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SECURING WHOSE PEACE? THE EFFECTS OF PEACE-AGREEMENT
PROVISIONS ON PHYSICAL INTEGRITY RIGHTS AFTER CIVIL WAR

A Dissertation

Presented to

the Faculty of the Josef Korbel School of International Studies

University of Denver

In Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements for the Degree

Doctor of Philosophy

by

Melvin R. Korsmo

August 2017

Advisor: Deborah Avant

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Title: SECURING WHOSE PEACE? THE EFFECTS OF PEACE-AGREEMENT PROVISIONS ON PHYSICAL INTEGRITY RIGHTS AFTER CIVIL WAR
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Abstract

When civil wars are resolved via negotiated settlement, peace-agreement provisions like power-sharing agreements and third-party security guarantees often are advocated for their purported benefits of ensuring a long-lasting and durable peace. Although scholars have explored the effects of peace-agreement provisions on enhancing the security of states, their influence on shaping individual security outcomes is largely unknown. The strong potential exists that these same provisions that improve a government's ability to deter future violence also increase that government's violation of its citizens' physical integrity rights as a means of coercion and governance. Also rare in the power-sharing literature is exploration of the effects of individual, disaggregated provisions.

This dissertation, therefore, asks: *Under what conditions do peace-agreement provisions significantly improve the state's protection of its citizens' physical integrity rights?* Two models are proposed. Model 1 considers aggregated power-sharing provisions. Model 2 considers disaggregated peace-agreement provisions, and includes both power-sharing agreements and robust third-party security guarantees.

Both models are evaluated in light of the situational and historical contexts relevant to each state's civil war experience. The universe of cases includes thirty-six civil wars in twenty-seven states where conflict terminated between 1989-2007 via negotiated settlement. This project leverages a mixed-method research design, including

contingency tables and fuzzy-set Quantitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) to resolve the “small number of cases, multiple variables” challenge and to account for causal complexity.

Four central claims are advanced in this dissertation: First, the common technique of evaluating peace-agreement provisions by aggregating them according to common political, military, and territorial dimensions obscures and misleads scholars; the disaggregation of peace-agreement provisions reveals how measures often act in opposition. Second, a number of commonly present provisions—including integration of rebels into the main military ranks and the granting of territorial autonomy—are consistently inhibitory to individual security after civil war ends. Third, other provisions such as robust third-party security guarantees and the granting of territorial federalism consistently lead to a reduction in the level of political repression used by states after civil war has ended. Fourth, significant human-rights improvement results from favorable causal recipes (i.e., combinations of disaggregated conditions) that together reduce both the motivation and opportunity of a government to repress.

These findings will assist decision-makers involved in negotiated settlements, as they (1) identify the appropriate blends of peace-agreement provisions for resolving different civil wars, and (2) balance the need for a post-conflict government to both assure its population and to deter future violence.

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Chapter One: Introduction

Civil wars are brutal. Cruel cousins of death, disease, and displacement afflict citizens in states undergoing such turmoil. However, all civil wars eventually come to an end. Four prominent pathways exist for their termination. War may end in military victory by rebels, in military victory by the government, in a ceasefire/stalemate, or in a negotiated settlement (Toft 2010).¹ The pathway to war termination reliably determines the duration of peace that follows a war. Civil wars ending in military victory—especially rebel victory—result in more durable, long-lasting peace than wars that end in negotiated settlements (Toft 2009).²

Civil wars also witness gross violations of fundamental human rights. Governments are particularly culpable of violating these rights, committing various acts of political repression both during and after a war, as a means of establishing social control (Saideman and Zahar 2008; Stohl and Lopez 1984, 1986). A prominent form of political repression is the government's violation of the physical-integrity rights of individuals through actions such as state-sanctioned torture, disappearances, imprisonment, or extrajudicial killings. Contemporary literature does not cover the effects of war termination pathways on political repression in its various forms. What is known

¹ Cease-fires/stalemates are rare, compared to the other civil war termination types.

² Toft (2010) corroborated these findings in a later study that showed conflicts ending in military victory from 1940 to 2000 were almost twice as likely as negotiated settlements to remain settled for five years (i.e. no civil war recurrence during that time period). Also see Licklider (1995) who concluded that outright military victories are more effective than negotiated settlements in resolving civil wars in that they comparatively increase the length of time until civil war recurs.

with respect to war termination and human rights writ large, is that wars ending in government or rebel military victory are more likely than negotiated settlements to result in acts of genocide and mass killings after a conflict formally ends (Harff 2003; Licklider 1995).³

This dissertation is about political repression, principally in the form of violations against physical integrity rights and as carried out by a government or its agents following a civil war. Given the strong empirical finding that the presence of a civil war results in increased political repression (Poe and Tate 1994; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999), the inverse also should hold true: The absence of civil war should result in decreased political repression. That is, once a civil war has ended, then government respect for the physical-integrity rights of its citizens should improve.

Yet this finding did not hold true across all the cases in this study. Often the level of political repression had remained unchanged or even had become worse after their civil wars ended, even if the type of conflict-termination had held constant. A brief review of the conflicts that ended in negotiated settlements since 1989 demonstrated a broad range of experience. Two years after their respective civil wars had ended, the violation of physical integrity rights by respective governments had: (1) increased in Chad and Rwanda; (2) remained unchanged in Cambodia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Nicaragua, and South Africa; and (3) decreased significantly in Guinea Bissau, Moldova, and Liberia (following its second and third civil wars).

What explains this broad range of experiences despite the end of civil war? If the principal driver for political repression had ended, why did political repression remain at

³ This effect is evident primarily in identity-based conflicts.

the same level or become worse in some states while the level of repression decreased significantly in others? One method for addressing this question is to compare the effects that each of the four types of war termination had on political repression. A second method is to focus on civil wars that ended in negotiated settlements. This dissertation takes the latter approach, based on the following two factors:

First, while military victory appeared to guarantee more enduring peace than negotiated settlements, the termination method of ending civil war via peace agreements became a more common termination pathway. The end of the Cold War demarcated this transition: In the fifty years preceding the transition (1940-1990), only 20 percent of civil wars were resolved with negotiated settlements (Walter 1997, 335). In the 1990s, almost three times as many conflicts (54% of all civil wars)⁴ ended in negotiated settlements (Hartzell and Hoddie 2003a, 10).⁵ This trend continued unabated into the twenty-first century, with fifteen of nineteen civil wars (79%) ending with power-sharing agreements in negotiated settlements (Hartzell and Hoddie 2015).

Second, this selection confronted a difficult conundrum head on: The manifold expansion of, and preference for, negotiated settlements was rebuffed by the reality that this method of civil war termination also had led to the quickest recurrence of civil war. This finding was unsettling. Indeed, it drove Toft to question whether some natural characteristic of negotiated settlements had caused them to “reignite more often than

⁴This trend holds true even with changes in the civil war dataset. Toft (2010, 6) for example, alternatively assessed that just seven of 68 civil wars (10 percent) ended in negotiated settlements between 1940-1989. In contrast, she found that 15 of the 37 civil wars (41 percent) ending in the 1990s concluded via negotiated settlements; of the remaining conflicts, 15 conflicted in military victory and seven concluded by cease-fire/stalemate. This represented a four-fold increase in the presence of negotiated settlements.

⁵The remaining civil wars were resolved equally by either military victories or ceasefires/stalemates (Hartzell and Hoddie 2003a, 10).

military victories” (Toft 2009, 151) and to investigate what potential factors might have changed the anticipated outcome. Toft concluded that the presence of security-sector reform had increased peace duration, while the presence of third-party security guarantees had meant civil war was more likely to recur.

What are the effects, though, of third-party security guarantees and military pacts (the operationalized version of Toft’s security-sector reform) on political repression? Do guarantees both aggravate civil war recurrence and also lead to worse human-rights violations? Do military pacts both improve peace duration and enhance government recognition of human rights? What if these recommended measures—or other commonly advocated peace-agreement provisions—improve peace duration but intensify the government’s violations of physical integrity rights?

Framing the Primary Research Question

These questions matter significantly to a host of actors, including the government and opposition group(s) who were fighting, as well as those representatives and third parties involved in peace negotiations. Conventional thinking about negotiated settlements is unprepared to address these issues, due to an overemphasis on the dependent variable of peace duration. Under this approach, success in negotiated settlements is based on whether conflict recurs in a given time period.⁶

⁶ Most scholars proxy *enduring peace*, understood as the absence of civil war, by measuring the number of months or years until civil war recurs. The common standard then for measuring the success of different negotiated settlements is based on whether the state relapsed into civil war within a given time period. By definition, civil war recurrence is triggered when the number of deaths within a state surpasses Small & Singer’s (1982) threshold of 1,000 deaths within one year.

This dissertation contends that the traditional method of defining success based on civil war recurrence is a suboptimal approach overall, for “Peace is not just the absence of war but the creation of all the conditions which enable man to live without anxiety or fear” (Comprehensive Agreement on Human Rights 1994). Protection from large-scale violence is an important component of peace. But it is not the *only* component of peace. The traditional approach fails to account for whether citizens live in constant anxiety and fear of their government after the war. It emphasizes the government’s ability to deter civil war while ignoring the government’s ability to assure its own population that it will not personally threaten their well being after conflict has ended.⁷

Practically speaking, this means that advocacy for the inclusion of certain peace-agreement measures in a negotiated settlement is principally related to their known effects on civil war recurrence; how they influence human rights is unknown. Ignorance of this carries great policy risks. Consider, for example, contemporary Iraq, which embodies this aforementioned challenge found in civil wars of rebuilding a government that is both strong enough to protect and deter large-scale violence, and that also assures the population it will not use this same power to threaten or harm them. As one scholar recently explained: “The fundamental problem in Iraq now is not that the government did not have enough coercive capability but that the governors were using that capability against the Sunnis . . . [who] have now opted for the Islamic State” (Saideman 2014).

Given the relevance of this topic to current civil wars in Iraq and Syria and the general dearth of empirical literature on the matter, this project asks: *Under what*

⁷ For more on this discussion about the need for governments to balance deterrence and assurance, see Chapter 2, as well as Saideman & Zahar (2008).

conditions do peace-agreement provisions significantly improve the state's protection of its citizens' physical integrity rights? Throughout this dissertation, a state's violation of its citizen's physical integrity rights is referred to in shorthand as *political repression*. Likewise a reduction in such violations is at times called *less political repression* or *human rights improvement*.⁸ For economy of explanation herein, these terms are used interchangeably throughout the dissertation—with the caveat and direct acknowledgment up front that the violation of physical integrity rights is but one form of political repression (albeit a prominent, important form, as detailed in Chapter 2) and that other types of human rights exist (as do various violations of them).⁹

Negotiated Settlements and Peace-Agreement Provisions

Negotiated settlements occur when civil war belligerents (i.e., contending government and rebel groups) initiate contractual guarantees (Toft 2009), which detail how power will be distributed or shared after a conflict. These guarantees are commonly referred to as power-sharing agreements, or arrangements.¹⁰ An established method of comparing negotiated settlements is evaluating the various power-sharing agreements between the government and the rebel group(s); these agreements are the “basic level” (Goertz 2006, 6) or general concept of interest.

⁸ Another way then of stating this main question is: *Under what conditions do peace agreements significantly improve human rights?*

⁹ Chapter two describes these other forms and types in more detail.

¹⁰ Technically, when the term “power sharing” is used throughout this work, it refers to both power-sharing and power-dividing mechanisms. Hoddie and Hartzell (2015, 40-41) argued the rationale for this best, stating “the power-sharing and power-dividing mechanisms that we analyze share a common emphasis on the *distribution* of authority—through the sharing and the dividing of power—among former rivals in the context of the postwar state.” The approach of using this single term also follows the coding and theoretical arguments of previous power-sharing agreement research (DeRouen, Lea, and Wallenstein 2009; Hartzell and Hoddie 2003b, 2007; Jarstad and Nilsson 2008; Mattes and Savun 2009; Walter 1997, 2002).

Power-sharing agreements, a subset of peace-agreement provisions, are commonly categorized and evaluated in the empirical literature based on political, military, economic, and/or territorial dimensions (Cammett and Malesky 2012; Hartzell and Hoddie 2003a, 2007; Jarstad and Nilsson 2008; Walter 2002). This categorization means that scholars typically evaluate the basic level, general concept of power-sharing agreements by using the “constitutive dimensions” of that concept (Goertz 2006, 6). But none of the power-sharing dimensions is a distinct measure persay. Rather, these constitutive dimensions are an aggregation of several specific peace-agreement provisions included in a negotiated settlement (see Figure 1 below). The provisions represent a third level of indicators, or data (Goertz 2006). They provide the substantive content that collectively makes up a given dimension. As discussed in detail in Chapter 3, each of these provisions can have quite divergent effects on the outcome of interest.




Figure 1: Basic, Secondary, and Indicator Levels of Power-Sharing Agreements

A core argument of this dissertation, then, is that disaggregated, individual provisions (as shown in this third-level) provide more consistent, useful findings with respect to the effects of power-sharing agreements on political repression than by using an approach based on aggregated dimensions. Thus, this dissertation is organized around comparing the following two models that I devised based on arguments and theories found in peace-agreement literature. Model 1 is based on the common approach within the field of using aggregated dimensions of power-sharing agreements. Model 2 is based on disaggregated provisions within negotiated settlements, and also includes the individual provision of third-party security guarantees.¹¹

The Aggregated Dimensions Approach

A central argument of this dissertation is that the aggregated approach to evaluating power-sharing agreements by their respective dimensions is insufficient and potentially misleading. To demonstrate this, this study examined the key arguments about aggregated power-sharing dimensions to see if they also obtained when an outcome had shifted from enduring peace to significant human-rights improvement as measured in terms of political repression. Thus, this research sought to confirm or disconfirm the various power-sharing theories as they apply to the alternative outcome of government respect for physical-integrity rights.

Advocates uphold power-sharing agreements as an ideal solution for civil wars, given their purposeful design and orientation toward resolving three paramount security-

¹¹ This measure is included given strong theoretical arguments (Walter 1997, 1999, 2002) that the presence of security guarantees helps resolve the critical problem of credible commitment, which in turn allows other provisions to have greater impact. Other scholars consider such guarantees non-essential as long as economic development is strong (DeRouen et al. 2010; Taydas and Peksen 2012) or as long as certain power-sharing dimensions are included (Jarstad and Nilsson 2008).

related concerns within such conflicts: (1) the threat and use of coercive force by a government against rebels, which some scholars contend is resolved with military power-sharing agreements; (2) the appropriate distribution of political power, which other scholars consider best resolved via political power-sharing agreements; and (3) the appropriate distribution of physical resources, which some scholars argue is best resolved with economic and territorial power-sharing arrangements (Hartzell 1999). Two main advocacy camps have arisen from differences over these dimensions: (1) Some scholars argue that *all* power-sharing dimensions matter for the prevention of civil war recurrence, while (2) others suggest that only *some* dimensions matter.

In the first camp, several scholars (Hartzell 1999, 4; Hartzell and Hoddie 2003b, 2007) contended that *extensively institutionalized settlements* matter most. From this view, the more dimensions of power sharing that are present, the better; that is, the different political, military, territorial, and economic dimensions reinforce each other. For simplicity, this is called the *more is better* approach. In this project, the condition of *extensively institutionalized settlements* tested whether the presence of more power-sharing dimensions reinforces improvement in the human-rights outcome.

Scholars in the second advocacy camp maintain that *certain thick, individual dimensions* matter more to durable peace. The foundational assumption here is that “The reinforcing effect of particular provisions within one dimension should be even more pronounced than the reinforcing effect across dimensions” (Mattes and Savun 2009, 748). In practice, scholars in this second camp do not agree on which thick dimensions matter more though. Jarstad and Nilsson (2008) contended, for example, that military and

territorial power-sharing agreements serve as costly signals, due to substantial economic and logistical implementation costs. As a result, they increase the duration of peace. In contrast, Mattes and Savun's (2009, 748) empirical research supported the argument that each additional provision of political power-sharing reduces the risk of civil war recurrence. This second camp might be summarized as the *more of some (dimensions) is better* approach.

For this study, I used three different conditions to evaluate this theoretical argument. The first condition of a *territorial power-sharing agreement* tested the argument that the presence of either form of territorial power-sharing agreement (whether autonomy or federalism) leads to improvement in human-rights outcomes. This measure cannot be assessed in terms of thickness, given that an agreement will only contain a provision for autonomy, or for federalism, but never both. In contrast, I assessed the second condition *thick political settlements* and third condition *thick military settlements* based on whether the thickness of the respective condition (i.e., dimension) mattered, as claimed by Mattes and Savun (2009).

An alternate view to these two advocacy camps is that power-sharing agreements ultimately undermine human security and elevate the risk of fractured peace (Horowitz 1985; Mehler 2009; Roeder and Rothchild 2005; Sisk 2013; Sriram 2008; Sriram and Zahar 2009). This perspective is abbreviated as the *less is better* approach. No further conditions were added for assessing this perspective, however, since it is examined by the negation of the previous arguments.

In summary, to evaluate these different theoretical arguments, I proposed four aggregated dimension-based conditions in application to the outcome of human rights. These include extensively institutionalized settlements, the presence (or absence) of a territorial power-sharing agreement, thick political settlements, and thick military settlements.¹² Figure 2 (below) summarizes the theories, associated scholars, and Set 1 proximate conditions that test these theories.

	Theory	Scholars	Set 1 Proximate Condition that Tests this Theory
Advocate Camp 1	More power sharing is better: the different political, military, territorial dimensions reinforce each other	Hartzell & Hoddie (1999, 2003b, 2007)	Extensively Institutionalized Settlements (<i>eis</i>)
Advocate Camp 2	More of <i>some</i> power-sharing dimensions is better: some dimensions matter more than others	Mattes & Savun (2009) Jarstad & Nilsson (2008)	Territorial PSA* (<i>tpsa</i>) Thick Political PSA (<i>th-ps</i>) Thick Military PSA (<i>th-ms</i>)
Opposition View	Less power sharing is better: power-sharing is dangerous.	Horowitz (1985); Mehler (2009); Roeder and Rothchild (2005); Sisk (2013); Sriram and Zahar (2009); Sriram (2008)	Tested by the negation of the previous four conditions

*PSA = Power-Sharing Agreement

Figure 2: Set 1 Proximate Conditions That Test Power-Sharing Theories

The Disaggregated Provisions Approach

An alternate approach to studying negotiated settlements by looking at aggregated power-sharing dimensions is to evaluate the *disaggregated* peace-agreement provisions. This approach may be more accurate since power-sharing measures within the same political, military, or territorial dimension are anticipated to have very different effects on human-rights outcomes. Aggregating these measures by dimension muddles the variance, with the potential risk of misguiding policymakers into relying on such analyses. While this study focused on the outcome of political repression, one strong implication on

¹² The specific definitions and operationalizations for these conditions are discussed in Chapter 4.

where a claim that disaggregated provision had divergent effects was accurate, then previous findings on power-sharing provisions vis-a-vis their effects on peace duration should be re-examined.

This study considered seven specific disaggregated provisions found within the aggregated political, military, and territorial power-sharing dimensions (recall Figure 1 above). I operationalized the aggregated dimensions, and the respective provisions within each, following prior scholars (Hartzell and Hoddie 2003a, 2015; Mattes and Savun 2009), who defined them, in brief, as follows:

Political power-sharing agreements involve the proportional distribution of political power in the central government, which means that prior belligerents “are guaranteed a degree of representation within governing institutions based on their group affiliation” (Hartzell and Hoddie 2015, 41). Three principal provisions are used here, including guarantees of proportional representation in legislative branch elections, in a certain number of cabinet and ministerial posts in the executive branch, and in the government’s civil service.

Military power-sharing agreements emphasize the proportional distribution of power within a state’s coercive apparatus (Hartzell and Hoddie 2015, 42). The most common provision employed in peace agreements is the integration of disputing parties into a state’s joint defense force. An alternate provision is the guarantee of key leadership positions in that joint defense force to prior rebels.

Finally, *territorial power-sharing agreements* decentralize government authority and redistribute political influence based on territory (Hartzell and Hoddie 2015, 42).

Two provisions used here include the allocation of separate powers to sub-state units (federalism) or the granting of authority on local issues in a certain region to a prior rebel group (autonomy) (Hartzell and Hoddie 2003a; Mattes and Savun 2009).

As discussed in Chapter 4, I excluded the economic power-sharing dimension (both in the aggregated and disaggregated) for two reasons: (1) This measure is rarely used in peace agreements; its rarity makes it difficult to measure the effectiveness. (2) A number of studies have examined wealth-sharing in post-conflict situations, but none found any statistically significant effects on the measured outcome of peace duration (Binningsbø and Rustad 2012; Hartzell and Hoddie 2007; Mattes and Savun 2009).

Peace agreements also may include a provision for third-party security guarantees. These guarantees are distinct, yet potentially supplemental to power-sharing provisions; their inclusion likely affects whether or not such provisions reduce the level of political repression. As Walter (1997, 1999, 2002) demonstrated, third-party security guarantees help prior belligerents to overcome credible commitment challenges that are inherent in civil wars resolved by negotiated settlement. Third parties theoretically increase compliance with a peace agreement by mitigating the weaker side's fears that the opposition might cheat them in moments of critical vulnerability, such as during times of demobilization or disarmament. Under this logic, third-party security guarantees help prevent defections from an agreement, allowing all parties to credibly commit to the settlement terms. In contrast to Toft's (2009) negative findings, my expectation for this research was that third-party guarantees do prevent violations of an agreement, including a government's use of political repression. In particular, *robust third-party security*

guarantees (i.e., those with a mandate to use force and sufficient force on the ground to back up that mandate) will lead to less political repression.

Organizing the Approaches into Two Models for Examination

A central tenet of this dissertation is that when the arguments of power-sharing advocates and of groups opposed to power-sharing are considered in relation to the outcome of political repression following civil war, neither of these groups is wholly correct nor are their approaches pragmatically useful to policymakers. Definitive guidance for policymakers is difficult because the aggregated, dimension-based approach used by most researchers to evaluate power-sharing agreements obscures the divergent effects of individual provisions. Analysis using the aggregated approach will show that the inclusion of more power-sharing dimensions is not better; the dimensions do not appear to positively reinforce each other. Second, less power sharing is often better; the military dimension in particular consistently lead to worse human-rights outcomes.

A corollary argument of this dissertation is that the disaggregation of peace-agreement provisions is necessary for understanding the effects of such provisions on human-rights outcomes. Furthermore, these individual provisions interact within a variety of situational and historical contexts that shape and constrain how much they will affect the level of political repression. A complex approach to causality is needed, one that accounts for and considers which causal combinations consistently reduce the likelihood that a government will choose to repress.

Causal recipes involve combinations of conditions from different categories. To aid in classifying conditions, I drew from Schneider and Wagemann (2006) who

concluded that, with complex social phenomena, conditions are often clearly divisible into two main categories which they call *proximate factors* and *remote factors*. According to the authors' construct, *proximate factors* are evidenced by their variance over time and by their recent origins. Proximate factors are manipulable conditions that result from human actions (Schneider and Wagemann 2006, 760). Proximate factors do not operate in isolation. Rather, they unfold in combination with *remote factors*, which capture the more constant, stable factors that reside largely outside the influence of actors (Schneider and Wagemann 2006, 2012), including: underlying conditions, historical legacies, and contexts that alternately constrain or enable a desired outcome.

Accounting for Situational and Historical Contexts

In this study, proximate factors included mechanisms like power-sharing agreements that represent intentional efforts by actors to improve the peace after the war. As discussed above, I evaluated two sets of proximate factors: Set 1, which captures aggregated, dimension-based theories (detailed in Chapter 3), and; Set 2, which covers disaggregated peace-agreement provisions (detailed in Chapter 4). Peace-agreement provisions, whether assessed in the aggregated or disaggregated, do not operate in isolation. Rather, these provisions operate within a variety of historical legacies and situational contexts that also may influence human-rights outcomes. These pre-existing conditions, established at and before the time of a peace agreement, may improve or stymy significant improvement in human-rights outcomes.

In this vein, I selected eight remote factors from the civil war literature, principally for their known effects on political repression. The eight remote factors

included: (1) whether civil war had recurred after a negotiated settlement, (2) whether the civil war was driven by ethnic causes, (3) the costs of that conflict, (4) the duration of the conflict, (5) the regime type that existed after the conflict, (6) the size of the population, (7) the level of economic development in the state, and (8) the overall state capacity.

To align with later methodological decisions and terminology, hereafter I refer to proximate and remote *factors* as proximate and remote *conditions*.¹³ The previously discussed sets of proximate conditions and remote conditions are summarized here:

Table 1: Proximate and Remote Conditions

PROXIMATE CONDITIONS		REMOTE CONDITIONS
<i>Set 1: Aggregate Dimensions</i>	<i>Set 2: Disaggregated Provisions</i>	
Extensively institutionalized settlements	Guarantee of proportional legislative elections	Non-ethnic conflict
Thick political settlements	Guarantee of proportional executive representation	War costs
Thick military settlements	Guarantee of proportional civil service representation	Short lived civil war
Territorial power-sharing agreement	Guarantee of integration in main ranks of military	Enduring peace
	Guarantee of integration in military leadership positions	Small population
	Guarantee of territorial autonomy	Highly democratic
	Guarantee of territorial federalism	Moderately developed economy
	Robust third-party security guarantee	State capacity

Research Methodology

Let us return to the overarching research question: *Under what conditions do provisions within negotiated settlements significantly decrease the degree of political*

¹³ This slight shift in terms still follows Schneider and Wagemann's (2006, 2012) purpose of dividing social phenomena into two principal categories.

repression conducted by a state? At the outset of this study, two methodological challenges arose in addressing this empirical question.

First, the research question narrowed the field of study to a small number of cases. I only considered cases where civil wars had ended in negotiated settlement, rather than those that had ended in all war-termination types. This smaller universe of cases was further restricted by the availability of human-rights data, which limited the number of cases to a maximum of thirty-six civil wars.

Second, the two models I devised for this study (discussed earlier) involved a substantial number of initial variables: Model 1—using an aggregated, dimensions-based approach—included four proximate conditions and eight remote conditions for a total of twelve total conditions (see Table 1 above). Model 2—using a disaggregated, individual provisions-based approach—included eight proximate conditions and eight remote conditions for a total of sixteen total conditions. Each model accounted for situational and historical contexts using the same set of eight remote conditions.

From these two challenges arose the classic “many variables, small number of cases” dilemma commonly found in comparative social science research (Lijphart 1971, 685; Lijphart 1975). This problem has persisted because quantitative techniques have been incapable of delineating causal complexity necessary to small and medium-N comparative research (Ragin 2008). A methodological divide exists between quantitative, variable-oriented approaches that emphasize probabilistic relationships and broad patterns across many cases with qualitative, case-oriented narrative approaches that emphasize holistic, close examination and historically specific contexts (2008, 2014).

Bridging the Methodological Divide

To evaluate which methodological approach was best for addressing the research question stated above, a robust means for bridging this divide and surmounting the “small N—many variables” dilemma proved to be Charles Ragin’s seminal work on the alternative methodology known as Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA). At its core, QCA analyzes *set relations* rather than *correlations*. This distinction also necessitated using a different lexicon: “In QCA terminology, the dependent variable is called the *outcome*, while the potential explanatory factors are called the *conditions*” though “the latter are not ‘independent’ variables as they are expected to operate in combination” (Engeli, Rihoux, and Allison 2014, 93). Set relations refer to the various causal recipes (i.e., to the different combinations of conditions, or input variables) that might generate a given outcome (i.e., the output variable). QCA assumes that the same outcome might result from different combinations of causal factors.

QCA combines features from both the qualitative and quantitative approaches. It retains the case-oriented approach’s capability to analyze causal complexity and to account for different combinatorial configurations, constellations, and conjunctures of explanatory factors (Berg-Schlusser 2012; Ragin 2014). Additionally, QCA imports the robust, analytical techniques of the variable-oriented approach. In addition, the use of Boolean algebra and logic in this study enabled cross-case comparison and examination of cases by clustering simplified, similar configurations of conditions. The blending of these features in QCA facilitated identifying causal patterns across cases.

In summary, QCA accommodates for, and helps to unravel, causal complexity by the application of set-theoretic methods to identify “decisive cross-case patterns, the usual domain of quantitative analysis” (Fiss 2012). These patterns are expressed in different combinations of conditions (causal recipes) that indicate the pathways by which the outcome consistently will be achieved.

Theory: Effects of Proximate and Remote Conditions on Political Repression

Earlier discussion noted that the desired outcome of significant human-rights improvement results from favorable causal recipes that, together, reduce the likelihood that a government will choose to repress. These causal recipes involve combinations of proximate and remote factors that, together, affect a government’s likelihood of pursuing political repression. In its simplest form, the two models I devised for this study differed with respect to whether power-sharing provisions had been evaluated individually (disaggregated) or by dimension (aggregated):

Model 1: Proximate (Aggregated) Conditions + Remote Conditions

Model 2: Proximate (Disaggregated) Conditions + Remote Conditions

Model 1 tested the aforementioned theories about (1) whether more power-sharing is better (i.e., extensively institutionalized settlements), (2) whether more of certain power-sharing dimensions is better (i.e., thick political settlements, thick military settlements, or the presence of any type of territorial power-sharing agreement), or (3) whether less power-sharing is better for human-rights outcomes.

Model 2 examined the effects of disaggregated provisions on human-rights outcomes, under the rationale that different provisions, even within the same dimension,

have quite divergent effects. Aggregation masks this variance and arguably misses significant factors that are diluted by inappropriate aggregation with other factors that have opposite effects. For these reasons, I anticipated less conclusive results from Model 1 in comparison to Model 2.

What Reduces Political Repression

In order to hypothesize how these factors might affect political repression, it was first necessary to grapple with what causes states to politically repress their people. Political repression is defined as the violation of citizens' physical-integrity rights by the state or by its agents (Wood and Gibney 2010, 369); also called personal-integrity rights, physical-integrity rights are a subset of universal human rights that everyone has as a human being. These rights include protection from political imprisonment, state-sanctioned torture, disappearances, and extrajudicial killings.

What is the role of the state with respect to these rights? An inherent tension exists between states and human rights because states are simultaneously the principal violator of human rights as well as the essential protector of these rights (Donnelly 2003, 35-37; Donnelly 2013). The restoration of a state after civil war must carefully account for this tension and help to establish the state as the essential protector rather than the principal violator of human rights.

Political repression is a form of governance. That is, the use of political repression—whether torture, killings, disappearances, or political imprisonment—is a course of action initiated by a government to control its people. Contemporary research indicates that states increase political repression as a function of three factors:

First, when the hostility or threat to a government is high, the state's *motivation* to repress increases. Threats and hostilities manifest in a variety of ways; including dissension and instability in the form of strikes, riots, demonstrations, general unrest, guerrilla warfare, and/or civil war. What matters most is the intensity of the threat. The more violent the domestic threat, the more likely it is that the state will increase political repression (Carey 2009; Davenport 1995; Gurr and Lichbach 1986; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999; Regan and Henderson 2002).

Second, when institutional checks and balances on a government are low, the state's *opportunity* to repress increases. Certain democratic institutions like electoral participation and competition, as well as executive constraints, serve to constrain political repression (Bueno De Mesquita et al. 2005; Davenport 2007c; Gates et al. 2006).

Third, beyond the prominent causal factors of state motivation and opportunity to repress, an often overlooked factor that affects the degree of political repression used by a state is whether the regime possesses *alternative, substitutable forms of governance*. In this regard, two prominent substitutes exist as alternatives to governance via coercion (i.e., political repression): *cooptation* and *cooperation*. States with strong economic capacity, for example, can coopt the opposition as a substitute strategy of social control. Alternatively, states with stronger democratic institutions, can cooperate with the opposition.

How do the existence or absence of governance alternatives reduce the level of political repression? Davenport (2004, 540) theorized that the presence of alternatives, such as cooptation and cooperation, compels those who advocate for coercion "to justify,

persuade, and compete” with those who advocate for the alternatives, while the absence of these alternatives means that “coercion and its advocates have free reign.” Existing research presents several means for capturing the existence or absence of governance alternatives: the *level of economic development* and the *state capacity* proxy a government’s ability to coopt its citizens, and the *degree of democracy* (or regime type) proxies the government’s ability to cooperate with its populace (Davenport and Armstrong 2004).

To recap, states adjust their use of political repression based on three factors: (1) *motivation*, which is a function of the threats to the regime; (2) *opportunity*, which is a function of the restrictions on governmental authority; and (3) *alternative governance mechanisms*, which is a function of the government’s economic capacity (its ability to coopt) and the government’s regime type (its ability to cooperate).

How Proximate Conditions Affect Political Repression

In application, political repression is likely to decrease when proximate and remote conditions: (1) reduce the threats to the government, (2) increase the restrictions on governmental authority, and (3) improve the regime’s alternative governance mechanisms. As noted earlier, aggregation of peace-agreement provisions by their respective dimensions obscures the possibility that these compiled measures may actually act in opposition to each other. Peace-agreement provisions must be disaggregated, because they influence the above three causal factors very differently. Certain provisions lead to significant human-rights improvement when they are present, while others lead to

such improvement when they are absent. Still others have mixed records because they influence these three causal factors in divergent ways.

Each disaggregated measure must be considered in relation to why states violate physical-integrity rights by politically repressing their citizens. Highlights of these relationships are summarized here. The full relationships are detailed in Chapter 4, alongside supporting empirical literature.

Sometimes, the presence of a provision consistently leads to improved human rights (i.e., less political repression), while its absence may lead equally to either better or worse rights. For example, the presence of territorial federalism is hypothesized to lead to better human rights by improving alternative governance mechanisms and by reducing the threat to the government; the former is accomplished when this provision is present, due to the allocation of separate powers to sub-state groups that serve as an additional constraint on executive power and guard the interests of opposition groups. Federalism also reduces political insecurities of the dissenting groups, by recognizing the “political and spatial realities on the ground” with respect to territorial divisions, while leaving external borders intact so the territorial integrity of the state is preserved (Lake and Rothchild 2005, 109-110); this reduces the threat of increased dissension and of autonomy to the regime. The absence of federalism, however, does not guarantee that human rights will either get better or worse.

Robust third-party security guarantees are hypothesized to follow a similar pattern. The presence of such guarantees helps former belligerents to commit credibly to the terms of a peace agreement by raising the costs and difficulty of either party cheating

on the settlement's terms. With defection from the peace agreement less likely and compliance by both parties verified, the threat to the government is reduced. Moreover, a robust guarantee protects vulnerable groups and detects any violations, meaning that the government's opportunity to politically repress its citizens is reduced. Robust guarantees—backed by a strong mandate and sufficient soldiers on the ground—are anticipated to consistently lead to significant human-rights improvement by both reducing the threat to the government and its opportunity to repress.

The presence of military power-sharing provisions that integrate rebels into the main ranks of a joint defense force or into leadership positions of that defense force are both hypothesized to improve human rights outcomes. Implementation of these military provisions carries high implementation, economic, and integration costs, as well as risks for the government (Jarstad and Nilsson 2008). Given these high costs, when the government and rebels offer up and agree to military integration provisions in a peace agreement, they send costly signals of their capabilities, intentions, and resolve to adhere to that agreement (Fearon 2005; Hoddie and Hartzell 2003; Jarstad and Nilsson 2008). From this perspective, when signals are costly like this, former belligerents (and especially the government) can overcome problems of credible commitment without the need for a third-party guarantor; trust built in this fashion reduces the potential that actors resort to political violence, which means the threat to the government is reduced and it should, concomitantly, reduce its use of political repression.

In addition, guaranteeing integration of rebels into the main ranks and into leadership adds a substantial new constraint on the executive branch, further restricting

the government's opportunity to use coercion against its people. This especially holds true in cases where the regime relied upon the defense force as its primary means of implementing different forms of political repression. Military integration installs a new check and balance against the government abusing its restored monopoly on the use of force towards coercive ends.

An alternate pattern occurs when the presence of a provision leads to more political repression, while its absence leads to improved human rights. Territorial autonomy is hypothesized to follow this pattern. Scholars are divided over whether autonomy serves as an ideal solution for permanently resolving conflicts in deeply divided societies (Downes 2006, 52; Kaufmann 1996, 137) or instead increases the likelihood of recurred conflict, as in a number of cases (Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl 2009, 2014).

How does autonomy affect political repression? Empirical evidence indicates that when a government loses territory, this division reifies existing differences, which leads to increased suspicion by the regime and increased political violence by the population (Bell 2013, 246). An increase in political violence increases the likelihood that the government will turn again to political repression, and autonomy likely will lead to worse human rights. Conversely, the absence of this partitioning provision preserves the territorial integrity of a state and yields the strong possibility of an overall decreased threat level to the regime in the aftermath of conflict.

Some provisions are predicted to result in mixed, less predictable outcomes. This variance in outcomes occurs because of how these conditions affect the different triggers

of political repression. Consider, for example, the various political provisions that guarantee proportional representation in the respective legislative and executive branches of government and in the civil service: On the one hand, such provisions are likely to improve a government's ability to cooperate with former belligerents (i.e. an improved alternative governance mechanism). This expected benefit may be overcome by the potential increased threat that each guarantee of proportional representation introduces into the political system.

Some governments, for example, view legislative elections that guarantee proportional representation of rebels as a threat to the status quo. They are likely to respond with increased political repression as compared to governments that consider elections a liberalizing, legitimating experience (Davenport 1997). Likewise, rapid inclusion of prior belligerents into the executive branch on occasion may lead to increased political instability and violence, which then leads to increased repression. This occurs as the result of "rapid mobilization of new groups into politics," particularly when the political institutions in a state are slow to develop and respond to the increased demand (Huntington 2006, 4). The integration of rebels into the civil service is unlikely to raise the threat to a government by much. At the same time, this provision provides only a weak constraining influence on executive decision-making.

In summary, the three political conditions outlined above are all anticipated to improve a government's ability to cooperate with prior combatants, though in varying degrees. A government's opportunity to repress is generally decreased given these new constraints on executive decision-making. Perhaps most important, governments often

view these provisions, especially elections and executive integration, with great suspicion. This increases the threat against the government and negates the prior benefits in a number of cases. As a result, given these opposite effects on drivers of political repression, overall outcomes based on political provisions are less predictable.

How Remote Conditions Affect Political Repression

Remote conditions also affect a regime's motives, opportunities, and/or alternative governance mechanisms, which cause those regimes to adjust their use of political repression. Since remote conditions are, by definition, more constant and stable factors that lie largely outside of actor influence, they are referenced in this dissertation as a form of scoping conditions.

According to Cohen's (1989) original formulation, scoping conditions are the set of circumstances under which a theoretical claim is applicable. Schneider and Wagemann's (2006, 2012) application of remote conditions, which I followed in this study, closely aligns with Cohen's arrangement. Therefore, in this dissertation, remote conditions are treated as factors that either constrain or enable the ability of proximate conditions to influence an outcome; they define the set of circumstances under which theoretical claims about proximate conditions are applicable.

Eight remote conditions were considered applicable to this study. Four of these conditions, defined below, were hypothesized as primarily affecting the level of residual threat facing a state:

(1) *Recurrence of civil war* signifies the presence of strong domestic threats to a regime. Research demonstrates that this factor correlates significantly with an increase in

state repression (Cingranelli and Richards 1999b; Davenport 1995; Harff 2003; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999).

(2) *Civil wars driven by ethnic divisions* are generally considered highly intractable, non-divisible conflicts (Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Kaufmann 1996; Licklider 1995). When resolved via negotiated settlements, peace breaks down more quickly compared to wars where ethnicity was not the issue at stake (Hartzell and Hoddie 2003b, 328; Mattes and Savun 2009). One common pathway to such breakdown is that elites leverage power-sharing arrangements to mobilize their political base more quickly. When such mobilization is coupled with inherent fears and resentments over resulting proportional representation (or over excluded ethnic groups), political violence is likely to result and the threat to the government to increase quickly (Aydin and Gates 2008; Petersen and Staniland 2008).

(3) *Severe civil wars* (i.e., those with a high number of battle-related deaths, what scholars commonly call *high war costs*) typically increase the likelihood of civil-war recurrence following a negotiated settlement (Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild 2001; Mattes and Savun 2009). These same high intensity conflicts are expected to similarly exacerbate a higher level of threat against the state, resulting in worse political repression by the regime.

(4) The *length of the war* affects the level of threat facing the state. Scholarship on the effects of war duration has concentrated principally on whether it helps or hinders the duration of peace. The answer is unclear. Some scholars have argued that long wars exhaust rivals and reveal more information about each combatant's intentions and

capabilities (Hartzell and Hoddie 2007; Mattes and Savun 2009; Zartman 2000, 2001). This exhaustion and information helps to overcome animosity and lack of trust, which is empirically demonstrated by longer wars leading to longer peace (Fortna 2004b; Walter 2004). Other scholars have not observed any significant effect of civil war duration on civil war recurrence (Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Mattes and Savun 2009). A potential reason for this latter observation is that animosity between rivals intensifies over time with tit-for-tat counterstrikes. Long wars reflect intractable, unresolved issues between bitter belligerents.

Although empirical evidence favors the former perspective for the outcome of durable peace, for human rights, I contend that long civil wars generally have led to increased political repression after war ended; that this happens because exhaustion does not mean prior combatants easily forget or forgive deep wounds. Short civil wars more readily lead to improved human rights, because all parties more readily recall life before the civil war and desire return to civility rather than retribution for long-standing feuds.

Two remote conditions likely affect a government's opportunity to repress: the *size of the population* and the *type of regime*. The size of the population matters because larger populations increase the sheer number of opportunities for political repression as well as the base within which a regime can diffuse increased violations (Murdie and Davis 2010; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999). Additionally, larger populations (and large flows of internally displaced persons) place greater strain on limited social, political, and economic resources, which overwhelms the respective institutional capacity to respond to demands (Henderson 1993; Murdie and Davis 2010; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999). This

then might lead to increased political violence and revolt, followed by more government repression. Some power-sharing agreements exacerbate these strains; for example, the guarantee of proportional representation in various political branches might create even greater demands on the supply and distribution of resources.

With respect to regime type, as a government becomes more democratic, its leaders find “both less opportunity and less willingness to repress” (Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999, 293). Davenport and Armstrong (2004, 551) empirically confirmed that, once a certain democratic threshold is passed, authorities begin to perceive constraints on their authority and consider alternative governance mechanisms to political repression. Regime type also affects a government’s consideration of alternative governance mechanisms, such as cooperation with opposition groups. Thus, two additional remote conditions were considered because of their effect on a government’s alternative governance mechanisms:

First, the *level of economic development* within a state consistently has correlated with an increased respect for physical-integrity rights by a regime (Cingranelli and Richards 1999b; Mitchell and McCormick 1988; Poe and Tate 1994; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999). The generation and distribution of valued goods and services coopts individuals and groups, which may both prevent revolts due to scarcity (Murdie and Davis 2010; Poe and Tate 1994; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999) and also reduce the need for third-party security guarantees (DeRouen et al. 2010; Taydas and Peksen 2012). These results are anticipated in economies that are at least moderately developed.

Second, recent literature (Arbetman and Kugler 1997; DeRouen et al. 2010; Hendrix 2010) has suggested that a better measure of a government’s ability to coopt and

cooperate with its population is *state capacity*. A state that is “capable of accommodating grievances via institutionalized channels, such as redistribution, the granting of autonomy rights, or the incorporation of dissident movements within the party system” will decrease the motivation for political violence (Hendrix 2010, 273) and also reduce the threat to the regime’s status quo.

In summary, the following four remote conditions likely would enable significant human-rights improvement by reducing threat to governments: the existence of enduring peace, non-ethnic civil wars, short wars, and low-cost wars. Conversely, if civil war recurs, if ethnic issues drive the civil war, if the war lasts longer, or if the war costs are high, then the overall threat to the regime after the conflict would be higher and more extensive political repression would be expected. In turn, the government’s opportunity and willingness to repress would be reduced when that regime became more democratic. Smaller populations provide less opportunity to repress and to hide such repression; demand on limited resources following civil war is also lower. The inverse also holds true, in that less democratic states and those with larger populations have greater opportunity and willingness to repress their people. Finally, governments with high levels of economic development and state capacity are unlikely to repress their populations, while those with low overall economic development and low state capacity are more likely to pursue political repression rather than alternative governance mechanisms.

A Testable Combined Theory

The relationship of power-sharing agreements with human-rights outcomes is clearest when disaggregated provisions are used rather than aggregated dimensions,

because provisions often affect a government's likely pursuit of political repression in divergent ways. Four of the eight power-sharing provisions are anticipated to consistently contribute to significant human-rights improvement when they are *present*; namely, robust third-party security guarantees, territorial federalism, rebel integration into the main ranks of the military, and rebel integration into the leadership of the military.¹⁴ The provision of territorial autonomy is expected to lead to the desired human-rights outcome primarily when it is *absent*. None of the political provisions is likely to maintain a consistent effect either way due to conflicting effects on drivers of political repression.

Model 1 (assuming the hypotheses hold true) would lead to less consistent results. Consider the four different proximate conditions included in Set 1: (1) *Thick political settlements*. As noted above, the presence of the political dimension is inconclusive, since each of the political provisions has conflicting effects on political repression. (2) *Thick military settlements*. Based on prior hypotheses, the presence of either military provision is likely to lead to improved human rights. (3) *Territorial power-sharing agreement*. This aggregation of territorial autonomy and territorial federalism is likely inconclusive, since these two provisions have divergent effects on the desired outcome of human-rights improvement. (4) *Extensively institutionalized settlements*. Recalling that this measure assesses whether the inclusion of more power-sharing dimensions is better, and seeing that the presence of either the political and territorial dimensions is likely inconclusive while the presence of the military dimension likely leads to worse human rights, extensively institutionalized settlements are anticipated to more strongly associate with the negation of the outcome. More power-sharing is not always better.

¹⁴ Security guarantees are not included in any aggregated component.

Returning to *Model 2* (expected to provide clearer, actionable insights for policymakers), now that the anticipated relationships of remote conditions with human-rights outcomes also have been explained, the remote conditions can be combined with the disaggregated, individual provisions in a single testable model. The expectations of that model can be visually represented (see Figure 3 below).¹⁵ In this model, proximate and remote conditions are aligned in accordance with their primary hypothesized effects on the three causal factors that lead to political repression, namely whether that condition is expected to: (1) reduce the threat to the regime, (2) reduce the regime’s opportunity to repress, or (3) improve the regime’s alternative governance mechanisms.¹⁶

The model anticipates that the desired outcome of significant human rights improvement (SHRI)—understood as a reduction over time in the overall violations by a government of its citizens’ physical-integrity rights—consistently occurs when territorial autonomy is *absent* and when all other non-political power-sharing provisions are *present* (i.e. integration of rebels into the main ranks of the military and into leadership positions, territorial federalism, and robust third-party security guarantees). Meanwhile, political power-sharing agreements (i.e., the guarantees of proportional representation in the executive and legislative branches and in the civil service) are not anticipated to result in

¹⁵ The idea for this figure and its legend came from Goertz’s (2006) work on set-theoretic models and from Mello’s (2014, 2016) use of a similar model in his work on premature coalition withdrawal from alliance-based military operations.

¹⁶ In the model, lowercase letters indicate that the condition’s absence is anticipated to lead to significant human-rights improvement (SHRI), while uppercase letters indicate the condition’s presence will likely lead to improvement. Multiple arrows indicate proximate conditions that affect several drivers of political repression. The remote conditions are vertically aligned with the drivers of political repression, to indicate where they are hypothesized to affect political repression. For example, the remote conditions of enduring peace, non-ethnic civil war, and low war costs are hypothesized as factors that reduce the threat to the government and therefore result in less use of political repression.

consistent effects on the level of political repression; therefore, they are not included in the diagram. Finally, the presence of the following remote conditions—enduring peace, non-ethnic civil war, low war costs, short war, moderately developed economies, and high state capacity—are anticipated to consistently encourage realization of the desired outcome of significant human rights improvement.




Figure 3: Model 2 – Disaggregated Proximate Conditions & Remote Conditions

Figure 3 also depicts that none of the proximate or remote conditions is considered a necessary or sufficient factor that would be able to produce the outcome of interest on its own. Rather, each of these conditions is considered an INUS condition, which is an acronym first coined by Mackie (1974, 79) to describe the conditions in which each respective factor is an “insufficient but necessary part of a condition which is

itself unnecessary but sufficient for the result.”¹⁷ This INUS term is another way of saying that multiple configurations of conditions, or causal recipes, lead to the outcome.

This study revealed, with respect to the desired outcome, a strong blend of expected and quite unexpected findings. With respect to remote conditions, *high state capacity* and *low war costs* were removed before the fuzzy-set analysis began due to lack of demonstrated relationship over any evaluated time period; the first step of the Two-Step Approach then removed *small populations*, *strong democracies*, and *moderately developed economies* as less consistent conditions, leaving just three remote conditions for pairing with proximate conditions. Of these remainders, both the presence of *enduring peace* and the presence of *short wars* exhibited wide coverage (multiple cases) and high consistency. Non-ethnic wars were largely indeterminate (one causal path with just one empirical case).

Meanwhile, with respect to proximate conditions, six of the nine sufficient pathways leading to significant human rights improvement involved the presence of *robust third-party security guarantees*; only one causal path consistently involved the absence of these guarantees.¹⁸ A stunning finding was that seven of the nine causal recipes leading to significant human rights improvement involved the absence of both the *integration of rebels into the military's main ranks* and *rebel integration into the*

¹⁷ The acronym arises from the beginning of the following italicized words: “*insufficient* but *necessary* part of a condition which is itself *unnecessary* but *sufficient* for the result.”□

¹⁸ Notably this causal path also involved the absence of *all* power-sharing provisions and was represented by multiple cases; the path is explored in depth in Chapters 7 and 8.

*leadership of that defense force.*¹⁹ The absence of *autonomy* was consistent in five of the nine causal pathways; of note, the only path where the presence of autonomy led to significant human rights improvement was when it was paired with robust third-party security guarantees AND the absence of both military power-sharing provisions. *Territorial federalism* consistently led in the mid- and long-term to improvement of human rights, but its rarity as a provision required its exclusion from the fuzzy set analysis (discussed more in Chapter 8).

The findings of Model 2 with respect to the outcome of significant human rights improvement are captured in Figure 4. They form the basis for the central claims advanced in this dissertation: First, aggregate dimensions obscure and mislead; disaggregation reveals. Second, significant human rights improvement is consistently achieved when certain provisions are absent—such as military integration of rebels into the main military ranks and the granting of territorial autonomy—and when other provisions like robust third-party security guarantees are present. Lastly, significant human-rights improvement results from favorable causal recipes (i.e., combinations of disaggregated conditions) that together reduce both the motivation and opportunity of a government to repress.

¹⁹ This extended the finding from Model 1, where *all* nine causal recipes that led to significant human rights improvement involved the absence of thick military power-sharing agreements.




Figure 4: Model 2 Findings—Conditions Leading to SHRI

Project Outline and Chapter Overview

The logical flow of the whole project is depicted in Figure 4 (below)²⁰, which aids in explaining the content, purpose, and sequencing of the different chapters. Since QCA has a “fundamentally iterative nature” (Rihoux and Lobe 2009, 230)—meaning that a constant dialogue exists among theoretical knowledge, case knowledge, and the operations within each of the steps—the more prominent relationships are depicted with return arrows and feedback loops.

²⁰ This figure is adapted from Rihoux and Lobe (2009, 238, Figure 12.2). Since their model only describes procedures for crisp-set QCA, adjustments were made to integrate remote and proximate conditions, the Two-Step Approach, and fuzzy-set QCA procedures, as well as the two pertinent models to this study.




Figure 5: Research Design Outline of fsQCA with Two-Step Approach

Chapters 2, 3, and 4 cover the first phase of QCA, where maximal complexity exists. Together, these chapters map out the pertinent theoretical knowledge and case knowledge necessary to proceed further with this dissertation’s analysis. This includes conceptually and operationally defining the outcome, the universe of cases, and the applicable proximate and remote conditions for each of the two models. Specifically:

Chapter 2 provides a theoretical basis for human rights writ large. The rationale for selecting physical-integrity rights as the specific outcome of interest is provided here. The state-society relationship is explored, with specific focus on the state’s prominent role in securing these rights and its common violation of the rights. The connection between the state’s violation of physical-integrity rights and the measure of political repression is explained. The chapter details the unique difficulties for states as they exit civil war, especially in balancing the need to deter further violence and to assure the

population that the regime will not pose a threat to them. The chapter then considers contemporary literature written on power-sharing agreements, showing its predominant orientation toward addressing the ability of the state to deter violence (measured as civil war recurrence) and toward assessment using aggregated dimensions of power-sharing agreements.

Chapter 3 outlines key components of the research design. First, it establishes the universe of cases, which initially included thirty-six civil wars in twenty-six states where conflict had terminated between 1989 and 2007 via negotiated settlement. Second, the chapter details why Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) was selected as the principal methodology for this project. In short, selecting QCA was based on its capacity for medium-N comparative research using a holistic, analytic approach and beginning analysis from an assumption of causal complexity. A lexicon for grappling with this different methodological approach is also provided. Third, the chapter provides initial coding and dichotomization of human-rights improvement (i.e., decrease in a state's use of political repression). To accomplish this, I determined applicable datasets for raw data on civil wars and human rights, then assessed those rights, looking at: the short-term (two years after a civil war ends), mid-term (five years later), and long-term (ten years later).

Chapter 4 establishes theoretical arguments about my two different models, defined earlier. Both of these models blended proximate conditions and remote conditions (i.e., those situational and historical contexts that remain largely outside actor influence). The models differed in that Model 1 evaluated the remote conditions alongside *aggregated* power-sharing dimensions. Model 2 evaluated remote conditions alongside

disaggregated peace-agreement provisions, including individual power-sharing measures and third-party security guarantees. In accordance with best practices for QCA regarding the transparent identification and description of selected conditions, I extensively examined each proximate and remote condition. This includes presenting the anticipated effects each might have on the three causal factors that increase a state's use of political repression: motivation, opportunity, and alternative governance mechanisms. Hypotheses are proposed regarding how each condition is likely to affect a government's violations of physical-integrity rights.

Next, with the theoretical foundations laid, hypotheses established, models proposed and raw data gathered, the analytic phase of QCA could begin in earnest. Given the initial breadth of potential factors affecting the outcome of significant human-rights improvement (SHRI), I followed the advice of several QCA scholars (Berg-Schlosser and De Meur 2009, 27-8)²¹ by using "a number of stepwise multi-methodological procedures" to reduce the initial complexity. This dissertation specifically used contingency tables and the Two-Step Approach, as detailed in Chapters 5 and 6, respectively.

In Chapter 5, statistical techniques (i.e., cross-tabulations, what others call contingency tables) are used to help identify strong bivariate relationships between the proximate or remote conditions and the outcome. Analysis of the 2x2 tables also helped to identify any asymmetric relationships. I retained conditions that displayed strong

²¹ See, for example, Berg-Schlosser & Mitchell's (2000, 1016) examination of why democracy survived in some European states between the world wars while authoritarianism and fascism emerged in others. Using previous empirical research, combinatorial logic, and statistical techniques they reduced their 61 original conditions down to 8 "super-conditions."

statistical or asymmetric relationships for the fuzzy-set QCA portions that would follow. To facilitate the analysis, I used the earlier dichotomization of human-rights improvement for the outcome data. At the end of Chapter 6, I employed Schneider and Wagemann's (2006, 2012) Two-Step Approach to QCA. This method conveniently leveraged the previous categorizations of proximate and remote conditions to achieve maximal parsimony. The remainder of Chapter 6 similarly aims to equip the reader with the necessary methodological toolkit for understanding the fuzzy-set analysis and interpretation given in Chapters 7 and 8.

Chapter 6 begins by comparing the three principal sub-methods within the QCA portfolio: crisp-set QCA, multi-value QCA, and fuzzy-set QCA. I selected the fuzzy-set QCA method for a number of reasons: Fuzzy sets permit varying degrees of membership rather than solely full membership or full non-membership in a given set. This means they can be used simultaneously to conduct qualitative and quantitative assessments by evaluating both differences-in-kind and differences-in-degree (Ragin 2009; Schneider and Wagemann 2012). The partial membership accommodated by fuzzy sets is especially critical for evaluating the outcome of human rights. This allows gradations of human-rights improvement rather than simple dichotomization of the outcome.

Fuzzy sets require calibration of specific terms in accordance with theoretical and/or empirical standards. Chapter 6 describes this calibration process, along with a number of other QCA techniques, such as how necessary and sufficient conditions are evaluated according to measures of consistency and coverage. Truth tables also are discussed, along with minimization procedures and factoring. Additionally, the negation

of the outcome is explained. The chapter concludes with explaining the Two-Step Approach. In brief, Step One of this approach evaluates all remote conditions, in order to find those that most consistently had enabled (or constrained) the desired outcome. Only those remote conditions were then carried into Step Two, which added in all proximate conditions brought forward from Chapter 5 for the analysis.

In Chapters 7 and 8, in order to ensure the full proper application of fuzzy-set QCA and not shortchange any of the steps of the outlined procedures, it was necessary to restrain evaluation of the two models to only the short-term period of two years after a civil war ended. Mid-term and long-term effects of disaggregated provisions are reserved for a future study.

Chapter 7 applies the fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) procedures in a systematic fashion to the first model of disaggregated power-sharing dimensions that interact within certain remote conditions. The chapter begins by calibrating conditions according to fuzzy-set standards, when possible. For example, whereas Chapter 4 uses a dichotomized operationalization of *human-rights improvement*, Chapters 6 provides a calibrated operationalization of *significant human-rights improvement* (SHRI). Fuzzy-set calibration, as indicated earlier, allows evaluation of not simply differences-in-kind, but also differences-in-degree. The term *significant* is added here in order to assess not only whether human rights had improved, but whether they had improved *significantly*. Chapter 7 uses this same operationalization of SHRI, by which I conducted the Two-Step Approach for the outcome of significant human-rights improvement as well as for its negation. The chapter factors the results and provides in-

depth interpretation of various cross-case patterns. It concludes with generalizations and implications for power-sharing agreements writ large, as well as for Chapter 8.

Chapter 8 replicates the analytical process used in Chapter 7. It shifts application of the fsQCA procedures to Model 2 and examines which causal combinations of individual, disaggregated provisions and remote conditions led to either significant human rights improvement, or to the negation of significant human rights improvement. Cross-case patterns are identified, along with a number of concluding generalizations and implications for future decision-makers, states, and belligerents involved in negotiated settlements.

The final Chapter 9 compiles the findings from Chapters 5, 7, and 8 with comparisons across the chapters. Additionally, it presents proposals for a host of future studies that might further our theoretical knowledge and understanding of how to help states exiting civil war, particularly via negotiated settlements.

In summary, this dissertation asks: *Under what conditions do peace-agreement provisions significantly reduce the degree of political repression conducted by a state?* The study specifically evaluated political, military, and territorial power-sharing agreements within the complex historical legacies and structural contexts of post-civil war environments. Human rights were measured in terms of the degree to which a governing regime politically had repressed and violated its citizens' physical-integrity rights. The universe of cases in this study included thirty-six civil wars in twenty-six states that had terminated conflict between 1989 and 2007 via negotiated settlements. To address the "many variables—small number of cases" puzzle, the methodological

approach of fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) was used as a means to examine different causal configurations; this involved two different models, including either aggregated power-sharing dimensions or disaggregated power-sharing provisions. Each of these sets of proximate conditions was combined with relevant remote conditions that had been shown to enable the desired result of significantly improved human-rights outcomes or to constrain this outcome, leading more readily to its negation.

This project has significant implications on securing the peace for individuals within states exiting civil war. The aim is to provide decision-makers with a greater understanding of how different individual provisions—and combinations of these provisions alongside situational contexts relevant to each conflict—might shape both how a state can deter violence in the future as well as assure the population that they will not politically repress them after the conflict ends.

Chapter Two: Theories on Human Rights and Political Repression

Human rights—those universal rights that everyone has as a human being—define and shape relations between citizens (who hold these rights) and states (who have certain obligations to uphold those rights) (Donnelly 2013; Freeman 2011; Schmitz and Sikkink 2002). In other words, human rights constitute individuals and states of a particular type, and a state’s recognition of fundamental human rights creates, establishes, and shapes the state-societal relationship into something different than what it would be without the presence of such rights (Donnelly 2013).²² Civil war upends the state-societal relationship though: States shift from the *essential protector* of human rights to becoming the *principal violator* of these same rights.²³

This chapter aims to lay a theoretical foundation for the project by mapping out the intellectual terrain. The core of the research is exploration of the conditions under which states honor, or continue to violate, a specific group of human rights—alternatively known as physical integrity rights or personal integrity rights—after civil war has ended. The selection of physical-integrity rights was based on the extensive use of this variable

²² Donnelly observed that human rights not only contain codified, regulative rules and practices that legally define the minimum set of goods, services, opportunities, and protections. Just as importantly, they also “constitute individuals as a particular kind of political subject: free and equal rights-bearing citizens. And by defining the requirements and limits of legitimate government they constitute states of a particular kind” (2013, 16).

²³ Donnelly (2013) used these italicized terms to describe the state’s already complicated relationship with human rights even outside of civil war.

throughout the human-rights literature²⁴ and because the violation of a person's physical integrity is considered the most severe, egregious form of political repression.²⁵

The chapter explores the state-society relationship outlined by Donnelly, with specific focus on the state's prominent role in securing these rights and its common violation of the rights. The theories explained in this chapter provide essential groundwork for the causal linkages established in Chapter 4 between peace-agreement provisions (the conditions) and significant improvement, or lack thereof, in the government's honoring of physical integrity rights (the outcome).

Scholars alternatively refer to violations of physical integrity rights as *state terrorism* or as *state repression*. The chapter begins by considering both of these approaches; the less pejorative term *political repression* is selected and defined in conceptual and operational terms. Political repression is then distinguished from other forms of mass political violence in that it serves as a form of governance.

A brief discussion follows this regarding the critical deterrence-assurance dilemma that states face after civil war: In rebuilding a strong coercive capacity able to monopolize violence within the state and deter future conflict, those same capabilities inherently threaten the citizens. Contemporary scholarship extensively evaluates the

²⁴ See, e.g. Bueno de Mesquite et al. 2005; Carey 2009; Davenport 1997, 2007b; Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2005; Henderson 1991; Henderson 1993; Mitchell and McCormick 1988; Poe and Tate 1994; Poe, Tate, and Keith 199; Stohl and Lopez 1984, 1986; Wood and Gibney 2010.

²⁵ The choice to evaluate individual security rather than other political, civil, and economic rights does not imply that these other rights do not matter. Rather, it recognizes that in post-civil war contexts, guaranteeing individual security is primary and essential. As one scholar put it well, "True political liberty can only occur when the security of the people is ensured" (Bonnemaïson 2002, 40).

effects that negotiated settlements have on deterrence, proxying the latter by the state's ability to prevent civil war recurrence.

However, the state's ability to assure its people—measured by the government decreasing its use of political repression—is only rarely addressed. Assurances must be enacted and enforced so that the government does not inflict political violence upon the populace. The chapter expounds on the causal mechanics of the deterrence-assurance dilemma, detailing how the government's development of deterrence capabilities in post-civil war contexts induces an internal security dilemma. This dilemma calls into question the government's ability to credibly commit to the peace agreement terms and to legitimately assure its population that it will not threaten them with its improved deterrence capabilities.

Finally, the chapter explains three principal drivers of state-based political repression, including the state's motivation to repress, its opportunity to repress, and the availability to the government of alternative governance methods. The chapter closes by demonstrating that if a peace-agreement provision is to succeed in reducing the government's use of political repression, it must decrease the government's motivation to repress, decrease its opportunity to repress, or improve alternative governance mechanisms so that it does not need to resort to coercive measures.

The State: Essential Protector or Principal Violator of Physical-Integrity Rights

Civil war upends the state-society relationship. By definition, civil war involves the government and the national army of an internationally recognized state engaging in armed conflict with one or more opposing factions that are able to effectively mount

resistance against the state, leading to more than a thousand deaths in a year and casualties on both sides (Doyle and Sambanis 2006). When civil war erupts, the government's fight against opposing faction(s) can take on a number of forms beyond direct military action. Measures like torture, imprisonment, extrajudicial killing, and kidnapping may be used against targeted individuals or groups in order to coerce and intimidate the opposition.²⁶ A natural outgrowth of civil war violence is that the government correspondingly increases violations of its citizens' physical-integrity rights (Poe and Tate 1994; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999). Civil war thus intensifies the risk that states become the *principal violator* of these rights rather than the *essential protector* of them. The scholarly literature is unsettled though regarding what phrase best describes the state's violations of physical integrity rights. The next section briefly details this debate and justifies the project's selection of terms.

Defining the State's Violations of Physical-Integrity Rights

Physical-integrity rights are a subset of *non-derogable rights*. Non-derogable rights refer to those human rights that cannot be suspended, compromised or removed from the individual, even in a state of emergency.²⁷ Non-derogable rights include political and civil rights designed to protect the individual's liberties and freedoms against the state's abuse and tyranny.²⁸ The set of physical-integrity rights specifically

²⁶ See, for example, Dallin and Breslauer (1970).

²⁷ Most human rights outlined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1948, are derogable; the government's obligations to respect its citizen's derogable human rights may be suspended temporarily during public emergencies (Murdie 2014; Richards and Clay 2012).

²⁸ Article 4(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) names seven non-derogable rights, including: the right to life (Article 6), freedom from torture (Article 7), freedom from slavery (Article 8), freedom from contractual imprisonment (Article 11), freedom from unlawful

includes the right to protection from: (1) political imprisonment, (2) state-sanctioned torture, (3) disappearances, and (4) extrajudicial killings.

Contemporary scholars use a variety of terms to describe violations of physical-integrity rights by the state, including: *state terrorism* (Corradi, Fagen, and Garretón 1992b; Kalyvas 2006; Stohl and Lopez 1984, 1986; Wood and Gibney 2010), *political terrorism* (Gibney and Dalton 1996; Gibney et al. 2014; Poe and Tate 1994; Wood and Gibney 2010), *state repression* (Davenport 2007a, b, c), and *political repression* (Goldstein 2001; Henderson 1991; Henderson 1993; Regan and Henderson 2002). The selection of different adjectives demonstrates that some scholars associate the abuse or violation of the right with the actor who is principally violating that right (i.e., the state) while others focus on the ends achieved by such acts (i.e., the political objectives).

One argument against the use of terms like *state terrorism* and *political terrorism* is that they carry pejorative baggage by inappropriately connecting the state with terrorist acts. This linkage is worth engaging before the terms are too quickly jettisoned. In this vein, Schmid (2011, 68-69) delivered cogent analysis:

By reserving the term ‘terrorism’ for non-state actors only, we neglect the multiple uses of terrorism by governments since the French Revolution and create, in effect, a double standard. It is true that the measured use of force by the state, when controlled by the constitution, the rule of law and the judiciary, and proportional to the actual threat, must be judged differently from vigilante or revolutionary “justice” which is not rule-based. However when a regime steps outside the legal principles while demanding adherence to them by its opponents, we are in a different situation. If a regime can conduct “terrorism” abroad, either directly or as a state sponsor, why should its domestic use not be called state or regime terrorism? Frankly, I see no good reason to exclude terrorism conducted by organs of a state from the conceptual reach of the term “terrorism.” The state

imprisonment (Article 15), the right to recognition as a person before the law (Article 16), and the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion (Article 18). See Richards and Clay (2012) for further discussion on non-derogable rights.

might have a monopoly of legitimate force but it has to use it defensively and minimally in the framework of a social contract, a constitution, and the rule of law.²⁹

Schmid assessed that states choose to persuade, pressure, abuse, and violently coerce their opponents outside of legal principles and constitutional or judicial rule-based practices that are purposefully designed to constrain their use of force (69-70). When states violate physical-integrity rights, their actions and aims resemble those of terrorism,³⁰ especially with respect to creating a broad, chronic state of fear through the use of psychological coercion and selective targeted violence.³¹

However, in selecting which terms to use here in describing the state's violations of physical-integrity rights, Barrett's (in Schmid 2011, 68) argumentation is both reasonable and convincing: "While I agree that a state actor may, to all intents and purposes, commit an act which is indistinguishable from terrorism, I believe it should be called something else." Based on this logic, and in order to distinguish the state's violations from those violations made by non-state actors, the less controversial term *political repression* is used throughout the rest of this dissertation.

²⁹ Scholarly disagreement here is less about tactics used by states and more about whether state actors should be included in a definition of terrorism as this decision shapes international law.

³⁰ Consider, for example, torture, which is one of the four types of physical-integrity rights violations: "Torture is first and foremost a political phenomenon...[that is] employed in a sophisticated and systematic way...by repressive governments...[in order] to control and destroy individual adversaries and their organizations" (Salimovich, Lira, and Weinstein 1992, 78).

³¹ On this subject of creating fear, see Corradi et. al's (1992a) collection of essays on how regimes intentionally instill fear through the combined use of physical repression, threats, repressive policies, and the absence of institutional protection. Their work details the experience from the individual's perspective, showing the effects of the repressive experience and the psychological effects generated by fear.

Political Repression: Conceptual and Operational Definitions

This study emphasizes the degree to which a state violates its citizens' physical-integrity rights, including the right to protection from political imprisonment, state-sanctioned torture, disappearance, and extrajudicial killings. Conceptually, political repression involves

“the actual or threatened use of physical sanctions against an individual or organization, within the territorial jurisdiction of the state, for the purpose of imposing a cost on the target as well as deterring specific activities and/or beliefs perceived to be challenging to government personnel, practices or institutions.”³²

Operationally though, a simpler definition is required, for it is difficult to empirically verify the *threatened* use of sanctions and the deterrence of *perceived beliefs*. Here, Wood and Gibney's (2010) definition provides a simple measure. Political repression is identified by “violations of physical or personal-integrity rights carried out by a state (or its agents)” (369).

Distinguishing Political Repression from Other Mass Political Violence

Political repression is distinct from, yet closely related to, other types of mass political violence like civil war, genocide, and reciprocal extermination. Kalyvas's (2006) typology of mass political violence (Table 2 below) usefully delineated differences among these four ideal types³³ based on two factors: (1) the *production of violence*, meaning whether the violence is “produced unilaterally (by one actor, usually the state) or bilaterally / multilaterally (by two or more competing actors)”; and (2) the *aims of*

³² See Davenport 2007b, 2.

