

1972

# Demographic Correlates of Foreign Affairs Disposition: An Analysis of Two Elite Groups

Charles R. Burns

*Eastern Illinois University*

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Demographic Correlates of Foreign Affairs

Disposition: An Analysis of Two Elite Groups  
(TITLE)

BY

Charles R. Burns

**THESIS**

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS  
FOR THE DEGREE OF

Master of Arts in Political Science

IN THE GRADUATE SCHOOL, EASTERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY  
CHARLESTON, ILLINOIS

1972  
YEAR

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## PREFACE

This research was conducted during the summer of 1971 in Charleston, Illinois. The opinions used to test the validity of the hypothesis were gathered from samples drawn from the faculty at Eastern Illinois University and from the elected county officials in Coles County. Briefly, this study sought to uncover the relationship between levels of education and specific foreign policy dispositions. Statistical methods facilitated the analysis of the large quantity of data.

The demonstration that a given hypothesis may or may not be valid seems only a small part of the learning process associated with a study of this type. Interviewing, and later just talking with forty county officials was similar to concurrent seminars in local government, American public opinion, the sociology of small groups, and political behavior stripped of all euphemisms. Experiences with the faculty group both confirmed and denied previously held impressions. Of course, a myriad of such impressions was gained eventually. Some of them are reflected in the data and analysis. Many, because of their judgmental, intuitive, or non-quantifiable nature are not appropriate to this study.

An appreciation and understanding of the complexities and prob-

lems of survey research and quantitative analysis is not the least of the realizations from this sort of study. The judgment, rigor, and attention to detail at each stage of the work determines the confidence with which the final results may be announced.

This study directly involved over one hundred people including respondents, interviewers, faculty advisors, programmers, typists, and just friends who performed various chores from scoring to proof-reading. Any researcher dealing with this many people is impressed with the near impossibility of coordinating their efforts and relying on their performances. At the same time, their ability to cooperate, adapt to the new and changing, and persist to the completion of a task is often uncanny. Little of this is especially new or unusual, but it is rewarding to experience.

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Eastern Illinois University

1971

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## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

Specific foreign policy issues change from year to year and from one administration to another. While the specific issues change, however, the general areas into which issues cluster remain the same. Despite the many differences between the Korean conflict and the war in Viet Nam, for instance, public debate on the two issues has been concerned with the extent to which each issue reflects United States' interests, its willingness to become involved in foreign affairs, and the use of military force as an instrument of foreign policy implementation. In the course of the rise and decline of United States involvement in Viet Nam, public debate on this immediate issue became particularly intense.

In a representative democracy, public debate and its substantive content is especially important. Leaders and decision makers must understand the content, sources, and direction of public opinion. Elected officials may be voted out of office if they fail to understand the character of the opinions which they attempt to lead, change, or shape.

With this in mind, this study proposes to explain two specific

attitudes and their sources. When operationalized, these attitudes are expressed as two distinct foreign affairs dispositions. The sources of the dispositions are the subject of the hypotheses and propositions advanced in this study.

This research is an analysis of hypotheses and related propositions by means of the collection and quantitative analysis of survey data. The attention of this paper is confined to the role of demographic variables in determining dispositions toward foreign affairs. Although two elite groups are examined, they are distinctly "public" elites as opposed to policy or decision-making elites in foreign affairs.

The two dispositions measured are nationalism-internationalism, and militarism-pacifism. The proposed determinants of the dispositions include the level of information of a respondent and several demographic variables, the primary of which is level of education. The demographic information is obtained by asking direct questions, but the dispositions are assessed by means of indirect scales. The two groups are local intellectual and political elites, but in drawing a sample from the elites, one assumes that the members of the sample possess attitudinal, dispositional, and demographic characteristics similar to the universe of elites of which they are a part.

In doing political science research, one might justifiably feel uncomfortable at the presentation of a project which does not involve a direct analysis of power, so central is this concept to politics and polit-

ical science. It is beyond the scope of this work either to catalogue an extensive list of definitions of power or to develop and defend an original definition. The extent to which this work is concerned with power is admittedly limited, and at that, only indirect.<sup>1</sup>

To some degree, however, power involves the influence of one actor or set of actors over another. The persistence and effectiveness of this influence is governed by many factors, not the least of which are the perceptions and attitudes of individuals and groups. At the receiving end, the more power an individual perceives another to have, the more likely it is that the recipient will be influenced by the other. Perception of actuality, which is molded by attitudinal and situational factors, may direct human behavior just as surely as what appears as actuality to the so-called "objective observer". Otto Klineberg has proposed that "If, as there is good reason to believe . . . , the expectation of war may in itself be a cause of war, the conviction that it is inevitable may have important practical consequences."<sup>2</sup>

Perception, in turn, is governed by a number of factors. Attitudes, circumstances, and time all interact to increase the likelihood of a particular perception. Chapter II is a selective consideration of the works of authors who have attempted to account for the factors which

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<sup>1</sup>See, for example, Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, Power and Society (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950) for a theoretical discussion of political power.

<sup>2</sup>Otto Klineberg, The Human Dimension In International Relations (New York: Holt, Rhinehart and Winston, 1965), p. 9.

govern attitudes and political perceptions, as well as a review of the techniques they have employed to measure both the determinant factors and the resultant perceptions. These studies are especially valuable for the methodological suggestions and for the hypotheses they provide.

Chapter III develops the major hypotheses examined in this work from the studies reviewed in Chapter II. Also, a number of related propositions are advanced. The terminology of the hypothesis and propositions is explained by means of both theoretical and operational definitions. In addition, a number of other terms that frequently appear in this study are defined. The operational definitions, of course, are only applicable to those concepts for which measuring instruments are developed. An understanding of the operational definitions is especially important for accurate appraisal of the data analysis.

Chapter IV provides the theoretical basis for this study. A number of concepts and their interrelationships are examined. At this level of generalization, we approach what has been termed "middle-range" theory.<sup>3</sup> Higher levels of generalization are not appropriate to the hypothesis being considered and not warranted by the scope of the study. Given hypotheses and evidence under consideration, more general theory would border on speculation.

Chapter V is a detailed description of the test used to examine the validity of the hypotheses. In most ways, the methodology reflects

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<sup>3</sup>See David E. Easton, ed., Varieties of Political Theory (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966), for a discussion of the range of theories in political science.

standard procedure among the practitioners of quantitative analysis and survey technique in political science. The purpose in using quantitative methods, aside from enabling the researcher to manage large amounts of information effectively, should be to permit the analysis and simplification of results and the development of conclusions. Because their use is intended to inform rather than confuse, similar scales and statistics are employed throughout the test. Hopefully, this lends consistency that aids in the interpretation of results. Because a large measure of the effort involved in this study was directed at the design and administration of the test, it represents a major section of the work. Appendix A includes samples of the testing materials described in this chapter.

Chapter VI analyzes the results of the tests in view of the hypothesis and propositions advanced in Chapter III. The analysis is selective in that the variables in the hypotheses are examined most carefully, along with variables that were not expected to yield significant relationships. Additional variables which are neither directly related to a hypothesis, nor result in unexpected relationships are treated only briefly. The results are analyzed according to each independent variable, both groups being considered. The analysis of the variables is preceded by a general description of each group and the characteristics of the aggregate (the results of combining the two groups). Supplementary tables and information regarding the data are included in Appendix B.

Chapter VII presents the major conclusions drawn from the data analysis, and relates these conclusions to the hypothesis and propositions.

Of course, the conclusions are definitive only within the limits of the accuracy of the test and the validity of the theoretical framework.

Throughout this study there is a consistent effort to be conservative where there is a likelihood of error. Therefore, relationships that are not clearly substantiated are presented as suggestions for further research rather than as conclusions.

## CHAPTER II

### LITERATURE REVIEW

This review of literature is intended to be selective and suggestive of the significant works available, but not exhaustive. The books and articles mentioned below were chosen either because they illustrate the use of survey techniques and quantitative analysis or because they offer interesting propositions that may be developed into hypotheses. Most of them will be referred to again during the analysis of the data, but for now it is necessary to describe their contributions to research in the subject area; they provide a context of background and perspective in which to set the analysis and conclusions of this study.

Gamson, Lane, and Sears all examine the extent to which education or knowledge governs foreign policy opinions.<sup>4</sup> Gamson, for example, argues that increases in the level of knowledge do not necessarily produce greater opinion consensus on foreign policy issues. Basing his discussion on attitude surveys, he finds that the two main

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<sup>4</sup>William A. Gamson and Andre Modigliani, "Knowledge and Foreign Policy Opinions," Public Opinion Quarterly, (Summer, 1966), 187-200; Robert E. Lane and David O. Sears, Public Opinion (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964).



determinants of foreign policy opinions are: (1) pre-existing individual attitudes; (2) prevalent or "mainstream" policy attitudes.

Gamson uses a "cognitive-consistency" model to evaluate public opinion formation and knowledge. The model employs three arbitrary belief systems and tests the frequency with which respondents change belief systems over a number of issues. Findings indicate that increases in knowledge at least provide for more consistent belief patterns although it does not determine the specific belief structure.

Lane and Sears examine a slightly different dimension of foreign policy opinion. They review the results of a study which found that education, in particular college education, was not a significant variable in the demonstration of a high level of political information. They turn to other influences such as family environment for the key determinants of level of information.

Significantly, Lane and Sears maintain that circumstance and immediate situation may to a large extent govern both level of information and the nature of an individual's opinion. This is based on the premise that people may carefully select only the information necessary to their functioning in a given situation. Extreme cases of this are obvious. The Foreign Service officer is more likely to be informed on international affairs than the metal worker. More subtle differences in situation, however, demand testing to establish the validity of the premise.

Rogers compared the foreign policy opinions of groups to their

level of information about the issue. The study not only found disagreement among the foreign policy views of the general public, but also among the "experts". His evidence suggests that higher levels of information do not necessarily produce greater consensus on foreign policy issues.<sup>5</sup>

A study by Reiselbach finds moderate correlations between the traditional determinants of isolationist behavior and isolationism. The traditional determinants are: rural-midwest; Republican-conservative; and ethnic perspective. Because his study uses Congressional voting records, Reiselbach encounters a major methodological problem. Party loyalty and pressure group activity may tend to influence voting on foreign policy issues as much as isolationist beliefs. Demography and issue salience are eventually judged to be the primary determinants of isolationist behavior.<sup>6</sup>

McClosky devotes approximately half of his book to a discussion of the merits, methodology, and techniques of survey research. The remainder of the work is a detailed study of "Personality and Attitude Correlates of Foreign Policy Orientation". This is an attempt to ". . . explore on various fronts the utility of psychological constructs for explaining political beliefs, orientation, and activity."<sup>7</sup>


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<sup>5</sup>William C. Rogers, Barbara Stuhler, and David A. Koenig, "A Comparison of Informed and General Public Opinion On U.S. Foreign Policy," Public Opinion Quarterly, II (Summer, 1967), 242-253.

<sup>6</sup>Leroy N. Reiselbach, "The Basis of Isolationist Behavior," Public Opinion Quarterly, IV (Winter, 1960), 645-653.

<sup>7</sup>Herbert McClosky, Political Inquiry (London: Macmillan Company, 1969), p. 71.

The main conceptual suggestion McClosky makes, for the purposes of this study, is that beliefs may be scaled along an isolationist-nonisolationism continuum. He further divides these beliefs into aggressive-nonaggressive, enabling a researcher to evaluate explicit beliefs on an axis that might be graphically expressed as below:



Although McClosky does not use this axis, it seems a fair representation of his conceptual framework, as well as a useful means of arranging aggregate data for analysis of group belief systems.

Because McClosky's study concentrates on the possible psychological determinants of foreign policy orientations, his treatment of the dependent variables mentioned above is more valuable than his analysis of independent variables.

Scott's approach is similar to McClosky's in the emphasis of the importance of psychological constructs in the explanation of an individual's behavior toward international relations. Basically, his hypothesis is that people tend to advocate relations among nations which correspond structurally with their notions of ideal relations among people. This emphasizes the impact of nonpolitical, or more general social values on foreign policy opinions.<sup>8</sup>

In his section on the nature of American public opinion and foreign policy, Charles O. Lerche proposes four major characteristic shortcomings of American public opinion: (1) the general lack of information possessed by American on foreign policy issues; (2) the tendency of Americans to be impatient about international affairs; (3) the highly emotional character of American public opinion; (4) the preference for dichotomies manifested by Americans. These four characteristics, which are supported by survey data, are important considerations for this study. They figured significantly in the design of the questionnaire and are important limitations on some of the conclusions.<sup>9</sup>

In his analysis of political behavior and the determinants of political behavior, Bowen proceeds on an assumption advanced by many students in this area:

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<sup>8</sup>William A. Scott, "International Ideology and Interpersonal Ideology," Public Opinion Quarterly, III (Fall, 1960), 419-436.

<sup>9</sup>Charles O. Lerche, Foreign Policy of the American People (3rd ed.: Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967), pp. 155-156.

