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**From Dissent to Democracy?
The Promise and Perils of Civil Resistance Transitions**

**A Dissertation
Presented to
the Faculty of the Josef Korbel School of International Studies
University of Denver**

**In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Doctor of Philosophy**

**By
Jonathan C. Pinckney
March 2018
Advisor: Dr. Erica Chenoweth**

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Title: From Dissent to Democracy? The Promise and Perils of Civil Resistance Transitions

Advisor: Dr. Erica Chenoweth

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Abstract

Under what conditions will successful nonviolent revolutions be followed by democratization? While the scholarly literature has shown that nonviolent resistance has a positive effect on a country's level of democracy, little research to date has disaggregated this population to explain which cases of successful nonviolent resistance lead to democracy and which do not. In this study I present a theory of democratization in civil resistance transitions in which I argue that political actors' behavior in three strategic challenges: mobilization, maximalism, and holdovers policy, systematically affect the likelihood of democratization. I test this theory using a nested research design that begins with statistical testing on a dataset of every political transition from authoritarian rule in the post-World War II period and continues with three in-depth case studies informed by interviews with key decisionmakers. The testing supports the importance of two out of the three challenges: differences in mobilization and maximalism have strong, consistent effects on democratization after civil resistance.

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Preface/Introduction

“Liberation may be the condition of freedom but by no means leads automatically to it...the notion of liberty implied in liberation can only be negative, and hence, that even the intention of liberating is not identical with the desire for freedom. Yet if these truisms are frequently forgotten, it is because liberation has always loomed large and the foundation of freedom has always been uncertain, if not altogether futile.”

-Hannah Arendt, *On Revolution*

This study seeks to answer a deceptively simple question: under what conditions are successful nonviolent revolutions followed by democratization? Which political transitions initiated through nonviolent resistance lead to democracy and which do not? Two puzzles inspired this question, one from real world events and the other from the scholarly literature. The real-world puzzle was the failure of the Arab Spring uprisings, for the most part, to lead to significant democratization. What happened to the massive revolutionary coalitions of 2011 who went to the streets calling for “bread, freedom, and social justice?” Why were the moments of hope in 2011 followed by long years of frustration and, in many cases, despair, as democratic openings failed to develop into new, representative regimes.

Many scholars have examined the problematic transitions following the Arab Spring from a country-specific or regional perspective (Zartman, 2015; Roberts, Willis, McCarthy, & Garton Ash, 2016). Yet an examination of the history of successful nonviolent resistance movements will quickly reveal that the Arab Spring was far from unique. Both in the occurrence of large, primarily nonviolent uprisings and in the variation in their democratization outcomes,

the uprisings of 2011 are only one of the latest in a long historical trend that includes waves from Africa in the 1960s, Southern Europe in the 1970s, Latin America in the 1980s, and Eastern Europe in the 1990s. Thus my interest expanded from seeking to understand the outcomes of the Arab Spring to instead looking at the broader phenomenon of democratization after nonviolent revolutions.

The second puzzle relates to the scholarly inability to predict democratization in a robust consistent way. This is surprising because while the scientific study of nonviolent action remains fairly new, the study of democratization is not. For decades scholars have attempted to explain why countries democratize, and developed a wealth of potential explanatory factors. Yet we still remain very uncertain about which countries will successfully move from autocracy to democracy.

This is particularly true in political transitions following the kinds of large, nonviolent uprisings observed in the Arab Spring. There is a reliable quantitative finding that these transitions are more likely to result in democracy than other types of transitions (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011, Celestino and Gleditsch 2013), but little examination of the variation within this particular population of transitions.

In this study I propose and test the first theory to systematically explain this variation. I argue that patterns of behavior by political actors and ordinary people during periods of political transition shapes the likelihood of a transition to democracy. I postulate three particular strategic challenges around which these patterns of behavior are particularly important: transitional mobilization, maximalism, and holdovers.

The core of the analysis is quantitative, taking political transitions after large nonviolent uprisings – what I call Civil Resistance Transitions or CRTs – as instances of a phenomenon and seeking to explain variation within this phenomenon through quantitatively operationalizing my three patterns of behavior as independent variables. To justify my focus on these patterns of behavior I then move outward from my specific question to discuss the nature of causation and explanatory social science when looking at large, rare occurrences like democratization. I critique the typical focus in quantitative social science on searching for exogenous structural variables and instead encourage scholars to operationalize all of the steps between a remote structural causal factor and a political outcome. It is my hope that this discussion will be a scholarly contribution that goes beyond my specific question.

In Chapter 2 I test the impact of these particular patterns of behavior, first offering arguments for my unique operationalization of these concepts and then testing their impact on both levels of democracy and the likelihood of a transition to at least a threshold level of democracy. I also test the contention that informs my study – that nonviolent resistance at the beginning of a political transition significantly pushes a transition towards democracy – using more robust statistical techniques than have previously been used in testing this contention.

Chapters 3-5 ground my statistical analysis in three in-depth studies of particular CRTs, following Lieberman's procedure for integrating quantitative and qualitative social science through "nested analysis" (Lieberman, 2005). The transitions that I examine are the transition in Nepal in the 2000s following the 2006 Second People's Movement, the transition in Zambia in the 1990s following the overthrow of President Kenneth Kaunda by the Movement for Multiparty Democracy, and the transition in Brazil in the 1980s away from military rule.

The studies are not comparative, except in the sense that they test the relevance of my proposed patterns of behavior in three contexts that are radically different, and demonstrate the plausibility of three transitional paths that are implied by my theoretical framing. The process tracing in these chapters is based primarily on three months of field work, in which I collected interviews from over 120 decision-makers and close political observers in all three countries.

Chapter 6 concludes the study, summarizing the insights gained from the research and proposing new directions to continue examining this important research puzzle. While my research offers significant insights it also opens many new questions. My theoretical proposals from Chapter 1 in particular open up many different avenues to explore a diverse set of political science questions, only a few of which I have space to even sketch in this chapter.

Chapter 1: The Structuration of Democracy.

In this chapter I present the core argument of my study. I begin by addressing the puzzle of democratization in the aftermath of nonviolent resistance and presenting my central argument. I then broaden my focus to consider the deeper theoretical underpinnings of my argument. I draw on structuration theory to make a critique of traditional structural approaches to democratization and show some of the larger implications of my approach for other questions in political science generally and the study of democratic transitions specifically.

Understanding Nonviolent Resistance

When we say nonviolent resistance we often mean either too much or too little. The concept is one of which both the scholarly community and popular audiences likely have some conception, but those conceptions are highly divergent. Even nonviolent resistance scholars do not speak with a single voice, as I will show below. Thus in a work of empirical scholarship that draws heavily on the concept of nonviolent resistance it is crucial to speak clearly about what I mean when I say nonviolent resistance, civil resistance, or nonviolent action.¹ Articulating a clear concept of nonviolent action is necessary in order to ensure that my argument about nonviolent resistance and democratization is coherent.

¹ I use these terms interchangeably.

Thus in this section I take on three questions. First, what do I mean when I say nonviolent resistance? Second, what is the relationship between nonviolent resistance and political order generally? And third, what do we know and what can we theorize about the impact of nonviolent resistance on political systems specifically in the context of transitions from authoritarian rule?

What is nonviolent resistance? For most readers these words conjure powerful historical images: Mahatma Gandhi marching to the sea or Martin Luther King, Jr. at the head of a column of marchers on the Edmund Pettus Bridge. For others, more tragic images such as a lone figure standing in front of a column of Chinese tanks moving on Tiananmen Square in Beijing may come to mind. Others may think of incidents from their own national histories: Russians surrounding parliament in 1991 to stop the Soviet hard-liner coup, South Africans launching strikes and boycotts in the townships to bring down Apartheid, millions of Filipinos gathering on the EDSA Boulevard to prevent President Ferdinand Marcos from stealing an election, or many others.

What do these images share? First, they are actions undertaken by unarmed civilians. In nonviolent resistance individuals come together to use their force of personality, moral authority, and non-cooperation, rather than their direct ability to impose physical costs. Nonviolent resistance is not only something that people without engaging in physical violence but also without bringing weapons; without the threat of violence.

What is the relationship between nonviolent resistance and other forms of violence such as psychological or structural violence? Todd May has argued that, in order to be nonviolent resistance, campaigns must also eschew connection to these other forms of violence

(May, 2015). He draws on, but also critiques Galtung's influential definition of violence as "when human beings are being influenced so that their actual somatic and mental realizations are below their potential realizations" (Galtung, 1969, p. 168). Galtung's definition of violence is useful in considering the impact of practices and structures that may not involve the most direct and visible forms of violent interaction, but its operationalization is more problematic. For nonviolence to be meaningful by Galtung's standards requires an almost infinitely complex set of practices to ensure that no form of violence is present. Furthermore, as an outside observer it will be nearly impossible to determine if a particular action is in fact nonviolent in a rigorous and consistent way.

May simplifies this definitional knot quite a bit by deconstructing the Galtungian definition of violence somewhat. He ends up with a definition of nonviolence as political action founded upon principles of *dignity* and *equality* (May, 2015, p. 46).

While these principles are normatively appealing they are also problematic to apply consistently across contexts. They provide significant space for the observer's preferences to bias their observation. The observer will doubtless find evidence for these principles predominating in movements they care for and likely not find it in movements they do not care for. This bias will then taint anything that can be said empirically about nonviolent resistance since other observers will approach the question of defining nonviolence with different normative lenses.

To avoid these problems I simplify nonviolence's definition to the most obvious and straightforward manifestations of violence: actual physical assaults upon persons or the plausible threat of such physical assaults. The presence of arms is one key separating factor.

Where weapons are either directly employed or even simply present, violence is likely present. However, arms are not a necessary factor to undermine whether a particular phenomenon is nonviolent resistance. In many cases, violence occurs without the use of arms through improvised weapons such as rocks or sticks, or even simply the human body. Such incidents are no longer nonviolent resistance by this definition.

Nonviolent resistance as I am discussing it is political. Some activists may take issue with this word – it certainly limits things from the perspective of more holistic approaches to the concept that think of nonviolence or, in the Gandhian parlance, *ahimsa*, as a life-principle. Nonviolent resistance may be linked to such holistic notions, but is not necessarily. If nonviolent resistance is something done *by* unarmed civilians, it is something done *to* political targets.

These political targets are often governments but need not be so in order to fall within this definition of nonviolent resistance. When I say political, I refer to the broad definition of politics formulated by David Easton: politics as the “authoritative allocation of values (Easton, 1953).”² Political struggles are struggles over how value will be defined and allocated in our communities. Limiting nonviolent resistance to the political, while limiting the scope of inquiry, remains quite broad.

Nonviolent resistance is *resistance*, by which I mean it is active political engagement. Actions that lack physical violence or the threat of physical violence may be non-violent but they do not necessarily constitute nonviolent resistance. Nonviolent resistance as *resistance* stands in opposition to the normal modes of constituting and conducting politics. Political actions that

² The general theme of this definition of politics goes as far back as Aristotle’s definition of the state as that community that seeks to attain the highest good and ensure the good life (Aristotle, *Politics*, Book 1, Chapters 1 and 2)

are nonviolent but fall within the normal bounds of institutional politics are not nonviolent resistance.

As an action that stands in opposition to normal modes of politics, nonviolent resistance is destructive to the current power structure. Gene Sharp describes nonviolent resistance in terms of refusing to cooperate with the current system of power, refusing by one's consent to continue to allow the structure to operate and thus undermining its ability to replenish itself (Sharp, 1973). Stellan Vinthagen describes nonviolent resistance as inherently "power-breaking" (Vinthagen, 2015).

Because of this, context is important in defining what is and is not nonviolent resistance since the same action may not have the same import in different contexts. A march supporting a political candidate in an advanced democracy is not nonviolent resistance since such marches are a normal, accepted, and power-reinforcing aspect of such countries' politics. However, the same march undertaken in a context where the political opposition is highly repressed or illegal and such marches undermine the rule of a particular political regime, would clearly be nonviolent resistance.

Thus nonviolent resistance is not synonymous with any one political action, method, or tactic such as protests, strikes, or boycotts. In order for an outside observer to know whether nonviolent resistance is occurring requires some degree of familiarity with the power structure in that particular society at that particular moment in time.

So, having defined nonviolent resistance, what should we expect nonviolent resistance's effects on political order to be? I identify two primary effects, the first negative and the second positive. The negative effect follows logically, almost tautologically, from the definition of

nonviolent resistance. If nonviolent resistance is non-institutional and intended to disrupt current patterns of political behavior then by definition it will be destructive of the existing political order. One need only look at the metaphors employed by scholars of nonviolent resistance to see this destructive character at work. Robert Helvey describes the goal of nonviolent resistance as to “undermine, neutralize, or destroy...the pillars of support” (Helvey, 2004, p. 9) that uphold a power holder. It undermines current political institutions, demanding their redefinition and reconstitution. It eliminates fear from people’s minds and calls upon them to no longer defer to existing authority relations (Sharp, 1973).

This effect of nonviolent resistance may be perceived as normatively appealing or unappealing depending on the observer’s perspective. When nonviolent resistance is employed in non-democratic regimes that abuse human rights outside observers will widely praise its ability to break down those authority relations. When it is employed against stable democratic regimes that protect human rights the same outside observers will widely condemn it.

Nonviolent resistance has a second aspect to it that is inherently constructive. Nonviolent resistance as I have defined it here requires an act of agency, a stepping outside of the routines and expectations of political life to envision a different political order. Thus it is inherently politically creative, expressive, and empowering. It puts political action tools in its participants’ hands and practices them in engaging in politics. It spreads civic culture and engagement, building greater social capital and investment in future political outcomes.³ This in turn is likely to build the social trust and norms of civic engagement necessary for a long-term

³ See for example Fernandes 2015, which examines this relationship through comparing the Spanish and Portuguese transitions to democracy.

sustainable political order (Putnam, 1993). For this reason nonviolent resistance, while destructive of individual political orders in the short term, will have a positive long-term effect.

This positive long-term effect can be attenuated or exacerbated depending on the particular resistance tactics and modalities employed by nonviolent resistance campaigns. Highly regimented tactics, for instance, that rely on strict hierarchical leadership, while they may still be nonviolent resistance, would be expected to have this effect largely on leaders, not on the wider populace.

Nonviolent resistance is also a tool of those who lack traditional avenues of political power. As above, this is almost tautological based on my definition. Those with political power employ institutional means because they have designed such institutional means to suit their particular ends. Institutional politics solidifies the particular set of players in power and excludes challenger groups. In Bruce Bueno de Mesquita's (2005) terms, institutional politics is the weapon of the winning coalition. As long as the same institutional mechanisms are employed the winning coalition will remain of a similar size and composition.

If, however, nonviolent resistance is regularly employed then the boundaries of the winning coalition will be under almost constant challenge. The elite will never be entirely secure in their position as the corridors of power are assaulted from outside. To avoid institutional arrangements' complete breakdown elites will have to bargain with those who use nonviolent resistance, expanding institutional avenues of access to power.⁴ Nonviolent challenger groups will then be incorporated into new institutional arrangements, with a concurrent expansion in

⁴ My distinction between groups within the polity and challengers from outside draws on Tilly's (1978) model of politics.

the size of the winning coalition.⁵ With each new instance of major nonviolent resistance from a new challenger group there is likely to be an attendant increase in winning coalition size, gradually expanding the representativeness of the political order and thus by definition making the political system more democratic.

So, given this definition of nonviolent action and these expected political effects, what can we expect about nonviolent resistance's impact in periods of political transition?

The first implication is the one that has become the most common contention in the literature on this subject: that nonviolent resistance during political transitions is likely to make democratization more likely and the democratic quality of the resulting regimes higher.⁶ Nonviolent resistance can break down less representative political orders and create greater civic engagement that will push regimes towards greater democracy. In particular, the powerful example of nonviolent resistance being used to oust the old regime will make it an attractive political tool for more challenger groups to employ.

Not all of these challenges will be successful, of course. Their success will depend on any number of contingent factors, from their level of popular support (Chenoweth & Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Resistance*, 2011), to the availability of resources and allies (McAdam, 1982), to the strategic capacity and skill of the challengers (Ganz, 2009), to the cohesiveness of whatever winning coalition has initially come to

⁵ For example, consider the examination of the labor movement in Latin America in Collier and Collier (1991). While labor initially functioned in opposition to the political order, when repression failed to suppress the movement Latin American political elites engaged in various strategies to incorporate the demands of labor into routinized politics, a shift that had important consequences for political contention across the region for decades following the initial incorporation.

⁶ The literature on this subject is large and growing. Some of the most important works to date are Karatnycky and Ackerman 2005, Johnstad 2010, Chenoweth and Stephan 2011, Celestino and Gleditsch 2013, and Bayer, Bethke, and Lambach 2016.

power during the transition (Lichbach, 1998). But it is reasonable to assume that even if a small proportion of nonviolent challenges are successful during the transition it will have important spillover effects far into the future. Shifts in political institutions to accommodate new challengers will be more likely to occur in the more fluid time of a political transition. Once these shifts have taken place the reinforcing feedback mechanisms of newly-established political institutions will make them more difficult to dislodge. Hence, we may expect a general trend of more highly democratic and representative political arrangements to continue well into the future.

However, in transitional periods the winning coalition is far from set and the boundaries of the political elite are uncertain. Thus, the power-breaking effect of nonviolent resistance may be particularly potent, and potentially destructive if employed to too great a degree. Indeed, when drawn to an extreme the pattern of continued challenge and expansion of the winning coalition that I have described is deeply antithetical to stable politics. If the first-order problem of defining who is in the polity is a constant preoccupation then second-order political problems, such as encouraging economic growth, will have difficulty gaining traction.

Thus, in short, we may expect that nonviolent resistance as a force initiating a political transition will be likely to have a democratizing effect on the political order, opening the bounds of competition and shifting the polity in a more democratic direction. This is in fact what the literature to date has found, showing empirically that, on average, transitions initiated through nonviolent resistance are much more likely to result in democratic regimes than other types of transition. However, of course, empirically in many cases we do not see this effect obtaining. Why is this the case? To address that puzzle, we must focus not just on the nature of nonviolent resistance in initiating a political transition but in what happens after the transition has already

occurred: the challenges of politics in a post-civil resistance transition. I now turn to these challenges, whose nature make up the core of my argument.

The Challenges of Civil Resistance Transitions

My core contention is that patterns of political behavior following civil resistance campaigns, during periods of political transition, can help us explain the puzzle of democratization after nonviolent resistance. How can we identify which kinds of patterns are likely to be important?

The transitology school of thought in democratization theory, which has taken up variations of this approach in the past, has shown how scholars can productively theorize along these lines. Beginning with foundational works from Rustow (1970), and particularly O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986), and continuing through more recent attempts to “revive transitology” (Mohamedou & Sisk, 2016), transitologists have identified a few key heuristics in identifying where to look for patterns of behavior that may facilitate democratization.

1. Look at behavior during the transitional period, rather than before or after it.

We can observe the impact of agency diverging from structural expectations most prominently when the rules of political behavior are limited or contested. Thus, we should look for potentially important patterns during times of transition. This is because transitions are periods in which the rules of the game are up for grabs. The basic deals that have been struck to define the range of acceptable political behavior have been badly shaken, or even dismantled, by prior events.

In Bayesian terms, the priors of the major political actors have been badly shaken. The impact of particular actions is unclear, necessitating a new process of updating and refining as

the transition unfolds. Political actors and ordinary people may hold beliefs about the likely impact of their actions that have not yet converged on new institutional norms. We are thus most likely to see actions that *do not* flow cleanly from structure during transitional periods.

Empirical support for this assertion goes well beyond O'Donnell and Schmitter's observations on transitions from authoritarian rule. Consider, for instance, Aristide Zolberg's discussion, later taken up by Sidney Tarrow, of "moments of madness," that is to say periods of political action in which all seems possible, and actors rebel against the confines of structure (Zolberg, 1972; Tarrow, 1993). Such moments are perhaps best captured in moments of regime breakdown and political transition. When such moments occur, while their utopian dreams almost always fail to be fully instantiated, the choices made there continue to shape the future long after the moment has passed.

Using this empirical heuristic does not imply an argument that patterns of political behavior during transitional periods are *sui generis*, or that agential choices off the structural equilibrium path cannot impact important political outcomes either before or after the transition is underway. However, it does provide a strong indication that, when looking for the impact of agency, we should look at the point in which agency is most likely to operate in ways that cannot be fully explained by observable structural factors. This point, by definition, is a period of political transition.

2. Multiple causal pathways can lead to the same pattern of strategic choices.

This is a crucial aspect of my argument. Patterns of political choices, of individual and group agency, of course arise from prior factors. Agential choices are not *sui generis*. Multiple, potentially infinite factors go into creating the particular set of choices that occur during a

political transition. Some of these can be captured through cross-national statistical analysis. Many more are contingent, or case-specific, and evade generalization.

What can be captured in creating a general theory is looking at when these causal paths converge into common patterns of behavior and when, subsequently, these common patterns of behavior systematically affect the formation of new political institutions.

Paths leading to transitional patterns of behavior have a certain degree of equifinality. We may see any number of paths, but during the transitional period we can reduce these many different paths to a simple set of transitional patterns of behavior.

These patterns are, of necessity, theoretical constructs. The researcher defines their parameters and judges their degree of usefulness. Yet the theoretical nature of these patterns does not imply that they are purely subjective. When operationalized statistically we can measure their statistical significance and predictive power. When examining particular cases qualitatively we can also see how closely the pattern of behavior described theoretically matches up with the patterns of behavior during transitional periods described by close observers and participants. Both are critical tests of the causal validity and epistemological usefulness of these theoretical constructs.

3. Preferences regarding the old regime and new regime and access to levers of political power are the most important dividing characteristics between actors.

O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986) divide the actors in a political transition from authoritarian rule along these two dimensions, with their famous fourfold division of hard-liners, soft-liners, moderates, and radicals. The transitional game is played among the elite leaders of these four social forces. In the model laid out in *TAR*, the game is essentially one of

soft-liners and moderates allying or pacting in order to prevent the excesses of the radicals and dis-incentivize the hard-liners from seeking to disrupt the transition through a coup.

Scholars have critiqued the TAR model of transitions as a poor description of the many third wave and fourth wave transitions that took place after the book's publication (Bratton & Van de Walle, *Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective*, 1997; Carothers, 2002; Geddes, 1999). While pacts may have been important in the Southern European and Latin American transitions they were of much less importance in the wave of transitions beginning in Eastern Europe and continuing through Africa, East and Southeast Asia, and most recently the Middle East. If TAR fails to explain these transitions, is this basic insight still valuable?

I argue strongly that it is, and the shape of my argument brings me into my next point:

4. Focus on universal transitional characteristics.

Where O'Donnell and Schmitter's model falls short is that it is too specific. In statistical terms it overfits to its sample. While it is a powerful descriptive account of that set of cases it failed as a predictive model when new cases were added. For example, their focus on the importance of pacts between elites failed to explain insurgent transitions where the impetus for democratization came primarily from non-elite groups (Wood, 2000). When our models become too specific, overfitting is always a problem. Instead of explaining democratization we are instead explaining democratization in these five cases, and presenting lessons of dubious value for future analysis.

Hence, when seeking to add patterns of political behavior as an explanatory factor in democratization, as in other efforts in social theory, we should avoid overfitting by abstracting

from as many dimensions of potential behavior identification as possible. Our goal should be parsimony and out of sample predictive power.

I do not mean to imply that rich description does not have scholarly usefulness. Detailed descriptions of particular cases make many important scholarly contributions. They can help us generate new understandings of causal mechanisms, or suggest more complex interactions of various factors. Deep description is an important check on the imperializing tendencies of broad, abstract theory, and without it, the ground for theoretical growth on any question in political science will be fallow indeed.

However, when our goal is to explain variation and to predict potential patterns of variation in the future, rich description will do little to get us there. The specificities of each individual case will bog down our theoretical insights and lead to overfitting.

My arguments here go back to the long scholarly debate over parsimony and the advancement or deterioration of scientific research programs. I follow Lakatos in arguing that we know a research program is advancing when we are able to explain additional data without *ad hoc* additional theorems (Lakatos, 1970). Systematic, simple theory gives us explanatory leverage.

With these four points I have laid out the basic characteristics of the behavioral patterns that we might best expect to predict democratization outcomes. Before moving on to laying out the specific patterns that I empirically test, a few words of clarification and address to potential alternate explanations are in order.

A critic might ask why the focus on preferences and power rather than other common dividing lines such as ethnicity or economic class. Both have been used in prior work to explain

democratization outcomes and predict particular patterns of behavior. For the first, an important theoretical work is Rabushka and Shepsle's (1972) *Politics in Plural Societies*, which makes a powerful formal argument that in ethnically divided societies greater preference for in-group private goods over public goods will inexorably lead to the disruption of democracy through ethnic outbidding. A number of important academic works on democratization have taken the second, class divides, as a key axis around which to predict behavior. Two recent and influential contributions are Carles Boix's (2003) *Democracy and Redistribution* and Acemoglu and Robinson's (2006) *Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*.

I do not find ethnicity to be a reliable axis around which to make a general theory about democratization and patterns of behavior primarily because its core independent variable is unclear. Kanchan Chandra's (2006) critique of the use of ethnicity and ethnic divides as an independent variable is one particularly powerful assault on the sloppy use of ethnicity to explain political outcomes. Chandra convincingly argues that, in both qualitative but especially quantitative research, the concept of ethnicity is used in different and conflicting ways based on *ad hoc* descriptions of specific national environments. In reality, ethnicity plays a variety of different roles, and is structured and practiced in radically different fashions. We cannot, looking from the outside, know what ethnicity means in a particular context. All individuals belong to multiple identity groups and those identity groups will have different valences at different times.

Rabushka and Shepsle's model, for instance, begins with one key assumption: that in plural societies there is a consistent greater preference for in-group private goods over public goods. Yet, as these authors would be the first to admit, plural society does not have a 1 to 1 correspondence to ethnically heterogeneous society. It depends on the particular constitution

of ethnicity in that society at that time. Thus, by its nature it is not generalizable, unless we think of their model simply in terms of a binary plural and not plural. But more importantly, the distinction between plural and not plural can only be made *post facto*. In order for their argument to hold, there must be a strong and consistent in-group preference. We might be able to know, prior to actual events, the strength of such a preference, through opinion polling – though even here I am somewhat skeptical – but by definition we can only know the consistency of this preference after it has proven itself to be consistent. Thus Rabushka and Shepsle’s model cannot be predictive. It overfits by definition because one cannot know the values of the independent variables until the dependent variables have been observed.

What of economic class? Here there are stronger grounds for holding onto class as an important factor not to abstract from when theorizing on the shape of patterns of transitional behavior. A long tradition going back to Marx has used economic class as a powerful predictor of behavior. One’s incentives can be easily deduced from class position, and consistent exogenous factors such as measures of economic growth, inequality, and the portability of capital be employed as independent variables. Much of the best work on democratization, both historically and recently, has been based on analysis defining actors and behavior on the basis of economic class (Moore B. , 1966; Rueschemeyer, Stephens, & Stephens, 1992).

As with ethnicity, though, I argue that, when attempting to define generalizable patterns of transitional behavior, economic class is instantiated differently across different

societies. It is not a truly general factor. The long effort by Marxist theorists to save dialectical materialism from its general failure to predict the future is one major piece of evidence for this.⁷

Note that my argument here is not that either identity-based or economic-based factors are unimportant in explaining democratization; far from it. However, for the purpose of theorizing I argue that we must abstract from them.

Why do past regime preference and degree of political power not fall into the same category as ethnicity of economic class? Because by definition they obtain in every political transition. Transitions are moves from one political regime to another. Therefore, in all cases there is an old regime and an emergent regime. Political elites and ordinary citizens by definition have some degree of preference between the two. Even ambivalence is a particular configuration of preferences.

Degrees of access to political power are also something present in all political systems, again, by definition. A political system is the authoritative allocation of values (Easton, 1953), a pattern of relationships that involve control, influence, power, and authority (Dahl, 1991), and so on. By its very nature it involves some players with greater degrees of power and some players with lesser degrees of power, some players with a greater ability to affect the rules of the political game, and some players with a lesser ability to affect the rules of the political game.

The definition of political power is a tricky theoretical problem that many previous theorists have spent long years developing.⁸ I do not engage directly with this literature, since my concern is not necessarily with power *per se* but with a specific subset of power – the power to

⁷ For prominent critiques of Marxist approaches to history and prediction see Popper 1962, Kolakowski 1978, and Giddens 1995. For a recent defense of Marxist historical approaches see Blackledge 2006.

⁸ See, for example classic discussions of the topic from Weber (1978), Lukes (1986), and Dahl (1957).

affect the political rules of the game and the distribution of values through politics. This type of power does not directly fall into some of the previous taxonomies of power developed by previous scholars such as Barnett and DuVall (2005). Both coercive power and cooperative power are relevant. Similarly coercive power and productive power are both useful. Various forms of capital: economic, moral, social, and otherwise, play into one's ability to affect these outcomes.

Thus, simply and directly stated, I define political power – the type of power with which I am concerned – as *the ability to affect the authoritative allocation of value and the rules whereby it is allocated*. Actors both inside and outside formal governmental institutions have such power. Actors' sources of capital that grant them this power vary in salience and degree depending on the context. Some actors, for instance, have very little political power alone but when linked with a network of other actors have a degree of power that far exceeds the sum of their individual parts.

To sum up my points thus far: I have presented a definition of nonviolent resistance as political action in opposition to current structures of power that does not involve physical violence or the threat of violence. I have argued that, considered in this way, nonviolent action will be destructive of political order in the short term but will be sustaining of representative political order in the longer term, thus explaining the general finding that nonviolent resistance at the beginning of a political transition tends to lead to higher levels of democracy.

The fact that we see significant variation in democracy after nonviolent resistance movements constitutes a core puzzle. I have outlined an approach to answering this puzzle through looking at broad, generalizable patterns of political behavior during transitional periods.

I now turn to outlining the specific patterns of behavior arising from this approach that I expect to be most important in shifting political transitions following civil resistance towards democratic outcomes.

I argue that there are three important patterns of behavior as defined by my highly abstract framework that would theoretically lead us to expect a greater likelihood of democratization. The salience of these patterns arises directly from the nature of political transitions and nonviolent resistance as I have defined them above and follow my criteria of focusing on the power positions and orientations towards the old and new regimes.

I have previously outlined the model from O'Donnell and Schmitter that describes the transition from authoritarian rule as one in which Hardliners, Softliners, Moderates, and Radicals compete over the shape of the political future. In addition, I have described the potential effects of nonviolent resistance on re-shaping the elite pact-focused picture that O'Donnell and Schmitter argue is most conducive to democratization. Nonviolent resistance has the potential to break the cohesion of previous ruling coalitions, including their control over the forces of state coercion. Thus, the balance of coercive force is more likely to be tilted towards actors whose bases of political support and socialization in the process of resistance incline them towards greater democratization

Thus, in contrast to the traditional model of political transitions in which fear of a coup is the overwhelming concern, transitions initiated by civil resistance have a different type of possible defection that can drive democratization outcomes: a return to resistance. If the democratizing reforms of the transition are not suitably extensive and inclusive, the people may return to the streets and push for more. Thus costly defection in a civil resistance transition is

less likely to be a game of compromise between softliners and moderates to avoid overly threatening the core concerns of hardliners but instead an attempt by softliners and moderates to as much as possible meet the demands of the revolution while still maintaining their own privileged position.

Simply stated, the coercive force in a transition initiated by civil resistance is much more likely to be in the hands of the Radicals and less likely to be in the hands of the Hardliners. However, since the victory of the Radicals has been nonviolent, forces of the *ancien regime* both hard and soft, remain political players with points of leverage over the transition.

This particular balance of coercive force contrasts sharply with transitions that have been initiated either by top-down liberalization or by armed insurrection and overthrow of the state. In the first case, the balance of force lies more closely with the *ancien regime*, and the strategic dynamics approximate those laid out in the original wave of transitory literature. In the second case, military victory implies an overwhelming advantage of force on the part of the opposition, and democratization becomes a matter solely of bargains worked out amongst the moderate and radical victors.

This basic theoretical assumption frames both the contention that civil resistance transitions are unique and the set of challenges that are inherent in their progression and key in moving from the breakdown of authoritarianism to the establishment of democracy.

The first challenge, transitional mobilization, has to do with keeping the balance of force in favor of the people. If a rapid demobilization follows the beginning of the transition then the balance of force shifts back to the old regime, and we are back in a traditional elite-led transition to democracy. The process of expansion of the winning coalition that I described in

the previous section fails to obtain. I expect these transitions to lead to limited but incomplete democratization, and conclude in what I describe as an elite semi-democracy.

Demobilization may occur for any number of reasons. The existence (real or perceived) of new legitimate channels for expressing political grievances may encourage those previously hitting the streets to instead simply wait at home for their chance to hit the ballot box (Muller & Seligson, 1987; Kingstone, Young, & Aubrey, 2013). Alternately, diverse coalitions that came together to oust the old regime may divide over differing visions of the new regime, reducing the available resources for public mobilization. Moderate opposition forces may even support repression against elements that seek to continue mobilization, as occurred in several important cases of CRTs such as Chile (Hipsher, 1998).

The second challenge, which I refer to as the problem of holdovers, relates to the remaining, though limited, power of the *ancien regime*. A successful civil resistance campaign is likely to have fragmented the elites of the old regime, but too radical moves towards purging former elites (a lustration strategy)⁹ reverses the effect that civil resistance has on undermining incumbent cohesion. Policies that push for removal of all or even the majority of old regime elites can unite them against the transition. In particular, this process is likely to remove the undermining effect of civil resistance on hardliner control of the armed forces and increase the likelihood of a coup.

If a coup occurs in response to the lustration strategy, three outcomes are possible. If mobilization during the transition is extremely high, popular opposition to the coup may lead to its defeat, as in Burkina Faso in 2015 (Pinckney, 2015). The hardliners thus fail in their attempt

⁹ Lustration has been examined in most detail following the transitions from Communist rule in Eastern Europe. See for example Fowler and Szczerbiak 2005 and Letki 2002.

to reverse the transition and it resumes its course. Second, the coup may not have sufficient momentum to successfully overthrow the government, but may put pressure on the government to attenuate its holdovers policy, as occurred in Argentina with the rebellion of the *carapintadas* (Barahona de Brito, 2001). Finally, if the coup is successful then the hardliners establish a new authoritarian regime, possibly even harsher than the previous regime.

Even if a coup, the most dramatic outcome of a full-fledged lustration strategy, does not occur, this strategy may still undermine the likelihood of democracy at the end of a transition by forging solidarity among the former partisans of the *ancien regime* against the new democracy and creating the seed of a disloyal opposition that sees no place for itself in the new regime and may work to dismantle it over time.¹⁰

On the other extreme, a strategy that cedes control of the transition to old elites and fails to put pressure on them to conform to new democratic norms, or that fails to in any meaningful way reconcile with the abuses of the past, is most likely to lead to co-optation of the transition and only limited and incomplete democratization, resulting, as with the challenge of mobilization, in an elite semi-democracy.

The strategies at these two extremes each reduce or even eliminate one of civil resistance's advantages in increasing the likelihood of democracy. The first eliminates its ability to undermine old elite cohesion, while the second eliminates the balance of force advantage possessed by those likely to be democratizers. Thus, I argue that the optimal strategy for increasing the likelihood of democracy falls between the two. I describe this strategy as integration, an approach in which some punishment for abuses of authoritarian rule occurs, and

¹⁰ See Linz 1978, 34-35 for an excellent discussion of this aspect of the challenge.

members of the old regime face some degree of accountability for their actions, but where there are meaningful paths for many of these old elites to become integrated into the new structures of power.

Hungary is an excellent example of such a strategy towards old elites. While there was mild pressure placed on old regime elites who were responsible for particularly egregious violations, the new political structure allowed many former members of the Communist regime to compete in new elections, motivating their involvement in the democratic process (Jenkins, 1992; Smithey & Kurtz, 1999).

The third and final challenge of maximalism¹¹ has to do with removing the potential for a coercive nonviolent defection from the realm of political possibility and shifting to regular democratic politics. This challenge has to do primarily not with the members of the old regime, but with conflicts among the political forces that came together to oust it. While these civil society forces are often portrayed in rosy terms during the campaign against the old regime, they often consist of widely heterogeneous elements with conflicting visions of the future and little tying them together but anti-incumbency sentiment (Pishchikova & Youngs, 2016; Beissinger, 2013; Tucker, 2007). As Przeworski says:

Conflicts inherent in transitions to democracy often occur on two fronts: between the opponents and defenders of the authoritarian regime about democracy and among the proto-democratic actors against one another for the best chance under democracy...societies are divided in many ways, and the very essence of democracy is the competition among political forces with conflicting interests. This situation creates a dilemma: to bring about democracy, anti-authoritarian forces must unite against authoritarianism, but to be victorious under democracy, they must compete with each other (Przeworski 1991, 66-67).

¹¹ Thanks to Colin Beck for suggesting this name.

The experience of a successful civil resistance campaign can be highly empowering for the leaders of social and political forces able to mobilize the mass numbers necessary to achieve success (Sharp, 1973). However, by its nature civil resistance involves going outside of the bounds of institutional politics in ways that are disruptive. Such disruption can be extremely powerful in ending political oppression. However, on a more basic level it can be used as a powerful tool to shift the balance of political power.

In the weakly institutionalized setting of a transition from authoritarian rule, the forces that came together to oust the previous regime may be tempted to rely upon this particularly powerful tool to further their own narrowly-defined interests in the new regime. In many cases this leads to a radicalization of politics, a constant move to the streets when electoral outcomes or government policies fail to satisfy the demands of particular political forces.

This radicalization can take a number of different forms, depending on the society's pre-existing social and political cleavages. In societies deeply divided along ethnic or religious lines, these points of identity cleavage often become the touchstones for competing civil resistance campaigns, as in Kenya following the fight for restoration of multiparty democracy in the 1990s.¹² Alternately, political parties led by particular charismatic individuals may become the centers of this maximalist mobilization, as in Bangladesh following the ouster of President Ershad (Schaffer, 2002). And in some cases both political parties and identity-based groups may serve as the basis for this type of mobilization, as in Madagascar in the early 2000s (Marcus, 2004).

¹² This model of radicalization of politics follows a similar logic to Rabushka and Shepsle's (1972) analysis of politics in "plural" societies that I have described briefly earlier but expands the scope beyond ethnic or cultural divisions.

All of these cases resulted in what I describe as a fractious semi-democracy, a polity in which the forms of democratic politics exist but their legitimacy and effectiveness is so limited that they fall short of genuine democratic rule. Electoral outcomes are rarely if ever accepted by the loser, and the ability to inflict costs through action on the streets becomes the primary arena of political contention.

The specific contours of contention vary depending on political actors' capacity to impose costs. When the balance of forces is fairly even, irregular alternations in power will be frequent as particular factions take advantage of short-term advantages of position. This has been the case in Thailand, where from 2006-2014 the primarily urban Yellow and primarily rural Red factions engaged in several back and forth resistance campaigns, often succeeding in achieving power but never moving from its temporary achievement to a consolidation of power and institutionalization of alternation in power.

In cases where one group possesses significantly more mobilization capacity than another, yet maximalism remains high, alternations in power are less likely, but because the institutional mechanisms for loyal opposition are either non-existent or lack legitimacy and influence, politics remains fractious, with the dominant group relying on more directly coercive mechanisms to suppress dissent and the weaker group attempting to undermine the dominant group's position through constant moves to disruptive mobilization. This political dynamic characterized the relationship between the Morsi government in Egypt and the liberal opposition from 2012-2013, ultimately motivating the liberal opposition to seek the support of the military in ousting Morsi in the 2013 coup.

In contrast, a move across the threshold of democracy is more likely if political or identity group leaders eschew even nonviolent defection and instead begin to develop formally institutionalized mechanisms of politics. Greater willingness to accept uncertainty in outcomes and the potential of losses, as well as compromising one's own goals with the other forces involved in the transition, will centrally push new democratic politics forward.

The set of challenges I have enumerated here is not intended to be closed. Other challenges could certainly be theorized using the same or a similarly parsimonious set of criteria. In describing these challenges I have not definitively solved the puzzle of the CRT but rather taken a first stab at articulating how scholars might consistently cross-nationally describe these types of transitions and the dynamics that might both facilitate and undermine democratization. Future work can continue to articulate new challenges, with the usual understandings of the benefits of parsimony and attempting to explain as much as possible using a limited set of variables. Distinguishing between a contingent factor of a particular case and a challenge that is more or less helpful in understanding a class of events will be an empirical question requiring research.

How much do individual political leaders choose to engage in a particular pattern of behavior? Can a democratically-minded leader choose to have a particular pattern of behavior obtain in her own country? This is a crucial question to address if I am arguing that agency plays a role here.

The simplest answer harkens back to the quote from Marx about the interplay of agency and structure. Structures no doubt constrain, but individual leaders do act with a certain degree of agency. The ability of any one particular leader to affect the trajectory of their

transition will be delimited by their own degree of political power and can be hampered by the actions and attitudes of other leaders and mass publics. For instance, even if a large group of political elites seek to continue mobilization into the transitional period they will fail if the people do not find them credible and so do not show up to their demonstrations or do not participate in their strikes. However, for mobilization to even be a possibility there must be positive choices made in its favor. Routinely in the three transitions examined in depth in this study, and in many more, leaders and people behaved in unexpected ways, ways out of the structural program, and changed the trajectory of their transitional path.

The next step in my argument is to take the highly abstract picture that I have painted above and operationalize it. What easily identifiable empirical indicators can we rely on to capture or reliably proxy for these various abstract patterns?

The first to consider is mobilization and demobilization. How can we tell if a populace has remained mobilized during the transitional period and is thus putting pressure for continued reform on the new elites?

The most basic and straightforward indicator here is the actual levels of political activity. How great is political participation in the transitional period? Participation can be roughly divided into two basic forms: institutional and non-institutional. The first refers to how widespread and comprehensive participation in the new institutions being set up during the transitional process is. Electoral turnout would be one key measure here. Measure of public engagement and consultation in matters of policy, how much interest the public takes in these matters, would be another measure.

Non-institutional refers to methods of political participation that are outside of institutional channels but still seek to achieve particular political goals such as public protests and demonstrations or strikes. These are the tactics of nonviolent resistance applied not just during the struggle against the old regime but as part of a larger effort to keep the new regime accountable.

A high level of mobilization during the transition will be characterized by high levels of both these categories of political participation. Mobilized and engaged citizens will turn out to vote in large numbers, will access official channels in large numbers, but will also engage in political action outside of these avenues. This is particularly true because during transitional periods by definition these institutional channels remain new and untested and non-institutional methods are likely to be both the most widely understood and powerful.

There are many ways to operationalize these two forms of political participation. The literature on political participation on advanced democracies has, of course, developed very detailed and comprehensive means of measuring political participation, based on survey data. Ideally, an operationalization of mobilization could rely on these types of measures, looking at the prevalence of common categories such as voting, contacting an elected official, or participating in a protest. However, consistent cross-national survey data is limited in this regard, and does not cover most of the countries during transitional periods. Thus, we must rely on more general observational data.

However, scholars of democratization have produced many different data resources that allow us to reliably measure these forms of participation. For example, many different data projects have sought to capture counts of protests, strikes, and other forms of non-institutional

political participation. Other data sets rely on expert knowledge to measure the degrees of public engagement, civil society activism, and other measures of mobilization. And of course many different scholars and practitioners have collected data on electoral turnout. I rely on these measures in my testing in Chapter 2.

The challenge of holdovers is somewhat more difficult to measure, because its operationalization relies on knowing the perception of threat from old elites during the transition's process of dealing with the sins of the past. Because we cannot reliably and generalizably know this, we must rely on somewhat indirect proxying. However, I contend that this does not present a major challenge to my analysis.

Our perceptions of threat are based on two key factors: actions of others towards us, and actions of others towards those like us. When we see those similar to us facing threats our own threat perception is increased. Thus, in the challenge of holdovers, we can reliably proxy for the perception of threat that old elites perceive by looking at the costs that their fellow elites face. As these costs rise, and as they are imposed with greater and greater generality, the perception of threat is likely to similarly increase.

Thus, we may measure behavior in the challenge of holdovers by looking at the scope and intensity of punishment that old elites face during the transitional period. This primarily takes shape through the mechanisms of transitional justice, something on which prior scholars have collected extensive data (Olsen, Payne, & Reiter, 2010). One can also examine lustration policies, and other more informal practices of exclusion or punishment of political elites.

Finally, observing the maximalism challenge involves two key factors: the stated goals of political participants and the tactics that they use to pursue those goals.

The issue of goals may be boiled down to a simple empirical question: do certain political groups articulate maximalist goals of transforming the political system? Do they follow an absolutist discourse in which they alone represent the national interest and their opponents are not just political rivals but in fact enemies of the people?

Historical studies of political polarization generate numerous examples of this type of discourse. For instance, in Egypt the Tamarod movement, which sought to remove President Mohamed Morsi from office, did not simply paint Morsi as a political opponent but essentially as a traitor to the country, as a figure whose continued presence in power was not just undesirable but in fact represented a fundamental threat to Egypt as a country. This was shown powerfully of course not just in the lead-up to Morsi's removal but afterwards as, under the control of General Abdelfatah al-Sisi, Tamarod enthusiastically endorsed the wholesale slaughter of Morsi supporters in the massacre at the Raba'a al-Adawiya mosque. In maximalist political systems the goal is to win and the stakes are permanent and often deadly.

There are various means of measuring such statements and attitudes. Collecting the public statements of political leaders, political party manifestos, and other textual artifacts of the political process can provide a wealth of information on the messages that political parties seek to communicate. The tools of textual analysis can then be applied to measure the intention and sentiment of the documents and a general picture of attitudes towards the political system can emerge. However, the work required to collect such information cross-nationally is prohibitively extensive, and interpreting the contextual signals from such documents consistently is very difficult to reliably achieve.

However, in lieu of developing a comprehensive analysis of cross-national political communication we may look to certain consistent shibboleths in order to determine whether maximalism of the type that I have described is becoming prevalent in the political system, putting a democratic transition at risk.

Out of these, I argue that the most consistent and reliable is a refusal to accept electoral results. If elections occur and the outcome is unfavorable for a particular political party, in an institutionalized political system the parties accept the results and begin mobilizing to achieve a better outcome in the next election. However, if instead political parties immediately seek to call into question the results of the election and rhetorically mobilize their supporters to overturn it through extra-institutional action, this is a key indicator that the process of maximalism that I have described is well underway. To make such a claim, particularly in the context of a popularly-initiated civil resistance transition, is to invoke the rhetoric of the movement in order to achieve a particularistic political aim. It is to call back to civil resistance of old and to equate the uncertainty of transition with the control and oppression of the old regime. Therefore, it fundamentally undermines the ability of a democratic politics with a mix of cleavage and consensus, as Lipset (1960) described, from consolidating.

This is not an original contribution – many previous scholars of democratic consolidation, particularly Przeworski (1991) have argued similarly that willingness to accept unfavorable electoral results is *the* fundamental underlying norm of democracy. Thus, in essence I am saying simply what democratization scholars have been saying for many years. However, in the context of a civil resistance transition, I interpret the significance of such actions differently than past scholars.

It is important to note as well that this mode of political discourse and action, while definitely supportive of democracy, is by no means identical to democracy, conceived of either as an institutional political system (Schumpeter's threshold), or as an idealized mode of politics which is perfectly responsive to the citizens (Dahl's ideal). Thus, while one might rightly observe that it is difficult to imagine a democratic politics suffused with maximalist anti-systemic discourse, this is demonstrating my argument through showing the strength of this factor in supporting democracy, not simply reducing to a tautology that democracy is difficult to imagine absent democracy.

The articulation of maximalist, anti-systemic goals is insufficient to indicate maximalism as I have described it, of course. At the very least it is a quite faulty indicator of maximalism. Political discourse in many countries, including highly developed democracies, relies on such language. The discourse of the American anti-abortion movement, for instance, is full of the language of genocide, and those who allow abortion to continue are frequently painted as almost demonic figures who can by no means be trusted with any degree of political power, worse than Nazis in the scale of their atrocities. Yet, if pressed, most political leaders from this movement or others in developed democracies who employ similar types of rhetoric will argue that they themselves do not truly believe the things that they say. Or at the least they express horror when their accusations of genocide are taken literally by their followers. Thus, for a truly reliable view of maximalism, we must go beyond rhetoric and consider political actors' behavior.

What kinds of actions fit into this mold? How can we know that political actors really believe what they are saying? We can look at a few important indicators. First, the level of political violence is an important and reliable indicator of at least some degree of political maximalism. If political actors, particularly large political actors central to the political system,

use violence as a means of achieving the kinds of maximalist goals articulated above, then we may safely assume that they are willing to “put their money where their mouth is” and both impose and obtain high costs in order to achieve them.

Yet the use of violence is by no means the only, or even the primary area in which we should look for concrete actions that match this picture of radicalization. Recall from my discussion above that the key way that maximalism relates to the initiation of a transition through civil resistance is that the experience of civil resistance, particularly large, successful civil resistance, puts the knowledge and tools of *nonviolent* resistance in the hands of actors throughout the political system. In a larger sense, it reveals the fragility of political orders.

In the main, this is an extremely positive development. The success of nonviolent resistance makes ordinary people and civil society groups aware that they need not interact with those in power with the degree of fear and trembling characteristic of most political orders. They know that, when organized, even without weapons ordinary people can achieve major concessions and undermine the integrity of oppressive or otherwise lacking political systems. This is a powerful mechanism of accountability. Yet the larger revealed fragility of the political system can encourage nonviolent mobilization that destabilizes the establishment of emerging political norms and practices.

This somewhat negative view of nonviolent resistance fits poorly with the extremely positive view of popular mobilization prominent in the academic literature on nonviolent action. For good reason, scholars of nonviolent action have been hesitant to describe their tools as anything but positive empowerment for those suffering under oppression or violence. Certainly one might argue that there are characteristics of nonviolent action that make its use much more

likely by those with beneficent, popular, democratizing goals. For instance, the numbers required in order to achieve a successful campaign of nonviolent action tend to be much higher than those required for a successful campaign of violent action, meaning that in order to succeed the leaders of a campaign of nonviolent action must necessarily adopt programs and practices that appeal to a large number of people. Indeed, such arguments are central to my own work in this study.

Yet, to argue that nonviolent action may be more likely to be taken up by those whose goals we find more normatively admirable is by no means to argue that all those who wield the nonviolent sword have goals that are civic and democratizing. Indeed, there are numerous examples of movements of a primarily nonviolent character whose goals are deeply anti-democratic and destructive. At the very least, such movements may often be particularistic and pursue simply the benefit of their own leaders at the expense of the larger public interest.

For instance, the so-called Yellow Shirt movement in Thailand has, since 2005, pursued multiple primarily nonviolent campaigns for power, first against Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra and later against the various iterations of his political movement. These movements have relied on tools easily recognizable to scholars and practitioners of nonviolent action, locatable in Gene Sharp's magisterial listing of 198 tactics of nonviolent action (Sharp, 1973). They have occupied buildings, staged marches, organized strikes, etc... and to great effect! Since 2006 the Yellow Shirts have ousted three governments and become a major force in Thai politics. Yet it is difficult to argue that their largely nonviolent repertoire has been a positive force in Thailand. Their constant move to the streets to oust rivals from the Red Shirt movement has been deeply destructive to the Thai economy, and ultimately to the Thai political system, as the constant back and forth of nonviolent action from 2006-2014 ultimately resulted

in a lack of popular faith in democracy that supported a successful military coup in 2014 that has moved Thailand from an increasingly-robust democracy to a military dictatorship.

Thus, not just violence but also forms of nonviolent action, when pursued for the purpose of these maximalist politics, are deeply problematic and destabilizing to democratic transitions. There are two or three strong empirical indicators that I look for as far as radicalized nonviolent actions go.