³³ Ideal type is an appropriate term here. As Sambanis (2004) noted, groups often shift during a conflict from one form of violence to another. This makes strict categorization and coding of political violence rather difficult in practice.

violence, which are distinguished by “whether at least one political actor intends to govern the population it targets for violence” (26, 28).³⁴

Table 2: Typology of Mass Political Violence³⁵

Production of Violence	Aims of Violence: Political Actor Intends to Govern the Targeted Population	
	Yes	No
Unilateral	Political Repression*	Genocide & Mass Deportation
Bilateral (or Multilateral)	Civil War Violence	Reciprocal Extermination

Referencing this 2x2 model, Kalyvas distinguished political repression from genocide and mass deportation³⁶ by the fact that with political repression, the government still intends to govern the intended population. This characteristic matches McCamant’s (1984) earlier declaration that political repression is best understood as a form of governance. Political repression differs from civil war in that the former involves one-way violence by the government against a group of people; in the latter, violence is bilateral or multilateral.

Rebuilding the State After Civil War: Balancing Deterrence and Assurance

Post-conflict reconstruction of these states requires delicate balance between *deterrence* and *assurance*. Restoration of the state’s deterrent capability ensures that the state can prevent civil war recurrence; power must be wielded in such a manner that

³⁴ The intent to govern is indicated by “whether the targets of violence have the option to surrender” (26).

³⁵ Adapted from Kalyvas (2006, 29). This project substitutes the term *political repression* where Kalyvas used the term *state terror*.

³⁶ Genocide is the *physical* elimination of targeted groups, while mass deportation is the *spatial* elimination of groups (2006, 30-31).

“individuals and groups refrain from engaging in serious conflict” (Saideman and Zahar 2008, 2). Simultaneously, the government must *assure* its citizens that it will not threaten them with this same coercive capability; the government is obligated not to threaten the well being of its citizens.

The challenge states have in balancing deterrence and assurance is not new. For example, Madison (in Hamilton et al., 2008, Federalist No. 51) concluded:

If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty is this: You must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place, oblige it to control itself.

Madison understood that deterrence alone is insufficient and dangerous; a government must also be obliged “to control itself”, to extend security guarantees to its own population without becoming a major threat to them.

Gaps in the Literature

The aforementioned arguments by Donnelly (2003, 2013), Madison (2008), and the applicable measures used by contemporary scholars are aligned and summarized in the table below in order to highlight research gaps.

Table 3: Government As Essential Protector and Principal Violator

	Government as Essential Protector	Government as Principal Violator
Madison's Term	Enabling the government to control the governed	Obliging the government to control itself
Key Concern	Ability to deter large scale violence	Assuring the population that it will not threaten them
Measurement	State security: Civil war recurrence	Human Security: Government's violation of physical integrity rights

With respect to civil war outcomes, the extant literature has thoroughly explored the left side of this table (i.e. the state's ability to protect and control the governed) by evaluating whether external intervention or negotiated settlements have helped the government sustain longer-term peace (Doyle and Sambanis 2000, 2010; Hartzell 1999; Licklider 1995; Regan 1998, 2002).³⁷ Scholars have also evaluated external interventions and negotiated settlements in terms of their ability to help *terminate civil wars* (Olson Lounsbury, Pearson, and Talentino 2011; Regan 2002) and *promote democratization* (Downes and Monten 2013; Meernik 1996; Pickering and Peceny 2006; Von Hippel 2000; Zürcher 2011; Zürcher et al. 2013).

In comparison, scholarship has only rarely addressed the right side of the table—evaluating government assurances in terms of human security—when considering civil war outcomes.³⁸ At the time of this writing, no empirical studies considered how power-

³⁷ These scholars differ with respect to how long they believed peace must last before an operation or negotiated agreement could be deemed successful. In Regan's (1998, 2002) view, success occurred as long as civil war did not recur within six months; Doyle and Sambanis (2000, 2010) defined success as long as recurrence did not happen within a two-year window; finally, Hartzell (1999) and Licklider (1995) used a five-year window for civil war recurrence.

³⁸ Diehl and Druckman (2010, 1) attributed such gaps in comparative civil wars studies as due to scholars' myopic focus "on the factors thought to produce success rather than devoting attention to the criteria used to assess that success." They proposed a multi-dimensional view of success in peace operations, based first

sharing provisions in civil wars affected the state's violations of its citizens' physical integrity rights.

The research on third-party involvement in civil wars and in post-civil war recovery is similarly thin and underexplored with respect to state repression of physical-integrity rights, and even thinner when constrained to third-party security guarantees. What literature does exist here has principally examined the effects of third-party interventions³⁹ and peacekeeping operations on *reducing civilian victimization and factional violence* (Kathman, Gent, and Wood 2012; Kathman and Wood 2014)⁴⁰, on *mass killings* (Kathman and Wood 2011), and on *physical-integrity rights* (Murdie and Davis 2010; Peksen 2012).⁴¹ With respect to the latter similar outcome, Murdie and Davis found that the mere presence of a peacekeeping intervention in a state experiencing

on whether operations contained the conflict, settled the dispute, and abated violence and second on success in assigned peacebuilding missions (e.g. local security, election supervision, human rights protection, etc).

³⁹ Third-party intervention is distinctly different than third-party security guarantees. Conceptually, the latter involve “commitments of an outside power to deploy troops to protect the antagonists from each other should one of them defect from the agreement” (Mattes and Savun 2009, 749). Comparison is difficult since the two terms differ with respect to at least three key issues: *timing* (i.e. before conflict ends vs. after a negotiated settlement), *direction of intervention* (i.e. in support of the government or rebels vs. neutral), and *purpose* (i.e. bringing an end to a conflict vs. addressing the problem of credible commitment to a negotiated settlement).

⁴⁰ Kathman and Wood explored several closely related issues. Their most recent research (2014) found that the presence of larger numbers of UN peacekeeping troops is effective at protecting civilians from factional violence in an unstable post-conflict period. Kathman and Wood also demonstrated in an earlier study (2011) that third-party interventions—when backed by demonstrated resolve—do reduce in the long term the severity of mass killings and genocide. They theorized that this occurs because third parties shape the perpetrator's decision-making calculus by changing the costs of policy implementation, thereby reducing the expectations of success. As noted in Kalyvas (2006) typology discussed in Chapter 2, genocide is categorically different than the violation of physical-integrity rights since the regime is not interested in governing these people over the long term.

⁴¹ Peksen predominantly considered *peace enforcement* missions; Murdie and Davis evaluated *peacekeeping* missions only.

civil war did not lead to human-rights improvement; rather, their presence negatively affected physical-integrity rights.⁴²

Peksen's (2012) causal argument—that third-party interventions made in support of governments increase that government's capacity and that this increase in capacity automatically leads to increased political repression—is more highly contested (Davenport 2007c; Poe et al. 2000). Empirical evidence by these other scholars does not indicate that stronger governments automatically repress their people; rather, they respond to the previously discussed domestic threats, especially those that threaten the status quo. More often, it is weaker states that resort to repression, because their strength-to-threat ratio is much lower than stronger states and, as a result, their motivation to repress is correspondingly higher (Poe et al. 2000).⁴³

More directly, scholarship has not yet examined, in any significant depth, how different provisions within negotiated settlements affect a state's obligation to control itself by refraining from political repression. It is unknown whether the peace-agreement provisions that help a state deter civil war recurrence also help a state assure its citizens through recognition and protection of their physical integrity rights. It is also generally unknown how the different situational and historical contexts of these civil wars (e.g., variations in their duration or intensity) constrain or enable the improvement of these specific rights after a conflict ends.

⁴³ Wood, Kathman, and Gent's (2012) research corroborated Poe et al.'s argument—groups receiving support from external interveners are less inclined to use violence against civilians; weakened groups increase violence and killing of civilians. Of note, Russia's external involvement in Syria has not followed this pattern as the Syrian regime has resorted to even greater levels of violence.

Government Assurances Unraveled by Civil War

When individuals and groups reside within states where the central government effectively enforces rules, promotes order, and distributes power, they have little to fear. The state serves as a critical buffer between its citizens and the perils and insecurities of anarchy (Walter and Snyder 1999). However, when a government's ability to control and rule breaks down—as experienced during a civil war—the buffer disappears; the Leviathan weakens, no longer holding the monopoly on the use of violence within its territory. Worse yet, the state itself turns against many citizens, using political repression to coerce those it perceives as opponents. In sum, “The modern state has emerged as both the principal threat to the enjoyment of human rights and the essential institution for their effective implementation and enforcement” (Donnelly 2003, 35).

The Internal Security Dilemma

The breakdown of a government's ability to control and rule during civil war means “domestic groups face a world of uncertainty and unanswered questions” that persist even after the conflict has ended (Walter and Snyder 1999, 5). Groups begin to compete for security and power, grappling afresh with how power will be redistributed and whether other societal groups will “respect the status quo” or instead “take advantage of the situation to enhance their position within society” (Walter and Snyder 1999, 5). The security concerns of contending parties hinge on three key vulnerabilities. Prior belligerents fear their opponents will: (1) gain control of the new state's coercive apparatus, (2) gain advantages regarding the new state's distribution of political power,

and (3) gain advantages regarding the new state's distribution of resources (Hartzell 1999; Hartzell and Hoddie 2007).

The state represents one of these competing groups; as a central participant in the civil war, it is a biased party regarding power redistribution and therefore cannot credibly commit to protecting the opposition group(s) that it just recently fought in battle. Its involvement in the war—and the fact that all belligerents are politically and territorially co-located within the same state—creates a conundrum in negotiated settlements: How are the belligerents' promises to be believed? How can prior combatants now living in close proximity provide realistic assurances? Walter (2002) termed this the challenge of *credible commitment* in resolving civil wars. In her view, the high stakes—should rivals cheat and exploit vulnerabilities rather than cooperate—creates a nearly impossible situation for combatants to credibly promise to abide by the negotiated terms after the agreement is signed and implementation begins.

If the state's coercive power is renewed after the war, opportunities are rife for the vicious spiral of security and power competition to re-ignite. Opposition groups are rightly concerned with how this power will affect their security. These deep concerns within post-conflict states create a “fear-producing environment” that encourages conflict between groups even if they lack aggressive aims (Walter and Snyder 1999). Hartzell (1999, 5) detailed this scenario well, highlighting the origins of the internal security dilemma after conflict has already ended:

Ending a civil war calls for the reconstruction of central authority and the exercise of that authority by the state *vis-a-vis* society. The state, not rival groups, must now be vested with a monopoly on the legitimate use of force, must reconstitute political power and enforce rules for the management of conflict, and must make

decisions regarding the redistribution of resources. Yet it is precisely these dimensions of state power that raise the specter of the security dilemma for groups in conflict. Accustomed to providing for their own security during the course of a civil war, groups in a divided society must now be concerned about the impact that the state's use of coercive force, control of political power, and regulation of economic resources will have on their security.

The conjunction of group vulnerability, lack of ability to credibly commit to peace terms, and the restoration of the state's coercive capability instigates a strategic predicament within the state known as "the security dilemma." This term defines "a strategic predicament in relations between states and other actors" where the actions of each party to improve its own security result in decreasing the security of the others (Booth and Wheeler 2008, 4). The pioneer of security dilemma theory, John Herz, concluded that individuals and groups caught in this strategic predicament are fearful of "being attacked, subjected, dominated, or annihilated by other groups and individuals" so they react by acquiring "more and more power in order to escape the power of others. This, in turn, renders the others more insecure and compels them to prepare for the worst" (1950, 157). A vicious action-reaction cycle of competition for security and power is initiated between opponents,⁴⁴ with the cycle intensifying if no external arbiter or authority intervenes to reverse the conflict spiral (Booth 2008; Herz 1950; Jervis 1978; Walter 1997).

⁴⁴ These competitions—both within the civil war and after its conclusion—have enduring consequences. Snyder and Jervis (1999, 22) for example, caution that the erosion of state authority as experienced in civil war "may not only create or awaken security fears but generate behavior that makes later situations much more intractable." This is because the security competition typically manifests not as a Hobbesian war of all against all, but rather between groups who fight to capture the previously discussed dimensions of state powers. As a result, "the security of individuals becomes implicated with the fates of the contending groups", meaning that personal security (i.e. one's physical-integrity rights) and personal well being (i.e. one's economic and social status) often become intertwined with one's ethnic or group identity (22).

Resolving the Internal Security Dilemma

Snyder and Jervis (1999, 17) detailed two prescriptive possibilities for resolving the security dilemma. First, if the question driving civil conflict is “Who rules?” (Betts 1994), one potential solution is “to answer that question quickly and decisively” by establishing a Hobbesian Leviathan—“a sovereign authority capable of enforcing a hegemonic peace upon all the fearfully contending parties” (17). This solution vests the state with robust deterrence capability, but leaves no assurances for opposition parties whatsoever; much of the population, as Hartzell noted earlier, would remain grossly insecure.

Alternatively, the contending parties might arrange a binding “institutional framework that guarantees their mutual self-restraint once they lay their weapons down” (Snyder and Jervis 1999, 18). Instead of establishing unlimited government power, the reconstituted regime would be constrained through arrangements like power-sharing schemes, new constitutional rules, and/or the presence of an external third-party guarantor. This solution set aligns with the writings of many classical liberal theorists—from John Locke to Baron Charles-Louis de Montesquies, James Mill, Alexander Hamilton, and James Madison—who each posited that:

Successful state building called for a careful balancing of two competing imperatives: limiting the power of the state in order to preserve individual liberty, and endowing government with sufficient means to uphold the law and to protect the constitutional order itself against foreign and domestic threats. These writers rejected Hobbes’ argument that an all-powerful ruler was needed to maintain domestic order and social life, but they did not entirely dispense with the Leviathan. They domesticated it. Lasting peace required both the protection of individual freedom and the existence of effective governmental institutions, since

the alternative to effective government was untenable: the insecure state of nature.⁴⁵

Empirical evidence backs their theoretical argument, demonstrating that the dissolution and isolation of “civil institutions capable of protecting or insulating citizens from state power” is known to increase political repression (Corradi, Fagen, and Garretón 1992b, 2). Conversely, the intentional reconstruction of effective government institutions with appropriate checks and balances leads to improved human rights.

Advocates of military, political, and territorial power-sharing agreements contend that the inclusion of these measures in the negotiated settlement necessarily restricts: (1) the exercise of central authority with respect to the use of force, (2) the enforcement of political rules, and (3) the redistribution of territorial resources, respectively. Such restrictions assure the opposition groups about their own security, which reduces their need to pursue power and security. In turn, this also reduces the threat to the government. The restrictions also limit the government’s opportunities to repress and may present the government with improved alternative governance mechanisms beyond coercion.

The provision of third-party security guarantees helps to guarantee self-restraint by the government and aid former belligerents in overcoming the challenges of credibly committing to institutional frameworks established in a peace agreement (Walter 1997; Walter and Snyder 1999; Walter 2002). In sum, this means that the inclusion of power-sharing agreements and third-party security guarantees ought to reduce the level of political repression used by the state after war has ended.

⁴⁵ This quotation is from Paris’s (2004, 50) superb distillation of the classical liberal theorists.

To explain these causal stories in more depth, the three factors known to lead to increased political repression are first explored below. Chapter 4 then summarizes the current literature—regarding peace-agreement provisions and peace duration—and extends application of the former conditions to the outcome of political repression, using the three factors discussed below.

Why States Politically Repress

The use of political repression by violating an individual’s physical integrity rights—whether in the form of torture, extrajudicial killings, arbitrary detention, or political imprisonment—is understood as a course of action initiated by the government. Governments often turn to this type of political repression as a means of governance, believing that “the state is master of society”; population coercion serves an essential role then in establishing and preserving political rule (McCamant 1984, 34).⁴⁶ Under this logic, political repression does not necessarily end when conflict ends, since powerful pressures exist for the ruling regime to solidify centralized control; kidnapping, torture, and murder are often employed as state policy in order to secure victory (Lopez 1984).

In order to find conditions that might mitigate or exacerbate the violation of physical integrity rights, this project first considers those factors that historically led to such increased political repression.⁴⁷ Contemporary research on political repression empirically demonstrates that state-based political repression increases when: (1) higher

⁴⁶ Also see Dallin and Breslauer’s (1970) discussion on political terror, in which they argue that government coercion is principally a means to exert political and social control.

⁴⁷ This argument was inspired by Fortna’s (2008, 82) use of causal logic to explain whether and how peacekeeping works in reducing war recurrence. Fortna began that exercise by thinking about ways that peace might collapse; to match the dependent variable (outcome in QCA), this project began by considering ways that political repression might increase.

levels of threat or political dissent increase the state's *motivation to repress*; (2) the absence of institutional checks and balances on the government increases its *opportunity to repress*; (3) the government lacks *alternative governance methods* for establishing societal control beyond the use of coercion. Each causal mechanism is explored below.

Motivation to Repress

When the domestic status quo is challenged—when behaviors such as political dissension or political violence threaten “the political system, government personnel, the economy, or the lives, beliefs, and livelihoods of those with their territorial jurisdiction”—states are likely to respond with repression (Davenport 2007a, 7).

Davenport (2007a, 7) aptly termed this “The Law of Coercive Responsiveness.” The empirical literature robustly demonstrates the principal driver of a state’s response is the intensity of the threat facing a regime. Increases in the level of political dissension and violence—whether in the form of strikes, riots, demonstrations, unrest or guerilla warfare—are consistently found to increase state repression (Carey 2009; Davenport 1995; Gurr and Lichbach 1986; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999; Regan and Henderson 2002).

Scholars have also shown that the intensity of the threat is typically reflected by the type or form of violence (e.g. demonstrations, riots, civil war, etc) that threatens a regime. Carey (2010), for example, evaluated the effects of different forms of domestic dissent on the probability of state-repression onset. She concluded that both non-violent dissent (e.g., demonstrations and strikes) and relatively unplanned dissent (e.g., riots) elicit very little repression-response in comparison with greater threats such as guerrilla

attacks.⁴⁸ Correspondingly, states engaged in civil war—arguably the greatest threat to the status quo—consistently increase political repression as a means of engaging against suspected opposition members (Poe and Tate 1994; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999).

Davenport’s law does not always hold true though. Sometimes intense threats do not lead to intense political repression. Empirical evidence shows that responses are, at times, moderated or altogether absent. To explain these exceptions, Poe, Tate, Keith, and Lanier (2000) proposed that the threat level is not the sole determinant of political repression. Instead, governments take into account the political strength of their regime relative to the threat before they choose to violate personal-integrity rights. According to this model, which they call the “strength-to-threat ratio,” leaders respond “either when they perceive levels of domestic threat (T) to be greater than their regime’s Strength (S), or when Threat has increased relative to the Strength of their regime, thus increasing their perception of the probability that their regime will be toppled” (29). When a government’s strength-to-threat ratio is low, it violates physical-integrity rights as a means to decrease the threat. Likewise, a state with a higher ratio is less likely to revert to political repression in comparison to a state where this gap is comparatively small. The weaker regime is more motivated to politically repress in order to avoid any further decay of their authority.⁴⁹

⁴⁸ Also see Davenport’s (2007b) repression model that emphasized when threats to the government become less severe, governments substitute non-violent repression techniques instead of violent repression.

⁴⁹ The use of coercion serves two purposes here: First, it influences the course of domestic opposition. Second, it signals to external parties that the regime still exerts a strong monopoly on the use of violence over their territory in spite of such threats (Davenport and Armstrong 2004).

Opportunity to Repress

...once a system that permits peaceful party opposition is highly institutionalized and surrounded with legal protections. . . the costs of destroying it are likely to be extremely high. For a government can destroy the opposition only by wrecking the constitutional system.⁵⁰

The presence of certain democratic institutional restrictions reduces the government's opportunity to repress. Institutional restrictions within democracies include such measures as electoral participation and competition, as well as executive constraints. Electoral participation and competition encourage the masses to participate in the democratic process. Governments operating under such restrictions reduce the degree of repression since higher levels of repression would more readily lead to contestation of political offices and removal from positions by being voted out of office (Bueno De Mesquita et al. 2005; Davenport 2007a). Executive constraints, meanwhile, refer to checks and balances on the decision-making powers of chief government executives. Such checks and balances include the institutionalized constraints imposed by various accountability groups; such as, a legislative assembly, the military, an independent judiciary (Marshall, Jagers, and Gurr 2010). These constraints on executive decision-making powers reduce the available repression opportunities.

Such restrictions strengthen the institutional checks and balances on the regime and thereby constrain the degree of political repression (Davenport 2007a; Gates et al. 2006; Bueno De Mesquita et al. 2005). Opportunities to repress abound in authoritarian regimes, since the government has little fear of accountability or attribution; evidence demonstrates that leaders in authoritarian regimes repress their citizens *more* than do

⁵⁰ See Dahl (1966, xvi).

leaders in democratic regimes, for the citizens possess few effective legal mechanisms to counter their power in comparison their democratic counterparts (Davenport 2007b).

Notably, the mere presence of a democratic regime will not automatically reduce the likelihood of political repression. Elections alone, for example, “neither make a democracy nor are they inherently the best place to begin state-building. Instead, elections are effective when other institutional changes that ensure accountability are put into place” (Bueno De Mesquita et al. 2005, 456).⁵¹

Meaningful improvement in a state’s human-rights performance is only likely after a regime adopts and permits institutionalization of certain competitive measures, such as, executive constraints and multi-party competition, which are strongly associated with deeper accountability (Bueno De Mesquita et al. 2005). These scholars also determined that improved human rights are correlated with full democracy; governments shy of this mark do not lead to greater respect for physical-integrity rights. In other words, only states with higher levels of democracy, regardless of their election rules, were more respectful of human rights (Cingranelli and Richards 1999b; Davenport 1995, 1997; Davenport and Armstrong 2004; Davenport 2007b; Mitchell and McCormick 1988; Poe and Tate 1994; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999).⁵² Davenport and Armstrong (2004; 2007b) further contested that a consistent relationship between democracy and respect for

⁵¹ Donnelly (2013) similarly warns against overemphasis on election mechanisms as the primary means to constrain rulers. Electoral democracies do not necessarily align with improved human rights. Rather, in his view, only liberal democracies reinforce human rights, for “The liberal commitment to individual rights more than the democratic commitment to popular empowerment makes contemporary liberal democracies rights-protective” (224).

⁵² The specific variables and operationalization of regime type with respect to these findings is discussed further in Chapter 4 and 5.

physical-integrity rights only holds true once a very high minimum threshold⁵³ of democracy has been passed; once beyond this level of democracy, authorities finally perceive constraints on their actions and reduce their use of political repression.

Alternative Governance Mechanisms

Coercion is just one of several options for governing state-society relations. Existing research shows regimes may also select from at least two alternative governance mechanisms, including (1) *coopting* the opposition and (2) *cooperating* with the opposition.⁵⁴ The government's ability to coopt the opposition is generally proxied by the level of economic development and by state capacity; its ability to cooperate is captured by regime type (Davenport and Armstrong 2004). When regimes possess increased capacity to coopt, or cooperate with, their populations, governments are constrained from pursuing coercion. Davenport and Armstrong (2004, 540) explained the causal linkage between governance alternatives and the level of political repression thusly:

Alternatives (e.g., material and normative forms of influence) create distinct approaches to governance as well as advocates for each style. Both can hinder the coercive strategies of government by offering a different way of looking at the problem of sociopolitical order and different means to get there. When alternatives exist, then coercion and those who advocate for its use are compelled to justify, persuade, and compete with the others, thereby hindering them (at least when viewed relative to the other contexts that do not require such actions).

Both alternatives are explored in more depth below.

⁵³ This threshold is detailed in Chapter 5, in the section on Regime Type.

⁵⁴ The names and initial arguments for this three-pronged approach to alternative governance mechanisms originated from Fjelde and Soysa's (2009) work entitled *Coercion, Cooptation, or Cooperation? State Capacity and the Risk of Civil War, 1961-2004*. Fjelde and Soysa considered these three components as the key dimensions of state capacity that define a state's relations with society. Where Fjelde and Soysa used these as pre-war predictors of civil war outbreak, they are applied here in the post-war context to state repression, as alternative mechanisms for governing a population.

Cooptation of the Opposition

States with sufficient economic development or extractive taxation mechanisms can leverage economic gains to directly coopt rivals, or to expand welfare to larger opposition groups through public goods provisions, rather than resort to political repression as the primary means of governance. According to the scholars DeRouen et al (2010) and Taydas and Peksen (2012), high levels of economic development may improve the ability to coopt rivals and also reduce the need for third-party involvement in peace agreement implementation.

Strong economic standing also may defray the level of threat facing a government (Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999). Empirical evidence provided by Hoddie and Hartzell (2003b) showed that peace agreements are more likely to be implemented at higher levels of economic development; in other words, civil war recurrence is less likely when states possess greater economic margin. Finally, a number of scholars (Mitchell and McCormick 1988; Poe and Tate 1994; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999) found that the level of economic development—also called economic standing—decreases human-rights violations; and that poor states resort to violating physical-integrity rights more readily than rich states, who have more resources to distribute to oppositions groups they have coopted.

Cooperation with the Opposition

Cooperation within democratic institutions is advocated and understood as a cheaper, more effective societal control mechanism than coercion, especially in the long term (Dallin and Breslauer 1970; Davenport and Armstrong 2004, 540; Davenport

2007a). Democratic institutions—with an emphasis on voting, negotiation, mediation, and compromise—allow for nonviolent conflict resolution without the state resorting to physical repression (Davenport 2007b; Poe and Tate 1994). Davenport (2007a, 11) explained this logic, concluding, “Democracies provide an alternative mechanism of control through participation and contestation. They also weaken the justification for coercive activity by reducing the likelihood for human conflict and facilitating the conveyance of grievances.”

Where states lack well-established democratic institutions, their ability “to resolve or suppress the conflicts of interest stemming from growing demands for political participation” is undermined (Mansfield and Snyder 2005, 87). The unresolved tensions usually result in either “belligerence abroad” (in the form of interstate war) or an increase in domestic dissent and political repression (Mansfield and Snyder 2005, 274). This increase in repression is often counterproductive, leading to escalated political dissension and violence. Nonetheless, regimes still revert to increased repression “not because it has a high probability of success but because the weakness of the state precludes its resort to less violent alternatives” (Job 1992, 29). Governments that lack alternative governance mechanisms outside of coercion are thus more likely to revert to political repression to control the governed and preserve political rule.

Returning then to the beneficial constraints introduced by democracy—these constraints are not inviolate. Research indicates that while democratic institutions reduce the likelihood of a regime’s selection of political repression, this influence may be overwhelmed by higher levels of political conflict (Davenport 2007a, b). In sum,

democratic institutions introduce useful constraints on the government's opportunity to repress, though strong threat levels can weaken these constraints.

Summary

This chapter argued that scholarship has not yet examined, in any significant depth, how different provisions within negotiated settlements affect a state's obligation to control itself by refraining from political repression. Therefore, this project focuses on government assurances after civil war has ended via negotiated settlement, by observing the state's protection of physical-integrity rights. The chapter demonstrated that the government's ability to assure its citizens is deeply unsettled during post-conflict reconstruction due to the challenge of credible commitment and the exacerbation of the internal security dilemma as the state regains its deterrence capabilities.

In accordance with previous scholarship, political repression was defined as unilateral political violence conducted by a state in order to govern its people. That is, a state that violates its citizens' physical integrity rights engages in acts of political repression in order to coerce them and thereby retain societal control. In contrast, a state that protects physical integrity rights is evidenced by its refraining from political repression.

States were shown to increase their use of political repression when: (1) threats to the regime increase, which motivates the state to repress; (2) no restrictions exist on the power of authorities, which increases the state's opportunity to repress without immediate costs or accountability; and (3) alternative governance mechanisms are absent, which leaves the government without the ability to coopt or cooperate with its citizens; coercion

becomes the sole avenue of governance. Conversely, states decrease their use of political repression—meaning human rights will significantly improve—when: (1) the threat to the regime is reduced; (2) when institutional checks and balances increase the costs and decrease the government’s opportunities to repress; and (3) when alternative governance mechanisms like cooptation and cooperation are robust, providing different options than coercion when threats arise. So then, if a peace-agreement provision is to succeed in reducing the government’s use of political repression, it likely must either decrease the government’s motivation to repress, decrease its opportunity to repress, or improve alternative governance mechanisms.

Chapter Three: Research Design

This chapter establishes essential components of the research design. It begins by defining civil war and negotiated settlements alongside identification of datasets for verifying these conditions. This information both bounds the universe of applicable cases and informs the selection of Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) as the principal methodology. The selection rationale for QCA is clarified and key terms within the methodology—such as, multiple conjunctural causality, equifinality, and INUS conditions—are explained.

The chapter then returns to the remaining requisite steps of the first phase of QCA, which includes: (1) identifying and defining the outcome; (2) identifying and defining the conditions; and (3) establishing a testable model (or models). Chapter 2 accomplished much of the first step, defining the outcome of political repression as the violation by a government or its actors of its citizens' personal-integrity rights. This chapter extends that discussion by identifying applicable datasets for human-rights data and demonstrating initial coding of the raw data.

With respect to selection of conditions (i.e. variables), several methods are available to QCA researchers. The methods selected here were particularly informed by the inherent challenge within QCA of limited diversity—which is the reality that not all potential causal configurations are empirically represented by actual cases. An excess of conditions exacerbates the problem of limited diversity; prudent scholarship requires

reducing and refining the conditions to an optimal number and representation that enables the simplest explanation that sufficiently explains the outcome. That is, scholars must balance parsimony with explanatory sufficiency.

Variable complexity was reduced in this project via the technique of categorizing conditions as remote or proximate conditions. The chapter explains this technique and then categorizes the conditions of this project accordingly; specific definition and elaboration of those conditions as well as the presentation of the two models is reserved for follow-on chapters.

To recapitulate, the purpose of this chapter is identification of the pertinent datasets, cases, and conditions that encapsulate the analysis. This information, coupled with the theoretical background provided in Chapter 2 and the selected methodology of Qualitative Comparative Analysis (also discussed here) establishes the necessary structural scaffolding and context upon which the hypotheses (proposed in Chapter 4) might be built and the multi-method analyses then begun.

Universe of Cases: Negotiated Settlements

By focusing on that peace-agreement provisions have on human rights outcomes, this project bounds the universe of relevant cases to the set of civil wars that ended in negotiated settlements. The other forms of civil war termination—including military victory by the government, military victory by the rebels, ceasefires, and stalemates—are excluded from the project.⁵⁵

⁵⁵ For analysis of how conflict termination type influences peace duration see Toft (2009).

Dataset for Negotiated Settlements

Several existing datasets cover negotiated peace agreements that followed civil wars. Hartzell and Hoddie (2003b), for example, investigated thirty-eight civil war settlements signed between 1945-1998. Mattes and Savun (2009) extended this dataset, covering peace agreements from 1945-2005. This project utilized the latter dataset, with two minor modifications to the timeline. First, the start date was delayed. Only civil wars with peace agreements initiated in 1989 or later were retained. This temporal shift was made for two reasons: (1) It controlled for the biased motivations of Cold War peace operations and third-party interventions;⁵⁶ and (2) Negotiated settlements in civil wars that ended before the Cold War were rare. Even if the start date of the dataset was shifted to the earliest possibility of 1976—when human-rights data first became available—this would only have added two more cases overall (i.e., Chad 1979 and Zimbabwe 1979).⁵⁷ The second timeline modification was that the end date was extended to 2007. This maximized the available data on civil wars, while preserving a minimum of five years of human-rights data for observation.⁵⁸

Several direct benefits resulted from using Mattes and Savun’s (2009) research as an initial baseline: First, Mattes and Savun provided empirical data for disaggregated political, military, and territorial power-sharing provisions during the timeframe of

⁵⁶ This modification follows scholarly precedent. Fortna (2008, 2010) observed, for example, that the primary purpose of peacekeeping in civil wars prior to 1989 “was less to prevent the resumption of war than to contain the conflict to prevent direct superpower intervention.” She therefore limited her study to the post-Cold War period.

⁵⁷ A number of civil wars occurred between 1976-1988, but the great majority of these ended in either government or rebel victory.

⁵⁸ When the dataset was initially compiled in November of 2014, PTS data was available through 2012 and CIRI data through 2011. As of January 2017, PTS data is now updated through 2015.

interest. Second, Mattes and Savun coded these provisions by indicating their presence (yes, or 1) or their absence (no, or 0). This dichotomization of power-sharing provisions ensured easy transferability into both the contingency tables and into QCA practices, without requiring further calibration of the raw data.

Civil War and Negotiated Settlements Defined

Mattes and Savun (2009) and Hartzell and Hoddie (2003b) defined *civil wars* using the four criteria of the Correlates of War (COW) project. The COW project identifies civil war occurrence when: (1) The conflict leads to at least 1,000 battle deaths per year; (2) the national government is one of the principal disputing parties; (3) both the national government and its adversaries demonstrate effective resistance; (4) the conflict occurs within a single state's recognized territorial boundaries (Singer and Small 1982).⁵⁹

In turn, these scholars operationally verified the presence of *negotiated settlements* based on “representatives of opposing sides in a conflict” holding “face-to-face talks” that led to the peace agreement (Mattes and Savun 2009; Hartzell and Hoddie 2003a, 309, 323). Notably their definition of settlements did not outline specific requirements that a negotiation must contain. Instead, provisions within peace agreements were reserved as independent variables. Likewise, in this project, peace-agreement provisions are used to differentiate between negotiated and their respective effects on a specific outcome of interest.

⁵⁹ Under COW's (Sarkees and Wayman 2010b) updated typology, *civil war* is but one type of intrastate war, distinguished by the involvement of a state's government against a non-state entity. Two other types of intrastate war exist in this new typology: 1) *regional internal wars* and 2) *intercommunal wars*. This project uses the original typology.

Dataset Extension and Benefits

Negotiated settlements signed after 2005 were identified using the aforementioned definition of civil wars and the COW database. The PRIO/UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset (Högbladh 2011) was used to confirm these civil wars. The two-year extension from 2005 to 2007 caused the following changes: (1) previously recorded data for Sudan and Burundi was adjusted; and (2) the civil war in Nepal was added. The civil war in Chad was also considered because it was in the COW database and in the PRIO/UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset. However, closer inspection revealed that Chad did not merit inclusion because the peace agreement failed to meet the previously discussed definition of a negotiated settlement.⁶⁰

When Mattes and Savun's dataset was adjusted to encapsulate negotiated settlements in civil wars ending between 1989-2007, a total of thirty-six civil wars were shown to have occurred in twenty-six different states.⁶¹ Table 4 (below) summarizes these wars, along with each conflicts' start and end years. The wars are organized chronologically by start year. When multiple conflicts occurred within the same state, a number was added after the state abbreviation to differentiate between these wars. For brevity in all tables hereafter, COW's standardized three-letter state abbreviations (caseID) are used to identify the different cases.

⁶⁰ Specifically, the Tripoli Accord (also known as the Tripoli Agreement or Tripoli Declaration) was more accurately an inter-state agreement signed on February 9, 2006 by President Al Bashir of the Republic of the Sudan and President Itno of the Republic of Chad rather than an agreement between the central government and internal opposition within its territory. The agreement itself—along with the full title of the agreement—makes this distinction clear, for it called urgently on “both parties to refrain from all interference in the internal affairs of the other party and from providing support to armed groups operating in either country” (UNSC 15 February 2006).

⁶¹ Civil war recurred in Angola (three recurrences), Liberia (two recurrences), and in Croatia, Georgia, , the Philippines, Sierra Leone, and Sudan. Of the 36 civil wars, 21 occurred in Africa.

Table 4: Civil Wars Ending in Negotiated Settlements, 1989-2007

civil war	caseID	Start	End	civil war	caseID	Start	End
Guatemala	GUA	1963	1996	Croatia	CRO1	1991	1992
Cambodia	CAM	1970	1991	Angola	ANG3	1992	1994
Philippines	PHI1	1972	1996	Bosnia	BOS	1992	1995
Angola	ANG1	1975	1989	Georgia (Abkhazia)	GRG2	1992	1994
Lebanon	LEB	1975	1989	Moldova	MLD	1992	1992
Afghanistan	AFG	1979	2001	Sierra Leone	SIE1	1992	1996
El Salvador	SAL	1979	1992	Tajikistan	TAJ	1992	1997
Nicaragua	NIC	1981	1989	Liberia	LBR2	1994	1996
Mozambique	MZM	1982	1992	Croatia	CRO2	1995	1995
South Africa	SAF	1983	1991	Congo (DRC)	DRC	1997	2001
Sudan	SUD1	1983	2002	Angola	ANG4	1998	2001
Angola	ANG2	1989	1991	Guinea-Bissau	GNB	1998	1998
Azerbaijan	AZE	1989	1994	Sierra Leone	SIE2	1998	1999
Chad	CHA	1989	1996	Burundi	BUI	2000	2002
Georgia (South Ossetia)	GRG1	1989	1992	Philippines	PHI2	2000	2000
Liberia	LBR1	1989	1993	Liberia	LBR3	2002	2003
Papua New Guinea	PNG	1989	1998	Nepal	NEP	2003	2006
Rwanda	RWA	1990	1993	Sudan	SUD2	2003	2005

Why QCA Was Selected

Two methodological challenges existed at the outset in addressing the effects of various peace-agreement measures on human-rights outcomes: First, the set of applicable cases was reduced by the focus on negotiated settlements and on the outcome of human rights. These limitations narrowed the maximum number of cases to thirty-six civil wars, which negated the use of regression tools. Other scholars like Jarstad and Nilsson (2008) surmounted this issue by counting multiple agreements within the same civil war as different cases.⁶² Their approach was not used here, given the probable bias toward civil wars resolved with multiple or incremental agreements versus those resolved with singular comprehensive peace agreements. Second, more variables had to be added

⁶² Where scholars like Mattes and Savun (2009) evaluated just three negotiated settlements for Liberia (one for each of its respective civil wars), Jarstad and Nilsson (2008) considered nine different agreements within those same three conflicts. Similarly, Jarstad and Nilsson evaluated Chad's singular civil war using nine different agreements. Their coding process yielded 83 agreements over a similar time period of interest to this study and allowed them to conduct statistical analysis.

beyond the individual peace-agreement provisions introduced earlier; that is, the analysis needed to account for potential intervening variables or scope conditions.

From these two challenges arose the classic “many variables, small number of cases” dilemma commonly found in comparative social science research (see, e.g., Lijphart 1971, 685; Lijphart 1975). This dilemma persists because neither quantitative nor qualitative methods produce resolution: predominant quantitative techniques are incapable of delineating the causal complexity necessary for small- and medium-N comparative research (Ragin 2008) and the sheer number of cases makes qualitative cross-case comparison via case studies unwieldy.

Bridging the Methodological Divide

To bridge the large methodological divide between the qualitative, case-oriented, narrative method and the quantitative, variable oriented approach, Ragin (1987, 2014) proposed an alternative methodology. Known as Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA), the method was designed to surmount the “small N, many variables” dilemma. Further, it allowed researchers who desired to test complex patterns in relatively small- to medium-sized datasets with a “synthetic, broadly comparative strategy”, one that sought to be “both holistic...and analytic” so that the cases would not be lost in the research process and so that more than a few cases could be comprehended, with the potential for at least modest generalization (Ragin 2014, xiv).

QCA uniquely combines key features from both the case-oriented and variable-oriented approaches. Regarding the former, QCA imports the capability to analyze causal complexity and to account for different combinatorial configurations, constellations, and

conjunctures of explanatory factors (Berg-Schlosser 2012; Ragin 1987, 2014). It accomplishes this by representing each individual case as a complex entity, holistically composed of a configuration of conditions (Marx and Dusa 2011; Ragin 2014; Rihoux & Lobe 2009). With respect to the variable-oriented approach, QCA imports its robust, analytical techniques; comparison of cases is made possible by data-reduction methods involving Boolean algebra and logic. In sum, the combination of qualitative components with cross-case comparison allows researchers to explore and identify “decisive cross-case patterns, the usual domain of quantitative analysis” (Fiss 2012).

Multiple Conjunctural Causation and INUS Conditions

Perhaps QCA’s greatest strength lies in its fundamental assumption known as *multiple conjunctural causation*. This notion assumes that different combinations or intersections of causal conditions may lead to the same outcome. The accommodation of multiple conjunctural causation implies that:

- (1) most often, it is a combination of conditions that generate an outcome;
- (2) several different combinations of conditions may produce the same outcome;
- (3) a given condition may have a different impact on the outcome depending on context. This allowance for greater causal complexity also implies that a causal condition may have opposite effects depending on context.⁶³

Context-free causality is, therefore, rejected in favor of context-sensitive causality that accounts for structural, enduring attributes of social entities like states (Marx and Dusa 2011; Ragin 2014, 55).

The use of set-theoretic relationships and Boolean logic also allows QCA practitioners to consider and evaluate “those factors as causally relevant that alone are not sufficient or necessary” (Schneider and Wagemann 2006, 754) to an outcome of interest.

⁶³ See Ragin (2014, xxii).

These factors are called INUS conditions. Mackie (1974, 79) first coined this acronym to describe situations where each respective condition is an “insufficient but necessary part of a condition which is itself unnecessary but sufficient for the result.” When Mackie referred to the condition being part of another condition, he was referencing what QCA scholars alternatively call causal recipes or configurations of conditions. Fiss’s (2012) clarification of Mackie’s original definition usefully separates the four different aspects of the definition (see Figure 6 below):

- | |
|--|
| <p>INUS conditions are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Insufficient (not sufficient by itself) but• Necessary components of causal combinations that are• Unnecessary (because of multiple paths) but• Sufficient for the outcome |
|--|

Figure 6: INUS Conditions Defined⁶⁴

QCA solution formulas, derived from truth tables and data reduction, commonly contain INUS conditions. These solutions contrast sharply with the approach of natural scientists who “attempt to establish causes that are either necessary or sufficient or both necessary and sufficient” (Ragin 2014, 27).

In summary, QCA’s selection as the primary methodology was based on: (1) its capacity to deal with medium-N comparative research, which is critical given the limited number of cases here; (2) its holistic and analytic approach, combining features of qualitative, case-oriented research with cross-case comparisons; (3) its context-sensitive causality, accounting for structural, enduring attributes; (4) its systematic approach that

⁶⁴ Reprinted from Fiss (2012). See Psillos (2002, 88-89) for an excellent illustration of an INUS condition, using the argument that a short circuit is an INUS condition for the outcome of a house fire.

involves the use of set-theoretic relationships, Boolean logic, and an assumption of causal complexity; and (5) its allowance for INUS conditions and for multiple conjunctural causation (i.e. the idea that different causal recipes may lead to the same outcome).

QCA's Lexicon

QCA is distinguished from quantitative analysis in its examination of *set relations* rather than *correlations*. Rather than emphasizing the explanatory power of competing *independent variables* on the *dependent variable*, the core of QCA's approach is oriented towards linking "configurations of causally relevant conditions to outcomes" (Ragin 2014, xxi-xxii). Conditions "are not 'independent' variables" however; rather "they are expected to operate in combination" (Engeli, Rihoux, and Allison 2014, 93). In addition, different sets (i.e. configurations or combinations) of conditions can lead to the same outcome. These fundamental differences necessitate an updated lexicon. The table below summarizes these terms; fuller explanations and applications are provided in Chapter 6.

Table 5: Conventional vs. QCA Terminology⁶⁵

Conventional Quantitative Terminology	QCA Terminology
Correlations	Set-theoretic relations
Dependent variables	Qualitative outcomes
Independent variables	Sets (or combinations) of conditions
Correlation matrices	Truth tables
Net effects	Causal recipes

The Outcome

The first critical phase in QCA involves identifying relevant cases, then identifying and defining the outcome of interest. The relevant cases were described above; the outcome of interest was conceptually and operationally defined in Chapter 2. Wood and Gibney’s (2010, 369) definition was selected: Political repression is recognized by “violations of physical or personal-integrity rights carried out by a state (or its agents).”

Measuring Violations of Personal-Integrity Rights

Political repression was measured using the Political Terror Scale (PTS) dataset. This dataset aligns with Wood and Gibney’s operational definition of political repression. The Political Terror Scale provides an aggregated measure of personal-integrity rights on a country-year basis. Originally developed by Gibney and Dalton (1996), this annual measure was given greater currency by Poe and Tate (1994) and leveraged in a number of empirical studies (Carey 2009; Davenport 2007a, b; Poe and Tate 1994; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999).

⁶⁵ Table adapted from Ragin (2014, xxiii, Table A).

In the PTS dataset, state violence is assessed along three dimensions: (1) *scope*, which addresses the type of violence employed by the state (e.g., killing, imprisonment, etc); (2) *intensity*, meaning the frequency with which a state conducts a given type of violence over a given time period; and (3) *range*, meaning the portion of the population or segment(s) of society targeted by the government for abuse (Wood and Gibney 2010). Two individual reviewers subjectively assessed these three measures using content analysis of yearly Amnesty International and US State Department Country Reports. The reviewers used a fixed five-point coding scheme⁶⁶ that capitalized on the aforementioned dimensions of scope, intensity, and range (Wood and Gibney 2010, 373):

1. Countries [are] under a secure rule of law, people are not imprisoned for their views, and torture is rare or exceptional. . . . Political murders are extremely rare.
2. There is a limited amount of imprisonment for nonviolent political activity. However, a few persons are affected; torture and beating are exceptional. . . . Political murder is rare.
3. There is extensive political imprisonment. . . . Execution or other political murders and brutality may be common. Unlimited detention, with or without trial, for political views is accepted.
4. The practices of Level 3 are expanded to larger numbers. Murders, disappearances, and torture are part of life. . . . In spite of its generality, on this level terror affects primarily those who interest themselves in politics or ideas.
5. The terrors of Level 4 have been extended to the whole population. . . . The leaders of these societies place no limits on the means or thoroughness with which they pursue personal or ideological goals.

On this data scale, 1 indicates a very low level of physical-integrity rights' violations, while 5 represents violence throughout the whole population. Two PTS scores (PTS-State, PTS-Amnesty) are published each year for each country, starting in 1976.

⁶⁶ The five-point coding scheme "was adopted from a 'political terror' scale published by Freedom House in its 1980 yearbook" (Wood and Gibney 2010, 373). For this original yearbook, see Gastil (1980).

Rather than using just one score—and given that the information in the State Department and Amnesty International reports provides different though related annual measures of the abuse of physical-integrity rights (Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999)—this project uses an average of these two scores as the measure of human rights at a given time period.

Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human-Rights Database

A second, well-respected measure of human rights, the Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) human rights database, also derives its categorical scores from the same source data. CIRI however prioritizes the US State Department Country Reports as its primary source and the Amnesty International Reports as its secondary source (Wood and Gibney 2010, 375). Since both PTS and CIRI measures focus on the same types of violence and code from the same descriptive data, they expectedly correlate quite highly at 0.65 for PTS-Amnesty scores and approximately 0.73 for PTS-State scores (Wood and Gibney 2010). However, the coding methodologies between PTS and CIRI differ significantly, which explains why the correlation is not stronger.

PTS provides a single score (1 to 5) that collectively assesses multiple types of political repression. In contrast, CIRI presents a 9-point cumulative scale (0 to 8) that is the aggregated total of four ordinal indicators that gauge the government's respect for its citizens' physical-integrity rights (Cingranelli and Richards 1999a).⁶⁷ Those indicators include extrajudicial killing, disappearance, political imprisonment, and torture. These

⁶⁷ For the CIRI dataset, higher scores represent *decreased* violations of physical-integrity rights, whereas with PTS, higher scores reflect *increased* violations of these rights. To aid in comparison and interpretation throughout this study, all CIRI scores were inverted in the datasets. This action aligned PTS and CIRI scores so that higher values indicated a higher level of human-rights abuses (i.e., more frequent, systematic violations by a government of physical-integrity rights).

four subcomponents are individually scored as 0 (no incidents in the category), 1 (1-49 incidents of the abuse), or 2 (50 or more incidents involving this type of repression).

In this study, the average PTS score is used as the primary human-rights measure. Findings in Chapter 5 were crosschecked against CIRI data.⁶⁸ CIRI is useful as a robustness check given its use of the same source data but with a different coding scheme. PTS was preferred as the primary human rights measure given CIRI's arbitrary coding threshold based on the occurrence of fifty incidents in a given country (Wood and Gibney 2010).⁶⁹ In addition, CIRI data is missing from a number of civil wars: seven of thirty-six cases (19%) are missing data at two years after the war ended; four of thirty-six cases (11%) are missing this four years after the war; and at ten years after the war, nine of thirty-six cases (25%) are missing data.

Coding the Outcome

To evaluate the effects of different conditions on the respective human-rights measures, the year that a civil war ended is set as time t . The end of civil war was selected rather than the year of the peace agreement because conflict often extends a year past the agreement and because the presence of civil war is strongly correlated with worse human-rights practices (Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999). The termination of civil war should therefore correspond with improved human rights, *ceteris parabis*.

⁶⁸ Running an alternative fuzzy-set analysis against CIRI data at a given time period is a time-consuming endeavor best reserved for future studies. This rationale is discussed in Chapter 6 and in the final chapter.

⁶⁹ Adapting a practical example from Wood and Gibney (2010), this means that fifty incidents of torture in a very populous country like China are treated the same as fifty incidents that occur in a small country (i.e., both are scored as a 1 for this attribute). Moreover, a country that tortures 50 people is scored the same as a country that tortures 500 or 50,000 citizens (i.e., both are scored as a 2).

The coding of human-rights scores over time involved three key steps: First, raw human-rights scores (PTS-State, PTS-Amnesty, and CIRI) were gathered for four distinct time periods: the end of the war (t) and then two, five, and ten years after the war ended (i.e., $t+2$, $t+5$, $t+10$). The PTS-State and PTS-Amnesty scores were averaged to provide a single PTS score for each respective country-year. CIRI scores, as noted earlier, were inverted to match the coding direction of PTS scores (i.e. higher scores equal increased violations of those rights).

The second step involved calculating the change in human-rights scores over time. Scores at each later time period ($t+2$, $t+5$, $t+10$) were compared with the original baseline score at time t by subtracting the score of the later period from the earlier period. These timeframes account for short-, medium-, and long-term effects by the various conditions on the outcome of human rights. The equation was oriented this way—rather than subtracting the earlier period from the later period—in order to align with the common QCA practice of operationalizing conditions so that positive scores refer to a desired outcome and negative scores indicate an undesired outcome. This made the third step of dichotomization fairly straightforward. Positive scores from Step Two, which indicate that human rights improved, were coded as 1; negative scores, where human rights became worse, were coded as 0. Since this project oriented to finding those provisions that lead to *improved* human rights, cases where human rights remained unchanged, were also coded as 0.⁷⁰

⁷⁰ Logically, a reduction in political repression over time only requires that *either* PTS-State or PTS-Amnesty to improve. The other score can remain unchanged. This would result in a change over time of +0.5, which would be dichotomized in Step Three as 1 (i.e. human rights improved).

A practical illustration using sample human-rights scores is helpful here: To calculate *pts2* (the change in the average PTS score from t to $t+2$), the $t+2$ score was subtracted from t . If the average PTS score for a given country at time t was 3 and the PTS score at time $t+2$ was 5, the change over time was calculated -2. This value from Step Two is less than zero, indicating that human rights became worse. Therefore, Step Three would dichotomize this case as zero. Conversely, human-rights scores that are positive indicate that human-rights outcomes improved (political repression decreased).

To recap, the outcome of political repression was assessed using PTS and CIRI datasets. Three steps were used: (Step One) Raw data was captured for four distinct time periods; (Step Two) The change in political repression was calculated over time by comparing later scores to the level of political repression when civil war ended; (Step Three) Data from Step Two was both dichotomized (for Chapter 5 contingency table calculations) and calibrated (for fuzzy-set QCA purposes).⁷¹ Table 6 below summarizes how these steps were conducted for PTS scores with dichotomization; coding for CIRI followed this same procedure.⁷²

⁷¹ Calibration of data is discussed in Chapter 6 and then performed in Chapters 7 and 8.

⁷² Step Two involved establishment of three variables (*pts2*, *pts5*, and *pts10*) to capture the *change* in human-rights scores over the respective two-year, five-year, and ten-year time periods after war ended. Step Three involved dichotomization of these variables into a final outcome (*pts2d*, *pts5d*, and *pts10d*), based on whether human rights had improved (coded as 1) or not improved (coded as 0). The absence of improvement was evidenced by human-rights scores remained unchanged over time, or becoming worse.

Table 6: Example Steps for Coding Human-Rights Outcomes Using PTS

Step 1: Raw PTS Scores *	Step 2: Calculating Δ in Score Over Time	Step 3: Dichotomizing PTS **
$t, t+2, t+5, t+10$	$pts2 = t - (t+2)$ $pts5 = t - (t+5)$ $pts10 = t - (t+10)$	$pts2d / pts5d / pts10d = 1$, if $pts2/5/10$ is +. $pts2d / pts5d / pts10d = 0$, if $pts2/5/10$ is 0 or negative.

* PTS scores = the average of PTS-S and PTS-A at the respective time periods

** Alternatively, step 3 may involve calibration of the data. See Chapter 5.

Application of this coding construct to the thirty-six cases, revealed, as shown in Table 7, a nearly equal split between human-rights improvement (coded as 1) and lack of human-rights improvement (i.e. human rights remaining unchanged or becoming worse; coded as 0). This finding held relatively constant regardless of the time period.

Table 7: Human-Rights Improvement over Time (in Number of Cases)

	$pts2d$	$pts5d$	$pts10d$
0	16	17	17
1	20	19	19

Selection of Causal Conditions

The identification of QCA conditions must be strongly informed by theory. Berg-Schlusser (2012, 41) asserted that just as case selection is informed by theoretical criteria, so to must QCA variables be selected via these same criteria. However, variable selection differs from case selection in that “a potential abundance of factors [need] to be considered” (41). Selection from the array of potential factors necessitates that researchers use some type of formal process in order to methodically narrow the field without losing significant and relevant information. Amenta and Poulsen (1994) tackled

this very issue for QCA scholars early on, identifying in their oft-cited article five different ways that these researchers can approach variable (i.e., condition) selection. Two of these methods are used here, including the *perspective approach* and the *significance approach*.⁷³ Considered the most common method of dealing with complexity, the *perspective approach* involves evaluating a broad “mixed bag of variables derived from the main theoretical perspectives in an empirical literature” (Amenta and Poulsen 1994, 25). Given the relative dearth of contemporary literature directly covering the relationship between peace-agreement provisions and political repression, both literatures were considered to derive an initial set of applicable variables.

Balancing Parsimony and Explanatory Sufficiency

The selection of conditions also requires that enough conditions be included such that explanatory sufficiency is achieved but not so many conditions that parsimony is lost. The challenge here, as Einstein (1934, 282) put it “is to cover the greatest possible number of empirical facts by logical deduction from the smallest possible number of hypotheses or axioms.” No formula or fixed ratio exists for determining how many conditions a fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis ought to include.⁷⁴ What is known is that fsQCA cannot handle indefinite explanatory conditions: QCA involves

⁷³ Beyond the two approaches detailed in the text that follows, Amenta and Poulsen (1994, 25, 29) also discuss a *comprehensive approach* that relies on all theories and explanations, a *second-look approach* that adds back in “selected statistically insignificant measures to significant ones...to see if the rejected factors have complex effects on the outcome”, and a *conjectural theory approach*. For discussion on all five of these approaches, see Amenta and Poulsen (1994). Additionally, see Rihoux and Ragin (2009) who expound on selected published research that embodies each of these five strategies.

⁷⁴ Known benchmarks do exist though for crisp-set QCA (see Marx and Dusa 2011). Their table alerts researchers to potentially poor csQCA specification, allowing them to accept or reject an analysis based on the potential that random data would produce the same results as real data. At the time of this writing, no similar benchmark table is available for fuzzy-set QCA, though Schneider and Wagemann (2006, 757) considered it “not unusual” to evaluate a set of eight factors.

configurations of conditions; the number of potential configurations can be estimated by 2^n , where n equals the number of those conditions.⁷⁵ This gives rise to QCA's challenge of *limited diversity*—which is the phenomenon that not all of these potential configurations are empirically represented by an actual case (or cases, since many cases may cluster under several different configurations).⁷⁶

Practically speaking, this means the addition of each new variable exacerbates the problem of limited diversity. For example, the simultaneous inclusion of fifteen variables, as initially proposed with Model 2, would result in 2^{15} (or 32,768) different combinations. If each case only aligned with a single causal combination, then at least 32,732 of these causal combinations would be unrepresented by an empirical case.

While some existence of limited diversity is always expected in the social sciences, this example demonstrates excessive limited diversity that must be addressed. That is, the number of proposed potential explanatory conditions needs appropriate reduction without stripping so much material that the proposed causal recipe cannot deliver sufficient explanations of the outcomes. To accomplish this, the project adhered to scholarly advice (Achen 2002; Amenta and Poulsen 1994; Berg-Schlosser and De Meur 2009) by employing a stepwise multi-methodological approach.

First, the cross-tabulations of Chapter 5 are used to evaluate the bivariate relationships between each of these conditions and the outcome of political repression;

⁷⁵ This estimate is only valid for crisp-set QCA since it uses dichotomized conditions. Non-dichotomized conditions raise the number of potential configurations significantly.

⁷⁶ When a configuration of variables is not empirically represented by a case, this row of the truth table is called a *logical remainder*.

statistically significant conditions were then retained for inclusion in the fuzzy-set QCA that followed. Additionally, non-statistically significant conditions were considered if the analysis revealed an asymmetric relationship; traditional statistical methods largely hide such relationships while QCA is specifically oriented to asymmetrical analysis.

The Two-Step Approach to QCA—described in Chapter 6 and executed in Chapters 7 and 8—also drops less consistent conditions from further investigation. In this manner, the project also follows the *significance approach* to selecting conditions, for it only investigates measures that demonstrate significant statistical effects in pretests. This approach leads to the most parsimonious, explanatorily sufficient explanation.

Remote and Proximate Factors

When the initial *perspective approach* yielded a complex range of potential conditions, a number of techniques used by previous scholars were considered in order to organize this complexity. Fortna (2004a, 2, 35-37), for example, delineated between situational variables “over which those who would make peace have little or no control”—which she later referred to as “baseline prospects for peace”—versus deliberate attempts by actors to positively influence post-conflict peace. Although Fortna’s work was oriented toward evaluating durable peace following inter-state rather than intra-state wars, the delineation proved insightful and portable in its application to civil wars.

Fortna’s distinction between situational, enduring variables and actor-influenced variables closely parallels Schneider and Wagemann’s (2006) Two-Step Approach to reducing complexity in QCA. Schneider and Wagemann found that most social science phenomena are readily divisible into two main camps: *remote factors* and *proximate*

factors. Their Two-Step Approach leverages this division, providing researchers with a viable strategy to confront questions involving a large number of conditions.

In their construct, *proximate factors* are evidenced by their variance over time and by their recent origins. Proximate factors represent “the products of (more or less conscious and purposeful) actions of human agency, if not human action itself” (Schneider and Wagemann 2006, 760). In this dissertation, proximate factors included various peace-agreement provisions such as aggregated and disaggregated power-sharing provisions and third-party security guarantees. These provisions represent intentional efforts by various actors to improve the peace after war.

Proximate factors do not operate in isolation. Rather, they interact within certain structures, historical legacies, and contexts known as *remote factors*. Both types of factors are wholly necessary in some combination. In this regard, Schneider and Wagemann (2012, 254) disclosed that

explanations that rely exclusively on remote (structural) factors provide for causal depth, but fall short of demonstrating the causal mechanisms that link deep, distant causes with an outcome. By contrast, explanations based on proximate factors display causal mechanisms (often, but not necessarily, at the micro-level). Consequently, a good causal statement consists of finding the right balance between the two core features: causal depth and causal mechanisms.

In application to the present study, this means that regardless of how peace-agreement provisions are operationalized—whether in terms of aggregated power-sharing dimensions, disaggregated power-sharing provisions, or third-party security guarantees—they must still be understood as “causal processes (proximate factors) which unfold within certain contexts (remote factors)” (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 254).

Remote factors are distinguished from proximate factors by three elements (Schneider and Wagemann 2012): (1) They remain generally stable over time. (2) The origin of these factors is spatially or temporally distant from the outcome being explained. (3) As a consequence of these first two realities, remote factors reside “(almost) completely outside the reach of the conscious influence of present actors” who cannot easily alter them (Schneider and Wagemann 2006, 760; 2012). In this study, remote factors included underlying conditions that serve as structural or situational antecedents to peace agreement initiation. Remote factors set baseline prospects for the post-civil war level of political repression; they may enable or constrain the influence of proximate factors to significantly reduce government violations after war ends. The differences between proximate and remote factors are summarized in Table 8 below.

Table 8: Proximate and Remote Factors According to Schneider and Wagemann

Proximate Factors	Remote Factors
Close in space and/or time to the outcome being explained	Distant in space and/or time from the outcome being explained
Vary more easily over time	Stable over time
The product of human actions; manipulable factors	Largely outside manipulative reach of actors; semi-permanent, enduring factors

Proximate Conditions Evaluated in this Project

All proximate factors in this project are unified by their inclusion as specific provisions within a peace agreement. One significant grouping of peace-agreement

provisions that is often codified therein is known as power-sharing agreements.⁷⁷ These agreements establish “formal institutional rules” and other inclusive governing measures (Norris 2008, 23) that aim to include “multiple political actors in decision-making processes” (Binningsbø 2013, 107).⁷⁸

At stake then in the negotiation process is the establishment of “rules that, in addition to defining how decisions will be made by groups within the polity, allocate decision-making rights, including access to state resources, among collectivities competing for power” (Hartzell and Hoddie 2003b, 320). Indeed, whether power-sharing agreements are defined as rules or arrangements, the commonality is that they institutionalize changes in how power is shared among contending groups in the state’s decision-making institutions; those institutions are selected due to their control over critical political, military, economic, and territorial resources. Scholars are divided regarding over the benefits and pitfalls of such measures: Do power-sharing agreements allow warring parties to “develop vested interests in its stability and proper functioning” (Cammett and Malesky 2012, 3) and prevent a single group from readily controlling the various dimensions of state power in a manner that threatens others? Or is power sharing fraught with peril (LeBas 2014; Sriram and Zahar 2009), introducing perverse incentives that induce any opposition groups excluded from the peace agreement to become spoilers

⁷⁷ Power-sharing agreements also prevail in a variety of situations beyond civil war resolution. See Norris’s (2008) seminal work for exploration of the influence of power-sharing institutions on developing and consolidating democratic regimes.

⁷⁸ Binningsbø drew primarily from Norris (2008) for this definition.

to the post-conflict peace process (Mehler 2009; Tull and Mehler 2005)⁷⁹ and “as likely to recreate the security dilemma as solve it” if powerful external parties do not intervene and guarantee the settlement (Snyder and Jervis 1999, 19)?

To investigate the empirical effects of such provisions, the project establishes two sets of proximate conditions. The first set of proximate conditions (Set One in Table 1: Proximate and Remote Conditions) is based on a prominent, established method in contemporary literature for evaluating these peace-agreement provisions.⁸⁰ This method aggregates and evaluates power-sharing provisions in alignment with the political, military, territorial, and economic dimensions they hold in common (see Figure 7 below):




Figure 7: Types of Peace-agreement Provisions

Political agreements involve the distribution of political power in the central government; military agreements concern the integration of rebels into the military force; territorial agreements allow for decentralization in some form; and economic agreements redistribute control over key state resources.

⁷⁹ The literature on power sharing is unsettled by the fact that no definitional consensus exists on what power sharing is, nor is there cohesive agreement on its purpose and how to study it. As a result, the literature understandably reaches divergent conclusions regarding its effects on civil war settlements (e.g. Binningsbø 2013).

⁸⁰ See, for example, Cammett and Malesky (2012); Hartzell and Hoddie (2003b, 2007); Jarstad and Nilsson (2008); Walter (2002).

In this project, four aggregated dimension-based conditions are considered, including extensively institutionalized settlements, the presence (or absence) of a territorial power-sharing agreement, thick political settlements, and thick military settlements. The associated literature and projected influence of these conditions on political repression are discussed in the next chapter.

Economic power-sharing agreements are excluded from this project for several reasons: (1) The use of economic power-sharing arrangements is rare compared to the other three forms. (2) The scant research that has explored this relationship has not yet found a positive or negative link between economic power-sharing and durable peace. (3) A preliminary probe of economic power sharing and human rights did not reveal any significant relationship. (4) This exclusion follows solid academic precedence (Hartzell and Hoddie 2003b, 2007; Jarstad and Nilsson 2008; Walter 1997, 2002).

The second set of proximate factors (Set Two in Table 1) includes seven specific disaggregated provisions found within the aggregated political, military, and territorial power-sharing dimensions. It additionally includes the presence (or absence) of robust third-party security guarantees. Identification of the political, military, and territorial dimensions—and their respective disaggregated provisions—is based on previous scholarship (Hartzell and Hoddie 2003a; Mattes and Savun 2009). The definitions of these aggregate dimensions and disaggregated provisions are summarized in Table 9 below and expounded in the next chapter.

Table 9: Political, Military, Territorial Power-Sharing Provisions

<p>Political power-sharing agreements: <i>Political agreements involve the distribution of political power in the central government through provisions such as</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">(i) conducting legislative elections based on the principles of proportional or equal representation;(ii) guaranteeing rebels representation in a certain number of cabinet and ministerial posts;(iii) guaranteeing rebels representation in the civil service.
<p>Military power-sharing agreements: <i>Military agreements involve the integration of rebels into the state's military forces, through provisions that</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">(i) guarantee integration of disputing parties into a joint defense force and/or(ii) guarantee representation of rebels in leadership positions of that defense force.
<p>Territorial power-sharing agreements: <i>Territorial agreements decentralize the authority of the government, through provisions that either:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">(i) allocate separate powers to sub-state units (federalism) or(ii) provide autonomy to the rebel group to control local issues in a certain region.

Remote Conditions Evaluated in this Project

With respect to remote conditions, eight factors were selected from the civil war literature, principally for their known effects on political repression. The project also initially considered factors known to strongly influence peace duration (i.e., civil war recurrence) and political violence. This extension honors an understated dissension-repression nexus that exists, wherein increased dissension begets increased repression and increased repression begets increased dissension. A number of scholars have empirically verified this relationship, noting how state repression of civil and political rights (particularly of personal-integrity rights) is associated with escalation into dissident violence and a return to civil war; likewise, the return to violent protest leads to increased repression (Carey 2006; Davenport, Armstrong, and Lichbach 2005; Thoms and Ron 2007; Young 2013).⁸¹

⁸¹ Of note, the relationship between repression and dissension is contested, due to inconsistent results. Different studies demonstrate statistically significant differences, though the relationships are alternatively shown as confirming positive, negative, and inverted U-shape relationships (Davenport 2007b). Lichbach's (1987) theory accounts for this alternation, as he argues that dissidents substitute their alternative means of

Conflict traps may result not only from devastation to a target state's economy (Collier 2007), but also from a repression-dissension cycle—the alternation among low levels of human-rights practices, increased violence, and civil war recurrence. The aperture of variables was expanded to account for this vicious cycle and interwoven relationship of violence, dissension, and repression. The eight remote factors include: (1) whether civil war had recurred after a negotiated settlement, (2) whether the civil war was driven by ethnic causes, (3) the costs of that conflict, (4) the duration of the conflict, (5) the regime type that existed after the conflict, (6) the size of the population, (7) the level of economic development in the state, and (8) the overall state capacity.

Conclusion

After establishing the universe of cases for this project, which initially included thirty-six civil wars in twenty-six different states, this chapter shifted to operationalization, coding, and dichotomization of human-rights improvement. Datasets for civil wars and human rights information were established. The chapter then discussed why Qualitative Comparative Analysis was selected as the principal methodology. Selection was based largely on QCA's capacity for addressing medium-N comparative research using a holistic, systematic method that leverages set-theoretic relationships to compare complex causal recipes leading to a specific outcome. Its ability to account for structural, enduring attributes—known as remote conditions—ensures a context-sensitive approach to causality. Remote conditions were then defined in comparison with

violent or non-violent protest based on state responses of repression. Moore's (1998) comparative empirical study buttresses Lichbach's theoretical approach.

proximate conditions. These terms were applied to this project through establishment of two sets of proximate conditions and a single set of remote conditions.

Where Chapter 2 provided initial theoretical knowledge, including illumination of the intrastate security dilemma and how it unwinds the government's ability to assure its citizens of their individual security after civil war ends, Chapter 3 built the project's methodological scaffolding. This included conceptually and operationally defining the outcome of interest and the universe of cases along with detailing the principal categories of proximate and remote conditions used to organize the array of factors under consideration in the next chapter.

Chapter Four: Proximate and Remote Conditions

Improvement in human rights—understood here as a reduction in the state’s use of political repression—requires certain combinations of proximate and remote conditions that, together, decrease the state’s motivation and opportunity to repress and improve alternative governance mechanisms beyond the use of coercion. While previous literature has explored factors that improve the government’s ability to deter violence, few scholars have considered the effects of those same factors on the government’s ability to assure the population that it will keep them secure.

This chapter comprehensively amplifies all of the nineteen proximate and remote conditions. Amplification involves extensively detailing definitions, theory, empirical research, coding, and proposed hypotheses regarding how each condition is anticipated to affect political repression. The in-depth interpretation and application of each condition is intentional, falling in line with recommended best practices for QCA regarding transparent identification and description of selected conditions. The chapter explains the relationship of each condition to the three aforementioned causal factors⁸² that increase political repression by the state (i.e., motivation, opportunity, and alternative governance mechanisms), followed by proposed hypotheses and the coding of the conditions.

The nineteen conditions are organized into three respective sets: Set 1 proximate conditions include factors that assess aggregated power-sharing dimensions. Set 2

⁸² See Chapter 2.

proximate conditions are drawn from the same dataset as Set 1, but differentiated by a focus on disaggregated power-sharing provisions. Set 2 also includes the individual provision of third-party security guarantees. Each set of proximate conditions is evaluated in conjunction with a single set of remote conditions that captures the situational and historical contexts of the states in which civil war has just ended.

Aggregated Power-Sharing Dimensions

The literature on power-sharing dimensions predominantly examines the effects of power-sharing agreements on *extending the peace* in war-torn states. Enduring peace is understood as the absence of war. Usually, it is proxied by the number of months or years before civil war recurs.

Three views predominate within the literature regarding the effects of different dimensions on peace duration: (1) Peace endures the longest when power is shared across more dimensions. Peace agreements that are extensively institutionalized—meaning those that involve more dimensions—matter the most; (2) Peace endures longest when power sharing in a single dimension is thick. In other words, provisions within the same political, military, and territorial dimension reinforce each other. However, scholars differ about which specific dimension matters most; (3) Enduring peace is unlikely with power sharing because it reifies differences and leads to rapid conflict recurrence. Power-sharing agreements ultimately undermine human security and elevate the risk of fractured peace. These three perspectives are described below.

View #1: Extensively Institutionalized Settlements Help the Peace

Therefore, those negotiated settlements that are the most extensively institutionalized—that is, that provide institutional guarantees for each of the

security threats antagonists face as the move toward a situation of centralized power—are the most likely to prove stable.⁸³

In Hartzell's (1999, 6-7) view, the inclusion of additional power-sharing dimensions ought to reduce the concentration of power available to the government—especially “power that can be used to coerce others” such as occurs with political repression. Hartzell and Hoddie (2003b, 2007) advanced this argument, concluding that each of the four power-sharing dimensions reinforce each other. This means that when negotiated settlements involve a greater degree of “settlement institutionalization” (i.e., more dimensions of power-sharing), the greater the chances for durable peace.

