

## University of Wisconsin Milwaukee UWM Digital Commons

---

Theses and Dissertations

---

May 2016

# Voting Radical Right in Europe: a Comprehensive Explanation for Vote Choice

Michael Allan Hansen

*University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee*

Follow this and additional works at: <https://dc.uwm.edu/etd>

 Part of the [Political Science Commons](#)

---

### Recommended Citation

Hansen, Michael Allan, "Voting Radical Right in Europe: a Comprehensive Explanation for Vote Choice" (2016). *Theses and Dissertations*. 1148.

<https://dc.uwm.edu/etd/1148>

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by UWM Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of UWM Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [open-access@uwm.edu](mailto:open-access@uwm.edu).

VOTING RADICAL RIGHT IN EUROPE: A COMPREHENSIVE EXPLANATION  
FOR VOTE CHOICE

by

Michael A. Hansen

A Dissertation Submitted in  
Partial Fulfillment of the  
Requirements for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy  
in Political Science

at

University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee

May 2016

## ABSTRACT

### VOTING RADICAL RIGHT IN EUROPE: A COMPREHENSIVE EXPLANATION FOR VOTE CHOICE

by

Michael A. Hansen

The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2016  
Under the Supervision of Professor David A. Armstrong II

Although the radical right in liberal democracies have received a wealth of attention in the literature, the mechanisms explaining individual radical right vote choice are unclear. This analysis provides the first comprehensive theoretical framework and empirical modeling of individual radical right vote choice. The choice to vote for a radical right party is a function of several factors. First, the opportunity structure in the form of external supply-side factors must be conducive for radical right success. Second, parties must make crucial decisions in order to take advantage of the opportunity structure (internal supply-side factors). Then, macro-social force illicit the adoption of crucial attitudes correlated with the radical right. Finally, these attitudes directly impact vote choice for radical right parties. This dissertation finds that attitudes alone do not necessarily lead to voting for a radical right party. Instead, macro-forces and supply-side factors play a significant role in the ability and desire to cast a vote for radical parties.

© Copyright by Michael A. Hansen, 2016  
All Rights Reserved

# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<b>List of Figures</b>	<b>vi</b>
<b>List of Tables</b>	<b>vii</b>
<b>List of Abbreviations</b>	<b>viii</b>
<b>Chapter 1 - Theory Explaining Illiberal Politics in Liberal Democracies</b>	<b>1</b>
Illiberal Politics . . . . .	5
The Puzzle . . . . .	10
Defining the Radical Right - Case Selection . . . . .	14
Theory: Individual Level Radical Right Vote Choice . . . . .	21
Supply: Internal Party Factors . . . . .	21
Supply: External Institutional Factors . . . . .	22
Demand: Macro-Forces . . . . .	24
Demand: Voter Demographics . . . . .	26
Demand: Voter Attitudes . . . . .	27
Comprehensive Theory . . . . .	29
Chapter Layout . . . . .	33
<b>Chapter 2 - Impact of Supply-Side Factors on the Radical Right</b>	<b>35</b>
External Supply-Side Factors . . . . .	37
Electoral System Type . . . . .	39
Electoral System Disproportionality . . . . .	41
Multi-Party Systems . . . . .	42
Ballot Access . . . . .	43
Campaign Finance . . . . .	43
Unoccupied Ideological Space . . . . .	44
Operationalization: External Supply-Side Factors . . . . .	44
Method and Dependent Variable . . . . .	49
Results: External Institutional Factors on Party Existence & Success . . . . .	52
Internal Supply-Side Factors . . . . .	56
Party Message . . . . .	57
Organizational Structure . . . . .	58
Professionalization . . . . .	58
Leadership . . . . .	59
Operationalization: Internal Supply-Side Factors . . . . .	59
Method and Dependent Variable . . . . .	61
Results: Effect of Internal Party Factors on Radical Right Success . . . . .	62
Conclusion . . . . .	64
<b>Chapter 3 - The Relationship Between External and Internal Factors</b>	<b>66</b>
Theory - Individual Relationships . . . . .	67
Method . . . . .	72
Results . . . . .	74
A Full Model of Success . . . . .	77
Results: Full Models . . . . .	79
Conclusion . . . . .	79

<b>Chapter 4 - Political Attitudes and Radical Right Vote Choice</b>	<b>82</b>
Socio-demographics and Radical Right Vote . . . . .	83
Age . . . . .	84
Gender . . . . .	84
Education . . . . .	85
Income . . . . .	86
Social Class . . . . .	86
Political Attitudes and Radical Right Vote . . . . .	87
Ideological Positioning . . . . .	88
Anti-Immigrant/Xenophobic Attitudes . . . . .	89
Welfare Chauvinism . . . . .	90
Populist Attitudes . . . . .	91
Authoritarian Attitudes . . . . .	92
Debated Characteristics - Neoliberalism & Euro-skepticism . . . . .	92
Data & Variable Operationalization . . . . .	93
Method . . . . .	98
Results . . . . .	102
Conclusion . . . . .	107
<b>Chapter 5 - The Conditioning Effect of Macro-Social Forces on Political Attitudes</b>	<b>111</b>
Macro-Social Forces . . . . .	112
Immigrant/Group Threat Theory . . . . .	114
Economic Strain Theory . . . . .	116
Interacting Relationships: Modernization-Loser Theory . . . . .	117
Alternative Explanations . . . . .	118
Variable Operationalization . . . . .	119
Method . . . . .	121
Results . . . . .	122
Conclusion . . . . .	126
<b>Chapter 6 - A Comprehensive Model of Radical Right Vote Choice</b>	<b>127</b>
Theory Review . . . . .	128
Findings Review . . . . .	130
Comprehensive Model . . . . .	132
Results . . . . .	134
Concluding Remarks . . . . .	138
<b>References</b>	<b>140</b>
<b>Appendix A</b>	<b>153</b>
<b>Appendix B</b>	<b>155</b>
Results: Interactive Models . . . . .	155
<b>Appendix C</b>	<b>156</b>
Results: Macro-Forces Model . . . . .	156
<b>Curriculum Vitae</b>	<b>158</b>

# LIST OF FIGURES

1	Party Manifesto Ideological Scores: France 2002 . . . . .	2
2	Theory: Individual Radical Right Vote Choice . . . . .	31
3	Theory: Spatial Model Example . . . . .	33
4	Pure Plurality Electoral System . . . . .	69
5	Pure Proportional Representation Electoral System . . . . .	70
6	Radical Right Space . . . . .	71
7	Basic Relationship Between External and Internal Factors . . . . .	77
8	Theory: Individual Radical Right Vote Choice . . . . .	128
9	Swiss People’s Party (SVP) Ads . . . . .	153
10	German National Democratic Party (NPD) Ads . . . . .	154
11	Multi-Modal Distribution . . . . .	154
12	Interaction: Asylum:Unemployment on Equality . . . . .	157

# LIST OF TABLES

1	How Do Scholars Categorize the Far Right? . . . . .	15
2	Cases: Radical Right Parties . . . . .	20
3	The Effect of External Supply-Side Factors on Radical Right Existence . . . . .	53
4	The Effect of External Supply-Side Factors on Radical Right Success . . . . .	55
5	Leadership Coding . . . . .	61
6	The Effect of Internal Supply-Side Factors on Radical Right Success . . . . .	63
7	The Effect of External Supply-Side Factors on Internal Factors . . . . .	75
8	Full Models: Vote Share & Seat Share . . . . .	80
9	Radical Right Vote Choice: 2002-2006 . . . . .	101
10	Radical Right Vote Choice: 2008 . . . . .	103
11	Radical Right Vote Choice: 2010 . . . . .	106
12	Radical Right Vote Choice: 2012 . . . . .	108
13	Macro-Forces Effect on Attitudes . . . . .	123
14	Macro-Forces Effect on Attitudes: Interactive Models . . . . .	124
15	Vote Choice: Comprehensive Models . . . . .	135
16	Linear Predictors Interactive Models - Vote Share . . . . .	155
17	Linear Predictors Interactive Models - Seat Share . . . . .	155



# LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AN - National Alliance (Italy)  
BNP - British National Party  
DF - Danish People's Party  
DS - Worker's Party of Social Justice  
ECHR - European Court of Human Rights  
EIP - Estonian Independence Party  
ELAM - National Popular Front  
EU - European Union  
EP - European Parliament  
FN - Front National  
FPÖ - Freedom Party  
FrP - Progress Party  
HČSP - Pure Party of Rights  
Jobbik - Movement for a Better Hungary  
LN - Lega Nord  
LPF - List Pim Fortuyn  
MIÉP - Hungarian Justice and Life Party  
MP- Member of Parliament  
NA - National Alliance (Latvia)  
Nazis - National Socialist German Worker's Party  
NPD - National Democratic Party  
PNR - National Renovator Party  
PS - True Finns  
PVV - Party for Freedom  
REP - The Republicans  
RUNR - Romanian National Unity Party  
SA - Sturmabteilung SD - Sweden Democrats  
SNS - Slovak National Party  
SNS - Slovenian National Party  
SVP - Swiss People's Party  
UKIP - United Kingdom Independence Party  
UN - United Nations  
U.S. - United States of America  
VB - Vlaams Belang/ Vlaams Blok

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First and foremost, I would like to thank my dissertation chair, Dr. Dave Armstrong, for recognizing my potential and overseeing my project. I am especially grateful for his mentorship throughout my tenure at UWM. He has provided me with a tremendous amount of guidance, and a great deal of my success is thanks to his dedication. I have also appreciated his passion for research and his ability to encourage me to explore other avenues of research. Dave has always made himself available when I have needed help, and the professional training he has given me will drive me to be successful in my future endeavors.

I thank Dr. Thomas Holbrook for providing guidance on the project as a member of my dissertation committee. Further, I thank him for the opportunity to work as a project assistant on several large research projects. I gained a great deal of experience through these projects that I could not have obtained elsewhere. Thanks to Dr. Natasha Borges Sugiyama, a dissertation committee member whose compassion, guidance, and encouragement reinforced the importance of finishing the project and pursuing a doctoral degree. I thank Dr. Ora John Rueter, a member of my dissertation committee, for his invaluable insights regarding the theoretical contribution of this project. I am especially grateful for John's desire to make himself available in order to work through the more challenging aspects of the theory.

A tremendous thank you to Jennifer Clemens, a colleague that read multiple drafts of chapters and provided crucial feedback. Her feedback ultimately lead to the project being of much higher quality than it otherwise would have been. Similarly, I would like the thank Nicholas Davis for his insights and comments regarding the projects. I would also like to thank Emily Van Dunk for her support and guidance when I interned at the Argosy Foundation. A special thanks for Dr. Kathy Dolan, Dr. Erin Kaheny, and Dr. Jenny Smith for the guidance they have provided, as well as the opportunities they have given me as a project assistant. Thank you to the Advanced Opportunity Program for providing me with funding to complete this project through their fellowship program. I would also like to thank Jonathan Olsen and Laura Gellott, two undergraduate professors

that inspired me to pursue studies in the area of European politics and political parties. Finally, I would like to thank Cheryl, Joy, and Gordy Hansen for providing me with much needed personal support to the complete this project.

# Chapter 1

## Theory Explaining Illiberal Politics in Liberal Democracies

*“At issue is the future of France, of even the idea we have of our country, of its great humanist tradition, of its universal calling. Also at issue is our capacity to live together and respect each other.... ” (French President, Jacques Chirac 2002)*


*“I think that tonight there are lots of people crying. This is not the France that we love.” (French Finance Minister, Laurent Fabius 2002)*

The above were made in response to the National Front (NF) leader's, Jean-Marie Le Pen, acquisition of 16.85% (4,804,713 votes) of the vote in the first round of the 2002 French Presidential Election. This vote share was only 3.02% (861,142 votes) behind incumbent President Jacques Chirac, and was the second largest vote share received by a presidential candidate in the election. Since Chirac was unable to acquire a majority of the votes, a runoff election was scheduled between Chirac and Le Pen. Following the initial result, a massive electoral campaign led by all parties across the ideological spectrum was conducted to encourage voters to cast a vote for Chirac in the runoff. The campaign was encouraged by all political parties because of the anti-Semitic and xenophobic views that the National Front's leader espoused. Even the staunchest of opponents of Chirac encouraged voters to vote for Chirac over Le Pen. Some opponents fashioned the slogan, “Vote for the crook, not the fascist” (Broughton 2002). Thanks in part to the campaign, Chirac would end up winning 82.21% of the vote in the second round, which was 64.42% more than Le Pen. The result was the largest winning margin for a presidential candidate since the start of the French Fifth Republic (1958) when Charles de Gaulle won 78.51% of the vote. The final result was hailed as a successful

defeat of the “neo-fascist” party, while also recognizing embarrassment over the fact that such an illiberal party could gain so many votes in France. As of 9 May 2014, a similar threat exists in France’s future. A French poll exploring the 2017 French general election demonstrates that NF leader Marine Le Pen, Jean Marie Le Pen’s daughter, would beat incumbent president François Hollande if a runoff was held between the two candidates (Le Figaro 2014). Further, on 1 November 2014 the FN reached 83,000 fully paid-up members, which the highest membership number since the party was founded, and 100% more than in 2012 (Huffington-Post 2014).

The anecdote above conveys the perceived threat that the success of a radical right party has on mainstream political system participants, as well as the response from those actors. Political parties that would normally be in contentious ideological conflict with each other combined their resources to ensure that the radical right candidate would not win the election. Figure 1 demonstrates the extremity of the National Front’s ideology in comparison to the other parties participating in the 2002 French National Election. The extreme ideology of radical right parties leads mainstream political figures to view the radical right as detrimental to the liberal democratic values of equality that Europe has progressed towards over the last 60 years. Europe’s fascist and Nazi legacies of the 1930’s and 1940’s has increased the public’s attentiveness to the success of parties on the far right of the ideological spectrum. Thus, it is no wonder that these parties receive a significant amount of attention from the media, political observers, and elected officials.

Figure 1: Party Manifesto Ideological Scores: France 2002



Parties of the far right on the ideological spectrum have also garnered a wealth of attention in the comparative political parties literature. This attention is due to the fact

that these parties appear to be undemocratic and illiberal in their political platforms, yet they achieve a significant level of success in some liberal democratic countries (ex. French National Front in 2002). Scholars argue that the radical right deserves particular attention because these parties pose a significant threat to liberal democratic governance (Mudde 2007, van Spanje 2010, Bale et al. 2010). Further, scholars question why radical right movements are continuing to gain in popularity even though far right ideologies have long been considered dangerous. These broad puzzles have led scholars to explore several diverse research agendas on the radical right.

Important areas of exploration related to radical right parties include explanations for their emergence (Betz 1994, Kitschelt 1995, Ignazi 2003, Mudde 2007), the substantive effects of radical right parties on the European political landscape (Howard 2010, Mudde 2013), how other political parties interact with the radical right (Norris 2005, Meguid 2005, Hainsworth 2008, Bale et al. 2010, Howard 2010, van Spanje 2010, van Heerden et al. 2014), and how to define and categorize parties of the radical right (Betz 1994, Kitschelt 1995, Mudde 2007). Additionally, a large number of research projects focus on the determinants of the electoral success of radical right parties (Jackman and Volpert 1996, Carter 2002, Golder 2003, Givens 2005, Carter 2005, Veugelers and Magnan 2005, Meguid 2005, Arzheimer and Carter 2006, Art 2007, Hainsworth 2008). Despite the wealth of attention, however, extant literature fails to identify the mechanisms linking macro forces, voter demographics, voter attitudes, and internal and external supply-side factors to radical right vote share. A great debate still exists regarding which factors are important, and if there is a relationship between these factors. For instance, some scholars argue that supply-side factors are most important for explaining success (Luther 2011), while others argue that demand-side factors translate into success (Arzheimer and Carter 2006). On the other hand, the phenomena may be understood as demand-side factors that generate the creation of supply-side mechanisms to express this demand. This research agenda develops a theory explaining differences in individual radical right vote choice, and provides statistical testing to confirm the existence of crucial mechanisms that connect these different theories. The main argument presented here is that a simple

spatial model explains radical right vote choice fairly well, but external supply-side factors do affect the ability of a political party to align at a particular space on the ideological spectrum.

No research agenda to date has explained radical right vote choice by teasing out casual mechanisms and linking them together in a single, coherent theory. Instead, contemporary research either looks at correlations between radical right vote share and one of these explanations (i.e. such as solely looking at radical right voters), or estimates models using a combination of variables from more than one of the explanations (i.e. voter socio-demographics and internal party organization). This work seeks to improve on the current literature in two major ways.

The first problem addressed in this work is that models estimated without all important explanatory variables may be overemphasizing the significance of variables that are empirically less important. Further, recognition of endogeneity problems is more difficult when only testing one theory or a single subset of variables. Secondly, without recognizing the important mechanisms that convey how variables relate, results are only tenuous (Brady and Seawright 2004). Elster (2007) argues that social science should seek to explain phenomena in terms of causal mechanisms, or causal chains. The argument is that in social science it is not possible to discuss explanations for a phenomenon in terms of law-like statements; therefore, explanations must be phrased in terms of causal mechanisms. In addition, without teasing out the mechanisms that explain the causal effect of some phenomena, the researcher is simply discussing correlations that could possibly be spurious (King, Keohane and Verba 1994). Thus, the absence of fully formed, clear mechanisms leads to an incomplete explanation for radical right party vote choice. This incomplete understanding does not allow the researcher to understand how variables representing different theories may interact in order to build a comprehensive explanation. By being explicit about the level of analysis (individual-level), and testing all theoretically relevant variables (macro-forces, attitudes, socio-demographics, and internal and external supply-side factors), this analysis is able to develop a comprehensive theory for radical right vote choice.

The introduction proceeds by providing evidence of the illiberal tendencies of radical right parties in Europe. This includes a recognition of the negative effects that these parties have had on liberal democratic governance. Next, the major puzzle is laid out in terms of demonstrating the tension between radical right party ideology and the current policy practices implemented in European countries that express the importance of equality. This discussion is followed by a brief discourse regarding defining and conceptualizing the radical right. In addition, case selection is discussed during the defining and conceptualizing stage. Finally, factors for radical right vote choice that are recognized in the literature are discussed, and the theory explaining individual vote choice for a radical right party is presented. The theory presented here provides the roadmap for the empirical analysis that is conducted throughout the rest of the study.

## **Illiberal Politics**

In order to fully understand the extent to which radical right parties are incompatible with liberal democratic governance, this section discusses several examples of the illiberal policy and ideological stances of radical right parties. Some of the examples provided here point to the direct anti-liberal effects that radical right parties have had on governmental policy. The important points to take away from this section are the many ways that radical right parties are in conflict with contemporary norms of liberal democratic governance.

On 20 November 2009, Switzerland surprisingly became the first European country to ban the building of minarets, which curbed Islamic religious freedom in the process (Cumming-Bruce and Erlanger 2009). The referendum passed with a clear majority of 57.5% of voters supporting the ban. Further, 22 out of 26 cantons had a majority supporting the referendum. The proposal was put forward to a vote in a national referendum by the Swiss People's Party (SVP). The SVP is the largest party in Swiss parliament, and a recognized radical right party in the scholarly literature. The reason for the referendum was, according to the SVP, to reduce the Islamization of Switzerland. The SVP's general secretary, Martin Baltisser, stated that, "the successful vote was against minarets



as symbols of Islamic power” (BBC 2009).

The ban is just one example in a long line of incidents where the SVP has antagonized Swiss immigrants. Notably, the United Nations (UN) officially labeled the party as a racist organization during their “UN Convention against Racism” over a political campaign ad that displayed white sheep kicking a black sheep out of Switzerland (Foulkes 2007). During the campaign to ban minarets, the SVP utilized another highly controversial poster. The campaign poster depicted a woman in a full body hijab standing next to black minarets that appear to be stabbing through the Swiss flag. In fact, it has become common place for the SVP to display a controversial ad during each election season or salient referendum. Clearly, the SVP’s ads convey xenophobia, and there is no doubt that their effect on public policy is illiberal (see Appendix for ads).

In France, the radical right party supported a different contentious policy directed at the Islamic community in Europe. On 3 March 2004, France banned the wearing of religious symbols in public schools (Vaisse 2004). The law was meant to integrate France’s large influx of Muslim immigrants into French culture, while continuing to promote religious neutrality (Vaisse 2004). Initially, the French Interior Minister Nicholas Sarkozy, who would become President in 2007, was opposed to the law. However, increased political pressure, and radical right leader Le Pen’s continued influence, compelled Sarkozy to switch his stance on the policy (Vaisse 2004).

Later, following the initial 2004 ban, France moved to ban similar religious symbols in the mass public. On 11 April 2011, France successfully passed a law that banned the hijab, niqābs, and burqas (Erlanger 2011). The ban was broadly targeted against any object that would cover the face while in public, which even includes objects such as motorcycle helmets. The punishment would be either a fine, or a police officer could require citizenship instruction. Interestingly, French authorities imply two reasons for this more recent ban. First, the authorities state explicitly that the ban was put in place in the interest of safety (Erlanger 2011). The argument is that the covering of the face does not allow authorities to recognize individuals that may be criminals or dangerous.

The second reason is implicitly conveyed. The second justification for the law is that

the wearing of religious facial coverings is in conflict with elite-level notions of French culture. This conflict between French culture and specific religious practices is the reason for the mandatory citizenship instruction for citizens wearing religious facial coverings. The European Court of Human Rights (2014) (ECHR) upheld the French ban by agreeing with the first argument. The Court stated that the ban, “was not expressly based on the religious connotation of the clothing in question, but solely on the fact that it concealed the face” (ECHR 2014). The decision by the ECHR has been followed by similar bans in Belgium and Spain. Further, Marina Le Pen has called for the banning of headscarves, Jewish Kippas, and the djellaba (Gibbons 2012). She argues that the basis for this policy is a desire to have “equality of discrimination” (Gibbons 2012). Meaning, that the current law’s opposition to Islamic religious symbols justifies the government’s ability to ban the symbols of other religions (i.e. Judaism) that elites view as in conflict with their notions of French culture. Nevertheless, the important point to take away here is that a precedent has been set where the banning of religious symbols or dress is justified, and this precedent was largely influenced by radical right parties.

Substantive public policy implementation is not the only political arena where radical right parties play a role in conveying illiberal tendencies. Some authors argue that radical right parties could also have a significant impact on the political thought of citizens in a country (Betz 1994, Kitschelt 1995, Mudde 2007). If this claim is true, it is important to evaluate the ideological positions that these parties convey. For instance, in the Netherlands, the Party for Freedom’s (PVV) leader, Geert Wilders, has been a force in the mainstream media in terms of conveying radical right ideology to European citizens. Wilders notoriety is especially surprising given the high levels of tolerance towards immigrants that traditionally exist in the Netherlands. For instance, the Netherlands is ranked 11th in the world in the raw number of asylum seekers the country accepted in 2011 (OECD 2014). Wilders has even appeared on television in the United States to “warn people about the dangers of Islam.” In fact, he appeared with Newt Gingrich at Ground Zero in New York on 11 September 2011 to give a speech warning against the building of a mosque at the location (Wilders 2010). The member of Dutch parliament

(MP) argued that building a mosque at the location would convey a failure to stand up to the “radical religion” (Wilders 2010).

Wilders has been known to make incensing comments towards the Islamic faith and Muslims around the world on a regular basis. In 2008, Wilders created a short movie titled *Fitna*. The movie consists of text displayed for the viewer from the Quran that could be considered violent, followed by visuals of radical Islamist terrorist attacks. In addition, the movie presents emergency distress calls from victims of these attacks, along with Islamic leaders and terrorists calling for violence against western nations. The film presents Islam as an inherently violent religion that has an ultimate goal of killing non-followers. The movie had received condemnation throughout the world from Muslim communities. In fact, Al-Qaeda and an Australian Imam issued Fatwās calling for the beheading of Wilders following the release of the movie.

In addition to creating *Fitna*, Wilders has incited Muslim communities by stating that the Quran should be banned in the Netherlands for the same reason that Adolf Hitler’s *Mein Kampf* has been banned for over 60 years. (Waterfield 2007). Wilders claims that the Quran is a fascist text that holds extinction of groups of people as its ultimate goal (Waterfield 2007). Further, he argues that the Quran, “calls on Muslims to oppress, persecute or kill Christians, Jews, dissidents and non-believers, to beat and rape women and to establish an Islamic state by force” (Wilders 2007). Following a series of newspaper editorials where Wilders called for the banning of the Quran, the MP was brought up on five charges of inciting hate speech (Traynor 2010). Following an increase of expressed support in the public, Wilders was acquitted of all charges (Jolly 2011). The judge found that while offensive, Wilders’ statements were considered protected speech.

The German National Democratic Party (NPD) provides another example of a radical right party conveying an obvious illiberal ideological platform where such an ideology is commonly considered unacceptable. The NPD has recreated many of the contentious campaign ads that were originally created by the SPD; including a poster displaying a white sheep kicking a black sheep out of Bavaria. In addition, NPD leader Udo Voigt created and displayed a notorious campaign ad with the slogan “GAS geben!” (see

Appendix A). This slogan in English is translated as “step on the gas,” “step on it,” or in a more literal interpretation as “give gas.” Clearly, a radical right party displaying the slogan “give gas” in a country where Jewish citizens were mass executed using gas chambers is considered in poor taste at best. However, this would not be the only time the NPD would refer to Germany’s Nazi legacy. Voigt, the son of a Nazi Sturmabteilung (SA) assault division member, was convicted in 2004 of promoting Nazism when he referred to Hitler as “a great man” and Berlin’s Holocaust Memorial as “an undesirable stain in the Reich capital” (Bacchi 2014). More recently, Voigt has stirred up controversy by seeking and being granted a committee seat in one of the European Parliament’s human rights committees (Bacchi 2014). In addition, Voigt’s predecessor, Günter Deckert, previously served five years in prison for Holocaust denial and incitement to racial hatred. Perhaps, nowhere is the link between 1930-1940 Nazi and Fascist ideology and current radical right ideology more clear than when exploring the statements of NPD members. The apparent link between the ideologies clearly portrays the current NPD ideology as illiberal and anti-democratic.

A final area of inquiry regarding the impact that radical right parties have on the illiberal direction of politics in a country is the interaction between the radical right and mainstream parties. Norris (2005) argues that radical right parties that achieve success in one election will have their policy platforms co-opted by mainstream parties in subsequent elections. Therefore, a shift will occur towards illiberal policies in that particular country. For example, Howard (2010) finds that the strength of radical right parties serves to mobilize anti-immigrant public opinion, which deters pressure for immigration policy liberalization of leftist parties. Further, van Heerden et al. (2014) find that radical right parties have successfully been able to force mainstream parties to give more attention to immigration and integration issues. This increased attention has led to mainstream parties promoting cultural integration (vs. socio-economic integration) and a monoculturalist position (vs. a multiculturalist position) (van Heerden et al. 2014). Although research on the radical right’s effect on mainstream party policy platforms is rather limited, there is some evidence that anti-liberal effects exist. What should be clear

from this section is that radical right parties adhere to illiberal ideological platforms, support illiberal governmental policies, and pressure mainstream parties towards illiberal positions on salient issues.

## **The Puzzle**

The previous section demonstrated the different ways in which radical right parties promote illiberal political ideas and policies. This section provides evidence for the disagreement between those illiberal tendencies and contemporary political norms of European countries. The goal here is to provide a convincing argument for the idea that countries in Europe have progressed further than most in terms of the liberal democratic values that they convey through public policy, and that this progression is in conflict with the success of the parties in question.

The first place to start such an inquiry would be by exploring the concept of democracy. Dahl (1971) provides one of the earliest and most complete classification strategies for defining a regime type associated with democracy, which the author labels “polyarchy.” The author promotes the argument that polyarchy should be conceptualized as measures on two axes representing the levels of participation and contestation in a country. The Polity IV dataset, which is one of the most utilized datasets for regime type, is inspired by Dahl’s (1971) classification and measures regime type by scoring countries on these two attributes (Marshall, Jaggers and Gurr 2010). Munck and Verkuilen (2002) provide one of the most in-depth discussions related to conceptualizing, measuring, and aggregating the concept of democracy. The conclusion the authors arrive at is that the two main attributes that represent the concept of democracy are contestation and participation. The authors argue that there are useful components of these attributes that researchers could leverage to fully measure the concept of democracy. However, they note that any attributes unrelated to contestation and participation that are included in a definition of democracy risk conceptual stretching or incorrect measurement. This is a problem that Collier and Levitsky (1997) caution researchers to avoid when attempting to define and measure democracy. In fact, several datasets that measure regime type

commonly include contestation and participation as the main component attributes for democracy; including Freedom House (2011) and Economist (2010).<sup>1</sup>

How do Western European countries compare to other countries in terms of contestation? It would not be a stretch to argue that Western European countries see on average the highest levels of contestation, government turnover, and coalition formation. In fact, the bulk of the literature on coalition formation was inspired by the governmental structures and practices of several European countries. For instance, the most revolutionary study on coalition formation, which was implemented by Laver and Schofield (1998), focused solely on coalition formation in ten European democracies. Building upon the work of Laver and Schofield (1998), Martin and Stevenson (2001) explore coalition formation relying on data from mostly European countries because the authors point out that this is where the majority of coalition governments are formed. In fact, the Polity IV (2010) dataset finds that European countries are at the highest levels in terms of competitiveness when compared to other countries. However, this is only one component attribute of democracy. The other component attribute of democracy, participation, is more likely to be targeted and limited by radical right parties.

When defining the concept of democracy there is perhaps no variable more utilized as a proxy, or component attribute, for measuring participation than universal suffrage. Following New Zealand and Australia, the next 11 countries to grant suffrage to women were European countries (Przeworski 2009).<sup>2</sup> Notably, all thirteen of these countries granted women the right to vote before the United States. In terms of universal suffrage, Europe led the way in granting suffrage to all people irrespective of gender or ethnicity (Hicks 2013). Today, in a time where particular voting eligibility rules and barriers to voting are more scrutinized, European countries have some of the most extensive voting laws in the world.

One example of the democratic-ness of voting laws throughout Europe is that any

---

<sup>1</sup>It is important to note that these measures are more or less successful at upholding Dahl's classification. However, each of them have a hint of his underlying components.

<sup>2</sup>The year women were granted suffrage: Finland 1906; Norway 1913; Denmark 1913; Austria 1918; Czechoslovakia 1918; Hungary 1918; Poland 1918; United Kingdom 1918; Germany 1919; Netherlands 1919; and Sweden 1919

European Union (EU) citizen is allowed to cast a vote for EU representation in any EU country, even if they are not a citizen of that country (Europa 2011). In order to cast a vote in a EU election the citizen need only demonstrate residency in that country (Europa 2011). For example, a Polish citizen could cast a vote for a German EU representative so long as they have residency in Germany. What makes this law particularly stunning is that many European citizens expect, in some respects, that their representative will protect national interests. Therefore, it is particularly interesting that a citizen from one country would be allowed to elect an EU representative of a different country. The EU's culture of compromise and ideal of putting Europe before national interests may provide some explanation for the implementation for this policy. Nevertheless, the policy does demonstrate the liberalness of European voting laws.

Additional examples of the extension of participation beyond the norm worldwide involves the extension of suffrage to non-citizens and people convicted of a crime. First, many European countries allow people convicted of a crime to vote. For instance, France allows people convicted of a crime to designate a proxy voter while incarcerated if the crime was not related to voting fraud (Assemblée Nationale 2012). Second, several European countries allow non-citizens to vote in municipal elections if the person can prove residency. For instance, in France any EU citizen could register to vote in municipal elections (Assemblée Nationale 2012). For comparison, imagine the outrage that would ensue if a U.S. politician suggested that non-citizens be allowed to vote in local level elections. It is not difficult to see why radical right parties would find these democratic policies in conflict with their policy.

It should be clear that European democracies are considered advanced in terms of democratic practices and policies, but where do these countries rank in terms of liberal policies? One area of government practice to explore would be the extent to which the government provides assistance to those in need. Esping-Anderson (1990) defines the welfare state as a state believing that it has the responsibility for securing some basic modicum of welfare for its citizens. Welfare could take the form of government economic assistance, schooling, healthcare, etc. European democracies were among the first to

provide universal healthcare for their citizens, and this healthcare has even expanded to non-citizens that have residency in the country. The citizenship assistance practices of Europe have even led to a new conceptual category in the welfare state literature. The concept of social democracy owes its creation to the extended welfare practices of several European countries. For instance, scholars commonly cite the Scandinavian countries as having the most extensive welfare benefits for its citizens, including some of the most liberal family policies (Huber and Stephens 2012).

An area of public policy where liberal policy practice creates a large amount of conflict occurs between radical right parties and government entities involves immigration and asylum policies. In terms of immigration inflow (standardized by population size), from 2001-2010, 17 out of the top 25 countries are European (OECD 2014).<sup>3</sup> Relatively loose restrictions on immigration inflows are not the only area where non-citizens enter these countries. European countries are also more accepting of asylum seekers than other countries throughout the world. In terms of the raw number of asylum seekers allowed in the country, 11 out of the top 15 countries are European (OECD 2014).<sup>4</sup> France and Germany alone accepted almost 100,000 asylum seekers in 2011. In comparison, the United States accepted 60,587 even though the United States has a population of around 170 million more people than Germany and France combined. Clearly, European countries are much more liberal in terms of their immigration and asylum seeking policies.

Why do citizens in advanced liberal democracies cast a vote for parties that are clearly illiberal or anti-democratic ideologically and in policy practice? This section has discussed a few ways in which European countries are liberal and advanced democratically in terms of a few key policy outcomes. Further, the previous section explored the ways in which radical right ideology and policy practices are incompatible with the values of these

---

<sup>3</sup> The percentage of immigrants standardized by population between 2001-2010: 1. Luxembourg 32.8%; 2. Israel 27.7%; 3. Switzerland 26.5%; 4. Australia 24.7%; 5. New Zealand 19.5%; 6. Canada 18.3%; 7. Estonia 17.3%; 8. Austria 14.7%; 9. Sweden 13%; 10. Germany 12.8%; 11. Belgium 12.2%; 12. United States 12.1%; 13. Ireland 12.1%; 14. France 11.3%; 15. Spain 11.3%; 16. United Kingdom 10.7%; 17. Netherlands 10.7%; 18. Greece 10.3%; 19. Slovenia 9.9%; 20. Iceland 9%; 21. Norway 8.9%; 22. Italy 7.6%; 23. Denmark 6.7%; 24. Portugal 6.3%; 25. Czech Republic 4.4%

<sup>4</sup>The raw number of asylum seekers by country in 2011: United States 60,587, France 52,147; Germany 45,741; Italy 34,117; Sweden 29,648; Belgium 26,003; United Kingdom 25,455; Canada 24,985; Switzerland 19,439; Turkey 16,021; Austria 14,416; Netherlands 11,590; Australia 11,505; Greece 9,311; Norway 9,053



countries. Therefore, a major puzzle exists. Why is it that citizens raised in countries with liberal policies and liberal values would cast a vote for parties that are looking to deconstruct these policies? How is it that radical right parties could gain votes in countries that have progressed towards such liberal values over the past 60 years? These questions comprise the major puzzle guiding this research.

## **Defining the Radical Right - Case Selection**

Before attempting to solve the major puzzle discussed here, it is important to define the dependent variable of interest. The major dependent variable analyzed in this research project is the individual level choice to vote for a radical right party. Undoubtedly, any analysis exploring a specific party family must inevitably confront the onerous task of conceptualizing the party family in question. In the comparative literature, most of the research and debate that has been dedicated to the radical right has focused on conceptualization and elite level content analysis. The debate on conceptualization is presented in this section, which includes a discussion on why the analysis here does not restrictively define the radical right.

Where does the radical right lie on the ideological spectrum? Some scholars make lots of distinctions between parties on the far right of the spectrum. For example, Arzheimer (2009) argues that there are significant differences on the right between extreme, radical, populist, and new right parties. In contrast, Zaslove (2004) argues that categories on the far right include neo-fascist, extreme and radical, populist, nonpopulist, and new populist right parties. However, the Zaslove (2004) concludes that the real difference on the far right is between broadly defined fascist parties and radical right parties. Some scholars do not treat these parties as distinctive. Meguid (2005) argues that these parties should be understood only as niche parties (Meguid 2005, 347). She categorizes them in this way because she believes that positioning of mainstream parties on the left-right scale accounts for the support of all small parties, which means that there is no need for further categorization. The four most commonly employed ways of categorizing parties of the far right are as populist, populist radical, extreme, and anti-immigrant. Table 1 presents

the four commonly utilized concepts to allude to the far right, and several scholars are placed into the category that they most recognize as the phenomenon currently sweeping throughout Europe.

