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This is an excellent book. It begins with Plantinga's "Self-Profile," a 94-page personal and intellectual autobiography. Writing with characteristic wit, insight, and modesty, Plantinga describes first his upbringing and education, including in this section anecdotes of the famous Wayne State department and detailing the influence his association with Calvin College has had on his commitment to Christian scholarship. Next Plantinga surveys the range of philosophical issues on which he has written; these include the problem of evil, the Ontological Argument, Calvinist epistemology, proper names, necessity *de dicto* and *de re*, and the metaphysics of possible worlds. (Curiously, Plantinga does not mention here the analogical argument for other minds.) Plantinga describes the origin of some of his work, summarizes many of its leading ideas, makes a few concessions, and refines and elaborates several points. Included in this last category, for example, is an elegant new proof that there are worlds God cannot actualize.

The next section of the book contains essays discussing different aspects of Plantinga's work contributed by nine distinguished philosophers. The first three deal with matters of modality. Peter van Inwagen deftly defends Plantinga's contention that there is no "problem of trans-world identity"—no problem associated with the same individual existing in more than one possible world—and he diagnoses some confusions that might have led some to think otherwise. *Existentialism*, at least as Plantinga uses the term, is the doctrine that haecceities (e.g., the property of being identical to Socrates) and singular propositions are ontologically dependent on the individuals they involve ("essence does not precede existence"), and actualism is the thesis that it is not possible that there are things that do not exist. (Plantinga rejects the former and accepts the latter.) In the course of examining Plantinga's treatment of possible worlds, John Pollock defends existentialism and argues against a version of actualism. Kit Fine endorses existentialism, too, but his main interest in his essay is to assess what he takes to be Plantinga's attempt to reduce possibilist discourse (claims about merely possible entities) to talk only of what is actual; Plantinga, however, eschews this program.

In her essay Diana Ackerman raises objections to the theories of proper names (according to which names express essences) that Plantinga has proposed in [7] and [2]. Next, Carl Ginet discusses Plantinga's treatment of the analogical argument for other minds in [4], and he argues against a Cartesian argument Plantinga

presents in [7] that is supposed to allow anyone to show that he or she is not a material thing.

The final four papers treat topics in the philosophy of religion. Robert Adams contributes a sensitive discussion of the problem of evil in both its logical and probabilistic forms. Adams contends that God does not have middle knowledge, or knowledge of what free creatures would do in various alternative circumstances, and he faults Plantinga's development of the free will defense for presupposing that God does have middle knowledge. James Tomberlin criticizes Plantinga's reasons for rejecting the Ontological Argument in [4], and he argues that the version of the argument that Plantinga holds in [7] to be sound does not, contrary to Plantinga's claim, show the rational acceptability of theism. Philip Quinn defends Plantinga's rejection (in [5]) of an argument for the conclusion that divine foreknowledge is incompatible with human freedom which Nelson Pike ([1]) has defended. William Alston raises some questions about Plantinga's suggestion (in [6] and elsewhere) that belief in God is properly basic, and he offers some proposals of his own for regarding an epistemic practice (including the practice of accepting certain theistic beliefs as basic) to be reliable and, more importantly, justified.

The final section of the book contains Plantinga's replies to these essays. There is much to be learned here, as Plantinga clarifies where he has been misunderstood, admits some mistakes, argues convincingly against his critics, and, often, advances the discussion of the issues. Of particular interest in this connection is his discussion of serious actualism (the doctrine that, necessarily, no object has a property in a world in which it does not exist). Two bibliographies are appended. The first is an annotated list of Plantinga's publications through 1983. It omits an essay Ginet refers to ([3]), it does not include book reviews, and at least one of the works listed as forthcoming did not appear as announced.[1] The other bibliography lists by category discussions of Plantinga's work.