Hartzell and Hoddie (2007) empirically verified that “the most extensively institutionalized settlements”—those that included power-sharing arrangements from more political, military, and territorial dimensions—produced the longest duration of peace (75). The logical argument carried forth here is that by implementing peace agreements that bear heavy costs for the signatory parties, former enemies deliver credible, concrete signals of their genuine commitment to peace and of their conciliatory intent (Hartzell and Hoddie 2003a).

In part, institutionalized settlements and costly signaling are positioned as contrarian logics to Walter's (2002) notion of credible commitments secured via third parties. From Hartzell and Hoddie's (2003b, 2007) perspective, the inclusion of multiple power-sharing dimensions serves as a clear and costly signal that is capable of overcoming security concerns and fears of opportunism by rivals; the costly signals inherent in extensive power-sharing guarantees and institutions can help establish “a self-

⁸³ See Hartzell (1999, 4).

enforcing peace,” one that does not necessarily require involvement of problematic third parties (2003b, 330).

Walter, in contrast, believed third-party guarantees helped rivals overcome credible commitment challenges—something that unsecured power-sharing guarantees could not accomplish on their own. Walter downgraded the value of costly signals as the best path to peace since monitoring, verifying, and enforcing settlement compliance between rivals is extremely limited without third parties (Walter 2002, 24-26).

A final counterpoint to Hartzell and Hoddie’s findings is the research by Jarstad and Nilsson’s (2008), which empirically discovered that the combination of political pacts with other power-sharing dimensions did not significantly affect the durability of peace.⁸⁴

To test a parallel argument to Hartzell and Hoddie’s conclusion that extensively institutionalized settlements improve peace, the following hypothesis is proposed:

Hypothesis 1: Civil war peace agreements with extensively institutionalized peace settlements result in improved human rights.

View #2: Thick, Individual Dimensions Help the Peace

While Hoddie and Hartzell’s (2007) research purported that “more power-sharing is always better,” their use of an unweighted composite measure presumed equal contribution and effects from all dimensions. Other scholars concluded that this assumption was ill-founded and wrong (Jarstad and Nilsson 2008; Mattes and Savun 2009). The principle counterargument offered by these scholars was that the thickness of individual power-sharing dimensions (e.g., political, military, territorial) mattered more

⁸⁴ See footnote, previous chapter, regarding the significant differences between how Jarstad and Nilsson (2008) and Hartzell and Hoddie (2003b, 2007) established their respective sets of applicable cases.

than the total number of dimensions. In this regard, Mattes and Savun contended, “The reinforcing effect of particular provisions within one dimension should be even more pronounced than the reinforcing effect across dimensions” (748). Scholars differ, though, regarding which dimensions matter more, with some arguing for political power-sharing agreements (Mattes and Savun 2009), some for military power-sharing agreements (Hartzell and Hoddie 2003a; Jarstad and Nilsson 2008), and some for territorial power-sharing agreements (Jarstad and Nilsson 2008).

Jarstad and Nilsson (2008) argued, for example, that enduring peace is only associated with *military* and *territorial* power-sharing agreements (PSAs) that have been implemented. In their view, military and territorial peace agreements successfully delay civil war recurrence because these PSAs function as legitimate, costly signals due to their substantial economic and logistical implementation costs: the “implementation of those power-sharing provisions that entail great concessions for the signatories reflects a higher degree of commitment by the parties, and hence makes peace likely to prevail” (Jarstad and Nilsson 2008, 207). This especially holds true in comparison to easily implemented, and easily reversed, political power sharing that shows no significant effects on peace.

In contrast, Mattes and Savun (2009) asserted that each additional provision within *political* power-sharing—defined as a representative electoral system and the guaranteed integration of rebels into cabinet posts and civil service—reduced the risk of civil war recurrence by about 29 percent. No other dimension realized statistically significant effects on peace duration. However, other scholars did not find any support for the notion that the presence of political power-sharing agreements (Hartzell and Hoddie

2005) or the implementation of these political pacts (Jarstad and Nilsson 2008) significantly affects the duration of peace. Regarding military power-sharing agreements, Hartzell and Hoddie (2003a) found in their earlier research of sixteen cases (1980-1996) that successful implementation of military power-sharing agreements within five years of a civil war's end had increased peace duration prospects.

Economic power sharing is one of the few dimensions void of any support. The few studies (Binningsbø and Rustad 2012; Hartzell and Hoddie 2007; Mattes and Savun 2009) that individually consider economic power-sharing agreements have not found any statistically significant positive effects on peace duration.⁸⁵ Findings on *territorial* power-sharing mainly have demonstrated a positive relationship with peace duration (Hartzell 2005; Hartzell and Hoddie 2005; Jarstad and Nilsson 2008; Walter 2002); however, Lake and Rothchild (2005) argued that such provisions lead to greater political instability and renewed conflict. Additionally, territorial PSAs cannot technically be considered thick since the only two options are wholly exclusive; either autonomy or federalism can be granted, but not both.

Based on these previous findings, the following hypotheses are proposed in relation to political repression:

Hypothesis 2: Civil war peace agreements with thick political power-sharing agreements result in improved human rights.

⁸⁵ Binningsbø and Rustad (2012) systematically investigated all post-conflict societies from 1946-2006 using newly gathered economic data on wealth redistribution, land reforms, and resource allocation. Even this deep effort did not demonstrate any influence of economic power-sharing agreements (or “wealth sharing” as they called it) on bringing about successful peace after the conflicts ended.

Hypothesis 3: Civil war peace agreements with thick political power-sharing agreements result in improved human rights.

Hypothesis 4: Civil war peace agreements with territorial power-sharing agreements result in improved human rights.


In accordance with Mattes and Savun's (2009) procedures, the thickness of political and military PSAs is operationalized using count variables to note the presence of specific provisions within each respective dimension. For example, each negotiated settlement was assessed for the presence of the following political power-sharing provisions: (1) whether legislative elections are conducted based on the principles of proportional or equal representation, (2) whether rebel groups are guaranteed a certain number of cabinet and ministerial posts, and (3) whether the rebels are guaranteed representation in the civil service (e.g., the police force). When the data was run, ten of the thirty-six negotiated settlements (28%) had all three political power-sharing provisions present. Seven (19%) settlements involved two provisions, and eleven settlements (31%) included just one of the political provisions.⁸⁶

Military thickness was similarly coded as a count variable, based on: (1) whether the disputing parties were integrated into the military defense force of the state, and (2) whether the rebels were guaranteed appointment to leadership positions in that defense force. Evaluation of the data showed that seven (19%) negotiated settlements included both military power-sharing provisions; sixteen cases (44%) had only one military provision in place, and just over one-third of the cases (13 of 36) did *not* have any form

⁸⁶ Eight cases (22 percent) have no political power-sharing provision.

of military PSA provision. The general orientation of negotiated settlements vis-à-vis military and political thickness are summarized in the table below.

Table 10: Count Variables for PSA Thickness

	0	1	2	3
Political PSA Provisions	8 (22%)	11 (31%)	7 (19%)	10 (28%)
Military PSA Provisions	13 (36%)	16 (44%)	7 (19%)	

View #3: Power-Sharing Agreements Hurt the Peace

Unfortunately, neither power-sharing institutions nor third-party intervention provide more than a temporary Band-Aid for the critical underlying problems, which are uncertainty about the adversary's intentions and inability to commit to the agreement.⁸⁷

A number of scholars share Downes' (2006) theoretical concerns that power-sharing does little to prevent conflict and, by giving the warring parties breathing space to regroup, may even increase it rather than reduce it (Horowitz 1985; Mehler 2009; Roeder and Rothchild 2005; Sisk 2013; Sriram 2008; Sriram and Zahar 2009). For example, Roeder and Rothchild (2005) believe that by satisfying the interests of those who initiate a civil war, power-sharing may incentivize the elites into threatening violence in the hope of extorting additional concessions. Tull and Mehler (2005) empirically verified this in their own study of the Democratic Republic of Congo, finding that political power-sharing arrangements might reproduce violence and insurgency by creating perverse incentives that reward violent behavior. In addition, from her own analysis of Sri Lanka, Sudan and Colombia, Sriram (2008) similarly discovered that power sharing might

⁸⁷ See Downes (2006, 52).

solidify cleavages between groups rather than resolve them. If what these scholars have concluded holds true for human-rights outcomes as well, then:

Hypothesis 5: Civil war peace agreements with power-sharing agreements result in worse human rights.⁸⁸

These three main ideas about aggregated power-sharing dimensions, along with their corresponding hypotheses and selected proximate conditions for testing these hypotheses, are summarized in Table 11 below.

Table 11: Theory and Hypotheses for Set 1 Proximate Conditions

Main Idea	Theory	Related Hypotheses	Set 1 Proximate Condition that Tests the Hypothesis
Extensively Institutionalized Settlements	More power sharing is better: the different political, military, territorial dimensions reinforce each other	<i>H1:</i> Peace agreements with extensively institutionalized settlements result in improved human rights.	Extensively Institutionalized Settlements (<i>eis</i>)
Thick, Individual Dimensions	More of <i>some</i> power-sharing dimensions is better: provisions within the same dimension reinforce that dimension	Peace agreements with . . . <i>H2:</i> thick political PSAs* <i>H3:</i> thick military PSAs <i>H4:</i> territorial PSAs . . . result in improved human rights.	Territorial PSA* (<i>tpsa</i>) Thick Political PSA (<i>th-ps</i>) Thick Military PSA (<i>th-ms</i>)
Less Power Sharing	Less power sharing is better: power-sharing is dangerous.	<i>H5:</i> Peace agreements with more power-sharing agreements result in worse human rights	Tested by the negation of the previous four hypotheses

*PSA = Power-Sharing Agreement

Disaggregated Power-Sharing Provisions

A foundational argument of this project is that none of the aggregated approaches described above accurately portrays how power-sharing agreements affect human-rights outcomes. These approaches are suboptimal for several reasons: First, aggregated dimensions hide the potential that individual measures within the same aggregated dimension are working at cross-purposes, thus potentially negating or reversing expected

⁸⁸ No additional operationalization is provided here because QCA allows for testing negative outcomes.

outcomes. Second, conditions known to build enduring peace do not necessarily lead to improved human rights: What secures the state and grants it the ability to deter violence may work at cross purposes to assuring the people of their individual security from political repression by the state.

Goertz's (2006) notion of three-level concepts provides an excellent means for reconsidering the conventional method of evaluating peace agreements using aggregated power-sharing dimensions. Goertz saw that social science researchers typically reverted to using the first two layers—known as basic and secondary levels—for their analyses. The basic level describes the general concept under investigation; in this case, power-sharing agreements are the basic level. The secondary level captures the “constitutive dimensions of the basic-level” (Goertz 2006, 6). In this study, constitutive dimensions included political, military, and territorial power-sharing dimensions.

Goertz insisted that many social science concepts necessitate deeper descriptions beyond the basic and secondary levels. The third-level, which Goertz (2006) called the indicator or data level, represents the substantive content that makes up a given dimension. This indicator level includes the various component parts that collectively compose each dimension. The argument made in this project aligns with Goertz in its contention that many contemporary studies of power sharing only look at the secondary level. Researchers erroneously presume that all measures within an aggregated dimension act equally in concert with each other.

Instead, research should consider the third-level of concepts by looking at the specific indicators that make up aggregated dimensions. Seven disaggregated power-

sharing provisions are evaluated in this project. Third-party security guarantees are also evaluated since these guarantees are an individual provision likely to reduce the threats to the government and its opportunity to repress.

Disaggregated power-sharing provisions, organized by their respective dimensions, include the following: (Mattes and Savun 2009): (1) Political power-sharing agreements involve the distribution of political power in the central government, and such provisions may include: (a) conducting legislative elections based on the principles of proportional or equal representation, (b) guaranteeing rebels representation in a certain number of cabinet and ministerial posts, and (c) guaranteeing rebels representation in the civil service. (2) Military power-sharing agreements involve the integration of rebels into the state's military forces, through provisions that: (a) guarantee integration of disputing parties into a joint defense force, and/or (b) guarantee representation of rebels in leadership positions of that defense force. (3) Territorial power-sharing agreements decentralize the authority of the government, through provisions that either: (a) allocate separate powers to sub-state units (federalism), or (b) provide autonomy to the rebel group to control local issues in a certain region (autonomy).

Goertz's Three Levels concept can now be visually integrated, using the following components: (1) the basic level of power-sharing agreements; (2) the aggregated dimensions that constitute the basic level; and (3) the disaggregated power-sharing provisions used as specific indicators within each dimension. Figure 8 below visually integrates these three elements.




Figure 8: Three Levels of Power-Sharing Agreements⁸⁹

Recalling the discussion in Chapter 2, the use of political repression—whether it involves torture, extrajudicial killings, arbitrary detention, political imprisonment, or censorship—is a course of action initiated by the government; political repression is a form of governance. The review of political repression literature also demonstrated that state-based political repression increases (and human rights correspondingly worsen) as a function of three primary factors: (1) A government is *motivated to repress* when higher levels of hostility or political dissent threaten it. (2) A government has increased *opportunity to repress* when certain institutional checks and balances on the government are absent. (3) A government lacking *alternative governance mechanisms* naturally turns to coercion as its method of ruling the people.

⁸⁹ The argument could be made that contemporary literature also uses a three-level concept: it involves a basic level of peace agreements, a secondary level of power-sharing agreements (alongside other non-power-sharing agreements used in a negotiated settlement), and a third level of aggregated power-sharing dimensions. However, this argument is weakened since dimensions, by their nature, align more appropriately with Goertz’s definition for the second level and the reality that these dimensions require further indicators to verify their existence.

Each disaggregated provision is therefore evaluated in relation to political repression theory (i.e., to why states violate human rights and with respect to how a provision potentially affects these causal mechanisms and drivers of political repression). Hypotheses are then presented for the relationship of the condition to human-rights outcomes; coding for all provisions is dichotomous (presence = 1; absence = 0), in accordance with Mattes and Savun's (2009) previously discussed dataset.

In keeping with Berg-Schlosser and De Meur's (2009) advice regarding best practices for selecting conditions in small- and medium-N research designs, each condition concludes with a formulated hypothesis that connects the proposed condition to the outcome. The hypotheses for disaggregated provisions (and the remote conditions that follow) also account for Ragin's (2008, 15) caution that "Set theoretic arguments are often erroneously reformulated as correlational hypotheses."⁹⁰ Two implications follow from Ragin's statement: (1) Set theoretic hypotheses should account for asymmetry, where applicable. A correlational hypothesis might propose, for example, that democratic states do *not* politically repress, and that less democratic states *do* politically repress; an asymmetrical hypothesis might assert only that democratic states do not politically repress. (2) Recalling the earlier discussion on INUS conditions, set theoretic hypotheses should also account for necessity and sufficiency.

⁹⁰ The hypotheses for aggregated dimensions were also connected to the outcome. However, since the current literature on aggregated power-sharing dimensions does not account for asymmetrical relations, and because the aggregation of conditions muddles the anticipated outcomes, these attributes of necessity, sufficiency, and asymmetry were not assigned.

Political Power-Sharing Agreements

Political power-sharing agreements involve the distribution of political power in the central government through provisions. Three principal provisions are assessed:

1. Legislative Elections Involving Proportional or Equal Representation (*repleg*):

Research has revealed that when groups are excluded from the political process, they return to political violence more often (Gurr 2000; Stedman 1997). Indeed, “Exclusion from state power is a powerful predictor of rebellion” (Bogaards 2013, 75). Power-sharing literature argues that the incorporation of previously excluded actors into the political process may mitigate future political violence. The basic aim of proportional representation, according to Lijphart (1999, 36), is to “divide the parliamentary seats among the parties in proportion to the votes they receive”, thereby allowing “societal cleavages [to translate] into party-system cleavages.”

Proportional or equal representation ensures equal voice for previously underrepresented parties. A more inclusive government—one with lower numbers of excluded, discontented, conceivably dangerous actors—also reduces the number of “spoilers” to the peace process (Bogaards 2013; Stedman 1997). This reduction in conflict spoilers means the threat to the government is reduced which, theoretically, should lead to a reduction in the government’s motivation to repress. Empirically, this idea has been verified. Data shows that national elections reduce repression of political and civil rights (Davenport 1997, 1998).

The holding of elections is not a guarantee, though, that political repression will decrease, for they involve many “points of contention as well as points of cohesion”

(Davenport 1997, 520). With respect to the former, for example, the granting of government seats to prior belligerents may perversely incentivize other contending groups to pursue violence toward these ends; alternatively, groups may simultaneously pursue strategies of violence and politics in the pursuit of power (Jarstad and Sisk 2008).⁹¹ The electoral process itself gives previously excluded actors two critical capabilities that may be abused: (1) the *ability to mobilize* (e.g., campaign, rally, distribute resources), and (2) the *ability to communicate* (e.g., distribute messages throughout society).

In light of these tensions, Davenport (1997) proposed that only when governments consider the electoral process as *a liberalizing, legitimating experience* will they then decrease the amount of repression. This decrease is made in anticipation that the election will stabilize the state, solidify a national identity, educate the populace and, thereby, legitimize their role. Governments that instead view *national elections as a threat*—as disruptive events that challenge their established order—will employ repressive behaviors in order to regulate political behavior (Davenport 1997).⁹² Davenport proposed that full democracies will consider the electoral process as a liberalizing, legitimating experience, while non-democracies will consider elections as threats to the status quo.

⁹¹ Jarstad and Sisk (2008, 117) explored the trade-offs between inclusion and exclusion, concluding “Inclusion of warring parties in a power-sharing arrangement does not always end violence. At the same time, concessions to some warring parties can provide incentives for other parties to use violence in the pursuit of a share of power. When this is the case, inclusion of warring parties in a power-sharing arrangement may at best be a short-term solution to violence. In the worst case, inclusion of warring parties can escalate violence and give rise to new conflicts.”

⁹² A third view is that the relationship of elections to political repression is non-existent (Davenport 1997).

Contrary to his expectations, the only statistically significant finding was that repressive behavior decreased for non-democracies. Of note, Davenport's findings were based on *all* elections, not just those following civil wars. Civil wars may still change the decision calculus for governments as they approach the first post-conflict elections; namely, by increasing the potential that non-democratic governments view national elections as a threat again.

The specific electoral design of proportional representation may also make a difference on political repression. In this regard, Lijphart (1999) concluded that elections with proportional representation (PR) serve to distribute and constrain political power. The legislative branch, for example, may constrain the decision-making powers of executive-branch elites through increased horizontal accountability between governing institutions (Marshall, Jagers, and Gurr 2010; O'Donnell 1998; Schedler 1999).

Cingranelli and Filippov (2010) warned against the assumption that the vertical accountability resident within elections would lead to improved human-rights outcomes. Their study was designed to evaluate the “[g]rowing consensus that the critical feature that makes a full-fledged democracy respect human rights is the accountability of its politicians to voters” (Cingranelli and Filippov 2010, 1; additionally see Bueno De Mesquita et al. 2005; Davenport 2007b). Many proportional representation systems lower this individual accountability by requiring competition among parties rather than among individual candidates.⁹³

⁹³ Cingranelli and Filippov (2010) found significant variety in the respect for human rights even between governments holding PR elections in common. For example, larger magnitude districts were less likely to respect physical-integrity rights, particularly in comparison to systems where parliament members were elected via low-district magnitude.

In summary, proportional representation in the legislative branch is anticipated to lead to mixed outcomes overall. On the one hand, representation may reduce the government's motivation to repress by guaranteeing political representation for previously excluded actors; those actors are less inclined to resort to political violence. Broader representation in the legislative branch is likely to increase horizontal accountability with the executive branch; in turn, this decreases the government's opportunity to repress.

However, proportional representation (PR) elections alone cannot transform a government into a non-repressive agent. Any parties excluded from representation are more likely to resort to violence in order to secure similar concessions. This increase in violence raises the threat to the government and will likely lead to increased repression. Additionally, the gains in horizontal accountability are countered by the loss of individual accountability. The regime will perceive the presence of unaccountable, prior belligerents—now guaranteed representation in the legislative branch—as a threat. They will respond with increased repression. As a result of these mixed signals, the expectation is that

Hypothesis 6: Legislative elections are *not* an INUS condition for either improved or worsened human rights.

2. Guaranteed Rebel Representation in Cabinet and Ministerial Posts (*repex*)

The guaranteed inclusion of rebels into certain cabinet and ministerial posts in the executive branch is principally oriented toward increasing horizontal accountability between governing institutions. Rather than “concentrating power in the hands of the

majority” where such power may be used to politically repress opponents, this “consensus model [of democracy] tries to share, disperse, and restrain power in a variety of ways” (Lijphart 1999, 33). The integration and dispersal of power serves to constrain the executive branch by increasing institutional accountability and increasing the costs of certain decisions. Mattes and Savun (2009, 742), for example, attest that the integration of rebels in different branches of government, especially in the legislative and executive branches, means that

their enemies cannot decree or implement policies without their consent. Under these conditions, the rebels’ enemies will be unable to pursue any policies, whether military, economic, cultural, or relating to autonomy and federalism, that are detrimental to the rebels. The sharing of decision-making power helps ensure that other kinds of power-sharing are implemented and opens up the possibility for both groups to shape future policies.

Increased accountability on executive decision-making power will decrease the government’s opportunity to repress.

Aydin and Gates (2008) empirically verified that the presence of increased executive constraints⁹⁴ strongly and negatively affects mass killings.⁹⁵ Their discussion (76-77) of how an increase in the number of actors introduces significant institutional restrictions and imposes great costs on elites is worth quoting in length:

Whether rulers govern through fear or welfare depends on the incentives that arise given a particular institutional arrangement . . . institutional restrictions on leaders’ access to political power raise the costs of repressive policies that target

⁹⁴ Aydin and Gates follow previous scholars (Gates et al. 2006; Marshall, Jagers, and Gurr 2010) in defining executive constraints as constraints on the decision-making powers of the executive branch by the presence and activity of accountability groups that serve as a check and balance against that branch.

⁹⁵ As detailed in Chapter 2, mass killings parallel political repression in the unilateral production of violence by the state. Mass killings may not reach the threshold of genocide, though they hold in common that the government does not likely intend to govern the targeted population. This element differs from political repression, where the government intends to govern the population but still coerces it.

civil rights and liberties. However, when authority becomes concentrated, the number of actors that can challenge policies due to their divergent preferences and political support base falls, which also decreases the costs of bad public policies. With this in mind, executive decision-making constraints constitute the key institutional dimension shaping rulers' incentives. Effective limitation points to the presence of accountability groups in the system, which substantially increases friction in policymaking. . . . In such an institutional environment [with multiple political actors], liberal governance leads to cooperation with other groups, expands societal consent and increases the legitimacy of the ruler. Repression of the masses, on the other hand, nurtures the relative strength of opponents and the power of rival ideologies.

In their view, a political environment institutionally designed to limit executive power will cause even dominant political elites to reconsider the costs of increasing repression and the benefits of pursuing good governance.

Integration of rebels into the executive branch carries more risk than these previous authors give credit. A counterposing view is that integration of rebels in the executive branch is not guaranteed to lead to improved human-rights outcomes. Just as “the rapid mobilization of new groups into politics coupled with the slow development of political institutions” leads to political violence and instability (Huntington 2006, 4)⁹⁶, so too may the rapid inclusion of prior belligerents into the executive branch lead to political instability and violence. By granting rebels representation in the executive branch, and by circumventing the electoral process to do so, this specific political power-sharing measure provides instant positional authority to a previously hostile opponent. The rebels may leverage this newfound positional authority for mobilizing or for communication in

⁹⁶ With respect to political violence and instability, Huntington was referring to a variety of military conflicts, including prolonged, irregular or guerrilla insurgency, brief revolts, coups and uprisings, and overt, militarily conventional wars (4). His principal thesis was that modernization's premise was dead wrong—economic change and development were not the principal determinants of stable, democratic political systems but rather contributed, alongside rapid social change, to create violence and instability. The arguments made here regarding political power-sharing agreements largely parallel this logic.

an outsized manner. Concomitantly, reigning executive elites may anticipate that the reservation of positions in the executive branch for opposition groups will serve as a significant check on their authority; they will likely perceive this imposed representation as a significant threat to their own authority. Moreover, the binding influences of institutional constraints—even in strong democracies—is overcome when threat levels increase (Davenport 2007b, c)

Mixed outcomes are anticipated for this power-sharing arrangement. New checks and balances on the executive branch will decrease a government's opportunity to repress. Simultaneously, the guaranteed representation of prior belligerents in the executive branch will potentially increase, at least in the short term, its motivation to repress. This counterproductive blend of decreased opportunity but increased motivation means that

Hypothesis 7: Rebel representation in the executive branch is not an INUS condition for either improved or worsened human rights.

3. Guaranteed Rebel Representation in the Civil Service (*repcs*)

The guaranteed representation of rebels into civil service positions represents the strengthening of an executive constraint. Integration of rebels into the civil service strengthens an additional accountability group, albeit one more disconnected from the repressive apparatus of the state. Civil service representatives are unlikely to be viewed as a significant threat to the regime, given their presence in a weaker government ministry. This makes the measure probably the easiest to implement of the three political power-sharing agreements. However, it also reflects how marginal the influence of civil

service representatives is on constraining executive or military action. Mixed outcomes are expected here as well—though, this is less due to contradicting influences on the causal factors leading to political repression and more about the nominal influence this measure has overall. On account of this,

Hypothesis 8: Rebel representation in the civil service branch is *not* an INUS condition for either improved or worsened human rights.

Military Power-Sharing Agreements

Military power-sharing agreements involve the integration of rebels into the state's military forces, through provisions that:

1. Guaranteed Integration of Disputing Parties into Joint Defense Force (*mil_rank*)

A host of scholars, including Hoddie and Hartzell (2003) and Jarstad and Nilsson (2008), have argued that military power-sharing provisions carry high logistical and economic implementation costs associated with integration of rebels into a joint defense force and into leadership positions. Because military pacts are more difficult to implement and carry higher costs than alternatives like political pacts, they effectively serve as costly signals of intent and commitment to an agreement. Costly signals, in Fearon's (1995) view, help belligerents avoid political conflict and war since adversaries can more effectively communicate their capabilities and intentions.⁹⁷

In turn, this ability to communicate capabilities—and especially intentions—helps formerly hostile parties move past deep distrust made worse by war and establish credible

⁹⁷ Not all scholars agree here that military integration of rebels positively influence peace duration though. Glassmyer and Sambanis (2008, 375, 381-2) found “no significant effect of [military integration] on peace duration in the short or long term”, though they also resisted drawing definitive conclusions about its overall efficacy given that integration is “is a messy process” and unclear results are likely due to a vast variety of integration provisions that are often poorly organized and/or incompletely implemented.

commitment to peace terms, since signals that are sent “have unavoidable costs attached to them” (Hartzell and Hoddie 2003, 305; Jarstad and Nilsson 2008, 210-211). Although this study reviews peace-agreement provisions rather than implementation of those provisions, the reality is that the peace agreement process itself—the construction of a negotiated settlement—is the first series of significant, costly, and credible signals; agreement implementation is then the second important signal (Hoddie and Hartzell (2003, 313). So even establishing and agreeing to these military integration provisions involves an initial set of costly signals.

Beyond the potential that military integration provisions serve as costly signals that help build trust and establish credible commitment (which would beneficially reduce the threat to the government), another possibility is that integration of rebels into the main military ranks will serve as a substantial new constraint on the executive branch, especially in cases where the regime relies upon the defense force as a primary means of implementing different forms of political repression. Integration destabilizes the state’s ability to quickly leverage its monopoly on the use of force towards coercive ends; it cannot readily rely on the military to politically repress on its behalf. Said differently, although alternative governance mechanisms are not necessarily strengthened, it is quite likely that the government’s coercive mechanism is weakened. Finally, former rebel combatants are not left in the lurch of individual vulnerability, where the government is re-arming while individuals and groups are forced to disarm and demobilize.

In sum, the reduction of threat combined with the addition of new executive constraints should result not just in extended peace, but also in reduced political repression. Consequently,

Hypothesis 9a: Military integration in the main ranks is an INUS condition for improved human rights.

Hypothesis 9b: The absence of military integration in the main ranks is an INUS condition for worse human rights.

2. Guaranteed Representation in Leadership Positions of the Defense Force (*mil_ldr*)

By and large, integration of rebels within military leadership roles is likely to hold similar benefits and risks to integration of rebels into the main ranks: First, the government is able to credibly commit to the peace agreement terms by sending costly signals of its intent; this should have similar beneficial effects on establishing a level of credible commitment that begins to build trust between former adversaries (Fearon 1995; Hoddie and Hartzell 2003; and Jarstad and Nilsson 2008).

Second, the government's abdication of leadership roles also markedly decreases the government's opportunity to repress. Guaranteeing rebels certain leadership roles in the military provides a powerful new restriction against the government exercising its coercive capability. Indeed, this constraint serves two purposes, by restricting the government's opportunity to coerce and by specifically weakening its coercive arm. With respect to the former element, even if the government uses the police rather than the military as its main agent of applying coercive repression, that police force is aware of this institutional change and is likely to limit the degree of repression. This also parallels

previous discussion on how changes in the electoral process of the legislative branch are likely to impact executive branch decisions.

Third, every instance of the provision guaranteeing rebel representation in military leadership positions was always coupled with integration in the main ranks; that is, no cases existed of the military leadership provision on its own (the reverse was not always the case though). The coupling of leadership integration measures with integration into the main ranks likely strengthens the constraints on the government and sends even stronger signals that the government is fully committed to the peace agreement, given the higher costs incurred with integration across both leadership and followership ranks.

Therefore, it is anticipated that

Hypothesis 10a: Military integration of rebels in leadership positions is an INUS condition for improved human rights.

Hypothesis 10b: The absence of military integration of rebels in leadership positions is an INUS condition for worse human rights.

Having assessed both military measures, and given their similar orientations, it is also possible now to conclude that the aggregated measure of *thick military power-sharing*—meaning the presence of both military power-sharing provisions—is likely to lead to *improved* human-rights outcomes (i.e., less political repression).

Territorial Power-Sharing Agreements

Territorial power-sharing agreements decentralize the authority of a government through mutually exclusive provisions that:

1. Allocate Separate Powers to Sub-state Units (*federalism*)

When a power-sharing agreement mandates federalism, the government still controls the territory. This provision minimizes the threat of full secession. Generally, a government's control of its territory also reduces the level of political dissent (Bell et al. 2013). Lower dissent levels, in turn, decrease the state's motivations to repress. Also, by allocating separate powers to sub-state units, the process of federalism adds another accountability group to the government. This group serves as a new constraint on executive power that specifically guards the interests of opposition groups.

Federalism—*territorial decentralization*⁹⁸ as Lake and Rothchild (2005, 109-110) call it—often garners strong peacemaker support, because it aligns with:

the political and spatial realities on the ground, especially the division of territory won on the battlefield and at the negotiating table. By granting each group a state-within-a-state, peacemakers aim to mitigate fears of political exploitation and intergroup violence and, at least in part, to satisfy local demands for cultural and religious autonomy. At the same time, decentralization maintains existing external borders, and thus does not challenge the principle of territorial integrity central to contemporary notions of sovereignty. . . . In short, decentralization is believed to address the political insecurities and desire for self-determination that lead to conflict while respecting the principle that, if at all possible, sovereignty should not be dismantled.

In combination, the increased accountability and reduced level of rebel dissent means that a government's opportunity and motivation to repress are both decreased. The reduced level of dissent, in Lake and Rothchild's (2005) assessment, is not attributable to the specific act or execution of federalism. Rather, it is the original offer of federalism in

⁹⁸ Lake and Rothchild (2005) prefer the more generic term of territorial decentralization because it incorporates *de facto* cases, whereas federalism represents only the *de jure* form of territorial decentralization. Lake and Rothchild define *territorial decentralization* as the allocation of "authority over policy domains to different subnational governmental entities that are, themselves, defined in terms of territory, with municipalities, provinces, and the central government each responsible for different services and policy domains" (2005, 109).

a peace agreement that serves as a costly signal of the political majority's moderation and intentions.

The challenge of all territorial power-sharing measures is that while they may regulate and mitigate conflict in the short term, their long-term effect is to embolden the dissolution of the state. Nordlinger (1972, 32) cautioned in this regard that "The combination of territorially distinctive segments and federalism's grant of partial autonomy sometimes provides additional impetus to demands for greater autonomy" and, when these demands are refused, "secession and civil war may follow." For this reason, caution is in order with respect to the long-term implications of federalism. While federalism aids in the initial transition from civil war, in the long term it appears "an unstable arrangement that typically ends in either centralization or fragmentation" (Lake and Rothchild 2005, 110, 112).

Only four of the thirty-six cases in this analysis involved federalism; most cases did not have this measure. Federalism is anticipated to have an asymmetric effect on political repression. Its presence leads to improved human rights, while its absence has no discernible impact. As a result, only the asymmetric hypothesis is presented here:

Hypothesis 11: Federalism is an INUS condition for improved human rights in the short- and mid-term time periods.

2. Allow Rebels to Control Local Issues in a Certain Region (*autonomy*)

Federalism involves a grant of territorial decentralization, of certain authority over local issues. In contrast, autonomy—at least from the regime's perspective—represents a zero-sum loss of territory. Autonomy is not really territorial power-sharing

but rather power dividing; it does not induce or facilitate further face-to-face interactions, but rather splits a state into different zones, potentially reifying existing regional or ethnic differences and leading to increased suspicions by the governing regime. An autonomous region also provides rebels a territorial base—meaning a sanctuary from which to fight and regroup, as well as superior knowledge of the local population compared to that of the government (Fearon and Laitin 2003). Rebels may mobilize from this base against the government or seek refuge in it.

The literature is divided on the benefits and dangers of autonomy. Scholars like Downes (2006, 52) have stressed that more borders lead to less conflict; and that partition is the ideal solution to resolving ethnic civil wars in deeply divided societies, because a “temporary Band-Aid” of third-party guarantees or power-sharing institutions will not resolve, in the long term, “uncertainty about the adversary’s intentions and ability to commit to the agreement.” Similarly, Kaufmann (1996, 137) believed that “only when the opposing [ethnic] groups are demographically separated into defensible enclaves” is it fully possible to resolve, not just stop, these conflicts. However, not all scholars agree that territorial partition is a good solution to civil war. Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl (2009, 2014) quantitatively tested these theories, demonstrating that partition does not reduce the risk of return to civil war. Rather, the risk increased in a number of cases.

What are the effects of autonomy on political violence? If plural societies require strong ties and allegiance of the rebels to the regime, as Lijphart (1999) argued, autonomy ultimately severs such ties and allegiances. In this vein, empirical analysis shows that when a government loses control of a territory, yet that territory still falls

within the state's boundaries, political violence will likely increase (Bell et al. 2013, 246). Increased political violence will be viewed as a threat to the regime and will likely lead to increased repression. Pospiesza and Schneider (2013) corroborated this in their investigation of power-sharing institutions and arrangements: "granting autonomy to a rebellious region increases the danger that the relationship with the government turns violent again . . . constitution makers should advocate power-sharing with caution." Given this context,

Hypothesis 12a: Autonomy is an INUS condition for worse human rights.

Hypothesis 12b: The absence of autonomy is an INUS condition for improved human rights.

Notably, the two territorial power-sharing provisions are anticipated to result in opposite effects. This likely will lead to confusing results when using the aggregated territorial power-sharing dimension described earlier, for it simply accounts for the presence of either measure.

Robust Third-Party Security Guarantees (*r3psg*)

Third-party security guarantees are analyzed alongside disaggregated power-sharing provisions since guarantees are also represented by an individual provision in a peace agreement. The theoretical argument for including third-party security guarantees was made earlier in Chapter 3, where its role in resolving the dual challenges of vulnerability and credible commitment was outlined. In short, the provision of an external, non-partisan guarantor helps belligerents credibly commit to the various terms of a peace agreement by raising the costs and difficulties in cheating. The government

and the people are both less threatened and less vulnerable; the government's opportunity to repress is also reduced.

However, not all guarantees are created equal. Correspondingly, they should not be treated as equally sufficient to the task. Even when promises are kept, third-party guarantees vary significantly in the strength of their commitment to verifying or enforcing the peace-agreement process. In this vein, Walter (2002), one of the first scholars to write on this issue, concluded that guarantees vary substantially with respect to the strength of their commitment for "enforcing or verifying the peace process and its display of force" (Walter 2002, 67).

These difference in commitment and force structure matter, especially when peace agreements include such elements as the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of belligerents. In the critical phase of post-conflict disarmament and demobilization, verification and monitoring missions are largely insufficient to the task of assuring the security of belligerents. Security guarantees that lack either the ability to use force if necessary (i.e., an insufficient mandate) or the necessary military force to coerce combatants are less likely to succeed in demobilizing and disarming rebels. This leaves a serious viable threat in place against the regime and is likely to lead to intensified political repression.

In contrast, *robust third-party security guarantees* reduce fear, especially for belligerents who are particularly vulnerable as they disarm and demobilize. This reduction in fear especially holds true when security guarantees include both a mandate the use of force if necessary and sufficient peacekeeping forces to guarantee that

mandate. The disarmament and demobilization of rebels removes the potential of violent threat to the regime's stability. By decreasing this threat, third-party security guarantees effectively decrease the primary motivation of the regime to politically repress its citizens.

Robustness also matters when peace-agreement terms do not formally include a provision for disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants. In such cases, credible commitment by prior belligerents is still required with respect to the other terms of the peace agreement. The presence of a robust peacekeeping force stabilizes internal security, allowing for a pattern of trust to develop between former combatants.

By definition, robust third-party security guarantees include mandates that authorize the use of force (if necessary), alongside a sufficient footprint size to execute the mandate. When security guarantees involve a significant deployed force, and a more extensive mandate that allows for the use of force, they are more likely to affect political-repression levels than their less extensive, under-manned counterparts. Missions that lack either a sufficient mandate *or* the necessary forces to execute that mandate are expected to be less effective at reducing a state's degree of political repression in a post-civil war context. Robust guarantees—backed by a strong mandate and sufficient soldiers on the ground—are anticipated to consistently lead to significant human-rights improvement by both reducing the threat to the government and its opportunity to repress. The expectation, based on these arguments, is that

Hypothesis 13a: Robust third-party security guarantees are an INUS condition for improved human rights.

Hypothesis 13b: The absence of robust third-party security guarantees is an INUS condition for worse human rights.

Differentiating Third-Party Security Guarantees

Walter’s (2002) operationalization is a useful starting point for showcasing the diverse types of third-party presence. Walter argued that most variation in third-party security guarantees (3PSGs) is captured by two key components: (1) *the type of mandate* (i.e., the mission parameters and rules of engagement, scaled from simple verification and observation to peace enforcement), and (2) *the footprint size* (i.e., the size of that verification or enforcement force). Walter proposed five categories of third-party security guarantees, based on variations in these two parameters (see Table 12 below).

Table 12: Walter’s Typology of Third-Party Security Guarantees

Walter's Typology of Third-Party Security Guarantees

0 = No third-party security guarantees
1 = Promise to protect but mandate and force not defined
2 = Promise to deploy verification mission of under five hundred
3 = Promise to deploy verification mission of at least five hundred
4 = Promise to deploy an armed peacekeeping force of under five thousand
5 = Promise to deploy an armed peacekeeping force of at least five thousand

Modifying Walter’s Typology

Walter’s typology requires several adjustments in order to align with the argument made here that robust third-party security guarantees—those with a mandate to use force if necessary and sufficient personnel necessary to back up this mandate—are

more likely to lead to decreased political repression than less robust guarantees (or no guarantee). First, Walter's initial two categories (designated as 0 and 1) were combined into one category. This aligned well with Walter's own contention that promises of intervention without a mandate or force are wholly ineffectual⁹⁹; external provisions without substantial implementation are just empty promises and their anticipated effect on human rights is negligible.

Second, an alternative term was selected to operationalize the robustness of third-party guarantees: *mandate strength* replaced *type of mandate*.¹⁰⁰ Mandate strength refers to the mission objective, rules of engagement, and level of force that is authorized. Walter's use of *footprint size* was retained since this term is commonly used in the literature for describing the number of personnel deployed on the ground for a given mission.¹⁰¹

Third, Walter's data needed full revision, since her dataset ended in 1992. Two variables were selected for coding 3PSGs according to her theoretical argument, though the terms were slightly modified. To operationalize *mandate strength*, Fortna's (2008) Classification of Peacekeeping Missions was used. This classification was selected

⁹⁹ Walter (66-67) argued that security guarantees essentially do not exist when the third party fails to arrive or if it arrives with a significantly reduced mandate, regardless of the original promises. She manually removed cases where a third party offered help during negotiations but then failed to provide assistance.

¹⁰⁰ The use of combined indicators (mandate strength + footprint size) to gauge a guarantee's robustness is an effort to assess them beyond simple presence or absence in a provision. In this same vein, future studies should investigate power-sharing provisions in a more robust fashion, perhaps using Jarstad & Nilsson (2008) idea of implementation. As discussed in the conclusion, this approach brings its own challenges.

¹⁰¹ See, for example, Edelstein (2009).

because Mattes and Savun (2009) used Fortna's data for their project¹⁰² and because it assesses mandate strength in great detail. With respect to the latter, for example, interpositional and multidimensional missions accommodate in their mandates for disarming and demobilizing factions. These missions are only lightly armed in comparison to peace-enforcement missions, which involve the strongest mandates:

Peace enforcement missions involve substantial military forces to provide security and ensure compliance with a cease-fire. They have a mandate to use force for purposes in addition to self-defense. . . . Most Chapter VII¹⁰³ missions do enjoy the consent of the belligerents, at least at the beginning of the mission. But unlike Chapter VI missions,¹⁰⁴ they are not obligated to part should they lose that consent. Other peace enforcement missions enjoy the consent of one side (most often the government), but not necessarily the other. In other words, Ch VII missions may have the consent of the belligerents, but it is not a necessary condition for their operation (7).

Fortna's mission classifications are summarized in Table 13 below.

¹⁰² Mattes and Savun (2009) used Fortna's (2004) data for their project. Fortna generally mirrored Doyle and Sambanis's (2000; 2006) typology with respect to various types of peacekeeping missions that exist.

¹⁰³ *Peace enforcement missions* are also called Chapter VII missions.

¹⁰⁴ Chapter VI missions are also called *consent-based missions*. Chapter VI missions include all verification, interpositional, and multidimensional missions.

Table 13: Fortna’s Classification of Peacekeeping Missions¹⁰⁵

<i>Fortna's Classification of Peacekeeping Missions</i>
0 = No peacekeeping
1 = Political missions (i.e. observation missions)
2 = Monitoring mission (i.e. unarmed mission)
3 = Interpositional missions (i.e. consent-based, traditional peacekeeping)
4 = Multidimensional missions (i.e. those involving civilian and military components to help implement a comprehensive peace agreement)
5 = Peace enforcement missions (i.e. those involving substantial military forces to provide security and ensure compliance)

Walter’s three categories of mandate strength—i.e., no mandate, verification, and armed force—do not fully capture the range of armed force provided within mandates. As noted earlier with respect to Fortna’s classifications, interpositional and multidimensional missions are only lightly armed in comparison to peace-enforcement missions. Therefore, to better capture the range of force allowed in these mandates, Walter’s category of armed force was broadened into two categories: *armed peacekeeping mission* (i.e., interpositional and multidimensional missions) and *peace enforcement mission*. Fortna’s classifications can then be aligned and coded according to this extension of Walter:

¹⁰⁵ Fortna’s (2008) dataset covered conflicts up to 2004. Fortna’s coding handbooks (“data notes”) are available at <http://www.columbia.edu/~vpf4/research.htm>. Missing data was resolved using specific UN Security Council Resolutions, UN peacekeeping operations (2015) and data on intrastate wars from the Correlates of War (Sarkees and Wayman 2010a) project and Mullenbach’s (2013a, b) dataset and dispute narratives.

Table 14: Fortna’s Missions Matched to Mandate Strength

<i>Fortna's Classification of Peacekeeping Missions</i>	<i>Mandate Strength</i>
0 = No peacekeeping	No mandate
1 = Political missions	Verification mission
2 = Monitoring mission	Verification mission
3 = Interpositional missions	Armed peacekeeping mission
4 = Multidimensional missions	Armed peacekeeping mission
5 = Peace enforcement missions	Peace enforcement mission

As shown in the table above, four levels of mandate strength were considered in this project: (1) no mandate; (2) verification mission; (3) armed peacekeeping; and (4) peace enforcement. *Footprint size* was operationalized using the *number of personnel deployed* from Mullenbach’s (2013b) dataset. Mullenbach accounted for the maximum number of international peacekeeping personnel (including military troops, military/civilian monitors, and civilian police) who deployed during a given mission.¹⁰⁶

When these modifications and data updates were blended with Walter’s original typology, a spectrum of third-party security guarantees emerged. The principle supposition undergirding this new typology (see Table 15 below) is that the most viable and effective guarantees are those that combine a strong mandate with significant footprint size. Based on this combined requirement, peace-enforcement missions that involved a smaller footprint size were deemed less robust than armed peacekeeping missions that had larger footprints sufficient to execute their assigned mandate.

¹⁰⁶ This specific variable was named *pknum1* in Mullenbach’s dataset.

Table 15: Initial Extension of Walter’s Third-Party Security Guarantees

Spectrum of Third-Party Security Guarantees: Mandate + Footprint

0 = No third-party security guarantee

1 = Guarantee involving verification mission AND less than 500 observers

2 = Guarantee involving verification mission AND at least 500 observers

3 = Guarantee involving either an armed peacekeeping mission *OR* a peace enforcement mission AND less than 5,000 armed personnel

4 = Guarantee involving armed peacekeeping mission AND at least 5,000 armed personnel

5 = Guarantee involving peace enforcement mission AND at least 5,000 armed personnel

All thirty-six cases were then coded according to this spectrum. The initial coding revealed that verification cases were rare, with just five of the third-six cases falling into category one or two. Furthermore, the footprint size for verification missions was usually small; only one civil war fit category two by having greater than five-hundred personnel (Guinea-Bissau). Given the rarity of verification missions, and the common use of a smaller footprint size for such missions, categories one and two were collapsed from the initial extension. This yielded the following final typology for comparison of robust third-party security guarantees:

Table 16: Author’s Proposed “Spectrum of Third-Party Security Guarantees”

Spectrum of Third-Party Security Guarantees: Mandate + Footprint

0 = No third-party security guarantee

1 = Guarantee involving verification mission

2 = Guarantee involving either an armed peacekeeping mission *OR* a peace enforcement mission AND less than 5,000 armed personnel

3 = Guarantee involving armed peacekeeping mission AND at least 5,000 armed personnel

4 = Guarantee involving peace enforcement mission AND at least 5,000 armed personnel

The breakdown of the case types (Table 17 below) demonstrates that seven of the thirty-six cases (19%) had no third-party presence. Five cases (14%) involved third-party security guarantees with a verification mandate; only one of those five cases involved more than five-hundred observers in country (Guinea-Bissau). Fully two-thirds of the negotiated settlements (24 of the 36) involved security guarantees backed by armed personnel (categories two, three, four). Nine of those armed mandates (25%) involved less than 5,000 troops¹⁰⁷; fifteen cases (42%) involved an armed peacekeeping or peace enforcement mandate with at least 5,000 or more deployed personnel. Of those fifteen cases, only four guarantees involved interpositional or multidimensional missions.

Table 17: Robust 3PSG Typology Applied to Negotiated Settlements

	<i>Robust Third-Party Security Guarantee (Type)</i>				
	0	1	2	3	4
<i># of cases</i>	7	5	9	4	11

An additional important finding shown in this table is that the most robust form of security guarantee (i.e., type 4 guarantee involving peace-enforcement mission and at least 5,000 armed personnel) was also the most common type of guarantee. The presence of at least 5,000 personnel tended to be coupled with the strongest mandate of peace enforcement. Still, less than one-third of all negotiated settlements concluding between 1989-2005 involved the most robust type of third-party security guarantee.

¹⁰⁷ Only one civil war—in Moldova—involved a third-party security guarantee with a peace enforcement mandate *and* less than 5,000 personnel; at its peak, just 1,200 armed personnel were involved. Moldova is rather unique in this dataset. Its civil war was short in duration (just 7 months) and the total deaths just reached the 1,000 death threshold required for consideration as a civil war. With a smaller population as well, the smaller deployment size per capita was potentially substantial enough to affect human rights.

Remote Conditions

Situational variables . . . refer to characteristics of the situation between the belligerents, over which those who would make peace have little or no control. Some of these are “pre-existing conditions,” that is, conditions at the time of the cease fire. . . . [C]hanges after a cease-fire is in place might also affect its prospects.¹⁰⁸

As noted earlier, peace agreements and third-party security guarantees do not operate in isolation. Other factors might be helping to do the explanatory work. A number of underlying conditions serve as structural and situational antecedents to peace agreement initiation. These antecedents set the context within which peace agreements operate. Peace-agreement mechanisms must be considered in combination with these factors, because they aid in rendering an effect more or less probable. Moreover, power-sharing arrangements are insufficient on their own to explain changes in human rights. Remote conditions may result in a variety of combinatorial effects when coupled with various power-sharing measures. Ultimately, the addition of situational and structural factors helps guard against spurious inferences (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994).

Where proximate conditions such as power-sharing agreements and third-party security guarantees represent intentional efforts to improve the peace after a war, structural and situational factors describe characteristics of the post-conflict situation over which belligerents hold little influence or sway.¹⁰⁹ What situational conditions are relevant here? As noted earlier, while few scholars directly explore the relationship

¹⁰⁸ See Fortna (2004, 83).

¹⁰⁹ This distinction parallels Fortna’s (2004, 2, 35-37) delineation between situational variables (what she also called “baseline prospects for peace”) versus deliberate attempts by actors to positively influence post-conflict peace. Although Fortna’s work was oriented toward evaluating durable peace following *interstate* wars, the delineation proves insightful and portable to civil wars. Additionally, this bifurcation strategy aligns the data with the two-step approach used recommended for use within QCA.

between peace agreements made in civil wars and political repression outcomes, these two literatures provide fertile empirical soil from which to consider probable remote factors likely to enhance or attenuate the influence of peace agreements and third-party security guarantees on political repression outcomes.¹¹⁰

Eight remote conditions were initially considered: civil war recurrence, conflict ethnicity, conflict costs, conflict duration, regime type, economic development, state capacity, and population size. These conditions are expected to affect political repression through the three causal mechanisms discussed in Chapter 2, which include: (1) the motivation of the government to politically repress, (2) the opportunities available to the government to repress, and (3) the types of alternative governance mechanisms required or available to the government in lieu of pursuing repression.

In relation to these causal mechanisms, the literatures on civil war and political repression demonstrate that the threat to the regime can be proxied by whether or not civil war recurs, by whether the conflict was driven by ethnic issues, by the costs of the conflict, and by its duration. In turn, the government's opportunity to repress is captured by the population size and by the type of regime that exists after the conflict ends, especially with respect to its degree of democracy. Finally, a government's ability to leverage alternative governance mechanisms is proxied by its level of economic development, by state capacity, and by regime type. The table below summarizes these

¹¹⁰ The introduction briefly introduced these conditions and Chapter 2 summarized them in Table 4: Motivation, Opportunities, and Alternative Governance Mechanisms.

eight situational conditions in relation to the principal causal factors known to affect the state's decision to politically repress.¹¹¹

Table 18: Motivation, Opportunities, and Alternative Governance Mechanisms

	Motivation	Opportunities	Alternative Governance Mechanisms
What it is:	Threats to the government	Institutional checks & balances that increase costs, decrease opportunities	Co-optation or Cooperation
Variables / Conditions	Civil war recurrence Conflict ethnicity Conflict costs Conflict duration	Population size Regime type (i.e. the strength of democratic institutions)	Economic development State capacity <i>Regime type</i> <i>Population size</i>

These eight remote conditions capture issues pertinent to each state and civil war. As explained in Chapter 3, these conditions largely fall outside of actor influence. In this project, they are used as scoping conditions. Their concomitant effects on the state's decision to repress may enable or constrain the influence of actor-influenced peace-agreement provisions on affecting political repression.

Motivation to Repress

A threatened government is motivated and likely to respond to threats with political repression. The (1) *recurrence of civil war*, (2) *conflict ethnicity*, (3) *costs of a conflict*, and its (4) *duration* are four prominent factors that shape how much a government is likely to feel threatened. Each of these is examined below.

¹¹¹ Population size and regime type affect both the government's opportunity to repress and alternative governance mechanisms. With respect to the latter component, an increase in population size creates the need for more alternatives while the type of regime shapes the alternatives that are available.

1. Civil War Recurrence and Enduring Peace

The basic logic here is simple. Authorities are assumed to prefer political order (quiescence, obedience, and active political support) to disorder (mass unrest) because it influences the perception of government legitimacy and performance. When the status quo is challenged, those in government may expand efforts to stabilize the situation by applying coercion . . . every investigation of the topic finds that behavioral challenge increases repression.¹¹²

When behavioral challenges¹¹³ (e.g., violent dissent and political conflict in the form of protests, riots, guerrilla warfare, civil war) threaten a governing regime, political authorities reflexively increase state repression as the preferred (and perceived) most effective response mechanism at their disposal (Cingranelli and Richards 1999b; Davenport 1995; Harff 2003). Indeed, domestic threats to a regime, especially in the form of a civil war, are empirically confirmed as the most pervasive driver of increased repression by a government (Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999). The recurrence of civil war—conceptually defined as “large scale internal violent behavior” (Davenport 2007b, 85)—is arguably the most significant form of domestic violence that can threaten a post-conflict regime. Poe, Tate, and Keith’s (1999) findings demonstrated in this regard that civil war recurrence affects physical-integrity rights more than any other evaluated factor. In decreasing order of influence, other factors—like economic development, population size, and the existence of a democratic regime—also affected physical-integrity rights. Given these substantial theoretical and empirical findings, the expectation is that

Hypothesis 14a: Civil war recurrence is an INUS condition for worse human rights.

¹¹² See Davenport (2007b, 83-84).

¹¹³ This term is used by Davenport to encompass the full range of potential political disorder and conflict.

Hypothesis 14b: The absence of civil war recurrence is an INUS condition for improved human rights.

Operationally, the existence of civil war was verified using the seminal definition of Small and Singer (1982) discussed in Chapter 3. Civil war recurrence was verified using Mattes and Savun (2009) dataset and the Correlates of War (Sarkees and Wayman 2010a). To align with QCA best practices, the coding and terminology was established so that the presence of peace was coded as “1” in order to correspond with the anticipated presence of improved human rights (also coded as 1); correspondingly, civil war recurrence was coded as “0” since it is anticipated to lead to worse human rights (also coded as 0). This means that civil war recurrence, and its antithesis of peace, are coded as follows:

0 = civil war recurrence

1 = peace (i.e., no civil war recurrence at $t+2$, $t+5$, $t+10$)¹¹⁴

Under this coding scheme, eight civil wars recurred at $t+2$, seven recurred at $t+5$, and six recurred at $t+10$ (see Table 19 below for specifics). The remaining states were at peace during those time periods. The condition accounting for civil war recurrence is also referred to by its relational opposite of enduring peace.

¹¹⁴ For simplicity, the residual effects of civil war recurrence were not coded, but only the recurrence of civil war within a given year that human-rights outcomes were measured.

Table 19: Civil War Recurrence at $t+2$, $t+5$, $t+10$

<i>Civil War Recurrence</i>		
$t+2$	$t+5$	$t+10$
AFG	AFG	AFG
ANG1	ANG1	ANG1
ANG2		ANG2
	ANG3	
CAM	CAM	
		CHA
GNB		
LBR1		LBR1
	PHI1	PHI1
	PHI2	
	RWA	
SAL1		
SUD1		

2. Ethnic vs. Non-Ethnic Wars

Conflicts caused and driven by identity issues—such as ethnicity and/or religious grievances—are generally understood as highly intractable and non-divisible conflicts compared to wars motivated by socio-economic or ideological concerns (Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Kaufmann 1996; Licklider 1995). Ethnic mobilization during the war leads to exclusion and targeting of minority groups.

Anxieties persist long after a conflict ends. In ethnically mobilized societies, ruling elites are more likely to exploit these identity differences and pursue mass killings as a political survival strategy (Aydin and Gates 2008).¹¹⁵ Similarly, Petersen and Staniland (2008, 98-99) observed that ethnic status reversals cause increased resentment and fear. These components especially prevail within the military structure, often triggering rapid escalations to violence as ethnic actors pursue quick re-establishment of “the ‘just’ social order” (99).

¹¹⁵ Aydin and Gates (2008) validated this finding using two different measures of ethnic polarization.

Ethnicity also affects civil war recurrence. When ethnicity was the issue at stake in a civil war, the breakdown of negotiated settlements increased 197 percent (Mattes and Savun 2009). Hartzell and Hoddie (2003b, 328) likewise concluded that when belligerents in a conflict were divided along ethnic lines, the risk of civil war recurrence increased four-fold in comparison to all other conflicts.

The introduction of power-sharing mechanisms is unlikely to resolve these tensions. Power-sharing agreements will cause structural and disruption of the ethnic representations within political and military institutions; such changes are likely to breed fear and resentment and cause increased political violence rather than reducing it (Aydin and Gates 2008). Power-sharing agreements may also provide avenues for elites to mobilize their political base around ethnic-based platforms; such ethnic mobilization favors even greater exclusion of minority groups. In parallel with these theories and empirical evidence, it is anticipated that

Hypothesis 15a: Ethnically-driven civil wars are an INUS condition for worse human rights.

Hypothesis 15b: Non-ethnic wars are an INUS condition for improved human rights.

Several options exist for testing the role of ethnicity, including data from Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl (2009)¹¹⁶ and Fearon and Laitin (2003). Because the data from Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl was already dichotomous, it was used as the primary variable for testing the role of ethnic-driven wars on human-rights outcomes. To

¹¹⁶ Missing data from Sambanis's dataset was replaced by consulting Mattes and Savun's (2009), Mullenbach's (2013a) dispute narratives, and DeRouen and Heo's (2007) compendium on civil wars.

align with best practices of QCA, their coding method was inverted so that expected conditions would align with expected outcomes. Since ethnic conflict is anticipated to align with worse human-rights outcomes, the coding used for *non-ethnic conflict* is:

0 - if the war was driven by ethnic issues

1 - if the war was not driven by ethnic issues

When this coding was applied to the universe of cases, twenty-one of the thirty-six cases (58%) were found to be driven by ethnic issues, while fifteen civil wars (42%) were non-ethnic wars.

Fearon and Laitin's (2003) ethnic data was then used to corroborate the findings. Mattes and Savun (2009) dataset on negotiated settlements in civil wars included (and extended) Fearon and Laitin's data, so the necessary information was readily available.¹¹⁷

The coding was also inverted here, which yielded the following:

0 - if the civil war was driven by ethnic identity

1 - if the civil war had some ethnic component

2 - if the war was not over ethnic issues

Under this coding methodology, nineteen civil wars (53%) were driven by ethnic issues, eleven civil wars (30%) involved some ethnic component, and only six cases (17%) had no ethnic component.

3. Duration of the Previous War

Two opposing views exist regarding the effects of war duration on the longevity of peace following negotiated settlements. Under one view, war duration may exhaust

¹¹⁷ In Mattes and Savun's (2009) dataset, this variable is called *issue at stake*.

rivals, leading to a mutually hurting stalemate and conflict “ripeness” in which rivals are both ready to negotiate and fully implement peace-agreement provisions (Zartman 2000, 2001). Additionally, longer wars reveal more information about the enemy’s intentions and capabilities (Mattes and Savun 2009). This combination of exhaustion and additional information helps to overcome the animosity and lack of trust between rivals; negotiated settlements are no longer viewed by one or both rivals as an opportunity to momentarily regroup but rather to finally pursue peace under the terms of negotiated settlement (Hartzell and Hoddie 2007).

Empirically, this view is supported by a number of authors who found that longer wars lead to longer peace (Fortna 2004b; Walter 2004). Initial research by Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild (2001) also corroborated Zartman’s theory, showing that civil wars with longer duration may experience a reduced risk of recurrent violence. However, other scholars have not observed any significant effect of civil war duration on civil war recurrence (Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Mattes and Savun 2009).

An opposing perspective to the notion of mutually hurting stalemates is the argument that the animosity between long-term rivals generally increases over time, which reduces trust between the parties. Further, long wars reflect intractable, very difficult to resolve issues. In this construct, negotiated settlements primarily represent opportunities for belligerents to regroup. Regrouped parties, with long-simmering animosities, represent a persistent threat to a government’s status quo and political repression will increase. While empirical evidence largely favors the former logic, this

project contends that when the evaluated outcome is shifted from enduring peace to political repression, then

Hypothesis 16a: Long civil wars are an INUS condition for worse human rights.

Hypothesis 16b: Short civil wars are an INUS condition for improved human rights.

Previous scholarship is followed (Mattes and Savun 2009) in measuring conflict duration as the logged number of months a war lasted.¹¹⁸ Dichotomization of this continuous variable is discussed in Chapter 5.

4. Costs of Civil War

One method for gauging the severity of a conflict—also commonly referred to as the costs of the civil war—is by counting the number of battle-related deaths. The common logic here is that states that experienced intense wars with high numbers of overall deaths are more likely to witness civil war recurrence due to widespread hatred and distrust across the state. However, empirical findings vary wildly on this matter. Doyle and Sambanis (2000) showed that more severe wars are significantly and *negatively* correlated with the recurrence of violence; Walter (2004) did not observe any relationship. Meanwhile, Hartzell and Hoddie (2001) concluded that higher intensity conflicts increase the risk that violence will recur and Mattes and Savun (2009) verified that when civil war costs were higher, negotiated settlements broke down 45 percent more.

¹¹⁸ In contrast, Jarstad and Nilsson (2008) instead use the logged number of *years* since the conflict first became active.

Post-conflict state repression may be affected by the costs of the previous war *if* the number of deaths shapes the amount of trust that exists between domestic enemies. Lower levels of trust lead to even deeper problems of credible commitment and increase the likelihood of cheating on agreements than in wars that had fewer deaths. However, high civil war costs may also be overcome when prior belligerents reach a mutually hurting stalemate. Sheer numbers alone will not reveal when this point has been reached since these numbers are not adjusted with respect to the state's population size.¹¹⁹ Given the potential for variation from state to state—meaning whether higher costs lead to a mutually hurting stalemate or to lingering distrust—the asymmetric expectation is that

Hypothesis 17: Civil wars with low costs are an INUS condition for improved human rights.

In line with other scholars (Hartzell and Hoddie 2003b; Mattes and Savun 2009), civil war costs are measured by dividing the number of battle-related deaths (in the thousands) by each war's duration, then logging the results. Dichotomization of this continuous variable is discussed in Chapter 5.

Opportunity to Repress

The government's opportunity to repress is shaped by the presence of institutional restrictions that curtail political repression by raising the political costs and increasing accountability. Democratic institutions, assessed by *regime type*, provide the greatest degree of institutional checks and balances on a government's opportunity to repress.

¹¹⁹ War duration, in contrast to total number of deaths, is more comparative across states. This constancy lends to the expectation that war duration is a more reliable predictor as compared to the costs of the war.

Regime Type

In describing regime types, the literature on democracy delineates between states undergoing *democratic transition* (i.e., a movement away from authoritarian rule toward democratic rule)¹²⁰ and those demonstrating *democratic consolidation* (i.e., where democracy has become, in the words of Giuseppe di Palma (1990), “the only game in town”).¹²¹ In application, this differentiation affords the theoretical possibility that, while power-sharing provisions introduce new constraint mechanisms to a regime,¹²² these mechanisms do not constrain authorities’ behavior until higher levels of democracy are reached. Stated differently, transition to democracy is not enough to guarantee that political repression decreases; rather, democratic consolidation—evidenced by higher levels of institutionalization and behaviors—is required before authorities begin to recognize any constraints on their use of coercion to govern. The logic here is that political leaders in more democratic regimes

have both *less opportunity* and *less willingness* [emphasis added] to repress when faced with domestic or international conflict: less opportunity because the structure and limited nature of democratic governments make extensive use of repression more difficult to arrange; less willing because of the variety of outlets through which conflict can be channeled for possible resolution and also due to socialization processes that guide citizens of democratic polities toward the belief that nonviolent means of resolving conflicts are preferred over violence.¹²³

¹²⁰ See, for example, O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986) and Mainwaring et al. (2000).

¹²¹ Also see Diamond (1994) and Schedler (1998). For a substantial discussion of democracy as it relates to repression and human rights, see Davenport (2007b).

¹²² Such constraints are imposed via mass- and elite-oriented behaviors of participation, competition, and executive constraints. In turn, these constraints are correlated with “increased political freedoms, better civil-military relations, and a pro-human rights norm. . . Democracy gives individuals a voice to articulate human rights concerns and a mechanism with which to punish human rights abusers” (Murdie and Davis 2010, 56). Also see Davenport (1997, 2007a, 2007b) for detailed exploration of democratic constraints.

¹²³ See Poe, Tate, and Keith (1999, 293).

Davenport and Armstrong (2004, 551) empirically verified the existence of a minimum democratic threshold, concluding that

authorities do not perceive any constraints on repression or alternatives to social control until the highest levels of democracy have been achieved; up to this point authorities are not deterred nor dissuaded from violating human rights. After this threshold of democratic institutionalization and behavior has been passed, however, then the constraints on authorities become greater, the alternatives become clearer, and the likelihood of repression is decreased.

Non-democratic regimes, and regimes with low levels of democracy, are unlikely to perceive constraints on their opportunity to repress. Conversely, highly democratic regimes will be dissuaded from the use of political repression. In accordance with previous scholarship, the following hypotheses are proposed:

Hypothesis 18a: Highly democratic regimes are an INUS condition for improved human rights.

Hypothesis 18b: Regimes lacking high levels of democracy are an INUS condition for worse human rights.

Defining democracy in conceptual and operational terms is difficult, given persistent debate in the field. The majority of researchers¹²⁴ adopt a procedural definition based on Dahl's (1971) conception of "polyarchy" (i.e., rule by many). Dahl proposed two key dimensions of democratization, including competition (public contestation) and participation (inclusiveness). Within democratization literature, the Polity (version IV) measure of democracy—robustly developed by Gurr and various associates over the last several decades (Gurr 1974; Gurr, Jagers, and Moore 1990; Jagers and Gurr 1995;

¹²⁴ See, for example (Altman and Pérez-Liñán 2002; Alvarez et al. 1996; Coppedge, Alvarez, and Maldonado 2008; Coppedge et al. 2011; Marshall, Jagers, and Gurr 2010; Vanhanen 2000).

Marshall, Jagers, and Gurr 2010)—“stands as the best comparative indicator of procedural democracy in terms of its incorporation of structural constraints on political participation and contestation” (Davenport and Armstrong 2004, 545).

In contrast, the Freedom House score measures political rights and civil liberties. Because this current project is evaluating an outcome of human rights, a definition of democracy was needed that did not conflate democracy with human rights.¹²⁵ The Polity IV dataset was therefore selected to measure democracy, using the specific variable of *polity2* which ranges from -10 (full autocracy) to +10 (full democracy). Chapter 5 details the selection of appropriate dichotomization thresholds for this variable.

Alternative Governance Mechanisms

Coercion via political repression is one method of social control. Rather than *coercing* the populace via the repression of physical-integrity rights, the government might instead *cooperate* with its citizens through democratic institutions. Democratic cooperation is advocated and understood as a less costly, more effective societal control mechanism, assessed best by evaluating the *degree of democracy* in a given state (Dallin and Breslauer 1970; Davenport and Armstrong 2004). Alternatively, governments might also *coopt* elites and citizens through economic inducements or the provision of public goods. Here, the *level of economic development* proxies the potential for cooptation (Davenport and Armstrong 2004). When a regime possesses alternative means by which to convince or coopt the population to follow its rule, political repression is less necessary; human rights are likely to improve. Governments revert to *coercion* via the

¹²⁵ Munck and Verkuilen (2002) cautioned against using maximal definitions that conflate democracy with other concepts. They specifically referenced Freedom House’s index for its inclusion of excess attributes.

repression of physical-integrity rights most often when alternative governance mechanisms, like *cooperation* and *cooptation*, are unavailable or cost too much.

Davenport and Armstrong (2004, 540) proposed that alternative mechanisms effectively serve as a constraint to political repression, because alternatives (e.g., material and normative forms of influence) create distinct approaches to governance as well as advocates for each style. Both can hinder the coercive strategies of government by offering a different way of looking at the problem of sociopolitical order and different means to get there. When alternatives exist, then coercion and those who advocate for its use are compelled to justify, persuade, and compete with the others, thereby hindering them (at least when viewed relative to the other contexts that do not require such actions). When alternatives and advocates do not exist, however, then coercion and its advocates have free reign (in this case, there is nothing else that can be done to establish, maintain, and extend practices and beliefs).

This means that when governments rule their people, they choose from alternative governing mechanisms, such as coercion, cooperation, and cooptation. The mechanism of coercion via political repression was explained in-depth in Chapter 2; the mechanism of cooperation via democratic institutions was detailed in the preceding section. This section focuses on the ability of a state to coopt its people. Three different conditions are considered: (1) the *size of the population*, which places greater demands on any available resources and provides increased opportunities to repress; (2) a government's *economic development*; and (3) *state capacity*. The latter two measures proxy the state's capacity to

coopt the population; they represent the supply side of the equation while population size represents the demand side.

Population Size

Larger populations may increase a state's pursuit of political repression through one of two possible mechanisms. (1) A large population may experience greater repression simply by increasing the number of opportunities when people might rebel or be repressed by the government (Murdie and Davis 2010; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999). Larger populations also enlarge the base within which a state can hide or diffuse its expanded use of political repression (Murdie and Davis 2010). (2) Larger populations stress the supply and distribution of natural resources (Henderson 1993; Murdie and Davis 2010; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999) and of social and political resources (Huntington 2006). This magnified demand can result in scarcity, all of which may amplify the degree of political violence and state repression.

This causal chain is made clear using an extension of Huntington's (2006) arguments (made earlier in this chapter) about the stresses placed on a government by rapid social and economic change. A larger population naturally increases the necessity of creating complex, effective, political institutions that can respond to demographic challenges and to increased social and political participation, *ceteris parabis*. Moreover, when conflict and political violence begin, political institutions are difficult or impossible to form (Huntington 2006). The lack of sufficient institutions exacerbates scarcity, which leads to more opportunities for popular revolt (Davies 1969; Gurr 1970) and for

repression (Murdie and Davis 2010). Empirically, Hegre and Sambanis (2006) substantiated that population size is the most robust correlate of civil war eruption.

