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THE CONCEPTUALIST ARGUMENT FOR GOD'S EXISTENCE

Quentin Smith

The familiar types of argument for God's existence include the cosmological, teleological and ontological arguments. The aim of this paper is to introduce a new type of argument, the conceptualist argument. The argument is that the conjunction of actualism and conceptualism entails Anselmian theism, that God exists in every possible world. According to actualism, possibilities are propositions, and according to conceptualism, propositions are effects of mental causes. The addition of other premises enables the conclusion to be deduced that in every possible world, every true proposition is a mental effect of the same mind, the divine mind. This article also discusses intimations of the conceptualist argument in Leibniz and in contemporary philosophers such as Plantinga. I conclude that the conceptualist argument may be rationally acceptable, but is not rationally compelling.

I

The aim of this paper is to make more explicit a type of argument for God's existence that has been given only scant attention in the literature. I shall call this argument *the conceptualist argument* and shall consider it as an addition to the family of arguments that includes the cosmological argument, the teleological argument, the ontological argument, the arguments from mystical experience and from moral conscience. In Section II the key terms are defined and in Section III the argument is set forth and claimed to be valid. In Section IV some previous intimations of this argument in the literature are discussed. In Section V, I address the issue of the soundness or unsoundness of the argument.

II

The conceptualist argument for God's existence (or at least the versions I shall develop in this paper) involves three main premises, conceptualism, actualism, and a premise about the necessary uniqueness of a certain divine attribute.

Conceptualism with respect to propositions is the theory that it is necessarily the case that propositions are effects of mental causes. It is necessarily true that for any x , if x is a proposition, then x is an effect of some propositional attitude. It may be said that the conceiving of a proposition (which may be taken as an element common to all propositional attitudes) is what



sustains the proposition in existence, such that the proposition exists by virtue of this conceiving. Conceptualism should not be defined as the thesis that it is necessarily the case that propositions are accusatives of propositional attitudes, since this precludes a philosopher from being both a platonist and an Anselmian theist. An Anselmian theist holds that God exists in every possible world and thus that in every possible world every proposition is an accusative of God's propositional attitudes; this could be held consistently with platonism, the thesis that propositions exist necessarily and by virtue of their natures, and not by virtue of being conceived by some mind. Conceptualism entails that it is necessary that every proposition is an accusative of some propositional attitude, but this entailment is not the thesis of conceptualism, which is that it is necessary that every proposition is an effect of some propositional attitude.

It has been objected to this distinction that if conceptualism entails the accusative thesis, then an Anselmian theist is still precluded from being a platonist. But this objection is unwarranted, since the Anselmian theist can hold the entailment (the accusative thesis) without holding the proposition that entails it (the conceptualist thesis). The Anselmian theist would be precluded from being a platonist if the accusative thesis entailed the conceptualist thesis, but there is no such entailment.

One reason I call my conceptualist arguments "versions" of the conceptualist argument is that they include the thesis of *actualism*, and I do not wish to preclude the possibility that conceptualist arguments without this premise may be constructed. *Actualism* is the theory that defines possibilities in terms of a subclass of actualities, namely, propositions.¹ "It is possible that there is a red unicorn" is analyzed as meaning "There exists the possibly true proposition *that some unicorn is red.*" The versions of the conceptualist argument I shall construct involve the claim that the conjunction of conceptualism, actualism and a third premise about the uniqueness of a certain divine attribute entails Anselmian theism, the thesis that God exists in every possible world.

III

One version of the conceptualist argument begins as follows. If actualism is true, then there exist propositions in every possible world; this follows from the fact that possibilities are possibly true propositions. If actualism and conceptualism are both true, it follows that there is some mind in every possible world. If there is some possible world W in which there is no mind, then either (1) the propositions in W are not effects of some mind(s), which contradicts conceptualism, or (2) the possibilities in W are not propositions, which contradicts actualism, or (3) there are no possibilities in W, which contradicts the assumption that W is possible. But "there exists some mind

in every possible world” does not entail that God exists in every possible world. Indeed, it does not even entail that God actually exists, since different minds exist in different worlds and no divine mind may actually exist. Perhaps the only minds that actually exist are human and animal minds.

A missing link in the argument is a statement to the effect that there exists at least one proposition that can be an accusative (and thus an effect) only of a divine mind. A possible candidate for this statement is that there exists a certain proposition that can be an accusative only of an omniscient mind. The actual world is an infinitely complex conjunction (not a set!)² of all true propositions; it is an accusative only of an omniscient mind.³ It follows that an omniscient mind actually exists.