. . . the amount and kind of information that an individual possesses concerning politics is likely to be a direct reflection of his group associations at all levels of education and status.<sup>10</sup>

The implication of this assumption for the study of foreign policy opinion is that a particular group membership is likely to affect the substantive nature of an opinion. Level of information and group membership, then, are interrelated variables in the determination of an opinion.

Two central propositions advanced by Gabriel Almond provide direction for the formulation and examination of a hypothesis. The first contains Almond's basic judgment on the nature of public attitudes and opinions on foreign policy:

Attitudes and opinions on foreign policy are not only to be understood as responses to objective problems and situations, but as conditioned by culturally imposed qualities of character. These largely unconscious patterns of reactions and behavior strongly influence the perception, selection, and evaluation of political reality.<sup>11</sup>

The above suggests that there are a number of indirect and subtle influences that shape public opinion on foreign policy issues. If the influences are culturally based, as Almond suggests, they might include social-economic status, level of education, and opportunities to participate in democratic processes. Variations among groups with respect to these determinants, therefore, would produce subsequent aggregate

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<sup>10</sup>Don R. Bowen, Political Behavior of the American Public (Columbus Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Company, 1968), p. 48.

<sup>11</sup>Gabriel Almond, The American People and Foreign Policy (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1960), p. 29.

differences in foreign policy attitudes.

More specifically, Almond proposes that "The will to participate in world affairs is an intellectual and learned attitude validated by immediate experience and moral pressure."<sup>12</sup> If this is the case, there will be differences in the foreign policy attitudes of the following groups of persons: (1) persons of varying levels of education; (2) persons who have had varying amounts of exposure to the social science disciplines; (3) persons who have varying amounts of moral pressure to hold foreign policy opinions. This moral pressure might come from peer groups, organizational membership, or occupational demands. This proposition and its implications provide the basis for the development of the hypothesis which this study investigates.

These studies represent the central body of knowledge from which this study proceeds. The techniques employed are most similar to McClosky's. The hypothesis and related propositions are generated primarily by Almond's work. All of the studies suggest areas of investigation and familiarize the researcher with some of the problems he is likely to encounter in doing a public opinion study of foreign affairs dispositions.

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<sup>12</sup>Almond, Op. Cit., p. 76.

## CHAPTER III

### HYPOTHESES AND DEFINITIONS

#### Introduction

This study is essentially a test of the propositions derived from the body of knowledge reviewed in Chapter II. Definitions of terms in this chapter are listed immediately below the hypotheses and propositions in which they first occur. The definitions are of two types: (1) Theoretical, in which the concepts are defined "...in terms of other concepts which are supposedly already understood."<sup>13</sup> (2) Operational definitions, which delineate the actual procedure used by this study to measure the concept. To the extent that the theoretical and operational definitions are coincident and consistent in actual fact, the validity of the concepts, and ultimately the validity of the hypotheses is tested. Ideally, each concept in a testable hypothesis should be operationally defined.<sup>14</sup> Some of the definitions in this chapter refer to concepts

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<sup>13</sup>Hubert M. Blalock, Social Statistics (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1960), p. 9.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid., p. 11.

that are not used in the hypotheses, but are used frequently in this study.

### Hypothesis I

Consideration of Almond's work leads to the conclusion that:<sup>15</sup>

As an individual's level of education increases, he tends to be more internationalist than nationalist in his attitude toward world affairs.

If this hypothesis is valid, then this proposition will be supported by the study:

Those individuals characterized by high levels of education are more likely to be internationalist, and those characterized by low levels are more likely to be nationalist.

Three groupings of individuals are examined in this study. The two basic groups are the faculty and the county officials. The validity of the hypotheses is tested when all respondents are members of one of these two groups. The third group is called the "aggregate". In the aggregate, the validity of the hypotheses is tested when all respondents are combined for analysis without regard to their membership in the first two groups.

Level of Education is measured in terms of the amount of formal education reported by the respondent. Six categories are used ranging from 0-8 years to graduate school study at the Ph.D. level. In the aggregate, and for the county officials, respondents are assigned to the

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<sup>15</sup>Almond, Op. Cit., pp. 139-157.



high level of education category if they have completed some college work or above. The low level of education category includes individuals with no college experience. The faculty group are considered of high level of education if they have completed graduate work at the M.A. or PH.D. levels; low, if they have a B.A. or B.S.<sup>16</sup>

Nationalists are individuals whose political concerns and priorities are primarily focused on the issues and interests of their own country. They tend to be much less concerned with the situation of the international community than with the well-being and advantage of their nation. Internationalists, on the other hand, are less concerned with national pride, independence, and territorial integrity than harmony among nations, cultural exchange, and active involvement in international affairs.<sup>17</sup>

In the aggregate, respondents scoring on or above the mean score of the aggregate on Levinson's "Nationalism-Internationalism" scale are considered nationalists.<sup>18</sup> All persons scoring below the aggregate mean are classified internationalists. Likewise, members of both elite groups are categorized as either nationalists or internationalists depend-

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<sup>16</sup>Demographic characteristics include party affiliation and level of education as well as the "hard" facts such as age, sex, and marital status. Some studies exclude the former, but for the sake of simplicity, this study considers them all as demographic variables.

<sup>17</sup>McClosky, Op. Cit., p. 77.

<sup>18</sup>D. J. Levinson, "Authoritarian Personality and Foreign Policy," The Journal of Conflict Resolution, I (March, 1957), pp. 37-47.

ing upon whether they score above or below the mean score of their respective group. To this extent, nationalism-internationalism is a relative attitude. Respondents are compared to other individuals in the group. It should also be noted that the nationalist-internationalist division in this study is somewhat artificial. The use of the mean score as a dividing line is arbitrary, but consistent. The categories are labeled "nationalist" and "internationalist", but should be more accurately understood as meaning "more nationalist" and "more internationalist".

Both nationalists and internationalists may be further characterized by their militarist-pacifist tendencies. This dimension is included to clarify nationalism-internationalism. No hypothesis regarding militarist-pacifist attitudes is advanced when this dimension is analyzed. The fundamental proposition about this attitude is that it is independent of nationalism-internationalism attitude changes.<sup>19</sup> Respondents are more militarist if they score below the mean for their group on Droba's "Militarism-Pacifism" scale.<sup>20</sup> Similarly, if they score on or above the mean, they are classified as more pacifist.

### Hypothesis II

Drawing on the work of Almond and Lane and Sears, it is possible

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<sup>19</sup>McClosky, Op. Cit., p. 73.

<sup>20</sup>D. D. Droba, "A Scale To Measure Militarism-Pacifism," Journal of Educational Psychology, XXII (January, 1931), pp. 96-111.

to conclude:<sup>21</sup>

The more education an individual has completed, the more informed he will tend to be about international affairs.

This study therefore expects to validate the following proposition:

Individuals characterized by high levels of education are more likely to exhibit high levels of information about foreign affairs than individuals of low levels of education.

### Hypothesis III

Lane and Sears propose that an individual's level of information will, in itself, affect his attitude structure.<sup>22</sup> Under these conditions, a person's opinion is a direct reflection of the amount of information he has gathered. This would indicate that:

An individual's specific disposition toward foreign affairs will be dependent on the amount of information he possesses about foreign affairs.

From this, and the preceding propositions, it is possible to conclude that:

IIIa. High information individuals are more likely to be internationalist than low information individuals.

IIIb. Low information individuals are more likely to be nationalist than

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<sup>21</sup>Almond, Op. Cit., p. 76.


<sup>22</sup>Lane and Sears, Op. Cit., p. 13.

high information individuals.

At this stage, two alternative causal models are evident. Symbolically, they may be expressed as below:

Figure 2

Models of Causal Linkage



Model I

$$X_1 \rightarrow X_2 \rightarrow Y$$

Model II

Where: X<sub>1</sub> = level of education

X<sub>2</sub> = level of information

Y = nationalism-internationalism attitude

In the first model, education and level of information interact to produce a specific attitude. Each is partially responsible for an individual's eventual disposition. The second model indicates a linear flow of causation where education determines level of information, and level of information determines the eventual attitude. A third possibility, which involves the rejection of Hypothesis III, would show that education determines attitudes directly. In this case, level of information would be irrelevant.

In this study, a scale drawing on television news broadcasts and

newspapers is used to evaluate an individual's level of information. Respondents scoring on or above the mean score of their group are understood to exhibit high levels of information. Respondents scoring below the mean exhibit low levels of information about foreign affairs.

#### Hypothesis IV

In order to examine the impact of different types of education on foreign affairs dispositions, respondents were asked how many social science courses they had completed. On the basis of the following hypothesis, an individual's exposure to the social sciences is tested for a possible relationship to his attitudes:

Among individuals with college experience, those with backgrounds in the social sciences will have significantly different attitudes than those with little or no social science background.

For the purposes of this study, two propositions are offered:

IVa. Individuals with high levels of social science background are more likely to be internationalist, and those with low levels of social science background are more likely to be nationalist in their foreign affairs disposition.

IVb. Individuals with high levels of social science background are more likely to exhibit high levels of information, and those with low levels of social science background are more likely to exhibit low levels of information about foreign affairs.

College social sciences include: political science, history, sociology, economics, and anthropology. Respondents who reported having studied a number of courses that is on or above the mean number for their group are characterized by high levels of background. Those below the mean are considered low level background individuals.

### Hypothesis V

The degree to which an individual's curiosity and interest in foreign affairs influence his attitudes and level of information is largely unexplored. One reason for the lack of research in this area is the problem of obtaining accurate self-evaluations. To examine this area, the following hypothesis is advanced:

Individuals who are interested in foreign affairs will have significantly different amounts of information and different attitudes from those who are not interested.

This hypothesis results in two propositions:

Va. Higher levels of interest will be accompanied by higher levels of information among individuals.

Vb. Individuals with high levels of interest are more likely to be internationalist, and those with low levels of interest are more likely to be nationalist in their foreign affairs disposition.

Two indicators measure level of interest in this study: (1) Self-evaluation, in which the respondent is directly asked if he is interested

in foreign affairs. Responses of "very interested" or "moderately interested" are placed in the high level of interest category. Responses of "interested, but not informed" or "not at all interested" are low levels of interest. (2) Indirect self-evaluation, in which individuals are asked to what extent they use radio or television newsbroadcasts or newspapers to keep informed. They either indicated that they did use the media regularly or that they did not use them regularly.

### Hypothesis VI

Gabriel Almond implies that an individual's foreign affairs disposition is partially determined by his "... immediate experience and moral pressure."<sup>23</sup> To the extent that elite group membership is a type of immediate experience which generates a certain moral pressure and demands on its members, the following hypothesis is offered:

Members of respective elite groups will be characterized by different levels of information and attitudes.

With the preceding propositions and the generally higher level of education among the faculty group in mind, the following propositions are expected to be valid:

VIa. Members of intellectual elites are more likely to exhibit high levels of information about foreign affairs than members of political elites.

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<sup>23</sup> Almond, Op. Cit., p. 76.

Vib. Members of intellectual elites are more likely to be internationalist, and members of political elites are more likely to be nationalist in their foreign affairs disposition.

Elite groups are characterized by high levels of homogeneity, social cohesiveness, and awareness among the membership of their inclusion in the group. Individuals in an elite group share certain common sets of values that are considered socially scarce and worthy of esteem from other members of society. These values may be used to characterize the nature of the specific elite under consideration. This study deals with elites that are opinion-holders rather than decision-makers as far as foreign policy is concerned.

The focus is on two elites in this study: (1) The intellectual elite, which is characterized by consistently high levels of education, involvement in scholarship, teaching, and related activities. A sample of faculty members at Eastern Illinois University, Charleston, Illinois, represents this elite. (2) The political elite which is characterized by relatively high levels of political activity and influence on public affairs. Often, members of the political elite occupy formal, elected political office. A sample of elected county officials in Coles County, Illinois, represents the political elite.

#### Hypothesis VII

If elite group membership constitutes a moral pressure which



influences the attitudes of the individual, membership in other groups will also influence attitudes to a certain extent. From this assumption, the following conclusion is drawn:

The number of voluntary organizations to which an individual belongs will influence the amount of information he possesses and his attitudes.

Two specific propositions devolve from this hypothesis:

VIIa. Persons indicating high levels of membership in voluntary organizations are more likely to exhibit high levels of information, and those with low levels of membership are more likely to exhibit low levels of information.

VIIb. Persons indicating high levels of organizational membership are more likely to be internationalists, and those with low levels of organization membership are more likely to be nationalist in their foreign affairs disposition.

Respondents indicating membership in a number of voluntary organizations on or above the mean are placed in the high level category. Those who belong to a number below the mean are low level respondents. Voluntary organizations include civic, fraternal, or professional groups or clubs.

In the preceding propositions, the phrase "more likely" denotes a relationship between the two variables which equals or exceeds one of the three orders of significance established at the end of Chapter V.

