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Geoffrey A. Gorham

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not face up to some of the larger ontological problems that are implicated in *True Virtue*—such as how to understand the relation between being and beauty—that have appropriately bedeviled interpreters of Edwards for ages. Among the essays by the theologians, the one most interesting to philosophers is likely to be Amy Plantinga Pauw's investigation of divine simplicity. Edwards' emphasis on excellency and beauty as fundamental concepts for thinking about the divine, which are essentially relational and pluralistic (and more specifically Trinitarian) according to Plantinga Pauw, puts him in contrast to much of the theological tradition's advocacy of simplicity. The issue raised in this essay is provocative; I found myself wishing that the author had been even more ambitious and taken up a more detailed comparison with one of simplicity's advocates. In addition to the essays mentioned above, the collection also contains Michael McClymond's essay on Edwards, Gregory Palamas and the uses of theological platonism, Stephen Holmes' essay on Sang Lee's claim that Edwards has a dispositional ontology, and Gerald McDermott's essay comparing Edwards and John Henry Newman on the status of non-Christian religions.

In conclusion, the editors are certainly correct in noting the need for more attention to the relation between philosophers of religion and theologians who are interested in Edwards' philosophical theology, and I believe the book should count as a success in beginning to address this need. There are two ways that it might have been even more successful. First, it would have been nice if the authors would have engaged more with the few other thinkers, such as Stephen H. Daniel, who have given book length analyses of Edwards' philosophical theology. Further, in a book with contributions from this many first rate philosophical minds, it would have been instructive to read more explicit reflection on the challenges of bridging the tasks of theology and philosophy, and how Edwards' work might represent an instructive moment in the history of Western thought for building such bridges. Nonetheless, this further work will be much easier for others to pursue with this collection of essays in hand.

Jonathan Edwards and the Metaphysics of Sin, by Oliver D. Crisp. Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2005. Pp. x, 146. \$89.95.

GEOFFREY A. GORHAM, University of Wisconsin, Eau Claire

Rather than an over-arching reading of Edwards's metaphysics, Crisp offers detailed critical analysis of several Edwardsian doctrines broadly related to sin. His method is not 'rational reconstruction', since he finds many of Edwards's positions and arguments inadequate. Instead, Crisp adopts what Jonathan Bennett calls the 'collegial approach' to the history of philosophy: "one studies the texts in the spirit of a colleague, an antagonist, a student, a teacher—aiming to learn as much philosophy as one can from studying them."¹ This review will consider Crisp's book in the same spirit, and draw a similar verdict as Crisp draws about Edwards's metaphysics of sin: imperfect but instructive.

The opening chapter deals with the logical (as opposed to temporal) order of God's decrees. As Crisp reads him, Edwards wants to forge a middle path between the 'supralapsarian' view that the decrees of election and reprobation are prior to the decree of the fall and the opposing 'infralapsarian' view. Edwards's position seems to be that God decrees election antecedent to good works and the fall, but decrees reprobation consequent to sin and the fall. So the decree of election is logically prior to the decree of reprobation, with the decree of the fall in between. Unfortunately, Crisp argues, the supralapsarian part of this scheme is "fatally flawed" (p. 18). Given Edwards's understanding of the covenant of redemption, God cannot intend election apart from redemption. And he cannot meaningfully intend redemption apart from the expectation of sin. So the decree of election cannot be logically prior to the decree of the fall. This reading leaves us to wonder why Edwards did not see this problem with supralapsarianism about the elect since, according to Crisp, he opts for infralapsarianism about the reprobate in order to avoid the exactly parallel problem: damnation doesn't make sense without sin.