It may be objected to this line of reasoning that there could actually exist an infinite number of non-omniscient minds, such that for each different part (conjunct) of the actual world, there is a different non-omniscient mind that knows that part. This would allow us to say that there exists the actual world, that there is no part of this world that is not an accusative of some mind, but that no divinity exists.

The response to this objection is that it commits the fallacy of composition. “Each part of the actual world is an accusative” no more entails “the actual world is an accusative” than “each conjunct of *p* is an accusative” entails “*p* is an accusative.” If *that red is a color* is an accusative of John’s mind and *that green is a color* is an accusative of Jane’s mind, that does not entail *that red is a color and green is a color* is an accusative of some mind. For the latter to be an accusative, there must be some mind that grasps the conjunction of the two propositions that John and Jane separately grasp. Thus, if the actual world and not just each of its parts is an accusative, there must be some mind that grasps the conjunction of all true propositions and this mind will be omniscient. Furthermore, there must be some mind that grasps the actual world, for a conjunction of all true propositions is itself a proposition and every proposition is an accusative of some mind.

A similar argument shows that God exists in every possible world. Each possible world *W* is a maximal conjunction of propositions, such that every proposition or its negation is a conjunct of *W*. Each merely possible world *W'* is such that it might have been actual; if *W'* had been actual, then *W'* would have contained only true conjuncts. This entails (given conceptualism) that if *W'* were to be actual, *W'* would be an accusative of an omniscient mind. This is logically equivalent to the assertion that if *W'* were to be actual, an omniscient mind would be actual. Given a third premise that is entailed by the necessary coextensivity of the divine attributes, the premise that there possibly exists no *x* such that *x* is omniscient and different than God, it follows that God exists in every possible world.

But this version of the conceptualist argument for Anselmian theism is not

complete as it stands, since it is open to the objection that an omniscient mind is not required by the conceptualist and actualist premises but merely a mind that conceives possible worlds. Conceptualism states that a proposition is an effect of some mind and a proposition need not be known or even believed to be an effect of a mind; it need merely be conceived. Accordingly, in order for the maximal proposition that is the actual world to be an effect of some mind, it need not be known by a mind but merely conceived, and the same holds for each other world. Thus the conceptualist and actualist premises entail merely that there is a mind that conceives possible worlds, not that there is an omniscient mind. Accordingly, a supplemental premise is needed about the relation between the divine attribute of omniscience and the attribute of conceiving everything that God knows. The premise is that

- (1) Necessarily, only God is omniscient and if a being x knows every true proposition, then there is no being y different from x that conceives every proposition that x knows.

Obviously, if God knows every true proposition, he conceives every true proposition and (1) adds to this obvious claim the assertion that only God conceives every proposition that God knows. Thus, we need the supplementary premise (1) in order for the conceptualist argument for Anselmian theism to go through.

(1) is not needed to rule out the possibility that there be a nondivine mind that knows every true proposition and yet believes some false ones, since this possibility is precluded for other reasons. For each true proposition p , if x knows p , then p is justified for x , which implies that x does not believe not- p . It follows from this that if x knows all truths, then x has no false beliefs.

I am assuming for the sake of simplicity that there are no indexical propositions (although there are indexical sentences), such as the propositions *that I am Quentin Smith* and *that I am here rather than there*, since God would not believe all of these propositions. If there are indexical propositions, then "God knows all true propositions" should be taken to mean "God knows all true nonindexical propositions."

A different argument for Anselmian theism may be constructed using the conceptualist and actualist premises and a different third premise, *viz.*, that it is impossible that there exists an x such that x is a necessarily existent mind and different from God. I take it to be a sound modal intuition that there is some possible world in which there are no contingently existent minds. In this world, however, there will be propositions (given actualism) and some mind(s) (given conceptualism). Since the mind(s) cannot be contingently existent, the mind(s) must be necessarily existent. Given the premise that it is impossible that there exists an x such that x is a necessarily existent mind and different from God, it follows that there is only one necessarily existent mind in this world and that this mind is God.

Another version of the conceptualist argument can be constructed that does not rely on the modal intuition that there is a possible world devoid of contingent minds. Instead, one may rely on the premise that there is some possible world in which contingent minds exist at some but not all times. Since some propositions exist at all times, there will be times at which propositions exist but are not accusatives of contingent minds. Since the propositions must be accusatives of some mind(s), it follows that at these times they are accusatives of some necessary mind(s). Given the premise that it is impossible that there exists an x such that x is a necessarily existent mind and different from God, it follows that there is only one necessary mind of which these propositions are accusatives and that this mind is God.

