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Samantha White

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MA political science
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Melinda Mueller
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War Spin: How U.S. Politicians, the President and the Media

Frame Foreign Intervention

(TITLE)

BY

Samantha White

THESIS

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
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Abstract: In this research, I seek to explain how three different foreign policy actors, the President, key Senators, and the media frame intervention policy when determining if intervention is used for human rights versus U.S. interests. I will be looking at four different areas of turmoil (Bosnia (1992-1995), Rwanda (1994), Syria (2011-present) and Iraq (2003-2011)) to see if the Presidents, Senators, and the media framed their intervention around human rights atrocities being committed, or if they framed it around a national security dilemma.

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Chapter 1. Introduction:

In the years following the atrocities of World War II, a new issue emerged in public policy, human rights policy. In fact, the Nuremberg Trials were the very first tribunals set up to address issues of human rights abuses, and led to the founding of the International Criminal Court, the Geneva Convention, the Human Rights Commission and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Since the Nuremberg Trials, numerous advances have been made in the area of international human rights, some of which would not have been possible without Congressional and Presidential support.

Presidents, Senators, and the media frame and justify their actions to intervene by using human rights buzzwords such as, genocide, war crimes or crimes against humanity, even if the intervention has no effect on the U.S. On some occasions, the humanitarian intervention angle is played just so the President and Senators can garner more positive public and media support, instead of pushing for an all-out military strike, even if humanitarian intervention is not needed. Presidents, Senators, and the media each have an influence on policymaking. Presidents and Senators are involved in the actual process of making policies when it comes to international human rights and intervention, while the media, has an enormous overall influence over the public agenda by selecting certain issues to focus on, regarding human rights and intervention.

Humanitarian intervention, simply put, is a “state's use of military force against another state when the chief publicly declared aim of that military action is ending human-rights violations being perpetrated by the state against which it is directed” (Marjanovic 2011). National security intervention is more straightforward; intervening in

another country because U.S. interests are at stake and the conflict occurring is a potential threat to our own security.

Framing effects utilized by the President, Senators, and the media can have unintended consequences, such as justifying intervention in a country that turns out to be a ten-year long war, or making an effort to curb human rights abuses when in reality, it makes the situation worse. The way the President and Senators frame the use of intervention when deciding to intercede in another country is a fundamental factor to understand. Take for example, the Vietnam War and the Gulf of Tonkin incident. The U.S. entered war with Vietnam to prevent the spread of communism and became more involved in Vietnam after the Gulf of Tonkin incident, which resulted in zero American casualties. President Johnson spoke to the American public on the incident and emphasized that American warships have been attacked by the North Vietnamese and that he had a commitment to the American people, but that he had no desire for war. Inconsistencies ran rampant over the Gulf of Tonkin incident and Johnson's speech. He had no desire for war, yet, the U.S. became more involved in Vietnam after the incident and the media teetered a fine line between what was true and what was false over the Gulf of Tonkin incident. While President Johnson and Congress decided to continue our involvement in Vietnam, Senator Gruening objected to "sending our American boys into combat in a war in which we have no business, which is not our war, into which we have been misguidedly drawn, which is steadily being escalated" (Johnson, 1993). While Johnson made comments about having a commitment to the American people and used that as a driving force in the Vietnam War, Senator Gruening believed the U.S. had no business in Vietnam. In this instance, we see a clear difference between Presidential

effects and Senatorial effects that ultimately resulted in a twenty-year long war that was wracked with public outcry and protests over our involvement. Johnson used the Gulf of Tonkin incident to further U.S. involvement in Vietnam, even after stating he had no desire to go to war. Johnson's inconsistencies over his words and actions resulted in the U.S. becoming involved in the longest war to date.

Occasionally, Presidents and Senators can use human rights justification to intervene just so they can use military force on that country, regardless if human rights abuses have occurred. Thus, examining if human rights are used to justify intervention is critical to determine if there is a difference in framing effects when it comes to humanitarian intervention or national security intervention. It is important to study Presidents, Senators, and the media because each of these institutions offers a different approach to having an influence on policymaking, both foreign and domestic.

Policymaking is one of the most important facets of government, as the decisions that are a result of policymaking are intended to solve problems and improve the quality of life for its citizens. Foreign policymaking, when it comes to international human rights, is important because it can set the course for future relations between countries and can assist when human rights abuses occur. If the U.S. decides to intervene in Sudan due to human rights abuses, and their main ally is not considered a friendly ally of the U.S., it can cause dire consequences for both countries.

In this research, I seek to explain how three different foreign policy actors, the President, key Senators, and the media frame intervention policy when determining if intervention is used for human rights versus U.S. interests. I will be looking at four different areas of turmoil (Bosnia (1992-1995), Rwanda (1994), Syria (2011-present) and

Iraq (2003-2011)) to see if the Presidents, Senators, and the media framed their intervention around human rights atrocities being committed, or if they framed it around a national security dilemma.

In Chapter 2 of my thesis, I review the scholarly literature on framing effects and how the President and the media can affect it, and then I review literature involving Senators, which includes how Senators propose legislation and how they come to support international human rights issues. In Chapter 3, I give details of my methodology and data and explain how I will utilize each of my variables in order to determine the framing effects of the President, Senators and the media, and how they use those framing effects to justify intervention. Chapter 4 of my thesis, I present my findings and conduct an analysis of my findings. Within this chapter, I take some facets of my literature review and apply them to my findings and I do an extensive data collection of different foreign policy actors (presidents, senators and the media) and determine if each used similar or different framing effects. After presenting my findings and analysis, I conclude my paper in Chapter 5 by discussing implications, and suggesting future research ideas pertaining to framing effects and justification for future intervention.

Chapter 2. Literature Review:

Before diving into the main facets of the literature review, there are a few key themes that should be discussed beforehand. The main theme throughout my literature review is framing. Framing can be defined as, “patterns of interpretation which are used to classify information and process it efficiently. Framing stresses certain aspects of reality, and pushes others into the background – it has a selective function. In this way, certain attributes, judgments and decisions are suggested” (Lechler, 2015) Framing has the ability to alter one’s perception on anything, which plays a key role in deciding when to intervene. A secondary theme is humanitarian intervention. Humanitarian intervention is the “state’s use of military force against another state” (Marjanovic 2011). Introducing humanitarian intervention is vital, as it is a form of a framing effect that Presidents, Senators and the media use to decide that intervention is necessary. While framing effects and humanitarian intervention are vital keys in decision making, Congress members desire to be re-elected plays a role as well. Based off whether a Senator is up for re-election or not, they can use that to their advantage by framing their decision around intervention based off what they believe their constituents want to hear, thus allowing them to use a possible war to their advantage. Framing effects, humanitarian intervention and re-election all play similar roles when it comes down to deciding to pursue intervention in another country and each are used strategically.

Druckman has written numerous articles on framing effects and the general, overall theories of framing. In Druckman’s 2001 article, he states that public opinion has the biggest impact on framing, as it depends on which frames elites should and can use. “Framing effects may occur, not because elites seek to manipulate citizens, but rather

because citizens delegate to credible elites for guidance” (pg. 1061). Not only does Druckman believe that framing is geared towards guidance over manipulation, but also that framing can help determine citizen’s beliefs toward certain issues. Mills (1940) also alludes to the idea of having different motives based off the type of vocabulary and expressions you use. He states that when a person vocalizes his motives, he is not trying to describe his action; instead, he is trying to influence others. This influencing action can be applied to presidential and media framing as if a president or the media are trying to influence the public, they will use different vocabulary and expressions than they normally use.

While Druckman’s (2001) article above focuses on framing effects, his (2004) article, deals with campaign effects in a U.S. Senate election. Druckman (2004) concludes that the Senate campaign of 2000, primed voters to base their decisions on the issues emphasized in the campaign. With this information, we can see how senators frame their campaigns towards voters. Will senators focus on international human rights issues in their campaign? If they do, then according to Druckman, if the voters get exposed to it, they will more likely support (or not support) it, depending on the type of exposure they get; positive or negative. If a senator emphasizes intervention in a heavy conflict zone with international human rights abuses occurring and makes it a top priority in his campaign, the voters will more likely support it and agree with it.

