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# CUR DEUS HOMO? PRIORITIES AMONG THE REASONS?

Marilyn McCord Adams

From some philosophical points of view, the Incarnation is difficult to motivate. From others, a host of reasons appear, raising the problem of how to choose among and/or prioritize them. In this paper I examine how different substantive commitments and starting points combine with contrasting understandings of method in philosophical theology, to generate different analyses and answers to Christianity's crucial question: *cur Deus homo?*

## *I. Cur Deus Homo? Configuring the Problem:*

*Cur Deus Homo?* Anselm asked and answered, laboring to shoulder an onerous burden of proof imposed by the metaphysical-value theory he and his opponents shared. Surely the "size-gap" between God and creatures makes Incarnation indecent! How could the Supreme Wisdom of a being a greater than which cannot be conceived, consent to lower its position on the ontological scale?<sup>1</sup> To rebut this presumption against Incarnation, Anselm looked for a reason that would make Incarnation *conditionally necessary*, given Divine nature and purposes. And he thought he found it, in the conditional necessity of a Divine remedy for human sin.

Except for dedicated Abelardians, school theologians generally agreed with Anselm's conclusion that by His Incarnation and passion, Christ makes satisfaction for human sin. But by the middle third of the thirteenth century, theological consensus had backed away from Anselm's configuration of the problem, because theologians began to read the implications of Divine Power and Goodness in somewhat different ways. On the one hand, Omnipotence would surely be *able* to free Adam's race from sin without Christ's Incarnation or passion. Nor—*pace* Anselm—would Justice *require* God (any more than human kings) to demand satisfaction for an offense against the Godself. It follows, twice-over, that remedy for sin does not generate the conditional necessity that Anselm sought. On the other hand, the recovery of pseudo-Dionysius (whom Anselm never read) introduced the idea that Goodness is by nature self-diffusing, that Goodness has/is a positive tendency to share Itself with others, that—as Plato insists—Divine generosity in sharing goodness could not be curbed by envy.<sup>2</sup> Theological consensus judged these latter notions to remove any presumption *against* Incarnation. Nevertheless, because Christians normally understood the Divine disposition to self-diffusion *ad extra* to be non-



necessitating, they saw it as generating *fitting* reasons *cur Deus homo*, but not ones that would render it conditionally necessary on God's nature and purposes.<sup>3</sup> Once again, human sin is a fact, and Scripture tells us that its remedy was an *actual reason* for Christ's Incarnation and passion. All agreed, human sin is a *sine qua non* of Christ's passion. Yet, because their philosophical understanding of Divine Goodness brought them to recognize a variety of other reasons *cur Deus homo*, they naturally began to debate the further question: whether—in the absence of human sin—God might still have freely acted on other considerations of propriety, whether God would have become Incarnate, even if humans had never sinned?<sup>4</sup>

I find this medieval debate intriguing and instructive, both in terms of methodology—e.g., in relation to a key question for Christian philosophers, both medieval and contemporary, of what roles Scripture and philosophical speculation play in theological formulation—and in terms of material content—i.e., the variety of reasons *cur Deus homo*, their relative weights and priorities, and their systematic connections. In what follows, I shall take acquaintance with Anselm's argument for granted, the better to concentrate on answers given by lesser known and also by equally eminent successors. All of these medieval treatments share the free-will-defender's contention that sin is optional. In closing I shall shed further light on the logical structure of medieval answers by contrasting them with my own (what philosophers would call) 'theodicy' and (theologians) 'soteriology,' where human need for redemption is—given an alternative estimate of Divine purposes—taken to be inevitable.

## II. *Cur Deus Homo? Perfection and Fulfillment!*

The variety of reasons for Incarnation may be overviewed, classified, and contrasted from many angles. [1] Where Anselm seeks the conditional necessity of the Incarnation in the *repair* of something that need not have been damaged, middle-third-of-the-thirteenth-century theologians—including Robert Grosseteste and Richard Fishacre<sup>6</sup>—weigh arguments that look instead to a three-fold consideration: [a] to the *perfection* of the universe, [b] to the *completion* of what is finite and so generable, corruptible and changeable, and [c] to the requirements of human perfection at its center, straddling the realms of material and spiritual being. Towards the end of the century, Duns Scotus begins with human perfection in particular, with union with God—membership in the trinitarian circle of friendship love—as the supranatural end of humankind. [2] Alternatively, it could be said that all of these thinkers agree that the condition of creation generally and of human being in particular is *non-optimal* apart from Incarnation. Anselm rivets attention on how sin pulls us down below nature's norm, whereas later thinkers note how Incarnation would complete the cosmos, or raise human being above the naturally achievable. [3] Again, Anselm and later theologians all agree that—in one way and another—Incarnation contributes to the second half of the metaphysical and spiritual *exitus/redditus* by which creatures "go out" from God in creation and "return to" God in various kinds of union.

**2.1. Completing the Cosmos, Perfecting the Microcosm:** Middle-third-of-the-thirteenth century authors collected a whole battery of arguments—Grosseteste lists nineteen—for the affirmative answer, that God would have become Incarnate anyway, even if Adam had not sinned. [1] One group focusses on *cosmic completion* writ large. [a] Self-diffusing Goodness, envy-free Divine generosity would flood the created universe with as much goodness as it is capable of receiving. But the capacity of hypostatic union is the noblest of created capacities, and its actualization would confer on creation its highest dignity. So far from being conferred at the fall, this capacity and Divine inclination to actualize it would—if anything—be diminished by sin. Surely Divine Goodness and Power would not have withheld this honor if instead rational creatures had always obeyed!<sup>7</sup>

[b] Again, *the unity of the universe* requires its organization under a single head. But this role could not be filled by a mere angel or mere human, because they are on a metaphysical par and so are not appropriately subordinated to one another but only to God. Yet, God is not in a genus; so no creature can share genus or species with the Divine. Therefore, the unity of the universe requires God to join Godself to it in hypostatic union. Nor would a God-angel do, because hypostatic union with a merely spiritual creature would not unite the spiritual with the material. By contrast, human nature is a microcosm, which participates in both. Human being joins a rational soul and a human body in personal union, its soul sharing intelligence with the angels, and its body sharing constitution from the four elements with all other bodies. Thus, the unity of the universe would require God to become Incarnate in human nature, even apart from sin.<sup>8</sup>

