

Otterbein University

Digital Commons @ Otterbein

The Otterbein Miscellany

Otterbein Journals & Magazines

6-1974

The Otterbein Miscellany - June 1974

Paul L. Redditt
Otterbein College

Thomas J. Kerr
Otterbein College

Sylvia Vance
Otterbein College

Alison Prindle
Otterbein College

James R. Bailey
Otterbein College

See next page for additional authors

Follow this and additional works at: <https://digitalcommons.otterbein.edu/miscellany>



Part of the [Fiction Commons](#), [Nonfiction Commons](#), and the [Poetry Commons](#)

Recommended Citation

Redditt, Paul L.; Kerr, Thomas J.; Vance, Sylvia; Prindle, Alison; Bailey, James R.; Chaney, Norman; Wooley, Kathleen Mattos; Rothgery, Michael F.; Epolito, Joe; Ray, James K.; Lovejoy, Albert; Amos, O.; and Hamilton, William T., "The Otterbein Miscellany - June 1974" (1974). *The Otterbein Miscellany*. 3.
<https://digitalcommons.otterbein.edu/miscellany/3>

This Book is brought to you for free and open access by the Otterbein Journals & Magazines at Digital Commons @ Otterbein. It has been accepted for inclusion in The Otterbein Miscellany by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Otterbein. For more information, please contact digitalcommons07@otterbein.edu.

Authors

Paul L. Redditt, Thomas J. Kerr, Sylvia Vance, Alison Prindle, James R. Bailey, Norman Chaney, Kathleen Mattos Wooley, Michael F. Rothgery, Joe Epolito, James K. Ray, Albert Lovejoy, O. Amos, and William T. Hamilton

FOREWORD

The *Otterbein Miscellany* is published once or twice a year as an outlet for faculty writing on a wide variety of topics. The college underwrites this publication in the belief that it will help maintain a genuine community of scholars. Papers are accepted, therefore, on the basis of their interest to the whole academic community rather than to members of a particular discipline. Editorial responsibility rests with a committee of the faculty.

Contributions are considered from the Otterbein College faculty and administration, active and emeritus — others on invitation only.

Editorial Board — 1973-1974

Editor:	Norman Chaney
Assistant Editor:	James R. Bailey
Editorial Advisers:	William T. Hamilton
	Harold B. Hancock
	Sylvia Vance
	Jeanne M. Willis
Ex Officio:	Thomas J. Kerr, IV

A Publication of the Otterbein College Faculty
Westerville, Ohio

The
Otterbein Miscellany

June, 1974

THE WORD

In an essay titled "Retreat from the Word," the British scholar, George Steiner, writes:

Erasmus tells of how he bent down in a muddy lane ecstatically when his eye lit upon a scrap of print, so new was the miracle of the printed page. This is how the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries seem to look upon language itself. The great treasure of it lies before them, suddenly unlocked, and they ransack it with a sense of infinite resource. The instrument now in our hands, on the contrary, is worn by long usage. And the demands of mass culture and mass communication have made it perform tasks of ever increasing tawdriness.

Like the fish which is constantly immersed in water, modern man is constantly immersed in the word. The printed word, the flashed word, the blared and garbled word has become our element, and as our element we assume it rather than give it thought. Steiner's lament is justified. We live in an age of *the new illiteracy*.

But merely lamenting this condition achieves little. A main function of the writer, the scholar, the teacher, is to alter this condition, to reflect through his or her own attentiveness to the word a respect for "the wide magnificence of its legacy." Admittedly, a verbal matrix is only one in which the articulations and conduct of the mind are conceivable. But as Eliot aptly notes in one of his poems, "I gotta use words when I talk to you." In talking to you through the pages of this publication, its contributors strive to hone the word to its finest precision and make it tell.

This is the tenth annual appearance of *The Otterbein Miscellany*. As we look forward to a second decade of publication, we gratefully acknowledge those editors, contributors, readers, typists, printers, and financial supporters who have made this yearly venture possible. The debt we owe them even words cannot weigh.

The Editor

CONTENTS

Method of Determining Authentic Sayings of Jesus and the Significance of the Task for the Christian	1
<i>Paul L. Redditt</i>	
The Social Sciences, Humanities and History: The Eye of the Beholder	16
<i>Thomas J. Kerr, IV</i>	
Celebration (poem)	30
<i>Sylvia Vance</i>	
Supercargo in Ralph Ellison's <i>Invisible Man</i>	31
<i>Alison Prindle</i>	
The Impertinent (poem)	37
<i>James R. Bailey</i>	
Theodore Roethke: Dionysian Poet of Nature	38
<i>Norman Chaney</i>	
Turkish Portraits; Afternoon Backporched; Textures; Thoughts about my Parents (poems)	48
<i>Kathleen Mattos Wooley</i>	
Leopold Von Ranke	51
<i>Michael F. Rothgery</i>	
Collection (poem)	55
<i>Joe Epolito</i>	
Spiro (poem)	56
<i>James K. Ray</i>	
"Ruff"	57
<i>Albert Lovejoy</i>	
Thoughts on Teaching and Learning	59
<i>O. Amos</i>	
Notes from a Sabbatical Journal	60
<i>William T. Hamilton</i>	
Contributors	85

Paul L. Redditt

METHOD OF DETERMINING AUTHENTIC SAYINGS OF JESUS AND THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE TASK FOR THE CHRISTIAN

Introduction

At first sight this topic looks superfluous. After all, the gospels are full of notable sayings attributed to Jesus. In fact, part of the problem is the embarrassing richness of sayings, especially in Matthew and Luke in contrast with John. As in other areas, the distinction between the synoptics¹ and the Johannine traditions is pronounced with regard to the teaching of Jesus. Did he speak in short parables with a pragmatic, rather condensed style (as in Mark and Q²), or did he speak in more allegorical parables which open up into expressions nearly approaching philosophy and metaphysics (as in John)? Either style alone would probably be accorded authenticity³ by scholars, so well written are the teachings. The two together, though, have caused most critical scholars to ask: "Which, if either, is the real style of Jesus' preaching?" Even when all four gospels record the same event, for example the feeding of the five thousand, the accompanying discourses are usually markedly different in style.

Beyond the problem of the richness of texts is the problem raised by form criticism of the gospels. Karl Ludwig Schmidt, in his epoch-making *Der Rahmen der Geschichte Jesu*, 1919, showed that the framework of the gospels was theologically, not chronologically, inspired. Hence the sequence of events and perspectives on Jesus varies from gospel to gospel and is not evidence for the writing of a biography of Jesus. Rudolph Bultmann, in his *History of the Synoptic Tradition*, 1932, showed that many, if not most, of the details of the gospel narratives follow certain stereotyped, literary styles and, hence, cannot simply be assumed to be historically accurate in every detail. In addition, Martin Dibelius, in his *From Tradition to Gospel*, showed that the narratives and accounts of Jesus' preaching were preserved because of and shaped in accordance with specific needs addressed by early Christian preaching. The import of all this work can be summarized thus: what the "historical Jesus"⁴ did and what he said may be entirely lost in what the church said about him during the forty to seventy years immediately

following his death, i.e. the time between the crucifixion and the writing of the gospels. It is, therefore, no longer sufficient when asking *historical* questions to reply that Jesus *could* have said or done thus-and-so. The materials *as we have them* are demonstrably the product of a later age.

Some scholars have been content to ignore form criticism (though the number of such people is rapidly diminishing) and proceed to biblical study, talking about history but refusing to employ the tools of the historian. On the opposite side are those who have been content to abandon the question of what Jesus did and said and refuse to study the relation between Jesus and the tradition about him. Increasingly, however, scholarship is addressing the questions: How does one get behind the sources to rediscover the historical Jesus? And, what is the relationship between the results of their scholarship and Christian faith? I shall take up these questions in sequence; the first in sections I and II, the second in section III. If scholars no longer suppose that they can write a chronology of Jesus' life and sayings, they do, nevertheless, attempt to form an impression of the man and what he stood for. Since this would be easier to discern in what he said than in the more ambiguous data of what he did, scholars have done far more work on the sayings of Jesus than on his deeds⁵ and, accordingly, have worked out a precise, but limited methodology.

I. Criteria for Determining Authentic Sayings of Jesus

We are now in the fortunate position that Norman Perrin⁶ has drawn together the basic criteria used in researching the sayings of Jesus. Perrin begins with those teachings ascribed to Jesus which have multiple attestation (that is, which appear in more than one gospel). He argues that one should first write a history of those traditions (cf. Bultmann's work), seeking to establish the earliest form of each tradition. Once this earliest form is arrived at – that is, once as much later accretion as possible has been removed – it is possible to apply three criteria to determine if a given saying is authentic. I shall review them one at a time.

The first of these criteria is the oldest. I am aware of its use as early as the second quarter of the nineteenth century by D. F. Strauss in his *Das Leben Jesu*. Perrin calls it the "criterion of dissimilarity." He says:

Recognizing that it follows an attempt to write a history of the tradition concerned, we may formulate it as follows: the earliest form of a saying we can reach may be regarded as authentic if it can be shown to be dissimilar to characteristic emphases both of ancient Judaism and of the early church, and this will particularly be the case where Christian tradition oriented towards Judaism can be shown to have modified the saying away from its original emphasis.⁷

An excellent example of the use of this criterion can be found in Joachim Jeremias' work on the Hebrew word "*abba*" in the New Testament.⁸ After an investigation of Jewish tradition, Jeremias concludes that "*abba*," translated "father," but really much closer to the infantile expression "dada," is unthinkable as a name for God in the mouths of pious Jews who guarded and revered the name of God so highly they would not even pronounce the proper Hebrew form *Yahweh*. Moreover, *abba* is used outside the prayers of Jesus only in Romans 8:15 and Galatians 4:6, where Paul apparently used the formula because as a Jew he appreciated its significance.⁹ In no sense, however, did the term *abba* gain acceptance in Christian circles, so, being neither of Jewish nor of early Christian origin, it can only have come from Jesus himself.

The first criterion, that of dissimilarity, is dependent upon the scholar's knowledge of Judaism and early Christianity. Moreover, it cannot take into account the traditions of groups whose thinking has not survived. Accordingly, the results of this criterion are rather limited and are not entirely assured, though any saying determined authentic by this procedure has considerable claim to authenticity. The second criterion is designed to apply to passages which under the first criterion would be determined inauthentic. This criterion is called the "criterion of coherence." Perrin explains that "material from the earliest strata of the tradition may be accepted as authentic if it can be shown to cohere with material established as authentic by means of the criterion of dissimilarity."¹⁰ Again I turn to Jeremias for an example of this method. He finds eight basic images in the parabolic teachings of Jesus (which are generally agreed to have been largely authentic in their earliest form and which evidence a discernible pattern of growth which Jeremias traces in seven steps).¹¹ These categories are "The Great Assurance," "Now is the Day of Salvation," "God's Mercy for Sinners," "The Imminence of Catastrophe," "The Challenge of Crisis," "Realized Discipleship," "The Via Dolorosa of the Son of Man," and "The Consummation." Under the basic category "Realized

Discipleship," Jeremias discusses the key parables of the Treasure in the Field and the Pearl found in Matthew 11:44-46. The primary emphasis, he says, is upon the joy in finding the treasure. No price is too great to pay to obtain the treasure.¹² I will now apply the insight of Jeremias to a new text. In Mark 9:43-49 we find a saying which makes the same point in antithetical fashion: pay any price, even maim yourself, rather than suffer damnation. Bultmann argues that the original construction mentioned neither the foot, nor was it specific concerning the *right* hand, etc.¹³ In this truncated form, I would argue, we may on the basis of the criterion of coherence consider the saying authentic.

It should be obvious that the criterion of coherence is valid only in so far as the criterion of dissimilarity is employed and is valid. Nevertheless, its usefulness as a means for rounding out the teaching of Jesus should not be denigrated. Much less reliable standard for determining authenticity is the "criterion of multiple attestation." Perrin explains: "This is a proposal to accept as authentic material which is attested in all, or most, of the sources which can be discerned behind the synoptic gospels."¹⁴ Moreover, the "usefulness of this criterion is somewhat restricted. It will not often help with specific sayings, but only with general motifs, and, consequently, will tend to be more useful in arriving at general characteristics of the ministry and teaching of Jesus than at specific elements in the teaching itself."¹⁵

Up to this point Perrin has dealt only with synoptic traditions whose history can be written. His fourth criterion is proposed as a way to work with isolated synoptic traditions whose history cannot be written because they appear only once. It is merely a judicious application of the three previously mentioned criteria.

Perrin is convinced that there are three aspects of the teaching of Jesus which can be reconstructed beyond reasonable doubt. These are the parables (cf. the above-mentioned works by Jeremias), perhaps not all, but a vast number; the teaching about the imminent coming of the Kingdom of God (cf. the late nineteenth century masterpiece by Johannes Weiss, available now in English under the title *Jesus' Proclamation of the Kingdom of God*); and the Lord's Prayer tradition. On the other hand Perrin rejects the Gospel of John as a source for authentic traditions. He justifies this rejection in a manner representative of most

biblical scholars: "It is generally recognized that it represents a reinterpretation of the ministry and teaching of Jesus along markedly theological lines."¹⁶ Until a history of the Johannine tradition is written, Perrin thinks work cannot progress far with John.

II. Critique of the Methodology for Determining Authenticity

In summary to this point, Perrin's four criteria are (1) the criterion of dissimilarity, (2) the criterion of coherence, (3) the criterion of multiple attestation — all in cases where it is possible to write a history of the traditions — and (4) careful application of these three criteria in special, isolated sayings. I wish now to offer three criticisms about the current methodology.

The first objection concerns the use of the Fourth Gospel as a historical source. It is now also widely recognized that each of the synoptics has its own point of view; it is not possible to attribute to any of them an exclusive or even predominant concern to write history or biography in the modern sense of those words. Hence, the problems encountered in studying John are no different from those involved in assessing the special Matthean and special Lukan source materials which have no parallels and with which Perrin is willing to work. While it may not be possible to find in John very many unaltered sayings of Jesus, there are materials which cohere with synoptic material; for example, in both Mark 14:58 and John 2:19 Jesus is quoted as predicting the destruction of the Temple and its subsequent rebuilding in three days.¹⁷ If Bultmann is correct about the authenticity of Mark 14:58, then by coherence John 2:19 should also be held authentic. Such materials should not be omitted simply because they occur in John.

The two remaining criticisms are directed at the use of the criterion of dissimilarity. One has already been intimated. The validity of the criterion rests upon the assumption that enough is known about Judaism and Christianity in first century Palestine to determine whether a given passage could have been at home in either context. As a matter of fact, the New Testament itself is virtually the only surviving witness to early Christianity, and except for the documents from the Qumran community on the Dead Sea¹⁸ and a few apocryphal books (most of which are likely not from Palestine) very little remains of Jewish thought from the first century which is not overlaid with subsequent commentary —

just like the words of Jesus. Certainly the task of uncovering first century rabbinic thought from the Talmud is incomplete. Hence, unrestricted confidence in the so-called "negative criterion" (criterion of dissimilarity) is not strictly warranted.

The last critique which I would raise against current methodology is somewhat more involved. I simply must protest what I would call the "tyranny of the negative criterion." On the one hand, this criterion gives us materials with the highest claim to probable authenticity, and scholars must continue to use it despite the shortcomings which I mentioned in the previous paragraph. On the other hand, the sayings granted authenticity by the use of this criterion tend by the nature of the methodology to be the most extreme statements attributed to Jesus. Perrin says: "If we are to seek that which is most characteristic of Jesus, it will be found not in the things which he shares with his contemporaries, but in the things wherein he differs from them."¹⁹ The word "characteristic" in this statement is questionable. If by "characteristic" we mean "major emphasis," we have no assurance at all that the negative criterion can deliver that to us. It can produce a picture of the *distinctive* teachings of Jesus and that is all, but some of these teachings may well have been *peripheral*. He surely shared many common ideas with his own Jewish people and the early church; and these teachings may have been far more representative of his overall teaching than the distinctive concepts retrievable through the use of the criterion of dissimilarity.

Nor is this a vain warning, for the danger in the use of the negative criterion is the tendency to use it exclusively. A clear example of this abuse is the work of the New Testament scholar Ernst Käsemann. He has isolated a large collection of special sayings lying behind the First Gospel.²⁰ Many of these sayings do, no doubt, stem from the early church, because they reflect matters affecting the organized church such as persecution and the position of Peter. Moreover, these materials are apocalyptic²¹ in content; they expect imminent judgment. By exclusive use of the negative criterion, therefore, Käsemann is able to argue that apocalyptic theology is the earliest Christian theology and therefore may not be attributed to Jesus. Jesus *cannot* have been an apocalypticist. It seems to me that Käsemann has pressed his methodology too far.²² The most he can claim by the exclusive use of the negative criterion is that one may not without further question attribute these sayings to Jesus.

Käsemann's argument can be reduced to absurdity by turning it upon the scholar himself. He is perhaps the most illustrious student of Rudolf Bultmann, and Käsemann himself has a number of disciples — myself included. If one asks what the "historical Käsemann" says and employs Käsemann's methodology to answer that question, Käsemann can have said nothing that he took directly from Bultmann or that Käsemann's students have taken directly from him! Poor Käsemann; the author of a steady stream of books and articles for years, and yet he has hardly an authentic word in the whole corpus. As a teacher I am well aware that students can totally misunderstand what I say, but they can also understand very well, or repeat to me the *ipsissima verba* of a given lecture to prove a different point. One should keep this in mind when one seeks to determine authenticity in the gospels. Sayings which do not reflect a post-Easter context and at the same time cannot pass the criterion of dissimilarity should be put in a kind of historical limbo, not denied to Jesus altogether.

