., 243.

⁶⁰ Ibid., 247.

⁶¹ Ibid., 240. The fifth initiative is the deployment of a new US Forward-based X-band radar-Transportable (FBX-T) at ASDF Shariki Subbase. For the BMD cooperation between the US and Japan, refer to the previous section.

to deter the rising China or the rebellious North Korea. Second, Japan also pursues to transform its security policy. Third, Japanese politics tends to be more stable; thus, the U.S. expected that the Japanese position on its cooperation with the U.S. would remain unchanged. Nevertheless, the dispute on the Futenma Air Station that occurred when the Democratic Party of Japan came to power was unexpected for the U.S..

Multilateral Exercise

Since 2000, Japan has actively engaged in multilateral joint training in the Asia-Pacific region hosted by the United States. From 2001 to 2004, the Japanese SDF was invited as an observer to participate in the annual “Cobra Gold,” a multilateral joint training co-hosted by the U.S. and Thailand. Japan became an official member in 2005. The training in which the SDF participated usually includes peacekeeping operation (PKO) field training exercises, command post exercises, training for medical divisions of humanitarian and civic assistance activities, and training in transporting Japanese nationals living abroad. In 2011 alone, Japan participated in multilateral joint training, such as the “Khaan Quest 11” co-hosted by the U.S. and Mongolia in August (participated by the Ground Self-defense Force (GSDF)) and the minesweeper training in the waters around Bahrain co-hosted by the U.S. and the United Kingdom in October 2011 (participated by the Maritime Self-defense Force (MSDF)). Furthermore, the ASDF, US Air Forces, and Royal Australian Air Force held their first joint Japan-US-Australia trilateral training, ‘Cope North Guam,’ in Guam in February 2012.⁶² For more details on the exercises in which Japan participated, refer to Table 19 in Appendix B.

⁶² *Defense of Japan 2012*, 276-7.

Japan was not only actively involved in multilateral joint training events hosted by other states, but it also hosted its own multilateral joint training. In April 2002, the MSDF hosted “Pacific Reach 2002,” a multilateral exercise for submarine rescue drills in the West Pacific. This training was the first time Japan hosted a multilateral exercise. The MSDF also hosted multilateral search and rescue exercises during the International Fleet Review in October 2002.⁶³ In March 2011, Japan and Indonesia co-hosted the second ASEAN Regional Forum Disaster Relief Exercise 2011 within the framework of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). Moreover, since 2002, the GSDF has hosted the annual Multinational Cooperation Program in the Asia Pacific.⁶⁴

Although the content of the multilateral joint training had nontraditional elements, such as humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and non-combatant evacuation operations, Tokyo’s attitude toward multilateral joint training had shifted dramatically.

In sum, the most obvious change was the scale and scope of the U.S.-Japan cooperation, which were expanded and enlarged. The focus of the U.S.-Japan alliance was the Japanese defense in the 1970s. After the affirmation of the alliance in 1996, the response to events in surrounding areas was added to its duties. The enhancement in the 2000s further increased the improvement in the international security environment. The role of Japan changed significantly. In the 1970s, the duties of the Japanese side were to ensure the utilization of facilities and areas by the U.S. forces and the possession of (minimal) defense capability. After the 1996 reaffirmation, Japan was expected to

⁶³ *Defense of Japan 2006*, 331.

⁶⁴ *Defense of Japan 2012*, 276-7.

support the activities of the U.S. forces, such as conducting surveillance and minesweeping, when faced with “a situation in the area surrounding Japan.” In the 2000s, Japan supported US activities, which were not limited to the area surrounding Japan. Japan transformed its role in the alliance from a passive one of simply providing military bases into an active one of contributing to the activities of the U.S. forces.

2. Advancements in the Japan Defense Policy

In the 2000s, Japan changed its defense policy in many dimensions, such as legal, institutional, and overseas activities.

Legal Dimension

In the legal dimension, the enactment of the Legislation for Responses to a Situation played an important role. The Defense Agency started the study on emergency legislation in 1977. In his policy speech at the Diet in February 2002, Prime Minister Koizumi expressed the necessity to create a country that is capable of responding to armed attacks and emergency situations.⁶⁵ Following this speech, three laws related to armed attack situation response were sent to the Diet in April 2002. After discussion and amendment, the Diet approved the three laws in 2003: “Law for Ensuring Peace and Independence of Japan and Security of the State and the People in Armed Attack Situation,” “Partial Amendment to the Security Council of Japan Establishment Law,” and “Partial Amendment to the SDF Law.” On May 20, 2004, the legislation for

⁶⁵ Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, “Policy Speech by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi to the 154th Session of the Diet,” February 4, 2002, accessed June 19, 2012, http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/koizumispeech/2002/02/04sisei_e.html.

responses to a situation was completed when the Diet approved the seven laws and three treaties on the response to armed attack situations, among others.⁶⁶

The most critical implication of the legislation for responses to a situation is that Japan changed its traditional security view on the low possibility of attacks against Japan and that Japan only required minimal force to defend itself. Japan's current security view is that external attack is possible. This view is reflected by other documents. The 2004 NDPG emphasized the responses toward the new types of threats, such as guerrilla commando attacks. The defense whitepapers in recent years have expanded their descriptions on invasion.

Structural Changes in Military Institution

In the institutional dimension, the most important change is the transition of the Defense Agency to the Ministry of Defense (MOD). The Defense Agency was upgraded to the MOD on January 9, 2007. International peace cooperation activities were positioned as the primary mission of the SDF. The director of the Defense Agency was also upgraded to defense minister under the direct supervision of the prime minister.

⁶⁶ The seven laws are “The Law Concerning the Restriction of Maritime Transportation of Foreign Military Supplies etc. in Armed Attack Situation,” “The Law Concerning the Treatment of Prisoners of War etc. in Armed Attack Situation,” “Law Concerning Penal Sanctions against Grave Breaches of the International Humanitarian Law,” “Partial Amendment of the Self-Defense Forces Law (ACSA-related),” “Law Concerning Measures for Protection of the Civilian Population in Armed Attack Situations,” “Law Related to Measures Conducted by the Government in Line with U.S. Military Actions in Armed Attack Situations,” and “Law Related to the Use of Specific Public Facilities in Armed Attack Situations.” Three treaties include “Agreement Amending the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America Concerning Reciprocal Provision of Logistic Support, Supplies and Services between the Self-Defense Forces of Japan and the Armed Forces of the United States of America,” “Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (protocol I),” and “Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II).”

Following the abolition of the National Security Agency, the Defense Agency was established on July 1, 1954 as an external ministerial bureau in the office of the prime minister. Although the transition to MOD was discussed, it did not materialize. In 1964, after the implementation of the First Defense Build-up Program, the bill for the MOD transition was approved by the Cabinet but was not submitted to the Diet. In 1981, this issue was mentioned at the Second Ad Hoc Commission on the Public Administrative Reform, which focused on the reform for the entire government organization. The Administration Reform Conference held in 1997 also discussed this issue. In 2001, “The Legislative Bill Concerning the Draft Defense Ministry Establishment Law” created by lawmakers was submitted to the Diet. In 2002, three ruling parties, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), the Komei Party, and the New Conservative Party, reached a consensus that this issue should be treated as priority. However, the House of Representatives was dissolved in October 2003 and the bill was abandoned.⁶⁷

In 2005, the discussion on the enactment of the transition to MOD started within the government. The “Act for Partial Revision of the Defense Agency Establishment Act,” which was a bill designed for the transition of the Defense Agency to MOD, was formally sent to the Diet on June 9, 2006. The Diet approved the law on December 15, 2006. The transition to MOD was formally completed on January 9, 2007. According to the 2008 defense whitepaper, the purposes for the transition to a ministry are for “bolstering the defense policy-making/planning system; rapid and appropriate response to diverse emergency situations; and the development of a structure to engage in proactive

⁶⁷ Ministry of Defense of Japan, *Defense of Japan 2007 (Annual White Paper)*, 181-2, accessed June 19, 2012, http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/2007.html.

efforts toward peace and the stability of the international community.”⁶⁸ The significance of this change is that the transition to a ministry was given more responsibilities and authority and bolstered its policy-making functions and implementation capabilities.⁶⁹

The stipulation of the International Peace Cooperation Activities as Primary Mission was also an important change in Japanese institutions. The first priority mission of the SDF was defense operation against direct and indirect aggressions, whereas the international peace cooperation activities of the SDF⁷⁰ were positioned as supplementary activities. The new changes stipulated the operations that were the secondary priority to the primary missions. These activities are first, operations based on the Anti-terrorism Special Measures Law and the Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq; second, activities such as rear area support, those based on the Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan, and ship inspection operations based on the Ship Inspection Operations Law; and third, minesweeping and the evacuation of Japanese

⁶⁸ Ministry of Defense of Japan, *Defense of Japan 2008 (Annual White Paper)*, 114-5, accessed June 19, 2012, http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/2008.html.

⁶⁹ First, “The Minister of Defense has been granted responsibility and authority appropriate to a policy organ that enables the MOD to present a variety of policy options. This bolstered its policy-making/planning functions and implementation capabilities.” Second, “The transition to a ministry has reinforced Japan’s system for responding to emergency situations in the following respects. The authority of the Prime Minister as the head of the Cabinet shall continue to be possessed by the Prime Minister.” Third, “MOD has become a ministry equivalent to administrative organs in charge of national defense in other countries for defense talks, international dialogue and in cooperation with other countries in SDF activities conducted overseas.” Bush, “Decisionmaking in Japan,” *The Perils of Proximity*.

⁷⁰ These operations consist of operations based on the Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan, as well as minesweeping and evacuating Japanese nationals overseas.

nationals overseas.⁷¹ The significance of this change is the stipulation of the International Peace Cooperation Activities as the primary mission, which enabled SDF to join more overseas activities, such as PKO, and provide support for US force activities.

Another important change is the SDF shift to a joint operations structure. On March 27, 2006, the Defense Agency/SDF changed to a joint operations posture, “in which the Chief of Staff from the Joint Staff Office (Joint Chief of Staff) solely assists the Minister of State for Defense on SDF operation matters requiring military expertise.”⁷² In April 2002, the Minister of State for Defense began to conduct studies on joint operations. The “Report on the Study of Joint Operations,” which outlines the need to switch to a structure to facilitate joint operations, was made in December 2002.⁷³ Furthermore, the NDPG approved by the Cabinet in December 2004 also stipulated the need to strengthen the joint operations posture. Following these developments, the Defense Agency Establishment Law and the Self-defense Forces Law were revised in July 2005 to establish the posture required for joint operations. The changes were the creation of the Joint Staff Office, the transfer of operational functions from the staff offices of the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF to the Joint Staff Office, and the integration of intelligence functions into the Defense Intelligence Headquarters. After the implementation of the measures required for joint operations, including the verification made by the Japan-US joint exercises that began on February 20, 2006, the transition to a

⁷¹ *Defense of Japan 2008*, 116.

⁷² *Defense of Japan 2006*, 148. The Minister of State for Defense is also known as the Director General of the Defense Agency.

⁷³ *Defense of Japan 2005 (Japanese Version)*, 123.

joint operations posture was completed on March 27, 2006.⁷⁴ This change integrated the SDF forces and enabled them to respond to crises immediately.

Overseas Activities

According to the laws, such as the “International Peace Cooperation Law,” “Anti-terrorism Special Measures Law,” and “Law Concerning the Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq,” the MOD and the SDF dispatched SDF units for overseas missions. The missions for “International Peace Cooperation Law” were mainly limited to UN peacekeeping missions. However, the purposes of the latter two laws are to assist the U.S. and allow missions that are not constrained within the UN framework. In this section, I briefly discuss these two laws and their significances.

Anti-terrorism Special Measures Law and Its Activities

Soon after the terrorist attacks on the U.S. on September 11, 2001, the Koizumi Administration adopted the Anti-terrorism Special Measures Law as a rapid response to support the U.S. war on terrorism. This law was sent to the Diet on October 5 and was enacted on October 29. On November 9, the MSDF sent a replenishment oiler, Hamana, to escort two ships, Kurama and Kirisame, to the Indian Ocean. Under the Anti-terrorism Special Measures Law, SDF can conduct activities such as 1) cooperation and support activities, 2) search and rescue activities, and 3) activities to assist people affected by terrorist acts. Specifically, the MSDF conducted cooperation and support activities, such as refueling naval vessels of the U.S. and other nations that operate in the Indian Ocean.

⁷⁴ *Defense of Japan 2006*, 148-9.

The ASDF conducted cooperation and support activities, such as airlifting goods and supplies of US forces.⁷⁵

The Anti-terrorism Special Measures Law was a temporary law and expired two years from the date of its enactment. It was extended thrice.⁷⁶ Despite the efforts to extend the law, the law lost its effect on November 1, 2007 as a result of the House of Councilors election in July 2007. The opposition parties won the majority in the upper house and they opposed the extension of the law. However, the government submitted a new bill called “The Special Measure Act concerning the Implementation of Fuel Supply Assistance to Overseas Anti-terrorist Activities,” generally known as the new Anti-terrorist Act or Fuel Supply Assistance Act. This bill was approved at the Diet on January 11, 2008. The law enabled the SDF to supply fuel to allied nations. The law was implemented in February 2008⁷⁷ and expired on January 15, 2010. The law was important because it allowed the ASDF to conduct operations overseas for the first time and the deployment of Aegis ship overseas for the first time.

Iraq Special Measures Law and its Activities

The apprehension of Washington and London on Iraq’s alleged possession of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) led the UN Security Council to pass Resolution 1441 in 2002, which required Iraq to completely cooperate with UN weapon inspectors to verify that Iraq was not in possession of WMD. On March 20, 2003, the U.S.-led

⁷⁵ For more details, refer to *Defense of Japan 2005 (Japanese Version)*.

⁷⁶ The first time was in October 2003, and it was extended for two years. The second time was in October 2005, and it was extended for one year. It was extended for another one year in October 2006.

⁷⁷ Although the bill was defeated in the House of Councilors, it was approved by two-thirds of the majority in the House of Representatives. *Defense of Japan 2008*, 278-280.

coalition invaded Iraq. On April 15, the coalition declared that the battle was over. After the major combat operations in Iraq ended, the international community engaged in efforts to help rebuild the country. Following the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1483 and subsequent resolutions beginning May 2003, the Japanese Diet approved “the Law Concerning the Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq (or the Iraq Special Measures Law)” on July 30, 2003. Before the enforcement of this law, SDF sent out C-130H aircrafts to transport necessary relief supplies from July to August 2003 in accordance with the “International Peace Cooperation Law.”

Based on the Iraq Special Measures Law, Japan dispatched SDF units to Middle Eastern countries in December 2003. According to a defense whitepaper, the purpose of the Iraq Special Measures Law was to “allow Japan to implement activities for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance and support activities for ensuring security in line with U.N. Security Council Resolution 1483 and others.”⁷⁸ This legislation was a temporary law and expired four years after its enforcement. The Diet reenacted the law in June 2007 and extended its legislation for an additional two years until July 21, 2009. The law eventually expired in 2009.

The duties of GSDF and ASDF units dispatched in Iraq were to conduct missions, such as water purification, provision of medical service, and transportation of personnel and aid materials, and to restore and improve schools and other public facilities.⁷⁹ The

⁷⁸ *Defense of Japan 2007*, 337.

⁷⁹ For more detail please refer to *Defense of Japan 2005 (Japanese Version)*, 222-227.

SDF units also assisted troops from foreign countries in their efforts to restore security and stability in Iraq. In June 2006, the Japanese government deemed the reconstruction in Muthanna Province, where the SDF units were mainly deployed, complete, and thus the government decided to withdraw the GSDF units from Iraq. An ASDF squadron conducted Iraqi aid operations, provided airlifting support to the UN, and continued to provide similar support to the multilateral force. The last JASDF forces left Kuwait on December 18, 2008.

These activities marked the significant shift in the history of SDF operations. The foreign deployment of Japanese troops was Japan's first since the Second World War, excluding the deployments for UN Peacekeeping Operation.

Overall Assessment of the Changing Japanese Security Policy

The conventional attitudes of Japan toward the security policy were conservative. Before the 1990s, discussions on security posture and policy were avoided. Compared with this conservative stance, the changes in the 2000s were significantly considerable. I provide three assessments of these changes. First, notable changes were made in Japan's defense focus and regions. The duty of SDF was restricted to the defense of Japan. Although the SDF started the PKO in 1992, the SDF was only allowed to carry minimal weapons. Moreover, according to the PKO Law, its mission did not apply collective defense rights. However, the reforms in the 2000s not only allowed SDF to join the peacekeeping forces but also to initiate other overseas activities to support the U.S. forces. Multilateral training and exercises also permitted the SDF to send troops to foreign

countries. Thus, SDF activities were not limited to Japan. These activities increased the actual combat experience of SDF.

Second, Japanese politicians and the public were more willing to discuss security policy and were concerned about external threats, particularly those from North Korea. Considering the controversial debates on SDF joining PKO in the early 1990s, the opinions of politicians and the public on security policy have changed. Unlike that in the post-war era, the security policy is no longer taboo, and politicians and the public no longer avoid this topic. This tendency enabled the upgrading of the Defense Agency to a ministry, which could lead to future reforms in the status of the SDF, to be called military forces as other countries do. However, the transformation does not imply critical changes in the military buildup.

Third, SDF has many domestic constraints. Although the Japanese government tends to adopt different interpretations of Article 9 of the Constitution to avoid the issue of revisions in the Constitutions, Article 9 restrains the development of SDF within the existing framework. Moreover, SDF activities are strictly limited by legal regulation, which specifically defines what SDF can and cannot do.⁸⁰

In sum, the changes in the 2000s in the Japanese security policy are considerable with regard to its indifference in security policy in the post-war era. However, based on the security policy standard of other countries, Japan is simply moving toward a normal state with a normal military force.

⁸⁰ Bush, "Features of China's and Japan's Military Institutions," *The Perils of Proximity*, 96-102.

III. The Chinese Government Response

A significant number of changes are evident in the development of the U.S.-Japan security cooperation and Japanese defense policy in the 2000s. Washington and Tokyo substantially intensified their military cooperation, including the decision of Japan to deploy the U.S. BMD system, the gradual integration of command, control, and communication systems, and the transformation of US military bases in Japan into the headquarters of US ground, air, and naval forces in the region. The Japanese defense policy had legal, institutional, and overseas activity dimensions, including the enactment of several security-related bills, the transition into Defense Ministry, and dispatch of the SDF to non-combat missions in the Indian Ocean and Iraq. As a neighboring country of Japan and a rising state in the East Asia region and the world, China was certainly not happy to see these developments.

According to the research of Garrett and Glaser, based on their discussions with Chinese government officials and analysts from civilian and military research institutions, to serve China's best interest, the expectation of China toward the U.S.-Japan relations should neither be too close nor too distant. China considers the presence of American forces and the U.S. nuclear umbrella over Japan to restrain the Japanese ambition of regional hegemony and the buildup of Japanese military strength. Thus, a rupture of the alliance between the U.S. and Japan could trigger the Japanese remilitarization and even the development of nuclear weapons. Conversely, a very close relationship between Washington and Tokyo could collude to pressure Beijing on issues such as military transparency and arms control, human rights, and trade. Moreover, the increase in

military cooperation between the U.S. and Japan could develop into the joint containment of China to stop any Chinese aggressive military activities, including the use of force to prevent Taiwan from becoming an independent state.⁸¹ Thus, China being wary of and threatened by the intensifying security cooperation between the U.S. and Japan is not surprising.

Beijing expected that the U.S.-Japan alliance would serve as a cork to curb Japanese military buildup. However, Washington encouraged Japan to break the taboo in collective defense right. These developments naturally led to increased apprehension for China. Nevertheless, compared with its responses to the redefinition of the U.S.-Japan alliance in 1996 and the new guideline in 1997, the Chinese response was restrained and measured.

On October 8, 2001, after the Anti-terrorism Special Measure Law was submitted to the Diet, Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro went to Beijing to explain this law. In this trip, Koizumi visited the Memorial Museum of Chinese People's Anti-Japanese War near the Marco Polo Bridge and expressed his heartfelt apology and mourning after viewing the exhibits. He thought that "Japan must, standing on the remorse for the past, learn a lesson from it and that it must never again fight a war." Moreover, he remarked that he believed that "Japan started the war because it was isolated from the international community."⁸² Chinese leaders observed that the tension

⁸¹ Banning Garrett and Bonnie Glaser, "Chinese Apprehensions about Revitalization of the US-Japan Alliance," *Asian Survey* 37: 4 (April 1997): 385-386.

⁸² The draft of his statement in English can be found in Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, "Visit to the People's Republic of China by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi Meeting with President Jiang Zemin (Overview and Evaluation)," October 8, 2001, accessed June 19, 2012,

between Japan and China had alleviated since the visit of Prime Minister Koizumi to the Yasukuni Shrine on August 13, 2001. Thus, they accepted the explanation of Koizumi on the Anti-terrorism Special Measure Law. When Koizumi explained that the SDF would not join the military activities, President Jiang Zemin remarked that it was understandable but reminded Prime Minister Koizumi that the people of Asia were in a state of alert.⁸³ According to Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji, “The expansion of the overseas activities of the SDF should be undertaken prudently and expressed his understanding that the measures against terrorism are to be taken in accordance with each country’s situation.”⁸⁴

On the approval of the Japan Diet of the Anti-terrorism Special Measure Law on October 29, the spokesperson of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)⁸⁵ Sun Yuxi (孙玉玺) said, “Due to some historical reasons, concerning what kind of function

<http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/china/pmv0110/meet-2.html>. For the original statement in Japanese, refer to Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Chugoku Jinmin kounichi senso kinenkan homon go no Koizumi sori no Hatsugen” [Prime Minister Koizumi’s Statement after visiting the Memorial Museum of Chinese People’s Anti-Japanese War], October 8, 2001, accessed June 19, 2012, http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/kaidan/s_koi/china0110/hatsugen.html. *People’s Daily* also provided an article in English for this event, *People’s Daily*, October 8, 2001, accessed June 19, 2012, http://english.people.com.cn/200110/08/eng20011008_81757.html.

⁸³ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Visit to the People’s Republic of China by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi: Meeting with President Jiang Zemin (Overview and Evaluation),” October 8, 2001, accessed June 19, 2012, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/china/pmv0110/meet-2.html>.

⁸⁴ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Visit to the People’s Republic of China by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi: Meeting with Premier Zhu Rongji (Overview and Evaluation),” October 8, 2001, accessed June 19, 2012, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/china/pmv0110/meet-1.html>.

⁸⁵ I adopted many statements and briefings from the MFA spokesperson during press conferences because they are usually considered authoritative “in the sense of explicitly ‘speaking for the regime.’” Michael D. Swaine, “Chinese Leadership and Elite Responses to the U.S. Pacific Pivot,” *China Leadership Monitor* 38 (Hoover Institution, Aug. 6, 2012): 1 and 16.

that Japan should act in military field, Japan should be more cautious.”⁸⁶ When asked about the SDF sending troops to the Indian Ocean, MFA spokesperson Zhang Qiyue (章启月) replied, “Although the fight against terrorism is a common mission that international society is facing, we hope every country should act conforming to its situation.” She added, “Due to a historical issue, Japan’s action in the military field is a very sensitive issue. We hope Japan can be cautious and committed to its promise on an exclusively defensive security policy.”⁸⁷ These statements were not against this law, although China maintained the constant position that Japan should be more cautious regarding military action. The explanation to this reaction is that Beijing also held the same position toward terrorism and intended to restore relations with the U.S. after it became tense when President Bush came into office and the EP-3 incident occurred. Thus, protesting the strengthening of the U.S.-Japan cooperation and the enactment of the Anti-terrorism Special Measure Law was difficult.

In terms of Beijing’s response to the Iraq war in 2003, Beijing held a critical position toward the U.S.-U.K. coalition but compared with that of France, Germany, and Russia, Beijing’s protest was far from strong. Its response to the enactment of the Iraq Special Measure Law was restrained as well. In response to the questions on Japan’s approval of the Iraq Special Measure Law on July 26, 2003, MFA spokesperson Kong Quan (孔泉) said, “Japan should conform to their exclusively defensive security policy

⁸⁶ *China Daily*, October 30, 2001, accessed June 19, 2012, <http://www.people.com.cn/BIG5/shizheng/3586/20011030/593883.html>.

⁸⁷ *Renmin Ribao*, November 22, 2001, accessed June 19, 2012, <http://www.people.com.cn/BIG5/shizheng/3586/20011122/611155.html>.

and maintain the way of peaceful development. This is not only consistent with Japan's interests, but also crucial for the peace and stability in this region and world."⁸⁸ The answer was routine and not focused on the law itself. In the same year, the Japan Diet approved the legislation for responding to a situation in 2003. The response of the MFA spokesperson Zhang Qiyue was similar to the previous statement.⁸⁹ This measured response could be explained by the domestic political dimension in China. The leadership was in transition in March 2003. The new leader Hu Jintao emphasized the foreign policy approach "Peaceful development" and preferred to maintain stable foreign relations with the U.S. and Japan.

However, the Beijing response was extremely strong against a US-Japan joint statement following the 2 plus 2 meeting on February 19, 2005. In this statement, Washington and Tokyo proclaimed "encouraging the peaceful resolution of issues concerning the Taiwan Straits through dialogue" as one of their common strategic objectives. Washington and Tokyo explicitly mentioned Taiwan in their joint document for the first time. Before the statement, both states had adopted strategic ambiguity on the Taiwan issue. MFA spokesperson Kong Quan stated, "A Cold War relic, the U.S.-Japan security alliance, whose own relevance is questionable, should not go beyond its bilateral framework and meddle in others' internal issues." He further remarked,

⁸⁸ *Renmin Ribao*, July 26, 2003, accessed June 19, 2012, <http://www.people.com.cn/BIG5/shizheng/1027/1985928.html> and *People's Daily*, February 3, 2004, accessed June 19, 2012, <http://www.people.com.cn/BIG5/shizheng/1027/2318414.html>.

⁸⁹ "We are concerned about this issue, and so do other countries in Asia. Due to historical reasons, Japan should keep its promise of having an exclusively defensive security policy and not becoming a military power. This is not only consistent with Japan's interests but also crucial for the stability in this region." *Renmin Ribao*, April 18, 2002, accessed June 19, 2012, <http://www.people.com.cn/BIG5/shizheng/20020418/712630.html>.

The Chinese government and people resolutely oppose the United States and Japan in issuing any bilateral document concerning China's Taiwan. It is nothing short of blatant meddling in China's internal affairs, and it amounts to a direct challenge to our sovereignty, territorial integrity, and State security.”⁹⁰

Moreover, Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing (李肇星) stressed that the issue was internal to China and “should by no means be deliberated in the framework of the security alliance.”⁹¹ Considering the strong anxiety of Beijing that Taiwan would move forward to seek independence under the Chen Shuibian (陳水扁) Administration, the Beijing protest against the joint declaration of Washington and Tokyo was understandable because Beijing considered this move might encourage Chen to make amore aggressive move.

Nonetheless, when the “US-Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future” (document for the second phase) was announced at the 2 plus 2 meeting on October 29, 2005, the MFA spokesperson repeated the routine response. ⁹² Beijing had no specific response to the third phase document “United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation,” which was approved in May 2006.⁹³

⁹⁰ *Renmin Ribao*, February 20, 2005, accessed June 19, 2012, <http://politics.people.com.cn/BIG5/1027/3188593.html>. Also refer to “US, Japan meddling in China's internal affair over Taiwan,” *Xinhua News Agency*, February 22, 2005, accessed June 19, 2012, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2005-02/22/content_2602512.htm and Keith Bradsher, “China Denounces United States-Japan Agreement on Taiwan,” *New York Times*, February 20, 2005, accessed June 19, 2012, <http://www.nytimes.com/2005/02/20/international/asia/20cnd-taiwan.html>.

⁹¹ “US and Japan told to layoff Taiwan,” *Xinhua News*, March 7 2005, accessed June 19, 2012, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2005-03/07/content_2659882.htm.

⁹² The routine response is “The US-Japan security alliance should not go beyond its bilateral framework and target on the third party. We hope that Japan and the United States would respect the security concerns of countries in this region and do more to contribute to the stability and peace in this region.” *Renmin Ribao*, November 1, 2005, <http://politics.people.com.cn/BIG5/1027/3819783.html>.

⁹³ Takagi Seiichiro, “Nichibei Domei ni taisuru chugoku no ninshiki to taiou: reisen go no tenkai” [Chinese Perceptions and Responses toward the US-Japanese Alliance in Post-Cold War Era], *Nichibeikankei no*

Surprisingly, China did not object to the upgrading of the Japanese Defense Agency to the Ministry of Defense, which was implemented in 2007. MFA spokesperson Jiang Yu (姜瑜) said,

With the mutual efforts of both China and Japan, the Sino-Japan relations have been restored. Now is a very crucial period. We hope that both sides can keep working on restoring the relations and increase the exchange and cooperation in every field. We think that Japan's insistence on the direction of peaceful development is in accordance with its own interest and contributes to the peace, stability, and development in this region.”⁹⁴

The response revealed that China was working to restore its relations with Japan and was toning down its criticisms to the changes in the defense policy of Japan.

The Chinese response toward the U.S.-Japan cooperation in BMD followed the same track. When the U.S. first revealed this idea in the late 1990s, Beijing initially held a strong position toward this cooperation. Beijing was concerned that the U.S. would deploy defense missiles to Northeast Asia, including Taiwan. For example, Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji remarked, “We... are firmly and particularly opposed to including Taiwan in the TMD because [it] not only violates international missile agreements but also interferes in China's internal affairs and encroaches on China's sovereignty and territorial integrity.”⁹⁵ When the meeting on the National Missile Defense system between the U.S. and China was mentioned, MFA spokesperson Sun Yuxi said, “China resolutely opposes the United States' national missile defense plan. We think that the

chuchoki teki tenbo [The Japan institute of International Affairs, *Medium- to Long-term Prospects for Japan-US-China Relations (in Japanese)*], (Tokyo, 2012), 81-90.

⁹⁴ *Renmin Ribao*, November 30, 2006, accessed June 19, 2012, <http://world.people.com.cn/BIG5/1029/5110744.html>.

⁹⁵ “Chinese Premier's Press Conference,” *BBC Worldwide Monitoring*, March 16, 1999.

United States or other countries will not benefit from this.”⁹⁶ On June 5, 2001, MFA spokesperson Sun Yuxi further emphasized China’s opposition to the joint research for missile defense system between the U.S. and Japan.⁹⁷

Beijing’s response was subdued compared with its vociferous criticism of the previous anti-missile defense. On August 8, 2001 although still opposing the U.S.-Japan joint efforts, China expressed its desire to solve this problem through dialogue. In an interview with the *New York Times*, President Jiang Zemin said, “Firstly, we are not in favor of the said move. ... Secondly, we stand for working out, through dialogue, solutions that would not harm security interests of any side.”⁹⁸ On December 15, 2001, the day after Washington decided to withdraw from the AMB Treaty, the Chinese MFA responded by calling for multilateral talks on the issue.⁹⁹

⁹⁶ “... The implementation of this plan will destroy the strategic balance and stability around the globe, damage mutual trust and cooperation within great powers, impede the international disarmament process and efforts of non-proliferation, and trigger a new arms race.” “We hold a strong opposition to the TMD because it strengthens military alliance, goes beyond the need for justified defense, creates threats to neighboring countries, and is not propitious for peace and instability in the Asia-Pacific region. Some people mentioned including Taiwan in the TMD, which is directly interfering with the domestic politics in China.” *Xinhua News Agency*, May 16, 2001, accessed June 19, 2012, <http://www.people.com.cn/BIG5/shizheng/16/20010516/466026.html>.

⁹⁷ *China New*, June 6, 2001, accessed June 19, 2012, <http://www.people.com.cn/BIG5/shizheng/3586/20010606/482738.html>.

⁹⁸ “[o]n the anti-missile issue, Jiang said that China’s position on the anti-missile issue can be summarized in two main points. Firstly, we are not in favor of the said move. We share the worries of many other countries that this move may cause a series of negative effects and thus impair world strategic stability. Secondly, we stand for working out, through dialogue, solutions that would not harm security interests of any side. China’s possession of the very limited nuclear weapons is solely for self-defense and poses no threat to any country. In order to safeguard our national security interests, we need to ensure the effectiveness of our nuclear force.” Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the United States of America, “President Jiang Zemin Meets the *New York Times* (part 1),” August 13, 2001, accessed June 19, 2012, <http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/xw/t33983.htm>.

⁹⁹ “Russia Ready to Negotiate Nuclear Arms Cuts, Despite US Withdrawal from ABM Treaty,” *Associated Press*, December 18, 2001.

After President Bush announced the deployment of BMD by 2004 on December 17, 2002, MFA spokesperson Liu Jianchao (刘建超) said, “The development of a missile defense system should not undermine international and regional security.” Regarding the decision of Washington and Tokyo to strengthen their cooperation through a joint study on missile defense system, he stated, “We are apprehensive about the possible negative impacts brought by the strengthening of the U.S.-Japan cooperation in missile defense. We hope that the countries involved will act cautiously.”¹⁰⁰

The responses to the missile defense system became routine answers. For example, in September 2003, Chinese Defense Minister Cao Gangchuan (曹刚川) told the visiting JDA Director General Shigeru Ishiba that the Japanese defense policy, including its missile defense deployment, could undermine the military balance and trigger a new arms race in the region.¹⁰¹ When asked about the call of some Japanese officials to strengthen the Japanese missile defense capability after North Korea launched missiles in 2006, MFA spokesperson Jiang Yu replied, “Maintaining the peace and stability in this region is the common hope and common responsibility of states in this region. We hope that all countries will do more actions that contribute to the peace and stability in Northeast Asia.”¹⁰² When a journalist asked about China’s position on Japan developing missile

¹⁰⁰ “We believe that only good cooperation can deal with the threats posed by the proliferation of WMD.” “The countries that create TMD should not damage other countries’ security interest. Like other countries in this region,” *People’s Daily*, December 19, 2002, accessed June 19, 2012, <http://www.people.com.cn/BIG5/shizheng/3586/20021219/891859.html>.

¹⁰¹ “China Concerned about Japan’s Missile Defense, Poison Gas,” *Japan Economic Newswire*, December 3, 2003.

¹⁰² *Renmin Ribao*, July 6, 2006, accessed June 19, 2012, <http://world.people.com.cn/BIG5/1029/42354/4567731.html>.

defense system in response to North Korea's missile launches, MFA spokesperson Liu Jianchao said, "We understand Japan's concerns, but we consider the related actions should be those that can contribute to the peace and stability in this region and help to prevent the current tension from escalating and getting worse."¹⁰³

When asked about Japan's successful test on intercepting missile attacks from the sea, MFA spokesperson Qin Gang (秦刚) first recognized Japan repeatedly stated that it insists on the way of peaceful development and replied that "we hope the related actions of Japan would contribute to maintain the peace and stability of this region and increase the mutual trust between states in this region."¹⁰⁴ These examples show that, although the official opposition to the missile defense system did not change, China no longer strongly opposed the moves.

Overall, the reactions of China to these moves were surprisingly measured and restrained,¹⁰⁵ except for the issues related to Taiwan. Examples of these Taiwan issues are the resolute opposition to the joint statement in 2005 and the protests against the U.S. developing a ballistic missile defense system in the early 2000s because of the possibility of applying this system to the defense of Taiwan.

¹⁰³ *Renmin Ribao*, October 12, 2006, accessed June 19, 2012, <http://world.people.com.cn/BIG5/8212/9491/57325/4913036.html>.

¹⁰⁴ *Renmin Ribao*, December 18, 2007, accessed June 19, 2012, <http://world.people.com.cn/BIG5/8212/9491/77793/6670797.html>.

¹⁰⁵ Most of these statements were made during regular press conferences in response to media questions. According to Michael D. Swaine, "The low ranking of such events as authoritative sources reinforces the relatively low-key treatment accorded to the issue." Swaine, "Chinese Leadership and Elite Responses," 5.

What caused the measured responses of China? This question can be answered from many dimensions, such as the bilateral relations dynamics in both Sino-US relations and Sino-Japan relations, domestic political changes such as leadership transition, the rising status and confidence of China, and the inputs from the analysis of think tank scholars.

First, from the bilateral relations dimension, the bilateral relations influenced the attitude and responses of China to the U.S.-Japan alliance and the Japanese defense policy. The Sino-US relations were severely strained in 1999 as a consequence of several events, such as the Chinese suppression of the Falun Gong on April 25, 1999,¹⁰⁶ the NATO intervention in Kosovo,¹⁰⁷ the decision of Clinton not to sign the WTO agreement with China in April 1999¹⁰⁸ and the accidental NATO bombing on the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, in May 1999.¹⁰⁹ The NATO bombing of the Chinese Embassy

¹⁰⁶ The background story is that more than 10,000 members of the Falun Gong, well known for its organization's morning physical exercise programs, managed to surround Zhongnanhai on April 25, 1999. The Falun Gong's leader, Li Hongzhi, lived in New York City, seemed to leading the movement over the Internet. The purpose of this quiet and peaceful demonstration was to express their dissatisfaction with local authorities who were opposed to the group. However, this action of surrounding the main political center of the Chinese government and power, Zhongnanhai, was unforgivable for the Chinese leaders. The public security forces and leaders were shocked that all their domestic intelligence capabilities had not forewarned them of a demonstration of such magnitude at the very seat of the Communist Party power. David M Lampton, *Same Bed, Different Dreams: Managing U.S.-China Relations, 1989-2000* (Berkeley, Calif: University of California Press, 2002), 56.

¹⁰⁷ China and Russia considered the ethnic cleansing violence in Kosovo a domestic problem, and they did not agree that the UN should intervene. After the United States and its European allies turned to NATO and began bombing, China was shocked that the United States was decisive in humanitarian intervention and even used NATO as a means to conduct multilateral intervention.

¹⁰⁸ Washington and Beijing had been negotiating China's WTO entrance agreement for 13 years. Despite the many concessions made by China, President Clinton decided not to proceed with the WTO agreement in April 1999 during the visit of Premier Zhu Rongji to the United States.

¹⁰⁹ The embassy was misidentified as a legitimate Serb military target partly because the U.S. and NATO targeters had to shoot so many targets that they became careless. Three Chinese citizens were killed and more than twenty were injured. For details on this incident, refer to Lampton, *Same Bed, Different Dreams*,

particularly worsened the relations between China and the U.S.. The Chinese people were outraged, and almost immediately anti-American demonstrations sprouted in many locations throughout the PRC.¹¹⁰ At the end of 2000, George W. Bush was elected as the new US president. The Bush administration revised its China policy and changed its view of China from a strategic partner to a strategic competitor. The EP-3 collision incident of April 2001¹¹¹ also caused negative effects on Sino-US relations. China recognized the importance of maintaining stable Sino-US relations. Thus, when the Bush administration recognized that the cooperation of China was necessary and critical after the terrorist attack on September 11, Beijing rapidly responded to this policy shift and restored its relations with the U.S..¹¹² Although Chinese suspicions toward the strengthening of the U.S.-Japan security cooperation remained strong, Beijing opted to adopt the more cooperative stance vis-à-vis Washington after September 11.

59-61.

¹¹⁰ According to some scholars, the Chinese government was involved in provoking and facilitating the anti-American demonstration. According to Lampton, “Among the most disturbing aspects of the Chinese government’s response to the bombing and subsequent demonstrations were that the Chinese people were not initially informed of the US apologies (officials claimed the expressions of regret were so superficial that they would have further inflamed the enraged populace), the PRC citizenry was not informed about Milosevic’s ethnic cleansing and therefore simply saw US/NATO intervention as aggression, and the Chinese authorities not only helped transport demonstrators to the Beijing protests but police seemed indifferent to the damage inflicted on US property.” According to Susan Shirk, the Patriotism Education Campaign influenced Chinese people’s perception of the United States. Moreover, 1999 was the 10th-year anniversary of the Tiananmen incident and the 80th-year anniversary of the May Fourth Movement. Therefore, the anti-American demonstration was able to distract people’s attention from any anniversary activity. Refer to Ibid, 59-61 and Susan L Shirk, *China: Fragile Superpower* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 212-218.