The first is electoral boycotts. An electoral boycott is certainly a form of nonviolent action, and perhaps even justified in certain circumstances, yet in the main it is a form of action that indicates an unwillingness to play by democratic rules. Boycotting an election that one anticipates not being able to win shows a lack of faith in the democratic process and indicates that nonviolent action is being directed not towards improving democracy but rather towards undermining it for particularistic ends. This is particularly the case if there is no reliable evidence that the elections are characterized by widespread fraud. No electoral system is perfect – even in highly developed nations such as the United States the rules of the electoral game are often stacked in favor of one party or another. In some cases the stacking of the deck may be so extreme that there is simply no credible way that an opposition party interested in promoting democracy can in good conscience give even the slightest legitimacy to the process. Yet if such extreme circumstances do not appear to hold and yet widespread electoral boycotts occur this says less about the nature of the system and more about the nature of the actors. Actors are afraid of electoral results and thus seek to avoid humiliation and play for power not on the field of democratic institutions but rather in the streets, where their inferior numbers may nonetheless be employed with greater strategic effect than at the ballot box.

Some scholars examining nonviolent action in particular transitions have argued that there is an important difference between tactics that seek to draw people together and communicate a message to authorities and those that more directly employ forms of nonviolent coercion (Lakier, 2007). General strikes, for instance, seek to directly pressure decision makers to accede to the demands of the group organizing the strike through imposing devastating economic costs. In Nepal since the 2006 overthrow of King Gyanendra, another common tactic has been the so-called *chakka jam* or traffic jam, in which small groups of nonviolent activists will blockade roadways or particular urban centers in order to impose economic pressure on their political opponents.

While I am sympathetic to the argument that these types of tactics may be more reliable indicators of the kind of maximalist nonviolent action that I am describing here, I am skeptical that their reliability would be broadly applicable in a cross-national setting. Any kind of strike, for instance, relies on a certain degree of economic coercion to have any kind of influence, yet strikes may be employed for far less than radical goals. A strike by a particular economic sector is almost the definition of a tactic pursued not for maximalist, radicalized goals but rather for very specific, sectoral goals. Similarly, forms of nonviolent intervention such as road blockades, while certainly seeking to impose economic costs, are also often a more symbolic attempt to achieve high visibility nonviolent action with smaller numbers of people. In the United States, for instance, road blockades have become a fairly common tactic employed as civil disobedience.

Thus I do not consider either of these forms of action to be a reliable indicator of the maximalist use of nonviolent action. Instead, I attempt to blend the idea of maximalist goals and action by looking at whether particular actors employ both the maximalist discourse that I

have described above and also, at the same time, do in fact seek to put their words into practice through any kind of large-scale nonviolent campaign.

Fortunately, several data sources exist which meld these twin concerns of both rhetoric and action. The Varieties of Democracy dataset (Coppedge, et al., V-Dem Dataset v6, 2016), for instance, measures the degree to which anti-system movements are present in the political system. This blends both the idea that such rhetoric is employed in political discourse and that it is carried out on the streets. The Major Episodes of Contention dataset (Moore, et al., 2016) collects data on whether maximalist nonviolent campaigns seeking regime change or some other form of major systemic change were present in a country in a particular year. I employ these kinds of measures to look at this aspect of radicalization.

This section has summarized how to move from the more abstract concepts of mobilization, holdovers, and radicalization to more direct empirical indicators. I have even suggested some of the specific data sources that I will employ to directly measure these things. In the next section I discuss the expected effects of these patterns of political behavior. What are the endpoints of civil resistance transitions? What do regimes look like after a civil resistance campaign occurs? I have mentioned above the four endpoints that I generally argue obtain: a new authoritarianism, an elite semi-democracy, a radicalized semi-democracy, and a democracy.

This typology is similar, of course, to many other typologies employed in the democratization literature. I argue that these ideal types are a useful heuristic because of their relationship to the particular challenges I have described. They allow for a parsimonious theoretical view of the links between transitional practices and long-term political equilibria. I

focus my descriptions on the more novel categories of elite semi-democracy and fractious semi-democracy as the general categories of democracy and authoritarianism are more extensively fleshed out in other works and I more or less directly appropriate these descriptions.

The Ends of Civil Resistance Transitions

Elite semi-democracy is the result of a civil resistance transition in which transitional mobilization is low, the challenge of holdovers is generally resolved through co-optation, and maximalism, if it occurs, occurs within the ranks of the elite.

In an elite semi-democracy the slogans of the nonviolent revolution are adopted and the forms of democracy are generally put in place. Elections occur and in most cases are likely to have an important impact on the distribution of political power. Elites fear to go too far beyond the bounds of democratic practice, lest they once again spark the ire of the people who rose up against the old regime.

However, while there are thus certain guardrails that prevent the wholesale rapid devolution of democracy these guardrails do little to actually ensure that the *de jure* forms of democracy are honored *de facto*, or that any progress is made towards ensuring that the country's democracy continues to improve in quality, or that the will of the people is faithfully represented.

Why does this occur? A lack of mobilization, that is to say a continuation of the popular pressure employed by the civil resistance campaign, means that the elites who come into power during the transition have no sense that they will be held accountable for their actions by those who are best-equipped to monitor them: the people. Any mechanisms of accountability will either be within the elite themselves, or from international sources. In the first case, any

constraining effect of accountability can be managed by using the tools of state power to distribute private goods among the elite and thus maintain a comfortable balance of political power and resources.

In addition, because of the widespread co-optation of the transition by old regime elites implied by the failure to resolve the challenge of holdovers the new power structures are suffused with elites who lack a strong preference for democracy and have often had decades of practice in ruling their nation in a top-down manner for their own private benefit. Those who attempt to resist the co-optation of the new democratic regime are generally few in number, lack political resources, and find themselves unable to call upon the force of popular resistance in order to restore momentum towards the bright democratic future envisioned during the struggle against the old regime.

International sources of accountability, while inconvenient, can be assuaged with the general forms of democracy while the overall practice of democracy, so much more difficult to reliably observe, can be manipulated to serve the private interests of the elite. As with the history of nonviolent resistance, the impact of international forces may be as a guardrail to prevent a wholesale return to a non-democratic political system, but is unlikely to be effective in comprehensively pushing such countries to major implementation of higher democratic standards absent some major change in mobilization by the people of the country themselves.

Absent some domestic mobilization shock, an elite semi-democracy can remain as an equilibrium political state for an indefinite period of time. Norm entrepreneurs among the populace find themselves leaders with few or no followers, the political elite maintains itself

comfortably in control over the nation, and the international community can do little to directly hold them accountable.

Elite semi-democratic regimes are likely to destabilize into another regime type under two conditions. First, a major move for power by one political faction of elites may spark popular resistance. An ambitious leader may push against the guardrails, leading to popular pushback that destabilizes the elite bargain and may initiate a new political transition. Alternately, a continued lack of mobilization over time may lead to a progressive erosion of democracy as elites gradually expand their scope of operation and push politics further and further away from the democratic ideal. At a certain point this pushing reaches an extent that it is no longer meaningful to even describe the political system as semi-democratic and instead we have a form of non-democratic regime.

The picture is radically different in fractious semi-democracies. Fractious semi-democracies have high mobilization in the wake of the civil resistance campaign. People truly take to heart the destabilizing message of civil resistance: change is possible with even a relatively small degree of mobilization if the tools of resistance are employed skillfully and strategically. Yet absent a centralizing non-democratic opponent, particular factions channel this resistance into their own narrow interests.

The attachment to the power of non-institutionalized resistance results in a move to employ these tools almost constantly as various forces jockey for political power. When elections occur they are mainly exercises in which all sides seek to employ various strategies to ensure that they alone benefit from the electoral contest. Each actor knows that the other is prepared to employ whatever tools are necessary to gain power and undermine the other's hold

on the political system. Thus, whenever one side does achieve some degree of power they attempt to manipulate the rules of the political game to ensure that this power can continue indefinitely into the future. Perceiving this, the other side accuses them of attempting to establish a new dictatorship and uses their behavior as justification for continued destructive resistance.

As long as support for the warring political factions remains high and maximalist attitudes are widespread throughout the population then fractious semi-democracy can also be an indefinite political equilibrium. However, second and third-order effects of this mode of political action are likely to ultimately destabilize the equilibrium. The economic and social instability caused by a failure to establish regularized democratic politics is likely to be extremely costly for the average citizen. Jobs will be scarce, economic development problematic, and the constant back and forth of maximalist political contention wearying and ultimately angering. Popular opinion may shift away from the actors fighting things out in the political arena towards more stable alternatives.

It is uncertain which direction the appeal of these alternatives is likely to push the political regime. It is certainly possible that frustration over political dysfunction may lead ordinary people to mobilize to encourage greater democratic protections and respect for political institutions. Yet it seems more likely, based on historical experience, that the appeal will more generally be for an authoritarian alternative. People will crave a strong leader who can get rid of all these dysfunctional politicians and return the country to stability and productivity, and if such a leader can be found, then there may be a serious authoritarian reversal (Linz 1978).

While I spend less time discussing democracy or new authoritarianism as endpoints, a few relevant words about the path to a return to autocracy bear mentioning. This seems to be a particular issue when it comes to the challenge of holdovers. Civil resistance implies that when the transition begins old regime elites are likely still powerful but fragmented, divided against one another by their prospects for power in the new order. If, however, it appears that those prospects are universally negative, then the old elites may unite to push for a new authoritarianism. This push may take many diverse forms depending on the particular political dynamics of that country, but most of these can be productively categorized as coups d'état.

There is an important caveat here, though, considering the nature of a civil resistance transition, coups make be particularly unlikely to succeed. As numerous historical examples have shown, a coup d'état is singularly difficult to achieve if there is widespread popular mobilization against it. For instance, the general strike launched by the German Socialists was responsible for preventing the so-called Kapp Putsch of 1920. The attempted coup by French Algerian generals in 1961 against Charles de Gaulle was similarly thwarted in part by a massive nonviolent popular opposition. More recently, the transition in Burkina Faso was maintained against an attempted coup when tens of thousands took to the streets condemning it. Thus, if mobilization is extremely high during the transition, even when old elites go the full distance in their attempts to derail democratization they are likely to fail.

It bears mentioning, of course, that such failures can likely be anticipated by many potential coup plotters. Thus we are unlikely to see large numbers of failed coups in situations where the challenge of holdovers has been resolved through widespread lustration. Instead, we are more likely to observe murmurings of potential coups never carried out, attempts to test the water by elites soon to be disenfranchised or imprisoned.

Up to this point I have presented the basic definitions of my concepts, my empirical puzzle, and my argument for its solution. In the following sections I widen the scope of my inquiry to show the implications of my approach for broader questions of democratization and political change, as well as to make a critique of current theories of democratization that focus on exogenous structural factors. My critique shows the theoretical underpinnings of my approach and underlines the necessity for theoretical and empirical innovation in the study of democratization.

Defining Regimes, Transitions, and Democracy

I have used the terms regime, transition, democracy, democratization, and democraticness in the preceding discussion fairly loosely, yet before moving on to it is necessary to clarify and restrict the scope of these definitions. My discussion at this point is fairly theoretical. I discuss my empirical operationalization of these concepts in Chapter 2.

The first important concept to define is the political regime. I define regimes, following Geddes and her co-authors (2014), O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986) and others as the basic set of rules and institutions that define who governs in a society and the primary means of political access. Regimes include, but are not limited to, the set of formal written laws that legally set out these procedures and identities. So, for example, both Lebanon's constitutionally-mandated religious power-sharing and Nigeria's informal alternation of the presidency between north and south would be important aspects of their country's respective regimes.

As an interlocking set of formal rules, informal norms, and political institutions political regimes function as a means of stabilizing the interaction of political actors as well as acting as focal points around which actors' expectations can converge. Political regimes at their core are

one critically important social structure that is both constituted by the routinized actions of political actors and that constitutes the actors that participate within its strictures. For instance, a democratic political regime is constituted by actors such as voters and elected officials. The regime does not exist absent these actors performing their routinized functions. However, its social structure as a whole also constitutes the actors within it. Being a voter is meaningless if there is no way to vote and no one to vote for.

Where coherent regimes do not exist they will almost always develop fairly rapidly. Politics absent a regime is highly inefficient since the lack of routinized interaction limits political actors' ability to predict the future. Actors with even a minor power advantage in an unstable regime environment will seek to elongate their period in power, as well as increase the extractive efficiency of their power, through institutionalizing regime arrangements. On a deeper level, Giddens and other social theorists argue that the absence of social routine is a powerful source of ontological insecurity that causes psychological distress and that actors will thus instinctively seek to resolve (Giddens, 1984, pp. 60-64). Where political routines are absent, actors must attempt to take into account all possible contingencies, since they lack consistent rules to shape their expectations. This task is almost by definition impossible, and actors know it is impossible. Hence, absent a regime political actors will feel deeply vulnerable, unable to protect themselves from loss of political position, a state of deep anxiety (Mitzen, 2006).

Once new regimes are in place and begin to perform their functions of stabilizing actors the same incentives that lead to their fairly rapid establishment will lead to a strong tendency to continue through time. Thus, while there will certainly be exceptions because of various kinds

of exogenous shocks, the general pattern will be for regimes to come into place fairly rapidly and to stay in place for lengthy periods of time.

When regimes do break down a polity enters a state of *political transition*. This occurs when these basic rules and institutions are destabilized and become fundamentally unclear to the major political actors. Routinized politics ceases to operate as it has in the past and politics becomes fundamentally abnormal (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986). For the reasons just discussed, times of transition tend to be distasteful to political actors and they will tend to minimize their duration.

A transition ends when a new regime has come into place and has endured long enough to begin functioning as a regime. That is to say when a temporary configuration of political power-holders and rules for choosing them has persisted long enough that its actions begin to become routinized and political actors strategize about the future based around the assumption that the regime will continue.

Measuring this point can be a difficult task, and almost by definition can only be done in a consistent cross-national way with *post facto* knowledge. I discuss this challenge in some detail in Chapter 2.

There are any number of different axes along which one can classify regimes. In this study the primary axis with which I am concerned is democracy. Democracy is, of course, a term with great normative currency in the current world order, though one whose normative appeal has come under challenge in recent years (Cooley, 2015). Yet its powerful normative appeal makes it difficult to entangle as a clear concept to use in social scientific analysis.

In this study I examine democracy as an empirical phenomenon, not a normative ideal. Democracy may or may not be the best political system out there, defined however one wishes to define best. Particular systems to which we apply the descriptor democratic need not be particularly loved by their citizens or admired by outside observers.

It is important to state these caveats so as to appropriately temper the magnitude of my claims relative to democracy and democratization. The normative appeal of democracy can lead readers to interpret claims regarding its creation as suspect if they can observe anything less than its full idealized picture. Similarly, claims about the ability of a particular factor to influence a country's democracy may be over-interpreted as implying moves to highly idealized forms of politics.

Robert Dahl goes so far in addressing this problem as to abandon the term democracy for anything short of a highly idealized political system. Instead, Dahl coined the term polyarchy as his preferred term for political systems that approached but nevertheless fell short of the normative ideal of democracy (Dahl, 1973).

I draw on Dahl in informing my definition of democracy but eschew his use of a separate term for the close to the ideal category of political systems as unnecessarily confusing. Instead, I think of democracy in two different senses, which implies two different definitions of the attendant terms of democratization and democraticness.

The first sense is of democracy as a regulative ideal. Democracy is an ideal-type political system which empirical political systems can more or less approximate. In defining this ideal I follow Dahl in considering democracy to be: "a political system one of the characteristics of which is the quality of being completely or almost completely responsive to all its

citizens...considered as political equals” (Dahl, 1973, p. 2). This definition in turn implies that democracies give their citizens unimpaired opportunities to formulate their preferences, signify those preferences, and have those preferences weighted equally by the government (Dahl, 1973).

As a regulative ideal, we may consider democracy as something that political systems approximate to greater or lesser degree. The closer a political system comes to this ideal the greater its degree of democraticness. When the political system changes from a form that poorly approximates this ideal to one which more closely approximates it we may describe the process as democratization.

Scholars have offered diverse insights as to what specific institutions will move a polity closer or further away from this ideal, and suggested several different dimensions of democraticness that, while all associated in some way with this underlying sense of equal representation, are in other ways orthogonal and even contradictory to one another. For instance, Dahl (1973) divided democratization into two orthogonal dimensions: contestation and participation, and future studies have found this two-dimensional structure a useful construct (Coppedge, Alvarez, & Maldonado, 2008). Others have argued that democracy composes as many as five dimensions, and possibly more (Coppedge, et al., 2011). Engaging in-depth in this important discussion is beyond the scope of this study. Instead, in Chapter 2 I simply adopt the simultaneously most cutting-edge and most well-accepted definitions of the various dimensions of democracy.

In addition to this ideal-type definition of democracy from Dahl I also look at democracy from a binary perspective informed by the Schumpeter (1942). Schumpeter is skeptical of the

ability of any political system actually approaching anything like representativeness, the general will, or the public good. Even if such a thing might be possible, Schumpeter is highly doubtful that an outside observer could ever actually measure it.

Because of this skepticism towards the more ideal-type definitions of democracy Schumpeter proposes a much more straightforward and limited definition of democracy based on political institutional arrangements. For Schumpeter, democracy is: “that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote” (Schumpeter, 1942, p. 241). We may thus fairly clearly, and with disagreement only over liminal cases, determine whether a country is a democracy. Democraticness is a binary characteristic that either fully obtains or fully fails to obtain for any particular political system at any point in time. Democratization is the movement from one side of the line to the other, and is accomplished wholesale at a single point in time.

This is, of course, a far cry from Dahl’s regulative ideal of democracy. It thus provides certain advantages and certain disadvantages, and gives scope for different kinds of analysis. Schumpeter’s criterion is eminently observable and allows us to fairly easily distinguish between democracies and non-democracies. However, it gives little space for comparing regimes within either of these categories. It also misses several central aspects of what we might describe as democratic. Schumpeter, for instance, provides no space for the exercise of direct democracy through methods such as the plebiscite, or for the protection of essential rights and freedoms beyond the right to vote.

Both approaches have drawbacks and advantages. And so rather than pitting one against another I instead employ both in my analysis. So, in my theoretical discussions I will

speak of both approaching Dahl's ideal and crossing Schumpeter's threshold. The contention that I will present theoretically in this chapter and provide empirical evidence for in the subsequent chapters is that civil resistance at the initiation of a transition and certain patterns of behavior during the transition affect both Schumpeter's threshold and Dahl's ideal in similar ways.

Having presented my theoretical definitions of regimes, transitions, democracy I now move to considering the nature of nonviolent resistance and of political transitions initiated by nonviolent resistance.

Civil Resistance Transitions

The highly abstract discussion above raises the question of why look specifically at transitions initiated by civil resistance campaigns. If indeed we can abstract from almost all characteristics of a country and the political actors within it, why should one limit the population of cases to those initiated through a particular method of political contention?

The simple answer, beyond inherent empirical interest, is that the method of contention which initiates a political transition is likely to affect my two key dimensions for identifying patterns of transitional behavior in consistent ways. Transitions initiated through civil resistance are highly likely to elevate to positions of power those with preferences strongly against the old regime and with strong preferences for a new, democratic regime (Ekiert & Kubik, 1999). The power advantages of these people with democratic preferences are then in turn highly likely to push the transition towards democracy (McFaul, 2002). Initiating the transition through nonviolent resistance is also likely to create a broad-based mandate for radical, democratizing change (Bunce, 2003). In contrast, those with preferences towards retaining the old regime are

much more likely to remain in positions of power in transitions initiated through top-down liberalization, and the mandate for change is likely to be more moderate.

It is crucial to emphasize that this assertion is probabilistic rather than deterministic. I am not arguing that participation in civil resistance is inherently either a necessary or sufficient condition for pro-democratic inclinations. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini comes to mind as an individual who played a critical leadership role in a primarily nonviolent revolution who nonetheless held extremely anti-democratic inclinations. Other leaders may be socialized into holding and promoting highly democratic views but depart from those views later in life as new socialization and political stimuli push them in different directions. Viktor Orban, who was a leader in the Hungarian movement against Communism as a student but as a Prime Minister several decades later has rolled back several aspects of Hungary's democratic system, would be a prime example of this tendency.

My contention is not ignoring the Khomeinis and Orbans of the world, but rather arguing that, on average, for every Khomeini and Orban there will be many more Mandelas, Walesas, and others for whom both personal factors and their participation in resistance will be far more inclined to promote the democratic character of their country's political system.

One can think of the method of initiating the transition as the final step in setting the field of play in which political forces engage during the transitional period. A suite of past structural characteristics influence, but do not determine, the method by which the transition is initiated. The method by which the transition is initiated then critically shapes these two dimensions under which we can examine the behavior of transitional actors. With consistently

different starting points, the patterns of behavior likely to be influential will be consistently different. Thus it makes good theoretical sense to examine them separately.

I divide the methods of initiating these transitions into three: top-down liberalization, violent overthrow, and civil resistance. In the first case, a regime transition occurs because of initiative from elites from the old regime. In the second case, a violent clash eliminates the power structure of the old regime and brings an entirely new group to power. In the third case, nonviolent resistance undermines the structures of power in the old regime, forcing a transition to a new regime.

This is certainly not the only viable method to divide mechanisms of initiating a transition. Stradiotto and Guo (2010), for instance, divide mechanisms into conversion, cooperation, collapse, and foreign intervention. I choose to divide the population of transitions this way because the paradigm of nonviolent resistance as a particular method of undermining authoritarian regimes has proved to be a powerful predictor of differing patterns of democratization outcomes (Karatnycky & Ackerman, 2005; Johnstad, 2010; Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011; Celestino & Gleditsch, 2013; Garcia-Ponce & Wantchekon, 2017). My empirical examination is thus built on a firm foundation for understanding why different patterns emerge.

A general theory of transitional action and democratization could certainly be built through analyzing the power position and preferences of different actors in each of these cases. In some ways, such work has already been done by O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986) in regards to top-down liberalization. Yet little or no analysis has been done specifically examining the power positions of various actors following transitions initiated by nonviolent resistance. Thus my work fills a significant gap in the literature.

This lack of analysis of civil resistance-initiated transitions is surprising considering that civil resistance has played a crucial role across much of the major waves of regime transitions for the last seventy years. From the end of authoritarian rule in Portugal and Greece in the 1970s to the return of democracy in Latin America in the 1980s, to the massive outpouring of popular opposition to authoritarian rule beginning in Eastern Europe and spreading as far as sub-Saharan Africa in the 1990s, to the Color Revolutions and Arab Spring of the early 21st century, nonviolent resistance has been at the center of political change. Thus, the gap left by prior scholar calls for attention.

However, in another sense, since my approach, while informed by these prior theorists, also departs from them in significant ways, I do believe that more could be learned about democratization in all three of these contexts through my approach. However, I leave this more general theorizing for future work and focus on the least well-understood of these three transitional conditions: the civil resistance initiated transition or CRT.

Having presented my puzzle, theory, and core conceptual definitions I now widen the scope of my discussion to take into account some of the theoretical underpinnings of my approach. This serves two functions: first to provide theoretical underpinnings for my particular focus on transitional patterns of behavior, in particular by defending this focus from accusations of endogeneity; and second to offer some thoughts on the wider theoretical implications of my approach and its relevance for broader theoretical questions.

Theoretical Underpinnings: The Structuration of Democracy

Understanding why societies move from one form of government to another is a fundamental problem in political science. Indeed, one might put it in this form as one of only

two real questions that political science can seek to answer, namely: why do patterns of authority change, and why do they stay the same? Almost every research question in our field can be summarized within these categories.

At this level of abstraction, these questions are universal. Continuity and change in patterns of authority can be examined across time and in societies as simple as hunter-gatherers and as complex as postmodern postindustrial democratic polities. Yet considering the temporality of our discipline, going back generously around a century and a half or so – despite the claims of a longer lineage going back to figures like Thucydides and Machiavelli – our interest in continuity and change has been preoccupied with the rise and fall of democracy. Of these two questions, the second has typically been less scrutinized. The decline of democracy, admirably addressed in the work of Linz and Stepan, among others, was applied primarily historically, in an attempt to understand grand historical trends such as the rise of Nazism in Weimar Germany and the rise of Fascism in Republican Italy.¹³

The study of democracy's rise – democratization – on the other hand, has remained fundamental to political science. From a disciplinary perspective, democratization has centrality because of its place as one of the primary instances of large-scale change in political systems. Ideologically, democratization is also a core concern of the liberal world order constituted by the United States and the international institutions put in place following the Second World War.

Democratization may be examined from two basic lenses, depending on whether one is interested in it as a political science problem or as an ideological concern of the neo-liberal

¹³ Though if we are indeed, as many argue, in an age of “democratic decline,” the breakdown of democracy may be on the verge of a revival in political science research. See Burrows and Stephan 2014, Haggard and Kaufman 2016, and Ulfelder 2010.

world order. The political scientist looks for patterns, structures, and markers that one may clearly identify and say: “Here, democratization. Here, autocracy.” Democratization is a puzzle that can be solved by identifying facilitating conditions, a particular class or economic structure, political resources available to the new actors, etc... The picture is generalized, abstract, broad.

As a concern of the neo-liberal world order, democratization is a series of technical challenges for the order’s international and domestic allies to overcome. It is highly specific, highly contingent, a series of interlocking, institutional, social, and political constructions that must be carefully fine-tuned to their particular situation.

Rarely do the two meet. Even the branches of political science that share the focus on specificity, perhaps best captured in Robert Bates’ discussion of Area Studies (Bates, 1997) typically focus on specificities that remain beyond the control of the policymaker. They are not the generalized abstraction of political science in its purest form, they are in fact highly specific and concrete, but they remain beyond manipulation for those with an ideological concern for democratic improvement. Democratization arises because of particular cultural or historical traditions, again a particular arrangement of society, this time stated not as a general rule but rather as a particularly contingent historical reality.

This broad structural picture is appealing for its parsimony, for its cleanness, for its predictability. It is bolstered most powerfully by the raft of statistical and econometric techniques that well-trained political scientists can easily deploy to interpret their particular situation. In its earlier stages, this analysis employed simpler techniques – witness Lipset’s simple cross-tabulations to demonstrate the link between economic development and democracy (Lipset, 1959). More recently, of course, multivariate regression in its various

permutations has become the norm. Highly significant relationships, predicting a shift from autocracy to democracy, or a general improvement in a country's level of democracy, are attractive and typically publishable findings.

But there is a dirty secret hidden in most of our statistical models that undermines the viability of this structural picture. Despite an ever-growing raft of statistically significant predictors of democratization, our ability to predict is still woefully limited.

This lack of predictive power is particularly surprising considering the highly-developed state of the democratization literature. Building from early scholars such as Lipset (1959), who was one of the first to draw a strong link between socio-economic development and democratization, a wealth of different factors have been found to be significant predictors of moves towards greater democracy. These include economic factors such as GDP per capita (Barro, 1999), the level of inequality (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006), and the mobility of capital (Boix, 2003); cultural factors such as the legacy of British colonialism (Bernhard, Reenock, & Nordstrom, 2004) or the Muslim percentage of the population (Fish, 2002); and international factors such as the democraticness of a country's region (Gleditsch & Ward, 2006), its economic and political linkage to the West (Levitsky & Way, 2010), or a global process of democratic socialization (Harrison & Mitchell, 2014).

Considering the many puzzle pieces these studies give us separately, we might expect that when putting them together a more or less complete predictive picture might emerge. Yet this is far from the case. As Teorell says, in one of the most comprehensive looks at various approaches to democratization: "even the broadest and most inclusive statistical models perform dismally poorly in trying to predict short-term development of democracy" (Teorell,

2010, p. 158).¹⁴ In quantitative research, that simple indicator of a model's explanatory power, the r-squared, is frequently quite low, suggesting that there is more going on there than even eclectically-aggregated models can explain.¹⁵ And even robust findings from a single scholar are often quite difficult for future scholars to replicate.¹⁶

Qualitative studies of democratization do not have formal measures of model fit, of course. Yet a similar logic applies. Few of our qualitative theories of democratization have weathered the test of time, suggesting that their "out of sample" explanatory power is limited. For example, as I referenced above, the core model of the "transitology" school exemplified by O'Donnell and Schmitter's (1986) book faced significant critique for its failure to accurately account for the wave of democratic transitions beginning in 1989 (Carothers, 2002; Fatton, 1999). Classic qualitative accounts of democratization such as Barrington Moore's *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* (1966), while providing insights into their particular cases, have failed to serve as generalizable theory applicable to later generations of democratic transitions (Skocpol, 1973; Rueschemeyer, Stephens, & Stephens, 1992, pp. 22-25).

It is one of my core arguments that the reason our structural models have failed to explain this fundamental political phenomenon is that their picture of political behavior is

¹⁴ Teorell does argue that long-term ability to predict is more reliable, but even here the correlation between predicted and observed levels of democracy still leaves quite significant residuals unexplained, see Teorell 2010, p. 159.

¹⁵ See, for example Fish 2002 (r^2 ranges from 0.51 to 0.55 in an n of 149), Przeworski et al 2000 (r^2 ranges from 0.05 to 0.19), or Stradiotto and Guo 2010 (r^2 ranges from 0.42 to 0.53 in an n of 57). Many other influential papers on democratization do not report goodness of fit measures at all (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006, Gleditsch and Ward 2006, Pevehouse 2002).

¹⁶ For example, while Boix's 2003 book *Democracy and Redistribution* finds a strong relationship between low levels of economic inequality and democratization, as measured by a country's Gini coefficient, later studies by Dutt and Mitra (2008), Houle (2009), and Teorell (2010) were unable to replicate this relationship.

flawed. Looking at temporally prior characteristics of societies and from them deducing a causal path to political outcomes will always disappoint us in the end. To make this argument I delve first into social theory, and from there into statistics. But first, a few words about the importance of explanatory and predictive power.

It could be argued that ultimately explanatory and predictive power in a statistical sense is not the goal of this kind of quantitative social science. That instead what we are trying to demonstrate is simply that one factor has a kind of relationship with a second factor, say economic development with democracy. As long as we can show, through demonstrating a robust statistically significant relationship, that such a relationship exists, then we have demonstrated something interesting that helps us understand a particular phenomenon.

This might be the case, but truly arguing that limited explanatory power is not problematic begins to strain credibility when stated so directly. As social scientists, we can seek various kinds of knowledge. Our knowledge can be predictive, seeking to answer the when question of the timing of a particular phenomenon, or explanatory, seeking to answer the why question about the preconditions of a past occurrence, or how questions of the process by which phenomena develop. Quantitative research by its nature is largely limited to the when and the why questions, and for both of these, the full explanatory power of our model is key. If we have a significant predictor yet its effect size is marginal and its ability to increase our predictive power limited then it is difficult to argue, in a real sense, what we have accomplished in demonstrating its relationship. In essence, what we do when we ignore explanatory power is a sort of jargon-based con game, claiming more than we can actually reasonably claim for the potential benefits of our research, either scientifically (in understanding a phenomenon) or practically (offering advice for those who directly interact with the phenomenon).

Regarding social theory, our structural theories of democratization rely on the assumption that particular characteristics of social or political systems affect patterns of changing authority relationships in consistent ways. The link between economic development and democracy is the best-articulated here, but many other factors could also be brought in. Yet the coherence of this theory rests upon a fundamental misunderstanding of human behavior. It unproblematically assumes structures directly act upon political agents, constraining and shaping their action. Yet advances in social theory from Giddens (1984) and others fundamentally dispute this picture. The picture of temporally prior structure shoving temporarily posterior agents into a particular path-dependent course of action fails to recognize the duality of agency and structure; that agents themselves reproduce the social and political structures in which they are embedded.

Of course, this is not to say that structure is insignificant, nor that agency comes temporally or causally prior to structure. To assert that individuals, even elites, have complete freedom of action to reshape their political structures would be as naïve as assuming that structures act directly on agents. Mutual constitution of intersubjective political realities means instead that structures continue in time because the agents embedded within them often do not see any other way of acting. Structures create equilibria outside of which rational agents either rationally do not want to move or simply cognitively cannot imagine moving.¹⁷ Hence the reason that major changes in social structures are so infrequent.

Yet the relationship between structure and individual action is always mediated by social construction and human knowledgeability, by agents' "motives and reasons" (Giddens, 1984; p. 310). Mutual processes of constitution create the structure even as the structure

¹⁷ See Giddens 1984, pp. 174-79 for a good discussion of this.

constrains. Thus the effects of structure by definition cannot be deterministic. Structural impacts rely on consistent perception of their meaning across time and space. Such consistent perceptions often obtain but frequently do not. Individuals, political groups, and even whole countries go off the equilibrium path in ways that cannot be explained simply by looking at their starting conditions.

There is a positivist workaround to the problem that economic, social, and political structures do not actually empirically behave in the way that our models imply. This is perhaps best articulated in Milton Friedman's essay on positive economics (Friedman, 1953), in which Friedman, through a famous analogy of mobile foliage in trees, argues powerfully that the assumptions of theory are irrelevant to its utility. The only key factor is the explanatory power of the theory in predicting outcomes. In economics the model is *Homo Economicus*, the completely amoral profit-maximizing executive, who may have never existed but upon whose mythical behavior we may build relatively reliable predictions of aggregate economic behavior. Similarly, we may ignore the ways things actually are when it comes to the structural influence of democratization as long as our theories built around structural factors generate clear and reliable predictions of when and how democratization will occur.

But such predictive capacity is sorely lacking when it comes to democratization theory, as I articulated above. Even if we can find significant relationships, the significance of these relationships fails to provide us with strong explanatory and predictive power for when democratization is likely to occur. Thus, Friedman's positivism will not save the fully structural picture of democratization.

Democratization is, of course, a rare event, which makes predicting it on its face a difficult task. Yet, far from saving the structural argument for democratization it instead reinforces the fact that something is missing from a purely structural democratization story. Structural factors are largely time invariant, or at the most their rate of change tends to be fairly slow and even. On its face it is thus unsurprising that it should be difficult to comprehensively explain a rare occurrence on the basis of independent variables with such limited variation. If we are to satisfactorily explain it then we must add more than structural factors.

Przeworski and his co-authors take on this approach in their well-known book (Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, & Limongi, 2000). They show that the established link between socio-economic development and democratization has empirical problems, and when carefully examining the data it is difficult to actually find a linear relationship between the risk of democratization and the level of modernization. The correlation between the two can be explained much more satisfyingly by arguing that economic development, rather than pushing a particular country towards a rare occurrence, instead helps maintain a democratic equilibrium once it comes into place. Democratization itself, they argue, emerges randomly with regard to structural variables such as economic development (Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, & Limongi, 2000, p. 89). Or, in the terms I am using here, structural factors do little to explain democratization; explanations rooted in human agency are an essential part of the story.

In this chapter I propose an alternative to the structural picture, built on social theory but seeking to engage the rigor and explanatory power of statistics. Social structures are intersubjectively reproduced by individuals in society. They are neither strange outside forces constraining action, nor are they fully pliable to the whims of individual will. Marx said it best: “[Humans] make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please” (Marx, 1978, p.

595). Our structural explanations ultimately fail because they do not take into account the power of human agency and reflexivity to shape outcomes, particularly in times in which some stimulus has destabilized the processes of social construction that supported the political order. It is not only structures, but also the choices within those structures, that critically shape democratization.

Where Things Flow: Choosing a Point of Analysis

The key point in analyzing the causes of democracy is choosing a moment from which things flow naturally. What I mean by this is simple, and can be illustrated by looking at a very straightforward statistical example - the basic equation for a linear regression – which I present in archetypal fashion in equation 1 below.

$$1) Y = \beta X + \varepsilon$$

From the simplest correlation to the most complex regression models this basic relationship is what we are talking about: y as a function of x with some random variance. The moment from which things flow naturally is in the equal sign. This is something unique to social science. In natural sciences, the equal sign is less of an assumption, though Humean epistemology might argue that ultimately even natural sciences are ultimately simply assuming a natural flow. In social science, this assumption of flow is much more inescapable. Our independent variables almost never directly shove our dependent variables. Instead, we theorize about often quite complex and involved chains of causation that flow naturally from our independent variables. Any deviations from the natural flow fall in the error term.

The structural view implicitly assumes that our models can capture the world through this point. We even push our models to focus as far back as possible so as to not catch

ourselves at a later point in this natural flow. Hence the overwhelming concern throughout social science with endogeneity. We are hesitant to use independent variables whose impact on our dependent variable may be fully explained by temporally prior independent variables. On its face this is, of course, a perfectly valid methodological concern. If we are to tell meaningful stories about causation it will do us little good to start in the middle of a naturally flowing story.

Yet when it comes to democratization we are not dealing with a naturally flowing story. The independent variables employed in our statistical models operate at second, third, and even more distant degrees of remove, and the movement at almost every step is problematic when examined directly. Consider, for example, one well known factor argued to impact democratization: the number of other democracies in a particular country's region.¹⁸ Several studies have shown such a relationship (Gleditsch & Ward, 2006; Brinks & Coppedge, 2006). What is the underlying story for why this relationship obtains?

Gleditsch and Ward (2006) argue that democratic neighbors increase the likelihood of a democratic transition because democratization is a struggle over power and networks of power and influence transcend national borders. When we see higher numbers of neighboring democracies, elites and institutions in these democracies will provide support to pro-democratic opposition movements in countries within their regions that remain non-democratic. This support will then be sufficient to tip the balance of power within the remaining non-democracies such that democratic transitions will be initiated and new democratic regimes will come to power. Other diffusion models rely on a similar set of mechanisms, for instance

¹⁸ See as well Haggard and Kauffman's (2012) critique of theories of distributive conflict and democratization which highlights how the multiple steps argued by these theories to explain a link between inequality and democratization fail to obtain when looking qualitatively at actual cases.

assuming that actors within political regimes receive some kind of benefits when their regime closely matches that of their neighbors (Brinks & Coppedge, 2006).

This broad relationship has been statistically demonstrated. Yet, as the authors often admit, they cannot actually test the mechanisms through which they claim their relationship obtains (Brinks & Coppedge, 2006, p. 467). The diffusion model assumes, first, that democratic governments, including new democratic governments, will seek to encourage similar democratic changes in their neighbors. Second, that pro-democratic partners within their neighbors exist to receive their assistance. Third, that such efforts to encourage democratic changes will successfully increase the political capacity of these nascent democratizers. Fourth, that the increase in political capacity will be sufficient to motivate pro-democratizers to in some way challenge the status quo. Fifth, that this challenge will be successful in bringing the pro-democratizers to power. Sixth, that once in power the pro-democratizers will actually seek to put in place a new democratic regime. Seventh, that they will succeed in doing so.

To simply accept the impact of diffusion on democratization, we must act as though we can assume that all of the steps unproblematically flow naturally from the impetus of a greater number of democratic neighbors. Yet, as will be clear to any scholar of democratization once the steps are laid out, not one of them can be so assumed. Take for example the idea that democracies seek to encourage democratic change in their neighbors. The most cursory glance through the history of US foreign policy towards its Latin American and Caribbean neighbors will show that such democratic support has been at best part of a much wider range of strategies towards the governments of these countries. The US, despite its high valuation of democracy at home, has energetically supported non-democratic regimes in many of its neighbors when such support was perceived to be in American national interest. Even when ostensibly seeking to

encourage democracy, its support has often been directed not towards a full-fledged democratization but rather towards a more limited form of democracy still dominated by a small elite (Robinson, 1996). Similar critiques could be leveled at all of the other assumed steps in the naturally flowing story of democratic diffusion.

The response, of course, is that these theories are probabilistic, and the fact that a statistically significant relationship obtains between the percentage of democratic neighbors and a country's level of democracy means that we can unproblematically treat each of these steps as at least probabilistically being pushed in a particular direction. This is true, but it returns us to the critique that I have focused on thus far: our models' levels of explanatory power. The fact that explanatory power remains low is a powerful indication that, in fact, there is a lot going on in each of these probabilistic steps that remains to be examined, opening up significant room for new kinds of research.

One approach to addressing this issue is to problematize the error term. We assume that variation from omitted variables of a similar structural nature has not been accounted for. If it were possible to build a full structural model then perhaps democratization would be fully explained. The eclectic approach of Teorell (2010) and others generally takes this approach, including a vast number of structural covariates of democratization to build a relatively comprehensive structural model. This effort at completeness is definitely an improvement over limited structural models, but remains limited in its explanatory power.¹⁹

¹⁹ Building such complex "garbage can" models also raises methodological questions, as including so many variables in a regression model reduces the likelihood that one can truly understand how any one variable's departure from the assumptions of one's estimation strategy affects the results (Achen, 2002; Achen, 2005).

I propose that instead of problematizing the error term we problematize the equal sign, the natural flow from structure to agency, from a high GDP per capita, strong ties with the West, low percentage of Muslims, or whatever the preferred structural explanation, to a certain likelihood or level of future democracy. Structures may shape, but the shape that they create is one that is sustained and shaped through future agential choices. In each of the steps between independent variable and dependent variable there is unexplained variation, there are points at which, for the natural flow to occur, particular actors must make particular choices that are by no means fully determined or even meaningfully determined by the observable structural factors.

How can one determine this is true and avoid the deadly accusation of endogeneity? I make two key assertions. The first is that the structural story fully eliminating the effects of agency on its own is itself a much higher empirical bar than scholarship often makes it. It is in fact something quite difficult to demonstrate that the choices of political elites and ordinary people in times of political transition can be fully or even just satisfactorily explained by their structural preconditions. Certainly no model of democratization that currently exists can demonstrate anything close to this level of certainty.

The attractiveness of exogeneity has masked this particular limitation. We need not deal with our failure to fully explain as long as we can convincingly argue that our favored explanation robustly and significantly explains part of the variation we are interested in. As long as the robustness of that partial explanation can be maintained through a battery of tests and is not vulnerable to accusations of endogeneity, then our potential for publication is safe. No model is ever perfect and we are all comfortable with some degree of error.

Yet this interest in exogeneity is not the best possible attempt at scholarly scientific explanation of the phenomenon of democratization, as shown by the failures to explain variation in democratization that I discussed above. So why the focus on exogeneity? Perhaps because of professional convenience driven by the incentive structure of the field. It is easier to build reliable statistical models using factors that are very clearly and distinctly exogenous. It is easier to focus on structure. But ultimately structure will not aid us because, when it comes to democratization, outcomes do not flow from structure. Instead, the shaping influence of structure allows for multiple potential paths whose outcomes are defined by individual and group strategic choices.

My second assertion is that methods for determining whether particular choices impact democratization are already quite simply built into our methods of statistical testing, and thus can be easily tested by employing current statistical methods, as long as the researcher is careful to employ tests of adequate robustness and not simply run the model and leave it at that.

Consider the following. Assume that democratization can be explained through a combination of structural preconditions (X_s) and particular patterns of political behavior (X_a). Those structural preconditions both make the ultimate end goal of democratization more likely, but also perhaps impact, but do not necessarily create, particular patterns of behavior. We conceptualize the level of democracy, as before, in simple linear regression terms.

$$2) Y = \beta_s X_s + \beta_a X_a + \epsilon$$

If X_s and X_a are independent of one another, yet we only include X_s in our model, then X_a will fall into the error term, our residuals will increase, and the model's goodness of fit will


decrease. However, if X_a is not independent of X_s , and is in fact fully determined by X_s , then including it will make the distinct causal impact of the two variables impossible for the model to determine. The standard errors for the coefficients will become infinitely large, making β_s and β_a impossible to estimate. We will be unable to perform the regression.

If, on the other hand, X_a is partially but not fully determined by X_s , with a significant degree of correlation between the two, then the size of the standard errors will increase, but not become infinitely large, and our estimates of β_s and β_a will be possible but unreliable, subject to change based on minor fluctuations in sample composition, and unlikely to be robust to out-of-sample validation.

From this very brief discussion it is quite clear that what we are discussing is an example of mediation, a situation in which one independent variable both affects the dependent variable directly and also affects it separately through the another variable, which additionally has its own independent effect on the dependent variable. While modeling such a relationship is somewhat more complex than a simple regression model in which one can assume complete independence of all the independent variables, it is by no means an insurmountable statistical problem and indeed lends itself quite easily to some particular statistical fixes.

In Figure 1.1 I reproduce a diagram from Baron and Kenny's (1986) text on mediating relationships, substituting the terms from this discussion in the appropriate places in the diagram, to illustrate how to conceptually model the relationship I am discussing.

Figure 1.1: Diagram of Mediation Relationships



Baron and Kenny (1986, p. 1177) recommend three steps to evaluate the presence of a theorized mediating relationship: regressing the mediator on the independent variable, regressing the dependent variable on the independent variable, and regressing the dependent variable on both the independent variable and on the mediator; estimating separate coefficients in each equation. If the independent variable affects the mediator in the first equation, the independent variable affects the dependent variable in the second equation, the mediator affects the dependent variable in the third equation, and the effect size of the independent variable is smaller in the third equation than in the first, then a mediating relationship is present.

The key problem to address to ensure that a mediator variable is contributing independently to the dependent variable and not simply proxying for the effects of a more remote causal variable is simply the familiar problem of multicollinearity. If the natural flow story is completely empirically true, then we should observe perfect collinearity between structural factors and political choices during democratization periods. Few would argue that such an outcome is likely since, as I discuss above, most structural theories of democratization, particularly those that employ quantitative methods, are probabilistic rather than deterministic.

The question is whether the inclusion of a particular variable can meaningfully improve this probabilistic story.

Thus the task becomes determining the degree of multicollinearity between the set of structural variables and the set of agential choices.²⁰ If patterns of political behavior are determined by structural conditions to a degree that their impact is not meaningful we should observe a high degree of correlation between these variables, and models that include both will fail standard multicollinearity tests. Adding variables that capture these patterns of behavior will have only minimal impact on measures of model fit (since very little unexplained variation is being explained by these variables), standard errors will increase significantly for both structural and agential variables, and it will thus become increasingly difficult to determine the coefficients for both structural and agential variables.

Testing for the presence and effects of multicollinearity, for instance through measuring the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) or conditioning numbers of one's independent variables, is a practice that scholars in various fields that employ regression modeling understand well, as is determining a model's goodness of fit. Doing such testing to a degree of statistical robustness demands more work than simply looking for low p -values, but is by no means an unanswerable empirical question. Therefore, if including the term for a democratizing pattern of behavior improves model fit, controlling for all plausible observable structural indicators, and does not significantly indicate a multicollinearity problem, we have at least plausible evidence that these

²⁰ As Farrar and Glauber (1967) remind us, building a relatively complete multivariate regression model of any complex empirical phenomenon will almost by necessity involve including independent variables that are correlated with one another. Thus diagnosing multicollinearity is not a question of examining its presence or absence but rather capturing its degree and its impact on one's model.

particular patterns have an impact on democratization, independent of their limited correlation with favorable structural preconditions.

Of course, we cannot rule out the possibility that patterns of behavior that facilitate democratization are being explained by unobserved temporally prior patterns of structural factors that fully determine their outcome. Yet I do not believe this to be an empirically reasonable standard. Showing that patterns of behavior explain additional variation when controlling for observable confounders, especially when the field of democratization is so well-developed (and thus has such a long list of potential confounders), is strong evidence. Similarly strong evidence cannot be marshalled by structural models without showing very high levels of variation being explained by structural factors.

Neither an approach limited to exogenous structural factors, nor an approach incorporating mediating patterns of behavior, can approach the level of internal validity able to be captured through an experimental approach to causal inference involving complete randomization of treatment. There will always be some degree of error, some degree of imperfection, in observational approaches. However, because of the nature of democratization, we are unable to address the empirical puzzle in question using truly experimental methods. Thus we must use the best possible observational statistical methods to approximate experimental conditions.

In addition, statistical methods exist for showing the plausibility of omitted variable bias. The careful researcher can employ sensitivity testing to ensure that, if their results are being driven by the ever-elusive omitted variable, that variable must truly be a phenomenal and highly

correlated factor with democratization, something, once again, highly unlikely in such a well-developed field.

So much for the general principle of agential patterns being a potentially important factor in explaining outcomes, and the kind of evidence that would be necessary to show their importance.

Conclusion

In this chapter I have presented the puzzle of Civil Resistance Transitions, and outlined my theory for how to address that puzzle. Then, beginning with first principles of social theory and the basic questions of political science, I have sketched out the parameters of the task that I have set for myself, the broad contribution to the understanding of democratization that I believe my focus on patterns of behavior can add, the nature and effects of nonviolent resistance, and the challenges implied by that nature and effects.

At this point, thus, the question becomes an empirical one. How can I demonstrate indeed that my approach has scholarly benefits and that the specific patterns of behavior that I have articulated do in fact have the effects that I have argued?

The first step is statistical, one which I have already articulated to some degree earlier in this chapter. If I can show a substantive and robust impact of patterns of behavior on the predictive power of a structural model of democratization, then it will be some degree of evidence that there is additional explanation inherent in patterns of behavior beyond the degree to which such patterns of behavior are themselves determined by structure. Thus, statistical testing will involve building a model of democratization in CRTs, populating the model

first with some of the most important structural variables, and then adding variables that capture the patterns of behavior that I am describing.

I have already indicated how to build such independent variables based on the empirical manifestations of the underlying behavioral patterns. In the subsequent chapter I go into the specific details of operationalization, and present the results of my statistical findings.

The statistical tests strongly support the picture that I have painted of behavioral patterns having powerful independent impacts on democratization. However, as with any kind of statistical testing, particularly absent strict experimental conditions, these tests can only give us a sense of correlations, not truly get at causation. In order to build a richer picture of the impact of these patterns of behavior I thus also include three detailed case studies of various transitions from authoritarian rule sparked by civil resistance.

The case studies follow a rough approximation of a most different case analysis, in that I selected them in part on the basis of their extreme differences. They occurred at different time periods, in different regions, and following radically different forms of nonviolent resistance movements. However, my most different analysis is not a strict comparative case study, as the three cases also vary in terms of my dependent variable of regime type. The three cases ended as a democracy, and two other regime types, the elite semi-democracy and fractious semi-democracy.

The utility of the most different selection is thus not to make a causal argument on the basis of their outcomes but rather to demonstrate how the impact of these patterns of behavior obtains empirically in particular cases despite radically different political, social, and cultural environments. How well do the cases match the ideal types that my theory has articulated here?

If the match is good, despite radically different circumstances, then I consider that strong evidence that the general empirical picture that I have articulated here is a good match for the population of CRTs as a whole.

However, before I turn to the case studies, I move to test the core statistical assertion that I have made in this chapter.

Chapter 2: Testing the Three Behavioral Patterns Quantitatively

In this chapter I move from abstract theoretical discussion of the nature of political change and nonviolent resistance, or the divide between structure and agency, into empirically testing my theory.

I have described three challenges based on my model of civil resistance transitions from authoritarian rule, and have offered some initial reflections on operationalizing those challenges. I have also suggested the standards by which to judge whether these challenges are indeed important in understanding democratization after civil resistance. I must show not only that the impact of these challenges as operationalized in accordance with my theory has a statistically significant impact on democratization but that the effect sizes are meaningful enough to distinguish my model's predictions from the predictions of a purely structural model and that the inclusion of my variables improves the predictive power of the model relative to the structural model. Only if all of these statistical thresholds can be met can we say that my approach offers something meaningful for the study of democratization generally and the specific example of the question of CRTs.

I begin the chapter by describing my data sources, including how I chose my population of CRTs and how I operationalize maximalism, mobilization, and holdovers, my structural control

variables, and my dependent variable of democratization. I then run several different models that test the impact of my independent variables.

First, I test the core contention that civil resistance transitions are more democratizing than other forms of transition. As I outlined in the previous chapter, this is a finding that has been widely replicated in the literature. My tests here extend and expand this earlier work in a number of ways. First, I incorporate a definition of transition, and particularly transitional endpoints, that is more theoretically developed than that employed by previous scholars such as Celestino and Gleditsch (2013). Second, I compare measures of model fit between structural models and models including the civil resistance variable, providing an additional test of the additional explanatory impact of civil resistance. Third, I compare all forms of transition, not only political change in the aftermath of violent or nonviolent resistance, as in Chenoweth and Stephan (2011), or transitions to democracy alone, as in Bayer, Bethke, and Lambach (2016) and Bethke and Pinckney (2016). Performing this test is central to demonstrating that civil resistance transitions are a distinct population that deserve their own unique examination. I then select the population of civil resistance transitions and test the impact of my three patterns of behavior in these transitions.

The results strongly support three out of my four hypotheses. I validate the impact of civil resistance on democratic transitions, and find evidence that mobilization and maximalism both powerfully affect democratic prospects in CRTs, significantly predicting greater democracy and increasing the predictive power of a simple structural model. The evidence for the challenge of holdovers is more mixed.

Operationalizing Concepts

My primary unit of analysis in my tests below is a political transition, defined as the period between the breakdown of one political regime and the establishment of a new regime. I discuss how I identify the beginnings and ends of transitions below.

