

1973

# The Palestine Resistance: The Politics of Despair

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*Eastern Illinois University*

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THE PALESTINE RESISTANCE:

THE POLITICS OF DESPAIR

(TITLE)

BY

Najib N. Younis

**THESIS**

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## CHAPTER I

### PROPOSITIONS AND METHODOLOGY

#### Introduction

The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the development, causes, objectives and future of the Palestine Resistance Movement. The study presents several original propositions concerning the extent to which the Palestinian Resistance is a self-contained movement. The Resistance Movement came about as a consequence of political and socio-economic circumstances, having its own well-defined values and goals, enjoying recognition of its viability among the Palestinian and Arab population, and might be affecting the future of Israel. The analysis combines substantive information on the Palestine Resistance Movement with a behavioral and theoretical approach to the phenomenon of resistance.

#### Propositions

The discussion concentrates on the following propositions:

1. The conventional wisdom in the literature on resistance and violence suggests that it is structural inequalities and unrepresentative government that provoke alienated groups in society to view the government as illegitimate. In some cases, however, it may be that alienated groups view the state and the political system themselves



as illegitimate. This may have been the case of the Palestinians of Israel who stayed in Israel after the 1947-1948 war, those on the West Bank of the Jordan River and in the Gaza Strip which became a part of Israel in 1967, and those Palestinians who are living in exile. It was the initial view of the Palestinians that the new Israeli government was illegitimate because they saw the state of Israel as illegitimate. This illegitimacy rendered the Israeli government unrepresentative in the eyes of the Palestinians.

2. If a political system tends to restrain certain groups from acquiring equal rights and status, and keeps other groups from participating in, or left outside the system, the impact of such an arrangement is tension resulting from a breakdown of communication between the existing government and the alienated groups. When the tension becomes uncontrollable, violence is likely to occur. The Palestinian Arabs (willingly or unwillingly, whether based on reason, logic, or emotions) have disassociated themselves from the Israeli political system. Their attitudes toward those whom they consider the sources of their problems have become attitudes of hate, revenge and violence. Revenge and violence may not be carried out if an existing regime is considerably repressive, but as a general rule, violence may flare up at any moment, since all other channels of communications are closed.

3. Shared goals bring a group's factions closer together and strengthen them, making the pursuit of their goals more effective; but contradicting approaches and ideologies may weaken the organization and split it apart, consequently rendering its goals unreachable.

The Palestinian organizations may be victims of such internal fracturing because of the variety of approaches to realizing their common goal.

4. Passive or active group resistance may be the outcome of political, social and economic inequalities, social change, and failures of members of the group to accommodate themselves by other means. Although all of the above mentioned criteria can provide the necessary momentum for violence, some other highly-valued goal such as country-identity may overshadow all other things and call for armed resistance of which consequences are not defined. This is true for the Palestinians. To the Palestinian, the homeland lies in the center of his basic existence and its loss renders life meaningless. The assertion of his right to make his life meaningful (fighting to regain his country-identity) is most likely to generate chains of violent events. These events may lead to goal attainment, abolition of the group, perpetuation of the existing state of affairs, or a compromise.

5. Organized armed resistance arises to accomplish specific goals. Consequently, counter-resistance is aimed at quieting the forces of resistance and dismantling their sources of support.

The Palestinian Arabs are convinced that their tactics of armed resistance in fighting Israel are the only effective ways to "liberate" Palestine. The Israelis react by attacking the bases of Palestinians in their host countries, threatening the host countries, and putting more pressures and controls on the Palestinian people who live within the geographic limits of Israel.

Having outlined the general points of discussion, let us now look at the problem and see how a Palestinian feels.

### Background

"One day spent in the slums of a big city should have sufficed"<sup>1</sup> to make one (any one who lives in better conditions) aware of the perpetual states of disappointments, frustration, anger and grudge that are held by slum dwellers against the system.

To the Palestinians, the loss of their homeland caused them to live in slums. Not only does the idea of living in the slums as such, create these feelings of hostility, but the loss of their homeland over which they did not cast a vote reinforces these feelings. Living in the slums in alien countries represents the absence of access to the political systems (except in Jordan where Palestinians have limited access) in the host countries. The non-existent political achievements work as a constant reminder of lack of power and prestige, as well as of the idea that the restoration of power and prestige can come about only by regaining Palestine. The uniqueness of the Palestinian problem is easily recognized.

"His Majesty's Government views with favor the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people and will use their best endeavors to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done to prejudice the civil and religious rights of the existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine."<sup>2</sup>

This is what is known as the Balfour Declaration of 1917, which came twenty years after the Zionist Movement made its aim in Palestine

clear. By the end of World War I, Palestine became a British mandate, and the Jewish immigration to Palestine increased more than ever. The Balfour Declaration, coupled with the inflow of immigrants to Palestine, alarmed the Palestinian Arabs. They demonstrated their dissatisfaction in many protests against the British rule and the newcomers. From 1920 until 1939, the protests of the Palestinians never stopped; nor did the Jewish immigration to Palestine, or the activities of the militant Zionist organizations cease against the indigenous Arab population of Palestine.<sup>3</sup> The conflict between the Palestinian Arabs and the Zionists, after World War II, was heightened and as a consequence, the British Government handed back its mandate over Palestine to the United Nations saying that it could no longer cope with the situation.<sup>4</sup>

At the time of the Balfour Declaration in 1917, the Palestinian Arab population consisted of nine-tenths of the total population of Palestine and owned about fifty-six percent of the land. The Jewish population was eight percent and owned two and one-half percent of the land. In 1947, after thirty years of Jewish immigration to Palestine, the Palestinian Arabs formed sixty-nine percent of the population and forty-seven percent of the land, and the Jewish population thirty-one percent and fifteen percent respectively.<sup>5</sup> (The land that is not accounted for was the property of the British Government--the Mandatory Government at the time.)

Preceded by the failure of the United Nations to find a solution acceptable to both parties to the dispute, the British forces withdrew from Palestine in mid-1948 leaving the country in utter

confusion. Consequently, the militant Zionist organizations spread their terrorist activities to encompass the whole Palestinian Arab population. As a result, the Palestinian Arabs were forced to abandon the land that their fathers and forefathers owned and grew on. Individuals and collectivities fled out of the country after they were terrorized physically and psychologically; many were massacred and tortured.<sup>6</sup> The waves of Palestinians seeking refuge in the neighboring countries found themselves first shelterless, and later living in shacks, tents, and slums facing very poor economic and health conditions. All of that, coupled with disoriented and dis-integrated social life, was thought of as the consequences of homelessness. The Palestinian felt deeply that with the loss of his homeland lay the loss of his identity and his honor. His pride and dignity were hurt and he was lowered in status and prestige. Every one of the above mentioned effects might have been enough to generate in the Palestinian a tremendous impetus to revolt against the realities with which he is always living, and consequently attack the Zionist state as the symbol of these realities.

As the situation presently stands, one may view the problem as a paradigm of group-conflict outside the constitutional framework in this manner:

If there exists two groups, A and B, in one area or country that are diametrically opposed to each other's orientations and philosophies with no perceived possibility of a compromise; and

If one of these groups, say group A, comes to power by force and consequently controls the natural and human resources of the areas; then,



Since group A came to rule through coercive means, group B must surrender, go into exile, or seek refuge. This could happen without group B abandoning its principles, and consequently its viewing the order of A as illegitimate. Accordingly, group B may never stop resisting the form, shape, or substance of group A's dominance wherever it exists. However, the methods that group B chooses to follow may vary according to its determination and the potentials of the available means under its disposal.

If armed resistance comes to the forefront, then counter-resistance follows. Armed resistance may not substantially endanger the existence of a very strong and well-established system, but it may annoy and divert the system's efforts from development and growth to maintenance of the existing institutions. This sort of retardation created by resistance to the system calls for counter-resistance by the existing government. Counter-resistance may be very effective in suppressing the forces of resistance temporarily, but if it ultimately fails to quiet them, the system has to come to terms with these forces in the end.

### Methodology

In addition to discussing the propositions described above, the study discusses the extent to which the Palestinian resistance:

(a) Is a self-contained movement, created by the social, economic, and political conditions of the Palestinian people;

(b) Possesses its own well-defined values and goals and has moved toward fulfilling these goals;

(c) Enjoys recognition of its viability among the Palestinian and Arab population, and;

(d) Might be affecting the future of Israel.

This study uses United Nations' data, reports published by United States Government Agencies, reports and studies of the Rand Corporation, publications of the Palestine Liberation Organization Research Center, and official announcements of spokesmen of the Movement, as well as some secondary sources in analysis of these propositions.

The United Nations data contain statistical information about the life conditions of the Palestinian refugees, that is, the socio-economic conditions. The United States documentary publications, which include attitude survey, deal with the political, social, and economic aspects of the Palestinians. The Rand Corporation reports and studies describe some of the aspect under which the Palestinian Resistance Movement came about, with discussions about the role Palestinians play in the Middle East crisis. The publications of the Palestine Liberation Organization Research Center describe the development of the problem using raw data about events and conditions that have contributed to the present situation. The announcements of the official spokesmen of the Movement spell out the results of the actions of the Movement and the implications for the future.

This material on the Palestine Resistance Movement provides the bulk of the information needed to show how the liberation movement arose and is supported by the entire Palestinian population.

The study thus combines substantive information on the Palestinian Resistance Movement with a behavioral and theoretical approach to the phenomenon of resistance.

The conclusions on the validity of the propositions will be brought together in an effort to formulate some more general propositions on (1) resistance as a political phenomenon, (2) the socio-economic determinants of resistance, and (3) the prospects for organized armed resistance to accomplish its goals.



FOOTNOTES

## Chapter One

<sup>1</sup>Hannah Arendt, On Revolution (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1970), p. 59.

<sup>2</sup>Anthony Nutting, "The Tragedy of Palestine from the Balfour Declaration to Today," The Arab World, Vol. XIV, No. 1-2, (January-February, 1968), p. 3.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p. 5.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., p. 4.

<sup>5</sup>Ibrahim Al-Abid, A Handbook to the Palestine Question, No. 17 (Beirut: Palestine Liberation Organization Research Center, 1969), p. 23.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid., pp. 82-84.

## CHAPTER II

### RESISTANCE: WHY AND WHEN IT OCCURS

#### Introduction

For most Western newspapers, magazines, journals, and commentators, the members of the Palestine Resistance Movement are terrorists, blood-thirsty rebels, fanatic nationals, and individuals whose irrationality is their common ground. They call themselves the resistance movement, the freedom fighters, and the liberators of the homeland whose cause is consciously denied. Between what they are called and what they call themselves there exists wide differences in values and characteristics. Regardless, the Palestinians seem to be determined to expand and perpetuate their actions until the present situation changes. But whether their actions will end tomorrow or will never cease, their Movement, internationally recognized at least in underground circles, was never the first and probably will not be the last.

A quick look at the history of the world during the last two hundred years is enough to show us that resistance is not a phenomenon of recent years or a monopoly of one region or another. Although resistance is normal, it is circumstantial and varies in dimensions and forms from one country to another.

The Twentieth Century and the post World War II era in particular have experienced many incidents which could be termed as ranging from mild to violent resistance. These experiences have taken the form of political protests, wars of liberation or independence, or revolutions. Therefore, political resistance may be defined as an opposition, passive, underground or overt, by individuals who share common principles and outlooks, who get together informally and, as time passes, may become an organized group or groups operating from within or without a political system, with the goal of limiting or changing certain policies governing the system. In case of armed resistance, the resisting groups' potential goal is doing away with the system and substituting their own. The magnitude of resistance, then, is determined by (1) the degree of popular support for the goals of the resisting groups; (2) the means available to execute their threats; and (3) the degree of repression (and its psychological repercussions) launched against them by the existing order, including a perceived denial of their rightful demands.

Thinkers and philosophers such as Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Moore, Locke, Hobbes, Bodin and many others, tried to systematize the best type of governments and social orders for the happiness of mankind. At the present there are some pioneer theorists whose concern is to contribute to people's well-being in searching into the causes and effects of disruptions of public life in both developed and developing nations, so that some beneficial conceptions can be learned from them. However, with diverse emphasis, their research and writings

show that psychological, social, economic and political factors are the components of people's uprisings.<sup>1</sup> Although there are numerous theories about protest, violence, and revolutions, this paper deals with a few theorists and parts of their interpretations which seem important to the analysis of this topic.

### Some Contemporary Interpretations of Resistance

In any serious conflict situations which may arise, one essential question would be posed; it is that of legitimacy. Nieburg says that the legitimacy of a government is reflected in a consensus among the population; that is, the state government and institutions are mere representations of people's values and expectations.<sup>2</sup> The implication of Nieburg's interpretation of legitimacy is that when a government loses its legitimacy, it loses its stability against rising discontent of the people. This discontent may be manifested by diverse methods of resistance to the government and its philosophy, which would consist of chaotic interactions in general, and may ultimately lead to structural changes.

Talking about American experiences in general and about the influence of political equality and consent in particular, Robert Dahl argues, "...traditional institutionalized inequalities tend to create all the conditions needed for a perfect self-fulfilling prophecy: political weakness leads to continued political weakness, and strength to continued strength."<sup>3</sup> It can be logically assumed that Dahl's proposition, based on the American minorities' experiences, could be

interpreted as arguing that the relationship which exists between weakness and strength is that of polarization. Polarization does not make the alienated group agree with the alienating group's policies but rather causes them to disagree (the range of this disagreement could be anywhere between mild and sharp). Therefore, the outcome of this disagreement would be based on how large the alienated group is, whether it could be organized, and the methods it is ready to employ to gain its ends, and, lastly, what means it has at its disposal. Dahl then argues that the degree of practical equality which exists imposes the degree of consent which exists, which in turn determines the intensity of any disagreements under basic control by the system. If the degree of practical equality is great, then the result can be a stable political system and a natural social order, and if not, tense and strained political and social orders will prevail.

People, whether individuals, groups, or society, have values, aspirations, and goals to pursue. Goals may not be achieved for different reasons, aspirations may wither away, and consequently the goal-pursuer is in a state of depression. Frustration, Ted Gurr argues, is a consequence of misachievements which are caused by a foreign agent. The relevance of achievements in terms of goals and the value placed upon them may, in the case of extreme importance, cause the frustrated person to attack that agent as a source of his frustrations.<sup>4</sup> A person, however, responds violently when he perceives that his whole existence is at stake. His potential response may be aimed at destroying the

source of threat if it should be the only way to stop potential harm, as he perceives it, which will occur to him if he does not act. Therefore, the frustration-aggression phenomenon may function according to the degree of induced anger of which causes and magnitude of response are learned through the socialization process.<sup>5</sup>

The frustration-aggression theory was introduced in 1939 by Dollard and Miller has generated various arguments, one of which says that "...a state of frustration may lead to aggressive, regressive, or resigned behavior."<sup>6</sup> The author also argues that the individual's capacity for aggression increases once he is in a group of the same orientation. This is simply because the fear of punishment would be less, plus the fact that "...within groups aggression would be greater in an organized rather than an unorganized group, since punishment expectations would be more clearly defined in the former than in the latter, and would in any case be less since an organized group by definition is one within which the occurrence of hostility does not lead to disintegration."<sup>7</sup>

Discontent and dissatisfaction have a direct bearing on people's attitudes and orientations. Existence of discontent and dissatisfaction create the necessary impetus for a total change of the existing social and political orders as perceived by a certain population, eventhough slight actions may not take place to bring about the hoped-for changes. Davies argues that when the chances of death are high, it is likely that people's feelings of discontent will remain dormant; but the lower the chances of death, the more likely it is that people will



demonstrate the degree of their dissatisfaction by an equivalent degree of resistance.<sup>8</sup> Therefore, if the latter state exists and if their discontent is at a maximum, it may be that a revolution is underway.

A society may be described as a reservoir in which the sum total of people's needs, desires, events and happenings are interacting and undergoing constant changes. Therefore, "...the possibility of violent socio-political conflict," Arnold Feldman assumes, "is always present in every society," and revolutions consist of extremes of tense situations between two opposing and interacting forces once tension-management fails to predominate.<sup>9</sup> Thus, the breaking of tension-management is caused by a specific degree of social change from which strains that are caused by the socio-political interactions will erupt and transform into a potential revolution.<sup>10</sup>

Leonard Berkowitz, basically in agreement with the frustration-aggression theory,<sup>11</sup> refers intergroup conflict to a set of variables charged, rightly or wrongly, with potential effects on people's behavior so that, as a result, people commit acts of aggression to hold up their beliefs.<sup>12</sup> Approaching his proposition through the experiences of the past European religious rivalries and their consequences--killings for potential gains or avoiding predictable threats--Berkowitz contends that "...ideological conflict frequently results from essentially similar conditions, that is, perceiving aggression as a means of gaining ends dictated by one's beliefs."<sup>13</sup>

It is apparent from Berkowitz's discussion that the magnitude of alienation and opposition between groups may determine the likelihood of aggression and conflict.