¹¹¹ On April 1, 2001, a US EP-3 military surveillance plane collided with a PLA Naval Air Force F-811 fighter jet. The Chinese pilot was killed by the collision, and the American spy plane crashed in the PLA Navy airfield in Hainan. The PLA held the American crew for 11 days until it received a written apology. It refused to allow the United States to repair the plane and fly it home, insisting that it should be disassembled and transported as freight. Susan L Shirk, *China: Fragile Superpower*, 234.

¹¹² Susan L Shirk, *China: Fragile Superpower*, 212-218.

Moreover, China had a tactical change in its Japan policy after 1998. Jiang's visit in the fall of 1998 showed that overemphasizing the historical issue would more likely to provoke anti-China sentiment than an apology from the Japanese public. In 1999, a debate ensued in the academic circle on the Japan policy and Beijing adopted a more tolerant attitude toward Japan.¹¹³ For example, China toned down its rhetoric criticisms when Zhu Rongjin visited Japan in 1999. The tolerance toward Japan declined, followed by the rising tension between China and Japan, as evidenced by China's strong opposition to the joint statement in 2005.¹¹⁴ After mid-2006, Sino-Japan relations were gradually restored. Beijing subdued its response to the revisions in the defense policy of Japan. In sum, the priority of maintaining stable Sino-US relations and tactical changes in China's Japan policy shaped the Chinese measured responses to the U.S.-Japan alliance and Japanese defense policy.

Second, domestic politics also plays an important role. In 2002 and 2003, Beijing did not want to engage in a potentially escalating dispute with Washington and Tokyo over security issues during a critical transition period for the PRC political leadership. Hu Jintao became General Secretary of the Communist Party of China on November 15,

¹¹³ Tatsumi Okabe, *Nichukankei no kako to shorai: gokai wo koete* [The Past and Future of Sino-Japanese Relations: Beyond the Misunderstanding (in Japanese)], (Iwanami Shoten, Publishers, 2006), 207-210.

¹¹⁴ The tension between China and Japan reached its peak in 2005 and turned into a demonstration against Japan in April 2005. The revision of a new textbook, which disregarded the Nanjing Massacre of 1937, Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's refusal to stop visiting the Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo, and the Japanese application to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council in UN, nationwide anti-Japanese demonstrations were held in over 25 cities in China, including Beijing, Shenzhen, and Shanghai, from April 2 to April 16. Susan L Shirk, *China: Fragile Superpower*, 141-146.

2002 and the president on March 15, 2003.¹¹⁵ On November 15 2002, a new Hu Jintao-led Politburo nominally succeeded Jiang. Soon after Hu came to office, Hu's leadership was challenged by the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) outbreak in early 2003. Other countries strongly criticized China for initially covering up and responding slowly to the problem. Thus, at that time, Hu's administration was preoccupied with the crisis management of SARS. The Chinese leadership transition from Jiang Zemin to Hu Jintao as well as the SARS crisis gave Hu little time to review and revise the foreign policy, especially the policy on important great powers. The new leadership chose to focus on domestic problems and adjust its foreign policy according to the policy shifts in other states. Moreover, Hu advocated China's peaceful development¹¹⁶ as his main foreign policy doctrine beginning 2004. This doctrine aims to reassure the other states that, although the PRC is rising in military and economic prominence, it will not pose a threat to other states. According to the whitepaper "China's Peaceful Development," "China's prosperity, development, and long-term stability represent an opportunity rather than a threat to its neighbors."¹¹⁷ Thus, domestic politics was the result of the restrained responses of the PRC.

¹¹⁵ Hu became the Chairman of the Central Military Commission of the CCP on September 19, 2004 and Supreme Military Command of the People's Republic of China on March 13, 2005 after Jiang Zemin resigned. Hu became the paramount leader.

¹¹⁶ The idea of "peaceful rise" was first brought up by the former Vice Principal of the Central Party School Zhang Bijian in a speech during the Boao Forum for Asia in late 2003. Then Premier Wen Jiabao reiterated this term in an ASEAN meeting as well as during his visit to the United States. As the term "rise" was considered controversial, Hu Jintao used the phrase "peaceful development" instead of "peaceful rise" in the 2004 session of the Boao Forum.

¹¹⁷ For more details, refer to the whitepaper issued in September 2011 by the State Council of the PRC. The Information Office of the State Council, "China's Peaceful Development," September 6, 2011, accessed June 19, 2012, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-09/06/c_131102329.htm.

Third, the rising status of China and its engagement with the international community helped China gain more confidence and experience in dealing with foreign affairs in a sophisticated manner. Its increasing national capability and the recognition from the international community enabled China to become more confident in dealing with international affairs. As Medeiros and Taylor pointed out, the time has come for China to change the country's long-held "victim mentality" to the "great power mentality."¹¹⁸ Beijing also chose more sophisticated ways to respond to the events and affairs of other countries when interacting with the international community. Swaine conducted a research on Chinese assessments of the Pacific Pivot and concluded the following: "Authoritative Chinese reactions to elements of the U.S. policy move are relatively rare and almost without exception restrained and cautious."¹¹⁹ This dissertation shows a similar tendency. Most of the responses were conveyed at a low level of authority, such as the remarks from MFA spokespersons in response to questions from the press. The responses do not mean that China was not concerned about these moves. Instead, China seemed to accept, although grudgingly, that the changes in the U.S. and Japanese security policy were inevitable. Regardless of whether Beijing opposed the changes or not, the U.S. and Japan pursued their security policies. Furthermore, the strong response, such as protests and threatening with the use of force, would only result in the apprehension of other states and reinforce the "theory of China threat." Therefore,

¹¹⁸ Evan S. Medeiros and M. Taylor, "China's New Diplomacy," *Foreign Affairs* 82: 6 (November-December 2003).

¹¹⁹ In this article, Swaine contrasts authoritative sources and both quasi- and non-authoritative Chinese sources and concludes that they convey very different messages regarding the origins, intentions, and consequences of the Pacific Pivot. Michael D. Swaine, "Chinese Leadership and Elite Responses."

instead of conducting protests, increasing the military and political capabilities of China was more pragmatic.

Fourth, the analyses of Chinese think tank scholars were objective and calm. Although the authors of the articles were apprehensive about the future direction of the U.S.-Japan alliance and the Japan defense policy, they also pointed out the limitations of the development. I think this is one of the important factors in China's measured responses. Chinese leaders referred to these analyses and adopted the policy to avoid overreaction.¹²⁰

IV. Analyses of the Discourses of Think Tank Scholars

To analyze the think tank scholar group systemically, the study adopts a quantitative review and a qualitative analysis on the think tank scholar group's study on Japan from 2001 to 2010. I conducted the content analysis method to examine the journal articles. I chose articles related to the U.S.-Japan alliance and the Japanese defense policy from several significant journals related to Japanese and international studies from 2001 to 2010 (total N=66). I evaluated the analyses of articles using a questionnaire.¹²¹ The content of the questionnaire was designed to assess the articles in the following aspects: the intentions of the U.S. and Japan, the role of the historical issue in the article, the North Korea and China factors that can strengthen the U.S.-Japan alliance, policy

¹²⁰ According to James Reilly, "A correlation between discourse and policy outcomes indicates that such advice was acceptable to policymakers. It does not decisively demonstrate the effect of experts' advice on China's Japan policy versus other factors shaping policy decisions." James M. Reilly, "The Role of Public Opinion in China's Japan Policy: 1997-2007" (PhD diss., The George Washington University, August 2008), 151, footnote 11.

¹²¹ I adopted the method of analyzing Chinese articles through the questionnaire which was designed by James Reilly. Ibid, "Chapter four" and "Appendix I," 148-198 and 297-9.

suggestions, and the threat perceptions of Japan.¹²² The journals that were analyzed were three international political journals, namely, *Contemporary International Relations* (Xiandai Guoji Guanxi 現代國際關係), *International Studies* (Guojij Wenti Yanjiu 國際問題研究), and *Asia and Africa Review* (Ya-Fei Zongheng 亞非縱橫), and two Japan-specific journals, namely, *Japan Studies* (Ribei Yanjiu 日本研究) and *Japanese Studies* (Ribei Xuekan 日本學刊). Although the samples of the analyses were limited, several themes were observed from these articles. (Please refer to Appendix A)

1. Intention of Japan to Change its Defense Policy

Almost all articles show that the Japanese defense capabilities have been strengthened. 54.55% of the articles argue that Japan pursues strengthening security policy actively, while 25.76% of the articles emphasize that both of the U.S. pressure and Japanese initiatives contribute to this policy change. Several articles indicate that Japan has broken or will break the taboo of its exclusive defensive security policy to develop an independent defensive policy or exercise collective defense right. The exclusive defense security policy is a policy that enables Japan to acquire limited defense ability, which should be utilized for self-defense only. This policy came from the restriction of Article 9 of the Constitution.¹²³ Moreover, collective security could involve Japan in the military

¹²² For details on the journal analysis conducted in this dissertation, including questionnaire, journal sources, and analysis results, please refer to the appendix. The tables are also in appendix.

¹²³ “Article 9: Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.” Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, “The Constitution of Japan,” accessed June 19, 2012, http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/constitution_and_government_of_japan/constitution_e.html. Japanese government interprets that “The self-defense capability to be possessed and maintained by Japan

conflicts of other countries. Allowing collective security right would remove the geographic restrictions on overseas dispatches of JSDF personnel. Thus, some scholars considered this move a violation of Article 9. Although most articles indicate that the defense policy of Japan has changed legally, strategically, and institutionally, but the authors also argue that these changes should not be over-interpreted and should not be viewed as a revival of Japanese militarism. Indeed, only two articles relate these policy changes to the revival of Japanese militarism.¹²⁴

Regarding the role and intention of Japan to strengthen the U.S.-Japan alliance, most articles point out that Japan took the advantage of its role and strengthened its own defense policy and only a few articles emphasize the passive role of Japan and that the changes in its security policy were due to US pressure.¹²⁵ Approximately 15% of the articles discuss the domestic factors, such as pacifism in the society, domestic laws, and Article 9 of the Constitution, which limit the defense policy of Japan.¹²⁶ Nearly 41% of the articles mention either US constraints or domestic constraints on Japan's military

under the Constitution is limited to the minimum necessary for self-defense.” Ministry of Defense of Japan, “Fundamental Concepts of National Defense: I. Constitution of Japan and Right of Self-Defense,” accessed June 19, 2012, http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/d_policy/dp01.html.

¹²⁴ Jia Dan, “21 Shiji Riben Fangwei he Anquan zhanlue tiaozheng zouxiang” [The Trends of Japanese Defense and Security Strategy Adjustment in the 21st Century], *Guoji wenti yanjiu* [International studies], No.2, (2003): 38-41 and Li Bing, “Ribei Haishang zhanlue tongdao sixiang yu zhengce tanxi” [Analyze Japanese Strategic Thought and Policy of Sea Line of Communication], *Riben xuekan* [Japanese studies], No.1, (2006): 94-104. The first article refers US strategists' researches, including Henry Kissinger's research, and indicates “The possibility of Japan to revive militarism and launch the war is still high.” However, it also mention the domestic constrains and US constrains will prevent Japan from transforming to military power. The second article quotes Korean news and Hong Kong news warning that Japan will revive militarism.

¹²⁵ Actually as indicated above, most articles mentioning US pressure also mentioned Japan's willingness to strengthen its policy.

¹²⁶ 4.55% of articles mention Japan's domestic constrains and 10.61% mention multiple constrains.

development. These authors argue that, although Japan altered its defense policy, the changes were limited because of these restrictions.

Concerning the goal of Japan, most articles point out that the future goal of Japan is to become a normal state. However, this term means different things depending on the interpretation of the authors. The term normal state was used interchangeably with political power and military power in 25.76% of the articles. 10.61% of the articles refer to this term to describe the situation in other normal states with normal military capabilities. Some articles indicate that Japan uses military buildup to pursue political power. Only two articles interpret the Japanese move as a revival of Japanese militarism. Some articles did not use these terms but described Japan's goal as "becoming a leading power that is able to manage international security."¹²⁷ Three articles discuss the possibility that Japan may develop nuclear weapons, but they conclude that Japan will not develop nuclear weapons in the near future because of too many restrictions.

2. Function of the U.S.-Japan Alliance

Several articles view the enhanced security cooperation between the U.S. and Japan as "threats to China's interests and national security" and many of them imply that the strengthening of the U.S.-Japan security cooperation and the defense capability of Japan will reduce the Chinese military advantage. The authors are also concerned about who the target of the U.S.-Japan alliance is. Ten articles emphasize that the U.S. and Japan view China as a threat. Among these articles, 14 point out that the strengthening of

¹²⁷ Shao qizhen and Sheng xin, "jiedu rimei junshi tongmeng de xin qushi ji riben de zhanlue yitu" [Interpret the New Trend of US-Japan Military Alliance and Japan's Strategic Intention], *Yafei Zongheng* [Asia and Africa Review], No. 2 (2007): 37-41, 64.

the alliance aims to deter and balance China's rising power. The realignment of the posture of the U.S. forces and the enhancement of the U.S.-Japan security cooperation were based on the concern about balancing the rising Chinese power. Two articles focusing on Taiwan argue that Japan and the U.S. are interested in Taiwan.

Regarding the interpretation of US expectations toward the defense policy of Japan, 27.27% of the articles argue that the U.S. encourages Japan to adopt a more active security policy and to strengthen its military capability. Among these articles, some point out that the U.S. even encourages Japan to lift some taboos, such as peace constitutions and the collective defense right. In some articles, the U.S. is portrayed as encouraging Japan to change its defense policy based on US interests. The expanding military interoperability and increasing coordination with Japan not only maintain US presence in East Asia but also enable the U.S. to immediately respond to military conflicts in the Asia-Pacific region. Moreover, an active Japan could share more defense responsibilities and missions. 25.76% of the articles indicate that, although the U.S. encourages Japan to play a more active role, it also restricts the military development of Japan. The U.S. not only wants to take advantage of Japanese economic and military capabilities but also wants to restrain and supervise the military development of Japan. For example, one author points out that the increasing integration of the command and control system will enable the U.S. to gain more control over the military development of Japan.¹²⁸ Another

¹²⁸ Wu Huaizhong, "Xin Shiji Riben anquan zhengce de tiaozheng" [The Adjustment of Japanese Security Policy in the 21st Century], *Yafei Zongheng* [Asia and Africa Review], No. 5 (2007): 12-17, 63 and Wu Huaizhong, "Rimei 'zaibian' xieshang yu Riben anquan zhanlue tiaozheng" [US-Japan Realignment and the Adjustment of Japanese Security Strategy], *Riben xuekan* [Japanese studies], No.4, (2006): 15-24.

article suggests that, although the U.S. may encourage Japan to exercise its collective defense right, it discourages Japan from developing nuclear power.¹²⁹

3. The North Korea and China Factors

The majority of the articles do not mention the North Korea and China factors in the strengthening of the U.S.-Japan alliance. Some articles cited the Japanese official document that highlighted the external threat, such as the North Korean missiles and the rise of China, to explain why Japan needs to revise its security policy. For example, the 2004 National Defense Program Guideline mentioned for the first time that North Korea and China are Japan's main security concerns.¹³⁰ The 2009 *Japanese White Paper on Defense* expressed concerns about the effect of the PRC military strength on "the regional situation and Japanese security."¹³¹ Some articles consider "Japanese views" as pretexts. Ten articles point out that the China threat theory emerged in Japan. For example, some articles cite Japanese whitepaper's concerns of the lack of transparency on the PRC national defense and the double-digit growth of China's defense spending as the China threat theory.

Twelve articles mention that the changes in the Japan defense policy and the U.S.-Japan alliance will bring potential instability and an arms race in East Asia. Four articles indicate that the instability may become one of the key factors affecting the Chinese

¹²⁹ Ma Junwei, "Ribei '2+2' huiyi wenjian yu rimei tongmeng zhuanxing" [US-Japanese '2+2' Meeting Documents and US-Japan Alliance Transformation], *Xiandai quoji guanxi* [Contemporary international relations], No. 6, (2007): 43-45.

¹³⁰ Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, "National Defense Program Guideline for FY 2005," accessed June 19, 2012, http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/policy/2004/1210taikou_e.html.

¹³¹ Ministry of Defense of Japan, *Defense of Japan 2009 (Annual White Paper)*, pp. 49-50, accessed June 19, 2012, http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/2009.html.

security environment. One article even states that the alliance between the U.S. and Japan restricts China. Nonetheless, three articles mention that the U.S. and Japan adopt the “conengagement policy.”

Only a few articles recognize that the need to deter North Korea is a major factor driving the U.S.-Japan security cooperation. Ten articles point out that the rise of China has acted as an additional stimulus for the two allies to deepen their defense ties and for Japan to seek an expansion of its military capabilities. International relations theorists are willing to accept that the security dilemma of North Korean missiles and the rise of China are threats to Japan. Four articles point out that the U.S. and Japan attach great importance to common interest and bilateral cooperation with China. Another article indicates that priority is given to tripartite cooperation.

4. History

The majority of the articles do not mention the history issue, but 24.24% of the articles mention the history of Japan’s wartime invasion of China and argue that Japan’s attitude toward the history issue causes the apprehension of neighboring countries. Most of these articles show their concern in one or two sentences only. The common phrase for expressing it may be paraphrase in the following way: “Considering the Japanese invasion in the Second World War and Japan’s management of the history issue, we still need to pay close attention to Japan’s military development.” Seven articles emphasize the history issue, and two articles are concerned about the revival of Japanese militarism. Five articles mention the historical disagreement between the U.S. and Japan or between Australia and Japan to show that the cooperation was not as consolidated as what people

imagined. Most of the articles use the term “right-wing” to refer to certain politicians in political parties and individual leaders (15.15%), or certain factions, trends, and forces (15.15%), but they do not refer to the public, the societal atmosphere, or the large number of politicians. Still, many articles do point out that Japanese politics has had a conservative trend in recent years and that Japan’s domestic politics has become increasingly conservative.

5. Position Suggestions

Only seven articles provide policy suggestions, with two of these articles published before mid-2006. One article from 2003 suggests that “China should adjust its acknowledgement of Japan: Considering the development of Sino-Japan security relations in the framework of bilateral relations and military exchange and cooperation” as policy recommendations for Sino-Japan relations.¹³² An article from 2005 also provides suggestions for Sino-Japan relations. It indicates that, although the friction in Sino-Japan relations causes people to worry,

How both countries handle various problems and disputes rationally from a long-range strategic perspective, construct a healthy Sino-Japan relations, including the maritime relations, is an urgent task for governments, academia, and the public from both countries.¹³³

Most articles that provide policy suggestions were published after mid-2006. One article suggests that “China should respond cautiously” to the enhancement of the U.S.-Japan alliance. Moreover,

¹³² Yuan Yang, “Ribei junshi zhuanxing yuzhongri junshi guanxi” [Japan Military Transformation and Sino-Japanese Military Relations], *Xiandai quoji guanxi* [Contemporary international relations], No. 10, (2003): 11-13.

¹³³ Xiu Bin, “Ribei haiyang zhanlue yanjiu de dongxiang” [The Trend of Japanese Maritime Strategic Studies], *Riben xuekan* [Japanese studies], No.2, (2005): 37-52.

China should resolve and remove the negative influence brought by the strengthening of the U.S.-Japan alliance by actively participating in and constructing the multilateral exchange and cooperative institutions, including those initiated by the United States and Japan. A harmonious international environment must be created for the rise of China, of East Asian multilateral institutions, and of Asia.¹³⁴

Another article suggests that “China should judge the effects of the U.S.-Japan alliance on Sino-Japan relations correctly. Follow the trend, pursue the interest, and avoid damage. A healthy and stable Sino-Japan relation should be developed.”¹³⁵ An article focusing on the Japanese defense policy indicates that

China should continue developing its relations with the United States, Japan, and Russia, and develop and extend the content of partnership relations. China should envisage the negative effect of great power relations in the East China Sea and turn the negative element into a positive one. Moreover, effective security cooperation institutions should be established as soon as possible to maintain peace and stability in this region.¹³⁶

Two articles give suggestions on developing relations with other countries. The first article analyzes the possibility of forming alliance with the U.S., Japan, India, and Australia, and concludes that China should take foreign measures to improve its relations with the four countries to stop them from forming an alliance. The article further points out that “China should not be oversensitive.”¹³⁷ The second article focuses on the security relations between Japan and Australia, suggesting that “although the development of the

¹³⁴ Zhang Jingquan, “Rimeitongmeng de qianguhua jiqi yingxiang” [The Advancement of US-Japan Alliance and its Influence], *Xiandai guoji guanxi* [Contemporary international relations], No.7, (2006): 26-30 and 37.

¹³⁵ Xu Wansheng, “Lun RimeiTongmeng yu Zhongriguanxi” [US-Japan Alliance and Sino-Japanese Relations], *Guoji wenti yanjiu* [International studies], No.4, (2006): 50-54.

¹³⁶ Geng Lihua, “Ribei fangwei zhengce jigidui dongya anquan de yingxiang” [Japanese Defense Policy and its Influence on East Asian Security], *Riben yanjiu* [Japan studies], No.4, (2008): 54-58.

¹³⁷ Zhao Qinghai, “siquoteongmeng gouxiang yu xianshi” [Four States Alliance: Ideas and Reality], *Guoji wenti yanjiu* [International studies], No.6, (2007): 28-32 and 71.

Japan-Australia security relations is unfavorable for the stability of the security environment surrounding China, there is no need to be too anxious.” It also points out that China should maintain a positive political interaction and deepen trade relations and security cooperation with the U.S., Japan, and Australia:

Utilize the multilateral institutions, such as ARF and APEC, to pursue the common strategic interests and political mutual trust with these three countries and avoid the apprehension breeding from each other’s modernization as well as the possibility of misjudging the strategy.¹³⁸

Several tendencies are evident from these policy suggestions. First, most of them conform to the official policy line of improving bilateral relations while being apprehensive about the strengthening of the U.S.-Japan alliance and the Japanese defense policy. Regarding the security development between the U.S., Japan, India, and Australia, improving bilateral foreign relations with each country and increasing mutual trust through multilateral institutions are suggested. These suggestions are consistent with the peaceful development policy of the Chinese government, which emphasizes maintaining stable relations with other states and the role of multilateral institutions.

Second, most articles providing policy suggestions were published after mid-2006. I argue that the reason for this is that the official policy line was ambiguous in the beginning of Hu Jintao’s administration. Although China’s policy toward Japan downplayed the other factors for economic cooperation and partnership relations with Japan, the political friction in the history issue, the mutual distrust from mutual military modernization, and the rise of nationalism in both countries contributed to the instability

¹³⁸ Wang Haibin, “cong riao anbao guanxi touxi riben anquan zhanlue xin dongxiang” [Analyze Japan’s New Trend of Security Strategy from Japanese-Australian Security Relations], *Riben xuekan* [Japanese studies], No.2, (2008): 39-49.

of the Sino-Japan relations. Thus, the new leadership under the Hu-Wen regime searched for balance between appeasing the anti-Japanese sentiments at home and maintaining relations with Japan without sacrificing vital national interests. The issue of the “New Thinking of Japan” in 2002 and 2003 also prevented think tank scholars from providing positive suggestions on China’s Japan policy.

6. Threat Perception of Japan

To observe authors’ overall threat perceptions of Japan, I measured each article on a scale from 3 to 0, from extremely threatened, to threatened, less threatened, and neutral. The threat perception is judged from three aspects: Japan’s intent and goal, Japan’s capacity, and how and which Chinese interests are being threatened.¹³⁹ Tone, word choice, and the way it mentions the history issue are also considered. The result shows that the majority of the articles were “neutral” (42.42%) and “less threatened” (36.36%). About 13.64% of the articles were “threatened” and the remaining articles were “extremely threatened.” I also examined these articles from two periods: from 2001 to mid-2006 and from mid-2006 to 2010. The first period is when Japan was under the Koizumi Administration, and the second is the post-Koizumi period. In the first period, four articles are “extremely threatened” and 7 articles are “threatened.” In the second period, no article is “extremely threatened,” and only two articles are “threatened.”

Most articles hold a moderate position. Although the majority of the articles show apprehension toward Japan’s security policy, they also recognize the shift to be driven by security concerns, such as the North Korea and China factor, or the U.S. pressure.

¹³⁹ This was inspired by James Reilly’s dissertation. Reilly, “The Role of Public Opinion,” 155-9.

Although many articles find that the goal of Japan is to pursue political power or military power, they also point out that Japan will not get too far and will be restrained by the U.S. and domestic constraints. The authors who provided policy suggestion prefer to develop relations with Japan.

Nonetheless, the articles that hold negative threat perceptions of Japan tend to view the U.S.-Japan security alliance as a threat to Chinese interests. Some articles emphasize Japan's management of the history issue and are concerned about the right-wing tendencies of Japan. The threat perception can be driven by historical biases, but it can also be derived from China's security concerns regarding Japan. However, the threat perception degree declines dramatically by the second half of the decade. No "extremely threatened" article is found, and only two articles are "threatened."

As the results show, these tendencies are consistent with the official policy position. The official policy of the Chinese government is to tone down the criticisms but to pay close attention to Japan's military development. However, before mid-2006, the friction in Sino-Japan relations brought more apprehensions to Chinese leaders; these apprehensions reflected on the policy. After mid-2006, with the new leadership in Japan, China restored its relation with Japan and returned to the original policy. Think tank scholars' threat perception also decreased. These results can be explained by two possible but contradicting reasons. First, the results are consistent with our assumption that the think tank scholar group usually avoids deviating from the official direction. Second, the official policy was influenced by think tank scholars' analyses. I argue that think tank scholars' analyses are referred to by Chinese leaders and influence the policy. Moreover,

the phenomenon that think tank scholars avoid providing policy suggestions, unless they can sense the policy line, is caused by self-discipline. I elaborate on this argument in the following section.

V. Discussion

Government Policy

As previously mentioned, the Chinese attitude toward the U.S.-Japan alliance and the Japanese defense policy is mainly apprehensive, except during the period of 1972 to 1990. However, unlike the high-profile criticisms in the 1990s, China's responses were more measured and restrained in the 2000s. The reasons for China's measured responses are the dynamics of bilateral relations, the relative power changes in China, and Chinese domestic politics, and the discourses of think tank scholars.

Think Tank Scholar Group

According to Bush, think tank scholars' analyses are sent to decision makers through the institutions and think tanks they work for.¹⁴⁰ Therefore, I argue that the overall trend of the analyses influences policy. The analyses are objective and not so different from those of foreign scholars. Most articles show that Japan is pursuing political and military power and has been strengthening its political and military capabilities, but it is restricted by the U.S. and domestic constraints. Therefore, there is no need to overreact.

However, the think tank scholar group's policy suggestions are constrained by official policy. I argue that think tank scholars avoid veering away from the official

¹⁴⁰ Bush, *The Perils of Proximity*, 135-6 and Liao, *Chinese Foreign Policy Think Tank*, 53-99.

policy line. From 2001 to mid-2006, only two articles provided policy suggestions. I argue that the reason for this is that Beijing's Japan policy was ambiguous and that its policy preferences were hard to perceive. Think tank scholars could not identify the policy preference so they avoided offering policy suggestions. Moreover, the debate on the new thinking of Japan in 2002 and 2003 caused some scholars who suggested downplaying the history issue to be attacked by radical nationalists. This attack could have prevented the think tank scholars from providing positive suggestions.

Moreover, as indicated in the analysis of the threat perception of Japan, articles that were "extremely threatened" and "threatened" dropped dramatically after mid-2006, following the shift in China's Japan policy in mid-2006. There was no "extremely threatened" article, and only two articles were "threatened." This result reveals that authors' threat perceptions change in accordance with the policy line.

These findings are consistent with the assumptions of two-level perception gap model. First, the model assumes that in "core interest issue" like this case, the interaction patterns between think tank and government include Interaction 1 (Interpreting the policy) and Interaction 3 (influence the policy). The finding confirmed that think tank scholars' objective analyses influence the policy, while they only provide policy suggestions conforming to the policy line. Moreover, these results also reflected the interaction pattern in the model that there was no suppression (Interaction D) between think tank scholars and party-state. I argue this is because of think tank scholars tend to be self-discipline and will not challenge the bottom line.

In sum, discourses from the think tank scholar group refer to decision makers and influence policies that withhold strong oppositions toward the changes in the U.S.-Japan alliance and the Japanese defense policy. However, the tone and direction of the discourses conform to the official policy position of being apprehensive and alarmed. Most articles did not provide policy suggestions. This finding is consistent with the assumption that think tank scholars are self-disciplined and avoid offering policy suggestions for risk hedge.

Relations between the Think Tank Scholar Group and the Government

The Japanese defense policy and the U.S.-Japan alliance are involved with China's vital interests. Therefore, as pointed out in Chapter 1, it is a "core interest issue." The assumption that I provided in Chapter 1 is as follows:

Hypothesis 2 (Self-Discipline): Because think tank scholars provide an objective analysis for Sino-Japan relations, the Chinese government adopts their observations and analyses (their analyses influence China's Japan Policy). However, as pluralist institutionalism reveals, under conventional institutions, think tank scholars usually do not challenge the official position in a core interest issue (Issue 1 and 2).

The results are consistent with the hypothesis that think tank scholars do not veer away from the official position. As Gu's pluralist institutionalism points out, although the government does not force think tank scholars to write according to the official policy line, scholars tend to discipline themselves for protection against unnecessary troubles. As Cheek's observation points out, Chinese intellectuals seek balance in professional

scholarship and avoid unnecessary political risk. I also argue that this style of writing and research can achieve two aims of the scholar group: 1) maintain the academic autonomy and objective analysis, and 2) refrain from challenging the party-state. As they are political scientists, their studies cannot avoid discussions on politics. All they can do is try their best to conform to the official policy direction.

The Patron-Client Model

Think tank scholars usually work for the establishment, whether government think tanks, academic specialized think tanks; or university-affiliated think tank. They prefer to go with the policy direction and write about safe topics. Therefore, applying the patron-client model on them seems reasonable. However, think tank scholar's analyses are not simply for interpreting the policy. The analyses of think tank scholars reflect their own objective viewpoints and knowledge about Japan's security policy. Moreover, the government refers to these analyses and adopts these analyses to the policy. Modern-day scholars are not only concerned about the government but also about their other audiences: the public and their colleagues in academia. They enjoy more academic autonomy and value their academic and public reputation. From this aspect, I argue that self-discipline is not intended for seeking recognition or taking orders from the "patron" but for hedging risk. Thus, referring to them as "clients" is not fair.

Furthermore, I argue that applying the patron-client model to the think tank scholar group is misleading. Think tank scholars enjoy a certain degree of academic freedom and are able to write down their ideas. If we assume that they can only write following the policy line, then we will make a misjudgment in two dimensions. First, we

get the wrong impression that think tank scholars' works are equal to Chinese policy, which becomes underestimated. Second, we may be unable to interpret the potential conflict between the government and intellectuals. For example, when liberal intellectuals such as Feng Lizhi challenged the Chinese government and the CCP in 1980s, many Western scholars applied the patron-client model to explain the state-intellectual relations and misjudged the conflict as a power struggle between the liberal elite and the conservative elite. Therefore, I argue that analyzing the state-intellectual relations in China through other approaches other than the patron-client model is necessary.

CHAPTER FOUR: PATRIOTIC DILEMMA IN THE CASE OF THE YASUKUNI SHRINE ISSUE

In the development of the history dispute between China and Japan, the main patterns is that Japan's domestic controversies, related to the interpretation of the history memory of the Second World War (WW2), caught Chinese attentions and led to China's protest, in such areas as history textbooks, apology issue,¹ and the Yasukuni controversy.

This section focuses on the Yasukuni issue because it is the most controversial issue of the 2000s. The main controversy focuses on the annual visits of Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi² to the Yasukuni Shrine. These visits have led to protests from the Chinese government and public. The most serious responses were the anti-Japanese demonstrations in major Chinese cities in April 2005.

The questions to be answered by this section are as follows. First, why were the visits of a Japanese prime minister to the Yasukuni Shrine considered a problem? Second, what were the responses of the Chinese government to the six visits of Koizumi from 2001 to 2006, and why had the Chinese government consider conceding to Japan regarding this issue? Third, what were the reactions of popular nationalist activists, and

¹ Peter Hays Gries, "China's Apology Diplomacy," *China's New Nationalism: Pride, Politics, and Diplomacy* (California: University of California Press, July 2005).

² To avoid redundancy, I omitted the first name and the title of Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi.

how did their discourses and actions influence Chinese public opinion and policy on Japan? The discussion on the relationship between the popular nationalist and the Chinese government will be found in the next chapter.

I. Why the Yasukuni Visit is a Controversial Issue

In June 1886, Emperor Meiji built the Tokyo Shokonsha shrine to commemorate the soldiers of the Boshin War of 1867. In 1879, the shrine was renamed as “Yasukuni Shrine,” which means “Shrine to Pacify the Country,” and became the primary national shrine for commemorating the war dead of Japan. After WW2, the Allied powers occupied Japan. The general headquarters, directed by Douglas MacArthur, introduced several reforms to the country. One of the reforms was the separation of church and state³ that forced Yasukuni to become a private religious institution independent from the Japanese government.

In 1958, all remaining Class A war criminals were released with the approval of 11 countries involved in the Tokyo Military Tribunal. In the same year, the Ministry of Health and Welfare, which is in charge of providing suggestions for enshrinement, provided a list of Class B and C war criminals executed after being sentenced to death at the Tokyo Military Tribunal. The Yasukuni Shrine enshrined these Class B and C war criminals in 1959. In 1966, the Ministry sent a list of Class A war criminals to Yasukuni. Although the representatives of the Council of Worshippers of Yasukuni Shrine accepted

³ The Japanese Constitutions clarifies the freedom of religion. “Article 20: Freedom of religion is guaranteed to all. No religious organization shall receive any privileges from the State, nor exercise any political authority. No person shall be compelled to take part in any religious act, celebration, rite or practice. The State and its organs shall refrain from religious education or any other religious activity.” Prime Minister of Japan and his Cabinet, “The Constitution of Japan,” accessed June 15, 2013, http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/constitution_and_government_of_japan/constitution_e.html.

these war criminals, Chief Priest Fujimaro Tukuba rejected them. Nonetheless, after the death of Tukuba in March 1978, the new Chief Priest Kagayoshi Matsudaira enshrined these war criminals in October 1978. The Class A war criminals included seven people executed by the Tokyo Military Tribunal and seven people who passed away during the trials or imprisonments.⁴ The news was not published by the media until April 1979. This decision was welcomed by Yasukuni supporters who considered the Tokyo Military Tribunal to be an unfair trial because most of the sentenced prisoners, including those criminals given a lifetime sentence, were released in 1958. These supporters considered the enshrinement of Class A war criminals and the visits of politicians to Yasukuni Shrine as a rejection of the result of the Tokyo Military Tribunal and a rehabilitation for those prisoners who were sentenced.

From the 1950s to the early 1980s, the Japanese prime minister customarily visited Yasukuni Shrine. Emperor Hirohito regularly visited Yasukuni Shrine until 1975.⁵

⁴ Class A war criminals refer to Japanese military or political leaders charged with “Crimes against peace” by the Tokyo Military Tribunal. These 14 Class A criminals include those sentenced to death and executed: General Hideki Tojo (東條英機), General Seishiro Itagaki (板垣征四郎), General Kenji Dohihara (土肥原賢二), General Iwane Matsui (松井石根), General Heitaro Kimura (木村兵太郎), Lieutenant General Akira Muto (武藤章), and Prime Minister Koki Hirota (広田弘毅) were sentenced to death. The other seven passed away during trial and imprisonment: Yosuke Matsuoka (松岡洋右) and Admiral Osami Nagano (永野修身) were sentenced to life imprisonment, but died during the trials. General Yoshijiro Umezu (梅津美治郎), Ambassador Toshio Shiratori (白鳥敏夫), General Kuniaki Koiso (小磯国昭), and Prime Minister Kiichiro Hiranuma (平沼騏一郎) died during imprisonment. Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo (東郷茂徳) was sentenced to imprisonment for 20 years and died during that period.

⁵ Emperor Hirohito refused to visit the shrine from 1978 to his death in 1989 because it enshrined Class A war criminals since 1978. A memorandum written on April 28, 1988, and released in 2006 by the former Grand Chamberlain of the Imperial Household, Tomohiko Tomita, indicated that the Emperor was disturbed by the enshrinement and criticized that Matsudaira did not understand his father’s desire for peace. Matsudaira’s father used to work in the Imperial Household (1946-1948). Akihiko Tanaka, “The Yasukuni Issue and Japan’s International Relations,” in *East Asia’s Haunted Present: Historical Memories and the Resurgence of Nationalism*, ed. Tsuyoshi Hasegawa and Kazuhiko Togo (Connecticut: Praeger, June 30, 2008), 124.

Visits to Yasukuni Shrine by important leaders were protested by supporters of other religions because they violated the separation of church and state according to the Constitution. Such visits of the prime minister to Shinto institutions were considered official disrespect to other religions. However, this issue developed into an international dispute only after the enshrinement of Class A war criminals. Several visits were made by Japanese prime ministers from 1979 to 1985: Masayoshi Ohira visited three times, Zenko Suzuki went nine times (including August 15 1980, August 15 1981, and August 15 1982), and Nakasone came over ten times (including August 15 1983, August 15 1984, and August 15 1985). In 1985, the visits of the prime minister to the Yasukuni Shrine attracted close attention from neighboring countries. (Please refer to Table 4)

1985 Visit of Nakasone

Yasukuni supporters and religious protesters disputed whether the prime minister should visit Yasukuni Shrine on official or private capacity. Yasuhiro Nakasone, who became prime minister in 1983, thus searched for an acceptable way to make an official visit. In August 1984, Chief Cabinet Secretary Fujinami Takao established a private advisory council⁶ to investigate how the prime minister can officially visit Yasukuni Shrine without violating the Constitution. The advisory council submitted its report on

⁶ The name of the council was “Advisory Council on Official Visits by Cabinet Ministers to the Yasukuni Shrine” (Kakuryō no Yasukuni Jinja Kōshiki Sanpai ni Kansuru Kondaikai). The final paper discussed the substance of the problems and the concerns if cabinet ministers officially visited the Yasukuni Shrine. The report did not give a clear stance on whether official visits by cabinet ministers are proper. “Report on Official Visits by Cabinet Ministers to the Yasukuni Shrine,” August 9, 1985, “The World and Japan” Database Project, accessed June 15, 2013, <http://www.ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/documents/texts/JH/19850809.O1J.html>.

August 9, 1985,⁷ and Nakasone then paid an official visit to Yasukuni Shrine on August 15, 1985. Ironically, this visit made Yasukuni a taboo, and the Japanese prime minister was prevented from visiting the shrine for more than a decade.

