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David Hume and Thomas Reid by rejecting the view that the ideal reflects the way human persons actually form beliefs. For instance, many of our beliefs are formed on the basis of testimony, and the ideal fails to consider this. RE claims that the ideal fails to hold not only for everyday beliefs, but also for religious beliefs.

RE is not only a negative project in epistemology. It is not simply the rejection of previous ideas. RE seeks to offer a positive account as well. Various RE thinkers focus on different epistemological merits, such as justification and warrant. Wolterstorff's work focuses on the merit of entitlement as it relates to rationality. Are theists entitled to their religious beliefs? Is there some epistemic obligation that they have failed to meet? When it comes to discerning if someone is entitled to her belief, one must discern if she has fulfilled her epistemic duty. This depends on various factors and belief dispositions that a person has. For Wolterstorff, there is no doxastic ideal for the ethics of belief that cuts across all persons, places, and times. "Obligations to employ practices of inquiry are *personally situated* obligations" (111). In employing a practice of inquiry, one must choose from among practices that are socially and personally acceptable, as well as personally accessible (102–103). As such, whether or not one is entitled to her belief is a complex person-situated matter.

Further, we often assess the rationality of our beliefs after we have formed them. Part of being entitled to a belief is assessing the beliefs that we find ourselves having. Our beliefs are "innocent-until-proven-guilty" (257). Being entitled could mean that a person has considered various arguments against her belief and found her belief unscathed. Or it could involve her deliberately intervening in the formation of one of her beliefs. The only way we can discern if she is rational is by scrutinizing her individual belief system and the way she has used her noetic equipment (262).

Both volumes contain valuable discussions for those interested in philosophy of religion, philosophical theology, and epistemology. Each would be useful for supplemental reading in a course on philosophy of religion or religious epistemology. Volume 2 is especially important for those who are researching reformed epistemology. Both volumes are a *must have* for those who are enamored with Wolterstorff's writings.

Nature Red in Tooth and Claw: Theism and the Problem of Animal Suffering, by Michael Murray. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008. 206 pages. \$70.00 (cloth).

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Michael Murray has written a provocative and challenging work on an issue that is often passed over far too quickly in discussions of the problem of evil. In this work he gives the problem of animal suffering the attention

it deserves, carefully analyzing various attempts to reconcile the omnipotence and benevolence of the God of Theism with the existence of animal pain and suffering. Murray contends that this indeed can be done, and while it is doubtful someone not already sympathetic to theism will be convinced, the arguments are worthy of serious consideration and likely to provoke further discussion on a neglected topic.

The critic of theism argues that [1] If God exists there would be no gratuitous evil (e.g., animal suffering), [2] There is gratuitous suffering, [3] Therefore God does not exist. Murray acknowledges that a mere defense of Theism is insufficient. A defense would show only that the critic has failed to establish that Theism is unlikely due to the fact of animal suffering. That is, the Theist could claim endorse [1] and deny [3] from which it follows that [2] is false. While such a defense may be successful, it provides no positive reasons to reconcile animal suffering with the existence of God. On the other hand, a full theodicy, which would explain every instance of animal suffering, goes too far, because it seems unlikely that humans could possibly know every divine purpose. Murray argues for a kind of middle path, which he calls a *Causa Dei* (CD), a term he borrowed from Leibniz. A successful CD would show that we are not justified in believing animal suffering to be gratuitous and thus counting the suffering as evidence against God's existence—in the light of our justified acceptances. That is, the successful CD would undermine [2]. Murray then systematically analyzes several CDs, contending that at least some are successful.

In the first chapter of the book, Murray discusses three moral conditions that must be met for permitting evil.

- A. The Necessity Condition: the good secured by the permission of the evil, E, could not have been secured without permitting either E or some evils morally equivalent to or worse than E.
- B. The Outweighing Condition: the good secured by the permission of the evil is sufficiently outweighing.
- C. The Rights Condition: it is within the rights of the one permitting the evil to permit it.

What sort of CDs could do this? Murray proposes that the theist needs to construct hypotheses (i) that show that the evil in question meets conditions A through C, and (ii) that the theist “is not justified or warranted in rejecting in the light of the claims she justifiably accepts” (39).

Ideally, the justifiable acceptances in the CDs would be held in common to theists and nontheists alike. Murray contends that many of the CDs contain explanations that “do not stand in tension with most of what I will take to be a common set of justified acceptances endorsed by individuals who are reasonably well-educated in matters of contemporary philosophy and science” (39). Still, there may vast differences between what theists and nontheists justifiably accept, so the objectives of CDs can differ. The point of some is to show that the theist can defend the rationality of her

belief in the face of evil; the point of others is to show that the non-theist is not justified in rejecting theism on the basis of evil. Still others, Murray claims, will do both. The CDs that purportedly can undermine the evidential argument from evil by showing that the non-theist is not justified in rejecting theism on the basis of animal suffering are of particular interest. If it turns out that all a CD can do is offer epistemic comfort for the theist; i.e., theism is defensible only because the theist can maintain rationality given what she but not the non-theist accepts, it's hard to see how the CD could be called a success at all. Indeed it would be hard to distinguish a CD from a mere defense. But again, Murray contends some of the CDs have enough force to demonstrate that atheism cannot be defended on the grounds of appealing to gratuitous evil.

