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American Reaction to the Sovietization of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, 1945-1948

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AMERICAN REACTION TO THE SOVIETIZATION OF
POLAND CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND HUNGARY 1945-1948
(TITLE)

BY

Dolores Balent

THESIS

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR THE DEGREE OF

Master of Arts in History

IN THE GRADUATE SCHOOL, EASTERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY
CHARLESTON, ILLINOIS

1972

YEAR

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PREFACE

The postwar foreign relations between the United States and the Soviet Union were analyzed for numerous years after World War II. Historians, both the earlier ones and the revisionists, who aspired to any degree of sophistication, took care to comment upon American policy between 1945 and 1948, and they tried to determine where the blame, if any, was to be placed.

Disregarding blame, the diplomacy and words spoken by the executive and legislative branches, the Department of State, and the American public actually shaped the future of the world. The following pages were written because those actions greatly affected, and still affect, American lives. A second reason for taking time and effort in reporting the "American Reaction to the Sovietization of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary 1945-1948" was to give needed attention to U.S. opinions of that period since they had not been much publicized.

What I was concerned with throughout the thesis was that elusive element known as opinion, specifically that of U.S. federal officials and public citizens during the

three year period of time after World War II, and the approach used was hopefully that of an objective historian. Newspapers, magazine articles, "letters to the editor," "editorials," the Journal of the Senate, Congressional Digest, and Congressional Record, plus numerous books were used for research and the writing of this thesis. Once that material was gathered, the methodology of arranging statements of fact, quotations, and interpretation on paper completed the work. The outcome was not a survey, but a specific account of the events in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary which directly influenced the postwar relations of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. at the governmental and public levels.

The following thesis was founded upon the mass of printed materials directly concerning United States relations with Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary and events in those three states between 1945-1948. I am, therefore, greatly indebted to historians who previously researched, reported, and interpreted that period of time. Using their professional information, it was possible for me to write the thesis.

By way of acknowledgments, friends criticized parts of this thesis or aided in other ways. In this connection, I would particularly like to thank Dr. Stephan Horak, Dr. Leonard C. Wood, Dr. David Maurer, Carl Davis, John Roy, Docia Taylor, Sandy Trojello, and George A. Rogers. Many librarians, both at Eastern Illinois University and the University of Illinois, also provided much needed help.

I feel especially indebted, however, to my parents, Mr. and Mrs. John M. Balent. Without the help, consideration, encouragement, and understanding of these two wonderful individuals, this paper would not have been possible. I am deeply grateful.

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PART I. FROM THE U.S.-SOVIET WAR ALLIANCE TO OPEN CONFLICT
AS A RESULT OF DEVELOPMENTS IN POLAND,
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION: THE PERIOD OF TRANSITION

I. From Isolationism to the Policy of Intervention

The period of 1945-1948 became one of transition as the world proceeded from a World War into a Cold War. During that time of international strife and conflict, the United States and the Soviet Union held the future of the world in their hands. They assumed the position of world leadership, an extreme reverse after the isolation from European affairs that both practiced after World War I, and by 1945 each superpower had formally accepted an interventionist policy in Europe. The philosophies of Washington and Moscow, however, were totally divergent. The situation was one of preordained conflict and dispute, and it pointed to a posture of defiance.

As World War II was swiftly coming to its termination, it soon became evident that the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. would ultimately have worldwide influence in the social, economic, and political spheres. Military strength had placed those two states at the summit of world power. Technology, national resources, and man-

power were to be their mainstay. When used toward the common cause of defeating a mutual enemy, these elements were useful and acceptable, but as peace gradually became a fact instead of an objective a less than friendly mood settled over American-Soviet relations.

. . . (I)t was plain that the task of building a lasting peace would be beset with many difficulties. . . . Total war by its very nature was at odds with the concept of a reasonable peace. And in the wartime coalition of the United Nations, the Big Three were often held together by little more than their common resistance to German expansion. . . .¹

The first skepticism concerning Allied cooperation after the war came when the military course of the hostilities changed propitiously for the Allies.

. . . By the beginning of 1943 the tide of battle had turned in both Europe and Asia. The Allies could at least be fairly confident of eventual victory. But as warmaking evolved into peacemaking, frictions within the Alliance intensified. In a series of conferences during 1943-1945, Stalin, Roosevelt, and Churchill discussed the kind of political settlement which would accompany victory; they uncovered as many profound disagreements as they produced optimistic but tenuous compromises.²

Russia was winning victory after victory over the Nazi in Eastern Europe. By January 17, 1945, Warsaw, the capital of Poland, would be liberated after five years and four

¹Arthur A. Ekirch, Jr., Ideas, Ideals, and American Diplomacy: A History of Their Growth and Interaction, (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1966), p. 169.

²Peter G. Filene, ed., American Views of Soviet Russia, 1917-1965, (Homewood, Illinois: The Dorsey Press, 1968), pp. 148-149.

months of German occupation. As Communist military supremacy emerged, future Soviet aims in Eastern Europe became apparent.

The intentions of that monolithic state were diverse from those of Great Britain and the United States. The latter two were working toward a permanent peace, a strong community of nations, and limited territorial expansion. The U.S.S.R. was working for the establishment of a strong buffer zone to protect it from aggression by its western neighbors. Moscow had developed an almost paranoid fear of Germany after the bitter, devastating and catastrophic war years. Therefore, the Kremlin desired to shield its frontiers against attack by a barrier of satellite states. The two states which could be most effectively used in that capacity were Poland and Czechoslovakia, since they directly bridged the territorial gap between Russia and the West or more specifically Germany. Indirectly Hungary served the same purpose. With the Hungarian nation under control, the Soviets would be linked to Austria and Communist oriented Yugoslavia and thereby have more territory from which to fashion an impregnable cushion against invasion.

In the final analysis, the Soviet Union was eager to make pawns of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. Two of those Eastern European states, however, looked toward the western democracies for post-war governmental models and economic support, and that merely hastened discord in the Allied coalition.

II. The Yalta Meeting and the Potsdam Conference

The last intra-war conference held by the Big Three seemed to be a prelude to postwar Allied cooperation, understanding and peace, but such tranquillity was superficial. Throughout the Yalta meeting, circumstances were more advantageous to Stalin than to either Churchill or Roosevelt. The basic reason for the Soviet ruler having the upper hand was due to a proposed arithmetic formula presented by the British Prime Minister when he visited Moscow in the autumn of 1944. At that time Churchill had wished to reconcile the Poles and Russians, but he failed on that point and settled for an agreement on the future of southeastern Europe:

. . . in Rumania the Soviets would have a "90-10" preponderance; in Bulgaria, "75-25"; in Yugoslavia and Hungary, influence would be divided "50-50" with the West; in Greece, the balance would be "90-10", in the Western favor. . . . Secondly, the Red Army's occupation of most of Eastern and Central Europe ensured Soviet control of these countries after the war. . . . Thirdly, Roosevelt still avoided any showdown with Stalin, in general because he wanted two commitments from Stalin: Soviet entry into the war against Japan, and Soviet participation in the postwar United Nations. . . .³

Roosevelt and Churchill had to adapt the above wartime facts to their diplomatic negotiations with Stalin for it was

³Ibid., pp. 156-157.

imperative that the Soviet Union be retained as an ally.⁴

Since they were not willing to apply military force to acquire the adherence of the U.S.S.R. to democratic principles and chance a split in the Allied wartime coalition, Washington and London officials decided upon a conciliatory diplomacy toward Moscow's demands. Special rights for the Communists in Manchuria, separate seats in the United Nations Organization for Byelorussia and Ukraine, and Soviet control of the Kurile islands were granted at Yalta. In return Stalin agreed to join in the war against Japan within three months after the defeat of Germany and consented to amicable participation in the postwar UNO. From the meeting Roosevelt obtained what he had desired most, and Stalin's signature was placed beneath the vague and ambiguous Yalta Charter on February 11, 1945.

Future world peace was based upon that document.

It provided for the following:

- I. A World Organization
- II. The Liberation of Europe
- III. The Dismemberment of Germany
- IV. The Military Occupation and Control of Germany with a Zone of Occupation for France
- V. Reparations from Germany
- VI. The Trial of Major War Criminals
- VII. A Poland with an eastern boundary generally along the Curzon Line of 1919, and a Provisional Government which would hold "free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot."

⁴Ekirch, op. cit., p. 170.

- VIII. A Yugoslavia based on the Tito-Subašić Agreement and the formation of an Anti-Fascist Assembly of National Liberation (Aunoj)
- IX. Three Foreign Secretaries were to meet "as often as necessary"; the first meeting was set up to meet in London

Additionally embraced within the concord were arrangements for governments, after the conclusion of hostilities, to be "broadly representative of all democratic elements."⁵ Despite these grandiloquent statements, the military and economic role of the United States and the Soviet Union during World War II made evident two facts. First, both powers would continue to exercise an immense measure of world leadership in the future. Second, the peace of the world would be established upon an unstable bipolar balance of power. Nonetheless, the results of the Conference in the Crimea were ardently accepted throughout the U.S.S.R., the British Commonwealth, and the U.S.A. The American press was virtually unanimous in praising the decisions reached by the Allied leaders. The endorsement of the accords, however, was not granted by the Polish Government in London. It convened on February 13, 1945, and later issued a communiqué announcing its rejection of the Polish territorial question laid down at the Crimea Conference. The negative objection of the Polish government-in-exile was not enough to nullify the Yalta Charter and so it remained a legal international compact.

⁵U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, A Decade of American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1941-49, (New York: Greenwood Press, Publishers, 1968), pp. 27-34.

The primary reason for the success of the Big Three meeting was Roosevelt's personal diplomacy. His position as "mediator between the declining fortunes of the British Empire and the rising star of the Soviets"⁶ had helped to insure the agreement at Yalta, but his death and a British election were to demonstrate just how tenuous the compact actually was. Roosevelt died on April 12, 1945, and was succeeded by Harry S. Truman. On May 23, 1945, there was a breakdown of the Coalition Government in England; Churchill and the Conservatives in the general election of July were defeated. Half-way through the Potsdam Conference, Clement Attlee and Ernest Bevin became the British representative officials, and Truman represented the United States.

The three major Allied powers met at Potsdam from July 17 to August 2, 1945, and the points which Stalin, Truman and Prime Minister Attlee agreed to inter alia were:

- "1. Germany was not to be partitioned, but to be treated as a single economic unit with certain central administrative departments, through which a program of decentralization was to be carried out.
- ca "2. Britain and the U.S.A. would support, in the eventual peace settlements, the Soviet annexation of the northern half of East Prussia (including Königsberg).
- "3. 'Pending the final delimitation of Poland's western frontier,' the 'former German territories' east of the Oder and Neisse Rivers and the former free city of Danzig were to be left under Polish administration and should not be considered as part of the Soviet zone of occupation in Germany.

⁶Ekirch, op. cit., p. 174.

- "4. Peace treaties should be concluded with Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, Italy, and Rumania.
- "5. The remaining German population in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary was to be transferred to Germany."⁷

Although the terms of the Potsdam compact had not deviated from the basic form created at Yalta, the tone of the discussion had emphatically changed. President Truman inaugurated a tougher policy toward the Soviet Union than Roosevelt had previously used. He pointed out America's military superiority over the U.S.S.R. and "disclosed to Premier Stalin the important news that American scientists had successfully developed a new weapon of unusual force,"⁸ in less than friendly tones. The new plan of action was coupled with some sharp debates over Eastern Europe and the argumentative atmosphere at Potsdam replaced accord and trust with suspicion, misunderstanding, and lack of cooperation. From the comradeship of arms during World War II, the paths of the Western nations and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics turned from an amicable relationship to open criticism. During the immediate postwar

⁷Keesing's Treaties and Alliances of the World: An International Survey Covering Treaties in Force and Communities of States. (Vienna-Zurich: Keesing's Publications Ltd., Keynsham, Bristol, Siegler & Co. KG., Bonn; New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1968), p. 17.

⁸Ekirch, op. cit., p. 178.

years, Washington-Moscow relations were heading toward a conflict of interests in Eastern Europe. The formation of new regimes in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary between 1942-1948 brought the collision into full view.

CHAPTER II

FORMATION OF THE NEW REGIMES

I. Poland, 1942-1947

In 1942 Poland was still under the oppressive weight of German occupation. The Soviet Union decided at that early date to penetrate the Polish underground in order to assure Moscow's chances of ultimately formulating Polish policy. Toward that end a group loyal to the U.S.S.R. were:

. . . secretly parachuted into Poland to infiltrate the Polish underground, to set up cells for the later seizure of power, to denounce members of the patriotic Underground to the Gestapo, and to set up new, seemingly non-communist, underground groups which were actually under the complete control of the Communist Party. The Kremlin exercised direct control over this group by its agent and Secretary General of the Workers' Party, Marcell Nowotko, who later was liquidated and replaced by another agent, Pawel Finder, also later liquidated.¹

Authoritatively but confidentially the Polish Communist Party, Polish Workers' Party or PPR --- Polska Partia Robotnicza, was resuscitated in Warsaw on January 5,

¹Edward J. Rozek, Allied Wartime Diplomacy: A Pattern in Poland, (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1958), p. 96. Pawel Finder, who succeeded Nowotko, was arrested by the German secret police in November of 1943. He was executed on July 26, 1944, by the Gestapo.

1942.* Marcelli Nowotko was its first secretary-general, but he was assassinated by Edward Molojec in November of 1942, in Warsaw. Molojec presumed him to be a collaborator with the Gestapo and a traitor to the Polish-Communist cause. Nowotko's successor as Secretary General of the Party was Wladyslaw Gomulka. He was the recipient of the top Party post in November of 1942.

Six months later, May 4, 1943, Moscow's objectives regarding Poland were advanced when Marshall Stalin replied to two interview questions posed by correspondents of The New York Times**

QUESTION: Does the Government of the U.S.S.R. desire to see a strong and independent Poland after the defeat of Hitlerite Germany?

STALIN: Unquestionably, it does.

QUESTION: On what fundamentals is it your opinion that relations between Poland and the U.S.S.R. should be based after the war?

STALIN: Upon the fundamentals of solid good neighborly relations and mutual respect, or should the Polish people so desire, upon the fundamentals of an alliance providing for the mutual assistance against the Germans as the chief enemies of the Soviet Union and Poland.²

The authoritative advocacy of future Soviet actions had been supplied, and time was the scarcely significant element which obstructed the ultimate annexation of Poland

*The Polish Communist Party had been prorogued in 1938.

**Journalists representing the London Times were also present.

²The New York Times, May 5, 1943, page 1.

by the Communists. Policies started in 1942 were retained, and Stalin assiduously ascertained that the Polish state was or soon would be controlled by Soviet sympathizers.

The infiltration of Poland had commenced. The modus operandi implementation was the formation of the communist-controlled Polish Army. Colonel Zygmunt Berling, prewar regular Polish army officer and commander of the Kosciuszko Division*, Major General Bevzink, Berling's Soviet military superior, and Alexander Zawadzki, an NKVD** colonel, were the agents chosen by the Moscow government to command the strategic take over of the Polish military forces, which guaranteed that the political power in Poland at the proper time would be transferred to Communist agents. Richard F. Staar depicted the manipulation. He said that many representatives from the U.S.S.R. joined the Kosciuszko Division and became officers in the political education corps.

These political-education elements combined in 1944 with the PPR, just emerged from the underground, on "liberated" Polish soil. The total strength of both groups was only 20,000 persons. This numerical weakness during the initial postwar period made Communist strategy subordinate socialism to nationalism, and forced communism to pose as a native Polish movement. . . .

*The Kosciuszko Division was the nucleus for the future Polish Soviet-controlled army. It was established on May 20, 1943, in the Soviet Union.

**Peoples' Commissariat of Internal Affairs (Soviet secret police).

³Richard F. Staar, Poland 1944-1962: The Sovietization of a Captive People, (Baton Rouge, Louisiana: Louisiana State University Press, 1962), pp. 80-81.

After January 1, 1944, Soviet agents presented a show of popular support when they shared in the leadership of the underground legislative National Council of the Homeland, known as the KRN or Krajowa Rada Narodowa, in Warsaw.⁴ That position also allowed them to be equal partners with other political parties in Poland, all of which were vying for governmental superiority within the Polish state. The Soviet sympathizers presented the illusion of political strength by being part of the KRN, but it was an exaggeration of their actual power. Indeed, "it was not this weak coalition by the military successes and the physical presence of the Soviet army which guaranteed the Communists a monopoly of political power in Poland."⁵

Having obtained key places in the newly revived government within the Polish state and possessing the mainstay of the swiftly advancing Red Army, the Communists were strengthening their strangulation hold upon Poland.

An executive body, the sixteen-man Polish Committee of National Liberation (PKWN --- Polski Komitet Wyzwolenia Narodowego), was established at the Chelm near Lublin on July 21, 1944 by the Communists. (There was) Communist control over the most important departments in the government(.)⁶

The Soviets had pressed their political advantage to the

⁴Ibid., pp. 80-81.

⁵Ibid., pp. 80-81. "At least nine of the original fourteen KRN members supported the Communists. . . . (Ibid., p. 81)."

⁶Ibid., pp. 80-81.

full in Poland by the time the Allies met for the Yalta Conference of February 4-11, 1945.⁷ Therefore, it was with a spirit of self-confidence that Stalin approached the question of a postwar settlement dealing with the territories west of Soviet Russia.

Western statesmen fostered the hope that "something resembling the liberal Europe of the 1920's would arise from the ashes of the conflagration," but apart from general decisions, "the principal work" in the Crimea "had to do with the postwar organization of Eastern Europe." The principal state within that area was Poland.⁸

Rudimentary stipulations were espoused in the Yalta accords for the creation of a Polish government which would be self-governing and embrace all democratic factions. Moscow, however, was more concerned with its own protection than democracy for Poland. In a period of less than thirty years, Polish territory had twice provided Germany with an almost unobstructed passage to the Russian state. That fact logically explained the U.S.S.R.'s concern over postwar Poland. The tide of battle shifted in the Red Army's favor by the middle of March 1945, and soon Soviet troops were entrenched in Poland. That situation established the basis for Communist domination of Polish territory when World War II ended. A strong buffer zone against any

⁷C.E. Black and E.C. Helmreich, Twentieth Century Europe: A History, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1966), p. 576.

⁸Ibid., p. 576.

possible future attack upon the Russian state from the West was also promoted. To advance its immediate military and future postwar political policy within Poland, Moscow proceeded "toward consolidation of Soviet power within the Polish state, and "a regular pattern of which the end result was the assumption of full power by Communists with the direct and indirect support of the Soviet Union followed."⁹

As early as April 21, 1945, Stalin was confident that he could dominate Poland and force an open agreement with the Polish Committee of National Liberation. The accord signed was the Treaty of Friendship, Mutual Assistance and Post-War Collaboration between the U.S.S.R. and the National Council of the Polish Republic.* The Soviet Premier signed the agreement for the former, and Edward Osobka-Morawski** was the signatory for the latter. Since Moscow had broken off diplomatic relations with the London Polish government-in-exile during May of 1943, over the pressure the London Poles were using to inaugurate an investigation of the Katyn Forest massacre of 10,000 Polish officers, the Poles abroad were barred from the negotiation.

⁹John C. Campbell, ed., The United States in World Affairs, 1948-1949, (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1949), p. 102.

*The Council was given sole legal authority in Poland by the Polish Committee of National Liberation on July 22, 1944.

**Former Polish Socialist Party member who was made Premier and Foreign Minister in the Provisional Government of Poland.

of any type of compact with the Soviet Union. Moscow, therefore, transferred its attention to the Communist-dominated Polish Patriots' Union and subsequently signed an agreement with it.¹⁰ The treaty guaranteed Polish-Soviet cooperation for twenty years and the basic element of the covenant was Article II, which called for the "strengthening of a stable and permanent friendship in time of war and after war" between the two contracting parties. That relationship, in turn, was to then

. . . strengthen the friendly collaboration between the two countries in conformity with the principles of mutual respect for their independence and sovereignty as well as non-intervention in internal affairs of the other state.¹¹

The article offered the Polish people the illusion of security and provided Osobka-Morawski's group substantial political and military support from the U.S.S.R. In return Stalin acquired a loyal regime in Poland. The entire treaty was just vague enough to keep the United States from detecting any desire to dominate Poland by non-democratic elements. No diplomatic or Presidential protest was given by the U.S.

The image of political independence in Poland did not last long as the Communists proceeded rapidly to tighten

¹⁰Black and Helmreich, op. cit., p. 576.

¹¹Leland M. Goodrich and Marie J. Carroll, eds., Documents on American Foreign Relations, Vol. VII, 1944-1945, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1947), p. 857.

their hold over the Polish nation. In March of 1945, Stalin arrested members of a delegation invited to negotiate with Moscow. Members of the group were:

The Vice Premier of the Polish Government, Jan Jankowski (Labor Party).

Three Ministers of the Polish Government, permanently in Poland, Adam Bien (Peasant Party); Stanislaw Jasiukowicz (National Democratic Party); and Antoni Pajdak (Socialist Party).

The Commander of the former Home Army, General Leopold Okulicki.

The Chairman of the secret Polish Parliament, known as the Council of National Unity, Kazimierz Puzak (Socialist Party).

Eight members of the Council of National Unity, representing the chief political parties in Poland: Stanislaw Mierzwa (Peasant Party); Kazimierz Baginski (Peasant Party); Josef Chacinski (Labor Party); Franciszk Urbanski (Labor Party); Zbigniew Stypulkowski (National Democratic Party); Kazimierz Kobylanski, Piotr Czernick, and Michalowski (all members of the National Democratic Party).

They were accused of carrying out disruptive acts in the rear of the Red Army as it was "liberating" Poland. In fact all of them were democratic leaders whose opinion in the matter of the formation of the future Polish Government had been important. As a group, they represented " a broad coalition of political parties in Poland and were members of the governing, military and political bodies and for five years directed the Polish nation's struggle against the German occupants in Poland." They were generally esteemed by the Poles in the homeland and abroad, and the Polish government-in-exile was completely confident in them.¹²

¹²Rozek, op. cit., p. 370.

By arresting the fifteen eminent Polish political leaders, Moscow desired to prevent the formation of a new democratic Poland and thereby undermine the measures agreed upon in the Crimea. The U.S.S.R.'s explanation for the arrest depicted the duplicity of Moscow's actions and pledges. It was given by the Soviet News Agency, TASS, on May 5, 1945:

. . . the group of Poles mentioned in the British press and referred to in the House of Commons is composed of sixteen and not fifteen people. It is headed by the well-known Polish General Okulicki . . . This group of sixteen persons did not disappear but was arrested by the military authorities of the Soviet Command, All these men, or some of them, according to the results of the inquiry, will be tried.¹³

Protests against the obviously false accusation came from several quarters. Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, head of the Polish government-in-exile denied the Soviet charges that the underground organizations were promoting and carrying out sabotage and justified their wartime acts as being "the instinct of self-preservation in the nation."¹⁴ Another expostulation was presented by Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., United States Secretary of State who on May 5, 1945, commented on the Soviet action. The language was temperate but expressed American anxiety over Soviet actions in Poland.

¹³Ibid., pp. 374-375. At first the Soviets disavowed any knowledge of the missing Polish delegation (Ibid.).

¹⁴Ibid., p. 375. See Appendix for full text of Mikolajczyk's statement (Document No. 1).

. . . Mr. Molotov has now officially informed Mr. Eden and myself that these leaders were arrested on the charge of "diversionist" activities against the Red Army.

We told Mr. Molotov of our great concern on learning after such a long delay of this disturbing development which has a direct bearing on the working out of the Polish problem. . . . We have asked . . . for a . . . full explanation of this action. . . . Further discussions must await a reply.¹⁵

No insensate innuendoes were spoken. The above weak protest was the only U.S. pressure applied to aid the captive Poles, and no demand for leniency was espoused. By not showing Moscow a greater degree of determination on behalf of the noted democratic elements in Poland, the United States lost an opportunity to advance the independence of Poland which was contingent with the holding of "free and unfettered elections" in that state.

To eliminate the "courageous and patriotic leaders of the Underground" was imperative to Stalin. The alleged crimes were a "tactical move to extort confessions which would incriminate the London Government and its underground organizations in Poland." Having accomplished that, the Communists had destroyed practically all "potential competition to their absolute rule of Poland," and several events prior to the Yalta-promised general elections aided the development of Moscow's complete domination of the Polish

¹⁵Goodrich and Carroll, eds., op. cit., p. 209. On June 21, the Court in Moscow charged twelve of the sixteen arrested Polish leaders with underground activities in the rear of the Red Army and sentenced them for periods of from four months to ten years. Three were acquitted and one, owing to illness, was not tried at that date (Ibid.).

state.¹⁶

The Tripartite Commission in Moscow reached an agreement on June 22, 1945; the formation of the Polish Provisional Government. Six days later the Lublin Committee resigned. Osobka-Morawski became the Premier of the new Provisional Government of National Unity, and Mikolajczyk's acceptance of the decisions reached at the Moscow meeting "united" the Poles.* On July 3, 1945, the new Polish Government promised Britain and the United States that it would hold the long-awaited "free and unfettered elections."** Two days later the U.S. and the United Kingdom recognized the Provisional Government as legal authority in Poland.

Dilatoriness tactics enabled the Communists to prevent a general election for a year, but they allowed a referendum to take place on June 30, 1946. It decided affirmatively to three important issues for Poland: (1) the abolition of the Senate; (2) the nationalization of industry and land reform; (3) the acceptance of the new western frontier.*** The situation prompted a less than speedy

¹⁶ Rozek, op. cit., p. 375.

*Mikolajczyk had acquiesced to the compact formulated during the Moscow meeting and pledged friendship to and cooperation with the U.S.S.R.