Table 4: Visits of the Showa Emperor and Prime Ministers to the Yasukuni Shrine

Important Leaders	Visit Dates
The Emperor Showa	Oct. 16, 1952; Oct. 19, 1954; Apr. 23, 1957; Apr. 23, 1959; Oct. 19, 1965; Oct. 20, 1969; Nov. 21, 1975
Shigeru Yoshida	Oct. 18, 1951; (May 5, 1952); Oct. 17, 1952; Apr. 23, 1953; (Oct. 24, 1953); (Apr. 25, 1954); (Oct. 20, 1954)
Nobusuke Kishi	Apr. 25, 1957; Oct. 21, 1958
Hayato Ikeda	Oct. 10, 1960; Jun. 18, 1961; Nov. 15, 1961; Nov. 4, 1962; Sep. 22, 1963
Eisaku Sato	Apr. 21, 1965; Apr. 21, 1966; Apr. 22, 1967; Apr. 23, 1968; Apr. 22, 1969; Oct. 18, 1969; Apr. 22, 1970; Oct. 17, 1970; Apr. 22, 1971; Oct. 18, 1971; Apr. 22, 1972
Kakuei Tanaka	Jul. 8, 1972; Oct. 17, 1972; Apr. 23, 1973; Oct. 18, 1973; Apr. 23, 1974; Oct. 19, 1974
Takeo Miki	Apr. 22, 1975; Aug. 15, 1975; Oct. 18, 1976
Takeo Fukuda	Apr. 21, 1977; Apr. 21, 1978; Aug. 15, 1978; Oct. 18, 1978
Masayoshi Ohira	Apr. 21, 1979; Oct. 18, 1979; Apr. 21, 1980
Zenko Suzuki	Aug. 15, 1980; Oct. 18, 1980; Apr. 21, 1981; Aug. 15, 1981; Oct. 17, 1981; Apr. 21, 1982; Aug. 15, 1982; Oct. 18, 1982
Yasuhiro Suzuki	Apr. 21, 1983; Aug. 15, 1983; Oct. 18, 1983; Jan. 5, 1984; Apr. 21, 1984; Aug. 15, 1984; Oct. 18, 1984; Jan. 21, 1985; Apr. 22, 1985; Aug. 15, 1985
Ryutaro Hashimoto	Jul. 29, 1996
Junichiro Koizumi	Aug. 13, 2001; Apr. 21, 2002; Jan. 14, 2003; Jan. 1, 2004; Oct. 17, 2005; Aug. 15, 2006

Source: Akihiko Tanaka, "The Yasukuni Issue and Japan's International Relations," in *East Asia's Haunted Present: Historical Memories and the Resurgence of Nationalism*, ed. Tsuyoshi Hasegawa and Kazuhiko Togo (Connecticut: Praeger, June 30, 2008), 125.

⁷ Chief Cabinet Secretary Fujinami Takao stated, "After referring and discussing this report thoroughly, the Cabinet decided an appropriate way for official visits. With this form, the society will not consider it as a religious activity violating the Constitution. In addition, this official visit will change the existing collective view of the Government," "Chief Cabinet Secretary Fujinami Takao's Talk on Official Visit by Prime Minister and other Cabinet Ministers to Yasukuni Shrine," August 14, 1986, "The World and Japan" Database Project, accessed June 15, 2013, <http://www.ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/documents/texts/JPCH/19850814.S2J.html>.

The visit of Nakasone drew strong Chinese responses. On August 17, 1980, the *People's Daily* first reported on the enshrinement of Class A war criminals. Although the Chinese media paid more attention and became increasingly critical of the Yasukuni issue, the Chinese government did not protest against such visits until 1985 despite yearly visits made on August 15. The Chinese government protested against the visit of Nakasone to Yasukuni because it was an official visit, which brought attention to Yasukuni, and thus, could not be ignored by the Chinese.

In 1985, things were different. Before the visit of the prime minister, the Chinese media revealed the plan and warned Nakasone not to proceed with the visit. The spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) said, "If Prime Minister Nakasone and other cabinet members of Japan visit Yasukuni Shrine, they will hurt the people of the world and Asian people including Japanese and Chinese people who suffered a great deal from the militarism."⁸ Influential Chinese politicians also revealed their indignation. On August 29, Deng Xiaoping, the chairman of the Central Advisory Commission, told Japanese Socialist Party politicians, "we and people in the East Asia are concerned about the movements of the militarist elements in Japan."⁹ On September 3, Peng Zhen, the chairman of the Standing Committee of the People's National Congress, pointed out that the visit of Nakasone to Yasukuni was detrimental to Sino-Japanese

⁸ "Statement of Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesman on Yasukuni Visit," *People's Daily (English Version)*, August 15, 1985 or refer to "The World and Japan" Database Project, accessed June 15, 2013, <http://www.ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/documents/texts/JPCH/19850814.S1J.html>.

⁹ *Asahi Shimbun*, August 30, 1985.

relations and Japan should cancel the visit. He further warned Japan “to stop doing things that remind Chinese people of the past.”¹⁰

The tension further escalated when Chinese students mobilized anti-Japanese demonstrations on September 18. These protests focused not only on Yasukuni but also on economic inequality. The demonstrations shocked both the Chinese government and the Nakasone administration. After all, when Hu visited Japan in 1983, he said that Sino-Japanese relations were at its best. The Chinese MFA quickly responded in September 20 that Japan did not heed the friendly advice of China and “went ahead of the official visit and hurt the people of China.”¹¹ Through official media, the Chinese government tried to persuade the students to calm down by emphasizing Japanese aid to Chinese economic development. Beijing asked Nakasone to cancel his October visit to the Yasukuni Shrine. On October 10, Foreign Minister Wu Xuequan (吴学谦) told his visiting Japanese counterpart, Shintaro Abe, that the policy of China to maintain long-term friendly Sino-Japanese relations would not change, and Japan should “try to understand and pay attention to the feelings of the Chinese people that existed behind the demonstration in Beijing on September 18. Japan should keep the commitment that Japan will not revive

¹⁰ *Nihon Keizai Shimbun* [Japanese Economic News], September 8, 1985.

¹¹ “The government of China expressed its opinion to the government of Japan on the issue of official visits of Japanese cabinet members to Yasukuni Shrine and asked the government of Japan to handle the issue cautiously. Regrettably, the Japanese side, without heeding to our friendly advice, went ahead of the official visit and hurt the people of China. It is an established policy of the government of China to develop neighborly and friendly relations between China and Japan with the government and people of Japan based on the principles decided by the China-Japan Joint Communiqué and the China-Japan Peace and Friendship Treaty. We hope that the leaders of the government of Japan fulfill the promise not to take the road of militarism and to contribute to establishing the Sino-Japanese friendship and peace in the world.” *Remin Ribao (The People’s Daily)*, September 20, 1985 and *Nihon Keizai Shimbun* (Evening), September 20, 1985.

militarism.”¹² Deng also told Abe that “Japan’s history textbook issue and Yasukuni issue brought difficulty to us.”¹³

On October 18, Chief Cabinet Secretary Kosei Fujinami declared that Prime Minister Nakasone would not visit Yasukuni Shrine in October. Nakasone decided to stop visiting Yasukuni because he did not want Hu Yaobang to lose his position because of the serious anti-Japanese demonstrations, and losing a counterpart in a friendly position will not suit the interests of Japan.¹⁴ Nakasone did not visit Yasukuni again as prime minister. On August 14, 1986, Chief Cabinet Secretary Masaharu Gotoda remarked that the visit brought critical views from neighboring foreign countries and that “[t]hese views may lead to misunderstanding and distrust to Japan’s reflections of the past war ... That is not in the national interest of Japan.”¹⁵ The attitude of Nakasone toward the

¹² *Asahi Shimbun*, October 11, 1985 and *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, October 11, 1985.

¹³ Deng said, “Both sides should avoid this kind of political dispute, because when this dispute occurred, it will remind people of history. We understand the Japanese government has its own interpretation; however, for people, including Chinese and Japanese people, they tend to seek the fact and substance of a problem. In order to maintain friendly Sino-Japanese relations, I suggest Japanese politicians and leaders to pay attention to this problem.” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PRC, “October 11,” October 11, 1985, accessed June 15, 2013, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_chn/ziliao_611306/historytoday_611370/t57701.shtml.

¹⁴ Nakasone told Tadashi Itagaki, a representative of LDP, and the Yasukuni supporters that “China’s opposition is not mere threat. If I continue to visit the shrine, student demonstrations will continue and Hu Yaobang may lose his job. It is not in Japan’s national interest to let Japan-China relations deteriorate and to see the pro-Japan government toppled in China. The heroic spirits would not want this. Therefore, I am going to cancel the visit. China’s reaction to the enshrinement of Class-A war criminals was strong. The imperial army’s conduct, including the Manchurian Incident, was factually excessive.” Itagaki Tadashi, *Yasukuni koshiki sanpai no sokatsu* [Sum Up the Yasukuni Official Visit (in Japanese)] (Tokyo: Tentensha, 2000), 179.

¹⁵ “Partly due to the fact that Yasukuni Shrine enshrines what is called Class-A war criminals, the official visit to the shrine last year brought about the critical views among the citizens of the neighboring countries who suffered tremendous pains and damages from the conduct of our country in the past. [They criticize] that we visited the shrine to pay respect to Class-A war criminals responsible for our past conduct. These views may lead to misunderstanding and distrust to Japan’s reflections of the past war [that have been] revealed on various occasions and Japan’s determination to pursue peace and friendship based on such reflections. That is not in the national interest of Japan, which desires to promote friendship with other countries and not suit up to the ultimate desires of the war dead,” “Naikaku Soridaijin sonota no

history issue remained cautious when a history textbook dispute happened in 1986. He ordered the revision of the controversial version and fired Education Minister Masayuki Fujio because of his inappropriate statements regarding history.¹⁶

Akihiko Tanaka used the concept of “constitutive rule” to explain the Yasukuni issue. Different groups interpreted the visit of the prime minister to Yasukuni in different ways. China viewed the visits to Yasukuni as an approval of the aggression of Class A war criminals. Similarly, supporters of Yasukuni viewed the visits to the shrine as a rejection of the Tokyo Military Tribunal. Others, including the bereaved families did not necessarily approve of the conduct of the Class A war criminals but supported the visits of the prime minister because they viewed such visits as a symbol of mourning the war dead. Thus, conflicts existed between constitutive rules. Further, Tanaka argued that the fact that Nakasone stopped to visit Yasukuni Shrine owing to Chinese protests strengthened the constitutive rules held by China that such visits justify aggression.¹⁷

Visits of Hashimoto

After 11 years, the Yasukuni Shrine received attention when Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto visited on July 29, 1996. The visit of Hashimoto to Yasukuni was expected because he was the chairman of the Japan Association of Bereaved Families of the War Dead from 1993 to 1995. Before he became prime minister, Hashimoto visited

kokumudaiji niyoru yasukuni jinja koushiki sanpai nitsuite no Gotoda kanbo chokan danwa” [Chief Cabinet Secretary Masaharu Gotoda Talk about Prime Minister and Other Ministers’ Official Visit to Yasukuni Shrine], “The World and Japan” Database Project, accessed June 15, 2013, <http://www.ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/documents/texts/JPCH/19860814.S1J.html>.

¹⁶ Masayuki Fujio said that “killing in war should not be a crime” and “Japan’s annexation of Korea is under Korea’s agreement.”

¹⁷ Akihiko Tanaka, “The Yasukuni Issue,” 128-130.

Yasukuni regularly during the spring and autumn festivals and annually on August 15. Thus, when Hashimoto assumed office in January 1996, the Japanese media already started to predict when he would visit. Hashimoto eventually visited Yasukuni on July 29 and explained that he visited as a promise to his cousin. The cousin of Hashimoto told him that his spirit would return to Yasukuni after he died in the war, and he had hoped Hashimoto would visit him. Hashimoto emphasized that he chose to visit on July 29, because it was the most private date, Hashimoto's birthday. Although the visit was a private matter, China still protested the visits of Prime Minister Hashimoto to Yasukuni.

The Chinese MFA expressed its deep regret about this visit.¹⁸ Chinese Vice Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Qian Qichen (钱其琛) told the New Frontier Party delegation who visited China that “The unacceptable act and speech related to History textbook issue and Yasukuni issue will damage Sino-Japanese relations.” Vice Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan (唐家璇) added, “Although Prime Minister Hashimoto contribute a lot to Sino-Japanese relations, the visit to Yasukuni is not a good thing.”¹⁹ Chinese President Jiang Zemin pointed out some people in Japan were trying to distort history and mentioned cabinet ministers as an example of longing for the militarist past.²⁰ In a meeting with Japanese Foreign Minister Yukihiko Ikeda in the United Nations, Qian Qichen mentioned, “It is a pity that Hashimoto broke the custom and went to visit

¹⁸ “We express our deep regret about PM Hashimoto's visit to the Yasukuni Shrine on the morning of July 29. His visit hurt the Asian people including the Chinese who suffered a great deal from Japan's militarists. Japan should reflect on the history of the aggression from the bottom of its heart and show its willingness to take the road of peaceful development by actual behavior.” *Nikkan Chugoku Tsushin [Japan China News]*, July 31, 1996.

¹⁹ *Asahi Shimbun*, August 28, 1996.

²⁰ *Asahi Shimbun*, September 7, 1996.

Yasukuni.”²¹ Hashimoto decided that visiting the Yasukuni Shrine at the price of other substantial interests was not worth it, and declared on October 16, “I, as Prime Minister, should choose action[s] so as not to invite unnecessary suspicions on Japan which might damage Japan’s interest.”²² Hashimoto shared the same viewpoint with Nakasone in his decision of stopping his visits. Both did not want to sacrifice actual national interests for Yasukuni not because they agreed with the opposition opinion that visiting Yasukuni meant justifying aggression.

Tanaka pointed out the differences between the visits of Nakasone and Hashimoto. Nakasone visited on August 15, 1985 (Victory over Japan Day), in an official capacity, whereas Hashimoto visited for private reasons and avoid sensitive date. This difference indicates that the constitutive rule was expanded to the following. As long as one is a prime minister, whether the date was August 15 and whether the purpose was official, the visit should not be allowed. This rule indicated that although Hashimoto tried to avoid dispute and chose a different day for his private visit, his visit and then stop owing to Chinese protests still strengthened and expanded the constitutive rule that visiting Yasukuni is a justification of aggression.²³ Although Hashimoto tried to change the constitutive rule from justification of aggression to mourning for an old friend who died in the war, China found the visit unacceptable. The position of China is understandable because Yasukuni supporters still viewed visiting Yasukuni as a rejection of the Tokyo

²¹ *Asahi Shimbun* (Evening), September 25, 1996.

²² Itagaki, *Yasukuni koshiki sanpai*, 287.

²³ Akihiko Tanaka, “The Yasukuni Issue,” 128-130.

Military Tribunal. Persuading China to change their perception of visiting Yasukuni would be difficult without changing the constitutive rules of Yasukuni supporters in Japan. Unless Japanese leaders reshaped a constitutional rule agreeable to Yasukuni supporters, the Japanese public, and international society, the view of China on Yasukuni cannot be changed.

The Chinese protest against the Hashimoto visit reflected distrust of Japan in the mid-1990s. This distrust was a result of a series of events: First, Hashimoto was considered a conservative politician, and thus, China already held a more defensive position when he became prime minister. Second, Washington and Tokyo redefined the U.S.-Japan alliance only a few months earlier, and China interpreted this act as containment against itself. Third, the Jiang administration seemed to be more sensitive to the history issue.²⁴ Thus, Beijing was more concerned about the Yasukuni visit of Hashimoto.

The Chinese protests against this visit and other history related issues changed the view of the Japanese public of the Chinese. The Japanese public started to interpret negatively Chinese protests over the history issue. After the Tiananmen incident, the public changed their perception of China from a friendly neighbor country to a nondemocratic country with unfavorable human rights records. The repeated protests and demands of the Chinese for Japanese apology for WW2 had caused resentment among the Japanese public. Although Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama already apologized for WW2 on August 15, 1995, China and South Korea still criticized and suspected that

²⁴ Richard C. Bush, *The Perils of Proximity: China-Japan Security Relations* (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2010), 146.

Japan might revive militarism.²⁵ The Japanese people felt frustrated and tired about the constant complaints of the Chinese over the history issue. Some Japanese surmised that the Chinese were playing the history card to gain political and economic advantage or to arouse nationalism to replace socialist ideology domestically. The high-profile criticisms of Chinese President Jiang Zemin on the Japanese attitude toward history and his demands for a written apology for WW2²⁶ when he visited Japan in 1998 strengthened the resentment of the Japanese public. During the trip, neither Jiang nor Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi signed the agreement, and Jiang did not obtain a written apology. The Japanese public supported the position of the Obuchi administration regarding this issue.²⁷ This trend of public opinion continued and influenced the attitude of Koizumi toward Yasukuni.

II. Yasukuni Shrine Visits of Koizumi and Responses of China

Koizumi was not a hard-core Yasukuni supporter before 2001. He visited Yasukuni as a cabinet member in 1989 and 1997. His visit to Yasukuni was supposed to be a fulfillment of an election pledge, which was to visit the shrine on August 15. During the presidential elections of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), Koizumi made the pledge to gain votes from the Japan Association of Bereaved Families of the War Dead

²⁵ However, Murayama is a prime minister from the Socialist Party, and the way the LDP politicians handled the history issue showed regression from the stance of Murayama.

²⁶ Xuanli Laio explained Jiang's high profile demands for written apology was resulted from South Korea got the written apology when Kim and Obuchi met in 1998. Xuanli Laio, *Chinese Foreign Policy Think Tank and China's Policy toward Japan* (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 2006), 190-193.

²⁷ Koji Murata, "Domestic Sources of Japan's Policy toward China," Peng Er Lam ed., *Japan's Relations with China: Facing a Rising Power* (New York: Routledge, April, 2006), 42-3.

and the Military Pension League. The resolute and stubborn attitude of Koizumi concerning the Yasukuni issue surprised the public.

1. 2001 Visit of Koizumi

Koizumi was elected prime minister on April 24, 2001, and soon faced several political and economic controversies.²⁸ Given that Koizumi had already promised to visit Yasukuni, Beijing called for Koizumi to cancel his plan as a diplomatic gesture. On May 11, MFA Vice-Chief of Information Department Sun Yuxi exposed that Koizumi revealed his plan to visit Yasukuni on August 15 in the National Diet of Japan. Sun stated that “The substance of this issue is about how Japanese government and leader face history of aggression.”²⁹ On May 17, Chinese vice Foreign Minister Wang Yi (王毅) summoned Japanese Ambassador Koreshige Anami and protested “we strongly opposed to Yasukuni visit, whatever way it is.”³⁰ Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan met with his Japanese counterpart Makiko Tanaka in the third Asia-Europe Meeting in Beijing on May 24, and said that “Japan needs to consider victims’ national sentiments and face history. We hope Japan can keep its commitment.”³¹ On May 28, President Jiang Zemin met with

²⁸ Former Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui visited Japan regardless of strong protests from China, and the Education Ministry approved a conservative version of history textbooks that ignored several details on World War II. Japan set a strict standard for several Chinese agricultural exports to Japan.

²⁹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, “Spokesperson on Japanese Prime Minister’s claim of paying homage to the Yasukuni Shrine,” May 11, 2001, accessed June 15, 2013, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/yzs/gjlb/2721/2725/t16032.shtml>.

³⁰ *Mainichi Shinbun*, May 18, 2001. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, “Vice Foreign Minister Wang Yi Expound China’s Solemn Position on Yasukuni Shrine,” May 18, 2001, accessed June 15, 2013, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/yzs/gjlb/2721/2726/t16046.shtml>.

³¹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, “Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan Meets Japanese Foreign Minister Makiko Tanaka,” May 25, 2001, accessed June 15, 2013, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/yzs/gjlb/2721/2724/t15993.shtml>.

a South Korean Ruling Party delegation and indicated that the “Prime Minister’s visit equals mourning militarist’s spirit.”³²

In a meeting with the secretaries-general of the three ruling coalition parties in Japan³³ on July 10, Foreign Minister Tang said that he could not accept the Koizumi visit to Yasukuni,³⁴ and President Jiang pointed out that the history issue had to be dealt with consideration.³⁵ The Japanese delegation reported to Koizumi the concerns of the Chinese leaders, but Koizumi insisted. On July 24, Foreign Minister Tang told his counterpart Makiko Tanaka in an Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Plus Three meeting in Hanoi that if Koizumi visited Yasukuni, “the Chinese public would have a strong reaction and that, from China’s perspective, Koizumi’s shrine visit looked like bowing to the Class-A war criminals.”³⁶ On August 2, Foreign Minister Tang met with Hiromu Nonaka in Beijing, a former secretary-general of the LDP, and said that “If Koizumi visits Yasukuni, it will hurt the trust relations.”³⁷

³² *Asahi Shimbun*, May 29, 2001.

³³ The delegation included Yamasaki Taku of the LDP, Fuyushiba Tetsuzo of New Komeito, and Noda Takeshi of Hoshuto (the New Conservative Party). The delegation brought Koizumi’s letter, which emphasized that Koizumi highly valued the importance of Japan’s friendly relations with China. *Yomiuri Shimbun*, July 6, 2001.

³⁴ *Asahi Shimbun*, July 10, 2001.

³⁵ *Asahi Shimbun*, July 10, 2001 and *Sankei Shimbun*, July 11, 2001.

³⁶ *Mainichi Shimbun*, July 25, 2001.

³⁷ *Sankei Shimbun*, August 3, 2001.

Faced with strong protests from China and South Korea and with the public opinion in Japan, Koizumi decided to act more cautiously with the Yasukuni issue,³⁸ and was advised to move the visit to a less controversial date.³⁹ Koizumi instead visited on August 13, and expressed his “feelings of profound remorse and sincere mourning to all the victims of the war.”⁴⁰ In a national poll conducted by *Mainichi Shinbun*, 65% of respondents supported Koizumi’s decision to change the date to August 13, whereas 28% did not support it.⁴¹

Nonetheless, Beijing organized strong protests. On August 14, MFA expressed its strong discontent and indignation to Japanese Ambassador Anami Koreshige.⁴² President

³⁸ The poll conducted by *Asahi Shimbun* on August 1 and 2 showed 65% of respondents held that Koizumi should act more cautiously in regard to the Yasukuni issue, and 26% supported his visits to Yasukuni although neighboring countries protested against his plan. *Asahi Shimbun*, August 4, 2001. However, different media polls had different results. The *Yomiuri Shimbun* poll showed that 40% supported Koizumi’s visit to Yasukuni, whereas 34% opposed it. *Yomiuri Shimbun*, August 7, 2001.

³⁹ Ming Wan indicated that Taku Yamasaki (secretary general of the LDP), Koichi Kado (former secretary general of the LDP), and Yasuo Fukuda (chief cabinet secretary) played an important part in persuading Koizumi to change the date of his Yasukuni visit. Ming Wang, *Sino-Japanese Relations: Interaction, Logic, and Transformation* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2006), 240.

⁴⁰ “Japan brought about a large damage to many people in the world including our nationals. In a certain period in the past, based on the wrong policies, Japan caused immeasurable damage and pains to our neighboring countries in Asia by colonization and aggression. The damage still remains as incurable wounds in the mind of many people in the region.” The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Statement of Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi,” August 13, 2001, accessed June 15, 2013, www.mofa.go.jp/announce/pm/koizumi/state0108.html.

⁴¹ Of those who supported, 29% did not care about the date as long as he went to visit and mourn for the war dead, 39% considered that shifting the date would be appropriate to show consideration to China and South Korea, and 31% considered that Koizumi’s stance was flexible. Of those who disagreed, 33% disagreed with changing the date because of the protests from China and South Korea, 32% considered that the visit violated the principle of separation of church and state, and 32% held that Koizumi compromised too much. Asked what they thought about the protests from China and South Korea, 45% considered such demands to be justified, whereas 49% considered them to be unreasonable. *Mainichi Shinbun*, August 20, 2001.

⁴² Vice Foreign Minister Wang Yi urgently summoned Japanese Ambassador Koreshige Anami and made solemn representations over Koizumi’s Yasukuni visit as follows. First, the Chinese government and people expressed strong indignation. Second, “the treatment of the issue of the Yasukuni Shrine has since become a touchstone for examining the attitude the Japanese government holds towards that period of

Jiang Zemin refused to meet Koizumi in an Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Shanghai.⁴³ When informed that Koizumi hoped to visit China, MFA Spokesperson Zhu Bangzao (朱邦造) responded that his visit to China would depend on his willingness to take real action to restore Chinese trust.⁴⁴ Although China expressed its indignation, it also recognized the act of changing the date of the visit, and his acknowledgment of aggression history in his statement.⁴⁵ The *People's Daily* also published the statement of Koizumi as a sign of acknowledgement.

Although Koizumi tried to amend relations with China and requested to visit China or meet with its leader, China asked Japan to show more sincerity. In response to the request of Koizumi to hasten the China-Japan Summit, MFA Spokesperson Sun Yuxi said that “China takes summit and mutual visits seriously; however, in order to realize it,

history of aggression.” Third, Japan has admitted its history of aggression against China and showed its attitude on introspecting and apologized to China. Nonetheless, “the Prime Minister’s visit to the Shrine violates the above-mentioned basic stance of the Japanese government, and again discredits Japan among the people in Asia and the world, including Chinese people, on the issue of history.” Fourth, China noted that, “Koizumi gave up his original plan to visit the Shrine on the sensitive day of August 15 and made remarks on historic issues, in which he admitted Japanese aggression and expressed introspection.” However, “his actual practice contradicts and runs against what he said.” Fifth, Koizumi’s Yasukuni visit “has damaged the political basis of Sino-Japanese relations and hurt the feelings of the Chinese people and people in other victimized Asian countries, and will inevitably affect the healthy development of future bilateral ties between China and Japan.” Sixth, Japan’s negative responses toward the issue of history in recent years have further “isolated Japan from its Asian neighbors and the international community.” Although Koizumi has repeatedly stated that “Japan will strengthen international coordination and develop friendly relationships with neighboring countries,” both the Japanese government and people need to ponder how to reflect on those statements in practice. Chinese Foreign Ministry, “Vice Foreign Minister Wang Yi Urgently Summons Japanese Ambassador Koreshige Anami to Make Solemn Representations,” August 14, 2001, accessed June 15, 2013, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t20698.htm>.

⁴³ Ming Wan, *Sino-Japanese Relations*, 242-243.

⁴⁴ “Koizumi’s China Visit Linked to Conciliatory Pledge,” *Japan Times*, August 27, 2001.

⁴⁵ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, “Spokesperson Zhang Qiyue on Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi’s Visit to the Yasukuni Shrine,” August 14, 2001, accessed June 15, 2013, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zsjg/yzs/gjlb/2721/2725/t16034.shtml>.

Japan needs to create necessary atmosphere and circumstance.”⁴⁶ On August 31, Foreign Minister Tang said, “We hope Japan can take actual action to restore bilateral relations to the right track as soon as possible” and “it is important for Japan to create favorable conditions for restoring relations.”⁴⁷ On September 13, President Jiang told a delegation of the Japan-China Friendship Parliamentarian Union that he could not understand why Koizumi visited Yasukuni and repeated a Chinese idiom, “Whoever started the trouble should end it,”⁴⁸ to express that Japan should take action to amend Sino-Japanese relations.⁴⁹ Although Japan was asked to show more sincerity, China did not deny the possibility of a mutual visit and summit and did not close the communication channel.

The September 11 attacks in 2001 became a turning point. The security policy of Koizumi of sending troops abroad to support the anti-terrorism war of the U.S. needed understanding from China. To restore its relations with the U.S., China did not want to be locked in a stalemate with Japan and wanted to move beyond the Yasukuni issue. Koizumi visited China on October 8, 2001, and went to the Marco Polo Bridge and the Memorial Museum of the Chinese People’s Resistance War against Japan. Koizumi used *owabi* (apology in Japanese) to apologize for Japanese aggression during WW2.⁵⁰ During

⁴⁶ *Asahi Shimbun*, August 17, 2001.

⁴⁷ *Asahi Shimbun*, September 1, 2001.

⁴⁸ The original words are “In order to untie the bell, the person who tied it is required. (iě líng hái xū jì líng rén).”

⁴⁹ *Asahi Shimbun*, September 14, 2001.

⁵⁰ Japanese leaders usually expressed “regret” or “remorse” for their country’s actions in WW2. Prime Minister Murayama was the first leader to use “owabi,” which unambiguously translates as “apology.” Thus, it is important to point out that Koizumi also used the word “owabi.” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Chugoku Jinmin kounichi senso kinenkan homon go no Koizumi sori no Hatsugen” [Prime

the summit, Jiang told Koizumi that continued Yasukuni visits would have serious consequences for the bilateral relationship.⁵¹ The Chinese had a positive response to the Koizumi visit to China. MFA praised the visit, but the history issue was not yet solved.⁵² The Chinese media highlighted his statement of apology at the museum, and reported that Jiang and Zhu raised the history issue and Yasukuni.⁵³ A *Xinhua News Agency* article pointed out that “no empirical evidence indicated that Japan’s leader was faking a friendly gesture toward Beijing.”⁵⁴ At that time, the Chinese leaders thought Koizumi would not visit Yasukuni again. Thus, the things that happened the following year angered the Chinese government.

2. 2002 Visit of Koizumi

Koizumi visited Yasukuni Shrine on April 21, 2002 unannounced. What was special about the timing of this visit was that Koizumi had earlier stated in the Boao Forum, “The rise of China is not a threat but opportunity for Japan.” While his speech

Minister Koizumi’s Statement After Visiting the Memorial Museum of Chinese People’s Anti-Japanese War (in Japanese)], October 8, 2001, http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/kaidan/s_koi/china0110/hatsugen.html.

⁵¹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Koizumi Sori hochu, Kotakumin shuseki to no kaidan” [Prime Minister Koizumi’s China Visit, Summit with President Jiang Zemin (in Japanese)], October 8, 2001, accessed June 15, 2013, http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/kaidan/s_koi/china0110/koutakumin.html and Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, “President Jiang Zemin met with Japanese PM Koizumi,” October 10, 2001, accessed June 15, 2013, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/yzs/gjlb/2721/2724/t15997.shtml>.

⁵² Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Koizumi Sori hochu, Kotakumin shuseki to no kaidan” [Prime Minister Koizumi’s China Visit, Summit with President Jiang Zemin (in Japanese)], October 8, 2001, accessed June 15, 2013, http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/kaidan/s_koi/china0110/koutakumin.html and Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, “President Jiang Zemin met with Japanese PM Koizumi,” October 10, 2001, accessed June 15, 2013, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/yzs/gjlb/2721/2724/t15997.shtml>.

⁵³ Ming Wan, *Sino-Japanese Relations*, 245.

⁵⁴ Wang Dajun, “Analysis: Why is Koizumi so Eager to Visit China?” *Xinhua News Agency*, September 6, 2001. Cited from Ming Wan, *Sino-Japanese Relations*, 245.

pleased the Chinese leaders, Koizumi visited Yasukuni again,⁵⁵ and as in the previous year, Beijing expressed its indignation. On April 21, 2002, Vice Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing urgently summoned Japanese Ambassador to China Koreshige and made solemn representations over Koizumi's visit to Yasukuni Shrine. Although most of the remarks were similar to the statement of Wang Yi in 2001, the statement of Li was more strongly worded.⁵⁶ The MFA spokesperson said that "the visit had hurt Chinese people's feeling and had done serious damage to Sino-Japanese political relations."⁵⁷ President Jiang told a delegation of the Komei Party on April 29 that "Yasukuni visits absolutely cannot be allowed."⁵⁸ On April 30, MFA spokesperson Kong Quan said that the

⁵⁵ Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, "Asia in a New Century- Challenge and Opportunity," Speech by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi at the Boao Forum for Asia, April 12, 2002, Boao, Hainan Island, People's Republic of China, accessed June 15, 2013, http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/koizumispeech/2002/04/12boao_e.html.

⁵⁶ Li Zhaoxing said that although Prime Minister Koizumi issued a speech at the Museum of the Anti-Japanese War in October 2001, in which he admitted aggression, regretted the war, and extended condolences and an apology, "the Japanese side again took an erroneous act" and "it is unacceptable in terms of feelings, reason, oriental ethic and international morals." Li even mentioned militarism, "Japanese leaders should understand that the Japanese people, who have suffered a lot from the war, will not allow their own country to return to the path of militarism." Li highlighted the sufferings caused by Japanese militarism, "The Chinese and Asian people will not forget the appalling tragedies caused by Japanese militarism in Nanjing and elsewhere in Asia. Besides, people will not forget the various barbarian acts by Japanese militarism on the Pacific Ocean. The truth of history will not be easily forgotten, slighted or betrayed." Li further pointed out that if Japan wanted to "shake off the shadow of history and play an international role," the leader of Japan needed to hold "a correct attitude towards the past war of aggression and the war criminals at that time" to win credit from the people of the world. Li blamed Japan for creating "time and again incidents on major issues concerning the political foundation of China-Japan relations, hurt the feelings of the Chinese people, and disturbed and damaged China-Japan relations." Finally, he suggested that Japan should "adopt concrete measures, eliminate its bad image and prevent similar incidents from happening again." Chinese Foreign Ministry, "Vice Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing Summoned Japanese Ambassador over Japanese Prime Minister's Shrine Visit," April 22, 2002, accessed June 15, 2013, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t20150.htm>.

⁵⁷ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, "Foreign Ministry Spokesperson's Press Conference on April 23, 2002," April 25, 2002, accessed June 15, 2013, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/s2510/2511/t14693.shtml>.

⁵⁸ *Asahi Shimbun*, April 30, 2002.

“Japanese leader should commit to hold a correct attitude toward the history of militarism aggression and promise to take an actual action.”⁵⁹ On June 26, Jiang told a delegation of the Democratic Party, “I thought Prime Minister Koizumi already reflected and will not visit Yasukuni again, but he visited again.”⁶⁰ During a meeting with Japanese Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi on September 8, Foreign Minister Tang commented on the Yasukuni issue: “I hope Japan can implement the attitude and common acknowledgement including Yasukuni and allow Sino-Japanese relations to surmount an obstacle.”⁶¹ On October 27, President Jiang met with Koizumi during the APEC summit in Los Cabos, Mexico, and mentioned Yasukuni three times during a 45-minute meeting. Jiang pointed out that “Yasukuni is the issue that touches on the feeling of 1.3 billion Chinese people” and “we usually separate a small amount of militarists from general Japanese public; thus, it is better not to visit Yasukuni shrine again.”⁶² Aside from the verbal protest, the Chinese government postponed the visit of the Japanese Defense Agency director-general in April and the port visit of Chinese navy ships to Japan in mid-May.⁶³ President Jiang

⁵⁹ “Kong Quan jiu Hu Jintao fangmei yu donghai chenchuan deng da jizhe wen quanwen” [The full text of Kong Quan’s Answers to reporters’ questions including Hu Jintao’s American Visit and Sinking Ship in the East China Sea (in Chinese)], *Renmin Ribao*, April 30, 2002, accessed June 15, 2013, <http://www.people.com.cn/BIG5/shizheng/3586/20020430/721423.html>.

⁶⁰ *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, June 27, 2002.

⁶¹ *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, September 9, 2002.

⁶² *Asahi Shimbun (Evening)*, October 28, 2002.

⁶³ *Remin Ribao*, April 23, 2002.

postponed Koizumi's visit, and Koizumi decided to postpone his visit to China as well on August 9.⁶⁴

According Ming Wan, the Chinese postponement of the mutual visits to protest was a wise decision for several reasons. First, such postponement sent a clear message of discontent to Japan. Second, this punishment was not too harsh but pragmatic as it did not close the communication channels with Japan and did not sacrifice substantial interests for "Major/Minor interest issues" as Yasukuni.⁶⁵ However, Koizumi did not view mutual visits as significant because he could still meet and talk with Chinese leaders in an international meeting in a third country.⁶⁶

3. 2003 Visit of Koizumi

Koizumi visited Yasukuni Shrine again on January 14, 2003, before the inauguration of new leaders in China and South Korea. Roh Moo-hyun became the South Korean President on February 25, 2003. Hu Jintao became the General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) on November 15, 2002, and Chinese President on March 15, 2003. The rationale behind the chosen date of visit was that the new leadership would be preoccupied by domestic rather than foreign affairs.

The Chinese response to this visit was negative as usual. On January 14, Chinese Ambassador Wu Dawei (武大伟) visited Japanese Vice Foreign Minister Yukio

⁶⁴ *Asahi Shimbun*, August 9, 2002 and "Koizumi Postpones China Trip amid Continued Yasukuni Anger," *Asahi Shimbun*, August 10, 2002.

⁶⁵ Ming Wan, *Sino-Japanese Relations*, 247-248.

⁶⁶ For example, in 2002, Koizumi had a meeting with Zhu Rongji during the Asia-Europe summit in Copenhagen on September 22, and met Jiang in an APEC summit in Mexico on October 27.

Takeuchi and protested that “this act is the provocation for 1.3 billion Chinese people.”⁶⁷ Vice Foreign Minister Yang Wenchang (杨文昌) summoned Japanese Ambassador Anami and “China expressed strong discontent and indignation on Koizumi’s Yasukuni Shrine. Prime Minister’s incorrect act hurt the feeling of Chinese people and Asian people.”⁶⁸ On the same day, MFA Spokesperson Zhang Qiyue said, “The essence of the question is how the Japanese leaders treat historic issue. As a result, no matter when the Japanese leaders choose to visit the Yasukuni Shrine are all resolutely opposed by the Chinese Government and people.”⁶⁹

China maintained its policy of rejecting mutual visits. On March 6, when asked about how to restore the mutual visits that were stopped because of the visits of Koizumi to Yasukuni, Chinese Foreign Minister Tang said that as a condition to restore mutual visits, the prime minister should promise that he would not visit Yasukuni again.⁷⁰ Chief Cabinet Secretary Yasuo Fukuda invited new Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao to Japan when they met on August 10. Wen said that he expected that “leaders from both countries can visit each other in a good atmosphere.” However, he added, “there is a problem that Japanese leader kept visiting Yasukuni Shrine.”⁷¹ The foreign minister from both sides

⁶⁷ *Sankei Shimbun*, January 15, 2003.

⁶⁸ *Asahi Shimbun*, January 15, 2003.

⁶⁹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson’s Press Conference on January 14, 2003,” January 18, 2003, accessed June 15, 2013, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/s2510/2511/t14633.shtml>.

⁷⁰ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, “Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan Gives a Press Conference During the 1st Session of the 10th NPC,” March 6, 2003, accessed June 15, 2013, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/topics/3696/t18866.shtml>.

⁷¹ *Asahi Shimbun (Evening)*, August 11, 2003.

met on August 11. Li Zhaoxing told Yoriko Kawaguchi that the Yasukuni visits complicated Sino-Japanese relations.⁷²

Accordingly, the leaders still met in other countries. Koizumi first met with Chinese President Hu Jintao in St. Petersburg to celebrate the tercentenary of the city on May 31. Hu asked Japan to conform to three official documents in Sino-Japanese relations. Although Hu mentioned “the importance of learning from history” and hoped Japan could appropriately handle the history and Taiwan issues, he did not directly mention Yasukuni. Hu also thanked Japan for its aid during the severe acute respiratory syndrome crisis.⁷³ Chinese Premier Wen and Koizumi met in an ASEAN+3 summit in Bali on October 7. Both leaders agreed that mutual visits should be made as soon as possible. Wen stated, “we hope to solve the problem in Sino-Japanese relations with wisdom of Prime Minister Koizumi.” Wen further added, “History issue is very sensitive issue that influences bilateral relations. The responsibility was on militarists at that time. Japanese people also suffered from that. It is important to handle history correctly for both countries.”⁷⁴ However, right after the summit, Koizumi told Japanese media that he

⁷² When Japanese Foreign Minister Kawaguchi invited Premier Wen Jiabao to Japan, Li pointed out that Japanese leader’s Yasukuni visit made difficult the realization of the environment needed for reciprocal high-level visits. James J. Przystup, “Japan-China Relations: Bridges to the Future, Reflections on the Past,” *Comparative Connections* 5: 3 (Honolulu: Pacific Forum CSIS, October 2003): 127.

⁷³ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Sankutopeteruburuku niokeru nicchu shuno kaidan,” [China-Japan Summit in Saint Petersburg (in Japanese)], May 31, 2003, accessed June 15, 2013, http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/kaidan/s_koi/g8_03/china_s_kaidan.html and Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, “President Hu Jintao Meets Japanese Prime Minister,” June 2, 2003, accessed June 15, 2013, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/topics/hjtcf/t23119.shtml>.

