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The Economic and Psychological Metrics of Political Decision-Making

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THE ECONOMIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL METRICS OF POLITICAL DECISION-

MAKING

by

Allyson L. Eslin

A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for a Degree with Honors
(Political Science, Psychology, & Economics)

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ABSTRACT

This project investigates what economic and psychological attributes influence Maine voters in their political decision-making. I examine how two typically separate disciplines—economics and psychology—combine, in order to understand unique characteristics that inform a voter's political decision-making. This knowledge is vital to the legislators who seek to understand and represent the people who elected them.

I examine the impact of *economic stress* on important political attitudes, a metric that has never been used to examine Maine voters. To gather this data, approximately 2,000 Maine residents were surveyed in 2013 using a questionnaire delivered through the mail. Using inferential statistics and regression analysis to control for confounding variables, the political ideology of participants—and its relationship to their *economic stress*—is examined. Though these issues have been examined in relation to feelings of an internalized "sense of control" and its correlation with conservatism or liberalism (Schlenker et al., 2012), the literature informing Maine decision-makers on the socio-fiscal perceptions of their particular constituents is sparse. This is particularly topical, as in today's intensely polarized political climate, Maine plays a unique role as a "purple" state in deciding even *national* elections.

It is this gap that this research hopes to fill, helping Maine lawmakers to better understand how their constituents reach these crucial political decisions — and how their circumstances may feed into these choices and needs.

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*For my parents, whose love, sacrifice, and support is
the reason I dare to dream.*

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES

LIST OF FIGURES

INTRODUCTION

"Let us not be afraid to help each other—let us never forget that government is ourselves and not an alien power over us. The ultimate rulers of our democracy are not a President and Senators and Congressmen and Government officials but the voters of this country."

President Franklin Delano Roosevelt's 1938 words to the citizens of

Marietta, Ohio capture both the beauty—and the challenge—facing politically

active citizens everywhere. What are they to do with fiscal and social policy

when no one can seem to agree on a thing?

It's particularly difficult in a country like the United States, where it is not

the government, a select group of "untouchable" linchpins, who are ultimately the

rulers of the nation so many endeavor to understand—no, it is the more than two

hundred million disparate and passionate individuals who comprise the American

electorate.

Voters in the United States are deeply divided by a number of factors that

are heavily documented and well understood by the broader academic

community—from neurocognitive structural disparities (Amodio et al., 2007) to

issues of personality (Carney et al., 2008). But there are a number of areas that

remain unexplored. One such area is in the relationship between a citizen's

(actual and perceived) *economic stress* and their position on the continuum

measuring both fiscal and social political ideology. The target of this research is to define

and quantify such a relationship (particularly as the United States struggles to understand

the underpinnings of its polarized and politicized electorate) so that compromises and

understanding can be reached between political opponents.

TERMINOLOGY AND DEFINITIONS

Fiscal ideology generally identifies a consistently held perspective about how the economy should be managed (Parkins, 2008). A broad brush conservative or neoconservative perspective, in this instance, would exhibit a tendency towards the preference of "restriction" in the majority of situations calling for government expenditures (Plotkin et al., 2000), emphasizing the elimination— rather than creation— of additional spending.

A definition of *ideology* as a whole is more difficult to pinpoint. A 1997 article by John Gerring argues that the definition of ideology is one that is ever-changing, unified only by a concept of "cohesiveness" and "coherence' between an individual's views. Here it will be understood in the context of Seliger's 1976 definition: "Sets of ideas by which men posit, explain and justify ends and means of organised social action, and specifically political action, irrespective of whether such action aims to preserve, amend, uproot or rebuild a given social order" (11).

In the context of a *social ideology*, this takes on the additional quality of explaining attitudes about the "social" phenomenon monopolizing the attention of the electorate—issues that require a determination of values and concern for a broader social order. This includes hot-button topics such as: when life begins, what constitutes marriage, and to what degree personal freedoms—like privacy and gun ownership—can be legislated about or infringed upon.

Finally, there is the issue of defining *economic stress*. *Economic stress* can be understood best in the context of Dr. Blair Wheaton's acclaimed 51-item stress model, measuring both the stress from certain specific life events and chronic stress. A persistent

sense of *economic stress* is a chronic life stressor that could be considered a "sub-stressor" in this context, and its factor (the calculation of which will demonstrated in the "Materials and Methods" section below) is composed of a number of Wheaton's items (Wheaton, 1994).

In this work, then, a participant's sense of *economic stress* has two distinct measurements.

The first measurement, an "economic stress factor"—the calculation of which was touched on above—was created using the questions influenced by Wheaton's work. And though it is still constructed using self-report items, it is a more "objective" and less direct measurement of each participant's *economic stress* than the second measurement.

The second measurement involves a participant directly reporting their fiscal stability by reporting their self-perceived "community status" on a ladder. An example of this self-report item can also be seen in the section below.

The concept of a need for both "control" and "security"—particularly the security of general safety and health—as well as the avoidance of stress, has been the focus of innumerable psychological and political analyses (Maslow, 1943; Doyal, Len & Gough, 1991), but its connection to political decision-making and economic well-being is more tenuous.

This project aims not only to expand this limited understanding of how one's *economic stress* can be quantified and measured, but also how it relates to a particularly understudied group of voters in a state whose role in the political process is crucial and difficult to predict.

LITERATURE

In the scholarly work used to inform this research, distinctions were made between three similar, but meaningfully different, psychological underpinnings and their role in explaining why a "moderate to strong conservatism" is common for those facing any sort of existential or personal threat.

1.0. Security

1.1. Defining Security

Security, in its simplest form, and like many of the definitions presented in this thesis, is difficult to define because of its extraordinarily large scope. "Owing to this [security's] multidimensional nature, the concept of security is difficult to define," according to a 2010 article by David Brooks in the *Security Journal*. But, as he later clarifies, it may be better understood when given a particular and focused context.

Let us then apply this context. The context of "security" for this research is oriented around citizen's feelings of economic and social confidence. Are citizens hindered by feelings of either economic (financial) or social (emotional and physical) insecurity/stress? Does this impact their ideological leanings? What does the literature suggest about how strongly ideology may be impacted by a need (or lack thereof) for security?

1.2. Who Wants Security, and Who Are They Really?

Several overarching themes emerge within this examination, the first of which is the link between an attraction to authoritarian tendencies and various aspects of a citizen's ideology and personality. In fact, one of these links is quite obviously a result of a citizen's need for security. As, according to the literature, it is the absence of security—

fear—that can perpetuate the development of an extremist right-wing personality in the first place.