[c] Likewise, *the beauty of the universe* is enhanced by Incarnation, because it joins the beginning (the Divine Word as creative source) with the end (human nature as last created) to form a circle, the most excellent shape. Indeed, creation is doubly circular, with another circumference swinging around from Christ the creator out to Adam and back through Adam the forefather of Jesus Christ (cf. the Lucan genealogy).<sup>9</sup> Again, hypostatic union enhances the glory of the universe, because it glorifies the flesh of Christ (the way wood glows when united to fire) and makes flesh worthy of adoration due to God.<sup>10</sup>

[2] Turning then to that *microcosmic perfection* in which cosmic perfection finds its center, it would seem unfitting for the creation of the noblest creature—viz., the soul of Christ—or the actualization of human nature’s noblest capacity—viz., that for hypostatic union with a Divine person—to be only for the instrumental purpose of redeeming sinners.<sup>11</sup> Likewise, it would seem contrary to justice for human being to gain the highest dignity of Incarnation as a consequence of its own malice towards God!<sup>12</sup> Again, would the bodily eye’s highest capacity—to see the glorified flesh of God—be left unactualized, just because human beings had refrained from sinning?<sup>13</sup>

[3] In any event, the Anselmian metaphysical “size-gap” between Godhead and human being means that sin is not the only obstacle to be overcome. For it is just as impossible for sinless but finite souls to unite with infinite goodness by their own power, as it is for any mere creature to make satisfaction for sin. [a] One argument combines the Pauline theme of

justification with Anselm's insistence that justice (or the *affectio iustitiae*) is a special gift from God over and above nature, to contend that even sinless humans and angels would need to be justified by God. But if only the Divinity of Christ were involved in conferring justice, then His humanity would be assumed only to provide the material with which to suffer, which—*pace* Anselm—seems absurd.<sup>14</sup>

Again, the Bible tells us that human being is destined to be joined to God, not merely in a conformity of wills, but through a union of natures, not just by spiritual harmony but by a union of flesh.<sup>15</sup> [b] For surely our sinlessness would not undermine Divine resolve to make us God's *children by adoption*. But mere conformity of will does not make us God's children or Christ's siblings but at most friends or obedient servants. We can share in Christ's Sonship only if we share in His nature, which is possible only if He shares in ours.<sup>16</sup> [c] Similarly, even apart from sin, the Church and the eucharist would be skillful means for bringing us into union with Christ and the Godhead. Christ is the head of His Body. But the head of a body is "conformed to" (of the same nature as) its members, and is the source that directs their movement and enlivens their senses. It is in the Incarnation that Christ becomes conformed to human beings, and becomes the source of their charity, grace, and perfection.<sup>17</sup> It is because Christ assumed our nature that the eucharist can be "the sacrament of unity," where we share in His flesh and are naturally made one Body with Christ and with one another. And because Christ also shares the nature of Deity, Christ is the Mediator of our union with the Trinity. The completion of this union is such a great good that surely the Church would not have lacked it, had there been no human fall!<sup>18</sup>

[4] Finally, the Incarnation perfects both cosmos and microcosm with respect to *glory*. Christ's union with flesh crowns the material universe with consummate beauty.<sup>19</sup> Moreover, glory will perfect the whole human being—the body, the senses, the intellect. Just as the Divine Word gives the mind's eye something to see, so the glorified assumed human nature gives the bodily eye something to look at, so that the blessed human "passes over" into God with both corporeal and spiritual parts.<sup>20</sup> Thus, if benefits for humankind are what rebut the Anselmian presumption against the Incarnation created by the metaphysical "size-gap," so also and all the more so should such perfecting of humankind apart from sin!

Grosseteste's "Incarnation anyway" discussion forwards the theme of flesh in a remarkable way. God made human being and glorified the material world with consummate beauty, and allows the bodily eye to enjoy a vision of God. The "one flesh" marriage of Adam and Eve in the Garden prophesies the "one flesh" union of Christ and His Church.<sup>21</sup> The eucharist occasions a fleshly union where our flesh takes in Christ's, and Christ incorporates us into His Body so that we are made members of one another.<sup>22</sup> Even in Paradise, the "one flesh union" sacraments of marriage and eucharist would be celebrated (along with priestly ordination to furnish ministers for the rites).<sup>23</sup>

Yet, such emphasis on flesh merely reasserts the idea that just as *the whole* universe—and not only its spiritual part—goes out from God (*exitus*) in creation, so *the whole* universe—and not only its spiritual part—

should return to God (*redditus*), with human being—that metaphysical spirit-matter straddler—leading the way. On this picture, all things would find their end in (and so would be made for the sake of) microcosmic humanity that unites spirit and flesh in unity of person. All things would find their ultimate end in Christ, God the Son, who joins Himself with humanity in hypostatic union. On this “Incarnation anyway” hypothesis, the end of all material things would be the Church triumphant, and pre-eminently Christ its head. All creatures would strain forward and “pant after” that consummate union, stretch toward the God-man head of the Church, whose advent would be the end of all things and the fullness of time!<sup>24</sup>

**2.2. Varieties of Caution:** Already in *Cur Deus Homo*, Anselm acknowledges that while Divine Justice focuses on propriety, not all considerations of fit are decisive; *convenientia* come in different weights.<sup>25</sup> Where—in speculative theology—they underdetermine, it becomes methodologically interesting to watch great thinkers decide what to say.

**2.2.1. Reluctance to Determine, Curricular Quarrels:** However inspiring the picture of Christ’s cosmic and microcosmic significance apart from sin, Grosseteste himself declines to embrace it. He advances the arguments as “apparently efficacious,”<sup>26</sup> even “persuasive.”<sup>27</sup> But at the end of the day, he maintains a disciplined agnosticism:

“These and other arguments of this sort seem to show that God would be human even if humans had never sinned. But whether this is true, I do not know, and I suffer not a little because of this ignorance. For—as I said above—I don’t recall having seen any of our authorities determine this question. And without explicit authority, I do not dare to assert anything about such a difficult question. For an argument probable to my small intelligence and knowledge can surely go astray.”<sup>28</sup>

Grosseteste’s hesitation is the more striking because—as James McEvoy points out—most of the retailed arguments do take their inspiration from recognized *auctoritates*—viz., from patristic exegesis of Holy Scripture. Grosseteste himself was thoroughly familiar with well-established patterns of patristic exegesis that represent the Incarnation as Divine Goodness seeking to share itself as much as possible (Ephesians 2:4-10); as a supreme proof of God’s love and friendship (John 3:16); as metaphysical mediation between the Father and the world (Hebrews 1:2-3; Colossians 1:17; John 1:18, 16:6-18). Likewise, patristic exegesis insisted on Christ’s role in creation (Gen 1:1; Proverbs 8:22; Ecclesiasticus 24:5 and Colossians 1:15), understood humans to be created in *Christ’s* image (Genesis 1:26), took all things to be created for Christ’s sake (Ephesians 1:3-14; Colossians 1:15-20), and saw in the *ante lapsum* union of Adam and Eve a prophecy of the Incarnation and of the union between Christ and the Church (Genesis 2:23-24). These interpretive traditions positively invited the conclusion—which the fathers in question did not explicitly draw—that God would have become Incarnate, even apart from human sin.<sup>29</sup>