In fact, I would go further to "resurrect" a methodological procedure employed between the world wars by Shirley Jackson Case of the University of Chicago. Case argued that if a saying betrayed Jewish backgrounds, it should be considered authentic; if Greek, inauthentic.²³ This position was informed by a view of early church history that to me is not tenable, namely that a complete hiatus existed between the simple proclamation of Jesus and the gospel after its accomodation to the Greek thought world of the church; so I do not wish to employ the methodology unaltered. However, I do think that the Jewishness of Jesus ought to be taken more fully into account in the reconstruction of his proclamation. I see two²⁴ currents of first century Judaism from which Jesus very likely drew some of his teachings. First, I concur with that group of scholars beginning with Johannes Weiss and Albert Schweitzer who view the unquestionably authentic proclamation of the kingdom of God as essentially apocalyptic. Second, it has long been recognized that some of the sayings attributed to Jesus reveal a striking similarity to teachings recorded in the vast rabbinic literature.²⁵ An opinion on their authenticity must be based on the nature of Jesus' contact with the rabbis. John Bowker has recently argued that the Pharisees of the New Testament constituted only an extremist position among the mixed group of teachers whose ideas were eventually more or less consolidated and became authoritative after the second century. He places Jesus in a specific historical succession and puts his finger on the chief issue of disagreement between Jesus and the less extreme among the teachers:

It is probable that originally Jesus was sufficiently close to the Hillelite tendency to believe that the expectation of God must first be established among the people whom God had chosen, before it could be extended to others; but his discovery that faith could be as real and as consequential among non-Jews as among Jews led to the obvious conclusion that the unity of effect between God and men is possible anywhere — indeed greater faith can sometimes be seen among non-Jews than, ironically, among Jews who ought (in view of their history) to have been vastly more expectant of the action and effect of God.²⁶

I would extend this assessment. It seems to me that Jesus also taught that God forgives and accepts people, freeing them to live godly lives, while the rabbis thought that deeds must precede and in some sense prove faith. This difference of opinion resulted in sharp antagonism between Jesus and rabbis of several varieties, and this antagonism only increased during the early history of the church. In view of the foregoing, I would argue that sayings of Jesus which seem to rely on rabbinic thought should not be determined inauthentic for that reason alone. In fact, in view of the growing tension between Judaism and her offspring church, I think that sayings which show influence of the rabbis should be considered authentic if they are altered in the history of the New Testament tradition, or if they do not presuppose the death of Jesus and/or the existence of the organized church.²⁷ One example will suffice. There is a rabbinic parallel to the proverb attributed to Jesus in Mark 2:27. The parallel reads: "The Sabbath was given to you, not you to the Sabbath." Despite this saying the Pharisees at least took issue with what Jesus did on the Sabbath, and the disciples' refusal to follow various rites only aggravated the fissure. Moreover, Bultmann has shown that 2:28 is a secondary expansion by the church defending Jesus' (and the church's) right to ignore the Sabbath law. Here then is a proverb which is probably more at home in the teachings of Jesus than among many of the rabbis and which the church found it necessary to modify by making more explicit in its ongoing debate with the synagogue. I would, therefore, argue that Mark 2:27 has a real claim to authenticity.

III. The Significance of the Task of Uncovering the Sayings of Jesus

An attempt to recover Jesus' teaching is simply a way of getting into the larger question of who and what Jesus was, said,

and did. Not all biblical scholars have been inclined to involve themselves in the so-called quest for the historical Jesus. Certainly many "conservative" scholars have condemned the enterprise, and many "liberal" scholars have eschewed the task as well. (Note the remark of Martin Kähler: "Therefore, Christian faith and history of Jesus repel each other like oil and water . . ."28) Surely it is not correct to say that Christian salvation is dependent upon the imminent solution of the problem encountered in this research. Nevertheless, the task is not inimical to Christian faith, and in a day of literalism and historical awareness it is at least an inevitable task and, perhaps, an absolutely necessary endeavor. I intend, therefore, to assess the significance of this task by indicating what it cannot do on the one hand and what it can do on the other.

Harvey K. McArthur summarizes the insufficiency of historical research in two statements: (1) historical facts cannot demonstrate the validity of Christian theological claims, and (2) there is inevitably a gap between what the historical Jesus did and said and what historians *qua* historians can prove about him.²⁹ I will comment upon these observations in reverse order. The lack of agreement among scholars concerning what may or may not be attributed to Jesus is conclusive enough evidence that the picture of Jesus which emerges from historical investigation is incomplete. This is inevitable, however, since the historian must assume an "I'm from Missouri; you must show me" attitude. He works on the basis of common sense, analogy, and verified or verifiable data. He organizes his material by discerning certain key events on the basis of *human* causality and development. If one then postulates a person who is without analogy, who is held to be perfect and, hence, above development, such a person is beyond historical verifiability. If the principal causality discerned behind his deeds is God, the poverty of the historian's tools to evaluate this claim becomes even clearer. Naturally, then, if the historian is limited as a historian by his tools, his picture of Jesus must be truncated when compared to the New Testament's confession about him.

The other statement by McArthur now makes more sense. The New Testament claims far more about Jesus than that he did or said thus and so. It claims that in Christ (for Paul another name for Jesus)³⁰ God was at work reconciling the world unto himself (II Corinthians 5:19). This kind of statement is theology, not history. There is no way known to man rationally or historically

to prove even the existence of God, let alone that he was acting in a certain man or event. The theological claims of the Bible, then, are not susceptible to proof by the historian. The results of historical criticism cannot, therefore, be used to reduce the element of risk involved in faith. Are, then, the theological claims of the Bible susceptible to disproof? The answer to this question is yes and no. The claim that God became incarnate in the man Jesus could be historically disproved if it could be shown that the man Jesus never existed. On the other hand, the claim could still be made that God is actively seeking to reconcile his world, but the historical element of the biblical faith would be lost.³¹ (This historical element is a key feature of the biblical confession, though the texts are not secular historiography as such and may not be attempting to describe mundane events. I will return shortly to the nature of much of the New Testament's presentation of Jesus.)

If historical research cannot demonstrate the validity of Christian theological claims and can only provide a truncated picture of what Jesus said and did, why engage in the study at all? What are the possible benefits from such an enterprise? I would suggest that at least five positive results derive from it. The first benefit of historical research is that it forces us to face up to what faith is. It is not the surety of sight, available to any disinterested observer. It requires a leap, a risk. It requires seeing more in Jesus than the religious and political leaders who plotted his death were able to see. But, faith in this sense is a far different thing than forcing oneself to believe logical nonsense or what one knows is not true. Moreover, it is the desire to communicate this "more" that dominates the New Testament's picture of Jesus. The gospel traditions began among people who knew the man Jesus, and the traditions were carried along with and were selected from a multitude of stories about what Jesus did and said. The biblical traditions were chosen precisely because of their insight into the "moreness" of Jesus, because they pictured Jesus not just as he was when alive, but as he is for all time, especially for the church in its sufferings and development.

This means, then, that the church did not make the kind of distinction I am making, the distinction between the historical Jesus and the Christ of faith; it had no need to do so. It required after the scandal of the cross to know about the conquering Christ. Thus the church was willing to let the historical Jesus

recede into the background in favor of the "contemporary" Christ, the Lord of the church who gave it direction and meaning. While we admit that interpretation is what makes the historical Jesus meaningful, we cannot give up the historical Jesus. Otherwise our theology loses its historical dimension and becomes docetic.³² Accordingly, I cannot accept Bultmann's hiatus between research and faith and his concomitant assertion that any attempt to do historical reconstruction smacks of "works," not faith.³³

The second benefit from the historical enterprise under discussion here is that it can help us to understand the mythological/symbolical nature of the texts with which we are dealing. The history of *reaction* to historical studies from the eighteenth century to the present shows that much of the church understands the gospels as documents of scientific observation rather than a confession of faith. We grow up using both discursive and religious language and fail to see that there is a difference between them. Religious language is mythological, that is, it is language about the God(s). When the church talks about the unique presence of God in the man Jesus it is using mythological, not scientific language. To fail to ask the question of the "historical Jesus" is to fail to discern the nature of the gospels. They are written "that you may believe that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God, and that believing you may have life in his name" (John 20:31). They are not written to tell the story of a man, though they obviously tell us some things about him. If we must recognize the mythological/symbolical nature of the gospels and religious language in general, we must also recognize that our attempt to retell the story is also mythological/symbolic. To say "God is my Father" is a qualitatively different statement from saying "Paul Leonard Redditt was my father."

The other three benefits from historical research arise out of the truncated picture of Jesus which we get. (1) We who have never known Jesus in the flesh get an impression of the kind of person Jesus was in terms of his sayings and deeds. We can see the *kind* of man about whom the early church did its theologizing. We can see the leap of faith that the disciples were willing to make, but others were not. Seeing that leap we are in a better position to judge whether we also wish to make that leap. The question of faith has been phrased in the following manner: To be a Christian is it necessary to believe things about Jesus that he might not have believed about himself? I can give no definitive

answer to that question, but I can say that I do hold such beliefs. (2) Historical research can help us to see what Jesus actually believed about *God*. That is surely of interest to the believer. While Christology may well be a concern of the post-Easter faith (as Bultmann tells us), the Christian conception of God takes its characteristic formulation in the proclamation of Jesus about forgiveness and is passed on in the church by Paul and other interpreters of the Christian faith. (3) To see clearly the distinctions and the similarities between Jesus and the early church is to put us in contact with the bedrock of Christian theology and its initial steps at reformulation in different contexts. This is indispensable in making our own interpretation biblical in the fullest sense.

Summary

I have attempted to use an introduction into the use of and a critique of a widely-accepted methodology in New Testament criticism to open the larger question of the limits and values of historical study of the Bible. I can only conclude that historical research is not merely *insufficient* as a basis for faith, but also is *beneficial* to faith by helping us see what faith is. Whether it is beneficial or not, however, the study will continue. Among a people who have an understanding of history, sooner or later the question of history must be directed to any document that has had the profound impact of the Bible. I have no doubt that the Bible will survive, even if the inquiry should turn into an assault.

FOOTNOTES

¹The term "Synoptic Gospels" designates the first three gospels, Matthew, Mark, and Luke, in recognition of their remarkable agreement, often word for word in subject, order of events, and language. This agreement is especially notable when these gospels are compared with John.

²"Q" is a siglum used to designate an alleged source standing behind Matthew and Luke. When one compares these gospels with Mark, one discovers many more sayings of Jesus than those recorded in Mark, most of which sayings agree word for word. The best explanation for this phenomenon is the assumption that both gospels employ the same source. In short, then, Q is the sayings (without accompanying actions) common to Matthew and Luke, but not in Mark. The siglum itself derives from the German word "*Quelle*," "well" or "source," by which it was originally designated. While the existence of Q is not proved in the sense that a copy of it has been discovered, such a collection of

sayings has been discovered, the Gnostic Gospel of Thomas. For a list of major sayings in Q, see R. M. Grant, *Historical Introduction to the New Testament* (New York and Evanston, 1963), p. 114.

³The terms "authentic" and "inauthentic" are easily misunderstood, for they appear to evaluate the worth or even legitimacy of any passage to which they are ascribed. Actually, though, the terms mean only to indicate whether a passage or saying was likely to have been expressed by the person(s) to whom it has been attributed. To say that a saying of Jesus is inauthentic is merely to render the judgment that it is a saying of the church read back into the preaching of Jesus.

⁴The historian attempts to work first of all in terms of data from the past which have been established by objective standards. "Consequently the expression 'historical Jesus' comes to mean 'What can be known of Jesus of Nazareth by means of the scientific methods of the historian.' Thus we have to do with a technical expression which must be recognized as such, and not automatically identified with the simple term 'Jesus'." James M. Robinson, *A New Quest of the Historical Jesus*, Studies in Biblical Theology, vol. XXV (London, 1959), pp. 26-7.

⁵A notable exception is the work of Ernst Fuchs, "Die Frage nach dem historischen Jesus," *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche*, LIII (1956), 210-19, and other articles.

⁶*Rediscovering the Teachings of Jesus* (New York and Evanston, 1967).

⁷*Ibid.*, p. 39.

⁸Joachim Jeremias, *The Central Message of the New Testament* (New York, 1965), pp. 9-30.

⁹*Ibid.*, p. 15.

¹⁰Perrin, p. 43.

¹¹*The Parables of Jesus*, trans. by S. H. Hooke (New York, 1955), p. 88:

- "1. There is the early appearance of a tendency to elaborate the parables.
2. The primitive church has largely transferred to the community parables which were originally addressed to opponents or to the crowd.
3. Hence there has occurred a frequent shifting of emphasis to the hortatory aspect, especially from the eschatological to the hortatory.
4. The primitive Church related the parables to its own actual situation, characterized by the Gentile environment, the Gentile mission, and the delay of the *parousia* [second coming]; in terms of this situation the Church interpreted and expanded the parables.
5. The primitive Church increasingly tended to interpret the parables allegorically with a hortatory purpose.
6. The primitive Church formed collections of parables, and this gave rise to the fusion of parables.
7. The primitive Church gave a setting to the parables, and this often produced a change in the meaning; in particular, by the addition of generalizing conclusions, many parables acquired a universal meaning."

¹²Jeremias, *The Parables of Jesus*, p. 140.

¹³Rudolf Bultmann, *History of the Synoptic Tradition*, trans. by John Marsh, 2nd ed. (New York and Evanston, 1968), pp. 86, 312.

¹⁴Perrin, p. 45. These sources are several. First there are the traditions inherited by Mark. In addition there are Q (see note 2), and

two special sources available to Luke and to Matthew respectively. This hypothesis concerning gospel sources has been widely accepted among biblical scholars, though certain of its provisions have recently come under attack by William R. Farmer, *The Synoptic Problem* (New York and London, 1964).

¹⁵Perrin, pp. 46-47.

¹⁶Perrin, p. 48.

¹⁷See Bultmann's discussion of the probable ultimate origin of the concept and the dominical use of the statement in *History of the Synoptic Tradition*, pp. 120-1.

¹⁸For a good, non-technical summary of scholarly investigation of the Qumran community and its literature see James A. Sanders, "The Dead Sea Scrolls — A Quarter Century of Study," *Biblical Archaeologist*, XXXVI (1973), 110-48.

¹⁹Perrin, p. 39.

²⁰These materials, scattered throughout Matthew, are largely legal in nature. Their structure involves the naming of an improper type of conduct in a dependent clause and the threat of judgment upon the disobedient at the end of time in an independent clause. This article appeared first as "Die Anfänge christlicher Theologie," in *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche*, LVII (1960), 162-85. It evoked instant response by Gerhard Ebeling and Ernst Fuchs, to whom Käsemann in turn addressed a rebuttal. All four articles are collected and translated in the *Journal for Theology and the Church*, VI (1969), 17-133. Rudolf Bultmann also entered the fray with an article "Ist die Apokalyptik die Mutter der christliche Theologie?" in *Festschrift für Ernst Haenchen* (Berlin, 1964), pp. 64-69. His only disagreement concerned the term "apocalyptic." Bultmann preferred to designate "eschatological" the theology Käsemann described. On the definitions of these terms see the next note.

²¹The term "apocalyptic" derives from a particular genre of Jewish-Christian literature. An apocalypse combines a panoramic view of history or heaven with a subsequent exhortation based upon that panorama. (Cf. Klaus Koch, *Ratlos vor der Apokalyptik* [Gütersloh, 1970].) Examples of the genre "apocalypse" are the biblical books Daniel and Revelation. "Apocalyptic" is a term to designate the theological perspective of those books and other writings sharing their world-view. A prominent feature of apocalyptic theology is its eschatology, its view of the end-time. Specifically, apocalyptic eschatology seems always to have expected an imminent end of the present world aeon.

²²See Käsemann's insistence that only the negative criterion is allowable in "The Problem of the Historical Jesus," *Essays on New Testament Themes*, trans. by W. J. Montague (London, 1964), p. 37.

²³*Jesus: A New Biography* (Chicago, 1928), p. 115.

²⁴It may be that a third group should be included here, the Zealots; see S. G. F. Brandon, *Jesus and the Zealots* (New York, 1967), who argues: (1) Jesus was condemned as a self-proclaimed Messiah; (2) he must have opposed Rome in order to gain a following; (3) the Zealots also opposed Rome, and several of Jesus' disciples were numbered among the Zealots; (4) therefore, Jesus was a Zealot and biblical statements in which he disclaimed political intentions are to be understood as the apology of the church in its Roman setting. There is no doubt that the sources can be forced to this conclusion, but it seems more likely to me that Jesus himself was the source for the New

Testament's reinterpretation of the political messianic concept, either by what he said or — more likely — by his refusal to mount armed attack against Rome. There is, however, no doubt that he was considered seditious by Rome and was executed as an agitator, potential or actual. To admit this, however, does not mean that the connection with the Zealots is assured or even implied.

²⁵See especially the massive work of H. L. Strack and P. Billerbeck, *Kommentar zum Neuen Testament aus Talmud und Midrasch*, 4 vols. (Munich, 1922-8).

²⁶John Bowker, *Jesus and the Pharisees* (Cambridge, 1973), p. 44. The phrase "Hillelite tendency" is a reference to the less harsh of two dominant rabbis who flourished from about 30 B.C. to A.D. 10.

²⁷The limits of my agreement and disagreement with Bultmann can be seen by comparing this paragraph with Bultmann's view in his *History of the Synoptic Tradition*, pp. 49-50.

²⁸*The So-called Historical Jesus and the Historic, Biblical Christ*, trans. by Carl E. Braaten (Philadelphia, 1964), p. 74.

²⁹*In Search of the Historical Jesus* (New York, 1969), pp. 18-19.

³⁰See, for example, Adolf Deissmann, *Paul: a Study in Social and Religious History*, trans. by William E. Wilson (New York, 1957), p. 191.

³¹Harvey K. McArthur, *The Quest through the Centuries* (Philadelphia, 1966), pp. 136-39.

³²Docetism was an early heresy with which the church had to contend. Certain Christians imbued with the Greek concept that the body was the prison for the soul held that Christ could have had no physical body. They claimed, instead, that he only seemed to have a body. The appellation for this view, docetism, is derived from the Greek word *dokeo*, which means to "seem" or "have the appearance of."

³³On this whole question see Leander Keck, *A Future for the Historical Jesus* (Nashville and New York, 1971), chapter two, especially pp. 50-56. My indebtedness to Keck is too far-reaching to indicate adequately with footnotes; I worked one year as his graduate assistant at Vanderbilt University.

THE SOCIAL SCIENCES, HUMANITIES AND HISTORY: THE EYE OF THE BEHOLDER

We live in an age of crisis and change. We are all part of the problem. We are all part of the solution. We cannot abstract either problems or solutions from our involvement. We can increase our understanding of problems and possible solutions. We can heighten our perception of self and society to give more purposeful direction to our personal and collective life.

The imbalance and disarray of our society envelopes us. We have great technological capacity to alter our physical environment. We can produce the most complex computers, send men to the moon and alter the face of our planet. We witness medical miracles and revolutions in agriculture. Advances in communications and transportation have produced one world. Jet propulsion and atomic energy have created power sources beyond the expectations of earlier generations.

Yet, many of our greatest technological achievements are hollow. While we have solved numerous technical problems we have unwittingly created others. The ecology and energy crises are only the most dramatic recent examples. Nuclear wars and urban blight are others. While we have created one world physically, in human relationships both our own and world society reflect discord and disunity.

We have made gods of science, technology and the organizational forms which serve their needs. Shaped in this image, our institutions have not kept pace with the problems. In many cases they have increased the problems of disorientation and dislocation. They fail to adapt to change. They fail to meet human needs. They confuse priorities and consequently, in the name of good, wreak human and institutional destruction. Watergate, that spreading stain on our national life and government, is but a logical consequence.