Table 1: How Do Scholars Categorize the Far Right?

<b>Author</b>	<b>Populist Radical Right</b>	<b>Populist Right</b>	<b>Extreme Right</b>	<b>Anti- Immigrant</b>
Art (2007)	✓			
Arzheimer (2009)	✓	✓	✓	
Bale et al. (2010)	✓			
Betz (1994)	✓			
Bos and van der Brug (2010)				✓
Canovan (1999)		✓		
Cutts, Ford and Goodwin (2011)			✓	
Evans and Ivaldi (2010)	✓			
Ford and Goodwin (2010)			✓	
Hakhverdian and Koop (2007)		✓		
Ignazi (1992)			✓	
Kitschelt (1995)	✓			
Luther (2011)		✓		
Mudde (2007)	✓	✓		
Norris (2005)	✓			
Pauwels (2010)	✓	✓		
Rydgren (2008)	✓			
Sprague-Jones (2010)			✓	
van der Brug, Fennema and Tillie (2000 <i>a</i> ), van Spanje (2010)				✓
Zaslove (2004)			✓	

In Table 1, some authors have checkmarks in multiple categories. Mudde (2007) and Pauwels (2010) both recognize the radical populist right and populist right categories because they make a clear distinction between the two groups, and argue that both have been a part of the recent far right wave of success. A second point in regards to the table is that some scholars are placed into a category based on how they primarily view the type of far right party achieving success, or how they commonly refer to these parties in their research agendas. A final point is that these four categories are not

completely different. For instance, as Mudde (2007) argues, populist parties contain all the same elements of populist radical right parties except for a radical opposition to the fundamental values of liberal democracy in regards to immigration and authoritarianism. Further, anti-immigrant attitudes are commonly attributed to all of these parties, but some scholars simply refer to far right parties as anti-immigrant because they argue that this is the only policy issue position that really matters (van Spanje 2010). Finally, the category “extreme right” is usually utilized when one seeks to make a blanket claim about the far right without wanting to delve into a conceptual framework argument. In fact, when dissecting the literature one would be hard pressed to find any real difference between the scholars above that make use of the extreme right concept when compared to those using the populist radical right concept. It is not that the extreme right is being discarded as a category, but that there is no meaningful distinction in the literature between extreme right and populist radical right parties except for the fact that these parties are more commonly referred to as populist radical right. As far as categorization based on multiple characteristics, the literature distinguishes between two types of far right parties: populist radical right and populist right.

The literature indicates that there are four possible features of populist radical right parties: nativism, populism, neoliberalism, and authoritarianism. In one of the earliest studies, Betz (1994) argues that the defining features of these parties are that they contain elements of national populism and a certain degree of neoliberalism (Betz 1994, 107-139). He attributes the first feature of neoliberalism to these parties due to the fact that these parties utilize neo-liberal economic programs that include an emphasis on individualism, competition, efficiency, entrepreneurship, and selectivity (Betz 1994, 109). Kitschelt (1995) also picks up on this neo-liberal stance from populist radical right parties, which is a theme that loses steam when moving towards more recent works. Betz’s (1994) second feature, national populism, points to the stance from these parties that they reject a multi-cultural society (Betz 1994, 125).

In comparison, the recognized authority on radical right parties, Cas Mudde (2007), defines populist radical right parties based on three main features: nativism, authoritar-

ianism, and populism. The scholar does not recognize neoliberalism as a feature of these parties. Nativism is identified as a belief that only native groups should inhabit states, and that non-native people are threatening to society (Mudde 2007: 19). Authoritarianism can be understood as a belief in a strictly ordered society and a strong idea of law and order (Mudde 2007: 23). Mudde (2007) argues that populism as an ideological feature could be understood as an idea that there is a struggle that pits “the pure people” against “the corrupt elite” (Mudde 2007, 23). This idea can also be understood as advocating that nothing is more important than the general will of the people, and that problems can be solved through “common sense” solutions (Mudde 2007, 23). The author argues that these parties are “radical” in their opposition to fundamental values of a liberal democracy because they hold the rights of native people over those of non-native people (Mudde 2007, 36). However, Mudde (2007) argues that this is not the only party on the far right of the ideological spectrum to enjoy recent success. The scholar also recognizes a different variant of far right party achieving success: populist right parties.

How do populist right parties differ from radical populist right parties? Mudde (2007) argues that populist right parties are understood in terms of their neo-liberal populist stance. He contrasts this argument with Betz (1994), who argues that national populism and neo-liberal populism are both features of the same type of party in Europe. In contrast, Mudde (2007) argues that the relatively large occurrence of populist right parties containing a neo-liberal element but not a national populist element, points to the lack of usefulness in Betz’s (1994) framework (Mudde 2007, 30). In other words, he believes that national populist, or radical populist, and neo-liberal populist parties exist separately and are just as different as they are similar. Pauwels (2010) is in agreement with this conclusion. In fact, Pauwels (2010) demonstrated that at a minimum the parties’ messages were different in his comparison of the neo-liberal populist Lijst Decker and radical populist Vlaams Belang in Belgium. As Pauwels (2010) notes, the neo-liberal populist parties also advocate the “pure people” vs. “corrupt people” view, but the neo-liberal element is the most important aspect of this message. Also, the scholar finds that these parties are not anti-immigrant, and do not espouse authoritarian attitudes. Clearly, the

process of defining these parties is a complicated one.

What is the best conceptualization for defining the radical right? Should an analysis focus on Mudde's (2007) populist radical right parties? Is there a different subset of the "far right" that should be explored? The argument presented here is that a strict conceptualization of the radical right restricts the ability of the researcher to explain outcomes, and that a broad conceptualization is the most useful for understanding the success of these parties. Sartori (1970) argues that we need information to be precise when conducting research in order for it to be meaningful. On the other hand, King, Keohane and Verba (1994) point out that the goal of good social science research is to strive for grand theory. When taking into account both of these research suggestions one is left with a trade-off. The researcher could either make their findings precise at the expense of the applicability of the theory, or commit more error in their findings in order to gain a greater snapshot of the causes of the phenomenon in question. There are three reasons why empirical research agendas exploring radical right vote choice should rely on a loose definition of the radical right over a strict definition.

First, there is the problem of selecting on the dependent variable. The problem of selecting on the dependent variable occurs when scholars exploring radical right parties categorize parties based on success. An example of this would be when a scholar decides a cutoff for success in large-N research, then the party is not included in the party family if it does not meet the cutoff. For instance, Norris (2005) excludes parties that do not obtain at least 3% of the seats in the national lower house. The decision to exclude an exploration of votes for these parties ignores the fact that these parties might achieve success in vertical elections (local or state level). For example, the NPD in Germany has been able to obtain a number of state parliament seats over the past 20 years, but not one seat at the national level. Further, this type of cutoff also ignores horizontal (EU vs. national parliament) differences in success. For instance, there are a number of radical right parties that perform better in EU elections than they do in parliamentary elections. One example of a party that achieves success at the EU level but not the national level is the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP). The party holds only 1 of the 650

House of Commons seats. However, the party holds a large 24 out of 73 EU parliament seats. Lastly, by defining a cutoff in this manner the scholar is losing variation in the dependent variable of interest. If a scholar wants to understand why some parties are successful and others are not, they would be ill suited to only look at successful parties.

The second reason to have a more encompassing definition for the radical right is to account for the fact that subtle ideological differences between parties might actually be an important explanatory variable for explaining differences in success. If the definition is too restrictive the explanations do not travel beyond that small number of parties. On the other hand, if the definition is too loose the scholar risks conceptual stretching (Sartori 1970). However, the problem of conceptual stretching could be controlled in this particular situation. Since the only factors that change in highly debated conceptualizations of the radical right are ideological elements, it is possible to control for these differences by including an independent variable to capture this variation. It might be the case that the extremity of the ideology is the major explanatory variable that explains individual vote choice. If the scholar were to only explore parties with the exact same ideological makeup they would not be aware of the fact that ideology is what is driving differences in success. The inclusion of this independent variable allows the researcher to lessen the attributes and move up Sartori's (1970) "ladder of abstraction" in order to uncover more generalizable findings.

The final reason to utilize a looser definition for the radical right is that the radical right party family is largely homogeneous. To some extent, qualitative party research on the radical right is leading to an unnecessary proliferation of party categories to represent this family. Ennser (2012) explored whether the proliferation of categories was warranted. The author's research explored the extent to which radical right parties were more or less homogenous than other party families. Using expert survey data on 94 parties from 17 Western European countries the author found that the party family of the radical right exhibits a degree of policy homogeneity that is similar to mainstream right parties (conservatives and Christian democrats). Further, the author found that the radical right is considerably more homogenous than the liberal party family. These findings led Ennser

(2012) to conclude that the debate on categorizing radical right parties is largely splitting hairs. Parties that lie to the far right on the ideological spectrum have largely adopted similar policy platforms, and there is only minimal amount of error when grouping them together in empirical analyses.

Table 2: Cases: Radical Right Parties

Country	Radical Right Party	Literature's Majority Classification
Austria	Freedom Party (FPÖ)	✓
Belgium	Vlaams Blok (VB)/	✓
	Vlaams Belang (VB)	✓
Bulgaria	Attack	✓
Croatia	Pure Party of Rights (HČSP)	
Cyprus	National Popular Front (ELAM)	
Czech Republic	Worker's Party of Social Justice (DS)	
Denmark	Danish People's Party (DF)	✓
Estonia	Estonian Independence Party (EIP)	✓
Finland	True Finns (PS)	✓
France	Front National (FN)	✓
Germany	National Democratic Party (NPD)/	
	Republicans (REP)	
Greece	Popular Association - Golden Dawn	✓
Hungary	Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik)/	✓
	Hungarian Justice and Life Party (MIÉP)	
Italy	Lega Nord (LN)/	✓
	National Alliance (AN)	✓
Latvia	National Alliance (NA)	✓
Netherlands	List Pim Fortuyn (LPF)/	
	Party for Freedom (PVV)	✓
Norway	Progress Party (FrP)	
Portugal	National Renovator party (PNR)	✓
Romania	Romanian National Unity Party (RUNR)	✓
Slovakia	Slovak National Party (SNS)	✓
Slovenia	Slovenian National Party (SNS)	✓
Sweden	Sweden Democrats (SD)	✓
Switzerland	Swiss People's Party (SVP)	✓
United Kingdom	British National Party (BNP)/	✓
	United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP)	

Given the reasons discussed above, the current research agenda includes all of the parties to the right of mainstream conservative and Christian democratic parties on the ideological spectrum in European countries. There is agreement in the literature that all of these parties are categorized as either populist radical right or populist right parties. Therefore, considerable confidence exists that all of the parties belong under the radical

right party label. Any significant variation that does happen to exist in terms of ideological platforms will be captured by an independent variable that measures party ideology when exploring internal party factors. Since the focus is on vote choice and not specific elite level policy differences, the choice to have a more inclusive definition does not create a large problem. The choice to avoid overly specific subtypes means that the research put forth here is better capable to strive for grand theory. A complete list of the parties being explored here is presented in Table 2.

### **Theory: Individual Level Radical Right Vote Choice**

What explains an individual's choice to vote for a radical right party? As previously stated, no research agenda to date has theorized and empirically tested a complete explanation for individual level vote choice that includes all factors. On the other hand, the literature has done a good job of theorizing a number of factors that could restrain or induce a vote for a radical right party. Broadly, the literature has theorized that macro forces, voter demographics, and voter attitudes could induce a vote for a radical right party, while internal party factors and external institutional factors could effect the availability of a radical right party. The literature labels the factors that could induce a vote as "demand," and the factors that could impact the availability of a radical right party as "supply." Before discussing the theoretical construct presented here, this section summarizes these important supply and demand factors.

#### **Supply: Internal Party Factors**

The first scholar to note the importance of factors internal to radical right parties for explaining vote choice was Kitschelt (1995). The author argues that the capabilities and choices of the radical right entrepreneurs and parties matter for success. In particular, the author notes that politicians may face a favorable opportunity structure, but fail to create a powerful message that enhances their success at the polls. In addition, Golder (2003) notes that it is important to distinguish between the extremity of radical right messages because more extreme parties (i.e. neo-fascist) are less successful at the polls.



The message that the party is conveying is very important. The message should be moderate and neglected by mainstream political parties if it is going to be successful in gaining a large number of votes (van Holsteyn, Irwin and den Ridder 2003, van Holsteyn and Irwin 2003, Norris 2005, Carter 2005, Mudde 2007, Rydgren 2008, Mudde 2011).

Although the explanation is usually not satisfactory in political science as a whole, a number of scholars have made the argument that leadership is important for radical right success (Zaslove 2004). For instance, DeClair (1999) argues that much of the success of the French National Front is due to the leadership skills of Jean Marie Le Pen. Similar arguments have been made about List Pim Fortuyn (LPF) in the Netherlands (van Holsteyn and Irwin 2003), Party for Freedom and Democracy (PVV) in the Netherlands (Bos and van der Brug 2010), Lijst Dedecker (LDD) in Belgium (Pauwels 2010), and the British National Party (BNP) in the United Kingdom (Copsey 2008). Qualitative research has done a particularly good job of demonstrating that leadership is an important internal supply-side factor that determines radical right success. However, this concept is much more difficult to operationalize in a quantitative analysis.

Similar to leadership, professionalization and party organization are important variables for determining whether the public views any particular radical right party as legitimate. Norris (2005) argues that for persistent success over a series of elections these parties need to build and consolidate their organization. Carter (2005) further argues that a centralized organizational structure and the existence of mechanisms for enforcing party discipline are likely to lead to better performance at the polls. For instance, Copsey (2008) argues that the British National Party (BNP) demonstrated professionalization through personal contact with voters in order to show that the party was not simply made up of a collection of Nazis in disguise. What should be clear is that internal supply-side variables matter. In fact, Luther (2011) argues that internal supply-side factors (or agency) explain more of the success of radical right parties than do demand-side factors.

## Supply: External Institutional Factors

In conjunction with internal factors, external factors also determine the supply of radical right parties. External supply-side factors could be described as the political opportunity structure that allows for the existence of a radical right party. These political opportunity factors include the political party system, electoral system, and the type of government system under which the radical right party is operating. First, the party system has a significant impact on the emergence of a radical right party. Kitschelt (1995) argues that mainstream convergence between the left and right conventional parties creates an ideological space that a radical right party could exploit. Further, Carter (2005) shows that the ideological proximity of the parties of the mainstream right in relation to the radical right determines how much political space may be available for success at the polls. The author argues that the greater the space to the right, the greater the result. Norris (2005) argues that the reduction of traditional party cleavages to catch-all parties leaves space for radical right parties to gain success. This is echoed by work arguing that ideologically vacant space in the party system is important for success (Meguid 2005, Mudde 2007, Pauwels 2010).

More broadly, multi-party systems are positively correlated with radical right vote share. Jackman and Volpert (1996) find that multi-partism increasingly fosters parties of the extreme right with rising electoral proportionality. In addition, Givens (2005) find that increasing the number of parties in a coalition government significantly increases the existence of a radical right party. Finally, using Lijphart's (2010) two institutional dimensions of government, Hakhverdian and Koop (2007) find that increasing the number of parties on the executive-parties dimension is correlated with increased radical right presence. The authors conclude that consensus democracy is more conducive to radical parties.

Additional research finds that institutional features that structure the number of parties in a political system is correlated with the success of the radical right. First, Jackman and Volpert (1996) find that increasing electoral thresholds dampen support for the extreme right as the number of parliamentary parties expands. In fact, DeClair (1999)

uncovered that National Front members in France commonly cite the electoral threshold as their greatest barrier to success. Norris (2005) finds support for this finding when looking at radical right success cross-nationally. Second, scholars argue that party finance laws could create a situation where radical right parties are essentially eliminated from participating in an election. For instance, rules that restrict public financing for these parties based on past electoral success leads to a perpetual cycle of these parties losing and missing out on funding. Again, Norris (2005) finds some evidence that stricter party finance laws hamper radical right success. Third, ballot access is also a electoral system feature that could ban a party from competing. For instance, the German system bans political parties that express anti-democratic principles, which almost led to the banning of the National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD). Finally, and most importantly, several authors find that the proportionality of the electoral system impacts radical right vote share (Jackman and Volpert 1996, Carter 2002, 2005, Givens 2005, Arzheimer 2009). As proportionality increases, so does radical right vote share. Therefore, any analysis of radical right success needs to account for these features of the electoral system.

The final two external supply-side factors clarify the type of government under which the radical right parties operate. First, Fieschi (2004) finds that presidentialism is positively correlated with the success of radical right parties. The author argues that presidentialism creates a bi-furcation situation that pits a left against an opposing right. This fragmentation is seen as normal in presidential systems. Thus, extreme rallying cries are seen as non-threatening. It would be important to test whether any correlation exists between presidentialism and radical right vote share. So far, Fieschi's (2004) book is the only piece of scholarly research that advances this argument. Second, federalism is believed to create an opportunity structure that leads to radical right success. Mudde (2007) argues that federalism may protect the national government from radical right success, but it creates a breeding ground for these parties' success at the state level. In addition, Hakhverdian and Koop (2007) argue that federal states are more conducive to radical right success than are unitary states. Therefore, when exploring success at other levels besides the national level, these factors need to be taken into account.

## **Demand: Macro-Forces**

Ragin (1987) argues that the comparative politics subfield is distinguished mainly by its focus on macro-social units for explaining country-level phenomena. Macro-social units are explored in order to explain and interpret diverse historical outcomes and processes, and their significance for current institutional arrangements. The major macro-social force that scholars argue leads to demand for the radical right is a profound transformation of the socioeconomic and sociocultural structure of Western democracies (Ignazi 1992, Betz 1994). Betz (1994) was the first to argue that the breakthrough of capitalism on a worldwide scale created a global economy where national governments lost the capacity to control their economies. This new economy promotes individualism and breaks down long-standing identities, resulting in new identities and social fragmentation. In the face of economic struggles in a changing global economy, there are bound to be losers of this modernization process: *modernization-loser theory*. Mudde (2007) argues that these parties attract the losers of modernization, and that processes of modernization leads to important societal changes, which in turn have political effects. Similarly, Rydgren (2013) argues that being on the losing side of modernization creates frustration and anger with the system. Unfortunately, this theory has only been loosely tested due to the complexity of operationalizing such an all-encompassing idea. On the other hand, the usefulness of this theory is that the grand logic upon which it is based lends support for the testing of two macro-level variables believed to impact radical right vote share. That is, this theory underpins the idea that when voters are the losers of modernization, the individual voter is more conscious of perceived threats to economic security.

The consequence, and basis for the modernization-loser theory, is that citizens who are negatively effected by modernization are likely to be insecure about there economic position. Therefore, the argument is that these people will react negatively to what they perceive to be “economic threats.” One of the most important macro economic threats advanced in the literature is that an influx of immigrants arriving into the country leads to a radical right vote (Betz 1994, Golder 2003, Norris 2005, Mudde 2007, Bowyer 2008, Berezin 2009, Arzheimer 2009, Jesuit, Paradowski and Mahler 2009, Ford and Goodwin

2010, Evans and Ivaldi 2010, Fitzgerald and Lawrence 2011, Dinas and van Spanje 2011, Poznyak, Abts and Swyngedouw 2011, Rydgren and Ruth 2011, van der Waal, de Koster and Achterberg 2013). Indeed, this threat is perceived to be so large that several scholars simply refer to radical right parties as “anti-immigrant” parties (van der Brug, Fennema and Tillie 2000*a*, Bos and van der Brug 2010, van Spanje 2010). The idea is that radical right vote share will increase as immigration rates increase. The logic is that a demand for radical right parties arises in order to deal with the cultural and economic threats posed by high immigration rates.

Additionally, scholars have recognized another economic threat linked to the modernization-loser theory. As discussed, it is believed that losers of the modernization process are more likely to demand and support a radical right movement. Therefore, an economic crisis, or high levels of unemployment, are hypothesized to lead to a higher radical right vote share in a given country (Betz 1994, Jackman and Volpert 1996, DeClair 1999, Golder 2003, Norris 2005, Arzheimer and Carter 2006, Mudde 2007, Bowyer 2008, Berezin 2009, Arzheimer 2009, Jesuit, Paradowski and Mahler 2009, Evans and Ivaldi 2010, Fitzgerald and Lawrence 2011). An economic crisis, such as high levels of unemployment, creates demand for a new party, not aligned with the mainstream, to handle such an issue. Therefore, the rise of the radical right is hypothesized in the literature as being created by demand for a party that is willing to take radical steps to deal with economic problems believed to be caused by mainstream party governance. In the present research, it will be important to uncover whether there is an interaction relationship between economic crisis and immigration rates, which is an analysis that was conducted in isolation from other explanatory variables in previous research (see, Arzheimer 2009).

### **Demand: Voter Demographics**

A second area of the literature that explains radical right demand includes exploring the socio-demographics of voters. The idea is to recognize trends in order to establish the demographic patterns that represent a higher vote share. For instance, several authors note that radical right voters tend to be at low to moderate levels of education in compar-

ison to other groups of citizens (Kitschelt 1995, Norris 2005, Givens 2005, Arzheimer and Carter 2006, Hainsworth 2008, Stefanova 2009, Mudde 2011, Ivarsflaten and Stubager 2013). There are several additional trends established in the literature; including the fact that men are more likely to vote for these parties, these parties attract a larger number of younger voters, private sectors and working class employees are more likely to support these parties, and voters tend to be non-practicing Catholics (Betz 1994, DeClair 1999, Mudde 2007, Bale et al. 2010, Coffe and Voorpostel 2010, Ford and Goodwin 2010, van der Brug et al. 2013, Betz and Meret 2013, Coffe 2013, Oesch 2013).

One important trend to control for in the time-series analysis is whether the importance of education stays the same over time. It would be important to determine whether the effect of education in the early years of a party's existence is the same as in later years. Education as an independent variable explaining radical right vote choice is one where there is a large amount of disagreement in empirical findings. In addition, it would be important to understand whether radical right success is a product of "population bubbles." Meaning, that it is important to determine whether younger voters always tend to vote for the radical right, or whether it is the case that an initial group of young voters in a particular time period continued to be loyal to the party. Therefore, the radical right's success is not a product of attracting young voters per se, but instead, the success is owed to the initial attraction of some young group.

### **Demand: Voter Attitudes**

The final factor that drives demand for a radical right vote are a voter's attitudes on a number of important policy issues and political ideas. The thought process here is that radical right parties are able to obtain a vote by placing themselves similarly on issues that voters find important. Therefore, if voters holds attitudes similar to the policy platforms of radical right parties then these voters would be rational to vote for the party. Here, several voter attitudes are briefly discussed that scholars believe are theoretically important for explaining radical right vote choice.

First, far right positioning on a left-right ideological scale is theorized to explain a

radical right vote. Givens (2005) found that far right ideological positioning on a left-right scale was positively correlated with voting for a radical right party. Mudde (2007) solidifies the finding that radical right voters view themselves to the far right of the ideological spectrum in his theoretical discussion of radical right voters. However, there is some debate regarding the importance of this attitude. Hainsworth (2008) argues that most party members and voters for the radical right do not self-identify as members of the extreme right. Instead, the author provides some evidence that these people tend to respond that they are more moderate than the radical right party they supported.

Second, several scholars argue, and find, that there is a relationship between anti-immigrant, xenophobic, and racist attitudinal positions and radical right vote choice (van der Brug, Fennema and Tillie 2000*b*, Kitschelt 1995, van Holsteyn and Irwin 2003, Givens 2005, Mudde 2007, Rydgren 2008, Sprague-Jones 2010, Cutts, Fieldhouse and Russell 2010, Ford and Goodwin 2010, Ford, Goodwin and Cutts 2012, Doosje et al. 2013). The argument is that the voters holding these attitudes will vote for radical right parties because these parties are the only ones in the electoral market representing their view on issues related to these attitudes. These issues include immigration, foreign workers, asylum seekers, and multicultural societies. The most obvious way that anti-immigrant attitudes manifest themselves is with strong welfare-chauvanist positions.

Third, Mudde (2007) argues that populist attitudes are a major driving force of voting for the radical right. Pauwels (2010, 2011) argues that populism should be understood as the idea that the “pure people” are in conflict with the “corrupt people.” The idea is that the common people are in conflict with those corrupt politicians that seek to reap the benefits from the labor of the common folk (Luther 2011). In contrast, several authors define populism more broadly as people who are discontent or disillusioned with the system and have no trust in government (i.e. politics of discontent) (Ignazi 2003, Norris 2005, Stefanova 2009, Ford and Goodwin 2010, Doosje et al. 2013). This attitude is said to be a function of insecurity with the citizen’s economic situation (Bornschieer and Kriesi 2013). In fact, voting for the radical right has commonly been attributed as protest voting against the current system (Ignazi 2003).

A fourth major attitudinal position of radical right voters is an authoritarian position on issues such as crime. Authoritarianism can be understood as the position that infringements of society should be punished severely, and that punishment is more important than rehabilitation (Mudde 2007). Rydgren (2013) argues that working class support for the radical right can be explained by the fact that the working class, on average, tends to be more socio-culturally authoritarian. Indeed, several authors find that authoritarian positions on legal punishment practices are positively correlated with radical right vote choice (Kitschelt 1995, Givens 2005).

The last two attitudes receive some empirical support in the literature, but are heavily debated between radical right scholars. First, Betz (1994) argues that radical right voters hold neo-liberal economic positions. The problem with this argument is that welfare-chauvinism, which is an attitudinal position of these voters that is not debated, does not necessarily translate into neo-liberal economics. However, there is a small amount of evidence in the literature that voters hold some neo-liberal economic positions. For instance, Norris (2005) finds that these voters seek to roll back the power of the state, and advocate pro-market economic ideas of privatization and inequality (45). The concern here is that this attitudinal position differs for voters across countries, which is an area of inquiry that should be explored.

Finally, Euro-skepticism is an attitudinal feature that some radical right voters are found to possess. The debate over this attitude is whether voters for all radical right parties hold anti-European Union attitudes. Recently, Ford, Goodwin and Cutts (2012) find that Euro-skepticism was the most important driver for the radical right United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP). However, Givens (2005) finds mixed results when exploring whether voters for radical right parties hold negative attitudes towards the EU. Mudde (2007) and Givens (2008) argue that this perceived Euro-skepticism is really just a skepticism of large multi-state organizations that subvert the power of the state. Again, it is important to note that these last two attitudes are highly debated in the literature. Nevertheless, these findings reveal an important area of inquiry.




## Comprehensive Theory

The theoretical framework provided in this research agenda is a sequential theory of individual radical right vote choice that links all of the previously hypothesized factors. Whereas previous research focused on either voters, supply of radical right parties, or some arbitrary combination of multiple factors, this research provides the first complete theory of radical right vote choice. It is important to note that the research here is specifically focused on individual level vote choice because previous research was hampered by an inability to distinguish between vote choice and vote share, and these analyses would arbitrarily alternate between them. Random alternating between the two dependent variables made interpretation of results in order to construct a more coherent theory more difficult. A visual interpretation of the theoretical construct is provided in Figure 1. The two stages of the model consist of factors that determine the supply of a viable radical right party, and the factors that determine the individual demand to vote for such a party.

The first stage of the theoretical vote choice model involves the existence (supply) of a viable radical right party in the electoral market. Obviously, before a voter is able to cast a vote for a particular party type, that party must exist as an electoral option. The existence of a viable radical right party to locate at a particular ideological space currently occupied by voters is a function of two types of factors. First, systems-level institutional factors that are external to the party have the ability to either restrict the ability of a radical right party to form, or damage the viability of the party. For example, plurality electoral rules have been known to restrict the ability of third parties to obtain votes. These *external institutional factors* have the ability to determine whether a radical right party exists in a political system, as well as the relative viability of a party to compete.

The second set of factors that determine the supply of a viable radical right party are those factors that are internal to the party, such a professionalization, organization, message/ideology, and leadership. For example, professionalized parties that are highly organized are going to be more viable because professional parties are traditionally better at running electoral campaigns. What determines *party internal factors*? The theory

Figure 2: Theory: Individual Radical Right Vote Choice



presented here argues that party internal factors are largely determined by the external institutional rules of a country. For instance, let us pretend that we have a country operating under plurality electoral rules and party finance laws that bias major parties. In this situation, even if a radical right party was able to form and get on the ballot, these institutional factors would make it utterly impossible for the radical right party to gain any significant amount of votes. The radical right party would lack the resources due to party finance laws to create an effective electoral campaign, the party would look unprofessional in comparison to the two main parties, and it would be irrational for an individual to waste their vote on the party (Downs 1957, Cox 1997). The party would not be able to compete at the level of the mainstream parties. The logic of this relationship is developed further in Chapter 2 and 3.


Given that a radical right party exists in the electoral market, the second stage of the theoretical vote choice model involves demand (desire to cast a vote) for a radical right

party. As perviously stated, prior research hypothesizes that three types of factors impact an individual's propensity to vote for the radical right party, or a radical right party's vote share in a country: *macro factors*, *voter soci-demographics*, and *voter attitudes*. Macro factors include those factors related to the modernization-loser theory; including perceived threats due to economic crisis and high immigration. Research on the socio-demographics of radical right voters has largely demonstrated patterns dealing with age, education, working status, etc. Finally, scholars have explored several attitudes that are hypothesized to lead to a radical right vote, such as anti-immigration, far right ideological positioning, authoritarianism, etc. However, previous analyses were not explicit about the level of analysis being conducted, which made hypothesizing about a relationship between these factors difficult.

In Figure 1, a theoretical framework is displayed that conveys the relationship between these demand factors. The argument presented here is that macro-forces play a key role in driving demand by conditioning attitudes of specific socio-demographic populations. Alternatively stated, macro forces create attitudes in the population of voters that are commonly understood as the losers of modernization. Then, these attitudes are what drives an individual to vote for a radical right party. Once these attitudes are ignited in a population where a viable radical right party exists, a one-dimensional ideological spatial model explains radical right vote choice.

The logic of the relationship between the factors that drive demand are presented in the simplified spatial model in Figure 2. Here, there is an original bi-modal distribution of voters that is predominantly captured by two parties (Party A & Party B). The dotted line demonstrates a new distribution of the same voters following the activation of attitudes, which the theory presented here argues is caused by the conditioning of attitudes through a change in macro forces. If the factors that determine supply are conducive to the existence of viable radical right party, then voters in the far right mode of the tri-modal distribution should move their vote from Party B to the radical right party. Therefore, after accounting for supply-side factors, individual radical right vote choice is explained by voter positioning on a one-dimensional ideological space. This sparse

Figure 3: Theory: Spatial Model Example



discussion encompasses the basics of the theory. Supporting chapters that follow fully tease out the mechanisms that link these factors together into a single, coherent theory.

## Chapter Layout

The chapters that follow develop the theory in a more concrete manner, as well as provide empirical testing to confirm the important mechanisms that demonstrate the validity of the theory. The chapter layout follows in an order that is consistent with the sequential nature of the theory. Chapter 2 specifically explores the external institutional factors and internal party factors that impact the availability and success of a viable radical right party in the electoral market. In this chapter, the relationship between the existence of a radical right party and external institutional factors is explored. Next, the chapter explores the relationship between external factors and radical right success. Finally, the chapter estimates the impact that internal supply-side factors have on radical right success.

The third chapter specifically explores the relationship between external and internal factors. The chapter seeks to determine whether external supply-side factors impact

important characteristics of the party that could later lead to a higher probability of success. Specifically, empirical testing is conducted utilizing statistical techniques in order to determine the relationship between external institutional factors and each theoretically important internal party factors in countries where a radical right party exists. The chapter concludes by estimating an overall model of success with all of the important supply-side variables of interest.

Chapter 4 explores the relationship between political attitudes and radical right vote choice at the individual level. The chapter conducts a large-N analysis using survey data across European countries in order to explore the important attitudes that translate into radical right vote choice. The analysis includes discussion and exploration of the ability of a one-dimensional spatial model to explain vote choice. The findings indicate that far right ideology, nativism, populism, anti-equality, and anti-EU attitudinal stances are correlated with radical right vote choice.

The fifth chapter investigates the conditioning effect that macro-social forces have on political attitudes. Specifically, this chapter focuses on the effect that immigration and negative economic circumstances have on the creation of the political attitudes that are correlated with a vote for the radical right. Further, the chapter posits a novel theory and argues that the mechanism that links macro-social forces to radical right vote choice is the creation of important radical right attitudes. The findings indicate that macro-forces do impact attitudes correlated with radical right vote choice.

The final chapter reviews the complete theory of radical right vote choice. In this chapter, an empirical model is estimated in order to represent a complete empirical test of the overarching theory. The model is a hierarchical model that incorporates important independent variables at both the individual level and country level. In this vein, the final statistical model represents the first attempt to estimate a comprehensive model for radical right vote choice.

## Chapter 2

# Impact of Supply-Side Factors on the Radical Right

*“But the system has been diverted from its original purpose. It does not filter out clownish candidates. It now filters out candidates who pose a danger to those in power.” (French National Front Head of Charente-Maritime, Jean-Marc de Lacoste 2012)*

*“I have my 500 signatures and therefore I will be a candidate in the presidential election.” (French National Front Leader, Marine Le Pen 2012)*

The quotes offered above were made during the 2012 French presidential campaign by two members of the National Front (NF). Presidential candidate hopeful, Marine Le Pen, and one of her regional leaders, made these statements in reference to a potential institutional barrier to entry for the party’s participation in the election. The rule mandates that a candidate must secure at least 500 signatures from elected individuals in order to be recognized on the ballot for the first-round of the French presidential elections. The NF argues that this institutional rule allows politically established politicians to block the entry of a new, democratic movement. In opposition, established politicians point out that the rule is intended to prevent illiberal or populist movements from entering office.

How valid is the concern that institutional rules are capable of preventing parties from competing in elections? The previous NF party leader, Jean-Marie Le Pen, was prevented from competing in the 1981 French presidential election due to not meeting the 500 signature limit. Le Pen competed in the previous presidential election of 1974 receiving .8% of the first-round vote (190,921 votes). In the presidential election of 1988, Le Pen secured 14.4% of the vote; equal to 4,570,838 votes in the first-round. At 14.4%, Le Pen obtained the fourth largest vote share in the 1988 election.

In regards to French national elections, there is another unique institutional feature that may prevent some minor party candidates, or candidates of newer parties, from being competitive. The French national electoral system is a two-round system. If no candidate receives 50% plus one vote in the first-round, then the two top vote receiving candidates face off in a second electoral round. The NF has only witnessed their presidential candidate move on to a second round of voting on one occasion. In the 2002 presidential election, Jean-Marie Le Pen was defeated in the first-round by only 3.02% of the vote. However, the second-round consisted of a massive campaign where all defeated parties joined together in order to ensure that the fringe candidate did not win. In the second-round, Le Pen was beaten by 64.42% of the vote.

This chapter seeks to determine what effect supply side factors, such as the institutional features discussed above, have on radical right emergence and success. More specifically, this research agenda posits hypotheses explaining how supply-side factors impact the viability of a political party in the voter's eyes. The analysis is divided into two sections in order to distinguish external supply-side factors from internal supply-side factors. First, *external supply-side factors* are examined. External supply-side factors are country-specific and election specific rules and features; such as party system type, electoral system proportionality, party finance laws, ballot access, and ideological space on the party spectrum. These factors have been theorized in previous literature to have a substantial effect on the ability of a radical right party to emerge and achieve success (Jackman and Volpert 1996, Golder 2003).

The second set of supply-side factors that could impact the emergence and success

of a radical right party are *internal supply-side factors*. Internal factors are characteristics of the political party; such as the party's level of professionalization, organizational structure, ideology, and leadership (Mudde 2007). These internal supply-side factors are evaluated by prospective voters. Voters calculate the probability of voter for a given party based on these characteristics. For instance, voters regularly evaluate whether their ideological beliefs are in accordance, or in conflict with, the platform of the available parties in the electoral market (Downs 1957).

