

1967

The Truman-MacArthur Controversy -- A Reappraisal

Ronald Lee Walker

Eastern Illinois University

This research is a product of the graduate program in [History](#) at Eastern Illinois University. [Find out more](#) about the program.

Recommended Citation

Walker, Ronald Lee, "The Truman-MacArthur Controversy -- A Reappraisal" (1967). *Masters Theses*. 4223.
<https://thekeep.eiu.edu/theses/4223>

This is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Theses & Publications at The Keep. It has been accepted for inclusion in Masters Theses by an authorized administrator of The Keep. For more information, please contact tabruns@eiu.edu.

PAPER CERTIFICATE #3

To: Graduate Degree Candidates who have written formal theses.

Subject: Permission to reproduce theses.

The University Library is receiving a number of requests from other institutions asking permission to reproduce dissertations for inclusion in their library holdings. Although no copyright laws are involved, we feel that professional courtesy demands that permission be obtained from the author before we allow theses to be copied.

Please sign one of the following statements.

Booth Library of Eastern Illinois University has my permission to lend my thesis to a reputable college or university for the purpose of copying it for inclusion in that institution's library or research holdings.

Aug 3, 1967
Date

I respectfully request Booth Library of Eastern Illinois University not allow my thesis be reproduced because _____

Date

Author

THE TRUMAN-MACARTHUR CONTROVERSY--

A REAPPRAISAL

(TITLE)

BY

Ronald Lee Walker

THESIS

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR THE DEGREE OF

Master of Arts

IN THE GRADUATE SCHOOL, EASTERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY
CHARLESTON, ILLINOIS

1967

YEAR

I HEREBY RECOMMEND THIS THESIS BE ACCEPTED AS FULFILLING
THIS PART OF THE GRADUATE DEGREE CITED ABOVE

8/2/67
DATE

Aug 7 1967
DATE

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
INTRODUCTION	1
I. BUILDING A LEGEND	4
The Recall	
Military Career	
MacArthur and Korea	
Military Operations	
The Seeds are Sown	
II. MACARTHUR RETURNS	24
Political Reaction	
Foreign Reaction	
Press Reaction	
Public Reaction	
MacArthur Speaks To Congress	
III. SENATE HEARINGS	51
Testimony of General MacArthur	
Testimony of Secretary of Defense Marshall	
Testimony of the Joint Chiefs of Staff	
Testimony of Secretary of State Acheson	
IV. CONCLUSION	60
BIBLIOGRAPHY	62
APPENDIX	73

INTRODUCTION

The "Big Three" powers, the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union, had successfully worked together to bring about the defeat of Germany, and ultimately the end of World War II. If not fast friends and allies, the powers had at least worked together to achieve a common goal.

The post-war period, however, saw the end of this collaboration. The Soviet Union was no longer concerned about cooperating with the West. Soviet interest returned to its goal of elimination of the non-Communist nations. George Kennan, the State Department expert on the Soviet Union described the Soviet policy of expansion as:

a fluid stream which moves constantly, wherever it is permitted to move, toward a given goal. Its main concern is to make sure that it has filled every nook and cranny available to it in the basin of world power. But if it finds unassailable barriers in its path, it accepts these philosophically and accomodates itself to them. The main thing is that there should always be pressure, unceasing constant pressure, toward the desired goal. There is no trace of any feeling in Soviet psychology that the goal must be reached at any given time. ¹

Faced with this new Soviet challenge, the United States needed to develop a method of countering it. The countermeasure developed was a policy of "containment". It was a long term program

¹John W. Spanier, The Truman-MacArthur Controversy and the Korean War (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1965), p. 257.

of patient, but firm and vigilant resistance to Soviet moves. It did not have as its objective the destruction of the Soviet Union and its satellites, but the creation of a balance of power which would keep the Soviet Union's aggressive tendencies in check.¹

This new policy of containment, while successful in counter-
ing Soviet offensive moves was not popular in the United States. Since the founding of the United States and Washington's admonition not to become entangled in foreign alliances, Americans had looked upon domestic development as their primary concern. Any excursions into the realm of foreign affairs had been considered temporary diversions.

In the past when the United States had gone to war, it had been a noble crusade, a war to correct a moral wrong. The nation had harnessed its full war potential and had brought it to bear on the enemy who had diverted the United States' attention from the more important internal affairs. After the enemy had been crushed, the nation would once more turn it's full attention to domestic pursuits.

The containment policy, however, did not make such a clear cut distinction between war and peace. The United States found itself in a position where it could not completely withdraw to the world of domestic affairs, nor could it harness the full energy of its war machine and defeat the enemy.

Unfortunately for the Administration, however well the containment policy was working, all the public saw was the unexciting generalities of "collective security" and not a dynamic

¹Spanier, Controversy, p. 257.

presentation of comprehensive Western strategy.¹ Unlike the earlier United States adventures into the realm of foreign affairs, containment did not show any immediate and outward signs of success. Thus in the public's mind containment became equated with failure.

The United States involvement in the Korean War tended to point up even more dramatically the differences between the traditional policy and the policy of containment. Instead of committing the full military might of the nation to the complete and immediate destruction of the enemy, the Administration was fighting a "limited war". A war which the United States for all of its military might seemed unable to win. This lack of any measurable success in Korea resulted in a growing sense of public frustration. The event which brought this feeling of animosity to the surface was President Truman's dismissal of General MacArthur from his Far Eastern commands. Public reaction, as President Truman had anticipated, was immediate and vociferous. The President's action met with a storm of disapproval throughout the nation. Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to examine the public reaction to the recall of MacArthur and to determine the factors responsible for this reversal.

¹David Rees, Korea: The Limited War (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1964), p. 281.

I BUILDING A LEGEND

The Recall

"I deeply regret that..." and so it was that General of the Army Douglas MacArthur received the official order relieving him of all his commands.

It was the afternoon of April 11, 1951, and Senator Warren Magnuson and William Sterns, an airline official, were the guests of the MacArthurs at the American Embassy in Tokyo. During the luncheon Mrs. MacArthur was called to the door where she was told the news of the General's recall by one of MacArthur's aides, Colonel Sid Huff, who had just heard the news of the recall on the radio. Mrs. MacArthur took the news back to the General. Placing her hand on his shoulder, she whispered something in his ear. MacArthur turned, looked fondly at his wife and said, "Jeannie, we're going home at last".¹ Within a few minutes Colonel Huff returned, this time carrying a brown Signal Corps envelope that contained the order that relieved MacArthur of all his commands. After fifty-two years in the service, Douglas MacArthur ceased to be on active duty.

When the news of the General's recall became known in Tokyo, the first reaction among those on his staff was shock and anger.

¹Robert B. Considine, The Life of General Douglas MacArthur (Greenwich, Connecticut: Fawcett Publications, Inc., 1964), p. 96.

Although most of MacArthur's staff in Tokyo recognized the extent to which the differences between President Harry S. Truman and the General had gone, they did not believe that anything could be done to MacArthur.¹ Perhaps a reprimand for the General would be forthcoming, but there was, as they saw it, not much anyone could or would dare to do to MacArthur.

Later when questioned about MacArthur's reaction to the news of his recall, General Courtney Whitney said: "I have just left him. He received the news of the Presidents dismissal from command magnificently. He never turned a hair. His soldierly qualities were never more pronounced. This has been his finest hour".²

Shortly after the order of recall was received MacArthur's headquarters issued a public statement under General Whitney's signature outlining his view that MacArthur felt that he had complied with all directives from Washington. Friday, April 13, MacArthur's headquarters issued another statement to the effect that MacArthur had never advocated or considered extending the Korean War "except to the limited degree necessary" that would allow it to be ended honorably and with a minimum loss of life. MacArthur's military secretary General Whitney said, "Led by the Communist press, advocates of the general policy of appeasement have attempted to slant their propoganda to the effect that General MacArthur has been an advocate of war expansion. Nothing could be

¹William J. Sebald and Russell Brines, With MacArthur in Japan: A Personal History of the Occupation(New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1965), pp. 223-24..

²David Reese, Korea: The Limited War(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1964), p. 220.

further from the truth." ¹

General MacArthur later recalled the tenor of the dismissal message.

The actual order I received was so drastic as to prevent the usual amenities incident to the transfer of command, and practically placed me under duress. No office boy, no charwoman, no servant of any sort would have been dismissed with such callous disregard for the ordinary decencies. ²

Whitney commenting on the recall said:

I have never seen the order committing Napoleon to exile, but I dare say that it exuded greater warmth and was couched in terms reflecting higher honor than that which authorized MacArthur to spend the public funds necessary to take him to an oblivian of his own selection. ³

Military Career

MacArthur's career was a brilliant one and it was this brilliance that led to its end. During the 1940's MacArthur was permitted to become more than a soldier. When in 1950 Truman tried to place him in the position of a mere theater commander he could no longer fit. ⁴ In order to understand the effect of the career upon the man it is necessary to examine MacArthur's service record.

¹New York Times, April 13, 1951, p. 6.

²Douglas MacArthur, Reminiscences (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1964), p. 395.

³Courtney Whitney, MacArthur: His Rendezvous with History (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956), pp. 479-80.

⁴Ernest R. May, The Ultimate Decision: The President as Commander in Chief (New York: George Braziller, 1960), p. 207.

The Class of 1903 at the United States Military Academy contained among the other brand new second lieutenants a young Lieutenant Douglas MacArthur, the son of a Civil War hero, Lieutenant-General Arthur MacArthur.¹ Douglas MacArthur ranked first in his class with the incredible four year scholastic average of 98.14. For his first assignment he was sent to the Philippine Islands where he worked with the Army Corps of Engineers. It was there that MacArthur received his first battle experience fighting with the Moros who had been harrasing the Engineers and their crews as they tried to complete their work. In 1905, MacArthur, then a first lieutenant, was assigned to the Far East where he served as an aide to his father, who was the American military observer there. Between 1906 and 1914 MacArthur spent time at the White House as an aide to his father's good friend President Theodore Roosevelt. He quickly tired of the White House duty and was allowed to go with the United States expedition to Veracruz, Mexico in 1914, when the United States Army seized control of that city.

With the entry of the United States into the First World War, MacArthur, then a Major on staff duty, originated the idea of a "Rainbow Division" of National Guard troops from various states. Going over the heads of his superior officers, MacArthur sold the idea to Newton D. Baker, then Secretary of War. In 1917, MacArthur went with the "Rainbow Division" to France. At the end of the war,

¹For the biographical material the author has relied upon Robert Considine, The Life of General Douglas MacArthur; Clarke Newlon, The Fighting Douglas MacArthur; Douglas MacArthur, Reminiscences; "Tattoo for a Warrior," Life, April 23, 1951, pp. 30-33.

MacArthur, who had been wounded twice, won two Distinguished Service Crosses, eleven other decorations, seven citations for bravery, and twenty-four foreign decorations. He now held the rank of a brigadier general and was placed in command of a division.

At the age of thirty-nine he returned to the United States to become Superintendent of the United States Military Academy. In 1925, he served on the Billy Mitchell Court-Martial Board, and he later claimed to be the only one who cast a vote in favor of Mitchell.¹

At fifty, MacArthur, now the youngest Chief of Staff in history, experienced a period of extreme unpopularity when he personally supervised the disbanding of the Bonus Army when it marched upon Washington in 1932. He remained as Chief of Staff until December 15, 1935.

After his retirement from that post, MacArthur was loaned to the Philippine Islands as a military adviser. On August 24, 1936, he received another honor when he was made Field Marshall of the Commonwealth Army.

On July 26, 1941, just a little over four months before Pearl Harbor, Roosevelt recalled MacArthur to active duty with the rank of Lieutenant-General and the title of Commander of United States Forces in the Far East. Eleven days after the attack on Pearl

¹Billy Mitchell was an outspoken advocate of the use of air power. When the army did not accept his views on the value of air power, he became increasingly outspoken in his criticism of the military, climaxing in September 1925, when he publicly accused the war and navy departments of "incompetency, criminal negligence and almost treasonable administration of the National Defense." In December 1925, an army court-martial convicted him of insubordination and suspended him from rank and duty for five years. He resigned from the army on February 1, 1926.

Harbor, MacArthur gained his fourth star and became a full general on December 19, 1941.

In the Second World War MacArthur established himself as a legend in the South Pacific. On Bataan in early 1942, at the age of sixty-two, he suffered the first serious defeat of his career. Superior Japanese forces pushed MacArthur slowly down the Philippine peninsula until finally under orders from President Roosevelt, MacArthur and his family left Corregidor for Australia. Upon his arrival in Australia, MacArthur found waiting for him, the Congressional Medal of Honor, for his work in the Philippines and the five-star rank of General of the Army, as Supreme Commander, Allied Forces, Pacific.

In late 1942, MacArthur began his offensive drive to defeat the Japanese in the Pacific. Unable to pierce the powerful Japanese positions by a frontal assault, MacArthur resorted to a type of campaign popularly called "leapfrogging." This system of warfare avoided frontal attacks on enemy strongholds where possible. Instead, they were simply neutralized by cutting their supply lines, leaving the Japanese forces on the island helpless and starving. MacArthur describing his Pacific campaign said:

To successfully envelop the enemy called for the careful selection of key points as objectives and the choosing of the most opportune moment to strike. I accordingly applied my major efforts to the seizure of areas which were suitable for airfields and base development, but which were only lightly defended by the enemy. Thus, by daring forward strikes, by neutralizing and by-passing enemy centers of strength, and by the judicious use of my air forces to cover each movement, I intended to destroy Japanese power in New Guinea and adjacent islands, and to clear the way for a drive to the Philippines. ¹

¹MacArthur, p. 169.

Working his way back across the South Pacific, on October 20, 1944, MacArthur returned to the Philippine Islands just as he had promised.

On September 2, 1945, on the deck of the battleship Missouri, MacArthur accepted the "unconditional surrender" of Japan. He then became Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in Japan for five and one-half years. As the Supreme Commander in Japan, MacArthur was not the head of state, that title still belonged to the Emperor, but in point of fact, MacArthur assumed several of the functions of the head of state. Operating through the channels of the Japanese government itself, MacArthur was able to control Japanese political life, or even set the government aside and rule by direct military order if necessary. He had full authority to direct foreign policy, military policy, and military operations in Japan. MacArthur's powers were so broad in scope that he was actually de facto ruler of Japan.

Some of MacArthur's critics later contended that the vast powers he had exercised in Japan, coupled with the minimum regulation from Washington were partially responsible for his dismissal. They alleged that his direction of foreign policy, military policy, and military operations in Japan for such a long period of time left him incapable of distinguishing between the three areas and was thus indirectly responsible for his overstepping his authority in Korea.