In the foregoing discussion, we tried to explore the scope of causes of violence and resistance in general to see where the Palestinian Resistance fits. After a brief review of the literature on the Palestine Resistance Movement, we will apply these contemporary interpretations of resistance to the present case study.

### Existing Literature on the Palestine Resistance Movement

Prior to the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, the Palestine Resistance Movement had no mention in the literature of political science. The violent incidents that took place before 1967 between the Fedayeen and the Israelis were reported in newspapers as Egyptian, Jordanian and Syrian infiltrators into Israel.

It was not until a few months after the 1967 war that the Fedayeen became recognized as an element in the Arab-Israeli dilemma, due to frequent attacks between the Fedayeen and the Israelis. Consequently, their movement and actions became an integral part of the daily news.

Due to the Fedayeen's mounting activities, the Palestine Resistance became the focus of some scholarly writings. The nationalistic orientations of the Palestine people is William Quandt's focus of study. Quandt assumes that the present movement may be the highest stage of Palestinian nationalism. His study "...analyzes developments in organization, leadership, ideology, and strategy within the Fedayeen movement."<sup>14</sup>

When such movements exist and impose themselves as a factor which cannot be ignored, the attention and interests of writers vary



according to specific points and sides they want to discover. The developments of the Palestine Resistance in a somewhat historical perspective is Professor M. Hudson's discussion. He deals with the Movement in terms of its role in the Middle East crisis, and its effectiveness on Israel, the Arab countries and the international community as well.<sup>15</sup>

Another fact of the Palestine Resistance is discussed by E. A. Nakhleh. The author contends that the Palestinian Resistance does not function according to a blueprint or long-range program despite the clarity of their goal.<sup>16</sup> However, Professor Nakhleh's analysis concerns itself with the violent process of the Movement with respect to the emergence and justification of violence, as the factions of the Movement see them, using the interpretations of Arendt, Fanon, Marx, and Waskow.<sup>17</sup>

The political socialization of the commandos is the theme of another article. The author uses attitude surveys conducted on Palestinian school children living in Jordan. The article reveals many interesting aspects about the political socialization of Palestinians in general and the potential commando-member in particular.<sup>18</sup>

The Palestine Liberation Organization Research Center published many books and articles concerning the legal and historical aspects of the Palestine question which led to the present-day armed resistance. Some major groups in the Movement published some booklets in descriptions of the resistance and the goals and orientations governing their activities, and the institutional framework of the future Palestine they advocate.

There does not seem to be other major scholarly studies of the Palestine Resistance Movement.

### Some Remarks on the Literature

An analysis of the views of H. Nieburg, R. Dahl, T. Gurr, A. Yates, J. Davies, A. Feldman, and L. Berkowitz reveals two things:

1. Their findings were arrived at from specific political and social events and situations.

2. Because of specific incidents which evoke certain feelings within a person, the human individual acts as he does. If the individual is exposed to an act which he perceives as constructive, in terms of his present or future physical and moral goals, his reaction may tend to be peaceful. If he is exposed to and directly influenced by an act which he feels as infringing upon his state of being, the way he understands it, his reaction would be oriented towards putting an end to that act. Thus, his reaction is heightened by the action itself. Therefore, anger is but a stage of total preparedness from which any action could be performed. Here arises an important question: What, in reality, are the factors that lead individuals, groups or societies to a stage of anger? The above-mentioned authors refer to this in broad terms such as emotions or learned behavior, simply because their experiments were conducted on animals such as rats, cats and the like; animals do not exhibit grounds for necessary specificity which is needed for a general and inclusive theory.

For at least two reasons, it is difficult to apply any one of the interpretations of resistance discussed above to the Palestine

Resistance Movement: (1) This resistance is not taking place in one socio-political entity, rather in four politically-separated and emotionally-interconnected entities--the resistance movements in Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and Israel--against one political entity--Israel--and over one geographically-defined entity--Palestine.<sup>19</sup> (2) The anger-saturated "frustration-aggression" theory holds true for spontaneous individual and group violence, and also for unorganized collective violence. It was not shown that controlled, directed, and conditioned acts of violence that are formalized by organizational structures function according to the "frustration-aggression" syndrome.<sup>20</sup> Therefore, a more inclusive approach needs to be developed. How does this need to be done in regard to our topic since attitude surveys are nearly non-existent?

Although attitude surveys are nearly non-existent, there are plenty of individual cases that manifest the attitudinal changes among the Palestinian people. Therefore, the bulk of the supportive materials for the behavioral and theoretical approach of this thesis are these individual cases; and conclusions will be drawn taking this limitation into account.

Although there are many publications and articles written by interested scholars and concerned organizations and institutions about the Palestinian Resistance, the economic, social, and political life, or the Palestinian refugees, there is an insignificant effort to tie these conditions and their psychological repercussions to the Resistance Movement. Therefore, besides the political aspects involved, this thesis

makes an effort to show the impact of these socio-economic circumstances which brought about an organized support and revival of the Resistance.

### Summary

To limit the scope of our discussion, several propositions were suggested in Chapter I as a framework within which the Palestine Resistance Movement is discussed. Chapter I includes a brief account of the problem which is considered the source of the creation of the Movement as well as a statement as to how the research in this paper was conducted.

In Chapter II, several views of some scholars were presented. These views dealt with some possible causes of political protest and resistance, violence, and revolution, and their possible application to the case of the Palestine Resistance Movement.

### Aspects of the Following Chapters

The development of events that led to the creation of the state of Israel, and why Palestinians view the state of Israel as illegitimate, are some aspects of our discussion in Chapter III.

In Chapter IV, the analysis deals with the circumstances and expectations of the Palestinians which strengthened their movement. By circumstances and expectations is meant:

1. The economic deprivations, political repression, social misachievements, dissatisfaction and discontent;
2. The justification and initiation of violence, with the

international community and the Arab countries having failed to provide a solution to the problem; and,

3. Economic well-being, political aspirations, and social achievements as eventual rewards.

Chapter IV, then, discovers the magnitude of issues which strengthened and gave new lights to previously existent (but dormant) resistance.

Since 1967, after the so-called Six-Day War, the resistance was escalated in terms of attacks and counterattacks. The escalation included the international community in regard to highjacking planes and government officials, and similar operations which created a tense local and international atmosphere. These activities resulted in (a) more apparent divisions among some groups in the Movement and Arab countries (according to the sides they take), and (b) tense and possibly explosive situations in the area due to Israeli reprisals and their repercussions. These developments are the focus of Chapter V.

In Chapter VI we will draw some conclusions on our initial propositions. Also, we will discuss the effects of the Movement on the Middle East and speculate on what future developments may come about.

FOOTNOTES

## CHAPTER II

<sup>1</sup> Robert J. Jackson and Michael B. Stein, Issues in Comparative Politics (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1971), pp. 268-269.

<sup>2</sup> H. L. Nieburg, Political Violence (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1969), p. 54.

<sup>3</sup> Robert A. Dahl, Democracy in the United States: Promise and Performance (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1972), p. 431.

<sup>4</sup> Ted R. Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), p. 34.

<sup>5</sup> Ted R. Gurr, "Psychological Factors in Civil Violence," World Politics, XX, No. 2 (January, 1968), pp. 245-278.

<sup>6</sup> Aubrey J. Yates, Frustration and Conflict (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1962), p. 23.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid., pp. 73-74.

<sup>8</sup> James C. Davies, "Toward a Theory of Revolution," American Sociological Review, 27, No. 1, (February, 1962), pp. 5-19.

<sup>9</sup> Arnold S. Feldman, "Violence and Volatility: The Likelihood of Revolution," in Internal War, ed. by Harry Eckstein (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), pp. 114-115.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid., pp. 115-116.

<sup>11</sup> Leonard Berkowitz, Aggression: A Social Psychological Analysis (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1962), p. xi.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid., p. 170.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid., p. 171.

<sup>14</sup> William B. Quandt, Palestinian Nationalism: Its Political and Military Dimensions (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corporation, 1971), p. iv.



<sup>15</sup> Michael Hudson, "The Palestinian Arab Resistance Movement: Its Significance in the Middle East Crisis," Middle East Journal, XXIII (Summer, 1969), p. 291.

<sup>16</sup> Emile A. Nakhleh, "The Anatomy of Violence: Theoretical Reflections on Palestinian Resistance," Middle East Journal, XXV (Spring, 1971), p. 180.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid., pp. 187-188, 190.

<sup>18</sup> Yasumasa Kurado, "Young Palestinian Commandos in Political Socialization Perspective," Middle East Journal, XXVI (Summer, 1972), p. 253.

<sup>19</sup> It should be noted that there were some bases for these movements in Algeria, Kuwait, Libya, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. The four countries mentioned here were mentioned only because they carry the weight of the movement and border Israel.

<sup>20</sup> This is not to suggest that "frustration-aggression" does not apply to structured and highly organized resistance movements. At the same time, the interpretations of the authors quoted do not necessarily apply to any organized resistance. What may be needed, then, is specific research and studies on resistance which is considered to be organized and functions under one commanding umbrella.

## CHAPTER III

### ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENTS OF THE PALESTINE RESISTANCE

There was no such thing as Palestinians...It was not as though there was a Palestinian people in Palestine considering itself as a Palestinian people and we came and threw them out and took their country away from them. They did not exist.

Golda Meir, The Arab World, Vol. III  
June 15, 1969.

If I were a young Arab, I might also be one of the Fedayeen.

David Ben-Gurion, Chicago Tribune,  
May 6, 1973.

The tragedy of the people of Palestine is that their country was 'given' by a foreign power to another people for the creation of a new state.

Bertrand Russel  
The Middle East Newsletter, Vol. IV,  
1970

In the previous chapter a brief analysis of contemporary interpretations on violence and revolutions by some scholars was presented. A brief survey of some of the existing literature on the Palestine Resistance Movement dealt mainly with the nature of this literature; that is, the approach and scope within which the Palestine Resistance was discussed.

In this chapter, the discussion deals with our first proposition, which states that though the conventional wisdom in the



literature on resistance and violence suggests that it is structural inequalities and unrepresentative government that provokes alienated groups in society to view the government as illegitimate, in some cases it may be that alienated groups view the state and the political systems themselves as illegitimate. This was the case of the Palestinians of Israel who stayed in Israel after the 1947-1948 war. This was also the case of those Palestinians of the West Bank of the Jordan River and of the Gaza Strip whose lands became part of Israel in 1967, and those Palestinians who are living in exile. It was the initial view of the Palestinians that the new Israeli government was illegitimate because they saw the state of Israel as illegitimate. This illegitimacy rendered the Israeli government unrepresentative in the eyes of the Palestinians.

The rhetoric which surrounds the Palestine Resistance, the Palestinian people, and Palestine itself varies greatly even among people of the same politico-philosophical orientations. Whatever variations of rhetoric exist to describe, discuss, or even suppress the originality of the Palestine Resistance and whether or not there exists a Palestinian people, there must be some undisputed facts as they pertain to this question. To uncover these facts, we will take the reader a little back in time to start with the origins of the Palestine Resistance and bring him up-to-date with the present developments.

It seems a mere waste of time and energy to try to show that there are Palestinian people simply because this fact speaks for itself

in many respects; historical, legal, economic and political aspects. Consequently, what remains of our concern in this chapter is the development of the Palestine Resistance.

### The Early Forms of Resistance

As early as the last decade of the Nineteenth Century the Palestinian Arabs became aware of the dealings of the people of the Jewish faith with the Turkish Sultan--Abdul Hameed--as related to permitting the Jewish immigration to Palestine. At this time, in 1891, the leaders of Jerusalem sent a telegram to the Sultan protesting the substance of the Jewish demands.<sup>1</sup> As a result of this protest, the Sultan issued an order to stop "...the Jews from entering into, and buying lands in Palestine." This induced the British to interfere with Turkish officials, thus rendering ineffective the restrictions put on Jewish immigration to Palestine by the Sultan's order.<sup>2</sup>

This four-sided relationship--Jewish, Turkish, Arab and British--continued for more than a dozen years from the time of the first official Palestinian protest of 1891. However, Hertzl (the key man of the Zionist Movement) failed to convince the Turkish Sultan to help establish the Jewish national home in Palestine. Neither did he succeed in convincing the Palestinian Arab representatives in the Turkish Parliament of the benefits of Jewish immigration to the Palestinian Arab population.<sup>3</sup> On the contrary, as far as the Palestinian Arabs were concerned, Hertzl's plight, coupled with the Zionist Convention of 1897 at Basl, Switzerland, came as an alarm to the

Palestinians to rally them against all maneuvering and claims towards the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine.

Although Hertzl's approach with the Sultan did not succeed, the Jewish immigration to Palestine, even though on a limited scale throughout the period between 1890-1915, and the land-ownership by Jews succeeded especially after the death of the Sultan in 1908.<sup>4</sup>

As a consequence, in 1908, the Palestinians, distressed over the increasing Zionist influence on the Turkish authorities, and conscious about the new developments, waged popular demonstrations against the Zionist policies and intentions in Palestine. In 1910, strikes and demonstrations "...started in the city of Nazareth" and spread all over Palestine. In both years the demonstrators attacked Jewish properties especially in the northern part of Palestine.<sup>5</sup>

The resistance was not restricted to popular demonstrations and destruction of properties. It was larger in scope, such that as a result, many publications and newspapers were newly established to inform the Palestinians and the people of the neighboring countries about the situation. The Arab representatives to the Turkish Parliament also pressured, for two years, from 1909-1911, the Premier and his Minister of Interior (who were accused of supporting the Zionist Movement) to declare that they were against the Zionist Movement.<sup>6</sup>

Besides the forms of resistance discussed above, other means appeared on the scene, such as the establishment of the Union Party and the initiation of many organizations, all in effort to fight the Zionist Movement.<sup>7</sup>

All of the activities initiated by the Palestinians did not seem to have helped except for the fact that the bulk of the people became aware of the Zionist Movement and its intentions in Palestine. At the time of World War I and its aftermath, the Palestinian Arab resistance seemed to have taken two major orientations.

#### The Decisive Years: 1914-1948

Two and a half decades from 1890 passed, yet the Palestinian protests to the Porte against the Zionist Movement's activities did not improve their situation. They were suspicious of the Turkish leaders' good will towards them at a time when "...in 1915, Great Britain promised to Sheikh Hussein of Mecca that in return for the help of his Arab armies in the campaign against Turkey, Germany's ally in World War I, all Palestine plus Iraq, Syria and Transjordan and the Arabian Peninsula would be free and independent once their Turkish rulers had been defeated."<sup>8</sup> Accordingly, in 1916, the Palestinian leaders, like all the Arab leaders at the time, supported the efforts of, and were satisfied with, the contents upon which Scherif Hussein declared the Arab Revolution against the Turkish presence in the area.<sup>9</sup> Ironically, the total Arab support of Hussein in his fighting the Ottomans for the independence of their country coincided with the Sykes-Picot agreement in which the British and the French agreed upon the division of the area after the Turkish defeat.<sup>10</sup> (The Arabs at the time did not know what this agreement was about until years later).

In joining the War along the Allies side, the Arabs, in general, foresaw that being, again, masters of their own destinies was drawing nearer. The Palestinians, in particular, supported and advocated the Arab revolution not only because of the fact that the Turkish defeat would bring independence but also because independence would eventually put an end to their insecurity against the Zionist intentions. The following events, however, even when the Arab forces were still battling with the Turkish armies, proved to the Arabs that the Allies, and especially Britain, conspired against them by the Balfour Declaration of 1917, and, after the defeat of Turkey, by the Mandate systems which came as a fulfillment of the Sykes-Picot agreement.

