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William T. Hamilton
Otterbein University

Albert E. Lovejoy
Otterbein University

Robert G. Clarke
Otterbein University

Norman Chaney
Otterbein University

Paul L. Redditt
Otterbein University

See next page for additional authors

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Authors

William T. Hamilton, Albert E. Lovejoy, Robert G. Clarke, Norman Chaney, Paul L. Redditt, Elwyn M. Williams, and J. Patrick Lewis

THE OTTERBEIN MISCELLANY

**VIRGIL THOMSON: AMERICAN MUSIC
AND MUSIC CRITICISM**

Remarks by Virgil Thomson

at the Otterbein Virgil Thomson Festival

Edited and with Preface by Barbara Z. Achter

**THE KNOWABLE COMMUNITY:
THE CRITICISM AND FICTION OF RAYMOND WILLIAMS**

William T. Hamilton

THE ABC'S OF CRIME AND ITS TREATMENT

Albert E. Lovejoy

FOREWORD

The *Otterbein Miscellany* is published once or twice a year as an outlet for faculty writing on a wide variety of topics. The college underwrites this publication in the belief that it will help maintain a genuine community of scholars. Papers are accepted, therefore, on the basis of their interest to the whole academic community rather than to members of a particular discipline. Editorial responsibility rests with a committee of the faculty.

Contributions are considered from the Otterbein College faculty and administration, active and emeritus — others on invitation only.

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MOWING

The English author Hilaire Belloc had an appreciative eye for persons who were engaged in scrupulous endeavor. In an essay titled, "The Mowing of a Field," Belloc's appreciation is reflected in a description of a "good mower" at his work:

So great an art can only be learnt by continual practice; but this much is worth writing down, that, as in all good work, to know the thing with which you work is the core of the affair. Good verse is best written on good paper with an easy pen, not with a lump of coal on a whitewashed wall. The pen thinks for you; and so does the scythe mow for you if you treat it honorably and in a manner that makes it recognize its service. The manner is this. You must regard the scythe as a pendulum that swings, not as a knife that cuts. A good mower puts no more strength into his stroke than into his lifting.... The bad mower, eager and full of pain, leans forward and tries to force the scythe through the grass. The good mower, serene and able, stands as nearly straight as the shape of the scythe will let him, and follows up every stroke closely, moving his left foot forward. Then also let every stroke get well away. Mowing is a thing of ample gestures, like drawing a cartoon. Then, again, get yourself into a mechanical and repetitive mood: be thinking of anything at all but your mowing, and be anxious only when there seems some interruption to the monotony of the sound.

Belloc applies the idea of good mowing, symbolically, to the whole of life. All that we do in our daily existence, he suggests, should be a "part of the easy but continual" labor of our lives. And we suggest that Belloc's symbolism of good mowing has a poignant application to the academic life. The good academic, we might say, is one who has mastered a certain easy but continual style of thought. It is a style in which basic perceptions that press upon the mind with the demand for completion are gradually worked out, not with the impatience of the bad mower, but with the patience of the good mower, who "goes forward very steadily."

Whether or not the writings in this edition of *The Otterbein Miscellany* have been worked out with the patience of the good mower is a matter for the reader to decide. As editors we merely hope that they seem to have been gleaned with a sharpened scythe.

As in previous years of the history of this publication, we wish to thank all those persons who have made the *Miscellany*

possible, writers, financial-supporters, editorial board, and proof-readers. We especially thank Margie Shaw, type-setter, Forest Moreland, printer, and Fred Baker, student-printer, whose skills are equaled only by their patience.

The Editors

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*Edited and with Preface by Barbara Z. Achter **

VIRGIL THOMSON: AMERICAN MUSIC AND MUSIC CRITICISM
Remarks by Virgil Thomson
at the Otterbein Virgil Thomson Festival

The composer, critic, and author Virgil Thomson spent four days at Otterbein College in November of 1975 as the guest of a festival in his honor. The Virgil Thomson Festival, part of Otterbein's yearlong Bicentennial Music Festival, was sponsored jointly by the Department of Music and the Otterbein Bicentennial Committee, and featured campus appearances by the composer and concert programs of his music. Also part of the Festival were two lively symposia on American music and music criticism, in which Thomson shared the platform with a group of Ohio music critics and members of the Otterbein faculty. All of these events afforded the College and Columbus community an opportunity to come to know the artist Virgil Thomson as, in his words, "elder statesman."¹

In his autobiography, Thomson has written this candid appraisal of himself at age five.

I arrived at my school years self-confident, cocky, and brash . . . Without the prelude of kindergarten or the benefit of any parental presence, I entered first grade wholly unafraid and ready for anything.²

This is not difficult to picture. Now more than three-quarters of a century later, there is still much of the precocious and mischievous boy in the octogenarian Virgil Thomson (b. November 25, 1896). In fact, despite a somewhat less than Olympian stature, he is in every way imposing. The owlish visage, the impeccable dress, the small rosette in his lapel (he is an *officier* of the French Légion d'Honneur) befit a man in command of himself and his profession. Virgil Thomson, one senses, has lived according to his own plan and high standards.

This Missourian, who served in the same World War I regiment as Harry Truman, possesses a rare mix of abilities. He is a

* *The remarks are edited from transcripts of tapes made at the two symposia on November 15, 1975, and are not necessarily in their original order. The first draft of the transcripts was done by Sharon Kelsey.*

composer/author with equal facility in both modes of expression. As a composer, Thomson has contributed to nearly every musical medium, although it is his operas to Gertrude Stein's librettos for which he is most acclaimed. Thomson's skill at setting English text may well stem from his own command of the language. As chief music critic for the New York *Herald Tribune* (1940-54), he was renowned for the high quality, readability, and often controversial nature of his reviews. And if this were not enough, he has produced seven books on wide-ranging musical subjects, an unusual literary output for either a composer or a critic. Thomson's books form a major contribution to music literature, a gold mine of thought and fact reflecting a career unique in American music.

Meeting Virgil Thomson is an unforgettable experience. He is utterly charming, at once exacting and debonair, and possessing the unusual but blessed gift of being able to make a fool of someone while maintaining their respect. Returning to the Midwest ("the air is better out here") and coming into a college setting ("this is how I keep my fingers in the pie, how I keep up") was a pleasure for him. During his stay at Otterbein, he coached both faculty and students alike in the proper execution of his music. He attended classes, held forth at gatherings in his honor, and delighted everyone within earshot with his editorial remarks (always kind, if funny) during concerts.

Yet perhaps most memorable were his spirited commentaries during the symposia. The way in which he developed his thoughts extemporaneously, always in complete, well-formed sentences, was baffling. Then there was the wit. As one dumbfounded listener exclaimed: "Good grief! An epigram a minute!" Thomson's humor was never completely frivolous, though. Underlying the clever turn of phrase was the insight and the informed opinion that had one nodding "how true" while laughing at the same time. For anyone who missed these sessions, the following excerpts may be taken as a sampler. And those who did hear them will recall the depth of understanding and joy with which Virgil Thomson surveys the musical scene, as well as life in general.



Virgil Thomson conducting a rehearsal of the Otterbein Wind Ensemble.

VIRGIL THOMSON

General Comments on Music Criticism

This business about composers and critics goes on and on. But there is a good book on the subject. Max Graf published a book called *Composers and Critics* [1946], in which he begins by saying it is the duty of a music reviewer not to explain the public to the artist, but to explain the artist to the public.³ Now I think that is basic common sense and a true view of the situation.

Actually, the history of music criticism over the last 200 years shows, as Dr. Graf lays it out in his book, that always during that time 50 per cent of the music reviewers have been composers. The other 50 per cent changes. In the first part of the eighteenth century, during the lifetimes of Bach and Handel, the other half of the music reviewers were likely to be musical analysts, experts in matters of harmony, counterpoint, and interval relations. Toward the end of the eighteenth century, there was a blessed period in which there were no music critics around. That was the time when Haydn and Mozart and Beethoven came to flower with absolutely no interference. But toward the end of Beethoven's life they were beginning to peep up again. This time it was a new sort of writer, not musical analysts. They were more likely to be poets. And then pretty soon the poets dropped out and musical historians became the bearers of the heavy duty. The music historians gave way in the late nineteenth century to *belles-lettres* essayists or, as Dr. Graf called them, *feuilletonistes*.⁴ They wrote little elegant pieces. But always and no matter what else happened, 50 per cent of the music reviewers, according to Dr. Graf, have been professional composers. I remember when I was working on a newspaper in New York, I started looking into this and simply counted the noses in the New York Music Critics' Circle, which had at that time twenty-five members. Well, out of that twenty-five members there were a number of historians, essayists, news reporters, but thirteen of them were practicing composers or had been in their youth. So it came out right.

I would, myself, strongly agree with Dr. Graf about the duty of the reviewer, which is to explain the artist and also to explain him in a way comparable to that in which the artist practices his art. You don't have to be quite as expert a man of letters as, shall we say, Ormandy or Toscanini is a conductor. But you have to use comparable standards of excellence in your work. Because, if you're going to wipe up the floor with Maria Callas or Kirsten Flagstad, you'd better do it in good English.

There are all sorts of things that I think it's rather foolish to do. I never would let the boys who worked for me at the New York *Herald Tribune* give singing lessons in public. No music critic ever told Artur Rubenstein how to finger a passage, but they'll all say "she didn't support her tones." What do they mean "support her tones?" That's a typical jargon phrase in the vocal studio and it belongs there. I don't see the use of critics trying to defend the public against the artist, considering us all as if we were practicing some kind of a shell game and that they know better and can unmask our pretensions. The truth of the matter is that all musical artists — composers or performers — are leading lives of great self-sacrifice. They've spent money and years of pain and hard labor training themselves, and they're entitled to the credit of good will on the part of no matter whom. Being a musical artist is a case of total commitment. Even the celebrities who are making a lot of money are still committed, because somebody is going to unmask them if they don't perform right and show their commitment.

Music reviews do not appear in the middle of a performance. They only appear after the performance, and the emotional reaction and the judgment of every individual there is usually formed by the time he reads them. There was a cartoon in one of the magazines a few years ago. Mama looks up from the newspaper and soup and says to Papa, "Say, you know that film we liked? I just found out it was lousy." Film reviewing, play reviewing, book reviewing are all shopping services. The most dangerous of all forms of reviewing is that of art works, because they are very expensive forms of property. And if you attack the commercial value of them, you may really get into trouble with museum trustees and rich collectors and people like that. Music reviewing has a function quite different from the other things. It is practically never a shopping service, it's a post mortem.

The Personal Element in Music Criticism

Your reactions are of no interest whatsoever! Your ability to describe an occasion or analyze an event — that is the professional thing. Description and analysis are the procedures. You are allowed a last sentence of what you think the event might mean, and when you read your piece over, if you don't like that, you can always cut it out. Informing the public as to what an artist is up to and what a piece contains is, I think, a far more valuable communication than your reactions. Besides, your preferences will come through automatically. You don't have to worry about those. You can even admit your personal bias. For instance, you can say that the opera *Louise* [1900, by Gustave Charpentier]

may not be the greatest music, but it's all about Paris and I like Paris. That enables the public by triangulation to figure out: here is the work, here I am, but it has to come through the dark glass of the critic. Knowing the color of that glass might be a tiny little help.

Your own reactions are very hard to get rid of. I remember when I first went on the paper, I said to my music editor Francis Perkins:⁵ "I go to something that I greatly enjoy and I feel good. I go to something that I really dislike and, you know, you can feel sour for two days about it. How long does that last?" He said "Oh, about six years." And he was quite right. After that I could go to any kind of an occasion, review it, describe it, and the next morning when I woke up to my paper, there was the review and I had no memory of what I had written or where I'd been. Suddenly it was recalled to me by the facts. It's very painful suppressing your emotions, though, as it is for mothers and school teachers. But they aren't supposed to have favorite children.

When to Write a Review; Music Reviews and the Papers from 1910 to the Present

When I came to work on a New York paper, I realized very quickly that you get something out of the "right-off-the-griddle" review that you never get the next day. You can actually mirror the event, you can evoke the sound of a piece or an artist. It's still fresh in your memory. The next day, about all that's left is your opinion of it, you see, not really what it was like. If you have enough time and can write fairly rapidly, you will do a more vivid and, on the whole, more fair depiction of the event or the work or the artist than if you wait. And, if you have further thoughts on the matter that there isn't time to go into, you usually have the possibility of a Sunday article for examining those. The French, Germans, and Italians have some awfully good, very knowledgeable critics who can write extremely well. But by the next day, they forget to tell you who wrote the piece, where it took place, and who conducted it. They start right off with personal opinion, which has been cooking for twelve to eighteen hours. But right off the bat you get something that you get in no other way.

For an average review, you need a half-hour. You can write a pretty good review in a half-hour. But less than that is skimpy. Now Olin Downes, late and lamented, was my colleague when I was working on a New York paper.⁶ And Olin used to complain a great deal about my facility. I could sit down and start writing

that first paragraph when you tell what took place, when, and where. This got my pencil going, and I always wrote with a pencil — much faster than a typewriter, of course. But Olin would say, “I can’t really get started until the fourth paragraph.” So he labored a good deal on his daily reviews, because it was hard for him to get the mind into motion.

My predecessor on the *Herald Tribune*, Lawrence Gilman, was a very slow writer and even though he had a two a.m. deadline in those days, he would still prepare reviews of a Philharmonic concert or anything like that by writing out all the details of who did what, and descriptive program-note matter about symphonic compositions, which are familiar and which he knew.⁷ And he would just leave a little slot for the new piece or the adjustment at the end, which he would then write in very carefully and polish. I had a much earlier deadline, but I could usually get a half-hour — sometimes as much as forty-five minutes — more if everybody else wasn’t asking for it. They can slot in one thing at the last moment, but if the heads of drama, dance, and music are all working that night and in addition it’s an election with last minute returns coming in, then they’re not going to hold the paper for you.

Of course, there are writers who are by nature garrulous. Now Bernard Shaw, who was a terrific reviewer and even something of a musician, could write like a whiz. But he was a garrulous old boy and he had lots of space. He wrote for a weekly paper and he filled three pages about something or other. We don’t have that kind of space available, although our predecessors in 1910 and 1920 did.

I can give you some funny figures about things like that. I used to look at the old papers to see how it was. Before World War I, say roughly between 1910 and 1920, the amount of reading matter in proportion to advertising in the *Times* and in my paper was anywhere from 75 per cent down to 50 per cent actual reading matter. After World War I, it never went over 50 per cent. And by 1930, it was down to 25 per cent of the space, the rest being ads. By World War II, it had gotten below 25 per cent, and now any page in the *Times* or the big Chicago papers has a little triangle of reading matter on the upper left hand page. The rest of it is ad and all the right side is ad too, or else it’s routine matter which is informative enough, but which takes lots and lots of space. The stock market reports will take five pages of documentation. And the *Times* publishes forty-six columns of sports news, which brings in practically no advertising but is for the information and

delight of the readers. This is an economic arrangement. You have to do things in a certain way. But they take it off of music. And today, dance gets more space in the big papers than music does. Because dance has become the American passion, and music is for old people and addicts.

Reviewing Modern Music

Well, there are ways to prepare. You can usually get ahold of a score, or go to a rehearsal. They're very nice about that, the conductors. But after you've been doing it a certain time, you will find out that there are only four or five kinds of the stuff anyway, and you'll be able to recognize right off which compartment it belongs in. That will enable you to answer the first and most important question about a work: what is it like? Is it a Romantic work structured on sequence with a little overlay of surface dissonance to make it sound modern? Is it a modern work of the neo-classic and impressionist school, because they are the same? The same composers write in the evocation of classical forms as of bright landscape pictures. Debussy did it. Richard Strauss, Stravinsky — they're all impressionists/neo-classicists. Then a little to the left of there come the twelve-tone people, who are essentially chromatic composers with the subject matter being their interior life rather than objective things like the evocation of the past or the depiction of natural scenery. They're very quarrelsome, the twelve-tone people, but they are one of the departments. Still farther to the left of those you have, of course, the percussion boys and the tape tamperers.

Now, in those four groups anybody can straddle one boundary, but nobody straddles two. Prokofiev, for instance, wrote part of his music in a kind of phony modern and part of it neo-classical/impressionist. But he's not a twelve-tone boy or a percussion calculator. The twelve-tone boys can spread over into the calculators, or they can spread backwards into the neo-romantic department of the neo-classicals. But they don't go clear back into the deliberate writing of sequence music.

It's fairly easy, once you get the hang of it, to answer the question "what is it like?", and that will do you usually for the amount of space you have. It's not so hard. You just stick around a while and do your homework and go to everything, and you'll find out in the first ten measures where a piece belongs. Now the question of "what is it about?" is much more difficult. That's a detective story: who committed the murder? Oh yes, that's much more elaborate. But there are methods for that, too, as to whether

it is dance music, or music that imitates the rise and fall of language, or music depicting un verbalized emotions of visceral origin, which is what the great classics are. They are mixed up with dance and poetry too, though, you see. They're a great *mélange*.

Here is one bit of documentary information that I think might entertain you. Some twenty or twenty-five years ago, the National Music League printed the results of a documentary investigation which was carried out in the city of Indianapolis. It was carried out by a St. Louis firm of people who take polls and do that kind of house-to-house and person-to-person inquiry. This is all perfectly standard procedure. The question asked was how much contemporary music should be in concert programs. "Contemporary" was defined as music from the last twenty-five years.

Well, the answers all came out by ages. People under thirty consistently would have preferred 75 per cent contemporary music. Between thirty and forty, they wanted 50-50. From forty to fifty, they wanted 25 per cent contemporary, and after fifty they didn't care if they got contemporary music or not. Because, after fifty, Debussy, Ravel, Stravinsky — all the twentieth-century old masters — are contemporary with them anyway, so they don't consider them as novel music. But the young would like to inform themselves while their minds are still flexible.

Performance Opportunities for Contemporary Music

There are compartments now for the novel works. There is the school and college trade, which performs quite a lot of them. There are the modern music societies — New York is lousy with them. There is the German radio, the French radio, and the BBC in England. They all perform new works for different reasons. In France, they perform new works because any citizen is entitled to a decent representation in the arts by state radio. In the public concerts of the subscription orchestras, their subsidies from the French government depend on their playing 100 minutes of new works by French citizens every year.

In Germany, modern music is subsidized in another way, because the publishers are very powerful in Germany and they have access to pretty well anything they want performed on the radio. The publishers are very rich and very powerful, and they can get anything they want on radio. Consequently, they publish any new music they can get their hands on, and they get it performed less in the orchestras but constantly on the radio. The only protection the radio people have against the possible lack of

popularity of these works is to put them on after eleven o'clock at night, by not giving them what we call "prime time."

In England, the BBC, which is half owned by the British government and supported by taxation, is the one independent music organization in the country. The Arts Council and the British Council are relatively independent, but they don't have enormous amounts of money. The English publishers, who have a monopolistic situation, can prevent the public performances of things except on the BBC. The BBC has been run for the last forty years or more by predominantly liberal-minded people.

In Italy they don't care so much. Italy has another problem, which is educating its people. You see, every Italian firmly believes that opera is the national art and that La Scala [opera house] is the Vatican, the temple where this art is practiced to perfection. The fact remains, however, that only 50 per cent of the Italian public has ever heard an opera. All right, what happens with television is that they get opera and it is organized around La Scala. The main studio for this, though, is in Milano and not in the theatre itself, because it is too much trouble with scene changing. And the house is constantly in use for rehearsals, anyway. So they built a vast studio covering acres on which they can set up twelve sets. They bring the La Scala orchestra and artists over there and take a documentary film of how each opera is done at La Scala. And that, of course, is what people want, not only in Italy but in Tokyo and in Idaho. They want to know how it really is. They don't want it translated into film terms. They get films all the time. Now this has been going on in Italy for something like fifteen or more years. They do an opera a month, so they have video tapes of an enormous repertory. And then they do them all over again when they have new artists. Callas is replaced by some other person in favor. They do a devoted job educating their public. Again, this is state, not commercial, funding of what the Italian people want and want to believe, which is that opera is quite grand as done in Milano. And they find that out.

We don't do anything like that. Radio was our gift to music. Television is anti-musical. It's even anti-ballet, because you can't dance on a dime. In addition to which, for ballet or similar purposes, the television studios are no good. The floor is occupied by men on horseback riding around and the lights are all dangled from above. Consequently, even Marilyn Monroe came out with great black circles under her eyes. She should have been lit from below, not from the top. But no one can get those men on

horseback off that floor. Television is so badly lit that in the entire history of the affair, which is now up to thirty years, it has never made a sex star. Films did, opera did, stage did. Nothing of the kind appears on television.

Regionalism in American Music

The West Coast has always faced Asia, and they've had more Chinese and Japanese around there than we have. And even still, they have films from those places which we don't hear much of in the Middle West or even in New York. So, those influences are absorbed locally, just as up around Seattle there is a school of painting that is very aware of totem poles. Our Southern regions used to be terribly aware of Blacks, but there aren't as many Blacks in the South now as there are in the North. So Boston, New York, Chicago, and Detroit now have valid Negro influences. Actually the best and most advanced jazz groups aren't in the South anymore, though you can usually find something pretty good in New Orleans. But now you find them, too, in Detroit and New York.

Big-company recording doesn't even reflect what goes on in popular music. The good jazz recordings are practically all put out by very small companies, or occasionally under the title of "race" records. Victor will put out something in Camden, New Jersey, or in Nashville. No, not Nashville anymore, but more like Chattanooga or Memphis. Nashville has a kind of monopoly on pseudo-country. The big companies put things out under labels called Blue Bird, or other names, because they can make them cheaply and sell them locally. I have quite a collection of so-called "race" records which were made in Tennessee in the 1930s, and which were collected there. They could never be found on the New York market, and certainly were not advertised.