The validation of a proposition does not prove the existence of a cause and effect relationship between the two variables. At the most, it indicates some degree of covariance between them. At the same time, however, there are causal implications in this study. To some extent, the independent variables, level of education, elite group membership, and so on, are understood to be causal factors of the dependent variable. At a higher level of generalization and a higher order of sophistication, the demographic variables are at least partially causal to the dispositional variables. The following is a symbolic expression of the causal form of the hypotheses in this chapter.

Figure 3

## Causal Form of Hypotheses I-VII


Key:  $\uparrow$  - An increase in ...

$\updownarrow$  - A decrease in ...

$\rightarrow$  - Causes

$X_{1...7}$  - The independent variable including education, level of information, social science background, elite group membership, and voluntary organization membership, or all of the demographic variables.

$Y_{1,2}$  - The dependent variables, nationalism-internationalism, level of information, essentially the dispositional or attitudinal variables.



As noted above, the precise causal interrelationships among the independent variables and their subsequent relationship to the dependent variables remain to be determined.

Essentially, this chapter is the operational transformation of Almond's statement, "The will to participate in world affairs" into a relative score on the nationalism-internationalism scale; whether it is "...an intellectual and learned attitude ..." is measured by level of formal education, social science background, interest, and level of information; whether it is "...validated by immediate experience and moral pressure" is indicated by elite group membership, membership in voluntary organizations, and, to some degree, level of information.<sup>24</sup>

The relationships among these indicators is made explicit by the formulation of the propositions. Seven related hypotheses are advanced because the validation of one or more of the propositions may indicate relationships of a higher order of generalization.

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<sup>24</sup>Ibid. .

## CHAPTER IV

### THEORETICAL ORIENTATION

A central problem of theoretical concern is conceptualization and the interrelation of concepts. This chapter is a discussion of major concepts which are basic to this study. The discussion is not intended to develop an exhaustive middle range theory of the role of political attitudes. More simply, it is a consideration of more narrow theoretical scope especially pertinent to the focus of this study.

From various sources, Shaw and Wright distill a definition of the concept of attitude:

A relatively enduring system of evaluative, affective reactions based upon and reflecting the evaluative concepts or beliefs which have been learned about the characteristics of a social object or class of social objects.<sup>25</sup>

More specifically, an attitude is "...an affective component which is based upon cognitive processes and is an antecedent of behavior."<sup>26</sup>

From this definition, the significance of attitudes is quite apparent.

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<sup>25</sup>Marvin E. Shaw and Jack M. Wright, Scales For The Measurement of Attitudes (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1967), p. 3.

<sup>26</sup>Ibid., pp. 2-3.

Political attitudes, for instance, immediately precede and direct political behavior. In one sense they are similar to political motives in that they provide direction for the resulting behavior. Unlike motives, however, attitudes are neither drive-producing or necessarily goal-specific.<sup>27</sup>

Attitudes are the sum of beliefs about an object and the "... evaluation of the preferability of the characteristics or existence of the object."<sup>28</sup> In the context of the previously advanced definition, attitudes are also value-related. The affective expression of the worth or value of an object is an important component of attitudes.

Shaw and Wright examine several characteristics of attitudes that are implicit in the foregoing discussion.

1. Attitudes are directly related to overt, motivated behavior. To the extent that they precede and direct behavior, knowledge of a specific attitude holds certain clues to eventual behavior.
2. Attitudes are understood to vary along a continuum in both intensity and quality. The continuum runs for strong preference through neutrality to strong aversion for the social object. This poses a serious operational problem. If attitudes actually vary along a continuum, any demarcation of the continuum is likely to be a distorted reflection of the attitude.
3. Attitudes are learned and cognitive rather than inherent, genetic,

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<sup>27</sup>Shaw and Wright, Op. Cit., p. 5.

<sup>28</sup>Ibid., p. 4.

or the result of biological or instinctual processes. Attitudes have the same characteristics common to all learning in that they may be reinforced, maintained, or altered.

4. Attitudes refer to specific social objects or sets of social objects. They may be more or less complex or specific depending upon the complexity or specificity of the referent object and the degree of individual elaboration of the attitude. The extent to which the attitude is well-developed and consistent with other attitudes seems to depend upon the relevance of a particular social object to the individual.

5. Attitudes are more or less interrelated. Central attitudes about relevant social objects tend to be more closely and logically interrelated than peripheral attitudes. Because they are interrelated, attitudes are resistant to change. Frequent alteration of central attitudes involves alteration of many related peripheral attitudes. Interrelatedness, therefore, demands some amount of stability. Frequent changing of an individual's highly complex attitudinal structure would result in constant confusion at the very least.<sup>29</sup>

Opinions are the expression of attitudes. A specific opinion may be the result of the influence and interrelatedness of several attitudes. Often, opinions are more specific than attitudes. For example, an individual has an attitude toward war which influences his opinion about

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<sup>29</sup>Shaw and Wright, Op. Cit., pp. 6-10.

a specific war. The most common form of attitude-expression or opinion-holding is verbal. Although actions express attitudes, they are more precisely overt behavior. In a peripheral sense, of course, opinion-holding is a form of human behavior.

Various factors may influence the learning, maintenance, or alteration of attitudes. Political attitudes should be understood to be similar to other sets of attitudes with respect to their development. Social circumstance, formal education, peer group associations, and the relevance of politics as a social object all contribute to the development of a particular political attitude. In turn, the attitude directly influences political behavior. The researcher's access to the nature of the attitude is through the individual's opinion. Clearly, opinion and overt behavior, voting, protest activity, and campaigning, for instance, are not always in perfect coincidence. To the degree that they coincide, however, knowledge of an individual's opinion may be of value in predicting his behavior. Information about the present political opinions of an individual may provide clues to his behavior in the future because opinions reflect attitudes, which are relatively stable and enduring.

It has been proposed that attitudes are learned and subject to change. They are learned from specific sets of social experiences. Some of these experiences have a stronger impact on the development of specific attitudes than others. Knowledge of which experiences tend to produce particular attitudes is of predictive value. This study finds

that level of education is positively related to internationalist tendencies. Militarist or pacifist tendencies, on the other hand are not related to level of education. Within the limitations of this study's findings, an observer noting an overall increase in a nation's level of education would predict a general shift toward internationalism, but no necessary change in militarism-pacifism attitudes.

Within this theoretical framework, a change in attitudes entails a necessary change in behavior. Nationalist-internationalist and militarist-pacifist opinions are examined in this study. One underlying assumption is that these opinions reflect similar attitudes which, in turn, direct appropriate behavior. Resultant behavior patterns are beyond the scope of this study. By way of a brief example, however, nationalist behavior would include a willingness to more readily accept nationalist-oriented foreign policies. Militarist behavior might include a readiness to support the rise of military force in the resolution of international conflict.

Various social experiences not only determine the specific nature of political attitudes, but also determine whether or not specific political attitudes are central or peripheral. Political referent objects which are more relevant to an individual are more likely to be central in his attitudinal structure. Central attitudes are more likely to be complex, interrelated, and logically consistent than peripheral attitudes. An individual actively collects and experiences more information about



referent objects that are important to him. Increased amounts of information allow for more elaborately developed and consistent attitudes. To some degree this creates attitudinal stability because existing predispositions will sort the information and experiences the individual receives.

Theoretically, demographic variables describe the individual's life experiences and situation and a particular point in time. Operationally, selected demographic variables are expressed quantitatively to measure their impact on attitudes and behavior. Unfortunately, these operations are often applied to the demographic variables which are easily quantified rather than those that may appear most theoretically significant.

McClosky's study of the "Personality and Attitude Correlates of Foreign Policy Orientation" is somewhat of an effort to circumvent this operational problem.<sup>30</sup> If apparently significant theoretical variables could not be measured directly, their most immediate effects, their psychological results that is, might be accurately measured. Obviously, the impact of variables such as child-rearing practices, emotional trauma, and personal success or failure might be more accurately determined through indirect measurement of their psychological effects at the current stage of scientific development.

This study does not take exception to the possible theoretical sig-

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<sup>30</sup>McClosky, Op. Cit.

nificance of these initial and highly personal variables or McClosky's measurement techniques. A major contention of this study, however, is that there are a number of relatively easily accessible and measurable variables which have significant influence on the development of political attitudes. These variables are susceptible to change, and will significantly alter the attitudes of the individuals they effect. Their effects on a wide range of political attitudes have been tested by previous researchers. An extensive, systematic analysis of the impact of demographic variables on nationalist-internationalist attitudes, and foreign affairs disposition in general, however, has been largely ignored. The theoretical significance of this study, therefore, rests on an examination of the possible validity and relevance of some of these variables to a specific attitude.

## CHAPTER V

### DESCRIPTION OF THE TEST

The selection of the survey technique as a means of gathering data to test the validity of the hypothesis and propositions dictated the design of a questionnaire. Four criteria were considered important limitations on the design and construction of the questionnaire: (1) The form of the questionnaire had to reduce as much as possible the cost of its construction and administration. With this in mind, an answer sheet separate from the questionnaire was used to record responses, eliminating the necessity of reproducing the five page questionnaire some eighty times. Also, the use of the answer sheet allowed for extensive pre-coding of responses and the use of a relatively simple scoring key and post-coding procedure, thereby reducing the amount of time needed to transform unprocessed information into data compatible with existing computer programs. The additional time required to pre-code and design the questionnaire was more than compensated for by the time saving realized when encoding the data for computer input.

(2) Accuracy in the measurement of both the opinions and the demographic factors was perhaps the most difficult of the criteria to

meet. The internationalism-nationalism scale and the militarism-pacifism scale had both been previously tested by researchers.<sup>31</sup> The selection of these two particular tests rather than the many others available was governed by a judgment of their appropriateness to the hypothesis being tested. Secondly, the tests were evaluated by an examination of their reliability in "Split-half", "Test-Retest", and validity correlates established by previous researchers.<sup>32</sup>

The level of information test was developed by the author with the guidance of academic personnel at Eastern Illinois University, and the extensive use of survey research literature.<sup>33</sup> Special attention was given to covering a wide range of foreign affairs issue areas. The final forms of the demographic questions were tested for clarity, precision, and the degree to which they consistently elicited the desired information. Specific limitations regarding the accuracy of each section

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<sup>31</sup>See Droba, Op. Cit., and Levinson, Op. Cit.

<sup>32</sup>See Shaw, Op. Cit., pp. 16-21. In the "Test-Retest Method... The attitude scale is administered to the same group of persons at two different times, and the correlation between the two sets of scores is computed." (p. 16) The "Split-half Method... estimates reliability by treating each of two or more parts of the attitude scale as a separate scale... the reliability estimate is the correlation between the scores of the separate scales." (p. 17).

<sup>33</sup>I relied on Charles H. Backstrom and Gerald W. Hursh, Survey Research (Chicago: Northwestern University Press, 1963) for phrasing the questions and statement sequence. The content of the questions was taken from metropolitan newspapers in consultation with Dr. John R. Faust, Professor of Political Science, Eastern Illinois University. Refinement of the scale after the pre-test was done with the assistance of Dr. Thomas E. Scism, Professor of Political Science, Eastern Illinois University.

of the questionnaire are discussed more fully in Chapter VI.

(3) The questionnaire is as comprehensive as possible given the restrictions of cost and the desire for brevity. If the null hypothesis were supported, it seemed desirable to be able to explain its support in terms of as many variables as possible. For this reason, a good deal of information other than level of education was obtained.

The Militarism-Pacificism test was included in order to add another dimension to the Internationalism-Nationalism measurement. This test would hopefully give more precision to the evaluation of the questionnaire in general.

(4) The pressures supporting brevity were compelling: the use of volunteer, relatively inexperienced, personnel for administration, the size of the project, the time available for completion, and the caveats of Messrs. Backstrom and Hursh argued for severe restrictions.<sup>34</sup> Initial tests by inexperienced interviewers required between thirty and forty minutes per respondent. Experienced interviewers eventually gathered data at an average rate of fifteen to twenty minutes per respondent.

In its final form the questionnaire has four major sections prefaced by "Instructions To The Interviewers".<sup>35</sup> The first section, which includes twelve questions, constitutes the internationalism-nationalism

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<sup>34</sup>Backstrom and Hursh, Op. Cit., pp. 60, 69-70, 112-13, 130.

<sup>35</sup>See Appendix A for the complete questionnaire in its final form.

scale (IN). The scale was developed by Levinson in 1957.<sup>36</sup> It is a Likert-type scale with a range of scores from 10-70. The starred items on the questionnaire included in the appendix are statements expressing an internationalist position; the others express a nationalist position. (The items were not starred on the questionnaires used for actual interviews.)

Respondents were allowed six degrees of agreement or disagreement ranging from strong support to strong opposition. Provision was made for no response. Each item is given a score ranging from 1-7; +3 is equivalent to 1; -3 is equivalent to 7. For starred items, the scoring is reversed; +3 is then equivalent to 7; -3 is equivalent to 1. The mean of the total items scores is multiplied by ten; the higher the resulting scores, the stronger the nationalist position.