"...Aggression, fear, and reverence for authority are the ingredients that fuel right-wing authoritarian movements," according to Altemeyer's 1988 exploration of right-wing authoritarianism, "Enemies of freedom: Understanding right-wing authoritarianism." Fear, the antithesis of security, is a primary ingredient in a sinister authoritarian cocktail.

Authoritarianism is strongly linked with fear, and the visceral avoidance of the deep discomfort that accompanies it [fear] works well with the prevailing idea that conservatives naturally seek conformity, closure, and security. A need that is demonstrated even in countries outside of the United States, like Italy (Chirumbolo, 2002).

This is also articulated in Malka et. al's "Do Needs for Security and Certainty Predict Cultural and Economic Conservatism? A Cross-National Analysis," a study conducted in 2014 for the *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*: "The personality characteristics most commonly identified as predictors of political orientation have been referred to collectively as needs to manage uncertainty and threat (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003; Jost et al., 2007) or needs for security and certainty (NSC; Johnston, 2012a, 2012b)," it says.

The need to manage uncertainty and threat, or the needs for security and certainty (NSC), tie together well the otherwise disparate psychological phenomena discussed in this literature review.

The article further elaborates. "Indeed, a long-running theoretical tradition posits a natural link between right-wing, or conservative, ideology and a psychological pattern

involving aversion to novelty, complexity, and stimulation; valuing of social conformity, obedience, and order; and strong concern with threat and security (e.g., Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950; Jost et al., 2003; Rokeach, 1960)."

It is important to note, however, that the article questions how strong this relationship actually is, and if the prevailing wisdom has overstated the correlation between these personality traits and the strength of ideological conservatism. And while innumerable sources offer evidence about the strength of this relationship, many of which are cited in the article itself, the authors' own results help identify crucial mitigating factors in this yearning for conformity and security among conservatives: things like political engagement and regional background.

"Analyses with cross-national data from 51 nations reveal that valuing conformity, security, and tradition over self-direction and stimulation (a) predicts ideological self-placement on the political right, but only among people high in political engagement and within relatively developed nations, ideologically constrained nations, and non-Eastern European nations," they clarify.

Conservatives also value different things, even beyond security and conformity, than their more liberal counterparts. While liberal constituents are friendlier and more open, conservative constituents are more conscientious and higher energy. Conservatives value security, power, achievement, conformity, and tradition—according to Caprara et al.'s 2006 assessment in the journal of *Political Psychology*, at least. Conversely, liberals like universalism, benevolence, and self-direction.

Carney et al. 2008, elaborate on even further personality divides between conservatives and liberals. Liberals, they find, are "open-minded, creative, curious and

6

novelty seeking" whereas conservatives are "orderly, conventional, and organized."

Conservatives are also more apt to confront aversive stimuli, like threats to security, than

liberals—who are content with simply interacting with pleasing stimuli (Dodd et al.,

2012).

So does security play a significant role in ideology? The consensus is that it

does—though its role may have been overstated and mythologized over time.

Conservatives do seem to consistently value very different things than liberals do,

however, and this includes security—but it also includes conformity, tradition, and

orderliness.

Conservatives, then, seek security. How this may manifest is not totally explored,

but it seems intuitive that those with lower economic stress (and in deep need and search

of security elsewhere) and those who've achieved security they would like to keep

(economically and otherwise) would be the most likely to display a conservative

ideology.

2.0. Stress

Like with "security" above, stress is a broadly understood—but not narrowly

defined—term that is necessary to unpack in the context of the study it's being used in. In

this instance, stress is understood to mean something that causes anxiety (or a similar

emotional burden) in an individual when something (emotionally or physically) taxing or

unpleasant occurs.

2.1. The Avoidance of Stress and Stressors

Ideologically disparate folks also experience *stress* differently. It is intuitive, however, that those who seek security also seek to minimize interactions with stress (preserving *emotional* security and preventing disorder and insecurity cognitively).

Consider, for instance, the *stress* of critically considering a controversial and conflict-ridden issue. The cognitive load created by carefully examining and debating an issue can be considered a *stressor* for an individual. In Eidelman et al's 2012 study, then, the examination of "low-effort" thought and how it produces default conservatism then speaks to the ability of a particular ideological perspective to handle stressful interactions.

"...political conservatism may be a process consequence of low-effort thought; when effortful, deliberate thought is disengaged, endorsement of conservative ideology increases," they find.

Conservative viewpoints, consistent with the associated desire for order and security, do not engage as completely, then, with stressful and complicated patterns of thought. They maintain the aforementioned security by maintaining a staunch and unwavering viewpoint that does not force uncomfortable contemplation and interaction.

Conservatives may also avoid stress because they experience it more strongly than liberals. A 2014 study by Joel, Burton & Plaks examined the experience of negative emotions (like stress) by individuals of different ideological stripes. Conservatives experienced negative emotions more *negatively* than liberals: another reason, then, for them to staunchly avoid things that could cause stress in the first place.

3.0. Threat

Concurrent with much of the thinking exhibited in the security and stress sections, threat is deeply negative emotion, and thus is—we can already anticipate —likely to be stringently avoided by conservatives (who, as mentioned previously, feel negative emotions more strongly than their liberal counterparts do, on average).

But threat also has some other interesting implications for ideology that both confirm and diverge from the implications of the *security* and *stress* sections.

3.1. The Ideological Power of Threat

For instance, threat can create cohesion among citizens that defies ideology. In 2004, nearly 100 undergraduate individuals who were given reminders of the devastation caused by the September 11th attacks were more apt to offer support for President Bush than his foe, then Democratic candidate and future Secretary of State John Kerry, regardless of ideology.

According to Landau et al., these presentations of threat create a support for the former president that may have gone so far as to influence his reelection effort in a meaningful way. This finding is further supported by the 2005 work by many of these same authors, whose findings continued to align with the idea that the pressing nature of the threat (terrorism, in this instance) and a desire for safety (from said terrorism) motivated individuals to support the candidate that "felt" the safest and strongest to them: the conservative.

This finding is further supported by work conducted by Nail et al. in 2009, which posits that when facing "system-injustice" and "mortality salience" threats, that "political

and dispositional liberals become more politically and psychologically conservative after threats."

To put it more simply: liberals behave like conservatives when liberals are threatened. A finding that could be extended, perhaps, when an individual faces prolonged threat to their economic well-being.

4. Hypothesis & Key Questions

Because *economic stress* can be considered a stressor/threat for individuals facing personal financial difficulties, causing risk to their personal security, I posit that *economic stress* may have played a role in the development of various fiscal and social ideologies for different levels of economic stability.