In my critical comments, I shall focus on the role of incompatibilism in the Free Will Defense and on the exchange with Ackerman. A concession Plantinga makes in his "Self-Profile" (pp. 45-47; also the reply to Adams, pp. 371 f.) has to do with the presupposition of incompatibilism in his development of the Free Will Defense. In [7] Plantinga summarized the Free Will Defense as follows;

> A world containing creatures who are sometimes significantly free (and freely perform more good than evil actions) is more valuable, all else being equal, than a world containing no free creatures at all. Now God can create free creatures, but he cannot *cause* or *determine* them to do only what is right. For if he does so, then they are not significantly free after all; they do not do what is right *freely*. To create people capable of *moral good*, therefore, he must create creatures capable of moral

evil; and he cannot leave these creatures *free* to perform evil and at the
same time prevent them from doing so. God did in fact create signific-
antly free creatures; but some of them went wrong in the exercise of
their freedom: this is the source of moral evil. (pp. 161f.)

(The subsequent presentation makes it clear that what the Free Will Defense
requires is that this story be possible.) Plantinga went on to give a strongly
incompatibilist account of freedom: ". . . a person is free with respect to an
action A at a time t only if no causal laws and antecedent conditions determine
either that he performs A at t or that he refrains from so doing." ([7], p. 170-71)

Now, however, Plantinga concedes that "if compatibilism is correct, the Free
Will Defense fails" (p. 45). I believe that this concession is hasty. The point of
introducing incompatibilism in the present context is that it helps establish the
claim that God cannot cause or determine his creatures to do only what is right.
But this point remains on any plausible version of compatibilism. According to
compatibilism, it's possible that all actions are both free and caused—caused,
that is, by antecedent conditions and not by the agent himself. But not just any
cause is compatible with an action's being free; free actions have to have *the
right kind* of cause. Typically, compatibilists have held a theory of agency
according to which it's a combination of the agent's beliefs and desires that
constitutes the right kind of cause of an action for it to be free, and careful
compatibilists add that these beliefs and desires must *arise* in the right way and
lead to their *effects* in the right way. For suppose that Jones implants electrodes
in Smith's brain and then intentionally manipulates them in a way that causes
Smith to have a certain combination of beliefs and desires, a combination that
causes Smith to perform action A. Clearly Smith doesn't do A freely. So if
compatibilism isn't supplemented by a theory of agency that rules out cases like
this in which someone is caused by another's manipulation to have the beliefs
and desires that issue in action, compatibilism isn't even remotely plausible.
Whatever condition rules out actions caused by beliefs and desires induced in
this way by the manipulation of electrodes should also rule out actions caused
by God, whether that is by his implanting the relevant beliefs and desires or by
some other method. Now the claim of the Free Will Defense that God "cannot
cause or *determine* . . . [his free creatures] to do only what is right" needn't
presuppose that for an action to be right, and hence, free, there can be *no*
antecedent conditions and causal laws jointly sufficient for its occurrence; all
that's required is that if *God* causes someone else's action to occur it's not a
free action. But this constraint on free agency seems compatible with com-
patibilism. So even if (*per incredibile*) compatibilism is correct, the Free Will
Defense remains viable.

In [7] Plantinga defended the view that proper names express *essences* and

that distinct names of the same object express the same essence. (An essence of a thing is a property which that thing could not fail to have and which nothing other than that thing could have.) Thus, 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' both express an essence of Venus, and

(1)   Hesperus is identical with Phosphorus

and

(2)   Phosphorus is identical with Phosphorus

express the same proposition. How then to account for the ancient Babylonian astronomers who, prior to their discovery, believed (2) but not (1)? (Assume that the Babylonians spoke English.) The answer in [7] is that they did indeed believe the proposition expressed both by (1) and (2), but they did not realize that (1) expressed that proposition. Subsequently, Plantinga became dissatisfied with this rejoinder, and in [2] he proposed that distinct names of the same object can express (in a narrow sense) distinct and epistemically inequivalent essences of the object. On the "Boethian" view, then, the ancient Babylonians were right about their beliefs when they professed to believe (2) but not (1). Plantinga went on to suggest that the essences expressed by proper names are "α - transforms," where the α - transforms of a property P $[(P_\alpha)]$ is a property a thing has in a world W just in case that thing exists in W and has P in α (the actual world). Perhaps, then, 'Thales' expresses the *(entity referred to by 'Thales')* α. In her contribution Diana Ackerman objects that although