As it was administered by Levinson, the test yielded a mean of 31.8, a standard deviation of 12.5, and a range of 10-64. The eighty-four subjects were a rather highly diversified group of students at Harvard University.<sup>37</sup> Levinson's findings correspond roughly with the results discussed in Chapter VI of this study.

Three significant modifications were made on the original scale. The first statement originally read: "We need more leaders like MacArthur, who have the morals and strength to put national honor above appease-

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<sup>36</sup>Levinson, Op. Cit., pp. 37-47.

<sup>37</sup>Ibid., p. 41.

ment."<sup>38</sup> MacArthur's name was deleted from the final version because its inclusion seems less significant now than in 1957 when the scale was developed. The strong nationalist sentiment, and even some military overtone seemed to remain after the deletion. Some of the confusion expressed by pre-test respondents was eliminated. In its final form, the statement reads: "We need more leaders who have the morals and strength to put national honor above appeasement."

The sixth statement originally read: "Our best policy in China would be to forget about Chiang-Kai-shek, and to work for a coalition between the Communists and the 'center' parties."<sup>39</sup> This statement is also oriented toward an issue that is somewhat dated. In an attempt to preserve the internationalist sentiment of the statement and update its issue content, it was changed to read: "Our best policy in Viet Nam would be to forget about the Saigon government, and work for an agreement with the Communists."

The third significant modification is that the test was administered orally to respondents in this survey. The original tests were taken silently by the respondents. In order to minimize the effects of this difference, respondents were given a card with the choices of agreement and disagreement printed in the same form as on the original test. Interviewers were allowed to repeat a statement twice if requested to

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<sup>38</sup>Levinson, Op. Cit., p. 41.

<sup>39</sup>Ibid.,

by the respondent, but were not allowed to return to a statement if they had proceeded to a subsequent statement. The interviewers were not allowed to change a response once they had recorded a response and read a subsequent statement.

The second major section consists of a twelve-item militarism-pacifism scale (MP). It is an equal-appearing interval scale developed by Droba in 1931.<sup>40</sup> Even though it is some forty years old, the highly general nature of the statements would seem to insulate it from changing issues.

Each item is assigned an equivalent number, depending upon how pro-militarist the statement is. The subject responds by indicating either agreement or disagreement with the sentiment of the statement. The equivalent numbers of statements with which the respondent agrees are totaled, giving a possible score between 0-122. A higher score indicates a more pacifistic position.

Droba's test was first administered to four hundred college students at the University of Chicago. It yielded a mean of approximately 11.77 and a maximum standard deviation of 2.35.<sup>41</sup> These figures are considerably lower than the ones obtained in Chapter VI of this study.

Two changes were made in the original test. The original test consisted of forty-four items. The final test was reduced to twelve

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<sup>40</sup>Droba, Op. Cit., pp. 96-111.

<sup>41</sup>Ibid., p. 108.



items by selecting every fourth statement from the original. The primary reason for abbreviating the test was reduction of the time needed to administer the questionnaire. This was justified because the scale was intended for this study primarily as an additional dimension to the IN scale. Its use as a separate independent variable is not crucial for the support of the alternate hypothesis.

The essential quantitative characteristics of the scale were preserved, and no other judgment other than the choice of every fourth statement beginning with the first was used. The original scale ranged from 0 to 462; the final scale from 0 to 122. The hypothetical mean value of a statement on the original scale was 10.5; for the final scale, 10. The minimum statement value on the original scale was 0; on the final scale also 0. The maximum statement value on the original was 21; on the final scale also 21.

The second modification was the oral administration of the test, which was originally administered silently. As in the case of the IN test, interviewers were allowed to repeat a statement twice if necessary, but not allowed to reread or change a response once they had proceeded to a following statement.

The third section of the questionnaire is a twelve item information level test (IL). The test was designed by the author to measure a wide range of familiarity with foreign affairs and foreign policy issues. Approximately 50 per cent of the questions are concerned with United

States foreign policy; the remainder with foreign affairs in general.

An attempt was made to insure wide geographic and issue distribution in both areas. The types of questions include: Name recognition, treaty recognition, country recognition, and situation recognition.

Generally, the questions proceed from the less difficult to the more difficult. The range of difficulty is fairly large because of the possibility of having to scale persons of low education levels (less than eight years formal education) and low interest levels, with persons of high education levels (Ph.D.) and high interest levels. Pre-test results indicated that the test was capable of scaling both of these extremes, while preserving an acceptable distribution around the hypothetical mean score. These results are corroborated in the final survey results. The range of the scale is 0-60, five points being awarded for each correct answer. Higher scores indicate higher information levels.

Two changes were made on the basis of pre-test experience. The test was administered orally, under the same rules of repetition and response change as the IN and MP tests. The length of the response choices in the IL test, however, tended to confuse a good number of respondents. Consequently, during the actual survey an answer sheet with the printed responses was given to the subject during the IL test. The statements and the responses were read by the interviewer while the subject followed the responses on his answer sheet.

On the sample questionnaire provided in the Appendix the cor-

rect answers are underlined. Question 28 has both "C" and "D" underlined. The test was prepared and pre-tested after President Nixon had announced the easing of some trade restrictions with the People's Republic of China, but before Presidential Advisor Henry Kissinger's first visit to mainland China. During the actual survey it became apparent that the visit, which had just taken place, made response "D" very close to a correct answer. Moderately informed respondents seemed quite confused about whether to answer "C" or "D". As a result, all respondents were given credit for either "C" or "D" responses. Questionnaires used in the survey, of course, did not have underlined answers.

The fourth section of the questionnaire includes questions relating to self-evaluation and demographic factors. Because of the relatively low level of organizational membership, questions 41 through 43 were combined in the post-coding to produce a single variable of "organization membership" (OM). The details of each demographic variable are discussed in Chapter VI under the appropriate section.

The order of appearance of each section is significant. The IN and MP opinion tests were presented first to gain the respondent's confidence and acquaint him with the questionnaire. The IL test, which has correct or incorrect answer choices, is third, followed by the self-evaluative and demographic questions. The interview experience of the author supports this particular organization as an effective means of gaining a respondent's confidence and reducing his inhibitions. Changing the order of the sections resulted in visible antagonism, and respond-

ent irritation in some cases during the pre-tests. The final organization plan of the questionnaire, then, is to proceed from the general to the specific.

With the questionnaire designed, thirteen volunteer interviewers were chosen. All were students at Eastern Illinois University. They received two one-hour briefings from the author. The first hour was devoted to an explanation of survey techniques and a checklist of "do's and don'ts" of interviewing.<sup>42</sup> The second hour reviewed interviewing techniques and trained the interviewers in the use of the questionnaire and answer sheet employed in this survey.

Subsequent meetings with interviewers after they had administered pre-tests answered their questions resulting from initial field experiences. The pre-test indicated that the scales were well-adjusted and indicated some changes that were necessary.<sup>43</sup>

The samples used in this survey were drawn from two groups. A random sample of fifty faculty members at Eastern Illinois University was drawn. Initial estimates of the time available for interviewing suggested a sample size of approximately forty for each group. The faculty sample was "overdrawn" by ten to compensate for "not at homes" and refusals. The faculty sample is a fairly accurate proportional representation of each school.<sup>44</sup> Because of the relatively small

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<sup>42</sup>Backstrom and Hursh, Op. Cit., p. 138.

<sup>43</sup>Ibid., pp. 129-130.

<sup>44</sup>The characteristics of the sample, including proportion of members per school, education level, and male-to-female proportions were similar to overall characteristics of the faculty.

size of the sample, however, the proportionality of the sample by academic department does not correspond with the population.

The sample of elected county officials in Coles County includes the following groups: County Officers, County Supervisors; Assistant Supervisors; and County Highway Commissioners. The total is forty-three persons. Forty successful interviews were completed.

Approximately eighty per cent of the county official interviews and fifty per cent of the faculty interviews were completed in two weeks of field work. The remainder were accomplished in a third week of interviewing.

At this stage, two limitations of this study become apparent. The use of volunteer interviewers who have limited training and experience is likely to introduce some amount of error or distortion. This may have been somewhat minimized by the training sessions, the pre-test experience, close supervision, and the fact that the author completed approximately fifty per cent of the interviews.

The size of the sample is also a limiting factor. The sample size was dictated primarily by the time available for completion of the survey within the requirements of statistical validity.<sup>45</sup> In one sense the necessity of using volunteer interviewers and the desire for a large sample are mutually exclusive considerations. The confidence and reliability increments afforded by an increase in sample size may well

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<sup>45</sup>Blalock, Op. Cit., pp. 165-167, 225-227.

have been counteracted by the increased distortion introduced by employing more interviewers, or by increasing the work load of existing interviewers. A final balance of eighty respondents and thirteen interviewers was decided upon.

The results of the interviews were scored and post-coded according to the directions in the Code Book included in the Appendix. The task was relatively straight-forward because of the use of closed responses and extensive pre-coding.<sup>46</sup> These data were transferred to computer matrix sheets, and then to computer punch cards.

The data and a program format detailing the operations to be performed on each variable was submitted to a technician for programming and processing.

Two separate programs were employed. The standard deviation, mean, standard error, and range of the data were determined using DMBO1D.<sup>47</sup> The second program, DMBO2S, calculated the chi square, chi square d.f., contingency coefficient, and table percentages for the

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<sup>46</sup>Backstrom and Hursh discuss the advantages and disadvantages of using "closed responses", in which the respondent has only listed options as choices. The central problem with "open responses" is the amount of time and effort required to code them for quantitative analysis. Further, they increase the time required to administer the interview. See Backstrom and Hursh, Op. Cit., pp. 73-74.

<sup>47</sup>See W. J. Dixon, Ed., BMD: Biomedical Computer Programs (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964).

selected data.<sup>48</sup>

With the exception of the party affiliation variable, the tables are exclusively 2x2. The size of the sample precluded the effective use of larger tables because of the possibility of encountering empty cells.<sup>49</sup> All demographic variables except occupation and academic discipline were tested for possible relationship with each of the three dependent variables, IN, MP, and IL. In turn, the dependent variables were tested for possible relationship among the three. Occupation and academic discipline were not tested for chi square significance because of the low number of cases in the resultant aggregates.

Three levels of significance were used to evaluate the results:

1. The alternate hypothesis is "supported" if a chi square of 3.841 or higher at .05 probability is indicated. Essentially, this means that the chances of finding a chi square of this magnitude if the relationship between the two variables were random is one in twenty.
2. The alternate hypothesis is "strongly supported" if a chi

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<sup>48</sup>For a description of BMDO2S see Kenneth Janda, Data Processing (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1969), p. 159. The entire program format may be found in W. J. Dixon, ed., BMD: Biomedical Computer Programs (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964).

<sup>49</sup>The accurate calculation of chi square requires at least five occurrences per cell. For figures of five and below, Blalock suggests the use of a "continuity correction". Essentially, this tends to give more conservative. Because of the conservative criteria used to evaluate this data, however, no corrections were added. The use of larger than 2x2 tables, however, would have necessitated the use of the correction in all cases, and made a good number of the tests invalid because of frequent occurrences of empty cells. See Blalock, Op. Cit., pp. 220-221.

square of 6.635 or higher at .01 probability is indicated. In this case, the chances are one in a hundred of a chi square of this magnitude with no relationship between the variables.

3. The alternate hypothesis is "validated" if a chi square of 10.827 or higher at .001 probability is indicated. At this level of confidence, there is a 99.9 per cent probability of the relationship between the variables being other than random.<sup>50</sup>

Standard error was used to evaluate the extent to which each dependent variable could be used effectively to test for a relationship with the independent variables. Key states that: "As the Standard of Error of estimate of Y approaches in size the standard deviation of Y, the ... degree of relationship between X and Y values declines."<sup>51</sup> In no case did the standard of error approach the standard deviation for the variables tested.

The major limitation on the use of chi square is the relatively small size of the sample employed. No statistical corrections were used, however. In Chapter VI, the estimates of reliability become more conservative if cell numbers approach five or smaller. There is essentially little advantage to employing a statistical device to compensate for continuity, as long as this is taken into consideration in the final

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<sup>50</sup>Blalock, Op. Cit., p. 452.

<sup>51</sup>V. O. Key, A Primer of Statistics for Political Scientists (New York: Crowell, 1954), p. 93.



analysis of the data.

It might be noted that although the relatively small size of this sample may cause some distortion of the results, large values of chi square are more difficult to obtain with a small sample. If large values appear in a small sample, they indicate greater certainty of a relationship than the same values for a large sample.<sup>52</sup>

Causal inferences from this sort of data must be made with caution. Chi square will indicate the existence of relationships significantly different than those expected under a given set of hypothetical assumptions (the null hypothesis).<sup>53</sup> It does not, however, indicate the direction of the relationship, or that the relationship is causal.

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<sup>52</sup>Blalock, Op. Cit., p. 230.