The national radio chains have been consistently opposed to jazz from their beginning. You've never really heard any real jazz on the radio chains. In the South, the local radio would sometimes put good bands on. They're not enslaved to Hollywood or Broadway. The South and the Middle West — particularly Kansas City, St. Louis, Chicago — have always been great collecting and generating centers for what you might call "black-and-tan" music. I don't think Boston ever amounted to much in that domain. Something can happen in Florida, with its mixtures of Carribean, and the Texas world reflects a bit of Mexico. It's regional, but then people move around.

Formerly, the Blacks were the great movers as well as the

shakers. They were constantly on the move to try to live a little better. And they played the same role in American music that the typsies did in Spain, which is to circulate the local stuff. The Negro inventions are not very many, but their circulating power is enormous. Of course, nowadays everybody circulates and the unjust domination of the commercial market by commercial agencies is thoroughly well known. But there is a great deal more in the American market than just commercial enterprise, commonly known as the "media."

Religious people used to circulate things. The evangelical revival of the early nineteenth century went first throughout New England and then the great Middle West. The great hymn lore got into the hymnals like the *Southern Harmony*, the *Missouri Harmony*, and all those nondenominational books. They went throughout the Protestant world. And they are the basis, of course, of the Negro spirituals, of which over 600 out of 900 have already been identified as Scotch-Irish in origin, both words and music. You don't find much Africa left in America, except a little bit among the older inhabitants of Sea Island [Georgia] and that has all been collected. Now Sea Island itself has a bridge to the Mainland and is no longer isolated.

*The Attraction of France to American Composers in the 1920s;
Nadia Boulanger*

The French methods of instruction had already been put into effect [by World War I]. The elements of harmony, counterpoint, and composition were taught at Harvard and Columbia by pupils of Vincent D'Indy [1851-1931], who never heard of Nadia Boulanger.⁸ They didn't hear of her until after World War I. Students who went to Paris right after World War I, if they went from Columbia or Harvard, usually went because they were accustomed to French pedagogy already. If they didn't come from there, they still went to Paris because Germany was in such an economic swamp that the pedagogical system wasn't operating right and the economic system for living wasn't operating right. It was very hard to go to Germany and really acquire anything but a great deal of sexual education, which is what they found in Berlin.

There was nothing going on in Vienna, which was dead as a doornail. England was fifty years outdated in pedagogy, and Italy has always been a group of little cities with no national unity in educational policy. So, if you found yourself a good teacher in Italy, as some people did, then that was that. But education is organized in France. It had not been disorganized by World War I so that, on the model that had already been exposed in America,

the students flocked to France.

Many of them found Nadia Boulanger good for them. Others went to the Conservatory or other musical establishments or other teachers. Actually, Aaron Copland and I and a third fellow, Melville Smith, who himself became a major pedagogical force in America, used to think that we were the origins and the source of Nadia Boulanger. Well, we weren't really at all. We simply just happened to be the first in 1921. That same summer saw the establishment in Fontainebleau of an American conservatory where she taught. Now this American conservatory was organized by Walter Damrosch with money from America, and he kept control over it for a great many years.⁹ And Nadia herself will tell you that the great volume of her American students came from the constant sending of Americans to this conservatory in the summertime, where they would get a taste of it, and stay on through the winter.

Nadia Boulanger had a particular gift for handling what you might call the "semi-literate" musical people, I think. The Germans and the French didn't need her, and the Italians weren't interested. She had a few English students, not many, but already in our day there were some Scandanavians. Now the Americans have diminished to a trickle, but she has Persians and Turks and Koreans. No, the Koreans are mostly at Juilliard, because they can get U.S. fellowships. But the Japanese, the Chinese, the Rumanians (if they can get through the curtain), South Americans of all kinds come to her now, because she has a way of understanding what they don't know. And what they don't know is what they've written.

You see, the musical elements are all the same. You don't have to have Nadia Boulanger to learn strict counterpoint or classical harmony or orchestration. There are plenty of pedagogues that can teach those things perfectly well. What Nadia Boulanger always was and is is an enormously perspicacious, instant critic. She takes a look at your piece and she knows what you meant. And since she knows what you meant, you're eternally grateful. You can see it there in front of her, and if it needs further work and correction you'll be the one to decide. The people without a critical tradition in music, like Americans, needed that. The French and the Germans have a critical tradition and they don't need her, you see. They know what they've written.

The practice of instant criticism on the work, of understanding the work, removes all the blame from having written music. They

used to blame us for writing music, you know. The method was always to compare what you had done as a child, practically as a beginner, with the best works of Bach, Beethoven, and Brahms. How are you going to get over a thing like that? Nadia Boulanger, like any French pedagogue for that matter, would put you at ease in front of the music paper so that what you wrote was as if you were writing a letter but didn't know quite what you had said. And then she would ask you a little question, or play it for you. Suddenly you would realize what you had said or intended to say, and you would know whether you wanted to go on with that piece. She would help you with the growing pains. But whenever she gave you a solution for a problem, she gave you a routine one — a rather ordinary, academic one. But when she let you find it, then your piece didn't lose the life in it.

Just as valuable a sort of universal skeleton key to writing music was Arnold Schoenberg [1874-1951]. Arnold Schoenberg didn't just turn out a lot of little twelve-tone composers. Everybody who had lessons from Arnold wrote music. The people who have lessons today from Olivier Messiaen [b. 1908] in Paris all write music. Darius Milhaud [1892-1974] had the best of feelings toward the young and he always said that he adored teaching. But he taught for fifty years and never turned out a pupil. Pedagogy is a gift.

Musical judgment is also a gift. Just as there are certain lawyers who have the gift of judgment and go to the head of the firm or on the bench, the more pugnacious ones are better in the courtroom. They're fighting a battle; they're not judging anything. They're trying to make something prevail. Nadia's critical faculty gave her a power of judgment which she exercised with the greatest of care. She didn't approve or disapprove of anything. She understood what she was doing. But nowadays they [composers] can find that in America, with the critical thing more developed here as a function in the schools. And there's so much composing going on that the boys and girls brush the edges off of one another. They don't run off to Europe all the time; they do that to see the sights.

The Absorption of Foreign Elements in New Music; George Gershwin

You can pick up an item here and there and put it into your work if your work is built on some kind of mature organic procedure. You know, you find a new fruit out in the woods and you make a jelly out of it. That's very easy; you apply a standard recipe and you gather up a new flavor. Where musical systems

are at war is not so much about materials as about the rigidity of the tonal layout. The great trouble with the Western tradition is 250 years of tempered tuning.¹⁰ The Europeans have such an investment in that, such a backlog of classical masterworks, that I don't think they're going to give it up. I think they'll die with their tempered tuning.

You see, you can't tell in advance what's going to work. You have to do it. That's why a lot of people have to do it to find out whether the effort is worth preserving or dropping. There are many tempting elements in African music or in Mohammedan music, Indian music, or Indonesian. Many of these can be absorbed into the Western tradition. The strongest Asian music system is, of course, the Japanese and Chinese classical stuff. And that, so far, simply will not fuse. Now, ever since the Japanese changed their government and reorganized their educational system in 1868, European music has been an obligatory study in all grades and all schools. So they are brought up on Western music, but they also preserve their own in a very learned and active manner. The two go right on side by side, but neither the efforts of Henry Cowell [1897-1965] nor the best Japanese composers have been able to make a fusion so far. And there's nothing wrong with that. Somebody may get a bright idea sometime, but you can't think it through in a logical manner. The application of arithmetical formulas, as in serial music, doesn't do it because it doesn't do anything to the material that it uses. It doesn't alter the material. The materials of two very strong traditions have to adjust to each other.

Actually, the Western world is pretty much all in accord now. The symphony orchestra and the standard opera company exist in all the Western countries, and there are standard operations in them. You can substitute any piece of music, any player, any conductor overnight and practically without rehearsal, and no one will know the difference. Music is as highly standardized as automobile manufacturing. On the other hand, you cannot substitute a Western musician in a performance of the Imperial *Gagaku*, in spite of the fact that the orchestra of the Imperial *Gagaku* is all educated in Western music and they play as a symphony orchestra half the week.

It's very strange, that resistance of certain things. Our own jazz has been enormously resistant to impurities. That's why you can't commercialize it. You can make a commercial so-called jazz, but it's not real. Now the real stuff (and everybody in that business knows the real from the phony), the real stuff simply

rejects anything that is not appropriate to itself. And it absorbs, as it has done in the last ten years, the most elaborate forms of the polymetrics and polytonalities, which it can take. Oh, it's very strange, all this business. You can't just say I'm going to do something and then do it.

An awful lot of people have written jazz symphonic pieces, and mostly they don't work. Gershwin's *Rhapsody in Blue* [1924] worked, because that's not real jazz at all. It's taken from the commercial world of the 1910s and '20s and, with the help of Walter Damrosch, poured into a kind of Hungarian rhapsody mold. It works just fine. When he [Gershwin] dealt with stiffer molds, as in the concerto, it didn't work very well. Even *Porgy and Bess* [1935] had to be rewritten, [reducing] its accompanied recitatives and some of the heavy orchestrations, and was left an opera by numbers, like *Carmen*, with dialogue interspersed. That way it works, because Gershwin could write good numbers. His upbringing and formation in the best commercial style of his time kept him pretty rigidly within that. He couldn't make a piece any longer. *Porgy and Bess* is based on American commercial music, and the performing style is that of American classical music with a little bit of Black wailing. But that's not even commercial; that's a kind of standard folk or country flavor.

There is a work being performed in New York now by the late Scott Joplin [1868-1917] which has been orchestrated by a devotee, Gunther Schuller. The work [*Treemonisha*] is one which Joplin himself never heard and never had a chance to try on the stage.¹² There are two terrific first class finales, but then there is a ten-minute piece that needs a little adjusting, and he never got around to adjusting it. It's much easier to adjust a piece when the author is dead. Widows, particularly, are difficult because they're often not musicians and wouldn't know how to cooperate.

Thomson's Own Operas

My operas are absolutely standard language of the English vocal music. They reek of that kind of patter that runs from Anglican morning prayer to Gilbert and Sullivan. English language is made for patter. So is Spanish, but the Spanish haven't discovered that yet. The Italians think they can do patter, but they can only repeat - "Figaro, Figaro, Figaro." And you can't possibly do any such thing as patter in German or French or Russian. Offenbach, who was German, tried to do it in French in *La Vie Parisienne* [1866]. The singers can manage to get it out, but it's practically incomprehensible.

The gifts of the different languages for the different kinds of music are what make Europe fun, and are what differentiate the the insideness of French music from German, from Italian, from English, and so forth. Because it's only on the top academic and international merchandise of symphony orchestra work, only on that level, that Europe has a solid tradition. They write counterpoint the same way, they harmonize the same way, but the material that they use comes from a different thing: it comes from their own language, habits, and their ancestors' habits. The French fall into those little things that in Greek are called tetrachords. The German language falls into arpeggios. The German masters, from Bach on down, have never hesitated to outline the notes of a chord in a contrapuntal melody, which is against all the rules of strict counterpoint and the books which Bach studied. Mozart didn't hesitate either, but he could also write the other way.

The Mother of Us All has been in existence now since 1947.¹³ That's practically thirty years and it's had hundreds of performances. There's another college performance in New York next month and the Santa Fe Opera is doing it this summer. There's something in Chicago, there's something in California, and then in all those colleges one never even finds out about. I sometimes see them on the royalty sheets. *The Mother of Us All* doesn't succeed because it's a feminist opera; it succeeds because somehow or other it's infallible. You cannot make a production so incompetent that the thing will not carry. *Lord Byron* is a different story. That's kind of hard. And after all, the lovers are brother and sister, which is a bit troublesome. *The Four Saints* is very hard to put on. *The Mother of Us All* is very easy to put on. It works, and it's all over the place. It just goes on and on and on.

The standard reviews of *Four Saints in Three Acts*, from the time when it first appeared in 1934 clear up until now, have followed a fairly regular line. The literary people would say that the text of Gertrude Stein was absolutely silly and absurd but the music was divine, and the musical people would say that the text is divine but . . . I just have to leave that to the historians. You can't write music and review it, you know. You can review others' music, but you're no good reviewing your own. Even composers' program notes are just blurb. They're really not objective at all. It used to shock people who were convinced modernists that I would take such an obscure and hermetic language as that of middle-period Gertrude Stein and put it to such simple-minded music, like do-mi-sol chords and things like that. They thought that I ought to match that with twelve-tone methods, or something

equally complex. I said no, because what this needs is to run along. I'm not going to put sand in the cogs. A maximum of dissonance makes a maximum of immobility. I have to let this run into patter. This is English; it wants patter. Miss Stein had no opinions about music. She thought music was for adolescents anyway. But, like any poet, she adored being set to music.

Thomson's American Pedigree

My dear fellow, nobody in this room is more American than I am. My father's family came in 1728 and my mother's in 1607. I once mentioned that in Boston, because they like to talk about ancestors. So, I said I've ancestors, too. A coldness appeared in the room. Nobody said anything, because they don't want anything mentioned that happened before 1620. That's when the "ancestor" was invented. Not only that. People had furniture and chairs and highboys that had supposedly hung from every yard-arm [of the Mayflower]. That's like pieces of the "True Cross" — self-generating. My direct forebears fought in every war there's ever been. And we moved West, and we owned Negroes. We've been through the gamut. And I had two grandfathers and thirteen great-uncles in the Confederate Army. You can't be more American. That's why I can take to Europe so nicely. Americans like Europe.

Ragtime, Jazz, and Other Types of Popular Music

There's a great move for ragtime right now. Ragtime is a fusion of classical piano playing with a compulsive rhythm. And on the basis of compulsive rhythm, of course, you can syncopate. Bach or Beethoven or any of the classical boys can tell you perfectly well that there is no such thing as syncopation without a steady beat. If your beat goes unsteady, your syncopations may even fall on the beat. That makes no sense at all. Ragtime has a very tenuous relation to jazz. Ragtime is a stream of its own which had a short life and a brilliant one. It is virtuosopiano playing based on steady rhythm and conventional harmony in which a certain amount of syncopation gives life to the steady rhythm, which would be very monotonous otherwise. But ragtime did not lead to jazz. It was replaced by jazz, which is a far more powerful method of composing music.

Rock is an enormous commercial success. No other kind of success. It's impure and musically uninteresting. You don't find Europeans or Asiatics suddenly "discovering" rock. They've heard it and it doesn't suit their purposes. When they discovered jazz, they knew they had ahold of something. But after all, jazz was at the beginning, and still is, a form of persecuted chamber

music: pure race, pure line, high intellectualism, and high integrity. Fancy rock people, like The Beatles and so forth, are not being persecuted or starved. Every rock performer that is touted in the press (I don't like to say "media") turns out to be somebody making several million dollars a year. So it's just press-agentry, as far as I'm concerned.

I have a friend who's been writing this stuff for a long time. I think he's won forty-eight hit parade diplomas. He told me fifteen years ago that rock is made for a public of ages nine to fourteen. That's why the rhythm is so elementary. They're not up to rhythm yet. And it's loud because of another sociological thing, which is that they all have little radios in their rooms. And they can go into their rooms and turn the radio up as loud as they can and obliterate the idea of the presence of the parents. That feels wonderful nine to fourteen. Later, when they get all grown up, they remember sentimentally when they were nine to fourteen, and first learned to turn up that beautiful radio sound and first got off in the bushes with a little girl. That's the age when they do it now.

All the colleges and high schools have choruses and they have marching bands, so that life goes on all the time. And the way they play guitars is nobody's business — quite badly, for the most part. But they wouldn't be caught dead playing well. A young woman explained to me about classical guitar. Classical guitar means you can read music. Non-classical guitar players wouldn't be caught dead reading music — that would be impure. On the one hand, you have these same kids turning up their radio to blast, but they play their guitars so softly that I can't hear them at all. It's all part of the rites of passage and the courting conventions of each decade. In my generation, they used to turn on the gramophone with record changers so they wouldn't be interrupted in their petting party.

Women Composers

Women have quite a fair place in American music. There are three countries that produce women composers: England, France, and the United States. You've never heard of a Russian woman composer, or a German one, or an Italian one. Actually, women under a semblance of freedom in Russia don't have as much as they might. But of all the countries in existence, I should think Germany and Italy really are the toughest on women. It takes a lot to get into any profession there, a lot of ingenuity. The Spaniards are better. The Spaniards have women surgeons and they even have women bull fighters and engineers. But the Eng-

lish and the Americans and the French, for practically a century or some time short of that, have had women composers. And what's wrong with that? We were talking about Nadia Boulanger. She was a composer. Her point of view was that every composer should be a performer and that every performer should be able to write music, whether or not he persists in it. And she wrote a good deal of music when she was young, but she thought she was not as much a genius as her sister [Lili Boulanger, 1893-1918], that her gift was pedagogy, which it is.

Twelve-Tone Music; Trends in Modern Composition

[Mr. Thomson was asked if he had a personal antagonism toward twelve-tone music.]

It's not personal, it's professional. I could elaborate on it, and explain to you what I consider to be the basic errors of the system, one of which is the enslavement to the tempered scale. You see, even string quartets play twelve-tone music in the tempered scale. It's made for the tempered scale. [Furthermore,] it's a little rule of thumb which can be learned in fifteen minutes. Schoenberg was writing non-tonal music for a good fifteen years before he ever hit on this little rule of thumb. That enables you to teach it, of course, which actually he didn't do. He didn't violate his teacher's contract by saying now we all just write twelve-tone music. He actually wrote a textbook on classical harmony. To his dying day, he was doing what he called adding the missing voices to Bach fugues. Oh no, he was a professional musician and he was doing his best to save a dying tradition, which was the German tradition. He seriously thought and said that his invention of the twelve-tone method of composition would ensure the dominance of German music for another 200 years. I'm not so sure myself. I think it's practically disappeared now as a practicing method. It's been replaced by hazard. Hazard, the aleatoric methods, are much easier to use because multiple serialism becomes virtually an impossible complexity. It slows up everything terribly.

You can tell [the mainstream] by what the boys and girls write in colleges. They all write a standard kind of music which is metrically asymmetrical — irregularly numbered measures — and across which you get gruppettos of odd numbers. It's totally disjunct and rather thin in instrumentation, and it all looks alike on the page. It doesn't all sound alike. I don't know what they write in the European conservatories. I haven't seen so much of that recently. Of course in Russia, writing in even so old-fashioned a thing as the twelve-tone system is still illegal, discouraged, and

must be done secretly — you must be careful to whom you show it. Poland is much freer. Right after or within ten years of the last war, Poland was writing twelve-tone music and non-tonal music. And the Polish composers have had considerable success here, so much so that the city of Chicago is commissioning an opera, by [Krzysztof] Penderecki [b. 1933].

I don't like, myself, the idea of a "mainstream." I think think "mainstream" is a term people use to protect what they're swimming in. It's one of those semantic terms that assumes the conclusion. It assumes that what you yourself are doing is the important thing. That's why I resist the term. One trend is no more important than another, anymore than it is in women's fashions. Whether you put skirts up or down, full or tight, alternates as with men's fashions, too. Ivy League boys now are wearing matching waistcoats and narrow ties and cutting their hair. There's even a tendency to touch while dancing. Of course, we did it cheek-to-cheek.

But the abundance of novelty is low all over the world. You see, the whole business, like the painting business and the poetry business and modern architecture, all are in a deep trough of a curve. The world is up to quite different things from the so-called humanities. The world is organizing communications, business, and the arts of war, and so the culture departments are hanging on like mad to what was novel, valid, and important fifty years ago. They're not inventing anything. There isn't anything around that I didn't know about at least twenty-five years ago. And electronic music itself started up right after the War in 1945, when the French simply stole a German patent.

The computer can be used for musical purposes, such as calculating microrhythms. It's very valuable for that. The computer is just as valuable, actually, as the question put into it. And if your question has been thoroughly studied with all sorts of ramifications possible, you put that into the machine and get an answer. Also, you must remember that the computer is based on a yes or no answer. It's bi-symmetric; it can only do two things. It's not a musical instrument, it's just a computer.

The synthesizer is something else again. There are three or four of the big ones in the United States at Columbia University, Illinois, UCLA, and there may be another one somewhere. These would come nearer being capable of a variety of effects. The little cheap ones will give you about five things, you know. You get birds twittering, or get the sea, or a kind of storm running up,

and even a railway brake, I think. But there's not much else they sound like. They're remarkably monotonous. Any composition made out of them is no less monotonous than the material that goes into it. And since they're not capable of either tonal structure or rhythmic elaboration, the cheap ones don't do anything major. They're nice toys to play with, and you can get money out of any college for anything that smells of engineering. Also, our engineering-minded young like to play with them. The big synthesizer is capable of a great many things, and some of the people who have practiced for twenty to thirty years give it up and some of them don't. The last ten to fifteen years, every major composer who has worked in any sophisticated way with electronics at all has been adding live music to the dead music, because it's wildly dead. It all comes out exactly the same, including the sixty-cycle "hummm" that permeates the whole thing. It all comes through the loud speaker, which gives you that canned taste. That's why you have to put live music with it, to relieve that taste of frozen food.

Postscript: In June, 1976, my husband and I visited Mr. Thomson at Roosevelt Hospital in New York, where he was recuperating from a flare-up of sciatica. Despite almost constant pain, he seemed to be in good spirits. Perhaps this is because, unlike most hospital settings, he had surrounded himself with the accoutrements of well-developed tastes in fine food and wine. He seemed to be making quite an impression on the hospital staff.