Two studies by Stephen F. Brown<sup>30</sup> suggest that Grosseteste’s reserve

may find its wider context in a debate about the appropriate syllabus for academic theology. Traditionally, Holy Scripture was the ordinary text, *lectio* the pedagogical method, line-by-line commentaries the professorial product in theology courses. Yet, from the beginning, *lectio*-focus on the letter of the text shaded over into questions about its meaning, which spilled over into an interest in probing more deeply into the theological issues raised by the text. The *lectio* method was supplemented by the *quaestio*, which arrayed *pro* and *contra* arguments for contradictory answers, the better to focus the issue, which then might be debated and determined by the master in charge. At first, *quaestiones* were raised and answered in connection with the lectures. But Richard Fishacre notes how some modern masters were beginning to separate these tasks, so that they taught only morals in the course of their lectures on Scripture and saved doctrinal questions for their lectures on Peter Lombard's *Sentences*.<sup>31</sup> The dispute was over what the latter book and broad-sense philosophy (which encompassed the liberal arts and philosophy proper) had to do with theology. In the inaugural lecture to his own *Sentence*-commentary, Fishacre attempted to chart a *via media*. Holy Scripture is the subject-matter of theology, but thorough grounding in the secular science helps to make clear the Bible's contents. Disputing the questions of Lombard's *Sentences* does not take one *away from* the study of Holy Scriptures, but is *a way of* faithfully expounding them.<sup>32</sup> Expertise in philosophy broad-sense and narrow positively benefits the faith, because it constitutes skill in raising questions and eliciting answers implicitly contained (*indistincte*) in Holy Scripture.<sup>33</sup> Accordingly, following Alexander of Hales' Parisian example—Fishacre was the first to make the *Sentences* the ordinary text for theology at Oxford.<sup>34</sup>

As Bishop of Lincoln (whose jurisdiction then included Oxford), Grosseteste took the other side in 1246, and tried to limit the ordinary theology lectures to the books of the Old and New Testaments, although Pope Innocent IV came to Fishacre's defense.<sup>35</sup> And this brings us back to the Bishop's surprising posture regarding the "Incarnation anyway" arguments that he so forcefully presents. Grosseteste disapproved of making speculative doctrinal questions the subject-matter of theology. Patristic exegesis might contain the makings of answers, but—so far as Grosseteste can remember—no *auctoritates* explicitly raise and determine this doctrinal question.<sup>36</sup> For him to put a new question and determine it, might have seemed to him to send a misleading signal or to set a bad example.

**2.2.2. Indecisive Arguments, Pious Pragmatics:** Writing a generation or so later, Bonaventure and Aquinas also evidence reluctance, this time not eventually to determine the question, but to allow what they regard as philosophical considerations to carry the day. Uneven as the individual "Incarnation anyway" arguments are, Bonaventure clearly feels the force of their cumulative case. Insofar as they appeal to considerations of excellence and order, Bonaventure deems "Incarnation anyway" more in accordance with "the judgment of reason." Bonaventure declares both positions defensible, both encouraging of piety and devotion.<sup>37</sup> Difficult as he finds it to say which of these is the truer, Bonaventure ultimately decides the question *on pragmatic grounds of piety*. Remedy for sin is the only reason explicitly mentioned by the authorities (Scripture and the Saints). It *inflames* the

faithful more to think of the Incarnation as cleansing them from pollution than abstractly to consider how it perfects the universe. Likewise, the mystery of the Incarnation is better commended by the dramatic—by emphasizing how something drastic would be required to placate God and restore sin-wrought wreckage.<sup>38</sup>

Piety might also protest the very idea of Incarnation being required for the *natural* perfection of creatures. To speak of the Incarnation as perfecting the created universe seems to subsume God under the rubric of perfecting God's works. Bonaventure finds it more respectful to see hypostatic union as *surplus* goodness, over and above what may be required for the natural completion of any created being; likewise more pious, to regard God as transcending every created order.<sup>39</sup> Even if the capacity for hypostatic union contributes to the dignity of human nature, it does not have to be actualized for humans to be the noblest of creatures.<sup>40</sup>

Here Aquinas agrees. Actual hypostatic union does not pertain to the *natural* potency or perfection of human or any other created substance nature. If it did, Aquinas thinks, we could reason from Divine consistency of purpose that God would not create human beings without that potency's being actualized in someone (any more than, e.g., God would create all human beings blind). Rather the capacity for hypostatic union pertains to the *obediential* potency of created substance natures, and it does not follow from Divine Wisdom and Goodness and Power that God would actualize all of the obediential potency that pertains to creatures, since it does not follow that God would do everything Divine Power can do.<sup>41</sup> Where the putative perfection is thus *supranatural*, we cannot *know* what the Divine will would choose unless it is handed down to us in Sacred Scripture.

Turning to the arguments from the microcosmic perfection of humankind, Bonaventure insists that neither grace nor glory requires Incarnation. Apart from the fall, the human mind would not have been darkened by sin, and would have been able to read the Book of Nature; God's power, wisdom, and liberality would have been so obvious in creation that there would have been no need for God to meet humans at the level of their sensory attention in the Incarnation.<sup>42</sup> Likewise, Bonaventure contends, God could have put us in a position to earn merit by sending the Holy Spirit into our hearts, without sending the Son of God into the flesh.<sup>43</sup> De-emphasizing concern for the *redditus* of material creation, Bonaventure finds it decidedly more pious to say that vision of the Divine nature would be sufficient to beatify the whole, so that the glory of the superior parts (e.g., intellect and will) would overflow into the lower (sensory and bodily) parts, whether or not there was any Divine flesh to see! Here, too, Aquinas completely concurs.<sup>44</sup>

**2.2.3. Silence as Denial:** In his *Sentence*-commentary, Aquinas declares both answers defensible, but neither demonstrable, and does not choose between them. Even though the negative verdict—that God would not have become Incarnate anyway—is supported by explicit statements in Augustine and Pope Leo's tome that Scripture always links Incarnation to the remedy for sin, Aquinas does not in this earlier work allow such *authoritates* to trump opposing arguments that Incarnation exalts human nature and constitutes the consummation of the whole created universe.<sup>45</sup>