<sup>53</sup>Ibid.

## CHAPTER VI

### PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS OF THE DATA

#### Preliminary Remarks

The following analysis is a detailed description of the sample characteristics, the dependent variables, and the independent variables which produce significant relationships. Independent variables which yield less than significant relationships are discussed briefly. When appropriate, findings are related to previous research reported in this area.

Tables that are especially long or only supplementary to the central discussion are included in Appendix B. Where noted all figures are expressed as percentages. The number of respondents for the aggregate (both groups combined) data is eighty; for faculty and county officials respectively, the number of respondents is always forty. The chi square and probability for each relationship are listed immediately below each table. All decimal figures are rounded to the nearest one-tenth.

On the basis of the levels of significance presented in Chapter V,

the degree to which each relationship supports the hypothesis under investigation is assessed.

### Quantitative Profile of the Sample

This is a brief consideration of some of the major characteristics of the sample.<sup>54</sup> When both groups are combined to yield aggregate results, they produce the following mean scores: Nationalism-Internationalism (IN) - 39.9; Militarism-Pacifism (MP) - 55.3; Information Level (IL) - 40.8.<sup>55</sup>

The mean of the IN variable compares favorably with the actual mean of Levinson's original study. The original mean score of 31.8 is close enough to the mean score of this study to indicate that attitudes on this scale have not shifted appreciably since 1957.<sup>56</sup> Likewise, the small differences between the range and standard deviation of Levinson's study and this study are not significant if differences in the groups under analysis are taken into account.

The mean score of the MP variable, however, is considerably higher than Droba's original 11.8. The higher standard deviation and greater range of scores in this study indicates a shift to pacifist attitudes and considerably less consensus of attitudes since Droba's initial study

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<sup>54</sup>A complete quantitative profile of the sample is found in Appendix B.

<sup>55</sup>See Appendix B.

<sup>56</sup>Levinson, Op. Cit., pp. 37-47.

in 1931.<sup>57</sup> Many factors combine to account for this shift. American experiences in the Korean War, and more recently in Viet Nam, have undoubtedly contributed to changing this attitude. The rather grim realities of these wars and the advent of nuclear weapons may figure largely in the shift to a more pacifist mean score. The divisive effects of United States involvement in Viet Nam may contribute to the larger range of opinion.

The IL mean score of the actual survey is close to the pre-test mean score. Because this test was developed especially for this survey, no previous results are available for comparison.

The relatively small size of the sample and the low instances of membership in voluntary organizations in many cases necessitated combining the three categories to produce one variable of organization membership. This may result in some distortion of the variable because passive membership in a professional organization, for example, is obviously quite different from active participation in a civic organization.

The respondents belong to an average of five voluntary organizations each. The faculty group belongs to an average of six organizations; the county official group to three. On the average, then, faculty respondents belong to 50 per cent more organizations than county officials.

The average age of the respondents is 47 years. Both the faculty

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<sup>57</sup>Droba, Op. Cit., pp. 96-111.

and county official group have approximately 11 years of experience either as teachers or as county officials.


The mean IN score of the faculty is 34.2, compared with the county officials' mean IN of 45.5. This indicates that the faculty group is considerably less nationalist than the county official group. The standard deviation of the two groups is approximately the same.

The mean MP score for the two groups is nearly the same. The faculty mean is 56. The county official mean is 54.2. This suggests that the tendency toward militarism or pacifism is independent of different elite group membership.

The mean IL score of the county officials is higher than that of the faculty. Initially, this would indicate that the county officials, on the whole, are more informed than the faculty. The faculty mean score is 40.4; the county official, 41.2. Examination of the standard deviations, however, illustrates that as a group, the faculty is more consistently well-informed than the county officials. The standard deviation of the faculty is 8.4; the county official, 63.9. These standard deviations would produce the following curves if distribution were normal:

Figure 4

Distribution Curves of Faculty and County Official Groups for Information Level (Normality assumed)



If all of the individuals studied are under the curves drawn in Figure 4, then it is apparent that most of the faculty members are clustered in the middle near the mean; that is, they all scored about the same on the scale. For the county officials, however, the relatively flat curve demonstrates that a sizeable number of county officials are highly informed, and a sizeable number have virtually no information.

The implication of these two curves is that the faculty is more consistently informed as a group than the county officials. Approximately 60 per cent of the faculty scored within 8 points of the mean. The county officials, on the other hand, more consistently varied from the mean score.

### The Dependent Variables

Each dependent variable was matched with every other dependent variable producing a total of nine possible relationships. With the exception of two relationships, the variables indicated nearly complete independence from each other. This is especially important for the MP and IN variables. Essentially, this independence reconfirms the proposition that militarism-pacifism and nationalism-internationalism are separate and distinct attitudes. On the basis of the scales used in this study, four categories of individuals may be established depending on their MP and IN scores: (1) militarist-nationalists; (2) pacifist-nationalists; (3) militarist-internationalists; (4) pacifist-internationalists.

Figures 5 and 6 illustrate the distribution of the faculty and county officials over the two scales. The intersection of the axes is the hypothetical median of the two scales.

Figure 5

Distribution of Faculty Sample Over Nationalism-Internationalism and Militarism-Pacifism Scales





Figure 6

Distribution of County Officials Sample Over Nationalism-Internationalism and Militarism-Pacifism Scales



This type of analysis permits a more precise description of groups of individuals. Quadrant I includes group with internationalist-pacifist attitudes; quadrant II, nationalist-pacifist; quadrant III, internationalist-militarist; quadrant IV, nationalist-militarist. Evidence in this study indicates that the nationalist-internationalist dimension is highly dependent on demographic factors. The militarist-pacificist dimension, on the other hand, is somewhat independent of demographic factors. McClosky's study of the psychological determinants of foreign affairs dispositions indicates that this dimension may be dependent on complex psychological factors.<sup>58</sup>

Table 1 indicates a significant relationship between militarism-pacifism and nationalism-internationalism among county officials. For this group only, there is a slight tendency for nationalists to be also militarist and internationalists to be also pacifist. This more closely coincides with the common stereotypes of nationalists and internationalists. The relationship does not obtain for either the faculty group or the aggregate, however.

Level of information is independent of militarism-pacifism and nationalism-internationalism except in one instance. Table 2 indicates a slight tendency in the aggregate toward high information levels being characteristic of internationalists, and low information levels being characteristic of nationalists. The relationship is not significant

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<sup>58</sup>McClosky, Op. Cit., pp. 77-78.



when the two groups are tested separately. The existence of a significant relationship in the aggregate, however, indicates that further relationships might obtain if the scales and the test were to have more discriminatory powers. For example, in a larger sample the use of interval scales and linear correlation might establish a stronger relationship.

TABLE 1

Militarism-Pacifism and Nationalism-Internationalism  
Among County Officials  
(Table Percentages)

	Militarism	Pacifism
Nationalism	10.3	5.1
Internationalism	41.	43.6
		Chi Square 4.9 P < .05

TABLE 2

Nationalism-Internationalism and  
Level of Information  
(Both Groups--Percentages)

		Nationalism	Internationalism
Level of Information	High	10.1	22.8
	Low	38.0	29.1
		Chi Square = 4.6 P < .05	

Analysis of the Independent Variables

Sex, Marital Status, and Age

No significant relationships exist between the dependent variables and sex or marital status. Slight tendencies toward significance in a few instances are discounted because of the low number of females and the low number of unmarried respondents. Relationships with initially low frequencies in the independent variables must be viewed conservatively. Unless the relationship is well into the significance range its validity is highly questionable.

Age is a significant factor in the aggregate and the county official group. Table 3 indicates a tendency of nationalists to be above the mean age for both groups and internationalists to be below the mean age.

TABLE 3

Nationalism-Internationalism and Age  
(Both Groups--Percentages)

	Nationalism	Internationalism
Age	33.7	22.5
	15.	28.7

Chi Square = 5.2  
P < .05

Table 4 shows that the relationship is even stronger among county officials. In general, younger members of the group tend to be internationalist, older members tend to be nationalists. For the county official

group, the relationship is one significance level stronger: in the aggregate  $p$  is less than .05; in the county official group  $p$  is less than .01.<sup>59</sup>

TABLE 4

Nationalism-Internationalism and  
Age of County Officials  
(Percentages)

	Nationalism	Internationalism
Age		
	Above Mean	32.5
	Below Mean	17.5
		12.5
		37.5

Chi Square = 6.5  
 $p < .01$

No relationship obtained for the faculty group when age was tested. This would tend to indicate that if increasing age is coincident with a certain attitudinal myopia, the effects are more pronounced in groups which are less mobile and less educated on the average. Also, older individuals whose attitude structures were formed soon after the United States' experience in World War I and during the Depression of the 1930's are likely to reflect these experiences in their increased nationalism. Again, tests with more discriminatory power, such as linear correlation, might discern more precise trends.

In no case is age found to be a significant determinant of militarism-pacifism or level of information.

<sup>59</sup>See Chapter VI for a description of the significance levels employed in this study.

Level of Interest, Television Viewing,  
Newspaper Reading, and Occupation

Respondents were placed into a high interest level group if they indicated that they were "very interested in foreign affairs" or "moderately interested". Responses of "interested, but not informed," or "not at all interested" were categorized as low interest levels. Tests yielded two significant relationships: (1) Information level and level of interest for the aggregate; (2) Nationalism-internationalism and level of information for county officials.

Table 5 indicates an inverse relationship between information level and level of interest for the aggregate. As level of interest declines, information level increases.

TABLE 5

Information Level and Level of Interest  
(Both Groups--Percentages)

		Information Level	
		High	Low
Interest	High	7.6	31.6
	Low	25.3	35.4

Chi Square = 4.2  
p < .05

The relationship does not exist when the aggregate is broken down into faculty and county official groups. The explanation of this somewhat curious relationship, which was unexpected, is that level of

interest is a self-evaluation variable. The data indicates that the faculty group consistently under-estimated their level of interest vis-a-vis their level of information. On the other hand, the county officials consistently over-estimated their level of interest vis-a-vis their score on the level of information scale.

The problem is not only one of proper self-evaluation. Respondents in each group appear to be comparing their level of interest to that of their peers. A biology instructor is not likely to be as diligent a reader in international affairs as a political science instructor. Consequently, he rates himself as "interested, but not informed". A county official, however, whose absolute level of interest is lower than the biology instructor's may well rate himself as moderately interested. Relative to his peers, the county official is moderately interested. With this problem in mind, the value of some objective means of measuring level of interest should be apparent.

Table 6 indicates that among county officials, higher levels of interest are more likely to be expressed by internationalists than nationalists. To the extent that their self-evaluations are accurate, this relationship is somewhat circular. Less interested individuals will tend to select the information to which they are exposed. As they are exposed to less information about international affairs, the focus of their interest narrows to nationalist concerns.

Although the relationship between nationalism-internationalism

and level of interest is in the second significance level for the county official group, it is not significant in either the aggregate or the faculty group. Again, the major difficulty in dealing with this variable is that it is self-evaluative.

TABLE 6

Nationalism-Internationalism and Level of Interest  
(County Officials--Percentages)

		Nationalism	Internationalism
Level of Interest	High	12.5	30
	Low	37.5	20
			Chi Square = 5.0 p < .01

Level of interest is not significantly related to militarism-pacifism in any group.

The two variables, reading newspapers and watching television are, in a sense, self-evaluative. Then too, the questions used to measure these factors were not refined enough to discriminate between those who followed international affairs and those who did not. No significant relationships were found between television viewing and any of the dependent variables. One reason for this is that 82.5 per cent of the respondents indicated that they watch television news regularly. This means that without more questions tapping levels of viewing and kinds of programs watched, it is nearly impossible to explain the role of this variable (given

the small size of the sample and the characteristics of the chi square test, also).

Consistent newspaper reading is significant in one instance: Even though approximately 70 per cent of the county officials indicated that they consistently read newspapers. Those who claim consistent reading habits are more likely to be internationalist than those who do not. Those reporting that they do not consistently read newspapers are more likely to be nationalist (see Table 7).

TABLE 7

Nationalism-Internationalism and  
Consistent Newspaper Reading  
(Both Groups--Percentages)

	Nationalism	Internationalism
Read	35	47.5
Do not Read	13.7	3.7

Chi Square = 6.0  
p < .05

Although the relationship is moderately significant for the county official groups, it is not significant for the aggregate or the faculty group. Again, the variable would be more valuable if the questionnaire had probed deeper: local newspaper reading, for example, could have been distinguished from metropolitan newspaper reading. News magazine reading could have been measured separately.

The imprecision of the variable is evident in the lack of correla-

tion between consistent newspaper reading and level of information. Most of the statements in the level of information scale are taken from newspapers.

No analysis has been made of the occupation responses of the county officials. The wide range of occupations would have created so many categories that, given the sample size, small numbers in the cells would have made statistical analysis invalid. For the same reason, the faculty group was not divided into disciplines or schools. The size and characteristics of the sample meant that even mean scores of the dependent variables would be of questionable accuracy.

