

# Oklahoma Law Review

---

Volume 71 | Number 2

---

2019

## “The Internet of Buildings”: Insurance of Cyber Risks for Commercial Real Estate

Thomas D. Hunt

Follow this and additional works at: <https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr>

 Part of the [Internet Law Commons](#)

---

### Recommended Citation

Thomas D. Hunt, *“The Internet of Buildings”: Insurance of Cyber Risks for Commercial Real Estate*, 71 OKLA. L. REV. 397 (2019), <https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol71/iss2/3>

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Oklahoma Law Review by an authorized editor of University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [darinfox@ou.edu](mailto:darinfox@ou.edu).

# “THE INTERNET OF BUILDINGS”: INSURANCE OF CYBER RISKS FOR COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE

THOMAS D. HUNT\*

*“I know I’ve made some very poor decisions recently, but I can give you my complete assurance that my work will be back to normal. I’ve still got the greatest enthusiasm and confidence in the mission.”*<sup>1</sup>

## I. Introduction

The technological advances of the twenty-first century have led modern societies to reap previously unheard of advantages, including the now ubiquitous “Internet of Things” (IoT).<sup>2</sup> IoT refers to the connection of ordinary objects to the internet—e.g., smart phones, smart TVs, smart

---

\* Thomas D. Hunt is a Risk Management Associate at Robert M. Currey & Associates. He is a member of the Massachusetts and Maine bars and a graduate of Suffolk University Law School (J.D., 2017, magna cum laude) and Boston University (B.A., 2013). For helpful discussions and edits, thank you to Tom Vincent II of the law firm GableGotwals as well as the entire staff of the *Oklahoma Law Review*.

1. 2001: A SPACE ODYSSEY (MGM 1968) (statement of a HAL 9000 computer, following its malfunction and murder of all but one of the crew of the spacecraft *Discovery One*, and immediately prior to being disconnected by the lone remaining mission pilot, Dave Bowman).

2. See Harald Bauer, Mark Patel & Jan Veira, *The Internet of Things: Sizing Up the Opportunity*, MCKINSEY & CO. (Dec. 2014), <https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/semiconductors/our-insights/the-internet-of-things-sizing-up-the-opportunity> (predicting IoT will become \$6.2 trillion industry by 2025); see also Steven A. Cash, David T. Doot & James B. Blackburn IV, *The Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) and the Law*, DAY PITNEY LLP (Sept. 28, 2017), <https://www.daypitney.com/insights/publications/2017/09/28-the-industrial-internet-of-things>. As attorneys Cash, Doot, and Blackburn note:

Most people are now familiar with the Internet of Things (IoT), the network of physical objects, embedded sensors, connections and computers that permeates much of our everyday life. Encompassing the mundane (smart refrigerators and toasters), the vital (medical devices), the amusing (smart toilets) and the creepy (tracking and shopping monitors), the IoT has become both a buzzword and a way of life.

*Id.* IoT has been defined as “the connection of systems and devices with primarily physical purposes (e.g., sensing, heating/cooling, lighting, motor actuation, transportation) to information networks (including the Internet) via interoperable protocols, often built into embedded systems.” U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., STRATEGIC PRINCIPLES FOR SECURING THE INTERNET OF THINGS 2 n.1 (2016), [https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Strategic\\_Principles\\_for\\_Securing\\_the\\_Internet\\_of\\_Things-2016-1115-FINAL\\_v2-dg11.pdf](https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Strategic_Principles_for_Securing_the_Internet_of_Things-2016-1115-FINAL_v2-dg11.pdf).

buildings, and soon enough smart cities.<sup>3</sup> In recent years, commercial real estate (CRE) owners, operators, builders, and developers have embraced IoT technology by gradually integrating artificial intelligence into the critical infrastructural components of buildings.<sup>4</sup> This helps generate advances in data analytics, open up new revenue streams, and ensure long-term efficiency and sustainability.<sup>5</sup> Although these developments undoubtedly connote progress, it is almost axiomatic that whenever the internet and computers become more involved with any aspect of our lives, the possibility of a system failure or data breach increases correlatively.<sup>6</sup> One prominent professor at Carnegie Mellon University and member of the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers opined that “security and privacy are the biggest hurdles to overcome to realize” the reality of a “smart city.”<sup>7</sup>

---

3. See WIPRO LTD., SMART BUILDINGS ENABLE SMART CITIES 6 (2016), <https://web.archive.org/web/20170921111021/http://www.wipro.com/documents/insights/Smart-Buildings-Enable-Smart-Cities.pdf> (noting that the International Data Corporation defines “smart building” as “a facility that utilizes advanced automation and integration to measure, monitor, control, and optimize operations and maintenance”); see also Michael Totty, *The Rise of the Smart City*, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 16, 2017, 10:12 PM), <https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-rise-of-the-smart-city-1492395120>; Michaela Ross, *DelBene, Cantwell Introduce Bill to Boost Smart Cities*, BLOOMBERG LAW: TECH & TELECOM (Oct. 2, 2017) <https://www.bna.com/delbene-cantwell-introduce-n73014470444/> (discussing H.R. 3895, the Smart Cities and Communities Act of 2017, a bill introduced to the House by Rep. Suzan DelBene (D-WA) and Sen. Maria Cantwell (D-WA) aiming to infuse \$1.1 billion of federal money into Smart Cities Initiative).

4. Totty, *supra* note 3 (discussing sensors being implemented in locations such as streetlights and water pipes).

5. See ROBERT T. O'BRIEN & SURABHI KEJRIWAL, EVOLVING CYBER RISK IN COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE 10 (2015), <https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/us/Documents/financial-services/us-fsi-cyber-risk-in-cre-infographic-online-final.pdf>; see also Wilfrid Donkers, *Rising Cyber Risk in Real Estate Through The Rise of Smart Buildings*, DELOITTE (Jan. 19, 2017), <https://www2.deloitte.com/nl/nl/pages/real-estate/articles/rising-cyber-risk-in-real-estate-through-the-rise-of-smart-buildings.html>; see also Alan Mihalic, *Protecting Smart Buildings from Cyber Attacks*, ENGINEERING.COM (Aug. 21, 2017), <https://www.engineering.com/BIM/ArticleID/15476/Protecting-Smart-Buildings-from-Cyber-Attacks.aspx>.

6. See Andrew McGill, *The Inevitability of Being Hacked*, ATLANTIC (Oct. 28, 2016), <https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/10/we-built-a-fake-web-toaster-and-it-was-hacked-in-an-hour/505571/> (demonstrating such risk through an experiment wherein a “smart toaster” suffered a first hack attempt within an hour of creation). This principle has massive implications for the commercial real estate sector, as experts predict 30.7 billion IoT devices will be installed in building bases by 2020. Mihalic, *supra* note 5.

7. Jimmy H. Koo, *Views on Smart Cities and Indoor Localization from Bruno Sinopoli, Associate Professor, Carnegie Mellon University*, BLOOMBERG LAW PRIVACY &

Some research and analysis has demonstrated that the risks of system failures and data breaches (hereinafter, collectively, “cyber events”) are especially large for the hotel and retail sectors.<sup>8</sup> However, cyber events can affect all businesses, and especially where entire buildings are becoming computerized, no real estate asset is safe from a cyber attack.<sup>9</sup> This article will argue that CRE stakeholders involved across *all* sectors must weigh the costs and benefits of purchasing cyber insurance as part of their larger risk management programs, and that the cyber carriers must accordingly tailor their products to better benefit CRE insureds. This article explores (1) the nature of cyber insurance;<sup>10</sup> (2) the types of risks that CRE should consider when shopping for coverage;<sup>11</sup> (3) whether such risks are adequately covered by other more “traditional” types of insurance;<sup>12</sup> (4) a concrete example of a real estate cyber event and how these principles might apply in a real-world scenario;<sup>13</sup> and ultimately, (5) how CRE stakeholders and their insurers should approach the cyber market going forward.<sup>14</sup>

---

DATA SECURITY (May 27, 2016), <https://www.bna.com/views-smart-cities-n57982073135/>. Professor Sinopoli elaborated:

Security is a difficult property to achieve as, unlike in computer networks, many devices will be deployed in the field with little physical protection and are bound to be tampered with. Several nodes of the network will be low-cost and simple, and therefore incapable of running layers of security that require more powerful and sophisticated devices. In addition, ICT will support the operation of physical systems, some of which may be safety-critical. Attacks, either of integrity or denial-of-service, can potentially lead to catastrophic consequences, even so far as loss of human life. One such example is connected vehicles—one can only imagine what could happen if an attacker can wirelessly take control of a number of cars on the road at the same time, as was recently demonstrated by the hackers Charlie Miller and Chris Valasek.

*Id.* (citation omitted).

8. Donkers, *supra* note 5. See, e.g., Alex Langlinais & Jan Larson, *Hotel Malware Attack Raises Unusual Insurance Questions*, LAW360 (Jan. 11, 2018, 11:53 ET) (citing *St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Rosen Millennium Inc.*, Case No. 6:17-cv-540-ORL-41-GJK, 2018 WL 4732718 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 28, 2018)) (discussing case involving credit card breach at hotel chain).

9. See *infra* Section II.A, Part VI.

10. See *infra* Part II.

11. See *infra* Parts III, IV.

12. See *infra* Part V.

13. See *infra* Part VI.

14. See *infra* Part VII.

## II. Rise of Cyber Insurance

### A. Nature of the Risk

The list of recent cyber events in the news is nearly endless—they happen on an almost daily basis, such that it now almost seems banal. In 2017, one of the “Big Three” U.S. credit reporting firms suffered a data breach (allegedly resulting from a mistake by a single employee) that resulted in the exposure of 146 million Americans’ sensitive personal information.<sup>15</sup> In 2014, the third largest U.S. retailer experienced one that saw 40 million credit and debit card records and 70 million other customer records stolen, leading to a reported \$61 million in related losses to the company.<sup>16</sup> That same year, malware wiped out and exposed for public review massive amounts of data from the corporate computers of one of Hollywood’s largest film studios in an attack that U.S. officials attribute to North Korea.<sup>17</sup> The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has suggested that the very integrity of U.S. elections has been threatened and will continue to be threatened by cyber attacks from malevolent foreign actors.<sup>18</sup> Reports estimate that cyber-crime costs the global economy over \$400

---

15. See Tara Siegel Bernard & Stacy Cowley, *Equifax Breach Caused by Lone Employee’s Error, Former C.E.O. Says*, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 3, 2017), <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/03/business/equifax-congress-data-breach.html> (observing that the breach led to the resignation of the firm’s CEO, increased scrutiny from members of the House Energy and Commerce Committee, and some significant public outrage); see also Todd Haselton, *Credit Reporting Firm Equifax Says Data Breach Could Potentially Affect 143 Million U.S. Consumers*, CNBC (Sept. 8, 2017, 3:25 ET), <https://www.cnbc.com/2017/09/07/credit-reporting-firm-equifax-says-cybersecurity-incident-could-potentially-affect-143-million-us-consumers.html> (noting a twelve percent share price drop in after-hours trading following disclosure of the breach).

16. Dhanya Skariachan & Jim Finkle, *Target Shares Recover After Reassurance of Data Breach Impact*, REUTERS (Feb. 26, 2014, 6:51 AM), <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/26/us-target-results-idUSBREA1P0WC20140226>.

17. David E. Sanger & Nicole Perlroth, *U.S. Said to Find North Korea Ordered Cyberattack on Sony*, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 17, 2017), [https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/18/world/asia/us-links-north-korea-to-sony-hacking.html?\\_r=0](https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/18/world/asia/us-links-north-korea-to-sony-hacking.html?_r=0). The hackers were eventually sanctioned and charged, but not without a high-profile resignation from Sony Pictures co-chair Amy Pascal. See Dan Mangan & Kate Fazzini, *North Korean Hackers Sanctioned, Facing Charges for Sony Hack, Wannacry Ransomware Attack*, CNBC (Sept. 6, 2018, 10:34 ET), <https://www.cnbc.com/2018/09/06/north-korean-hackers-will-be-charged-for-sony-pictures-wannacry-ransomware-attacks.html>.

18. Michael Riley & Jordan Robertson, *Russian Cyber Hacks on U.S. Electoral System Far Wider than Previously Known*, BLOOMBERG (June 13, 2017, 4:00 AM CDT), <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-06-13/russian-breach-of-39-states-threatens-future-u-s-elections>.

billion per year,<sup>19</sup> with one Munich Re subsidiary's survey finding that almost one-third of U.S. businesses suffered a data breach in 2017 alone.<sup>20</sup>

CRE, for its part, has historically avoided purchasing cyber insurance, but as smart buildings, cloud based computing, electronic wire transfers, and other "internetizing" phenomena have become more prevalent, CRE stakeholders no longer feel so immune from cyber risks, nor should they.<sup>21</sup> In the past, CRE owners may have rested assured that much of the risk surrounding cyber events was borne with their tenants or property managers. Because the tenants and property managers were the entities actually operating whatever computer or digital technology existed at the premises, together with storing any related data, any liability arising

---

19. CENTRE FOR STRATEGIC & INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, NET LOSSES: ESTIMATING THE GLOBAL COST OF CYBERCRIME 2 (2014), [https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy\\_files/files/attachments/140609\\_rp\\_economic\\_impact\\_cybercrime\\_report.pdf](https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/attachments/140609_rp_economic_impact_cybercrime_report.pdf) (estimating that the annual losses are between a "conservative estimate" of \$375 billion and a "maximum" of \$575 billion, giving a "likely" estimate of "more than \$400 billion"). Concentration of cyber attacks is as high or higher in the United States than any other country in the world. *Id.* at 8-9. One Lloyds study indicated that a single major global cyber-attack could cause \$3.5 billion in economic losses, roughly equivalent to 2012's Superstorm Sandy. See TREVOR MAYNARD, COUNTING THE COST: CYBER EXPOSURE DECODED 5 (2017), <https://www.lloyds.com/news-and-risk-insight/risk-reports/library/technology/countingthe-cost>.

20. *Almost One-Third of U.S. Businesses Had a Data Breach*, MUNICH RE (Dec. 7, 2017), <https://www.munichre.com/HSB/data-breach-survey-2017/index.html>.

21. See Mihalic, *supra* note 5; Walter Andrews & Jennifer White, *Real Estate Is Not Above the (Cyber Attack) Risk*, COM. OBSERVER (Aug. 9, 2017, 3:58 PM), <https://commercialobserver.com/2017/08/real-estate-is-not-above-the-cyber-attack-risk/> (noting that at least one-third of real estate firms have experienced a cybersecurity event in the last two years). As one director from the Real Estate Financial Advisory practice at Deloitte summarizes:

Industries like retail, travel and hospitality, and the financial services industries have long been dealing with cyberattacks, and have not only matured their response capability but also positioned cybersecurity as a core element of their businesses. In contrast, [CRE] . . . considers itself to be relatively less at risk from a potential cyberattack. This is because CRE firms typically maintain relatively less consumer personally identifiable information (PII) and valuable intellectual property (IP) directly on their own technology systems. However, due to the rise of smart buildings where tenants have building management systems on their smart phones, new opportunities for cyberattacks will emerge within the sector. The interconnectedness of real estate owners' systems and tenant IT systems form a potential cyber risk for both parties. As a consequence to this heightened risk we predict IT and CRE will become more intertwined during the coming year to face these new cyber threats.

Donkers, *supra* note 5.

therefrom logically rested with them. Now, however, computers can be intertwined with the very shell or structure of the building itself,<sup>22</sup> and while CRE owners frequently attempt to pass off all liability risks to others via triple-net leases, indemnity agreements, and other contractual remedies, the buck often stops with the landlord when it comes to insuring the shell of the building.<sup>23</sup> This not only means that vast amounts of personal data may be incidentally or purposefully stored in CRE owners' buildings, but also that critical, core components of the building itself are put at risk of system failure because a cyber event could disrupt the computers that operate them.

Moreover, much like all other businesses, the corporate offices for CRE companies tend to hold "tax records, federal identification numbers, social security numbers and other [sensitive private] information" in their computer systems.<sup>24</sup> Their corporate teams frequently (1) conduct complex

---

22. See PRACTICAL LAW REAL ESTATE, CYBER SECURITY INSURANCE FOR COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE (May 5, 2016), Westlaw W-002-1978 [hereinafter CYBER SECURITY INSURANCE FOR COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE]. Critical parts of modern building systems are remotely accessible through digital means, including closed-circuit TV; security systems; utilities; fire alarms; servers; voicemail; fax; and email. *Id.* In industrial real estate, expensive pieces of industrial hardware such as "switches, valves, pumps and other heavy machinery" are controlled by or with the assistance of computer technology. Cash, Doot & Blackburn, *supra* note 2.

23. See, e.g., PRACTICAL LAW REAL ESTATE, OFFICE LEASE AGREEMENT (MULTI-TENANT NET LEASE) (PRO-LANDLORD SHORT FORM) (2018), Westlaw W-005-8336 [hereinafter OFFICE LEASE AGREEMENT]. This particular Westlaw form office lease includes the following pertinent language:

(d) Landlord shall purchase and maintain: (i) a standard policy of "all-risk" insurance with customary exclusions covering the Building in the full replacement cost of the Building, together with rent loss insurance and windstorm coverage (on a full replacement cost basis); and (ii) broad form commercial general liability insurance with a minimum combined single limit of liability of at least [NUMBER IN WORDS] Dollars (\$[NUMBER]), written by companies authorized to do business in the State of [STATE].

*Id.*; see also STEPHEN RAPTIS & DONNA WILSON, BLOOMBERG BNA/MANATT WEBINAR, NAVIGATING THE EVOLVING WORLD OF CYBER INSURANCE (2016) (on file with author) ("Indemnity agreements typically have limitations, and are only as good as the entity providing the indemnity."); Matthew R. Slakoff, *Commercial Insurance Update—Managing Real Property Exposures*, CAVIGNAC & ASSOCIATES (Aug. 2007), <http://www.cavignac.com/publications/publications-commercial-client-commercial-insurance-update/commercial-insurance-update-managing-real-property-exposures/> ("In most cases, landlords should buy their own insurance covering the leased property.")

24. John Mark Tichar, *How Cyber Security Risks Impact the Real Estate Industry*, OSWALD COMPANIES (Oct. 15, 2015), <https://www.oswaldcompanies.com/blog-feed/how-cyber-security-risks-impact-the-real-estate-industry/>. These offices also often hold sensitive

transactions by electronic means (e.g., completing closings through wire transfers), (2) utilize cloud servers, and (3) ask employees to use their own smartphones and tablets at work, all of which potentially expose massive amounts of personal and financial information to malicious actors.<sup>25</sup> A CRE owner may purport to assign management of some of its data to a third party operator or property manager, but there still undeniably remains a massive amount of data that is in the care, custody, and control of the owner, whether it be connected to the underlying asset or on the corporate computers. Thus, it would be *the owner's* insurance that would need to respond to cover any economic losses related to such data.<sup>26</sup>

---

*corporate* information in their systems, such as pending transactions for public-traded companies that have not yet been disclosed.

25. Donkers, *supra* note 5. The Deloitte Center for Financial Services has even predicted that commercial real estate may soon utilize blockchain technology for execution of “smart contracts.” SURABHI KEJRIWAL & SAURABH MAHAJAN, BLOCKCHAIN IN COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE 13 (2017), <https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/us/Documents/financial-services/us-fsi-rec-blockchain-in-commercial-real-estate.pdf>.