The next chapter examines Edwards's explanation for man's first sin. Although God withholds from Adam the 'divine influence' or 'confirming grace' sufficient to withstand all temptations, he does provide him with a rational will which holds him in a temporary state of holiness. What goes wrong is that the rational will is deceived and subordinated to natural appetites. But whence this deception? Crisp finds the materials for an interesting answer in Edwards's elaborate moral psychology. The upshot is that Adam engages in a kind of self-deception: his rational will perceives that it is better not to sin, but he suppresses or 'compartmentalizes' this perception in order to satisfy his natural appetites. Crisp regards this as an 'interesting and plausible' explanation for Adam's fall. However, given Edwards's occasionalism, it cannot block the attribution of direct responsibility to God. Regardless of Adam's self-deception, "God alone has causal power and God alone is therefore the proximate cause of Adam's sin" (p. 50).

The third and fourth chapters address two familiar problems that arise from Edwards's very strong conception of God's sovereignty. First, if God determines all events that come to pass, does that not make God the author of sin? Edwards says that God does not produce sin by 'positive agency' but merely 'permits' it. For example, God might determine that two antagonists shall meet and fight, but he does not strike the blows himself. Crisp argues, quite persuasively, that even if this absolves God of responsibility for the sin itself, it makes him unjust in condemning the sinner: "God causes the wicked to act wickedly but without individual moral culpability for their actions, only to blame them for actions he caused them to perform!" (p. 69). Nevertheless, it remains a different matter to commit a wrong yourself than to condemn a sin for which you bear some causal responsibility (or so every parent hopes). Crisp argues that Edwards's positive agency/permission distinction cannot in any case be sustained in light of his occasionalism: God is the sole cause of all events, so he actually *does* strike the blows. But here the reader is disappointed that so little is said on Edwards's behalf. Occasionalism brings a special urgency to the 'authorship of sin' problem, as philosophers like Malebranche recognized. If Edwards doesn't see it, why not?

The other problem about God's sovereignty is that it seems insincere for him to command what he has determined I will not perform. As usual, Edwards argues first of all *tu quoque* that his libertarian adversaries have the same problem. On this point, Crisp provides a nice defense of Edwards against criticisms leveled by Plantinga. In particular, there can be no difference between the sort of necessity an action has by virtue of being past, and being merely foreknown, since according to Edwards God knows all things timelessly. (This obviously raises its own set of problems, such as God's knowledge of tensed facts, but these are not discussed by Crisp.) Crisp suggests several ways in which Edwards might blunt the insincerity charge, but finds them all wanting. In (only) one case, I think the Edwardsian reply is dispatched too quickly. This reply—which is actually due to William Wainwright—notes that one may have a duty to issue commands even if one is certain they will be ineffectual. Thus, the platoon-leader commands the shell-shocked to fight and my dentist commands me to floss. The problem with this, Crisp says, is that "God knows his commands will be ineffectual because he ordained this, not because other circumstances have intervened" (p. 90). But other circumstances do 'intervene' in the case of sin: temptation, self-deception, and so on. In any case, the platoon-leader probably *is* the reason the soldier is shell-shocked, but that does not release him from his duties as commander.

The final three chapters and appendix, which I will discuss together, deal with aspects of Edwards's 'metaphysics of sin' that are not only novel, but also more likely than what is discussed in preceding chapters to be of interest to contemporary metaphysicians. To explain the imputation of original sin, Edwards introduces a doctrine of temporal parts (or 'perdurantism' in today's jargon). The idea is that Adam and his progeny share in sin (and guilt) because they constitute a single thing spread out over time, just like a tree is spread out over space: "Both guilt, or exposedness to punishment, and also depravity of heart, came upon Adam's posterity just as they came upon him, as much as if they had all co-existed, like a tree with many branches." (Edwards, *Original Sin*, p. 389)