The three psychological underpinnings of this *economic stress*, whose influence may have played a role in an individual's development of their personal ideology, are *security, stress* and *threat*.

To undertake this, I ask two question: Q1. "What different ideological profiles to Maine citizens have?" and Q2. "How is economic stress and community standing related to political ideology?"

MATERIALS & METHODS

1.0. Survey Design and Administration

Data for this analysis was collected as a part of the Sustainability Solutions Initiative's (SSI) 2013 Maine Energy Survey, which was deployed to measure Maine residents' attitudes about the implementation of renewable energy—in particular, wind energy.

Two-thousand one hundred and twenty respondents took part in the study, with a response rate of 31 percent. All respondents received the fiscal and social item used to measure political ideology, with 1862 and 1878 responses, respectively.

The survey itself contained six sections: background, benefits (of wind energy), concerns (regarding wind energy), demographics, and experimental variations and metrics capturing attitudes and beliefs (PsychBank). The "PsychBank"—as well as the demographics section—comprise the data used for this analysis, including questions intended to capture *economic stress* and fiscal/social ideology. Further questions from Section 4, demographics, are utilized to characterize these groups more generally.

A sliding scale item measuring both fiscal and social ideology was included in the survey. Scales offered options between 1 and 7, with 1 indicating the most "liberal" response, and 7 indicating the most conservative response. **Figure 1** replicates the scale shown to survey recipients.

Figure 1. The self-report item used in the survey to measure fiscal and social ideology.

2.0. Analysis & Metric Development

Generally, according to the Census Bureau, the population examined in the survey was older, wealthier, and more male than that the general population in Maine. However, this discrepancy does not undercut the validity of this research for two reasons: 1) these are problems endemic in survey research. Participants are generally from an older and richer subset simply for self-selection reasons. And, 2) these differences are later controlled for in the regression analysis.

Comparing Populations			
Census		Data	
Frequency/Mean		Frequency/Mean	
Age	44.20	Age	57.87
Education	-	Education	14.78
Gender	51.00%	Gender	37.50%
Income	$49,331	Income	$66,886.38
Source: US Census Bureau			

Table 1. How survey respondents compared to the demographics of Mainers as a whole.

2.1. Ideology

Results from the physical survey were entered by at least two researchers in order to ensure accuracy. Analysis was conducted using Statistical Analysis Software (SAS), Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS), and Microsoft Excel.

For analytical purposes, in some portions of the analysis, three "distinct" categories were formed for each of these scales. In these instances, responses ranging from 1-2 were demarcated as "liberal"—3-5 as "moderate"—and 6-7 as "conservative." These divisions are referred to as "discrete" fiscal and social ideologies in later analysis, while the use of scale without this divisions is referred to as "continuous" fiscal and

social ideologies. Additional categories were also formed based on the respondent's combination of attitudes on both items.

The categories that respondents could be sorted into for analysis, and which were used as qualitative descriptors, are listed below—with categories that are focused on in the analysis below marked with an asterisk and bolded.

Fiscal Category	Social Category	Abbreviation	Combination Name
Liberal	Liberal	LL	**"Pure Liberal"***
Liberal	Moderate	LM	"Moderate/Fiscal Liberal"
Moderate	Liberal	ML	"Moderate/Social Liberal"
Liberal	Conservative	LC	"Fiscal Independent"
Conservative	Conservative	CC	**"Pure Conservative"***
Conservative	Moderate	CM	"Moderate/Fiscal Conservative"
Moderate	Conservative	MC	"Moderate/Social Conservative"
Conservative	Liberal	CL	**"Social Independent"***
Moderate	Moderate	MM	**"Pure Moderate"***

Table 2. Categories formed reflecting possible fiscal and social combinations.

The number of participants who fell into each of these categories varied widely, with numbers of applicable respondents ranging from more than 700 to less than 10. "Pure Moderates" were the most common, with 741 applicable participants, while "Fiscal Independents" were distinctly less so, with just six. The number of survey respondents who fell into each category are shown in **Table 3** below.

Combination Name	Abbreviation	Number of Respondents
"Pure Liberal"*	LL	152
"Moderate/Fiscal Liberal"	LM	10
"Moderate/Social Liberal"	ML	231
"Fiscal Independent"	LC	6
"Pure Conservative"*	CC	340
"Moderate/Fiscal Conservative"	CM	210
"Moderate/Social Conservative"	MC	70
"Social Independent"*	CL	94
"Pure Moderate"*	MM	741

Table 3. The number of respondents who fell into each category.

Again, categories focused on in later analysis and discussion are marked with an asterisk and bolded. Categories that are primarily excluded from later discussion are still presented in current and later tables for comparison purposes, but will not play a significant role in the conclusion or suggestions for future research articulated in the results and conclusion sections.

2.2. Economic Stress & Perceived Community Standing

For evaluation of a participant's *economic stress*, two possible measures were utilized: *economic stress*, and *perceived community standing*.

Set	Question	Versions Question is Included In
Economic Stressor	I don't have enough money to pay rent or mortgage.	All Surveys.
Economic Stressor	I don't have enough money to buy the things I (or my family) needs.	All Surveys.
Economic Stressor	I don't have enough money to make needed improvements to my living situation (move, renovate).	All Surveys.
Economic Stressor	I don't have enough money to take vacations.	All Surveys.

Table 4. The panel of questions utilized to form the factor "economic stress."

The *economic stress* metric was generated using the four questions in **Table 4** above. The mean of these four questions was evaluated, and the same split used in the categorization of political ideologies was utilized. In this instance, a rating of 1-2

indicated "low economic stress"—a rating of 3-5 indicated "moderate economic stress"—and a rating of 6-7 indicated "high economic stress." The reliability analysis for this factor gave $\alpha = 0.867$.

The second categorization, *perceived community standing,* was a simple self-evaluation done by each respondent. Participants were asked to evaluate their own community and socioeconomic station on the survey.

Participants used a drawing of a ladder to mark the rung they believed best represented their own standing in the community. The item used for this self-evaluation is demonstrated below in **Figure 2**. Note that the bottom of the ladder, the first rung, represents the "lowest" standing, and the top of the ladder, the twelfth rung, represents the "highest" standing in the community.

Figure 2. The self-report item used by respondents to evaluate their personal station in the community.

RESULTS

Combination Name	Economic Stress (Mean)	SD (σ)	Number (n)
"Pure Liberal"*	2.8573	1.81018	80
"Moderate/Fiscal Liberal"	5.0208	0.70833	4
"Moderate/Social Liberal"	2.7576	1.56545	110
"Fiscal Independent"	2.3100	0.57735	3
"Pure Conservative"*	3.0131	1.735	172
"Moderate/Fiscal Conservative"	2.8931	1.71444	92
"Moderate/Social Conservative"	3.7344	1.94163	32
"Social Independent"*	5.8333	1.735	50
"Pure Moderate"*	3.4492	1.78455	389

Table 5. Mean economic stress of each possible ideological grouping.