26. *See, e.g.*, Am. Int'l Grp., Inc., Policy No. 101017, Cyber Extortion Coverage Section (2013) [hereinafter Am. Int'l Grp., Cyber Extortion Coverage Section]; Am. Int'l Grp., Inc., Policy No. 101018, Event Management Coverage Section (2013) [hereinafter Am. Int'l Grp., Event Management Coverage Section]; Am. Int'l. Grp., Inc., Policy No. 101021, Network Interruption Coverage Section (2013) [hereinafter Am. Int'l Grp., Network Interruption Coverage Section]; Am. Int'l. Grp., Inc., Policy No. 101024, Security and Privacy Coverage Section (2013) [hereinafter Am. Int'l Grp., Security and Privacy Coverage Section]; Am. Int'l. Grp., Inc., Policy No. 115982, Reputation Guard Coverage Section (2013) [hereinafter Am. Int'l Grp., Reputation Guard Coverage Section] (defining “Computer System” as “any computer hardware, software or any components thereof that are . . . under the ownership, operation or control of, or that are leased by, a Company”); Jardine Lloyd Thompson, Asset Management Cyber Policy, Definitions 34, 39 (2017) [hereinafter JLT Asset Management Cyber Policy] (on file with the *Oklahoma Law Review*) (defining triggering “System Event” as an event affecting “*the Company's* computer system” and “Privacy Breach Event” as breach of data “for which *the Company* is responsible”) (emphasis added); *cf.* Lauren G. Citrome, *Data Centers and REITs: Is There Real Estate in the Cloud?*, 11 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 191, 206 (2014) (stating that in the case of data REITs, where the underlying tenants’ actual line of business is data ownership, “tenants bring their own servers to store in rented cabinets at a data center”).



### B. Growth of Cyber Insurance<sup>27</sup>

The earliest iterations of cyber insurance arrived on the market in the 1990s under the auspices of errors and omissions coverage, generally covering computer virus or malware-related events,<sup>28</sup> with the first cyber policy being underwritten in 1997 by AIG agent Steve Haase.<sup>29</sup> These early policies afforded coverage only for third-party lawsuits arising from data breaches caused by outsiders of the insured company.<sup>30</sup> The problem was that, in reality, over fifty percent of these breaches were coming from disgruntled employees *inside* the company.<sup>31</sup> As the internet has grown, so too has the coverage.<sup>32</sup> The market for stand-alone cyber policies has seen an explosion over the last decade because cyber risks have become so difficult to ignore both for businesses and their insurance carriers.<sup>33</sup> In

---

27. Cyber insurance has been marketed under various different names, including Cyber Liability Insurance, Network Security Insurance, Privacy Breach Insurance, Cyber Risk & Data Compromise Coverage, Cyber and Privacy Liability, Cyber & Security Incident, Cyber Cover Policy Program, and Cyber One. See Sasha Romanosky, Lillian Ablon, Andreas Kuehn & Therese Jones, *Content Analysis of Cyber Insurance Policies: How do Carriers Price Cyber Risk?* 9 (RAND Corp., Working Paper No. WR-1208, 2017) [hereinafter RAND Study], [https://www.rand.org/pubs/working\\_papers/WR1208.html](https://www.rand.org/pubs/working_papers/WR1208.html); RENE SIEMENS & DAVID L. BECK, SIEMENS AND BECK ON OBTAINING OPTIMAL CYBER INSURANCE \*8 (Sept. 4, 2012), 2012 Emerging Issues 6613 (Lexis) (on file with the *Oklahoma Law Review*). For simplicity's sake, this Article will refer to all the above as "cyber insurance."

28. Lauri Floresca, *Cyber Insurance 101: The Basics of Cyber Coverage*, WOODRUFF-SAWYER (June 19, 2014), <https://woodrufflaw.com/cyber-liability/cyber-basics/> (noting that in cyber insurance's earliest days, the coverage was generally only purchased by technology companies).

29. See Brian D. Brown, *The Ever-Evolving Nature of Cyber Coverage*, INS. J. (Sept. 24, 2014), <https://www.insurancejournal.com/magazines/features/2014/09/22/340633.htm>.

30. *Id.*

31. *Id.*

32. *Id.*

33. See, e.g., ACE, Form No. PF-27000, Privacy Protection Privacy & Network Liability Insurance Policy (2009); Beazley, Form No. F00106, Information Security & Privacy Insurance with Electronic Media Liability Coverage (2011); Chubb Cyber Enterprise Risk Management Policy, Form No. PF-48169 (2016) (on file with the *Oklahoma Law Review*) [hereinafter Chubb Cyber Policy]; Evolve MGA, *Evo 3.0: Our Evolved Cyber Policy* (2015) [hereinafter Evolve MGA Cyber Policy]; JLT Asset Management Cyber Policy, *supra* note 26; Philadelphia Ins., Form No. PI-CYB-001, Cyber Security Liability Coverage (2012); Travelers, Form No. CYB-3001, CyberRisk (2010); Zurich, Form No. U-SPR-1000-C CW, Security and Privacy Protection Policy (2014); see also Guidance Concerning Stand-Alone Cyber Liability insurance Policies Under the Terrorism Risk Insurance Program, 81 Fed. Reg. 95,312, 95,313 (Dec. 27, 2016). The U.S. Treasury Department noted:

2016, insurers collected \$3.25 billion in cyber premiums, up from \$2.75 billion in 2015 and \$2.5 billion in 2014, with the market expected to triple by 2020 and quadruple by 2025.<sup>34</sup> The relative novelty of cyber insurance presents both a challenge and an opportunity for risk managers and counsel because on the one hand, it is among the most negotiable (and thus the most malleable) types of coverage on the market, but on the other hand, it is among the most uncertain because of the dearth of court interpretations of cyber policy language and the lack of standardized forms.<sup>35</sup>

---

The cyber risk insurance market has evolved significantly since it first emerged approximately two decades ago and is expected to continue experiencing rapid growth. A 2016 report on cyber insurance noted that 19 different categories of coverage are available to a greater or lesser extent in the cyber insurance market, including first and third party coverage related to data breaches, cyber extortion, business interruption, data and software loss, physical damage, and death and bodily injury.

*Id.* (footnotes omitted).

34. STEPHEN O'HEARN ET AL., *INSURANCE 2020 & BEYOND: REAPING THE DIVIDENDS OF CYBER RESILIENCE* 10 (2015), <http://www.pwc.com/gx/en/insurance/publications/assets/reaping-dividends-cyber-resilience.pdf> (“An estimated \$2.5 billion in cyber insurance premium was written in 2014.”); *see also* Richard S. Betterley, *Cyber/Privacy Insurance Market Survey: A Tough Market for Larger Insureds, but Smaller Insureds Finding Eager Insurers*, BETTERLEY REP. June 2016, at 6 (“Large rates of growth seemed to be found in all sizes of insurers . . . .”); Raptis & Wilson, *supra* note 23. The number of companies that purchased cyber insurance “increased 250 percent between 2013 and 2015” alone. Stephen Joyce, *Cybersecurity Insurance, Internet-of-Things Standards Linked*, BLOOMBERG LAW: PRIVACY & DATA SECURITY (June 3, 2016), <https://www.bna.com/cybersecurity-insurance-internetofthings-n57982073576/>.

35. *See* Micah E. Skidmore, *Negotiating Coverage & Pursuing Claims Under Cyber-Security & Privacy Insurance*, 14 J. TEX. INS. L. 27, 28 (2015) (noting lack of court guidance on meanings of wrongful acts, “incidents,” “events,” and “breaches” in cyber policies); *see also* Raptis & Wilson, *supra* note 23. There have been only a few cases discussing the scope of cyber policies. *See, e.g.*, P.F. Chang’s China Bistro, Inc. v. Fed Ins. Co., No. CV-15-01322-PHX-SMM, 2016 WL 3055111, at \*8-9 (D. Ariz. May 31, 2016) (holding policy excluded coverage for fees required to be paid to credit card processor following breach); Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. v. Fed. Recovery Servs., Inc., 103 F. Supp. 3d 1297, 1302 (D. Utah 2015) (holding no errors and omissions coverage under cyber policy where third party complaint alleged knowledge, willfulness, and maliciousness); Columbia Cas. Co. v. Cottage Health Sys., 2:15-CV-03432, 2015 WL 4497730, at \*1-2 (C.D. Cal. July 17, 2015) (wherein insurer argued that a “minimum required practices” exclusion and condition barred coverage, but no substantive ruling was made as it was dismissed to go to mediation per the policy language). The insurer’s complaint in *Columbia Casualty* is especially troubling, as it asserted it had no obligation to fund any of a \$4.125 million class action settlement resulting from a group of hospitals’ data breach, solely due to the fact that the insured did not follow some “Minimum Required Practices” set forth in its application for the insurance. Compl. ¶¶

### C. Nature of Cyber Insurance

An adequate cyber insurance policy covers both an insured's first-party losses and third-party losses.<sup>36</sup> First-party coverage may include payment for lost income resulting from the breach; administrative safeguards; recovery of lost data; hiring of experienced professionals for investigative and responsive purposes; notification to affected parties (by mail and through call centers, etc.); and credit monitoring for affected parties, if applicable.<sup>37</sup> Third-party coverage includes payment for regulatory defense, fines, and punitive damages; costs of litigation defense; and litigation damages.<sup>38</sup> The policies often have separate definitions for the "trigger events" of these coverages—e.g., under JLT Asset Management Cyber Policy wording, a "System Event" (with respect to the first-party costs) as opposed to a "Privacy Breach Event" (with respect to the third-party costs).<sup>39</sup> Under the JLT policy, "System Event" is defined as:

any intrusion, modification, damage inability to access, service degradation, corruption, or failure of the Company's Computer System due to:

- (i) a denial of service attack, a malicious code, computer virus, or hacker attack
- (ii) any negligence, or mistakes, in operating, maintaining or upgrading the Company's Computer System
- (iii) Programming errors or software bugs in fully operational and integrated programs or software
- (iv) Malfunction or failure of the Company's Computer System.<sup>40</sup>

---

4, 8, 26-27, *Columbia Casualty v. Cottage Health Systems*, 2:15-cv-03432, 2015 WL 4497730 (C.D. Cal. July 17, 2015).

36. See RAND Study, *supra* note 27, at 11-12; CYBER SECURITY INSURANCE FOR COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE, *supra* note 22; see also Ins. Servs. Office, Inc., Form No. BP 15 07 03 15, Information Security Protection Endorsement (2014) [hereinafter Ins. Servs. Office, Information Security Protection Endorsement Form].

37. See generally RAND Study, *supra* note 27; see also CYBER SECURITY INSURANCE FOR COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE, *supra* note 22; Ins. Servs. Office, Information Security Protection Endorsement Form, *supra* note 36.

38. See sources cited *supra* note 37.

39. See JLT Asset Management Cyber Policy, *supra* note 26, Definitions 34 and 39.

40. See *id.* at Definition 39.

“Privacy Breach Event” is then defined as:

the actual or alleged unauthorised disclosure, access, or transmission of:

(i) personally identifiable information (PII), including an individual’s name, address, telephone number, health information, or credit card, debit card, and bank account information

(ii) any Third Party’s trade secrets, data, designs, forecasts, formulas, practices, processes, records, reports, documents subject to legal privilege or other item of information that is not available to the general public for which the Company is responsible.<sup>41</sup>

The JLT policy also covers “Cyber Extortion” (i.e., ransomware, discussed *below*) and “Digital Media Liability” (liability from alleged torts committed during the course of the insured’s website or social media operations) under still more separate definitions.<sup>42</sup>

These distinct definitions can be critical. To take just one example, cyber policies typically assign “waiting periods” whereby the insurer will only provide coverage for any business interruption losses that occur after a certain number of hours, and the moment when that waiting period begins

---

41. See JLT Asset Management Cyber Policy, *supra* note 26, Definition 34; see also Am. Int’l Grp., Security and Privacy Coverage Section, *supra* note 26, Definition 2(l). The AIG policy defines “Privacy Event” as follows:

(1) any failure to protect Confidential Information (whether by "phishing," other social engineering technique or otherwise) including, without limitation, that which could result in an identity theft or other wrongful emulation of the identity of an individual or corporation;

(2) any failure to disclose an event referenced in Sub-paragraph (1) above in violation of any Security Breach Notice Law;

(3) any unintentional failure of an Insured to comply with those parts of a Company’s privacy policy that (a) prohibit or restrict the disclosure or sale of Confidential Information by an Insured, or (b) require an Insured to allow an individual to access or correct Confidential Information about such individual; or

(4) any violation of a federal, state, foreign or local privacy statute alleged in connection with a Claim for a failure described in Sub-paragraphs (1) or (2) above.

*Id.*

42. JLT Asset Management Cyber Policy, *supra* note 26, Additional Coverage Sections C(1)-(2); see also Am. Int’l Grp., Cyber Extortion Coverage Section, *supra* note 26.

is determined by which “event” starts the clock.<sup>43</sup> In the JLT example, the triggering event is a “System Event,” and thus the insured need only self-insure losses for ten hours after “any intrusion,” which presumably would mean the moment a phishing e-mail is sent, even if it is not opened until hours or even days later.<sup>44</sup> If the triggering event were a “Privacy Breach Event,” however, the waiting period clock would start when “the actual or alleged unauthorised disclosure, access, or transmission” occurs, which could mean that the insurer might cover significantly less in the first party context, because many of the costs associated with a data breach arise almost simultaneously with the disclosure, access, or transmission.<sup>45</sup> The JLT definition offers a favorable outcome in terms of counting up losses relative to the waiting period, but not so favorable in that only a “System Event” will actually trigger business interruption coverage, whereas Privacy Breach Events and Cyber Extortion events will not.<sup>46</sup>

#### *D. Negotiability of Cyber Insurance*

Unlike traditional lines of insurance, cyber insurance is difficult to price because it is difficult for carriers to quantify the risks involved.<sup>47</sup> Underwriters can predict, for example, by operating on some reasonable factual assumptions, which counties are more likely to suffer damage from a hurricane, but the scope and scale of the danger of cyber events is more difficult to pin down.<sup>48</sup> Some data supports the assertion that hackers target

---

43. See JLT Asset Management Cyber Policy, *supra* note 26, Business Interruption and System Restoration A(1); Evolve MGA Cyber Policy, *supra* note 33, Insuring Clause 3, Section B; Am. Int'l Grp., Network Interruption Coverage Section, *supra* note 26, Section 1 (Insuring Agreement).

44. See JLT Asset Management Cyber Policy, *supra* note 26, Definition 39.

45. See *id.* at Definition 34; see also *infra* Section IV.A-B.

46. See sources cited *supra* note 43; see also *infra* Section III.B, Part VI.

47. PricewaterhouseCoopers, *supra* note 34, at 9. Underwriters struggle with the lack of historical data as well as the constantly changing nature of cyberattacks when pricing cyber insurance. *Id.*; see also RAND Study, *supra* note 27, at 23 (“In only a few cases were carriers confident in their own experience to develop pricing models.”). In response to this issue, insurers are lobbying government regulators to allow them access, at least on an anonymized basis, to any cyber-related data collected in enforcement actions. See William Shaw, *GDPR's Reporting Mandate May Fuel Fledgling Cyber Market*, LAW360 (Mar. 7, 2018, 9:58 PM GMT), <https://www.law360.com/articles/1019400/gdpr-s-reporting-mandate-may-fuel-fledgling-cyber-market>.

48. See Shaw, *supra* note 47. As Russ Johnston, CEO of QBE North America, summarized: “Most major cat exposures tend to have a season. To the extent you have sophisticated models, the market can expect events and project magnitudes. Cyber does not have a season and can cross multiple lines of business and customer segments.” Rebecca

smaller businesses because of their weaker cybersecurity measures,<sup>49</sup> but other data suggests that it is larger companies that suffer much greater losses.<sup>50</sup> Hackers may show no rhyme or reason as to which companies they target. The ransom amount cyber attackers request in a ransomware attack varies; the business interruption losses are unpredictable because one does not know how long systems will remain shut down, and the response by governmental authorities like the FBI is often inadequate as the hacker(s) frequently escape scot-free.<sup>51</sup> All of these variables, on the one hand, make pricing of cyber insurance challenging, but on the other hand, they make it heavily negotiable. The market price can fluctuate massively depending on the robustness of the insured's cybersecurity practices, the insured's line of business, the amount of and types of coverages purchased, the amount of the deductible or retention, and whether the insurance is intended to sit primary or excess.<sup>52</sup>

---

Bole, *Silent Cyber - The New Catastrophe Risk: CIAB Round-up*, ADVISEN FRONT PAGE NEWS (Oct. 12, 2017), [http://www.advisen.com/tools/fpnproc/fpns/articles\\_new\\_1/P/294251097.html?rid=294251097&list\\_id=1](http://www.advisen.com/tools/fpnproc/fpns/articles_new_1/P/294251097.html?rid=294251097&list_id=1).

49. A total of 58% of data-breach victims in a 2018 Verizon study were categorized as "small businesses." VERIZON, 2018 DATA BREACH INVESTIGATIONS REPORT 5 (11th ed.), [https://www.verizonenterprise.com/resources/reports/rp\\_DBIR\\_2018\\_Report\\_en\\_xg.pdf](https://www.verizonenterprise.com/resources/reports/rp_DBIR_2018_Report_en_xg.pdf); see also Geoffrey A. Fowler & Ben Worthen, *Hackers Shift Attacks to Small Firms*, WALL ST. J. (July 21, 2011), <https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304567604576454173706460768?ns=prod/accounts-wsj>.

50. PricewaterhouseCoopers, *supra* note 34, at 8.

51. See Mihalic, *supra* note 5. For example, the perpetrators of the ransomware attack on Hollywood Presbyterian Medical Center were never found. *Id.* The email "spoofing" scam artists who tricked a company employee into wiring \$4.8 million to a Chinese bank account in the underlying facts of *Medidata Solutions Inc. v. Federal Insurance Co.* were never found or even identified. See Jeff Sistrunk, *Email Scam Not a Covered Fraud, Insurer Org. Tells 2nd Circ.*, LAW360 (Nov. 29, 2017, 9:49 PM EST), <https://www.law360.com/articles/989344/email-scam-not-a-covered-fraud-insurer-org-tells-2nd-circ->; see also discussion *infra* Section V.C. The U.S. federal government itself suffers from cyberattacks on a regular basis and thus surely cannot be counted upon to prevent or remedy cyberattacks on private companies or citizens. See Julie Hirschfeld Davis, *Hacking of Government Computers Exposed 21.5 Million People*, N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2015), <https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/10/us/office-of-personnel-management-hackers-got-data-of-millions.html> (reporting on massive hacking of government computer systems leading to compromise of SSNs and other sensitive information); Michelle Price, *U.S. SEC Says Hackers May Have Traded Using Stolen Insider Information*, REUTERS (Sept. 21, 2017, 6:26 AM), <https://www.reuters.com/article/legal-us-sec-intrusion/u-s-sec-says-hackers-may-have-traded-using-stolen-insider-information-idUSKCN1BW1K0> (discussing hacking of SEC's "EDGAR" database and subsequent insider trading resulting therefrom).

52. See Siemens & Beck, *supra* note 27, at \*10; Raptis & Wilson, *supra* note 23; L.D. Simmons II, *A Buyer's Guide to Cyber Insurance*, MCGUIREWOODS LLP (Oct. 2, 2013),

### *III. First Party Cyber Risks*

CRE stakeholders need to ensure that they have proper coverage for direct loss of assets resulting from a cyber event. This part of the Article discusses three of the most significant “first-party” concerns in the cyber arena from a CRE perspective and how typical cyber insurance policies respond: (1) loss of tangible property, money, or important data from system failures or cyberattacks; (2) business interruption from data breaches or cyberattacks; and (3) money paid out due to ransomware attacks.

