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THE POSSIBILITY OF A CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY: A THOMISTIC PERSPECTIVE

John F. Wippel

In addressing myself to this issue, I have chosen to concentrate on what one might call a “Thomistic” perspective for at least two reasons: first in order to bring some historical background to bear on our topic; and secondly, because in my opinion today’s believing Christian who would engage in philosophizing about certain questions of relevance to his religious belief may find something useful in Aquinas’s approach. At the same time, I am only too aware that the proper interpretation of Aquinas’s thinking on this matter has been subject to considerable debate during the twentieth century, and especially during the period running roughly from 1930 into the 1960’s. In 1931 a memorable conflict about the possibility of Christian philosophy broke out between Emile Bréhier and Etienne Gilson at a meeting of the *Société française de philosophie*. This was followed by another lively session devoted to the same problem some two years later at a meeting of the French Thomist society, held at Juvisy.¹ While these debates were by no means limited to the proper interpretation of Aquinas’s thinking on this matter, this would become a central part of much of the ensuing controversy concerning the possibility of a Christian philosophy.²

One reason for the disagreement concerning the proper interpretation of Aquinas’s thought on this issue may be the fact that he did not address himself in so many words to the problem of Christian Philosophy. He did, however, have a great deal to say about the relationship between faith and reason. And in his own work as a professional theologian, he did develop a highly sophisticated philosophy. One can learn from Thomas not only by observing what he said about the faith-reason problem, but also by considering carefully what he did—the procedure he followed—in addressing himself to topics of philosophical interest.³

It will not be my intention here to rehearse the various elements of the twentieth-century debate concerning Christian Philosophy. What I rather propose to do is to single out certain generally accepted principles and procedures which one finds in many Christian thinkers long before Aquinas. Then I would like to highlight some additional precisions contributed by Thomas himself to the general issue of the faith-reason problem. Finally, I would like to offer some reflections about the possible application of some of Thomas’s precisions to the twentieth-century situation for the Christian philosopher.



I

Long before the time of Aquinas we find a fairly clear awareness on the part of many leading Christian thinkers of the difference between believing in something because it has been revealed by God, on the one hand, and accepting it as true because it has been demonstrated, on the other. One can offer illustrations of this from some of the Fathers of the Church. For that matter, a number of Christian thinkers also saw this same distinction implied by Paul's statement in *Romans* 1:20: "For since the creation of the world his invisible attributes are clearly seen—his everlasting power and divinity—being understood through the things that are made." Without pausing here to discuss whether this is or is not the correct interpretation of this oft-quoted Scriptural passage, it will be enough for me to stress the fact that it was frequently enough cited—and cited to make the point that certain fundamental truths can be discovered about God without one's relying on revelation and that these were accessible to the pagans.⁴

At the same time, we have an interesting case in Justin the Martyr. He tells of his having investigated the various leading philosophies of his day, and of his ability to find satisfaction only in Christianity. For this, as he puts it, is the only sure and useful philosophy. Here the term "philosophy" is being used in a broad sense, so as to be equivalent to a distinctive world-view, in this case, Christianity. But Justin also refers to the writings of the prophets, who "gave no proof at that time for their statements. For, as reliable witnesses of the truth, they were beyond proof." Implied in that remark seems to be our distinction between believing something and accepting it because it has been proved.⁵

Or if we turn to St. Augustine, he distinguishes clearly between believing something on religious grounds and proving it philosophically, for instance, in Bk. II of his *De libero arbitrio*. But in that very same context he quotes *Isaias* 7:9 from the Latin translation of the Septuagint to this effect: "Unless you believe, you shall not understand." The fact that the Septuagint and hence its Latin translation as known to Augustine was a mistranslation does not alter the historical importance this admonition was to have on subsequent Latin medieval thought. First believe, and then seek to understand, we are repeatedly reminded by an Anselm and others who follow in his wake.⁶

Against this, one might offer Boethius as a counterexample. In him we have a far sharper separation between that which he accepts on religious faith, and that which he analyzes philosophically. This is reflected by the fact that he did write purely philosophical works—translations and commentaries in large measure, to be sure—and that he also wrote what we know today as his "theological treatises." In most of the latter, however, there is an interesting application of philosophical reasoning to topics which follow from and presuppose the Christian faith. His *Consolation of Philosophy* stands apart. There we have a philosophical discussion

of some of the great problems both for theistic philosophers and for religious believers—the seeming triumph of evil rather than of virtue in this life, and the reconciliation of all of this and of free human activity with an omniscient and provident God. So sparing is Boethius of references to his Christian faith in the *Consolation* (there is no explicit mention of it) that for a time some scholars doubted that this work could have been written by a believing Christian, that is, by the author of the theological treatises. Yet it clearly was.⁷

