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NIETZSCHE'S AUTONOMY, RESPONSIBILITY, AND WILL UNIFICATION

by

Waylon Smith

A Thesis Submitted in
Partial Fulfillment of the
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ABSTRACT

NIETZSCHE'S: AUTONOMY, RESPONSIBILITY, AND WILL UNIFICATION

by

Waylon Smith

The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2016
Under the Supervision of Professor William Bristow

The modern analytic's conception of morality usually grounds the agent's morality in some conception of responsibility and autonomy. Friedrich Nietzsche agrees that morality should be grounded in responsibility and autonomy, however his conceptions of responsibility and autonomy are quite different from the modern analytic literature. In this paper, I present Nietzsche's account of autonomy and responsibility. In part one, I describe Nietzsche's beliefs about human nature and how the human psyche became disparate. The sovereign individual is also introduced as the Nietzschean ideal capable of autonomy and responsibility. The second part of the paper refines Nietzsche's ideas concerning both the will and free will and their relation to morality. Finally, I argue that Nietzsche provides a process of how a disparate individual may become an autonomous and responsible individual.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction	1
Part 1: Human Nature: Development of the Disparate Will	3
1.1 Sovereign Individuals and Fragmented Wills	6
1.2 Free Will	7
Part 2: Nietzsche's Will and Its Relations	11
2.1 Drive Psychology	12
2.2 Relations of Body, Self, Will, Spirit	14
2.3 Upshots of Nietzschean Drive Psychology	17
Part 3: The Spirits: The Process of Will Unification	22
3.1 First Interpretation	26
3.2 The Problems of Transformation	28
3.3 The Camel Spirit: Reverence/Affirmation Function	32
3.4 The Lion Spirit: Doubt Function	34
3.5 The Child Spirit: Ranking and Ordering Function	37
3.5 (a) Transformations	37
3.5 (b) Creation and Destruction	39
3.5 (c) Back to the Child	40
3.5 (d) Woman and Man: Camel and Lion	42

Introduction

We use the word “I” in everyday language, and it is this word “I” that conceptually unifies our actions. For example, “I have a desire for ice cream. I am thinking about summer. I appreciate hot weather and I love Mary.” Every thought in my head, whether it be a value, a desire, etc. is attached to this “I.” And it is this “I” that unifies all the various mental states. It is also the “I” that unifies all my various actions. For example, “I bought ice cream and I ate it.” In this way, my deep thoughts, my grief, my joy, and my actions involved in both the purchasing and eating of ice cream are all round this “I.” Thus, I believe that when I say “I,” I take responsibility for my actions.

We can think of responsibility in two ways, in a non-moral sense and in a moral sense. First, in a non-moral sense, we can claim that one event is the cause of another or one event is the reason for another, thus one event is responsible for another event. For example, when asked, “Why does the sun rise and set?” I might respond by saying that the Earth’s rotation around the sun is the reason or the cause for the Sun’s rising and setting. Second, in a moral sense, a person is held morally responsible or morally accountable for an unjust action if that person is both the cause of that unjust action, and that person had the freedom to do otherwise. What makes me both the cause of my action and gives me the freedom to do otherwise is usually grounded in some type of conscious effort of control that I have exhibited while committing the action. Thus, if I am conscious of my actions, then I am both autonomous and responsible for my actions.

However, Nietzsche does not believe this exact relationship between consciousness and responsibility exists. The consciousness of my action, and even this feeling of deliberateness that “I am the cause” of my actions is not enough for Nietzsche to ascribe autonomy and responsibility to an agent. Instead, Nietzsche argues that responsibility

and freedom are grounded in a unified will, and that will is unified by a particular set of dominating instincts.

Nietzsche articulates much of this view about responsibility and autonomy within the *The Genealogy of Morals* Essay 2, but because there are multiple stories, it is easy to lose the focus of Nietzsche's main theme within this essay. For example, one story explains how the active capacity of forgetting is overcome by suffering, thus producing both memory and the idea of promising. A second story explains how guilt and punishment arose out of a man-made sickness called the "the bad conscience." However, there is also a more general story which encapsulates both these two stories and Nietzsche's work as a whole. It is the story of how the human psyche became various and disparate and how those various wills which constitute this psyche need to be unified in order for the human to become a responsible, "sovereign individual." Taking this more general story into account, the story of promising may be interpreted as a story of a will in the present moment trying to both sustain itself and take responsibility for some future moment. And, the story of guilt becomes a story of a will in the present moment reaching back into some past moment, trying to claim that it is the same will responsible for a past action during that past moment.

These stories give credit to Nietzsche's belief that the process of unifying the will is one of man's¹ most important endeavors. However, what Nietzsche means by "will unification" and "the process of will unification" are debated topics. In this paper, I argue that will unification is the ranking and ordering of an individual's values, and I argue that will

¹For ease of interpreting Nietzsche, "he" and "man" is used throughout this paper. However, Nietzsche's psychology applies to both men and women.

unification is a three part process in which an individual proceeds through a linear progression of spirits known as the camel, the lion, and the child. My argument involves equating Nietzsche's ideal of the "child" from the first speech of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* with his ideal of the "sovereign individual" in *On the Genealogy of Morals*, and I will argue for my thesis in the following manner. First, I present what Nietzsche believes to be both the history and the metaphysics of the human psyche. This involves a psychological account of how the human will became disparate, and Nietzsche's definition of a free-willed sovereign individual. The second part of the paper refines Nietzsche's conception of will, morality, and the self-constituted individual using: (a) Paul Katsafanas's interpretation of Nietzsche's psychology (b) relations between the unified will, fragmented will, self, body, sense, and spirit. And (c) Nietzsche's three progressions of thought within morality. The third, and final part of the paper, argues that Nietzsche has given us a structured process describing how to unify the will and thus become a sovereign, responsible individual. That process involves ranking and ordering one's values which can only happen once the individual has progressed through three spirits: the camel, the lion, and the child which are all presented in the first speech of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*.

PART 1. HUMAN NATURE: The Development of the Disparate Will

Nietzsche believes that the components of man's psyche evolved parallel to the process of culture and civilization. "Man found himself within the walls of society and of peace," and this relation between man and society created "the stress of the most funda-

mental change he ever experienced” (GM 2,16 [p.84]). This stress was due to the interaction between the individual and the society, and the stress was of a specific sort. Nietzsche claims:

All instincts that do not discharge themselves outwardly, turn themselves inward—this is what I call internalization of man: thus it was that man first developed what was later called his “soul.” The entire inner world, originally as thin as if it were stretched between two membranes, expanded and extended itself, acquired depth, breadth, and height in the same measure as outward discharge was inhibited. (GM 2, 16 [p.84])

From this quote, a certain explanation of Nietzsche’s psychology can be formed. At one point in time, man’s instincts “discharged themselves outwardly.” At this time, man was not psychologically complex. In fact, he may have been as simple as most other mammalian type animals. However, this psychological feature (simplicity) changed with the growth of man’s social relations. As cultures and societies formed, man’s bodily instincts were blocked, and thus this manifold of instincts could not be expressed in any external sense. However, these instincts did not dissipate, go away, or cease to be. Instead, they reversed their direction and turned back on man himself in the “same measure” or the same amount that they could not be discharged externally. This internal discharge of instincts expanded man’s inner, mental world in “depth, breadth, and height.” The output of this process consisted in various psychological drives which were both an extension and a mirror of the body’s instinctive drives.

Nietzsche also alludes to this relationship between the body and the consciousness in *Zarathustra*. He writes, “And how nicely the bitch sensuality knows how to beg for a piece of spirit when a piece of flesh is denied her.” (TSZ 1:13 [48]) This quote describes

the instinct as being denied its satisfaction in material or external “flesh.” Due to this denial, the instinct turns inward and alleviates its desire by expressing itself spiritually or within the mental realm. Notice how this interpretation of the quote matches with the previous quote: “All instincts that do not discharge themselves outward turn inward—this is what I call the internalization of man.” (GM 2,16 [p.84])

This process seems complex, but Nietzsche believes it all to be a part of what he calls the “will to power.” Though the body is full of various instincts, these instincts are instantiations of a more fundamental and basic instinct. That instinct is “the instinct for freedom (in my language: the will to power); only here the material upon which the form-giving and ravishing nature of this force vents itself is man himself” (GM 2,18 [p.87]). From this quote, it can be claimed that Nietzsche believes that the instinct to be free, to be an autonomous and responsible individual, is equated with the will to power. And it is this primal, fundamental instinct that causes the development of all the other instincts. For Nietzsche, “life simply is will to power” (BGE, 259 [p.203]). The following quote expresses this idea in full.

“Suppose finally, we succeeded in explaining our entire instinctive life as development and ramification of one basic form of the will—namely the will to power, as my proposition has it; suppose all organic functions could be traced back to this will to power and one could also find in it the solution of the problem of procreation and nourishment—it is one problem—then one would have gained the right to determine all efficient force univocally as—will to power. The world viewed from inside, the world defined and determined according to its “intelligible character”—it would be “will to power” and nothing else” (BGE 36 [p.48]).