I define a civil resistance transition (CRT) as a political transition in which a civil resistance campaign played a crucial role in breaking down the prior regime. Had the civil resistance campaign not occurred then either regime breakdown would have been highly unlikely to occur or its dynamics would have been so radically different that it would be unrecognizable relative to the transition that occurred in part because of the civil resistance campaign.

Civil resistance need not be the only factor, or even the only necessary factor in initiating a transition for me to classify it as a CRT. For one thing, to demonstrate such a strong condition would be exceedingly empirically difficult, perhaps impossible, absent a deep familiarity with each individual case that even many country experts could only disingenuously claim.

This point relates to the issue of “natural flow” I discuss in the previous chapter. A sole necessary condition implies that everything up to the outcome “flows naturally” from this condition, or that we can assume such a flow unproblematically. Yet to demonstrate such natural flow is ultimately impossible. We can only argue for the importance of a condition and then appeal to plausibility.

For example, one of the cases I will examine in a later chapter is the 2006 overthrow of King Gyanendra of Nepal in the so-called “Jana Andolan II” or “Second People’s Movement.”

The Jana Andolan II approximates the ideal-type of a CRT. An autocrat stepped down after millions of his people took to the streets to demand his ouster. His resignation initiated a major transformation in the political and social institutions of the country. This seems to be a clear example of a CRT.

Yet arguing that civil resistance was the *only* necessary factor in explaining the transition will immediately become problematic. The civil resistance campaign came at the end of a ten-year civil war by Maoist revolutionaries. The civil war degraded state capacity and undermined the king's legitimacy. Furthermore, the civil resistance campaign was partially led by old elites who had been disenfranchised by the king's recent moves to consolidate power. It was also aided by the defection of the regime's former ally and regular Nepali *eminence grise*: the government of India. A careful observer could make a plausible argument that all of these factors were necessary for the outcome of the Nepali transition.

A critical scholar could easily apply a similar analysis to any transition we might care to categorize as a CRT, if we are attempting to justify a strong set of inclusion criteria. Thus we might quickly find ourselves with no cases remaining to analyze.

It is important to note that such elimination of cases upon close inspection is not unique to civil resistance transitions. Almost any strict classification that attempts a high standard of empirical necessity will quickly run into problems if the investigators are intellectually honest. Because of these difficulties, the lower standard of crucial but not sole contributing factor is both much more useful and ultimately more intellectually defensible.

One can still, of course, attack whether civil resistance was indeed crucial to regime breakdown in a case. But in that case we are on much more solid empirical ground, and can

have meaningful discussions about the plausibility of alternative scenarios. Such discussion is particularly warranted in cases in which civil resistance movements took place but their impact is unclear. In the cases that I examine in depth this is perhaps most prominent in Brazil, where scholars have argued that the primary impetus for change came from the military hierarchy, not from the nonviolent resistance from below (Stepan, 1989). I take on that question in some detail in that chapter and so do not address it here.

If civil resistance has been crucial to initiating a transition then the political dynamics of transition approximate the theoretical model that I have described in the previous chapter even if other factors have played an important role in initiating the transition. We should still observe a balance of power in favor of more pro-democratic figures, higher levels of popular mobilization and political awareness, and the dispersion of skills and knowledge of nonviolent resistance techniques amongst political elites and throughout the populace. In other words, all of the factors that I have argued shove civil resistance transitions in a democratizing direction should be present. All of these factors should flow fairly naturally from a crucial role for civil resistance, regardless of other precipitating factors. Hence, in identifying CRTs I rely on this definition of crucial contribution but not necessarily sole major contribution to transition initiation.

My population of cases, both of transitions as a whole and then of CRTs, comes from combining two well-respected data sources: the data on non-democratic regimes and their

types of failure produced by Barbara Geddes, Joseph Wright, and Erica Frantz (2014) and the NAVCO 2.1 dataset produced by Erica Chenoweth and Christopher Shay.²¹

The Geddes data includes every instance of authoritarian regime breakdown. It has a crucial advantage over other data sources such as Polity IV because measures the duration of individual regimes, defined as “the rules that: (1) identify the group from which leaders can come; and (2) determine who influences leadership choice and policy” (Geddes, Wright, & Frantz, 2014, p. 314). Transitions from one authoritarian regime to another are captured in the data, even if the level of democracy remained more or less unchanged from before the transition to after the transition. For instance the Cuban Revolution in 1959 or the Iranian Revolution in 1979, in both of which one authoritarian regime was replaced by another, are both captured in the data as transitions from one regime to another rather than continuous periods of non-democracy.

I first take the entire population of authoritarian regime breakdown from 1945 through 2011 in the Geddes data.²² I add to this population all of the transitions from colonial rule to independence during this time period. The Geddes data does not include these transitions since it only collects data on states with formal independence and sovereignty, however, I argue that they are appropriate to include. Colonial rule was an important form of non-democratic rule for almost the first half of the period that I am including, and there is no inherent theoretical reason why we should expect colonial rule to depart from the general models of transition from

²¹ NAVCO 2.1 is a revised and expanded version of the NAVCO 2.0 dataset initially produced by Chenoweth and Lewis (2013).

²² The Geddes data only goes through 2010. I personally coded the data forward through 2015 to capture any additional regime breakdowns. I detail this process as well as providing justification for any additional regime breakdown codings in the statistical appendix.

authoritarian rule that I have previously described. This process leads to a total population of 331 transitions.

From this population I then determined which cases were CRTs. My first cut at this was to identify all country-years with ongoing nonviolent resistance campaigns in NAVCO 2.1 that correlate with a year of authoritarian regime breakdown in the Geddes data. I then checked each of these cases individually through an examination of the country-specific scholarly literature to ensure that it met my inclusion criteria. I also added a small number of cases discovered through independent research and through examining the cases included in Pinckney (2014) and Bethke and Pinckney (2016).

I performed at least a cursory examination of each CRT to ensure that it warrants inclusion. To make this determination I looked for several factors.

1. Scope. Was the civil resistance campaign of a size and ubiquity that it would have been almost impossible to ignore? Larger campaigns that were spread more widely across the country are more likely to have had a crucial impact on the subsequent process of political development. I treated campaigns that took place coterminous with regime transitions but were small or concentrated solely in isolated pockets of the country with more skepticism, and possibly as cases that did not warrant inclusion.
2. Other triggering factors. As I describe above, the existence of other crucial factors in explaining a transition do not mean that a transition is excluded from the population of CRTs. However, if in reviewing the secondary literature on a case where a civil resistance movement took place I routinely find the civil resistance campaign

ignored, or its significance downplayed by scholars and other observers, then I treated its inclusion with greater skepticism.

3. Elapsed time. If regime breakdown occurred coterminous with, or in the immediate aftermath of, major civil resistance activity then I considered the case a more likely candidate for inclusion. If a long period of time elapsed between major nonviolent resistance activities and the regime change then I considered the case more skeptically.
4. Counterfactual plausibility. This is the most powerful criterion even if it is also the most abstract. Can one make a plausible case that the trajectory of regime breakdown would have occurred in the same or a similar way absent the civil resistance campaign? If so, then the case is likely not suitable for inclusion as a CRT. If however, the historical case for regime change is difficult to plausibly imagine absent the civil resistance campaign then the case is likely a CRT.

Different observers might come to different conclusions on the inclusion of a few liminal cases, however, I am confident that in most cases a fair examination of the evidence would come to similar conclusions to mine.

This process of data collection and checking left me in the end with a total population of 78 CRTs from 1945 until 2011. I chose to set my examination to this period for practical rather than theoretical reasons. My theory of CRTs is broad and I have no reason to expect that it would not apply in times prior to WWII. However, finding the kinds of fine-grained data that are consistent cross-nationally and could be reliably used for this kind of analysis is difficult when one moves back past WWII.

In addition, the number of likely cases that I could add by moving the period of examination further back in time is small. The NAVCO 1.0 dataset, which collected data on nonviolent and violent resistance campaigns back to 1900, includes less than 10 nonviolent campaigns from around the world prior to 1945, of which only a few led to regime change.


This may not be an entirely empirical phenomenon, but rather due to the limited availability of data sources. Newspaper coverage, for example, is severely limited for many parts of the world when one goes back so far in time. Qualitative research continues to uncover more and more examples of powerful nonviolent resistance from around the world from well before this time period.²³ As scholars continue to give attention to these historic struggles, our history of both civil resistance and civil resistance transitions will continue to be improved. However, for the purposes of consistent cross-national quantitative testing, I am limited by the availability of reliable data sources, many of which only go back to 1945, if indeed they go back that far.

I extended the population up to 2011 in order to make the population as broad and diverse as possible, given the above constraints, and in particular to include the recent “Arab Spring” transitions. While a few CRTs have taken place in the years since 2011, for instance in Burkina Faso (Pinckney 2014), and possibly by the end of this project in Venezuela, the Arab Spring of 2011 is the most recent major example of political transition following civil resistance, hence I found it crucial to include these cases.

²³ For example, see the many examples of nonviolent resistance in liberation struggles described in Bartkowski 2013.

These 78 cases come from every region of the world and have diverse backgrounds and precipitating conditions. This is not a European story, a Latin American story, or an African story, but a global story. Figure 2.1 shows all the countries with at least one CRT.

Figure 2.1: Countries with Civil Resistance Transitions initiated from 1945-2011.



Multiple transitions can and have occurred in single countries, such as Madagascar or Zambia. I do not exclude transitions from countries that have previously appeared in the data, but instead control for non-independence of observations through using robust standard errors clustered by country.

The beginning of a transition is fairly easy to identify. I do so primarily by relying on the pre-existing definition from Geddes and her co-authors (2014, pp. 317-18). Transitions occur when a regime, that is, the system of rules and rule-makers currently in place for determining the authoritative allocation of values, ceases to function. Rules are destabilized and uncertain

for a time before re-stabilizing, typically in a different form or at least with different players at the helm.

Regimes break down for any number of reasons, and their breakdown can come in many different forms. Even within the category of civil resistance transitions there are any number of different modalities of regime breakdown, in accordance with the varying mechanisms whereby nonviolent resistance can achieve its goals. Gene Sharp's fourfold categorization of the mechanisms of success for nonviolent resistance is helpful to illustrate this point (Sharp, 1973; 2005). Sharp argued that nonviolent resistance can achieve success in four distinct ways, depending on the tactics used by the resisters and the situation's political dynamics.

In Sharp's first method, conversion, the actions of the nonviolent resistance group so touch the heart and mind of the opponent that they adopt the perspective of the resister and willingly grant their demands. In the second, accommodation, while the opponent is not directly coerced, they "see the writing on the wall" choose to seek conciliation with the nonviolent resister. In the third, nonviolent coercion, the prospect of escalating costs from nonviolent resistance forces the opponent against their will to give in. In the fourth, disintegration, the effects of nonviolent resistance are such that the structures of support available to the opponent collapse and their ability to continue fighting the nonviolent resister is eliminated.

Any or all of these mechanisms may become operative in the process of a regime breakdown. Therefore, the general category of civil resistance transitions may contain diverse sets of empirical manifestations.

Consider, for example, the “Bulldozer Revolution” in Serbia in 2000.²⁴ A sustained campaign of nonviolent resistance first played a role in motivating Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic to hold an early presidential election and in uniting the opposition behind a single opponent to Milosevic. The nonviolent resistance movement, spearheaded by the youth movement Otpor, anticipated that Milosevic would attempt to steal the election. When he did so they organized mass demonstrations that descended on Belgrade and shut the city down until Milosevic agreed to cede power. Milosevic did so after only a few days, agreeing to abide by the outcome of the election. In this case, one can see the impact of nonviolent resistance through both the mechanisms of accommodation and nonviolent coercion, with some degree of disintegration, at work. Milosevic came to an agreement with the opposition on the basis of the ability of the nonviolent resistance movement to continue to impose costs on him through the mass demonstrations and the signals that this resistance showed about the likely prospects should he attempt to violently suppress the movement.

Now, compare the “Bulldozer Revolution” to the “Tulip Revolution” in Kyrgyzstan a few years later.²⁵ There are some similarities across the two cases: in both, a stolen election motivated protests against an authoritarian regime. However, while in Serbia Milosevic negotiated his way out of power through accommodation in Kyrgyzstan the protests reached such a ubiquity and size that security forces refused to repress them, the instruments of government broke down, and the president fled the country as his system of control no longer

²⁴ For discussion of this case see Binnendijk and Marovic 2006, Bujosevic and Radovanovic 2003, Bunce and Wolchik 2011, and Vejvoa 2009.

²⁵ For discussion of this case see Bunce and Wolchik 2011, Marat 2006, and Radnitz 2010.

functioned. In this case little to no accommodation took place, and even nonviolent coercion was minimal. The opponent regime simply disintegrated.

Similar comparisons could be made across any number of CRTs. This demonstrates the theoretical and empirical justification for lumping together the diverse set of transitions that any careful observer will note are contained in my set of CRTs. Nonviolent resistance effects political change in a variety of ways, many of which depart from the archetypal image of masses on the streets demanding the downfall of the regime. It often involves long negotiation processes, or appropriation of authoritarian institutions, or the conversion or accommodation of former regime actors that then break down the coherence of the opponent regime coalition. What all these cases share is a crucial role played by nonviolent resistance in initiating regime change.

How do I operationalize the ends of these transitions? This is a crucial empirical question because it determines the point at which I measure my dependent variable of democratization. The question of transitional endpoints flows naturally, of course, from the question of transitional beginnings, but in order to frame the discussion it is important first to briefly discuss how I operationalize democracy.

Definitions of democracy are highly variable and contested. As I describe in the previous chapter, on a theoretical level I rely on both a threshold institutional notion of democracy based on the work of Schumpeter (1942), Przeworski (2000), and others that focuses on free and fair elections, and an ideal-type more normative notion of democracy based on the work of Robert Dahl (1973). A regime is democratic in a binary sense if it crosses Schumpeter's threshold. It is democratic in a continuous sense to the degree that it approximates Dahl's ideal of a political system perfectly and equally responsive to its citizens.

There are, of course, several datasets that attempt to empirically capture democracy in both the binary and continuous sense. Perhaps the best-known of these is the Polity dataset, currently in its fourth iteration, which collects various aspects of democracy and authoritarianism and aggregates them linearly into a single score ranging from -10 to 10 (Marshall, Gurr, & Jaggers, 2016). The creation of Polity was a crucial step forward in the study of democracy, and its contribution should not be understated. However, as data collection has advanced its utility has declined and several theoretical and empirical issues have surfaced, particularly with its top-level aggregated score – the measure most commonly used in research (Gleditsch & Ward, 1997; Treier & Jackman, 2008).

Several other measures, such as those generated by Freedom House or the Unified Democracy Scores, all have their strengths and weaknesses which I will not go into here. The strongest measure of democracy that exists, and that which most closely approximates my theoretical goal of capturing a polity's degree of distance from the Dahlian ideal, is the Polyarchy score created by the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project.

V-Dem has a number of strengths over other common data sources on democracy. The first is in its data collection process. Instead of relying on undergraduate or graduate student coders, whose knowledge of cases may be uneven, V-Dem generates its data on the basis of either factual information from publicly available documents or subjective codings from multiple country experts. Each variable is coded by five experts, and their individual scores are then aggregated into a single score using Bayesian Item Response Theory methods.²⁶ This gives both a better sense of the underlying dimension of each indicator and also a confidence interval in

²⁶ For details on the V-Dem Methodology see Coppedge et al 2017.

addition to the individual point estimate. The indicators that country experts are asked to code are also highly specific and in most cases fairly easy for a knowledgeable observer to empirically verify, reducing the scope for potential bias. Almost all indicators are measured at the country-year level.

The second strength is in how individual indicators are then aggregated into a conception of the broader concept of democracy. The creators of V-Dem, following some of the best theoretical work on democracy (Coppedge, et al., 2011), recognize that the underlying Dahlian ideal of democracy incorporates a number of different dimensions that may be orthogonal to one another. Thus they first aggregate different indicators into these orthogonal dimensions. Finally these dimensions are aggregated into to top-level overall index of democracy, the “polyarchy” score.

Polyarchy scores range in theory from 0 to 1, but recognizing the ideal-type nature of these endpoints never fully approach them. In the entire V-Dem dataset the polyarchy score ranges from 0.009 to 0.949. Since the polyarchy score is the most comprehensive, complex, well-coded attempt to capture the Dahlian ideal of democracy, I use it as my dependent variable to measure democracy at the conclusion of a transition.


This brings us back to the question of how we can know if we are at a transition’s conclusion. The bluntest approach is to arbitrarily assume that transitions cannot go on forever into the future, and so if we pick a point relatively distant in time from the initiation of the transition then we can reliably proxy for the level of democracy at the end of the transition. However, there are strong theoretical reasons for being suspect of such an approach. Qualitative scholars will point out the vast differences in time between empirical markers of

transitional endpoints across different cases. For example, while in Brazil a new constitution was ratified and promulgated in 1988, only three years after their transition in 1985, in Nepal a new constitution was not ratified and promulgated until 2015, almost ten years after the Second People's Movement overthrew the Nepali monarchy and initiated the transition.

However, it could be the case that such distinctions are not substantive when discussing the aggregate level of democracy in a country and so would not significantly impact the results of the kind of analysis I perform in this chapter. One way to tell if this is the case is to look at the variation in the change in the level of democracy in countries at fixed points in time after their transitions. Do we see a global trend of a certain temporal point at which variation begins to decline to a level where it is no longer meaningful?


Figure 2.2 below shows the average absolute change in the polyarchy score of CRT countries at various points in time after a nonviolent resistance campaign initiates a CRT. As the line in the figure shows, there is a sharp decline in the average amount of change over the first two years following a CRT. After that point the mean change in polyarchy on an annual basis stabilizes at an average of around 0.02.

Figure 2.2: Annual Absolute Change in Polyarchy after a Civil Resistance Campaign



The most meaningful point in time to select might be two years after the transition. However, while to do so might be more or less accurate in the aggregate it poorly captures a great deal of variation in transitions that occurred over longer periods. To illustrate, in Figure 2.3 I show the change in polyarchy scores for three different countries over a ten-year period following a successful civil resistance campaign. As the widely divergent lines show, there is no clear cut-off point where variation in polyarchy scores levels out, indicating an end to transition and stabilization of new political institutions. Picking an arbitrary point after the initiation of the transition will not be a reliable means of measuring the dependent variable of democratization.

Figure 2.3: Absolute Change in Polyarchy in Iran, Ukraine, and Haiti after Civil Resistance



Scholars of democratization have suggested several empirical markers that could be applicable here. These tend to be defined as either the point at which the democratization process is complete or when democratic consolidation has occurred. The most influential of these come from Linz and Stepan, who define democratization as complete when the first election for the executive occurs that is relatively free and fair (Linz & Stepan, 1996, p. 1).²⁷ They then subsequently argue that the process of democratic consolidation is complete when democracy has become “the only game in town” behaviorally, attitudinally, and constitutionally (Linz & Stepan, 1996, p. 5).

²⁷ I am simplifying Linz and Stepan’s definition for the sake of brevity. They also include several caveats related to the *de facto* authority of the elected government, etc... For all of the details on Linz and Stepan’s definition, see Linz and Stepan 1996, p1.

The first of these definitions can be easily empirically applied across a global sample of cases. Any number of different data sources collect information on the occurrence of elections and offer informed opinions on their relative freedom and fairness.²⁸

However, this institutional measure fails to capture the fact that the radically different nature of different transitions gives these formal institutional measures of democratization different significance regarding the underlying question of the establishment of a new political regime. In addition, these measures are democratization-specific, and offer little insight into the mirrored question of how we may measure the end of a transition that concludes in a non-democratic regime.

The measure of the “only game in town” better captures the end of a political transition based on how we have defined a political regime, though it might be a bit too high of a standard to truly be reliable. If a political regime is the set of rules and rule-makers that are reliably expected by other actors to define how values are authoritatively allocated, then one can consider a new regime to be in place when its “game,” while perhaps not the “only” one major actors consider, is at least the predominate game that most actors reliably expect to follow most of the time. This definition would apply, of course, no matter which “game” actors are playing: the “game” of full-fledged democratic politics, authoritarian politics, or some quasi-democratic hybrid of the two. The key thing is that the rules of the game have stabilized into a fairly reliable pattern.

²⁸ Though, as Schedler **Invalid source specified.** points out, the evaluation of “freedom and fairness” is shot through with many challenges as the powerful seek to break various points in the “chain of democratic choice.” Even here consistent cross-national evaluation is difficult.

This is, in my view, the most empirically meaningful way to examine the question of transitional outcomes. We are not strictly interested in the regime type at a fixed moment in time, but instead in the characteristics of the political games that fairly reliably continue into the future.

Previous democratization scholars have used the term “consolidation” to describe this process. While there is some merit in the term, I avoid it because of its inherent fuzziness. How can we reliably know when a democracy is fully “consolidated?” Debates about this question have led some scholars as far as arguing that is either impossible or nearly impossible to specify when a democratic regime has truly “consolidated” (O'Donnell, 1996).

How can we measure these endpoints in a way that is theoretically satisfying and empirically useful? The best way is by measuring the level of democracy not at a fixed number of years subsequent to the beginning of the transition, nor at a specific institutional milestone, but rather when we observe fluctuation in regular measures of the characteristics of the political system declining below some predefined threshold. In doing so we are measuring the characteristics of the political system when they have empirically begun to institutionalize, or to reproduce themselves reliably into the future.

I make no assumption about the indefinite continuation of these institutions, as is implied to some degree by the problematic term “consolidation.” My sole assumption is that by measuring the dependent variable in this way I am capturing a new equilibrium point in the political game. New stimuli may disturb this equilibrium point in the future, but for now I leave

that question to other research and the insights of scholars of democratic consolidation.²⁹ My research question is concerned with the endpoints of civil resistance transitions. I incorporate enough stability in my operationalization of the subsequent regime so as to make the distinction between transition and new regime meaningful, but am agnostic in this project about the ultimate question of the subsequent regime's stability.

Since my dependent variable is democracy, as measured by the polyarchy score, it makes the most sense to measure at the point at which the polyarchy score ceases to dramatically fluctuate. My primary definition of "dramatic" fluctuation is one country-specific standard deviation. This definition allows for some country-specific contingency in what "counts" as meaningful change in the polyarchy score, while still remaining fairly consistent across countries.³⁰ I also run robustness checks defining a "dramatic" fluctuation as a change of either 0.1 or 0.05 in the polyarchy score. Table 2.1 below shows the correlation matrix between these three different measures of transitional endpoints. The three measures are highly correlated, and changing the definition of the transitional endpoint does not significantly affect the analysis that I perform in subsequent sections of this chapter.³¹

²⁹ For example, Svobik **Invalid source specified.** examines the effects of economic factors such as recessions on the likelihood of democratic breakdowns.

³⁰ These standard deviations range from 0.016 to 0.396.

³¹ I report results using the two alternative measures of transitional endpoints in the statistical appendix. I also report statistics on the difference in polyarchy scores at the end of transitions as defined by these different measures. In the large majority of transitions the difference in final polyarchy scores across endpoint definitions is minimal.

Table 2.1: Correlation between Measures of Transitional Endpoints

	Measure 1 (SD)	Measure 2 (0.1)	Measure 3 (0.05)
Measure 1 (SD)	1	0.806891	0.679508
Measure 2 (0.1)	0.806891	1	0.759186
Measure 3 (0.05)	0.679508	0.759186	1

Having operationalized the beginning and ends of transitions, my dependent variable, and the point at which I measure it, the next step is to operationalize my independent and control variables.

Two out of my three independent variables capture latent, underlying dimensions of a political system. Mobilization, for instance, can take any number of different forms. The empirical indications of these different forms can be observed, but not the underlying dimension of mobilization. The same is true of maximalism. I am not arguing that any individual political action significantly shoves CRTs either towards or away from democracy, but instead that an array of empirical political behaviors when considered together constitute a pattern that both constitutes and empirically proxies for an underlying characteristic of the political system.

The holdovers challenge is easier to directly observe. Simply stated, what government policies are put in place against members of the old regime? Are they allowed to continue as members of the political elite or do they face expulsion from public office and possibly prosecution and punishment?

For these reasons, when operationalizing mobilization and maximalism, rather than rely on a single empirical indicator, I use primary factor analysis to capture the underlying dimension of both these phenomena. Factor analysis uses the patterns of covariance between different empirical indicators to describe the underlying dimensionalities that they share.

In the previous chapter I have laid out the kinds of data that would be useful in informing such factors. For mobilization, measures of popular engagement and participation of both institutional and non-institutional forms are the primary indicators. Fortunately some such measures are included in the V-Dem dataset, while others are available from other data sources. I use two variables from V-Dem and one measure from the Phoenix Historical Event Data produced by the Cline Center at the University of Illinois to inform my mobilization factor (Althaus, Bajjalieh, Carter, Peyton, & Shalmon, 2017).

The first indicator measures the degree of popular involvement in civil society activity in a country in a year. The coding of this variable involved asking the expert coders to characterize a country's level of public involvement in civil society on a four point scale ranging from a characterization of "most associations are state-sponsored...participation is not purely voluntary" at one end to "there are many diverse CSOs and it is considered normal for people to be at least occasionally active in one of them" at the other end (Coppedge, et al., 2017, p. 246).

The second measures the degree of public deliberation. As with the above measure, country experts coded this variable based on an ordinal characterization of a country in a year. Codings could range on a six-point scale from values equivalent to "public deliberation is never allowed" to "large numbers of non-elite groups as well as ordinary people tend to discuss major policies among themselves, in the media, in associations or neighborhoods, or in the streets. Grass roots deliberation is common and unconstrained" (Coppedge, et al., 2017, pp. 202-203)

I chose these measures for a few key reasons. First, for validity of inference issues it was crucial to choose indicators from V-Dem that were not part of the aggregation process for creating the polyarchy score, since this would amount to using a variable to predict itself. V-

Dem includes other measures that could plausibly be included in a mobilization factor, but these almost all are included in one of the indices that V-Dem's creators then use to construct the polyarchy score.

Next, these measures specifically capture the actions of the masses of ordinary people, not the political decisions of elites. As described in the previous chapter, the transitional mobilization challenge involves both elite decision-making and popular response to that decision-making. The patterns of behavior that I am arguing are important go far beyond the choices of individual leaders in favor of democracy and speak to wider patterns of action. This is important to show that what I am measuring is not simply a proxy for elite theories of democratization (Higley & Burton, 2006).

These measures also speak to the more positive aspects of nonviolent resistance that Sharp argues for (1973). High scores on these measures give evidence that following a successful nonviolent resistance campaign ordinary people have taken to heart the lessons of the efficacy of nonviolence and become involved in shaping the transition's direction, encouraging greater accountability from leaders.

The two measures from V-Dem capture more institutional forms of mobilization. The measure from Phoenix captures more traditionally-considered nonviolent resistance. It is a sum of the number of "protest" events in a country in a year, according to the CAMEO ontology (Schrodt, Gerner, Yilmaz, & Hermreck, 2008), with adjustments for temporal and geographic

reporting bias.³² This is a broad set of events that includes sub-categories such as “rally or demonstrate,” and “conduct strike or boycott.”

When run through principal factor analysis these three measures combine to create a single factor above the common standard of an eigenvalue greater than one, strongly suggesting that their covariance can be best explained in terms of a single underlying dimension. Table 2.2 below shows the factor loading of the indicators, averaged across the five Amelia imputations. As the table shows, the Phoenix measure loads weakest onto the factor.

Table 2.2: Mobilization Factor Component Loading

Variable	Factor Loading
Public Deliberation	0.791795
Civil Society Participation	0.792332
Protest Events	0.045711

The maximalism factor similarly uses some variables from V-Dem as well as one from the Polity IV dataset to generate its factor score. Two measures relate to elections, as I argued was most useful in the prior chapter. The first measures the degree to which political actors engage in electoral boycotts. This is a four-level ordinal variable that ranges from “no parties or candidates boycotted the elections” to “all opposition parties and candidates boycotted the elections” and is then transformed into a continuous variable using V-Dem’s ordinal interval response theory method (Coppedge, et al., 2017, pp. 96-97). The second measures the degree to which electoral results are accepted, and is also a four-level ordinal variable transformed into a continuous variable through interval response theory methods. The variable’s original values ranged from “no candidates accepted the results of the election” to “all parties and candidates

³² I describe the details of this adjustment process, as well as provide greater detail on the Phoenix Data, in the statistical appendix. I also run robustness checks replacing this data with an annual count of protests and strikes from the Banks Cross-National Time Series, with substantively similar results.

accepted the results” (Coppedge, et al., 2017, p. 107) The third measures the degree to which “anti-system” movements, defined as “any movement – peaceful or armed – that is based in the country (not abroad) and is organized in opposition to the current political system” are present in the political system, and has original values that range from “anti-system movements are practically non-existent” to “there is a very high level of anti-system movement activity, posing a real and present threat to the regime” (Coppedge, et al., 2017, p. 247).

I also include a measure from the Polity IV dataset based off of their “regulation of participation” or *parreg* variable. In Polity’s codebook, this variable is presented as ordinal with five possible levels, capturing a political system’s place along the spectrum of “unregulated” to “regulated.” Regulation of participation can capture any number of diverse aspects of the political system, and is not precisely what I am intending to describe in my maximalism factor. Thus I do not use directly use the Polity variable. However, one level of this variable is intended to capture whether a political system is “sectarian,” that is, according to the Polity IV codebook, a political system where “political demands are characterized by incompatible interests and intransigent posturing among multiple identity groups and oscillate more or less regularly between intense factionalism and government favoritism” (Marshall, Gurr, & Jaggers, 2016, p. 26). This description closely approximates what I am describing with a political system characterized by maximalism, so I created a binary transformation of the *parreg* variable capturing whether a country was considered to be “sectarian” in a year.

As with the mobilization factor, principal factor analysis of these indicators generated only a single factor with an eigenvalue greater than one. Table 2.3 below shows the loading of the indicators.

Table 2.3: Maximalism Factor Component Loading

Variable	Factor Loading
Election Acceptance	0.579966
Electoral Boycotts	0.650137
Anti-System Movements	0.347952
Sectarian Political Participation	0.05568

For the holdovers challenge, since pre-existing data sources did not exactly capture the challenge as I am describing it, I relied on my own more direct coding of the various aspects of the challenge. My first source was the transitional justice database (TJDB) (Olsen, Payne, & Reiter, 2010). The TJDB contains data on transitional justice trials, truth commissions, amnesties, reparations, and lustration policies in 167 countries from 1970 until 2007. The vast majority of the CRTs in my dataset (62 cases) fall into this time frame. If TJDB did not record any of their mechanisms as taking place around the period of the CRT then I coded the case as having no policies against members of the former regime. If TJDB mentioned any one of their transitional justice mechanisms as being present I examined the scholarly literature on the case to determine precise codings of the challenge. If a case was in a country or time period not covered by the TJDB I began the research with scholarly sources on the case. Based on these sources I coded three aspects of the new regime’s treatment of members of the old regime: the severity, scope, and degree of differentiation in punishment. In all three cases I used a four-level ordinal coding, ranging from “none” to “high.” Table 2.4 below shows my coding scheme.

Table 2.4: Index of Lustration Policies

Severity	
None (0)	No policies against members of the old regime
Low (1)	Penalties involve only public shame or temporary loss of political position
Medium (2)	Penalties are severe but not extreme: short prison sentences or political bans
High (3)	Penalties for are extremely costly: extensive prison sentences, death, etc...
Scope	
None (0)	No policies against members of the old regime
Low (1)	Penalties limited to small group of people (less than 100)
Medium (2)	Penalties imposed on several hundred people
High (3)	Penalties extend to large group of people (thousands or more)
Differentiation	
None (0)	No policies against members of the old regime
Low (1)	Penalties carefully imposed only for the most severe violations
Medium (2)	Penalties are imposed fairly broadly, based on cursory investigation
High (3)	Penalties are imposed indiscriminately, based on only tenuous connections

I then combined these individual scores additively into an index that could range from 0 to 9 and empirically ranged across my cases from 0 to 8. As described in the previous chapter, I expect that middling values of this variable would be the most conducive to democratization. Hence I normalized the variable by first subtracting two from the scores above zero so that each interval between values was equal, then subtracting the mean from all values and re-scaling based on the standard deviation. I then include both the index and a squared transformation of the index in my regression models.

Finally, of course, due to the issues of endogeneity I discussed in the previous chapter, it is insufficient to only put these behavioral patterns into a regression model and see whether their relationship with the polyarchy score is significant. I must show that these behavioral patterns are a meaningful addition to the pre-existing structural model of democratization. Therefore, it is important to include structural variables not only to “control” for them but in

order to show the explanatory impact of these variables over and above the explanatory power of the structural model.

The first key aspect of the structural model to consider is modernization. This is the most consistent and influential structural explanation of democratization. Scholars have employed various operationalizations of modernization. The most common has been GDP per capita (Lipset, 1959; Dahl, 1973; Barro, 1999). However, as Teorell (2010, pp. 164-165) has argued, relying on GDP per capita alone is an imperfect proxy for modernization, since the theoretical arguments for modernization's impact on democracy account not only for economic growth but for a larger package of social changes. These include greater urbanization, a move away from subsistence agriculture, and increases in education. However, dropping GDP per capita in favor of a different indicator is also a problematic way of dealing with this problem, since economic growth is an important part of the modernization "package." And including multiple indicators of modernization in a model raises problems of multicollinearity and reductions in degrees of freedom.

Because of these challenges, I follow Teorell's (2010) lead in building a single factor that captures the underlying dimension of modernization through several empirical indicators. I constructed the factor using four different aspects of modernization that have been commonly employed by past scholars: GDP per capita, the infant mortality rate, the degree of urbanization, and the average number of years of education for children older than 15.³³ When run through principal factor analysis, these four measures yield a single factor with an eigenvalue above one.

³³ See the statistical appendix for the sources and coding details of these component variables.

I keep this factor as my measure of modernization. Table 2.5 below contains the factor loadings of the four variables in the final factor, averaged across the five Amelia imputations.

Table 2.5: Modernization Factor

Variable	Factor Loading
GDP per capita (Logged)	0.804074
Urbanization	0.804613
Education	0.864839
Infant Mortality	0.847989

International explanations of democratization are also an influential part of the structural model, hence I seek to account for two important mechanisms: regional diffusion and linkage with the West. I measure regional diffusion using the percentage of democracies in a country's geographic region, as defined by Haber and Menaldo (2011). I measure Western linkage using two different measures, informed by prior studies on this subject. The first is the annual flow of exports and imports for a country from the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and the Euro Area, as measured by the IMF, divided by GDP. The second is the INGO network country score (INCS), developed by Hughes and her co-authors (2009), and later expanded by Paxton and her co-authors (2015).

The INCS is a theoretical innovation built on the common practice of using an absolute count of a country's membership in INGOs (Murdie, 2009; Landman, 2005). This absolute count has become a fairly common way of measuring a country's degree of linkage to the Western-dominated global system. However, as Hughes and her co-authors point out, the absolute count is misleading. Frequency of INGO membership does not act as a country attribute, directly affecting a country's politics. Instead, the global *network* of INGO linkages and a country's position in that network are the key thing that affects a country's actions. Thus, it is

more theoretically satisfying to measure a country's position in this network rather than its absolute number of memberships, since a country's memberships will have different salience depending on where the country falls in the network (Hughes, Peterson, Harrison, & Paxton, 2009, pp. 1716-1719).

Because of this, in constructing the INCS Hughes and her co-authors take the countries common memberships in INGOs to construct a model of the INGO network. They then assign country scores using the Bonacich measure of eigenvector network centrality (Bonacich, 1972). This is a measure not just of a country's connections but how closely they are linked to other highly linked countries.

In their extension of the original INCS scores, Paxton and her co-authors collect this data at roughly five-year intervals from 1950 to 2008 (Paxton, Hughes, & Reith, 2015). I take the scores reported in the INCS and then filled in the missing years using linear interpolation for years between 1950 and 2008 and linear extrapolation for years from 1945-1949 and from 2009-2015.³⁴

Finally, I also control for the level of democracy in the old regime that preceded the CRT. This is important to control for because, as in almost any political phenomenon, the best predictor of the future value is almost always the past value. Past democratic experience has been shown to be a significant predictor of the likelihood of democratization in other research (cite), and therefore is important to consider. I use the average polyarchy score over the five years preceding the transition as my primary operationalization of the past level of democracy.

³⁴ Since these scores change fairly slowly in most cases, I consider this linear imputation process to be the most reasonable method of imputing these missing scores. I also ran robustness checks in which I used the Amelia II program, described below, to impute the missing scores.

Scholars caution against “garbage can” or “kitchen sink” regression models in which every potential confounder is “thrown in” to see what happens (Achen, 2005). Achen suggests that the complexities of truly understanding one’s data necessitates that scholars keep close to a “rule of three,” employing no more than three independent variables in any model (Achen, 2002). Beyond this rule he argues the complexities of basic data analysis become so complex that the findings generated are likely to be spurious and unstable. Yet, of course, in such a complex phenomenon as democratization it is critical to capture as much of the variation as possible, and account for many influential prior explanations. The variables I have selected here capture the most distinctive and influential structural explanations of democratization, and so in my primary tests they are the only control variables that I include. However, in order to show that my results are not spurious to some influential omitted variable I also run many additional models in which additional control variables are included. Table 2.6 includes the full list of potential confounding variables that I include, most of which come theoretically from Teorell’s 2010 study of democratization and empirically from many different data sources. I describe each of these data sources, as well as the specific ways I transform the variables to fit my purposes, in the statistical appendix.

Table 2.6: Control Variable Operationalization and Sources

Primary Controls		
Variable	Operationalization	Data Sources
Modernization	GDP per capita, Infant Mortality, Urbanization, Education	V-Dem
Democratic Neighbors	Percentage of Democracies in Country's Region	Haber and Menaldo (2011)
Western Linkage	Imports and exports to Western countries divided by GDP, INGO network centrality	IMF DoT data, Paxton et al INCS scores
Previous Democracy	Polyarchy score average from five years before transition	V-Dem
Secondary Controls		
Geographic Area	Land area in square kilometers (logged)	Haber and Menaldo (2011)
Inequality	Gini coefficient	World Income Inequality Database
Muslim Population	Percentage of Muslims	Maoz and Henderson (2013)
Oil and Gas Dependence	Annual oil and gas revenue	Haber and Menaldo (2011)
British Colonialism	Binary measure of past British colonialism	ICOW Colonial History Dataset

Establishing causality through observational testing is a difficult task. Absent the strict conditions of experimental science, any finding may be suspect. Even meeting all of the traditional measures of statistical significance, effect size, and model fit are subject to concerns of data validity and massaged results. The single reported highly significant statistical result means little if it is merely the visible tip of an iceberg of negative findings. This is the phenomenon of *p*-hacking, something increasingly recognized as a problem in many different scientific fields (Head, Holman, Lanfear, Kahn, & Jennions, 2015; Ioannidis, 2005). Observational studies are particularly vulnerable to *p*-hacking to it since the population one can examine is more fluid and the parameters for defining independent and dependent variables more dependent on the choices of the researcher.

I address the potential problem of p -hacking by using a several different statistical models to establish the plausibility of my approach, and transparently presenting the results of all of these varied tests. With each attendant positive result it becomes less and less plausible to argue that my findings are the result of p -hacking or statistical artifacts from the data. I am also transparent about statistical tests that do not generate positive results, providing the skeptical reader with the full spectrum of results run from many different kinds of models and with different tweaks on the operationalization of my study population and model variables.

My first set of tests are simple OLS linear regression models. These models measure the effects of maximalism, mobilization, and holdovers during a CRT on the level of democracy at the conclusion of the transition. I run OLS models with a variety of different controls and the different operationalizations of my variables that I have discussed in this chapter.

My second set of tests are logistic regression models. In these models I transform my dependent variable from the linear polyarchy score into a binary score intended to capture a country passing over the “democratic threshold.” To perform this transformation I relied on the traditional quantitative democratic threshold of a polity score of 6 or higher. I ran an OLS model regressing the polity score on the polyarchy score then used the predictions of that model to define a polyarchy score equivalent to a polity score of 6. In the full V-Dem and Polity datasets, this came to roughly a value of 0.624. Thus, I then coded every polyarchy score equal to or above this value as democracies, and all those below it as non-democracies.

These two sets of tests are the core of my analysis as they most directly test the core theoretical set-up of my question: the shape of the regime that comes into power following a

CRT. However, to provide additional support for the general picture that I am painting, I also run an additional set of tests that measures a slightly different but related question.

In this set of tests I run linear and logit models that shift the unit of observation from the country to the country-year on a population of country-years for a ten-year period following the initiation of a CRT. The major benefit of these tests is that the ten-fold increase in sample size implied by shifting to this unit of observation gives me much greater statistical power. However, shifting to country-years also comes with some significant methodological downsides. The most important of these is autocorrelation. Even more so than transitions in the same country, country-years that are part of the same transition and post-transition regime lack independence. And of course, as I described in the previous chapter, testing several years of observations from the new regime begins to get into a slightly different research question related to regime stability rather than regime characteristics at the initiation of a new regime. Nevertheless, despite these weaknesses, I do believe that the country-year models provide some insights, as long as these caveats are appropriately taken into account.

I considered incorporating tests using simultaneous equations to address the concerns over endogeneity in my independent variables, however, after an examination of the econometrics literature I determined that this would not be an appropriate test (Mills & Patterson, 2006; Hausman, 1983). A simultaneous equations model is intended to address a situation in which some of the independent variables are caused by the dependent variable, creating a correlation between the independent variable and the error term of the regression model. In my case, however, I am not dealing with endogeneity in this sense, but rather endogeneity in the sense of my independent variables being part of a larger system of causation

– steps along the way from remote causal variables to a future dependent variable. Thus, the relationship I am modeling is not one of simultaneity but rather mediation, as I discuss in the previous chapter.

To test whether this mediating relationship obtains thus does not involve simultaneous equations but rather tests for mediation. The first set of tests I employ are those suggested by Baron and Kenny (1986) in their seminal article on the topic, and which I discussed in the previous chapter.

I also perform tests using propensity score matching, reporting the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) in my tests of the impact of civil resistance on post-transition democracy. For my tests of the patterns of transitional behavior I use Bia and Mattei's (2008) extension of dose-response function estimation using a generalized propensity score as developed by Hirano and Imbens (2004) since my independent variables are continuous.

Finally, for many of my variables missing data is a major issue. Many of these transitions have occurred in developing countries where data for several of my variables is infrequently collected. This means that, for models that include the full suite of control variables, the number of observations that can be employed drops precipitously, potentially biasing the coefficients. To address this problem, I employ the Amelia II multiple imputation algorithm developed by James Honaker and his co-authors (2011). Amelia II uses the data present in an incomplete time-series cross-sectional dataset and creates multiple "complete" datasets with all of the missing data filled in.³⁵ I then perform tests on each of the imputed datasets and average

³⁵ For an in-depth description of Amelia II's methodology and use in TSCS data, see Honaker and King 2010. For my tests I ran the Amelia II algorithm with country-specific intercepts assumed.

the coefficients, standard errors, and p-values across the different tests. Amelia II is an increasingly common tool employed by social scientists to address missing data problems.

In the next section I describe the data through descriptive statistics for my main independent, dependent, and control variables before moving on to reporting the results of my statistical testing.

Describing The Data and Testing CRTs and Non-CRTs

Table 2.7 contains summary statistics on all of the variables used in the subsequent analysis, including both values in the original dataset and the average values from the imputed datasets after the Amelia procedure.³⁶

As I described above, my population of CRTs begins in 1945 at the end of the Second World War. The first case in the data is the overthrow of Jorge Ubico in Guatemala, while the last cases are the successful Arab Spring revolutions in Egypt, Tunisia, and Yemen in 2011. There is a high degree of temporal and geographic dispersion across cases, with examples of anti-colonial struggles, campaigns against military juntas, single-party regimes, and personalistic tinpot dictators.

³⁶ The Amelia procedure is computationally intensive, particularly when one adds country-specific intercepts and time-dependencies to one's data, as I did. Hence, I was only able to run my core independent, dependent, and control variables through the Amelia process. I did not include the other control variables: the logged geographic area, Muslim percentage of the population, Gini coefficient, British colonialism, and prior military regime, in the Amelia process, hence some data is missing and the total number of observations in models that include these measures is limited.

Table 2.7: Summary Statistics for Original and Amelia Imputed Data

Variable	N	Mean	Std Dev	Min	Max
Polyarchy (Original)	326	0.343301	0.2212	0.023517	0.901669
Polyarchy (Amelia)	328	0.341899	0.221185	0.022356	0.901669
Polarchy Binary (Original)	328	0.137195	0.344579	0	1
Polyarchy Binary (Amelia)	328	0.131098	0.338023	0	1
Mobilization (Original)	329	0.108216	0.715746	-1.85695	1.67953
Mobilization (Amelia)	329	0.108766	0.714546	-1.85695	1.67953
Maximalism (Original)	98	0.142905	0.760559	-1.11934	2.215734
Maximalism (Amelia)	329	0.077375	0.703872	-1.79078	2.36524
Index of Lustration Policies ³⁷	78	0	1	-0.77948	2.762232
Modernization (Original)	240	-0.33919	0.93038	-2.06277	1.864894
Modernization (Amelia)	331	-0.2772	0.857837	-2.38851	1.829107
Trade Linkage (Original)	206	0.0182	0.072832	0	0.598078
Trade Linkage (Amelia)	331	0.028254	0.105009	0	1.500097
Democratic Neighbors (Original)	278	0.196887	0.202052	0	1
Democratic Neighbors (Amelia)	331	0.203807	0.196115	0	1
Prior Level of Democracy (Original)	305	0.229303	0.1313	0.016965	0.681619
Prior Level of Democracy (Amelia)	331	0.231211	0.136478	0	0.727188
INCS Score (Original)	328	0.207968	0.195723	0	0.835663
INCS Score (Amelia)	328	0.207968	0.195723	0	0.835663
Area in Square Kilometers (logged)	331	12.31735	1.64418	5.697093	16.65459
Muslim Percentage of Population	329	0.303588	0.380605	0	1
Gini Coefficient	172	40.75188	10.22475	15.6	68.87
British Colonialism	331	0.241692	0.428757	0	1
Prior Military Regime	331	0.190332	0.393158	0	1

As a shrewd scholar of democratization would expect, the cases cluster temporally and geographically. The majority of cases in the 1950s and 60s are decolonization struggles in Africa. In the 1980s there are a wave of movements in Latin America, and in 1989 the breakdown of the Communist bloc in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union make up the single largest wave of

³⁷ Since I hand-coded this variable for each of the CRTs based on my own original research there was no need to run this variable through the Amelia procedure. These are the summary statistics after centering the variable, as described previously.

cases. There is a second “African wave” in the 1990s, then the handful of “Color Revolutions” in the early 2000s, and finally the Arab Spring in 2011.

As with the phenomenon of large civil resistance campaigns more broadly, there is a marked increase in cases over time. The increase peaks in the 1990s and declines thereafter. As Chenoweth has shown, while the frequency of nonviolent resistance campaigns has continued to increase in the first two decades of the 21st century their success rates have declined from previous peaks (Chenoweth, 2015), so it is unsurprising that we should find a declining number of regime changes following civil resistance campaigns after the year 2000.

By definition, as I have stated above, all of these cases took place in non-democracies. Therefore the peak level of polyarchy prior to the transition is necessarily circumscribed. Taking this into account, the mean level of polyarchy is 0.23, and the median slightly smaller. In other words, the regimes in which civil resistance campaigns are succeeding in sparking regime change are highly undemocratic.

CRTs do have a strong positive effect on the level of democracy in the country. In the year following the end of a CRT the average level of polyarchy jumps to 0.53, a significant increase considering the range of the variable. However, this is a mean level that falls well short of well-functioning democracy, or even a democracy at all. There is also significant variation in these scores, with the standard deviation roughly 0.23. Democratization after civil resistance is clearly phenomenon with a significant degree of variation.

A simple cross-tabulation of mean polyarchy scores at transitional endpoints shows a strong positive effect on the level of polyarchy from a transition being initiated by nonviolent

resistance. In all of the incidents of authoritarian regime failure recorded by Geddes and her co-authors that are not CRTs the average level of polyarchy at the end of the regime transition is 0.28, highly undemocratic, validating the finding that most authoritarian regime breakdowns do not result in democracy but instead result in the establishment of a new non-democratic regime.


Table 2.8: Cross-Tabulation of Transitional Endpoint Polyarchy in CRTs and Non-CRTs

	N	Mean	Std Dev	Min	Max
Polyarchy (Non-CRTs)	250	0.283483	0.183775	0.022356	0.810285
Polyarchy (CRTs)	78	0.529128	0.227945	0.083536	0.901669

Looking at the distribution of polyarchy scores at transitional endpoints both for CRTs and non-CRTs gives us more information to explain this difference in means. As shown in Figure 2.4, in both sets of transitions there is a fair amount of variation. The variation in CRTs is fairly normally distributed, with the modal outcome being a polyarchy score around 0.6, and fairly even numbers of transitions ending either higher or lower than this mid-range value. In terms of the distribution of outcomes, a CRT has a roughly even change of being on either the democratic or non-democratic side at the end of a transition.

In contrast, non-CRTs have an extreme left-skew, with the modal outcome being a polyarchy score of 0.2. The frequency of polyarchy scores drops precipitously from this point, with few cases exceeding the democratic threshold around 0.6 and almost none moving any higher.

Figure 2.4: Distribution of End of Transition Polyarchy Scores in CRTs and non-CRTs.



There are some important differences between the two populations. CRTs have a slightly higher level of modernization and a higher percentage of democratic neighbors. Their level of connection to the West is not significantly different, nor is their past level of democracy. In fact, CRTs tend to occur in slightly less democratic contexts. However, because of these differences it will be important to control for these differences when testing the impact of CRTs on future levels of polyarchy.

First, I test the linear effect of a transition being a CRT on the level of polyarchy at the end of the transition. Table 2.9 below reports the results of this test in Model 1. The indicator of a civil resistance transition is highly significant, with an effect size of roughly 0.17, large considering the limited range of the dependent variable.³⁸ To give some sense of comparison,

³⁸ Because the variable is binomial the marginal effect is equivalent to the beta coefficient.

the effect of having a transition initiated by civil resistance is roughly equivalent to having a country increase the percentage of its democratic neighbors by 96%. Including the CRT measure also increases the model's r squared by roughly 9% over a purely structural model, indicating increased explanatory power.³⁹

Table 2.9: Effects of Civil Resistance on Post-Transition Democracy

	Model 1 OLS	Model 2 OLS	Model 3 Logistic	Model 4 Logistic
Civil Resistance Transition	.17082*** (.02386)		2.2028*** (.47958)	
Modernization	.08080*** (.01486)	.09486*** (.01822)	1.4973*** (.31306)	1.6077*** (.29455)
Democratic Neighbors	.17754*** (.04580)	.19510*** (.05557)	.55276 (.87733)	.66815 (.85527)
Trade Linkage	-.00222 (.03674)	-.03200 (.04999)	1.1303 (.97453)	.54561 (1.1905)
INGO Network Centrality	.01669 (.05833)	.15342* (.06833)	-.02848 (.89497)	1.5979 (.88859)
Previous Polyarchy Level	.47595*** (.08035)	.41672*** (.08564)	4.2547** (1.3874)	2.9237* (1.4375)
Constant	.17431*** (.02980)	.20168*** (.03495)	-4.4709*** (.60959)	-3.6343*** (.54579)
N	325	325	325	325
r^2 /Pseudo r^2	.54690	.46266	.41199	.32344

Robust standard errors, clustered by country, in parentheses


* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Three of the five control variables function as expected. The measures of Western linkage are more inconsistent, with both the trade linkage and INCS scores changing significance and sign across different models.

³⁹ VIF testing shows no problematic multicollinearity between the independent variables. The highest VIF for one of the variables is around 3, well below the standard point of concern at 10. Examination of a residuals against fitted values (RVF) plot shows no visible pattern of heteroskedasticity. I show a representative example of the RVF plot from one Amelia imputation in the statistical appendix.

The graph on the left side of figure 2.5 below plots the marginal effect of civil resistance transitions on the predicted level of democracy with all of the control variables held at their means.