#### *A. Loss of Tangible Property, Money, or Important Data*

Cyber attacks and system failures at smart buildings could lead to significant physical damage because the computer systems involved are interconnected with the utilities and basic functions of the buildings.<sup>53</sup> They also can lead to the loss of or damage to important electronic data that is critical to the smooth operation of the company.<sup>54</sup> This might include valuable customer account information, employee information, trade secrets or other intellectual property, or confidential internal correspondence, any of which might be stolen in a data breach.<sup>55</sup> Additionally, malicious actors may seek to obtain money from the company by re-routing wire transfers or by conducting so-called “spoofing” schemes, or “social engineering,” where they pretend to be a person entitled to payment of funds via a convincing email, and a company employee obliges them by wiring funds to the account instructed. To the extent possible, CRE insureds should ensure that they have first-party coverage for property, dollars, and data that could be lost in a cyber event, including money paid out to scams, investigation of the hacking incidents, incident response, notification and credit monitoring of affected parties, and data and software restoration.

Unfortunately, most cyber policies will not cover physical damage to property or equipment resulting from a cyber event, which is one of the

---

<https://www.mcguirewoods.com/Client-Resources/Alerts/2013/10/Buyers-Guide-to-Cyber-Insurance.aspx>. Factors that can drive up the cost of coverage include whether the insured is involved in the healthcare or retail industries and whether the insured has a history of data breaches. Raptis & Wilson, *supra* note 23; *see also* RAND Study, *supra* note 27, at 23 (“[I]t was not unseen for carriers to examine their competitors in order to define rates.”).

53. *See supra* note 21 and accompanying text.

54. *See id.*

55. *See* O’Brien & Kejriwal, *supra* note 5.

most significant risks a smart building owner faces.<sup>56</sup> Many policies will also carve out or exclude coverage for lost value of intellectual property, which eliminates even more of the policies' alleged value.<sup>57</sup> Additionally, as discussed in Part V, courts continue to wrestle with the issue of whether commercial crime insurance already covers email scammers who engage in "spoofing" or "social engineering" schemes.<sup>58</sup> Often the only novel coverage the cyber policy *does* provide on the first party side is the costs associated with lost electronic data and software restoration, e.g., "repairing, restoring, re-collecting or reconstructing any data or software applications hosted on the Company's Computer System."<sup>59</sup> Such costs are likely to be relatively insignificant when compared to the potential damage to physical and intellectual property, as well as loss of money, that may inflict CRE insureds. The CRE owner might be left wondering whether cyber coverage is worth purchasing at all.<sup>60</sup>

---

56. See RAND Study, *supra* note 27, at 14-15; Evolve MGA Cyber Policy, *supra* note 33, Exclusion 21 (excluding any payment "for any tangible property repair or replacement including the cost of repairing any hardware or replacing any tangible property or equipment"); *id.* at Exclusion 5; JLT Asset Management Cyber Policy, *supra* note 26, Exclusions 8, 14 (excluding "(i) any loss or destruction of tangible property other than Data" and "(ii) any repair or replacement of hardware or equipment which forms part of the Company's Computer System"); Raptis & Wilson, *supra* note 23; Chubb Cyber Policy, *supra* note 33, Exclusion 6, (excluding, under property damage definition, losses related to "physical injury to, or loss or destruction of, tangible property, including the loss of use thereof whether or not it is damaged or destroyed"). The property damage exclusion should at least be negotiated to carve out damage to *intangible* property, i.e., electronic data, one of the very reasons the cyber policy is meant to exist in the first place. See, e.g., JLT Asset Management Cyber Policy, *supra* note 26, Exclusion 14(i) (excluding, *inter alia*, "any loss or destruction of tangible property, other than Data").

57. See Shawn Tuma & Katti Smith, *Risky Business: Why Lawyers Need to Understand Cyber Insurance for Their Clients*, 78 TEX. B.J. 854, 855 (2015); RAND Study, *supra* note 27, at 14-15; JLT Asset Management Cyber Policy, *supra* note 26, Exclusion 9; Chubb Cyber Policy, *supra* note 33, Exclusion 13. Given the amount of unique technology systems that can be in place in smart buildings due to the innovative designs by the engineers and IT professionals, this could be a significant issue. This gap in coverage is especially critical for engineers and architects who design smart buildings, as their intellectual property relating to this new technology is becoming increasingly valuable. See Mihalic, *supra* note 5. Similarly, and as a side note, CRE should ensure that any contracting architects and engineers carry errors and omissions coverage separately from cyber coverage to ensure that any defective designs in the smart buildings are insured.

58. See *Spoofing*, INVESTOPEDIA, <https://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/spoofing.asp> (last visited Oct. 16, 2018); see also *infra* Section V.C.

59. See JLT Asset Management Cyber Policy, *supra* note 26, Business Interruption and System Restoration A(3).

60. *But see infra* Section V.A (casting doubt on this notion).



### B. Business Interruption

Business interruption is “a time-element coverage offered under first-party property policies” that covers the costs associated with a necessitated shutdown of business operations on the premises caused by a direct physical loss or specified cause of loss under the policy.<sup>61</sup> CRE policyholders should be concerned about business interruption costs accompanying cyber events, including the lost rent and other revenue that might stem from a system failure, as well as the potential loss of customers, investors, tenants, reputation, and goodwill resulting from a data breach and resulting public concern. For example, in the smart building context, if a hacker breaks into a building’s electricity system (which is operated by a centralized computer) and turns it off for a month, the building owner might have trouble collecting rent from its tenants because of disruptions in their respective businesses.<sup>62</sup> Furthermore, if highly publicized data breaches affecting commercial tenants at the property lead to a drop in business,<sup>63</sup> it is conceivable that those tenants will become insolvent or otherwise incapable of continuing to pay rent.

Cyber insurance may cover the lost rental income and extra expenses associated with a cyber event.<sup>64</sup> This coverage should include reputational harm and loss of future revenue (although how one can calculate such a number is another intriguing question altogether).<sup>65</sup> Most policies will predicate business interruption coverage on there being a “System Event”

---

61. Costantino P. Suriano & Bruce R. Kaliner, *Business Interruption Meets Cyber Coverage*, BUS. INS. (Mar. 6, 2017, 12:00 AM), <http://www.businessinsurance.com/article/00010101/ISSUE0401/912312222/Business-interruption-meets-cyber-risk-coverage>.

62. *See, e.g.*, N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 227 (McKinney, Westlaw through 2018 Legis. Sess.) (New York’s constructive eviction statute). The law states:

Where any building, which is leased or occupied, is destroyed or so injured by the elements, or any other cause as to be untenable, and unfit for occupancy, and no express agreement to the contrary has been made in writing, the lessee or occupant may, if the destruction or injury occurred without his or her fault or neglect, quit and surrender possession of the leasehold premises, and of the land so leased or occupied; and he or she is not liable to pay to the lessor or owner, rent for the time subsequent to the surrender. Any rent paid in advance or which may have accrued by the terms of a lease or any other hiring shall be adjusted to the date of such surrender.

*Id.* This law is applicable to commercial leases. *See generally* Barash v. Pa. Terminal Real Estate Corp., 256 N.E.2d 707 (N.Y. 1970); Johnson v. Cabrera, 668 N.Y.S.2d 45 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998).

63. *See generally* Suriano & Kaliner, *supra* note 61.

64. *See id.*; *see also* sources cited *supra* note 43.

65. Tuma & Smith, *supra* note 57, 855; Raptis & Wilson, *supra* note 23.

rather than a “Privacy Breach Event,” which can be a problem in and of itself.<sup>66</sup> For example, if a hacker intrudes upon a building’s computer systems in order to gather massive amounts of personally identifiable information (PII) to sell, but does not deny any critical building services, then businesses may not actually cease operations.<sup>67</sup> Still, when the PII is ultimately released or sold, bad publicity could cause the tenants’ revenues to suffer over time, which could ultimately lead to lost rental income to the landlord/owner.<sup>68</sup> Policies that do not cover this risk ought to be avoided because this indirect loss in revenue is a significant concern for CRE owners whose financial salubrity originates in no small part from that of their tenants.<sup>69</sup> Thus it is critical that CRE insureds carefully read the business interruption language in all cyber policies available to them, as the decision on which policy to buy could come down to which language offers the broadest type of coverage and is most easily triggered.

### *C. Ransomware Attacks*

Cyber events do not always happen in isolation—they may come with ransom messages, demanding payment of Bitcoin or payment by electronic wire transfer to an attacker’s bank account in exchange for a return to normalcy in computer systems or for neglecting to sell or reveal individuals’ PII on the dark web.<sup>70</sup> These are generally referred to as

---

66. See sources cited *supra* note 43.

67. Suriano & Kaliner, *supra* note 61.

68. See *id.*

69. Siemens & Beck, *supra* note 27, at \*3.

70. See Greg Bensinger & Robert McMillan, *Uber Reveals Data Breach and Cover-up, Leading to Two Firings*, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 21, 2017, 11:38 PM ET), <https://www.wsj.com/articles/uber-reveals-data-breach-and-cover-up-leading-to-two-firings-1511305453>; Dan Bilefsky, *Hackers Use New Tactic at Austrian Hotel: Locking the Doors*, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2017), <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/30/world/europe/hotel-austria-bitcoin-ransom.html>; Robert Hutton, Jeremy Kahn & Jordan Robertson, *Extortionists Mount Global Hacking Attack Seeking Ransom*, BLOOMBERG (last updated May 13, 2017, 3:52 AM), <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-05-12/patients-turned-away-as-british-hospitals-hit-by-cyber-attack>; Mihalic, *supra* note 5; Giles Turner, Anurag Kotoky & Christian Wienberg, *Ransomware Cyberattack Goes Global*, BLOOMBERG (June 28, 2017, 11:28 AM), <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-06-28/cyberattack-reaches-asia-as-new-targets-hit-by-ransomware-demand>; see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HOW TO PROTECT YOUR NETWORKS FROM RANSOMWARE 2 (2016), <https://www.justice.gov/criminal-ccips/file/872771/download>. (noting that since January 1, 2016, homes and businesses have suffered more than 4,000 ransomware attacks per day, a 300% increase since 2015, making ransomware the fastest growing malware threat in existence).

“ransomware”<sup>71</sup> or “Cyber Extortion”<sup>72</sup> events. One disturbing example of a ransomware event in the real estate world occurred in February of 2016 at Hollywood Presbyterian Medical Center, where hackers turned off all hospital computer systems, including emergency systems, thereby inducing a panic and eventually a ransom payment by the hospital of \$17,000 worth of Bitcoin.<sup>73</sup> To curb the possible pitfalls of events like this, CRE insureds need first-party coverage not only for the property damage, data restoration, and business interruption costs associated with cyber events, but also for the dollars actually paid out to cyber criminals. This is one area where most cyber policies should theoretically provide coverage.<sup>74</sup>

---

71. The FBI defines “ransomware” as follows in their Internet Crime Complaint Center report:

a form of malware targeting both human and technical weaknesses in an effort to deny the availability of critical data and/or systems. Ransomware is frequently delivered through various vectors, including phishing and Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP). RDP allows computers to connect to each other across a network. In one scenario, spear phishing emails are sent to end users resulting in the rapid encryption of sensitive files on a corporate network. When the victim organization determines they are no longer able to access their data, the cyber actor demands the payment of a ransom, typically in virtual currency such as Bitcoin. The actor will purportedly provide an avenue to the victim to regain access to their data. Recent iterations target specific organizations and their employees, making awareness and training a critical preventative measure. In 2016, the IC3 received 2,673 complaints identified as ransomware with losses of over \$2.4 million.

FBI, 2016 INTERNET CRIME REPORT 10, [https://pdf.ic3.gov/2016\\_IC3Report.pdf](https://pdf.ic3.gov/2016_IC3Report.pdf).

72. The FBI discusses “extortion” separately in the same Internet Crime Complaint Center report:

Extortion is defined as an incident when a cyber criminal demands something of value from a victim by threatening physical or financial harm or the release of sensitive data. Extortion is often used in various schemes reported to the IC3, including Denial of Service attacks, hitman schemes, sextortion, Government impersonation schemes, loan schemes, and high-profile data breaches. Another tactic exploited in extortion schemes is the use of virtual currency as a payment mechanism. Virtual currency provides the cyber criminal an additional layer of anonymity when perpetrating these schemes. The IC3 continues to receive complaints regarding various extortion techniques. In 2016, the IC3 received 17,146 extortion-related complaints with adjusted losses of over \$15 million.

*Id.* at 13; *see also* JLT Asset Management Cyber Policy, *supra* note 26, Additional Coverage Section C(2).

73. *See* Mihalic, *supra* note 5.

74. *See supra* Section II.C (discussing cyber policy’s coverage of “cyber extortion”).

To add a further layer of complexity, however, several high-profile ransomware attacks have come from rogue foreign governments.<sup>75</sup> Look no further than the infamous WannaCry ransomware that affected over 200,000 victims in 150 countries, which is widely attributed to the North Korean government.<sup>76</sup> The sponsorship of such a rogue foreign actor, in and of itself, may create a gap in coverage because cyber liability policies often exclude not only war (an insurance policy staple), but also broader perils like “act[s] of foreign enemy, hostilities or warlike activities.”<sup>77</sup> Such language could preclude coverage for events like North Korea’s sponsored cyberattack on Sony.<sup>78</sup> Even if the insured successfully convinces the carrier that North Korea is not a “foreign enemy” or engaging in “hostilities” (a dubious premise), cyberwarfare could certainly be construed to be a “warlike activity.” Such language may provide the insurer a convenient excuse to deny coverage.

This reasoning for denial may be further bolstered by the commonly incorporated “Terrorism” exclusion, defined as including “the use of force or violence . . . whether acting alone, on behalf of or in connection with any

---

75. See, e.g., Ryan Browne, *UK Government: North Korea Was Behind the WannaCry Cyber-Attack that Crippled Health Service*, CNBC (Oct. 27, 2017, 11:56 AM), <https://www.cnn.com/2017/10/27/uk-north-korea-behind-wannacry-cyber-attack-that-crippled-nhs.html> (noting Great Britain’s hypothesis that North Korea was the origin of infamous WannaCry ransomware attack against U.K. National Health Service); Riley & Robertson, *supra* note 18 (reporting Russian attempts at meddling in U.S. elections); Sanger & Perle, *supra* note 17 (discussing North Korea attack on Sony); see also Dustin Volz, *U.S. Charges, Sanctions Iranians for Global Cyber Attacks on Behalf of Tehran*, REUTERS (Mar. 23, 2018, 9:09 AM), <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-cyber-iran/u-s-charges-sanctions-iranians-for-global-cyber-attacks-on-behalf-of-tehran-idUSKBN1GZ22K>.

76. *Cyber Attack Hits 200,000 in at Least 150 Countries: Europol*, REUTERS (May 14, 2017, 5:23 AM), <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cyber-attack-europol/cyber-attack-hits-200000-in-at-least-150-countries-europol-idUSKCN18A0FX>; see also Dustin Volz, *U.S. Blames North Korea for 'WannaCry' Cyber Attack*, REUTERS (Dec. 18, 2017), <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-cyber-northkorea/u-s-blames-north-korea-for-wannacry-cyber-attack-idUSKBN1ED00Q>.

77. JLT Asset Management Cyber Policy, *supra* note 26, Exclusion 23; see also Evolve MGA Cyber Policy, *supra* note 33, Exclusion 28(a) (excluding losses arising directly or indirectly out of “war, invasion, acts of foreign enemies, hostilities or warlike operations (whether war is declared or not)”); Maynard, *supra* note 19, at 17; RAND Study, *supra* note 27, at 15 (noting “expenses for extortion or from an act of terrorism, war, or a military action [are] covered in rare cases, but mostly noted as exclusions” in cyber policies); Raptis & Wilson, *supra* note 23 (noting prevalence of these exclusions and thus absence of coverage for incidents similar to North Korea’s hacking of Sony).

78. See *Cyber Attack Hits 200,000 in at Least 150 Countries: Europol*, *supra* note 76; see also Volz, *supra* note 76.

organization(s), committed for political, religious, ideological purposes.”<sup>79</sup> The Terrorism exclusion paints with a fairly broad brush, and could also be argued to exclude ransomware attacks. Although ransomware attacks are not typically violent, there is always some effort to “force” payment of currency, and the insurance carrier could always argue that any living and breathing person has some kind of “ideological purpose.” Insurers could attempt to use both the War and the Terrorism exclusions, if they are worded broadly enough, to deny ransomware or “Cyber Extortion” coverage under certain circumstances.

#### *IV. Third Party Cyber Risks*

CRE stakeholders also need to carry adequate insurance coverage that obliges the insurer to defend against claims arising out of a data breach (whether an accidental breach by the insured or one by a hacker). This part discusses the different sorts of “third-party” concerns in the cyber arena from a CRE perspective and how typical cyber policies respond, namely: (1) contract and tort liability, (2) government enforcement actions, and (3) derivative/shareholder litigation.

##### *A. Contract and Tort Liability*

Cyber events can result in costly litigation in the form of class action lawsuits.<sup>80</sup> Although it may be dubious whether the plaintiffs have suffered an injury-in-fact in data breach cases, courts remain divided on whether

---

79. JLT Asset Management Cyber Policy, *supra* note 26, Exclusion 21; *see also* Evolve MGA Cyber Policy, *supra* note 33, Exclusion 28(b) (excluding “any act or threat of force or violence . . . , whether acting alone or on behalf of or in connection with any organization or government, committed for political, religious, ideological or similar purposes”); RAND Study, *supra* note 27, at 15 (noting “expenses for extortion or from an act of terrorism, war, or a military action [are] covered in rare cases, but mostly noted as exclusions” in cyber policies); Raptis & Wilson, *supra* note 23.