This chapter proceeds by considering each of these supply-side factors and providing an overview of the literature regarding their impact on radical right emergence and success. Based on the expected relationships, hypotheses are provided for empirical analysis. Subsequently, each set of factors is tested in isolation in order to verify whether it has an effect on both emergence and vote share. The data in this research agenda are gathered for European countries between 1990-2013. The empirical results indicate that specific election rules have an effect on radical right emergence, while candidate-centered electoral rules and the overall electoral type impacts success. In addition, party professionalization, organizational structure, and electoral experience are internal supply-side factors that lead to radical right success.

## **External Supply-Side Factors**

External supply-side factors are more concretely understood as factors that dictate the political opportunity structure that exists in a given country or election. Tarrow (1994) defines political opportunity structures as, "consistent, but not necessarily formal or permanent, dimensions of the political environment that provide incentives for people to undertake collective action by affecting their expectations for success or failure" (85). In the case of the radical right, these external supply-side factors could theoretically alter the political opportunity structure in a number of ways.

For instance, whether political entrepreneurs view the creation of a radical right party as a fruitful endeavor, or simply the creation of another unsuccessful minor party, matters for the political opportunity structure. Similarly, if a radical right party already exists,



the existing structure could dissuade political entrepreneurs from joining the party if the prospects for success are low. If politicians are acting rationally, it would not be beneficial for a politician to create or join a radical right party that, in their eyes, could not secure a substantial number of votes, office positions, or changes in policy (Müller and Strøm 1999). There is a vast literature in American politics which demonstrates this relationship regarding the incentive to win election politician entrepreneurship behavior (Mayhew 1974, Miller and Stokes 1963, Erikson 1978, Hibbing 1991, Stratmann 2000, Griffin 2006). Therefore, low prospects of winning an election could dissuade political entrepreneurs from creating or joining a radical right party since the cost of party creation is not worth the low possibility of reward.

The political opportunity structure available in a country or election could also alter voters' perception of the viability of a radical right party. Voter support for a political party relies on satisfying two important requirements. First, prospective voters must view radical right parties as representing their interests and ideological viewpoints. The ideological beliefs of a voter must align with the political policy platform of the party. The importance of ideological congruence is discussed and empirically tested in a later chapter specifically exploring demand-side factors for radical right vote choice. The second requirement is that the voter must view the party as legitimate. In other words, the party must be viewed as a competitor with a realistic chance of success. According to rational voting theories, voters are much less likely to support a party that does not have a legitimate chance of winning office (Duverger 1986, Riker 1986, Cox 1997). In addition, Duch, May and Armstrong (2010) find that voters even make calculations about the prospects for participation in a coalition government for niche parties based on strategic behavior. This is precisely the reason why there is a tendency to see two-party political systems correlate with first-past-the-post electoral rules. Voters will not cast a vote for a party that has no realistic chance of winning. Similarly, the electoral system rules discussed above could significantly impact the calculation that voters make when determining the prospects for success of the party.

There is no doubt that some electoral rules put certain types of parties at a disadvan-

tage in terms of electoral competition, thus narrowing the political opportunity structure. For example, it has long been asserted that first-past-the-post electoral systems make it difficult for third-parties to achieve success (Duverger 1986, Riker 1986, Cox 1997), and this assertion is commonly used to explain the inability of radical right parties to achieve success in specific settings (Jackman and Volpert 1996, Carter 2002, Golder 2003, Norris 2005, Carter 2005, Givens 2005, Mudde 2007, Arzheimer 2009). The United States and the United Kingdom are prime examples of the ability of electoral rules to prevent third-parties from becoming a significant electoral force. Historically, neither country has ever witnessed the success of a radical right party at the national level. In addition, ballot access rules and party finance laws could put parties at a significant disadvantage. For instance, the French presidential election ballot access rule requiring 500 signatures from politicians in order to compete in the first-round of the election was able to prevent Le Pen from competing in the 1981 election.

This section will explore the ability of external supply-side factors, such as electoral rules, to narrow or widen the political opportunity structure available to radical right parties. The section is organized as follows. First, I present a brief review of literature, followed by a proffered set of hypotheses that identify the precise effect that these factors have on radical right parties. Finally, variable operationalization and the fit of these variables with the statistical approach is explained.

## **Electoral System Type**

The type of electoral system a country utilizes to fill elected positions is of great interest to both political scientists and governing parties. Classical comparative politics literature offers numerous explorations of the consequences of different electoral systems. Broadly, Duverger (1967), Riker (1986), and Cox (1997) acknowledge that first-past-the-post electoral rules tend to create two-party systems. Riker (1986) argues that two mechanisms explain this outcomes. First, the author identifies a ‘mechanical effect’ whereby losing parties are underrepresented by plurality electoral systems (33). The effect of this mechanism is that plurality systems tend to underrepresent and therefore

discourage the success of less supported parties mathematically in their translation from votes to seats. Second, Riker (1986) argues that a ‘psychological effect’ exists whereby voters, being aware of this mechanical discrepancy, will not vote for third parties because they do not want to waste their vote. In addition, first-past-the-post electoral systems tend to see political parties converge ideologically in the center of the ideological distribution near the median voter in order to win a plurality of the votes (Cox 1997, Shepsle 2010). Therefore, the resulting party system for countries utilizing first-past-the-post is a system in which two, ideologically convergent parties compete for the median voter on the ideological spectrum. In sum, it should be more difficult for radical right parties to exist and succeed in countries using first-past-the-post electoral systems (Jackman and Volpert 1996, Carter 2002, Golder 2003, Norris 2005, Carter 2005, Givens 2005, Mudde 2007, Arzheimer 2009).

There are several distinct electoral rules that could also impact radical right parties. The total number of seats up for election could be related to the ability of radical right parties to compete. Generally, as the number of seats contested in an election rises, the competition area becomes more geographically bound. The effect of this type of bounded competition could mean that smaller, regionally popular parties are better able to compete (DeClair 1999). Alternatively, a rise in the total number of seats could simply provide smaller parties with a greater chance for contesting seats due to the increase in the number of opportunities for success. Second, elections for legislatures sometimes operate under split rules to elect the entire chamber. The general intent behind split rules elections is to create stable governance, while also allowing smaller parties to win and represent the interests of minority groups. Usually, elections operating under split rules are done in order to satisfy an ethnic minority. However, sometimes the intent, or at the very least the outcome, is to ensure greater party choice and stable governance (i.e. Germany’s split rules elections to the Bundestag). In addition, an increase in districts and use of two-round elections are believed to stifle radical right success. An increase in districts and use of two-round elections are believed to have the same effect as first-past-the-post electoral rules. There is a tendency for these two electoral features

to be associated with two-party systems that witness the convergence of parties on the ideological median voter.

There are two electoral rules that are specifically intended to limit the success of extreme parties. First, a few countries contain bans on neo-nazi, fascist, and radical nationalist parties. For instance, Germany and Lithuania have constitutional bans on political parties that disrupt the current liberal democratic order of the government. The bans are intended to limit the nationalistic rhetoric that swept throughout Europe in the 1930s-1940s. In these countries, the existence of radical right parties is thought to be limited by these bans since radical right parties contain ideological ties with these more extreme parties of the World War II era. In addition, several countries adopted electoral thresholds in order to prevent small, extreme parties from entering office. Again, Germany provides a prime example. Germany's adoption of the electoral threshold was a direct consequence of the rise of the National Socialist German Worker's Party (Nazi). The Nazi party started as small party receiving less than 5% of the vote and winning a few elected positions. The party leveraged these government positions as a political platform to spread their extreme rhetoric. Thus, the implementation of electoral thresholds seeks not only to limit the success of extreme parties, but also to limit their ability to spread extreme ideologies.

The final electoral rule theorized to effect radical right parties is compulsory voting. Norris (2005) was the first scholar to hypothesize that a relationship exists between compulsory voting and radical right party success. She argues that forcing people to vote who are dissatisfied with the mainstream parties could result in the increase in votes for more radical parties (122). The author does not statistically test this assertion, but she does provide some descriptive statistics that lend credence to the initial claim. Empirically testing this assertion would give us a good indication of the precise effect of compulsory voting on radical right existence and vote share.

## **Electoral System Disproportionality**

The disproportionality of the electoral system is commonly cited as a barrier to success for radical right parties (Jackman and Volpert 1996, Carter 2002, 2005, Givens 2005, Arzheimer 2009). NF members in France cite the electoral system's lack of proportionality as their greatest barrier to success (DeClair 1999). Cross-nationally, Norris (2005) finds some evidence for this claim. As proportionality increases so does radical right vote share. However, it will be interesting to test whether proportionality is a function of the electoral system, a specific electoral rule, or whether this factor is isolated from other external factors. Carter (2005) argues that the proportionality of the electoral system impacts radical right success more than the overall electoral system type. This occurs because several specific electoral rules work together in order to determine the overall proportionality of the system. Here, the hypothesis is that a more disproportionate system makes it less likely a radical right party will emerge and succeed.

## **Multi-Party Systems**

Multi-party systems are positively correlated with radical right vote share. Jackman and Volpert (1996) find that multi-partism increasingly fosters parties of the extreme right with rising electoral proportionality. In addition, Givens (2005) find that increasing the number of parties in a coalition government significantly increases the existence of a radical right party. Finally, using Lijphart's (2010) two institutional dimensions of government, Hakhverdian and Koop (2007) find that increasing the number of parties on the executive-parties dimension is correlated with increased radical right presence. The authors conclude that Lijphart's consensus democracy categorization is more conducive to radical parties.

The assertion that multi-party systems lead to radical right party success is one that is tangled in a web of other theories. Classical electoral system research asserts that the number of parties in a country is a function of electoral system design (Duverger 1972, Riker 1986). On the other hand, contrasting arguments claim that the number and type of parties in a country are a function of social cleavages caused by the ideological makeup

of voters (Lipset and Rokkan 1967, Taagepera and Grofman 1985). What becomes important here is the statistical relationship between the number of parties in a system and specific electoral rules. If electoral rules correlate highly with the number of parties in a system, perhaps the number of parties in the system is really a confounding variable in the analysis.

## **Ballot Access**

Electoral laws and regulations targeting candidates and parties have the ability to sway the prospects of parties to exist and succeed in a political system. Norris (2005) splits these laws and regulations into two categories: nomination and campaigning (83). In regards to nomination, her major focus is on rules related to ballot access, such as banning the participation of a party or group. However, there are several other rules related to ballot access that deserve attention. Theoretically, the manipulation of minor ballot access laws could have a big impact on the ability of parties to represent the interests of specific groups. For instance, a high age barrier could make it difficult for younger people to achieve substantive representation on their issues. For example, in order to run for the Czech Republic Senate a candidate must be at least 40 years old. Overall, as the strictness of ballot access laws increase it should be more difficult for smaller, extreme parties to be successful. To date, the precise effect of ballot access on outcomes for radical right parties has not been empirically tested.

## **Campaign Finance**

Within Norris's (2005) second category, campaigning, campaign finance laws and regulations emerge as most important. The strictness of campaign finance laws can make it difficult for newer and/or smaller parties to compete in elections. For instance, loose restrictions on donor contributions could allow a wealthy minority of citizens to finance the activities of a party that started out fairly small. The increase in finance would then allow the minority party to compete through several campaign activities, such as advertising. In regards to campaign finance laws, there could be differing effects based

on subtle particularities in the law. For example, candidate spending restrictions might even the playing field between candidates, but the same effect would not extend to the party. Some parties may be able to field more candidates, thereby increasing the number of chances for success. Still, it is possible that spending restrictions of parties could even the level of exposure each party is able to convey to the voters.

Norris (2005) attempted to explore this relationship between party finance and party outcomes. Unfortunately, the data did not exist to test this assertion directly. However, the author found indirect evidence that less strict campaign finance laws are positively related to the number of parties in a political system. The overall conclusion from this indirect test was that radical right parties may benefit from looser restrictions on campaign finance. Here, the assertion is tested empirically for the first time.

### **Unoccupied Ideological Space**

It is commonly theorized that the ability of a radical right party to emerge and achieve success in a country are a function of the space available on the ideological spectrum for a party to locate. Carter (2005) argues that the ideological proximity of the parties on the mainstream right determines how much political space is available to the extreme right parties. Stated simply, the author argues that the greater the space to the right, the greater the probability of emergence and sustained success. Mudde (2007) concurs with the idea that there needs to be ideological space for a new party (i.e. electoral volatility) to emerge. Unfortunately, existing literature has been unable to test this assertion due to data unavailability and measurement hurdles. This research provides the first attempt to empirically test this assertion.

### **Operationalization: External Supply-Side Factors**

The most straightforward external supply side variables to operationalize for empirical testing were those variables that represent the electoral system; including several specific electoral system features. Broadly, each country's overall electoral system type was coded as operating under either first-past-the-post or proportional representation

electoral rules.<sup>5</sup> Originally, the electoral system variable was coded to account for two other types of electoral systems. Ireland and Malta were coded as operating under single-transferable vote electoral rules, and Poland was coded as operating under plurality-bloc voting. However, the lack of variation on the electoral system variable led to model convergence problems and inflated standard errors. Further, successful attempts to remedy these problems did not produce substantively different results.<sup>6</sup> Since single-transferable vote and plurality-bloc voting mimic the high election thresholds outlined in first-past-the-post electoral rules, these cases were coded as first-past-the-post.

There were several additional electoral rules that were included in the statistical analyses. First, the total number of seats up for election is included in the analysis in order to account for the fact that a larger number of seats may lead to a greater opportunity for contestation.<sup>7</sup> Second, several countries operated under split rules in order to fill their legislative chamber(s).<sup>8</sup> Certainly, it is possible that countries with split rules elections signal to voters and parties that there is ample opportunity for successful entry into the legislature. Finally, the statistical models accounted for the electoral rule of compulsory voting.<sup>9</sup> Where people are forced to vote in an election, there could be a higher incidence of voters casting protest votes in favor of radical right, or more broadly, anti-system, parties.<sup>10</sup>

---

<sup>5</sup>In the dataset, there were 93 elections (32.18%) conducted under first-past-the-post electoral rules, and 196 elections (67.82%) conducted under proportional representation electoral rules. In the truncated dataset including success, there were 25 elections (20.83%) conducted under first-past-the-post electoral rules, and 95 elections (79.17%) conducted under proportional representation electoral rules. The highest correlation between this variable and any another independent variable in the models was .333.

<sup>6</sup>Firth logistic regression models were estimated in order to determine whether single-transferable and plurality-bloc voting rules were significantly and substantively different in terms of effecting outcomes. The model results indicated that they were not.

<sup>7</sup>In the dataset, the total number of seats ranged from zero to 659, with a mean of 197.4 seats. The elections where 0 seats were contested included elections where a first-round was necessary in order to advance and receive a chance at winning a seat. In the truncated dataset for success, the minimum and maximum number of seats remained the same, but the mean was 203.5. The highest correlation between total seats and any other independent variable in the models was .281.

<sup>8</sup>In the dataset, there were 66 out of 289 elections (22.84%) operating under split rules in order to fill the legislature. In the truncated dataset for success, 23 out of 120 elections (19.17%) were operating under split rules. The variable did not correlate higher than .234 with any of the other variables in the models.

<sup>9</sup>In the dataset, 16.96% of the elections were held with compulsory voting in place. In the truncated dataset for success, 22.5% of the elections were held with compulsory voting in place. The variable correlated no higher than .24 with any of the other independent variables included in the models.

<sup>10</sup>There were a number of electoral rules also considered for statistical testing that were ultimately excluded due to their high correlation with other variables; these include two-round elections, the number



The disproportionality of the electoral system could be measured in a number of possible ways (Mudambi 1997, Karpov 2008). For instance, Gallagher (1991, 1992) has done substantial work related to how scholars should measure electoral system proportionality, and the effects of proportionality on outcomes. The measure utilized here, in order to represent electoral system proportionality, is derived from Lijphart's (1994) work on electoral and party systems. Lijphart's (1994) index is represented mathematically as  $I_{Lijphart} = \frac{(s_i - v_i) + (s_j - v_j)}{2}$ . The equation only takes into account the two largest vote receiving parties' vote share and share of the seats. Since the largest parties usually have the most significant deviations from the quota, the measure represents the disproportionality of the entire system.<sup>11</sup>

The effective number of parties represented in a political system is included in this analysis in order to account for the theory that larger party systems lead to radical right

---

of electoral districts, threshold, multi-seat constituencies, and extreme right bans. A few countries operate under elections that have two-rounds. In the original dataset, 7.07% of elections were the first-round of an election, and 8.75% were the second-round of an election. The first round of the election determines which top-two vote receivers move on to a second-round runoff. The argument in favor of a two-round electoral system is that the system is more democratic since the winner must receive a plurality of the votes cast in the election. Since radical right parties appear to do very well in the first-round of these elections, the variable merited consideration. The rounds variable correlated at .724 with a variable representing whether the constituency was a multi-seat constituency, .655 with a variable representing the electoral system, and .587 with a variable representing the threshold. Second, a variable representing the number of districts that are contested in the election was utilized in a previous analysis. The variable ranged from one district for the entire country to 650 districts. The mean number of districts was 74.49. The variable was originally included in order to account for whether having more districts allows radical right parties to be more successful by taking advantage of regional strategies. The district variable correlated at .682 with a variable representing whether the constituency was a multi-seat constituency, .637 with a variable representing the electoral system, and .577 with a variable representing the threshold. Third, a variable was included that represented the threshold percentage of the vote that a party needed to obtain in order to be allocated seats in the legislature. In the original dataset, the variable ranged from 3% to 50% plus one vote. The thought process is that a lower threshold would allow more fringe parties to obtain success. The threshold variable correlated at .811 with a variable measuring whether the constituency was a multi-seat constituency, and .988 with the electoral system variable. Fourth, included in the original analysis was a variable that represented whether the constituency was a multi-seat constituency. In the original dataset, 76.09% for the elections took places with multi-seat constituencies. The variable was included originally in order to account for the fact that multi-seat constituencies are less likely to lead two-party systems. Indeed, the variable representing multi-seat constituencies correlated at .813 with the electoral system type. Finally, there was a variable included in the analysis that represented whether extreme right/neo-nazi parties were banned from participating in elections. Unfortunately, the inclusion of this variable led to model convergence issues. Less than 10% of the elections in the sample occurred in places where these parties were banned. Further, in 51.58% of the countries where extreme right parties were banned, there was a radical right party in existence.

<sup>11</sup>The disproportionality measure ranges from a minimum of -.333 (Slovakia - 2012) to a maximum value of .34 (Lithuania - 2012). The mean electoral disproportionality was .04. In the truncated dataset for success, the measure ranges from -.333 to .2763 (France - 1997). The mean was .04086. The highest correlation between electoral system disproportionality and any other independent variable was .331 (electoral system type).

success. The effective number of parties was calculated using Laakso and Taagepera's (1979) mathematical formula. Laakso and Taagepera's calculation for the effective number of parties is  $N = \frac{1}{\sum_{i=1}^n P_i^2}$ . Party systems with a greater number of parties should have a higher probability of radical right emergence, and these systems should witness greater radical right success.<sup>12</sup>

A measure for the strictness of party finance laws was created by coding several specific party finance laws, and then estimating factor analysis in order to create an overall measure of strictness. First, a variable was coded in order to represent restrictions on donors. The variable was coded a one if the election occurred under donor limits, and a zero if there were no donor limits.<sup>13</sup> Next, a variable was coded that accounted for existing spending limitations on candidates. The variable was coded a one if there were spending limitations imposed on candidates or parties, and a zero otherwise.<sup>14</sup> Finally, two variables were created to account for the reporting of campaign finance activities. The first variable represents whether candidates needed to report contributions. The variable was a coded a zero if candidates do not have to report contributions, a .5 if reporting must occur when a contribution is over a certain amount, and a one if all campaign contributions must be reported.<sup>15</sup> The other campaign finance variable was the targeted at expenditures. The variable was coded a zero if candidates did not have to report expenditures, a .5 if they did have to report expenditures over a certain amount of money, and a one if candidates must have reported all expenditures.<sup>16</sup> The factor analysis technique was estimated including these four variables. The factor scores were saved for each observation in order to represent the strictness of the countries party finance laws.<sup>17</sup>

---

<sup>12</sup>The variable ranged from 2.024 (Malta - 2003) to 13.83 (Poland 1991), and had a mean of 5.014. In the truncated dataset for success, the measure ranged from 2.508 (Italy - 2001) to 10.24 (Belgium - 1999), and had mean of 5.669. The highest correlation between electoral system disproportionality and any other independent variable was .229 (electoral system type).

<sup>13</sup>In the original data, 47.14% of elections occurred where there were donor limitations.

<sup>14</sup>In the original dataset, 51.51% of elections had spending limitations in place.

<sup>15</sup>In the original dataset, 27.6% of the time there was no reporting law in effect for contributions, and 5.38% of the time contributions only had to be reported if the contribution was over a certain amount.

<sup>16</sup>In the original dataset, 27.94% of the time there was no reporting law in effect, and 1% of the time there was a reporting law in effect only for certain expenditures amounts.

<sup>17</sup>The proportion of the variance explained with one factor loading was .591. The calculation for the squared multiple correlation of the factor scores for all of the variables was .855, which means that the values from the variables are highly weighted when calculating the factor analysis scores. The original calculation included a variable representing whether public funding was available for candidates and

Factor analysis scores were also estimated to represent the restrictiveness of ballot access laws. There were five separately coded ballot access laws used for the estimation. First, the required age a person must be in order to run as a candidate for election was obtained.<sup>18</sup> Second, a variable was coded to represent whether a person must be a member of a registered political party in order to run for election. The variable is coded a one if you must be a registered member, and a zero otherwise.<sup>19</sup> Third, the number of signatures a person must obtain from the voting population in order to run for election was represented.<sup>20</sup> Fourth, the number of signatures a person must obtain from current elected officials in order to run for election was represented.<sup>21</sup> Finally, a variable was created to represent whether a person needed support from both elected politicians and the voting population before being allowed to stand for election. The variable was coded a one if support was needed from both, and a zero otherwise.<sup>22</sup> Factor analysis scores were estimated based on the values for these five variables, and scores were saved for each observation.<sup>23</sup>

The final external supply-side variable was ideological space. Ideological space was the most difficult variable to operationalize since political party positioning could be measured in a number of ways. In order to operationalize party ideology and space, Party Manifesto Project's "rile" scores were utilized for elections where available (Volkens et al. 2014). The Party Manifesto Score scale ranges from -100 to 100. The smallest possible score of -100 indicates the most extreme left party, and the largest possible score of 100 indicates the most extreme right party. Here, the ideological space available for a radical

---

whether a payment must be made in order to run for election. However, these two variables were not correlated with other variables utilized for measuring party finance law restrictiveness.

<sup>18</sup>In the original dataset, the required age for candidacy ranged from 18 to 40 years old with a mean of 22.03.

<sup>19</sup>In the original dataset, 14.42% of candidates are required to be members of a registered political party in order to run for election.

<sup>20</sup>In the original dataset, the number of signatures needed from voters ranged from 0 to 10,000 (Bulgaria) with a mean of 1964.

<sup>21</sup>In the original dataset, the number of current elected officials signatures needed ranged from 0 to 500 (France) with a mean of 18.68.

<sup>22</sup>In the original dataset, 6.52% of the time a person must receive signatures from voters and current elected officials.

<sup>23</sup>The proportion of the variance explained with one factor loading was .289. The calculation for the squared multiple correlation of the factor scores for all of the variables was .991. This high statistic indicates that the factors scores were created based on value of these variables with minimal error.

right party was calculated using party manifesto scores for each election ( $i$ ) with one of the two equations below:<sup>24</sup>

If the radical right party is the furthest party to the right:

$$\text{Party}_{iRR} - \text{Party}_{il}$$

If the radical right party is not the furthest party to the right:

$$\frac{(\text{Party}_{ir} - \text{Party}_{il})}{\text{Party}_{iLargest} - \text{Party}_{iSmallest}}$$

$\text{Party}_{il}$  represents the party manifesto score of the party to the left of the radical right party in the election. Likewise,  $\text{Party}_{ir}$  represents the party to the right of the radical right party. The denominator of the second equation represents the difference between the largest and smallest party manifesto scores in the election. The above calculations were done in order to err on the side of caution and not overestimate the available space for a radical right party. For instance, if the radical right party is the furthest right party, that party could technically locate anywhere between  $\text{Party}_{il}$  and the party manifesto value of 100. However, this assumption would not be realistic due to the fact that a distribution of voters may also be limiting the available ideological space for a radical right party to locate, which is an assertion left for future research to test.

## Method and Dependent Variable

The empirical analyses testing for the effect of external supply-side factors occurs in two-stages. The first stage of empirical testing seeks to understand the effect of external supply-side factors on radical right party existence in an election. The dependent variable is coded a one if a radical right party contested seats in the election, and a zero if no radical right party participated in the election. In the dataset, 67% (194) of European elections between 1990-2014 witnessed a radical right party contesting seats. Since the variable is binary, Bayesian binary models are estimated using the Markov Chain Monte

---

<sup>24</sup>The ideological space variable ranges from -0.5392 (Austria - 1995) to 49.97 (Croatia - 2003-2011), and has a mean of 7.508. The ideological space variable did not correlate any higher than .214 with any other independent variables in the models.

Carlo (MCMC) simulation method.<sup>25</sup> One of the main differences between frequentist and Bayesian inference is that Bayesians assume that data are fixed and parameters are variable, whereas frequentists assume that data come from some infinitely repeatable generating process with constant, fixed parameters. The frequentist assumption of infinite repeatability may not be realistic here where the universe of cases is known.

The model testing the effect of external supply-side factors on radical right existence had the prior variance for each variable set at multivariate normal with the mean vector equalling zero and a precision matrix that is diagonal. The prior means for each variable were set at zero when estimating the model.<sup>26</sup> When plotting the distributions for the chains, the distributions overlapped quite closely. The model presented here was estimated by using a burnin of 100,000, and a sample of 700,000 that was thinned by 5.<sup>27</sup> In regards to model convergence, each parameter for both chains passed Gelman and Rubin, Geweke, and Heidelberger and Welch tests. The Gelman and Rubin test statistics gave a potential scale reduction factor of 1 for all parameters; indicating there was no need to run the chains longer to improve convergence of the stationarity distribution<sup>28</sup> The Geweke diagnostic test statistics indicated that the means of the parameters from two different locations in the chains converged to a standard normal distribution. All parameters passed the stationarity and half-width tests of the Heidelberger and Welch test. In addition, trace plots of the Markov chains showed that there was no trending present for the chains, or the individual parameters for each chain. Lastly, density plots

---

<sup>25</sup>The Bayesian models were estimated in JAGS version 3.4.0. The models were estimated in R version 3.1.3 on a MAC running OS X 10.10.3.

<sup>26</sup>It is important to note that two additional models were estimated for each model presented here. The first additional model set the prior mean for each variable as either +1 or -1 depending on the directionality of the theoretical expectations for the variable. For instance, the effective number of parties prior mean was set at +1, because the theory expects that the number of parties is positively related to radical right existence. Then, another model was estimated where the prior mean for each variable was set as the opposite of the first model (i.e. effective number of parties set at -1). This was done in order to test the robustness of the prior specification. In particular, one would want to know whether the probability distributions of the estimated Markov Chains for the models were statistically different from each other in any meaningful way that could skew results. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests indicated that the probability distributions of the models were not statistically different from one another, which means that prior mean specification did not bias results received here. However, model convergence was impacted by prior specification. Models where prior means were set to the opposite of theoretical expectations took significantly longer to converge, or did not converge at all.

<sup>27</sup>Several models were estimated where the number of burning, sampling, and thinning were changed. When the models converged, the results were substantively the same.

<sup>28</sup>Statistics of 1.2 or higher are the cutoff.

conveyed that the distribution of the posterior parameters were normally distributed. The equation for the model is presented here:

$$\begin{aligned} \log \left( \frac{\text{Pr(RadicalRightParty)}}{1 - \text{Pr(RadicalRightParty)}} \right) &= \alpha + \beta_1 \text{ElectoralSystem} + \beta_2 \text{TotalSeats} \\ &+ \beta_3 \text{SplitRules} + \beta_4 \text{CompulsoryVoting} \\ &+ \beta_5 \text{ElectoralSystemDisproportionality} \\ &+ \beta_6 \text{Effective\#ofParties} + \beta_7 \text{PartyFinanceLaws} \\ &+ \beta_8 \text{BallotAccessLaws} + \epsilon \\ \epsilon &\sim N(0, \theta_\epsilon^2) \end{aligned}$$

The second stage of empirical testing explored the effect that external supply-side factors have on radical right success. Radical right success is measured here in two ways. First, success is measured as the percentage of the vote that the radical right party received in the election. The variable ranges from 0% to 34.33% (Austrian Freedom Party - 2006) of the overall vote share.<sup>29</sup> Second, success is measured as the proportion of the seats that the radical right party obtained. The variable ranges from 0% to 36.07%.<sup>30</sup> Again, Bayesian regression models were estimated while using the MCMC method. However, here the Bayesian models were linear Bayesian regression since the dependent variables are theoretically continuous. Another unique aspect of these Bayesian models is that prior mean and variance were set as the coefficients and standard errors of frequentist regression models in order to help with model convergence. This approach is useful since the results of the frequentist models conformed with theoretical expectations.<sup>31</sup> Plots of the distributions for the chains confirmed that the distributions overlapped. The models presented here were estimated using a burnin of 500,000, and a sample of 200,000

---

<sup>29</sup>The mean of the variable was 4.96%

<sup>30</sup>The mean of the variable was 4.95%.

<sup>31</sup>Additional models were estimated with different prior specifications (see, footnote 32). Aside from impacting the quickness of model convergence, the model results were substantively similar where convergence occurred.

that was thinned by 25.<sup>32</sup> In regards to model convergence, the models passed all of the same convergence tests discussed previously. The equations for the models are presented below.<sup>33</sup> In the equation, radical right success stands for vote share and seat share in separate models.<sup>34</sup>

$$\begin{aligned}
\text{RadicalRightSuccess} &= \alpha + \beta_1 \text{ElectoralSystem} + \beta_2 \text{TotalSeats} \\
&+ \beta_3 \text{SplitRules} + \beta_4 \text{CompulsoryVoting} \\
&+ \beta_5 \text{ElectoralSystemDisproportionality} \\
&+ \beta_6 \text{Effective\#ofParties} + \beta_7 \text{PartyFinanceLaws} \\
&+ \beta_8 \text{BallotAccessLaws} + \beta_9 \text{IdeologicalSpace} + \epsilon \\
\epsilon &\sim N(0, \theta_\epsilon^2) \\
b_j &\sim N(\mu_j, \tau_j)
\end{aligned}$$

## Results: External Institutional Factors on Party Existence & Success

Statistical output from models estimating the relationship between external supply-side factors and radical right existence and success are presented in Tables 3 and 4. Before discussing the results, it is important to note that there are four models predicting radical right success. The reason for estimating four models is because the ideological space variable requires calculations from the Party Manifesto Project. This calculation

---

<sup>32</sup>Several models were estimated where these specifications were different. No substantively different results emerged where the models converged.

<sup>33</sup>Additional models was presented where ideological space was excluded as an independent variable. This was done due to the fact that the ideological space variable has a lot of missing values, as not all elections were coded for the Party Manifesto Project.

<sup>34</sup>In the vote share model, the prior means are  $\mu = (0.043, 0.053, 0.000, 0.031, 0.024, 0.175, -0.000, -0.027, -0.014, -0.000)$ , and the prior variance are  $\tau = (0.041, 0.023, 0.000, 0.022, 0.019, 0.127, 0.005, 0.008, 0.014, 0.000)$ . In the seat share model, the prior means are  $\mu = (-0.024, 0.122, 0.000, 0.052, 0.029, 0.068, -0.002, -0.027, -0.018, -0.000)$ , and the prior variance are  $\tau = (0.041, 0.024, 0.000, 0.000, 0.019, 0.129, 0.004, 0.008, 0.014, 0.000)$ .

reduces the number of observations to 120 for both measures of success due to missing data. Therefore, results from both models are presented in order to compare differences in outcomes.

Table 3: The Effect of External Supply-Side Factors on Radical Right Existence

	Existence
Intercept	0.431 (-0.097, 0.970)
Electoral System (PR)	0.603 (-0.079, 1.286)
Total Seats	0.417* (0.116, 0.736)
Split Rules	0.392* (0.090, 0.706)
Compulsory Voting	0.401* (0.093, 0.734)
Disproportionality	-0.149 (-0.466, 0.156)
Effective # of Parties	0.458* (0.128, 0.805)
Party Finance Laws	-0.180 (-0.477, 0.111)
Ballot Access Laws	-0.143 (-0.432, 0.144)
<i>N</i>	289
PRE	.147 (0.000, 0.253)

95% credible intervals are in parentheses

\* indicates at least 95% of the posterior density on the same side of zero.

PRE = Proportional Reduction in Error

While reviewing the results, notice the measure of fit scores. On average, the existence model explains about 14.7% in the variance of radical right parties contested elections throughout Europe. For the models predicting vote share, the range in explanatory on average is between 14.5% and 15.3%. In comparison, models predicting the share of the seats that the radical right party received performs substantially better. On average, these models explain between 21% and 35.5% in the variance in seat share. The results conform well with Norris's (2005) expectation that external factors are more capable of explaining seat share than vote share.

Output from the model predicting the existence of a radical right party contesting



seats in a national legislative election reveals theoretically guided results. First, the total number of seats available for contestation is positively related to the existence of a radical right party. As the number of seats increase, the expectation that radical right parties will have a higher propensity to contest seats increases. Second, elections for legislative bodies that are contested under split rules have a higher probability of witnessing the existence of a radical right party. As stated, split rules have been known to level the playing field for smaller parties seeking to obtain some representation in the legislature, while maintaining some ability for majorities to govern. Finally, the only other variable statistically related to radical right existence is the effective number of parties in a political system. As the effective number of parties increases, the probability of the existence of a radical right party in the election increases.

There were several variables that were thought to be theoretically relevant that had no statistical impact on radical right existence. The electoral system as a whole does not dissuade radical right parties from participating in the election. This result is somewhat surprising given that first-past-the-post electoral systems are thought to create two-party systems where third-parties have no chance of existence. Perhaps, the electoral system plays less of a role for radical right party emergence when controlling for the effective number of parties. The results is made stronger by the fact that the electoral system and effective number of parties are not correlated. Further, the disproportionality of the electoral system is not statistically related to radical right existence. Therefore, no claims can be made that radical right parties are dissuaded from emergence by the uneven translation of votes to seats. Finally, neither ballot access or party finance laws have a statistical effect on radical right existence. However, the results suggest that several variables not related to existence do play a role in determining radical right success.

Results predicting radical right success reveal that there are different external supply-side factors at play than those that predict emergence. First, electoral system type has a statistically significant relationship with radical right party success. Obviously, the result is susceptible to the possibility of endogeneity. The variable is significant across all models, but was not significant for predicting radical right existence. In particular,

Table 4: The Effect of External Supply-Side Factors on Radical Right Success

	Vote Share	Vote Share	Seat Share	Seat Share
Intercept	0.005 (-0.023, 0.033)	0.058 (-0.014, 0.129)	0.015* (0.000, 0.030)	-0.002 (-0.075, 0.071)
Electoral System (PR)	0.024* (0.006, 0.042)	0.044* (0.002, 0.086)	0.042* (0.022, 0.061)	0.113* (0.070, 0.156)
Total Seats	-0.000 (-0.000, 0.000)	0.000 (-0.000, 0.000)	-0.005 (-0.014, 0.003)	0.000 (-0.000, 0.000)
Split Rules	0.002 (-0.017, 0.022)	0.028 (-0.013, 0.069)	-0.000 (-0.009, 0.008)	0.044* (0.003, 0.086)
Compulsory Voting	0.004 (-0.016, 0.025)	0.021 (-0.015, 0.057)	-0.003 (-0.011, 0.005)	0.027 (-0.009, 0.064)
Disproportionality	-0.005 (-0.098, 0.088)	0.069 (-0.081, 0.218)	-0.008 (-0.017, 0.000)	0.033 (-0.117, 0.183)
Effective # of Parties	0.007* (0.003, 0.011)	-0.000 (-0.009, 0.008)	0.016* (0.007, 0.024)	-0.003 (-0.012, 0.006)
Party Finance Laws	-0.006 (-0.014, 0.002)	-0.027* (-0.042, -0.012)	-0.006 (-0.015, 0.002)	-0.027* (-0.042, -0.012)
Ballot Access Laws	-0.017* (-0.025, -0.008)	-0.011 (-0.037, 0.015)	-0.012* (-0.021, -0.003)	-0.015 (-0.042, 0.012)
Ideological Space	NA	-0.000 (-0.002, 0.001)	NA	-0.001 (-0.002, 0.000)
<i>N</i>	289	120	289	120
R <sup>2</sup>	0.145 (0.120, 0.157)	0.153 (0.097, 0.184)	0.210 (0.185, 0.222)	0.353 (0.303, 0.379)

95% credible intervals are in parentheses

\* indicates at least 95% of the posterior density on the same side of zero.