I have recalled the above points in order to show that long before the time of Aquinas Christian thinkers were already well aware of the need to make some distinction between that which they believed and that which they claimed to establish by natural reason. At the same time, it must also be admitted that relatively few of these Christian writers were interested in working out a pure philosophy for its own sake, or in protecting the autonomy of any such philosophy. Most of them were much more interested in developing what, for want of a better expression, we might call “Christian wisdom.” Many of them would employ and even develop a great deal of philosophical reasoning in pursuing Christian wisdom, as they understood it, and some wrote what we might, even by post-medieval standards, refer to as philosophical works.⁸ But in the main, as I have indicated, they were much more interested in using and developing philosophy only insofar as it could be of service to their pursuit of Christian wisdom. To what extent, then, if at all, were these writers engaged in what we might call “Christian philosophy?”

It has been suggested, for instance by F. Van Steenberghe, that we might take the term “philosophy” very broadly, so as to signify a general *Weltanschauung* or world-view. In this sense we can refer to the achievements of such thinkers not only as illustrations of Christian wisdom, it would seem, but also as illustrations of Christian Philosophy. The only problem with this is that the word philosophy is being used very broadly, so as to be equivalent to wisdom, and this application as Christian Philosophy seems to cover both the philosophical and theological dimensions of the achievement of such Christian writers. But suppose we take the term “philosophy” much more strictly, so as to apply only to an enterprise worked out on purely rational grounds and under the positive guidance of natural reason alone. Then, while it remains true that we can refer to such early Christian thinkers as Christian philosophers, it seems to be more difficult to justify describing their work as Christian Philosophy.⁹

II

With this, I would now like to turn to Thomas Aquinas. Like his predecessors and his contemporaries, Thomas clearly distinguished between believing something on religious grounds—on the authority of God revealing—and knowing something because of natural or philosophical evidence or demonstration. Corres-

ponding to this, he also distinguishes two kinds of truths about divine things which are accessible to us.

On the one hand, there are certain truths concerning God and divine things which natural reason can discover, truths such as God's existence, or God's unity, and others of this kind. Thomas acknowledges that the philosophers have in fact demonstrated some of these things concerning God (SCG I, 3). But there is another kind of truth concerning divine things which completely surpasses human understanding. Here Thomas has in mind what we might refer to as revealed mysteries, such as the Trinity or the Incarnation. These could never be discovered by unaided natural or philosophical means. Given this distinction, Thomas also argues that it was fitting for God to reveal some of those truths about himself which, at least in principle, unaided human reason could discover. For otherwise, reasons Thomas, very few men would succeed in discovering truths such as God's existence. Even those who did succeed in this effort would do so only after a long period of time had passed, and quite likely with a considerable degree of error intermingled with the truth they had discovered (SCG I, 4).

Thomas goes on within this same general context in Bk. I of the *Summa contra gentiles* to argue that there can be no real contradiction between the truth which natural reason or philosophy can discover and that truth which has been revealed to man by God. Thomas spells out his reasons for making this claim even more clearly in his Commentary on the *De Trinitate* of Boethius. There Thomas is considering the question whether in the science of the faith which treats of God (in other words, whether in one's theology) it is permissible for one to use philosophical arguments and authorities.¹⁰

He begins his reply by stressing one of his central theological points: the gifts of grace are not added to nature so as to destroy nature but rather so as to perfect it. If this is so, the light of faith which is given to us as a grace does not destroy the light of natural reason. Thomas immediately adds that this light of natural reason is also given to us by God. Granting that the natural light of the human mind is insufficient to manifest those things which can be discovered only by faith—that is, the revealed mysteries—it is impossible, continues Thomas, for those things which are given to us by God through faith to be contrary to those which are instilled in us by nature. For one or the other would have to be false. (Here the unexpressed premise is that two contradictory propositions cannot both be true at the same time.) And since both of these come to us from God, to admit this would be to make God himself the author of falsity. This, of course, Thomas rejects as impossible.¹¹

Thomas then applies this same reasoning to the relationship between faith and philosophy. (Until this point in our text he had compared faith and reason.) Just as what he here calls sacred teaching (*sacra doctrina*)—which is roughly equivalent to theology—is based on the light of faith, so is philosophy based on the natural light of reason. Therefore, continues Thomas, it is impossible for those things

which belong to philosophy to be opposed to those which are given to us through faith. He also comments that the things known to us by philosophical means will fall short of those which we accept on faith. Again the implied presuppositions are twofold. First, both religious faith and philosophically discovered truth are given to us by God, one by him as the author of revelation, and the other by him as the creator. Secondly, two contradictory propositions cannot both be true at the same time. Hence we have Thomas's serene conclusion that there can be no real conflict between faith and reason, and therefore none between faith and philosophy. While in this discussion Thomas is writing as a theologian and is seeking to justify the appropriateness of employing philosophical argumentation in theologizing, he clearly recognizes the distinctiveness of the philosophical approach and its legitimacy.¹²