To the Palestinians, like all Arabs, the Balfour Declaration and the intentions of Britain and France of carrying out the Sykes-Picot agreement constituted a major breach and violation of the substance of the British promise (of helping the Arabs realize their independence after the Turkish defeat). Accordingly the Christian-Islamic organizations in Palestine called for a general convention to discuss the developments. Thus, early in 1919, delegates representing each town, city, and region in Palestine met in Jerusalem and (1)"... denounced the Balfour Declaration, the Jewish immigration, and the British Mandate," and (2) demanded total independence of Palestine within the Arab union, the latter being called "Greater Syria." Among other resolutions, the Jerusalem Convention established two delegations; one to meet in June of the same year in Damascus and another to meet with the Allies' representatives to the Armistice talks.<sup>11</sup> The Syrian



delegates were elected whereas the Palestinian and Lebanese delegates were chosen by the private associations, organizations, and the big families. "...The number of delegates to the Convention exceeded eighty among whom more than twenty were from Palestine."<sup>12</sup> On the whole, the Convention unanimously "...protested against Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations" which recommended placing "Syria" (Syria, Lebanon and Palestine) under the Mandate system.<sup>13</sup> Although the convention protested strongly the substance of Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, the delegates sought that the United States be the assisting power if Article 22 had to be carried out.<sup>14</sup>

The King-Crane report (the report of the American Commissioners of the International Commission on Mandates in Turkey) is a detailed United States official document that describes the general feelings of the people of the area at the time. The Commission gathered its information through frequent visits to towns and cities, meeting with delegates, representatives, and councils of all creeds and orientations for a period of eleven days.<sup>15</sup> Their assignment in Palestine covered eighteen major towns from all parts of Palestine.<sup>16</sup> They met with a total of 140 delegations representing the various political, social, economic, and religious groups in the country in which the inhabitants communicated their views to the Commission "...with a large degree of frankness with which opinions were expressed...even where there was evident fear of consequences."<sup>17</sup> (See Appendix I B)

Besides the Commission meeting with these delegations, and listening to their demands concerning their hopes of the future of

their country, they also received 1,863 petitions from the entire areas of Palestine, Syria and Lebanon as shown in the following table.

TABLE 1

The Concerns of the People of the Areas Expressed in Petitions and by Issues as Reported by the King-Crane Commission<sup>18</sup>

Issues	No. of Petitions For (Total 1863)	Percent of Petitions
For United Syria (Syria, Lebanon and Palestine)	1500	80.40
For Separate Palestine	6	.32
For Absolute Independence of Syria	1370	73.50
For Guarding the Rights of Minorities	1023	54.90
For British Mandate	66	3.53
For British "Assistance"	4	.21
For British "Assistance" as Second Choice	1032	55.30
For American Mandate	57	3.05
For American "Assistance"	1064	57.00
For Complete Zionist Program (Jewish State and immigra- tion)	11	.59
For Modified Zionist Program	8	.40
Against Zionist Program	1350	72.30

The preceding table clears up many points:

1. The great majority of petitions, 80.40 percent, were for a United Syria when Palestine was included in the union. This "... in effect, is intended as a declaration against Zionism."<sup>19</sup>

2. The second largest majority, 73.50 percent, expressed "...absolute independence," with the United States or Britain or to be the assisting power and not the mandatory power. Mandatory power had insignificant support.

3. The third largest majority refused the Zionist program. Among the 1363 petitions, "...1350 (72.30 percent) protested against Zionist claims and purposes," which constituted "...the third largest number for any one point and represents a more widespread general opinion among both Moslems and Christians than any other. The anti-Zionist note was especially strong in Palestine, where 222 (85.30 percent) of the 260 petitions declared against the Zionist program. This is the largest percentage in the district for any one point."<sup>20</sup> As opposed to this,

4. A small percentage (.99 percent) of the total population was for a complete or modified Jewish program, keeping in mind that all the Jews in Palestine, "...who constituted a little over ten percent of the population, were all for Zionism."<sup>21</sup>

#### Remarks on the Report

If one doubts the accuracy of these petitions in mathematical terms, the doubt does not render these petitions unrepresentative of



the general feelings and orientations of the people at the time. "...The petitions," the King-Crane Report says, "are certainly representative. As the classified list of delegations received by the Commission clearly indicates, the petitions came from a wide range of political, economic, social, and religious classes and organizations. It was generally known throughout Syria that the American Commission would receive in confidence any documents that any individual or group should care to present. In the few cities in which the military authorities sought to exert control, directly or indirectly, over the delegations, without exception, the opposition parties found opportunities to present their ideas to the Commission, if not always orally, at least in writing."<sup>22</sup>

Another criticism may be that the Report could have been true of the total Arab population in the area, but yet it does not necessarily mean that it could have been representative of the people who lived in Palestine, because the Report does not categorize the area in terms of its three parts; the Syrian, the Lebanese, and the Palestinian parts. The reader should not fall in such a trap, because the Report did not classify issues by the parts of "Syria," for the following reasons:

First, the Commission's work was in an area called Syria, with Lebanon and Palestine parts of it. Since 80.40 percent of the petitions were for United Syria, and 73.50 percent were for absolute independence, and since the petitions were representative of the total population (see ft. 22), then the general will of the people of the area was expressed.

Second, the inhabitants of the southern part of Syria (Palestine) would be directly affected by the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine. Because of fear of the realization of such an idea, they could have ardently supported, more than any other factions--the Syrians and the Lebanese--an absolute independence in United Syria, as they showed strong opposition to the Zionist program (see ft. 20), for the mere fact that absolute independence would eliminate their fears of Zionism and render its intentions unrealized. Therefore, if the Report should be considered in terms of the degree of representation to the Palestinians, attitudes and desires, it should be considered under-representative..

The wishes and desires of the people of the area did not seem to have swayed the opinions of the Allies, and the demands of the delegates had no impact on them except in taking further steps towards their aims and more restrictions on the movements of the Arab leaders. One of these measures was the withdrawal of the British forces from Syria and Lebanon to Palestine leaving the French armies in charge. This act by itself steered the events in the area towards new developments, even though they constituted expansions of the previous ones, but this time these developments were confined in influence to the specific area and its mandatory power. That is, (1) the responsibility of each mandatory power became specific and (2) the activities of the people became restricted, repressed and punished by each mandatory power according to its area of jurisdiction.

The following years did not witness activities other than demonstrations and protests by the Palestinians hoping that the British

reassurances of not allowing a Zionist state in Palestine, would come true. However, the creation of the Jewish Agency, and the increasing Jewish immigration (see Appendix II) increased the Palestinians' suspicion of the British authorities and administration in Palestine and their collaboration with the Zionist Organization and seemed to have pushed the Palestinians to an extreme.<sup>23</sup> As a result, the period from 1929 until 1948 was characterized by constant upheavals, in which two major dates emerged as periods when all-encompassing violent processes took place. The first was in 1929 and the second from 1936 to 1939. The events that took place in the years mentioned above were of substantial effectiveness because they were the sum total of all previous means of protest (which were executed individually over a period of forty years) used simultaneously, paralyzing the British administration in Palestine for a time. Although the 1929 events did not last more than fifteen days, many people on both sides--Palestinians and Jews--were killed, and the British government had to issue the so-called White Papers of 1930 to calm the situation.<sup>24</sup> The White Papers, however, were responsive to the Palestinians' demands to the extent that in 1931 "...as sequel to the Passfield White Paper (1930), the Seventeenth Zionist Congress passes(d) vote of no confidence, signifying that Weizmann no longer acceptable as President."<sup>25</sup> However, the Zionist influence on the British government suppressed the promises of the White Papers and consequently the preconditions of 1929, as far as the Palestinians were concerned, continued on a rather larger scale.<sup>26</sup> It became evident to the Palestinians, at the time, that

the British administration meant ill-will to the Palestinians. Accordingly, the 1936-1939 revolution demonstrated their feelings of despair and hopelessness to the Mandatory government hoping it would respond to their demands. Thus, the Palestinians waged their campaign on the British administration in Palestine, as well as the Jewish settlers for three years in which the British armies killed most of the Movement's leaders and dispersed the others. Again, the British government issued the White Papers of 1939 that did not mean much to the Palestinians since it contained essentially what other papers recommended and meanwhile the Zionist protest appeared to be stronger than ever.<sup>27</sup> Consequently, this revolution failed to provide the Palestinians with any improvement and this further affected the outcome of events in the following years to the benefit of the Zionists.

#### An Analysis of the Events Between 1890-1939

It seems, so far, from the above discussion, as though the Palestinian Arabs were attacking the mandatory power, the Zionist settlers, and the Jewish properties because of their (the Palestinians) initial perception and fear of the Zionist intentions in Palestine; and it seems that the Zionists were only defending themselves. This is not true. The Jewish Agency in Palestine was functioning with clear objectives; with organizational, political and financial goals to attain using all possible means.<sup>28</sup> Since the Agency comprised groups of different political orientations and outlooks, and since it (the Agency) was the official common denominator of all the Zionist groups, the militant organizations such as

the Irgun, Stern Gang, and the Haganah were functioning within the framework already programmed by the Zionist Congresses. Therefore, the Agency, being the head organ, constituted one organization of different branches (including militants) working for the same goal on one hand, and on the other, encouraging all means that could bring about the fulfillment of that goal. The militant groups such as those mentioned were prerequisites for program-execution. A program-execution, in such a time of uncertainties and upheavals, does not come about by defense alone, but also by organized offensive. This is how the militant groups within the political organ of the Agency did their duties. They were attacking Palestinians and British soldiers whenever it was possible.<sup>29</sup>

However, the repeated organized actions of these forces made clear to the Palestinians the role they were playing and that they intended to carry out, which perpetuated their fear and sense of insecurity.

The Zionists had total organizational, financial and political support of the World Zionist Organization and moral and administrative support from the British government.<sup>30</sup> The Palestinians had none of that. Divided among themselves, they were battling many social and economic problems before and during their battles with the Zionist forces and the Mandatory power. What were these problems and how did they affect the Palestinian resistance?



Prominent Facts About the Pre-1948 Palestinian Society

1. The four centuries of Turkish occupation of the Middle East produced among other things, two distinct classes; a very few landed-aristocracy, and a mass of impoverished people. The landed-aristocracy was not only wealthy but also prestigious among both the Turkish authorities and the mass of the Palestinian people. This was due to the fact that, in order to live, the majority of the people had to work on the land of this elite since working the land was the main source of living at the time. Thus, he who controlled the people's bread-winning, controlled their lives. Consequently, people's allegiance to them became a necessity.

2. The social structure of Palestine at the time was semi-tribal and adhered to traditional social and religious teachings and upbringing through which this aristocracy (mentioned above) came, led, and was divided within itself. The division of this aristocracy was ameliorated by families' rivalries along which most of the early Palestinian protests (against the Turkish occupation, the Zionist Movement, and the British Mandate) developed and took place.<sup>31</sup>

3. The social structure, however, was not the only peculiar problem. There was also the persistence of traditional fragmented leadership which crippled the resistance and dominated Palestinian society.<sup>32</sup>

4. The subsistence level of living and the lack of "know-how" with which the Palestinians were saddled left the early existence with no effective services. If economic wealth is based on "know-how" (if

the resources exist), and if acquiring the skills requires education, then there was no hope that the Palestinians could change their economic position. By 1937, 18 years after the beginning of the Mandate, only 15 percent of the people were literate.<sup>33</sup>

Another factor, which we should account for with respect to the traditional Palestinian society, by and large, was their conception of resistance, which stressed a religious overtone for the following reasons:

1. The only learned and well-listened to groups in traditional Islam were the Ulema and Sheikhs. With the presence of the mandatory power and its influence on the Palestinian society, coupled with the rise of nationalism, the Ulema was the only vocal group that persisted and which had the means to communicate its beliefs and messages to the people.<sup>34</sup>

2. Their messages and speeches stressed the position of the Arab society against that of the West and the unacceptable changes which the West's civilization would make in theirs. Consequently, a simple call for jihad was conveyed. Jihad by itself does not represent organized movement and does not render a resistance successful, simply because the times demanded more than that; that is, discipline, money, trained men and the like.<sup>35</sup> One example of such a religious tone of resistance was that of the leader of the 1936-1939 revolution. At the time of the crack-down upon him and his men by the British army, "...the 65-year old Muslim preacher," Izz al-Din al-Qassam, had the opportunity to escape but refused to do so, "preferring to die a



martyr," instead of, as the understanding of armed resistance may suggest, escaping and perpetuating the resistance.<sup>36</sup>

The 1936-1939 Palestinian "revolution," having in its background all the religious, social, economic and political problems, could be identified and described only as spontaneous disorganized responses to the continuing or perpetuating states of frustration which the Palestinians, fathers and sons, had been having for generations.<sup>37</sup>

The uncertainties of the Second War, and the agonies created for both parties (discrimination against the Jews in Europe and dire needs of the Palestinians) kept the fighting between the two at an insignificant level. However, before the War was over, in 1944, the large-scale confrontations between the two factions resumed but, this time, with great disproportions. Why?

1. As a consequence of discrimination against the Jews in Europe, beginning in 1933, the flow of immigrants was constant, and many joined the militant organizations while they were in Europe.<sup>38</sup>

2. A Jewish quasi-government was created by the "administrative machinery" of the Zionists (the Jewish Agency). This administrative machinery gave total autonomy to the Jews and their daily life and also established the Jewish army in 1941 to fight on the Allies' side, and the Jewish Guard for internal security.<sup>39</sup>

3. The increase of wealth of the Jewish community came from contributions from abroad, money investments in fixed assets in Palestine, and the selling of 40 percent of their industrial production to the Allies' forces stationed in Palestine and the area.<sup>40</sup>

4. The impact of World War II on the Jews increased their perception of independence in a country where they could be masters. The different organizations, which had by then great potential, did not stop attacking the Palestinians, destroying official (British) buildings and properties, and committing other acts of violence and terrorism.<sup>41</sup>

Unlike the Zionists, the Palestinians did not display improved methods after the Second World War against the British forces and the Zionist Movement in Palestine. Disorganization and lack of money and outside support continued to hamper their efforts during the post-World War II period. The consequences for the Palestinians were their expulsion from Palestine, thousands killed, tortured, and a total loss of Palestine for which they fought fifty years not to lose.

### Conclusions

Between the Palestinians and the Zionist Jews, there developed, through a period of about sixty years, a culture of alienation, characterized by protests, strikes, demonstrations, violence and killings. These were based on their understanding of each other, the impact of discrimination of the Jews in Europe, and the rivalries and interests of the big powers. The Palestinians, suspicious of Zionism, afraid of cultural disintegration if the Zionist Movement was to succeed, increased their opposition to the Zionist programs in Palestine, refused the Mandate (even though the League of Nations imposed it on them). With each experience the Palestinians went through, they met with frustration and suppression, adding to their perception of the Zionist danger more negative impressions.

The Jews who fought the Palestinians, also having their own past experiences, used their potential to be sure that what happened to them in Europe would never happen again. Thus, they carried out acts along the other extreme. In other words, two factions were out to exterminate each other. The outcome could never be forgotten. Eventually, Zionism won the war. Most of the Palestinians fled, so that they did not have to face the fate of others who were killed. Some were expelled, and a few remained living where they had previously. However, the greater part, the majority, are not living where now the people whom they fought with for decades live and dominate. The years of fighting only split them farther apart; and with such a heritage of violence the majority of Palestinians thought that the government then in power was a perpetuation of the colonial order. Most of the governors and the majority of the governed were aliens to Palestine, were born in foreign countries, and occupied the country by violence at the expense of the indigenous population whose majority then lived in exile. Consequently, the government and state were neither representative of the indigenous people nor legitimate, since they (Palestinians of Israel) still considered themselves a part of the greater Palestinian population (whose majority lives outside Israel) and not of Israel.

In other words, to a non-participant impartial party, who is adequately informed and aware of the problems at the time, the state of Israel then came to exist not through a plebiscite and peaceful transfer of powers, but rather as a crowning to a period of violence and bloodshed between Palestinians and Jews. Consequently, it was the final outcome of diverse violent processes.

To the Palestinians, Israel established itself not only against their will, but also as a consequence of British deceit and collaboration with Zionism in many ways. Accordingly, any state that is not a Palestinian state in Palestine, and any government which is not by and for the Palestinians is alien and colonial in structure and, therefore, is neither legitimate nor representative.

To the Zionist Jews, Israel was established as a consequence of liberating the promised homeland from its occupiers, or settling of a people without land in a land without people, where Jews would live in a country of their own, where they could no longer be discriminated against. Consequently, all Jews of the world are welcomed in Israel to live in peace. Was this possible in the face of realities created by the establishment of the state of Israel?