PRE = Proportional Reduction in Error

proportional representation is associated with an increase in radical right vote share and seat share. It is easy to understand how electoral system formulas could impact seat share, but here the results indicate that the decision to cast a vote for a radical right party is also affected by the electoral system. This result contradicts Carter's (2005) argument that the electoral system does not effect overall vote share. On average, the increase in vote share for proportional representation is between 2.4% and 4.4% when compared to first-past-the-post electoral systems, and an increase of 4.2% to 11.3% for seat share. The other three variables statistically related to radical right success are not consistent across models. Model 1 and 3 indicate that the effective number of parties in an election is related to radical right vote share and seat share. The average effect is a little less than an increase of 1% per additional party competing in the election. The effective number of parties variable is significant in the full dataset where ideological space is not included as an independent variable. Likewise, in model 1 and 3, ballot

access laws are statistically related to radical right success. In particular, an increase in the restrictiveness of ballot access laws leads to a decrease in radical right vote share and seat share. On the other hand, the results of model 2 and 4 indicate that party finance laws are statistically related to radical right success. Specifically, an increase in the strictness of party finance laws leads to a decrease in radical right success. The result indicates that where radical right parties exist, more restrictive ballot access laws could make it more difficult to obtain a higher overall vote share.

What story do these results tell regarding the direct effect of external supply-side factors on radical right parties? The story here is that there are specific electoral rules that might dissuade radical right parties from emerging and participating. In particular, rules dealing with how many seats are contested and filled, voter mandates, and the number of parties available in the electoral market increase the probability of a radical right party contesting seats. On the other hand, more broad electoral rules effect radical right success. For instance, electoral system type effects whether it is rational to vote for a radical right party, as well as the translation of votes to seats. In addition, laws targeted at candidate behavior also appear to impact radical right success. Party finance and ballot access laws could be putting radical right parties and candidates.

In sum, countries seeking to limit the existence and success of radical right parties would be wise to make electoral laws that guide candidate behavior and the number of relevant parties. For example, strict party finance and ballot access laws put smaller parties at a disadvantage due to the inability to compete financially or evolve into a professional party. Further, electoral rules that limit the number of parties, such as first-past-the-post electoral systems, could make casting a vote for a radical right party the same as wasting a vote.

## **Internal Supply-Side Factors**

Internal supply-side factors encompass the qualities that are chosen by the political party in order to best compete in the political market. Mudde (2007) states this best when he says that, “irrespective of how favorable the breeding ground and the political

opportunity structure might be to new political parties, they merely present actors with a series of possibilities” (256). Kitschelt (1995) also emphasizes that the choices of rightist entrepreneurs and parties matter for success. He states that “politicians may face a favorable opportunity structure but fail to create strategies that enhance their power at the polls and in legislatures.” Meaning, parties must decide the course of action that will best lead to success while taking into account the existing constraints. Stated clearly, parties play a significant role in their prospects for success. This section posits hypotheses for the effect that internal supply-side factors have on success, operationalizes these factors, and then provides empirical testing.

### **Party Message**

The most important, and widely acknowledged, internal supply side factor is the party’s ideology/message. Hainsworth (2000) makes a convincing argument that parties that are able to distance themselves from the ideas of the historically extreme parties on the ideological spectrum tend to be the most successful in Europe. Further, Golder (2003) points out that it is important to distinguish between parties on the right because their fortunes depend on the extremity of their ideology. van Holsteyn, Irwin and den Ridder (2003) provide an example of the importance in party messages by demonstrating that the Netherlands’ List Pim Fortuyn (LPF) strategically placed themselves in ideologically moderate, unoccupied spaces. By constructing a moderate and flexible ideology, LPF was able to go from political newcomer to legitimate competitor.

The party’s ideology matters immensely in terms of success because vote choice is predicated on a voter’s closeness to the ideology of the party. If radical right parties are adopting ideologies that are so extreme that voters do not hold the same beliefs, than these parties should not witness any success. In addition, parties would be wise to locate themselves on an ideological spectrum where there is a sizable segment of otherwise unrepresented voters. Overall, it will be important to test whether there is an overall effect of ideology without accounting for the distribution of voters. It will also be important to understand whether there is a specific ideologically extreme threshold that radical right

parties are not able to surpass if they want to achieve success.

## **Organizational Structure**

Political parties tend to organize based on contrasting incentives and goals. Since Olson's (1965) piece discussing the collective action problem, scholars have sought to understand the organizational structure of parties. Wilson (1974) has argued that there are three types of parties: machines, purposive, and solidarity. The three types of parties are organized based on their dominant goal. However, Müller and Strøm (1999) argue rather convincingly that contemporary political parties are guided by interacting goals. These goals include a desire to win votes, a desire to win office, and a desire to implement policy. For this reason, most parties today are similar in overall structure. However, there is one major organizational feature which parties commonly differ. Mudde (2007) argues that parties differ on the centralization of party organization, and that centralized parties are better able to enhance party cohesion and leadership stability. The author argues that without these features, other parties will not take radical right parties seriously and voters will refuse to support them. Carter (2005) agrees with this argument. The scholar argues that centralized organizational structures are better able to enforce party discipline. When party discipline is enforced, radical right parties are able to do better at the polls. Zaslove (2004) mentions that most radical right parties have implemented a hierarchical structure, and that this structure is able to control party members' activities. Therefore, the expectation is that decentralized radical right parties should not be able to enforce the type of party discipline necessary for success. As a final point, any discussion of organization would not be complete without at least mentioning Panebianco (1988). The conclusions reached by the author regarding the importance of structures that maintain internal cohesion are not lost on this study. Unfortunately, longitudinal quantitative codings over multiple years of Panebianco's (1988) qualitative analyses were not feasible here.

## **Professionalization**

Closely related to organizational structure is the level of professionalization that a party exhibits. Kitschelt (1995) was one of the first scholars to recognize that radical right parties moving towards professionalization appeared to be more successful. For instance, Copsey (2008) demonstrates how the British National Party (BNP) was able to achieve success by vetting candidate backgrounds and building professional networks for donations. No where is professionalization more important and salient than determining a party's leadership. Professional parties have democratic leadership structures that are responsive to important movements within the party. For radical right parties, one would expect that party professionalization sends a signal to voters that the party is able to represent their needs. One of the most important concerns when voting for a fringe party is whether the party will be able to govern once elected. Increased professionalization sends a strong signal that the party could govern if given the chance.

## **Leadership**

In political science, no explanatory variable gains more attention than the role of leadership. There is no doubt that political entrepreneurs are able to induce outcomes ranging from successful election bids to revolution. Due to the difficulty of measuring leadership, several qualitative studies have been better equipped to dissect the role that leadership plays in determining radical right success. Using interviews with French FN members, DeClair (1999) highlights how Jean-Marie Le Pen was successful in making the party more professionalized. Further, Zaslove (2004) points out that some of the most successful radical right parties contain charismatic leaders. Still, another example is how Nick Griffin of the BNP was able to modernize the party from an unelectable band of neo-nazis to a more moderated party concerned with workers' issues (Copsey 2008). Indeed, there are countless examples of political entrepreneurs taking advantage of a favorable opportunity structure.

## Operationalization: Internal Supply-Side Factors

The operationalization of internal supply-side factors was difficult due to a lack of data over multiple years and the inherent difficulty in operationalizing specific party features. In all, there were five internal supply-side variables included in the final statistical analysis.<sup>35</sup> First, party experience is measured as the number of years a party had been in existence since the official creation/registration of the political party.<sup>36</sup>

Second, party ideology was included in order to determine whether the extremity of the party's ideology positively or negatively impacts success. In other words, this variable is meant to test whether very ideologically extreme parties really do perform worse in elections. The ideological value utilized in the analysis is taken from the Party Manifesto Project's coding of the "rile" variable (Volkens et al. 2014). The "rile" variable is a numeric left-right coding of the parties' overall ideology.<sup>37</sup> Originally, a dummy variable was included that indicated whether the radical right party was the furthest party to the right in the election.<sup>38</sup> Unfortunately, a high correlation of .589 with the ideology variable led to model convergence problematic. In turn, the dummy variable was dropped in favor of the ideology variable, which contains more substantive information.

Two internal supply-side variables explored overall party attributes. The first variable, party professionalization, was coded as a binary variable. If a party has a democratic leadership structure it was coded a one, and if the party had no means of electing leadership it was coded a zero.<sup>39</sup> The other party attribute variable was party organizational structure. The variable was coded as a zero if the structure is decentralized and the party operates distinctively at different levels of government. The variable was coded as a one

---

<sup>35</sup>Previous attempts at statistical modeling included additional aspects related to party organization. For instance, an attempt was made to include party membership size, which is a theme throughout Katz and Mair (1994). However, there was an absence of data over multiple years.

<sup>36</sup>The number of years a party had been in existence ranged from one to 52 (Austrian Freedom Party). The mean number of years was 14.69. The highest correlation between the year variable and any other independent variable was .378 (organization).

<sup>37</sup>The variable ranges from a value of -8.59 (Pure Party of Rights - 2000) to 57.34 (Pure Party of Rights - 2007). The mean of the variable is 17.34. The variable did not correlate higher than .189 with any other independent variables.

<sup>38</sup>In the original dataset, 42.06% of radical right parties were the furthest right party ideologically in the election.

<sup>39</sup>In the dataset, 80.83% of radical right parties had a democratic leadership structure in place. The highest correlation between the party professionalization variable and any other independent variable was .3 (leadership).

if the party is centralized; meaning that decisions at all levels of government are made by party leadership. Finally, the variable was coded a two if there is an individualistic organizational structure where a dynamic leader runs the party.<sup>40</sup>

The final internal supply-side variable included for empirical testing, and the most difficult variable to operationalize, was party leadership. Political scientists commonly refer to leadership as an important explanatory variable for a number of outcomes including party success. Quantifying leadership is a difficult endeavor with several potential pitfalls. Indeed, qualitative research has been more effective at teasing out the importance of party leadership in electoral outcomes. Here, party leadership is quantified using the party leader’s level of electoral experience. Quantitative research has long been quantifying leadership based on the experience of the politician (Abbott and Rogowsky 1971). The coding scheme for the variable is presented in Table 5.<sup>41</sup> The variable attempts to quantify the political success and entrepreneurship of the radical right party. Of course, there are likely other ways to measure leadership, but given the time-period under review this way was the most realistic.<sup>42</sup>

Table 5: Leadership Coding

Leader Experience	Numeric Value
No Experience	0
State and Local Office (previously held)	1
European Parliament (previously held)	2
National Office (previously held)	3
State and Local Office	4
European Parliament	5
National Office	6

<sup>40</sup>In the dataset, 21.16% of the parties had a decentralized organizational structure, 65.83% had a centralized organizational structure, and 12.5% had an individualistic organizational structure. The highest correlation between party organizational structure and any other independent variable was .378 (organization).

<sup>41</sup>In the dataset, 20.83% of radical right leaders had no prior experience holding elected office, 3.33% previously held office at the state or local level, 15.83% currently hold office at the state or local level, 25.83% currently hold office at the European Parliament level, and 34.17% currently hold office at the national level.

<sup>42</sup>When the variable is left categorical the substantive result that arises is that previously holding state and local office leads to an increase in vote share. However, the result is not very robust given the small number of cases (4) in the category.



## Method and Dependent Variable

In order to test for the effect of internal supply-side factors on radical right success, radical right vote share and seat share are used as the dependent variables. Similarly, a Bayesian linear regression model utilizing the MCMC method is estimated here where the prior means and variance are set as the coefficients and standard errors of an estimated frequentist regression model.<sup>43</sup> The original frequentist results conformed with theoretical expectations. The models were estimated using a burnin 500,000, and a sample of 200,000 thinned by 25.<sup>44</sup> Plots of the distributions for the chains confirmed that the distributions overlapped, and the chains passed all model convergence criteria discussed previously. The model equations are presented here:<sup>45</sup>

$$\begin{aligned} \text{RadicalRightSuccess} &= \alpha + \beta_1 \text{Years} + \beta_2 \text{Party Ideology} \\ &+ \beta_3 \text{Party Professionalization} + \beta_4 \text{Organizational Structure} \\ &+ \beta_5 \text{Party Leadership} + \epsilon \end{aligned}$$

$$\epsilon \sim N(0, \theta_\epsilon^2)$$

$$b_j \sim N(\mu_j, \tau_j)$$

---

<sup>43</sup>Again, several models were estimated where the prior means and variance were specified differently. Where model convergence occurred, there were no substantively different results.

<sup>44</sup>Similarly, additional models were estimated where the number of burnin, sampling, and thinning was changed. However, no substantively different results arose where significant.

<sup>45</sup>In the vote share model, the prior means are  $\mu = (0.05, 0.001, 0.000, 0.033, -0.021, 0.011)$ , and the prior variance are  $\tau = (0.02, 0.001, 0.000, 0.016, 0.011, 0.003)$ . In the seat share model, the prior means are  $\mu = (0.077, 0.001, -0.000, 0.04, -0.031, -0.000)$ , and the prior variance are  $\tau = (0.025, 0.000, 0.000, 0.02, 0.014, 0.003)$ .

## Results: Effect of Internal Party Factors on Radical Right Success

Table 6 presents the results of the model estimating the relationship between internal supply-side factors and radical right success. The  $R^2$  statistic reveals that the vote share model predicts 19.2% of the variance in radical right success across elections, while the seat share model predicts 13% of the variance. There were two variables in the models that were not significantly related to success. First, a party's ideology does not necessarily determine the level of electoral success the party will achieve. The result may be surprising due to the fact that extreme ideologies are not seen as electorally viable. However, this model does not take into account the distribution of voter ideology present in an election. Therefore, the explanation could simply be that extreme ideologies are only electorally damaging when a distribution of voters is absent on that ideological position. Second, party leadership, measured as party leadership experience, does not have a statistical relationship with radical right success. Future research could test the importance of leadership through more in-depth qualitative research.

Table 6: The Effect of Internal Supply-Side Factors on Radical Right Success

	Vote Share	Seat Share
Intercept	0.062*	0.078*
	(0.023, 0.101)	(0.031, 0.125)
Years	0.001*	0.001
	(0.000, 0.002)	(-0.000, 0.002)
Party Ideology	0.000	-0.000
	(-0.000, 0.001)	(-0.001, 0.001)
Party Professionalization	0.032*	0.039*
	(0.000, 0.063)	(0.001, 0.077)
Organizational Structure	-0.022	-0.031*
	(-0.044, 0.000)	(-0.058, -0.005)
Party Leadership	0.001	-0.000
	(-0.004, 0.007)	(-0.007, 0.006)
$N$	120	120
$R^2$	0.192	0.130
	(0.144, 0.209)	(0.082, 0.149)

95% credible intervals are in parentheses

\* indicates at least 95% of the posterior density on the same side of zero.

Three internal supply-side variables that had a statistical relationship with radical

right success. The number of years a radical right party has been in existence is statistically related to success. The year variable attempts to capture a combination of qualities related to experience or notoriety. However, the substantive effect is fairly weak. For every year in existence, a radical right party gains on average around .1% more in vote share. Therefore, it would take around ten years for a radical right party to gain a 1% increase. On the other hand, party professionalization has a much larger substantive impact on radical right success. The coefficient indicates that a professional party with a democratic leadership structure receives, on average, an increase of around 3.2% in vote share when compared to radical right parties with no professional party leadership organizations. Further, a professional party would receive on average an increase of 3.9% in seat share. The final statistically significant variable is organizational structure. For radical right parties, centralized and decentralized organizations produce the same relative levels of success. In contrast, those parties with personalistic structures can expect to obtain significantly fewer seats than decentralized parties.

## **Conclusion**

This research agenda examined the effect of external and internal supply-side factors have on radical right existence and success. Previous research has explored the statistical effect of one, or a small combination of these factors, but no research to date has systematically tested all theoretically relevant factors. For external factors, previous research has not explored both radical right existence and success under the assumption that different external factors could have differing substantive effects on these two outcomes. Instead, previous research has assumed that the same external factors effect emergence and success to similar degrees. By relaxing this assumption and testing for individual effects, this research has shown that differing effects exist. There are external factors that effect emergence but not success, and vice versa.

The major findings of this research are threefold. First, particular electoral rules have a statistical relationship with the absence of a radical right party contesting seats in an election. Rather surprisingly, bans on extreme parties do not prevent radical right parties

from existing, and compulsory voting is positively associated with the presence of radical right parties. The idea that bans do more harm than good runs counter to the literature, and is a notion that elected policy-makers should consider if they want to prevent radical right parties. Second, radical right success is more of a function of the overall electoral system and rules targeting candidates than it is a function of particularized electoral rules. Rules targeting candidate behavior and guiding the overall electoral tone dictate success. Finally, factors internal to the party matter in terms of success. Party professionalization, organizational structure, and experience do play a role in determining the vote and seat share received by radical right parties.

The next step to take moving forward would be to test for the relationship between external and internal factors. Meaning, that research should seek to uncover whether internal factors are the product of values for specific external factors. For instance, one may want to know whether party professionalization is a function of electoral rules handicapping the ability of parties to organize elections freely. Further, statistical operationalization of internal factors is lacking in the literature, and future studies should seek to find better measures for internal party factors.

## Chapter 3

# The Relationship Between External and Internal Factors

*“We identified ourselves as right-wing radicals first. And now, the big mainstream party is radicalizing.” (Jobbik Supporter, Lajos Deak 2015)*

*“They stole this issue. But if it was a good idea, then why not steal it? Even if Jobbik hadn’t said it first, I think our prime minister would have done the same.” (Hungarian Graduate Student, Istvan Kiss 2015)*

The quotes above derive from a recent development in Hungarian politics where the mainstream governing conservative party is co-opting a large segment of the radical right party’s political platform (Frayer 2015). Hungary’s radical right party, Jobbik, is witnessing their restrictive stance on immigration being adopted by the Fidesz - Hungarian Civic Alliance, which is the ruling mainstream conservative party/coalition. The situation has led Jobbik politicians and supporters to voice their anger over the “stealing” of their platform. The question is why would Jobbik complain that a governing party in the position to implement new policy is adopting the policy positions that they so staunchly advocate?

The question appears perplexing at first glance, but a closer exploration into the goals of the party elucidate an answer. Müller and Strøm (1999) argue that parties must balance three often conflicting goals: policy-seeking, office-seeking, and vote-seeking. In

this situation, Jobbik members are recognizing that policy success at the hands of the ruling party would mean less relevance for their party. Voters seeking Jobbik's particularly harsh stance on immigration would have a more reputable and successful political party towards which to shift their support. Such a shift could result in the need for Jobbik to alter its tactics or strategies for success.

This narrative illustrates a situation where external supply-side factors outside of a radical right party's control could cause a significant shift in a party's internal supply-side factors. For instance, if the ruling party in Hungary is able to successfully co-opt Jobbik's anti-immigrant platform, then Jobbik may need to shift their ideology in order to distinguish themselves to voters. The particular impact of external supply-side factors on internal-supply side factors is the focus of this chapter. Here, Bayesian statistical models and the Markov Chain Monte Carlo method are utilized in order to estimate the precise impact that several prominent external supply-side factors have on four key internal supply-side factors: leadership, organizational structure, professionalization, and party ideology. The major finding is that candidate-centered electoral laws shift the party's internal composition.

## **Theory - Individual Relationships**

Factors internal to the party make a significant difference in determining a radical right party's level of success. Internal supply-side factors encompass the qualities that are chosen by the political party in order to best compete in the political market. Mudde (2007) states this best when he says that, irrespective of how favorable the breeding ground and the political opportunity structure might be to new political parties, these factors merely present actors with a series of possibilities (256). Carter (2005) argues that radical right parties are "masters of their own success." The authors goes on to state that:

"That is, regardless of the political environment in which they operate and regardless of the institutional contexts within which they find themselves, their electoral success will depend, in part, on the ideology they espouse and

the policies they put forward, and on the way in which they are organized and led.” (Carter 2005: 13)

Stated clearly, parties play a significant role in their prospects for success. However, external supply-side factors (i.e. political opportunity structure) may play a large role in limiting the range of acceptable strategies to achieve success.

The previous chapter demonstrated that party professionalization and organizational structure are correlated with success. In particular, these aspects are related to the vote and seat shares that a party receives in an election. Further, the number of years a party has been in existence is also a predictor of vote share. While it is clear that internal factors matter for party success, the determinants of these factors remain nebulous.

The relationship between external and internal supply-side factors is one that has not been empirically explored in the literature. Instead, the literature tends to acknowledge the fact that external factors may limit the availability of certain internal factors, but does not specifically test for a relationship. Assuming that parties are actors who take advantage of the political opportunity structure available to them, one would expect specific external factors to be correlated with certain internal factors. If this relationship exists, there should be a trend where parties systematically choose the best strategy, given the institutional structures, in order to achieve success.

The easiest way to demonstrate how external supply-side factors could impact an internal supply-side variable would be to explore party ideology in-depth. Downs (1957) describes the logic of voting as a citizen casting a vote for the party that is closest to them on an ideological scale. The caveat to this basic logic is that the voter must view the party as having a legitimate shot at winning government (Downs 1957: 36-50). Therefore, Downs (1957) hypothesizes that parties develop political ideologies mainly as a way of securing votes.

What is important to note here is that parties are not selecting a political party ideology arbitrarily. Rather, the institutional structure that exists influences the party’s selection of a political ideology. For instance, Duverger (1972) and Riker (1986) discuss how plurality/first-past-the-post electoral rules inevitably lead to a two-party system.

Riker (1986) indicates that plurality electoral rules underrepresent losing parties when translating votes to seats. As a result, citizens choose not to vote for third-parties because they do not want to waste their vote. In this situation, a radical right party could locate itself anywhere on the far right of an ideological spectrum and the result would be similar. The radical right party would only receive a small proportion of the vote from protest voters. As stated, the important assumption of ideological spatial models is that citizens will cast a vote for the party that is closest to their ideal ideological position if that party has a legitimate shot at winning. Thus, one could predict which party a citizen would be most likely to cast a vote in favor based on the structure of electoral rules.

Figure 4: Pure Plurality Electoral System





Figure 4 illustrates a symmetric, uni-modal distribution of voters in a pure plurality electoral system. In a plurality electoral system, a party must receive 50% plus 1 vote in order to capture a seat. Therefore, there is a tendency in these electoral systems for parties to converge on the median voter in order to win a plurality of the vote share. In Figure 4, citizens to the left of Party A on the ideological spectrum will vote for Party A, and citizens to the right of Party B on the ideological spectrum will vote for Party B. The fight between the two parties is over who can capture the median in order to win a plurality. In this scenario, even if a radical right party positions itself to the far right of Party B where a distribution of voters is located, voters located near the radical right



party would still be rational to vote for Party B. This relationship exists because the radical right party has no real shot at winning the election due to the plurality system’s mechanical discrepancy when converting votes to seats. Therefore, rational voters would choose to vote for one of the parties that is closest to them and has a chance of winning (i.e. Party B). Of course, there will be voters that continue to cast a vote for the radical right party despite this mechanical discrepancy. However, the proportion of voters that continue to “waste” their vote is minuscule when surveying radical right vote share in plurality systems.


Figure 5: Pure Proportional Representation Electoral System



In comparison, parties in proportional representation electoral systems have greater flexibility to choose where to position themselves ideologically. To convey this arrangement, Figure 5 displays a symmetric, uni-modal distribution in a pure proportional representation electoral system. The figure has parties positioned equidistant away from each other within the distribution of voters. In this scenario, Party A would capture the voters between the furthest left voter in the distribution and cut-point 1, Party B would capture the voters between cut-point 1 and the median voter, Party C would capture the voters between the median voter and cut-point 2, and the radical right party would capture the voters between cut-point 2 and the furthest right voter. What is important to point out here is that party positioning is important. If radical right parties become

more extreme in ideology and moves to the right on the ideological spectrum, cut-point 2 also shifts. This shift means that the radical right party is able to capture fewer voters. The result exists because the movement of the cut-point further to the right means that Party C will have a greater number of voters under the distribution.

Figure 6: Radical Right Space



Similarly, the ideological space that competitor parties choose to occupy has an effect on radical right parties. In particular, the position that mainstream conservative (i.e. center-right) parties choose to occupy limits the available space for a radical right party to locate on the spectrum. Figure 6 graphically displays this situation. As a mainstream party shifts its ideological position towards the extreme end of the right spectrum, the radical right party is given less available space to occupy. The result of such a scenario would be that there are fewer citizens available to vote for the radical right party. Thus, it makes sense why supporters of Jobbik would be upset that part of their ideological platform is being co-opted by the mainstream right. Supporters are upset because the mainstream right is squeezing the amount of supporters that Jobbik could hope to retain.

The examples provided above convey simplistic models of possible scenarios that could occur in pure plurality and proportional representation electoral systems. However, it is important to note that particular electoral rules contained within the overall electoral system have large variation across countries. The electoral rule differences could have

varying impact on party location. In addition, it is most certainly the case that a symmetric, uni-modal distribution of voters does not exist across country electorates (see, Appendix for multi-modal distribution example). The examples are in no way intended to represent the norm for party and citizen ideological positioning. However, these examples are useful for conveying the underlying logic behind external supply-side factors having an effect on an internal supply-side factor (i.e. party ideology).

The idea that parties adjust their internal factors in order to achieve success is not a new one. Schattschneider (1942) proposes that parties must be flexible in design in order to achieve their electoral goals. Further, Aldrich (2011) discusses how parties are initially organized in order to achieve the collective goal of winning office. Müller and Strøm (1999) specifically point out that political institutions restrict party behavior (internal factors) in two ways: directly and indirectly. Directly, party leaders face varying incentive structures in different institutional settings. Indirectly, electoral rules may influence different types of party organizational designs. Here, the empirical analysis tests whether several external factors have an effect on four major internal party factors as an initial inquiry into this topic.

## Method

The empirical analyses utilize Bayesian statistical models and the Markov Chain Monte Carlo method for estimating the impact of external supply-side factors on internal factors. A total of four models that were estimated. Two Bayesian ordered logistic regression models were estimated in order to test for the effect of external factors on party leadership and organizational structure.<sup>46</sup> Party leadership is quantified as the party leader's electoral experience.<sup>47</sup> The variable attempts to quantify the political suc-

---

<sup>46</sup>Prior variance for each variable was set at multivariate normal with the mean vector equalling zero and a precision matrix that is diagonal. The prior means for each variable were set at zero. The model presented here was estimated by using a burnin of 100,000, and a sample of 100,000 that was thinned by 10. The models passed all convergence criteria.

<sup>47</sup>The variable is coded a zero for no experience, one for previously held state and local office, two for previously held EP office, three for previously held national office, four for currently holding state and local office, five for currently holding EP office, and six for currently holding national office.

cess and entrepreneurship of the radical right party.<sup>48</sup> Organizational structure is coded into three categories: decentralized, centralized, and individualistic structures.<sup>49</sup> Third, a Bayesian binary regression model was estimated in order to test the effect that external factors have on party professionalization.<sup>50</sup> Professionalization is measured based on whether the party has a democratic leadership structure.<sup>51</sup> Finally, a Bayesian linear regression model was estimated in order to test the effect of external factors on party ideology.<sup>52</sup> The ideological value is taken from the Party Manifesto Project's coding of the "rile" variable (Volkens et al. 2014). The "rile" variable is a numeric left-right coding of the parties' overall ideology.<sup>53</sup> The independent variables include all of the external factors included in the previous chapter. The base equation for the models estimated in this analysis is presented below:

---

<sup>48</sup>In the dataset, 20.83% of radical right leaders had no prior experience holding elected office, 3.33% previously held office at the state or local level, 15.83% currently hold office at the state or local level, 25.83% currently hold office at the European Parliament level, and 34.17% currently hold office at the national level.

<sup>49</sup>In the dataset, 21.16% of the parties had a decentralized organizational structure, 65.83% had a centralized organizational structure, and 12.5% had an individualistic organizational structure. The highest correlation between party organizational structure and any other independent variable was .378 (organization).

<sup>50</sup>Prior variance for each variable was set at multivariate normal with the mean vector equalling zero and a precision matrix that is diagonal. The prior means for each variable were set at zero. The model presented here was estimated by using a burnin of 100,000, and a sample of 200,000 that was thinned by 5. The models passed all convergence criteria.

<sup>51</sup>In the dataset, 80.83% of radical right parties had a democratic leadership structure in place. The highest correlation between the party professionalization variable and any other independent variable was .3 (leadership).

<sup>52</sup>Prior variance for each variable was set as the standard errors for the frequentist version of the model. The prior means for each variable were set as the coefficients for each variable. The model presented here was estimated by using a burnin of 500,000, and a sample of 200,000 that was thinned by 25. The models passed all convergence criteria.

<sup>53</sup>The variable ranges from a value of -8.59 (Pure Party of Rights - 2000) to 57.34 (Pure Party of Rights - 2007). The mean of the variable is 17.34. The variable did not correlate higher than .189 with any other independent variables.

$$\begin{aligned}
\log \left( \frac{Pr(\text{Internal Party Factor} < j)}{1 - Pr(\text{Internal Party Factor} < j)} \right) &= \tau_j - \mu \\
&= \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Electoral System} + \beta_2 \text{Total Seats} \\
&+ \beta_3 \text{Split Rules} + \beta_4 \text{Compulsory Voting} \\
&+ \beta_5 \text{Electoral System Disproportionality} \\
&+ \beta_6 \text{Effective \# Parties} + \beta_7 \text{Finance Laws} \\
&+ \beta_8 \text{Ballot Access} + \beta_9 \text{Ideological Space}
\end{aligned}$$

## Results

The model outputs from the four Bayesian regression models are presented in Table 7.<sup>54</sup> First, the model predicting leadership contains one significant variable. Further, the model output indicates that dependent variable's categories are statistically different from one another. The external supply-side variable that is related to radical right leadership is ballot access. The restrictiveness of ballot access laws are negatively related to radical right leadership experience. Meaning, that as ballot access laws become more restrictive, the experience of radical right leaders is lower. Theoretically, it makes sense that radical right leaders would have less experience winning public office when ballot access laws are stricter.

---

<sup>54</sup>The Bayesian models were estimated in JAGS version 3.4.0. The models were estimated in R version 3.1.3 on a MAC running OS X 10.10.3. In regards to model convergence, each parameter for both chains passed Gelman and Rubin, Geweke, and Heidelberger and Welch tests. The Gelman and Rubin test statistics gave a potential scale reduction factor of 1 for all parameters; indicating there was no need to run the chains longer to improve convergence of the stationarity distribution. The Geweke diagnostic test statistics indicated that the means of the parameters from two different locations in the chains converged to a standard normal distribution. All parameters passed the stationarity and half-width tests of the Heidelberger and Welch test. In addition, trace plots of the Markov chains showed that there was no trending present for the chains, or for the individual parameters of each chain. Lastly, density plots conveyed that the distribution of the posterior parameters were normally distributed.

Table 7: The Effect of External Supply-Side Factors on Internal Factors

	Leadership	Org. Structure	Profession -alization	Party Ideology
Intercept	NA	NA	2.494 (1.018, 4.111)	0.010 (-0.135, 0.155)
Electoral System (PR)	0.058 (-1.205, 1.328)	-1.125 (-2.633, 0.359)	-1.126 (-2.800, 0.453)	-0.052 (-0.232, 0.129)
Total Seats	0.249 (-0.131, 0.635)	0.303 (-0.153, 0.766)	0.073 (-0.456, 0.620)	0.078 (-0.043, 0.199)
Split Rules	-0.117 (-0.615, 0.382)	-0.381 (-0.987, 0.213)	0.141 (-0.538, 0.852)	0.184* (0.029, 0.339)
Compulsory Voting	0.300 (-0.118, 0.719)	0.193 (-0.249, 0.645)	NA	-0.072 (-0.199, 0.055)
Electoral System Disproportionality	0.293 (-0.140, 0.748)	0.079 (-0.367, 0.529)	-0.572 (-1.304, 0.075)	-0.073 (-0.198, 0.052)
Effective # of Parties	0.009 (-0.505, 0.522)	0.092 (-0.501, 0.693)	0.651 (-0.094, 1.466)	0.116 (-0.048, 0.281)
Finance Laws	0.333 (-0.126, 0.796)	0.223 (-0.273, 0.722)	-0.669 (-1.454, 0.041)	-0.144* (-0.278, -0.010)
Ballot Access Laws	-0.797* (-1.619, -0.022)	1.220* (0.289, 2.166)	-0.386 (-1.451, 0.746)	0.019 (-0.153, 0.191)
Ideological Space	-0.266 (-0.777, 0.257)	-0.362 (-0.888, 0.154)	-0.186 (-0.779, 0.407)	0.713* (0.567, 0.859)
Cut-point 1	-1.543* (-2.040, -1.078)	-1.603* (-2.146, -1.102)	NA	NA
Cut-point 2	-1.289* (-1.755, -0.848)	2.530* (1.889, 3.251)	NA	NA
Cut-point 3	-0.438* (-0.842, -0.043)	NA	NA	NA
Cut-point 4	0.762* (0.358, 1.179)	NA	NA	NA
<i>N</i>	120	120	120	120
PCP	0.221 (0.192, 0.375)	0.294 (0.208, 0.423)	NA	NA
PRE	NA	NA	-0.087 (-0.348, 0.130)	NA
R <sup>2</sup>	NA	NA	NA	0.412 (0.382, 0.426)

\* indicates at least 95% of the posterior density on the same side of zero.

95% credible intervals are in parentheses

PCP = Percent Correctly Predicted; PRE = Proportional Reduction in Error

Output for the model predicting a radical right party's organizational structure are presented in the second column. Again, the dependent variable's categories are statistically different from one another. Further, the restrictiveness of ballot access laws are positively correlated with organizational structure. In particular, as the restrictiveness in ballot access laws increases, the probability that the radical right party's organizational structure is centralized or personalistic also increases. The result makes sense theoretically because strict ballot access laws would create a need for a strong centralized party that could organize candidate requirements. On the other hand, party professionalization is not effected by any of the external factors in the model.

Lastly, in the model exploring a radical right party's political ideology, there are three significant variables. First, elections operating under split rules in order to elect a legislature lead to an increase in the extremity of a radical right party's ideology. A possible explanation for the result is that split rule elections allow parties to contest a number of seats for a legislature under proportional representation. Therefore, these systems do not necessarily lead to two political parties converging on the median voter. Instead, a radical right party could stake out a position on the right end of the political spectrum and obtain voters from a distribution of voters located in that area. Citizens will not view the allocation of a vote to a radical right party as irrational since the party could realistically obtain a seat under these rules. Second, party finance laws are negatively correlated with party ideology. As the strictness of party finance laws increases, party ideology moderates. The result is not easily explained. However, one possible explanation is that party's operating under strict party finance laws must be well-regulated. Therefore, these parties tend to have less ideologically extreme members within the party leadership. Instead, these parties are more directed at navigating the country's strict electoral rules.

The final variable correlated with party ideology is ideological space. The ideological space variable explores the space available for a radical right party to locate in order to collect supporters. The result indicates that as more space is available on the right side of the spectrum for the party to locate, party ideology becomes more extreme. Since the

ideological space variable was calculated by taking into account the ideological positions of the parties participating in the election, and the measure errs on the side of caution in not overestimating the available space, the result is salient. If there is an increase of space on the right side of the ideological spectrum in an election for a radical right party to locate, the party will take advantage of this space in order to distinguish itself from other right wing parties.

## A Full Model of Success

The previous section tested the impact of external supply-side factors on internal supply-side factors. However, the previous section does not touch upon how these variables exist in a full model predicting radical right success. Figure 7 displays a theoretical model for understanding how external and internal factors impact radical right vote and seat share. Since the complexity of these relationships has not been explored in empirical research, the figure conveys expectations in an ideal election.