In the *Summa Theologica*, however, Aquinas determines the question in the negative. For whatever unstated reasons he now leaves aside patristic exegesis of “cosmic Christ” passages to read Scripture as the above-mentioned *auctoritates* from Augustine and Pope Leo do. Thus, while Incarnation does *de facto* confer supernatural dignity on the human race and thence on the created universe, Aquinas concludes, it would be more fitting to deny that God would have done it for that reason alone and apart from sin.<sup>46</sup>

Methodologically, Aquinas’ posture in the *Summa Theologica* is extreme. For [a] we are not dealing with a case in which philosophical reflection yields results that are *contradictory* to the evident claims of Scripture or creeds. Not only are the excellence of the universe and the remedy for sin compatible desiderata; Aquinas agrees with all and sundry that they are both goals to which the Incarnation *de facto* contributes. [b] Nor is Aquinas opposed to importing into theology the pseudo-Dionysian philosophical conceptuality of Goodness as self-diffusing. He himself uses it to defend the metaphysical propriety of Incarnation.<sup>47</sup> [c] Aquinas is not content to signal *the tentative nature* of philosophical speculation towards theological conclusions that go beyond what is explicit in the primary authoritative documents. In *Cur Deus Homo*, Anselm repeatedly cautions readers to be open to alternative and better answers (e.g., regarding whether heaven was originally intended for angels only, or how God took a sinless human nature from Adam’s race),<sup>48</sup> and—*fides quaerens intellectum*—repeatedly offers reasoned explanations (e.g., not one but two rationales for the immaculate conception of Jesus).<sup>49</sup> [d] Rather, given that the issue depends on God’s free and contingent choices, Aquinas takes the alleged fact that the Bible *does not explicitly mention* other reasons to be *equivalent to denying that there are any other reasons ante-mortem* thinkable by us that would be sufficient for God. And he does so, even where theologically acceptable philosophical conceptualizations of Divine perfection suggest answers. Aquinas concludes, we can all shout, “*Felix culpa!*” because God would not have become Incarnate apart from Adam’s fall!<sup>50</sup>

**2.2.4. The Spirit of Adventure:** By contrast, Fishacre’s methodological stance seems closer to Anselm’s. Like Grosseteste but contrary to Aquinas in the *Summa Theologica*, Fishacre does not find the Scriptures so silent about Christ’s cosmic role, alluding as he does to a shorter list of proof-texts (among which he instances Ephesians 1:9-11 and Galatians 4:14) that seem positively (if less than explicitly) to link Incarnation with cosmic completion.<sup>51</sup> Like Anselm but contrary to Grosseteste, Fishacre thinks that making the implicit explicit is the theologian’s job.

For his part, Fishacre explains away the *frequency* of the Bible’s promotion of the Incarnation as the remedy for sin, by appeal to the very rhetorical consideration Bonaventure identifies: *viz.*, its power to enkindle gratitude. Fishacre’s grimly realistic estimate is that we are more grateful for goods conferred on us alone (and hence for redemption specially conferred on humankind) than for those given to others as well (say, the perfection of the universe as a whole).<sup>52</sup> Nevertheless, the Bible’s sometime comment on Christ’s cosmic role need not undermine the spiritual director’s enterprise of stirring devotion. For even if the Incarnation benefits by perfecting the world as a whole, everybody

agrees that the *passion* was for us sinners, and would not have been suffered apart from Adam's fall!<sup>53</sup>

**2.2.5. What Kind of Perfection?** Turning to the material issue of whether or how Incarnation contributes to the excellence of the universe, Scotus later advances a helpful distinction between passive and active capacities. Against Aquinas, Scotus argues that if beatific intimacy with God is the human and angelic goal, such creatures must by nature have a passive capacity to receive the mental quality or qualities that constitute beatific vision of the Godhead. Yet, no creature has the corresponding active capacity to actualize that potentiality. Rather God alone acts as a free and supranatural efficient cause in producing that beatific vision.<sup>54</sup> Similarly, "Incarnation anyway" advocates could have agreed against Aquinas that the passive capacity for hypostatic union is natural to (human) created substance natures, but that no created natural active power can produce that result. Rather created substance natures are (as Aquinas also concedes) in obediential potency with respect to Divine power, which can produce that effect.<sup>55</sup> Thus, whether you count hypostatic union as perfecting the nature (because of the natural passive capacity) or supranatural perfection (because of the supranatural efficient cause), it adds dignity to the nature—a dignity, they would insist, that self-diffusing Goodness would not be less inclined to share in the absence of sin.

**2.3. Well-Organized Love Affair:** In the last decades of the thirteenth century, John Duns Scotus approached Christology with the exuberant dicitum, inspired by devotion and diametrically opposed to Aquinas' policy in *Summa Theologica*: viz., where matters are underdetermined by Scripture and authoritative ecclesiastical documents, be bold, exhibit Godlike extravagance; risk praising Christ too much rather than too little; praise Christ as much as you can! In this vein, Scotus firmly "seconds" the overall conclusion of earlier "Incarnation anyway" arguments: viz., that it would be maximally irrational to regard sin as a *sine qua non* of Incarnation. For God is a maximally well-organized Lover, and it would be incongruous for the best thing God does in creation to be driven by the worst thing creatures do!<sup>56</sup> Scotus recognizes natural or explanatory priorities and posteriorities within a single instant of time or within the "now" of eternity. He marks these by speaking of earlier and later "signs" or "instants of nature." The order of explanation is the order of Divine purposes. On Scotus' distinctive analysis, God does not first (in an earlier instant of nature) aim at the perfection of the universe and then (in a subsequent instant of nature) recognize Incarnation as a constitutive means thereto. Rather God's principal aim in creation (in the first instant of nature) is to widen the circle of trinitarian friendship love by welcoming spiritual creatures into it; first and foremost, Divine love elects to include the soul of Christ. To fit that soul for such exalted society, God wills (in the second instant of nature) not only to infuse it with fullness of grace and virtue, maximal knowledge, and impeccability of will; God also wills for it to be hypostatically united to the Divine Word.<sup>57</sup> Only afterwards (in a still later instant of nature) does God will to create a material world, so that the soul of Christ (an incomplete being) and other co-lovers may enjoy natural fitness as the substantial forms of a complete individual human natures.<sup>59</sup> Thus, spiritual crea-

tures, pre-eminently the soul of Christ, are made for God's sake; and the God-man does not exist to complete the world; rather the material world is made for Christ's sake. Scotus' God is focussed on glory; all of this is settled prior in the order of explanation to Divine permission of and fore/middle knowledge of sin. Once sin comes into the picture, Christ volunteers for the "secondary" mission of making satisfaction for the sin of Adam's race.<sup>59</sup>

**2.4. Reasons and Priorities:** Taking stock, we see [1] how Anselm, Bonaventure, Aquinas (in the *Summa Theologica*) all agree that *remedy for sin* is a *sine qua non* of Incarnation. For them, restoration collapses the two projects of reversing the damaging effects of sin and lifting us up beyond our natural capacities into a graced society involving union with God. But—*pace* Anselm—neither Bonaventure nor Aquinas treats Incarnation as a *sine qua non* condition of the remedy for sin. Rather Incarnation figures in the best—because most integrative—approach that God could adopt.