One of these indisputable realities which came about upon the establishment of the state of Israel was the fate of the Palestinian people. Their fate was characterized by the following:

1. The majority of them sought refuge in neighboring countries to save their lives.
2. A small percentage of them remained in Israel.
3. Thousands of them died in the battles, massacres, and tortures.
4. All of them engaged in one form or another of activities against the initiation of the Jewish National Home in Palestine.
5. All of them were affected by the events preceding the establishment of the state of Israel; they still had fresh memories about their fighting-mates, friends, and relatives who lost their lives, and also the loss of their country.

FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER III

<sup>1</sup>Naji Alloush, Al-Mukawamah Al-Arabiya fi Filistin 1917-1948 ("The Arab Resistance in Palestine: 1917-1948") (Beirut: The Palestine Liberation Organization Research Center, 1967), p. 33.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 33.

<sup>3</sup>Constantin Khammar, Almujaz fi Tarikh Alkadiya Alfilistiniya ("Briefing of the History of the Palestine Case") (Beirut: Almaktab Atijari, 1966), pp. 38-39.

<sup>4</sup>Alloush, op. cit., pp. 34-35.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid., p. 34.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid., p. 34.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid., p. 35.

<sup>8</sup>Nutting, op. cit., pp. 3-6.

<sup>9</sup>Alloush, op. cit., p. 35.

<sup>10</sup>Nutting, op. cit.

<sup>11</sup>Alloush, op. cit., pp. 37-38.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid. p. 39.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid., p. 39.

<sup>14</sup>"Report of American Section of Inter-Allied Commission on Mandates in Turkey: An Official United States Government Report," Editor and Publisher, LV (December 2, 1922), pp. IV-VII. It is also known as the King-Crane Commission Report.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid., p. IV.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid., p. IV.

<sup>17</sup>Ibid., p. V.

18

Ibid., p. V.

19

Ibid., p. V.

20

Ibid., p. VI.

21

Ibid., p. VI.

22

Ibid., p. V.

23 Elias Saad, Alhijral Yahoudiya ila Filistin, ("The Jewish Immigration to Palestine,") (Beirut: The Palestine Liberation Organization Research Center, 1969), pp. 37-38.

24

Alloush, op. cit., p. 61.

25

Chaim Weizmann, The Letters and Papers of Chaim Weizmann, I, ed. by Leonard Stein (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. xxxii.

26

Khammar, op. cit., pp. 73-74.

27

Hisham Sharabi, Palestine and Israel: The Lethal Dilemma (New York: Pegasus, 1969), pp. 184-191.

28

For a full account of the names and description of the duties of the committees established by and/or associated with the Zionist Movement, see Chaim Weizmann, op. cit., p. xxx.

29

J. C. Hurewitz, The Struggle for Palestine (New York: Greenwood Press, Publishers, 1968), pp. 92, 108, 243.

30

Weizmann, op. cit., p. xxx. See also Arnold Toynbee, A Study of History, IX (London: Oxford University Press, 1954), p. 290

31

Alloush, op. cit., pp. 28-31.

32

Ibid., p. 31.

33

Ibid., p. 32.

34

Ibid., pp. 31-32. "Ulema" is a group of learned religious people. "Sheikh" is a title of a respected elder of the community or tribe.

35

Ibid., p. 32. The literary meaning of the word "jihad" is perseverance. Traditionally, when the expression "sacred jihad" was used, it had a religious overtone.

36

Sharabi, op. cit., p. 187.

37

Ibid., p. 184.

<sup>38</sup> Hurewitz, op. cit., p. 164.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid., pp. 130-131.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid., p. 131.

<sup>41</sup> On many occasions, Hurewitz, in his book mentioned above, describes the activities of the militant Jewish organizations and the effective roles they played in their struggle for Palestine.



## CHAPTER IV

### THE POLITICAL, SOCIAL, AND ECONOMIC FACTORS AFFECTING THE PALESTINE RESISTANCE

Imagine yourself to be a Palestinian Arab. Imagine yourself to be one of those million Arabs whose fathers and forefathers since time immemorial had lived in Palestine and called that land their home. Imagine yourself living and planning and looking into the future with that sense of security and responsibility which is normal and healthy in human beings... And then imagine yourself suddenly being tossed around in a whirlwind of political turmoil which is neither of your choice nor of your doing. Imagine yourself becoming overnight, homeless, penniless, with no earthly asset but the clothes you have on... Imagine yourself therefore in a situation where the most joyful hope you dare cherish is the hope that your loved ones may join you in the misery of hunger, of cold, of dreary idleness, of homelessness, and of hate.

Fayez A. Sayegh  
The Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1956

In this chapter, the discussion explores the Palestine Resistance Movement that arose directly after the establishment of the State of Israel and has continued to endure until the present time. This period will be examined in the light of our proposition that if a political system tends to restrain certain groups from acquiring equal rights and status, and keeps other groups from participating in, or left outside the system, the impact of such an arrangement is tension resulting from a breakdown of communication between the existing government and the alienated groups. When the tension becomes uncontrollable, violence is likely to occur. The Palestinian Arabs (willingly or unwillingly, and whether based on reason, logic, or emotions) have dissociated

themselves from the Israeli political system. Their attitudes toward those whom they consider the sources of their problems have become attitudes of hate, revenge, and violence. However, revenge and violence may flare up at any moment since all other channels of communications are closed, and also because Palestinians were not assimilated into the societies of their countries of refuge.

The Palestinian tragedy of 1948 was actually initiated in 1917 by the Balfour Declaration, was ratified by the League of Nations because it placed the Turkish heritage under the mandate system, and was executed in 1948 as a result of "growing pressures, both Zionist and international, to create a Jewish state in Palestine."<sup>1</sup>

The State of Israel was established, among other things, to put an end to the sufferings of the Jews all over the world, and to form the beginning of an era in which the Palestinian people have compensated and are still compensating for the Jewish sufferings in Europe and elsewhere. This compensation was in lives, property, and prestige, and now it is in persistent economic deprivation, only because they happened to be Palestinians. The owners of the land living in their own homes where their fathers and forefathers grew up for twelve successive centuries, became dispersed, living in tents donated to them by welfare agencies and organizations. The once Palestinian society became Palestinian communities living in refugee camps where their misfortunes happened to take them. All was a result of confronting Zionism and its forces with a divided leadership, incompatible help and pressure given by the Arab countries, and basic social and economic

problems that added only confusion in their ranks. Did the situation change after the creation of the state of Israel, and how?

THE FRAGMENTED SOCIETY: Its Political Aspects 1948-

The Palestinian Arabs in Israel (The Israeli Arabs)

Since 1948, the Arabs who remained in Israel have been living under strict military regulations.<sup>2</sup> These regulations are strictly executed by special military courts where hundreds of Arabs have been in jails, exiled, or sentenced because the Israeli military authorities have suspected their activities.<sup>3</sup> Any suspicious Arab living in areas subject to military rule (240,000 persons prior to the June war of 1967) would be tried in military courts where he would not be allowed to appeal. Also, there are many regions that an Arab cannot enter without being arrested.<sup>4</sup>

These restrictions that are presently imposed on the Arab population living in Israel were the main regulations imposed on the whole population of Palestine in the mid-1940's by the British administration. However, in 1946, the "Hebrew lawyers in the land of Israel" protested strongly against these regulations and called for their elimination because they violated the individual's basic human rights.<sup>5</sup>

Such regulations, however, do not exist except in states of emergency, (even plenty of contemporary examples teach us without reference to a particular incident), and if the developments in the country do not necessitate restrictions as such, and if the state authorities persist in keeping these regulations in specific areas,

it is because of distrust of the residents of these areas and the fact that liberalization of policies may encourage acts that affect Israel's security. Thus, since these regulations are directed against the Arabs in Israel and imposed on areas where the Arab population is heavily concentrated, their persistence is to keep the Arab population from taking any actions. This by itself constitutes a recognition, on the part of the Israeli government, that the Arabs of Israel do not share the principles and philosophies of the State of Israel with the rest of the population, and these repressive measures come as requirements to retain peace in the country.

However, repressive measures prevent those people who do not espouse the principles of the government from making aggressive moves against the system because "...as a rule, a successful population may be expected to adopt behaviors designed to maximize its survival potential and to minimize the risk of losses, with respect to its particular ecological niche."<sup>6</sup> Hence, if the Palestinian Arabs should take any action which is considered by the military authorities to be disruptive in the state's security, they would suffer the consequences. These consequences, however, are of severe impact on them because their living conditions make them a distinct community susceptible and very much vulnerable to the harshest Israeli attack.<sup>7</sup> The impact of any confrontation between the two is a zero-sum game in which the Palestinian Arab community would be a sure loser. In this kind of situation, the Palestinians already have lost many liberties including their basic rights (see ft. 6), and do not have anything left to lose except their

lives. This alternative does not serve their purpose; and, as a response to their survival instinct, they have conditioned themselves to their realities in order to be able to adapt to the situation.

Adaptation occurs whenever conditions above one's capabilities exist; but it is by no means certain that given a situation within their capabilities, men will exercise their opportunity for choice in an adaptive manner.<sup>8</sup> Thus the Palestinians in Israel can under no circumstances choose the kind of life they want to live; they have to observe the Israeli laws for their personal safety and adapt to these laws, choosing less dangerous means to express their state of mind.

Although sets of rules and regulations may be used against people to restrict their physical activities and actions, the human imagination is too active, creative, and beyond any control by worldly authorities. In the history of occupation and repressive regimes where people's activities are restricted to subsistence, the hoped-for actions by the occupied people were expressed by diverse passive means.

French resistance during World War II was best expressed by literature; and if there is any means to show the present intellectuals' discontent with the rigid policies of the Soviet Union, it would be best shown by the literary writings appearing every now and then. Thus, the Palestinians' resistance, the kind of life and the aspirations of the Arab residents of the State of Israel, are expressed in many literary forms among which poetry ranks first.<sup>9</sup> As late as April, 1973, two editors of "Al-Fajr," an Arab weekly, were arrested because of the latest of a series of articles sympathetic to the Resistance Movement.



This article was described as the strongest that had appeared in a newspaper since 1967, as it was concerned with the killings of Palestinian leaders; Kamal Nasser, Yussef Najjar, and Kamal Adwan, in Beirut, at the hands of Israeli commandos.<sup>10</sup>

### The Palestinians of Israel After 1967

The 1967 war between Israel, Egypt, Syria, and Jordan had a great impact on the Palestinians:

1. The whole territory of Palestine came under Israeli occupation, with about one-third of the initial Palestinian population living there.

2. An exodus of Palestinians took place from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip to Jordan. Under severe natural conditions, terrorized by the Israeli military, new refugees (about 140,000 persons of West Bank alone) walked the long road to estrangement.<sup>11</sup> Few of them, however, returned. Only fifteen thousand returnees were admitted to go back after incessant mediation by the Red Cross representatives. Also, many of those who sought refuge in 1948 in the West Bank, sought refuge in Jordan in 1967.<sup>12</sup>

As a consequence to the Israeli occupation of these territories, the popular mood erupted in many towns and cities. These eruptions took the forms of sporadic shooting at units or individuals of the Israeli army, demonstrations, and shop-strikes. The Israeli retaliations were severe; many homes were blown-up, shops were sealed with red tapes, many people were deported and were transferred, and whole towns were demolished:

"...In 1967, ICRC (International Commission of the Red Cross) delegates observed, after the event, that the following villages and camps had been destroyed: Yalou, Beit Numa and Yuwas, in the Latroun area; Surif, Beit Awwa, Beit Mirsem and il Shuyouth in the Hebron area; and Jiflik, Agarich and Nuseirat in the Jordan Valley. They also saw that certain quarters of Jerusalem and Qalquilya had been demolished.<sup>13</sup> In Gaza alone in a two-month period, a total of 2,554 families, comprising 15,855 persons, were affected by the demolitions carried out in July and August, 1971 in three refugee camps by the Israeli authorities.<sup>14</sup>

In this kind of situation, what a Palestinian can do is very limited because the individual, if active, is placed in jail and in confinement. The group has shrunk to an individual's status since it is cut from other groups, and therefore, a single Palestinian community does not exist in Israel, nor the conditions to make one. The sense of insecurity among Palestinians is high. Insecurity among the group tends to diminish its resistance (see Chapter II, ft. 7). Therefore a group-community resistance does not exist because their previous experiences with the regime and the fear of consequences have been putting the community to disintegration.

Although sporadic individual violence and popular demonstrations by the residents of these regions against the Israeli units occurred, how do we account for limited upheavals among the people of the West Bank and Gaza Strip as opposed to submission or apparent individual and limited passive resistance of the Arab residents of the State of Israel since 1948?



While much of our forthcoming analysis on the Palestine residents in the several Arab states answers this question in general, some salient points remain of special characteristics of these areas to be tackled here. (1) Although since 1948 the West Bank has been incorporated into the Jordanian kingdom and Gaza has come under Egyptian administration, the majority of the residents were Palestinians who were given autonomy to manage their affairs. Because of this fact and the locations of these areas bordering Israel, they remained in the same spirit of pre-1948. This interpretation shows up best in the history of events between Gaza residents and the Israeli authorities. These events show that there were always incidents of violence between the two, and its peak occurred when Israel occupied Gaza. (2) With respect to the West Bank, their resistance does not only support our assumption, but also shows many other things. (a) Despite the tacit understanding between the Jordanian and Israeli governments, and despite the fact that the West Bank was incorporated into the Jordanian territory, they maintained their previous attitudes towards Israel, as was demonstrated by forming bases of organizational resistance.<sup>15</sup> This is proven by Israeli massive retaliation on quarters and towns where organized limited and local resistance took place. (b) The establishment of these organized attacks shows the independence of the Movement from the Jordanian regime. This independence acknowledges that interactions between the Palestinians of Jordan and those living in other countries were taking place. Therefore, the pre-1948 attitudes persisted, but this time with closely knit groupings. In both areas, however, demonstrations show spontaneous popular reactions.<sup>16</sup>

In brief, three important points appear in the above discussion:

1. The resistance in Gaza and the West Bank was independent from any Arab political regime, and in some instances it appeared to be an extension of well-organized groups whose headquarters are outside Gaza and the West Bank.
2. The resistance was stronger where Israeli retaliation was massive.
3. The Palestinian character of Gaza and the West Bank, and perpetuation of former attitudes towards Israel, contributed to the kind and the manner used to express their feelings.

#### The Palestinians in the Arab Countries

Prior to 1921, the Palestinians were pursuing the same goals of the people under the Turkish occupation. Their movement, then, was an integral part of an overall Arab movement for independence, even though the Palestinians had to follow a course of Arab nationalism with more extensive local activities due to the nature of developments that were taking place.

The decision of the League of Nations of placing Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine under the leadership of Britain and France converted the activities of the people of these countries from an Arab movement to localized movements. That is; a Palestinian nationalist movement, a Syrian, and a Lebanese nationalist movement became clear, even though it seemed at times that the only dividing lines among these movements were the mandatory powers. Consequently, the Palestinian problems

during the British mandate were the concern of the Palestinians in the first place until the withdrawal of the British forces from Palestine in 1948. Since then, the Palestine question has entered a new era in its history.

The Palestinians' Political Life in the Arab Countries: 1948-1967

The 1947-1948 events between the militant Zionist organizations and Palestinians, plus the tactics used by these organizations, did not leave the Palestinians any choice of the country of refuge. Rather, they moved to the country which was close to their original place of residence, for two reasons:

1. They moved within a short period of time after the escalation of events on the assumption that once the situation calmed down, they would return to their homes.<sup>17</sup>

2. The majority left in thousands in a panicky situation after knowing of the Deir Yassin massacre, in which "...there had been 400 people in this village, 50 had fled, three were still living, all the rest had been systematically, and deliberately massacred."<sup>18</sup>

The United Nations failed to make Israel accept the return of the refugees. Aware of this fact, faced with their past experiences, the Palestinians thought that their only hope to return to Palestine was through their countries of residence in which they had many things in common. Accordingly, "...Palestine became an Arab problem during the late 1940's and remained at the center of inter-Arab politics for the next two decades. But Palestinian organizations, parties, and leadership were only secondary to the plethora of Arab political movements.