Figure 7: Basic Relationship Between External and Internal Factors




Figure 7 demonstrates three sets of relationships. The first relationship specifies that internal party factors directly impact vote share and seat share. In particular, these internal factors convey to citizens the legitimacy of the party in the election, and the ideological proximity of the citizen to the party. Second, the figure conveys the



relationship between external factors and party success. The important aspect to note here is that not all external supply side factors have an effect on success. In particular, the effective number of parties, party finance laws, ballot finance laws, and ideological space do not have a direct effect on success. However, rules specific to the electoral system do have a direct effect on success. For instance, electoral system type and disproportionality have a direct impact on translating votes to seats. If voters know about a discrepancy in this translation, a rational voter will choose not to vote for a radical right party. Thus, decreasing the party's overall vote share. In addition, previous analyses have demonstrated that compulsory voting is correlated with a higher vote and seat share. The third relationship demonstrated in the figure is the relationship between external factors and internal factors. The previous section already tested for the existence of this relationship. Therefore, the task at hand is to estimate a full model including all of the external factors and internal factors on our measures of success. The model should be estimated while excluding external factors that do not directly effect success in order to avoid co-linearity.<sup>55</sup> The models are estimated using Bayesian regression since the dependent variables are continuous.<sup>56</sup> The model equation is presented below:

$$\begin{aligned}
\text{RadicalRightSuccess} &= \alpha + \beta_1 \text{ElectoralSystem} + \beta_2 \text{TotalSeats} \\
&+ \beta_3 \text{SplitRules} + \beta_4 \text{CompulsoryVoting} \\
&+ \beta_5 \text{ElectoralSystemDisproportionality} \\
&+ \beta_6 \text{PartyIdeology} + \beta_7 \text{PartyProfessionalization} \\
&+ \beta_8 \text{OrganizationalStructure} + \beta_9 \text{PartyLeadership} + \epsilon \\
\epsilon &\sim N(0, \theta_\epsilon^2)
\end{aligned}$$

---

<sup>55</sup>An alternative strategy would be to test for an interactive relationship between external supply-side variables and internal supply-side variables on success. This strategy would require first estimating a model that regresses all of the external factors on the measures of success. A second model would be estimated where all of the internal factors are regressed on success. Finally, the predictive values from the first two models would need to be saved, and an interactive model would need to be estimated using these predictions on success. The results of these models are presented in Appendix B. The result was that the interactive relationships do hold predictive power. However, this method does not necessarily follow well-grounded theoretical guidance.

<sup>56</sup>As before, prior means and variance for the parameters were set at the results of frequentist models (i.e. coefficients and standard errors respectively). Importantly, the models passed all important convergence criteria.

## Results: Full Models

The results from the full model are presented in Table 8. The first aspect of the results to compare between the two models are the measure of fit scores (i.e.  $R^2$ ). The model predicting radical right seat share does substantially better than the model predicting vote share. Since the variables are scaled to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one, coefficients are comparable within models. The first substantive result is that electoral system type has the largest effect on both radical right vote share and seat share. For vote share, radical right parties receive an average increase of 2.2% in proportional representation systems when compared to plurality systems. For seat share, the average increase when moving from a plurality system to a proportional representation system is 4.8%. As stated previously, the electoral system holds significant explanatory power when calculating the translation of votes to seats.

The second substantive effect is that party characteristics matter in terms of success, and this relationship holds even when accounting for internal factors. For instance, professional parties with a democratic leadership structure can expect an average increase in vote share of 1.8% and seat share of 1.7%. In addition, parties with individualistic organizational structures can expect a decrease in vote share of and seat share of around 1.5%. Since the number of citizens in a population that hold extreme right ideological views tends to be small in most countries, these models help to explain a large amount of variance without including attitudes. On average, the additive substantive impact of the variables in the vote share model explain around 5.5% of the variance. Further, on average, the additive substantive impact of the variables in the seat share model explain around 8.1% of the variance.

## Conclusion

The analyses presented here include the first empirical tests that seek to determine how electoral rules and other external/institutional supply-side factors constrain characteristics internal to radical right parties. The concluding results are twofold. First, external supply-side factors do correlate with specific internal party characteristics. For

Table 8: Full Models: Vote Share &amp; Seat Share

	Vote Share	Seat Share
Intercept	0.100*	0.091*
	(0.088, 0.111)	(0.079, 0.103)
Electoral System	0.022*	0.048*
	(0.005, 0.039)	(0.031, 0.066)
Total Seats	-0.001	0.006
	(-0.014, 0.013)	(-0.008, 0.021)
Split Rules	0.002	0.011
	(-0.012, 0.017)	(-0.004, 0.025)
Compulsory Voting	-0.003	-0.001
	(-0.017, 0.011)	(-0.016, 0.013)
Electoral System Proportionality	0.007	-0.001
	(-0.007, 0.021)	(-0.015, 0.014)
Party Ideology	0.012	0.009
	(-0.000, 0.025)	(-0.005, 0.022)
Professionalization	0.018*	0.017*
	(0.005, 0.032)	(0.003, 0.031)
Organizational Structure	-0.015*	-0.016*
	(-0.028, -0.002)	(-0.029, -0.003)
Leadership	0.007	0.008
	(-0.006, 0.020)	(-0.006, 0.021)
<i>N</i>	120	120
<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	0.187	0.349
	(0.131, 0.216)	(0.298, 0.375)

\* indicates at least 95% of the posterior density on the same side of zero.

95% credible intervals are in parentheses

instance, electoral laws targeted at candidates have an impact on leadership and organizational structure. Theoretically, the result makes sense because strict candidate-centered laws force the party to be better organized in order to participate in elections. In addition, party ideology is correlated with both the ideological space available in the electoral market and electoral rules. The second overarching conclusion is that additive models including external and internal supply-side models in order to predict success perform relatively well. The additive models predict a relatively large amount of variance in radical right vote and seat share.

Where to go from here? External and internal supply-side variables represent only a fraction of the story when exploring the fate of radical right parties. In particular, voters are crucial to the story. For instance, it is important to understand why voters hold radical right attitudes, and why a distribution of voters exist in the extreme right end of

the ideological spectrum. Therefore, subsequent analyses should focus on uncovering the attitudes correlated with radical right vote choice, as well as exploring the macro-social forces that create these attitudes.

## Chapter 4

# Political Attitudes and Radical Right Vote Choice

*These individuals wanted to, “kill out of xenophobic and anti-state sentiments all citizens of foreign origin” (German Attorney General, Harald Range 2011)*

In November 2011, a group calling themselves the National Socialist Underground was confronted by German law enforcement officers after a botched bank robbery. German officials would later uncover that the group was responsible for the murders of at least nine immigrants. In addition, the group conducted a number of bank robberies and bombings between 2000 and 2011. The German Attorney General labelled the group a right-wing extremist group, and in the quote above he indicates that these actions were based on racial hatred (Range 2011). Upon investigation, the authorities uncovered that the members of the group had known ties to skinhead organizations and Germany’s radical right party, the National Democratic Party (NPD). The finding that members of this extreme organization have known ties to the NPD, and speculation that the NPD was financing underground terror networks, led members of the Bundestag to begin calls for a constitutional banishment of the party. Although the banning was ultimately unsuccessful, the situation brought a higher level of scrutiny to the NPD and its supporters.

While the events that occurred in Germany represent a very extreme situation where supporters of a radical right party adopted violence and illegal tactics in order to achieve their preferred outcome, previous research demonstrates that radical right supporters do

not necessarily hold neo-nazi, fascist, or other ideologically violent beliefs (Norris 2005, Hainsworth 2008). Instead, scholars argue that these supporters are people that have grown dissatisfied with mainstream political parties and their ability to handle particularized issues (Ignazi 2003, Givens 2005, Norris 2005, Mudde 2007, Ford and Goodwin 2010). This analysis provides a test in order to uncover the socio-demographic composition of radical right voters. In addition, this work explores salient attitudes that correlate with voting for a radical right party. In order to empirically test the demographics and attitudes that are correlated with radical right vote choice, this research utilizes the European Social Survey (ESS 2015). The survey was conducted biannually from 2002-2012 for a large majority of European countries. The literature is riddled with conflicting claims regarding the importance of specific attitudes and demographics for predicting vote choice. Therefore, this chapter begins by reviewing the literature and providing expectations. Then, Bayesian binary regression is used to conduct individual-level empirical testing in order to predict vote choice. Finally, the findings are discussed and a brief conclusion is offered.

## **Socio-demographics and Radical Right Vote**

Is there a particular socio-demographic pattern that emerges when analyzing radical right voters? The answer to this question has not been very consistent in the literature. Betz (1994) argues that these voters are typically “floaters” (142). In other words, these voters are people from all over the ideological spectrum that do not understand the intricacies of politics, and fall prey to clever demagogues. In addition, Kitschelt (1995) agrees that there is no one block of voters that give support to radical right parties. The author goes on to argue that an individual level theories cannot explain the mobilization of voters for these parties. On the other hand, newer studies have argued that a specific demographic composition emerges clearly when exploring demographics in large-n studies on radical right parties (DeClair 1999, Norris 2005, Givens 2005, Arzheimer and Carter 2006, Mudde 2007, Hainsworth 2008). In particular, studies have explored trends related to age, gender, education, income, and social class. Authors have argued that the erosion

of traditional social cleavages has led to the emergence of a new distinct social cleavage when studying radical right voters. The theoretical contributions of these studies are discussed here.

## **Age**

In the literature, a puzzle exists regarding the relationship between age and radical right vote choice. The conflict is whether radical right parties acquire their support from predominately younger or older voters. DeClair (1999) was one of the first scholars to uncover that radical right parties predominately draw support from younger voters. In his analysis on the National Front (NF) in France, the DeClair (1999) found that younger voters tend to be drawn to parties that are outside the older, established mainstream. Younger voters tend to view mainstream parties as ineffective and the cause of current problems. The result that younger people tend to vote for the radical right has been confirmed in subsequent research (Givens 2005, Arzheimer and Carter 2006, Hainsworth 2008). Hainsworth (2008) clarifies his theory by arguing that radical right parties mostly obtain support from first time voters, and that first time voters tend to be younger. Therefore, age is not the independent variable, but instead first time participation is the explanatory factor.

In comparison, a couple of scholars have argued that the relationship between radical right vote choice and age is actually positive (Norris 2005, Ford and Goodwin 2010). Norris (2005) found in her large-n study that there is a positive statistically significant relationship between age and vote choice. Similarly, Ford and Goodwin (2010) determined that British National Party (BNP) voters were statistically older than voters for all other parties. The hypothesis provided here is that as age increases, the probability of voting radical right decreases. Younger voters do not have the political ties to mainstream parties, and radical right parties are able to paint mainstream parties as perpetuating the same old problems.

## **Gender**

Radical right parties tend to be predominately supported by men. Several scholars have theorized that radical right parties attract male voters (Betz 1994, Kitschelt 1995, Mudde 2007, 2011), and empirical studies have found that the relationship is statistically significant (DeClair 1999, Norris 2005, Givens 2005, Arzheimer and Carter 2006, Hainsworth 2008, Ford and Goodwin 2010, van der Brug et al. 2013, Coffe 2013). Coffe (2013) provides one of the most in-depth analyses of the gender gap that exists within supporters of the radical right. The author finds that when accounting for differences in views of immigrants there is the same probability of voting for a radical right party between men and women. However, women are much less likely to hold anti-immigrant and xenophobic attitudes. The author finds that men tend to vote for radical right parties in higher numbers due to a concern for job security and the maintenance of household finances. Male voters tend to ascribe uncertainty in the household as being a function of immigration problems. The expectation is that men will have a higher probability of voting for the radical right.

## **Education**

The relationship between voting for radical right parties and education is theoretically straightforward. Radical right voters tend to be at lower levels of education because these are the voters that are most worried about losing their jobs to immigrants, and are most susceptible to populist rhetoric. In particular, radical right voters are most likely to believe that complex political problems could be solved through “common sense” solutions, which populist rhetoric conveys. Voters at lower education levels are less able to grasp the idea that even the most basic political problem requires complex solutions in order to avoid unintended negative consequences. Norris (2005) found that there is a statistically significant decrease in the probability of voting for a radical right party as a voter obtains higher levels of education. Relative to middle-levels of education, where Stefanova (2009) and Oesch (2013) find that radical right parties attract moderately educated voters, Givens (2005) concludes that both low and middle education levels are



overrepresented in support for the radical right. In fact, there appears to be consensus in the literature that these parties attract a majority of their voters from lower education levels (Arzheimer and Carter 2006, Mudde 2007, Hainsworth 2008, Ford and Goodwin 2010, Mudde 2011, Ivarsflaten and Stubager 2013). Here, it is expected that radical right voters will be at lower levels of education.

### **Income**

The relationship between income and radical right vote choice follows a trajectory similar to education level. In fact, the relationship between income and education tends to be interactive (Fox 2008). Therefore, supporters of radical right parties should tend to be at lower to middle levels of income. However, income is rarely utilized as an independent variable for predicting radical right vote choice. The reason for the exclusion of income is because social class is a much more theoretically grounded variable of interest. However, several surveys do not include questions that directly tap into social class. Therefore, income is included here as an independent variable. The use of income would be an indirect measure for getting at the mechanism that explains voting for the radical right. One hypothesis that could be presented is that when controlling for education, income is actually positively related to radical right vote choice. It would not be unreasonable to presume that individuals at low education levels, but high income levels, are individuals that would be likely to worry about increased competition for resources.

### **Social Class**

Social class is a difficult concept to operationalize in a world where older, established political ties are being deconstructed, and new political parties are emerging as a response to salient (i.e. polarizing) issues. One could argue that the beginning of the New Left movement in Europe during the 1960s and 1970s led political scientists on an endless search to classify a number of modern movements that appear to be motivated around a few narrow issues. In fact, Kitschelt (1995) theorizes that the existence of the radical right in Europe was in part a reaction to the New Left environmental movements. Never-

theless, contemporary literature presents conflicting findings when exploring social class and radical right vote choice.

Betz (1994) argues that radical right supporters vote with no political loyalties. Indeed, Norris (2005) and Mudde (2007) make the claim that radical right voters represent a new class of voters. Mudde (2007) recognizes that radical right voters cut across class divisions. He states that these voters are overrepresented by two opposing groups: the self-employed and blue collar workers. Consistent with Mudde (2007), several scholars point out that blue collar workers appear to predominately vote for the radical right (Kitschelt 1995, Givens 2005, Stefanova 2009). In comparison, Norris (2005) notes that manual laborers and the unemployed appear to be overrepresented, while professional and managerial employees are less likely to vote for the radical right. Hainsworth (2008) also points to the overrepresentation of unemployed citizens in voting for the radical right.

On the other hand, several scholars simply note that radical right voters tend to be from the “lower classes” or “working class” (Hainsworth 2008, Bale et al. 2010, van der Brug et al. 2013, Betz and Meret 2013). For instance, Betz and Meret (2013) argue that radical right parties owe their success to appealing to lower class voters that prefer a restrictive position on immigration due to the uncertainty of their economic position. Bale et al. (2010) point out that radical right voters tend to be from working class backgrounds that would traditionally be supportive of the center left. However, the scholars note that external threat and the incitement of specific political attitudes have led to these voters supporting more radical platforms. Here, one should expect that predominately working class individuals will be more likely to vote for radical right parties and professionals will be less likely.

## **Political Attitudes and Radical Right Vote**

The area of radical right scholarship most interesting to political scientists investigates the attitudes that radical right parties espouse. Understanding voting attitudes is imperative since these parties are considered illiberal, and perhaps dangerous, to liberal democratic governance. By necessity, full comprehension can only come from understanding

the extent to which voters support the illiberal policies present in radical right platforms. In particular, this research is important because it explores whether the main ideological pillars of radical right parties are present in the general public. Van der Brug and Fennema (2007) point out that recent research has been too focused on supply side factors only, and that characteristics of citizens need to be brought back to the forefront in order to fully explain the electoral fortunes of radical right parties. The ideological pillars representing radical right parties include: far right positioning, anti-immigrant/xenophobic attitudes (i.e. nativism), populist/anti-system attitudes, authoritarian attitudes, welfare chauvinism, neoliberalism, and Euro-skepticism (Betz 1994, Kitschelt 1995, Givens 2005, Norris 2005, Hainsworth 2008, Mudde 2011).

### **Ideological Positioning**

When a citizen casts a vote for a political party or politician there is a calculation that occurs where the citizen decides which entity best represents their ideological beliefs or interests. Downs (1957) was one of the first political scientists to theorize a spatial model of voting where politicians and parties position themselves on an ideological space in order to attract votes. In his model, parties strategically place themselves on an ideological spectrum where a distribution of voters exists. Parties do so in order to give themselves the best possible prospect of winning election. If a spatial model of voting explains vote choice, one would expect that people voting for radical right parties are those citizens that position themselves on the far/extreme right end of the political spectrum.

Givens (2005) found that far right self-placement on an ideological spectrum was positively correlated with voting for a radical right party. In addition, van der Brug, Fennema and Tillie (2000) found that voters for these parties are ideologically closer to radical right parties than any other party in the political market, and that ideological proximity is the most useful individual-level attribute for predicting vote choice. Mudde (2007) reiterates that at the micro-level (i.e. individual-level) extreme right ideological positioning on a left-right scale is predictive of radical right support. However, the author places much less emphasis on the importance of voter ideology in his analysis.

In contrast, Hainsworth (2008) argues that most members of and voters for the radical right do not self-identify as members of the extreme right. Instead, the author claims that these parties are populist organizations that claim to speak for the people of the nation. Therefore, voters for radical right parties tend to view themselves as a member of the “common people.” Thus, these voters do not view themselves as some segment of voters occupying an extreme placement on the ideological spectrum. In addition, Stefanova (2009) found that extreme right voters in Bulgarian parliamentary elections tend to be of centrist ideology. The author argues that other attitudes are more predictive of radical right vote than a simple ideological spatial relationship, such as xenophobic attitudes. Here, the hypothesis advanced is that a far-right positioning on a left-right spectrum increases the probability of voting radical right.

### **Anti-Immigrant/Xenophobic Attitudes**

Several scholars find that there is a relationship between anti-immigrant, xenophobic, racist attitudinal positions (i.e. nativist positions) and radical right vote choice (van der Brug, Fennema and Tillie 2000*b*, Kitschelt 1995, van Holsteyn and Irwin 2003, Givens 2005, Mudde 2007, Rydgren 2008, Sprague-Jones 2010, Cutts, Fieldhouse and Russell 2010, Ford and Goodwin 2010, Ford, Goodwin and Cutts 2012, Doosje et al. 2013). In fact, some argue that the relationship between anti-immigrant sentiment and radical right vote choice is strong enough as to define these parties as single-issue parties, or simply, “anti-immigrant parties” (Bos and van der Brug 2010, van der Brug, Fennema, and Tillie 2000*a*, and van Spanje 2010). The crux of the argument is that the voters holding nativist attitudes will vote for radical right parties because these parties are the only option in the electoral market representing their view on these issues. These issues include immigration, foreign workers, asylum seekers, and multicultural societies.

A number of studies have empirically demonstrated the predictability power of anti-immigrant sentiment on radical right vote choice. van Holsteyn and Irwin (2003) found that in the 2002 Dutch national elections there was a relationship between the belief that foreigners should adapt to Dutch society and voting for List Pim Fortuyn (LPF).

Further more, Rydgren (2008) uncovered that the single greatest predictor of radical right vote choice among several Western European countries (i.e. Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, the Netherlands, and Norway) is immigration skepticism. The result was replicated in the United Kingdom when Cutts, Fieldhouse and Russell (2010) and Ford and Goodwin (2010) concluded that high levels of anxiety about immigration led people to vote for the British National Party (BNP). Cutts, Ford and Goodwin (2011) even found that the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), which is considered less radical than the BNP, achieved most of its support from voters that had negative views of immigrants. What is important is that most studies recognize the crucial role that anti-immigrant sentiment plays in radical right vote choice.

### **Welfare Chauvinism**

The most obvious way that anti-immigrant attitudes manifest themselves is with strong welfare chauvinistic positions. Welfare chauvinism refers to two positions regarding the recipients of government benefits. First, the concept refers to the idea that some people receiving government benefits are abusing the system, and have, in fact, the means to support themselves. Second, the concept refers to the idea that governmental economic support should be restricted to certain groups. For radical right parties, government support and welfare programs should be restricted to native people, or people that the party identifies as being true natives. These parties advocate that non-native people, illegal immigrants, and legal immigrants should not have the same access to government services.

However, it is important to note that welfare chauvinism is not a synonym for market liberalism. In fact, many radical right parties actively promote protectionist economic platforms. For instance, the BNP has rallied against European Union (EU) policies that could negatively impact the British market. In fact, a number of radical right parties have rallied against EU economic intervention and economic control in their member-state. Further, radical right parties may not advocate for pro-market privatization and the rolling back of state economic policies like the 1980s neoconservatives. It would be

difficult to find a scholar that holistically equates Thatcherism or Reaganism with the current string of radical right movements. However, some of the same negative portrayals of “underserving” welfare recipients do exist within radical right parties. The hypothesis is that increases in welfare chauvinistic attitudes will lead to an increase in the probability of voting radical right.

### **Populist Attitudes**

Populist individual attitudes and susceptibility to populism in the general public are illusive concepts that are difficult to operationalize. Mudde (2007) argues that populist attitudes are a major driving force of voting for the radical right. Pauwels (2010, 2011) agrees with this assertion and argues that populism should be understood as the idea that the “pure people” are in conflict with the “corrupt people.” The idea is that the common people are in conflict with those corrupt politicians that seek to reap the benefits from the labor of the common folk (Luther 2011). Populism also refers to the idea that politicians unnecessarily complicate basic political problems in order to inflate the amount of gain that they are able to extract from the solution. This extraction either occurs through making the population appear as though the politician is the only one capable of solving the problem, or through the extraction of benefits within the program itself (e.g. pork). Usually, these parties advocate for “common sense” solutions to problems, which is even evident in the United States’ Tea Party movement.

In contrast, several authors define populism under the “politics of discontent” (Ignazi 2003, Norris 2005, Stefanova 2009, Ford and Goodwin 2010, Doosje et al. 2013). In this view, populism includes discontent or disillusionment with the system and a lack of trust in the government. This attitude is said to be a function of insecurity with the citizen’s economic situation (Bornschieer and Kriesi 2013). In fact, voting for the radical right has commonly been attributed as protest voting against the current system (Ignazi 2003). Ignazi (2003) argues that radical right parties tend to represent people who feel alienated by the system. In particular, scholars have advocated for the idea that populism could be understood more clearly as a lack of trust or increased skepticism in the system’s

institutions. For instance, Norris (2005) found a correlation between having less trust in governmental institutions and voting for a radical right party. In addition, when the radical right party is in government, the author found that supporters have more positive views of government. However, Hainsworth (2008) argues that the opposite is empirically true; especially in instances where a radical right party joins a coalition government with a mainstream party. Hainsworth (2008) argues that radical right parties in government will witness a decrease in support. Nevertheless, it is important to attempt to capture the extent to which the component attributes of populism, such as anti-establishment attitudes and skepticism of the political elite, drive radical right vote choice. The hypothesis is that increases in populist attitudes will lead to an increase in the probability of voting radical right.

### **Authoritarian Attitudes**

Another major attitudinal position of radical right voters is an authoritarian position on issues, such as crime. Authoritarianism can be understood as the position that illegal infringements of society should be punished severely, and that punishment is more important than rehabilitation (Mudde 2007). Rydgren (2013) argues that working class support for the radical right can be explained by the fact that the working class, on average, tends to be more socio-culturally authoritarian than other workers. Further, Ivarsflaten and Stubager (2013) find that citizens with authoritarian values tend to vote for radical right parties. In particular, the authors argue that through education people move on the spectrum from authoritarian to libertarian values. When citizens do not obtain a high level of education they appear to retain a large amount of authoritarian inclinations. Indeed, several authors find that authoritarian positions on legal punishment practices are positively correlated with radical right vote choice (Kitschelt 1995, Givens 2005).

## Debated Characteristics - Neoliberalism & Euro-skepticism

The last two attitudes receive some empirical support in the literature, but are heavily debated between radical right scholars. First, Betz (1994) argues that radical right voters hold neoliberal economic positions. The problem with this argument is that welfare-chauvinism, which is an attitudinal position of these voters that is not debated, does not necessarily translate into neoliberal economics. However, there is a small amount of evidence in the literature that voters hold some neoliberal economic positions. For instance, Norris (2005) finds that these voters seek to roll back the power of the state, and advocate pro-market economic ideas of privatization and inequality (45). In addition, some radical right parties, such as the the Progress Party (FrP) in Norway, advocate strong individualistic platforms. However, it is important to note that individualism and rolling back the power of the state do not appear to be primary concerns for radical right parties. Therefore, it would be difficult to imagine that voters are receiving strong cues from parties about their stances on these issues.

Finally, Euroskepticism is an attitudinal feature that some radical right voters have been found to possess. The debate over this attitude is whether voters for all radical right parties hold anti-EU attitudes. Recently, Ford, Goodwin and Cutts (2012) find that Euroskepticism was the most important driver for the radical right UKIP. However, Givens (2005) finds mixed results when exploring whether voters for radical right parties hold negative attitudes towards the EU. Mudde (2007) and Givens (2008) argue that this perceived Euroskepticism is really just a skepticism of large multi-state organizations that subvert the power of the state. However, an increase in the EU's role may lead some voters to move from mainstream parties to more radical parties. The EU's handling of the Euro crisis and other economic hardships could very well lead to an abandonment of the status quo. It will be interesting to explore whether radical right parties were able to attract these voters. Again, it is important to note that these last two attitudes are highly debated in the literature. Nevertheless, previous findings reveal an important area of inquiry to be explored here.



## Data & Variable Operationalization

The biannual survey data utilized for this analysis includes all six rounds of the European Social Survey (ESS), which were conducted between 2002-2012 (ESS 2014).<sup>57</sup> The dependent variable for the statistical analysis is whether the respondent voted for the radical right party in their country's national election.<sup>58</sup> The statistical analyses are separated based on survey round for two reasons. First, the prevalence of radical right parties obtaining a significantly higher share of the vote and entering government increases over time. Therefore, individuals might have different incentives to vote for radical right parties throughout this time period. Second, rotating question modules that are specific to a given round provide useful information in order to test theoretical constructs. For example, questions that allow for one to test for the role that welfare chauvinism plays in radical right vote choice are only included in a special rotating module in the ESS Round 4 (2008).

Operationalizing the socio-demographic variables for the empirical analyses was relatively straightforward. Respondent age was operationalized as the respondent's current age when the survey was conducted.<sup>59</sup> The respondent's gender was coded a one for women and a zero for men.<sup>60</sup> Education was operationalized as a continuous variable coded based on the level achieved and the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCE).<sup>61</sup> Income was also operationalized as a continuous variable coded based on the household's total income after taxes and deductions. In particular, the respondent was asked to select an income category, and then the variable was recoded to be numeric.<sup>62</sup> A variable indicating whether a respondent had been unemployed was created

---

<sup>57</sup>It is important to note that there are data limitations. Mainly, surveys were not conducted in every country for every round (see, ESS methodology for more information).

<sup>58</sup>The proportion of respondents voting for the radical right party in a given election approximates the aggregate national results. The mean for the radical right individual vote variable was 8.1%. The minimum was zero and the maximum was 34.33%.

<sup>59</sup>The mean age for respondents across surveys was 48.09, the minimum age of a respondent was 18, and the maximum age was 98.

<sup>60</sup>The mean percentage of women across surveys was 53.78%.

<sup>61</sup>Since the question that asks about education was coded based on different standards for the classification scheme from 2002-2010, the variable was recoded to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one in order to be comparable across surveys.

<sup>62</sup>The question that asks about income category was also coded based on a different category scheme between 2002-2010. For ease of comparison, this variable was also recoded to have a mean of zero and a

using the question that asks whether a respondent had been unemployed and looking for work for a period of three months or longer.<sup>63</sup> In addition, a variable was created in order to represent membership in a occupational union. The variable was coded a one for current or previous union membership, and a zero if the respondent was never a member of a union.<sup>64</sup> In addition to union membership, an occupational variable was included in the 2008-2012 statistical analyses that looked at type of work. The occupation variable is intended to capture the social class of the respondent.<sup>65</sup> Finally, there were two variables that were created in order to represent whether the respondent was a member of what a radical right party would label as an “out-group.” The first variable represents whether a respondent was born in a different country than the one in which they are currently residing. The variable is coded a one for foreign-born respondents and zero otherwise.<sup>66</sup> The final variable explores whether the respondent has a parent that was born in a different country. The variable was coded a one if the respondent has a parent that is foreign-born, and a zero if both parents were born in the country where the respondent is currently residing.<sup>67</sup>

The attitudinal variables utilized in the empirical analyses were constructed in a number of ways. Ideological positioning was coded based on a simplistic left-right scale where respondents are directed to self-place where their ideology is located. The scale ranges from zero to ten, where zero indicates extremely liberal and ten indicates extremely conservative.<sup>68</sup>

A variable was created in order to represent the level of anti-immigrant attitudes that a respondent holds. The variable was created by estimating factor analysis scores based on responses to five questions that asks about immigrants.<sup>69</sup> The first two questions asked

---

standard deviation of one.

<sup>63</sup>The mean percentage of people that were unemployed and looking for work for a period of three months or longer across surveys was 25.84%.

<sup>64</sup>The mean percentage of union membership across surveys was 45.59%.

<sup>65</sup>The respondent’s choices were private firm, local government, public sector job, state owned enterprise, or other.

<sup>66</sup>The mean percentage of foreign-born respondents across surveys was 8.35%.

<sup>67</sup>The mean percentage of respondents across surveys that had at least one parent that was foreign-born was 14.71%.

<sup>68</sup>The mean self-placed ideological location on the left-right spectrum was 5.084 across surveys.

<sup>69</sup>The average Cronbach Alpha score across surveys was .808. The average proportion of the variance explained across surveys with one factor loading was .547. The average calculation for the squared

about the acceptable level of immigration into the country from different race or ethnic groups and from immigrants outside of Europe. The respondent could choose “allow many to come live here,” “allow some,” “allow few,” or “allow none.” The next three variables asked respondents to place where they would align on a 0-10 scale based their feeling towards a given statement. First, respondents were asked whether immigrants were good or bad for the economy. Second, respondents were asked whether immigrants enrich or damage cultural life. Finally, respondents were asked whether immigrants make a country a better or worse place to live. All of the responses were recoded to numeric variables where higher values indicate more hostility to immigrants.

A measure for the welfare chauvinism attitudinal position was only estimated for the 2008 model. Unfortunately, Round 4’s rotating module was the only situation in the ESS where questions tapped into the idea of welfare chauvinism. The variable was created by estimating factor analysis scores based on responses to five questions.<sup>70</sup> For three of the questions, respondents were given a statement, and then asked to indicate whether they “agree strongly,” “agree,” “neither agree nor disagree,” “disagree,” or “disagree strongly.” The first statement is that, “benefits encourage others to come to the country.” The second statement is that “benefits tend to make people lazy.” The last statement was that “the unemployed don’t look for work.” An additional question utilized a 0-10 feeling thermometer and asked whether immigrants receive more in governmental benefits than they contribute. The final question asked about the length of time it should take for an immigrants to receive social benefits. The possible responses were “immediately on arrival,” “after a year, whether or not have worked,” “after worked and paid taxes at least a year,” “once they have become a citizen,” or “they should never get the same rights.” All of the responses were recoded to numeric variables where higher values indicate welfare chauvinistic attitudes.

---

multiple correlation of the factors scores across surveys for all of the variables was .893. This high statistic indicates that the factors scores were created based on the value of these variables with minimal error.

<sup>70</sup>The Cronbach Alpha score was .537. The proportion of the variance explained with one factor loading was .229. The average calculation for the squared multiple correlation of the factors scores across surveys for all of the variables was .636. The statistic indicates that the factors scores were created based on the value of these variables with only a small amount of error.

Populist attitudes are difficult to tap capture using traditional survey questions. Here, populism is operationalized as distrust in governmental entities. Since theoretical arguments indicate that populism is understood as an ideological feature that “pits the pure people against the corrupt people” (Mudde 2007), and the corrupt people are viewed as politicians holding office (Pauwels 2010), these features offer an appropriate starting point. In addition, Mudde (2007) and Pauwels (2011) argue that radical right parties view institutions with skepticism. In particular, the variable was created by estimating factor analysis scores based on responses to three questions.<sup>71</sup> The questions ask the level of trust the respondent obtains for politicians, the country’s parliament, and the legal system. The variables were recoded so that higher scores indicate less trust.

There were two variables included in all of the analyses that attempted to capture authoritarian attitudes. The first variable was created based on a question that asks whether it is important for people to follow traditions and customs. The second variable asks whether it is important for government to be strong and ensure safety. The respondent’s choices were this sounds, “very much like me,” “like me,” “somewhat like me,” “a little like me,” “not like me,” and “not like me at all.” The variables were numerically coded so that larger values indicated more authoritarian attitudes.<sup>72</sup> In the 2010 analysis, three additional variables were utilized in the empirical analysis in order to measure authoritarianism. The two original variables are not strong proxies, and the 2010 rotating module included additional variables that more directly tapped into this idea. The first variable asks whether people who break the laws should receive much harsher penalties than they currently receive. The second variable asks whether all laws should be strictly obeyed. For both of these questions, the respondent’s options were the same as above. The final question gave the respondent a criminal situation, then asked them to choose the penalty. The presented situation documented was a second offense for house burglary. The respondent could choose between “community sentence,”

---

<sup>71</sup>The Cronbach Alpha score was .863. The proportion of the variance explained with one factor loading was .664. The average calculation for the squared multiple correlation of the factors scores across surveys for all of the variables was .859. The statistic indicates that the factors scores were created based on the value of these variables with only a minimal amount of error.

<sup>72</sup>The mean for the traditions and customs variables was a 3.262 on a 1-5 scale across the surveys. The mean for the government strength variable was a 3.602 on a 1-5 scale across surveys.

“fine,” “suspended prison,” or “prison sentence.” The variables were coded numerically so that higher values indicated more authoritarian attitudes. For the 2010 analysis, factor analysis scores were estimated based on the three additional variables.<sup>73</sup>

Neoliberalism is another attitudinal position that is difficult to operationalize using general survey questions. There were two variables included in all of the analyses that attempts to capture neoliberal attitudes. First, a question was utilized that asked whether the government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels. Second, a question was utilized that asks whether it is important for people to be treated equally and have equal opportunities. The respondents were asked to indicate their level of agreement with these statements in the same way described above. For the 2002 analysis, two additional variables were included in the statistical analysis in order to more concretely measure neoliberal attitudes. The first question asks whether it is important for the government not to intervene in the economy. The second asks whether employees need strong trade unions in order to protect their working conditions and wages. Again, all of the variables were coded numerically so that higher values indicated neoliberal attitudes.

The final attitudinal position tested in the empirical analysis was Euroskepticism. The major variable used to operationalize Euroskepticism was the respondent’s level of trust in the EU. The respondent was offered a 0-10 scale where they could place their level of trust. The variable was coded so that larger values indicate less trust.<sup>74</sup> A second indicator was utilized where for the 2004, 2006, 2008, and 2012 analyses. In these rounds, the ESS asked respondents whether they believe EU unification went too far. The respondent was offered a 0-10 scale where they could place their position on the issues. The variable was also coded so that larger values indicate that unification has already gone too far.<sup>75</sup>

---

<sup>73</sup>The Cronbach Alpha score was .582. The proportion of the variance explained with one factor loading was .294. The average calculation for the squared multiple correlation of the factors scores across surveys for all of the variables was .796. The statistic indicates that the factors scores were created based on the value of these variables with only a small amount of error.

<sup>74</sup>The mean across surveys for trust in the EU was 5.504.

<sup>75</sup>The mean was a 4.68 across all of the surveys in regards to unification going too far.

## Method

Since the dependent variable (i.e. radical right vote choice) is binary, Bayesian binary models were estimated using the Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) method.<sup>76</sup> For several survey rounds, additional models were estimated. An additional model was estimated for 2002 that explored the effect of additional neoliberal attitudes on radical right vote choice. Further, additional models were estimated to explore occupation for 2008, 2010, and 2012. Finally, additional models were estimated for 2008 to account for the effect of welfare chauvinism and 2010 to explore authoritarianism. In order to have coefficients that are directly comparable in the model output, all continuous variables were scaled to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one.