Druckman’s (2001) also explores the effects of framing, concluding that there are two types of framing: equivalency framing effects, which represent logically equivalent alternatives portrayed in different ways, and emphasis framing effects, which simplify reality by focusing on a subset of relevant aspects of a situation or issue (p. 230). He

states that these two effects have different implications, may work differently and may produce an entirely different result. Not only does the framing effect depend on what is being framed itself, but also the political conditions at the time, as both of these will have an influence on citizen competency when it comes to framing. Cherwitz and Zagacki (1986) offer a different view of framing and focus on two different types of rhetoric: consummatory rhetoric, which is where presidential discourse initially constituted the only official reply made by the American government, and justificatory crisis rhetoric, which is where presidential discourse was part of a larger, military retaliation taken by the government. Within these two types of rhetoric, Cherwitz and Zagacki (1986), argue that they can be used in a way that gets the public to support intervention, even if intervention is generally not considered a good idea. They also state that crisis rhetoric is predictably and regularly crafted commensurate with the larger situational response, thus, alluding to the idea that the type of rhetoric used can play a large role when it comes to presidential speeches and the media.

Framing is not only relevant when it comes to campaigns and intervention; it also plays a role during public policy debates. Jerit (2008) assesses the use of framing and engagement strategies of public policy debates and puts an emphasis on strategic framing (selectively highlight the considerations that mobilize public opinion behind their policy position). Jerit concludes that engagement was more effective at increasing support than framing was when it comes to public policy debates; however, Jerit conducted this study on health care reform. If public policy debates toward international human rights abuses and intervention were studied, the results yielded might be different.

Given Druckman's basic overview of framing effects and framing theories, it is also important to note when to decide to use humanitarian intervention. Moore (2007) focuses on the factors that influence when to intervene. He looks at the cases of Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti, Kosovo and Afghanistan and makes the case that they fell prey to humanitarian intervention from the U.S. by either being unilateral, seeking a regime or dictator change or simply national interests.

Previously, general framing effects have been mentioned. Humanitarian intervention is a type of framing effect that offers different policy actors to use when determining that intervention is necessary while giving the general public a reason to intervene. Wertheim (2010) argues that humanitarian intervention has experienced an increase from 1991-2003. He states that previously, humanitarian intervention was limited and meant to be on an *ad hoc* basis only, however, in recent years, humanitarian intervention has become increasingly popular as a way to gather support for military intervention in different regions. Wertheim (2010) also states that humanitarian intervention is most commonly used as a way to make the public believe that the U.S. has a responsibility to protect ourselves and other countries in turmoil.

Regan and Aydin (2006) examine different forms of intervention when it comes to civil wars. The authors conclude that interventions in civil wars are not effective in reducing the amount of violence or the duration of the civil war; instead, diplomacy should be the first and only option. Since I will be using two civil war examples in my analysis, it is important to have a background on civil war intervention. This will aid me in my analysis because it gives me an idea of what works versus what doesn't work when it comes to civil war intervention.

Since civil war intervention can either be militaristic or humanitarian, focusing on military intervention when humanitarian crises are relevant is also important. Boettcher III (2004) focuses on military intervention decisions during the humanitarian crises of Rwanda, Kosovo, Somalia and Indonesia. He determines that the most important factors that influence support from the public are: foreign policy frames, the framing source, the type of the humanitarian crisis, the location of the crisis, the race/ethnicity/religion of the endangered population, and the ratio of the U.S. lives saved (349).

Ben-Porath (2007) and Gross (2008) focus on the type of language a President uses to justify intervention. Ben-Porath (2007) finds that in building the case for an imminent war, Presidents tend to rely upon narrative descriptions of atrocities, such as rape and torture. In the same respect however, Presidents who wish to avoid involvement in war, rely upon abstract and statistical terms that concern human rights, but refrain from using narrative descriptions. Gross (2008) finds that episodic and thematic framing plays the biggest influence to the public, as it appeals to their emotions. If framing has an emotional effect on the public, then the public will be more likely and more willing to support intervention, regardless at what's at stake. Both Gross and Ben-Porath offer insights into what will get the most public support when justifying intervention.

Kuusisto (1998) and Auerbach and Bloch-Elkon (2005) look at how the Bosnian war was framed with Kuusisto (1998) focusing on rhetoric and Auerbach and Bloch-Elkon (2005) focusing on media framing. Kuusisto (1998) determined that the President focused on trying to explain the events occurring in Bosnia and instead of referring to it as 'just another war', he focused on the tragedies that were occurring, stating that it was a 'catastrophe' and a 'nightmare.' This statement allowed President Clinton to garner more

public support to intervene on Bosnia's behalf. Bloch-Elkon (2005), on the other hand, gears his article towards media framing. He argues that the media highlighted core U.S. interests and values threatened by the developments in Bosnia, which in turn, pushed President Clinton to have a more active policy in the crisis.

Hopper (2009) makes the case that "Presidents have good reason to frame their actions in terms most likely to elicit support from the American people and other elites and to aim to have their version of events presented to the public by the mass media" (2). This sets the stage for the idea that Presidents frame their reasons for intervention in a way that will garner the most support from the public and have it shown by the media. If a President frames his justification for intervention around what will be most popular, it could have unintended consequences for the President, as he could be entering into a long, drawn out civil war, or he could make the humanitarian crisis worse, which would result in American losses. It's important to determine how the President frames intervention and who his intended audience is.

Garrison (2001) examines the framing effects of President Carter and how Carter's advisors framed their policy preferences favorably in order to influence Carter's policy choices. Based off the framing effects of Carter's advisors, Garrison looks at historical/cultural symbolism, personal beliefs and values, and political cost assessments when it comes to the components of framing processes. Throughout his article, Garrison alludes that "advisors who chair and important committee have an advantage in the framing process because they can more directly control the terms of debate on an issue" (800). Garrison also points out that the president can attempt to play a more active role in decision-making in order to alleviate the influence of his advisors. This article points out

that while the president is powerful and can frame his own decisions, his advisors can also play a role when it comes to framing things to the president, which in turn, can have a positive or negative effect when it comes to presidential framing.

Reese and Lewis (2009) focus on how the War on Terror was framed during the Bush administration. They find that the public was more inclined to support Bush and his War on Terror because he framed it around the September 11 attacks, which spurred the public's support for intervention. Reese and Lewis (2009) conclude that the War on Terror, even years later, had a lasting effect on the public due to Bush's and the media's framing on the subject. The framing provided by both parties resulted in a policy label that couldn't be forgotten due to the September 11 attacks.

Boettcher III and Cobb (2009) similarly focus on the Iraq War on Terror, but do so through casualty frames and public tolerance for escalating commitment. The authors find that framing effects are inconsistent when the frames are attributed to sources and when causalities are reported; the public is less likely to continue to support intervention.

Kriner and Shen (2007) focus on how the Iraq War influenced the 2006 Senate elections. Within their analysis, they believe that Republican senators had less of a chance of winning the election because George W. Bush was the Republican ringleader of the Iraq War. Since citizens and voters were becoming increasingly dissatisfied with the war in Iraq and President Bush, they were skeptical of voting more Republicans into office, as they would most likely continue to support Bush and Iraq. Because of the dissatisfaction rate of voters, Democratic senators had the upper hand during the 2006 election, as opposed to Republicans.

As noted above, Presidents have a certain way of framing conflicts, which can be used to justify intervention or used to shy away from intervention. Senators also have a particular way of framing conflicts, sometimes in a way to seek reelection, to join caucuses in regards to international human rights, or because senators constituents have a deep concern for international human rights.

While Presidents have their own motives and reasons for intervening and using framing effects to do so, Congress members have a different way. One, that a few believe, is based off Senators underlying goal of being re-elected. Mayhew (1974) assumes that Members of Congress are single-minded seekers of reelection, and based off this assumption, we would expect that Congress members would devote significant resources to advertising, credit claiming and position taking. Mayhew's arguments add to the idea that Congress members have one main goal: reelection. If they are solely focused on reelection, then they will only make efforts that will help them achieve this goal. This research is valuable when learning about Congress members, their main goals and how they propose legislation when they only seek reelection. If they only want reelection, then their legislation action towards international human rights won't be significant, unless their constituents are fiercely adamant about certain policy issues, which would affect the way they frame international human rights issues, as they would not put significant weight into justifying intervention.