1.0. Political Ideology

Four, from the possible 9, combinations of fiscal and social ideology were analyzed in-depth to discover information beyond their general demographic profiles. The mean values and frequencies for all 9, however, are depicted below—but advanced analysis is only conducted on the demarcated individuals (those bolded and marked with an asterisk). The full profiles of all categories, however, are lumped into three potential categories: the "Purists" the "Moderate Mixes" and the "Paradoxes."

1.1. The Purists

The "purists" are individuals whose fiscal and social ideologies align. These folks comprise a relatively large portion of the survey's respondents, particularly in terms of conservatives and moderates. "Purists" are who many think of when they consider a quintessentially partisan Democrat or Republican associate.

The Purists (Means & Frequencies)							
Group	Age	Child	Gender	Household	Income (Amount)	Ladder	LiveME
Pure Liberal	58.49	Yes - 19% No - 81%	Female - 50% Male - 50%	2.16	$67,593.53	7.42	37.55
Pure Moderate	56.77	Yes - 24% No - 76%	Female - 39% Male - 61%	2.5	$61,469.27	7.06	44.57
Pure Conservative	59.57	Yes - 21% No - 79%	Female - 25% Male - 75%	2.41	$67,400.00	7.76	44.56

Table 6. Mean values and frequencies for "purist" participants' demographic variables.

Pure Liberals

The "Pure Liberal" category consisted of individuals with a rating of 1 to 2 on each ideological measure included in the survey. Of the full survey sample, 145 individuals matched these criteria. "Pure Liberals" had a mean age of 58.49, an average household size of 2.16, and an average income of $67,593.53; they'd lived in Maine for an average of 37.55 years and were more likely than not to *not* have children living in the home (81% of respondents in this category did not have an individual under 18 residing in their home). Finally, respondents were evenly split with regards to gender.

Pure Moderates

The "Pure Moderate" category consisted of individuals with a rating of 3 to 5 on each ideological measure included in the survey. Of the full survey sample, 713 individuals matched these criteria. "Pure Moderates" had a mean age of 56.77, an average household size of 2.50, and an average income of $61,469.27; they'd lived in Maine for an average of 44.57 years and were more likely than not to *not* have children living in the home (76% of respondents in this category did not have an individual under 18 residing in their home). Finally, respondents were more often male than female, with only 39% of women responding.

Pure Conservatives

The "Pure Conservative" category consisted of individuals with a rating of 6 to 7 on each ideological measure included in the survey. Of the full survey sample, 317 individuals matched these criteria. "Pure Conservatives" had a mean age of 59.57, an average household size of 2.41, and an average income of $67,400; they'd lived in Maine for an average of 44.56 years and were more likely than not to not have children living in the home (79% of respondents in this category did not have an individual under 18 residing in their home). Finally, respondents were more often male than female, with only 25% of women responding.

1.2. The Moderate Mixes

The "moderate mixes" are individuals whose fiscal and social ideologies do not perfectly align, as is the case with the "Purists," but are not quite at odds, as is the case below with the "Paradoxes." With the "mixes," either the participant's fiscal or social ideology registered as moderate, rather than strictly conservative or liberal. These folks comprise a moderate portion of the survey's respondents, particularly in terms of ideologically extreme fiscal conservatives and social liberals with otherwise moderate viewpoints.

The Moderate Mixes (Means & Frequencies)							
Group	**Age**	**Child**	**Gender**	**Household**	**Income (Amount)**	**Ladder**	**LiveME**
Moderate/Fiscal Liberal	55.22	Yes - 22% No - 78%	Female - 56% Male - 44%	2.2	$35,437.50	7.5	39.3
Moderate/Social Liberal	54.98	Yes - 22% No - 78%	Female - 53% Male - 47%	2.28	$79,187.79	7.42	33.17
Moderate/Fiscal Conservative	57.76	Yes - 20% No - 80%	Female - 27% Male - 73%	2.29	$76,175.39	7.67	43.44
Moderate/Social Conservative	58.72	Yes - 21% No - 79%	Female - 38% Male - 62%	2.35	$60,656.72	7.27	44.72

Table 7. Mean values and frequencies for "moderate mix" participants' demographic variables.

Moderate/Fiscal Liberal

The "Moderate/Fiscal Liberal" category consisted of individuals with a rating of 1 to 2 on the measure of fiscal ideology, and a rating of 3 to 5 on the measure of social ideology. Of the full survey sample, 9 individuals matched these criteria. "Moderate/Fiscal Liberal" had a mean age of 55.22, an average household size of 2.20, and an average income of $35,437.50; they'd lived in Maine for an average of 39.30 years and were more likely than not to not have children living in the home (78% of respondents in this category did not have an individual under 18 residing in their home). Finally, respondents were more often female than male, with only 44% of men responding.

Moderate/Social Liberal

The "Moderate/Social Liberal" category consisted of individuals with a rating of 1 to 2 on the measure of social ideology, and a rating of 3 to 5 on the measure of fiscal ideology. Of the full survey sample, 225 individuals matched these criteria. "Moderate/Social Liberal" had a mean age of 54.98, an average household size of 2.28, and an average income of $79,187.79; they'd lived in Maine for an average of 33.17 years and were more likely than not to not have children living in the home (78% of respondents in this category did not have an individual under 18 residing in their home).

Finally, respondents were more often female than male, with only 47% of men responding.

Moderate/Fiscal Conservative

The "Moderate/Fiscal Conservative" category consisted of individuals with a rating of 6 to 7 on the measure of fiscal ideology, and a rating of 3 to 5 on the measure of social ideology. Of the full survey sample, 204 individuals matched these criteria. "Moderate/Fiscal Conservative" had a mean age of 57.76, an average household size of 2.29, and an average income of $54,318.37; they'd lived in Maine for an average of 43.44 years and were more likely than not to not have children living in the home (80% of respondents in this category did not have an individual under 18 residing in their home). Finally, respondents were more often male than female, with only 27% of women responding.

Moderate/Social Conservative

The "Moderate/Fiscal Conservative" category consisted of individuals with a rating of 6 to 7 on the measure of social ideology, and a rating of 3 to 5 on the measure of fiscal ideology. Of the full survey sample, 68 individuals matched these criteria. "Moderate/Fiscal Conservative" had a mean age of 58.72, an average household size of 2.35, and an average income of $60,656.72; they'd lived in Maine for an average of 44.72 years and were more likely than not to not have children living in the home (79% of respondents in this category did not have an individual under 18 residing in their home). Finally, respondents were more often male than female, with only 38% of women responding.