In our nation we face a crisis of confidence and skepticism on a part of the majority of the people, which if ignored, could destroy most of our institutions. In a recent Lou Harris poll of American attitudes, 71 per cent of those surveyed felt that the

Federal government failed to improve their lives. In a dramatic increase from a similar poll seven years earlier, 61 per cent believed that what they thought did not count. Fifty-three per cent felt that something was deeply wrong in America and a surprising 45 per cent felt that the quality of life had grown worse over the past ten years.¹

There are other signs of disillusionment. The "occult wave" evidenced in the rising popularity of *The Exorcist*, witchcraft, voodoo, horoscopes, fortune telling, palmistry and spiritualism reflects a rejection of societal goals and institutions for the hidden, secretive and supernatural. Psychotherapist Dr. Rollo May sees the occult wave as "a reaction against a science and objectivity that many people feel just didn't work."²

We cannot blame science, technology and modern organizational form for our problems. Certainly a strong case exists for their achievements. They are, in themselves, neither good nor bad. Rather we need to consider why their application has separated man from man, and man from his institutions and community. Our approach to knowledge in the academic and the closely allied professional world offers valuable insight into this problem.

At root our problem is one of perception. Practitioners in the social sciences, humanities and history all have different perceptions of our world and our problems. Certainly these perceptions have done much to contribute to our understanding and enrichment. We know that how we perceive relationships determines how we perceive life. At the turn of the century a series of experiments in psychology demonstrated the importance of perception. A subject was given goggles with inverted lenses. The result was extreme disorientation. As the individual learned to deal with the world through the goggles, his entire vision field inverted. A revolutionary transformation of vision occurred which permitted the viewer to see the world as he had before. "What a man sees depends both upon what he looks at and also upon what his previous visual-conceptual experience has taught him to see."³ The context of the viewing and the eye of the beholder determine perception.

In the twentieth century the social sciences have added new dimensions to the perception of man in society. The social sciences developed rapidly in the late nineteenth century and

reached new heights in our own times. In the United States during the 1960's they grew by 163 per cent, more than any occupational group. Our greater affluence and the increase of social problems in a rapidly changing, technologically based society account for much of the growth.⁴

In general the social sciences are "those mental or cultural sciences which deal with the activities of the individual as a member of a group."⁵ Among the most commonly listed disciplines are economics, sociology, anthropology, political science, and social psychology. Practitioners of these disciplines share the desire to apply rigorous scientific methodology to man in a social setting. The goal is to analyze problems, identify uniformities (or deviations from norms), state general laws of behavior, and predict future behavior. Methodology is all important in determining the results. Social scientists employ descriptive analysis of historical experience, mathematical techniques, theoretical models for analysis and prediction, and comparative analysis.⁶ Perception depends on the conceptual framework employed for analysis and the particular data observed. As sociologist Daniel Bell has stated, "Reality is a flux of events. What every observer does is to select salient aspects for comparison . . .; this saliency is determined by a conceptual scheme."⁷

The perceptions of the social scientist have given us valuable tools for analyzing our society, identifying problems, stating alternative solutions, planning, and, within a limited range, predicting. They have given us considerable insight into rational and irrational behavior. Numerous theories have had significant impact. Those of John Maynard Keynes in economics have altered our emphasis from saving to consumption. Christopher Jencks and his associates have attacked the conventional wisdom that claims democratic schooling brings greater economic equality. Behaviorists, such as B. F. Skinner, have built a theory of culture, freedom and dignity around the conditioned reflex.⁸ The social science model operates by control and exclusion. Variables are selected, defined and controlled in the interest of identifying uniformities and predictability.

Despite the perceptual contributions of the social sciences, they have serious limitations. While in science paradigms are usually widely accepted for extensive time periods, the social sciences are constantly shifting according to the current social problems. In science agreement usually prevails on what should be taught. In the social sciences, the absence of agreement

creates insecurity. This often leads to an over emphasis on methodology. The result is fragmentation. Too frequently social scientists select studies based on their adaptability to accepted methodologies rather than significance. This breaks communications with all but the most highly specialized.

There are other limitations. Recall the failures of long term predictability: the elimination of poverty in the 1920's; economic stagnation and population decline of the 1930's, and the expanding population forecasts of the 1950's. The attempt to frame universal social laws is also a record of more frustrations than successes.⁹ As Alfred North Whitehead pointed out, political economy after Adam Smith dispelled many economic fallacies and taught us how to think about the industrial revolution, but it also formulated a disastrous set of abstractions that "de-humanized industry."¹⁰

The humanities, including fine arts, music and literature, offer different perceptions of reality even though they share some common characteristics with the social sciences.¹¹ In the humanities the academic disciplines exhibit some perceptual limitations similar to those in the social sciences. The separation of idea and action through abstraction and fragmentation are common. In some areas methodology even comes to supersede the significance of content.¹²

The humanities, like the social sciences, have practitioners and significance outside academe. The artist, musician and writer offer substantially different perception from social scientists. The humanities arise "out of man's need to create for himself . . . a meaningful and valuable world: . . . to intensify, and to project in more permanent forms those precious parts of his experience that would otherwise slip too quickly out of his grasp." The humanities are personal attempts "to widen the province of the personality, so that feelings, emotions, attitudes, and values . . . can be transmitted with all their force and meaning to other persons or to other cultures."¹³

The humanities are individual efforts to grasp reality as a whole. Visual art plays an important role in this process. The first symbolic abstraction is usually an image. This is then followed by an idea which enters human consciousness. The gothic cathedral with the conception of space embodied in the vault is intimately related to the idea of a transcendental and

infinite deity. Sir Herbert Read argues that "it is only in so far as the artist establishes symbols for the representation of reality that mind, as a structure of thought can take shape." The artist perceives reality and represents "his consciousness of these new aspects of reality in plastic or poetic images."¹⁴

Many artists have discussed their efforts to direct perception of reality into images and human consciousness. The personal experience of the artist is intimately involved with his perception. The Russian, Vassili Kandinsky, one of the founders of abstract painting, described his perceptual process as "suffering, searching, tormented souls deeply sundered by the conflict between spirit and matter." Jackson Pollock saw his innovative methods as part of his desire "to express my feelings rather than illustrate them." Pablo Picasso viewed his painting as an "art experience" that expressed a clear emotion. He wanted only one interpretation and "in that one to some extent the possibility of recognizing nature, even distorted nature which is, after all, a kind of struggle between my interior life and the external world as it exists for most people."¹⁵

Lewis Mumford summarized this process when he noted that the artist attempts to communicate his perception "through a common language of symbols and forms" which embodies "the experience of a lifetime: the potentialities of many lifetimes. These esthetic moments endow life with a new meaning; and these new meanings heighten life with other esthetic moments."¹⁶

Music is a similar expression of perception in different form. Composers are creative artists who develop feelings, emotions and ideas from their contacts with the world. Cultural and personal factors enter the process. Igor Stravinsky has noted the importance of perceptual observation. "The faculty of creating is never given to us all by itself. It always goes hand in hand with the gift of observation. And the true creator may be recognized by his ability always to find about him, in the commonest and humblest thing, items worthy of note."¹⁷

In describing the whole process of music as an expression of perception and unity, American composer-musician Aaron Copeland argued that:

A composer writes music to express and communicate and put down in permanent form certain thoughts, emotions and states of being. These thoughts and emotions are gradually

formed by the contact of the composer's personality with the world in which he lives. He expresses these . . . in the musical language of his own time.¹⁸

The combination of individual perception based on experience and the search for broader unity finds expression in literature as well as art and music. Often the creative force comes from a conflict between the writer and his society. It comes from the struggle to give life meaning.¹⁹ While the writer may write for himself, social significance "obtrudes through the cracks," in the words of novelist Graham Greene, "like grass through cement."²⁰ Ultimately, "by means of its writers a society communicates with itself."²¹ The writer enhances knowledge and serves as "a conferrer of shape, an interpreter of direction" in a world where "shapelessness, lack of meaning, and being without direction is most people's nightmare . . ."²²

The complex novels of James Joyce illustrate the interrelationship between the individual and broad themes of human existence. Joyce employed elaborate techniques of internal self-examination, historical myths and dreams. Thornton Wilder claimed that Joyce "was hunting for a style that would reveal the extent to which every individual — you and I, the millions of the people who walk this earth — is both sole and unique and also archetypical."²³

Compared to the social sciences, the humanities offer a different, complementary perceptual insight into man and society. They are both more individualistic and more grandiose in conception. They are less methodological and vastly more intuitive. In the academic world the humanities reflect an organizational fragmentation similar to the social sciences. An even more fundamental fragmentation results from the multitude of individualized conceptions of practitioners. The problems of man and society are spoken to sometimes with deep insight, sometimes with little, but always with many voices.

History has some assets of both the social sciences and humanities, but it also has limitations. Academicians and historians themselves have long debated whether history is a social science or humanity. Some colleges and universities house it in the academic structure with one, some with the other.²⁴ Simply defined, "history as a study is the attempt to discover and understand what happened."²⁵ This attempt to discover and understand is richly enhanced by a tradition in both the social

sciences and humanities. John B. Bury, 19th century historian of the late Roman period, claimed that true history could "be attained only through the discovery, collection, classification, and interpretation of facts through scientific research." His emphasis was on methodology and accumulation.²⁶ Thomas Babington Macaulay, a 19th century English historian in the best literary tradition, represented quite a different philosophy. He insisted that "history begins in novel and ends in essay" and that the historian is most like the portrait painter whose works "are resemblances – but not mere resemblances, faithful – but more than faithful . . ." ²⁷

In recent decades social science insight and methodology have profoundly influenced historians and historical perception. In studying an event "the use of social science approaches focuses attention on the aspects of the event that reveal the major dynamics of the culture, the uniformities rather than those features that appear to be most colorful or unique."²⁸ Illustrations abound. Psychology has helped historians analyze personality, motivation, the irrational and emotional in history. Historians have employed the models of the economist, the comparative techniques of the anthropologist and the structural analysis of the sociologist. They have become actively involved with computer methodology and quantitative approaches initially applied in the social sciences.²⁹

Historians do not always eagerly embrace the social sciences. Substantial differences between history and the social sciences exist. Social scientists usually form hypotheses first and then go to the data, while historians more frequently follow a deductive path based on an examination of the data first. The social scientist attempts to increase perception through applying precise structures of thought and methodology while historians, more like the humanities, often proceed through suggestion and indirection. While the historian implies the direction of events, he does not seek predictability. Historians are often unwilling to exchange "the free creativity of the artist for the more restricted methods of science."³⁰

While historians, like social scientists, might wish to assume that methodology and precision discount personal involvement and bias, they have much greater difficulty in sustaining such a view. Like the writer, artist and musician, the historian cannot separate mind "from feelings, needs and fantasies." He "is ines-

capably part of the evidence he attempts to assess."³¹ Increasingly historians recognize this intimacy with the present and argue that a dispassionate view of the past is not possible. The methods and insight of the historian are as valid, in some ways even more valid, in analyzing contemporary events.³²

History differs from both the humanities and social sciences in attempting to perceive a total picture. Those in the humanities, while seeking universals, do so through a highly individualized and unique perception. The social scientist attempts to abstract the particular from reality. The historian, "while investigating the particular never loses sight of the complete whole, on which it is working."³³

The social sciences, humanities, and history have important differences, but they all strive to enlarge human perception. Discipline, creativity and a relationship to the times provide elements of commonality to all. The careful application of methodology and discipline in research and thought are well known marks of academic scholars in the social sciences, humanities and history. For the artist, musician or writer the rigors of discipline are equally important to achievement and creativity. The discipline is self-imposed, personal and intense, often requiring the individual to divorce himself from his personal life during creative periods.³⁴ The failure to achieve discipline, regardless of talent and perception, ultimately leads only to disintegration.³⁵

The social scientist, the practitioner of the humanities, and the historian all strive to express creativity. In essence creativity is a new perception — one which communicates a broader, a more beautiful insight into the reality of life. For the social scientist it may be a new model, for the writer a new society or a personal idiosyncrasy, for the historian a new interpretation, for the musician a new tone pattern, and for the artist a new balance of light and color.³⁶

Social scientists, those in the humanities, and historians, all recognized the impact of their own times in affecting methodology, style and content of their work. The times do influence perception. In the past decade "new left" scholars, in most academic fields, have reasserted the significance of contemporary problems.³⁷ Even those who reject their times feel the impact. "Whatever the source of the emotion that drives me to create,"

stated Pablo Picasso, "I want to give it a form that has some connection with the visible world, even if it is only to wage war on that world."³⁸

The central problem of our time is one of perception. We live in an era dominated by specialists, those whom Lewis Mumford calls "unbalanced men who have made a madness out of their method."³⁹ We are divided from ourselves and from a broader meaning of life. We have lost confidence in ourselves and our society. We have lost a sense of life as an organic whole and come to view it as mechanistic parts.⁴⁰ Our perception of life — self and social — has mirrored the fragmentation of our man-made world reinforcing fragmentation rather than correcting it.

In our post industrial society we have a knowledge-technology with capacity far in excess of any previous era. This has come at a high cost. Sociologist Daniel Bell has pointed out that the knowledge explosion in most disciplines has geometrically increased the problem of selection and generalization. Greater human interaction through communications and transportation has increased problems of coordination. This in turn has necessitated costly organization and planning.⁴¹ Too often, while we may have improved perception of the particular, we have obscured the general.

In our post Watergate society we experience the disastrous impact of this perceptual failure. The time honored professions of politics and law suffer disrepute because able practitioners have applied their talents and conceived their loyalties and responsibilities too narrowly.⁴² Too frequently those in the social sciences, humanities and history share this spirit of narrowness. Increasingly there is a feeling in the academic world that "the obsession with rationalism, embodied in the worship of scientific objectivity, has seriously damaged personal as well as scholarly perceptions."⁴³

Nearly half a century ago, Alfred North Whitehead identified the danger of "thought within a groove." "Each profession makes progress, but it is progress in its own groove . . . But there is no groove of abstractions which is adequate for the comprehension of human life." In such a situation "the leading intellectuals lack balance" and while "the specialized functions of the community are performed better and more progressively, the generalized direction lacks vision."⁴⁴

What can we do to replace thought in a grove with a broader comprehension of life that embodies perception with unity, balance and vision? We must seek a greater understanding of truth in relation to perception. We must also seek instruction from models of greater perceptual unity and balance. We must devise specific strategies.

Truth is the perception of meaning in contexts. In this sense truth is in the eye of the beholder. If the context for perception is narrowly defined the insight perceived may meet the test of truth in that context but have little other meaning and thus little truth, in a wider context. The search for truth is the search for the most meaningful perception in the broadest possible context. A simple analogy demonstrates the point. "When you understand all about the sun and all about the atmosphere and all about the rotation of the earth, you may still miss the radiance of the sunset."⁴⁵

In addition to an understanding of perception, essential ingredients in the search for truth are the freedom of pursuit, commitment and tolerance. Without the freedom of pursuit, contexts and perception become limited. No commitment, and dogmatic commitment are equally destructive. Both skepticism as a "fanaticism of doubt" and absolute beliefs in absolute truths are intolerant and thus destructive of truth. The French philosopher, Jacques Maritain, defined the problem precisely:

There is real and genuine tolerance only when a man is firmly and absolutely convinced of a truth, or what he holds to be a truth, and when he at the same time recognizes the right of those who deny this truth to exist, and their right to contradict him and speak their own mind, not because they are free from truth but because they seek truth in their own way, and he respects in them human nature and human dignity and those very resources and living springs of the intellect and of the conscience which make them potentially capable of attaining the truth he loves, if some day they happen to see it.⁴⁶

Many models furnish insight into truth conceived with maximum meaning in the broadest context. The lives of some historical figures such as Albert Schweitzer, Thomas Jefferson, and Leonardo da Vinci bear witness to a balanced and unified approach, to life. Such men avoided concentrating their efforts in one field and searched for broader wholistic perceptions of life.

Perhaps no society has achieved as unified a perception of

life as the ancient Greeks. They achieved a true organic view. They always sought the most pervasive law which would harmonize life and give meaning to all its dimensions. Every part was subordinate to an ideal whole. They sought to educate "man to his true form, the real and genuine human nature." From the Greeks we gain our concept and model of humanism, the humanities and the liberal arts.⁴⁷

Other models also offer insight into a unified life perception. The great world religions embody such insight. For Christians the Great Commandments, "You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, and with all your soul, and with all your mind . . . You shall love your neighbor as yourself," relate self, others, and God in unity.⁴⁸

We must eradicate the fragmentation and resulting skepticism of our time. We need strategies to enhance the broadest possible perception of both contexts and meanings. We need to seek the most general truth. To this end we need new organizational patterns and new approaches to relate ideas to experience and to each other.

In higher education we must restore the liberal arts college to the center of the educational process and devise improved patterns for interaction between those in the liberal arts and those in professional studies. In the liberal arts we must overcome the fragmentation between and within disciplines. We must transcend departmentalism with more unified organizational patterns. The teacher-scholar must participate in more than one discipline or one specialty within a discipline. We need more programs involving students in experience related to ideas and involving experienced practitioners with those working with ideas.

We must overcome fragmentation in teaching. Teachers must become connectors of ideas and relators of ideas to experience. John Ciardi has put it incisively:

The right teaching question is not, "How do you feel about this idea" but "If this is the idea, what can we use to describe it, define it (if possible), and to evaluate it, not for ourselves alone but as a way of locating agreements and disagreements with the thinking of others who have explored the same idea."⁴⁹

Increased use of the comparative technique would help implement this strategy. Teaching offers infinite opportunities for comparing

theory and practice, the ideas of one discipline to those in another, and differing interpretations in the same discipline.⁵⁰ All disciplines offer valuable perceptions. Their value increases as those perceptions meet the test of meaning in different contexts.

Such strategies are essential. Only as we implement them will we end destructive fragmentation. Only then will we find it possible to perceive truth in a way which helps us approach life as a living whole.

FOOTNOTES

¹"What America Thinks of Itself," *Newsweek*, December 10, 1973, pp. 40, 45, 48; David E. Rosenbaum, "Survey Finds Loss of Faith in Leadership of Country," *New York Times*, December 3, 1973.

²Quoted in Louise Sweeney, "The Occult Wave: 'Ultimately Destructive,'" *Christian Science Monitor*, Wednesday, March 6, 1974.

³Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), pp. 111-112.

⁴Shirley H. Rhine, "The Emergence of the Social Scientist," *The Conference Board Record*, February, 1974, 38-46.

⁵David L. Sills, (ed.), *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, I (7 vols., N.Y.: Macmillan, 1968), xxi.

⁶See Daniel Lerner (ed.), *The Human Meaning of the Social Sciences* (New York: Meridian, 1959), pp. 15-19, 99-106, 189-190, 215-216, 245-246; William C. Freund, "What Does an Economist Get Paid For?" *New York Times*, August 12, 1973.