This last argument requires the additional premise that in the possible world mentioned, propositions exist at times. This premise is obviously false on some definitions of "time," e.g., the Einsteinian definition that entails that something is in time if and only if it is connectable to a physical event by a light or slower signal. But there are other more liberal definitions of "time" that entail that propositions exist in time. It may be argued⁴ that a sufficient condition of existing in time is that something acquire or lose any n -adic property, such as the property of being an accusative of John's mind. Given this partial definition of "time," it follows that the propositions exist in time in the world in question and that this version of the conceptualist argument goes through.

IV

There is rarely anything that is completely new in philosophy and it would be surprising indeed if no intimations of the conceptualist argument could be found in previous literature. One of the earliest intimations is this passage in Aquinas's *De Veritate*:

Even if there were no human intellects, there could be truths because of their relation to the divine intellect. But if, *per impossibile*, there were no intellects at all, but things continued to exist, then there would be no such reality as truth.⁵

This passage suggests a commitment to conceptualism, but it falls short of being a conceptualist argument for God's existence (in the sense outlined in Sections II-III) if only for the reason that actualism is not a premise of an argument for the existence of a divine intellect. In fact, Aquinas does not seem to be suggesting an argument for God's necessary existence on the basis of the necessary existence of truths, but an argument for the necessary existence of truths on the basis of the premise that there necessarily exists at least one intellect, the divine one.

A closer approximation to the conceptualist argument can be found in Leibniz's *Monadology*; Leibniz argues from the reality of possibilities to the existence of God:

if there is reality in essences or possibilities, or indeed in eternal truths, this reality must be founded on something existent and actual, and consequently on the existence of the necessary being in whom essence involves existence, or in whom to be possible is itself to be actual.... Without [God] there would be nothing real in the possibilities—not only nothing existent, but also nothing possible.⁶

If we take the first occurrence of “or” in the first sentence as indicating that essences *are* possibilities (Leibniz’s version of actualism; see *Monadology*, sec. 43), then we have this argument:

- (2) Essences are possibilities
- (3) The reality of possibilities is dependent on something actual.

Therefore,

- (4) The reality of essences requires the actuality of the necessary being, God.

Although this argument is invalid, further premises can be drawn from Leibniz’s own philosophy to make the argument valid. For example, one such premise is that there are an infinite number of truths involving essences in each possible world. But in lieu of excavating all the suppressed premises I will point out an important difference between Leibniz’s argument and the versions of the conceptualist argument I have outlined. I argued from the existence of possibilities to the existence of God, but Leibniz argues from the reality of possibilities (what makes something a real possibility or a “metaphysical possibility” in contemporary jargon, as opposed to a merely logical or epistemic possibility) to something that grounds this reality. This is suggested by Leibniz’s above-quoted remark that “Without [God] there would be nothing *real* in the possibilities—not only nothing *existent*, but also nothing *possible*” (my italics). Impossibilities, merely epistemic possibilities and metaphysical possibilities all *exist*, but only the latter are *real*, capable of being actualized. What makes something really possible, Leibniz seems to be implicitly suggesting, is God’s ability to actualize it. In Leibniz’s terminology of essences, a premise of my argument is that an essence exists if and only if God entertains it, whereas the crucial premise of Leibniz’s suggested argument is that an essence is a real possibility if and only if God has the ability to actualize it.

Contemporary intimations of the conceptualist argument can be found in articles by Alvin Plantinga, by Christopher Menzel and Thomas Morris, and by Brian Leftow.⁷ I shall consider the first of these to appear, Plantinga’s “How to be an Anti-Realist.” Plantinga puts forth the conceptualist line:

How could there be truths totally independent of minds or persons?... How could the things that are in fact true or false—propositions, let’s say—exist in serene and majestic independence of persons and their means of apprehension? How could there be propositions no one has ever so much as grasped or thought of?⁸

Plantinga presents the theistic argument in the form a thesis, an antithesis, and a synthesis:

The thesis, then, is that truth cannot be independent of noetic activity on the part of persons. The antithesis is that it must be independent of *our* noetic activity. And the synthesis is that truth is independent of our intellectual activity but not of God's.⁹