FOOTNOTES

¹Virgil Thomson, *The State of Music* (2nd ed., rev., New York: Vintage Books, 1962), p. 12.

²Virgil Thomson (New York: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1967), p. 14.

³Max Graf (1873-1958), a music reviewer on the *Neue Freie Presse*, left his native Vienna in 1939 and lived in New York City until 1946 when he returned to Vienna. While in the United States, he published several books in both English and German, including *Composers and Critics*.

⁴Graf, in *Composers and Critics* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1946), p. 214, describes the *feuilleton* as "the special form of French criticism," which is "as light as a leaf falling from a tree" but growing from the tree of "science and wisdom."

⁵Francis Perkins (1897-1970) became assistant music critic of the *Herald Tribune* in 1922 and then music editor of the paper beginning in 1940.

⁶Olin Downes (1886-1955) was the chief music critic of the *New York Times* from 1924 to 1955.

⁷Lawrence Gilman (1878-1939) was the chief music critic of the *Herald Tribune* from 1923 to 1939.

⁸Nadia Boulanger (b. 1887) is probably the world's most famous teacher of composers. She won the Second Prix de Rome for composition in 1908 but thereafter turned to teaching. With the discovery of her pedagogical abilities by Americans in the 1920s, she took on a host of foreign students, becoming in essence the mother of an entire generation of outstanding American composers, as well as those from other countries. Among her former American pupils are Copland, Thomson, Roy Harris, Walter Piston, Robert Russell Bennett, Theodore Chanler, Elliott Carter, Elie Siegmeister, Louise Talma, and Irving Fine.

⁹The Conservatoire Américain in Fontainebleau was founded in 1920 as a summer music school for Americans. It was the conception of Walter Damrosch (1862-1950), himself a composer as well as conductor and author.

¹⁰Tempered tuning is a system of tuning in which the intervals deviate, or are "tempered", from the natural intonation of pitches in the overtone series. The "equal temperament" system, in which the size of the half-step is standardized throughout the scale, is almost universally accepted.

¹¹*Gagaku*, the ancient orchestral music of the Imperial Japanese court, is based on the even older *gagaku* of continental Asia. *Gagaku* originated in Japan in the eighth century and has changed little since that time.

¹²Scott Joplin's *Treemonisha* was the fulfillment of a dream and years of labor by the composer. The opera never achieved an adequate performance during Joplin's lifetime, although it was given a run-through in 1915. Its first modern performance was in 1972, and its premiere by a professional company occurred in May, 1975 at the Houston Grand Opera. The contemporary version of *Treemonisha* was arranged and orchestrated by Gunther Schuller (b. 1925), a conductor, composer, and educator.

¹³Thomson's three operas are *Four Saints in Three Acts* (libretto by Gertrude Stein, written in 1928, and premiered in 1934), *The Mother of Us All* (libretto by Gertrude Stein, written and premiered in 1947), and *Lord Byron* (libretto by Jack Larson, written in 1968, and premiered in 1972).

Robert G. Clarke

OPUS EIGHTY-ONE *

In the beginning was the Board of Trustees. It was without form and lifeless; there was darkness in its midst.

And the Board said to itself, "We are lonely. Let us create something in our own image." So it created a college and placed it in the midst of green grass and running waters. The Board pondered what it had done, liked what it saw, and declared it to be good. Thus ended the first term.

Then the Board said, "Let us give our creation form and arrangement." So it formulated committees, subcommittees, task forces and curricula. They prospered and multiplied. The Board observed what it had done and declared it was good. Thus ended the second term.

Soon afterwards the Board of Trustees observed that its college creation was not functioning properly; so it fashioned chairpersons and presidents, secretaries and parliamentarians, deans and faculties. The Board viewed what it had done, smiled, and declared it was good. Thus ended the third term.

During the next term the Board considered a perplexing query: For what purpose does our college creation exist? Finding responses to the query conflicting and without immediate resolution, the Board acknowledged need for further study and delegated its presidents, chairpersons and faculties to ponder the inquiry and return with a recommendation in a subsequent term. The Board felt good about its handling of this First Question. Thus ended the fourth term.

Incompleteness in its college creation was still felt among Board members. So in their wisdom they created student persons, one named Ed, and one named Coed. The Board designated a dormitory for each. The college creation now looked very good. Thus ended the fifth term.

The Board then said to the student persons, "If you obey the rules we will reward you with the golden fruits of competency and solvency." Ed and Coed were overjoyed and agreed to all the rules. The Board viewed its college creation once again. It was pleased; it had made a covenant with order and security. Life

was good. Thus ended the sixth term.

Now it was the term for resting and reflection. The Board said to Ed and Coed, "Behold, we have given to you all the requisites for success — competency and order, solvency and security. Be prosperous and multiply." The student persons nodded in affirmation. And while still resting and reflecting the Board conferred with itself, remembering the response to that First Question: For what purpose does our college creation exist (?) was still pending. Life appeared good. Thus ended the seventh term.

* This is Mr. Clarke's eighty-first devotional message given to the College Senate since coming to Otterbein in August 1968.

THE KNOWABLE COMMUNITY: THE CRITICISM AND FICTION
OF RAYMOND WILLIAMS

One of the most impressive attempts in recent British literature to define the nature of community has been the work of Raymond Williams. In a brilliant series of cultural and literary histories, most notably *The Country and the City*, Williams has attempted to define the community which has appeared in the literature of the past. In his formulation of the "knowable community," he has described an important aspect of the subject and even the structure of most traditional novels, an aspect that conventional techniques of analysis are likely to miss. But Williams has gone further than that: in a pair of novels written in the early '60's, he has himself attempted to explain the position the "community" occupies in the mind and emotions of contemporary men and women.

Thus, Williams is a particularly suitable figure to investigate in a meeting devoted to possible "answers to alienation" that might appear in modern British literature. Williams is not only in a sense our colleague in trying to find such answers; in both his fiction and his criticism Williams points to significant tensions in our attitudes towards the concept of community, tensions that suggest some dangers inherent in the concept itself. As Williams recounts it, the history of literary versions of community is fraught with the dangers of sentimentalism. Faced with the apparent fact of alienation, poets and novelists, as well as literary historians have frequently looked to the past as the place where communal values prevailed, and thought that the restoration of such values would immediately cure our sense of alienation. Further, the same idea has served as an explanation of alienation. To see enclosure as a violation of community would then account for the alienation that followed enclosure, and a similar analysis could be applied to industrialism, the Reform Bill, World War I or the General Strike of 1926. The error in each case was to assume, without much examination, that a sense of community had in fact existed before whichever cataclysmic event one blamed the trouble on.

Part of the difficulty with past formulations of the concept of community lies in the fact that, as Williams points out in his recent book *Keywords*, "community" is one of the few terms in our vocabulary of culture and society without negative connota-

tions.¹ The word implies values that oppose both the selfishness that may be inherent in "individualism" and the pressures towards conformity or anomie that seem to inhere in the word "society." Thus if we can identify a "community" in a version of the past presented to us in, say, a novel of Jane Austen, we have the feeling that we have been restored to a kind of Golden Age, where people held in common a sense of values with which they were mutually secure. Other positive impressions are also invoked, particularly a sense of relationship with nature, a collective life lived close to the beauties of a lost rural England.

As Williams points out in *The Country and the City*, such impressions blind us to the reality of what we are seeing in novels of the past. We are seeing, not the actual human arrangements of the nineteenth-century England, but instead what Williams calls the "knowable community." The difference is a profound one, because Williams maintains that, even in the most "realistic" of nineteenth-century English novels, we are seeing only a misleading partial picture of the social reality we can reconstruct from other sources, and we are thus led to a mistake about what the modern experience has been in regard to the nature of the community.

The distinction Williams makes between what he calls the "knowable community" of the novel and the "known community," or the actual set of social relationships of which this novel is supposed to be a reflection, is a crucial one, in terms both of understanding Williams's critical approach to English literature and of appreciating what he has attempted in his own novels. "Most novels," Williams maintains, "are in some sense knowable communities. It is part of a traditional method — an underlying stance and approach — that the novelist offers to show people and their relationships in essentially knowable and communicable ways." The word "knowable" is crucial to his argument, for the "knowable community" is not the same as the "known community." Jane Austen, for example, describes a community that is "outstandingly face-to-face," a community in which the members know each other directly and share an underlying value system. But, Williams goes on, the community of the novel is "very precisely selective. Neighbors in Jane Austen are not the people actually living nearby; they are the people living a little less nearby who, in social recognition, can be visited. What she sees across the land is a network of propertied houses and families, and through the holes of this tightly drawn mesh most actual people are simply not seen. No other community, in physical presence or in social reality, is by any means know-

able."²

Thus, in William's view, we do not get a picture of the "real" community in the typical novel. We see instead that part of the community that recognizes each other as socially significant. Those people who have a direct material rather than an aesthetically appreciative relationship with the land and who provide the wealth on which Jane Austen's society is based are not part of the "knowable community," even though, in a nonliterary way, both Austen and her readers "know" they are there.

In his perceptive analysis of George Eliot's novels, Williams points out that, though her knowable community is much wider than Austen's, what Eliot does is merely to restore "the real inhabitants of rural England" — the laborers, the servants, the tradesmen — as part of the landscape. We tend to talk about the Poysers, the Gleggs, and the Dodsons in the plural; we remember them as types, "while the emotional direction of the novel is toward separated individuals." Thus, in her attempt to include all of the characters of the "known" rural community in the "knowable community" of the novel, Eliot resorts to "the formula which has been so complacently powerful in English novel-writing: the 'fine-old,' 'dear-old,' quaint-talking, honest-living country characters." Thus, as the main characters of her novels aspire to an individualism above the concerns of the local community, the "honest-living country characters" have been patronized into a stereotyped version of community patronized as "quaint."

For Williams, this kind of literary patronage of large parts of English society leads to an important historical error on the subject of community. One segment of traditional rural society — the landed aristocracy, the propertied middle-class, the clergy — has been adequately described in the face-to-face terms of the knowable community. Another segment, the workers and the poor generally, have been patronized in the sentimentalizing terms of the first segment. Thus, when George Eliot writes of her own era, rather than of the recent past, she is able to see industrialism and the creation of industrial cities as the force that has destroyed the community of the past. Community has been "lost": "Value is in the past, as a general retrospective condition, and is in the present only as a particular and private sensibility, the individual moral action."³ The interest of the novel shifts from the community to the individual; the community is located in the past before modern developments destroyed it. The mistake is to assume that the community, in the sense of shared values and a

common purpose and language, *did* exist in the past. To make this assumption is to forget the people who fell through the holes in the net, the people whose interests never were included in the "knowable community" of the novel and of our sentimental view of the rural past.

In his own novels, Williams attempts to correct this view of the history of communities. *Border Country* and *Second Generation* were written before the formulations about the novel as "knowable community" he makes in *The Country and the City*, but references to his own novels in *The Country and the City* indicate that he was consciously working with the same ideas in the fiction. In the novels, Williams is able to draw heavily on his experience: the movement he has made from rural Wales to Cambridge and the transatlantic intellectual community. Although the novels are heavily invested with Williams's theories of culture, they are nevertheless dramatic, imaginative renderings of important aspects of modern experience. They are also, it seems to me, crucial books for an understanding of the problem of community in modern society.

The central character of *Border Country* is Matthew Price, a university lecturer in economic history, who, like Williams himself, was born and brought up in the Welsh Border Country. The first paragraph of the novel suggests another meaning of the title:

As he ran for the bus he was glad: not only because he was going home, after a difficult day, but mainly because the run in itself was pleasant, as a break from the contained indifference what was still his dominant feeling of London. The conductress, a West Indian, smiled as he jumped to the platform, and he said, "Good evening," and was answered, with an easiness that had almost been lost. You don't speak to people in London, he remembered; in fact you don't speak to people anywhere in England; there is plenty of time for that sort of thing on the appointed occasions — in an office, in a seminar, at a party.⁴

The title refers not only to a region of Britain, but also to a modern border country between ways of feeling, between "the contained indifference" of London and a felt or imagined face-to-face openness between people that must have existed somewhere or sometime. One of the assumptions Williams makes in all his work is that the loss of a sense of community is not an event that took place at some point in the past — the Industrial Revolution, for example — and was presented to modern man as an accomplished fact, but instead is a continuing crisis which tends to leave each generation with the same sense of recent loss.

Williams points out in his criticism that he is able to find evidence of the sense of recent loss of rural communal felicity in England as far back as the tenth century: our nostalgia for Eden has evidently been much more durable than the Garden itself was.⁵ Whatever the history of this sense of loss is, Williams believes we can watch it take place in the emotional history of contemporary people, particularly of people like Matthew Price and Williams himself who have moved from villages to cities and universities.

But Williams also shows that much the same process goes on whether you leave the village or stay there. The structure of *Border Country* forces Price, just after we first meet him, back into the village and back into the lives of his father and his father's friend Morgan Rosser. In spite of the theoretical understanding of the past he has acquired as a lecturer in economic history, Matthew has not been able to complete his study of the nineteenth-century migrations into the Welsh mining towns. He himself has "migrated," and he cannot understand what the earlier population movements meant until he can understand his own. His father's stroke and eventual death draw Matthew back to his native village and force him to come to grips with the experience of his father's generation.

Between them, Harry Price and Morgan Rosser have explored many of the possibilities a twentieth-century Welsh village has to offer. Both of them began their adult lives as railway workers, taking advantage of the economic opportunities offered by one of the earliest forces of modern industrialism to push itself into the region. Harry's father has continued to rely on the wages the railway provides as a means of subsistence, but he has also supplemented his income by gardening, beekeeping and tending the local bowling green. Though he often seems remote to his friends, he is profoundly admired by the community and his son for his self-sufficiency.

Morgan Rosser has taken a different tack. From the beginning, he has supplemented his income by taking in lodgers, and he eventually buys a truck with which to carry fresh produce and homemade jam from local gardens and kitchens to the mining towns. Finally he enters into a partnership with a local gentleman landowner to grow more berries to supply a modern factory he builds to produce jam, no longer homemade, to market in a much wider area.

Driven by the same impulses, Harry and Morgan take differ-

ent approaches to the same goal. They both want independence more than a sense of belonging, and that, in modern times, involves money, more money than either farming a small holding or drawing wages from the railway will provide. Both of them, at crucial stages in their lives, in effect violate existing community arrangements.

For Harry, the violation is a highly domestic one: he opposes a community sense at the family level. When Harry and his young wife first came to the village soon after World War I, they took rooms in Morgan's rented house. Morgan's wife had recently died, and he was living with his infant daughter and Mrs. Lucas, an elderly woman who had first come to take care of the expectant mother. The Prices — particularly Ellen, Matthew's mother — fit comfortably in the Rosser household. When Ellen becomes pregnant, she is pleased to have Mrs. Lucas there for help and companionship.

But Harry is never quite happy with this arrangement. He is profoundly disturbed when Ellen identifies the group — Harry, Morgan and his daughter, and herself — as a family. It isn't a family, because they are not related by blood, and, in the midst of Ellen's pregnancy, Harry insists on moving them to a place of their own: only there will he have the kind of independence he needs.

The problem Harry is facing is suggested by William's note on the word "family" in *Keywords*. He points out that the term came to have its present exclusive meaning of a "small kin-group" only in the nineteenth century, possibly reflecting "the development of smaller separate houses and therefore households [of] the new working class and lower-middle class who were defined by "wage-labour" and who could "define [their] social relationships, in any positive sense, only in this way." Thus, "*Family* or *family and friends* can represent the only immediately positive attachments in a large-scale and complex wage-earning society."⁶ For Harry, identity and independence are possible only under his own roof, and the concept of a broader community is sacrificed for the family related by blood.

Morgan Rosser violates the existing community relationships when he goes into partnership with Major Blakely, an upper-class Englishman who owns a large amount of land in the valley. Morgan persuades Blakely that he can make more money by devoting his land to the single purpose of berry-growing. As a result, Jack Meredith, another railway worker, is forced off the bit of

land he rents from the Major. Thus, a communal arrangement that had provided Meredith with a certain economic independence is terminated, not only by the English landlord, but also by a fellow Welsh laborer on the rise. Morgan Rosser, with his new ideas of commerce and large-scale industrial farming, is now of course held in suspicion by the more conservative, less ambitious members of the community.

For both Morgan Rosser and Harry Price, the General Strike of 1926 was a kind of spiritual crisis as well as an economic and political one, and much of their subsequent conduct was determined by the lessons learned during the Strike. As railway workers, their participation in the Strike was meant to support the coal miners in their struggle against falling wages, and Morgan at least found in "trade-union solidarity" a kind of community that would replace the relationships that seemed to be collapsing in the local community. Morgan at this stage is a committed socialist who sees an opportunity to wrest power away from the owning classes and give it to a rising community of workers.

The Strike, however, fails to accomplish anything like these Utopian goals. The Railway Union gives in without accomplishing anything for the miners. Morgan is disillusioned, and it is at this point that he begins to turn what had been an effort to get good inexpensive food to the miners into a large commercial enterprise. He has concluded that his ambitions for a better life than that of a railway signalman can be achieved neither within the old context of a small farming community nor in the new one of labor solidarity.

For Harry, on the other hand, the effect of the General Strike is to confirm his ideas rather than alter them. He is not surprised at the failure of the trade-union movement to achieve its goals: it is possible for individuals to help each other, but he sees little possibility of large groups making any headway against injustice. Harry believes in the individual's power to maintain his own dignity and make sacrifices for others, but he sees no possibility of the small community being constructively supplanted by the larger political coalition.

Harry Price's attitude is confirmed by the action of Jack Meredith, the only railway worker in the community who opposes the strike. He has been hired as a signalman, and he continues in that job until he is locked out by his fellow workers. When work

resumes, the railway refuses to take back the full workforce, and Harry, as junior man, is not rehired. Meredith refuses to work overtime into what would have been Harry's shift and thus forces the company to rehire Harry. It is the act of a single brave man.

Faced with the same desire to lead independent, self-sufficient lives, Harry and Morgan take two different approaches. Harry in a sense goes backward in history towards a closer relationship with the land — his gardens and his bees. Morgan advances out of his rural background into a version of capitalism: the produce of the land is turned into money and power. Neither of them finds enough of what they value in the simple community of the Welsh Village.

For Matthew Price, the lesson is clear. The change in the balance of things, the alienation, did not take place when he left the village for the university. The new emphasis was in the village itself. The primitive community sense lives on only as an emotional anachronism: the village moves in a fussy, confusing way to console him and his mother for the death of Harry Price. Beyond that, the small community has nothing with which to oppose the new pressures that all three men — Morgan, Matthew and Harry — in their turn must face.

In *Second Generation*, Williams elaborates on this theme. The second novel is set in Oxford, which is both a university town and a factory city. It is that dual character of Oxford that Williams seeks to account for: can a community be formed that includes University intellectuals, labor politicians, and the workers themselves? The novel centers on the Owen family, who came from the Welsh border country to work in the automobile factories. In the "second generation," their son Peter moves even further: he becomes a graduate student in sociology.

Like Matthew Price, Peter Owen would like to understand the experience his family has undergone. But the novel mainly recounts a number of failed attempts to find a common element that would link the disparate classes and interests of contemporary Oxford. Two failures to discover such a common element are particularly noteworthy. The first is the attempt of Robert Lane, Peter's academic advisor, to prove that the interest in gardening he shares with Peter's uncle constitutes evidence of a community between these two men of differing class and education. Both men love their plants, and they respond to each other on this basis. A great deal of conventional literary wisdom lies behind Lane's notion that this shared love of nature is a unifying factor

that transcends superficial differences, but Peter immediately recognizes that the idea is essentially sentimental. The chrysanthemums his uncle grows are "just a corner of his life," a release from the monotony of factory work. For Lane, there is a coherence in his teaching, writing and gardening that is not possible for the factory worker.⁷ For Williams, how a man earns his living is a crucial way of defining him, and the differences between an Oxford don and an auto worker are not to be glossed over.

The second attempt to find a community in the disparate elements of Oxford is through politics. Grossly to oversimplify the rich development of the novel on this point, all of the characters would seem to have something in common in that they all, factory workers and intellectuals alike, belong to the Labour Party. But this mutual socialism also fails to establish any real community. Peter's parents, Harold and Kate, have been involved in politics all of their adult lives, and, when the factories go out on strike, Robert Lane symbolically joins their parade. But here again, the issues are different for the worker and the intellectual. For the latter, only his principles are involved, not his livelihood, and no real community exists unless the whole of one's being is involved.

In a poignant way, this lesson becomes clear to Peter's mother Kate. Responding to the boredom and lack of fulfillment she finds with her worker husband, she has a brief affair with Arthur Dean, a socialist intellectual of middle-class background. Again, as in the case of Harry Price, the failure in community is felt on the family level. Kate believes she is branching out into a world of ideas, a society that takes its vacations in Europe instead of going home to Wales. She, too, discovers that Arthur's world really doesn't speak the same language, and that class differences matter more than a shared interest in either gardening or radical politics.

Thus, *Second Generation* seems to leave the quest for community unfulfilled. As in *Border Country*, the impulses towards self-fulfillment, self-expression and independence seem to make a wide community impossible, while the narrow community of the past, if it ever existed, is an anachronism. But Williams doesn't leave it at that. In *The Country and the City*, he talks of an "internal crisis" common to modern man: the need to find relationships between one's work and one's thought, one's self and others, and points to the underlying metaphor of *Second Generation*: "an image of traffic, of relationships as traffic and of per-

sistent attempts to find other relationships."⁸ As Peter drives back to Oxford from Wales, he considers the meaning of "traffic": "What was central now was the fact of traffic; its kind of signal, its inherent versions of what people were like and the ways to react to them. Everyone knew, in a private way, how much was left out, by these common definitions, yet still, in common practice, they seemed daily more absolute and more relevant. This was the network by which the society lived, and through which it moved and communicated. The rest, ineradicably, was private."⁹

The image of a network of traffic suggests that the relationships do exist in the modern world, and that they imply some sort of ultimate community. The question is what connection can such a community have with the private aspirations of the individual? In both novels, all of the characters find their interests absorbed into this network, a network we need to come to understand if we are to achieve once more a sense of community.