Figure 2.5: Effects of Civil Resistance on Predicted Democracy



The effect of a CRT is also robust to looking at democracy in a binary fashion. Model 3 in table 2.9 reports the coefficients and standard errors from a logit model using my binary transformation of the polyarchy score at the end of a transition. Initiating a transition through civil resistance significantly increases the odds of a country being a democracy at the end of the transition, relative to other kinds of transitions and controlling for the major explanations of democratization. The graph on the right side of Figure 2.5 plots the effects of civil resistance transitions on the predicted likelihood of passing the democratic threshold, as above with all control variables held at their means.

Next, I shift the unit of analysis to the individual country-year following the initiation of a transition. As described above, these results should be interpreted differently than models with transitions as the units of analysis. The country-year unit of analysis almost certainly involves a degree of autocorrelation, and so pooling country-years may lead to suspect results. To partially address issues of autocorrelation, in these tests I include the polyarchy score lagged one year as an independent variable. In these tests my key independent variable is whether a country-year came after the initiation of a civil resistance transition. All of my other independent variables are the same as in Models 1-4, except in this case they are lagged one year, instead of the values at the beginning of the transition. Model 5 in Table 2.10 reports the results of these tests.

Table 2.10: Country-Year Tests of Civil Resistance Impact

	Model 5 OLS	Model 6 OLS	Model 7 Logistic	Model 8 Logistic
Civil Resistance Transition	.00810* (.00403)		.73225* (.33477)	
Modernization	.00319 (.00204)	.00331 (.00207)	-.12079 (.35611)	-.15841 (.34884)
Trade Linkage	.00161 (.01306)	.00084 (.01376)	2.0946 (1.7717)	2.0929 (1.8774)
INGO Network Centrality	.02919*** (.00851)	.03293*** (.00845)	1.6079 (1.0349)	2.2343* (1.0244)
Democratic Neighbors	.02523*** (.00676)	.02408*** (.00661)	-.87474 (.78595)	-.96939 (.76748)
Lagged Polyarchy Score	.94593*** (.00913)	.95224*** (.00716)	31.977*** (4.1470)	32.178*** (3.9316)
Constant	.00765* (.00303)	.00700* (.00293)	-20.392*** (2.5196)	-20.338*** (2.4118)
n	2597	2597	2597	2597
r ² /Pseudo r ²	.94582	.94565	.82380	.82069

Robust standard errors, clustered by country, in parentheses

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

As expected, autocorrelation dominates the results, with by far the greatest degree of variation being explained by the lagged polyarchy score. However, even in this case the variable for a civil resistance transition remains significant, though the effect size is significantly reduced because of the different unit of analysis.⁴⁰


Finally, I use propensity score matching to attempt to control for the potential that the higher rates of democracy in CRTs are being explained by a greater propensity for democracy in the population of CRTs. Matching procedures attempt to capture the causal impact of a particular treatment by compiling a balanced sample where groups are as comparable as possible. After assembling the balanced samples, the researcher can then simply measure the difference between the mean values of the treated and untreated groups, commonly referred to as the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT). I matched transitions using the same set of control variables included in my models above: modernization, trade linkage, INGO network centrality, the percentage of democratic neighbors, and the lagged polyarchy score. I use kernel matching to produce the matched samples.

Far from eliminating the effects of civil resistance on post-transition democracy the matching procedure actually suggests that the OLS models are significantly understating the effect of civil resistance. The ATT of the CRT variable averages roughly 0.23 across the five Amelia imputations, with the lowest value of a 95% bootstrapped confidence interval on the point estimate well above zero. In Figure 2.6 below I show point estimates and confidence

⁴⁰ The results for all of the independent variables are inconsistent in this model. Including a second lagged polyarchy score reduces the significance of the civil resistance transition variable to $p < 0.1$, and including a third lagged polyarchy score makes the coefficient insignificant (though still positive).

intervals for the ATT in each of the five Amelia imputations, as well as in the non-Amelia imputed data (marked on the graph as imputation 0).

Figure 2.6: ATT of Civil Resistance Transitions on Post-Transition Democracy across Amelia Imputations



Testing the Challenges of Civil Resistance Transitions

Next, I move from confirming the general finding in the literature on the superior democratizing effect of civil resistance to testing my specific hypotheses on the three patterns of behavior that I expect will lead to higher levels of democracy at the end of the transition: mobilization, maximalism, and holdovers.


As I describe in Chapter 1, I expect that higher levels of mobilization, lower levels of maximalism, and middling levels of holdovers policy will have two main effects. First, they will move countries closer to Dahl's ideal. The patterns of behavior in response to each challenge will push a country's political system closer or farther away from a political system that is

equally responsive to all of its citizens. In some cases this means that countries will approach close to Dahl's democratic ideal. In others it means that formerly autocratic countries will move into slightly more representative anocratic or partially democratic systems. Yet on average the shifts will be more towards democracy.

Second, a related but distinct effect will be a greater likelihood of moving across Schumpeter's "democratic threshold," moving from a non-democratic to a democratic regime considered in simple binary fashion. For some countries this implies only a minor shift, say in moving from unfair to fair elections. For others it implies large changes in political institutions, moving from highly authoritarian systems to at least minimally democratic ones.

Visual inspection of the data shows the first suggestive support of at least some of these relationships. Figure 2.6 presents a scatterplot of mobilization scores against maximalism scores, with the points distinguished by color on the basis of whether they passed the democratic threshold at the end of the transition. There is a clear pattern, with all of the democracies clustered in the upper left quadrant of the graph, with high mobilization scores and low maximalism scores. The non-democracies are more dispersed, but tend to fall towards the lower right side of the graph, with high maximalism scores and low mobilization scores.

Figure 2.7: Mobilization and Maximalism Scores Separated by EOT Democracy



In Model 9 below, I present my primary test of these relationships. As the model shows, higher scores on the mobilization factor and lower scores on the radicalization factor are highly significant predictors of increased levels of democracy in CRTs. In addition, as can be seen by comparing Model 9, which includes these variables with Model 10, which does not, including these factors significantly increases model fit. In the logistic regression model, the mobilization factor falls just below conventional standards of statistical significance, but its closeness to this standard ($p = 0.050103$) is still highly suggestive, and well below the less strenuous $p < 0.1$ standard of significance.

Table 2.11: Main Tests of Transitional Patterns on EOT Democracy

	Model 9 OLS	Model 10 OLS	Model 11 Logistic	Model 12 Logistic
Mobilization	.14435*** (.02242)		2.2555 (1.1419)	
Maximalism	-.11034*** (.02138)		-3.0250** (1.0928)	
Lustration Index	.02547 (.02415)		.42057 (.79802)	
Lustration Index (Squared)	-.01236 (.01731)		-.18544 (.38592)	
Modernization	.08702*** (.02206)	.16506*** (.02404)	1.8806** (.64926)	1.9695*** (.51772)
Trade Linkage	-.03504 (.13677)	.28123 (.18583)	2.3979 (3.7604)	6.3503 (3.0970)
Democratic Neighbors	.12801 (.08972)	.13194 (.11502)	.83879 (1.7782)	1.0702 (1.4412)
INGO Network Centrality	-.12019 (.08120)	-.08031 (.10362)	-2.6348 (2.2987)	-.02656 (1.3685)
Previous Polyarchy Level	.10419 (.09765)	.15572 (.15376)	1.9569 (3.6602)	1.4111 (3.2517)
Constant	.38526*** (.04074)	.44059*** (.04991)	-3.8988* (1.7311)	-2.1057* (1.0345)
<i>n</i>	78	78	78	78
<i>r</i> ² /Pseudo <i>r</i> ²	.74790	.49902	.58692	.36000

Robust standard errors, clustered by country, in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Figure 2.8 below shows the predicted effects of moving from one end of the mobilization and maximalism factors to the other, with all variables held at their means. Moving from one extreme of the variable to the other predicts sizable differences in polyarchy at the end of transition, for both variables roughly a difference in polyarchy score of 0.4. Considering the polyarchy score only ranges from 0 to 1 this difference is important.

Figure 2.8: Predicted Levels of Democracy across Mobilization and Maximalism Scores





Figure 2.8 shows the same predicted value plot for the ILP. There is some evidence of the curvilinear relationship predicted by the theory, as the predicted values roughly follow this pattern. However, as evidenced by the wide confidence interval, particularly at high values of the variable, the variable lacks significance and so its predictive power is uncertain.

Figure 2.9: Predicted Levels of Democracy across ILP Values



I performed several tests to address the potential of multicollinearity. First, I examined the VIF scores for each of my independent variables. VIFs for all of the variables are well below the standard rule of thumb of a VIF of 10 for problematic multicollinearity. Second, I examined the condition numbers for each model. As with the VIF, the numbers are well below standard rules of thumb for problematic multicollinearity.⁴¹

When multicollinearity is present to a significant degree in a dataset, the effect is an increase in the size of the standard errors, making it more difficult to reject the null hypothesis for any one variable. Hence multicollinearity is much more likely to generate “false negatives” instead of “false positives.” The fact that both of these behavioral pattern variables and

⁴¹ I report these numbers, as well as tests for heteroskedasticity in the residuals of all OLS models in the statistical appendix.

structural variables are, for the most part, significant, suggests multicollinearity is not affecting the results.

The results are also fundamentally similar if run on the unimputed data, though there is some slight variation due to the significant number of observations dropped due to missing data. The coefficients for mobilization and radicalization also remain significant and of a similar size when included in a model including my whole suite of various potential confounders, as well as a version of this model run through a stepwise deletion process. I report the results of all of these alternative models in the statistical appendix.

I run one additional “hard test” to ensure my results are robust. One advantage of Varieties of Democracy dataset is that, in addition to point estimates for each of its indexes it reports low and high values of a 95% confidence interval for each variable. In Table 2.12 below I re-run my primary tests with the values of my dependent variable set at the low end of the confidence interval for the half of the observations predicted to be most democratic and set at the high end of the confidence interval for the lower half of observations. In essence, I am making it significantly less likely I will be able to reject the null by shifting the values of the dependent variable as far away from my expected relationship as is reasonable.

Even having imposed this heavy penalty, the relationship between my key independent variables and the level of polyarchy at the conclusion of the transition remains robust in the OLS models, with both mobilization and maximalism still highly significant and adding to the r^2 of the structural model. In the logistic regression models, imposing this penalty eliminates the significance of both the mobilization and maximalism variables, with p values for both now falling between 0.1 and 0.2. This shows the threshold effect is not as robust as the linear effect

of mobilization and maximalism, however, the extreme difficulty of passing this test gives me confidence this does not fundamentally undermine the other logistic model results. The size and signs of the coefficients remain consistent.

Table 2.12: Hard Test Models

	Model 13 OLS	Model 14 OLS	Model 15 Logistic	Model 16 Logistic
Mobilization	.11685*** (.02459)		.96775 (.70679)	
Maximalism	-.07458** (.02342)		-1.1609 (.67965)	
Lustration Index	.01978 (.02515)		.42387 (.50169)	
Lustration Index (Squared)	-.00808 (.01661)		-.16562 (.30127)	
Modernization	.08896*** (.02361)	.14728*** (.02247)	1.3464* (.55994)	1.7550*** (.49383)
Trade Linkage	-.09111 (.13317)	.15858 (.15780)	4.8412 (3.7985)	7.2277* (3.2078)
Democratic Neighbors	.13098 (.09240)	.13182 (.10507)	2.5512 (1.7204)	2.5246 (1.5125)
INGO Network Centrality	-.15234 (.08461)	-.12389 (.09241)	-2.0978 (1.6047)	-1.0286 (1.3246)
Previous Polyarchy Level	.10191 (.10701)	.14871 (.13438)	2.5357 (2.9959)	1.8317 (3.6074)
Constant	.41235*** (.04190)	.45707*** (.04501)	-3.1450* (1.4619)	-2.6111** (.98370)
<i>n</i>	78	78	78	78
<i>r</i> ² /Pseudo <i>r</i> ²	.64391	.46593	.41848	.33682

Robust standard errors, clustered by country, in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Next, I run country-year models looking at the ten-year period following the end of a CRT. As in my tests of the impact of a CRT relative to a non-CRT I use one-year lagged control variables, and include the one year lagged polyarchy score to control for autocorrelation. The values for mobilization, maximalism, and the ILP are the same as those used in my main models.

As with my first set of country-year models, autocorrelation accounts for the vast majority of variation, with the lagged polyarchy score the most significant and substantial coefficient in every model. However, the mobilization and maximalism variables still play an important explanatory role. In the OLS models, the mobilization variable is the most highly significant predictor behind the lagged polyarchy score. While the maximalism variable does not reach the $p < 0.05$ level of significance, its level of significance is still suggestive ($p = 0.086$). In the logistic regression model the only statistically significant variable is the lagged polyarchy score. However, the mobilization and maximalism variables are the closest to statistical significance of any of the other variables. The maximalism factor's p-value is very close to significance ($p = 0.0576$), while the mobilization variable's p-value is below 0.2.

Table 2.13: Country-Year Tests of Behavioral Pattern Impact

	Model 17 OLS	Model 18 OLS	Model 19 Logistic	Model 20 Logistic
Mobilization	.02723** (.00883)		1.9661 (1.5781)	
Maximalism	-.01382 (.00666)		-2.7663 (1.1872)	
Lustration Index	-.00231 (.00458)		.79625 (.87298)	
Lustration Index (Squared)	.00269 (.00278)		-.61900 (.97896)	
Modernization	-.00436 (.00740)	.00473 (.00492)	-1.0461 (1.0501)	-.32533 (.64391)
Trade Linkage	-.01484 (.01151)	-.01269 (.00985)	4.1408 (5.3829)	7.9179 (6.2716)
INGO Network Centrality	.05086* (.02239)	.02254 (.01247)	3.5594 (3.0590)	1.2995 (1.8059)
Democratic Neighbors	.03001 (.02366)	.00376 (.00927)	1.8487 (3.6936)	1.0633 (1.9391)
Lagged Polyarchy Score	.89740*** (.02459)	.97153*** (.01197)	31.376*** (8.0108)	39.485*** (7.4454)
Constant	.01006 (.01075)	.00950 (.00737)	-21.790*** (4.4292)	-24.764*** (4.4806)
<i>n</i>	426	746	426	746
<i>r</i> ² /Pseudo <i>r</i> ²	.94381	.96071	.86736	.85846


Robust standard errors, clustered by country, in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Finally, I tested a dose-response model with propensity score matching for each of my three independent variables using Hirano and Imbens's procedure for incorporating matching with a continuous treatment (Hirano & Imbens, 2004). As in the more common method of propensity score matching with a binary treatment Hirano and Imbens's procedure adjusts for imbalance in covariates at different levels of the independent variable, producing a generalized propensity score (GPS) which can then attenuate the bias caused by imbalanced covariates. As in the propensity score matching I performed above I generated the GPS using the same set of

control variables incorporated in my main predictive models: modernization, trade linkage, INGO network centrality, the percentage of democratic neighbors, and the pre-transition polyarchy level. Figure 2.9 below shows the predicted values of the polyarchy score based on the dose-response model. As is readily apparent, the predictions are very close to those generated by the OLS models, with some minor perturbation due to imbalance in the covariates at different levels of mobilization and maximalism.

Figure 2.10: Dose-Response Model with Propensity Score Matching



Discussion

In this chapter I have quantitatively tested both the core contention that civil resistance systematically pushes political transitions towards democracy, validating my focus on CRTs, and the impact of my three theorized patterns of political behavior on the levels of democracy at the

conclusion of the political transition, as well as the likelihood of crossing the democratic threshold.

The data strongly support the uniqueness of CRTs when it comes to democratization. As expected, civil resistance at the initiation of a political transition highly biases the transition towards concluding in a democracy, controlling for plausible alternative explanations. This validates the current literature on civil resistance and democratization, providing one of the most rigorous tests of this relationship currently performed. As shown in Model 1, civil resistance initiating a political transition increases a country's polyarchy score at the end of the transition by 0.17, or 17% of the entire range of variation in the polyarchy score. Among democracies in 2016, this difference would be roughly equivalent to the difference between Sweden (0.908) and Senegal (0.726). Among non-democracies in 2016, this is roughly the difference in polyarchy score between Syria (0.148) and Zimbabwe (0.325). Clearly, the effect size is far from trivial.

Civil resistance is not the only factor that significantly affects countries' levels of post-transition democracy. The country's level of modernization, past history of democracy, and democratic neighborhood are all highly significant predictors of its future level of democracy. The measures of Western linkage, both in terms of trade and INGO network centrality, are less robust predictors, significantly predicting democracy in some models but not in others. Yet, while some of these structural factors matter, their predictive accuracy and model fit is improved by adding civil resistance to the picture.

Within the population of civil resistance transitions, there is strong evidence to support the impact of two out of my three theorized patterns of behavior. Both high levels of public

mobilization and low levels of maximalism during the transitional period exert a strong and consistent effect on the level of democracy at the end of the transition, and a slightly less robust but still substantive impact on the likelihood of crossing the democratic threshold. An increase in transitional mobilization of one standard deviation increases the predicted post-transition polyarchy score by roughly 0.1, while a similar increase in maximalism decreases the predicted post-transition polyarchy score by roughly 0.08.

The effects of holdovers policy did not prove to be significant in any of the models, either linearly or curvilinearly. Thus I am unable to reject the null when it comes to lustration. While some effect may be present in specific cases, and the general shape of the data is suggestive of some curvilinear relationship with post-transition democracy, the quantitative evidence is simply not strong enough to show a relationship.

This is not to positively argue holdovers policies are do not exert important effects, or even that there may be some broadly generalizable relationship between holdovers policies and post-transition democracy. Any number of factors may be affecting the reliability of my data when it comes to this variable. In particular, one concern would be the generalizability of the TJDB data to the broader question of holdovers policy. The TJDB is explicitly concerned with events falling into the archetypal categories of transitional justice, and may not include sufficient data on other potential holdovers policies. The years in which I relied on the TJDB the data may suffer from left-skewing. The mean value of the centered ILP index during the TJDB period (1970-2007) is -0.083, while the mean value of the index for cases outside of this period

is 0.297.⁴² Re-coding cases during the TJDB period to take a broader view of holdovers policy into account might yield some fruitful data on this question.

Having performed my quantitative testing and shown the significance of two out of my three patterns of behavior for democratization, I now turn from broad trends and relationships to my specific narratives of cases.

⁴² Difference in means significant at the $p < 0.1$ level in a one-tailed t-test.

Introduction to Case Study Chapters

The Case Selection Process

The three chapters that follow present case studies of political dynamics in transitions following civil resistance movements.

My goal in these chapters is not to perform a strict comparison in order to tease out causal impact but rather to examine the dynamics of my three transitional challenges in particular historical environments. Having shown quantitatively that a correlation exists between at least two of these challenges and post-transition democracy, do we observe that relationship obtaining in actual cases? What are the observable impacts of each particular challenge in specific historical cases? In other words, through the case studies I am not seeking to establish a causal effect but rather to examine a set of causal mechanisms (Gerring, 2004).


In selecting the cases in which to perform this analysis I closely follow Lieberman's (2005) nested analysis research design. Lieberman argues that scholars who apply a single logic of inference to qualitative and quantitative methods of analysis such as King, Keohane and Verba (1994) are not appropriately leveraging the strengths of these distinct research methods. Instead of treating qualitative analysis as statistics with an insufficient number of cases, or quantitative analysis as comparative case study research with insufficient time to examine each case in depth, scholars should instead draw on what each of these approaches can offer to the other.

Lieberman suggests that scholars who wish to engage in this double-leveraging should use the following process: first, perform a large-*n* analysis to examine the robustness of one's theoretical model. If the model proves to be robust, then the scholar then selects a certain number of cases that are well-predicted by the model for intensive case study analysis. The purpose of this analysis is to show that "the start, end, and *intermediate* steps of the model...explain the behavior of real world actors" (Lieberman, 2005, p. 442). If the small-*n* analysis generally confirms the theorized mechanisms then the scholar may conclude their analysis and make a convincing argument that their hypotheses have been supported. If either the large-*n* or small-*n* analysis fails to produce robust results the scholar can return to an earlier step in the process, continuing to do so recursively until they either find satisfactory results or determine that their initial theoretical insight was flawed.

To illustrate this process, in Figure 3.1 I reproduce a simplified version of Figure 1 from Lieberman's article presenting the logic of Nested Analysis.⁴³ Since my large-*n* analysis has produced satisfactory results for at least two of my key independent variables I follow the left-hand path to Model-testing Small-N Analysis (SNA), assessing whether the SNA fits the model, and if not, the reasons for the poor fit.

⁴³ I omit the complete path of Model-Building Small-N Analysis as displayed in Lieberman's original figure since it is less relevant for this discussion.

Figure 3.1: The Nested Analysis Approach (Lieberman, 2005, p. 437)



In addition to the criterion that cases in model-testing small-N analysis be well-predicted by the model, Lieberman also argues that scholars should select cases that show a wide degree of variation in the model's independent variables in order to demonstrate that the model's mechanisms operate in a wide number of different contexts, insofar as such variation can be incorporated with the general costs and benefits of conducting qualitative analysis (Lieberman, 2005, p. 444). For my analysis, this meant selecting cases where mobilization, maximalism, and holdovers policy varied.

In addition to predicting general levels of democracy my theory also offers specific predictions about the character of the political regimes that will follow the particular

constellation of values on my independent variables: “fractious semi-democracy” through high mobilization, high maximalism, and an integrative or lustrated holdovers policy; and “elite semi-democracy” through low mobilization, low maximalism, and a co-opted holdovers policy. If my cases exhibit the characteristics of these regime sub-types then this is strong evidence not just for the general link between the patterns I have described and democracy overall but the specific transitional pathways that I have argued for.

Following a similar logic as Lieberman’s suggestion to select cases with different values of the key independent variables, I also selected cases that varied widely in structural factors that may not be built into my model but would plausibly bound the external validity of my theory. So I was, for instance, careful to select cases that came from different regions of the world, which occurred in different time periods, and which had radically different prior regime types.

This is not an attempt to establish causality through a formal most different case selection research design, as defined in Millian terms, since such an analysis would require similar values on the dependent variable and on a single independent variable (Mill, 1967; Przeworski & Teune, 1970). The external validity of my causal argument comes from the large-*n* analysis performed in the prior chapter. Instead, the logic of choosing cases that differ from one another so radically is to demonstrate that the model’s internal validity is not limited to an easily-identifiable sub-category of cases.

A number of potential cases in my 78 CRTs fit these criteria. I selected three to illustrate three out of the four endpoints described in Chapter 1: The Second People’s Movement in Nepal in 2006 as an example of the path to fractious semi-democracy, the Movement for Multiparty

Democracy in Zambia as an example of the path to elite semi-democracy, and the *Diretas Ja* movement against military rule in Brazil as an example of the path to democracy.

The Qualitative Research Process

In each case I conducted fieldwork in the country in question to serve as the core of my analysis. The fieldwork consisted of interviews with key political decision-makers during both the civil resistance movement that sparked the transition, as well as the transition itself. I also interviewed journalists, academics, and other close observers of the events surrounding the transition. I conducted a total of 128 interviews over roughly three months of fieldwork.

The interviews were semi-structured and roughly an hour in length, with some going as long as two hours and others as brief as thirty minutes. I include the questionnaire that structured the interviews in the appendices. I followed the advice of Leech (2002) and Berry (2002) in how I structured both the interview itself and the overall design of the fieldwork. In the total population of interviewees I sought to cross all of the relevant political and social cleavages so as to triangulate as complete a picture of the dynamics of the transition as possible. For instance, in Nepal I conducted interviews with political leaders from all of the major parties: the Nepali Congress, the Communist Party of Nepal (United Marxist-Leninist) (CPN-UML), the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist Center) CPN-MC, parties representing the Madhesi community from Southern Nepal, and members of the monarchical government under former King Gyanendra.

In the interviews I focused first on building rapport with the interviewees, asking them questions about their background and personal connection to the transitional events. The bulk of the interview consisted largely of so-called grand tour questions in which I invited the

interviewee to give me an overview of what they considered to be the important events of the movement leading up to the transition and the transition itself. I would then typically follow up a grand tour question with a set of fairly informal prompts, picking up on significant aspects of their answer to the grand tour question and asking them to elaborate.⁴⁴ I kept my own direction of the interview to a minimum, allowing the interviewee to offer any comments they thought relevant and appropriate.⁴⁵

In all three cases the events in question remain politically relevant and often controversial, particularly in Nepal, where contemporary politics is deeply shaped by the transitional patterns of behavior I am describing. Thus, in consultation with the Institutional Review Board for the protection of human subjects at the University of Denver, I chose to keep the information presented in the interviews de-linked from the identities of the interviewees. While I do present a list of the names and positions of the people I and my research assistants interviewed in the appendices, I do not connect this list in any way with specific claims and quotes made in the text of the case studies.

For all three cases the first step in my argument is to show that the cases in fact fit the basic values on the variables that I have assigned to them as above. I then give historical context to each case, laying out the historical antecedents to the transitions that I am interested in. I then give a detailed account of the events of the transition itself, process-tracing the steps whereby these countries arrived at their respective regime endpoints. I then conclude each

⁴⁴ In Nepal and Zambia I conducted all of the interviews personally. In Brazil, I hired a team of Brazilian graduate students as research assistants who conducted the interviews on my behalf and translated them from Portuguese to English.

⁴⁵ Some additional sources that informed my interview research methodology were McCracken **Invalid source specified.** and Spradley (1979).

chapter with analysis, evaluating the impact of my proposed pathway argument and considering potential alternative explanations.

Chapter 3: Nepal's Second People's Movement and Fractious Semi-Democracy

In this chapter I outline the dynamics of transition in Nepal beginning from the successful civil resistance campaign of 2006 against the regime of King Gyanendra Shah. I argue that Nepal currently represents a case of fractious semi-democracy. In fractious semi-democracies, the challenges of mobilization and holdovers are resolved more or less successfully. In regards to mobilization, civil resistance continues to characterize a transition and place pressure on new political leaders to implement a fully democratic regime. In regards to holdovers, the middle road of integration punishes some former regime elites for their past abuses and restricts them from participation in the new regime. However, the new government does not pursue a full-fledged purge of old regime elites. Instead, most old regime elites are integrated into the new system. The challenge that fractious semi-democracies fail to resolve is the challenge of maximalism. Instead of moving to normalized democratic politics, new political forces instead use the tools of civil resistance for their own narrow, winner-take-all ends. There is widespread defection from the rules of the game, leading to a failure of democracy to become institutionalized.

Fractious semi-democracy is itself a regime, and can become a long-term equilibrium outcome, particularly if no one political force is strong enough on its own to establish solid control over the political system. However, it is a sub-optimal equilibrium for the public as a


whole. Back and forth battles for political control typically lead to a failure in service delivery, economic development, and other outcome legitimacy aspects of governance. This sub-optimality makes it ultimately an unstable equilibrium. If service delivery and economic growth cannot be delivered, widespread public disillusion with democracy can empower various non-democratic claimants to the throne.

Few close observers would dispute that Nepal's politics since 2006 has been fractious. Nepal's political parties have fought vigorously for control of the center, with agreements made and broken in rapid succession and political alliances shifting rapidly on the basis of short-term political incentives. Since 2006 there have been ten Prime Ministers (as of the date of this writing in mid-2017), none of whose governments have lasted more than two years. Since in the same time period there have only been two elections, in 2008 and 2013, the primary method of turnover has not been electoral. Instead political parties have relied on the nonviolent defection of disruptive civil resistance tactics such as general strikes and road blockades to put pressure to achieve their objectives and destabilize their opponents.

Nepal is also firmly semi-democratic. This status is prominently displayed in respected scholarly indices on democracy. The V-Dem dataset has rated Nepal in the range of 0.3 to 0.6 since 2006, with similar middle range rankings coming from the Polity dataset (Marshall, Gurr, & Jaggers, 2016) and the Unified Democracy Scores (Pemstein, Meserve, & Melton, 2010). Figure 3.2 displays these indices over time graphically.⁴⁶


⁴⁶ All indices re-scaled to 0 to 1 for comparability.

Figure 3.2: Nepal’s Democracy Index Scores



This opinion was widely shared among the political and civil society elites I interviewed during my research. In each interview I asked interviewees to rate Nepal’s current level of democracy, with the options: “completely democratic, mostly democratic, just a little democratic, or not democratic at all.” While respondents answered ranged across this spectrum, the vast majority either chose the “mostly democratic” or “just a little democratic” options. See Figure 3.3 below for the distribution of answers.

Figure 3.3: Perspective on Nepal’s Level of Democracy From Political Elite Interviewees



Typically, interviewees responded to this question by arguing that Nepal's constitution was highly democratic, and the official forms of politics reflected democratic norms, but that this democracy was only "cosmetic" or "formal" in nature and that the substantive functioning of democracy fell well below what one could reasonably describe as democracy.

Nepal's transition largely confirms my theory, but with some important caveats. First, the transition displays a close interaction between the patterns of mobilization and maximalism. While mobilization on an absolute level remained high, as predicted by my theory, the character and shape of this mobilization was influential. While mobilization remained high the mobilization was in large part captured by political parties, while independent civil society groups largely demobilized.

Thus the case certainly confirms the importance of the challenge of mobilization, but suggests that mobilization, to maintain its democratizing pressure, must be matched with a certain degree of autonomy. If mobilization is simply a tool deployed by political elites, then it is unlikely to have a full democratizing effect.

The challenge of holdovers also shows some degree of co-optation. While there was a public commission that made recommendations on punishments for certain particularly harsh abusers of human rights under the monarchy, the recommendations of this commission were never fulfilled. Any move towards transitional justice has also been powerfully resisted by Nepal's new political leaders, in large part because many of Nepal's new political leaders are the same as Nepal's old political leaders. Prominent political figures such as Sher Bahadur Deuba and K.P. Oli were complicit in the king's regime, and likely.

Thus Nepal matches up to my theory in the following way: mobilization (but not independent mobilization), integration (but leaning towards co-optation), and clear maximalism. Nepal is a “fractious semi-democracy,” but with definite elements of the “elite semi-democracy” as well.

The resolution of these strategic challenges did take place during the transition, and was by no means predetermined by Nepal’s political or social structure. Nor was it fully the product of elite consensus or lack of consensus. Instead, the shape of popular mobilization and pressure played a critical role in shaping Nepal’s transition.

In the remainder of this chapter I first give an overview of the major events of Nepal’s transition since 2006. I then discuss and dismiss alternative explanations for Nepal’s current political situation and conclude by reiterating the contribution of my theory.

Background of the “Jana Andolan II”

Certain historical context is central to understanding Nepal’s 2006 transition. The very name of the movement that initiated the transition, the “Jana Andolan II” or “Second People’s Movement,” indicates that this movement did not arise in a vacuum, absent a tradition of civil resistance and popular mobilization. The 2006 Second People’s Movement was a direct descendant of Nepal’s “First People’s Movement” in 1990, itself a direct descendant of an even earlier popular mobilization in the 1940s and early 1950s for democratic rights.

Nepal’s modern politics, commonly marked by my interviewees as beginning with the end of the oligarchic Rana Regime in 1951, was characterized by a series of back and forth struggles between Nepal’s traditional monarchy and a series of emergent political forces: initially the Nepali Congress Party, then the Communist movement, and finally the Maoist

revolutionaries of the 1990s. Brief periods of democratic breakthrough in the 1950s and 1990s were rapidly undermined by the resurgent power of a monarchy unwilling to limit itself to a mere ceremonial role and, in the latter case, by the outbreak of civil war.

The second democratic breakthrough, in 1990, critically shaped the events of 2006 and thus deserves some closer scrutiny. The Nepali Congress, Nepal's traditional democratic party, had attempted violent uprisings against the monarchy several times in the 1970s and 1980s, but had failed to successfully undermine the monarchy. In 1990 they attempted a different strategic path, joining forces with Nepal's Communist movement in a nonviolent struggle, commonly referred to in Nepal as a "Jana Andolan," or people's movement. The mass mobilization of this movement successfully pressured King Birendra Shah to end the system of direct monarchical rule, known as the *Panchayat* system, and allow the writing of a new constitution that would reduce his role to that of a ceremonial monarch.

Opinions on the new regime initiated in 1990 vary within Nepal's political elites. Many of them, particularly members of the Nepali Congress, are quite positive about this period of Nepal's history. While inequality and other social and economic problems were prominent, they argue that the country was fundamentally on a positive, pro-democratic path, and, had it been given sufficient time, would have fully democratized. Critics, particularly those from the far left, argue that the regime was fundamentally flawed from the beginning. Maintaining the monarch in a central position and constitutionally enshrining Nepal's identity as a unitary Hindu state meant that the government could never be fully democratic but would always be shot through with degrees of feudalism. Economic, regional, and ethnic inequality remained major issues that democracy left unresolved, and corruption at the center was pervasive.

Nepal is an ethnically diverse country. The 2011 government census reported 125 different caste and ethnic identity groups (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2014).⁴⁷ At the most aggregated level, most political elites I spoke to divide Nepal into three major identity groups: hill-based Brahmin-Chettris, Madheshis, and Indigenous groups (also referred to as Adivasi or Janajati groups), each of which accounts for roughly a third of Nepal's population.⁴⁸ Of these three groups, the Brahmin-Chettri have dominated Nepal's politics and society for almost all its history. This has been the case both for periods of domination by the monarchy and during periods of ostensible democracy. The *Panchayat* system of 1960-1990 was dominated by Chettris, while the 1990 democratic system was dominated by Brahmins.

Until 2006, Brahmin-Chettri dominance took place under a backdrop of an ostensible single Nepali identity.⁴⁹ First the monarch and then the democratic system strongly argued that Nepal was as much a single ethnic unit as a political unit, and discouraged or persecuted the use of languages and customs other than those of the Brahmin-Chettri elite.

⁴⁷ Even this number may dramatically understate the number of identity groups in Nepal. Nepal's Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) reported that actual responses to the 2011 census question on ethnic/caste identity amounted to over 1,200 distinct identity groups. The CBS then parsed these actual responses down into 125 categories. Their report does not specify the methodology used to make these determinations (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2014, pp. 1-2)

⁴⁸ Brahmins and Chhetris are the highest caste groups in the traditional caste hierarchy of Nepal. The term "Madheshi" encompasses a diverse group of ethnic and linguistic groups that are native to Nepal's southern plains. This region is commonly referred to as "Madhesh," a term meaning "Middle Country" and also as "The Tarai," a term which is roughly equivalent to "plains" or "lowlands" in English. The Nepalese Central Bureau of Statistics makes these divisions somewhat differently, splitting the Nepalese population into nine categories: "(1) The caste-origin Hill groups, (2) Hill Adivasi/Janajati groups, (3) Hill Dalit, (4) Madhesi caste-origin groups (Level 1), (5) Madhesi caste origin groups (Level 2), (6) Madhesi caste-origin low caste groups or Dalits (Level 3), (7) Tarai (Madhesi) Adivasi/Janajati, (8) Musalman or Muslims, and (9) other cultural groups" (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2014, p. 3)

⁴⁹ Terminology can be somewhat confusing when it comes to distinguishing the Nepali ethnolinguistic identity and the national identity of citizens of Nepal. I follow the convention common in Nepal of using "Nepali" to refer to members of the ethnolinguistic group that speaks the language commonly referred to as "Nepali," "Gorkha," or "Khaskura" and the term "Nepalese" to refer to a citizen of the country of Nepal of no particular ethnolinguistic identity group.


In part it was this domination by the Brahmin-Chettri elite which inspired certain factions of Nepal's far left, led by the ideologues Mohan Vaidya, Baburam Bhattarai, and Pushpa Kamal Dahal (or Prachanda, as he later became known), to issue a list of 40 demands to the Nepalese government in February 1996. The demands were far more than even a sympathetic government could have granted, and thus soon afterwards the leftists left Kathmandu to begin a Maoist-style insurrection against the government, initiating Nepal's ten-year civil war.

For five years of war Nepal remained a fairly robust, though flawed democracy. However, in 2001 and early 2002 a series of events led to the unraveling of Nepal's democracy and the establishment of a quasi and then full-fledged dictatorship under Nepal's monarch. The process began with the assassination under mysterious circumstances of King Birendra, along with much of the royal family, in 2001. One of the few surviving royals, the King's brother Gyanendra, ascended to the throne promising to take a harder line against the Maoists and expressing skepticism over his brother's openness to democratic reform.

In 2002 the democratically elected parliament was dissolved, and the King began appointing Prime Ministers. Meanwhile he rapidly increased the intensity of the conflict against the Maoists, leading to a spike in casualties as the two sides clashed with increasing violence. See Figure 3.4 for a breakdown of the casualties of the conflict over time.⁵⁰

⁵⁰ Figure reproduced from Do and Iyer 2010 using casualty data collected by the Informal Sector Service Center (INSEC) www.insec.org.

Figure 3.4: Casualties in Nepal's Civil War, 1996-2006 (Do & Iyer, 2010, p. 737)



The quasi-democratic elements of this monarchical regime came to an end in February 2005 when the king dismissed the final prime minister and began ruling by decree, arguing that such direct rule was necessary to bring an end to the conflict with the Maoists.

The king's coup in 2005 echoed the actions of his father, King Mahendra, in 1960. However, as many interviewees observed, the situation was no longer amenable to such interference. The king's move was deeply unpopular and served as a major mobilizational moment. The political parties, particularly the Nepali Congress, had been leading protests and other civil resistance actions against the monarchy for some time. Yet their campaign had remained quite limited in size, dominated almost entirely by long-time party cadres. The public at large was deeply skeptical of the political parties' leadership, with many viewing them as corrupt and ineffective. However, when the king assumed direct power in 2005, no longer even maintaining an appearance of democratic rule, opposition spread rapidly throughout society. In particular, a widely-respected community of civil society and human rights activists began to condemn the king's move and take action against it.

One of the largest civil society groups to mobilize against the king was the Citizens' Movement for Democracy and Peace (CMDP). Led by former civil servant Devendra Raj Pandey and human rights activist Krishna Pahadi, the CMDP began organizing civil disobedience actions against the king's curfews and other restrictions on civil liberties. Even their initial events were met with a massive mobilization response, as ordinary Nepalese citizens joined forces with these activists. The activists lent their support to the struggling political parties, inviting political leaders to attend their events and hear what the people had to say.

A second critical impact of the king's coup in 2005 was to firmly push together the mainstream political parties and the Maoist rebels. The major political parties, joined under the mantle of the Seven-Party Alliance (SPA), wanted the Maoists' support in Nepal's rural districts to bring pressure against the king. The Maoists, on the other hand, had reached a clear point of military stalemate with the Royal Nepalese Army (RNA). The RNA was unable to dislodge the Maoists from their rural strongholds but the Maoists lacked the manpower and equipment to directly engage the RNA. Thus for several years Maoist leaders had opened negotiations, both with the palace and the political parties, to seek some form of political settlement. The King's coup eliminated the possibility of a Maoist accommodation with the palace and instead drove the Maoists and the SPA into each other's arms.

The two sides reached an agreement in November of 2005, the so-called Twelve Point Agreement, signed in Delhi under the watchful and approving eye of the Indian government. Under the agreement, both sides acknowledged the monarchy as the primary obstacle to Nepal's political development and agreed to work together to eliminate it. The Maoists agreed to give up arms and to accept the principle of multi-party democracy. The SPA, which had previously been fighting simply for the restoration of the previous democratically-elected

parliament and wanted to maintain a system of constitutional monarchy, agreed to the Maoists' core demand for a constituent assembly that would move Nepal away from monarchy and towards a Republican system.

With the Maoists, the political parties, and civil society all in alignment against the king, Gyanendra found himself with few allies. Mobilization swelled through late 2005 and early 2006, peaking in April 2006, when a general strike in the Kathmandu valley planned by the political parties achieved a success wilder than even the most optimistic political leaders had anticipated. Millions of residents of Kathmandu created a miles-long procession around Kathmandu's ring road, shutting down the city. Meanwhile, throughout the country Maoist cadres blockaded roads and shut down district administration centers.

At the last gasp, the King ordered the army to suppress the protests with deadly force. However, the army refused to obey the order, arguing that the size of the protests would prevent them from doing so. Fearing an imminent popular assault on the palace itself, Gyanendra agreed to give over power to the former parliament, and left the palace on April 24, 2006.

From “Jana Andolan” to Fractious Semi-Democracy

In this section I trace ten years of the development of Nepal's current political regime, beginning from the king's removal from power in 2006 and concluding in late 2016 with the political struggle over amending Nepal's new constitution. I structure my narrative roughly chronologically, but focus on my three key challenges of mobilization, maximalism, and holdovers.

Contestation between major political forces was intense from the transition's beginning. Indeed, the major parties participating in the Jana Andolan were in disagreement over whether the king's restoration of the old parliament was in fact the victory they had been hoping for. The Maoists, whose mobilizational potential played a critical role in the movement's success, wanted a more direct and immediate push for a constituent assembly, rather than the restoration of one of the institutions they had waged their initial struggle against.

Several of my interviewees critiqued the *ad hoc* or even anti-democratic nature of the new regime under Prime Minister G.P. Koirala. The parliament that Koirala headed up had been elected in 1999 with a maximum five year mandate, long expired by April of 2006. Its leading members were the same Kathmandu elites who had been deeply critiqued for corruption and lack of effective service delivery in the 1990s. Could putting this same group of people in power truly be the outcome of such a massive popular uprising?

The long-term goals of the movement itself had been somewhat unclear, as many of my interviewees reported. Ordinary people wanted the restoration of freedom and peace with the Maoists. This simple two-point agenda was the common rallying cry. However, political elites interpreted the movement as legitimating their own particular goals of restructuring the Nepalese state. In particular, leaders in the Maoist movement saw the Jana Andolan as a powerful legitimation of their long-term goals of a Communist People's Democracy. Leaders of Madheshi and other minority groups saw the mandate of the movement as ending discrimination against their people and the political dominance of hill-based Brahmin-Chettris. And the old-time democrats of the Nepali Congress saw it as legitimating their own vision of representative multi-party democracy with themselves in a privileged position.

These divergent visions were bound to conflict. Yet the modality of their conflict was by no means predetermined. Instead early crucial actions initiated a repeating pattern of radicalized, winner-take-all conflict based on short-term political expediency rather than long-term national interest. As several interviewees reported, the restoration of the parliament, and particularly the introduction of Maoists as parliamentarians, despite their never having been elected, were prominent examples. Developing rule of law or even consistent rules of the political game was downplayed in favor of a focus on accommodating the interests of the *de facto* politically powerful.

Mobilization by civil society also began to suffer early on in the transition. Initially, the leaders of the CMDP, one of the most powerful forces behind the Jana Andolan, had intended to keep their movement in existence, arguing that it was necessary to keep the political parties accountable. Yet declining numbers, fractures over policy disagreements, and departures from the movement to join political parties led to the decline of CMDP's independent voice.

One demand of the movement had been accountability for the king and others who had been complicit in the abuses of the period of direct monarchical rule, particularly violence towards the peaceful protesters of the Jana Andolan II. There were moves early on in the transition to address this problem, and a commission was formed under the guidance of respected elder Judge Krishna Jung Rayamajhi. The commission made several recommendations for prosecution of those figures from the old government who were particularly complicit in human rights abuses. However, the interim government refused to take up the recommendations of the Rayamahji Commission, and to date no government has made the commission's recommendations public.

Since the recommendations have not been made public, most of my interviewees could only speculate about the reasons why the commission's report was so completely disregarded. However, nearly all were in consensus that the report implicated figures who remained integral to Nepal's contemporary political environment. Nearly all of the major figures of Nepal's democratic movement, including the current Prime Minister and head of the Nepali Congress, Sher Bahadur Deuba, had served in the increasingly authoritarian regime of King Gyanendra. Had prosecutions begun, the Nepalese political elite were concerned about where they might end.

In addition to the Rayamajhi Commission, whose work was actually completed, the political parties had made several commitments in their various agreements to investigate the abuses of the past. The twelfth point of the 2005 12-point agreement was a commitment by the SPA and the Maoists to investigate any "inappropriate conduct...among the parties in the past," and "take action over the guilty one" (Nepal Ministry of Peace and Reconciliation, 2005, p. 5). More specifically, the later Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the Maoists and the government of Nepal committed Nepal's political parties to establishing a Truth and Reconciliation Commission and Commission to Investigate Disappearances. Yet multiple governments delayed the creation of both of these commissions throughout the transition and today, despite the fact that they have finally been created, they have remained understaffed and have in large part failed to hold conflict parties accountable (Jeffery, 2017).

Civil society figures I interviewed condemned this failure of accountability and environment of impunity. Criticism in Nepal's media has also been extensive.⁵¹ Yet no non-partisan mobilization against the continued political role of old regime figures or for

⁵¹ See for example: Bandi 2017, Bhandari 2016, Kapur 2017, Himalayan Times 2017.

prosecutions of severe human rights abuses of sufficient size and scope to change the political incentives against impunity has been forthcoming.

The landmark achievement of the first year of the transition was undoubtedly the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, or CPA, signed by Interim Prime Minister G.P. Koirala and Maoist Leader Pushpa Kamal Dahal. This agreement formally ended Nepal's civil war and incorporated the Maoists into the interim parliament. It also marked the achievement of the second of the Jana Andolan's key goals: a formal end to Nepal's ten-year civil war.

The agreement is lofty in its rhetoric and aspirations. Beyond its direct provisions for ending violence against one another, it also obligates its parties, among many other things, to restructure the state to end caste, ethnic, language, cultural, religious, and regional discrimination (Article 3.5), implement "scientific" land reform (Article 3.7), and make Nepal "advanced and economically prosperous in a just manner within a short span of time" (Article 3.12).

Regarding the actual provisions related to conflict, the agreement sets up the cantonment system for housing and providing for the Maoist ex-combatants, with UN monitoring of weapons storage, and commits both sides to refraining from an extensive list of conflict-related activities. These include, of course, direct military activities such as "setting up ambush" (Article 5.1.1e) and "Aerial attacks or bombings" (Article 5.1.1h), but range beyond these to encompass "acts rendering...mental pressure on any individuals" (Article 5.1.1c).

The agreement's lofty goals may have doomed it from the start, but regardless of whether one makes such a deterministic claim, that the agreement was almost immediately broken is without doubt. In particular, while their People's Liberation Army moved into the

cantonments, the Maoists moved quickly to establish an alternative quasi-military wing through its youth organization, the Young Communist League (YCL). The YCL quickly became the enforcers of Maoist control in their traditional rural strongholds.

The growth of the YCL reinforced the conception for the mainstream political parties that the Maoists' move to accept multi-party politics was purely tactical, and that if given the chance they would still attempt to capture the state and use the organs of state power to establish a single-party dictatorship. These fears came even more to the fore after the first constituent assembly elections were held and the Maoists emerged as the largest party.

So, from its beginning the Nepalese transition was characterized by a number of practices that would stymie Nepal's democratic development: a demobilized civil society despite its important role in the 2006 Jana Andolan, a lack of trust and confrontational, winner-take-all politics from the political parties, and impunity for those from the king's dictatorship (and the Maoist rebellion) who were accused of severe human rights abuses.

Into this context came a second earthquake in Nepalese politics: the Madheshi movement of 2007.⁵² Madheshi activists, long a peripheral force in Nepalese politics, had played a prominent role in the 2006 people's movement. As many of my Madheshi interviewees reported, the goals of ending discrimination against and political disempowerment of Madheshis were by no means separate or distinct from the 2006 movement. Indeed, it was the hope of a "New Nepal" free of regional discrimination that had been a central force in mobilizing Madheshis to participate.

⁵² For an excellent overview of the background and dynamics of the 2007 Madheshi Movement, see Hachchethu 2007.

The view was not accidental. As a mobilizing tactic, the ten-year Maoist rebellion had long since abandoned a purely abstract Marxist vision of class struggle and instead argued that in the Nepalese context a People's Republic would require empowerment of Nepal's oppressed ethnic and caste groups, including the Madheshis. Many prominent Madheshi political figures, including future Madheshi movement leader Upendra Yadav, joined the Maoist rebellion for these reasons. Thus, when the Maoists joined forces with the political parties in the 2006 movement, Madheshi figures considered it natural that their own demands for greater political empowerment, particularly federalism, would be met.

However, major political parties, particularly the Nepali Congress, resisted any moves towards federalism. Thus, in the interim constitution, federalism made no appearance whatsoever, and the electoral system failed to meet Madheshi demands for greater representation. When the government released the interim constitution, making the abandonment of federalism clear, widespread protests broke out across the Tarai region.

Madheshi activists and politicians are quick to point to this movement as a direct and logical consequence of the 2006 movement. They point to the 2006 movement as focused on achieving democracy that for the first time would truly represent the interests of all Nepalese, not just the *pahadi* elites.⁵³ The ouster of the king – perhaps the ultimate symbol of hilly high-caste domination – was only a step along the road, not the ultimate goal. Thus, the interim constitution, from their perspective, was a step backwards, a setback for the goals of the movement that had brought millions of Nepalese citizens to the streets.

⁵³ Pahadi is a Nepali term that literally translates as “hilly person,” and is commonly used in Nepal to refer to people whose ethnic background is from the Himalayan foothills.

Mobilization of the movement was rapidly accelerated by a heavy-handed response to the initial protests by the government and *pahadi* residents of the Tarai. In particular, on the 16th of January, 2007, supporters of the Madheshi social and political pressure group the Madheshi Jana Adhikar Forum (MJF) clashed with a group of Maoist cadres in the town of Lahan. The clashes led to the death of a young Madheshi activist named Ramesh Kumar Mahato. Mahato's killing sparked a wave of popular resentment across the Tarai region and mobilization in the Madheshi movement exploded.

The Madheshi movement, like the 2006 movement itself, is a powerful example of the influence of ordinary people trumping the intentions of elites. The 2007 Madhesh movement was not planned. Upendra Yadav and the MJF, along with some radical militant groups, had held small actions against the interim constitution, but they themselves were caught by surprise by the sudden wave of popular support for the cause of federalism and Madheshi empowerment that swept across their region. Protests and strikes were widespread, and, perhaps most importantly for the role of the Madheshis in the remainder of the transition, the Madheshi movement succeeded in shutting down the supply routes from India to Kathmandu.

The geography of Nepal, a landlocked country with the world's highest mountain range on its northern border, gives Madhesh this natural advantage over the rest of the country. Nepalese society is almost entirely dependent on critical imports from India, particularly for fuel but also for basic foodstuffs.⁵⁴ And every single one of the routes for these critical imports to reach the power center of Nepal in the Kathmandu valley runs through Madhesh. When mobilized the Madheshis have the capacity to starve the Nepalese political elite into submission.

⁵⁴ India is Nepal's largest trading partner by far, accounting for over 60% of both Nepal's imports and exports in 2015, and a trade deficit between the two countries of roughly 3.6 billion dollars (World Integrated Trade Solution, 2017).

This vulnerability has created no little resentment against the Madheshis on the part of those same Kathmandu elites. Few incidents during the transition evoked more heated emotion from my interviewees than the Madheshi (and later Indian) blockades of the road and rail lines from India to the hilly and mountainous regions of Nepal. One interviewee in particular spoke alternately wistfully and defiantly about plans for a coming Chinese rail line to Kathmandu, Pokhara, and Lumpini that would allow Nepal to import basic commodities from China and bypass India and Madhesh entirely.

Despite its negative emotional resonance the tactic was effective. The Nepalese government engaged in a gradual set of concessions, with interim Prime Minister G.P. Koirala promising federalism in a speech at the end of January, the interim parliament amending the interim constitution to promise federalism in April, and a series of agreements later in the year between *pahadi* elites and Madheshi leaders later in the year cementing these moves.

The Madheshi movement catapulted a new set of elites into public prominence, most importantly MJF leader Upendra Yadav. Thus when Nepal finally held its twice-delayed elections to the constituent assembly, tasked with writing a new constitution, Madheshi parties had an unexpectedly strong showing, capturing 45 out of a total of 601 seats.

While Madheshi gains were a major surprise in the election, the biggest shock was the overwhelming victory of the Maoists. NC and UML political figures had comfortably assumed they would resume their pre-transition position as the first and second parties in Nepalese politics, with the Maoists a comfortable distance behind. In contrast, CPN (Maoist) had a commanding electoral victory across the country, capturing 220 out of the 601 seats and

becoming the largest party in the interim legislature – larger than the Nepali Congress and the CPN-UML combined.