80. *See, e.g.*, *Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC*, 794 F.3d 688, 691-92 (7th Cir. 2015) (analyzing dispute where customers brought a putative class action against Neiman Marcus after cyber attackers stole their credit card information, and the customers asserted negligence, breach of implied contract, unjust enrichment, unfair and deceptive business practices, invasion of privacy, and the violation of state data breach laws); Edvard Pettersson, *Uber Sued for Negligence After Disclosing Massive Data Breach*, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 21, 2017, 7:46 PM), <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-11-22/uber-sued-for-negligence-after-disclosing-massive-data-breach> (discussing a class action lawsuit arising out of an Uber data breach affecting 50 million Uber riders and 7 million drivers (citing Class Action Complaint, *Flores v. Raiser, LLC*, 2:17-CV-08 503 (C.D. Cal Nov. 21, 2017))).

such plaintiffs have standing to sue depending on the facts and circumstances.<sup>81</sup> A release of PII can give rise to privacy-related litigation under a variety of legal theories such as invasion of privacy,<sup>82</sup> breach of contract,<sup>83</sup> plain vanilla negligence,<sup>84</sup> and liability under state privacy statutes.<sup>85</sup> These lawsuits pose a far greater danger to CRE in the age of smart buildings. The owner of the building may no longer be able to hide behind its contractual risk transfers to tenants because private data is being stored and transferred either in the shell of the building itself or on a network system indistinguishably connected to the owner.<sup>86</sup> Similarly, even

---

81. See, e.g., *Remijas*, 794 F.3d at 691-92 (analyzing customers' putative class action claims against Neiman Marcus following a cyber-attack in which the attackers obtained the plaintiffs' credit card information). The Seventh Circuit in this case reversed and remanded an Illinois district court ruling that the plaintiffs lacked standing, finding that "injuries associated with resolving fraudulent charges and protecting oneself against future identity theft" were sufficient to constitute injuries in fact for Article III standing purposes. *Id.* at 696-97. This reversal ultimately led to a \$1.6 million settlement in favor of the plaintiffs in 2017 after years of litigation. Suevon Lee, *Neiman Marcus to Pay \$1.6M in Shopper Data Breach Suit*, LAW360 (Mar. 17, 2017, 10:15 PM EDT), <https://www.law360.com/articles/903573/neiman-marcus-to-pay-1-6m-in-shopper-data-breach-suit>; see also *In re Target Corp. Data Sec. Breach Litigation*, 66 F. Supp. 3d 1154 (D. Minn. 2014); *Corona v. Sony Pictures Entm't, Inc.*, No. 14-CV-09600 RGK (Ex), 2015 WL 3916744 (C.D. Cal. 2015) (plaintiffs survived motions to dismiss for lack of standing); *Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co.*, 663 F. App'x 384 (6th Cir. 2016) (reversing and remanding an Ohio state court decision finding that plaintiffs' increased risk of harm following a data breach at Nationwide and plaintiffs' expenses to guard against such risks were insufficient to establish injuries in fact for standing purposes); *Flores, LLC*, 2:17-CV-08503; *Ruiz v. Gap, Inc.*, 540 F. Supp. 2d 1121, 1126 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (holding plaintiff had standing to sue based on an alleged increased risk of identity theft). *But see Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA*, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013) (holding plaintiffs lacked standing to sue National Security Administration because they did not show the threat of interception of their personal communications to be "certainly impending to constitute injury in fact"); *Beck v. McDonald*, 848 F.3d 262, 274-76 (4th Cir. 2017) (holding precise opposite of *Galaria* court); *Santana v. Take-Two Interactive Software, Inc.*, 717 F. App'x 12, 17-18 (2d Cir. 2017) (affirming the Southern District of New York's dismissal of Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act class action for lack of standing).

82. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (Am. Law Inst. 1977) (discussing intrusion upon seclusion as invasion of privacy); *id.* § 652D (discussing publicity given to private life as invasion of privacy).

83. See *Remijas*, 794 F.3d at 690.

84. See *id.*

85. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 995.50 (2014).

86. See *supra* Section II.A; see also Mike Weston, "Smart Cities" Will Know Everything About You, WALL ST. J. (July 12, 2015, 6:36 PM ET), <http://www.wsj.com/articles/smart-cities-will-know-everything-about-you-1436740596>. Journalist Mike Weston ominously prophesizes:

where the plaintiffs place blame solely on the tenants, those same tenants could then turn around and look to the owner for indemnification for any litigation costs and sue for negligent maintenance of the building's computer systems.<sup>87</sup>

While privacy tort liability defense is usually included in the limits of a market-competitive cyber policy, contractual liability arising out of data breaches generally is not.<sup>88</sup> For example, the definition of "damages" in the sample JLT policy discussed in this Article excludes "costs or other amounts that the Insured is responsible for under a merchant services agreement, unless they are liable for such amounts in the absence of such agreement."<sup>89</sup> This definition would arguably include payments to credit card companies for failure to comply with terms of the credit card services agreement,<sup>90</sup> which can be one of the most significant costs arising out of a

---

In a fully "smart" city, every movement an individual makes can be tracked. The data will reveal where she works, how she commutes, her shopping habits, places she visits and her proximity to other people. . . . [T]his data will be centralized and easy to access. . . . Private companies could know more about people than they know about themselves.

*Id.* This increased interconnectedness exponentially increases the liability exposure for CRE.

87. See generally O'Brien & Kejriwal, *supra* note 5.

88. See P.F. Chang's China Bistro, Inc. v. Federal Ins. Co., No. CV-15-01322-PHX-SMM, 2016 WL 3055111 at \*7-8 (D. Ariz. May 31, 2016) (CyberSecurity by Chubb Policy did not cover restaurant for its indemnity obligations to Bank of America resulting from fees imposed on Bank of America by credit card associations due to stolen customer credit card information); JLT Asset Management Cyber Policy, *supra* note 26, Exclusion 4, Definition 11; RAND Study, *supra* note 27, at 15. As one underwriter noted:

Many policy forms in the marketplace directly exclude contractual indemnities and liability, including that which stems from merchant service agreements. Some policy forms initially grant coverage for breach of contract claims, but then add exclusions concerning key components of this coverage. In addition, some policy forms exclude breach of contract claims with some very narrow carvebacks to the exclusionary wording that may not help the insured much in the event of a payment card breach. Although most privacy/security insurance policies grant the insured coverage for situations in which they need to incur the first-party costs to notify individuals and extend insureds credit monitoring services, not all will directly respond to the breach of, or the indemnities contained in, a merchant services agreement.

Matt Donovan, *Banking on Credit: Merchants Bear the Brunt of Data Breach Risks in the Hospitality Industry*, PROPERTYCASUALTY 360° (Nov. 30, 2013), <http://www.propertycasualty360.com/2013/11/30/banking-on-credit>.

89. JLT Asset Management Cyber Policy, *supra* note 26, Definition 11.

90. See, e.g., P.F. Chang's China Bistro, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., No. CV-15-01322-PHX-SMM, 2016 WL 3055111, at \*2 (D. Ariz. May 31, 2016). In P.F. Chang's, the Chinese restaurant had to pay Bank of America Merchant Services (BAMS) "any fines, fees, or

data breach. Additionally, some cyber policies have exclusions or restrictions on payments for liability arising out of consumer protection statutes, which are a substantial source of privacy-related litigation across the United States.<sup>91</sup> Accordingly, cyber policies may be helpful for responding to some civil lawsuits, but they generally leave much to be desired in the breadth of such coverage.

### B. Government Enforcement Actions

Beyond pure traditional contract and tort liability, privacy liability has also increasingly taken the form of government enforcement actions. All fifty states, along with the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Guam, and the U.S. Virgin Islands, have enacted data breach notification laws requiring private entities to notify individuals of data breaches involving certain PII within a specified period of time.<sup>92</sup> Some of these statutes allow

---

penalties imposed on [BAMS] by any Associations, resulting from Chargebacks and any other fines, fees or penalties imposed by an Association with respect to acts or omissions of [Chang's]." *Id.* Pursuant to this contractual agreement, BAMS billed P.F. Chang's \$1,929,921.57 for costs arising out of a breach of P.F. Chang's systems. *Id.* Under its cyber policy language, which excluded "any Loss on account of any Claim, or for any Expense . . . based upon, arising from or in consequence of any . . . liability assumed by any Insured under any contract or agreement," the court agreed with Federal Insurance Co. that coverage for these costs was precluded. *Id.* at \*7-8.

91. *See, e.g.*, Evolve MGA Cyber Policy, *supra* note 33, Exclusions 2, 27; *see also* Raptis & Wilson, *supra* note 23; RAND Study, *supra* note 27, at 15-16; *infra* note 98 and accompanying text.

92. *See* ALASKA STAT. §§ 45.48.010 to .090 (2016); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-552 (2017); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-110-101 to -108 (2011); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.29, 1798.82 (Deering Supp. 2018); COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-1-716 (2018); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 36a-701b, 4e-70 (2015); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 12B-101 to -104 (2013); FLA. STAT. §§ 282.0041, 282.318(2)(i), 501.171 (2017); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 10-1-910 to -912 (2018); *id.* § 46-5-214 (Supp. 2017); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 487N-1 to 7 (West 2008 & Supp. 2017); IDAHO CODE §§ 28-51-104 to -107 (2013 & Supp. 2018); 815 ILL COMP. STAT. §§ 530/1 to 530/25 (2016 & Supp. 2017); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 4-1-11-1 to -10, 24-4.9-1-1 (LexisNexis 2013); IOWA CODE §§ 715C.1, 715C.2 (2017); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 50-7a01 to -7a04 (Supp. 2014); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 365.732 (LexisNexis Supp. 2017), KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 61.931 to 61.934 (LexisNexis 2015); LA. STAT. ANN. §§ 51:3071 to :3080 (2013); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 1346-1350 (2017); MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW §§ 14-3501 to -3508 (LexisNexis 2013 & Supp. 2017); MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T §§ 10-1301 to -1308 (LexisNexis 2014); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93H, §§ 1-6 (2013); MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 445.63, 445.72 (2013); MINN. STAT. §§ 325E.61, 325E.64 (2016); MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-24-29 (Supp. 2017); MO. REV. STAT. § 407.1500 (2016); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 2-6-1501 to -1503, 30-14-1701 to -1736, 33-19-321 (2017); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 87-802 to -805, 87-807 (2014), §§ 87-801, -806, -808 (amended by 2018 Nebraska Laws L.B. 757); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 242.183, 603A.010 to .920 (West 2014 & Supp. 2018); N.H. REV. STAT.



injured persons to recover damages and attorney's fees through a private right of action,<sup>93</sup> while others authorize state administrative bodies to assess fines based on number of persons affected by the breach or based simply on the government's discretion.<sup>94</sup> In addition to state laws,<sup>95</sup> the Federal Trade

---

ANN. §§ 359-C:19 to :21 (Supp. 2017); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-161 to -166.1 (West 2018); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-12C (West Supp. 2017); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 899-aa (LexisNexis Supp. 2018); N.Y. STATE TECH. LAW § 208 (McKinney, Westlaw through 2018 Legis. Sess.); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 75-61, 75-65 (2017); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 51-30-01 to -07 (2018); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1347.12, 1349.19, 1349.191, 1349.192 (LexisNexis 2018); 24 OKLA. STAT. §§ 161-166 (2011); 74 OKLA. STAT. § -3113.1 (2011); OREGON REV. STAT. §§ 646A.600 to .628 (2017); 73 PA. STAT. §§ 2301-2329 (Westlaw through 2018 Reg. Sess. Act 76); 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 49.3-1 to .3-6 (West Supp. 2018); S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-1-90 (Supp. 2017); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 22-40-1 to -8 (2017); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 8-4-119 (2016), 47-18-2107 (Supp. 2016); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 521.002, 521.053 (West Supp. 2017); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 13-44-101 to -102 (West 2010); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §§ 2430 (amended by 2018 Vermont Laws No. 171 (H.764)), 2435 (Supp. 2017); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-186.6 (Supp. 2018); *id.* § 32.1-127.1:05 (2015); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 19.255.010, 42.56.590 (2016); W.VA. CODE ANN. §§ 46A-2A-101 to -105 (LexisNexis 2015); WIS. STAT. § 134.98 (2016); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-12-501 to -509 (2017); D.C. CODE §§ 28-3851 to -3853 (2013); 9 GUAM CODE ANN. §§ 48.10 to .80 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 34-081); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 10 §§ 4051-55 (2011); V.I. CODE tit. 14, §§ 2208, 2209 (2012); Alabama Data Breach Notification Act of 2018, 2018 Alabama Laws Act 2018-396 (S.B. 318) (codified as amended at ALA. CODE §§ 8-38-1 to -12). It should be noted that the term "PII" is used loosely in this Article, as the definitions of "breach," "personal information" and other terms vary from state to state, and a breach of one particular type of "PII" may require notification of affected individuals in one state, but not another.

93. *See, e.g.*, ALASKA STAT. §§ 45.48.080(b), 45.50.471-45.50.531 (2016); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.29, 1798.80, 1798.82, 1798.84 (Deering Supp. 2018); D.C. CODE § 28-3853(a) (2013); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 487N-3(b) (West 2008); 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. §§ 530/20, 505/10 (2016 & Supp. 2017); LA. STAT. ANN. § 51:3075 (2013); MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW §§ 13-408, 14-3508 (West Supp. 2017); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 603A.900 (2017); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 75-16, 16.1, 65(i) (2017); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 359-C:21(I) (2009); N.J. STAT. ANN. 56:8-19 (West 2018); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-11-490(G), 39-1-90(G) (2017); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 47-18-2105(d), 47-18-2107(h) (2013 & Supp. 2017); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-186.6(I) (Supp. 2018); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 19.255.010(13)(a)-(c), 42.56.590(12)(a)-(c) (2016). For concerns about privately brought lawsuits brought against the insured, *see supra* Section IV.A.

94. *See, e.g.*, MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 93A § 4, 93H § 6 (2013) (entitling attorney general to injunctive relief or \$5,000 for each violation along with reasonable costs and attorney's fees); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 899-aa (LexisNexis Supp. 2018) (entitling court to impose up to the greater of \$5000 or \$10 per failed notification [not to exceed \$150,000] in fines where knowledge or recklessness is found). *See generally supra* note 92 and accompanying text.

95. Included among state privacy laws are the notice statutes, discussed *supra* note 92, as well as other privacy regulations outside the scope of this article, like the New York

Commission (FTC) has authority to enforce the identity theft and privacy requirements of the Gramm Leach Bliley Act (GLBA)<sup>96</sup> and the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA),<sup>97</sup> as well as those found to be implicit in the prohibitions on unfairness and deception in the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA).<sup>98</sup> Where healthcare information is involved, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) and the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH) Act also come into play.<sup>99</sup>

Furthermore, public outcry after breaches like Equifax's has instigated renewed interest in cyber risk from regulators, meaning that still more enforcement might loom on the horizon.<sup>100</sup> Members of Congress have repeatedly remarked upon the importance of addressing cyber risks in committee hearings.<sup>101</sup> Recent activity and rumors suggest that the

---

Department of Financial Services cybersecurity regulation made effective August 28, 2017. See 23 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 23, § 500 (2018) (setting forth more stringent requirements for New York financial services companies).

96. 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801-6809, 6821-6929 (2012).

97. *Id.* §§ 1681-1681x.

98. *Id.* §§ 41-58. The Act allows the FTC to investigate and pursue actions against an organization whose activity qualifies as a practice that "causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves and not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition." *Id.* § 45(n). The FTC has used this authority to bring actions against companies on the theory that inadequate cybersecurity is an "unfair trade practice." See, e.g., Uber Techs. Inc., F.T.C. No. C-1523054, at 2 (Aug. 21, 2017) (decision and order) (prohibiting misrepresentations by Uber or its representatives/agents regarding extent to which it protects people's privacy and mandating Uber maintain a comprehensive privacy program to ensure confidentiality of personal information); Petco Animal Supplies, Inc., 139 F.T.C. 102, 107 (2005) (stating the violation of company's own privacy policy was alleged to be "unfair or deceptive acts or practices"); Geocities, 127 F.T.C. 94 (1999).

99. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1181-1187 (2012)); Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH) Act, Pub. L. No. 111-5, §§ 13001-13424, 123 Stat. 115, 226-79 (2009) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 17901-17953 (2012)); 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.102-534 (2017) (the HIPAA privacy rule). CRE stakeholders involved with hospitals, nursing homes, assisted living facilities, or similar buildings involving storage of large amounts of medical information must be aware of this unique exposure and have it insured accordingly.

100. See, e.g., Office of Attorney General Maura Healey, *AG Healey Launches Online Data Breach Reporting Portal*, MASS.GOV (Feb. 1, 2018) <https://www.mass.gov/news/ag-healey-launches-online-data-breach-reporting-portal>.

101. Rep. Joe Barton (R-TX), for example, called on Congress to "put some teeth" into cybersecurity enforcement by creating federal statutory data breach penalties. Bernard & Cowley, *supra* note 15. At a congressional hearing on the Equifax breach, Barton lamented,

Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) may begin to enforce privacy standards against financial firms as part of its broad statutory authority.<sup>102</sup> Perhaps most significantly, the European Union (EU) recently rolled out its much-anticipated General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), which threatens CRE insureds with properties in EU countries with incredibly stringent and harsh penalties for data breaches.<sup>103</sup> Despite

---

“We could have this hearing every year from now on if we don’t do something to change the current system.” *Id.* John Ratcliffe (R-TX) likened the importance of cyber insurance to homeowner’s insurance in a statement made in his capacity as Chairman of the House Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection and Security Technologies Subcommittee. *See* Jimmy H. Koo, *More Incident Data Needed on Cyber Insurance*, BLOOMBERG LAW: PRIVACY & DATA SECURITY (Mar. 28, 2016), <https://www.bna.com/incident-data-needed-n57982069086/>. Congress has attempted to pass federal data-breach-notification laws in the past on numerous occasions. Siemens & Beck, *supra* note 27 at \*8. Several already-enacted laws also indicate the federal government’s general interest in cybersecurity, although these laws mostly just direct already-existing federal agencies to be aware of and track cyber threats and have procedures in place to prevent breaches on their own systems. *See, e.g.*, Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-274, 128 Stat. 2971 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 7421-7464 (2012)); Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-283, 128 Stat. 3073 (codified at 44 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3558 (2012)); Cybersecurity Workforce Assessment Act, Pub. L. No. 113-246, 128 Stat. 2880 (2014) (codified at 6 U.S.C. § 146 (2012)); Border Patrol Agent Pay Reform Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-277, 128 Stat. 2995 (codified at 6 U.S.C. §§ 146-147 (2012)); National Cybersecurity Protection Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-282, 128 Stat. 3066 (codified at 6 U.S.C. §§ 148-150 (2012)). President Obama established the Commission on Enhancing National Cybersecurity in 2016 to investigate whether the government should have some role to play in cyber insurance itself. *See* Joyce, *supra* note 34.

102. *See* Dwolla, Inc., CFPB No. 2016-CFPB-0007, at 26 (Mar. 2, 2016) (consent order) (finding that Dwolla Inc.’s data security representations were “deceptive” under Consumer Financial Protection Act); Michael Gordon, et al., *BNA Insights: The CFPB and Data Security Enforcement*, BLOOMBERG LAW (June 8, 2016), <https://www.bna.com/bna-insights-cfpb-n57982073820/>; Thomas Pahl, *The CFPB Is a Sleeping Giant on Data Security. Let's Not Wake It*, THE HILL (Dec. 28, 2016, 12:00 PM EST), <http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/finance/311974-the-cfpb-is-a-sleeping-giant-on-data-security-lets-not-wake-it> (opining that CFPB should stay out of data breach enforcement matters).

103. *See* Council Regulation 2016/679, 2016 O.J.(L 119) 1 on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) [hereinafter GDPR]. The GDPR took effect on May 25, 2018. *Id.* art. 51(4), at 65. Noncompliance with the GDPR can result in fines of up to four percent of a company’s global revenue or €20 million, whichever is greater. *Id.* art. 83(5); *see also* Mitzi Hill, *GDPR: Good Defense = Prepared + Responsive!*, TAYLOR ENGLISH DUMA LLP (Sept. 26, 2017), <https://www.taylorenglish.com/blogs-emerging-markets/gdpr-good-defense-prepared-responsive>. Disturbingly, it is mostly unknown whether GDPR fines could actually be covered by insurance, as coverage may depend on whether local regulators or courts deem that such fines are

the occurrence of Brexit in 2016, the Data Protection Act in the United Kingdom may be enforced with similar rigor.<sup>104</sup>

CRE insureds must confirm that costs related to compliance with these statutes and any subsequent enforcement thereof are covered under their policies. Fortunately, many cyber policies currently offer coverage for the regulatory investigations and fines, fees, and penalties associated with the above,<sup>105</sup> where standard commercial general liability policies fall short.<sup>106</sup>

### C. Derivative and Shareholder Litigation

In the case of publicly traded REITs or any publicly traded companies with real estate, the disclosure of customer or tenant information, valuable trade secrets, or other sensitive commercial information that leads to a drop in the company's stock price could spawn fiduciary or shareholder derivative litigation<sup>107</sup> or securities class actions<sup>108</sup> against the company and

---

“punitive” damages, which many jurisdictions say are uninsurable. See Seth Row, *Will Your Cyber Insurance Cover GDPR Fines and Penalties?*, MILLER NASH GRAHAM & DUNN (May 21, 2018), <https://www.nwpolicyholder.com/2018/05/will-your-cyber-insurance-cover-gdpr-fines-penalties/>; Theodore F. Claypoole, *Your Cyber Insurance Policy May Not Cover GDPR*, WOMBLE BOND DICKINSON (Sep. 21, 2018), <https://www.natlawreview.com/article/your-cyber-insurance-policy-may-not-cover-gdpr-fines-and-liabilities>; *The Price of Data Security: A Guide to the Insurability of GDPR Fines Across Europe*, AON & DLA PIPER (May 2018), [http://www.aon.com/attachments/risk-services/Aon\\_DLA-Piper-GDPR-Fines-Guide\\_Final\\_May2018.pdf](http://www.aon.com/attachments/risk-services/Aon_DLA-Piper-GDPR-Fines-Guide_Final_May2018.pdf).