At first glance, Nietzsche's "will to power" should be a unifying force in the psyche of man. One may think this because the will to power is univocal and informs all the instantiated instincts. However, Nietzsche believes this to be a false assumption. Nietzsche writes the "basic drives of man" are "inspiring spirits" and "every single one of them would like only too well to represent just itself as the ultimate purpose of existence and the legitimate master of all the other drives. For every drive wants to be master" (BGE 6 [p.13]). From this quote we can claim that the various instincts, which are merely instantiations of the will to power, all contain the essence of will to power, and because of this fact, the instincts fight among themselves, each believing that it alone is the real expression of life affirmation. Due to this conflict among the instincts, Nietzsche petitions the reader to view the "(will) as a social structure of the drives and affects," and as a "mortal" "subjective multiplicity" (BGE 12 [p.20]).

We can now conclude that Nietzsche believes man's complex and disparate psyche is the result of the following process. First, the various instincts in the body are all instantiations of the will to power. Second, these bodily instincts are usually discharged into the environment outside the individual. Third, society imposes restrictions on these external discharges therefore, these instincts reverse their direction and instead discharge themselves back upon man's mental consciousness. Fourth, this interaction between the world and the individual creates a complex and various psyche within the individual. This psyche is composed of a social structure of wills in which each fragment of will fights for supremacy over all others because each disparate will believes that it alone, is will to power.

1.1 Sovereign Individuals and Fragmented Wills

The fragmented will and its unification are not explicitly spoken about within the *Genealogy*, but responsibility and the freedom to pursue that responsibility are explicitly expressed by means of an ideal called the “sovereign individual.” Nietzsche introduces this sovereign individual by first contrasting this ideal with the standard man of society. He believes that society and morality subjugate the standard man and make this standard man “calculable.” Due to this subjugation, the standard man’s will is a product of sources external to himself, and so this standard man is neither free nor responsible according to Nietzsche. In contrast, the sovereign individual is “the ripest fruit” of society. He is autonomous, independent, and has the right to make promises. He is “liberated from the morality of custom” and he is the “master of a free will.” Nietzsche believes that this sovereign individual is the next evolution in man because such a man exists at the end of a “tremendous process” which consists in “the society and the morality of custom...revealing what they have been a means to.” Nietzsche’s sovereign individual has a “proud awareness of the extraordinary privilege of responsibility, the consciousness of this rare freedom,” and “his power over oneself and one’s fate, has in his case penetrated to the profoundest depths and become instinct, the dominating instinct.” (GM 2,2)

At this point, I have presented evidence that Nietzsche believes the fragmented will to be a feature of the first evolution of society. I have also presented evidence that Nietzsche believes the sovereign free individual to be the ripest fruit of society and next evolution of man. However, we don’t know exactly what Nietzsche means by “free will” or how the sovereign individual assumes these features of free will and responsibility.

1.2 Free Will

The sovereign individual is a “master of free will,” but Nietzsche’s free will is not the same free will discussed in modern analytic literature. Nietzsche describes the will itself in the following manner. First, he claims, “Willing seems to me to be above all something complicated, something that is a unit only as a word—and it is precisely in this one word that the popular prejudice lurks.” There are “a plurality of sensations” in will. And there is also a ruling thought in every act of will, a commanding thought. Finally, there is an affect, “specifically the affect of command.” (BGE, 19 [p.25]) From these three assertions, Nietzsche concludes

“That which is termed ‘freedom of the will’ is essentially the affect of superiority in relation to him who must obey: ‘I am free, he must obey.’—this consciousness is inherent in every will; and equally so the straining of attention, the straight look that fixes itself exclusively on one aim...the inward certainty that obedience will be rendered—and whatever else belongs to the position of the commander. A man who wills commands something within himself that renders obedience, or that he believes renders obedience.” (BGE, 19 [p.26])

He goes on to say that the will is a “manifold thing,” and each human is “at the same time, the commanding and the obeying parties” of oneself. Nietzsche then follows this by equating the soul and will and states, “Our body is but a social structure composed of many souls.” Thus Nietzsche believes that man’s will is a complex constitution of many different commanding and obeying parties.

One may argue that this does not mean that Nietzsche believes the will is necessarily fragmented and disparate due to the interactions between man and society. In fact he immediately defines free will in the following manner. Free will “is the expression for

the complex state of delight of the person exercising volition, who commands and at the same time identifies himself with the executor of the order” (BGE 19 [p.26]).

Prima facie, this quote may invoke the reader to believe that Nietzsche’s account and the modern analytic’s metaphysical question of free will are in agreement. However, this is an inaccurate assumption because the modern free will problem understands science as a constraint and limiting factor on man’s freedom to control action. Nietzsche does not agree with this constraint. He states that there are no “causal connections” and that there are no “laws” of nature. Nietzsche instead claims that not just free will, but the question of free will in this metaphysical sense is “the best self-contradiction.” In fact, even the idea of a free will or an un-free will within a scientifically constrained philosophy is nothing but a mythology. Instead, for these reasons, we can conclude that Nietzsche disregards scientific constraints and claims that the modern analytic’s question of a metaphysically free will is both ridiculous and senseless (BGE, 21 [p.29]).

It still might not be apparent to the reader why Nietzsche would call the modern free will question a contradiction. Permit me to explain. The modern question of free will assumes that the world is constrained by the laws of cause and effect. Since men are objects in the world, men must also be constrained by the laws of cause and effect, and because of this fact, we must redesign our concepts of free will to be consistent with this scientific account. Nietzsche denies this scientifically constrained causal view of the world, and so the problem of modern analytic question of free will becomes a senseless question.²

² See Nehamas’s “Life as Literature” for Nietzsche’s account of truth and science.

If this is the case, then it is not immediately clear what Nietzsche means when he speaks about “free will,” and “responsibility” so we must ask: what does Nietzsche mean when he refers to this free sovereign individual? He answers immediately with the statement, “In real life, it is only a matter of strong and weak wills” (BGE 21[p.29]). But, it is important to note that Nietzsche is not talking about one man’s will being stronger than another man’s will. He is talking about the disparate set of wills within each individual. Remember that Nietzsche believes each man, in our modern culture, has become a legion of wills, a fundamental multiplicity, “a ball of wild snakes” (TSZ 1:6 [34]), and each fragment of will strives and struggles with the other fragments for power over the whole. Thus, when Nietzsche’s speaks of a strong will, he is speaking of one specific fragment of the will and its quest to dominate the others. And it seems that any particular fragment might become a dominant commander at any time. Thus, “strength” is not an adjective describing the will as a whole. Strength is a specific feature of one of many disparate wills as that specific will assumes dominance over the other disparate wills. And since any fragment may become dominant at any time, the strength of any specific will within this “ball of snakes,” is not measured in the frequency that it accesses dominance over the other fragments, but in its ability to both gain power and also hold that power over a certain length of time. This is a daunting task when no will wishes to obey, and each of these disparate wills wishes to command.

Returning to Essay 2 in the *On The Genealogy Morals*, Nietzsche claims that man desires to be a creature that can make promises, to connect a present will to a future will. This is because the sovereign individual has a sustained dominant instinct that rules over the ball of snakes that Nietzsche calls “will” in general. Connecting this understanding of the sovereign individual’s dominating instinct with Nietzsche’s premise that there are

only strong and weak wills, we can conclude that Nietzsche believes a free will to be a self-constituting process where the many disparate wills and their separate aims are unified by a particular dominating will which remains in its dominant state *permanently*. This permanent dominating will is the will of the “sovereign individual.”

If my claims to this point are accepted, I have defined what Nietzsche believes to be a free will as a will that is ruled permanently by a strong dominating instinct. Using this definition of free will we can conclude all of the following. First, the sovereign individual is a person that is both free and responsible for his actions. This autonomy depends on the fact that the sovereign individual has some dominating instinct that has become a permanent master over all the other fragmented parts of the will. Thus, a fragmented whole is unified by a dominating instinct (aka a dominating will) which allows man to take responsibility for his actions. And since Nietzsche claims that the sovereign individual is the only responsible man, the sovereign individual must be an individual who has unified his fragmented will because one must have a free will in order to be responsible.

Part 2: Nietzsche’s Will and Its Relations

In order to understand what unification of a will might mean, it would be helpful to know what Nietzsche means when he claims that the will is a “manifold thing” and “a necessary social structure.” For that reason the second part of my paper has two goals. First, I will argue that each fragment of the will is equated to a particular “drive.” And then I will argue that it is these numerous disparate drives and their relations between each other that creates both the “manifold” of the will, and its “social structure.”