⁷⁴ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “ASEAN+3 shuno kaigi niokeru nicchu shuno kaidan “ [China-Japan Summit in ASEAN+3 Summit (in Japanese)], October 7, 2003, accessed June 15, 2013, http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/kaidan/s_koi/asean+3_03/j_c_gaiyo.html.

will visit Yasukuni again, and “the Chinese side understood his view that visits to Yasukuni would not compromise Japan-China relations”⁷⁵

This statement irritated China, especially because Koizumi made the declaration right after he met Premier Wen Jiabao. On October 9, Foreign Ministry spokesperson Zhang Qiyue stated “while China wanted to have a good-neighbor relationship with Japan. It hoped that Japan would learn the history lesson.”⁷⁶ Three days later on October 12, Zhang criticized more strongly that it was hard to understand why Koizumi kept visiting Yasukuni Shrine. She also pointed out that the Japanese side should recognize that the Yasukuni issue is highly sensitive.⁷⁷ On October 14, Zhang pointed out that “The Chinese Government attaches importance to developing China-Japanese relationship, hoping to maintain the exchanges of high level visits. But both sides should contribute to the end.”⁷⁸ On October 20, Koizumi met with President Hu Jintao during the APEC summit in Bangkok, Thailand. Hu said, “it is critical that do not hurt the feeling of people who were war victims.”⁷⁹

⁷⁵ *Asahi Shimbun*, October 12, 2003.

⁷⁶ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson’s Press Conference on 9 October,” October 11, 2003, accessed June 15, 2013, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/s2510/2511/t27185.shtml>.

⁷⁷ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, “Spokesperson’s Remarks on Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi’s claim to visit the Yasukuni Shrine again next year,” October 12, 2003, accessed June 15, 2013, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/s2510/t29101.shtml>.

⁷⁸ “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson’s Press Conference on 14 October,” October 14, 2003, accessed June 15, 2013, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/s2510/2511/t29288.shtml>.

⁷⁹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “APEC shuno kaigi ni okeru Nicchu shuno kaidan” [China-Japan Summit in APEC summit (in Japanese)], October 20, 2003, accessed June 15, 2013, http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/kaidan/s_koi/apec_03/chaina_kaidan.html.

According to Ming Wan, Beijing faced a challenging task with the Yasukuni issue. First, the Yasukuni visit of Koizumi seemed to be routine, and he seemed unwilling to change his stand. Although several people in Japan suggested establishing a new memorial for politicians to visit and to mourn, no indication of the willingness of the Japanese government to build one was observed. However, the creation of a new memorial was not a guarantee that Koizumi would not visit Yasukuni. Moreover, Koizumi won the LDP presidential elections on September 20 again, and thus, enjoyed strong public support, in part because of his position of not conceding to pressure from China and South Korea.⁸⁰ Ming Wan pointed out that Japan felt that Hu Jintao was more flexible regarding the history issue than Jiang Zemin, and Hu arranged several high-level visits, and thus, Japan expected the Chinese government to concede in the Yasukuni issue.⁸¹

4. 2004 Visit of Koizumi

Similar to the previous year, Koizumi visited Yasukuni on January 1st, New Year's Day. Koizumi told the Japanese press, "I made the visit to both express my appreciation to those who gave their lives in past wars as well as pledge to never again cause war."⁸² Although Koizumi revealed his intention to amend relations with China and South Korea, he still delinked the Yasukuni issue from bilateral relations.

⁸⁰ Ming Wan, *Sino-Japanese Relations*, 250.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 251.

⁸² "Koizumi: We Will Protect the SDF," *Asahi Shimbun*, January 6, 2004, accessed June 15, <http://www.asahi.com/english/politics/TKY200401060128.html>.

As expected, Beijing expressed its discontent. Vice Foreign Minister Wang Yi summoned Japanese Chargés d’Affaires Ad Interim Harada Chikahito on January 1, and protested that the “Chinese people absolutely cannot accept this type of betrayal.”⁸³ The mutual navy visits were again postponed. Chinese President Hu Jintao met with former Prime Minister Nakasone in China on January 14, and suggested “both leader should do things contributing to the friendly relations, not those things in opposite.”⁸⁴ On February 11, Vice Foreign Minister Wang Yi met with Foreign Minister Kawaguchi and again expressed discontent.⁸⁵ A representative of the Komei Party, Takenori Kanzaki, visited China and met with President Hu Jintao and former Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan on February 12. With regard to the Koizumi visit to Yasukuni, Hu told Kanzaki that “both leaders need to take responsibility toward history.” Tang criticized that the Yasukuni issue “restricted the political development between China and Japan.”⁸⁶ On August 12, MFA Spokesperson Kong Quan criticized the remarks Koizumi’s concerning visiting Yasukuni again, and observed that the “Japanese leader ignored people’s voice in victim countries and continued the provoking remarks.”⁸⁷

⁸³ *Xinhua News Agency*, January 1, 2004 and *Yomiuri Shimbun*, January 3, 2004.

⁸⁴ *Asahi Shimbun*, January 15, 2004.

⁸⁵ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, “Japanese Foreign Minister Meets Chinese Vice Foreign Minister China-Japan Security Consultation Opens in Tokyo,” February 13, 2004, accessed June 15, 2013, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zsjg/yzs/xwlb/t68286.shtml>.

⁸⁶ *Asahi Shimbun*, February 12, 2004.

⁸⁷ “Zhang Qiyue jiu xiaoquan cheng meinian caobai jingguo shenshe da jizhe wen” [Zhang Qiyue Answer Reporters’ Question on Koizumi Said he will Visit Yasukuni Shrine Every Year (in Chinese)], *Renmin Ribao*, July 6, 2004, accessed June 15, 2013, <http://www.people.com.cn/BIG5/shizheng/1027/2621030.html>.

In the previous three years, Beijing took the pragmatic approach. Although withholding mutual visits, the Chinese government maintained open communication channels, including leader summits in other countries and mutual visits and meetings of other high-level officials. With such open communication channels, China did not sacrifice its substantial interests in the bilateral relations. However, the Chinese leader became increasingly irritated. Top Chinese leaders directly criticized Yasukuni issue frequently. In a press conference after the adjournment of the National People's Congress on March 14, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao stated that "Now the main problems in China-Japan relations lie in the fact that some leaders in Japan keep on visiting the Yasukuni Shrine which enshrined class-A war criminals. This has hurt the pride of the Chinese people and people in other Asian countries."⁸⁸ On April 3, Premier Wen Jiabao met with Foreign Minister Kawaguchi, and indicated the Yasukuni visit of Koizumi impeded the normal interactions between both leaders.⁸⁹ On September 22, President Hu Jintao met with Yohei Kono, president of the House of Representatives of Japan. Hu expressed his appreciation of Chinese relations with Japan as well as his concern that, "It is possible that Yasukuni issue might affect other fields."⁹⁰ President Hu Jintao met with Koizumi during the APEC summit in Santiago, Chile, on November 21. Hu told Koizumi that the "Japanese leader's Yasukuni visit has put Sino-Japanese relations in a difficult situation.

⁸⁸ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, "Premier Wen Jiabao's Press Conference at the Conclusion of the Second Session of the 10th National People's Congress (NPC)," March 15, 2004, accessed June 15, 2013, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/topics/lianghuizhuanti/t80119.shtml>.

⁸⁹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, "Premier Wen Jiabao Meets with Japanese Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi," April 3, 2004, accessed June 15, 2013, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zjg/yzs/xwlb/t82535.shtml>.

⁹⁰ *Mainichi Shimbun*, April 23, 2004.

It is important to learn from history. We hope Japan can handle it properly.” This comment was the first time that Hu mentioned the Yasukuni issue to Koizumi. Koizumi reaffirmed his determination that Japan will not start wars again, and raised the issue of a Chinese submarine entering Japanese territorial seas on November 10 2004.⁹¹ During the ASEAN Plus Three summit in Vientiane, Laos, on November 30, Premier Wen Jiabao met with Koizumi. Regarding the history issue, Wen asked Koizumi to handle the Yasukuni issue properly.⁹² Chinese leaders even declined to meet with Koizumi in other countries. For example, Wen declined to meet with Koizumi in an Asia-Europe meeting in Hanoi in October. The remarks of Koizumi after their previous meeting in October 2003 distorted the position of Wen toward the history issue, which irritated Wen.⁹³

5. 2005 Visit of Koizumi

The constant stance of Koizumi toward the Yasukuni issue was that he did not consider the visits to Yasukuni equal to supporting militarism aggression, rejecting peace, or rehabilitating Class A war criminals.⁹⁴ Koizumi even urged China “to look past

⁹¹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “APEC shuno kaigi ni okeru Nicchu shuno kaidan” [China-Japan Summit in APEC summit (in Japanese)], November 22, 2004, accessed June 15, 2013, http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/kaidan/s_koi/apec_04/j_china_gh.html and Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, “President Hu Jintao Meets with Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi,” November 23, 2004, accessed June 15, 2013, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/topics/13apec/hjt2004apec/t171653.shtml>.

⁹² Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “ASEAN+3 shuno kaigi nosai no nichu shuno kaidan” [China-Japan Summit in ASEAN+3 Summit (in Japanese)], November 30, 2004, accessed June 15, 2013, http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/kaidan/s_koi/asean+3_04/china_g.html and Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, “Premier Wen Jiabao Meets with Leaders Attending the 10+3 Summit and Related Meetings,” November 30, 2004, accessed June 15, 2013, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/yzs/gjlb/2691/2693/t172770.shtml>.

⁹³ Ming Wan, *Sino-Japanese Relations*, 255.

⁹⁴ Tanaka argued that Koizumi probably attempted to reshape the constitutive rule of visiting Yasukuni from justification of aggression to mourning the war dead. Every time he visited Yasukuni Shrine, he released a statement that he supported peace, would never start war again, and fought against aggression. He did not equate Yasukuni to justification of aggression. However, his statement and attitude toward the

Yasukuni” and emphasized that “Yasukuni is not the only important issue in Japan-China relations.”⁹⁵ However, the pressure from China became increasingly intense for Koizumi. First, the criticisms of Chinese leaders on the Yasukuni issue became more strongly worded and asked him directly to handle the issue properly. Second, Koizumi did not care so much about mutual visits because he could still meet Chinese leaders several times a year in other countries. Nonetheless, Premier Wen Jiabao rejected to meet him in an Asia-Europe Meeting in 2004. In addition, when he invited Premier Wen Jiabao to join the World Expo in Aichi, Japan, in 2005, Wen replied that although he wanted to visit Japan in the proper time, the political atmosphere was unfavorable.⁹⁶ Thus, Koizumi was ambiguous about his plan of visiting Yasukuni in early 2005.

Pressure was also felt on the Chinese side. Although President Hu Jintao wanted to mend relations with Japan, domestic anti-Japanese sentiment made the Yasukuni issue more difficult to ignore. If Hu conceded the Yasukuni issue, he would be considered too weak on Japan policy. The debate about new thinking toward Japan in 2002 and 2003 taught Chinese leaders a lesson that whether it benefits Chinese interests and whether the Chinese leadership considers Yasukuni an important matter, they cannot back down on this issue. By contrast, the Japanese side seemed similarly unwilling to concede in the Yasukuni issue. If Koizumi stepped down as prime minister, his possible successor,

Yasukuni issue did not get through to China. He cannot change the constitutive rule without recognition from others and seemed to be unwilling to accept this fact. Akihiko Tanaka, “The Yasukuni Issue and Japan’s International Relations,” 135.

⁹⁵ “Koizumi Hoping China Can Look Past Yasukuni,” *Japan Times*, November 24, 2004, accessed June 15, <http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2004/11/24/national/koizumi-hoping-china-can-look-past-yasukuni/#.UXnBESsjrZg>.

⁹⁶ *Yomiuri Shimbun*, November 30, 2004.

Shinzo Abe, would be more conservative than him. Abe criticized Koizumi when Koizumi took an ambiguous position in the Yasukuni issue.⁹⁷ Beijing faced a deadlock.

The year 2005 was the worst time for Sino-Japanese relations because several devastating events occurred. First, on February 9, the Japanese government took control of the lighthouse in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands as national property and named it “Uotsurishima today (Lighthouse of Uotsuri Island).”⁹⁸ Second, on February 19, the U.S.-Japanese Security Consultative Committee declared a common statement that put a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan Strait into their common strategic goal.⁹⁹ Third, the Japanese Education Ministry approved a controversial version of the history textbook on April 5.¹⁰⁰ Fourth, Japan bid for a permanent membership in the Security Council in the United Nations.

After the third meeting of the Tenth National People’s Congress, Premier Wen Jiabao suggested improvements in Sino-Japanese relations on March 15. Without directly referring to the Koizumi visit to Yasukuni, Wen pointed out that the main problem was the history issue and indicated his willingness to improve relations with Japan.¹⁰¹ At the

⁹⁷ Ming Wan, *Sino-Japanese Relations*, 258.

⁹⁸ Please refer to Chapter 5.

⁹⁹ Please refer to Chapter 3.

¹⁰⁰ “Nihon no kyokasho mondai de gaikoubu hodokan ga danwa” [Foreign Ministry Spokesperson talked about Japan’s History Textbook Issue (in Japanese)], *Remin Ribao (Japanese Version)*, March 26, 2005, accessed June 15, 2013, http://j.people.com.cn/2005/03/26/jp20050326_48706.html and “Rekishu kyokasho kentei kekka de nihon ni genchu na moshiire gaikobu” [Foreign Ministry made forceful representations to Japan on the approval result of History Textbook (in Japanese)], *Remin Ribao (Japanese Version)*, April 6, 2005, accessed June 15, 2013, http://j.people.com.cn/2005/04/06/jp20050406_49003.html.

¹⁰¹ Chinese Embassy in Japan, “Chunichi Kankei ni mitsu no gensoku wo teian Okaho sori” [Suggest three principles for Sino-Japanese relations, Premier Wen Jiabao (in Japanese)], March 15, 2005, accessed June 15, 2013, <http://www.china-embassy.or.jp/jpn/zrgxs/t187311.htm2005/03/14>.

beginning of 2005, China still held certain policy positions. First, the problems need to be clarified with the hope that Japan changed its policy. Second, China emphasized the willingness to improve bilateral relations. Third, China did not close communication channels, such as in summits in third countries and during ministerial meetings.

On April 2, anti-Japanese demonstrations against the bid of Japan for a permanent United Nations Security Council position started in Chengdu, Sichuan Province. On April 9, about ten thousand Beijing citizens demonstrated against Japan, and on April 10, around twenty thousand people in Guangzhou, Guangdong Province, organized an anti-Japanese demonstration.¹⁰² On April 16 and 17, the anti-Japanese demonstrations spread to nine other cities, including Shanghai and Shenyang. Widespread anti-Japanese demonstrations across China culminated in three weeks.

Shotaro Yachi (Japanese permanent vice Foreign Minister) and Nobutaka Machimura (Japanese Foreign Minister) protested the violent acts toward the Japanese embassy and companies, and requested compensation.¹⁰³ Koizumi said, “It was a great pity. It was China’s responsibility to ensure the security of Japanese people living in China.”¹⁰⁴ However, the Chinese side pointed out that the anti-Japanese demonstration was the fault of the Japanese side. In a meeting with his counterpart Nobutaka

¹⁰² Kyoto Tsushin, April 10, 2005 and Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Chugoku ni okeru nihon kanren kougatsu katsu” [Protest Activities related to Japan in China (in Japanese)], April 12, 2005, accessed June 15, 2013, http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/china/j_kogi01.html.

¹⁰³ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Protest Activities related to Japan in China.”

¹⁰⁴ “Koizumi shusho ga ikan hyomei hannichi demo, shuno kaidan mo” [Koizumi Prime Minister said it was a pity, talk about Anti-Japanese Demonstration and Summit Meeting (in Japanese)], *Kyoto News*, April 11, 2005, accessed June 15, 2013, <http://www.47news.jp/CN/200504/CN2005041101003488.html>. Premier Wen stated to reporters that “The core problem in Sino-Japanese relations is Japan must handle history correctly.” “Ousori ga tanichi demo ni genkyu ‘nihon tokyoku ha fukaku hansei wo’” [Premier Wen Talked about Japanese-related Demonstration “the Japan Authority should Reflect deeply” (in Japanese)], *Remin Ribao (Japanese Version)*, April 13, 2005, http://j.people.com.cn/2005/04/13/jp20050413_49217.html.

Machimura in Beijing on April 17, Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing emphasized that the reason of the anti-Japanese demonstrations was due to the way Japan handled the history issue. Li stated the “Chinese government did not do anything wrong toward Japanese people. However, the way that Japanese government dealt with Taiwan issue, human rights, and history issue has hurt Chinese people’s feeling.” Li also denied the need to compensate Japan’s losses.¹⁰⁵ State Councilor Tang Jiaxuan also met with Foreign Minister Machimura on April 18, and said “A proper atmosphere and environment are important for leaders’ summit,” which implies resolution will be difficult, unless the Yasukuni issue is solved.¹⁰⁶

In mid-April, the Chinese government tried to curb the anti-Japanese demonstrations by imposing regulations and restraining negative media coverage of Japan. On April 14, the Beijing Municipal Public Security Bureau declared that “the demonstrations and assemblies without approvals are forbidden and the legal liability of violator will be pursued.” It was the first time during the 2005 spring demonstrations that Chinese official public security institutions clearly mentioned such regulations.¹⁰⁷ On April 21, the Chinese Ministry of Public Security issued the following statement, “the

¹⁰⁵ *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, April 18, 2005 and Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Machimura gaimu daijin hochu (nichu gaisho kaidan) [Machimura Foreign Minister Visited China (China-Japan Foreign Ministers’ Meeting) (in Japanese)], April 17, 2005, accessed June 15, 2013, http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/kaidan/g_machimura/china05/gaisho_gai.html.

¹⁰⁶ “Tokasen kokumu iin, nihon no Machimura Nobutaka to kaiken” [State Councilor Tang Jiaxuan met with Japanese Foreign Minister Nobutaka Machimura (in Japanese)], *Remin Ribao (Japanese Version)*, April 19, 2005, accessed June 15, 2013, http://j.people.com.cn/2005/04/19/jp20050419_49368.html.

¹⁰⁷ “Mukyoka no hannichi demo kinshi pekinshi, tainchi akka ni hadome” [Anti-Japanese Demonstrations with no approvals will be prohibited, Beijing City apply a brake to avoid further deterioration of Relations with Japan (in Japanese)], *Kyoto News*, April 15, 2005, accessed June 15, 2013, <http://www.47news.jp/CN/200504/CN2005041501001283.html>.

anti-Japanese demonstrations without approvals were illegal and the act organizing demonstration through Internet was legal as well.”¹⁰⁸ On April 22, Bo Xilai, the Minister of Commerce, discouraged the boycott of Japanese products because it would cause losses for both countries.¹⁰⁹

The anti-Japanese demonstrations forced Beijing to toughen its policy toward Japan. The Chinese government emphasized the history issue. On April 23, when President Hu Jintao met with Koizumi in the Asia-Africa Summit in Jakarta, Indonesia, Hu said that his position regarding the history and Yasukuni issues was the same as that in his statement in the Santiago summit in November 2004.¹¹⁰ On May 7, both foreign ministers met in Kyoto and agreed on a joint research on history. Li Zhaoxing strongly demanded Koizumi to stop visiting Yasukuni.¹¹¹ On May 22, President Hu Jintao met with Tsutomu Takebe, the secretary-general of the LDP, and Tetsuzo Fuyushiba, the secretary-general of the Komei Party. Hu strongly criticized Japanese errant moves in the previous year, including Koizumi’s visits to Yasukuni, history textbook issue, and the Taiwan issue.¹¹²

¹⁰⁸ “Tainichi demo ni tsuite danwa happyo kouanbu hodokan” [Ministry of Public Security Spokesperson talked about Anti-Japanese Demonstration (in Japanese)], *Remin Ribao (Japanese Version)*, April 22, 2005, accessed June 15, 2013, http://j.people.com.cn/2005/04/22/jp20050422_49495.html.

¹⁰⁹ “Fubai undo no chushi motomeru nihon seihin de chugoku shomusho” [Ask to Stop Boycott Movement, Chinese Commerce Minister Talked about Japanese Product (in Japanese)], *Kyoto News*, April 22, 2005, accessed June 15, 2013, <http://www.47news.jp/CN/200504/CN2005042201004350.html>.

¹¹⁰ *Yomiuri Shimbun*, April 24, 2005.

¹¹¹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “ASEM gaisho kaigo ni okeru nicchu gaisho kaidan” [China-Japan Foreign Ministers’ meeting in ASEM Foreign Ministers’ Meeting (in Japanese)], May 8, 2005, accessed June 15, 2013, http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/kaidan/g_machimura/ase7_05/jc_gai2.html.

¹¹² *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, May 23, 2005.

The remark of Koizumi hinting that he would visit Yasukuni again brought more difficulties for China. On May 16, Koizumi said that he would not stop visiting Yasukuni Shrine, but would decide the appropriate time to go. He said, “Each country has ways to mourn the dead. Other countries should not interfere with the way of mourning,” in reply to opposition Democratic Party lawmaker Yoshito Sengoku in a House of Representatives Budget Committee session.¹¹³ Vice Premier Wu Yi (吴仪) abruptly canceled the scheduled meeting with Koizumi and returned to China on May 23 because of Koizumi’s remarks on visiting Yasukuni.¹¹⁴

Right after the victory of the Upper House elections on September 11 and the approval of the bill of postal privatization on October 14, Koizumi visited Yasukuni Shrine again on October 17. Koizumi acted more low-key this time as he remarked that it was a private visit and did not write the title “Prime Minister” in the shrine register. As usual, he reiterated he supported peace and emphasized the importance of friendly relations with China and South Korea, but he also expressed displeasure at foreign government criticism of how Japanese mourn their war dead.¹¹⁵

¹¹³ “Koizumi hints to visit shrine again this year,” *China Daily*, May 16, 2005, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-05/16/content_442651.htm.

¹¹⁴ Chinese MFA spokesperson said “While vice Premier was visiting Japan, Japanese leaders gave several remarks which was unfavorable for Sino-Japanese relations. It destructed the necessary atmosphere and condition for the meeting.” “Kong Quan: Ri lianxu fabiao buli zhongri guanxi gaishan yanlun lingren yihan” [Kong Quan: It is a pity that Japan kept giving talks unfavorable for improving Sino-Japanese Relations (in Chinese)], *Renmin Ribao*, May 24, 2005, accessed June 15, 2013, <http://world.people.com.cn/BIG5/1029/3411204.html>.

¹¹⁵ “Koizumi shusho, Yasukuni wo sanpai shunin irai gokaime” [Prime Ministere Koizumi, Visit Yasukuni Shrine Fifth Time After He Came to Office (in Japanese)], *Kyoto News*, October 17, 2005.

Chinese protests were particularly strong to this visit. First, MFA summoned Japanese Ambassador Koreshige Anami.¹¹⁶ Second, Beijing rejected high-level meetings, including summit and ministerial meetings. Beijing postponed the foreign minister meeting planned for October 23 and 24 in Beijing.¹¹⁷ Third, dozens of Chinese marched in front of the Japanese embassy.¹¹⁸ Fourth, the Chinese side refused to meet with Japanese leaders in an APEC summit in Pusan on November 18 and 19.¹¹⁹ The ministerial meetings were stopped because of Koizumi's unwillingness to concede and internal anti-Japanese sentiment. Beijing was reluctant but was forced to adopt this policy.

6. 2006 Visit of Koizumi

Koizumi was unwilling to change his stance on the Yasukuni issue even if Chinese leaders refused to meet with him in international summits in other countries. In a press conference on January 4, 2006, when asked about his visit resulting in China and South Korea rejecting a leaders' summit with Japan, Koizumi replied that "They should not close other communication channel for one issue."¹²⁰

¹¹⁶ Chinese Government's Official Web Portal, "China condemns Koizumi's 5th shrine visit," October 18, 2005, accessed June 15, 2013, http://english.gov.cn/2005-10/18/content_78882.htm.

¹¹⁷ Chinese Government's Official Web Portal, "China Postpones Japanese FM's Visit," October 19, 2005, accessed June 15, 2013, http://www.gov.cn/misc/2005-10/19/content_79209.htm.

¹¹⁸ Ming Wan, *Sino-Japanese Relations*, 259.

¹¹⁹ Spokesperson stated "Based on the strict current situation, this summit meeting will be inappropriate. We told Tokyo that Prime Minister Koizumi's Yasukuni visit will result in very severe outcome; hence, he should responsible for all the political consequence." "waijiaobu jiu mei fangchang fanghua, qinliugan he zhongri guanxi dengdawan" [Foreign Ministry answered the questions including US Defense Minister's China Visit, Avian influenza, and Sino-Japanese Relations (in Chinese)], *Remin Ribao*, October 20, 2005, accessed June 15, 2013, <http://politics.people.com.cn/BIG5/1027/3787571.html>.

¹²⁰ Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, "Prime Minister Koizumi, First Press Conference of the Year," January 14, 2006, <http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/koizumispeech/2006/01/04press.html>.

Although facing a deadlock, Beijing maintained a pragmatic position highlighting the possibility of restoring Sino-Japanese relations. Beijing sent out signals that China was willing to improve relations with Japan as long as the successor of Koizumi would not visit Yasukuni.

In a press conference after the fourth session of the tenth National People's Congress on March 14, Premier Wen Jiabao reproached that the difficulties in Sino-Japanese relations resulted from the visits of Japanese leaders to Yasukuni and pointed out, "Pending a solution to this issue, the China-Japan relationship could hardly develop in a smooth manner." Wen emphasized that Beijing maintains an unswerving policy of developing friendship with Japan and called for continuing strategic dialogue, strengthening and increasing people-to-people exchanges, and stabilizing, developing, and even expanding economic relations and trade.¹²¹ On March 31, former Prime Minister Hashimoto visited China and met with President Hu Jintao. Hu told him, "If Japanese leader stop visiting Yasukuni Shrine, I will not reject a bilateral summit."¹²² After receiving the credentials of Yuji Miyamoto, a new Japanese ambassador to China, on June 10, President Hu Jintao declared the possibility of visiting Japan in the future.¹²³

¹²¹ "Chinese Premier Addresses Media on Major Issues," *People's Daily*, March 15, 2006, accessed June 15, 2012, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200603/15/eng20060315_250735.html.

¹²² "Kokinto shuseki yasukuni sanpai shinai nara shuno kaidan hiraku to hyomei" [President Hu Jintao: If (Japanese leader) don't visit Yasukuni again, bilateral summit will be hold (in Japanese)], *Mainichi Shimbun*, March 31, 2006.

¹²³ "Nicchu kaizen, posuto Koizumi ni shuha Ko shuseki 'Jyoken Totonoeba honichi'" [Improve Sino-Japanese Relations, Sent message to Koizumi's successor, Present Hu: if the condition is completed, he will visit Japan (in Japanese)], *Asahi Shimbun*, June 11, 2006.

The pragmatic position of China can also be seen in its actual foreign policy. Without communication channels, relations with Japan would be more devastating. Thus, the Chinese side reopened ministerial level dialogue after one year. For example, the foreign ministers met in Qatar on May 23, and Commerce Minister Bo Xilai traveled to Japan from May 28 to 30 to join an environmental forum in Kyoto representing Chinese leaders.¹²⁴

Koizumi visited Yasukuni Shrine on August 15 for the first time and fulfilled his pledge during the LDP presidential elections in 2000. Twenty-one years had passed after Nakasone's visit to the shrine on August 15, 1985. Chinese MFA protested against Koizumi's visit to Yasukuni Shrine on the same day. However, MFA also pledged to "continue to work untiringly with all Japanese statesmen and people who value and are committed to China-Japan friendship" and was confident that the Japanese people "will follow the trend of history to remove the political obstacle and help put China-Japan relations back on the track of normal growth at an early date."¹²⁵

Nonetheless, Beijing is flexible enough to look forward to his successor after Koizumi declared he would step down as prime minister. The potential successor of Koizumi, Chief Cabinet Secretary Shinzo Abe, responded to China's signals properly. Although he acted more conservatively than Koizumi, Abe took an ambiguous attitude on

¹²⁴ "Chinese, Japanese FMs to meet in Qatar," *Xinhua News Agency*, May 23, 2006, accessed June 15, 2013, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2006-05/23/content_4590628.htm and Chinese Government's Official Web Portal, "Chinese, Japanese commerce ministers meet in Kyoto," May 31, 2006, accessed June 15, 2013, http://www.gov.cn/misc/2006-05/31/content_296692.htm.

¹²⁵ Chinese Government's Official Web Portal, "China's statement on Koizumi's shrine visit," August 15, 2006, http://english.gov.cn/2006-08/15/content_362774.htm.

whether he would visit Yasukuni Shrine.¹²⁶ Shinzo Abe was elected president of the LDP on September 19 and became prime minister of Japan a week later. Wen Jiabao congratulated Abe immediately and stated, “Japan-China relations are at a crucial historic moment.”¹²⁷ In his inaugural speech to the Japanese Diet on September 29, Abe called for “strengthening bonds of trust” with China and South Korea.¹²⁸ Chinese and Japanese diplomats started to work quickly to arrange a summit meeting. At the beginning, Beijing insisted that Abe should promise that he would not visit Yasukuni. However, China was eager to make Abe choose Beijing as his first foreign visit after he became prime minister, and thus, China agreed to a visit and a summit even without Abe’s pledge of not visiting Yasukuni Shrine.¹²⁹ Abe visited China and met with Hu Jintao on October 8, which was the first summit in five years. Regarding the Yasukuni issue, Abe pledged to handle the Yasukuni issue “appropriately.”¹³⁰

¹²⁶ Japanese media revealed Abe secretly visited Yasukuni Shrine in April. When asked about this visit, Abe answered “I have no intention to tell did I visit or not.” “Shasetsu Abeshi Yasukuni Sanpai ‘konosaki’ ha meikaku na kotoba de” [Editorial: Abe Should make it clear about will he visit Yasukuni or not (in Japanese)], *Mainichi Shimbun*, August 5, 2006. Chinese FMA spokesperson responses cautiously, “we hope China and Japan can work together to bring Sino-Japan relations back to track toward normal development as early as possible.” “Gin Gang: zhong fang gaunqie rimei youguan anbei jinsan canbai de baodao” [Gin Gang: China is concerned about the Japanese reports regarding Abe Shinzo’s visit (Yasukuni Shrine) (in Chinese)], *Xinhua News Agency*, August 4, 2006.

¹²⁷ “Wen Jiabao Zongli dianhe anbei jinsan jiuren riben xin shouxiang” [Premier Wen Jiabao to congratulate Abe Shinzo’s inauguration by telegraph (in Chinese)], *Xinhua News Agency*, September 27, 2006, accessed June 15, 2013, http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2006-09/27/content_5144573.htm.

¹²⁸ Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, “Policy Speech by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to the 165th Session of the Diet,” September 29, 2006, accessed June 15, 2013, http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/abespeech/2006/09/29speech_e.html.

¹²⁹ James M. Reilly, “The Role of Public Opinion in China’s Japan Policy: 1997-2007” (PhD diss., The George Washington University, August 2008), 85.

¹³⁰ “With regard to the visits to Yasukuni Shrine, I explained my thoughts. Whether I have visited or will visit Yasukuni Shrine is not something I shall make clear since this is a matter that has been turned into a diplomatic and political issue. I shall not elaborate on it. That said, from the viewpoint that both sides shall

The visit of Premier Wen Jiabao to Japan from April 11 to 13 in 2007 showed the policy of Beijing of downplaying the history issue. In this successful visit, Wen clarified the stance of China in the history issue in his speech at the Japanese Diet, “by stressing the importance of drawing the lessons from history, we do not mean to perpetuate hatred. Rather, we want to secure a better future for our relations.” He further acknowledged Japan’s repeated apologies and pledged that “The Chinese people will never forget Japan’s support of China during our opening, reform, and modernization.”¹³¹ Before Wen’s trip to Japan, the Propaganda Department issued internal rulings that the media should not criticize Prime Minister Abe and the coverage of Japan should remain positive ahead of Wen’s visit.¹³² The Chinese newspaper coverage of Wen’s visit was extensive and extremely positive. An article on April 13 published in the *People’s Daily* even praised Japanese investments and ODA in China.¹³³ Although the position of the Abe on “comfort women” aroused controversy in March 2007,¹³⁴ the *People’s Daily* and other media in China downplayed this dispute. Instead, media extensively covered the March

overcome political difficulties and promote the sound development of the two countries, I shall address this matter appropriately. This explanation which I made, I believe, was understood by the Chinese side. What I mean by ‘address appropriately’ is what I just explained now.” Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, “Press Conference by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe Following His Visit to China,” October 8, 2006, accessed June 15, 2013, http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/abespeech/2006/10/08chinapress_e.html.

¹³¹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PRC, “Speech by Premier Wen Jiabao of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China at the Japanese Diet,” April 12, 2007, accessed June 15, 2013, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/yzs/gjlb/2721/2724/t311544.htm>.

¹³² Reilly, “The Role of Public Opinion,” 138.

¹³³ “First ‘Breaking’ Now ‘Melting’ the Ice,” *Renmin Ribao* (People’s Daily), April 13, 2007.

¹³⁴ James J. Przystup, “Japan-China Relations: New Year, Old Problems, Hope for Wen,” *Comparative Connections*, 9: 1 (April 2007).

11 statement of Abe and interpreted this statement, in which he pledged to stand by the Kono Statement,¹³⁵ as an apology.¹³⁶

In sum, Chinese policy has been downplaying the history issue. China adopted a pragmatic policy that only stopped mutual visits and did not close other communication channels, such as ministerial meetings and summits in other countries. Beijing invited more delegations of Japanese political parties to China. Moreover, Chinese leaders avoided mentioning the Yasukuni issue directly to Koizumi before 2004, although they demanded Koizumi to handle the history issue carefully. The anti-Japanese demonstrations in April 2005 forced the Chinese government to adopt a tougher attitude and policy toward Japan, such as stopping the high-level meetings. However, China gradually returned to the original policy of downplaying the history issue from late 2006 after Prime Minister Abe came to office.

III. Discourse of the Popular Nationalist

This section focuses on activists who mobilized protest activities against Japan, and attempts to answer the following questions. What is the root of their anti-Japanese sentiment and perception toward Japan? What are their arguments related to the history issue? What are their motivations and goals of protest activities and what is the content of their activities? How do these activist discourses mobilize public opinion? This section also analyzes the origins of anti-Japanese sentiment.

¹³⁵ Regarding the comfort women issue please refer to “Denial Reopens Wounds of Japan’s ex-sex slaves,” *New York Times*, March 8, 2007, accessed June 15, 2013, <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/08/world/asia/08japan.html?pagewanted=all> and Larry Niksch, “Japanese Military’s ‘Comfort Women’ System,” *Congressional Research Service Memorandum* (April 3, 2007).

¹³⁶ Reilly, “The Role of Public Opinion,” 139.

Popular nationalist activists refer to individuals who devote themselves to social movement related to Japan, such as the redress and Baodiao movements. With regard to these popular nationalist activists, people might have stereotypes, such as irrational, ignorant, not well-informed, and unfamiliar with Japan or international affairs. However, these stereotypes are not necessarily correct. For example, some people assume that popular nationalist activists protest against Japan because they are unfamiliar with the country, and thus, their image of the Japanese are biased by the valiant figures from movies or dramas on WW2. Nevertheless, Feng Jinhua (冯锦华), an active nationalist activist who led the 2004 Baodiao landing, studied and worked in Japan for eight years in the 1990s. Feng Jinhua went to Japan in 1994 to learn Japanese and entered Toyo University in 1996 (major in law). After graduation, he worked at a Chinese business department in a Japanese telecommunications company.¹³⁷ Moreover, most activists are well-educated and well-informed. For example, Tong Zeng (童增), chairman of the Chinese Federation for Defending the Diaoyu Islands (CFDD), was a researcher at a government think tank but lost his job in 1992 because he started a campaign to help wartime victims file lawsuits in Japan to demand war compensation from the Japanese government.¹³⁸ Wang Jinsi (王锦思) and Li Nan (李南) was a reporter and worked for a TV station.

¹³⁷ “Feng Jinhua buxiang jingguo shenshe daoqian” [Feng Jinhua won’t apologize to Yasukuni Shrine (in Chinese)], *Huanqiu shibao* [Global Times], September 7, 2001.

¹³⁸ Jian Zhang, “Influence of Chinese nationalism on Sino-Japanese relations,” in *China-Japan relations in the twenty-first century: creating a future past?*, ed. Michael Heazle and Nick Knight (Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, c2007), 25.

Thus, this section focuses on an activist, Wang Jinsi. In contrast to the stereotype most people perceive of so-called popular nationalists, he holds a comparatively objective position toward Japan. Although Wang protested against the mistaken interpretation of history and inappropriate policies by Japanese politicians and government, he objectively evaluated Japan's national reputation in international society, contribution to China's development, and pacifist policy in the post-war era. Wang's idea and arguments are introduced in his book, "How China and Japan get along? A personal experience, survey, and suggestions related to Sino-Japanese relations from a Post Resistance against Japan activist." This book was written by Wang in Chinese and translated into Japanese by Sun Xiuping, a journalist from the *Global Times*. Because of some sensitive content, the book was turned down by several Chinese publishers. Thus, the Japanese translation version became the first version of this book.¹³⁹

1. Roots of Anti-Japanese Sentiment

Wang Jinsi was born in Dehui City, Jilin Province, which is in the northeast part of China. The northeast region in modern China (formerly, Manchuria) was invaded by Imperial Japan in 1931. From 1931 to 1945, Japan installed a puppet state (Manchu State) and assigned the last emperor of the Qing Dynasty, Pu Yi, as a nominal emperor. Wang has heard many tragic wartime stories of the suffering of the Chinese people, such as the stories of Chinese civilians mobilized by the Kwangtung Army for slave work. When he was a child, he was fascinated by the portraits of heroes in the war of resistance against

¹³⁹ Translator Sun Xiuping mentioned that he published his book in Japan to help the Japanese people to understand the root of anti-Japanese sentiment and the arguments of so-called "anti-Japanese activists." Wang Jinsi, *Chugoku hanichikatsudoka no shogen* [The Testimony of Chinese 'Anti-Japanese' activists (in Japanese)], trans. Sun Xiuping (Tokyo: Kawade Shobo Shinsha Publishers, March 23, 2011), 199.

Japan in films. These memories contributed to his interests in studying the history of that period. He researched about the war of resistance against Japan and interviewed people who had wartime experience or were victims of the invasion and colonization.

Wang argued that the history of the war of resistance against Japan was not researched thoroughly and remembered respectfully. He thinks Chinese citizens are not knowledgeable enough about this war, and even the government was too careless with regard to memorial events. In 2002, he made a huge life decision to quit his job in the Changchun TV Bureau and devoted himself to patriotic activities. Wang and his colleagues organized and participated in the protests to demand for war compensation, defended the Diaoyu Islands, and corrected Japan's errors. Thus, they were usually viewed as anti-Japanese activists. Wang defined their activities as "Post resistance against Japan [后抗日]." He defined "Post resistance against Japan" as "a series of acts pursuing justice including conducting rational research on the war of resistance against Japan and on Japan and then publicized the result; solving the remaining problem of this war," including the memorial events and citizen compensation; and condemning, criticizing, and protesting against Japan's misconducts.¹⁴⁰

At first, his activity focused on calling for a national scale memorial event for the war of resistance against Japan. Inspired by the memorial events in Shenyang, where they sounded alarms and sirens on September 18 to commemorate the 1931 invasion of

¹⁴⁰ Please refer to Wang Jinsi's blog article "Zai riben chubenshu wanwan: *Zhongguo fanri huodongjia de zhengyan*" [Publish a book in Japan: *The Testimony of Chinese 'Anti-Japanese' Activists* (in Chinese)], <http://blog.ifeng.com/article/14161350.html>.

Shenyang,¹⁴¹ Wang organized activities calling for similar memorial events on a national scale. He then met other activists who shared his ideas, such as the participants of the Coalition of Patriots Web (aiguoazhe tongmen wang 爱国者同盟网). Wang joined and played an important role in other protest activities by providing research papers and drafting petitions.