Although Plantinga is an actualist, actualism does not play a part in his argument. Accordingly, he cannot derive Anselmian theism without the additional premise that there are propositions in every possible world. Unless this premise is itself based on actualism (i.e., on the theory that a possibility is a proposition and that every possible world is a conjunction of propositions), then some additional argument is needed to show that propositions exist in every possible world. For example, a conceptualist who is neither an Anselmian theist nor an actualist might argue that there are some possible worlds in which there are no minds and thus no propositions. He would not argue that in these worlds that it is false that (say) 2 plus 2 equals 4, but that in these worlds there exists no proposition *that 2 plus 2 equals 4* and thus nothing that is true or false. There would exist matter, but no minds and thus no propositions formed or created by these minds. To the objection that if there were matter then it would be true that there were matter, he would respond that this objection presupposes platonism and thus is question-begging against conceptualism. According to conceptualism, in order for it to be true that there is matter there must not only be matter but also a mind that can construct this truth through its noetic activity. Thus, without the actualist premise (and without the question-begging assumption that God exists in every possible world), it is not obvious that there is a reason for a conceptualist to believe that propositions exist in every possible world. Accordingly, unless Plantinga invokes actualism, or introduces some independent argument that propositions exist in every possible world, his argument will not be a valid argument for Anselmian theism.

But I would like to draw attention to a feature of Plantinga's discussion of this argument that bears upon some claims I shall shortly put forth, namely, that there really is no good argument for *the conceptualist premise* but merely an intuition. Plantinga calls "anti-realism" a doctrine more or less similar to conceptualism and says

there is strong intuitive support for it or something like it. This intuition is often dressed up in fancy argumentative clothes of one sort or another, partly because, these days, one feels the need of argument for respectability. But the arguments aren't successful; and what there is of substance here is just this intuition, this impulse towards anti-realism.¹⁰

In one respect I think Plantinga is right, but he has stated his case one-sidedly. For if there is "strong intuitive support" for conceptualism, then why do

platonists and nominalists find conceptualism counterintuitive and, indeed, downright false? It would seem more accurate to say that there are no knock-down arguments for conceptualism, platonism or nominalism and that the issue comes down in the end to a matter of intuitions, with some people finding conceptualism to have “strong intuitive support” and others finding platonism or nominalism to have “strong intuitive support.” But this statement itself needs some argumentative support:

V

Many philosophers would hold that the key premise needing support to make the conceptualist argument compelling is the premise that conceptualism is true. I would like here to examine the claim that humans are not in an epistemic situation where they can conclusively establish or refute this premise and that in this respect this premise is similar to some of the key premises of some of the traditional types of theistic argument, such as the cosmological and ontological arguments. But, as I have suggested, this is not the same point that Plantinga makes about conceptualism, that there are no good arguments for it but that there is a strong intuition that it is true. My point rather is that it is false that every rational person would find conceptualism intuitively plausible, but true that (a) there are no rationally compelling arguments for or against conceptualism and that (b) a rational person may find conceptualism intuitively plausible but an equally rational person may find platonism or nominalism intuitively plausible. I shall suggest that the relevant premises in the conceptualist and some other theistic arguments are synthetic *a priori* propositions that are neither self-evident nor capable of being demonstrated to all rational persons.

A person is rational if and only if her beliefs are compatible with (i) the observational facts of common sense, (ii) the currently warranted scientific theories, (iii) the principles of inductive and deductive logic, and (iv) set theory and mathematics. Since there probably exists no person all of whose beliefs meet these conditions, the notion of a rational person should be tacitly understood as relativized to the proposition or argument under discussion: A person is rational with respect to a proposition *p* or argument *A* if and only if her set of beliefs about *p* or *A* are compatible with (i) the observational facts of common sense, (ii) the currently warranted scientific theories, (iii) the principles of inductive and deductive logic, and (iv) set theory and mathematics. For example, a person is rational with respect to the argument *All humans are mortal: Socrates is human; therefore, Socrates is mortal*, if the person's set of beliefs about this argument is the unit set [belief that it is sound].

My definition of a rational person is not meant to analyze the ordinary meaning of “rational person,” since my definition is much too restrictive, but it is useful for the purposes of explaining the epistemic status of the premises

in the theistic arguments I shall discuss. Ordinarily, we would call a person "rational" even if the person violated some of the conditions; e.g. Frege was a "rational person" in the ordinary sense even though his views on sets entailed a contradiction in first order logic.

The definition of a rational person is controversial or ambiguous at least inasmuch as it is controversial which logic (tense logic, modal logic, paraconsistent logic, etc.), scientific theory (string theory, supergravity, etc.), set theory, etc. is to be chosen, but these controversies will not affect the following discussion.