Larger populations increase the demands on limited resources. Scarcity follows, often leading to political violence and revolt from the citizens and more repression from the government. As a result,

Hypothesis 19a: States with larger populations are an INUS condition for worse human rights.

Hypothesis 19b: States with smaller populations are an INUS condition for improved human rights.

Population-size data was taken from Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl (2009) and updated using The World Bank's *World Development Indicators* (2011). Dichotomization of this continuous variable is discussed in Chapter 5.

Economic Development

The level of economic development within a state, also referred to as its economic standing, is consistently found to increase its respect for physical-integrity rights (Cingranelli and Richards 1999b; Mitchell and McCormick 1988; Poe and Tate 1994; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999). Empirical evidence by Hartzell and Hoddie (2003b), for example, showed that successful implementation of peace agreements increases at higher levels of economic development.¹²⁶ In a later study, Hartzell and Hoddie (2007, 80-81)

¹²⁶ Also see Collier and Hoeffler (2004, 262) who documented that higher per capita income reduces the duration of conflict: "A 10% increase in per capita income is associated with a 5% reduction in the duration of conflict." In evaluating this causal linkage, they proposed that higher per capita income represents "the opportunity cost of conflict to society, and so one interpretation is that it is proxying this social cost."

discovered that the risk of return to civil war is also reduced by higher levels of economic development.

Strong economic standing may defray the level of threat facing a government; that is, revolts due to scarcity are less likely when more valued goods are generated and distributed (Murdie and Davis 2010; Poe and Tate 1994; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999). Redistributionist policies may satisfy aggrieved protestors, making such rebellions less likely (Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2009). The distribution of economic benefits, such as public goods and services throughout a state, coopts individuals and groups; at the same time, it may also provide those same individuals with additional resources to resist repressive regimes if they wish (Murdie and Davis 2010; Poe and Tate 1994). According to other scholars, high levels of economic development may both increase alternative governance mechanisms and reduce the need for third-party involvement in peace agreement implementation (DeRouen et al. 2010; Taydas and Peksen 2012). In line with this scholarship, the asymmetric expectation is

Hypothesis 20: Economically developed states are an INUS condition for improved human rights.

Economic development was captured used a slight modification to Poe, Tate, and Keith's (1999) operationalization of this concept. Where they used GNP per capita, this project uses the more common and accessible GDP per capita to control for economic explanation.¹²⁷ The natural log of GDP per capita is used to tighten the model fit. Chapter

¹²⁷ GDP/capita was used to proxy economic development since this measure assesses the strength of the state's economy within its boundaries, whereas GNP includes the production of a state's citizens in foreign lands, even if those funds do not flow back to that state.

5 details the dichotomization of this continuous variable, with data acquired from Mattes & Savun (2009) and The World Bank (2016b).

State Capacity

Recent literature suggests that state capacity is better than economic development at assessing the government's real capacity to govern its people without coercing them.

Hendrix (2010, 273), for example, argued:

If the state is capable of repressing, then the likelihood of capture will be higher and rebellion will be less likely. If the state is capable of accommodating grievances via institutionalized channels, such as redistribution, the granting of autonomy rights, or the incorporation of dissident movements within the party system, then the motivation for violent rebellion will be lessened and conflict will be less likely.

According to this viewpoint, the decision of citizens to violently rebel against their government accounts for the state's repressive capacity as well its ability to accommodate or coopt the opposition through the redistribution of resources and power. A state with strong repressive capability and the capacity to coopt or accommodate rebels is less likely to experience rebellion; conversely, a state with limited capacity to repress its people or to accommodate them means rebels will choose more often to fight.

State capacity also potentially affects the types of peace-agreement measures it might implement. Weaker states lack the necessary revenue to fund institutional changes. Measures that involve extensive implementation costs in such states are likely to fail. Meanwhile, higher levels of economic development correlate with an increased likelihood that peace agreements will be fully implemented (Hartzell and Hoddie 2003b).

Finding a solid measure for state capacity (rather than the strongly related idea of economic development) is quite difficult. Definitions vary widely, with some scholars

proxying state capacity with the “quality of government” (Taydas and Peksen 2007) and others defining it as “the state’s ability to accomplish those goals it pursues, possibly in the face of resistance by actors within the state” (DeRouen et al. 2010, 335).

Hendrix’s work (2010) provides an excellent foundation for measuring state capacity. Hendrix evaluated fifteen different operationalizations of state capacity offered by other scholars. He then identified three principal dimensions of state capacity which proved common across all fifteen measures. These dimensions included: (1) *rational legality* (a state’s bureaucratic and administrative capacity), (2) *rentier-autocraticness*, and (3) *neopatromoniality*.

Hendrix concluded that while no single variable can adequately model the multidimensional aspects of a state’s capacity, the variable of *total taxes/GDP* (as a proxy for a state’s revenue-generating capacity) proved highly correlated with all three state capacity dimensions. Moreover, “revenue generation is not simply correlated with state capacity, is its *sine qua non*: that which the state must be able to do if any other goals are to be pursued” (Hendrix 2010, 283). State capacity was proxied using Kugler and Arbetman’s (1997, 279) variable of *relative political capacity*.¹²⁸ Hendrix lauded this measure for its ability to address “the limitations of basic tax capacity by creating a ratio of a state’s actual to predicted tax revenue (*total taxes/GDP*).”

Cross-tabulations and preliminary QCA procedures were run to investigate the relationship of these conditions against political repression. No definitive relationships

¹²⁸ For extensive discussion on relative political capacity, as well as other measures for evaluating a state’s capabilities with respect to reach, allocation, and extraction, see Kugler and Tammen’s (2012) work on *The Performance of Nations* and their corresponding datasets.

were found in the cross-tabulations, despite consideration of three different alternative thresholds of 0.9, 1, and 1.1. The crisp-set QCA procedures resulted in constant truth table contradictions regardless of which other variables were considered or thresholds were used. The absence of any findings should perhaps not come as a surprise. The challenge in using “Basic measures of tax capacity, such as total taxes/GDP” is that they unfortunately “do not distinguish between states that rely on administratively sophisticated revenue instruments and those that do not” (Hendrix 2010, 279).¹²⁹

In summary, the hypothesis that state capacity affects human-rights outcomes was tested using the strongest current proxies for this condition (as assessed by experts within the field like Hendrix). No evidence was found that state capacity related to state repression, regardless of adjustments in the thresholds. Given the lack of any clear relationships with human-rights outcomes, state capacity was not included in Chapter 5 discussion or in the fuzzy-set analysis.

This should not be interpreted to mean that such relationships do not exist. Rather, an insufficient number of corresponding cases of political repression, with available state capacity data, restricted robust exploration of potential relations. Hendrix came to a similar conclusion, asserting that while “State terror [political terrorism] is both real and understudied . Unfortunately, there is insufficient data about cross-national events data to examine the relationship between state terror and state capacity” (2014, 330). When this data becomes available, state capacity should be reassessed.

¹²⁹ While *relative political capacity* attempts to correct for this, it also still masks those states that derive “significant revenue from non-tax sources” which represent states that naturally “will have fewer incentives to access societal resources and will not have pecuniary incentives to invest in monitoring and coercive capacity” (Hendrix 2010, 279).

Conclusion

Chapter 4 evaluated three sets of conditions: (1) Set 1 proximate conditions addressed theories about aggregated power-sharing dimensions; (2) Set 2 proximate conditions covered disaggregated, individual measures like power-sharing provisions and third-party security guarantees; and (3) remote conditions accounted for situational and historical contexts pertinent to each state. Theoretical and empirical evidence was presented for all of these conditions and the anticipated effects of each condition on the outcome of human rights were described. Hypotheses were projected, followed by explanation of the specific indicators used to represent each condition.

The chapter began with a review of the contemporary power-sharing literature on aggregated power-sharing dimensions (i.e., Set 1 proximate conditions). Three general camps of arguments were considered: (1) *More power-sharing is better*. Whether more of certain power-sharing dimensions is better (i.e., thick political settlements, thick military settlements, or the presence of any type of territorial power-sharing agreement), or whether less power-sharing is better for human-rights outcomes. (2) *Power-sharing dimensions reinforce each other* (i.e., extensively institutionalized settlements) *and improve post-war conditions*. Additional provisions within certain dimensions reinforce each other and improve post-war conditions (i.e., thick political settlements, thick military settlements, or the presence of any type of territorial power-sharing agreement). (3) *Power-sharing is dangerous*. This discussion helped to identify four proximate conditions for testing the hypotheses (recall Table 11 above).

Table 20: Hypotheses on Set 2 Proximate Conditions and Remote Conditions

Condition	Hypotheses
<i>SET 2 PROXIMATE CONDITIONS (DISAGGREGATED PROVISIONS)</i>	
Legislative elections	H6 Legislative elections are not an INUS condition for either improved or worsened human rights.
Executive representation	H7 Rebel representation in the executive branch is not an INUS condition for either improved or worsened human rights.
Civil service representation	H8 Rebel representation in the civil service branch is not an INUS condition for either improved or worsened human rights.
Military integration, main ranks	H9a Military integration in the main ranks is an INUS condition for improved human rights.
	H9b The absence of military integration in the main ranks is an INUS condition for worse human rights.
Military integration, leadership	H10a Military integration of rebels in leadership positions is an INUS condition for improved human rights.
	H10b The absence of military integration of rebels in leadership positions is an INUS condition for worse human rights.
Federalism	H11 Federalism is an INUS condition for improved human rights in the short- and mid-term time periods.
Autonomy	H12a Autonomy is an INUS condition for worse human rights.
	H12b The absence of autonomy is an INUS condition for improved human rights.
Robust third-party security guarantees	H13a Robust third-party security guarantees are an INUS condition for improved human rights.
	H13b The absence of robust third-party security guarantees is an INUS condition for worse human rights.
<i>REMOTE CONDITIONS</i>	
Civil war recurrence	H14a Civil war recurrence is an INUS condition for worse human rights.
	H14b The absence of civil war recurrence is a necessary condition for improved human rights.
Civil war ethnicity	H15a Ethnically-driven civil wars are an INUS condition for worse human rights.
	H15b Non-ethnic wars are an INUS condition for improved human rights.
Civil war duration	H16a Long civil wars are an INUS condition for worse human rights.
	H16b Short civil wars are an INUS condition for improved human rights.
Civil war costs	H17 Civil wars with low costs are an INUS condition for improved human rights.
Regime type	H18a Highly democratic regimes are an INUS condition for improved human rights.
	H18b Regimes lacking high levels of democracy are an INUS condition for worse human rights.
Population size	H19a States with larger populations are an INUS condition for worse human rights.
	H19b States with smaller populations are an INUS condition for improved human rights.
Economic development	H20 Economically developed states are an INUS condition for improved human rights.

Under the central premise that an aggregated approach to evaluating negotiated settlements is problematic and misleading, an alternative evaluation method was then described using disaggregated individual provisions. This portion included discussion on seven disaggregated power-sharing provisions found within the political, military, and territorial dimensions, as well as robust third-party security guarantees. The projected

effects of these conditions on the outcome diverge significantly from each other (see the summary in Table 20 above); different provisions, even within the same dimension, are projected to have opposing effects.

Finally, this chapter evaluated situational and historical contexts—called remote conditions in QCA—that form the baseline prospects for significant human-rights improvement. Proximate factors operate within these remote conditions, and their potential to affect the level of political repression pursued by the state is alternatively enabled or constrained based on the remote conditions that exist within the state.

The goal of this project was to investigate peace-agreement provisions, particularly power-sharing measures and third-party security guarantees, using these two different combinations of conditions: Model 1 to evaluate aggregated power-sharing dimensions within remote contexts, and Model 2 to evaluate disaggregated peace-agreement provisions (including individual power-sharing measures and third-party security guarantees) within these same remote contexts.

These models primarily differ with respect to whether power-sharing provisions are evaluated individually (disaggregated) or by dimension (aggregated):

Model 1: Proximate (Aggregated) Conditions + Remote Conditions

Model 2: Proximate (Disaggregated) Conditions + Remote Conditions

The ultimate objective in using Models 1 and 2 was to determine which combinations of conditions helped or hindered governments exiting civil war in honoring the physical-integrity rights of their citizens. An overall reduction in the number of proposed conditions is advisable before implementing QCA methods. As outlined in

Tables 12 and 20, this project involved a total of nineteen different conditions. This relatively high number of initial conditions is not unprecedented or rare in QCA scholarship.¹³⁰

These conditions were partially divided into the two different models, reducing the number of conditions being simultaneously considered. Initially, Model 1 involved eleven conditions in total (four proximate and seven remote conditions); Model 2 involved fifteen conditions (eight proximate and seven remote).

Scholars like Rihoux and De Meur (2009a, b) unilaterally caution that while a perspectives-based approach (as was used here) lowers the risk of variable omission, the iterative process can become quite time-intensive as researchers must refine and re-operationalize conditions. They recommend the use of stepwise analysis to eliminate superfluous conditions and arrive at a parsimonious model. The next chapter was intentionally designed toward achieving this very objective.

¹³⁰ Rihoux (2001) for example, used a perspective-based approach to set his range of conditions. He covered 26 potential conditions in his examination of factors influencing organizational change. His set of cases was similarly small, involving just 14 different political parties spanning 12 Western European states. This explanation of Rihoux's earlier work was provided in Rihoux and Ragin (2009).

Chapter Five: Quantitative Analysis of Proximate and Remote Conditions

Now that theoretical foundations have been laid, hypotheses established, models proposed, and raw data gathered, the second phase of QCA known as the “analytic moment” (Rihoux and Lobe 2009, 229) could fully commence. Following the advice of several QCA scholars (Berg-Schlosser and De Meur 2009, 27-28), the analytic stage began with “stepwise multi-methodological procedures” to reduce the overall complexity of the two models. The purpose of this chapter was to identify strong bivariate relationships—whether symmetrical or asymmetric in nature—and leverage these insights to reduce the total number of conditions under consideration, especially with respect to Model 2 since it initially contains 15 proximate and remote conditions.

Reduction in the total number of conditions under consideration was facilitated by statistical techniques, specifically via the use of contingency tables (also called cross tabulations or cross tabs). Contingency tables were designed for evaluation of bivariate relationships, such as those between each of the proposed conditions and human-rights outcomes. These tables illustrate statistical significance and the direction of the relationships between the variables. Strong bivariate relationships between proximate or remote conditions and the outcome were retained for use in the fuzzy-set analysis.

Of note, correlational methods only assess relationships in a symmetrical manner. They focus simultaneously and equivalently on “the degree to which instances of the cause produce instances of the outcome . . . and on the degree to which instances of the

absence of the cause are linked to the absence of the outcome” (Ragin 2008, 21). Since QCA was designed for asymmetrical analysis, those conditions that demonstrate strong *asymmetrical* relationships, as evidenced in the tables themselves, are also retained for use in fsQCA. In sum, the insights gained from the contingency-table observations help refine and reduce the initial number of proposed conditions, which creates a more favorable ratio between the number of conditions and the number of cases.

The chapter begins by briefly explaining the statistical tools used here for analyzing the contingency tables, such as the chi-square statistic, Cramer’s V coefficient, and Fisher’s exact test of independence. The remainder (and bulk) of this chapter is dedicated to applying and analyzing the bivariate relationships between each of the conditions and the human-rights outcomes. Relationships are assessed across the three previously discussed periods (two years after the civil war ends; five years after the war; and ten years after the war, as compared to when the war ended), using both the Political Terror Scale and the CIRI human-rights measures.¹³¹

The nineteen proximate and remote conditions are reviewed in order of the respective set into which they were initially categorized (Set 1 proximate conditions; Set 2 proximate conditions; remote conditions).¹³² The naming conventions for these 19 conditions are summarized in Appendix 1. Most of the remote conditions involved either ordinal or continuous interval data, so discussion there begins with justification of selected thresholds, followed by analysis using contingency tables. The chapter concludes

¹³¹ See Chapter 3 for definitions and operationalization of these periods and terms.

¹³² Recall Table 1: Proximate and Remote Conditions. Per discussion and evaluation in Chapter 4, *state capacity* was removed from further consideration.

with an analysis of whether any conditions are considered necessary for states to experience improved human rights.

Tools for Analyzing Contingency Tables

A primary concern of researchers is determining whether or not a relationship exists between variables. Contingency tables, also called cross-tabs, are a simple quantitative method for testing such correlations.¹³³ For categorical data used in contingency tables, tools like the *chi-square statistic* and *Fisher's exact test* prove useful for testing whether or not a statistically significant relationship exists. However, these measures are limited in that they do not indicate the nature of the relationship (i.e. its strength and direction). To accomplish the latter, measures of association—like the *phi correlation* and *Cramer's V*—help gauge the association between variables. Each of these four tools is expounded briefly below.

Relational Tests: Chi-Square Statistic & Fisher's Exact Test

The first, and perhaps most common, statistical test for examining whether a relationship exists between two categorical variables is Pearson's chi-square test. This test is “an extremely elegant statistic based on the simple idea of comparing the frequencies you observe in certain categories to the frequencies you might expect to get in those categories by chance” (Field 2009, 688). The observed chi-square statistic must be compared to the chi-square distribution,¹³⁴ If the observed statistic exceeds the known

¹³³ In the simplest contingency table (a 2x2 table), the values compare the presence or absence of a cause against the presence or absence of an outcome.

¹³⁴ The chi-square distribution has known properties based on the desired probability and the number of degrees of freedom (e.g. for a 2x2 matrix, $df = 1$, yields critical values of 3.84 ($p = .05$) and 6.63 ($p = .01$). In contrast, for a 3x2 matrix, $df = 2$ yields critical values of 5.99 (for $p = .05$) and 9.21 ($p = .01$).

distribution, then the relationship is statistically significant at either $p < .05$ or $p < .01$ and the null hypothesis—that there is no association between the two variables—can be rejected (Field 2009). The rejection of the null hypothesis does not reveal the direction of the relationship or its strength though.

One important caveat applies to the chi-square test: The chi-square test is only considered accurate for 2x2 contingency tables when the expected frequencies in each cell are greater than five, and for tables larger than 2x2, when two conditions prevail: (1) no more than 20 percent of all expected counts are less than five; and (2) each individual expected count is one or greater (Field 2009, 690; Yates et al. 1998). When the chi-square test is not usable due to violation of these standards, then *Fisher's exact test of independence*—designed to compute the exact probability of chi-square statistics and improve accuracy in small sample sizes (Field 2009)—is substituted. As with the chi-square, Fisher's exact test only identifies whether or not a relationship is statistically significant; it provides no information about the *degree* or *direction* of that relationship (Freeman and Campbell 2007).

Measures of Association: Phi Correlation and Cramer's V

The *phi-coefficient* and *Cramer's V coefficient* are chi-square-based measures that measure the strength of the relationship between two variables.¹³⁵ For interpretation purposes, phi values vary between -1 and 1. This permits analysis of positive and

¹³⁵ Phi and Cramer's V both account for sample size. Phi is equal to the square root of chi-square divided by n , where n equals the same size. Cramer's V is quite similar, with one small change—the square root of chi-square is divided by n times m , where m is the smaller of (rows - 1) or (columns - 1).

negative associations, as well as the strength of relationships.¹³⁶ In contrast, Cramer's V varies between zero and one. For both measures, a generally accepted convention is that low absolute values of 0 to 0.3 indicate a negligible-to-weak relationship; values between 0.31 to 0.7 indicate a moderate-to-substantial relationship; and values 0.71 or higher indicate a strong-to-very-strong relationship.

Application of Contingency Tables

Using the four statistical tools listed above, the following procedures were applied to each bivariate relationship: The first step involved determining whether a statistically significant relationship existed between the causal condition and the outcome. The null hypothesis was either accepted or rejected based on tests of independence. When the minimum expected frequency in each cell was five or greater, the chi-square test was used; in all other cases, Fisher's exact test was used.

Given that QCA accounts for asymmetric and for the combinatorial effects of factors arranged in various causal recipes—and that contingency tables use a symmetric approach to evaluating relationships—the parameters for significance were broadened here. So then, rather than only addressing significance at $p < .05$, additional relationships were highlighted to include those that either: (1) approached or were below significance at $p < .10$ and/or (2) where a strong asymmetric relationship appeared that might be masked by the symmetric approach of contingency table statistics; or (2) the strength of the proposed relationship was assessed using measures of association. For 2x2 tables, the

¹³⁶ In tables larger than 2x2, phi may be greater than 1.0, which makes interpretation difficult and non-intuitive. Also, for 2x2 tables, Cramer's V = phi.

phi-coefficient was used; tables larger than this required Cramer's V coefficient. To summarize, each condition was evaluated for the following:

1. Did a statistically significant relationship exist?
 - Present the hypothesis and the null hypothesis.
 - Assess null hypothesis using *tests of independence*.
 - a. Evaluate chi-square (if frequency in cells five or greater).
 - b. If chi-square not possible, use Fisher's exact test.
2. How strong was the relationship?
 - Assess relationship using *measures of association*.
 - a. For 2x2 tables, use phi-coefficient.
 - b. For tables larger than 2x2, use Cramer's V coefficient.

These procedures were applied, in turn, to three sets of conditions: (1) proximate conditions testing contemporary power-sharing literature theories about *power-sharing dimensions*, including dimension institutionalization and strength as well as territorial power-sharing; (2) proximate conditions testing theories about robust third-party security guarantees and disaggregated power-sharing dimensions; and (3) remote conditions testing the situational and historical variety of post-civil war contexts. As outlined in Chapter 3, the change in human-rights outcomes (i.e., changes in PTS or CIRI scores) was evaluated over three time periods (i.e., t as compared to $t+2$, $t+5$, and $t+10$); the dichotomized values were captured in the variables *pts2d*, *pts5d*, and *pts10d*.

Set 1: Aggregated Power-Sharing Dimensions

Since the first set of conditions aggregated power-sharing dimensions, several conditions were initially added to aid in preliminary cross-case comparison of civil wars ending in negotiated settlements. These two conditions included: (1) the presence of any type of political power-sharing agreement (*pps*a), and (2) the presence of any type of military power-sharing agreement (*mps*a). This helped to gauge the extent to which these different dimensions had been used. The presence of territorial power-sharing agreements (*tps*a) already had been captured in this regard, so no additional measure was needed.

Once the data was run for all Set 1 conditions and human-rights outcomes (see Appendix 2), the widespread use and preference for political power-sharing agreements (*pps*a) in negotiated settlements became clear. Nearly four of every five negotiated settlements—fully 78 percent of the civil wars (28 of 36) ending in peace agreements between 1989-2005—involved at least one political measure. In contrast, military power-sharing measures (*mps*a) were present in only 64 percent (23 of 36) of all peace agreements, and territorial measures were used in only 33 percent (12 of 36).

The four original conditions proposed here for testing the various theories about aggregated power-sharing dimensions included: (1) extensively institutionalized settlements (*eis*), (2) thick political power-sharing settlements (*th-ps*), (3) thick military power-sharing settlements (*th-ms*), and (4) territorial power-sharing agreements (*tps*a). A deeper perusal of these conditions, in relation to human-rights outcomes (the right side of Appendix 2), reveals the wide variety, complexity, and seemingly contradictory effects of those conditions. The first civil war in the Philippines, for example, involved an

extensively institutionalized settlement as well as both a thick military and political settlement and the use of territorial agreements. Even so, human-rights outcomes did not improve for either PTS or CIRI across all three-time periods, with the sole exception of *ciri2d*. The negotiated settlement in Burundi involved an identically thick and extensively institutionalized agreement. Of the five human-rights conditions where data was available, four showed an opposite outcome of that in the Philippines: Human rights improved.

With this intermediate volume of cases, it was very difficult to identify accurate trends across the different conditions and outcomes. Cross-tabulations were used to elucidate relational significance and the direction and strength of influences, if any. Appendix 2 summarizes the data used for the respective bivariate contingency tables; all conditions were coded in accordance with procedures described in Chapter 4.¹³⁷ The first condition of extensively institutionalized settlements illustrates the quantitative analysis in detail; thereafter, the explanatory background material is truncated.

Extensively Institutionalized Settlements (*eis*)

In order to test whether a relationship exists between extensively institutionalized settlements (*eis*) and human-rights outcomes, the following hypotheses were evaluated:

Null hypothesis H0: No relationship between institutionalization and HR outcome

Alternative hypothesis H1: Relationship between institutionalization and HR outcome

¹³⁷ The principal technique used to operationalize these conditions was count variables.

The initial evidence (depicted in Tables 21, 22, and 23 below)¹³⁸ appeared to support the existence of a relationship, although the direction of that relationship is counterintuitive, for it runs opposite of what contemporary scholarship has proposed. Table 21 shows extensively institutionalized settlements versus *pts2d* (i.e. the change in the level of political repression from time *t* to time *t*+2, dichotomized).¹³⁹ The data indicates that when settlement institutionalization is nonexistent (*eis* = 0), human rights are guaranteed to improve in all such cases (four in this instance). That is, 100 percent of the cases *without* any power-sharing agreements resulted in improved human rights.

Table 21: Contingency Table for *eis* and *pts2d*

Outcome	Extensively Institutionalized Settlements				Total
	0	1	2	3	
pts2d (1)	4 (100%)	5 (71%)	8 (42%)	3 (50%)	20
pts2d (0)	0 (0%)	2 (29%)	11 (58%)	3 (50%)	16
Total	4 (100%)	7 (100%)	19 (100%)	6 (100%)	36

The inverted relationship between institutionalization and improved human-rights outcomes held relatively strong when only one dimension was added (71 percent of 7 cases). Incorporation of two or three power-sharing dimensions in a peace agreement showed little correspondence with the change in political terror-scale scores, over time; both led to nearly equal numbers of cases with improved or worse outcomes.

¹³⁸ In each of these tables, the outcome variable of human rights is shown in the rows, while the independent variables are shown in the columns.

¹³⁹ The change in the score is dichotomized to indicate whether human rights improved (1) or worsened (0). See Chapter 3 for coding of the outcome.

To evaluate whether a statistically significant relationship is present, the contingency table is examined using tests of independence. The table below illustrates the calculations performed by the IBM SPSS Statistics package, with respect to expected counts used to generate Pearson chi-square.

Table 22: Expected Counts for *eis* and *pts2d*

			Extensively Institutionalized Settlements (eis)				Total
			.0	1.0	2.0	3.0	
pts2d	1.0	Count	4	5	8	3	20
		Expected Count	2.2	3.9	10.6	3.3	20.0
		% within pts2d	20.0%	25.0%	40.0%	15.0%	100.0%
		% within Extensively Institutionalized Settlements (eis)	100.0%	71.4%	42.1%	50.0%	55.6%
	.0	Count	0	2	11	3	16
		Expected Count	1.8	3.1	8.4	2.7	16.0
		% within pts2d	0.0%	12.5%	68.8%	18.8%	100.0%
		% within Extensively Institutionalized Settlements (eis)	0.0%	28.6%	57.9%	50.0%	44.4%
Total		Count	4	7	19	6	36
		Expected Count	4.0	7.0	19.0	6.0	36.0
		% within pts2d	11.1%	19.4%	52.8%	16.7%	100.0%
		% within Extensively Institutionalized Settlements (eis)	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

This table reveals that four cells (50%) have an expected count less than five, which is well above the 20 percent maximum recommended by Yates et al. (1998). Therefore, the calculated chi-square value of 5.38 was ignored and Fisher's exact test of 0.16 was used.¹⁴⁰ Fisher's exact test fell outside the desired α level of .05 for rejecting the null hypothesis. As a result, while the relationship between institutionalization and *pts2d* appears to be negative, the relationship was not statistically significant.

The relationship between *eis* and *pts5d* (i.e. the change in PTS score from time t to time $t+5$, dichotomized) was also not statistically significant since Fisher's exact test was 0.147. The influence of settlement institutionalization at two and five years on

¹⁴⁰ SPSS did not calculate Fisher's exact test in tables larger than 2x2, so Lowry's (2015b, c) online calculators were used to obtain these probability values.

human rights might become more clear when considered in combination with certain situational factors as evaluated within QCA.

Finally, the visual relationship between settlement institutionalization and *pts10d* was more pronounced than in the previous two explorations. While the chi-square score was high at 8.767 (which for $df=3$ would surpass the critical value of 7.81 associated with an α level of 0.05), chi-square could not be used due to expected counts exceeding the 20 percent maximum. The substitute of Fisher’s exact test was calculated as 0.023, indicating that the null hypothesis could be rejected in this case. That is, some type of relationship exists between these variables in the long term. In addition, Cramer’s V was 0.508, indicating a quite strong relationship between the variables. The relationship oscillated like a sine wave, though: All six cases with thin settlement institutionalization (i.e., just one power-sharing dimension) resulted in improved human rights. Increases in institutionalization then led to worse human-rights outcomes,¹⁴¹ followed by improved human-rights outcomes.¹⁴²

Table 23: Contingency Table for *eis* and *pts10d*

Outcome	Extensively Institutionalized Settlements				Total
	0	1	2	3	
pts10d (1)	2 (50%)	6 (100%)	7 (37%)	4 (80%)	19
pts10d (0)	2 (50%)	0 (0%)	12 (63%)	1 (20%)	15
Total	4 (100%)	6 (100%)	19 (100%)	5 (100%)	34

¹⁴¹ Nineteen cases involved two power-sharing dimensions. Twelve of the nineteen cases (63%) led to worse human rights.

¹⁴² Five peace agreements involved all three power-sharing dimensions. Four of the five cases (80%) led to improved human rights.

The institutionalization of settlements was also checked against CIRI data. *Ciri5d* closely mirrored the direction and intensity of previous PTS findings (see Table 24 below). Nine cases were coded with either low (i.e. 1 dimension) or nonexistent settlement institutionalization. All nine of these cases (100 percent) resulted in improved human rights. Inclusion of more power-sharing dimensions yielded a muddled relationship between the two variables. The computed value for Fisher’s test was 0.093, again short of the common rejection standard of 0.05; the negative direction of the relationship was clear here, though, and the strength of the relationship was moderately strong, with Cramer’s V of 0.459.

Table 24: Contingency Table for *eis* and *ciri5d*

Outcome	Extensively Institutionalized Settlements				Total
	0	1	2	3	
ciri5d (1)	4 (100%)	5 (100%)	9 (50%)	3 (60%)	21
ciri5d (0)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	9 (50%)	2 (40%)	11
Total	4 (100%)	5 (100%)	18 (100%)	5 (100%)	32

This research revealed that marginal or non-inclusive negotiated settlements generally had led to better human-rights outcomes in all three periods. In contrast, more inclusive or fully inclusive settlements were non-definitive; better or worse human-rights outcomes may occur with nearly equal consistency. The null hypothesis that no relationship exists between extensively institutionalized settlements (*eis*) and human-rights outcomes can be rejected, but only for the longest time period (using *pts10d*). The

direction and strength of relationship were clearest in the mid-term period, with *ciri5d* approaching the rejection standard at 0.93.

Preliminarily, the relationship between extensively institutionalized settlements and human-rights outcomes appears to be the inverse of what the literature proposed. Thin or nonexistent PSA institutionalization was consistently associated, over all time periods, with improved human rights; extensively institutionalized settlements resulted in more muddled findings in the short and mid-term periods.

Thick Political Settlements (*th-ps*)

What is the influence of thick individual dimensions on human-rights outcomes? Do reinforcing effects *within* military or political dimensions matter more than reinforcing effects *across* dimensions, as captured with institutionalization? Political thickness tests the following hypotheses:

Null hypothesis H0: No relationship between political thickness and HR outcome

Alternative hypothesis H1: Relationship between political thickness and HR outcome

The null hypothesis held for all three time periods and both PTS and CIRI outcomes. *Ciri5d* was the only measure marginally close to rejecting the null hypothesis, with Fisher's exact test score of 0.131. Looking at the cross-tabulations for *ciri5d* (Table 25 below), it was apparent that semi-thick political dimensions (those with two political power-sharing provisions) consistently resulted in improved human-rights outcomes. All six cases in this category improved. However, for the nine cases with the thickest power-

sharing dimension, the results were almost equally split between better and worse human rights. At the opposite end of the spectrum, 75 percent of the cases (6 of 8) that did not include any political power-sharing provisions resulted in improved human rights.

Table 25: Contingency Table for *th-ps* and *ciri5d*

Outcome	Thickness of Political Power Sharing Dimension				Total
	0	1	2	3	
ciri5d (1)	6 (75%)	4 (44%)	6 (100%)	5 (56%)	21
ciri5d (0)	2 (25%)	5 (56%)	0 (0%)	4 (44%)	11
Total	8 (100%)	9 (100%)	6 (100%)	7 (100%)	32

These results beg the question: Is there something unique about which political PSA measures were included and which were excluded? And do certain combinations work really well? When looking at the specific combinations of political provisions for the six cases coded here with *th-ps* of [2], five cases involved *repex* in combination with some other political measure and four involved *repcs*. Unfortunately, quantitative tools cannot account for the multi-causal complexity of different factors interacting. The argument for analyzing disaggregated political provisions using cross tabulations and fuzzy-set QCA is made strong by these findings. Chapters 6 and 7 consider such combinatorial effects through the use of fuzzy-set QCA.

Although political thickness might contribute to reducing the probability of civil war recurrence, its effects on human-rights outcomes has been quite varied and is unsubstantiated. No relationships of statistical significance were found between *thick* political power-sharing agreements and PTS or CIRI outcomes at any time period. As discussed earlier, this might be due to the potential that different political measures

actually work at cross-purposes with each other. In this vein, a review of the contingency tables revealed that different measures included in the aggregated measure (or different combinations of them) might be creating divergent effects on human rights. However, this possibility cannot be confirmed from the aggregated data.

An additional idea spurred by these findings is that the presence (or absence) of *any* political power-sharing agreement (*ppsas*) might be creating more significant effects than the thickness of the dimension itself. Since this condition was easily available and already introduced, the potential relationship was quickly tested using a null hypothesis that no relationship exists between the presence of the political power-sharing dimension and human-rights outcomes.

The short-term data was striking. The relationship between *ppsas* and *pts2d*, with $\chi^2 = 6.9$ was well within the critical region to reject the null hypothesis at the $p < 0.01$ level of significance. The contingency table (see Table 26 below) and the calculated value of phi at -0.44 together indicated a moderately strong negative association between the presence of the political power-sharing dimension and human rights. Thirteen cases had *no* political power-sharing provision in the peace agreement. Eighty-five percent of those cases (11 of 13) resulted in improved human rights, whereas the presence of the political power-sharing dimension more often resulted in worse human rights.

Table 26: Contingency Table for *ppsa* and *pts2d*

Outcome	Political Power-Sharing		Total
	0	1	
pts2d (1)	11 (85%)	9 (39%)	20
pts2d (0)	2 (15%)	14 (61%)	16
Total	13 (100%)	23 (100%)	36

The strength of this relationship began to fade though at the five-year point. While the relationship was still negative ($\phi = -0.248$), it did not reach the level of statistical significance (i.e., χ^2 for $pts5d = 2.2 < 3.84$ for $p < 0.05$).¹⁴³ Nevertheless, a statistically significant relationship was confirmed between the *political PSA dimension* and *pts2d*. This relationship indicated a strong negative association between the political power-sharing dimension and human-rights outcomes in the short term. Human-rights outcomes are more likely to improve when political power-sharing agreements are absent.

Thick Military Settlements (*th-ms*)

Hoddie and Hartzell (2003a) and Jarstad and Nilson (2008) claimed that the thickness of military measures in power-sharing agreements influences human rights more significantly and positively than political power-sharing measures, because the latter set are more easily implemented and more easily reversed than military measures.

The following hypotheses were examined in this regard:

Null hypothesis H0: No relationship between political thickness and HR outcome

¹⁴³ Data for *ciri5d* corroborated this finding. Chi-square was 1.949 and phi was -0.247. No other CIRI aggregated data was close to significant.

Alternative hypothesis H1: Relationship between political thickness and HR outcome

The first relationship tested was *th-ms* and *pts2d*. The null hypothesis can be rejected since Fisher’s exact test was 0.033,¹⁴⁴ below the $p < 0.05$ significance threshold. Notably the relationship was *opposite* of what was proposed by contemporary literature (see Table 27 below).

Table 27: Contingency Table for *th-ms* and *pts2d*

Outcome	Thickness of Military Power-Sharing Dimension			Total
	0	1	2	
pts2d (1)	11 (85%)	6 (37%)	3 (43%)	20
pts2d (0)	2 (15%)	10 (63%)	4 (57%)	16
Total	13 (100%)	16 (100%)	7 (100%)	36

Cramer’s V was computed as 0.441, indicating a strong association between the two variables. The data also indicated a negative relationship. As depicted, negotiated settlements *without* any military power-sharing measures consistently resulted in improved human rights in the short term (85% of 13 cases); over half of the cases (11 of 20) that experienced improved human rights were those that lacked any military power-sharing agreements.

In contrast, negotiated settlements with one or two military measures were inclined, by an almost 2:1 ratio, to experience worse human rights over the same period.

¹⁴⁴ Pearson’s chi-square for *military thickness* and *pts2d* was 7.016, well past the $p < 0.05$ value of 5.99 for $df=2$; however, Fisher’s exact test was more appropriate since two of the six cells (>20%) had an expected count less than 5.

Over time, however, this relationship seemed to erode. Fisher's exact test for *pts5d* was calculated as 0.318 and for *pts10d*, 0.99. No significance was found between military thickness and any CIRI scores. As with the political PSAs, the presence of any military power-sharing agreement (*mpsa*) was also tested in order to gauge the effects of this dimension on human-rights outcomes. No significant relationships were found at any time period for either PTS or CIRI scores.

Territorial Power-Sharing Agreements (*tpsa*)

One-third of the thirty-six cases involved territorial power-sharing agreements by granting either autonomy or federalism. As with the previous prominent theories, the following hypotheses were examined:

Null hypothesis H0: No relationship between territorial power-sharing agreements and HR outcome

Alternative hypothesis H1: Relationship between territorial power-sharing agreements and HR outcome

While chi-square values for all PTS and CIRI scores were legitimate (i.e., zero cells had expected counts less than five),¹⁴⁵ none of the calculated statistics led to outright rejection of the null hypothesis.

The relationship between *tpsa* and *ciri5d* did approach significance at $p < 0.05$.¹⁴⁶

Notably, the phi value was -0.307, indicating a moderate negative relationship, which is

¹⁴⁵ Since territorial power-sharing agreements simply gauged presence or absence rather than a count value of how many provisions existed (as seen with institutionalization and political/military thickness), this resulted in a 2x2 contingency table. Naturally this reduced the number of possible cells and ensured a usable chi-square statistic.

¹⁴⁶ Chi square was assessed at 3.023. A critical value of 3.84 or greater was necessary to cross the significance threshold.

quite evident in Table 28 below. When territorial power-sharing agreements were absent, 76 percent of the twenty-one cases resulted in improved human rights; in contrast, the presence of territorial power-sharing agreements resulted in slightly more cases of worse human rights during the same time period. This moderate negative relationship held for *ciri2d* and *ciri10d*, as well as *pts2d* and *pts10d*; none of these approached statistical significance, but the asymmetric relationship merits further investigation.

Table 28: Contingency Table for *tpsa* and *ciri5d*

Outcome	Territorial Power Sharing		Total
	0	1	
ciri5d (1)	16 (76%)	5 (46%)	21
ciri5d (0)	5 (24%)	6 (55%)	11
Total	21 (100%)	11 (100%)	32

Set 1 Summary

A host of contemporary scholars studying power-sharing agreements contend that such provisions matter significantly for seeking to reduce civil war recurrence. The literature is divided between whether the inclusion of more power sharing is better (i.e., extensively institutionalized settlements) or more of certain dimensions is better. A third camp contends that power sharing is actually rather dangerous to the peace that follows.

Contrary to the expectations of both advocacy camps, power-sharing agreements—when assessed by aggregated dimensions—do not positively affect human-rights outcomes. Indeed, when relationships do exist, they always indicate an inverse relationship:

1. Less extensively institutionalized settlements are very likely to experience improved human rights over all time periods; the record for more extensively institutionalized settlements is muddled.
2. In the short term, the absence of any type of political power-sharing measure is very likely to lead to improved human rights; the presence of such measures is more likely to lead to worse human rights.¹⁴⁷
3. In the short term, less military thickness consistently leads to improved human rights; more thickness tends to lead toward worse human rights.
4. The absence of territorial power-sharing agreements in the mid-term consistently leads to improved human rights; the presence of such agreements leads almost equally to better or worse human rights.

Contrary to expectations, political thickness did not reveal any significant relationship. Table 29 below summarizes these findings, along with all calculations for all the tests of independence for Set 1 conditions and both human-rights outcomes (PTS and CIRI, over the three different time periods).

¹⁴⁷ As noted earlier, this same analysis for the presence or absence of military power-sharing measures did not reveal any significant relationships.

Table 29: Tests of Independence for Set 1 Conditions and Human-Rights Outcomes

	Human Rights Outcomes, Change Over Time						Summary of Significant Relationships & Associations
	pts2d	pts5d	ptds10d	crl2d	crl5d	crl10d	
Extensively Institutionalized Settlements (eis)	0.16	0.147	.023 **	0.999	.093 *	0.822	Mid/Long term: Less inclusive = better HR (++); More inclusive ≠ better or worse HR outcomes
Thick Political Dimension (th-ps)	0.882	0.911	0.776	0.848	0.131	0.21	<i>No significant relationship</i>
<i>Political Power-Sharing Agreement (ppsa)</i>	6.96P ***	2.21P	0.045P	0.024P	1.95P	0.29P	Short term: Absence of political PSA = improved HR (++); ppsa presence = worse HR (-)
Thick Military Dimension (th-ms)	0.033 **	0.318	0.99	0.805	0.408	0.726	Short term: Less military thickness = better HR (++); Full thickness ≠ better or worse HR.
<i>Military Power-Sharing Agreement (mpsa)</i>	0.201P	0.390P	0.147P	0.109P	.416P	0.667P	<i>No significant relationship</i>
Territorial Power-Sharing Agreement (tpsa)	0.225P	1.393P	0.717P	0.279P	3.023*	0.005P	Mid-term: Absence of territorial PSA = improved HR (++); Present ≠ better or worse HR outcomes.

* indicates $\alpha < 0.1$; ** indicates $\alpha < 0.05$; *** indicates $\alpha < 0.01$

P = Pearson Chi-Square Test. For $df=1$ (a 2x2 table), $\alpha < 0.05$ is 3.84 & $\alpha < 0.01$ is 6.63. All other values are Fisher's exact test.

(+) or (-) indicates mild to moderate association; (++) or (--) indicates strong association

Set 2: Disaggregated Power-Sharing Provisions and Robust 3PSGs

The challenge of using Set 1 conditions, such as aggregated measures like the thickness of political and military power-sharing dimensions or extensively institutionalized settlements, is that a dimension-based approach to the field assumes that all measures within a given power-sharing dimension shape outcomes in similar fashions (i.e., in the same direction). The reality is that different measures within the same dimension can counteract each other and dilute the observed outcomes. This obscures the influence of different conditions, potentially hiding any individual measures that actually work in direct opposition to expected influence patterns.

Disaggregation of power-sharing measures is necessary for revealing actual effects from each provision. Disaggregation removes the assumption that all provisions within a dimension operate in concert. Set 2 conditions include seven disaggregated

power-sharing provisions found within the three previously discussed dimensions. Robust third-party security guarantees are included here given that guarantees are a similar, individual provision included within many peace agreements.

The disaggregated power-sharing provisions were already dichotomized, with presence of a provision coded as 1 and absence coded as 0. Dichotomization of robust guarantees is still necessary, so the discussion begins there, followed by presentation of the dichotomized data for all Set 2 conditions and cross-tabulation analysis.

Dichotomization of Robust 3PSGs

Chapter 4 proposed a spectrum of robust third-party security guarantees. Dichotomization of this spectrum is problematic since it was designed to capture a range of values based on the premise that the pairing of ever-stronger mandates with larger footprint sizes (i.e., more deployed armed personnel) leads to ever-increasing improvements in human-rights outcomes. Any dichotomization of a range like this is imperfect at best.

Under this challenge, the decision was made to evaluate the most robust guarantees—those with sufficient mandate strength (i.e., an authorization to use force) coupled with sufficient footprint size (i.e., more than 5,000 armed personnel on the ground to execute the mandate)—against all other guarantees. The combination of these two elements was expected to consistently and positively affect human-rights outcomes. Using the spectrum of third-party security guarantees provided in Chapter 4, only categories three and four fit these qualifications. Both involved at least 5,000 armed personnel and both authorized the use of force; category three is an armed peacekeeping

mission, while category four is a peace enforcement mission. This yielded the following dichotomization profile:

Table 30: Dichotomization of Robust 3PSGs (*r3psg*)

Dichotomization of Robust Third-Party Security Guarantees (<i>r3psg</i>)	
0	= Non-Robust Missions (includes categories 0-2 from the "Spectrum of 3PSGs", Chapter 4)
1	= Robust Missions (includes category 3 and 4 from the "Spectrum of 3PSGs", Chapter 4)

This dichotomization yielded twenty-one non-robust missions (coded 0) and fifteen robust third-party security guarantees (coded 1).

Dichotomized Data for Set 2 Conditions

With dichotomization of third-party guarantees completed, all data for Set 2 conditions was then coded and results summarized in Appendix 3. The human-rights outcomes (the right side of the chart) are, of course, the same for all three sets. A number of insights arose when comparing the disaggregated provisions. Each political power-sharing provision was used almost the same number of times: proportional representation in legislative elections (*repleg*) occurred eighteen times; guaranteed representation in the executive branch occurred eighteen times; and guaranteed representation in the civil service occurred nineteen times. Political power-sharing provisions were used in a multitude of combinations.

Comparatively, the inclusion of the provision guaranteeing military integration in the main military-force structure was favored three-to-one over the provision

guaranteeing integration of rebels into the military leadership (23 cases versus just 7). Interestingly, every time that integration into military leadership was offered, it was *always* paired with integration into the main military force structure. Finally, settlements with autonomy occurred at twice the rate as federalism. Since autonomy and federalism are mutually exclusive measures, this represented twelve unique cases of territorial power-sharing agreements.

Political Provisions: Legislative, Executive, & Civil Service Representation

In negotiated settlements, the rebels and the government might agree to a number of alternative provisions that redistribute political power in the central government. This includes legislative elections based on principles of proportional or equal representation, the guarantee of a certain number of cabinet and ministerial posts in the executive branch, and the guarantee of rebel representation in the civil service.

Interestingly, no significant relationships were found to exist between any of these three political power-sharing measures and aggregated human-rights outcomes, at any time period.¹⁴⁸ The closest relationship approaching significance was between civil service (*repcs*) and *pts10d*. Over this longer time period, the guarantee of rebel representation in the civil service carried a mild negative association (phi of -0.244). This negative association was evidenced by a greater than 2:1 ratio of states without the civil service provision experiencing an improvement of overall human rights (see Table 31 below). In contrast, states with civil service representation generally experienced worse human rights during the same time period. The overall relationship was deemed not

¹⁴⁸ The full set of calculations for all Set 2 conditions is provided later in Table 40.

significant, for the chi-square statistic of 2.030 did not cross the critical threshold, even at $p < 0.10$.

Table 31: Contingency Table for *repcs* and *pts10d*

Outcome	Civil Service Representation		Total
	0	1	
pts10d (1)	11 (69%)	8 (44%)	19
pts10d (0)	5 (31%)	10 (56%)	15
Total	16 (100%)	18 (100%)	34

Military Provisions: Integration in the Main Ranks and in Leadership

Military power-sharing agreements involve the integration of rebels into the state's military forces, through provisions that either guarantee rebel representation in the leadership positions of that defense force, or guarantee integration into the main ranks of a joint defense force. In this study, no significant relationships were found between integration in leadership positions and human-rights outcomes over any of the three time periods.

In contrast, the contingency tables investigating military integration into the main ranks (*milint*) revealed a strong, negative relationship with human-rights outcomes, especially early on after war has ended. In the short-term period, the relationship between *milint* and *pts2d* was statistically significant at the $p < 0.01$ level of confidence; Pearson's chi-square test of 6.959 exceeded the critical threshold of 6.63. The association between these two variables was negative, with a moderately strong phi of -0.440. This negative relationship was strongest when integration was absent: In 85 percent of cases *without* military integration of rebels into a joint defense force (11 of 13 cases), human rights

improved; meanwhile, 61 percent of states *with* integration (14 of 23 cases) resulted in worse human rights over this time period (see Table 32 below).

Table 32: Contingency Table for *milint* and *pts2d*

Outcome	Military Integration in Ranks		Total
	0	1	
pts2d (1)	11 (85%)	9 (39%)	16
pts2d (0)	2 (15%)	14 (61%)	20
Total	13 (100%)	23 (100%)	36

At the five-year point (using *pts5d*), the negative direction of association still held. Nine of thirteen states (69%) *without* military integration experienced improved human rights, while thirteen of twenty-three states *with* integration (57%) underwent worse human rights (see Table 33 below). The relationship is asymmetric, with the absence of the provision indicating a stronger relationship with human-rights outcomes than is shown with its presence. However, the relationship was not statistically significant, with chi-square of 2.21, falling short of the critical distribution value for $p < 0.10$ of 2.70.

Table 33: Contingency Table for *milint* and *pts5d*

Outcome	Military Integration in Ranks		Total
	0	1	
pts5d (1)	9 (69%)	10 (43%)	19
pts5d (0)	4 (31%)	13 (57%)	17
Total	13 (100%)	23 (100%)	36

Territorial Provision: Federalism

Federalism is one of two types of territorial power-sharing agreements. It is defined as the decentralization of governmental authority through provisions that allocate separate powers to sub-state units. The use of federalism as a territorial measure occurred in only four of thirty-six cases during the observed time period from 1989-2005. In the short term, one state (South Africa) experienced worse human rights, while the other three states (X, Y, Z) improved. At both the mid-term period (*pts5d*) and the long-term period (*pts10d*), federalism was distinguished by the fact that 100 percent of the cases with this provision (4 of 4) resulted in improved human rights.¹⁴⁹ The relationship between the federalism provision and human-rights outcomes is asymmetric as evidenced by the even split between better and worse outcomes for non-federal cases (see table below).

For the relationship between *federalism* and *pts5d*, the shift of the South Africa case from worse human rights to improved human rights resulted in a shift in Fisher's exact test from 0.613 (for *pts2d*) to 0.106. This significant shift demonstrated the significance of even a single case when the relationship is asymmetric and only a small number of the asymmetric cases exist. Without additional cases of federalism to evaluate here, a statistically significant relationship is not possible.

¹⁴⁹ The delayed reversal for the South Africa case may be attributed to the time necessary to fully implement federalism and realize its effects.

Table 34: Contingency Table for *federalism* and *pts5d*

Outcome	Federalism		Total
	0	1	
pts5d (1)	15 (47%)	4 (100%)	19
pts5d (0)	17 (53%)	0 (100%)	17
Total	32 (100%)	4 (100%)	36

Territorial Provision: Autonomy

Autonomy, the second type of territorial power-sharing agreement, involves decentralization of governmental authority through provisions that provide autonomy to the rebel group to control local issues in a certain region. In this study, autonomy provisions were present in eight of the thirty-six peace agreements. As with federalism, the effects of autonomy were delayed, perhaps due to the time needed to implement such measures. At the five-year point (using *ciri5d*), 75 percent of those cases *with* autonomy present (6 of 8) had worse human rights, while nearly 80 percent of the cases *without* autonomy (19 of 24) experienced improved human rights (see Table 35 below).¹⁵⁰ This moderately strong, negative association (phi of -0.427) was statistically significant at $p < 0.01$.

¹⁵⁰ The *autonomy-pts5d* contingency tables did not corroborate this same relationship.

Table 35: Contingency Table for *autonomy* and *ciri5d*

Outcome	Autonomy		Total
	0	1	
ciri5d (1)	19 (79%)	2 (25%)	21
ciri5d (0)	5 (21%)	6 (75%)	11
Total	24 (100%)	8 (100%)	32

At the ten-year point, autonomy was still negatively associated (phi of -0.494) with human-rights outcomes. In 85 percent of cases (6 of 7), the presence of autonomy led to worse human rights; its absence led to improved human rights by a 2:1 ratio (see Table 36 below). This relationship was also statistically significant, with Fisher's exact test at 0.028, $p < 0.05$.

Table 36: Contingency Table for *autonomy* and *pts10d*

Outcome	Autonomy		Total
	0	1	
pts10d (1)	18 (67%)	1 (14%)	19
pts10d (0)	9 (33%)	6 (85%)	15
Total	27 (100%)	7 (100%)	34

Robust Third-Party Security Guarantees

In the short- and mid-term periods of two and five years, robust guarantees did not have any statistical effects. In the long term, the presence of third-party security guarantees demonstrated a statistically significant relationship, with a Pearson chi-square

score of 4.97, $p < 0.05$.¹⁵¹ As observed in Table 37 below, just shy of 80 percent of the cases (11 of 14) with robust third-party security guarantees resulted in improved human rights.¹⁵² The absence of such guarantees more often resulted in worse human rights. The relationship was moderately positive, with phi equal to 0.382.

Table 37: Contingency Table for *r3psg* and *pts10d*

Outcome	Robust 3PSG		Total
	0	1	
pts10d (1)	8 (40%)	11 (79%)	19
pts10d (0)	12 (60%)	3 (21%)	15
Total	20 (100%)	14 (100%)	34

Data for *r3psg-ciri10* largely corroborated this long-term relationship between robust security guarantees and human-rights outcomes. Indeed, the effects of robust 3PSGs *presence* were even clearer: 100 percent of the nine cases with robust guarantees resulted in improved human rights (see Table 38 below).¹⁵³ Fisher’s exact test was 0.059, falling just shy of significance at the $p < 0.05$ level. Phi in this case was 0.418, indicating an even stronger positive relationship than with *pts10d*.

¹⁵¹ An alternative dichotomization (*3psgv2*) was also considered, where 3PSGs were coded as robust only if they involved peace enforcement missions and at least 5,000 personnel (category 4). In this second version, twenty-five missions were considered non-robust (coded 0) and eleven missions were considered robust third-party security guarantees (coded 1). For *3psgv2* and *pts10d*, third-party presence resulted in decreased political repression in eight out of ten cases. This relationship, while moderately positive (phi of 0.314), fell short of statistical significance, with Fisher’s exact test equal to 0.128. The primary measure used in the text is more useful in indicating when human rights will change based on security guarantees.

¹⁵² Human rights data is not yet published for Sudan (2005) and Nepal (2006) at the ten-year point, so only 34 cases could be evaluated here.

¹⁵³ As detailed earlier in Chapter 3, the total number of cases is lower because CIRI data is missing for many civil war cases.

Table 38: Contingency Table for *r3psg* and *ciri10d*

Outcome	Robust 3PSG		Total
	0	1	
ciri10d (1)	11 (61%)	9 (100%)	20
ciri10d (0)	7 (39%)	0 (0%)	7
Total	18 (100%)	9 (100%)	27

The relationship between robust guarantees and human-rights outcomes appears largely asymmetric: states with the presence of robust third-party security guarantees experienced improved human rights, while the absence of these guarantees was much less definitive in consistently leading to worse human rights. QCA capitalizes on such asymmetries, which is why these are highlighted here.

Set 2 Disaggregated Provisions Summary

A central argument of this dissertation is that contemporary theories about which peace-agreement provisions matter most are erroneously based on aggregated dimensions that can obscure the effects of different measures within the same power-sharing dimension. Such aggregation generally assumes that these different measures act in concert rather than in opposition. This variance in effects means that when measures are aggregated, the observations may dilute results or lead to misinterpretation.

Both of these possibilities—dilution of results and misinterpretation of evidence—are evident in the results found here. With respect to dilution, consider the previous results for thick military settlements (*th-ms*) and *pts2d* which indicated a relatively significant, negative relationship. When the two military measures were

disaggregated, the significance and intensity of the relationship was clearly attributable to military integration of rebels into the main ranks rather than to both measures. The inclusion of the integration of military leadership only served to dilute the results (see Table 39 below) below).

The potential for misinterpretation of evidence is manifest when considering the aggregated measure of territorial power-sharing agreements (*tpsa*). This aggregated measure indicates the presence of either autonomy or federalism. The cross-tab evidence demonstrates very opposite effects for these two territorial provisions: The presence of federalism asymmetrically leads to improved human rights; the absence of federalism is non-definitive. In contrast, the relationship of autonomy to human rights is symmetric, with the presence of autonomy leading to worse human rights and the absence of autonomy leading to improved human rights. Aggregation dangerously obscured the results, which were almost completely opposite of each other. Researchers would quite likely draw incorrect conclusions as a result of using the aggregated measure. All Set 2 tests of independence are summarized in Table 39 below.

The element of time is an important consideration for individual provisions. Military integration into the main ranks, for example, immediately and negatively affected the human-rights outcomes; however, the significance of this negative effect faded before five years was reached. In contrast, the effects of robust third-party security guarantees improved over time, reaching statistical significance at ten years after the conflict ended. Similarly, the effects of autonomy were felt mostly at the mid- and long-term periods. Theoretically, these differences might be attributable to the speed of

implementation; military integration is expected to be faster than implementing autonomy and robust third-party security guarantees.

Table 39: Tests of Independence for Set 2 Conditions and Human-Rights Outcomes

	Human Rights Outcomes, Change Over Time						Summary of Significant Relationships & Associations
	pts2d	pts5d	pts10d	ciri2d	ciri5d	ciri10d	
PPSA: Legislative Representation (<i>repleg</i>)	0.450P	0.111P	0.537P	0.042P	1.247P	0.617P	No significant relationship
PPSA: Executive Representation (<i>repex</i>)	0.450P	0.111P	0.119P	0.829P	0.712	1	No significant relationship
PPSA: Civil Service Representation (<i>repcs</i>)	0.139P	0.472P	2.030P	0.852P	0.020P	0.964P	No significant relationship
MPSA: Military Integration in Main Ranks (<i>millint</i>)	6.959P***	2.21P	0.045P	0.024P	0.248	0.678	Absence of integration = better HR (++); Presence of integration = worse HR (-)
MPSA: Integration of Military Leadership (<i>millldr</i>)	0.675	0.684	1	0.682	0.667	0.58	No significant relationship
TPSA: Autonomy	0.422	1	0.028**	1	.01***	0.633	Negative moderate/strong relationship
TPSA: Federalism	0.613	0.106	0.113	0.598	0.534	1	Positive medium relationship; only 4 cases, not statistically significant
Robust 3PSGs (<i>r3psg</i>)	0.206P	0.538	4.97**	0.45	0.139	0.059*	Long term: Positive medium relationship

* indicates $\alpha < 0.1$; ** indicates $\alpha < 0.05$; *** indicates $\alpha < 0.01$

P = Pearson Chi-Square Test. For $df=1$ (a 2x2 table), $\alpha < 0.05$ is 3.84 & $\alpha < 0.01$ is 6.63. All other values are Fisher's exact test.

(+) or (-) indicates mild to moderate association; (++) or (--) indicates strong association

Alternatively, the effects of these measures may be more clear and consistent when such measures are evaluated as part of causal recipes with other conditions. The reality is that these individual measures are never enacted in isolation, but rather as a portfolio of options employed into a variety of different situational and historical contexts. QCA is, in this regard, an effective analytical tool for evaluating such increases in causal complexity.

Set 3: Remote Conditions

Remote conditions represent the constant, stable situational and structural factors that largely reside outside actor influence (Schneider and Wagemann 2006, 2012). These conditions may constrain or enable the ability of proximate factors to affect the outcome. Of the seven remaining remote factors in this study, four were continuous variables (i.e., war costs, war duration, population size, economic development), two already had been dichotomized (i.e., non-ethnic conflict, enduring peace), and one was a discrete variable (i.e., regime type).

In their original forms, continuous and discrete variables are not easily usable in contingency tables. So, to re-code those five remote conditions for quantitative analysis, the best practices of configurational comparative methods were followed (Rihoux and De Meur 2009b). This involved dichotomizing these conditions in a transparent manner based on theoretically relevant, empirically verifiable grounds.¹⁵⁴ Whenever the substantive literature was unclear regarding specific thresholds (i.e., as regarding the costs of civil war, war duration, and population size), cluster analysis of the data was used to identify appropriate cutoffs. The *Tosmana* QCA software has a *thresholdsetter* tool specifically developed for this very purpose (Cronqvist 2011). *Thresholdsetter* facilitates simple cluster analysis and threshold identification by visually depicting data distribution.

Several conditions yielded distributions with multiple potential thresholds. Each of these thresholds was crosschecked using a full set of contingency tables. The main text

¹⁵⁴ Dichotomization was selected rather than recoding into three or four respective categories given the low number of total cases.

provides coding and data for the primary threshold that was hypothesized to have the greatest effect; robustness checks using alternative thresholds are then summarized in the footnotes.

Dichotomization of Remote Conditions

All of the remote conditions were coded “so that their presence ([1] value)” would be “theoretically expected to be associated with a positive outcome ([1] outcome value)” (Rihoux and De Meur 2009a, 42). After dichotomizing the five continuous and discrete variables, each of the remote factors was evaluated vis-à-vis its relationship with human-rights outcomes over the three respective time periods.

Costs of the Civil War

The measurement of civil war costs involved dividing the number of battle-related deaths (in the thousands) by the war duration, then logging the result.¹⁵⁵ Since this result provided interval-scaled data, an appropriate threshold was necessary for transforming the data into dichotomous data for the contingency tables. No definitive theoretical or empirical threshold is known in the literature; cluster analysis of the data, using the *Tosmana thresholdsetter* tool, was used to establish a threshold. The visual illustration of the war costs (see Figure 9 below) yields a clear threshold at a value of 6.5—just above the tight cluster centered near the mean and sufficient to differentiate this group from civil wars with more significant total costs.

¹⁵⁵ These calculations were already performed for the majority of cases used here by Mattes and Savun (2009); missing data was procured followed these same procedures.




Figure 9: *Tosmana* Depiction of Logged Costs with Dichotomization Threshold¹⁵⁶

Because low costs are expected to result in improved human rights, while high costs typically result in worse human rights, the following dichotomization was used:

0 = states with costs ≥ 6.5 (high costs)

1 = states with costs < 6.5 (low costs)

With this threshold, eleven cases had high costs (≥ 6.5 ; coded 0) while nineteen had low costs; data was missing for six of the cases.

Civil War Duration

War duration was calculated based on the logged number of months that the war lasted (Mattes and Savun 2009). The reason for using logarithms here was made clear by first visualizing the unadjusted, raw data. The graph below represents the number of months that civil war lasted, mapped out for all thirty-six conflicts (Figure 10).

Establishing a clear line of demarcation was difficult since several outliers skewed the full graph; further, the cluster at the far left was nearly impossible to decipher.

¹⁵⁶ The red lines on these charts indicate the median while the green lines indicate user-set parameters.




Figure 10: Duration of Civil Wars Ending in Negotiated Settlements (in months)

The logged duration of civil war, visualized using *Tosmana's thresholdsetter*, helped announce differences in the data and highlighted appropriate thresholds (see Figure 11 below).¹⁵⁷




Figure 11: Logged Duration of Civil Wars, with Thresholds of 24, 48, 84 Months

Three different thresholds were established using the *Tosmana trendsetter* chart above: 24 months (natural log of 3.18), 48 months (natural log of 3.87), and 84 months (natural log of 4.43). Cross-tabulations were run for each of these three thresholds against

¹⁵⁷ Mattes and Savun's (2009) dataset was missing civil war duration for several cases. This missing data was rectified using the start month and end month in UCDP/PRIO's dataset (Pettersson 2015) to calculate the civil war duration in months.

the outcome of human rights; the two-year threshold had the greatest discernible effect on human rights.¹⁵⁸ Since the hypotheses proposed that short durations improve human-rights outcomes and long civil wars lead to worse human rights, civil war duration was coded as follows:

0 = natural log of duration is ≥ 3.178 (2 years) = long duration

1 = natural log of duration is < 3.178 (2 years) = short duration

Under this coding, twelve cases involved short civil war and twenty-four cases involved long civil wars.¹⁵⁹

Population Size

Population data was taken from Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl (2009) and updated using the *World Development Indicators* (The World Bank 2011). As with the war's duration, the population size was logged in order to improve model fit with a more normal distribution. *Tosmana's thresholdsetter* (Cronqvist 2011) was used to assess an appropriate threshold corresponding to the resulting data (see **Error! Reference source not found.** below).

A clear threshold was available at approximately 16. Iteratively, a threshold of 10 million people (with a natural log of 16.12) closely corresponded to this demarcation while also preserving the cases assigned to each category. Since smaller states were expected to experience less political repression, coding proceeded as follows:

¹⁵⁸ Results from the other thresholds are provided, as appropriate, in the footnotes for the cross-tab analysis section on civil war duration.

¹⁵⁹ According to the other two thresholds, sixteen cases cases involved civil wars longer than four years; twelve civil wars lasted longer than seven years.

0 = population \geq 10M (natural log of 16.12)

1 = population $<$ 10M (natural log of 16.12)

Using this threshold, fifteen civil wars involved states with populations *greater than* 10 million people; twenty-one wars involved populations with *less than* 10 million people.




Figure 12: Population Threshold using *Tosmana* - 10 million (natural log 16.12)

Regime Type

Regime type was captured using the *polity2* variable from the Polity IV dataset (Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr 2010). *Polity2* is a single-scale continuum, ranging from -10 (full autocracy) to +10 (full democracy). Scholars commonly distinguish democratic states as those with *polity2* scores of six and higher (see, for example, Rasler and Thompson 2005; Pickering and Peceny 2006; Jarstad and Nilsson 2008). Based on this threshold, regime type was assessed using the following coding:

0 = Polity Score $<$ 6 = Non-Democratic

1 = Polity Score \geq 6 = Democratic

Under this coding, eight cases were considered democratic at $t+2$, eleven at $t+5$, and fourteen at $t+10$.

Two additional thresholds (Polity IV \geq +7 or +8) were examined in order to check the effects that shifting this threshold might have on human-rights outcomes. These higher thresholds were based on Davenport and Armstrong's (2004) finding that only higher Polity scores (e.g. +8, +9, and +10) caused the state to decrease its politically repressive behavior.¹⁶⁰ The limits used in this project of +6, +7, and +8 were lower than these authors for two reasons: First, their analysis involved *all* states in the world, not just those exiting a civil war. Second, very few cases meet these higher thresholds right after civil war. For example, the higher threshold of 8 and above constrained the number of civil war cases to just four cases at $t+2$, five cases at $t+5$, and eight cases at $t+10$.

Economic Development

Economic development was used to gauge a state's capability to coopt its citizens. When a government possesses alternative means for governing its citizens, that regime is less likely to revert to political repression. Cooptation is quite unlikely if a government cannot raise its citizens beyond absolute poverty—a level of economic development personified by daily struggle for survival.

Perhaps the most apt definition of absolute poverty was provided by Robert McNamara (1980, 17), then president of The World Bank who declared it as “a condition of life so limited by malnutrition, illiteracy, disease, high infant mortality, and low life expectancy as to be beneath any rational definition of human decency.” Operationally, The World Bank identified absolute poverty as earning less than \$1.25 per day, at 2005

¹⁶⁰ Davenport and Armstrong (2004) argued that only the highest Polity level measures—those often ignored in the literature—reduce political repression the most. Specifically, they concluded “there are essentially three different categories of democracy, each with a different influence on state repression: one that has no effect (values 0-7), an intermediate category with some negative effects on repressive behavior (values 8-9) and another category with a strong negative effect on state repression (value 10).”

purchasing power parity exchange rates (Ravallion, Chen, and Sangraula 2009). At \$1.25 per day, absolute poverty is equal to \$456 per year (GDP per capita). The natural log of \$456 GDP per capita is 6.12; this natural logged result was set as the demarcation threshold.

Under the expectation that high economic development corresponds with improvement in alternative governance mechanisms—specifically the ability to coopt citizens—and that the possession of such alternative causes governments to decrease their use of political repression, economic development was coded as follows:

$$0 = \text{GDP/capita} < \$456 \text{ (natural log 6.12)}$$

$$1 = \text{GDP/capita} \geq \$456 \text{ (natural log 6.12)}$$

This coding yielded fifteen cases below the threshold (coded 0), and twenty-one above the threshold (coded 1).

An additional threshold was also tested using The World Bank's *moderate poverty* line of \$2 a day for middle-income economies (2010). Moderate poverty describes subsistence with little beyond the minimal necessities for sustaining life. Over the course of a year, this is equivalent to \$730 GPD per capita or a logged result of 6.59.¹⁶¹ The moderate poverty line coincidentally equals the mean and the median for the universe of cases; it is shown as the red line in Figure 13 below and yields an equal split of eighteen cases above and eighteen cases below the set threshold.

¹⁶¹ This threshold of \$730 differs slightly from The World Bank's (2016a) threshold of \$765, used elsewhere to analytically distinguish states with low income economies from those with lower middle income economies.




Figure 13: GDP/Capita Thresholds Set At Absolute Poverty and Moderate Poverty

Summary of Dichotomizations for Remote Conditions

Raw data for all remote conditions was procured from the previously mentioned sources and collated (see Appendix 4), then recoded according to the proposed dichotomization thresholds detailed in Table 40 below. Where possible, these thresholds were based on empirical, case-based knowledge and theoretical understandings; when such thresholds were unknown, substantive criteria were referenced and case distributions were evaluated along a continuum using cluster analysis and *Tosmana's thresholdsetter* tool designed for QCA. The recoded data for all remote conditions is summarized in Appendix 5. The data in this table were used for the contingency table analyses that follow.