⁷Daniel Bell, "Bell vs. Bimbaum," in "Letters to the Editor," *New York Times Book Review*, August 12, 1973, pp. 21-22.

⁸See Freund, "What Does an Economist Get Paid For?"; Lerner (ed.), pp. 245-246; H. Stuart Hughers, *Consciousness and Society* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1958), pp. 3-32; Thomas C. Cochran, *The Inner Revolution* (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), pp. 1-18; Christopher Jencks, et al., *Inequality: A Reassessment of the Effect of Family and Schooling in America* (New York: Basic Books, 1972), pp. 7-13, 187; B. F. Skinner, *Beyond Freedom and Dignity* (New York: Knopf, 1971) pp. 26-29, 44, 129, 142, 160-161, 211-215.

⁹Lerner (ed.), pp. 99, 104-106, 189; Nathan Glazer, "Social Sciences and the Crisis of General Education," *Chronicle of Higher Education*, November 5, 1973; Kuhn, pp. 37, 110, 162-163.

¹⁰*Science and the Modern World* (New York: Macmillan, 1960), p. 288.

¹¹Lester Ashrim, et al., *The Humanities and the Library* (Chicago: American Library Association, 1957), pp. xv-xviii, 1-2.

¹²Malcolm G. Scully, "The 'New' Scholars' A Special Report," *Chronicle of Higher Education*, October 23, 1973, pp. 9-12.

¹³Lewis Mumford, *Art and Technics* (New York: Columbia University, 1952) p. 16.

¹⁴*Icon and Idea: The Function of Art in the Development of Human Consciousness* (New York: Schocken Books, 1965), pp. 18, 53, 61-62, 65-67.

¹⁵Richard Friedenthal (ed.) *Letters of the Great Artists from Blake to Pollock*, II (2 vols., New York: Random House, 1963), 203, 272, 256; Alden Whiteman, "Picasso: Protean and Prodigious, the Greatest Single Force in 70 Years of Art," *New York Times*, April 9, 1973.

¹⁶*Art and Technics*, p. 139.

¹⁷*Poetics of Music* (Cambridge, Harvard University, 1947), p. 54.

¹⁸Sam Morgenstern (ed.), *Composers on Music* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1956), p. 548. See also Anton Webern, *The Path to the New Music* (Bryn Mawr, Pa.: Theodore Presser, 1963), pp. 10-11, 18.

¹⁹V. S. Pritchett, *et al.*, *Why Do I Write?* (London: Folcroft Press, 1940, 1969), pp. 24, 36, 49.

²⁰*Ibid.*, p. 27.

²¹*Ibid.*, p. 18.

²²Elizabeth Bowen in *ibid.* pp. 24-25.

²³"Joyce and the Modern Novel," in Marvin Magalaner (ed.), *A James Joyce Miscellany* (New York: James Joyce Society, 1957), pp. 11-12.

²⁴David L. Sills (ed.), *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, I (17 vols., New York: Macmillan, 1968), xxi and Glazer, "Social Sciences and the Crisis of General Education," p. 6 put history in the social sciences. It is frequently included as a humanity, however.

²⁵Boyd C. Shafer, *et al.*, *Historical Study in the West* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1968), p. 3.

²⁶"History as a Science," in Fritz Stern (ed.), *The Varieties of History* (New York: Meridian Books, 1956), pp. 217-218.

²⁷"History and Literature" in *ibid.*, pp. 73, 75

²⁸Thomas Cochran, "History and the Social Sciences," in *ibid.*, p. 353.

²⁹H. Stuart Hughes, *History as Art and as Science* (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), pp. 21, 48-51, 61; Francois Furet, "Quantitative History," *Daedalus*, C (Winter 1971), 151-167; Frank E. Manuel, "The Use and Abuse of Psychology in History," *ibid.*, 187-213; John Habakkuk, "Economic History and Economic Theory," *ibid.*, 305-322; Robert P. Swierenga, "Computers and American History: The Impact of the 'New' Generation," *Journal of American History*, LX (March 1974), 1045-1070; Edward N. Saveth (ed.), *American History and the Social Sciences* (New York: Free Press, 1964).

³⁰Cochran, pp. 19, 21, 32-33; Hughes, *History as Art and as Science*, pp. 3, 10, 86-88.

³¹Martin Duberman, "The Historian as Ghost," *New York Times*, July 8, 1973.

³²This view is argued persuasively by Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., "The Historian as Participant," *Daedalus*, C (Spring 1971), 339-358.

³³Leopold von Ranke, "The Ideal of Universal History," in Stern (ed.), p. 61. See also Hughes, *History as Art and as Science*, p. 69.

³⁴Friedenthal (ed.), pp. 202, 240; Morgenstern (ed.), pp. 360-361, 254-255; Stravinsky, pp. 5-6, 63; William Rubin, "Pollock Was No Accident," *New York Times Magazine*, January 27, 1974, 35-38, 40, 46-49; Whitman, "Picasso: Protean and Prodigious"; Copeland, pp. 52-53; Whitehead, p. 291.

³⁵A good description of this process appears in Midge Decter, "Review," of Myra Friedman, *Buried Alive* (New York: William Morris, 1973) in *New York Times Book Review*, August 12, 1973, pp. 1-3.

³⁶For several illustrations see Pritchett, *et al.*, pp. 16-17, 23-24; Stravinsky, p. 54.

37Scully, "The 'New' Scholars." On the relationship of music to the times see Morgenstern (ed.), pp. 333, 363-364.

38Quoted in Whitman, "Picasso: Protean and Prodigious."

39*The Conduct of Life* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1951), p. 181.

40See Mumford, *Art and Technics*, pp. 11-12, 29-30, 136-137, 141, 150.

41Daniel Bell, "The End of Scarcity?" *Saturday Review*, I (May 1973), 49-52.

42Lesley Oelsner, "Watergate and the Law: Scandal Prompts a Call in Profession for the Teaching of Ethics," *New York Times*, July 16, 1973; James A. Michener, "Is America Burning?" *New York Times Magazine*, July 1, 1973, p. 28.

43Scully, "The 'New' Scholars."

44*Science and the Modern World*, pp. 282-283.

45*Ibid.*, p. 284.

46"Are Only Skeptics Tolerant?" *Center Magazine*, VI (July/August, 1973), 12-14.

47Werner Jaeger, *Paideia*, I (3 vols., New York: Oxford University Press, 1939, 1960), xx-xxiv.

48Matthew 23:36-39.

49"As I Was Saying," *World*, II (August 14, 1973), 12.

50For suggestions of a strategy in history see, Thomas J. Kerr, IV, "Developing Perception: The Use of New Interpretations in American History," *The Social Studies*, LXII (March 1971), 106-113.

CELEBRATION

Heaven is only the bluest
Victories have a dimension
Longer than sea drift or tideline
Wider than day silent shifting

Walls had kept angling inward
Echo was backward reminding
Heavy the deadening summer
Shattering shell into silence

Tentative time in the seeding
Wind tossed to future for flower
Voice to a seasoned salvation
Bright for an infinite blooming

Shouting of blue in the blooming
Angling of chicory shining
Victory fills on the roadside
The multiple cups of reflection

Heaven is only the bluest
Victories have a dimension
Stronger than walls or than silence
The force in the wind and the singing.

— *Sylvia Vance*

SUPERCARGO IN RALPH ELLISON'S *INVISIBLE MAN*

In chapter three of Ralph Ellison's *Invisible Man*, the unnamed narrator recalls an anxiety-ridden visit made as a college student to the Golden Day, a local black "sporting and gambling house." Though the narrator merely wants a glass of whiskey for the shocked and fainting white trustee, Mr. Norton, the two of them are forced by circumstances to enter the Golden Day and remain there for some time. By chance, the Golden Day is filled with the shell-shocked veterans from the nearby asylum and their attendant, Supercargo, on their weekly 'therapy' visit. In view of the importance of naming in the novel,¹ the unusual name Ellison gives to the hospital attendant in charge of the vets seems deliberately selected as a sign of the thematic implications of the Golden Day scene.

The naming of Supercargo is used by Ellison to point both to the external social controls that structure American society and to the internal controls of the *Invisible Man*'s own developing consciousness. The name, Supercargo, has an immediate denotative meaning that Ellison would be aware of from his service in the Merchant Marine. According to the OED, the present definition of a supercargo is: "an officer on board a merchant ship whose business it is to superintend the cargo and the commercial transactions of the voyage." And, in now obsolete usage, the word refers to "an agent who superintended a merchant's business in a foreign country." Certainly in a very general sense, Ellison's Supercargo is handling cargo: black men whose ancestors were the slave cargo of many a commercial voyage. And, in keeping these men in line, he is an agent of the white society whose interests he represents. In its denotative meaning, 'supercargo' leads into the book's portrait of the relationship between white and black society.

Yet the commercial and nautical metaphors inherent in the name for the hospital attendant remain largely inert in the Golden Day scene itself. The events recounted there suggest instead that Ellison chose the name for its potential echoes: that is, he chose supercargo because it echoes superego. The two words differ in only one syllable, and the attendant clearly functions in the scene as the externalized superego for the veterans, who, for

reasons not wholly bad, do not regulate their thoughts or behavior by means of any internalized censor.² Ellison draws our attention to this function for his character through more than the choice of name: the comments of the vets, the conflicts in the scene, and the relation of the Golden Day episode to the novel's major thematic concerns all reinforce the verbal echoes between Supercargo and superego. This punning allusiveness in the name permits Ellison to create awareness of both the social forces that are internalized by the superego and the inner world of the narrator's consciousness. Through Supercargo as superego, Ellison externalizes the pattern that Freud sees operative within the individual personality, implies that it also operates as a social mechanism, and then returns us to the personal development of the Invisible Man, who, "on the lower frequencies," may speak for us.

In the Golden Day, one of the vets, described as "short, fat, and very intelligent-looking," refers to the attendant, Supercargo, as a "kind of censor," who is sent along with the vets "to see that the therapy fails."³ The suggestion that Supercargo should make us think of superego is also given credence by the language of the narrator's anxiety when he enters the Golden Day: "Supercargo, the white-uniformed attendant who usually kept the men quiet was nowhere to be seen. I didn't like it for when he was upstairs they had absolutely no inhibitions"(59). Supercargo is there to censor behavior; he is there to repress, to inhibit the expression of feelings or desires. This corresponds to the function of the superego as Freud defined it: "In the course of an individual's development a portion of the inhibiting forces in the external world are internalized and an agency is constructed in the ego which confronts the rest of the ego in an observing, criticizing and prohibiting sense. We call this new agency the superego."⁴ However, the veterans have not internalized the superego fully; it remains an external and visible censor, openly at odds with the ego and the id, and Ellison has made the state of tension between controller and controlled the dramatic focus of the chapter.

The comments of the vets further develop the superego-Supercargo identification. The source of the superego generally lies in the internalization of the supervisory role which the parents — specifically, for Freud, the father — played in the child's life: "The superego arises, as we know, from an identification with the father taken as model."⁵ Interestingly, the

veterans in the Golden Day have fathers on their minds. When the vets bring Mr. Norton into the house, one is cursing his own father (60). When Supercargo himself is down and the men kick him, a vet says in justification: "I'm 45 and he's been acting like he's my old man"(64). Both Supercargo and the white-haired Mr. Norton are linked with father figures by the vets; one calls the white trustee his grandfather: "'Gentlemen, this man is my grandfather!' 'But he's *white*, his name's Norton!' 'I should know my own grandfather' "(60).

And, obviously, the vet does know who his metaphorical grandfather is: both Mr. Norton, white trustee of an all black college, and Supercargo are father figures and representatives of the inhibiting and controlling force the white world exerts over the blacks. Though a black man himself, Supercargo is called "the white uniformed attendant," and when he first appears to quiet the unruly vets, the narrator says, "I hardly recognized him without his hard-starched white uniform"(63). Given the symbolic use of white and black throughout *Invisible Man*, (most notable in the Liberty Paints episode), the white uniform for the black attendant certainly implies that his authority symbolically derives from the white world. Supercargo's few words reveal his own sense of his role: "'I want order down there,' Supercargo boomed, 'and if there's white folks down there I wan's double order' "(63). But his power is broken, the white uniformed superego ineffective, perhaps because he has taken off his authoritative whiteness. The vets attack their censor, dragging him down the stairs and kicking him into unconsciousness. Mr. Norton protests, but the men are kicking Supercargo because he represents the white codes that Mr. Norton is speaking for. In response to Mr. Norton's protest, they say of Supercargo, "He's the white folks' man!"(64), and they begin jumping on him with both feet. The white man himself is somehow in the melee hurt and shoved unconscious under the stairwell. No direct assault is openly made against him, but his fortunes are tied to those of Supercargo.

As an agent of the white world among black vets Supercargo serves as a symbol of the authority and repressive censorship of the superego within the mind. And the mind's condition is a major issue in the scene. The vets are classified as insane. They say what they shouldn't; their ideas are illogical, irrational, absurd. Yet nothing in the scene indicates that we should support Supercargo's efforts at control. The release from his control is instead

to be sought. That Supercargo in this context is meant to suggest not merely the external but also an internal repression and control is most strikingly revealed by the vet named Sylvester. When urging the narrator to become involved in the overthrow of Supercargo, he says: " 'Try it, school-boy, it feels so good. It gives you relief.' . . . 'Sometimes I get so afraid of him I feel that he's inside my head. There!' he said, giving Supercargo another kick"(65). Later another vet links Mr. Norton too with the inner control of a man's mind: told that Mr. Norton is a trustee, he replies, " 'One of the very first, no doubt. . . . A trustee of consciousness' "(69).

As the scene at the Golden Day progresses, the narrator witnesses one of the vets, a former doctor, care for the injured Mr. Norton and act as if he were the white man's equal. This behavior shocks the narrator more than the treatment given Supercargo, because the boy whose experience is narrated has accepted the white man's evaluation of blacks: his white superego is in full control. He says in distress, "Men like us did not look at a man like Mr. Norton in that manner, and I stepped hurriedly forward"(69). The vet, he says, was "acting toward the white man with a freedom which could only bring on trouble"(71). The importance of the boy-narrator's fear and awe of the white man is that he has developed, through his attitude toward whites, a superego that is destructive of his own potential and identity. The doctor tries to explain to the narrator that the white world inhibits, controls, and destroys the humanity of black men: apparently quite sane, clearly an expert in his field (his diagnosis of Mr. Norton's special condition is recognized by the trustee as entirely correct), the doctor has been driven out of society (literally by the Ku Klux Klan) by the impossibility of living a life of human dignity as a black in the white world. But the Invisible Man does not at the time permit himself to understand the doctor's words. As the vet says, " 'He registers with his senses but short circuits his brain' "(72); " 'Already he's learned to repress not only his emotions but his humanity' "(72). And what the black narrator has accepted as the controlling and censoring agency in his life is, as the doctor again says, " 'That great false wisdom taught slaves and pragmatists alike, that white is right' "(73).

In the Golden Day episode, then, a group of insane black veterans beat up their attendant. Yet it is the narrator's superego, rather than their Supercargo, that is or should be challenged. His

loss of humanity and loss of identity have resulted from the internalization of the roles and values required of him in the largely white world. In the Epilogue, the narrator will at last see: "My problem was that I always tried to go in everyone's way but my own"(433). The Golden Day scene presents not merely riot and disorder, not merely the discharge of crazed hostility, but a necessary rejection of a superego that enforces white thinking on the black man and society's thinking on the individual. The vets, jubilantly, though temporarily, free themselves from Supercargo, but the Invisible Man needs the shocks of Bledsoe's letter, the job at Liberty Paints, and the Brotherhood's betrayal of Tod Clifton to free himself from the repressive, destructive control of his social censor, his white superego.

And yet Ellison's book, even in the Golden Day scene, speaks for whites as well as blacks. In the first three major episodes of the novel (Battle Royal, Jim Trueblood's dream, Golden Day), the dramatic confrontations involve the release of inhibitions and repressions, and in all three it is the abnormality and anxiety of *white* responses to natural desires, to the animal side of being human, that are most noticeable and disturbing. Mr. Norton, for example, has been made physically ill by the intensity of his interest in Jim Trueblood's story of incest, while Trueblood himself has accepted and dealt with his behavior in a healthy and responsible manner. The whites are the source of the superego that confines the Invisible Man in these early chapters, but they are not themselves freed from its repressions and prohibitions. In each scene, the black world is needed to act out for the white one a release from the censorious control that denies acceptance of the full range of humanity to the whites as well as to the blacks. In his essay, "Twentieth Century Fiction and the Black Mask of Humanity," Ellison has commented more generally upon this role for blacks: "The Negro stereotype is really an image of the unorganized, irrational forces of American life, forces through which, by projecting them in forms of images of an easily dominated minority, the white individual seeks to be at home in the vast unknown world of America."⁶ As well, we might add, as in the vast unknown world of himself.

In these early sections of *Invisible Man*, both Mr. Norton and the narrator are abstractions – god and slave, power and machine – rather than human beings. They have lost humanity by accepting the destructive conventional censor. Speaking of Huck Finn's decision to free Jim and "go to hell," Ellison has addressed in

another context the need to reject the social censor of the superego and restore the self to knowledge of the flux and fullness of complex human possibility: "And it will be noted that when Huck makes his decision he identifies himself with Jim and accepts the judgment of his superego — that internalized representative of the community — that his action is evil. Like Prometheus, who for mankind stole fire from the gods, he embraces the evil implicit in his act in order to affirm his belief in humanity. Jim, therefore, is not simply a slave, he is a symbol of humanity, and in freeing Jim, Huck makes a bid to free himself from the conventionalized evil taken for civilization by the town."⁷ So in the Golden Day scene, the author asks us to embrace the violence and disorder, the passion and desires that are unleashed by the vets as part of our humanity: in so doing, we free ourselves, and the 'therapy' available at the Golden Day will not be 'thwarted' by Supercargo.

FOOTNOTES

1. The thread of names suggesting Brer Rabbit and Brer Bear has been commented on by Floyd R. Horowitz, "Ralph Ellison's Modern Version of Brer Bear and Brer Rabbit in *Invisible Man*," *Midcontinent American Studies Journal* 4:2 (1963): pp. 21-27, reprinted in *Twentieth Century Interpretations of Invisible Man*, ed. John M. Reilly (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1970), pp. 32-38. Most of the names in the novel are significant, to the point that the narrator himself will gloss the name Rinehart and will himself go unnamed to indicate his lack of self-knowledge. In this regard, Ralph Ellison's essay, "Hidden Name and Complex Fate," in *Shadow and Act* (New York: Random House, 1964), pp. 144-66, especially 147-52, is informative.