**It was not stated when the elections would be held. Therefore, they could be put off indefinitely.

***It was the frontier agreed to during the Yalta Conference, along the Oder-Neisse rivers.

note from Washington on August 20, 1946, charging the government in Poland with curtailment of democratic activity and irregularity in conducting the referendum, but the decisions of the referendum became law regardless of U.S. protest. Because of that situation, any elections specified in the Yalta Agreement were not immediately expected to take place.

Finally on January 19, 1947, the Polish state selected its new ruling government. The results were published by the Communists on January 28, 1947. The publication showed that only 11,413,618 of 12,701,056 voters actually cast their ballots. The division of Parliamentary seats was:

TABLE 1

DIVISION OF PARLIAMENTARY SEATS ¹⁷	
Government bloc -----	394 seats
Polish Peasant Party -----	28
Christian Labor Party -----	12
PSL, New Liberation Party ---	7
Catholic Progressive Party --	3
Total -----	<hr/> 444

The Communists together with their political allies had won a clear-cut victory, and the Red Army was present to ensure Polish obedience to the newly elected regime. Soviet domination over Poland was complete.

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 429.

II. Czechoslovakia: 1944-1948

In the winter of 1944-45, the Red Army had liberated all of Slovakia and Moravia and most of Bohemia. The forces of the United States freed the city of Pilsen and most of western Bohemia, but at the insistence of the Soviets they did not advance to Prague and relieve Czech forces there. The troops of the U.S.S.R. were to have the honor of driving the Germans from the capital of Czechoslovakia on May 7, 1945.

Following the liberation of half of Slovakia and the whole of Carpatho-Ruthenia by the Soviet Army, Dr. Eduard Benes, the Czechoslovak President broadcasted from London to his people on February 17, 1945. He announced that he and his government would shortly return to Czechoslovakia from London, but ten months later the Czech government-in-exile was still in England. Despite the delay, Jan Masaryk, the Foreign Minister, publicly presented the future foreign policy of the state of Czechoslovakia on December 31, 1945.

Our foreign policy will be based on the solid, unalterable, and mighty foundation of our treaty with the Soviet Union. . . . Our relations with our neighbors will be determined in the light of our Soviet treaty.¹⁸

¹⁸Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Vol. V, 1943-45, (London: Keesing's Publications Limited, 1946), p. 7052.

Masaryk was referring to the 1943 Czech-Soviet treaty of alliance. The treaty itself had previously reflected the policy of Benes and the Foreign Minister to "rebuild their country as a bridge between East and West."¹⁹ It was with the most minute effort that Soviet influence was established in Czechoslovakia, and the government-in-exile was prepared to acquiesce to that power. Indeed, upon returning to his liberated nation, Benes "voluntarily admitted Communists into the Czech cabinet."²⁰ It was a procedure not prompted by reality since the Communists and their political allies had not acquired a majority of seats in the general elections of May 26, 1946.

TABLE 2

PARTY REPRESENTATION IN THE
CZECHOSLOVAK NATIONAL
ASSEMBLY²¹

Communist Party of Czechoslovakia -----	93
Communist Party of Slovakia -----	21
Czechoslovak Social Democratic Party ---	37
Czechoslovak National Socialist Party --	5 5
Czechoslovak People's Party -----	46
Democratic Party (Slovak) -----	43
Other parties -----	5
	300

The New York Times reported the elections as being a

¹⁹Black and Helmreich, op. cit., p. 758.

²⁰Ibid., p. 758.

²¹H. Gordon Skilling, "Revolution and Continuity in Czechoslovakia," Journal of Central European Affairs, Vol. XX, No. 4 (January, 1961), p. 377.

"rebuilding of a democratic life in Czechoslovakia,"²² but democracy in that state was merely a facade. Communist influence was substantial and they were steadily gaining power. Pro-Moscow politicians held the most influential governmental positions. Klement Gottwald, a prominent member of the Communist party, became Premier on May 30, 1946. Jan Masaryk was retained as Foreign Minister, and on June 19, 1946, the Assembly unanimously re-elected Benes as President of Czechoslovakia. The Soviet sphere of influence was slowly engulfing the Czechoslovakian republic, and just how far it had been removed from the West and democracy became lucid in little over a year. In October of 1947, Raymond Daniel made an adequate observation.

. . . There is no visible evidence of Soviet interference in Czech affairs or life. There doesn't need to be. The Russians quite wisely are leaving it all to their Czech comrades. There are 1,200,000 Communist party members and the party has a firm grip on the Government. . . . It was an experiment in political collaboration which resulted in the non-Communist elements becoming prisoners of the Communists.²³

As long as that situation held true, the Soviets had no reason to intervene officially into Czechoslovakia's domestic affairs, and the illusion of independence was maintained.

²²The New York Times, May 27, 1946, page 26.

²³Raymond Daniel, "Crossroads Between Two Worlds," The New York Times Magazine, Vol. XXXXVIII (October 26, 1947), pp. 7; 57-60.

Everything appeared to be going according to Moscow's expectations until the Czechs announced their desire to participate in the Paris discussions of the Marshall plan. Stalin put a speedy halt to such freedom of expression, and subtle Communist pressure became overt. Despite the Soviet intervention, President Benes continued to await a major move by them to restrain civil liberties. When it took place he would then turn to the Parliament for support in preserving Czechoslovakia's freedom. He had underestimated the Communists, however. When the move came it was not in the area of civil liberties. Instead, it was a Communist formulated political crisis, which transpired on February 25, 1948.

The Soviet solution to the artificially created crisis was a new government under the Communist leader Klement Gottwald, but Benes refused to accept the Soviet terms. His objection was exposed in a letter to the Presidium of the Communist Party in which he insisted upon "parliamentary democracy and parliamentary government," but Moscow's will prevailed.²⁴

The United States, France, and Great Britain issued a formal protest on February 26, 1948.

(Through) means of a crisis artificially and deliberately instigated the use of certain methods already tested in other places has permitted the

²⁴"Document," Current History, Vol. XIV (April, 1948), p. 20.

suspension of the free exercise of parliamentary institutions and the establishment of a disguised dictatorship of a single party under the cloak of a government of national union.

(We) . . . can but condemn . . . the consequences . . . which can only be disastrous for the Czechoslovak people . . .²⁵

The note had no effect and did not change the political situation in Czechoslovakia. On May 30, 1948, national elections took place and the Communist-dominated National Front received 6,413,963 valid votes out of a total of 7,204,256.

Benes resigned on June 7, 1948, because of ill health, and Klement Gottwald was elected to the Presidency by the Assembly seven days later. The Communist Antonin Zapotocky succeeded Gottwald as Prime Minister, and Czechoslovakia became a Communist ruled country. The means were called "democratic," but the end was the loss of Czechoslovakian independence.

. . . The case of Czechoslovakia show(ed) clearly that the active interest and impressive display of Soviet power in contrast to the West's hesitant policy not only formed the background but were the chief bases for Communist successes in Eastern Europe. Careful, professional infiltration of democratic institutions and the wishful thinking of the democrats did the rest.²⁶

²⁵"Document," Current History, Vol. XIV (April, 1948), p. 235. See Appendix for full text of the note (Document No. 2).

²⁶Ivo Duchacek, "The Strategy of Communist Infiltration: Czechoslovakia, 1944-48," World Politics, Vol. II (October 1949-July 1950), pp. 345-346.

The strategy used by the Communists in obtaining complete control of Czechoslovak government was broken down into four basic steps by Ivo Duchacek: (1) isolation of the democrats; (2) advance of the Red Army combined with the feeling and propaganda that the U.S.S.R. was the only possible ally who could prevent German aggression in Eastern Europe; (3) rapid Communist control of the main government positions (agriculture and police departments); (4) use of democracy and decentralizations as weapons for infiltrating and disorganizing of the government.²⁷ All four steps were followed very closely and assiduously by the Communists, but Czechoslovakia remained for a limited period of time a reluctant ally of Moscow.

Regardless of Czechoslovakia's hesitancy, its fate had been sealed. From May 1945 to February 1948, the republic had been ruled by a coalition of parties headed by the Communist Party. Democratic elements in Czechoslovakia were led by Eduard Benes, and they hoped that the Soviet Union would permit their nation the freedom to choose its own form of government. Benes professed that belief as early as April 1946.

It is natural that the socialistic system of the neighboring Soviet Union should exercise an influence on the economic reorganization of Czechoslovakia. In spite of this fact, Czechoslovakia remains and will remain absolutely independent, with her own political democratic regime and her own parliamentary democracy.

²⁷Ibid., pp. 346; 356.

The Soviet Union does not interfere in any respect in Czechoslovak affairs. Czechoslovakia is following her own way, her own methods and traditions. . . .²⁸

Such dreams were traditionally well-founded but not realistic according to the developing situation. Ultimately the Communist Party seized power in February of 1948, and it was too late for anti-Communist parties to prevent the complete Communist domination of the Czechoslovakian government.²⁹

The future of democracy in Czechoslovakia and also that state's independence had been founded upon "free and unfettered elections." The majority of the voting population, known to be democratic and non-Marxist, was to assert itself at the polls, but it was naive to believe that the ballot box was an unimpregnable sanctuary. The Soviets placed their faith in subversive actions. They thereby won the upper hand and terminated democracy in Czechoslovakia. "The result was a depressing shock for the Western world, and an encouraging sign for the Eastern world and Communism in general."³⁰

²⁸Eduard Benes, "Postwar Czechoslovakia," Foreign Affairs, XXIV, (April, 1946), pp. 397; 409.

²⁹Duchacek, op. cit., p. 372.

³⁰Ivo Duchacek, "The February Coup in Czechoslovakia," World Politics, Vol. III (July, 1950), p. 532.

III. Hungary: 1945-1948

As early as September 23, 1945, the United States informed the government of Hungary that diplomatic relations would be established with it, provided free elections were held. The Hungarian Government accepted that criterion, and Washington gave its de jure recognition on November 2, 1945. Two days later, the Hungarian nation went to the polls. The results were:

TABLE 3

REPRESENTATION IN
THE NATIONAL
ASSEMBLY

PARTIES	REPRESENTATION
Smallholders	222
Communists	70
Social Democrats	69
Peasants	22
Liberty	16
Democratic People's	2
Citizens' Democratic	1
Non-party	18
Total	<u>420*</u>

*409 members were elected; 11 were appointed.³¹

Zoltan Tildy was named Prime Minister on November 11, 1945.

Voting presented clear proof that the Communists lacked

³¹Walter H. Mallory, ed., Political Handbook of the World: Parliaments, Parties and Press as of January 1, 1947, (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1947), p. 98.

dominant influence in Hungary. The Smallholders and the West were encouraged to believe that Hungary could escape Communist rule. Indeed, proclamation of a Republic in February, 1946, was permitted without direct Soviet intervention.* Apparently the Soviet Union was not fearful of an established republic near its frontier. Moscow was even cooperative during the early postwar years.**

With the amicability of the U.S.S.R. and the diplomatic recognition of the U.S.A., the general belief was that the Hungarian state would be consistently gaining in strength and stability. That illusion did not last long, even though the November 1945 elections had actually been free.

. . . Now . . . came the first disillusionment, for the head of the Soviet Mission insisted that the coalition form of government must continue, and backed by pressure from him, the Communists obtained the ministry of interior, with the control of the police. The Smallholders were allowed to retain the Minister Presidency, but were forced by 'salami tactics' of pressure and blackmail to expel successively their more courageous elements as 'Fascists' . . .³²

Following political consolidation of its influence,

*Zoltan Tildy was elected President, and on February 4, 1946, Ferenc Nagy of the Smallholders party became Premier.

**Moscow extended Hungary's reparation payment for a period of two years. Premier Nagy returned from the Kremlin to Budapest on April 20, 1946, with the news.

³²C.A. McCartney, Hungary: A Short History, (Chicago, Illinois: Aldine Publishing Company, 1962), pp. 237-238.

the Soviet Union proceeded into the realm of economics. Its program of stripping Hungary began in July of 1946, which produced a protest from the United States. The U.S. note invoked the Yalta agreement, but it did not cause the termination of Communist actions. Indeed, Soviet techniques of infiltration were intensified. Within a year, Communist pressure had forced the resignation of Premier Nagy, and a new coalition government was formed under Lajos Dinnyes of the Smallholders party on May 31, 1947. On June 5, 1947, the President of the U.S.A., Harry S. Truman, made a statement in which he described the change of government in Hungary as an outrage. Nevertheless, the United States Senate ratified its peace treaty with Hungary on the same day. That action appeared as a sanction of Soviet exploitation of Hungary, and it made Washington seem indifferent to the situation. Therefore, the Hungarian struggle against Communist domination was solely its own.

Michael T. Florinsky depicted the manner in which the U.S.S.R. obtained Hungarian submission. The following observation was quite correct:

The method chosen was unimaginative, crude, and painfully familiar. At the end of February, 1947, Bela Kovacs, a prominent member of parliament and secretary general of the Smallholders' Party, was arrested by the Russians, an action branded by the American government as "unwarranted intervention." . . . Premier Nagy . . . was forced to resign. A new coalition government, nominally under Premier Lajos Dinnyes, but actually controlled by the Communist leader, Rakosi, was installed. Mass arrests which began

in March were intensified, the army was purged, and with the "voluntary" dissolution on July 22 of the Liberal party, the last vestiges of political opposition disappeared.³³

There was only mild political sensation created by the overthrow on May 30, 1947, of the Budapest government and it had already subsided by September of that year.³⁴ Dinnyes and the other government officials were surprised with the absence of protests from the free nations of the world, but then no nation had bothered to stop Soviet infiltration either. With that in mind, Dinnyes himself sought close cooperation with the U.S.S.R., but before it could be acquired several steps had to be taken. More than 5,000 anti-Communists were arrested; Bela Kovacs died in prison; Joseph Kovaco was fired; and Nagy was forced to resign. As long as these procedures went smoothly for the Communists, the Hungarians had no fear of direct military intervention by the Soviets, but Moscow desired total domination of the Hungarian state. To that end a new order, the "Iron Fist," was established. It was headed by Matyas Rakosi, Deputy Premier and Communist party leader, and it brought about the fusion of democracy and the brave iron-fisted Communist party.³⁵

³³Michael T. Florinsky, "The Case of Hungary," Current History, Vol. XIII, (September, 1946), pp. 154-155. Matyas Rakosi was one of the returning "Muscovite" exiles and a member of the hard core of the Hungarian Communist Party.

³⁴Ibid., p. 153.

³⁵"Hungary: The New Order," Newsweek, Vol. XXIX, No. 24 (June 16, 1947), pp. 42-43.

After the fusion, the Hungarian political, social, and economic situation would remain status quo. The actions taken by the U.S. in order to influence developments within that nation had no effect. Hungary had fought against the "Iron Curtain" by itself and lost.

The Soviets gained a substantial political base from which they enclosed the Hungarian nation, and their Communist agents within the country steadily strengthened their influence. The Communists consolidated their power quickly during 1947, and on July 25, the Assembly was dissolved and a new election was held on August 31, 1947.

TABLE 4

PERCENTAGE OF VOTES CAST ON AUGUST 31, 1947	
PARTIES	PERCENTAGES OF VOTES*
Coalition Parties	
Communists	22.0-
Smallholders	15.1
Socialists	14.6
National Peasants	9.0
Opposition Parties:	
Democratic People's	16.0
Independent Democratic ..	14.0
Father Balogy's Party ...	5.0
Minor Parties	4.3

*The percentages of votes cast in the 1945 election were as follows: Communists 17, Smallholders 57, Socialists 17, National Peasants 9.³⁶

A coalition government under the leadership of Dinnyes was

³⁶Mallory, op. cit., 1948, p. 95.

created on September 23, 1947, which included four Smallholders, five Communists, four Socialists, and two National Peasants. Eleven months later President Zoltan Tildy announced his resignation after the arrest of his son-in-law on charges of high treason and espionage, and on August 3, 1948, Arpad Szakasits was elected President by the Parliament and immediately assumed office. The U.S. Department of State protested against these electoral machinations.

(We) . . . are seriously concerned by reports from Budapest of widespread abuses of the already restrictive provisions of the new Hungarian electoral law, under which the national elections will be held on August 31. The United States Government, which has taken note of the assurances of free elections voiced publicly by the Hungarian Prime Minister and other Hungarian officials, is prompted . . . by its desire that freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty of Peace with Hungary . . . shall not be denied the Hungarian people.³⁷

The note went on to state how there was a disfranchisement of voters by the Communist controlled electoral organs on flimsy and illegal pretexts. It was also noted that the lists of candidates prepared by other political parties were supervised by the Communists. The lists were obtained by pressure. The measures mentioned within the Washington note was recognized as illegal means used by the Communists

³⁷Raymond Darnett and Robert K. Turner, eds., Documents on American Foreign Relations, Vol. IX, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1949), p. 698.

to provide them with complete control of the newly elected legislature regardless of the outcome of the voting.³⁸

Again, protesting produced no justice or reversal of Communist actions previously taken. The Soviet sympathizers had gained complete political control of the new regime in Hungary, and the Hungarian republic was at an end.

³⁸Ibid., pp. 698-699.

LA

PART, II. ACTIONS AND REACTIONS OF THE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AND THE U.S. CONGRESS

CHAPTER III.

U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT DIPLOMACY TOWARD POLAND, HUNGARY AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1945-1948

I. Poland

Moscow was the mainstay of the Polish Committee of National Liberation, but in July of 1944 the Committee "proclaimed friendship and a permanent alliance with the United States and Great Britain." A guarantee was also made that the traditional Franco-Polish alliance would be preserved and collaboration with every democratic nation throughout the world continued. "These pledges were soon forgotten, as Poland became progressively intergrated with the Soviet orbit."¹

On July 25, 1944, the U.S.S.R. stated its relation to Poland as being strictly military. Moscow said that it did not desire to organize an adiminstration of its own within the territory of Poland but did hope for the continuance of friendly Soviet-Polish collaboration. An accord was signed the next day between the Liberation Committee and the Soviet Union. Article six of the agreement was the most efficacious:

¹Staar, op. cit., p. 116.

As soon as any part of the liberated territory of Poland ceases to be a zone of direct military operations, the Polish Committee of National Liberation shall fully assume the direction of all affairs of civil administration.²

The Committee, subsequently known as the Lublin Government, vied with the Government-in-exile in London for the political leadership of Poland.

The Soviet Union aided and befriended the Lublin Government. It was the first step toward the Communist take over of Poland but appeared to be an amicable Allied action since the Soviets were fighting to liberate Eastern Europe from the Nazi invaders. Another manifestation of Allied cooperation on the part of Moscow was the solemn agreement to the Yalta accords regarding Poland. A major segment endorsed during the Conference was the Declaration on Poland:

A new situation has been created in Poland as a result of her complete liberation by the Red Army. This calls for the establishment of a Polish Provisional Government . . . The . . . Government which is now functioning in Poland should therefore be reorganized on a broader democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland and from Poles abroad. (It) should then be called the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity.³

That written statement was to insure an independent and democratic Poland, but a mere three months after the Big

²Dennet and Turner, op. cit., Vol. VIII, pp. 854-855.

³U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, A Decade of American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1941-49, (New York: Greenwood Press, 1968), p. 30.

Three met at Yalta the Soviets began to eliminate some of the Polish Democratic Leaders.*

Despite such Communist tactics, the United States established diplomatic relations with the expanded Polish Provisional Government of National Unity on July 5, 1945, thereby forming a good basis for friendly diplomatic relations with the Government in control of Poland. During the same month, the Allied leaders met at Potsdam. The central issue there was still Poland. The West desired more assurances not merely that elections would be free but that they would actually be held.

This time, Stalin resisted any firm declarations, arguing that the Provisional Government was committed to free elections and should not be hectorred or insulted by Allied meddling in Polish affairs. Stalin . . . did not mention that he effectively controlled "Polish affairs" and intended to continue doing so. The Western Allies understood this well enough, but (they) were still hopeful that the "free and unfettered elections" agreed upon at Yalta would be held.⁴

The United States had four specific points which the Polish Government was to meet, and Arthur Bliss Lane, U.S. Ambassador to Poland, presented the criteria to the Polish Foreign Office on August 19, 1946:

. . . it is essential for the carrying out of free elections that (1) all democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall be allowed to conduct election campaigns freely without arrest or threat of arrest. The parties recognized . . . (are) . . . The Polish Workers' Party (PPR), the Democratic

*See above pages 6-9.

⁴William P. Gerberding, United States Foreign Policy: Perspectives and Analysis, (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1966), p. 140.

Party (SD), the Polish Socialist Party (SL), and the Labor Party (SP); (2) all such parties shall be represented on all electoral commissions and ballots be counted in presence of representatives of all such parties; (3) results shall be published immediately by local districts; and (4) there shall be an adequate system of appealing election disputes.⁵

The four points were aimed at prodding the Polish regime into keeping the promise it gave at the Yalta Conference to hold "free and unfettered elections." If these steps were executed, the United States believed that Poland would be an independent and democratic nation and still possessed the conviction that events in Poland would advance smoothly since the Polish Government had announced January 19, 1947, as the date on which the Polish state would vote.

Just two months prior to the general elections; however, an induced Communist election deal was forced upon the Peasant Party. It was presented as a compromise political action in order to prevent the dissolution of the coalition, thereby averting any political chaos which would follow the termination of governmental functioning. The compromise, known as the Moscow agreement,

. . . awarded Mikolajczyk's party one-third of the places in government and administration--- enough for a voice but not enough for power. Their allotment was spelt out in detail: one Vice-President (Wincenty Witos), one vice-Premier (Mikolajczyk), and five of the fifteen ministries. . . . (T)he vital internal security department was made into a special ministry led by Stanislaw Radkiewicz. He had spent most of the war years in the Soviet Union. . . .⁶

⁵Dennet and Turner, op. cit., Vol. VIII, p. 883.

⁶Nicholas Bethell, Gomulak: His Poland, His Communism, (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1969), p. 107.

According to the compact, Mikolajczyk's Peasant party was also to receive fifty-four seats in Parliament. "It was party politics, Polish style. 'Parliamentary democracy' and 'free elections' became mere words written into documents to salve people's consciences."⁷

The United States failed to comprehend reality and merely addressed notes to the Polish Provisional Government in regard to the arrangements for the holding of "free and unfettered elections" in Poland. It was only when reports of terror tactics reached the U.S.A. that harsh American protests were conveyed to both Poland and Moscow. The Polish Foreign Office received its note from Gerald Keith on November 22, 1946. It stated that "the importance which the United States Government attaches to the carrying out of these decisions (reached at Yalta and Potsdam) had repeatedly been brought to the attention of the Polish Government," and only by adhering to the four points stated in the August 19, 1946, U.S. note could America "regard the terms of the decisions as having been fulfilled."⁸ Just a few days prior to the general election in Poland, Andrei Vyshinsky, Deputy Minister of the Soviet Union, received a note from the U.S. Ambassador W. Bedell Smith. It empha-

⁷Ibid., p. 110.

⁸Committee on Foreign Affairs, The Strategy and Tactics of World Communism, Supplement II, (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1948), p. 66. A second note was delivered by Arthur Bliss Lane to the Polish Foreign Office on January 9, 1947. See Appendix for full text (Document No. 3).

sized the fact that the U.S. had been a signatory of both the Yalta and Potsdam Agreements and placed the most import upon the sections which dealt

with the establishment of a representative government in Poland through the instrumentality of free and unfettered elections . . .

It also informed Vyshinsky's government that Washington was concerned with

the pre-election activities of the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity . . . (and was) especially perturbed by the increasingly frequent reports of repressive measures which the Polish Provisional Government (had) seen fit to employ against those democratic elements in Poland which (had) not aligned themselves with the "bloc" parties.⁹

The Soviet reply was direct and uncompromising. It simply stated that Moscow could "not agree with the accusations contained in the note" sent by the United States.¹⁰ No U.S. answer was made to Vyshinsky's statement, and American officials and a few Poles continued to believe that the election would meet the requirements of the August 19th note. In short, Washington was contented "to mix Gomulka and Mikolajczyk like oil and water, stand back, observe and deplore the insoluble result,"¹¹ but once the results of the 1947 elections were publicly known the United States realized that Poland would never be a free, demo-

⁹Committee on Foreign Affairs, op. cit., p. 67. See Appendix for full text (Document No. 4).

¹⁰Ibid., p. 70. See Appendix for full text of the Soviet reply (Document No. 5).

¹¹Bethell, op. cit., p. 110.

TABLE 5

OFFICIAL RESULTS OF THE
1947 ELECTIONS¹³

Party designation	Valid votes	Percent	National List
Government bloc ^a	9,003,684	80.1	327
Polish Peasant Party	1,154,847	10.3	24
Labor Party	530,979	4.7	10
PSL---New Liberation ^b	379,754	3.5	7
Other groups ^c	157,611	1.4	4
Unaccounted for	<u>18,000</u>	<u>----</u>	<u>---</u>
	11,244,875	100.0	372

Party designation	State List	Total Number of Seats
Government bloc ^a	57	384
Polish Peasant Party	4	28
Labor Party	5	15
PSL---New Liberation ^b	6	13
Other groups ^c	0	4
Unaccounted for	<u>---</u>	<u>---</u>
	72	444

^aThe breakdown of seats gained by the individual parties forming the government bloc was as follows:

Polish Workers' (Communist) Party	119
Polish Socialist party	119
Peasant party	103
Democratic party	43
	<u>384</u>

^bA radical splinter from the Polish Peasant Party.

^cProgressive Catholic (three seats) and independent Socialists (one seat).