MacArthur and Korea

It was a little after 10:00 p.m. Saturday, June 24, 1950, when President Truman received word of the surprise attack of the North Korean People's Army on the Republic of Korea. Word of the

attack had been flashed from Korea to Washington and then to Independence, Missouri, where the President had gone for the weekend. Then and there the United States was faced with two choices: it could allow the Communist government of North Korea to take over South Korea or it could act to repel the Communist aggressors. Truman chose to act--to meet the Communist challenge.

Truman saw Korea as a Soviet test of the Western determination to stand up to the Communist advances. President Truman felt that if South Korea were allowed to fall to Communism, the Communist leaders would gradually become bolder and bolder in their aggression until the world would be involved in a third world war.¹ Truman recalled that on the part of his advisers there was "complete, almost unspoken acceptance on the part of everyone that whatever had to be done to meet this aggression, had to be done."²

One of the key principles of the Truman Administration's foreign policy entailed major support of the United Nations and working closely with the European nations in matters of common defense.³ The North Korean attack was "the test of all the talk of the last five years of collective security."⁴ The State Department and the Defense Department, working closely together, developed, at the request of President Truman, a list of recommend-

¹Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, Vol. II: Years of Trial and Hope 1946-1952 (New York: Signet Books, 1965), p. 379.

²Ibid., p. 381.

³Louis W. Koeing (ed.), The Truman Administration: Its Principles and Practices (New York: New York University Press, 1956), p. 266.

⁴Truman, p. 381.

ations for meeting the North Korean attack. The question raised in high administration circles was not whether force would have to be employed, but how much force would be needed. During the first few hours of the fight it was thought that the Republic of Korea (ROK) forces, assisted by American Air Force and Naval units would be sufficient to repulse the North Korean attack. Since no one in Washington had a really clear picture of the situation in Korea, Truman ordered General MacArthur, Supreme Commander Allied Powers in Japan, to send a survey party to Korea to assess the situation and to estimate the amount of military aid which would be required.

When the news of the North Korean attack and the United States determination to meet it reached the public, President Truman's actions were widely acclaimed. Congressional and public opinion were squarely behind the President.¹ Although some Congressmen were to later challenge the constitutionality of Truman's actions, except for Robert A. Taft, there were no objections raised at the time.

By Monday, June 26, the collapse of the ROK forces was imminent unless something was done to help them. In a effort to bolster the sagging South Korean forces, President Truman ordered General MacArthur to use American air and naval power to support the ROK Army, but to limit the operations of the American forces to the area south of the 38th Parallel. MacArthur, on June 29, after personally flying to Korea on an inspection trip warned that unless American ground troops were sent to Korea to support the ROK

¹Eric F. Goldman, The Crucial Decade: America, 1945-1955 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956), pp. 157-58.

Army, it would be unable to hold the Communist forces at their present position at the Han River. President Truman immediately followed the general's recommendation and in a press release on June 30, President Truman announced that

he had authorized the United States Air Force to conduct missions on specific military targets in North Korea wherever militarily necessary and had ordered a Naval blockade of the entire Korean coast. General MacArthur has been authorized to use certain ground units. ¹

Following the President's policy of international cooperation, the United Nations had been informed of the situation in Korea and of the President's actions--which received much acclaim from U.N. members. Acting upon the urging of the American ambassador, a special meeting of the United Nations Security Council was called to deal with the Korean situation. On June 25, the Security Council passed a resolution that urged both parties to the conflict to stop fighting and to return to the status quo. When this resolution was ignored the United Nations took the next logical step in its efforts to maintain the peace. It, on June 27, called upon its members to "furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area." ² On July 7, the Security Council passed another resolution which created a unified command for those forces contributed as a result of the second United Nations resolution, and authorized the use of the United Nations Flag by this command. The resolution also asked that the

¹John W. Spanier, The Truman-MacArthur Controversy and the Korean War (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1965), p. 31.

²Ibid., p. 36.

United States designate the commander of the unified force and that it provide the Security Council with reports, as appropriate, on the course of action taken by this military command. Thus the American stand in Korea, supporting a new United States policy of containment, had become a crusade for collective security by the United Nations. Korea had resulted in a cooperative venture by the United States and the United Nations, a marriage of efforts, so to speak, for better or for worse.

It was only the absence of the delegate of the Soviet Union to the Security Council, due to a Soviet boycott of the world organization, that enabled it to take such speedy and forthright action. It did not become bogged down by the usual prolonged debate and ultimately the Soviet veto. Of course, when the Soviet Union returned to the Security Council they protested the action, calling it illegal. Their protests, however, were in vain, for just as the United States intervention had actually come before the United Nations resolution authorizing such action, the Soviet Union upon its return was presented with a fait accompli.

In response to the July 8 United Nations resolution, President Truman appointed General of the Army Douglas MacArthur Commander in Chief of the Unified Command.

Military Operations

Due to their careful preparation and the element of surprise, the North Korean forces had managed to push the South Korean forces to the southern end of the Korean peninsula and for a time it appeared that the ROK forces might be pushed off the peninsula alto-

gether.¹ As more United States forces became available and were sent into the Korean battleground the resistance to the North Korean Army stiffened and their offensive began to slow down until on August 5, 1950, it came to a halt. The United Nations forces had managed to stabilize a defense perimeter around the port of Pusan and the United Nations retreat had come to an end. The tide had begun to turn in favor of the United Nations as they gradually built up their forces until they were ready to launch a counter-offensive. On September 15, General MacArthur in a brilliant amphibious operation landed troops at Inchon, on the western coast of Korea, in a move that took the North Korean's by complete surprise.

MacArthur's forces then began to drive eastward across the peninsula. The North Korean troops surprised by the Inchon landings found themselves cut off and surrounded by the United Nations troops. Breaking ranks in large numbers, thousands of the Communist troops began surrendering to the U.N. forces; others began to run northward for the 38th Parallel and the safety north of it.

Turning northward, the U.N. forces quickly reached the 38th Parallel, the place where it had all started, on September 30. The United Nations was then faced with deciding whether to cross the Parallel and proceed into North Korea or not. The Chinese Communists had warned the United Nations that if U.N. forces entered North Korea, she would come into the war. This gave the United

¹For military history of the Korean War, the author has relied upon Eric Goldman, The Crucial Decade; Leland M. Goodrich, Korea: A Study of U.S. Policy in the United Nations; Cabell Phillips, The Truman Presidency: The History of a Triumphant Succession; David Reese, Korea: The Limited War; John W. Spanier, The Truman-MacArthur Controversy and the Korean War.

Nations cause for serious thought. General MacArthur's G-2 (intelligence section) said it felt that the Chinese Communists were only bluffing and that it did not believe that China would enter the war at this late stage with the defeat of North Korea eminent. On October 7, the United Nations passed a new resolution that indicated that the U.N. forces should proceed into North Korea. "All appropriate steps [should] be taken to ensure conditions of stability" in Korea.¹ With the immediate goal of repulsing the North Korean forces accomplished, the United States goal of a militarily united Korea came into sight.² The emphasis of the war had changed from a defensive one, that of defending the integrity of South Korea, to an offensive one in an effort to achieve a permanent change in the status quo.

The Chinese Communist government had announced several times, both publicly and privately that if the U.N. troops crossed the 38th Parallel that the Chinese people would not tolerate this foreign aggression. The U.N. troops, however, crossed the parallel and swept northward toward the Yalu River. The Chinese Communists, as they had warned they would do, began to send men into North Korea. Starting about October 14, the first of what was to eventually amount to around a third of a million men began to slip over the bridges at Antung and Manpojin and enter North Korea undetected.

Gradually the Chinese forces began to enter the fighting against the United Nations forces. Rumors of the Chinese forces engaging in the fighting had been floating about for some time

¹Rees, p. 101.

²Spanier, Controversy, p. 91.

so when news of these new Chinese Communist forces reached Tokyo, it was simply shrugged off as just another rumor. Even when some Chinese Communist soldiers were captured in battle, the possibility of large scale Chinese intervention was discounted.

The U.N. forces meanwhile continued to sweep northward meeting only minor resistance. On November 24, victory was in sight as MacArthur launched his last major offensive and was anticipating a quick clean up operation and having most of the boys home (MacArthur was referring to Japan for most of the U.S. soldiers) for Christmas dinner. The second day of the U.N. offensive was met with a massive Chinese Communist counterattack. Swarming over the U.N. forces in great numbers the Chinese forced the U.N. troops back, further and further until they managed to hold a defensive position a little to the south of the 38th Parallel.

The staggering losses in both men and equipment made MacArthur the subject of a great deal of public criticism in the United States. A man with MacArthur's outstanding service record should have been able to take such criticism in his stride, but he had developed what was almost a compulsion to maintain his record without a spot. Rationalizing to himself he found it easy to place the blame for his defeat on Washington.¹ Thus in November MacArthur released his first major verbal barrage against the Administration. On November 28, he sent a cablegram to Ray Henle of the Three Star Extra newsbroadcast. On November 30, he replied to a message from Arthur Krock of the New York Times. He sent a lengthy message to Hugh Baille, president of the United

¹Ibid., pp. 148-49.

Press and granted an interview to the editors of the U.S. News and World Report on December 1. He also sent messages to Ward Price of the London Daily Mail; Barry Faris, managing editor of the International News Service; and the Tokyo Press Corps. ¹

The Seeds are Sown

When President Truman appointed MacArthur as Commander in Chief of the United Nations forces in Korea he had unwittingly sown the seeds of the controversy that would later lead to his having to recall the General from command. Truman said:

From the very beginning of the Korean action, I had always looked at it as a Russian maneuver, as part of the Kremlin's plan to destroy the unity of the free world. NATO, the Russians knew, would succeed only if the United States took part in the defense of Europe. The easiest way to keep us from doing our share in NATO was to draw us into military conflict in Asia. We could not deny military aid to a victim of Communist aggression in Asia unless we wanted other small nations to swing into the Soviet camp for fear of aggression which, alone, they could not resist. At the same time, it served to weaken us on a global plane and that, of course, was Russia's aim. ²

MacArthur, on the other hand, saw Korea not as a side issue, but as the main event. He saw Asia as the center of the world wide struggle with Communism.

It seems strangely difficult for some to realize that here in Asia is where the Communist conspirators have elected to make their play for global conquest, and that we have joined the issue thus raised on the battlefield; that here we fight Europe's war with arms while the diplomats there still fight it with words; that if we lose the war to Communism in Asia, the fall of Europe is inevitable; win it and Europe most probably would avoid war and yet preserve freedom. ³

¹Ibid., p. 149.

²Truman, p. 496.

³MacArthur, p. 386.

He saw the war as providing the United States with a great opportunity to inflict a limited, but severe blow to the Sino-Soviet block while demonstrating American determination and power.¹

Even before the Chinese entered the war there was a certain amount of friction between the United Nations Commander in Tokyo and the President. General MacArthur was responsible for dealing with the military aspects of the Korean War; Truman, however, had to deal not only with this, but he also had to contend with the problems involved in preserving the support of the United Nations in Korea. The United Nations provided the shield of political respectability that justified the United States military presence in Korea.

On several occasions MacArthur had embarrassed the administration before the world by giving the impression that the United States spoke with two voices, a civilian one and a military one. This tended to confuse the allies and to make them all the more reluctant to follow the lead of American policy as time passed. They began to fear that the government could not control MacArthur and he might plunge the United Nations into an unwanted war.²

The first of MacArthur's **embarrassments to the administration** came with his visit to Formosa and Chiang Kai-shek. In late July, 1950, MacArthur went to Formosa to check on the Nationalist troops and their ability to defend themselves in the event of an attack from the mainland. After the visit MacArthur released a communique in which he expressed warm praise for Chiang and his displeasure at the unwillingness of the United States to make any use of

¹Spanier, Controversy, p. 266.

²Ibid., p. 267.

Chiang's forces.

Truman saw a need to make clear to MacArthur the United States policy, not only in Korea, but the overall global strategy. Thus on August 3, Truman sent Averell Harriman to Tokyo to "enlighten" MacArthur. After two days of discussion with MacArthur, Harriman returned to Washington. He said in his report to Truman that MacArthur had agreed with the United States decision to intervene in Korea, and that he would ultimately be able to destroy the North Korean forces. Harriman quoted MacArthur as saying that he did not believe either Communist China or the Soviet Union would help North Korea by entering the war directly. MacArthur again expressed his unhappiness over Washington's treatment of Chiang Kai-shek. Harriman, in his report, stated

For reasons which are rather difficult to explain, I do not feel that we came to a full agreement on the way we believed things should be handled on Formosa and with the Generalissimo. He accepted the President's position and will act accordingly, but without full conviction...¹

On August 26, MacArthur sent a message to the Veterans of Foreign Wars in which he outlined his program for a Far Eastern policy which was in complete opposition to that of the administration. He concluded his statement by implying that the administration's handling of Chiang Kai-shek was "appeasement".

Nothing could be more fallacious than the threadbare argument by those who advocate appeasement and defeatism in the Pacific, that if we defend Formosa, we alienate continental Asia.²

¹Walter Millis, Arms and the State: Civil-Military Elements in National Policy (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1958), p. 269.

²Vorin E. Whan, Jr. (ed.), A Soldier Speaks: Public Papers and Speeches of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur (New York: Frederick Praeger, 1965), p. 221.

The President ordered MacArthur to withdraw the statement, which he did immediately, but several of the news magazines had already printed it.

The next contact between the President and his Far Eastern Commander came in October when Truman flew to Wake Island for a conference with MacArthur. Truman hoped that he might have better luck in getting MacArthur to see the world picture.

Events since June had shown me that MacArthur had lost some of his contacts with the country and its people in the many years of his absence. He had been in the Orient for nearly fourteen years then, and all his thoughts were wrapped up in the East. I had made efforts through Harriman and others to let him see the world-wide picture as we saw it in Washington, but I felt that we had had little success. I thought he might adjust more easily if he heard it from me directly.¹

The actual meeting at Wake Island took place on Sunday, October 15. The actual conference didn't accomplish much. MacArthur restated his view that the Korean War would be over by Thanksgiving and that the Chinese would not come into the war against the United Nations.

The entrance of the Chinese Communists in the Korean War made a re-evaluation of United States policy in Korea necessary, for Congressional pressure against the President's foreign policy had been steadily mounting. It was at this time that General MacArthur began issuing statements calling for an expansion of the war against China and implying that the administration policy in Korea was one of appeasement.