104. See *Various Claimants v. Wm Morrisons Supermarket PLC* [2017] EWHC 311 (QB) [197] (holding employer vicariously liable for criminal data breaches caused by rogue employee).

105. Evolve MGA Cyber Policy, *supra* note 33, Insuring Clause 1, Section B. Note, however, that costs related to *industry-wide* regulatory investigations are excluded under the JLT policy. See JLT Asset Management Cyber Policy, *supra* note 26, Exclusion 18 (excluding “any industry-wide, non-firm specific, inquiry or action by any governmental, regulatory or statutory body”). Small wrinkles such as this underscore the omnipresent importance of reading each specific policy word by word.

106. See discussion *infra* Section V.B.

107. See Elizabeth E. McGinn et al., *The Board of Directors and Cybersecurity: Setting up the Right Structure*, 103 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 8, at 458, 461-62 (Aug. 26, 2014).

108. See *generally* Complaint, *Yuan v. Facebook, Inc.*, No. 3:18-cv-01725, 2018 WL 1400036 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 2018). Guidance from the SEC Division of Corporation Finance warns that compliance with existing disclosure requirements under the securities laws (e.g., Exchange Act Rules 12b-20, 14a-9 and 10b-5) may require disclosure of:

- 1) Risk factors relating to a potential cyber incident, including known or threatened attacks;
- 2) Costs or other consequences associated with known cyber incidents or the risk of potential incidents, where the costs of such incidents individually or

its individual directors and officers. Although the intent of cyber insurance is generally to provide coverage on behalf of the company and not individuals, some policy forms include directors and officers under the definition of “insured persons”—but troublingly, many cyber policies often exclude securities claims altogether.<sup>109</sup> Depending on the policy language, many directors’ and officers’ (“D&O”) liability policy forms could provide defense and indemnity regardless of whether the claims against the directors and officers arise out of a cyber event.<sup>110</sup>

### V. Traditional Insurance Solutions

There are five types of policies that could conceivably provide coverage for some of the risks discussed here: property, commercial general liability, crime, terrorism, and D&O. This part will discuss the possible cyber coverages (or lack thereof) provided by all five.

#### A. All-Risk Property Insurance

A layperson might believe that property insurance should cover direct losses resulting from system failures (e.g., loss of tangible property and data, and related business interruption costs).<sup>111</sup> All-risk (also called “special form”) property policies offer insureds coverage for physical

---

collectively represent a material event, through disclosure in the Management Discussion and Analysis section of the registrant’s annual report;

3) Cyber incidents that materially affect a registrant’s products, services, or relationships with customers and suppliers;

4) Material legal proceedings involving cyber incidents; and

5) Any material impact of cyber security, both pre- and post-incident, on the registrant’s financial statements.

Siemens & Beck, *supra* note 27, at \*8 (citing DIV. OF CORP. FIN., SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, CF DISCLOSURE GUIDANCE: TOPIC NO. 2 – CYBERSECURITY (2011), [https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/cfguidance-topic2.htm#\\_edn3](https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/cfguidance-topic2.htm#_edn3) [hereinafter CF DISCLOSURE GUIDANCE]). As part of the first prong, the SEC advises that disclosure of “relevant insurance coverage” may be relevant to the extent material for purposes of Regulation S-K Item 503(c), presenting yet another compelling reason that every business should consider cyber insurance. *See* CF DISCLOSURE GUIDANCE, *supra*; *see also* Commission Statement and Guidance on Public Company Cybersecurity Disclosures Release Nos. 33-10459, 34-82746, 83 Fed. Reg. 8166 (Feb. 26, 2018) <https://www.sec.gov/rules/interp/2018/33-10459.pdf> (clarifying same guidance).

109. *See, e.g.*, JLT Asset Management Cyber Policy, *supra* note 26, Exclusions 19-20; Am. Int’l Grp., Security and Privacy Coverage Section, *supra* note 26, Exclusion 3(f); RAND Study, *supra* note 27, at 16.

110. *See* discussion *infra* Section V.E.

111. *See supra* Section IV.A (describing nature of first party cyber risks).

damage to their property and, if purchased, related business interruption costs.<sup>112</sup> Yet these policies generally do *not* provide coverage for loss of electronic data, and moreover, they usually contain cyber exclusions specifically precluding coverage for any losses arising from, *inter alia*, system failures, corruption of data, and loss of use of any computer.<sup>113</sup> Historically, property insurance responded to costs relating to a computer virus infecting a business' network.<sup>114</sup> But beginning in 2002, insurance carriers began adding exclusionary language like the NMA 2914 endorsement to their policies, which makes their intent to exclude such events from coverage relatively clear:

This Policy does not insure loss, damage, destruction, distortion, erasure, corruption or alteration of ELECTRONIC DATA *from any cause whatsoever* (including but not limited to COMPUTER VIRUS) or loss of use, reduction in functionality, cost, expense of whatsoever nature resulting therefrom, *regardless of any other cause or event contributing concurrently or in any other sequence* to the loss.<sup>115</sup>

---

112. See Ins. Servs. Office, Inc., Form No. CP 10 30 10 12; *All Risks Coverage*, INT'L RISK MGMT. INST., INC., <https://www.irmi.com/online/insurance-glossary/terms/a/all-risks-coverage.aspx> (last visited Feb 8, 2018).

113. See PR 9514 (on file with author). This endorsement states that the insurer will not pay for Damage or Consequential Loss directly or indirectly caused by, consisting of, or arising from:

1. Any functioning or malfunctioning of the internet or similar facility, or of any intranet or private network or similar facility,
2. Any corruption, destruction, distortion, erasure or other loss or damage to data, software, or any kind of programming or instruction set,
3. Loss of use or functionality whether partial or entire of data, coding, program, software, any computer or computer system or other device dependent upon any microchip or embedded logic, and any ensuing liability or failure of the Insured to conduct business.

*Id.*; see also Ins. Servs. Office, Inc., Form No. CP 01 70 (standard endorsement introduced to exclude electronic data from ISO standard Building and Personal Property coverage form).

114. See, e.g., *Lambrecht & Assocs., Inc. v. State Farm Lloyds*, 119 S.W.3d 16, 26 (Tex. App. 2003) (holding that costs arising from a computer virus, including server replacement, were covered by business insurance policy); see also *Am. Guarantee & Liab. Ins. Co. v. Ingram Micro, Inc.*, No. 99-185 TUC ACM, 2000 WL 726789, at \*3 (D. Ariz. Apr. 18, 2000) (concluding that insured was "physically damaged" by power outage which affected computer systems).

115. See NMA 2914A Electronic Data Endorsement C (2015) (endorsement created by London's Non-Marine Association) (on file with author) (emphasis added); see also NMA

This language signifies a straightforward elimination of coverage for first-party electronic data losses that could be covered under a property policy.

Some property policies can be endorsed to provide limited coverage for first-party losses resulting from cyber events.<sup>116</sup> In most cases, however, a data intrusion would likely neither constitute a direct physical loss nor a covered cause of loss, thereby making the possibility of business interruption coverage for cyber events on a property policy very slim.<sup>117</sup>

---

2915A Electronic Data Endorsement D (2015) (on file with author) (excluding “loss, damage, destruction, distortion, erasure, corruption or alteration of [electronic data],” and any “loss of use, reduction in functionality, cost, expense of whatsoever nature resulting” from that loss of data); NMA 2912 (on file with author) (excluding losses arising out of the “(i) loss of, alteration of, or damage to, or (ii) a reduction in the functionality, availability or operation of” computer systems, hardware, programs, software, data information repository, microchip, integrated circuit or similar devices in computer equipment or non-computer equipment); NMA 2928 (on file with author); CL 380 (on file with author) (excluding all loss, damage and liability directly or indirectly caused by, contributed to by, or arising from, the use or operation “as a means for inflicting harm” of any computer, computer system, computer software program, malicious code, computer virus or process or any other electronic system); Michael Rossi, *The End of Computer Virus Coverage as We Know It?*, INT’L RISK MGMT. INST., INC. (May 2002), <https://www.irmi.com/articles/expert-commentary/the-end-of-computer-virus-coverage-as-we-know-it/>.

116. See Computer Systems Damage, Zurich EDGE-100-B (2010) (on file with author). This Zurich policy form states:

The Company will pay for direct physical loss of or damage to the Insured's Electronic Data, Programs, Software and the actual Time Element loss sustained, as provided by this Policy, during the Period of Interruption directly resulting from mysterious disappearance of code, any failure, malfunction, deficiency, deletion, fault, Computer Virus or corruption to the Insured's Electronic Data, Programs, Software at an Insured Location. The Company will also pay for such loss or damage that may arise out of or result from any authorized or unauthorized access in, of, or to any computer, communication system, file server, networking equipment, computer system, computer hardware, data processing equipment, computer memory, microchip, microprocessor, integrated circuit or similar device.

This Coverage will only apply when the Period of Interruption exceeds the time shown as Qualifying Period in the Qualifying Period clause of the Declarations section. If the Qualifying Period is exceeded, then this Policy will pay for the amount of loss in excess of the Policy Deductible, but not more than the limit applying to this Coverage.

*Id.* Note, however, that this coverage is typically subject to a low sublimit (e.g., \$1,000,000) as well as a “Qualifying Period” whereby the insured self-insures for a specified period of time until the coverage kicks in (e.g., forty-eight hours). See *id.*

117. See Suriano & Kaliner, *supra* note 61 (discussing the triggering of business interruption coverage on a typical policy). But see *Ashland Hosp. Corp. v. Affiliated FM Ins. Co.*, No. 11-16-DLB-EBA, 2013 WL 4400516 (E.D. Ky. Aug. 14, 2013) (holding insurer

With respect to data restoration or system recovery costs, even if the endorsements excluding electronic data can be successfully removed during negotiations, the associated premium increase would likely be cost-prohibitive. Further, policy forms' exclusion of "electronic data" from the definition of covered property would still render potential coverage for cyber risks an unsettling question mark at best. Given all these difficulties, an all-risk property policy is likely not a good place to turn for any meaningful cyber coverage.

Cyber policies, as discussed above, generally *do* cover the restoration of any lost or corrupted data accompanying a cyber event, as well as some business interruption costs related thereto.<sup>118</sup> Given that business interruption is one of the most critical and necessary aspects of cyber coverage for CRE insureds, this represents one of the reasons cyber policies could be a worthwhile purchase.<sup>119</sup> On the other hand, many cyber policies exclude or attempt to sublimit reimbursement for reputational harm, loss of future revenue, and tangible property damage arising out of cyber events.<sup>120</sup> Given the interconnectedness of the infrastructure of a smart building with the computer system and data therein, CRE insureds should want coverage for those risks in particular.<sup>121</sup> CRE insureds must carefully inspect their policy language in order to determine whether the stand-alone cyber policy offers any meaningful value or protection at all over the standard "all-risk" property policy.

### *B. Commercial General Liability Insurance*

The commercial general liability (CGL) policy may be another place to turn for coverage of cyber risks. CGL policies pay, under "Coverage A," for sums that an insured becomes legally obligated to pay due to an occurrence that results in property damage or bodily injury, with property damage being defined as "[p]hysical injury to tangible property, including all resulting loss of use of that property."<sup>122</sup> Most CGL forms now state that

---

was required to pay for loss of data storage network where such loss was caused by extreme temperatures which caused physical damage to data at microscopic level).

118. *See supra* Section III.A, III.B.

119. *See supra* note 115 and accompanying text.

120. *See supra* Section III.B; 2 STUART A. PANENSKY, *DATA SECURITY & PRIVACY LAW* § 14:6, Westlaw (database updated June 2018) (noting the gap in available coverage for physical property damage caused by a data breach).

121. *See supra* note 21 and accompanying text.

122. *See, e.g.*, Ins. Servs. Office, Inc., Form No. CG 00 01 04 13, Commercial General Liability Coverage Form, Definition (17)(a) (2012) [hereinafter Ins. Servs. Office, 2012 Commercial General Liability Coverage Form]. This limiting definition was added in 2001,



“electronic data is not tangible property,”<sup>123</sup> and explicitly exclude “Damages arising out of the loss of, loss of use of, damage to, corruption of, inability to access, or inability to manipulate electronic data.”<sup>124</sup> While courts have accordingly been reluctant to categorize electronically stored data as “tangible property” for purposes of triggering a CGL policy,<sup>125</sup>

---

effectively eliminating the “Computer Fraud” coverage which in preceding years was an additional coverage that could be purchased and endorsed to the CGL form. *See* Virginia N. Roddy, *Expanding Risks, Growing Market: Cyber Insurance Today*, DRI FOR DEF., Oct. 2017, at 80. Computer Fraud coverage is still available in the market, but only on commercial crime policies. *See infra* Section V.C.

123. *See, e.g.*, Ins. Servs. Office, Inc., Form No. CG 00 01 12 04, Commercial General Liability Coverage Form, Definition (17) (2000).

124. *See, e.g.*, Ins. Servs. Office, 2012 Commercial General Liability Coverage Form, *supra* note 124, Exclusion (p). This policy form excludes:

Damages arising out of the loss of, loss of use of, damage to, corruption of, inability to access, or inability to manipulate electronic data. However, this exclusion does not apply to liability for damages because of “bodily injury”. As used in this exclusion, electronic data means information, facts or programs stored as or on, created or used on, or transmitted to or from computer software, including systems and applications software, hard or floppy disks, CDROMs, tapes, drives, cells, data processing devices or any other media which are used with electronically controlled equipment.

*Id.*; *see also* RSVT Holdings, LLC v. Main St. Am. Assurance Co., 25 N.Y.S.3d 712, 713-14 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016) (siding with insurer by applying electronic data exclusion to lawsuit arising out of restaurant’s data breach).

125. *See* Liberty Corp. Capital Ltd. v. Sec. Safe Outlet, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 2d 891, 901 (E.D. Ky. 2013) (noting that customer email addresses are not tangible property), *aff’d*, 577 F. App’x 399 (6th Cir. 2014); *Am. Online, Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co.*, 347 F.3d 89, 96 (4th Cir. 2003) (applying Virginia law and relying on dictionary definitions of “tangible property” to differentiate between coverage for lawsuits arising out of damage to hardware versus software); *Lucker Mfg. v. Home Ins. Co.*, 23 F.3d 808 (3d Cir. 1994) (applying Pennsylvania and Wisconsin law and holding that system design was intangible because its value emanated from an idea and not from its memorializing medium); *Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Prof'l Data Servs., Inc.*, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15859, at \*21 (D. Kan. July 18, 2003) (relying on *America Online* to hold that loss of use of software and data is not damage to “tangible property because neither has any physical substance [or] is perceptible to the senses”); *State Auto Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Midwest Computs. & More*, 147 F. Supp. 2d 1113, 1116 (W.D. Okla. 2001) (stating in dicta that electronic data is not tangible property because it “cannot be touched, held, or sensed by the human mind”); *Seagate Tech., Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.*, 11 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1155 (N.D. Cal. 1998); *Greco & Traficante v. Fid. & Guar. Ins. Co.*, No. D052179, 2009 WL 162068, at \*5-6 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 26, 2009); *Better Imaging Facilitators, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.*, No. B188520, 2006 WL 3187150, at \*3-5 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 6, 2006); *Ward Gen. Ins. Servs., Inc. v. Emp’rs Fire Ins. Co.*, 7 Cal. Rptr. 3d 844, 851 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (ruling loss of

insureds have occasionally found an effective way around this by arguing that because computer *hardware* is clearly tangible property, any lawsuits relating to losses anent physical components of the computers themselves must be covered under Coverage A.<sup>126</sup> Therefore, if a real estate cyber attack physically damages a building's computer systems, any lawsuits deriving therefrom could trigger the insurer's duty to defend on a CGL policy. Nevertheless, it likely would be a grave mistake to rely on this loophole for all cyber liability coverage, given that (1) the insurer likely will fight on this point, and (2) much of the liability risk stems from privacy lawsuits rather than tangible property damage.<sup>127</sup>

CGL policies also insure "personal and advertising injury" resulting from offenses such as violation of the right to privacy under Coverage B.<sup>128</sup> Included within this scope of coverage is liability arising out of an "[o]ral or written *publication*, in any manner, of material that violates a person's right of privacy."<sup>129</sup> Some courts have suggested or held that a disclosure of PII resulting from a data breach constitutes a "publication" and, consequently, that CGL carriers owe a duty to defend and potentially indemnify from lawsuits arising out of such disclosure.<sup>130</sup> Unfortunately,

---

stored computer data is not "direct physical loss"); *Warner v. Fire Ins. Exch.*, 281 Cal. Rptr. 635 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (using the same analysis as *America Online*).

126. *See, e.g., Eyebaster, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co.*, 613 F.3d 797, 802 (8th Cir. 2010) (holding that "[t]he plain meaning of tangible property includes computers, and the Sefton complaint alleges repeatedly the 'loss of use' of his computer" and "conclud[ing] . . . the allegations are within the scope of the General Liability policy," despite the policy's exclusion of electronic data from the definition of "tangible property"); *Centillum Commc'ns v. Atl. Mut. Ins. Co.*, 528 F. Supp. 2d 940, 948-49 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (applying California law and holding that allegations that semiconductor chips physically injured other components of routers triggered insurer's duty to defend); *State Auto Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Midwest Compts. & More*, 147 F. Supp. 2d 1113, 1116 (W.D. Okla. 2001) ("Because a computer clearly is tangible property, an alleged loss of use of computers constitutes 'property damage' within the meaning of plaintiff's policy."); *Retail Sys., Inc. v. CNA Ins. Cos.*, 469 N.W.2d 735, 737 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (holding data on computer tape containing results of a political survey constituted tangible property because "[t]he data on the tape was of permanent value and was integrated completely with the physical property of the tape.").

127. *See supra* Section IV.A and accompanying text.

128. *See, e.g., Ins. Servs. Office, Inc.*, Form No. CG 00 01 04 13, Commercial General Liability Coverage Form: Personal and Advertising Injury Liability (2013).

129. *Id.* at Definition (14)(e) (emphasis added).