2. Attitude of Wang toward History Disputes

Wang observed that although more than 60 years has passed after the end of WW2, several problems remained. For example, war victims should request compensation from the Japanese government. Moreover, some chemical weapons or mines buried during WW2 still endangered Chinese citizens. For example, dozens of Chinese citizens were injured in Qiqihar in 2003 by the chemical weapons left over by the Japanese imperial army during WW2. Wang believed that China and Japan can reach a real settlement only when all wartime problems have been solved.

Wang pointed out that the anti-Japanese activities, or as he calls it, “Post Resistance against Japan Activities,” began during the first history textbook controversy in 1982. Japan’s attitude toward history irritated and hurt the Chinese people’s feelings. He criticized that some Japanese¹⁴² misunderstood the generous forgiveness of Chinese

¹⁴¹ This memorial ceremony started in 1995. In August 1995, for commemorating fifty anniversary of the victory of the War of Resistance against Japan and the Anti-Fascist War of the World, Shenyang Municipal government decided that to sound the siren in the whole city for three minutes on September 18 in every year.

¹⁴² Wang argued that the war responsibilities of Japan were not assessed and punished thoroughly after the WW2 because the outbreak of the Cold War led the US to change its policy on Japan. Thus, the responsibility of Emperor Hirohito during the war was not investigated, and the emperor system was not abolished although individuals who were already sentenced by the Tokyo Military Tribunal were released. Thus, Wang concluded that these developments prevented the conservative power and right-wing groups in Japan from being thoroughly eliminated. Wang, *Testimony*, 55.

leaders and stepped back from the previous position of sincere apology. Some Japanese even ignored or whitewashed the history of invasion. Thus, Wang argued that forgiveness and apology were different. Even though Chinese leaders often mentioned to “let bygones be bygones,” and even if Japanese leaders already apologized several times for the invasion, as long as Japan holds a wrong attitude toward history, the Chinese people should correct and protest against it. Moreover, Wang refuted the arguments of the Japanese media that Chinese anti-Japanese sentiment resulted from the Patriotic Education Campaign in the 1990s. He argued that the education campaign is for educating the youth about the historical facts of WW2, which were ignored by the Chinese people. He believed that the purpose was to educate citizens to be patriots, not nationalists.¹⁴³

Wang considered the Yasukuni issue a good example of how the conservatives in Japan denied the invasion and distorted history. He said, “Japanese Prime Minister, ministers, and lawmakers frequently visit Yasukuni Shrine and attempt to call back the spirit of war criminals.”¹⁴⁴ Wang refuted some Japanese arguments that Chinese criticisms toward Yasukuni visits interfered with Japan’s domestic politics. He said, “It is not simply the problem of the freedom of belief, but it hurts the feeling of Chinese people, especially when the visits were made by important people in Japanese government.”¹⁴⁵ Wang believed that the Yasukuni Shrine plays a role in downplaying the substance of

¹⁴³ Ibid., 125-9.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid., 55-6.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid., 187.

Japan's invasion history. Thus, protesting against the visits of important Japanese politicians to the shrine is justified. Moreover, Wang argued that the removal of Class-A war criminals from Yasukuni Shrine cannot solve the problems because Yasukuni Shrine itself was the symbol of militarism.

The criticisms of Wang focused on Japan and on the Chinese domestic attitude toward history. Considering the enormous suffering caused by this war, Wang believed the Chinese people should not forget it. He was disappointed about the lack of knowledge of many Chinese people about this war, and called for attaching more importance to research on the history of this war and more widely disseminating this history to Chinese citizens. He felt discouraged that the Chinese government did not have national memorial events for WW2, which are similar to the commemoration of the Japanese government of the anniversary of the atomic bombing in Japan.

Wang admitted that the mutual perceptions between the Chinese and Japanese people have entered into a vicious circulation pattern in which Japanese domestic affairs related to the history issue occurred. The Chinese people, who depended on superficial information and Chinese media reports, protested against these incidents and even started to hate the Japanese.

3. "Post Resistance against Japan Activities" and their Influence on Public Opinion

Wang Jinsi organized an activity calling for memorial events of national scale to commemorate the victory of the war of resistance against Japan. He suggested that the central government should hold memorial ceremonies on important dates, such as September 18. Memorial events should include the speeches of national leaders, sounding

sirens through the whole nation, and mourning quietly for the war dead for three minutes with flags flown at half mast. He started collecting petitions and sending his suggestions to politicians in 2001. Other activists supported his ideas. For example, nationalist websites such as Coalition of Patriots Web and National Industry posted and promoted his ideas. In March 2003, with the support of the Coalition of Patriots Web, Wang Jinsi, Gao Heng (高恒), Feng Jinhua, and Lu Yunfei (卢云飞) held a press conference calling for the sounding of sirens on September 18 in the whole nation. Some politicians, such as Jiang Xiaoqin (姜笑琴) and Hu Yamei (胡亚美), accepted his idea and wrote a bill to the National People's Congress (2002 to 2006). Although his idea was not accepted by the central government, a hundred cities sounded sirens on September 18 in 2011.¹⁴⁶

On January 1, 2003, Wang met with Feng Jinhua, Li Nan, and Lu Yunfei decided to become allies. From that time, every time Japan said or did something wrong in relation to the history issue, Wang and other activists staged protests. Their activities included defending the Diaoyu Islands, petitioning against importing Japan *Shinkansen* technology for the high-speed railroad between Shanghai and Beijing, and petitioning against the Qiqihar chemical weapon issue. Through these activities, the Coalition of Patriots Web became known as a civil website protesting against Japanese right-wing ideas and militarism.

On August 15, 2003, Japanese ministers and lawmakers visited the Yasukuni Shrine. Feng Jinhua asked Wang to draft a protest letter and to send it to the Japanese

¹⁴⁶ “Zhongguo yubaizuo chengshi laxiang fangkong jingbao jinian918” [Around 100 cities sounded sirens to commemorate 918 (in Chinese)], *China News Service*, September 19, 2011, accessed June 15, 2013, <http://www.chinanews.com/gn/2011/09-18/3335452.shtml>.

embassy. This protest document indicated that for these activists, the Yasukuni issue is a part of the history issue that needed protesting and correcting. According to the protest letter, the Chinese people still suffered from Japan's invasion in several ways.

First, the Chemical weapon left by Japanese imperial army still endangered Chinese citizens. Second, Tokyo tried to beautify invasion history by revising history textbook. Third, Japan adopted various measures on China's territory, the Diaoyu Islands, and Japanese navy ship even crashed Chinese citizen Baodiao boat with which activists appealing the Chinese sovereignty. Fourth, Several Japanese previous Prime Ministers and lawmakers visited Yasukuni Shrine and it defies to the result of Tokyo Military Tribunal. Five, Japan sent troops to overseas and even maintained that Japan should develop nuclear weapon.¹⁴⁷

Popular nationalist activists such as Wang Jinsi played an important part in planning, leading, and launching protest activities against Japan. According to Wang, these activists worked alone at first, leading their own websites or activities. However, after meeting each other, they started to work as a team. According to Wang, most of the leaders of activists are well-educated and are in their 20s and 30s.¹⁴⁸ With the leadership of these leaders in every city, activities spread to other cities. These leaders are the brain of the activities. For example, Wang wrote survey papers on WW2 history, drafts of petitions, and opinion letters for the activities. They used new media, such as the Internet, to express and to spread their opinions, and to influence the general public. The petition against *Shinkansen* is a good example of how their activities influenced public opinion, and then government policy.

The petition in April 2003 against the Beijing-Shanghai high-speed railway using Japanese *Shinkansen* technology demonstrated the influence of the activists on public

¹⁴⁷ Wang, *Testimony*, 99.

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 101.

opinion. In early 2003, a researcher familiar with the project from the Science Research Institute of the Railway Ministry stated that “the possibility of selecting Japan’s *Shinkansen* was already greater than 90%.”¹⁴⁹ Not long after, the Railroad Ministry circulated an internal report announcing their plan to outsource Japanese firms.¹⁵⁰ In April 2003, *Japan’s Economic News* reported that China told Japanese railway companies that “the possibility of choosing *Shinkansen* is about 95%.”¹⁵¹ During a summit in St. Petersburg in May 31, the leaders of both countries talked about this railway project. President Hu said, “We are still discussing whether to adopt linear technology or rail technology. After we reached the conclusion, we will consider the cooperation with Japan.”¹⁵² In mid-July, the Chinese media reported that the Ministry of Railways completed research on the Beijing-Shanghai high-speed rail, and that it preferred traditional railway technology.¹⁵³

These developments prompted Internet discussion and disappointed the Chinese public. On July 19, the Coalition of Patriots Web started an online petition against

¹⁴⁹ It also points out that “Even though it required approval by the top leadership, the essential explanation behind the approval was already done and the only thing left to do was the procedural aspects of the auditing.” Liu Ning, “Jinghugaotiezaoyuminyimenjian” [Beijing-Shanghai High-Speed Rail Encounters the Threshold of Public Opinion (in Chinese)], *Nanfengchuang* [Southern Wind Window], August 16, 2003, accessed June 15, 2013, <http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2003-08-16/14521556454.html>.

¹⁵⁰ Reilly, “The Role of Public Opinion,” 203.

¹⁵¹ Han Xuan, “Hujinggaotiepengshangminzuzhuyiliangchao” [The Beijing-Shanghai High Speed Train Encounters a Wave of Nationalism (in Chinese)], *Guoji Xianfeng Daobao* [International Herald Tribune (Beijing)], August 4, 2003, accessed June 15, 2013, <http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2003-08-04/15541475533.html>.

¹⁵² Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “China-Japan Summit in Saint Petersburg.”

¹⁵³ Han Xuan, “The Beijing-Shanghai High Speed Train.”

importing Japanese *Shinkansen*.¹⁵⁴ Within 10 days, 82,752 signatures were collected. The website clarified its reasons for opposing the use of Japanese technology:

First, Japan hurt the feeling of Chinese people. Secondly, once importing the *Shinkansen*, Japan can investigate Chinese geographic environment and conduct geological surveys in China. If there will be war between China and Japan, it will be not favorable for China. Third, Japan side is usually conservative and will not transfer their technology as China request. Fourth, if this construction project of rail of 7,150,000 km is given to Japan, it will bring energy to Japan's manufacturing, electronic engineering industry, and right-wing corporation Mitsubishi Heavy Industries. Fifth, if China adopts *Shinkansen*, a symbol of Japan's success and a symbol of Japan's national spirit and pride, Japan will feel more superior to China.¹⁵⁵

On August 4, 2003, Lu Yunfei, Zhang Likun (张立昆), and Wang Jinsi submitted the petition and opinion letter drafted by Wang to the Ministry of Railways of PRC.

On August 5, 2003, the Japanese Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport, and Tourism Oogi Chikage, who was visiting China, held a press conference to appeal for *Shinkansen*.¹⁵⁶ Asked if she knew about the petitions against *Shinkansen*, Chikage answered, "I knew. It is only the opinions from a part of people and it does not mean that *Shinkansen* has defect."¹⁵⁷ During a meeting between Oogi and Vice Premier Huang Ju (黄菊), Huang praised Japan's *Shinkansen* technology, but explained that China's experts were still evaluating the situation. Deputy Director of the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) Zhang Guobao (张国宝), who was directly responsible for

¹⁵⁴ The petition (no longer available) was at: http://www.1931-9-18.org/bbs/guest_sign.ASP.

¹⁵⁵ Wang, *Testimony*, 111-2.

¹⁵⁶ "Shinkansen no yuisei wo kyocho he chugoku no tetsudo jikan ni Oogi kokko sho" [Transport Minister Oogi Emphasize the Advantage of Shinkansen to Vice Railways Minister (in Japanese)], *Kyodo Tsushin*, August 5, 2003, accessed June 15, 2013, <http://www.47news.jp/CN/200308/CN2003080501000042.html>.

¹⁵⁷ Wang, *Testimony*, 113.

the project, informed Oogi of the domestic debate domestically and further pointed out “we will take Chinese citizens’ public opinions into consideration.”¹⁵⁸ In December 2003, a Chinese official told Japanese media that the Hu administration cannot ignore public opinion on this project.¹⁵⁹ In March 2004, Cheng Yonghua (程永华), a counselor in the Chinese Embassy in Tokyo, told Japanese journalists that the Internet debates and domestic opposition to the Japanese bid would significantly influence the decision of China.¹⁶⁰

On August 29 2004, Xinhua News Agency reported that Japanese firms had received contracts to build 80 high-speed trains amounting to ¥1.34 trillion, Chinese activists quickly organized a new petition for the Chinese to build their own high-speed rail.¹⁶¹ The website of the activists was shut down the next day.¹⁶² On March 7, 2006, the NDRC announced that China would build a traditional high-speed railway with Chinese technology for the Beijing-Shanghai line and a Maglev train between Shanghai and Hangzhou.¹⁶³ This final decision roughly matched the demand of the activists. Although

¹⁵⁸ Ibid., 158 and Liu Ning, “Beijing-Shanghai High-Speed Rail.”

¹⁵⁹ Reilly, “The Role of Public Opinion,” 207.

¹⁶⁰ Ming Wan, *Sino-Japanese Relations*, 138, footnote. 28.

¹⁶¹ James J. Przystup, “Japan-China Relations: Not the Best of Times,” *Comparative Connections* 6: 3 (October 2004), 124.

¹⁶² Ibid., and Peter Hays Gries, “China’s ‘New Thinking’ on Japan,” *The China Quarterly* 184 (December 2005), 846.

¹⁶³ Reilly, “The Role of Public Opinion,” 210.

public mobilization was not the only concern,¹⁶⁴ it crucially influenced the delaying of the decision making, and the public sentiment significantly affected the decision making.¹⁶⁵

4. Origin of the Anti-Japanese Sentiment

As pointed out earlier, the activists did not necessarily hold an irrational view of Japan. However, some supporters were not as objective or rational as others. Although some anti-Japanese public opinions were influenced by the activists, some public opinions regarding Japan had already been negative before the activists adopted actions.¹⁶⁶ Thus, I would like to provide some observations of the origins of the anti-Japanese sentiment.

One assumption is state-led nationalism under the CCP regime. The CCP regime lost the legitimacy of socialist ideology and replaced it with nationalism to buttress the legitimacy of its regime. The Patriotic Education Campaign in the early 1990s indeed strengthened the knowledge of the younger generation about WW2.¹⁶⁷ For many Chinese citizens, the image of Japan was molded by their education.¹⁶⁸ Although the state-led

¹⁶⁴ Developing China's high-speed railway technology is also important in this case.

¹⁶⁵ Reilly, "The Role of Public Opinion," 212.

¹⁶⁶ Japan Research Center and Chinese Academy of Social Science, "Kokusai yoron chyosa- nichu kankei nit suite no kokusai hikaku yoron chyosa" [International public opinion survey - comparative international public opinion survey regarding to Sino-Japanese relations (in Japanese)], August 7, 2007. accessed June 15, 2013, <http://www.nrc.co.jp/report/pdf/070807.pdf>.

¹⁶⁷ Regarding the detail of Patriotic Education Campaign and its impact, please refer to Suisheng Zhao, *A Nation-State by Construction: Dynamics of Modern Chinese Nationalism* (California: Stanford University Press, 2004), 207-247.

¹⁶⁸ "Dong-A Ilbo Opinion Poll: Special Research on Chinese Attitudes toward Japan and Other Nations," conducted with *Asahi Shimbun* and the Institute of Sociology, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), released April 26, 2005, accessed June 15, 2013, <http://mansfieldfdn.org/program/research-education-and-communication/asian-opinion-poll-database/listofpolls/2005-polls/march-2005-dong-a-ilbo-opinion-poll-on-chinese-attitudes-toward-japan-and-other-nations/>.

patriotic education campaign may refresh people's memory and knowledge of Japanese atrocities in WW2, the purpose of state was not arousing or inflaming the anti-Japanese sentiment.

The second source of anti-Japanese sentiment is arguably the relaxed controls over WW2 studies. He Yinan related that the CCP government suppressed domestic truth-telling about the resistance war against Japan, and downplayed Japanese atrocities in history textbooks before the 1980s.¹⁶⁹ Textbooks focused on criticizing the Kuomintang (KMT) and American imperialism. The resistance war against Japan was simply part of the humiliation of a hundred years, which ended when CCP defeated KMT. Compared with the demonization of the U.S. and the KMT, the descriptions of Japan tended to distinguish a small group of the militarist and innocent Japanese public.¹⁷⁰ Moreover, research on the resistance war against Japan was suppressed. The history department at Nanjing University completed research on the Nanjing Massacre as early as the 1960s, but was only allowed to publish the study in 1979 via internal circulation. When Mei Ruao (梅汝璈), a judge in the Tokyo Military Tribunal, called for research on the Nanjing Massacre, he was accused of "arousing the hatred toward Japanese people."¹⁷¹ Movies about the resistance war against Japan avoided portrayals of Japanese atrocities and Chinese suffering.¹⁷² The foreign policy regarding Japan downplayed

¹⁶⁹ He Yinan, "National Mythmaking and the Problems of History in Sino-Japanese Relations," Peng Er Lam ed., *Japan's Relations with China: Facing a Rising Power* (Routledge, 2006).

¹⁷⁰ Ibid., 73.

¹⁷¹ Ibid., 74.

¹⁷² Ibid.

history disputes in favor of cooperation with the country. For example, the CCP government waived demands for war compensation¹⁷³ and accepted the ambiguous apology of Japanese Prime Minister Kakue Tanaka in a statement of normalization.¹⁷⁴ The negotiation focus in the normalization was the Taiwan issue and anti-hegemony clause, whereas the negotiations in the Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty focused on strategic issues. Under Mao, the CCP government shelved the history dispute with Japan to win its cooperation and to avoid deviating from criticizing the real enemies, which were KMT and American imperialism.

However, this policy gradually changed, when the CCP government embarked a policy of shaping the state-led nationalism. This policy not only appeased the conservative group, who were afraid of the negative effect brought by economic reform, but also underpinned the CCP regime's legitimacy.¹⁷⁵ This policy changed the historical narrative. The "enemy" in textbooks became Japanese imperialism.¹⁷⁶ Textbooks vividly described Japanese atrocities and provided concrete statistics, pictures, and accounts of victims. Museums commemorated important battles and events in various places, and

¹⁷³ "Tanaka Sori Shu onrai sori kaidan kiroku" [Japan-China Summit Meeting between Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka and Premier Zhou En-lai (in Japanese)], September 25-28, 1972. "The World and Japan" Database Project, accessed June 15, 2013, <http://www.ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/documents/texts/JPCH/19720925.O1J.html>.

¹⁷⁴ Regarding the negotiation on apology, refer to Xuanli Laio, *Chinese Foreign Policy Think Tank*, pp. 145-156. The part mentioning history issue in the statement: "The Japanese side is keenly conscious of the responsibility for the serious damage that Japan caused in the past to the Chinese people through war, and deeply reproaches itself." Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, "Joint Communiqué of the Government of Japan and the Government of the People's Republic of China," September 29, 1972, accessed June 15, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/china/joint72.html>.

¹⁷⁵ Zhao, *A Nation-State by Construction*, 207-218.

¹⁷⁶ He Yinan, "National Mythmaking," 79-80.

students were brought to these museums as part of their education. Research on the resistance war against Japan increased.¹⁷⁷

Moreover, beginning in the early 1990s, non-government organizations (NGOs) and history activists significantly influenced the agenda setting of historical issues. NGO activists, such as Tong Zeng, brought to light several new cases of Japanese atrocities, such as forced labor and comfort women. These NGO activists assisted victims to lodge lawsuits in Japanese courts.¹⁷⁸ The civilian compensation campaign gained wide publicity in both countries by unearthing Japanese wartime atrocities in China and caused the Chinese to pay more attention on historical issues. The research of these history activists on Japanese atrocities also contributed to this tendency.¹⁷⁹

Third, the market-oriented media played an important role in stimulating anti-Japanese sentiment. The state controlled the media through a complex bureaucratic oversight system.¹⁸⁰ The Central Propaganda Department issued regular notices to all television and print media. These notices included guidance on “what issue should be covered or not be covered and the proper ‘line’ to take.”¹⁸¹ Punishments on media that crossed the line included warnings of discipline, termination of editors, or even shutdown of the publication. However, the market-oriented media did not receive subsidy from

¹⁷⁷ Concerning the content of Patriotic Education Campaign, please refer to Zhao, *A Nation-State by Construction*, 218-238.

¹⁷⁸ Zhang, “Influence of Chinese nationalism,” 18.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid.

¹⁸⁰ Susan L Shirk, “Changing Media, Changing Foreign Policy in China.” *Japanese Journal of Political Science* 8: 1 (2007): 43-70.

¹⁸¹ Reilly, “The Role of Public Opinion,” 138.

government and raised their own funds, which gave them latitude to report sensational news to satisfy the market. Thus, the market-oriented media struggled to survive between the Party line and the bottom line, and avoided offending the Party while pleasing the public. The success of *Global Times* (*Huanqiu Shibao*) through reporting sensational and nationalist stories related to the history issue showed other market-oriented media that stories related to the history issue and negative coverage of Japan sell, and the government had lighter restraints on coverage of Japan.¹⁸² Extensive sensationalist and nationalist stories covered by the market-oriented media and spread via the Internet significantly shaped the issue agenda and anti-Japanese sentiment from 2001 to 2005.

Overall, the influence of popular nationalist discourses on public opinion and policy was more significant in the domestic policy arena, such as with the *Shinkansen* issue, than in the foreign policy arena. The impact of popular nationalist discourses and public opinion on foreign policy are complicated because they involve the policy and response of counterparts. Foreign policy on “major/minor interest issues” can only be challenge and to influence in a short term, unless the state changes its priority of national interest and a “major/minor interest issues” becomes a “core interests issue.”

Thus, the next case (Diaoyu Island) will clarify the extent of influence of popular nationalist discourse on foreign policy on “core interest issue.” The next chapter also

¹⁸² *Global Times* is published by the *People's Daily* group, which is owned by CCP. Thus, other media outlets might feel that the news reported in *Global Times* can be safely covered by other media. Moreover, Daniela Stockmann pointed out that the editors of the Beijing newspaper felt they did not have any constraints on the coverage of Japan. Daniela Stockmann, “What kind of information does the public demand? Getting the news during the 2005 anti-Japanese protests,” in *Changing media, changing China* ed. Susan L. Shirk (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 183.

discusses the influence of activists on both cases, the Yasukuni issue case and the Diaoyu dispute cases, and their relations with the government.

CHAPTER FIVE: PATRIOTIC DILEMMA IN THE CASE OF THE DIAOYU/SENKAKU DISPUTE

This section describes the grounds for sovereign claim of Diaoyu/Senkaku of both sides.¹ Further, this chapter investigates the official policy on the Diaoyu dispute from 1971 up to the present, and points out that the official direction has shifted to a stronger position. Third, this section describes the discourses and actions of popular nationalist activists and their influence on public mobilization. Based on the analyses from chapter four and this chapter, the last section discusses the role of popular nationalist activists in China's Japan policy making and the relations between popular nationalist activists and the government.

I. Claims of Both Sides

The Diaoyu Islands are located in the East China Sea (Pacific Ocean) between Japan, China, and Taiwan.² The archipelago consists of five uninhabited islets and three barren rocks.³ The total landmass of these islands is approximately 5.69 km². In 1968, the United Nations (UN) Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) revealed

¹ To avoid redundancy, I will use "the Diaoyu Islands" (except in the part describing Japan's position) because this case focuses on the policy of China on Japan.

² The archipelago is located approximately 120 nautical miles northeast of Taiwan, 200 nautical miles east of the Chinese mainland, and 200 nautical miles southwest of the Japanese island of Okinawa. The islands are known as the Senkaku Islands in Japan, the Diaoyu in China, and the Tiaoyutai Islands in Taiwan. They are also known as the Pinnacle Islands.

³ The Chinese/Japanese names of these islands are as follows: Diaoyu Dao/Uotsuri-shima, Huangwei Yu/Kuba-shima, Chiwei Yu/Taisho-jima, Bei Xiaodao/Kita-Kojima, and Nan Xiaodao/Minami-Kojima. The three rocks are named Bei Yu/Okinokitaiwa, Nan Yu/Okinominamiwa, and Fei Yu/Tobise.

that possible oil and gas reserves were found in the vicinity of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. China, Taiwan, and Japan all started to claim sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands and engaged in a territorial dispute. This section focuses primarily on the claim and position of China and Japan.

Claim of China

In the *White Paper on Diaoyu Dao, an Inherent Territory of China*, published in September 2012, China provided historical documents and other evidence to assert that the Diaoyu Islands and its affiliated islands are “China’s inherent territory in all historical, geographical and legal terms, and China enjoys indisputable sovereignty over Diaoyu Dao.”⁴ China cited several historical documents to support that the Diaoyu Islands were first discovered, named, and exploited by China. The earliest historical record of the names of the Diaoyu Islands can be found in the book, *Voyage with a Tail Wind (Shun Feng Xiang Song)*, published in 1403. This record showed that China already discovered and named the islands by the 14th and 15th centuries.⁵ Other historical travelogues and official documents indicated that China placed the Diaoyu Islands under its coastal

⁴ State Council Information Office of the PRC, *White Paper on Diaoyu Dao, An Inherent Territory of China*, September 2012, <http://english.people.com.cn/90785/7960320.html>.

⁵ Sources of other historical documents included Chen Kan, an imperial title-conferring envoy from the Ming court, who wrote the *Records of the Imperial Title-Conferring Envoys to Ryukyu (Shi Liu Qiu Lu)* in 1534. Another imperial envoy of the Ming Dynasty, Guo Rulin, wrote *Shi Liu Qiu Lu* in 1562. In 1719, Xu Baoguang, a deputy title-conferring envoy to Ryukyu in the Qing Dynasty, clearly recorded these islands in his book *Records of Messages from Chong-shan (Zhong Shan Chuan Xin Lu)*. These three documents emphasized the location of the Diaoyu Islands in the route from China to Ryukyu. In 1650, *the Annals of Chong-shan (Zhong Shan Shi Jian)*, the first official historical record of the Ryukyu Kingdom drafted under the supervision of Ryukyu Prime Minister Xiang Xiangxian (Kozoken), confirmed that the Diaoyu Islands are not part of Ryukyu. Ibid.

defense in the early years of the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644).⁶ The Qing Dynasty (1644-1911) placed the islands under the jurisdiction of the local government of Taiwan.⁷ Chinese and foreign maps showed that the Diaoyu Islands belonged to China.⁸ Japanese literature, *Outline of the Three Countries* (Hayashi Shihei, 1785), indicated that the Diaoyu Islands belonged to China.⁹ China argued that Hei Shu Gou (黑水沟; also known as Okinawa Trough) in the ocean floor separated the Diaoyu Islands and China's continental shelf from Japan's Ryuku Islands. Historical documents revealed the border line between China and Ryukyu lies in Hei Shui Gou, and between Chiwei Yu and Kume Island.¹⁰ Based on these historical documents, China refuted the Japanese argument based

⁶ These historical documents included the following sources. In 1561, Zheng Ruozeng compiled a book, *An Illustrated Compendium on Maritime Security (Chou Hai Tu Bian)*, under the auspices of Hu Zongxian, the supreme commander of the southeast coastal defense of the Ming court. Xu Bida and others drew *The Complete Map of Unified Maritime Territory for Coastal Defense (Qian Kun Yi Tong Hai Fang Quan Tu)* in 1605. Mao Yuanyi drew *The Treatise on Military Preparations. Coastal Defense II. Map of Fujian's Coastal Mountains and Sands (Wu Bei Zhi. Hai Fang Er. Fu Jian Yan Hai Shan Sha Tu)* in 1621. Ibid.

⁷ Official documents of the Qing court, such as *A Tour of Duty in the Taiwan Strait (Tai Hai Shi Cha Lu)* and *Annals of Taiwan Prefecture (Tai Wan Fu Zhi)*, gave detailed accounts concerning China's administration over Diaoyu Dao. Volume 86 of *Recompiled General Annals of Fujian (Chong Zuan Fu Jian Tong Zhi)*, a book compiled by Chen Shouqi and others in 1871 pointed out the same fact. Ibid.

⁸ These Chinese maps included *The Roadmap to Ryukyu (Liu Qiu Guo Hai Tu)* in *Shi Liu Qiu Lu*, written by imperial title-conferring envoy Xiao Chongye in 1579; *the Record of the Interpreters of August Ming (Huang Ming Xiang Xu Lu)*, written by Mao Ruizheng in 1629; *the Great Universal Geographic Map (Kun Yu Quan Tu)*, created in 1767; and *the Atlas of the Great Qing Dynasty (Huang Chao Zhong Wai Yi Tong Yu Tu)*, published in 1863. All marked Diaoyu Dao as Chinese territory. Maps from other countries, such as *The Map of East China Sea Littoral States* created by French cartographer Pierre Lapie and others in 1809, *A New Map of China from the Latest Authorities* published in Britain in 1811, *Colton's China* published in the United States in 1859, and *A Map of China's East Coast: Hongkong to Gulf of Liao-Tung* compiled by the British Navy in 1877, all marked Diaoyu Dao as part of China's territory. Ibid.

⁹ This book was the earliest Japanese literature to mention Diaoyu Dao. "The Map of the Three Provinces and 36 Islands of Ryukyu in the book put Diaoyu Dao as being apart from the 36 islands of Ryukyu and colored it the same as the mainland of China, indicating that Diaoyu Dao was part of China territory." Ibid.

¹⁰ These historical documents included the following: In 1579, Xie Jie, a deputy imperial title-conferring envoy of the Ming Dynasty, recorded his book, *Addendum to Summarized Record of Ryukyu (Liu Qiu Lu Cuo Yao Bu Yi)*. Xia Ziyang, another imperial envoy of the Ming court, wrote "when the water flows Hei Shui back to Cang Shui, it enters the Chinese territory" in 1606. Wang Ji, an imperial envoy of the Qing

on the international law principle of “occupation of terra nullius (land belonging to no state),” because China had exercised valid jurisdiction over the island for several hundred years.¹¹

As evidence of the acknowledgment of the Meiji government that the Senkaku Islands were the territory of China before being incorporated into the Okinawa Prefecture, the Chinese government referred to the correspondence between Foreign Minister Kaoru Inoue and Interior Minister Aritomo Yamagata in 1885. When the Japanese government dispatched a secret survey of the Diaoyu Islands, the Chinese newspaper *Shen-pao* (*Shanghai News*) reported on September 6, 1885 that “Recently, Japanese flags have been seen on the islands northeast to Taiwan, revealing Japan’s intention to occupy these islands.”¹² On September 22, 1885, the governor of Okinawa Prefecture sent a report to Minister of Internal Affairs Yamagata Aritomo, saying that

These uninhabited islands were, in fact, the same Diaoyu Tai, Huangwei Yu and Chiwe Yu that were recorded in *the Records of Messages from Chong-shan* (*Zhong Shan Chuan Xin Lu*) and known well to imperial title-conferring envoys of the Qing court on their voyages to Ryukyu.¹³

Minister Yamagata solicited the opinion of Foreign Minister Inoue on October 9, 1885.¹⁴ In a letter to Yamagata on October 21, Kaoru Inoue suggested they should wait

Dynasty, wrote a book, *Miscellaneous Records of a Mission to Ryukyu (Shi Liu Qiu Za Lu)* in 1683. In 1756, Zhou Huang, a deputy imperial envoy of the Qing Dynasty, wrote *Annals of Ryukyu (Liu Qiu Guo Zhi Lue)*. Ibid.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ The content of the letter is as follows: A letter dated October 9, 1885 by Interior Minister Yamagata to Foreign Minister Inoue, “Draft report to the Grand Council of State concerning investigation into the uninhabited Kumeakashima and two other islands dotted between Okinawa Prefecture and Fuzhou of the

for a better time to deal with the erection of sovereignty markers, land development, and other undertakings to avoid Qing Dynasty suspicions.¹⁵ Moreover, the white paper argued that the Japanese cabinet secretly passed a resolution on January 14, 1985, the anniversary of the First Sino-Japanese War.¹⁶ From the survey of the Diaoyu Islands in 1885 to their occupation in 1895, Japan had consistently acted in secrecy.¹⁷

The Chinese described how Japan invaded and occupied the Diaoyu Islands. Japan seized Ryukyu in 1879, invaded and occupied the Diaoyu Islands, and incorporated them into its territory at the end of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895. The defeat of China in the Sino-Japanese War forced the country to sign the Treaty of Shimonoseki and

Qing Dynasty, the prefectural governor submitted a report as per the document attached (note: a report submitted by the governor of Okinawa to Interior Minister Yamagata on September 22, 1885, Appendix 2). The aforementioned islands appear to be identical with the islands reported in the *Records of Messages from Chong-shan*, but they were mentioned as a mere direction in the course of voyage and showed no particular trace of having been under the control of the Qing Dynasty while the islands' names were different between them and us. They belong to the uninhabited islands near Miyako, Yaeyama and others under the control of Okinawa and, therefore, there should be no problem with the prefecture surveying them and erecting national markers on them." Thus, Japan argued that "in his letter to the foreign minister in 1885, the interior minister said to the effect that the Senkaku Islands showed no trace of having been under the control of the Qing Dynasty." Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, "Q&A on the Senkaku Islands," Q8/A8, accessed June 15, 2013, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/senkaku/qa_1010.html.

¹⁵ The content of the letter is as follows: A letter dated October 21, 1885, sent by Foreign Minister Inoue to Interior Minister Yamagata, "Concerning the aforementioned islands (note: Senkaku Islands), they are in proximity to the national border with the Qing Dynasty, their circumferences appear smaller than those of the Daito Islands after our on-site survey and in particular, their names are being attached by the Qing Dynasty. There are rumors recently circulated by Qing newspapers and others, including one that says our government is going to occupy the islands in the vicinity of Taiwan that belong to the Qing Dynasty, which are arousing their suspicions towards our country and frequently alerting the Qing government for caution. If we took measures such as publicly erecting national markers, it would result in making the Qing Dynasty suspicious. Therefore, we should have the islands surveyed and details ? such as the configuration of harbors and the prospect of land development and local production ? reported and stop there. [question marks are originally in the Q&A document] We should deal with the erection of national markers, land development and other undertakings some other day." Ibid.

¹⁶ State Council Information Office of the PRC, *White Paper on Diaoyu Dao*.

¹⁷ Ibid. Regarding this argument, Japan argued that international law does not require notifying other countries of government intention to occupy *terra nullius*. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, "Q&A on the Senkaku Islands," Q10/A10.

cede to Japan the island of Formosa (Taiwan) together with the Diaoyu Islands. China contended the Diaoyu Islands were ceded to Japan according to the Treaty of Shimonoseki in 1895. Therefore, the Diaoyu Islands should be returned to China as parts of Taiwan in accordance with the Cairo Declaration, the Potsdam Proclamation, and the Japanese Instrument of Surrender. Nonetheless, the U.S. arbitrarily included the islands under its trusteeship in the 1950s, and transferred their administration to Japan when the U.S. returned Okinawa to Japan in 1971. On December 30, 1971, the Chinese MFA issued a solemn statement pointing out that

It is completely illegal for the government of the United States and Japan to include China's Diaoyu Dao Islands into the territories to be returned to Japan in the Okinawa Reversion Agreement and that it can by no means change the People's Republic of China's territorial sovereignty over the Diaoyu Dao Islands.¹⁸

Claim of Japan

Japan asserted that historical fact and international law confirmed that the Senkaku Islands are inherent to the territory of Japan and are under the valid control of Japan. Tokyo does not acknowledge the territorial dispute. The grounds for Japan's territorial sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands are as follows: Japan incorporated Senkaku Islands based on "terra nullius." The Senkaku Islands have been under valid control of Japan since they were returned to Japan in 1972. Meanwhile, China did not challenge Japan's claim until 1971, following the UN ECAFE report.

First, Japan incorporated the Senkaku Islands based on terra nullius. According to the Japanese MFA, the Japanese government conducted thorough surveys through the

¹⁸ State Council Information Office of the PRC, *White Paper on Diaoyu Dao*.

Okinawa Prefecture and other means in 1885, and confirmed that the Senkaku Islands had been terra nullius and showed no evidence of having been under the control of the Qing Dynasty of China.¹⁹ This finding meant that Japan rejected Chinese claims that the islands were under China's control before 1895. Japan further pointed out "the Japanese Government made a Cabinet Decision on January 14 1895 to erect a marker on the islands to formally incorporate the Senkaku Islands into the territory of Japan," and it asserts "[t]hese measures were carried out in accordance with the ways of duly acquiring territorial sovereignty under international law (occupation of *terra nullius*)."²⁰

Second, the Senkaku Islands have been under the valid control of Japan. Japan gave two examples concerning its valid control over the islands before 1972. Japan asserted that the approval of the Meiji government of the lease of the islands to a resident of Okinawa Prefecture in 1896 demonstrated Japan's valid control over the islands. In addition, the Central Government and the local government of Okinawa Prefecture conducted activities, such as field surveys, on the Senkaku Islands before WW2.²¹ After WW2, the Senkaku Islands were placed under the administration of the U.S., and thus, Japan could not exercise direct control over the Islands until the administrative rights were reverted to Japan on May 15, 1972.²² After 1972, Japan exercised valid control over

¹⁹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, "Recent Developments in Japan-China Relations. Basic Facts on the Senkaku Islands and the Recent Incident," October 2010, accessed June 15, 2013, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/china/pdfs/facts1010.pdf>.

²⁰ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, "Japan-China Relations: Current Situation of Senkaku Islands," May 2013, accessed June 15, 2013, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/senkaku/index.html>.

²¹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, "Q&A on the Senkaku Islands," Q3/A3.

²² Ibid, Q2/A2 and Q3/A3.

the Senkaku Islands in patrol and law enforcement (e.g., law enforcement on illegal fishing by foreign fishing boats), levying taxes on the owners of the islands under private ownership (in Kuba Island), management as state-owned land (e.g., in Taisho Island and Uotsuri Island), and research by the Central Government and the government of the Okinawa Prefecture. Moreover, the government of Japan has offered Kuba Island and Taisho Island to the U.S. since 1972 as facilities/districts in Japan under the Japan-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement.²³

Refuting Chinese arguments, Japan asserted that the Senkaku Islands were not part of Taiwan and were not included in the territory, which Japan renounced under Article II of the San Francisco Peace Treaty.²⁴ Senkaku Islands belonged to the Nansei Shoto Islands, which were placed under the administration of the U.S. under Article III of the San Francisco Peace Treaty. The Senkaku Islands were returned in 1972 in accordance with the Agreement between Japan and the United States of America Concerning the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands.²⁵

Third, the Japanese official position argued that Beijing and Taipei began to assert their territorial sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands only in the 1970s, following the ECAFE report. Before 1971, neither sovereignty claims nor objections to Japanese sovereignty were made. China acquiesced to the status of the islands being under the administration of the U.S. under Article III of the San Francisco Peace Treaty. China

²³ Ibid, Q3/A3.

²⁴ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, "The Basic View on Sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands," May 2013, accessed June 15, 2013, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/senkaku/basic_view.html

²⁵ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, "Q&A on the Senkaku Islands," Q12/A12.

never protested that the U.S. military used some parts of the Senkaku Islands (Taisho and Kuba Islands) as firing/bombing ranges when the islands were under the administration of the United States. Moreover, Japan provided some documents that showed the PRC or ROC recognized the Senkaku Islands as a part of Japan's territory.²⁶ Japan contended that although the Chinese government or Taiwanese authorities have presented historical, geographic, and geological evidence, none of them is valid under international law. For instance, the discovery of an island alone does not support territorial sovereignty under international law. Japan pointed out that the contents of these historical documents and maps that the Chinese presented as evidence were insufficient.²⁷

Both countries have its grounds in claiming sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands.