To what can we attribute the Maoists' surprising victory? Scholars and my interviewees had different interpretations of this electoral outcome. Maoists viewed the election of 2008 as a vindication of their long struggle in the jungle and in the streets in 2006. They argued that the people had clearly shown their preference for the Maoist agenda of federalism, greater ethnic representation, and dismantling of the traditional structures of Nepalese politics, with the ultimate goal – sometimes stated, sometimes left unstated – of a one-party Communist state. On the negative side, members of other political parties and independent civil society observers pointed to widespread voter intimidation and fraud in many parts of the country. While the PLA ostensibly remained in its cantonments, not threatening its former supporters or victims, the YCL was out in full force.

Other parties also engaged in election-related violence, with the heaviest clashes taking place between Nepali Congress and CPN-UML cadres in the Dhading district west of Kathmandu. The general pattern was one of tit-for-tat violence, with no individual political party solely responsible for the violence.⁵⁵ In addition, many more radical Madheshi groups rejected the election outright, and attempted to depress voter turnout and delegitimize the electoral process through both violent and nonviolent intimidation. Some groups attempted to enforce *bandhs* (general strikes) in various Tarai districts, while others detonated small improvised explosive devices (IEDs) (Cooper, 2008).

⁵⁵ For more detail on the election violence and the general dynamics of the 2008 election see International Crisis Group 2008.

The truth behind the Maoists' victory is likely somewhere in the middle between genuine support for the Maoists and intimidation by the growing force of the YCL. International election observers judged that the election was free and fair, and while some instances of intimidation did occur, they were not crucial to the outcome.⁵⁶ Many of my interviewees argued that most Nepalese voters were interested not so much in the particular platform the Maoists espoused, but simply in the possibility for change. The country wanted to see fresh faces in Kathmandu, and CPN (Maoist) seemed to be the easiest way to get them.

Whatever the reasons, the Maoists' victory in 2008, followed soon thereafter by the accession of Maoist leader and former guerrilla near-legend Prachanda to the Prime Ministership of Nepal sent a shockwave through Nepalese politics, and heightened the fear and uncertainty on the part of the traditional democratic parties that the Maoists would take advantage of their electoral advantage to seize the state and ultimately unravel the democratic system.

Before moving on to the (first) Prachanda government, though, it bears mentioning that the election of the constituent assembly was, on its own, a historic achievement, and in many ways marked the final culmination not just of the 2006 movement but of Nepal's long democratic tradition since the early 20th century. The demand for a constituent assembly to write a people's constitution for Nepal had been first articulated by the Nepali Congress in its armed uprising against the Rana regime in the 1940s. King Tribhuvan had promised to meet the demand, but the promise remained unfulfilled when his son Mahendra ended Nepal's first democratic regime and instituted the *Panchayat* system. The 1990 movement against the

⁵⁶ See reports by the Carter Center (2008), which deployed 62 election observers, and the Asian Network for Free Elections (ANFREL), which deployed over 100 election observers (Cooper, 2008).

monarchy had made great strides, but had given up the idea of a constituent assembly in exchange for concessions from the monarchy, establishing the constitutional monarchical system of the 1990s. The Maoist rebellion, in turn, had made the demand for a constituent assembly a central plank of their long armed struggle. Now, finally, the Nepalese people would have their own elected representatives determining their future political institutions.

The first action by the constituent assembly was equally historic, as they voted almost unanimously to formally abolish Nepal's monarchy, which had technically only been suspended since King Gyanendra bowed to the second people's movement two years before, and make Nepal a republic. They also voted to eliminate Hinduism as the state religion and instead make Nepal formally a secular state.

These are historic achievements, representing fundamental change of a type and degree rarely seen even in the course of democratic transitions. Many questioned them at the time, and many do still today. Public polling in the months leading up to the 2008 election found that 49 percent of Nepal's population still supported at least some role for the monarchy at the time, and even more (59%) supported the idea of a Hindu state (Sharma & Sen, 2008, p. v). The vote to eliminate the monarchy was also wreathed in controversy and intrigue, as a vote meant to take place immediately upon the opening of the first session was delayed and delayed until a late hour of the evening. Several interviewees sympathetic to the monarchy pointed to these dynamics as evidence of underhandedness on the part of political leaders attempting to push through major changes they knew were not the will of the Nepalese people.

With the monarchy abolished and Hinduism no longer in its pride of place as the official state religion (though still in a place of great privilege – the president now presides over formal

Hindu ceremonies), the constituent assembly set about its work of writing a new constitution, while the former rebels of the CPN (Maoist) for the first time moved into the formal government offices in Singha Durbar in downtown Kathmandu. The fears of many of Nepal's conservative elites had come to pass.

A number of moves by Prachanda over the next year did nothing to assuage those fears. Interviewees pointed to a number of incidents, beginning with attempts to remove the South Indian Hindu priests at Pashupatinath Temple, the center of Nepalese Hinduism. A number of other actions, including the systematic installation of Maoist cadres in the civil service and other government positions, continually solidified the impression in the minds of the other parties that Prachanda was attempting to build an unassailable political position from which CPN (M) could never be dislodged.

The final straw in this series of actions came in 2009 when Prachanda attempted to dismiss the Chief of Army Staff General Rookmangud Katawal. Maoist interviewees painted this move in non-threatening terms, arguing that it would have been taken by any political leader in Prachanda's situation, facing a figure like Katawal. Katawal had been a long-time royalist. Under a well-known pseudonym Katawal had written a number of public op-eds during the civil war period calling for "enlightened despotism," and though he swore allegiance to Nepal's new democratic regime after being elevated to Chief of Army Staff (CoAS) by Prime Minister Koirala in the months following the Second People's Movement, his core sympathies were widely believed to be with the palace. In his later career he had played a key role in the RNA entering the war against the Maoists, during which time soldiers under his command had been accused of severe human rights abuses. He also faced inquiries over potential abuses by troops under his command during the Second People's Movement in 2006.

Most prominent in Prachanda's desire to remove Katawal, however, was that Katawal had become a highly prominent critic of the Maoist government. When forced to follow orders from his Maoist arch-enemies, Katawal had resisted, fighting back against, among other things, the integration of Maoist cadres into the army, the retirement of several army generals, and a freeze on recruiting new non-Maoist soldiers (Adhikari, 2014). Prachanda thus attempted in May of 2009 to get Katawal to step down by offering him an ambassadorship. When Katawal refused, the Prime Minister fired him.

For Nepal's political establishment, as well as the Army itself, this was an unacceptable action. The Nepalese Army was widely seen as the one functioning institution unable to be co-opted by the Maoists. With Katawal out, Nepal's political parties feared that a full-scale Maoist takeover of the state would soon follow.

Katawal refused to step down, and, in a continuation of the pattern of following short-term political incentives rather than the formal rule of law, Nepal's president, Ram Baran Yadav, a member of the Congress party and a strong opponent of the Maoists, successfully kept him in place. The abrogation of the Prime Minister's authority was too much for Prachanda to take and he resigned shortly afterwards. Intense jockeying for power followed, ultimately resulting in the establishment of a new government under UML Prime Minister Madhav Kumar Nepal.

The Maoists, excluded from government despite their continued position as by far the largest party in parliament, refused to go quietly, and in May of 2010 they attempted a full-scale nonviolent defection. Bringing tens of thousands of supporters from around the country to Kathmandu they attempted to replicate the conditions of the 2006 movement and force the Nepal government to fall.

This time, however, the Maoists lacked alliances in civil society and the political parties, and their attempted civil resistance takeover failed to take hold. With dwindling numbers of supporters enforcing their general strike in Kathmandu and no prospect of success, the Maoists ended the strike.

Intense competition continued, though, ultimately leading a few months later to Prime Minister Nepal stepping down as a gesture to attempt to break the political deadlock. Nepal's gesture, however, failed to achieve its desired effect. Instead, for the next several months Nepal functioned without a Prime Minister as the various parties voted over and over again, with no candidate able to achieve an electoral majority. Finally, after seven months of voting, the Maoists agreed to back the UML candidate, Jhala Nath Khanal, and a new government was formed. The Khanal government was followed quickly thereafter by another governing crisis and the establishment of a new government under Maoist leader Baburam Bhattarai.

Under Bhattarai's tenure, Nepal reached another critical turning point in the transition. The constituent assembly elected in 2008 to write Nepal's new constitution had originally been given a one-year mandate. As unwillingness to reach political compromises and focus on the back and forth series of power struggles in Singha Durbar made the actual work of writing a constitution more and more difficult, the Assembly had voted to grant itself several extensions. However, in 2013 Nepal's Supreme Court ruled that the assembly no longer had the right to continue to extend its mandate.

This once again put Nepal's politicians in a position of making a short-term political compromise outside of the framework of the institutional rule of law. The eventual compromise position was that Maoist Prime Minister Baburam Bhattarai would step down and hand over

power to a technocratic government headed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Khil Raj Regmi. Regmi would have a very brief mandate, just long enough to plan and execute elections for a new constituent assembly.

Many of my interviewees pointed to this compromise as a particularly egregious example of the failure of Nepal's politicians to honor the norms of democratic politics. Regmi had, of course, never been elected, and while in office did not even give up the position of Chief Justice, but instead continued to serve in both capacities.

Democratic flaws aside, the Regmi regime did succeed in organizing elections in a relatively brief time period. And, just as the Maoist victory in 2008 had been a shocking outcome for Nepal's political elites, the outcome of the 2013 election was similarly shocking. The new, progressive political forces of CPN (Maoist) and the Madheshi political parties faced electoral annihilation. CPN (M) went from the largest party in the constituent assembly by a wide margin to a distant third behind Nepal's two traditional political parties, the NC and CPN (UML). Madheshi parties were almost wiped out, with only a scattering of figures remaining in the second constituent assembly.

What explains this change in electoral outcome? Interviewees were divided. Some simply attributed it to a revelation of the population's natural preferences when better voter rolls were in place and voter intimidation by the Maoists and their YCL had been largely eliminated. Others argue that, as in 2008, the Nepalese public simply wanted change. They were angry over the Maoists failure to deliver a new constitution in line with their promises in the jungle and in the lead-up to the 2008 election, and thus honored their rivals in the Congress and UML. Others point to more sinister conspiracies, often with the common Indian flavor.

Whatever the reason, Nepal's traditional political elites were now firmly in charge of the government once again, an outcome that sparked alarm not just from supporters of the Maoists but across the spectrum of Nepalese progressive forces, those who still saw the 2006 movement as one not just for restoring the elite-dominated democracy of the 1990s but for fundamentally restructuring the Nepalese state.

The process of constitution-writing and competition over control of the central government remained contentious during the second constituent assembly. In particular, a number of identity-based movements waged intense resistance struggles to ensure that the rights they had hoped to obtain from the Maoist-led first constituent assembly were maintained in this second, more conservative constituent assembly.

One prominent example of this was the struggle in 2015 by a number of Dalit organizations to ensure the protection of Dalit rights in the new constitution. Led by long-time Dalit activists such as Padam Sundas of the Samata Foundation, the movement was sparked by rumors coming from Dalit members of the new CA that guarantees of proportional representation in elections and affirmative action for Dalits in public service promised during the first CA were on the verge of being rescinded in the new constitution. Coordinated through Samata's office in Sanepa, just south of Kathmandu, the Dalit movement engaged in a major push, coordinated through NGOs, sister organizations of political parties, and Dalit members of the various parties themselves to ensure that these rights were kept in the new constitution. Their activism was successful and many of the guarantees were reinstated.

The contentious process of constitution-writing might have followed the same outcome as the first CA, with infighting and political jockeying preventing the establishment of any final

document, except that in April of 2015 a major exogenous shock struck the country in the form of a massive earthquake, with an epicenter close to the heavily-populated Kathmandu valley. Thousands were killed in the immediate aftermath of the quake, and hundreds of thousands more made homeless.

The quake had two major effects on Nepal's political development. In the first case, it sparked a massive outpouring of international aid for disaster relief. Aid had already become a major industry in Nepal since the beginning of the transition in 2006. As one interviewee observed: "for many years the biggest industry in Nepal has been the peace industry." Yet the scale of aid immediately ramped up significantly following the earthquake. These inputs of aid further demobilized Nepalese civil society from political activism, as NGOs shifted focus to earthquake-related service delivery and relief.

In the second case, the earthquake proved to be a potent motivator for Nepal's political elites to finally come together and agree on a constitution. In the months following the earthquake Nepal's political parties departed from their typical pattern of winner take all politics to finally pass (with 90% support) and promulgate Nepal's new constitution, its first to be written by an assembly elected by the people.

Almost all my interviewees had positive things to say about the new constitution. It is impressively progressive, with guarantees of many fundamental rights enshrined in it. It attempts to accommodate many of the most central demands articulated in the 2006 movement and subsequent movements by Madheshis, Dalits, and indigenous peoples. It includes required proportional representation for women and several different minority groups in the parliament and in government service.

Yet, following the pattern of Nepal's prior political agreements, the lofty rhetoric agreed to by the parties has often failed to be realized in practice. When asked about the quality of Nepal's democracy, this was a point emphasized by almost every interviewee from every sector. The guarantees of the constitution, the institutions called for by the constitution, are *highly* democratic, far more democratic than any other legal framework in South Asia. Yet on almost no count are they fully implemented.

Beyond the problems of implementation, certain groups were deeply angered by the constitutional arrangement itself. In particular, Madheshi groups condemned the constitution as continuing the dominance of Brahmin and Chhetri *pahadis*. In particular, the Madheshis objected to the proposed borders of Nepal's new federal states, which diluted Madheshi control by adding some hilly area districts into one of the proposed Tarai-based states and removing some others.

The Madheshis responded by launching a new movement, and once again employing their most powerful tool: a blockade of the main road and rail lines from India to the Kathmandu valley and other hilly regions. In this, they were heavily assisted by the Indian government (though India disputes this). As in 2007 the blockade proved potent in achieving its desired outcome, and the Nepalese government agreed to amend the new constitution to change the state boundaries and accommodate Madheshi demands.

This history largely brings us up to the present, a moment in which Nepal's transition is ostensibly entering its final stages. Upon promulgation of the constitution the constituent assembly redefined itself as a legislative parliament and extended its mandate until national elections could be held some time in 2017. They also planned to hold local and federal elections

in the same time period, a triple electoral process that would ostensibly mark the final end to Nepal's lengthy transition. This timeline was complicated by the Madheshi agitation of 2015 and early 2016, which put the federal boundaries in question. As of this writing, in August of 2017, the election timeline seems doubtful. Local elections have taken place in six out of Nepal's seven provinces – a major accomplishment considering the last local elections took place over 20 years ago – but the government has still failed to announce a date for parliamentary elections, and local elections in Province 2 have been delayed due to a threatened electoral boycott by Madheshi parties.⁵⁷ The constitutional amendment agreed to as a compromise with the Madheshi forces has been put into question by powerful resistance from the CPN-UML and conservative elements of the Congress party, and its future remains uncertain as of this writing.

If Nepal's political parties can agree on the amendment to the constitution, as well as schedule and hold elections at every administrative level, it will doubtless mark a major advancement and potentially an end to the applicability of the term transition to describing Nepal's political situation. Yet it remains to be seen whether a departure from transition in any practical, institutional sense will move Nepal away from its position as a fractious semi-democracy.

Reasons for skepticism lie in a number of areas, but primarily in the structure of Nepalese political competition, a structure that seems unlikely to change with the simple move towards a more normal electoral system. Every one of Nepal's political parties is structured hierarchically, with key decisions on platform and personnel made almost exclusively by a small

⁵⁷ See Kathmandu Post, August 15th, 2017. "EC officials urge PM to announce date for parliamentary election." <http://kathmandupost.ekantipur.com/news/2017-08-15/ec-officials-urge-pm-to-announce-date-for-parliamentary-election.html>.

circle of senior leaders. Loyalty from lower-level cadres is maintained primarily through the promise of future patronage and career advancement.

This lack of internal party democracy has undermined the establishment of ideological-based distinction and party competition on the basis of service delivery. Instead, competition tends to be based on absolute numbers of people who can be drawn into the individual party's patronage network. Since control of the center is the ultimate means of expanding one's patronage network, political logic is focused almost exclusively on being part of the ruling coalition rather than achieving one's own ideological goals.

This dynamic in turn makes political alliances unstable and undermines trust between the political parties. In contrast to ideological commitments, whose implementation is at least to some degree zero-sum – for example, one cannot implement both a progressive land reform policy and maintain the privileges of the old landed elite – and thus drive alliances between parties for whom ideological conflict is minimal, the benefits of patronage are fungible between different alliance partners. Alliance partners are interchangeable in the distribution of patronage, and negotiation becomes simply a matter of marginal degree.

Nepal's current government is perhaps the ultimate example of this mode of political competition, as it brings together the ostensibly far-left CPN (Maoist), the traditional center-right (In Nepalese politics, at least), Nepali Congress, and, at least until recently, the monarchist Rashtriya Prajatantra Party (RPP). Knowing that they are interchangeable, and seeing the pattern of shifting alliances and betrayal of prior agreements, political parties have reasons to be skeptical of one another's guarantees. Yet this lack of trust in guarantees continues to

exacerbate the radicalized conflict over control of the center and de-emphasize competition over positive service delivery and implementation of a particular ideological platform.

Greater implementation of the new constitution, particularly through lower-level elections, could have an important impact on these dynamics. A new cadre of young, local political leaders could shake up the top-down, patronage-based structure of Nepal's political parties, and bring new blood to the fore who would be incentivized to seek public support on the basis of a political platform or delivery of government services. Yet it is certainly possible that even in these circumstances the patterns of politics engrained by Nepal's political parties to date will continue to shape and shove new leaders into its mold. The future is open-ended, but it seems highly likely that Nepal's status as a fractious semi-democracy will continue into the future.

Analysis

What explains the trajectory of Nepal's transition? Why has Nepal been able to make such tremendous progress towards social and political transformation and yet failed to move to a more consolidated, regular democratic system? I consider some of the most popular explanations, both from my interviewees and from broader scholarship on Nepal.

The first explanation relates to Nepal's neighbors, in particular India. Indian underhanded behavior is a favorite explanation for almost any political event in Nepal indefinitely into the past until today. Different accounts offer different rationales for India's interference, but a focus on Indian involvement is important in almost any description of the trajectory of Nepal's transition. One interviewee went so far as to describe the primary division

in Nepal's politics as between the *rastrabadh* – nationalists – and *lampasarbadh*, those who are willing to give in to Indian interests.

Indian perfidy is particularly prominent in discussions of the Madheshi movement. The Madheshis are often painted as tools of Indian foreign policy to divide Nepal and provide India with a frontier region under easily-controlled political leaders. The close linguistic, ethnic, and familial ties between the populations of the neighboring Indian states of Bihar and Uttar Pradesh and the Madheshis make such connections easy to draw.

That India has played an important role in the transition is undeniable. Indian mediation played an important part in bringing together the Maoists and the seven-party alliance before the 2006 Second People's Movement. The 12-point agreement between the two was signed in Delhi, under the watchful eye of the Indian government. And the Indian ambassador in Nepal has played an important role at key moments of political crisis, throwing his weight behind one political faction or another in order to achieve particular political outcomes.

Thus a weak version of the argument that Indian influence explains Nepal's transition certainly has some merit. In specific instances, when tracing the political process, one often finds Indian actors in the middle. However, several key pieces of evidence undermine the stronger argument for an overwhelming causal role for Indian foreign policy.

The first is the character of popular mobilization first in the Jana Andolan II and then in the Madheshi movement and subsequent mobilizations. While India played a role in bringing the political elites together in the 12-point agreement, in the movement of 2006 these political elites initially played a fairly marginal role. Due to a widespread loss of legitimacy, few people were willing to mobilize on the streets in support of the political parties. Instead it was

independent civil society leaders who organized the first large-scale protests against the King's rule. The political parties and Maoist revolutionaries were later folded into the movement, but they were not the key actors who sparked it, nor the majority of those who participated. Thus, even assuming that all those who agreed to the 12-point agreement were acting as tools of Indian foreign policy (itself a fairly challenging argument to make), the movement itself cannot be explained solely or even primarily through their actions. It was a massive popular upswell driven by civil society and popular attitudes more broadly that were deeply opposed to the king's actions.

Some interviewees alleged that the mobilization itself was simply the result of Indian money, that protesters on the streets were paid by India. While I cannot rule out this accusation, a number of data points make it extremely unlikely.

The first is the sheer size of the 2006 movement. Estimates vary, but even conservatively the participation was at least in the millions, with demonstrations in almost every municipality in the country. In Kathmandu alone, according to multiple interviewees from different political and civil society groups, during the height of the Jana Andolan II the march along Kathmandu's ring road filled the entire circumference of the road, which would put the number of participants in this demonstration at bare minimum in the hundreds of thousands. While it is impossible to rule out that some participants in these demonstrations received financial compensation of some kind, it stretches plausibility to assume that this number was any significant portion.

The second is the reports of an overwhelming percentage of interviewees. During the course of my fieldwork I had access to many of the most central leaders in the 2006 movement.

They all told a fairly consistent story about the progression of the movement's mobilization, with differences that would be expected based on their different positions at the time. As with the numbers of participants, I am, of course unable to determine with 100% accuracy the veracity of individual statements made to me by interviewees, however, the existence of a consistent conspiracy begins to stretch plausibility as the number of those speaking against it increases.

Thus it is difficult to argue that India played a sufficient role in the 2006 Jana Andolan. Absent popular mobilization by fiercely independent civil society leaders such as Devendra Raj Pandey and the CMDP it is difficult if not impossible to imagine the 2006 movement following the trajectory that it did. Was Indian intervention necessary? Here the causal question is somewhat more complex. Certainly the 12-point agreement was an important moment enabling the movement and helping to spark mobilization, since people went onto the streets not just for democracy but also for peace, and the 12-point agreement made it clear that peace would only be achieved if the king was out of the picture. Yet even here, India's necessary position is unclear. The agreement was signed in India, but it was preceded by various negotiations that were not orchestrated by India. Thus counterfactually it is not difficult to see a situation in which an agreement between the parties could have been reached absent Indian intervention. Thus, whether India's involvement was necessary for the success of the 2006 movement is also questionable.

So much for India's grand role behind the 2006 movement. What of the major political events in the succeeding ten years of transition? Did India derail Nepal's transition for its own nefarious intentions?

Perhaps the strongest piece of evidence against a consistent Indian role here is the absence of a consistent story among my interviewees as to what exactly the Indian disruptive role was. Many if not all were clear that India's foreign policy played a deleterious role, yet their view of that deleterious role varied significantly depending on their political position. Those further on the left, particularly Maoists, argued that India's interference was essentially on behalf of the Hindu right, to ensure that Nepal remained a Hindu state. Those further on the right pointed to India's connection with the Maoists and argued that India fundamentally sought to destabilize Nepal, to prevent Nepal from standing on its own two feet.

Consistent historical instances in which Indian interference derailed the transition process are also difficult to find. My interviewees listed very few at all, and none consistently across different political positions.

The one exception to this rule was in regards to the 2015 border blockade. With the exception of some Madheshi activists, all of my interviewees condemned this instance as a clear attack by India on the successful completion of the constitution, and prime evidence of India's destabilizing hand.

Yet was this in fact the case? The blockade certainly imposed heavy costs on the Nepalese economy, and forced Nepal's political parties to negotiate with the Madheshis over the provincial boundaries. Yet it does not appear to have had any particularly differentiating impact on Nepal's transition. Indeed, as evidenced by the 2007 Madheshi movement, it seems doubtful that Indian interference was even necessary for a major costly blockade to be imposed. Had the promulgation of the constitution gone forward absent amendment, Madheshi mobilization alone could very plausibly have led to similar concessions. Furthermore, while this

remains a point of intense contestation, it is not a unique point in Nepalese politics. Rather it follows a pattern of practice common beyond the 2015 blockade and the Madheshi issue more generally. Thus, even in the most heavy-handed of India's alleged actions during the Nepalese transition, it is difficult to determine a determinative Indian influence on the political trajectory.

To reiterate, this in no way implies that India has played no role in the transition. The Indian embassy has doubtless been actively involved in Nepalese politics throughout the transition period, as has been the case ever since Indian independence, but the argument that their influence has been a determinative factor in Nepal's current regime is doubtful.

I would make a similar argument about the influence of Western powers, particularly the United States. That they played, or attempted to play, an influence is undeniable. However, whether their influence was either necessary or sufficient to ultimately affect the outcome of Nepal's transition is more doubtful.

The first piece of evidence on this regard was the inconsistent nature of the arguments for Western influence. Some argued it was positive, supporting and encouraging democratic development. Others argued that it was negative, encouraging a professionalization and demobilization of civil society, disconnecting politicians from their role in writing Nepal's new constitution, and forcing focus away from actual indigenous needs towards the particular program of donors.

Thus, western influence certainly played a role, but the role does not seem to have been determinative in any meaningful fashion.

What about structural determinants, and the broader modernization argument? Nepal is certainly poor, with a GDP per capita of only \$1,684 at the time of the Jana Andolan II, only

rising to \$2,288 by 2016.⁵⁸ Some interviewees pointed to poverty as a factor shaping how the transition unfolded, particularly with poverty's add-on effects on education. However, can poverty really explain the outcome in Nepal? What are the mechanisms whereby we could determine that outcome?

Lipset's traditional analysis of the effects of modernization on democratization, the initial analysis that underlies most of the contemporary thinking in this regard, focused on the effects of wealth on the mindset of the poor and wealthy (Lipset, 1959). In countries with high levels of poverty the poor would be attracted to radical anti-democratic ideologies against the wealthy, while the wealthy would look down on the poor with disdain and be resistant to extending the franchise to them. Does this pattern characterize Nepal's transition?

A first glance might indicate that it does. After all, Nepal's ten-year civil war was led by Maoist revolutionaries. Would this not indicate that in fact the Lipset argument about poverty is not only applicable but in fact crucial? Perhaps. But a closer look even at Nepal's Maoist revolution puts that into question. In their attempt to wage a class-based Maoist struggle the CPN (Maoist) in fact found itself constantly thwarted, a phenomenon that forced them to change their rhetorical strategy from one focused on class, poverty, and inequality and instead focused on Nepal's unique constellation of caste-based and ethnic-based discrimination. Similarly in the transition economics has played a marginal role in the rhetoric of the so-called progressive parties.

Neither have the Nepal's economic elites used the fear of the lower classes and the fear of redistribution as a major argument against democratization, as argued for in more recent

⁵⁸ PPP GDP per capita in constant 2011 international \$ from the World Bank World Development Indicators (www.databank.worldbank.org).

scholarly arguments on the role of economics in democratization (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006; Boix, 2003). Indeed, there is near-consensus across all of Nepal's political parties (dominated by the political and economic elite) that Nepal should be run as a socialist democracy. The picture of the mechanisms whereby poverty affects democratization is unclear at best.

What about the traditional transitologist's picture of a democratic transition where elite pacts between moderates are the driving force in pushing towards democratization, and popular mobilization is a dangerous force that can put elite pacts into jeopardy (O'Donnell & Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies*, 1986)? Here too, the facts of the Nepalese transition make the traditional transitologist's picture a poor fit. First, while transitology predicts a popular upsurge by civil society and the masses at large to arise in response to an initial opening on the part of the regime, in Nepal the direction is reversed. The peak mobilization of the Jana Andolan II in fact came at the most authoritarian, most repressive moment in King Gyanendra's rule, and was in fact largely sparked by that. In contrast, once the king had been removed there was a large-scale *de*-mobilization of civil society, not the pent-up upsurge that O'Donnell and Schmitter would lead us to expect. Instead mobilization shifted from a civil society upswell to a maximalized winner-take-all confrontation between the political parties.

And what of the beneficial character of elite pacts? Here too the Nepalese picture gives us reason to be skeptical. If there was one common theme across Nepal's transition, it was continuous pact-making. From the 12-point agreement before the king's fall to the series of agreement with the Madheshis in 2007, to the agreements over the constitutional amendment in 2016 and 2017 Nepal's elites have become practiced at making pacts with one another. Yet the pacts, far from establishing sustainable democratic politics, instead seem to hinder that

process. Pacts have enshrined the power of a small anti-democratic elite, hindered Nepal's move towards an inclusive democracy. When they have been in a progressive direction, it has come as a result of pressure from outside.

Nor is there significant evidence that pressure from "radicals" has significantly destabilized the transition or incentivized "hardliners" to attempt to overthrow the transition and return things to the status quo ante. There is pressure to return to an authoritarian system. But the source of the pressure is not primarily fear of radicalism but rather disgust with the pattern of Nepalese politics currently evidenced by the "moderates" skilled at pact-making with one another!

Finally, what of Higley and Burton's (2006) argument that elite unity is the key factor defining the success of a democratic transition? Nepal's transition provides powerful evidence for the problematic nature of any analysis that relies on the "elite" as an analytical category. Who exactly are Nepal's "elite?" And how can we know whether they are united?

One can easily marshal a story from Nepal's transition of a disunited elite. As described in the prior sections, the factions of Nepal's Jana Andolan II had radically different visions of the future. Under the common banner of a "New Nepal" any number of different visions flew and indeed continue to fly, from the Maoist vision of a one-party people's republic to the Madheshi vision of federalism, to the Nepali Congress vision of a multiparty regime. Nepal's elites are disunited, therefore sustainable democracy is impossible.

However, one can just as easily interpret the data in the opposite direction. Nepal remains dominated by a small group of primarily Brahmin and Chhetri educated leaders. The same family names that have dominated Nepalese politics for decades continue to be in pride of

place. They share a vision of a Nepal with limited competition between themselves, with the influence of other social and ethnic groups limited or non-existent, and with power centralized in Kathmandu.

Beyond this there is a third story, and one which hits the Higley and Burton argument in a more central place. Who are the elites to begin with? Are the elites the old Brahmin-Chhetri Kathmandu educated set? They certainly have the historical pedigree for it. Yet the Maoists, whose political role has been central to the transition, would not fit into this category. Once one has been a Prime Minister twice, as Prachanda has, surely one fits into the category of elite. Yet if one accepts Higley and Burton's definition of the political elite: "persons who are able...to affect political outcomes regularly and substantially," (Higley & Burton, 2006, p. 7) then this is questionable. Have they truly been able to affect political outcomes "regularly and substantially?" They have had to compromise away almost all of their core principles, and, for the most part, failed when attempting to push political outcomes in their direction. What really are their preferences to begin with? And what about the Madheshis? Are they elites? Or not? The very category is dubious to begin with. Furthermore, the key moments of the Nepalese transition are not characterized by elite initiative and mass influence wielded instrumentally. Rather mass action by the people drives elites into particular actions.

For all these reasons, traditional explanations of Nepal's democratic transition are severely wanting. How well then does the picture fit the predictions of my theory of strategic challenges in civil resistance transitions? While the fit is imperfect, as is to be expected when applying theoretical ideal types to particular empirical cases, my theoretical picture predicts the Nepalese transition quite closely.

First, in regards to mobilization, it is undoubtedly true that mobilization of a sort remained high following Nepal's democratic transition, and continued to powerfully shape the transition process. The best example of this is the Madheshi movement, to whose activism the entire direction of the Nepalese transition, from a unitary to a federal republic, may be attributed. Yet a fine-grained look at the Nepalese transition reveals hundreds of causes mobilized for during the course of transition. My interviewees gave frequent witness to this, describing the frequent instances of popular mobilization, from street demonstrations to general strikes, that have characterized Nepal's transition. Other scholars' work confirms this dynamic. For example, the UN Department of Safety and Security recorded 4,451 general strikes in Nepal from 2008 through 2013. The overwhelming majority of these general strikes are conducted by political parties and other groups pushing particular political agendas, not trade unions or other traditional labor groups (Shrestha & Chaudhary, 2014).

Did mobilization shape outcomes? Again, the answer is very clear. As Aditya observes in the conclusion of an in-depth examination of Nepal's political parties, the first lesson of the transition was that "protest and pressure work" (Aditya, 2016, p. 79). Throughout the transition, when political forces hit the streets they often achieved their goals, and redirected the endpoints of the transition process. This is most clearly seen in the example of the Madheshi mobilization, but various other mobilizations such as the Dalit movement in 2015 were very successful in pressuring elites into concessions.

Was mobilization a check on democratic backsliding? There was some indirect evidence of this effect among several of my interviewees. While many expressed fear (or hope!) of a move towards a more authoritarian system in Nepal, all also expressed a firm belief that an authoritarian system was ultimately impossible in Nepal because of the activation of the

Nepalese people. Elites appeared to be closely attentive to the signals emerging from the streets, and recalibrated their political positions on the basis of this mobilization.

However, there was one major factor undermining the democratizing effect of mobilization. Little of it was independently connected to ordinary citizens absent political formations. Political parties, or civil society groups closely linked to political parties, manipulated much of the mobilization for their own narrow ends. They adopted the mantle of democracy in most cases to bring people to the streets, but largely used the mobilization to advance their own particularistic agenda.

The dynamics of the holdovers also largely fit the predictions of my theory, though Nepal falls much closer towards the co-optation side than initially predicted. Many, perhaps even the majority of Nepalese political elites currently enjoying political power emerged from the prior regime. Some were even major figures in the worst excesses of the monarchy. These elites have clearly benefited from the new democratic regime and thus have not found it in their interest to attempt to derail the transition in a major way towards authoritarianism. However, there have been some limited moves to remove old regime elites guilty of the worst abuses. This effort is ongoing – recently taking the form of impeachment proceedings against Chairman of the Commission for the Investigation of the Abuse of Authority Lokman Singh Karki.

What of the third challenge of maximalism? The empirical dynamics are certainly there. Some of the most disruptive tactics of civil resistance have been used repeatedly by particular political factions in order to pursue a narrow political agenda. The election results after both the 2008 and 2013 constituent assembly elections were contested as unfair at the time, and remain perceived as unfair by those on various sides of the Nepalese political spectrum.

The rhetoric used by the various political factions to describe one another is maximalist. This is particularly the case across a developing master cleavage in Nepal's politics, with the "traditional" or "conservative" parties of the Nepali Congress and the UML on one side and the CPN (Maoist Center) and Madheshi parties on the other side.

These maximalist mobilizations have played key roles in preventing Nepal's constituent assemblies from writing constitutions. Had it not been for the intervention of the 2015 earthquake, it seems quite likely that even the 2015 constitution would not have been passed. Even today, several Madheshi respondents described the constitution as inherently racist. Meanwhile, Congress and UML respondents often described the Maoists, despite their move into the mainstream of politics, as fundamentally seeking to destroy Nepal's democratic political system, and the Madheshis as a force for the dissolution of the country.

Thus the position of maximalism in derailing democratic progress is fairly self-evident in the Nepalese case. The important question then is whether this pattern represents a meaningful example of political agency. Is it meaningful to discuss maximalism as a factor affecting democratization in its own right or is maximalism in the Nepalese case reducible to the deterministic workings of the underlying structure of Nepalese politics?

The question is of course difficult to suss out empirically, for many of the reasons eloquently described in many of the discussions of structure and agency in seminal works of political science. Theda Skocpol's discussion of agency during times of revolution is particularly apropos (Skocpol, 1979, p. 18). Structure certainly plays an important role. It is difficult to imagine, for example, that the maximalism over ethnic federalism would have taken place without the long-standing ethnic division between *madheshi* and *pahadi*, or the history of

exclusion of madheshis by the pahadi class. The presence of two powerful neighbors, one of whom is seen as particularly manipulative of Nepalese politics, is another crucial structural factor that shaped these political dynamics. The distinction between *rastrabadh* and *lampasabadh* is an easy frame to draw on to delegitimize one's opponents, pointing to them as a threat to Nepal's sovereignty and territorial integrity. Without a history of domination by a powerful neighbor, this frame would be unavailable to Nepal's political elites.

Social and political structure is undoubtedly the raw material of radicalized political contention. Yet, as discussed in Chapter 1, it is constituted and regenerated through practice, and this practice is never fully determined by prior conditions. The practices of Nepalese politics in the transition to democracy were not predetermined, and at several critical juncture points could have shifted in alternate directions.

This is perhaps best illustrated through the many invocations of "blunders" by my interviewees. Time and again interviewees pointed to particular political choices that hung in the balance only to be resolved at a sub-optimal level for all concerned. Political elites miscalculated the dynamics of a particular situation and made a strong play for narrow political power. Ordinary people rewarded or punished elites for particular actions in ways that retrospectively do not flow from the prior conditions. While their actions make up a single story, they do not flow in deterministic fashion from that story.

Perhaps the most damaging consequence of Nepal's maximalized politics is how it has undermined faith in the functioning of democracy. Early in the transition, support for democratic principles was extremely high across almost all segments of Nepalese society. However, as radicalized politics first prevented the formulation of a constitution, and later

undermined effective government development and service delivery, faith in democracy has declined.

This decline in faith in democracy is not limited to the poorly educated or informed. Several of my interviewees, from the highest elite levels of Nepalese society, expressed nostalgia for an authoritarian past in which a single leader could do away with the disturbances entailed by maximalized politics. Some argued that the only way to fix the current dynamics of Nepalese politics would be to do away with democracy and impose order through a period of military rule or a return to the monarchy.

Such an occurrence was almost universally depicted by my interviewees as extremely unlikely. They argued that the freedom of expression and association brought about by the 1990 and 2006 movements had moved Nepalese society too far towards democracy for significant backsliding, and that any serious move to reverse the last two decades of democratic progress would spark significant public backlash. However, if Nepal's political class continues to fail to institutionalize democratic politics, and service delivery remains extremely poor, then the likelihood of major democratic backsliding seems at the very least plausible.

Nepal's politics, for instance, currently resemble the situation in Thailand from the mid-2000s until the 2014 military coup. Constant back and forth struggle by diametrically opposed political factions in that case eventually led to the end of Thailand's most recent democratic experiment. Interviewees connected with the Nepalese military discounted the possibility of a military takeover, emphasizing the professionalization of the NA's officer corps. However, similar dynamics in Bangladesh, a country whose military is similar to Nepal's in many respects, puts this in question.

In conclusion, Nepal's transition has proven problematic for many of the reasons predicted by my theory. The causal mechanisms I argue for in Chapter 1 provide closer explanation for the Nepali transition than prominent explanations specific to the Nepal case (the pernicious influence of India) as well as major scholarly explanations such as modernization theory, transitology, and the elite theory.

The case does, however, indicate room for expansion and growth in future theory-building when it comes to transitional patterns of behavior. In particular, the evidence from Nepal problematizes the concept of mobilization. Mobilization may be high in a particular case, but if it is easily captured by maximalized political groups, then its democratizing influence may be attenuated. Even partisan mobilization may have a good long-term effect, as it diffuses political skills across the population, but in the short term its effect is likely to be negative.

Having traced the path of a transition to "fractious semi-democracy" I now turn my attention to a potential case of "elite semi-democracy," the 1991 political transition in Zambia.

Chapter 4: “Power is Sweet” Elite Semi-Democracy in Zambia

My second case comes from Southern Africa, and moves back in time from the 2000s to the 1990s.

Zambia has an important place in civil resistance struggles. Like Nepal it has experienced multiple transitions following primarily nonviolent resistance movements. In the 1960s an anti-colonial movement, first under Mbikusita Lewanika and later under Kenneth Kaunda peacefully fought first to expel the British and then against an effort to make Zambia a part of a Federated Rhodesian state dominated by white settlers. Kaunda, the leader of the movement, was explicit in his commitment to nonviolence, and this commitment deeply shaped both the resistance and the shape of the future state. In the 1970s, Kaunda and his United National Independence Party (UNIP) ended Zambia’s democracy on the grounds that the existence of multiple political parties was fostering tribalism. In 1990 and 1991 a new nonviolent movement, the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD), successfully overthrew Kaunda’s one-party state and re-established democracy. Finally, in 2001, a third major nonviolent movement successfully resisted attempts by MMD leader Frederick Chiluba to extend his presidency into a third term.

In this chapter I focus on the second of these three major nonviolent movements in Zambia’s history: the 1990-1991 Movement for Multi-Party democracy and the transitional

period that followed its electoral victory over President Kaunda and UNIP in the 1991 Zambian elections. I argue that Zambia follows the path of an “elite semi-democracy.” Following a large civil resistance campaign that comes together to oust an old regime, leaders are unable to maintain mobilization during the transitional period. This, tied with a lack of robust measures of holding holdovers accountable, led to a semi-democratic regime dominated by a small group of elites that manipulate the levers of government for their own advantage.

In the Zambian case, the causes for this particular pattern of demobilization are manifold. Many Zambian interviewees pointed to a culture of faith in the “big man,” a pattern they argued is common across many African countries. Others pointed to the severe economic crisis that faced Zambia in the immediate aftermath of the 1991 election. As the MMD moved away from the quasi-socialist policies of their predecessor and embraced a harsh structural adjustment program with terms dictated by the International Monetary Fund, the attendant economic dislocation led ordinary Zambians away from political mobilization and forced them to focus on the increasingly difficult task of simply providing for themselves and their families. Others were deeply critical of the person of President Frederick Chiluba himself, arguing that from the beginning the goal of Chiluba and many in his central circle had not been greater democracy but rather simply occupying the seat of power. Still others made an institutional argument, pointing to the extremely high level of power granted to the president by the Zambian constitution, and pointing to the ways in which Zambian political institutions give the President high levels of capacity to both repress and co-opt potential opponents.


I do not attempt to distinguish between these arguments. As I argue in the first chapter, patterns of transitional behavior can be reached through many different potential causal pathways. Any number of different historical, cultural, and institutional factors may have

affected the outcomes of these strategic challenges. My key argument is that once one arrives at this pattern of behavior the behavior itself has a long-term impact, regardless of the specific path that may have led to it. In this case, I focus on how a lack of mobilization and a holdovers policy that led to domination of the new government by members of the old regime – due to any number of potential causes – gave space for a decline in democratic quality that prevented the MMD from fully realizing the dream of democracy that inspired its first leaders.

First, a few matters of clarification. Is Zambia an elite semi-democracy, as I have described it? Most interviewees I spoke to argued that Zambia, similar to Nepal, is somewhat democratic but not fully democratic and has been so to some degree since the beginning of the 1991 transition. Elections are held, and are meaningfully contested, but are often subject to severe suspicion of manipulation. Almost all interviewees universally spoke of the pervasiveness of corruption and patterns of patronage in Zambian politics. The Zambian constitution, while in general laying out democratic institutions, is also almost unchanged from Zambia's days as a one-party socialist state dominated by a single powerful president. Only article four of the Zambian constitution, which specifically forbade the existence of more than a single party, was changed as a result of the activism of the original Movement for Multi-party Democracy. Authoritarian legacies live on in restrictions on freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and perhaps most prominently on freedom of assembly. The Public Order Act, a colonial legacy, continues to be in operation, and requires any group desiring to hold a public meeting to get approval from the local police up to two weeks in advance. This permission is frequently denied on explicitly partisan grounds, with opposition parties and civil society groups denied permission to meet while the ruling party is never refused permission to meet.

International scholars of democracy largely agree with this analysis. The figure below shows Zambia’s score on three prominent democracy indices in the decade before and after the 1991 political transition. For all three indices, the success of the MMD prompted a jump in the level of democracy, but the jump falls short of democratic thresholds. The V-Dem polyarchy score remains roughly around 0.5, with similar rankings from the Polity dataset (Marshall, Gurr, & Jaggers, 2016) and Unified Democracy Scores (Pemstein, Meserve, & Melton, 2010).

Figure 4.1: Zambia’s Democracy Index Scores



Scholars of Zambian history and politics generally concur. Miles Larmer refers to Zambia’s political system as a “largely choiceless or disciplined democracy” (Larmer, 2011, p. 264), and Lise Rakner, writing about the ten years of the Chiluba presidency (1991-2001) concludes that: “democratic governance in Zambia in the 1990s has remained in a ‘grey zone,’ a situation of partial reform” (Rakner, 2003, p. 174). Bauer and Taylor go much further, describing

the ten years of the Chiluba regime as a “descent into an anti-democratic kleptocracy” (Bauer & Taylor, 2011, p. 53). Similar analyses can be found in the work of any number of scholars (Ihonvbere, 1995; Erdmann & Simuntanyi, 2003; van Donge, 1995; Mbikusita-Lewanika, 2003; Cheeseman & Larmer, 2015).

Zambia’s political system at the end of its most recent transition also fits the “elite” variety of semi-democracy that I have described previously quite closely. Politics is dominated by a small group of political and economic elites, and is largely focused on the personal enrichment of that elite class. Competition does not revolve around ideological lines but is instead primarily focused on gaining control of access to state resources. The same group of political leaders that have dominated politics since the 1990s remains central to Zambian politics. Party allegiances are fluid, with major political figures shifting their party identification frequently in order to maintain access to the central levers of power.

In the remainder of the chapter I first provide a brief history of Zambia’s political environment since independence, then a narrative of the Movement for Multiparty Democracy and the subsequent political transition. I focus on the challenges of mobilization and holdovers, arguing that a lack of continued mobilization and the incorporation of anti-democratic elites (and the attendant sidelining of more democratic MMD leaders) are key in explaining the outcome of the Zambian transition. I spend less time on the problem of maximalism, since I expect lower levels of mobilization to make maximalism less relevant. However, I do discuss this challenge in relation to the competition between the MMD and rump-UNIP.

Background

Zambia achieved its independence in 1964 after a long, largely nonviolent struggle. By the time of independence the undisputed leader of the independence struggle was Dr. Kenneth Kaunda. Kaunda had begun as an activist in the Zambian branch of the African National Congress but left the ANC to form his own organization – originally called the Zambian National Congress and later the United National Independence Party, or UNIP – after believing that the ANC was not radical enough in its pursuit of independence. At independence UNIP was the dominant political force in the country, but the ANC remained a potent political force.

As with most African states, Zambia is a country of a variety of ethnic and linguistic groups, with roughly 70 different ethnic groups according to government statistics. Five groups: the Bemba, Tonga, Chewa, Lozi, and Nsenga make up roughly 60% of the population, with other groups accounting for much smaller percentages. While interviewees were quick to argue that tribalism has played little role in Zambian politics for much of its history, in the first years after independence there were some moves towards partisan division on tribal lines.⁵⁹

These tribalist divisions provided the primary justification for the move in 1973 from multi-party competition to formalizing UNIP's domination of Zambian politics and making all other political parties illegal. Kaunda and UNIP argued that this decision did not fundamentally undermine Zambia's democracy but instead simply re-shaped it, allowing a means for "participation" but without partisanship that would be damaging to national unity.

Kaunda's UNIP government followed the model of many other contemporary African nations, perhaps most prominently Julius Nyerere's Tanzania, in pursuing collectivization and a

⁵⁹ See Wina 1985 for an examination of these dynamics at this point in Zambian history.

large expansion of the welfare state in tandem with the domination of the state by a single political force. In Zambia's case, this massive expansion of the state was facilitated by the large-scale export of Zambia's most precious and abundant primary commodity: copper.

The one-party state faced major challenges almost immediately as the 1973 oil crisis led to a sharp increase in the price of exports and the price of copper subsequently declined. As copper revenues decreased throughout the 80s the government became increasingly incapable of supporting its extensive welfare state, while the parastatal businesses that dominated the economy were increasingly inefficient and ineffective.

Zambian political figures I interviewed pointed primarily to these economic challenges as a central factor in sparking the eventual movement that would overthrow the Kaunda regime. In addition, President Kaunda's increasing personalization of power alienated many of the UNIP elites who had been involved in the struggle for independence and then subsequently become long-time supporters of his government. The sources of this alienation were areas of significant contention between my interviewees. Many argued that the majority of those dismissed by the Kaunda government were dismissed for good, justifiable reasons. Others, however, argued that their moves away from the Kaunda government was motivated by conscience – anger at the increasing personalization of power under Kaunda and a desire for meaningful political and economy reforms.

While Zambia's regime at this time was technically dominated by the political party, along the lines of the one-party regimes of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact countries, in fact power was more and more concentrated in the person of President Kaunda. This concentration was perhaps best captured by the growing cult of personality surrounding Kaunda. A popular

slogan often repeated by interviewees was: “In heaven, there is God, on earth there is Kaunda.” Kaunda was the undisputed leader of UNIP, and the one topic in which no political dissent or anti-government expression was tolerated.

Elections, even for the presidency, continued to take place at regular five year intervals during the period of one-party rule. At the local and parliamentary levels these elections even involved some degree of competition, as various UNIP functionaries competed for the party’s nomination. At the level of the presidency, however, there was no political competition. While Kaunda ran for re-election, he always ran unopposed. Many interviewees recalled particular presidential elections in which Kaunda would run against a picture of a frog or rabbit to symbolize the degree to which Kaunda controlled Zambian politics.

However, while UNIP firmly controlled Zambian politics during this period, opposition was by no means absent. In the absence of formal opposition parties or civil society organizations beyond those focused on service delivery, sources of opposition common to most stories of resistance to authoritarian rule played a significant role in opposing the Kaunda regime. Student criticism of the government, primarily at the country’s flagship institution, the University of Zambia, was frequent and vocal. Many of my interviewees cut their political teeth as student activists marching in protest and organizing student groups against the one party state.

The Zambian Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), originally formed as a UNIP organ to co-opt labor activism into the party structure, emerged as early as the late 1970s as an important counterweight to UNIP influence. ZCTU president Frederick Chiluba organized the union’s cadres to oppose the 1980 Local Government Act, a legislative act that would have eliminated

the universal franchise for electing local officials and limited voting for local councils to UNIP members. The resistance was intense – between 1981 and 1983 the ZCTU and the Mineworkers' Union of Zambia (MUZ) organized over 200 illegal strikes in opposition to the act (Chiluba, 1994, p. 73). Chiluba himself was briefly sent to prison for his role in organizing this opposition. Chiluba also refused the place on the UNIP central committee traditionally reserved for the secretary-general of the ZCTU, an act that many of my interviewees reported gave him a great deal of credibility as an opposition leader.

Zambian churches also emerged as an important locus of resistance to the excesses of one-party rule, with church leaders using their significant moral authority to demand greater protection for human rights. The *National Mirror* newspaper, jointly published by Zambia's three largest church bodies: the Evangelical Fellowship of Zambia (EFZ), Christian Council of Zambia, and the Zambian Episcopal Conference (ZEC), was one of the few, if not the only major independent media voices by the end of the period of one-party rule. While President Kaunda made many efforts to integrate church leaders into his regime several issues, particularly UNIP's embrace of a more open policy towards abortion and attempts to implement "scientific socialism" alienated church leaders and led to increasing levels of confrontation (Hinfelaar, 2008).

Many in Zambia's growing intellectual community also criticized the one-party state, with the Economics Association of Zambia (EAZ), led by Akashambatwa Mbikusita-Lewanika and Derrick Chitala becoming one early center of critique. The EAZ hosted monthly discussions on economic and political topics which frequently involved criticism of the one party state and became an important convening forum in which those discontented with the one party state could meet and share ideas.

Struggling Against the One-Party State

These disparate centers of opposition to the one-party state: disenfranchised former UNIP elites, trade unions, churches, and intellectuals, came together in 1990 under the banner of a movement that would later become Zambia's new ruling party: The Movement for Multiparty Democracy, (MMD).

In the late 1980s the Kaunda government had begun to roll back some of its prior extensive government consumption supports, particularly price supports for the staple foods of mealie meal (corn meal) and cooking oil. The economic downturn sparked by declining copper prices was the underlying factor behind these rollbacks. Declining amounts of foreign exchange forced the Kaunda government to seek a bailout from the IMF, which demanded significant reductions in government expenditure in return.

Even before the subsidies were removed, discontent with President Kaunda's handling of the Zambian economy had been growing. Many of my interviewees related stories about the difficulties in actually getting access to government price-supported goods at this time. Long lines were the norm to obtain even the most basic staples. When the government raised prices, this simmering discontent boiled over into direct disruption and defiance. Food riots broke out across many of the country's major urban centers, first in the major cities of the Copper Belt and later in Lusaka.

In response to these riots, a small group of Zambian army officers led by Lieutenant Mwamba Luchembe attempted to overthrow the Kaunda government on July 1, 1990. While the coup failed, it was greeted with a great deal of enthusiasm on the streets, providing a powerful signal that the people were no longer supporting the Kaunda government.

In this context, a group of intellectuals who had been involved in discussions in the Economics Association of Zambia about reforming Zambia's political system began talking about bringing together the various strands of potential opposition to the one-party state under a single umbrella. Mr. Akashambatwa Mbikusita-Lewanika, a member of the Barotse royal family and former president of the EAZ, was the driving force behind organizing a meeting in which a formal discussion of this opposition could take place.