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The educated and intellectuals among Palestinians followed different directions in their countries of refuge. Some of them joined the Jordanian political and administrative machineries. Others within the Jordanian kingdom who did not agree with the philosophy of the government moved like the rest of them to Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon to join the political parties of these countries that stressed Arab nationalism.<sup>20</sup> Among the following political parties new and sharp divisions at times occurred: The Arab Baath Socialist Party, the Syrian Social Nationalist Party, the Arab Nationalist Movement, and the politico-religious movement of the Muslim Brotherhood. Accordingly, "...once again, these conditions did little to foster a sense of purpose and unity among the emerging Palestinian elite."<sup>21</sup> What these conditions did create was more ideological alienation among the different competing factions, in which the bulk of the young Palestinians participated. Their experience ended by marking another failing approach to solving their problem. Their failure, however, can best be understood by understanding the developments in those countries where they found themselves an informal or unofficial part of their political life, since the failure of a part, which by its nature happened to be totally dependent on the whole, does not happen unless by the failure of the whole.

#### The Arab Countries and the Palestinians

If so many Palestinians joined these political and some socio-religious movements in their countries of refuge, and if they interfered in the internal affairs of these countries, they have done so

only to be able to accomplish through an overall Arab nationalism what Palestinian nationalism, considering the international situation, failed to do; that is, to be able to go back and live in Palestine.

The Palestinian refugees settled in the neighboring countries at a time which may be best described as a period when these countries were experiencing major social, economic, and political transformations; a time when, a few years after independence, the peak of a search for identity existed. This search for identity, after centuries of colonialism, coincided with an increase in education, openness to world problems, events, and social, economic, and political philosophies that were all weighed in terms of the existing realities. These realities were mainly economic in essence, yet had indisputable effects on the intellectuals of these countries as to their political aspirations and how these aspirations can be fulfilled. Political parties and socio-religious movements were numerous, each of them espousing a different approach to bring about the realization of an Arab unity. Each of them idealized the rights of the individual, social equality, and freedom of speech, religion and the like. Yet each of them discredited the other and considered itself the only means to fulfill these goals. That is, cooperation among these parties and movements was lacking. Lack of cooperation, coupled with inadequate economic programming, scarce resources, and tribal and traditional divisions, added more confusion in these countries and among each other as well.

These events and others happened at a time when the army appeared to show interest in politics.<sup>22</sup> Who, other than the army,



can restore the power to the people and make the country move towards development and the restoration of Palestine? During the decade in which coup d'etats were the norm in some Arab countries, thousands of able men lost their lives, and a "brain-drain" of developmental resources took place.

Throughout the years, each political party and social movement repeatedly in their platforms, activities, and celebrations ranked the restoration of Palestine as the first goal to pursue. Also, when the one-party system, represented by a handful of military men in control of the country, substituted the multi-party system, the Palestine question remained one of priority. Yet, the concerned Arab countries neither accommodated the needs of the Palestinians nor helped their goals. This may be explained by two points:

1. The Arab countries imposed many restrictions on the Palestinians:

- (a) Palestinians were not hired for jobs unless they showed superior ability and if citizens of the country were not available.
- (b) They had no access to the formal political structure (except in Jordan) and few were naturalized, and
- (c) They were denied the facilities of travelling outside their countries of residence. Only a few had the opportunity to do so and then after very complicated procedures.

2. Inter-Arab rivalries came to divide the Arab countries into factions opposing each other, and consequently the destiny of the

Palestinians was a never-ending speculative affair. Division among these countries between progressive-revolutionaries and reactionaries, as the labeling went, was not conducive to more than manipulation of the Palestinians simply because they (the Arab countries) could not unite their efforts to impose either a peaceful or a military solution to the problem.

The Arabs' search for a new identity then, was at the expense of their political stability and social and economic developments along which the Palestinians and their needs seemed to function on their peripheries.

However, in a civilized world, or so it is called, the United Nations was created to help solve world problems. With respect to the Palestinian question, the United Nations' actions, politically speaking, did not go beyond resolutions passed by a majority of member states acknowledging the rights of Palestinians to return to Palestine.

#### The United Nations and the Palestine Question

The concern of the United Nations with the Palestine question goes back to 1947 when Britain decided to withdraw from Palestine. The United Nations entered the scene to find a solution to the dispute-- Palestine vs. Zionists. In other words, the United Nations took over the problem when the sympathies of Europe, the Soviet Union, and North America were all in favor of the creation of the state of Israel.<sup>23</sup> Accordingly, the United Nations commission recommended the partition of Palestine, and the Partition Resolution of November 29, 1947 was adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations.<sup>24</sup>



However, the Palestinian Arab response to the Partition Plan was negative, accusing the United Nations of being unfair and incompetent. The Palestinians considered it incompetent because it ignored the principle of self-determination when it considered the partition of Palestine. Its unfairness was justified on the ground that it gave 31 percent of the total population, who owned 15 percent of the land, 56.5 percent of the land to be the Jewish state.<sup>25</sup>

After the establishment of the State of Israel, the United Nations tried to make Israel accept the return of Palestinians to their homes, but all its efforts were in vain.

From the establishment of the State of Israel until the early 1950's, any discussion of the problem of the area in the United Nations was centered around the rights of Palestinians in returning to Palestine. After 1956, the true nature of the problem was obfuscated with the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the Palestinians were referred to as the Near East refugees. What did this triple-failure create inside the Palestinians considering their socio-economic realities?

The political factors of the Palestinians themselves, the Arab countries and the United Nations constitute only one side of the kind of life the Palestinians live. The quality of socio-economic life they live in their places of refuge was and still is a prime factor in trying to discuss any developments in order to give a true picture and maybe some hints about the impact of such conditions.

### The Social and Economic Conditions

If there is anything to make life bearable at a time characterized by hardships, it may be the hope that the future may be better. But the future is unknown and it may very well be the product of the present. Still, the survival instinct may promote a brighter picture of the future. So many people were born in misery, lived in misery, and died because of misery even before they matured. At the same time, universal peace, social and economic justice, civil and human rights, equal opportunity, and self-determination were and still are the rhetoric of the time.

The displacement of Palestinians in 1947-1948 marked only the beginning of an episode of their lives and the lives of later generations which can only be described as unbearable for the great majority of them.

The educated and those who were lucky and had some training immigrated to different countries wherever they could support themselves and their families. Thousands of young Palestinians are now working in different public and private enterprises anywhere they found jobs. But for the majority of them, life has been identified with diseases, malnutrition and hunger. They have been living on charity and donations, the only thing which protected them from starvation. While the average world intake of calories is 2,500, it is only around 1,500 calories for over a million Palestinian refugees.<sup>26</sup>

Undernutrition, poor living conditions, the unavailability of jobs, and poor economic conditions have produced a high rate of infant mortality.

"...During the long summers, dehydration and malnutrition are normally the most severe medical problems faced by UNRWA staff. Some 32 percent (593) of all reported deaths of refugee children age six and younger during 1970 were due to diarrheal disease."<sup>27</sup>

The United Nations Relief and Works Agency has been, since May, 1950, the sole agency to care about the Palestine refugee problems. Contributions to fund the agency's programs have been coming from governments, private organizations and humanitarian associations throughout the world. These contributions range from food-stuffs and clothing to money contributions. The following table shows to a great

TABLE 1

UNRWA Expenditures on Palestine Refugees by  
Year and Registered Population<sup>28</sup>

Year Ending	Registered Population	Millions of Dollars	\$ Per Person Per Year	Cents Per Day Per Person
June 1951	879,667	33,598,972	38.19	10
June 1952	882,673	28,573,053	32.37	09
June 1953	871,748	26,778,934	30.72	08
June 1954	887,058	29,192,012	32.91	09
June 1955	905,986	29,222,705	32.26	09
June 1956	922,279	31,198,550	34.91	10
7/56-12/57	933,556	52,464,139*	37.91	10
Dec. 1958	963,556	32,777,564	34.00	09
Dec. 1959	990,181	35,015,817	35.36	10
Dec. 1960	1,016,006	34,674,460	34.13	09
Dec. 1961	1,039,996	39,051,521	37.55	10
Dec. 1962	1,054,660	35,688,844	33.84	09
Dec. 1963	1,079,988	36,207,078	33.53	09
Dec. 1964	1,105,395	37,192,861	33.66	09
Dec. 1965	1,125,725	37,618,472	33.42	09
Dec. 1966	1,145,147	37,498,420	32.75	09
Dec. 1967	1,173,767	40,540,693	34.54	09
Dec. 1968	1,155,236	43,987,105	38.08	10
Dec. 1969	1,146,017	44,264,000	38.63	11

\*Amount of \$ for 18 months due to switching of fiscal year.

extent the kind of life hundreds of thousands of Palestinians have been living for two decades. These sums have been spent on education and training, health care and medical treatment, and supplying the basic daily protein requirements.

The preceding table shows several things about the refugee problem:

1. The average per capita daily expenditures do not exceed a few cents, and do not take the individual beyond the subsistence level. This situation compelled the able persons to look for means to support their families wherever it was possible. But since only the young generations have been equipped with necessary requirements for the jobs, it means that the bulk of those over twenty-five years of age are dependent partly on the Agency. This also suggests that if the refugees had not been supporting themselves, they would not have been able to live until now simply because of weather and other natural conditions as opposed to housing accommodations.

2. The fast increase in the birth rate has outstripped the available funds. This increase accounts for 684,597 births from July, 1950 to June, 1969, a net population increase, only of the registered population, of 543,747 persons (deaths for the same period accounted for 140,850).<sup>29</sup>

3. A substantial number of refugees are not registered with the UNRWA; they are self-supporting. The total number of refugees is around three million.

4. The table does not include registered persons who are not receiving rations and services. If we are to include another quarter

of a million people who are registered but are eligible for receiving only part of the services, the average per capita per day expenditures will be cut down to about 7 cents.<sup>30</sup>

### Summary and Conclusions

The United Nations Charter of Human Rights, which was put together by able men and women, comes to reflect human needs as opposed to human experiences. The fulfillment of these needs, or at least the implementation processes that initiate a beginning in that direction, means that the universal human community is overcoming its problems and therefore providing solutions for these problems. This Charter in its present form is a common understanding, agreed upon by the entire states-membership of the Community, which means a common understanding that our problems have been persistent because of social and economic inequalities, maltreatments of one group by another, ignorance, deprivations, diseases and the like.

The Declaration of the Rights of the Child as proclaimed by the United Nations on November 20, 1959, asserts that, if the child does not "enjoy special protection" and is not "given opportunities to enable him to develop in a healthy and normal manner and in conditions of freedom and dignity;" if he is not "entitled from his birth to a name and a nationality," and if he has not been loved, has not been understood, and has not been given education, the child will, in all probability, develop and grow up having negative attitudes towards his environment.<sup>31</sup> What effects and possible developments would this kind of life have on the Palestinians?



There exists a common belief in the body of knowledge of politics that it is not poverty as such which causes social and political upheavals, it is rather poverty and wealth side by side. If this is true, it may be that frustrations as opposed to aspirations, realities as opposed to goals, and unidentity and the needs for identity all may be the sources that shape the relationships of people and their environment if these conditions prevail, since aspirations, goal-attainment, and identity are criteria of any human community.

The Palestinians were uprooted and the United Nations' body-politics did not effectuate its resolution of allowing their return, upon which the Palestinians built a sense of suspicion of the United Nations which constituted no faith either in it or the forces dominating it.

Upon the first United Nations failure to respond to the will of Palestinians to return to their country, it was conditioned that the Palestinians adapt to a situation which they could do nothing about. Politically, they shaped themselves according to their environment which meant another blow to their goals. In Israel they are suspected, distrusted, and they live as second-class citizens under strict military control; they can only get menial jobs. Their economic life speaks for itself. A national identity is a sense of security and pride. The Palestinians were deprived of these feelings.

Considering these conditions, despite the existence of the United Nations Charter of Human Rights and the Declaration of the Rights of the Child, the Palestinian may not have any hopes in any institutional structure or government to solve their problem.



Accordingly, what they may do is that which their experiences as opposed to what their goals dictate.

The Palestinians, aware of the forces they are fighting, affected by utter social and economic hardships, and coupled with a multitude of unsuccessful attempts to realize their ultimate goal decided to take the initiative of self-determination by an armed resistance.

The Palestinians, then, whether those who live in or those who live outside Israel, were excluded from participating in the system. This notion, constituted a complete breakdown of positive communication between Israelis and Palestinians. In this kind of situation, violence may flare up at any time.

In this chapter, we discussed the Palestine refugees' political, social, and economic life in the Arab world and the roads they have followed to pursue their goal. We also discussed the Palestinians remaining in Israel since 1948 and those who live in Gaza and the West Bank, showing the feeling of general discontent among them. We elaborated about the effects of the failure of the Arab world and the World Community to accommodate them. This was done all in essence to see why the Palestinians started organized armed struggle against Israel. In brief, we discussed the circumstances that brought about the present state of affairs.

In the following chapter, we will discuss the ideological orientations, the organizational set-up, and the theoretical approaches of the Palestine Resistance. The discussion will take into account the effectiveness and the accomplishments of the Resistance as viewed by the available sources in our hands.

## FOOTNOTES

### CHAPTER IV

<sup>1</sup>William B. Quandt, Palestinian Nationalism: Its Political and Military Dimensions, R-782-ISA, The Rand Corporation, November, 1971, p. 3.

<sup>2</sup>Mohammed Asha'ir, Alharbul Fidaiya fi Filistin, ("The Commando Warfare in Palestine") (Beirut: Alghrayeb, 1967), p. 164.

<sup>3</sup>Sabri Jeryes, Al Arab fi Israel, I ("The Arabs in Israel") (Beirut: PLORC, 1967), pp. 76-77. These regulations are (1) Arabs cannot move freely in the country without permit. Even with a permit they cannot go except to specified places in the permit. (2) They are allowed to change their place of residence only after acquiring a written permit from the military authorities. (3) Curfew.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., p. 44.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid., pp. 16-17. (The author mentions that there is a movement in Israel composed of very well educated individuals and others in important positions in the Israeli government petitioning the authorities to eliminate the laws that infringe upon the Arabs' basic human rights; however, they have been unsuccessful. pp. 61-91.)

<sup>6</sup>Peter A. Corning, "The Biological Bases of Behavior and Some Implications for Political Science," World Politics, XXIII, No. 3, (April, 1971), p. 332.

<sup>7</sup>Some factors of the environmental and ecological effects on violence are discussed at length by Michael McCall where he contends that the Los Angeles riots of 1968 were successful primarily because the Black population of Los Angeles is spread over a wide area, many of them owned the facilities to get to the scene, roads in Los Angeles are large and numerous and the like. In Harlem, the author argues, these riots were not successful mainly because the Blacks live in a confined area from which the police can keep them from leaving, and can stop their means of transportation because few have cars. See Michael McCall, "Some Ecological Aspects of Negro Slum Riots (1968)," in Protest, Reform and Revolution: A Reader in Social Movements, edited by John K. Gastfield (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc. 1970), p. 354.

<sup>8</sup> Corning, op. cit., p. 333.

<sup>9</sup> See, for example, the poetry of Mahaud Darweesh and others in They Claim There Is No Resistance, trans. by Sulafa Hijjawi (Beirut: The Palestine National Liberation Movement, n.d.).

<sup>10</sup> The New York Times, April 17, 1973, p. C3. Quoted in Palestine Digest, 3, Issue 2, p. 5.

<sup>11</sup> International Review of the Red Cross, "The Middle East Activities of the International Committee of the Red Cross, June 1967-June 1970." Report of the International Committee of the Red Cross; Geneva (August, 1970). Quoted in the Red Cross Testifies (Beirut: published in association with Palestine Affairs, n.d.), p. 448.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid., p. 447.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid., pp. 485-486.

<sup>14</sup> Palestine Refugees in the Gaza Strip, Report of the Secretary General, Palestine Refugees Today, Newsletter No. 74, Oct., Nov., Dec., 1972, p. 22.

<sup>15</sup> Fred Charles Ikle, How Nations Negotiate (New York: Frederick Praeger, Publishers, 1964), p. 5.

<sup>16</sup> Revolution Until Victory, Fatch: The Palestine Liberation Movement, n.d., no pagination.

<sup>17</sup> Quandt, op. cit., p. 4.

<sup>18</sup> The Red Cross Testifies, op. cit., p. xii.

<sup>19</sup> Quandt, op. cit., p. 5.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid., p. 5.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid., p. 5.