130. *Travelers Indem. Co. of Am. v. Portal Healthcare Sols., LLC*, 644 F. App'x 245, 247-48 (4th Cir. 2016) (holding that data breach constituted "publication" under CGL personal and advertising coverage); *see also Am. States Ins. Co. v. Capital Assocs. of Jackson Cty.*, 392 F.3d 939, 941 (7th Cir. 2004) (stating in dicta that "[t]he language reads

widely circulated endorsements first introduced in 2014 now exclude liability arising out of “Access Or Disclosure Of Confidential Or Personal Information” from both Coverages A and B<sup>131</sup> or explicitly delete privacy lawsuits from Coverage B.<sup>132</sup> Although there is not a substantial amount of case law interpreting these endorsements, it seems clear that the intent is to negate coverage for invasion-of-privacy lawsuits as part of a renewed effort to force insureds to purchase a separate cyber insurance product.<sup>133</sup> Followers of the insurance industry understand that whenever there is increased regulatory scrutiny for an exposure (as with cyber),<sup>134</sup> insurers look to exclude and segregate the risk from the broadly worded general

---

like coverage of the tort of ‘invasion of privacy,’” and “[p]erhaps the language reasonably could be understood to cover improper disclosures of Social Security numbers, credit records, email addresses, and other details that could facilitate identity theft or spamming”); *Hartford Cas. Ins. Co. v. Corcino & Assocs.*, No. CV 13–3728 GAF (JCx), 2013 WL 5687527, at \*3 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 2013) (endorsing, tacitly, Hartford’s choice not to dispute that accidental posting of confidential information on website was “publication”); *Tamm v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co.*, No. 020541BLS2, 2003 WL 21960374, at \*4 (Mass. Super. Ct. July 10, 2003) (holding that revealing private correspondence of the insured and its executives via email to outside attorneys constituted “publication” under Coverage B). *But see* *Innovak Int’l, Inc. v. Hanover Ins. Co.*, 280 F. Supp. 3d 1340, 1349 (M.D. Fla. 2017) (holding that because third party hackers and not the insured caused the data breach, coverage was barred because lawsuit did not arise out of the insured’s oral or written publication); *Recall Total Info. Mgmt. v. Fed. Ins. Co.*, 115 A.3d 458, 460 (Conn. 2015). In *Recall Total*, Connecticut’s highest court found that coverage was barred where computer tapes fell out of the insured’s transportation contractor’s van and were subsequently stolen. 115 A.3d 458 at 459-60. This case presented a unique set of facts because there was no computer hack, but rather a loss of physical tapes, and also no evidence existed that anyone ever accessed the confidential information on the stolen tapes. *Id.* at 459.

131. *See, e.g.*, Ins. Servs. Office, Inc., Form No. CG 21 06 05 14, Commercial General Liability Exclusions 2(p), I(A-B) (2013) (with limited bodily injury exception); Ins. Servs. Office, Inc., Form No. CG 21 07 05 14, Commercial General Liability Exclusion 2(p), I(A-B) (without limited bodily injury exception) (2013); Ins. Servs. Office, Inc., Form No. CG 21 08 05 14, Commercial General Liability Exclusions I(B)(2) (2013) (excluding “Access Or Disclosure Of Confidential Or Personal Information And Data-Related Liability” with some variations); SCOTT M. SEAMAN & JASON R. SCHULZE, ALLOCATION OF LOSSES IN COMPLEX INSURANCE COVERAGE CLAIMS § 17:2(c), Westlaw (database updated Dec. 2017).

132. *See, e.g.*, Ins. Servs. Office, Inc. CG 24 13 04 13 (excluding privacy lawsuits from Personal & Advertising Injury coverage).

133. *See infra* note 135 and accompanying text; *see also* *Big 5 Sporting Goods Corp. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co.*, 635 F. App’x 351 (9th Cir. 2015) (holding CGL insurer had no duty to defend lawsuit against insured brought under Song–Beverly Act of 1991 because all underlying claims arose from the “alleged violation of the statutory right to privacy,” which was excluded under the CGL policy).

134. *See supra* Section IV.B.

liability policy in order to force policyholders to pay additional premium for a separate policy to insure the risk.<sup>135</sup>

CRE stakeholders can attempt to negotiate the re-inclusion of electronic data in the definition of “tangible property” with brokers and carriers via endorsement.<sup>136</sup> It is uncertain how willing carriers are to remove the “Access Or Disclosure Of Confidential Or Personal Information And Data-Related Liability” exclusions from Coverage B, and even if they are willing, the premium might be cost-prohibitive. Further, even if such exclusions are left off of policies at a reasonable price, there remains some

---

135. We know this to be true because the insurance industry has publicly acknowledged the fact. See Bole, *supra* note 48 (noting that uncomfortable insurers will “take a ‘hard look’ at where cyber cover could appear in [other non-cyber] policies”); Jeffrey P. Klenk, *Emerging Coverage Issues In Employment Practices Liability Insurance: The Industry Perspective On Recent Developments*, 21 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 323 (1999) (explaining dawn of employment practices exclusion on CGL policy and subsequent policy segregation resulted from, *inter alia*, the Civil Rights Act of 1991); E. Joshua Rosenkranz, *The Pollution Exclusion Clause Through The Looking Glass*, 74 GEO. L.J. 1237 (1986) (explaining dawn of pollution exclusion on CGL policy and subsequent policy segregation resulted from, *inter alia*, the RCRA, CERCLA, and other new statutory schemes). Bob O’Leary, president and CEO of Philadelphia Insurance Companies even openly predicted and admitted that underwriters of traditional lines of insurance will ramp up their exclusionary language as it relates to cyber, stating that “[s]ilent cyber cover will be closed down across the industry via exclusionary language . . . We did this with pollution cover and saw a quicker take-up rate of standalone pollution cover as a result.” Bole, *supra* note 48 (emphasis added). This is one of the economic realities of the insurance industry that on the one hand cannot be overstated, but that on the other hand lawyers and academics still struggle to accept as it relates to cyber coverage. See, e.g., Erik S. Knutsen, & Jeffrey W. Stempel, *The Techno-Neutrality Solution To Navigating Insurance Coverage For Cyber Losses*, 122 PENN ST. L. REV. 645 (2018) (arguing that insurance industry should fold cyber coverage into already-existing traditional coverages such as CGL and property). Countless academic writings on cyber insurance simply emphasize possible existing cyber coverages on traditional policies rather than acknowledging the reality that soon all such coverage will be excluded. See SEAMAN & SCHULZE, *supra* note 131; Larry Bowman, Kenneth Johnston, Dan Klein & Shae Keefe, *Data Breach: The Aftermath – Insurance Coverage Under CGL Policies for Cyber Security Breaches, Hacks, and Malware Attacks*, KANE RUSSELL COLEMAN LOGAN PC (Oct. 18, 2016), <https://www.krcl.com/articles/litigation-update/data-breach-aftermath-insurance-coverage-cgl-policies-cyber-security-breaches-hacks-malware-attacks/>; James H. Kallianis, Jr., *Read The Fine Print – Insurance Coverage Issues Implicated in Data-Breach Claims*, DRI FOR DEF., Mar. 2015, at 56.

136. See Ins. Servs. Office, Inc., Form No. CG 04 37 12 04, Commercial General Liability Form, Exclusion 2(p) Definition 17(c) (2008). This endorsement changes the definition to include: “[L]oss of, loss of use of, damage to, corruption of, inability to access, or inability to properly manipulate ‘electronic data,’ resulting from physical injury to tangible property. . . . All such loss of ‘electronic data’ shall be deemed to occur at the time of the ‘occurrence’ that caused it.” *Id.*

questions as to (1) whether a cyber event resulting from intentional conduct would qualify as an accident or an occurrence to trigger the CGL policy;<sup>137</sup> and (2) whether a CGL policy would cover a publication initiated by a *third party* (i.e., a hacker) rather than the insured itself.<sup>138</sup> Accordingly, in terms of mitigating third-party liability risk, the cyber policy will likely be a necessary avenue of defense for all contract and tort lawsuits and government enforcement actions arising out of cyber events for CRE, except in circumstances where the insured successfully argues that the lawsuit arises out of “physical damage” to “tangible property.” Even then, the cyber policy must be carefully reviewed for coverage gaps, because bodily injury and property damage are often excluded with critically worded carvebacks, leaving an opening for insurance carriers to argue that claims like allegations of emotional distress are excluded as a type of “bodily injury.”<sup>139</sup>

---

137. See, e.g., *Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Websolv Computing, Inc.*, 580 F.3d 543, 551-52 (7th Cir. 2009) (applying Iowa law); *Melrose Hotel Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.*, 432 F. Supp. 2d 488, 511-12 (E.D. Pa. 2006) (applying Pennsylvania law).

138. A New York trial court judge in the case between Sony and its insurer Zurich found that the oral or written publication must have been committed by the insured itself, and thus “an oral or written publication that was perpetrated by the hackers” did not qualify for coverage under Sony’s CGL policy. *Zurich Am. Ins. v. Sony Corp. of Am.*, No. 651982/2011, 2014 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 5141, at \*70 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 21, 2014); see also *Innovak Int’l, Inc v. Hanover Ins. Co.*, 280 F. Supp. 3d 1340, 1349 (M.D. Fla. 2017); *St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Rosen Millennium Inc.*, Case No. 6:17-cv-540-ORL-41-GJK, 2018 WL 4732718 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 28, 2018). But see *Oscines v. Mt. Hood Ins. Co.*, No. 1401-426 (Or. Cir. Ct. July 2, 2015) (holding that Coverage B “in any manner” verbiage necessitates coverage of liability arising from release by third-party hackers).

139. See *Chubb Cyber Policy*, *supra* note 33, Exclusion III(A)(5) (excluding bodily injury except in the case of the liability coverage part with respect to “mental injury, mental anguish, mental tension, emotional distress, pain and suffering, or shock resulting from an Incident”); *Evolve MGA Cyber Policy*, *supra* note 33, Exclusion 5 (excluding bodily injury and property damage altogether with no carveback). The bodily injury carveback (or lack thereof) can be critical because a carrier could use a plaintiff’s assertion of emotional distress (together with whatever other privacy claims they are bringing) as an excuse to deny defense or deny coverage. Even the risk of death and more physical bodily injury should not be disregarded when it comes to cyber insurance. See, e.g., *Nicole Perloth & Clifford Krauss, A Cyberattack in Saudi Arabia Had a Deadly Goal. Experts Fear Another Try*, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 15, 2018), <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/15/technology/saudi-arabia-hacks-cyberattacks.html> (discussing how attempted hacking of a petrochemical manufacturer appears to have sought “to sabotage the firm’s operations and trigger an explosion”).

### C. Commercial Crime Insurance

Commercial crime insurance<sup>140</sup> may be purchased on a stand-alone basis or as part of a CRE insured's package policy.<sup>141</sup> The policy typically provides coverage for "Computer Fraud," which is usually defined as:

[L]oss of or damage to "money," "securities" and "other property" resulting directly from the use of any computer to fraudulently cause a transfer of that property from inside the "premises" or "banking premises:" (a) To a person (other than a "messenger") outside those "premises;" or (b) To a place outside those "premises."<sup>142</sup>

Crime policies typically also cover "Funds Transfer Fraud," often stating something to the effect of: "We will pay for the loss of 'funds' resulting directly from a 'fraudulent instruction' directing a financial institution to transfer, pay or deliver 'funds' from your 'transfer account.'"<sup>143</sup>

Under New York law, these two provisions cover dollars lost to "social engineering" or "spoofing" schemes.<sup>144</sup> In *Medidata Solutions v. Federal Insurance Co.*,<sup>145</sup> a New York federal judge held that Chubb subsidiary Federal Insurance Co. had to pay the money that an employee in the accounts-payable department of Medidata paid to a malicious party that had posed as the company president via email, despite Federal's argument that coverage was negated by the fact that the transfer of money was done by an employee with authorization to transfer the funds and that there was no "entry or change of data to Medidata's computer system."<sup>146</sup> Federal

140. See, e.g., Ins. Servs. Office, Inc., Form No. CR 00 23 05 06, Commercial Crime Policy (Loss Sustained Form) (2008) [hereinafter Ins. Servs. Office, Inc., Commercial Crime Policy (Loss Sustained Form)].

141. *What Is Commercial Crime Insurance?*, BOLT INS. AGENCY (Sept. 13, 2012), <https://www.boltinsurance.com/what-is-commercial-crime-insurance/>.

142. Ins. Servs. Office, Inc., Commercial Crime Policy (Loss Sustained Form), *supra* note 140, Insuring Agreements, Section 6.

143. *Id.* at Section 7.

144. See *Medidata Sols. v. Fed. Ins. Co.*, 268 F. Supp. 3d 471 (S.D.N.Y. 2017), *aff'd*, 729 F. App'x 117 (2d. Cir. 2018).

145. *Id.*

146. *Id.* at 476-80. On appeal, an insurance trade group filed an amicus brief siding with Federal, arguing from a prudential perspective that "[i]f 'computer fraud' insurance is construed so overbroadly to cover losses resulting from e-mails that fool the insured's employees, who do not take commercially reasonable steps to confirm the substance of the e-mails, such insurance will become much harder to obtain and substantially more expensive." Brief for the Sur. & Fid. Ass'n of Am. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellant

appealed the judgment to the Second Circuit, who subsequently affirmed the lower court's decision.<sup>147</sup> A few unpublished opinions by the Fifth and Ninth Circuits align more with the insurer's argument that because victims of these schemes instruct their own bank to transfer the funds via an agent with "authorization," there cannot have been any computer fraud or funds-transfer fraud under the above definitions because the loss did not "result directly" from a fraudulent instruction using a computer.<sup>148</sup> Other courts tend to agree more with Judge Carter's reasoning in *Medidata*.<sup>149</sup>

The Second Circuit's decision is incredibly significant in the context of this Article because of the vast number of CRE companies based in New York and insurers based in Connecticut, two Second Circuit jurisdictions.<sup>150</sup>

---

at \*14, *Medidata Sols., Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co.*, 729 F. App'x 117 (2nd Cir. 2018). Of course, an interest group's vague cautionary threat that a certain ruling might make coverage more expensive has no bearing on what the law dictates a result to be.

147. *Medidata Sols. Fed. Ins.*, 729 F. App'x at 119.

148. See *Taylor & Lieberman v. Fed. Ins. Co.*, 681 F. App'x 627 (9th Cir. 2017); *Apache Corp. v. Great Am. Ins. Co.*, 662 F. App'x 252 (5th Cir. 2016); *Posco Daewoo Am. Corp. v. Allnex USA, Inc.*, No. CV 17-483, 2017 WL 4922014 (D.N.J. Oct. 31, 2017); *Am. Tooling Ctr., Inc. v. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am.*, No. 16-12108, 2017 WL 3263356 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 1, 2017), *rev'd*, 895 F.3d 455 (6th Cir. 2018); *Brick Warehouse LP v. Chubb Ins. Co. of Can.*, 2017 ABQB 413 (Can.). *Posco Daewoo* is a somewhat distinct case because it involved a "reverse" social engineering scheme, wherein the intended *payee* of the funds, not the *payor*, asserted a claim under its own crime policy for recovery of funds that a malicious actor had tricked the *payor* into paying out. 2017 WL 4922014, at \*1-2. The court then understandably held that because the claimant had no actual property interest in the money (at least, not yet), they then had no good claim under the crime policy. *Id.* at \*6-7. Therefore, the *Poscoe Daewoo* holding does not necessarily portend New Jersey courts' or the Third Circuit Court of Appeals' alignment with the view of the Fifth Circuit and the Michigan court.

149. See *Am. Tooling Ctr., Inc. v. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am.*, 895 F.3d 455 (6th Cir. 2018) (holding insured suffered "direct loss . . . directly caused by . . . computer fraud" when it mistakenly transferred funds); *State Bank of Bellingham v. BancInsure Inc. n/k/a Red Rock Ins. Co.*, 823 F.3d 456 (8th Cir. 2016) (applying the concurrent causation doctrine under Minnesota law and holding that financial institution bond holder had to pay insured bank for illegal transfer of funds from bank by criminal third party despite violations of policies and procedures governing computer security by bank's employees, an excluded peril under the financial institution bond); *Principle Sols. Grp., LLC v. Ironshore Indem., Inc.*, No. 1:15-CV-4130-RWS, 2016 WL 4618761 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 30, 2016); see also *Complaint, RB International Fin. USA EEC v. Allianz Glob. Risks U.S. Ins. Co.*, No. 1:17-cv-08690 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 8, 2017).

150. Additionally, on the typical Bermuda policy form, the governing law in case of a dispute is New York. See Mina Martin, *The Good and Evil of Permissive Notices of Occurrences*, LAW360 (Nov. 9, 2017, 10:51 AM EST), <https://www.law360.com/insurance/articles/982446/the-good-and-evil-of-permissive-notices-of-occurrences>.

In the meantime, the rest of the country should follow Judge Carter's lead, as the divergent contemporaneous case law simply defies reason. The court in *Apache Corporation v. Great American Insurance Co.*, for example, based on similar facts as *Medidata*, used the following pretzel logic to justify its ruling that the loss did not "result directly" from computer fraud:

The email was part of the scheme; but, the email was merely incidental to the occurrence of the authorized transfer of money. To interpret the computer-fraud provision as reaching any fraudulent scheme in which an email communication was part of the process would . . . convert the computer-fraud provision to one for general fraud.<sup>151</sup>

As Judge Story of the Northern District of Georgia pointed out in *Principle Solutions Group LLC v. Ironshore Indemnity Inc.*, "If some employee interaction between the fraud and the loss [i]s sufficient to allow [the insurer] to be relieved from paying under the provision at issue, the provision would be rendered 'almost pointless' and would result in illusory coverage."<sup>152</sup> This conclusion is correct because the nature of fraud is that a misrepresentation by a malicious party *induces action by an innocent party* (i.e., action that the innocent party would not have taken *but for* the misrepresentation).<sup>153</sup> To suggest that an "authorized" action by the insured's agent(s) somehow would negate fraud coverage essentially renders the computer fraud coverage useless, as it undercuts the very definition of fraud itself.<sup>154</sup> The email is not "incidental" to the occurrence

---

151. *Apache Corp.*, 662 F. App'x. at 258.

152. Civil Action No. 1:15-CV-4130-RWS, 2016 WL 4618761 at \*5 (quoting *Apache Corp.*, No. 4:14-CV-237, 2015 WL 7709584, at \*3 (S.D. Texas Aug. 7, 2015)). In finding that money paid to a spoofing scammer was covered under a crime policy's Funds Transfer Fraud provision in *Medidata*, Judge Carter echoed this sentiment, summarizing the scenario succinctly and accurately:

It is also undisputed that the accounts payable personnel would not have initiated the wire transfer, but for, the third parties' manipulation of the emails. The fact that the accounts payable employee willingly pressed the send button on the bank transfer does not transform the bank wire into a valid transaction. To the contrary, the validity of the wire transfer depended upon several high level employees' knowledge and consent which was only obtained by trick. As the parties are well aware, larceny by trick is still larceny.

278 F. Supp. 3d 471, 480 (S.D.N.Y. 2017).

153. See *Fraud*, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) ("fraud n. (14c) 1. A knowing misrepresentation or knowing concealment of a material fact *made to induce another to act to his or her detriment.*" (emphasis added)).

154. See *id.*; see also Knutsen & Stempel, *supra* note 135, at 663-64.



of the money transfer in any of these cases, but rather the direct cause. Blend this common-sense rationale with the bedrock insurance-law principle that any policy ambiguities are to be construed in favor of the insured,<sup>155</sup> and one reasonably could conclude that future court decisions will side more with Judge Carter and Judge Story rather than the unpublished Fifth and Ninth Circuit opinions.