The "paradoxes" represent participants whose fiscal and social ideologies are on opposite ends of the political spectrum. With no ideological moderates to be found in this bunch, the "paradoxes" hold extremist views from both political perspectives. Far more common were social liberals with fiscally conservative views, but fiscal liberals with socially conservative views were present in small numbers. These unique cases, and their demographics, can be seen in **Tables 9** and **10.**

The "Paradoxes" (Means & Frequencies)							
Group	Age	Child	Gender	Household	Income (Amount)	Ladder	LiveME
Fiscal Independent	54.33	Yes - 50% No - 50%	Female - 33% Male - 67%	3.5	$48,750.00	6	45.5
Social Independent	57.14	Yes - 22% No - 78%	Female - 41% Male - 59%	2.21	$95,416.67	7.79	36.27

Table 8. Mean values and frequencies for "paradox" participants' demographic variables.

Fiscal Independent

The "Fiscal Independent" category consisted of individuals with a rating of 6 to 7 on the measure of social ideology, and a rating of 1 to 2 on the measure of fiscal ideology. Of the full survey sample, 6 individuals matched these criteria. "Fiscal Independents" had a mean age of 54.33, an average household size of 3.5, and an average income of $48,750.00; they'd lived in Maine for an average of 45.50 years and were equally likely to have children living in the home than not (50% of respondents in this category did not have an individual under 18 residing in their home). Finally, respondents were more often male than female, with only 33% of women responding.

Social Independent

The "Social Independent" category consisted of individuals with a rating of 1 to 2 on the measure of social ideology, and a rating of 6 to 7 on the measure of fiscal ideology. Of the full survey sample, 91 individuals matched these criteria. "Social

Independents" had a mean age of 57.14, an average household size of 2.21, and an average income of $95,416.67; they'd lived in Maine for an average of 36.27 years and were more likely than not to *not* have children living in the home (78% of respondents did not have an individual under 18 residing in their home). Finally, respondents were more often male than female, with only 41% of women responding.

2.0. Economic Stress & Community Status' Role

2.1. The Differences of Economic Stress

ANOVAs		
	F	Sig.
Age	2.076	0.035
Child	0.773	0.627
Gender	8.634	<0.001
Household	2.602	0.008
Income	7.156	<0.001
LiveME	9.503	<0.001

Table 9. A one-way ANOVA demonstrating demographic categories where significant differences lie between groups.

Significant Demographic Difference					
	Group 1	**Group 2**	**Mean Difference**	**Std. Error**	**Sig.**
Age	CC	LM	4.592	1.269	0.009
Gender	LL	CC	-0.251	0.048	0
	LL	MC	-0.225	0.052	0
	CC	MM	0.144	0.032	0
	CC	LM	0.283	0.041	0
	MM	LM	0.139	0.036	0.004
	MM	MC	-0.117	0.038	0.048
Income	LL	LC	-27,823.141	6,957.405	0.002
	CC	LC	-28,016.667	6,203.362	0
	MM	LC	-33,947.401	5,828.534	0
	MM	LM	-17,718.528	3,962.146	0
	MM	MC	-14,706.127	4,131.483	0.011
	LC	ML	59,979.167	18,627.354	0.035
	LC	CM	34,759.950	8,246.190	0.001
LiveME	LL	CC	-7.018	2.016	0.015
	LL	MM	-7.028	1.837	0.004
	CC	LC	8.296	2.404	0.017
	CC	LM	11.394	1.763	0
	MM	LC	8.306	2.256	0.007
	MM	LM	11.404	1.554	0
	LM	CM	-11.550	2.830	0.002
	LM	MC	-8.306	2.256	0.007

Table 10. How significant demographic differences are distributed *within* ideological groupings.

Significant differences existed between these nine groupings in a number of demographic categories. Post hoc testing (Tukey's at a p < 0.05) was used to discover how groups differed in their socio-demographics. The results of this testing can been seen in **Table 10**.

In **Table 10**, a "pure conservative" or "CC" represents a fiscally *and* socially conservative ideology, while "LM" represents a fiscal liberal and social moderate. Though all demographic categories were considered for this analysis, there were no significant differences found between these nine ideological groups for the "Age" or "Household" variables.

Gender

LL & CC

With a mean difference of -0.251, a standard error of 0.048, and a significance of <0.001, there are demonstrable differences between "pure" conservatives and "pure" liberals in terms of gender. Liberals are significantly more likely to be female than conservatives.

CC & MM

With a mean difference of 0.144, a standard error of 0.032, and a significance of <0.001, there are also demonstrable differences between "pure" conservatives and "pure" moderates in terms of gender.

Income

One of the most significant differences demonstrated demographically by these groups was the income disparity between individuals who possess a mixed ideology (fiscally conservative and socially liberal; or "CL") and the "purists" in the model. Making an average income of $95,416.67, these "mixed" citizens are making nearly $30,000 a year more than their ideologically consistent counterparts (CC, LL, and MMs).

LiveME

LL & MM

With a mean difference in the number of years lived in Maine of -7.028, a standard error of 1.837, and a significance level of 0.004, "pure" liberals have lived significantly fewer years in Maine than their more conservative, but still moderate, counterparts.

LL & CC

With a mean difference in the number of years lived in Maine of -7.018, a standard error of 2.016, and a significance level of 0.015, "pure" liberals have lived significantly fewer years in Maine than their purely conservative counterparts.

CC & LC

With a mean difference in the number of years lived in Maine of 8.296, a standard error of 2.404, and a significance level of 0.017, "pure" conservatives have lived significantly more years in Maine than their socially independent counterparts.

MM & LC

With a mean difference in the number of years lived in Maine of 8.306, a standard error of 2.256, and a significance level of 0.007, "pure" moderates have lived a significantly larger number of years in Maine than their socially independent counterparts.

3.0. The Role of Economic Stress

3.1. Economic Stress & Political Ideology

To examine the relationship between *economic stress* and political ideology, the mean *economic stress* of each group was calculated, and correlations were run between both continuous and discrete versions of the ideological thermometer. Though this could have been done with a strictly continuous thermometer, a discrete thermometer was created so that regression analysis could be run to determine confounding variables.