The models testing radical right vote choice had the prior variance for each variable set at multivariate normal with the mean vector equalling zero and a precision matrix that is diagonal. The prior means for each variable were set at zero when estimating the model.<sup>77</sup> When plotting the distributions for the chains, the distributions overlapped quite closely. The models presented here were all estimated by using a burnin of 100,000, and a sample of 50,000 that was thinned by 5.<sup>78</sup> In regards to model convergence, each parameter for both chains passed Gelman and Rubin, Geweke, and Heidelberger and Welch tests. The Gelman and Rubin test statistics gave a potential scale reduction factor of 1 for all parameters; indicating there was no need to run the chains longer to improve convergence of the stationarity distribution<sup>79</sup> The Geweke diagnostic test statistics indicated that the

---

<sup>76</sup>The Bayesian models were estimated in JAGS version 4.0. The models were estimated in R version 3.2.2 on a MAC running OS X 10.11.

<sup>77</sup>It is important to note that two additional models were estimated for each model presented here. The first additional model set the prior mean for each variable as either +1 or -1 depending on the directionality of the theoretical expectations for the variable. For instance, the effective number of parties prior mean was set at +1, because the theory expects that the number of parties is positively related to radical right existence. Then, another model was estimated where the prior mean for each variable was set as the opposite of the first model (i.e. effective number of parties set at -1). This was done in order to test the robustness of the prior specification. In particular, one would want to know whether the probability distributions of the estimated Markov Chains for the models were statistically different from each other in any meaningful way that could skew results. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests indicated that the probability distributions of the models were not statistically different from one another, which means that prior mean specification did not bias results received here. However, model convergence was impacted by prior specification. Models where prior means were set to the opposite of theoretical expectations took significantly longer to converge, or did not converge at all.

<sup>78</sup>Several models were estimated where the number of burnin, sampling, and thinning were changed. When the models converged, the results were substantively the same.

<sup>79</sup>Statistics of 1.2 or higher are the cutoff.

means of the parameters from two different locations in the chains converged to a standard normal distribution. All parameters passed the stationarity and half-width tests of the Heidelberger and Welch test. In addition, trace plots of the Markov chains showed that there was no trending present for the chains, or the individual parameters for each chain. Lastly, density plots conveyed that the distribution of the posterior parameters were normally distributed. The equation for the basic models are presented here:

$$\begin{aligned}
\log\left(\frac{\Pr(\text{RRVoteChoice})}{1 - \Pr(\text{RRVoteChoice})}\right) &= \alpha + \beta_1\text{Age} + \beta_2\text{Gender} \\
&+ \beta_3\text{Income} + \beta_4\text{Education} \\
&+ \beta_5\text{Unemployed} \\
&+ \beta_6\text{UnionMember} + \beta_7\text{Foreign-Born} \\
&+ \beta_8\text{ParentForeign-Born} \\
&+ \beta_9\text{Ideology} + \beta_{10}\text{Nativism} \\
&+ \beta_{11}\text{Populism} + \beta_{12}\text{TradBeliefs} \\
&+ \beta_{13}\text{StrongGov} + \beta_{14}\text{GovDisparity} \\
&+ \beta_{15}\text{EqualOpp} + \beta_{16}\text{EUTrust} + \epsilon \\
\epsilon &\sim N(0, \theta_\epsilon^2)
\end{aligned}$$

Table 9: Radical Right Vote Choice: 2002-2006

	Basic Model (2002)	Full Model (2002)	Basic Model (2004)	Basic Model (2006)
Intercept	-3.009*	-3.004*	-2.996*	-2.969*
	(-3.123, -2.900)	(-3.119, -2.889)	(-3.108, -2.885)	(-3.076, -2.865)
Age	-0.115*	-0.117*	-0.209*	-0.212*
	(-0.203, -0.029)	(-0.205, -0.028)	(-0.298, -0.120)	(-0.299, -0.126)
Gender	-0.173*	-0.177*	-0.258*	-0.219*
	(-0.262, -0.085)	(-0.267, -0.088)	(-0.347, -0.170)	(-0.304, -0.134)
Education	-0.298*	-0.295*	-0.314*	-0.259*
	(-0.395, -0.203)	(-0.392, -0.197)	(-0.415, -0.214)	(-0.356, -0.163)
Income	0.284*	0.277*	0.252*	0.220*
	(0.190, 0.378)	(0.185, 0.372)	(0.158, 0.346)	(0.126, 0.315)
Unemployed	-0.122*	-0.115*	0.046	0.091*
	(-0.214, -0.033)	(-0.207, -0.025)	(-0.039, 0.132)	(0.009, 0.172)
Union	-0.046	-0.052	-0.086*	0.045
	(-0.130, 0.038)	(-0.140, 0.035)	(-0.171, -0.002)	(-0.037, 0.128)
Foreign-Born	0.031	0.022	-0.025	-0.065
	(-0.068, 0.124)	(-0.078, 0.118)	(-0.137, 0.080)	(-0.173, 0.037)
Parent Foreign-Born	0.054	0.056	0.030	0.064
	(-0.043, 0.148)	(-0.043, 0.150)	(-0.137, 0.080)	(-0.031, 0.156)
Ideology	0.604*	0.605*	0.530*	0.582*
	(0.512, 0.698)	(0.510, 0.700)	(0.438, 0.622)	(0.492, 0.673)
Nativism	0.551*	0.554*	0.547*	0.445*
	(0.456, 0.648)	(0.456, 0.653)	(0.448, 0.645)	(0.350, 0.543)
Populism	0.154*	0.148*	0.174*	0.236*
	(0.053, 0.257)	(0.042, 0.252)	(0.067, 0.279)	(0.134, 0.339)
Traditional Beliefs	-0.075	-0.073	0.098*	0.058
	(-0.162, 0.012)	(-0.160, 0.016)	(0.010, 0.188)	(-0.029, 0.147)
Strong Government	0.018	0.015	0.023	0.091
	(-0.076, 0.112)	(-0.078, 0.109)	(-0.070, 0.116)	(-0.002, 0.182)
Gov. Reduce Disparity	0.043	0.059	-0.094*	0.044
	(-0.043, 0.128)	(-0.031, 0.146)	(-0.184, -0.006)	(-0.042, 0.129)
Equal Opportunities	0.118*	0.121*	0.156*	0.095*
	(0.038, 0.198)	(0.040, 0.201)	(0.076, 0.235)	(0.016, 0.172)
Gob. Intervene (Econ)		-0.007		
		(-0.092, 0.077)		
Strong Trade Unions		-0.027		
		(-0.115, 0.060)		
EU Trust	0.188*	0.183*	0.095	0.029
	(0.091, 0.285)	(0.085, 0.285)	(-0.012, 0.203)	(-0.071, 0.129)
Unification Too Far			0.160*	0.125*
			(0.069, 0.253)	(0.037, 0.215)
N	8837	8702	8693	9382
PRE	0.917	0.917	0.917	0.919
	(0.916, 0.917)	(0.916, 0.918)	(0.915, 0.918)	(0.919, 0.920)

95% credible intervals are in parentheses

\* indicates at least 95% of the posterior density on the same side of zero.

PRE = Proportional Reduction in Error



## Results

Statistical outputs for the radical right vote choice models are presented in Tables 10-13. When testing the impact of specific socio-demographic trends have on radical right vote choice, the statistically significant results align quite well with theoretical expectations. First, across all of the individual-level models presented here age is negatively related to radical right vote choice. There is debate in the literature whether older people with more conservative values and a negative view of immigrants are the radical right's voting base, or whether younger people dissatisfied with older, mainstream parties are the culprit. Here, the results indicate definitively that younger people are more likely to vote radical right. One possible explanation for this result could be the fact that a majority of older voters have maintained their ties to more established parties, while many younger voters dissatisfied with politics, tend to view established parties as part of the problem.

Second, across all of the individual-level vote choice models, gender is statistically related to vote choice. In particular, women are less likely to vote for radical right parties. Third, an increase in education is correlated with a decrease in the probability of voting radical right. Relative to income, data reveal to trends. Between 2002 and 2006, income is positively related to voting for the radical right. However, income is negatively related to voting radical right from 2008-2012. The result might seem surprising at first, but a closer look helps to explain why this result emerges. There has been a movement for radical right parties to shift from more neoliberal economic rhetoric towards the advocating of protectionist policies. For instance, the Party for Freedom (PVV) in the Netherlands has increased their support for the welfare state steadily with every election. The result also explains why unemployment is only significant for 2002 and 2006, and the directionality of the relationship appears to shift. Across models, union membership is positively related to radical right vote choice following 2006. The trend demonstrates that radical right parties may be poaching lower to middle, working class voters. Finally, it is worth noting that there are instances where the foreign-born variables are significant. If a respondent or their parents were foreign-born they are less likely to vote for a radical right party.

Table 10: Radical Right Vote Choice: 2008

	Full Model	Basic Model	Sparse Model
Intercept	-3.656* (-4.014, -3.319)	-3.601* (-3.941, -3.274)	-3.267* (-3.388, -3.150)
Age	-0.338* (-0.439, -0.237)	-0.342* (-0.440, -0.245)	-0.351* (-0.449, -0.255)
Gender	-0.227* (-0.323, -0.132)	-0.229* (-0.323, -0.135)	-0.235* (-0.326, -0.144)
Education	-0.228* (-0.336, -0.122)	-0.235* (-0.339, -0.132)	-0.244* (-0.348, -0.139)
Income	-0.098* (-0.196, 0.000)	-0.092* (-0.189, 0.006)	-0.089* (-0.187, 0.009)
Job: Private Firm	0.457* (0.119, 0.817)	0.405* (0.072, 0.746)	
Job: Local Gov	0.620* (0.201, 1.050)	0.522* (0.109, 0.936)	
Job: Public Sec	0.114 (-0.363, 0.590)	0.021 (-0.454, 0.495)	
Job: State Owned	0.324 (-0.141, 0.784)	0.276 (-0.179, 0.736)	
Job: Other	0.173 (-0.560, 0.858)	0.080 (-0.665, 0.754)	
Unemployed	0.001 (-0.090, 0.093)	0.000 (-0.089, 0.089)	0.007 (-0.082, 0.094)
Union	0.126* (0.032, 0.220)	0.121 (-0.073, 0.149)	0.128* (0.038, 0.220)
Foreign-Born	0.040 (-0.074, 0.149)	0.041 (-0.073, 0.149)	0.044 (-0.071, 0.154)
Parent Foreign-Born	-0.049 (-0.166, 0.063)	-0.058 (-0.173, 0.052)	-0.055 (-0.171, 0.054)
Ideology	0.621* (0.521, 0.722)	0.640* (0.544, 0.738)	0.634* (0.536, 0.732)
Nativism	0.359* (0.250, 0.467)	0.403* (0.301, 0.505)	0.409* (0.308, 0.510)
Welfare Chauvinism	0.168* (0.066, 0.273)		
Populism	-0.191* (-0.307, -0.076)	-0.195* (-0.308, -0.083)	-0.196* (-0.308, -0.084)
Traditional Beliefs	0.108* (0.014, 0.205)	0.095* (0.003, 0.188)	0.099* (0.006, 0.194)
Strong Government	0.035 (-0.063, 0.134)	0.047 (-0.050, 0.144)	0.045 (-0.052, 0.144)
Gov. Reduce Disparity	0.034 (-0.061, 0.127)	0.045 (-0.048, 0.136)	0.049 (-0.043, 0.141)
Equal Opportunities	0.059 (-0.028, 0.146)	0.052 (-0.034, 0.137)	0.058 (-0.029, 0.143)
EU Trust	0.329* (0.220, 0.441)	0.350* (0.242, 0.458)	0.353* (0.244, 0.462)
Unification Too Far	0.299* (0.203, 0.394)	0.295* (0.201, 0.389)	0.294* (0.200, 0.388)
<i>N</i>	9735	9245	9245
PRE	0.929 (0.926, 0.931)	0.932 (0.930, 0.933)	0.931 (0.930, 0.933)

95% credible intervals are in parentheses

\* indicates at least 95% of the posterior density on the same side of zero.

PRE = Proportional Reduction in Error

Evaluating the relative strength of attitudinal variables is easily done by viewing the size of the variables' coefficients in relation to one another. The most apparent finding is that radical right self-placement on a left-right ideological scale and nativist attitudes have a great impact on voting for a radical right party. Across all of the models, when moving from the most extreme left value to the most extreme right value, there is an increase on average of .18 in the probability of voting radical right.<sup>80</sup> The result contradicts Hainsworth's (2008) claim that most members and voters for the radical right do not self-identify as members of the extreme right. Here, as a respondent moves closer to the extreme area on the right side of the spectrum, the probability of voting radical right increases.

Similarly, nativist attitudes have one of the strongest relationships to radical right vote choice in the estimated models. The relationship between holding nativist attitudes and voting radical right is positive, an increase in anti-immigrant attitudes leads to an increase in the probability of voting radical right. Since ideology and nativism have overlapping 95% confidence bounds in all of the models, it is not directly apparent which variable holds more predictive power. On average across models, moving from very positive attitudes towards immigrants to very negative attitudes (i.e. nativism) leads to an increase of .14 in the probability of voting radical right. Therefore, a far right positioning on the ideological spectrum, along with holding nativist attitudes, could explain over a quarter of the variance in the probability to vote for the radical right when compared to someone with contrasting attitudes.

As stated previously, the most obvious way that anti-immigrant attitudes manifest themselves is with strong welfare-chauvinist attitudinal positions. Unfortunately, it was not possible to test the effect that welfare chauvinistic attitudes have on radical right vote choice for every year. The survey only includes one module (2008) where applicable questions were asked. Table 11 provides the model output testing the relationship between welfare chauvinism and radical right vote choice. The result is that welfare chauvinistic

---

<sup>80</sup>Predicted probabilities were calculated for significant variables by holding dummy variables at zero and continuous variables at their median. There is almost no variance across models regarding the size of the substantive effect of ideology. Further, the 95% confidence bounds are extremely tight around the predicted values.

attitudes have a positive, statistically significant effect on radical right vote choice. However, the substantive effect of the variable is very small. When moving from one extreme value to the opposite extreme value on the variable there is only an increase of .0002 in voting radical right. Further, the 95% confidence bounds around the predicted values are quite large.

The effect of populism on radical right vote choice is more difficult to interpret based on model output. As expected, from 2002-2006 populism has a statistically significant, positive relationship with radical right vote choice. Radical right voters appear to have less trust in politicians, political parties, and the legal system. The result provides confirmatory evidence that radical right voters hold populist attitudes. However, it is important to warn against reading too much into the results for three reasons. First, the populism measure is very indirect. The measure attempts to capture the idea that voters see mainstream politicians as corrupt people succeeding at the expense of the voters. The only way to measure this idea using the ESS was by looking at trust in politicians, parties, and institutions; which indirectly operationalizes the concept. Second, the model output indicates that in 2008 and 2010 populism is negatively related to radical right vote choice. The result runs counter to theoretical expectations. On the other hand, this result could be explained away by the fact that radical right parties began to enter public office more successfully in these years. Therefore, radical right voters are seeing politicians and parties as more trustworthy since the parties they vote for are entering office. The result runs counter to the claims made by Hainsworth (2008) about voters losing trust in government as radical right parties secure more seats. Finally, the substantive effect of the populism variable is miniscule. From 2002-2006, the variable explains less than a .02 increase in the probability of voting radical right, and from 2008-2010 the variable explains less than a .01 decrease in the probability of voting radical right.<sup>81</sup>

---

<sup>81</sup>The 95% confidence bounds around the predicted values are incredibly large.

Table 11: Radical Right Vote Choice: 2010

	Full Model	Basic Model	Sparse Model
Intercept	-3.531* (-3.822, -3.254)	-3.563* (-3.849, -3.292)	-3.151* (-3.254, -3.051)
Age	-0.299* (-0.385, -0.213)	-0.308* (-0.392, -0.223)	-0.327* (-0.409, -0.245)
Gender	-0.228* (-0.310, -0.147)	-0.243* (-0.324, -0.163)	-0.241* (-0.320, -0.163)
Education	-0.314* (-0.406, -0.225)	-0.319* (-0.409, -0.229)	-0.318* (-0.407, -0.229)
Income	-0.202* (-0.289, -0.115)	-0.193* (-0.278, -0.108)	-0.185* (-0.269, -0.099)
Job: Private Firm	0.476* (0.197, 0.766)	0.498* (0.224, 0.785)	
Job: Local Gov	0.399* (0.049, 0.752)	0.432* (0.084, 0.784)	
Job: Public Sec	0.375* (0.001, 0.746)	0.403* (0.032, 0.777)	
Job: State Owned	0.226 (-0.152, 0.605)	0.254 (-0.121, 0.626)	
Job: Other	-0.144 (-0.852, 0.506)	0.028 (-0.634, 0.637)	
Unemployed	0.005 (-0.073, 0.082)	0.016 (-0.061, 0.092)	0.029 (-0.047, 0.105)
Union	0.133* (0.053, 0.213)	0.130* (0.049, 0.210)	0.141* (0.063, 0.220)
Foreign-Born	-0.162* (-0.288, -0.047)	-0.134* (-0.255, -0.024)	-0.131* (-0.252, -0.019)
Parent Foreign-Born	0.007 (-0.088, 0.100)	0.001 (-0.094, 0.093)	0.001 (-0.095, 0.093)
Ideology	0.588* (0.503, 0.673)	0.597* (0.512, 0.682)	0.586* (0.503, 0.670)
Nativism	0.451* (0.362, 0.539)	0.456* (0.370, 0.543)	0.457* (0.371, 0.544)
Populism	-0.166* (-0.269, -0.064)	-0.152* (-0.254, -0.051)	-0.159* (-0.260, -0.058)
Authoritarianism	0.095* (0.016, 0.175)		
Traditional Beliefs	-0.007 (-0.089, 0.076)	-0.006 (-0.087, 0.075)	-0.012 (-0.094, 0.070)
Strong Government	-0.017 (-0.102, 0.069)	0.004 (-0.079, 0.088)	0.002 (-0.081, 0.087)
Gov. Reduce Disparity	0.062 (-0.019, 0.143)	0.058 (-0.025, 0.138)	0.064 (-0.015, 0.144)
Equal Opportunities	0.136* (0.064, 0.209)	0.144* (0.072, 0.215)	0.142* (0.071, 0.212)
EU Trust	0.384* (0.287, 0.480)	0.378* (0.283, 0.475)	0.378* (0.283, 0.473)
<i>N</i>	11845	12157	12157
PRE	0.928 (0.927, 0.929)	0.928 (0.926, 0.929)	0.929 (0.926, 0.929)

95% credible intervals are in parentheses

\* indicates at least 95% of the posterior density on the same side of zero.

PRE = Proportional Reduction in Error

Model output lends some support to the idea that radical right voters tend to hold authoritarian attitudes. Though the substantive impact was not very large, voters that believe it is important to follow traditions and customs were statistically more likely to vote for the radical right party in 2004 and 2008. On the other hand, belief that there needs to be a strong government in order to protect the security of the people has no statistical relationship with voting radical right.

Similarly, the results show that radical right voters are statistically more likely to hold neoliberal attitudes. For example, radical right voters in 2002, 2004, 2006, and 2010 were more likely to hold the attitude that it is not important for people to be treated equally and have equal opportunities. On the other hand, believing that the government should not reduce inequality, that the government should not intervene in the economy, and that strong trade unions are unimportant were not predictors of radical right vote choice. Therefore, one could conclude that respondents interpret discussions about the importance of equal opportunity as being targeted towards particular groups. A respondent might be aware that questions of this nature are indirectly asking whether all groups should be equal, which radical right voters would reject.

The last attitudinal positions explored were attitudes towards the EU. The literature is unclear about whether radical right parties are anti-European integration due to their hostility towards other cultures, or have more positive feelings towards the EU through participation in the European Parliament (EP). The unequivocal finding is that radical right voters are anti-EU. In fact, behind far right ideological positioning and nativism, anti-EU sentiment ranks as the third strongest predictor for radical right vote choice. For example, when moving from a high level of trust in the EU to a low level of trust there is an increase of .1 on average across models in the probability of voting radical right. In addition, belief that European unification has gone too far explains a shift of .03 in the probability of voting radical right.

Table 12: Radical Right Vote Choice: 2012

	Basic Model		Sparse Model	
Intercept	-3.256*	(-3.389, -3.126)	-3.335*	(-3.445, -3.227)
Age	-0.366*	(-0.452, -0.281)	-0.375*	(-0.459, -0.292)
Gender	-0.289*	(-0.372, -0.207)	-0.301*	(-0.382, -0.219)
Education	-0.312*	(-0.403, -0.223)	-0.319*	(-0.408, -0.230)
Income	-0.095*	(-0.181, -0.008)	-0.094*	(-0.180, -0.008)
Job: Private Firm	-0.075	(-0.338, 0.181)		
Job: Local Gov	-0.280*	(-0.545, -0.024)		
Job: Public Sec	-0.115	(-0.397, 0.157)		
Job: State Owned	-0.160	(-0.466, 0.132)		
Job: Other	-0.716*	(-1.400, -0.114)		
Unemployed	0.010	(-0.067, 0.087)	0.009	(-0.067, 0.085)
Union	0.200*	(0.120, 0.280)	0.193*	(0.114, 0.272)
Foreign-Born	0.040	(-0.067, 0.142)	0.042	(-0.066, 0.145)
Parent Foreign-Born	-0.110*	(-0.217, -0.007)	-0.108*	(-0.215, -0.005)
Ideology	0.562*	(0.477, 0.648)	0.563*	(0.477, 0.648)
Nativism	0.580*	(0.492, 0.670)	0.580*	(0.492, 0.668)
Populism	-0.088	(-0.193, 0.016)	-0.087	(-0.190, 0.018)
Traditional Beliefs	-0.051	(-0.130, 0.027)	-0.052	(-0.129, 0.026)
Strong Government	0.011	(-0.072, 0.096)	0.009	(-0.073, 0.093)
Gov. Reduce Disparity	-0.024	(-0.103, 0.053)	-0.022	(-0.099, 0.056)
Equal Opportunities	0.017	(-0.056, 0.090)	0.020	(-0.052, 0.092)
EU Trust	0.326*	(0.226, 0.427)	0.327*	(0.227, 0.427)
Unification Too Far	0.333*	(0.251, 0.419)	0.334*	(0.251, 0.419)
<i>N</i>	12731		12731	
PRE	0.932	(0.931, 0.932)	0.932	(0.931, 0.932)

95% credible intervals are in parentheses

\* indicates at least 95% of the posterior density on the same side of zero.

PRE = Proportional Reduction in Error

## Conclusion

The major takeaway from these individual-level analyses on radical right vote choice is that extreme right self-placement and anti-immigrant sentiment are the attitudinal positions driving a citizen to vote for a radical right party. In fact, attitudes towards immigrants and ideological self-placement are the strongest predictors of vote choice when compared to other attitudinal positions. In addition, this work corroborates the findings in other research that suggest several other attitudes play a minor role in vote choice. For example, radical right voters tend to be hostile towards the EU and European integration. Trust in the EU among radical right voters is low compared to voters for

other parties, and a belief that European integration has gone too far exists among these supporters. Radical right supporters are also driven to vote for these parties, in part because of populist sentiment, authoritarian positions, and neoliberal tendencies.

Do radical right voters constitute a well-defined demographic block? Radical right voters tend to be younger men at lower education levels. Further, there is a positive relationship between voting radical right, being a member of a union, and holding a job at a private firm or in the public sector. The result provides some evidence that these voters tend to be from the traditional working class. Therefore, there is some evidence that radical right voters constitute a defined voting base.

As previously stated, the major takeaway here is that anti-immigrant sentiment is clearly the driving force behind radical right vote choice. This finding informs the way that governments and mainstream parties should approach the issue in order to limit radical right vote share. Governments should conduct attitudinal research targeted at the particular immigration issues that radical right voters find most important, and attempt to alleviate these issues when possible. Mainstream parties need to find a way to either reduce hostility towards immigrants through legislation, or must co-opt segments of the radical right's immigration platform. Finding a solution to the problem of hostility towards immigrants is difficult. If mainstream parties co-opt the radical right's platforms then they are contributing to the nativist sentiment. On the other hand, legislation that pushes for cultural competency education would probably take years to cause a shift in attitudinal positions in the general public. Nevertheless, it would benefit mainstream parties to not ignore the large role that anti-immigrant sentiment plays in determining vote choice.

Where should research go from here? Moving forward, research should explore the macro-social forces that determine the important attitudinal positions leading to radical right vote choice. If the forces that drive people towards a nativist attitudinal position are identified, then it might be possible to circumvent the creation of these attitudes. For example, say we found that high unemployment, interacted with a large immigrant population, is creating anti-immigrant attitudes. Knowing this result would make it



possible to advocate for legislation that alleviates the strain caused by high unemployment in order to potentially subvert anti-immigrant attitudes.

## Chapter 5

# The Conditioning Effect of Macro-Social Forces on Political Attitudes

*“I’ve never before seen Red Cross helpers attacked in a civilized country like Germany” (Red Cross Head, Rüdiger Unger 2015)*

*“That’s the great danger, that those racist views and propensity for violence reaches normal people, that they start taking part in racist protests” (Amadeu Antonio Foundation, Robert Lüdeck 2015)*

The German Federal Ministry of the Interior registered 202 attacks on refugee shelters from January to July 2015. The high number of attacks in the first half of the year were more than all of the registered attacks in 2014. The Interior Ministry has attributed the vast majority of these attacks to right-wing extremists and supporters of the radical right National Democratic Party of Germany, and speculates that the violence will continue (Somaskanda 2015). The quotes above were made by members of non-governmental organizations that were assisting in providing shelter and aid for the Syrian citizens seeking refuge in Germany. The non-governmental organizations have seen their efforts to help refugees impeded by citizens, and witnessed an increase in anti-immigrant rhetoric from the German populations where they are holding operations.

As one of the above quotes indicates, organizations against the increase in right-wing extremist rhetoric are worried about the possibility that the average citizen will adopt a radical stance against immigrants entering the country. Implicitly, the statement made here would indicate that these non-governmental organizations believe that the current wave of refugees entering the country could exacerbate the negative views of immigrants. However, the question remains whether macro situations/forces, such as an influx of refugees, really ignite radical right attitudes in the public? The analyses conducted here test for the relationships between macro-social forces and attitudes that are related to radical right party vote choice.

## **Macro-Social Forces**

Macro-level explanations for radical right success encompass demand-side theories that focus on the broad economic, historical, and social processes that take place at the national level (Mudde 2007). In the literature, macro-level explanations for success are abundant (Ignazi 1992, Betz 1994, Kitschelt 1995, Jackman and Volpert 1996, DeClair 1999, Ignazi 2003, Golder 2003, Norris 2005, Veugelers and Magnan 2005*b*, Arzheimer and Carter 2006, Mudde 2007, Art 2007, Copsey 2008, Bowyer 2008, Berezin 2009, Arzheimer 2009, Jesuit, Paradowski and Mahler 2009, Ford and Goodwin 2010, Evans and Ivaldi 2010, Fitzgerald and Lawrence 2011, Dinas and van Spanje 2011, Poznyak, Abts and Swyngedouw 2011, Rydgren and Ruth 2011, van der Waal, de Koster and Achterberg 2013). In particular, the literature has focused on perceived threats from outsiders, economic strain, and responses to new social movements. However, empirical investigations of the relationship between macro-level explanations and success suffer from three main deficiencies.

The first problem with current empirical studies linking macro-social forces to radical right success is that they fail to demonstrate a mechanism capable of fully explaining the relationship. The literature delves into some theoretical depth in regards to why people experiencing the impact of some macro-force (i.e. influx of immigrants) might be inclined to vote for a radical right party. However, the empirical tests implemented

solely explore the correlation between a macro-social force and radical right vote share. For instance, Jackman and Volpert (1996) argue that high unemployment provides a favorable condition for the success of extreme right parties. Indeed, the authors find that high unemployment is positively correlated with radical right vote share. Unfortunately, the statistical test does not provide a mechanism to explain why this correlation exists. What exactly is it about high unemployment, or being unemployed, that drives radical right vote share to increase? Current empirical testing does not directly answer this question.

The second problem with current research exploring the impact of macro-social forces is that the literature does not disaggregate explanations for radical right success in their empirical analyses. In this situation, macro-social variables are estimated in a model of success with several other explanations that do not operate at the same level of analysis. For instance, Arzheimer and Carter (2006) included individual-level voter characteristics, external supply-side factors, and macro-social factors in order to predict radical right vote choice. The problem with the analysis is that macro-social factors may effect voter attitudes, and external supply-side factors may impact the translation of attitudes to vote choice. However, the model is a simple additive model that oversimplifies the relationship, and does not account for the inter-relationships between these different factors.

The final problem is that current research finds contradictory conclusions regarding the role that particular macro-social forces play when predicting the success of radical right parties. The conflicting findings might be due to the two problems outlined above. For example, Arzheimer and Carter (2006) find that high unemployment decreases radical right vote share, while Mudde (2007), and Jesuit, Paradowski, and Mahler (2009), Evans and Ivaldi (2010) find that high unemployment increases radical right vote share. Further, Golder (2003), and Arzheimer (2009) find that the relationship between unemployment and radical right vote share is conditional on immigration rates.

The present inquiry attempts to correct for these deficiencies in the literature. First, this research agenda tests for the direct relationship that macro-social forces have on individual attitudes that lead to radical right vote share. Second, by conducting the

analysis in this manner, the factors that lead to radical right success are disaggregated in order to not oversimplify the relationship. Finally, the statistical testing conducted here attempts to provide a definitive statement regarding the role that macro-social forces have on radical right success. However, before conducting statistical testing, the literature and theoretical constructs are presented here. In particular, the role that immigration and economic strain play on developing radical right attitudes is discussed.

### **Immigrant/Group Threat Theory**

The most prominent macro-level theory explaining radical right success is the perceived threat from foreign “outsiders.” In fact, the literature places so much emphasis on the importance of immigration and anti-immigrant attitudes that some scholars simply refer to radical right parties as anti-immigrant parties (Bos and van der Brug 2010, van der Brug, Fennema and Tillie 2000*b*, van Spanje 2010). However, other authors argue that these parties are not single issue parties that can be solely understood as a response to the influx of immigrants (Kitschelt 1995). The literature posits that the relationship is positive. Therefore, when immigration increases, the success of radical right parties in terms of vote share will increase. Further, the literature argues that citizens witnessing an influx of immigrants in their country will view this occurrence as a threat, and that these people will vote for radical right parties because these are the only parties in the electoral market willing to deal with the perceived problem.

Mudde (2007) argues that radical right success at the macro-level could be explained by “ethnic backlash,” which is a defensive response by the majority to a perceived ethnic threat. In particular, the author argues that this perceived threat comes from non-European migrants. Further, Berezin (2009) argues that an exogenous shock (i.e. influx of immigrants) creates a situation where a political system transforms difference between groups from a social fact to social exacerbation. As far as empirical findings, Jesuit, Paradowski, and Mahler (2009) find that an increase in immigration leads to an increase in radical right success. Further, Ford and Goodwin (2010) discover that in areas with large Muslim minority populations of Pakistani or African origin, the British National

Party witnesses an increase in success. Likewise, Evans and Ivaldi (2010), Fitzgerald and Lawrence (2011), Dinas and van Spanje (2011), and Poznyak, Abts, and Sqyngedouw (2011) all find that an increase in immigration leads to an increase in radical right voting in different contexts throughout Europe.

Some authors argue that the relationship is more complex than the one described above. In particular, several scholars point out that the particular immigrant group is of great importance. For instance, Betz (1994) argues that an increase in the number of migrant workers and asylum seekers, and not overall immigration, leads to increased support for the radical right. DeClair (1999), Norris (2005), and Mudde (2007) agree that there is importance in the status of the immigration group, and that migrant workers and asylum seekers receive particular attention. Further, several authors disaggregate the immigration groupings, arguing that radical right support comes from people hostile to immigrants from particular areas. As stated above, Ford and Goodwin (2010) find that hostility to Muslims leads to success. In addition, Poznyak, Abts, and Sqyngedouw (2011) find that a higher proportion of immigrants from Turkey is correlated with higher radical right vote share. Overall, Betz (1994) claims that there are differences from country to country in regards to which immigrant groups illicit a negative response based on cultural backgrounds of the countries. Therefore, attention needs to be paid to particular groups.

At the local level, scholars have find that immigrant location matters for success. Unfortunately, it is difficult to replicate these results at the national level. Still, the literature warrants a brief review. Bowyer (2008) found that BNP support at the district level was highest where large ethnic minority populations exist. When the authors delves within districts, the party is strongest in predominantly white neighborhoods. Rydgren and Ruth (2011) confirm that radical right support is highest in areas close to immigrant dense areas, but not within these areas. Finally, van der Waal, de Koster, and Achterberg (2013) found that ethnic segregation of Dutch cities leads to voting for the Party for Freedom (PVV) in the Netherlands.

The relationship described between macro-social forces and attitudes indicates that an influx of immigrants should lead to an increase in attitudes that are associated with

radical right vote choice. An influx of immigrants alone does not lead to vote choice. Instead, the argument presented here is that an influx of immigrants ignites attitudes that then leads to vote choice. Therefore, the empirical analysis should demonstrate a relationship between immigration and attitudes.

### **Economic Strain Theory**

Betz (1994) was the first scholar to argue that economic forces lead to radical right party success. Broadly, the author argued that postindustrial capitalism creates an individualistic economy where long-standing identities are broken down and people are less able to rely on group identity for economic success. Therefore, citizens are less likely to align with a political party based on social class, and more likely to allow specific issue positions to drive vote choice. In addition, since competition is played out globally, national governments lose capacity to control economic outcomes. Thus, individuals in a negative economic situation blame established parties (Berezin 2009). If this theory is interpreted broadly, any economic crisis could incite a vote for the radical right (Mudde 2007). Further, economic indicators such as income inequality, redistribution of wealth, and per capita income have also been correlated with radical right success (Jesuit, Paradowski, and Mahler 2009, Poznyak, Abts, and Sqyngedouw 2011).

The primary economic situation that scholars agree impacts radical right success is unemployment (Jackman and Volpert 1996, DeClair 1999, Arzheimer and Carter 2006, Mudde 2007, Arzheimer 2009). However, scholars do not always agree on directionality of the relationship. Norris (2005) argues that the public has reacted to the consequence of globalization negatively when it is accompanied by growing numbers of job losses. Jackman and Volpert (1996), Arzheimer and Carter (2006), and Arzheimer (2009) find that the odds of radical right success decrease with higher unemployment. What explains the relationship between unemployment and radical right success? The predominant theory argues that people will view increasing unemployment as being caused by the mainstream political parties. Therefore, these citizens will move their votes from the establishment to the more radical parties. Again, the effect that this macro-social force

has on particular attitudes has not been explored previously.

Similar to the immigrant threat theory, a negative economic situation on its own does not necessarily lead to vote choice. One would be hard-pressed to find a political party in any electoral market advocating for high unemployment and a great disparity in wealth. However, there could be a connection between difficult economic situations and the acquisition of attitudes correlated with radical right voting. In particular, one would expect someone in a bad economic situation to be more likely to succumb to populist and anti-immigrant attitudes. Perhaps, individuals adopting populist attitudes may even blame the European Union for their misfortune.

### **Interacting Relationships: Modernization-Loser Theory**

A more reasonable and theoretically grounded means of understanding the effect of the macro-social forces above would be to explore the conditional relationship between these factors. Kitschelt (1995) argued that radical right parties that could be explained by one of these macro-social forces. More specifically, Mudde (2007) argues that radical right parties predominantly attract the “losers of modernization” in order to gain success. The author argues that the processes of modernization lead to important societal changes, which, in turn, have political effects. In particular, Rydgren and Ruth (2011) argue that socio-economic marginalization leads to a higher radical right vote share. Connecting these findings, this paper argues that economic downturns resulting from an increase in the availability of cheap labor creates a population of citizens known as the losers of modernization. Specifically, people that have recently lost their job view immigrants as the reason for their economic misfortunes. Previous research demonstrates this conditional relationship between economic distress and immigration influx.