Theft and fraudulent transfer of funds by malicious actors is a significant concern for CRE because a substantial amount of acquisitions, dispositions, and financing of properties occur through web transactions, ripe territory for computer scam artists.<sup>156</sup> If the insured purchases the coverage for theft by non-employees, it seems undisputed that commercial crime policies would cover a hacker's unlawful entry into a computer system whereby the hacker unlawfully transfers funds himself directly (standard larceny).<sup>157</sup> Under *Medidata* and related cases, moreover, the related computer-fraud coverage also should cover money lost to a "social engineer" or "spoofing" scam artist, and the purchase of certain computer-fraud riders can even cover related losses arising out of such incidents, including credit card fees

---

155. See, e.g., *Emp'rs Ins. Co. of Ala. v. Jeff Gin Co.*, 378 So. 2d 693, 695 (Ala. 1979); *Hahn v. Alaska Title Guar. Co.*, 557 P.2d 143, 144 (Alaska 1976); *S. Title Ins. Co. v. Oller*, 595 S.W.2d 681, 683 (Ark. 1980); *Travelers Ins. Co. v. Namerow*, 778 A.2d 168, 177 (Conn. 2001); *Healy Tibbitts Constr. Co. v. Emp'rs' Surplus Lines Ins. Co.*, 140 Cal. Rptr. 375, 379 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977); *Res. Ins. Co. v. Pisciotta*, 640 P.2d 764, 811 (Cal. 1982); *Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Robert S.*, 28 P.3d 889, 896 (Cal. 2001) (Baxter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); *Carlyle Inv. Mgmt. LLC v. Ace Am. Ins. Co.*, 131 A.3d 886, 896 (D.C. 2016); *Penzer v. Transp. Ins. Co.*, 545 F.3d 1303, 1309 (11th Cir. 2008), *certified question answered*, 29 So. 3d 1000 (Fla. 2010); *St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. FDIC*, 774 F.3d 702, 709 (11th Cir. 2014) (applying Georgia law); *Kemper Nat'l Ins. Cos. v. Heaven Hill Distilleries, Inc.*, 82 S.W.3d 869, 874 (Ky. 2002); *Kottenbrook v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co.*, 69 So. 3d 561, 563 (La. Ct. App. 2011); *USA Life One Ins. Co. of Ind. v. Nuckolls*, 682 N.E.2d 534, 538 (Ind. 1997); *State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Ferrin*, 2002 MT 196, ¶¶ 16, 21, 54 P.3d 21, 23-24; *Nascimento v. Preferred Mut. Ins. Co.*, 513 F.3d 273, 277 n.2 (1st Cir. 2008) (applying Massachusetts law); *Contoocook Valley Sch. Dist. v. Graphic Arts Mut. Ins. Co.*, 788 A.2d 259, 261 (N.H. 2001); *W. 56th St. Assoc. v. Greater N.Y. Mut. Ins. Co.*, 681 N.Y.S.2d 523, 526 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998), *as amended* (Jan. 19, 1999); *Am. Int'l. Specialty Lines Ins. Co. v. Rentech Steel LLC*, 620 F.3d 558, 562-63 (5th Cir. 2010) (applying Texas law); *W. Indem. Ins. Co. v. Am. Physicians Ins. Exch.*, 950 S.W.2d 185, 188 (Tex. App. 1997); *Builders Mut. Ins. Co. v. Parallel Design & Dev. LLC*, 785 F. Supp. 2d 535, 543 (E.D. Va. 2011).

156. See Donkers, *supra* note 5; *supra* Section II.A.

157. See generally *Ins. Servs. Office Inc.*, Form No. CR 00 23 05 06, Commercial Crime Policy (Loss Sustained Form).

and public-relations expenses.<sup>158</sup> Crime policies, on the other hand, do not cover Cyber Extortion.<sup>159</sup> Thus the cyber policy must step in to insure this exposure, but it should be noted simultaneously that some cyber policies may *not* cover fraudulent instructions such as the one discussed in *Medidata* where larceny by trick is involved.<sup>160</sup> Accordingly, CRE insureds should ensure that their crime and cyber coverages work in concordance with one another in order to fill these respective gaps, as well as to avoid overpayment of premiums for “double coverage.”

#### *D. Terrorism Insurance*

In the absence of help from crime coverage, CRE insureds might seek refuge from ransomware attacks through terrorism coverage. Under the

---

158. *Retail Ventures, Inc. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa.*, 691 F.3d 821, 824, 833-34 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding that under computer crime rider’s “resulting directly from” language, a proximate cause standard controlled, necessitating coverage for “incurred expenses for customer communications, public relations, . . . charge backs, card reissuance, account monitoring, and fines imposed by VISA/MasterCard”).

159. *See* Ins. Servs. Office Inc., Form No. CR 00 23 05 06, Commercial Crime Policy (Loss Sustained Form), Exclusions (f)(1)(a)-(e) (2005). This policy form states:

Insuring Agreements . . . do not cover . . . (1) Loss of or damage to property after it has been transferred or surrendered to a person or place outside the “premises” or “banking premises”; . . . (c) As a result of a threat to do damage to any property; (d) As a result of a threat to introduce a denial of service attack into your computer system; (e) As a result of a threat to introduce a virus or other malicious instruction into your computer system which is designed to damage, destroy or corrupt data or computer programs stored within your computer system[.]

*Id.*

160. *See* Am. Int’l Grp., Cyber Extortion Coverage Section, *supra* note 26, Exclusion 3(a) (excluding from coverage “any payment for Loss: (a) arising out of, based upon or attributable to any dishonest, fraudulent, criminal or malicious act, error or omission, or any intentional or knowing violation of the law, if committed by any . . . (2) past or present employee . . .”); JLT Asset Management Cyber Policy, *supra* note 26, Exclusion 16 (excluding “monetary value of any electronic fund transfers or transactions by or on behalf of the Insured which is lost, diminished or damaged during transfer from, into or between accounts”); JLT Asset Management Cyber Policy, *supra* note 26, Additional Coverage Section C(2), Definition 18 (tying Cyber Extortion coverage solely to “Extortion Demand(s),” which by definition must include a “threats” or a “series of threats”). *But see* Am. Int’l Grp., Event Management Coverage Section, *supra* note 26, Definition 2(l) (including “social engineering” within definition of “Privacy Event”); Evolve MGA Cyber Policy, *supra* note 33, Insuring Clause 2, Section A(e) (covering under Cyber Crime “any phishing, vishing or other social engineering attack against any employee or senior executive officer that results in the transfer of your funds to an unintended third party”).

Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (TRIA),<sup>161</sup> as extended through 2020 by the Terrorism Risk Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2015 (TRIPRA),<sup>162</sup> insurers must offer terrorism insurance with coverage at least as broad as the property or casualty policy being offered provides, and for its part, the federal government offers a financial backstop for the insurers in case a large loss does occur.<sup>163</sup> The Terrorism Risk Insurance Program (TRIP) only provides this reinsurance, however, for certified “acts of terrorism,” which require, *inter alia*:

- a violent act dangerous to human life, property, or infrastructure;
- occurring within the United States (or at a U.S. mission or U.S. air carrier/flag vessel);
- committed by an individual(s) as part of an effort to coerce the civilian population of the United States or to influence the policy or affect the conduct of the United States Government by coercion;
- and property and casualty losses exceeding \$5,000,000.<sup>164</sup>

Because many insurers tie their coverage to this federal certification, the question of whether terrorism insurance will respond to a cyber event frequently revolves around whether the event meets the above definition.<sup>165</sup>

U.S. Treasury Department guidance has confirmed that stand-alone cyber liability policies are subject to TRIA requirements because they generally are categorized as “property and casualty” rather than “[p]rofessional [e]rrors and [o]missions” policies, and therefore insurers must “make available” terrorism

---

161. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-297, 116 Stat. 2322 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 248 note, 15 U.S.C. § 6701 note, 28 U.S.C. § 1610 note (2012)).

162. Terrorism Risk Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2015, H.R. 26, 114th Cong. § 101 (2015) (enacted).

163. *See id.* §§ 103(c), 105(a). TRIA requires insurers to offer terrorism coverage that “does not differ materially from the terms, amounts, and other coverage limitations applicable to losses arising from events other than acts of terrorism.” *Id.* § 103(c)(1)(B); *see also* EDWARD M. BLOOM & MICHAEL S. STRAUSS, MASSACHUSETTS CLE, INC., LEASE DRAFTING IN MASSACHUSETTS – INSURANCE, SUBROGATION, AND INDEMNITY (4th ed. 2017).

164. *See* 31 C.F.R. §§ 50.4(b), 50.60 (2017) (setting forth the definition of “act of terrorism” and the process under which an act is certified as an act of terrorism).

165. *See* Marianne Bonner, *Do You Need Terrorism Insurance?*, THE BALANCE: SMALL BUS. (Aug. 31, 2017), <https://www.thebalance.com/do-you-need-terrorism-insurance-4102840>.

coverage in connection with their sale of such policies.<sup>166</sup> This requirement does not answer the question of whether terrorism coverage necessarily applies to a cyber event, however.<sup>167</sup> It would be difficult in many cases to argue that certain cyber scammers are attempting “to coerce the civilian population of the United States or to influence the policy or affect the conduct of the United States Government by coercion” with their actions, although there are surely conceivable exceptions.<sup>168</sup> Even in the event of the rare exception, cyber events are seldom “violent” acts, absent special facts—indeed, part of the appeal of being a hacker is being able to make money while still hiding safely behind a computer screen without facing any threat of violence.<sup>169</sup> To add another wrinkle, many terrorism forms contain endorsements excluding losses arising out of the malfunctioning, theft, corruption, or loss of use of or access to electronic data, just as property and CGL insurers now have done, leading to the final conclusion that seeking cyber coverage under the standard terrorism coverage offered with CGL and property policies is at best an uphill battle.<sup>170</sup> Even specialized “kidnap,

---

166. See Guidance Concerning Stand-Alone Cyber Liability Insurance Policies Under the Terrorism Risk Insurance Program, 81 Fed. Reg. 95,312 (Dec. 27, 2016).

167. See *id.* Such ambiguity is a pervasive problem for TRIA and related terrorism legislation, as a few practitioners have noted: “Terrorism legislation of all sorts defy cohesive analysis by their sheer volume. Even if one finds the pertinent statute, there are numerous other authorities, such as enactments specific to certain countries or even specific court cases, executive orders, and regulations.” VED P. NANDA, DAVID K. PANSIUS & BRYAN NEIHART, 1 LITIGATION OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES IN U.S. COURTS § 3:52, Westlaw (database updated Apr. 2018).

168. 31 C.F.R. § 50.4(b)(2017); see Daniel Wilson, *ISIS-Linked Hacker Pleads Guilty In Cyberterror Case*, LAW360 (June 17, 2016, 2:41 PM EDT), <https://www.law360.com/articles/808220/isis-linked-hacker-pleads-guilty-in-cyberterror-case> (“Kosovo man pled guilty in Virginia federal court to charges that he hacked the personal details of around 1,300 American troops and government personnel and put them at risk by posting that information on a Twitter account controlled by the Islamic State group, commonly called ISIS.”).

169. See John Winn & Kevin Govern, *Identity Theft: Risks and Challenges to Business of Data Compromise*, 28 TEMP. J. SCI. TECH. & ENVT’L L. 49, 51 (2009) (“Cyber-theft is usually non-violent, has high profit margins, and incurs little or no risk of detection or prosecution.”).

170. See, e.g., UKP 602 1213 Endorsement (on file with author). This endorsement excludes:

any loss, damage, cost or expense directly or indirectly caused by, consisting of, or resulting from any of the following, regardless of any other cause or event contributing concurrently or in any other sequence thereto:

1. Any functioning or malfunctioning of Electronic Data (including but not limited to any issues related to dates or date processing), the internet, an intranet, a private network, or any similar facility;

ransom, and extortion” insurance policies do not necessarily cover ransomware.<sup>171</sup>

#### *E. Directors’ & Officers’ Insurance*

Directors’ and officers’ (D&O) liability insurance policies provide coverage for claims against directors and officers that allege wrongful acts that those officials committed in their capacity as directors and officers of the insured company.<sup>172</sup> Some D&O policy forms exclude coverage for claims arising out of “damage to or destruction of any data or tangible property, including loss of use thereof; [provided this exclusion does] not apply to Loss on account of any Claim arising from damage to, destruction of, loss of, or loss of use of, client records in an Insured’s possession.”<sup>173</sup> This exclusionary language is not nearly as far-reaching as that of the “Access Or Disclosure Of Confidential Or Personal Information” endorsement found in almost all CGL policies (discussed *supra* Section V.B), as it only excludes “damage to” or “destruction” of data, which does not necessarily occur during the course of a Privacy Breach Event. However, many D&O policies specifically exclude coverage for “invasion of privacy,” and courts generally enforce such exclusions, which could

---

2. Any corruption, destruction, distortion, erasure, alteration, theft, or other loss or damage to Electronic Data;

3. Loss of use, access to, or functionality, all whether partial or entire, of Electronic Data, any computer or computer system, or any other device dependent upon any microchip or embedded logic, and any ensuing liability or failure of the Insured to conduct business.

*Id.*

171. See Jeffrey Weinstein & Bruce Kaliner, *Will Crisis Management Insurance Cover Ransomware?*, LAW360 (Jan. 17, 2018, 4:44 PM EST), <https://www.law360.com/insurance/articles/1002995/will-crisis-management-insurance-cover-ransomware->. Although many of these policies have updated their language to expressly include computer-related events, there may be coverage hiccups in some instances where the following policy conditions are not met: (1) the threat is “communicated to the insured by person(s) who demand a ransom as a condition for not carrying out or ending the extortion incident”; and (2) “the insured is the intended victim of the triggering event.” *Id.* These conditions can be difficult because during these events the malware encryption often has already taken place before any threat is made; there is no “human” threat but rather only a computer message; and the “intended victim” is often not precise, as the ransomware does not necessarily target certain individuals but rather is designed to spread and infect. *Id.*

172. See *Directors and Officers (D&O) Liability Insurance*, INT’L RISK MGMT. INST., INC., <https://www.irmi.com/online/insurance-glossary/terms/d/directors-and-officers-liability-insurance.aspx> (last visited Jan. 3, 2018).

173. See Chubb Ltd., Asset Management, D&O Form 26-10-0426 (1998) (on file with author).

present a problem if a securities-law or fiduciary-duty claim arose out of a Privacy Breach Event.<sup>174</sup>

The insured has prevailed in obtaining D&O coverage for a Privacy Breach Event when it (the insured) specifically purchases “Electronic Risk Liability” coverage. In *First Bank of Delaware, Inc. v. Fidelity and Deposit Co. of Maryland*, the insured subcontracted with Data Access Systems (DAS) to process certain credit card payments.<sup>175</sup> Malicious actors hacked DAS’s servers, which led to millions of unauthorized withdrawals from customer accounts, placing First Bank out of compliance with the “Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (‘PCI DSS’).”<sup>176</sup> First Bank sought coverage under a provision of its D&O policy that covered electronic-risk liability, defined as “any unauthorized use of, or unauthorized access to, electronic data or software with a computer system.”<sup>177</sup> The insurer argued that there was no covered “loss event” because the computer system was “not used to transact business on behalf of First Bank” (an element of the policy’s definition of “Computer System”), and that coverage should be denied under an exclusion for claims “based upon or attributable to or arising from the actual or purported fraudulent use by any person or entity of any data or in any credit, debit, charge, access, convenience, customer identification or other card, including, but not limited to, the card number.”<sup>178</sup> The court sided with the insured, finding that a loss event did occur because DAS’s computers were used to conduct credit card transactions, fees from which were indeed part of First Bank’s “business.”<sup>179</sup> It determined that every unauthorized use of or access to the insured’s electronic data or software would almost necessarily involve fraud, and thus a literal reading of the policy’s exclusion would render the electronic-risk coverage illusory.<sup>180</sup>

---

174. See *L.A. Lakers, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co.*, No. CV 14-7743 DMG (SHx), 2015 WL 2088865, at \*5-9 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 2015); *LAC Basketball Club Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co.*, No. CV 14-00113 GAF (FFMx), 2014 WL 1623704 at \*4-5 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2014); *Res. Bank v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co.*, 503 F. Supp. 2d 789, 794-97 (E.D. Va. 2007).

175. *First Bank of Del., Inc. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md.*, No. N11C-08-221 MMJ CCLD, 2013 WL 5858794, at \*1 (Del. Super. Ct. Oct. 30, 2013).

176. *Id.* at \*1-2.

177. *Id.* at \*2, 5.

178. *Id.* at \*4-8.

179. *Id.* at \*5.

180. *Id.* at \*5-9. With respect to the latter point, the court summarized:

The Court finds that applying Exclusion M would swallow the coverage granted under Section 4.III(L)(1) for “any unauthorized use of, or unauthorized access to electronic data . . . with a computer system.” It is theoretically

### VI. A Nightmare Scenario

As one might be able to glean from this Article, there are myriad cyber scenarios that could present problems for CRE insureds.<sup>181</sup> However, it is useful to walk through an example of a potential cyber event and provide a step-by-step explanation of the dangers involved and how insurers would respond. Drawing upon the real events as well as the policy form and endorsement language discussed in this Article, the following represents a possible cyber event for which CRE insureds should be sufficiently prepared. Although the example utilizes a multi-tenant office asset (and makes a number of other assumptions) for simplicity's sake, it should be noted that there are nearly limitless distinct applications and exposures that could be discussed, all of which could have varying outcomes.

Suppose Owner leases a Chicago office building to various entities, including Tenant. In the Lease, Tenant warrants that it is a small startup company that sells widgets and that it will use its portion of the leased premises as a corporate office. Tenant covenants that it will obtain and maintain various traditional insurance coverages during the Lease Term, including general liability insurance and insurance for its own personal property. Owner covenants that it will carry "all-risk" property insurance for the building, and Owner also happens to carry its own CGL, crime, terrorism, D&O, and cyber insurance. The Lease provides that Tenant will indemnify, defend, and hold Owner harmless for any and all claims and losses "in connection with or arising from the use or occupancy or manner of use or occupancy of the Premises or any injury or damage caused by Tenant."<sup>182</sup> Suppose further the Lease states that the HVAC at the building is to be handled through a centralized system that is ultimately controlled

---

possible that an example of non-fraudulent unauthorized use of data exists. However, in the context of this Policy, all unauthorized use could be, to some extent, fraudulent. The abstract possibility of some coverage surviving the fraud exclusion is not sufficient to persuade the Court to apply an exclusion that is almost entirely irreconcilable with the Loss Event coverage.

*Id.* at \*9. Note that Judge Johnston's logic here is entirely consistent with this Article's position on *Medidata* and related cases of computer fraud, discussed *supra* in Section V.C of this Article ("Commercial Crime Insurance"). The Fifth Circuit has also ruled in favor of the D&O insured in a case involving a hacking of credit card information leading to non-compliance with the PCI DSS. *See Spec's Family Partners, Ltd. v. Hanover Ins. Co.*, No. 17-20263, 2018 WL 3120794 (5th Cir., Jun. 25, 2018) (holding insurer wrongfully refused to defend insured because contractual liability exclusion did not explicitly excuse duty to defend).

181. *See supra* Sections III-IV.

182. *See, e.g.*, OFFICE LEASE AGREEMENT, *supra* note 23.

by the Owner, but that Tenant will be charged proportional costs related to maintaining the HVAC as Additional Rent.<sup>183</sup> Owner contracts with a third-party HVAC vendor to handle all the heat and air conditioning and maintenance thereof.