Nordlinger (2005) explores the facets of the importance of background within the Human Rights Caucus. For example, through their Cuban-American background within the Human Rights Caucus, some Cuban-American legislators have been fierce advocates for Cuban and Cuban-American rights. Nordlinger (2005) stated that, "the Cuban

experience is central to their lives” (22). The Human Rights Caucus in Congress has around 170 members, and each of them have a different background that is influential within the caucus. When there is a member in Congress who has a minority background, it can greatly influence and help garner support for their background that is also relevant in different countries where human rights abuses are occurring. Caucus members and their backgrounds, especially in the Human Rights Caucus plays one of the biggest roles when deciding what human rights issues and countries to focus on.

According to Miler (2011), “the caucus system complements the existing party and committee systems in the House by providing another way for legislators to express issues of importance to their constituents and come together to pursue policy goals” (913). Miler’s research provides numerous opportunities to why caucus membership is important and how caucus membership can allow House members to accurately and uniquely represent their constituents. Miler also argues “caucuses provide insight into how legislators represent the diversity of interests in their district” (914).

McCormick and Mitchell (2007) explore the facets of the Congressional Human Rights Caucus and who decides to join it. Membership in the CHRC offers very few incentives; yet, it regularly has a large membership. They conclude “House members’ motivation for action extends beyond the reelection imperative with members also pursuing good public policy, such as the promotion of human rights” (589). This research offers a different motivation behind joining caucuses, and more specifically the Human Rights Caucus. Caucus membership allows for a greater trust between constituents and their representatives, while at the same time, allow representatives to pursue their policy goals. This will aid me in my research of the motivation behind Senatorial caucus

membership and policy goals. It will also be important when determining how they proposed legislation, if caucus membership played a significant role or not.

Human rights may not be at the top of the list for most constituents, but for constituents in diverse or ethnic based districts, it may very well be. King, Bentele and Soule (2007) offer arguments that connect protesting to policymaking. The authors explore how protesting calls attention to Congress because protesting is viewed as a disruptive force. King, Bentele and Soule argue “protest brings issues to the attention of lawmakers that were previously ignored...protestors’ claims that were once ignored can become an important part of the public agenda” (153). This article offers insight into protesting and how it garners the attention of Congress, which in turn, could lead to issues being heard at the Congressional level.

Berger (2012) conducts a case study on the effects of lobbying and campaign contributions in regards to U.S. aid to Egypt. Berger states, “campaign contributions can play a role in determining the voting behavior of U.S. representatives” (626). U.S. aid to Egypt was viewed as successful because there were lobbying efforts and campaign contributions from constituents. If constituents were to do this for more human rights issues, it would put pressure on representatives to do something. Berger’s article allows me to explore the behind the scenes of Dole, McCain and Reid’s motivations behind human rights legislation; do they enact and propose legislation as a side effect of lobbying efforts and campaign contributions, or do they propose human rights legislation, without constituent support because they are passionate about the issue.

In lieu of Berger’s and King, Bentele and Soule’s research, Wu (2009) puts aside constituent support and instead argues that some human rights support is simply because

of shared norms of democracy and human rights. Wu examines this through the case of Taiwan. She originally hypothesized that there “was a relationship between increased Taiwanese importation of U.S. exports and greater American congressional support for Taiwan” (382), but instead found that support for Taiwan simply stems from a series of shared norms of democracy and human rights. Congressional support isn’t concerned with Taiwanese trade, but instead concerned more with their democratic process and human rights record. Wu’s research allows me to further examine Congressional support for human rights and the motives behind representatives’ human rights legislation. It will also allow me to determine their approach to human rights. If it’s constituent based or simply morally based; if countries human rights violations are so bad, that something must be done.

While constituents can have an effect on representatives in regards to human rights issues, it isn’t necessarily always the case. In order for constituents’ effects to be heard and taken into consideration by their representative, constituents first need to care and know enough about human rights violations in order to make an effective impact. Cutrone and Fordham (2010) explore if Congress put human rights concerns on their agenda in response to constituents demand for trade protection, or if they put it on their agenda because that is what they want to focus on. Cutrone and Fordham found two staggering conclusions: “members of Congress use human rights issues as a way to protect their constituents’ economic interests” (652) and that members of Congress “focused on real human rights violations, but tended to select those who competed with their constituents” (653). These conclusions offer even more insight into the way Congressmen bring up human rights issues in their Congressional sessions. Supposedly if

constituents' economic interests are affected by human rights violations, then representatives will be more inclined to propose legislation to protect their economic interests. This research allows me to further delve behind the motivating factors behind Dole, McCain and Reid's initiative to propose human rights legislation. Do they support intervention when human rights abuses are occurring because they truly care about the issue, or are they framing intervention around the security interests of the state? Another important aspect to note in regards to motivating factors on human rights legislation is leadership.

If members of Congress are more inclined to promote human rights legislation if they know they will gain Presidential approval, then it is important to look at this factor. Carter (1986) and Keys (2010) explore this leadership aspect. Carter (1986) argues that the Congressional role is to follow the President's lead and that Congress has been less passive to the needs of the Presidency, especially after the Vietnam War, however, Congress does play a vital role in some foreign policy situations. Carter concludes "Congress has not been a 'rubber stamp' for the President...every post-World War II President has publicly castigated Congress at some point for the restrictions it places upon him in foreign policy making" (352). This is especially important to note because while some Congress members are more than willing to pass legislation on human rights, it can't always be done. If the President is more likely to propose human rights issues that Congress members agree with, the chances of the issues passing will be higher.

Keys (2010) takes a similar, yet different approach to leadership. She explores Henry Kissinger, Congress and the origins of human rights diplomacy. In 1975, Kissinger established the Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, in the hopes that it

would enable the State Department to do less about international human rights. Kissinger constantly complained that Congress's activities complicated relations with allies of the United States. Despite Kissinger's best efforts to squander Congressional involvement in human rights, President Carter set the basis for his human rights agenda from Congressional proposals. Key's research is important in the leadership aspect by showing that Congress can play a vast and vital role in determining the course of events and actions in regard to human rights legislation. This will aid me in determining Dole, McCain and Reid's role in garnering support for human rights legislation, their stance on human rights issues in response to different leaderships and the way they promote human rights legislation and issues. In some cases, human rights abuses are so great and devastating, that single member promotion and legislation is not needed.

Uscinski, Rocca, Sanchez and Brenden (2009) examine Congressional action on the Darfur genocide and Hendrickson (2013) examines Congressional action on Joseph Kony and the Lord's Resistance Army. Uscinski, Rocca, Sanchez and Brenden (2009) explore the Darfur genocide and Congressional action pertaining to it. They find that the reelection motivation does not exist during the voting on the Darfur genocide, but instead, making good public policy becomes more important. They also conclude "institutional and personal characteristics mattered in the Darfur voting...Darfur may be seen as a winning issue for every member of Congress regardless of party affiliation" (494). This conclusion allows me to expand my approach on partisanship between Dole, McCain and Reid and their motivations behind voting and human rights legislation.

Hendrickson (2013) explores Joseph Kony and the Lord's Resistance Army and the efforts Congress put forth in order to defeat him. He includes constituents motivating

members of Congress, the NGO group Invisible Children playing a viable role, bipartisanship, violations of human rights and Congress members advancing issues with a robust personal appeal. Hendrickson resolves, "One may conclude that a 'perfect storm' of political variables came together to help pass this legislation through constituency pressure, terrorism, violations of children's human rights, bipartisanship, and deeply committed members of Congress" (28). This article not only explores Congressional action, it explores the interworking's of individual Congress members and how they put aside their strong political and partisan views and came together to attempt to defeat Joseph Kony and the Lord's Resistance Army. His research is pertinent because it allows me to explore every aspect that happens when human rights legislation and action come into play in Congress, including their proposed legislation, their partisan bias, their motives and their framing effects.