¹³Staar, op. cit., p. 53.

cratic and independent nation.*

Intimidation and fraud had aided the Communists in strengthening their control over the Polish Government, but not wishing to provoke a war with the Soviets, simply to make Poland a democratic state, the U.S. could only expostulate what had taken place. The American position on the conduct of the Polish elections were made public January 28, 1947, but the actual note had been delivered to the Polish Provisional Government on January 9th. It contained the following five points: (1) elections which would be in accordance with the terms of the Potsdam agreement could not be held unless repressive activities by the Provisional Government ceased immediately; (2) the Polish Provisional Government failed to carry out its solemn pledges; (3) the U.S. Government still maintained its interest in the welfare of the Polish people; (4) the United States retained full liberty of action to determine its future attitude toward the government of Poland; and (5) Washington would keep itself informed of developments in Poland through its diplomatic mission in Warsaw.¹²

In keeping with point three, President Truman accepted the Letters of Credence of the Ambassador of Poland to the United States, Jozef Winiewicz, on February 4, 1947. On that occasion, Truman presented two apropos comments. The

*See previous page (42-A) for the election results.

¹²Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, op. cit., pp. 71-72.

first concerned the Polish elections:

. . . It is a cause of deep concern to me and to the American people that the Polish Provisional Government has failed to fulfill that pledge (of holding a free election).

The second implied that the United States would not "turn its back" upon the Polish people and would keep diplomatic channels open in order to acquire a more democratic Poland.

Truman's final statement was:

The Government of the United States has not lost interest in the welfare of the Polish people. It is with this in mind that I offer to your (government) the cooperation of the officials of this Government.¹⁴

Regardless of that expression of goodwill on the part of the U.S.A., a glance at the new Polish cabinet revealed how much the Communist domination of Poland had solidified.

The new governmental officials met on February 4, 1947, and faced the drafting of a new constitution and the election of a president. The previous President of the Polish National Council, Boleslaw Bierut, was elected President of the state, and he appointed Jozef Cyrankiewicz Premier. Cyrankiewicz had been Secretary of the Polish Socialist Party. He announced the composition of the new cabinet on February 6th, and five of the primary ministries were held by Communists: (1) first vice-Premier and Minister for the recovered territories was Wladyslaw Gomulka; (2) the

¹⁴Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, op. cit., pp. 71-72; 74.

man in charge of Foreign Affairs was Zygmunt Modzelewski; (3) Hilary Minc, a member of the Polish Workers' Party, was at the head of Industry; (4) Public Security was placed in the hands of Stanislaw Radkiewicz; and (5) the Department of Education was given to Professor Stanislaw Skrzyszewski. All five were known Communists.¹⁵

If the elections of 1947 and the new Polish Cabinet failed to make the Communist domination of Poland obvious, the acceptance and subsequent rejection of the Marshall Plan did. Poland "declined to take part because of the personal intervention by Stalin," which revealed "its strong ties with the U.S.S.R. and manifested Soviet influence in Poland."¹⁶ The United States could only stand by helplessly as the "Iron Curtain" began to isolate Poland from the free world.

¹⁵"Document," Journal of Central European Affairs, VII (April 1947-January 1948), pp. 87-88.

¹⁶Staar, op. cit., pp. 6 and 94.

II. Hungary

Following the penetration of the Red Army into Hungary, the Hungarian Communist Party was organized on September 19, 1944, by Hungarian Communists in Moscow, and the next year its first assembly met in Budapest. It enjoyed the support of Soviet troops, which controlled all Hungarian territory by April 4, 1945. Despite such backing, the HCP polled only 17.11% of the votes cast in the free elections of November 4, 1945.* The Communists, however, obtained the key Ministry of the Interior in the new cabinet of the National Front.¹⁷

The United States revised its foreign policy toward the new government of Hungary, and between 1945 and mid-1946, the plan of action was composed of five essential issues: (1) concluding an armistice;** (2) establishing diplomatic relations; (3) extending economic aid; (4) pushing for free elections which would insure a "representative government and provide for freedom of political expression;"

*They acquired only 70 seats in Parliament. The Smallholders Party polled 59.9% of all votes cast and obtained 222 seats.

¹⁷Ervin Laszlo, The Communist Ideology in Hungary: Handbook for Basic Research, (Dordrecht-Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1966), p. 33.

**It provided for the establishment in Hungary of an Allied Control Commission.

and (5) waiting to see if the newly "liberated" Hungarian state would comply with its pledges.¹⁸ Of the five points, economics was the fundamental fact, and the protests of the U.S.A. were generated by that situation in Hungary rather than the socio-political developments of that state. If the Hungarians could not be made financially independent or brought within the trade and foreign aid sphere of the United States, it would be impossible to prevent the U.S.S.R. from using their state as a base for inaugurating extensive westward expansion.

By July of 1946, Washington realized that Communist infiltration of the Hungarian government was already solidifying and Soviet disintegration of the Hungarian economy had just commenced. In regard to Moscow's actions, the American Ambassador to the Soviet Union, W. Bedell Smith, delivered a note to Molotov, the Soviet Foreign Minister, on July 23, 1946. In it Smith stated that since the end of 1945, the U.S. had proposed consideration of a way in which the Big Three could aid in rebuilding Hungarian economy.

In a reply dated April 21 A.Y. Vyshinski, the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, rejected the United States proposal on the ground that the working out of an economic rehabilitation plan for Hungary fell within the competence of the Hungarian Government, . . . (and) that the cost to Hungary of Soviet reparations and occupation was not in any way responsible for the deteriora-

¹⁸Dennet and Turner, op. cit., Vol. VIII, p. 327.

tion of economic conditions in Hungary. . . .¹⁹

Despite Soviet noncooperation, the United States publicized its decision to assist in the restoration of Hungary. It was presented on September 24, 1946.

. . . (T)he United States has undertaken, within limites imposed upon it by the lack of (Moscow's) cooperation, to render such assistance as might be effective toward the rehabilitation of Hungary . . . (It) is designed to assist (Hungary) directly; on the other hand, Soviet aid mentioned in the Soviet Government's note of July 27 consists principally of partial postponement of economic drains on the Hungarian economy in the form of reparations. Meanwhile it is understood that requisitions and removals²⁰ by the Soviet Army are, in practice, continuing.

Communist economic disintergration and infiltration of Hungary continued even after the tactful note of September 24th. The procedure provoked official U.S. opposition to the Soviet High Command's intervention in Hungary. That protest was registered on March 5, 1947.

. . . The pattern of recent political developments in Hungary appears to threaten the right of the people to live under a government of their own free choosing, for it involves foreign inter²¹vention in the domestic affairs of Hungary . . .

The March 5th note also contained the request of Washington that the Allied Control Commission plus five top Hungarian

¹⁹Ibid., pp. 327-328. New York Times printed the full text of the note on July 27, 1946; see Appendix (Document No. 6). For the Soviet reply see Appendix (Document No. 7).

²⁰Committee on Foreign Affairs, op. cit., pp. 21-22. "The U.S.A. returned \$32,000,000 of gold to Hungary and granted it a long-term credit of \$15,000,000 (Ibid.)."

²¹Ibid., pp. 23-24.

officials* analyze the conspiracy to overthrow the government and the case against Mr. Kovacs. After an extensive investigation, the group would then make certain recommendations to the Government of Hungary as to steps which should be taken for the orderly solution of their problem. The Washington officials also requested the Soviet authorities to take no further measures without consulting the representatives on the Allied Control Commission first.²²

Lt. General V.P. Sviridov, the Soviet Acting Chairman of the Allied Control Commission for Hungary presented Moscow's reply on March 8th. It was delivered to George H. Weems, U.S. Representative on the Commission.

The existence of an anti-constitutional plot and the threat that it represented to the young Hungarian democracy is not denied even by the Smallholder Party itself. . . .

The investigations on the subject of the plot, . . . have already been completed by the Hungarian authorities and the case of the plotters is at present being investigated by the Independent Democratic Court of the Hungarian Republic. On this basis I cannot agree to your proposal for a mutual investigation of the present situation . . .²³

With the above answer, the U.S.S.R. obstructed any objective investigation of Communist political maneuvering in Hungary.

*They were the Hungarian Prime Minister, the Minister of Defense, Minister of Interior, Minister of Justice, and the President of the National Assembly.

²²Ibid., p. 24.

²³Ibid., p. 26.

Notes of protest against Communist actions, compromise proposals by the United States, and Soviet rejections were delivered in almost rote fashion over the economic situation in Hungary. The first signs of objections against political activities within that state had been delivered on March 5, 1947. There quickly followed another note on March 17, 1947. The New York Times printed the text of the protest as released by the State Department. Three important points were made. First, it was apparent to Washington that

minority groups under the leadership of the Hungarian Communist party (were) attempting to seize power through . . . extraconstitutional tactics.

Secondly, that such actions threatened "the continuance of democracy in Hungary, and finally, as signatory powers of the Yalta Agreement, the Big Three were "obligated to undertake concerted action to investigate political conditions in Hungary." The note also made public U.S. resentment of Russia's position in Hungary. The memorandum stated clearly that the U.S.S.R. was "in a position to take out of Hungary all that the West put in."²⁴

Three months later, another American statement was presented to V.P. Sviridov. It was strictly in reference to the arrest of Bela Kovacs, and it stated that the U.S. expostulation to the unilateral action of the Soviets was in violation of the Yalta agreements. It also opposed

²⁴New York Times, March 18, 1947, p. 5. See Appendix for full text (Document No. 8).

their interference in Hungarian political affairs, such as the derogation of the use of democratic rights and the free will of the Hungarian people. It was an evaluation of the political situation in Hungary with which Sviridov disagreed. He contended that the United States' "assertion of some change in the political power in Hungary, the nullification of the will of the majority of the Hungarian people and also of the establishment of some kind of control over Hungary by the minority appeared to be unfounded fiction."²⁵ It was a blunt affirmation that the Communists would continue their political tactics. They did so with increasing intensity as the August national election was drawing near.

The next State Department news release concerned the electoral practices in Hungary. It pointed out Soviet activities and asked for a correction of the abuses.

In as much as the Hungarian Government, under article 2 of the treaty of peace, has assumed the obligation of securing to all persons under Hungarian jurisdiction the enjoyment of human rights and the fundamental freedoms, including freedom of political opinion, the United States Government has instructed the American Minister in Budapest to seek an interview with the Hungarian Prime Minister and to urge him to take all necessary steps on behalf of his Government to correct the prevailing electoral abuses. . . .²⁶

The meeting took place and pledges were made, but the abuses were allowed to continue. By using such pressure,

²⁵Committee on Foreign Affairs, op. cit., pp. 27-28.

²⁶"Document," Journal of Central European Affairs, VIII (April 1947-January 1948), pp. 310-311.

the Communist-led National Coalition obtained 60% of the votes in the August election, of which the Hungarian Communist Party received about 23%, the Social-Democratic Party almost 15%, and the National Peasant Party 8.3%. The Parties of the opposition polled 32% of the votes. The remaining votes were taken up by the three minor parties, soon pressured into collaboration with the Communists, who had acquired five portfolios in the new cabinet. The Social-Democrats and Smallholders each obtained four, and the Peasant Party had two.²⁷

The United States Government was fully aware that the Hungarian Government came under Communist control irrevocable, but it did not cease all attempts to keep diplomatic relations open. In fact, the U.S.A. sought to keep its prewar treaties, bilateral ones, with Hungary in force.* It was only a dim light in the window to the West, and after only a short time the U.S.S.R. pulled the "Iron Curtain" down on that window in order to prevent all Western contacts from reaching Hungary.

²⁷Laszlo, op. cit., p. 34.

*See Appendix for full text of the note (Document No. 9).

of the six main parties (40 seats to each) and assure representation to mass organizations (44 seats), to outstanding personalities (11), and to the Ukrainian population in Slovakia (5). A similar parity of representation was maintained in the national committees.

As a result, the Assembly was not a reflection of a free popular choice. . . .²⁹

Regardless of whether the elections were popular and free or not, the United States was obliged to conduct its foreign policy toward the newly established Czechoslovakian government.

The withdrawal of U.S. forces from Czechoslovakia by the beginning of 1946 was the first American action toward the traditionally democratic nation in the realm of foreign policy. Next came the valuable credit of \$20,000,000* and one for \$50,000,000. The latter was suspended by the State Department, and three reasons were given for the action:

(1) the Czech nationalization of American enterprises; (2) the support by the Czechoslovak Government of Soviet charges that the United States, through its foreign lending program, was engaging in 'economic imperialism'; and (3) the transfer by Czechoslovakia of surpluses to Rumania.³⁰

Despite these political and economic actions by the Czechoslovakian Government, Washington persisted in seeking a commercial agreement with the new republic. Each of the three Czechoslovak actions were diplomatically discussed

²⁹ Ibid., pp. 367-368.

*The sum was to be used for the financing of cotton imports from the United States. The Export-Import Bank of Washington advanced the credit to the Prague Credit Bank in May of 1946.

³⁰ Dennet and Turner, op. cit., Vol. VIII, p. 895.

and a commercial policy was ultimately agreed upon.³¹

From that point on, there was the illusion that the Czechoslovakian nation was advancing toward a form of government which would fulfill the democratic tradition inaugurated in 1918, and the U.S.A., diplomatically and economically, had come to amicable terms with the new provisional government. The members of the new governmental offices were basically Social Democrats, Democrats, or non-partisan, and that led Washington to assume that the Czechoslovak state would tend toward the western democracies instead of Communism. With each passing year, however, the whole political complex began to alter.³² Although it was not boldly apparent, the Communists were gradually gaining a hold over the government in Czechoslovakia. Complete control was not being acquired rapidly enough for the Soviet Union, though, since opposition to the Communists was stiffening. The opposing faction was given moral support and economic aid by the United States, but the U.S.S.R. swiftly created a political crisis in the government and artfully forced through a take over in February of 1948.³³

³¹Ibid., pp. 895-897.

³²"Notes," Journal of Central European Affairs, V, No. 2, (July, 1945), p. 185. "After negotiations between representatives of the various Czechoslovak political parties in Moscow, President Benes on April 4, 1945 appointed in Kosice a new provisional government, a government of National Front(Ibid.)."

³³"Is a U.S.-Russian Breakup Near?," The United States News, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. News Publishing Corporation, 1947), p. 15.

III. Czechoslovakia

The idea of constitutional continuity was valued in Czechoslovakia, and in 1945, an important feature of it was the consortium of the Communists with the gradually emanating governmental institutions. It "warded off the danger of an independent, purely revolutionary approach," and constitutional stability was maintained. The manner in which an ephemeral and revolutionary situation was avoided by the Czechoslovakian government was revealed in an acceptable manner by H. Gordon Skilling:

. . . (W)ith a semi-revolutionary assumption of power, without popular elections, a President who had assumed power in London and a government which had been formed in Moscow took over office in Prague and proceeded to exercise the full powers of a government, legislative as well as executive.²⁸

Another development which aided in providing Czechoslovakia with constitutional stability was the election of the Provisional National Assembly, but it was not a democratic election.

. . . (T)he choice of delegates and finally of deputies occurred in public meetings, and note through secret ballot. . . (B)y agreement of the parties of the National Front, a common candidate list for the Assembly was agreed to beforehand, so as to guarantee equality to each

²⁸Skilling, op. cit., pp. 366-367.

The U.S. detected the increasing tension in Czechoslovakia and issued a joint declaration with Britain and France.

. . . (B)y means of a crisis artificially and deliberately instigated the use of certain methods already tested on other places has permitted the suspension of the free exercise of parliamentary institutions and the establishment of a disguised dictatorship of a single party under the clock of a Government of national union.

(We) can but condemn a development the consequences of which can only be disastrous for the Czechoslovak people . . .³⁴

The note was issued from Washington, Paris, and London on February 26, 1948, just one day after the announcement of the new Communist dominated Czechoslovakian cabinet.³⁵

It was a protest which had no affect, and the Communist coup d' état was successful. The Western democracies were profoundly shocked because it was "the first forcible Communist conquest of a strongly based free government." Most Western publics looked "upon the power, ferocity and scope of Communist aggression" in a different, almost hostile light.³⁶ The United States appealed to the United Nations, and, over the opposition of the U.S.S.R., the Security Council on March 17, 1948, approved the inclusion of the Czechoslovak question in its agenda.³⁷ The U.S. Representa-

³⁴Dennet and Turner, op. cit., Vol. X, p. 625.

³⁵"Document," Journal of Central European Affairs, VIII, No. 1, (April, 1948), pp. 89-90.

³⁶Walter Millis, ed., The Forrestal Diaries, (New York: The Viking Press, 1951), p. 382.

³⁷Dennet and Turner, op. cit., p. 627.

tive on the United Nations Security Council, Joseph Austin, presented the American view of Communist actions in Czechoslovakia on March 23, 1948.

Too much has happened which is not in character with the Czechoslovak people and Czechoslovak tradition. Too much has happened which bears a striking similarity to what happened in other countries, for the Security Council to be satisfied with perfunctory or categorical denials, or with further red herrings. The Security Council deserves and should receive from the Czechoslovak representative the fullest explanation . . .³⁸

The United States sponsored resolution inviting the new Czechoslovakian Government to participate without vote in the Council's consideration was approved, but the invitation was refused by the Czechoslovak Representative in the U.N. on April 8th with the excuse that "since the discussion of the internal matters of Czechoslovakia in the Security Council is contrary to the basic principles of the Charter, the Czechoslovak Government does not find it possible to take part in any such discussion."³⁹

The U.S.A. lost Czechoslovakia to the Soviet orbit, even though the two super-powers had pledged and signed declarations at Yalta and Potsdam to promote independent governments. In the final analysis, postwar declarations by the U.S. State Department had no influence upon the governmental, social, and economic questions in Czechoslovakia or in Hungary and Poland. Such questions were decided by the

³⁸ Ibid., pp. 631-632.

³⁹ Ibid., p. 632.

facts of geography and the fortunes of war. In short, any Eastern European state which fell within the military operations of the Soviet armies sooner or later relinquished its political power to the Communists.⁴⁰

⁴⁰ John C. Campbell, American Policy Toward Communist Eastern Europe: The Choices Ahead, (Minneapolis, Minnesota: The University of Minnesota Press, 1965), p. 7.

CHAPTER IV

REACTION OF THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS TO EVENTS IN POLAND, CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND HUNGARY: 1945-1948

I. An Over-All View

President Franklin D. Roosevelt exercised emergency powers as commander-in-chief during World War II, while Congress remained in the background. After 1945, however, Congress was more self-assertive. There were two reasons for that new mood: (1) the United States had assumed a leading role in world affairs;¹ and (2) the prominent position of the U.S.A. as one of the Allied superpowers allocated it to the preservation of peace and the promotion of collective security following the end of the war. All this placed a vital question before the Congress: "How was the world to be arranged in order to maintain permanent postwar peace?"

. . . It was generally agreed that there would be an international organization, but many questions remained unsettled. There were fears on the part of most. . . .²

The Yalta agreements later provided substance to general sentiment, but the terms of the Yalta talks created

¹Campbell, op. cit., p. 16.

²Charles John Graham, "Republican Foreign Policy, 1939-1952" (unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, University of Illinois, 1951), p. 108.

an illusion of peace and cooperation between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A.³ Within three months of the endorsement made at the Crimea, however, the amicable relations between Washington and Moscow were detected as being deceitful. Communist actions were speaking louder than their solemn pledges, and Senator Robert A. Taft brought the situation to public attention. At a meeting of 3,000 Polish-Americans held in New York on May 20, 1945, Taft demanded that

. . . (a) firm stand by the United States against Russia's unilateral policies affecting Poland and other liberated countries under Soviet occupation and stopping of all lend-lease to Russia "under present conditions" . . .

It was the first in a series of one-sided Communist activities which became unpopular in the United States. Another annoyance was the Soviet visa hitch, blocking Senators Russell and Maybank from a brief goodwill visit to Russia. The two-man Senatorial commission was detained in Paris on June 16, 1945. The Senators believed that the entire situation was a case of Soviet double dealing since Moscow was totally aware that "any delay would force can-

³McGoerge Bundy, "The Test of Yalta," Foreign Affairs, XXVII (October 1948-July 1949), pp. 618 & 629. "The basis of American hopes in 1945 was the double commitment of Yalta: self-government in Eastern Europe, and cooperation in the United Nations (Ibid., p. 629)."

⁴New York Times, May 21, 1945, p. 1 & 11. It was a report of an address by Senator Robert A. Taft of Ohio, chairman of the Republican Steering Committee in the Senate. The meeting, during which the address was given, was under the joint auspices of the American Polish Congress and the Coordinating Committee of American Polish Associations.

cellation of the trip" since they had "fixed plans to return to Washington." The U.S. gesture was one of open goodwill. The reply had been a slap in the face.⁵ One branch of Congress had received a dose of Communist duplicity, and the publicity given to the incident made the House of Representatives and most Americans more conscious of Soviet actions.

After four months of vacillation, the formation of a stalwart policy regarding the U.S.S.R. was encouraged by Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg⁶ and undertaken by the Eightieth Congress elected on November 5, 1946. It was a Congress which contained a Republican majority in both houses and was to work with a Democratic administration until 1948. "Leaders of the new Congress emphasized their support of a bi-partisan foreign policy but demanded that Congress be recognized as a full-fledged partner of the executive branch in the conduct of foreign relations," and through the efforts of Charles A. Eaton, chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs and Secretary of State Marshall a firm foundation for a concurrent foreign policy was established.⁷

⁵Ibid., June 17, 1945, pp. 1 & 3.

⁶U.S. Congress, Senate, Congressional Record, 79th Congress, 2d sess., Vol. 92, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1946), pp. 1694-1695.

⁷Dennet and Turner, op. cit., Vol. IX, p. 22. See Appendix (Document No. 10).

With a synchronized plan of action, the House of Representatives was able to pass a resolution authorizing the printing of additional copies of House Document Number 754, of the Seventy-ninth Congress, entitled "Communism in Action." The Senate and House accepted the resolution after minimal Senate amendments regarding the number of extra copies, the date which they were to be printed, and the amount of money to be spent on their publication.⁸ It was the first offensive action by the legislative branch of the U.S. government during the early months of 1948, and it reflected the accumulating skepticism of Soviet machinations.

Additional efforts to maintain Congressional alertness regarding Communist acts were provided throughout the remaining months of 1948. Three were protuberant. The first was an address by Representative Estes Kefauver on March 16, 1948, in which he read and commented upon the feature article in the Memphis Press-Scimiter of March 9, 1948. It was written by Edward J. Meeman, editor, and the major position professed was for the United States to take the offensive against the Soviets, but not with bombs. Kefauver then remarked:

. . . (A)ll of us are concerned and alarmed about the expansion of Soviet influence in Europe and

⁸U.S. Senate, Journal of the Senate of the United States of America, 80th Congress, 1st sess., (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1948), p. 96. The resolution was received, read and referred, reported with amendments and considered, amended, and agreed to, and the House agreed to the Senate's amendments (Ibid., pp. 108, 110, 125, and 148, respectively).

Asia. Americans and other free people want to do something about it but we lack a long range program. The European recovery program and Truman doctrine of aid to Greece and Turkey are . . . necessary measures which will help greatly but a policy for the future and a program looking to the years after the expiration of the European recovery program must be adopted. . . .⁹

In his final statement Kefauver recommended the reading of Meeman's article to those who were looking for a progressive and definite program to stop the encroachment of communism and to preserve peace. A recitation of the author's work was given and printed in the Congressional Record.

The second effort to keep Congress aware of Communist acts was led by the Department of State. On June 2, 1948, it submitted a document to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. It became known as the Senate Report No. 1440 of the Eightieth Congress, second session, and the Senate Resolution No. 213. It contained four major sections: (1) Germany; (2) Austria; (3) Eastern and Southeastern Europe; and (4) Korea. Part Three, a vital concern of this thesis, deliberated upon Bulgaria, Poland and Hungary. The analysis of Poland merely expressed the agreement of "free and unfettered elections," and the violations of that promise by the Polish Provisional Government. There were three accords and infractions regarding Hungary, but the primary one concerned Soviet abuse of its power on the Allied Control

⁹U.S. Congress, Congressional Record, House, 80th Congress, 2d sess., Appendix, Vol. 94, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1948), p. A1658.

Commission.¹⁰

The final action which followed in Congress was a direct result of Senate Report No. 1440. It was initiated by Senator Vandenberg in the form of a declaration of U.S. foreign policy and placed faith in the United Nations.

. . . (It) called for a voluntary agreement to remove the vote in Security Council actions concerning pacific settlements and the admission of new UN members, and for 'maximum efforts' to secure agreements on arms reduction and the establishment of UN forces. It also called for U.S. association with 'such regional and other collective arrangements as (were) based on continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid . . .' and declared U.S. 'determination to exercise the right of individual or collective self-defense under Article 51 should armed attack occur affecting its national security.'

. . .¹¹

Debate on the Vandenberg resolution was centered upon the intention of the latter provisions. A Democratic Senator from Florida, Pepper, charged that the stipulations had been "carefully developed to prepare Congress and the country for a military alliance between the United States and Western Europe." The accusation was denied, and the action by Pepper to obliterate the parts concerning collective security arrangements was rejected 6-61. "The Senate then adopted the Vandenberg resolution, June 11, 1948, by a vote of 64-4," and the U.S.A. finally settled upon the use of a firm but flexible foreign policy toward Communism.¹²

¹⁰Dennet and Turner, op. cit., pp. 919-133. See Appendix for full text (Document No. 11).

¹¹U.S. Congress, House, Congress and the Nation 1945-1964: A Review of Government and Politics in the Postwar Years, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1965), p. 102.

¹²Ibid., pp. 102-103.

II. Poland

The freedom and independence of Poland had been one of the major issues of the Second World War. It became the central problem of the post-war years, and the U.S. Congress overtly deliberated upon Polish events. The first speech concerning the Polish state was presented by Representative Alvin E. O'Konski of Wisconsin on February 15, 1945. A well known educator, journalist, lecturer and editor, he was an outspoken denunciator of Communism in Poland.

. . . The names and records of these so-called leaders of the Polish Nation read like a Communist's who's who. These so-called leaders are about as representative of the Polish Nation as the draft dodger of World War No. 1, Earl Browder and his gang are representative of the American people.
. . . 13

There followed a list of twenty Polish governmental posts and individuals who were officiating. The lives of all but seven of these men were then briefly depicted, and O'Konski eloquently disclosed the Communist loyalty of each.