Thus, in his own novels, Raymond Williams attempts to expand the "knowable community" of the English novel to reveal the secret reality of that community. We have not established a sense of community, Williams makes clear, if we have not brought all of the disparate elements of a complex social environment into face-to-face contact with each other. The hard job for a novelist or for anyone else who would define a community is to avoid alienating anyone by definition: by leaving them out of consideration in defining the interests, aspirations and motivations that make up a human environment.

And, it is to be noted, when you do not leave anyone out, the form the novel takes is quite different from the way we have traditionally looked at novels. Neither of these novels really has a protagonist. The young men, Matthew Price and Peter Owen, serve as centers of consciousness, but the real protagonist is a shifting, confused, only occasionally articulate, group of men and women, trying to find connections between work and life, between themselves and nature, between themselves and ideas and groups of other people that would make life meaningful. The real center of the novel, that is, is a group of men and women trying to find a community. The obstacles before such a quest are both personal and historical, and the attempt of Raymond Williams, in both his criticism and his fiction, to understand those obstacles makes him one of the most important contemporary British writers.

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Albert E. Lovejoy

THE ABC'S OF CRIME AND ITS TREATMENT

Crime and the treatment of criminals have frequently been over-simplified by the mass media. Three areas in particular have suffered this fate: (1) criminal types, (2) criminal statistics, and (3) ways of treating convicted criminals.

Criminal Types

Probably all of us have a mental image of "the criminal," even though in our more reflective moments we realize that there is no more "a criminal" than there is "a flower." Overlooking the legal classification of offenses brings us face-to-face with the fact that criminologists have been developing typologies for at least 200 years — typologies of people who in one way or another are commonly thought of as criminals.

Some early students of crime thought that it was an innate characteristic — you were either born "that way" or you weren't. Others saw predisposing tendencies toward criminal behavior, such things as body build, genetic make-up, personality type, glandular functioning, etc., as the etiological bases of criminality.

Still later, ecological "causes" were presented. Areas and districts were discovered to be criminalistic. Was it not singular that certain "delinquency areas" of Chicago, for example, remained so even as their populations changed from one ethnic complexion to another? Was there not an almost mystical sense in which one's place of residence was his destiny, whether his ancestors were from the potato famine countries of rural Ireland of the 1840's, the west coast of Africa, or the steaming ghettos of Puerto Rico? However, such human geography failed to help us understand why many, if not most, of the youths living in such criminalistic tracts were possibly good kids, occasionally even models of upright behavior.

Another "causal factor" of a more complex type was introduced, namely socialization, to explain how delinquent and criminal tendencies were the weedy results of parental neglect in the garden of childhood. If parents had gone amiss in their rearing responsibilities, could they not be the culprit? Edwin H. Sutherland, for a time the dean of American criminologists, devel-

oped the "differential association" theory which was related somewhat to the above thesis. One became what he became, criminal, semi-criminal, or non-criminal, because of the socializing company he kept. If one's peers traded stolen stereos or ten-speed bicycles for ready cash, and if this were thought to be all right, though risky, then one might take a more casual attitude toward the line that separates "mine from thine."

Nowadays there are those who say that one's societal label (e.g. one's reputation as lazy, dumb, or improvident) is the crucial element. Call someone "no good," treat him as a no-good, force him to live with no-goods and what can you expect — a person of middle-class propriety? In this view we become what people think we are. If one belongs to the hard working respectable poor in his home town, he has a role of decency, respectfulness, and diligence to live up to. But call a kid "bad" or stupid or crazy long enough and you will indeed help produce a person with a negative self image.

The above are a few of the ways in which students of crime have tried to make sense of criminal behavior. We have not mentioned other concepts such as original sin, alienation in the face of confusing, unfeeling bigness; selfishness; bullheadedness; institutional inequities, like racial prejudice; societal value conflicts; great differences in human potential; extremely limiting mental, physical, psychic, or environmental handicaps; or the pride of being and having.

Hopefully, however, we have illustrated the fact that "the criminal" is almost non-existent and to believe in such a mythological creature severely weakens our ability to deal rationally with crime and its treatment.

Common sense might tell us that some "criminals" are not criminals at all. The law even recognizes that a person may perform a criminal act, but that such an act may not always be intended, premeditated, or even desired. In such a case there is no *mens rea* or guilty mind or intent. It is also well understood by most of us that people suffering distortions of reality or inability to perceive what normative reality is may do things that have criminal consequences, but for which they cannot be held responsible.

Unfortunately, for those who are mentally disturbed and commit criminal acts, both the hoary M'Naghten and the more recent Durham rules are so simplistic in their conception of mental illness

as to do almost as much mischief as they were intended to avoid. Using the M'Naghten rule as a guide, one assumes that the defendant did not *know* the difference between right and wrong; in *Durham* one assumes the defendant's mental disease or defect. But is it not true that each one of us, as a "normal" person, has been at one time or another "off" in some way which in particular circumstances could have been influential in shaping our behavior toward a criminal act, and yet no one would allege that we were crazy or criminalistic!

There is also a whole group of criminal offenses which may not be offenses in a conventional sense. They are called "victimless crimes" even though they really are not quite victimless in the most basic psychological, sociological, or ethical sense. They are types of behavior which at least some adults of sound mind and body engage in from time to time. They tend to be in the realms of sexuality, pregnancy termination, the use of mind/body altering substances, and matters of trivial public order and decorum. These tend to affect others in only indirect, peripheral, or definitional ways, but do no great injury to their persons and subtract nothing from their property. Many of these crimes fall under the rubric of the blue laws which are seldom enforced, because of a lack of public consensus and support. Occasionally they may tempt unscrupulous police departments into the evils of entrapment, invasion of privacy, abridgement of civil rights, or selective enforcement.

So what does this leave us with in terms of real criminals? It leaves us with adults (the definition of how old an adult is has varied historically and from state to state) who can be put into these groupings: professional criminals, white-collar criminals, habitual offenders, violent criminals, political criminals, organized criminals, property criminals and occupational criminals.

Professional criminals are people who look upon their criminal activity as a business or a profession and whose contra-cultural peers feel much the same way. If they are bright and well organized, they seldom suffer the stigmatizing penalties of incarceration because they build into their underworld professions a kind of insurance against this eventuality.

White collar criminals are criminaloid or betrayers-of-trust types. They are in business, the professions, or areas of governmental service and they too, like the professional criminals, ordinarily bear no criminal stigma and have no public indignity thrust upon them because they do not conceive of their illegal

activities as being deviant and they are seldom apprehended or convicted. Only infrequently do they make the headlines, as in the case of the Great Electrical Equipment Companies Antitrust conspiracy of 1961. Even then their sentences were minimal, their embarrassment was probably only temporary, and their peer group was likely to sympathize with their bad fortune in being caught.

Habitual offenders are likely to spend their lives in and out of penal institutions. Quite often more of their time is spent "in" than out. They have never figured out how successfully to avoid detection, how to ransom their way to freedom when caught, or how to escape the criminal justice dragnet. These habitual criminals are truly "losers" and in the past were sometimes mistakenly thought to be typical of all criminals, for they were the ones typically under lock and key and thus easily studied. Recent surveys have indicated that a very disproportionate number of them are male, black, poor, uneducated, and without the security of friends or influence outside the prison walls. Ironically, many of them consider prison just another hateful place of incarceration within the "prison-society" in which they feel they live.

Then there are the violent personal criminal types (murderers, rapists, muggers, *et al.*). Even in this group there are several subtypes, depending on motivation, intended victim, and mode of attack. Their insensitive brutality frightens much of the populace, especially women, children and older people.

Political criminals should not be viewed in the current class-consciousness sense, but rather as people who very conscientiously and firmly reject certain governmental requirements, such as performing military service, paying taxes, etc. They may be young, idealistic, religiously devout, of above average intelligence, and people with a "higher loyalty" and a different set of priorities than the average citizen.

Organized criminals overlap with professional criminal types, but have the added trait of being regionally, nationally, or internationally organized — perhaps for the purpose of making illicit goods or services available where and when the public demand is great. They may extort moneys from fearful victims for alleged services or "protection."

Property criminals may be several previously mentioned types, depending on criminal motive, frequency of criminal behavior, and attitude. Auto thieves, for example, may have pleasure,

personal need, or profit as motives and they may take cars only occasionally or quite regularly and systematically.

Occupational criminals are not all included among the white-collar types, since it seems to be common knowledge, for instance, that employee thefts are very significant in the aggregate and that sometimes otherwise honest citizens feel free to fleece the big corporations when they think they can get away with it. This behavior may be easily rationalized when the employee feels he is underpaid or otherwise exploited.

When one realizes that these types and others may have favorite climatic, geographic, and temporal seasons of activity; may work under differing constraints of need; may develop various rationalizations for underworld life styles; may have many or few confederates and kinspeople in their criminal sub-culture; may have several levels of organization; may live unified or compartmentalized lives; may suffer great or little stigma if successfully prosecuted; may represent the whole range of intellectual potentialities; may be in any stage of mental health or illness; may really have almost no desire to go straight or conversely may really wish to convert to the conventional "non-criminal" world; when these parameters of the criminal type are understood, the whole problem of the criminal and what to do with him or her seems much less simple than it may have earlier if one's information has come mainly from the mass media.

Let me try to summarize in a simple yet multi-factored fashion and to use the word "victim" in place of "criminal" in a somewhat unconventional, perhaps socio-psychological way. Could we say that criminals are victims of the following? (1) relative poverty and deprivation; (2) little and/or inferior education; (3) low mentality and/or small chance to develop it; (4) mental illness of slight or profound, of general or specific nature; (5) poor parenting (weak socialization) by mother, father, and the educational, religious, and other nurturant agencies of our society; (6) the persistent American values of individualism, competitiveness, acquisitiveness, freedom of movement, majority rule, and aggressiveness, without having legitimate channels through which to realize such values; (7) the impersonal bureaucratic systems that seem to be essential for large urban-industrial nations to function, but which for some people result in feelings of helplessness, hopelessness and panic; (8) mass media images equating success with sexuality, materialism, and attractive personal appearance; (9) affluent living for the majority of Americans with consequent rising levels of expectation, set in the

context of immediate gratification, and made possible through deferred payment purchase plans; (10) poor self-concepts or "spoiled identity," partially due to prejudices in areas of race, religion, sex, socio-economic class status, ethnic origin, or one's mental and physical appearance; (11) dull routine home and work lives in which the elements of risk, adventure, and fun are missing; (12) "progress" which may uproot people physically, terminate their work plans prematurely, and beset them with confusing value standards, coming at them with future shock rapidity; (13) deprivation, rejection, and desertion by "significant others"; (14) idealized, illusory, and unrealistic notions of what is possible to achieve through hard work, honest interaction, and unselfish attitudes toward others; (15) too narrow loyalties to nation, race, ethnic group, socio-economic class, profession, political ideology, or neighborhood; (16) dramatic, influential peers whose "right," though wrong, looks so appealing through the eyes of friendship and love; (17) old-fashioned or outmoded notions of personal morality; (18) entering the wrong group (gang) when one is most vulnerable and in need of such support; (19) the contaminating influence of unreconstructed criminal types in places of incarceration; (20) a criminal justice system which from top to bottom is largely infused with middle-class ideas and ideals, coming out of a white Anglo-Saxon, Protestant heritage; (21) having been rewarded for the deviant and/or criminal act, however cursory, and not punished for doing it; (22) the intoxication of power, the old eccentric notion that might makes right rather than the reverse; (23) exercising aggressive, competitive, adventurous, proclivities in inappropriate ways and then having been caught and labeled or stigmatized; and finally victims of (24) misdemeanor or felonious parents who passed their anti-social traits on to their offspring, much as the thief caste of India socialized their children.

Criminal Statistics

The first and most significant problem with criminal statistics is, that as all criminologists will readily acknowledge, there is a *dark area of crime* which is unknown, and some think, unknowable. This unknown quantity of criminality has always existed and probably always will. It is like the proverbial iceberg of which we see only the disproportionately small tip.

If we let X stand for all crime committed at a given time in a given place, let us examine how X is diminished before we know how much crime has officially occurred. First, some crimes are probably never discovered by anyone or, if and when discovered,

are attributed to carelessness, mischievousness, accident, or absentmindedness. Surely all of us have "lost" small items which in fact we feel are too trivial in value for us to be concerned about.

Second, when someone does discover or learn of a crime, he or she may not report it for a number of reasons. It may appear to be too trivial to bother with. It might have been done by a friend or a neighbor. It is too "old" to provide enough evidence for police to do anything about it. The police may be thought to be corrupt, inept, or biased and thus are not alerted. The individual does not wish to involve his own time and effort to the extent needed to aid the police. One is fearful of personal repercussions from the perpetrators if he or she does call the police. One's integrity, pride, or intelligence may be besmirched if police do a thorough investigation — in other words, the crime reporter may not come into the case with entirely clean hands.

Third, when the police are indeed notified, they may give the suspect a warning. They may find a trail so cold that the scent is dead. They may look the other way because they are being paid to do so. Their superiors may have ordered benign unconcern. The enormity of the organized crime operation is so great that the average police officer could see his investigation of it as having almost no ultimate punitive or deterrent effect. The act is seen as a victimless "status" offense. For example, why bring Mayor Smith to the station house on a sex morals charge when one knows that his home life is horrible? Flossie, his paramour, is a good kid (she tips police off when "outside" criminal types blow into town and coincidentally into the brothel). And, besides, Smith would beat the rap, take the police officer's job or have him assigned to a tougher beat. Perhaps Flossie likes and rewards a "smart cop" when she sees one! These and other considerations could prevent many crimes from ever becoming officially tabulated.

Fourth, and the next step in the criminal justice *filter process*, the police may make an official report and book a suspect, but sometimes the evidence does not truly justify further time and attention and the matter is dropped then and there. Or perhaps the suspect is a juvenile and the case goes to the juvenile unit shortly after arrest. If the alleged culprit is arrested and booked and makes an initial appearance before a magistrate, the charges may be dropped. If it is a petty offense, it may be handled in a summary trial.

The next or fifth procedure is a preliminary hearing, at which time the evidence against the defendant is tested. If the evidence is found wanting, the charges may be dropped or reduced. But if the evidence is sufficient, a charge is filed by the prosecutor on the basis of the information filed by the police or a citizen. Here again a grand jury may refuse to indict if there seems to be no case or if it seems to be a weak one.

But if the grand jury gives the go-ahead, the sixth step is an appearance for a plea of guilty or not guilty; the defendant usually has the option of being tried by a judge or a jury and if he, the defendant, is indigent and is accused of a felony, arrangements are made to secure a public defender for him or her. The trial may result in acquittal or plea bargaining, or a guilty plea to a lesser offense. One can see how the sifting action continues throughout this often tedious, deliberate, and cumbersome, but hopefully justice-seeking, system. (For an elegant and much more detailed explanatory diagram of this whole filtering process, see Elmer H. Johnson's *Crime, Correction, and Society*, 3rd ed., Homewood, Illinois: The Dorsey Press, 1974, pp. 298-299.)

If the trial decision is guilty, then a sentence is announced. This may be appealed and in serious cases often is. However, if the sentence is a fine, this may be paid and the individual exits from the criminal justice system. If imprisonment seems too harsh a sentence, probation under certain circumstances may circumvent jailing. If a fine is not or cannot be paid, or if the terms of probation are not or cannot be met, then the defendant is very likely to find him or herself behind bars. But here again a writ of habeas corpus or revocation of the sentence, or, as sometimes occurs in Ohio and some other states, "shock probation," or early parole, may extricate the individual from the toils of the criminal justice system.

I hope the above account sheds some light on how the "criminal" who is in Lucasville or Marysville, and who is thus most easily studied and observed, may be the least representative sample of all those involved in the criminal activity that occurs in a given time and place.

Leaving the criminal justice filter process aside for a moment, let us consider the case of white-collar criminals and their non-appearance in criminal statistics. Their big fault has usually been a very significant violation of trust. It is uncommon for such business and professional people to go through the criminal courts, even when their offenses are felonies. It is much more

typical for their offenses to be handled through civil proceedings or by administrative bodies. Even when they are admittedly guilty, public policy and attitude may allow them to slink quietly away with the promise that they will sin no more! Sometimes the penalties of loss of social standing, inability to regain positions of trust, and family embarrassment, among others, may be visited upon them, but the fact of the matter is that they seldom become labeled as criminals or deviants. Physicians or nurses might become drug addicted, but whoever heard Dick Tracy calling them "dope fiends," as he does others in the comic strip sagas? University officials might have "misappropriated" or "lost" hundreds of thousands of dollars, but whoever recalls their being stigmatized as robbers, swindlers, or crooks? And so the litany of upper-middle and upper-class offenses could go on, but without the public's knowledge of our punitive attitude toward such offenders, as would be common for people of the "have not" groups of our society. I am not arguing that the treatment of these prominent offenders is necessarily bad. In fact, I am inclined to think that it "works" as well or better than the way in which the criminal justice system handles the predominantly young, black, poor, uneducated, uninfluential offenders.

Members of organized crime who, unlike white-collar criminals, really accept a criminal identity as do other professional types of criminals, do not appear in their proportionate numbers in our criminal statistics. There are other blurs and streaks in the criminal statistical picture. One of these has to do with how and why statistics are gathered by local police departments — which, after all, are the fundamental sources from which most F.B.I. and other criminal statistics emanate. It is on the basis of F.B.I. crime reports that public policy is formulated and tax moneys are spent. Bruce J. Cohen, editor of *Crime in America: Perspectives on Criminal and Delinquent Behavior*, (Itasca, Illinois: F. E. Peacock Pub., Inc., 1970, p. 4) neatly summarizes some of these possibly biasing criminal data gathering problems in the scientific study of criminal behavior: (1) inaccurate reporting by police agencies and victims; (2) lack of consistency in legal definitions of criminal offenses among the several political jurisdictions; (3) misinterpretations of the *Uniform Crime Reports*; (4) a selective bias directed against the lower classes; (5) a significant number of white collar offenses handled by administrative boards and commissions rather than the criminal courts.

We can easily think of reasons for inaccuracies in reporting by police departments. Aside from common human error, changes

in police personnel and equipment could make differences from one time period to another. There are public pressures (from mass media, for example) to get certain criminals off the streets, to lock up certain "disorderly" houses, to find the brutal murderer of a beloved innocent child. If the members of the police department need tax dollars, it might be advantageous for them to show a high crime rate this year when they have too few officers and too much outmoded detection equipment. After the bond issue has safely passed, it might be politic to show, with considerable pride and a feeling of security, that the crime rate has gone down, thanks to the deterrent effect of police visibility and known technical competence. The variables are almost legion. One can imagine, for example, what the "criminal police" of Denver a few years ago did about reporting robberies and burglaries which they or their off-duty cohorts had committed! We have already commented on the fear, embarrassment, and rational reluctance which some victims of crime have about reporting offenses against themselves. Only recently have more than a small fraction of rape victims begun to file complaints. The victims of flim-flam or con artists, who have exhibited a bit of the larceny in their own hearts, are understandably reluctant to go running to the police for redress of their loss, a loss made possible by the sinister twins of gullibility and cupidity!

The second frustrating point Cohen makes is that of changing and different definitions for the same essential "offense," as we move from one time to another or from one place to another. Is gambling unacceptable if it's done in Ohio in an office football pool, but acceptable through the state lottery system where the real odds are hardly ever mentioned and the same appeal to a "get something for nothing" philosophy is promulgated? Is a youth serving ten years for marijuana possession in Texas a different sort of individual from one let off with fatherly advice in California? Were the convicted criminals of the Volstead era still bad people after repeal of the Noble Experiment? One of these was a generous, kindly, helpful neighbor who spent one year in the New Hampshire penitentiary for his dealings in spirits.

We err when we look at the *Uniform Crime Report's* criminal statistics as being reliable or accurate just because they are compiled by our national crime detection agency. These figures are no better than the individual police departments reporting them. And not only that, we are not even sure that the few crimes they tabulate are the most significant ones overall. Again Cohen points out in *Crime in America* (p. 11) that the *President's Com-*

mission on Law Enforcement: Crime in America indicates that surveys on unreported crime show that the actual magnitude of crime is several times that reported to the police, even in some precincts reporting the highest crime rates! So caution must be exercised in interpreting statistics from the *Uniform Crime Reports* since small changes in reporting methods may affect the rates importantly.

Many of us commonly observe that police look for crime where they expect to find it. A Friday or a Saturday drive on Parsons Avenue in Columbus, Ohio has occasionally yielded for me the tangle of almost a whole fleet of police cruisers interspersed among the other vehicular traffic. The riot-control vehicles and devices of the Columbus Police Department would not commonly be deployed in upper-middle or upper class neighborhoods. We would even speculate that the over surveillance of certain areas of our cities might almost elicit the trouble police are on the lookout for. Young boys, especially, have often been intrigued by the challenge to their cleverness and bravado. In fact, when the police helicopters fly over Westerville looking for "weed" patches and other criminal developments, I sometimes have the momentary temptation to take off running in a zigzag course down fetid alleys to see whether they'll laser beam me to the bricks and call out the National Guard!