The comments of Japanese scholar Hiroaki Yokoyama provide a good observation:

“Facing the Qing Dynasty of China who was not familiar with international law and did not claim for the islands, Japan announced the sovereignty over the

²⁶ These documents included a letter of appreciation dated May 1920 sent from the then-consul of the Republic of China in Nagasaki (The letter concerned the distress around the Senkaku Islands involving Chinese fishermen from Fujian Province and described “the Senkaku Islands, Yaeyama District, Okinawa Prefecture, Empire of Japan”), an article (“Battle of people in the Ryukyu Islands against US occupation”) published in the *People's Daily* dated January 8, 1953, and *World Atlas Collection* (1958 (reprinted in 1960)) published by a Chinese map-publishing company. Ibid, Q4/A4.

²⁷ Japan reviewed *The Records of the Imperial Title-Conferring Envoys to Ryukyu (Shi Liu Qiu Lu)* (1534) written by Chen Kan. Japan concluded that historical documents may point out that Kume Island belonged to Ryukyu, but “they did not have any reference that the Senkaku Islands, located to the west of Kume Island, belonged to the Ming or Qing Dynasty of China.” The records, like *An Illustrated Compendium on Maritime Security (Chou Hai Tu Bian)* (1561), “is not clear regarding whether these groups of islands were within the coastal defense of the Ming Court. The mere fact that the Senkaku Islands were printed on that map does not mean that they were generally regarded as territory of China at that time.” Regarding the maps that China presented, Japan pointed out that the “intended purposes of maps and compilers of maps vary and the existence of a map in itself are not the evidence of the assertion of territorial sovereignty.” Japan further pointed out that the map in the *Illustrated Outline of the Three Countries* (1785) was not based on accurate knowledge. For instance, the size of Taiwan in the map is only about one third of that of Okinawa's main island. Ibid, Q6/A6.

islands based on the ‘Terra nullius,’ principle. Although Japan’s act was sly, it was effective in international law.”²⁸

II. Chinese Policy toward the Diaoyu/ Senkaku Islands Dispute

1. 1970s

After the ECAFE report identified potential oil and gas reserves in the vicinity of the Diaoyu Islands in 1968, both ROC and PRC claimed sovereignty over the Islands. The ROC claimed sovereignty on June 11, 1971, whereas the PRC claimed it on December 30, 1971.²⁹ The Japanese MFA issued a statement on March 8, 1972, “Regarding the sovereignty over Senkaku Islands,” in which it argued its claim over the islands and refuted the claims of the ROC and PRC. On May 15, 1972, the Diaoyu Islands, as parts of Okinawa, were returned to Japan in accordance with the Agreement between Japan and the United States of America Concerning the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands.

Although China claimed its sovereignty and protested against the return of the Diaoyu Islands to Japan in 1971, it eventually shelved this issue. In a meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Kakue Tanaka, Premier Zhou Enlai did not insist on this issue. When Tanaka asked about his view on the Senkaku Islands, Zhou replied “I do not want to talk about the Diaoyu Islands this time. It is not good to discuss this now. It became an issue because of the oil out there. If there wasn’t oil, neither Taiwan nor the U.S. would

²⁸ Hiroaki Yokoyama, *Hanichi to hanchu* [Anti-Japan and Anti-China], (Tokyo: Shueisha, 2005), 178.

²⁹ “Statement of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of People’s Republic of China, December 30, 1971,” *Peking Review* 15 (1): 12 (January 7, 1972): 12, accessed June 15, 2013, <http://www.massline.org/PekingReview/PR1972/PR1972-01.pdf>.

make this an issue.”³⁰ China considered normalization with Japan as priority. This stance was reaffirmed during the negotiations for the conclusion of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Japan and the PRC. On October 25, 1978, Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping commented on the Diaoyu dispute, “...there’s probably insufficient wisdom to resolve the issue in our generation, but with the next generation likely to be savvier than us, they will probably be able to find some resolution to the issue.”³¹ Deng restated this position in a press conference.³² Deng mentioned the Diaoyu Islands in 1978 because several LDP members preferred to link the treaty with a Chinese concession on the Diaoyu issue.³³ With regard to the policy of shelving the dispute over the Diaoyu Islands, China asserted that this policy is a common agreement despite the non-recognition of Japan of such agreement.

³⁰ “Tanaka Sori Shu onrai sori kaidan kiroku” [Japan-China Summit Meeting between Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka and Premier Zhou En-lai (in Japanese)], September 25-28, 1972. “The World and Japan” Database Project, accessed June 15, 2013, <http://www.ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/documents/texts/JPCH/19720925.O1J.html>.

³¹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “The Senkaku Islands,” March 2013, accessed June 15, 2013, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/senkaku/pdfs/senkaku_en.pdf.

³² A press conference by Deputy Premier Deng was held on the day he met with Prime Minister Fukuda on October 25, 1978, as shown above. When the reporter asked Deng that, “The Senkaku Islands are Japan’s inherent territory, and I feel the recent trouble is a matter for regret. What is the view of the Deputy Premier?” Deng replied, “Certainly there are differences of opinion between us on this issue but when we normalized diplomatic relations between our two countries, both parties promised to leave the issue aside. At this time of negotiation on the Treaty of Peace and Friendship, we agreed to leave the issue aside in much the same way. Based on Chinese wisdom, this is the only idea we have. If we delve into the subject, it becomes difficult to say something clearly. Certainly there are some people that want to use this issue to throw cold water onto China-Japan relations. Therefore, I think it is better to avoid the issue when our countries have negotiations. Even if this means the issue is temporarily shelved, I don’t think I mind. I don’t mind if it’s shelved for ten years. The people of our generation don’t have sufficient wisdom to settle this discussion, but the people of the next generation will probably be wiser than us. At that time, a solution that everyone can agree on will probably be found.” Ibid.

³³ June Teufel Dreyer: The Shifting Triangle: Sino-Japanese-American relations in stressful times, *Journal of Contemporary China* 21:75 (2012): 411.

2. 1990s

China claimed sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands in “The Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone,” which was adopted on February 1992. Chinese President Jiang Zemin clarified that China’s stance held constant that China was willing “to shelve the dispute in favor of joint development” when he visited Japan in April 1992.³⁴ The implementation of this policy was that Chinese leaders declared China’s de jure sovereignty over the islands and criticized Japanese efforts to demonstrate Japan’s sovereignty claims. However, this policy did not challenge Japan’s de facto control over the islands. For example, China did not send any navy ships to this area at that time.

Additionally, both states tried to sustain stable relations and played down this issue by responding calmly to activist movements in the mid-1990s. The right-wing organization, Japan Youth Society (Nihon Seinensha), built another lighthouse on Kita Kojiima in July 1996, and asked the Japanese government to put it on the nautical chart, but the Japanese government refused.³⁵ The activities of Japanese right-wing organizations on the Diaoyu Islands can be traced back to the 1970s. After around 200 Chinese fishing boats approached the islands in April 1978,³⁶ Japanese right-wing

³⁴ Young C. Kim, “Japanese Policy towards China: Politics of the Imperial Visit to China in 1992,” *Pacific Affairs* 74:2 (2001): 225-42.

³⁵ Shigeo Hiramatsu, “Senkaku shoto no ryoyuken mondai to chugoku no higashi shina kai senryaku” [The Sovereignty dispute of the Senkaku Islands and China’s East China Sea Strategy (in Japanese)], *Kyorin Shakai kagaku kenkyu* [Kyorin University journal of social sciences], 12:.3 (December 1996) and “Nihon Seinensha ga torikumu senkaku shoto jikkou shihai” [Japan Youth Society grapple with the effective control over Senkaku Islands (in Japanese)], the Website of Japan Youth Society, June 17, 2003, accessed June 15, 2013, <http://www.seinensya.org/undo/ryodo/senkakushoto/030616ayumi.htm>.

³⁶ “These steps were already modest and hesitant toward an agreement, but were abruptly undone when, in April 1978, a large number of boats, eventually numbering 200, appeared off the islands. In the wake of massive adverse reactions from Japanese public opinion and media accompanied by official protests from the government, the Chinese side replied that the appearance of the boats were accidental. They were

organizations landed on the islands on May 11, 1978 to claim sovereignty. This landing was the first in the post-war era.³⁷ On August 12, 1978, the Japanese Youth Society built a lighthouse on Uotsuri/Diaoyu Island. Since then, right-wing activists have returned to the islands to inspect and to repair the lighthouse.

As a response to the construction of a second lighthouse, the second wave of the Baodiao (保釣; means Defending the Diaoyu Islands) movement in Taiwan and Hong Kong started in 1996. Although China protested against the second lighthouse, it suppressed protests at home and controlled media coverage over this issue.³⁸ Japan tried to avoid dispute. Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto openly expressed his displeasure when two right-wing Japanese politicians raised the Japanese flag on the islands in May 1997. Beijing downplayed this issue without lodging any protest.³⁹

3. 2000s

2004 Chinese Activist Landing Incident

In 2004, the Chinese government was forced to support Baodiao activities. In March 24, 2004, seven mainland Chinese Baodiao activists landed on the islands and

chasing a school of fish and did not realize where they were. Observers pointed out that no fishing was being carried out, that personnel on the boats carried signs claiming that the islands belonged to China, and that many of them were armed, some with machine guns.” June Teufel Dreyer (2012): *The Shifting Triangle*, 413.

³⁷ “Sengo hatsu no nihon kokumin ni yoru senkaku shoto Uotsuri to jyoriku” [First landing by Japanese citizens on Uotsuri Islands in the Senkaku Islands in Post War Era (in Japanese)], the Website of “ohnihon sekisei kai Aichi ken honbu” [Great Japan Sincerity Society, the Head Office in Aichi prefecture], April 5, 2006, accessed June 15, 2013, <http://www.ab.auone-net.jp/~sekisei/sub1020.htm>.

³⁸ Chien-peng Chung, “The Diaoyu/Tiaoyutai/Senkaku Islands dispute: domestic politics and the limits of diplomacy,” *American Asian Review* 16: 3 (1998): 162.

³⁹ James M. Reilly, “The Role of Public Opinion in China’s Japan Policy: 1997-2007” (PhD diss., The George Washington University, August 2008), 65.

were arrested by the Japan Coast Guard (JCG). Chinese Vice-Foreign Minister Zhang Yesui (张业遂) urgently summoned the chargé d'affaires of the Japanese Embassy Chikahito Harada and demanded that “the Japanese side protect their personal security, and immediately release them without condition. Otherwise, the situation will expand and grow more complicated, and certainly will arouse the powerful indignation of the Chinese people.”⁴⁰ Meanwhile, Chinese activists began to protest outside the Japanese embassy. The Chinese MFA spokesperson remarked on their protest activities that “Japan’s behaviors have seriously offended the feeling of the Chinese people, so much so that they have to express their strong indignation in one way or another.”⁴¹ Japan finally decided to release the seven Chinese activists on March 26. Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi talked about his role in this decision, “while dealing with it appropriately based on law, I instructed government officials to consider how to handle the issue from a comprehensive view so as not to hurt the bilateral relationship with China.”⁴² The seven activists left Japan on the evening of March 26.

This incident was a turning point of Chinese policy on the Diaoyu Islands issue. Although Beijing shelved sovereignty disputes, it articulated its sovereignty claims over the Diaoyu Islands and expressed strong protests against the arrest of seven activists in the 2004 landing incident. However, Beijing was only forced by this unexpected incident

⁴⁰ “waijiaobu jiuwo gongmin deng diaoyu dao zao kouliu tong rifang yanzheng jiaoshe” [Foreign Minister solemnly Negotiated with Japan for detained Chinese Citizens who landed on the Diaoyu Islands (in Chinese)], *Xinhua News Agency*, March 25, 2004, accessed June 15, 2013, http://news.xinhuanet.com/zhengfu/2004-03/25/content_1384529.htm.

⁴¹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PRC, “Foreign Ministry Spokesman’s Press Conference,” March 25, 2004, accessed June 15, 2013, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/s2510/2511/t80720.shtml>.

⁴² “Japan deported Chinese protesters under political pressure,” *Japan Economic Newswire* (April 1, 2004).

and by public opinion in support of the activists. Thus, China had an ambivalent policy in following up this incident. The Chinese government contained public opinion in support of the activists. Hundreds of supporters waited at the Shanghai airport to welcome the victorious homecoming of the activists, but these activists were taken into custody as soon as they arrived.⁴³ On March 28, Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing expressed to his Japanese counterpart, Yoriko Kawaguchi, the appreciation of China for the release of the activists.⁴⁴ MFA spokesperson Kong Quan emphasized the Chinese stance that although China had an “indisputable” claim to the islands, it hoped that both countries could solve the problem through peaceful negotiations.⁴⁵

This incident had several outcomes. First, both governments took measures to stop activists from sailing to the islands and avoid exacerbating the dispute. After the Chinese activists landed on Diaoyu in March, the Japanese Diet passed a bill (in the same month) that disallowed landing on the islands. The JCG stopped a right-wing political group from sailing to the islands.⁴⁶ The Chinese government reined in Chinese activists who were planning to sail to the islands.⁴⁷ Second, this incident heightened domestic concern and public opinion in Japan regarding strongly asserting its sovereignty claims. As a response to these calls, the Japanese House of Representatives Security Committee

⁴³ James M. Reilly, “The Role of Public Opinion,” 228.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ “China Restates Senkakus Claim, but Ready to Talk with Japan,” *Kyodo News*, March 30, 2004.

⁴⁶ Kaijō Hoanchō [Japan Coast Guard], ed., *Kaijō Hoan Repōto* 2005 [Japan Coast Guard Annual Report 2005 (in Japanese)], (Tokyo: Kokuritsu Insatsu Kyoku, 2005), accessed June 15, 2013, <http://www.kaiho.mlit.go.jp/info/books/report2005/tokushu/p018.html>.

⁴⁷ Please refer to the discussion section in this chapter.

called for the government to “exercise extreme vigilance” around the islands.⁴⁸ On April, 23, 2004, a group of Japanese right-wing activists drove a van into the Chinese consulate in Osaka, which sparked another flag-burning protest at the Japanese embassy in Beijing.⁴⁹ The Japanese government strengthened its coastal defense in the summer of 2004 by stationing two coast guard vessels after three Chinese activists landed on the islands in March.⁵⁰

Strengthening Control from Both Sides

The Japanese government continued to strengthen control over the islands. Since April 2002, the Japanese government has leased three private islands (Uotsuri, Kita-kojima, and Minami-kojima) to gain full control over all the islands and deter both Chinese and Japanese activist acts. China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong protested against this action. In February 2005, the Japanese government took control of the two lighthouses on the Uotsuri and Kita-kojima Islands. By removing their reason for visiting, this measure

⁴⁸ “Senkaku Jyoriku jiken wo uke ryodo hozen ketsugi shuin anpoin ga zenkai icchi” [Influenced by the landing incident on the Senkaku Islands, the Security Protection Committee under the Japanese House of Representatives endorsed a resolution concerning the protection of Japanese territory (in Japanese)], *Asahi Shimbun*, March 30, 2004, accessed June 15, 2013, <http://www.asahi.com/special/senkaku/TKY200403300323.html>.

⁴⁹ “Chugoku Soryojikan ni gaisensha totsunyu ‘senkaku mondai kougi’” [Protest Senakaku Dispute, a Sound truck broke into the Chinese consulate general (in Japanese)], *Kyodo Tsushin*, April 23, 2004.

⁵⁰ M. Taylor Fravel, “Explaining Stability in the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands Dispute,” in *Getting the Triangle Straight: Managing China-Japan-US Relations* ed. Gerald Curtis, Ryosei Kokubun, and Wang Jisi (Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange, c2010), 152.

aimed to stop right-wing activists from landing.⁵¹ However, this move was denounced by the Chinese MFA as “illegal and invalid.”⁵²

China increased its visibility near the islands. In February 2007, the JCG discovered a Chinese research vessel in the area and asked the vessel to leave. However, the ship refused. Although the Japanese government protested to China,⁵³ China replied that it owns the Diaoyu Islands. As a response, the Japanese Diet enacted a law in June 2008 on foreign ship navigation in Japanese territorial waters.⁵⁴ The law allowed JCG to take more aggressive action against the illegal incursion of foreign ships.

On December 8, 2008, two ocean surveillance ships belonging to China Marine Surveillance (CMS) of the State Oceanic Administration (SOA) entered the territorial waters near the Diaoyu Islands and circled the islands.⁵⁵ The JCG detected these vessels when they entered the 12-mile limit of the Diaoyu Islands. JCG asked the Chinese vessels to leave Japanese territorial waters. When the ships would not leave, JCG threatened to attack the intruders and to block their route. Eventually, JCG backed off and departed

⁵¹ For example, the Japan Youth Society went back to inspect and repair the lighthouses. Ibid, 151-2.

⁵² Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PRC, “Foreign Ministry Spokesman Kong Quan’s Comment on Japanese Government’s Taking over Lighthouse on Diaoyu Islands,” February 9, 2005, accessed June 15, 2013, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/s2510/2535/t183742.shtml>.

⁵³ “chugoku chosasen ga senkaku kinaki ni EEZ nai, keikoku ni ojizu” [Chinese surveillance ship entered the water near the Senkaku Islands, in EEZ, and did not respond to the warning (in Japanese)], *Kyodo Tsushin*, February 4, 2007, accessed June 15, 2013, <http://www.47news.jp/CN/200702/CN2007020401000414.html>.

⁵⁴ Richard C. Bush, *The Perils of Proximity: China-Japan Security Relations* (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2010), 73.

⁵⁵ “Chugoku Chosasen ga ryokainai ni shinnyu senkakushoto oki, 9jikan koko” [Chinese surveillance ship entered the territorial water of the Senkaku Islands and circled for 9 hours (in Japanese)], *Kyodo Tsushin*, December 8, 2008, accessed June 15, 2013, <http://www.47news.jp/CN/200812/CN2008120801000458.html>.

after nine hours. The Japanese government protested against this action, but the Chinese MFA insisted that Diaoyu is part of China and that the two vessels simply entered Chinese territorial waters.⁵⁶

On December 9, CMS Deputy Chief Sun Shuxian (孙书贤) commented on December 9 that

In international law there are two principles regarding disputed water: historical evidence and valid control. To simply claim sovereignty, as we did before, is not good enough. Valid control is important as well. CMS must show its own presence in these waters to show we have valid control.⁵⁷

Sun pointed out that China will strengthen patrol activities in this area. On February 16, 2009, SOA Director Sun Zhihui (孙志辉) asserted that “Ocean Surveillance Ships entered and conducted surveillances in water nears the Diaoyu Islands. Using the real action to show our government’s stance and claim over Diaoyu dispute,”⁵⁸ Sun revealed the intention of China to strengthen sovereign claim with patrol missions.

As a response to this incident, Japan increased its security activities and patrols from two to three times a day. Since December 2009, Japan reverted to twice a day patrols, but deployed a vessel with a helicopter. The Maritime Self-Defense Force continued its regular surveillance flights. China protested against the increased control

⁵⁶ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PRC, “Foreign Ministry Spokesman Liu Jianchao’s Remarks on Chinese Marine Surveillance Ships Entering the Waters near the Diaoyu Islands,” December 9, 2005, accessed June 15, 2013, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/s2510/2535/t525428.shtml>.

⁵⁷ “Zhongguo haijian zongdui: jiangjiaqiang dui zhengyi haiyu guanxia” [Chinese Marine Surveillance: will strengthen jurisdiction over disputed water (in Chinese)], *Xinjingbao* [The Beijing News], December 12, 2008, accessed June 15, 2013, http://big5.china.com/gate/big5/news.china.com/zh_cn/domestic/945/20081210/15227846.html.

⁵⁸ “2008nian woguo haiyang weiquan zhifa hangcheng jin 50wan haili” [The Overall Distance of Our Country’s Maritime Law Enforcement of the Sea in 2008 were around 500,000 nautical miles (in Chinese)], *Xinhua News Agency*, February 16, 2009.

measures of Japan, and viewed these activities as “illegal and invalid and should be stopped immediately.”⁵⁹ Hence, the capability race over Diaoyu Islands increased in both MSF and JCG activities.

2010 Incident

Tensions over the Diaoyu Islands heated when the JCG arrested the captain of a Chinese fishing trawler. On September 7, a Chinese fishing boat, Minjinyu No. 5179 (闽晋渔5179号), collided with two patrol vessels from JCG near the Diaoyu Islands. Japan detained the captain, crew, and ship. On September 10, JCG handed over Zhan Qixiong (詹其雄), the captain of the Chinese fishing boat, to prosecutors for possible indictment for obstructing the Coast Guard when executing its duties. Officials at Okinawa approved to detain the captain of the Chinese fishing ship on September 11. The 14 crewmen and ship were released on September 13. On September 20, the Ishigaki court approved to extend the detention of the Chinese captain for another 10 days.⁶⁰

PRC officials, including Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi (杨洁篪), Vice Foreign Minister Wang Guangya (王光亚), and State Councilor Dai Bingguo (戴秉国), summoned the Japanese ambassador several times to demand Japan to stop illegal interception, and to protest against its detention of the Chinese ship and captain.⁶¹ On

⁵⁹ Richard C. Bush, *The Perils of Proximity*, 73 and “Senkaku Shoto shuhen ni heri tosai jyunshisen wo jyochi kaiho, ryokai shinnyu kanshi wo kyoka” [JCG Stationed Patrol Vessels Loaded with Helicopter and strengthened the surveillance on intrusion of territorial waters. (in Japanese)], *Sanaki Shimibun*, February 4, 2009.

⁶⁰ Please refer to James J. Przystup, “Japan-China Relations: Troubled Waters,” *Comparative Connections: A Quarterly E-Journal on East Asian Bilateral Relations* 12: 4 (January 2011): 117-29.

⁶¹ Japan’s Ambassador Niw was called by Chinese officials on September 8 (by Chinese Foreign Ministry), September 9 (by Chinese Foreign Ministry), September 10 (by Foreign Minister Yang), September 11 (for

September 22, Premier Wen Jiabao, in a speech in New York, criticized Japan for arresting the Chinese captain, and declared Japan's actions were "completely illegal and unreasonable." He strongly urged the release of the ship captain without condition. Wen added, "If the Japanese side insists on acting arbitrarily, the Chinese side will take new action. Japan will have to take all the responsibility for the serious consequences."⁶²

China adopted strong countermeasures.⁶³ Beijing canceled several meetings and planned visits.⁶⁴ Two Fisheries Law Enforcement Command (FLEC) ships, Yuzheng 201 and Yuzheng 202, were deployed near the island waters on September 11. These ships approached a Japanese research ship, demanding the halting of its research activities.⁶⁵ On September 20, China detained four Japanese employees of Fujita Construction for entering a restricted military area in Shijiazhuang, Hebei Province, without permission.⁶⁶

midnight meeting, by State Councilor Dai Bingguo), September 14 (by Chinese Foreign Ministry), and September 19 (by Chinese Foreign Ministry).

⁶² Wu Jiao, "Premier Wen urges Japan to release captain," *China Daily*, September 22, 2010, accessed June 15, 2013, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010-09/22/content_11337158.htm.

⁶³ Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Ma Zhaoxu said, "If Japan acts willfully despite advice to the contrary and insists on making one mistake after another, the Chinese side will take strong countermeasures, and all the consequences should be borne by the Japanese side." "China suspends contacts as Japan boat row deepens," *Reuters*, September 19, 2010, accessed June 15, 2013, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/09/19/us-japan-china-idUSTRE68I06520100919>.

⁶⁴ Chinese Foreign Ministry announced the postponement of East China Sea negotiations on September 11 because of the fishing boat incident. China canceled the planned five-day visit to Japan of the vice chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress on September 13. On September 21, China ruled out the Wen-Kan meeting at the UNGA in New York.

⁶⁵ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PRC, "Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Jiang Yu's Regular Press Conference on September 9, 2010," September 9, 2010, accessed June 15, 2013, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/s2510/2511/t739264.shtml>.

⁶⁶ Three of four detained Fujita Construction employees were released on September 30. "Chugoku, Fujita shain 3nin wo shakuho nihongaimusho ga kakunin" [Japanese Foreign Ministry confirmed that China released 3 Fujita Construction employees (in Japanese)], *Kyodo Tsushin*, September 30, 2010, accessed June 15, 2013, <http://www.47news.jp/CN/201009/CN2010093001000284.html>.

The export to Japan of rare earth metals, which are essential for a range of products from electronics to cars, was banned because of bad feelings toward Japan.⁶⁷ On September 24, Yuzheng 201 and Yuzheng 203 entered the waters near the Diaoyu Islands.⁶⁸ On September 27, Beijing announced that the PRC had deployed surveillance ships and FLEC ships to patrol near the Diaoyu Islands. Since then, patrol missions in the area had become regular.⁶⁹

On September 24, the Naha Prosecutor's Office announced the release of the Chinese captain on the following day.⁷⁰ Chinese MFA issued a statement demanding an apology and compensation from Japan over the fishing boat incident on September 25,⁷¹ while the Japanese side refused and said these demands are "completely groundless and

⁶⁷ Trading companies report China's export of rare earth metals has resumed on September 29. "China lifts rare earth export ban to Japan: trader," *Reuters*, September 29, 2010, accessed June 15, 2013, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/09/29/us-japan-china-export-idUSTRE68S0BT20100929>.

⁶⁸ "Senkaku kinkai de chugoku kanshisen ga katsudo gaimusho, chushi yosei 4kai" [Chinese Surveillance Ship Entered the Water near Senkaku Islands, Japanese Foreign Ministry Asked China to Stop for 4 Times (in Japanese)], *Asahi Shimbun*, September 28, 2010, accessed June 15, 2013, <http://www.asahi.com/special/senkaku/TKY201009270371.html>.

⁶⁹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PRC, "Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Jiang Yu's Regular Press Conference on September 28, 2010," September 29, 2010, accessed June 15, 2013, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/s2510/2511/t757229.shtml>.

⁷⁰ The Naha Prosecutor's Office explained that "the decision was reached based on "considerations about the Japan-China relationship." "Chugokujin sencho, shobunhoryu de shakuho Naha chiken 'nicchukankei wo koryo'" [Release Chinese Captain without Indictment, Naha Prosecutor's Office said it was 'out of Consideration for Sino-Japanese Relations (in Japanese)], *Kyodo Tsushin*, September 25, 2010, accessed June 15, 2013, <http://www.47news.jp/CN/201009/CN2010092401000480.html>.

⁷¹ "Yanzhong weifan Zhongguo lingtu ji zhongguoshimin de renquan" [(Such an act) seriously infringed upon China's territorial sovereignty and violated the human rights of Chinese citizens (in Chinese)], *Xinhua News Agency*, September 25, 2010, accessed June 15, 2013, http://news.xinhuanet.com/2010-09/25/c_12601119.htm.

is utterly unacceptable for Japan.”⁷² Prime Minister Naoto Kan refused to apologize and stated, “The Senkaku Islands are our territory. There is no reason to compensate.”⁷³

Two points can be observed from this incident: First, the patrols in this area by Chinese ships were measures to show that China had valid control over the islands. The Chinese side decided to dispatch surveillance and FLEC ships regularly. Second, the measures that China used to pressure Japan included the ban on rare earth exports. The countermeasure of sacrificing economic interests showed Chinese determination to assert sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands.

Japanese Government Purchase of the Diaoyu Islands

Although the PRC deployed surveillance and FLEC ships to conduct routine patrols near the islands since 2010, the situation had been comparatively calm until 2012. In early 2012, both sides took some measures. On January 16, Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary Osamu Fujimura announced that Japan would name 39 inhabited islets located near the Diaoyu Islands.⁷⁴ In response to this official naming, the MFA spokesperson said, “We protest strongly against Japan’s plan of naming these islets. Japan’s measures on the

⁷² Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Statement by the Press Secretary/Director-General for Press and Public Relations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on the Collision between Japan Coast Guard Patrol Vessels and a Chinese Fishing Trawler in Japan’s Territorial Waters off the Senkaku Islands,” September 25, 2010, accessed June 15, 2013, http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2010/9/0925_01.html.

⁷³ “Japan’s PM rejects China’s demand for apology,” *CNN*, September 26, 2010, accessed June 15, 2013, <http://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/asiapcf/09/26/china.japan.apology/index.html> and “Shusho, shazai to baisho wo kyohi kankei kaizen mitooshi tatazu” [Prime Minister rejects apology and compensation, there is no prospect of improving relations (in Japanese)], *Kyodo Tsushin*, September 26, 2010, accessed June 15, 2013, <http://www.47news.jp/CN/201009/CN2010092601000223.html>.

⁷⁴ Prime Minister of Japan and his Cabinet, “Press Conference by the Chief Cabinet Secretary (Excerpt),” January 16, 2012, accessed June 15, 2013, http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/tyoukanpress/201201/16_a.html.

Diaoyu Islands are illegal and invalid.”⁷⁵ The Japanese Foreign Minister did not heed the protest.⁷⁶ After Japan proceeded with the naming of the islets on March 3, the Chinese State Oceanic Administration and Ministry of Civil Affairs announced its own standard names of 71 inhabited islets.⁷⁷ The Japanese foreign minister expressed its regret on March 6.⁷⁸

On September 10, 2012, Japan announced that the central government would purchase three islands (Uotsuri, Kitakojima, and Minamikojima) in the Senkaku Islands from private owners. From 2002 to 2012, Japan leased these three islands from private owners, namely, the Kurihara family. However, on April 16, 2012, Tokyo Governor Shintaro Ishihara announced that he planned to purchase these three islands.⁷⁹ This move worried the Japanese government. Shintaro Ishihara was a representative nationalist politician, and if he owned the islands, he might do something that might provoke controversy. On July 6, the central government of Japan confirmed its plan to nationalize

⁷⁵ Ministry of Foreign Ministry of PRC, “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Liu Weimin’s Remarks on Japan’s Plan to Name the Affiliated Islands of the Diaoyu Island,” January 30, 2012, accessed June 15, 2013, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/s2510/2535/t900339.shtml>.

⁷⁶ “Senkaku meimei he no chugoku gawa kougi wo kyohi gaisho Genba” [Foreign Minister Genba Rejected Chinese Protests on Naming Senaku (in Japanese)], *Sankei Shimbun*, January 31, 2012, accessed June 15, 2013, <http://japannewswatch.seesaa.net/article/249550030.html>.

⁷⁷ “China Release Standard Names of Diaoyu Islands,” *Xinhua News Agency*, March 03, 2012.

⁷⁸ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Gaimu daijin kaiken kiroku (heisei 24 nen 3 gatsu 6nichi)” [Foreign Minister Press Conference Record (March 6, 2012) (in Japanese)], March 6, 2012, accessed June 15, 2013, http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/press/kaiken/gaisho/g_1203.html#3-C.

⁷⁹ “Ishihara seeking to buy Senkaku Islands,” *The Japan Times*, April 18, 2012, accessed June 15, 2013, [HTTP://WWW.JAPANTIMES.CO.JP/NEWS/2012/04/18/NATIONAL/ISHIHARA-SEEKING-TO-BUY-SENKAKU-ISLANDS/#.UB91DPB73ZG](http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2012/04/18/national/ishihara-seeking-to-buy-senkaku-islands/#.UB91DPB73ZG).

the islands.⁸⁰ On September 11, 2012, the Japanese government announced that it had nationalized the three islands and signed a contract with the Kurihara family to purchase these three islands for ¥2.05 billion.⁸¹

Before the announcement, Chinese President Hu already emphasized the opposition of China to the purchase of the islands during a meeting with Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda on the sidelines of the APEC meeting in Vladivostok on September 9.⁸² The announcement further prompted immediate and combative Chinese responses. On the same date of the announcement, the Chinese MFA issued a statement that “Japan’s purchase of islands is illegal and invalid. ... The era of Chinese nation being bullied has gone. China will not sit back and watch its territorial sovereignty violated”⁸³ Two Chinese ships owned by CMS, Haijian 46 and Haijian 49, arrived in the vicinity of the islands.⁸⁴ On September 14, two Chinese surveillance ship fleets have arrived at waters around Diaoyu Islands.⁸⁵ The Chinese government notified the Japanese government on

⁸⁰ “Central government plans to buy Senkaku Islands,” *The Asahi Shimbun*, July 7, 2012, accessed June 15, 2013, http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/politics/AJ201207070062.

⁸¹ Prime Minister of Japan and his Cabinet, “Press Conference by the Chief Cabinet Secretary (Excerpt),” September 11, 2012, accessed June 15, 2013, http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/tyoukanpress/201209/11_a.html.

⁸² “Japan, China leaders meet amid tension over islands,” *Reuters*, September 9, 2012, accessed June 15, 2013, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/09/us-japan-china-idUSBRE88804A20120909>.

⁸³ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Qin Gang’s Remarks on the Chinese Government’s Release of the Base Points and Baselines of the Territorial Sea of the Diaoyu Island and Its Affiliated Islands,” September 11, 2012, accessed June 15, 2013, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/s2510/2535/t969122.shtml>.

⁸⁴ Yang Jingjie, “China starts Diaoyu patrols,” *Global Times*, September 12, 2012, accessed June 15, 2013, <http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/732649.shtml>.

⁸⁵ “Chinese Surveillance Ships Start Patrol around Diaoyu Islands,” *Xinhua News Agency*, September 14, 2012, accessed June 15, 2013, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-09/14/c_131849375.htm.

September 23 of the cancelation of formal commemorative ceremonies of its 40th anniversary scheduled for September 27 in the Great Hall of the People in Beijing.⁸⁶ The State Council Information Office of the PRC issued the *White Paper on Diaoyu Dao, an Inherent Territory of China* on September 25, 2012.

The deadlock did not end even after September. Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Zhijun (张志军) emphasized the Chinese stance in a foreign press conference held on October 26. He said, “Japan has no right to buy or sell Chinese territory in any form ... Whatever form Japan used to purchase the islands is a serious violation of Chinese territorial sovereignty.”⁸⁷ The PRC refused to send officials to the annual meeting of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank in Tokyo on October 12.⁸⁸ Prime Ministers Noda and Wen attended the ASEM in Vientiane on November 5 and 6 but did not meet.⁸⁹

Although efforts were made, such as a negotiation or suggestion of peaceful resolution, the deadlock remained. Vice Foreign Minister Kawai Chikao and his counterpart Zhang Zhijun met in Beijing on September 25 to discuss the Diaoyu issue.⁹⁰

⁸⁶ “Senkaku hanpatsu de Nicchu 40 shunen shikiten chushi kankei hiekomi shocho” [Postponed Ceremony for Sino-Japanese 40th Anniversary for Protesting Senkaku, A Symbol of Chilling Relations (in Japanese)], *Kyodo Tsushin*, September 23, 2012, accessed June 15, 2013, <http://www.47news.jp/CN/201209/CN2012092301001364.html>.

⁸⁷ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, “Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Zhijun Gave Briefing to Chinese and Foreign Journalists on the Diaoyu Dao Issue (Transcript),” October 27, 2012, accessed June 15, 2013, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/topics/diaodao/t983015.shtml>.

⁸⁸ Lesley Wroughton, “Top China delegate pulls out of IMF meet amid islands row,” *Reuters*, October 10, 2012, accessed June 15, 2013, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/10/us-imf-china-japan-idUSBRE89900X20121010>.

⁸⁹ Yang Jingjie, “Premier Wen not to meet Japanese counterpart during Laos summit,” *Global Times*, November 1, 2012, accessed June 15, 2013, <http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/741618.shtml>.

⁹⁰ “Nicchujikan kaidan ha heikosen gaishokaidan de goi dekizu” [Vice Foreign Minister meeting was not on the same wavelength and cannot reach an agreement on holding a Foreign Minister Meeting (in

On October 3, Japanese Foreign Minister Koichiro Genba called for a dialogue to stabilize the issue while underscoring Japan's non-negotiable position regarding sovereignty over the islands.⁹¹ Prime Minister Noda delivered a speech at the United Nations General Assembly on September 26 and called for an enhancement of the rule of law to support peaceful resolution of outstanding territorial issues.⁹² On the following day, the Foreign Minister of China Yang Jiechi spoke at the General Assembly and blasted the Diaoyu purchase as "illegal and invalid."⁹³ Neither side was willing to compromise in this issue. Both sides held fast to their positions and took additional actions that made backing down even more difficult.

4. Reasons Why China Changed Its Diaoyu Policy

The policy of China on the Diaoyu Islands changed. The country is more determined to consolidate its sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands by demonstrating that the islands are under China's valid control. First, in terms of legal rights, the 2009 Law of the PRC on the Protection of Offshore Islands "establishes a system of protecting,

Japanese)], *Kyodo Tsushin*, September 25, 2012, accessed June 15, <http://www.47news.jp/CN/201209/CN2012092501000294.html>.

⁹¹ James J. Przystup, "Japan-China Relations: 40th Anniversary: 'Fuggetaboutit!,'" *Comparative Connections: A Triannual E-Journal on East Asian Bilateral Relations* 14: 3 (January 2013): 119.

⁹² Prime Minister of Japan and his Cabinet, "Address by H.E. Mr. Yoshihiko Noda, Prime Minister of Japan at the Sixty-Seventh Session of the United Nations General Assembly," Wednesday, September 26, 2012, accessed June 15, 2013, http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/noda/statement/201209/26un_e.html.

⁹³ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, "Yang Jiechi Expounds China's Solemn Position on the Diaoyu Islands Issue at the 67th Session of the UN General Assembly," September 28, 2012, accessed June 15, 2013, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/topics/diaodao/t975814.htm>.

developing and managing offshore islands.”⁹⁴ Based on this law, Beijing officially named the Diaoyu Islands in March 2012. Beijing announced the baselines of the territorial sea of the Diaoyu Islands on September 10, 2012. Three days later, the Chinese government submitted a table of coordinates and chart of the base points and baselines of the territorial sea of the Diaoyu Islands to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.⁹⁵

Moreover, in terms of jurisdiction, Chinese law enforcement agencies have increased patrol missions and monitoring activities to show that China has exercised administration in the waters of the Diaoyu Islands. In December 2008, Haijian 46 and Haijian 51 of the SOA conducted navigation operations in the territorial waters near the Diaoyu Islands. After the collision of JCG vessels and a Chinese fishing trawler in September 2010, patrol missions have regularly been conducted by surveillance ships of the CMS of the SOA and by FLEC ships of the Bureau of Fisheries of the Ministry of Agriculture of China.

The Chinese government has also become more determined regarding its claim. For example, during negotiations on the release of the captain of the fishing trawler, China was extremely adamant and adopted several countermeasures, including the export ban on rare earth materials. China issued the *White Paper on Diaoyu Dao, an Inherent Territory of China* in September 2012 to reiterate its claim over the Diaoyu Islands. The 2012 Defense Whitepaper also pointed out, “Individual neighboring countries to take on

⁹⁴ “The 2009 Law of the PRC on the Protection of Offshore Islands,” December 26, 2009 (Article 9) accessed June 15, 2013, http://www.falvmen.com.cn/falvm/app/db/f_enlawshow.jsp?TID=20111021163003175768622.

⁹⁵ “Diaoyu Islands Baseline Announcement Significant: Chinese Diplomat” *Xinhua News Agency*, September 13, 2012, accessed June 15, 2013, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-09/13/c_123713561.htm.

China's territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests are involved to complicate matters, expansion move, create disturbances Japan on the Diaoyu Islands issue.”⁹⁶

Why did China change its policy on the Diaoyu Islands? First, Japan's sovereignty claim over the Diaoyu Islands will be more consolidated and internationally recognized if China does not challenge Japan's de facto control over the islands because it is based on the legal principle of acquisitive prescription. Thus, China has to challenge Japan's sovereignty claim by demonstrating its valid control over the islands.⁹⁷

Second, Japan's actions of controlling the islands also escalated. As mentioned above, the Japanese government leased the three islands from 2002, stationed two JCG vessels near the islands after the Chinese activists landed in March 2004, took over the lighthouse in 2005, increased the patrol missions of JCG from 2004, and eventually purchased the three islands from their private owner in September 2012.