2. In "The Strange Silence of Ralph Ellison," *California English Journal* 1:2 (1965): pp. 63-38, reprinted *Twentieth Century Interpretations of Invisible Man*, pp. 106-10: Richard D. Lehan has also suggested the identification of Supercargo and superego, though he does not treat the Golden Day scene in detail. He feels, as I do not, that the Freudian implications are part of an overwrought and unsuccessful structure of symbolism in the novel.

3. Ralph Ellison, *Invisible Man* (New York: Vintage-Random House, 1972), p. 62. All further references to the novel will be to this edition, more easily available than the first (New York: Random House, 1952), and page numbers will be cited parenthetically in the text.

4. Sigmund Freud, "Moses and Monotheism," *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, vol. 23, trans. James Strachey (London: Hogarth Press, 1964), p. 116.

5. Freud, "The Ego and the Id," *Works*, vol. 19, trans. Joan Riviere (London: Hogarth Press, 1961), p. 54.

6. *Shadow and Act*, p. 41.

7. "Twentieth Century Fiction and the Black Mask of Humanity," *Shadow and Act*, pp. 31-32.

THE IMPERTINENT

A wild and white plum tree,
Later to be green,
Arrested me that day.
Under the fickle spring sun
I watched the petals snow.

Tender fruitlets,
Should they escape the pinch,
Might later grace the thorny lines
With puckery yield –
Scant pay for a season's patience.
Or so it seemed to me
As I, under the cloud,
Forecast meagerness ahead.

In summer's fullness
I stopped again.
The pebbly fruits,
Those tiny plums,
Had defied each adversity
Of frost and wind and rain.

To what end, I fretted,
Should nature clasp these pips,
Sourish stones,
And drop so many sweets?

No oracle, surly or polite,
Nodded at my impertinence.

James R. Bailey

THEODORE ROETHKE: DIONYSIAN POET OF NATURE

The Roman Catholic theologian and literary critic, Father Willaim Lynch, has noted that there are two extremes of literary imagination in our time, one which exploits the "real" in order to produce a mystical vision of the transcendent,¹ and another which faces the facts of the real in order to produce a vision of the world as "a kind of Hell revisited."² The exploiters of the real are those writers of angelic imagination, whose chief ambition is to see visions and to dream dreams, to live, as it were, in an unworldly paradise. The facers of the facts, on the other hand, are those writers of mundane imagination, whose chief ambition is to describe the world in all its ugliness and contingency, to usher before the mind of the reader an image of life as depraved and hopeless.

I wish to suggest, however, that there is still a third type of literary imagination in our time, and that this type of imagination is exemplified in the work of the modern American poet, Theodore Roethke. Roethke, I shall be suggesting, was neither an exploiter of the real nor a facer of fact. Rather, he was a poet who perceived that the world, in spite of its ugliness and contingency, was also a place of beauty, mystery, and worth; and that the man who could learn to contemplate this beauty, mystery, and worth would find himself in the final analysis a happy man.

Roethke was born in 1908 in Saginaw, Michigan. The poet was of German heritage, his paternal grandfather having immigrated to America in 1870 from East Prussia, where he had been Bismarck's head forester. In Saginaw the grandfather started a florticulture establishment, a business which he handed down to his two sons, Charles and Otto (the latter being the poet's father). When the business was at its height, around 1920, "it took up twenty-five acres within the city of Saginaw with a quarter of a million feet under glass."³ Roethke remembered fondly throughout his life his childhood experiences in and around the greenhouses, turning again and again to these experiences as subject and inspiration for his poetry. Indeed, in one of his last published poems he writes:

In my mind's eye I see those fields of glass,
As I looked out at them from the high house,

Riding beneath the moon, hid from the moon,
Then slowly breaking whiter in the dawn;
When George the watchman's lantern dropped from sight
The long pipes knocked: it was the end of night.
I'd stand upon my bed, a sleepless child
Watching the waking of my father's world. —
O world so far away! O my lost world!⁴

In 1922, Charles and Otto Roethke had a dispute which resulted in their selling of the family-owned business. Shortly thereafter Charles committed suicide, and Otto fell ill, dying in 1923. Two years later, Roethke entered the University of Michigan, beginning an academic career that eventually took him to Harvard (as a graduate student) and to a number of other colleges and universities (Lafayette, Penn State, Bennington, the University of Washington) as a professor of literature. In the course of his career as a poet, Roethke published nine volumes, and won all the major awards that are offered in the field of poetry on the American scene (including the Pulitzer Prize, in 1954). At his death in 1963, he left over one-hundred fifty notebooks filled with poems in progress. Many of these notebooks have now been edited and published by David Wagoner, himself a poet, who was for a number of years Roethke's colleague at the University of Washington.

Roethke's biography affords a harvest for seekers of literary gossip. He was a brilliant man who was also at times something of a ring-tailed roarer. Recounting the unpredictability of Roethke's moods, Mark Van Doren spoke of having received an invitation to a party which Roethke was giving in a hotel suite in New York City. Upon arriving at the party, Van Doren was surprised to see the rooms decorated with dozens of roses, many of them still in their boxes, with Roethke himself dressed in his underwear and an old bathrobe. The climax came when Roethke dashed to a window, threw it open, and threatened to push his guests out one by one. In the next few minutes there was a quiet but steady exodus as Roethke's guests eased along the wall and out the door.

But there are also many stories of Roethke's kindness and generosity, his gusto for life and his capacity for hard work. Unfortunately, he spent a number of his days in mental hospitals, suffering from what his doctors diagnosed as manic-depression. In spite of the debilitation and humiliation of these episodes, however, he seems to have written poetry every day of his adult life. It gave a fillip to his pride, says Roethke's biographer,

Allan Seager, to identify with other "mad" poets of the English language, such as Christopher Smart, John Clare, and William Blake, who in spite of their handicaps created works of great permanence.⁵

In attempting to define what comprises the permanence of Roethke's work, we may begin by citing a passage from a late poem titled "The Far Field":

I dream of journeys repeatedly:
Of flying like a bat deep into a narrowing tunnel,
Of driving alone, without luggage, out a long peninsula,
The road lined with a snow-laden second growth,
A fine dry snow ticking the windshield,
Alternate snow and sleet, no on-coming traffic,
And no lights behind, in the blurred side-mirror,
The road changing from glazed tarface to a rubble of stone,
Ending at last in a hopeless sand-rut,
Where the car stalls,
Churning in a snowdrift
Until the headlights darken.⁶

Throughout his career Roethke was haunted by thoughts of death. "I dream of journeys repeatedly," the poet proclaims. But these are often journeys to places where tunnels are narrowing, where roads are ending in a moment of cold and final darkness. In speaking of his own fears of death, however, the poet attained that universality which is the hallmark of great art. He seems to have captured a mood that has beset many modern men. It is a mood that is closely bound to a certain religious despair, the despair of not having anything ultimate to believe in anymore. In an attempt to describe the cultural context out of which this despair rises, the theologian Gordon D. Kaufman has written:

Our forefathers had a sense of God's continuous providential guidance of history as a whole and of their individual destinies in particular; they found their lives meaningful because they were lived within the context of God's purposes, each man having his own unique place and task. But such meaning as most men of our time find is the this-worldly humanly created meaning emergent from ordinary social intercourse and/or cultural activity. For some this loss of a transcendent source and purpose has reduced human life to meaninglessness and absurdity, a pointless and empty burden simply to be endured (Beckett); others react with bitterness and revulsion (Sartre); still others seem to find sufficient satisfaction in their daily round of activities, punctuated occasionally by aesthetic experience or unusual excitement, not to miss or lament the dimensions

of depth and transcendence and mystery in which previous generations found their lives ensconced. But in any case the radical "eclipse of God" (Buber) or even the final irretrievable "death of God" (Nietzsche) appears to be the most momentous theological fact of our age.⁷

On the basis of the darker moods of his poetry, some readers have been tempted to view Roethke as a prime spokesman for the theme of the *eclipse of God*.⁸ I submit, however, that it was these moods which prompted him to seek and express an alternative to this theme. In a speech which he presented at Northwestern University only a few months before his death, Roethke declared:

. . . there is a God, and He's here, immediate, accessible. He is accessible now, not only in works of art or in the glories of a particular religious service, or in the light, the aftermath that follows the dark night of the soul, but in the lowest forms of life, He moves and has His being. Nobody has killed off the snails.⁹

The poet went on to observe that the idea that God is present and alive in all things is hardly a new thought. But he insisted that this idea is nevertheless one that "needs some practicing in Western thought."¹⁰ The religious view that Roethke advocated as an alternative to the theme of the *eclipse of God* is what may be described in traditional metaphysical terms as *panentheism*. In our immediate discussion, however, I shall characterize the religious view that emerges in Roethke's work as a Dionysian view.

Dionysus was a strange and wild god of Greek mythology. He seems to have originated in Thrace, where he was a god of fertility and the power of nature. On Greek soil he became associated with metamorphosis, which is associated with the cycle of the seasons. The worship of Dionysus was literally enthusiastic; it involved ecstasy, license, revelry, and direct participation by eating in the life of the dying and reborn god. In the ecstasy induced by revelry and dancing the worshippers lost their own personalities and were merged with Dionysus. Thus the boundaries separating man, nature, and the divine were abolished.

The counterpart of Dionysus was Apollo.¹¹ He was the god who most fully incarnates the ideals we associate with classical Greek thought: the god of the ego, of light, youth, purity, reasonableness, order, discipline and balance. Wisdom in the Apol-

lonian tradition consisted of learning the rules and boundaries and in distinguishing with clarity between that which belongs to mortality and that which is immortal, between the knowable and the unknowable, the possible and the impossible, man and God. The happy man, having learned the proper limits of humanity, followed the way of moderation and sought to govern the rebellious forces of the senses and the wayward imagination by the imposition of discipline.

Now, Roethke, as a modern follower of the Dionysian way, is concerned to break down the boundaries that separate the ego, or the personality, from all the subhuman things and creatures of the earth. We may briefly contrast him in this concern with a poet such as Robert Frost, who, as a poet of nature, requires to be conceived as primarily a follower of the Apollonian way. In a poem such as Frost's "Stopping by Woods on a Snowy Evening," for example, the speaker stands on the verge of the woods looking in. I do not adhere to the interpretation of this poem (often associated with Lionel Trilling) which asserts that the speaker is contemplating suicide. I suggest, rather, that he is contemplating the abandonment of the civilized for the primitive, of security for risk, of order for chaos, of reason for ecstasy, of responsibility for no responsibility. Even though the speaker recognizes that the woods, as a symbol for the Dionysian way, "are lovely, dark and deep," he is restrained by his sense of obligation within the human or social world from pursuing the beckoning mystery of the woods:

The woods are lovely, dark and deep,
But I have promises to keep,
And miles to go before I sleep,
And miles to go before I sleep.¹²

As a poet of the Apollonian way, Frost grasps the ideal of reasonableness and by force of will imposes it upon the primitive impulse to lose one's personality, to surrender oneself to an immanent life-force that is everywhere and always present and active within the creation.

Roethke, on the other hand, as a follower of the Dionysian way, will not be content until he enters the world of nature. He wishes to immerse himself as fully as possible in the creation, to seek an imaginative identification of the "I" with the "not-I." Both technically and emotionally this is a high-risk venture, and I propose to mention briefly the technical and emotional character

of this risk.

Technically, the poetic brooding on forms of life remote from our own, such as Roethke practices, has traditionally been directed by a presiding appetite for analogy. The literary critic, John Wain, aptly describes this technical matter as it relates to Roethke:

“Even as” the flower or bird does such-and-such, the poet himself does so-and-so. The nightingale comforts the ailing Keats because it is a type of the immortality of art; individual nightingales die, but since they all repeat the same song through century after century, they belong to a world of art that is immune to decay and death.¹³

But Roethke’s meditations, Wain elaborates, are not analogical. The participation they celebrate purports to be entirely immediate. This technique of composition presents special problems to the reader, for we are caught up in the poet’s immediate ruminations as he shuttles back and forth in time from the present moment even to the creation’s beginnings. A prime example of this method of composition occurs in a final passage from a poem titled “Praise to the End!”:

Arch of air, my heart’s original knock,
I’m awake all over:
I’ve crawled from the mire, alert as a saint or a dog;
I know the back-stream’s joy, and the stone’s eternal pulseless longing,
Felicity I cannot hoard.
My friend, the rat in the wall, brings me the clearest messages;
I bask in the bower of change;
The plants wave me in, and the summer apples;
My palm-sweat flashes gold;
Many astounds before, I lost my identity to a pebble;
The minnows love me, and the humped and spitting creatures.

I believe! I believe! —
In the sparrow, happy on gravel;
In the winter-wasp, pulsing its wings in the sunlight;
I have been somewhere else; I remember the sea-faced uncles.
I hear, clearly, the heart of another singing,
Lighter than bells,
Softer than water.

Wherefore, O birds and small fish, surround me.
Lave me, ultimate waters.
The dark showed me a face.
My ghosts are all gay.
The light becomes me.¹⁴

If the technical risk of such poetry is that the poet defies or defeats the reader's understanding, the emotional risk is that the poet practically loses a sense of his own identity. He is little more than a consciousness which speaks through the things and creatures he is describing. We are here at the heart of the Dionysian view of man. The poet as follower of the wild god breaks down the boundaries, abolishes the *principium individuationis*, substituting for it the unity of the self with nature. But we may properly ask, if the boundaries established by the self are to be broken down in order that direct participation in the divine power which pervades all may be experienced, what of the self who remains the focus of experience? This is precisely the problem which stands at the center of the Dionysian view of man. The Dionysian way is unable to offer an adequate doctrine of the person. The breakthrough of the self into nature is also a break-up of the self. It imposes on the poet a terrible burden, for he is ever on the edge of what Rimbaud described as the systematic *dérèglement de tous les sens*. "One does not know whether to rejoice with the poems or sympathize with the poet." It seems certain that the disintegration which bore strange and marvelous fruits in Roethke's poetry also caused tragic breakdowns in his life.¹⁵ And it is not surprising to see him in the late phases of his career tending to moderate his acceptance of the Dionysian way.

But even with this moderation, what prevails in Roethke's work as in no other modern poet of my acquaintance is a sense of empathy with the things of this world. We find in him what Albert Schweitzer would have identified as a *reverence for life*, a profound sense of partnership with the whole of creation. An instance of this sense of partnership is expressed in a poem titled "The Meadow Mouse":

In a shoe box stuffed in an old nylon stocking
 Sleeps a baby mouse I found in the meadow,
 Where he trembled and shook beneath a stick
 Till I caught him up by the tail and brought him in,
 Cradled in my hand,
 A little quaker, the whole body of him trembling,
 His absurd whiskers sticking out like a cartoon-mouse,
 His feet like small leaves,
 Little lizard-feet,
 Whitish and spread wide when he tried to struggle away,
 Wriggling like a miniscule puppy.

Now he's eaten his three kinds of cheese and drunk from his
 bottle-cap watering-trough —

So much he just lies in one corner,
His tail curled under him, his belly big
As his head; his bat-like ears
Twitching, tilting toward the least sound.

Do I imagine he no longer trembles
When I come close to him?
He seems no longer to tremble.

But this morning the shoe-box house on the back porch is empty.
Where has he gone, my meadow mouse,
My thumb of a child that nuzzled in my palm? —
To run under the hawk's wing,
Under the eye of the great owl watching from the elm-tree,
To live by courtesy of the shrike, the snake, the tom-cat.

I think of the nestling fallen into the deep grass,
The turtle gasping in the dusty rubble of the highway,
The paralytic stunned in the tub, and the water rising, —
All things innocent, hapless, forsaken.¹⁶

Roethke was not a poet to blink the cruelty, the pathos, the haplessness of existence. It is a world in which the mouse lives under the shadow of the hawk's wing, in which the paralytic lies stunned in the tub, the water rising. But neither was he a poet to react simply with bitterness and revulsion to the inexplicable character of fate. Roethke's poetic legacy is a basic optimism about the divine character of nature itself in an age in which many of us have lost the ability to live with nature, to comprehend its greatness, or feel its power. His desire to live with nature recalls an anecdote by the theologian, Paul Tillich:

A Chinese emperor asked a famous painter to paint a picture of a rooster for him. The painter assented, but said that it would take a long time. After a year the emperor reminded him of his promise. The painter replied that after a year of studying the rooster he had just begun to perceive the surface of its nature. After another year the artist asserted that he had just begun to penetrate the essence of this kind of life. And so on, year after year. Finally, after ten years of concentration on the nature of the rooster, he painted the picture — a work described as an inexhaustible revelation of the divine ground of the universe in one small part of it, a rooster.¹⁷

We may compare the emperor's wise patience and the painter's saintly contemplation of an infinitely small expression of the divine life with the patience and wisdom of a poet such as Roethke. What his poetry says to those of us who are exploiters

of the real or facers of fact is that the whole of life is "a field of revelation"¹⁸ to those who have the ears to hear and the eyes to see. It was not within Roethke's vocation as a poet to express his vision in theological formulae. In one of the last and finest poems of his career, however, the poet seems to have expressed the attitude towards the whole of life to which his art had all along been intending. We conclude with a quotation of the last lines of Roethke's magnificent "The Abyss," in which the poet's happiness seems wholly earned and wholly credible:

I thirst by day. I watch by night.
I receive! I have been received!
I hear the flowers drinking in their light,
I have taken counsel of the crab and the sea-urchin,
I recall the falling of small waters,
The stream slipping beneath the mossy logs,
Winding down to the stretch of irregular sand,
The great logs piled like matchsticks.

I am most immoderately married:
The Lord God has taken my heaviness away;
I have merged, like the bird, with the bright air,
And my thought flies to the place by the bo-tree.

Being, not doing, is my first joy.¹⁹

FOOTNOTES

¹*Christ and Apollo* (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1960), p. 8.

²*Ibid.*, p. 11.

³Theodore Roethke, *Selected Letters of Theodore Roethke*, ed. Ralph J. Mills, Jr. (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1968), p. 253.

⁴*The Collected Poetry of Theodore Roethke* (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1966), p. 225 — hereafter cited as *CP*.

⁵*The Glass House: The Life of Theodore Roethke* (New York: McGraw-Hill Company, 1968), p. 224.

⁶*CP*, p. 199.

⁷*Transcendence*, eds. Herbert W. Richardson and Donald R. Cutler (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969), p. 114.

⁸See, for example, *Critical Issues in Modern Religion*, ed. Roger A. Johnson (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1973), pp. 444-55.

⁹"On 'Identity,'" *On the Poet and His Craft: Selected Prose of Theodore Roethke* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1965), p. 27.

¹⁰*Ibid.*

¹¹For a brief but apt treatment of Roethke in light of the Dionysus-Apollo dyad, see Monroe K. Spears, *Dionysus and the City* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), pp. 247-50.

¹²*Complete Poems of Robert Frost* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1961), p. 275.