On December 6, Truman issued an order to all government agencies that until further notice all speeches, press releases, or other public statements concerning foreign policy were to be cleared

¹Truman, p. 414.

with the State Department in advance; and that officials overseas were to clear all but routine statements with their departments.

Although he had received a directive against uncleared public statements, on March 7 MacArthur issued a public statement in which he complained of the "abnormal military inhibitions" and said that a "military stalemate was inevitable."

In late March the dispute between the President and his general came to a head. The Joint Chiefs of Staff advised MacArthur that the President was planning to announce that the United Nations was prepared to discuss conditions of settlement in Korea. On March 24, General MacArthur, fully aware of the forthcoming Presidential announcement, issued a statement in which he announced that he stood ready to meet in the field with the commander in chief of the enemy forces and he implied that if China did not admit that she had lost the war, the United Nations might increase the pressure on the Communist forces and press for a clearcut victory.

Upon hearing of MacArthur's statement, Truman became angry and he directed the Joint Chiefs to call General MacArthur's attention to the December directive. On April 5, Representative Joseph Martin, Jr. (R-Mass.), the House Minority Leader, made public a letter from MacArthur that seemed to agree with Martin's demand to use Nationalist Chinese troops to open a second front on the Korean War. It was at this point that President Truman decided that MacArthur had gone too far and would have to be removed from command. Between April 6 and 9, the President held conferences with top administration officials to see what they thought should

be done about MacArthur.¹

On April 10, President Truman officially relieved General MacArthur of all his commands.

¹"The Real Story of MacArthur: How and Why Mr. Truman Dismissed Him", U.S. News and World Report, April 20, 1951, p. 21.

II MACARTHUR RETURNS

Tuesday, April 10, the lights burned late in the office of the Presidential Press Secretary. His staff was busy contacting the White House reporters. They simply told the reporters that the White House would have an important announcement at 1:00 a.m.

Sharply at 12:56 a.m. on what was then Wednesday morning, Presidential Press Secretary Joe Short broke the news that President Truman had relieved General of the Army Douglas MacArthur of all of his commands.¹ Short read:

With deep regret I have concluded that General of the Army Douglas MacArthur is unable to give his wholehearted support to the policies of the United States Government and of the United Nations in matters pertaining to his official duties. In view of the specific responsibilities imposed upon me by the Constitution of the United States and the added responsibility which has been entrusted to me by the United Nations, I have decided that I must make a change of command in the Far East. I have, therefore, relieved General MacArthur of his commands and have designated Lieutenant General Matthew B. Ridgeway as his successor.

Full and vigorous debate on matters of national policy is a vital element in the constitutional system of our free democracy. It is fundamental, however, that military commanders must be governed by the policies and directives issued to them in the manner provided by our laws and Constitution. In time of crisis, the consideration is particularly compelling.

¹United Nations Commander; United States Commander in Chief, Far East; Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in Japan; Commanding General, United States Army, Far East.

General MacArthur's place in history as one of our greatest commanders is fully established. The nation owes him a debt of gratitude for the distinguished and exceptional service which he has rendered his country in posts of great responsibility. For this reason I repeat my regret at the necessity for the action I feel compelled to take in this case.¹

He then gave them a sheath of mimeographed documents containing copies of the actual order of recall sent to General MacArthur, the December 6 directive, the President's message of January 12 to the General, and other directives and memos bearing on the conflict. Then he told the reporters that the President would go on the air at 10:30 p.m. Wednesday evening to explain his action to the American people. The announcement took only seven minutes and then at 1:03 a.m. the reporters rushed to the telephones and filed the story with their offices. The next morning when the nation learned of the news, the reaction, as President Truman had anticipated, was immediate and loud.

Political Reaction

Representative Martin was awakened at 1:30 a.m. by an angry woman that had called from Connecticut to tell him how terrible she thought it was for President Truman to have done such a thing to General MacArthur. The call was the first Martin had heard of the news, but by 2:00 a.m. he had heard the news twice more. His second caller had been Congressman Dewey Short (D-Mo.) and the third a lady in Yakima, Washington. Congressmen and senators all over Washington were roused out of bed by reporters eager to get their reaction at the news of the dismissal. In most cases the official had not heard the news until the reporter told him of it. Some

¹Truman, p. 509.

officials like Carl Vinson simply hung up after having given the reporter a lecture on the time of the morning. Others, like Wisconsin's Senator Alexander Wiley, made typically non-committal statements such as, "Now is a time when we must weigh our words."¹ Still other prominent figures were less reserved in their comments.

Speaker of the House Sam Rayburn said that the military is subject to the control of the civilian administration and that we must never give up that idea. Republican Senator William Jenner was quoted as saying that impeachment of President Truman was the only choice left. General Dwight D. Eisenhower said that when one put on a uniform he automatically accepted certain inhibitions; he also expressed the hope that General MacArthur would not return to the United States and become a center of controversy.²

Senator Joseph McCarthy, speaking in Milwaukee, Wisconsin strongly implied that the President's decision was fogged with "bourbon and benedictine". "The son of a bitch," said McCarthy, although he later denied it, "ought to be impeached".³

Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt said that she did not think that a general should be allowed to make policy. Senator James H. Duff (R-Pa.) said that if MacArthur's dismissal was the only way to accomplish unity it had to be done, and that to permit a continued dispute as to authority and military policy during this period was unthinkable.⁴ Senator Richard M. Nixon (R-Calif.) stated that the dismissal of General MacArthur was an act of

¹"Tattoo for a Warrior," Life, April 23, 1951, p. 36.

²"What They Said," Time, April 23, 1951, p. 28.

³"Tattoo for a Warrior," Life, April 23, 1951, p. 37.

⁴"What They Said," Time, April 23, 1951, p. 28.

appeasement of the Communists and that the Senate should censure the President and demand the reinstatement of General MacArthur.¹ He said, "President Truman has given them just what they were after--MacArthur's scalp."²

The House of Representatives heard President Truman's action called "the greatest victory for the Communists since the fall of China." The Republican Policy Committee asked whether the Truman-Acheson-Marshall triumvirate was preparing for a "super-Munich" in Asia.³

Senator William Jenner went even further on the floor of the Senate when he charged:

This country today is in the hands of a secret inner coterie which is directed by agents of the Soviet Union. We must out this whole cancerous conspiracy out of our Government at once. Our only course is to impeach President Truman and find out who is the secret invisible government which has so cleverly led our country down the road to destruction.⁴

Former President Herbert Hoover sent the following message to MacArthur in Tokyo, "Fly home as quickly as possible before Truman and Marshall and their crowd of propagandists can smear you."⁵

Just as Congress was split over President Truman's action, state legislatures too were debating the recall.⁶

¹Rees, p. 222.

²"What They Said," Time, April 23, 1951, p. 28.

³Rees, p. 222.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Frazier Hunt, The Untold Story of Douglas MacArthur (New York: Deven-Adair Company, 1954), p. 518.

⁶New York Times, April 13, 1951, p. 5.

The Texas Legislature, in Austin, was considering a resolution that invited General MacArthur to address a joint session of the legislature. The resolution stated that the legislature needed and desired the information that the General could give it. The Wisconsin Senate by a voice vote concurred in an Assembly resolution which invited the General to address a joint session of the legislature. The predominately Democratic Florida House of Representatives defeated, overwhelmingly, a resolution introduced by the Republican minority, praising General MacArthur. The leader of the Democratic opposition was Representative Francis Williams, an Air Force sergeant on leave to serve in his elected capacity. Williams said that if he had done what MacArthur did he (Williams) could have been courtmartialed. He felt that the Republicans were backing MacArthur in an effort to get themselves a successful presidential candidate. In other state capitals around the nation legislative reaction was equally emotional, with the President's action being praised and damned.

Foreign Reaction

Among the most enthusiastic backers of President Truman's recall of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur were the nations of Europe, especially those allies with troops in Korea. Although some of the men on the street, when interviewed, agreed with the Duke of Marlborough, who in reply to reporters' questions replied that it had been done in a rather unceremonious fashion, the general feeling was one of approval of the President's action. The first reaction abroad on hearing of the recall was one of surprise, surprise that President Truman had dared to take such action against

a man of MacArthur's popularity with both members of Congress and the public. ¹

There had been a feeling of apprehension in Europe while MacArthur had been in a position where he could easily start the Third World War. The French did not seem to be so worried about what MacArthur might do as had been the British. The general feeling, however, was that the MacArthur recall might have saved the United States from complete diplomatic isolation, as well as keeping the United States out of some serious military difficulties. There was a feeling that the recall meant less chance of total war in Europe; and it was acknowledged as a sign that President Truman had given priority to the defense of Europe. ²

The British, on the other hand, gave a great sigh of relief upon hearing the news of the recall. They felt that MacArthur had been responsible for much of the anti-British feeling in the United States, and for much of the difficulty that plagued the Anglo-American partnership in Korea. To the British, MacArthur had appeared an arrogant procounsel that was flaunting American and United Nations policy. He appeared to be flirting with the idea of using Chinese Nationalist troops in an effort to extend the war in Korea and even to China proper, in direct opposition to the announced policy of the United States and the United Nations, which was to not extend the war, but to keep it confined to the Korean peninsula. ³

¹New York Times, April 15, 1951, IV, p. 5.

²Ibid.

³Ibid.

The only British journal of large circulation to take issue with Truman's action was the conservative Beaverbrook Daily Express--"Is he [General Ridgeway] also to be told by the Lake Success lollipops that he can do anything he likes to the Chinese except hurt them?...It is like asking Joe Louis to go into the ring with a pair of handcuffs on." ¹

The United Nations registered mainly praise and approval of President Truman's action. There the recall was seen as improving chances for peace, and as a positive step in the direction of gaining support for the United States policy on Korea and solidifying the United Nations stand on the Korean War. There were those who began hoping again that perhaps Red China would now be willing to negotiate on peace talks and an armistice. All foreign reaction to the recall, however, was not jubilation. There were expressions of sorrow from Japan and the Philippine Islands, where MacArthur was held in high esteem.

With the return of General MacArthur to the United States the tone of the European nations turned to that of bafflement, when instead of coming home to the United States in disgrace as an insubordinate Army officer that had been dismissed by his government, he received a hero's welcome. The jubilation with which he was received wherever he went caused a dwindling of any hopes for an early fade out of MacArthur and his ideas. They were, instead, replaced with a fear that the pressure of MacArthur and his public popularity might result in a change of the United States

¹Ibid.

policy of cooperation with the United Nations and the adoption of a unilateral policy along the lines advocated by the MacArthur faction in the government. ¹

Press Reaction

Probably one of the calmest groups in the United States on the subject of the MacArthur dismissal was the press corps. Surprisingly enough, even many representatives of the press usually critical of the President stood behind his action. Of New York City's six daily newspapers, four, the Daily News, the Mirror, the Journal-American, and the World Telegram and Sun took General MacArthur's side in the controversy. The New York Times and the Herald Tribune, on the other hand rushed to the defense of the President. ²

Working together, the New York Times, the Associated Press, and the United Press published a series of excerpts from editorial comment throughout the country, regarding the recall of General MacArthur. ³ The New York Herald Tribune stated that MacArthur had virtually forced his own removal. There was no room for a divided command in matters of high policy. A dangerous problem had been met in the only way possible. The New York Daily News said that the entire Korean War situation stunk to heaven and that MacArthur was the man best suited to inform the public about what was wrong in Korea. It was another of MacArthur's duties, one of many in a lifetime of loyal service, to tell the American public what needed to be done. The New York Compass spoke of the courage President

¹Ibid.

²Chicago Tribune, April 15, 1951, p. 24.

³The New York Times, April 12, 1951, p. 7.

Truman displayed in his long overdue removal of General MacArthur, thus ending his various attempts to sabotage the Administrations moves toward peace in Asia. The Newark Evening News said that the full implications of MacArthur's position were not realized by those who were looking at him through the "gleaming veil of laudable sentiment." There could not be two captains on the ship, and the President as Commander in Chief was right to act. The Louisville Kentucky Courier-Journal remarked that a stronger President would have removed MacArthur earlier, when it became clear that he would not limit himself to his military job. The only alternative to Truman's action would have been to surrender the power of the Presidency to a field commander. The Pittsburg Post Gazette saw MacArthur, through repeated insubordination, as forcing the issue. It continued, even those who felt that MacArthur's policy for the Far East was right should be able to see that he could not be allowed to go off in one direction while the administration moved in another. The Chicago Sun Times asserted that no general was bigger than the United States government or his Commander in Chief. It felt that MacArthur would get a hero's welcome which he deserved, but that was a great deal different than following him on a course that would lead inescapably to the Third World War. The St. Louis Post-Dispatch felt that the President made a choice which was both right and difficult. It was what MacArthur would have done to any subordinate officer who had made a practice of ignoring military orders from higher authority. It continued, the only difference was that General MacArthur would have done it after the first breach, he would not have waited to be goaded to act. In Seattle, the Times

called for the public to exercise calm and reasonable judgement and above all to remember that Harry Truman was President of the United States, not Douglas MacArthur.

Although the majority of the journalists and publishers tended to support President Truman, General MacArthur had his support in the press. David Lawrence of the U.S. News and World Report was inclined toward General MacArthur's position. Lawrence in one of his editorials referred to MacArthur as a symbol of hope that came out of the clouds of frustration and despair. He called the public receptions that MacArthur received a sign that the American public rejected an "unmoral [sic] and weak-kneed Administration that preaches defeatism even as it seeks by innuendoes and smears to persuade the American People...it...is just a disobedience of 'orders'." ¹ Life magazine, in one of its editorials supporting MacArthur, spoke of him as a man that understood the global interest of the United States and understood Asia and was highly respected there. It called MacArthur a man who was free to speak out and cut through the poisonous politics, the meanness and smallness of the last few months. ²

One of the most vociferous supporters of General MacArthur was the Chicago Tribune. The day after the announcement of General MacArthur's recall, the Tribune carried a front page editorial severely criticizing President Truman. The editorial was simply entitled "Impeach Truman", and it read:

¹David Lawrence, "Inviting World War III?", U.S. News and World Report, XXX (April 20, 1951), p. 76.

²"The Role of MacArthur", Life, April 23, 1951, p. 42.

President Truman must be impeached and convicted. His hasty and vindictive removal of Gen. MacArthur is the culmination of a series of acts which have shown that he is unfit, morally and mentally, for his high office.

Mr. Truman can be impeached for usurping the power of congress when he ordered American troops to the Korean front without a declaration of war. He can be impeached, also, for surrounding himself with grafters and incompetents. Of the grafters alone, there is a verified list as long as your arm.