The HVAC system is “smart”—i.e., it includes various environmental sensors that monitor the system for abnormalities, energy consumption, and the need for service checkups and routine maintenance. Accordingly, the HVAC vendor that operates the system retains access rights to Owner’s computer network for carrying out these tasks.<sup>184</sup> One day, malevolent hackers breach the HVAC system through a security vulnerability, thus giving them a foothold in Owner’s network and allowing them to exercise control of not only the HVAC systems, but also the building electrical systems, the Tenant’s Wi-Fi, and Tenant’s customer-payment systems.<sup>185</sup> The intrusion has thus occurred. That day, Owner and Tenant both receive messages from the hackers indicating that if they do not transfer \$10,000 in Bitcoin to the hackers within forty-eight hours, the hackers will turn off the HVAC and electricity at the office building and release on the dark web the information of 10 million individuals found in Tenant’s payment-systems database.

Unsure of whether this message is some kind of bluff or joke, Owner and Tenant work together during the next two days to address the problem by consulting law enforcement and hired computer experts. They begin the process of obtaining enough Bitcoin to pay the hackers in the event they end up needing to pay, but they assume the issue will be fixed and that

---

183. See, e.g., W. MICHAEL BOND & JOHN GOLDMAN, OFFICE LEASE NEGOTIATIONS FOR TENANTS (2018) Westlaw 6-503-7910.

184. See Jaikumar Vijayan, *Target Attack Shows Danger of Remotely Accessible HVAC Systems*, COMPUTERWORLD (Feb. 7, 2014, 6:52 AM PT), <https://www.computerworld.com/article/2487452/cybercrime-hacking/target-attack-shows-danger-of-remotely-accessible-hvac-systems.html>.

185. This sort of breach through the HVAC system is exactly how the Target cyber attack was accomplished. *Id.*

[T]hieves sent phishing emails to Fazio Mechanical Services, a third-party HVAC vendor that had access to Target’s computer systems, according to court documents. The emails were designed to trick users into clicking a link to download password-stealing malware. That gave Fazio’s Target network passwords to the hackers, who then used them to steal the retail giant’s customer data.

Brandon Lowrey, *Are Insurance Lawyers Ready for the ‘Year of the Phish’?*, LAW360 (Feb. 16, 2018 6:44 PM), <https://www.law360.com/articles/1013330/are-insurance-lawyers-ready-for-the-year-of-the-phish-> (emphasis omitted).



business will continue smoothly<sup>186</sup> (and furthermore, they are told that their Bitcoin transaction will take a few days to process).<sup>187</sup> Unfortunately, the message is not a bluff, and the hackers do exactly as they threatened after forty-eight hours. The building's HVAC and electricity are turned off, and the hackers release the personal data of millions of individuals over the dark web, the long-term effect of which is immeasurable. While there is no electricity, heat, or air conditioning, Tenant is unable to conduct business operations. At this point, data breach notification statutes are triggered, and Owner immediately retains a lawyer who specializes in data security and privacy, meanwhile putting all Owner and Tenant insurance carriers on notice of the issue.

On the day of this calamitous occurrence, computer experts are quickly able to compile all of the names of the people potentially affected. Owner and Tenant both incur significant expenses notifying all affected parties of the breach, in compliance with all relevant data breach notification statutes,<sup>188</sup> which is in addition to the fees they are paying the lawyer and the computer experts. The stakeholders agree at this point that it is probably best to just pay the hackers so that the building will be placed back into service. Owner pays the hackers that same day with the understanding that insurance likely will reimburse the cost, and failing that, Tenant's indemnity obligations should kick in. Sadly, once the payment is made, the hackers do not turn the HVAC and electricity back on, but rather, demand another ransom payment. Owner and Tenant are both (understandably) incredibly frustrated at this point and refuse to pay out any more money to these awful hackers. After about three more weeks, the computer experts discover the vulnerability, fix it, and make changes sufficient to ensure that the hackers no longer have access to any of the computer systems. Normalcy is restored.

The return of the HVAC and electricity is all well and good, but in the meantime, Owner has lost a month's worth of rental income from each of its angry tenants whose lawyers advised that they withhold rent payments because Owner failed to maintain the building in a tenantable manner for nearly an entire month due to its failure to adequately secure the HVAC

---

186. One survey found that only "24.6% of companies would be willing to pay a ransom to hackers." CLOUD SEC. ALL. & SKYHIGH, THE CLOUD BALANCING ACT FOR IT: BETWEEN PROMISE AND PERIL 2 (2016), <http://info.skyhighnetworks.com/rs/274-AUP-214/images/WP%20CSA%20Survey%20Cloud%20Balancing%20Act%200116.pdf>.

187. See *Why Does a Buy Take So Long?*, COINBASE, <https://support.coinbase.com/customer/portal/articles/1392022-why-does-a-buy-take-so-long> (last visited Sept. 5, 2018).

188. See *supra* Section IV.B.

(for which it was responsible under the Lease) and maintain the electricity.<sup>189</sup> Tenant, a small startup company, is unable to withstand the deadly combined blow of one month without widget-selling and the tarnished reputation from the release of its customers' PII, so it eventually files for bankruptcy. Predictably, it also breaks the lease, and Owner now must find a replacement tenant, not to mention the expenses incurred through the ineffective Bitcoin payment, data breach notification compliance, attorneys' fees, and payment for the computer experts. To make matters worse, plaintiffs' lawyers have discovered that the breach that caused the release of PII originated in the HVAC, which was the Owner's responsibility under the Lease. Given that Tenant is rendered insolvent and that the HVAC vendor does not have pockets as deep as the Owner's, the plaintiffs' lawyers organize a big-money class action lawsuit against Owner.

Tenant's insurance policies would not assist with any of these costs because (1) the class action is not against Tenant, so the insurer has no duty to defend (not to mention the applicability of the Access Or Disclosure Of Confidential Or Personal Information And Data-Related Liability exclusion); (2) the HVAC is not Tenant's personal property, but rather, it is Owner's property, so Tenant's property policy would not respond (not to mention any applicable electronic data exclusions); and (3) Owner did not require Tenant to carry any cyber insurance, so there would be no cyber coverage. Furthermore, Tenant is insolvent, so any attempts by Owner to attain satisfaction on Tenant's indemnity obligations will inevitably be relegated to the back of the line with the other unsecured creditors in bankruptcy. Even if Tenant had remained solvent, it is certainly arguable whether a hacking of *Owner's* HVAC would give rise to any obligations on behalf of Tenant under the Lease language.<sup>190</sup> Could Owner seek any defense or indemnification from its own insurance? Let us assume that throughout this whole process, Owner dutifully and accurately has kept its insurance carriers abreast of everything with the hope of obtaining coverage for all of these expenses.

---

189. See *supra* Section III.B; note 62 and accompanying text.

190. See OFFICE LEASE AGREEMENT, *supra* note 23 (stating in lease language that Tenant will indemnify for claims and losses "in connection with or arising from the use or occupancy or manner of use or occupancy of the Premises or any injury or damage caused by Tenant") (emphasis added). Here, the breach of the HVAC did not arise out of Tenant's use or occupancy or manner of use or occupancy, and all losses were arguably caused by the acts or omissions of Owner or his HVAC vendor, not Tenant.

The business interruption coverage on Owner's all-risk property policy would likely not provide any coverage for lost rent or income, because although building systems were turned off, there was no specified covered peril or physical damage to trigger the policy.<sup>191</sup> The CGL carrier would not tender a defense in relation to the class action, as the action arises out of "Access Or Disclosure Of Confidential Or Personal Information And Data-Related Liability."<sup>192</sup> Owner's crime and terrorism carriers will deny the claim for the massive Bitcoin payment because standard crime policies do not cover Cyber Extortion, and absent other facts, it is unlikely that this hacking would be deemed a certified act of terrorism.<sup>193</sup> If shareholders sued Owner's officers and directors for breach of duty of care, then theoretically Owner's D&O coverage could provide defense and possibly indemnity depending on the policy language, but only as to that particular lawsuit.<sup>194</sup> Thus, Owner's cyber policy would almost certainly be the last resort for indemnification for these losses.

First, any adequate cyber policy should cover all of Owner's data breach notification costs, as well as the fees paid to the computer experts.<sup>195</sup> The Cyber Extortion coverage provisions of most cyber policies should cover the eventual payment of the Bitcoin.<sup>196</sup> Defense of the class action lawsuit should also be covered, assuming the policy does not have a blanket exclusion for consumer-protection class actions that the carrier uses to deny the claim.<sup>197</sup> So, under the average cyber policy, the insured Owner would likely recoup some of the costs associated with this unfortunate event.

As to the lost rental income stemming from the angry tenants and the insolvent Tenant, however, it is likely that many cyber insurers would deny coverage for *all* the costs related thereto because many of the business-interruption costs here arguably were caused by a "Privacy Breach Event"

---

191. *See supra* Section V.A.

192. *See supra* Section V.B.

193. *See supra* Sections V.C-D.

194. *See supra* Sections V.E. Owner would have to ensure that its D&O policy does not contain any relevant exclusion, such as one for "invasion of privacy." *See supra* Section V.E.

195. *See* RAND Study, *supra* note 27, at 13; Am. Int'l Grp., Event Management Coverage Section, *supra* note 26, Definition 2(h); Am. Int'l Grp., Reputation Guard Coverage Section, *supra* note 26, Definition 2(f); Evolve MGA Cyber Policy, *supra* note 33, Insuring Clause 1, Sections A, B; JLT Asset Management Cyber Policy, *supra* note 26, Privacy Breach, Privacy Breach Management B.1; Chubb Cyber Policy, *supra* note 33, Cyber Incident Response Expenses Definition.

196. *See* Chubb Cyber Policy, *supra* note 33, Extortion Expenses Definition.

197. *See* sources cited *supra* note 195.

or a “Cyber Extortion Event” rather than a “System Event.”<sup>198</sup> Although the hackers did shut systems down in this hypothetical, they also threatened release of PII through ransomware, giving the insurer plenty of room to argue that business-interruption coverage was *never triggered at all*. Given that the building at issue is a multi-tenant office building in Chicago, the amount lost to Owner if the insurer denies this coverage is likely in the millions of dollars. Furthermore, if it ever becomes apparent that the hackers in question were operating at the behest of North Korea or a terrorist group, the insurer could deny coverage *altogether* if the policy contained broad terrorism or war exclusion wording.<sup>199</sup> As the reader undoubtedly now recognizes, traditional insurance policies are not adequate to cover events like these, and indeed even the cyber policy coverage itself can be tenuous, a reality that underscores the importance of buying the right policy with the most expansive possible coverage.

This hypothetical obviously presents something of a nightmare scenario, but it is not terribly far-fetched. All of the events in this hypothetical are drawn from actual cyber events and related litigation, most of which were discussed in this Article. CRE insureds would do well to take these threats seriously and attempt to address them with robust cybersecurity, contractual risk transfer, and well-negotiated cyber insurance. Until more case law comes down to determine what types of events are really covered by cyber insurance, rigorous diligence before policies are bound and before claims arise is the best risk mitigation approach. For example, the Lease in this hypothetical should have included a cyber insurance requirement for all tenants as well as indemnification language indicating that tenants would indemnify, defend, and hold Owner harmless for any costs arising out of any cyber events, including those related to the HVAC. Further, Owner’s cyber policy should have adequately addressed the provision of indemnity for business interruption caused by Privacy Breach Events and Cyber Extortion Events rather than only System Events.

---

198. See *supra* Sections II.C, III.B; JLT Asset Management Cyber Policy, *supra* note 26, Definitions 34, 39; see also Am. Int’l Grp., Network Interruption Coverage Section, *supra* note 26, Section 1 (Insuring Agreement), Definition 2(k) (tying business interruption coverage to “Security Failure”); Am. Int’l Grp., Security and Privacy Coverage Section, *supra* note 26, Section 1 (Insuring Agreement), Definitions 2(l) and 2(p) (tying liability coverage to either “Security Failure” or “Privacy Event”); but see Evolve MGA Cyber Policy, *supra* note 33, Insuring Clauses 1 & 3, Definition 11 (tying both first- and third-party coverages to broadly defined “cyber event”).

199. See *supra* Section III.C.

### VII. Conclusion

Given the acuteness of cyber threats, it is critical that risk managers and insurance counsel analyze any and all potential gaps between current policies and the market's available cyber options when shopping for coverage.<sup>200</sup> CRE insureds involved with the construction or ownership of smart buildings are likely to be most concerned about property damage, business interruption, and liability to third parties arising from cyber events.<sup>201</sup> Insurance coverage for these dangers that might have historically existed under property, CGL, crime, terrorism, and D&O policies (i.e., "silent cyber") has already been or soon will be phased out from those policies and segregated into cyber insurance products.<sup>202</sup> Regrettably, many of the cyber solutions that the insurance industry offers can also be too narrow in their scope in that they too do not guarantee sufficient coverage for these risks.<sup>203</sup> From a smart building owner's perspective, broadly worded exclusions relating to property damage,<sup>204</sup> bodily injury,<sup>205</sup> contractual liability,<sup>206</sup> war,<sup>207</sup> intellectual property,<sup>208</sup> and other terms collectively serve to obfuscate the advantages of many cyber policies in the market.<sup>209</sup>

Still, CRE stakeholders must ensure that a risk assessment and coverage gap analysis takes place, using the analysis thereof as the basis for their negotiations with cyber carriers to obtain coverage to fill those specific gaps and obtain the necessary coverage to the extent available.<sup>210</sup> Insureds must also emphasize stronger negotiation and contractual risk transfer to ensure that any tenants or property managers maintaining the data at smart buildings purchase cyber insurance and agree to indemnify the owner for losses arising out of any cyber events.<sup>211</sup> Cyber insurance carriers, meanwhile, should focus their efforts on offering products that are more narrowly tailored to CRE needs and the risks associated with smart

---

200. *See supra* Section V.

201. *See supra* Sections III-IV.

202. *See supra* Sections V-VI; *see also supra* note 135 and accompanying text.

203. *See supra* Sections III-IV.

204. *See supra* Section III.A; note 56 and accompanying text.

205. *See supra* Section V.B; note 139 and accompanying text.

206. *See supra* Section IV.A.

207. *See supra* Section III.C.

208. *See supra* Section III.A; note 57 and accompanying text.

209. *See supra* Sections III-IV.

210. This is possible because cyber insurance is relatively negotiable due to its difficulty in pricing. *See supra* Section II.D.

211. *See supra* Sections V-VI.

buildings, so that they can actually offer additional protection that is worth purchasing as these new perils continue to emerge. Otherwise, CRE might continue to stay away from cyber insurance products where there is little to no articulable benefit to purchasing them.<sup>212</sup> Nevertheless, because the insurance industry has already begun the process of excluding any possible “silent cyber” from the traditional policies, obtainment and maintenance of cyber insurance will soon undoubtedly become more of a necessity, and less of a luxury, for all businesses.<sup>213</sup>

---

212. *See supra* note 21 and accompanying text. Innovative products may already be starting to accomplish these goals. *See Willis Towers Watson Launches Tailored Cyberinsurance Coverage for Construction Industry*, WILLIS TOWERS WATSON (July 10, 2018), <https://www.willistowerswatson.com/en-US/press/2018/07/tailored-cyberinsurance-coverage-for-construction-industry>; *see also* Jeff Sistrunk, *Apple, Cisco Venture Could Fuel Cyberinsurance Market Surge*, LAW360 (Feb. 9, 2018, 7:11 PM EST), <https://www.law360.com/articles/1010553/apple-cisco-venture-could-fuel-cyberinsurance-market-surge>.

213. *See supra* note 135 and accompanying text.

*Appendix*

*Cyber Coverage Checklist for CRE<sup>214</sup> Based on Current Case Law and  
Prevalent Policy Forms and Endorsements*

- \_\_\_ LOST INCOME, REVENUE, REPUTATION / BUSINESS INTERRUPTION INCLUDED<sup>215</sup>
- \_\_\_ BUSINESS INTERRUPTION WAITING PERIOD IS 8 HOURS OR LESS<sup>216</sup>
- \_\_\_ NO EXCLUSION FOR BODILY INJURY, OR IF THERE IS AN EXCLUSION, CARVEBACK FOR MENTAL ANGUISH/EMOTIONAL DISTRESS<sup>217</sup>
- \_\_\_ EXCLUSION FOR PROPERTY DAMAGE CARVED BACK TO ALLOW COVERAGE FOR BRICKING AND DAMAGE TO INTANGIBLE PROPERTY (I.E., ELECTRONIC DATA)<sup>218</sup>
- \_\_\_ EXCLUSION FOR CONTRACTUAL LIABILITY CARVED BACK TO PROVIDE COVERAGE FOR PCI FINES, LIABILITY THAT WOULD HAVE ARISEN IN ABSENCE OF CONTRACT, AND CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION TO SECURE/MAINTAIN PII<sup>219</sup>
- \_\_\_ SECURITIES CLAIMS/BREACH OF SECURITIES LAWS EXCLUSION CARVED BACK TO ALLOW COVERAGE FOR SUCH CLAIMS THAT ARISE OUT OF CYBERSECURITY/ CYBER LIABILITY<sup>220</sup>
- \_\_\_ NO TERRORISM EXCLUSION DEFINING TERRORISM AS BEING ANY ATTACK CONNECTED TO AN “IDEOLOGY” OR OTHER VAGUE TERMS<sup>221</sup>
- \_\_\_ WAR EXCLUSION DOES NOT APPLY TO CYBERTERRORISM<sup>222</sup>
- \_\_\_ AUTOMATIC COVERAGE FOR MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS<sup>223</sup>

---

214. Please note that depending on the size and nature of the various exposures to the insured, as well as the costliness of adding/removing certain items, some of these terms should not necessarily be “deal breakers” during the negotiation process for every insured. Rather, this list is an attempt to provide considerations insureds should seek to confirm with their insurance brokers and carriers as part of the negotiation and decision-making process when signing up with a cyber insurance program.

215. *See supra* Section III.B.

216. *See supra* Section II.C. Note, the shortest waiting period the author has seen offered is six hours.

217. *See supra* note 139 and accompanying text.

218. *See supra* Section III.A.

219. *See supra* Section IV.A.

220. *See supra* Section IV.C.

221. *See supra* Section III.C.

222. *See supra* Section III.C.

223. Although not discussed in this Article at great length, this is a critical component of proper cyber coverage for real estate companies because new assets are going to need to be added to the policy throughout the term. A CRE insured does not want a negotiation to occur or have a substantial additional premium be charged every single time a new property is

- \_\_\_ CONFIRM GDPR COVERAGE (TO THE EXTENT ENFORCEABLE)<sup>224</sup>
- \_\_\_ RETENTION/DEDUCTIBLE NOT GREATER THAN \$25,000<sup>225</sup>
- \_\_\_ VIOLATION OF CONSUMER PROTECTION STATUTE NOT EXCLUDED (OR, IF EXCLUDED, SUCH EXCLUSION IS SPECIFICALLY CARVED BACK FOR SUITS/ACTIONS BROUGHT UNDER THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ACT)<sup>226</sup>
- \_\_\_ CRYPTOCURRENCY PROVIDED AS PART OF CYBER EXTORTION/RANSOMWARE COVERAGE (WITH NO WAITING PERIOD)<sup>227</sup>

---

added to the portfolio.

224. *See supra* note 103 and accompanying text.

225. This is the market standard as of this writing.

226. *See supra* Section IV.A.

227. *See supra* note 187 and accompanying text.