#### Natives of Illinois

Tables 8 and 9 show a relationship between natives of Illinois and level of information and nationalism-internationalism in the aggregate. There is a tendency for natives of Illinois to be slightly less informed than non-natives. Also, natives tend to be nationalist, whereas non-natives tend to be internationalist. Both relationships are of a second level of significance where  $p$  is less than .01.

TABLE 8

Information Level and Natives of Illinois  
(Both Groups--Percentages)

	Information Level	
	High	Low
Natives	15.2	50.6
Non-natives	17.7	16.5

Chi Square = 6.7  
 $p < .01$



TABLE 9

Nationalism-Internationalism and Natives of Illinois  
(Both Groups--Percentages)

	Nationalism	Internationalism
Natives	40.0	26.2
Non-natives	8.7	25.0

Chi Square = 8.4  
p < .01

At first glance, the data seem to indicate that more highly mobile persons tend to be better informed and more internationalist than less mobile individuals. The finding must be qualified, however, by two factors. To some extent, mobility parallels elite group membership. Approximately 94 per cent of the county officials are natives of Illinois. Only 37.5 per cent of the faculty group are natives. This means that level of education and elite group membership are factors in the determination of the relationships between attitudes and mobility (Tables 8 and 9).

#### Organization Membership

The results in Table 10 are slightly below the first order of significance established for this study. A chi square of 3.2 when p is less than .10, however, is close enough to the first order of significance to warrant its inclusion. In the aggregate there is a slight tendency of nationalism to be coincident with relatively low organization membership and internationalism with relatively high organization membership.

The trend is slight, however, especially since the organization membership variable is a combined variable (see Chapter V).

TABLE 10

Nationalism-Internationalism and Organization Membership  
(Both Groups--Percentages)

		Nationalism	Internationalism
Organization Membership	High	18.8	30.0
	Low	30.0	21.2
			Chi Square = 3.2 p < .10

There is no significant relationship between organizational membership and militarism-pacifism or level of information. Further, the relationship between organization membership and nationalism-internationalism is not significant when the aggregate was divided into faculty and county official groups.

#### Party Affiliation


McClosky's study of Democratic and Republican leaders and followers in a nation-wide survey suggests a possible relationship between isolationism and party affiliation. Although McClosky's isolationism scale is somewhat different, and his sample is significantly different, his findings are persuasive enough to warrant testing by this study. McClosky finds a distinct tendency for Republicans to be more isolationist than Democrats, especially among the party leadership. The relationship

is even stronger when level of education is a controlling factor.<sup>60</sup>

The results in Table 11 reinforce McClosky's findings. At a second order of significance, Democrats are more likely to be internationalist; Republicans tend to be nationalist.

TABLE 11

Nationalism-Internationalism and Party Affiliation  
(Both Groups -- Row Percentages)




The relationship in Table 11 does not obtain for the county official group which was divided evenly among nationalists and internationalists. As Table 12 illustrates, however, there is a second order of significance relationship among the faculty group. This may indicate a greater amount of ideological elaboration and consistency among the faculty than among the county officials. At higher levels of education, members of intellectual elites may tend to engage in more cognitive explorations of the implications of their respective party affiliations.

<sup>60</sup>McClosky, *Op. Cit.*, p. 82.

TABLE 12


Nationalism-Internationalism and  
Party Affiliation Among Faculty  
(Row Percentages)



Party affiliation is the independent variable which had the most significant relationship with militarism-pacifism. Table 13 indicates a first order of significance relationship between party affiliation and militarism-pacifism. Democrats are more likely to be relatively pacifist, while Republicans are more likely to be militarist oriented.

TABLE 13

Militarism-Pacifism and Party Affiliation  
(Both Groups--Row Percentages)




As in the relationship of party affiliation to nationalism-internationalism, the relationship obtains for the faculty group, but not as significantly for the county official group. Table 14 shows that the relationship is stronger when elite group membership is a controlled factor. It is important to note that 10.3 per cent of the independents were pacifist. The relationship among the faculty is highly significant. This third order relationship is especially important in view of the fact that no other independent variable in this study correlates as closely with militarism-pacifism. The general trend is present in the county official group, but is less significant.

The display of Tables 11 through 14 with bars representing row percentages aids visual comparison of the amount of overlap among the groups. This is especially helpful when presenting 3x2 tables. Several features become apparent in this arrangement. In Table 11, for example, the chi square result is strongly affected by the occurrence of 100 per cent of independents in the internationalist category. The considerable amount of overlap between the Democrats and Republicans indicates that the relationship is not as significant for the two parties.

Table 14 illustrates a more convincing statistical distribution. There is little overlap between Democrats and Republicans, suggesting that the relationship obtains for the two major parties in the faculty group. The large amount of overlap in the county official group and the low chi square demonstrate a situation in which there is very little

TABLE 14

Militarism-Pacifism and Party Affiliation  
Among Faculty and County Officials  
(Row Percentages)



relationship between the variables.

Level of Education, Social Science Course  
Background, and Elite Group Membership

The independent variables in this section are directly related to the validation of the hypotheses advanced in Chapter III. Information collected about the preceding independent variables provides valuable background for the testing of the hypotheses, but is only indirectly related to them.

Table 15 provides strong support for the hypothesis that more highly educated individuals are more likely to be highly informed. The chi square of the relationship is 10.3 where  $p$  is less than .01. This is a second order of significance according to the criteria of this study.

Close examination of Table 15 indicates that the impact of level of education on level of information is especially noticeable among low levels of education. The highly educated are more evenly divided between high and low information levels. In low levels of education, however, there is a strong tendency for these individuals to also exhibit low information levels. For the aggregate, therefore, it can be said that there is strong support for the hypothesis that level of information varies positively with level of education.

Almond has reported that:

On questions involving knowledge of facts affecting foreign policy it was found that the college-educated contained four or five times as many informed persons as the grade school sample.<sup>61</sup>

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<sup>61</sup>Almond, Op. Cit., p. 127.

TABLE 15

Information Level and Level of Education  
(Both Groups--Percentages)

		Information Level	
		High	Low
Level of Education	High	30.4	38.0
	Low	2.5	29.1

Chi Square = 10.3  
p < .01

The inclusion of high school level respondents in Table 15 undoubtedly tends to make the results of this study less striking than Almond's. The level of significance obtained, however, confirms Almond's initial findings.

When the aggregate is divided into faculty and county official groups, the relationship between level of education and level of information is not as significant. Table 16 indicates a general trend toward the relationship established by Table 15.

In an effort to discover whether the distinction between high and low education might affect the results, the data were retested. For the faculty group the high level of education cut-off became the Ph. D. level instead of the M. A. level. For the county officials, high school became the new cut-off point. No significant changes in the strength of the relationships occurred as a result of these attempts.



TABLE 16

Information Level and Level of Education  
Among Faculty and County Officials  
(Percentages)

		Information Level			
		Faculty		County Official	
		High	Low	High	Low
Level of Education	High	62.5	27.5	10.3	25.6
	Low	2.5	7.5	5.1	59.0
		Chi Square = 3.1 p < .10		Chi Square = 2.9 p < .10	

Two significant inferences are drawn from the analysis of Tables 15 and 16. First, the largest differences in level of information appear to be the result of some college exposure, that is, undergraduate study. Evidently, an increased inclination to be informed about international affairs tapers off after some college work. The differences between the levels of information among individuals with Ph.D. degrees and those with B.A. degrees is not highly significant. Similarly, the difference between individuals with grade school education and those with high school education is of a lower order of significance.

Secondly, these tables indicate that elite group membership is a significant factor in the determination of level of information. In the aggregate, the differences between low levels of education and high levels of information are the greatest. Approximately 20 per cent of the county

officials had completed some college study, whereas 100 per cent of the faculty were in the high level of education category. To some extent, then, this would imply a relationship between elite group membership and level of information. This tendency will be discussed in more detail later in the study. At this point it is sufficient to note that intra-group differences in levels of information are significantly less than differences among the aggregate.

The test illustrated by Table 17 yields a third order of significance relationship between level of education and nationalism-internationalism. For the aggregate, the chi square is 15.8 where  $p$  is less than .001. Under these conditions, the proposition that individuals of high levels of education are more likely to be internationalists is validated. Also, individuals of low levels of education are more likely to be nationalist.

TABLE 17

Nationalism-Internationalism and Level of Education  
(Both Groups--Percentages)

	Nationalism	Internationalism
High	22.5	45.0
Low	26.2	6.3

Chi Square = 15.8  
 $p < .001$

It is important to note that only 6.3 per cent of the respondents are internationalists with low levels of education. The lower right cell

of Table 17 contains the smallest percentage of respondents in the table. This information quite clearly confirms the hypothesis that increased levels of education are positively related to increased internationalism.

The relationship does not appear as strong when the groups are tested separately, however. Table 18 illustrates that a trend toward this relationship exists among county officials, but not among faculty. For the county officials, the hypothesis is strongly supported with a chi square of 4.0 where  $p$  is less than .01.

TABLE 18

Nationalism-Internationalism and Level of Education  
Among Faculty and County Officials

Nationalism-Internationalism					
Faculty (N = 40)			County Official (N = 40)		
		Nationalist	Internationalist	Nationalist	Internationalist
Level of Education	High	42.5	47.5	10	25
	Low	5	5	40	25
Chi Square = .01			Chi Square = 4.0		
$p < .90$			$p < .01$		

Among the county officials, internationalists are equally divided into high and low education levels. The nationalists in this group, however, were much more likely to exhibit low education levels.

In the faculty group, both the high and low education levels were almost equally divided into nationalists and internationalists. From Table 18 it is evident that the faculty group is preponderantly in the

high level of education category. The low frequencies in the low level of education category prompted a resort of the data along the lines described previously under the level of information variable. No significant change in the chi square of the test resulted after re-establishing cut-off points.

As mentioned before, this lack of a high level of significance among the faculty group may indicate that increased tendencies toward internationalism taper off after initial exposure to college education. Because the differences noted in the aggregate are more significant than when elite group membership is controlled for, this implies that group membership has an impact on nationalism-internationalism.

In an effort to discern the impact of social science courses on level of information, the test illustrated by Table 19 was performed. The test produced a chi square of 19.3 where  $p$  is less than .001. This is well over a third order of significance. The hypothesis that individuals with relatively high levels of social science course background are more likely to be well informed is validated. The relationship is especially evident at low levels of social science background. Only 5.1 per cent of respondents exhibited low social science background and high levels of information in the aggregate. On the other hand, 45.6 per cent of respondents from low social science backgrounds were in the low information level category. Among respondents from high social science backgrounds, the difference between high and low information levels is not as large.

TABLE 19

Information Level and Social Science Course Background  
(Both Groups--Percentages)

		Information Level	
		High	Low
Social Science Background	High	27.8	21.5
	Low	5.1	45.6

Chi Square = 19.3  
p < .001

The same trend is present when the aggregate is divided into the two elite groups. As in previous tests, the significance in the faculty group is much lower than either the aggregate or the county official group. The faculty group yielded a chi square of 1.0, but the county official group produced a chi square of 4.3. Because the questionnaire did not distinguish between types of social science courses, it is impossible to determine whether there is an actual quantitative limit where social science courses cease contributing to increased levels of information or whether the specific subject area of courses influences levels of information. In the aggregate, however, the positive influence of social science course background on internationalism is evident.

The results presented in Table 20 support the hypothesis that individuals from high levels of social science background are more likely to be internationalist. For the aggregate, the test obtained a chi square of 12.9 where p is less than .001.

TABLE 20

Nationalism-Internationalism and Social Science Course Background  
(Both Groups -- Percentages)

		Nationalism	Internationalism
Social Science Course Background	High	13.7	35.0
	Low	35.0	16.2

Chi Square = 12.9  
p < .001

Within the two elite groups the positive relationship between social science background and internationalism is less significant. A chi square of 4.3 where p is less than .01 was obtained from the county official group. In this case, the hypothesis is strongly supported. Possibly because the questionnaire does not have sufficient discriminatory powers at very high levels of social science course background, no significance was determined from the faculty group. Again, it is worthwhile mentioning that internationalism may increase up to a certain level of social science course background and then stabilize at a given level. Also, types of courses may be important in determining the impact of this variable on internationalism.

The results presented in Table 21 provide strong support for the hypothesis that level of information is dependent on specific elite group membership. A chi square of 10.7 where p is less than .01 establishes a second order of significance for this relationship.<sup>62</sup> Faculty mem-

<sup>62</sup>A chi square of 10.7 is .1 away from a third order relationship.

bers were evenly divided into high and low level respondents. The county officials, however, were much more likely to be in the low level of information category. Approximately 84 per cent of the county officials scored below the aggregate mean on the level of information scale.