Rep. Martin, speaking for Republican leaders in congress who conferred on the MacArthur dismissal, said that impeachments were discussed. He emphasized the plural. Mr. Truman's mean and small mind is under the domination of more sinister ones. His latest action is a victory for the Lattimores and Services, for Acheson, the friend and defender of the traitor, Hiss, and the British socialists, eager to sacrifice every principle to save their Hong Kong trade.

Every day that Mr. Truman remains in office menaces the safety of the United States and the lives of millions of its sons. The Democrats must put country above party.

Mr. Truman obviously acted with little more forethought than when he addressed a music critic in gutter language. Personal spite moved him. He is spiteful because Gen. MacArthur's recent statements have made it clear to the nation Truman's own folly and the moral bankruptcy of the United Nations.

Gen. MacArthur was fired because he said forcefully what the people of the United States are thinking. The nation is appalled. Not only will it support impeachment; it will demand it.

Except that they have been deprived of the leadership of the greatest soldier of this generation, the situation is not changed for the privates in the mud of Korea. Their officers are still tied by the directive of March 20, which Mr. Truman has now disclosed, forbidding advances in force beyond the 38th parallel. Stalin and his Chinese agents are given official assurance that they have sanctuary in North Korea from which to launch further attacks, while Mr. Truman's leaders try to scare congress into drafting more men and sending more troops to Europe.

The stage is now set to sell out to the Communists. Foreign Minister Morrison of Great Britain greeted the

news of Gen. MacArthur's dismissal with the statement that the way is now open for discussing a cease-fire in Korea. The bribe is ready. His government announced officially that it favors the "eventual" return of Formosa to Red China. Anything to save the Hong Kong trade.

The American nation has never been in greater danger. It is led by a fool who is surrounded by knaves. Impeachment is the only remedy. ¹

John Cowles, president of the Minneapolis Star and Tribune, speaking at the University of Missouri asked the question, "Would not qualified psychologists, regardless of their political views say that what we have been witnessing in the United States in the last couple of weeks is what took place in Germany and Italy not too long ago for some of us to remember?" ²

The July 14, 1951, issue of the Saturday Review of Literature carried a survey of the reaction of news correspondents to the MacArthur dismissal. ³ According to the survey the correspondents, by more than six to one, believed that Truman was right in relieving MacArthur of his commands. One of the reporters said that President Truman was absolutely justified in removing MacArthur and that MacArthur had been writing his own foreign policy with almost treasonous disregard for the administration policy and his Commander in Chief. Several other reporters said that they had begun to question MacArthur's competence in his handling of the

¹Chicago Tribune, April 12, 1951, p. 1.

²New York Times, May 5, 1951, p. 9.

³Elmo Roper and Louis Harris, "The Press and the Great Debate", Saturday Review of Literature, XXXIV (July 14, 1951), pp. 6-9, 29-31.

war; that his ability as a commander had become questionable.¹

Life correspondent John Dominis, writing from Korea, summed up this feeling when he said:

Truman was right not only because of MacArthur's differences of opinions with the Joint Chiefs but because of his Yalu River mistake, his aloofness with the troops, which failed to inspire them, and his complete non-concern over the moral of his troops. His one man show inspired few in his command.²

Many of the Washington correspondents not only agreed with the recall, but felt that Truman should have acted earlier in recalling MacArthur. MacArthur, they felt, had been creating a serious division among allied powers and therefore had to go; but most reporters felt that Truman could have chosen a more tactful way of removing MacArthur.

Several of the reporters expressed the view that MacArthur had not been entirely honest in his public statements. Another said that MacArthur had come dangerously close to deliberate deception in presenting his case to the American people before Congress and the Committee.

The vast majority of the press urged a calm, deliberate consideration of the facts of the matter, and issued a plea to avoid the ~~overemotional~~ fever of the moment.

Public Reaction

The reaction of the press and Congress were minor in comparison to the storm once the news of the General's recall reached the public. There have been few political events in American history

¹Ibid., p. 7.

²Ibid., pp. 6-7.

which have caused as explosive or as extensive a public reaction as did the recall of General MacArthur. A minority of the people immediately supported President Truman's action, but by far the large majority of the population thought Truman's recall of MacArthur showed signs of "insolence, jealousy, vindictiveness, and some even considered it a sacrilege."¹

The White House and members of Congress were almost immediately swamped with the deluge of telegrams and telephone calls that began to pour in shortly after the public learned of the recall. Senator Richard Nixon of California got more than six hundred telegrams on the first day, most of which were in favor of impeachment of Truman. In less than twenty-four hours the White House alone had received 1700 telegrams, running three to one against the recall. While the most immediate public reaction was opposed to the President's action, on April 16, the White House announced that the trend of the mail had changed and now the letters ran only three to two against Truman.² The White House then announced on April 25, that the President was gaining in support and the mail was then fifty-two per cent in favor of the General and forty-eight per cent in favor of the President.³

The first public response as had been expected, was sharply

¹Phillips, p. 344.

²"MacArthur Homecoming", Facts on File, April 13-19, 1951, p. 122.

³"MacArthur-China Controversy", Facts on File, April 20-26, 1951, p. 129.

divided and highly emotional.¹ The reaction of the man on the street, unlike his representative on Capitol Hill did not follow strictly along party lines. A New York Times survey indicated that in the Northeast the first wave of emotion was strongly favorable to the General and highly critical of the President. The Middle West like the Northeast generally supported the General. In Omaha twenty-three out of twenty-five persons interviewed on the street supported MacArthur. In Chicago, while the feeling did not run quite so strongly, the public temper did run slightly in favor of MacArthur. The Southern portion of the country seemed to be more favorable to Truman. A sample of public opinion in Richmond, Virginia, showed the margin of public support for the President was about two to one. The Pacific coast which is more sensitive to Asian policy registered feelings of shock and regret at losing such a great military commander.

Various demonstrations of support for the General occurred around the country. In San Gabriel, California, among other places, a group of college students hung Truman in effigy from a flag pole. At Little Rock, Arkansas, MacArthur's birthplace, the flag was lowered to half-mast when the news was received.

Telegrams were the order of the day. A minister in Houston, Texas, started dictating a telegram on the telephone, he got as far as "Your removal of General MacArthur is a great victory for Joseph Stalin..." and then he dropped dead. One rather emotional lady in Charlestown, Maryland, started to send a telegram calling

¹New York Times, April 15, 1951, IV, p. 5.

Truman a "moron", but she was censored by Western Union--finally she and the company settled on using the word "wilting".¹

One Los Angeles newsman doing on the street interviews was turned into a straight man during one of his interviews. The man being interviewed commented he was going out for a Truman beer. The announcer quarrried "What kind of beer is that?" The man replied, "Just like any other beer--except it hasn't got a head."

In Los Angeles a man and his wife got into an argument over the MacArthur recall and ended with the man hitting his wife over the head with a radio. A group of Chicago mothers whose sons had been fighting in Korea, under MacArthur, paraded around with open umbrellas on which they had printed "Impeach Truman" and "Our boys in Korea need MacArthur." In Atlanta, Georgia, a former soldier got so mad that he took a Bronze Star which he had received from Truman, wrapped it up in the citation and mailed it to the White House.

Another indignant man, sixty-five year old Halsey McGovern, refused to accept the Medal of Honor bestowed on one of his two sons that had died in Korea, on the grounds that Truman was unworthy to bestow it.

When MacArthur's plane, the Bataan, touched down in San Francisco on Tuesday, April 17, he received a tremendous greeting as he sat foot on his native soil for the first time since 1937. Speaking at the airport he said, "The only politics I have is

¹"Tattoo for a Warrior", Life, April 23, 1951, p. 36.

²Ibid.

³Ibid., p. 37

contained in the simple phrase known well by all of you: God bless America".¹

Thursday morning at a few minutes after midnight the MacArthur party reached Washington and twelve thousand hysterical well wishers at National Airport broke through police lines and made a shambles of the official welcome.

New York City, which is famous for the greetings it gives public officials and heroes, out did itself in welcoming MacArthur home. The reception it accorded was greater than that given Lindberg or Eisenhower, it was even larger than the one on V-J Day. Torn paper fell until some of the streets were ankle deep, on some parts of the parade route the paper was coming down so heavily that television cameras taking pictures of the parade could on occasion get pictures of nothing but white blurs. As MacArthur's limousine passed several men and women were seen to cross themselves.²

An anonymous Southern Senator commented "The people in my part of the country are almost hysterical, but there is nothing whatsoever to do in this instance but to stand with Truman. It is simply a question of whether civil government is to be maintained."³

The American Legion went on record as being opposed to the recall of MacArthur. They said it was terrible to put a man in the position where he was responsible for men's lives, tie his hands, and then fire him for complaining. Other veteran groups, however, did express support for the President's actions. The Amvets and the American Veterans Committee supported Truman because they felt

¹Phillips, p. 347.

²Goldman, p. 205.

³Rees, p. 223.

that MacArthur had displayed repeated insubordination in violating the basic American principles governing civil-military relations.¹

Not even the churches were immune to the raging controversy. The Vatican paper l'Osservatore Romano said that President Truman's action showed a desire for peace.

The letters to the editor section of most newspapers was receiving all the mail they could possibly handle, and then some. Some readers wrote heated **denunciations** of one side or the other of the issue, others sent more clearly thought out comments on the problem. One reader wrote, "Sure General MacArthur spoke out of turn and thank God he did ! If you were facing the enemy with your hands tied behind your back you, too, would speak out."² Another reader commented that the most urgent need of the United States was for two ex-Presidents. One wrote:

I imagine that General MacArthur had Mao pretty worried until our State Department made it clear that he had nothing to worry about. What next? It is surprising that no one has suggested the abolishment to the State Department. Its function could be better administrated by the Army or the Boy Scouts or by me.³

Not all of the letters were opposed to the Administration and its policies. A Chicago lady wrote that MacArthur had been tied up with the Pacific for so long that he was no longer able to evaluate the world wide problems of today. One letter referred to MacArthur as a "would-be American Hitler" and his desire to plunge the United States into an atom bomb war.

By late May 1951, the letters to the editor began to change

¹New York Times, April 12, 1951, p. 5.

²Chicago Tribune, April 14, 1951, p. 8.

³Time, April 23, 1951, p. 6.

in their emphasis. Gradually at first and then in increasing numbers the readers began to point out that several of the Republicans who were attacking the Administration were getting on pretty shaky ground in some of their charges. After the Senate hearings the emphasis of the letters on the Far East seemed to be primarily concerned with bringing the war to a conclusion.

Throughout the hue and cry for his scalp, President Truman remained calm. He confided to friendly reporters that he had expected the immediate reaction to the recall to be both loud and favorable to MacArthur. But he felt that slowly, as the facts came to light, the public would come to realize that he was only striving to preserve peace.

Just as though he were on trial in a court of law, Truman planned for the defense of his foreign policy in the court of public opinion. The stage on which he would present his case was the Senate hearings, and his main witnesses were to be the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In their testimony, the service chiefs hammered on two main points. They said that MacArthur, by his actions was challenging the concept of civilian control of the military, and that some of the moves he was advocating were "tragically wrong." They emphasized that in their opinion MacArthur's program would involve the United States in a full scale war with Red China (and possibly the Soviet Union). A war which they felt the United States could not afford to enter.

MacArthur Speaks to Congress

Shortly after his return to the United States, MacArthur began

a crusade, a crusade aimed at stirring the American people to action to right national wrongs. He saw the dangers menacing the land and the people he loved and felt that not to speak, not to warn them would be a betrayal of their belief in him. ¹

The first step in MacArthur's crusade, even though he did not describe it as a crusade at this time, was his address to Congress.

With due pomp and ceremony MacArthur entered the House chambers as the House Doorkeeper announced, "Mr. Speaker, General of the Army Douglas MacArthur." ² To the applause of the members of Congress and those present in the galleries MacArthur entered the chamber and took his place before the microphones. Arthur, the General's young son and a line of officers who had served with MacArthur sat in a row of chairs normally reserved for the Cabinet during a joint session, but there were no Cabinet members present at this session. At first glance, it appeared more as if there were to be an address by a chief of state of a foreign nation rather than a relieved Army officer. "Mr. President, Mr. Speaker, distinguished Members of Congress...I address you...with but one purpose in mind, to serve my country." ³ As he spoke MacArthur projected a powerful image, a man in complete control of the situation. His bearing was dignified and upright, his delivery was stern and unhurried, the urgency of the message combined with his use of the dramatic pause produced a speech which had a great effect on those who heard it. ⁴ In his address he attacked the Administration's

¹Whitney, p. 490.

²Spanier, Controversy, p. 215.

³Ibid.

⁴Ibid., p. 216.

policy as appeasement by those who were blind to the lessons of history. He reiterated his support for the Chiang government. He said that the intervention of the Communist Chinese into the Korean War made it an entirely new war. New political decisions which were needed for the adoption of a realistic military policy were not forthcoming. He reiterated his four basic proposals whose adoption, he said, would win the war in Korea for the United States. MacArthur closed his address with what some cynics called corn, but whatever it was called it made an impression on his audience,

I am closing my 52 years of military service. When I joined the Army, even before the turn of the century, it was the fulfillment of all my boyish hopes and dreams. The world has turned over many times since I took the oath on the Plain at West Point, and the hopes and dreams have long since vanished. But I still remember the refrain of one of the most popular barrack ballads of that day, which proclaimed, most proudly, that "Old soldiers never die. They just fade away."

And like the old soldier of that ballad, I now close my military career and just fade away--an old soldier who tried to do his duty as God gave him the light to see that duty. Goodbye. ¹

As MacArthur finished his speech he handed his manuscript to the House Clerk, waved to his wife sitting in the galleries and walked toward the exit. The applause following his speech was thunderous. Several Congressmen had tears in their eyes, others were even more emotional. MacArthur's was a well polished and well practiced speech, and it achieved the desired effect. Representative Dewey Short later said in the House, "We heard God speak here today, God in the flesh, the voice of God..." Herbert Hoover refraining from going quite that far saw MacArthur as a "reincarnation

¹Whan, p. 252.

of St. Paul into a great General of the Army who came out of the East." One of the Senators who was supporting the administration said "this is a new experience; I have never feared more for the institutions of the country. I honestly felt that if the speech had gone on much longer there might have been a march on the White House." ¹

Millions of people who had seen the speech on television or who had listened on radio turned off their sets in a state of high emotion. The public had been aroused to fever pitch once again by the speech.