Having been indiscriminately informed of Soviet activities throughout Poland, the House of Representatives continued to expound on the subject. The next speech was provided by Representative Charles R. Clason of Massachusetts,

13 ¹³ U.S. Congress, Congressional Record, House, 79th Congress, 1st sess., Appendix, Vol. 91-Part 10, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1945), pp. A642-A643.

whose dissertation was devoted to the "future government of Poland." Clason delivered his address on March 24, 1945, and the last section of it concerned resolutions adopted by the General Court of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, which were presented in a memorial to Congress. These resolutions called upon Congress

. . . to take official cognizance of the inherent right of the people of Poland, as well as the people of other small nations, to determine the form and kind of their own government . . .¹⁴

Andrew John Biemiller, Democratic representative from Wisconsin, presented similar views on March 27, 1945.

It is no secret that many groups and individuals in America have been fearful for the future of Poland as outlined in the Yalta agreement. . . .

The Russian Government must learn that Americans believe in democracy. We have no intention of interfering in the internal affairs of the U.S.S.R., but we do take seriously the Atlantic Charter (ideals) of freedom and democracy. . . .¹⁵

A few weeks later, on April 19, 1945, Representative John Lesinski of Michigan, of Polish descent and a member of the Polish National Alliance and the Polish Turner's and Fellowcraft, maintained that what was desired was a "Polish Poland, not a Soviet-Lublinized Poland."¹⁶

¹⁴Ibid., p. A1457. The resolutions were set forth in full on page 2519 of the Congressional Record of March 21, 1945.

¹⁵U.S. Congress, Congressional Record, House, 79th Congress, 1st sess., Vol. 91-Part 3, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1945), p. 3049.

¹⁶U.S. Congress, Congressional Record, House, 79th Congress, 1st sess., Appendix, Vol. 91-Part 11, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1945), pp. A1833-A1836.

Although anticipating the best, many members of Congress feared that Poland would be lost to the Soviet orbit. The Hon. Daniel John Flood, Democratic representative of Pennsylvania and one time corporation lawyer, eloquently reasserted Moscow's dictatorial comportment in Poland, and made his main point in the following manner:

The cause of Poland is a symbol of the cause for which this war was began --- the right of small nations, the right to be free from oppression, the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live --- and futher, and mark this well, the right to the restoration of self-government to those who have been forcible deprived thereof.¹⁷

Thus, the tragedy of Poland was kept in the minds of many Congressmen during 1945.

The skepticism inaugurated in early 1945 was reiterated in 1946 and 1947. Only two addresses were presented in 1946. The first was by Thomas S. Gordon, representative from Illinois. He spoke on February 11, 1946, of the "reign of terror in Poland." The second was a speech given on March 15, 1946, by Representative Daniel J. Flood. It was a forceful address which denounced the "unjust treatment of Poland" and contained two other bitter statements.

. . . When I hear and read the statements made by the official mouthpieces of Moscow and the Warsaw Quislings I can only say 'a pox on both your houses.'

¹⁷U.S. Congress, Congressional Record, House, 79th Congress, 1st sess., Vol. 91-Part 3, op. cit., p. 4153.

¹⁸U.S. Congress, Congressional Record, House, 79th Congress, 2d sess., Appendix, Vol. 92-Part 9, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1946), p. A647.

. . . The fact is that Poland is an occupied country --- occupied by Russia. . . .¹⁹

The above indiscretionary comments prepared the way for more elaborate attacks upon Soviet activities during 1947. That year, the major issue with which the U.S. Congress concerned itself was the Polish general elections. In the Senate and House of Representatives, eleven addresses were printed in the Record. They included individual opinions, readings of articles and editorials, and excerpts from books and speeches. Two were illustrative. The first was delivered on February 3, 1947, by Representative Thomas S. Gordon of Illinois. He read aloud the Department of State's press release of January 28, 1947, concerning the Polish Provisional Government. The main point was that

. . . (T)he Polish Provisional Government . . . employed widespread measures of coercion and intimidation against democratic elements which were loyal to Poland although not partisans of the government bloc. In these circumstances the United States Government cannot consider that the provisions of the Yalta and Potsdam Agreements have been fulfilled.²⁰

The second speech was made by Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., and it was given on December 15, 1947. On that date, the Massachusetts Senator merely reread an address which he had delivered on November 30, 1947, concerning

¹⁹Ibid., Vol. 92-Part 10, p. A1400.

²⁰Ibid., 80th Congress, 1st sess., Appendix, Vol. 93-Part 10, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1946), pp. A378-A379.

Justice for Poland. It was a brief history of the Polish nation which ended with a "Lodge solution" to Poland's problems:

. . . I want my country to proceed vigorously with its announced policy. I don't want it to say things which it doesn't mean. . . . I want it to be very exacting, indeed about any principle for which it stands. I want it to do more than pass resolutions and utter pious words. . . . I want my Government to use its strong bargaining position . . . to implement its policies toward Poland and toward all the world. If peace is to exist there must be justice. There can be no justice ^{if} we do not keep our promises in word and deed.²¹

The solution submitted by Lodge, Jr., was a reasonable one, but whether or not it was applicable to the world situation remained to be discussed. The United States Congress continued to be indecisive, but it reiterated its disfavor of Soviet activities in Poland during 1948, in clearly acrimonious language.

Only three major addresses were given in 1948, in Congress. The first was presented by Representative Daniel A. Reed, from New York, on February 2nd. He urged every American citizen to read Arthur Bliss Lane's book, I Saw Poland Betrayed, because it would make them aware of the danger inherent in U.S. foreign policy. Reed concluded his address by reading an article written by George E. Sokolsky which appeared in the Washington D.C. Times-Herald of February 11, 1948. Sokolsky praised Lane's book and

²¹U.S. Congress, Congressional Record, Senate, 80th Congress, 1st sess., Appendix, Vol. 93-Part 13, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1947), pp. A4716-A4717.

published excerpts from it. The journalist's* own opinion was contained in the first two paragraphs of the article.

Ambassador Arthur Bliss Lane had contributed immensely to the American people by publishing I Saw Poland Betrayed. It is a report to his fellow countrymen on his mission to Poland between 1944 and 1947.

I wonder whether the title should not be: "I Saw America Betrayed?" for when the officials of a country forsake its honor and lower its dignity for whatever expediency, do they not disclose that its spirit has been fouled, its national morality abandoned?²²

The second speech concerning Poland was delivered by T.H. Gordon on Monday, June 7, 1948. His talk was merely a reiteration of an article by John E. Thompson, chief of the Berlin bureau for the American Newsweek Magazine Company, who had recently returned from a tour of Poland. The major point of the report was that Poland had gradually progressed economically, but a shadow of fear was also presented.

Poland will play a key role in the Russian scheme to give eastern Europe the industrial

*George Ephraim Sokolsky graduated from the Columbia University of Journalism and subsequently was employed by the "New Republic News Agency." He was sent to Russia in 1917-1918 and there edited the "Russian Daily News" in Petrograd, the only English language newspaper in that city. He wrote editorials critical of the new (Lenin) government and was expelled.

²²U.S. Congress, Congressional Record, House, 80th Congress, 2d sess., Appendix, Vol. 94-Part 9, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1948), p. A812. See Appendix for full text (Document No. 12). In an address a month before, Representative Charles J. Kersten of Wisconsin (January 8, 1948) read an article from the Milwaukee Sentinel which was a report by Stanislaw Mikolajczyk on Poland (Ibid., pp. A63-S64). See Appendix for full report (Document No. 13).

strength to survive without western Europe and the Marshall plan. Polish industry is to be completely integrated with Czechoslovak industry and with the Russian economy. . . .²³

The final address in regard to Poland in the Record in 1948 placed hope in the future and faith in justice, but by 1948 the shining light of optimism had dimmed considerably. That last speech was made by Representative Charles A. Wolverton of New Jersey on August 7, 1948. His talk contained two main points: (1) it was generally distressing for a freedom-loving people to be held "under the domination of a foreign dictatorial power"; and (2) it was the duty of the U.S.

. . . to rectify . . . the great wrong and injustice that had been done to Poland (and) to sustain the spirit of Poland and her people; and encourage them to live on in the hope and with the faith that liberty, freedom, and justice will again prevail. . . .²⁴

The feelings of skepticism, duty, responsibility, indignation, morality, and judiciousness held by the Congress between 1945 and 1948 had blocked its realization of agreement upon a foreign policy which was neither inflexible nor flexible, but workable.

²³Ibid., Vol. 94-Part 11, p. A3595.

²⁴Ibid., Vol. 94-Part 12, p. A5149. See Appendix for full text of the address (Document No. 14).

III. Hungary

The United States Congress concerned itself almost exclusively with the political developments in Poland, but regarding Hungary it was more apprehensive about the economic situation. As early as September 25, 1945, Soviet maneuvering was revealed when it was announced that the Hungarian state was to sign a pact with the U.S.S.R. The U.S. opposed the agreement and viewed the Balkan nation as the loser.

To justify the economic arrangements (forced) on the Governments of the countries under her influence, Russia urges her need for reparations in kind and their legalization by the clause of the Berlin agreement that authorized her to take over German assets in Hungary, eastern Austria and Rumania. But the result . . . promises to be indistinguishable from the most flagrant imperialism of the west in the days when imperialism was being reprehended by Moscow.²⁵

That opinion was vastly different from the one presented eight months previously by Representative Augustus W. Bennet, who replaced Hamilton Fish in Congress. Bennet stated that the Soviet Union and the U.S.A. should be capable of working together toward a lasting peace;

²⁵The New York Times, September 25, 1945, p. 5.

They have no common frontiers; neither wants anything the other has except by way of exchange in the open market, and there is no history of victories, defeats, or injustices to embitter the peoples of the two countries against each other.²⁶

The feeling was much the same in February 1946, when a resolution was presented in the Senate which called for the reestablishment of communications and banking services with Hungary and two other European nations,²⁷ and one month later the Senate passed a resolution for the immediate and effective relief for the war stricken population of Hungary.²⁸ Both were highly commendable acts, but they failed to be effective because Congressional concern for the Hungarian nation was soon turned up on the pending peace treaty with that state.

Representative Robert Allen Grant of Indiana made a typical speech dealing with the situation. It was a reading of a petition, on July 22, 1946, which was entitled "A Just Peace for Hungary." It contained the formal views of the New York chapter of the American Hungarian Federation. Monsignor John Sabo, pastor of Our Lady of Hungary Roman Catholic Church of South Bend, Indiana, sent Grant the conclusions reached at the meeting. There were seven points expressed in the message. The first, second, third,

²⁶Ibid., January 25, 1946, p. 15.

²⁷U.S. Congress, Congressional Record, Senate, 79th Congress, 2d sess., Vol. 92-Part 1, p. 1255.

²⁸U.S. Congress, Senate, Journal of the Senate of the United States, 79th Congress, 2d sess., (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1946), p. 124.

sixth and seventh were the most important. The leading one called for the prevention of a partition of Europe into zones of influence. The second wanted an assurance that Hungary would regain its rightful and traditional place with the democratic western nations. The third asked that the principles of the Atlantic Charter, especially the ethnic ones, be applied when drafting Hungary's future frontiers. Points six and seven were:

6. To relieve Hungary of the unbearable burden of reparations and of occupation which prevent reconstruction and threaten the nation's survival.

7. To expedite the conclusion of the Hungarian peace treaty without further unwarranted delay.²⁹

The United States Senate did not ratify the peace treaty with Hungary until June 5, 1947, eleven months after the last petition by American citizens. All other actions by the U.S. during that time regarding the Hungarian nation were executed by the Department of State or the President.

²⁹U.S. Congress, Congressional Record, Senate, 79th Congress, 2d sess., Vol. 92-Part 12, Appendix, p. A4334. See Appendix for full text (Document No. 15).

IV. Czechoslovakia

The United States legislative branch heard only two addresses in 1945 regarding Czechoslovakia. The first was delivered by Mrs. Clare Boothe Luce, Republican representative from Connecticut, on July 5, 1945.* She commenced her speech by reminding the House that Mr. Grew, the Acting Secretary of State, assured four Democratic Congressmen that the U.S. was going out of its way in order to avoid offending the U.S.S.R. Mrs. Luce then stated that he could or could not have meant that statement in reference to Czechoslovakia, and she brought forth the fact that several developments had taken place since Grew's reassurance on June 1, 1945. A brief political history of the CRS followed and then she expressed her final view.

American troops are still holding one small corner of Czechoslovakia. But our right to be there has been challenged both by Russian occupation units and by the Czech government, which has announced it wished all armies---except the Russian-trained Czech Army---to leave Czechoslovakia. . . . (I)f we withdraw, all who do not support communism in Czechoslovakia are doomed. Liquidation of independent elements---which means murder on a large scale---is a primary step in "unifying" a

*The Hon. Clare Boothe Luce was writer, associate editor, and managing editor of Vanity Fair from 1929 to 1934. She was also known as an author, playwright, journalist, foreign correspondent, and lecturer.

country under a one-party system.³⁰

An opposing opinion was presented by Adolph Josph Sabath, Democratic representative from Illinois.* He addressed the House on October 1, 1945, and read the following article: "Iron Curtain Around Czechs Undiscoverable --- Country is Described as Paradise of Freedom for Foreign Correspondents." The report was written by Maurice Hindus and printed in the New York Herald Tribune on September 8, 1945. Hindus was reporting from Prague and had been there two weeks. He began his statements with an interesting observation and closed with an equally attentive one. The primal one was:

. . . For foreign correspondents the country is almost a paradise. There is no censorship, direct or indirect. . . . We may write as we please and move about the country as we please. . . .

His final statement was:

There is no secret political police organization. Nor is there interference in the relations between Czechs and foreigners, and the Czechs as well as the Slovaks, regardless of their political persuasion, never hesitate to speak freely on any subject.

The rumor of an iron curtain over Czechoslovakia is a pure myth.³¹

³⁰U.S. Congress, Congressional Record, House, 79th Congress, 1st sess., Vol. 91-Part 12, Appendix, op. cit., p. A3263.

*Sabath was born in Zabiori, Czechoslovakia and immigrated to the United States in 1881, at age two, with his family.

³¹Ibid., pp. A4101-A4102.

The only event in 1945 which hinted at possible Communist infiltration was the decree of a wide nationalization program by the Czechoslovak Government on October 18th. After that date, Congress paid little or no attention to events in Czechoslovakia, and reports, addresses, and speeches were lacking regarding that state during 1946 and 1947. An event in 1948, however, brought an abundance of Congressional views, opinions, resolutions, and protests. One of the first speeches in the Senate regarding Czechoslovakia was delivered by Senator Tom Stewart, Democrat from Tennessee, on February 27, 1948. On that date he read aloud an editorial which appeared in the Knoxville News Sentinel on February 25th. Stewart gave his views on the article printed and had it placed in the Record. The Senator called it a timely editorial. It pointed out that

. . . we should act quickly on the Marshall plan and that we should strengthen the United Nations. It also show(ed) the importance of strengthening ourselves here in America from within. America should have no patience with communism, . . . (a) most dangerous enemy of the civilized world today. It challenge(d) the right of free people to remain free. . . .³²

The event which had prompted the type of address presented above was the Communist coup of February 1948 in Czechoslovakia. Representatives John Davis Lodge of Connecticut and Karl Stefan of Nebraska also added their views of the situation to the Record. Both their speeches were delivered on March 1, 1948, in the House of Representatives.

³²U.S. Congress, Congressional Record, Senate, 80th Congress, 2d sess., Appendix, Op. cit., p. A1204. See Appendix for full text (Document No. 16).

Lodge viewed the events in Czechoslovakia as marking a vanishment in Czechoslovakian liberties.³³ Stefan also viewed the developments as deplorable, but ended his statements with an optimistic note.

It is true that a Russian rider sits in the Czech saddle. But if I know those people, and I think I do, the spirit of democracy will not die as long as on Czech lives.

It is also my belief that the Russian rider will find that he sits astride a strong-willed and bucking mount.³⁴

Hale Boggs, Democratic representative of Louisiana, was not so assured.* He expressed his apprehension by reading an editorial from the Catholic Action of the South on March 15, 1948. The article was entitled "The Menace Grows." The more significant part of the report was the second, stressing the ideological aspect of Communism in relation to other views.

Red ideologies don't permit any others to co-exist or to be held by anybody wherever communism holds sway, least of all the teachings of Christ. In the light of that realization today, we can recall with bitter irony the fullsome writing in the American press of not many years ago, when Russia and her tyrants and their ideologies were being vociferously touted as "democratic."³⁵

³³U.S. Congress, Congressional Record, House, 80th Congress, 2d sess., Appendix, op. cit., p. A1259 and A160. See Appendix for full report (Document No. 17).

³⁴Ibid., p. A1266. See Appendix for full text (Document No. 18). The comments of Senator Tom Stewart, Democratic representative from Tennessee were of a similar tone (Ibid., pp. A1285 and A1292).

*Boggs served in the U.S. Naval Reserve until 1946.

³⁵Ibid., p. A1612.

The final address in Congress concerning Czechoslovakia was delivered on April 22, 1948, by Representative Alvin F. Weichel of Ohio. He read a letter which he had sent Secretary of State Marshall. In it he requested that the State Department withhold trade privileges to communistically dominated Czechoslovakia. The reply was made by Charles E. Bohlen for the Acting Secretary of State, Grew, and attached to it was a Presidential press release. The former informed Weichel that the Department of State had decided to apply the general trade agreements to the Czechoslovakian government. The latter was the proclamation to that effect.³⁶

The Congress desired to introduce a more inflexible and less friendly policy toward the newly established Communist Czechoslovakia, but the State Department and the executive arm of the U.S. government were willing to retain open trade in the economic realm and secret communications in the diplomatic area. Congress acquiesced, and it followed, rather than led, United States foreign policy regarding the newly established Communist governments in Eastern Europe of Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland.

³⁶ Ibid., pp. A2471-A2472.

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PART III EXECUTIVE AND PUBLIC POSITIONS PLUS A
SUMMARY ON U.S.-SOVIET FOREIGN RELATIONS

CHAPTER V

PRESIDENTIAL AND PUBLIC OPINIONS CONCERNING POLAND, HUNGARY AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA

I. The Executive Position

A. Franklin D. Roosevelt: Friendship Above All

The Allies desired to win World War II in order to insure the preservance of a lasting world peace, and as early as the concluding months of 1943, that single goal was more on their minds than the actual waging of the war. The year of 1943 was also the period of the great international conferences.* At these, Franklin D. Roosevelt acted as leader and mediator. Each meeting ended in compromise regarding the Big Three's war strategy and postwar peace policy. Cooperation was essential for it promoted unity within the coalition, but it was often obtained by Roosevelt catering to Stalin's demands. Since it was a fact that the Soviet Union was "fighting our fight" in Europe, maintaining amicable relations with the U.S.S.R. was ever present in F.D.R.'s

*Discussions between Roosevelt and Churchill were held at Casablanca(January 14-24), Washington(May 11-24), and Quebec(August 11-24); the three Great Powers met at Moscow(October 19-November 1); Chiang Kai-shek, Churchill, and Roosevelt talked together at Cairo(November 22-26); Teheran was where the Big Three(November 28-December 1) solved the issue of the second front.

mind. Consequently, trust and conciliatory action were his key diplomatic tools during the war parleys. It was excellent military strategy and good for morale but far from adequate or realistic political maneuvering.

The Yalta Conference, held between February 4-11, 1945, provided a great task, and postwar peace and international cooperation were contingent to that Big Three meeting. Once more Roosevelt was the guiding force, but his control was not as predominant and his influence was ebbing. Again, the desires of Stalin were accepted, because the U.S. believed that the defeat of Japan, with small loss of American life, could be achieved only with the aid of the U.S.S.R. Therefore, F.D.R. was bound in the military area. He was also restrained in the political realm. First his flexibility was limited because a lasting peace depended upon Soviet participation in the United Nations Organization. Secondly, the Washington representative hindered himself by thinking in terms of moralism and idealism instead of the realities of politics. As a result of that prevailing attitude, the American executive was forced to accept a compromise which was to be far more favorable to the Soviets than to the United States in the postwar world.

Roosevelt addressed the Congress on March 1, 1945, to provide it with direct information concerning the Yalta (Crimea) Conference. The President said:

Speaking in all frankness, the question of whether it is to be entirely fruitful or not lies to a great extent in your hands. For unless you here in the

halls of the American Congress---with the support of the American people---concur in the decisions reached at Yalta, and give them your active support, the meeting will not have produced lasting results.

There was on all sides at this conference an enthusiastic effort to reach agreement (especially regarding Poland). . . .¹

Roosevelt skipped over the concessions made to the U.S.S.R. because he believed that when the Big Three met for the Potsdam Conference the Yalta compromise could be made a more equal proposition. It might have happened, for he was beginning to strengthen his tone and way of thinking about the Soviet Union.* Whether it would actually have been accomplished remained unanswered for the President died on April 12, 1945. His successor, Harry S. Truman, represented the United States at the Potsdam Conference.

Potsdam, August 1945, proved publicly what was already fact: the "Iron Curtain" of the Communists had divided Europe. Truman showed that he would not be weak in the face of the Soviet challenge, but the situation which had developed could not be stopped by mere words.

B. Harry S. Truman: An End of a Friendship

The Truman Administration inaugurated a policy of patience and firmness. It was only a short time before that strategy was abandoned, but it was Stalin who had first

¹ Goodrich and Carroll, op. cit., pp. 18-19.

*See Appendix (Document No. 19).

spoken of an unsolvable conflict between communism and capitalism in February of 1946. Churchill presented his views of the same subject one month later. In his speech, he talked of an "Iron Curtain" which had descended across Europe.

Amid the growing split between the two great powers of the world, Americans sought to establish a perspective--- a policy ---toward the Soviet Union. That task was not easy. Postwar events had been too sudden, and hopes of international peace and friendship too strong, for reassessment to take place quickly and with consensus.²

The first major public speech on future U.S. foreign policy was delivered by President Truman in New York on October 27, 1946, and was known as his "Navy Day speech." In it five important points were made.

1. We seek no territorial expansion or selfish advantage. We have no plans for aggression against any other state, large or small. We have no objective which need clash with the peaceful aims of any other nation.

2. We believe in the eventual return of sovereign rights and self-government to all peoples who have been deprived of them by force.

6. We shall refuse to recognize any government imposed upon any nation by the force of any foreign power. . . .

8. We believe that all states which are accepted in the society of nations should have access on equal terms to the trade and raw materials of the world.

12. We are convinced that the preservation of peace between nations requires a United Nations Organization composed of all peace-loving nations of the world who are willing jointly to use force if necessary to insure peace.³

²Peter G. Filene, op. cit., p. 167.

³Dennet and Turner, op. cit., p. 12.

As far as a clear-cut policy toward the Soviet Union, the speech was vague. "What policies, in concrete terms, the United States would regard as required its interests remained an open question,"⁴ but substantial terms were soon to follow. Through the Marshall Plan, the "Truman Doctrine," and the policy of containment, the world was shown exactly what Washington would do to keep democratic rights from being infringed by aggressive powers. Economic and military aid would be given primarily, but if the need arose armed intervention would ensue. Containment was the plan of action, and

. . . here, better than any other term, was the expression of the emerging Truman policies in foreign and domestic affairs. Abroad, Communist expansion was to be halted and prevented from affecting American life any further. . . . "We aim," Truman put it, "to keep America secured inside and out" --- to contain a general situation which the President was sure, could much more easily get worse than better.⁵

Truman had taken a realistic look at the postwar world and ultimately decided upon a concrete policy that would maintain the balance of a world which had solidified into a bipolarized power structure. "The 'strange alliance' had given way to the policy of 'containment,'"⁶ and it brought

⁴John C. Campbell, The United States in World Affairs 1945-1947, (Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 1951), p. 24.

⁵Eric F. Goldman, The Crucial Decade - And After: America, 1945-1960, (New York: Vintage Books, A Division of Random House, 1960), pp. 80-81.

⁶Filene, op. cit., p. 167.

the ideological differences of the Soviet Union and the United States into the open. Washington wished to build up and consolidate free institutions wherever possible. The Communists desired to gain complete control over the governmental positions within various Eastern European and Balkan states.

Each great power became suspicious of the other's actions. Soviet leaders regarded western moves as attempts to create a capitalist-imperialist bloc which would encircle their country.

. . . They redoubled their efforts to strengthen their own bloc, to wreck the Marshall plan, to create difficulties for the western powers in Asia, and to thwart American policies in Germany and Japan. . . .

Moves perpetuated by Moscow were regarded by the United States as acts of aggression and dangerous to the "democratic" way of life.⁷ The relations of the two major powers of the world were unstable, but Truman and other U.S. leaders were never so anxious that total war against the spread of Communism in Eastern Europe was thought to be the answer to tense international situations.

⁷Campbell, op. cit., p. 6.

II. Public Opinion and the Press

President Roosevelt expressed an opinion of far reaching importance in his annual message to Congress on January 6, 1945.

. . . We and our allies have a duty, which we cannot ignore, to use our influence to the end that no temporary or provisional authorities in the liberated countries block the eventual exercise of the people's right freely to choose the government and institutions under which, as free men, they are to live. . . .⁸

The attitude of many Americans was the same, especially in regard to the duty being a joint venture. U.S. citizens also retained the opinion that the wartime alliance should continue in the time of peace.⁹ It was even almost impossible for them to think of any single act by the United States since 1917 which would cause Communist distrust once peace was assured. Amicable foreign relations were expected, but, following the conclusion of hostilities, there was a rapid deterioration of Soviet-American relations. The post-war foreign policy of Washington was molded by that collapse of the East-West coalition. The situation disturbed many

⁸U.S. Congress, Congressional Record, Joint Session, 79th Congress, 1st sess., Vol. 91-Part 1, op. cit. . . . P. 71.