<sup>22</sup> Manfred Halpern, The Politics of Change in the Middle East and North Africa, R-417-PR, The Rand Corporation, September 1963, Chapters 11 and 12 in general.

<sup>23</sup> Chaim Weizmann, Trial and Error: An Autobiography (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1949), pp. 424-425, 431-432, 441.

<sup>24</sup> Faysz A. Sayegh, The Arab-Israeli Conflict (New York: The Arab Information Center, Information Paper No. 2, November, 1956), p. 14.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid., p. 15.

<sup>26</sup> Palastine Refugees Today: An UNRWA Newsletter (New York: U.S. Committee for Refugees, Distributors, (April-May, 1963), No. 25, p. 9. See also same title No. 68, (June-July, 1971), pp. 19-25.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid., No. 68, p. 20.

<sup>28</sup> United Nations, General Assembly, 24th Session, July 1, 1968-June 30, 1969, Report of the Commissioner General of the UNRWA for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, A/7614, Supplement 14, pp. 63, 82. (Only the number of registered population and total expenditures are adapted.)

<sup>29</sup> Ibid., p. 66. (Table 3).

<sup>30</sup> Ibid., p. 63.

<sup>31</sup> Palastine Refugees Today, op. cit., No. 73 (July-September, 1972), p. 7. (For an abridged version of the Declaration of the Rights of the Child.)

## CHAPTER V

### THE PALESTINE RESISTANCE: 1967-

For eighteen years the Palestinian Arabs had depended on Arab states and the world community of nations, working through the United Nations and the great powers, to resolve their conflict with Israel, but this had not worked in terms of bringing peace. The shock of Arab defeat in June, 1967 and the subsequent occupation of Arab territory by Israel has changed all of this. The Palestinian Arabs were awakened to the fact that if they want redress for the injustices that they believed they had suffered, they must begin doing things for themselves.

John H. Davis  
(Former Commissioner General of UNRWA)  
Congressional Record - Senate June 3,  
1970 (S8254).

In this chapter, our analysis will deal with issues within the context of the following two propositions:

1. Shared goals bring a group's factions closer together and strengthen them making the pursuit of their goals more effective; but contradicting approaches and ideologies may weaken the organization and split it apart, and consequently render its goal unreachable. The Palestinian organizations may be the victims of such internal fracturing because of the variety of approaches to realizing their common goal.

2. Passive or active group resistance may be the outcome of political, social and economic inequalities, social change, and failure of group members to accommodate themselves by other means.



Although all of the above mentioned criteria can provide the necessary momentum for violence, some other highly-valued thing such as country-identity may overshadow all other things and call for armed resistance whose consequences are not defined. This is true for the Palestinians. To the Palestinian, the homeland lies in the center of his basic existence and its loss renders life meaningless. The assertion of his rights through fighting to regain his country-identity is most likely to generate chains of violent events. These events may lead to goal attainment, abolition of the group, perpetuation of the existing state of affairs, or a compromise.

The Suez crisis of 1956 and the June War of 1967 proved to the Palestinians that the liberation of Palestine is a matter that cannot be accomplished by the Arab countries. The Arab countries that are directly involved in the problem are poor, have obsolete military training and programs, have agrarian-based economies, and do not have a unified defense system. With the persistence of these conditions, the Arab countries have lost and are bound to lose in the future any encounter with Israel. The reason is that Israel is wealthy, industrialized, and advanced technologically, has modern weapons systems and training.<sup>1</sup> With this view in mind, the Palestine Resistance developed and Palestinians insisted on taking the initiative from the Arab countries by organizing their own efforts. Accordingly, many organizations came into existence mainly after 1967.

Concerning the first proposition, we will take each group independently to discuss it in terms of the circumstances that brought it about, its orientation and relations with other groups. Through



recent past developments we will show the disagreements that exist among the different factions of the Resistance.

The Palestinian leadership in the post-1967 era comprised new personalities with new approaches, but there remained major differences among them with respect to the means they should employ to realize their goal. That is, a new dynamic but divided leadership came to the scene of events, creating immediate chaos and potential restraints for the Resistance through numerous factions each of which formed its own organizational structure and followers. Each one of these organizations differed from the other in its theoretical and ideological orientations with respect to the degree of rigidity and time element within which it intended to carry out its activities. Those theoretical and ideological differences manifested themselves in open and sometimes bloody oppositions of each other along two lines. One line was that the liberation of Palestine is a part of liberating the Arab masses from reactionary leadership, the idea espoused by the leftists such as George Habash (PFLP) and others. The second approach was that of the Palestine National Liberation Movement (Fateh). Fateh's concern was to get all the financial and popular support from the Arab countries without any form of control over its activities.<sup>2</sup>

#### The Emergence of Various Organizations

Due to the embarrassment of defeat in the 1967 war, the Arab countries could not arrest the activities of the Palestinians, especially in 1968 and 1969, but created some Palestinian organizations to be used as tools in their hands and encouraged others whose approach is to

transform all the Arab countries into "revolutionary" regimes. At least fourteen different organizations emerged. Most of them remained rhetorical in scope, with the bulk of activities against Israel being carried out by Fateh, PFLP, and PDFLP:

#### Fateh: Ideology and Objectives

The Palestine National Liberation Movement (Fateh) started its operations against Israel on New Year's Eve of 1964-1965 with a dedicated group of 82 commandos after a few years of preparation and reconnaissance missions inside Israel.

The purpose of Fateh's operations have been to (1) "...present the Palestinians' cause to international public opinion as a cause of liberation," and to prepare the people for "...armed revolutionary action;" (2) ascertain the Palestinian character of the problem and "...prevent attempts by the Arab regimes to contain the Palestine struggle;" (3) establish bases for resistance in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; (4) take back the initiative and render the problem its original nature; that is, to show that the problem is not over disputed borders between Israel and Arab states; (5) "...give the upcoming generations the opportunity of getting used to taking up arms and to acquaint them with the Palestinian soil through armed raids."<sup>3</sup>

After the 1967 war, Fateh communicated its contentions of resistance in order to prepare the Palestinian people for the long and hard confrontation with Israel to attain its goal. Fateh stressed the need of political and armed struggle.

The "political struggle" advocated by Fateh concentrated on several goals. First, the political socialization of Palestinians in order to recruit the able and willing individuals and indoctrinate the youths to become potential recruits for the Movement. The "Ashbal" (a youth organization) was created for this reason. Second, to bring about a new understanding for their Movement through organized information campaigns in the Arab world as well as in the Western world. Third, to be able, in the long run, to mobilize the Arab masses behind the Movement. Fourth, to raise funds from Arab regimes and private parties, especially Palestinians, for the support of families whose heads have died during battles and to finance other projects.<sup>4</sup>

The "armed struggle" was initiated as a supplement to the political struggle through which the Movement meant to make its final commitment in dealing with the problem. The armed struggle consisted of attacking the Israeli forces in hit and run operations, destroying military and industrial installations, recruiting and training men, and collecting and buying weapons.<sup>5</sup>

Both political and armed struggles have been launched in an effort to establish a non-sectarian democratic state in Palestine where every citizen Christian, Moslem, and Jew can live as equals.

#### Fateh After June 1967

The impact of the 1967 War has contributed to making every living Palestinian either a refugee or living under the occupying forces. This fact, coupled with a moderate approach by Fateh leaders after a period of eight years, and the commando attacks against Israel, made

Fateh the most popular and important commando organization among the other organizations and the Arab countries. It was about mid-March of 1968, after the Israeli attack on commando bases in Al-Karamah in Jordan, when the Fateh's influence and popularity became greater. Fateh gained its influence and popularity not only because of its commando activities, but also because it communicated its nationalist ideological aims to the people in a way that enabled the average Palestinian to understand and identify himself. The cohesiveness of its leadership and its declaration of disinterest in interfering in inter-Arab affairs gave it the opportunity to explain its methodological approach and objectives with which the bulk of Palestinians became acquainted. Accordingly, its membership increased substantially after the Al-Karamah attack and it was estimated in early 1970 to exceed 10,000 armed men.<sup>6</sup>

Although Fateh became influential and strong after 1968, many problems retarded its growth from within and from without. The problem of uniting the different commando groups and encountering the Jordanian regimes without losing what it had accomplished was a salient problem. However, Fateh's efforts with other commando factions opened a new dialogue even though it ended with little success. As far as their situation in Jordan was concerned, the commandos only enjoyed free maneuvering on the Jordanian soil from June 1967 through the third quarter of 1969. Thereafter, the Jordanian regime started encountering the commando activities until it was ended by a major battle between the government and the commandos in September 1970. The results were thousands of deaths and the dismantling of any substantial commando bases in Jordan.

The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine

At a time when, in the late 1950's, the present Fateh leadership was entertaining the idea of self-reliance in pursuing the Palestine question, another faction was forming around a totally different orientation. The Arab Nationalist Movement, supported by Egyptian President Nasser, found responses among the intellectuals, especially the young Palestinians. The ANM's approach to the Palestine problem was through Arab unity, which came as one major contradiction with Fateh's approach. During the mid-1960's a split between Nasser and the ANM occurred when the former tried to incorporate the latter into the Arab Socialist Union, and consequently, the Palestinian leaders in the ANM, after a period of quarrels, fights, and competition, formed what is presently known as the PFLP headed by George Habash. The creation of the PFLP was preceded by a wider gap between Fateh and the Baathist government in Syria. The rapprochement talks between Fateh and the leaders who later on formed the PFLP concerning the prospects for a unified command drifted along the division between Fateh and the Baath Party of Syria. However, the leadership of George Habash did not seem to live up to the expectations of the younger and more sophisticated Marxist-Leninist oriented influential leader in the PFLP, Nayef Hawatmeh, who defied Habash. The Hawatmeh-Habash conflict created three splinter groups, the PDFLP, Hawatmeh faction, was the strongest among the splinter groups.<sup>7</sup>



### Ideology of PFLP and How It Differs From Fateh

As believers in Arab unity as the only sound means to liberate Palestine, the PFLP leadership stressed two points:

1. It refused the direct armed struggle used by Fateh as a means to their goals and advocated organizational planning as the stage preceding the use of violence. However, due to competition and in order to gain popular support, the PFLP found itself drawn into the mainstream of Fateh's doctrine; that is, using violence before any preparatory phase, especially when it failed to establish its own underground centers in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.<sup>8</sup>

2. The PFLP's attitudes towards Arab regimes represent a major principle of its workability. The leadership contends that since Palestine is an integral part of the Arab world, its work ought to start opposing those Arab regimes whose orientations are incompatible with that of the PFLP. This approach deprived the PFLP of the assistance of the wealthy traditional Arab leaders, and its resulting reliance on Iraq and Syria made it appear to function according to those two regimes' desires with respect to inter-Arab politics.<sup>9</sup>

The limited popularity of PFLP and its ineffectiveness may be attributed not only to its leftist doctrinaire orientation but also to the unwillingness of the Palestinians as well as the Arab people to support such an ideological structure. The lack of acceptance of leftist-based movements by the society of the Middle East, even though the rhetoric of such movements appealed to the emotions of the people, may be due to the deep-seated socio-religious attachments of individuals.



These socio-religious commitments between the individual and his environment proved throughout the Twentieth Century that they were stronger than political principles alien to the society.<sup>10</sup>

A second factor may be accounted for regarding the lack of success of the PFLP. It stems from the insignificant contributions of the Communist parties to their respective governments. All Communist parties were and still are banned (except in Lebanon at the present time) because they were considered as subversive groups in the countries. Besides this stigma attached to them, they, according to their lines of orientations (Russian or Chinese), promoted non-violent processes regarding the Palestine question. By the late 1960's, after more than a decade of existence, these parties and their approaches proved impractical for solving the issue. Therefore, the PFLP came at a time when the Palestinians were saturated by colored rhetoric and were not ready to accept this line of argument any more. At the same time they had an alternative in Fateh which suited their direct needs.<sup>11</sup>

A third factor may be the fact that the PFLP came to the scene of events when Fateh was very well established, and when by the late 1960's, the Soviet Union was insisting on a political settlement of the issue, at a time when the Soviets were discrediting Fateh's actions. Any leftist organization was doomed to failure, since ideologically it was supported by either the Soviet Union or Red China, and since a political settlement was viewed by the majority of Palestinians as an international conspiracy against them as long as they were not considered a part of the dispute.<sup>12</sup> Furthermore, with such persisting approaches,

the leftist organizations were not contributing to creating a Palestinian image. They rather perpetuated the self-defeating image of the realities of the Arab countries, whereas Fateh created the unique image of future Palestinian success without jeopardizing or divesting the individual's personal belief.<sup>13</sup>

#### Other Commando Organizations

In the early 1960's, the Baath parties of Syria and Iraq came to power. It was not long before the differences between the leaders of the two countries started to split them apart until the original Baath Party was identified by its two wings--the right and the left wings. In the late 1960's the divisions between Syria and Iraq became irreconcilable. Sometimes, they went to extremes with each other; that is, to encourage military factions to revolt and/or instigate coups d'etat. Both factions, the Syrian and the Iraqi, were in opposition to Nasser's policies and leadership. This three-sided antagonistic relationship happened at a time when Fateh and the armed struggle approach were gaining momentum among Palestinians as well as Arabs in general. The Syrian regime, not trusting the leadership of Fateh and discrediting Habash, coupled with inter-party conflict, created the Saiqa forces.

The Saiqa gained membership and recognition of other groups within a few months. This fact may be because it sided with Fateh whenever inter-organizational conflict came about, and accepted the PFLP and PDFLP, the main opponents of Habash. Furthermore, the Saiqa

accepted among its ranks a great number of non-Palestinians (Syrians) since it is located in and supported by Syria. During 1969 and 1970, it became clear that the Saiqa was under the Syrian regime's control.<sup>14</sup> The early May events of 1973 in Lebanon between the Lebanese army and the commandos in which the Saiqa forces were the main group, coupled with the Syrian initiative of closing down the borders between Lebanon and Syria, was a solid proof of the Syrian control over the Saiqa operations and tactics.

The Syrian initiative in creating the Saiqa did not stop at that level. On the contrary, in early 1968, the Syrian regime arrested George Habash and encouraged his opponents within the PFLP which appeared later on by the formation of the PDFLP of Hawatmeh, and the PFL of Jabril.

At this stage, Iraq, observing the developments and the Syrian maneuvering, wanted to have its own stake in the shaping of events; and, to encounter any possible Syrian control over the Movement, created its own group, the Arab Liberation Front (AFL). When Habash fled from his Syrian prison, he found that the Iraqi regime was willing to support him. However, the AFL remained unknown and unrecognized by major groups, and its membership did not exceed a few hundred.<sup>15</sup> Meanwhile, a few other organizations such as the Palestine Popular Struggle Front (PPSF), the Action Organization for the Liberation of Palestine (AOLP), and the Ansar were either recently created or in the process of formation. The allegiance of the PPSF and AOLP was to the UAR (Egypt) as it appeared later from their programs. The Ansar was strictly a group of communist Palestinians supported by Moscow-oriented factions of the outlawed Communist Parties in the Arab countries which neither gained

a large membership nor was recognized by major organizations except for the PFLP and the PDFLP.<sup>16</sup> These groups were the main target of the Jordanian regime, although Fateh's activities were not spared. It was also believed that these groups were the main factions that instigated the 1973 May events in Lebanon. In both situations, the September events in Jordan and the May events in Lebanon, Fateh's leadership was the main faction to settle the disputes between the concerned governments and the Fedayeen.