(3)   Donnellan believes that the proposition that Thales is a Greek is identical with the proposition that Thales is a Greek, but it is false that Donnellan believes that the proposition that Thales is a Greek is identical with the proposition that the (entity referred to by 'Thales') α is a Greek

is true, replacing "the (entity referred to by 'Thales')$_\alpha$" by 'Thales' yields a contradiction. (p. 190) Hence, by a principle she calls the Propositional Attitude Principle (PAP), these terms do not, contrary to Plantinga's suggestion, express the same property. Plantinga's response (pp. 350-361) is to argue against (PAP). In particular, he claims that since questions of propositional identity are difficult, it is possible to be mistaken about whether one believes a proposition. In response to a subsequent objection, Plantinga claims that our grasp of propositions is often partial or dependent upon the language in which they are expressed, and he adds that "this is why Donnellan can be mistaken about what he believes." (p. 358) But this response cuts against the reason given for moving from the view presented in [7] to the Boethian view. Maybe the Babylonians *were* mistaken about what they believed; perhaps they had an imperfect grasp of the proposition expressed

by (1) and (2), or perhaps they did not recognize it when expressed by (1).

Plantinga offers two considerations for favoring his Boethian view over the view in [7]:

> First, I think [the former] encounter[s] difficulty with empty proper names. How could an empty proper name express a haecceity, or any sort of essence? Clearly it couldn't express an *exemplified* essence. (If 'Romulus', for example, expressed an exemplified essence, then the proposition expressed by 'Romulus does not exist' would be false rather than true.) And how could it possibly express an unexemplified haecceity or essence? Of course we could say that empty proper names function quite differently from non-empty proper names. But a more satisfying theory would have empty and non-empty proper names functioning in the same or closely similar ways. Here the Boethian view displays a certain charm; names in negative existentials, for example, resemble their colleagues in positive existentials in that in each case they express α - transforms of singular properties—unexemplified in the first case and exemplified in the second. Second, the Boethian view allows a bit more flexibility, a little more latitude. If objects *have* epistemically inequivalent essences, why not take advantage of that fact in explaining the behavior of proper names? So I see the Boethian view as having these advantages. (p. 362)

But I think that these alleged advantages are slender. Notice first that the Boethian view does not treat empty and non-empty names exactly analogously; for the leading idea of the Boethian view is that proper names express *essences*, but the α - transforms allegedly expressed by empty names are not essences. To see this it suffices to observe that since nothing in fact exemplifies, say, *the (entity referred to by 'Romulus')*$_\alpha$, nothing in any other possible world exemplifies it, either. For in order for something in a world W to exemplify this property, it must exist in W and be referred to by 'Romulus' in α; but nothing is referred to by 'Romulus' in α. So being the (entity referred to by 'Romulus')$_\alpha$ is not a property that it is possible that something have essentially and not possible that any other thing have at all, since it is not so much as possible that anything have this property. So the Boethian view treats empty and non-empty names alike only to the extent that it holds that they both express α - transforms, not that they both express essences. More importantly, this view seems to have some counter-intuitive consequences, namely, that all empty names express properties that are logically equivalent to each other (since they are all impossible), and such sentences as

(1)   Romulus founded Rome

express propositions that are logically impossible. Plantinga's other consideration in favor of the Boethian view over his earlier view is that appealing to epistemically inequivalent essences allows for greater flexibility. But Plantinga's assumptions that we can be mistaken about whether we believe a proposition, that we can grasp propositions imperfectly, and that they are mediated by the sentences that express them would seem already to yield the flexibility Plantinga values; whenever the Boethian theory says that two names (or tokens of the same name) express different essences of an object, the alternative theory can say that the same essence is mediated by different names (or tokens).[2]

NOTES

1. Readers expecting to find "Dlaczego sie wspinamy?," the Polish translation of [8], should recall that it did not appear until after 1983.

2. I am grateful to Alvin Plantinga, whose comments on an earlier draft of this review resulted in the excision of some egregious galimatias.

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[3] _____, "Comments on Paul Ziff's 'The Simplicity of Other Minds'," *Journal of Philosophy 62* (1965): 585-87.

[4] _____, *God and Other Minds* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1967).

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[6] _____, "Is Belief in God Rational?" in C. Delaney, ed., *Rationality and Religious Belief* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1979).

[7] _____, *The Nature of Necessity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974).

[8] _____, "Why Climb Mountains?" *The Reformed Journal 20* (1970): 6-8.