Although the speech was hailed as a masterpiece, it really didn't change anyone's mind. It only made those who were already supporting MacArthur sure that they were right as it did with those supporting the Administration.

After his address to Congress, MacArthur did not fade away. In fact it would not have been in character for MacArthur to have done so. Following his testimony to the Senate committee, he began a nationwide crusade "to revitalize the nation and save the freedom of representative government in America" or a "vendetta" was the name given to it in Democratic circles. ²

Speaking to the Texas Legislature, June 13, 1951, MacArthur spoke of the moral decay in the United States.

I have been amazed, and deeply concerned, since my return, to observe the extent to which the orientation of our national policy tends to depart from the traditional courage, vision and forthrightness which has animated

¹Rees, p. 227.

²Goldman, p. 206.

and guided our great leaders of the past, to be now largely influenced, if not indeed in some instances dictated, from abroad and dominated by fear of what others may think or others may do. Never before in our history can precedent be found for such a subordination of policy to the opinions of others with a minimum regard for the direction of our own national interest. Never before have we geared national policy to timidity and fear. The guide, instead, has invariably been one of high moral principle and the courage to decide great issues on the spiritual level of what is right and what is wrong. Yet, in Korea today, we have reached that degree of moral trepidation that we pay tribute in the blood of our sons to the doubtful belief that the hand of a blustering potential enemy may be some way be thus stayed. Munich, and many other historical examples, have taught us that diplomatic appeasement but sews the seeds of future conflict. Yet, oblivious to these bloody lessons, we now practice a new and yet more dangerous form of appeasement--appeasement on the battlefield whereunder we soften our blows, withhold our power, and surrender military advantages, in apparent hope that in some nebulous way by so doing a potential enemy will be coerced to desist from attacking us. ¹

Before the Massachusetts Legislature, MacArthur warned:

insidious forces working from within which have already so drastically altered the character of our free institutions--those institutions which formerly we hailed as something beyond question or challenge--those institutions we proudly called the American way of life. ²

He also voiced deep concern about:

a new and heretofore unknown and dangerous concept that the members of our armed forces owe primary allegiance and loyalty to those who temporarily exercise the authority of the executive branch of Government, rather than to the country and its Constitution which they are sworn to defend. ³

¹Whan, pp. 263-64.

²Douglas MacArthur, "As MacArthur Sees the Issues--Resistance to Communism, to Excessive Taxation, Bureaucratic Government and Corruption," U.S. News and World Report, August 3, 1951, p. 55.

³Ibid. p. 56.

He said that the administrations policy of reckless spending and overtaxation was stifling the American spirit.¹

In a speech delivered to the American Legion National Convention at Miami, MacArthur accused the Administration of squandering United States resources in Korea and of not really wanting to win the war there. He said:

Despite some public statements to the contrary, there is reason to fear that it is still the overriding purpose of some of our political leaders, under the influence of allies who maintain diplomatic ties with Communist China, to yield the island of Formosa at an opportune time to the Chinese henchmen of international Communism.

There is little doubt that the yielding of Formosa and the seating of Communist China in the United Nations was fully planned when I called upon the enemy commander in Korea on March 24 to meet me in the field to arrange armistice terms. This I did in view of the fundamental weakness of his military position due to the lack of an industrial base in China capable of supporting modern warfare.²

He condemned the Administration for leading the nation down the road to socialism and economic disaster. He called for a stronger United States committment in Korea to support the American troops there and an end to the useless slaughter.³

It was in Seattle, Washington, on November 13, 1951, that MacArthur delivered his sharpest attack to date on the Truman Administration. He called upon Americans to change the national leadership. He accused the Administration of blundering toward a third world war and of contributing to the building up of Soviet military strength and for the victory of the Communists in China.

¹Ibid., p. 55.

²"MacArthur's Program for U.S.," U.S. News and World Report, October 26, 1951.

³Ibid., p. 85.

He again repeated his charge that the Administration was allowing the country to drift toward socialism and was pursuing a ruinous spending and taxing policy. Many Democrats in the audience considered the speech so strong and so partisan that they got up and walked out when MacArthur was only mid-way in his speech. Several of them even refused to show up at a ceremony welcoming a shipload of Korean veterans home at which MacArthur was to be present. The next evening at a dinner when asked to speak he replied that his wife had told him he had talked enough in Seattle. ¹

Throughout his speaking tour MacArthur implied that the British and some of our "so called" allies were responsible for this recall and that it was part of a global plot. ² He said that there were no reasons for his dismissal and that in retrospect, it must seem that all of the Administrations "reasons" masked something deeper.

As time passed MacArthur broadened the basis of his opposition to the Administration. He moved from his attack on Far Eastern policy to attacking the whole of American foreign and domestic policy. The emphasis of MacArthur's challenge had changed, what had originally been the key issue--whether the Communist threat was to be countered principally in Europe or in Asia--had become an issue of minor importance. ³

¹"The General in Seattle", Time, November 26, 1951, pp. 24-25.

²Richard Rovere, The American Establishment and Other Reports, Opinions, and Speculations (New York: Harcourt, Brace, & World, Inc., 1962), p. 231.

³Richard Rovere and Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., The MacArthur Controversy and American Foreign Policy (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1965), pp. 220-21.

The more MacArthur talked the more he sounded like a candidate for public office.¹

Courtney Whitney describing MacArthur's crusade said that the light in the eyes and the fervent expression of friendship were identical in California, New York, Texas, Massachusetts, and Mississippi. "It was one great powerful manifestation of the American public's belief that MacArthur had been brutally wronged by the manner of his dismissal, that he deserved the greatest hero's welcome of all, that--to put it bluntly--MacArthur was right and Truman wrong."²

On his tours of the United States MacArthur appeared in city after city posing with his wife and son, exemplifying what he called "the simple, eternal truths of the American way." MacArthur stood for what Eric Goldman so aptly labeled an "Older America." His speeches were loaded with sort of grandiose patriotism more typical of the America of the early 1900's. His speeches were vaguely reminiscent of the era of William Jennings Bryan.³

MacArthur in his speeches spoke for an older America, an America in which things did not move quite so quickly. Like many other Americans, MacArthur, who had been away from the United States for fifteen years, was frightened and confused by the rapidly

¹"Eyes on MacArthur", Newsweek, June 25, 1951, p. 17.

²Whitney, p. 282.

³Goldman, p. 207-08.

changing United States to which he had returned.¹ This was not the America that he remembered. MacArthur had proved to be out of touch with the changing face of the United States, and even more important he was out of touch with the **temperament** of the American people and their changed attitude.

¹Ibid.

III SENATE HEARINGS

Within a short time after President Truman announced the recall of General Douglas MacArthur from his Far Eastern posts, the Republican members of Congress began to demand a full-scale investigation into the Administration's Far Eastern policy. After much discussion it was agreed that the hearings would be conducted by the combined Senate Foreign Relations Committee and Armed Services Committee, with Senator Richard Russell (D-Ga.) acting as chairman. The committee opened its investigation on May 3, 1951.

Testimony of General MacArthur

The first witness to appear before the Senate committee was the former Far Eastern Commander. At the opening of his testimony MacArthur said that he had no prepared statement to make. He emphasized that he was appearing "not as a voluntary witness at all, but in response to request of the committee."¹

In his testimony the General accused the Truman Administration of having no definite plan for Korea, except to continue the war

¹U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services and Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings on the Military Situation in the Far East and the Facts Surrounding the Relief of General Douglas MacArthur from his Assignment in that Area, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1951, Part 1, p. 3. (Hereafter cited as Hearings.)

without victory and at a heavy cost in American lives. He said that the war would be won if all the wraps were taken off the air and sea forces. By bombing the Chinese supply bases in Manchuria and China, using a naval blockade to cut off incoming supplies, and making use of the Chinese Nationalist forces available, the war could be turned to favor the United Nations forces. ¹ MacArthur stated that so far as he knew the position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and his were practically identical. He supported as evidence a study that the Joint Chiefs presented to the Secretary of Defense on January 12, which included his four points for action in Korea. He said that so far as he knew the Joint Chiefs had never changed their recommendations. ² When questioned further about the Joint Chiefs' support for his policies MacArthur said that he had received no other information from the Chiefs either collectively or individually. While MacArthur admitted that he had not received any evidence either in writing or orally of the Joint Chiefs' support he said that so far as he knew they had never taken any position which was in contradiction to the position of January 12. ³

MacArthur said that he knew of no military commander in history who had weapons at his disposal which would probably be decisive in causing a favorable end to a war who did not use them. ⁴

¹"MacArthur Testimony," Facts on File, May 4-10, 1951, p. 146.

²Hearings, Part 1, p. 13.

³Ibid., p. 48.

⁴Ibid., p. 60.

Under questioning from Senators Wayne Morse and Russell McMahon, the General stated that he believed that what the United Nations did in the war would not affect the question of Soviet intervention. He said that if the Soviet Union decided that she had more to gain by letting conditions remain as they were and decided not to attack the West, then whatever the United Nations chose to do in Asia would not cause the Soviet Union to change her mind. If, however, the Soviet Union felt that war with the Western powers must come sooner or later then what was done in Korea could cause a shift in the Soviet timetable.¹ If this were to happen, however, it would be to the advantage of the United States since Russia would have to make her move before she was completely prepared.

MacArthur took another swipe at the Administration's policy of limited war, calling it appeasement. He said that a nation went to war when all other political means had failed and that when men became locked in battle, there should be no artifice under the name of politics that handicapped your own men and decreased their chances of winning.²

Testimony of Secretary of Defense Marshall

One point that the Secretary of Defense made clear from the first of his testimony was that the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not

¹Ibid., pp. 9, 67, 75.

²Millis, Arms and the State, pp. 324-25.

agree with MacArthur as MacArthur had contended they did.

From the very beginning of the Korean conflict down to the present moment, there has been no disagreement between the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff that I am aware of.

There have been, however, and continue to be basic differences of judgement between General MacArthur, on the one hand, and the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the other hand.¹

Marshall told the Senators that the United Nations forces were inflicting terrific casualties on the Chinese Reds and that the Reds would eventually be forced to the conference table, for they could not afford to keep throwing away their best Army units as they were now doing. He stated his belief that the war in Korea must remain as limited as possible, that direct attacks on China would be defeating the United States' own policy by increasing the rate of casualties, broadening the war, and giving the Soviet Union a very legitimate reason for entering the war, in view of the Sino-Soviet defense agreements. He expressed his belief that the danger of Soviet intervention was very real and eminent possibility.²

Speaking of General MacArthur's recall, Marshall said that it was no one statement in particular that brought it about, but an accumulation of statements challenging Washington's policy and disrupting Allied cooperation which made the recall necessary. Marshall also said that the United States was strongly opposed to allowing Red China to take control of Formosa or to shoot her

¹Hearings, Part 1, p. 323.

²"Marshall's Testimony," Facts on File, May 4-10, 1951, pp. 146-47.

way into the United Nations. He expressed confidence that the war in Korea, while being unlikely to end as a military triumph, would end satisfactorily. ¹

Testimony of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Speaking of MacArthur's plan to expand the war to Red China,

Omar Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff² said:

Red China is not the powerful nation seeking to dominate the world. Frankly, in the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, this strategy would involve us in the wrong war, at the wrong place, at the wrong time. ³

He implied that the real enemy of the United States was the Soviet Union, and that nothing would suit it better than to see the United States become bogged down in an Asian land war. In this manner, he said, the Soviet Union could tie up the United States forces, while at the same time leaving their military might unencumbered. It was, he stated the opinion of the Joint Chiefs that the United States policy should be to wear out the enemy by inflicting heavy losses on their army in Korea and avoid any risk of becoming in-

¹Ibid.

²The Joint Chiefs of Staff whose function it is to advise the President on military matters and to work with the National Security Council to prepare, maintain, and coordinate the military programs of the United States, consists of the Chief of Staff for each of the services. The Joint Chiefs of Staff is composed of General of the Army Omar N. Bradley, Chairman; General J. Lawton Collins, Chief of Staff, United States Army; General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Chief of Staff, United States Air Force; Admiral Forrest P. Sherman, Chief of Naval Operations.

³Hearings, Part 2, p. 732.

volved in a bigger war.¹ Bradley also clarified the part played by the Joint Chiefs in the recall of MacArthur. He said that the Joint Chiefs never charged MacArthur with insubordination. They did not suggest his dismissal, but from a military point of view they concurred in his dismissal because his statements showed that he was not in favor of the decision to limit the war to Korea; he failed to comply with a Presidential directive to clear policy statements in advance; and his actions were continuing to jeopardize civilian control of the military and it was necessary to have a commander more responsive to control from Washington.² In his testimony Bradley answered MacArthur's charge of "appeasement":

From a military viewpoint, appeasement occurs when you give up something, which is rightfully free, to an aggressor without putting up a struggle, or making him pay a price. Forsaking Korea--with-drawing from the fight unless we are forced out--would be appeasement to aggression. Refusing to enlarge the quarrel to the point where our global capabilities are diminished is certainly not appeasement but is a militarily sound course of action under the present circumstances.³

General Vandenberg, in his testimony, said that MacArthur was wrong in thinking that Red China could be bombed out of the Korean War. He said

Air power, and especially the application of strategic air power, should go to the heart of the industrial centers to become reasonably efficient. Now, the source of the material that is coming to the Chinese Communists and the North Koreans is from Russia. Therefore, hitting across the Yalu, we could destroy or lay waste all of Manchuria and the principal cities of China if we utilized the full power of the United States Air Force...In doing

¹"MacArthur Controversy", Facts On File, May 18-24, 1951, p. 162.

²Ibid., p. 163.

³Hearings, Part 2, p. 733.

that, however, we are bound to get attrition. If we utilize less than the full power of the United States Air Force, in my opinion it might not and probably would not be conclusive.

And even if we utilized it and laid waste to it there is a possibility that it would not be conclusive, but the effect on the United States Air Force, with our start from approximately 40 groups, would fix it so that, should we have to operate in any other area with full power of the United States Air Force, we would not be able to...(and the defenses of the United States would be) naked for several years to come.

The fact is that the United States is operating a showstring air force in view of its global responsibilities...

In my opinion, the United States Air Force is the single potential that has kept the balance of power in our favor. It is the one thing that has, up to date, kept the Russians from deciding to go to war...