My second goal further involves a further refinement of Nietzsche's concept conception of will. In order to achieve this goal I first introduce Paul Katsafanas' interpretation of Nietzschean psychology which equates each piece of Nietzsche's fragmented will with what Katsafanas calls a "drive." Second, I make further relations between Nietzsche's conceptions of fragmented will, unified will, body, self, and spirit. And last, I explain Nietzsche's denial of the relationship between intentional will, responsibility, and morality.

2.1 Drive Psychology

Paul Katsafanas claims that drives are the fundamental element in Nietzschean psychology because they contain both a motivational component and an attitudinal perspective component. First, Katsafanas argues that Nietzsche "invokes drives to explain broad patterns of behavior rather than particular instances of actions." (Katsafanas, 7) These drives are broad because they have indeterminate aims, and these indeterminate aims are different from teleological aims in that drives are not specifically oriented at one specific goal. Katsafanas also argues that "drives are indefinitely multiple and deeply intertwined, and the desires, emotions, and other affects that prompt particular actions are products of these intertwined drives. Accordingly, actions have highly complex etiologies and typically serve a multitude of ends." (Katsafanas, 13) Thus, it is always a drive or a set of drives that are the fundamental explanation to any action. Katsafanas ends this "motivational component" section by providing a brief sample of what he considers to be drives: "to imagine metaphors, to nature, to logic, to rest, to fight, to distinguish oneself, to create

art, to avoid boredom, to knowledge, to appearances, to religion, to freedom, to domination, to sex, to property, to politics, to play, to lie, to self-preservation, and to truth.” (Katsafanas, 8)

However, Katsafanas does not stop at the motivation level. He also argues that these drives influence and motivate ways in which we perceive the world. Katsafanas separates the forces of these perspectives into two components. First, drives influence salience and second, they distort. Due to this salience and distortion, they influence which facts we deem relevant and at the same time, they give a perspective “shading” or “coloring” to those events and facts. Because of this coloring and shading, we approach our surroundings with a perspective, and it is that perspective which both accesses and filters the relative information that we acquire about those surroundings. We can easily make sense of such a claim if we think about an example in which ten different people may describe a series of events in ten different ways. It is each person’s perspective, that creates these different interpretive descriptions, and these interpretations are influenced by each person’s controlling drive at that moment. Thus, “drives engender selective views of the world” (Katsafanas, 10). In this way, Katsafanas’ drives act much like what Nietzsche has described as the dominating instinct or the dominating will. And following Nietzsche’s metaphysical story about how a specific disparate will seizes control of the psyche, we can make sense of Katsafanas’s drives by equating each particular drive with a specific fragment of the disparate will.

Most importantly for the purposes of my paper, Katsafanas argues that “drives trigger thoughts, patterns of attention, and *evaluative outlooks*” (Katsafanas, 8). Drives have an evaluative component, and our perspectives are shaped by these evaluations. And if we follow the argument from the last paragraphs. Each drive is a specific disparate will,

and so each disparate will contains specific thoughts (beliefs), patterns of attention (desires), and evaluative outlooks (values). So, using Katsafanas's psychology, I claim that Nietzsche's use of the term "will" refers to more than conscious decision or conscious volition as described by the modern analytic philosopher. For Nietzsche, the will encompasses all of our mental activities, and each specific part of the will, each specific snake, has a specific set of mental capacities attached to it. Each fragment of the will has its own specific desire, its own specific value, its own specific reasoning capacity, its own perspective, its own emotions, etc. Therefore, we can conclude that the human will is a "manifold" piece of machinery.

2.2 Relations of Body, Self, Will, Spirit

Katsafanas's "drive" psychology explains what it means to be a disparate will, but the relations between the disparate will, the unified will, the spirit, the body and the self still need to be refined. Nietzsche explains the "spirit" of an individual in the following manner.

What I have just said of a "basic will of spirit" may not be readily understood: permit me an explanation. That commanding something which the people call "the spirit" wants to be master in and around its own house and wants to feel that it is master; it has the will from multiplicity to simplicity, a will that ties up, tames, and is domineering and truly masterful. Its needs and capacities are so far the same as those which physiologists posit for everything that lives, grows, and multiplies. The spirit's power to appropriate the foreign stands revealed in its inclination to assimilate the new to the old, to simplify the manifold, and to overlook or repulse whatever is totally contradictory...growth in a word—or more precisely, the feeling of growth, the feeling of increased power (will to power) (BGE 230 [p.159]).

Thus, the spirit is a particular dominating instinct (drive) that *tries* to command the other disparate fragments of will. This dominating instinct *tries* to move the disparate “multiplicity” into a “simplistic” unity. It also tries to “appropriate” the other fragments of will into itself. However, this assimilation of other disparate wills is also its test of power/strength. There is an implicit assumption in the above quote: Not all disparate drives (spirits) are capable of this complete appropriation and thus, by Nietzsche’s definition, these drives (though they may assume power for some time) will never be powerful enough to command and unify the whole set of disparate, fragmented wills in a permanent sense. Therefore, there must be a specific drive or drives that has more power than others, and it is this specific will that will show its “strength” by appropriating *all* other drives. This is a first step at understanding what Nietzsche means by “social structure.” Each fragment of will is capable of appropriating certain other fragments of will when that particular fragment seizes power. Thus each fragment has a necessary social structure to some other fragments of will.

It is this explanation of spirit that explains the relationship between free will, fragmented will, spirit, and the unified will also. First, Nietzsche claims that a “free will” is the attribute of will where a specific “strong” fragment of will commands obedience, and rules over the other disparate wills. Second, since “strength/power” was defined in the last paragraph as that will which appropriates the foreign and “assimilates the old into the new,” we can now assume that the fragment of will which is capable of “appropriating” all other disparate wills is the strongest will. Third, since the dominating will is called “the spirit” we can conclude that the strongest spirit appropriates all the other disparate wills and thus, unifies the set of disparate wills into a whole. We can also finally conclude that the

dominating spirit must be the spirit of the “sovereign individual” because the sovereign individual is ruled by a “permanently” dominant instinct (drive/will fragment).

Nietzsche also claims that this dominating spirit has a final goal, and that final goal is a creation of a “self.” In “On the Despisers of the Body,” Nietzsche writes “senses and spirit would like to persuade you that they are the end of all things.” However, senses and spirit are merely “tools and toys,” and “behind them there yet lies the self” (TSZ 1,4 [p.30,31]). “Behind... lies the self,” can be interpreted in one of two ways. The first way would claim that Nietzsche is speaking of the self, the senses and the spirit like an onion, and if a person peels away the layers of sense and spirit, that person will find the true self *behind* the first layers. This interpretation does not make sense with Nietzsche’s conception of human nature nor is it consistent with his arguments against a unified “I”. I argue this because being a “self” seems to require some type of unification and Nietzsche denies this unification when he presents us with a disparate will.

If these psychological drives are an extension of the body, it does not necessarily mean that when the disparate psychology is pulled away, there will be a unified whole beneath them. In fact, it may be better for simplicity to assume the opposite. Nietzsche says nothing about the body’s instincts being unified. He only claims that each of the body’s instincts correlates with one specific psychological drive. And so, the body’s instincts and the “self” associated with these instincts may parallel the disparateness of the extended psychology.

For these reasons, I propose that “behind” refers to chronology and so, “behind” means “after in time.” In this interpretation, “senses and spirit” are necessary capacities used to form a unified self. And so, when Nietzsche writes, “Behind your thoughts and feelings, my brother, stands a mighty commander, an unknown wise man—his name is

Self. In your body he dwells. He is your body.” Nietzsche is specifically speaking of the ability to become a unified Self. The senses and spirit are the means to that end Nietzsche calls “self” which can now also be called the unified will or the unified soul.³

In this same section, Nietzsche also states, “creating body created spirit as a hand of its will.” Thus, the will of the body created both sense and spirit as an extension of itself. Remembering that sense and spirit are the necessary components for creating a self, a crude linear progression of a constituted self can be seen in Nietzsche’s thoughts. Starting with bodily instincts, these instincts contain will that is discharged back upon the individual. The body reacts to this internal discharge by creating and expanding the mental world. This also expands the hand of the body’s will into the mental world. At this point there are various disparate fragmented wills (or what we can now call drives) that fight for dominance. Nietzsche believes that most people are dominated at any given time by any arbitrary instinct (which we will now call a drive because drives are extensions of instincts). However, Nietzsche does not believe this arbitrary, temporarily dominating drive succeeds at unifying the whole set of disparate wills. Nor does this this arbitrary, temporarily dominating drive make a person responsible. This is because most of these drives cannot “appropriate” the whole set of disparate drives. Therefore, Nietzsche believes there must be a specific drive or drives that are capable of appropriating and thus unifying all the other disparate drives, and it is this specific drive or drives that is the dominating instinct within the sovereign individual.