The scope of CDs discussed by Murray is impressive. He analyzes arguments carefully, critically, and charitably. He carefully dissects CDs that associate animal suffering with the Fall, concluding that the variety of this CD that appeals to a pre-human fall of Satan and his cohorts might be defensible, since, at least for some of us, none of our warranted acceptances justify the rejection of this CD. Still, Murray acknowledges that few people, theist or not, are likely to find this CD attractive.

The most compelling of the CDs Murray analyzes are the "nomic-regularity" CDs. Murray favors the chaos to nomic-regularity CD (CTO). The supposition of this CD is that a universe that moves from chaos to order is intrinsically good, and that animal pain in such a universe is unavoidable and outweighed by the intrinsic goodness of the CTO universe. Murray states, "Animal suffering is necessary since, in a world that is governed by nomic regularity and CTO, a spectrum of organisms with increasingly complex cognitive capacities is necessary in order to secure the emergence of beings capable of morally significant freedom" (191). Thus, Murray argues that the CTO CD meets all three conditions (Necessity, Outweighing, and Rights). But the critic's position is that it *does* seem logically possible that an omnipotent being could have brought about an orderly world with significantly morally free beings, without the animal suffering. Of course, the critic could be wrong, but isn't she justified in believing that the Necessity Condition is not met? So, the most that can be said for the CTO CD is that appropriately amended, the theist can maintain the rationality of her belief because, for all she knows, the animal suffering does meet the Necessity Condition. But the nontheist has little reason to think this.

The least compelling, but perhaps the most interesting, CD Murray defends is an updated appeal to a neo-Cartesian view about animals. Murray describes and defends this approach in some detail, and offers four distinct versions of the view. In general the contention seems to be that we are not justified in rejecting the claim that animals lack phenomenal consciousness. And without phenomenal consciousness, there can be no awareness of pain. Clearly, without awareness of pain, there just is no problem of animal suffering. Whatever the merits of this neo-Cartesian view, it is not

properly a CD at all. There is no *reason* given for the permission of animal suffering; instead, the Neo-Cartesian approach is simply to deny this is a genuine problem at all.

While it's not a proper CD, since a proper CD would have to acknowledge that animal suffering is an evil and then explain it, neo-Cartesianism must be taken seriously. After all, if it is successful, the problem just goes away. And recall that the standard for success is fairly low. Neo-Cartesianism need only be shown to be as plausible as not, given what we know. The Cartesian picture can be supported by drawing a distinction between access consciousness and phenomenal consciousness, a well-known distinction in contemporary philosophy of mind. Access consciousness simply means that the mental representations are available for an individual to use in rational action or speech. Phenomenal consciousness is the subjective feel, having to do with qualitative experiences. A robot could access its various cognitive states, avoid noxious stimuli, etc., while having no phenomenally conscious states at all. There need be nothing that it is like to be that robot. When Thomas Nagel wrote his famous "What it's Like to Be a Bat?," he assumed that there is *something* that it's like to be a bat.¹

That is to say, bats and other animals are *sentient* beings. So, Neo-Cartesians can maintain that while many animals may have access consciousness, they do not necessarily have phenomenal consciousness. And it's only phenomenal consciousness that counts from a moral point of view and with respect to the problem of God and animal pain.

What then would make a mental state phenomenally conscious? Murray describes one theory as follows:

For a mental state to be a conscious state (phenomenally) requires an accompanying higher-order mental state (a HOT) that has that state as its intentional object. The HOT must be thought that one is, oneself, in that first-order state. Only humans have the cognitive faculties required to form the conception of themselves being in a first-order state that one must have in order to have a HOT. (55)

Thus, one can attribute a rich mental life to animals, including having pain states, and recognize that these states can be accessed in the cognitive economy of individuals, playing a causal role in their behaviors, while maintaining that animals do not have the higher order mental states that would make them aware of the other mental states. So, they could actually be in pain, but since they don't have the mental capacity to represent themselves as being in pain, their pain is phenomenally nonconscious. Murray shows how the neo-Cartesian positions can deflect various sorts of objections. Behavioral evidence in favor of animal pain and suffering is at best inconclusive because the behavioral evidence can be explained by

¹Nagel's essay is widely published, e.g., in *The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates*, ed. Ned Block, Owen Flanagan, and Guven Guzeldere (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997). The distinction between access and phenomenal consciousness was first put forward in Ned Block's paper "On a Confusion About the Function of Consciousness," which is also included in this helpful volume.

appeals to access consciousness alone. Thus alleged similarities in behavior can be accounted for by appealing to certain human cases where consciousness seems to play a role, but doesn't, such as automatic driving, reaction to painful stimuli without awareness of pain, blind-sightedness, etc.