While we can lay the industrial potential of Russia today to waste, in my opinion, or we can lay the Manchurian countryside to waste, as well as the principal cities of China, we cannot do both, again because we have got a shoestring air force. ¹

Admiral Sherman, commenting on the proposal for a naval blockade of Communist China said:

If the United Nations should declare a naval blockade, the Russians probably would respect it...if the United States should declare a blockade unilaterally...it is conceivable that they might oppose it by force...I do not believe that a unilateral United States naval blockade is advisable. ²

He stated that the United States must have a commander on whom they could rely and to whom they could confide, therefore he felt that MacArthur's dismissal was justified.

¹Robert Leckie, Conflict: The History of the Korean War, 1950-53 (New York: G. P. Putman's Sons, 1962), pp. 280-81.

²"Top Military Thinking on Seven Vital Questions", Newsweek, June 11, 1951, p. 34.

General Collins testified that MacArthur had sent American troops to the Manchurian frontier the previous year thus violating a clearcut directive to use only South Korean troops near the border. He continued:

I think this was one indication among many others, which certainly have been clear, that General MacArthur was not in conformance with the basic policies that led us gradually to fear that just as he violated a policy in this case without consulting us, perhaps the thing might be done in some other instance of a more serious nature. ¹

Testimony of Secretary of State Acheson

In the Secretary of State's testimony he clearly defined the purpose of American foreign policy.

As a people we condemn aggression. We reject appeasement of any kind. If we had stood with our arms folded while Korea was swallowed up, it would have meant abandoning our principles (and) the defeat of the collective security system on which our own safety ultimately depends. The Four Freedoms, the Atlantic Charter, the United Nations-- these were not cynical slogans...Our people felt in their hearts the principles were worth fighting for. It has been the purpose of our foreign policy to keep faith with that idea...to deter war if we can...to help peoples who had just regained their independence from losing it again to the new imperialism of the Soviet Union. ²

Acheson, on June 2, said that MacArthur's program for air attacks on Red China might very well break up the anti-Communist alliance if the United States carried it out alone, and it probably would not win the war. He said that our allies are ready to "take the sufferings" of another war if necessary, but they do not want the hardships of war to fall on them unnecessarily or by some provocation on our part. ³

¹New York Times, May 27, 1951, p. 51.

²"MacArthur Hearings", Facts on File, June 1-7, 1951, pp. 178-79.

³Ibid., p. 179.

In his testimony Acheson drew a clear distinction between military and political objectives. He said that military objectives were to repel the armed attacks and to restore peace and security in Korea. The United States and the United Nations also have long term political objectives--to establish a free, independent and democratic Korea. He made it clear, however, that the United States was not obliged to keep fighting until this larger objective was achieved.¹ There were six other witnesses who were called to give testimony before the Senate committee, but since they do not bear on the matter concerned with in this paper they will be omitted.

Conclusion of Hearings

On August 17, 1951 the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Foreign Relations Committee met for the last time in joint session to conclude their investigation into the recall of General MacArthur and the Administration's Far Eastern policy. The Committee decided by a twenty to three vote that the transcript of the hearings along with any added appendices be sent to the Senate, but they decided not to file a committee report due to the disagreement among the members.

¹New York Times, June 6, 1951, p. 15

IV CONCLUSION

John Spanier in American Foreign Policy Since World War II points out American frustration with containment. This writer, after a study of the problem, feels that Mr. Spanier has not only presented an accurate picture of the situation, but has also provided the key for explaining the reversal in public opinion supporting MacArthur's program for the Far East.

It is the opinion of this writer that there was no real change in public opinion, that is that there never was any real support for MacArthur's proposals.

When MacArthur returned to the United States and began his crusade against the Administration, he was only voicing the reaction of the public to containment. Wherever he went MacArthur met esthusiastic receptions and vast outpourings of emotion. While the emotions were real, they were not, as MacArthur believed, expressions of support for his Far Eastern program. There were two factors which were responsible for this public outburst. First, there was a very definite feeling of frustration with containment, and most of the emotionalism which MacArthur saw was an expression of this discontentment. Second, whatever else he was MacArthur was a hero of the Second World War, and there was a desire on the part of the American people to give him the hero's welcome he hadn't received at the end of the war.

When the public began to examine carefully MacArthur's proposals, they found that like containment, his proposals would not allow them to revert to the traditional preoccupation with domestic affairs. The most important factors in bursting the bubble of public emotion was the Senate hearings and more specifically the unanimous support of Administration policy by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The hearings forced Americans to face the fact that they could no longer withdraw into their shell of domestic tranquillity, but were, however much they protested, a part of the world and its problems. The testimony of the Joint Chiefs of Staff had clearly pointed out the dangers of MacArthur's proposals, dangers which Americans did not want to face needlessly, and the fact that there was no easy military answer to Korea.

Thus the public support which MacArthur saw for his proposals was only a myth, a letting off of steam before the American people settled down to accept the world responsibilities which they knew must come.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Congressional Hearings

United States Senate, Committee on Armed Services and Committee on Foreign Relations. Hearings on the Military Situation in the Far East and the Facts Surrounding the Relief of General Douglas MacArthur from his Assignment in that Area. Parts 1-5, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., 1951

Books

Considine, Robert B. The Life of General Douglas MacArthur. Greenwich, Conn.: Fawcett Publications, Inc., 1964.

Editors of the Army Times. The Banners and the Glory: The Story of General Douglas MacArthur. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1965.

Goldman, Eric F. The Crucial Decade: America, 1945-1955. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956.

Goodrich, Leland M. Korea: A Study of U. S. Policy in the United Nations. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1956.

Gunther, John. The Riddle of MacArthur. New York: Harper Brothers, 1951.

Higgin, Trumbull. Korea and the Fall of MacArthur: A Precipice in Limited War. New York: Oxford University Press, 1960.

Hillman, William. Mr. President: The First Publication from the Personal Diaries, Private Letters, Papers and Revealing Interviews of Harry S. Truman. New York: Farrar, Straus and Young, 1952.

Hunt, Frazier. The Untold Story of Douglas MacArthur. New York: The Deven-Adair Company, 1954.

Kahn, E. J., Jr. The Peculiar War: Impressions of a Reporter in Korea. New York: Random House, 1952.

- Koeing, Louis W. (ed.). The Truman Administration: Its Principles and Practices. New York: New York University Press, 1956.
- Leckie, Robert. Conflict: The History of the Korean War, 1950-53. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1962.
- May, Ernest R. (ed.). The Ultimate Decision: The President as Commander in Chief. New York: George Braziller, 1960.
- MacArthur, Douglas. Duty Honor Country: Two Memorable Addresses by General of the Army Douglas MacArthur. New York: Rolton House Publishers, Inc., 1962.
- _____. Reminiscences. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1964.
- McNaughton, Frank and Hehmyer, Walter. This Man Truman. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1945.
- Millis, Walter. Arms and Men: A Study in American Military History. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1956.
- _____. Arms and the State: Civil-Military Elements in National Policy. New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1958.
- Newlon, Clarke. The Fighting Douglas MacArthur. New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1965.
- Phillips, Cabell. The Truman Presidency: The History of a Triumphant Succession. New York: The Macmillian Company, 1966.
- Rees, David. Korea: The Limited War. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1964.
- Rovere, Richard. The American Establishment and Other Reports, Opinions, and Speculations. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1962.
- _____, and Schlesinger, Arthur, Jr. The MacArthur Controversy and American Foreign Policy. New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1965.
- Scott, William A. and Withey, Stephen B. The United States and the United Nations: The Public View 1945-1955. New York: Manhattan Publishing Company 1958.
- Sebald, William J. and Brines, Russell. With MacArthur in Japan: A Personal History of the Occupation. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1965.
- Sevareid, Eric. In One Ear. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1952.

_____. Small Sounds in the Night. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956.

Spanier, John W. American Foreign Policy Since World War II. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965

_____. The Truman-MacArthur Controversy and the Korean War. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1965

Steinberg, Alfred. The Man from Missouri: The Life and Times of Harry S. Truman. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1962.

Stone, I. F. The Hidden History of the Korean War. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1952.

Truman, Harry S. Memoirs. Vol. II: Years of Trial and Hope 1946-1952. New York: Signet Books, 1965.

Vinacke, Harold M. The United States and the Far East 1945-1951. London: Stanford University Press, 1952.

Articles

"A B C of the Big Debate," U.S. News and World Report, XXX (May 18, 1951), 19-20.

Acheson, Dean. "U.S. Foreign Policy Problems and Objectives," Vital Speeches, XVII (May 1, 1951), 426-30.

"Acheson Stirs the MacArthur Pudding," Newsweek, XXXVII (June 11, 1951), 23-24.

"Acheson's Week," Newsweek, XXXVII (June 18, 1951), 19-20.

"The Air View," Time, IVII (June 4, 1951), 22.

Bailey, Gilbert. "M'Arthur Issue as Seen from Abroad," New York Times, April 15, 1951

Baldwin, Hanson W. "The Magic of M'Arthur," New York Times, April 23, 1951.

Bolles, B. "MacArthur Hearings Leave Asian Strategy Uncertain," Foreign Policy Bulletin, XXX (June 8, 1951), 1-2.

Bradley, Omar N. "Korea, the Key to Success or Failure," Vital Speeches, XVII (May 1, 1951), 424-26.

"Bradley in the Answer Seat," Newsweek, XXXVII (May 28, 1951), 17-19.

"Bradley's Case," Time, LVII (May 28, 1951), 23.

- "Challenge by Colleagues," Newsweek, XXXVII (June 4, 1951), 18.
- "Challenge is Heard Around the World," Life, XXX (April 30, 1951), 26-27.
- "Chips Down in the Strategy Battle," Newsweek, XXXVII (May 7, 1951), 21-23.
- Coffin, Tris. "The MacArthur Rebellion," New Republic, (June 11, 1951), 161-62.
- "The Cool Man," Time, LVII (June 11, 1951), 22-24.
- "Cooperation in World Struggle for Freedom," U.S. Department of State Bulletin, XXIV (April 9, 1951), 566-68.
- "Congress Concerned with the Insistent Demands of the People," Congressional Digest, XXX (June, 1951), 161-62.
- "Defensive Strength of Free World Continues to Drive Ahead," U.S. Department of State Bulletin, XXV (September 10, 1951), 415.
- Del Vago, J. Alvarez. "Relief, Hope and Shame," Nation, CLXXII (April 21, 1951), 365-66.
- "Enigma of MacArthur," Christian Century, LXVIII (April 11, 1951), 451.
- "Eyes on MacArthur," Newsweek, XXXVII (June 25, 1951), 17.
- "Facts Behind the Truman-MacArthur Mix-up," U.S. News and World Report, XXX (April 27, 1951), 15.
- "Foreign Reaction--Cheers, Few Tears," Newsweek, XXXVII (April 23, 1951), 28.
- "The General in Seattle," Time, LVIII (November 26, 1951), 24-25.
- "Going It Alone," Commonweal, XIV (May 18, 1951), 131-32.
- Hinton, H. C. "MacArthur Argument," Commonweal, XIV (May 11, 1951), 111-12.
- "How the General Scooped the President," Newsweek, XXXVII (April 2, 1951), 26.
- Ickes, Harold L. "MacArthur is Always Right," New Republic, CXXIV (March 12, 1951), 16.
- _____. "Nathan Hale and MacArthur," New Republic, CXXIV (May 7, 1951), 15.
- _____. "Newsmen Say, Fade Away," New Republic, CXXV (July 30, 1951), 18.

- _____. "MacArthur Strategy," New Republic, CXXIV (May 14, 1951), 17.
- _____. "Truman Has the Last Word," New Republic, CXXIV (April 23, 1951), 17.
- "Impatient Audience," Time LVII (June 4, 1951), 22.
- "Impeach Truman," Chicago Tribune, April 12, 1951.
- "Is MacArthur Winning?," New Republic, CXXIV (May 21, 1951), 5-6.
- "Johnson Tells About 'K Day'," U.S. News and World Report, XXX (June 22, 1951), 21-22.
- Kirchwey, Freda. "Next Moves," Nation, CLXXII (April 21, 1951), 360.
- _____. "The General's Sanctuary," Nation, CLXXII (May 12, 1951), 435-36.
- "Latest Woe: the Leadership Crisis," Newsweek, XXXVII (April 16, 1951), 27-28.
- Lawrence, David H. "Inviting World War III?," U.S. News and World Report, XXX (April 20, 1951), 76.
- _____. "Salute to Courage," U.S. News and World Report, XXX (April 27, 1951), 76.
- Lawrence, W. H. "Truman, Portrait of a Stubborn Man," New York Times Magazine, (April 22, 1951), 8;64.
- "Legislatures Act on M'Arthur Plans," New York Times, April 13, 1951.
- Lindley, Ernest K. "Behind the MacArthur Strategy," Newsweek, XXXVII (May 14, 1951), 31.
- _____. "J C S Verdict on MacArthur," Newsweek, XXXVII (June 4, 1951), 19.
- _____. "Korea and MacArthur," Newsweek, XXXVII (April 16, 1951), 33.
- _____. "MacArthur and Global Strategy," Newsweek, XXXVII (April 23, 1951), 25.
- _____. "MacArthur and Our Allies," Newsweek, XXXVII (May 21, 1951), 30.
- "Logic or Language," Commonweal, LIV (August 19, 1951), 421.
- MacArthur, Douglas. "America Now Stands at a Crossroads," Vital Speeches, XVIII (April 15, 1952), 389-92.

- _____. "American Tradition: Need for Patriotic Fervor and Religious Devotion," Vital Speeches, XVIII (June 15, 1952), 529-32.
- _____. "The Battle to Save the Republic: Drift Toward Totalitarian Rule," Vital Speeches, XVII (September 15, 1951), 713-716.
- _____. "Don't Scuttle the Pacific," Vital Speeches, XVII (May 1, 1951), 430-33.
- _____. "MacArthur's Program for the U. S.," U.S. News and World Report, XXXI (October 26, 1951), 84-86.
- MacArthur, Douglas, "Policy of Fear is Un-American," Vital Speeches, XVII (July 1, 1951), 546-49.
- _____. "Misdirection of Domestic and Foreign Policies," Vital Speeches, XVIII (July 15, 1952), 578-82.
- _____. "As MacArthur Sees the Issues--Resistance to Communism, to Excessive Taxation, Bureaucratic Government and Corruption," U.S. News and World Report, XXXI (August 3, 1951), 55-57.
- _____. "What is the Policy in Korea?," Vital Speeches, XVII (May 15, 1951), 450.
- "MacArthur Agonistes," The Roundtable (London), XXXI (June 1, 1951), 240-46.
- "MacArthur's Career," Time, LVII (April 23, 1951), 24.
- "MacArthur-China Controversy," Facts on File, XI, No. 547 (April 20-26, 1951), 129-30.
- "MacArthur Controversy," Facts on File, XI, No. 549 (May 4-10, 1951), 145-47.
- "MacArthur Controversy," Facts on File, XI, No. 550 (May 11-17, 1951), 154.
- "MacArthur Controversy," Facts on File, XI, No. 551 (May 18-24, 1951), 162-63.
- "MacArthur Controversy," Facts on File, XI, No. 552 (May 25-31, 1951), 170-71.
- "MacArthur Controversy," Scholastic, LVIII (April 18, 1951), 12.
- "MacArthur Dismissal," Facts on File, XI, No. 545 (April 6-12, 1951), 113-15.
- "MacArthur Fears Red Tide," Facts on File, XI, No. 595 (March 21-27, 1952), 96.