The meeting took place on July 20th and 21st, 1990, in the Garden House Hotel in Lusaka. Chaired by freedom fighter and long-time major political player Arthur Wina, the two-day conference featured many of the figures who would later become central in Zambian politics. By the end of the two-day conference, the attendees had decided to form an organization, the Movement for Multi-Party Democracy, whose task would be to advocate for a return to multiparty politics in Zambia. The organization was explicitly not organized as a political party, in order to steer clear of violating Zambia's prohibition of multiparty politics. This care went as far as the name of the organization itself. Several of my interviewees who attended the Garden House meeting vividly recalled the debate over this issues. The original name for the organization had been the "Alliance for Democracy and Development." Fear that this name made the organization sound too much like a political party prompted the organizers to change the name to the "Movement for Multi-Party Democracy."

The various strands of anti-government activism came together in MMD's early leaders. The founding executive committee included alienated elites from the old regime such as Arthur Wina, Vernon Mwaanga, and Keli Walubita as well as ZCTU chairman Frederick Chiluba. Akashambata Mbikusita-Lewanika and many of the so-called "intellectual" wing of the opposition dominated the MMD secretariat.

MMD was able to rapidly organize opposition to the one-party state. In large part they drew on the pre-existing national structures of the ZCTU, a fact that gave ZCTU chairman Chiluba outsized influence in the organization. In addition to ZCTU, though, a number of other semi-autonomous opposition groups had arisen in the previous years. One interviewee reported how he joined a small cell in Ndola planning resistance to the one-party state after an informal conversation on a minibus. Their cell met weekly: “only a hundred meters from the police station!” Once the national-level structure of the MMD had been formed, these groups quickly integrated into this structure as well.

MMD’s initial goal was to get President Kaunda to allow a return to multiparty politics through a national referendum. However, in late 1990 President Kaunda, instead of following his initial plan for a referendum, instead called on the UNIP national assembly to change Article four of the Zambian constitution (the Article banning parties outside of UNIP), and announced that he would cut short his term to allow for a presidential election in 1991. In general, my interviewees agreed that this was a strategic move on Kaunda’s part (though ultimately it ended up being a strategic blunder). Kaunda was not confident that he would succeed in a referendum, and if the referendum passed, waiting until the next scheduled presidential election in 1993 would give the nascent opposition forces too much time to mobilize around a single presidential candidate.

With this change in political environment, MMD was faced with the question of how to continue to pursue its goals. The organization’s leadership decided to repurpose themselves as a political party competing with UNIP in the 1991 elections. Some competition among the various leaders of the party eventually resulted in Frederick Chiluba becoming the party’s candidate for President.

On no subject were interviewees so divided as the character and personality of Frederick Chiluba. Some described him as a strong, principled leader whose strength of character and commitment to democratic principle were crucial in moving Zambia to a democratic system. Such is certainly the picture that emerges in Chiluba's own writing on his involvement in the struggle for multi-party democracy, first in the ZCTU and later in the MMD. The greatest example of this is Chiluba's 1994 master's thesis, written during his first term as President of Zambia. The thesis is a powerful critique of the one-party state, arguing that the system set up by Kaunda was fundamentally untenable from the beginning, and offers many strong arguments both for the superiority of a fully democratic system and the necessary steps for moving Zambia towards a greater and more sustainable democracy. In particular, Chiluba argues for the need for a greater democratic culture among elites, more systematic means of political engagement for ordinary citizens, and the reform of many of Zambia's formal political institutions.

However, many interviewees painted a much darker picture of Zambia's second president. Most common was the picture of a political opportunist. In the words of one interviewee: "Chiluba's goal was always the president's seat. Beyond that he didn't care" According to these interviewees Chiluba was fundamentally ambiguous when it came to actual democratic institutions. He had no particularly pro or anti-democratic preferences from the beginning. Instead, he was solely interested in his own personal wealth and prestige. The limited space for personal advancement afforded by the one-party state pushed Chiluba first into the trade unions and then into the opposition. Once he became president, he then used the office for personal enrichment but beyond this level of corruption was a fairly benign and even positive influence.

The third picture of Chiluba is much darker, that of a ruthless narcissist with dictatorial tendencies and deep insecurities that drove him to unrelentingly attack all those who threatened his position. Not pro-democratic, or even neutral towards democracy, but rabidly anti-democratic throughout his entire career. Some interviewees pointed as far back as Chiluba's rise to leadership of the ZCTU, and the often brutal methods by which he put down potential competitors to that position. Chiluba had been leader of ZCTU for seventeen years before he became MMD's presidential candidate and then president of Zambia in 1991. Once in power, these interviewees argued, the tools at Chiluba's disposal to enhance his own power and put down his rivals were radically expanded, and he used them to devastating effect.

There were other more shadowy accusations against Chiluba as well. Several interviewees reported a pattern of mysterious killings of prominent MMD figures or former MMD figures such as Emmanuel Kasonde or Ronald Penza. Deaths or unexpected suicides seemed to track many of those who had some kind of presidential aspiration during the Chiluba presidency.

Which of these pictures of President Chiluba is the true one? Answering that question goes well beyond the scope of this research. Yet, in a sense, this psychological question is ultimately irrelevant to my larger argument. Regardless of the actual psychological motivations of President Chiluba, what all interviewees shared was a strong emphasis on Chiluba's agency. As an individual, Chiluba made key decisions that shifted the Zambian transition in important ways. The structural story was certainly important. Many interviewees discussed the constraining effects of poverty, an international system dominated by donor states more interested in dictating from above rather than allowing autonomy to develop from below, and other factors beyond the control of Chiluba and the new MMD government. However, these

factors acted as shoves, not puppet strings. Chiluba and the major figures of the MMD government, as well as Zambian civil society and the population as a whole, made choices that pushed the transition. I now turn to a discussion of these larger set of social decisions.

With Chiluba as its presidential candidate, the MMD was fully repurposed as a political party. They developed an extensive nationwide infrastructure, and fielded candidates for parliamentary seats across the country. The MMD leaders traveled extensively, holding rallies in urban and rural areas in every province in Zambia. Interviewees reported an electric atmosphere, an almost boundless feeling of optimism over the possibility for change and the country's potential if new leadership could be brought into power.

While there were some scattered incidents of violence against the MMD, on the whole government repression was fairly minimal. President Kaunda attempted to use the machinery and resources of the state to support his own campaign, and the Public Order Act was deployed from time to time to suppress MMD public gatherings, but for the most part political elites and ordinary Zambians felt the winds of change, saw the intense popularity of MMD, and rather than resist attempted to work out accommodations with this new political force. In the lead-up to the 1991 election defections from UNIP to MMD were rapid and widespread. One of the most high-profile of these was future President of Zambia Michael Sata, a UNIP MP and long-time political fixer who brought a significant political machinery along with him.

The MMD in Power

The MMD domination of the 1991 election was staggering. Out of 150 seats in the Zambian national assembly, MMD candidates won 125. This was despite the fact that during the election President Kaunda and the UNIP leadership continued to use the state resources at their

disposal to improve their electoral prospects. The vote totals for MMD candidates in many constituencies went over 90%. In the presidential contest, Chiluba won the presidency with 76% of the vote. The Zambian electorate had sent an overwhelmingly powerful message demanding change and endorsing the MMD.

Thus, while MMD of course campaigned as the champions of multi-party democracy, they effectively entered power almost as a new single party regime, to the extent that some observers described the 1991 election as nothing more than a move from a “*de jure to de facto* one party state” (Chikulo, 1993, p. 99). Their domination in the national assembly and the presidency gave them almost unlimited power both to reshape the ranks of government and to change laws and even the Zambian constitution. To be effective, any resistance would have to come from within the ranks of the MMD or from forces outside of politics.

Resistance within MMD began to develop around a year after the 1991 election when a small number of prominent MMD figures, including the convener of the Garden House meeting Akashambatwa Mbikusita-Lewanika, resigned from their positions in the Chiluba government over accusations of corruption. Aka, Baldwin Nkumbula, and others who resigned moved to form an opposition party: the National Party. The pattern was repeated several times throughout the Chiluba presidency, including perhaps most prominently in 1996-97, when Vice President Levy Mwanawasa resigned over accusations of corruption.⁶⁰

Yet, despite this fragmentation of the MMD, no serious political opposition emerged from these defections. All of the parties that emerged from the MMD defectors remained

⁶⁰ This incident is discussed in-depth in Malupenga 2009.

extremely small, with little or no ability to directly influence policy and few card-carrying members. In the 1996 election, MMD in fact expanded its majority from 125 to 131 seats.

The MMD's dominance in the 1996 election was enhanced because the one opposition force not emerging from its ranks: the rump UNIP, chose to boycott the election following the changes to the Zambian constitution that barred former President Kaunda, UNIP's leader, from running for the presidency.

The interaction between the MMD and UNIP during this period provide interesting insights into the maximalism challenge, which proved to be relevant even in an environment of fairly low mobilization. After a brief retirement, Kaunda returned as leader of UNIP and began strenuously pushing against the MMD government, rapidly advocating for civil disobedience and even describing the MMD government as a government that: "should be fought in the same way UNIP fought the colonial government" (Ihonvbere, 1995, p. 95). In 1993 several UNIP leaders, including Kaunda's son Wezi Kaunda, developed a plan to carry out this fight, the so-called "Zero Option" plan, that planned to overthrow the government prior to the 1996 elections through a combination of fostering divisions within MMD and orchestrating a nationwide campaign of strikes and demonstrations. The plan also called for more sinister attempts to disrupt MMD rule through, for instance, paying unemployed young men to initiate a wave of thefts and other petty crimes in major town centers in order to create a feeling of chaos and insecurity around the country (Ihonvbere, 1995, p. 99) This plan was never implemented, but badly shook the MMD government and led to the arrests of a number of 26 UNIP leaders, and a brief declaration of a state of emergency.

Following the disruption of the “Zero Option” plan, Kaunda shifted tactics and began making moves to run against President Chiluba in the 1996 presidential election. President Chiluba threw the whole mechanism of the Zambian state against him. The Public Order Act, a holdover from colonial days used throughout Zambian history to suppress political opposition, was employed extensively against UNIP rallies. Kaunda was arrested, and even physically attacked during his political activities. And finally, in early 1996 President Chiluba orchestrated an amendment to the Zambian constitution that barred from the presidency all people lacking two parents born in Zambia, anyone who had previously served two presidential terms, and traditional chiefs. The only potential contender for the presidency at that time to whom the first two stipulations would apply was President Kaunda, while the third stipulation eliminated the UNIP deputy leader Chief Inyambo Yeta.⁶¹

Thus formal political opposition was largely ineffective in providing a check on the MMD once in power. What of informal political forces from civil society?

The return of multi-party democracy doubtlessly expanded the space for civil society to function, something attested to by many different interviewees involved in civil society during this period. The sheer number of civil society groups expanded significantly, and they put pressure on the MMD government on a number of different front. The Zambian women’s movement, for instance, which had played a prominent role in the movement against the one-party state, engaged in a great deal of advocacy on a number of issues. A growing free press, perhaps best embodied in the Post newspaper, also engaged in significant criticism of the government.

⁶¹ In an ironic twist, though, it is possible that the constitutional provision would have actually disqualified Chiluba himself, as Zambian media revealed significant evidence that Chiluba’s parents originally came from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Reynolds, 1999, p. 154).

However, these efforts to hold the MMD government accountable were significantly hampered by a lack of grassroots public support. Elite civil society groups were largely reliant on foreign sources of funding and support, and had relatively limited levels of success in mobilizing ordinary Zambians to engage in serious political activism.

This declining mobilization and level of political engagement is evidenced by the fact that political participation actually declined from its levels in the one-party state after the transition to multiparty politics. Elections under the one-party state had participation levels estimated at about 39% of the eligible electorate. In the 1996 election this dropped to around 30% (Erdmann & Simuntanyi, 2003, p. 29). The numbers are even more striking in the elections that took place between these two presidential elections. In local elections in 1992 only 14% of registered voters took part, while parliamentary by-elections between 1991 and 1994 averaged turnout of only 21% of registered voters (Bratton, 1999, p. 555).

The decline in formal methods of political participation was matched by a precipitous decline in informal or non-institutional methods of political participation. While the labor movement did engage in a series of strikes in protest against the MMD's moves to privatize state resources and shrink the size of the state (Ihonvbere, 1995, p. 16), Zambians as a whole largely eschewed any kind of mass political participation.⁶² A comprehensive political participation survey in 1996 found that only 6 percent of Zambians had participated in even a single political demonstration, march, or rally in the five years between the 1991 election and 1996 election (Bratton, Alderfer, & Simutanyi, 1997, p. 7).

⁶² An important point here is that, while the trade union movement played an important role in the organization of the MMD, trade union participation in Zambia is actually quite low. In a 1993 survey only 2% of respondents reported membership in any kind of trade union (Bratton, 1999, p. 560).

In this mobilizational vacuum, the MMD government steadily moved away from the principles on which the movement had been founded. Perhaps the most visible of these moves away was in the area of corruption. While the extent of corruption is difficult to measure, and interviewees disagreed significantly on its pervasiveness in the Chiluba administration, that President Chiluba presided over a significant increase in corruption from the Kaunda years is undeniable.

Second, MMD showed itself increasingly intolerant of the political opposition. The attacks on Kaunda and UNIP mentioned above were the most prominent but by no means the only example of this. The 1996 election was a significant step down in democratic quality from the 1991 election in which the MMD had first come to power. In the lead-up to the election the government launched a voter registration effort contracted out to the Israeli company NIKUV that systematically excluded rural voters and was rife with irregularities (Reynolds, 1999, p. 155). The MMD also freely manipulated media coverage in its favor, and liberally used the stipulations of the Public Order Act to prevent its political rivals from holding public meetings. This manipulation of the political playing field led almost all international and domestic observers of the election to conclude that the election had been far from “free and fair” (National Democratic Institute, 1997)

Third, MMD failed to deliver on its promise of fundamentally re-shaping the Zambian political system. While in opposition to the one-party state, the MMD had promised that, once in power, they would rewrite the Zambian constitution to encourage greater democracy, particularly by ending the public order act and curtailing the power of the president in appointing government officials. A constitutional review did take place beginning in 1993 under the mantle of the Manakatwe Commission. However, the government ignored almost all of the

commission's recommendations and the only changes were those previously mentioned which targeted former president Kaunda.

Fourth, MMD followed the practice of UNIP in highly politicizing not just the top officials in the government but the government as a whole, using government resources and jobs in the civil service as political patronage.

Why did the MMD follow these trends? I argue that low mobilization, as well as high integration (or co-optation) by former leaders in the one-party state were key factors. One interviewee laughed when asked about the challenges of democratization: "these guys were all UNIP. What did you expect they would do?" While many of the early leaders of the MMD had emerged from civil society groups, by the time MMD had been in power for a few years it was fully dominated by elites from the old UNIP government, whose experience in administration and professional norms were overwhelmingly those of a non-democratic regime.

These norms and preferences might have been shaped to a greater degree by popular pressure to do so. After all, many of these leaders had defected from the one-party government while the outcome of the struggle for multi-party democracy was by no means fully decided. They had strongly espoused democratic principles when the Zambian people were out en masse to push for them. But in the politically demobilized moment of the first few years of the Chiluba administration, old regime elites found themselves with a relatively free hand to operate as they pleased.

Why did these patterns occur? Interviewees offered various reasons. Most argued that cultural values related to "patience" were important factors. "Zambians are a very patient people..." one interviewee related. "We won't do anything until we are really pushed." There

were certainly also active efforts on the part of the government to demobilize potential opposition outside of the MMD, through the liberal use of the public order act and the strategic deployment of political patronage. One interviewee involved in opposition politics during the 1990s related an incident in which he was called into President Chiluba's office in the lead-up to the 1996 election. President Chiluba told him that his activism was disruptive, and offered to give him and his party a specific number of seats in parliament in the upcoming election if they would agree to stop mobilizing against him. After this opposition figure refused he was later attacked by MMD supporters at a rally, leading to significant injuries.

The power of popular mobilization to shape elite preferences is shown in another episode of major civil resistance that occurred at the end of President Chiluba's second term in 2001. In the last few years of Chiluba's second term many interviewees both from politics and civil society reported concern that no steps were being taken to prepare a successor for the presidency. As 2001 grew closer, President Chiluba began explicitly making moves towards changing the constitution to allow him to run for a third term.

These moves sparked an immediate reaction within civil society. Organizations from the NGOCC in the women's movement to the Law Association of Zambia came together to form the Oasis Forum, an alliance of civil society groups that demanded that President Chiluba give up any attempt to run for a third term. The churches, including the evangelical churches, which had been major supporters of President Chiluba since his proclamation of Zambia as a Christian Nation, joined the Oasis Forum in condemning any moves for Chiluba to extend his time in office.

These moves had a powerful effect deep within President Chiluba's inner circle. Close advisors such as former Foreign Minister Vernon Mwaanga who had remained in place throughout the Chiluba presidency came together to tell President Chiluba that his time was up. The master political manipulator, who had sidelined all other major figures within MMD and made it almost his own personal fiefdom, found his pillars of political support collapsing under him. Faced with the prospect of losing the support of his party, President Chiluba backed off from his attempts to push for a third term and instead agreed to give the MMD nomination to his former Vice President Levy Mwanawasa, a widely-admired figure that was judged to be acceptable to the civil society coalition that had orchestrated the movement against President Chiluba's third term.

It is beyond the scope of this analysis to detail Zambia's political history from Mwanawasa's presidency to the present. The relevant aspects of democratic quality and legitimacy have fluctuated in the decades since. Tribalism has become more relevant in recent years, particularly since the rise of current Zambian President Edgar Lungu. Yet my interviewees overall agreed that the general character of the Zambian political regime has remained consistent. The patterns of behavior set up during the political transition have been institutionalized and remain fairly consistent until today.

Analysis

How does the Zambian case match the predictions of my theory and the findings on the impact of mobilization, maximalism, and holdovers from my quantitative research?

That significant demobilization occurred after the MMD's 1991 ascension to power is clear. The reports of my interviewees also strongly supports the contention that this

demobilization gave significant leeway for the failure of the transition to result in a more fully democratic regime. There is similar strong evidence for the impact of a co-optation pattern of holdovers policy. MMD's heavy reliance on old UNIP loyalists to fundraise, mobilize, and campaign on its behalf put into power a great number of people whose primary goal in ousting President Kaunda was not to fundamentally change the Zambian state but who joined the movement in order to gain power and prestige for themselves in an elite semi-democracy.

Maximalism, as evidenced on the one hand by UNIP and the "Zero Option" plan and by the MMD's attempts to shut President Kaunda out of the political process also played a significant role in undermining Zambia's democratic development. This is a surprising element, considering that mobilization was quite low, even for UNIP, and thus one might expect maximalism from such a minor political force to have a relatively minor impact. The outsized impact can in part be explained by UNIP's history as a ruling party, and particularly by the larger than life figure of President Kaunda himself. Many of my interviewees who were involved in the MMD government in the 1990s spoke of the deep paranoia that President Chiluba felt concerning President Kaunda. This may have caused him to over-react to the UNIP threat.

So the patterns of behavior that I have described do seem to have had their expected impacts on Zambia's democratic development. Yet this is, of course, not the key question. The key question is whether these patterns of behavior are simply the result of a natural flow from deeper structural factors. Such determinism was certainly evident in some of my interviewees' attitudes towards the transition. Many major political figures in Zambia have become cynical about the prospects of popular action bringing about any kind of significant political change. Several looked back fondly on the Kaunda era, recalling the strict limits on corruption and powerful economic supports that were in place for the Zambian people even during the most

dictatorial periods of President Kaunda's rule. So, was it all for nothing? Was the outcome of the Zambian transition predetermined by structural factors? By the fact that Zambia is poor, or ethnically divided, or just in Africa?

Poverty, tribal divisions, colonial history, natural resources dependence, and regional context have doubtless played a role in shaping the outcome of the Zambian political system. Cultural attitudes are no doubt also an important factor in shaping the decision-making processes both of political elites and ordinary people. Yet the sharp breaks in political continuity and powerful moments of political mobilization in Zambia's history belie the plausibility of any simply structural story. Zambia first waged a peaceful struggle for independence under the British. Then in the 1980s until 1991 a panoply of political actors engaged in highly effective political struggle that brought an end to President Kaunda's single-party rule. Even in the context of a quasi-democratic system under President Chiluba, moments of political action were not absent, as evidenced by the struggle over the third term. While Zambians may be divided by ethnicity and held back by poverty and history, they have shown time and time again that when roused they can use nonviolent tools of political action to achieve astounding changes.

That these moments of intensely powerful nonviolent mobilization have failed to continue through periods of consolidation, leading to a less than perfectly democratic outcome, does not take away from their influence. Instead, it suggests powerfully that the strategic challenge of mobilization is itself that, a challenge. When it is not resolved successfully, democratic transitions have a tendency to break down. But when it is resolved, when the people hit the streets, even in conditions of powerful structural disadvantages, major changes can occur.

The particular resolution of this challenge in the Zambian case did not simply flow from the strategic alignments given by the pre-existing economic, social, and cultural structure of Zambia, but instead was shaped by the choices made during the period itself. For instance, as Sishuwa Sishuwa writes regarding politics in Zambia during the Chiluba years:

“Opposition leaders...played their hands badly. A closer examination of the nature of leadership during this period would reveal that many of the most prominent opposition actors were elitists who failed to take politics out of the boardroom and onto the streets. They lacked a language with which to connect their political agenda with the demands or concerns of the electorate, the majority of whom lived in abject poverty, and so failed to build grassroots support networks” (Sishuwa, 2012, p. 364).

The outcomes did not flow simply from the “hand” dealt to Zambia by the past, but how this “hand” was played in the moment by political leaders.

What alternative explanations are there for the outcome of the transition in Zambia?

Perhaps the most common is one related to modernization theory. Many interviewees attributed Zambia’s failure to democratize to the low levels of socio-economic development that characterize the country. Poverty, according to many of these arguments, played the definitive role in the demobilization that allowed a small group of elites to take control of the Zambian government and turn it to their own ends.

While there are certainly truthful elements to this story, I find it ultimately unsatisfying for two key reasons: first, it fails to explain well the most important event of this transitional story: the 1990-91 movement itself. And in fact the indicators of modernization are deployed to explain both mobilization and demobilization. On the one hand, the poverty engendered by economic difficulty in the 1980s is used as a factor to explain why the Zambian people were amenable to the mass mobilization that was necessary to oust Kaunda and bring the MMD to

power, while on the other it is also deployed to explain why, a few years later, the same group of people were *de*-mobilized and unable to hold this new government to account.

Second, data on political participation in Zambia during this period gives no support to the traditional contention that poverty undermines democratic participation or attitudes. In a 1993 survey Bratton found that poverty had no impact on Zambians' likelihood to participate in politics, and increasing levels of education actually had a negative impact on the likelihood of participation (Bratton, 1999, p. 561). Similarly, a 1996 survey by Bratton, Alderfer, and Simutanyi found that traditional socio-economic measures had inconsistent impacts on political participation (Bratton, Alderfer, & Simutanyi, 1997, pp. 17-18). If the modernization story were correct, the data should look very different. We would expect to see low levels of political participation and support for democracy among the poor, rural, uneducated segments of Zambian society. That such patterns almost fully fail to obtain suggests that something very different is going on.

Clearly poverty plays a significant role in Zambian politics. Economic development or the lack thereof is a central axis of political contention. As the literature shows and as I also show in my quantitative testing, modernization plays a significant role in shaping democratization outcomes. Yet this role is mediated by a long list of strategic choices and patterns of behavior made by those who come into power and the people who enable them to do so.

Zambia, as an elite semi-democracy, is perhaps an excellent example of the elite theory of democratization. But here too, as in Nepal, a close examination of the facts makes the theory's application problematic. The old question of who counts as an elite is relevant – the

1991 movement elevated a number of figures who had been marginal in the old regime. One might interpret this as elite circulation, along the lines of classical elite theory (Mosca, 1939; Pareto, 1915). Yet many of these “new elites” quickly fell out of political favor and proved unable to actually pursue their policy agenda. So were they ever elites in the first place? How can one judge an intensely powerful impact for a relatively short period of time that falls away?

Next, one might argue that there was an elite consensus against a full-fledged liberal democratic regime, and that the elite semi-democracy was always the goal of the movement. Yet to do so requires a great deal of *post hoc* reconstruction. The MMD manifesto, for instance, is a document of sterling democratic intention, focused on goals that even the most critical democratic analyst would find difficult to criticize. Similarly, the reports of the political elites themselves in interviews indicate a significant degree of consensus on the preferability of a liberal democratic system. One may, of course, assume that such statements are deceptive, but to do so on the basis of outcomes is, again, not using elite consensus for or against democracy as a means of predicting a democratic or non-democratic outcome but instead defining the lack of an elite consensus on the basis of a failure to democratize.

Furthermore, the elite theory of democratization is belied by the fact that the initiative for both of the major changes in Zambia’s political system: the 1991 movement for multi-party democracy and the 2001 movement against President Chiluba’s third term, emerged from outside of the ranks of the political elites, and political elites were forced to respond to it. Far from serving as the force initiating major transformations, political elites for the most part proved themselves to act more as adaptors, shaping their actions in response to the pressures that they received from outside.

I find my focus on policy towards holdovers as a transitional challenge a much more satisfying way of dealing with the question of the impact of elites. Instead of assuming that we can treat elites as a single category and judge their degree of preference and consensus towards democracy as an explanatory factor, my approach instead assumes that individuals come to politics in transitional times with varying degrees of political power and preferences. Those whose background and socialization are in the leadership of a non-democratic regime are likely to hold preferences and engage in patterns of political behavior that are opposed to a full-fledged democratic regime. When such figures are given significant latitude to integrate into a fledgling democratic regime they are likely to shift the regime in directions that will undermine democratization.

This is, in fact, quite close to what we observe when looking at the Zambian transition. Erstwhile UNIP leaders who had a brief democratic awakening when the mobilization of the 1990-1991 movement made it in their interest to have one moved rapidly to appropriating the state for personal benefit and undermining the democratic character of the new regime once in place. Rather than attempting to divine the preferences and degree of unity amongst the nebulous category of “the elite” we can gain more insight by looking directly at the avenues of access to power in the new regime that were open to these figures on the basis of the levels of mobilization and the formal and informal policy towards holdovers adopted during the transition.

Can Zambia’s failure to democratize be attributed simply to “cultural factors” of passivity and a preference for patronage politics? As with poverty, it seems clear from the literature and my own interview research that these factors play an important role in shaping the dynamics of mobilization and holdovers policy that I focus on. Yet the dynamic character of

these events also belies the explanatory usefulness of a single focus on “culture.” Can a “passive” culture explain Kaunda’s ouster? Or the resistance to Chiluba’s third term? At the very least Zambian political culture is a complex, involved factor that sometimes can explain some degree of mobilization and at other times a degree of demobilization. Culture helps to set the stage, but patterns of agential behavior make up the play.

In conclusion, while the picture is complex, a close analysis of the Zambian transition generally supports my theory and the findings from my quantitative research. The particular constellation of patterns of behavior relative to mobilization, maximalism, and holdovers have resulted in a regime that closely approximates my description of an elite semi-democracy. These patterns, while influenced by prior structural factors, are not fully determined by them, nor can the outcome be satisfactorily explained by a focus on the preferences of elites or the traditional focus in transitology on elite pact-making.


Having covered regimes that approximated my two medial categories of fractious semi-democracy and elite semi-democracy I now turn to analyzing a case of successful democratization in the aftermath of a Civil Resistance Transition: the transition to democracy in Brazil in the 1980s.

Chapter 5: Brazil: Moderation and Mobilization

In this final case study chapter I trace Brazil's transition from military rule to democracy in the 1980s. I argue that Brazil is an example of a successful transition to democracy. In recent years the country has certainly experienced democratic challenges, particularly related to corruption. Yet since the transition to civilian rule in 1985 and the promulgation of the new constitution in 1988, Brazil's political system has been broadly representative, its elections have been widely considered free and fair, and its protections for human rights and fundamental freedoms have been robust. The system is imperfect, as all political systems are, but well exceeds Schumpeter's threshold and in some respects even approaches Dahl's ideal.

Brazil scores quite highly on the most highly-respected cross-national quantitative measures of democracy. Figure 5.1 below replicates the figures from Chapters three and four, showing Brazil's scores on the Polyarchy, Polity, and Unified Democracy scores in the ten years before and after the beginning of the transition in 1985. Even the lowest of these, the Unified Democracy Score, rates Brazil as at least minimally across the threshold of a democratic regime, and Polity and Polyarchy rate the regime as quite highly democratic.

Figure 5.1: Brazil's Democracy Index Scores



Brazil follows two out of the three patterns that I theorize would push a country towards a more democratic regime. Political and social mobilization remained extremely high after the initial democratic breakthrough in 1985. This mobilization took a number of forms, with the greatest emphasis focused on advocating for protections to be incorporated in the 1988 constitution. Brazil's labor movement was one major source of this mobilization, both within the constitution-writing process and outside in day to day struggles for greater labor rights and protections. This mobilization successfully constrained potential anti-democratic forces and helped push the Brazilian transition towards a more full-fledged democratic regime.

Mobilization during the transition also almost universally took non-maximalist forms, with the focus of most major actors on working within the confines of the new constitutional system. Brazil's major political actors, even those associated with the old authoritarian regime, focused their attentions not on all-or-nothing grabs for power at the center but on developing cooperative relationships for mutual benefit based on responding to a diverse set of pressures

from the broader society. Even formerly maximalist actors such as the Communist Party of Brazil (PCdoB) focused on engaging in institutionalized, electoral politics rather than seeking to fundamentally disrupt the political system. This is particularly surprising considering Brazil's long history of "political activism" overcoming "legalism" as numerous political actors relied on whatever means necessary to achieve their goals (Schneider, 1991, p. 9).

Where Brazil diverges from my theory's expected patterns of behavior is in its policy towards the holdovers of the old regime. Instead of pursuing a middle of the road integration policy with some , as I argue is most likely to lead to democracy, Brazil engaged in almost no punishment or exclusion of figures from the old regime. A wide-ranging amnesty law from 1979 protected almost all figures from the old regime from prosecution, and the nature of the transition meant that from the beginning leading figures in the new government were the same elites who had dominated during the period of military rule. This is perhaps best captured by the fact that Brazil's first civilian president after military rule, Jose Sarney, was a defector from the military government's political party, in which he had been a central figure. This undermines my argument that an integration-based "holdovers" policy is an important factor shaping the likelihood of post-transition democracy, and accords with the statistical evidence showing that holdovers policy has an inconsistent effect on democratic outcomes.

However, this lack of accountability has not been without consequences for the quality of Brazil's democracy. A number of interviewees pointed to amnesty as a major factor undermining the quality of Brazil's democracy and leading to a modern politics that is characterized to a significant degree by clientelist relationships (Avritzer, 1995).

My research strategy in approaching the Brazilian case was slightly different than my strategy in Nepal and Zambia. The events in question are further removed in time. The country's political and social elites are also much more widely dispersed, with major figures distributed among urban centers such as Brasilia, Sao Paolo, Rio de Janeiro, Porto Allegre, and many others. Thus, it was less feasible for me to conduct a large number of primary source interviews. Hence, my analysis in this chapter relies on the scholarly literature to a much greater degree than in the other two chapters. Brazil's transition has been a major topic for scholars of democratization, providing an extensive amount of prior scholarly work that I could easily mine for insights. I was able to conduct a limited number of interviews through Brazilian research assistants, which supplement and deepen the insights of the scholarly literature.

In this chapter first I briefly describe the historical and political context for Brazil's transition to democracy, then trace the events of the transition itself, focusing on the role played by continued mobilization and the move towards institutionalized politics rather than maximalism. I conclude with an analysis of the role of these challenges in the Brazilian transition and make an argument for their importance.

Brazil: The Road to Military Government and Out of it Again

Brazil is a vast and diverse country, with a rich history and deeply complex political dynamics even within its many regions, much less at the level of the national government. The history I sketch here will be only the briefest overview in order to set the stage for the events of the 1985 transition.

Modern Brazil's history begins with Portugese colonialism in 1500. After a period of colonial rule, the country became independent in 1822 as the Empire of Brazil under the rule of

Pedro I. The imperial period was followed by the revolution of 1889, which shifted the country ostensibly to a republic, but one which was dominated by a small class of large landowners.

The old republic came to an end in 1930 when the so-called “coffee with milk policy” of power-sharing between the most populous and powerful states of Sao Paulo and Minas Gerais broke down and led to an armed conflict. This revolution brought opposition politician Getulio Vargas to power. Vargas initially ruled as a more or less democratic ruler, but following rumors of a Communist coup centralized power in his own hands in 1938, leading to the establishment of the corporatist, quasi-fascist *Estado Novo*. Vargas ruled Brazil until 1945, when he was deposed in a military coup.

Vargas’ ouster led to an almost twenty year period of democratic rule. Yet Brazil’s nascent democracy collapsed in 1964 when rumors that President Joao Goulart was planning on attempting major land reform initiatives triggered a military coup.

Brazil’s military regime initially waged an intense repressive campaign to suppress political opposition and concentrate power in their hands. However, throughout their period of rule the regime always maintained a degree of at least nominal adherence to quasi-democratic institutions, prompting Juan Linz to observe in 1973 that Brazil did not have an authoritarian regime but rather simply an authoritarian “situation” (Linz J. , 1973).

In particular the military regime sought to institutionalize and incorporate opposition to the regime. Their primary strategy to achieve this goal was through outlawing all pre-1964 political parties and establishing a government-mandated two-party system (Kinzo, 1988). In this system the military’s conservative allies ruled through the *Aliança Renovadora Nacional* (ARENA), or National Renewal Alliance, and the opposition was represented through the

Movimento Democrático Brasileiro MDB), or Brazilian Democratic Movement, the government-sanctioned “loyal opposition” party. The MDB was permitted to contest elections, and even sometimes to win them, but the electoral and governing institutions were heavily tilted to advantage ARENA and maintain a firm hold on power by elites loyal to the military.

Brazil’s period of military rule was defined by the various generals who assumed the presidency during this period. Brazil’s military was heavily factionalized, and the various factions’ visions of the goals of military rule diverged widely (Zirker, 1986). Under Presidents Castelo Branco, Costa e Silva, and Medici the regime assumed a set of highly repressive policies, particularly the fifth institutional act (AI-5) of 1968, which centralized power in the executive branch, suspended rights of *habeus corpus*, and severely restricted freedom of the press, freedom of expression and freedom of assembly.

These extremely repressive measures sparked a backlash. Several different opposition groups attempted to organize violent insurgency-based opposition to the military regime. One of the most prominent of these were the so-called “Araguaia Guerrillas,” organized by the Communist Party of Brazil (PCdoB).⁶³ The PCdoB had broken off from the more mainstream Brazilian Communist Party (PCB) over the question of achieving the goal of a single-party Communist state through armed insurrection even prior to the military coup of 1964. The coup provided the impetus for accelerating their efforts and beginning to create cells of guerrillas in the jungles of the Araguaia region. The guerrillas followed the Maoist model of “prolonged popular war,” and some had received military training in China. The Brazilian military was extremely effective at suppressing this movement. By the early 1970s, through a combination

⁶³ For more on the Araguaia Guerrillas and other violent opposition to the military regime see Teles 2017, Almeida 2015.

of intensive intelligence operations and application of overwhelming military force the guerrillas had been almost entirely eliminated, with their leaders arrested, killed, or driven into exile.

A period of liberalization began with the ascension to the presidency of Ernesto Geisel in 1974. Geisel began lifting some of the heavy restrictions on freedom of assembly, and to allow for greater civil society mobilization. The goal of the liberalization was primarily to enhance the legitimacy of military rule by allowing the façade of popular participation while still maintaining a heavy authoritarian control on the scope of opposition to the government (Lamounier, 1989).

The response was a flowering of various social movements. The Catholic Church played a crucial role in this flowering. Traditionally a conservative force in Brazilian politics, the dynamics of the Catholic Church in Brazil, as in much of Latin America, had begun to change in the aftermath of the Vatican II council in the early 1960s and the Medellín Council of Latin American bishops in 1968. On an elite level, by the 1970s the leadership of the Brazilian Catholic Church, organized under the National Conference of Brazilian Bishops (CNBB), began sponsoring programs for social change, focused around a “centrist defense of civil liberties and human rights” (Della Cava, 1989, p. 146), in particular expressing opposition to torture and other authoritarian excesses. On the grassroots level, much more radical clergy and laypeople engaged in much more direct activism through the formation of the Ecumenical Base Communities, or CEBs, small local cells that functioned as crucial brokers between the various sections of Brazil’s emerging civil society.

The regime still heavily limited the degree to which social organizations could directly question the state, and so few focused on the issue of democratization. Instead there was a diversity of different movement goals, based on the type of organization. One interviewee

spoke about how his organization “did not directly call for the end of the military regime. But we discussed things that could be worked on in a new system.” Yet the overall frame of resisting authoritarianism gave a sense of unity to these disparate social movements (Hochstetler, 2000, p. 166). A vast number of neighborhood movements, for example, grew to advocate for the interests of people in particular localities. These often began as simple service delivery organizations, but when confronted by the political nature of the challenges facing their communities often escalated their activity to direct advocacy (Mainwaring, 1989). Mother’s groups and neighborhood women’s groups also emerged to advocate for the rights of women (Alvarez, 1989), and linked the struggle for women’s freedom in the home with freedom from the violence of authoritarian rule (Nelson, 1996).

A resurgent labor movement also began to take shape, primarily in the industrial areas of Sao Paulo State’s ABCD region. During the *Estado Novo* period under President Vargas, the Brazilian government had created a set of labor institutions that severely limited the power of unions. Union leaders were designed to be almost civil servants whose responsibility was not to advocate for the interests of their union members but instead to ensure harmony between workers and the government (Keck, 1992). A large portion of union expenses were paid through a union tax collected by the government and distributed to union leaders. The primary responsibility of union leaders was to oversee the distribution of social security benefits, a task that cemented their role as government functionaries and undermined any sense of an independent power base.

Thus, for much of the military regime there had been little in the way of labor organizing, despite the fact that the Brazilian military regime was explicitly focused on a highly unequal, internationalist, neoliberal mode of development. However, the end of Brazil’s

“economic miracle” as growth rates declined in the late 1970s due in part to the shock to oil prices due to the OPEC embargo, along with the widening space for organization because of the government’s liberalization process, led to increased levels of activity.

The first major example of organization came in response to the revelation in 1977 that the government had been falsifying inflation indexing numbers, resulting in a severe underpayment for workers in several different unions (Keck, 1992, pp. 63-64). Luis Inacio “Lula” da Silva, the President of the Sao Paulo Metalworkers’ Union, revealed the government’s deception and demanded that the salary numbers be adjusted.

This initial example of resistance on a labor level helped lead to a massive strike wave in 1978 and 1979. During the wave of strikes hundreds of thousands of workers across dozens of industries went on strike over various labor demands. Lula, the Metalworkers’ Union leader, emerged as a touchstone in these strikes, a powerful charismatic figure able to rally huge crowds of workers and to frame the demands of the working class for social, economic, and political change in way that had not previously been articulated.

The strikes of 1979 coincided with a strategic re-calculation by the government. The MDB had successfully used the enforced two-party system as a way of transforming elections into plebiscites on the government’s performance. Particularly as Brazil’s economic fortunes worsened, this meant that, despite electoral rules that heavily favored ARENA, the MDB was increasingly gaining seats in the Brazilian Congress, as well as local positions around the country. As the only legal anti-government party, MDB aggregated a wide set of diverse social and political forces under its banner.

Thus, the government sought to disrupt MDB's electoral momentum by changing the laws to allow for the creation of multiple parties. The rules for party creation were still extremely strict – in order to be formed parties had to demonstrate a wide degree of geographic dispersion, as well as meet high electoral thresholds. Radical leftist parties such as the Community Party of Brazil (Portuguese acronym PCdoB) were still illegal.

Perhaps the most significant long-term consequence of the party liberalization law was the creation of the Worker's Party (PT) as an outgrowth of the revitalized labor movement under leaders such as Lula. Unlike Brazil's traditional political parties, including the MDB (now renamed the PMDB in accord with the naming rules in the new party law), the PT from the start was a party with a mass base and membership that was highly invested in party structure. The PT also incorporated a significant degree of intra-party democracy, choosing candidates through mechanisms in which party members were able to select candidates independent of the preferences of party bosses (Keck, 1992, p. 112).

While the PT and a handful of other parties formed in response to the new party law, the PMDB was initially much more successful in making the case to the Brazilian people that they were the real alternative to military rule. The military was increasingly unpopular, and the appeal of opposition government was growing. The PMDB's leadership was under pressure to push for a rapid move to civilian government, but under leaders such as Fernando Henrique Cardoso they instead opted to work within the system to gradually assume control, rather than more directly confronting the military. Cardoso in particular made the argument that a direct confrontation with the military would lead to bloodshed, and that in the long term democratic

government could only be achieved not if the military was defeated but if it was brought on board with democratic change.

1982 was a crucial turning point in this process of growing PMDB strength. In the elections that year PMDB candidates assumed the governorships of Brazil's three largest states – a position with significant power and influence in Brazil's federal system, and took many federal deputy and senate seats.

In 1984 these winds of change broke into a storm as Brazil's social movements, the PT, and the PMDB came together in a massive campaign of civil resistance to push for an immediate end to military rule through an amendment to the constitution that would allow for direct elections to the presidency. Brazil's constitution at the time dictated that the president be elected through an indirect electoral college whose members were dominated by military loyalists.

The *Diretas Ja* (Direct Elections Now!) movement was the largest example of nonviolent resistance in Brazil's history, with millions taking to the streets to push for the amendment's passage. The movement failed in its immediate goal of passing a constitutional amendment. Yet the signaling of popular opposition to military rule forced major reconsiderations of the future among the military and their political elite allies. The goal of *abertura*: to create a stable foundation for continued quasi-authoritarian rule dominated by the military, would have to be re-thought. Since the beginning of Geisel's presidency the military had justified its rule by claiming that it was gradually preparing the country for democracy, that they did not want to rule indefinitely but that the transition to democracy must be very carefully managed by the traditional military and political hierarchy. It is unclear how exactly the military leadership and

their civilian allies intended for this process to take place. Yet it is clear that *diratas ja* signaled to many that the process would have to adapt to realities on the ground, and “spelled the death of authoritarianism in Brazil” (Avritzer, 1995, p. 256).

Perhaps the most consequential outcome of this significant demonstration of popular opposition to continuing authoritarian rule were widespread defections by a number of legislators from the government’s party, the PDS (Martinez-Lara, 1996, p. 34).⁶⁴ These legislators, interested in finding a role in what now, because of *Diratas Ja*, felt like an inevitable move to democratization, formed the center-right Liberal Front and began negotiating with centrists in the PMDB for an acceptable way of transitioning from military to civilian rule.

Top military leaders also began negotiating with the PMDB. The character of these negotiations remains largely a matter of speculation, and several of my interviewees reported that they could only offer vague assumptions about the specifics of what both sides agreed to give up to achieve a peaceful transition. Yet one almost definite demand from the government’s side was in who the PMDB would elevate as their candidate for President. The PMDB did not nominate long-time head and prominent dissident Ulysses Guimarães, but instead put forward the much more moderate PMDB governor of the state of Minas Gerais, Tancredo Neves.

The result of these defections and negotiations was that in the electoral college elections for the presidency in January 1985 Tancredo Neves defeated the PDS candidate Paolo Maluf. Former PDS party head and now leader of the Liberal Front Jose Sarney ran on Neves’

⁶⁴ The successor to ARENA after the party reform of 1979.

ticket as his vice president, bringing the PDS defectors on board and further assuaging fears from military leaders of a radical opposition victory.

The continuation of popular opposition during the period leading up to election served to secure Neves' position. Maluf extended wide patronage guarantees to the members of the electoral college and threatened defectors with retribution. Yet popular opinion polls showed that the Neves ticket had an almost three-to-one advantage over Maluf, and mass rallies held by Neves around the country demonstrated the continued willingness of large numbers of people to resist the continuation of military rule, should the military's allies attempt to undermine the PMDB ticket (Schneider, 1991, p. 302).

Brazil's first non-military president since the coup of 1964 was set to take office in 1985 and initiate a full-scale democratic transition.

The Brazilian Transition

A stroke of unkind fate changed the character of the Brazilian transition. Shortly before taking office, Tancredo Neves was taken ill and died on April 21st, 1985. The next steps were somewhat unclear. Jose Sarney, former head of ARENA and a long-time military loyalist, was the vice-president and thus had a certain claim to the presidency. However, since he had never been sworn in as the vice-president, the legal precedent for his taking office was not straightforward. Were Sarney not to take office, the presidency would fall to the Speaker of the House, Ulysses Guimaraes, a more radical leader of the PMDB with whom the military had some serious concerns. To ensure the stability of the transition, Guimaraes agreed to not contest the presidency, and swore Sarney in as Brazil's first civilian president since 1964 (Martinez-Lara, 1996, p. 52; Goertzel, 1999).

While the level of social mobilization did not reach the peak of the *Diretas Ja* movement, widespread popular opposition continued under the Sarney government. As Hochstetler writes:

“Although the mid-1980s did see significant changes in social movements organizing in Brazil, popular and middle-class actors did not retreat from active mobilization. In fact, they launched a new cycle of social movement protest...[which showed] social movements to be important and positive contributors to the effort to deepen Brazilian democracy” (Hochstetler, 2000, p. 163)

Many of the social movements that had struggled against the military regime felt that the new government was far from what they had wanted, particularly with Sarney at the helm. Furthermore, while the various social movements that had come together to make up the opposition had shared a desire for democratization, for many of them a shift to civilian government and direct elections was not the endpoint of their struggle, but rather the beginning point for advocacy for a greater set of rights (Keck, 1992, p. 2).

Popular movements born in the fires of resistance to authoritarian rule began considering the means by which they could turn the mobilization necessary to fight military rule into the creation of a genuine, fully participatory democracy (Della Cava, 1989, p. 152). These popular movements, while they had joined hands with the MDB and later PMDB to resist military rule, also for the most part remained autonomous from the MDB or any other political party structure. Thus they were able to maintain an external source of pressure over particular policy goals during the transition period (Mainwaring, 1989, p. 190; Avritzer, 1995). The strategies and slogans of resistance to authoritarian rule were repurposed for the goals of particular policy-based movements in the transition. For instance, the *Diretas Ja*, or “Direct

Elections Now” slogan of the movement against military rule was repurposed as *Planejamento Familiar Ja!* Or “Family Planning Now!” during the transition (Alvarez, 1989, p. 221).

Civil society movements were well aware of the potential for demobilization during the transition, and actively sought to counter those tendencies. As Martinez-Lara writes:

“[Popular movements] believed that organized efforts should be arranged in order to avoid the demobilizing effects of the ‘transition through transaction’ and to maximize the prospects of making a break with the past...aspirations for a more just society could only be achieved if popular pressure and participation were exercised” (Martinez-Lara, 1996, p. 86).

Thus mobilization during the transition was undertaken not just in reaction to immediate needs but as part of a wider vision of advancing a democratic agenda during the uncertain times of the transition.

Within the party system the PT, while they had allied with the PMDB over the issue of direct elections, had even at that time critiqued the PMDB as a bourgeois elite party that did not truly have the interests of workers at heart (Keck, 1992). Under Sarney the labor movement launched a wave of strikes that even exceeded their level of activity in 1978 and 1979 (Skidmore, 1988, p. 294). In 1989 over 3,000 strikes took place around the country, a massive increase even from the peak of pre-transition labor activism (Sandoval, 1993, p. 156). Environmental movements, women’s movements, neighborhood associations, and others continued their push for their own preferred policy agenda through this period.

Mobilization was also facilitated by widespread disillusionment with the Sarney government’s attempts to address Brazil’s economic woes through the so-called “Cruzado Plan.” This plan involved a series of macroeconomic interventions, including the creation of a new

currency and an extensive system of price controls, that were intended to fight inflation and stabilize Brazil's economy. While the Cruzado plan had some initial success in 1985 and 1986 by 1987 its effectiveness was waning, leading to an increase in popular opposition to President Sarney and his government.

High levels of mobilization and political engagement were evidenced by the high turnout in Brazil's first national elections after the return of civilian rule, with almost 95% of registered voters participating (Lamounier & Neto, Brazil, 2005, p. 175). The elections were particularly crucial as the legislature elected would also be tasked with serving as a constituent assembly to write Brazil's new constitution.

The PMDB dominated the 1986 election, winning roughly 55% of the seats in the Senate and Chamber of Deputies, an important majority as the rules of the constituent assembly dictated that the constitution would be passed by simple majority (Sa, 2014, p. 87) Yet as the PMDB increasingly became seen as "the government," its social movement allies began to mobilize against it in favor of their preferred policy positions. Vast numbers of people from different movements came to Brasilia to push the constituent assembly to include things such as greater human rights protections, and policies to address Brazil's high levels of poverty and inequality, in the new constitution. The PMDB, with its long history of simply being a forum for opposition to the military government, was also highly fragmented and had little capacity to act as a unified front.

While the constitution was not a full "people's constitution" in the sense that it was largely drafted by Brazil's political elite class, including a large number of legislators from the old PDS government, the advocacy of labor rights activists, human rights defenders, and others was

successful in gaining a number of different concessions from the government, leading to the creation, for example, of Brazil's national health service.

Civil society and social movement groups participated actively and heavily in the drafting of the constitution through the proposal of popular amendments. The diversity of these amendments and the large numbers of signatures obtained by the organizations pushing for them displays the depth and breadth of popular mobilization during the Brazilian transition. 122 popular amendments were sent to the assembly, by organizations as diverse as the labor unions, the agricultural cooperative movement, and the National Housewives Association (Sa, 2014).

While there was certainly a diversity of political opinions and strategies, as one might expect in such a large and diverse country, most mainstream Brazilian politicians also pursued fairly institutionalized, non-maximal strategies for achieving political power. Political party and social movement leaders tended to push for their preferred policy agendas within the framework of the constitutional convention, and to accept the outcome.

As scholars have observed, Brazil's transition, more than perhaps any other in Latin America, maintained the privileged position of the military (Hunter, 1997). The amnesty law of 1979 protected military figures from prosecution for human rights abuses committed during the military regime, and political deals that allowed elites to shift parties, for instance through the defection of senators from the PDS to the liberal party and the PMDB, allowed many of the old regime elites to stay in power. President Sarney, of course, as an old ARENA hand himself, was friendly to the prerogatives of the military and did not question the military leadership to a significant degree.

Part of this friendliness to the military regime was due to the relatively light nature of Brazilian military dictatorship. While the regime brutally suppressed Brazil's own Communist insurgency in the late 1960s, the regime had a much less checkered past than the military dictatorships in Brazil's neighbors such as Argentina and Chile. The numbers of recorded "disappearances," for instance, are quite slight for such a large country and compared to either of these other countries. Thus the impetus for a reckoning with the sins of the past was less intense. Furthermore, the political bargains that had been struck between the political elites who had cooperated closely with the military and those that had labored in the opposition hampered any efforts to clean the slate. The president himself had been a leader in ARENA, and the PMDB government was full of figures who had been part of the military system for its entire tenure.

Thus in terms of holdovers policy, Brazil went very far in the direction of co-optation. Elites from the *ancien regime* largely remained in positions of power and influence, simply adapting themselves to the new political dispensation. Nearly 50% of the members of Brazil's constituent assembly had, at some point, served in the military regime's allied party ARENA (de Souza, 1989, p. 355). However, for the most part these elites did not seek to undermine the democratic character of the new government but rather maintained their positions of political power through democratic means.

In 1988 Brazil's constituent assembly passed and promulgated Brazil's new constitution, formalizing the transition to a democratic regime. The passage of the constitution was followed soon afterwards by Brazil's first direct presidential election, in which a divided party space led to the surprise election of President Fernando Collor de Melo, a scion of one of Brazil's oldest

political families and a figure that, like President Sarney, had been closely associated with the old regime.

By most measures, and according to the reckoning of the majority of my interviewees, the election of President Collor indicated the end of the political transition, as new rules for achieving political power had been fully established and put into practice, such that political actors' expectations could converge around the new rules. However, because subsequent dramatic events played a role in the establishment of the new regime, and evidence the impact of nonviolent resistance on the Brazilian democratic regime, they bear some mention here.