This literature will help me determine if the public is manipulated by Presidential framing when it comes to human rights, or if they are simply seeking guidance. It will also give me a background on the broad theories of framing and what type of framing the President uses when determining intervention. Not only does the previous literature offer guidelines on different types of narrative descriptions and abstract terms to push for a war, it also gives me an insight into presidential and media rhetoric. Why does the media frame a conflict differently than the president? Is there a secret agenda behind it, or is it just done to gain support from the public? The information supplied by Kuusisto (1998) and Auerbach and Bloch-Elkon (2005) will allow me to determine how Presidents frame possible interventions, by utilizing the media or by using specific rhetoric to gain public

support. This will allow me to determine all the factors that go into play when a President is attempting humanitarian intervention and the lasting effects of framing.

Senators and presidents are closely interlinked when it comes to some instances, as established above. Nevertheless, senators have a different approach when it comes to framing and justification effects for international human rights. Senators and presidents face reelection issues, constituent issues and partisanship issues, however, each entity has a different way of getting past such issues, which is relevant by Senators in different caucus membership, proposed legislation and constituent affairs.

While this previous literature offers a wide range of data, methods and analysis that are useful to my current research, there seems to be no extensive data collection that compares the president and senators to the media when it comes to framing different conflicts. While past research has been done on how the president framed the Gulf War or the Iraq War, a comparison with the media has not been done. By filling in this gap, it can allow me to look at different framing aspects and seeing the effect they can have on the public and the public's support for intervention. If a president wants to intervene and there is a human rights crisis, will he use buzzwords such as, "US security" or "humanitarian"? How will this differ from the media's approach?

Knowing the answers to these questions, or at least, attempting to answer them, will breathe new light into framing effects of the president and the media. By comparing the two, it can be done to previous wars and conflicts which we can determine how the president, senators and the media framed it, either differently or the same. Not only is this beneficial to previous wars and conflicts, as we can study the framing effects, but

incredibly beneficial to future research, as we can truly see how framing differs between the president, senators and the media.

Chapter 3. Methodology and Data:

Senators and Presidents often coincide with each other when it comes to foreign and domestic policy decisions; however, there can be instances when Senators and Presidents disagree on policy decisions, which can lead to consequences when it comes to media support. This difference can be apparent through how the President and Senate frame their senate floor remarks, news conferences, weekly addresses, proposed legislation, and personal biographies. I will be using both qualitative and quantitative methods to gather data for my research. I will collect count data from presidential news conferences and weekly addresses and top newspapers. I will also conduct case study analyses of key senators, exploring their personal and political websites and overall international human rights work. I will determine the number of bills and legislation they have proposed during the conflict and examine the language they used both in the legislation and in their advocacy for the legislation. On top of bills and legislation, I will look at caucus membership and funding from foreign policy or human rights PACs

In order to fully understand if a president framed his attempt to intervene based on human rights issues, I will do a content analysis of presidential news conferences and weekly addresses given towards the conflict. I will look for human rights buzzwords and consider whether the president defined the intervention as humanitarian or a security concern. The buzzwords that I will look at in regards to news conferences, weekly addresses and newspapers will remain the same to determine if there is a similar language used and if Presidents and Senators frame the conflicts differently or in a similar fashion; Bosnia: “genocide,” “ethnic cleansing,” “humanitarian,” and “US interests at stake”. Rwanda: “human rights,” “genocide,” “humanitarian,” and “ethnic cleansing”. Iraq:

“civil war,” “US security,” “terror,” and “freedom.” Syria: “human rights,” “humanitarian,” “civil war,” and “US security interests.” I selected these buzzwords by first determining if the conflict was geared toward U.S. security or geared toward humanitarian intervention. I picked generalizable buzzwords that I thought were most relevant and used during the time of the conflicts, as authors in my literature review focused on using narrative descriptions and rhetoric over buzzwords. I will be looking at every news conference and weekly addresses the presidents made during the time period of the conflict, as this will give me a wide range to look at. The presidents who I will be doing a content analysis on are President Clinton (Rwanda and Bosnia), President Bush (Iraq), and President Obama (Syria). I chose these four presidents because they each have been involved in a war, are all well-known, have been either well-liked or hated by the American public and they each have different techniques of addressing the public when it comes to justifying intervention. Each of these presidents offer a different viewpoint and framing effect when it came down to intervening and gave a different reason why. Having this difference allows me to see how different framing effects and buzzwords are used.

Since senators do not always have as many public records available as presidents, I will be conducting qualitative case studies on three senators instead of doing a content analysis. While I will be including different bills and legislation they have proposed, I will be focusing on their senate floor remarks (if applicable), their personal and political websites, money spent on towards human rights issues and their caucus membership within the Senate to see if they have done any work pertaining to international human rights. The Senators who I will be conducting a case study on are Bob Dole (Bosnia and

Rwanda), John McCain (Iraq), and Harry Reid (Syria). Each of these Senators has either supported the President when it came to humanitarian intervention, or they have gone against him, and have been engaged in human rights policy.

Finally, the media also may have a major influence on public opinion, so it is important to include whether the media framed the conflict differently from the presidents and senators or if the media followed suit with what the president and senator said. Since these four conflicts occurred during different time periods, my media analysis will vary given the time frame. In order to get a wide variety of results, I searched headlines and editorials done by national newspapers during the time frame of the conflicts and I did a key word search within major and minor US newspapers and did an assortment of searches with four key words, varying the way I used them. From there, I narrowed it down by focusing on major newspapers in the U.S. that had the different variations of buzzwords in their articles, these main newspapers included: *The New York Times*, *The Chicago Sun*, *The Daily Herald*, *USA Today*, *The Washington Times*, *Herald Sun*, *The Washington Post*, *The Times*, *The New York Post*, *Chicago Tribune*, and *The Daily News*. I chose these newspapers because they are the top newspapers that people read and are the most well-known newspapers. To determine if there is a framing difference between the media and the president, I will conduct a series of count data of different buzzwords used during each conflict and see how many times they were used by the president versus how many times they were used by the media. This allows me to see how exactly different conflicts has been framed by the media, presidents and senators.

While content analysis may run the risk of validity problems, the multiple sources over a period of time help to mitigate those problems. Using count data comes with a

disparity, as it can be deemed as “cherry-picking”, however, using count data allowed me to determine what words were used the most with each key policy actor. With the presidency, I am examining an entire conflict period and looking at multiple sources of presidential framing opportunities. For the Senate, I will also be looking at multiple sources of information over the entire conflict, all in conjunction with media analysis. This methodological approach allows me to fully examine all aspects of why different policy actors decide to intervene and how they justify their decision. Counting buzzwords and conducting content analyses provides me with an in depth look at how presidents, senators and the media relay their information and decisions.

Chapter 4. Findings and Analysis:

In American politics, different presidents and members of Congress have argued in favor of launching military or other interventions on foreign soil, sometimes using human rights violations in these countries as the primary justification, and other times framing the issue around national security interests. In this research, I seek to understand how and under what conditions human rights have been used to justify foreign interventions by U.S. presidents and senators looking at four different areas of turmoil (Bosnia (1992-1995), Rwanda (1994), Syria (2011-present) and Iraq (2003-2011)) to consider whether Presidents, Senators and the media framed their intervention around human rights atrocities being committed, or if they framed it around a national security dilemma. I will use the following table to elaborate on whether intervention is determined by whether it affects the U.S. or not, and whether the conflict is a humanitarian issue versus a civil war.