The first issue considered by Crisp is the identity conditions for this temporally extended object (which he dubs 'perdurantist humanity' or 'PDH'). For example, why am I part of PDH and not part of a thing composed by your life, my life, and Dick Cheney's vice-presidency ('YMD')? Edwards's answer is simple: God himself "makes truth in affairs of this nature." (*Original Sin*, p. 404) But, as Chisholm has observed, this seems to imply that if God decided to 'make truth' differently then he could "justly punish me this year and you last year for the sins that the Vice-President committed the year before that."² Crisp points out that PDH does have the structure of a family tree, which is perhaps more natural than the gerrymandered YMD. If sin can only flow 'downstream', as it were, this would explain why you and I share in Adam's sin but not the Vice-President's. Considering this, Crisp notes, "God has good reason for making truth in this way rather than some other way, because this best suits the divine purpose" (p. 103). But now the reader will begin to worry that what initially seemed a real theological innovation is finally doing no work in the explanation of imputation. If God has antecedent good reasons for imputing Adam's sin and guilt to us (and not vice-versa), then surely he can see

to this without having to treat us as one thing. Crisp argues that, according to Edwards, PDH is really *made* a single thing by God ('strong perdurantism'), and not merely *treated* as such for the purpose of imputing sin ('weak perdurantism'). But if God really 'makes truth' concerning identity this is a distinction without a difference: things simply are the way God treats them. And the fundamental problem remains that the model doesn't explain original sin because the underlying ontology of imputation rests entirely on a (possibly inscrutable) divine purpose.

Furthermore, it generates a host of theological difficulties. If I share in Adam's sin because we are parts of a single thing, then why doesn't he also share in my sin? If I share in Adam's post-fall sin, why don't I also share in his pre-fall blessedness? If I share in the sin of the primal father, why not also the sin of my immediate father, grandfathers, and so on? The solutions to these depend mostly on additional appeals to divine purpose. Thus, on the first of these difficulties, Crisp writes: "Of course, the fact that this relation is unidirectional is due merely to the divine will" (p. 101).

Finally, even granted PDH really is a single thing, why should sin and guilt distribute through the whole? At one point in his searching discussion of this issue, Crisp suggests plausibly that sin and guilt are not distributed from Adam to the posterity, but rather global properties of the "one corporate spacetime entity" (p. 121). This account faces the problem of why only some features of Adam (and only properties of Adam) are properties of the entire PDH. Crisp points out that guilt can be carried an entire life, but then so can properties like 'onetime inhabitant of Eden'.

For Edwards, the reason all identities over time depend on divine fiat is that God must re-create the world at each instant (owing, among other things, to the lack of causal power in created beings). From this he infers that each successive time slice of a thing, considered in itself, is a distinct thing. Crisp argues that this undercuts Edwards's perdurantism, and with it his entire model of original sin: "Nothing persists from one moment to the next. At every moment a new Adam is created out of nothing. But if each Adam is a numerically distinct individual . . . then Edwards has undermined the very doctrine of sin he set out to defend" (p. 132. See also 110). But this charge seems to be based on a misconstrual of perdurantism. On the perdurantist view, Adam persists because he is identical with an entire sequence of temporal parts, not with any of the parts taken individually. So, from the fact that these parts are numerically distinct from one another it doesn't follow that Adam does not persist (perdure), any more than it follows that an object is not extended because its spatial parts are distinct.

This book will be welcomed by analytical philosophers of religion for its incisive analysis and contributions to ongoing discussions of Edwards's philosophical theology. It is unlikely, however, to encourage broader interest in Edwards's 'metaphysics of sin' since the overall message is that his system is interesting in certain details but incoherent as a whole. Crisp argues that Edwards's account of God's decrees is fatally flawed and that his treatments of the authorship of sin and divine insincerity problems are both undermined by his occasionalism. He also maintains (I think wrongly) that the theory of temporal parts is inconsistent with the very doctrines that support it: occasionalism and continuous creation *ex nihilo*.

Crisp suggests that Edwards could dispense with these doctrines while retaining his metaphysical account of original sin. But this is far from clear. After all, it is the absolute dependence of created things on God, both for existence and for identity over time, which enables God to treat PDH as one thing. And even if Edwards's system would be more coherent if shorn of these doctrines, it would also be much less interesting.

NOTES

1. Jonathan Bennett, *Learning from Six Philosophers: Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Locke, Berkeley, Hume*, Vol. 1, (Oxford University Press, 2001) p. 1.
2. Roderick Chisholm, *Person and Object*, (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1976) p. 139.