#### The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)

One of the decisions of the Cairo conference of the Arab leaders of January, 1964 was the establishment of a Palestinian organization having the authority and power to manage and institutionalize the Palestinian affairs. As a result, "...over four hundred Palestinians from a wide variety of backgrounds met and charged Ahmed Shukayri with selecting an Executive Committee for the Palestine Liberation Organization."<sup>17</sup> The PLO at the time did not intend to function independently from the Arab regimes; and accordingly, the Palestine Liberation Army, a conventional type force, was created. The members of the PLA were recruited from Palestinians and were stationed in Egypt, Syria, and Iraq. After 1967, Shukayri was abandoned and Yahia Hammouda became the acting chairman of the PLO. Yahia Hammouda tried to reorganize the efforts of the PLO, but it seemed that the PLA (the PLO's armed forces) was not a cohesive force and created inter-organization tensions that weakened the position of the PLO and gained the Syrian enmity. In early 1968, Yahia Hammouda called for a Palestinian Congress so that

all existing organizations could meet and talk out their differences, but his efforts were not successful. The meeting took place late in 1968 with the absence of some factions due to the fact that some PFLP leaders were arrested by the Syrian regime, and the Saiqa leadership did not participate.<sup>18</sup> Furthermore, the persistence of the PLA mutinies did weaken the PLO, and since the other major groups were competing to gain more power and prestige before the fifth session of the National Congress, Fateh and Saiqa were the two major groups to benefit from the PLO problems. Accordingly, when the National Congress convened in January, 1969, Fateh had "...the largest number of seats, 33, followed by Saiqa and the PFLP with 12 each. "...Other organizations refused to participate, protesting the small number of seats they were given.<sup>19</sup>

The National Congress adjourned with Fateh making an impressive political victory and its official spokesman, Yasser Arafat, became the Chairman of the PLO. The 1969 PLO's executive membership was divided among three main groups, seven members of Fateh, three of Saiqa, and one of the old PLO Executive Committee.<sup>20</sup>

With all these divisions and maneuvers that existed among them, the different groups were waging their attacks against Israel placing heavy emphasis on their rights of self-determination. In the coming discussion, we will try to deal with events according to our second proposition which says that country-identity may be viewed as the most important moving element behind a resistance.



The Movement's Confrontation with Israel and  
the Arab Regimes: An Assessment

From May, 1949 until December, 1964, the confrontation in the Middle Eastern area of our concern (excluding the Suez crisis of 1956), consisted of border clashes and ambushes, raids and retaliations, shellings, air strikes, and information campaigns between Israel and the bordering Arab countries. The Palestinians' activities at this time did not go beyond a few commando raids and significant reconnaissance missions inside Israel.

From 1965 until the present, and especially in the period after the June War, 1967, until September, 1970, the commandos activities mounted in effectiveness and encompassed a wide range of means. During the period between mid-June 1967 until December 20, 1968, 1002 commando raids against Israel were carried out. As a result, 259 Israelis were killed and 10,005 wounded.<sup>21</sup> Most of these raids were initiated by Fateh. Other organizations, and especially the PFLP, the PLF, the PDFLP, and after September, 1970, the Black Septemberists, executed actions such as hijacking and exploding planes, attacking Israeli embassies, properties, officials, and other representatives abroad.

It was natural that Israel would retaliate. The Israeli reprisals consisted of air raids, commando raids, and shelling the Palestinians' commando headquarters and bases. Since most of the commando headquarters were located in the refugee camps and cities, the civilians were also exposed to the Israeli retaliatory actions.<sup>22</sup> Accordingly, during a period of four years, from 1965 until 1969, the Arab and Palestinian casualties exceeded two thousand.<sup>23</sup>



The Israeli raids into Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan caused considerable problems in these countries. Accordingly, these concerned countries, coupled with miscalculations on the part of some groups, affected, and in some cases ended, the commando presence as a group.

In Syria, for instance, the commando activities were cut down to a minimum until the present time; that is, the commandos were not allowed to cross the Syrian borders to activate their programs. They were allowed, however, and at times encouraged, to cross the Syrian boundaries to go to Jordan and Lebanon.

In Jordan, from June, 1967 until mid-1970, the Fedayeen were operating under full autonomy and were recognized by the Jordanian regime.<sup>24</sup> Their autonomy started to deteriorate. By the end of 1968 and early 1969 the leftist organizations (PFLP, PFL, and PDFLP) emerged and openly declared their enmity towards the King and his authority. Once the King of Jordan felt that his authority was threatened by the presence of these organizations, he moved against them using his military forces at full potential with no differentiation between one commando group and another. Consequently, the confrontations between the two sides resulted in thousands of casualties among the commandos. Many commandos fled to Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and even to Israel. Another result was the birth of the Black September group. Hence, the impact of these confrontations signaled the end of the Movement in Jordan.<sup>25</sup>

Throughout the period between June, 1967 until the end of 1968, the Fedayeen presence in Lebanon consisted mainly of their administrative headquarters where they launched their information campaigns and

recruitment centers in each refugee camp. Other activities were kept to an insignificant level. This situation changed drastically in 1969 and increased by the end of 1970. Why?

After the Israeli attack of December 28, 1968 on the Lebanese international airport, the Lebanese government was faced with a frustrated and angry popular mood which paralyzed the governing process, and resulted in a chaotic situation throughout the country for more than six weeks. In this kind of situation, the newly-created Saiqa forces infiltrated the Southern part of Lebanon and started operating against Israel. Consequently, the Israeli retaliation was prompt and indiscriminatory at times, especially after the 1970 Jordanian crack-down on the commandos, when major commando activities were launched through the Southern and Southeastern Lebanese borders.<sup>26</sup> The Lebanese army found itself in a peculiarly humiliating position, coupled with some miscalculations on the part of some commando factions, brought about by the latest clashes of May, 1973, between the commandos and the Lebanese army. The fighting ended by a cease-fire through which the commandos' activities are now contained.

As it appears from the above discussion, the Palestine Resistance Movement is in a state of stagnation in Lebanon, is institutionalized, controlled, and weak in Syria, and does not exist in Jordan. In Iraq, it is kept on a nominal level of effectiveness and more so in Egypt. In Israel proper, the Movement never has existed as an organized group. Although the Movement is presently contained, there could be no doubt that it made some major accomplishments on different levels.

### Achievements of the Movement

It may appear at one time or another that it is hard to assess what the Palestine Resistance achieved throughout the period from 1965 until the present. This difficulty, however, applies only to the status of the Resistance with respect to the Palestinian population due to the near total lack of attitude surveys among the Palestinians. But with the little attitudinal information we have, and based on our analysis of the Movement so far, we may present the following points as some major accomplishments:

1. For the first time in recent history there existed an organized Palestinian Resistance Movement. Despite the fragmented nature of the Movement, it did restore the lost sense of dignity, prestige, and pride of Palestinianism and being a commando or an affiliate with and supporter of any commando group. This may be revealed by the majority opinion of a random sample of tenth-graders, Palestinian students in Jordan. Yasumasa Kuroda's study reveals that 51 percent of the sample are directly involved in one organization or another, and 30 percent show indirect involvement.<sup>27</sup> (This also shows the kind of political socialization the young Palestinians are exposed to.)

2. The Movement remains an important force in Middle Eastern affairs. It was and still is capable of retarding any political regime, social, and economic structure of any of the countries it resides in including Jordan.<sup>28</sup>

3. An unofficial universal recognition of the Movement became a reality. Palestinians are now something besides refugees. Presently,

they are seen as a group that has a potential to pursue its goals with the means it pleases. Some private and public bodies are aware of this fact and recommending that the Palestinians plight must be heard. This notion may be explained by a part of the recommendations of the Subcommittee on the Near East of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, United States House of Representatives. This Subcommittee drew its report after listening to scholars of different orientations concerned with the Middle Eastern developments:

"...The United States should watch closely Palestinian developments, be prepared to deal with them and support peaceful and viable ways to encourage expression of the Palestinians' right to have a greater voice in their own political future within the context of a peace settlement."<sup>29</sup>

4. The Resistance has a purpose and a program. The most respected influential and moderate group with highest membership in the Movement, Fateh, has been operating on a well-defined nationalist ideological premise, from which it has not deviated. This approach was and still is used in pursuance of the purpose (a unitary non-sectarian state in Palestine) along which it had been indoctrinating its members. This consciousness has been not only among Fateh's membership but also an aspect of the life of moderate Palestinians, knowingly that the great majority of Palestinians are committed to moderation.<sup>30</sup>

### Summary and Conclusions

#### A. The Inter-movement Relationships

The Palestine Resistance Movement has experienced throughout the period of its existence a series of developments consisting of several

divisions along organizational and ideological lines, achievements and setbacks, and a role to be reckoned with now and in the future.

Prior to 1967, it seemed as if the Resistance triggered the events which led to the June War of 1967.<sup>31</sup> Also, at that time, the Resistance was not known among the Palestinian circles. Even those who were aware of its existence, whether Palestinians who were not a part of it or Arabs, were skeptical about its credibility and intentions.

During the post-1967 war, while the Arab countries were demoralized after their humiliating defeat, the Resistance forces emerged as the only victorious group in the Arab world. The more the Resistance was gaining momentum and prestige through membership, armament, finance and independence from Arab regimes and foreign influence, the more organizations, some active, others dormant, with different ideological orientations, became parts to it. The more divisions created by these organizations, coupled with the attitude of the Arab regimes towards them, and the Israeli retaliatory actions, the less effective the Resistance became.

Considering the numerous post-1967 organizations, the leaderships of the moderate ones called for unification. Despite their calls, the Movement is still fragmented. By 1970, the moderate organizations operated under a loose unified command, and the leftist organizations still have their autonomy within their ideological framework.<sup>32</sup> The PLO, for instance, does not act as the 1969 National Palestinian Congress intended--one agency managing the affairs of its parts. Rather each of these organizations still has its own offices and independence.



By 1972, however, a better understanding among these concerned organizations dominated their relationships which may be referred to as a new perceptual development of the nature of forces that want to eliminate them. In other words, the inter-organization alignments and alienation among the different groups during the past eight years had "...led to the inevitable delays and prevarications that postponed the achievement of national unity."<sup>33</sup> Thus, the contradictions approach of these factions have weakened the Palestine Resistance, and its persistence may render their common goal unrealized.

#### B. The Nature of the Palestine Resistance

In their analysis of revolutions, social scientists and some world-famous politicians argue that the socio-economic circumstances that exist in a society are determinants of whether or not a revolution takes place. That is, people are willing to revolt when they are disheartened by economic hardships, or when they perceive that the upcoming developments are a threat to their material well-being. This interpretation may be true of the Palestinian Resistance when early under the mandatory government, the Palestinian farmers were revolting against the new Jewish settlers.<sup>34</sup> But after the creation of the State of Israel, the face of the Resistance had changed. The nucleus of the present Resistance as it came about in 1964 was only in response to the Palestinians political aspirations as opposed to their deprivation of country-identity; yet the Resistance was strengthened and ameliorated because of their social problems and economic hardships. This, however,



should not suggest that if the Palestinian refugees were better off economically, the Resistance would not have become as strong within a short period of time. Kuroda's survey conducted on 234 Palestinian students living in Jordan may explain this contention:

"...Even though they live under economic hardships of great magnitude, their concern to regain their homeland is an obsession to them. This is well-illustrated in their response to the question of what they would do if they had an Aladdin's lamp. Only one student said that he wanted money. Twenty-three respondents indicated their desire to satisfy their personal desires of one sort or another, while the remaining majority wanted Aladdin's lamp to bring back their homeland.<sup>35</sup>

The socio-economic life of the Palestinian refugees showed in many circumstances that it gave the Movement a great momentum. The nature of their dispersement coupled with necessities of life, in many circumstances, caused members of the same family not to be able to see each other again. The limitations imposed on them, especially after 1967, created all the pre-conditions of revolt.

Palestinians hold international identity cards. These cards are not accepted all over the world. A Palestinian cannot enter an Arab country unless his training and qualifications are needed and consequently sent after by the concerned private or public enterprise. Once students finish a level of education and need to travel abroad for a higher level of education or even just to travel, they are not given entry visas especially to the Western world, and only the elitest few are able to travel in pursuance of their individual goals after exhaustingly frustrating experiences.<sup>36</sup>

In this kind of situation, one would dare to say that Palestinians have been indoctrinated on embitterment and hate of their environments for years, generation after generation. Accordingly, a restoration

of a dignified life will never come about unless by regaining Palestine. Furthermore, Palestinians seem to be determined on pursuing their goal, where it may be easier on their opponents to remove them totally from life rather than put an end to their aspirations:

"...the resistance has many strengths, with which to prevail against the Jordanian regime, and against all the Arab regimes too, should they seek to obstruct the Palestinian revolution. For what do we fear now? In the past, we used to be anxious for our overrated institutions. But now there is nothing to fear."<sup>37</sup>

Therefore, we cannot be sure of the degree of pressure exerted on Palestinians by their social and economic conditions to wage the kind of resistance they advocate and carry out. However, the discussion in this chapter concerning our second proposition reveals that they place great emphasis on regaining Palestine. Their emphasis on the "liberation" of Palestine by armed struggle, so far, as opposed to counter-resistance, caused the Palestine Resistance Movement to function at an ineffective level.

## FOOTNOTES

### CHAPTER V

<sup>1</sup>Political and Armed Struggle, Fateh: The Palestine National Liberation Movement, n.d., pp. 3-4.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 7.

<sup>3</sup>Revolution Until Victory, op. cit.,

<sup>4</sup>Political and Armed Struggle, op. cit., pp. 21-26.

<sup>5</sup>Revolution Until Victory, op. cit.,

<sup>6</sup>Quandt, op. cit., p. 12.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid., pp. 16-21. See also Sharabi, op. cit., pp. 195-196.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid., p. 18. Also, for an interesting presentation of their differences see Sharabi, op. cit., pp. 198-200.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid., p. 20.

<sup>10</sup>For a broad analysis of the socio-religious aspects of Middle Eastern countries see Halpern, op. cit., pp. 162-175.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid., pp. 192-195. (For accounts about the obstacles to the success of Communism in the Middle East.)

<sup>12</sup>About pacifist attitudes of Communist groups, see Eric Rouleau, The Manchester Guardian, week ending January 27, 1973, p. 18.

<sup>13</sup>Khalid Al-Hassan, Palestine Lives: Interviews with Leaders of the Resistance, Palestine Books No. 40, (Beirut: Palestine Research Center and the Kuwaiti Teachers Association, 1973), p. 29.

<sup>14</sup>Quandt, op. cit., p. 23.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid., p. 24.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid., pp. 24-25.

<sup>17</sup>Ibid., p. 27.

<sup>18</sup>Ibid., p. 28.

<sup>19</sup>Ibid., p. 29.

<sup>20</sup>Ibid., p. 30.

<sup>21</sup>Near East Report, XIII, 1969, p. 3.

<sup>22</sup>The Christian Science Monitor, March 13, 1972, p. 3.

<sup>23</sup>Barry M. Blechman, "Impact of Israel's Reprisals on Behavior of the Bordering Arab Nations Directed At Israel," Journal of Conflict Resolution, XVI, No. 2, (June, 1972), p. 181.

<sup>24</sup>Abu Iyad, Palestine Lives: Interviews with Leaders of the Resistance, op. cit., p. 52.

<sup>25</sup>Ibid., p. 51.

<sup>26</sup>The Christian Science Monitor, op. cit., p. 3.

<sup>27</sup>Kuroda, op. cit., p. 260.

<sup>28</sup>Joseph Churba, Fedayeen and Middle East Crisis (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University Documentary Research Study, 1969), p. 3. Clovis Maksoud, Palestine Lives: Interviews with Leaders of the Resistance, op. cit., p. 7. Also see The Middle East in Crisis: Problems and Prospects, Report of the Subcommittee on the Near East, 92nd Congress, 1st Session, 1971, pp. 11-12.

<sup>29</sup>The Middle East in Crisis: Problems and Prospects, op. cit., p. 12.

<sup>30</sup>Ibid., p. 11.

<sup>31</sup>Charles Yost, "The Arab Israeli War: How It Began," Approaches to Peace in the Middle East, Hearings, 92nd Congress, 2nd Session, 1972, p. 115.

<sup>32</sup>Iyad, op. cit., p. 53.

<sup>33</sup>Maksoud, op. cit., p. 23.

<sup>34</sup>Sharabi, op. cit., p. 185.

<sup>35</sup>Kuroda, op. cit., p. 256.

<sup>36</sup>The New York Times, June 25, 1973, p. 23.

<sup>37</sup>Iyad, op. cit., p. 51.

## CHAPTER VI

### CONCLUSION

#### The Validity of Our Initial Propositions, and the Future of the Resistance

According to our findings throughout this thesis, we may conclude the following observations as they pertain to our initial propositions:

1. We proposed that in a very well-established system, a government may become unrepresentative and ultimately illegitimate if it does not espouse people's values and beliefs' system, and if alienation between the government and the people persists.