Table 1.	Humanitarian	National Security
Affects the U.S.	Bosnia	Iraq
Doesn't Affect the U.S.	Rwanda	Syria

Presidential Framing

Throughout my content analysis of weekly addresses and news conferences of the president, there were numerous instances where the same words were being used repeatedly. I took all weekly addresses and news conferences during the time the conflict occurred; start to end. Bosnia occurred from March 1, 1992- December 14, 1995, Rwanda occurred from April 7, 1994-July 15 1994, Iraq occurred from March 20, 2003-

December 15, 2011, and Syria from March 15, 2011-present. Instead of taking content and data from the entire president's administrations, I only took it from the time of conflict, as it allowed me to narrow down my data and do a more in depth analysis. The level of coverage varied significantly:

- Bosnia, 5 weekly addresses and 21 news conferences
- Rwanda, 0 weekly addresses and news conferences
- Iraq, 84 weekly addresses (80 with Bush and 4 with Obama) and 36 news conferences (33 with Bush and 3 with Obama).
- Syria, 2 weekly addresses and 3 news conferences

From my compilation of news conferences, I searched for four different buzzwords for each conflict. In news conferences about Bosnia, I searched for "genocide," "ethnic cleansing," "humanitarian," and "US interests at stake." Since there were no news conferences about the conflict in Rwanda, there were no buzzwords needed. In news conferences about Iraq, I searched for "civil war," "US security," "terror," and "freedom." In news conferences about Syria, I searched for "human rights," "humanitarian," "civil war," and "US security interests." Since Obama had the ending of the Iraq war, I didn't do a buzzword count for his news conferences and weekly addresses geared towards Iraq. Instead, I searched for the most used words in his conferences and addresses and found that he used the words "troop withdrawal" and "US security" more than any other words. In news conferences, he totaled a use of six for "troop withdrawal" and seven for "US security." The following tables show how often each buzzword was used within each news conference (each buzzword is in quotes at the top of the tables, followed by the number of times each buzzword was used underneath).

Table 2. Presidential News Conferences and Buzzwords	
Conflict	Buzzwords and Counts
Bosnia	Genocide/8 Ethnic Cleansing/7 Humanitarian/9 US Interests at Stake/8
Iraq	Civil War/8 US Security/51 Terror/40 Freedom/27
Syria	Human Rights/3 Humanitarian/5 Civil War/1 US Security Interests/8

Based off these tables, we can see that some words are used more than others by the president during his news conferences. In Clinton's conferences regarding Bosnia, he used all the buzzwords almost equally, but "humanitarian" came out on top with a total of nine times being used, in all his news conferences from that time combined (21 news conferences total). In Bush's conflict of Iraq, he used the buzzwords of "US security," "terror," and "freedom" the most often, but used "US security" far more than the others (fifty-one times in thirty-three news conferences). In Obama's conflict of Syria, he used the buzzword of "US security interests" the most, totaling at eight times in three news conferences.

I also analyzed weekly addresses. I used the same buzzwords as I did from news conferences: Bosnia: "genocide," "ethnic cleansing," "humanitarian," and "US interests at stake". Since there were also no weekly addresses about the conflict in Rwanda, there were no buzzwords needed. Iraq: "civil war", "US security", "terror", and "freedom." Syria: "human rights," "humanitarian," "civil war," and "US security interests." As was the case with news conferences with Obama and Iraq, the same held true for weekly

addresses, using the buzzwords of “troop withdrawal” and “US security” I found that “troop withdrawal” was used three times and “US security” was used six times. The following tables show how often each buzzword was used during weekly addresses.

Conflict	Buzzwords and Counts
Bosnia	Genocide/4 Ethnic Cleansing/4 Humanitarian/4 US Interests at Stake/3
Iraq	Civil War/4 US Security/70 Terror/86 Freedom/39
Syria	Human Rights/2 Humanitarian/1 Civil War/0 US Security Interests/7

Within these weekly addresses, we can see, if we compare this table to the analysis of news conferences, that the buzzwords were used less for Clinton and Obama. With Clinton’s weekly addresses, he used “genocide,” “ethnic cleansing,” and “humanitarian” four times. In Bush’s addresses about Iraq, he used the buzzword of “terror” a whopping eighty-six times. In President Obama’s addresses about the Syria conflict, he used the buzzword of “US security interests” the most.

Based off the use of buzzwords in news conferences and weekly addresses by the Presidents, we can see that some buzzwords were used more than others. “US security interests” were used the most regarding Syria, “US security” and “terror” were used the most regarding Iraq, and “genocide,” “ethnic cleansing” and “humanitarian” were used in regards to Bosnia. So did the president have a different way of framing the conflicts from the media?

In my content analysis of newspapers (which includes headlines, bylines and editorials), I found the way they reported the conflicts going on were drastically different than the way the presidents presented them. Within each of these major newspapers, there were 157 articles pertaining to Bosnia, 14 pertaining to Rwanda, 128 pertaining to Iraq and 69 pertaining to Syria. In order to keep in line with presidential news conferences and weekly addresses, I used the same buzzwords as I did for news conferences and weekly addresses. Bosnia: “genocide,” “ethnic cleansing,” “humanitarian,” and “US interests at stake”. Rwanda: “human rights,” “genocide,” “humanitarian,” and “ethnic cleansing”. Iraq: “civil war,” “US security,” “terror,” and “freedom”. Syria: “human rights,” “humanitarian,” “civil war,” and “US security interests”. The following tables show how often different newspapers used the buzzwords.

Conflict	Buzzwords and Counts
Bosnia	Genocide/104 Ethnic Cleansing/96 Humanitarian/71 US Interests at Stake/12
Rwanda	Human Rights/41 Genocide/12 Humanitarian/10 Ethnic Cleansing/8
Iraq	Civil War/60 US Security/100 Terror/140 Freedom/73
Syria	Human Rights/3 Humanitarian/0 Civil War/109 US Security Interests/92

* All data from newspaper articles are taken from *The New York Times*, *The Chicago Sun*, *The Daily Herald*, *USA Today*, *The Washington Times*, *Herald Sun*, *The Washington Post*, *The Times*, *The New York Post*, *Chicago Tribune*, and *The Daily News* using a Lexis-Nexis keyword search.

From the table above, we can see that there is a difference between the buzzwords used by the presidents versus the media. In the case of Bosnia, the buzzword “genocide” was used the most often totaling 104 times by newspapers. In Rwanda, the buzzword of “human rights” was used the most, whereas in news conferences and weekly addresses, Rwanda was not once mentioned. In Iraq, the most often used buzzword of “terror” was used 140 times. Finally, in Syria, the buzzword of “civil war” was used the most often totaling 109. It appears that the media focus on human rights violations, whereas the presidents focus on US interests. Below, is a table showing a side by side view of buzzwords used by the media and the presidents. In almost every instance, the media uses more buzzwords than the president and focuses more on the humanitarian aspect than national security. Based off this information, we can determine that the media focuses more so on humanitarian effects and the presidents focus on national security effects.

Table 5. Media vs Presidents		
Conflict	Buzzwords and Counts: Media	Buzzwords and Counts: Presidents
Bosnia	Genocide/104 Ethnic Cleansing/96 Humanitarian/71 US Interests at Stake/12	Genocide/12 Ethnic Cleansing/11 Humanitarian/13 US Interests at Stake/11
Rwanda	Human Rights/41 Genocide/12 Humanitarian/10 Ethnic Cleansing/8	
Iraq	Civil War/60 US Security/100 Terror/140 Freedom/73	Civil War/12 US Security/121 Terror/126 Freedom/66
Syria	Human Rights/3 Humanitarian/0 Civil War/109 US Security Interests/92	Human Rights/5 Humanitarian/6 Civil War/1 US Security Interests/15

Senate Framing

Oftentimes, the Senate is considered more prestigious and purposeful than the House of Representatives, as the Senate is smaller and is granted more powers than the House. When examining if human rights is used to justify intervention, doing a qualitative case study on different Senators becomes advantageous, as they have more power than the House of Representatives and are often more closely linked to Presidential politics.

In order to determine the link between Presidents, the media, Senators and their justification for intervention, I will be doing case studies on Senator Robert J. Dole, who was senator when Bill Clinton was President, during the crises' in Rwanda and Bosnia, Senator John McCain, who was senator when George H.W. Bush was President, during the Iraq War, and finally, Senator Harry Reid, who is senator under President Barack Obama, during the Syrian crisis. During my case studies of these three senators, I looked at bill summaries, which contained legislation that was sponsored and cosponsored by each senator, Congressional records, which contains complete summaries during the congressional session, as well as, being limited to each specific senator.