³ Notice that this description is also consistent with the way I described Katsafanas’s drive psychology in section 2.1 of this paper

2.3 Upshots of Nietzschean Drive Psychology

There are specific upshots to Nietzsche's account when we think about responsibility. For instance, when a specific value, desire, and way of reasoning are all linked together as part of a specific drive, weakness of will is no longer an issue in the way we currently understand weakness of will. The modern analytic concern with weakness of will disappears because there is no longer a conflict between one's desires (or emotions/or other motivational component) and one's rationality. If I am eating cake, whether I approve or disapprove of my actions, I must admit that the single action of eating cake contains a value for a cake, a desire to eat cake, and some type of reasoning to eat the cake. Therefore, I must also admit that my dominant will at this moment is one of "cake eating" and not the will of "dieting" and that at this moment in time, my desire and value for my diet program is weaker than my value to eat cake. This can be extended to moral actions in that I am forced to admit that the dominant drive at some time values, desires, and believes my actions to be somewhat reasonable even though I may have some moral drive that claims these actions are inappropriate. Finally, I am forced to take ownership of all my actions and words no matter how cruel or evil I believe them to be, and no matter how much I might like to disown them. I cannot merely say, I don't value that action and thus it is not a part of me.

A second upshot involves the conception of self. When I speak of a sense of self, I usually want to speak about a self that is unified and does not alienate any particular actions or thoughts. However, when values and desires are allowed to be exclusive and break apart as they do in some philosophical views, then a person can claim to be unified while

also denying certain parts of oneself.⁴ This is not a problem for Nietzsche's account because there is no weakness of will and thus no part of oneself that can be denied. This is because there is only the strong will that has found a dominating place in one's motivations and actions. And, until the disparate, fragmented will is unified, there can be no genuine conception of self, only multiple fragments of self that take command at given times. Because of this fact, I must admit that there are actions that I, as a fragmented self, commit that I do not like as opposed to prematurely denying that it was "I", a fully rational intentional self that committed the action.⁵

I introduce these upshots, in order to prompt an underlying assumption that grounds Nietzsche's moral psychology (and will also be important in the final part of this paper). Many philosophers have used consciousness as a starting point for both self-knowledge and rationality, and it is the relation between rationality and the other motivating components of the mind that creates both the problem of weakness of will and the problem of a unified self in analytic philosophy. Specifically, it is usually the rational conscious mind that is associated with the recognition of self-interest and moral duties. However, emotions or other motivational factors sometimes overrun the rational mind and so, people act in ways that are either immoral or not in their best self-interest. It is this phenomenon that is generally recognized as weakness of will. As previously argued, Nietzsche's psychology cannot recognize this type of weakness of will because, according to drive psychology, each drive contains its own conscious rationality, its own emotions, its

⁴ David Velleman has a narrative paper where he denies his actions in such a way.

⁵ This acceptance of one's actions without there being a self is a tricky conceptual structure which may need more explanation. However, its purpose in this paper is merely to show that Nietzsche doesn't agree with the modern conception of a unified self, and to promote questions about morality. Thus I will not give this conceptual structure a full explanation.

own values, and other such motivational factors. Thus rationality is not a separate component which conflicts with other motivating factors; instead, rationality is a smaller distinctive part of a larger whole called a “drive.”

The same consciousness that is used to assess rationality is used to assess the individual’s conceptions of both the self and controlled action. Thus, if I am conscious, I am capable of being a fully recognized person, and I am (to some degree) in control of my actions. This assumption that consciousness, rationality, and conceptions of self are intimately linked to responsibility and control of one’s actions entered the literature with Descartes, and it is these intimate connections between the concepts that Nietzsche claims we need to overcome.

Specifically, Nietzsche claims there are three levels of human understanding and consciousness existing in the genealogical progression towards morality. In the first level, there is the pre-moral in which the consequences of one’s actions being good for oneself is most important. At this level, there is no attempt at “self-knowledge” or impartial morality. Neither is there any attempt to relate morality with conscious intention of any sort. There is merely the expression of some instinct to grab that which one desires. This is how Plato’s interlocutor Thrasymachus speaks to Socrates in “The Republic.” Socrates asks, “What is justice?” And Thrasymachus replies, “Justice is the interests of the stronger.” Crudely, this may also say, “Justice is merely an attempt to limit my desires.” (Republic, 338 c)

Nietzsche goes on to state that there is a second level of understanding. This level of understanding involves consciousness; specifically *intention*. This type of understanding is Kantian, and in a Kantian fashion the answer to the question, “What is moral?” no longer concerns “my” personal consequences. Instead, it’s about impartial rationalization

by means of a categorical imperative. This intention carries a certain sense of self reflection, and so “It (also) involves the first attempt at self-knowledge,” because at this level, there is a conscious intention to correlate one’s actions with some moral truth. One must become self-reflective and measure if one’s own actions match actions as categorized by some objective moral truth.⁶

Notice that once this second level of understanding is in place, the individual may also reflect back on the former non-self-reflective state in the first level and refer to the first level as an egoistic state of morality. This type of conscious reflection cannot be done in the first level of moral understanding, so only the second level can judge the first level as egoistic.

This pattern will continue into the last level, where Nietzsche speaks about that which is “ultra-moral” and “unintentional.” And it is at this level that the modern analytic problems of weakness of will and conceptions of self disappear. The individual now has a new level of understanding that goes “beyond” the intentional. This understanding allows the “ultra-moral” to view and reflect on the second level of consciousness as inferior much in the same way that the second level is able to reflect and measure the first level of consciousness as inferior. It is also at this third level that Nietzsche claims we will go past the “the skin” of intentional rational thought, approach real self-knowledge, and furtherly develop in a moral sense. Therefore, we can conclude that Nietzsche believes the key to man’s next jump in morality is the recognition of that which is unconscious, and it is these unconscious factors that hold the key to man’s self-knowledge, freedom, and responsibility (BGE 32 [p.44]).

⁶ It is also this level that creates the problems of weakness of will and conceptions of self previously discussed because it creates rationality (intention) as a motivational component that conflicts with other motivational factors such as emotion, desire, etc.

Of course, a claim of this sort can only be understood and used to access self-knowledge if we accept the exact metaphysics of human nature and human 'drive' psychology that Nietzsche has proposed. The proposal follows: All men and women contain unconscious drives that correlate with specific values, desires, and actions. There is no second order evaluative system that tries to evaluate these drives. There are only weaker drives that voice their opinions. Thus, I gain self-knowledge by observing what drives are in control during different contexts. I observe my drives by observing my actions and thoughts, and it is these actions and thoughts that inform me of who I am. If I gain this knowledge, I am starting a progress from being a weak fragmented self towards a strong unified self that has a specific dominant drive at the helm. So for Nietzsche, oddly, the first step in taking responsibility for my life does not involve taking responsibility for all the actions that I have conscious and intentional control over. The first step is claiming that all my actions are mine in that they are all produced by some specific part of my fr

Part 3: The Spirits: The Process of Will Unification

If the logic has been followed to this point, then there are two questions left for the reader to ask. (1) Does Nietzsche provide a process of how the fragmented will may become unified? (2) What is this exact process of will unification where one becomes a sovereign individual? Or to ask this question in another way: How might a person acquire free will and the ability to be responsible for one's own actions? Nietzsche's answers these questions in the following manner. He closes the first essay in *On the Genealogy of Morals* with what he views to be the most important moral aim of man. He states that man must make some type of "determination of the order of rank among values." This is the

last sentence before the second essay, and it can therefore be taken as an introduction into the question of man's morality and the question of responsibility that he goes on to address in the second essay. He conveys this same claim in *Beyond Good and Evil* when he states, "In the philosopher...his morality bears decided and decisive witness to who he is—that is, in what order of rank the innermost drives of his nature stand in relation to each other" (BGE, 6 [p.14]).

In the previous sections we argued that each value is a component of a specific drive, and we argued that a dominating drive is always at the top of the social hierarchy within a person's will, so the last sentence can be reinterpreted as follows: Since a man's morality is decided by the rank and order of his values, a moral, responsible man is a man who has ranked and ordered his drives in a correct manner with a dominating instinct that properly appropriates all other drives. This means that ranking and ordering ones values can also be equated with the process of will unification, and if a person desires to take responsibility "there (must be) an order of rank among states of the soul" (BGE, 213 [p.140]) within that person. Thus, we can conclude that Nietzsche believes that a person unifies his will and assumes responsibility for his actions by ranking and ordering his values. If we insert "drives" for values, (which we can because one is a component of the other) we can restate the conclusion in the following manner. Nietzsche believes that if a man ranks and orders his drives then that person unifies his will and becomes a responsible moral agent.

The last part of my paper describes an account of three "spirits" (see 2.2) the individual must instantiate before being able to rank and order his values and thus take responsibility for his actions. However, the first speech (an aphorism) from *Thus Spoke*

Zarathustra must be read in its entirety before I can give that account. The speech follows:

Speech 1. On the Three Transformations

Three transformations of the spirit I name for you: how the spirit becomes a camel, and the camel a lion, and the lion at last a child.