Table 40: Dichotomization Thresholds for Remote Conditions

Condition	Coding	Dataset Source
Non-Ethnic Conflict	0 - if the war was driven by ethnic issues 1 - if the war was not driven by ethnic issues	Sambanis (2009)
	<i>Alternative coding:</i> 0 - if the civil war was driven by ethnic identity 1 - if the civil war had some ethnic component 2 - if the war was not over ethnic issues	<i>Alternative coding:</i> Fearon & Laitin (2003) Mattes & Savun (2009)
Civil war costs	0 = states with costs ≥ 6.5 (high costs) 1 = states with costs < 6.5 (low costs)	Mattes & Savun 2009
Civil war duration	0 = natural log of duration is ≥ 3.178 (≥ 2 years) = long duration 1 = natural log of duration is < 3.178 (< 2 years) = short duration	Mattes & Savun 2009 UCDP/PRIO (Pettersson 2015)
	<i>Alternative thresholds of 4 years and 7 years</i>	
Enduring peace	0 = civil war recurrence 1 = peace (i.e., no civil war recurrence at $t+2$, $t+5$, $t+10$)	Mattes and Savun (2009) Correlates of War (Sarkees and Wayman 2010a)
Population size	0 = population $\geq 10M$ (natural log of 16.12) 1 = population $< 10M$ (natural log of 16.12)	Sambanis (2009) World Development Indicators (The World Bank 2016)
	0 = Polity Score* < 6 = Non-Democratic 1 = Polity Score* ≥ 6 = Democratic <i>Alternative thresholds at ≥ 7, ≥ 8 * Measured at respective $t+2$, $t+5$, $t+10$ time periods</i>	Polity IV (Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr 2010)
Economic Development	0 = GDP/capita $< \$456$ (natural log 6.12) 1 = GDP/capita $\geq \$456$ (natural log 6.12)	Mattes & Savun 2009 World Development Indicators (The World Bank 2016)
	<i>Alternative threshold at \$730 (natural log 6.59)</i>	

Ethnic vs. Non-Ethnic Conflicts

Ethnic conflicts are expected to lead to worse human-rights outcomes, while states with non-ethnic civil wars are expected to experience improved human rights. This expectation was verified by the relationship between *non-ethnic conflicts* and *ciri2d*. Over the short-term period, 90 percent of non-ethnic conflicts (9 of 10 cases) resulted in improved human rights while 68 percent of the cases involving ethnic conflict (13 of 19 cases) resulted in unchanged or worse human rights (see Table 41 below). This relationship was statistically significant at the $p < 0.01$ level (Fisher's exact test = 0.005).¹⁶² Phi, the preferred measure of association for 2x2 contingency tables, was

¹⁶² Although Pearson's Chi-Square was 8.955, one cell of the four had an expected count less than five. Fisher's test was used for this reason.

0.556, indicating a rather strong positive relationship. No other PTS or CIRI scores approached significance over the other time periods.

Table 41: Contingency Table for *Non-Ethnic Conflicts* and *ciri2d*

Outcome	Non-Ethnic Conflict		Total
	0	1	
<i>ciri2d</i> (1)	6 (32%)	9 (90%)	15
<i>ciri2d</i> (0)	13 (68%)	1 (10%)	14
Total	19 (100%)	10 (100%)	29

To verify Sambanis’s coding of non-ethnic conflicts, Fearon and Laitin’s (2003)¹⁶³ tripartite coding of ethnic conflicts was also evaluated. The closest relationship between this alternative coding for ethnic conflicts and human-rights outcomes was at *pts10d*. Over this longer-term period, 80 percent of non-ethnic wars (4 of 5 cases) and 73 percent of partially ethnic wars (8 of 11 cases) resulted in improved human rights while outright ethnic conflicts more often resulted in unchanged or worse human rights (61 percent, or 11 of 18 cases). While this relationship was shy of statistical significance, the positive orientation (Cramer’s V of 0.366) corroborated the direction and the strength of the relationship between non-ethnic conflicts and human rights.¹⁶⁴

¹⁶³ As detailed in Chapter 4, their coding was inverted so that 0 represented civil war driven by ethnicity; 1 represented war with some ethnic component; and 2 indicated the war was not over ethnic issues.

¹⁶⁴ Fisher’s exact test was only 0.139. The relationship between Fearon & Laitin’s tripartite coding and *ciri5* matched this as well: a positive relationship (Cramer’s V of 0.360) though shy of significance (Fisher’s exact test score of 0.149).

Costs of the Civil War

The costs of the civil war were not found to have any significant relationship with PTS or CIRI scores at any of the three respective time periods. No strong asymmetric relationships were observed either.

Duration

This project hypothesized—in contrast to the prevailing expectations of the extant literature—that long civil wars lead to worse human rights while short civil wars more often lead to improved human rights. The primary threshold of dichotomizing civil war duration at the two-year point was statistically significant in relation to *pts2d*, with a chi-square test score of 5.625, $p < 0.05$. Specifically, 83 percent of the civil wars lasting less than two years in length (10 of 12 cases) resulted in improved human-rights outcomes (e.g. less political repression) physical-integrity rights at $t+2$. The relationship was moderately asymmetrical, with stronger results for the presence of this condition as compared to its absence (i.e. longer duration war, coded as 0; see Table 42 below). The association between these variables was strongly positive at $\Phi = 0.395$.

Table 42: Contingency Table for *duration* and *pts2d*

Outcome	Duration < 24 months		Total
	0	1	
pts2d (1)	10 (42%)	10 (83%)	20
pts2d (0)	14 (58%)	2 (17%)	16
Total	24 (100%)	12 (100%)	36

The positive orientation of this relationship was consistent throughout the observed periods. For *pts5d* and *pts10d*, states with longer conflicts (those coded as 0) experienced better or worse rights at a relatively equal basis; states with shorter conflicts (those coded as 1) experienced better human rights at least two times more often than they experienced worse human rights. However, the relationship was not statistically significant for these years nor was any CIRI score statistically significant.

In accordance with earlier described procedures, the other thresholds of four years (natural log value of 3.87) and seven years (natural log value of 4.43) were also evaluated, since these values corresponded with clear demarcations between data clusters (see Figure 10). Civil war duration at four years closely approached significance for the same human-rights outcome of *pts2d*.¹⁶⁵ The seven-year threshold was not relationally significant for any time period.

Enduring Peace

In the short term, the recurrence of conflict soon after the end of the war did not appear to invoke significant changes in government repression; no effects were observed on *pts2d* or *ciri2d*. The recurrence of civil war in the mid-term period, however, guaranteed that human rights did not improve. One-hundred percent of the seven cases with civil war recurrence failed to experience improved human rights; meanwhile, 66 percent of the cases where peace held at $t+5$ (19 of 29 cases) experienced improved human rights (see Table 43 below). The *peace-pts5d* was statistically significant, with

¹⁶⁵ The chi-square score was 3.803, compared to 5.625 for the two-year threshold.

Fisher’s exact test = 0.002, $p < 0.01$. Phi was 0.519, confirming a strong positive association between the two variables.

Table 43: Contingency Table for Peace at $t+5$ and $pts5d$

Outcome	Peace at $t+5$		Total
	0	1	
pts5d (1)	0 (0%)	19 (66%)	19
pts5d (0)	7 (100%)	10 (34%)	17
Total	7 (100%)	29 (100%)	36

The long-term relationship of peace with improved human rights was significant for both $pts10d$ (Fisher’s exact test of 0.066) and $ciri10d$ (Fisher’s exact test of 0.091) at the $p < 0.10$ level. The seemingly substantial drop in statistical significance from $t+5$ to $t+10$ is attributable to a single outlier case where civil war recurred and human rights improved. The first civil war in Liberia (LIB1, 1989-1993) was this rare exception, with civil war recurring from 2002-2003. Human rights improved in this war by 0.5 over the ten-year period, meaning that either PTS-Amnesty or PTS-State was rated one point higher, but not both. The marginal change in human rights for this single case caused the drop in statistical significance.

Enduring peace was critical to human-rights improvement, especially as more time passed after the end of the civil war. The relationship of peace to human-rights outcomes was strongly asymmetric; that is, its absence more strongly led to a change in outcome, compared to its presence. This asymmetry would especially show up in a fuzzy-set analysis that asymmetrically evaluates when human rights *worsen*.

Population Size

Theory and empirical evidence suggest that larger populations place greater demands on their governments, often exceeding the capacity of those governments to effectively respond. At five years after the war, negotiated settlements involving populations less than 10 million people were two times more likely to experience improved human-rights outcomes (14 vs. 7 cases); conversely, populations larger than 10 million people were only half as likely to experience improved human-rights outcomes (5 vs. 10 cases; see Table 45 below). The mid-term relationship between *population size* and *pts5d* was significant, with chi-square = 3.901, $p < 0.05$. Phi was 0.329, indicating a moderately positive relationship.

Table 44: Contingency Table for *population* and *pts5d*

Outcome	Population < 10M		Total
	0	1	
pts5d (1)	5 (33%)	14 (67%)	19
pts5d (0)	10 (67%)	7 (33%)	17
Total	15 (100%)	21 (100%)	36

This result corroborated previous empirical evidence, suggesting that states with larger populations are more likely to violate physical-integrity rights than those with smaller populations. At *pts10d*, the chi-square test score was 2.591, just shy of significance for $p < 0.10$.

Regime Type

The expectation from empirical and theoretical literature is that highly democratic regimes lead to improved human rights and regimes lacking such high levels of democracy experience worse human rights, *ceteris parabis*. The contingency tables show that regime type was strongly associated with improved human rights in the short and mid-term periods. This significant association was only evident in CIRI outcomes, not in PTS outcomes. For example, the regime type at $t+2$ —assessed at a threshold of ≥ 6 —was significant in relation to *ciri2*, with Fisher’s exact test = 0.035, $p < .05$. Phi was 0.442, indicating a moderately positive relationship in line with expectations. Of the eight cases with a polity score of 6 or greater at $t+2$, all but one case experienced improved human rights (7 of 8 cases; see table below).

Table 45: Contingency Table for *regime type* and *ciri2d*

Outcome	Regime Type (≥ 6)		Total
	0	1	
ciri2d (1)	8 (38%)	7 (88%)	15
ciri2d (0)	13 (62%)	1 (12%)	14
Total	21 (100%)	8 (100%)	29

Similarly, regime type at $t+5$ was significant (0.049 Fisher’s test, $p < 0.05$) and moderately positive (0.391 Phi) in relation to *ciri5*. The relationship at $t+5$ was even stronger in an asymmetric sense, with 91 percent of the cases with democratic regimes (10 of 11) experiencing improved human rights. Of note, the threshold of polity scores ≥ 6 was the most useful demarcation for regime type, yielding several statistically

significant results; when regime type was dichotomized at polity scores ≥ 7 and ≥ 8 , no significant relationships were found for any time period.

Economic Development

Economic development was tested using dichotomization thresholds at 6.12 and 6.59, corresponding with absolute and moderate poverty, respectively. Neither threshold revealed any statistically significant relationships with human-rights outcomes.

In order to account for the potential that this lack of relationship was due to erroneous thresholds based solely on theoretical perspectives, two natural thresholds from cluster analysis of 7.12 (approximately \$1240/capita) and 8 (approximately \$3000/capita) were also considered. The former yielded nine states above the threshold, while the latter showed just four states above the threshold. In neither case was there a statistically significant relationship between GDP/capita and aggregated human-rights outcomes.

Summary of Remote Conditions

Two remote conditions—namely civil war costs and economic development—did not indicate any relationship with human-rights outcomes (see Table 47 below). This does not perfectly guarantee that no relationship exists. With contingency tables, the verification of a statistically significant relationship via Pearson's Chi-Square Test or Fisher's Exact Test permits *rejection* of the null hypothesis (i.e., that no relationship exists) with a certain degree of confidence; however, a non-significant test result does *not* permit acceptance of the null hypothesis (Lowry 2015a, Chapter 8). Nonetheless, given the absence of any significance across two different human-rights outcomes and three

different time periods—and the absence of asymmetries in the contingency tables—these two remote conditions are excluded from the fuzzy-set analysis that follows.

The direction of relationship for all remaining situational factors was as expected though the time periods varied: The presence of ethnic war strongly led to worse human rights in the short term while the absence of ethnic war was moderately associated with improved human rights. In the short term, wars of short duration (less than two years) were strongly and asymmetrically associated with improved human rights. Civil war recurrence, in the mid- and long-term periods, consistently prevented human-rights improvement; peace, on the other hand, more often allowed human rights to improve.

Larger populations in the mid-term experienced unchanged or worse human rights and smaller populations experienced improved human rights, at a 2:1 ratio for each scenario.. This finding is in line with the hypotheses (H19a/19b), but contrary to the empirical literature. Finally, democratic states in the short and mid-term periods were strongly associated with improved human rights using CIRI. Non-democratic states—those with less than 6 on the polity IV score—generally experienced worse human rights. All of these findings are summarized in the table below:

Table 46: Tests of Independence for Remote Conditions & Human-Rights Outcomes

	Human Rights Outcomes, Change Over Time						Summary of Significant Relationships & Associations
	pts2d	pts5d	pts10d	ciri2d	ciri5d	ciri10d	
Non-Ethnic Conflict	0.051P	0.003P	0.334P	0.005 ***	0.45	0.662	Presence of ethnic war = worse HR (--); while absence of ethnic war = better HR (+)
Costs of Civil War	0.010P	2.01P	.708P	0.423	0.667	0.621	No significant relationship
Civil War Duration	5.625P **	1.393P	0.271	1	0.703	0.633	Shorter duration = better HR (++); Longer duration ≠ better or worse HR outcomes
Peace (at respective period - t2p, t5p, t10p)	0.422	0.002 ***	0.066 *	0.169	0.667	0.091 *	Absence of peace = worse HR (--); Enduring peace = better HR (+)
Population Size ≤ 10M	0.051P	3.901P**	2.59P	0.318P	0.396P	0.010P	Small population = better HR (+); Large population = worse HR (-)
Regime Type (≥ 6 Polity score)	0.699	2.2P	1.43P	0.035 **	0.049**	0.18	Democratic state = better HR (++); Non-democratic state = worse HR (-)
Econ Dev (GDP/capita) 6.12	0.051P	0.003P	0.682P	0.45	0.139	1	No significant relationship

* indicates $\alpha < 0.1$; ** indicates $\alpha < 0.05$; *** indicates $\alpha < 0.01$
P = Pearson Chi-Square Test. For *df*=1 (a 2x2 table), $\alpha < 0.05$ is 3.84 & $\alpha < 0.01$ is 6.63. All other values are Fisher's exact test.
 (+) or (-) indicates mild to moderate association; (++) or (--) indicates strong association

Analyzing the Necessity of Proximate and Remote Conditions

Parsimonious solutions in a QCA often eliminate necessary conditions, so the use of contingency tables helps “to see if any of the causal conditions might be considered necessary (but not sufficient) conditions for the outcome” (Fiss 2012). Such assessments are possible using the row percentages within contingency tables, as compared to the column percentages that were reported in all the tables above. The crucial calculation for identifying necessary conditions is the percentage of cases in which *both* the causal condition and the outcome are present (i.e., cell #2 in Table 47 below). Since 100 percent consistency is exceptionally rare in the social sciences, Fiss set a threshold score of 90

percent consistency across those instances. When the value of cell #2 exceeds 90 percent, this indicates a probable necessary condition.¹⁶⁶

Table 47: Contingency Tables: Cause Is Necessary But Insufficient¹⁶⁷

	Cause (or Condition) Absent	Cause (or Condition) Present
Outcome Present	no cases here (#1)	Many cases present here (#2)
Outcome Absent	not relevant (#3)	not relevant (#4)

All contingency tables for the nineteen conditions were reviewed in relation to both sets of human-rights outcomes and across the three different time periods. The only factor that crossed the 90 percent threshold in cell #2 was *enduring peace*, defined as the absence of civil war recurrence at the respective time period. Indeed, *enduring peace* approached and crossed this threshold consistently across all three-time periods: (1) In the short term, cell #2 for *pts2d* was 85 percent and for *ciri2d* was 93 percent. (2) In the mid-term for *pts5d*, cell #2 was 100 percent (19 of 19 cases). (3) In the long term, cell #2 was 95 percent for *pts10d* (18 of 19 cases), and 90 percent for *ciri10d* (18 of 20 cases). The presence of *enduring peace*, therefore, was a necessary but not sufficient condition for human rights to improve.

Conclusion

This chapter was intentionally designed to help reduce the overall complexity of the two proposed Models 1 and 2 by using cross-tabulations and statistical analysis that

¹⁶⁶ With respect to cell #2, Fiss (2012) concluded, “if all instances (or almost all instances) agree in displaying a particular causal condition, then that condition might be interpreted as a necessary condition.”

¹⁶⁷ Table adapted from Fiss (2012).

identified statistically significant bivariate relationships. The strength and direction of these relations were highlighted and the respective proximate and remote conditions were retained for later fuzzy-set analysis. Since QCA is an asymmetric methodology, the contingency tables also were evaluated for any strong asymmetric relationships. Together these insights informed the retention and exclusion of conditions for fuzzy-set QCA.

For the contingency-table analysis, the nineteen proposed conditions were organized into three sets: Set 1 proximate conditions (testing aggregated power-sharing dimensions) included extensively institutionalized settlements, thick political settlements, thick military settlements, and territorial power-sharing agreements. The findings for these conditions were contrary to previous empirical findings. In the main, human rights consistently improved when military power-sharing agreements were thinnest, territorial power-sharing agreements were absent, and peace agreements were less institutionalized. The thickness of political settlements was not found to be significant here, though the absence of such agreements led to improved human rights. Since QCA accounts for causal complexity and how various combinations of conditions react differently, and because the first model does not involve excess conditions, the political thickness condition was retained for fuzzy-set analysis along with the other three aggregated measures.

With respect to Set 2 conditions—which include individual and disaggregated peace-agreement provisions—no significant or asymmetric relationships were found for any of the disaggregated political measures (*repleg*, *repex*, *repcs*) or for integration of the military leadership (*mil_ldr*). The fuzzy-set analysis in Chapter 8, therefore, initially

prioritized the four remaining factors of military integration in the main ranks, robust third-party security guarantees, autonomy, and federalism.¹⁶⁸

With respect to the third set (remote conditions used in both models), no significant or asymmetric relationship was found between *civil war costs* and *human-rights outcomes*, regardless of whether an outcome was assessed by a change in PTS or in CIRI scores. War-cost data also were missing for six cases. Since fuzzy-set QCA cannot account for or run an analysis with missing data¹⁶⁹—and given the lack of any significant or asymmetric relationship with civil war costs and human rights—this condition was dropped from the fuzzy-set analysis.

The remote condition of *economic development* also failed to demonstrate any significant or asymmetric relationship with human-rights outcomes, even when assessed against both the changes in PTS and CIRI scores. This condition was initially kept in the fsQCA process, both because the fuzzy-set QCA calibration method can more robustly account for theoretical and empirical arguments in ways that dichotomization may have hidden and because of the strong theoretical arguments for cooptation and alternative governance mechanisms.

In summary, the observations in this chapter led to the permanent removal of one remote condition (*war costs*) from both models and semi-permanent removal of four proximate conditions from Model 2. Chapters 7 and 8 discuss these decisions further.

¹⁶⁸ Chapter 8 details why each of these measures was included and why certain adjustments were made to the final composition of conditions for fuzzy-set analysis.

¹⁶⁹ *Tosmana* software is able to run crisp-set QCA and multi-value QCA when data is missing. However, it does this by running a case with missing data as if it is two cases—one with the missing variable marked as present and one with the missing variable marked as absent.

Chapter Six: Fuzzy-Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA)

In this project, the second phase of Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA)—also known as the analytic moment—involved stepwise multi-methodological procedures. Chapter 5 presented the first stages of the analysis, using contingency tables to illuminate significant symmetric and strong asymmetric relationships that existed between proximate or remote conditions and the outcome of human rights. The analysis hereafter is based on a specific technique of Qualitative Comparative Analysis known as fuzzy-set QCA (fsQCA). The principal purpose of this chapter is to explain the tools, terminology, and techniques that will be used to conduct the analysis and interpretation of results.

The conversation begins by distinguishing fuzzy-set QCA from the other two techniques falling under the umbrella of the QCA method. This foray affords quick discussion of the substantial research efforts initially attempted using these other techniques and it demonstrates why fsQCA was selected as the ideal approach for this project. The discussion shifts to description of the formalized process and logic behind calibrating conditions and outcomes. The notations and operations of Boolean algebra are then detailed, followed by definitions for necessary and sufficient conditions; parameters of fit and truth tables are established as useful tools for establishing those conditions. Finally, the chapter concludes with brief description of Schneider and Wagemann's

(2012) two-step process and a summarization of the strengths and weaknesses of fuzzy-set QCA.

QCA: A Formalized Set-Theoretic Method

A fundamental assumption of QCA is that social phenomena are rarely the outcome of a single factor. Rather, social phenomena result from various combinations of factors that jointly produce an outcome. Scholars alternatively substitute terms like *constellations*, *conjunctures*, *causal recipes*, and *casual paths* to signify those “configurations of causally relevant conditions” that lead to an outcome (Ragin 2014, xxi-xxii). QCA involves comparing these multiple configurations¹⁷⁰ using set theory; sets have specific membership criteria and individual cases are evaluated for their membership, non-membership, or partial membership in multiple sets.

Three sub-methods of QCA exist: crisp-set QCA, multi-value QCA, and fuzzy set QCA. Initially this research project used crisp-set QCA based on the dichotomous coding conducted in Chapter 5. Unfortunately, the resulting data were deeply laden with multiple contradictions, due to the loss of key discriminating data that commonly occurs when dichotomizing information in medium-sized datasets (Herrmann and Cronqvist 2009).¹⁷¹ Multi-value QCA (mvQCA) was also considered, but even with the use of multiple values and adherence to Meur’s (2009a) recommended best practices for resolving contradictory configurations, the contradictions remained unresolvable. And

¹⁷⁰ A *configuration* is most simply understood as “a specific combination of factors (or stimuli, causal variables, ingredients, determinants, etc.— we call these *conditions*...) that produces a given *outcome* of interest” (Rihoux and Ragin 2009, xix).

¹⁷¹ Resolution of these contradictory configurations was attempted by following Rihoux and De Meur’s (2009a, 49-50) recommended best practices, including: (1) adding condition(s) to the model; (2) removing and replacing condition(s) from the model); (3) re-examining operationalization of various conditions by adjusting the dichotomization thresholds; and (4) reconsidering the outcome variable itself.

unfortunately while mvQCA allows for conditions to be measured at multiple values, the technique does not allow for using multiple values of the outcome.

Before switching automatically to fuzzy-set QCA—which accommodates multiple values for a given condition or outcome—a preliminary test was run to observe how much “analytically relevant information” (Skaaning 2011, 404) was lost when the human-rights outcome was dichotomized. The probe compared changes in the data when two thresholds were used instead of one. This effort (see Appendix 6) solidly affirmed the need to evaluate the human rights outcome via a range of values rather than simple dichotomization. As detailed below, fuzzy set QCA accommodates this necessity.

Fuzzy-Set QCA

In many respects, fuzzy sets are simultaneously qualitative and quantitative, for they incorporate both kinds of distinctions in the calibration of degree of set membership. Thus, fuzzy sets have many of the virtues of conventional interval-scale variables, especially their ability to make fine-grained distinctions, but at the same time they permit set theoretic operations.¹⁷²

Fuzzy-set QCA preserves the set-theoretic, configurational approach of the other QCA methods while accommodating partial set membership in both the conditions and the outcome (Berg-Schlosser 2012; Ragin 2009). This feature allows cases to “vary in the degree to which they satisfy membership criteria” (Ragin 2014, xxiv), meaning that gradations of set membership and non-membership are possible. The technique also requires conversion of the original ordinal or interval raw data into fuzzy-set scores using a process called *calibration* (described in the next section). By allowing for degrees of membership, fuzzy sets simultaneously conduct qualitative and quantitative assessments

¹⁷² See Rihoux and Ragin 2009, 89.

by evaluating both differences-in-kind and differences-in-degree, respectively (Ragin 2009; Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 27).

Fuzzy-Set Calibrations

The purpose of calibration is to interpret and transform raw data according to transparently selected parameters and thresholds. Indeed, “It is impossible to conduct meaningful fuzzy set-theoretic analysis without attending to issues of calibration. All fuzzy sets must be interpreted according to external standards” (Ragin 2008, 8).

Thresholds identify key points at which conditions affect a given outcome. In practical terms, calibration is the “process of assigning set membership”, where membership sets are defined using thresholds or boundaries that establish “zones of inclusion and exclusion” for a given condition or outcome (Mahoney, as quoted in Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 24).

By calibrating the degree of set membership, fuzzy sets permit blurring of boundaries between membership and non-membership (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 27-28). Fuzzy-set membership scores range from 0 to 1, with the qualitative value of 1 representing full membership and 0 signifying full non-membership. These scores at either end of the continuum represent qualitative anchors (or thresholds) beyond which variation in that condition is considered irrelevant by the researcher.¹⁷³ Meanwhile, scores between the two anchors of full membership (1) and full non-membership (0) represent various degrees of partial membership. Partial membership means “Fuzzy sets preserve the capability of establishing difference-in-kind between cases (qualitative

¹⁷³ As Ragin (2008, 83) declared, a critical feature of fuzzy sets is “the fact that in order to calibrate a fuzzy set it is necessary for researchers to distinguish between relevant and irrelevant variation.”

difference) and add to this the ability to establish difference-in-degree (quantitative difference) between qualitatively identical cases” (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 27).

Calibration in fuzzy-set QCA involves defining (via theoretical and empirical knowledge): (1) what constitutes a set, (2) what indicator represents this target set, and (3) whether the direct or indirect method of calibration will be used. Researchers are advised to use external criteria (i.e., substantive, empirical, or theoretical knowledge) in order to conceptualize, define, and label these target sets (Engeli and Allison 2014; Ragin 2008). This knowledge also informs the second key step of selecting an appropriate indicator for representing the target set, as well as defining the target set in terms of set theoretic language (Ragin 2009). The third step, after defining the target set and its indicator, is to select either either the direct or indirect method of calibration to transform the raw data. All calibrations conducted herein follow this three-step process.

Direct and Indirect Calibration

The principle distinction between these two calibration methods is that “The direct method utilizes precise specifications of the key benchmarks, while the indirect method requires only a broad classification of cases” (Ragin 2008, 96). In the indirect method, the researcher establishes interval-scale values and their associated fuzzy scores according to selected “knowledge-based, qualitative groupings” that roughly approximate the degree of set membership for each group of cases (Engeli and Allison 2014; Ragin 2008, 96). Common conceptualizations of indirect calibration include a *three-value fuzzy set* (1=fully in, 0.5=neither fully in nor fully out, 0=fully out) and a *four-value fuzzy set*

(1=fully in, 0.67=more in than out, 0.33=more out than in, 0=fully out), though any number of potential combinations and assigned scores are possible.¹⁷⁴

In every instance, the fuzzy-set values can be assigned a verbal description that expresses its degree of membership. In other words, membership scores indicate “the extent to which a case belongs or does not belong to a theoretically defined set of cases” (Engeli, Rihoux, and Allison 2014, 93). A commonly accepted standard for labeling the various degrees of partial membership (adapted here from Engeli, Rihoux and Allison 2014, 95; Ragin 2000, 156; and Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 29) is as follows:

Table 48: Suggested Labels for Fuzzy-Set Membership Scores

Fuzzy Set Value	The membership status is...
1	Fully in: Full membership of the set
0.9	Almost fully in
0.8	Mostly but not fully in
0.6	More in than out
0.5	Crossover: neither in nor out
0.4	More out than in
0.2	Mostly but not fully out
0.1	Almost fully out
0	Fully out: Full non-membership of the set

In the direct method of calibration, the researcher must specify values on the interval scale that correspond with three qualitative anchors or breakpoints: (1) *an upper threshold* (which constitutes full membership; (2) *a lower threshold* (which constitutes non-membership, or 0); and (3) *a crossover point* (defined as “the point of maximum

¹⁷⁴ As Ragin notes, “the stronger the empirical basis for making qualitative assessments of set membership, the more precise the calibration of the values of the interval-scale indicator as set membership scores” (2008, 96). For additional calibration examples, see Ragin (2008) and Schneider and Wagemann (2012).

indifference about membership versus non-membership,”¹⁷⁵ or 0.5) (Ragin 2008, 985-94; Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 32). The original raw data (i.e. the interval-scale values) are transformed into fuzzy-set values using the three qualitative benchmarks established by the researcher (2009).¹⁷⁶

Both the direct and indirect method were used to calibrate conditions in follow-on chapters. Assigned thresholds and calibration values were made in accordance with the above procedures and executed in a transparent fashion based on empirical and substantive insights. Four additional methodological elements were followed:

1. Researchers may mix and match dichotomized conditions with fuzzy-set conditions; no restrictions or adjustments are necessary. Effects: Those conditions that were naturally dichotomized (e.g., presence/absence of a disaggregated power-sharing provision, etc.) were retained in this format.
2. Whatever technique or type of condition is used, a best practice for coding conditions is to set their direction so that the presence of a condition is theoretically expected to result in a positive outcome (Rihoux and De Meur 2009a, 42). Effects: All conditions were oriented accordingly.
3. When substantive, empirical and/or theoretical grounds for establishing thresholds are not available or possible, Rihoux and De Meur (2009a) recommended that technical methods (such as cluster analysis of case

¹⁷⁵ Ragin alternatively defined the crossover point as “the value of the interval-scale variable where there is maximum ambiguity as to whether a case is more in or more out of the target set” (2008, 86). This point is not necessarily represented by empirical cases, but it should have a theoretical or substantive basis.

¹⁷⁶ Computer software uses these three qualitative anchors, along with a logistic function, to transform the data. This process is discussed more in the calibration of several conditions in Chapters 7 and 8.

distribution) be used, but only to the extent that such clusters make sense.

Effects: This technique was used to establish appropriate thresholds for population size.

4. With fsQCA, not all variation is considered meaningful or “equally relevant” (Greckhamer and Mossholder 2011, 268); researchers should “distinguish between relevant and irrelevant variation” (Ragin 2008, 83). In practical application, this means that when upper and lower thresholds are established, the raw data that exist beyond these anchors are considered irrelevant by the researcher. Effects: Irrelevant data are explained in Chapters 7 and 8, alongside the selection of these thresholds.

Boolean Algebra and Fuzzy-Set Theory

Boolean algebra’s use of symbolic calculations requires, as with any new language, that its respective notations and operations are understood before engaging in further analysis (Rihoux and De Meur 2009a, 34). This project follows the notations employed by Schneider and Wagemann (2012) in their seminal textbook on set-theoretic methods (summarized in Box 1 and described briefly here): Uppercase letters

Box 1: Notations & Operations of Boolean Algebra

UPPERCASE = the presence of a condition
lowercase = the absence of a condition

Logical **AND** (*Boolean multiplication: indicates set intersection, combined conditions*)

$$A * b = A b = \min (A, b)$$

Logical **OR** (*Boolean addition: indicates set union, alternate conditions*)

$$A + b = \max (A, b)$$

→ indicates a sufficient condition; “leads to. . .”

Fuzzy set and Crisp Set Negation

$$\sim A = 1 - A$$

indicate the presence (i.e., 1) of a condition while lowercase letters indicate the absence (i.e., 0) of a condition. Two basic operators—logical *AND*, logical *OR*—provide the primary means for assigning set relations. A logical *AND*, represented by the multiplication (*) symbol indicates set intersection. Set intersection is defined as a *conjunction* of two (or more) conditions that together form a causal path leading to an outcome (Engeli, Rihoux, and Allison 2014, 101). A case's degree of membership in this causal combination is calculated by taking the minimum membership score in the respective conditions.

A logical *OR*, represented by the addition (+) symbol, refers to the set union of alternative conditions, in which two or more sets are joined in a union of sets. The logical *OR* means that either one condition *or* the other may lead to the same outcome. Since the logical *OR* indicates alternative conditions, the fuzzy-set membership of a case is assessed by taking the maximum of the respective membership scores (Ragin 2008, 71; Ragin 2009, 96). A third basic operator—the arrow symbol (\rightarrow)—is employed to indicate the causal link between a set of conditions and the outcome being explained (Rihoux and De Meur 2009a, 34-35). Finally, the negation of a set value is found by subtracting the case's membership value in that set from 1 (symbolically, $\sim A = 1 - A$) (Mello 2014, 51).

Analyzing Set-Theoretic Relations

Influential causal relations, such as *necessity* and *sufficiency*, are indicated when certain types of set relations exist. Necessity is about gauging shared antecedents while sufficiency is about assessing shared outcomes (Ragin 2014, xxviii). In practice, a condition is defined as necessary “if it is always present when the outcome occurs,” meaning “the outcome cannot occur in the absence of the condition” (Rihoux and Ragin 2009, xix).

Box 2: Defining Necessary & Sufficient Conditions

“A cause is both necessary and sufficient if it is the only cause that produces an outcome and it is singular (that is, not a combination of cases).

A cause is sufficient but not necessary if it is capable of producing the outcome but is not the only cause with this capability.

A cause is necessary but not sufficient if it is capable of producing an outcome in combination with other causes and appears in all such combinations.

Finally, a cause is neither necessary nor sufficient if it appears only in a subset of the combinations of conditions that produce an outcome” (Ragin 2014, 99-100)

Furthermore, “In situations where causation is multiple and conjunctural, there may be no necessary or sufficient conditions for an outcome of interest” (Ragin 2014, 27).

Sufficient conditions are evident “if the outcome always occurs when the condition is present. However, the outcome could also result from other conditions” (Rihoux and Ragin 2009, xix). Box 2 summarizes various combinations of these terms; the latter notion of multiple conjunctural causation is particularly applicable in this analysis and when using fsQCA.

Goodness-of-Fit Measures

Two goodness-of-fit measures, *consistency* and *coverage*, are used to identify necessary and sufficient conditions by evaluating each of the different causal paths. *Consistency* measures the degree to which the empirical evidence fits a set-theoretic (i.e.,

set-subset) relationship (Berg-Schlosser 2012; Ragin 2008).¹⁷⁷ A causal path is considered consistent when its “similar configuration of conditions leads to a similar outcome” (Engeli, Rihoux, and Allison, 2014, 102).

Measuring Consistency

Scholars customarily identify *necessary conditions* using a threshold of 0.90 consistency¹⁷⁸ (Schneider and Wagemann 2012), *almost necessary conditions* using a threshold of 0.80 consistency (Ragin 2003, 182), and *substantially inconsistent conditions*—those configurational paths that should be considered “non-robust and unreliable”—with scores below 0.75 (Engeli, Rihoux, and Allison 2014, 102; Ragin 2008). Necessary conditions in this project are identified using these parameters.

Scholars traditionally use less rigid consistency thresholds when evaluating *sufficient conditions*.¹⁷⁹ Researchers are generally commended to rule out consistent values near or below 0.5, where contradictions exist in (almost) half of the evaluated empirical evidence, and pursue values at or above 0.75 consistency when possible (127). In establishing high consistency thresholds, a practical trade-off is triggered: higher consistency scores often result in lower coverage (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 149). This project explores such trade-offs and explains why specific thresholds were selected.

¹⁷⁷ For detailed explanation of the consistency and coverage formulas, see Schneider and Wagemann (2012, Chapter 5).

¹⁷⁸ Note that the necessity threshold of 0.90 corresponds with the aforementioned 90% consistency threshold used by Fiss (2012) to identify necessary variables within contingency tables.

¹⁷⁹ In their QCA textbook, Schneider and Wagemann (2012) strongly implored researchers to refrain from strict imposition or justification of a consistency threshold for sufficient conditions based on rigid methodological benchmarks or some sort of “universally accepted consistency threshold, akin to the (largely non-reflected) use of the 95 percent confidence interval in inferential statistics” (127-128). Rather, researchers should think of goodness-of-fit tools as “numerical summaries that describe the data patterns in the underlying dataset” (148), thus using their specific research projects to guide any such decisions (128).

Measuring Coverage

Coverage is an assessment of a condition's significance. Coverage serves as "a gauge of empirical importance or weight" (Ragin 2008, 101), revealing the proportion of an outcome that is explained or "covered" by a causal condition (or a combination of conditions) (Berg-Schlosser 2012; Ragin 2008; Schneider and Wagemann 2012).¹⁸⁰

Unlike consistency, no minimum threshold exists for coverage scores; the decision rests with the researcher. This project follows the common practice used in small- and medium-N comparisons of requiring only a single case in order to analyze a specific path; that is, every causal configuration matters (Engeli, Rihoux, and Allison 2014, 10). Causal paths with high frequency were also evaluated in depth; this step is recommended when conducting research with potential policy recommendations (Rihoux et al 2014, 102).

All three of the different coverage measures available to researchers are used in the next two chapters. These include: (1) *Solution coverage* indicates the proportion of outcome membership covered by the complete solution term. (2) *Raw coverage* indicates the proportion of outcome membership explained by a specific causal path (i.e., set of conditions). (3) *Unique coverage* indicates the proportion of outcome membership exclusively explained by a specific causal path (i.e., by a set of conditions) (Schneider and Wagemann 2010, 2012).

Truth Tables and Sufficient Conditions

While computer software was used to quickly calculate measures of consistency and coverage for necessary conditions, the calculation of these measures for sufficient

¹⁸⁰ The closer a coverage measure is to 1.0, the greater the number of cases that are covered by a specific path (Engeli, Rihoux, and Allison 2014, 102).

conditions required truth-table procedures. These procedures represent the core of any set-theoretic analysis using QCA, for:

[T]he truth table elaborates and formalizes one of the key analytic strategies of comparative research—examining cases sharing specific combinations of causal conditions to see if they share the same outcome. Indeed, the main goal of truth table analysis is to identify explicit conditions between combinations of causal conditions and outcomes.¹⁸¹

The truth-table procedure provides a visual map of all “the logically possible combinations of causal conditions that lead to the occurrence or non-occurrence of the outcome” (Engeli, Rihoux, and Allison 2014, 97).¹⁸²

In fuzzy set truth table construction, respective cases potentially have partial (i.e. varied or differentiated) membership in every available truth table row (Berg-Schlusser 2012, 97; Ragin 2009, 100, 104). To resolve this complexity, this project follows the standard practice of aligning each case with the respective causal path where it is most strongly representative (i.e. “more in than out” of that configuration) (Berg-Schlusser 2012, 97, 99; Ragin 2009; Schneider and Wagemann 2012).¹⁸³

Truth Table Minimization Process

A fundamental step in the analysis of truth tables is the reduction of logical complexity. This reduction is made possible via the so-called Quine-McCluskey algorithm. This algorithm involves a stepwise reduction of the possible combinations of

¹⁸¹ See Ragin (2008, 24-25).

¹⁸² This analysis uses a minimum frequency of a single observation to warrant inclusion of a configuration in the truth table. A specific configuration may also correspond with several actual observed cases.

¹⁸³ This practice was made possible by the discovery that “Each case can have only one membership score greater than 0.5 in the logically possible combinations formed from a given set of conditions” (Rihoux and Ragin 2009, 106).

conditions in order to obtain the shortest possible causal combination—also commonly called the minimal solution.

Before researchers run the Quine-McCluskey minimization procedure using various QCA software programs, they must determine: (1) the consistency score, and (2) how they will deal with limited diversity. The consistency score is “used as a cutoff value for determining which causal combinations pass fuzzy set theoretic consistency and which do not” (Ragin 2009, 109). A common practice is to analyze multiple thresholds in order to assess the trade-offs and consequences of raising or lowering the consistency cutoff.

Fuzzy-set QCA also forces researchers to make an explicit decision about how they will deal with logical remainders (Schneider and Wagemann 2006, 758). Logical remainders—defined as those causal combinations and fuzzy-set corners that lack at least one empirically strong case—occur because of limited diversity in empirical data; “[t]he observed data are far less rich than the potential property space delineated by the conditions” (Berg-Schlosser and De Meur 2009, 27). Three options exist: (1) Logical remainders “can be avoided altogether,” which results in a *complex solution*. This solution is a more conservative, safe estimate since it minimizes using only actual empirical observations; however, the resulting solution is often quite complex and difficult to interpret (Engeli, Rihoux, and Allison 2014, 99). (2) Logical remainders can be “used without explicit evaluation of their plausibility,” which yields a *parsimonious solution*. All empirical cases and all logically possible cases (even if empirically unrepresented) are included in the procedure. (3) Or logical remainders can be “used

selectively, based on the researcher’s substantive and theoretical knowledge,” which is considered the *intermediate solution* (Ragin 2009, 120). Some logical remainders are retained here, but only for plausible conditions that are informed by the researcher’s theoretical and substantive knowledge of how these conditions are expected to affect the outcome (Engeli, Rihoux, and Allison 2014, 99; Ragin 2009, 110, 118).

In summary, truth tables allow researchers to disentangle causal complexity. The truth table is strategically organized around the idea that cases with shared causal pathways might be examined to see whether their outcomes are also shared. The process necessitates a number of explicit researcher decisions, from establishing consistency or coverage thresholds to selecting the appropriate minimization technique.

Truth tables are employed throughout Chapters 7 and 8 in order to explore and identify shared causal conditions that shape human-rights outcomes. The decisions made throughout the analytical process are backed by theoretical and substantive justification and are all transparently shared so that others may replicate or adjust follow-on research.

Negation of the Outcome

Analysis of the negation of the outcome—though uncommon still in contemporary literature¹⁸⁴—is critical to validating a researcher’s causal argument. The analysis of a given truth table may reveal that certain conditions are sufficient for an outcome to occur. But because set-theoretic relationships do not assume symmetry

¹⁸⁴ Although Schneider and Wagemann (2010, 2012) concluded that it is ‘good practice’ to analyze the negation of the outcome, Mello’s (2013) analysis of twenty-four fsQCA peer-reviewed, published articles found that only seven of these studies evaluated the negation of the outcome.

between causes and effects,¹⁸⁵ researchers cannot infer from these sufficient conditions what the sufficient conditions will be for the *non*-occurrence (or negation) of that outcome. Key insights are possible from analysis of the latter. For example, if a certain causal pathway consistently leads to both the outcome and the negation of the outcome, then

serious doubts arise about the explanatory strength of the conditions employed. Likewise, a meaningful analysis of the non-outcome necessitates the inclusion of *negative cases*, which can strengthen the confidence in the fsQCA results for both analyses.¹⁸⁶

Two-Step Approach for fsQCA

Schneider and Wagemann's (2006, 2012) Two-Step Approach is grounded in the understanding that actor-influenced variables (i.e. proximate conditions) "unfold within certain [situational and historical] contexts" (i.e. remote conditions) that enable or constrain their influence (Schneider and Wagemann 2006, 2012, 254). This approach aligned with the natural division of causal factors in this project into two distinct sets; Chapter 3 distinguished proximate and remote conditions by their spatiotemporal differences. Chapter 4 then defined and operationalized these conditions.

Both steps in the Two-Step Approach involve the construction of truth tables.¹⁸⁷

In the first step, the truth table is based exclusively on evaluating the remote conditions and the outcome of interest. Logical complexity in the truth table is reduced using the

¹⁸⁵ In contrast, when correlations test the relationship between a cause and effect, they simultaneously test the relationship between the absence of that cause and the absence of the same effect.

¹⁸⁶ See Mello (2013, 14).

¹⁸⁷ The outline of these principles is based on Schneider and Wagemann's (2006) example of a two-step process in which they explain and demonstrate the approach, as well as their QCA textbook (2012, 254-5, 315).

Quine-McCluskey minimization procedure oriented to obtaining the parsimonious solution and using intentionally lower consistency thresholds. The parsimonious solution reduces complexity of the initial model by treating logical remainders—defined as those causal combination and fuzzy set corners that lack at least one empirically strong case (Berg-Schlosser and De Meur 2009, 27)—“without explicit evaluation of their plausibility” (Ragin 2009, 120).¹⁸⁸ The deliberate underspecification (lowering) of the consistency threshold helps to derive remote conditions that may enable the outcome while not overly constraining the results. This first step allows researchers to derive “outcome-enabling conditions”—understood as the contextual conditions “under which a given outcome is more likely to occur than other contexts” (Schneider and Wagemann 2006, 761)—all while retaining space for improvement in the overall solution once proximate factors are added in the second step.

The purpose of the second step is to unravel those combinations of remote conditions and proximate conditions that led to the outcome. Multiple truth tables are constructed: each “outcome-enabling” remote condition from Step One is individually run alongside the full set of proximate conditions. Logical minimization using Quine-McCluskey procedures is made stringent by higher consistency thresholds and by selection of the complex solution, which discards all logical remainders and opts instead for minimization based solely on actual empirical cases. The resulting solution yields those sufficient causal paths that consistently lead to the outcome. All of the truth tables run in the second step are then consolidated into a single table.

¹⁸⁸ This means that all empirical cases and all logically possible cases (even if empirically unrepresented) are included in the procedure.

Of note, this two-step process largely negates the utility of the coverage calculations (for sufficient conditions), since coverage is assessed in separate truth-table procedures against each individual remote condition and these coverages are thus non-applicable since they cannot account for the entire table. However, the previously discussed addition of frequency considerations supplements the absence of this measure.

Strengths and Limitations of Fuzzy-Set QCA

QCA was selected for this study because of its capacity to address small- and intermediate-N comparative research, combined with its systematic approach that allows for context-sensitive causality and multiple conjunctural causation. This latter characteristic allows researchers to compare different causal pathways, as well as cases with similar combinations of conditions and their effects on the outcome.

Certain disadvantages and burdens are inherent in QCA, as well. A greater onus is placed on researchers who use its techniques. For example, the QCA framework is analytically malleable in that it flexibly accommodates—better said, it requires—a number of methodological decisions by the researcher, many of which have been detailed in this chapter. In addition, QCA encourages retroductive analysis, involving continual movement back and forth between theory and empirical data (recall Figure 5). The combination of these two characteristics places a particularly strong burden on scholars who use QCA to transparently explain their decisions and to base them on theoretical or empirical knowledge.

Making policy prescriptions based on QCA or other set-theoretic research methods alone is potentially risky. QCA is able to explore “context-sensitive and

historically bound explanations” where equal weighting is given “to each particular case including deviant ones or outliers. . . .” (Berg-Schlosser 2012, 85), but it does not account for spatiotemporal analysis. That is to say, QCA does not examine how the order or timing of conditions affects an outcome; the *sequencing* of conditions at such critical junctures is unaddressed. Indeed, causal chains and sequences “might be masked by what appears to be a cross-section conjunction on the macro level” (Beach and Rohlfing 2015, 4). And research in closely related fields has demonstrated that the sequencing of conditions can be absolutely critical. For example, the success of post-conflict state building often hinges on well-designed sequencing of reconstruction measures (Paris and Sisk 2009).

Another disadvantage is that while fuzzy-set QCA identifies causal configurations, it is limited in verifying the exact causal mechanisms at play. QCA does provide rapid inroads to case comparisons by using common causal configurations that lead to the same outcome. QCA is definitively case-oriented; it should not be considered equivalent to case study analysis though. A tradeoff always exists between the number of cases originally considered (the breadth) and the degree of intimacy that is gained with each individual case (the depth) (Rihoux and Lobe 2009).

Ideally, a QCA study is followed by further analysis, such as process tracing of selected case studies that can examine and corroborate the theorized causal pathways.¹⁸⁹

A promising new proposal yet to be explored in-depth by researchers is the integration of

¹⁸⁹ For this reason, scholars like Berg-Schlosser and De Meur (1994) followed-up their Boolean-based analysis later with comparative case studies to examine these causal mechanisms more closely (see Berg-Schlosser and Mitchell 2016).

cross-case analyses with process tracing, using set theoretic methods. Several scholars (Beach and Rohlfing 2015; Schneider and Rohlfing 2013) have proposed mixed-method practices for pursuing this integration further.

A final disadvantage of fsQCA is its potential sensitivity to researcher coding, though comparative scholarship on this issue is thin.¹⁹⁰ For this reason, advocates of QCA continually emphasize the transparent selection of coding thresholds based on specific theoretical and empirical grounds.

Conclusion

This chapter serves as a foundational guide for the analytical procedures of fuzzy set QCA applied hereafter. The chapter showed how the specific method of fsQCA employs calibration, formal logic, Boolean algebra, and set theory to analyze the necessity and sufficiency of various configurations of conditions that lead to an outcome (or to its negation). These terms and tools were defined and explained. Additionally, the specific tools necessary for understanding goodness-of-fit measures like consistency and coverage, as well as truth-table procedures, were also covered. The chapter closed by detailing how the Two-Step Approach will be used in the forthcoming analyses in Chapters 7 and 8. It also addressed limitations of the selected research design.

Fuzzy-set QCA represents a rigorous methodological alternative to prevailing social science methods. These latter methods measure the net effects of individual variables rather than assess configurations of conditions. In comparison, QCA at its core

¹⁹⁰ On the subject of QCA coding sensitivity, Skaaning (2011, 405) replicated three different studies to explore this issue and found that while QCA findings are sensitive to minor adjustments, the modifications in most cases “did not have much—if any—impact.” In addition, fuzzy-set QCA was found to be less sensitive than crisp-set QCA. Skaaning was hesitant to generalize these findings given the small-N analysis.

assumes multi-conjunctural causation and equifinality, which “allows for different, mutually non-exclusive sufficient conditions, or paths, for the outcome” (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 326). The Two-Step Approach particularly emphasizes and accounts for historical and situational context that might shape the potential effects of actor-influenced conditions. The unique methodological advantages and perspectives of fsQCA blossom in the analysis and interpretation that begins now.

Chapter Seven: Fuzzy-Set QCA of Model 1, Aggregated Power-Sharing Dimensions

This and the next chapter investigate the effects of peace-agreement provisions on human-rights outcomes in civil wars that ended 1989-2007. Two different models are investigated. The principal difference between these models is how they approach investigating the various peace-agreement provisions offered within peace agreements. This chapter investigates Model 1, which includes *aggregated power-sharing dimensions* (proximate Set 1 conditions) and situational, historical contexts called remote conditions. The next chapter investigates Model 2, which involves *disaggregated peace-agreement provisions* (proximate Set 2 conditions) and the same set of remote conditions used in the first model.

This chapter mobilizes fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) to evaluate how aggregated power-sharing dimensions (Set 1 proximate conditions) combine and interact within certain remote conditions to influence human-rights outcomes. The investigation builds upon the theories and hypotheses first detailed in Chapters 2 and 4, and the examination of bivariate relationships conducted via contingency tables in Chapter 5. The methodological tools covered in Chapter 6 are used here to elucidate necessary and sufficient causal recipes that lead to either the desired outcome of significant human rights improvement (SHRI), or to the negation of this outcome (~SHRI).

All four original proximate conditions—including extensively institutionalized settlements, thick political settlements, thick military settlements, and territorial power-sharing agreements—were retained for fsQCA. Three-letter identifiers were used to designate these proximate conditions, as shown in Table 49 below.

Table 49: Aggregated Power-Sharing Dimensions (Proximate Set 1 Conditions)

PROXIMATE CONDITIONS
<i>Set 1: Aggregate Dimensions</i>
EIS - Extensively institutionalized settlements
THP - Thick political settlements
THM - Thick military settlements
TPS - Territorial power-sharing agreement

This chapter evaluates how these four proximate conditions operate within different situational and historical contexts. These contexts, referred to in this dissertation as remote conditions, enhance or constrain the likelihood that different proximate factors influence a given outcome. The following remote conditions were retained from the bivariate analysis in Chapter 5:

Table 50: Remote Conditions Retained for fsQCA

REMOTE CONDITIONS
NE - Non-ethnic conflict
SW - Short civil war
EP - Enduring peace
SP - Small population
HD - Highly democratic
MD - Moderately developed economy

As detailed in Chapter 6, this evaluation will use Schneider and Wagemann’s (2006, 2012) Two-Step Approach and the methodology of fuzzy-set Qualitative

Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) to investigate the causal combinations of proximate and remote conditions leading to the outcome and to the non-outcome. To facilitate this process, all non-dichotomous conditions and outcomes were calibrated in accordance with the procedures outlined in the previous chapter. Conditions and outcomes that required calibration included: (1) the Set 1 proximate conditions of extensively institutionalized settlements, thick political power-sharing, and thick military power-sharing; (2) the remote conditions of civil war duration, population size, regime type, and economic development; and (3) significant human-rights improvement (i.e., significant reduction in the state's use of political repression).¹⁹¹

The chapter begins with these calibration procedures. Following calibration, the analysis includes separate procedures for investigating the outcome, then its negation. The reason for these separate procedures is based on QCA's asymmetric nature, wherein the results for the negation of the outcome cannot be inferred (or simply inverted) from the results of the outcome. This is a strength and benefit of QCA. Chapter 4 demonstrated the limits of symmetric analyses, such as cross-tabulation tables, that may obscure the asymmetric influence of a given condition on an outcome. For these reasons, both the outcome and its negation must be considered separately.

Fuzzy-Set Calibrations

In accordance with best practices (Rihoux and De Meur 2009a), the raw data was calibrated based on theoretically relevant, empirically verifiable grounds. Where the substantive literature was unclear regarding specific thresholds, clustering techniques

¹⁹¹ Dichotomous conditions like territorial power-sharing provisions, non-ethnic conflict, and enduring peace are already operationalized for fsQCA. Set 2 proximate conditions are calibrated in the next chapter.

were used to identify appropriate cutoffs. All conditions were coded “so that their presence ([1] value) is theoretically expected to be associated with a positive outcome ([1] outcome value)” (Rihoux and De Meur 2009a, 42).

Set 1 Proximate Aggregated Conditions

Three of the four proximate conditions in Set 1—including extensively institutionalized settlements, thick political power-sharing, and thick military power-sharing—require calibration. The condition of territorial power sharing is already dichotomized based on the presence or absence of either territorial provision (i.e., autonomy or federalism) in a negotiated settlement.

Extensively Institutionalized Settlements

In considering calibration parameters for any proposed condition, the foremost issue is discerning an appropriate definition of the target set, followed by consideration of how indicators map to that target set. For this first condition, the target set is defined as *extensively institutionalized settlements* (condition identifier: EIS). This target set embodies the theory proposed by Hartzell and Hoddie (2007, 75), wherein “the most extensively institutionalized settlements” produce the greatest impact on the outcome of interest. The qualifier *extensively* is necessary for establishing the degree of institutionalization in negotiated settlements.

The specific indicator that maps to this target set is the composite measure of *settlement institutionalization*, which was defined in Chapters 4 and 5. To briefly recap, institutionalized settlements are assessed by a composite measure that varies from 0 to 3 in accordance with the additional presence of respective political, military, and territorial

power-sharing dimensions. In a substantive sense, extensively institutionalized settlements are negotiated settlements where all three dimensions of power sharing are included. Such settlements are considered full members in the fuzzy set and recoded as 1. Cases definitively *not* in the EIS set (i.e., full non-members) were identified by the absence of any power-sharing measures, and coded for fuzzy-set analysis as 0.

How should the other institutionalized settlements—those involving just one or two dimensions—be calibrated? The first method considered here was a four-value fuzzy-set scheme used by Ragin (2008) to assign the interval values of 0.0 (“fully out”), 0.33 (“more out than in”), 0.67 (“more in than out”), and 1 (“fully in”). These rigid settings, however, do not accurately capture Hartzell and Hoddie’s (2007, 82) empirical finding that “higher levels of settlement institutionalization lower the risk of a return to civil war.” This finding showed that the absence of *any* power-sharing institutions resulted in an increased risk of civil war recurrence by 420 percent. Comparatively, the addition of just one power-sharing institution increased the risk of civil war recurrence by 153 percent.¹⁹² As Hartzell and Hoddie astutely observed, while the inclusion of additional dimensions initially results in an increased risk of civil war recurrence, this still represents a risk level reduction compared with when all such measures are excluded. Meanwhile, the presence of three or more types of power-sharing institutions in a settlement represented a breakpoint, with civil war recurrence *reduced* by 40 percent.

If each additional power-sharing dimension (assessed as increased membership in the set of extensively institutionalized settlements) further reduces the risk of civil war

¹⁹² This finding parallels Hartzell and Hoddie’s (2003b, 327) earlier work which found that “inclusion of power-sharing provisions in any of the four categories reduces the likelihood of settlement failure by 53%.”

recurrence, how should this partial membership be properly transformed? Ragin (2008) accommodated for this possibility, clarifying that his illustrated settings were not prescriptive, rigid principles. Rather, “the specific translation of ordinal ranks to fuzzy membership scores depends on the fit between the specific content of the ordinal categories and the researcher’s conceptualization and labeling of the fuzzy set” (Ragin 2008, 32).¹⁹³ This underscores “the fact that researchers must use substantive and theoretical knowledge” so that the “calibration of degree of membership in sets” might be purposeful and meaningful rather than mechanical (Ragin 2008, 32).

In this instance, the presence of even a single dimension of power sharing significantly improves the outcome, compared to its absence. Therefore, *partially* institutionalized settlements are considered more “in” the set of extensively institutionalized settlements than “out” of the set, and are represented with a corresponding fuzzy score of 0.67. The relationship between institutionalization and outcomes is considered exponential, with increasing membership in the set of extensively institutionalized settlements resulting in ever improving outcomes with respect to peace duration. For this reason, *mostly* institutionalized settlements were coded as 0.9, representing cases that were “*almost fully in.*” The following table summarizes the fuzzy-set scores for this target set:

¹⁹³ Schneider and Wagemann (2012, 29) substantiated this approach, stating that “different intervals between the fuzzy-set membership scores are possible: it is perfectly fine if a fuzzy set shows membership scores of, say, 0.1, 0.4, 0.6 and 1, if theoretical considerations warrant it.”

Table 51: Fuzzy-Score Calibration for Extensively Institutionalized Settlements (EIS)

Label	Summary Description and Operationalization	Fuzzy Score
Extensively institutionalized settlements	All three dimensions of power-sharing agreements, including political, military, and territorial dimensions, are found in the negotiated settlement	1
Mostly institutionalized settlements	Two of the three power-sharing agreement dimensions exist in the negotiated settlement; "almost fully in" the set	0.9
Partially institutionalized settlements	Just one of the three power-sharing agreement dimensions exists in the negotiated settlement; "more in than out" of the set	0.67
Non-institutionalized settlements	No power-sharing agreement dimensions exist in the settlement; "fully out" of the set	0

Thick Political Settlements

The next target set was defined simply as *thick political settlements* (condition identifier: TPS). This set exemplifies Mattes and Savun's (2009) contention that political power-sharing agreements reduce the risk of civil war recurrence. Indeed, they found that each additional political power-sharing provision reduced that risk by 29 percent. The specific indicator used here was the count measure of political power-sharing thickness discussed in Chapter 3. This measure varies from 0 to 3, with the maximum value indicating that a negotiated settlement provides for three specific political measures; including representative legislative elections, as well as guaranteed integration of rebels into cabinet posts in the executive branch and into posts in the civil service.

The two target sets of exclusively institutionalized settlements and thick political settlements were both converted from four-value scales. However, where institutionalization had an exponential or multiplicative effect on the outcome (i.e., each additional dimension significantly improved the results), the effects from thick political

settlements were considered more additive in nature. The calibration scores accounted for this additive nature by using equally spaced intervals. Also, the inclusion of even a single political measure was assumed to produce at least some positive effects; partially thick political settlements, with just one political settlement, are therefore scored above the crossover threshold. This results in the following fuzzy-score calibration:

Table 52: Fuzzy-Score Calibration for Thick Political Settlements (TPS)

Label	Summary Description and Operationalization	Fuzzy Score
Fully thick political settlement	Fully thick political power-sharing dimension; all three provisions (representation in executive, legislative, and civil service) are included	1
Mostly thick political settlement	Two of the three political power-sharing agreement provisions are included; "mostly in" the set	0.8
Partially thick political settlement	Just one of the three political power-sharing agreement provisions is included; "more in than out" of the set	0.6
Non-political settlement	No political power-sharing provisions exist in the negotiated settlement; "fully out" of the set	0

Thick Military Settlements

Calibration of *thick military settlements* (condition identifier: TMS) closely resembled the calibration done for thick political settlements (TPS). The military condition accounted for the assertions of Hartzell and Hoddie (2003a) and Jarstad and Nilsson (2008), who found that military power-sharing agreements are strongly associated with durable peace because they function as legitimate, costly signals between war rivals. The indicator used here to map *thick military settlements* was the count measure of military power-sharing thickness discussed in Chapter 3. This count measure varies from 0 to 2, with the maximum value indicating that a negotiated settlement

provides for guaranteed integration of rebels into a state's joint-defense force and into leadership positions of that same force.

Calibration of a three-value fuzzy set is somewhat trickier than sets with four values. A number of scholars have cautioned against rigidly following Ragin's (2008, 31) proposed solution of setting the three values at 0 ("fully out"), 0.5 ("neither fully in nor fully out"), and 1("fully in"). Schneider and Wagemann (2012, 28) warned that assigning cases with a fuzzy-set membership score of 0.5 demonstrates "we are unable to say for an individual case whether it is more a member of the set or more a non-member" of that set. Many QCA software programs drop all cases where values are exactly 0.5.¹⁹⁴

The middle value in this set, defined as those peace agreements involving only a single military power-sharing provision, was not ambiguous. Rather than setting this value at 0.5, proper calibration places this *above* the threshold (i.e., as residing *mostly in* the set of thick military settlements). The presence of a single military integration measure is very good for a negotiated settlement. Scholars contended that the presence of a single measure demonstrated a costly signal that the government was ready to distribute authority within its own coercive apparatus (Hartzell and Hoddie 2015). Fuzzy-score calibration for thick military settlements was set as follows:

¹⁹⁴ Both *fsQCA* and *kirq* software programs are known to drop such cases.

Table 53: Fuzzy-Score Calibration for Thick Military Settlements (TMS)

Label	Summary Description and Operationalization	Fuzzy Score
Fully thick military settlement	Fully thick military power-sharing dimension; both military provisions (integration in main ranks and in leadership) are included in negotiated settlement	1
Partially thick military settlement	One of the two military power-sharing provisions is included; "mostly in" the set	0.8
Non-military settlement	No military power-sharing agreement provisions exist in the negotiated settlement	0

Remote Conditions

Next, the remote conditions of civil war duration, population size, regime type, and economic development were calibrated. Enduring peace and non-ethnic wars were already dichotomized.

War Duration

War duration was the first condition discussed that involved calibrating interval-scale variables. The target set for this condition was *states that experienced very short-duration civil wars* (condition identifier: SW). A six-value fuzzy set, as described by Ragin (2008), was initially considered for establishing appropriate values. Using previous thresholds of two years, four years and seven years,¹⁹⁵ the set was demarcated as shown (in Table 54 below).

This calibration provided a decent initial approximation; however, the demarcations using these intervals were sub-optimal. A simple illustration of the data demonstrates this: A war that lasts 23 months is not so different from one that lasts 24 or

¹⁹⁵ See Chapter 5 for discussion about these thresholds.

25 months such that it would warrant a drop in score from 0.8 (“mostly in” the set) to 0.6 (“more in than out” of the set). How, then, should this condition be calibrated?

Table 54: Six-value Fuzzy-score Calibration for Short-duration Civil Wars (SW)

Label	Summary Description and Operationalization	Fuzzy Score
Very short-duration civil wars	Civil wars lasting less than one year in duration	1
Short civil wars	Civil wars lasting more than one year but less than two years in duration	0.8
Semi-short civil wars	Civil wars lasting two or more years but less than four years in duration	0.6
Medium-length civil wars	Civil wars lasting longer than four years but less than seven years	0.3
Long civil wars	Civil wars lasting longer than seven years but less than ten years	0.1
Extended duration civil wars	Wars lasting ten years or longer	0

An alternative calibration method that more accurately accounts for the diversity of conflict duration, without using intermittent thresholds, is the *direct method of calibration* (Ragin 2008, 85-94). As briefly discussed earlier, this approach requires specifying three qualitative anchors: (1) an *upper threshold* (i.e., constitutes full membership), (2) a *lower threshold* (i.e., constitutes non-membership), and (3) a *crossover point* (i.e., “the value of the interval-scale variable where there is maximum ambiguity as to whether a case is more in or more out of the target set” (Ragin 2008, 86)). The purpose of these benchmarks is to “transform the original interval-scale values to fuzzy membership scores” (Ragin 2008, 85). When applied here, the direct method replaced the rough approximations found in the original six-value fuzzy calibration scoring with a “fine-grained calibration of the degree of membership of cases in sets, with scores ranging from 0.0 to 1.0” (Ragin 2008, 85).

The use of qualitative anchors, when based on an explicit rationale, also made it “possible to distinguish between relevant and irrelevant variation” (Ragin 2008, 33). For example, the *upper threshold of full membership* in the set of *states that experienced short-lived civil wars* was intentionally established as civil wars that were shorter than twelve months. The upper threshold was set beyond the known threshold of two years discussed earlier in order to capture some of the variation that exists in shorter conflicts.¹⁹⁶ Setting the threshold at twelve months was also equivalent to asserting that the difference between a war that lasts four months and one that lasts eleven months is an irrelevant distinction; both are considered full members within the set.

Two components informed the *lower threshold of non-membership*: (1) the previous *Tosmana*-established threshold of seven years¹⁹⁷, and (2) Fearon’s (2004) finding that the median for non-coup and non-revolutionary wars was approximately nine years. The lower threshold was set at ten years—one year beyond Fearon’s median—in order to capture variety below these respective thresholds. This also set a conservative boundary for defining the point at which variation in war duration would be considered inconsequential.

With respect to setting *the crossover point*, the previous *Tosmana*-established threshold of four years was initially considered as the point of maximum ambiguity. Closer investigation of the thirty-six cases revealed, though, that five years was a better

¹⁹⁶ See Chapter 4. Also, this two-year threshold closely aligns with Fearon’s (2004) estimation that the median civil war duration for coup-related or popular revolutions is approximately 2.1 years.

¹⁹⁷ See Chapter 4. Additionally, Appendix 11 demonstrates the importance of the seven-year threshold with respect to robust third-party security guarantees: in short, robust guarantees involving peace enforcement are particularly rare in long duration conflicts beyond 7 years.

middle threshold. Two civil wars that lasted between four to five years informed this adjustment. In general, human rights improved in both, indicating that the crossover point needed to shift to the five-year period. In *Azerbaijan*, human rights improved over the short- and mid-term periods, with no human-rights data available for the long-term period. In *Sierra Leone*, human rights were initially worse in the short term, but then improved. The worsening of human rights in the short term is likely related to the recurrence of civil war at $t+2$.

The five-year threshold also was close to halfway between the median for civil wars involving coups or revolutions (2.1 years) and the median for non-coup, non-revolutionary wars (9 years). Therefore, the crossover threshold was set at five years instead of four, since this appeared to demarcate a more accurate threshold for where ambiguity was most prevalent. Of note, the process used here to set the lower threshold highlights an aforementioned strength of QCA; namely, QCA encourages retroductive analysis, with a continual dialogue and exchange between theory and data.

To summarize the following thresholds were established for the set of *states that experienced short-lived civil wars (SW)*: full membership (< 1 year), non-membership (> 10 years), and crossover point (5 years). To capture relevant variation, these anchors were set close to, but outside of, known anchor points described in the literature.¹⁹⁸ With these three qualitative anchors established, the original interval-scale data could then be transformed into fuzzy membership scores (Ragin 2008, 85). This transformation was

¹⁹⁸ From this literature, war duration represents both the length of the conflict and potentially a proxy of the type of conflict.

accomplished using Rubinson's (2015) software program that calculated the "direct" method of calibration once the thresholds were determined.¹⁹⁹

Population Size

The target set for population size is *states with small populations* (condition identifier: SP). This definition aligns with extensive theoretical and empirical evidence (Hegre and Sambanis 2006; Henderson 1993; Huntington 2006; Murdie and Davis 2010; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999) that larger populations experience increased political repression. This increased repression is due to a variety of mechanisms, including, *inter alia*, increased demographic demands on socio-economic and political institutions as well as resource scarcity. States with smaller populations experience fewer of these stressors, which leads to less political repression. The specific indicator that maps to this target set is the interval-scale data of *population size* discussed in Chapter 4.

The current literature does not establish external criteria corresponding to clear anchors. Therefore, for the crossover threshold, the previously established and tested *Tosmana*-based threshold of 10 million people (a natural log of 16.12) was used (see Chapter 4). The upper threshold for full membership was set at 1 million, below the lowest population size for the set. This ensured that all variation was captured given the lack of external criteria. The lower threshold was established to correspond with states having populations of 50 million people or more; this threshold was five times the crossover value and aligned with a clear threshold in the available data (see figure below; note that 17.73 represents the natural log of 50 million people).

¹⁹⁹ Users wishing to replicate this data or leverage this software should note that the inversion function is necessary given that the calibrate function assumes increasing values are associated with upper thresholds.




Figure 14: Population Thresholds Using *Tosmana* - 10 and 50 million

By way of review, suitable anchors for the set of *less populated states* (SP) are: (1) an upper threshold of full membership at 1 million people (natural log 13.82), (2) a crossover threshold at 10 million people (natural log 16.12), and (3) a lower threshold of full non-membership at 50 million people (natural log 17.73). With these three qualitative thresholds, Rubinson’s (2015) QCA add-on was again used to run the direct method of calibration for the target set.²⁰⁰

Economic Development

As with the *war costs* condition, *economic development* did not demonstrate any significant relationship with human-rights outcomes (see Chapter 5 contingency tables), even when assessed at all three time periods and using both PTS and CIRI data. This condition was initially included in the fuzzy-set analysis, due to the clarity of potential thresholds that matter and the strength of prior empirical relationships; fuzzy-set QCA calibration can account for these thresholds and reveal relationships otherwise hidden by dichotomization.

²⁰⁰ See calibration of short wars for further discussion of this tool.

For economic development, the target set was defined as *states with at least moderately developed economies* (condition identifier: ME). As discussed in Chapter 4, stronger economic standing empirically corresponds with successful implementation of peace agreements (Hartzell and Hoddie 2003b) as well as with an increased level of respect for physical-integrity rights (Cingranelli and Richards 1999b; Mitchell and McCormick 1988; Poe and Tate 1994; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999). The probable causal relationship between economic standing and political repression is that regimes with at least moderate economic development may leverage the distribution of economic goods to coopt rebels and opposition elements, rather than coerce them (Poe and Tate 1994; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999, 294).

The specific indicator that maps this target set is the interval scale data of *GDP per capita* (see previous discussion in Chapter 4). States with full membership in this set are considered to possess high enough levels of economic standing that alternative governance mechanisms, such as the distribution of public goods and the coopting of rebels or opposition elements, are a consistently viable option. An appropriate upper threshold here is \$3,036. This corresponds with The World Bank's (2016) minimum amount for classification as a state with an "upper-middle income."²⁰¹ The lower threshold (full non-membership) is \$456, corresponding with The World Bank's definition of absolute poverty, as defined in Chapter 4. The crossover point is \$765.

The crossover point was selected in accordance with a distinguishing threshold used by The World Bank. Specifically, the World Bank (2016) classified states that sat in

²⁰¹ For further discussion on The World Bank's selection of these thresholds, on comparing levels of development, and on the limitations of different economic measures, see Soubbotina and Sheram (2000).

the range *above* this crossover point, but below the upper threshold (i.e., \$766-\$3,035 GDP/capita) as “lower-middle-income states.” In turn, all states *below* this crossover anchor are classified as “low income states.” Therefore, these anchors distinguish between those states *below* the absolute poverty line (considered full non-members) and those *above* this poverty threshold but still below the moderate poverty line. This latter group resides below the crossover point. States that fall in this range merit appropriate calibration as “almost fully out,” “mostly out,” “more out than in,” and variations in-between. Likewise, the aforementioned “lower-middle-income states” are considered above the crossover point and have been assessed as “more in than out,” “mostly in,” “almost fully in,” and variations in-between.