- "MacArthur Gives the Great Debate A Shot in the Arm," Saturday Evening Post, CCXXIII (May 12, 1951), 10.
- "MacArthur Hearings," Facts on File, XI, No. 553 (June 1-7, 1951), 178-79.
- "MacArthur Hearings," Facts on File, XI, No. 554 (June 8-15, 1951), 186-87.
- "MacArthur Hearings," Facts on File, XI, No. 555 (June 15-21, 1951), 194-95.
- "MacArthur Hearings," Facts on File, XI, No. 556 (June 22-28, 1951), 203.
- "MacArthur Hearings: Being a Good Boy," Time, LVII, (June 25, 1951), 18-19.
- "MacArthur Hearings, Epilogue," Time, LVIII (July 9, 1951), 17.
- "The MacArthur Hearings--Political Squall," Time, LVII (May 28, 1951), 22-24.
- "The MacArthur Hearings--What Eight Republicans Found," Time, LVIII (August 27, 1951), 18.
- "MacArthur Homecoming," Facts on File, XI, No. 546 (April 13-19, 1951), 122.
- "MacArthur and National Purpose," Fortune, XLIII (May, 1951), 71-72.
- "MacArthur Speaks Out," Newsweek, XXXIX (March 31, 1952), 21.
- "As MacArthur Sees the Issues," Time, LVIII (August 6, 1951), 13.
- "MacArthur Tells His Side in the Controversy," Scholastic, LVIII (May 2, 1951), 14.
- "MacArthur v. Marshall," Time, LVII (May 21, 1951), 20.
- "MacArthur v. Truman," Time, LVII (April 23, 1951), 31-33.
- "Marshall, Truman Views Oppose General MacArthur," Scholastic, (May 16, 1951), 12.
- "The Military Rests," Time, LVII (June 11, 1951), 24.
- "Minucius to MacArthur: Adapted from Plutarch's Life of Fabius," New Republic, CXXIII (May 21, 1951), 13-14.
- "Morse Rebuffs Minority," Facts on File, XI, No. 564 (August 18-23, 1951), 266.
- Neuberger, Richard L. "When MacArthur Remained Silent," Nation, (November 24, 1951), 436-37.

- "An Old Soldier Fades Away into New Glory," Life, XXX (April 30, 1951), 23.
- "Our Far East Policy: Will MacArthur Win?," U.S. News and World Report, XXX (May 11, 1951), 13-14.
- Parrott, Lindsay. "MacArthur--Study in Black and White," New York Times Magazine, (April 22, 1951), 9.
- "President, A General, A Showdown," Newsweek, XXXVII (April 23, 1951), 21-25.
- "President and the General," Scholastic, LVIII (April 25, 1951), 10-11.
- "The President's Message to the Congress on U.S. Participation in the U.N.," U.S. Department of State Bulletin, XXVII (July 21, 1952), 121-23.
- "Probe Aftermath," Facts on File, XI, No. 558 (July 6-12, 1951), 218.
- "The Real Story of MacArthur: How and Why Mr. Truman Dismissed Him," U.S. News and World Report, XXX (April 20, 1951), 19-21.
- "Remarkable Shift in U.S. Foreign Policy," Time, LVIII (September 3, 1951), 21.
- "Response to MacArthur," Life, XXX (April 30, 1951), 34.
- Reston, James. "Memorandum to General MacArthur," New York Times Magazine, (April 22, 1951), 5; 61; 63.
- "Role of MacArthur," Life, XXX (April 23, 1951), 42.
- Roper, Elmo and Harris, Louis. "The Press and the Great Debate: A Survey of Correspondents in the Truman-MacArthur Controversy," Saturday Review of Literature, XXXIII (July 14, 1951), 6-9; 29-31.
- "Secretary Marshall's Testimony," U.S. News and World Report, XXX (May 18, 1951), 101-18.
- "Secretary's Rebuttal," Time, LVII (May 14, 1951), 25.
- Sheerin, John B. "MacArthur Asks A Question," Catholic World, (June, 1951), 151-65.
- Shelton, Willard. "Acheson Foils the Wolves," Nation, CLXXII (June 16, 1951), 553-54.
- _____. "H.S.T. is Still President," Nation, CLXXII (May 5, 1951), 409-11.
- _____. "Inevitable Showdown," Nation, CLXXII (April 21, 1951), 362-63.

- _____. "A Slight Correction," Time, LVII (June 4, 1951).
- Smith, Howard K. "Equal Among Equals," Nation, CLXXII (February 3, 1951), 103.
- _____. "Thou Art Only Soldier," Nation, CLXXII (April 21, 1951), 103.
- Stone, Irving F. "New Facts on Korea," Nation, CLXXIII (December 15, 1951), 514-17.
- "Summary of Comments on MacArthur's Firing," Time, LVII (April 23, 1951), 28.
- "Supreme Dilemma," Newsweek, XXXVII (April 16, 1951), 28.
- Taft, Robert A. "The Korean War and MacArthur Dismissal: Danger of the Acheson Policy," Vital Speeches, XVII (May 1, 1951), 420-22.
- "Take a Clear Look, Then Listen," Colliers, CXXVII (June 30, 1951), 75.
- "Tattoo for a Warrior," Life, XXX (April 23, 1951), 29.
- Taylor, Allan. "M'Arthur Issue as Seen in the Nation," New York Times, April 15, 1951.
- "There Must Exist Above All Else A Spiritual Impulse--A Will to Victory," Time, LVIII (October 29, 1951), 19.
- "Tokyo--Washington Messages Behind the Dismissal of MacArthur," U.S. News and World Report, XXX (April 20, 1951), 46.
- "Top Military Thinking on Seven Vital Questions," Newsweek, XXXVII (June 11, 1951), 34.
- "Tribute Baffles Europe," Newsweek, XXXVII (April 30, 1951), 35-36.
- Truman, Harry S. "Far Eastern Policy: Reason for Relieving MacArthur," Vital Speeches, XVII (May 1, 1951), 418-420.
- _____. "A Free and Peaceful World," Vital Speeches, XVII (May 1, 1951), 422-24.
- _____. "The Increasing Duties of Citizenship," Vital Speeches, XVII (June 1, 1951), 482-84.
- _____. "Paradox of Arming for Peace," U.S. Department of State Bulletin, XXIII (March 26, 1951), 14-15.
- _____. "Peace Comes High," Vital Speeches, XVIII (November 1, 1951), 34-36.
- _____. "Proclaim Liberty Throughout World," Vital Speeches, XVII (July 15, 1951), 578-80.

"U.N.: Cornerstone of U.S. Foreign Policy," U.S. Department of State Bulletin, XXVII (October 6, 1952), 529.

"Truman's or MacArthur's? Which Global Strategy...Will Beat the Reds and Prevent a General War?," Newsweek, XXXVII (April 23, 1951), 26-28.

"Turn at Bat for the Joint Chiefs," Newsweek, XXXVII (May 14, 1951), 26-28.

"Two Generals' Views on Korea," U.S. News and World Report, XXX (April 27, 1951), 70-75.

"U.S. Policy in Review," U.S. Department of State Bulletin, XXVIII, (January 12, 1953), 43-46.

"U.S. Press Comment on the Removal of MacArthur," New York Times, April 12, 1951.

"U.S. Press Views on General's Speech to Congress," New York Times, April 20, 1951.

"War to the Death," New Republic, CXXIIII (May 14, 1951), 5.

Warner, Albert L. "How the Korean Decision Was Made," Harpers, (June, 1951), 99-106.

Weintal, Edward. "Puzzles--MacArthur and the Parallel," Newsweek, XXXVII (April 9, 1951), 24-25.

Werth, Alexander. "Judgement Reserved," Nation, CLXXII (April 21, 1951), 364.

"What They Said," Time, LVII (April 23, 1951), 28.

Willoughby, Charles A. "The Truth about Korea," Hearst's International Cosmopolitan, (December, 1951).

"Willoughby Attacks Newsmen," Facts on File, XI, No. 578, (November 23-29, 1951), 178.

Periodicals

Facts on File, XI, No. 545 (April 6, 1951-December 31, 1951).

Life, (April, 1951-January, 1952).

Newsweek, (April, 1951-December, 1951).

Time, (April, 1951-March 1952).

Newspapers

Danville Commercial News (March 1, 1951-May 31, 1951).

Chicago Tribune (April 10, 1951-January 31, 1952).

New York Times (April 10, 1951-October 31, 1951).

San Francisco Chronicle (April 10, 1951-January 31, 1952).

APPENDIX

- I. Message from Joint Chiefs of Staff to General MacArthur, December 6, 1950.
- II. Message from Joint Chiefs of Staff to General MacArthur, March 20, 1951.
- III. Statement of General MacArthur, March 24, 1951.
- IV. Message from Joint Chiefs of Staff to General MacArthur, March 24, 1951.
- V. Letters Exchanged by Honorable Joseph W. Martin, Jr., and General MacArthur, March, 1951.
- VI. Statement of the President relative to the Relief of General MacArthur, April 10, 1951
- VII. Radio Address of the President Relative to the Relief of General MacArthur, April 11, 1951.
- VIII. Examples of Political Cartoons From Newspapers.

I. Message from Joint Chiefs of Staff to General MacArthur, December 6, 1950.

From Joint Chiefs of Staff to Commander-in-Chief, Far East, Tokyo, Japan
(and other commanders):

"1. The President, as of 5 Dec., forwarded a memo to all Cabinet members and to the chairman N.S.R.B., administrator E.C.A., director C.I.A., administrator E.S.A. and director Selective Service, which reads as follows:

"In the light of the present critical international situation, and until further written notice from me, I wish that each one of you would take immediate steps to reduce the number of public speeches pertaining to foreign or military policy made by officials of the departments and agencies of the Executive Branch. This applies to officials in the field as well as those in Washington.

"No speech, press release, or other public statement concerning foreign policy would be released until it has received clearance from the Department of State.

"No speech, press release, or other statement concerning military policy should be released until it has received clearance from the Department of Defense.

"In addition to the copies submitted to the Departments of State and Defense for clearance, advance copies of speeches and press releases concerning foreign policy or military policy should be submitted to the White House for information.

"The purpose of this memorandum is not to curtail the flow of information to the American people, but rather to insure that the information made public is accurate and fully in accord with the policies of the United States Government.

"2. He also forwarded the following to the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense:

"In addition to the policy expressed in my memorandum of this date to the heads of departments, concerning the clearance of speeches and statements, I wish the following steps to be taken:

"Officials overseas, including military commanders and diplomatic representatives, should be ordered to exercise extreme caution in public statements, to clear all but routine statements with their departments, and to refrain from direct communication on military or foreign policy with newspapers, magazines or other publicity media in the United States."

"3. The above is transmitted to you for guidance and appropriate action."

II. Message from Joint Chiefs of Staff to General MacArthur, March 20, 1951.

TO: Commander in Chief, Far East, Tokyo, Japan
FROM: Joint Chiefs of Staff

State planning presidential announcement shortly that, with clearing of bulk of South Korea of aggressors, United Nations now prepared to discuss conditions of settlement in Korea. Strong U.N. feeling persists that further diplomatic effort towards settlement should be made before any advance with major forces north of 38th parallel. Time will be required to determine diplomatic reactions and permit new negotiations that may develop. Recognizing that parallel has no military significance, State has asked JCS what authority you should have to permit sufficient freedom of action for next few weeks to provide security for U.N. forces and maintain contact with enemy. Your recommendations desired.

III. Statement of General MacArthur, March 24, 1951.

Operations continue according to schedule and plan. We have now substantially cleared South Korea of organized Communist forces. It is becoming increasingly evident that the heavy destruction along the enemy's lines of supply caused by our 'round-the-clock massive air and naval bombardment, has left his troops in the forward battle area deficient in requirements to sustain his operations.

This weakness is being brilliantly exploited by our ground forces. The enemy's human wave tactics definitely failed him as our own forces become seasoned to this form of warfare; his tactics of infiltration are but contributing to his piecemeal losses; and he is showing less stamina than our own troops under rigors of climate, terrain, and battle.

Of even greater significance than our tactical success has been the clear revelation that this new enemy, Red China, of such exaggerated and vaunted military power, lacks the industrial capacity to provide adequately many critical items essential to the conduct of modern war.

He lacks manufacturing bases and those raw materials needed to produce, maintain and operate even moderate air and naval power, and he cannot provide the essentials for successful ground operations, such as tanks, heavy artillery and other refinements science has introduced into the conduct of military campaigns.

Formerly his great numerical potential might well have filled this gap, but with the development of existing methods of mass destruction, numbers alone do not offset vulnerability inherent in such deficiencies. Control of the sea and air, which in turn means control over supplies, communications and transportation, are no less essential and decisive now than in the past.

When this control exists, as in our case, and is coupled with the inferiority of ground firepower, as in the enemy's case, the resulting disparity is such that it cannot be overcome by bravery, however fanatical, or the most gross indifference to human loss.

These military weaknesses have been clearly and definitely revealed since Red China entered upon its undeclared war in Korea. Even under inhibitions which now restrict activity of the United Nations forces and the corresponding military advantages which accrue to Red China, it has been shown its complete inability to accomplish by force of arms the conquest of Korea.

The enemy therefore must by now be painfully aware that a decision of the United Nations to depart from its tolerant effort to contain the war to the area of Korea through expansion of our military operations to his coastal areas and interior bases would doom Red China to the risk of imminent military collapse.

These basic facts being established, there should be no insuperable difficulty arriving at decisions on the Korean problem if the issues are resolved on their own merits without being burdened by extraneous matters not directly related to Korea, such as Formosa and China's seat in the United Nations.

The Korean nation and people which have been so cruelly ravaged must not be sacrificed. That is the paramount concern. Apart from the military area of the problem where the issues are resolved in the course of combat, the fundamental questions continue to be political in nature and must find their answer in the diplomatic sphere.