Sutherland's professional name as a criminologist was largely based on his careful documentation of the plethora of criminal violations by huge corporations. The damage in financial and other terms from these depredations was and is so monumental that one wonders what a five to ten year sentenced burglar who has stolen \$250 worth of silver and jewelry from the house of a family vacationing in the Swiss Alps thinks about as he ponders such societal and criminal justice system discrepancies?

Another problem with crime statistics, and a reason why actual crime may be many times greater than reported crime, is that a suspect may have committed a number of offenses, but will only be tried for the most serious, as in the case of a rape-murder offender. An offender isn't likely to divulge smaller crimes, if he believes they will go undiscovered or cannot be traced to him, if his neck is already in the noose for a felony which the police do have evidence enough to convict him for.

We must treat criminal statistics with a good deal of caution and skepticism. We don't really know how much crime there is. Self-reporting surveys (and they have their weaknesses, too)

would tend to indicate that there is much more than we ordinarily believe. But perhaps this is nothing new — at least since the twin traits, urbanism and industrialism, have appeared in the modern world. The importance of all this is that our treasure, our personhood, our time, our energy, and our peace of mind are somehow tied up in these statistics and more especially in the use that is made of them by public servants.

Treatment

The history of the treatment of criminal offenders is unfortunately replete with the starkest illustrations of man's inhumanity to man. Burning at the stake, drawing and quartering, lashing, drowning, tarring and feathering, and virtually immuring people for life are only a few of the ways people used to "help" criminals expiate their sins. My use of the word "sins" is intentional because there has not always been a very clear distinction made between acts harmful to one's fellow man, harmful to the commonwealth, or harmful to the integrity of religious belief and practice. Even today, as one of my references indicates (Smith and Pollack's *Some Sins Are Not Crimes*, 1975) we seem not entirely able to separate secular from sacred offenses when it comes to public prosecution.

When a convict merited less than the death penalty, and early 19th-century Great Britain had about 200 capital offenses in its criminal statutes (Conklin, *The Impact of Crime*, p. 159), virtual shipboard enslavement, transportation to a prison colony (recall that Georgia, Virginia, the West Indies, and Australia, among others, were English prison colonies), and throwing convicts into the most malignant, pest-ridden, unsanitary dungeons were ways of "treating" some of our Anglo-Saxon ancestors. In fact, the English penchant for physical punishment was noted by early American Indian observers of parent-child interaction among colonial families. The native "savages" found it incredible that parents could use physically brutalizing techniques of child discipline as the English were wont to do.

The above sketchy portrayal of only one of our historic immigrant streams to America shows that we have surely evolved to more constructive and humane ways of treating the convicted offenders among us. Some would argue that we have substituted the psychological for the physical as our method of attempting to exercise social control and thus insure public order. They would not necessarily see this change as representing progress.

We still enthusiastically use lock-ups, jails, reformatories, prisons, and penitentiaries. Essentially they all have the same purpose: to control the movement and freedom of people "for cause." But the "for cause" includes those awaiting trial and those awaiting a sentence as well as those who have been found guilty of committing an offense, for which the punishment is incarceration for a period of time. This incarceration is supposed to serve four functions: (1) *Security*. Open society is protected from further offenses by this particular inmate for a specified length of time. (2) *Deterrence*. This convict, at least, is being presently deterred from crime while institutionalized, but it is far from clear how his or her imprisonment is deterring others. (3) *Punishment*. For the majority of Americans the loss of freedom and the reduction in status to that of a subject of the criminal justice system would seem to be sufficient punishment, but to these must be added loss of privacy, loss of individuality, loss of peer support, loss of free world status, fear of fellow inmates, and the 101 ways of personal derogation which are so well described in Irvin Goffman's works on *total* institutions. (4) *Reform*. The question of whether to use the concept of reform and/or rehabilitation is a knotty one: is the correctional program supposed to re-form the inmate to an assumed pre-crime image or is it supposed to re-form him or her into a middle-class and, some would suggest, a WASP sort of character? In other words, how far do the concepts of cultural pluralism or cultural homogeneity obtain in the reformation or rehabilitation goals on an institutional program?

It should be fairly obvious that these four purposes of incarceration tend to work against each other. An example of the conflicts is seen in the various modifications and exit patterns that have been established to release convicts from their bondage to a prison or jail before their entire sentence has been served.

One of these is the "work furlough plan," which usually allows the inmate to hold a free society job during the day and return to the prison each night. A variation of this allows convicts, especially those who have excellent behavior and attitude profiles, to make weekend visits to their homes as they near the end of their sentences.

The parole system has had much the same rationale. Let the inmate enter the free world, albeit under rather severe and close surveillance, toward the end of the sentence. If all goes well, the individual is thus given that much of a head-start on his or her re-entry-to-society. If he or she violates some of the strict

parole rules, then it's back to the penal facility to serve out the remainder of the sentence.

To take this program several steps closer to the moment of conviction, we may see the first offender, whose offense is surrounded by mitigating circumstances, offered probation. Again the offender is given the welcome option of living under close restrictions and being supervised by a probation officer or other court-designated adult in lieu of serving a prison term. This option is seen as avoiding the status shock of actual imprisonment, the "contamination" of prisonization (one's complete assimilation of the argot, value standards, and life-ways of one's fellow convicts), and the necessity of re-socialization to the straight world upon release.

In some cases, where a monetary penalty is appropriate, then even the necessity of probation and/or later parole is avoided. If one is well-to-do or has wealthy, generous friends or kin, one can entirely miss the unpleasant stigma of having served a prison sentence!

Since no human system ever has worked or perhaps ever will work perfectly, there are other approaches to the reform of a convicted offender. A common one today is the total psychiatric work-up of the convict. This procedure should help authorities answer such questions as these: Will this individual likely commit another or a similar crime? Is it possible to "cure" this convict of proclivities toward illegal and socially destructive behavior? What kinds of treatment are indicated and does the state have the resources and the moral authority to institute such procedures (e.g. behavior modification, psychosurgery, etc.)?

Akin to this approach would be that of community-based counseling. Is it possible for the whole community, or a segment of it, to constitute itself the therapist in the re-formation of this individual? Are the risks outweighed by the potentialities for ultimate good? The state of Massachusetts in recent years has been engaged in an experiment with its juvenile offenders, premised on the assumption that out-of-institution treatment may in the long run be more effective and cheaper than the traditional institutional programs.

Half-way houses represent another way of dealing with problems faced by offenders after conviction or after they have served a portion or all of their sentences. Here the group support of those who "have been there" and the high resolve "to make it

on the streets" are important elements in a controlled living environment which help the ex-con to change to a law-abiding person.

The man-to-man/woman-to-woman programs are also designed to set up a liaison between the inmate, while still incarcerated, and an exemplary friend from a nearby community. The two are carefully matched so that a sustained meaningful relationship can begin in the institution and continue at least until the inmate has become firmly and satisfactorily established in a residence, job, and pattern of social group relationships in the free world.

There are various ex-offender support groups which all propose to aid the ex-inmate in the recognizably difficult re-socialization process from underworld, to prison, to free world. They publish journals. They promote sensitivity sessions like those held by Alcoholics Anonymous. They lend financial, moral, and practical aid when they are needed. One might hypothesize that, as with Alcoholics Anonymous, a strong therapeutic experience for the ex-offender is for him or her to be busily engaged in the attempted rehabilitation of fellow ex-inmates.

All of these treatment programs and others like them rest upon some unexpressed assumptions if we are to presume their average success. One of these is that the ex-offender is the type of person who *can be re-formed* and indeed *wishes to be reformed*. This is by no means always the case. Another assumption is that free world society is ready and willing to forgive and forget the offense for which the offender "has paid his or her debt to society." Too often the ex-con stigma is carried, almost scarlet letter-like, by the offender to his death. Since society now seems to be softening in its tenacious labeling of ex-cons and thus their status as second-class citizens of a pariah caste is less automatic, it would seem at least probable that ex-offenders can look to the future with more hope than in the past. If criminologists are correct in saying that we are all "criminals," then we may in the future find it more nearly possible to give ex-offenders a "hand up" in their return to the straight world. This would involve jobs, admission to our churches and clubs, a welcome to our neighborhood barbecues and to leadership of our Cub Scout packs, full citizenship rights, and the kind of support we give people who hold ideals and goals similar to ours.

None of the "treatments" I have described works as well as it should. As with other agencies, programs, and people in our world, more nearly adequate budgets, better trained personnel,

national as well as local value congruency, and the greater dedication of public officials, professionals, and lay volunteers would improve these attempted treatments in most instances.

In the near future we really must examine incarceration as a technique. If it is becoming increasingly expensive, but if it is absolutely essential for some types of offenders, how may size, living conditions, treatment programs (educational and vocational), liaisons with the free world, etc., ensure that we will be getting our money's worth? Since it is generally agreed that some types of offenders "burn out" or even "wise up" at mid-life, one could suggest that even the absence of treatment might result in some diminution of crime through natural human aging and maturing processes. If the kinds of criminals we do lock up have a rather impressive recidivism rate (25-75 per cent), depending on many variables, maybe these too could be treated more effectively in some other fashion. Some of these other techniques have been explored and it is to be hoped that interest and ingenuity will result in further social inventions which will aid us in giving offenders a fighting chance for successful re-entry into the "straight world."

In conclusion, I wish to shoot a few parting arrows at the target of this essay, namely a greater comprehension of the subtleties and complexities of criminal types, crime statistics and the treatment of offenders.

First, "criminals" come in different ages (mostly a young population where we can count them), races, religions, national origins, socio-economic statuses, etc., but the ones we see are only a portion, half to one-third, of those we have! (See Reid, *Crime and Criminology*, p. 56, quoting from an L.E.A.A. study of 200,000 citizens in eight cities of the U.S.A.)

Second, we probably need to decriminalize some behaviors and actions, especially if we realistically expect our criminal justice system to do its job effectively with those others who are most threatening to our personal safety and property.

Third, we need to take a very solemn look at the psychological and sociological factors behind some types of criminality before we condemn those who are caught in our net from which the big fish seem to escape. Can we expect poor, unemployed, discouraged, frustrated, alienated people to have the same attitudes, values, and behavior patterns that we educated, working,

relatively affluent, hopeful, socially involved people have?

Fourth, what vested interest do we have in maintaining a pariah criminal caste? What power, income, jobs, status justification, subjects for enforcement, subjects for uplift, etc., would be lost, if the entire human criminal population could be wiped out by a magical semantic master stroke or a broad policy change pronouncement?

Fifth, will our skepticism about statistics exert pressure on public officials to show us as closely as science is able what our real criminal problems and populations are? How can we spend our taxes wisely if we are ignorant of the real dimensions of the problems as well as strategies for solving them? Since we are dealing with an enigma wrapped in a paradox anyway, will we be less likely to be stampeded into half measures, unthrifty use of available funds, poor utilization of the personnel we do have, once we have become aware of the jungle of figures surrounding criminal behavior?

Sixth, we know that jails, reformatories, and prisons are very expensive. We know that they are not doing a very successful job in reforming their populations. Is the solution, then, to build more of them? Or is the "solution," or a step toward a possible solution, to try various alternatives and do these as well as we can? What would happen to crime rates if four or five million unemployed people were put to work at useful productive tasks? What would happen if our tax laws truly took taxes from citizens in accordance with their ability to support the country that has helped to make their wealth possible? What would happen to the *alienation index* (source of some criminal and delinquent behavior) if our local, state, and federal governments gave high priority, for a few decades at least, to the following areas: education, health, meaningful employment, decent housing, adequate child care, and the abolition of racial, sexual, chronological, and socio-economic status discrimination for all citizens?

Seventh, can we somehow work out decentralization strategies in our urban centers that will not only aid the dependent, depressed, and depleted, but will also give most of us the experience of a cooperative-competitive society in which human welfare and happiness are linked to planetary common sense? This common sense would pertain to arms races, ethnic jealousies, power ploys, and the dishonorable plunder of a perfectly and potentially good place for people to live.

Finally, I am saying that the crime we have is the crime we have in part engendered and thus deserve. Our societal products did not arise *de nihil* — they are ours to nurture, guide, correct, and live with. So, what can we do? A few suggestions: Let us visit the city jail, the county facility, or the state penitentiary to see for ourselves what incarceration feels, smells and looks like. Let us check with probation and parole officers to ascertain what their problems and putative solutions to them might be. Let us talk with our governmental representatives about these matters and develop reasonable legislative priorities.

The disgraceful, destructive chaos of Attica, for example, did not occur by chance. Many criminologists see such outbursts as desperate attempts by inmates to communicate to us. There may be hope when prisoners rebel, but when their hope vanishes and their self identity becomes debased, then our society is likely to have a mirror held up to its face. And 1984 is little more than seven and one-half years away!

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DAWN

This morning,
I heard the first
bird sing,
saying,
"Thank-you,
for many dawns."

Fine as rain
on slate,
the song ran
toward a borderland:
something more.

And the fat,
black earth,
groaning sooner
than it would,
said,
"All of this
is yours."

Norman Chaney

Paul L. Redditt

EASTERN INFLUENCE ON THE WEST AN ESSAY ON CULTURAL INTERDEPENDENCE

“Europeans and Americans usually assume that their culture is superior to that of the Orient. Whether or not this assumption is correct, it renders the West more or less immune to Eastern influence.”¹ Perhaps the traditions of colonialism and isolationism help to explain this phenomenon, but the fact remains that books abound in the West concerning the impact of the West on the East, but few materials study the impact of the East on the West. On the other hand, most of those Westerners who have escaped the mold have taken a pendulum ride to the opposite extreme, finding little or nothing worthwhile in Occidental culture and nothing blameworthy in Oriental culture. Indeed fascination with the noble Eastern sage was simply an eighteenth and nineteenth century fad in Europe following interest in the good Negro of Ethiopia and the noble red savage of America. Summarizing the work of Henri Baudet, Franklin Bauer says that European fascination with the non-European was in fact merely a reflection of “changing European taste and self-criticism, especially the latter. The European’s images of non-European man are not primarily if at all descriptions of real people, but rather projections of his own nostalgia and feeling of inadequacy. They are judgments on himself and his history. The outsider, whether primitive or civilized, is held up as a model of what he (the European) had been in happier days, or of what he would like to be and perhaps could be once again.”² If this is true of Europe, it is no less true of America. By and large, those most interested in Eastern culture are disaffected with American culture and turn to the East for refuge.

Surely such a famine or feast approach to Eastern cultures is not necessary. Surely a vibrant, healthy culture — or faith for that matter — can turn to others to learn from them, precisely because the culture or faith is healthy, indeed secure enough in itself that it is not threatened. Such is the spirit which lies behind this essay. For it is my intention to steer a course between these two extremes, casting what I trust will be a balanced look upon the question of Eastern influence upon the West. I shall proceed in four steps. First I shall list representative contributions of the East to world civilization. Second, I shall discuss three major figures of the last hundred years, assessing Eastern influence upon them. Third, I shall speculate briefly on the impact and

function of Eastern religion in the West today. Finally, I shall estimate the prospects for more Eastern influence in the not too distant future.

I. Overview of Significant Eastern Contributions to Western Civilization

It would serve no purpose for me to recite all Eastern contribution to the community of man that I can find. Rather, I shall be selective, hoping to convey an impression that the progress of man in a variety of areas is not wholly the result of Western science and technology and of Judeo-Christian thought. I shall move progressively Eastward, from the Muslims of the Middle East through India, to the contributions of Chinese culture. If I were asked to underscore one Muslim achievement of especial importance to the West, it would surely be the literary efforts of Medieval Islam. When "the grandeur that was Rome" faded in the early middle ages, the accumulated wisdom of Greece lost its grip on the Latin mind. Indeed, much Greek philosophy was eclipsed, and Western man concerned himself with different matters or different approaches to truth. In the Muslim world, however, this was not the case. During the century and a half from A.D. 750-900, a period of intense translation activity took place, as first Christian and then Muslim scholars collected and assimilated the knowledge of the ancient world. Works of medicine, mathematics, and astronomy were translated first, followed later by more theoretical philosophical treatises. Books were translated from Sanskrit, Persian, Punic, and especially Greek. The age of translation was followed by a period of intense scientific and philosophical advance until the thirteenth century, when the rise of Muslim orthodoxy, the end of expansion, and the cessation of translation combined to stifle Muslim creativity.³ When the West rediscovered the Greeks, it read them mainly in Arabic translations. Thus Islam turned out to be the bridge connecting the early Renaissance with its inspirational model, the ancient Greeks. Not only, however, did Islam convey Aristotle to the medieval Church, it also shared its own thinking. Many have argued that Al Farabi had a profound influence upon the theological system of St. Thomas of Aquino,⁴ and Moses Maimonides in his *Mishneh Tora* specifically cites Ibn Roshd as his teacher, despite the fact that Maimonides' greatest work, *The Guide for the Perplexed*, has as one of its purposes to refute Muslim teaching.

If in some sense the greatest influence of Islam was the conveyance of Western thought to the West, the impact of Indian

culture has been more innovative. Among the gifts of India to the world appear to have been such things as rice, cotton, and many spices; such games as chess; and the domestication of the fowl. Especially far reaching was India's part in the development of the Indo-Germanic language. Moreover, the modern science of phonetics seems to have been founded immediately upon the West's rediscovery of the Sanskrit alphabet.⁵

Hindu thought has had its impact in the West as well. In the nineteenth century, translations of Indian literature were avidly read and at times appropriated by Western authors such as Goethe, Hegel, and Schopenhauer. The same is true for New England writers, Ralph Waldo Emerson especially. In the twentieth century the slim figure of Mahatma Gandhi standing non-violently against the might of the British Empire has surely proved inspirational in the West as well as the East.

One final achievement of India must be mentioned, and that is the invention of the decimal system, the so-called Arabic numerals⁶ and the cipher zero, all by the year A.D. 595. Indian mathematicians were able, in fact, between the eighth and thirteenth centuries to figure positive and negative values, find square and cube roots, solve quadratic equations and compute the value of *pi* to 3.1416 (and ultimately to extend the value to nine decimals), accomplishments which the West was able to repeat only in the Renaissance and would never have achieved using the Roman numeral system.⁷

If the influence of Islam and India have been largely philosophical, the influence of China has been more pragmatic, reflecting its special temperament. Tea was served in delicate porcelain or "china" for centuries before both became exports to the West. Another practical yet beautiful gift of China was silk. The gift of Chinese plants included apricots, peaches, oranges, lemons and chrysanthemums. The Chinese appear also to have introduced paper money, gunpowder, and the magnetic compass to Europe. To be sure, the Westerners adapted these items to their specification, especially the compass, which in China was oriented southwards toward land masses where the Chinese could travel. Many items of amusement adopted from China by Europeans included dominoes, kites, and shadow play. Simple machines such as the wheelbarrow, the rotary fan, the winnowing machine and spinning and weaving machines were exported from China to the West. The influence of Chinese and Japanese art upon Western figures like the French impressionists and the writers Ezra Pound and William Butler Yeats is also significant.

Yeats introduced many principles of Japanese Noh drama into his plays on Irish folk motifs, and Pound based most of his theory of aesthetics on the Chinese ideogram.⁸

In view of the preceding it is clear that the impact of the East upon Western culture is rather widespread and includes matters from the trivial to the useful, of scientific and technological as well as philosophical value. This debt of the Occident to the Orient does not entirely lie in the past; it continues to grow. I turn now to survey three modern figures of immense significance in their fields, each of whom displays considerable Eastern coloration.

II. Three Modern Westerners Influenced by the East.

The persons I wish to treat are the American architect Frank Lloyd Wright, the New England philosopher and poet Ralph Waldo Emerson, and the Irish critic, poet, and playwright William Butler Yeats. Their selection is conditioned mainly by the fact that they are all major figures in quite different fields, With this understanding I shall take them up in the order in which I have mentioned them.

Frank Lloyd Wright was influenced by the East in his personal philosophy, though it is perhaps too much to claim that Wright's architecture was inspired by the East no matter how congenial he found Eastern architecture. At least we must so conclude if we believe his own words.

To cut ambiguity short: there never was exterior influence upon my work, either foreign or native, other than that of Lieber Meister, Dankar Adler and John Roebling, Whitman and Emerson, and the great poets worldwide. My work is original not only in fact but in spiritual fiber. No practice by any European architect to this day has influenced mine in the least.

As for the Incas, the Mayans, even the Japanese -- all were to me but splendid confirmation.⁹

Wright many times amplified this last comment that Japan had confirmed his architectural ideas.

Many people have wondered about an Oriental quality they see in my work. I suppose it is true that when we speak of organic architecture, we are speaking of something that is more Oriental than Western. The answer is: my work *is*, in that deeper philosophical sense, Oriental. These ideals have not been

common to the whole people of the Orient; but there was Laotse, for instance. Our society has never known the Taoist mind. The Orientals must have had the sense of it, whatever may have been their consideration for it, and they instinctively built that way. Their instinct was right. So this gospel of organic architecture still has more in sympathy and in common with Oriental thought than it has with any other thing the West has ever confessed.

For a long time, I thought I had "discovered" it, only to find after all that this idea of the interior space being the reality of the building was ancient and Oriental When building Unity Temple at Oak Park and the Larkin Building in Buffalo, I was making the first great protest I knew anything about against the building coming up on you from the outside as enclosure. I reversed that old idiom in idea and in fact.