13“The Monocle of My Sea-faced Uncle,” *Theodore Roethke: Essays on the Poetry*, ed. Arnold Stein (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1965), p. 62.

14CP, p. 88.

15Stephen Spender, “The Objective Ego,” *Theodore Roethke: Essays on the Poetry*, p. 8.

16CP, p. 227.

17*The Shaking of the Foundations* (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1948), pp. 79-80.

18“Unfold! Unfold!” CP, p. 90.

19CP, p. 222.

AFTERNOON BACKPORCHED

When late evening comes
Before seven,
Bringing its layered
Nostalgias,
And nothing is ready
To take in body warm nights,
And skin warmed lunchsack days....
Early daylilies relax green fists
Into long piano-player's hands.

Nostrils, empty of the smell of charcoaled steak
For a season seven years long,
Sweat roses in sniffs,
Lazy whiffs of remember.

Second times mix
A complex harmony –
Ragtime syncopations,
Sophistications on a theme.

Reverberations fine tune,
Add the middle ranges,
Rest,
For the tension shadowed
Detail
In the Wholes.

– Kathleen Mattos Wooley

TEXTURES

Sunlight slides under the curtain
Over sheets turned back,
And across the floor,
Awakening oriental patterns
In its way.

Sunlit brass is not a solid
But a water-worked host of reflections
Imprisoned within an arbitrary shape,
Around which kings with staves
Or flowers
March or flow or stand.

Intensities
Cannot stay,
But move in an exchange of shape.

Touched by sun,
Shadows
Intensify the surface,
And go.

— *Kathleen Mattos Wooley*

THOUGHTS ABOUT MY PARENTS

Once, I never knew the poignant
Weightlessness
Of their evanescence.

Standing about holding drinks
And laughing,
Or reading newspapers
Or paperback books in bed,
They appeared
Material enough.

— *Kathleen Mattos Wooley*

Michael F. Rothgery

LEOPOLD VON RANKE

In his book *Debates with Historians*, Pieter Geyl suggests, through an ambivalent characterization penned by Lord Acton of Leopold Von Ranke (1795-1886), that he stands as “ ‘ . . . the representative of the age which instituted the modern study of history. He taught it to be critical, to be colourless and to be new. We meet him at every step, and he has done more for us than any other man.’ ” Few deny the significance of Von Ranke’s contribution to the discipline of history. His prolific scholarship includes his *History of the Popes*, *German History in the Times of the Reformation in Germany*, *A History of France*, *A History of England*, and in his declining years the unfinished *World History*. A perusal of his *History of England* reveals the contributions of Von Ranke.

The historiographical principles which guided Leopold Von Ranke in the writing of the *History of England* are the basis for much of modern historiography. He contributed to the discipline of history by his emphasis on the importance of objectivity, his use of primary sources, and more significantly his critical employment of them. In addition to these principles, he believed in a universal view of the course of history and he further developed the concept of historicism (later defined in this essay).

Von Ranke was a firm believer that history should accurately reveal the past (*wie es eigentlich gewesen*). This principle was the guiding aim for him in his work. Certainly Ranke’s idea of history as revealing what actually happened was not new, but his approach and his eschewing all other purposes were new. In contrast with the Romantics, who like Ranke wanted to resurrect the past, he sought to approach such a task with detachment. Romantics like Jules Michelet (1798-1874) imposed their enthusiasms and prejudices on the period they were studying. Ranke’s purpose was to obtain an impartial view of the past. For Von Ranke “the strict presentation of the facts, contingent and unattractive though they may be, was undoubtedly the supreme law.”

Whatever Von Ranke’s beliefs or intents, it is obvious that total objectivity is neither possible nor desirable. The absolute

separation of writer and judge from his work denies the discipline of its real interest. In the mere selection of facts and in their arrangement Von Ranke imposed his own order on his history reflecting his bias. It is also clear that Von Ranke was moved by other convictions: e.g., his reaction to the French Revolution and his belief in God's role in the processes of history conditioned by his Lutheran faith. Conservative in his political beliefs, Von Ranke resisted the pure power policy and tendency to totalitarianism contained in revolutionary ideas. Despite his claims to objectivity, he was guided in explaining historical development by his belief that God's handiwork was apparent in history. For Von Ranke "history is religion" or at any rate, there was a connection between them. For Von Ranke all human activity of intellectual importance originated in some way from God. So too, the political life of all nations was guided by religious ideas. Von Ranke wrote ". . . the ecclesiastical element in English history appears at every step."

The German historian sought out the facts through extensive use of primary sources and, more significantly, in the use of archival materials. He worked untiringly in the archives of Berlin, Vienna, Paris, Rome, and Venice. The result of this work was the turning up of a vast amount of diplomatic correspondence. His extensive use of these materials helps to explain his nearly exclusive interest in political and diplomatic history. His use of these sources also gave him a greater understanding of the balance of power politics in Europe. Von Ranke believed that each State in its rivalry and conflict kept the European community and civilization in being. Examples of such diplomatic correspondence appear in his *History of England*, both in his citations in the narrative and in his appendix which is a critical analysis of his source material. Although Ranke's reliance on these sources was greater than that of previous historians, the utilization of this primary material was not new. Von Ranke's most significant contribution was in the way he used them.

In order to discover whether these primary materials were accurate, Von Ranke subjected them to criticism. In reviewing a document, he attempted to seek out the "personal equation," writes Harry Elmer Barnes in his *History of Historical Writing*. The Germans call this "Author-Kritik." In other words, Ranke sought to understand the "personality, tendencies, activities and opportunities" of the author of the document. In this way Ranke established one of the guiding principles of modern historiography.

Ranke used two contemporary accounts by the English historians Clarendon and Gilbert Burnet in writing his *History of England*. In using these sources he was critical of their motives. Ranke asserted that although Clarendon's "... sketches of character are unequalled in the English language: they are by no means free from political colouring and party bias." He also charged that Burnet had changed the second draft of his *History of His Own Times* because of "deliberate ill will against the Tories." Ranke sums up Burnet's history as "... a strange mixture of rumor and error with knowledge and truth, of credulous partiality and the effort to be impartial." Ranke ultimately rejects the objective truth of Burnet's facts. Two other forms of criticism used by Ranke were *Dokument-Kritik* (assessing the genuineness of a document) and *Sack-Kritik* (assessing the credibility of what is reported).

Fritz Stern, in his *Varieties of History*, suggests that Ranke's stress on the importance of accurate factual data has led some critics, like the Anglo-American historians, to accuse him of *particularism* (overemphasis on fact and scientific inquiry). Stern further points out that these critics have forgotten Ranke's "own insistence on a universal history." Ranke wrote "... the discipline of history — at its highest — is itself called upon, and is able, to lift itself in its own fashion from the investigation and observation of particulars to a universal view of events." In his *History of England* Ranke looked upon James II's attempts to re-introduce Catholicism as "... a definite stage in the general struggle" in Europe in 1688. Furthermore, Ranke observed that the internal conflict in England "... thus lost its insular character and entered into connexion with the great religious and political conflict which then in various ways divided Europe, and appears as an essential part of it." Ranke did not merely lay before the reader the bare facts, but he sought to discover the connexions between them. Significantly, Ranke was aware of the interrelatedness of the affairs of Europe. Ranke refers to the states and empires of Europe as belonging "... to the general community of peoples of the west."

Another principle used by Von Ranke was his belief that history was a continual process of development. This concept is known as *historicism*. This idea had guided the Romantics and was further developed by Ranke. *Historicism* replaced the appeal to reason with an appeal to history. Borrowing from the Romantics Von Ranke rejected the classicist emphasis on reason "... as a

motive force and as the instrument for the unravelling of the process of history." Ranke asserted that each age and nation had its own characteristics and is dominated by a prevalent set of ideas (*Zeitgeist*), but the developments of each age had an "organic cohesion and a continuity" with the past. Ranke wrote that "... the events have been irrevocably prepared by the past, and developed then by their own impulses." With this concept in mind, Ranke could conclude that William III's position was a further development of the position of Queen Elizabeth almost 100 years earlier.

Ranke's concept of historical development also emphasized the role of ideas in history. Pieter Geyl implies that it is here that we touch on Ranke's inspiring value to the study of history. In Ranke's description of the House of Orange, he relates that the conflicts of great ideas helped determine the course of personal ambition of its princes. The historian further points out that the relation of Protestant and Catholic ideas decided the course of all of England's foreign affairs and by extension the idea of balance of power.

His most serious weakness resulted from his over-dependence on primary sources. In this sense he restricted himself to political and diplomatic history. Consequently, he neglected the areas of economic and social history where there were fewer reliable sources.

Despite these shortcomings, Ranke still stands as the master of historical scholarship. G. P. Gooch, in his *History and Historians in the Nineteenth Century*, succinctly states that Ranke "... was the greatest historical writer of modern times, not only because he founded the scientific study of materials and possessed in an unrivaled degree the judicial temper, but because his powers of work and length of life enabled him to produce a larger number of first-rate works than any other member of the craft."

COLLECTION

Thru the pool
of time
I have travelled
collecting pebbles
of knowledge
and friendships
and storing them
in the secret spots
of mind and heart.
Waiting for someone
to exchange them
with
(like bubble gum cards)
gathering and storing.
until the collection is complete.

Joseph Epolito

SPIRO

A fellow named Spiro
Ofttimes was considered a hero;
But they looked at his taxes
And sharpened their axes —
Now Spiro, the hero, is zero.

James K. Ray

“RUFF”

An old sociological adage, now seldom discussed, points out the very positive effect on children of the negative exemplars of public and private decorum. My socialization and that of other children in my small home town was thus affected. During our formative years we were positively and frighteningly influenced by these examples of “the bad seed.” One of them was Mr. Ruff Sollins.

“Rah, rah Ruff, rah, rah Ruff,” screamed the children as they ran from the pock-marked, red-gray faced and obviously inebriated Mr. Rollins. “Ruff,” as he was commonly and amiably called by his fellow townspeople, was a man of middle stature, of some slight obesity, of alcoholically deteriorating physique, and of chronically unemployed status, who lived, yes, who literally lived, in the loft of a boathouse alongside the village wharf. That he never fell into the deep cold water and drowned could only have been providential – perhaps he was being preserved for the socially useful role he was playing as the character “whom *not* to become like ” as we kids passed from childhood to late adolescence.

“Ruff” had the misfortune not only to be a victim of alcoholism, but also to have this disease in the nobly experimental Prohibition era! With legal beverages unattainable and with Canadian and domestic bootleg liquor occasionally bringing blindness or death, impecunious “Ruff” was forced to buy “canned heat,” Sterno, which is still used to heat carafes and fondu pans. With this and other poisons of his preference, which must have had an absolutely devastating effect upon his internal organs and processes, “Ruff” fed his habit. So it was, then, that unbelievably though innocently cruel children would taunt and tantalize this sad hulk of misbegotten humanity. And because he had another weakness, namely that as he became intoxicated, his stuttering became more pronounced, the children would devilishly mimic his speech impairment and he would angrily chase them in his towering but largely impotent rage and frustration. Who knows? Perhaps this attention by these pint-sized tormentors was a kind of recognition of the peculiar niche he occupied in our sober, puritanical, self-righteous village as “that horrid old village drunk!”

I have often wondered whatever became of "Ruff" because some of us certainly owe him a kind of debt — some would say he left us a malignant heritage at that — a debt of gratitude for personally exhibiting how far a person can fall when alcohol is his master and how hellish the young pimple-faced hounds of heaven can be in their ridicule and debasement of an unfortunate human being.

Today "Ruff" would, of course, be recognized as someone needing medical and psychiatric assistance and the strong empathic support of the "significant others" of a local A.A. chapter or similar group. But in the days of my youth he was thought of as just another cast-off and wretched derelict of small-town society where every citizen's foibles and virtues were catalogued in the minds of morally unbending Yankee townfolk.

THOUGHTS ON TEACHING AND LEARNING

From the Teacher to the Learner:
Self-Discovery is Learning, too

I am continuing to discover who I am. Some of what I am, I like and want to keep. Some of what I am, I would like to change and I will and can change! Some of what I am I cannot change. Since I am discovering who I am, I perceive that you are discovering things about yourself, too. Let's decide together that we will respect each others' needs to discover, to grow, to change. This inherent need to discover ourselves should be a unifying bond among us, and an enriching learning experience.

Let the learners teach today!

The Teacher is a Learner

When I teach, I want to learn something. If none of my students create anything new and different, I get bored. If no students say, "Gee, I never thought of that before," I feel disappointed. If no student says to me, "Wait one minute, I don't know if I agree with that," I get careless with my own opinions. Fortunately, I have not had much chance to get bored, disappointed, or careless!

Teaching is not a job or an occupation; it is a relationship, a way of thinking, a way of being.

William T. Hamilton

NOTES FROM A SABBATICAL JOURNAL

My sabbatical in the fall of 1972 was devoted to the study of the city – in literature and in reality. I kept a journal, but in the desultory way I find so objectionable in my students, not in the orderly write-something-everyday fashion I so sincerely recommend. The following is a selection from that journal. I haven't included every note I made, nor have I hesitated to revise and update some of the ideas I've continued to think about.

I spent much of my sabbatical in two cities in which I lived a large part of my childhood – Washington and London. They are unquestionably great cities, particularly London, but they are not, I think, being particularly well treated by the passage of time. So my nostalgia about these places was made somewhat melancholy (as nostalgia usually is) by a sense of loss. There is, I believe, a kind of centrifugal force in the modern city, in modern life generally, that threatens any entity as delicate as a human community.

Significantly, the fall of 1972 was a political season, and, though my journal doesn't always reflect it, I was aware that an election was going on. Politics is of central importance in the fate of the city, and it seems to me hard to look back on that election without feeling that our system demonstrated a kind of moral and ideological bankruptcy that fall. What can the men who won be said to believe, if they were prepared to behave in the ways they apparently did? And what can be said of an opposition that could not effectively oppose such men?

The idealism that built Washington, that animates much of the American literature that speaks of the city, was profoundly absent in the political city of 1972. Politics and community – they are in a sense synonyms – are terms with moral imperatives behind them. The contemporary problem is to find a new moral dimension to the planning of human communities, or to rediscover the old ones.

September 23, 1972
Dupont Circle, Washington, D.C.

Sitting on a bench in the circle. This is my second day in Washington: it took longer to get organized and out of Westerville than I had hoped. It is going to take awhile to get this journal moving in useful directions, but I am beginning to see what I can accomplish on this sabbatical. The question boils down to what extent the city — this city — is livable for me, and how far my experience is applicable to any one else.

A couple of observations so far. I am staying with Dick and Dot McKinney, Otterbein graduates who live on Capitol Hill, perhaps ten blocks from the capitol. I have wanted to believe that the crime problem in this city was exaggerated: after all, as much as I have a hometown, this is it, and one wants to believe that one's home is livable. So far the evidence is not good. The McKinneys, with John Muster, have bought an attractive old town house which they are remodelling in a very imaginative way. The locks on the doors are among the most impressive features. An old man was beaten and robbed of his watch across the street from their house at two o'clock in the afternoon the day before I arrived. Dot never goes out at night by herself, Dick seldom. It takes Dot fifty minutes to an hour to get home from her job here at the Circle: a distance of about three miles.

On the other hand there is this circle. Several great avenues converge here — Massachusetts, probably the most important diplomatic address in the world, Connecticut, etc. An interesting piece of sculpture — a fountain — forms the center of the circle. It is a place of incredible life: students, office workers, tourists. On this cool but sunny autumn afternoon, the benches are nearly all full. I suppose there are pickpockets around, but a crime more violent than that seems highly unlikely: there are too many witnesses.

It is probably a sign of our times that I've begun thinking about the city in terms of urban crime. The "typical" urban crime is probably mugging: a peculiarly unpleasant form of assault of person and property. I suppose there is plenty of scholarship on the causes of such crime, but it ought to be possible to imagine the motives, on the assumption that both the mugger and I are human, swept by the same passions, or perhaps merely bored by the same modern condition.

What, then, from the base of pure speculation, might be the motives of a mugger?

1. Excitement. For the kid in the city, mugging must offer some of the challenge of hunting or fishing: a demonstration of courage, prowess, and strength. If we're inclined to think it doesn't take much courage to beat up an old man, how much does it take to shoot a deer? We have whole battalions of middle-aged suburbanites arguing for the character-building qualities of squirrel-hunting and a real shortage of apologists for mugging.

2. A need for money. If you're in debt, need a fix, a new pair of tires, a turtleneck sweater, whatever — a quick hit and you may be able to raise what you need.

3. I'm inclined to think that both of these motives are pretty powerful, but I don't think that they cover the ground. There is also obviously a strong sense of injustice operating in a ghetto teenager. Society does little or nothing for you, so why should you observe its guidelines, which were not designed for your benefit anyway? Anti-social (the word is exactly right) behavior becomes a way of striking out at the enemy.

These may be very literary motives, and they may be quite wrong. What is troublesome is that, in spite of the attention politicians give to "crime-in-the-streets" as an issue, little attention is paid to these — or any other — motives. What if we started at this end in trying to reduce crime in American cities? How would we proceed?

1. Excitement. Could we create living environments that were so interesting that no one needed to resort to interpersonal violence simply as a way of achieving a thrill? If we could, we might solve other problems as well.

2. The financial motive. With the will, this would be the easiest to solve. This is a profligate society. Our generosity to such institutions as Lockheed and Penn Central must be winning us points in *some* paradise. Why not simply set up inner-city loan offices, federally financed, where you could borrow up to fifty dollars on your signature? We no doubt would lose some money, but crime is expensive too. And, as a loyal and indebted member of the middle class, I'm aware of a strange thing: how responsible and socially respectable a big burden of debt makes one. Who knows where I'd be without a mortgage and an outstanding balance on my BankAmericard?

3. The sense of injustice. By the far the toughest. This requires, somehow, that we create in the most down-trodden a sense of participation in "national goals." In this election year, we seem farther from ever from doing so: we seem to have no such goals worthy of the name.

Monday, September 25, 1974

Thomas Jefferson Reading Room, Library of Congress

Great as it is, why is one allowed to smoke in this part of the Library? The tobacco lobby in Congress? Or, more poetically and less likely, because Jefferson was a tobacco-planter?

I am reading Ian McHarg's *Design with Nature*. He talks of the nuclear engineers as "the destroyers." He continues, "If life ends, then let us await the death of the sun. We must know these men and their views. If they are like the first innocent astronaut, then may they yet gain that vital deference for this immense journey." He calls them "archaic men who still retain the vengeful view of man against nature, who can carelessly ignore the fruits of evolution and extinguish all life as the remedy for human contests."