Previous research demonstrates this conditional relationship between economic distress and immigration influx. Golder (2003) finds that although immigration has a positive effect on populist parties irrespective of the unemployment level. Rather, unemployment only matters when immigration is high. Further, Arzheimer (2009) determined that the interaction between unemployment and immigration is negative when exploring



radical right success. The author also finds that unemployment does not matter when immigration is sufficiently high. It will be important to explore exactly how the interactive relationship conditions attitudes.

If there is an interaction between negative economic strain and immigration, one would expect to see these two factors impact a number of attitudes correlated with radical right vote choice. For instance, when unemployment and the number of asylum seekers is high one would expect populist attitudes to flourish in a country. Therefore, it is worth estimating models where both of these theories are allowed to interact with one another.

### **Alternative Explanations**

The main alternative explanation advocating for the success of radical right parties through a profound macro-social force is the growth of the New Left and the welfare state (Ignazi 1992, Kitschelt 1995, Vuegelers and Magnan 2005). Kitschelt (1995) argues that the “New Right” constitutes the mirror image and opposite political pole of a New Left social movement that began in the 1960’s. Further, Ignazi (1992, 2003) advocates that the radical right’s emergence represents a “counter-revolution” against the New Left’s emergence. The problem is that these radical right movements do not constitute a mirror opposite ideologically of the much larger New Left social movement (Mudde 2007). For instance, radical right movements, such as the Party for Freedom (PVV) in the Netherlands, actually promote welfare programs. In addition, there is no correlation between the arrival of a New Left movement, or strength of New Left movement, and the emergence of a radical right party (attributed to the difficulty of determining when exactly a new radical right movement emerges). In fact, there are currently no research agendas empirically testing the moment of emergence for these parties. Still, this early explanation lays the foundation for developing more concrete macro-social explanations.

In a slightly related strain of argumentation, Kitschelt (1995) theorizes and observes that radical right parties are most likely to appear in postindustrial societies with large welfare states. Further, Veugelers and Magnan (2005) argue that growth in the welfare state leads to radical right success. In particular, these scholars theorize that radical right

parties constitute the only competitor party in the electoral market that are looking to deconstruct the welfare state. However, as stated above, the difficulty in accepting this theoretical construct is that several radical right parties advocate comprehensive state intervention. In addition, is it difficult to point to a theory or mechanism explaining why these parties would oppose state intervention.

## Variable Operationalization

The dependent variables utilized in the statistical modeling include relevant attitudes correlated with radical right vote choice. The data on individual-level attitudes was acquired from the European Social Survey (ESS). Further, the attitudes that were statistically significant in predicting vote choice in the previous chapter are the attitudes included in the empirical analysis: ideology, populism, nativism, feeling towards the European Union, and feelings toward equality.

The immigrant threat theory is represented in the empirical model by two distinct variables. The two variables are utilized in order to account for differing theoretical strains in the literature. First, several authors point out that the success of radical right parties is owed broadly to an influx of immigrants or non-native people living in a country. The proportion of the population that is foreign-born was included in the statistical analysis because it would make sense, theoretically, that a larger pool of non-native people might have an effect on radical right attitudes.<sup>82</sup> In the statistical modeling, the variable is lagged one year in order to align more precisely with theoretical expectations for two reasons.<sup>83</sup> First, it is not entirely clear in the literature that the number of immigrants has an immediate effect on attitudes. Second, the surveys were conducted at different times throughout the year. Therefore, it is important to err on the side of caution and ensure that the independent variable does indeed precede the dependent variable in the empirical model. When exploring descriptive statistics, one observes that the country that consistently has the highest proportion of immigrants

---

<sup>82</sup>The proportion of immigrants in a country ranges from 0.0058 (Bulgaria) to .2565 (Switzerland), and has a mean of 0.0891.

<sup>83</sup>The lag proportion of immigrants in a country ranges from 0.009 to 0.235, and has a mean of 0.087.

is Switzerland. Further, Switzerland's Swiss People's Party is historically one of the most successful radical right parties in Europe. Further, the country with the lowest proportion of foreign-born people is Bulgaria, which is a country with a radical right party that normally only obtains about 1% of the vote share. At least initially, there is some indication that the number of non-native people is related to radical right success.

The second measure utilized in order to represent the immigrant threat theory is more specific regarding which members of the overall immigrant population are most salient for inciting radical right attitudes. In particular, several scholars note that asylum seekers are an especially noticeable group to radical right voters (DeClair 1999, Norris 2005, Mudde 2007). Therefore, the raw number of asylum seeking grantees in a given year is utilized as an independent variable.<sup>84</sup> Again, the variable is lagged for the reasons listed above. Further, the variable is logged in order to account for any non-linearity.<sup>85</sup> When exploring the descriptive statistics, the relationship between radical right success and the number of asylum seekers is not readily apparent. Estonia accepted the fewest number of asylum seekers overall, and Estonia's radical right party is not very successful. However, Germany accepted the highest number of asylum seekers, and radical right parties have not been all that successful historically. On the other hand, Germany is usually considered a hot bed in terms of anti-immigrant sentiment. For example, Germany is currently the location that is experiencing some of the most hostile rallies and demonstrations espousing neo-nazi sentiment towards asylum seekers.

The empirical analysis also utilizes two different variables in order to represent economic strain. The first variable is the unemployment rate of the country.<sup>86</sup> The variable is lagged due to theoretical expectations regarding the timed effect of macro forces.<sup>87</sup> The expectation is that a high unemployment rate could possibly incite anger and the adoption of radical attitudes that exist on the right side of the ideological spectrum. The

---

<sup>84</sup>The number of asylum seeker grantees ranges from 15 (Estonia) to 202,645 (Germany), and has a mean of 24,980.

<sup>85</sup>The lagged number of asylum seeker grantees ranges from 40 (Estonia) to 126,700 (Germany), and has a mean of 23,530.

<sup>86</sup>The unemployment rate ranges from 2.6% (Norway) to 16.9% (Estonia), and has a mean of 6.885%.

<sup>87</sup>The lagged unemployment rate variable ranges from 2.1 (Netherlands) to 16.2 (Slovakia), and has a mean of 6.766.

second variable included in the models is the Gini Coefficient for each country.<sup>88</sup> The Gini Coefficient is a measure of inequality based on the dispersion of income in a given country. The Gini Coefficient is included in order to account for the alternative argument that radical right success rises in countries with expansive welfare systems. Since countries with expansive welfare systems have smaller gaps in wealth among citizens, this measure would accurately capture this idea.<sup>89</sup> In particular, the lag of the Gini Coefficient is utilized.<sup>90</sup>

## Method

Since the attitudes were measured on a continuous scale, Bayesian linear hierarchical models were estimated using the Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) method.<sup>91</sup> Further, hierarchical models were estimated because the dependent variable is measured at the individual level, but the independent variables are measured at the country level (n=17).<sup>92</sup> Finally, in the models the intercepts and slopes were allowed to vary in order to account for differences between countries. For each attitude, two models were estimated. There was a model estimated with the four independent variables, and a model estimated with an interaction between the asylum seekers variable and unemployment.<sup>93</sup>

The models testing radical right attitudes had the prior variance and prior means for each variable set at zero when estimating the model. When plotting the distributions for the chains, the distributions overlapped quite closely. The models presented here were all estimated by using a burnin of 50,000, and a sample of 50,000 that was thinned by

---

<sup>88</sup>The Gini Coefficient ranges from 23.72 (Slovenia) to 36.01 (Bulgaria), and has a mean of 29.81.

<sup>89</sup>Data availability for the Gini Coefficient is limited. Therefore, additional models were estimated where the gini coefficient variable was left out. In these instances, many independent variables had a slightly stronger relationship with the attitudes. However, the overall substantive effects did not change much.

<sup>90</sup>The lagged Gini Coefficient variable has a range of 24.37 (Slovenia) to 39.4 (Latvia), and has a mean of 29.74.

<sup>91</sup>The Bayesian models were estimated in JAGS version 4.0. The models were estimated in R version 3.2.2 on a MAC running OS X 10.11.

<sup>92</sup>The independent variables were scaled in order to be on comparable scales when assessing substantive importance across variables.

<sup>93</sup>A third set of models were estimated that also explored the interaction between the proportion of the population that was foreign-born and the unemployment rate. The models are presented in Appendix C. There was only one instance where the interactive models were substantively important (i.e. equality model).

5.<sup>94</sup> In regards to model convergence, each parameter for both chains passed Gelman and Rubin, Geweke, and Heidelberger and Welch tests. The Gelman and Rubin test statistics gave a potential scale reduction factor of 1 for all parameters; indicating there was no need to run the chains longer to improve convergence of the stationarity distribution.<sup>95</sup> The Geweke diagnostic test statistics indicated that the means of the parameters from two different locations in the chains converged to a standard normal distribution. All parameters passed the stationarity and half-width tests of the Heidelberger and Welch test. In addition, trace plots of the Markov chains showed that there was no trending present for the chains, or the individual parameters for each chain. Lastly, density plots conveyed that posterior parameters were normally distributed. The equation for the Bayesian hierarchical models are presented here:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{RadicalRightAttitude} &= \beta_{0j} \\ \beta_{0j} &= b_0 + b_1\text{ForeignBornPop}_j + b_2\text{AsylumSeekers}_j \\ &+ b_3\text{UnemploymentRate}_j + b_{4j}\text{GiniIndex}_j \\ &+ v_j \end{aligned}$$

$$b \sim N_4(0, \varepsilon)$$

$$\varepsilon = 10\mathbf{I}_4$$

$$v \sim N(0, \theta_v^2)$$

$$\theta_v^2 \sim \text{IG}(1, .1)$$

$$\theta_\epsilon^2 \sim \text{IG}(1, .1)$$

## Results

The results from the models that explored the effect of macro-forces on radical right attitudes are presented in Table 13. It is important to remind the reader that the at-

---

<sup>94</sup>Several models were estimated where the number of burnin, sampling, and thinning were changed. When the models converged, the results were substantively the same.

<sup>95</sup>Statistics of 1.2 or higher are the cutoff.

itudinal variables are measured so that higher values indicate radical right positions. Besides the intercepts, there is only one significant coefficient in any of the models that explored radical right attitudes. In particular, the models demonstrate that the Gini Coefficient is a statistically significant predictor of populist attitudes for individuals. As the Gini Coefficient increases, the likelihood of holding populist attitudes increases. The result indicates that higher income inequality may lead to populist attitudes. The finding is intuitive. When individuals view income inequality as being considerably high, they may hold elected officials and the establishment as the cause. Thus, voters witnessing this situation will take a negative view of those elected officials and institutions.

Table 13: Macro-Forces Effect on Attitudes

	Ideology	Populism	Nativism	EU	Equal
Intercept	5.127* (4.851, 5.394)	0.159 (-0.053, 0.371)	0.078 (-0.125, 0.281)	5.360* (5.059, 5.652)	0.986* (0.871, 1.102)
Foreign Born	0.057 (-0.239, 0.356)	-0.216 (-0.449, 0.018)	-0.041 (-0.260, 0.181)	0.006 (-0.316, 0.327)	0.030 (-0.095, 0.156)
Asylum Grantees	-0.136 (-0.490, 0.216)	-0.059 (-0.335, 0.220)	-0.033 ) (-0.300, 0.230)	0.178 (-0.208, 0.563)	-0.121 (-0.271, 0.029)
Unemp. Rate	0.016 (-0.335, 0.368)	0.189 (-0.087, 0.466)	0.155 (-0.108, 0.420)	0.084 (-0.297, 0.470)	-0.073 (-0.222, 0.079)
Gini Coef	-0.034 (-0.347, 0.279)	0.246* (0.002, 0.493)	0.085 (-0.148, 0.319)	0.081 (-0.257, 0.421)	0.027 (-0.106, 0.161)
$N$	28660	28660	28660	28660	28660
$R^2$	0.003 (0.000, 0.014)	0.099 (0.022, 0.129)	0.016 (0.000, 0.024)	0.006 (0.000, 0.010)	0.005 (0.000, 0.010)

95% credible intervals are in parentheses

\* indicates at least 95% of the posterior density on the same side of zero.

The result uncovered in Table 13 that the Gini Index's coefficient is the only significant predictor, given the 95% credible bounds, for radical right attitudes might be anticlimatic. However, Bayesian statistical theory provides other avenues for exploring the statistical significance of a variable. For example, the alternative strategy that a researcher could utilize for explore statistical significance is to view the percentage of observations in the posterior distribution of the data that fall on one side or the other of the value of zero.

The posterior distribution provides the predicted unobserved observations, conditional on the observed data. When exploring the posterior distribution, a couple of additional variables of interest have a statistical relationship with the radical right attitudes.

First, the unemployment rate of a country appears to have a significant impact on whether individuals hold nativist attitudes. For example, 91.38% of the time, the unemployment rate is positively related to nativist attitudes. Substantively, as unemployment rises, people tend to hold anti-immigrant attitudes. The result would make sense given the theoretical construct that individuals might hold immigrants responsible for their negative economic situation. Second, the unemployment rate of a country is also related to whether an individual holds populist attitudes. In particular, 91.67% of the time, the unemployment rate is positively related to populist attitudes. Therefore, an increase in unemployment is associated with an increase in individuals holding populist attitudes.

Table 14: Macro-Forces Effect on Attitudes: Interactive Models

	Ideology	Populism	Nativism	EU	Equal
Intercept	5.126* (4.843, 5.405)	0.159 (-0.039, 0.357)	0.077 (-0.131, 0.286)	5.360* (5.069, 5.644)	0.897* (0.778, 1.014)
Foreign-Born	0.012 (-0.365, 0.395)	-0.079 (-0.357, 0.194)	0.000 (-0.288, 0.287)	0.143 (-0.252, 0.530)	-0.083 (-0.216, 0.051)
Asylum Grantees	0.128 (-1.243, 1.487)	-0.866 (-1.866, 0.172)	-0.275 (-1.333, 0.802)	-0.624 (-1.999, 0.802)	0.522* (0.010, 1.026)
Unemployment Rate	0.330 (-1.288, 1.929)	-0.770 (-1.952, 0.446)	-0.132 (-1.379, 1.136)	-0.871 (-2.484, 0.807)	-0.137* (-0.268, -0.005)
Gini Coef	-0.050 (-0.383, 0.283)	0.296* (0.060, 0.530)	0.100 (-0.148, 0.347)	0.131 (-0.211, 0.469)	-0.015 (-0.129, 0.100)
Interaction (Asylum:Unemp)	-0.308 (-1.846, 1.241)	0.941 (-0.228, 2.077)	0.282 (-0.934, 1.471)	0.939 (-0.677, 2.493)	-0.196* (-0.344, -0.049)
<i>N</i>	28660	28660	28660	28660	28660
<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	0.003 (0.000, 0.010)	0.100 (0.036, 0.129)	0.014 (0.000, 0.023)	0.012 (0.004, 0.014)	0.005 (0.000, 0.011)

95% credible intervals are in parentheses

\* indicates at least 95% of the posterior density on the same side of zero.

In comparison, Table 14 presents the results of models estimating the effect of macro-forces on radical right attitudes where an interactive relationship was estimated between unemployment and asylum seekers. When exploring the coefficients and credible bounds,

there are several macro-social variables that have an impact on radical right attitudes. Again, the Gini Coefficient is positively associated with populist attitudes.

Further, two macro-social forces have an impact on the importance people place on equality. The variable explores whether individuals believe it is important for people to be treated equally and have equal opportunities. The results for this model are slightly puzzling. First, the number of asylum grantees is positively related to feelings on equality. Substantively, the result is intuitive and indicates that an increase in asylum seekers is associated with an increase in feelings that people should not be treated equally. Theoretically, the result is explained as existing because individuals might not want asylum grantees to receive the same benefits as themselves. The individuals might be experiencing the effects of group threat when the number of asylum grantees is high. Second, unemployment is negatively related to feelings that people should not be treated equally. When unemployment is high, people tend to view equality and equal treatment as important. Finally, the interaction between the two variables is significant and negative. When unemployment is low, variation in asylum matters a lot. Similarly, when the number of asylum grantees is low, unemployment matters a lot.<sup>96</sup>

An exploration of the posterior distributions for the interactive models indicate a number of variables have a statistical relationship with radical right attitudes. For citizens holding populist attitudes, both unemployment and the Gini Coefficient are positively related. In fact, 97.57% of the observations in the posterior distribution that lay on the positive side of zero for unemployment, and 99.12% for the Gini Coefficient. As unemployment and income inequality rise, individuals tend to hold populist attitudes. In addition, 94.67% of the observations in the posterior distribution are located on the positive side of zero for the interaction. The result suggests that as unemployment and the number of asylum grantees rise, individuals are more likely to adopt positive attitudes.

Finally, the posterior distributions demonstrate that there is a relationship between macro-forces and feelings towards EU. In particular, 90.5% of observations fall on the positive side of zero when exploring the impact of the interaction between unemployment

---

<sup>96</sup>The negative result could be explained by the fact that there are countries that are very high on one variable and not on the other (see, Appendix C).



and the number of asylum grantees. The result indicates that when unemployment and the number of asylum grantees is high, individuals have less trust in the EU. The result is intuitive because one could imagine that people blame these situations on the EU for their overarching economic and social policies.

## **Conclusion**

The present chapter explored the impact of macro-social forces on attitudes that are correlated with radical right vote choice. Previous research has focused solely on the direct effect that macro forces, such as unemployment or immigration, have on radical right vote choice. However, these previous attempts to explore the radical right have not established a mechanism that explains the link between the two. Thus, a significant contribution of this research is that it provides the mechanism linking macro-social forces to radical right vote choice. Specifically, macro-social forces create or amplify attitudes, and then these attitudes translate into vote choice.

In addition, several broad observations should be highlighted. First, economic distress represented by income inequality and unemployment have an impact on key radical right attitudes. These attitudes include nativism/anti-immigrant attitudes, populism, feelings toward the European Union, and feelings about equality. As a person's economic situation declines, the probability of that individual acquiring or holding important radical right attitudes increases.

Second, there is evidence to support the idea that an immigrant threat is related to a higher proportion of a population holding radical right attitudes. For example, the number of asylum grantees is positively related to views on the importance of equality. When the number of asylum grantees is large, individuals indicate that treating people equally is not important. Pending data availability, future research on the role of immigration should seek more nuanced measures of immigration that account for the type of immigrant group.

## Chapter 6

# A Comprehensive Model of Radical Right Vote Choice

Radical right parties promote a number of public policies that would appear to be in conflict with the spirit of liberal democracies throughout Europe. From advocating for the banning of the Quran, to promotion of racially antagonistic campaign material, radical right parties espouse ideas that one would expect to be unacceptable to citizens in countries with rich histories of democracy. However, across Europe radical right parties have been able to achieve a surprising level of success. The present research agenda set out to understand the mechanisms that explain why individuals ultimately decide to cast a vote for the illiberal parties.


Thus far, the empirical analyses presented in this research have uncovered a wealth of evidence in favor of a more comprehensive theory for explaining radical right vote choice. The preceding investigations in this research agenda have focused on very particular relationships between specific sets of explanatory variables, which include supply-side factors, individual level characteristics and attitudes, and macro-social forces. The major goal of this chapter is to utilize the findings from previous analyses in order to estimate a comprehensive model that explains radical right vote choice. The chapter proceeds by reviewing the theory and preceding findings. Then, discussion is provided regarding the estimation of a comprehensive model of radical right vote choice. Following statistical

testing, the substantive results are discussed. Finally, concluding remarks are offered on the direction of future research on this topic.

## Theory Review

The framework provided is a sequential theory of individual radical right vote choice. The theory links all of the previously hypothesized factors in the radical/extreme right literature. For reference, a visual interpretation of the theoretical construct is provided again in Figure 8. The two stages of the model consist of factors that determine the supply of a viable radical right party, and the factors that determine the individual demand to vote for such a party (i.e political opportunity structure).

Figure 8: Theory: Individual Radical Right Vote Choice



The **first stage** of the theoretical vote choice model involves the existence (supply) of a viable radical right party in the electoral market. Obviously, before a voter is able to cast a vote for a particular party type, that party must exist as an electoral option. The

existence of a viable radical right party to locate at a particular ideological space where voters are located is a function of two types of factors. First, systems-level, institutional factors that are external to the party have the ability to either restrict the ability of a radical right party to form or determine some level of success. In addition, these variables can damage the viability of the party in the voters' eyes if the institutional rules pose considerable constraints. For example, first-past-the-post electoral rules tend to lead to lower vote share for radical parties. Thus, not only can these *external institutional factors* determine whether a radical right party exists in a political system, but they also function to regulate the competitive viability of a party.

The second set of factors that determine the supply of a viable radical right party are those factors that are internal to the party, such as professionalization, organization, message/ideology, and leadership. For example, professionalized parties that are highly organized are going to be more viable because professional parties are traditionally better adapted at running electoral campaigns. What determines *party internal factors*? The theory presented here argues that party internal factors are largely determined by the external institutional rules of a country. For instance, strict campaign finance or ballot access laws can make it more difficult for smaller, niche parties, to organize and compete. In this situation, a radical right party would have a more difficult time creating an efficient party structure because the electoral rules are difficult to navigate. For instance, strict party finance laws could result in a radical right party that lacks the resources necessary to create an effective electoral campaign and therefore appears unprofessional in comparison to the "main" parties. In this case, it would be irrational for an individual to vote for the radical right party, as the vote would be "wasted" (Downs 1957, Cox 1997).

Given that a radical right party exists in the electoral market, the **second stage** of the theoretical vote choice model involves demand (desire to cast a vote) for a radical right party. As previously stated, prior research hypothesizes that three types of factors impact an individual's propensity to vote for the radical right party, or a radical right party's vote share in a country: *macro factors*, *voter soci-demographics*, and *voter attitudes*. In the theory advanced here, I argue that macro factors, such as high unemployment

and immigration, illicit extreme attitudes that are correlated with radical right vote choice, such as nativism and populism. Finally, research on the socio-demographics of radical right voters has largely demonstrated patterns dealing with age, education, working status, etc.; where specific socio-demographic groups are more likely to hold these radical right attitudes.

In Figure 8, the displayed framework conveys the relationship between these demand factors. The argument presented here is that macro-forces play a key role in driving demand by conditioning attitudes within specific socio-demographic populations. Alternatively stated, macro forces create attitudes in the population of voters that are commonly understood as the losers of modernization. Subsequently, it is these attitudes that drive an individual to vote for a radical right party. Once these attitudes are ignited in a population where a viable radical right party exists, a vote is cast for the radical right party.

## **Findings Review**

The preceding chapters empirically tested stages of the theoretical framework advanced in this research agenda. A review of each stage of these analyses is presented here. Chapter 2 encompassed an in-depth investigation of the isolated impact that external and internal supply-side factors have on radical right parties. First, the chapter explored the impact of external supply-side variables on radical right existence. The major finding was that institutional rules have a statistically significant relationship with the existence of a radical right party. For example, the total number of seats, split rules elections, compulsory voting, and the effective number of parties in an election all have a positive relationship with radical right party existence. Specifically, compulsory voting is associated with the existence of a radical right party. Collectively, the results hint at the unintended negative consequences that occur when people are forced to participate in democratic procedures.

The second part of the analysis explored the impact of external supply-side variables on radical right success, measured as vote and seat share. The important findings were

that both overall electoral system rules, and specific institutional rules targeting candidates, matter for determining radical right success. For example, the overall electoral system (proportional representation vs. plurality elections) has a significant impact on overall radical right success. Radical right parties achieve a higher level of success in proportional representation systems. In addition, institutional rules targeting individuals, such as the the strictness of ballot access and campaign finance, also impact overall radical right success. In particular, the stricter the ballot access and campaign finance laws, the lower radical right success in terms of vote and seat share. Finally, in terms of success, Chapter 2 explored the impact that internal supply-side features have on radical right parties. The results indicate that factors internal to the party matter. The experience of the party, party professionalization, and organizational structure impact radical right success. A centralized, professional party can expect a significant increase in both vote and seat share when compared to a party without those qualities.

A large piece of the theoretical puzzle that had previously not been explored is the relationship between external and internal supply-side factors. Certainly, it must be the case that if external factors impact radical right success, radical right parties would change their approach in elections with particular external institutional configurations. Therefore, Chapter 3 explored the effect that external supply-side variables have on internal supply-side variables. The findings indicate that external factors have a relationship with internal party factors. For example, party ideology has a tendency to be more extreme when a larger proportion of space exists on the right side of the ideological spectrum in an election. In addition, in countries with strict ballot access laws, parties have a tendency to be more professional and decentralized. The results provide some evidence that parties make strategic decisions based on the institutional structures within which they must compete.

Chapter 4 set out to concretely examine the socio-demographic characteristics and attitudinal beliefs of radical right voters. In regards to socio-demographics, a clear pattern emerged for these citizens. Radical right voters tend to be older men at lower levels of education and income. Further, the radical right voters were born in the country were they

currently reside. At least initially, some anecdotal evidence is provided by these results regarding the literatures' losers of modernization theory. Next, attitudes were explored. The attitudes correlated with radical right vote choice align well with the literature and theoretical expectations. In particular, a far-right ideological stance, populism, nativism, anti-EU sentiment, and a rejection of equality are associated with radical right vote choice. Clearly, the attitudes of radical right voters are not the traditional attitudes one would associate with advanced, liberal democracies.

The final stand alone empirical analysis explored the impact that macro-social forces have on attitudes correlated with radical right vote choice. In particular, the theory argues that negative economic circumstances and an influx of immigrants illicit the adoption of these radical attitudes. The results indicate that these two macro-social forces do indeed have an impact on crucial radical right attitudes. For example, the unemployment rate of a country is correlated with holding nativist attitudes. Further, the interaction between the number of asylum grantees and unemployment leads to higher rates of populism and negative feelings towards the idea of equality. What is unique about this analysis is that it is the first one that explored a relationship between these two sets of variables in the radical right literature.

## **Comprehensive Model**

The final empirical analysis is the estimation of a comprehensive model of radical right vote choice with the inclusion of all of the theoretically relevant variables previously explored.<sup>97</sup> Since independent variables operate at different levels of analysis, and specific variables at the second level have an impact on select variables in the first level, model selection is very important. The estimated models are generalized linear mixed-effects

---

<sup>97</sup>In the final models, only the statistically significant variables from previous chapters are included. The reason is that there are degrees of freedom issues given the structure of the data. The significant variables include: External factors - effective number of parties, party finance restrictiveness, ballot access restrictiveness, and electoral system. Internal factors - party professionalization and organizational structure. Macro factors - asylum grantees, unemployment rate, and Gini Coefficient. Demographics - age, gender, education, income, unemployed, union, foreign born. Attitudinal positions - ideology, nativist, populism, equality, EU trust. However, three significant variables are not included in the final model. Party organizational structure and the electoral system are not included due to a lack of variation in the final dataset. Similarly, the Gini Coefficient is not included due to a high volume of missing data.

models. The models incorporate fixed effects parameters in a linear predictor via maximum likelihood estimation. In the model, the systems level variables, such as external supply-side, internal supply-side, and macro factors, are grouped by country and year. The systems level variables only have an effect on the intercept for a particular country and year, while individual level variables coefficients' vary.<sup>98</sup> The basic format of the model is presented in the equation below:

$$\begin{aligned} \log \left( \frac{\text{Pr}(\text{RRVoteChoice})}{1 - \text{Pr}(\text{RRVoteChoice})} \right) &= \alpha_j + \beta_1 \text{Age} + \beta_2 \text{Gender} \\ &+ \beta_3 \text{Income} + \beta_4 \text{Education} \\ &+ \beta_5 \text{Unemployed} + \beta_6 \text{UnionMember} \\ &+ \beta_7 \text{Foreign-Born} + \beta_8 \text{Ideology} \\ &+ \beta_9 \text{Nativism} + \beta_{10} \text{Populism} \\ &+ \beta_{11} \text{Equality} + \beta_{12} \text{EUTrust} + \epsilon \\ \\ \alpha_j &= \gamma_1 \text{Effective\#ofParties}_j + \gamma_2 \text{FinanceLaws}_j \\ &+ \gamma_3 \text{BallotAccess}_j + \gamma_4 \text{OrgStructure}_j \\ &+ \gamma_5 \text{AsylumGrantees}_j + \gamma_6 \text{UnemploymentRate}_j + \epsilon_j \end{aligned}$$

In all, three models were estimated.<sup>99</sup> The first model is a basic mixed effects model with the inclusion of all relevant variables. The second model takes into account the results from Chapter 5 by estimating an additive attitude conditioning model. In particular, the second model includes interactions between the macro-social forces (i.e. unemployment and asylum grantees) and voter attitudes. For each attitude, there are two interactions; one interaction with unemployment and one with the number of asylum

---

<sup>98</sup>An alternative approach would have been to estimate a Bayesian binary hierarchical model that takes into account the relationship between macro-social forces in the second level and the individual attitudes in the first round. Unfortunately, the estimation of a model of this nature was computationally too intensive. The specific problem was that the intensive calculations made model convergence seemingly impossible. Therefore, the approach described above was taken as the next best alternative.

<sup>99</sup>All three models converged. The models were estimated with a specification of 25,000 iterations using the BOBYQA optimizer.



grantees. There is recognition in this model that macro-social forces might impact the radical right attitudes that lead to vote choice. Likewise, the final model takes into account this relationship, but model estimation is slightly different. The third model is a multiplicative attitude conditioning model. The model includes a three way interaction between each individual attitude and both macro-social forces. The models are estimated in this manner in order to more accurately account for the idea that the impact of one of the macro-social forces on an attitude might be contingent on the level of another macro-social force.

## Results

Model outputs for the mixed effects models are presented in Table 15. The first aspect of the output to explore is the comparison between the three models. According to Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) scores the additive attitude conditioning model, estimated with the two-way interactions between individual attitudes and each of the macro-social forces, is the best model. Further, log-likelihood ratio tests were not significant. Therefore, this section will focus on the results from only the additive model.

Theoretically, the set of factors that immediately impact the political opportunity structure for radical right parties includes the external supply-side factors. Two external supply-side variables have a statistically significant effect on radical right vote choice. First, the effective number of parties that exist in an election is related to radical right vote choice. Where there are more parties in the electoral market, voters will be more likely to choose a radical right party. The result is indirectly tapping into the combined effect of a number of specific electoral rules. Mainly, the result is indicative of the numerous electoral rules in a system that translate votes to seats. Therefore, where more parties are able to exist and compete, radical right parties will achieve a higher level of success. Since a higher number of parties have a chance to participate in government, citizens will not view their vote for a radical right party as a wasted vote. The other external variable correlated with radical right vote choice is ballot access. In particular,

Table 15: Vote Choice: Comprehensive Models

	Basic Model	Additive Attitude Conditioning Model	Multiplicative Attitude Conditioning Model
Intercept	-5.181* (0.744)	-5.269* (0.379)	-5.22* (0.396)
Age	-0.251* (0.018)	-0.281* (0.019)	-0.286* (0.019)
Gender	-0.228* (0.018)	-0.243* (0.019)	-0.241* (0.019)
Education	-0.203* (0.022)	-0.354* (0.031)	-0.355* (0.031)
Income	-0.168* (0.018)	-0.126* (0.020)	-0.126* (0.020)
Unemployed	0.105* (0.017)	0.109* (0.018)	0.109* (0.018)
Union	0.187* (0.040)	0.206* (0.041)	0.206 (0.041)
Foreign-Born	-0.201* (0.099)	-0.202* (0.102)	-0.201* (0.102)
Ideology	0.596* (0.019)	0.587* (0.047)	0.578* (0.047)
Nativism	0.724* (0.020)	0.716* (0.038)	0.728* (0.035)
Populism	0.340* (0.024)	0.380* (0.042)	0.377* (0.042)
Equality	0.074* (0.016)	0.106* (0.017)	0.105* (0.018)
EU Trust	0.166* (0.022)	0.138* (0.038)	0.141* (0.037)
Effective # of Parties	0.360* (0.048)	0.463* (0.125)	0.457* (0.125)
Finance Laws	1.057* (0.091)	-0.303 (0.201)	-0.372 (0.219)
Ballot Access Laws	-2.688* (0.945)	-1.508* (0.523)	-1.404* (0.548)
Org. Structure	0.320 (0.615)	0.727* (0.219)	0.728* (0.220)
Asylum	0.149* (0.055)	-0.037 (0.149)	-0.056 (0.188)
Unemployment	-0.070 (0.048)	-0.130 (0.181)	-0.110 (0.189)
Ideology×Asylum		0.145* (0.052)	0.182* (0.059)
Ideology×Unemp		-0.186* (0.047)	-0.202* (0.048)
Nativism×Asylum		0.155* (0.044)	0.100* (0.045)
Nativism×Unemp		-0.086* (0.038)	-0.066 (0.035)
Populism×Asylum		0.036 (0.051)	0.049 (0.056)
Populism×Unemp		0.030 (0.042)	0.024 (0.043)
Equality×Asylum		0.065* (0.023)	0.060* (0.024)
Equality×Unemp		0.065* (0.018)	0.064* (0.018)
EU Trust×Asylum		-0.090* (0.044)	-0.107* (0.049)
EU Trust×Unemp		-0.016 (0.037)	-0.009 (0.038)
Asylum×Unemp			0.004 (0.127)
Ideology×Asylum×Unemp			-0.055 (0.048)
Nativism×Asylum×Unemp			0.108* (0.038)
Populism×Asylum×Unemp			-0.014 (0.046)
Equality×Asylum×Unemp			0.021 (0.022)
EU Trust×Asylum×Unemp			0.023 (0.041)
<i>N</i>	65203	65203	65203
AIC	24910.0	23782.7	23784.7
BIC	25082.7	24227.9	24284.4
Log-Likelihood	-12436.0	-11842.3	-11837.3

Std. Errors are in parentheses

\* indicates significance at  $p < 0.05$

as ballot access laws are made more strict, radical right vote choice decreases. One explanation for this result is that strict ballot access laws render smaller parties less effective when it comes to electoral participation. In regards to voters, voters might witness that the more extreme parties are not able to field the number of high quality candidates necessary for substantial participation in government. Therefore, voting for these parties is viewed by the citizen as a wasted vote.

Chapter 4 found that a particular pattern exists when exploring the socio-demographic indicators of radical right voters. The final model results confirm this pattern. Age, gender, education, income, and foreign birth are statistically, and negatively, related to radical right vote choice. If these voters are losers of modernization, then this result is intuitive. Radical right voters are more likely to be at a lower level on key sociodemographic indicators (i.e. poorer, lower educated, male, etc). Further, the results demonstrate that these voters are younger than some studies previously hypothesized. There is some debate in the literature regarding the direction of the impact of age on vote choice for these parties. Here, it is clear that younger voters are more likely to support radical right parties. The finding can be explained by the fact that older voters tend to have long-standing party ties that are hard to break. Another demographic finding is that citizens born in a different country than the one in which they voted are less likely to support the radical right party. In contrast, union membership and unemployment are positively related to radical right vote choice. Again, these results align well with the modernization-loser theory. Radical right voters tend to be unemployed or working in lower paying, blue-collar jobs. The economic and working positions of these citizens are seen as being caused by the process of modernization.

The attitudes correlated with radical right vote choice are similar to previous findings. Since all of the attitudinal variables are coded so that higher values indicate a more extreme right positioning, interpretation of the results is straightforward. Further, the variables were scaled in order to easily compare impact across variables. There are a number of attitudes that impact vote choice. First, nativism (i.e. anti-immigrant attitudes) is the strongest predictor of vote choice. Clearly, there is some validity to the

claim that the defining characteristics of these parties are their anti-immigrant platforms. Next, a far right self-placement on the ideological spectrum comes second in importance for predicting vote choice. Since some scholars posit that radical right voters do not view themselves as extreme, the result might be viewed with skepticism. However, model output indicates that it is indeed the case that these people understand the extremity of their views. In addition, populist sentiment is another fairly strong attitudinal predictor of radical right vote choice. Radical right voters tend to be suspicious of the political establishment. Finally, a rejection of equality and a negative view of the EU are also statistically associated with radical right vote choice. It is heavily debated in the literature whether these last two attitudes are really a feature of radical right parties. The results make it clear that there is evidence of a relationship between these two attitudes and radical right vote choice.