One point of contention between conceptualists and platonists concerns the truth value of

(5) Necessarily, every proposition is an effect of some mind.

The truth value of (5) cannot be settled by observation or induction, if only for the reason of (5)'s modal operator. If not an *a posteriori* statement, it is either analytically or synthetically *a priori*. Now it is dubious at best to regard (5) as analytically true. The concept of a proposition includes such concepts as *having relations or properties among its parts, having parts that are ordered to each other in a certain way, and being a bearer of a truth value* (assuming the principle of bivalence). Perhaps the concept of a proposition also includes the concept *being understandable or possibly, being an object of a propositional attitude*, but even if these latter concepts are included they do not entail conceptualism since a platonist would freely admit that each proposition can be grasped by some possible mind. But it is implausible to think that the concept of a proposition includes the concept of *being the effect of some mind*.

Perhaps the concept of a *judgement* includes the concept of *being the result of an act of judgement*, but even if "judgement" (in one of its uses) expresses this mentalist concept, it is not an analytic truth that every proposition is a judgement.

This suggests the view that (5) is a synthetic *a priori* truth or falsehood. (5) is synthetic if only for the reason that neither of the two concepts expressed by "is an effect of some mind" and "is not an effect of any mind" is a part of the concept expressed by "proposition." (5) is *a priori* in that its true value is not knowable by virtue of empirical observations but by virtue of reflection on the proposition itself (or by reflection upon other *a priori* propositions that entail or are entailed by it).

Now it is clear that (5) if true is not *self-evident*, where a synthetic *a priori* proposition *p* is self-evident if and only if any person who is rational with respect to *p* would believe *p* simply by virtue of understanding *p*. An example of a synthetic *a priori* proposition that is self-evident is *that no body can be simultaneously red all over and green all over*. (5) is not self-evident since there exist persons, *viz.*, some platonists and nominalists, who are rational with respect to (5) and yet both understand and reject (5). I would suggest

that (5) also does not have a rationally compelling proof. A proof of a synthetic *a priori* proposition is rationally compelling if and only if any person who is rational with respect to the proof and who understood the proof would believe the premises true and the conclusion validly derived. An example of a rationally compelling proof is *that no body can be one color all over and simultaneously be a different color all over; red is a different color than green; therefore, no body can be simultaneously red all over and green all over*. I believe it would be acknowledged that there exists in the literature no rationally compelling proof of the truth or falsity of (5), and I cannot think of how any such proof could possibly be constructed.

If (5) is neither self-evident nor provable in a rationally compelling way, it may be *rationally acceptable*. A synthetic *a priori* proposition *p* is rationally acceptable (and no more) for a person *x* if and only if, (1) neither *p* nor not-*p* are self-evident or compellingly provable and (2) *p* appears true to *x* even after *x* has considered possible objections to *p* and considered *p*'s relations to other relevant propositions that *x* believes or disbelieves, and (3) *x* is rational with respect to *p*.

If (5) is rationally acceptable (and no more), then the conceptualist argument for God's existence is not a rationally compelling proof. Rather, it is a *rationally acceptable* argument. An argument *A* for a thesis *T* is rationally acceptable (and no more) to *x* if and only if (1) *A* is not a rationally compelling proof of *T* and there is no rationally compelling proof of not-*T*, (2) *A* appears sound to *x* even after *x* has considered possible objections to *A* and considered *A*'s relations to other relevant arguments he accepts or rejects, and (3) *x* is rational with respect to *A*.

I think the conceptualist argument for God's existence may be compared in this respect with the other traditional arguments for God's existence, especially with the cosmological and ontological arguments. A key premise of some forms of the cosmological argument is the principle of sufficient reason, which has at least two versions. One strong version is

(6) Necessarily, everything that exists has a reason why it exists;

and one weak version is

(7) Necessarily, everything that begins to exist has a reason why it exists.

These are not analytic principles and their modal operator prevents them from being merely inductive generalizations. Thus, it is plausible to regard (6) and (7) as synthetic *a priori* truths if true at all. But it is notorious, however, that some philosophers who are rational with respect to (6) and (7) believe (6) or (7) and other philosophers who are similarly rational disbelieve (6) and (7). If this is the case, and the other conditions of a rational acceptable argument are met, then the cosmological argument is not a rationally compelling but merely a rationally acceptable argument for God's existence.