⁹"U.S. Opinion on Russia," Fortune, XXXII, No. 4, (September, 1945), pp. 233-238. See Appendix (Document No. 20).

Americans for they had certainly not hoped to see such a confused state of affairs confronting them at the war's termination.¹⁰

The events in Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Greece, and Turkey, aided in gaining the support of numerous Americans for the idea that Communism had to be stopped some-where. The Chicago Tribune printed two articles worthy of note. The first concerned Czechoslovakia and was the harbinger of situations to come. The press release contained one vital point: having the Red Army in Czechoslovakia made life unpleasant.¹¹ The second report was in regard to Hungary, and it covered the 1947 voting bill of the Hungarian nation which was cut to the Red pattern.

In setting out voting procedure, the bill specifies that any qualified voter may cast his ballot wherever he happens to be on election day. It makes no provision for ascertaining whether a person votes only once and provides no penalty for voting more than once. . . .¹²

Such information spread the idea that the U.S.S.R. needed to be shown that the United States would not back-down when faced with a Soviet challenge, and by the fall of 1947, many individuals in the U.S.A. were willing to exert force in order to prevent Moscow from extending its sphere of influence, The Soviet Union "was always on the offensive, the U.S. must act constantly on the defensive. Eastern

¹⁰W.W. Rostow, The United States in the World Arena: An Essay in Recent History, (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1960), p. 143.

¹¹The Chicago Tribune, February 5, 1946, p. 9.

¹²Ibid., July 17, 1947, pp. 1 & 5.

Europe was gone. Russia, in effect, stood on the Elbe River and the Adriatic Sea."¹³ And by late 1947 and early 1948, many realized that the U.S. and U.S.S.R. were at loggerheads.*

With each passing month, the American public, was becoming more educated in the area of Soviet-American affairs, for the press kept it well informed of the international situation in the postwar years. Texts of the peace treaties, Washington protests of Communist actions in Eastern Europe, and diplomatic actions regarding economic aid and governmental recognition of the new regime in Poland, and those of Hungary and Czechoslovakia were printed.

Even though "public opinion generally followed rather

¹³Time Magazine, Vol. L, No. 12, (September 22, 1947) p. 29.

*During that period, many widely read magazines and journals were publishing critical material concerning the Soviet Union. The November 1947, Reader's Digest published a condensed version of "How the Russians Stole My Government" by Ferenc Nagy, which had appeared in the Saturday Evening Post; The January 1948, School Life Education contained a five page article by William H.E. Johnson entitled "What Shall We Teach About Russia?"; A few articles printed during 1947 and 1948 were optimistic, others were just the opposite. The January 10, 1947, issue of The United States News printed an article which told of \$6,500,000,000 American aid to Europe. The result was not a trend toward democracy but toward socialism and state-owned industry. Time Magazine (September 22, 1947) painted a dark picture of international relations. Pointing out political and economic crisis, the article said that the U.S.S.R.'s military and political advantage was obvious. In containing Communism, the U.S. was forced to approach Russia from all sides, at widely scattered points, with widely scattered resources. Russia could strike where she wished. A few articles, such as the one printed in the August 1, 1947, issue of The United States News, were more optimistic. According to it, the inventory of a divided Europe showed the U.S.A.'s sphere in the most advantageous position.

than led the development of U.S. policy,"¹⁴ a few citizens had very definite and intelligent opinions concerning foreign policy. The expression of these beliefs were found very often in the "editorial" and "letters to the editor" columns of widely read newspapers like The New York Times. Some views were expressed at rallies and group meetings and then reported to the general public via the newspapers, and a vast amount were found to be very hyper-critical of American policy. With the war still being fought, the American citizenry opposed certain diplomatic actions, and the Yalta agreements were assailed.

Only men with a touching faith in the ignorance of the public could at the same time agree to one-sided Russian annexation of a third of Poland and reaffirm their belief in the Atlantic Charter, which condemns 'territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the people concerned.'¹⁵

In a letter to The New York Times, Carleton F. Wells of Ann Arbor, Michigan, was especially vociferous:

Now that Poland has been told its fate by the Big Three, we Americans may well ponder the final words of President Roosevelt's recent inaugural: "Let us live as men, not as ostriches." Marshal Stalin's demand that Messrs. Churchill and Roosevelt acquiesce in this partition of a United Nations ally has won an ominous triumph. Likewise the terms of Moscow's notorious puppet regime first set up in Lublin.

Concluding his letter Mr. Wells condemned the U.S. for its role in Polish affairs.¹⁶

¹⁴Campbell, op. cit., 1947-1948, p. 24.

¹⁵The New York Times, February 16, 1945, p. 10.

¹⁶Ibid., February 19, 1945, p. 21.

The following year, reports were of a similar tone. Two were representative of articles published during 1946. The first was in The New Statesman and Nation on April 6, 1946, and it concerned the political purges taking place in Hungary.¹⁷ The second was an article regarding the Czechoslovakian elections, which declared that Czechoslovakia was "not yet" in the Russian sphere.¹⁸

As far as Poland was concerned, U.S. citizens grew recurringly apprehensive about that state in 1947 and freely aired their views.

The United States is bound by the Yalta agreement to help insure democratic elections in Poland, Charles Rozmarek, president of the Polish Congress, asserted today in a telegram to Secretary of State Byrnes.

Mr. Rozmarek said that Jan. 19 elections would be a "a tragic farce, serving merely the purpose of confirming Soviet control over the country." Poland, he added, is living under Russian terrorism.¹⁹

This represented the views of Americans who had become extremely suspicious of the Soviet Union, since they realized that Poland's fate had been decided. The Government of the U.S.A. asked both the British and Soviet leaders to cooperate in assuring the promised "free and unfettered elections" for Poland, but the results were a flagrant sham.

¹⁷Paul Ignotus, "Political Purge in Hungary," The New Statesman and Nation, XXXI-XXXII (January 5, 1946-December 28, 1946), pp. 242-243.

¹⁸"Czechoslovak Elections," The New Statesman and Nation, XXXI-XXXII (June 15, 1946), pp. 426-427.

¹⁹The New York Times, January 4, 1947, p. 16.

Two commentaries were found to be typical of the various opinions given publicly between 1945 and 1948, with regard to Poland. The first was an editorial on December 23, 1946, in The New York Times, which reported:

It is . . . evident that the present Communist-dominated regime in Poland is determined to (keep) itself in power by turning the national elections . . . into . . . farce and fraud (.) That is quite in deeping with Communist practice, which does not disdain to utilize deomcratic processes to attain and legitimize power but would never permit such processes to overthrow a Communist regime once it is established.

. . . Meanwhile, the American and British Governments would only stultify themselves and violate their own obligation to the Polish people if they gave the least aid or comfort to the present Polish regime.²⁰

The second report was a speech made by Mikolajczyk in January of 1948, under the auspices of the Committee to stop world Communism. The central point contained within the address urged the U.S. to grant aid to Poland to fight the Reds.²¹ The Polish people had not given up democratic ideals, but with the assistance of the Red Army, Polish Communists held firm control of that westward looking state.

The future of Hungary, too, was already known. It was quite adequately described by Andrew Gyorgy in the Review of Politics, where he revealed that forces which prompted a democratic reconstruction of the Hungarian nation were "swiftly destroyed by the rising influence of the Communist Party which brought internal disruption and social crisis."

²⁰Ibid., December 23, 1946, p. 18.

²¹The Chicago Tribune, January 26, 1948, p. 26.

Gyorgy's closing remark was that Hungary was "headed toward the more permanent status of a political and economic satellite nation."²²

Czechoslovakia's path remained uncertain, and whether its place was to be in the Western or Eastern sphere of influence was not revealed until 1948. Early that year various political and military events began taking place. The ultimate conclusion of these incidents was an overthrow, and the American public reacted accordingly. This was illustrated in a New York Times' editorial which emphasized three major points:

First;

Shocked by the Communist coup d' état in Czechoslovakia into their first joint action on Russo-Communist expansion, the Government of the United States, Britain and France have condemned what they characterize bluntly as the establishment of a one-party dictatorship disguised under the cloak of a Government of National Union. . . .

Secondly;

. . . Today, Stalin's acquisitions already amount to more than four times those of Hitler prior to the war, and, like Hitler, he is reaching out for more. . . .

And finally;

It seems amazing that, having seen these things happen in Germany under Hitler, the Czech leaders and parties still dedicated to democracy should have permitted them to happen in Czechoslovakia---going

²²Andrew Gyorgy, "Postwar Hungary," Review of Politics, IX, No. 3, (July, 1947), pp. 297-321.

along step by step, making one concession after another, until they were powerless to resist.

That in itself is a warning to all countries still under the delusion they can cooperate with the Communists without signing their own death warrant.²³

One man had vocalized the sentiments of many U.S. citizens who had discovered that their country had lost another state to the Soviets. Consequently, specific facts were unveiled and championed by popular publications like Life, which reported in its March 1948 issue that

. . . (t)he Czechs obviously were surprised to learn that you can't do business with Communists. So, apparently, were the Western democracies, but with less excuse.

The fall of Czechoslovakia to the Moscow puppets . . . underline(d) the fact that U.S. foreign policy was still vague in the face of European realities. The best the U.S. government could do, while its citizens began to experience that 'here we go again' feeling, was to join France and Britain in a note of protest that was stupidly late and pitifully little. . . .²⁴

United States citizens were dismayed, surprised, and "up-in-arms", but they accepted the government's foreign policy; they did not advocate fighting a total war for Czechoslovakian independence. The American public recognized that the irreconcilable conflict between East and West had been solidified by the middle of 1948, and they were willing to let the Washington officials handle the situation.

²³New York Times, February 27, 1948, pp. 1-2.

²⁴Life Magazine, Vol. XXIV, No. 10, (March 8, 1948)
p. 27.

CONCLUSION

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSION: A SUMMARY OF TRANSITION

The postwar period of 1945-1948 brought forth several crucial points. One was the final tabulation of the cost for the Second World War.

Military expenditures of the combatant nations exceeded one trillion dollars (\$1,117,000,000,000), and property damage has been estimated at twice that sum. . . . In balance, World War II killed more than twice as many people as World War I, cost thirteen times as much in calculable monetary terms, and devastated a far larger area of Europe. Finally, there was the incalculable loss in terms of human misery and what the expanded resources of life and wealth might have meant could they have been applied to the arts of peace.¹

A second point was the emergence of two super states from the War years toward a position of worldwide influence in the economic, political, social, and ideological realms. The United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics were fused in a battle against their mutual enemy on the European continent, Germany, and coalition diplomacy was maintained until the Potsdam Conference which was held from July 17 to August 2, 1945. That meeting marked the turning point in Soviet-American relations.

¹Wallace K. Ferguson and Geoffrey Bruun, A Survey of European Civilization, Third Edition, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1962), pp. 936-937.

For while an outward show of unity was preserved, and important decisions were taken, rifts and misunderstandings appeared which were never bridged or properly corrected.²

After that, international peace was a dead issue, and the Red Army's penetration of Eastern Europe dictated future planning for both the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. The presence of Soviet troops in that area could be utilized by the Communists but such military power could not be ignored by democratically orientated Westerners.

The third point revealed in the immediate postwar period was that as the two great states transformed friendship into open criticism, the conflict of interest was most intense in the Eastern European states of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. The newly established governments in those states after World War II brought the American-Soviet collision into full view. Finally, when Washington protests, indignation and pleading failed to change Communist actions, "the confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union became increasingly open and rigid."³ Ironically, though, the period of transition ended in much the same fashion as it was initiated.

Early 1945 was a year of limited action. The U.S. policy was one which entailed rejection of total war and hope for a better future. The United States' Department of

²Ibid., p. 943.

³Filene, op. cit., p. 233.

State and the Congress clung to that plan of action and followed, with but a few dissenting voices and votes, the lead of the executive in relation to foreign policy and diplomatic conduct. All three branches of the government desired to avoid an all-out war with the Soviet Union and substituted three plans to promote goodwill and lessen the chance of hostilities between the two states. The three were known as the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, and the Vandenberg Resolution. The first aimed at containment by improvising a makeshift buffer zone. It was to prevent the Communists from gaining a larger sphere of influence but allow a healthy and free exchange of trade, ideas, and culture. All of which would be supervised by the United Nations and protected by military power. The second was for the reconstruction of war torn Europe. As "indefinite Communist expansion would mean atomic war; what sounder way to halt the expansion than by revivifying the economic life of that critical area(?)"⁴ The final plan set forth an explicit policy but placed major confidence in the United Nations Organization.*

More often than not, though, the President, Congress and State Department were at a loss as to what type of action to take in relation to the events in Eastern Europe between 1945 and 1948. The "free and unfettered" elections in Poland brought a cry of indignation and a mountain of

⁴Goldman, op. cit., p. 79.

*See above pages 62 and 63.

protests from them. All three divisions were greatly concerned that Hungary would not maintain its economic independence and were extremely distressed when it fell under the "Iron Curtain." Finally, each expressed shock over the coup d' état in Czechoslovakia. The crisis of that state ended

. . . with the discarding of the last trappings of true democracy and the establishment of an unadulterated Communist dictatorship. . . . (T)his development represented a defensive reaction--- and one foreseen by ourselves---to the success of the Marshall Plan initiative. . . . The result was that the Communist crackdown in Czechoslovakia, when it came, was received generally as a new Communist success---the evidence, in fact, of the inadequacy of the methods of containment employed up to that time. . . .⁵

As far as preventing the events, the leaders in Washington yielded no answers and presented the picture of being at a loss as to what action was most appropriate when contending with Soviet acts.

The American public and press were just as confused. The newspapers, magazines, and news commentators related events as they occurred, and personal views were attached at certain times to the reports. The public read or just listened and formed opinions of the situations within Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, but, on the whole, the press and individuals within the United States, excepting certain pockets of indifference, retained seven principal ideas:

⁵George F. Kennan, Memoirs (1925-1950), (Toronto, Canada: Bantam Books, 1969), p. 399.

(1) the Soviet sphere of influence and Communist ideas had to be stopped from expanding; (2) the democratic form of government was a righteous goal which should be perpetuated; (3) most Americans were of the opinion that the United States was the Number One power of the world; (4) many were critical of the leaders in both Moscow and Washington and the policies of each; (5) more often than not, anxiety and the feeling of repetition were predominant in regard to Soviet-American confrontations; (6) because of that insecure feeling, the U.S. press and public followed, rather than leading or forcing a change in, foreign policy; and (7) actual policy making was specifically left to the President, Congress and State Department.

By the end of 1948, the transition from cooperative U.S.A.-U.S.S.R. relations of 1945 to suspicion and open conflict was complete. The public, press, Congress, Department of State and President, however, continued to adhere to two basic ideals: (1) rejection of an armed conflict with the Soviet Union; and (2) the retention of hope for and belief in a better and more peaceful future. The first did not prevent the infiltration and take-over of Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia, and it only showed that most Americans feared total war. The second ranked words above military force. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted on December 10, 1948, by the UN General Assembly supplied a document for the direct public expression

of peaceful and humanitarian ideals. It was a noble gesture on the part of the U.N. members, but the Declaration provided merely the hope of a better existence for those peoples to whom freedom and justice were illusive shadows. In 1948, as it had been in 1945, idealism was placed before realpolitik. The implications of and reactions to that policy were far-reaching and generated the vengeance of the Cold War.

APPENDIX

(Document No. 1)

Mikolajczyk Speaks Out Against Soviet Acts in Poland¹

I reject this accusation of sabotage by the underground organizations. I was prepared for this accusation and even expected the Soviets to say that not just a hundred but a few thousand Soviet officers and men were shot by the Poles. This figure of one hundred shot, even if true, does not prove anything because:

(a) Surely during the fighting certain German units operated behind the Soviet lines until they were liquidated. We know from previous experience that when the German Army is retreating it leaves behind it some agents for special jobs.

(b) In the environment of the life in the underground in any country, a certain amount of criminal element exists, and it acts in an irresponsible way.

(c) It cannot be rule out that during the arrests and terror which the communists are perpetuating, certain acts of self-defense undoubtedly took place. I completely reject any assertion of organized sabotage against the Red Army. Our instructions were full of warning against illegal actions because these would provide an excuse for the Soviets and the Lublin group to introduce political terror and even deportations. I have reports that these instructions were carried out because they reflected the instinct of self-preservation in the nation.

¹Rozek, op. cit., p. 375.

(Document No. 2)

Three-Power Joint Protest on Communist
Coup in Czechoslovakia²

On February 26, 1948, the governments of the United States, Great Britain, and France issued simultaneously an official condemnation of the Communist coup in Czechoslovakia. The full text of the joint protest follows:

The governments of the United States, France and Great Britain have attentively followed the course of the events which have just taken place in Czechoslovakia and which place in jeopardy the very existence of the principles of liberty to which all democratic nations are attached. They note that by means of a crisis artificially and deliberately instigated the use of certain methods already tested in other places

has permitted the suspension of the free exercise of parliamentary institutions and the establishment of a disguised dictatorship of a single party under the cloak of a government of national union.

They can but condemn a development the consequences of which can only be disastrous for the Czechoslovak people, who had proved once more in the midst of the sufferings of the Second World War their attachment to the cause of liberty.

²"Document," Current History XIV (April, 1948), p. 235.

(Document No. 3)

U.S. Note on the Polish Elections³

Text of a note delivered on January 9 at 12:16 p. m., Warsaw time, by Ambassador Arthur Bliss Lane to the Polish Foreign Office

I have the honor to refer to the Embassy's notes of Aug. 19th and Nov. 22, 1946th regarding the Polish National elections, to which no reply has yet been received, and pursuant to instructions from my Government to inform Your Excellency, as a signatory of the Yalta and Potsdam Agreements, with particular regard to those sections of the two agreements which deal with the establishment of a government in Poland, through the instrumentality of free and unfettered elections, of my Government's continued concern over the pre-election activities of the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity. My Government is especially perturbed by the increasingly frequent reports of repressive measures which the Polish Provisional Government has seen fit to employ against those democratic elements in Poland which have not aligned themselves with the "bloc" parties.

It is a source of regret to my Government that its previous efforts to call the attention of the Polish Provisional Government to its failure to perform its obligations under the agreements cited have not resulted in any change in the course which that Government has pursued in connection with pre-election political activities. According to information reaching my Government from various authoritative sources, these repressive activities on the part of the Provisional Government have now increased in intensity to the point where, if they do not cease immediately, there is little likelihood that elections can be held in accordance with the terms of the Potsdam agreement which call for free and unfettered elections "on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot in which all democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take part and put forward candidates."

It is the view of my Government that this matter involves the sanctity of international agreements, a principle upon which depends the establishment and maintenance of peace and the reign of justice under law. The obligations with respect to the Polish elections which my Government assumed at Yalta and reiterated at Potsdam, together with the Soviet and British Governments, and the obligations subsequently assumed by the Polish Government and frequently reiterated, provide for the conduct of free and unfettered elections of the type and in the manner described above. The fact that the subject matter of these agreements relates to elections in Poland is incidental. The essential fact is that they constitute an international agreement under which all four nations concerned have assumed obligations. I need hardly say that my Government is interested only in seeing that the Polish people have the opportunity to participate in a free and unfettered election and that my Government does not regard the results of such an election as being a proper concern of anyone other than the Polish people themselves.

My Government would be failing in its duty if it did not again point out that the continuation of the present policy of suppression, coercion, and intimidation as applied to political opposition in Poland constitutes a violation of the letter as well as the spirit of the Yalta and Potsdam Agreements (Bulletin, January 19, 1947, p. 26).

³U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, The Strategy and Tactics of World Communism, Supplement II, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1948), p. 66.

(Document No. 4)

United States Position on Polish Elections⁴

NOTES DELIVERED TO THE BRITISH, SOVIET, AND POLISH GOVERNMENTS

[Released to the press January 7, 1947]

*Text of note regarding the forthcoming Polish elections delivered on January 5, 1947 to Lord Inverchapel, British Ambassador in Washington*²⁹.

EXCELLENCY: The Government of the United States,²⁷ as a signatory of the Yalta and Potsdam Agreements, with particular regard to those sections of the two agreements which deal with the establishment of a representative government in Poland through the instrumentality of free and unfettered elections, wishes me to inform you of the concern with which it views the pre-election activities of the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity. My Government is especially perturbed by the increasingly frequent reports of repressive measures which the Polish Provisional Government has seen fit to employ against those democratic elements in Poland which have not aligned themselves with the "bloc" parties.

According to information reaching my Government from various authoritative sources, these repressive activities on the part of the Provisional Government have now increased in intensity to the point where, if they do not cease immediately, there is little likelihood that elections can be held in accordance with the terms of the Potsdam Agreement which call for free and unfettered elections "on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot in which all democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take part and put forward candidates."

On December 18, 1946, Vice Premier Stanislaw Mikolajczyk addressed a communication to the American Ambassador in Warsaw in which he called attention to the reprehensible methods employed by the Provisional Government in denying freedom of political action to the Polish Peasant Party. This communication pointed out *inter alia* that the methods used by the Government in its efforts to eliminate the participation by the Polish Peasant Party in the elections include political arrests and murders, compulsory enrollment of Polish Peasant Party members in the "bloc" political parties, dismissal of Polish Peasant Party members from their employment, searches of homes, attacks by secret police and members of the Communist Party on Polish Peasant Party premises and party congresses, suspension and restriction by government authorities of Polish Peasant Party meetings and suspension of party activities in 28 Powiats, suppression of the party press and limitation of circulation of party papers, and arrest of the editorial staff of the Party Bulletin and of the *Gazeta Ludowa*. Authoritative reports from other quarters in Poland serve to substantiate the charges brought by Mr. Mikolajczyk in the communication cited. It is understood that copies of this communication were also delivered to the Soviet and British Ambassadors at Warsaw as representatives of the other two Yalta powers.

²⁷ A similar note was delivered on Jan. 5, 1947 to Andrei Vyshinsky, Deputy Minister of the Soviet Union, by U. S. Ambassador W. Bevell Smith.

²⁹ In the note to the Soviet Union, "my Government" is substituted for "the Government of the United States".

(Document No. 5)

Reply from the U.S.S.R. to the U.S. Note
on the Polish Elections⁵

Translation of substance of Soviet note on Polish elections. The note, dated January 13, 1947 and signed by Foreign Minister Molotov, was delivered to the American Embassy at Moscow on January 14, 1947

In connection with your note of January 5, 1947, regarding the impending elections in Poland, I consider it necessary to inform you of the following:

The Soviet Government cannot agree with the accusations contained in the note under reference against the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity of violating the obligations imposed on it by the decisions of the Yalta and Berlin conferences envisaging the holding in Poland of free and unfettered elections on the basis of universal suffrage, by secret ballot, in which all democratic and anti-Nazi parties will have the right to take part and put forward candidates.

The Government of the United States of America advancing in its note of January 5,²² a series of accusations against the Polish Government, states that the basis therefor are reports coming to the American Government, and makes reference to the sole source of the information received—to the communication of the Vice Premier of the Polish Government, S. Mikolajczyk, who transmitted to the American Ambassador in Warsaw reports of the above character, which the American Government considered possible to reproduce in its note.

In the note are repeated the accusations against the Polish Provisional Government contained in Mikolajczyk's statement of repressive measures directed against certain members of the party he represents. In this connection, however, there are completely ignored widely known facts concerning the participation of certain of the members of Mikolajczyk's party in the activities of underground organizations, who resort to every kind of threat, to violence, and to murder in order to interfere with the normal conduct of the electoral campaign for the Sejm.

Among other things, numerous facts are known concerning bandit attacks on electoral districts, terrorization of electors with threats in respect of adherents of the government and of the democratic bloc and even a whole series of murders of members of the electoral commissions.

In this situation, the Polish Government cannot remain indifferent and not undertake decisive measures with respect to the criminal elements who are endeavoring to disrupt the free and unfettered elections for the Sejm, even though certain members of Mikolajczyk's party should be guilty in this.

As is known, Poland suffered grievous years of German occupation, the consequences of which are still apparent at the present time both in the difficult economic conditions as well as in the difficulties in overcoming the remnants of the banditry generated in the period of occupation of Polish territory by German troops.

It is impossible also to ignore the criminal activities of fascist emigre circles endeavoring to base themselves on their underground organizations in Poland, particularly, having in view the connection

²²Bulletin of January 10, 1947, p. 184.

⁵Ibid., pp. 70-72.

of these underground organizations with the bandit elements who avail themselves of every kind of violence, even of murder of representatives of the Polish authorities and leaders of the democratic parties. In these circumstances the Polish Government would not be fulfilling its duty to the people if it did not take measures against these criminal elements to assure the conditions necessary for the holding of free democratic elections. To interfere with the carrying out of such measures would be inadmissible particularly on the part of foreign governments.

In view of the foregoing, the Soviet Government does not perceive any basis for the taking of any such steps, as the Government of the United States of America proposes, with respect to the Polish Government in connection with the impending elections in Poland and thereby in this fashion bringing about interference in the internal affairs of Poland on the part of the powers who signed the Yalta and Berlin agreements (Bulletin, January 26, 1947, p. 164).

27. U. S. POSITION ON CONDUCT OF RECENT POLISH ELECTIONS

(Released to the press January 28, 1947)

On January 19 a general election was held in Poland, the results of which are expected to be announced shortly. The United States Government has followed closely the developments leading up to this event in accordance with the commitments it accepted at the Yalta and Potsdam Conferences. On numerous occasions it has expressed its concern over the course of events in Poland, which increasingly indicated that the election would not be conducted in such manner as to allow a free expression of the will of the Polish people. On August 19²³ and November 22,²⁴ 1946, formal notes were addressed to the Polish Provisional Government on this subject. On January 5²⁵ this Government brought the situation in Poland to the attention of the British and Soviet Governments and expressed the hope that those Governments would associate themselves with the Government of the United States in an approach to the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity. This proposal was rejected by the Soviet Government.²⁶ On January 9²⁷ this Government delivered a further note to the Polish Provisional Government which stated among other things that if the repressive activities on the part of the Provisional Government did not cease immediately there was little likelihood that elections could be held in accordance with the terms of the Potsdam agreement. The British Government has also protested to the Polish Provisional Government the violation of its election pledges.