Senator	Conflict	Congressional Session	Sponsored Legislation	Co-Sponsored Legislation	Total Legislation
Bob Dole	Rwanda	103 rd	1	0	1
Bob Dole	Bosnia	103 rd	14	6	20
Bob Dole	Bosnia	104 th	7	3	10
John McCain	Iraq	108 th	4	11	15
John McCain	Iraq	109 th	0	6	6
John McCain	Iraq	110 th	2	10	12

John McCain	Iraq	111 th	1	3	4
Harry Reid	Syria	112 th	0	0	0
Harry Reid	Syria	113 th	0	0	0

The table above shows the results of the sponsored and cosponsored bills for each Senator during the congressional session that was represented during the time of the conflict. Since the conflict in Syria is currently ongoing, I presume that there will be more legislation toward it as time progresses, as there was no sponsored or cosponsored legislation for it by Senator Harry Reid. However, that is not to say that there is legislation on the conflict in Syria by other Senators and House of Representative members. Senator Bob Dole sponsored and cosponsored thirty different pieces of legislation dealing with the conflict in Bosnia, but only sponsored one piece of legislation dealing with Rwanda. Senator John McCain, based off the table, appears to have cosponsored more legislation than sponsoring it, as he cosponsored thirty pieces of legislation and only sponsored seven.

According to this table, there seems to be no real pattern when it comes to senators and the amount of legislation they sponsor and cosponsor, as legislation is staggered throughout the congressional sessions. The fact that there is no pattern that appears is surprising, as I would have thought that as the conflict got more intense and involved, more legislation would have been proposed by the senators. The amount of sponsored and cosponsored legislation represented in the table does not mean that the senators did not get more involved when it came to international human rights. Congressional records offer an insight into how often conflicts got mentioned during congressional sessions.

In order to limit my results within congressional records, I looked them up by Senators and within that senatorial search, I searched under the conflict name (i.e.: Bosnia, Rwanda, Iraq and Syria), as searching under different buzzwords yielded little or the same results. Congressional records are the official record of the proceedings and debates of the U.S. Congress, however, I limited mine to Senators, which allowed me to see how many proceedings and debates (which I labeled as articles) Dole, McCain and Reid made in regards to their conflicts.

Senator	Conflict	Congressional Record Year	Number of Articles	Total Number of Articles
Bob Dole	Bosnia	1993-1994	26	180
Bob Dole	Bosnia	1995-1996	27	169
John McCain	Iraq	2003-2004	18	190
John McCain	Iraq	2005-2006	1	150
John McCain	Iraq	2007-2008	19	225
John McCain	Iraq	2009-2010	2	140
Harry Reid	Syria	2011-2012	1	47
Harry Reid	Syria	2013-2014	6	61

As shown above, the congressional records are similar to that of the table showing cosponsored and sponsored legislation, as there appears to be no distinguishable pattern between the number of articles mentioning the conflict versus the total number of articles. Rwanda is noticeably absent from this table, which, given the previous data on Rwanda, is not that surprising. Throughout my congressional records searches, no results were found for Rwanda, in fact, when searching within Bob Dole and Rwanda, Bosnia was mentioned instead. One facet that sticks out in the congressional records table involves the articles mentioned by Harry Reid regarding the conflict in Syria. Reid did not sponsor or cosponsor any legislation during the 112th and 113th congressional sessions, but he did make floor remarks on it. From this information on Harry Reid and Syria, we can assume

that while he did not sponsor legislation on it, he did speak about it in Congressional sessions, which gives us the idea that he found importance in discussing the Syrian conflict instead of ignoring it like the Rwandan conflict. Dole and McCain have the same patterns in their congressional records as their sponsored and cosponsored legislation, they do not focus entirely on the conflict, but they do put effort into making sure the conflict is known and mentioned within Congress. Given the congressional records and the sponsored and cosponsored legislation, we can determine how often Dole, McCain and Reid made their conflicts a top issue within Congress.

In order to determine how much attention is given to the senator's conflicts outside of Congress, I looked at their personal websites and archives. Unfortunately, Bob Dole's website had no information on the conflicts in Bosnia and Rwanda, as his website only contains information on his hometown, his biography and what he is doing now, however, the internet was not as established as it was back in the mid 1990's as it is now. No current website archives exist for Dole either.

For John McCain's website, I looked at his 'issues' section and his 'services' section to see how often the war in Iraq got mentioned. Surprisingly, McCain's website does not mention the war in Iraq or his involvement. Looking at issues under defense, national security and foreign affairs, relinquished inconclusive results, as under each section, there is a brief three-sentence description as to what the issue means to McCain instead of his stance on each. McCain uses words such as 'robust', and 'proud' and continuously mentions his military history. While McCain's current website does not mention the Iraq War, his archived website from 2000 sheds light that McCain has always been a fierce supporter of United States security. He states, "Although the next

century will hold many dangers for America and our cause, it will, more than ever, be an age of untold possibilities for good. It is our destiny to seize this opportunity to build a safer, freer and more prosperous nation and a world free of the tyranny that has made the passing century such a violent age” (McCain, 1999). This sentiment was made before the Iraq War occurred, but is important to consider because it provides suggestion that McCain would have supported the Iraq War, even with a Democratic president.

Harry Reid’s personal website is also inconclusive, as the conflict in Syria was not mentioned once. Instead of focusing on Syria, Reid gave more service to Iraq and Afghanistan. What’s interesting about Reid’s personal site is that he makes constant connections back to his represented state of Nevada. While McCain and Dole focus on the federal level of issues and services, Reid focuses on the state level. While Dole, McCain and Reid’s personal websites did not mention their conflicts; the media gave their conflicts an implausible amount of attention.

During my media framing analysis of Presidents, I counted buzzwords and compared those buzzwords to the ones the Presidents used in their weekly addresses and news conferences. Since there are no weekly addresses or news conferences for Senators, it would be increasingly hard to do a buzzword count comparison. Instead, I did an archived search of newspapers through Lexis-Nexis and found top newspapers that focused on the conflicts while also focusing on the Senator involved.

One of the main issues newspapers focused on during the conflict in Bosnia and Bob Dole was how Dole was snubbing President Clinton and sought an end to the Bosnian arms embargo. While the newspapers focused greatly on how Clinton and Dole clashed over what to do in Bosnia, there were some instances when they reported their

partisanship, especially when it came to intervention in Bosnia. When Clinton announced that he wanted to send U.S. troops to Bosnia, Dole threw, wittingly, or not, his support behind Clinton, which was a change of pace from their previous interactions on the conflict. One of the main differences between media coverage of Senators and the Presidents is the lack of framing the media uses when reporting on Senators. Instead of giving their personal opinion of the conflict, the media reports on the Senators opinion, whereas when the President was involved, they offered an opinion. When talking on the conflict in Bosnia, Dole did not use any buzzwords of “genocide,” or “ethnic cleansing,” but, at times, he referred to it as a humanitarian mission and had concerns about what intervening would mean for U.S. troops. When comparing the media coverage towards Senators and Presidents, we see that the media and Presidents were more critical and willing to use buzzwords that would have the most effect when justifying intervention.

Bob Dole was Senator when two conflicts occurred: Bosnia and Rwanda.

However, I found no newspaper coverage pertaining to Rwanda and Dole during the time of the Rwandan conflict. The majority of articles concerning Dole and Rwanda dealt with Dole not pushing to intervene on Rwanda’s behalf and taking a back seat to the conflict. In one interview published, Dole stated, “I don’t think we have any national interest here...I hope we don’t get involved . . . The Americans are out” (NBC news program, 2001). When going through articles of Dole and Rwanda, numerous newspapers laid the blame of the conflict in Rwanda on Dole and Clinton, something which Clinton “deeply regrets” (My Life, Bill Clinton 2004).