The same holds for the ontological argument. In Plantinga's version, for example, the premise

(8) Unsurpassable greatness is possibly exemplified

is taken by Plantinga to be a proposition a rational person could accept or reject.¹¹ Plantinga does not characterize this proposition as synthetic and *a priori*, but it is obviously not an empirical generalization and the sentence that expresses it is not reducible to a tautology by substitution of synonyms for synonyms. It seems natural, then, to regard it as a synthetic *a priori* truth if true. Given Plantinga's own admission that a rational person could accept or reject (8), the ontological argument in Plantinga's version is not a rationally compelling argument for God's existence.

If none of the other theistic arguments (e.g. the teleological argument or the argument from mystical experience) are rationally compelling, then the best the theist can hope for is to establish the rational acceptability of theism. The explicit formulation of the conceptualist argument for theism in this paper thus may be interpreted as contributing to establishing the rational acceptability of theism.

But I would note that the argument of this paper is different than and does not entail that theistic (or atheistic) belief is basic. The point rather is that theistic belief is based on reasons, albeit acceptable rather than compelling reasons, and that there is an additional acceptable reason to the familiar ones, *viz.*, the premises of the conceptualist argument for God's existence.

However, this way of understanding the argument of this paper must be made with qualifications, for I have not discussed the issue of whether there is a rationally compelling argument for atheism. If there is such an argument, then no argument for theism is rationally acceptable. But the issue of atheological arguments falls outside the scope of this paper.¹²

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NOTES

1. Other versions of actualism define possibilities in terms of other sub-classes of actualities, such as states of affairs (Plantinga), properties (Stalnaker) and sentences (Hintikka). See Alvin Plantinga, *The Nature of Necessity* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974), Robert Stalnaker, "Possible Worlds," in *The Possible and the Actual*, ed. M. Loux (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1979), pp. 225-234, and Jaakko Hintikka, "The Modes of Modality," *ibid.*, pp. 65-79.

2. The power-set axiom precludes the possibility that there is a set of all truths. See Selmer Bringsjord, "Are There Set Theoretic Possible Worlds?," *Analysis* 45.1 (1985), Christopher Menzel, "On Set Theoretic Possible Worlds," *Analysis* 46.2 (1986), and Patrick Grim, "On Sets and Worlds: A Reply to Menzel," *Analysis* 46.4 (1986).

3. The actual world should not be confused with *the universe*, the aggregate of all (created) concrete objects, inclusive of all organisms, matter, energy, and space-time positions. Propositions are abstract objects and thus are not parts of the universe. Nor should the actual world be confused with *the aggregate of all that exists*, what I have elsewhere termed "the world-whole" (*The Felt Meanings of the World*: West Lafayette, Purdue University Press, 1986). The aggregate of all that exists contains all concrete and abstract objects. The accusative of an omniscient mind is the actual world, not the universe or the aggregate of all that exists. However, an omniscient mind knows about the universe and the aggregate of all that exists by virtue of knowing the true maximal proposition that is the actual world, since this proposition contains true propositions about everything in the universe and in the aggregate of all that exists.

4. This is argued in Quentin Smith, "A New Typology of Temporal and Atemporal Permanence," *Noûs* 23 (1989), pp. 307-30 and "Time and Propositions," *Philosophia* 20 (1990), pp. 279-94.

5. St. Thomas Aquinas, *De Veritate*, Q. 1. A.6. Responso.

6. Leibniz, *Monadology*, sec. 44, p. 10 in *Leibniz: Philosophical Writings*, trans. Mary Morris (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co.), 1934.

7. Alvin Plantinga, "How to be an Anti-Realist," *APA Proceedings and Addresses*, 1982, pp. 47-70; Thomis Morris and Christopher Menzel, "Absolute Creation," *American Philosophical Quarterly* 22 (1985), pp. 353-62; Brian Leftow, "A Leibnizian Cosmological Argument," *Philosophical Studies* 57 (1989), pp. 135-55.

8. Plantinga, "How to be an Anti-Realist," p. 67.

9. Plantinga, p. 68.

10. Plantinga, p. 67.

11. Plantinga, *The Nature of Necessity* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974), pp. 219-20.

12. The most familiar atheological argument is the argument from evil. For a discussion of one version of the atheological argument from natural evil, see Quentin Smith, "An Atheological Argument from Evil Natural Laws," *International Journal for the Philosophy of Religion* 29 (1991), pp. 159-74. Other considerations relevant to atheological arguments can be found in Quentin Smith, "Atheism, Theism and Big Bang Cosmology," *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 69 (1991), pp. 48-66.

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