President Collor had based his appeal primarily around his youth and a stated commitment to clear out old corrupt elites. Yet very quickly after beginning his presidential term it became apparent that the president himself was presiding over a deeply corrupt administration, centered around his family members. As these allegations became increasingly clear, Brazil's civil society began mobilizing to demand that the problem of corruption be addressed. Non-partisan mobilization around the issue of corruption reached a peak in late 1992, when numbers similar to those that had hit the streets during the *Diretas Ja* campaign returned to the public square to demand that Collor be impeached for his corrupt practices (Hochstetler, 2000, p. 171). Brazil's political parties responded by uniting in opposition to the president and, following the procedures laid out in the new constitution, impeaching him.

This episode is important because of the evidence it shows for the power of both high mobilization and low maximalism in Brazil's transitional and post-transitional politics. Even though the rules were relatively untested, and a move to more maximalist mobilization would have been eminently understandable, political forces for the most part did not take advantage

of this opportunity. Instead they followed the legal, institutionalized process, preserving the new democratic order.

Analysis

How well does my theory do in explaining the Brazilian transition to democracy and how well does it stand up against prominent alternative explanations?

The Brazilian transition certainly exhibits two out of my three proposed patterns of behavior that I expect will promote greater democratization. The level of mobilization during the transitional period was extremely high, with widespread activity on multiple fronts by new political parties, civil society groups, social movements, and a growing labor movement.

What were the sources of this continued mobilization? The diffuse nature and diverse goals of the Brazilian movement for political change was frequently cited by interviewees as a key reason that this mobilization continued. Opposition to the military regime had been situated in a broad set of movements with many different goals over much of the period of military rule. For almost all of these ending the military regime had only been seen as a step along the way. They had broader goals related to the social character of the state, increased rights for workers, greater protection of the environment, and many more. Even the PMDB, whose identity had been for decades almost entirely focused around its opposition to military rule, was forced to quickly shift into a political party advocating for a particular agenda as it rapidly found itself competing for electoral supremacy with the PT and other political parties.

Mobilization was also facilitated by the incomplete nature of the 1985 transition. The death of Tancredo Neves and ascension of Jose Sarney to the presidency put most opposition

forces in a position of deep suspicion towards the government. The PT in particular felt that it was critical to continue to act as a counterbalance to the influence of Sarney and old PDS loyalists.

These patterns of mobilization were by no means predetermined by Brazil's political past. Indeed, the flowering of civil society and its increasing influence during the transition of the 1980s was a radically new and innovative pattern in Brazilian politics. As Schneider writes in the early 1990s: "Mobilization of the populace has been a strikingly ineffective force in Brazilian political life" (Schneider, 1991, p. 13). In the past, clientelist relationships, a strict social hierarchy, and the very diversity of interests across the vast country's different regions had stymied both the size and the impact of political mobilization of ordinary people. Thus we would expect such mobilization to continue to be minimal in size and marginal in impact in this political transition. Yet, while the old patterns continued to exert an influence, they were heavily influenced by popular mobilization along various fronts of a greater degree than the country had ever previously experienced, to the point that by the 1990s former president Itamar Franco suggested the "*Diretas Ja* and impeachment campaign models" as powerful tools for achieving difficult political goals (Hochstetler, 2000, p. 171).

Both tactically and rhetorically, the various players in Brazil's politics also eschewed maximalism and moved to institutionalize political contention. Political struggle quickly moved to the forum of the constituent assembly and contention over the degree to which various agendas would be incorporated in the new constitutional structure, and then to the structures put in place by the constituent assembly process.

Throughout the transition there was a pattern of compromise and agreement, rather than all or nothing control of the center. As Schneider writes: “The successful transition owed a great deal to the reasonableness and moderation demonstrated by almost all significant political actors. Those disappointed by the course of events came to accept their setback and eventually assumed a statesmanlike stance” (Schneider, 1991, p. 304). Major political actors did not exhibit maximalist tendencies, but instead accepted losses and sought to maintain the environment of conciliation among political factions.

This was perhaps best captured in the way that the transition was initiated, through an agreement between Tancredo Neves and those PDS political leaders who had seen the level of mobilization during the *Diretas Ja* movement and sought to adapt to the new political order. These kinds of agreements continued to be a pattern during the transitional period. And even when major moves to change power in the center took place, as in the impeachment proceedings against President Collor de Melo, these moves took place within the confines of the new legal order. Major disruptive non-institutional action played a fairly minimal role in achieving these political changes.

As the transition and later Brazil’s new democratic regime moved forward, the low maximalism and high degree of institutionalization in Brazil’s politics was well-captured by the strategies pursued by the PT. Despite its connections to more revolutionary leftist groups, the PT quickly moved to function as a “loyal opposition,” articulating its goals and grievances through the realm of institutionalized politics and providing a structured, nonviolent channel of participation for activists disillusioned with the ways in which Brazil’s politics fell short of the ideals they had hoped for when struggling against the military regime (Nylon, 2000).

This type of action has not been typical of Brazilian politics for much of the country's history. Rather, at least since the beginning of Brazil's old republic in the late 1880s political competition had tended to follow much more typically maximalist lines, with political goals trumping allegiance to any particular legal or normative structure. The pattern of politics that the MDB began to articulate during the period of military rule and that came to the fore during the transitional period was a new pattern in Brazil, off the equilibrium path of the past. This sharp divergence speaks to the importance of actors' agential choices. Culture, economics, and political institutions shape but do not define the choices that actors make, particularly during the critical juncture moments of political transitions. As scholars we must look at these choices directly and systematically if we are to understand major political outcomes.

A holdovers policy that largely welcomed figures from the old regime is the one exception to my theory – though the fact that such a policy did not fundamentally undermine Brazil's democratization accords with the mixed evidence of the impact of holdovers policy from my quantitative testing.

What about the major alternative explanations? Because of the situation of this case in particular, it is important to take a slightly different approach than in my other chapters. The strongest alternative explanation is that this transition was not a civil resistance transition at all but instead that the transition was solely a matter of military initiative, and its terms dictated by the hierarchy of the Brazilian military leadership. Brazil is one of the cases most often cited as an example of a pacted transition brought about through top-down initiative, and Wendy Hunter describes the position of the Brazilian military at the beginning of the transition as "unassailable" (Hunter, 1997, p. 26). Since this is the case, is my theory truly applicable?

That initiative on the part of the military leadership played a key role in Brazil's transition is undeniable. The decision by President Geisel to initiate the *distensão* or "decompression" and later *abertura* or "opening" critically shaped the sequence of events that resulted in Brazil's transition to democracy. It is difficult to imagine the shape of the Brazilian transition had such steps not been taken.

But similarly, it is difficult to imagine the shape of the Brazilian transition, or indeed even the occurrence of a transition, absent the long tireless efforts of the opposition. The years of *abertura* were a dialectical process, in which both the government and opposition were feeling out how far they could push the other (Skidmore, 1989). As Mainwaring writes: "many changes were not foreseen by the originators of the *abertura*; they rather reflected an ongoing process of opposition initiatives, followed by subsequent regime response and initiatives, with occasional negotiating between the two sides" (Mainwaring, 1989, p. 196). The process of *abertura* was not merely a matter of top-down initiative but reflected pushes from both above and below.

When Geisel came to power and initiated some liberalizing steps his vision was not of democratization but a gradual move towards increased participation by "responsible elites." Their steps were designed not to democratize the Brazilian government, but rather to stabilize a form of authoritarian rule (Schneider, 1991, p. 269), in which elections might occur but pro-government parties would always win (Skidmore, 1988, p. 164; Martinez-Lara, 1996). The military continued to open because they feared the consequences if they remained closed. They feared the consequences of remaining closed at least in part because of the intensity of

widespread opposition to their regime, which they anticipated would continue to narrow their range of potential options if they kept the political regime fully closed (Schneider, 1991, p. 270).

Once *abertura* was initiated, resistance by the opposition played a key role in cementing the gains made and pushing for more. As Lamounier writes: “The importance of movements of so-called civil society...was not so much that they forced the beginning of the *abertura*, but that little by little they created informal but effective constraints on the dictatorial exercise of power” (Lamounier, 1989, p. 71). Nonviolent resistance prevented a return to dictatorial control and pushed the minimal liberalization envisioned by the military into a full-fledged democratic transition. Interviewees who had participated in various civil society movements during this period heavily emphasized this aspect of the democratic resistance.

The military did enjoy a significant degree of influence over the transition. There was no full breakdown of regime control, and military leaders were able to negotiate significant concessions for themselves in the new regime. But this control was by no means absolute, and by the time of Collor’s presidency had faded significantly into the background (Zirker, 1993). As Wendy Hunter’s work shows, in the transitional period military leaders quickly found themselves sidelined by the political leaders that had been elevated to positions of influence. For example, the Brazilian military had a well-known preference in limiting labor rights in the new democratic regime, and in particular limiting the right to strike (Hunter, 1997, p. 84). Yet well-organized popular mobilization by the Brazilian labor movement not only resulted in increased protection of labor rights, but even got the right to strike enshrined in the Brazilian constitution. When the military attempted to intervene in strikes during the transition, it sparked such wide societal backlash that the military was forced to significantly scale back its

role in labor relations (Hunter, 1997, p. 90). If the military were pulling the strings all along we would not expect to see this result.

Thus I argue that it is reasonable to look at Brazil as a case of a Civil Resistance Transition. Civil Resistance did not lead to the disintegration of the Brazilian military regime. But disintegration is only one of the mechanisms whereby civil resistance can achieve political change. The Brazilian case evidences instead the mechanisms of accommodation, in which the opponent perceives the shifting balance of power brought about through nonviolent resistance and attempts to avoid a worse result by going along with it (Sharp, *The Politics of Nonviolent Action*, 1973, pp. 733-40).

So much for the idea that the military leaders in Brazil were solely responsible for the transition and its character. What about broader arguments related to modernization?

Brazil had certainly gone through significant socio-economic development when the transition began in 1985. Yet it is difficult to see the mechanisms of modernization theory at work in the Brazilian case, primarily because of Brazil's high degree of inequality. While GDP per capita had risen to a level beyond which democratic breakdowns were unlikely, these economic gains were heavily concentrated in Brazil's wealthiest classes. A large majority of the Brazilian population still lived (and lives) in extreme poverty.

Increasing levels of economic development, education, etc... were filtered through a particular set of strategies pursued by the major political actors in Brazil's transition. The economic situation shaped, but did not determine the particular shape that these strategies took.

Elite theory is a better candidate in the Brazilian case. Elite pacts did play an important role in both initiating the transition and in determining its shape. Brazil, more than most countries, has a political elite whose shape is fairly straightforward to observe. A number of large political families have dominated the country's politics for most of its history and at least in part continue to do so today.

Yet even here the boundaries of "the elite" are porous, and an explanatory model that rests upon their preferences is of limited utility. One example of this porousness is the rise of the PT and a new set of "elites" such as Lula. By transition's end Lula and the PT leadership were certainly in the ranks of Brazil's political elite. Yet at what point do we determine their entry? The 1978 strikes that initially brought them some level of political influence? Their first accession to political power in 1980s?

Similarly, even the PMDB's "elite" credentials are questionable before the transition. Prior to the 1982 election the PMDB's power was almost entirely symbolic. They had little to no power to actually influence policy, certainly at the national level and even at the state and local level. By 1985 their position of political power certainly qualifies them as "elite."

During the transitional period whether there was an elite consensus is also empirically questionable. While the appetite for a return to military rule may have been limited, there was a great diversity of opinion as to the character of the future Brazilian regime. For example, the early drafts of the constitution as drawn up by the Afonso Arinos commission prior to the beginning of the constituent assembly envisaged a move from a presidential system of government to a parliamentary system of government. After the assembly began, many members of the PMDB supported such a proposal as a way of undermining the authority of

President Sarney. Only later in the constitutional drafting process did the presidential system return to prominence, and the vote between the two options in the constitutional assembly was sharply divided.

Even the basic structure of democracy was questioned by more fringe groups during the transition, with some groups even advocating for a return to a monarchical system of government (Sa, 2014, p. 139), a position of such influence that the country held a referendum on the subject in 1993.

Similarly, the traditional transitology approach, which was in part inspired by the early stages of the Brazilian transition, certainly fits the transition to some degree. But the fear over popular mobilization and emphasis on the agency of elites will lead us astray if we focus on them too heavily. The political decisions of ordinary people played a central role in shaping the transition's direction, and the mobilization of society to continue to push the transition forward was key in leading Brazil to not just become an illiberal quasi-democracy but instead a well-developed, highly democratic political system.

Thus, in the end, I argue that, while prior theories do a good job of explaining some of the features of the Brazilian transition, my theory adds important explanatory power. The transitional dynamics themselves shaped the development of Brazilian democracy, leading to a result that could have been very different had political leaders and ordinary people made different choices.

This examination of the Brazilian transition concludes my three case studies and the "model-testing small-*n* analysis" component of my nested analysis research design (Lieberman,

2005). In all three cases, while the qualitative examination of the cases revealed some potential additional factors to explore, such as the degree of autonomy of political mobilization during the transition, the qualitative research supports my quantitative findings. High mobilization and high maximalism in the Nepali case undermined the institutionalization of a new democratic system and led to a fractious semi-democracy. Low mobilization and low maximalism in the Zambian case led to an elite semi-democracy. And in Brazil the combination of high mobilization and low maximalism during the transition has led to

The case studies also confirm the uncertain and inconsistent impact of holdovers policy. Similar policies in different cases have had radically different results. This also confirms the weak statistical finding in regards to holdovers policy, and speaks both to the strength of the statistical model overall and to the need for greater research to examine the impact of holdovers policy on democratization.

With my case studies concluded, I now move to a final chapter summarizing the findings of this research, examining its limitations, and articulating potential areas for expansion and future research.

Conclusion: Civil Resistance and Democratization

In this study I have examined the question of democratization in transitions initiated by nonviolent resistance. The study was motivated by this underlying empirical puzzle: that despite the overall positive influence of nonviolent resistance on the prospects for democratization, we have still observed significant variation in democratic prospects in civil resistance transitions. Why is this the case? And can it be explained simply by looking at underlying variation in the facilitating conditions for democracy in these transitions?

I have shown through a nested analysis research design, beginning with quantitative analysis and then supplementing with three case studies that the answer does not lie in these traditional structural approaches to democratization. These give us part, but not all of the answer to the puzzle. In order to explain democratization in civil resistance transitions we must examine the political dynamics and patterns of behavior within the transitional period itself. As Francisco Weffort, one of the protagonists of the democratization struggle in Brazil, writes:

“It is *always* possible to take different paths of action...much as the conditions weigh upon the situation, much as the past imposes itself, there are always choices to make. A political action is *par excellence*, an act of freedom. It takes place only in the present and in the face of a future which is always open and uncertain” (Weffort, 1989, p. 331).

This builds upon the insights of transitologists, who have long pointed to the importance of the contingent decisions of political actors. I extend their work by building simple, parsimonious theory that can be consistently operationalized cross-nationally and fits the incentives implied by a transition initiated through nonviolent resistance. I theorized three

challenges based on the simple core characteristics of political transitions that would be likely to affect democratization.

The evidence of the quantitative testing and case studies is that two of these challenges: transitional mobilization and maximalism, consistently impact both the likelihood of democracy and its quality at the conclusion of civil resistance transitions. The impact of holdovers policies is less consistent cross-nationally, and is an area for further research. Quantitatively, the index of lustration policies gives us little additional information about the level of democracy and likelihood of crossing the democratic threshold, either when looked at linearly or quadratically. Similarly, while I have identified some effects of holdovers policy in my cases, these effects are inconsistent. In Zambia, the failure to punish members of the old regime and the full-fledged integration of those members into the new regime had a pernicious effect on the transition, resulting in an elite semi-democracy. In Brazil, however, the pernicious effects of a similar policy were undermined by the consistent application of popular mobilization and the political incentives of an incoming political class.

These challenges mediate the impact of more exogenous structural factors such as the degree of socio-economic modernization and the percentage of democratic neighbors. That is to say, while structural factors exert some effect both on the likelihood of successfully resolving these strategic challenges and on the level of democracy, this does not mean that the effects of mobilization and maximalism can be reduced to their structural preconditions. The level of correlation between these strategic factors and structural factors is not sufficient to justify this conclusion. In addition, adding the strategic factors to a structural model significantly improves model fit across multiple estimation methods, indicating the increase in variance explained by

looking beyond structure. Thus it is empirically justifiable and analytically useful to incorporate this kind of strategic analysis into explanatory models of democratic transitions.

I ground this approach in a structurationist understanding of social theory, building on the insights of Giddens and others that critique the model of remote structural causes acting on temporally posterior actors. Actors and structures co-constitute one another, meaning that the decisions of individuals, particularly in situations of political flux, may diverge from what we might expect to be a structural “equilibrium path.” Thus, systematizing patterns of behavior is a productive means of improving both our analytic understanding and predictive power when it comes to rare, yet consequential phenomena such as CRTs.

The enumeration of the two challenges that I have found support for in this analysis is by no means the last word on the question of CRT democratization, nor of my broader theoretical approach of operationalizing all of the steps along the causal chain from a structural antecedent to a political outcome. Numerous other challenges could certainly be articulated. For instance, the decisions of military leaders to either submit to civilian leadership or attempt to subvert the transition is a crucial factor in almost every transition.

The key thing to keep in mind when formulating new challenges to test is the necessity of broad applicability and explanatory parsimony. The role of the military, for instance, is highly context-dependent, based on whether the prior authoritarian regime was a military regime or not.

In this study I have attempted to gain explanatory parsimony by limiting my independent variables to factors that can be defined on the basis of level of political power and preferences regarding the old and new regime, characteristics which can reasonably be applied

across the board to transitions of any kind. Other similarly parsimonious theoretical schema are certainly possible. Scholars should bring as many models as possible to bear in the interest of gaining explanatory leverage. Yet we should be careful to not overfit our models by selecting explanatory variables whose character is limited to transitions of a particular time, place, or prior regime.

Next steps in this research program involve building these new models and working towards the expansion of the approach. There are three avenues where I see this research most productively continuing. First, articulating additional challenges through continuing to theorize about the political incentives implied by the nature of civil resistance transitions. Second, applying this approach to looking at the broader questions of democratization more generally, and third looking systematically at the sources of the patterns of mobilization and maximalism in political transitions.

First, what other challenges might we articulate and test to build better explanations of democratization in CRTs? One insight from the case studies relates to mobilization. Mobilization was most effective in promoting democratization when it was independent from the political parties that came into power after the success of the civil resistance movement. When mobilization was tied too closely to political leaders, its democratizing effect was attenuated. In Nepal, for instance, activism has been hampered by the perception that most “independent” civil society actors are in fact simply figures from one of the country’s three political parties for whom it is not currently convenient to be in office. Attempts to pursue ostensibly non-partisan, pro-democratic agendas are perceived by major political actors as being strategically deployed for partisan benefit. In Zambia, the fact that the infrastructure of resistance was almost entirely channeled through an organization that became a political party

meant that once that political party entered power there were few powerful countervailing forces to resist its excesses. In Brazil, in contrast, the opposition had been highly dispersed among different groups with divergent goals. The years of transition were characterized by high levels of pressure from groups that had only tangential connections to particular political parties, and thus could credibly advocate for their particular issue areas.

Thus an additional challenge in civil resistance transitions would relate to not just the existence of mobilization during the transitional period but also its organizational structure. What are avenues through which mobilization is pursued? Related to this, a more specific examination of the goals of mobilization could also enrich our understanding of the mechanisms whereby mobilization has its positive effect on democratization. Numerous other challenges could also be articulated. The careful blending of qualitative theory building and quantitative testing will be crucial in establishing the applicability and effects of these challenges.

Second, do maximalism and mobilization have the same effects in other kinds of democratic transitions? I theorize that the mechanisms should operate similarly, but with some important divergences. We would expect that popular pressure would generally be positive for democratization, and the disruption caused by maximalist political contention would generally be negative. Yet the contextual differences between a CRT and other forms of political transition should impact their effects.

Finally, understanding the sources of mobilization and maximalism in a systematic way will be another crucial way to expand this research agenda. In this study I have argued that there is a certain degree of equifinality in the paths to particular patterns of behavior during

political transitions. Multiple stimuli can lead to the particular set of decisions that take place during a transition.

My models show as well that this set of patterns cannot be reduced to any of the “usual suspects” in democratization theory. For instance, high mobilization during a political transition does not automatically come in countries with high levels of modernization, or in those countries that had relatively light authoritarian regimes prior to the transition. Just as civil resistance itself is difficult to predict through structural factors (Chenoweth & Ulfelder, 2017), so are the patterns of behavior during civil resistance transitions. Yet, just as I have shown that strategic factors during the transition matter in defining the transition’s conclusion, so it is certainly plausible that particular strategic factors from before the transition might matter systematically in at least partially explaining these patterns of behavior.

Scholars have already done some initial work in examining these questions. For instance, in a 2014 study I showed that the mechanism whereby a nonviolent resistance movement succeeded in ousting an authoritarian regime had a statistically significant influence on the country’s level of post-transition democracy (Pinckney 2014). As with civil resistance itself, the effects of these mechanisms might work through affecting the levels of mobilization and maximalism during the transition.

Similarly, Charles Butcher and his co-authors (2018) have shown that when certain social groups, particularly labor unions, participate in nonviolent resistance movements, their future level of democracy is significantly increased. This occurs because these groups have justifications for functioning that come from quotidian needs that endure beyond the ousting of the old regime. Thus, these groups are able to continue to mobilize resistance once the old

regime has been removed. The mechanism here is identical to my mechanism of transitional mobilization. Thus, examining the connections between the makeup of resistance movements and patterns of mobilization would likely be a fruitful avenue to explore.

Political institutions in the old regime may also have an impact on the likelihood of democratization and the level of democracy in the country at the end of the transition. Scholars of the post-Communist transitions in Eastern Europe, for example, have argued that countries that had allowed for even minimal, non-competitive opposition were better prepared for their democratic transitions than those that had largely suppressed opposition (Ekiert, Kubik, & Vachudova, 2007). One mechanism for this effect to obtain would be through affecting the mobilizational capacity of various social and political actors during the transition and making maximalism a less attractive choice.

What are the lessons of this study for the study of nonviolent resistance more generally? One lesson is positive. Civil resistance as a force for initiating political change does indeed have a powerful democratizing effect, an effect which is stronger and more consistent than many of the other traditionally-considered sources of democratization. Civil resistance certainly is not *less* democratizing than more orderly, elite-led transitions, and in fact seems to be much more democratizing. Thus the critique of civil resistance as, on average, ushering in “*Maidan*cracies” in which unstable street politics destroy the potential for establishing consolidated democratic institutions, is largely unfounded, at least when compared to all other potential sources for political transition (Li, 2014).

However, civil resistance transitions can certainly break down. Initiating a transition nonviolently, while it may give a country an advantage in the struggle for democratization, is by

no means a panacea. Many civil resistance transitions fall short of the high-flown democratic ideals that outside observers often attribute to them at the heights of their mobilization.

Yet, when civil resistance transitions break down we can understand the systematic sources of that breakdown: they tend to come when either mobilization fails or maximalism triumphs. Maintaining mobilization during the transition is a difficult challenge, as the centralizing and unifying figure of the old regime is no longer there to maintain disparate factions' connections to one another. The temptations of maximalism, using the disruptive and destructive potential of nonviolent resistance for narrow political ends, is also a major challenge that a country's new leadership often fails to overcome. And breakdowns in mobilization and moves to high levels of maximalism eliminate much of the advantage of civil resistance over other types of transition.

The insights into the effects of mobilization and maximalism on democratization also speak to several related debates in the nonviolent resistance literature. For instance, there is both a popular and a scholarly debate over the potential benefits of mixing nonviolent resistance with violent tactics. Some argue that any departure from strict nonviolent discipline reduces the chances of campaign success through undermining the mechanisms of nonviolent action (Chenoweth & Schock, 2015), while other work argues that mixing some violent tactics with nonviolent ones protects vulnerable nonviolent protesters, aids in creating the kinds of disruption that make nonviolent resistance effective, and may give the nonviolent segments of a resistance campaign greater appeal and leverage over their opponents (Haines, 1984).

Leaving the question of success aside, my research indicates that the use of violent tactics to overthrow an authoritarian regime likely has a pernicious effect on long-term

democratization through encouraging maximalist political dynamics. This was clearest in Nepal, where the fact that Nepal's political parties, particularly the Maoists, had armed cadres that they could call upon significantly undermined trust between major political actors, discouraged compromise, and encouraged attempts by all the actors involved to push as much as possible for their own secure power base.

Are there practical lessons for political leaders and ordinary citizens of countries going through civil resistance transitions? The necessity of strong, continued popular mobilization beyond the moment of the campaign itself is a clear implication of the work. How can this mobilization be achieved? The case studies have several lessons here. Suspicion of one's own leaders is one important lesson. In Zambia, mobilization collapsed in large part because of the faith in the new MMD government. In Nepal, mobilization continued but became tainted with maximalism as the avenues for mobilization largely followed the dictates of particular political leaders. Thus personalized nonviolent movements with prominent leaders who dictate the character of mobilization to their followers might be one risk factor for a decline in mobilization during a transitional period. Similarly, a too close attachment to the fortunes of any particular leader, rather than to the success of the system, may encourage the kinds of winner-take-all politics characteristic of high maximalism systems.

The findings also speak to the importance of compromise, and the potential for tension between democracy as a set of political institutions and as an ultimate goal. The sources of maximalism in Nepal, for instance, were given greater salience by a push to fundamentally restructure the state through the demands of particular narrowly defined communities. Engaging in maximalism, while it may lead to short-term gains, ultimately undermines the institutional frameworks that support democratic consolidation.

In conclusion, I return to the words of Hannah Arendt that opened this study, and the distinction between liberation and freedom. The road to liberation is hard enough, filled with treacherous passes and forks to choose from whose import may only be clearly seen long after they have passed. And yet, achieving liberation, overthrowing an old oppressive regime, is only the beginning. Getting from liberation to freedom is long, arduous, and uncertain. Yet we may shed at least a little light on the turns in the path. If the work done here enlightens that long road even a little for one of the many heroic travelers on that journey, then all the effort put into it will be more than worth it.

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Appendix A: Variable Coding and Additional Statistical Tests

Expanding Authoritarian Regimes Data

I expanded the Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2014) (GWF) dataset on authoritarian regimes through 2015 to include new cases of political transition. I checked a number of sources to ascertain whether a regime change event occurred from 2011-2015. For countries coded as democracies by GWF my first source to check was the V-Dem Polyarchy score. If the score had remained more or less the same as in 2010 (less than a 0.2 decline), I simply coded a democratic regime as continuing through 2015. If there had been a decline in the Polyarchy score I then checked the Freedom House reports on the country to ascertain the reasons for the declining score. This was typically enough to determine whether a democratic breakdown (as defined by the GWF codebook) had occurred.

For authoritarian regimes I checked the Archigos dataset to determine whether there had been an irregular leader entry or exit from 2010-2015. If no irregular leader change had occurred I simply coded the regime as continuing through 2015. If Archigos did code an irregular leadership change I checked the Archigos case narratives and other secondary sources to determine the nature of the change.

I also added a prior regime coding of “colonial” to regimes if they entered the dataset as a result of obtaining independence from their colonizer (excluding previously colonized countries which became independent prior to 1946). This allowed me to include cases of transition from colonial rule.

I attempted to follow the GWF coding rules as closely as possible, and unless the empirical evidence was overwhelmingly strong I deferred to their prior codings. Prior to reading

the case notes below I recommend reading the GWF codebook for context, available at:
<http://sites.psu.edu/dictators/wp-content/uploads/sites/12570/2016/05/GWF-Codebook.pdf>.

Specific Case Codings

Bosnia: GWF code Bosnia as “foreign-occupied” because of the power of the High Representative to overturn elected government decisions. I follow their coding rule.

Honduras: I coded this as a democratic regime continuing despite the country’s 2009 coup. The coup plotters did not fundamentally change regime rules and democratic elections (according to GWF rules) were held in 2010 and 2014.

Guinea Bissau: I code the regime as *provisional* from 2012-2013. A military coup in 2012 deposed the democratic government, but the military authorities quickly established a transitional government that did end with free and fair elections. I code the regime as democratic from 2014 onward.

Macedonia: The country has had some serious democratic backsliding since 2010, particularly related to the 2014 election, however, unlikely that this rises to the level of GWF coding rules for democratic breakdown. While GWF do consider a “rigged election” one possible start date for an authoritarian regime, it is unclear that the 2014 election would definitively qualify as “rigged.” See Freedom House 2015 report on Macedonia <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2015/macedonia>.

Thailand: I code the democratic regime as ending in 2014 with the military coup that overthrew Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra, and a military regime in 2015.

Myanmar: I considered re-coding Myanmar as beginning a democratic regime in 2011. V-Dem marks Myanmar's polyarchy score as improving from 0.18 in 2010 to 0.44 in 2015. However, this is still extremely low, and Freedom House codes the country as still "Not Free" as of the end of the year in 2015. Hence I coded the prior authoritarian regime as continuing.

Kyrgyzstan: I coded Kyrgyzstan as beginning a democratic regime in 2011. V-Dem codes a jump of around 0.1 in polyarchy score from 2010 to 2011 which is subsequently sustained. Freedom House also codes the country as moving from "Not Free" to "Partly Free," and records that the 2010 election was free and fair.

Afghanistan: I continued GWF's coding of Afghanistan as personalistic from 2009 through 2015. I code a regime failure moment at the 2014 election since this fits the definition of regime change, but this did not mark a democratic transition since the election was not free and fair. It is difficult to categorize the current Afghan regime in terms of GWF's typology, hence for ease of analysis I simply keep it as personalistic.

Yemen: I code the Saleh regime as ending on 23 November with President Saleh's signing of the GCC power-transfer agreement. The following Hadi regime I code as provisional because Hadi was elected in an unopposed election with a mandate to orchestrate a transition to democracy. I code this regime as ending in 2014 with the Houthi takeover of Sana'a and subsequent breakout of civil war across Yemen.

Egypt: I code the "Egypt 52-NA" regime as ending with Mubarak's resignation on Feb 11th, 2011. I code the following regime as "provisional." While it was led by the military, it explicitly took power as a temporary measure to lead up to democratic elections, and then did in fact allow the elections to occur in 2012 when Mohammed Morsi was elected. I code Morsi's regime as

democratic because his election was widely considered to be free and fair. I code the beginning of a new regime with the coup that overthrew Morsi in 2013, and the subsequent regime under Abdel-fatah al-Sisi as Military-Personalistic.

Iraq: GWF code Iraq as transitioning from foreign occupation to autocracy in the beginning of 2011. I code the subsequent regime as party-personal, reflecting the domination both by Shi'a political parties and specifically by Nouri al-Maliki.

Turkey: I strongly considered Turkey as moving to a personalistic regime during this period. However, Freedom House reports that the 2015 election, while certainly contentious, was relatively free and fair. It is certainly possible, indeed likely, that the Erdogan regime's crackdown on opposition following the 2016 attempted coup mark Turkey's move away from democracy, but it does not appear that this transition occurred prior to 2016.

Libya: I code the Gadhafi regime as ending with the fall of Sirte in November 2011. The subsequent regime by the General National Council I code as provisional, and ending in 2014 with the beginning of major hostilities between the Tripoli and Tobruk governments.

Tunisia: I code the Ben Ali regime as ending with President Ben Ali's flight from Tunisia on January 14th, 2011. I code the following regime as provisional, first under Fouad Mebazaa and then under the National Constituent Assembly, which was tasked with running the government until a constitution could be written and democratic elections held. I code this regime as continuing until the presidential and parliamentary elections in the fall of 2014, when I code Tunisia as becoming a democracy.

Madagascar: GWF code the regime of Andry Rajoelina beginning in 2009 as personalistic. Rajoelina maintained that his regime was transitional, and did in fact allow another candidate to

take power in 2014. Thus, I considered coding the regime as provisional. However, by a strict reading of GWF's coding rules, provisional governments are only those charged with conducting elections as "part of a transition to democracy," and thus coding the Rajoelina regime as autocratic is closer to their rules. I code the regime as failing with the assumption of power by democratically-elected president Rajaonarimampianina in January 2014.

Botswana: GWF code Botswana as a single-party authoritarian regime due to the domination of Botswanan politics by the Botswana Democratic Party. V-Dem gives Botswana a fairly high Polyarchy score (roughly 0.7 during the whole 2010-2015 period), one well above other regimes that GWF code as democracies. However, for the sake of continuity I deferred to GWF's coding and coded Botswana as a single-party authoritarian regime through 2015.

Zambia: GWF code Zambia as a single-party regime from the 1996 ban on major opposition parties through the election of 2011 when the opposition Patriotic Front was allowed to take power, after which they say Zambia was a democracy. I follow their coding and code Zambia as a democracy from 2012-2015.

Burundi: GWF code Burundi as a democracy beginning with the election of 2005. I code this democratic regime as ending in 2010 because of the widespread electoral fraud and intimidation of the opposition that characterized the May-July 2010 elections. This follows GWF's coding rules of an authoritarian regime starting when a leader assumes power through an election that is not free and fair (GWF Codebook page 6). I code the following regime as a party-personal regime.

CAR: I code the regime in CAR as ending in 2013 with the capture of Bangui by the Seleka militia. I code the subsequent regime under Michel Djotodia as personalistic, and code it as ending with Djotodia's resignation and the election of Catherine Samba-Panza in 2014.

Burkina Faso: I code the Compaore regime in Burkina Faso as ending in October 2014 with Compaore's ouster in the 2014 Lwili Revolution. I code the following regime under interim president Michel Kafando as provisional – the regime was explicitly set up to prepare for democratic elections, which did in fact take place in late 2015. Late 2015 marks the beginning of a democratic regime. There was an attempted coup in late 2015, but the coup failed to ultimately unseat Kafando.

Guinea: GWF code Guinea as becoming a democracy following the free and fair election of President Conde in 2010. Guinea's status as a "democracy" is certainly problematic – the regime repeatedly delayed holding parliamentary elections until 2013, and the elections themselves were marked by significant violence and allegations of fraud. However, the 2015 presidential election, while characterized by violence, was judged to be relatively free and fair by international observers (Freedom House). Thus, by a strict reading of the GWF coding rules Guinea should be considered a democracy. I thus code Guinea's regime from the 2010 election through the present as democratic.

Ivory Coast: I code the regime in Ivory Coast as ending in 2011 with the arrest of Laurent Gbagbo following the civil war after the 2010 election. While the 2010 election was widely considered acceptably free and fair, and thus the subsequent regime could be coded as a democracy (following GWF's coding rules), the electoral outcome was ultimately not determinative of the new regime. Thus, I code the following regime as provisional until the 2015 election in which

President Outtara won re-election in an election that was widely considered free and fair (Freedom House).

Niger: I code the regime in Niger as ending with the 2010 coup that ousted President Mamadou Tandja. The following regime I code as an authoritarian military regime that continued until the 2011 presidential elections. These elections were judged as relatively free and fair, and initiated a democratic regime that continued until the end of 2015.

Mali: I code the Malian democratic regime as ending in 2012 with the coup that overthrew President Toure. The subsequent regime I code as military – the government was first directly in the hands of the military, and then under a nominal civilian administration which was nonetheless dominated by the military. I code Mali as returning to democracy following the 2013 presidential elections, which were judged to be free and fair by international observers (Freedom House).

Guinea Bissau: I code the Guinea Bissau democratic regime as ending in 2012 with the coup that took place between the two rounds of the presidential election. I code the following regime as military, and ending with the agreement that put in place the transitional unity government in early 2013. The transitional government I then code as ending in 2014 when relatively free and fair presidential elections took place. I code the subsequent regime as democratic.

Ukraine: This is the only place where I directly diverge from a coding by GWF. They code Ukraine as democratic from its independence from the Soviet Union in 1992. However, by their coding rules autocratic regimes start when an executive achieves power through undemocratic means, i.e. elections that are not reasonably competitive. According to experts, the 1999 election of Leonid Kuchma was very far from free and fair, and Kuchma subsequently

significantly changed the rules for choosing leaders and policies, centralizing presidential power (Freedom House). Thus I code Ukraine as autocratic from 1999 to 2004, when the Orange Revolution defeated Kuchma's successor. I code Ukraine as democratic subsequently. V-Dem shows a precipitous decline in Ukraine's polyarchy score following the Euromaidan protests and ouster of President Yanukovich. I decided to code a regime failure event in 2014, considering the dramatic change in rules for choosing leaders and policies that took place in the aftermath of the Euromaidan protests. However, because Yanukovich's ouster and a free and fair executive election both took place in 2014, the country-years show up as a continuous democratic period.

Missing Prior Regimes for Civil Resistance Transitions

In addition to expanding the GWF data through 2015 I also filled in some missing values from the GWF data on regimes in existence prior to the beginning of a civil resistance transition. Almost all of these codings were fairly straightforward and uncontroversial, however, for the sake of transparency and clarity I include each of these codings here.

Guatemala 1945: I code the previous regime as *personalistic*. The regime prior to the civil resistance campaign here was dominated by the dictator Jorge Ubico. While Ubico emerged from the military he did not rule as part of a military junta or other military structure but rather as a personalistic dictator.

India 1947, Morocco 1956, Ghana 1956, Malawi 1960, Democratic Republic of the Congo 1960, Zambia 1964, and Timor-Leste 2002 I all code as being *foreign-ruled* since the prior regime in all these cases was a colonial authority.

Belarus 1991, Latvia 1991, Estonia 1991, Lithuania 1991, and Kyrgyzstan 1991 I all code as being *single-party* ruled since they were all part of the Soviet Union.

Slovenia 1991 I similarly code as being *single-party* ruled, since they were part of the single-party Communist regime in Yugoslavia.

Guyana 1992. I code the previous regime as *single-party* due to the domination of politics by the People's National Congress (PNC) party. See Hinds, David. 2005. "Problems of Democratic Transition in Guyana: Mistakes and Miscalculations in 1992." *Social and Economic Studies* 54, vol 1. 67-82.

Additional Information on Sources and Variable Construction

In this section I present additional information on all of the variables that go into my analysis, including the secondary controls used in robustness checks. To illustrate each variable

Democracy: The Polyarchy Score

I operationalize my dependent variable using the polyarchy score from the Varieties of Democracy project. I described the polyarchy index in brief in the main text – its goal is to, as far as is possible, capture the multi-dimensional nature of the concept of democracy in a single aggregated index. To that end, the polyarchy score is an index of indexes, aggregating different dimensions of democracy that themselves are made up of particular empirical indicators. To give a better sense of the underlying concept of polyarchy that the creators of V-Dem are seeking to capture through the polyarchy score I quote from the codebook at some length:

“The electoral principle of democracy seeks to embody the core value of making rulers responsive to citizens, achieved through electoral competition for the electorate’s

approval under circumstances when suffrage is extensive; political and civil society organizations can operate freely; elections are clean and not marred by fraud or systematic irregularities; and elections affect the composition of the chief executive of the country. In between elections, there is freedom of expression and an independent media capable of presenting alternative views on matters of political relevance. In the V-Dem conceptual scheme, electoral democracy is understood as an essential element of any other conception of (representative) democracy – liberal, participatory, deliberative, egalitarian, or some other.” (Coppedge, et al., V-Dem Codebook v7, 2017, p. 47).

Practically speaking ,the polyarchy score is constructed by aggregating the scores from five different indexes: V-Dem’s freedom of association index, freedom of expression index, clean elections index, elected officials index, and suffrage index. These indexes are aggregated by taking their weighted average and then adding their multiplicative interaction. This incorporates the ideas both that, on the one hand, weaknesses along one dimension can be made up for by strengths in another but also that being particularly “weak” in any one dimension can undermine the strength of the other dimensions. For more detail, see the V-Dem codebook, pages 47-48, as well as Teorell et al 2016.

Transitional Mobilization

As I describe in Chapter 2, this measure seeks to capture the degree to which political action and engagement continue through the transitional period. That is to say, how much is

the mobilization of the civil resistance campaign carried through once its major goals of regime change have been achieved?

My independent variable is a factor made up of three underlying components, two of which capture more conventional political engagement while the third captures more unconventional, typical “civil resistance” type activities. Here I put coding details for each of these three underlying variables, as described in their original data sources.

Engaged Society

This is an expert-coded variable from the V-Dem dataset. Experts were asked to code their responses to the question: “when important policy changes are being considered, how wide and how independent are public deliberations?” Their answers could take one of six possible ordinal levels, defined as follows:

“0: Public deliberation is never, or almost never allowed.

1: Some limited public deliberations are allowed but the public below the elite levels is almost always either unaware of major policy debates or unable to take part in them.

2: Public deliberation is not repressed but nevertheless infrequent and non-elite actors are typically controlled and/or constrained by the elites.

3: Public deliberation is actively encouraged and some autonomous non-elite groups participate, but it is confined to a small slice of specialized groups that tends to be the same across issue-areas.

4: Public deliberation is actively encouraged and a relatively broad segment of nonelite groups often participate and vary with different issue-areas.

5: Large numbers of non-elite groups as well as ordinary people tend to discuss major policies among themselves, in the media, in associations or neighborhoods, or in the streets. Grass-roots deliberation is common and unconstrained. “

(Coppedge, et al., V-Dem Codebook v7, 2017, pp. 202-203).

The V-Dem coders then transform these aggregated ordinal codings from multiple expert coders into a single continuous variable using the V-Dem Item Response Theory methodology as described in the main text.

Civil Society Participation

This is another expert-coded variable from the V-Dem dataset. V-Dem asked its country experts to code their responses to the question: “Which of these best describes the involvement of people in civil society organizations (CSOs)?” Their answers could take one of four ordinal values:

“0: Most associations are state-sponsored, and although a large number of people may be active in them, their participation is not purely voluntary.

1: Voluntary CSOs exist but few people are active in them.

2: There are many diverse CSOs, but popular involvement is minimal.

3: There are many diverse CSOs and it is considered normal for people to be at least occasionally active in at least one of them.”

(Coppedge, et al., V-Dem Codebook v7, 2017, p. 246).

As above, the V-Dem coders then transform these aggregated ordinal codings from multiple expert coders into a single continuous variable using the V-Dem Item Response Theory methodology.

Contentious Mobilization

This variable is intended to capture more contentious, confrontational, non-conventional and yet nonviolent forms of collective action, or in short: nonviolent resistance as I have defined it in Chapter 1. My primary source is the Phoenix Historical Event Data Set recently released by the Cline Center for Democracy at the University of Illinois and produced in collaboration with the Open Event Data Alliance (OEDA).

Researchers at the Cline Center and the OEDA produced the Phoenix Historical Event Data by first collecting a corpus of roughly 14 million news articles from three distinct sources: the New York Times, the British Broadcasting Corporation's (BBC) Summary of World Broadcasts (SWB) and the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) produced by the CIA. These articles were then transformed into event data using the second version of the Python Engine for Text Resolution and Related Coding Hierarchy (PETRARCH-2) software, with some minor modifications (Althaus, Bajjalieh, Carter, Peyton, & Shalmon, 2017, pp. 1-2). PETRARCH-2 interprets the information contained in news articles to produce conflict event data following the CAMEO structure of actors performing verbs on targets (Schrodt, Gerner, Yilmaz, & Hermreck, 2008).

As an almost-fully automatically collected and coded dataset, the Phoenix Data has one key advantage and one key disadvantage. Its advantage is its breadth and scope. The greater

efficiencies of automated coding allow the project to incorporate a vast amount of data and code a staggering number of events. The complete dataset incorporates almost 5 million events from its three sources from every country in the world for a period of seventy years. To create the same data using human coders would be prohibitively time-consuming and expensive.

However, the disadvantage of automated coding is its accuracy. As the dataset's creators readily acknowledge, their process results in significant duplication of events and mis-categorization based on their algorithm's misinterpretation of non-conflict related events such as soccer matches. The problem of duplication is particularly problematic when attempting to code over a long period of time, as the quality and scope of coverage has increased over time, and certain countries are almost certainly covered in greater depth than others.

Hence, the events in Phoenix are best used not as individual units of analysis, but as part of a larger trend-line, and with the biases of uneven coverage over time and space taken into account.

Hence, in transforming this data for my purposes I take three key steps before using the data in analysis. First, I take the annual account of "protest" events from each country as reported by each of the three different sources in Phoenix and then average the three numbers.⁶⁵ I then take each annual global cross-section and average the number of events per country reported in that year. I then adjust the event counts by subtracting this average from each country's event count in that year to account for temporal reporting bias. I then perform

⁶⁵ "Protest" events are those with a CAMEO root code of 14. The broad category contains more specific categories such as "demonstrate or rally," "conduct hunger strike," "conduct strike or boycott," "obstruct passage, block," and "protest violently, riot" (Althaus, Bajjalieh, Carter, Peyton, & Shalmon, 2017, pp. 19-20).

the same operation on each country-specific time series, subtracting the mean from each annual count within that country.

The result is a continuous variable that captures the relative degree of protest activity in a country in a particular year, taking into account some degree both temporal and geographic reporting bias. These efforts to address potential bias issues, and my use of the data not in terms of the attributes of single events but rather in large aggregates give me confidence that this is the best data source to use in measuring contention during transitional periods.

However, since this source is relatively new I perform robustness checks using an alternative measure of political contention: the Cross-National Time Series Data Archive originally created by Arthur Banks (2016). The archive contains data on many different aspects of countries' economic, social, and political systems. Their most relevant set of variables are those capturing annual counts of so-called "domestic conflict events." This set of variables and their coding rules are listed in Table Ap.1 below:

Table Ap.1: Bank Cross-National Time Series Domestic Conflict Event Codings

Variable	Domestic Conflict Event Data Definitions
Anti-government Demonstrations	Any peaceful public gathering of at least 100 people for the primary purpose of displaying or voicing their opposition to government policies or authority, excluding demonstrations of a distinctly anti-foreign nature.
Assassinations	Any politically motivated murder or attempted murder of a high government official or politician.
General Strikes	Any strike of 1,000 or more industrial or service workers that involves more than one employer and that is aimed at national government policies or authority.
Guerrilla Warfare	Any armed activity, sabotage, or bombings carried on by independent bands of citizens or irregular forces and aimed at the overthrow of the present regime.
Major Government Crises	Any rapidly developing situation that threatens to bring the downfall of the present regime - excluding situations of revolt aimed at such overthrow.
Purges	Any systematic elimination by jailing or execution of political opposition within the ranks of the regime or the opposition.
Revolutions	Any illegal or forced change in the top government elite, any attempt at such a change, or any successful or unsuccessful armed rebellion whose aim is independence from the central government.
Riots	Any violent demonstration or clash of more than 100 citizens involving the use of physical force.

I summed the number of anti-government demonstrations and general strikes to create my “contention” variable.

The primary benefit of the CNTS is its wide scope. Annual data have been collected from 1815 through 2015 (excluding the periods of WWI, 1914-1918, and WWII, 1940-1945). The drawback is that the data’s sourcing is somewhat unclear and limited, particularly for non-Western countries. Thus, while I consider this source adequate as a robustness check I do not consider it as good a source as the Phoenix data.

Maximalism

As I describe in Chapter 2, this variable seeks to capture the degree to which the tools of civil resistance are employed in a way that is destructive of the current system and is essentially “winner-take-all” in its orientation. The maximalism factor that I use in my analysis incorporates four underlying indicators, three from V-Dem and one from the Polity IV dataset. I detail the coding rules for each of them here.

Electoral Boycotts

This is an ordinal expert-coded variable. V-Dem asked its country experts to answer the question: “In this national election, did any registered opposition candidates or parties boycott?” with the clarification that “a boycott is a deliberate and public refusal to participate in an election by a candidate or a party who is eligible to participate.” Coders could give one of five responses:

“0: Total. All opposition parties and candidates boycotted the election.

1: Significant. Some but not all opposition parties or candidates boycotted but it is unclear whether they would have constituted a major electoral force.

2: Ambiguous. A few opposition parties or candidates boycotted and they were relatively insignificant ones.

3: Minor. A few opposition parties or candidates boycotted and they were relatively insignificant ones.

4: Nonexistent. No parties or candidates boycotted the elections.”

(Coppedge, et al., V-Dem Codebook v7, 2017, pp. 96-97)

As above, the V-Dem coders then transform these aggregated ordinal codings from multiple expert coders into a single continuous variable using the V-Dem Item Response Theory methodology.

Acceptance of Electoral Results

This is also an ordinal expert-coded variable. V-Dem asked its country experts to answer the question: “Did losing parties and candidates accept the result of this national election within three months?” Coders could give one of five responses:

“0: None. None of the losing parties or candidates accepted the results of the election, or all opposition was banned.

1: A few. Some but not all losing parties or candidates accepted the results but those who constituted the main opposition force did not.

2: Some. Some but not all opposition parties or candidates accepted the results but it is unclear whether they constituted a major opposition force or were relatively insignificant.

3: Most. Many but not all opposition parties or candidates accepted the results and those who did not had little electoral support.

4: All. All parties and candidates accepted the results.”

(Coppedge, et al., V-Dem Codebook v7, 2017, p. 107)

As above, the V-Dem coders then transform these aggregated ordinal codings from multiple expert coders into a single continuous variable using the V-Dem Item Response Theory methodology.

Anti-System Movements

This was also an ordinal, expert-coded variable from V-Dem that asked expert coders the question: “Among civil society organizations, are there anti-system opposition movements?” With the clarification that: “an anti-system movement is any movement – peaceful or armed = that is based in the country (not abroad) and is organized in opposition to the current political system. That is, it aims to change the polity in fundamental ways, e.g., from democratic to autocratic (or vice versa), from capitalist to community (or vice versa), from secular to fundamentalist (or vice versa). This movement may be linked to a political party that competes in elections but it must also have a “movement” character, which is to say a mass base and an existence separate from normal electoral competition. If there are several movements, please answer in a general way about the relationship of those movements to the regime.” Coders could assign one of five values:

“0: No, or very minimal. Anti-system movements are practically nonexistent.

1: There is only a low-level of anti-system movement activity but it does not pose much of a threat to the regime.

2: There is a modest level of anti-system movement activity, posing some threat to the regime.

3: There is a high level of anti-system movement activity, posing substantial threat to the regime.

4: There is a very high level of anti-system movement activity, posing a real and present threat to the regime.”

(Coppedge, et al., V-Dem Codebook v7, 2017, p. 247).

As above, the V-Dem coders then transform these aggregated ordinal codings from multiple expert coders into a single continuous variable using the V-Dem Item Response Theory methodology.

Sectarian Political Competition

The next component of my maximalism measure comes from the Polity IV dataset, which, among its various components measures the degree of “regulation of participation” in a political system. This is originally a five-point scale going from unregulated to regulated. However, each step on the scale has its own detailed description. I determined after examining these descriptions that the closest approximation of maximalism as I had theorized it was the level that the Polity IV authors describe as “sectarian.” The complete description of “Sectarian” political competition from the Polity IV codebook is as follows:

“Political demands are characterized by incompatible interests and intransigent posturing among multiple identity groups and oscillate more or less regularly between intense factionalism and government favoritism, that is, when one identity group secures central power it favors group members in central allocations and restricts competing groups' political activities, until it is displaced in turn (i.e., active factionalism). Also coded here are polities in which political groups are based on restricted membership and significant portions of the population historically have been excluded from access to positions of power (latent factionalism, e.g., indigenous peoples in some South American countries).”

(Marshall, Gurr, & Jaggers, 2016, p. 26).

I created a binary variable measuring whether or not a country's politics in a particular year were coded as "sectarian" by Polity IV.

Modernization

My measure of modernization is a factor variable made up of four underlying elements: GDP per capita, urbanization, education, and infant mortality. I present details on each of these underlying elements below:

GDP Per Capita (Logged)

I import this variable from V-Dem and transform it using the natural logarithm. The variable's original source is the Maddison Project. For details on their data collection process, see Bolt and van Zanden 2014 as well as the project's website: <http://www.ggdnc.net/maddison/maddison-project/home.htm>.

Urbanization

The variable is the ratio of the total urban population to the country's total population. Urban population is defined according to "the criteria of each area of country." I import this variable from V-Dem. The original data comes from the Clio-Infra project at the International Institute of Social History in the Netherlands. V-Dem then fills in missing years of data through linear interpolation. For more detail see the V-Dem codebook, v7, pages 391-92 or the Clio-Infra project website at <https://www.clio-infra.eu/>.