The reports received from the United States Embassy in Poland in the period immediately prior to the elections as well as its subsequent reports based upon the observations of American officials who visited a number of Polish voting centers confirmed the fears which this Government had expressed that the election would not be free. These reports were corroborated by the general tenor of the dispatches from foreign correspondents in Poland. It is clear that the Provisional Government did not confine itself to the suppression of the so-

²³ Bulletin of September 1, 1946, p. 422.

²⁴ Bulletin of December 8, 1946, p. 1057.

²⁵ Bulletin of January 10, 1947, p. 134.

²⁶ Bulletin of January 26, 1947, p. 164.

²⁷ Bulletin of January 19, 1947, p. 186.

called "underground" but employed wide-spread measures of coercion and intimidation against democratic elements which were loyal to Poland although not partisans of the Government "bloc". In these circumstances the United States Government cannot consider that the provisions of the Yalta and Potsdam agreements have been fulfilled.

The United States Government has made it clear that it has no desire to intervene in the internal affairs of Poland. By virtue of the responsibility which devolved upon it as one of the principal powers engaged in liberating the countries of Europe from Nazi occupation it undertook, together with the British and Soviet Governments, to secure for the long-suffering Polish people the opportunity to select a government of their own choosing. It was in connection with this undertaking that this Government agreed to the decisions respecting Poland that were taken at the Yalta Conference, including the decision to recognize the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity. These decisions with respect to Poland, which were accepted by the Polish Provisional Government in their entirety, formed part of a series of agreements between the United States, British, and Soviet Governments. The United States Government considers that the Polish Provisional Government has failed to carry out its solemn pledges.

The United States Government intends to maintain its interest in the welfare of the Polish people. While retaining full liberty of action to determine its future attitude toward the government of Poland, this Government will continue to keep itself informed of developments in Poland through its diplomatic mission in Warsaw.

(Document No. 6)

State Department's Announcement on Russian Activities in Hungary⁶

In the Crimea Declaration on liberated Europe, the heads of Government of the U.S.S.R., Great Britain and the United States undertook "in concert during the temporary period of instability in liberated Europe the policies of their three Governments in assisting the peoples liberated from the domination of Nazi Germany and the peoples of the former Axis satellite states of Europe to solve by democratic means their pressing political economic problems."

In following closely the economic recovery problems of the countries of Europe, the United States Government became seriously concerned several months ago over the alarming deterioration of the Hungarian economy. This concern has mounted in the intervening months, during which the Hungarian economic situation has become progressively worse, culminating in the present chaotic inflation.

Since December, 1945, the United States Government has taken the initiative in proposing that the Soviet Union, Great Britain and the United States consider means whereby the three Powers, as contemplated in the Crimea Declaration, could assist Hungary to rebuild its shattered economy. These proposals, however, have been rejected by the Soviet Government.

U. S. Offers Rebuffed

In a meeting of the Allied Control Commission in Budapest in December, 1945, the United States representative recommended the establishment of a subcommittee of the control commission to consider questions of Hungarian industry, finance and economics. This approach was unavailing.

Subsequently, in a note to the Soviet Government on March 2, 1946, this Government again raised the issue by reviewing the grave economic plight of Hungary, by calling attention to the overburdening of that country with reparations, requisitions and the costs of maintaining large occupation forces, and by requesting the Soviet Government to instruct its representatives in Hungary to confer at an early date with the United States and British representatives there in devising a program which would bring to an end the process of disintegration in Hungary, and at the same time provide a framework within which the rehabilitation of the country and its reintegration with the general European economy might be accomplished.

In a reply dated April 21, Mr. A. Y. Vishinsky, the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, rejected the United States proposal on the ground that the working out of an economic rehabilitation plan for Hungary fell within the competence of the Hungarian Government. Mr. Vishinsky also denied that the cost to Hungary of Soviet reparations and occupation was in any way responsible for the deterioration of economic conditions in Hungary, and alleged that the failure of the United States to return to Hungary from the United States-occupied zones in Germany and Austria displaced property, estimated in value at \$3,000,000,000 was one of the principal reasons for Hungary's present economic difficulties.

Russia Takes Half of Output

In connection with this exchange of notes concerning the economic situation in Hungary, the American Ambassador in Moscow, upon instructions from this Government, has now delivered a further note to the Soviet Government under date of July 23, 1946, the text of which is as follows:

"July 23, 1946.

"His Excellency

"V. M. Molotov,

"Minister for Foreign Affairs
of the U.S.S.R.,

"Moscow.

"Excellency,

"My Government has directed me to communicate to you the following reply to Mr. Vishinsky's letter of April 21, 1946, relating to the economic situation of Hungary:

"My Government is unable to agree with the Soviet Government that the fulfillment by Hungary of its reparations obligations and the presence of occupation troops in Hungary do not and cannot exercise any serious influence on the economic situation of the country."

"My Government wishes to bring to the attention of the Soviet Government the fact that half of the current output of Hungarian manufacturing industry, which is operating at only one-third of the pre-war level, is absorbed by reparations and other requirements of the occupying Power. In the case of heavy industry, coal, iron, metal and machine production, which is very urgently required for Hungary's rehabilitation, reparations alone absorb between 80 and 90 per cent of the current output. Except for some bridge and railway construction necessary to facilitate the movement of goods, Hungarian heavy industry is producing practically nothing for domestic requirements.

Soviet Requisitions Itemized

"With reference to the economic burden placed upon Hungary by the Soviet occupation forces, I am instructed to inform the Soviet Government of reliable

⁶New York Times, July, 1946, p. 11.

information in the possession of my Government to the effect that 4,000,000 tons of wheat, rye, barley, corn and oats were taken by the Red Army in Hungary in 1945, mostly during the first six months. This figure may be compared with 1938 Hungarian production of approximately 7,180,000 tons of these foodstuffs. Of stocks of food available for the support of the Hungarian urban population in the second half of 1945, the Red Army absorbed nearly all of the meats, one-sixth of the wheat and rye, more than a quarter of the legumes, nearly three-quarters of thelard, one-tenth of the vegetable oil, and one-fifth of the milk and dairy products.

"According to the most recent reports received, extensive requisitioning of foodstuffs was taking place as late as April, 1946. My Government finds it impossible to reconcile this information with the statement of the Soviet Government that 'the Soviet Command in Hungary has neither carried out nor is carrying out any requisitions.'

"My Government has noted that, in the opinion of the Soviet Government, 'the real reasons for the severe economic and financial situation in Hungary are the expenditures incurred by her in the war against the United Nations and the ravaging of the country by the Germans and the former Hungarian rulers.'

"I am instructed to mention for the information of the Soviet Government that, on the basis of reliable estimates, it has been calculated that the total war damage to Hungarian manufacturing industry, including removals, amounted to \$345,000,000, of which \$124,200,000 was due to removals by Soviet forces.

Claims of Russia Refuted

"Note has also been taken of the view of the Soviet Government that 'one of the main reasons for the difficult economic situation in Hungary . . . is the fact that a large quantity of Hungarian property and valuables continues to this day to remain in the American zone of occupation on the territory of Austria and southern Germany, where this property was shipped by the Salnszy Government during the period of the advance of the troops of the Red Army.' The Soviet Government mentions a figure of about \$3,000,000,000 as the estimated value of this property.

"In connection with this estimate, I am instructed to direct the attention of the Soviet Government to official Hungarian statistics, which estimate all Hungarian war damages attributed to Germans and Italians, including destruction within the coun-

try and removals from the country, and including damage to real estate, at \$1,250,000,000. Since the property removed from Hungary is only a part of this total, and since only a part of the removed property ever reached the American zones, it is clear that the estimate cited by the Soviet Government is grossly exaggerated. This conclusion is indicated also by the fact that the Hungarian Government's estimate of total national wealth in 1943, excluding houses and buildings, amounted to only \$4,400,000,000.

"Since the Hungarian Government is only now, at the request of my Government, in the course of preparing complete lists of Hungarian property believed to be located in the American zones of Germany and Austria, my Government is not yet in a position accurately to determine the total value of such property. The most important single item of Hungarian property in the American zones appears, however, to be the gold which was removed from Hungary to Austria by former officials of the Hungarian National Bank, and which the United States Government understands amounts to approximately \$32,000,000.

U. S. to Restore Gold

"With respect to the status of Hungarian property located in the American zones of Germany and Austria, the Soviet Government will be interested to learn that my Government has notified the Hungarian Government of its intention to return to Hungary the looted gold in its custody, and to expedite restitution of identifiable looted property.

"Restitution of commercial inland water craft on the Danube will be deferred pending the outcome of discussions between the United States military authorities and the Soviet authorities in Vienna with a view toward establishing principles of freedom of movement of vessels on the Danube under the flags which they now fly without danger of seizure. This program of restitution is in accordance with and in implementation of the statement made by the Secretary of State to the Hungarian Premier in Washington.

"As pointed out in the original letter of March 2, 1946, the United States Government, at the time of the signing of the Hungarian armistice, reserved the right to reopen the question of Hungarian reparations. My Government agreed to the armistice as a means of facilitating the speedy termination of hostilities. It believed that with careful management, Hungary might have been able to pay \$300,000,000 in reparations.

"It did not foresee that Hun-

gary's production capacity and national income would be cut to half or less in the space of a few months, and that the reparations payable by Hungary in 1945, for example, would equal 24 per cent of the national income. Likewise, it did not foresee that Hungary would be required to surrender large quantities of goods and services over and above its reparations obligations.

U. S. Asks 3-Power Program

"My Government has noted the position taken by the Soviet Government with respect to the formulation by the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States, of a program which would assist the rehabilitation of Hungary and its reintegration with the general economy of Europe. The Soviet Government may be assured that it is not the policy of the Government of the United States to force acceptance by Hungary of any economic program.

"The United States, in proposing tripartite discussion of an economic program for Hungary, had in mind the discussion of aid and assistance which the three Powers could give to Hungary, once the economic obligations of that country were carefully defined and scheduled so as to permit their discharge without depriving the people of Hungary of their means of livelihood. The United States has no desire to impose a plan for Hungary's economy, but does desire to lend assistance to Hungary through a concert of policies such as was envisaged in the declaration made by the three Powers at the Crimea Conference.

"Hungarian Government officials have, in fact, requested such assistance of the three Powers. The Hungarian Finance Minister submitted to the Soviet economic advisor of the Control Commission a report on the Hungarian economic and financial situation under date of Dec. 3, 1945. This report concluded with the following statement:

"The only way that we can see out of our serious financial and economic difficulties is a plan of reconstruction, to be carried out with the assistance of the Allied Powers, the objective of which would be to raise production to a substantially higher level than at present and restore equilibrium in the country's economic and financial affairs.

"Since, however, we cannot work out a plan of reconstruction until it is known what support we may count upon from the Allied Powers, there is an urgent necessity that the Allied Powers should send a commission which, with the cooperation of the Hun-

garian Government, would examine the economic and financial situation of the country and the methods by which assistance could be given.

"We should expect from the work of the commission a statement of what measures and what foreign assistance are necessary, in the present economic state of the country, with its present burdens and requirements, in order that the country may recover economically and be able to meet the triple obligation arising from reparations, other obligations under the armistice agreement and pre-war foreign debts."

"The Soviet chairman of the Control Commission refused to accept or to consider this report, nor would he agree to a proposal of the United States representative that there be established a subcommittee of the Control Commission to discuss questions of Hungarian industry, finance and economics.

U. S. Again Asks Soviet Help

"In view of the position taken by the chairman, my Government cannot conclude that the willingness of the Soviet chairman to acquaint himself with such considerations as may be advanced by the representatives of the United States . . . concerning Hungary's economic situation constitutes a satisfactory procedure for the solution of these problems.

"I am instructed again to call attention to the obligation freely undertaken by the Soviet Union at the Yalta Conference, in which the three heads of state agreed to concert the policies of their three Governments in assisting . . . the peoples of the former Axis satellite States of Europe to solve by democratic means their pressing political and economic problems.

"Pursuant to this agreement, the United States Government again requests that instructions be sent to the Soviet representative in Hungary to concert with the American and British representatives there in halting the present economic disintegration and to provide a framework within which the rehabilitation of that country, and its early reintegration with the general economy of Europe, will be possible.

"Finally, an immediate consideration is that the prompt issuance of such instructions would have a salutary effect on the financial stabilization program which the Hungarian Government is initiating on Aug. 1, and in the interest of which the United States Government is returning to Hungary monetary gold reported to be valued at about \$32,000,000."

W. BRADY SMITH

(Document No. 7)

Soviet Reply to the Accusations of the U.S.⁷

(2) *Note from the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Dekanonozov) to the United States Ambassador to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Smith), July 27, 1946.*¹

In connection with your letter of July 22, 1946 addressed to Minister of Foreign Affairs V. M. Molotov regarding the economic situation of Hungary and the payment by Hungary of reparations to the Soviet Union, I consider it necessary to draw your attention to the fact that the data cited in your letter and the conclusions which you draw on the basis of this data do not correspond to reality.

In your letter you maintain that the difficulties observed at present in the economic life of Hungary are allegedly the result of the fact that the bulk of the current production of Hungarian industry is being consumed by reparations and by the satisfaction of other demands, as you express it, of the occupying power. You assert, moreover, that reparations consume from 80-90 percent of the production of heavy industry, including the production of iron, metal and machines. You add, that, moreover, from the supplies of the urban population the Red Army allegedly received from Hungary during the first months of 1945 "almost all the supplies of meat, one sixth of the wheat and rye, more than one quarter of the vegetables, almost three quarters of the supply of lard," etc., and that thus reparations paid by Hungary, on the one hand, and the above withdrawals for the supply of the Red Army on the other hand, are the cause of the grievous economic situation of Hungary. The unfoundedness of such an assertion cannot fail to strike any-unprejudiced person, particularly if one takes into account the fact that the entire sum of Hungarian reparations deliveries to the Soviet Union for 1945 did not exceed \$10,000,000, that is, constitutes a quite insignificant sum. This fact alone is sufficient to demonstrate the complete lack of foundation of the assertion in your letter that the bulk of Hungarian production is being consumed by reparations.

The extent of the unfoundedness of these assertions is apparent from the fact that the Hungarian Government addressing on May 28 of this year, a request to the Soviet Government to fix a plan for reparations deliveries for 1946-53 itself fixed the amount of these deliveries for 1946 as \$21,800,000. Under these circumstances the statement to the effect

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 263.

⁷ Raymond Dennet and Robert Turner, eds., Documents on American Foreign Relations, Vol. VIII, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1946), pp. 332-334.

that the reparations obligations of Hungary are excessive, "crushing" and so on is deprived of any foundation.

The Soviet Government, taking into account the economic difficulties of Hungary, already a year ago made considerable concessions to the Hungarian Government, extending the term of reparation deliveries to eight years from six years, prescribed by the armistice agreement. The Soviet Government fully satisfied also the above request of the Hungarian Government for further concessions to Hungary regarding reparations, fully accepting the plan proposed by the Hungarian Government on May 28 for further reparations deliveries to the Soviet Union. According to this plan, reparations deliveries for 1946 are fixed at a sum of \$21,800,000; for 1947, 23,000,000; for 1948, 25,000,000; for 1949-53, 30,000,000 annually. At the same time the Soviet Government released Hungary from payment of a fine of 6,000,000 for non-fulfillment on time of reparations deliveries in the first year in which the reparations agreement was in force. To the above must be added, that according to the Soviet-Hungarian trade agreement, Hungary received from the Soviet Union in the past year 1945, goods to the amount of \$6,300,000, while at the same time Hungary itself delivered to the Soviet Union goods only to the amount of \$26,600. If, thus, there are taken into account goods received by Hungary from the Soviet Union to the value of 6,300,000, then, in the account, it turns out that all Hungarian deliveries for the Soviet Union do not exceed \$3,700,000.

In your letter you state that the American Government agreeing to the conditions of the armistice with Hungary did not foresee that "the productive power of Hungary and its national income would be reduced by half or even more in the course of a few months and that, for example, reparations subject to payment by Hungary in 1945 would equal 24 percent of the national income." For a statement of this sort there are no foundations of reality. The above cited data prove fully convincingly that the extent of reparations pointed out in your letter, subject to delivery by Hungary in 1945 to no extent correspond to the real scope of these deliveries, constituting an entirely insignificant amount.

This is the real state of affairs regarding taking of reparations from Hungary for the benefit of the Soviet Union.

The situation also is the same with regard to the data on the supplying the Red Army at the expense of the Hungarian economy cited in your letter, particularly the data regarding wheat, rye, oats, meats, etc. All these data are entirely incorrect. In reality the Soviet forces received not more than three percent of the total amount of these cultures of the 1945 harvest and of fats not more than eight percent by head of swine. The Hungarian Government did not make deliveries of industrial products for the Red Army, with exception of fuel and a certain amount of commissary supplies.

Citing its data, the Government of the U. S. made use of clearly incorrect information which can only create confusion.

It is impossible not to note the quite arbitrary characterization contained in your letter of the economic *situation* of Hungary. The data at the disposal of the Soviet Government do not confirm this characteriza-

tion. In reality the capacity of the industrial enterprises of Hungary curtailed as the result of the war to 60 percent of the prewar level, had by the middle of July 1946 risen to 70-85 percent in the production of pig iron, steel, rolled metal and machine building and to 85-90 percent in light industry. If the output of industrial production in Hungary in 1945 constituted 30-35 percent of the prewar level at the present time, the output of production has been brought to 60 percent of the prewar level. Thus, despite the existing difficulties, Hungary, since the termination of the war, has increased the productive capacity of its industry by 20-25 percent and by 25-30 percent the output of industrial production. These successes have been achieved despite the fact that the Germans and the followers of Szalshai carried off to Germany a large quantity of the most valuable industrial equipment and raw materials which, like the removed Hungarian gold, fell into the hands of the American Government and to the present time has still not been returned to Hungary. Such a situation, deriving from the policy carried out by the American authorities creates extremely difficult economic conditions for Hungary and is in complete contradiction with the statements of the U. S. Government regarding the necessity of accelerating the economic restoration of Hungary. In your letter of July 22 it is stated that the information regarding the amount of Hungarian property carried off by the Germans and the followers of Szalshai which is already for the second year in the American zone of occupation is exaggerated. But the American Government, as you state, is still preparing lists of Hungarian property plundered and carried away to Germany and Austria and has still not determined the value of this property. The Hungarian Prime Minister Ferenc Nagy in his statement in Parliament on February 7 of the present year declared that the Hungarian Government had registered the property located in the American zone of occupation of Germany and Austria at more than 2 billion. Besides this, the Hungarian Prime Minister added that as the property which had been carried away came to light this sum would reach about 3 billion. This fully corresponds to the figure of 3 million indicated in the note of the Soviet Government of April 21, 1946.

Speaking of the economic situation of Hungary, it is impossible not to note that despite the difficulties existing in this sphere, a number of new factory shops and plants have also been restored and reequipped. It is worth noting such facts as the construction of a new plant for the production of machine tools, the new "Reniks Electric Resistance Plant", and a number of shops for the production of automobile pistons, the reconstruction of the tractor shop in the "Hoferstrans" plant, the restoration and reequipping of various shops in the "Rossman", "Kozma", and other plants. The expansion of the aluminum rolling and wares plant, large scale work on the reequipping of the "Hans" electro mechanical plant. All these facts indicate that the process of the restoration of industry is proceeding in Hungary and that the reparations obligations in Hungary are in no way hindering this process. In the same way is refuted the assertion contained in your letter that the bulk of Hungarian production of current output is allegedly being consumed by reparations

and that nothing remains for the restoration of Hungarian economy and for the internal needs of Hungary. Such an assertion is refuted also by the fact that during the second half of 1945 almost 50 percent of the entire rolled metal output went to the needs of Hungarian economy.

In your letter of July 22 there is contained the entirely incorrect assertion that the Soviet authorities have allegedly removed in Hungary industrial equipment in the amount of \$124,000,000. Such statements do not have any foundation and only elicit surprise with regard to the sources of the information which has been utilized in this connection. The Soviet forces removed from Hungary as trophy equipment certain military enterprises of a value not exceeding \$11,000,000.

With regard to the proposal of the American Government that the representatives of the Soviet Union, U. S. and Great Britain in the Control Commission jointly work out a plan for the economic restoration of Hungary, the Soviet Government as before, considers this proposal not acceptable inasmuch as was pointed out in the letter of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of April 21, the working of such a plan belongs exclusively to the competence of the Hungarian Government.

(Document No. 8)

U.S. Note Regarding Political Developments
in Hungary⁸

Text of New U. S. Note on Hungary

WASHINGTON, March 17 (AP)—The State Department published tonight the following text of the second protest addressed by Brig. Gen. George H. Weems, American representative in the Allied Control Commission for Hungary, to Lieut. Gen. V. P. Sviridov, Russian acting chairman of the commis-

sion:
I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of March 8, 1947, in reply to the note which I addressed to you on March 5, 1947, concerning political developments in Hungary and on instructions from my Government, to transmit the following comment of the United States Government thereon.

The United States Government has carefully considered the Soviet views set forth in your communication. However, it is noted that your letter fails to take account of the following circumstances alluded to in my note of March 5.

People's Court Scored

(1) Investigation of the plot against the state has to date been conducted only by Communist-dominated police organs. While the Smallholders' party has endeavored to obtain agreement to a parliamentary investigation, on an inter-party basis, of allegations concerning the involvement in the conspiracy of members of

the National Assembly, the Communists have declined to accept such a procedure;

(2) Of four representatives of political parties who, with a jurist chairman, comprise the People's Court, which is now conducting trials of certain individuals alleged to have been involved in this plot, three are representatives of parties aligned in a minority bloc as against one selected by the majority Smallholders;

(3) Concerning the arrest of Bela Kovacs, although normal arrests by occupation forces for the purpose of maintaining the security of such forces could not of course be objected to on the grounds of unwarranted intervention, the arrest of Mr. Kovacs by the Soviet authority cannot, on the face of it, be considered of such a nature. It is noted that the arrest was not made until the Hungarian Communist party had, without avail, resorted to numerous stratagems to obtain the waiver of Mr. Kovacs' parliamentary immunity and his arrest by the political police. During that period there was no indication that he might be suspected of activities against the Soviet occupation forces.

Attempt to Seize Power Seen

In the circumstances, the United States Government cannot, in the light of all the information available, agree with the in-

terpretation of Hungarian political developments contained in your communication under acknowledgment. It seems clear to the United States Government that minority groups under the leadership of the Hungarian Communist party are attempting to seize power through resort to extraconstitutional tactics.

In the opinion of the United States, this clearly threatens the continuance of democracy in Hungary. In such a situation, the United States Government considers that the powers signatory to the agreement concluded at Yalta in regard to liberated Europe are obligated to undertake concerted action to investigate political conditions in Hungary. The need for such consultation and investigation becomes all the more imperative because of the fact that there is a disagreement between the Soviet and United States Governments on a matter of so basic importance to Hungary.

In my Government's view, it cannot be contended that such an investigation would, as you suggest, improperly impair the legal rights of the Hungarian courts or that my Government's concern with regard to the case of Bela Kovacs constitutes an infringement of the right of the Soviet occupation authorities to take reasonable measures for the maintenance of the security of the occupation forces.

⁸ New York Times, March 18, 1947, p. 5.

(Document No. 9)

United States-Hungarian Prewar
Bilateral Treaties⁹

(1) *Note from the Government of the United States to the Government of Hungary Regarding Prewar Bilateral Treaties and Other International Instruments with Hungary to be Kept in Force or Revived, March 9, 1948.*¹

I have the honor to refer to the Treaty of Peace with Hungary, signed at Paris February 10, 1947, which came into force, in accordance with the provisions of article 42 thereof, on September 15, 1947 upon the deposit of instruments of ratification by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America. Article 10 of the Treaty of Peace reads as follows:

1. Each Allied or Associated Power will notify Hungary, within a period of six months from the coming into force of the present Treaty, which of its prewar bilateral treaties with Hungary it desires to keep in force or revive. Any provisions not in conformity with the present Treaty shall, however, be deleted from the above-mentioned treaties.

2. All such treaties so notified shall be registered with the Secretariat of the United Nations in accordance with article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

3. All such treaties not so notified shall be regarded as abrogated.

I have the honor, by direction of the Government of the United States of America and on its behalf, to notify the Hungarian Government, in accordance with the provision of the Treaty of Peace quoted above, that the Government of the United States of America desires to keep in force or revive the following pre-war bilateral treaties and other international agreements with Hungary:

Arbitration

1. Arbitration treaty. Signed at Washington January 26, 1929. Ratified by the United States February 28, 1929. Ratified by Hungary July 6, 1929. Ratifications exchanged at Washington July 24, 1929. Effective July 24, 1929. [Treaty Series 797; 46 Stat. 2349.]

Commerce

2. Treaty of friendship, commerce and consular rights, and exchanges of notes. Signed at Washington June 24, 1925. Ratified by the United States June 16, 1926. Ratified by Hungary April 1, 1926. Ratifications exchanged at Budapest September 4, 1926. Effective October 4, 1926. [Treaty Series 748, 44 Stat. 2441]

Conciliation

3. Conciliation treaty. Signed at Washington January 26, 1929. Ratified by the United States February 28, 1929. Ratified by Hungary July 6, 1929. Ratifications

¹ Department of State Press Release 191, March 11, 1948.