There is much that is heavy for the spirit, for the strong, weight-bearing spirit in which reverence dwells: the heavy and hardest are what its strength desires.

What is heavy? Thus asks the weight-bearing spirit, and thus it kneels down, like the camel, and would be well laden.

What is heaviest, you heroes? Thus asks the weight-bearing spirit. That I may take it upon me and become well pleased with my strength.

Is it not this: lowering oneself, in order to hurt one's haughtiness? Letting one's folly shine forth, in order to mock one's wisdom?

Or is it this: separating from our cause when it celebrates victory? Climbing high mountains in order to tempt the tempter?

Or is it this: feeding on the acorns and grass of understanding and for the sake of truth suffering hunger of the soul?

Or is it this: being sick and sending the comforters home, and making friends with deaf people who never hear what it is you want?

Or is it this: stepping into filthy water, as long as they are the waters of truth, and not repelling cold frogs or hot toads?

Or is it this: loving those who despise us, and offering the spectre our hand when it wants to frighten us?

All these heaviest things the weight-bearing spirit takes upon itself: like the camel that presses on well laden into the desert, thus does the spirit press on into its desert.

But in the loneliest desert the second transformation occurs: the spirit here becomes a lion; it will seize freedom for itself and become lord in its own desert.

It's ultimate lord it seeks out here: his enemy it will become and enemy of his ultimate god; it will wrestle for victory with the greatest dragon.

What is the great dragon that the spirit no longer likes to call Lord and God? 'Thou shalt' is the name of the great dragon. But the spirit of the lion says "I will."

'Thou shalt' lies in its way, sparkling with god, a scaly beat, and on every scale there glistens, golden, 'Thou Shalt!'

Values thousands of years old glisten on these scales, and thus speaks the mightiest of all dragons: 'All value in things—that glistens on me.'

'All value has already been created, and all created value—that is me. Verily, there shall be no more "I will"!' Thus speaks the dragon.

My brothers, why is the lion needed in the spirit? Why does the beast of burden, which is renounces and is reverent, not suffice?

To create new values—that even the lion cannot yet do: but to create for itself freedom for new creation—that is within the power of the lion.

To create freedom for oneself and a sacred Nay even to duty: for that, my brothers, the lion is needed.

To seize the right to new values—that is the most terrible seizure for a weight-bearing and reverent spirit. Verily, a predation it is to such a spirit and a matter for a predatory beast.

Once it loved, as most sacred for it, ‘Thou shalt’: now it must find delusion and caprice even in the most sacred, that it might seize its freedom from its love: for this predation the lion is needed.

But say, my brothers, what can the child yet do that even the lion could not do? Why must the predatory lion yet become a child?

Innocence the child is and forgetting, a beginning anew, a play, a self-propelling wheel, a first movement, a sacred Yea-saying.

Yes, for the play of creating, my brothers, a sacred Yea-saying is needed: the spirit now wills its own will, the one who had lost the world attain its own world.

Three transformations of spirit have I named for you: how the spirit became a camel, and the camel a lion, and the lion at last a child.—

Thus spoke Zarathustra. And at that time he was staying in the town that is called: The Motley Cow.

Thus Spoke Zarathustra: (Nietzsche, 23,24)

Before analyzing this speech, I would like to present some notes that will help the reader go forward. First, in the first part of this paper, the sovereign individual was described as the end product of will unification. The speech (above) presents another ideal called “the child.” The child is like the sovereign individual in that the child is “a beginning anew... a self-propelling wheel, a first movement.” However, the child is also a “sacred yea-saying” spirit that affirms its life. This may mean that the child and the sovereign individual are not the same ideal because the sovereign individual seems to lack the feature of life affirmation. The sovereign individual ideal only contains freedom and responsibility. However, Nietzsche claims that the life instinct is will to power, and will to power is expressed in the sovereign individual by means of will unification, the affirmation (the life instinct) of one’s life must be expressed through this will unification (GM 2,18 [p.87]). It is also the case that the child must affirm its life and so the child may use the same

process of will unification. This means that the sovereign individual and the child have the same goal and even if they may be separate ideals, the two can be equated if we wish to understand the process of will unification.

Second, I would like to remind the reader of some of the main feature in Katsafanas's psychology. First, for the purposes of this paper, we can exchange the terms "values," "drives," and "will" because each specific value is intimately connected to a specific, desire, and perspective, and all of these are the necessary constituent parts of a single drive. Second, once psychological drives have been identified with necessary constitutive components of will and value, the following claim can be made: ranking and ordering one's values, ranking and ordering one's drives, and ranking and ordering one's disparate fragments of will are all equated in this process.

Third, Using Katsafanas's psychology, I assume that the camel and the lion are two different drives within the human psyche. I will also assume Nietzsche's "spirit" (see 2.2) to be the dominating drive at any specific moment. So the "spirit" of the camel is instituted within the individual when the set of drives known as the camel are the ruling power of the human psyche. And, the "spirit" of the lion is instituted within the individual when the set of drives known as the lion are the ruling power of the human psyche.

Last, this final section's total objective and thesis is to identify a process that Nietzsche would equate with the process of an individual's attempt to unify his will. The argument will proceed in the following manner. First, I quickly present an interpretation of the speech, and then I explain specific conflicts a reader may have with this first interpretation. Second, I suggest a second interpretation that reads the speech in a "functional" manner such that each spirit serves a "functional" relation to the others. The functions are all different, but each function will make sense as we advance through the material.

In my third and final argument: I will argue that the unified will can only be formed from the seemingly opposite camel and lion spirits, and once this occurs, Nietzsche's ideal of the sovereign individual is instantiated within the person, and that person is a free-willed, responsible moral agent.

3.1 First Interpretation

The first spiritual form that Nietzsche speaks about is the camel. Nietzsche describes the camel as a tame creature of reverence. It is a "weight-bearing spirit" that is "pleased" to take on the burdens that it has been given. This person happily takes on its moral burden of "renouncing" because he possesses an attitude of reverence toward what he believes to be moral truth. This attitude of reverence manifests itself in the "love" (TSZ 1:1 [24]) the camel has for the truth. The camel is willing to suffer "for the sake of truth," and it is willing to step into "filthy waters" in order to find and follow moral truth. These characteristics of reverence and truth seeking allow the spirit to proceed alone into the desert where it will then transform into the lion (TSZ 1;1 [23]).

The lion is the second form in the hierarchy presented in "On the Three Transformations." The lion "seizes freedom for itself and becomes lord in its own desert" (TSZ 1;1 [23]). This desert is the world of values and beliefs, and in this desert the lion does battle with the dragon. The dragon is the law of "thou shall," and the dragon claims that "all value has already been created." Notice this is a moral realist claim much like Kant's categorical imperative. Since the lion refuses the laws of "thou shall," the lion also rejects Kantian moral realism when it says, "I will." However, this spirit is not one of creation but

of critique. It critiques and it denies moral realism. This will can only be anti-moral realism. It says “Nay” to all Kant’s “duties,” and in this denial it creates the “freedom for new creation.” The lion “seizes its freedom from (the camel’s) love.” And in the process, the lion destroys the reverence that the camel possessed for moral truth in the form of Kant’s moral realism. However, the lion possesses no value of its own. It is a valueless spirit, and so it is also a spirit of nihilism (TSZ 1;1 [24]).

Finally, the man must become a “child.” The child is a “self-propelling wheel, a first movement, a sacred Yea-saying.” The first two characteristics describe the child’s unified will. It is free and its own cause for its actions. It is an active will and not a reactive will. The last characteristic describes the child’s reverence, and thus affirmation of its own value system. This “spirit now wills its own will” (TSZ 1;1 [24]). Yet once again, we must ask, “How can a responsible and playful spirit arise out of a nihilistic tendency.

3.2 The Problems of Transformation

When the “spirit” is interpreted as the psychological drive/will that is likely to dominate at some give time,⁷ certain problems may arise during attempts to explain the relationships between these three forms. *Prima facie*, if we take the perspective of each animal spirit, all of these forms are both isolated from each other and antagonistic towards each other in that they do not seem to be compatible or related by any measures. Proof of isolation consists in the fact that the camel is reverent, but the lion is valueless. The child laughs, while the lion destroys. And the camel is reverent towards objective moral values, but the child follows his own internal set of subjective values. Thus there

⁷ See section 2.2

are no seemingly consistent, overlapping characteristics that these spirits share. Furthermore, the move from camel to lion to child is one of reverence to destruction/nihilism and back to reverence, and Nietzsche offers no explanation of how each spirit form may be constructed or converted to another within this process. Thus these spirits are not merely incompatible; they are antagonistic towards each other. Putting both of these concerns together, Nietzsche specifically does not explain how a spirit that has reverence for rule and law can transform into a nihilistic, anti-cultural spirit, and then back into an innocent, reverential spirit.