Within the area of my authority as military commander, however, it should be needless to say I stand ready at any time to confer in the field with the commander in chief of the enemy forces in an earnest effort to find any military means whereby the realization of the political objectives of the United Nations in Korea, to which no nation may justly take exceptions, might be accomplished without further bloodshed.

IV. Message from Joint Chiefs of Staff to General MacArthur,
March 24, 1951.

To: Commander in Chief, Far East, Tokyo, Japan
From: Joint Chiefs of Staff, personal for MacArthur

The President has directed that your attention be called to his order as transmitted 6 December 1950. In view of the information given you 20 March 1951 any further statements by you must be co-ordinated as prescribed in the order of 6 December.

The President has also directed that in the event Communist military leaders request an armistice in the field, you immediately report that fact to the JCS for instructions.

V. Letters exchanged by Honorable Joseph W. Martin, Jr., and General MacArthur, March 1951.

(1) Letter from Honorable Joseph W. Martin, Jr. to General MacArthur, March 8, 1951.

My Dear General: In the current discussions on foreign policy and overall strategy many of us have been distressed that, although the European aspects have been heavily emphasized, we have been without the views of yourself as Commander in Chief of the Far Eastern Command.

I think it is imperative to the security of our Nation and for the safety of the world that policies of the United States embrace the broadest possible strategy and that in our earnest desire to protect Europe we not weaken our position in Asia.

Enclosed is a copy of an address I delivered in Brooklyn, N.Y., February 12, stressing this vital point and suggesting that the forces of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek on Formosa might be employed in the opening of a second Asiatic front to relieve the pressure on our forces in Korea.

I have since repeated the essence of this thesis in other speeches, and intend to do so again on March 21, when I will be on a radio hook-up.

I would deem it a great help if I could have your views on this point, either on a confidential basis or otherwise. Your admirers are legion, and the respect you command is enormous. May success be your in the gigantic undertaking which you direct.

Sincerely yours,

Joseph W. Martin, Jr.

(2) Reply thereto by General MacArthur, March 20, 1951.

Dear Congressman Martin: I am most grateful for your note of the 8th forwarding me a copy of your address of February 12. The latter I have read with much interest, and find that with the passage of years you have certainly lost none of your old-time punch.

My views and recommendations with respect to the situation created by Red China's entry into war against us in Korea have been submitted to Washington in most complete detail. Generally these views are well known and clearly understood, as they follow the conventional pattern of meeting force with maximum counter-force as we have never failed to do in the past. Your view with respect to the utilization of the Chinese forces on Formosa is in conflict with neither logic nor this tradition.

It seems strangely difficult for some to realize that here in Asia is where the Communist conspirators have elected to make their play for global conquest, and that we have joined the issue thus raised on the battlefield; that there we fight Europe's war with arms while the diplomats there still fight it with words; that if we lose the war to communism in Asia the fall of Europe is inevitable, win it and Europe most probably would avoid war and yet preserve freedom. As you pointed out, we must win. There is no substitute for victory.

With renewed thanks and expressions of most cordial regard, I am,

Faithfully yours,

Douglas MacArthur

VI. Statement of the President Relative to the Relief of General MacArthur, April 10, 1951.

With deep regret I have concluded that General of the Army Douglas MacArthur is unable to give his wholehearted support to the policies of the United States Government and of the United Nations in matters pertaining to his official duties. In view of the specific responsibilities imposed upon me by the Constitution of the United States and the added responsibility which has been entrusted to me by the United Nations, I have decided that I must make a change of command in the Far East. I have, therefore, relieved General MacArthur of his commands and have designated Lt. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway as his successor.

Full and vigorous debate on matters of national policy is a vital element in the constitutional system of our free democracy. It is fundamental, however, that military commanders must be governed by the policies and directives issued to them in the manner provided by our laws and Constitution. In time of crisis, this consideration is particularly compelling.

General MacArthur's place in history as one of our greatest commanders is fully established. The nation owes him a debt of gratitude for the distinguished and exceptional service which he has rendered his country in posts of great responsibility. For that reason I repeat my regret at the necessity for the action I feel compelled to take in this case.

VII. Radio Address of the President Relative to the Relief of General MacArthur, April 11, 1951.

I want to talk plainly to you tonight about what we are doing in Korea and about our policy in the Far East.

In the simplest terms, what we are doing in Korea is this:

I think most people in this country recognized that fact last June. And they warmly supported the decision of the Government to help the Republic of Korea against the Communist aggressors. Now, many persons, even some who applauded our decision to defend Korea, have forgotten the basic reason for our action.

It is right for us to be in Korea, It was right last June. It is right today.

I want to remind you why this is true.

The Communists in the Kremlin are engaged in a monstrous conspiracy to stamp out freedom all over the world. If they were to succeed, the United States would be numbered among their principal victims. It must be clear to everyone that the United States cannot -- and will not -- sit idly by and await foreign conquest. The only question is: When is the best time to meet the threat and how is the best way to meet it?

The best time to meet the threat is in the beginning. It is easier to put out a fire in the beginning when it is small than after it has become a roaring blaze.

And the best way to meet the threat of aggression is for the peaceloving nations to act together. If they don't act together, they are likely to be picked off, one by one.

If they had followed the right policies in the 1930's -- if the free countries had acted together, to crush the aggression of the dictators and if they had acted in the beginning, when the aggression was small -- there probably would have been no World War II.

If history has taught us anything, it is that aggression anywhere in the world is a threat to peace everywhere in the world. When that aggression is supported by the cruel and selfish rulers of a powerful nation who are bent on conquest, it becomes a clear and present danger to the security and independence of every free nation.

This is a lesson that most people in this country have learned thoroughly. This is the basic reason why we joined in creating the United Nations. And, since the end of World War II, we have been putting that lesson into practice -- we have been working with other free nations to check the aggressive designs of the Soviet Union before they can result in a third world war.

That is what we did in Greece, when that nation was threatened by the aggression of international communism.

The attack against Greece could have led to general war. But this country came to the aid of Greece. The United Nations sup-

ported Greek resistance. With our help, the determination and efforts of the Greek people defeated the attack on the spot.

Another big Communist threat to peace was the Berlin blockade. That too could have led to war. But again it was settled because free men would not back down in an emergency.

The aggression against Korea is the boldest and most dangerous move the Communists have yet made.

The attack on Korea was part of a greater plan for conquering all of Asia.

I would like to read to you from a secret intelligence report which came to us after the attack. It is a report of a speech a Communist army officer in North Korea gave to a group of spies and saboteurs last May, one month before South Korea was invaded. The report shows in great detail how this invasion was part of a carefully prepared plot. Here is part of what the Communist officer, who had been trained in Moscow, told his men: "Our forces," he said, "are scheduled to attack South Korean forces about the middle of June...the coming attack on South Korea marks the first step toward liberation of Asia."

Notice that he used the word "liberation." That is Communist double-talk meaning "conquest."

I have another secret intelligence report here. This one tells what another Communist officer in the Far East told his men several months before the invasion of Korea. Here is what he said: "In order to successfully undertake the long awaited world revolution, we must first unify Asia...Java, Indo-China, Malaya, Tibet, Thailand, Philippines, and Japan are our ultimate targets...the United States is the only obstacle on our road for the liberation of all countries in southeast Asia. In other words, we must unify the people of Asia and crush the United States."

That is what the Communist leaders are telling their people, and that is what they have been trying to do.

Again, "liberation" in Commie language, means "conquest."

They want to control all Asia from the Kremlin.

This plan of conquest is in flat contradiction to what we believe. We believe that Korea belongs to the Koreans. We believe that India belongs to the Indians. We believe that all the nations of Asia should be free to work out their affairs in their own way. This is the basis of peace in the Far East and it is the basis of peace everywhere else.

The whole Communist imperialism is back of the attack on peace in the Far East. It was the Soviet Union that trained and equipped the North Koreans for aggression. The Chinese Communists massed 44 well-trained and well-equipped divisions on the Korean frontier. These were the troops they threw into battle when the North Korean Communists were beaten.

The question we have to face is whether the Communist plan of conquest can be stopped without general war. Our Government and other countries associated with us in the United Nations believe that the best chance of stopping it without general war is to meet the attack in Korea and defeat it there.

That is what we have been doing. It is a difficult and bitter task.

But so far it has been successful.

So far, we have prevented World War III.

So far, by fighting a limited war in Korea, we have prevented aggression from succeeding, and bringing on a general war. And the ability of the whole free world to resist Communist aggression has been greatly improved.

We have taught the enemy a lesson. He has found out that aggression is not cheap or easy. Moreover, men all over the world who want to remain free have been given new courage and new hope. They know now that the champions of freedom can stand up and fight and that they will stand up and fight.

Our resolute stand in Korea is helping the forces of freedom now fighting in Indo-China and other countries in that part of the world. It has already slowed down the time-table of conquest.

In Korea itself, there are signs that the enemy is building up his ground forces for a new mass offensive. We also know that there have been large increases in the enemy's available air forces.

If a new attack comes I feel confident it will be turned back. The United Nations fighting forces are tough and able and well equipped. They are fighting for a just cause. They are proving to all the world that the principle of collective security will work. We are proud of all these forces for the magnificent job they have done against heavy odds. We pray that their efforts may succeed, for upon their success may hinge the peace of the world.

The Communist side must now choose its course of action. The Communist rulers may press the attack against us. They may take further action which will spread the conflict. They have that choice, and with it the awful responsibility for what may follow. The Communists also have the choice of a peaceful settlement which could lead to a general relaxation of tensions in the Far East. The decision is theirs, because the forces of the United Nations will strive to limit the conflict if possible.

We do not want to see the conflict in Korea extended. We are trying to prevent a world war -- not to start one. The best way to do that is to make it plain that we and the other free countries will continue to resist the attack.

But you may ask why can't we take other steps to punish the aggressor. Why don't we bomb Manchuria and China itself? Why don't we assist Chinese Nationalist troops to land on the mainland of China?

If we were to do these things we would be running a very grave risk of starting a general war. If that were to happen, we would have brought about the exact situation we are trying to prevent.

If we were to do these things, we would become entangled in a vast conflict on the continent of Asia and our task would become immeasurably more difficult all over the world.

What would suit the ambitions of the Kremlin better than for our military forces to be committed to a full scale war with Red China?

It may well be that, in spite of our best efforts, the Communists may spread the war. But it would be wrong -- tragically wrong -- for us to take the initiative in extending the war.

The dangers are great. Make no mistake about it. Behind the North Koreans and Chinese Communists in the front lines stand additional millions of Chinese soldiers. And behind the Chinese stand the tanks, the planes, the submarines, the soldiers, and the scheming rulers of the Soviet Union.

Our aim is to avoid the spread of the conflict.

The course we have been following is the one best calculated to avoid an all-out war. It is the course consistent with our obligation to do all we can to maintain international peace and security. Our experience in Greece and Berlin shows that it is the most effective course of action we can follow.

First of all, it is clear that our efforts in Korea can blunt the will of the Chinese Communists to continue the struggle. The United Nations forces have put up a tremendous fight in Korea and have inflicted very heavy casualties on the enemy. Our forces are stronger now than they have been before. These are plain facts which may discourage the Chinese Communists from continuing their attack.

Second, the free world as a whole is growing in military strength every day. In the United States, in western Europe, and throughout the world, free men are alert to the Soviet threat and are building their defenses. This may discourage the Communist rulers from continuing the war in Korea -- and from undertaking new acts of aggression elsewhere.

If the Communists authorities realize that they cannot defeat us in Korea, if they realize it would be foolhardy to widen the hostilities beyond Korea, then they may recognize the folly of continuing their aggression. A peaceful settlement may then be possible. The door is always open.

Then we may achieve a settlement in Korea which will not compromise the principles and purposes of the United Nations.

I have thought long and hard about this question of extending the war in Asia. I have discussed it many times with the ablest military advisers in the country. I believe with all my heart that the course we are following is the best course.

I believe that we must try to limit the war to Korea for these vital reasons: To make sure that the precious lives of our fighting men are not wasted, to see that the security of our country and the free world is not needlessly jeopardized and to prevent a third world war.

A number of events have made it evident that General MacArthur did not agree with that policy. I have, therefore, considered it essential to relieve General MacArthur so that there would be no doubt or confusion as to the real purpose and aim of our policy.

It was with the deepest personal regret that I found myself compelled to take this action, General MacArthur is one of our greatest military commanders. But the cause of world peace is more important than any individual.

The change in commands in the Far East means no change whatever in the policy of the United States. We will carry on the fight in Korea with vigor and determination in an effort to bring the war to a speedy and successful conclusion.

The new commander, Lieut. Gen. Matthew Ridgway, has already demonstrated that he has the great qualities of leadership needed for this task.

We are ready, at any time, to negotiate for a restoration of peace in the area. But we will not engage in appeasement. We are only interested in real peace.

Real peace can be achieved through a settlement based on the following factors:

One: The fighting must stop.

Two: Concrete steps must be taken to insure that the fighting will not break out again.

Three: There must be an end to the aggression.

A settlement founded upon these elements would open the way for the unification of Korea and the withdrawal of all foreign forces.

In the meantime, I want to be clear about our military objective. We are fighting to resist an outrageous aggression in Korea. We are trying to keep the Korean conflict from spreading to other areas. But at the same time we must conduct our military activities so as to insure the security of our forces. This is essential if they are to continue the fight until the enemy abandons its ruthless attempt to destroy the Republic of Korea.

That is our military objective -- to repel attack and to restore peace.

In the hard fighting in Korea, we are proving that collective action among nations is not only a high principle but a workable means of resisting aggression. Defeat of aggression in Korea may be the turning point in the world's search for a practical way of achieving peace and security.

The struggle of the United Nations in Korea is a struggle for peace.



The free nations have united their strength in an effort to prevent a third world war.

That war can come if the Communist rulers want it to come. But this Nation and its allies will not be responsible for its coming.


We do not want to widen the conflict. We will use every effort to prevent that disaster. And in so doing, we know that we are following the great principles of peace, freedom, and justice.

VIII. Examples of Political Cartoons From Newspapers

PRO - M'ARTHUR



PRO-TRUMAN



Herb Block in The Washington Post
"48-Star Commander-in-Chief."



Ripley in The Chicago Tribune
"Who does Truman think he is—the President?"



White in The Akron Beacon Journal
"A choice of explosions."



Alexander in The Pittsburgh Courier
"Because of too many hats."

LATEST IN GERM WARFARE



YOU'RE FIRED!

The germ.

COTTON CONTENT