When pretty well puffed up by this, I received a little book by Okakura Kakuzo, entitled *The Book of Tea*, sent to me by the ambassador from Japan to the United States. Reading it, I came across this sentence. "The reality of a room was to be found in the space enclosed by the roof and walls not in the roof and walls themselves."¹⁰

Wright designed buildings in Japan and studied Japanese architecture when he had the opportunity. He came to see the design of the Japanese home "as a supreme study in elimination — not only of dirt but the elimination of the insignificant."¹¹ Indeed, he rhapsodized: "At last I had found one country on earth where simplicity, as natural, is supreme."¹² "By heaven, here was a house used by those who made it with just that naturalness with which a turtle uses his shell."¹³ Wright thought that the Japanese house would stand, not as a model for Americans to copy, for that would not fit our life-style, but as an inspiration to achieve the ideal of total naturalness, total simplicity, and total usability.

If Wright's architecture was not influenced but confirmed by the East, his thinking and teaching were laced with Eastern concepts, especially concepts from the Buddha, whom Wright admired and revered. In an imaginary dialogue he wrote between the Buddha and himself, Wright dared to hope in a passage that exposes his soul:

But in this little green valley (Taliesin) as in others elsewhere, a message is being prepared: a message you (the Buddha) have helped make clear to us. We aim to reach our people with the living message we call Architecture. One day we may look back and see Truth we can touch and feel because we live in it. Our nation will some day realize the great source of true power is Spirit and find Truth coming to them from a source where they

have looked for it least and last: the buildings they build to live in. You have the right to speak of Spirit as more Oriental than Western. But the Occident has known it too. Some day East and West as one will waken to the honest practice of what we call a natural or organic Architecture. Today — on Earth everywhere youth is waking and working, loving this old, yet new, integrity.

(And the Buddha responds.) Then you may not die as all civilizations preceding yours have died! Sharing our ancient Wisdom, you may live . . . not forever, no Forever, too, is finite. We will know eternal life together. This meeting of East and West in thought will become a mighty feeling only when this vicarious Force you call the Machine becomes, instead of your master, your expedient servant. Then only will you know Freedom."¹⁴

I have allowed Wright to speak in his own words because they are fresh and vibrant. I shall, however, keep more to my own language as I proceed to the second modern figure influenced by the East, Ralph Waldo Emerson. That Emerson was influenced by the East is rather obvious. Even a cursory reading of his essays and poems turns up references to the Koran, Zoroaster, Hindu Brahmins, Buddhism, and the Confucian sage Mencius, not to mention the ancient Egyptians and the Hellenized Middle East. But one is also confronted by the immense impact of Western tradition upon him: classical Greek; the Bible, Church Fathers, the Reformers; German philosophers, English men of letters, Italian painters. The list goes on and on. Indeed, the intellectual influences upon Emerson are so many that for a while it became fashionable to denigrate his significance and view him as only a preserver or vehicle of traditions at best and an imitator at worst. Now I think the tide has turned in his favor. I need not rehearse this battle, since my main concern is with influence upon him, not his creativity or greatness.

In an essay titled "The Transcendentalist," in which Emerson elaborates his own philosophy, he speaks of the peculiar openness of the oriental mind to spiritual value:

The oriental mind has always tended to this largeness. Buddhism is an expression of it. The Buddhist who thanks no man, who says, "Do not flatter your benefactors," but who, in his conviction that every good deed can by no means possibly escape its reward, will not deceive the benefactor by pretending that he has done more than he should is a Transcendentalist.¹⁶

Here Emerson claims as transcendental an expression of Buddhist karma. Karma is the distinctive Indian teaching that all conduct

carries with it the seed of its own reward or punishment and in a morally construed universe will bear its own fruit. Such is also the thrust of Emerson's essay "Compensation." Apparently provoked by a sermon on retribution on the Day of Judgment, Emerson argues that all reward and punishment is this-worldly. That people do not understand this moral fact is attributable to two causes: (1) that considerable time often passes between the commission of an act and the fruition of its retribution; and (2) that retribution may not be recognized when it comes. For example, the cost of moving into the White House, he reminds us, is the loss of privacy and the freedom to be anything but a slave to the office. In short, Emerson says: There is a price for everything in life; whatever you take you will pay for. Emerson is no doubt telling us the truth when he says that his own experience had taught him even as a lad the error of the preacher's message that sinners can get off free in this life, but we also have from his own hand indications that he understood and quite accepted the Buddhist view of karma. Whether we should call this an influence or a confirmation, I cannot say, but we can point out the striking similarity.

The same Indian thought strikes us when we turn to Emerson's notion of the Over-Soul. To be sure, Western philosophy knew of its monists and Emerson lists the ancients. Here, though, in Emerson's notion of the Over Soul, we are not dealing with a monism derived from water or what have you, as Greek monists often suggested, but the concept of an Absolute One, unifying man, thought, and nature, the great Soul behind every soul. I do not suppose that Emerson is thinking of the Hindu notion of the Brahman as the Universal Soul of which man's essential atman (or soul) is an atom. However, the concept of Brahman was known to Emerson, and, even if it was not expressed in his essay on the Over-Soul, it was expressed in his exquisite poem "Brahma," in which the absolute speaks, expressing the oneness of all things no matter how apparently opposite.

If the red slayer thinks he slays,
or if the slain things he is slain,
They know not well the subtle ways
I keep, and pass, and turn again.

Far or forgot to me is near;
Shadow and sunlight are the same;
The vanished gods to me appear;
And one to me are shame and fame.

They reckon ill who leave me out;
When me they fly, I am the wings'

I am the doubter and the doubt,
And I the hymn the Brahmin sings.

The strong gods pine for my abode,
And pine in vain the sacred Seven;
But thou, meek lover of the good!
Find me, and turn thy back on heaven.¹⁷

If Wright found only confirmation of his ideas in the East, and Emerson was influenced to an extent not easily calculated, the situation with regard to William Butler Yeats is, I think, a little clearer. To be sure, the full impact of the East upon Yeats is impossible to calculate, but it is considerable. During the 1890's his reading led him into contact with Madame Blavatsky's Theosophical Society and ultimately into such a study of Indian philosophy that in 1937 he published jointly with Shree Purohit Swami a translation of ten Upanishads. I wish, however, to focus our attention for the moment upon Yeats' deliberate use of elements of Noh theater in his own plays.

Yeats employed Ezra Pound as his secretary during the winters from 1913-1916, and through Pound was involved in a small group, including the translator Arthur Waley, which studied, translated and published Noh plays. Yeats was already deeply interested in a variety of spiritualists and was fascinated by ghosts, witches, and the supernatural. Further he had already begun using masks in his theater productions. He was excited to learn from Pound that Noh was an elitist theater (his experience as director of the Irish Literary Theatre, later the Abbey Theater, had soured him on the general theater-goer and government censorship), employing chorus, mask, stylized dance, and spirits. At last he had found a traditional medium which would allow him to blend Irish motifs and traditions with the eerie workings of his mind. The use of Noh as a kind of anti-theater allowed him to express his own anti-self and work through his troubles.¹⁵ It is this transformation that distinguishes the later from the earlier Yeats, and it is this antithesis that characterizes much of his most famous work. His poem "The Second Coming" pictures the coming of the Anti-Christ (which he later identified with the impending doom of Hitler's Naziism) in images reminiscent of the Nativity:

And what rough beast, its hour come around at last,
Slouches towards Bethlehem to be born?¹⁹

Yeats could even create an Anti-Noh. One of the characteristics of Noh most appealing to Yeats is that the crisis usually

occurs in Noh drama when a character who appears to be human turns out to be a god or a spirit.²⁰ In a Noh-inspired play on the resurrection of Jesus, a Hebrew and a Greek dialogue as they look at Calvary, and the Greek laughs.

The Hebrew. Be quiet. You do not know what you are doing. You have gone out of your mind. You are laughing at Calvary.

The Greek. No, no. I am laughing because they thought they were nailing the hands of a living man upon the Cross, and all the time there was nothing there but a phantom . . . We Greeks understand these things. No god has ever been buried, no god has ever suffered. Christ only seemed to eat, seemed to sleep, seemed to talk, seemed to die.²¹

Confident that he knows the truth, the Greek after the resurrection walks up to the risen phantom to prove to the Hebrew that Jesus is not real; even if Jesus looks real, either the Greek's hand will pass through or Jesus will be hard as stone. The Greek touches the left side of the "phantom" and feels the warmth and the heartbeat and shrieks with terror. The play closes with the last words of the Greek before the chorus sings.

O Athens, Alexandria, Rome, something has come to destroy you. The heart of the phantom is beating. Man has begun to die. Your words are clear at last, O Heraclitus. God and man die each other's life, live each other's death.²²

In my view the real impact of this Noh-type drama, with bare stages, masks, musicians, and so forth, is its anti-Noh crisis. A being that the Greek, typically Gnostic, considers a god, turns out instead to be a real man, and the antitheses of God and man, life and death turn out to be unreal. I submit that Noh drama could not speak the essence of Mahayana Buddhism clearer: Nirvana (eternity) is samsara (time); all is Buddha nature; there are no dichotomies.

On this note I draw to a close a discussion of Eastern influence on three distinguished moderns: an architect, a philosopher and a poet/playwright. Influence varies in intensity and function, but the impact of the East on all three of these men is discussed or at least mentioned by them. I turn now to an area where the question is especially delicate, the influence of the East upon Western religions. Before doing so, however, I must note one thing. Christianity — like its mother Judaism and its sister Islam — was originally a Middle Eastern religion. It and Judaism moved West, originally not only to missionize, but sometimes just to

survive persecution. The point, though, is simple. No great world religion was cradled in the West; even Judaism and Christianity are Eastern in place of origin.

III. The Present Impact of Eastern Religions on the West.

The present impact of Eastern religions on the West has not occurred in a vacuum or without precedents. To assess this impact requires that we describe this context in order that we might highlight the role of Eastern religion in our society. Before, however, we view the social context of Eastern religions in the West, it may prove helpful to delve briefly into research into the psychology of human consciousness. I rely at this point upon the work of Robert Ornstein.

Ornstein argues that the two hemispheres of the human brain tend to specialize in different processes, indeed that they seem to exist simultaneously "as two semi-independent information-processing units."²³

The left hemisphere (connected to the right side of the body) is predominantly involved with analytic, logical thinking, especially in verbal and mathematical functions. Its mode of operation is primarily linear. This hemisphere seems to process information sequentially . . .

If the left hemisphere is specialized for analysis, the right hemisphere (again, remember, connected to the left side of the body) seems specialized for holistic mentation. Its language ability is quite limited. This hemisphere is primarily responsible for our orientation in space, artistic endeavor, crafts, body image, recognition of faces. It processes information more diffusely than does the left hemisphere, and its responsibilities demand a ready integration of many inputs at once. If the left hemisphere can be termed predominantly analytic and sequential in its operation, then the right hemisphere is more holistic and relational, and more simultaneous in its mode of operation.²⁴

Now we turn from psychology to the history of religion for a conceptual framework to distinguish types of religions. We shall see a remarkable similarity to the work of Ornstein. Since the work of Max Weber, it has been customary in the study of religious phenomena to distinguish "exemplary" from "emissary" or ethical religions. The exemplary prophet is a founder who is full of the divine, in harmony with the universe. What one learns from him is not his teaching, but his technique. By contrast, the emissary prophet is one who comes as the teacher of a message from God for repentance and obedience, individually or collec-

tively. The two types of religions then are "those grounded in cosmic wonder and communicated by the exemplary personalities, and those grounded in revelation within history and emissary communication."²⁵ Moreover, this cosmic type of religion is mystic and holistic/monistic, sensing the universe to be unlimited, timeless; and the revelatory mode is analytic, sequential, and rather dualistic. Thus what we find is that the dominant Western Judeo-Christian Traditions with its emphasis on right belief, right conduct and historical (i.e. sequential) revelation is representative not only of emissary religion, but of the left hemisphere of the brain and the type of action and worldview characteristic of that hemisphere. Also the Eastern religions, especially Indian religions, with their emphases on internal and external harmony, enlightenment, and intuition rather than analysis, are representative of the right side of the brain and the type of action and worldview characteristic of that hemisphere. Most religions, as most contemporary disciplines and most people, emphasize one pole of consciousness more than another, though a few may be balanced and some others may be totally one-sided.

We can now assess the role of Eastern religions in the West. In the context of Western religion, which is predominantly "left-brained," the human consciousness exerts "right-brained" pressures. Historically these pressures have typically manifested themselves in the form of mysticism, which the Roman Catholic Church usually showed itself flexible enough to accommodate, especially in the monastic orders. In other cases, groups flourished for a time just beyond the limits of orthodoxy as "Christian heresies." Other groups also have flourished, of course (one thinks, for example, of the Jewish Kabbalah), but not until perhaps the nineteenth century did the West learn enough about Eastern religions for them to make a significant impact. The rise of the Theosophical Society toward the end of the century and the World Parliament of Religions held in Chicago in 1893 introduced Eastern religions in a respectable form. By the sixties and seventies of this century, the trickle from the East had become a flowing stream, and the largely rational approach of the Theosophical Society had been replaced by the exemplary types like the Maharishi Mahesh Yogi or Zen monks in San Francisco or Hindu gurus in New York. In one sense, then, Eastern religions are called into being as the opposite of the dominant view. But their "dynamic cannot be fully understood if one considers [them] merely a negative reaction to the dominant culture of the day."²⁶ They have a life of their own and their own kind of creativity which can interact with the dominant culture — not just respond to it.

The nature of that interaction is not yet clear. For one thing, most Buddhists and Hindus are people born in the East or married to an Easterner. On the other hand, the wide-spread acceptance of Yoga classes at the YWCA and a deliberately secularized Hinduism in the form of Transcendental Meditation portends a much larger impact on the pluralistic American scene, and future dialogue and/or contention with the dominant tradition(s) will surely follow. Realistically, however, Eastern religions, separated from the cultures they nourished and by which they were largely shaped, will not likely attract numerous converts in our lifetime and maybe never. A more fruitful prospect to explore is the arrival of what some scholars call global religions.²⁷ As differences in cultures break down — by choice or necessity — and as mutual understanding and toleration increase, it is sometimes supposed that a global religion, perhaps something like Bahai, will emerge. Frankly I am a little skeptical. We are not speaking of the collision of preliterate religions with great world religions, which encounters always are resolved in the overwhelming though not exclusive favor of the great religions. Rather we are speaking of the encounter of great religions which have proved capable of molding to a large extent vast cultures. There is yet no evidence (for example) that increased knowledge of Hinduism turns devout Christians into Hindu-Christians. But the possibility does and will exist for the comparison of giant systems, the testing of the personal, political, and economic outcomes of believing in a given way, and the borrowing of insights to help one resolve problems in his own faith and express it more clearly. Indeed, many theologians are saying that the last great Christian theology has been written which does not take into account Eastern religions.²⁸ Just as Christianity emerged in the first century from its Oriental, Semitic background, embraced and won the Hellenistic world and became a Western religion, so again some say it will break the shackles of its own Western prison, restructure its message in terms of other major religions, and become truly a "world" religion. Perhaps all religions that survive another century will do precisely that.

This breaking of the cultural bounds of theology has already begun. The process will flourish through dialogue, a quest for mutual understanding conducted in mutual trust. In such dialogue a fundamental polarity will emerge; the polarity of universal experience and particular expression. Father William Johnston speaks of the first of these poles of the possibility of finding common ground between Zen and Christianity:

[It] will be clear that there is one point of contact — namely

religious experience. The Christian with some depth in prayer and experience of the things of God will find himself in wonderful sympathy with the monk who has practiced Buddhist meditation. There is undoubtedly something in common between John of the Cross and the Buddha; and the Christian will find interior guidance in much Buddhist literature, just as John of the Cross points out the way to not a few Buddhists."²⁹

The pole of particularity of difference of expression with regard to the experience, however, is equally weighty. This is clearly the case with the Christian who says confessionally: "In Jesus the Christ, God acted uniquely and cosmically for the redemption of all men, and apart from the redemptive work of God through Christ no man is saved." To be sure not all Christians would speak in this vein, but many if not most would. For such persons it will be necessary to distinguish between the ultimate vehicle or redemption and multiple vehicles of salvific revelation if they are ever able to dialogue in charity with Buddhists and others as corecipients of the revelation of God. By the same token, however, Eastern religions, for all their vaunted toleration, discriminate between the expressions of religious experience. One need only read the pecking order of worshippers utilized by Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan: "The worshippers of the Absolute are the highest in rank; second to them are the worshippers of the personal God; then come the worshippers of the incarnations like Rama, Krishna, Buddha; below them are those who worship ancestors, deities and sages, and lowest of all are the worshippers of the petty forces and spirits."³⁰ Since religious experience never occurs in a vacuum, such tensions are inevitable. On the other hand, a focus on experience does help us to distinguish between the ultimate and our idea of it and not idolize the latter in the name of the former.

With this discussion of the impact of Eastern religion on the West, we have completed our survey of past and present influence and set the stages for the last section of the paper.

IV. The Prospects for Future Eastern Influence on the West.

The mantle of the prophet does not fit my shoulders well. I am by profession more at home in the study of the ancient Near East than with future projections. Nevertheless, I wish to venture three projections about the prospects for future Eastern influence on the West.

My first projection is that the East will teach us to trust our

feelings more. Emotions do not convey to us infallible knowledge, but then neither does our mind. Emotions, moreover, cannot remain unbridled, if society and civilization are to exist. But the West has forgotten that emotions are our bodily and mental reactions to what we perceive. We do not trust them, but cover them, suppress them, deny them. Especially in academic work, we strive for unfeeling objectivity. Also Christian thought has often held that many such feelings are sinful. But when we ignore our feelings, we are surprised at our irrational (and often explosive) conduct. Indian thought, by contrast, teaches us to face them, register what they are telling us, and to utilize their stimulus for our own purposes.

My second projection is that the East will teach us to re-emphasize spirit and values. I do not much subscribe to the old dichotomy which distinguished the materialistic West from the spiritualistic East. Yet I must agree that many Westerners are thoroughly materialistic, that our economic structure supports materialism, and that our religious institutions are up to their necks in the material. If Weber is right, capitalism is rooted in the Calvinist's quest for security in salvation. Marx, a Western man, thought that materialism was the key to human behavior and history, and Easterners are inevitably impressed by our quest for things. Some of our academic institutions seek to train youth in a valueless context, rather than face the questions of right and wrong and the agony of how one knows what actions belong to which category. Perhaps the East with its variety of value systems, some of them predicated on atheism, can furnish us with models for addressing the question of morals. In our society we must finally face the challenge of Dostoyevski that if God does not exist, everything is permitted. Today, the crucial issues we face are ethical. Technology does not cause them; neither can it solve them. But it can and has made them more pressing. Whether we believe in God or not, we must attempt morality or we are doomed.

My third projection is that the East may teach us to look at things holistically. Our forte is analysis; we develop experts in all kinds of analysis, news analysis, systems analysis, laboratory analysis to name but a few. Unfortunately, we are mostly narrow specialists. If we see a problem, we take the most direct, complete, efficient route to solve the problem. If we have a recession, we spend our way out. If we have too many insects, we apply lethal doses of insecticides. What we often wind up with is inflation and contaminated food. What we fail to do is to take what I consider to be a typically Eastern approach, that is to

look at the whole, to see ourselves as parts of a whole, a family, a society, or an ecological system.

Conclusion

The above remarks have been written with a considerable amount of apprehension. The essay is intended as a thoughtful, not scholarly, essay across many lines. I trust that any errors I may have made do not obscure the validity of the concern that lies behind it.

That concern can be stated quite simply. No individual, no discipline of study, no culture is perfect. That being the case, it behooves all of us to learn from whatever teacher or in whatever school we can. The dual heritage of a sometimes exclusivistic religious tradition and a superior technology developed at a time of the decline of Eastern culture has led us not only to assume we have nothing to learn from the East — or others — but also to a state of ignorance of our past debt. I conclude, then, with the hope expressed by Carl Gustav Jung that the Westerner would not become a cheap imitator of the Easterner. Rather, as Jung expresses it:

The possibilities open to him would be so much greater if he would remain true to himself and develop out of his own nature all that the East has brought forth from its inner being in the course of the centuries.³¹

FOOTNOTES

¹Maurice Parnellee, *Oriental and Occidental Culture: An Interpretation* (New York and London: Century, 1928), p. 361.

²Franklin L. Bauer in the Foreword to Henri Bandet, *Paradise on Earth*, trans. Elizabeth Wentholt (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1965), p. vii.

³Eugene A. Meyers, *Arabic Thought and the Western World* (New York: Frederick Unger, 1964), pp. 76-77.

⁴See Robert Hammond's comparison of Al Farabi and St. Thomas on the proofs of God's existence reproduced in Meyers, *Arabic Thought and the Western World*, pp. 17-30.

⁵A. L. Basham, *The Wonder That Was India* (New York: Grove Press, 1959), p. 388. A side note here might be interesting. Philologists have compared the gypsy language of Romani with North Indian language and proved conclusively the derivation of the former from the latter. Thus, despite European gypsy tradition that gypsies are Egyptian — in one Russian variant descendents of an Egyptian soldier and a Jewess who escaped from Pharaoh with Moses — modern philology has traced them linguistically to their real home in Northern India.