And of the city: "We can think of the city as a great zoo to which the gregarious animals voluntarily make their daily way by familiar trails to enter their cages, rather like the starlings whose penchant for bridge trusses is uncomfortable, similar." A bleak picture of modern urban man, but not an implausible one. Suburban man follows longer trails, goes to more trouble, to get from cage to cage.

McHarg makes an ecological comparison of a sand dune and a mature forest which has grown on an ancient dune. This is a remarkable passage, with far-ranging implications, not only for an understanding of ecology but for the way things are put together generally. The sand dune is simple, primitive: few species of plants and animals, few symbioses, few interrelationships. The forest is complex - many of each of these. All of this has importance in considering the difference between a rich human environment and an impoverished one. Since he links the forest with evolution and the dune with retrogression, the values of the two modes become even more striking.

October 2, 1974
Thomas Jefferson Room

We talk about "time to think" as a luxury, something we get instead of money, for all of us know, deep in our hearts, that if we weren't professors we'd be rich industrialists, or best-selling novelists, or highly paid attorneys. But the notion that contemplation is a luxury seems to be based on the assumption that thinking is an entirely pleasurable activity. Alone with books and paper for several weeks in a great library – if one is thinking – one is confronted not only with pleasure but with doubts: doubts about your very capacity to think adequately, for one thing. Lost is the chance to read for a few hours and then dash into a classroom and, before you yourself have been touched, to pass a set of half-formed conclusions to a group of students who will at least assure that you are not alone with an idea.

My reading to date has developed one exciting, terrible idea. It sounds like a commonplace, but for me it has its power. First, of all the problems facing this society the most critical is the crisis of the city. If we fail to make Washington and New York livable, the contagion that spreads from their death will destroy us in small town and suburb as well; our failure to contain drugs and crime in the inner city is evidence for this proposition. The idea itself comes primarily from Ian McHarg's book. We have available to us a set of ecological principles that would allow us to create a livable landscape. It would be characterized by its extreme complexity. Such simplistic notions as neighborhood-by-neighborhood zoning would be eliminated. To a great extent, where we locate our houses and factories and parks would depend on the most critical natural capacities of a given place — its relation to aquifers and foundation rock and regional airsheds. We have available, at least in its broad outlines, the scientific knowledge to build such an environment. But most analyses of our present cultural and political characteristics suggest that we will probably not build it. Instead we will build where the maximum financial return can be realized, and we will continue gradually to reduce the potential of the land to replenish our supplies of food, clean air and water and, more vaguely, our spirits.

McHarg's first chapter deals with the comparatively simple planning needs involved in developing the great Atlantic barrier beaches — the Jersey Shore, Assateague, Cape Hatteras. It can be demonstrated that one must leave the primary dunes with their complex of grasses absolutely inviolate — this grass we really must not walk on. Only this dune protects the shifting structure of the barrier. It allows woods to grow behind it on the secondary dune and in the trough behind the dune. It protects the shallow bay behind the barrier, and this bay is the nursery for an incredible quantity of food resources — fishes and shellfishes of many kinds.

At one time, I had visited the Atlantic coast of Maryland and Virginia frequently, but with only a fragmentary knowledge of these principles. I went back to Assateague last week, impelled, I want to insist, not only by my unscholarly desire for a dip in the ocean, but also by the wish to look at the dunes with my newly educated eyes. Assateague is all right: development is behind the dune, and not very intensive there. The Park Service has provided crossovers to the beach that keep the dunes relatively inviolate and still permit intense recreation on the beach. Assateague, as I say, is all right.

The next day I drove north along the coast, from Ocean City almost to Dover, Delaware. If one wants an indication of how unlikely we are to build according to the best knowledge we have, he need go no further than this stretch of coast. For miles and miles, the dunes have not only not been protected, they have been systematically bulldozed, stripped of grasses, frequently even levelled. Great ugly concrete condominiums, some of them near skyscraper proportions, have replaced the grasses. The bay, that crucial food source, has also been violated. Instead of the shallows that in my memory teemed with clams and fish and waterfowl, we now have landfill (bulldozed, I suppose, from the dunes across the highway) and deep sterile canals for motorboats. Instead of what nature built to protect a fragile marine environment, we have what man made to make a buck.

Henry James, *The American Scene* (1905), writing about the Jersey Shore: "Here was the expensive as a power by itself, a power unguided, undirected, practically unapplied, really exerting itself in a void that could make it no response, that had nothing — poor gentle, patient, rueful, but altogether helplessly void! — to offer in return." This of the relatively casual development of the coast for vacation homes in the late nineteenth century.

October 3, 1974
Library of Congress

One of the things that characterizes a good piece of fiction is its *density*. This density is so important that we hardly notice its presence. A good story begins immediately with sentences that are packed with nuance and detail. My experience both as an editor and a failed writer suggests that this indispensable richness, so easy when we read it, is one of the most difficult things there is for a writer to obtain.

It is a parallel characteristic that makes a good city — or a good city neighborhood. Dupont Circle is an example. There is, first of all, the circle itself, graced with a fountain, statuary and many benches. The suburb, the small town — Otterbein College — never seem to understand how important benches are. In Dupont Circle, they attract old men, drunks, lovers, students and an occasional tourist who is wise enough to realize that he may get a better sense of the city sitting here than by riding around in a tour bus being harangued about the White House. The circle itself — a visual and social focal point — is where avenues and

people meet.

Then the avenues radiating out from the circle and the smaller streets which in a moment's walk carry one from the bustle of the circle into tree-shaded neighborhoods which possess some of the most elegant, practical domestic architecture in the world. Back on these streets are fine little office buildings, the incredibly warm and charming Phillips Gallery, a little museum of African art, a residence for foreign students and so on and on. The avenues have liquor stores, sidewalk cafés, bookstores, drug stores, groceries, boutiques, framing shops — even gas stations. Pedestrian traffic is heavy, multi-purposed, surely a sign of urban health.

Crucially, the scene is complex. An intense variety of activities go on. Mothers wheel their babies, beggars look for handouts, businessmen and scholars buy cigarettes and papers, and, in the fall anyway, a pair of young black boys peddle chrysanthemums from a handcart.

It is a charming scene: it is also a practical scene: needs are met, money changes hands, visual appetites are satisfied. I don't know how the crime rate in Dupont Circle compares with that elsewhere in the city, but I suspect it is markedly lower than in a number of other areas. Certainly, the level of healthy stimulation is higher. Both ghetto (at least the ones I've looked at here and in Columbus) and suburb are marred by their very lack of this kind of social density.

Take a look at the typical Westerville suburb. It has no social density. Even the cheapest suburb, with the smallest lots, has a very low population density compared to the area around Dupont Circle. There is, if you look closely, practically no pedestrian traffic: there are few people; more sadly, there is no place for them to go. There may be, however, quite a bit of motor traffic. It is almost certainly leaving or returning from some outside place where needs may be met. The suburb itself meets only one need — shelter. The suburbanite doesn't need to buy chrysanthemums: if he likes them, in the fall he has his own. But since he won't be walking to the flower vendor, he won't be meeting anyone on his way. He won't be tempted into an art gallery or a bookstore. The suburbs take great pride in the fact that one is rather unlikely to see a drunk or a beggar on the street. One won't see anyone else, either.

To get away from the drunk and the beggar – and, let us admit, from much worse than that – we have built suburbs in the countryside, little paramilitary bases in defense of the good life. (Some of them, I've read recently, actually have walls around them and guards – hardly *para*-military at all anymore.) But, though our children and ourselves have thus gained a modest margin of physical safety (modest because crime is showing a great resistance to being confined to the city), we have at the same time granted ourselves *intellectual* safety, a freedom from fear of new ideas, new risky encounters.

Does the suburb have to be like this? Does it have to have its present kind of deadly monotony? Can't we have miniature Dupont Circles in our bedroom towns? Could – awesome thought – Otterbein College become such a place, and become so vital to Westerville and the northern suburbs of Columbus that the community simply couldn't afford to let her die?

How could we fill this role? What could we do for the suburban environment in which history has set us? Obviously, in the foreseeable future, Otterbein is not going to sell flowers, wine, and cheese, though the closing of an old liberal arts college here in Washington yesterday reminds me that some of us may be selling apples some day.

October 4, 1974
Columbia, Maryland

So far – and I haven't seen much but the Mall – Columbia gives the impression of being like living in a bigger and better Northland. The shopping center has its amenities, but I've seen no bookstore.

There is some interesting architecture, and the lake and its waterfront is attractive, though not as attractive as I had hoped.

The place is extremely clean – Lewis Mumford would like that. And maybe some of the negative factors associated with that cleanliness will diminish in time. At present, it seems just a bit sterile. Margaret's image of the restaurant with its morning bread delivery stacked unwrapped on the sidewalk is instructive, I think. This place may lack that kind of intriguing incongruity.

A nice little toy shop, however, that provided the opportunity

to buy trinkets for the children.

October 6, 1972
Library of Congress

Studs Lonigan. This has considerable value as a city novel. Students might be able to draw some conclusions about it similar to those raised by *Maggie*: the spiritual emptiness of the American urbanite as seen by the American urban writer.

At the point I'm now reading, Studs is having difficulties with women — as he does throughout the book. His problem seems to be that he has nothing to say to them, and no *gentleness* — in a somewhat Victorian sense of the word — with which to say it.

A problem of use with a novel like this: to what extent is the protagonist of a novel a *type*, whose characterization allows one to discuss the general implications of urban life, and to what extent is he a unique conception whose interest for the reader is personal, not sociological? This area might be worth exploring in a class.

We don't know who decided that London would be a good place for a city, or even when. We do have fairly precise information for Boston, Washington, New York. That is a substantial difference between the American historical experience and the European.

October 26, 1972

What the city is, at its best, the liberal arts college must become. This is probably an impossible goal: the college is small, somewhat uniform in its purposes. The city is large, multiform, created by design and accident to perform a wide range of functions. But, walking in Washington, I have been struck with envy by the multitude of students I see. Can we ever hope on the campus of an Ohio college to give our students what those city kids get just from being where they are? Probably not, but surely we must try.

What does the city give? Openness and risk. The city is intellectually and socially dangerous; that is its great virtue. Espe-

cially if you are young and open, it constantly threatens unearned kinds of balance. A book, a painting, a person you bump into — any of these things can destroy the cherished assumptions of a lifetime.

I'm exaggerating. One can wander through a city — I've done it — without letting one's defenses drop for a moment. But there are opportunities for openness here that may not be as apparent anywhere else.

I've been reading *Open Marriage*. Surely the closures the book describes as confining conventional marriage are operative elsewhere. One of the greatest problems that faces me as a teacher at Otterbein is that I am unable to *shock* a great many students, who come to me, it seems, already dead. (If you like the word "surprise" better than shock, please read it in.) Too many of the young adults we face across that yard or so and those years and books that separate us have apparently already given up. They have a kind of self-possession that is not based on knowledge, but on an assumption, picked up God knows where, that no knowledge, no new idea, can possibly do anything for them or touch them in any way.

This closedness threatens to destroy us, not only us as a college, but as a free society. If, as President Kerr suggests, we are going to study the suburb, we must first come to grips with this fact: that the great rise of the automobile-serviced suburb has occurred simultaneously with the triumph of television, the decay of true literacy in our young, and a kind of deadness of mind that, as a student of American literature and culture, I can find in no other era. Our students are terribly handicapped by coming from communities in which the prices of houses don't vary by \$5000 over a half-mile area, where nearly everyone chooses their evening's entertainment from three nearly identical television networks, where for the first ten years of their lives the only males they ever saw engaged in serious work were the mailman, the milkman, and the elementary school principal.

Back briefly to another idea in this journal — the sabbatical itself. Every other academic project has led to some clearly defined goal: a seminar paper, a dissertation, a lecture. I started out with the idea that this period of time must produce some

publication: after all I've got my career to advance. I have written one book review, but I would have done that anyway. I've written a fair amount in this journal. But my reading has not been narrow enough to lead to an article. I've been reading fiction, the *Washington Post*, philosophy, history, sociology, landscape architecture.

A possible lesson here: I may have got more out of this reading, though I'm certainly not able to specify what, than I would have out of more traditionally directed scholarship. Is it possible that we close in our teachers (and thus our students) by insisting on directed research that always has in sight a definite end product? The rules of the academic game are such that one cannot usually risk the kind of reading I've been doing. The consequences of such rules may be the serious hampering of scholarship so that it can only ask questions that can be, relatively quickly, answered in publishable form.

October 29, 1972

Last evening was an interesting one. The McKinneys had some friends from across the street over for an impromptu fondue. The husband is about to receive his dental degree at Georgetown University; the wife is a folklorist at Maryland. Good food, good talk. We talked a great deal about this neighborhood, the blacks who are being displaced, the vandalism in the Safeway. Jerry, the folklorist, commented that when they moved into the neighborhood a year or two ago they felt somewhat threatened by the street life at night — the older residents sitting on the porches, the shouting back and forth from house to house. As outsiders, they found this somewhat puzzling and even threatening. As the neighborhood became increasingly white, this evening front-porch social life began to diminish. This fall, while I've been here, the neighborhood is quiet at night, except for roving bands of kids, who are of course frightening to white adults.

We talked about vandalism. I mentioned early in this journal the mugging across the street from the McKinneys. I've heard of no similar incident in the immediate area in the last month or so. But a trip to the local Safeway is an astonishing experience. Bands of black kids — usually three or four of them, ranging in age from about five to ten, dash through the aisles knocking down boxes and cans. Various policing efforts are made; they work as long as they are actively enforced. For an adult, the experience

is disquieting — perhaps primarily in a literal sense. The noise is erratic, highly irritating. Sunday afternoon I went to the local laundromat at the other end of Stanton Park and watched a group of elementary-school aged girls kick the change maker until it yielded them a few quarters. There were about five people in the laundromat — finally, a young man, probably a law-school student, drove them off. A quick impression: this juvenile vandalism seems to be much less prevalent in small grocery stores and so on where the manager is in evidence than it is in large supermarkets and unattended laundromats. The latter, of course, are hideously bleak: the machines are in poor repair, trash baskets are seldom emptied, conditions are generally filthy.

To get back to the evening's conversation, the Johnsons are generally very enthusiastic about life on Capitol Hill. They have a great deal of social curiosity of the kind that is probably necessary to appreciate fully life in the city. They are interested in black dialect: Jerry is certain, from conversations in the course of doing business in the city as well as from her experience teaching at Howard, that there is a kind of expressiveness — poetry she called it — in this language, particularly among the young, that is lacking in middle-class youth. She had great success in getting students to write verse: she thought about 40 per cent of her students were regularly writing poetry on their own. We talked about the depressing reality that this street language, with its vague origins in the rural South, must be at least to some extent repressed to make way for the "mainstream" language, if blacks are to find their way into trades and professions that have generally been dominated by whites. An idea for teaching: it might be very useful, perhaps in English 10, to discover some text that would allow us to introduce our white middle-class to this black language, not so they would have a second language, but so they would have some sense of the linguistic options that are in some sense a part of the American heritage. It might also be a useful way of suggesting the relationships between language and culture, particularly in 10 which explores the relationship between the individual and society.

I advanced my theory that private ownership of certain essentials dictates our lives in unfortunate directions: we each own automobiles instead of having decent public transportation, we all have TV sets instead of the best, most varied kinds of theater and cinema to "own" in common; in a suburb like Annerhurst Village, we each have a back yard instead of adequate parks and open spaces. To some extent, I pointed out, the city

still has not fallen into this trap: there is *some* public transportation, some theater, galleries, parks, etc. My friends found this idea interesting, but had some strong and cogent reservations. Dick pointed out that his present occupation involves him in travelling at odd times of the day to scattered parts of the city; his efficiency would be considerably lowered if he had to rely on buses; he could not afford to travel by taxi as a regular thing. Jim raised a more basic, and at the moment I think nearly unanswerable, objection. To give up one's car — or any of the other objects in question — would be to throw oneself entirely on the mercy of the government, state, national, or local. The basic and quite justified distrust the citizen has for his leadership makes him very reluctant to put himself into governmental hands for things as vital as these. I am struck, over and over again, by how little we are going to be able to accomplish until we begin to develop governing institutions that are more responsive to our needs and that we can have more faith in.

Later in the evening, we — the McKinneys and I — went for a walk. A beautiful warm fall evening, and the streets were full of people. We walked from the McKinney's house C St. N.E. to Pennsylvania Avenue, which on the Hill is a neighborhood of pleasant shops and restaurants. On a night like this, this part of the city is relatively safe: it meets the conditions for safety Jane Jacobs describes in her book, *The Life and Death of Great American Cities*. The safety factor is the pedestrian traffic: people are watching each other — it's a principal urban recreation. The one danger spot I could see was north along Second and Third Streets, the avenues that run between the Library of Congress and its Annex and the other government buildings. Since these buildings are closed at night and since there are no stores or residences along them, there is little or no pedestrian traffic, and a person who ventured alone into these dark areas might well be in danger, in the unlikely event that he ran into a mugger who waited long enough to find a victim. One sign of the pathology of the city is these single-purpose areas — neighborhood is the wrong word for them — where government buildings, factories, whatever, totally dominate the scene. When these operations close down at night or for the weekend, a wasteland of dead space ensues. Thus public buildings, unless they function in ways that encourage pedestrian traffic, operate as a blight on the landscape. The more complex a neighborhood is, the better it is for human purposes.

We wound up at about midnight at a party up the street from the McKinneys. A lovely old house, restored into a most comfortable modern residence. The owners or renters of the house were four people; I never was quite sure which of the fifty or so people milling around actually owned the place. But the party was a pleasant minor example of the pleasures of city life. Conversation was interesting, varied, quiet, loud. People did not, as far as I could tell, talk about weather, pets, their children, or, except in terms of wide interest, their jobs. In some ways, of course, these restrictions were artificial: people do tend to have children, they certainly have weather.

October 31, 1972
Fairfield, Pennsylvania

My subject, I discover, has become more than the city. What I am thinking about is what kinds of environments men can have that permit them to develop as fully as they can in directions that are most satisfactory to themselves. The city has some very serious problems. For example, none of the people I've been talking to in the city have children, and, since all of them are relatively affluent, I strongly doubt that many of them will remain in the city when they do. And Bil Gilbert, my host here, was commenting the other night when I was discussing some of these matters with him that the usual city resident has to spend so much time making a living, doing his shopping and so on that he may have limited time to appreciate its resources. The city is also terribly expensive. As it stands now, it may be not a good place to live for any but the wealthy, the young, and the childless. It does, however, offer possibilities that might serve as models for alternative arrangements. None of these alternative arrangements, however, are going to realize their full potential unless they can cluster around functioning, healthy cities. A place like Columbia, Maryland, simply cannot provide everything its residents need for the fullest possible creative life.