Still, Thomas is aware that in times past philosophers have arrived at conclusions which are at odds with the faith. And he himself would actively intervene in another such controversy some years later during his second Parisian teaching period (1269-1272) when confronted with certain heterodox views being advanced in the Arts Faculty there. What then, of such situations where there is contradiction between philosophers and religious belief? Thomas comments that if anything is found in the sayings of the philosophers which is contrary to religious belief, this is not philosophy but rather an abuse or misuse of philosophy resulting from the weakness of human reason. Here again his overriding conviction is the same. There can be no real conflict between faith and reason. Hence, in cases of conflict between an alleged philosophical conclusion and something that is really contained in revelation, Aquinas concludes that the philosopher must have made some mistake in arriving at this conclusion. In other words, Thomas allows for one's religious belief to correct one's philosophizing in cases of conflict between the two.¹³

In fact Thomas concludes from this that in such a situation it is possible by using the principles of philosophy to refute an error of this kind either by showing that it is impossible, or else by showing that it has not been demonstrated. Here he is allowing for two types of situations. It might be that the revealed truth which has been contradicted by a particular philosopher is the kind which is also capable of being demonstrated philosophically—a truth such as God's existence, for instance. In that case it should be possible for the believer, by using purely philosophical means, to demonstrate the falsity of the alleged philosophical position and, in effect, thereby demonstrate the truth of its contradictory, that is of the revealed datum. On the other hand, it may be that the kind of revealed truth which has been contradicted by a philosopher is a pure mystery, and hence not open to philosophical demonstration—a truth such as the Trinity, for instance. In this case Thomas does not hold that one can demonstrate the falsity of the denial of that truth; for then one would in effect be demonstrating the truth of the revealed mystery itself. But one can, he is convinced, show that the alleged philosophical con-

clusion has not in fact been demonstrated.¹⁴

Thomas concludes this discussion by singling out three ways in which one may use philosophy in *sacra doctrina*: (1) in order to demonstrate certain things which he here describes as preambles to faith, such as God's existence, or the unity of God, and other things of this kind which, he says, are proved in philosophy and presupposed by faith; (2) in order to make manifest certain things which are proper to faith by using similitudes (analogies) drawn from the philosophical order for the purpose of illustration; (3) in order to reply to attacks against the faith either by showing that such attacks are false in their claims, or at least by showing that their claims have not themselves been demonstrated.¹⁵

Thomas also comments that those who use philosophy in their theologizing can fall into error in one of two ways: either by introducing things which are opposed to the faith and which are not, in Thomas's judgment, true philosophy but rather a corruption or an abuse of philosophy; or by attempting to include within philosophy things which are reserved for faith (for instance, by refusing to accept on faith anything which cannot be proven philosophically).¹⁶

Thomas's immediate purpose in this discussion from his Commentary on the *De Trinitate* was to justify and then to clarify the theologian's usage of philosophical reasoning in his theologizing. But here we are interested in the question of Christian Philosophy. What do Thomas's remarks tell us about his views concerning the believer's use and practice of philosophy, even if that believer does not happen to be a theologian? Such a situation was not unknown to Aquinas, for there were Masters in the Arts Faculty at Paris who were Christians and who claimed to be philosophers. They were certainly not theologians. Names such as Siger of Brabant and Boethius of Dacia come to mind. What of them? And what of the Christian today who would be a philosopher, and who is perhaps neither professionally trained as nor interested in becoming a theologian?

Certain points from Thomas's discussion of the faith-reason relationship should be recalled here. First of all, he does clearly distinguish between faith and reason, and then just as clearly between both faith (and theology), on the one hand, and philosophy, on the other. If the motive for accepting something as true in the case of religious belief is divine authority, in the case of philosophy it can only be naturally accessible evidence. Secondly, in the course of defending the theologian's right to use philosophy in his theologizing, Thomas has also defended the legitimacy of philosophy. Not only is it distinct from faith and from theology; it can arrive at truth, and even at some truths concerning divine things. Finally, Thomas has allowed faith to play a negative role in the believer's assessment of any philosophical conclusion which conflicts with revealed data. In such cases, because of his conviction that two contradictory propositions cannot both be true at the same time and because of God's authorship of revealed truth, Thomas holds that there must be something wrong with one's philosophizing.