The next few paragraphs will further motivate these problems between the camel, lion, and child spirits. The camel is *prima facie*, the common man of a culture, but Nietzsche does not explicitly make this claim. In fact, he is already speaking about an extremely specific type of psyche. Notice how the camel has reverence for the moral rules that are placed upon its back. This reverence is important, but Nietzsche is making a more specific claim than first recognized because he claims that there is love in the reverence, thus love and reverence have a specific relationship for Nietzsche. Starting with this relationship between love and reverence, the camel can be distinguished from other animals in the “herd,” but there are even distinctions between the other “herd” types.

One example concerns the strength of sustaining a dominating will. This characteristic varies in degree depending on the particular type of “herd” animal. Nietzsche claims in the *Genealogy of Morals* that the ascetic priests are masters of themselves in a way that the common man is not. This allows them to rule over the common people. Once we realize that mastery over one’s will comes in degrees, other non-explicit distinctions can be made that separate the herd from the camel. (GM 3,15) For instance, not all people follow the rules and laws of their society because they have a positive attitude of reverence

towards these rules and laws. There is a first set of people who hold a neutral attitude towards these laws and rules. Thus, other motivations compel them to follow their culture. First, they may follow rules and laws out of habit. Second, they may desire to be inconspicuous. Or third, they may follow rules and laws for utility reasons. And there is yet another set of people who hold an attitude of rebellion against these laws but follow the laws for the same reasons as the first group or have the extended motivation of fearing the punishment that will be inflicted upon them. Thus, the attitude of reverence is extremely specific and not held by all tamed animals.

This first interpretation of the speech portrays the camel spirit as an individual that is more refined than most of the herd. It is a creature of reverence who follows morals truth no matter what the consequences. This is a Kantian Ideal (see 2.3). If we assume the sovereign individual and the child spirit are equated, we can return to Essay 2.2 of the *Genealogy* for this implicit, if not explicit claim. Nietzsche states with parentheses, “for autonomous and moral are mutually exclusive.” This parenthetical remark is not an attack against morality in general. It is an attack against Kant’s account of morality and Kant’s ideal of the autonomous human being. Kant believes that the moral agent is the autonomous agent in that one’s autonomy depends on how well one instantiates moral truths in one’s actions. This relates back to the camel because the Kantian idea of morality involves a tool that he calls a categorical imperative. This tool is an extension of man’s rational function which presumably allows man to gain epistemic access to morally objective facts external to man’s own subjective thoughts, desires, and emotions. Thus, Nietzsche believes the camel is an ideal Kantian agent who follows the moral law not because of fear or practicality, but because the moral law is the moral truth.

Now that the camel has been categorically distinguished from all the other tamed animals, the camel's conflict with the lion is more profound. The camel spirit is in itself a masterful spirit in that it commands itself, it feels power and affirms itself by following moral law. However, the camel is more than a creature that follow the rules and laws consistently. The camel is a creature who does this not with a neutral or negative attitude, but with a positive attitude of reverence. In Kantian terms, the camel is someone who embraces moral truth and therefore, does the right thing for the right reasons. And, if a person embraces this type of self-constitution scheme, it is an even more difficult task to understand why the camel's strong loving reverence might take the further antithetical step into nihilism. From all this, the reader may conclude the following: once this extreme difference between the camel and other herd animal is distinguished, the additional claim that the camel's reverence is antithetical to the lions' nihilism is almost severe because the reader may ask, "What is wrong with the form of the camel's spirit? What reason would it need to transform into something else?"

The problem of the lion's transition to the child is more straightforward than the camel. It is not a problem of motivation, but a problem of ability. The lion's will is strong, and its will is supposedly stronger than the camel's since it is above the camel in the hierarchical structure of spirits. And yet, the lion is both powerful and impotent at the same time. This is not an outright contradiction, but it does not make sense either. If the lion is powerful enough to separate itself from the system of values that the camel followed, shouldn't the lion also have the ability to create a new set of values for itself?

Without the ability to create new values, the lion is nothing but a spirit of destruction. This produces further questions: why should the lion be viewed to be any stronger than the camel when the lion is a creature that exists in a state of nihilism (no values)?

And without values, shouldn't the lion slip into chaos and death, for if nothing has value, how does the lion continue to function or order its life in any systematic manner that affirms said life?

And last, from this state of nihilism, the strenuous task of recreating reverence appears to be an impossibility because the ideal of moral realism has been destroyed. So the reader may also want to ask: what power does a nihilist spirit of destruction have to become a spiritual form that is fully autonomous, self-willing, and creator of its own values (like a child)? Or to ask another way, how does the impotent, valueless lion suddenly regenerate itself and shift into a form that is a first cause, responsible and free in a moral sense?

Interpretation 2

3.3 The Camel Spirit: Reverence/Affirmation Function

These problems can be solved if we reconcile the differences between the spirits. We know that the spirits appear in a specific order, and this order may be necessary to Nietzsche. If an argument can be made that each spirit performs a necessary function and contains a necessary feature that allows the preceding or following spirit to also do its function, then the tensions between the spirits can be relieved. Thus, locating that function is a promising effort to understanding the correct relations between the spirits and relieving the tensions that exists between said spirits. I will explain the function of the camel spirit in two ways. First I will explain the camel's features as they relate to Kantian moral law. Second, I will explain why the camel, as a Kantian ideal, leads to nihilism.

Specifically, the camel spirit needs Kant's objective moral law in order to grow and prepare for the lion transformation. Nietzsche believes that the camel "lowers itself"

in order to “hurt its haughtiness.” This means that the camel takes on the attitude of one who “obeys.” When the camel “obeys,” the moral law, the camel is obeying the laws of the Kant’s categorical imperative. Of course these laws are external to the camel, but they are also empowering to the camel because the camel believes these laws to be his own. The camel “recognize(es) something outside oneself as one’s own” because its rational will is presumably able to assess these external objective moral truths by use of the categorical imperative. So, the camel is capable of affirming its life and thus, expresses its will to power through this process of recognizing objective moral truths by use of the rational will.

The camel’s attitude towards engaging with these objective moral laws is also specific. It is an attitude of celebration. The camel is a strong spirit that happily does what it is told. Kant’s categorical imperative says “Thou shall not…” and the camel follows each and every law because the camel’s will to power is invigorated by following these laws. The camel is strong in will because it follows the laws with a sense of reverence, and it is this reverence that distinguishes the camel from the common, standard man.

We can once again contrast the camel with the common standard man. Such men follow moral laws for a different reason—“they want that nobody should hurt them” “virtue for them is whatever makes one modest and tame. With that they have made the wolf into a dog and the human being itself into the human’s best domestic animal” (TSZ 3:5, [147]). This quote describes the characteristic of the “herd” animals who are not camels, and it also implicitly describes two of the camel’s Kantian characteristics. First, the camel is not afraid to suffer. This parallels Kant’s ideal moral agent because Kant’s agent does not worry about the consequences of his actions. Suffering may be involved in doing the right thing. Second, the goal of the camel is neither modesty nor civility. The goal, much

like Kant's ideal, is self-unification that leads to life affirmation. So we can conclude that the camel spirit shares the characteristics of other domesticated animals in that the camel follows moral laws. But the standard man celebrates that which he cannot do while the camel uses the external objective moral laws as a means to affirm life by sustaining a will that seeks to obey with a sense of reverence (GM 1:14 [483]).

Now that the camel can be fully understood as a Kantian ideal, its problems must be recognized. The features that follow are the clues that Nietzsche has given the reader to work with in understanding the camel. First, the camel is a specific drive or set of drives whose dominant characteristic is reverence, and reverence contains and is expressed in the attitudes of holding sacred, affirming the worth of, nurturing, and obeying. Second, the camel wants to take on the weight of something, and that something is the restrictions placed on the camel by objective moral law.

Through these features, the camel seems to be a true life affirming spirit that should be able to unify the will. However, this assumption is wrong for the following reason. While describing the camel, I have deliberately made the reader aware of the fact that "objective moral laws" exist external to the camel, and it is this fact that is a problem for the camel. Nietzsche believes that appealing to external objective moral laws is a denial of one's own life because to affirm something outside of oneself is not the same thing as affirming one's own life. The camel thinks that he is affirming himself when he affirms objective moral laws due to his rational capacity. But this is wrong because the camel is only affirming one part of himself, his rational capacity. It consciously believes that its rational will has accessed moral objective truths and if the camel aligns itself with those moral truths, then it will unify its will. However, this all results in the following problem:

By gaining epistemic access to morally objective facts, the camel also attaches its reverence to an external source. The camel then identifies this external source of morality as its reason for living. Thus, the camel affirms its life in a non-life affirming process. Nietzsche calls this lack of life affirmation “nihilism.”