Education

The variable is the average number of years of education received for those over the age of 15, with some years of missing data imputed using a linear model based on sources that measure the average years of educational attainment, primary school completion rate, secondary school enrollment rate, and literacy rate. I import this variable from V-Dem. They base the variable on several original sources – primarily Clio Infra, but also data from the World Bank and others. For more detail see the V-Dem codebook, v7, page 369 or the Clio Infra website at <https://www.clio-infra.eu/>.

Infant Mortality

The base variable is the number of deaths prior to age 1 per 1000 live births in a year. I invert the variable so that the “good” outcome of lower infant mortality is at the high end of the variable, and thus the variable can be incorporated into a modernization factor. I import the variable from V-Dem. They draw the data for the variable from Gapminder and Clio Infram and linearly interpolate missing data within a time series. For more detail see the V-Dem codebook, v7, pages 389-390, and the Clio Infra and Gapminder websites at <https://www.clio-infra.eu/> and www.gapminder.org respectively.

Trade Data

My data on trade used in generating the Western linkage control variable comes from the IMF’s Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS). I sum the annual flow of exports and imports for each country from the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and the Euro Area, and then divide by the country’s GDP.

Transitional Endpoints

Determining the endpoint of a political transition is a challenging task, often only fully realizable *post facto*. Since transitions by definition are period in which the rules of the political game are in flux, one can only tell whether the flux has concluded by observing recurring patterns over a particular period of time.

I use the V-Dem polyarchy score to determine my primary measure of transitional endpoints. I first create a variable measuring the annual difference in polyarchy score. I then created three different variables to measure what degree of flux was necessary to consider a country “still in transition.” The first measure considers a transition to be continuing any time there is a continuous change in the polyarchy score of at least one standard deviation. The second and third measures consider transitions to be ongoing if the level of change in polyarchy score exceeds a cut-off point of either 0.1 and 0.05. These cut-off points are, of course, somewhat arbitrary, but reflect the pattern of change in the polyarchy score around these transitional moments.⁶⁶

The three measures are highly correlated with one another, with only minor differences. For all three measures, the modal length of transition is a single year while the maximum length is ten years.

I use these measures of transitional endpoints for two purposes. First, I measure my key dependent variables related to levels of democracy at the transitional endpoint rather than at

⁶⁶ The mean change in polyarchy score in the year of a civil resistance transition is 0.13. The mean annual change in polyarchy score over a five-year period following a civil resistance transition is 0.62.

an arbitrary point in the future following the initiation of the transition. Second, I perform tests where I average my independent variables across all years in the transitional period.

As I describe in the main text, I determine the beginnings of transitions by looking at authoritarian regime failures as described in the data on authoritarian regimes produced by Geddes, Wright, and Frantz. I supplement their data with data on civil resistance campaigns that successfully overthrew a non-democratic regime from Chenoweth, Shay, and Lewis.

A coding challenge arose when considering regime failure events coded by Geddes, Wright and Frantz that fell within periods of time that I had determined, based on the pattern of change in the polyarchy score, to be within a single transition. After careful examination of all of the country-years in which this was the case I determined that the best way to address this problem was through dropping these as instances of regime failure and incorporating them as part of the transition already ongoing when they occurred.

My key rationale for making this choice was that, in all of these cases, the “regimes” that were put in place still involved significant fluctuations in the polyarchy score, indicating that they had not truly reached a stable equilibrium point. Thus, considering them as regimes that broke down, initiating their own transitions, did not match well with the actual historical record.

For example, in Haiti, a 1986 primarily nonviolent uprising ousted the authoritarian president Jean-Claude “Baby Doc” Duvalier. Duvalier put in place a transitional government that was tasked with creating a new constitution and holding presidential elections. Elections in 1987 were canceled after widespread violent attacks on voters. Elections in 1988 brought President Leslie Manigat to power, but almost the entire population boycotted the election, giving it little democratic legitimacy. Manigat only remained in power a few months before

being ousted in a coup by General Henri Namphy. Namphy ruled until late 1990, when another presidential election brought Roman Catholic Priest Jean-Bertrand Aristide to power. However, Aristide also was ousted in less than a year in a coup led by General Raoul Cedras, who instituted a brief-lived military dictatorship. While military rule in this case lasted somewhat longer than the previous presidencies, it too only lasted until 1994, when an international intervention spearheaded by the United States ousted the military regime and brought Aristide back to power.

After Aristide's return, Haitian politics settled into a more regularized pattern, with Aristide remaining in power until 1996, then handing over power to Rene Preval after Preval won the 1996 presidential election. Preval subsequently returned power to Aristide in 2001, and Aristide ruled until 2004, when he was ousted in the 2004 Haitian uprising.

Geddes and her co-authors code regime failures (and thus transitions to a new regime) occurring in 1986 with the overthrow of Duvalier, in 1988 with General Namphy's military coup, in 1990 with the election and almost immediate overthrow of Aristide, and in 1994 with the ousting of the military regime and Aristide's return to power. While I agree with them that each of these points marked an important turning point, I argue that it makes more theoretical and empirical sense to consider each of these as points within a lengthy transition rather than new regimes whose failure in each case initiated a new transition. I base my argument on the definitions of a regime and a transition.


As I describe in Chapter 1, the definition of a regime that I am using in this project is the set of rules and institutions that define who governs in a society and the primary means of political access. These rules must have enough staying power that major political actors'

expectations are able to converge around them. Political transitions, the period between regimes, last until these rules become at least somewhat routinized, the point at which “abnormality” no longer characterizes politics (O'Donnell & Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies*, 1986).

From 1986 until 1994 in Haiti, while many different groups of people governed, in no case were these governments able to establish themselves in a stable way. This was most prominent, of course, for the elected presidents: Manigat and Aristide, whose terms of office only lasted months, but the military regimes as well were not characterized by the institutionalization of a new set of governing rules but rather by erratic changes. Only after the 1994 intervention and return of Aristide did Haiti settle into a new, relatively stable pattern of political authority. This pattern did, of course, break down as well, but only after a lengthy period of relative stability. Note as well that this pattern was not “democratic” per se, as evidenced by the middling value of the polyarchy score (hovering around 0.45 from 1995 until 2004). Nevertheless, it proved able to reproduce itself for a period of time longer than two or three years, indicating a certain ability to shape actors’ expectations.

To illustrate, Figure AP.1 below shows the polyarchy score for Haiti from 1970 until 2010. The polyarchy score remains almost completely flat for nearly the entire period of the Duvalier regime, then swings significantly back and forth until 1995, when the intervention restoring Aristide to power. After 1995 it remains stable until Aristide’s 2004 overthrow. Thus, in my counting of transitions and calculation of transitional endpoints I consider this transition in Haiti (and similar cases in a handful of other countries) to have begun in 1986 and ended in 1995, as indicated by the two vertical lines on the graph.

Figure AP.1: Polyarchy Score in Haiti, 1970-2010



INGO Membership

An additional measure of western linkage is the degree to which countries are embedded in the international network of INGOs. A common way of measuring INGO presence is through the absolute count of the number of INGOs in which the country is either a member or which have offices in that country. However, as Paxton et al (2015) argue, INGO membership is not the same for all countries because the global set of INGOs constitute a network that links states in relative positions of network centrality. Two states may have the same absolute number of INGO memberships but be at radically different positions in this network.

I follow Paxton and her co-authors in using a measure of network centrality: a country's eigenvector score, as a more theoretically informed alternative to the absolute count score. Eigenvector scores measure the degree to which countries are connected to other highly connected countries, thus capturing their proximity to the "center" of the global network.

Paxton and her co-authors generate their scores by recording country-level memberships in over five thousand INGOs at 11 points in time from 1950 until 2008. They then convert these into eigenvector scores. I use linear interpolation for scores in intervening years, and linear extrapolation to determine the scores from 1945-1949 and 2009-2016. I logically bound my extrapolations at 0 and 1, with any extrapolated values above or below these limits set at the liminal value.

Religious Membership (Percent Muslim Population)

I use the World Religion Dataset (WRD) produced by Zeev Maoz and Errol Henderson (2013) to get my variable for the percentage of a country's population that is Muslim. The finding that a large Muslim population decreases the likelihood of democratization is highly contested, with various arguments that the finding is spurious because of the effects of oil wealth (Ross 2012) or of unique regional dynamics in the Middle East (Solingen 2009). Thus it is not one of the variables that I include in my main tests. However, I do include the variable in some additional models that I run for the sake of robustness checking.

WRD's National Religion dataset contains estimates of the numbers of adherents of each of the world's main religions in every country in the international system from 1945 to 2010. The data is collected at five-year intervals. The dataset reports both the raw numbers of adherents as well as an estimate of the percentage of the total population that adheres to a particular faith. For my testing I use WRD's "isgenpct" variable, which measures the total number of Muslims in a country. These numbers do not vary much from year to year, thus I use linear interpolation to fill in the missing years and linear extrapolation for the years 2011-2016.

As with the INCS scores, I logically bound my extrapolations at 0 and 1, with any extrapolated values above or below these limits set at the liminal value.

Inequality (Gini Coefficient)

For my measure of inequality, I employ the most commonly used measure in academic work on inequality: a country's Gini coefficient. The Gini coefficient is a mathematical measure derived from the Lorenz Curve, a graphical tool for depicting the distribution of income or expenditure in a society. The Lorenz Curve plots the percentage of the country's population against the percentage of income that that portion of the population possesses. A perfectly straight Lorenz curve line moving at a 45 degree angle from 0 to 100 would depict a society with perfectly equal distribution of income. The Gini coefficient measures the two-dimensional space between a 45 degree Lorenz curve and the actual Lorenz curve, divided by the total area beneath the 45 degree line.

Many different academics and public policy professionals have sought to measure Gini coefficients globally, yet the practicalities of measuring individual or household-level income in methodologically robust ways, particularly in developing countries, means that obtaining a global time-series of Gini coefficients stretching back for a significant period of time is almost impossibly costly.

The most comprehensive dataset on Gini coefficients globally is the United Nations University (UNU) World Income Inequality Database (WIID). WIID aggregates many different data collection measures for 182 countries around the world. It includes data on income distribution from the World Bank, the OECD, Eurostat, and a wealth of different academic

studies, including, for example, the Deininger and Squire (1996) data on inequality that Carles Boix (2003) used in his influential book *Democracy and Redistribution*.

While WIID contains many thousands of observations, the irregular and aggregative nature of the dataset means that it does not simply report a simplified country-year time-series cross-sectional dataset. Thus, to use it for my purposes some adaptation was necessary. First, I averaged the different measures of the Gini coefficient for the same country-year, only dropping those measures that WIID reports to be of “Low” quality. The WIID creators caution against this, since different data sources employ different methods of calculating the Gini coefficient. However, I believe this to be a reasonable procedure since what I am seeking to measure is the general underlying degree of inequality, rather than any specific type of inequality. It is reasonable to assume that different measures of the Gini coefficient all capture some degree of inequality, and that the actual measure is somewhere in between them.

Simply averaging the scores is a fairly crude method of getting at this underlying aspect of inequality. Factor analysis or Item Response Theory measures would be a more methodologically robust way of doing so. However, the spottiness of the different data sources made these more robust measures impractical. Since I am limited to this fairly crude method, the results I report with Gini coefficients should thus be taken with a grain of salt. It bears mentioning, however, that results from other well-respected academic studies that use the Gini coefficient over a lengthy time period are subject to the same critique. Inequality is simply something difficult to measure.

After creating these country-year average scores, I then use linear interpolation to fill in missing years, and linear extrapolation for up to a five year window back from the earliest and

forward from the latest scores where necessary. Reported Gini coefficients tend to remain within a fairly narrow band, without dramatic changes over time, thus I find the assumptions of the linear interpolation and extrapolation to be reasonable. However, since over the longer term the likelihood of a stochastic shock to inequality becomes more likely I do not extrapolate beyond five years from the known data.

In addition, because of the limited range of variation in the observed Gini coefficients, I put bounds on the maximum extent to which the linear extrapolation can diverge from the known data. In no country does the maximum or minimum observed score exceed a distance of more than 2.6 standard deviations from the mean. Hence, my logical bounds for the extrapolated Gini scores are 2.6 country-specific standard deviations from the mean observed Gini coefficient.

Additional Results Not Reported in Main Text

Effects of Civil Resistance on Post-Transition Democracy

In this section I present additional tests, primarily robustness checks, not reported in the main text of the dissertation.

Figure AP.2 shows residuals versus fitted plots for my two OLS models looking at the entire population of transitions from 1945-2011. Model 1 includes a binary measure of whether the transition was a civil resistance transition, while Model 2 contains only my primary structural variables.

Figure AP.2: Residuals versus Fitted Value Plots for Models of CRT impact on Post-Transition Democracy




Table AP.2 shows the variance inflation factor (VIF) scores for each of the variables included in these two models, a standard way of testing for the possibility of multicollinearity between the independent variables affecting the outcome. As the table shows, VIF scores are universally low for each of the independent variables, with the highest falling just short of a score of 2 - well below the standard cut-off point of 10.

Table AP.2: VIF Scores for Models 1 and 2

Variable	VIF Score - Model 1	VIF Score - Model 2
Trade Linkage	1.015431	1.014614
Previous Polyarchy	1.120589	1.104891
CRT	1.302282	
Democratic Neighbors	1.330532	1.328308
INCS Score	1.599519	1.422195
Modernization	1.922559	1.886904

The RVF plots and VIF tables I report here are from regression models run on the first of my five Amelia imputations, rather than averages of regressions run on all five Amelia imputations. I only report results from this single imputation for the sake of brevity and clarity – tests run on regression models in the other four imputations are substantively identical to the results reported here.

I also ran these models showing the impact of CRTs relative to other forms of transition using my two alternative definitions of transitional endpoints, that is to say when the fluctuation in the polyarchy score declines below 0.1 or 0.05 for a period of at least two years respectively. Models 1(2) through 4(3) below replicate the results I report in Table 2.9, with Models 1(2) through 4(2) using the 0.1 cut-off and models 1(3) through 4(3) using the 0.05 cut-off. Finally, I ran the models measuring democracy at a fixed point in the future: five years after the transition. Models 1(4) through 4(4) in table AP.5 report these results.

Table AP.3: Effects of Civil Resistance on Post-Transition Democracy (Alternative Endpoint 1)

	Model 1(2) OLS	Model 2(2) OLS	Model 3(2) Logistic	Model 4(2) Logistic
Civil Resistance Transition	.18373*** (.02580)		2.0854*** (.46189)	
Modernization	.07503*** (.01547)	.09015*** (.01888)	1.3438*** (.29920)	1.4712*** (.28920)
Democratic Neighbors	.19382*** (.05050)	.21270*** (.05549)	1.2844 (.83308)	1.2548 (.75888)
Trade Linkage	.07850 (.08714)	.04645 (.10824)	1.9815 (1.7349)	1.4577 (2.2699)
INGO Network Centrality	.04808 (.06221)	.19515** (.06782)	.60949 (.93817)	2.0802* (.89003)
Previous Polyarchy Level	.50697*** (.06967)	.44326*** (.07399)	4.1298** (1.3705)	2.8591* (1.4198)
Constant	.15708*** (.02899)	.18651*** (.03441)	-4.5866*** (.59041)	-3.7660*** (.54512)
<i>n</i>	325	325	325	325
<i>r</i> ² /Pseudo <i>r</i> ²	.58015	.48582	.41690	.33659

Robust standard errors, clustered by country, in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table AP.4: Effects of Civil Resistance on Post-Transition Democracy (Alternative Endpoint 2)

	Model 1(3) OLS	Model 2(3) OLS	Model 3(3) Logistic	Model 4(3) Logistic
Civil Resistance Transition	.18313*** (.02668)		2.1877*** (.46448)	
Modernization	.07523*** (.01545)	.09030*** (.01876)	1.2854*** (.29843)	1.4095*** (.28553)
Democratic Neighbors	.20133*** (.04966)	.22016*** (.05431)	1.4158 (.81249)	1.3590 (.74655)
Trade Linkage	.07614 (.08887)	.04422 (.10969)	1.9857 (1.7287)	1.4299 (2.2745)
INGO Network Centrality	.05566 (.06512)	.20225** (.07037)	.92486 (.89705)	2.4220** (.88814)
Previous Polyarchy Level	.48105*** (.06985)	.41755*** (.07506)	4.0152** (1.4070)	2.6559 (1.4646)
Constant	.16370*** (.02757)	.19304*** (.03299)	-4.6386*** (.59697)	-3.7458*** (.57402)
<i>n</i>	325	325	325	325
<i>r</i> ² /Pseudo <i>r</i> ²	.57084	.47833	.42898	.34051

Robust standard errors, clustered by country, in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table AP.5 Effects of Civil Resistance on Post-Transition Democracy (Five-Year Fixed Point)

	Model 1 (4) OLS	Model 2 (4) OLS	Model 3 (4) Logistic	Model 4 (4) Logistic
Civil Resistance Transition	.16464*** (.02837)		2.1896*** (.43228)	
Modernization	.07341*** (.01631)	.08655*** (.01922)	1.1832*** (.29444)	1.2850*** (.28302)
Democratic Neighbors	.23610*** (.04852)	.25172*** (.05289)	1.0144 (.83610)	1.0412 (.73351)
Trade Linkage	.03205 (.08919)	.00351 (.10747)	1.5060 (1.6986)	.96564 (2.1399)
INGO Network Centrality	.10005 (.06958)	.23320** (.07462)	.41881 (.87582)	2.0900* (.86686)
Previous Polyarchy Level	.40359*** (.07681)	.35283*** (.08407)	1.4874 (1.3429)	.51265 (1.4410)
Constant	.16712*** (.02910)	.19237*** (.03443)	-3.5866*** (.56890)	-2.8642*** (.50895)
<i>n</i>	320	320	320	320
<i>r</i> ² /Pseudo <i>r</i> ²	.54492	.47130	.37822	.28005

Robust standard errors, clustered by country, in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

I also replicated the same model using my primary transitional endpoint but substituting the Polity IV score for the V-Dem Polyarchy score. Models 1(5) through 4(5) report the results. The effect of a civil resistance transition is similar, highly significant both in improving the linear predicted Polity score and in improving the likelihood of crossing the democratic threshold. The control variables also have effects of similar size and direction as in the Polyarchy score tests, though levels of significance are somewhat different for some controls.

Table AP.6: Effects of Civil Resistance Transitions on Post-Transition Democracy (Polity IV Score)

	Model 1 (5) OLS	Model 2 (5) OLS	Model 3 (5) Logistic	Model 4 (5) Logistic
Civil Resistance Transition	4.0934*** (.76357)		1.6318*** (.33262)	
Modernization	1.1090* (.44058)	1.4458** (.49006)	.33632 (.18660)	.46020* (.19416)
Democratic Neighbors	6.7529*** (1.4494)	7.1740*** (1.5828)	2.4963** (.79646)	2.4833** (.81589)
Trade Linkage	.84662 (1.1762)	.13246 (1.5278)	-1.5510 (1.1539)	-1.5886 (1.2501)
INGO Network Centrality	2.4179 (1.8757)	5.6944** (1.9288)	.91709 (.83946)	2.1066** (.81191)
Previous Polyarchy Level	10.270*** (2.2089)	8.8511*** (2.2090)	2.3357* (1.0329)	1.5536 (1.0021)
Constant	-4.6170*** (.92025)	-3.9613*** (.98420)	-2.4859*** (.45420)	-2.0748*** (.43685)
<i>n</i>	325	325	325	325
<i>r</i> ² /Pseudo <i>r</i> ²	.36232	.30343	.23419	.17344

Robust standard errors, clustered by country, in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Finally, I ran the same set of models using data that had not been put through the Amelia multiple imputation process. Instead all observations with missing data on any of the variables were removed using listwise deletion. The results are robust to this reduction in sample size. Table AP.6 reports the coefficients and standard errors from these models.

Table AP.7: Effects of CRTs relative to non-CRTs (non-Amelia data)

	Model 1(6) OLS	Model 2(6) OLS	Model 3(6) Logistic	Model 4(6) Logistic
Civil Resistance Transition	0.164*** (0.0287)		2.726*** (0.810)	
Modernization	0.0852*** (0.0196)	0.0977*** (0.0240)	1.996** (0.619)	2.108*** (0.577)
Democratic Neighbors	0.208** (0.0735)	0.249** (0.0937)	1.278 (1.338)	1.701 (1.458)
Trade Linkage	0.0751 (0.0429)	0.0856 (0.0536)	5.353*** (1.290)	5.370*** (1.462)
INGO Network Centrality	0.0664 (0.0823)	0.161 (0.0952)	-0.374 (2.047)	0.632 (1.869)
Previous Polyarchy Level	0.216 (0.122)	0.176 (0.146)	-0.954 (3.710)	-1.893 (3.544)
Constant	0.219*** (0.0476)	0.250*** (0.0573)	-3.651* (1.507)	-2.421* (1.130)
N	178	178	178	178
r^2 /Pseudo r^2	0.535	0.438	0.546	0.424

Robust standard errors, clustered by country, in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

These results show that the findings reported in the main chapter are robust to several different specifications, and not a statistical artifact of the Amelia process.

Additional Tests of Hypotheses 2-4: The Three Patterns of Behavior

The Baron-Kenny Mediation Tests

As I describe in Chapters 1 and 2, in a seminal article Baron and Kenny (1986) propose a series of simple tests using various regression models to determine whether a theorized mediating relationship exists between two independent variables and a dependent variable. These tests are crucial to demonstrate the character of the relationship between the independent variables, and demonstrate both that a theorized mediator does in fact affect a

portion of the causal effect of an independent variable on a dependent variable, but also has its own independent impact on the dependent variable. In the case of the mechanisms that I am proposing for understanding democratization in CRTs, this is crucial to demonstrate that mobilization and radicalization mediate the effect of structural variables such as modernization.

Table AP.6 reports the Baron-Kenny models for my mobilization factor, averaged across the five Amelia imputations. As shown in Model BK1, both modernization and trade linkage are significant predictors of the mobilization factor. The other structural variables are not, hence I drop them and run a second model of the mobilization factor simply including modernization and trade linkage. Model 3 reports the direct effects of these two structural factors on the final dependent variable of democracy, while Model 4 includes both mobilization and the two structural factors. The relationships pass all of Baron and Kenny's tests. In particular, the coefficient sizes for modernization and trade linkage are significantly smaller when the mobilization factor is included in the regression equation. Thus, I consider the theoretical assertion that mobilization acts as a mediator for these structural factors to be well supported by the data.

Table AP.8: Baron-Kenny Mediation Test Models for Mobilization Factor

	Model BK1 DV: Mobilization	Model BK2 DV: Mobilization	Model BK3 DV: Democracy	Model BK4 DV: Democracy
Mobilization				.16478*** (.02496)
Modernization	.26881*** (.07673)	.27465*** (.06884)	.17330*** (.01540)	.12804*** (.01729)
Trade Linkage	1.5167** (.49026)	1.6026** (.46337)	.33882 (.17902)	.07475 (.15517)
Democratic Neighbors	-.28204 (.28405)			
INGO Network Centrality	.17498 (.27114)			
Previous Polyarchy Level	.85794 (.46626)			
Constant	.38492* (.15633)	.56826*** (.07666)	.47952*** (.02081)	.38588*** (.02366)
N	78	78	78	78
r^2	.23336	.19372	.47814	.63597

Robust standard errors, clustered by country, in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table AP.7 performs the same set of tests on the maximalism factor. Modernization is the only one of my structural variables that significantly predicts maximalism, hence it is the only structural variable that I retain in Models BK5-BK8. As shown in comparing Models BK7 and BK8, adding the maximalism factor reduces the effect size of modernization on post-transition democracy, indicating that maximalism is mediating the effect of modernization.

Table AP.9: Baron-Kenny Mediation Test Models for Maximalism Factor

	Model BK5 DV: Maximalism	Model BK6 DV: Maximalism	Model BK7 DV: Democracy	Model BK8 DV: Democracy
Maximalism				-.13337*** (.03116)
Modernization	-.34034** (.11450)	-.37925*** (.09274)	.17433*** (.01540)	.12384*** (.02313)
Trade Linkage	-.40380 (.64375)			
Democratic Neighbors	-.32094 (.30337)			
INGO Network Centrality	-.02230 (.36466)			
Previous Polyarchy Level	.43120 (.52844)			
Constant	-.19600 (.18990)	-.18843* (.08683)	.48578*** (.02031)	.46081*** (.02059)
N	78	78	78	78
r^2	.26662	.24674	.46959	.59119

Robust standard errors, clustered by country, in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Figure AP.3 contains scatter plots of all three of my patterns of behavior plotted against the polyarchy score at the conclusion of the transition. Clear patterns of correlation can be easily observed for both the mobilization and maximalism factors, with a positive relationship between mobilization and post-transition democracy and an inverse relationship between maximalism and democracy. The relationship is much less clear in the scatter plot for the index of lustration policies, with a range of polyarchy scores across most of the values of the index. However, this could be obscured in part by the non-continuous nature of the variable. Thus, figure AP.3 also contains a bar graph of the mean values of polyarchy at the end of a transition

across the different values of the ILP index.⁶⁷ The mean values provide some indication of the curvilinear relationship I argue for in the theory chapter, with the highest levels of democracy at middling values of the index.

Figure AP.3: Scatter and Bar graphs of main independent variables and EOT polyarchy scores.⁶⁸




Figure AP.4 shows the residuals versus fitted values plots for Models 9 and 10 from the main text, that is to say tests of the impact of the three patterns of behavior on the post-transition level of democracy in addition to structural factors in CRTs (Model 9) and the impact

⁶⁷ For visual ease the x axis is simply labeled in numerical ascending order rather than with the actual numerical values of these categories after the centering and normalizing process.

⁶⁸ Scatter plots generated from imputation 1 of the Amelia data. The shape of the data is fundamentally similar in each of the five Amelia imputations.

of structural factors alone on post-transition democracy in CRTs (Model 10). As the figure shows there is no clear pattern in the plot, indicating no homoscedasticity.

Figure AP.4: RVFplots for Models 9 and 10




Table AP.6 reports variance inflation factor (VIF) scores for all independent variables in both of these models as well. The VIF scores are well below 10, indicating no problematic multicollinearity among the variables.

Table AP.10: VIF Scores from Models 9 and 10

Variable	VIF Score - Model 9	VIF Score - Model 10
Modernization	2.578615	1.027104
ILP Index	1.982721	
ILP Index (Squared)	1.931574	
INGO Network Centrality	1.853216	1.499119
Democratic Neighbors	1.635201	
Mobilization	1.411611	
Maximalism	1.326271	
Previous Polyarchy Score	1.127628	1.662535
Trade Linkage	1.081497	2.055682

I also tested the condition numbers of these models.⁶⁹ The standard baseline for potential for multicollinearity is a condition number above 15, while a number above 30 represents almost certainly problematic multicollinearity. The condition number for model 9 is roughly 10.6, while the condition number for model 10 is roughly 7.4, indicating that neither model is suffering from multicollinearity.

I ran all four models on data that had not been put through Amelia. The OLS models, displayed as Models 9(2) and 10(2) below, show the same relationship as in the Amelia data, with similar coefficient sizes and relative levels of statistical significance, as well as similar increases in the model's r^2 relative to the purely structural model. However, as would be expected, the significantly decreased number of observations results in somewhat decreased levels of statistical significance overall.

⁶⁹ See Belsley et al 1980 for a classic discussion of the derivation of the condition number of a regression model.

The logistic regression models were more problematic. With the significant reduction in the number of observations, my statistical software was no longer able to estimate a model using the full suite of independent and control variables. All of the observations were completely determined by the model, making it impossible to estimate coefficients. This is unsurprising considering the number of variables and observations (9 independent variables on 23 observations) almost of necessity creates overfitting, falling well below advised proportions of n to k in standard texts on logistic regression modeling (Peduzzi, Concato, Kemper, Holford, & Feinstein, 1996; Vittinghoff & McCulloch, 2007).

To still present some meaningful results, I performed a modified stepwise deletion procedure, removing from the model the independent variable with the highest p-values from Model 11 (the full logistic regression model on the Amelia-imputed data), and attempting to estimate a model on the non-Amelia data. Through this procedure I first deleted the ILP index and its squared term, and then the trade linkage variable. I present the model that remained after this procedure as Model 11(2) below.

The effects of a still relatively large number of independent variables on a very small sample of cases make the results unstable. Only the INGO Network Centrality score is a significant predictor at the $p < 0.05$ level, quite surprising considering that it is far from significant in any other model, and the coefficients for almost all of the independent variables are radically different than in other models. It does bear mention, however, that the signs of the independent variables are consistent with other logistic regression models, indicating at least some similarities in the overall pattern of variation.

Table AP.11: Main Tests on Non-Amelia Imputed Data

	Model 9 (2)	Model 10 (2)	Model 11 (2)	Model 12 (2)
	OLS	OLS	Logistic	Logistic
Mobilization	0.190*** (0.0402)		0.197 (1.711)	
Maximalism	-0.130* (0.0516)		-6.402 (3.832)	
Lustration Index	-0.0446 (0.0465)			
Lustration Index (Squared)	0.0739 (0.0601)			
Modernization	0.0293 (0.0436)	0.108** (0.0394)	2.075 (1.209)	1.859* (0.821)
Trade Linkage	-0.948 (4.554)	0.456*** (0.102)		9.035** (3.164)
Democratic Neighbors	0.113 (0.129)	0.153 (0.125)	1.699 (2.102)	1.335 (1.737)
INGO Network Centrality	-0.0732 (0.150)	0.119 (0.180)	-7.237* (3.445)	0.571 (3.041)
Previous Polyarchy Level	0.0398 (0.133)	0.119 (0.182)	1.609 (4.036)	0.885 (3.975)
Constant	0.331** (0.0884)	0.394*** (0.0939)	-0.525 (2.927)	-1.808 (1.734)
<i>n</i>	23	53	26	53
<i>r</i> ² /Pseudo <i>r</i> ²	0.860	0.469	0.683	0.429

Robust standard errors, clustered by country, in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

I also ran these primary models again while shifting the definition of the transitional endpoint to my two alternative measures. As shown in Tables AP.8 and AP.9 below, in neither case does the change in endpoint definition result in any significant change in coefficient size, sign, or significance. The inclusion of the three patterns of behavior also significantly increases the r^2 and pseudo r^2 over a purely structural model.

Table AP.12: Main Tests with Alternative Transitional Endpoint 1

	Model 9 (3) OLS	Model 10 (3) OLS	Model 11 (3) Logistic	Model 12 (3) Logistic
Mobilization	.14777*** (.01882)		2.9985* (1.3148)	
Maximalism	-.11164*** (.01896)		-3.3660* (1.2601)	
Lustration Index	.01013 (.01766)		.46893 (.69347)	
Lustration Index (Squared)	-.00585 (.02101)		-.41841 (.47422)	
Modernization	.08024** (.02268)	.16062*** (.02485)	1.9305** (.73586)	1.8406*** (.48757)
Trade Linkage	.02547 (.12852)	.28549 (.16058)	2.9689 (3.5534)	6.0282* (2.9766)
Democratic Neighbors	.10817 (.08346)	.09458 (.10200)	2.2617 (1.9619)	1.6528 (1.4529)
INGO Network Centrality	-.09358 (.07295)	-.03324 (.09223)	-3.7851 (2.7634)	.05133 (1.3895)
Previous Polyarchy Level	.08824 (.08024)	.14541 (.13755)	1.4135 (3.6659)	1.4356 (3.0950)
Constant	.38247*** (.04122)	.45565*** (.04710)	-4.2315* (1.9612)	-2.0570* (.98192)
<i>n</i>	78	78	78	78
<i>r</i> ² /Pseudo <i>r</i> ²	.78056	.52896	.61839	.36211

Robust standard errors, clustered by country, in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table AP.13 Main Tests with Alternative Transitional Endpoint 2

	Model 9 (4) OLS	Model 10 (4) OLS	Model 11 (4) Logistic	Model 12 (4) Logistic
Mobilization	.16696*** (.01926)		2.2477** (.82429)	
Maximalism	-.11128*** (.02086)		-2.4473** (.88834)	
Lustration Index	-.00659 (.01881)		.03878 (.61351)	
Lustration Index (Squared)	.00346 (.02080)		-.11381 (.43433)	
Modernization	.06975** (.02443)	.14994*** (.02752)	1.2224* (.52968)	1.6372*** (.45301)
Trade Linkage	.04474 (.12554)	.28223 (.17668)	4.8900 (3.5823)	6.3296* (3.0692)
Democratic Neighbors	.13046 (.08339)	.13058 (.10964)	2.7025 (1.8613)	2.0202 (1.4814)
INGO Network Centrality	-.06521 (.07966)	-.01444 (.10900)	-.84458 (1.9344)	.85088 (1.2362)
Previous Polyarchy Level	.03309 (.08506)	.11626 (.14287)	-.55868 (3.8531)	.89124 (3.2901)
Constant	.36553*** (.04640)	.45341*** (.05216)	-3.5953* (1.5531)	-2.0687* (1.0144)
<i>n</i>	78	78	78	78
<i>r</i> ² /Pseudo <i>r</i> ²	.77541	.49247	.57920	.36374

Robust standard errors, clustered by country, in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Next I run the same model with the dependent variable measured five years after the beginning of the transition. This is a less reliable indicator of post-transition democracy because some transitions are still ongoing at this point while other have long ended. However, it is an additional way to confirm that my results are not spurious. I change the measurement of my mobilization and maximalism factors slightly in this test, using the scores in the year after the

initiation of the transition rather than the average score across all years in the transition. I make this change because some transitions are longer than five years.

The findings are substantively similar to tests using my various more dynamic measures of transitional endpoints. Most importantly, they confirm the statistically significant impact of transitional mobilization and maximalism on future levels of democracy. The r^2 across all models is lower than in models using a more dynamic definition of transitional endpoints, as we would expect considering that the arbitrary cut-off point is capturing different dynamics of existing regimes and continuing transitions.

Table AP.14: Main Tests with Polyarchy Measured 5 Years after Initiation of Transition

	Model 9 (5) OLS	Model 10 (5) OLS	Model 11 (5) Logistic	Model 12 (5) Logistic
Mobilization	.16088*** (.02517)		2.1724** (.78002)	
Maximalism	-.10327*** (.02556)		-1.8201* (.77909)	
Lustration Index	.02686 (.02692)		.82331 (.59938)	
Lustration Index (Squared)	-.02579 (.01957)		-.57301 (.32636)	
Modernization	.06456* (.02991)	.14341*** (.03355)	.78858 (.64592)	1.3171** (.47255)
Trade Linkage	-.20014 (.19119)	.14284 (.24502)	3.2436 (6.0503)	5.9236 (3.2699)
Democratic Neighbors	.22034* (.09868)	.15449 (.11094)	3.2651 (1.8835)	1.8517 (1.3932)
INGO Network Centrality	-.03045 (.10200)	.05711 (.12799)	-.69295 (1.9314)	.68507 (1.3185)
Previous Polyarchy Level	.05034 (.10985)	.15391 (.13988)	-.01253 (2.8131)	.88864 (2.5802)
Constant	.37243*** (.05280)	.40770*** (.06213)	-2.5613 (1.3278)	-1.7243* (.84737)
<i>n</i>	78	78	78	78
<i>r</i> ² /Pseudo <i>r</i> ²	.71665	.47142	.52065	.29009

Robust standard errors, clustered by country, in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Next I shifted my measurement of the dependent variable from the Polyarchy score to the Polity IV score. As described in Chapter 2, I consider this to be an inferior measure to the polyarchy score, with less reliable and theoretically satisfying definition of democracy and democraticness. However, it also provides a meaningful way of providing additional robustness to my results.

Using the Polity score as my measurement of post-transition democracy leads to two key differences from my primary tests. In the linear tests maximalism loses its significance. However, in the logistic regression models predicting the likelihood of crossing the democratic threshold the mobilization factor, which falls below the $p < 0.05$ level of significance in my primary tests, is now a significant predictor of post-transition democracy.

Table AP.15: Main Tests with Polity IV Score as Dependent Variable

	Model 9 (6) OLS	Model 10 (6) OLS	Model 11 (6) Logistic	Model 12 (6) Logistic
Mobilization	4.7374*** (.80612)		1.5965* (.76166)	
Maximalism	-.97115 (.76708)		-1.8188* (.77945)	
Lustration Index	-.66370 (.60223)		.87763 (.65432)	
Lustration Index (Squared)	.24414 (.38695)		-.81142 (.42139)	
Modernization	1.2459 (.59771)	2.8174*** (.58953)	.21821 (.59999)	.95818* (.43381)
Trade Linkage	-4.0013 (3.7938)	2.2134 (3.1284)	-8.8721 (9.5982)	2.0265 (3.5722)
Democratic Neighbors	3.4331* (1.5062)	2.0023 (2.1836)	2.3296 (2.3132)	1.0353 (1.5157)
INGO Network Centrality	-3.7287 (1.9264)	-3.0559 (2.2151)	.12616 (1.7301)	.86019 (1.5161)
Previous Polyarchy Level	.55626 (3.3330)	4.9721 (2.7435)	6.9058 (4.2543)	5.1706** (1.9248)
Constant	1.4723 (1.3241)	3.5344** (1.1012)	-1.9405 (1.5694)	-1.3628 (.78978)
<i>n</i>	78	78	78	78
<i>r</i> ² /Pseudo <i>r</i> ²	.57638	.28370	.47996	.23376

Robust standard errors, clustered by country, in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Finally, I ran the models including the secondary control variables: logged area in square km, British colonialism, military regime, the gini coefficient, the Muslim population, and oil and gas rents. I report the results in Model 9(5) in Table AP.10 below. Even with these additional controls the mobilization and maximalism variables have relatively unchanged coefficient sizes and significance levels.

In Table AP.10 I also report the results of running this extended structural model through a stepwise deletion process, that is to say running the model iteratively while deleting the least significant independent variable from the model in each iteration until only variables with a p value below a certain threshold remain. I chose an elimination threshold of $p > 0.1$. Comparing Models 9(5) and 11(5) with the SWD models shows the robustness of the mobilization and maximalism measures relative to structural predictors. The most significant structural variable, modernization, is eliminated by stepwise deletion, while the gini coefficient, insignificant in the original model, ends up as the most significant structural predictor of democracy. In contrast to these fluctuating levels of significance for structural factors, throughout the stepwise deletion process the mobilization and maximalism measures remain highly significant, and are often the most significant predictors by an order of magnitude.

Table AP.16: Models with Secondary Controls and Stepwise Deletion

	Model 9 (5) OLS	Model 10 (5) OLS	Model 11 (5) Logistic	Model 12 (5) Logistic	SWD Model OLS	SWD Model Logistic
Mobilization	.1172** (.0353)		.2928 (.9442)		.1475*** (.0265)	
Maximalism	-.1068** (.0351)		-4.2642* (1.5479)		-.1232*** (.0245)	-2.47*** (.68579)
Lustration Index	.02901 (.0249)		1.0545 (.9812)			
Lustration Index (Squared)	-.0143 (.0303)		-.8215 (.8431)			
Modernization	.0557 (.0384)	.11609* (.04607)	2.4747* (.9644)	2.2040* (1.0602)	.0573* (.0230)	1.486*** (.42093)
Trade Linkage	-.3834 (.9989)	-.9141 (.8804)	-16.531 (16.693)	-10.941 (12.477)		
Democratic Neighbors	.1373 (.1030)	.1145 (.1072)	2.6060 (2.5036)	2.2348 (1.9144)	.1777* (.0763)	
INGO Network Centrality	.0159 (.1395)	.2252 (.1512)	-4.4276 (5.3753)	1.7643 (3.3901)		
Old Polyarchy Level	.1103 (.1621)	.0356 (.1986)	8.3761 (5.7011)	2.0846 (4.9896)		
Land, sq km (logged)	.0004 (.0129)	-.0077 (.0160)	.2008 (.4595)	-.15095 (.50575)		
British Colony	.0177 (.0493)	.0294 (.0660)	2.6860 (1.4054)	2.2539 (1.7338)		
Military Regime	-.0410 (.0556)	-.0590 (.0676)	1.4441 (1.2971)	.25956 (.80780)		
Gini Coefficient	-.0036 (.0023)	-.0030 (.0026)	-.1033 (.0827)	-.03895 (.04975)	-.0033* (.0016)	
Muslim Population	-.0535 (.0763)	-.0459 (.1074)	.2976 (2.2033)	-.86646 (2.2824)		
Oil and Gas Revenue	-.0000 (.0000)	-.0001 (.0001)	.0006 (.0014)	.00035 (.00106)		
Constant	.5206** (.1656)	.6450*** (.1751)	-2.9776 (4.2949)	-.13339 (4.2875)	.4606*** (.0646)	-2.01*** (.4932)
<i>n</i>	58	58	58	58	67	78
<i>r</i> ² /Pseudo <i>r</i> ²	.7237	.5602	.6257	.4545	.7114	.4734

Robust standard errors, clustered by country, in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Appendix B: Complete List of Interviewees

Table AP.17: Nepal Interviewees

Nepal			
Name	Position	Interview Date	
Aditya Adhikari	Journalist, Kathmandu Post	12/22/2016	
Indra Adhikari	Deputy Executive Director, Institute of Foreign Affairs	12/14/2016	
Rabindra Adhikari	Member of Parliament, CPN-UML	12/7/2016	
Govinda Sharma	Bandi Advocate, Supreme Court of Nepal	12/18/2016	
Lok Raj Baral	Executive Chairman, Nepal Center for Contemporary Studies	12/12/2016	
Basanti Basatoli	Journalist, Sancharika Samuha	12/14/2016	
Binod Bhattarai	Founding President, Inter-Party Society of Nepal (IPAS-Nepal)	12/12/2016	
Rajan Bhattarai	Member of Parliament, CPN-UML	12/8/2016	
Meena Bishwakarma	Central Committee Member, Nepali Congress	12/5/2016	
Rem Bahadur Biswokarma	President, Collective Campaign for Peace	12/10/2016	
Shobhakar Budathoki	Independent NGO Contractor and Human Rights Activist	12/1/2016	
Devraj Dahal	Nepal Country Director, Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung	12/6/2016	
Khim Lal Devkota	Spokesman, Naya Shakti Party	12/11/2016	
Daman Nath Dunghana	Former Speaker of the House, Nepali Congress	12/5/2016	
Yubraj Ghimire	Editor, Annapurna Post	12/17/2016	
Yogendra Ghising	Member of Parliament, CPN-MC	12/17/2016	
Dipak Gyawali	Former Minister and Academician, Nepal Academy of Science and Technology	12/7/2016	
Vijay Karna	Professor of Political Science, Tribhuvan University	12/11/2016	
Ajaya Khanal	Former Editor, Himalayan Times	12/14/2016	
Muma Ram Khanal	Central Committee Member, Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), 1996-2004	12/9/2016	
Sridhar Khatri	Professor of Foreign Affairs, Tribhuvan University	12/13/2016	
Suresh Ale Magar	Secretariat Member, Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist Center)	12/23/2016	
Pancha Maharjan	Professor, Center for Nepal and Asian Studies (CNAS), Tribhuvan University	12/1/2016	

Bharat	Nepali	Executive Director, Feminist Dalit Organization	12/13/2016
Krishna	Pahadi	Founding Chair, Human Rights and Peace Society	12/13/2016
Devendra Raj	Pandey	Convener, Citizen's Movement for Democracy and Peace	12/21/2016
Kamal Krishna Man	Pangeni	Member of Parliament, Nepali Congress	12/18/2016
Prateek Charan Subodh Raj	Pradhan	Executive Director, Nepal Law Society	12/6/2016
	Pradhan Prasai	Editor-in-Chief, Bharapuri Online Newspaper	12/9/2016
		Coordinator, Accountability Watch Committee	12/15/2016
	Pyakurel	Chairperson, Informal Sector Service Center	12/2/2016
Sushil	Pyakurel	Special Advisor to the President, Government of Nepal	12/20/2016
Gaurav	Rana	Chief of General Staff, Nepal Army (2012-2015)	12/21/2016
Uday Shamsher	Rana	Member of Parliament, Nepali Congress	12/13/2016
Minendra	Rijal	Former Minister and Member of Parliament, Nepali Congress	12/16/2016
Hari Bishnu Om Prakash	Rokka Sapkota	Independent Analyst in Political Economy	12/9/2016
		Country Director, FHI 360 Nepal	12/22/2016
Abhishek Pratap	Sen	Director, Advocacy Forum-Nepal	12/16/2016
	Shah	Member of Parliament, Federal Socialist Forum	12/20/2016
Tula	Shah	Executive Director, Nepal Madhes Foundation	12/2/2016
Min Bahadur	Shahi	Chairperson, Human Rights Alliance	12/15/2016
Bala Nanda	Sharma	General (Ret.), Nepal Army	12/15/2016
Hari Prakash Mani	Sharma	Director, Alliance for Social Dialogue	12/20/2016
	Sharma	Senior Advocate, Pro Public	12/20/2016
Sumit	Sharma	Executive Director, Nepal Transition to Peace Initiative	12/12/2016
Kapil	Shrestha	Professor, Tribhuvan University	12/3/2016
Sabin	Shrestha	Executive Director, Forum for Women, Law, and Development	12/19/2016
Shyam Renu	Shrestha Sijapati	Member of Parliament, CPN (Maoist Center)	12/15/2016
		General Secretary, Feminist Dalit Organization	12/13/2016
Malla K	Sundar	Founding Member, Nepal Federation of Indigenous Nationalities	12/14/2016
Padam	Sundas	Chairperson, Samata Foundation	11/29/2016

Ujjwal	Sundas	Managing Direction, Samata Foundation	11/29/2016
Deepak	Thapa	Director, Social Science Baha	12/16/2016
Dinesh	Tripathi	Advocate, Supreme Court of Nepal	12/4/2016
Padma Ratna	Tuladhar	Independent Left Politician	12/8/2016
Dina	Upadhyay	Member of Parliament, Nepali Congress	12/19/2016
Bishnu	Upreti	Director, Nepal Center for Contemporary Research	12/13/2016
George	Varughese	Nepal Country Representative, The Asia Foundation	12/8/2016

Table AP.18: Zambia Interviewees

Zambia			
Name		Position	Interview Date
Darison	Chaala	Former General Secretary, Civil Servants and Allied Workers of Zambia Union	3/31/2017
Theresa	Chewe	Administrator, Southern Africa Center for Constructive Resolution of Disputes (SACCORD)	4/10/2017
McDonald	Chipenzi	Former Executive Director, Foundation for Democratic Process (FODEP)	3/28/2017
Chris	Chirwa	Director, Image Publishers Limited	3/28/2017
Mbita	Chitala	Founding Deputy Secretary, Movement for Multiparty Democracy	4/5/2017
Mark	Chona	Founding Permanent Secretary, Zambian Ministry of Foreign Affairs	4/4/2017
Rodger	Chongwe	Former President, Law Association of Zambia	3/22/2017
Bright	Chunga	Former Presidential Chief of Staff, Government of Zambia	3/27/2017
Jacob	Goma	General Secretary, Forum for Democracy and Peace	3/20/2017
Lee	Havasonda	President, Transparency International Zambia; Former Executive Director, SACCORD	3/27/2017
Batuke	Imenda	Former Member of Parliament, National Assembly of Zambia	4/12/2017
Jack	Kalala	Foreign Service of Zambia	3/25/2017
Austin	Kaluba	Journalist, National Mirror	4/3/2017
Enoch	Kavindele	Former Vice-President of Zambia	3/28/2017
Sarah	Longwe	Chair, NGO Coordinating Committee	3/29/2017
Bradford	Machila	Former Minister for Lands, Government of Zambia	4/6/2017
Peter	Machungwa	Former Home Affairs Minister, Government of Zambia	4/11/2017
Amos	Malupenga	Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Local Government and Housing	3/24/2017
John	Mambo	Chairperson, Civil Society Constitutional Agenda	4/4/2017
Akashambatwa	Mbikusita-Lewanika	Founding National Secretary, Movement for Multiparty Democracy	3/18/2017
Chibeza	Mfuni	Founding President, Social Democratic Party	3/31/2017
Stanley	Mhango	Former President, Foundation for Democratic Process (FODEP)	4/10/2017
Laura	Miti	Executive Director, Alliance for Community Action	3/30/2017

Jotham	Momba	Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Zambia	4/12/2017
Alfred	Mudenda	Deputy Secretary General, Zambian Congress of Trade Unions	3/23/2017
Gilbert	Mudenda	Founding Member, Movement for Multiparty Democracy	4/9/2017
Teddy	Mulonga	Former Deputy Secretary to the Cabinet, Government of Zambia	3/24/2017
Mike	Mulongoti	President, People's Party	3/23/2017
Christine	Munalula	Program Manager, CARE International	3/22/2017
Charity	Musamba	Lecturer in Development Studies, University of Zambia	4/4/2017
Frederick	Mutesa	Founder, Zambians for Empowerment and Development Party	4/6/2017
Lucy	Muyoyeta	Former Chairperson, NGO Coordinating Council	4/12/2017
Vernon	Mwaanga	Founding Vice-Chair for Publicity, Movement for Multiparty Democracy	3/27/2017
Maureen	Mwanawasa	Former First Lady of Zambia	4/11/2017
Tentani	Mwanza	President, National Democratic Party	3/21/2017
Lewis	Mwape	Executive Director, Zambia Council for Social Development	4/3/2017
Raphael	Nakacinda	National Secretary, Movement for Multiparty Democracy	4/11/2017
Bizeck	Phiri	Professor of Political Science, University of Zambia	4/3/2017
Sketchley	Sacika	Former Secretary to the Cabinet, Government of Zambia	4/7/2017
Richard	Sakala	Editor, Daily Nation Newspaper	3/29/2017
Guy	Scott	Acting President of Zambia, 2014-2015	4/14/2017
Fackson	Shamenda	Former President, Zambian Council of Trade Unions	3/30/2017
Emily	Sikazwe	Commissioner, Electoral Commission of Zambia	3/31/2017
Neo	Simutanyi	Executive Director, Center for Policy Dialogue	4/5/2017
Ludwig	Sondashi	President, Forum for Democratic Alternatives	3/29/2017
Keli	Walubita	Founding Vice-Chair for Security and Intelligence, Movement for Multiparty Democracy	3/21/2017
Sikota	Wina	Former Minister (various portfolios), Government of Zambia	4/1/2017
Simon	Zukas	Founding Member, Movement for Multiparty Democracy;	3/29/2017
Ballard	Zulu	Outreach Director, Indaba Agricultural Policy Research Institute	4/13/2017

Table AP.19: Brazil Interviewees

Brazil			
Name		Position	Interview Date
Jaime	Almeida	Professor, University of Brasilia	6/7/2017
Criméia	Almeida	Activist, Comissão de Familiares de Mortos e Desaparecidos	6/28/2017
Ademar	Bertucci	Former President, Caritas	6/6/2017
Carlos Henrique	Cardim	Ambassador, Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs	6/20/2017
Athos Magno Antonio	Costa e Silva	Founding Member, Workers Party (PT)	6/9/2017
Carlos Alves	Coutinho	Brigadier General, Escola Superior de Guerra	5/31/2017
Alvaro	Dias	Senator, PMDB	6/1/2017
Helio	Doyle	Founding Member, Workers Party (PT)	6/19/2017
Helio	Duque	Constituent Assembly Member	6/30/2017
Elio	Gaspari	Journalist, O Globo/Folha de S. Paulo	6/14/2017
Eliana Magalhães	Graça	Sociologist, Special Secretariat on Women's Politics (SPM)	6/29/2017
Ada	Lemos	Political Analyst, Party of the Brazilian Democratic Movement (PMDB)	6/23/2017
Ivan	Marx	Federal Attorney, Transitional Justice Working Group	6/30/2017
Delano	Menezes	Brigadier General; Director, Escola Superior de Guerra	5/26/2017
Vera	Mercucci	Lobbyist, Health Professionals Syndicate (SINDISAUDE)	6/20/2017
Elimar	Nascimento	Former Student Activist and PCdoB militant	7/3/2017
Bolívar	Pêgo	Researcher, Institute for Applied Economic Research	6/7/2017
Daniel	Reis	Founding Member, Workers Party (PT)	7/6/2017
Isaac	Roitman	Professor, Brazilian Society for the Advancement of Science	6/20/2017
Maria	Skorupski	Former Student Activist	6/26/2017
Tin	Urbiniatti	Found, Grupo Forja; Cultural Advisor, Sao Paolo Worker's Movement	6/20/2017