- ⁶*Ibid.*, pp. 512-515. The Arabs call mathematics "the Indian art."
- ⁷*Ibid.*, pp. 495-496.
- ⁸Helen G. Matthew, "East-West Throughout the Centuries," *Asia in the Modern World*, ed. Helen G. Matthew (New York: New American Library, 1963), pp. 15-16.
- ⁹Frank Lloyd Wright, *A Testament* (New York: Bramhall House, 1957), p. 205.
- ¹⁰Frank Lloyd Wright, *The Natural House* (New York: Horizon Press, 1954), pp. 218-221.
- ¹¹Frank Lloyd Wright, *An American Architecture*, ed. Edgar Kaufman (New York: Bramhall House, 1960), p. 246.
- ¹²*Ibid.*
- ¹³*Ibid.*, p. 249.
- ¹⁴Frank Lloyd Wright, *Architectural Forum*, January, 1951, inside back cover.
- ¹⁵Ralph Waldo Emerson, "The Transcendentalist" in *Selected Writings*, The Modern Library (New York: Random House, 1940), pp. 92-93.
- ¹⁶*Ibid.*, p. 92. If I am correct in my interpretation of Emerson's passage that Emerson's notion of compensation is very similar to the Buddhist notion of karma, it is unfortunate that he did not also come to a position similar to the Indian corollary reincarnation. I say it is unfortunate because in affirming that all evil is deserved, Emerson stands at the level of the comforters of Job. By contrast, the Indian thinkers had a ready explanation for the apparent injustice of life — the birth of malformed infants, for example. That explanation is that the eternal soul (atman) has earned such a condition in a previous life. Emerson has no explanation for such misfortunes. To deny their existence was to open himself to the charge of being simplistic.
- ¹⁷Ralph Waldo Emerson, "Brahma," in *Selected Writings*, p. 809.
- ¹⁸Richard Ellmann, *Yeats, The Man and His Masks* (New York: Macmillan, 1948), pp. 213-217.
- ¹⁹William Butler Yeats, "The Second Coming," *English Literature*, ed. Donald B. Clark, et al. (New York: Macmillan, 1960), p. 938.
- ²⁰Ellmann, *Yeats, The Man and His Masks*, p. 213.
- ²¹William Butler Yeats, *The Collected Plays* (New edition; New York: Macmillan, 1953), p. 366.
- ²²*Ibid.*, pp. 372-373.
- ²³Robert Ornstein, *The Psychology of Consciousness* (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1972), p. 63.
- ²⁴*Ibid.*, pp. 51-53. Ornstein does concede the following (p. 53): "At least in very young people, each side does possess the potential for both modes; e.g., brain damage to the left hemisphere in young children often results in the development of language in the right side."
- ²⁵Robert S. Ellwood, Jr., *Religious and Spiritual Groups in Modern America* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1973), p. xiv.
- ²⁶*Ibid.*, p. 60.
- ²⁷John B. Magee, *Religion and Modern Man* (New York, Evanston, and London: Harper and Row, 1967), p. 50.
- ²⁸See, for example, Wilfred Cantwell Smith, *The Faith of Other Men*, Harper Torchbooks (New York, Evanston, San Francisco, London: Harper and Row, 1962), pp. 121-122.
- ²⁹William Johnston, *The Still Point*, Perennial Library (New York, Evanston, San Francisco, London: Harper and Row, 1970), p. 184.
- ³⁰Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, *The Hindu View of Life* (New York: Macmillan, no date), p. 24.

³¹Carl Gustav Jung in his commentary to *The Secret of the Golden Flower*, trans. Richard Wilhelm (Rev. ed.; New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1962), pp. 85-86.

INTERSTITIAL THOUGHTS

In autumn's firm grasp we slowly resign ourselves to colder, shorter, more rigorous times. Nostalgically longing for less hectic schedules and the relaxed comfort of summer, trust in the stark beauty of winter's grip, and the promise of springlike rebirth, taking from each day, from each season, its peculiar contribution to the rhythm of life.

Know the vanity of devotion to the particular season or problem, and the lovely realism of the wholeness of nature and of life itself. Fret not, there is an incandescence in each day which purifies our temporary frustrations in the heat of responsible tasks.

Be thankful for each spark of insight; take from unrelated episodes the common denominator of joy within one's self.

Seek the poise which breaks hectic moments into manageable days and which transforms weeks of worry into years of fulfillment.

It is not instant pudding, this kind of awareness of life, but the simmering of one's whole being in eternal consciousness.

So in moments of reflection before and between the busyness of this day, we confess our need for perceptive pauses.

Elwyn M. Williams

J. Patrick Lewis

CORPORATE POWER, ANTITRUST AND "THE SEVEN PER CENT SOLUTION"

If political rhetoric proclaiming an end to recession has a hollow ring these days, economic advice is surely thought to be purblind. American citizens are not (yet) inured to rates of inflation that annually deflate their real incomes and to levels of unemployment that remain intractably high. They continue to question the merits of public policy allegedly designed to improve their economic health and welfare. And what a weighty policy menu it is. Plug up a few tax loopholes, reduce tariff barriers against foreign competitors, rein in the growth of the money supply, urge collective bargaining restraint on unions, debureaucratize Washington via revenue sharing with cities and states, charge polluters for their misdeeds, deregulate oil and natural gas, etc. Sooner or later, they will all appear on any respectable economist's agenda for correcting inflation and/or unemployment. Such cures for economic "dislocations" – the tamest euphemism – are as plentiful as pet rocks. These remedies have two things in common: first, their adoption represents at least an indirect attempt to buy price stability with higher unemployment rates or, conversely, to reach full employment at the cost of more inflation. Secondly, the structure of the U.S. economy would be left untouched by any one or all of these policies.

The basis of my argument is that if we cannot alter the structure of capitalist institutions, we are condemned to unemployment/inflation trade-off policies. Rather than put another trophy on the mantle of the what-will-you-put-in-its-place school of social thought, I examine in this essay the rationale and measures for dissolving corporate power in American industry.

The matter of bigness in business has been both a fact of life and a controversial issue for at least eight decades. Though many economists claim that industrial concentration of market power has waned a bit since the turn of the century – the age of the "robber barons" – another small band of experts consistently maintains that fewer firms are controlling ever larger shares of their respective markets. The debate, carried on *ad nauseum* in academic journals, serves only the dubious purpose of facilitating the promotion process in university departments.

The imperatives of the capitalist mode of production, according to Marx, would lead to a condition in which control over real and financial capital would come to rest in the hands of a few. Less efficient and more scrupulous producers would eventually be dispossessed and pushed into the working class. This, of course, is a testable hypothesis, and it is not surprising that Western antipathy toward Marx should have called forth so much effort to refute it. As a substantive issue, however, the *trend* in concentration is practically meaningless. Investing long hours of research to determine that the share of sales held by the top four firms in a particular industry has increased (or decreased) by 2 to 3 per cent since, say, World War II is a classic example of missing the forest for the trees. Public policy will not benefit one whit from these labors. As Robert Lekachman has recently put it: "The world will continue to astonish economists so long as they concentrate upon the small, incremental changes in purely economic magnitudes to which their training has habituated them."¹

In looking at the growth of capitalist enterprise, we find two separable issues: how firms get big and why they get big. The first question is an institutional one and depends upon corporate aggressiveness and government response. The second question is analytical: mainstream microeconomic theory has for years rationalized the growth of firms, but the theory is only partially substantiated by the empirical evidence. A rudimentary understanding of both of these processes — the "how" and the "why" — is necessary to comprehend fully the magnitude of monopoly power now extant in the U.S.

By increasing output, entering new markets, or improving its product, a business firm achieves growth. An apparent tautology, this statement represents a serious departure from the wonderful world of perfect competition found today only in the recesses of economics textbooks. The theory of perfect competition, so lucidly described two centuries ago by Adam Smith in *The Wealth of Nations*, rests upon many assumptions. The most restrictive of these is the proviso that the individual firm cannot grow. At least it cannot grow to the point where its product is distinguishable by consumers from those of its competitors within the industry. A firm that succeeded in so distinguishing itself would gain some element of control over its price and markets. In the extreme case, such control could eliminate all other competitors, and the single firm would supply the entire market. We have relied upon the Greeks to give us a name for the ending to this drama: the word is monopoly.

The detractors of the perfectly competitive model are probably now in a slight majority within the economics profession, but one might reasonably ask why the perfectly competitive model has been so remarkably durable. First, despite its restrictive, even silly, assumptions, the theory allegedly leads to fairly accurate predictions about market behavior. Some methodologists assert that the true test of any theory is not the reasonableness of its assumptions but its predictive power. For example, the existence of a vacuum (that which nature abhors) is an assumption literally out of this world, but it has facilitated a great many of our most notable discoveries in the realm of physics.

More importantly, it is the consequences of perfect competition that are so highly acclaimed by economists.² Nothing more than a simple mathematical proof is required to demonstrate that, relative to any alternative economic model, an economy structured according to competitive dictates will result in lower prices, greater output, and fuller employment of a nation's resources. These truths are never lost on the business community which takes great pains to convince the public of the "rigors of competition" in the "free enterprise system." Such catch phrases deserve pride of place in the archives of Americana, but they are as alien to the 1970s as prohibition and the Bull Moose Party.

The internal growth of business firms can and has occurred for the obvious reasons: superior management and labor skills; greater efficiency in production processes; innovative marketing programs; wise location decisions which reduce the cost of transportation and distribution. Many of the great "success stories" in business history have more spectacular plots. In the last half of the nineteenth century, the growth of Standard Oil under the extraordinary leadership of John D. Rockefeller was engineered through unquestionably gifted innovations. But Rockefeller's monopoly was consummated through predatory practices — rebates from railroad shippers, selling at prices below cost to freeze out competitors — which the Supreme Court finally refused to tolerate. It dissolved the oil trust in 1911, but the net effect of the decision was virtually nil with respect to market power in oil.

Corporations, however, need not resort to criminal activities to ensure growth. Governments have long sought to promote ingenuity by protecting inventors through the granting of patents, i.e., exclusive, long-term rights to produce and market a new invention or innovation. In the hands of big business, the patent has become both an offensive and defensive weapon to immobilize potential competitors. Yesterday's inventors share equal

billing with presidents in the history books; today's inventors are nameless. They have either been pressed into the service of corporate research laboratories or find it rewarding to relinquish new ideas to corporations for a cash settlement. Companies such as RCA, General Electric, Westinghouse, IBM, Polaroid, Western Electric, National Cash Register, Eastman Kodak, control large shares of their respective markets in part because they have so skillfully wielded patent infringement suits against would-be competitors.

A similar stimulus to growth and insulator against competition is the ownership and control of the vital raw materials necessary for production. By 1945 the Aluminum Company of America (ALCOA) had come to command 90 per cent of the aluminum market because its international hold on bauxite reserves precluded entry by other firms into the industry. This road to monopolization is well-travelled, especially by the handful of dominant firms in the copper, salt, lead, sulphur, gypsum, molybdenum and forest products industries.

The last and by a wide margin the most successful method of business expansion is the process of merging two or more firms under the roof of one corporation. Firms unheard of or known by another name two decades ago are now numbered among the top 100 U.S. corporations: Tenneco, Occidental Petroleum, Ling-Temco-Vought, General Dynamics, Textron, Gulf & Western, Litton Industries. They have spread themselves out in widely disparate markets, hence the name "conglomerate." The undisputed king of the conglomerates in International Telephone and Telegraph. In 1960 ITT was the thirty-fifth largest corporation in America; today it ranks ninth.³ From 1961 to 1968 ITT acquired fifth firms with a total of nearly \$4 billion in assets. One economist has drawn this picture (ITT subsidiaries in brackets):

The average citizen can buy his home from ITT [Levitt, the nation's leading home builder and developer], live in one of its 'planned communities', have the house insured by another of ITT's divisions [Hartford Insurance], take a trip in one of ITT's rental cars [Avis], stay at one of ITT's hotels or motels [Sheraton], purchase his bread and other bakery products [Wonder Bread from Continental, the world's largest baker; Hostess Twinkies; Morton Frozen Foods], buy his cigarettes and coffee from one of its vending machines [Canteen], obtain a loan from one of its finance companies [Aetna or Thorp], and could, had it not been for antitrust objections, watch TV on an ITT-owned network [ABC].⁴

The bold business strategies outlined above have produced a

pyramid of power with the top 200 manufacturing corporations in control of two-thirds of all U.S. manufacturing assets. If political and economic ends of corporate power were invariably deleterious to society, we should suppose that government would have taken greater precautions to squelch the means to the ends. No, growth is not merely a function of the requisites of power. Even to those unburdened with the esoteric arguments of economics it is obvious that society benefits as business firms expand. A small enterprise cannot use technology to full effect. In many types of production – for example, auto assembly lines, blast furnaces in steel-making – efficient utilization of resources is practical only at higher levels of output. Producing at these high levels allows the single plant to achieve economies of scale, i.e., savings (per unit cost reductions) due to large size. But the conclusion that the largest firms must necessarily be the most efficient is fallacious. Per unit costs do decline as output expands, but with continued growth the firm will eventually encounter increases in unit costs.

In the 1950s a Princeton economist, Joe Bain, investigated the behavior of production costs in twenty major manufacturing industries.⁵ His objective was to determine the size of the firm necessary to achieve the lowest unit cost of production in each industry. Since the results of Bain's somewhat dated study have been replicated in most of the subsequent research on economies of scale, his findings are instructive. In nineteen of the twenty industries studied, the optimal (least cost) firm was considerably smaller than the actual firms in the industries. Automobile production, dominated then as now by the Big 3, could be more efficiently undertaken with ten firms of smaller scale. In other words, General Motors and, to a lesser extent, Ford, had grown to sizes unjustified by the economies of scale argument. While economies of scale go far to explain why a local manufacturer would gain from expansion, they cannot be used to support the high levels of concentration in industry today.

Proponents of big business back their claims for superconcentration with yet another argument of dubious merit. How, they ask, could the U.S. economy enjoy sophisticated technological progress and a wide array of consumer goods without the billions of dollars spent on research and development that only huge business concerns can afford to undertake? First, roughly two-thirds of the significant inventions since 1900 have come from independent inventors and small research firms rather than corporate laboratories. Secondly, over a third of all monies spent for R & D originate from non-business sources (government, the universi-

ties, etc.). Statistics aside, the large corporations that do operate major research laboratories have little incentive to proliferate new innovations because of their destabilizing influence. As Sir John Hicks, the British economist, has observed: "Monopoly is the pursuit of the quiet life." The record clearly shows that it is the smaller firms, anxious to gain bigger shares of the sales pie, that have aggressively tested the lethargy of the giant firms. The weight of the empirical evidence suggests that "a little bit of bigness — up to sales levels of roughly \$75 million to \$200 million in most industries — is good for invention and innovation. But beyond the threshold further bigness adds little or nothing."⁶

Is there a chance that tightly-knit groups of corporations in control of the key industries could find their power dissipated by the entry of new firms? For those aware of the confluence of factors responsible for today's market structure, that is a rhetorical question. Consider the two most formidable obstacles facing a potential entrant on the outside looking in. Should the new firm decide to produce cars, for example, an enormous amount of start-up capital will be required. "In 1970, it would cost a company \$779 million to enter the automobile industry. The costs of annual style change capability, it is estimated, account for \$724 million, or more than 90 per cent, of this figure."⁷ In the steel industry, the cost of an integrated plant would exceed \$300 million.⁸

Added to the initial capital requirements, a built-in recognition factor deters the would-be entrant. In soft drinks, malt liquors, toothpaste, coffee and a thousand other consumer products, the new firm must be ready to compete with brand names like Coca-Cola, Budweiser, Crest and Folger's — names cemented in consumers' minds by time and mass advertising. It matters little that differences between competing products may be fancied if consumers are convinced that the differences are real. The new firm's own advertising budget must reflect its willingness and ability to engage in this competitive hood-winking. Few economists see any aesthetic value in this commercialism, but most of them still praise advertising for its "high information value." One economist has had the temerity — and good sense — to call it "clear social waste."⁹ As a barrier to entry, and hence a contributor to high concentration, advertising has few rivals.

Up to this point, we have used the term "monopoly" (one seller dominating an entire market) to describe the corporate framework in the U.S. Strictly speaking, perfect monopoly is as rarefied (save for the local utility company) as perfect competi-

tion. In the current economic jargon, industries dominated by a handful of firms (no matter how many midgets quibble over the piddling sales morsels that remain) are called "oligopolies." But the interdependence and common goals of these firms warrant the more accurate description of "shared monopolies." A select list of industries and their respective concentration ratios (Table 1) gives us a clue as to the magnitude of their influence in the U.S. economy.

TABLE 1
Percentage Share of the Value of Shipments Accounted for by the
4 and 8 Largest Companies in Each Manufacturing Industry (1972)

Industry	No. of firms in the industry	Total \$ value of shipments (in millions)	% accounted for by the	
			top 4 firms	top 8 firms
Cereal breakfast foods	34	\$ 1,125.5	90	98
Cigarettes	13	3,744.6	84	D
Pharmaceutical preparations ^a	680	7,149.5	26	44
Petroleum refining ^b	152	25,921.1	31	56
Tires and Tubes	136	5,747.1	73	90
Blast furnaces and steel mills	241	10,304.7	45	D
Primary copper	11	487.8	72	92
Primary aluminum	12	1,959.8	79	79
Metal cans	134	4,510.8	66	98
Household laundry equipment	20	1,356.5	83	D
Telephone and telegraph equipment	157	2,650.1	D	90
Electronic computing equipment (1967)	518	3,123.9	72	98
Typewriters (1967)	20	595.5	81	99
Motor vehicles and car bodies	165	42,905.6	62	74
Soap and other detergents	577	3,394.4	D	98
Photographic film	C	1,335.8	81	D
Flat glass	11	937.1	92	D
Turbines and turbine generator sets	59	2,189.0	90	96
Aircraft engines and parts	189	3,640.2	77	87
Razor blades	C	207.2	97	99
Sanitary paper products	72	1,981.9	65	82
Malt beverages	108	4,054.4	52	70
Roasted coffee	162	2,328.7	65	82

Source and notes: Data are drawn from U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1972 Census of Manufactures, *Concentration Ratios in Manufacturing, 1975*.

D - information withheld (by companies) to avoid disclosing figure for individual companies

C - not available in this source

a - 4- and 8-firm concentration ratios are deceptively low because "pharmaceutical preparations" represents the overall drug market. The industry is fragmented, however, into a number of separate, noncompeting therapeutic sub-markets (e.g., vitamins, antibiotics, tranquilizers, etc.) with significantly higher concentration ratios.

b - Market power is inadequately conveyed by these concentration ratios. Refining is one of four major operations in the oil industry; the others are crude oil production, transportation and sales to distributors. All the top oil producers are fully integrated firms. Of the 16 largest firms in the U.S., 9 are oil companies.

If the methods of amassing corporate power in the industrial core of the economy were strictly legal, in violation of no statute, we would still have cause to question the legitimacy of shared monopolies. For the lopsided distribution of income in the U.S., high levels of unemployment, permanent inflation, wasted resources, political disruption in the affairs of foreign countries are all affected or effected by them. Public outrage is muted here because the causal relationship is not readily perceived. Consider the motives and actions of shared monopolies in fostering unemployment and inflation. Firms in concentrated industries seek to make their products relatively scarce by restricting supply. Sizeable expenditures are then directed to the task of convincing consumers how prosaic and unfulfilled their lives will

be without these indispensable products. Quality of goods is unaffected; price, owing to restricted supply and the higher costs of persuasion, naturally climbs. Any decision to curtail production necessarily implies a decision to utilize fewer resources, and the queues are lengthened at unemployment offices. This tale would have to be modified to account for the behavior of particular industries, but the plot would remain unchanged. Curiously, when the sins of corporate power are made manifest by antitrust indictment and judicial action, the public yawns and may momentarily wonder how such events could have so completely passed out of its control.

As it happens, U.S. laws against monopoly are stronger than in any other country in the world. Monopolization or attempts to monopolize are illegal *per se* (Sherman Act, Section 2, 1890). Price fixing, restricting output, sharing of markets are likewise illegal (Sherman Act, Section 1). But in a number of precedent-setting cases, the courts have compromised the initial intent of the law. In a word, while the Sherman Act sought to define monopoly on *structural* grounds, the courts have preferred to view monopoly in *behavioral* terms. Business conduct rather than market size has become the appropriate criterion for antitrust action, ever since the judicial "rule of reason" was adopted (*Standard Oil* and *American Tobacco* cases in 1911), allowing the expedient of deciding between "good" and "bad" monopolies. In antitrust as in architecture it's not how big you make it, it's how you make it big. Over the years, the cumbersome judicial process, permissive attitudes of the courts, the David and Goliath confrontation between the Antitrust Division and big business, and the behavioral criterion itself have combined to erect market structures a strict interpretation of the Sherman Act would have performed outlawed.

It is an interesting speculation, and nothing more, that the mere existence of strong antitrust laws, and not their vigorous prosecution, is a sufficient deterrent to monopolization and price-fixing. Despite the spurious claims of the dominant firms to the contrary, corporate fear of the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department and the Federal Trade Commission is largely illusory. Society has not seen fit to pursue crime in the suites as diligently as it has crime in the streets. From 1965 to 1974, only thirty-three individuals served jail sentences for a total of less than thirty-four months (i.e., about one month per executive on average) in criminal cases brought by the Justice Department.¹⁰ The enduring image of the righteous business executive is sustained by the fact that the vast majority of antitrust suits — in

some cases involving tens of millions of dollars – are juridically equivalent to parking violations. So much for “equal justice under the law.”