⁹Dennet and Turner, *op. cit.*, Vol. X, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1949), pp. 640-641.

exchanged at Washington July 24, 1929. Effective July 24, 1929. [Treaty Series 798; 46 Stat. 2353]

Copyright

4. Copyright convention. Signed at Budapest January 30, 1912. Ratified by the United States July 31, 1912. Ratified by Hungary August 12, 1912. Ratifications exchanged at Washington September 16, 1912. Effective October 16, 1912. (Revived May 27, 1922) [Treaty Series 571; 37 Stat. 1631]

Debt-Funding

5. Debt-funding agreement. Signed at Washington April 25, 1924. Effective as of December 15, 1923. [Combined Annual Reports of World War Foreign Debt Commission (1927) 132.]

6. Agreement modifying the debt-funding agreement of April 25, 1924 (Moratorium). Signed at Washington May 27, 1932. Effective as of July 1, 1931. [Printed by the Treasury Department 1932.]

Extradition

7. Treaty for the extradition of fugitives from justice. Signed at Washington July 3, 1856. Ratified by the United States December 12, 1856. Ratified by Austria-Hungary November 16, 1856. Ratifications exchanged December 13, 1856. Effective December 13, 1856. (Revived May 27, 1922.) [Treaty Series 9; 11 Stat. 691 and 18 Stat. 26]

Passport Visa Fees

8. Reciprocal arrangement for temporary waiver of visitors' visa fees. Signed April 6 and 21, 1936. Term extended to March 31, 1937, by notes exchanged at Budapest October 9 and 31, 1936. Term extended to September 30, 1937, by notes exchanged at Budapest March 22 and 23, 1937. Term extended indefinitely by notes exchanged at Budapest August 18, September 21 and 23, 1937. [Not printed.]

Postal

9. Parcel post convention. Signed at Budapest July 3, 1928 and at Washington August 16, 1928. Ratified by the United States August 21, 1928. (Post Office Department print.)

10. Agreement for collect-on-delivery service. Signed at Budapest December 15, 1930 and at Washington January 15, 1931. Ratified by the United States January 21, 1931. (Post Office Department print; 46 Stat. 2894)

11. Convention for exchange of money orders. Signed at Washington April 3, 1922 and at Budapest May 6, 1922. Effective June 15, 1922. (Not printed.)

Relations

12. Treaty establishing friendly relations. Signed at Budapest August 29, 1921. Ratified by the United States October 21, 1921. Ratified by Hungary December 12, 1921. Ratifications exchanged at Budapest December 17, 1921. Effective December 17, 1921. (Treaty Series 660; 42 Stat. 1951.)

This notification will be deemed to be effective on the date of the present note.

It is understood, of course, that either of the two Governments may propose revisions in any of the treaties or other agreements mentioned in the above list.

Further, it shall be understood that any of the provisions in the treaties and other agreements listed in this notification which may be found in particular circumstances to be not in conformity with the Treaty of Peace shall be considered to have been deleted so far as application of the Treaty of Peace is involved but shall be regarded as being in full force and effect with respect to matters not covered by the latter treaty.

(Document No. 10)

Search for a Bi-partisan Foreign Policy Agreement¹⁰

(2) *Letter from the Secretary of State (Marshall) to the Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives (Eaton), February 3, 1947.*⁵

I have your letter of January 29 advising me of the adoption by the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the resolution, a copy of which accompanies your letter. The resolution invites the Secretary of State to cooperate with the Committee in various respects so as to aid the Committee in the formulation and

⁵ Department of State Press Release 92, February 4, 1947; Department of State, *Bulletin*, XVI, p. 283.

execution of a bi-partisan foreign policy and also to aid the Committee in cooperating with the President and myself in the discharge of our responsibilities. The resolution also states the desire and purpose of the Committee to discharge its obligations to the people and to the House of Representatives of recommending legislative action only after full knowledge of the facts and policies involved.

Let me say immediately that I am glad to accept the invitation of the Committee and that I am in sympathy with the desires evidenced by the resolution and your letter to further mutual cooperation between the Committee and the Department of State in the furtherance of a bi-partisan foreign policy, and to assist in fulfilling our respective responsibilities to the people and their Representatives. You will appreciate that it would not be appropriate for me to comment upon the portions of the resolution which are concerned with the relationship between the Committee on Foreign Affairs and other committees of the House of Representatives. Perhaps it is not inappropriate, however, for me to say that the Department of State is in agreement with the desirability of avoiding unnecessary duplication of studies and hearings.

I wish to thank you for the expressions in the resolution of the desire and purpose of the Committee to cooperate to the fullest extent with the President and myself. On behalf of the President and myself, we fully reciprocate. I am confident we can work out the details satisfactorily.

The report of the subcommittee referred to in your presentation of the resolution to the House on January 29, 1947, recognizes the constitutional responsibilities with respect to the conduct of foreign affairs. Without any derogation from these responsibilities, I am confident that they can be best fulfilled by the cooperation proposed in the resolution of your Committee.

¹⁰Dennet and Turner, *op. cit.*, Vol. IX, pp. 22-23.

(Document No. 11)

Soviet Violations of Treaty Obligations¹¹

Document Submitted by the Department of State to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, June 2, 1948*

TEXT OF RESOLUTION
(S. Res. 213, 80th Cong., 2d sess)

Whereas the President of the United States declared in his address to the Congress on March 17, 1948, that one nation has "persistently ignored and violated" agreements which "could have" furnished a basis for a just peace; and

Whereas such violations have been proclaimed the cause for international disturbances which have led to the requested consideration by this Congress of drastic legislation affecting the peoples of this Nation; Therefore be it

Resolved, That the President of the United States be, and is hereby, requested to furnish to the Congress full and complete information on the specific violations of agreements by the nation referred to in the President's address on March 17, 1948, before the Congress; . . .

Document Submitted by the Department of State

¹¹Ibid., pp. 919-933.

*Senate Report No. 1440, 80th Congress, 2d session, June 2, 1948.

III. EASTERN AND SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE

POLAND

"This Polish Provisional Government of National Unity shall be pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot. In these elections all democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take part and to put forward candidates" (Crimean Conference, February 12, 1945).

"The three powers note that the Polish Provisional Government in accordance with the decisions of the Crimea Conference has agreed to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot in which all democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take part and to put forward candidates * * *"
(Potsdam agreement, August 2, 1945).

On several occasions prior to the elections and following persistent reports of reprehensible methods employed by the Government against the democratic opposition, this Government reminded the Polish Provisional Government of its obligations under the Yalta and Potsdam agreements and was joined on these occasions by the British Government. On January 5, 1947, the British and Soviet Governments were asked to associate themselves with this Government in approaching the Poles on this subject, and the British Government made similar representations to the Soviet Government reiterating the request that the Soviet Government support the British and American Governments in calling for a strict fulfillment of Poland's obligations. The Soviet Government refused to participate in the proposed approach to the Polish Government. The

Agreements

Violations

British and American representations were summarily rejected by the Polish Government as "undue interference" in the internal affairs of Poland.

Of the 444 deputies elected to the parliament in the elections of January 19, 1947, the Polish Peasant Party (reliably reported to represent a large majority of the population) obtained only 28 places, thus demonstrating the efficiency with which the govern-

III. EASTERN AND SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE—Continued

POLAND—continued

Agreements

Violations

ment had prepared the ground. On January 28, the Department of State issued a release to the press stating that reports received from our Embassy in Poland immediately prior to and subsequent to the elections, based upon the observations of American officials, confirmed the fears which this Government had expressed that the election would not be free.

HUNGARY

1. Under the armistice agreement an Allied Control Commission was established under the chairmanship of the U. S. S. R. and with participation of the United States and United Kingdom (armistice agreement, January 1945, art. 18 and annex F).

2. The three heads of the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United States, and United Kingdom declared their mutual agreement to concert during the temporary period of instability in liberated Europe the policies of their three Governments in assisting the peoples liberated from the domination of Nazi Germany and the peoples of the former Axis satellite states of Europe to solve by democratic means their pressing political and economic problems (Yalta agreement, February 1945).

1. The U. S. S. R. representative on the ACC for Hungary consistently acted unilaterally in the name of the ACC without consultation with or notice to his United States and United Kingdom colleagues, thus denying them any semblance of effective participation in the work of the ACC.

2. Contrary to the Yalta agreement, the U. S. S. R., acting through the Hungarian Communist Party and its own agencies and armed forces in Hungary, far from concerting its policy toward assisting the Hungarian people to solve their problems by democratic means, unilaterally subverted the will of the Hungarian people to totalitarianism in negation of fundamental freedoms. For example—

(1) General Sviridov, Deputy Soviet Chairman of the ACC, without consulting the United States and United Kingdom ACC representatives, dissolved Catholic youth organizations, June 1946.

(2) Soviet armed forces arrested Bela Kovacs, member of Parliament and former secretary general of Smallholders Party, February 1947.

III. EASTERN AND SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE—Continued

HUNGARY—continued

Agreements

3. Upon the cessation of hostilities, it was agreed at Potsdam that the United States, United Kingdom and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics would consult with a view to revising the procedures of the Allied Control Commissions for Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary to provide for effective participation by the United States and United Kingdom in the work of those bodies (Potsdam protocol XI, August 1945).

Violations

(3) General Sviridov precipitated a political crisis enabling the Communist minority to force the resignation of Prime Minister Nagy, May-June 1947.

(4) The Soviet Government refused repeated United States proposals that it join in tripartite examination of Hungary's economic situation with a view to assisting Hungary to solve its pressing economic problems, 1946.

(5) Discriminatory economic agreements were forced upon Hungary, including the establishment of joint Soviet-Hungarian companies, 1945-47.

(6) The Soviet ACC contended that only the occupational forces who control the airfields can permit the Hungarian Government to negotiate air agreements. Notwithstanding, the Soviets formed a Hungarian-Soviet civil air transport company. The Soviets also permitted the Hungarian Government to negotiate agreements with certain other countries but not with the United States or Britain.

3. Despite repeated requests, the U. S. S. R. declined to discuss the revision of procedures for the ACC's as agreed at Potsdam. Instead, the U. S. S. R. continued to act unilaterally in the name of the ACC's in matters of substance without consultation with, or notice to, the United States and United Kingdom members. For example—

(1) Instructions were issued by the Soviet High Command regarding the size of the Hungarian Army without consulting the British or United States representatives.

(2) The Soviet deputy chairman of the ACC ordered the Hungarian

III. EASTERN AND SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE--Continued

HUNGARY--continued

Agreements

Violations

Government without the knowledge of the United States to disband certain Catholic youth organizations in June-July 1946. He also recommended dismissal of certain Government officials.

(3) In the fall of 1946 permission was given by the Soviet element of the Allied Control Commission, without consulting the Americans or British, for the formation of the Hungarian Freedom Party.

(4) Early in 1947 the Hungarian police were ordered by the Soviet chairman in the name of the Allied Control Commission to suppress the publication of Ciano's diary.

(5) In early 1947 the Soviet chairman stated he had personally given approval to the Hungarian Government to resume diplomatic relations with certain countries in the name of the Allied Control Commission and without prior discussion with the British or Americans.

(6) In May 1947 the ACC chairman refused the United States permission to visit Hungarian Army units.

(7) The Soviets refused to permit free movement of the American element of the Allied Control Commission.

(8) The Soviets refused to transmit to the American representative data on the arrest by the Soviet Army of Bela Kovacs.

(Document No. 12)

Representative Reed's Comments on a Book by
Ambassador Arthur Bliss Lane and
an Article by G. E. Sokolosky

HON. DANIEL A. REED

OF NEW YORK
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Monday, February 2, 1948

Mr. REED of New York. Mr. Speaker, I hope that every American citizen will read I Saw Poland Betrayed. Ambassador Arthur Bliss Lane, the author of the book, has rendered a patriotic service to his countrymen. What he has disclosed ought to put the people on the alert as to the danger inherent in our present foreign policy. It is a foreign policy that, if continued, will pauperize our thrifty citizens, weaken our Republic, and endanger the very existence of our free institutions.

When existing undisclosed commitments are all made public, our humiliation as a nation will be complete. The word "honor" is apparently unknown to the New Deal administration.

As a part of my remarks, I am inserting an article by George E. Sokolosky which appeared in the Times-Herald Wednesday, February 11, 1948:

TUESDAY
(By George E. Sokolosky)

Ambassador Arthur Bliss Lane has contributed immensely to the American people by publishing I Saw Poland Betrayed. It is a report to his fellow countrymen on his mission to Poland between 1944 and 1947.

I wonder whether the title should not be: I Saw America Betrayed? For when the officials of a country forsake its honor and lower its dignity for whatever expediency, do they not disclose that its spirit has been fouled, its national morality abandoned?

The tale really begins at Tehran when Great Britain, which went to war with Germany over Poland, abandoned principle upon demand of Stalin and at the instigation of Roosevelt. Lane says:

"The discussions at the conference at Tehran in December 1943 among Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin remained an official secret . . . even within the Department of State the truth of what happened at this momentous conference was probably not known, except perhaps to two or three.

"Some key officials, indeed, who had the responsibility of making important recommendations on matters dealing with the United Nations organization, in conversations with me shortly after President Roosevelt's death in April 1945, deplored the fact that no records of the Tehran meeting were available even to them. Perhaps none had been made."

For page after page, following this quotation, Lane records the deceptions pursued by President Roosevelt. He recounts in detail the relations between the President and Charles Rozmarek, president of the Polish-American Congress. Rozmarek wrote to Lane:

"President Roosevelt in his talk with me expressed distrust of Stalin, having been fooled by him, as he stated, on a number of occasions. He plainly indicated that he was fearful that Stalin might again collaborate with Hitler as he did in the initial stages of the war, and the President wanted at all costs to prevent such an alliance.

Also, we granted a \$30,000,000 loan to the Polish government. Lane telegraphed the State Department:

"With the greatest earnestness of which I am capable I beg the department not to approve the extension of any credits at this time. When the terroristic activities of the security police come to an end, when freedom of the press is restored, and when American citizens are released from Polish prisons—not until then should United States public funds be used to assist the Polish provisional government of national unity."

He ends his chapter:
"In my opinion, these minor gains in no way compensated for the loss of prestige suffered by the United States when we granted credits to a government which had not kept its word to us and which seized on our leniency as warrant for proceeding to even greater attacks on the freedom of its own citizens—and of our citizens."

The book should be read by every American in humility and shame.

"He kept on repenting to me: 'Let us win the war with Germany first.' The President let it be understood that once Hitler was defeated, he would know how to handle Stalin."

Stalin actually got a better deal in Poland from Roosevelt and Churchill than he got out of Hitler by the Stalin-Hitler alliance. Apparently Roosevelt was so sure that he could outfox Stalin after the war that he complacently permitted Stalin to outfox him while the war was on.

Lane went to Poland as our Ambassador after the peace and after we had recognized that country's puppet government. Our mission to Poland was treated cavalierly. It was improperly and even humiliatingly housed.

Its diplomatic telegrams to its own Government were delayed or not sent at all. Members of the mission and other Americans were arrested. The Russians established the fact in the minds of the Polish people that the United States did not count.

Did we do anything about it? Of course. Ambassador Lane reports:

"Over my personal protest, Director General Herbert H. Lehman had appointed as director of the first UNRRA mission to Poland the Soviet member of the UNRRA council, Mr. Menshikov. . . . It was no surprise to me when in August the agreement concluded in Warsaw provided that the Polish Government, and not UNRRA, should have complete jurisdiction over the distribution of UNRRA supplies in Poland."

(Document No. 13)

Mikolajczyk Articles Presented in the House of Representatives¹³

HON. CHARLES J. KERSTEN

OF WISCONSIN

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, January 8, 1948

Mr. KERSTEN of Wisconsin. Mr. Speaker, the Milwaukee Sentinel is printing a series of most significant articles by Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, former Prime Minister of Poland and president of the Polish Peasant Party. As you know, Mikolajczyk recently escaped from Poland where it is believed he would have been put to death if he had remained. The evidence of communistic terror emanating from all countries into which the Soviet Government has placed its despotic hand becomes overwhelming. Humanity cries out at the barbarism of the Soviet Government. Mikolajczyk's voice is only one in the chorus. The situation in Poland is all the more tragic because of the Christian tradition in that land. The Polish people are highly spiritual and have a strong attachment to Christian culture. That is why the heel of Russia presses hard upon the Polish heart.

Under leave to extend my remarks, I include the following article from the Milwaukee Sentinel:

MIKOLAJCZYK TELLS HOW REDS TORTURE PEOPLE OF POLAND—"MY NATION IN FRONT LINES OF NEW WAR," HE ASSESTS

(By Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, former Prime Minister of Poland and President of the Polish Peasant Party)

(Installment I)

Poland, conquered by Adolf Hitler first and later forsaken by its own allies, may seem to be a remote land to the reader.

The names of its people, including my own, may be difficult to pronounce, and its tragedy may be dismissed by some as the normal plight of Europeans and particularly Poles.

But Poland today is you. When a Pole today is deprived of his God-given rights or is tortured vilely and put to death for simply believing steadfastly in what millions of democratic peoples elsewhere take for granted, you, too, are being attacked. And so is the sanctity of your home.

A fantastic World War began on Polish soil, after being conceived in the twisted minds of Hitler, Stalin, Mussolini, and Tojo.

And now an even more horrible war has erupted in Poland. It is a war against the dignity and freedom of all democratic peoples, and the Poles once again are in the front lines.

REDS IMPOSE YOKE ON WORLD

Just as World War II spread its tentacles out of Poland, this war could reach the homes of peace-loving people elsewhere in the world—and more quickly and with a thousand times the venom of the opening of the Battle of Britain and the attack on Pearl Harbor.

I know, because I am a survivor of the opening movements of that war of which I speak.

I know the determination, the pitilessness and the vigor of the new common enemy of mankind, communism, directed from the U. S. S. R.

I know Stalin personally. I know the men behind him, and the workings of their minds and the yoke which they are now imposing on the world.

¹³Ibid., pp. A63-A64.

Forget for a moment my very humble and the positions that I held in the Polish Government not only during the occupation by the Nazis but by the even more sinister invader of today—the Reds.

Simply assume you are a Pole, like myself, and that you are still possessed of your love of personal liberty, your feelings on the rights of man, and your beliefs that you have the right to speak, act, and vote as your conscience dictates.

MIXTURE OF MOCKERY, MURDER

One night, without warning, a group of armed security police, trained, directed, and controlled by a foreign power, enters your home and arrests you.

You ask to see their warrant and they laugh at you, for their warrant is the machine gun that is pointed at your stomach. In their pockets is your sentence, already made out, and your "trial" in the military court—if you are given one—will be only a fiction.

One of them casually pulls out a revolver, opens a drawer in your desk, puts the revolver in the drawer, lifts it out again, and accuses you of concealing weapons in violation of a "law" that is suddenly a mixture of mockery and murder.

Your wife and children and relatives and even associates are taken from you, and you may never see them again and—if you live—you will always be tormented by the terrors inflicted upon them.

You yourself are subjected to what could be 10,000 types of torture, for there is no limit to the infamy concocted by the Communist torturer. And if you survive and are released, you must sign a document in which you promise not to reveal what has been done to you or your family. If you break that promise, there are other tortures and no difficulty in arresting you again.

You are cursed in the controlled newspapers as a "bandit" or "Fascist" or "traitor" though you are none of these things and have proved it throughout your life.

Your crime? You liked a certain candidate for office and had announced your intention to vote for him. Or, perhaps, you had decided to run for office yourself—constitutionally your right—on a ticket that does not happen to please Moscow.

You would protest, of course. You might even die—as thousands of Poles similar to you have done—rather than yield to such an incredible tyranny.

But this is certain: You would say to yourself, "This cannot happen in the twentieth century. This cannot be the work of men by whose side we fought the Germans. The Americans and British will do something about this." You would say, knowing the heart-warming humanity of those powers.

There lies the ultimate tragedy.

What Russia and its agents are doing in Poland today is nothing but a bold perversion of solemn pacts and promises signed by Stalin, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and Winston Churchill, first at Tehran and then at Yalta.

Roosevelt and Churchill must have sincerely believed that they could do business with Russia. Those men, men of good faith, believed in the solemnity of the pacts which they signed with Stalin.

They simply underestimated Stalin. Nobody can do business with Stalin. Take this as the testimony of a man who tried for 2½ years, and then failed under the brutal force of Stalin's Communist agents in Poland.

(Document No. 14)

Representative Wolverton Speaks of the
Distressing Situation of Poland¹⁴

HON. CHARLES A. WOLVERTON

OF NEW JERSEY

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Saturday, August 7, 1948

Mr. WOLVERTON. Mr. Speaker, the condition of Poland today is one of the most distressing in all of Europe. What could be more distressing than that a freedom-loving people should be held under the domination of a foreign dictatorial power?

Through centuries of time the Polish people have fought and died in the cause of liberty and freedom. Time and again they have suffered under cruel and despotlike conquerors. But, never has adversity nor distress caused them to falter in their love for liberty and freedom. The soul of Poland has survived in the past and will survive the adversity of the present. It lives today. It will live tomorrow. It will continue to live until the darkness of today turns to the brightness of a new day.

In years that have long passed Poland was the defender of Christianity against the Mohammedan Turk. Today it is the defender of Christianity against the evil forces of godless communism. Well do I remember the confidence with which His Holiness Pope Pius XII spoke of the Christian courage of the people of Poland and other central European countries, 3 years ago when I had the privilege of an audience and opportunity to talk with him in the Vatican. At that time he painted a most dark and discouraging picture of communist forces in central Europe, but, in answer to my question whether the Catholics of those countries would falter in their faith, his face lightened and with confidence he said, "No, I don't think so—their hearts are right." He pointed out that while force might dominate the physical, it could not change the heart. How true this is. The same strength of spirit that enables the Polish people to maintain their allegiance to their church, likewise enables them to hold firm their allegiance to the principles of liberty and freedom.

No nation has suffered so badly from the ravages of war. But, the sad part is to realize that Poland has not only suffered from the acts of her enemies, but, also from the deceit of those whom she thought to be her friends. The first to enter the conflict against nazism she continues to suffer though nazism has been destroyed. Without knowledge upon her part she was sold down the river at Tehran, Yalta, and Potsdam by nations at whose behest she entered the war, and, beside whose soldiers her own soldiers had fought with heroism and courage until victory was gained.

As a result of these secret agreements millions of people in Poland live, today, under the domination of a dictatorship, fearful, in a state of confusion and un-

certainty as to the future. Those agreements have brought tragic consequences to Poland and its people. They should never have been made. So long as they remain in force they will constitute a blot upon the integrity and honor of the nations responsible for them. The real Poland today lies prostrate and helpless as a result of the perfidy of those who should have been her protectors.

Secret agreements are contrary to the principles upon which this nation was founded. They have brought distress to Poland. They likewise have brought distress to the people of our own Nation, as we realize the extent to which they set at naught the principles of liberty, justice, and freedom, for which this Nation has been the leading exponent throughout the world. America, like Poland, was also sold down the river when those secret agreements were entered into.

In the days that are ahead it is our duty to rectify, whenever and in whatever way we can, the great wrong and injustice that has been done to Poland. It is our duty to sustain the spirit of Poland and her people; and encourage them to live on in the hope and with the faith that liberty, freedom, and justice will again prevail. Ever remember, the soul of Poland is not dead. It lives and will continue to live until Poland is again a free land.

¹⁴Ibid., Vol. 94-Part 12, p. A5149.

which originally frustrated the honest votes of a brave people which still believed that pacts and promises made by the three big powers were more than paper and hot air.

There have been vigorous protests from Washington and London, but they have been callously ignored by Russia and by the Reds who pose as Poles and dominate the police state.

They laugh at such protests, and when they do not laugh they carry out reprisals which cause additional bloodshed in my land—such as the destruction of the Warsaw headquarters of my Polish Peasant Party by Communists immediately after Mr. James F. Byrnes' speech at Stuttgart.

The only vestige of democracy left in Poland today—in a country, mind you, which Mr. Roosevelt earnestly hailed as "the inspiration of nations"—is in the pulpits of the church.

Only here can the so-called liberated Pole be told he should be free. Only here can he be openly told to love instead of hate, to tell truths instead of lies, to believe in his destiny.

But the Red offense against this last barricade of democracy in Poland has now been brought into the open. At the opening session of the Sejm, our Parliament, on October 29, 1947, Josef Cyrankiewicz, Prime Minister of the Communist-dominated Polish Government, accused the church of attempting to thwart the "people's democracy."

Two weeks later, in a brutal burlesque of a military trial, Cardinals Hlond and Sapieha were denounced by a specially instructed witness as collaborators with the anti-Government underground.

Do not be surprised at the news, in the near future, that there have been other trumped-up charges against clergymen as "collaborators," "saboteurs," and "traitors." All this inevitably in the maniacal tradition of dictatorships.

Poland is but one country in Russia's overall plan for conquest of the world. But it is a key nation, for it symbolizes the essential treachery of the Red plan and its ruthless lack of conscience. Though occupied throughout World War II, Poland produced no quisling government. It was an Ally. Today it is invaded again and is actually paying reparations to Russia.

Russia will strike former friend or former foe without discrimination. France and Italy have but recently barely evaded Communist-inspired civil wars which would have been the signal for the Red army to plunge to the Atlantic with legions of troops and the most modern armor, to "defend the rights of the suppressed peoples."

Russia has lost these two recent battles, but they were only battles. Russia has not lost the war it is waging on the dignity and freedom of all democratic peoples any more than the loss of some of its western cities to Hitler in 1941-43 meant that it had lost World War II.

It will try again, soon and on many fronts.

It will do its utmost to defeat the Marshall plan, whose aim is to stabilize and raise the European standard of living—a condition which is an antidote against the Reds' program, based on misery and chaos.

Russia is content that nothing can stop the march toward domination—political, economic, and military—of the entire world. Stalin can die, but his successors, Zhdanov, Molotov, and others, will carry on.

There are countless trained men in many echelons behind these leaders, waiting to step forward and pursue the Red program. Tomorrow I shall tell you about that program.