[2] Anselm, the theologians whose arguments Grosseteste retails, Bonaventure, Aquinas, and Scotus all promote beatific love and intimacy with God the Blessed Trinity as the optimal human condition. Getting human sinners there is the Divine purpose upon which—Anselm thinks—the Incarnation is conditionally necessary. But even Grosseteste's "Incarnation-anyway" authors, Fishacre, and Scotus have to admit that beatific love and vision are possible for human souls not hypostatically united to a Divine person (e.g., beatific vision and love are possible for all Christians). So—apart from sin—the spiritual *exitus/redditus* could be achieved without Incarnation by the infusion of graces, spiritual gifts, etc. and by other exercises of Divine power to cause the vision and confirm the will in love. For Scotus, hypostatic union is the measure of the extravagance of Divine love that seeks the maximum possible union with its favorite object, the soul of Christ! What is striking about the earlier arguments listed by Grosseteste is how they manage to give material *redditus* equal weight. While Bonaventure and Aquinas both sound the theme that Incarnation into metaphysically straddling human being unites God with the whole of creation, their account of human beatification reflects a more subordinate interest in our material dimensions. This tendency is all the more explicit in Scotus, who makes God's creation of the material world very much an afterthought (i.e., a very remote means), undertaken so that Christ's human soul is not left dangling as a metaphysically incomplete being!

[3] Bonaventure and Aquinas insist that Incarnation is not a *sine qua non* condition of the *natural* perfection of the universe; God will not have left creation *defective, naturally incomplete* if God does not hypostatically unite Godself to some part of it. He simply will have *refrained from adorning it* by actualizing its highest supranatural capacity. Since—most school theologians agree—it is empirically obvious that God does not adorn creatures as much as God could (witness how many individual creatures could have better accidents than they do), one can't credibly insist that God everywhere and always maximizes along this parameter.

[4] Nevertheless, when Grosseteste's "Incarnation anyway" authors, Fishacre, and Scotus deny that sin is a *sine qua non* of Incarnation, they do so, because they think that God could find other good enough

(Grosseteste's "Incarnation-anyway" authors and Fishacre) or even better (Scotus) reasons on which to act in hypostatically uniting a particular human nature to the Divine Word. Among middle-third-of-the-thirteenth century authors, Fishacre refuses to decide which of God's actual reasons—remedy for sin and perfection of the universe—is primary. Apparently, each and either would be good enough by itself for God to act upon. Scotus does say that Divine desire to include the soul of Christ within the trinitarian friendship circle is God's *de facto* reason for Incarnation. But—given his high doctrine of Divine freedom—Scotus would presumably grant the metaphysical possibility of God's freely willing to become Incarnate for any number of other reasons. What Scotus insists upon is that the efficacious Divine resolve to hypostatically unite itself to the soul of Christ, is *prior* in the order of explanation to any Divine consideration of sin or its remedy. For Scotus, it is doubly contingent that Incarnation figures in the remedy for sin at all, insofar as [a] sin is contingent and [b] what counts as satisfaction-making and whether any satisfaction is needed, are a function of Divine free choice (God could have waived satisfaction or accepted the created sinner's repentance, for example). Thus, when it comes to Incarnation, Anselm's God is focussed on the repair of sin; the God of Grosseteste's "Incarnation-anyway" authors and of Fishacre may have binocular vision; while Scotus' God fixes His attention first and foremost on glory, human as well as Divine!

### III. *Cur Deus Homo? The Problem, Reconfigured*

We think with the past to profit in the present, to make it our own before we hand it down. Methodologically, this need not mean that we—like icon-painters of legend—merely copy the copies precisely, projecting into them as little of ourselves as we can. In the middle ages, it would entail holding Scripture, creeds, and ecumenical councils constant, while questioning and disputing past *auctoritates*, to see how themes and theses reconfigure when set up against new premisses. As a contemporary Christian philosopher, long-since medieval, I turn now to set my own answers to *cur Deus homo?* up against those of my "out-classing" predecessors, to assess how considerations of perfection and repair, attention to cosmic and human *loci* reintegrate and recombine.<sup>61</sup>

**3.1. Alternatives, Priorities, and False Choices:** Still another way to frame what is at stake in our disputed question—whether God would have become Incarnate, even if humans had never sinned?—is whether God's decision to become Incarnate issues out of Divine purposes for *creation*, or, or as well as, the human need for *redemption*. Middle-third-of-the-thirteenth century "Incarnation anyway" authors answer "both/and": God's creative aim at universal excellence would have been enough, and the human need for redemption would have been enough. Scotus replies, "First and foremost, God's goals in creation." On Scotus' scheme, human need for redemption does not function as a reason for Incarnation. Rather, only because the Incarnation is already in place (at the earlier instant of nature) does it seem wise and efficient (at the later instant of nature) for the Incarnate One to supply the remedy for sin.

Yet, these stances are open to them, only because they conceive of sin as optional—i.e., because they think it metaphysically possible for humans and angels to exist without ever sinning. This is how middle-third-of-the-thirteenth-century “Incarnation anyway” authors can regard “if humans never sinned” as something other than contrary to necessary fact. Scotus is able to place Incarnation *prior* in the order of explanation to sin and its need of remedy, only because he makes the same assumption. If sin were a naturally necessary consequence of the existence of rational creatures the way revolutions around the earth were supposed to be of the existence of earth and sun, then Divine decision to create the soul of Christ and other rational creatures in a world such as this would already include in it the inevitability of sin and its need of remedy. And the question, “*Cur Deus homo?* Creation? or Redemption?” would represent a false choice.

My own approach is not “creation” exclusive-or “redemption,” but “both/and.” Refusing to choose, I would see Divine reasons *cur Deus homo* as at least triple: the Creator’s drive towards cosmic perfection (sponsored by middle-third-of-the-thirteenth-century “Incarnation anyway” authors), Divine Love’s determination to unite with Its created object (featured by Scotus), and the repair of the non-optimal human condition and non-optimal Divine-human relations. Because—unlike medieval (but not all patristic) theologians—I see human non-optimality as inevitable given God’s creative aims, I do not envision a situation in which God’s creative and redemptive motives for Incarnation would break apart.