Most importantly, because maritime rights and interests became China's vital national interest, the Diaoyu Islands became its core interest, as the Chinese government has indicated. The Chinese official media outlet, the *People's Daily*, commented on January 17, 2012, that Japan's naming of the 39 islands near the Diaoyu Islands

⁹⁶ Information Office of the State Council of PRC, *The Diversified Employment of China's Armed Forces*, April 2013, accessed June 15, 2013, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-04/16/c_132312681.htm.

⁹⁷ Linus Hagstrom, "Quiet power: Japan's China policy in Regard to *the Pinnacle Islands*," *The Pacific Review* 18: 2 (June 2005): 176.

“damages China’s core interest.”⁹⁸ In his comment on the planned purchase of Ishihara of the Diaoyu Islands during the meeting with Japanese former Foreign Minister Masahiko Komura on May 3, 2012, Vice President Xi Jinping (习近平) stated “with regard of the issue involving counterpart’s core interest and matter of high concern, we hope Japan should be more prudent.”⁹⁹ Premier Wen Jiabao met with Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda, who visited Beijing on May 13 and discussed with him Ishihara’s plan to purchase the Diaoyu Islands. Without directly mentioning the Diaoyu Islands, Premier Wen Jiabao said, “it is important to respect [China’s] core interest and matter of high concern.”¹⁰⁰ MFA Spokesperson Hua Chunying (华春莹) stated on April 26, 2013 that “China firmly safeguards its core national interests, including national sovereignty, national security and territorial integrity. The Diaoyu Islands issue concerns Chinese territorial sovereignty.”¹⁰¹

⁹⁸ Zhong Sheng, “zhong guo wei hu lingtu zhu quan de yizhi burong shitan,” [Do not Prone China’s Will of Defending Sovereignty of Territory (in Chinese)], *Remin Ribao*, January 17, 2013, accessed June 15, 2013, http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrb/html/2012-01/17/nw.D110000renmrb_20120117_5-03.htm.

⁹⁹ “Shukinpeishi, ‘kakushintekiriki’ to hatsugen senkaku kensei” [Xi Jinping Remarks ‘Core Interest,’ Trying to Constrain Japan’s Move on Senkaku Islands (in Japanese)], *Kyodo Tsushin*, May 3, 2012, accessed June 15, 2013, <http://www.47news.jp/CN/201205/CN2012050301001691.html>.

¹⁰⁰ “Nichu shuno, senkakumondai de gekiron, chugoku nihon wo kensei” [Chinese and Japanese leaders had a heated discussion on Senkaku issue. China tried to constrain Japan’s Move (in Japanese)], *Kyodo Tsushin*, May 13, 2012, accessed June 15, 2013, <http://www.47news.jp/CN/201205/CN2012051301001924.html>.

¹⁰¹ “China’s Peaceful Development, the white paper released by China’s State Council Information Office in September 2011, made it clear that China firmly safeguards its core national interests, including national sovereignty, national security and territorial integrity. The Diaoyu Islands issue concerns China’s territorial sovereignty.” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PRC, “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying held a press conference on April 26, 2013,” April 28, accessed June 15, 2013, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/s2510/2511/t1035948.shtml>.

Maritime rights and interests have become vital national concerns for China. The 2012 defense whitepaper particularly emphasized safeguarding China's maritime rights and interests.¹⁰² The enhancement of the Chinese navy in recent years showed that China has prioritized naval capability. Whether as a measure to defend its maritime rights and interests or as a deterrent in disputes with other countries, naval force is crucial. Chinese naval power has been considerably developed and modernized. The Chinese Navy has shifted its focus from inshore defensive before the 1970s, to offshore defensive operations after the 1980s, to now a "modern force for maritime operations has taken shape, consisting of combined arms with both nuclear and conventional means of operations."¹⁰³ The number of Chinese vessels increased from 740 to 1090 from 2003 to 2012.¹⁰⁴ To modernize its vessels, the Chinese Navy introduced modern Kilo-class submarines from Russia, and increased its surface combatant ships with improved air defense and anti-ship attack capabilities, landing ships, and supply ships.¹⁰⁵ The Chinese navy commissioned its first aircraft carrier, Liaoning ship, in September 2012. The 2012 Defense Whitepaper indicated that "China's development of aircraft carriers has far-reaching significance for building a powerful navy and maintain maritime security."¹⁰⁶

¹⁰² Information Office of the State Council of the PRC, *The Diversified Employment of China's Armed Forces*.

¹⁰³ Information Office of the State Council of the PRC, *China's National Defense in 2008*, January 2009, Beijing, accessed June 15, http://english.gov.cn/official/2009-01/20/content_1210227.htm.

¹⁰⁴ These numbers are based on the *Japanese Defense White Paper* from 2003-2012.

¹⁰⁵ Japan Ministry of Defense, *Defense of Japan 2012* (Annual White Paper), 33-4, accessed June 15, 2013, http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2012/07_Part1_Chapter1_Sec3.pdf.

¹⁰⁶ Information Office of the State Council of the PRC, *The Diversified Employment of China's Armed Forces*.

Chinese maritime activities have extended and intensified. China participates in multilateral exercises and trainings, and conducts its operations as routine practice in the East China Sea and the Pacific Ocean as well as in the South China Sea.¹⁰⁷ Several incidents have attracted international attention. For example, a submerged Chinese nuclear-powered submarine navigated in Japanese territorial waters in November 2004, and a Chinese Song-class submarine surfaced in the vicinity of the U.S. aircraft carrier Kitty Hawk in international waters in October 2006.¹⁰⁸

III. Mainland Baodiao Activists

In this section, we focus on mainland Baodiao activists and their activities. Baodiao means “defending the Diaoyu Islands” in Chinese. The Baodiao movement is a social movement in China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. This movement asserts Chinese sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands. Baodiao activities can also be traced back to the 1970s. The movement was started by overseas Chinese students in the United States. When the U.S. announced its imminent reversion of Okinawa, including the Diaoyu Islands, it aroused protests from ROC. Overseas Taiwanese students in the U.S. who supported the ROC government discussed this issue in 1970. On January 29, 1971, a demonstration was staged in San Francisco. This demonstration protested against the decision of the U.S. to “return” the Diaoyu Islands (which they asserted was ROC territory) to Japan, and appealed for the ROC government to fight for its rights. This

¹⁰⁷ Information Office of the State Council of the PRC, China’s National Defense in 2010: Modernization of the People’s Liberation Army, March 31, 2011, accessed June 15, 2013, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-03/31/c_13806851_7.htm.

¹⁰⁸ Japan Ministry of Defense, *Defense of Japan 2012*, 36, footnote 48.

demonstration spread to other cities in the United States. For instance, over a thousand Chinese students from several East Coast universities protested in front of the UN building and the Japanese consulate on January 30.¹⁰⁹ The demonstrations forced the ROC government to assert its claim over the islands in June 1971. These demonstrations were considered the first wave of Baodiao activities.

The second wave of Baodiao activities took place in the mid-1990s. The event that Japan Youth Society constructed a second lighthouse in Kitakojima in July 1996 stimulated the establishment of the Action Committee for Defending the Diaoyu Islands in Hong Kong. Although Baodiao activists from Hong Kong and Taiwan had organized several landing missions, they were often intercepted by the JCG. On September 26, 1996, David Chan Yuk-cheung (陈毓祥), an important leader of the Baodiao movement in Hong Kong, drowned when he tried to swim to the islands. On October 7, 1996, 41 boats carrying Baodiao activists from Hong Kong and Taiwan approached the waters near Diaoyu, and four activists who landed on the Uotsuri/Diaoyu Islands raised the PRC and ROC flags.

1. Beginnings and the 2003 Attempt

The popular nationalist activities in mainland China can be traced back to 1996. As mentioned above, when a Japanese nationalist group built a second lighthouse in July 1996, activists expressed their anger in various ways. For example, Tong Zeng gathered 257 signatures for a petition calling on China's Central Military Commission to send

¹⁰⁹ Frank Ching, "US Chinese ask backing on Isles," *New York Times*, April 12, 1971. Except the demonstrations in late January, another wave of demonstration was launched in major American cities, including Washington, San Francisco, Los Angeles, Chicago, and Houston on April 10.

warships to dismantle the lighthouse.¹¹⁰ On September 1, 1996, Tong Zeng and others issued a public letter protesting Japanese occupation of Chinese territory (i.e., the Diaoyu Islands). On September 8, Tong and others established the Chinese Federation for Defending the Diaoyu Islands (CFDD, zhongguo minjian baodiao lianhe hui 中国民间保钓联合会).¹¹¹ Although Tong Zeng encouraged Baodiao volunteers to go to Macau and join the Chinese Joint Baodiao Movement, the efforts did not pay off. In 1998, Zhang Likun, a mainland activist, went to Hong Kong alone to join the joint Baodiao action. However, that action failed because the vessel that carried the activists was stopped by the JCG on its way to the Diaoyu Islands.¹¹²

In February 2003, the CFDD website was established,¹¹³ and soon the CFDD prepared for real action. As Wang Jinsi recalled, when a group of popular nationalist activists met in Beijing on April 6, Feng Jinhua already talked about the plan. Feng Jinhua said, “Japanese right-wing already took action before us and they gained the supports from the Japanese government. We should land on the Diaoyu Islands in order to express the voice of Chinese citizens and show the constant position of the Chinese

¹¹⁰ Jian Zhang, “Influence of Chinese nationalism on Sino-Japanese relations,” in *China-Japan relations in the twenty-first century: creating a future past?*, ed. Michael Heazle, Nick Knight (Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, c2007), 19.

¹¹¹ Lu Yan and Zhong Jian, “Dailu baodiao pian: duozhu heta de Jianghu” [Maintain Baodiao: Leader and his Activities (Helmsman and his Fraternity) (in Chinese)], *fenghuangzhoukan* [Phoenix Weekly], No.26 (2012) accessed June 15, 2013, <http://big5.ifeng.com/gate/big5/zhoukan.blog.ifeng.com/article/25685577.html>.

¹¹² Wu Fei, “Diaoyudao yuwo de 42nian” [42 Years between Diaoyu Islands and Me (in Chinese)], *Beijing qingnian bao* [Beijing Youth Daily], August 26, 2012, accessed June 15, 2013, <http://bjyouth.ynet.com/3.1/1208/26/7407013.html>.

¹¹³ The website of the ‘CFDD,’ which was established in February 2003, now boasted a membership of 111,236 for its forum in June 2013.

government.” Asked about Japanese forces possibly stopping the activities, Feng Jinhua said, “Even if we cannot land on the islands, we can show the attitudes and position of the Chinese youth.”¹¹⁴ On April 16, Feng Jinhua posted a solicitation letter on the Internet, and asked for donations and assistance. Feng Jinhua was the general contact person, and thus, indicated his name, ID number, and cell phone number in the letter to lend credibility to their activities.¹¹⁵ Feng is an activist famous for his vandalism of the Yasukuni Shrine on August 14, 2001.¹¹⁶ The responses were strong. The letter was accessed 10,000 times on the Coalition of Patriots Web (aiguozhe tongmen wang), and donors exceeded one thousand people in a short period.¹¹⁷ On May 19, 2003, Feng Jinhua, Zhang Likun, Li Nan, Niu Li-Pi (牛力丕), and Zhou Wenbo (周文博) posted the announcement, “Chinese Baodiao Activity start to convene landing volunteer,” on the

¹¹⁴ Wang Jinsi, *Chugoku hanichikatsudoka no shogen* [The Testimony of Chinese ‘Anti-Japanese’ Activists], trans. Sun Xiuping (Tokyo: Kawade Shobo Shinsha Publishers, March 23, 2011), 117.

¹¹⁵ Wu Fei, “42 Years between Diaoyu Islands and Me.”

¹¹⁶ For expressing his indignation and protest against Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi’s Shrine visit to Yasukuni, Feng Jinhua painted a red “gaisi” [accursed] on the base of a stone lion sculpture in front of the Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo on the evening of August 14. He was arrested by police immediately. Tokyo court sentenced Feng Jinhua to 10 months in jail with 3 years’ suspension.

“A Chinese Arrested for Protesting Shrine Visit in Japan,” *People’s Daily*, August 24, 2001, accessed June 15, 2013, http://english.people.com.cn/200108/24/eng20010824_78208.html, “Feng Jinhua buxiang jingguo shenshe daoqian” [Feng Jinhua won’t apologize to Yasukuni Shrine (in Chinese)], *Global Time*, September 7, 2001 and Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, “Spokesperson on the Verdict Handed down By a Tokyo Court against Feng Jinhua.” December 11, 2001, accessed June 15, 2013, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/yzs/gjlb/2721/2725/t16037.shtml>.

¹¹⁷ “40nian baodiao licheng huigu: Minjian baodiao quefa chengshou silu yindao” [Looking Back the 40 years’ Path of Baodiao Activities: Ungovernmental Baodiao Activities were short of the Guiding by Mature thinking (in Chinese)], *sanlian shenghou zhoukan* [Life Week], No. 49, December 3, 2010, accessed June 15, 2013, <http://news.sina.com.cn/c/sd/2010-12-03/171321578935.shtml>.

site, and invited volunteers to join in sailing to the Diaoyu Islands to appeal China's sovereignty.¹¹⁸

The Baodiao activists departed from Huangmen Port, Yuhuan County, Zhejiangon, on June 22. At 7:35 AM on June 23, these activists were intercepted by JCG vessels and plane. The activists were 30 nautical miles away from the Diaoyu Islands. The activists used megaphone to announce, "This is the territorial water of China. Please leave right away."¹¹⁹ The standoff between the Baodiao boat and the JCG vessels was broadcast live on the Coalition of Patriots Web. Around noon, the Baodiao activists decided that they cannot go any further and should withdraw. Before withdrawing, the activists bowed three times to the direction of the Diaoyu Islands and paid public tribute to David Chan Yuk-cheung by spreading white flowers into the ocean.¹²⁰ This action was significant because these activists comprised the first group of mainland Baodiao activists. On December 27, 2003, a global forum for defending the Diaoyu Islands was held in Xiamen, which was attended by over 30 representatives of the Baodiao organization from Hong Kong, Taiwan, and North and South America. In the forum, the participants officially established the CFDD and elected Tong Zeng as its chairman.

¹¹⁸ Wu Fei, "42 Years between Diaoyu Islands and Me."

¹¹⁹ Wu Fei, "42 Years between Diaoyu Islands and Me."

¹²⁰ Wang, *Testimony*, 119.

2. 2004 Landing

Around 6 AM on March 24, 2004, a mainland Baodiao activist boat led by Yu Haize (虞海泽)¹²¹ broke through the guard line created by the JCG, and a group of seven Chinese Baodiao activists organized by the CFDD landed on Uotsuri/Diaoyu Island successfully. After landing on the islands, these activists planted a Chinese flag, paid tribute to David Chan Yuk-cheung, and explored the entire island. They destroyed the Senkaku Shrine and started a fire to dry their clothes. Around 5 PM, four Japanese helicopters and 18 police officers came and arrested these activists. The activists refused to sign any paper that the Japanese asked them to do. They were released on March 26.¹²² This event was significant for the Chinese popular nationalists because it was the first time that mainland Chinese landed on the islands. After the incident, the creator of “Coalition of Patriots Web” Lu Yunfei told reporters “the incident marks a big victory in China's diplomacy towards Japan.”¹²³

3. Calling for Release of the Captain in September 2010

After the collision of the Chinese fishing boat and two JCG ships on September 7, activists expressed their support to the captain of the fishing boat. On September 8, 30 Baodiao activists from CFDD held a small-scale protest (around 30 to 40 people) in front

¹²¹ Yu adopted a strategy that posting a fake plan with a wrong date on the website and an alternative training activity in Xiamen to mislead the potential information gathering personnels of the JCG, while acted secretly with limited members. He also conducted a thorough research on the water they were sailing to. Shi Jie, “Benbaojiemi baodiaodengdao zhunbei quocheng” [Our Paper Reveals the Preparing Process for Baodiao Landing (in Chinese)], *GuojiXianfengDaobao* [International Herald Tribune (Beijing)], April 1, 2004, accessed June 15, 2013, http://big5.xinhuanet.com/gate/big5/news.xinhuanet.com/herald/2004-04/01/content_1395662.htm.

¹²² Wang, *Testimony*, 120-1.

¹²³ Reilly, “The Role of Public Opinion,” 228.

of the Japanese embassy. They waved Chinese flags and sang the national anthem. The activists demanded the release of the captain and submitted a protest letter to the embassy staff. A CFDD member, Li Wen (李文), said, “We will use various measures to call for the release of Captain.” He also emphasized that “we should use reasonable and legal way to express our patriotic voice.”¹²⁴ Demonstrations were also staged outside Japanese consulates in other major Chinese cities, but these rallies were under police control.¹²⁵ On September 18, dozens of individuals staged a demonstration around the Japanese embassy in Beijing, calling for Japanese withdrawal from the islands.¹²⁶

4. 2012 Baodiao Events

When Tokyo Governor Shintaro Ishihara publicly announced his decision to purchase the Diaoyu Islands, Baodiao activists decided to sail to the islands to claim and defend Chinese sovereignty over the islands. However, the Chinese participants were stopped by the PRC government, and the activity was canceled.¹²⁷ On July 7, 2012, Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda revealed that the Japanese government considered purchasing the Senkaku Islands. On August 15, although stopped by the JCG,

¹²⁴ Wang, *Testimony*, 195 and “40 Chinese protest near Japanese embassy over detention of fishing boat,” *Xinhua News Agency*, September 8, 2010, accessed June 15, 2013, <http://english.sina.com/china/2010/0908/338535.html>.

¹²⁵ “Gyosen shototsu, chugoku kakuchi de kogi demo nihonkokan maede” [Fishing Boat Collision, Demonstrations were also staged outside Japanese government establishment in Chinese cities (in Japanese)], *Kyodo Tsushin*, September 18, 2010, accessed June 15, 2013, <http://www.47news.jp/CN/201009/CN2010091801000078.html>.

¹²⁶ “Anti-Japan protests mark China anniversary,” *BBC*, September 18, 2010, accessed June 15, 2013, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-11354735>.

¹²⁷ “TaiBaodiao renshi: Dalu Baodiao chengyuan yibei qinghui xingdong queding quxiao” [Taiwanese Baodiao activists: Mainland Baodiao activists were already asked to return to China and the activities will be cancelled (in Chinese)], *Fong Huang weishi* [Phoenix TV], June 16, 2012, accessed June 15, 2013, http://news.ifeng.com/taiwan/3/detail_2012_06/16/15349379_0.shtml.

seven Hong Kong activists jumped from their ships to swim ashore Uotsuri/Diaoyu Island, and five of them successfully landed.¹²⁸ Fourteen activists were subsequently arrested by the Okinawa Prefectural Police and JCG officers waiting on the island. Eight years passed since the last time Chinese activists landed on the islands in 2004. Vice Foreign Minister Kenichiro Sasae summoned Ambassador Cheng Yonghua to protest, while, Chinese MFA called in Ambassador Uichiro Niwa to demand the release of the 14 activists. Japan did not press charges and released these activists on August 17. In Beijing, 20 to 30 activists protested in front of the Japanese embassy on August 15. Following the departure of the Hong Kong activists, Japanese activists responded by landing on the islands on August 19. Beijing protested the landing and requested Tokyo to “immediately cease actions harming China’s territorial sovereignty.”¹²⁹ Ambassador Niwa rejected the protest and called on Beijing to prevent such actions as the August 15 landing.¹³⁰

The arrests of the Baodiao activists and Japanese nationalists landing on the islands heated up anti-Japanese demonstrations in China, and caused the first wave of protests on August 19. Demonstrations of varied intensities were held in other major cities, such as Jinan, Qingdao, Guangzhou, Taiyuan, Shenyang, Changchun, Harbin, Chengdu, Shenzhen, Xian, Huangzhou, and Hangzhou. Police officers maintained order

¹²⁸ Martine Fackler, “Japan Holds 14 Chinese in Island Landing,” *New York Times*, August 15, 2012, accessed June 15, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/16/world/asia/japanese-ministers-visit-tokyo-shrine.html?_r=0 and Elizabeth Yuan, “Japan deporting Chinese held over island landing,” *CNN*, August 17, 2012, accessed June 15, 2013, <http://www.cnn.com/2012/08/17/world/asia/japan-china-island-dispute>.

¹²⁹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Qin Gang’s Remarks on Japanese Right-wing Activists’ Plan to Conduct Activities in Waters off the Diaoyu Islands,” August 18, 2012, accessed June 15, 2013, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/s2510/2535/t962446.shtml>.

¹³⁰ James J. Przystup, “Japan-China Relations: Happy 40th Anniversary..? Part 2,” *Comparative Connections* 14: 2 (September 2012): 113.

to prevent violence.¹³¹ China's *Youth Daily* published an article titled "Smashing Japanese Automobiles Is Not an Act of Patriotism," indicating that the car smashing hurt "China's image."¹³² On August 27, Ambassador Niwa's car was attacked in Beijing, and the Japanese flag was torn from it. The Chinese MFA expressed deep regret over the incident.

These series of events was just the beginning. On September 11, Japan formally nationalized the three islands. A second wave of protests broke out, starting with demonstrations in Beijing outside the Japanese embassy on September 12. On September 15 and 16, anti-Japanese demonstrations were staged in as many as 85 Chinese cities, including Shanghai, Shenyang, Zhengzhou, Hangzhou, and Harbin, and protesters called for a boycott of Japanese products. The numbers of protesters and cities exceeded the numbers in the 2005 anti-Japanese demonstrations because the protests spread to smaller cities. In several cases, demonstrations escalated to violent acts, such as throwing rocks at Japanese diplomatic missions and damaging the facilities of Japanese business establishments.¹³³ On September 18, the 81st anniversary of the Mukden Incident, Chinese citizens in over 180 cities of China participated in demonstrations.¹³⁴

¹³¹ Keith Bradsher, Martine Fackler and Andrew Jacobs, "Anti-Japan Protests Erupt in China Over Disputed Island," August 19, 2012, accessed June 15, 2013, <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/20/world/asia/japanese-activists-display-flag-on-disputed-island.html?pagewanted=all>.

¹³² "Zatongbao rixiche de chunxing bushi aiguo shi haiguo" [Mashing Japanese Automobiles Owned by Chinese is not an Act of Patriotism (in Chinese)], *Zhongguo QingnianBao* [China Youth Daily], August 20, 2012.

¹³³ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, "Q&A on the Senkaku Islands," Q16/A16.

¹³⁴ Chen Chenchen, "No protests can ever justify use of violent acts," *Global Times*, September 23, 2012, accessed June 15, 2013, <http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/734862.shtml> and "Anti-Japan protests reignite

Chinese MFA urged activists to express thoughts “rationally and within the law.”¹³⁵ On September 16, the Chinese media appealed to citizens to stay calm and not to use violence in the name of patriotism.¹³⁶ On September 17, police in various cities started to curb the demonstrations by limiting their time at the site to a few minutes, stripping demonstrators of projectiles, banning large protests, prohibiting the use of phones and online messages to organize illegal protests, and arresting people for violent acts, among others.¹³⁷ On September 19, the Central government adopted measures to restrain citizens from attending demonstrations. For instance, the Beijing Public Security Bureau sent cell phone messages to ask citizens not to attend protests near the Japanese embassy. National authorities deployed riot police to suppress ongoing protests. The

across China on occupation anniversary,” *Reuters*, September 18, 2012, accessed June 15, 2013, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/18/us-china-japan-idUSBRE88F00H20120918>.

¹³⁵ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PRC, “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hong Lei’s Regular Press Conference on September 11, 2012,” September 12, 2012, accessed June 15, 2013, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/s2510/2511/t969123.shtml>.

¹³⁶ Si Zhuang, “Remin wangping: Womenzenme baowei Diaoyudao” [People.com Opinion: How We Defend Diaoyu Islands (in Chinese)], *Remin Ribao*, September 15, 2012, accessed June 15, 2013, <http://opinion.people.com.cn/n/2012/0915/c1003-19018681.html>; “Shelun: suqiu xu lixing biaoda.wei gongmin nengrang chengshi meihao” [Editorial: Appeal should Express rationally. Only Citizen can Make City become Glorious (in Chinese)], *Nanfangdushibao* [Southern Metropolitan Daily], September 17, 2012, accessed June 15, 2013, <http://gcontent.oeeee.com/1/d9/1d94108e907bb831/Blog/e18/574f9e.html>; “Aiguo, bunengjianyue falu dixian” [Patriotism cannot oversteps law (in Chinese)], *XinJingbao* [The Beijing News], September 15, 2012; and “Dazaqingshao bushi aiguo shihaimin” [Vandalism is not Patriotism but Injuring the Citizen (in Chinese)], *Beijing qingnian bao* [Beijing Youth Daily], September 16, 2012, accessed June 15, 2013, <http://bjyouth.ynet.com/3.1/1209/16/7459087.html>.

¹³⁷ “Beijing threatens to clamp down on anti-Japan protests,” *South China Morning Post*, September 18, 2012, accessed June 15, 2013, <http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1039384/beijing-threatens-clamp-down-anti-japan-protests>; “18 Detained in Guangzhou for Violence in anti-Japan Protests,” *Xinhua News Agency*, September 20, 2012, accessed June 15, 2013, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-09/20/c_131861231.htm and James T. Areddy, “Amid Protests, Shanghai Protects Japanese Consulate it Paid To Fix,” *The Wall Street Journal*, September 19, 2012, accessed June 15, 2013, <http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2012/09/19/amid-protests-shanghai-protects-japanese-consulate-it-paid-to-fix/>.

protest activities in front of the Japanese embassy lasted eight days. The nationwide demonstrations gradually quieted down.¹³⁸

IV. Discussion

In Chapter 1, the two-level perception gap model proposed two hypotheses related to these two cases.

Hypothesis 1 (National Interest Priority): *When the state changes its national interest priority and considers an issue as core interest issue, which is originally sensitive at the public level and Major/Minor Issue at the government level (Issue 3), the state changes its foreign policy. Public opinion appears to influence foreign policy.*

Hypothesis 3 (Patriot Dilemma): *When the popular nationalist group and the party-state disagree on a certain issue (Issue 3), the discourses of the popular nationalist group irritate the anti-foreign public opinions and public mobilization, challenging the official foreign policy and limiting the policy choice of decision makers. When the government reluctantly changes the policy under these pressures, we define this situation as a patriot dilemma. However, foreign policy changes are limited to rhetoric revisions, and the government adopts a tougher attitude but does not change the substance of the policy.*

This section examines these hypotheses.

¹³⁸ “Anti-Japan protests ease off in China,” *Agence France-Presse*, September 20, 2012.

Case One: Yasukuni Issue

The position of the Chinese government is to downplay the history issue to maintain bilateral relations with Japan. Although Beijing persistently refused leaders' mutual visits, it did not have any further countermeasures against Japan. Criticisms toward Yasukuni were voiced by lower-level officials or in regular press conferences by the MFA. However, in 2004, Chinese leaders for the first time directly asked Prime Minister Koizumi to stop visiting Yasukuni, and refused to meet with Koizumi in a summit in another country. The year 2005 was the peak of anti-Japanese sentiment and Sino-Japanese tensions. In contrast to its previous stance, China adopted more concrete measures to punish Japan, including a refusal to join a summit with Prime Minister Koizumi in another country and a hiatus on ministerial meetings. However, this policy change was not intended by Beijing, but was forced by intense anti-Japanese sentiment at home. After the anti-Japanese sentiment calmed down in 2006, China sought to restore relations with Japan and approached potential successors of Koizumi. When Abe came to office, his position on the history issue was more conservative than Koizumi's stand, but the Chinese government chose not to criticize it. As mentioned in Chapter 4, the Chinese government even sealed the negative media coverage of the stance of Abe on the issue of comfort women. Overall, China adopted a pragmatic policy to downplay the history issue and emphasized on more important issues.

This case showed that the positions of the Chinese government and popular nationalist activists toward the history issue were significantly different in the 2000s. Popular nationalist activists considered the history issue to be very important and

sensitive, whereas the Chinese government downplayed it to maintain other national interests, such as economic interests. As the two-level perception gap model assumed, the public considered the history issue to be sensitive, whereas the government considered it as major/minor issue and thus allowed concessions. Moreover, as Hypothesis 3 assumed, a “patriotic dilemma” occurred in April 2005 when the Chinese government was forced to change its policy on Japan to appease the anti-Japanese sentiment at home. However, public mobilization can change the Chinese policy of downplaying the history issue only for a short term.

Another case of the “patriotic dilemma” was the petition regarding the Beijing high-speed rail. This petition is another good example of how popular nationalist activism influenced public opinion, mobilized the public, and forced the government to change policies. The roles of activists are to provide information, to write a petition, and to collect signatures from the public to support them. If no activists led the movement even if the general public has expressed opposition, such movement would not be gathered into a force that could challenge existing policies. In the area of domestic policies, a petition can make a difference. However, to shift foreign policy requires greater aggregation of nationalist public opinion, such as demonstrations on a national scale.

Case Two: Diaoyu/Senkaku Dispute

The policy of China toward the Diaoyu Islands dramatically changed. Beijing previously shelved the territory issue and preferred joint development. To consolidate its sovereignty claim, Beijing shifted to criticizing Japanese actions and adopting more

concrete actions. Such concrete actions include demonstrating its valid control over the islands with regular patrols and issuing laws or whitepapers to strengthen its claim. Beijing was willing to pay higher costs to claim sovereignty. For example, in negotiating the release of the captain in the 2010 incident, countermeasures included banning rare earth exports to Japan.

Although some scholars argued that the policy shift was caused by nationalist public opinion at home, I argue that it was caused by a shift in the core interest to the Diaoyu Islands and the East China Sea. As mentioned earlier, strengthening naval power and protecting maritime interests have become vital national interest. The competition with Japan over naval power and oil and natural gas resources in the East China Sea made the Diaoyu Islands an issue that China did not want to concede.

Thus, the model indicated that the public considered this issue as “sensitive issue,” and the government looked at it as “core interest issue” (in contrast to its previous view as Major/Minor Issue (MMI)). As Hypothesis 1 assumed, this change of policy resulted from a change in priority of national interests, and not from nationalist public opinion.

However, when the Chinese government had to negotiate with the Japanese government to release the activists who landed on the Diaoyu Islands and were arrested by the JCG, a patriotic dilemma occurred. The Chinese government did not intend for this situation to happen, but it was forced to respond in contrast to its plans. In this case, the popular nationalist activists, with their unexpected and bold move, influenced the policy of China on Japan by forcing the government to negotiate actively for the release of the captured activists. However, the influence of popular nationalist activists on policy was

limited, and their actions were often suppressed by the government. For instance, the Baodiao activists who attempted to sail to the Diaoyu Islands were intercepted and detained at home.

Relations between State and Popular Nationalist Activists

As two-level perception gap model assumes, when it is Issue 3 (MMI at the government level/sensitive issue at the public level), the interactions between popular nationalist and state include government used these nationalist discourses and public opinions for negotiation (Interaction B); influence the policy (Interaction C); and Chinese government adopts restriction measures on popular nationalist (Interaction D). The controversy over Yasukuni and the dispute over the Diaoyu Islands before 2000s are categorized as Issue 3. The results showed that three of these interaction existed. Chinese officials mentioned the public opinions at home to request their counterpart to concede. As previously mentioned, patriotic dilemma occurred in April 2005 and Chinese government was forced to stop the high-level meeting. The interaction of suppression will be described in detail.

However, when it is Issue 1 (Core interest issue at the government level/sensitive issue at the public level), the interactions include Interaction A (Interpreting the policy) and Interaction B. The purpose of Baodiao activities is to strengthen the claim on sovereignty of the Islands which is consistent with government position. Their discourses and action indeed interpret the official policy. During the negotiation for release of seven Baodiao activists in 2004, Chinese Ambassador to Japan Wu Dawei visited the Japanese MFA and demanded that Japan should immediately release the activists and warned of

Chinese public sentiment.¹³⁹ The dispute over the Diaoyu Islands in 2000s is categorized as Issue 1. However, the results show Interaction D (restriction measures) also existed in 2000s. The restriction measures mainly aim at preventing sailing to and landing on the Diaoyu Islands or restricting the overheated anti-Japanese demonstration. Thus, I argue that it is because although the government and Baodiao activists both agree on strengthening the sovereignty claim over the Islands, the government does not support the Baodiao activist action like landing on the Islands.

Suppression from Chinese Authorities

The position of popular nationalist activists is consistent with the official position of the state, such as on defending the sovereignty of China or protesting against the regression of Japan on the history issue. Although these issues have rhetorically emphasized, the Chinese government sacrificed these issues for economic interests or other important interests. Thus, a patriotic dilemma occurred in which the government had to change its policy to appease the public or the government had to suppress public opinions. The government cannot publicly suppress public sentiment, or it would be criticized to be too weak on Japan. The government thus took less overt measures, such as closing the activist websites or blocking their sailing by preventing fishermen from renting boats to them.

This section showed two examples of controlling popular nationalist activists and public opinions, namely, the aftermath of the 2005 spring demonstrations and the Baodiao movement.

¹³⁹ Reilly, "The Role of Public Opinion," 227.

Chinese authorities demonstrated its capacity to shift public opinion in a favorable direction by suppressing public protests and negative media coverage of Japan. With this capacity, China restored its relations with Japan in less than a month after Abe became Japanese prime minister. By spring 2007, China reverted to its previous policy on Japan (from 1999 to 2001), which was to downplay history issues.

After the April 2005 demonstrations, the Chinese authorities restrained public protests by announcing legal regulations and controlling media coverage. The police prevented people from joining the protests to secure the meeting between Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing and Japanese Foreign Minister Nobutaka Machimura in the Seventh ASEM on April 17.¹⁴⁰ According to Daniela Stockmann, before the demonstrations in 2005, the editors and reporters in Beijing felt that their coverage of Japan was unconstrained by the government. Negative headlines related to Japan were frequently used. On April 9, 2005, the Propaganda Department forbade the media to report the demonstrations, and required the media to assume the position of the government. In the following week, the news was homogenized. For example, the media were demanded to publish the statement of the foreign minister asking citizens to be “calm, rational, and orderly in accordance with the law.”¹⁴¹ On April 14, the Beijing Public Security Bureau held a press conference and announced that “although citizens had a right to demonstrate, protesters had to register with the government in order for the

¹⁴⁰ Daniela Stockmann, “What Kind of Information does the Public Demand? Getting the News during the 2005 Anti-Japanese Protests,” in *Changing media, changing China*, ed. Susan L. Shirk ed., (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 183.

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 184.

protest march to be legal.”¹⁴² The media report informed citizens not to participate in illegal demonstrations and to trust that the government would handle the issue to the benefit of the entire population. MFA spokesperson requested not to boycott Japanese products.¹⁴³ Such press restrictions continued for two more months.

Beijing closed down several “anti-Japan” websites and prevented popular nationalist activists from holding demonstrations outside the Japanese embassy in Beijing.¹⁴⁴ The government took more direct action in restraining criticisms of Japan. Anti-Japanese comments on bulletin boards calling for protests were immediately removed.¹⁴⁵

Chinese authorities swayed public opinion by increasing positive media coverage of Japan, and several campaigns appealing for cooperation with Japan. As James Reilly pointed out, several campaigns promoted cooperative relations with Japan: First, veteran diplomat and President of the College of Foreign Relations Wu Jianmin delivered a series of speeches in major cities in late March, urging the Chinese people to view Sino-Japanese relations from a long-term perspective. These speeches were widely covered by the Chinese media.¹⁴⁶ The government requested several top Japanese experts to give

¹⁴² Ibid. and “Mukyoka no hannichi demo kinshi pekinshi, tainchi akka ni hadome” [Anti-Japanese Demonstrations with no Approvals will be Prohibited, Beijing City Apply a Brake to Avoid Further Deterioration of Relations with Japan (in Japanese)], *Kyoto News*, April 15, 2005, accessed June 15, 2013, <http://www.47news.jp/CN/200504/CN2005041501001283.html>.

¹⁴³ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Qin Gang’s Press Conference on 12 April 2005,” April 14, 2005, accessed June 15, 2013, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/s2510/2511/t191585.shtml>.

¹⁴⁴ Reilly, “The Role of Public Opinion,” p 140.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid., 137 and “‘Aigo no Jyonetsu wo Do arawasuka’, Gokeiren shi ni kiku” [Ask Wu Jinglian, “How to

speeches to university students to call for taking a more reasonable stance on Japan.¹⁴⁷ Scholars contributed articles to newspapers criticizing the boycott of Japanese products as harmful to national interests.¹⁴⁸

The Chinese government adopted similar measures toward the Baodiao movement. Although the Chinese government shifted its policy toward the Diaoyu Islands, instead of shelving the issue, it emphasized its sovereignty with regular patrols and allowed no concession in this issue. However, this change did not mean that the government became more tolerant of Baodiao activities.

The policy of restricting Baodiao activities can be traced back to the 1990s. The dispute on the Diaoyu Islands was minimally covered by media. When the lighthouse dispute happened in 1996, the Chinese government tried to prevent and ban petitions, protests, and demonstrations with methods such as media control policies. As a CCP Central Propaganda Department document indicated, “All news reports and commentaries on the Diaoyu Islands shall take a uniform stand and be approved by the relevant central authorities and be issued by *Xinhua News Agency* and published in *People’s Daily* and other major national newspapers.”¹⁴⁹ One reason for these controls was that both countries were determined to prevent popular nationalist groups from

express patriotic passion”], *People’s Daily (Japanese Version)*, April 21, 2005, http://j.people.com.cn/2005/04/21/jp20050421_49456.html

¹⁴⁷ Ibid., 138.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid., 137.

¹⁴⁹ Suisheng Zhao, *A Nation-State by Construction: Dynamics of Modern Chinese Nationalism* (California: Stanford University Press, 2004), 274-5.

escalating the dispute. However, Beijing did a better job than Tokyo partly because of the Chinese political system.

Media coverage of the Diaoyu Islands was limited. M. Taylor Fravel investigated both the *People's Liberation Army Daily* (Jiefangjun bao) and the *People's Daily* (Renmin ribao) from 1987 to 2005 and found that the number of articles with “Diaoyu Dao” (Senkaku Islands) in the title was low. Fravel also analyzed individual news reports, and found that “the publication of articles is caused by events linked to the dispute, especially activists’ attempts to land on the islands as well as Japan’s own administrative actions.” He concluded with the analysis that “the goal is to minimize attention to the conflict while demonstrating China’s ‘resolute’ stance on the question of sovereignty when an event occurs that appears to question or challenge China’s claim.”¹⁵⁰

The most troublesome issue has been the series of attempts of activists to land on the island as a way to demonstrate sovereignty claims for both governments. This issue became the leading source of friction and compelled the governments to take a clear stance on the dispute. While the Chinese government tolerated the establishment of the Baodiao organization like the CFDD, the policy toward such groups before this landing was unclear. However, after the landing in March 2004, the Chinese government prevented activists from sailing to the Diaoyu Islands again. As Wang Jinsi pointed out,

“It also became harder for Baodiao activists to sail out. The CFDD had three attempts to sailing to the Diaoyu Islands to appeal for Chinese sovereignty. All of them were failed because the authority stopped the captain of fishing boat from renting fishing boat to Baodiao activists.”¹⁵¹

¹⁵⁰ M. Taylor Fravel, “Explaining stability in the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands dispute,” 154.

¹⁵¹ Wang, *Testimony*, 195.