In sum, befitting anchors for the set of *at least moderately developed states* (ME) are: (1) an upper threshold of full membership at \$3,036 (minimum threshold for upper-middle-income states), (2) a crossover threshold of \$765 (dividing between low-income and lower-middle-income states), and (3) a threshold of full non-membership at \$456 (which corresponds with absolute poverty). As with the previous two target sets, these three qualitative anchors were input into available software to run a direct calibration method on this target set. By using this calibration process rather than “mere mechanistic rescalings of national income,” the resulting values “reflect the position of external criteria via the three qualitative anchors. The use of such external criteria is the hallmark of measurement calibration” (Ragin 2008, 91).

Regime Type

The target set for regime type is defined as *highly democratic states* (condition identifier: HD). The selected indicator used to map this set was the *Polity score* from the Polity IV dataset (Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr 2010).²⁰² The Polity score is an aggregated variable of regime type on a 21-point scale, ranging from -10 (full autocracy) to +10 (full democracy). The definition of the target set encapsulates Davenport and Armstrong's (2004) finding that only highly democratic states (i.e., polity scores of 8, 9, and especially the highest score of 10) had experienced less political repression by the state.

The potential relationship between democracy and human rights was explored using known thresholds within the empirical literature. Full membership in the set of *highly democratic states* (HD) was established at a Polity score of 10, in alignment with Davenport and Armstrong's (2004) findings. Full non-membership was set at a Polity score of -10. Polity scores of 8 and 9 were considered "almost fully in" and given a fuzzy-set score of 0.9. The Polity scores of 6 and 7 were considered "mostly in" the set and assigned a fuzzy score of 0.8. This latter score was based on two factors: First, Davenport's study was not limited to post-civil war contexts; scores may matter differently in such situations. Second, other scholars like Jarstad and Nilsson (2008) corroborated this possibility, showing that in post-civil war contexts, a Polity threshold of 6 and above corresponds with reduced political repression. Polity scores 0 to 5 were considered somewhat democratic and "more in than out" of the set. They were scored closely to the crossover threshold for this reason, with a fuzzy score of 0.6. Negative

²⁰² See Chapter 4 for further discussion on this measure.

polity scores were calibrated using the mirror image of these positive scores. The resulting fuzzy-score calibration for this set is summarized in the table below.

Table 55: Fuzzy Score Calibration for the Set of Highly Democratic Countries (HD)

Label	Summary Description and Operationalization	Fuzzy Score
Highly democratic	Polity IV score of 10	1
Almost highly democratic	Polity IV score of 8-9	0.9
Mostly democratic	Polity IV score of 6-7	0.8
Somewhat democratic	Polity IV score of 0-5	0.6
Somewhat non-democratic	Polity IV score of -5 to -1	0.4
Mostly non-democratic	Polity IV score of -7 and -6	0.2
Almost fully non-democratic	Polity IV score of -8 and -9	0.1
Fully non-democratic	Polity IV score of -10	0

In comparison with the decision about whether to include *war costs*, the arguments for including *regime type* were empirically robust, with the literature consistently finding regime type as an explanatory variable for the degree of political repression. The contingency tables from Chapter 5 corroborated the empirical literature by demonstrating that non-democratic states often experience *worse* human rights, whereas democratic states more consistently experience *improved* human rights. The earlier discussion about war costs noted that QCA software is not able to run an analysis with missing fuzzy-set data. Three different cases were missing the Polity score, including the civil wars in Bosnia, Lebanon, and Afghanistan. Inclusion of this condition in the fuzzy-set analysis required the loss of those three cases.

Adjustment of the case studies at this later stage is not anomalous within QCA research. Indeed, the selection of cases to be studied is a key element of QCA, involving researcher discretion throughout the process. The selection and adjustment of these cases is “not a one-way street, but rather a back-and-forth process during which cases are added and dropped based on preliminary empirical evidence and updated conceptual insights” (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 293). The strength of empirical evidence about regime type was balanced against the loss of three cases from the dataset; the condition was retained.

Human-Rights Outcomes

Chapter 4 dichotomized the change in human-rights score over time, for the purposes of optimized contingency tables (see Chapter 5). Restricting the outcome to a binary result was both useful and necessary for symmetrically assessing statistical significance, given the small number of total cases. In shifting the analysis from cross-tabulations to QCA, one key consideration was whether the outcome of human rights ought to be kept in dichotomous form or expanded to account for the broader range of actual outcomes. Selection of a binary outcome necessitated the use of a crisp set, or multi-value QCA. Calibration of the outcome required use of fuzzy-set QCA. As discussed in Chapter 6, the latter method of fsQCA is preferred because it captures both the *qualitative* difference between human rights improving or becoming worse, as well as the *quantitative* difference of how much improvement or degradation of human rights occurred.

To assess the outcome condition of human rights, the target was defined as *cases where significant human-rights improvement occurred over time* (condition identifier: SHRI). The qualifier of *significant* improvement was included because of the way fuzzy scores work. If the target had instead been defined as *cases where human rights improved*, all variation in the amount of improvement would become lost data; all scores with any improvement at all would be granted full membership (i.e., scored 1.0) and the actual degree of improvement would be considered an irrelevant variation.²⁰³ In contrast, setting the target with a higher threshold for full membership captured the degree of human-rights improvement. This accommodated a more comprehensive assessment of the effects of power-sharing agreements and various remote factors on the full range of human-rights outcomes.

To evaluate the change in human-rights outcomes over time, the previously established indicators of *pts2*, *pts5*, and *pts10* were used (see Chapter 3, Table 7). Full membership in the set of *cases where significant human-rights improvement occurred over time* (SHRI) was associated with an improvement in the Political Terror Scale (PTS) of 2 or more points over the respective time period.²⁰⁴ Countries with a change in the PTS score of 1.5 are considered “almost fully in” (fuzzy score 0.9), and states with a change of 1 are considered “mostly in” (fuzzy score 0.8). In this study, a score change in PTS of 0.5 reflected that only one of the respective aggregated scores (PTS-Amnesty or PTS State) had changed. These states are considered “more in than out” of the set. The

²⁰³ See earlier discussion, this chapter, on the use of qualitative anchors for distinguishing the difference between relevant and irrelevant variation.

²⁰⁴ The maximum positive change over time was a total of four points, assuming that a state moved from the worst ranking of 5 to the best ranking of 1.

assigned fuzzy score of 0.6 reflects that some human-rights improvement occurred, but this improvement was not significant enough to substantiate corroboration by both PTS-Amnesty and PTS-State.

In a similar fashion, states with either a decrease in score of -0.5 or no change in the score are considered “more out than in” in a given target set. Those with no change are considered *below* the threshold, under the following rationale: (1) The level of political repression used by the state did not decrease despite the fact that the civil war ended and that civil war itself is a primary driver of political repression. (2) The target set assesses improvement, which means that presence above the crossover point necessitates evidence of improvement in some measure; absence of improvement falls below the threshold. (3) States with an original PTS score of 5 cannot become worse violators of human rights. They are already scored at the worst ranking. If they are scored again at $t+2$ with a PTS average score of 5, then logically they should be scored below the crossover threshold.

Finally, states with a decrease in their PTS score of -1 or more are considered “fully out” of the target set. A score like this indicates that both of the respective aggregated scores (PTS-A and PTS-S) demonstrate that human rights worsened in that state. Based on these factors, the following fuzzy scores were assigned for this target set:

Table 56: Fuzzy Score Calibration for Significant Human-rights improvement (SHRI)

Label	Summary Description and Operationalization	Fuzzy Score
Fully in	Improvement in PTS score of 2 or more	1
Almost fully in	Improvement in PTS score of 1.5	0.9
Mostly in	Improvement in PTS score of 1	0.8
More in than out	Improvement in PTS score of 0.5	0.6
More out than in	Decrease in score of -0.5 or no change	0.4
Fully out	Decrease in score of -1 or more	0

This calibration model requires that states be able to improve their scores by at least two points or more, which means that the original PTS score at time t would need to be at least three for a given state. A state lacking this prerequisite would never be able to achieve full membership in the set of states demonstrating significant human-rights improvement.

Two cases from the original dataset had PTS scores less than three at time t : Papua New Guinea (score of 2) and Tajikistan (score of 2.5). Preliminary crisp-set truth table constructions highlighted the problems with including such cases in QCA. In short, the parsimonious equation demonstrated eleven different possible causal recipes. One state—Papua New Guinea (PNG)—was a consistent contradiction through seven of these combinations. An exhaustive comparison of conditions revealed that the principal unique feature of Papua New Guinea was that its original score of 2 left little room for human rights to improve. Resolution of contradictions in the crisp set analysis was impossible without removal of this outlier case.

Based on this logic, these two cases were removed from the final fuzzy-set analysis. All other civil wars ended with scores of three or worse. This reduction of two

cases—plus the loss of three cases when including the regime type as a condition—resulted in a total of thirty-one cases for fsQCA purposes.

Necessary Conditions: SHRI and ~SHRI

This section investigates potential necessary conditions that contribute to either the outcome of (1) significantly improved human rights (condition identifier: SHRI) or to (2) the negation of the outcome (~SHRI). A potentially necessary condition is indicated whenever instances of an outcome are a subset of instances of that condition. Said differently, a necessary condition is a superset of the outcome, meaning that the condition “must be present for the outcome to occur, but its presence does not guarantee that occurrence” (2004). As discussed earlier in Chapter 6 (“Negation of the Outcome”), separate analysis of the outcome’s negation is advised due to the *asymmetric* nature of QCA (Ragin 2008; Schneider and Wagemann 2010). The additional analysis may confirm the causal logics underlying the positive cases or generate unique insights on its own.

Substantively, necessary conditions are assessed using the measures of consistency and coverage, as detailed in Chapter 6. In accordance with these procedures, each condition and its negation are tested separately against both outcomes (i.e., SHRI, ~SHRI). Consistency is evaluated first. A consistency-value for a given condition at a threshold of 0.90 or higher indicates a necessary condition. A consistency threshold of 0.85 or greater is used to indicate an “almost necessary” condition.²⁰⁵ Conditions that reach either of these thresholds are assessed further with respect to coverage.

²⁰⁵ Schneider and Wagemann (2012) recommended the necessity threshold of 0.90. Ragin (in Goertz and Starr 2003, 182) used 0.80 as a threshold for “almost necessary” conditions. Note that the necessity threshold of 0.90 in QCA corresponds with the 90% consistency threshold used by Fiss (2012) to identify necessary variables within contingency tables (see Chapter 5).

The consistency and coverage calculations (summarized in Appendices 6 and 7) show that the *presence* of extensively institutionalized settlements (EIS) is a necessary condition for the *absence* of significant human-rights improvement (~SHRI). This relationship occurs with 0.92 consistency and 0.53 coverage. No other remote conditions or Set 1 proximate conditions reach the threshold of a “necessary” or “almost necessary” condition. This finding, which is contrary to many conventional arguments about power-sharing, demonstrates that the addition of more power-sharing dimensions is a “necessary” condition for political repression, at least in the short-term period of two years after a civil war has ended. Based on this finding, the “more is better” approach to power-sharing agreements should be approached with caution.

Significant Human-Rights Improvement (SHRI)

What conditions lead to significantly improved human rights when civil wars end in negotiated settlements? Do specific pathways exist that corroborate the previously outlined theoretical expectations? To address these questions and inspect the sufficient conditions that lead to the outcome, the fuzzy-set analysis below follows a sequence of procedures according to Schneider and Wagemann’s (2006) Two-Step Approach. Step One addresses the remote factors only, in order to identify conditions that enhance and enable the applicable outcome of SHRI. Step Two analyzes these enabling conditions individually, alongside proximate factors. Figure 15 summarizes these steps and the applicable conditions examined at each stage.




Figure 15: Two-Step fsQCA Applied to Remote and Set 1 Proximate Conditions

For quick recognition, all remote conditions use a two-letter identifier, while all proximate conditions use a three-letter identifier. As discussed in Chapter 6, the presence of a condition is indicated by all uppercase letters, while absence of that condition is indicated by the symbol “~” preceding these letters.

Step One: Search for Human-Rights Enhancing Remote Conditions

The two-step analysis introduced by Schneider and Wagemann (2006) is a method for addressing the “small N—many variables” problem by reducing the complexity of too many variables. With the conditions already divided into the two main camps of remote and proximate factors the authors’ approach of examining remote factors only is followed in this first step. This exclusion helped derive “*outcome-enabling conditions*” from the range of remote factors. Outcome-enabling conditions are understood as those combinations of contextual conditions “under which a given outcome is more likely to

occur than other contexts” (Schneider and Wagemann 2006, 761). They represent the remote conditions most likely to enable the outcome.²⁰⁶

In accordance with QCA procedures, the model uses Boolean expressions. The model involves a sufficiency test of all six potential remote conditions:

$$NE * SW * EP * SP * HD * MD \leq SHRI.$$

The * indicates AND. Capitalization signifies the presence of a condition and ~ signals the absence of a condition. The \leq signifies that the entire expression to the left represents a subset of the expression to the right (Schneider and Wagemann 2006).

Per the Two-Step Approach, the sufficiency test of remote factors is deliberately underspecified. Lower-consistency thresholds are used to help reduce the complexity of the initial model while leaving space for improvement once proximate factors are added in the second step. Chapter 6 detailed that consistency refers to how well the empirical evidence fits a given set-theoretical relationship. Selection of a consistency score is used to set “a cutoff value for determining which causal combinations pass fuzzy set-theoretic consistency and which do not” (Ragin 2008, 135).

A consistency threshold of 0.7 was initially considered, for this setting matched the threshold used by Schneider and Wagemann (2006). However, this threshold yielded an unwieldy solution, with ten different causal recipes of two to three conditions each; all six conditions were present in at least one of these causal combinations. Such a solution does not achieve the dual objective of parsimony and explanatory sufficiency. Higher

²⁰⁶ Likewise, when used to examine the negation of the outcome, the identified conditions are those most likely to enable the outcome’s negation—said in reverse, when looking at the negation of the outcome, the identified “outcome-enabling conditions” constrain the desired outcome.

consistencies only increased the complexity; therefore, to reduce the complexity, a slightly lower threshold value of 0.65 was used.²⁰⁷

The sufficiency test is demonstrated with a fuzzy-set truth-table construction,²⁰⁸ which visually depicts the different combinations of conditions represented by the actual data. Each row in a truth table represents a logically possible combination of the different assessed conditions. Truth tables contain 2^X potential combinations, in which X equals the number of conditions. In this case, 2^6 (or 64) different combinations were possible. Table 57 (below) demonstrates that 19 of the 64 rows in the truth table are represented by the thirty-one cases. This means empirical evidence is missing for 45 potential combinations (rows 20-64). These missing combinations (i.e., *logical remainders* in QCA) demonstrate the common situation in social science of *limited diversity* (Schneider and Wagemann 2006). Fuzzy-set QCA forces researchers to consciously decide how to treat empirically missing combinations.²⁰⁹ With the Two-Step Approach, Schneider and Wagemann (2006) direct researchers to use the most parsimonious solution²¹⁰ in this first step. This selection deliberately underspecifies the model while delivering outcome-enhancing solutions for use in Step Two.

²⁰⁷ Measures of consistency may range from 0.0 to 1.0. Selection of 0.65 means that causal combinations with scores between 0.0 and 0.65 represent significant inconsistency.

²⁰⁸ Here Ragin's (2008) recommendations are used, along with fsQCA and Kirq software.

²⁰⁹ According to Ragin (2008, 150), "A causal combination that lacks empirical instances and therefore must be imagined is a *counterfactual case*." QCA requires researchers state how they will deal with these counterfactuals. For an in-depth discussion on this issue, see Ragin (2008, Ch 8, 9).

²¹⁰ Chapter 6 established that the parsimonious solution means the researcher allows the QCA software to include and apply all simplifying assumptions to the logical remainders.

Table 57: Consistency Test of Remote Conditions for SHRI

Configuration	Conditions						Outcome SHRI	Consistency	N*	Country
	NE	SW	EP	SP	HD	MD				
1	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	1.00	1	PH2
2	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1.00	1	GB
3	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	1.00	1	GA
4	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	1.00	2	CR1, CR2
5	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	0.96	3	AN3, AN4, SU2
6	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	0.91	2	ES, NI
7	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	0.90	4	BU, GS, LI2, LI3
8	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	0.85	2	GU, PH1
9	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0.85	1	MOZ
10	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	0.84	2	MOL, SL2
11	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0.84	1	CA
12	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0.83	2	AN1, SU1
13	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	0.82	1	SL1
14	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	0.81	2	AZ, RW
15	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	0.73	1	SA
16	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	0.67	2	DRC, NE
17	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	0.66	1	CH
18	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	0.4	1	LI1
19	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	AN2
...							?		0	
64							?		0	

Note: N* = number of cases with fuzzy membership score higher than 0.5; [NE] Non-ethnic conflict; [SW] Short lived civil war; [EP] Enduring peace; [SP] Small population; [SD] Strong Democracy; [ME] Moderately Developed Economy

Other key information is displayed in this truth table. First, the number of cases represented by each causal configuration is shown as N*. Each case is represented once, aligned with that causal combination where its fuzzy-set membership score is greater than 0.5 (see Ragin 2008, 131). Second, the consistency value in this table signifies “the degree to which the fuzzy set membership scores of all cases in a combination are consistent with the statement that *this combination of conditions is sufficient for the outcome*” (Schneider and Wagemann 2006, 781). Rows 1-17 demonstrate consistency greater than 0.65 in achieving the desired outcome of significant human-rights improvement. The truth table thus reveals those conditions that are sufficient to the outcome. This information is initially not very informative given the significant number of rows represented.

To obtain a more succinct answer, QCA leverages the rules of Boolean algebra to minimize the truth table.²¹¹ In fsQCA, truth-table minimization is accomplished via the Quine-McCluskey algorithm, which is performed by QCA software. Ultimately, this minimization leads to identification of combinations of conditions that sufficiently produce the outcome (Ragin 2014, 93-97; Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 104-111). A sufficient condition means that an outcome “almost” always occurs when that causal condition (or combination of conditions) is present. The sufficiency analysis of the remote conditions using this process leads to the following parsimonious solution:

$$NE + \sim SW + EP \longrightarrow SHRI$$

Here the ‘ \longrightarrow ’ indicates an “if-then” relationship, wherein if one (or more) of these remote conditions exists, the outcome is “almost always” present. Recalling that in Boolean language the + means OR, the equation shows that the presence of non-ethnic conflicts (NE) OR the absence of short wars ($\sim SW$) OR the presence of enduring peace (EP) “almost always” leads to significantly improved human-rights outcomes (SHRI).

Three important observations arise from this specific solution: First, the existence of three separate contextual conditions confirms that no individual remote factor is necessary for human rights to improve. A review of the *raw coverage* and the *unique coverage* for these conditions corroborates this fact; the raw and unique coverages for the three remote conditions, as well as respective civil wars corresponding to those conditions, are summarized in Appendix 9. Raw coverage refers to the “percentage of all

²¹¹ Minimization involves implementing fundamental rules, such as the following: “If two Boolean expressions differ in only one causal condition yet produce the same outcome, then the causal condition that distinguishes the two expressions can be considered irrelevant and can be removed to create a simpler, combined expression” (Ragin 2014, 93).

cases' set membership in the outcome covered by a single sufficient path of an equifinal solution term" (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 332). The highest raw coverage by a single sufficient remote pathway—the presence of enduring peace (EP)—is 81 percent.

The *unique coverage* of enduring peace refers to the percentage of the outcome uniquely covered by this pathway—meaning those cases not also covered by the absence of short wars (~SW) or the presence of non-ethnic civil wars (NE). The unique coverage of enduring peace is only 40 percent. The equation shows that states with certain contextual circumstances are more likely to experience significant improvement in human rights. These circumstances vary. No single remote condition is necessary.

Second, all three contexts produce similar consistency values: the presence of non-ethnic civil wars (NE) is 0.58; the absence of short wars (~SW) is 0.60; the presence of enduring peace (EP) is 0.60. The lower-consistency values here are expected, because the Two-Step Approach “explicitly relies on the fact that the first step yields inconclusive results” (Schneider and Wagemann 2006, 770).

Third, two of the three conditions—namely, the presence of non-ethnic wars (NE) and the presence of enduring peace (EP)—are in alignment with theoretical expectations and with the preliminary cross-tab analysis in Chapter 5. The association of longer wars (~SW) with improved human rights is contrary to the hypothesized relationship. However, ~SW does align with much of the contemporary empirical literature, which argues that longer civil wars facilitate a higher potential for human-rights improvement (see Chapter 4). What remains unknown, though, is whether the effects of this remote factor change when combined with proximate conditions. Indeed, it is too early to

conclude the actual impact of any of these conditions upon the civil wars. At this time, it can only be noted that these three remote conditions are outcome-enabling conditions.

Step Two: Evaluating SHRI...Proximate Factors in Remote Contexts

The purpose of Step Two was to formulate the different causal pathways that led to an outcome. Proximate factors react differently, given certain remote contexts. The process involved examining the different combinations of proximate factors as they interacted within these three different remote contexts. Following Schneider and Wagemann's (2006, 2012) procedures, analyses were conducted using the three remote-context conditions noted above: non-ethnic conflict (NE), short wars (SW), and enduring peace (EP). Each of these remote conditions was individually evaluated in combination with all Set 1 proximate conditions (i.e., EIS, THP, THM, TPS; see Figure 15 above). The consistency-threshold criteria for passing the sufficiency test was raised to 0.80,²¹² with the same requirement retained that at least one case must demonstrate membership higher than 0.5 in a causal combination in order for that causal pathway to be recognized.²¹³ Step Two is more conservative than Step One in that the use of all

²¹² A higher sufficiency threshold of 0.85 was considered as well, but a significant tradeoff occurred at this point. While solution consistency increased nominally, the solution coverage substantially dropped off. For example, in the first analysis of non-ethnic conflict paired with all four proximate factors, when the sufficiency threshold was raised from 0.8 to 0.85, the resulting solution consistency increased from 0.85 to 0.89, but coverage dropped from 0.50 to 0.32. Similarly, for this same shift in sufficiency threshold, the pairing of enduring peace with the proximate factors resulted in an increased consistency from 0.86 to 1.0 and a drop in coverage from 0.53 to 0.26. No change occurs for the pairing of short wars as this threshold does not affect any rows in the truth table. This exchange corroborates the consistency-coverage tradeoff discussed in Chapter 6.

²¹³ This threshold is higher than that of Schneider and Wagemann (2006) who use a consistency threshold criterion of 0.70 for both Step One and Step Two. Ragin (2008, 136), in contrast, recommends a cutoff value not less than 0.75, although his threshold refers to a single-step procedure rather than the two-step process used by Schneider and Wagemann.

counterfactuals is rejected (Schneider and Wagemann 2006, 2012). In QCA terms, this rejection occurs when researchers select the complex solution.

Table 58 below summarizes all nine sufficient causal recipes that result from application of the aforementioned procedures and constraints, including the combination of individual remote contexts with proximate power-sharing agreement configurations, and that lead to significant human-rights improvement. With the exception of Paths 4 and 5 (*p4*, *p5*), all the paths in this table involve multiple memberships. All of these paths also demonstrate a consistency of 0.80 or greater.

Table 58: Sufficient Paths Toward SHRI²¹⁴

SHRI =	Remote Context	Proximate Power-Sharing Configurations	Consistency	N	Country
(<i>p1</i>)	NE *	EIS * ~THM * TPS	0.83	2	GUA, MLD
(<i>p2</i>)	~NE *	~EIS * ~THP * ~THM * ~TPS	0.82	4	ANG1, AZE, CRO1, PHI2
(<i>p3</i>)	SW *	EIS * THP * ~THM * ~TPS	0.91	5	CRO2, GNB, LBR1, LBR2, NEP
(<i>p4</i>)	SW *	EIS * ~THP * ~THM * TPS	1.00	1	MLD
(<i>p5</i>)	~SW *	EIS * THP * ~THM * TPS	1.00	1	GUA
(<i>p6</i>)	EP *	EIS * ~THM * TPS	0.80	3	GRG2, GUA, MLD
(<i>p7</i>)	EP *	EIS * THP * ~THM	0.94	5	GRG2, CRO2, GUA, LBR2, NEP
(<i>p8</i>)	-	EIS * THP * ~THM * ~TPS	0.91	5	CRO2, GNB, LBR1, LBR2, NEP
(<i>p9</i>)	-	~EIS * ~THP * ~THM * ~TPS	0.85	4	ANG1, AZE, CRO1, PHI2

Notes: [NE] Non-Ethnic Civil War; [SW] Short War; [EP] Enduring Peace; [EIS] Extensively Institutionalized Settlement; [THP] Thick Political Settlement; [THM] Thick Military Settlement; [TPS] Territorial Power-Sharing Agreement (present)

This stronger consistency demonstrates Schneider and Wagemann's (2006, 770)

contention that:

Only when proximate factors are added to the analysis in the second step should the solution terms be found that combine remote and proximate factors and that lead to an (almost always) consistently sufficient result. In this sense, proximate factors increase the consistency of the solution terms by making the conjunctural

²¹⁴ The colors in this table are provided to enable quick recognition and comparison of similar conditions across cases.

solution terms more specific, theoretically complex and thus empirically consistent.²¹⁵

Table 58 also personifies Ragin's (2008, 149) declaration that "causation is complex and very often involves specific combinations of causal conditions (or causal 'recipes')." In this vein, the improvement of human-rights outcomes that follow negotiated settlements in civil wars are not the result of single isolated variables. Neither remote nor proximate factors alone satisfactorily account for the outcome. Rather, significant human-rights improvement is the result of complex conjunctural causation, in which different remote and proximate factors jointly combine to produce a reduction in the state's use of political repression. Scholars refer to this notion that a given outcome may arise from different causal pathways or combinations of conditions as *equifinality*, (George and Bennett 2005; Mackie 1974; Ragin 1987, 2008).

A few additional observations are noteworthy: First, the absence of any form of power-sharing agreements is by no means a showstopper for SHRI. Path 2 (*p2*) and Path 9 (*p9*) illuminate that all four cases where power-sharing agreements were completely absent—Angola 1975-1989, Azerbaijan 1989-1994, Croatia 1991-1992, and the Philippines 2000-2000—experienced a reduction in political violence despite the total absence of these measures. Interestingly, all of these were also considered ethnic conflicts. A closer look shows that Path 2 (*p2*) a subset of Path 9 (*p9*), with the sole difference being the inclusion of this ethnic-conflict factor.

²¹⁵ Schneider and Wagemann argued, in other words, that when proximate factors are merged with the remote factors, the two-step process naturally leads to increased consistency of the final solution terms.

Second, *all* nine causal recipes that led to significant human-rights improvement involved the *absence* of thick military power-sharing agreements. This finding serves as a significant caution to policymakers and merits further investigation. Chapter 8 explores this issue by disaggregating the military power-sharing dimension into its two components (integration into the main ranks of the military, and integration into leadership positions of that same military force) to observe whether one factor matters more than the other and to see if they are both dangerous to human-rights outcomes.

Third, when war duration (the condition of SW) was considered in the first step—which involved remote factors only—it appeared that long-lasting wars mattered most for attaining significant human-rights improvement. Guatemala’s civil war (*p5*) is the sole case matching the argument that long-duration civil wars make a consistent positive effect on significant human-rights improvement. More predominantly, the reverse held true: when short civil wars were combined with proximate factors, significant human-rights improvement occurred,. This situation is most demonstrable by examining several of the pathways together. Starting with Path 3 (*p3*) and Path 4 (*p4*), the following equation is found (Equation 1):

$$(1) \text{ SHRI} = \text{SW} * \text{EIS} * \text{THP} * \sim\text{THM} * \sim\text{TPS} (p3) + \text{SW} * \text{EIS} * \sim\text{THP} * \sim\text{THM} * \text{TPS} (p4)$$

This Boolean equation can be simplified by factoring. Much like standard algebraic factoring, Boolean factoring can help clarify an equation by highlighting a specific condition or by simplifying an equation; either situation helps identify necessary

conditions and causally equivalent conditions (Ragin 2014, 100-101). Factoring of Equation 1 (i.e., simplifying where duplicate conditions exist), results in:

$$(2) \text{ SHRI} = \text{SW} * \text{EIS} * \sim\text{THM} (\text{THP} * \sim\text{TPS} + \sim\text{THP} * \text{TPS})$$

This reveals that significant improvement of human rights is likely when wars of short duration are answered by extensively institutionalized settlements that simultaneously avoid thick military power-sharing agreements. Within that context, thick political power-sharing agreements (THP) and territorial power-sharing agreements (TPS) lead to improved human rights (SHRI), as long as the presence of these features are not combined. That is, when thick political settlements are present (THP), then territorial power-sharing agreements must be absent ($\sim\text{TPS}$), and vice versa. This inverted relationship also holds true for the other pathways, except for those that involve the absence of all power-sharing agreements (i.e., Path 2, Path 9).

Fourth, if these latter two pathways (where all power-sharing agreements are absent) are momentarily ignored, all remaining pathways would include extensively institutionalized settlements (EIS). SHRI outcomes consistently follow when agreements are extensively institutionalized. This insight is not particularly helpful since earlier analysis also showed that this same condition—the *presence* of extensively institutionalized settlements (EIS)—is a necessary condition for the *absence* of significant human-rights improvement ($\sim\text{SHRI}$). This does, however, show the difficulty in accurate, useful interpretation of aggregated power-sharing dimensions.

Fifth, comparison of Paths 3, 5, 7, and 8 shows that when EIS is combined with thick political-power sharing (THP) and the absence of thick military power-sharing (THM), the desired outcome of significant human-rights improvement is obtained.

Sixth, territorial power-sharing agreements (TPSAs) appear common in Paths 1, 4, 5, and 6. Combining these three pathways (Equation 3):

$$(3) \text{ SHRI} = \text{NE} * \text{EIS} * \sim\text{THM} * \text{TPS} (p1) + \text{SW} * \text{EIS} * \sim\text{THP} * \sim\text{THM} * \text{TPS} (p4) + \sim\text{SW} * \text{EIS} * \text{THP} * \sim\text{THM} * \text{TPS} (p5) + \text{EP} * \text{EIS} * \sim\text{THM} * \text{TPS} (p6)$$

the equation can then be simplified to read:

$$(4) \text{ SHRI} = \text{EIS} * \sim\text{THM} * \text{TPS} (\text{NE} + \text{SW} * \sim\text{THP} + \sim\text{SW} * \text{THP} + \text{EP})$$

In translation, this equation shows that SHRI is more likely when extensively institutionalized settlements (EIS) combine with the absence of thick military settlements ($\sim\text{THM}$) and the presence of territorial power-sharing agreements (TPS). In turn, the three remote factors of non-ethnic conflicts, short wars, and enduring peace are influential, though largely substitutable. Also, the presence of short wars (SW) combines with the absence of thick political power-sharing agreements ($\sim\text{THP}$), while the inverse of both conditions also holds true (i.e., $\sim\text{SW}$ combines with THP). As noted earlier, thick power-sharing agreements often occur with short wars and lead to SHRI, but not when territorial power-sharing agreements are present (see earlier discussion regarding $p3$ and $p4$). This combination of conditions is still rather complex, leaving policymakers without definitive guidance about which individual measures matter and should be included within a negotiated settlement and which should be excluded.

Negation of Significant Human-Rights Improvement (~SHRI)

What conditions lead to the negation of significant human-rights improvement (~SHRI) when civil wars end in negotiated settlements? What causal recipes might be identified that correspond with theoretical expectations? To address these issues, the fuzzy-set analysis applies the same sequence of procedures demonstrated with respect to Schneider and Wagemann's (2006, 2012) Two-Step Approach.

Step One: Search for Human-Rights Constraining Remote Conditions

Analysis of the negation of significantly improved human rights uses the same set of remote conditions and Set 1 proximate conditions as was used for examining SHRI. The initial model involved a similar sufficiency test of all six potential remote conditions but with the altered outcome:

$$NE * SW * EP * SP * HD * MD \leq \sim SHRI.$$

The next requirement was selecting an appropriate threshold for identifying causal combinations that pass fuzzy-set theoretic consistency and those that do not (Ragin 2008). As before, the sufficiency test was intentionally underspecified in this first step by using lower consistency thresholds. Initially, the same threshold of 0.65 as used for SHRI was evaluated. However, this yielded an overly complex truth-table solution, involving five separate pathways. The initial truth-table solution was:

$$\sim SP + \sim NE + \sim SW * \sim HD + \sim SW * \sim MD + EP * \sim HD.$$

All of these conditions, outside of enduring peace, coincided with theoretical expectations for the negation of human rights. That is, human rights are expected to be worse when populations are large (~SP), when ethnic wars occur (~NE), when wars are

long and strong democracies are absent ($\sim SW^* \sim HD$), and when wars are long and the economy is not at least moderately developed ($\sim SW^* \sim MD$). The final causal combination demonstrated the critical nature of strong democracy. Stated differently, in the absence of a highly democratic regime ($\sim HD$), even the existence of enduring peace (EP) does not change a government's use of political repression after a war ends. The consistency and coverage for these factors and their corresponding civil wars are summarized in Appendix 10.

This initial solution was overly complex, with all six remote factors present in at least one of the causal recipes. Use of a complex recipe when all remote factors are present would yield an excessive amount of counterfactual cases and exacerbate the problem of limited diversity when the remote conditions are combined with proximate factors in Step Two. Therefore, a lower threshold of 0.64 was used instead. This very slight shift in threshold resulted in almost exactly the same exact truth table *solution coverage* (an increase from 0.95 to 0.96) and *solution consistency* (slight decrease from 0.49 to 0.47, respectively); consistency and coverage results are summarized in Appendix 11. The minor decrease in solution consistency was well worth the tradeoff, yielding a much more parsimonious solution involving just three singular conditions rather than the complexity highlighted above.

The truth table for this consistency test is displayed in Table 59 below. Each row indicates a logically possible combination; that is, a potential causal recipe. Since there were six remote conditions, the number of potential combinations was 2^6 (or 64). The

table shows that nineteen of the sixty-four potential combinations are represented by the thirty-one cases. Empirical evidence is missing for the remaining forty-five rows.

Table 59: Consistency Test of Remote Conditions for SHRI

Configuration	Conditions						Outcome		N*	Country
	NE	SW	EP	SP	HD	MD	~SHRI	Consistency		
1	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	1.00	1	ANG2
2	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	1.00	1	LBR1
3	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	1.00	1	CHA
4	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0.93	1	CAM
5	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	0.93	2	GUA, PHI1
6	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0.91	1	MZM
7	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	0.83	1	SAF
8	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	0.82	2	DRC, NEP
9	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	0.80	3	ANG3, ANG4, SUD2
10	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	0.80	1	PHI2
11	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	0.76	2	AZE, RWA
12	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	0.75	1	GRG2
13	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0.72	2	ANG1, SUD1
14	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	0.69	4	BUI, GRG1, LBR2, LBR3
15	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	0.66	2	CRO1, CRO2
16	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	0.65	2	SAL (.8), NIC
17	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	0.59	1	SIE1 (.4)
18	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0.52	2	SIE2 (.8), MLD
19	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0.40	1	GNB
...							?		0	
64							?		0	

Note: N* = number of cases with fuzzy membership score higher than 0.5; [NE] Non-ethnic conflict; [SW] Short lived civil war; [EP] Enduring peace; [SP] Small population; [SD] Strong Democracy; [ME] Moderately Developed Economy

Truth table minimization is accomplished within QCA software by selecting the Quine-McCluskey algorithm and the parsimonious solution. Minimization identifies conjunctural combinations that sufficiently produce the negation of the outcome. In this case, the sufficiency analysis of the remote conditions at 0.64 consistency yielded the following parsimonious solution:

$$\sim\text{NE} + \sim\text{SW} + \sim\text{SP} \longrightarrow \sim\text{SHRI}$$

The ‘ \longrightarrow ’ shows an if-then relationship. In shorthand, the equation states: if $\sim\text{NE}$ or $\sim\text{SW}$ or $\sim\text{SP}$, then $\sim\text{SHRI}$. This signifies that the absence of non-ethnic wars ($\sim\text{NE}$) OR the absence of short wars ($\sim\text{SW}$) OR the absence of small populations ($\sim\text{SP}$) almost always leads to the negation of significantly improved human-rights outcomes ($\sim\text{SHRI}$).

More succinctly, *ethnic wars*, *long wars*, and *large populations* generally prevent improvement in human rights after civil wars. Political repression is more likely when these conditions increasingly are present.

Several important observations resulted from this specific solution: First, all of these conditions are in alignment with theoretical expectations regarding ethnic wars, long wars, and large populations leading to worse human rights.

Second, no individual factor on its own is sufficient to cause the negation of significant human-rights improvement. The raw coverage for each of these conditions confirmed that no condition fully covers all cases. The most common and consistent condition was the absence of small populations (~SP), with a raw coverage of 66 percent of the cases; the absence of non-ethnic conflicts (~NE) and the absence of short wars (~SW) each covered 55 percent of the cases.

Third, the low percentages of unique coverage (Table 60 below) indicated that these three individual conditions overlap significantly. This means that the great majority of cases leading to the negation of the outcome involved two or three of these proximate conditions.

Table 60: Raw and Unique Coverage & Consistency (Step One, ~SHRI)

	<i>Raw Coverage</i>	<i>Unique Coverage</i>	<i>Consistency</i>
~NE	0.62	0.19	0.43
~SE	0.55	0.08	0.61
~SP	0.66	0.06	0.69

*NE = Non-ethnic civil war; SP = Small population;
SW = Short war; ~ = negation of condition/outcome*

Fourth, the consistency values were fairly strong for \sim SP (0.69) and \sim SW (0.61), but weak for \sim NE (0.43). As noted in the earlier section on SHRI, low consistency is expected for this first step. The solutions are intentionally inconclusive, leaving room for the addition of proximate conditions to refine the conjunctural combinations.

Finally, the conditions found in the parsimonious solution for \sim SHRI resemble, but do not duplicate, the inverse of the parsimonious solution for SHRI. Overlaying the Step One findings from both the outcome (SHRI) and the negation of the outcome (\sim SHRI) exposes several similarities and differences:

$$NE + \sim SW + EP \longrightarrow SHRI$$

$$\sim NE + \sim SW + \sim SP \longrightarrow \sim SHRI$$

First, when remote contexts are considered on their own, the presence of non-ethnic wars led to the outcome and the absence of this same condition led to the negation of the outcome. Second, the absence of short wars (i.e., the presence of long wars) led to both the outcome and to the negation of the outcome.²¹⁶ The third condition of enduring peace was not as critical to the outcome's negation. Rather, it was replaced by the absence of small populations. This latter shift in conditions personifies QCA's asymmetric nature. What remains to be seen is how proximate conditions interact within these different remote contexts and observe what causal pathways lead to the negation of the outcome.

²¹⁶ Recall that when this remote condition was examined alongside Set 1 proximate conditions with respect to the outcome (SHRI), the presence of short wars (SW) was much more common than its absence.

Step Two: Evaluating ~SHRI...Proximate Factors in Remote Contexts

This section considers all of the proximate factors as they operate within these three different remote contexts. This combination of conditions reveals the different causal recipes that sufficiently lead to the negation of an outcome. The process involved applying each remote context from the parsimonious solution—e.g., non-ethnic conflict (NE), short wars (SW), and small populations (SP)—to the four proximate factors of EIS, THP, THM, and TPS. The consistency threshold criteria was again raised to 0.80, with the requirement that at least one case had membership higher than 0.5 in a causal combination.²¹⁷ For Step Two, the Quine-McCluskey algorithm was applied in a conservative fashion, using only empirical instances and rejecting all counterfactuals.

The resulting complex solution yielded the following eight sufficient causal recipes (see Table 61 below), which led to the negation of the outcome (~SHRI).

Table 61: Sufficient Paths Toward ~SHRI

	Remote Context	Proximate Power-Sharing Configurations	Consistency	N	Country
(p1)	SW *	EIS * ~THP * THM * ~TPS	0.93	1	SIE1
(p2)	~SW *	EIS * THP * THM * ~TPS	0.83	4	NIC, CAM, CHA, SAL
(p3)	~SW *	EIS * THP * ~THM * TPS	0.81	1	GUA
(p4)	~SW *	EIS * ~THP * THM * TPS	0.85	1	SUD1
(p5)	SP *	EIS * ~THP * THM	0.86	2	GRG1, SIE1
(p6)	~SP *	EIS * THP * ~TPS	0.79	6	DRC, ANG4, NEP, ANG3, ANG2, CAM
(p7)	~SP *	EIS * THP * ~THM	0.84	2	NEP, GUA
(p8)		EIS * ~THP * THM * TPS	0.80	2	GRG1, SUD1

Notes: [SW] Short War; [SP] Small Population; [EIS] Extensively Institutionalized Settlement; [THP] Thick Political Settlement; [THM] Thick Military Settlement; [TPS] Territorial Power-Sharing Agreement (present)

²¹⁷ A lower threshold of 0.70 was also considered, following Schneider and Wagemann's (2006) example. This caused significant problems in the consistencies of various pathways within the truth table solution. For example, when the remote condition of small population was combined with the proximate conditions to produce a solution, the three resulting pathways yielded low consistencies of 0.76, 0.72, and 0.61.

A number of observations may be made from the above table, beyond the clear difference that this complex solution involved several causal combinations with only one case each (see Paths 1, 3, 4):²¹⁸

First, two pathways are distinguished by the *presence* of the remote condition rather than the anticipated absence of those conditions. This includes Path 1, in which the presence of short wars (SW) combined with other factors to result in unimproved human rights, and Path 5, in which the presence of small populations (SP) combined with other factors for the same result. In these remote contexts (SW and SP), human rights are theoretically anticipated to improve.

What proximate factors overcame these human-rights enabling conditions? Do aggregated power-sharing dimensions help illuminate what matters most here? Consider Path 5 (causal combination: SP * EIS * ~THP and THM), where the presence of a small population was overcome in the two civil wars of GRG1 (Georgia, 1st civil war) and SIE1 (Sierra Leone, 1st civil war). The condition of extensively institutionalized settlements (EIS) is not particularly informative with respect to which dimensions matter most. This leaves the *absence* of thick political agreements and/or the *presence* of thick military settlements as a principal explanatory factor in the first civil wars in Georgia and in Sierra Leone for why human rights became worse despite the presence of a small

²¹⁸ Note that the cases represented in each of these combinations are also present in another causal recipe: SIE1 from Path 1 is in Path 5; GUA from Path 3 is in Path 7; and SUD1 from Path 4 is in Path 8.

population.²¹⁹ More refined analysis is difficult without considering the specific provisions or in-depth cross-case comparison beyond the scope of this dissertation.

Second, no paths exist that contain the remote condition of non-ethnic civil wars (NE or ~NE). Why is this? Earlier, it was shown that ~NE had a low consistency of just 0.43 in the original parsimonious solution for ~SHRI. This inconsistency continued when the condition was combined with the proximate factors, as evidenced by the lack of any paths present with this factor. Said differently, all potential rows in the truth table where NE was combined with other proximate factors involved causal combinations below 0.80 in consistency. Civil war ethnicity appears to matter here, at least when aggregated dimension conditions are combined with it.

Third, the proximate condition of extensively institutionalized settlements (EIS) was present in all the pathways, confirming that this is a necessary condition for the negation of the outcome (~SHRI). This makes even more sense when recalling that in the four cases where power-sharing dimensions were completely absent, *all* the cases resulted in improved human rights. Naturally then, given the calibration protocol assigned to the EIS condition for fsQCA purposes, the remaining cases all have some degree of institutionalized settlements. Nevertheless, the reality that this is a necessary condition for the outcome negation, but not a necessary condition for the outcome, is a cautionary reproach to exuberant advocacy for power-sharing agreements as a civil war panacea.

²¹⁹ The Sierra Leone case was also present in Path 1, where the combination of thick military settlements, with an absence of thick political settlements, also overcame the purported benefits of short war.

Fourth, there are three causal pathways (Paths 3, 4, and 8) that include the presence of territorial power-sharing agreements (TPS). The presence of the first civil war in Sudan (SUD1) in two of these paths (Path 4 and Path 8) alerts us to the potential that one of these paths is a subset of the other. In comparing these two paths, Path 4 adds the qualifier of \sim SW, making Path 4 a subset of Path 8. Path 8 is therefore compared to Path 3. The resulting causal combination (Equation 5):

$$(5) \sim\text{SHRI} = \sim\text{SW} * \text{EIS} * \text{THP} * \sim\text{THM} * \text{TPS} (p3) + \text{EIS} * \sim\text{THP} * \text{THM} * \text{TPS} (p8)$$

can be simplified, using factoring, to read:

$$(6) \sim\text{SHRI} = \text{EIS} * \text{TPS} (\sim\text{SW} * \text{THP} * \sim\text{THM} + \sim\text{THP} * \text{THM})$$

The elements in the parentheses represent substitutable sets of conditions. This factored combination illuminates that human rights are unlikely to improve when extensively institutionalized settlements (EIS) combine with territorial power-sharing (TPS) AND when either (1) thick political settlements are represented in the negotiated settlement, but thick military settlements are absent OR (2) the inverse situation, meaning that thick political settlements are absent and thick military settlements are present.²²⁰ Long wars (\sim SW) also play a factor in two of the three cases represented by these causal pathways.

Unfortunately, the proximate aggregated conditions used here do not inform decision-makers about what types of territorial power-sharing agreements or military power-sharing provisions are represented here. Disaggregation would show, for example,

²²⁰ Long wars are present in the former and in half the cases of the latter.

that all the cases from these three causal pathways (GUA, SUD1, GRG1) involved territorial autonomy, not federalism.

Fifth, Paths 6 and 7 largely parallel each other. We can simplify these two pathways from (Equation 7):

$$(7) \sim\text{SHRI} = \sim\text{SP} * \text{EIS} * \text{THP} * \sim\text{TPS} (p6) + \sim\text{SP} * \text{EIS} * \text{THP} * \sim\text{THM} (p7)$$

to (Equation 8):

$$(8) \sim\text{SHRI} = \sim\text{SP} * \text{EIS} * \text{THP} (\sim\text{TPS} + \sim\text{THM})$$

In translation, this combined equation reveals that improvement in human rights is unlikely when the respective states involve large populations, when the negotiated settlements are extensively institutionalized, and when thick political agreements are pursued. The absence of territorial power-sharing agreements and the absence of thick military settlements are substitutable conditions. This equation situation covers seven cases (including the DRC, ANG4, NEP, ANG3, ANG3, CAM, GUA).

Conclusion

One of the most analytically fruitful features of fs/QCA is that one can also specify the non-occurrence of the outcome as a dependent variable. Social scientific theories are not always symmetric (i.e. the explanation of the occurrence of the outcome does not directly lead to the explanation for its nonoccurrence).²²¹

This asymmetry—and QCA’s advantage in exploring this asymmetry—was the principle reason this chapter (and the next) explored both the outcome and the negation (or non-occurrence) of the outcome. The first step in the Two-Step Analysis demonstrated the asymmetry of remote conditions on political repression: when investigating those remote conditions leading to the outcome (significant human-rights improvement, or

²²¹ See Schneider and Wagemann (2006, 781).

SHRI), the presence of enduring peace (EP) was a strongly consistent factor.

Investigation of the same remote conditions leading to the negation of the outcome (~SHRI) did not reveal that the absence of enduring peace (~EP) was a consistent factor. Rather, a more consistent condition leading to the non-occurrence of improved human rights was the absence of small populations (~SP). The second step then evaluated how proximate conditions interacted within the different remote contexts that enabled the outcome or enabled the outcome's negation. This chapter specifically reviewed Set 1 proximate conditions, which assess prominent theories regarding aggregated power-sharing dimensions.

Another important finding in this process is that states exiting civil war via negotiated settlements, and any parties assisting them in such negotiations, should recognize that no single pathway exists that will significantly improve human-rights outcomes in these post-civil war contexts. Nine different causal pathways involving various combinations of remote and proximate conditions led to the desired outcome.

While certain remote and proximate conditions inform us about what causal combinations lead to significant human-rights improvement, these conditions cannot be automatically inverted under the expectation that the resulting combinations will lead to worse human rights. Rather, as accomplished here, it is best to run the Two-Step Approach, again, for the negation of the outcome. Eight different causal pathways led to the negation of the outcome. Only one pathway was found to lead to both the desired outcome and to the negation of the outcome.²²²

²²² The causal recipe of ~SW*EIS*THP*~THM*TPS was present in both Table 62 (p5) and Table 65 (p3), each represented by the case of Guatemala.

Nor are power-sharing agreements necessary or sufficient for human rights to improve. In this regard, four cases were found where power-sharing agreements were completely absent in all forms. In all four of these cases, the states experienced a reduction in political repression despite the total absence of power-sharing measures. Of note, these conflicts were also all considered ethnic wars—and ethnic conflicts are expected to lead to increased political repression more than non-ethnic conflicts. Somehow, despite this shared remote condition of ethnic conflict, the absence of power-sharing agreements led to less political repression.

This does not mean that power-sharing agreements should be delinked from their respective situational and historical contexts (e.g., remote conditions), for these remote conditions enable or constrain the likelihood that the outcome occurs. Excepting the four aforementioned cases—and the anomalous case of Guatemala where long war led to improved human rights—all other causal pathways involved the *presence* of the remote condition leading to the *presence* of significantly improved human rights. That is, the relationship between the remote condition and the outcome responded as hypothesized. Table 58 detailed how this held true for non-ethnic wars (NE) with two cases at 0.83 consistency (*p1*), for short wars (SW) with five cases at 0.91 consistency (*p3*) and one case at 1.0 consistency (*p4*); and for enduring peace (EP) with three cases at 0.80 consistency (*p7*) and five cases at 0.94 consistency (*p8*). The most common and consistent remote conditions found in causal combinations leading to significant human-rights improvement were the conditions of human-rights improvement enduring peace

(EP) and of short duration wars (SW). Of note, the condition of short duration wars contradicts much of contemporary literature (recall Chapter 4 discussion).

Not all power-sharing agreements are created equal, either. Significant human-rights improvement is more likely when thick military power-sharing agreements (THM) are absent. Indeed, *all* nine causal recipes involved the absence of such measures. Meanwhile the combination of extensively institutionalized settlements (EIS) and thick political settlements (THP), operating within the aforementioned remote factors, is likely to lead to improved human rights. Territorial power-sharing agreements (TPS) work best when these two former conditions (EIS and THP) are obtained.

When inspecting how the proximate and remote conditions shape the non-occurrence of the outcome (~SHRI), a number of asymmetric observations arise. First, human rights are unlikely to improve when the country has a large population (~SP) or when the war is long in duration (~SW). The presence of a small population (SP) or a short war (SW) is no guarantee, however, that human rights will improve. Both of these latter remote contexts were overcome by the causal combination of EIS * ~THP * THM. In translation, this causal pathway indicates that something in the combination of thick military settlements (THM), extensively institutionalized settlements (EIS), and the absence of thick political settlements (~THP) consistently resulted in human rights stagnating or becoming worse.

Another observation is that extensively institutionalized settlements (EIS) were common throughout the pathways that led to both SHRI and ~SHRI. The general symmetry of this condition across both outcomes demonstrated the inherent shortfalls in

using an aggregated measure of peace-agreement provisions rather than disaggregated individual provisions. Of note, extensively institutionalized settlements were only considered a necessary condition for the negation of the outcome.

Another example of how aggregated measures muddy the follow-on analysis is evident in looking at the negation of the outcome. This study showed—in Paths 3, 4, and 9—that human rights are unlikely to improve when extensively institutionalized settlements (EIS) are combined with territorial power-sharing AND either (1) the presence of thick political settlements (THP) but the absence of thick military settlements (~THM) OR (2) the inverse situation, meaning the absence of thick political settlements (~THM) combine with the presence of thick military settlements. Without disaggregating the political, military, or territorial power-sharing dimensions, researchers would not know if a specific individual provision is causing these alternations.

This study showed the limits of using aggregated dimensions of power-sharing agreements rather than the individual measures. To further the analysis, Chapter 8 disaggregates the various political, military, and territorial measures to assess their potential effects within the same remote contexts discovered in the Step One analyses for both SHRI and ~SHRI. Additionally, it explores how third-party security guarantees shape these respective outcomes.

Chapter Eight: Fuzzy-Set QCA of Model 2, Disaggregated Power-Sharing Measures and Robust Third-Party Security Guarantees

When a civil war ends in negotiated settlement, what conditions lead to significant human-rights improvement? The previous chapter addressed this question by considering how different combinations of remote conditions (i.e., the historical and situational contexts of real previous conflicts) and proximate conditions (i.e., aggregated power-sharing dimensions) affected the desired outcomes. This chapter follows a similar pattern and methodology. The same remote conditions and desired outcomes are retained, as is the adjusted universe of cases that considers civil wars ending in negotiated settlements between 1989-2007.²²³ The Two-Step Approach is again used for the fuzzy-set analysis.

The principal difference between these two chapters is that where Chapter 7 evaluated aggregated dimensions of power-sharing agreements (Set 1 proximate conditions) within varied remote conditions, this chapter assesses disaggregated peace-agreement provisions (Set 2 proximate conditions), which includes individual power-sharing measures and third-party security guarantees.

²²³ The original dataset included 36 cases, which were all investigated in Chapter 5 (though with adjustments to each bivariate analysis based on available data). Chapter 7 detailed the necessary adjustment to this original dataset due to identified discontinuities: the three cases of Bosnia, Lebanon, and Afghanistan were removed in order to retain the condition assessing the degree of democracy; the two cases of Papua New Guinea and Tajikistan were removed as these cases did not accommodate significant improvement of the human rights condition. See Chapter 7, calibration sections on regime type and human-rights outcomes, for further details.

In answering the introductory question about those conditions that lead to significant human-rights improvement, this chapter builds substantially on the content of previous chapters. To review briefly: The theoretical basis of Chapter 8 is principally found in Chapter 4, which proffered a number of distinct remote and proximate conditions that might shape human-rights outcomes after the conclusion of a civil war. The second set of proximate conditions was defined and operationalized there. Chapter 5 then quantitatively examined the effects of each remote and proximate factor on human-rights outcomes over three time periods.

This process revealed that four of the Set 2 proximate conditions—namely all three disaggregated political power-sharing measures and the provision for integration of rebels into the military leadership—lacked any evidence of significant or asymmetric relationships over all three periods. Therefore, the analysis initially prioritized the four remaining factors of military integration in the main ranks, robust third-party security guarantees, autonomy, and federalism.²²⁴ Deeper investigation of necessary condition leading to the outcome and to its negation, discussed herein, demonstrates that the condition of territorial federalism ought to be removed from consideration; the chapter also explains why the condition of rebel integration into the military leadership was a worthy substitution for inclusion.

Given that all individual power-sharing provisions were already dichotomized (see Chapter 4), this chapter begins by calibrating the only remaining proximate

²²⁴ Chapter 8 details why each of these measures was included and why certain adjustments were made to the final composition of conditions for fuzzy-set analysis.

condition of robust third-party security guarantees.²²⁵ Necessary conditions are then discussed and identified. The Two-Step Approach to fuzzy-set QCA is applied, starting with the same remote conditions as calibrated in the previous chapter. These conditions remain the same because the situational and historical contexts of each civil war did not change. Indeed, the first step procedures and findings are the same for this reason; this chapter briefly reviews those findings, then carries the relevant remote conditions into the second step based on whether those conditions either enhanced significant human-rights improvement (SHRI) or constrained such improvement (~SHRI).

In the second step, these remote conditions are combined with selected disaggregated proximate conditions to observe those sufficient paths—those causal recipes or combinations—that consistently led to either the outcome of significant human-rights improvement (SHRI) or to the negation of the outcome (~SHRI). The outcome and its negation are addressed in separate processes, each using this Two-Step Approach. This dual process is recommended by a number of scholars (Ragin 2008; Schneider and Wagemann 2010) because of QCA’s asymmetric nature which prevents researchers from automatically concluding that the results leading to an outcome will also lead to the negation of that outcome. By including analysis of an outcome’s negation, a researcher thus validates the initial findings.²²⁶

²²⁵ In Chapter 4, a spectrum of third-party security guarantees was proposed (see Table 17: Author’s Proposed “Spectrum of Third-Party Security Guarantees”) based on a theoretical extension to Walter’s (2002, 67) original typology. Calibration is based on this previous operationalization in terms of the combination of mandate strength and the size of the actual deployed peacekeeping force sent to uphold the third party’s mission.

²²⁶ This process either strengthens confidence in the results or alternatively raises questions about the explanatory strength of certain causal configurations (Mello 2013, 14; Schneider and Wagemann 2010, 408-409).

Once the Two-Step Approach identifies sufficient causal pathways, the analysis of the outcome and of its negation continues with a number of comparative observations and specific findings about these different causal recipes.

Fuzzy-Set Calibration of Robust Security Guarantees

When robust third-party security guarantees were defined in Chapter 4, according to a combination of mandate strength and the size of the deployed peacekeeping force, an ordinal scale was selected to establish a spectrum of the robustness of each guarantee. One of five potential scores was assigned to each case, with the range of experience extending from no guarantee (scored as 0) to a guarantee involving a peace-enforcement mandate alongside the deployment of an armed peacekeeping force of at least 5,000 personnel (scored as 4).

By way of review, the bivariate analysis conducted in Chapter 5 applied a dichotomized definition of robust third-party security guarantees in order to retain high significance for the contingency tables.²²⁷ Robust third-party security guarantees²²⁸ were found statistically significant over the long term for both the change in PTS and CIRI human rights scores over time. From the contingency tables, the absence of guarantees generally led to a nearly equal split between human rights improving or worsening; the presence of guarantees dramatically increased the likelihood of improved human rights.

²²⁷ These contingency tables were designed as a pre-evaluation of the different conditions in the study; use of the five-part scale in Chapter 5 would have diluted the category-to-case ratio below acceptable statistical standards and negated the purpose of these tables.

²²⁸ Under dichotomization, robust guarantees were those with peace-enforcement mandates and a deployment of 5,000 personnel; all other guarantees were considered non-robust.

In shifting from the quantitative analysis of Chapter 5 to fuzzy-set theoretic analysis, it is important to recall that “Fuzzy sets allow for degrees of membership, thus differentiating between different levels of belonging anchored by two extreme membership scores at 1 and 0” (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 28). The dichotomization profiles used in Chapter 5 to distinguish robust from non-robust guarantees unfortunately discarded important differences between combinations of mandates and deployed personnel, which cannot be fully captured by re-dichotomizing the threshold. Recapturing this data is possible via fuzzy-set calibration.

Chapter 6 detailed the calibration process, explaining how data calibration is a prerequisite for any meaningful fuzzy-set analysis (Ragin 2008, 8). For this specific condition, the target set was defined as *robust third-party security guarantees* (condition: R3P). Full membership within the R3PSG was defined by the combined presence of sufficient mandate and significant deployed armed personnel commensurate with the challenges of executing that mandate—especially to the challenging task of rebel demobilization and disarmament. The specific indicator that maps onto this target set is the “Spectrum of Third-Party Security Guarantees,” (see Chapter 4, Table 17).

Fuzzy-score calibration of this spectrum used the following theoretical decisions:

1. Third-party guarantees that involve a fully robust mandate and sufficient footprint size (i.e., include a peace-enforcement mandate coupled with a large deployment force of at least 5,000 personnel) were coded as 1 (i.e., considered “fully in” the fuzzy set).

2. Guarantees that limited use of force to self-defense (e.g., interposition and multidimensional mandates)—when coupled with a sufficient footprint of 5,000 or more personnel—are expected to have *almost* as great an impact as their more robust cousins. With a strong, but not fully robust mandate, these guarantees were considered “almost fully in” the set of robust third-party security guarantees and were assigned a fuzzy set score of 0.9.
3. When an armed mandate loses the requisite personnel, this undersized footprint in country is expected to highly reduce the positive influence of such guarantees; these guarantees were still considered “more in than out,” meaning that they possess the potential to positively affect human rights, though not at the same degree as occurs with more robust guarantees. These guarantees were assigned a fuzzy set score of 0.67.
4. Chapter 4 detailed a theoretical argument regarding verification missions that diverge from scholars like Walter (2002). Here, small mandates and small footprints are considered non-robust and thus inadequate to the task of overcoming commitment problems; human rights are unlikely to improve. This group of guarantees is coded below the crossover point at 0.33 (i.e. “better than nothing” but also “more out than in” the target set).
5. Finally, the absence of any third-party security guarantee was definitively out of the target set and assigned a fuzzy-set score of 0.

All of these calibration decisions are summarized in the table below:

Table 62: Fuzzy-Score Calibration for Robust Third-Party Security Guarantees

Label	Spectrum Type	Summary Description	Fuzzy Score
Fully robust mandate, sufficient footprint	4	Guarantee involving peace enforcement mandate (Fortna's type 4 mission) AND deployment of an armed peacekeeping force of at least five thousand personnel	1
Mostly robust mandate, sufficient footprint	3	Guarantee involving interpositional or multidimensional mandate (Fortna's type 2 or 3 mission, respectively) AND deployment of an armed peacekeeping force of at least five thousand personnel	0.9
Armed mandate, undersized footprint	2	Guarantee involving interpositional, multidimensional, or peace enforcement mandate (Fortna's type 2, 3, or 4 mission, respectively) AND an armed peacekeeping force of < five thousand personnel	0.67
Small mandate, small footprint	1	Guarantee involving observation & monitoring mandate (Fortna's type 1 mission)	0.33
Non-Robust 3PSG	0	No third-party security guarantee	0

Under this coding protocol, and using the adjusted set of 31 cases, ten cases were below the crossover threshold and twenty-one cases were above the threshold. Of the twenty-one cases above the threshold, less than half were fully robust (eight cases total). Four cases were mostly robust and nine cases were “more in than out” of the target set, with an armed mandate but an undersized deployed force (i.e. footprint) for enforcing that mandate.

Calculating Necessary Conditions for SHRI and ~SHRI

Following scholarly advice and precedence (Mello 2014; Ragin 2008, 71; 2009, 96), necessary conditions were tested first. After that, a truth-table analysis was conducted in search of sufficient conditions. The presence of a necessary condition—explained extensively in Chapter 6—means that whenever an outcome occurs, that specific condition is present. Necessity is about assessing shared antecedents, by identifying conditions that are required for an outcome to occur (Ragin 2014).

Identification of necessary conditions, especially when those conditions are manipulable by actors, may establish important policy implications for decision-makers to consider in social interventions such as negotiated settlements (Ragin 2000, 203). Knowing whether a necessary condition will constrain or enable an outcome is vital to considering these potential policy implications (Ragin 2000).

Consistency and Coverage

Necessary conditions are identified using two goodness-of-fit measures known as consistency and coverage.²²⁹ Consistency measures the constancy with which an identical causal configuration leads to a similar outcome. Consistency is calculated by observing a given causal recipe across different cases to see whether this configuration of conditions results in the same outcome. Conventionally, conditions that meet or surpass a threshold of 0.90 consistency are treated as necessary conditions, while those that reach a threshold of 0.85 consistency are considered “almost necessary” conditions (Ragin 2003, 182; Schneider and Wagemann 2012).

In contrast, coverage gauges the empirical significance of a configurational path by calculating the proportional relationship between a given set of conditions and the outcome that is explained (Ragin 2008; Schneider and Wagemann 2012). No minimum thresholds exist for coverage scores, and a known tradeoff exists between obtaining higher consistency scores and a corresponding reduction in coverage scores (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 149). Coverage scores still inform researchers about empirical relevance. While all causal paths matter in small and intermediate-N comparisons,

²²⁹ See Chapter 6 for an in-depth explanation and operationalization of these terms.

researchers conducting the latter type of analyses should consider the frequencies with which different causal paths occur, because this has potential policy implications (Engeli, Rihoux, and Allison 2014, 102).

Necessary Conditions

Each condition and its negation was tested for consistency and coverage *vis-a-vis* both outcomes (SHRI and ~SHRI). The calculations for necessity of Set 2 proximate conditions (summarized in Appendices 6 and 7)²³⁰ show that the absence of federalism (~FED) is an *almost necessary* condition for SHRI, at 0.89 consistency and 0.56 coverage. In addition, this same condition (absence of federalism, or ~FED) is also a *necessary* condition for the absence of significant human-rights improvement (~SHRI), with 0.92 consistency and 0.44 coverage. The finding that the absence of federalism consistently leads to both the outcome and its negation at nearly equal rates effectively negates its utility as a necessary condition in either case. Moreover, it elucidates an interesting conundrum that is less highlighted in scholarship on QCA methodology—namely, that researchers should be cautious about including conditions in QCA that rarely occur in the selected universe of cases.²³¹ The inclusion of such conditions may lead to spurious findings about the necessity of that condition (or its negation), especially if the researcher fails to analyze the negation of the outcome.

²³⁰ No remote conditions met the stated thresholds for necessary conditions.

²³¹ In this regard, Chapter 5 detailed that the preponderance of cases did not involve federalism as a measure; only 4 of the original 36 cases involved this provision. And a closer look at the contingency tables there shows an asymmetric relationship, wherein the absence of federalism lead equally to improved or worse human rights while the presence of federalism consistently lead to improved human rights. This relationship fell shy of statistical significance given the low number of cases with federalism present.

An additional insight is that the *absence* of integrated military leadership (~IML) falls just shy of classification as an *almost necessary* condition for the significant improvement of human rights (SHRI), at 0.84 consistency and fairly high coverage of 0.62. This finding affords additional support to the ever-stronger argument that significant human-rights improvement requires the absence of the provision for integrating rebels into the military leadership (see Table 20: Hypotheses on Set 2 Proximate Conditions and Remote Conditions, specifically H10a/b). Any further relationship needs to be confirmed in the Two-Step Approach for fsQCA. Beyond these findings on federalism and the integration of military leadership, all other Set 2 proximate conditions are substantially below the accepted standard.

Significant Human-Rights Improvement (SHRI)

When a civil war ends in negotiated settlement, what conditions lead to significant human-rights improvement? Do distinct causal pathways exist that substantiate previously discussed theoretical expectations about disaggregated power-sharing provisions and third-party security guarantees? These questions were addressed using fuzzy-set QCA procedures and Schneider and Wagemann's (2006) Two-Step Approach. The latter accounts for proximate conditions operating within a variety of historical and situational contexts and helps reduce overall causal complexity.

Step One of the approach involves evaluating the remote factors by themselves in order to pinpoint human-rights enhancing conditions that enable an outcome by establishing a situational context "under which a given outcome is more likely to occur

than other contexts” (Schneider and Wagemann 2006, 761). Step Two then evaluates the enabling conditions one by one alongside the set of proximate factors.

Step One: Search for Human-Rights Enhancing Remote Conditions

The six remote conditions and initial equation used here (i.e., NE * SW * EP * SP * HD * MD → SHRI) are the same as those tested in Chapter 7. Therefore, analysis of Step One for the proposed outcome of significant human-rights improvement (SHRI) already was conducted.²³² That analysis found, using a deliberately underspecified consistency threshold and the Quine-McCluskey algorithm, the following parsimonious solution:

$$NE + \sim SW + EP \rightarrow SHRI^{233}$$

This equation indicates that if certain remote conditions are present in a state exiting civil war—namely, the presence of non-ethnic conflicts (NE) *OR* the absence of short wars ($\sim SW$) *OR* the presence of enduring peace (EP)—then significant human-rights improvement is a likely outcome. Three observations followed from this solution: (1) No individual remote condition was necessary for human rights to improve; the raw coverage of enduring peace (EP) was quite high though, at 81 percent. (2) The consistency values for these three remote conditions were intentionally low. This aligned with the purposeful design of producing “inconclusive results” in Step One that leave space for refinement in Step Two when proximate conditions are added (Schneider and Wagemann 2006, 770). (3) The presence of non-ethnic wars (NE) and the presence of

²³² The findings of the first step for the negation of the outcome are also included later in the chapter.

²³³ Recall that in Boolean language, the + means *OR* while the → indicates an *if-then* relationship.

enduring peace (EP) were in alignment with theoretical expectations as laid out in Chapter 2 and with the preliminary analysis conducted in Chapter 4. The association of longer wars (~SW, or the absence of short wars) with improved human rights was contrary to the theoretical position and to earlier findings in Chapter 5.²³⁴ The relationship of this remote condition with human-rights outcomes changed when combined with aggregated power-sharing dimensions; the relationship may similarly change here when combined with disaggregated power-sharing provisions.

Step Two: Evaluating SHRI...Proximate Factors in Remote Contexts

The objective of the second step is to determine the different causal pathways that lead to an outcome, including varied configurations of remote and proximate conditions. This step aims to unravel and examine the different combinations of proximate factors as they operate within different remote contexts (Schneider and Wagemann 2006, 2012).

To accomplish Step Two, individual truth tables were constructed for each outcome using the remote conditions discovered in Step One and individually examining these alongside a select group of proximate conditions (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 254). Not all eight proximate conditions from Set 2 could be included in the second step. Even though the splitting of conditions into two separate sets dramatically reduced the number of logical remainders (Schneider and Wagemann 2006, 762),²³⁵ the inclusion of all disaggregated provisions would still result in a hefty 320 multi-dimensional corners

²³⁴ The latter found, for example, that short-duration conflicts are correlated with improved human rights, while long-duration wars have led almost equally to either better or worse rights.

²³⁵ The Two-Step Approach provided a remarkable contraction of logical remainders by well over 95 percent compared to a fuzzy-set analysis evaluating six remote conditions and eight proximate conditions together in a single step. The respective truth table in such an analysis would have involved an unwieldy 2^{14} (i.e., 16,384) corners for this intermediate-N study.

against 31 empirical examples; the number of corners exceeds the number of cases by approximately ten-fold.

In order to preserve a tighter condition-to-case ratio and keep the logical remainders low, a reduction in the number of proximate conditions was required. An appropriate initial construct here was to start with the same combination of six remote conditions and four proximate conditions used in Chapter 7. Together, those two steps resulted in 80 different corners of the vector space, with 2^6 (i.e., 64) rows in Step One and 2^4 (i.e., 16) rows in Step Two. This total was slightly more than double but less than triple the number of cases.²³⁶

Selecting Proximate Conditions

Which four factors are expected to matter most and, therefore, should be retained? As noted in the introduction of this chapter, the previous contingency table analysis identified four proximate conditions most likely to affect human-rights outcomes: (1) the military integration of rebels into the main ranks of a joint defense force (IDF), (2) autonomy (AUT), (3) robust third-party security guarantees (R3P), and (4) the military integration of rebels into military leadership positions (IML).

Although federalism always led to improved human rights in the mid- and long-term periods (and in three of four cases in the short term)²³⁷, the decision was made to

²³⁶ The inclusion of five proximate conditions in Step Two rather than four was also considered, for this only mildly raised the total number of corners to 96 (i.e., 64 rows from Step One and 2^5 or 32 rows from Step Two). While this shift added just 16 corners, the addition of a single condition consistently resulted in a sharp increase in the number of individualized cases. That is, almost every causal path was represented by just a single case when five proximate conditions were included in the second step.