**3.2. Divine Love for Material Creation:** Like Scotus, I begin by accentuating the positive, by contending that Incarnation is part and parcel of God’s creative aims. Whereas Scotus sees God approaching the project with an initial focus on love among spiritual beings (the Divine persons, the soul of Christ, other human souls and angels), and brings the material world in as an afterthought (at a much later instant of nature); my hypothesis begins with Divine love of material creation—not just any material creation, but a world including matter such as this—which leads to Incarnation two ways.

**3.2.1. Perfecting the Cosmos:** On the one hand, Divine love for material creation such as this includes a Divine desire to perfect it by making matter as Godlike as possible while allowing it to have its own integrity. So God creates physico-chemical processes, with *energy and dynamic power* to interact, produce new things within a framework of order and stability. Beyond that, God wants creation to *live*. And so God makes plants and animals with a capacity for self-replication and self-sustenance. Moreover, God adds *perception*, so that life can have, and interact with the world from its own point of view. Finally, God endows animal nature with *personality*, with *self-consciousness*, *the capacity for relationship*, *the ability to give and receive love*. Thus, human nature crowns God’s efforts to make material creation—while yet material—more and more Godlike. What finishing touch could be added to this perfecting process other than for God to actualize the potency of material creation for hypostatic union, in which there is unity of person while the natures remain unconfused?

**3.2.2. Lovers United:** On the other hand, love seeks union with its object (in this case, God with material creation). Certainly, God and creatures are

inevitably united by a real relation of dependence of the creature on God. Divine love goes further, when It seeks to enter into personal intimacy with material creation, by attempting to win the heart of each and every human being. Divine desire to unite heaven to earth and earth to heaven, Godhead to material creation, finds its culmination in the Incarnation, when God becomes part of it, when a Divine person unites a human nature to Itself.

Thus, on this account as much as Scotus', Divine desire to have a creation to love, leads to a cosmic *exitus*, which involves not only the "going out" from God of created beings, but also God's "going out" to unite Godself to material creation.

**3.3. Redemption from Horrors:** Redemption represents repair work, and constitutes a negative motive for Incarnation. But if medieval theologians generally conceptualize the non-optimal human condition and non-optimal Divine-human relations in terms of sin and its consequences, I begin with the problem of horrendous evils and refocus non-optimality problems by subsuming them under the rubric of "participation in horrors." I define horrors as evils the participation in (the doing or suffering of which) constitutes *prima facie* reason to believe that the participant's life cannot be a great good to him/her on the whole. Intuitively, horrors include the very worst that we can suffer, be, or do. Where value wholes are concerned, I borrow Roderick Chisholm's distinction between "balancing-off" (an additive relation in which the value or disvalue of one part is merely summed with that of the others) and "defeat" (in which the value or disvalue of one part is brought into a relation of organic unity with others in the whole). On my understanding, horrors so devour the goodness of our lives that we cannot conceive of any package of merely created goods that would balance them off. They so eat into and pervert our meaning-making structures as to degrade us by *prima facie* defeating the positive significance of our lives, leaving us and onlookers at a loss to see how it could be worthwhile for us to go on. My own measure is that *horrors are so bad that the only way to restore the possibility of positive meaning for the participant is to integrate participation in them into that person's relationship with God, where God is the Incommensurate Good, and where a personal relationship with God, which is beatific on the whole and in the end, is understood to be incommensurately good-for the created person.*

I find it empirically obvious that humans are radically vulnerable to participation in horrors. And I trace this vulnerability back, not in the first instance to anything we do or that our primal ancestors have done, but to what and where we are—to our natures as enspirited matter, as personal animals, placed in a material environment such as this under conditions of real and apparent scarcity. Ultimately, our predicament is an inevitable consequence of God's creative purpose, of Divine love which makes a material world such as this, allows it to evolve into ever more Godlike forms, eventually into personal animals, and still—for the most part—permits material creatures to be themselves, "to do their own thing."

My contention is that a God Who loved material creation would want to compensate the material creatures who bear the greatest cost for the Divine creative experiment, to honor *personal* animality by restoring the possibility of positive meaning, by defeating participation in horrors within the frame-

work of the individual participants' lives. A logical step in this direction, one that otherwise accords with the thrust of God's creative intentions, would be for God to identify with human radical vulnerability to horrors, through the Incarnation and passion of Christ. Thus, God's *exitus* into creation to become part of it, is also decisive for the *reditus*, for the manifold reunion of material creation with its Creator, first and foremost through those material creatures who are most Godlike, through the individual human nature Christ assumes, and through us horror-ridden human beings.

**3.4. "God-Infested" Creation:** Bonaventure worried that making Incarnation a contribution to the natural perfection of the universe might be insulting to God, somehow spiritually dangerous in tempting us to treat God as "a means only" and not as "an end in" Godself. In my judgment, this concern is metaphysically misguided. Certainly, it is not one that either Bonaventure or Aquinas is in a position consistently to press. Roughly speaking, there are two understandings of created natures in school theology. One (espoused by Bonaventure, Aquinas, and Henry of Ghent) sees them as defined by imitability relations, as—at their metaphysical foundations—ways of imitating the Divine essence. The other (defended by later Aristotelians such as Scotus and Ockham) insists that natures are fundamentally integrated congeries of powers, whose constitution is metaphysically necessary and prior in the order of explanation to their relations to anything else. Turning to rational creatures in particular, there are roughly two approaches to their natural functioning. The later Aristotelians (such as Scotus and Ockham) think that the built in nature-constituting powers and the capacities that necessarily flow from them, are sufficient for the always-or-for-the-most-part smooth functioning of things. By contrast, those influenced by Augustine (which include Bonaventure and Henry of Ghent), think that Divine power not only endows the creature with the powers in the first place and sustains it in existence, but also that Divine illumination is involved in the day-to-day smooth functioning of human thinking and willing. Christ the Teacher reveals Eternal Truth about which we reason, the normative standards that govern our will. Bonaventure takes this for granted in the *Itinerarium*, when he wonders why—with God ever at work in the inner human, whenever we think and will—more people are not aware of this!