TABLE 21

Information Level and Elite Group Membership  
(Both Groups--Percentages)

	Information Level	
	High	Low
Faculty	25.3	25.3
County Officials	7.6	41.8

Chi Square = 10.7  
 $p < .01$

Evidence presented earlier in this chapter demonstrated that the mean score of the county official group on the IL scale was slightly higher than the faculty mean score. It was also noted that the standard deviation of the county official group was much larger than that of the faculty group. Combined with Table 21, this indicates that the few county officials who scored above the mean on the IL scale scored very high. The remainder either scored on or closely below the mean. The distribution of the faculty group around the mean appears more "normal", although the curve is rather steeply sloped.

Table 22 illustrates the relationship which is the most significant of all those that were tested in this study. This test yielded a chi

square of 22.0 where  $p$  is less than .001. The hypothesis that nationalism-internationalism is dependent on specific elite group membership is validated. The faculty group consistently tended to be more internationalist than the county official group. The county official group were consistently more nationalist than the faculty group. On the basis of the information in this study, elite group memberships appear to be the single most important factor in the determination of nationalism-internationalism.

TABLE 22

Nationalism-Internationalism and Elite Group Membership  
(Both Groups--Percentages)

	Nationalism	Internationalism
Faculty	11.2	38.7
County Official	37.5	12.5
		Chi Square = 22.0 $p < .001$

This striking relationship is the result of the combination of a number of factors. High levels of mobility, education, social science course background, and organization membership, all of which are more or less associated with internationalism, are exhibited by the faculty group. Similarly, low levels of these variables, which are associated with nationalism, are apparent in the county official group. The combination of these factors, however, falls short of totally explaining the very strong relationship between elite group membership and nationalism-



internationalism. Clearly, elite group membership in itself is an additional and important variable in the determination of nationalist or internationalist attitudes.

## CHAPTER VII

### CONCLUSION

This paper offers support for the contention that demographic variables are significant determinants of political attitudes. Experience gained in this study also provides the basis for suggestions for further research in this area, especially in view of the following conclusions.

The significant relationship between high levels of formal education and internationalist dispositions is an important finding for foreign policy decision-making analysis. For instance, one might speculate that as the average level of education in a nation increases, the more difficult it would become for leadership to gain public acceptance of strictly nationalist-oriented foreign policies. In this circumstance, increasingly internationalist foreign policies would coincide more closely with existing attitudes.

The results in this study indicate that a more highly educated electorate is also likely to be better informed about foreign affairs. Generally high levels of information among the electorate in a democracy might result in more careful scrutiny of proposed foreign policies.

This would tend to make policy makers responsible for more extensive and open justification of their proposals and actions.

Considered with the other findings, the strong relationship between elite group membership and foreign affairs dispositions carries important implications. To some extent, foreign policy is formulated in the context of the values and attitudes of the electorate. This study indicates that at least some of the attitudes are determined by factors which are beyond the immediate control of any one administration. Furthermore, the large number and variety of elite groups in the United States indicates the difficulties that leaders encounter when attempting to formulate a consensus of opinion on a particular foreign policy issue.

This not only underscores the complexity of a President's task of opinion leading, but also may indicate the extent to which an administration is limited in the range of foreign policy alternatives that it may adopt. The illustration that foreign affairs dispositions are at least partially determined by demographic variables therefore implies that the task of a foreign policy decision-maker is to opt for the policy which most closely coincides with the dispositions of most of the electorate.

This is somewhat analogous to the mathematical problem of calculating the position of a straight line through a field of points so that the line is as close as possible to every point. The decision-maker's problem is considerably more complex because he has more "points" to deal with, and they may be slowly moving as he attempts his calculation.

Of course, a good number of alternative policies are precluded by the strategies of the particular international situation. Also, the possibility of secret foreign policy moves means that the dispositions of the electorate are not necessarily equally relevant in all situations.

It should be noted that these findings do not deny a President's ability to form and lead public opinion on foreign policy. The decision to emphasize one issue instead of another, for example, no doubt molds opinion to some extent. These findings, however, indicate that an administration operates within definable parameters of public disposition that it can violate only at a risk to its acceptability to the electorate. The parameters may shift gradually as level of education and group membership change, but it is probably safe to propose that their control is beyond the capability of even a two-term administration.

Better substantiation of these conclusions would involve research in the area of public opinion-foreign policy linkages. Research in this area would attempt to discover a relationship between public opinion content and foreign policy content over a specific period of time. Further research at the level of analysis employed by this study, however, might use several refinements in technique. More extensive and more precise survey research would allow one to advance the previous conclusions with fewer qualifications and greater certainty.

Two variables, social science course background and organization membership, illustrate one of the most significant problems for this study. In both cases, the causal flow of the relationship might run

in the opposite direction. Specifically, it may be the case that individuals of internationalist disposition tend to enroll in more social science courses and join more voluntary organizations. Also, the flow may run in both directions, where the attitude encourages the activity, and the activity reinforces the attitude.

More extensive studies of parent-child samples and pre-college followed by post-college tests would contribute to a better understanding of these relationships. Research designed to establish the relationship between nationalism-internationalism and other political and social attitudes might short cut this problem somewhat. Although the existence and direction of a cause-effect relationship is debatable, the significance of the relationships illustrates that the variables are useful indicators of existing attitudes.

The factor separating truly useful indicators from merely interesting ones is the conceptual and operational precision of the measuring instrument. It may be noted without embarrassment that the instruments and scales employed in this study could be refined considerably. For instance, if all scales had been interval, linear regression analysis would have been possible. This would have added a degree of statistical precision to the final product. Even though the scales had been extensively pre-tested, they could have been changed in some cases to good advantage. Larger samples would yield more reliable results. The list of possible improvements and modifications is perhaps endless.

One of the purposes of this study, however, was to determine

whether these specific sets of variables merit further and more sophisticated investigation. The existence of highly significant relationships at this level of sophistication justifies the use of more refined methods and more extensive procedures for further research in this area.

**APPENDIX A**

The survey that you have been asked to participate in is being done in partial fulfillment of the requirements for a Masters Degree at Eastern Illinois University. The results of your questionnaire will be kept completely confidential. Eventually the information from over one hundred such questionnaires will be compiled for academic purposes. This study will not express any individual's opinion, but rather considers opinions of groups of people: For instance, older people's versus younger people's opinions, and men's versus women's opinions.

In its completed form, this study will be on file in Booth Library at Eastern Illinois University as of December 1, 1971. If you wish, you may read the results in Booth after that date.

You have been selected by techniques which make it important that you in particular respond to the questionnaire. Your cooperation is invaluable and will be greatly appreciated.

Thank You,

Charles R. Burns  
Graduate Student  
Department of Political Science  
Eastern Illinois University



FOREIGN AFFAIRS SURVEY  
EASTERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY  
SUMMER 1971

## INSTRUCTIONS TO INTERVIEWERS

1. Your directions on the questionnaire are enclosed in boxes. During an interview read the entire questionnaire word for word, except those directions enclosed in boxes.
2. Read the statements slowly and clearly. If the respondent does not understand a statement or some instruction, reread the statement or instruction without changing a word.
3. Be certain that the cards used by the respondent are returned to you immediately.
4. Get a response for each question and fill in each blank on the answer sheet with a pen.
5. Mark each block plainly; write the occupation and academic discipline response legibly.
6. Don't forget to enter the case number and your number on the answer sheet.
7. If you have any problems; in the event that anyone questions your credentials, call the Political Science Department.
8. Smile.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS QUESTIONNAIRE  
EASTERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY  
SUMMER 1971

INTRODUCTION: HELLO...I'M AN INTERVIEWER FROM EASTERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY. THEY'RE DOING A STUDY OF SOME OF THE OPINIONS THAT PEOPLE HAVE ABOUT INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS.

THE FOLLOWING ARE STATEMENTS WITH WHICH SOME PEOPLE AGREE AND OTHERS DISAGREE. PLEASE TELL ME THE AMOUNT OF YOUR AGREEMENT OR DISAGREEMENT WITH EACH ONE AFTER I READ IT, BY USING THIS CARD.

HAND CARD:

1. We need more leaders who have the morals and strength to put national honor above appeasement.
2. If it weren't for Russia and her satellites, the world would be headed for peace and prosperity by now.
- \*3. In the long run, it would be to our best interest as a nation to spend less money for military purposes and more money for education, housing and other social improvements.
4. The immigration of foreigners to this country should be kept down so that we can provide for Americans first.
5. The only way peace can be maintained is to keep America so powerful and well armed that no other nation will dare attack us.
- \*6. Our best policy in Viet Nam would be to forget about the Saigon government and work for an agreement with the Communists.
7. If the United Nations doesn't show more signs of getting rough with Russia soon, America must be prepared to carry on the fight by itself.
8. While we should give military aid to countries which are prepared to fight our enemies, we ought to cut down on foreign economic help, or else the other countries will just play us for a sucker.
9. In these troubled times, if we are to be strong and united against our common enemy, we must have more laws and safeguards against the spreading of dangerous ideas.
- \*10. One main trouble with American foreign policy today is that there is too much concern with military force and too little concern with political negotiation and economic reconstruction.

11. In view of America's material and moral superiority, it is only right that we should have the biggest say in deciding United Nations policy.
- \*12. The first principle of our foreign policy should be to join forces with any country even if it is not very democratic, just as long as it is strongly anti-Communist.

TAKE CARD BACK:

THE PURPOSE OF THE NEXT GROUP OF QUESTIONS IS TO MEASURE DIFFERENCES IN OPINIONS RELATING TO PEACE AND WAR. THE STATEMENTS EXPRESS VARIOUS DEGREES OF OPINION ABOUT MILITARISM-PACIFISM.

AFTER I READ EACH STATEMENT, TELL IF, ON THE WHOLE YOU AGREE WITH THE STATEMENT, OR IF, ON THE WHOLE YOU DISAGREE WITH THE SENTIMENT OF THE STATEMENT. PLEASE RESPOND TO EACH STATEMENT EVEN IF IT SEEMS AMBIGUOUS AND YOU HAVE TO MAKE SOME SORT OF GUESS.

MARK A PLUS SIGN ON THE ANSWER SHEET FOR AGREEMENT, AND A MINUS SIGN TO INDICATE DISAGREEMENT.

13. Multitudes are benefited by learning the lesson of wartime discipline.
14. Army discipline injures self-respect and individuality.
15. It is the moral duty of the individual to refuse to participate in any war, no matter what the cause.
16. For the liberty of oppressed nations wars should be fought.
17. It is impossible to have a large military force without being tempted to use it.
18. So long as any people, white, black, brown or yellow hold weapons in their hands, we must not commit the folly of disarming.
19. No scheme of aggression or conquest can be pursued for any considerable length of time without enfeebling victor as well as vanquished.
20. There is no progress without war.
21. If armed conflict between individuals and cities can be outlawed, it is possible to outlaw armed conflict between nations.
22. Military training is imperative, but it should be voluntary.

23. A host of young men entered the war in a spirit of idealism and unselfish devotion to a great cause, only to return disillusioned and cynical as to the value of ideals.
24. Peace and war are both essential to progress.

THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS CAN BE COMPLETED BY ONE OF FOUR CHOICES THAT WILL BE READ AFTER EACH STATEMENT. CHOOSE THE ONE THAT YOU THINK IS MOST CORRECT FOR EACH STATEMENT. IF YOU HAVEN'T HAD TIME TO READ ABOUT OR HAVEN'T HEARD ABOUT ONE OF THE STATEMENTS MAKE SOME SORT OF GUESS.

25. The name of the current Secretary-General of the United Nations is: A. Arthur Goldberg; B. David K. Bruce; C. U Thant; D. William J. Fullbright.
26. The following country is not a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO): A. The United Kingdom; B. France; C. Sweden; D. The United States.
27. The Warsaw Pact might be considered the East European equivalent to: A. SEATO; B. NATO; C. The UN; D. EEC.
28. A recent move by President Nixon to improve United States' relations with Red China has been: A. Breaking diplomatic relations with Nationalist China; B. Sending foreign aid to mainland China; C. Easing some trade restrictions with mainland China; D. Sending an official delegation to both mainland and Nationalist China.
29. The principal participants in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) are: A. The United States and France; B. France and The Soviet Union; C. Germany and The Soviet Union; D. The United States and The Soviet Union.
30. One of the main goals of United States foreign policy in the Middle East has been: A. The return of the Golan Heights; B. Confrontation with the Soviet Union whenever possible; C. Increasing the stability of the current cease-fire situation; D. Opening of the Suez Canal under Israeli supervision.
31. The Alliance For Progress was the framework for a United States foreign policy directed at countries in: A. South America; B. Africa; C. Eastern Europe; D. Southeast Asia.
32. According to the "Domino Theory" of international relations, allowing one country in Southeast Asia to become controlled by the Communists would result in: A. Worldwide Communist takeover; B. Other countries thinking that the United States is weak; C. Economic ruin.

of the neighboring countries; D. Communist takeover in the neighboring countries.