Even if public sentiment for vigorous antitrust were as widespread as for, say, consumerism, it is simply naive to believe that our policing agencies, as presently structured, are capable of making serious inroads against corporate mischief. The annual budget of the entire Antitrust Division, Ralph Nader has remarked, is equivalent to the cost of two or three new high schools, or about 10 per cent of the unsold 1974 Pintos, or about one and one half *hours* of defense spending, or what Proctor & Gamble spends to advertise Crest toothpaste for a single year.¹¹ As a case in point, when IBM was charged in 1969 with attempting to monopolize the computer industry, the Justice Department had hopes of winning a landmark antitrust victory. In its defense, IBM submitted twenty-seven million pages of evidence.¹² If the Antitrust Division had dropped all other investigations and had directed its staff of 550 lawyers and economists to devote full time to the IBM case, each staffer would have been buried under 50,000 pages of evidence. The prosecution, needless to add, was effectively stymied. Even when the Justice Department is successful in striking down an illegal merger, it takes an average sixty-three and eight-tenths months – over five years – from the time of indictment to final divestiture.¹³ But the litigation period pales in comparison to the length of time over which monopolies enjoy the fruits of their restrictive behavior unconstrained by any hint of antitrust threat. In IBM's case, a not uncommon one, “free enterprise” lasted over forty years.¹⁴

When national policies fail to produce anticipated results, economists often lamely excuse themselves with the claim that economics is an “inexact science” sensitive to unpredictable human behavior. Further, their tortuous use of the English language lends to credence to the suspicion that there is within the profession a loose conspiracy to keep economics as arcane as astrophysics. Whatever the state of the debate in the upper reaches of the economics profession, suppose we can agree that today's most pressing domestic problem is a 7 per cent rate of inflation in lockstep with a 7 per cent plus rate of unemployment. These are macroeconomic problems, so the “seven per cent solution” must be macroeconomic, right? Wrong. The most finely-honed instruments of Washington policy-makers are not going to save a dying animal from its fate.¹⁵ The animal, or rather the species, must become acclimated to a new environment to escape extinction. The meaning of this biological analogy is that by

changing the climate we recognize the necessity of a micro-economic policy approach: fundamental reform of corporate institutions.

In 1972 Senator Philip Hart of Michigan introduced a bill with just this purpose in mind. Without question, the Industrial Reorganization Act (initially known as S. 1167; now S. 1959) is, in its present form, the most sweeping piece of economic legislation ever to be aired in a Congressional subcommittee. Like its eighty-six year old predecessor, the Sherman Act, Hart's bill makes market structure, not business conduct, the central criterion for antitrust intervention. But S. 1959 goes further than the Sherman Act in that, for the first time, it sets down a specific three-pronged definition of monopoly power. Though the bill has encountered the predictable contempt of the business community, corporations are likely to find the definition of monopoly its only redeeming value. For years they have complained that the nebulous nature of antitrust law leaves them in the dark as to what is and what is not objectionable behavior. For clarity of purpose the language of the bill cannot be improved:

- . . . monopoly power is possessed
1. by any corporation if the average rate of return on net worth after taxes is in excess of 15% over a period of five consecutive years out of the most recent seven years preceding the filing of the complaint.
 2. if there has been no substantial price competition among two or more corporations in any line of commerce. . . for a period of three consecutive years out of the most recent five years preceding the filing of the complaint.
 3. if any four or fewer corporations account for 50% or more of sales in any line of commerce in any year out of the most recent three years preceding the filing of the complaint.

There are two escape clauses:

A corporation shall not be required to divest monopoly power if it can show

1. such power is due solely to the ownership of valid patents, lawfully acquired and lawfully used, or
2. such a divestiture would result in a loss of substantial economies [of scale].¹⁶

Now glance back at Table 1. Should S. 1959 ever get the congressional imprimatur, some nineteen of the twenty-three industries listed would be subject to immediate investigation for violation of definition 3, if not 1 and 2. And there are twice again as many industries whose four-firm concentration ratios exceed 50 per cent, but, for lack of space, are not included in the table.

It is quite apparent that the Antitrust Division and the FTC with their minuscule budgets could not satisfactorily carry out the resulting dissolution judgments. Thus the bill calls for the creation of a Commission on Reorganization with greatly expanded investigative and divestiture powers.

One need not elaborate on the anti-antitrust stance of organizations such as the National Association of Manufacturers or the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. Their position on monopoly-busting and government usurpation is well-known, as any brief perusal of business publications or congressional hearings on the subject will testify. For others, cognizant of the malevolent effects of shared monopolies, the consensus is that corporate power has won by default. Antitrust is a "fake" (Lekachman), a "charade" (John Kenneth Galbraith), part of "the folklore of capitalism" (Thorman Arnold), and "the faded passion of American reform" (Richard Hofstadter). Perhaps Lekachman is right in noting that "a good blast against monopoly entertains the voters who enjoy a good fight while doing no harm to corporate activity. A genuine attempt to break up giant corporations is just about as popular as school busing in South Boston or scatter-site housing in Queens."¹⁷ If this is an accurate assessment of public sentiment, legislators will have little incentive to resist political lobbyists of the oil, auto, steel, communications, banking, insurance and other industries. Legislation of consequence — such as the Industrial Reorganization bill and the Oil Divestiture bill now before Congress — will simply fade away.

No single policy tool, including effective antitrust, can possibly be counted on to accomplish goals entirely consistent with "the public good." The response of political leaders to their own failures has not been to question the efficacy of policy but to redefine the goals. "Full employment," once characterized as a 4 per cent unemployment rate, is now a 5 per cent goal. Price stability traditionally meant annual cost-of-living increases in the neighborhood of 1 to 2 per cent. A doubling of that rate now would be hailed by both politicians and the public as a major victory. Unemployment and inflation are, to be sure, not the only issues on the nation's agenda, but they rank at or near the top, especially for those who are currently out of a job or are living on fixed incomes. Relief from the twin problems of unemployment and inflation and the suppression of shared monopolies are directly correlated. The present size of many of the nation's largest 500 corporations has neither economic nor political justification. Until strong antitrust measures are added to the arsenal of government policy tools, we must resign ourselves to the

shadowboxing implicit in Presidential "game plans" and macro-economic "fine tuning." With short-lived exceptions, the current economic crisis will be with us throughout the next few decades unless corporate power, far from being an object of public reverence, becomes the central subject of radical reform.

FOOTNOTES

1. *Economists at Bay: Why the Experts Will Never Solve Your Problems*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1976, p. 7.
2. Consequences here refer only to considerations of *efficiency*. All theoretical models are mute on the subject of *equity*, i.e., whether the outcome of a given market structure in terms of income distribution will be "fair."
3. "The 500 Largest Industrial Corporations," *Fortune*, May 1976, p. 318.
4. John M. Blair, *Economic Concentration: Structure, Behavior and Public Policy*. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Jovanovich, 1972, p. 286. In the early seventies, ITT faced a major antitrust suit in which the government sought to divest the conglomerate of its Hartford, Avis and Levitt holdings. ITT agreed in a consent decree to dispose of Avis and Levitt, but was allowed to keep Hartford — an outcome favorable to ITT since Avis and Levitt were incurring losses while Hartford provided nearly a quarter of ITT's profits. Interestingly enough, the Antitrust Division's zeal in pursuing the case waned after ITT committed \$400,000 to underwrite the 1972 Republican national convention.
5. *Barriers to New Competition: Their Character and Consequences in Manufacturing Industries*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1956.
6. F. M. Scherer, *Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance*. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1970, p. 361.
7. Robert Townsend, "America, Inc.: A Review," *New York Times*, May 30, 1971.
8. Blair, *op cit.*, p. 402.
9. Kenneth Boulding, *Economic Analysis*. New York: Harper, 1941, p. 621.
10. Hearings before the Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly, U.S. Congress, 94th session, *The Antitrust Improvements Act of 1975*, part 1, p. 377.
11. Mark Green et al., *The Closed Enterprise System*. New York: Grossman, 1972, *passim*. An equally penetrating analysis of the relationships between corporate giants and legal dwarfs can be found in Morton Mintz and Jerry S. Cohen, *America, Inc.* New York: Dial Press, 1971.
12. *Ibid.*, p. ix.
13. *The Antitrust Improvements Act of 1975, op cit.*, p. 377.
14. William C. Shepherd, *The Treatment of Market Power: Antitrust, Regulation and Public Enterprise*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1975, p. 187.
15. On the death of the economic system as we know it, see Robert Heilbroner, *Business Civilization in Decline*. New York: Norton, 1976 and Michael Harrington, *The Twilight of Capitalism*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1976.

16. Cf. Hearings before the Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly, U.S. Congress, 93rd and 94th sessions, *The Industrial Reorganization Act*, 9 vols., 1972-1975.
17. *Economists at Bay*, *op cit.*, p. 142.

Norman Chaney

A REVIEW ESSAY OF ROBERT M. PIRSIG'S *ZEN AND THE ART OF MOTORCYCLE MAINTENANCE: AN INQUIRY INTO VALUES*

A main theme of modern philosophical thought, especially in its existentialist mode, is that we live in an age of anxiety. Modern man, so runs the familiar analysis, is an outsider: he suffers from the ill of "alienation." We may characterize this ill by saying that man who was once totally integrated (as in a primordial or mythical time) has become radically split in three main aspects. He is divided within himself, he is divided from other men, and he is divided from his environment. His only hope for recovery (for those thinkers who hold out hope) is to find the way to a reintegration which will restore his unity with himself, his community with his fellow men, and his companionability with an alien and hostile outer world.

But what is the way to this reintegration? Does the way lie, for instance, through psychoanalysis, or through traditional religious faith? For Robert Pirsig, the author of *Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance*, neither of these proposed ways would suffice. For Pirsig, the way lies through the discovery of "zen," a term he spends much of his book trying to explain. A main purpose of this essay is to grasp Pirsig's explanation, and to "place" the book in an intellectual context.

Robert Pirsig was born in 1929. He holds a B.A. degree in philosophy and an M.A. degree in journalism from the University of Minnesota. In recent years he has earned his living primarily as a technical writer.

In the summer of 1968, Pirsig and his eleven-year-old son, Chris, mounted a 305 cc red Honda Superhawk and left their home town of St. Paul, Minnesota, for a two month motorcycle ride. *Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance* is largely an autobiographical account of the trip. But the book is also a "chautauqua," or a long intellectual monologue. A main purpose of the trip is to return to Bozeman, Montana, where in the late '50's and early '60's, while teaching English at Montana State, Pirsig suffered a mental collapse that eventually hospitalized him for a series of shock treatments. Throughout the book Pirsig alludes to "Phaedrus" (a name appropriated from a Platonic dialogue). The reader does well to understand early in the book that Phae-

drus is the name Pirsig attributes to the person he was before he underwent the shock therapy that blotted out his memory of the past. In returning to Bozeman, Pirsig is also attempting to recall his past and relate it to his present.

Pirsig is a thinker who stands in the mainstream of American Transcendentalism. Like Emerson before him, who is generally regarded as the chief spokesman of the American Transcendentalist movement, Pirsig is a philosopher of the self conceived both as representative and as defined by its capacity for growth. He is a thinker dedicated to a new or "high" kind of "seeing," ultimately to illumination or mystic vision ("zen"), a realization in experience, not in theory, of what Emerson referred to as the seer "becoming" what he sees.

But we must make a basic distinction between Emerson and Pirsig as philosophical thinkers. While Emerson was primarily concerned with the cultivation of innocent vision (a vision uninhibited by inquiry and analysis) as a means of regaining a childlike appreciation of the *oneness* of the world with us and around us, Pirsig recognizes that inquiry and analysis are crucial to our existence, especially in an age in which we are compelled to think our way through the technomania of society. Pirsig, in other words, is an Emersonian of strongly rationalistic bent. Though he longs for the intellectual naiveté of the child, he recognizes the necessity for the intellectual maturity of the man. How to bring naiveté and maturity, intuition and judgment into confluence, how to have a childlike appreciation of the world and yet have a rationalistic understanding of the world — these are dichotomies with which Pirsig is concerned.

I propose not to rehearse the plot of the book so much as concentrate on its central philosophical ideas. (Much of the pleasure of the book lies in the reader's tracing its plot-line.) And I perceive these to be at least threefold: (1) the idea of classical and romantic understanding; (2) the idea of Quality; and (3) the idea of zen. We will discuss each of these in turn.

Classical and romantic understanding. Pirsig assumes that there are at least two basic modes of human understanding: classical and romantic. He describes these two modes in the following manner:

A classical understanding sees the world primarily as underlying form itself. A romantic understanding sees it primarily in terms of immediate appearance. If you were to show

an engine or a mechanical drawing or electronic schematic to a romantic it is unlikely he would see much of interest in it. It has no appeal because the reality he sees is its surface. Dull, complex lists of names, lines and numbers. Nothing interesting. But if you were to show the same description to a classical person he might look at it and then become fascinated by it because he sees that within the lines and shapes and symbols is a tremendous richness of underlying form.

The romantic mode is primarily inspirational, imaginative, creative, intuitive. Feelings rather than facts predominate. "Art" when it is opposed to "Science" is often romantic. It does not proceed by reason or by laws. It proceeds by feeling, intuition and esthetic conscience. In the northern European cultures the romantic mode is usually associated with femininity, but this is certainly not a necessary association.

The classic mode, by contrast, proceeds by reason and by laws — which are themselves underlying forms of thought and behavior. In the European cultures it is primarily a masculine mode and the fields of science, law and medicine are unattractive to women largely for this reason. Although motorcycle riding is romantic, motorcycle maintenance is purely classic. The dirt, the grease, the mastery of underlying form required all give it such a negative romantic appeal that women never go near it.¹

Throughout the book, Pirsig depicts certain characters as manifesting either a classical or romantic understanding of life. Pirsig's "Phaedrus" self, for example, was almost exclusively classical in his understanding (a fact which contributed to his breakdown). The husband and wife, John and Sylvia Sutherland, on the other hand, with whom Pirsig and his son make the motorcycle trip, are almost exclusively romantic in their understanding. Pirsig sees both the classical and romantic understandings as "valid ways of looking at the world." But they are "irreconcilable with each other."² A main assumption of Pirsig's is that authentic existence must be based on a mode of understanding that is neither strictly classical nor romantic, but that is independent of the two. And he identifies this mode of understanding as "zen." Let us delay our examination of Pirsig's notion of "zen," however, until we have examined his notion of Quality.

The idea of Quality. In the book Pirsig touches upon two thousand years of epistemological theories: those offered by the Sophists, Plato, Aristotle, Hume, Kant, and others. He is fascinated by the subject-object distinction that runs through the history of Western philosophy. Inherent to this distinction is the question of whether value, or what Pirsig describes as "Quality," exists merely in the mind (the subject) or whether it exists in the thing itself (the object). Pirsig approaches this question in the following manner:

Quality . . . you know what it is, yet you don't know what it is. But that's self-contradictory. But some things *are* better than others, that is, they have more quality. But when you try to say what the quality is, apart from the things that have it, it all goes *poof!* There's nothing to talk about. But if you can't say what Quality is, how do you know what it is, or how do you know that it even exists? If no one knows what it is, then for all practical purposes it doesn't exist at all. But for all practical purposes it really does exist. What else are the grades based on? Why else would people pay fortunes for some things and throw others in the trash pile? Obviously some things are better than others . . . but what's the "betterness"? . . . So round and round you go, spinning mental wheels and nowhere finding anyplace to get traction. What the hell is Quality? What is it?³

If Quality exists in the object, Pirsig maintains, "then you must explain just why scientific instruments are unable to detect it." On the other hand, if Quality exists merely in the mind, "then . . . Quality . . . is just a fancy name for whatever you like."⁴ Neither the answer that Quality exists in the object nor that it exists in the mind is satisfactory from Pirsig's point of view. He describes the discovery he made, therefore, at the time he was Phaedrus, of where Quality does exist:

And really, the Quality he was talking about *wasn't* classic Quality or romantic Quality. It was beyond both of them. And by God, it wasn't subjective or objective either, it was beyond both of *those* categories. Actually this whole dilemma of subjectivity-objectivity, or mind-matter, with relationship to Quality was unfair. That mind-matter relationship has been an intellectual hang-up for centuries. They were just putting that hang-up on top of Quality to drag Quality down. How could *he* say whether Quality was mind or matter when there was no logical clarity as to what was mind and what was matter in the first place?

And so: he rejected the left horn. Quality is not objective, he said. It doesn't reside in the material world.

Then: he rejected the right horn. Quality is not subjective, he said. It doesn't reside merely in the mind.

And finally: Phaedrus, following a path that to his knowledge had never been taken before in the history of Western thought, went straight between the horns of the subjectivity-objectivity dilemma and said Quality is neither a part of mind, nor is it a part of matter. It is a *third* entity which is independent of the two.⁵

The acquiring of an understanding of Quality, Pirsig implies, depends upon the acquiring of a viewpoint for looking into the essence of things, a viewpoint which Pirsig identifies as "zen."

The idea of zen. Pirsig makes no claim in his book for being

fully cognizant of "that great body of factual information relating to orthodox Zen Buddhist practice."⁶ By whatever means of intuition and judgment, however, he seems to have attained a grasp of the Zen Buddhist notion that there is a mode of understanding which is an intuitive looking-into, in contradistinction to intellectual and logical understanding. Whatever else the term "zen" might mean, in the context of *Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance*, it means the unfolding of a worldview unperceived in the confusion of a dualistic mind. When one is under the sway of the zen mode of understanding, the universe and man are one indissolvable existence, one total whole. Only *Quality is*. Anything and everything that appears as an individual entity or phenomenon (motorcycle or man), is but a temporary manifestation of Quality in form. Or as Pirsig expresses this idea in his own idiom again as he recalls a realization at the time he was Phaedrus:

"The sun of quality . . . does not revolve around the subjects and objects of our existence. It does not just passively illuminate them. It is not subordinate to them in any way. It has *created* them. They are subordinate to it!"⁷

"Zen," for Pirsig, in short, is a realization of the *oneness* of the world with us and around us. Philosophically speaking, he is a *monist*, or one who sees in the universe the manifestation or working of a single principle.

According to my own reading of Pirsig's book, at least two major difficulties confront us concerning its intellectual content. First, nowhere does a clear explanation of "Quality" present itself. If, as Pirsig suggests, Quality is the underlying principle which alone is the *ground* of all things, then how can he maintain that some things are *better* in Quality than others? Why should he not maintain that all things are equal in Quality since all things are grounded in Quality? Apparently he holds to some notion of the gradation of Quality, which is not explained in the book itself.

Second, Pirsig's positive attitude toward the world of entities does not positively and satisfyingly include persons. He tends to take other persons for granted (as is evident in the stoical posture he assumes in relation to the mental anguish of his son). Love and friendship among persons may be a concern for Pirsig, but it is not a primary concern. One feels that his interest in the world of men is muted.

But apart from these two difficulties of Pirsig's book, we may observe that in *Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance* he is a prime spokesman for a mode of philosophical monism which is seemingly in vogue in our time. Why should philosophical monism be in vogue? We have suggested a possible answer to this question in the beginning of this essay. The fact that modern man experiences a sense of division within himself, from other people, and from his environment instills in him a yearning for a sense of being-at-home in the universe, a sense of companionship with the world in which he moves and has his being. This yearning for companionship may well be an attempt on the part of modern man to recapture the feeling of intimate belonging that was characteristic of man in a pretechnological age. The student of primitive thought, Laurens Van der Post, describes this feeling in the following passage:

[The] first man lived in an extraordinary intimacy with nature. There was nowhere that he did not feel he belonged. He had none of that dreadful sense of not belonging, of isolation, of meaninglessness which so devastates the heart of modern man. Wherever he went he felt that he belonged, and, what was more important, where he went he felt that he was known. We today are convinced that we know. We are a generation of know-all's. But few of us have the life-giving feeling of being known. Wherever this little man went he was known. The trees knew him; animals knew him as he knew them; the stars knew him. His sense of relationship was so vivid that he could speak of "our brother the vulture." He looked up at the stars and he spoke of "Grandmother Sirius" and of "Grandfather Canis" because this was the highest title of honor he could bestow.⁸

Of course, Pirsig as a thinker recognizes that modern man cannot return to a pretechnological age. Indeed, Pirsig himself is an advocate of technology (as symbolized by the motorcycle). But he also recognizes that as modern man's destiny interlocks with technology, he must sustain an apprehension (zen) of that deeper reality (Quality) which underlies and supports the quotidian reality of existence. Apart from such an apprehension, Pirsig's book suggests, human life is bound to be a pretty lack-lustre affair.

FOOTNOTES

¹*Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance: An Inquiry into Values* (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1974), pp. 73-74.

²*Ibid.*, p. 83.

³*Ibid.*, p. 184.

⁴*Ibid.*, pp. 228-29.

⁵*Ibid.*, p. 237.

⁶See the "Author's Note" at the beginning of the book.

⁷*Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance*, p. 240.

⁸*Patterns of Renewal* (Wallingford, Pa.: Pendle Hill Pamphlet No. 121, undated), p. 8.

CONTRIBUTORS

Barbara Z. Achter is completing her doctoral dissertation *Americanism and American Art Music, 1929 to 1946* in musicology at the University of Michigan. She has been on the faculty of both the University of Michigan and Drew University, and is married to Morton Achter, Chairman of the Department of Music at Otterbein.

Norman Chaney is Assistant Professor of English. He also teaches in the Department of Religion and Philosophy and has recently completed a period of study during sabbatical in the Divinity School of the University of Edinburgh.

Robert G. Clarke, former Chaplain and instructor at Otterbein, is now a Chaplain at the University of Akron.

William T. Hamilton is Associate Professor of English and Chairman of the Department of Integrative Studies. His essay in this issue of *Miscellany* was recently presented at The Eighteenth Annual Meeting of the Midwest Modern Language Society.

J. Patrick Lewis is Assistant Professor of Economics and Business Administration. He also teaches in the Department of Integrative Studies.

Albert E. Lovejoy, Professor of Sociology and Chairman of the Department of Sociology, has previously contributed to *Miscellany*. One of his main professional concerns is the treatment of crime.

Paul L. Redditt is Assistant Professor in the Department of Religion and Philosophy. His special areas of study are textual criticism of the Old Testament and Far Eastern Religions.

Elwyn M. Williams, Vice President for Development, has published poetry in the 1975 issue of *Miscellany* as well as in other publications.

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