While the conflict in Rwanda was barely given any attention by Dole, the war in Iraq was a conflict given a large amount of attention by Senator John McCain in the

media. McCain constantly referred to intervention in Iraq as a way to protect and secure the U.S. from potential threats. According to newspapers, McCain was one of the few frontrunners that wholeheartedly supported the war in Iraq, while others did not support the war or President Bush. McCain often made comments about how the invasion into Iraq needed to happen in order to protect America and to stop Saddam Hussein from becoming a “grave threat” to the U.S. McCain repeatedly spoke of Saddam Hussein as being an imminent threat and an international terrorist, which matches up to how President Bush referred to the war in Iraq. When the Iraq war was in the middle of its magnitude, McCain often criticized Democrats of trying to undermine the U.S. military by not taking enough action towards Iraq.

Much like how the newspapers were anti-Iraq and anti-Bush, they were also borderline anti-McCain. While newspapers were semi less biased towards McCain and the Iraq war, as they reported more facts than opinions, they still had hints of negative views towards McCain and his favoring towards the Iraq war. Articles from the Huffington post call McCain “clueless” and “wanting to bomb everything” (2008). McCain and Dole do not frame their conflicts as the media does, but instead, follow close suit with the Presidents. Harry Reid, however, does not follow suit with McCain and Dole.

The conflict in Syria was focused on the humanitarian aspect and how it will affect the U.S. security wise, by Obama, while the media almost solely focused on the civil war happening and how it will affect our Israeli ally. Harry Reid, however, pushed for intervention in Syria and constantly invoked Nazi Germany to authorize military strikes against Syria and focused his comments on the brutality going on. Instead of

newspapers picking up on Reid's comparison of Syria to Nazi Germany, they continued to focus on how intervention would affect our ally relations with Israel. There were not too many newspaper articles pertaining to Reid and his comments on Syria, as they were all similar in content given his comments comparing Syria to Nazi Germany.

Media Framing

Since the media has multiple outlets, compared to a single outlet by the President, a single speech by the President could have a much larger impact than many news articles. In light of this, I will be focusing on substantive comparisons of presidential versus media framing. For each conflict, I will cite a news story's framing versus Senate and presidential framing.

Regarding the conflict in Rwanda, it was not reported in news conferences or weekly addresses by the president. According to the Senate action table, Senator Bob Dole only sponsored one piece of legislation concerning Rwanda and had no congressional records pertaining to it. However, major newspapers focused on the human rights and genocide aspect of it and the atrocities that were being committed. Every newspaper, out of the fourteen that mentioned Rwanda with the buzzwords, were pushing for some sort of action to be taken by the U.S. and stated that it was the responsibility of the U.S. to take a stand against what happened in Rwanda.

While Bob Dole was deficient with Rwanda, he was front and center regarding Bosnia. Dole was apprehensive about sending troops to Bosnia, as he was a critic of Clinton in that respect, which may be due to a difference in parties, but, Dole finally gave his support to Clinton to send troops to Bosnia, as he believed an opposition would "decrease soldier morale" (NY Times 1995). From this statement, we can deduce that

Dole was weary of sending troops to Bosnia, regardless of how Clinton and the media viewed it. Dole made no remarks on how the United States would be affected or the genocide going on, instead, he focused on soldier morale.

Newspapers used the buzzwords of “genocide,” “ethnic cleansing,” “humanitarian,” and “US interests at stake” increasingly more than the president did. With the newspaper articles, there seemed to be a focus on intervention and a push for why the United States needs to help Bosnia. Out of 157 newspaper articles devoted to Bosnia, 98 compared the conflict in Bosnia to the Holocaust from World War II. During the president’s news conferences and weekly addresses, there was no mention of how the conflict in Bosnia compares to the Holocaust; in fact, when the president did mention Bosnia, his main concern was how it affects the United States. The president didn’t focus on one specific buzzword or compare Bosnia to the Holocaust, but instead he made it seem like the U.S. needed to act in order to stop the atrocities occurring. While the President and newspapers both addressed the human rights abuses, the newspapers made comparisons to the Holocaust, using stronger language. This example of newspapers comparing Bosnia to the Holocaust sheds light on how the media frames certain events. In order to foster support for Bosnia, the media compared it to the Holocaust, whereas, while the President did bring up the human rights abuses in Bosnia, he did not compare it to the Holocaust, but rather, focused on how we are going to help Bosnia and how it affects the United States. When Dole voiced concerns about how the peace keeping mission in Bosnia was failing, he focused on withdrawing troops, and again, failed to mention any buzzwords used by the president and media.

During the Bosnian conflict, Senator Dole was not a big actor of support with intervention and President Clinton, such is not the case pertaining to Iraq and Senator McCain. While McCain had a similar track record to Dole in regards to congressional action and records, McCain was fiercely behind President Bush's decision to intervene in Iraq. However, this could be due to the fact that Bush and McCain were both Republican representatives. In a Republican Debate transcript from CNN McCain states, "as long as Saddam Hussein is in power, I am convinced that he will pose a threat to our security" (2000 Republican Debate). This exert showcases McCain's sense of urgency to intervene in Iraq, as he believes if we do not take out Hussein, America will always be under a threat. President Bush mirrors McCain closely within his presidential and weekly addresses, as he focused on "US security" in each of them.

President Bush used the buzzwords of "US security" and "terror" more often than the other two, but, the media also used those two buzzwords more often than the others. What is interesting about the framing of the media versus the president is that the president focuses on the security of the United States. Every single one of Bush's news conferences and weekly addresses about Iraq was centered on the security and freedom of the nation and how getting involved in Iraq will make the U.S. a more secure place. The media did not focus on the security of the U.S., even though "US security" was a top buzzword. The media instead focused on why the U.S. should not be involved and laces their articles with criticisms of Bush and the Iraq War. Out of 128 newspaper articles, none of them framed the Iraq War as positive, promoting U.S. security. While the buzzword usage was more similar than the other two conflicts, the framing effects were vastly different. Over 52 articles relate the Iraq War to that of Vietnam. Not surprisingly,

the president never once draws a comparison of Iraq to Vietnam. Comparing the newspaper articles to the president's news conferences and weekly addresses, it's clear that the president and Senator McCain framed Iraq around nation security, while the media framed Iraq around how disadvantageous it is and how the Iraq War will become the new Vietnam.

Much like Bosnia, Syria shows a glaring contrast between the president and the media. While the president only mentioned the buzzword of "civil war" once, newspapers mentioned it 109 times. Interestingly, the president framed the conflict in Syria as a 'proceed with caution' deal. He presented the benefits and negatives of intervening in Syria, but was mixed on how the U.S. should proceed. While he argued that something needs to be done to stop the human rights abuses going on, he also argued that getting involved would be a double edged sword for the U.S., as getting involved in the Middle East could mean a lapse in allies. Out of 69 newspaper articles pertaining to Syria, 42 of them brought up the concern of getting involved with Syria and what that would mean to Israel. In fact, newspaper articles were more likely to use Israel as the frame. Over half of the newspaper articles were focused on Israel and what that meant for the U.S. Would intervening in Syria cause a rift between our Middle Eastern allies? Or would Israel understand our need to intervene and support us regardless? As the conflict in Syria is still ongoing, the answers to these questions are still out of reach, at least for now.

Given the comparison between the Senators, the Presidents and the media portrayal of each, we can see there is a framing effect between all three, with some of them intermixing with each other and having the same framing effects. While the President, Senators and media all have their own opinions and agendas when it comes to

what they think is best for the United States, they invariably have some similarities. McCain, Bush and the media all stressed that U.S. security was a top priority in Iraq, but disagreed on the best course of action, with Bush and McCain pushing for intervention and the media unsure of what to do. Dole and Clinton disagreed greatly on what should be done in Bosnia. While both were silent on the conflict in Rwanda (and later regretted it), they were not silent when it came to Bosnia. Clinton pushed for intervention, while Dole was hesitant to intervene, even though they both cited human rights issues as the main reason something needed to happen. The media, regarding Bosnia, compared the conflict to the next Holocaust; Clinton and Dole did not. This shows that while there is one conflict going on, three different policy actors can interpret and view it in a different way from one another.