3.4 The Lion Spirit: Doubt Function

In order to understand the relation between the camel and the lion we need to first know the lion’s function and how that function may be invigorated or helped by the camel spirit. The function of the lion is written in Zarathustra’s speech. It has the function of “seiz(ing) freedom for itself” and becoming its own “lord.” The lion seizes its freedom from its “enemy,” its “ultimate god,” also known as the “greatest dragon.” And, “Thou shalt” is the name of this lord. “Thou shalt” refers to Kant’s duty and the lion “says Nay even to duty.”

Putting this into context, the camel spirit obeys that which objective moral truth commands and the natural conclusion to this relationship is nihilism. Kant’s duties and laws of “thou shalt” are the objective moral truths that hold power like a lord over the camel, and thus lead the camel into nihilism. In order to save itself from life denial, the camel must instantiate the lion so that it may seize back its right to rule over itself and affirm its own life.

So from this perspective, the lion is not a means to nihilism. The lion is instead, the savior who recognizes the forthcoming nihilism of the camel, and in order to save the individual from falling into life denial, the lion to seizes command from that which is external. The lion says, “No” to the demands, obligations, and duties that Kant’s moral law

places upon the back of the camel spirit. The lion says “No” to Kant’s categorical imperative because it is the lion’s function to save the camel from life denial. The lion does this by celebrating and affirming the only thing it really can, its own existence. In order to do this is must tell all external sources, including society, “I no longer have one consciousness with you” (TSZ 1:17, [54]).

I have explained what the lion does for the camel, but the relationship is reciprocal and the camel also helps the lion. Nietzsche recognizes a deeply ingrained instinct in humans. We are social creatures by nature, and we crave the companionship of other people. We crave their support. We crave their intimacy. We crave their touch and their recognition. However, this social instinct is an external source of life affirmation, and so it must also be cut away. Nietzsche recognizes this deep ingrained instinct not just for its existence, but for its strength. Thus the lion must use the strength of will that the camel has developed, the will and ability to suffer and sit alone with one’s burdens. In this way, the lion uses the camel’s strength to cut the individual’s ties with all external sources of life affirmation, including all other people.

The lion is the result of the camel’s realization of its own strength in reverence. The camel has spent time practicing its duties and obligations without appeal to any type of consequences. It does what is good because “doing the good” is the moral truth that it abides by. Hence, the camel rejects both consequences and all appeals to human pleasure as being good. This requires much strength however, the lion knows that the object of reverence can no longer be that which is external. The new object of reverence must be oneself. The lion is the understanding that a person knows, by way of the camel’s practices, that he has the ability to live completely free of others. Once this realization is made, the camel does the heavy lifting for the severe, lion. The lion’s strength is derivative of

the camel's ability to obey the lion as the lion battles with one of the wills strongest instincts. That instinct is the desire to be part of something external to itself. Such externalities include, both society and objective moral laws.

The lion drive uses the strength of the camel drive in order to make its break from the external. However, I can also ask, "What capacities does the lion drive contain in itself?" "What motivates the lion to break away?" The answer is two-fold: doubt and courage. "Delusion and caprice" refer to the doubt that must be placed on every value from an external source, and critique with severity is a must. Nietzsche states, "To understand: that is the pleasure of the lion willed" (TSZ 3,16 [p.179]). For Nietzsche, understanding requires knowledge and certain tendencies. "Every courageous thinker will recognize this in himself...he has hardened and sharpened his eye for himself long enough and that he is used to severe discipline as well as severe words" (BGE, 230 [p.161]). This courageous severity in the lion's intellectual doubting process parallels the severity of the camel's reverence.

3.5 The Child Spirit: Ranking and Ordering Function

The processes of camel and lion seem to naturally follow one another when we realize that both the lion is the camel's savior, and the camel is a means to the lion's objective. The next step is to understand the child's function and relate that function back to both the lion and the camel. Most of Nietzsche's imagery concerning the child relates to affirmation, autonomy, and responsibility. This "child is described as "a beginning anew, a play, a self-propelling wheel, a first movement, a sacred yea-saying." However, the child is also "innocent" and "forgetting."

The first part of this imagery is much like the sovereign individual, however “innocent” and “forgetting” need to be explained and somehow related to the other concepts. In order to provide this explanation I will take a step back and talk about Nietzsche’s concepts of creation, destruction and transformation. Once these concepts are explained I will relate them back to Nietzsche’s imagery and continue the explanation of the child spirit.

3.5 (a) Transformations

(1) “Change of values—that means change of creators. Whoever must be a creator always annihilates” (TSZ 1:15, [52])

(2) “whoever must be a creator in good and evil: verily, he must first be an annihilator and shatter values.” (TSZ 2:12, [100])

(3) “The one who breaks their tablet of values, the breaker, the lawbreaker:--yet that is the creator” (TSZ 1:9, [21])

Destruction, creation, and transformation are specific relations for Nietzsche. I will start with transformation. First, there are two ways an object may transform its qualities in relation to time. It may change these properties instantaneously or incrementally. An example of instantaneous change would consist in pouring certain chemical solutions together such that they produce a precipitate instantly. As soon as the two solutions interact, the empirical qualities change. An example of incremental change consists in watching a tadpole change into a frog or watching a caterpillar change into a butterfly.

There is also a second question to be asked about transformation. What does it mean when we say something has transformed? This change may mean (a) adopting some new essential features, (b) loss of some essential features, (c) adoption and loss of some essential features, (d) loss of all previous essential features and adoption of all new

essential features, or (e) manipulation of essential features. Of course what we call essential here is relative to context so I will stay at the levels of appearance for most of this argument.

Roughly, examples of (a,b,c) can be found in a caterpillar's appearance as it changes into a butterfly. Wings are grown and color is added and the caterpillar seems to be a new insect. Hair is lost. And depending on the type of caterpillar (a), (b) or (c) happens at the appearance level. However at the DNA level, the caterpillar and the butterfly are the same. One may wish to explain the caterpillar's transformation in terms of (d) but this is incorrect because the DNA of the caterpillar and the butterfly are the same. One cannot change the DNA of the caterpillar without creating something new. (d) may be called magic because it's an impossibility in the everyday world of human existence. The DNA stays the same, but some parts of the DNA are expressed at certain times whereas other parts of the DNA are expressed at other times. An example of (e) is in the aqueous solutions from the time relation. The two solutions were combined and formed a precipitate. However, all elemental components remain the same even though the appearance of the elements change as they recombine with other elements in the solutions.

The question now is which type of these types of transformations does Nietzsche appeal? The answer lies in Nietzsche's story about internalizing the instincts. The instinctual drives wish to present themselves in an external manner, but they are forced back into man creating the depth and breadth of man's inner world. But Nietzsche admits that nothing is essentially changed about the drives, only their appearance. Just as ice become water, the material-instinctual drives becomes mental drives. And as Nietzsche claims "all instincts that do not discharge themselves outward turn inward—this is what I call the

internalization of man” (GM 2:16, [520]) Thus Nietzsche’s change in spirit is truly a transformation of type (e) because it is a manipulation of essential elements. There is only a solution of various elements that combine, separate, and recombine. However, as these elements recombine with each other, the outward actions and behaviors can change. So at the lower level there is only manipulation of elements whereas at the upper level, there are extreme changes.

3.5 (b) Creation and Destruction

A second question of transformation involves the relationship between creation and destruction. There are three ways creation and destruction happen. I will review these three ways in terms of building/creating a hospital. (1), One may first build/create a new hospital from new resources and then destroy/bulldoze the old hospital. (2), One may first destroy/bulldoze the old hospital and then build a new hospital using new resources or some combination of the old and new resources. And third, one may take apart the old hospital piece by piece while simultaneously using those pieces to build a new. Notice that in the first two examples, new resources are introduced and there are elements of before and after, but in the last example, only the existing resources are required and the creation destruction happen simultaneously.

Nietzsche’s metaphysics concerning the internalization of desires only correspond to the third option. The first two options of creation need new resources and these resources are not available to the spirit. It must work with the drives it has been given. However, a remark can be made. Returning to the butterfly/caterpillar example, certain expressions of DNA may happen at certain times meaning there are resources in storage that have not been used. In the same way a hospital may have resources in its basement

that are not used in the current hospital but may be used in the creating the new hospital. And, so a spirit may also have unused drives that it incorporates as it becomes stronger.

3.5 (c) Back to the Child

Understanding the child in relation to these concepts of creation, destruction, and transformation helps explain the functions of “forgetting” and “innocence.” It also helps to relate “forgetting” and “innocence” to the other features: “a beginning anew, a play, a self-propelling wheel, a first movement, a sacred yea-saying.”

From the previous sections, I assume that the child is the culmination of the will unification process, thus the child is the individual who contains a unified will, and for Nietzsche, a unified will is a will that has a permanently sustained dominant drive that rules over all the other drives. I also assume that in a free will, the drives that are lower can be brought forth when they are needed by the dominant drives thus there is various rearrangements of these lower drives depending on how the lower can serve the higher. These rearrangements are transformations of creation and destructions where the permanent reigning spirit both creates and destroys its underlying structure. This was previously referred to as “appropriation.”