²³⁷ For the fuzzy-set analysis, the civil war in Bosnia was excluded due to missing data about regime type. This left just three cases with federalism in the short term: Two of these three cases (Burundi and Moldova)

exclude federalism from the fuzzy set analysis. This decision was due both to the rarity of the measure and to the conflicting simultaneous identification of the absence of this provision (\sim FED) as a necessary condition to both significant human-rights improvement (SHRI) and the negation of that improvement (\sim SHRI).²³⁸

Previous discussion on necessary conditions also noted that the absence of rebel integration into military leadership positions (\sim IML) fell just shy of an almost necessary condition for significant human rights improvement (SHRI) at 0.84 consistency and coverage of 0.62. Since this finding paralleled theoretical expectations that significant human-rights improvement required the absence of this measure, the provision for integration of rebels into military leadership positions (IML) was added in as the fourth proximate condition.

To review, four proximate conditions were selected from the eight disaggregated peace-agreement provisions based on preceding evidence of statistically significant relationships, necessary relationships, and/or asymmetric relationships with human-rights improvement. The final four conditions for consideration in the second step here are: (1) the military integration of rebels into the main ranks of a joint defense force (IDF), (2) autonomy (AUT), (3) robust third-party security guarantees (R3P), and (4) the military integration of rebels into military leadership positions (IML).

Following Schneider and Wagemann's (2006, 2012) procedures, each remote condition from Step One—i.e., the remote context conditions of non-ethnic conflict (NE),

each experienced improved human rights outcomes; political repression in South Africa became slightly worse over that time period.

²³⁸ See previous discussion, this chapter, about necessary conditions.

short wars (SW), and enduring peace (EP)—was individually evaluated in combination with all of the four selected proximate conditions (i.e., IDF, AUT, R3P, and IML). In an additional robustness check, all three political power-sharing provisions were added individually as a fifth condition (described in the next section). The full process and applicable conditions are summarized in the updated figure below.




Figure 16: Two-Step fsQCA for Reduced Set 2 Proximate Conditions

In Step Two of this study, the consistency threshold criteria for passing the sufficiency test was raised to 0.80. This threshold is higher than the threshold of 0.70 used by Schneider and Wagemann (2006) and also higher than Ragin’s recommended cut-off value of no less than 0.75.²³⁹ Additionally, in order for a causal pathway to be evaluated, at least one empirical case had to demonstrate membership higher than 0.5 in that vector space. Finally, this second step was intentionally conservative through its use

²³⁹ As noted in Chapter 7, Ragin’s (2012, 29) threshold refers to a single-step procedure rather than the two-step process used by Schneider and Wagemann.

of the complex solution that fully rejects all counterfactuals and bases the results solely on empirical cases (Schneider and Wagemann 2006, 2012).

Robustness Checks

In order to cross-examine the selection of 0.80 as the consistency threshold, a second evaluation was made using a higher consistency threshold of 0.85 for Step Two. An important tradeoff occurred at that point. Small gains in the overall solution consistency resulted in a substantial loss of overall solution coverage. For example, when the consistency threshold was increased from 0.8 to 0.85 for the pairing of the first remote condition of non-ethnic conflict (NE) with the four selected proximate factors, the solution consistency increased mildly from 0.82 to 0.87; however, the solution coverage dropped dramatically from 0.56 to just 0.38. The pairing of short wars (SW) with the proximate factors was less severe. Consistency remained almost exactly the same, at approximately 0.87; the solution coverage dropped from 0.55 to 0.51. Finally, the third analysis—combining enduring peace (EP) with the proximate factors—did not show any changes in the solution consistency or coverage, because no truth-table rows were affected by the small increase in the consistency threshold.

The small adjustment in consistency thresholds resulted in tradeoffs with the coverage of those causal pathways (i.e., a reduction in the number of cases covered by those paths). This finding corroborated the consistency-coverage tradeoff emphasized by Schneider and Wagemann (2012, 149) and discussed in Chapter 6. Based on these tradeoffs, the threshold of 0.80 was retained. A 0.80 threshold accommodated broader

comparison and generalizability given its blend of high consistency with greater coverage.

An additional robustness check made here was the inclusion of a fifth proximate condition alongside the previous four proximate conditions. Each of the three excluded political power-sharing conditions—i.e., rebel representation in the (1) executive branch (EXE), (2) legislative branch (LEG), and (3) civil service (CIV)—was considered as a potential fifth condition. The same process was following of individually pairing the outcome-enabling conditions from Step One with the full set of proximate conditions (though with this fifth condition added to the latter set). This process confirmed previous suspicions that adding a fifth condition would likely lead to excessive complexity and to causal recipes individualized to single cases. This held especially true for executive representation (EXE) and legislative representation (LEG), with the former involving sixteen different causal pathways, six of which involved singular cases.

Even when cases were not individualized, the additional fifth condition consistently diluted the raw coverage of the different causal pathways, creating similar effects to that of increasing the consistency threshold from 0.80 to 0.85. Also, in reviewing the resulting causal pathways, neither the presence nor the absence of the added conditions consistently led to the desired outcome of significantly improved human rights. One interesting insight was that the causal pathway with the highest coverage for each of the three added conditions (LEG, EXE, CIV) included the presence of short wars (SW) with the absence of autonomy (~AUT); two of these three paths also included robust third-party security guarantees, as shown below:

(1) SW * ~LEG * ~IML * ~AUT * R3P

0.85 consistency, 0.23 raw coverage, 6 cases

(2) SW * EXE * ~IML * ~AUT * R3P

0.86 consistency, 0.27 raw coverage, 6 cases

(3) SW * ~CIV * ~IMM * ~IML * ~AUT

0.86 consistency, 0.34 raw coverage, 8 cases

Other causal pathways negated placing too much stock in the presence or absence of the added political power-sharing provision.

General Observations

The original Step Two process—involving the combination of each outcome-enabling condition with the four selected proximate power-sharing measures—resulted in a combined total of nine causal recipes (see Table 63 below). These causal recipes represent the sufficient causal configurations that led to significant human-rights improvement (SHRI). Except for the first two pathways (*p1*, *p2*)—both represented by the single case of El Salvador (SAL)—all of the causal paths demonstrated multiple memberships.

Table 63: Sufficient Paths Toward SHRI

SHRI =	Remote Context	Proximate Power-Sharing Configurations	Consistency	N	Country
(p1)	NE	IDF * IML * ~AUT * R3P	1.00	1	SAL
(p2)	~SW	IDF * IML * ~AUT * R3P	0.82	1	SAL
(p3)	SW	~IDF * ~IML * ~AUT	0.88	9	CRO2, GNB, CRO1, MLD, PHI2, LBR2, NEP, LBR1, AZE
(p4)	SW	~IDF * ~IML * R3P	0.9	7	CRO2, CRO1, LBR2, LBR1, GRG2, MLD, NEP
(p5)	EP	~IDF * ~IML * R3P	0.93	7	CRO2, LBR2, CRO1, GRG2, GUA, MLD, NEP
(p6)	-	~IDF * ~IML * ~AUT	0.80	10	ANG1, AZE, CRO1, CRO2, GNB, LBR1, LBR2, MLD, NEP, PHI2
(p7)	-	~IDF * ~IML * R3P	0.86	8	CRO2, LBR1, LBR2, CRO1, GRG2, GUA, MLD, NEP
(p8)	-	~IDF * ~IML * ~AUT * ~R3P	0.90	4	AZE, PHI2, ANG1, GNB
(p9)	-	~IDF * ~IML * AUT * R3P	0.90	2	GRG2, GUA

All of the causal paths demonstrated a consistency score of 0.80 or greater. This contrasts with Step One, where the remote contexts viewed on their own produced much lower consistency values of 0.58 (NE), 0.60 (~SW), and 0.60 (EP). The addition of proximate factors increased the overall consistency of the causal pathways by making these conjunctural solutions “more specific, theoretically complex and thus empirically consistent” (Schneider and Wagemann 2006, 770). This increased specificity eventually bumps against a certain threshold with inherent tradeoffs. As illustrated earlier, adding even one more condition can result in almost double the number of causal pathways with only nominal gains in the overall consistency.

In similar fashion to Model 1, this second model demonstrates that remote and proximate factors, viewed in isolation, do not satisfactorily account for significant human-rights improvement (SHRI) following negotiated settlements in civil wars. Rather, complex causation—involving multiple pathways and “specific combinations of causal conditions” or “causal recipes” (Ragin 2008, 149)—led to the outcome. Human

rights improve (i.e., political repression decreases) when certain proximate factors are employed in specific remote contexts. The latter serve as scope conditions that alternatively constrain or enable the capacity of proximate factors to affect an outcome.

The nine pathways shown in Table 67 also demonstrate equifinality because the outcome of significant human-rights improvement arose from multiple pathways. These paths also exhibit what Ragin (2008) termed multiple conjunctural causation, which is evidenced by the combination of different remote and proximate factors in a variety of solutions that each produce a reduction in the state's use of political repression.

Specific Findings

Seven comparative observations may be made across the causal pathways about specific conditions and combinations of conditions:

1. The Absence of Power-Sharing Measures

As with Model 1, the absence of individual power-sharing provisions did not prevent human rights from still improving significantly. This finding was anticipated based on Model 1, which demonstrated earlier (with four strong cases) that where there were no power-sharing dimensions, human rights still improved. The expectation, then, was that this finding would hold for disaggregated provisions as well. In this same vein, Path 8 (*p8*) in Table 67 revealed that when the assessed power-sharing measures of IDF, IML, AUT, and R3P were completely absent, human rights still improved significantly. Four states strongly represented this causal configuration, including: Angola 1975-1989, Azerbaijan 1989-1994, Guinea Bissau 1998-1998, and the Philippines 2000-2000.²⁴⁰

²⁴⁰ Comparatively, Model 1 included the first civil war in Croatia, which is absent here from Model 2. The causal pathways are dissimilar in that Model 2 adds the qualifier of ~R3P. The civil war in Croatia involved

2. The Absence of Military Power-Sharing Measures

The absence of all military measures (e.g., ~IDF and ~IML) in negotiated settlements consistently aligned with the improvement of human-rights outcomes after a civil war ended. This extended the findings from Model 1 where all nine causal recipes that had led to significant human-rights improvement (SHRI) involved the absence of thick military power-sharing agreements. The disaggregation of the military power-sharing dimension into its constituent conditions thus indicated that the absence of *both* conditions from a negotiated settlement was associated with human rights improving after a civil war had ended.

Paths 3-9 (Table 67: *p3-p9*) all led to significant human-rights improvement when *both* military power-sharing conditions were absent. Notably, each of these pathways was represented by at least two and as many as ten different cases. Coverage, in other words, was quite large for most of these paths since these specific causal combinations explained many of the cases.

3. The Presence of Military Power-Sharing Measures

Two causal paths (Path 1 and 2) included *both* the presence of military integration into the joint defense force (IDF) and the presence of rebel integration into the military leadership (IML). Notably, these two causal paths are represented by the single outlier case of El Salvador (SAL). This outlier is worth evaluating more deeply in order to discern what other conditions in that civil war might have accommodated the presence of the IDF and IMF conditions while still resulting in improved human rights after the war.

a semi-robust third-party security guarantee (fuzzy set score of 0.67); therefore that civil war has an overall different causal configuration than Path 8.

How did the Salvadorian negotiated settlement overcome the seemingly negative effects of military measures on human-rights outcomes? From the conditions noted above in Paths 1 and 2, the El Salvador conflict was considered a long-lasting, non-ethnic war. Autonomy was not granted in the negotiated settlement. The third-party security guarantee included a multidimensional mandate (Fortna's Type 3 mission) but with only a small corresponding structure to enforce that mandate. Theoretically, this combination of a strong mandate with an undersized footprint would, on its own, help marginally improve human-rights outcomes

Case study analyses of the Salvadorian civil war revealed additional key insights about the conflict. Lasting from 1979-1992, the civil war exemplified in its final years what Zartman (2000, 2001) called a mutually hurting stalemate, because the rivals were both exhausted.²⁴¹ The conflict had originated as an "agrarian insurgency" (Wood 2003, 2), with the disenfranchised rural poor persistently mobilizing in a protracted conflict against economic elites whose interests had long converged with military elites who were overly eager to extort the populace and protect the status quo (DeRouen and Heo 2007; Stanley 2010; Wood 2000, 2003).

In late 1989, the opposition—known as the Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN)—failed in its efforts to reignite the conflict; the government simultaneously recognized that it could not win militarily (Zartman and De Soto 2010). The peaceful compromise was arguably delayed by the United States

²⁴¹ Indeed, Zartman and de Soto (2000) specifically reference El Salvador as a fundamental exemplar of this stalemate in their guide to peacemakers on how to recognize conflict ripeness and time mediation efforts when belligerents are most amenable to a negotiated settlement.

externally intervening in support of the weaker government and by the civil war's corresponding role as a proxy conflict during the Cold War.²⁴²

To review, it appears that one critical factor that potentially enabled the integration of rebels into the main military ranks (IDF) and into military leadership positions (IML) in El Salvador's negotiated settlement was that the conflict was deeply exhausting for the rivals.²⁴³ Once proxy support was removed, negotiations quickly gained traction. This exhaustion, combined with a third-party security guarantee—nominal as it was with respect to the strength of its presence—was extensive enough to improve human-rights outcomes despite both forms of military integration that elsewhere have proved inhibitory to positive human-rights outcomes.

4. The Role of War Duration

When war duration was considered in Step One (i.e., using remote conditions only), the results indicated that long-lasting wars (~SW) matter most for significantly improving human-rights outcomes. However, the combination of war duration with the proximate conditions revealed that, in the main, the reverse holds true. The sole exception to this was El Salvador (Path 2), as discussed above.

²⁴² The peaceful compromise was arguably delayed by the US externally intervening in support of the weaker government and by the civil war's corresponding role as a proxy conflict in the Cold War. Rosenblum (in DeRouen and Heo 2007, 345) argued, for example, that peace finally arrived "When both sides came to see their economic and political interests as better served by compromise than through continued bloodshed—a decision that might have been reached a decade—and tens of thousands of civilian lives—earlier, had it not been for the external context of the Cold War and US opposition to a negotiated settlement."

²⁴³ Several other unique factors may have buttressed this specific negotiated stalemate. One scholar (Wood 2000) noted that democracy in El Salvador was "forged from below—meaning that it was initiated by the insurgency and took root in the peace-agreement terms. Those peace agreement terms also included legalization of the FMLN opposition as a legitimate political party, as well as placing civilians in charge of all security forces (4-5). These conditions may be worth exploring in future research on peace agreement initiatives that influence human-rights outcomes.

The paths that involved the remote condition of war duration (Path 3 and 4) were compared by combining the two paths into a single equation (Equation 1):

$$(1) \text{ SHRI} = \text{SW} * \sim\text{IDF} * \sim\text{IML} * \sim\text{AUT} (p3) + \text{SW} * \sim\text{IDF} * \sim\text{IML} * \text{R3P} \\ (p4)$$

This combination from the initial Boolean analysis was then simplified with *factoring*, a procedure that helps to clarify an equation and identify causally equivalent conditions (Ragin 2014, 100-101). Simplifying Equation 1 to account for duplicate conditions resulted in:

$$(2) \text{ SHRI} = \text{SW} * \sim\text{IDF} * \sim\text{IML} (\sim\text{AUT} + \text{R3P})$$

This simplified equation indicated that significant human-rights improvement is likely when wars of short duration (SW) are combined with negotiated settlements that exclude both forms of military power-sharing provisions. The peace agreement does not include any provision for rebel integration into the main ranks of that state's defense force ($\sim\text{IDF}$) or for integration into military leadership positions ($\sim\text{IML}$). The two remaining conditions—the absence of autonomy ($\sim\text{AUT}$) OR the presence of robust third-party security guarantees (R3P)—are causally equivalent, substitutable conditions. That is, the presence of third-party security guarantees OR the absence of autonomy power-sharing measures, when combined with these other three conditions (i.e. $\text{SW} * \sim\text{IDF} * \sim\text{IML}$), is sufficient for the outcome of significantly improved human rights.²⁴⁴

²⁴⁴ The first civil war in Liberia (LIB1) is a sole exception to the outcome. While LIB1 has strong membership in this causal pathway, its outcome is below the threshold at a fuzzy set score of 0.4. This fuzzy set score means the PTS score did not change over the measured two-year period. Civil war was recurring ($\sim\text{EP}$) at that two-year point when human rights were measured.

5. The Role of Enduring Peace

In Step One, using only remote conditions, the presence of enduring peace (EP) corresponded with the expectation of significantly improved human-rights outcomes. The second step corroborated this expectation. The causal combination in Path 5 had the highest consistency level (at 0.93) of any causal pathway.

Given that Paths 4 and 5 involved remarkably similar conditions leading to significant human-rights improvement, these paths were combined for further exploration (Equation 3):

$$(3) \text{ SHRI} = \text{SW} * \sim\text{IDF} * \sim\text{IML} * \text{R3P} (p4) + \text{EP} * \sim\text{IDF} * \sim\text{IML} * \text{R3P} (p5)$$

Simplifying Equation 3 resulted in:

$$(4) \text{ SHRI} = \sim\text{IDF} * \sim\text{IML} * \text{R3P} (\text{SW} + \text{EP})$$

This simplification unveils that the remote conditions of short war (SW) and enduring peace (EP) are causally equivalent when combined with robust third-party security guarantees (R3P) and the absence of all military power-sharing provisions (i.e. rebel integration into the defense force ($\sim\text{IDF}$) and into the leadership of that military ($\sim\text{IML}$)). Further investigation shows that while raw coverage is great for both pathways, their respective unique coverage is much smaller: Path 4 uniquely covered the first civil war, in Liberia (LBR1);²⁴⁵ Path 5 uniquely covered the second civil war, in Georgia (GRG2). All other cases were jointly covered. Additionally, these causal paths were both subsets of Path 7, which does not involve any remote conditions. Path 7 shows that the combination of $\sim\text{IDF} * \sim\text{IML} * \sim\text{R3P}$ leads to SHRI. As subsets of this path, paths 4 and

²⁴⁵ See earlier footnote on Liberia.

5 principally differ in that each causal pathway adds a single remote condition. In both cases this addition of a single condition led to a greater overall consistency of that causal pathway: overall consistency increased from 0.86 (*p7*) to 0.9 (*p4*) and 0.93 (*p5*).

6. Autonomy with Third-Party Security Guarantees

Path 9 (*p9*) was unique in that it was the only pathway where the territorial power-sharing measure of autonomy was present (AUT). This pathway covered two cases, including the second civil war in Georgia (GRG2) and the civil war in Guatemala (GUA). This causal pathway did not uniquely cover either case; both cases were present in a number of other causal paths and sometimes in the same causal path (*p5*, for example). In addition, Path 9 was similar to Paths 4 and 5 in that it was also a subset of Path 7. Path 9 differed from Path 7 by the addition of the autonomy provision (AUT), which helped improve the overall consistency from 0.86 (*p7*) to 0.90 (*p9*).

Theoretically and empirically, the presence of autonomy power-sharing measures in a negotiated settlement suggests that worse human rights will result. Yet, human rights slightly improved (+0.5 in PTS score) in the short term for both cases. Why? One common component to both cases was the presence of enduring peace (EP; see *p5*). The non-recurrence of civil war is central to providing an atmosphere for human rights to improve. Beyond this similarity, the remote contexts for the two civil wars varied on the remaining assessed conditions. The civil war in Georgia (Abkhazia) was short in duration (SW, 1992-1994) and ethnic in nature (~NE), while the Guatemalan civil war was incredibly long (~SW, 1963-1996) and non-ethnically based (NE).²⁴⁶

²⁴⁶ Like the long-lasting, intense civil war in El Salvador, the Guatemalan civil war found a substantial part of its roots in a class-based conflict pitting an oligarchic elite against an insurgent peasant population.

One possible explanation for the similar outcome of improved human rights is that the inclusion of robust third-party security guarantees in both civil wars mitigated the negative influence of autonomous measures. How robust were these guarantees though? The civil war in Georgia-Abkhazia involved an interpositional mandate (Fortna's Type 2 mission), along with an armed peacekeeping force of 2,542 people (Mullenbach 2013c). This combination of an armed mandate with an undersized footprint was graded "more in than out" of the set of robust third-party security guarantees. A matching fuzzy set score of 0.67 was assigned. Such a combination of mandate and force structure was anticipated to mildly but positively influence the government's honoring of physical-integrity rights after the conflict.

Similarly, the Guatemalan civil war involved an interpositional mandate (Fortna's Type 2 mission), though with a smaller footprint of just one hundred forty-five people (Mullenbach 2013c). The combination of mandate and force structure was also assigned a fuzzy score of 0.67, indicating a strong mandate with an undersized footprint. It is possible that the presence of these semi-robust third-party security guarantees attenuated the negative potential effects that autonomous power-sharing measures are expected to make on human-rights outcomes. The causal mechanisms need further exploration.

7. Third-Party Security Guarantees

Six of the nine sufficient pathways involved the presence of robust third-party security guarantees. Only one causal path consistently involved the absence of these

Unlike El Salvador, a mutually hurting stalemate was not fully reached. In the lead-up to and immediately following signed negotiations on human rights, for example, the government continued to target returning refugees and unarmed civilians with attacks by death squads (Rosenblum and Lunsford in DeRouen and Heo 2007, 329-49 and 385-402, respectively). Lunsford also contended that class divisions in Guatemala aligned with ethnic identities. The classification of this civil war as a non-ethnic conflict is thus disputed.

guarantees (p8). That path was discussed as the first finding, for it was also made distinct by the total absence of all power-sharing provisions as well. Third-party security guarantees are discussed in more depth below, given the presence of this provision in one of the paths with wide coverage (p7, eight cases).

Implications

A central finding of this study was that none of the hypothesized factors was a necessary or sufficient condition on its own for significant human-rights improvement. Instead, multiple conjunctural combinations of select conditions (i.e., various causal pathways) were able to account for, with strong consistencies, the observed instances of this improvement. Table 63 above lays out the full array of sufficient paths that led to significant human-rights improvement.

So, how well did the paths discussed therein cover cases where human rights had improved? Table 64 below illustrates the breakdown of all thirty-one cases based on their calibrated fuzzy set scores. Of the thirty-one cases studied here using fsQCA, eighteen involved at least nominal improvement in human rights (+0.5 change in PTS score; fuzzy-set score of 0.6 or higher) over the two years following civil war. Of these eighteen cases, the causal pathways in this analysis covered 67 percent of the cases (12 total).

Table 64: Coverage of Sufficient Pathways for SHRI²⁴⁷

Fuzzy Set Score for Significant Human Rights Improvement (SHRI)						
	0	0.4	0.6	0.8	0.9	1
Number of Cases	3	10	7	6	3	2
Number of cases covered by sufficient paths	0	1	3	5	2	2

This initial coverage is somewhat deceiving. Consider a slight refinement to the previous question—and one that aligns more appropriately with the design of this project: How well did the paths discussed in Table 67 cover the cases where human rights *significantly* had improved? The benchmark of significant human-rights improvement, as explored in Chapter 7, is a change in PTS score of +2.0 or more over time. Recall, though, that changes of +1.0 or more in that score were deemed “almost fully” in this set and were correspondingly scored with fuzzy-set scores of 0.8.

With this in mind, how well did the selected remote and proximate conditions perform in producing a set of causal pathways with high consistencies that account for cases where human rights improved by +1.0 or more? Table 68 substantiates that the causal paths covered 82 percent of these cases (9 of 11).²⁴⁸ In contrast, looking only at those cases where human rights had improved marginally (i.e., fuzzy-set score of 0.6), the resulting causal pathways covered just 43 percent of the cases (3 of 7).²⁴⁹

This means that the causal pathways unveiled by using fuzzy-set QCA and the Two-Step Approach effectively captured those combinations of remote and proximate

²⁴⁷ The fuzzy set score for the human-rights outcome was calibrated in Chapter 7.

²⁴⁸ The sufficient causal pathways do not cover LBR3 or SIE2. Both cases are discussed later below.

²⁴⁹ Specifically the pathways do not cover ANG3, ANG4, BUI, and MZM.

conditions that lead to significant human-rights improvement. This process also incorporated three cases (of seven) with just nominal human-rights improvement and one case (out of ten) where human rights became nominally worse.²⁵⁰

Predominant Pathways

When research has potential policy recommendations, another recommended procedure is to account for the frequency of different causal paths (Rihoux et al 2014, 102). In this regard, when the sole outlier case of El Salvador is momentarily excluded (Paths 1 and 2), two predominant pathways (Paths 6 and 7) cover all remaining cases. These two paths are supra-sets; all other paths are subsets of these paths: Paths 3 and 8 were subsets of Path 6; they started with the causal combination found in Path 6 ($\sim\text{IDF} * \sim\text{IML} * \sim\text{AUT}$), then added the conditions of SW and $\sim\text{R3P}$, respectively. Paths 4, 5, and 9 were subsets of Path 7; they started with the causal combination found in Path 7 ($\sim\text{IDF} * \sim\text{IML} * \text{R3P}$) and added, respectively, the additional conditions of SW, EP, and AUT. In all subsets, the addition of a single condition reduced the total number of cases covered (i.e. coverage), while also raising the overall consistency as compared to the initial path.

Combining the two predominant causal paths into one equation resulted in

Equation 5:

$$(5) \text{ SHRI} = \sim\text{IDF} * \sim\text{IML} * \sim\text{AUT} (p6)^{251} + \sim\text{IDF} * \sim\text{IML} * \text{R3P} (p7)^{252}$$

²⁵⁰ This outlier case, as discussed in an earlier footnote, was LIB1.

²⁵¹ Cases with strong membership in the first combination (*p6*) included: ANG1, AZE, CRO1, CRO2, GNB, LBR1, LBR2, MLD, NEP, PHI2.

²⁵² Cases with strong membership in the second combination (*p7*) included: CRO2, LBR1, LBR2, CRO1, GRG2, GUA, MLD, NEP. A number of cases overlapped both combinations. The first combination uniquely covered ANG1, AZE, GNB, PHI2, while the second combination uniquely covered GRG2 and GUA.

Simplifying this equation via factoring resulted in Equation 6:

$$(6) \text{ SHRI} = \sim\text{IDF} * \sim\text{IML} (\sim\text{AUT} + \text{R3P})$$

This simplified, succinct equation covered 72 percent of the cases (8 of 11) where human rights improved by +1.0 change in the PTS score over two years.²⁵³ A major implication of this equation, applicable to all actors involved in the negotiated settlement process, is that if those actors desire significant human-rights improvement, the most consistent pathway toward this end is to exclude all military power-sharing provisions from peace agreements. The integration of rebels into the defense force (IDF) and into the military leadership (IML) should *not* be included in peace agreements if improvement of human-rights outcomes is desired in the short term after civil war has ended.

Under this same rationale, another implication of Equation 6 is that peace agreements ought to exclude territorial autonomy. Finally, robust third-party security guarantees are a causally equivalent condition to the exclusion of autonomy for obtaining significantly improved human-rights outcomes. The current data suggests that inclusion of robust third-party security guarantees might overcome including autonomous measures as long as the two aforementioned military measures are excluded. Path 9 has demonstrated this possibility, but the shallower coverage of just two cases (GRG2 and GUA) and the nominal improvements made in both cases (only +0.5 improvement in PTS score) should attenuate strong exuberance for such an approach.

²⁵³ The Salvadorian civil war, as discussed earlier, is not captured by this more succinct equation.

Two Missing Cases Where SHRI Occurred

The full set of sufficient pathways covered all but two cases where human rights significantly had improved by +1.0 or more in the PTS score (i.e., fuzzy-set score of 0.8 or higher; see Table 67 above). These two cases included the second civil war in Sierra Leone and the third civil war in Liberia.

What do these civil wars hold in common, and how do they compare with the previously discussed sufficient equation (Equation 6) for describing cases where significant human-rights improvement occurred? Both of the excluded conflicts were short wars (SW) with enduring peace (EP). Neither included measures of autonomy (~AUT) nor integration into the military leadership (~IML). Principally, they differed from the sufficient causal pathways by their inclusion of measures for integrating rebels into the military defense force (IDF).

How then did human rights improve so much (i.e., a full +1 improvement in PTS score for Sierra Leone and +1.5 improvement in PTS score for Liberia), despite inclusion of the military provision for rebel integration into the defense force? One possible explanation is that the beneficial remote contexts of short wars and enduring peace, combined with the simultaneous inclusion of fully robust forms of third-party security guarantees, overcame any potential negative effect of this rebel integration into the defense force. With respect to robust third-party guarantees, both of these negotiated settlements included the strongest mandate possible. Peace-enforcement missions (Fortna's Type 4 mission) were established. These strong mandates were coupled with military footprints well beyond the proposed 5,000 troop minimum for a robust

guarantee: in Sierra Leone, a maximum of 17,455 peacekeepers were deployed to enforce the mandate; in Liberia, 17,045 peacekeepers were deployed (Mullenbach 2013c).

Negation of Significant Human-Rights Improvement (~SHRI)

When civil wars end in negotiated settlements, what conditions lead to the negation of significant human-rights improvement (~SHRI)? Do certain causal recipes (i.e., combinations of these conditions) exist that substantiate previously discussed theoretical expectations regarding disaggregated power-sharing measures and third-party security guarantees?

Studying the negation of an outcome helps to validate causal arguments. If the same combination of conditions that led consistently to an outcome also led to the negation of that outcome, then the explanatory strength of the selected conditions and causal pathways is in question (Mello 2013, 14). A key component of examining the negation of significant human-rights improvement (~SHRI) is checking for duplicate pathways that led sufficiently to each outcome. Here is an additional component: Because QCA is based in set-theoretic methodology, the testing of the non-occurrence of an outcome also checks the potential asymmetric nature of conditions.

The sequence of procedures used here, and defined below, also followed Schneider and Wagemann's (2006) Two-Step Approach: in Step One, searching for the remote conditions that constrained human-rights improvement by using lower consistency thresholds along with the parsimonious solution; then in Step Two, observing how proximate factors like third-party security guarantees and disaggregated power-sharing measures operated within those historical and situational contexts. The second

step raised the consistency threshold criteria to 0.80, with the requirement that at least one case had membership higher than 0.5 in a causal combination, and the use of the complex solution.

Step One: Search for Human-Rights Constraining Remote Conditions

The six remote conditions used here in Step One (i.e., NE * SW * EP * SP * HD * MD) are the same as those tested in Chapter 7. As a result, the analysis of this first step—investigating the negation of the significant human-rights improvement (SHRI) outcome—already has been completed. Using a deliberately underspecified consistency threshold and the Quine-McCluskey algorithm, that analysis found the following parsimonious solution:

$$\sim\text{NE} + \sim\text{SW} + \sim\text{SP} \longrightarrow \sim\text{SHRI}$$

In shorthand, the equation states that if $\sim\text{NE}$ OR $\sim\text{SW}$ OR $\sim\text{SP}$, then $\sim\text{SHRI}$. This equation, indicates that when certain remote conditions are present in a state exiting a civil war—namely, the absence of non-ethnic wars ($\sim\text{NE}$) or the absence of short wars ($\sim\text{SW}$) or the absence of small populations ($\sim\text{SP}$)—then the outcome of significant human-rights improvement is likely negated ($\sim\text{SHRI}$). Stated differently, three contextual (remote) conditions generally prevent improvement in human rights after a civil war: *ethnic war*, *long war*, and *large population*. Five observations followed from this solution:

1. None of these three contextual conditions is individually necessary for the negation of human rights. Indeed, raw coverage for the most common and

consistent condition involving the absence of small populations (~SP) had reached just two out of three cases.

2. The low percentages of unique coverage—ranging from 0.06 (~SP) to 0.08 (~SW) and 0.19 (~NE)—indicated that the remote conditions overlapped substantially, with many cases involving two or three of them.
3. The consistency values were strong for ~SP (0.69) and ~SW (0.61), but weaker for ~NE (0.43). Lower consistencies were expected in Step One since intentional constraints were designed to produce “inconclusive results” that accommodated refinement when proximate factors were added in Step Two (Schneider and Wagemann 2006, 770).
4. The remote conditions aligned with theoretical expectations: Ethnic war, long war, and large population were all expected to lead to worse human rights.
5. The remote conditions found in this parsimonious solution for ~SHRI closely resembled the mirror inverse of the parsimonious solution for SHRI.

Step Two: Evaluating ~SHRI...Proximate Conditions in Remote Contexts

The purpose of Step Two was to consider the selected proximate factors as they operated within the three different remote contexts. This illuminated the different causal recipes that had led to the negation of the outcome. In accordance with procedures, each remote context from the parsimonious solution—including non-ethnic conflict (NE), short war (SW), and small population (SP)—was compared alongside the same four proximate factors of military integration of rebels into the main ranks of the joint defense

force (IDF), integration of rebels into military leadership positions (IML), autonomy (AUT), and robust third-party security guarantees (R3P).

Based on earlier discussion in this chapter as well as in Chapter 5, the theoretical expectation is that the remote contexts of ethnic war (~NE), long-duration war (~SW), and the absence of a small population (~SP) will more often lead to the negation of an outcome by constraining the effects of actor-influenced conditions. With respect to proximate conditions, the presence of military integration of rebels into the main ranks of the joint defense force (IDF) and into military leadership positions (IML) will generally lead to worse human rights. The absence of either military provision is not a guarantee that worse human rights can be avoided though. In turn, the presence of the territorial autonomy provision is expected to consistently lead to worse human rights.

Finally, the relationship of third-party security guarantees (R3P) is less determinate with respect to the negation of significant human-rights improvement. This is due to an asymmetric relationship: When security guarantees are present in the short term, human rights are highly likely to improve. When such guarantees are absent, human rights may or may not get worse; the data in Chapter 5 is divided here.

Robustness Checks

A higher threshold of 0.85 was again used to crosscheck the consistency threshold of 0.80 and to consider which set was more appropriate for analysis. As with previous evaluations, trade-offs were evident, though they were not gross here. The higher threshold consistently yielded increases in the overall solution consistency that generally paralleled the losses in overall solution coverage (i.e., the number of cases covered).

When the remote condition of short wars (SW) was paired with the four proximate factors, for example, the raised threshold resulted in an increased solution consistency (from 0.82 to 0.94) but a drop in solution coverage (from 0.46 to 0.31). Likewise, the pairing of small populations (SP) with proximate conditions provided an increase in overall solution consistency (from 0.74 to 0.85) but a more minor loss in coverage from (0.52 to 0.46). Interestingly, the pairing of non-ethnic conflict (NE) with the proximate factors resulted in decreases for *both* consistency and coverage, from 0.76 to 0.72 and from 0.31 to 0.18, respectively.

The tradeoffs with this higher threshold seem worth considering its use, given that overall coverage loss is comparatively small. Closer inspection raises a prominent concern though. The higher threshold of 0.85 resulted in ten causal pathways, but only three of these paths were represented by multiple cases and just two had high consistencies.²⁵⁴ That is, the causal pathways with this higher threshold were typically represented by a single case rather than by multiple cases. Comparatively, the threshold of 0.80 provided twelve causal pathways with all but two represented by multiple cases.

For the main analysis, the threshold of 0.80 was retained, both to align with the previous analysis of the outcome and also because it blended still-high consistency above scholarly recommendations while retaining greater coverage. After the threshold was set, the Quine-McCluskey algorithm was applied to produce the complex solution, which is a more conservative result based on the use of empirical instances and the rejection of all counterfactuals (Ragin 2008, 136).

²⁵⁴ These two paths with multiple cases and high consistencies are discussed later below.

An additional robustness check was conducted involving the examination of each of the three excluded political conditions of rebel representation in the executive branch (EXE), legislative branch (LEG), and civil service (CIV). As discussed earlier, each condition was considered as a fifth condition alongside the previous four proximate conditions. Just like the analysis for the outcome of SHRI, this process confirmed that adding a fifth condition consistently resulted in sufficient causal recipes that were individualized to single cases. For example, the addition of the LEG condition resulted in fifteen sufficient causal recipes. Thirteen of these fifteen causal paths were represented by only one case. In reviewing the resulting causal pathways for all three political power-sharing measures—both with respect to those leading to the outcome and those leading to the negation of the outcome—neither the presence nor the absence of any of these added conditions consistently resulted in the outcome or the negation of the outcome.

General Observations and Specific Findings

Following Schneider and Wagemann's (2006, 2012) procedures, each remote outcome from Step One was individually reviewed (i.e., truth tables were made) in combination with all four proximate conditions (i.e., IDF, IML, AUT, and R3P). This resulted in a combined total of twelve causal recipes, as shown in the table below:

Table 65: Sufficient Paths Toward ~SHRI

SHRI =	Remote Context	Proximate Power-Sharing Configurations	Consistency	N	Country
(p1)	~NE	IDF * ~IML * ~R3P	0.85	3	SAF, ANG2, SUD1
(p2)	~NE	IDF * ~IML * AUT	0.60	2	GRG1, SUD1
(p3)	NE	IDF * IML * ~AUT * ~R3P	0.90	1	CHA
(p4)	~SW	IDF * ~AUT * ~R3P	0.86	2	SAF, CHA
(p5)	~SW	IDF * ~IML * ~R3P	0.86	2	SAF, SUD1
(p6)	~SW	IDF * ~IML * ~AUT	0.74	3	CAM, SAF, NIC
(p7)	SW	IDF * ~IML * AUT * R3P	0.9	1	GRG1
(p8)	~SP	IDF * ~IML	0.78	7	DRC, SAF, SUD1, MZM, ANG3, ANG2, CAM
(p9)	~SP	~IML * AUT * R3P	0.82	2	MZM, GUA
(p10)	-	IDF * IML * ~AUT * ~R3P	0.7	2	ANG4, CHA
(p11)	-	IDF * ~IML * ~AUT * ~R3P	0.86	2	SAF, ANG2
(p12)	-	IDF * ~IML * AUT * R3P	0.7	2	MZM, GRG1

Five comparative observations may be drawn from this table:

1. The Effects of Remote Conditions Writ Large

The majority of sufficient paths and strong cases that had led to the negation of an outcome involved these three anticipated contextual conditions: (1) ethnic conflict (~NE), represented by two causal paths and four distinct strong cases; (2) long wars (~SW), represented by three causal paths and five distinct cases; and (3) large populations (~SP), represented by two causal paths and eight distinct cases. As discussed earlier, this suggests that, while none of the remote conditions on its own had guaranteed that human rights would improve or worsen, these conditions strongly had constrained (or enabled) the ability of proximate conditions to further affect human-rights outcomes. Moreover, the orientation of these remote conditions strongly aligned with theoretical expectations.

2. Positive Remote Conditions, Overwhelmed

It is rare, but not impossible, that the positive influence of remote conditions also can be overcome when combined with certain proximate power-sharing configurations.

For the negation of an outcome, only two paths consistently had demonstrated this. Each path was represented by just a single strong case.

Path 3 (*p3*), for example, involved the positive influence of a non-ethnic war (NE). Yet when this remote condition was combined with the presence of both military power-sharing measures (IDF and IML) and the absence of any third-party security guarantees, worse human rights resulted; the civil war in Chad demonstrated this configuration and negated outcome.²⁵⁵

Path 7 (*p7*) is the only other example here of a positive remote context (short war) becoming overwhelmed by other conditions. As the sole strong representation of this pathway, the first civil war in Georgia (GRG1) involved two additional measures that were anticipated to lead to worse human-rights outcomes, namely the presence of rebel integration into the defense force (IDF) and the presence of autonomy (AUT) measures. The weaker third-party security guarantee²⁵⁶ was insufficient to affect human rights in a positive way; and the human rights remained unchanged, when the removal of the civil war would have been expected to lead to improved outcomes.

3. Low Consistencies

A number of causal paths (shown in Table 69) involved consistencies that were lower than the set threshold used to calculate those sufficient paths that led to the negated outcome. While the consistency tool is best thought of as a goodness-of-fit tool that

²⁵⁵ Path 3 is a subset of the causal recipe found in Path 10. The sole difference between the two paths is the removal of the remote context.

²⁵⁶ This third-party security guarantee was calibrated at 0.67 fuzzy set score representation in the set of robust third-party security guarantees. Per earlier discussion on R3P calibration, this indicates the presence of an armed mandate coupled with an undersized footprint for executing that mandate.

describes “the data patterns in the underlying dataset” rather than as a rigid methodological benchmark, certain minimum thresholds still apply (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 148). No further analysis was conducted on causal recipes residing below the minimum recommended value of 0.75. This included Path 2 (0.60), Path 6 (0.74), Path 10 (0.70), and Path 12 (0.70). Path 8, at 0.78 consistency, was retained and is discussed later below.

4. The Presence of Integrated Defense Force (IDF) Measures

The preponderance of all the paths shown in Table 69, including those with low consistency, involved the presence of the military power-sharing measure that guaranteed rebel representation in a joint defense force (IDF). The negation of the outcome was continuously associated with the inclusion of this provision in the negotiated settlement, regardless of other conditions. Fully 92 percent (11 of 12) of the sufficient pathways leading to the negation of the outcome (~SHRI) involved the presence of rebel integration in the defense force (IDF).²⁵⁷ No other remote or proximate condition reached this level of continuous association with the negated outcome.

Many of the causal combinations leading to the outcome’s negation differed by just a single condition. Combining these sufficient pathways, then factoring the equations, helped to identify causally equivalent conditions. In Paths 1, 5 and 11, for example, the conditions of IDF, ~IML, and ~R3P are repeated. Adjoining these paths in a single equation obtains the following (Equation 7):

²⁵⁷ Path 9 was the sole exception.

$$(7) \sim\text{SHRI} = \sim\text{NE} * \text{IDF} * \sim\text{IML} * \sim\text{R3P} (p1) + \sim\text{SW} * \text{IDF} * \sim\text{IML} * \sim\text{R3P} (p5) + \text{IDF} * \sim\text{IML} * \sim\text{AUT} * \sim\text{R3P} (p11)$$

Simplifying this equation to account for duplicate conditions, showed:

$$(8) \sim\text{SHRI} = \text{IDF} * \sim\text{IML} * \sim\text{R3P} (\sim\text{NE} + \sim\text{SW} + \sim\text{AUT})$$

This simplified equation indicated that the negation of significant human-rights improvement ($\sim\text{SHRI}$) consistently had occurred when the military power-sharing provision of an integrated defense force (IDF) was present but provisions like the integration of military leadership and of robust third-party security guarantees were both absent ($\sim\text{IML}$ and $\sim\text{R3P}$, respectively). In addition, at least one of the following substitutable conditions must have been present: (1) either the conflict was an ethnic civil war ($\sim\text{NE}$), (2) or the civil war was long in duration ($\sim\text{SW}$), or (3) the negotiated settlement excluded autonomy ($\sim\text{AUT}$) as a power-sharing measure. Altogether, two conditions sit opposite of hypothesized expectations: $\sim\text{IML}$ and $\sim\text{AUT}$ resulting in the negation of the outcome. One possible explanation here is that the beneficial absence of such measures is contingent upon the corresponding absence of other conditions. Said differently, any benefit gained by those measures is greatly overcome when a peace agreement includes integration of the rebels into the defense force (IDF) but fails to provide a robust third-party security guarantee ($\sim\text{R3P}$) to strengthen credible commitment by all parties and reduce the threat to the government. In the absence of that guarantee, the government is likely to respond to the increased threat—regardless of the exclusion of other measures like $\sim\text{IML}$ and $\sim\text{AUT}$ —with increased political repression.

5. Exception to the Presence of Integrated Defense Force (IDF) Measures

Path 9 is the only causal combination that did not include the presence (or absence, for that matter) of rebel integration into the joint defense force of a country. Path 9 is additionally made distinct by the fact that the two strongest representative states in this path—the civil war in Mozambique (MZM) and the civil war in Guatemala (GUA)—actually improved slightly (+0.5 PTS score) in their human-rights outcomes. This seems, at first glance, like a contradictory finding. How do the only strong cases that represent a causal configuration—designed to report a sufficient combination of conditions resulting in the negation of an outcome—both point to improved human rights?

Recall from Chapter 6 that “each case has varying degrees of membership in the different corners of the vector space and thus varying degrees of membership in each truth table row” (Ragin 2009, 104). At the same time, each case only has “one membership greater than 0.5 in the logically possible combinations formed from a given set of conditions,” making it possible to “sort cases according to corners of the vector space based on their degree of membership” (Ragin 2009, 106). In this case, both MZM and GUA had strong membership in this causal configuration, but their outcomes led to slightly improved human rights. Though none of the other cases were sorted strongly into this specific causal recipe, their partial memberships in this vector space yielded a sufficient pathway with 0.82 consistency.

This causal configuration did not include the presence or the absence of the provision for rebel integration into the defense force. This is because the civil war in

Mozambique (MZM) included this provision, but the civil war in Guatemala (GUA) did not. Both civil wars also notably included measures of autonomy.

How did both civil wars result in nominal improvement of their human-rights scores despite the inclusion of autonomy and, in the case of Mozambique, the inclusion of rebel integration into the main ranks? One possible explanation, based on the conditions analyzed here, is that inclusion of a robust third-party security guarantee (R3P fuzzy score of 0.9) in Mozambique helped to reduce this potential threat to the government. The government's motivation and opportunity to politically repress was significantly reduced by this guarantee. In contrast, Guatemala's negotiated settlement did not include this negative measure of rebel integration. The security guarantee was also less robust (R3P fuzzy score of 0.67), which may explain their similar small human-rights improvements.²⁵⁸ In short, the fact that the two strongest cases in this causal pathway resulted in opposite outcomes to the one being measured means that a host of observations with weak membership scores are driving the results and that this pathway is indeterminate.²⁵⁹

Implications

What implications does this fuzzy-set theoretic analysis for the negation of the outcome have on negotiated settlements? While no hypothesized remote or proximate condition is necessary or sufficient on its own for the negation of significant human-rights improvement (\sim SHRI), this process illuminated a number of consistent

²⁵⁸ For further discussion on the Guatemalan civil war, see previous section on sufficient conditions leading to the outcome (SHRI), this chapter.

²⁵⁹ My thanks to Professor Rubinson for his insights and help on these anomalous cases.

relationships for comparison with those leading to the outcome (SHRI). For example, just as the absence of the military power-sharing measure involving the integration of rebels into the defense force (\sim IDF) consistently had led to the outcome of significant human-rights improvement (SHRI); conversely, the presence of this IDF measure consistently had led to the negation of that outcome (\sim SHRI).

In addition, the majority of the causal paths—and the representative cases of those paths—involved remote contexts theoretically and empirically identified as leading to worse or unchanged human rights. This included ethnic wars (\sim NE), long wars (\sim SW), and large populations (\sim SP). In two singular rare instances (Paths 3 and 7), the beneficial aspects of non-ethnic conflict (NE) and short wars (SW) were overcome. Both cases involved two additional power-sharing measures hypothesized as leading to worse human rights: Path 3, represented singularly by the civil war in Chad, involved the presence of both military power-sharing measures (IDF and IML); Path 7, represented singularly by the first civil war in Georgia, involved the presence of rebel integration into the defense force (IDF) and the presence of autonomy measures (AUT).

How well did the sufficient causal paths derived from this fuzzy-set analysis (see Table 69: Sufficient Paths Toward \sim SHRI) cover the actual empirical cases where human rights either did not change or became worse? Of the thirty-one cases assessed here, thirteen cases involved either no change (fuzzy-set score of 0.4) or worse human-rights scores (fuzzy-set score of 0) over the two years. Of these thirteen cases, 62 percent (8 of the 13) were covered by the initial solution set. Table 66 (below) shows this breakdown.

These pathways also captured four of the seven cases where had human rights improved just slightly (fuzzy-set score of 0.6). No cases where human rights improved by +1 PTS score or more (fuzzy-set score of 0.8 or higher) were strongly present in these pathways.²⁶⁰

Table 66: Coverage of Sufficient Pathways for ~SHRI

		Fuzzy Set Score for Significant Human Rights Improvement (SHRI)					
		0	0.4	0.6	0.8	0.9	1
Number of Cases		3	10	7	6	3	2
Number of cases covered by sufficient paths (for ~SHRI)		2	6	4	0	0	0

Predominant Pathways

An additional method for gauging the fuzzy-set analysis is to assess predominant causal pathways. Discussion of Path 8 was reserved for this section, given its role as a predominant causal recipe that consistently led to the negation of outcomes.²⁶¹ This causal pathway covered five of the thirteen cases (38%) that led to worse or unchanged human rights, as well as two cases where human rights improved just slightly (at 0.6 fuzzy-set score; see table below for full breakdown).

²⁶⁰ This includes the full solution set of sufficient paths leading toward ~SHRI, as initially calculated in Table 69. These calculations were uncorrected for the lower consistencies found in paths 2, 6, 10, and 12. Removal of these paths dropped the covered cases to 2, 5, and 3 (vice 2, 6, and 4), respectively. This is due to the loss of Nicaragua (at 0.4) and the fourth civil war in Angola (at 0.6)

²⁶¹ As noted earlier, Path 8's consistency of 0.78 surpasses the minimum consistency of 0.75 recommended by scholars for further analysis.

Table 67: Coverage of Path 8

<i>Fuzzy Set Score for PTS *</i>	0	0.4	0.6	0.8	0.9	1
<i>Number of cases</i>	3	10	7	6	3	2
<i>Number of cases covered by sufficient paths</i>	1	4	2	0	0	0

**From Chapter 6, Fuzzy Score Calibration for Political Terror Scale*

Path 8 identified a consistent pattern within certain negotiated settlements that led to negated outcomes (Equation 9):

$$(9) \sim\text{SHRI} = \sim\text{SP} * \text{IDF} * \sim\text{IML} (p8)$$

This equation indicates that when civil wars occur in states with large populations ($\sim\text{SP}$)—and those civil wars are resolved using negotiated settlements that include the military power-sharing provision of rebel integration into the military defense force (IDF) but exclusion of those rebels from the military leadership positions ($\sim\text{IML}$)—human rights in that state will likely remain unchanged or become worse. Two of these three factors are suspected to primarily contribute to the negative outcome, namely large populations ($\sim\text{SP}$) and rebel integration into the defense force (IDF). The combination of these two conditions uniquely exacerbates a government’s ability to govern while increasing potential threats to that government.

The larger population size both increases the number of opportunities for repression and exacerbates the stresses on a government’s institutional capacity to respond in times of scarcity, which are quickly overwhelmed in post-civil war contexts. The ability of a government to use alternative governance mechanisms, like cooptation and cooperation, gives way to coercion as regimes look to preserve their societal control.

In turn, while large populations overwhelm a state's ability to use alternative governance mechanisms, the addition of rebel integration into a joint defense force dangerously retains prior belligerents in the armed forces rather than disarming, demobilizing, and reintegrating them. This provision increases a government's motivation to repress, because the question of internal security now reigns in mind preeminently: Will those forces follow the issued orders? Will they rise up in an armed coup or a rebellion against the government, à la Turkey's attempted 2016 coup? This ever-present tension, at least in the short term, consistently has resulted in worse human rights.

In contrast, the absence of rebel integration into leadership positions in the military (~IML) is considered the least influential component in this causal relationship. Decision-makers should not erroneously conclude that human rights can be improved—and the odds of this causal relationship avoided—by simply changing the causal path through the addition of the IML power-sharing measure. Rather, they should remember that the analysis of the outcome (SHRI) had demonstrated only two consistent paths where the presence of IDF and IML had led to improved human rights. Notably, the singular strong case that represented this causal path was El Salvador, which had a small population (SP).²⁶²

An exception where a large population was combined with the presence of both military power-sharing measures was the fourth civil war in Angola. Even here, however, it only improved marginally in the short term (at +0.5 PTS improvement). Like El

²⁶² An additional factor, mentioned earlier in the Step Two analysis of the outcome (SHRI), was that the civil war in El Salvador had reached a substantial mutually hurting stalemate.

Salvador, conflict in Angola spanned multiple decades with a number of attempts at negotiated settlements. The sheer exhaustion of the belligerents and the population, combined with the death of the insurgent's obstinate leader, aided in its successful resolution (Dougherty in DeRouen 2007).

Predominant Paths at 0.85 Consistency

Earlier, the higher consistency threshold of 0.85 was discussed as a robustness check on the selected threshold of 0.80 for Step Two. This higher threshold yielded ten causal pathways. Two of these ten causal paths contained both high consistencies and multiple case representations. The combined predominant causal pathway is mentioned here because it strongly paralleled earlier analysis for the outcome. The combination of these two predominant pathways resulted in the following equation (Equation 10):

$$(10) \sim\text{SHRI} = \sim\text{SP} * \text{IDF} * \sim\text{IML} * \sim\text{AUT} (p8)^{263} + \sim\text{SP} * \text{IDF} * \sim\text{IML} * \sim\text{R3P} (p7)^{264}$$

Factoring Equation 10 resulted in:

$$(11) \sim\text{SHRI} = \sim\text{SP} * \text{IDF} * \sim\text{IML} (\sim\text{AUT} + \sim\text{R3P})$$

Equation 11 covered 38 percent of the cases (5 of 13) that had led to a negated outcome and one case (ANG3) where human rights had improved slightly. Equation 11 uniquely lined up for comparison purposes with the predominant causal pathway that had led to SHRI. Recall the simplified Equation 6, which covered eight of the eleven cases (71%) where significant human-rights improvement (SHRI) had occurred:

$$(6) \text{SHRI} = \sim\text{IDF} * \sim\text{IML} (\sim\text{AUT} + \text{R3P})$$

²⁶³ Cases with strong membership in this path included: DRC, SAF, ANG3, ANG2, CAM.

²⁶⁴ Cases with strong membership in this path included: SAF, SUD1, ANG2.

A number of comparative observations may be made using these two equations:

1. In both equations (Equation 11 and Equation 6), the general conditions of autonomy and robust third-party security guarantees are substitutable factors.
2. Two conditions demonstrated consistent symmetry. Human rights remained unchanged or became worse when integration of the defense force (IDF) was present; they improved when this measure was absent. Conversely, the substitutable condition of robust third-party security guarantees was consistently absent when the outcome was negated and consistently present when the outcome was realized.
3. Both large and small states experience significantly improved human rights. However, large states are more likely to experience worse or unchanged human rights than small ones.
4. Lastly, the absence of autonomy and the absence of integrated military leadership may allow human rights to improve but do not, on their own, guarantee that this will occur.

Missing Cases Where ~SHRI Occurred

Five cases exist where human rights remained unchanged or became worse and where the sufficient causal pathways did not capture these cases. While the causal combinations reflected in these different cases did not obtain the minimum consistencies required for inclusion as a sufficient causal pathway, a few observations are still useful here, particularly because four of the five cases—Rwanda, Democratic Republic of the

Congo, the first civil war in Sierra Leone, and the second civil war in Sudan—involved varying degrees of robust third-party security guarantees.²⁶⁵

How did the anticipated positive effects of these security guarantees become overwhelmed in these cases? Two of the four cases (Democratic Republic and the second Sudanese civil war) involved the aforementioned combination of large populations (~SP) alongside the presence of the integrated defense force (IDF) measure. This combination was shown to overwhelm a government's institutional capacity to respond with alternative governance mechanisms outside of coercion and, simultaneously, increased the potential threat to the regime. Both measures were anticipated to inflate the government's motivation to repress.

The civil war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo was accompanied by a weaker security guarantee (fuzzy-set score 0.67). The second civil war in the Sudan included a quite robust guarantee (fuzzy-set score 1); however, this positive element was significantly counteracted by other conditions, including an ethnic conflict (~NE) and a negotiated settlement that included the generally negative conditions of autonomy (AUT) and rebel integration in the military leadership (IML).

Meanwhile, the civil war in Rwanda included a strong third-party security guarantee (fuzzy-set score 0.9); however, this guarantee was counteracted by an ethnic conflict (~NE)—by military measures guaranteeing integration in both the joint defense

²⁶⁵ The data on all five missing cases was as follows, with respect to the same set of remote and proximate conditions: **RWA**: ~NE * SW * SP * IDF * IML * ~AUT * R3P; **DRC**: NE * SW * ~SP * IDF * ~IML * ~AUT * R3P; **PHI1**: NE * ~SW * ~SP * IDF * IML * AUT * ~R3P; **SIE1**: NE * SW * SP * IDF * ~IML * ~AUT * R3P; **SUD2**: ~NE * SW * ~SP * IDF * IML * AUT * R3P.

force (IDF) and the military leadership (IML), and by a mass genocide event after the negotiated settlement that was not captured by the conditions used in this project.

Finally, the first civil war in Sierra Leone involved a very robust third-party guarantee (fuzzy-set score 1). However, the negotiated settlement included the negative condition of rebel integration into the defense force (IDF), and civil war recurred at the measured interval (~EP).

To recapitulate, these four cases—all of which involved third-party security guarantees but resulted in worse or unchanged human rights—raised some caution against suggesting that such guarantees are a universal panacea. One perspective is that if such guarantees were absent, then even more intense violations of physical-integrity rights would have occurred by the government.

An alternative, and perhaps more sobering assessment, is that these guarantees require certain causal combinations in order to succeed. This might include, for example, civil wars of short duration and in which no military power-sharing measures are included, because certain causal combinations of remote and proximate conditions can negate and overwhelm their positive influence on human-rights outcomes.

When Do Third Parties Intervene Robustly?

Investigation of the outcome showed that six of the nine pathways leading to the desired outcome involved the presence of third-party security guarantees; only one sufficient causal pathway leading to the desired outcome consistently involved its absence. Is this apparently strong relationship between robust third-party security guarantees and human-rights outcomes influenced by selection effects? Do third parties

select easier conflicts in which to intervene, which is naturally followed more often by improved human rights?

Fortna (2008, 19) explored a corresponding concern in her work, dedicating a full chapter to evaluating “whether the international community tends to send peacekeepers to the easy cases or to the hard ones.” Her finding was that peacekeepers had been deployed more often in the difficult cases than in the easier ones.

Does Fortna’s finding that peacekeepers are sent to the more difficult conflicts hold true for third-party security guarantees as well? To examine this question of when third parties are inclined to offer and implement security guarantees, the bivariate relationships between previously defined situational (i.e., remote) variables of *war costs*, *war duration*, *GDP per capita*, and *ethnic conflicts* were explored. Of note, this analysis differed from Fortna’s in that it looks at when third parties intervened *robustly*, rather than simply at all third-party security guarantees writ large. This restriction was established in order to evaluate the strong relationship between robust third-party security guarantees and long-term human-rights outcomes.

The investigation showed that robust third-party security guarantees were generally more common when the cost of the conflict was high, the conflict duration was short, and the country was economically poor. Of these three variables, absolute poverty was the only statistically significant factor, though (see Appendix 12 for an in-depth discussion).

Conclusion

Certain remote conditions enable the effectiveness of proximate conditions to affect the desired outcome. Other remote conditions constrain the effectiveness of proximate conditions. The selected methodology of fuzzy-set QCA proved ideally suited for assessing how well these tools actually work in tandem; more accurately, these conditions work together in complex causal configurations. That is to say, the use of QCA accommodated previous scholarly insights, like those of Hafner-Burton (2014, 276), who asserted that “The central insight about prevention efforts is that no single tool works consistently to promote or protect human rights; all tools have extensive scope conditions that limit their effectiveness. Often, the tools work best in tandem.”

This chapter differed from previous chapters by its disaggregation of peace-agreement provisions. Principally, this disaggregation was driven by the core contention that individual power-sharing measures create a variety of effects on human-rights outcomes. More power sharing is not always better. Indeed, sometimes it is consistently made worse. Some power-sharing measures improve human rights, while some consistently lead to worse human rights. The effects are both varied and asymmetric, and cannot be lumped or aggregated altogether as most of the literature does, because this masks their influence.

Given the challenges of limited diversity, the number of proximate conditions was necessarily constrained to just four additional conditions in Step Two. These proximate conditions were selected based on previous theoretical and empirical findings, particularly those discussed in Chapter 5. They included measures guaranteeing rebel

integration into the joint defense force (IDF) or into military leadership positions (IML) as well as measures guaranteeing territorial autonomy (AUT) or robust third-party security guarantees (R3P).

In robustness checks, the excluded political power-sharing variables of measures that guaranteed legislative elections (LEG), executive representation (EXE), and civil service representation (CIV) were also examined; each of these conditions were added one at a time (i.e., as a fifth proximate condition).²⁶⁶ As suspected, this fifth condition routinely resulted in solution sets where each individual causal pathway was covered by an individualized explanation; that is, the bulk of causal recipes were represented by a singular strong empirical case. While common QCA practice directs that “each causal path matters,” this excessive approach diluted useful comparison between cases. Aiming, then, for a balance between parsimony and explanatory sufficiency, the original model of analysis was retained at a strong consistency level of 0.80. Additional insights from the higher threshold of 0.85, with such data consistent and involved in multiple cases, were provided.

A central finding of this analysis was that none of the hypothesized factors was a necessary or sufficient condition on its own for significant human-rights improvement (SHRI). Rather, multiple causal recipes accounted for the observed instances of significant human-rights improvement (or its absence). Certain scope conditions consistently enabled, or alternatively constrained, the likelihood that significant human-rights improvement occurred. The existence of short wars (SW) and of enduring peace

²⁶⁶ Federalism, as noted earlier, was excluded to the rarity of the measure in this dataset.

(EP) consistently led, for example, to significant human-rights improvement. Conversely, the existence of ethnic wars (~NE), long wars (~SW), and especially large populations (~SP) consistently constrained the ability of states to improve their human-rights performance in the short term.

Frequency considerations were also considered, based on QCA scholars who advised for its inclusion when conducting research with potential policy implications (Engeli, Rihoux, and Allison 2014, 102). In this vein, certain predominant pathways were discussed further given the significant number of cases covered by these sufficient causal combinations. Eight of the eleven cases (71%) where significant human-rights improvement had occurred were covered by the following simplified equation:

$$(6) \text{ SHRI} = \sim\text{IDF} * \sim\text{IML} (\sim\text{AUT} + \text{R3P})$$

This causal recipe suggests—to those engaged in or considering negotiated settlements—that military power-sharing measures that involve integrating rebels into the defense force (IDF) and into the military leadership (IML) should *not* be included in the peace agreement if improvement of human-rights outcomes is desired in the short term after a civil war ends. Additionally, decision-makers should strongly consider *excluding* measures of autonomy for this same reason. Concomitantly, the *inclusion* of robust third-party security guarantees—defined by the strength of mandate and corresponding footprint (i.e., boots on the ground) to reinforce that mandate—are consistently associated with significant human-rights improvement.

The two conditions of third-party guarantees (R3P) and integration of rebels into the defense force (IDF) are symmetrically associated with human rights improving or

becoming worse. That is, when the most frequent causal path leading to the negation of an outcome was evaluated, these conditions assumed an inverse orientation:

$$(11) \sim\text{SHRI} = \sim\text{SP} * \text{IDF} * \sim\text{IML} (\sim\text{AUT} + \sim\text{R3P})$$

This equation demonstrates that the negation of the outcome consistently occurred when the integrated defense force (IDF) provision was present.. The absence of robust third-party security guarantees ($\sim\text{R3P}$) also consistently led to this outcome.²⁶⁷

²⁶⁷ Technically since $\sim\text{R3P}$ is inside the parenthesis, it is a substitutable condition with $\sim\text{AUT}$. That is, the absence of third-party guarantees combined with the presence of IDF does not, on its own, produce the negation of the outcome.

Chapter Nine: Research Findings and Conclusions

The end of the Cold War in 1989 corresponded with an increase in global civil wars terminating via negotiated settlements. The prevention of civil war recurrence was upheld as the principal benchmark for gauging the success of different peace agreements. Scholars have differed over which features matter most within these agreements, and which provisions might ensure settlements that will endure over time.

Where the extant literature principally focused on the effects of aggregated power-sharing provisions on the duration of peace, this study shifted the outcome of interest to individual security by assessing the level of a state's violations against its citizens' personal-integrity rights (i.e., the state's use of political repression). The desired outcome was defined as significant human-rights improvement, recognized by a significant reduction in the government's use of political repression after the war as compared to the end of the war. In short, this project demonstrated that power-sharing provisions are *not* an all-encompassing panacea for the resolution of civil wars. Lijphart (1977, 44) was right when he stated "All of the consociational methods must be applied with caution and restraint."

This conclusion chapter is comprised of three main sections: (1) research overview, (2) research findings, and (3) final conclusions. The research overview covers key components of the research design, including the research puzzle, key research questions, the purpose of the research, the universe of cases and applicable datasets, and

the research methods. The section on research findings discusses central findings from the bivariate contingency tables as well as from the fuzzy-set analyses conducted for both the outcome and the negation of the outcome using the two proposed models. The conclusions section wraps up the project with commentary on the limitations of this research, recommendations for future research, and final thoughts.

Overview of the Study

This project evaluated the effects of peace-agreement provisions (i.e., robust third-party security guarantees and political, military, and territorial power-sharing agreements) on the use of political repression by the state after civil war termination. These actor-influenced provisions, also referred to as proximate conditions, were examined in the situational and historical contexts (i.e. remote conditions) relevant to each state's civil war experience.

This project employed fuzzy-set QCA to examine the relationship between different combinations of proximate and remote conditions that, together, resulted in the outcome of significant human-rights improvement. To confirm these findings, the research also tested the different combinations of proximate and remote conditions that led to the negation of the outcome. The manifold benefits of fsQCA—such as its accommodation of the smaller number of cases and the higher number of initial conditions, its asymmetric orientation, and its assumption of causal complexity—were expounded in Chapters 3 and 6.

Research Puzzle

The challenge of framing any new government—especially for states exiting civil war—is finding the right balance between that government’s capacity to *deter* violence (an issue covered extensively by contemporary literature) and its ability to *assure* the population that this capacity will not be used wantonly against them. Rare is the literature that covers the latter. Yet the importance of assurance is fundamental to the birth of political liberty. As de Montesquieu (2011, Section 4.2) defined it, “The political liberty of the subject is a tranquillity of mind arising from the opinion each person has of his safety. In order to have this liberty, it is requisite that the government be so constituted as one man need not be afraid of another.”

Additionally, the understated assumption in much of the literature on power-sharing provisions is that all disaggregated provisions in the same dimension act in parallel, in the same direction of influence; aggregation of provisions into similar dimensions is thus the commonly pursued protocol. A more robust understanding is needed of peace after civil war, for a misbalanced, myopic understanding can lead to recommendations for provisions that correlate with enduring peace but also consistently lead to worse human rights or, at best, leaves the level of political repression only nominally changed compared to when civil war was still ongoing.

Based on these research gaps, detailed in Chapter 2, this study therefore evaluated the effects of peace-agreement provisions—both aggregated and disaggregated—on human-rights outcomes. These outcomes were evaluated using the level of a

government's violations of its citizens' physical-integrity rights (i.e. the amount of political repression).

Research Question and Purpose

The principal question of interest in this project was: *Under what conditions do provisions within negotiated settlements significantly improve the degree of political repression conducted by the state?* The project's purpose was to explore human-rights outcomes, specifically the level of political repression pursued by the state after civil war ended and identify provisions within negotiated settlements that might lead to significant human rights improvement (SHRI).

A central argument of this project was that the aggregated, dimension-based approach to evaluating power-sharing agreements—the most common method used in the academic literature—obscures and misses important relationships between conditions and outcomes. A disaggregated approach, involving individual peace-agreement provisions, elucidates these relationships in a clearer fashion.

The phrasing of the research question, and evaluation of these two different approaches dovetailed well with the selected methodology of fuzzy-set QCA. QCA facilitates the identification of core combinations of conditions (i.e. causal recipes) that, together, produce variation in a given outcome of interest (Ragin 2014). In this project, input factors were organized into two categories: (1) *proximate conditions*, which included actor-influenced peace-agreement provisions interacting within (2) different *remote conditions*, which involved a variety of situational and historical contexts residing outside actor influence. The central argument was tested using two different models,

distinguished by their respective emphasis on either aggregated power-sharing dimensions (Model One, Chapter 7) or disaggregated peace-agreement provisions (Model Two, Chapter 8); both models used the same set of remote conditions.

The research aimed at identifying the specific combinations of (aggregated OR disaggregated) proximate conditions AND remote conditions that consistently resulted in significant improvement of human rights over time; the negation of this outcome was also examined given QCA's asymmetric nature. The following four aggregated arguments were evaluated: (1) More power sharing across multiple dimensions (i.e., extensively institutionalized settlements) is better for the desired outcome. (2) More of the military power-sharing dimension (i.e., thick military settlements) is better for the desired outcome. (3) More of the political power-sharing dimension (i.e., thick political settlements) is better for the desired outcome. (4) The presence of any type of territorial power-sharing agreement is better for the desired outcome. A total of eight individual peace-agreement provisions were initially considered, including robust third-party security guarantees and seven disaggregated political, military, and territorial power-sharing agreement provisions.

The inclusion of robust third-party security guarantees allowed testing of the opposing viewpoints within the academic literature that such guarantees are replaceable by more extensive or thicker power-sharing agreements or, instead, should be considered indispensable features of negotiated settlements. A new typology of robust third-party security guarantees was proposed as an extension to Walter's (1997, 2002) original arguments, under the logic that their success depends upon the dual presence of an

extensive mandate that allows for the use of force and of a sizeable deployed footprint involving armed peacekeepers.

By applying the technique of fuzzy-set QCA, the causal recipes (i.e., combinations of proximate and remote conditions) that consistently led to the outcome and to the negation of the outcome could be identified. Since both models used the same universe of cases, the same human-rights outcome data and the same power-sharing datasets, the findings from the aggregated and disaggregated models could be compared and insights could be gleaned regarding which peace-agreement provisions (or dimensions) mattered most to the outcome and the negation of the outcome. These findings will assist decision-makers involved in negotiated settlements, as they (1) identify the appropriate blends of peace-agreement provisions for resolving different civil wars, and (2) balance the need for a post-conflict government to both assure its population and to deter future violence.

Universe of Cases and Applicable Datasets

Data for individual peace-agreement provisions was procured from Mattes and Savun's (2009) dataset, which included disaggregated political, military, and territorial power-sharing provisions.²⁶⁸ Human rights data was primarily measured using the Political Terror Scale (PTS) dataset; initial quantitative findings (Chapter 5) were crosschecked against CIRI data given its use of the same source data but with an alternative coding scheme. The initial universe of cases included thirty-six civil wars in twenty-seven states from 1989-2007, which had terminated conflict with negotiated

²⁶⁸ The dataset was truncated to correspond with the end of the Cold War and extended to 2007 to maximize available human-rights data. Chapter 3 details this process.

settlements. All thirty-six cases were utilized in the first stage of the analysis, using contingency tables (Chapter 5).

In the second major stage of the analysis (Chapters 6, 7, 8), five cases were removed from the original set, based on methodological decisions. The two cases of Papua New Guinea and Tajikistan were removed based on calibration decisions, namely with respect to defining the outcome target set as *cases where significant human-rights improvement occurred over time*. Operationally, full membership in this target set was defined as a positive change of two points or more on a state's PTS score over time. Neither of those two cases could improve by two points or more, based on their starting point on the scale at the end of the civil war.²⁶⁹ The decision to include the critical remote condition of regime type resulted in the loss of the civil wars in Bosnia, Lebanon, and Afghanistan, since these cases were missing Polity scores at the respective time periods. This reduction of five cases left a total of thirty-one civil wars in twenty-two states for the fuzzy-set analysis.