Chapter 5. Discussion and Conclusion:

Summarizing Results

From this analysis, there are clear differences in framing by the media, senators and the president. In the conflict in Bosnia, president Clinton framed it as a human rights issue with U.S. interests at stake; however, the media focused strictly on the genocides and ethnic cleansings that were occurring in the region, without mentioning U.S. interests being at stake. Dole focused on how the U.S. needed to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia and action needed to be taken in order to secure Bosnia and used phrases such as “humanitarian mission” and had concerns about what intervening would mean for U.S. troops. While Clinton used significantly lower buzzwords of “genocide” and “ethnic cleansing,” the media used them more than any other words. From the conflict in Bosnia alone, we can see that the media is more likely to have a framing effect that will affect the general public in a way that will make the public favor intervention. The media frequently compared the conflict in Bosnia to what happened in World War II, the Holocaust. During President Clinton’s news conferences and weekly addresses, there was no mention of how the conflict in Bosnia compares to the Holocaust, instead, his main concern was how it affects the United States; the president made it seem like the U.S. needed to act in order to stop the atrocities occurring. Senator Dole followed suit with President Clinton and did not compare Bosnia to the Holocaust, but realized some sort of action needed to be taken in Bosnia. While the President and newspapers both reported on the human rights abuses, the newspapers took it to a different extreme and made comparisons to the Holocaust, which is a sure fire way to get numerous support from the

public, as the Holocaust is considered one of the greatest tragedies that has happened in U.S. and World history.

Rwanda presents itself as an outlier case due to the fact that President Clinton did not mention the crisis in Rwanda once, but the media did. While Senator Dole did mention Rwanda, he viewed it as a conflict that the U.S. needed to stay out of, not focusing on the atrocities at hand, but instead focusing on how the U.S. should not be involved. While the conflict in Rwanda did not affect the U.S. directly, the media focused on the human rights abuses that were occurring and pushed for some sort of U.S. intervention to stop the abuses from continuing. From this information, we can assume that the media were trying to garner support from the public to support intervention in Rwanda to stop the human rights abuses from occurring. Since the president and Senator Dole took no action, the media was trying to push them to take action by attempting to sway the public.

President Bush may be best known for his 'failure in Iraq,' however, Bush did not see it as failure, nor did Senator McCain. Instead, Bush and McCain framed the Iraq War as a necessity to secure America and to remain safe from future terrorist attacks. He relied upon words such as "security" and "freedom" in order to sway the public that the Iraq War was a good idea because it had a monumental effect on the U.S. and its security. While the media also focused on security and freedom, it did so in a different way. The media turned Bush and McCain's comments about security around and made it into a negative. Not a single newspaper article pertaining to the Iraq War argued that the war was a good idea, instead, newspapers made sure to point out that while U.S. security is important, the Iraq War was not the answer. The media criticized Bush and the Iraq War

by making their articles anti-Iraq pieces and criticized everything Bush was doing that pertained to Iraq; and many newspaper articles even compared the Iraq War to the 'next Vietnam', further giving traction to the theory that the media framed Iraq in a negatively light and tried to compare it to the Vietnam War to get less people to support Iraq.

President Obama's response to Syria was quite different than the media and Senator Reid's response. While Obama focused on the humanitarian aspect of Syria and how it will affect the U.S. security wise, the media almost solely focused on the civil war happening and how it will affect our Israeli ally, while Reid compared the Syrian conflict to the Holocaust. This lends itself to a different type of framing that shies away from the previous three conflicts. While we see that the media often compared ongoing conflicts to those that have happened in the past that were devastating, in the case of Syria, we don't see that by the media, but by a senator. Instead, we get framing centered on what intervention in Syria would mean for the U.S.-Israel relationship in the long run. Nevertheless, even with this framing effect, both the president and the media were unsure if intervention is the right answer. Both make arguments that something needs to be done, but are unsure on what exactly should be done. Senator Reid, however, shies away from the media and the president and makes the case that intervention needs to occur in order to curb the brutality continuing on in Syria.

From the conflicts in Bosnia, Rwanda, Iraq and Syria, there is a substantial amount of evidence that supports my original theory of how the president and senators frame conflicts versus how the media frames the same conflicts. Are human rights used to justify intervention? In some cases, yes; in others, no. In the case of Bosnia (which did affect the U.S.) and Rwanda (which did not affect the U.S.), human rights atrocities were

at the top of the list to promote and support intervention. Iraq and Syria are a different story. While human rights abuses were not used to justify intervention in Iraq, national security was. President Bush and Senator McCain mentioned how the security of the U.S. was at stake if we did not intervene in Iraq in every news conference and weekly address he gave. Bush framed intervention in Iraq off of U.S. security, who would go against feeling safe? Syria once again, proves to be an outlier. While both the president and the media believe that something does need to be done in Syria to stop human rights abuses, neither are sure intervention are the best option, while Senator Reid fervently pushes for humanitarian intervention. The media is concerned about what it would mean for Israel while the president is concerned about U.S. security interests. While the conflict in Syria is ongoing, the framing effects of senators, President Obama and the media could change while more information about the conflict develops.

This work could also be expanded upon to include our current administration when it comes to North Korea, Mexico or Syria. Since Trump has taken office, there has been a clash between himself, the media and senators. This isn't just a regular democrat versus republican disagreement, Trump has people from his own party with different reactions and opinions than his own. This is especially apparent in Trump's tweets about North Korean leader, Kim Jong Un. Previously, Trump taunted Jong Un and made threats about a nuclear strike because Jong Un made a comment about how his nuclear button was on his desk at all times. Trump took to twitter to boast about his button being bigger and better, stating, "will someone from his depleted and food starved regime please inform him that I too have a nuclear button, but it is much bigger and more powerful one than his and my button works!" (Baker and Tackett, 2018). Not only is Trump goading

Kim Jong Un, he's mocking him into a "mine's bigger than yours' moment when it comes to nuclear weapons and buttons. The U.S. has continuously had a shaky relationship with North Korea, but Trump throws caution to the wind and engages in childish-like behavior when serious issues are at stake. Trump made notice of North Korea's struggles in his tweet, but instead of focusing on how poor the country is doing, he focuses on how big his nuclear button is. Other policy actors, notably Eliot Cohen, said Trump's tweet "demonstrated immaturity that is dangerous for a commander in chief" (Baker and Tackett, 2018).

If Trump decided to intervene with North Korea, specifically if it came down to a nuclear showdown or a food shortage, would Trump frame it around him, would he frame it around U.S. interests, or would he frame it around humanitarian issues? Based off his social media and his public comments, he would frame it around North Korea being a threat to the U.S., but goes about it in a non-conventional way (i.e. taking to twitter). Social media has become a significant part of our generation and current administration. Updating this research to include President Trump's social media use could pave the way for a new type of framing effect. It would be interesting to compare what Trump tweets versus what he says in weekly address and how the media frames what Trump says.

The information that was presented throughout this paper sheds light on the framing effects between the president, senators and the media and how each entity uses their framing effect to justify intervention when it comes to conflicts. More research could be done by bringing in information on how the public views each conflict and comparing them to who they will closely follow to: the media, president or senators. If future conflicts occur, the information I presented could be used to aid fellow interested

people to conduct their own research on framing effects to see how often framing effects occur between different foreign policy actors, or framing effects could be expanded to include non-foreign policy actors and determine how they view and justify intervention. Different buzzwords could be used or the same buzzwords for all content analysis could be used to get a more solid base and understanding of how often each key policy actor uses those buzzwords. It would be interesting to do a more depth comparison of older presidents versus newer presidents and how their framing effects were similar or different. I think adding in a political climate factor could make a difference as well. If we are more divided as a nation, does that change the framing effects used? Would the media focus more on the lack of partisanship or would they focus on foreign policy? These questions could be used as a jumping point to expand intervention justification to beyond humanitarian versus U.S. interests at stake. Applying another framing factor of social media could pave the way for future research to determine if presidents and senators talk different on social media versus in person. There is an apparent distinction between foreign policy actors and their framing effects, but research should still be continued to determine the extent of framing effects and how they are used to justify intervention when it comes to international human rights.

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