Economic Stress of Ideological Groupings				
	Abb.	Mean	N	Std. Deviation
1	LL	2.8573	80	1.81018
2	CC	3.0131	172	1.83863
3	MM	3.4492	389	1.78455
4	LC	2.31	50	1.735
5	CL	5.8333	3	0.57735
6	LM	2.7576	110	1.56545
7	ML	5.0208	4	0.70833
8	CM	3.7344	32	1.94163
9	MC	2.8931	92	1.71444

Table 11. Economic stress for each political ideology grouping.

As seen in the table below, in the case of continuous social ideology, a significant relationship existed between *economic stress* scores and the participants' political preference. However, no significant relationship was found between continuously measured fiscal ideology and *economic stress*. These conclusions can been seen in **Table 12**.

26

Group		Economic Stress	Fiscal Ideology (Continuous)	Social Ideology (Continuous)
Economic Stress	Pearson Correlation	1	-0.056	.102**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		0.086	0.002
	N	1040	938	946
Fiscal Ideology (Continuous)	Pearson Correlation	-0.056	1	.587**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.086		0.000
	N	938	1862	1854
Social Ideology (Continuous)	Pearson Correlation	.102**	.587**	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.002	0.000	
	N	946	1854	1887
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).				

Table 12. Correlations between continuous ideology and economic stress.

In the case of discrete social ideology, a significant relationship existed between *economic stress* scores and the participants' social political preferences. However, unlike when analysis was run on the continuous fiscal ideological score, there was found to be a significant relationship between discrete fiscal ideology and *economic stress*. These conclusions can been seen in **Table 13**.

Group		Economic Stress	Fiscal Ideology (Discrete)	Social Ideology (Discrete)
Economic Stress	Pearson Correlation	1	-.071*	.093**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		0.029	0.004
	N	1040	938	946
Fiscal Ideology (Discrete)	Pearson Correlation	-.071*	1	.520**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.029		0
	N	938	1862	1854
Social Ideology (Discrete)	Pearson Correlation	.093**	.520**	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.004	0	
	N	946	1854	1887
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).				
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).				

Table 13. Correlations between discrete ideology and economic stress.

Means			
Economic Stress * Ladder Grouping(s)			
Ladder Grouping(s)	Mean	N	Std. Deviation
1 (High Status)	4.0414	133	1.85948
2 (Medium Status)	3.3031	468	1.75801
3 (Low Status)	2.6944	342	1.68042
Total	3.1865	943	1.79909

Table 14. Perceived community status and mean economic stress.

3.2. Economic Stress & Perceived Community Status

An individual's *perceived* station is also important to their level of individual *economic stress*. After all, a family of six making $10,000 a year may be just stressed as a

single person making $25,000, regardless of the appearance *strictly* their income may present.

Because of this, some brief analysis was also conducted on the "ladder" item mentioned in the Materials and Methods section to examine *perceived community status.* The means of the individuals in three distinct groupings are shown in **Table 14.**

These means are given for three "groups"—those who indicated that they felt they were on rungs 1 through 4 of the ladder ("Low Status"), those who indicated that they felt they were on rungs 5 through 8 of the ladder ("Medium Status") and those who felt they were on rungs 9 through 12 of the ladder ("High Status"). These means represent the *perceived economic stress* of the participants, similar to what was measured using the less direct factorial metric. Significant differences ($p < 0.01$) were found between all groups.

Tukey HSD				
Ladder Grouping(s)	Ladder Grouping(s) II	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.
1 (High Status)	2	.73829*	0.17148	0.00
	3	1.34691*	0.17833	0.00
2 (Medium Status)	1	-.73829*	0.17148	0.00
	3	.60862*	0.12414	0.00
3 (Low Status)	1	-1.34691*	0.17833	0.00
	2	-.60862*	0.12414	0.00
* The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.				

Table 15. Tukey's HSD demonstrating where differences lie for ladder "status" groupings.

Fiscal Ideology (Discrete)								
		Coefficients						
Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.	95.0% Confidence Interval for B	
		B	Std. Error	Beta			Lower Bound	Upper Bound
1	(Constant)	2.181	0.189		11.569	0	1.811	2.552
	Age	0.003	0.002	0.072	2.037	0.042	0	0.006
	Education	-0.012	0.009	-0.049	-1.246	0.213	-0.03	0.007
	Fiscal Security	-0.018	0.014	-0.052	-1.287	0.198	-0.044	0.009
	Gender	0.14	0.045	0.112	3.126	0.002	0.052	0.228
	Income	4.01E-07	0	0.035	0.817	0.414	0	0

Table(s) 16. Regression analysis for fiscal ideology.

The ANOVA run on this grouping confirms that there are, in fact, significant differences between the low, medium, and high status "groupings" in terms of *economic stress*. The fact that this is the case may provide some assurance that individuals' self-perception aligns across metrics with their deduced *economic stress*. This also helps to bolster the reliability of "economic stress" as both an empirical and psychological construct.

4. Factors Impacting Ideology

Using the discrete representation of fiscal ideology, R=0.164. and R^2=0.021. This constitutes a relatively poor prediction of fiscal ideology based on the model, though it is significant (at $p < 0.001$).

Social Ideology (Discrete)								
		Coefficients						
Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.	95.0% Confidence Interval for B	
		B	Std. Error	Beta			Lower Bound	Upper Bound
1	(Constant)	2.805	0.202		13.889	0	2.408	3.201
	Age	0.003	0.002	0.063	1.887	0.059	0	0.006
	Education	-0.076	0.01	-0.276	-7.456	0	-0.096	-0.056
	Fiscal Security	0.002	0.015	0.004	0.103	0.918	-0.028	0.031
	Gender	0.228	0.048	0.16	4.716	0	0.133	0.322
	Income	-5.90E-07	0	-0.045	-1.115	0.265	0	0

Table(s) 17. Regression analysis for social ideology.

Using the discrete representation of social ideology, R=0.348. and R^2=0.116. This constitutes a relatively poor prediction of social ideology based on the model, though it is significant (at $p < 0.001$).

CONCLUSION(S)

1.0. What Do Demographic Differences Mean?

The demographic descriptives and correlations undertaken here imply small differences in a number of areas. Significant differences with staying power, however, do arise, and there are several of these that may have meaningful implications for the legislators looking to address and engage these groups both during and after the campaign.

1.1. Gender

Liberals and moderates are significantly more likely to be female than conservatives. This is possibly as a result of "partisan" differences in a party's ideological platform (Maniam, 2016), wherein liberal candidates tend to espouse a platform that grants broader reproductive rights and concerns about equality. Conservative ideologies do appeal to married and religious women, but liberals hold a distinct edge, according to polling done by Pew.