So when the child is “forgetting” it is not forgetting in the sense of forgetting a memory. It is forgetting in the sense that it can rearrange the multiple components of its will. We can understand this if we use the opposition of words, forgetting and remembering. One may remember some thought, idea, etc. But one may also re-member an object, meaning to put it back together. Thus when the child “forgets,” the child allows a current structure of drives/will to fall apart, and then it re-members the drives/will in a different

structure depending on the circumstance. And thus, like creation and destruction, forgetting and remembering happen simultaneously as the non-dominant drives are “appropriated” in new ways.⁸

The child’s “innocence” can also be related to this structuring. This restructuring is always a new start, a new affirmation, thus when the wills are rearranged the child is reborn. And so there is a “beginning anew” and a “first movement.” This affirmation works with the analogy of the child at “play” because when a child plays with a toy at some particular moment in time, that toy is everything to the child. The child affirms the value of the toy, and that affirmation is the “sacred yea-saying” of the child. That toy is the child’s most valuable possession. And then, there will be another moment where there is a new toy, a new situation and the child forgets the past. There is another “forgetting,” another restructuring and another first movement.

Thus the function of the child is to “rank and order” values, and I argue that the child “ranks and orders” the existing values, thus remolding the individual into something new. This process of “ranking and ordering” one’s values is the process of creating, destroying, and transforming simultaneously while using the same materials, adding nothing new, nor taking anything away. Even more, since the will and “self” have been equated, this process of “ranking and ordering” of values is equivalent to molding, shaping, and constructing the self.

⁸ This was suggested by Scott Cowan.

3.5 (d) Woman and Man: Camel and Lion

But how does the child accomplish this “ranking and ordering,” and how does the child use the other two spirits to accomplish its goal? We must remember that the camel and lion drives are not unifying spirits alone. They are sets of drives that command for a certain amount of time, affirming life in particular ways, but also destined for failure if left in their dominant position. Hence, the camel and lion spirits are not permanent while the child must be permanent.

I believe that the child is not a new spirit or drive. The child is the outcome of both the camel and lion drives sharing this dominant position. So, in an aristocratic fashion, these two drives share leadership over all the other drives and this unification of leadership between the two drives also unifies the individual’s will as a whole. The camel and lion drives act as internal, self-valuing commanders, and all other drives obey these masters. Thus the child spirit uses the lion to say “nay to duty” and “seizes the right to new values.” And at the same time, the child uses the obeying camel to affirm these new values. Nietzsche does not explicitly claim that the camel and lion must combine under the child spirit, but the child is a contradiction in that it both creates and destroys. Separately, the lion and the camel contradict each other also much in the same way. The camel is a drive of reverence (creation) while the lion is a drive of doubt (destruction). But Nietzsche provides a reconciling metaphor using men and women. This metaphor may point at the final relationship between these two drives.

First, Nietzsche implicitly claims that the camel drive is a feminine drive. He says, “Where there is great love of oneself, it is the true sign of pregnancy.” (TSZ 3:3 [139]) He also refers to the “maternal instinct, the secret love of that which is growing in him” This maternal instinct that Nietzsche refers to is not creation but love for something, and also

the desire to care and nurture something. Pregnancy is the promise of creation and the maternal instinct is that which nurtures and provides care. Though the analogy has its flaws, the instincts to nurture and provide care are much like the reverence of the camel. We can claim that when an individual has reverence for something, that individual takes care of the revered object. So the camel can be represented as the spirit of the nurturer. Nietzsche names this spirit “woman.”

Second, Nietzsche implicitly claims that the lion drive is a masculine drive. I have also argued that the lion represents doubt, and doubt is the polar opposite of reverence. The camel has reverence for society and therefore, the camel obeys without question. The lion’s most basic feature is to question whether that reverence is due. The lion doubts, and with this doubt the lion destroys reverence for society. The violence of the lion can be quoted if we associate the lion with the male. Nietzsche claims “Thus will I have man and woman: the one adept in war, the other adept in birth, but both adept in dancing with heads and legs.” (TSZ 3:23, [183])

Third, both the lion and the camel are impotent alone. Neither of them is a “creator” of values. The lion can say “No,” but it cannot create value. The camel can revere but it cannot give birth value. Thus neither the lion nor the camel can create values alone. Relating this back to the man and woman, only the woman’s body is capable of giving birth, but the woman cannot give birth until she is joined with the man. They must become one before the child can be created. Thus the contradiction of man and woman, birth and war, reverence and doubt, must be united to produce a laughing child. And once joined, the lion can protect and say “NO” while the camel claims and reveres new values. Thus they work together as a unit in self-creation.

Nietzsche's speech "On Children and Marriage" also gives reason to accept this interpretation that the camel and lion become the aristocratic dominating drives and this shared dominance gives birth to the "child" spirit. He writes:

You are young and wish for a child and marriage. But I ask you now: are you a human being with the right to wish for a child?"—Not only onward shall you propagate yourself, but upward! May the garden of marriage help you to do so! A higher body shall you create, a first movement, a self-propelling wheel—a creator shall you create. Marriage: thus I call the the will of two to create the one that is more than those who created it. Reverence for each other I call marriage, as for the willers of such a will.

He restates this relationship later in *Zarathustra* when he says, "To propagate yourselves not only onward, but upward—to that end, O my brother, may the garden of marriage help you" (TSZ 3,24 [184]). Both of these quotes imply a relationship of two things creating one and with that creation, the spirit rises in terms of its spirituality. Hence, the camel and lion rise to become the child. And as they rise towards will unification, autonomy, and responsibility, certain features can be claimed that identify the child. Nietzsche claims "All good things laugh—whoever is approaching his goal dance—Lift up you hearts, my brothers, high! Higher! And do not forget your legs either! Lift up you legs too, you fine dancers and better still: even stand on your heads" (TSZ 4,17 [257])

This marriage relation between the spirits is also strengthened by Nietzsche's metaphors of "ripe fruit" and "miscarriage." The child is the fruit of the man and woman but if the process is not completed, the individual becomes a miscarriage because the ideal has not been achieved. Those who are self-creators are often referred to by this metaphor of pregnancy. Nietzsche writes, "You creators, you superior humans! One is pregnant only for one's own child" and "In your selfishness, you creators, is the prudence and providence

of those who are pregnant! That which no one has ever laid eyes on, the fruit: that is what your entire love shelters and protects and nourishes” (TSZ 4,11 [254]).

There may still be a question of how this unification happens in a metaphysical sense. There must be some type of feature or relationship between the two that acts as a unifier. I suggest that Nietzsche uses a Hegelian style of argument for this unifying feature. This can be confirmed if we notice that Nietzsche constantly speaks of the spirit “rising” in many of the quotes that I used to connect the camel and the lion in the previous paragraphs. This “rising” of spirit is the same language Hegel uses when he speaks of “new” knowledge. Coarsely,⁹ Hegel believes that new knowledge is gained in the following manner. There is a thesis and antithesis, and these two are seemingly opposite, but then we find a way to synthesize these two opposites into a unified whole. In this way, old knowledge concerning a thesis and an antithesis “rises” into a new type of synthesized knowledge. This process of Hegelian knowledge is a metaphor for the metaphysical process that happens with the camel and the lion. The camel and lion are not only two distinct components. They are opposites in the same way thesis and antithesis are opposites. However, they must share one specific dominant spot of existence. They “rise” into this dominant spot in the psyche, and it is there that they seize command. Neither alone, can unify the will but when they assume this aristocratic rule over the other drives, they not only bring opposites into synthesis, they bring a multitude of drives into synthesis. And it is this feature of shared dominance that acts as not only their own unification but as the unification of the entire will.

⁹ As a Non-Hegelian scholar...

In conclusion, if my interpretation is accepted, the child spirit is the interplay between these two dominating spirits: camel and child. The child both commands reverence to itself and its own values, and it ranks and orders its drives. In this fashion Nietzsche's project of responsibility and what it means to self-create goes beyond Kant's. Kant's conception of autonomy begins and ends with morality, yet the extent of the human condition goes past Kant's ethical concerns. There is much that Kant leaves out when he speaks about the will and its freedom, especially about one's own goals and desires. Hence Nietzsche uses the camel to show how Kant's conception of morality leads to nihilism or life denial. He uses the lion spirit to critique these external systems of affirmation and then cut oneself off from them. And last he uses the child spirit as a mean of establishing the features of a fully functional autonomous and responsible individual. For this reason, Nietzsche goes beyond Kant. And so if you thought that it was hard to be free, responsible and moral according to Kant's standards, it is might as well be impossible to be free, responsible and moral according to Nietzsche. However, that does not mean that we should not strive for this ideal, to be sovereign individuals, self-creating children at play.

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