If the HOT theory is true, phenomenal consciousness would indeed seem unavailable to most animals. There are, however, alternative plausible theories of consciousness that are friendlier to the thesis that animals are phenomenally conscious than the HOT theory.² And, if we accept the neo-Cartesian view of phenomenal consciousness, we must also accept that infants and severely mentally defective human beings do not feel pain, for they would not have the capacity to have the requisite higher order mental states to be phenomenally conscious. Perhaps, as Murray suggests, harming animals is morally objectionable on other grounds, but *torturing* animals, infants, or severely mentally defective human beings would clearly not be possible. If infants can feel pain HOT or similar theories are false. With respect to animals, pain behavior is stronger than Murray acknowledges. Anatomical similarities between humans and other animals, the fact that many animals have endogenous pain control systems, and the observation that analgesics and anesthetics work on many animals in just the way they work on human beings all suggest that many animals actually feel their pains. Anatomical similarities and evolutionary evidence provide strong (though admittedly not conclusive) evidence that animals can and do suffer.

The skeptical argument of Neo-Cartesianism seems to run something like this; because it's *possible* that certain creaturely actions can be accounted for without appealing to consciousness, it's *reasonable* to conclude they didn't. That type of reasoning doesn't work generally, and it won't work here. It may be possible that I don't sweeten my coffee, but whether or not it's reasonable to claim I don't will depend on examining the actual evidence. The evidence we have suggests that many animals do have phenomenally conscious states. Of course, in principle, much of this evidence can be explained with access consciousness alone. But given that no one has yet discovered a consciousness structure in the brain, we can also account for human behavior without phenomenal consciousness as well. That's why it's so easy to think of androids, robots, or zombies behaving just like us without any phenomenal states at all. Neo-Cartesian arguments that make animals into zombies can do the same for us. The problem of animal consciousness is a special case of the problem of other minds. It may seem possible to doubt the conscious states of other beings, but possibility does not entail "as plausible as not, given our justified acceptances."

It is not clear that any of the CDs or any combination of them is superior to the Inscrutibilist position Murray discusses in the very first chapter. If one has good reason to think that God exists and would not permit

²For a concise overview of arguments for and against animal consciousness, see Colin Allen and Mark Bekoff, "Animal Consciousness," in *The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness*, ed. Max Velmans and Susan Schneider (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007), 58–71.

gratuitous evil, then it follows there one has good reason to think there is no gratuitous evil. It is just beyond the scope of human understanding to grasp what those reasons might be. The nontheist is not convinced of course, but also cannot easily show the theist's view about God and animal pain is irrational. It is hard to see how the suffering of this or that particular fawn dying slowly in a forest fire is logically necessary to lead to a greater good, even in the light of the more plausible CDs Murray defends. It may not be reasonable to expect a CD or combination of CDs to do that. The real value of Murray's book is that it attempts to take the problem of animal suffering seriously. The hope of the CD approach is to investigate what some of those reasons might be. The danger of the CD approach, at least for some of them, is they may unjustifiably minimize the significance of animal suffering or simply explain it away. Murray's work is a well-argued comprehensive examination of this topic making use of the best resources not only from philosophy of religion, but also philosophy of mind and ethics. It will provoke, I expect, lively discussion on this topic for some time. It does not, however, solve the problem of God and animal pain. That problem just won't go away.

Thinking Through Feeling: God, Emotion and Passibility, by Anastasia Philippa Scrutton. New York: Continuum, 2011. 227 pages. \$120.00 (hardcover).

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Debates regarding the passibility or impassibility of God have to do, in large part, with whether God experiences, or even can experience, certain emotions. *Thinking Through Feeling* was written by Anastasia Philippa Scrutton out of her conviction that philosophy of the emotions has important implications for answers to questions about the passibility or impassibility of God. Scrutton prefers to speak of philosophy of the emotions, rather than of emotion in the singular, because "emotions are so diverse that few generalizations can be made about them" (144). Hence, she prefers to take a Wittgensteinian, family resemblance approach to emotions rather than seeking for an essence of emotion.

Through her historical survey at the beginning of *Thinking* and her many presentations of contemporary scholars, Scrutton's book proves to be a valuable resource and she proves to be an able thinker regarding her two central topics: the emotions and the nature of God *vis a vis* the emotions. Her careful, penetrating analyses reveal a serious, subtle, well-studied mind.

For readers unfamiliar with the divine impassibility debate and the philosophy of emotions, chapter 1 is a valuable survey. For readers familiar with those topics, chapter 1 might be skipped except that Scrutton does a good job of showing that, unlike what many believe, there is not a sharp *historical* divide between those who believe in divine impassibility