Finally, the results reveal that a conditioning effect exists between macro-social forces and radical right attitudes. In fact, macro-social forces on their own do not have a direct effect on vote choice. There are a number of unique observations regarding the relationship between attitudes, macro-forces, and radical right vote choice in the model output. First, the interactions between ideology and asylum grantees, as well as ideology and unemployment rate are both statistically significant. The finding indicates that the impact of ideology is amplified as the number of asylum seekers increases. However, the impact is decreased as the unemployment rate increases. This suggests that an influx of a particular group of immigrants into a country incites more extreme attitudes associated with radical right vote choice. The same result is present when exploring the relationship between nativism and the macro-social forces. The impact of nativism is larger when the number of asylum grantees is higher, and smaller when unemployment is higher. Additionally, both the number of asylum grantees and unemployment rate have a boosting effect on the importance of equality. When the number of asylum grantees and unemployment is high, a citizen's belief that people should not be equal has a larger impact on voting for the radical right party. Intuitively, it would make sense that citizens with low socio-economic backgrounds would not believe that immigrants should be treated

equally during times of economic decline. This result provides added support for the losers of modernization theory. The final conditional result is that the number asylum grantees decreases the impact of ‘trust in the EU’ on vote choice. When comparing the effect of the number of asylum grantees across attitudes, there are different outcomes. The number of asylum grantees has a positive effect on those attitudes that are most predictive of radical right vote choice. However, when the number of asylum grantees is high, there is a lessening effect on other attitudes, such as ‘trust in the EU,’ which matters less in terms of vote choice. In sum, the number of asylum grantees is crucial for determining the attitudes that predict radical right vote choice.

## **Concluding Remarks**

This research provides the first complete, sequential theory and empirical testing that explains radical right vote choice. Three concluding remarks deserve emphasis. First, evidence supports a sequential model of radical right vote choice. The chapters outlined here, as well as the results from the final empirical model demonstrate that there is a relationship between the independent variables that predict radical right vote choice. For example, macro-social forces have a conditioning effect on important attitudes correlated with radical right vote choice. Further, previous chapters demonstrated a link between sets of explanatory variables, such as external and internal supply-side variables. However, there should be some caution taken when applying the theory holistically. There should be some recognition that a feedback loop exists. For instance, it would not be unreasonable to expect that demand for a radical right party, in the form of a proportion of the population holding extreme right attitudes, could lead to the creation of a radical right party. Further, demand in this form could drive a party to adopt strategic internal party characteristics, such as an extreme right ideology. In this vein, concerns of endogeneity are present. The theory advanced here acknowledges the possibility, but advocates that on average the theory operates based on the sequencing outlined previously.

Second, there is now overwhelming evidence in support of the idea that radical right voters are predominately citizens that could be categorized as “losers of modernization.”

The socio-demographic make-up of the citizens voting for radical right parties comprises the same set of factors that identify the losers of modernization. The susceptible population includes young men at lower levels of income and education. Further, these citizens hold radical attitudes generally associated with populism far-right ideas about government, and simplistic notions regarding the operations of government. Finally, the macro-level forces most associated with the theory have a direct effect on attitudes correlated with radical right vote choice. This research agenda is the first one to uncover a direct relationship between these two sets of independent variables.

The final remark deals with normative ideas of the impact of these parties. If radical right parties advocate illiberal public policies that are dangerous to liberal democracies, then there is some usefulness in recognizing the situations where radical right parties are not successful. Chapter 2 demonstrated that radical right parties are not successful in countries that have electoral systems benefiting large, mainstream, and moderate parties. Further, compulsory voting is associated with the existence of a radical right party. The finding is unique in the democratic literature because we commonly believe that more participation is better for the health of democracy. Overall, in countries where anti-immigrant and extreme right ideological sentiment is high, mainstream political parties looking to eliminate radical right parties would be wise to reform the electoral system in order to limit competition from niche parties. The reform could be done by targeting particular electoral rules that have a direct effect on electoral system disproportionality, such as thresholds, number of seats, etc.

# References

- Abbott, David W. and Edward T. Rogowsky. 1971. *Political Parties: Leadership, Organization, Linkage*. Rand McNally & Company.
- Aldrich, John H. 2011. *Why Parties?* University of Chicago Press.
- Art, David. 2007. "Reacting to the Radical Right: Lessons from Germany and Austria." *Party Politics* 13(3):331–349.
- Arzheimer, Kai. 2009. "Contextual Factors and the Extreme Right Vote in Western Europe, 1980-2002." *American Journal of Political Science* 53(2):259–275.
- Arzheimer, Kai and Elisabeth Carter. 2006. "Political Opportunity Structures and Right-Wing Extremist Party Success." *European Journal of Political Research* 45:419–443.
- Assemblée Nationale, France. 2012. "Questions About Voting." .  
**URL:** <http://www.elections-legislatives.fr/en/voting.asp>
- Bacchi, Umberto. 2014. "German Neo-Nazi MEP Udo Voigt Gets EU Parliament Human Rights Committee Seat." *International Business Times* .
- Bale, Tim, Christoffer Green-Pedersen, Andre Krouwel, Kurt Richard Luther and Nick Sitter. 2010. "If You Can't Beat Them, Join Them? Explaining Social Democratic Responses to the Challenge from the Populist Radical Right in Western Europe." *Political Studies* 58:410–426.
- BBC. 2009. "Swiss voters back ban on minarets." .  
**URL:** <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8385069.stm>
- Berezin, Mabel. 2009. *Illiberal Politics in Neoliberal Times: Culture, Security, and Populism in the New Europe*. Cambridge University Press.
- Betz, Hans-Georg and Susi Meret. 2013. *Class Politics and the Radical Right*. Routledge: Taylor and Francis Group chapter Right-wing populist parties and the working-class vote.

- Betz, Hans-George. 1994. *Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe*. St. Martin's Press.
- Bornschieer, Simon and Hanspeter Kriesi. 2013. *Class Politics and the Radical Right*. Routledge: Taylor and Francis Group chapter The populist right, the working class, and the changing face of class politics.
- Bos, Linda and W. van der Brug. 2010. "Public images of leaders of anti-immigration parties: Perceptions of legitimacy and effectiveness." *Party Politics* 16(6):777–799.
- Bowyer, Benjamin. 2008. "Local Context and Extreme Right Support in England: The British National Party in the 2002 and 2003 Elections." *Electoral Studies* 24(4):611–620.
- Brady, Henry E. and Jason Seawright. 2004. "Framing Social Inquiry: From Models of Causation to Statistically Based Causal Inference." APSA Manuscript.
- Broughton, Delves Phillip. 2002. "French get choice of 'crook or fascist'".  
**URL:** <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/france/1392313/French-get-choice-of-crook-or-fascist.html>
- Canovan, Margaret. 1999. "Trust the People! Populism and the Two Faces of Democracy." *Political Studies* XLVII:2–16.
- Carter, Elisabeth. 2005. *The Extreme Right in Western Europe: Success of Failure?* Manchester University Press.
- Carter, Elisabeth L. 2002. "Proportional Representation and the Fortunes of Right-Wing Extremist Parties." *West European Politics* 25(3):125–146.
- Coffe, Hilde. 2013. *Class Politics and the Radical Right*. Routledge: Taylor and Francis Group chapter Gender, class, and radical right voting.
- Coffe, Hilde and Marieke Voorpostel. 2010. "Young people, parents and radical right voting. The Case of the Swiss People's Party." *Electoral Studies* 29:435–443.



- Collier, David and Steven Levitsky. 1997. "Democracy with Adjectives: Conceptual Innovation in Comparative Research." *World Politics* 49(3):430–451.
- Copsey, Nigel. 2008. *Contemporary British Fascism: The British National Party and the Quest for Legitimacy*. Palgrave Macmillan.
- Cox, G. W. 1997. *Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World's Electoral Systems*. Cambridge University Press.
- Cumming-Bruce, Nick and Steven Erlanger. 2009. "Swiss Ban Building of Minarets on Mosques."
- Cutts, D., E. Fieldhouse and A. Russell. 2010. "The Campaign That Changed Everything and Still Did Not Matter? The Liberal Democrat Campaign and Performance." *Parliamentary Affairs* 63(4):689–707.
- Cutts, D., R. Ford and M. J. Goodwin. 2011. "Anti-Immigrant, politically disaffected or still racist after all? Examining the attitudinal drivers of extreme right support in Britain in the 2009 European elections." *European Journal of Political Research* 50:418–440.
- Dahl, Robert A. 1971. *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition*. Yale University Press.
- DeClair, Edward G. 1999. *Politics on the Fringe: The People, Policies, and Organization of the French National Front*. Duke University Press.
- Dinas, Elias and Joost van Spanje. 2011. "Crime Story: The role of crime and immigration in the anti-immigration vote." *Electoral Studies* 30:658–671.
- Doosje, Bertjan, Kees van den Bos, Annemarie Loseman, Allard R. Feddes and Liesbeth Mann. 2013. "'My In-group is Superior!': Susceptibility for Radical Right-wing Attitudes and Behaviors in Dutch Youth." *Negotiation and Conflict Management Research* 5(3):253–268.
- Downs, Anthony. 1957. *An Economic Theory of Democracy*. Harper Collins Press.

- Duch, Raymond M., Jeff May and David A. Armstrong. 2010. "Coalition-directed Voting in Multiparty Democracies." *American Political Science Review* 104(4):698–719.
- Duverger, M. 1972. *Party Politics and Pressure Groups: A Comparative Introduction*. Thomas Y. Crowell Company, New York chapter Factors in a Two-Party and Multiparty System, pp. 23–32.
- Duverger, M. 1986. "Duverger's law: Forty years later." *Electoral laws and their political consequences* pp. 69–84.
- ECHR, European Court of Human Rights. 2014. "French ban on the wearing in public of clothing designed to conceal one's face does not breach the Convention." *Press Release: issued by the Registrar of the Court*.
- Economist. 2010. Democracy Index 2010: Democracy in Retreat. A report from the economist intelligence unit Economist.
- Elster, Jon. 2007. *Explaining Social Behavior: More Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences*. Cambridge University Press.
- Ennsner, Laurenz. 2012. "The homogeneity of West European Party Families: The Radical Right in Comparative Perspective." *Party Politics* 18(2):151–171.
- Erikson, Robert S. 1978. "Constituency Opinion and Congressional Behavior: A Reexamination of Miller-Stokes." *American Journal of Political Science* 22(3):511–535.
- Erlanger, Steven. 2011. "France Enforces Ban on Full-Face Veils in Public."
- Esping-Anderson, Gosta. 1990. *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*. Polity Press.
- ESS, European Social Survey. 2014. *ESS Round 1-6: European Social Survey Round 1-6 Data (2002-2012)*. Vol. Data file edition 2.1 Norwegian Social Science Data Services, Norway – Data Archive and distributor of ESS data.  
**URL:** <http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/data/>
- Europa. 2011. "Voting rights and eligibility in European Parliament elections."

- Evans, Jocelyn and Gilles Ivaldi. 2010. "Comparing forecast models of Radical Right voting in four European countries (1973-2008)." *International Journal of Forecasting* 26:82–97.
- Fieschi, Catherine. 2004. *Fascism, Populism, and the French Fifth Republic: In the Shadow of Democracy*. Manchester University Press.
- Fitzgerald, J. and D. Lawrence. 2011. "Local cohesion and radical right support: The case of the Swiss People's Party." *Electoral Studies* 30(4):834–847.
- Ford, R. and M. Goodwin. 2010. "Angry White Men: Individual and Contextual Predictors of Support for the British National Party." *Political Studies* 58:1–25.
- Ford, Robert, Matthew J. Goodwin and David Cutts. 2012. "Strategic Eurosceptics and polite xenophobes: Support for the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) in the 2009 European Parliament elections." *European Journal of Political Research* 51:204–234.
- Foulkes, Imogen. 2007. "Swiss row over black sheep poster."  
**URL:** <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6980766.stm>
- Fox, John. 2008. *Applied Regression Analysis and Generalized Linear Models*. Second ed. Sage Publishing.
- Frayer, Lauren. 2015. "A Race To The Far Right In Hungarian Politics."  
**URL:** <http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2015/10/12/447911182/a-race-to-the-far-right-in-hungarian-politics>
- Freedom House. 2011. Checklist Questions and Questionnaires. Technical report Freedom House.
- Gallagher, Michael. 1991. "Proportionality, Disproportionality, and Electoral Systems." *Electoral Studies* 10:33–51.

- Gallagher, Michael. 1992. "Comparing Proportional Representation Electoral Systems: Quotas, Thresholds, Paradoxes and Majorities." *British Journal of Political Science* 22:469–496.
- Gibbons, Fiachra. 2012. "What kind of French republic needs the protection of Marine Le Pen?"  
**URL:** <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/belief/2012/sep/26/marine-le-pen-jewish-kippas-ban>
- Givens, Terri E. 2005. *Voting Radical Right in Western Europe*. Cambridge University Press.
- Golder, Matt. 2003. "Explaining Variation in the Success of Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe." *Comparative Political Studies* 36(4):432–466.
- Griffin, John D. 2006. "Electoral Competition and Democratic Responsiveness: A Defense of Marginality." *Journal of Politics* 68(4):911–921.
- Hainsworth, Paul. 2008. *The Extreme Right in Western Europe: Making of the Contemporary World*. Routledge: Taylor and Francis Group.
- Hakhverdian, Armen and Christel Koop. 2007. "Consensus Democracy and Support for Populist Parties in Western Europe." *Acta Politica* 42:401–420.
- Hibbing, John R. 1991. "Contours of the Modern Congressional Career." *American Political Science Review* 85(2):405–428.
- Hicks, Daniel L. 2013. "War and the political zeitgeist: Evidence from the history of female suffrage." *European Journal of Political Economy* 31:60–81.
- Howard, Marc Morje. 2010. "The Impact of the Far Right on Citizenship Policy in Europe: Explaining Continuity and Change." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 36(5):735–751.
- Huber, Evelyn and John Stephens. 2012. *Democracy and the Left: Social Policy and Inequality in Latin America*. University of Chicago Press.

- Huffington-Post. 2014. "France's National Front Reaches Highest Membership Number Since Party Was Founded."
- Ignazi, Piero. 1992. "The Silent Counter-Revolution: Hypothesis on the Emergence of Extreme Right in Western Europe." *European Journal of Political Research* 22:3–34.
- Ignazi, Piero. 2003. *Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe*. Oxford University Press.
- Ivarsflaten, Elisabeth and Rune Stubager. 2013. *Class Politics and the Radical Right*. Routledge: Taylor and Francis Group chapter Voting for the populist radical right in Western Europe: The role of education.
- Jackman, Robert W. and Karin Volpert. 1996. "Conditions Favouring Parties of the Extreme Right in Western Europe." *British Journal of Political Science* 26:501–521.
- Jesuit, D. K., P. R. Paradowski and V. A. Mahler. 2009. "Electoral support for extreme right-wing parties: A sub-national analysis of western European elections." *Electoral Studies* 28:279–290.
- Jolly, David. 2011. "Dutch Court Acquits Anti-Islam Politician."  
**URL:** <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/24/world/europe/24dutch>
- Karpov, Alexander. 2008. "Measurement of disproportionality in proportional representation systems." *Mathematical and Computer Modeling* 48(9-10):1421–1438.
- Katz, Richard S. and Peter Mair. 1994. *How Parties Organize: Change and Adaption in Party Organizations in Western Democracies*. Sage Publishing.
- King, Gary, Robert O. Keohane and Sidney Verba. 1994. *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research*. Princeton University Press.
- Kitschelt, Herbert. 1995. *The Radical Right in Western Europe*. University of Michigan Press.
- Laakso, M. and R. Taagepera. 1979. "Effective Number of Parties: A Measure with Application to West Europe." *Comparative Political Studies* 12(1):3–27.

- Laver, Michael and Norman Schofield. 1998. *Multiparty Government: The Politics of Coalition in Europe*. University of Michigan Press.
- Le Figaro, France. 2014. “Présidentielle 2017 : Marine Le Pen en tête au premier tour dans tous les cas de figure.”
- URL:** <http://www.lefigaro.fr/politique/2014/09/05/01002-20140905ARTFIG00167-sondage-marine-le-pen-en-tete-de-la-presidentielle-dans-tous-les-cas-de-figure.php>
- Lijphart, Arend. 1994. *Electoral Systems and Party Systems*. Oxford University Press.
- Lijphart, Arend. 2010. *Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries*. Yale University Press.
- Lipset, S. M. and S. Rokkan. 1967. “Party Systems and Voter Alignments.” *New York* .
- Luther, K. R. 2011. “Of goals and own goals: A case study of right-wing populist party strategy for and during incumbency.” *Party Politics* 17(4):453–470.
- Marshall, Monty G., Keith Jagers and Ted Robert Gurr. 2010. Polity IV Data Set. Technical report Polity IV.
- Martin, Lanny W. and Randolph T. Stevenson. 2001. “Government Formation in Parliamentary Democracies.” *American Journal of Political Science* 45(1):33–50.
- Mayhew, David. 1974. *Congress: The Electoral Connection*. Yale University Press.
- Meguid, Bonnie. 2005. “Competition Between Unequals: The Role of Mainstream Party Strategy in Niche Party Success.” *American Political Science Review* 99(3):347–359.
- Miller, Warren E. and Donald E. Stokes. 1963. “Constituency Influence in Congress.” *American Political Science Review* 57(1):45–56.
- Mudambi, Ram. 1997. “A Complete Information Index for Measuring the Proportionality of Electoral Systems.” *Applied Economic Letters* 4:101–104.
- Mudde, Cas. 2007. *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe*. Cambridge University Press.

- Mudde, Cas. 2011. “Who’s Afraid of the European Radical Right?” *Dissent* Fall:7–11.
- Mudde, Cas. 2013. “The 2012 Stein Rokkan Lecture: Three decades of populist radical right parties in Western Europe: So what?” *European Journal of Political Research* 52:1–19.
- Müller, Wolfgang C. and Kaare Strøm. 1999. *Policy, Office, or Votes? How Political Parties in Western Europe Make Hard Decisions*. Cambridge University Press.
- Munck, Gerardo L. and Jay Verkuilen. 2002. “Conceptualizing and Measuring Democracy: Evaluating Alternative Indices.” *Comparative Political Studies* 35(1):5–34.
- Norris, Pippa. 2005. *Radical Right: Voters and Parties in the Electoral Market*. Cambridge University Press.
- OECD, Organization for Economic Co-Operation/ Development. 2014. International Migration Database. Technical report.
- Oesch, Daniel. 2013. *Class Politics and the Radical Right*. Routledge: Taylor and Francis Group chapter The class basis of the cleavage between the New Left and the radical right.
- Olson, Mancur. 1965. *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups*. Harvard University Press.
- Panebianco, Angelo. 1988. *Political Parties: Organization and Power*. Cambridge University Press.
- Pauwels, Teun. 2010. “Explaining the Success of Neo-Liberal Populist Parties: The Case of Lijst Dedecker in Belgium.” *Political Studies* 58:1009–1029.
- Pauwels, Teun. 2011. “Measuring Populism: A Quantitative Text Analysis of Party Literature in Belgium.” *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties* 21(1):97–119.

- Poznyak, D., K. Abts and M. Swyngedouw. 2011. "The dynamics of the extreme right support: A growth curve model of the populist vote in Flanders-Belgium in 1987-2007." *Electoral Studies* 30:672–688.
- Przeworski, Adam. 2009. "Conquered or Granted? A History of Suffrage Extensions." *British Journal of Political Science* 39(2):291–321.
- Ragin, Charles. 1987. *The Comparative Method: Moving Beyond Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies*. University of California Press.
- Range, Harald. 2011. Arrest warrant against the arsonist of Zwickau because of membership in the terrorist organization. Technical report The Federal Attorney General.
- Riker, W. H. 1986. "Duverger's law revisited." *Electoral Laws and Their Political Consequences* pp. 19–42.
- Rydgren, Jens. 2008. "Immigration Skeptics, Xenophobes, or Racists? Radical Right-Wing Voting in Six West European Countries." *European Journal of Political Research* 47:737–765.
- Rydgren, Jens. 2013. *Class Politics and the Radical Right*. Routledge: Taylor and Francis Group.
- Rydgren, Jens and Patrick Ruth. 2011. "Contextual explanations of radical right-wing support in Sweden: socioeconomic marginalization, group threat, and the halo effect." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 36(4):711–728.
- Sartori, Giovanni. 1970. "Concept Misinformation in Comparative Politics." *American Political Science Review* 64(4):1033–1053.
- Schattschneider, E.E. 1942. *Party Government*. Rinehart Publishing.
- Shepsle, Kenneth A. 2010. *Analyzing Politics: Rationality, Behavior, and Institutions*. 2nd ed. W. W. Norton & Company.



- Somaskanda, Sumi. 2015. "Germany has a Refugee Problem, and the Problem is the Germans.".
- URL:** <http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/08/07/germany-refugees-asylum-seekers-arson-violence-unwelcome/>
- Sprague-Jones, Jessica. 2010. "Extreme right wing vote and support for multiculturalism in Europe." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 34(4):535–555.
- Stefanova, Boyka. 2009. "Ethnic nationalism, social structure, and political agency: explaining electoral support for the radical right in Bulgaria." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 32(9):1534–1556.
- Stratmann, Thomas. 2000. "Congressional Voting over Legislative Careers: Shifting Positions and Changing Constraints." *American Political Science Review* 94(3):665–676.
- Taagepera, R. and B. Grofman. 1985. "Rethinking Duverger's Law: Predicting the Effective Number of Parties in Plurality and PR Systems—Parties Minus Issues Equals One\*." *European Journal of Political Research* 13(4):341–352.
- Tarrow, Sydney. 1994. *Power in Movement*. Cambridge University Press.
- Traynor, Ian. 2010. "Geert Wilders hate speech trial collapses in Netherlands.".
- URL:** <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/oct/22/geert-wilders-trial-collapses>
- Vaisse, Justin. 2004. "Veiled Meaning: The French Law Banning Religious Symbols in Public Schools." *The Brookings Institution U.S.-France Analysis Series*.
- van der Brug, W., M. Fennema and J. Tillie. 2000a. "Anti-immigrant parties in Europe: Ideological or protest vote?" *European Journal of Political Research* 37:77–102.
- van der Brug, Wouter, Meindert Fennema and Jean Tillie. 2000b. "Anti-immigrant parties in Europe: Ideological or protest vote?" *European Journal of Political Research* 37:77–102.

- van der Brug, Wouter, Meindert Fennema, Sarah de Lange and Inger Baller. 2013. *Class Politics and the Radical Right*. Routledge: Taylor and Francis Group chapter Radical right parties: Their voters and their electoral competitors.
- van der Waal, Jeroen, Willem de Koster and Peter Achterberg. 2013. "Ethnic Segregation and Radical Right-Wing Voting in Dutch Cities." *Urban Affairs Review* 49(5):748–777.
- van Heerden, Sjoerdje, Sarah L. de Lange, Wouter van der Brug and Meindert Fennema. 2014. "The Immigration and Integration Debate in the Netherlands: Discursive and Programmatic Reactions to the Rise of Anti-Immigration Parties." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 40(1):119–136.
- van Holsteyn, Joop J.M. and Galen A. Irwin. 2003. "Never a Dull Moment: Pim Fortuyn and the Dutch Parliamentary Election of 2002." *West European Politics* 26(2):41–66.
- van Holsteyn, Joop J.M., Galen A. Irwin and Josje M. den Ridder. 2003. "In the Eye of the Beholder: The Perception of the List Pim Fortuyn and the Parliamentary Elections of May 2002." *Acta Politica* 38:69–87.
- van Spanje, Joost. 2010. "Parties beyond the pale: Why some political parties are ostracized by thier competitors while others are not." *Comparative European Politics* 8(3):354–383.
- Veugelers, John and André Magnan. 2005a. "Conditions of Far-Right Strenth in Contemporary Western Europe: An Application of Kitschelt's Theory." *European Journal of Political Research* 44:837–860.
- Veugelers, John and Andre Magnan. 2005b. "Conditions of Far-Right Strenth in Contemporary Western Europe: An Application of Kitschelt's Theory." *European Journal of Political Research* 44:837–860.
- Volkens, Andrea, Pola Lehmann, Nicolas Merz, Sven Regel and Annika Werner. 2014. *The Manifesto Data Collection. Manifesto Project (MRG/CMP/MARPOR). Version 2014b*. Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung.

Waterfield, Bruno. 2007. "Ban Koran like Mein Kampf, says Dutch MP."

**URL:** <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1559877/Ban-Koran-like-Mein-Kampf-says-Dutch-MP.html>

Wilders, Geert. 2010. "In the Name of Freedom, No Mosque Here!" Rally at Ground Zero New York.

Wilders, Geert. 2007. "Wilders: verbied de Koran, ook in moskee." *de Volkskrant* .

Wilson, James Q. 1974. *Political Organizations*. Basic Books, Inc.

Zaslove, Andrej. 2004. "The Dark Side of European Politics: Unmasking the Radical Right." *European Integration* 26(1):61–81.

# Appendix A


Figure 9: Swiss People's Party (SVP) Ads



Figure 10: German National Democratic Party (NPD) Ads



Figure 11: Multi-Modal Distribution



# Appendix B

## Results: Interactive Models

Table 16: Linear Predictors Interactive Models - Vote Share

	Vote Share		
	Full Model	Significance Model (.1 level)	Significance Model (.05 level)
Intercept	0.126* (0.021, 0.231)	-0.001 (-0.032, 0.030)	-0.001 (-0.032, 0.030)
External Factors	-2.030* (-3.723, -0.342)	0.129 (-0.466, 0.723)	0.128 (-0.465, 0.725)
Internal Factors	-0.681 (-1.724, 0.359)	0.459 (-0.031, 0.948)	0.458 (-0.031, 0.948)
Interaction	26.756* (10.475, 43.142)	7.744 (-0.483, 16.073)	7.772 (-0.509, 16.035)
<i>N</i>	120	194	194
<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	0.317 (0.283, 0.325)	0.345 (0.325, 0.349)	0.345 (0.324, 0.349)

95% credible intervals are in parentheses

\* indicates significance at  $p < 0.05$

Table 17: Linear Predictors Interactive Models - Seat Share

	Seat Share		
	Full Model	Significance Model (.1 level)	Significance Model (.05 level)
Intercept	0.007 (-0.059, 0.074)	-0.002 (-0.030, 0.025)	-0.004 (-0.032, 0.024)
External Factors	0.177 (-0.894, 1.258)	0.216 (-0.349, 0.781)	0.245 (-0.321, 0.811)
Internal Factors	0.295 (-0.443, 1.032)	0.304 (-0.113, 0.720)	0.241 (-0.198, 0.681)
Interaction	8.953 (-2.492, 20.299)	10.329* (2.696, 17.940)	11.703* (3.805, 19.630)
<i>N</i>	120	194	194
<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	0.335 (0.301, 0.342)	0.365 (0.345, 0.370)	0.370 (0.351, 0.374)

95% credible intervals are in parentheses

\* indicates significance at  $p < 0.05$

# Appendix C


## Results: Macro-Forces Model

	Ideology	Populism	Nativism	EU	Equal
Intercept	5.126* (4.839, 5.406)	0.159 (-0.058, 0.377)	0.078 (-0.132, 0.289)	5.359* (5.052, 5.661)	0.986* (0.876, 1.096)
Foreign-Born	0.020 (-0.743, 0.786)	-0.017 (-0.608, 0.570)	0.054 (-0.512, 0.620)	0.162 (-0.656, 0.978)	-0.172 (-0.470, 0.128)
Asylum Seekers	-0.006 (-0.555, 0.542)	0.305 (-0.116, 0.726)	0.210 (-0.198, 0.618)	0.174 (-0.412, 0.761)	-0.191 (-0.405, 0.023)
Unemployment Rate	-0.130 (-0.518, 0.258)	-0.092 (-0.387, 0.204)	-0.050 (-0.335, 0.237)	0.152 (-0.262, 0.566)	-0.087 (-0.237, 0.063)
Gini Coef	-0.035 (-0.365, 0.296)	0.255 (0.004, 0.506)	0.091* (-0.150, 0.334)	0.089 (-0.265, 0.443)	0.018 (-0.109, 0.146)
Interaction (ForBor:Unemp)	0.043 (-0.772, 0.863)	-0.234 (-0.862, 0.401)	-0.112 (-0.717, 0.502)	-0.185 (-1.060, 0.689)	0.237 (-0.084, 0.559)
<i>N</i>	28660	28660	28660	28660	28660
<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	0.002 (0.000, 0.010)	0.097 (0.021, 0.130)	0.015 (0.000, 0.024)	0.004 (0.000, 0.011)	0.001 (0.000, 0.014)

95% credible intervals are in parentheses

\* indicates significance at  $p < 0.05$

Figure 12: Interaction: Asylum:Unemployment on Equality





# Curriculum Vitae

**Michael A. Hansen**

Department of Political Science  
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee

## Education

Ph.D., Political Science, University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee, May 2016

*Exam Fields:* Comparative and American Politics

*Thesis:* Voting Radical Right in Europe: A Comprehensive Explanation for Vote Choice

*Committee:* Dave A. Armstrong (chair), Thomas M. Holbrook, Ora John Reuter, Natasha Borges Sugiyama

M.A., Political Science, University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee, May 2012

*Thesis:* The Populist Right-Populist Radical Right Distinction: Are Their Voters Actually Different?

*Committee:* Jennifer K. Smith (chair), Dave A. Armstrong, and Erin B. Kaheny

B.A., Political Science (Law Concentration), University of Wisconsin–Parkside, May 2010  
Cum Laude (with distinction in the major)

2010 Academic Achievement Award Winner (Political Science and Law)

*Thesis:* The British Election Game Changer: Labour’s Rise and Tory Decline

*Advisor:* Jonathan R. Olsen

Attended, Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research Summer Program in Quantitative Methods of Social Research, University of Michigan, Summer 2013  
Studied: Maximum Likelihood Estimation, Time-Series Analysis

## Peer-Reviewed Publications

Hansen, Michael A. *Forthcoming*. “Trust in the System? Factors that Impact Citizens’ View of Courts in the United Kingdom,” *Social Science Quarterly*.

Kaheny, Erin B., John J. Szmer, Michael A. Hansen, and Katherine Felix Scheurer. 2015. “High Court Recruitment of Female Clerks: A Comparative Analysis of the U.S. Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of Canada” *Justice System Journal* 36(4): 355-377.

Hansen, Michael A. 2015. “Explaining Deviations from the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP): Power, Ideology, Economic Need, or Diffusion?” *Journal of Public Policy* 35(3): 477-504.

## Working Papers

“Those Irrational Voter Wasters! Testing Competing Theories for Liberal Democratic Voting in the 2010 British General Election,” currently under review at *British Politics*.

“What to Expect When You’re Electing: The Relationship Between Far-Right Strength and Citizenship Policy in Europe.” currently under review at *Government and Opposition* (w/ Jennifer L. Clemens).

“Who is the Gatekeeper for the Party? The Impact of Supply-Side Factors on Radical Right Parties,” currently under review at *Journal of Politics*.

## **Academic Appointments**

Adjunct Instructor, Marquette University, Spring 2016 - Present

Graduate Instructor, UW-Milwaukee, Fall 2015 - Present

Project Assistant, (for Kathleen A. Dolan), May 2015 - July 2015

Graduate Teaching Assistant, UW-Milwaukee, January 2011 - Spring 2015

Adjunct Instructor in Politics, Carroll University, Fall 2013

Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) Summer Program Teaching Assistant, (for David A. Armstrong), June 2013 - July 2013

Associate Lecturer, University of Wisconsin - Parkside, Spring 2013 - Spring 2016

Project Assistant, (for Erin B. Kaheny), June 2012 - July 2012

Wilder Crane Project Assistant (for Thomas M. Holbrook), July 2011 - July 2012

## **Awards/Fellowships**

Advanced Opportunity Program (AOP) Fellowship, 2015-2016, \$15,000

AOP Conference Travel Grant, 2015-2016, \$1,000

Advanced Opportunity Program (AOP) Fellowship, 2014-2015, \$15,000

AOP Conference Travel Grant, 2014-2015, \$1,000

Advanced Opportunity Program (AOP) Fellowship, 2013-2014, \$14,000

UWM Political Science ICPSR funding, 2013, \$500

UWM Chancellor’s Graduate Student Award, 2012, \$4,500

## **Courses Taught**

POL SCI 106 Politics of the World’s Nations, UW-Milwaukee, Spring 2016

POL SCI 2201 American Politics, Marquette University, Spring 2016

POL SCI 100 American Politics, UW-Parkside, Spring 2016

POL SCI 106 Politics of the World’s Nations, UW-Milwaukee, Fall 2015

POL SCI 301 Politics of Developed Nations, Carroll University, Fall 2013  
POL SCI 103 Introduction to Comparative Politics, UW-Parkside, Spring 2013

### **Teaching Assistantships**

POL SCI 390 Political Data Analysis (for Clayton Clause), UWM, Spring 2015  
POL SCI 390 Political Data Analysis (for Sara Benesh), UWM, Fall 2014  
POL SCI 250 Law and Society (for Zachary Wallander), UWM, Spring 2014  
POL SCI 390 Political Data Analysis (for Kelly Gleason), UWM, Fall 2013  
Regression Analysis III: Advanced Methods (for David A. Armstrong), ICSPR, Summer 2013  
POL SCI 334 German Politics and the New Europe (for Jennifer K. Smith), UWM, Spring 2013  
POL SCI 104 Introduction to American Government (for Kathleen A. Dolan), UWM, Fall 2012 -Spring 2013  
POL SCI 425 Women and Politics (for Kathleen A. Dolan), UWM, Spring 2011  
POL SCI 464 Women and the Law (for Erin B. Kaheny), UWM, Spring 2011

### **Advanced Methodology:**

Regression Analysis III: Advanced Methods (for David A. Armstrong), ICSPR, Summer 2013  
POL SCI 702 Advanced Techniques of Political Science Research (for David A. Armstrong), UWM, Spring 2012

### **Discussion Sections Taught:**

POL SCI 104 Introduction to American Government and Politics (for Kathleen A. Dolan), UWM, Fall 2012  
POL SCI 104 Introduction to American Government and Politics (for Kathleen A. Dolan), UWM, Spring 2013

### **Lab Sections Taught:**

POL SCI 390 Political Data Analysis (for Sara Benesh), UWM, Fall 2014  
POL SCI 390 Political Data Analysis (for Kelly Gleason), UWM, Fall 2013

### **Conference Presentations**

“Who is the Gatekeeper for the Party?: Impact of Supply-Side Factors on Radical Right Parties.” Presented at the 2016 meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL.

“What to Expect When You’re Electing: The Relationship Between Far-Right Strength and Citizenship Policy in Europe.” Presented at the 2015 meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL. (w/ Jennifer L. Clemens).

“Followers of the Treaties? A Test of European Union Policy Deviations by Exploring the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP).” Presented at the 2014 meeting of the Midwest

Political Science Association, Chicago, IL.

“Those Irrational Voter Wasters! Testing Competing Theories for Liberal Democratic Voting in the 2010 British General Election.” Presented at the British Politics Group Section at the 2013 meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, IL.

“The Populist Right-Populist Radical Right Distinction: Are Their Voters Actually Different.” Presented at the 2013 meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL.

“The *Anti-Crowd*: Explaining ‘Populist Radical Right’ Support by Examining Party For Freedom (PVV) Voters.” Presented at the 2012 meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL.

## **Invited Lectures**

“German Historical Institutionalism: 1914-2015,” presented at UWM on 4 May 2015.

“Explaining Deviations from the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP): Power, Ideology, Economic Need, or Diffusion?” UWM Graduate Student Fellowship Celebration, 18 September 2014.

“Germany and World War II: Ideology, Institutions, and Economic Crises,” presented at Carroll University on 29 October 2013.

## **Methodological Training**

Maximum Likelihood Estimation, at ICPSR

Time-Series Analysis, at ICPSR

Advanced Regression Analysis, at UW-Milwaukee

Advanced Maximum Likelihood Estimation, at UW-Milwaukee

Applied Bayesian Modeling, at UW-Milwaukee

## **Manuscript Referee**

*Political Behavior* (2014)

## **Professional Experience**

Vice President, Political Science Graduate Student Association, UWM, 2014-2016

Urban Mayoral Elections Data Collection Project

Crane and Hagensick’s Wisconsin Government and Politics Project

Research Internship, *Argosy Foundation*, Summer 2014 - Present

## **Professional Memberships**

Midwest Political Science Association  
American Political Science Association

## **Computing Skills**

SPSS, L<sup>A</sup>T<sub>E</sub>X, R, STATA