In my judgment, the idea that creation needs, at every level, to be God-infested—God as the paradigm that defines their essence, God as the furnisher and sustainer of being, God as a partner in natural functioning—humbles creation by emphasizing its dependence, and magnifies God as the source of all. For somewhat different philosophical reasons, I too insist that Divine partnership is necessary for optimal human functioning. At a high level of generality, human radical vulnerability to and actual participation in horrors furnishes ample evidence that it is beyond our merely human powers to coordinate the "odd couple" of matter and spirit into a reliably smooth-functioning unit in an environment such as this. Actual participation in horrors so stumps, indeed often wrecks the participants' meaning-making capacities as to require a "live-in" Teacher to work with us at both unconscious and conscious levels to make eventual positive sense of our lives. In my judgment (although this is a longer story), the emergency exposes what St. Paul main-

tained was the normal case: the Spirit of God always indwelling and helping, groaning within us with sighs too deep for words.

**3.5. Methodological Retrospective:** As for how *fides quaerens intellectum* should govern itself when probing Divine motivations for redemptive choices, we can learn from all my authors if we distinguish between the role of ecclesiastical authority in dogmatizing—i.e., defining doctrines as binding on believers—and that of Christian philosophers and philosophical theologians in offering explanations. Conciliar definitions are usually demanded by particular polemical contexts. They focus on what they take to be certain and important, and are appropriately minimalist in scope. Since the Truth is one, however, both *fides quaerens intellectum* and unbelieving objectors may wonder how and whether the dogma can fit with what else we believe to be true. It belongs to Christian philosophy and philosophical theology to shoulder the burden of this explanatory task. Because philosophical claims are inherently controversial, we should expect a variety of explanations of the same doctrinal claim. Thus, medieval school theology proved the ripe time for the Chalcedonian definition—that in Christ there are two distinct and unconfused natures and one person—to receive extensive technical philosophical attention. Among others, Aquinas, Bonaventure, Scotus, and Ockham brought their own distinctive philosophical commitments to bear. None of them thought the Church had any business dogmatizing the philosophically contentious items that divided them. At the same time, those many rigorous theoretical developments of the doctrine furnished *gravitas* and texture, and (to those on the outside) exhibited the dogma as philosophically defensible.

When we are pronouncing upon what “orthodoxy” requires of Christians philosophers, I think it good to go some way with Aquinas’ *Summa Theologica* reticence: to treat dogmatic silence about an item as equivalent to a denial that the item is required. (For example, since no ecumenical council has officially defined the “penal substitutionary theory of the atonement,” we should admit that it is not incumbent on any and all “orthodox” Christians to believe it.) But when it comes to philosophical and theological explanations, I take my stand with Anselm. Biblical and conciliar silence should not be enough to stifle inquiry. To be sure, it is good, indeed courteous, and evidence of a love for Truth, for Christian philosophers and philosophical theologians to imitate Anselm in *Cur Deus Homo* in identifying what is more and less speculative, and distinguishing what is tentative from what is bedrock and entrenched. Theological hypotheses should meet the test of congruence with Scripture and conciliar definitions. But where *auctoritates* underdetermine the matter, let faith deepen understanding by speculating with Anselm and exploring with Scotus. The medieval moral I draw for contemporary Christian philosophers is thus unsurprising: as *Christian* philosophers, let us praise Christ for all we’re worth—as perfecter of the universe, first and head among co-lovers of the Trinity, Savior of sinners, the Recreator of horror-shattered lives; and as *Christian philosophers*, let inquiry be free, *quaestio et disputatio* unfettered, the better in the end to commend our Christology for its consistency and coherence, its fruitfulness and explanatory power!



## NOTES

1. *Cur Deus Homo* I.iii; Schmitt II.50.24-28; I.viii; Schmitt II.59,16-17. Cf. also Anselm's minimalism about how many limitations of our human nature Christ assumed in *Cur Deus Homo* II.xi-xiii; Schmitt II.109-113.

2. Robert Grosseteste, *De cessatione legalium*, ed. by Richard C. Dales and Edward B. King (London: Oxford University Press for the British Academy, 1986) III.I.9.122. Cf. Aquinas, *Summa Theologica* III,q.1,a.1,c.

3. E.g., would God really have become human just to make sure humans were actually produced all four ways (from neither male nor female; from man alone; from male and female together; from female alone)? See section 2.1 below.

4. Grosseteste says that he cannot recall other authors debating this question (*De cessatione legalium*, ed. by Richard C. Dales and Edward B. King (London: Oxford University Press for the British Academy, 1986), III.I.2.119; III.II.1.133), but James McEvoy points out that there were antecedents in Rupert of Deutz and Honorius of Autun ("The Absolute Predestination of Christ in the Theology of Robert Grosseteste," in *Robert Grosseteste, Exegete and Philosopher* (Aldershot, Hampshire: Variorum, 1994), 212-230.

5. Because their works have been less readily available. Grosseteste's position has been laid out in an admirable article by James McEvoy, "The Absolute Predestination of Christ in the Theology of Robert Grosseteste," in *Robert Grosseteste, Exegete and Philosopher* (Aldershot, Hampshire: Variorum, 1994), 212-230; while Richard Fishacre's treatment is discussed in James Long's fine piece "The Cosmic Christ: The Christology of Richard Fishacre, O.P.," in *Christ among the Medieval Dominicans*, ed. by Kent Emery, Jr., and Joseph P. Wawrykow (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1998), 332-343. Long quotes texts from his forthcoming edition of Fishacre in the notes of that article.

6. Robert Grosseteste takes up this issue in *De cessatione legalium*, ed.cit., III.I.1.119- III.II.4.135; Fishacre, in Book III of his commentary on Peter Lombard's *Sentences*,d.1,q.1.

7. Grosseteste, *De cessatione legalium* III.I.3.120, III.I.4.120, III.I.5.120- I.7.121, III.I.9.122; Fishacre, *In III Sent.* d.1,q.1 (MS O, 3:10b) [Long's note 11]. Cf. Aquinas, *Sent.* III,d.1,q.1,a.3,pro-args.4-5; Parma VII.1.12AB.

8. Grosseteste, *De cessatione legalium* III.I.25.129- I.28.131.

9. Grosseteste, *De cessatione legalium* III.I.28.131- I.29.132; Fishacre, *In III Sent.* d.1,q.1 (MS O, 3:9b) [Long's notes 5 & 6]. Cf. Bonaventure, *Sent.* III,d.1,a.2,q.2; Quarrachi III.20,23. Aquinas, *Sent.* III,d.1,q.1,a.3,pro-arg.1; Parma VII.1.12A.

10. Grosseteste, *De cessatione legalium* III.I.8.121-122.

11. Bonaventure, *Sent.* III,d.1,a.2,q.2; Quaracchi III.22-23.

12. Bonaventure, *Sent.* III,d.1,a.2,q.2; Quaracchi III.23. According to James McEvoy, Honorius of Autun makes this point ("The Absolute Predestination of Christ," 221).