Research Method

To address the “many variables–small number of cases” conundrum, a multi-method approach was employed, which first involved quantitative analysis, then fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis. Foundational components were established before these analyses began, including: theoretical underpinnings (Chapter 2); the universe of cases, applicable datasets, and research design (Chapter 3); and definitions of variables (i.e., conditions and outcomes in QCA) and related hypotheses (Chapter 4).

²⁶⁹ See Chapter 6 for more details.

The first stage of the multi-method approach began with quantitative analysis and contingency tables to identify statistically significant relationships (Chapter 5). These variables—along with potential asymmetric relationships—were retained for later examination using the methodological approach of fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis.²⁷⁰ This first stage helped to reduce the total number of variables under consideration.

The methodological technique of QCA (explained in Chapter 6) provided the ability to examine different causal configurations that consistently had led to significantly improved human-rights outcomes, or to the negation of this outcome. Both outcomes were explored because QCA does not assume causal asymmetry; the presence of the outcome and the absence of the outcome may require different explanations (Schlosser et al. 2009, 9). A guiding assumption in this project was that in the messy, complex environment of states exiting civil wars, no single causal model best fit the data. In this regard, QCA was well positioned, given its emphasis on multiple conjunctural causation, for QCA researchers are “urged not to specify a specific a single causal model that best fits the data, as one usually does with statistical techniques, but instead to determine the number and character of the different causal models that exist among comparable cases” (Schlosser et al. 2009, 8).

²⁷⁰ An exception to this was that the remote condition of economic development was still retained for fsQCA even though it did not demonstrate any significant bivariate relationship with political repression. This decision was made based on the strength of prior empirical data confirming this relationship, the strong theoretical arguments for co-optation and alternative governance mechanisms, and because fuzzy-set QCA calibration could account for alternative thresholds and asymmetric relationships in ways that dichotomization and contingency tables might have hidden (see Chapter 7 for further discussion).

By organizing conditions into proximate and remote categories, Schneider and Wagemann's (2006, 2012) Two-Step Approach could then be used to further winnow the number of conditions under evaluation and reduce potential errors due to limited diversity (i.e., the phenomenon that not all potential causal recipes are empirically represented by an actual case). The first step in this approach delivers a deliberately underspecified solution set of remote conditions that alternatively enabled or constrained the outcome. These conditions were then evaluated in conjunction with selected proximate conditions.

Chapters 7 and 8 applied this Two-Step Approach, alongside additional fsQCA procedures laid out in Chapter 6, to evaluate how different combinations of remote and proximate conditions together produced the desired outcome of significant human-rights improvement (SHRI) or the negation of significant human-rights improvement (~SHRI).

Model 1 (Ch 7): Proximate (Aggregated) Conditions + Remote Conditions \Rightarrow SHRI

Proximate (Aggregated) Conditions + Remote Conditions \Rightarrow ~SHRI

Model 2 (Ch 8): Proximate (Disaggregated) Conditions + Remote Conditions \Rightarrow SHRI

Proximate (Disaggregated) Conditions + Remote Conditions \Rightarrow ~SHR

Research Findings

Research findings are organized into three parts: Findings from contingency tables (Chapter 5), and fuzzy-set analyses conducted for Model 1 (Chapter 7) and for Model 2 (Chapter 8).

Findings from Contingency Tables

Contingency tables were used in Chapter 5 to explore the bivariate relationships between the proximate or remote conditions and political repression. The nineteen initial

proposed conditions were organized into three sets: (1) conditions related to aggregated power-sharing dimensions; (2) conditions related to individual peace-agreement provisions, including disaggregated power-sharing measures and third-party security guarantees; and (3) remote conditions that captured the unique situational and historical contexts of different civil wars.

Contrary to the expectations of power-sharing advocacy camps, power-sharing agreements—when assessed by aggregated dimensions—did not positively affect the level of political repression pursued by states after their civil wars. Instead, the contingency tables showed that when relationships did exist, they always indicated an inverse relationship:

(1) *Less* extensively institutionalized settlements were quite likely to experience *improved* human rights over all time periods; the record for more extensively institutionalized settlements was muddled. This relationship was statistically significant ($p < .05$) for PTS data over the ten-year time period, and approached significance ($p < .10$) for CIRI data over the five-year time period.

(2) In the short term (two-year period), *less* military thickness consistently led to *improved* human rights; *more* military thickness tended to lead toward *worse* human rights. This relationship was significant for $p < .05$.

(3) The *absence* of territorial power-sharing agreements in the mid-term consistently had led to improved human rights; the *presence* of such agreements had led almost equally to better or worse human rights. This relationship approached significance for CIRI over the mid-term period ($p < .10$).

(4) Political thickness did not reveal any significant relationship over any of the evaluated time periods. However, the *absence* of any political power-sharing agreement in the short-term period was strongly significant ($p < .01$) and associated with *improved* human-rights outcomes. In sum, these findings generally appear to buttress the arguments of those who caution against the use of power-sharing agreements in negotiated settlements.

A central argument of this study was that aggregation of power-sharing provisions could obscure the effects of different measures within the same dimension, since it assumes that different measures within the same dimension act in concert rather than in opposition. This possibility was verified by disaggregation of the different power-sharing dimensions. Disaggregation showed, for example, that the significance and intensity of the relationship between thick military settlements and short-term political repression was clearly attributable to military integration of rebels into the main ranks (significant at $p < .01$) rather than to both military power-sharing provisions. The inclusion of the integration of military leadership, a non-significant relationship, only served to dilute the results (see Chapter 5 for further details).²⁷¹

Aggregation also dangerously obscured the results regarding territorial power-sharing agreements. Cross-tabulation evidence for the disaggregated provisions demonstrated that territorial federalism and territorial autonomy operated in opposition: The presence of federalism asymmetrically led to *improved* human rights (4 of 4 cases in

²⁷¹ Neither military provision was statistically significant at later time periods.

the mid- and long-term periods). The *presence* of autonomy, in contrast, led consistently to *worse* human rights, while the *absence* of autonomy led to *improved* human rights.²⁷²

The bivariate analysis of the disaggregated peace-agreement provisions did not reveal any significant relationships over any time period for the political power-sharing provisions of guaranteed rebel representation in the legislative branch, the executive branch, or the civil service. The final remaining provision of robust third-party security guarantees demonstrated a positive, medium relationship over the long-term period ($p < .05$),²⁷³ meaning the *presence* of these guarantees corresponded with *improved* human-rights outcomes.

Notably, outside of federalism and third-party security guarantees, none of the disaggregated peace-agreement provisions correlated *positively* with improved human-rights outcomes. By contrast, the conditions of territorial autonomy and military integration into the main ranks correlated *negatively* with improved human-rights outcomes. The remaining four proximate, disaggregated conditions were identified for potential exclusion from the fuzzy-set analysis, including all three of the disaggregated political measures (*repleg*, *repex*, *repcs*) and the integration of rebels into the military leadership (*mil_ldr*).

Returning to remote conditions, five of the seven remote conditions demonstrated statistically significant relationships over at least one of the three measured time periods; no relationship was found at any time for war costs or economic development. The

²⁷² This latter relationship was significant over the mid-term period for CIRI data ($p < .01$) and over the long-term period for PTS data ($p < .05$).

²⁷³ CIRI data corroborated this finding, with $p < .10$ over this same time period.

direction of relationship for the remaining conditions consistently corresponded with the proposed hypotheses. The presence of ethnic war strongly led to worse human rights in the short term, while the absence of ethnic war was moderately associated with improved human rights (CIRI, $p < .01$). In the short term, wars of short duration (less than two years) were strongly and asymmetrically associated with improved human rights ($p < .05$).

Larger populations in the mid-term experienced unchanged or worse human rights, and smaller populations experienced improved human rights, at a 2:1 ratio ($p < .05$). This finding was in line with the proposed hypotheses (H19a/19b) but contrary to the empirical literature. Democratic states in the short and mid-term periods were strongly associated with improved human rights; non-democratic states—those with a Polity IV score less than 6—generally experienced worse human rights (CIRI, $p < .05$ for each period).

Civil war recurrence, in the mid- and long-term periods, consistently prevented human-rights improvement; peace, on the other hand, more often allowed human rights to improve ($p < .01$, 5 years; $p < .10$ for PTS and CIRI, 10 years). This condition of enduring peace—defined as the absence of civil war recurrence at the respective time period—was the only proximate or remote factor that met the threshold for identification as a necessary but not sufficient condition for human rights to improve. Enduring peace consistently met this threshold across all three-time periods.

Findings from Model 1: Remote + Aggregated Conditions

The findings from the contingency table analysis were used to refine which variables were carried forward into the fuzzy-set analysis. Relational comparisons between the remote or proximate conditions and the outcome of human rights were inherently limited by dichotomization, which resulted in a loss of data. Fuzzy-set QCA corrected for these limitations in two ways:

First, it allowed for calibration of the outcome in alignment with theoretical arguments and empirical data. The target set for the outcome was defined as those cases where significant human-rights improvement occurred over time (SHRI); coding was conducted in accordance with this definition, and the range of experiences were more accurately captured.

Second, individual conditions were assumed—in accordance with QCA methodology—never to act in isolation. Rather, these conditions had interacted in combination with one another and in a variety of different situational and historical contexts. Eight major findings from the fuzzy-set analysis of Model 1, using remote conditions and Set 1 proximate conditions (those related to aggregated dimensions), are discussed below.

Eight Major Findings of Model 1

(1) *The presence of power-sharing agreements is not necessary for human rights to improve.* Four cases were shown where power-sharing agreements were completely absent.²⁷⁴ Despite the total absence of such agreements, the four respective states all

²⁷⁴ In contrast, the only other consistent causal pathway that included this condition involved non-ethnic wars in combination with the absence of thick military settlements, extensively institutionalized

witnessed a reduction in the level of state-based political repression, All four of these wars were also ethnic wars; as explained in the contingency table results, the presence of ethnic conflict in the short term was strongly associated with worse human rights. Surprisingly, these four cases shared in common the *absence* of all power-sharing agreements and the *presence* of ethnic conflict, yet they experienced less political repression in the short term as compared to when the conflict ended.

(2) *Some remote conditions asymmetrically affect the level of political repression pursued by the state after civil war.* Asymmetrical relationships are made apparent when comparing those conditions (and combinations of conditions) that led to the *outcome* of significant human rights improvement (SHRI) against those that led to the *negation of the outcome* (~SHRI, or the non-occurrence of significant human-rights improvement). A prime example found in this investigation was that the presence of enduring peace (EP) consistently had led to the outcome. Correspondingly, we might expect that the absence of enduring peace (~EP) would consistently lead to the negation of the outcome. However, this was not the case. Rather, a more consistent condition leading to the negation of the outcome was the absence of small populations (~SP, aka large populations). This condition, like enduring peace, was also asymmetrically related to political repression. That is, the presence of small populations was *not* shown as a consistent remote condition leading to the outcome.

(3) *Multiple pathways are available to attain significant human-rights improvement after civil war.* Said in reverse, no single pathway exists. At the same time,

settlements, and territorial power-sharing agreements. These cases included Angola 1975-1989, Azerbaijan 1989-1994, Croatia 1991-1992, and the Philippines 2000-2000.

certain features are prominent and foretell a predictive pattern. Specifically, *all* nine causal recipes that led to significant human-rights improvement involved the *absence* of thick military power-sharing agreements (~THM). This finding serves as a significant caution to policymakers and merits further investigation. Chapter 8 explored this issue further by disaggregating the military power-sharing dimension into its two components (i.e, integration into the main ranks of the military, and integration into leadership positions of that same military force) to observe any (a)symmetries and whether one factor mattered more than the other to human-rights outcomes.

(4) *The remote conditions of enduring peace (EP) and of short wars (SW) consistently affected political repression, as hypothesized.* The presence of enduring peace was evident in two causal pathways, both of which evidenced high consistency ($p6: 0.80$; $p7: 0.94$) and multiple associated cases (3 cases and 5 cases, respectively). This finding corroborated the proposed hypothesis (H14b) that the absence of civil war recurrence is an INUS condition for significantly improved human rights.

Regarding war duration: Outside of the anomalous case of Guatemala, where long war led to improved human rights, all other causal pathways involving the remote condition of short war resulted in significant human-rights improvement with high consistency ($p3: 0.91$ consistency, 5 cases; $p4: 1.0$ consistency, 1 case). In other words, when short civil wars were combined with proximate conditions, significant human-rights improvement occurred. This aligned with the proposed hypothesis (H16b) that short wars are an INUS condition for improved human rights. Of note, this hypothesis contradicted much of the contemporary literature regarding war duration.

(5) *The condition of non-ethnic wars (NE) did not respond in line with the proposed hypothesis.* As mentioned above, one causal pathway existed where the *presence* of ethnic war (\sim NE, or the absence of non-ethnic war) combined with the *absence* of all power-sharing agreements to consistently result in significant human-rights improvement. Four cases strongly fit this causal pattern.²⁷⁵

(6) *The type of power-sharing dimension matters, just not in the ways that power-sharing advocates stated.* As noted above, the *absence* of thick military power-sharing agreements corresponded consistently with the desired outcome of significant human-rights improvement. The other dimensions—captured by the conditions of thick political power-sharing agreements and the presence or absence of territorial power-sharing agreements—were less definitive here. Sometimes, thick political dimensions and/or the presence of territorial power sharing led to the desired outcome; at other times, thin political dimensions and/or absent territorial power sharing led to the desired outcome. Extensively institutionalized settlements seem more consistent, but even this is somewhat deceiving (see later discussion below).

(7) *While remote conditions may constrain political repression, their beneficial influences can be overcome.* Discussed in Chapter 5, the contingency tables show that human rights are unlikely to improve when a country has a large population (\sim SP) or when its war is long in duration (\sim SW). Likewise, small populations (SP) and short wars (SW) are associated with improved human rights. When examined in the fuzzy-set

²⁷⁵ In contrast, the only other consistent causal pathway that included this condition involved non-ethnic wars in combination with the absence of thick military settlements, extensively institutionalized settlements, and territorial power-sharing agreements. This causal pathway was strongly represented by the two empirical examples of Guatemala and Moldova.

analysis for the negation of the outcome, though, the presence of a small population (SP) or a short war (SW) is no guarantee that human rights would improve.

Both of these beneficial remote contexts were overcome by the same causal combination of three proximate aggregated conditions: Something in the combination of thick military settlements (THM), extensively institutionalized settlements (EIS), and the absence of thick political settlements (~THP) consistently resulted in human rights stagnating or becoming worse. Without disaggregating the power-sharing dimensions, it is difficult to recommend or further investigate what specific measures might be overwhelming the beneficial situational contexts. This leads to the final observation here:

(8) *Analysis of power-sharing agreements using aggregated dimensions is of limited utility.* Besides the previous finding, other observations demonstrated the limitations of using aggregated dimensions to evaluate human-rights outcomes. For example, extensively institutionalized settlements (EIS) were common throughout the pathways that had led to both the outcome (SHRI) and the negation of the outcome (~SHRI). Extensively institutionalized settlements were also considered a necessary condition for the negation of the outcome. The consistent presence of this condition in seven of the nine causal pathways that led to the outcome,²⁷⁶ and all eight of the pathways that led to the outcome's negation, demonstrated the inherent shortfalls in using an aggregated measure of peace-agreement provisions rather than disaggregated individual provisions.

²⁷⁶ If the two pathways where all power-sharing agreements were absent are momentarily ignored, then all remaining pathways included extensively institutionalized settlements (EIS).

Another example of how aggregated measures muddy the follow-on analysis is evident in looking at the negation of the outcome. This study showed—in Paths 3, 4, and 9 (see Table 65)—that human rights are unlikely to improve when extensively institutionalized settlements (EIS) are combined with territorial power-sharing *and*: EITHER (1) the *presence* of thick political settlements (THP) but the *absence* of thick military settlements (~THM), OR (2) the inverse situation, meaning the *absence* of thick political settlements (~THM) combined with the *presence* of thick military settlements (THP). Without disaggregating the political, military, or territorial power-sharing dimensions, researchers would not know if specific individual provisions are causing these alternations. Policymakers are largely left without definitive guidance regarding which individual measures affect political repression and in which direction.

Findings from Model 2: Remote + Disaggregated Provisions

The second model examined the effects of disaggregated peace-agreement provisions in combination with remote conditions on the outcome of significant human-rights improvement (SHRI) and on the negation of this outcome (~SHRI). The disaggregated provisions under initial consideration included robust third-party security guarantees and seven individual power-sharing provisions. The contingency table analysis helped to narrow the field from eight proximate conditions to just four: (1) integration of rebels into the main ranks of the military defense force, (2) territorial autonomy, (3) territorial federalism, and (4) robust third-party security guarantees.²⁷⁷ The

²⁷⁷ The political provisions were also checked individually as a fifth proximate condition alongside the previous set of four proximate conditions. This fifth condition routinely resulted in solution sets where each individual causal pathway was covered by an individualized explanation; that is, the bulk of causal recipes were represented by a singular strong empirical case. See Chapter 8.

rarity of federalism led to its substitution with the condition of integrating rebels into the leadership of the military defense force.²⁷⁸ Eight major findings from the fuzzy-set analysis of Model 2 are discussed below.

Eight Major Findings of Model 2

(1) *As with Model 1, the absence of individual power-sharing provisions did not prevent human rights from still improving significantly.* Model 1 demonstrated that four empirical cases lacked any power-sharing dimensions. Correspondingly, those cases lack any power-sharing provisions, so this finding still held for Model 2.

(2) *Significant human-rights improvement was likely when both military power-sharing measures (i.e., integration of rebels into the main ranks of the military and into leadership positions) were absent.* This extended the findings from Model 1 where *all* nine causal recipes that had led to significant human-rights improvement (SHRI) involved the *absence* of thick military power-sharing agreements. In Model 2, seven of the nine causal pathways led to the desired outcome of significant human-rights improvement when both military power-sharing conditions were absent. Coverage for these pathways was quite large, with each of the pathways represented by at least two and as many as ten different cases.

The two causal pathways not captured by this commonality were both represented by the sole outlier case of the civil war in El Salvador. These pathways included the

²⁷⁸ Preliminary investigation revealed that the *absence* of federalism consistently led to both the outcome and to the negation of the outcome at nearly equal rates. This is largely intuitive, since federalism is a dichotomous measure and just 3 of the final 31 cases under fsQCA consideration included this provision. Its inclusion in leading to both the outcome and the negation of the outcome effectively negated its utility as a necessary condition in either set. Therefore the next most suitable condition was substituted. See Chapter 8 for further discussion.

presence of military integration into the defense force and the presence of rebel integration into military leadership of that defense force. Further analysis of this outlier case showed that one critical factor that potentially enabled significant human-rights improvement to occur was that the conflict was deeply exhausting for the rivals. The existence of a mutually hurting stalemate, combined with a third-party security guarantee—nominal as it was with respect to the strength of its presence—was extensive enough to improve human-rights outcomes despite both forms of military integration that, elsewhere, had proved consistently inhibitory to achieving positive human-rights outcomes.²⁷⁹

(3) *Short wars consistently led to significant human-rights improvement, when combined with other key proximate conditions.* Improvement required the absence of both military power-sharing provisions. In addition, one of two remaining conditions had to be met: EITHER the condition of territorial autonomy (~AUT) was excluded from the negotiated settlement, OR the presence of robust third-party security guarantees (R3P) was included in that settlement. That is to say, the absence of autonomy and the presence of robust third-party security guarantees represent causally equivalent, substitutable conditions here. Both of these causal pathways had very high consistency and high frequencies (see Table 67).

(4) *The most consistent causal pathway to achieving the desired outcome of significant human-rights improvement—based on the requirement that the path involve multiple representative empirical cases—included the remote condition of enduring*

²⁷⁹ See Chapter 8 for further discussion on this specific case.

peace. Specifically, Path 5 (see Table 63) had the highest consistency (0.93). This causal combination also involved robust third-party security guarantees and the absence of both military power-sharing measures.

(5) *The only pathway where the territorial power-sharing measure of autonomy was present (AUT) also involved the presence of robust third-party security guarantees AND the presence of enduring peace*. It is possible that the presence of semi-robust third-party security guarantees attenuated the negative potential effects that autonomous power-sharing measures are expected to make on human-rights outcomes.²⁸⁰ The causal mechanisms need further exploration.

(6) *Six of the nine sufficient causal pathways leading to significant human rights improvement (SHRI) involved the presence of robust third-party security guarantees*. Coverage on these six pathways was high. Outside of federalism—which was not included in the fuzzy-set analysis—this proximate condition of robust security guarantees was the *only* peace-agreement provision where the presence of that provision consistently had led to the desired outcome.²⁸¹

For this reason, Appendix 12 explored this specific condition further to see if the apparently strong relationship between these guarantees and reduced political repression might be influenced by selection effects, wherein third parties choose easier conflicts in which to intervene. Naturally, such conflicts would be followed more often by improved human rights. Bivariate relationships between previously defined remote variables of war

²⁸⁰ Chapter 8 discusses the specific mandates and footprints involved in the two civil wars (Georgia-Abkhazia and Guatemala) represented by this causal path.

²⁸¹ The one causal path that consistently involved the absence of such guarantees was also made distinct by the absence of all power-sharing provisions and the presence of ethnic conflict (see first finding above).

costs, war duration, GDP per capita, and ethnic conflicts were explored. The investigation showed that robust third-party security guarantees were generally more common when the cost of the conflict was high, the conflict duration short, and the country economically poor. Of these three variables, absolute poverty was the only statistically significant factor, though (see Appendix 11 for an in-depth discussion).

(7) The majority of sufficient paths and strong cases that led to the negation of the outcome (~SHRI) involved one of three anticipated contextual conditions: ethnic conflict (~NE), long wars (~SW), and large populations (~SP). Correspondingly, it was rare, but not impossible, that the anticipated positive influence of remote conditions was overcome. Only two paths, each represented by a single strong case, demonstrated this with high consistency. The civil war in Chad involved the positive influence of a non-ethnic war (NE). The benefits of this remote condition were overwhelmed by the presence of both military power-sharing measures (IDF & IML) and the absence of any third-party security guarantees (~R3P); worse human rights resulted.

The first civil war in Georgia involved a short war (SW), but two proximate conditions that were anticipated to lead to worse human-rights outcomes—namely, the presence of rebel integration into the defense force (IDF) and the presence of autonomy (AUT)—were also included. The semi-robust third-party security guarantee (an armed mandate coupled with an undersized footprint) was insufficient to affect human rights in a positive way. Human rights remained unchanged, despite the ending of the civil war.

(8) The presence of the provision to integrate rebels into the defense force (IDF) was continuously associated with the negation of the outcome, regardless of changes in

other conditions. Fully 92 percent (11 of 12) of the sufficient pathways leading to the negation of the outcome (~SHRI) involved the presence of rebel integration in the defense force (IDF). No other remote or proximate condition reached this level of continuous association with the negated outcome.

Conclusions

This research project began with a sequence of questions exploring the relationship between peace-agreement provisions and political repression. These issues were encapsulated in the primary research question: *Under what conditions do peace-agreement provisions significantly reduce the degree of political repression conducted by the state?*

Considerations for Decision Makers

The findings from this research strongly suggest that decision-makers and practitioners engaged in negotiated settlements should consider the following ten implications:

(1) *Endurance of peace is asymmetrically related to significant human rights improvement.* The most consistent causal pathway (0.93 consistency) with multi-case coverage involved the remote condition of enduring peace.²⁸² Moreover, the only pathway where the territorial power-sharing measure of autonomy was present (AUT) also involved the presence of both enduring peace AND robust third-party security guarantees. Surprisingly, the negation of the outcome is not consistently affected by the absence of enduring peace using the parameters described herein.

²⁸² This causal combination also involved robust third-party security guarantees AND the absence of both military power-sharing measures.

(2) *War duration negatively and symmetrically affects political repression.* Those states that experienced very short-duration civil wars (i.e., one year or less) and those with partial membership in this defined set (i.e., less than five years) consistently witnessed significant human-rights improvement. Conversely, when wars were long in duration, those states consistently experienced worse, or at best unchanged, human-rights outcomes.

(3) *The size of the population is asymmetrically related to the level of political repression.* Small population size does *not* consistently affect significant human-rights improvement. But the negation of that outcome is consistent when states have large populations of greater than ten million people.

(4) *The presence of ethnic-based conflict, combined with the absence of all power-sharing agreements consistently resulted in significant human-rights improvement.* This was the most unexpected result of the study. The four cases that strongly represented this causal combination merit further investigation.

(5) *Power sharing is not a panacea for significant human-rights improvement.* Rather, the desired outcome was more consistently reached when settlements were less extensively institutionalized (i.e., less dimensions included), when the military power-sharing dimension was thin or absent, and when the provision of territorial autonomy was absent.

(6) *Political power-sharing agreements—whether assessed in the aggregate or disaggregate, over the short, mid, or long-term, or using contingency tables or fuzzy-set analysis—did not reveal any consistent relationship with political repression.* This does

not mean they have *no* effects on the outcome. Rather, the effects may vary too much from state to state (see discussion and hypotheses in Chapter 4 for potential reasons why this happens).

(7) *Significant human-rights improvement is more likely if territorial autonomy is absent.* If this provision is strongly desired in a negotiated settlement, decision-makers should insist upon inclusion of a robust third-party security guarantee involving a mandate to use force and a sizeable footprint of greater than 5,000 armed personnel to enforce that mandate.²⁸³

(8) *The only power-sharing provision to consistently result in improvement human rights over time was territorial federalism.* The rarity of this provision precluded its use in the fuzzy-set analysis. Further investigation is needed to determine when its use is merited and why it succeeded.

(9) *Outside of federalism, the provision of robust third-party security guarantees was the only peace-agreement provision where the presence of the provision consistently led to the desired outcome.* Six of nine sufficient causal pathways involved this measure. Third parties engaged more often when the cost of conflict was high, conflict duration was short, and the country was economically poor; only this last variable was statistically significant, though.

(10) *If significant human-rights improvement (SHRI) is desired after civil war, then both military power-sharing measures—including integration of rebels into the main*

²⁸³ This recommendation is based on the fact that the sole sufficient causal path that included autonomy and that resulted in SHRI also included the presence of a semi-robust third-party security guarantee and the presence of enduring peace.

ranks and into leadership positions—should be excluded from negotiated settlements. All nine causal recipes that consistently led to the desired outcome occurred when both provisions were absent. Furthermore, when the provision to integrate rebels into the main ranks was present, the negation of the outcome consistently occurred. This provision was present in 92 percent (11 of 12) of the sufficient pathways leading to the outcome’s negation.

In sum, the results here suggest that decision-makers involved in negotiated settlements used to terminate civil war should approach power-sharing provisions with great caution and restraint. Outside of federalism, no power-sharing provision was consistently or significantly associated with human-rights improvement. Other measures, like the inclusion of rebels into the main ranks of a state’s military police force, consistently resulted in unchanged or worse human rights; the absence of that same measure consistently resulted in significant human-rights improvement.

Causation, as Ragin (2008, 149) noted, “is complex and very often involves specific combinations of causal conditions (or causal ‘recipes’).” These combinations of factors jointly produce an outcome. In this regard, the most consistent pathway to the desired outcome of significant human-rights improvement—represented by seven empirical cases—involved the combination of enduring peace, robust third-party security guarantees, and the absence of all military power-sharing provisions from the negotiated settlement.

Explaining the Negative Influence of Military Integration

With respect to human-rights outcomes, this project found that military integration in the main ranks and in leadership positions is not just ineffective—it is downright dangerous. This position stands in opposition to much of the conventional literature and to the proposed hypotheses outlined in Chapter 4. What went wrong?

A review of Figure 4 from the introduction provides critical initial insights: looking at the proximate and remote conditions that mattered most to reducing the state's use of political repression after civil war, it becomes quite apparent that the strongest causal mechanism was reducing the threat to the government (as compared to constraining its opportunity or improving alternative governance mechanisms). Viewed primarily from the state's perspective, military integration into the main ranks (IDF) is potentially dangerous for several reasons. First, the integration of former belligerents into a joint defense force places the state's monopoly on the use of force in serious question. Integration also occurs at a critical juncture, when the population is already skeptical of the force and when the state is seeking its reconstitution in order to deter future political violence. Complicating this unease is the reality that this power-sharing agreement re-arms and remobilizes previous rebel combatants into a joint defense force rather than transforming prior combatants into civilians—as is the aim of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programs.

Second, internal security is preeminent in the government's mind: Will these new integrated forces respond to orders issued to them by the government? Are they trustworthy? Will these forces rise up against the government in a coup or a rebellion?

Integration of rebels into the main ranks may intensify short-term tensions, with the government perceiving integration as a significant threat to the status quo. Any perceived benefits that such integration will decrease the government's opportunity to repress appear to be significantly overwhelmed by the government's perception of a threat to its monopoly on the use of force. Political repression thus increases when this provision is present.

Integration of rebels into military leadership roles (IML) holds similar benefits and risks. While integration provides a new restriction on the government's ability and opportunity to repress, the government's motivation to repress likely increases. Guaranteeing rebels representation in leadership positions of a joint defense force is setting "the fox to guard the henhouse"; these new leaders have strong potential conflicts of interest. When rebels hold significant power with certain military leadership roles, they may wield this power for coercive purposes, such as a military coup.

This reality is made clear when reviewing the thirty-six cases here. Every instance of the provision guaranteeing rebel representation in military leadership positions was always coupled with integration in the main ranks; that is, no cases existed of the military leadership provision on its own. Whether intended or not, this ensures that new rebel military leaders will have available followers—fellow rebels integrated in the main ranks. Any rebel guaranteed a military leadership position knows, as does the government, that the military ranks now include rebels, too. Governments will likely remain quite wary of this tenuous hold they retain on military power.

In retrospect, the integration of rebels into military leadership positions likely necessitates the presence of a third-party security guarantee in order to succeed (as evidenced in paths 1 and 2 of Table 63). John Nagl (2014) made this same argument about the integrated Iraqi Army. In his assessment, the loss of a third-party guarantor shortly preceded—if not allowed for—the untimely unraveling of security sector reform measures in Iraq and the corresponding rise of ISIL in the resulting security vacuum. Nuri al-Maliki, the former Iraqi prime minister, had purged his most senior and capable Sunni Iraqi Army officers under fears of a coup, yet “An American presence would have kept Maliki more honest, resulting in improved leadership of Iraqi forces that would have fought harder against the ISIL assault” (Nagl 2014). From this perspective, robust third-party security guarantees provide a sufficient check against the potential threat to the government that is inherent with integration of rebels into military leadership positions.

Research Limitations

This study is the first known to analyze and investigate the influence of disaggregated peace-agreement provisions on a state’s use of political repression. The project is additionally distinct by its mixed-method research design and use of fuzzy-set QCA.

The scope of the research was limited by the available cases where civil wars had concluded via negotiated settlement and where data was available on political repression. Additional constraints in the project included the: (1) dichotomization of data, (2) calibration of data, (3) restriction of the fuzzy-set analysis to short-term changes over

time, (4) focus on peace-agreement provisions rather than on practice, and (5) QCA disadvantages. These limitations are reviewed in sequence.

Dichotomization of Data

The decision to dichotomize was based on the low number of available cases where negotiated settlements had occurred and the human-rights data was available (see Chapter 5 for further explanation). The dichotomization of conditions made it possible to construct contingency tables that evaluated bivariate relationships between proximate and remote conditions and the outcome of interest. This provided an initial foray into the relationships between various peace-agreement provisions or remote contexts and human-rights outcomes after war.

Certain limitations apply to these findings, though, since all of the conditions—with the exception of aggregated proximate conditions—were dichotomized. In addition, the outcome of human rights required dichomitization, which lumped cases where the level of political repression had remained unchanged where human rights became worse after conflict ended. The dichotomization process naturally dumps a great deal of information, including pertinent, critical details. These distinctions and details matter.

In this vein, the findings from fuzzy-set QCA were granted more scholarly weight, for they allowed me to assign gradations in set membership and to simultaneously conduct qualitative and quantitative assessments. To accomplish this, the data had to be calibrated according to set definitions, which were based on theoretical arguments and empirical findings.

Calibration of Data

This research project was very transparent in the calibration process in order that future researchers might corroborate the data and test alternative interpretations of where those calibration parameters ought to be set. Said differently, the research findings in this project are linked to the calibration decisions made herein. Substantial calibration changes will likely change the research findings.

Restriction of the Fuzzy-set Analysis

The implications of this project are also limited by time. The fuzzy-set analysis was necessarily restricted to just the short-term period. In this regard, Snyder and Jervis (1999, 28) cautioned that in post-civil war contexts, a consistent tradeoff often exists “between short-run stabilization and long-term transformation.” Will there be such a trade-off here? Will the short-term findings from this project also obtain over the mid- and long-term periods?

Preliminary research indicates that the research findings will generally hold. Cross-tabulations of the proximate and remote conditions in this project indicated the following four relationships with human-rights outcomes: (1) Federalism became more positive in the mid- and long-term periods. (2) Robust third-party security guarantees were significant in the long-term. (3) Military integration into the main ranks became non-significant in the later periods. (4) Autonomy became significant and remained negative for both the mid- and long-term periods.

Based on these relationships—albeit, limited by bivariate analysis—I anticipate that future fuzzy-set QCA performed on the mid- and long-term periods will not reveal

dramatic shifts outside of a slight lessening in the consistent, negative relationship between military integration in the main ranks and attaining significant human-rights improvement. Any lessening of this provision will be overshadowed by intensification of the roles that robust third-party security guarantees and autonomy are likely to play in causal combinations over the mid- and long-term periods.

Focus on Peace-agreement Provisions

This project was restricted by its emphasis on peace-agreement *provisions*, referring simply to the existence of a given measure in a negotiated settlement. Other scholars, like Jarstad and Nilsson (2008), asserted that the *practice* of such measures—meaning whether those provisions were actually implemented—matters more than the “mere” provisions. They then coded provisions based on whether: no implementation had occurred (0), partial implementation had occurred (1) or full implementation had occurred (2). One problem with their dataset—and the primary reason their data was not used here—was that Jarstad and Nilsson evaluated every peace agreement that had occurred within a civil war rather than evaluate a single civil war as a whole. As a result, those civil wars that involved multiple agreements were weighted more heavily.²⁸⁴

One other challenge in using this approach, which Ottman and Vullers (2014) demonstrated, is that a snapshot-in-time of rebel integration in certain political, economic, or military positions can miss the reversal of implementation. Full implementation might occur, with rebels placed into reserved government positions. At

²⁸⁴ See Chapter X for further discussion on Jarstad and Nilsson’s study. Also, as a counterpoint to Jarstad and Nilsson’s (2008) argument that the practice of these agreements is so critical, their own data in the article revealed that in 5 of the 12 cases where peace was kept, power sharing agreements were not implemented.

some later time period, the rebels might be fully or partially removed. Ottman and Vullers' new "Power-Sharing Event Dataset (PSED)" reinforced the argument that the practice of implementation is a constantly moving target that can be rather difficult to measure, unless the dataset is continuously updated to track all changes over a set time range.

Future studies should consider using this new dataset to see whether the findings change when the practices of peace agreements are evaluated instead of the provisions. One under-discussed possibility is that both provisions and practice are useful: Provisions might matter more in the short term, while practice may be a better gauge for outcomes in the long term. In either case, a more uniform dataset that tracks *both* provisions and practices is needed if the two arguments are to be accurately compared.

QCA Limitations

Chapter 6 detailed certain disadvantages and burdens inherent to QCA. As discussed there, equal weighting is given to every individual case, including outliers and deviant cases (Berg-Schlosser 2012). To balance out QCA's known insensitivities to "the historical frequency of occurrences" this project accounted for "those causal combinations responsible for the largest number of the outcome of interest" (Chan 2003, 63) by reviewing what I called *predominant causal pathways*. QCA is also limited in that it cannot account for the sequencing or timing of conditions. Case studies may aid in examining theorized causal pathways and potential sequencing concerns; the research conducted here did not afford full case-study exploration, but potential avenues for future studies were discussed. Finally, the methodological techniques within QCA force a

number of methodological decisions that place great onus on the researcher to be transparent in justifying and explaining the selections so that future researchers can verify and extend research avenues.

Recommendations for Future Research

Research on the relationship between peace-agreement provisions and political repression is far from complete. The introductory chapter discussed and depicted (see Figure 5) how the findings of this project ought to feed back into future research that builds upon these insights in a recursive process. A ripe, primary area for immediate exploration would involve conducting fuzzy-set QCA, using the project's existing data, to evaluate the effects of remote and proximate conditions over the mid- and long-term periods. Differences over time would supplement these findings, not negate them. That is, QCA is context and conjuncture-sensitive, meaning the effects of different provisions are anticipated to change over time. This holds true because QCA methodology "does not assume any permanent causal direction between a given condition and the outcome" (Engeli, Rihoux, and Allison, 2014, 86). After this analysis, Ottman and Vullers' (2014) new dataset might then be used to evaluate differences in findings when peace-agreement practices are evaluated rather than provisions.

A multitude of avenues exist for refining, confirming, and then expanding examination of the relationship between power-sharing agreements and political repression. The quickest inroad for confirmatory analysis would be to conduct fuzzy-set QCA using CIRI data over the short-term period. CIRI data also would accommodate exploration of a disaggregated outcome. This would allow researchers to observe how

different conditions shape the *type* of political repression (i.e., kidnapping, torture, imprisonment, extrajudicial killings) pursued by the government and whether governments alter their preferred methods. Governments might also switch to less visible techniques, such as repressing freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, or domestic movement. These indicators, along with four others, are captured in the CIRI empowerment index.

The potential also exists that governments might switch *who* conducts the violence, by outsourcing this to pro-government militias acting on their behalf. Carey, Mitchell, and Lowe (2013) documented this possibility in their presentation of a new database covering pro-government militias.²⁸⁵

Returning to the causal conditions, alternative disaggregation methods of power-sharing agreements should be considered. In this vein, Cammett and Malesky (2012) made the case that political power-sharing agreements ought to be disaggregated and evaluated based on whether the new institutions provide effective governance rather than procedural democracy. They found that closed-list proportional representation served as the strongest check on executive power, enabling peace to endure longer than when rebels were guaranteed representation of certain seats in the executive branch, legislative branch, or civil service. This argument about constitutional design and electoral systems and the level of political repression after civil war merits further investigation.²⁸⁶

²⁸⁵ The Shi'ite militias engaged throughout Iraq represent a clear contemporary example of this concern (Parker 2015).

²⁸⁶ On the issue of political institutions and electoral system design within (and following) peace agreements, see Bogaards (2013), Reilly (2013), Pospieszna and Schneider (2013).

Finally, future research should also consider confirmatory research techniques, alongside exploration of alternative but related variables and conditions. A promising arena for deepening the arguments made here—and for confirming whether the proffered hypotheses and causal pathways outlined in Chapter 4 hold true—would integrate the cross-case analyses with causal process tracing of individual specific cases. The merging of in-depth case studies alongside set-theoretic research is a nascent field, recently inhabited by a host of proposals on how best to merge these methodologies.²⁸⁷ Scholars commend the use of causal process tracing “to test the internal causal validity of the findings from a QCA study” by selecting “a typical case for those causal configurations which have high levels of coverage and consistency” (Blatter and Haverland 2012, 231).²⁸⁸ This commendation is useful for future case selection process; such case studies would help verify the causal mechanisms and hypotheses proposed and described in Chapter 4 and the findings established herein.

Final Thoughts

To what end should social science projects, like this one, aim? Lynch (2014) contended that “The purpose of social science, if it has any, must be to inform our decisions about the likely effects of our actions.” What then are the likely effects of selecting different power-sharing provisions on life in that state after the war? As the introduction and Chapter 2 detailed, most scholarship on power-sharing provisions has

²⁸⁷ See, for example, Beach and Rohlfing (2015), Blatter and Haverland (2012), Mikkelsen (2015a, 2015b), and Schneider and Rohlfing (2013),.

²⁸⁸ These methodological proposals are still largely theoretical in nature. The advocates (Blatter and Haverland 2012, 231; Rohlfing and Schneider 2011) knowingly acknowledge they cannot point researchers towards any existing study that effectively combines QCA with causal process tracing as they prescribe.

evaluated them using an aggregated approach and primarily in relation to their effects on peace duration (a proxy for state security). Given the potential that such measures might simultaneously make the populace less secure and lead to increased political repression by the state, a driving force behinds this project was exploration of the “likely effects of our actions” when choosing and advocating various provisions within negotiated settlements. We ought to know not just how such decisions affect a state’s ability to deter future violence, but also how these measures secure the peace for individuals in a state by assuring them that the regime is not a grave threat to their personal-integrity rights.

While no single pathway exists to improve human-rights outcomes significantly in post-civil war contexts, this research demonstrated that a number of common power-sharing provisions—namely integration of military power-sharing in the main ranks and territorial autonomy—are consistently inhibitory to individual security after civil war ends. Other provisions, like robust third-party security guarantees and (albeit rare) territorial federalism, demonstrate consistent presence alongside a reduction in the level of political repression used by a state.

How then shall this information be used? It is imperative that the decision-makers involved in developing any peace agreement properly balance (1) the ability of the state to deter internal violence and prevent civil war recurrence with (2) the government assuring its population that it no longer threatens them. Focusing only on the first element might secure the state but would potentially jeopardize the security of the people within the state—while preserving high levels of political repression and the latent potential for great dissension again in the future.

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Appendix 1: Naming Conventions for Proximate & Remote Conditions

	Variable Name (for cross-tabs)	Condition Name (for fsQCA)
Proximate Conditions		
Set 1: Aggregate Dimensions		
Extensively institutionalized settlements	<i>eis</i>	EIS
Thick political settlements	<i>th-ps</i>	THP
Thick military settlements	<i>th-ms</i>	THM
Territorial power-sharing agreement	<i>tpsa</i>	TPSA
Proximate Conditions		
Set 2: Disaggregated Provisions		
Legislative elections	<i>repleg</i>	LEG
Executive representation	<i>repex</i>	EXE
Civil service representation	<i>repcs</i>	CIV
Military integration, main ranks	<i>mil_int</i>	IDF
Military integration, leadership	<i>mil_ldr</i>	IML
Federalism	<i>fed</i>	FED
Autonomy	<i>aut</i>	AUT
Robust third-party security guarantee	<i>r3psg</i>	R3P
REMOTE CONDITIONS		
Civil war recurrence	<i>t2p / t5p / t10p</i>	EP
Civil war ethnicity	<i>nec</i>	NE
Civil war duration	<i>sw</i>	SW
Civil war costs	<i>lc</i>	N/A
Regime type	<i>t2d / t5d / t10d</i>	HD
Population size	<i>sp</i>	SP
Economic development	<i>ed</i>	MD

Appendix 2: Dichotomized Set 1 Conditions & Human-Rights Outcomes

caseID	eis	th-ps	th-ms	tpsa	ppsa	mpsa	pts2d	pts5d	pts10d	ciri2d	ciri5d	ciri10d
AFG	2	3	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	-	1	1
ANG1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	1
ANG2	2	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	0
ANG3	2	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	1
ANG4	2	2	2	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
AZE	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	0
BOS	3	3	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	-	-	-
BUI	3	3	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	-
CAM	2	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	1
CHA	2	1	2	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
CRO1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1
CRO2	1	3	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1
DRC	2	3	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	0
GNB	1	2	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	-	-	-
GRG1	2	0	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1
GRG2	2	3	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	1
GUA	2	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	1
LBR1	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	-	-
LBR2	1	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	1
LBR3	2	3	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	-	1	-
LEB	2	3	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	-	0	0
MLD	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1
MZM	3	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
NEP	1	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	-	1	1	-
NIC	2	2	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1
PHI1	3	3	2	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	0
PHI2	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	1
PNG	2	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
RWA	2	2	2	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	1
SAF	3	2	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	1
SAL	2	1	2	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
SIE1	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	-	1	1
SIE2	2	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	-	-	-
SUD1	2	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	-
SUD2	3	3	2	1	1	1	0	0	-	0	0	-
TAJ	2	2	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	1
<i>Total</i>				12	28	23	20	19	19	15	21	20

Note: [eis] Extensively institutionalized settlements, [th-ps] Thick political settlements, [th-ms] Thick military settlements, [tpsa] Territorial PSA, [ppsa] Political PSA, [mpsa] Military PSA, [pts2/5/10d] Political Terror Scale, Δ over respective time; [ciri2/5/10d] CIRI, Δ over respective time, [-] data not available or missing

Appendix 3: Dichotomized Set 2 Conditions & Human-Rights Outcomes

caseID	repleg	repex	repcs	milint	milldr	auto	fed	r3psg	pts2d	pts5d	pts10d	ciri2d	ciri5d	ciri10d
AFG	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	-	1	1
ANG1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	1
ANG2	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
ANG3	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	1
ANG4	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1
AZE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	0
BOS	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	-	-	-
BUI	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	-
CAM	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	1
CHA	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CRO1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
CRO2	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
DRC	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0
GNB	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	-	-	-
GRG1	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	1
GRG2	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	1
GUA	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	1
LBR1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	-	-
LBR2	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	1	1
LBR3	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	-	1	-
LEB	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-	0	0
MLD	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1
MZM	1	0	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
NEP	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	-	1	1	-
NIC	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1
PHI1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
PHI2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	1
PNG	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
RWA	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	1
SAF	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	1
SAL	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1
SIE1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	-	1	1
SIE2	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	-	-	-
SUD1	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-
SUD2	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	-	0	0	-
TAJ	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	1
<i>Total</i>	<i>18</i>	<i>18</i>	<i>19</i>	<i>23</i>	<i>7</i>	<i>8</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>15</i>	<i>20</i>	<i>19</i>	<i>19</i>	<i>15</i>	<i>21</i>	<i>20</i>

Note: [repleg] legislative elections based on proportional or equal representation, [repex] rebel representation in executive branch, [repcs] rebel representation in civil service, [milint] rebel integration into main forces, [milldr] rebel representation in military leadership, [auto] autonomy to rebel group to control w/in region, [fed] allocation of powers to sub-state units (federalism), [r3psg] robust third party security guarantee, [pts2/5/10d] Political Terror Scale, Δ over respective time; [ciri2/5/10d] CIRI, Δ over respective time, [-] data not available or missing

Appendix 4: Raw Data for Remote Conditions

caseID	nec	lncosts	lndur	lnpop	lngdp	t2p	t5p	t10p	t2pol	t5pol	t10pol
AFG	1	4.79	5.6	16.96	5.49	0	0	0	-	-	-
ANG1	0	7.62	5.1	16.18	7.30	0	0	0	-3	-1	-3
ANG2	0	-	3	16.25	6.88	0	1	0	-1	-2	-3
ANG3	0	9.67	2.8	16.34	7.03	1	0	1	-2	-3	-2
ANG4	0	8.77	3.7	16.55	7.24	1	1	1	-2	-2	-2
AZE	0	6.13	4	15.86	6.48	1	1	1	-6	-7	-7
BOS	0	7.40	3.8	15.08	7.50	1	1	1	-	-	-
BUI	0	4.93	3.2	15.83	4.99	1	1	1	5	6	6
CAM	0	7.20	5.5	16.13	5.49	0	0	1	1	1	2
CHA	1	5.95	4.3	15.86	5.99	1	1	0	-2	-2	-2
CRO1	0	-	2	15.35	8.80	1	1	1	-3	-5	8
CRO2	0	7.88	1.1	15.34	8.94	1	1	1	-5	8	9
DRC	1	6.21	3.6	17.75	5.33	1	1	1	1	5	5
GNB	1	5.30	1.6	14.06	6.05	0	1	1	-1	-1	-1
GRG1	0	3.66	3.4	15.4	6.52	1	1	1	4	5	5
GRG2	0	6.35	3	15.35	6.71	1	1	1	5	5	7
GUA	1	5.50	6	16.18	7.62	1	1	1	8	8	8
LBR1	0	7.07	3.8	14.55	3.91	0	1	0	0	0	1
LBR2	0	8.29	3.2	14.75	4.80	1	1	1	0	0	6
LBR3	0	-	2.5	15	5.11	1	1	1	5	6	6
LEB	1	6.87	5.2	14.83	8.43	1	1	1	-	-	-
MLD	1	4.95	2	15.12	6.49	1	1	1	7	7	8
MZM	1	5.98	4.8	16.55	5.24	1	1	1	5	5	5
NEP	1	-	3.6	17.08	5.86	1	1	1	6	6	-
NIC	1	5.77	4.5	15.26	6.82	1	1	1	6	6	8
PHI1	1	5.58	5.6	18.12	6.94	1	0	0	8	8	8
PHI2	0	-	2.5	18.21	6.99	1	0	1	8	8	8
PNG	0	4.54	4.7	15.5	6.70	1	1	1	4	4	4
RWA	0	4.05	3.5	15.55	5.28	1	0	1	-6	-6	-3
SAF	0	5.08	4.6	17.44	8.45	1	1	1	8	9	9
SAL	1	6.21	5	15.55	7.68	1	1	1	7	7	7
SIE1	1	6.30	4	15.19	5.62	0	1	1	0	2	5
SIE2	1	6.03	3.2	15.27	5.51	1	1	1	2	5	7
SUD1	0	8.56	5.4	17.24	6.65	0	1	1	-6	-4	-
SUD2	0	-	3	17.32	6.65	1	1	1	-4	-2	-
TAJ	1	6.72	4.1	15.62	5.39	1	1	1	-1	-1	-3
<i>Total</i>	15					28	29	30			

Note: [nec] non-ethnic conflict, [lncosts] natural log of war costs, [lndur] natural log of war duration, [lnpop] natural log of population, [lngdp] natural log of GDP/capita, [t2p/t5p/t10p] Enduring peace at respective time period, [t2pol/t5pol/t10pol] Polity 2 score at respective time period

Appendix 5: Dichotomized Remote Conditions & Human-rights Outcomes

caseID	nec	lc	sw	sp	ed	t2p	t5p	t10p	t2d	t5d	t10d	pts2d	pts5d	pts10d	ciri2d	ciri5d	ciri10d
AFG	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	-	-	-	1	0	0	-	1	1
ANG1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	1
ANG2	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
ANG3	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	1
ANG4	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1
AZE	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	0
BOS	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	-	-	-	1	1	1	-	-	-
BUI	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	-
CAM	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
CHA	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CRO1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
CRO2	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
DRC	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0
GNB	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	-	-	-
GRG1	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	1
GRG2	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	1
GUA	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1
LBR1	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	-	-
LBR2	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	1	1
LBR3	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	-	1	-
LEB	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	-	-	-	0	0	0	-	0	0
MLD	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
MZM	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1
NEP	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	-	1	1	-	1	1	-
NIC	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1
PHI1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	0
PHI2	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1
PNG	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
RWA	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
SAF	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	1
SAL	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
SIE1	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	-	1	1
SIE2	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	-	-	-
SUD1	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	-	0	0	0	0	0	-
SUD2	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	-	0	0	-	0	0	-
TAJ	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1
<i>Total</i>	15	19	12	21		28	29	30	8	11	14	20	19	19	15	21	20

Note: [nec] Non-ethnic conflict, [lc] Low civil war costs, [sw] Short war, lasting < 2 years, [sp] Small population, less than 10 million, [ed] Economic development ≥ \$446 GDP/capita, [t2p/t5p/t10p] Enduring peace at respective time period, [t2d/t5d/t10d] Democratic regime (i.e. polity2 ≥ 6 for respective time), [pts2/5/10d] Political Terror Scale, Δ over respective time; [ciri2/5/10d] CIRI, Δ over respective time, [-] data not available or missing

Appendix 6: Plausability Probe – Exploring Limitations of csQCA and mvQCA

Both csQCA and mvQCA require a dichotomized outcome. Before switching automatically to fuzzy-set QCA—which accommodates multiple values for a given condition or outcome—a preliminary test was run to observe how much “analytically relevant information” (Skaaning 2011, 404) was lost when the human-rights outcome was dichotomized. The probe compared changes in the data when two thresholds were used instead of one.

The outcome of human rights (i.e., change in political repression assessed over time) was initially dichotomized over the three assessed time periods as shown in Chapter 3 (Table 7: Human-Rights Improvement over Time (in Number of Cases)). For the purposes of this preliminary probe, an alternative coding of PTS change over time was proposed using two thresholds. Changes of $\pm .5$ were coded as representing nominal change in human-rights outcomes; values outside these neutral scores represented cases where human-rights outcomes definitively worsened or improved. Such scores require that both PTS-Amnesty and PTS-State scores indicate a change in the same direction in human-rights outcomes.²⁸⁹

The change in the PTS score over the first time period (from t to $t+2$), adjusted for multiple thresholds, was coded as:

$$\begin{aligned} pts2mt &= 0, \text{ if } pts2 \text{ is } \leq -1 \text{ (human rights worse; repression increased)} \\ pts2mt &= 1, \text{ if } pts2 \text{ is } -0.5, 0, \text{ or } +0.5 \text{ (neutral, nominal change)} \end{aligned}$$

²⁸⁹ When states only change by half a point (± 0.5) in the PTS score over time, this indicates that only one of the PTS-State or PTS-Amnesty evaluations changed by one point, while the other assessment remained the same. Such a small shift indicates nominal change in the human-rights score as compared to more significant positive (or negative) change in the human-rights outcome—which would be verified by both evaluations changing and a corresponding score change of at least ± 1.0 over time.

$pts2mt = 2$, if $pts2$ is $\geq +1$ (human rights improved; repression decreased)

This coding scheme was also applied to the two other time periods, and captured in the variables $pts5mt$ and $pts10mt$. The application of these new thresholds to the thirty-six cases, yielded the following results:

Table 68: Human Rights Δ Over Time vs. Human-rights Outcome (two thresholds)

		<i>pts2mt</i>	<i>pts5mt</i>	<i>pts10mt</i>
<i>HR worse</i>	0	3	6	6
<i>Nominal change in HR</i>	1	20	14	12
<i>HR improved</i>	2	13	16	18

This recoded data revealed a significantly different interpretation to human-rights outcomes following negotiated settlements: First, the great majority of cases in the short term did not experience significant human-rights improvement. Nor did human rights get significantly worse. Rather, 56 percent of cases (20 of 36) experienced nominal change in the human-rights score. Second, the number of neutral cases continually decreased over time. From the two-year to the five-year point, those cases with nominal change in the human-rights outcome reduced from twenty to fourteen cases. Of the six cases that changed score, three experienced improved human rights and three experienced worse human rights. Negative cases (worse human-rights outcomes) doubled as a result. In the long-term situation, two more neutral cases became positive in outcome (improved human rights).

Lastly, while human-rights outcomes appeared stagnant over time in the original dichotomized data (i.e., net gain of only one positive case), the recoded data showed continual change over time. For example, two years after civil war ended, human-rights outcomes had improved in just over one-third of the cases (13 total). By ten years, human-rights outcomes had improved in fully half of the cases (18 of the 36) and worsened in only six cases (17%). Stated in reverse, when using the recoded data, human-rights outcomes for twenty of the thirty-six states (56%) had changed only marginally in the short term. By ten years after a civil war had ended, only one-third of those states had remained nominally close to their original scoring, while one-sixth had worsened and fully one-half had improved.

This plausibility probe of recoding the outcome demonstrates that a strong potential cause for continual contradictions in the csQCA and mvQCA analyses was the limitations inherent in dichotomizing the outcome of interest. The significant loss of precise, discriminating, empirically useful information constrained the utility of these two techniques; not all social science concepts easily translate into distinct dichotomies. As Ragin (2009) put it, “Many of the conditions that interest social scientists . . . vary by level or degree” and, therefore, cannot be effectively captured by the simple absence/presence dichotomies of csQCA or the multichotomies of mvQCA.

Appendix 7: Analysis of Necessary Conditions for SHRI (Consistency & Coverage)

	Consistency	Coverage
SET ONE Conditions		
(Aggregated Dimensions)		
EIS	0.76	0.58
~EIS	0.38	0.86
THP	0.65	0.65
~THP	0.54	0.72
THM	0.47	0.51
~THM	0.64	0.79
TPS	0.30	0.53
~TPS	0.70	0.59
SET TWO Conditions		
(Disaggregated Provisions)		
LEG	0.48	0.57
~LEG	0.52	0.58
EXE	0.46	0.59
~EXE	0.54	0.56
CIV	0.41	0.52
~CIV	0.59	0.61
IMM	0.48	0.45
~IMM	0.52	0.77
IML	0.16	0.40
~IML	0.84	0.62
AUT	0.19	0.49
~AUT	0.81	0.60
FED	0.11	0.63
~FED	0.89 *	0.56
R3P	0.74	0.69
~R3P	0.45	0.66
REMOTE CONDITIONS		
NE	0.39	0.58
~NE	0.61	0.57
SW	0.73	0.69
~SW	0.41	0.60
SP	0.78	0.75
~SP	0.49	0.69
ME	0.52	0.79
~ME	0.71	0.65
EP	0.81	0.60
~EP	0.19	0.49
SD	0.77	0.77
~SD	0.61	0.81

Note: * Almost necessary condition (≥ 0.85)

** Necessary condition (≥ 0.90)

Appendix 8: Analysis of Necessary Conditions for ~SHRI (Consistency & Coverage)

	<u>Consistency</u>	<u>Coverage</u>
SET ONE Conditions		
(Aggregated Dimensions)		
EIS	0.92 **	0.53
~EIS	0.26	0.45
THP	0.72	0.54
~THP	0.53	0.53
THM	0.77	0.62
~THM	0.38	0.35
TPS	0.35	0.47
~TPS	0.65	0.41
SET TWO Conditions		
(Disaggregated Provisions)		
LEG	0.49	0.43
~LEG	0.51	0.43
EXE	0.44	0.41
~EXE	0.56	0.44
CIV	0.50	0.48
~CIV	0.50	0.39
IMM	0.79	0.55
~IMM	0.21	0.23
IML	0.32	0.60
~IML	0.68	0.38
AUT	0.27	0.51
~AUT	0.73	0.40
FED	0.08	0.37
~FED	0.92 **	0.44
R3P	0.70	0.49
~R3P	0.56	0.62
REMOTE CONDITIONS		
NE	0.38	0.43
~NE	0.62	0.43
SW	0.64	0.45
~SW	0.55	0.61
SP	0.70	0.51
~SP	0.66	0.69
ME	0.48	0.56
~ME	0.82	0.56
EP	0.73	0.40
~EP	0.27	0.51
SD	0.80	0.61
~SD	0.70	0.69

Note: * Almost necessary condition (≥ 0.85)

** Necessary condition (≥ 0.90)

Appendix 9: Truth Table Solution, SHRI (Step 1, 0.65 Consistency Threshold)

	Raw Coverage	Unique Coverage	Consistency
	-----	-----	-----
NE	0.389831	0.054802	0.575000
~SW	0.410170	0.104520	0.602490
EP	0.807910	0.401130	0.595833

solution coverage: 0.991525

solution consistency: 0.598363

Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term NE:

CHA (1,0), DRC (1,0.4), SAL (1,0.8), GNB (1,1), GUA (1,0.6), MLD (1,0.9), MZM (1,0.6),
NEP (1,0.6), NIC (1,0.4), PHI1 (1,0.4), SIE1 (1,0.4), SIE2 (1,0.8)

Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term ~SW:

ANG1 (1,0.8), CAM (1,0.4), GUA (1,0.6), PHI1 (1,0.4), SUD1 (1,0.4), SAL (0.99,0.8),
MZM (0.96,0.6), SAF (0.88,0.4), NIC (0.84,0.4), CHA (0.65,0)

Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term EP:

SUD2 (1,0.4), SIE2 (1,0.8), SAF (1,0.4), RWA (1,0), PHI2 (1,0.8), PHI1 (1,0.4), NIC (1,0.4),
NEP (1,0.6), MZM (1,0.6), MLD (1,0.9), LIB3 (1,0.9), LIB2 (1,0.9), GUA (1,0.6), GRG1 (1,0.4),
GRG2 (1,0.6), SAL (1,0.8), DRC (1,0.4), CRO2 (1,1), CRO1 (1,0.8), CHA (1,0)

Note: The first value represents the strength in a causal configuration and the second represents the human rights outcome.

Appendix 10: Truth Table Solution, ~SHRI (Step 1, 0.65 Consistency Threshold)

	raw	unique	
		coverage	coverage consistency
		-----	-----
~SP	0.660639	0.062331	0.688565
~NE	0.616541	0.091827	0.431579
~SW*~SD	0.405338	0.000000	0.864358
~SW*~ME	0.450301	0.024361	0.826753
EP*~SD	0.503759	0.005271	0.697917

solution coverage: 0.949173

solution consistency: 0.493657

Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term ~SP:

PHI2 (0.9951,0.2), PHI1 (0.9921,0.6), DRC (0.9558,0.6), SAF (0.887,0.6), SUD2 (0.8509,0.6), SUD1 (0.8261,0.6), NEP (0.7718,0.4), MZM (0.6009,0.4), ANG4 (0.6003,0.4), ANG3 (0.5458,0.4), ANG2 (0.5257,1), GUA (0.513,0.4), ANG1 (0.5122,0.2), CAM (0.5015,0.6)

Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term ~NE:

SUD2 (1,0.6), SUD1 (1,0.6), SAF (1,0.6), RWA (1,1), PHI2 (1,0.2), LBR3 (1,0.1), LBR2 (1,0.1), LBR1 (1,0.6), GRG2 (1,0.4), GRG1 (1,0.6), CRO2 (1,0), CRO1 (1,0.2), CAM (1,0.6), BUI (1,0.4), AZE (1,0.2), ANG4 (1,0.4), ANG3 (1,0.4), ANG2 (1,1), ANG1 (1,0.2)

Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term ~SW*~SD:

SUD1 (0.8,0.6), ANG1 (0.6,0.2), CHA (0.6,1)

Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term ~SW*~ME:

CAM (0.994,0.6), MZM (0.964,0.4), CHA (0.651,1)

Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term EP*~SD:

AZE (0.8,0.2), RWA (0.8,1), ANG3 (0.6,0.4), ANG4 (0.6,0.4), CHA (0.6,1), CRO1 (0.6,0.2), CRO2 (0.6,0), SUD2 (0.6,0.6)

Note: The first value represents the strength in a causal configuration and the second represents the human rights outcome.

Appendix 11: Truth Table Solution, ~SHRI (Step 1, 0.64 Consistency Threshold)

	raw	unique	
	coverage	coverage	consistency
	-----	-----	-----
~SP	0.660639	0.055105	0.688565
~SW	0.553684	0.083977	0.609502
~NE	0.616541	0.187353	0.431579

solution coverage: 0.955105

solution consistency: 0.472471

Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term ~SP:

PHI2 (0.9951,0.2), PHI1 (0.9921,0.6), DRC (0.9558,0.6), SAF (0.887,0.6), SUD2 (0.8509,0.6), SUD1 (0.8261,0.6), NEP (0.7718,0.4), MZM (0.6009,0.4), ANG4 (0.6003,0.4), ANG3 (0.5458,0.4), ANG2 (0.5257,1), GUA (0.513,0.4), ANG1 (0.5122,0.2), CAM (0.5015,0.6)

Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term ~SW:

CAM (1,0.6), GUA (1,0.4), PHI1 (1,0.6), SUD1 (1,0.6), ANG1 (0.996,0.2), SAL (0.99,0.2), MZM (0.964,0.4), SAF (0.881,0.6), NIC (0.841,0.6), CHA (0.651,1)

Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term ~NE:

SUD2 (1,0.6), SUD1 (1,0.6), SAF (1,0.6), RWA (1,1), PHI2 (1,0.2), LBR3 (1,0.1), LBR2 (1,0.1), LBR1 (1,0.6), GRG2 (1,0.4), GRG1 (1,0.6), CRO2 (1,0), CRO1 (1,0.2), CAM (1,0.6), BUI (1,0.4), AZE (1,0.2), ANG4 (1,0.4), ANG3 (1,0.4), ANG2 (1,1), ANG1 (1,0.2)

Note: The first value represents the strength in a causal configuration and the second represents the human rights outcome.

Appendix 12: When do Third Parties Intervene Robustly?

Introduction

Investigation of Model 2 for the desired outcome of significant human rights improvement (SHRI) showed that six of the nine pathways involved the presence of third-party security guarantees; only one sufficient causal pathway leading to the desired outcome consistently involved its absence. Was this apparently strong relationship between robust third-party security guarantees and human-rights outcomes influenced by selection effects? Do third parties select easier conflicts in which to intervene, which is naturally followed more often by improved human rights? This section examines the question of when third parties are inclined to offer and implement security guarantees by evaluating the bivariate relationships between third-party guarantees and the previously defined situational (i.e., remote) variables of *war costs*, *war duration*, *GDP per capita*, and *ethnic conflicts*. This analysis differed from Fortna's review in that it looks at when third parties intervened *robustly*, rather than simply at all third-party security guarantees writ large. This restriction was established in order to evaluate the strong relationship between robust third-party security guarantees and long-term human-rights outcomes.

War Costs

How does the intensity of a civil war influence its post-conflict intervention? The available data on war costs²⁹⁰ shows that half of the robust guarantees (6 of 12) had occurred in the more costly wars and half in the less costly wars. By considering what percentage these interventions have represented in each category, greater insight can be

²⁹⁰ Recall that war costs were measured by dividing the number of battle-related deaths (in thousands) by the war duration and then logging this result. The threshold was set at 6.5.

gained on where the third parties were engaged. Data on war costs exists for thirty of the thirty-six states. Nineteen of these thirty states were considered low-cost conflicts. Third parties had intervened robustly in only 32 percent of the conflicts. In the remaining eleven high-cost civil wars, robust third-party intervention occurred in over half of the conflicts.

In other words, when the cost of conflict is high, in terms of deaths adjusted for war duration, third parties intervene more often. This relationship does not reach statistical significance, but it does parallel and corroborate Fortna's (2008) findings that intervention tends to occur more often in difficult wars.

War Duration

Do third parties intervene more often in shorter wars or in longer wars? In considering this, I examined the three previously discussed duration thresholds of two years, four years, and seven years. Third parties were present in half of the conflicts that lasted two years or less (6 of 12 civil wars), as well as half of all conflicts (10 of the 20 civil wars) that lasted less than four years. This trend also held for wars that lasted seven years or less, with third parties involved in twelve of these twenty-four conflicts. Most telling, of the twelve wars that lasted seven years or longer, third parties engaged robustly in only three of these conflicts (just 25%, see table below):

Table 69: Contingency Table for *Robust 3PSGs & Civil War Duration*

Outcome	R3PSG V1		Total
	0	1	
Duration ≥ 7 years (1)	9 (43%)	3 (20%)	12
Duration < 7 years (0)	12 (57%)	12 (80%)	24
Total	21 (100%)	15 (100%)	36

Additionally, when robustness is defined more narrowly as involving only peace-enforcement missions,²⁹¹ third parties intervened robustly in only one of these twelve long-duration conflicts. The sole outlier was the civil war in Afghanistan.

To recap, for the civil wars that ended in negotiated settlement, third parties intervened in half of all the civil wars that lasted less than seven years, but in only one-quarter of the wars that lasted beyond seven years. When intervention in long-duration conflicts did occur, third parties favored interpositional or multidimensional missions over peace enforcement. When choosing to commit full force via peace-enforcement missions, third parties opted for shorter conflicts of less than seven years. Of note, none of these relationships reached statistical significance, although they did show a general trend that guarantees are more likely with wars of shorter duration.

GDP Per Capita

What influence does a state’s economic condition have on 3PSGs? Are third parties more inclined to intervene robustly when the chances of success are higher, such

²⁹¹ This is assessed using category four from the ‘Spectrum of Third-Party Security Guarantees.’

as when a state's economy is already strong and the peoples' economic condition is more secured?

GDP per capita is a proxy for gauging the level of economic development in a given state. In looking at the relationship of robust 3PSGs with respect to the two previously discussed thresholds of absolute poverty (\$456 per year per person) and moderate poverty (\$730 per person per year), the clearer and stronger relationship is with absolute poverty. Data exists for all thirty-six states, with twenty states surpassing the threshold of absolute poverty and fifteen states residing below it.

Robust 3PSGs occurred in just four of the twenty-one states (19%), with greater than \$456 GDP/capita. In states exiting civil war, but with their populace largely undergoing absolute poverty, third parties intervened robustly nearly three times more often. Third-party security guarantees occurred in 73 percent of all available cases (11 of 15 civil wars). This relationship, depicted in Table 73 below, is statistically significant with Pearson's Chi-Square equal to 10.609. The corresponding value of .0016 sits just shy of $p < .01$ but well within significance at $p < .05$. The relationship, as described above, is strongly negative, which phi confirms at -.543. The relationship between robust third-party security guarantees and GDP/capita is one of the most significant and strong relationships seen so far in this study. Also, this data point buttresses Fortna's conclusion that interventions occur more often in difficult rather than easy civil war contexts.

Table 70: Contingency Table for *Robust 3PSGs & GDP/capita*²⁹²

Outcome	R3PSG V1		Total
	0	1	
GDP/capita ≥ \$456 (1)	17 (81%)	4 (27%)	31
GDP/capita < \$456 (0)	4 (19%)	11 (73%)	15
Total	21 (100%)	15 (100%)	36

Ethnic War

Lastly, do third parties avoid ethnic conflicts, which are known to carry often deeper divisions and more challenging post-conflict resolution? The evidence indicates that there are equal opportunists here, intervening almost equally in ethnic conflicts (45% of the total, or 9 of 20 civil wars) as in non-ethnic wars (38% of the total, or 6 of 16 civil wars).

In the same fashion, ethnic conflict had no effects on the decision to intervene robustly using peace-enforcement missions. When ethnic wars occurred, third parties intervened robustly with peace enforcement in only 30 percent of those missions (6 of 14). In the non-ethnic wars, third parties similarly intervened in almost exactly the same percentage of missions (31%, or 5 of 16 missions).

Ethnic conflicts did not affect the tendencies of parties to intervene. In this regard, Fortna’s findings that intervention occurs in difficult conflicts were largely corroborated. Robust third-party security guarantees—those involving the strongest mandate and strongest force structure to back that mandate—occurred more often when conditions for recovery were more difficult. Difficult, intense conflicts (i.e., those with high costs) and

²⁹² This is set at absolute poverty.

prevailing absolute poverty within a state attract robust third-party security guarantees, though third parties are less likely to provide such guarantees following a long-lasting conflict (i.e., one those lasting longer than seven years).

Summary of Findings

The investigation showed that robust third-party security guarantees were generally more common when the cost of the conflict was high, the conflict duration was short, and the country was economically poor. Of these three variables, absolute poverty was the only statistically significant factor.