33. One of the main obstacles to nuclear disarmament is: A. France's refusal to sign the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty; B. Failure to agree on the terms of inspections; C. Continued underground nuclear testing by the Soviet Union; D. Repeated nuclear threats by Red China.
34. The chief delegate to the Paris Peace talks for the Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG) is: A. Le Duc Tho; B. Nguyen Cao Ky; C. Mme. Nguyen Thi Binh; D. General Khan.
35. The General Assembly of the United Nations can act on a issue when the Security Council is deadlocked in a veto under the provisions of: A. The Grand Alliance; B. The Essentials of Peace Resolution; C. The Uniting for Peace Resolution; D. The Troika Plan.
36. The five nation Andean Pact is designed to: A. Limit foreign investment in South America; B. Provide for the common defense of South American countries on both sides of the Andes; C. Establish a sort of Common Market in South America; D. Impose economic hardships on the United States by means of a limited boycott.

IN ORDER TO COMPLETE THIS STUDY, SOME INFORMATION ABOUT YOU IS NECESSARY. PLEASE ANSWER THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS AS ACCURATELY AS POSSIBLE.

37. Do you consider yourself: A. Very interested in foreign affairs; B. Moderately interested; C. Interested, but not informed; D. Not at all interested?
38. Do you read newspapers regularly?
39. Do you listen to the news on the radio or television regularly?
40. Do you consider yourself a native of Illinois?
41. About how many professional organizations do you belong to?
42. About how many civic organizations do you belong to?
43. About how many fraternal organizations do you belong to?
44. What is your primary occupation?

OBTAIN A DEFINITE ANSWER. IF RESPONDENT IS A TEACHER, CONTINUE WITH QUESTION #45; IF NOT, PROCEED TO QUESTION #46.

45. What is your academic discipline?

46. HAND RESPONDENT CARD #2: Looking at this card just give me the letter of the group which describes how much school you have completed.

IF RESPONSE IS "D" THRU "G" ASK QUESTION #47; IF NOT, PROCEED TO QUESTION #48.

47. About how many courses did you have in the social sciences?

48. In politics do you consider yourself a Democrat or a Republican, or a member of some other party?

IF RESPONSE IS "INDEPENDENT", ASK QUESTION #49; IF NOT, PROCEED TO QUESTION #50.

49. Would you say that you lean more toward the Republican side or toward the Democratic side?

IF RESPONSE IS STILL "INDEPENDENT", RECORD IT AS SUCH.

50. What is your age in years? IF NO RESPONSE, ENTER AN ESTIMATE.

51. What is your marital status?

52. ENTER WHETHER RESPONDENT IS MALE OR FEMALE.

53. ENTER CASE NUMBER.

54. ENTER INTERVIEWER NUMBER.

55. IS RESPONDENT: A. A MEMBER OF EIU FACULTY; B. COUNTY OFFICIAL?

56. IF RESPONDENT IS A COUNTY OFFICIAL ASK: How many years have you been an elected county official?

TELL THE INTERVIEWER THE AMOUNT OF YOUR AGREEMENT OR DISAGREEMENT WITH EACH STATEMENT THAT HE READS BY CHOOSING THE NUMBER OPPOSITE THE PHRASE THAT BEST EXPRESSES YOUR OPINION:

- |                                 |                                   |
|---------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| +1: Slightly support, agreement | -1: Slight opposition, disagree   |
| +2: Moderate support, agreement | -2: Moderate opposition, disagree |
| +3: Strong support, agreement   | -3: Strong opposition, disagree   |

PLEASE RETURN THIS CARD TO THE INTERVIEWER

TELL THE INTERVIEWER THE LETTER OF THE GROUP WHICH DESCRIBES HOW MUCH SCHOOL YOU HAVE COMPLETED:

- A. 0-8 years
- B. Some High School
- C. Completed High School
- D. Some College
- E. Completed College
- F. Graduate Degree (MA Level)
- G. Graduate Degree (Ph.D. Level)

PLEASE RETURN THIS CARD TO THE INTERVIEWER



CHOOSE THE ANSWER THAT YOU THINK BEST COMPLETES THE STATEMENT THAT IS READ BY THE INTERVIEWER:

25. A. Arthur Goldberg; B. David K. Bruce; C. U Thant; D. William J. Fullbright.
26. A. The United Kingdom; B. France; C. Sweden; D. The United States.
27. A. SEATO; B. NATO; C. The UN; D. EEC.
28. A. Breaking diplomatic relations with Nationalist China; B. Sending foreign aid to mainland China; C. Easing some trade restrictions with mainland China; D. Sending an official delegation to both mainland and Nationalist China.
29. A. The United States and France; B. France and the Soviet Union; C. Germany and the Soviet Union; D. The United States and the Soviet Union.
30. A. The return of the Golan Heights; B. Confrontation with the Soviet Union whenever possible; C. Increasing the stability of the current cease-fire situation; D. Opening of the Suez Canal under Israeli supervision.
31. A. South America; B. Africa; C. Eastern Europe; D. Southeast Asia.
32. A. Worldwide Communist takeover; B. Other countries thinking that the United States is weak; C. Economic ruin of the neighboring countries; D. Communist takeover in the neighboring countries.
33. A. France's refusal to sign the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty; B. Failure to agree on the terms of inspections; C. Continued underground nuclear testing by the Soviet Union; D. Repeated nuclear threats by Red China.
34. A. Le Duc Tho; B. Nguyen Cao Ky; C. Mme. Nguyen Thi Binh; D. General Khan.
35. A. The Grand Alliance; B. The Essentials of Peace Resolution; C. The Uniting for Peace Resolution; D. The Troika Plan.
36. A. Limit foreign investment in South America; B. Provide for the common defense of South American countries on both sides of the Andes; C. Establish a sort of Common Market in South America; D. Impose economic hardships on the United States by means of a limited boycott.

PLEASE RETURN THIS LIST TO THE INTERVIEWER

## ANSWER SHEET

	+3	+2	+1	NR	-1	-2	-3	A	B	C	D			
1								25						
2								26						
3								27						
4								28						
5								29						
6								30						
7								31						
8								32						
9								33						
10								34						
11								35						
12								36						
	+	-	NR					37	A	B	C	D		
13	5							38	Yes			No		
14	15							39	Yes			No		
15	21							40	Yes			No		
16	6							41						
17	13							42						
18	4							43						
19	13							44						
20	0							45						
21	14			52	M	F		46						
22	7			53				47						
23	15			54				48	D	R	I	NR		
24	9			55	A	B		49	D	R	I	NR		
				56				50						
				57				51	S	M	D	SP.	W	NR

CODE BOOK  
FOREIGN AFFAIRS SURVEY  
SUMMER 1971

CODING INSTRUCTIONS<sup>63</sup>

If quantitative values are of fewer digits than available columns, preface values with zeroes to fill all columns.

Column Numbers  
and Variables

## Procedure

C1 - C3

Add scores of numbers 1-12 using the following equivalent numbers:

+3	+2	+1	NR	-1	-2	-3
7	6	5	4	3	2	1
*1	2	3	4	5	6	7

\*Note: Equivalency scale is reverse for starred items.

Determine the mean value of the total score and multiply by ten.

Enter result in C1 - C3.

SKIP C4

C5 - C7

Add equivalent numbers in items 12-24 which show a check in the plus (+) column.

Enter result in C5 - C7.

SKIP C8

C9 - C11

Add five points for each correct answer in items 25-36.

Enter total in C9 - C11.

SKIP C12

---

<sup>63</sup>These procedures were developed to transfer the data to computer punch cards.

The procedures outlined were considerably simplified in actual field work by the use of a relatively simple scoring key which fitted over the answer sheet.

## CODING INSTRUCTIONS (Continued)

Column Numbers and Variables	Procedure
C13	Enter checked value:  A = 1; B = 2; C = 3; D = 4.
C14, C15, C16	Enter "1" for Yes; "2" for No in C14, C15, C16 respectively.
C17	Add values of items 41 - 43 and enter result in C17.  Note: If value is greater than "9", enter "9" in C17.
SKIP C18	
C19 - 21	Consult occupation equivalencies and enter equivalent numbers in C19 - C21.
SKIP C22	
C23 Academic Discipline	Consult any discipline equivalencies and enter equivalent number in C23.
C24 Level of Education	Convert value in Item 46 by consulting Level of Education Equivalencies and enter equiva- lent number in C24.
C25 Courses in Social Sciences	Enter value in item 47 in C25.  If value is greater than "9", enter "9".  If blank, enter "0".
SKIP C26	
C27 Party Affiliation	For items 48 - 49, enter the following value in C27: D = 1; R = 2; I = 3; NR = 4.
SKIP C28	
C29 - 31 Age	Enter value of Item 50 in C29 - 31.

## CODING INSTRUCTIONS (Continued)

Column Numbers and Variables	Procedure
SKIP C32	
C33 Marital Status	For item 51 enter the following values in C33: S = 1; M = 2; D = 3; Sp = 4; W = 5; NR = 6.
C34 Sex	For item 52 enter the following value in C34: M = 1; F = 2.
SKIP C35	
C36 - C38 Case Number	For item 53 enter value in C36 - C38.
SKIP C39	
C40 - C42 Interviewer Number	For item 54 enter value in C40 - C42.
SKIP C43	
C44 Faculty or County Official Group	For item 55 enter the following values: A = 1; B = 2.
SKIP C45	
C46 - C48 Years of Teaching Experience	For item 56 enter appearing values If less than one year, enter "001". For any part of a year, enter next highest year. If blank, enter "000" in C46 - C48.
SKIP C49	
C50 - C52 Years in Public Office	For item 57 enter appearing values. If less than one year, enter "001". For any part of a year, enter "001". If blank, enter "000" in C50 - C52.

## CODING INSTRUCTIONS (Continued)

Column Numbers  
and Variables

Procedure

C54 - C58

Enter "08071" (Date and Project Code) in  
C54 - C58 for all cards.

OCCUPATION EQUIVALENCIES<sup>64</sup> C19 - C21

Equivalency	Occupation
001	Professional and technical.
002	Farmers and farm managers.
003	Managers, officials, and proprietors.
004	Clerical workers.
005	Sales workers.
006	Craftsmen and foremen.
007	Operatives.
008	Private household workers.
009	Service workers.
010	Farm laborers and foremen.
011	Laborers, except farm and mine.
012	Students.
013	Housewives.
014	Retired, Unemployed, and Widows.

---

<sup>64</sup>Adapted from Backstrom and Hursch, Op. Cit., pp. 99-101.



## DISCIPLINE EQUIVALENCIES C23

Equivalent Number	Academic Discipline
1	<u>College of Letters and Science.</u> Political Science; Sociology and Anthropology; History; Economics; Physiology; Botany; Zoology; Life Science; Physics; Chemistry; Geology and Geography; Mathematics; Philosophy; Art; Theatre Arts; Speech; Languages and Literature.
2	Faculty of Education
3	<u>School of Business.</u> Accounting; Business Education and Secretarial Studies; Management; Marketing; Graduate School of Business.
4	School of Health, Physical Education and Recreation
5	School of Home Economics
6	School of Industrial Arts and Technology
7	School of Music

## LEVEL OF EDUCATION EQUIVALENCIES C24

Equivalent Number	Answer Sheet Response	Level of Education
1	A	0 - 8 years
2	B	Some High School
3	C	Completed High School
4	D	Some College
5	E	Completed College
6	F	Graduate Degree (MA level)
7	G	Graduate Degree (Ph.D. level)

**APPENDIX B**

TABLE 23

Quantitative Characteristics of Elite Groups  
And Aggregate Sample

	Mean	S.D.	S.E.	Range
<u>Aggregate</u>				
Nationalism-Internationalism	9.9	10.9	1.2	45
Militarism-Pacifism	55.3	20.5	2.3	90
Information Level	40.8	45.3	5.1	30
Organization Membership	4.6	3.3	.4	9
Age	47.1	12.3	1.4	75
Social Science Background	3.8	3.6	.4	9
<u>Faculty</u>				
Nationalism-Internationalism	34.2	10.0	1.6	45
Militarism-Pacifism	56.0	20.5	3.2	90
Information Level	40.4	8.4	1.3	35
Organization Membership	5.9	2.9	.5	9
Age	42.6	12.4	2.0	62
Social Science Background	6.5	2.7	.4	9
Experience	11.5	8.0	1.3	30
<u>County Officials</u>				
Nationalism-Internationalism	45.5	8.6	1.4	37
Militarism-Pacifism	54.7	20.8	3.3	84
Information Level	41.2	63.9	10.1	70
Organization Membership	3.3	3.0	.5	9
Age	1.2	2.2	.4	9
Social Science Background	51.6	10.6	1.7	42
Experience	11.8	20.3	3.2	25

Figure 7

Attitudinal Distribution of Faculty Over  
Nationalism-Internationalism and  
Militarism-Pacifism Scales





Figure 8

Attitudinal Distribution of County Officials  
Over Nationalism-Internationalism and  
Militarism-Pacifism Scales



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## BIBLIOGRAPHY

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