The Palestinians have not been integrated into the social and political system imposed by Israel. The state of Israel was established by a majority of non-Palestinian origin, representing an exclusive ethnic-religious minority of the indigenous population of Palestine. The period preceding the establishment of the State of Israel was characterized by a heritage of killings and hate between Palestinian Arabs and Zionists. Both Palestinian factions were fighting the mandatory power during which the minority (the Zionist Palestinian faction) seized upon the opportunity to expel the majority of the other faction (the Palestinian Arabs) in order to become the majority of the state they advocated. Since more than 50 percent of the population of Israel, directly after and within a few months of its establishment, were not of Palestinian

origin, and since the establishment of their own state ended with the expulsion of the majority of the indigenous population, the Palestinian Arab expellees viewed the new order as alien and therefore colonial in essence. The remaining Palestinians became a minority in the new state, but considered themselves a part of the greater Palestinian population. A colonial order was neither representative of the indigenous population nor legitimate in their eyes. Accordingly, the state of Israel was neither representative of Palestinians nor legitimate in their own eyes, because it did not belong to them, nor did it espouse their values and beliefs or represent their interests.

2. We proposed that if a state system tends to keep certain groups from participating in it, and if these groups do not desire to participate in the system (maybe in hope for changing it), the results may be uncontrollable tension.

The Palestinians who remained in Israel after 1948, do not have equal rights with the rest of the Israeli citizens. The Israeli constitution, deliberately, contains restriction against the Palestinians in Israel (or the Israeli-Arabs). In general, the Arabs of Israel are treated as second-class citizens and kept under strict measures. The harshness of these measures keeps tension under control. The Arabs have adapted to a situation where they can express their discontent in literary forms and render intelligence services to the Palestine Resistance headquarters that are located outside Israel.

Palestinian groups that live outside Israel have been denied the right of returning to their homeland. The Israeli denial of these rights has created an atmosphere with which the Palestinian refugees



have organized their efforts behind different organizations advocating and supporting armed struggle as the only means to redress their grievances.

3. Our proposition of the negative impact which an organization may be saddled with whenever it comprises different factions with contradicting approaches and ideologies may be very true of the Palestine Resistance Movement. Six years of inter-resistance conflicts did not strengthen the Resistance. On the contrary, the inability of the groups to unify their efforts rendered the Resistance ineffective and weakened it against the pressures of the regimes surrounding it.

4. We proposed that the assertion of the need of acquiring a country-identity may be a prime factor behind armed resistance where the socio-economic conditions come second in importance. The determination to acquire "country-identity" will eventually generate violence especially if there exist conflicts of interests between two groups. In this kind of situation, violence may lead to goal attainment, abolition of the group, perpetuation of the existing state of affairs, or a compromise.

Previous research findings in the social sciences suggest that violence and political revolutions come about primarily because of social and economic conditions. The findings also tell us that the "...need for establishing the identity or selfhood...and the need for self-actualization" are at the heart of any individual's behavior and therefore any population.<sup>1</sup>

We cannot be certain, however, whether or not the socio-economic conditions of Palestinians are behind their present orientations, but

we know that the principle of "country-identity" has been dominating the minds of Palestinians throughout their diaspora (see ft. 35, ch. 5 above).

Why is there so much emphasis on the political side of the problem? Aside from the needs for establishing identity or selfhood and for self-actualization, the whole problem and even the present socio-economic state of affairs among Palestinians were caused by political decisions. The Balfour Declaration, the mandate system, and the Partition Plan were all political actions that led, among other things, to Palestinian expulsion. Even when they were under British rule, Palestinians did not suffer as severe social and economic consequences as at present. Presently, therefore, Palestinians are most likely to be influenced only by the values they place on restoring their country-identity. These values, however, do not eliminate the possibility that Palestinians think that once they acquire their identity, the solution to other problems would be in process. Furthermore, Palestinians argue that they are fighting a nationalist war, along which the value and belief system of Palestinians has been based. Therefore, a nationalist war has clear political connotations as far as Palestinians are concerned.

The nationalist orientations of the Palestine Resistance come in conflict with the Israeli interests, creating a continuous state of upheaval in the Middle East. Thus, we may conclude that the prime goal of the resistance has not been attained, and the resistance could not induce Israel to compromise. Israel, on the other hand, cannot yet abolish the resistance. What seems as a natural consequence, then,

is that the situation will continue, though it is not known to what extent.

5. The Palestine armed resistance started with the hope of arriving at its ultimate goal. That is, to "liberate" Palestine. (This, however, does not suggest, if we consider Fateh's proposed structure of the new state, for instance, that liberating Palestine means doing away with the Israeli population.)

The process of liberating Palestine must meet some preconditions, or short term goals. These short-term goals generated counter-resistance from the Israeli's. The Israeli reprisals on the bases of the resistance wherever it is located causes more restrictions on the resistance. Since the resistance is still alive, these restrictions may prove to be dangerous. The resistance, however, presumes that the more pressure that comes from Israel, the more the resistance gains momentum. Although this has occurred at times, the official attempts by the host governments show that this hypothesis may not be true. We may conclude that it is true that organized armed resistance arises to accomplish specific goals, yet its success or failure is directly connected to the counter-measures it creates and their effectiveness as opposed to the determination, strength, and the environmental circumstances of the resistance.

Let us try now to project what might be the future of the Palestine resistance. To do this, we will be looking at the resistance in terms of the outcome of the interactions of "resistance-counter-resistance" as well as the environmental factors affecting the Palestine resistance.

### The Future of the Movement

The Israeli regime, so far, is determined not to come to terms with the Resistance, but rather liquidate it. Also, the Arab governments are containing the Movement within confined geographic limits, and in some countries, the Movement does not have any apparent organized structure. In addition, there are still different organizations with different approaches for achieving the Movement's goal. In this kind of situation, how effective is the Palestine Resistance, and how may it be affecting the future of Israel and vice-versa? We will explore the extent of this question within the context of our proposition which states that organized armed resistance arises to accomplish specific goals. Consequently, counter-resistance is aimed at quieting the forces of resistance and dismantling their sources of support.

### The Movement's Effects on the Middle East

For the last six years the Palestine Resistance Movement has been influencing events in the Middle East. This influence has been affecting the functions of governments, and therefore the societies on three different levels; in the Arab countries where the Resistance forms a considerable force, in Israel, and both countries are influencing the shape and form of the Movement itself.

### Its Effects on the Arab Countries

The effects of the Movement on the Arab countries manifest themselves in different ways:

1. The Movement refused the Rogers' peace initiative and also King Hussein's proposal to Israel about a Palestinian state within the Jordanian Kingdom. They also warned against any such proposals and negotiations stressing the notion that only Palestinians can decide their own destiny.<sup>2</sup>

2. The Movement has been a decisive factor in inter-Arab relationships along which agreements and disagreements have been voiced.

3. Particularly in Jordan and Lebanon, the Movement created new events and shaped policies accordingly.

The last two ways in which the Movement affects the Arab countries do not need any particular reference. The breakdown of the diplomatic relations between several Arab states and Jordan after the so-called Amman massacre of 1970, and the governmental crisis in Lebanon are common knowledge.

#### The Movement's Effects on Israel

It may be uncertain whether the Movement will affect the future of the State of Israel as an entity, but there is no doubt that presently the Movement is affecting Israel in the following areas:

1. The growing activities of the Movement have compelled Israel to raise its defense budget significantly.

a. Although Israel receives millions of dollars of contributions from abroad every year, presently it spends about 25 percent of its GNP on defense as compared to about 10 percent in the early sixties.<sup>3</sup> This suggests that a significant amount of money is used on military



expenditures where it could have been spent on development. This constitutes a burden on the Israeli economy.<sup>4</sup>

b. The growing effectiveness of the Movement has caused Israel to keep a large standing army on alert.<sup>5</sup>

2. The Movement costs Israel a considerable loss in manpower and human lives that did not prevail prior to the Movement's existence.

3. The Movement is contributing to gradual awareness among the Israelis of the injustices done to the Palestinians; and the morality of Zionism as taught to them by their official representatives has been questioned.<sup>6</sup> Also, it has been acknowledged in some official circles, one of which comes from the Secretary General of the Israeli Labor Party (the largest party in Israel):

"...The Palestinian nation is identifiable as a national entity by national consciousness, by continuous territory where most of the Palestinians live, by a history of several decades replete with battles and wars, and a diaspora which maintains a link with the Palestinian homeland. At the same time it is conscious of a common national catastrophe, sacrifice, suffering, heroes. It has dreams and the start of a national literature and poetry."<sup>7</sup>

4. "...Israel, so far, has been a democracy, but it is moving towards a garrison state...Yet the force of circumstances is pushing Israel in that direction, and this, inevitably will degrade its national life."<sup>8</sup>

#### The Effects of Israel and the Arab Regimes on the Movement

It seems that the lack of a unified Palestinian leadership had a negative effect on the degree of effectiveness displayed by the Movement. It also seems that after each round of repression of the Movement,



the members of the leadership draw closer to each other. That is, a conversion towards establishing a collective leadership comprising the different organizations may be in its final step.

In the post-September, 1970 events of Jordan, a loose understanding among the different leaders came about. Also, it seems now, after the May, 1973 events of Lebanon that the leaders--Arafat and Habash--who were "...once bitter rivals, have pulled Fateh and the Popular Front together in an alliance that verges on merger. 'Ideology is a cosmetic' is becoming the catch-phrase."<sup>9</sup> This latest accord between the two extremes of the Movement may mean, among other things, that an organization which is based on alien ideological ground does not have but insignificant support as opposed to an organization functioning according to nationalist aspirations. In other words, the PFLP accord with Fateh, preceded by merger of most small organizations with Fateh, signify that Fateh, the most prominent group in the Movement, is appealing to the Palestinians because of its independent nationalist outlook.

Although merger of smaller organizations into larger and well-established ones, and cooperation among the larger ones may be leading towards a unified Palestinian leadership, what goals may armed resistance be able to accomplish in the face of the Israeli determination to liquidate the Resistance and the Arab States determination to contain it? Again, what can armed resistance accomplish in the face of "... the intelligence services of Israel, Jordan, America, perhaps other countries too," to suppress it?<sup>10</sup>

Recent history provides us with a lesson to consider. It is that if a resistance movement perpetuates and functions along a continuum, where it transforms from few individuals to few groups, to strong organizations, and then to an entire societal front where everybody knows his place and contributes accordingly, there would be no power to stop this sort of human determination. The Kenyan, the Algerian, the Vietnamese revolutions are some examples to consider.

The Palestinian consciousness is now beyond containment. This has been proven by the fact that the more the Movement comes under pressure the more compromise and accord among the different factions exists, and therefore, the more organized and stronger it becomes. The strength of the Movement, however, is always supplied by the young and the old, by the very well educated and those who are poorly educated because they all were once, if they are not now, the product of refuge and abandonment where the politics of despair were nurtured. In the refugee camps, their hate and revenge are "...easily fed by all the old memories of villages razed, houses and graves plowed under." In a condition such as that, and in situations where they have been driven to extremes, the Palestinians "...seem to feel in the nightmare of their loneliness--bombs, horror, death--is better than being swirled away unheeded down the caverns of the world's indifference."<sup>11</sup>

Maybe now more than ever before, the Palestinians are acting as a group that will eventually react with a full potential to defend not only their survival needs, as a community, but also to protect what they have acquired until the present time. In this kind of situation, they are capable of destroying any social, economic, and political system in

the Arab Middle East.<sup>12</sup> In the end, however, the winner in such a show-down will be the government's forces, but this will end before dissolving the Movement. What then may happen is that even the moderates will become Black Septemberists. Then, not only their direct environment would have much to fear, but also the international community as well.

What is, then, the solution?

"...In Israel and among that country's supporters in the West the true nature of the conflict is obfuscated by the persistent belief that the crucial conflict is with Arab governments... The initial cause of all these complicating disputes is not 'freedom of passage through international waterways,' or 'recognition' by neighboring states, or other such peace agenda items. The root cause which led to these disputes is the loss of Palestinian Arab rights... These are not the observations of an antagonist or foe of Israel, but of a friend."<sup>13</sup>

Unless the legitimate rights of the Palestinians are attained, the armed resistance will continue to grow and to be the focus of events in the Middle East for generations.

## FOOTNOTES

### CHAPTER VI

<sup>1</sup>James C. Davies, "The Family's Role in Political Socialization," in The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, CCCLXI, (September, 1965), pp. 10-19.

<sup>2</sup>Eric Rouleau, The Manchester Guardian, week ending January 27, 1973, p. 18.

<sup>3</sup>See, for example, The Christian Science Monitor, January 7, 1971, p. 3. Also see "Israel at 25" in The Chicago Tribune, May 6, 1973.

<sup>4</sup>The Near East Conflict, Hearings before the Subcommittee on the Near East, 91st Congress, 2nd Session, 1970, p. 23.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid., p. 23.

<sup>6</sup>Palestine Digest, III, Issue 3, June, 1973, pp. 17-18. Quoted from Le Monde, April 11 and 12, 1973, p. 13.

<sup>7</sup>Don Peretz, "Getting to the Heart of the Matter: Palestine," in The Near East Conflict, op. cit., p. 25.

<sup>8</sup>William E. Griffith, "Zero Hour for the Middle East," in The Near East Conflict, op. cit., p. 156.

<sup>9</sup>The Washington Post, May 17, 1973, p. F2. Quoted in Palestine Digest, III, Issue 3, p. 5.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid., p. 4.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid., p. 5.

<sup>12</sup>See, for example, The Manchester Guardian, May 12, 1973, p. 3. in Palestine Digest, op. cit., p. 25.

<sup>13</sup>Peretz, op. cit., p. 25.

APPENDIX I (A)

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Cities and Towns of Palestine Where the Commission  
Met with Delegates and Representatives

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Acre

Beersheba - (Gaza)    Bethlehem

Haifa

Hebron

Jaffa (Ludd, Ramleh)

Jenin

Jerusalem

Nablus

Nazareth (Safed, Tiberias)

Ramallah

Richon-le-Sion

Tel-a-Viv

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Adapted from: "Report of American Section of Inter-  
Allied Commission on Mandates in Turkey: An Official  
United States Government Report," Editor and Pub-  
lisher, LXXV, December 2, 1922.

## APPENDIX I (B)

Number of Palestinian Delegations that Met with the Commission by Groups	
Groups	No. of Delegations
I. Political Groups	
1. Mayors and Municipal Councils	12
2. Administrative Councils	2
3. Councils of Village Chiefs	22
4. Arab Sheikhs	6
5. Arab Societies	2
6. Moslem Christian Committees	3
Total	<u>47</u>
II. Economic and Social Groups	
1. Professions and Trades	1
2. Farmers, etc.	1
3. Young Men's Clubs	1
4. Chambers of Commerce	1
5. Miscellaneous Groups	1
Total	<u>5</u>
III. Religious Groups	
A. Christians	
1. General Christian Groups (Composite)	7
2. Protestants	9
3. Latins	9
4. Greek Orthodox	7
5. Greek Catholics	8
6. Maronites	7
7. Armenians (General Groups)	1
8. Syrian Catholics	1
9. Chaldean Catholics	1
10. Copts	1
11. Abyssinians	2
Total	<u>53</u>
B. Moslems	
1. Muftis and Ulema	7
2. Moslem Notables	2
3. Moslem Sunnites	9
Total	<u>18</u>
C. Other Religious Groups	
1. Jews	14
2. Druses	1
3. Samaritans	1
4. Persians	1
Total	<u>17</u>
Grand Total	140

Adapted from: "Report of American Section of Inter-Allied Commission on Mandates in Turkey: An Official United States Government Report," Editor and Publisher, LXXV, December 2, 1922.



APPENDIX II

Jewish Immigration to Palestine by Year and Percentage\*

Year	No. of Immigrants	Percent
1920	5,514	----
1921	9,149	----
1922	7,844	11.1
1923	7,421	11.7
1924	12,856	11.8
1925	33,801	14.4
1926	13,081	16.6
1927	2,713	16.3
1928	2,178	16.2
1929	5,249	16.3
1930	4,944	16.6
1931	4,075	16.9
1932	9,553	17.9
1933	30,326	20.6
1934	42,358	23.4
1935	61,854	27.2
1936	29,727	28.1
1937	10,536	28.2
1938	12,868	28.7
1939	27,561	29.7
1940	10,445	30.0
1941	3,839	29.9
1942	3,581	29.9
1943	8,558	30.0
1944	14,491	30.4
1945	13,156	30.6

\*Percent of the Jewish population of the total population of Palestine.

Source: Elias Saad, *Alhijral Yahoudiya ila Filistin*, ("The Jewish Immigration to Palestine,") (Beirut: The Palestine Liberation Organization Research Center, 1969), pp. 37-38.

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