1.2. Income

The kind of difference demonstrated within the results (between fiscal conservatives/social liberals and the "purists") here may have important implications about the malleability of ideology, as it could imply that either wealth creates a particular kind of person politically, or that a particular kind of ideological person finds success (depending on the direction of the relationship).

While even larger differences exist between the wealthiest cohort (CL) and those of the more moderate mixes of ideologies, the sample sizes of these groupings are too small to read into with certainty.

1.3. LiveME

LL & CC

This difference could have ties to the comfort and security available by remaining in a familiar place, versus a willingness to explore and move, which is demonstrated by more liberal individuals (who value novelty and curiosity, as mentioned above).

LL & MM

This difference could also have ties to the comfort and security available by remaining in a familiar place, versus a willingness to explore and move, which is demonstrated by more and more liberal individuals (who value novelty and curiosity, as mentioned above).

CC & LC

This difference could more still have ties to the comfort and security available by remaining in a familiar place, particularly since "Social Independents" have such an innate sense of security embedded from their high income. It is also possible that these people are recent transplants *brought* to Maine by their money.

MM & LC

This difference could also have ties to the comfort and security available by remaining in a familiar place, again since "Social Independents" have such an innate sense of security embedded from their high income. It is also possible that these people, too, are recent transplants *brought* to Maine by their money for attractive coastal living.

2. What Do Differences in Economic Stress Mean?

The *economic stress* factor was found to be weakly correlated with both fiscal and social ideology in participants. These effects, however, are undermined when controlling for mediating variables, such as age, education, gender and income.

Though the literature strongly supports the logical underpinnings of *economic stress* playing a role in ideological opinion formation, it's also true that other stressors, like family life and health, may be playing a bigger role in transmitting these factors from personality to ideology. Examining how various stressors contribute to ideology may aid legislators in crafting messages that best address the concerns of their particular constituents, as well as understanding how different groups can be benefitted with particular and targeted legislation.

3. Are There Implications for Future Research?

Based on the success (though mild) of the *economic stress* factor, and the strong literary background supporting the connection between stressors and conservatism, it could be interesting to pursue how other "stressful" life circumstances may play a role in the development of ideology. Adapting a survey from Wheaton's scale may allow for researchers to get at *other* types of stress, as they contribute to ideology, and develop a more complete model of how stress can impact a constituent's viewpoints.

To govern, we must lead, that is true—but most of all, we must understand. Without understanding, ultimately our efforts—no matter how good-intentioned—will be misguided. Mainers deserve legislators who do not only lead, but who understand them. This research, and that following it, hopes to impart that possibility.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

<u>Syntax</u>

     ANOVAs

ONEWAY Age Child Gender Household Income LiveME BY EconomicStress
 /MISSING ANALYSIS.
 /POSTHOC=TUKEY ALPHA(0.05).

ONEWAY LadderCategory BY EconomicStress
 /MISSING ANALYSIS.
 /POSTHOC=TUKEY ALPHA(0.05).

ONEWAY Social Fiscal BY EconomicStress
 /MISSING ANALYSIS.

ONEWAY SocialDiscrete FiscalDiscrete BY EconomicStress
 /MISSING ANALYSIS.

     Compare Means

MEANS TABLES=EconomicStress BY AllIdeologies
 /CELLS=MEAN COUNT STDDEV.

MEANS TABLES=LadderCategory BY EconomicStress
 /CELLS=MEAN COUNT STDDEV.

     Correlations

CORRELATIONS
 /VARIABLES=EconomicStress Social Fiscal
 /PRINT=TWOTAIL NOSIG
 /MISSING=PAIRWISE.

CORRELATIONS
 /VARIABLES=EconomicStress SocialDiscrete FiscalDiscrete
 /PRINT=TWOTAIL NOSIG
 /MISSING=PAIRWISE.

     Crosstabs

CROSSTABS
 /TABLES=Age Household Income Ladder LiveME BY AllIdeologies
 /FORMAT=AVALUE TABLES
 /CELLS=COUNT

/COUNT ROUND CELL.

Frequencies

FREQUENCIES VARIABLES=AllIdeologies
 /ORDER=ANALYSIS.

FREQUENCIES VARIABLES=Gender
 /ORDER=ANALYSIS.

Regression

REGRESSION
 /MISSING LISTWISE
 /STATISTICS COEFF OUTS R ANOVA
 /CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10)
 /NOORIGIN
 /DEPENDENT FiscalDiscrete
 /METHOD=ENTER Age Education FiscalSecurity Gender Income

REGRESSION
 /MISSING LISTWISE
 /STATISTICS COEFF OUTS R ANOVA
 /CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10)
 /NOORIGIN
 /DEPENDENT SocialDiscrete
 /METHOD=ENTER Age Education FiscalSecurity Gender Income

APPENDIX B

<u>Additional & Full Tables</u>

Full In-Text Tables

The Purists

The Purists (Means & Frequencies)						
Group	**Value**	**Age**	**Household**	**Income (Amount)**	**Ladder**	**LiveME**
Pure Liberal*	Mean	58.49	2.16	67593.53	7.42	37.55
	N	145	148	139	132	150
	Std. Deviation	13.858	1.088	50821.354	2.667	21.558
Pure Moderate*	Mean	56.77	2.5	61469.27	7.06	44.57
	N	713	733	667	691	729
	Std. Deviation	14.956	1.287	43416.718	2.409	20.275
Pure Conservative*	Mean	59.57	2.41	67400	7.76	44.56
	N	317	334	305	312	331
	Std. Deviation	14.472	1.284	49146.388	2.358	21.68

Group	**Value**	**Child**	**Gender**
Pure Liberal*	0	117	72
		81%	50%
	1	28	73
		19%	50%
Pure Moderate*	0	544	281
		76%	39%
	1	174	441
		24%	61%
Pure Conservative*	0	257	80
		79%	25%
	1	67	246
		21%	75%

Table(s) 6. Mean values and frequencies for "purist" participants' demographic variables.