We could also live in hawk blinds. Bil Gilbert has trapped and banded hawks along the mountains for several years. I came up Monday night to accompany him on a trapping expedition, something I haven't done in a number of years. We saw some hawks, though we didn't trap any. The best part of the trip was meeting Robert Cantwell. Cantwell did a book on Alexander Wilson several

years ago, and Bil introduced me to the book which led to my dissertation. So we talked about Wilson, but also about Hemingway. Cantwell wrote two novels – in the 'thirties I think. He met Hemingway through Dos Passos, a mutual friend. Hemingway thought Cantwell would be his successor as the great American novelist, borrowed Cantwell's only copy of the second book, which was never returned. We had a good long talk about "Big Two-Hearted River." Cantwell had noticed, as I had, the absence of birds or bird songs or similar matters a sensitive man might have noticed in the woods. He had mentioned this to Dos Passos, who told him of course Hemingway was not interested in these things: he was never interested in anything he couldn't kill.

Cantwell, after many years in the city, has finally moved to Bethlehem, Pa., where the air is cleaner than in New York.

But back to living in hawk blinds. Johnson's comment on the man who is bored with London is bored with life has taken an ironic turn. These, Bil Gilbert and Cantwell, are professional writers, and writing is, has been anyway, inextricably connected with the city, where the publishers and the bookstores are. Yet how much of the good conversations, the actual writing, that makes a great literature has gone on in this country in country houses and hawk blinds. Bil maintains that he has found city people dull: too many of their ideas have come from the same newspapers, so they talk in clichés. City people, glutted with the minimal social contacts that come from rubbing elbows with too many people, have become insensitive to individuals. For really interesting conversation, he wants a country man.

November 12, 1972

I have thought for some time – probably even read it somewhere – that teachers suffer from a kind of missionary complex: they are continually oppressed by a kind of anxiety that they must get the "truth" across to their students, and are devastated emotionally when they fail to convert all of the heathens under their charge. I do think, however, that the teacher does exert a kind of moral force or at least has that kind of responsibility.

Start this idea over again: what I want to say is that, to a

certain extent, at least within the context of a single term in a given class, we probably cannot ask our students to be what we are unable to be. If we want students to be open to the joys and challenges of literature, we must somehow project such joy and challenge as something we experience ourselves in some genuine and dynamic fashion.

When we come right down to it, the best a college can probably offer, with the exception of a few facts and techniques that can be obtained more economically from books, is the opportunity to experience a kind of life that society as we now know it will probably not give them again. If the word had not been so badly debased, I would call that kind of life scholarship: an opportunity to live primarily in the mind — or in an unusual complex of interchanges between felt experience and an intellectual framework with which to structure it. If this is so, we as teachers must show that we are able to do this, and, more important, that we get some kind of joy from doing it. This is partly an emotional matter, a thing that can take place anywhere there is a teacher, a student and a few books. But there may be kinds of physical environments that make this more possible, more pleasurable, than others.

November 16, 1972

G. M. Trevelyan points out that, in the Middle Ages, the citizen had rural interests as well as urban. In some cases he grazed cattle and cultivated corn on lands outside the city. A 1388 Parliamentary Statute required that journeymen and apprentices help bring in the harvest. "There was none of the rigid distinction between rural and urban which has prevailed since the Industrial Revolution. No Englishman then was ignorant of all country things, as the great majority of Englishmen are today."

November 19, 1972

I'm not sure whether I made much of it at the time in these pages, but it was interesting to note of the young vandals in the laundromat and the Safeway in Washington that they were really quite happy children: uninhibited, joyful, adventurous. This in spite of the fact that they were a great source of annoyance to

their elders, particularly white. And in spite of the fact that these children are in considerable danger from the adult world: policemen, rapists, automobiles, and so on. The city slums are not the environment one would choose for one's children, but the energy and the excitement one sees there are a challenge to our ideas about childhood.

November 29, 1972
Paisley, Scotland
9:30 a.m.

This was, it turns out, a good place to start, I wish I knew more about the town's present function: it seems to be largely a suburb of Glasgow and a shopping/banking town. Chivas seems to have a plant here. I gather weaving is dead as a major industry.

We arrived at Prestwick at about 6 a.m. yesterday and immediately took the train here. That was somewhat unfortunate, since the sun didn't rise until we got here and we missed what looked to be interesting countryside. But the train was marvelous: quick, comfortable, clean. Public transportation is remarkable here: buses go by our guest house and out to Renfrew Ferry every few minutes. By contrast, there is very little automobile traffic; State Street in Westerville is much more crowded.

December 3, 1972

We've had a car now for two days - a Hillman Hunter, a large, very comfortable car. We drove down from Edinburgh through beautiful country, and were, fortunately, through the Cheviot Hills before dark. I wouldn't have wanted to miss them. A bit of snow in patches on the peak. Old soft hills, like the Appalachians, but with heather instead of trees. Couldn't find a satisfactory hotel until we got to Newcastle, where we stayed in a rather nasty Bed and Breakfast place. Newcastle is a depressing place - the car has conquered there.

Durham yesterday - an absolutely awe-inspiring cathedral, and an interesting little town clustered around it. A fine bakery among other things. But no place to cash dollar traveller checks on a weekend.

Last night and tonight, at a lovely old guest house in Ripon,

the site of a cathedral that is celebrating its 1300th anniversary this year. Today we drove through the Dales — Wensleydale, Wharfedale, Airedale, to Haworth, a bleak but lovely little village — the Brontës. First real literary stop (except, I guess, Paisley) that we've made. Something to talk to Jim Bailey about: Haworth is a suburb of Keighley, not far from Leeds, Manchester, Bradford; these places must have been growing into their present ignominious reality in Emily's time, but you wouldn't know it from reading the book. An anti-urban novel, or merely an a-urban one?

The wild "dales" — terribly wild, but completely domesticated by the old stone walls, which have blended into the scene completely.

December 4, 1972
York

We came here more by accident than by design: this was the most convenient place to turn in the car. The cathedral was most impressive: they were rehearsing Haydn's *Creation* in the Minster, and the combination of stone, glass, voices and orchestra was impressive indeed. Our landlord in Ripon was telling us that the extensive repairs that are being made on the Minster have led to some striking discoveries. Under the Minster is a network of underground waterways, built by the Romans, and the building itself is on a kind of raft foundation. He's an interesting man himself: an electrician, apparently, who is fascinated with English history and geography. He visited Hadrian's Wall this summer, and he was impressed by the way it follows and utilizes natural contours of the land. Not like modern engineering, we agreed.

These small cities — Durham, York, Ripon (about 12,000) — are very interesting. All of them are complete — it is hard to imagine what a resident of any of them would need to go to a bigger city for. All of them are cathedral towns — that may be their main source of income: in each case it provides a kind of center for the city, though only in York is the church near the geographical center. Durham and Ripon both have open air markets (Durham has a covered one, too), which conduct serious business — they're not just quaint operations for tourists.

The cities all suggest a principle of city planning. Create a

center — cathedral, university, market — build a wall or otherwise establish a perimeter for the city, and then control the population to fit those bounds. If the population extends beyond the limits that the city can contain, build another one someplace else.

Why? Because geographical compactness guarantees two things. One is that the facilities of the city will be accessible by foot to the inhabitants. The other is that the concentration will provide a sufficient population to support a variety of activities. Westerville cannot support a good bookstore, for example, because it does not have a sufficiently large population concentrated within and around who cannot, with the aid of an automobile, get to a bigger and better bookstore in Columbus. But Columbus is too diffuse to allow for much in the way of variety.

An interesting thing about these cities: concentration of competitors. There is a little street near the Minster here with several jewelry shops, several bookshops. One would think that you would want to have the only bookshop on a street or in a neighborhood. But reflection shows why this is not the case: one wants to have his shop where people look for that kind of shop. A sophisticated shopper is going to want to look at several jewelry shops before he buys a diamond ring: better have your shop among those he looks at.

Freeways: in England overpasses or elevated highways are called "flyovers." When land is condemned for these monstrosities, the houses are not immediately torn down, so that in a place like Newcastle or Glasgow you drive past hundreds of empty buildings, right next to the motorway, real symbols of the march of progress.

December 6, 1972
Oxford

Arrived here by train at about 1:00 p.m. yesterday, made the mistake of not immediately looking for a bed and breakfast, so we're staying at a rather seedy place, quite a way from the center of the city. But it will serve. Spent the afternoon (and a lot of money — charged of course) at Blackwell's various locations.

Today we rented another car, this time a mini at much lower rates, and drove over to the Cotswolds, our principle point of

sightseeing being the village of Chipping Campden. The Cotswolds are lovely, even at this time of year, and we're anxious to see them in the spring. Trevelyan considers Chipping Campden the most beautiful village in England. I wouldn't be surprised. It was a great international center of the wool industry in the Middle Ages, so considerable money went into its architecture, particularly its handsome "perpendicular" style church, in which I was most impressed with the commemorative brasses in the floor.

The village is now supported, apparently, by tourists, craft-shops and, Margaret suggests, old-age pensions. We stopped in one little rare-book shop (in hopes of buying a guide, which he didn't have), and were met by its owner, obviously a refugee from somewhere in the larger world. In addition to collecting (and writing) books, he composes wry notices, in beautiful hand lettering, on tiny slips of paper, urging one not to shoplift, to complain if the stock seems inadequate, and so on. And he sings.

One of the great neglected natural resources is daylight. Margaret was told in the day-care center she visited in Paisley that the children were off getting their "ultraviolet" – treatments to make up for the sunshine deficiency. And we are beginning to find it somewhat depressing that it is full dark by 4:30.

December 10, 1972
London, 6 p.m.

It is difficult to believe that this will be our fourth night in London. Our stay here has been exciting, exhausting, and depressing in the sense that it is quite clear that there is not time to do anywhere near everything we'd like to do. I remember thinking as a child, when we lived here, that this was an incredibly exciting place. It is even more exciting to be here as an adult when one realizes that few of the cities of the world are as healthy as this one.

It is hard, we've found, to know where to start in seeing London; it is hard even to know where to start to catalog what I've seen and thought while I've been here. There has not been time to keep a journal: too great a sense that one must fill every

waking moment, because God knows when one will get back.

Freshest in my mind this evening and as good a place to start as any is Kensington Gardens. Round Pond is one of my sharpest memories of my two childhood years here, and it was moving to go back there today after twenty-three years. The gardens, even in winter, are exquisite and, though somewhat diminished by time, the Pond is as exciting a place as I remember it. On this December morning there were only a few sailboats: on that spring or summer day of my childhood there must have been dozens, as well as complicated model steamboats running on methylated spirits and even, as I recall, an exquisite battery-operated submarine. One day I lost a boat here – a lovely blue-and-white wooden sailboat perhaps eighteen inches long. You set the sails and rudder of your boat and push the boat out into the pond and pick it up wherever it comes ashore, following it, yourself literally landbound but in imagination at the tiller of the little boat, around the perimeter. A sailboat, if it has a heavy enough keel to keep it from capsizing, always comes ashore; only the power boats, subject to engine failure, get stalled in the middle of the pond. I watched my boat make a clean, straight course right across the pond, but by the time I was to it a rather sinister (in memory, anyway) man, twice my size, had it in his hands. I was unable to convince him to give it to me. It occurs to me that this was one of the very few really upsetting experiences I ever had during a childhood a large part of which was spent on the streets, subways and public places of large cities. My parents generously replaced the boat (it had been a rather expensive birthday present, I think), but we were unable to get another blue one, and had to settle for a red one, not quite so pretty.

As I say, there were only a few boys with their boats today. Also a few men with kites. These were interesting. At first we noticed only the kites, lovely things very high over the park. Only later did we attend to the fliers. These were middle-aged men (I saw one teenage boy, probably the son of one of them). They had a little sort of covered kiosk near the pond, a comfortable place to discuss the intricacies of kiting, set aside for them, probably by tradition rather than law. They had the most incredibly complicated and expensive-looking equipment: light, finely braided strings, elaborate wooden reels, canvas cases to fold their kites into – not to mention the kites themselves. Obviously kite-flying is not, in Kensington Gardens anyway, something one does for his children on a whim and with an investment of fifty

cents some windy Saturday in March. England – London anyway – supports an incredible variety of hobbies, particularly for men, all of them taken with a kind of seriousness that I think is rather rare among Americans. It is a nation of railroad buffs (and they don't only build HO gauge trains, but read histories, buy antique prints, and follow existing lines), pigeon fanciers, and kite fliers. It is hard to imagine anything more pleasant, in a quiet, undemanding way, than getting together with a few cronies to fly your kite on a Sunday afternoon – or anything more foreign to the American suburban tenor of life.

The great virtue of foreign travel, even if it is to a country as much like ours as England is in many ways, is the opportunity it provides to see that people do live differently – that there is nothing inevitable about the way we live, and that we do have some choices. I think most of the time we have a tendency to believe that we have built our cities and towns in responses to laws of nature, and that we live as we do because it is the only way we possibly can live. Not true, apparently.

December 22, 1972
Westerville

Though I try to convince students with literary pretensions to keep a journal, it is a hard habit to maintain. I'm back from England and now must try to set things down that ought to have been set down at the time. So these observations are going to be extremely miscellaneous.

Pubs. We were enthralled with them, all over England. They are a marvellous place to get a delicious, inexpensive lunch; it took us no time at all to get used to British beer. They perform some crucial social functions that I suspect are not filled in most American communities. One notable service they perform is to civilize the young. Kids may drink beer at the age of eighteen. At least in smaller communities – Ripon and Claygate in our experience – young people drink in the “local” in the presence of their elders. They learn a considerable amount of drinking etiquette, and though they are not apparently inhibited (they neck and hold hands, hug, etc.), there are certain kinds of behavior that obviously would not be tolerated. The same thing undoubt-

edly applies to adults. We never saw an offensively intoxicated Englishman in a pub. Liquor is extremely expensive by the bottle, quite cheap by the drink in a pub. I wonder what the relative rates of alcoholism are in the two countries.

The local is also obviously a great marketplace of ideas and gossip. Few people stay long – a pint of bitter, or two, with some friends and then off. I ran into an American educator in a pub in Oxford, and stayed quite a while talking to him. The only locals who stayed as long as we did were a man and his wife, who sat in a corner of the lounge, he reading several newspapers, she doing her knitting. It was a remarkable scene of domestic tranquillity though they drank very little and apparently spoke not at all.

Graffiti – in men's rooms, always political. No perverted advertisements (they are to be found quite openly on bulletin boards at newstands), only slogans like – the I.R.A.

Class. Still very apparent. It tried my democratic fisherman's soul to realize that all good salmon and trout fishing is still privately owned.

Cities – ideal places seemed to be York, Winchester, Durham, big enough to be cities, with cathedrals and museums, but small enough not to be overpowering. But the magnetic power of London and New York undoubtedly have the same effect in both countries: they pull the most talented people to them and impoverish the smaller cities, a trend perhaps impossible to reverse.

April 22, 1974
Westerville

In the process of making selections from this journal, I notice I left some avenues unpursued, and never got back to some ideas I meant to run down. Such was the hazard of the method.

I was in Washington briefly over the "spring" break. Two great construction projects are well advanced: the Metro subway system, which may give Washington for the first time a relatively decent system of public transportation, and the new FBI building. My architectural vocabulary is inadequate to describe the latter monstrosity, but there is an interesting pedestrian perspective

on it from the corner of Tenth and Pennsylvania Avenue: a modest, very handsome statue of Ben Franklin in front of a great fortress of prefabricated concrete which, rumor has it will have half a dozen stories *beneath ground level*. Computers there will store information about us all, and the building will be functioning well before 1984. Franklin, for all of his faults, was a great urbanite, a lover of cities like Dr. Johnson, a useful citizen who founded a magazine and a postal system — sound contributions to community. What would this exemplar of civic virtue think of the colossus rising, so to speak, over his right shoulder?

Finally, as a useful exercise in modesty, here is an observation of Doris Lessing's I came across today: "For one of the advantages of living in the suburbs of the world is that the commonplaces which are too tedious for repetition anywhere else come as overwhelming discoveries."

CONTRIBUTORS

Oris Elizabeth Amos is Assistant Professor of Education. She wrote a commentary in the 1973 issue of the *Miscellany* on two poems by her husband, Winsom Amos. She has a particular interest in Black Cultural Studies.

James R. Bailey is Assistant Professor of English and Chairman of the English Department. His special interests are American fiction and regional literature of the Midwest. He is a contributor to an annual bibliography of Midwest literature.

Norman Chaney is Assistant Professor of English. His contribution to this *Miscellany* is a revision of an address delivered at a Torch and Key initiation ceremony, scholastic honor society of Otterbein College.

Joe Epolito has been teaching theatre courses at Otterbein this year. He has published two one-act plays, "Ride to the Beach" and "Dark Nite of the Soul." His poetry has been published in *Pembroke Magazine* and *Wormwood Review*.

William T. Hamilton is Associate Professor of English and Chairman of the Department of Common Courses. His writing also appears in the 1965, 1969, 1970, and 1972 issues of the *Miscellany*.

Thomas J. Kerr, IV, President of the College and Professor of History, has written widely in scholarly journals. A previous contribution by President Kerr appears in the 1972 *Miscellany*.

Albert E. Lovejoy, Professor of Sociology and Chairman of the Department of Sociology, concentrates in the areas of the sociology of religion and the sociology of the family. One of his main hobbies is people-watching.

Alison Prindle is Assistant Professor of English. Her special interests are Medieval and Renaissance literature, but her teaching in the Department of Common Courses has greatly encouraged her to believe that some things written after 1660 may be worth our attention.

James K. Ray, Associate Professor of English, Emeritus, has previously contributed poetry to this publication. He is poet laureate of Annehurst Village.

Paul L. Redditt is Assistant Professor in the Department of Religion and Philosophy. His publications include several book reviews and an article on textual criticism of the Old Testament in the most recent edition of the *Ohio Journal of Religious Studies*.

Michael F. Rothgery is Instructor in the Department of History. His special interests are Medieval history and the history of ideas.

Sylvia Vance, Assistant Professor of French, is a former editor of the *Miscellany*. She is currently pursuing doctoral studies at The Ohio State University.

Kathleen Wooley recently spent two years teaching in northern Mediterranean countries, while also studying the interconnection of fine and literary arts in American cultural history.

causes - symptoms
vs.
Steinbeck. causes

2 kinds of jobs - objective - got - to see sethup.
radical - come back to one of
these @ the end of ea. class.

THE OTTERBEIN MISCELLANY

Vol. I, May, 1965

Vol. II, June, 1966

Vol. III, May, 1967

Vol. IV, May, 1968

Vol. V, May, 1969

Vol. VI, May, 1970

Vol. VII, May, 1971

Vol. VIII, May, 1972

Vol. IX, May, 1973

Copies still available at one dollar per volume.

Address: Director of Publications,
Otterbein College,
Westerville, Ohio 43081