(Document No. 15)

Citizens' Petition for "A Just Peace for Hungary"
Read by Robert A. Grant¹⁵

HON. ROBERT A. GRANT

OF INDIANA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, July 22, 1946

Mr. GRANT of Indiana. Mr. Speaker, Americans of Hungarian origin recently met in New York City under the direction of the American Hungarian Federation.

Out of that meeting came the following resolution, which has been sent to me by the Right Reverend Monsignor John Sabo, pastor of Our Lady of Hungary Roman Catholic Church of South Bend,

Ind., and dean of the South Bend Deanery, Fort Wayne diocese:

We, American citizens of Hungarian origin, at a mass meeting held on this day, June 16, 1946, after due consideration of all facts and in full realization of our obligations as citizens of the United States ask our Government:

1. To prevent the partition of Europe into zones of influence, either by granting to any great power political, military or economic privileges, or by accepting facts accomplished during the armistice period which are incompatible with the freedom, independence and sovereign rights of any nation.

2. To assure to Hungary, separated today from western Europe, her traditional and rightful place in the family of the western democratic nations. In conformity with the Moscow Declaration (October 31, 1943), we ask for Hungary "that political and economic security, which is the only basis for lasting peace."

3. To put fully into effect in the Hungarian Peace Treaty the principles of the Atlantic Charter and in particular to apply the ethnic principles without prejudice to Hungary in the drafting of her future frontiers. Border territories inhabited by Hungarians or Hungarian majorities should be returned to their motherland.

4. To prevent persecution of minorities on racial basis, and forbid their expulsion and confiscation of their properties as has been practiced during the armistice period by Czecho-slovakia. Minorities should be granted full minority rights under international guaranties.

5. To restore Transylvania as an independent state within a Danubian Federation. This is the only proper solution capable of establishing lasting peace between Hungary and Rumania.

6. To relieve Hungary of the unbearable burden of reparations and of occupation which prevent reconstruction and threaten the nation's survival.

7. To expedite the conclusion of the Hungarian peace treaty without further unwarranted delay.

¹⁵U.S. Congress, Congressional Record, Senate, 70th Congress, 2d sess., Vol. 92-Part 12, Appendix, op. cit., p. A4334.

(Document No. 16)

Reading by Senator Tom Stewart of an Editorial
Telling of the Red Seizure of
Czechoslovakia¹⁶

HON. TOM STEWART

OF TENNESSEE

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

Friday, February 27 (legislative day of
Monday, February 2), 1948

Mr. STEWART. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to place in the Appendix of the *CONGRESSIONAL RECORD* a very timely editorial which appeared in the *Knoxville News Sentinel*, Knoxville, Tenn., on February 25, 1948.

This editorial accurately and truthfully points out that the Red seizure of Czechoslovakia strikes a familiar communistic chord and it is the same old story of communistic treachery and betrayal.

Certainly, it is running true to Soviet form and anyone who has observed the Stalin finesse sees definitely the same old pattern being cut.

This editorial points out that we should act quickly on the Marshall plan and that we should strengthen the United Nations. It also shows the importance of strengthening ourselves here in America from within. America should have no patience with communism. It is the most dangerous enemy of the civilized world today. It challenges the right of free people to remain free. This is a timely editorial.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the *Record*, as follows:

STALIN'S STEP TOWARD WAR

Red seizure of Czechoslovakia has been only a matter of time ever since Yalta. One by one, Stalin has picked off the nations of eastern Europe. Now only little Finland is left in the twilight zone of phony freedom.

It is the same old story of Communist treachery and betrayal, of the Soviet stab in the back. It has been repeated in so many places, Stalin's method and purpose should be known to all the world. And yet there are still a few even in America who call themselves non-Communists like Mr. Wallace, who profess to believe that democracy can be saved by appeasement.

Stalin has played it precisely like Hitler and the Japs—only with more skill. No Nazi or Jap fifth column ever operated with the insidious perfection of the Soviet agents who have taken over eastern Europe and who have bored so deeply into Italy, France, and China.

If the analogy holds, Stalin will go on until he provokes a world war; until his

cheap victories over smaller nations end in his final defeat by the strong whom he is trying to destroy.

There is one chance that he may be stopped without such a war. If the remaining free countries can transform their economic weakness into strength through the Marshall plan, and if they can combine in an effective defense pact under the United Nations, Stalin may retreat when faced by greater power.

But, whether he retreats or advances to war, the protective unity of the free nations now rests chiefly on American economic strength and military preparedness. That much at least is clear.

¹⁶U.S. Congress, *Congressional Record*, Senate, 80th Congress, 2d sess., Appendix, *op. cit.*, p. A1204.

(Document No. 17)

Vanshing Czechoslovakian Liberties Made Known by Representative John Davis Lodge¹⁷

HON. JOHN DAVIS LODGE

OF CONNECTICUT

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, March 1, 1948

Mr. LODGE. Mr. Speaker, under leave to extend my remarks in the RECORD, I include the following article from the Washington Post of February 29, 1948:

Europe Fearful as Czech Liberties Vanish

(By Ferdinand Kuhn, Jr.)

What happened in Prague last week was murder most foul—the murder of the civil liberties and free institutions of 12,000,000 people.

A week ago the people of Czechoslovakia could read what they liked, say what they liked, vote as they liked. Their country was in the Soviet sphere of influence, tied to Russia by a military and political alliance, but in its internal affairs it was still free.

The Czechs could read attacks on their Government in newspapers of the opposition parties. They could go to see American or Soviet films, as they chose. They could buy foreign publications. They could move and travel where they wished.

Today the non-Communist newspapers have been taken over by a disciplined Communist minority. Politicians of the non-

Communist parties have been arrested and jailed. Soon there will be the purges, the concentration camps, and perhaps the firing squad or gallows.

From now on, into an indefinite future, the Czechoslovak people can look forward only to the dread sound and symbol of the police state—what Dean Acheson, former Under Secretary of State, once called "the knock on the door at night that strikes terror into men and women."

THE CLOCK SPINS BACK

The Czechs have heard it all before. Nine years ago next month Hitler's mechanized armies rumbled into Prague, bringing with them the black-shirted secret police, the concentration camps, and the living death of Nazi rule. Then, as now, the Czechs lost their liberty, and it took years of occupation and war to set them free.

In the eyes of the remaining free nations of Europe, this second extinction of Czech freedom is not only tragic but deadly serious. For western Europe looked upon the Czech people as Slavic in language but western in culture, tradition, and achievement.

The sight of these people being swallowed into the Soviet system has given western Europe a greater shock than anything since the end of the war. In Paris and London, still half prostrate from the wounds of one war, it looks as if Russia is on the march once more; as if the Kremlin has regained the initiative which Secretary Marshall took from it last summer. Each country again looks at its neighbor, as it did in Hitler's day, and asks, "Who's next?"

And there is a haunting sense in western Europe that only the United States, acting with more swiftness and strength than ever before, can prevent the Czechoslovak pattern from being followed in Italy before summer.

If the sense of shock has not yet hit official Washington—and there is little sign that it has—it is because the United States long ago wrote off Czechoslovakia as a genuinely independent country. Officials here have felt that the death warrant of Czechoslovak liberties was signed almost 2 years ago, on the fateful day when President Eduard Benes accepted Klement Gottwald, a Moscow-trained Communist, as Premier.

COOPERATED INTERNALLY

Gottwald was accepted because his Communist Party had won 88 percent of the votes in the April 1946 election, and had become the biggest single party in the state. He promised to cooperate with the non-Communist parties in the cabinet; he let the country have genuine democracy and free institutions within its borders, as long as it suited his purposes.

But from the day he became Premier, Czechoslovakia ceased to follow an independent foreign policy. Her delegates at foreign conferences voted obediently and monotonously with the Soviet Union and its satellites. Only in trade and cultural relations with the outer world did the Czechs differ from their Soviet masters, and then they did it by permission.

The final proof of their lost independence, in American eyes, came last summer in the aftermath of Secretary Marshall's famous speech at Harvard. The British and French invited the Czechs, together with all other European countries except Spain, to come to Paris and discuss European economic cooperation. The Czechs accepted promptly.

But it was not long before their Premier and their Foreign Minister, Jan Masaryk, were summoned to Moscow. The Czechs were compelled to withdraw their acceptance of the Paris invitation. They declined to take part in the Marshall plan, and their spokesmen at home and abroad began attacking it as an attempt to eliminate the peoples of Europe.

¹⁷U.S. Congress, Congressional Record, House, 80th Congress, 2d sess., Appendix, op. cit., pp. A1259-A1260.

termination to give strictly American help to countries who would not denounce us for giving them the relief they asked for, in place of internationally administered relief on the UNRRA model.

The record shows, however, that the United States continued giving some help to the Czechs long after their foreign policy passed into virtual Soviet control.

Czechoslovakia had received a total of \$208,250,000 from UNRRA up to the end of 1940, 70 percent of it contributed by the United States. It had used \$9,304,694 of the surplus property credit before Byrnes cut it off. It had received \$3,042,000 in direct and indirect lend-lease help following the liberation. Yet in February of last year it got \$20,000,000 from the Export-Import Bank to buy American cotton, and two million for tobacco.

Apart from these sums, the Czechs asked, but did not get, a further cotton credit of twenty million and a surplus property credit of the same amount. They also sent the World Bank a letter of intent for a \$350,000,000-reconstruction loan, but no formal application has ever been received.

SMALL BUSINESS' TURN

The seizure of power by the Communists probably extinguishes any hopes the Czechs may have had of getting economic help from the west, except for the indirect effects to be expected from a revival of east-west trade under the Marshall plan.

The economic consequences will be serious in other ways. Czechoslovakia until now has been a nation of small-business men and some big industries. Until now the small businesses have been allowed to follow paths of free enterprise even though the big industries have been nationalized. The advent of a straight Communist regime is expected to lead to the gradual nationalizing of all businesses, and the small-business man may be driven to the wall.

Politically, the new regime is also expected to move gradually after its lightning seizure of power. The scheduled elections will be held with the opposition leaders in jail or powerless to speak; therefore a rigged result is almost certain. The parliamentary forms may be preserved until a new Soviet-type constitution can be written, but they will be a hollow mockery.

Whether or not President Beneš remains, his power to control events appears gone. He had his value to the Communists as a symbol of the Czechoslovak Nation. He had compromised with them in a wholly sincere belief that east and west could live together in peace and that Czechoslovakia, as bridge between them, could belong to neither side.

If he stayed, the Communists, being what they are, would have used him until it suited their purposes to discard him, just as they discarded King Michael, likewise a symbol of the state in Rumania.

THE ROAD TO ROME

What can the outer world do about it now? Probably it is too late to do anything for Czechoslovakia except to keep open every possible channel of communication to the Czech people, the majority of whom are democratic to the marrow of their bones.

It is not too late, however, to take to heart the lessons of this latest Soviet triumph. The pattern of bloodless conquest has now taken the Soviet system farther west than it has ever penetrated before.

The singer of future trouble now points squarely at Italy, where the government is shaky, the Communists strong and ably led, the Socialists divided. A general election in Italy is due April 18. It is wholly likely that the Communist machine will begin a drumbeat to discredit the election results in advance, as it did in Greece, and then attempt a coup d'état of the kind it engineered with such deadly skill and precision in Prague.

So far American policy makers have not faced up to this situation. Their thoughts and energies have been devoted to getting the European recovery program passed promptly by Congress and followed up by the Western Europeans.

Secretary Marshall has said already that Europe's immediate future depends on ERP, and that there can be no true peace until American economic help can repair the weaknesses of the western European countries.

But the past week's events have made it clear that economic help is not enough. Unless western Europe is tightened as swiftly as possible, by political as well as economic measures, there may yet be a repetition of

From that moment official Washington no longer regarded Czechoslovakia as an independent country able to carry out its own policies in its own interests. Its civil liberties and parliamentary institutions were admirable, but they could be wiped out by the stroke of a finger in the Kremlin.

TOUGH BUT PASSIVE

When the crisis finally came last week, the Czechs submitted more tamely than their less-cultured and less-democratic Balkan neighbors. They are tough people, so tough that the old Austrian Empire could not crush their national spirit in hundreds of years. But their traditional role under Austria and Hitler Germany was that of passive resisters, noncooperators, and saboteurs, rather than active rebels. It remains to be seen how they will withstand the Soviet version of totalitarian rule.

The overturn in Prague differed in three respects from the Communist coups in Hungary, Rumania, and Poland. They are differences in detail, but they are worth examining and remembering, for the Czech overturn contains clues to what may be expected from the Communists elsewhere.

In the first place, there was no Red Army actually in Czechoslovak soil, and not even any Soviet troops ostensibly guarding communication lines as they did in Hungary. The actual tramp of Red Army boots was not needed. Soviet territory adjoins Czechoslovakia at its narrow eastern border, and Soviet armed power spoke as loudly in its absence as if it had been on the spot.

In the second place, the Czechoslovak overturn was the first in eastern Europe in which the trade-unions played a prominent and perhaps decisive part. In Poland, and still more in the Balkan countries, trade-unions are comparatively weak. In Czechoslovakia, an industrial country, they are strong, disciplined, and well organized. The seizure of Communist power last week could not have taken place so smoothly without their connivance and cooperation.

Finally, Czechoslovakia was one of the few European countries where an important wing of the Socialist Party had continued to cooperate with the Communists. Although European socialism and communism are deadly enemies, the left wing of Czech socialism had a leader, former Premier Zdenek Fierlinger, who was ready to do the Communists' bidding. It may yet be that Socialist leader Pietro Nenni in Italy will play the Fierlinger role when communism is ready to try for power in the Mediterranean.

BYRNES EXPLAINS "SHOVE?"

At moments like these an American may wonder whether the United States could not have saved the Czechs from their present purgatory. Leading Czechs, friendly to the western world, have often complained that Secretary Byrnes helped to throw them into Russian arms in 1946 by cutting off American economic help.

The reasons were told in the Byrnes book, Speaking Frankly. At the Paris Peace Conference of 1946, Andrei Vishinsky, of Russia, had just finished a denunciation of the United States for trying to dominate the world by hand-outs. Byrnes noticed two of the Czechoslovak delegates applauding heartily.

At that very time, he remembered, the Czechs had been allotted a \$50,000,000 surplus-property credit from the United States. He also discovered that a Communist minister, without the knowledge of Foreign Minister Mnasyk, had contracted to renege \$10,000,000 of this to Rumania at a higher rate of interest.

Byrnes promptly cut off the credit with the bitter remark that he did not want to offend the Czechs further by giving them American hand-outs.

(Document No. 18)

The Deplorable Events of Czechoslovakia as Told by Representative Karl Stefan¹⁸

HON. KARL STEFAN

OF NEBRASKA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, March 1, 1948

Mr. STEFAN. Mr. Speaker, this past Friday, over radio station WOL in Washington, at 8 o'clock in the morning, Mr. George E. Reedy, the popular commentator, discussed the fall of Czechoslovakia to the Communists. I quote:

The fall of Czechoslovakia to the Communists has brought the United States to its greatest diplomatic crisis since the beginning of the late war. American officials are making no attempt to disguise their deep concern.

Of course, Czechoslovakia is only one of a long series of nations to fall to the Communists. It has been preceded by practically all of eastern Europe. Soviet domination of border countries has become the pattern of the postwar world.

But the fall of Czechoslovakia presents a different picture. The other nations had been under Russian domination in one form or another for several centuries.

Their nation, which grew out of the First World War, was patterned after our own. Its government was modeled on the lines of our Government, and its people had a passionate devotion to liberty. They have proved it over and over.

From a strategic standpoint, the capture of Czechoslovakia was important to the Communists. It advances the Russian sphere of influence to western Europe itself, and it brings to the Soviets an important industrial prize.

The Soviet Union has always lacked a pool of skilled workers. Czechoslovakia as an industrial nation has plenty. Before the war it was one of the most important manufacturing centers on the Continent.

There is little doubt that Russia will be able to make good use of this pool of workmen. The Germans proved that it could be done, and the Communists are fully as efficient as the Nazis. The Czechs will work—whether they want to or not.

All of these things considered, it is not surprising that the United States, Great Britain, and France have joined to denounce the Communist stroke. Their language is bitter and undiplomatic, but it is justified.

The three-power note calls the coup a "disguised dictatorship of a single party." It calls the crisis which was used to bring it about "artificially and deliberately instigated." No words are minced—or softened.

Such language, of course, does nothing but give the three nations a chance to blow off some steam. They are still faced with the problem of doing something to halt a further Soviet advance. Czechoslovakia, must be written off the books.

Secretary of State Marshall has already asked Congress for more aid to Greece—the only non-Communist country adjoining the Soviet sphere. He wants \$275,000,000 to strengthen the Greek Government.

But the real fear is that the Communists have designs on France and Italy. Those are the two vulnerable points in western Europe. The Communists know they cannot take them except by force from the outside.

A strike, at either by Soviet forces would put this country directly on the spot. We would either have to fight or get out of Europe altogether. Neither alternative would be a happy one. Either alternative could be disastrous.

The true significance of the fall of Czechoslovakia is this: There are now no more buffers in the world. From here on out international diplomacy is played for keeps. Any further Soviet expansion means we must put up—or shut up.

Mr. Speaker, and so ends the commentary last Friday morning of Mr. George E. Reedy.

Much of what Mr. Reedy said about Czechoslovakia and her current situation I am sure most of us will agree with.

However, I wish to most earnestly correct Mr. Reedy's remark that "Czechoslovakia must be written off the books."

Mr. Reedy and the world must never forget that Czechoslovakia is a young republic, younger even than our own United States. And youth has vitality, strength, and courage. Nor must the world forget that the people of Czechoslovakia cherish in their hearts a deep love of liberty as passionate and sincere as is our own.

It is true that a Russian rider sits in the Czech saddle. But if I know those people, and I think I do, the spirit of democracy will not die as long as one Czech lives.

It is also my belief that the Russian rider will find that he sits astride a strong-willed and bucking mount.

¹⁸ Ibid., p. A1266.

(Document No. 19)

Telegram Showing F.D.R.'s Change of Attitude
Toward the Soviet Union¹⁹

THE WHITE HOUSE,
March 24, 1945

Personal and Secret from the President to Stalin:

Ambassador Gromyko has just informed the State Department of the composition of the Soviet delegation to the San Francisco Conference. While we have the highest respect for Ambassador Gromyko's character and capabilities and know that he would ably represent his country, I cannot help being deeply disappointed that Mr. Molotov apparently does not plan to attend. Recalling the friendly and fruitful cooperation at Yalta between Mr. Molotov, Mr. Eden, and Mr. Stettinius, I know the Secretary of State has been looking forward to continuing the joint work in the same spirit at San Francisco for the eventual realization of our mutual goal, the establishment of an effective international organization to insure a secure and peaceful future for the world.

. . . . If (Molotov's) pressing and heavy responsibilities in the Soviet Union make it impossible for him to stay for the entire Conference, I very much hope that you will find it possible to let him come at least for the vital opening sessions. Since all sponsoring powers and the majority of other countries attending will be represented by their Ministers of Foreign Affairs, I am afraid that Mr. Molotov's absence will be construed all over the world as a lack of comparable interest on the part of the Soviet Government in the great objectives of this Conference.

ROOSEVELT

¹⁹Elliott Roosevelt and Joseph P. Lash, eds., F.D.R. His Personal Letters, 1928-1945, (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1950), pp. 1577-1578.

(Document No. 20)

Survey on American Opinion of the U.S.S.R.²⁰

In the mind of the U.S. public, there is little doubt of the importance of friendly relations with Russia. The following attitude scale shows the Russophobes in a minority of less than 10 per cent, those cool toward Russia a mere 11 per cent—both together about balanced by those who say it is important to keep on friendly terms with Russia. But most significantly, the scale shows that the largest segment of the public wants to put a stop-loss order on its endorsement of Russia's importance. Success or failure of the relationship is looked on as a joint responsibility of the two countries.

With which one of these four statements do you come closest to agreeing?

It is going to be very important to keep on friendly terms with Russia after the war, and we should make every possible effort to do so	22.7%
It is important for the U.S. to be on friendly terms with Russia after the war, but not so important that we should make too many concessions to her	49.2
If Russia wants to keep on friendly terms with us after the war, we shouldn't discourage her, but there is no reason why we should make any special effort to be friendly	11.3
We shall be better off if we have just as little as possible to do with Russia after the war	9.3
Don't know	7.5

Hopes for success are down a little from last January and "don't know" answers have increased, probably because of V-E strains, but hope still predominates.

Thinking back for a moment to our relations with Russia a few years before the war, do you think we will get along better with Russia in the future than we did in the past, not so well, or about the same?

	January	This survey
Better	48.3%	42.4%
Not so well	22.0	19.1
About the same	20.1	23.5
Don't know	9.6	15.0

Russian Motives—the U.S. View

What does the U.S. public deduce as Russia's purpose? The first question exploring this area brought an almost exact standoff:

²⁰ "U.S. Opinion on Russia," Fortune XXXII, No. 4, (September, 1945), pp. 233-238.

Would you describe Russia as a peace-loving nation, willing to fight only if she thinks she has to defend herself—or as an aggressive nation that would start a war to get something she wants?

Peace-loving	38.6%
Aggressive	37.8
Both (volunteered)	8.4
Don't know	15.2

Although the Russian attitude toward the world thus seems to puzzle Americans, there is little feeling that the Russian people are definitely hostile to the U.S. Yet only a bare majority feel sure of Russian friendliness:

Do you feel that most of the common people in Russia are now pretty friendly toward the U.S., or not so friendly, or that most of them don't have any feeling one way or the other?

Friendly toward U.S.	52.7%
Not so friendly	7.0
Not one way or other	22.0
Don't know	18.3

A good part of the U.S. public apparently assumes friendship on the part of the Russians because it has a clear conscience—whether justified or not—on its own behavior toward Russia. Asked if the U.S. had done anything since the last war that may have given the Russians reason to doubt our friendship, 73.7 per cent answered that there was nothing they could think of. Among those who could think of unfriendly acts, mention was made most frequently of the failure of the U.S. to recognize the Russian Government.

Russian interest in the countries close to her is appraised by the U.S. public, perhaps correctly, in military and political terms. As follows:

Which one of these do you think is the most important reason behind Russia's interest in the countries lying along her borders?

She wants to spread communism	25.6%
She needs things they can produce	16.4
She wants to be able to count on them in case of attack	29.4
She wants to improve conditions for people in those countries	8.7
Don't know	19.9

Military security is seen as paramount, political security as a close second. Whatever ominous implications there may be in Russia's policy on her Manchurian border, either the public is ignorant of the situation, which is quite likely, or else does not consider it nearly so

important as shortening the Japanese war. Asked if they would like to see Russia join us in the war against Japan or would rather she stayed out, 71.4 per cent of the people wanted Russia in, only 18.5 per cent wanted her to stay out. The compelling reason probably lies in public feeling about the toughness of the Japanese war. Only 26.9 per cent of the people think Japan will give up before she is beaten as Germany was; 62.2 per cent think Japan will fight on.

Good Russian Points and Bad

The public was asked to volunteer its own ideas about Russia's good points and bad points. Forty-three per cent could think of no particular good points, 33 per cent could think of no particular bad points. Those who answered scattered their replies over a wide range. On the asset side the Russian military performance was mentioned most frequently, but it was closely followed by approval of the redistribution of wealth, of equality, and of economic security. Russian educational opportunities were frequently mentioned, as well as advances in industrial production. When personal characteristics were considered, Russian patriotism, courage, and industriousness came in for praise.

Foremost among the bad points Americans see in Russia is communism, followed by Russian hostility to religion and various aspects of Russia's dictatorial government and lack of personal freedom. A number of Americans believe that Russia's foreign policy is purely selfish and acquisitive. Objections to Russia, however, concentrated on matters of government and policy--only 1.8 per cent had any hard words to say about the Russian people.

When asked more specific questions about Russian policies, the people continued to show high proportions who had no information or opinion. For instance:

Which of these things have you liked about Russia, and which haven't you liked so well?

	<i>Liked</i>	<i>Liked part</i>	<i>Not liked</i>	<i>Don't know</i>
The way she handles her diplomatic relations with this country	18.0%	8.5%	42.6%	30.9%
The way she handles her military campaigns	66.9	3.0	4.2	25.9
The way she handles our news correspondents	8.5	3.5	39.7	48.3
The way she handles justice and the legal rights of her own people	16.1	2.5	24.1	57.3

Comments made by those expressing an opinion on the last of these questions repeated the feeling that Russians have little in the way of personal rights. Those who said they like Russian justice were frequently at a loss to say why.

Most of the U.S. people have acquired the belief that the Russian Government considers itself to be above the source of law.

Do you think the Russian Government pays a lot of attention to what the Russian people (and people in the rest of the world) think, or that it decides what it is going to do without taking what they think much into account?

	<i>The Russian people</i>	<i>People in the rest of the world</i>
Pays attention to them	16.0%	16.0%
Decides without them	64.8	67.6
Don't know	19.2	16.4

Thus public opinion, the balance wheel of American politics, is believed to have little weight in Russian policy making.

When the people were asked to compare Russia and the U.S. on a number of points, only very small minorities gave Russia the advantage. Asked "which country gives its people as a whole a better chance to get ahead," 86.1 per cent named the U.S., only 2.3 per cent named Russia. Seventy per cent think that the U.S. also gives its people as a whole a better sense of economic security, and 75 per cent think the U.S. has a better setup for encouraging good new inventions. And U.S. eminence in these and other respects is not believed to be threatened—65.5 per cent think that the U.S. will be more important than Russia in world affairs twenty-five years from now. Only 6.3 per cent think that Russia will then be more important; only 11.5 per cent think the two nations will be of about the same importance. Her military accomplishments alone bring Russia abreast of the U.S. in U.S. opinion. Asked whether Germany could have been defeated this year if Russia had not been in the war, 84 per cent said "No." But even fewer believed that Russia and Britain could have done it alone—92 per cent thought Germany could not have been defeated this year if the U.S. had not been in the war.

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