The Moderate Mixes

The Moderate Mixes (Means & Frequencies)						
Group	**Value**	**Age**	**Household**	**Income (Amount)**	**Ladder**	**LiveME**
Moderate/Fiscal Liberal	Mean	55.22	2.2	35437.5	7.5	39.3
	N	9	10	8	10	10
	Std. Deviation	18.492	0.789	57492.507	2.506	17.613
Moderate/Social Liberal	Mean	54.98	2.28	79187.79	7.42	33.17
	N	225	228	213	219	228
	Std. Deviation	14.247	1.15	54318.374	2.258	18.534
Moderate/Fiscal Conservative	Mean	57.76	2.29	76175.39	7.67	43.44
	N	204	208	191	195	209
	Std. Deviation	14.872	1.205	58501.276	2.296	20.058
Moderate/Social Conservative	Mean	58.72	2.35	60656.72	7.27	44.72
	N	68	69	67	67	68
	Std. Deviation	14.905	1.27	51108.264	2.666	21.398

Group	**Value**	**Child**	**Gender**
Moderate/Fiscal Liberal	0	7	5
		78%	56%
	1	2	4
		22%	44%
Moderate/Social Liberal	0	176	120
		78%	53%
	1	51	107
		22%	47%
Moderate/Fiscal Conservative	0	164	56
		80%	27%
	1	41	150
		20%	73%
Moderate/Social Conservative	0	54	26
		79%	38%
	1	14	42
		21%	62%

Table 7. Mean values and frequencies for "moderate mix" participants' demographic variables.

The "Paradoxes"

The "Paradoxes" (Means & Frequencies)						
Group	**Value**	**Age**	**Household**	**Income (Amount)**	**Ladder**	**LiveME**
Fiscal Independent	Mean	54.33	3.5	48750	6	45.5
	N	6	6	6	5	6
	Std. Deviation	6.683	1.225	35133.673	1.581	15.215
Social Independent*	Mean	57.14	2.21	95416.67	7.79	36.27
	N	91	91	84	85	93
	Std. Deviation	12.389	1.08	70410.622	2.325	21.284

Group	**Value**	**Child**	**Gender**
Fiscal Independent	0	3	2
		50%	33%
	1	3	4
		50%	67%
Social Independent*	0	71	37
		78%	41%
	1	20	54
		22%	59%

Table 8. Mean values and frequencies for "paradox" participants' demographic variables.

Significant Differences

ANOVAs		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Age	Between Groups	3522.294	8	440.287	2.076	0.035
	Within Groups	375121.985	1769	212.053		
	Total	378644.28	1777			
Child	Between Groups	1.074	8	0.134	0.773	0.627
	Within Groups	309.69	1784	0.174		
	Total	310.764	1792			
Gender	Between Groups	15.703	8	1.963	8.634	<0.001
	Within Groups	407.163	1791	0.227		
	Total	422.866	1799			
Household	Between Groups	31.661	8	3.958	2.602	0.008
	Within Groups	2764.836	1818	1.521		
	Total	2796.497	1826			
Income	Between Groups	145100551700	8	18137568960	7.156	<0.001
	Within Groups	4235066582000	1671	2534450378		
	Total	4380167133000	1679			
LiveME	Between Groups	31898.754	8	3987.344	9.503	<0.001
	Within Groups	761578.219	1815	419.602		
	Total	793476.973	1823			

Table 9. A one-way ANOVA demonstrating demographic categories where significant differences lie between groups.

Regression Analysis

Fiscal Ideology (Discrete)				
Model Summary				
Model	**R**	**R Square**	**Adjusted R Square**	**Std. Error of the Estimate**
1	0.164	0.027	0.021	0.59825

Fiscal Ideology (Discrete)						
ANOVA						
Model		**Sum of Squares**	**df**	**Mean Square**	**F**	**Sig.**
1	Regression	8.059	5	1.612	4.503	.000b
	Residual	289.897	810	0.358		
	Total	297.956	815			

Fiscal Ideology (Discrete)								
Coefficients								
Model		**Unstandardized Coefficients**		**Standardized Coefficients**	**t**	**Sig.**	**95.0% Confidence Interval for B**	
		B	Std. Error	Beta			Lower Bound	Upper Bound
1	(Constant)	2.181	0.189		11.569	0	1.811	2.552
	Age	0.003	0.002	0.072	2.037	0.042	0	0.006
	Education	-0.012	0.009	-0.049	-1.246	0.213	-0.03	0.007
	Fiscal Security	-0.018	0.014	-0.052	-1.287	0.198	-0.044	0.009
	Gender	0.14	0.045	0.112	3.126	0.002	0.052	0.228
	Income	4.01E-07	0	0.035	0.817	0.414	0	0

Table(s) 16. Regression analysis for fiscal ideology.

Social Ideology (Discrete)				
Model Summary				
Model	**R**	**R Square**	**Adjusted R Square**	**Std. Error of the Estimate**
1	0.348	0.121	0.116	0.64603

Social Ideology (Discrete)						
ANOVA						
Model		**Sum of Squares**	**df**	**Mean Square**	**F**	**Sig.**
1	Regression	46.773	5	9.355	22.414	.000b
	Residual	338.896	812	0.417		
	Total	385.669	817			

Social Ideology (Discrete)								
Coefficients								
Model		**Unstandardized Coefficients**		**Standardized Coefficients**	**t**	**Sig.**	**95.0% Confidence Interval for B**	
		B	Std. Error	Beta			Lower Bound	Upper Bound
1	(Constant)	2.805	0.202		13.889	0	2.408	3.201
	Age	0.003	0.002	0.063	1.887	0.059	0	0.006
	Education	-0.076	0.01	-0.276	-7.456	0	-0.096	-0.056
	Fiscal Security	0.002	0.015	0.004	0.103	0.918	-0.028	0.031
	Gender	0.228	0.048	0.16	4.716	0	0.133	0.322
	Income	-5.90E-07	0	-0.045	-1.115	0.265	0	0

Table(s) 17. Regression analysis for social ideology.

Additional Tables

Signficant Group Differences				
Ladder Grouping(s) * Fiscal & Social Ideology				
Group 1	**Group 2**	**Mean Difference**	**Std. Error**	**Sig.**
CC	MM	0.20671	0.04522	<0.001
MM	MC	-0.18427	0.05376	0.018

AUTHOR'S BIOGRAPHY

Allyson Lindsay Eslin was born on August 3, 1995 in Bangor, Maine to Rebekah and Robert Eslin. She is the 2017 University of Maine valedictorian, with majors in Political Science, Psychology, and Economics.

She has worked as both a School of Economics research assistant — on the NEST, SEANET, and SSI projects—and as the Editor-in-Chief of *The Maine Campus*. Her research for the School of Economics, advised by Dr. Caroline Noblet, eventually culminated in her selection as a Margaret Chase Smith Public Affairs Scholar—earning her a Center for Undergraduate Research (CUGR) award for the resulting poster presentation in 2016.

Eslin interned in Washington D.C. for Senator Angus King in the spring of 2016, and was selected as a member of All Maine Women for the 2016/17 academic year.

She hopes to continue her work after graduating in the public sector, tackling issues of inequality and environmental degradation while attending the University of Maine's Graduate School—earning a dual Masters in both Global Policy and Economics.