13. Grosseteste, *De cessatione legalium* III.I.24.129. Aquinas, *Sent.* III,d.1,q.1,a.3,pro-arg.6; Parma VII.1.12B.

14. Grosseteste, *De cessatione legalium* III.I.11.123- I.15.125. Cf. Bonaventure who speaks of Christ as the source of our merit, even apart from sin (*Sent.* III,d.1,a.2,q.2; Quaracchi III.22).

15. Grosseteste, *De cessatione legalium* III.I.16.125- I.17.126; I.30.132-133.

16. Grosseteste, *De cessatione legalium* III.I.16.125- I.17.126.

17. Bonaventure, *Sent.* III,d.1,a.2,q.2; Quaracchi III.23.

18. Grosseteste, *De cessatione legalium* III.I.30.132-133.

19. Grosseteste, *De cessatione legalium* III.I.8.121-122; I.24.129.
20. Bonaventure, *Sent.* III,d.1,a.2,q.2; Quaracchi III.22-23. Grosseteste, *De cessatione legalium* III.I.22.128- I.23.129. Cf. Aquinas, *Sent.* III,d.1,q.1,a.3,pro-arg 6; Parma VII.1.12B.
21. Grosseteste, *De cessatione legalium* III.II.4.135.
22. Grosseteste, *De cessatione legalium* III.I.30.132-133.
23. Grosseteste, *De cessatione legalium* III.II.4.135.
24. Grosseteste, *De cessatione legalium* III.II.2.134).
25. *Cur Deus Homo* I.iv; Schmitt II.51,16; 52,6; II.viii; Schmitt II.104,3-28.
26. Grosseteste, *De cessatione legalium* III.I.2.119.
27. Grosseteste, *De cessatione legalium* III.I.3.120.
28. Grosseteste, *De cessatione legalium* III.II.1.133.
29. James McEvoy, "The Absolute Predestination of Christ in the Theology of Robert Grosseteste," 219-220.
30. Stephen F. Brown, "Key Terms in Medieval Theological Vocabulary," in *Civocima: Etudes sur le Vocabulaire Intellectuel du Moyen Age*, III: *Methodes et instruments du travail intellectuel au moyen age: Etudes sur le vocabulaire* (Brepols: Turnhout, Belgium, 1991), 82-96; and "Richard Fishacre on the Need for 'Philosophy'," in *A Straight Path: Studies in Medieval Philosophy and Culture: Essays in Honor of Arthur Hyman*, ed. by Ruth Link-Salinger (Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1988), ch.3, 23-36.
31. Brown, "Richard Fishacre on the Need for 'Philosophy'," 33.
32. Brown, "Richard Fishacre on the Need for 'Philosophy'," 28, 36.
33. Brown, "Richard Fishacre on the Necessity of 'Philosophy'," 36.
34. Brown, "Richard Fishacre on the Necessity of 'Philosophy'," 32-33.
35. Brown, "Richard Fishacre on the Need for 'Philosophy'," 32.
36. Grosseteste, *De cessatione legalium* III.I.2.119; II.1.133.
37. Bonaventure, *Sent.* III,d.1,a.2,q.2; Quaracchi III.24-25.
38. Bonaventure, *Sent.* III,d.1,a.2,q.2; Quaracchi III.24-25.
39. Bonaventure, *Sent.* III,d.1,a.2,q.2; Quaracchi III.25; see also d.2,q.1; Quaracchi III.37-38.
40. Bonaventure, *Sent.* III,d.1,a.2,q.2, ad 2um; Quaracchi III.26.
41. Aquinas, *Sent.* III,d.1,q.1,a.3,ad 4um; *Summa Theologica* III,q.1,a.3,ad 3um.
42. Bonaventure, *Sent.* III,d.1,a.2,q.2,ad 3um; Quaracchi III.26.
43. Bonaventure, *Sent.* III,d.1,a.2,q.2; Quaracchi III.26.
44. Bonaventure, *Sent.* III,d.1,a.2,q.2,ad 2um; Quaracchi III.25-26. Cf. Aquinas, *Sent.* III,d.1,q.1,a.3,ad 6um; Parma VII.1.13B.
45. Aquinas, *Sent.* III,d.1,q.1,a.3,c; Parma VII.1.13A.
46. *Summa Theologica* III,q.1,a.3,c & ad 1um.
47. *Summa Theologica* III,q.1,a.1,c.
48. *Cur Deus Homo* I.ii; Schmitt II.50,7-12; I.xviii; Schmitt II.82,5-16. *Commendatio*; Schmitt II.40,5-7.
49. That in *Cur Deus Homo* II.xvi; Schmitt II.116,13-122,21; and in *De conceptione virginali et de originali peccato*; Schmitt II.134-173.
50. Aquinas explicitly cites the liturgical *felix culpa*, both in *Sent.* III,d.1,q.1,a.3,ad 5um; Parma VII.1.13B, and in *Summa Theologica* III,q.1,a.3,ad 3um.
51. Fishacre, *In III Sent.* d.1,q.1 (MS O, 3:11a) [Long's note 15].
52. Fishacre, *In III Sent.* d.1,q.1 (MS O, 3:10b-11a) [Long's notes 13 & 14].
53. Fishacre, *In III Sent.* d.1,q.1 (MS O, 3:11a) [Long's notes 17 & 18].
54. For a more extensive discussion of these issues, see Marilyn McCord Adams, "The Resurrection of the Body according to Three Medieval Aristotelians: Thomas Aquinas, John Duns Scotus, William Ockham,"

*Philosophical Topics* 20 (1993), 1-33.

55. *Summa Theologica* III,q.1,a.3,ad 3um.

56. Scotus, *Rep.Bar.* III,d.7,q.3; CB,182; *Lect.Completa* III,d.7,q.3; CB,188; *Op.Ox.* III,d.7,q.4; CB,14-15.

57. Scotus, *Op.Ox.* III,d.7,q.4; CB,12.

58. Scotus, *Op.Ox.* IV,d.46,q.1,n.9; Wadding-Vives XX,425-426.

59. Scotus, *Op.Ox.* III,d.20,q.u.n.10; Wadding VII.1,430; cf. d.19,q.u.n.6; Wadding VII.1,415.

60. Fishacre, *In III Sent.* d.1,q.1 (MS O, 3:11b) [Long's note 19].

61. The position I sketch here is developed at length in my book *Horrendous Evils and the Goodness of God* (Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press, 1999).