After the anti-Japanese protests in April 2005, the government raided the offices of the federation in Beijing in July 2005.¹⁵² In October 2007, four members of the federation who had entered Japanese territorial waters and attempted but failed to land on the islands were placed under house detention when they returned to China.¹⁵³ According to Wang, on September 25 2010, the website of the CFDD was closed. The top page could not be accessed. The content of the top page was: the statement and letter to the Japanese government. In the letter, they demanded the Japanese government should compensate all the Chinese fishermen's losses and withdraw from the Diaoyu Islands immediately. On the top page, they also posted that "we will continue to organize activities of sailing to the Diaoyu Islands to appeal sovereignty."¹⁵⁴

Application of the Patron-Client Model

The position of the activists seemed to support government policy. However, their act clarified that the deeds and declarations of the government were inconsistent. The discourses and actions of the activists were also unexpected and uncontrollable. Thus, it is impossible for the government to become their patron. Some of them questioned and criticized government policy. For example, Wang Jinsi expressed that the Chinese authorities did not pay enough attention to WW2 history.¹⁵⁵ Overall, the behavior pattern of the activists was more likely explained by the dissident approach than by the patron-client model.

¹⁵² Leu Siew Ying, "Raid on HQ Angers Diaoyus Activist," *South China Morning Post*, April 27, 2005, accessed June 15, 2013, <http://www.scmp.com/article/498339/raid-hq-angers-diaoyus-activist>.

¹⁵³ "Sibaodiao renshi fujian zaokoucha" [Four Baodiao Activists were detained in Fujian (in Chinese)], *Mingbao* October 31, 2007.

¹⁵⁴ Wang, *Testimony*, 196-7.

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 61.

CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION

Who is the modern-day Chinese intellectual? What is the state of intellectual-state relations? These questions are the main focus of this dissertation. To answer these questions, this study adopted a different perspective to observe and to analyze intellectual-state relations: Instead of highlighting domestic policy, this dissertation analyzed intellectual-state relations by observing the role of Chinese intellectuals in Chinese foreign policymaking. This dissertation focused on two intellectual groups considered to have significant influence on the policy of China toward Japan, namely, the think tank scholars and the popular nationalist activists. Three cases, which include Chinese attitudes toward Japanese defense policy, the Yasukuni Shrine issue, and the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute, were examined to support the argument of this dissertation.

To analyze the think tank scholar and popular nationalist groups and their relations with the party-state through their influences on the CFP, this dissertation provides a model called the two-level perception gap model to analyze the extent and degree to which intellectual discourses could influence the CFP. First, this model shows that the state and the public view the same issue in different ways. Moreover, different interaction patterns between the party-state and the think tank scholar and popular nationalist groups on different issues can be observed.

The main contribution of this dissertation is to introduce a model to integrate two scholarships: society-state relations and FPA. To be more specific, this model integrates the studies of the role of the intellectual in Chinese foreign policymaking and intellectual-state relations in China. (Please refer to Table 5)

In this chapter, I summarize the findings from examining the two-level perception gap model. First, this chapter reviewed China’s Japan policy in 2000s. Secondly, the findings examined from three hypotheses and the model are summarized. Third, I conclude this dissertation with some personal observations.

Table 5: Basic Structure of Dissertation

		FPA: Intellectuals’ Role in CFP making	State-Society Relations: Intellectual-State Relations
Think Tank Scholar	Case: Security Policy	Influence CFP (core interest issue) through analyses but avoid providing policy suggestions.	Pluralist institutionalism [Hypothesis 2: Self-discipline]
Popular Nationalist	<i>Case One: Yasukuni Issue</i>	Influenced CFP for a short term; however, government will gradually return to original policy. [Hypothesis 3: Patriotic Dilemma]	Government had to give in for the strong public opinions, even though it was not its intention. Patriotic dilemma happened more in History issue, because it is MMI issue.
	<i>Case Two: Diaoyu Islands Issue</i>	Government changed FP; thus, it seems like popular nationalist influenced CFP. [Hypothesis 1: Priority of National Interest]	Government also considered territorial dispute as core interest. However, patriotic dilemma still happened when the nationalist group’s act went too far or out of government’s expectation (e.g., 2004 landing).

Policy of China on Japan

General Policy Direction

From normalization in 1972 to the Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty in 1978, the policy of China on Japan pursued intensifying trade relations, and cultural and people exchanges. After the 1978 treaty, China viewed extending economic and strategic

cooperation with the U.S. and Japan as a priority and downplayed history issues and territorial disputes. This policy was sustained until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Following the end of the Cold War, the Chinese modernized its military, and held an apprehensive position toward US-Japan security cooperation while maintaining economic relations. The 2000s witnessed more changes: First, Beijing was forced to gradually adopt a tougher position on the history issue based on domestic nationalist public opinion from 2001 to mid-2006, although it gradually returned to downplaying the issue in late 2006. Second, China revised its policy of shelving the territorial dispute to protect its maritime interest. These policy directions were consistent with the priority of the national interests (indicated in Table 1 in Chapter 1).

Policy in Different Issue Arena

In 1996, the policy of China on the U.S.-Japanese alliance and Japanese defense policy changed. In the 1970s and 1980s, China formed a semi-alliance with the U.S. and Japan against the Soviet Union. After the end of the Cold War in 1989 and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, China started to modernize its military and to participate in several military actions in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait. China interpreted the redefinition of the U.S.-Japanese alliance as containment against it, and thus, China protested against the alliance. From 1996 to 2001, China continued high-profile criticisms of the U.S.-Japan alliance and the Japanese defense policy. Although Beijing did not alter its policy of apprehension, the criticisms were toned down in 2001.

China consistently downplayed the history issue but adopted responsive measures to the discourse of Japanese politicians and domestic incidents related to the issue. Anti-

Japanese nationalism intensified the tone and scale of responses. Three turning points were observed. First, the Jiang administration increasingly emphasized the history issue, such as the Yasukuni visits of Hashimoto and the Japan visits of Jiang. The latter was considered a failure and led to a debate concerning the policy of China on Japan. Thus, in 1999, the policy switched back to downplaying the history issue.

Second, from 2002 to 2006, the continued visits of Koizumi to the Yasukuni Shrine and the anti-Japanese sentiments at home placed Chinese decision makers in a difficult position. The history issue could no longer be downplayed, and thus, China was forced to adopt an increasingly tougher policy. Third, after Abe came to office in September 2006, China gradually stepped back to the previous policy of downplaying the history issue.

Beijing shelved the territorial dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands from 1972 to the late 1990s. This policy shifted to consolidate its sovereign claim over the islands. Chinese maritime surveillance ships sailed around the islands as early as 1999. In the 2000s, the increased emphasis on maritime interests revealed the Chinese policy on the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute and reflected the development of naval power and oil and natural gas resources in the East China Sea. China adopted substantial measures to demonstrate its sovereignty over the islands, which included legal regulations, official statements and white papers, and the deployment of maritime law enforcement ships. A Chinese surveillance boat entered the territorial waters of the islands in December 2008, and surveillance activities became routine after the collision between JCG vessels and a

Chinese fishing boat in 2010. Although the exact time of the policy shift is difficult to identify, the attitude and responses of Beijing showed that the policy has transformed.

Intellectual Influence on the Policy of China toward Japan

Think Tank Scholar Group

Previous studies indicated think-tank scholars are consulted in policymaking, and thus, influence Chinese foreign policy. This dissertation is inclined to make the same conclusion. The case focuses on Chinese attitude toward the U.S.-Japanese alliance and the Japanese defense policy. This case is categorized as “core interest/sensitive issue” in the model. The hypothesis is examined by contrasting the policy of China on Japan with the interpretation of think tank scholar groups on this issue. In Chapter 3, the objective analyses of think tank scholar groups influenced Chinese attitude toward the U.S.-Japanese alliance and the Japanese security policy. Although enhancements in the U.S.-Japanese security cooperation relations and Japanese defense policy were considerable, Chinese responses were measured. Although most authors of scholarly articles investigated in Chapter 3 were apprehensive about future development, they argued that Japan’s security policy still had many restrictions.

However, think tank scholars did not influence policy by providing policy suggestions, at least not based on their articles. Think tank scholars probably made policy suggestions through personal relations with decision makers. In these articles analyzed in Chapter 3, think tank scholars either did not provide policy suggestions or simply provide policy suggestions that conformed to the official policy line.

Popular Nationalist Activists on History Issue and Territorial Dispute

Previous researches reveal that nationalism in China is becoming aggressive and forced Chinese decision makers to adopt tougher foreign policies. Nationalism in China is passionate and sometimes irrational, but unnecessarily influences Chinese foreign policy. I argue that public mobilization led by popular nationalist activists can influence policy only with a “patriotic dilemma,” and that this influence is limited and lasts only for a short period. The fourth and fifth chapters examine the hypothesis of “patriotic dilemma,” which refers to how popular nationalist activists sway public opinion, and challenge and restrain the policy of Chinese decision makers. Chapter 4 examines the history issue of Yasukuni, which is categorized as MMI/sensitive issue in the model. A patriotic dilemma occurred when popular nationalist activists molded public opinion in several cases in the first half of the 2000s, particularly during the April 2005 demonstrations. When nationalist public mobilization developed into nationwide demonstrations in April 2005, the Chinese government was forced to adopt a tougher attitude and policy. However, the government simultaneously adopted two measures. On the one hand, the government returned to the previous policy of downplaying the history issue and even had to make more concessions to acquire the cooperation of the Abe administration. On the other hand, Chinese authorities adopted a restrained policy on popular nationalist activism, such as suppressing the illegal anti-Japanese demonstrations. After the authorities prohibited the demonstrations, the protests gradually stopped. The Chinese government could still control Chinese public mobilization, although such

capability was weakened by new communication tools, such as cell phones and the Internet.

The case of the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute is different. Beijing changed its previous policy of shelving the territorial dispute, and pressed Japan to recognize the territorial dispute of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. The fifth chapter examines the territorial dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. The model considers this issue to be “MMI/sensitive issue” initially, and “core interest/sensitive issue” subsequently. This hypothesis of issue transformation indicates that when vital national interests change, the government changes its perspectives on a certain issue, and thus, an issue can shift from a “MMI interest issue” to a “core interest issue.” This hypothesis is confirmed by the changes in the policy of Beijing concerning the Diaoyu dispute. Based on the analysis, this dissertation asserts that the policy change was influenced by the shift in vital national interests, and not by the popular nationalist activists. However, patriotic dilemma was observed when the Chinese government was forced to rescue the Baodiao activists arrested by Japanese authorities in March 2004. After the landing, the Chinese government stopped Baodiao activists from reckless acts by preventing them from sailing to and landing on the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands.

Nationalism is rising in China, and perhaps, nationalism will be out of the control of the Chinese government in the future. However, the Chinese government still can manage the movement now.

Intellectual-State Relations

Think Tank Scholar Groups versus State

The third chapter examines the hypothesis that think tank scholars tend to be self-disciplined, as inspired by Gu's pluralist institutionalism. The pluralist institutionalism indicates that scholars in the establishment tended to be self-disciplined. The policy suggestions in articles examined were usually in accordance with the official policy. Think tank scholars often avoided providing policy suggestions when the official policy lines were ambiguous.

However, in contrast to the assumption of Gu in which the patron-client model is applicable to think tank scholars, I argue that although some scholars may have personal relations with decision makers, most think tank scholars are not the "clients" of the state or decision makers. My argument is based on several observations. First, most scholars enjoy academic autonomy, such as the freedom to write from an objective personal view. Second, the audiences of scholars include colleagues, such as foreign scholars and the general public, and thus, are not limited to decision makers. Third, the self-discipline of think tank scholars is not intended to show loyalty to the patron but to avoid state interference.

Popular Nationalist Activists versus State

The relationship of popular nationalist activists with the state is complicated. Although popular nationalist activists considered their actions support state claims and national honor, their acts have persuaded the public of the soft pragmatic policy of the state. Meanwhile, the attitude of the state toward popular nationalist activists is

ambivalent. Nationalist sentiment can be used to support the official government line of encouraging nationalism and be used for negotiations with foreign countries. By contrast, the unpredictable movement of activists and public mobilization challenged official policy and restricted the policy choices of decision makers. The state is also anxious that public mobilization might transform into an anti-government movement.

The constant policy of the state on popular nationalist activists and public opinion is more tolerant than its policy on dissidents, but the state still maintains control by restricting the media and restraining protests. As indicated in Chapter 5, the capacity of the state to dominate public opinion and to suppress popular nationalist activism is notable. Both the activists and the public who joined the demonstrations were aware of what was tolerable for the government and when to stop. Even the popular nationalist activists recognized the importance of self-discipline. For instance, in the first few days of the 2005 spring demonstrations, the Chinese authorities did not react. The government began to restrict the press only on April 9. Thus, potential protest participants had the impression that the authority did not oppose the protest activities, which led to the increasing number of protesters. Not until mid-April did both the Foreign Ministry and the Public Security Bureau make known their position. The state sent out a message via media, Internet, and cell phone that read “demonstration without approval is illegal.”¹ Thus, the protest activities gradually reduced and eventually stopped. Ironically, the

¹ Daniela Stockmann, “What kind of information does the public demand? Getting the news during the 2005 anti-Japanese protests,” in *Changing media, changing China*, ed. Susan L. Shirk ed., (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 197.

subtle balance between Chinese intellectuals and government is not fragile, because it is a balance maintained by both the Chinese government and intellectuals.

Limitation

The decision-making process in China is not transparent. Hence, the influence of intellectual discourse on foreign policy is difficult to determine. In this dissertation, I can only contrast the intellectual discourses with the policy of China on Japan, and find the correlation between them. As chapter 1 pointed out, it is difficult to collect scientific materials to confirm the causal relations of how popular nationalists mobilize public opinions and how these public opinions influence the foreign policy. Chapter 4 provided the case of High Speed Rail project showing that popular nationalist organized petition from the public and became a strong anti-Japanese public opinion to force Chinese government to delay and change the result of original policy decision. However, in other cases like anti-Japanese demonstrations in 2005 or 2012, it is difficult to confirm the causal relations of how popular nationalists organized and mobilized protesters, because most anti-Japanese websites or organization denied their participation in these demonstrations. Moreover, the causal relations of how 2005 demonstration forced the government to stop the high-level meeting with Japan are difficult to be confirmed scientifically.

Concluding Remarks: Departing from the Patron-Client Model

In a country without freedom of expression such as China, intellectuals struggle to express their ideas and beliefs as individuals not controlled or manipulated by the state. Intellectuals linger around the bottom line and sometimes, attempt to push their

limitations. However, lessons learned from the history of intellectual-state relations in PRC reveal that confrontation with the state brings tragedy. Faced with state restrictions, intellectuals are not prepared to challenge or to overthrow the authorities. Although special cases have occurred, such as the *Southern Weekend* incident in early 2013, most intellectuals tend to be self-disciplined.

Most think tank scholars work in the establishment, and thus, tend to be conservative and not challenge the authorities and the bottom line. However, activists from various occupations usually tend to be passionate and willing to challenge the bottom line. These characteristics do not mean that activists do not value self-preservation. During the 2005 demonstration, the “Coalition of Patriots Web” asserted that the anti-Japanese movement should not violate law and call for other protesters to act calmly and peacefully.² Wang further commented on the Baodiao activities that “Baodiao activities should be consistent with nation’s domestic and foreign policy. Landing is not the only way. Act blindly will only damage China’s national interests and China’s relations with Japan.”³ Struggling between conscience and government constraints is probably a realistic portrait of modern-day intellectuals.

Using the Western definition of critical intellectuals to criticize Chinese intellectuals who are not adequately critical of the state is harsh. Using the patron-client model to generalize Chinese intellectuals as “clients” of the state is also unfair. In observing and analyzing Chinese intellectuals, I argue that we should adopt their

² Wang Jinsi, *Chugoku hanichikatsudoka no shogen* [The Testimony of Chinese ‘Anti-Japanese’ Activists], trans. Sun Xiuping (Tokyo: Kawade Shobo Shinsha Publishers, March 23, 2011), 135.

³ Wang, *Testimony*, 122.

viewpoints, and from that point, we can appreciate their work and responses in their struggles.

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APPENDIX A: JOURNAL ANALAYSIS

I. Selection of Journals

The journals that were analyzed were three international political journals, namely, *Contemporary International Relations* (現代國際關係), *International Studies* (國際問題研究), and *Asia and Africa Review* (亞非縱橫), and two Japan-specific journals, namely, *Japan Studies* (日本研究) and *Japanese Studies* (日本學刊).

1. *Contemporary International Relations* (Xiandai Guoji Guanxi 現代國際關係)

This journal is published by the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR, Zhongguo Xiandai Guoji Guanxi Yanjiusuo). CICIR is a government think tank and is the largest research institute in international studies in China. CICIR has been subordinate to the Foreign Affairs Leading Group. This journal begun in 1981 and became a quarterly in 1986, a bimonthly in 1992, and finally a monthly in 1993. It was an internal journal but started to accept articles from international specialist from other institutions since late 1990s.¹

2. *International Studies* (Guojij Wenti Yanjiu 國際問題研究)

This journal is published by the China Institute of International Studies (CIIS, Zhongguo Guojij Wenti Yanjiusuo). CIIS is also a government think tank and directly subordinate to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This journal was first published in 1951. It was published irregularly but became a quarterly since 1981.²

3. *Asia and Africa Review* (Ya-Fei Zongheng 亞非縱橫)

¹ Xuanli Liao, *Chinese Foreign Policy Think Tanks and China's Policy towards Japan* (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 2006), 76-77.

² Ibid., 79-81.

This journal is published by Asia-Africa Development Research Institute in the Development Research Centre (DRC, Guowuyuan Fazhan Yanjiu Zhongxin). DRC was formed in 1981 and is a major policy research institute providing policy advice to the State Council.³

4. *Japanese Studies* (Ribei Xuekan 日本學刊)

This journal is published by Institute of Japanese Studies (IJS, Ribei Yanjiusuo) under the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS, Zhongguo Shehui Kexueyuan). Among seven institutes on Japanese studies within China's national and provincial academics of social sciences, the IJS under CASS is the largest and most influential research institute in China's Japan policy formulation. The IJS first published a journal entitled *Materials of Japanese Problems*, which was for internal reference for the central government, and in 1985 the journal changes its title to *Japanese Problem* (Ribei Wenti) for public circulation. It was renamed as Ribei Xuekan (Japanese Studies) in 1991.⁴

5. *Japan Studies* (Ribei Yanjiu 日本研究)

This journal is published by the Institute of Japanese Studies of Liaoning University. This institute was founded in 1964 and was famous for its Japanese economic studies. This journal is a quarterly since 1985.⁵

³ Ibid., 81-82.

⁴ Ibid., 87-89.

⁵ Ibid., 91.

II. Selection of Articles and Questionnaires

I went through all the articles from 2001 to 2010 in these five journals and categorized them into several categories such as security, history issue, territorial issue, and others. I focused on the articles categorized “US-Japan Alliance” and “Japanese security policy.” Among 66 articles selected, 38 articles were published from 2001 to mid-2006 and 28 articles were published from mid-2006 to 2010.

Table 6: Articles from Journals

	Years	Number	2001-2010
<i>Contemporary International Relations</i>	2001-mid-2006	8	15
	mid-2006-2010	7	
<i>International Studies</i>	2001-mid-2006	6	9
	mid-2006-2010	3	
<i>Asia and Africa Review</i>	2001-mid-2006	1	5
	mid-2006-2010	4	
<i>Japan Studies</i>	2001-mid-2006	4	8
	mid-2006-2010	4	
<i>Japanese Studies</i>	2001-mid-2006	19	29
	mid-2006-2010	10	
Total		66	66

Moreover, I analyze these articles through a series of questionnaires to categorize their policy positions on Japan. The questionnaires are as follows:

1. Japanese defense policy: If the article about the strengthening of Japanese defense policy, what does the author perceives the intent of Japan?

Political power/ Military power/ Normal state, etc.

2. US-Japan alliance: If the article discusses the strengthening of US-Japan alliance, what does author analyzes Japan’s attitude toward cooperation with the United States?

Active (take advantage of US-Japan alliance to pursue its own goal); Passive (responses to the demands of the US).

3. US-Japan alliance: If the article discusses the US-Japan alliance, does it argue that

the US encourages Japan to play more active role or is the US-Japan alliance a constraint upon Japan's security policies?

Encourage; Constraint

4. Constrains on Japan's security policy: Does the article mention constrain on Japan's security policy?

No/ Constrains from the US/ Constrains from domestic politics

5. Threats to Japan: Does the author argue that the changes of Japan's security policies are responses to external threats, North Korean missiles, or are such factors dismissed as mere "excuses" by Japan?

North Korea factor=Yes/ Excuse/ Does not mention.

6. Rise of China: Does the author argue that the rise of China or China's security policies cause Japan to alter its security policies? Does the author argue that the strengthening of US-Japan alliance and Japan's security policy aim at deterring China.

Yes/No/Detering China ...

7. Security Dilemma: Does the author argue that the enhancement in Japan's security policy and US-Japan alliance will bring instability to East Asia or are not favorable for China?

Instability in East Asia/ Unfavorable for China

8. History: Does the history of Japan's wartime invasion of China play an important role in the article or not?

Yes/No/Mentions but not emphasizes it.

9. Conservative Trend in Japan: Does the author argue that a conservative trend is

emerging in Japan? Does the author use right-wing or hawk faction to describe Japanese society or politician?

Conservative trends/ Right-wing/hawk faction

10. Policy Suggestions. Does the article advocate a policy for China?

Yes/ No

III. Results

Table 7: Japan’s Attitude toward US Demand of Strengthening US-Japan Alliance

Categories: Active, Passive, both Active and Passive

	Active	Both	Does not mention	Total
Before 2006	22	10	6	38
2001- mid-2006	57.89%	26.32%	15.79%	
After 2006	14	7	7	28
mid-2006-2010	50.00%	25.00%	25.00%	
Overall	36	17	13	66
	54.55%	25.76%	19.70%	

Table 8: Constrains on Japan’s Security Policy

Categories: Constrains from the US/ Constrains from domestic politics/ mentioning multiple constrains

	US Constrain	Domestic Constrain	Multiple Constrain	Does not mention	Total
Before 2006	6	3	5	24	38
2001- mid-2006	15.79%	7.89%	13.16%	63.16%	
After 2006	11	0	2	15	28
mid-2006-2010	39.29%	0.00%	7.14%	53.57%	
Overall	17	3	7	39	66
	25.76%	4.55%	10.61%	59.09%	

Table 9: The Goal of Japan

The goals of Japan include: Normal state; “normal state” but use it interchangeable with Political power or military power; great power/ political power; military power; Militarism; does not mention Japan’s goal.

	Does not mention	Normal	Interchangeable	GP/PP	MP	Militarism	Total
Before 2006	12	2	9	6	7	2	38
2001- mid-2006	31.58%	5.26%	23.60%	15.79%	18.42%	5.26%	
After 2006	8	5	8	2	5	0	28
mid-2006-2010	28.57%	17.86%	28.57%	7.14%	17.86%	0%	
Overall	20	7	17	8	12	2	66
	30.30%	10.61%	25.76%	12.12%	18.18%	3.03%	

Table 10: The US Attitude toward Japan’s Security Policy

Categories: Encourage Japan to play an active role; constrain Japan’s security development within the framework of US-Japan alliance; encourage Japan to play an active role but constrains Japan via US-Japan alliance (both).

	Encourage	Constrain	Both	Does not mention	Total
Before 2006	12	1	8	17	38
2001- mid-2006	32.43%	2.70%	21.62%	43.24%	
After 2006	6	1	9	12	28
mid-2006-2010	20.69%	3.45%	31.03%	44.83%	
Overall	18	2	17	29	66
	27.27%	3.03%	25.76%	43.94%	

Table 11: The North Korea Factor in Japan’s Altering Policy

Categories: Does not mention; does not mention North Korea factor but mention other factor; mention North Korea factor; mention North Korea factor but argue that it is excuse; North Korea threat theory; quote Japanese document which mentions North Korea factor.

	Does not mention	Other Factor	Yes	Excuse	Threat Theory	Quote	Total
Before 2006	24	4	0	8	0	2	38
2001- mid-2006	64.86%	10.81%	0.00%	18.92%	0.00%	5.41%	
After 2006	17	1	5	1	2	2	28
mid-2006-2010	58.62%	3.45%	17.24%	6.90%	6.90%	6.90%	
Overall	41	5	5	9	2	4	66
	62.12%	7.58%	7.58%	13.64%	3.03%	6.06%	

Table 12: The Rise of China influences Japan's Altering Policy

Categories: Does not mention; the rise of China cause Japan's policy change (Yes); mention the rise of China but argue that it is Japan's excuse (excuse); the emergence of China threat theory in Japan; the purpose of Japan's policy change is for deterring China; quote Japanese document which mentions China factor; and Japan depends on China or highlight the importance of China.

	Does not mention	Deter China	Yes	Depends on China	Excuse	Threat Theory	Quote	Total
Before 2006	18	5	5	2	1	5	2	38
2001- mid-2006	47.37%	13.16%	13.16%	5.26%	2.63%	13.16%	5.26%	
After 2006	6	9	5	2	0	5	1	28
mid-2006-2010	21.43%	32.14%	17.86%	7.14%	0.00%	17.86%	3.57%	
Overall	24	14	10	4	1	10	3	66
	36.36%	21.21%	15.15%	6.06%	1.52%	15.15%	4.55%	

Table 13: Security Dilemma

Categories: Does not mention; cause instability in the region; become pressure for China; quote media comment that the strengthening of Japan's security policy will cause instability.

	Does not mention	Instability	Pressure for China	Quote	Total
Before 2006	28	6	3	1	38
2001- mid-2006	73.68%	15.79%	7.89%	2.63%	
After 2006	21	6	1	0	28
mid-2006-2010	75.00%	21.43%	3.57%	0.00%	
Overall	49	12	4	1	66
	74.24%	18.18%	6.06%	1.52%	

Table 14: Conservative Trend in Japan

Categories: Conservative; Hawk faction (Yinpai); right-wing but refer to specific politician, media, thought, etc (right-wing specific); right wing (faction, trend, force), etc.

	Conservative	Hawk faction	Right-wing	Right-wing Specific	Does not mention	Total
Before 2006	2	4	8	5	19	38
2001- mid-2006	5.26%	10.53%	21.05%	13.16%	50.00%	
After 2006	0	1	2	5	20	28
mid-2006-2010	0.00%	3.57%	7.14%	17.86%	71.43%	
Overall	2	5	10	10	39	66
	3.03%	7.58%	15.15%	15.15%	59.09%	

Table 15: History

Categories: Does not mention; mention only one sentence; only one paragraph; emphasize on history; the history dispute between other countries and Japan.

	Does not mention	Sentence	Paragraph	Emphasis	Others	Total
Before 2006	20	9	2	6	1	38
2001- mid-2006	52.63%	23.68%	5.26%	15.79%	2.63%	
After 2006	14	7	2	1	4	28
mid-2006-2010	50.00%	25.00%	7.14%	3.57%	14.29%	
Overall	34	16	4	7	5	66
	51.52%	24.24%	6.06%	10.61%	7.58%	

Table 16: Policy Suggestion

Journal Names	Years	Yes
<i>Contemporary International Relations</i>	2001-mid-2006	1
	mid-2006-2010	1
<i>International Studies</i>	2001-mid-2006	
	mid-2006-2010	2
<i>Asia and Africa Review</i>	2001-mid-2006	
	mid-2006-2010	
<i>Japan Studies</i>	2001-mid-2006	
	mid-2006-2010	1
<i>Japanese Studies</i>	2001-mid-2006	1
	mid-2006-2010	1
Total		7

Table 17: Threat Perception of Authors toward Japan

(TP3= extremely threatened; TP2= threatened; TP1=less threatened; TP0=neutral)

	TP3	TP2	TP1	TP0	Total
Before 2006	4	7	12	15	38
2001- mid-2006	10.26%	17.95%	33.33%	38.46%	
After 2006	0	2	12	14	28
mid-2006-2010	0.00%	7.41%	40.74%	51.85%	
Overall	4	9	24	29	66
	0.00%	13.64%	36.36%	43.94%	

APPENDIX B: SUPPLEMENTAL TABLES

Table 18: The History of Efforts for BMD Development in Japan

1995	Commenced a comprehensive study on the posture of the air defense system of Japan and a Japan–U.S. joint study on ballistic missile defense
1998	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • North Korea launched a ballistic missile over Japanese territory • The Security Council and the Cabinet meeting approved the Japan–U.S. joint cooperative technical research on ballistic missile defense (BMD) as part of a sea-based upper-tier system
1999	Started the joint Japan–U.S. technical research on four major components for advanced interceptor missiles
2000	The Security Council and the Cabinet meeting approved the Mid-Term Defense Program (FY2001–FY2005) with a decision to continue the Japan–U.S. joint cooperative technical research on a sea-based upper-tier system and to take necessary measures after the review of its technical feasibility
2002	Decision by the United States on the initial deployment of BMD
2003	The Security Council and the Cabinet meeting approved the introduction of BMD system and other measures, and the deployment of BMD in Japan started
2004	The Security Council and the Cabinet meeting approved the National Defense Program Guidelines and the Mid-Term Defense Build-up Program, with a decision to take necessary measures after examining possible transition of the joint technical research to a development stage, together with continued efforts of build-up to establish a necessary defense posture including development of the BMD system
2005	The Security Council and the Cabinet meeting approved a Japan–U.S. Cooperative Development on advanced interceptor missiles for BMD
2006	North Korea launched seven ballistic missiles toward the Sea of Japan
2007	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The deployment of Patriot PAC-3 units started • SM-3 test-launch by Aegis destroyer Kongo
2008	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Test-launch of Patriot PAC-3 • SM-3 test-launch by Aegis destroyer Chokai
2009	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 2009 North Korea launched one ballistic missile toward the Pacific Ocean in April and seven toward the Sea of Japan in July • Orders for ballistic missile destruction measures were issued for the first time • Test-launch of Patriot PAC-3 • SM-3 test-launch by Aegis destroyer Myoko
2010	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Patriot PAC-3 units deployment completed • SM-3 Test-launch by Aegis destroyer Kirishima (upgrading BMD of four Aegis-equipped vessels completed)
2011	• Completing deployment of FPS-5 (4 radars total)
2012	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • North Korea launched a missile which it calls a “Satellite” • An order was issued to destroy the ballistic missile

Source: Japan Defense Agency, *Defense of Japan 2012 (Annual White Paper)*, p187.

Table 19: The Multinational Exercises that Japan Joined from 2005 to 2012

Date	Exercises	Hosts	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Participating Nations • Participation of the Defense Agency and SDF
May/2005	Multinational Joint exercise (Cobra Gold 05)	US & Thailand	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Armed forces, and governmental and private sector representatives from 21 countries • Participation of 27 SDF officers
May/ 2005	WPNS Multilateral Marine Exercise	Singaporean Navy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Vessels from nine countries including Japan • One escort vessel from JMSDF
May/2006	Multinational Joint exercise (Cobra Gold 06)	US & Thailand	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Armed forces, and governmental and private sector representatives from five countries (including Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand, U.S.A., Japan) • Participation of 45 SDF officers
June/2006	Third Western Pacific Minesweeping Joint Exercise	Malaysian Navy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 21 countries including Australia, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Korea, Singapore, U.S.A., and Japan • Minesweeping mother ship, one minesweeping warship and one minesweeping vessel
August/ 2006	Khaan Quest 2006	U.S. and Mongolian militaries	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • About 22 countries, including U.S.A., Mongol, Bangladesh, Fiji, India, Thailand, and Tonga • A total of five from the Joint Staff Office, Ground Staff Office and ASDF participating as observers
May/ 2007	Cobra Gold 2007	US & Thailand	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 14 countries, including Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand, U.S.A., and Japan • 48 SDF officers
May/ 2007	WPNS Multilateral Sea Exercise	Singapore Navy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Australia, Bangladesh, China, France, India, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, U.S.A., and Japan • One MSDF destroyer and about 180 personnel including those aboard the destroyer
August 2007	Khaan Quest 2007	U.S. and Mongolian militaries	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • About 22 countries, including U.S., Mongolia, Bangladesh, Fiji, India, Thailand and Tonga • Two GSDF participating as observers
Sep./ 2007	Maritime Multilateral Exercises, Malabar 07-2	U.S. Navy, Indian Navy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • India, Australia, Singapore, U.S., Japan • Two destroyers, two P-3C patrol aircraft, approximately 400 participants

(Continued)

Date	Exercises	Hosts	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Participating Nations • Participation of the Defense Agency and SDF
Nov.- Dec./ 2007	Western Pacific Rescue Submarine Exercises (Pacific Reach 07)	Australian Navy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Australia, U.S., Singapore, the ROK, the United Kingdom, Canada, China, Japan and others • The Response of Ministry of Defense and SDF. One rescue submarine and a crew etc. of approximately 130 personnel
May/2008	Cobra Gold 2008	US & Thailand	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 21 countries, including Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand, U.S., and Japan • 69 SDF officers
Jul.-Aug./ 2008	Exercise Kakadu 2008	Australian Navy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Australia, France, Malaysia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Singapore, Thailand, Japan • One Destroyer ship and about 160 crewmembers of the ship participated
Feb./2009	Cobra Gold 2009	US & Thailand	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Thailand, U.S., Indonesia, Singapore, Japan, etc. • 78 personnel participated
Mar./ 2009	Exercise Aman 2009	Pakistani Navy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Pakistan, Australia, Bangladesh, France, Kuwait, Malaysia, Nigeria, China, Turkey, U.K., U.S., Japan • Two P-3C patrol aircraft and about 40 personnel participated
May/2009	ARF disaster relief field exercise	The Philippines & the U.S.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Philippines, U.S., Australia, EU, Indonesia, ROK, Japan, etc. • One US-2 search and rescue amphibian, two C-130 transport airplanes and 25 personnel participated
April/2009	Malabar 2009	Indian Armed Forces	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • U.S., India, Japan • Participation of 2 destroyers and 3 P-3C patrol aircraft
April/2009	Third WPNS Multilateral Sea Exercise	Singapore Armed Forces	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Japan, U.S., Singapore, France, Australia, Thailand, New Zealand, Bangladesh, Malaysia • Participation of 1 destroyer
May/2009	ARF disaster relief field exercises	US & Philippine	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Philippines, U.S., Australia, EU, Indonesia, ROK, Japan, etc. • Participation of 1 US-2 search and rescue amphibian, 2 C-130H transport airplanes and about 90 personnel
Sept./2009	Japan– U.S.– Australia joint military exercise	Japan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Japan, U.S., Australia • Participation of 2 destroyers and a P-3C patrol aircraft

(Continued)

Date	Exercises	Venue	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Participating Nations • Participation of the Defense Agency and SDF • (Host)
Feb./ 2010 Fig. III-3-1	Cobra Gold 10	Thailand	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Indonesia, Japan, ROK, Singapore, Thailand, U.S., etc. • Approximately 100 participants from Joint Staff office, Ground Staff office, Maritime Staff office, Central Readiness Force, Internal Bureau, etc. • US & Thailand (U.S. Armed Forces, Royal Thai Armed Forces)
May –Jul./ 2010	Pacific Partnership 2010	US	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Australia, Canada, France, New Zealand, Portugal, Singapore, U.K., U.S., etc. • 1 vessel; approximately 40 crew
June/ 2010	Japan–Australia–New Zealand Joint Training	Waters off the West Coast of Canada	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Japan, Australia, New Zealand • 1 vessel
June/ 2010	Japan–U.S.–Australia–Canada–France Joint Training	Waters stretching from Canada to Hawaii	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Japan, U.S., Australia, Canada, France • 2 vessels
June/ 2010	Japan–U.S.–Australia Joint Training	Waters around Okinawa	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Japan, U.S., Australia • 7 vessels; several aircraft (Participation by 4 destroyers, 1 missile equipped vessel, 2 submarines, and several aircraft) • Japan
June-Aug./ 2010	RIMPAC 2010	Waters around Hawaii	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • U.S., Australia, Canada, Chile, Columbia, France, Singapore, Thailand, Japan, Indonesia, ROK, Malaysia, Netherlands, Peru • 3 vessels; 3 aircraft • US
Aug.-Sept./ 2010	KAKADU 10	Australia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Australia, Japan, New Zealand, Singapore, Thailand • 1 vessel; 2 aircraft • Australia
August 2010	PACIFIC REACH 2010	Waters around Singapore	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Singapore, U.S., Japan, Australia, ROK • 1 vessel • Singapore

(Continued)

Date	Exercises	Venue	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Participating Nations • Participation of the Defense Agency and SDF
Sept./ 2010	PSI - Pacific Protector 10	Australia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cambodia, Mongolia, Philippines, ROK, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Australia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Vanuatu, Argentina, Canada, U.S., Portugal, Russia, etc. • Approximately 10 participants from Internal Bureau, Joint Staff office, Air Staff office, Air Defense Command, etc. • Australia
Oct./ 2010	PSI - Eastern Endeavor 10	Waters around Pusan, etc.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • U.S., ROK, Japan, Australia, France, Canada, New Zealand, Turkey, Chile, Argentina, etc. • 2 vessels
Feb./ 2011	Cobra Gold 11	Thailand	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Indonesia, Japan, ROK, Singapore, Thailand, U.S., Malaysia, etc. • Approximately 60 participants from Joint Staff office, Ground Staff office, Air Support Command, Central Readiness Force, Internal Bureau, etc. • Thailand & US
March/ 2011	AMAN-11	Pakistan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Pakistan, China, France, U.K., U.S., Japan, Australia, etc. • 2 aircraft
March/ 2011	ARF-DiREx 2011	Indonesia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Indonesia, Japan, India, Australia, Singapore, China, U.S., etc. • Approximately 10 participants from Joint Staff office, Ground Staff office, Maritime Staff office, Air Staff office, Internal Bureau
June/ 2011	Global Peace Operations Initiative Capstone training (Ayala Guardian 11)	Thailand	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Japan, Thailand, U.S., Bangladesh, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mongolia, Nepal, Philippines, Vietnam, etc. • Approximately 10 crew including observers
June-July/ 2011	Pacific Partnership 2011	Timor-Leste, Micronesia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Japan, U.S., Australia, Canada, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Spain, etc. • Approximately 10 crew
July/ 2011	Japan-U.S.-Australia Joint Training	Waters around Brunei	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Japan, U.S., Australia • 1 vessel

(Continued)

Date	Exercises	Venue	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Participating Nations • Participation of the Defense Agency and SDF
July-Aug./ 2011	Multilateral Joint Training (Conquest 11)	Mongolia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Japan, U.S., Mongolia, Cambodia, India, Korea, Indonesia. • 2 crew
Oct./ 2011	U.S.-U.K. Cohosted Multilateral Minesweeper Training	Waters around Bahrain	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Japan, U.S., U.K. • 2 vessels
Feb./ 2012	Japan-U.S.-Australia Joint Training (Cope North Guam)	U.S. Guam Island and surrounding airspace	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Japan, U.S., Australia • Approximately 20 aircraft and 330 crew
Feb./ 2012	Cobra Gold 12	Thailand	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Japan, U.S., Thailand, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, etc. • Approximately 70 participants from the Joint Staff office, Ground Staff office, Air Support Command, Central Readiness Force, Internal Bureau, etc.
Feb.-Mar./ 2012	Global Peace Operations Initiative Capstone training (Shanti Doot-3)	Bangladesh	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Japan, Bangladesh, Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Nepal, etc. • 2 crew
April/ 2012	American-Filipino Joint Training (Balikatan 12)	Philippines	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Japan, U.S., Philippines, Australia, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia. • 3 crew
May/ 2012	Australian Army-Hosted Shooting Convention	Australia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Japan, U.S., Australia, Brunei, Canada, France, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Timor-Leste. • Approximately 20 crew
June/ 2012	Japan-U.S.-Australia Joint Training	Kyushu, southeastern waters	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Japan, U.S., Australia • 2 vessels, 1 aircraft
June/ 2012	Japan-U.S.-Korea Joint Training	Korean peninsula, southern waters	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Japan, U.S., Korea • 3 vessel
June-July/ 2012	Pacific Partnership 2012	Philippines and Vietnam	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Japan, U.S., Australia, Canada, Chile, Malaysia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Singapore, etc. • 1 vessel, 6 aircraft and approximately 200 crew

Source: Japanese Defense Whitepaper from 2006 to 2012.