But some twentieth-century defenders of the Christian character of Thomas's philosophy insist that this is not enough. It is not enough for the believing Christian to allow his religious belief to serve as a negative norm in his philosophizing. As they note, Thomas himself was by profession a theologian rather than a pure philosopher. In the course of developing his theology he also worked out a highly interesting and original philosophy. But, we are reminded, and especially by Etienne Gilson and his followers, Thomas philosophized only as a believing Christian and as a professional theologian. Hence one must allow for some kind of positive and intrinsic influence which runs from Thomas's faith to his philosophy. Any effort on our part to separate his philosophy from its original theological context is bound to be inaccurate, historically speaking, and to run counter to his spirit. In short, Thomas Aquinas was not a pure philosopher, but a philosophizing theologian or, as Gilson often expressed it, a Christian philosopher. And if this is so, one cannot describe his philosophical achievement as pure philosophy but as "Christian Philosophy."¹⁷

Not only this, but if a believing Christian today would be guided by Aquinas's procedure in his own philosophizing, he should do no less. He should not attempt to develop a philosophy independently from his religious belief or, according to the later Gilson, independently from his theology. In fact, if one wishes to become a philosopher in the Thomistic sense, or to become a Christian philosopher as Gilson understands this, it seems that according to the later Gilson, one should first become a theologian and philosophize from within one's theology.¹⁸

Since on other occasions I have critically examined the historical accuracy of some aspects of Gilson's presentation of Aquinas's philosophy as a Christian Philosophy, I shall quickly pass over that issue here.¹⁹ On the historical side, it will be enough for me to recall some of Thomas's views concerning the intrinsic integrity, the methodology, and the order which are proper to philosophy, and especially to metaphysics.

Aquinas has worked out in detail his views concerning the distinction between theology and philosophy, and within philosophy itself, between its different parts. He distinguishes practical philosophy from speculative or theoretical philosophy, both by reason of the different kinds of things studied in each, and by reason of diversity in end or goal. Within theoretical philosophy he distinguishes between natural philosophy, mathematics, and metaphysics, and this in turn by reason of the different kinds of subjects for theoretical inquiry (*speculabilia*); the different kinds of intellectual processes required to discover these subjects; and the different levels of termination or verification for the propositions which are characteristic of each, that is, of natural philosophy, mathematics, and metaphysics.²⁰ More than this, he also clearly distinguishes between the theological order (wherein one moves from a study of God to a study of creatures) and the philosophical order (wherein one moves from a study of created being to a study of God, its cause).²¹

Throughout his literary corpus, both in his philosophical and in his theological writings, various elements of his philosophy, and especially of his metaphysics, are to be found.

It is true that Thomas never presented a *Summa philosophiae* or a *Summa metaphysicae* which would more less be his philosophical parallel to his *Summa theologiae* or his *Summa contra gentiles*. It is also clear that he had created a general philosophical and in particular a metaphysical synthesis in his own mind, and that he constantly drew upon this in addressing himself to particular philosophical and theological issues. From the historical standpoint, therefore, today's historian of philosophy has every right to try and recapture the essential elements of Thomas's philosophical and metaphysical thought. In doing this he should use all of Thomas's writings in which the various elements of that philosophical thought are to be found—both philosophical writings and theological writings. He should not ignore Thomas's Commentaries on Aristotle, or minimize the importance of his philosophical opuscula, as Gilson tended to do. Today's scholar should be guided in his efforts at historical reconstruction by Thomas's detailed indications concerning the proper subject-matter, distinctive type of thinking, and level of verification which are appropriate to metaphysics and to the other parts of theoretical philosophy. And he should present the elements of this thought according to the philosophical order as this is defined by Aquinas, not according to the theological order followed by Thomas in his works of theological synthesis, as Gilson would have today's scholar do.²²

I stress these historical points because they show that Thomas had worked out the distinction between philosophy, on the one hand, and faith as well as theology, on the other, with greater thoroughness and precision than any other Christian thinker before his time. They also indicate how concerned he was with defining precisely the distinctive subject-matters and methodologies of the various parts of philosophy, especially of theoretical philosophy.

III

Rather than delay longer over the accuracy of Gilson's historical reading of Aquinas I shall now turn to the more theoretical question: If one would philosophize today while remaining a believing Christian, and if one would do so in accord with Aquinas's views concerning the proper relationship between faith and reason and between theology and philosophy, should one move from one's faith to the development of one's philosophy? Or to put this even more forcefully, should one first become a theologian and move from one's theology to one's philosophy? And if one does proceed in either of these ways, can the resulting enterprise fittingly be described as Christian Philosophy? Gilson has, at least in his later writings, replied in the affirmative to each of these questions.²³ On the other

side, if one rejects any such approach (as I would at least in part) and still wishes to philosophize while continuing to be a Christian, is there any proper sense in which one's undertaking may be described as Christian Philosophy?

For my part, I would prefer to fall back upon a distinction between the order or moment of discovery, on the one hand, and the order or moment of proof, on the other. Some other scholars have already suggested that this distinction can be applied to the present issue. Often enough those who reject the possibility of a Christian philosophy do so because they view philosophy only in its moment of proof—as a completed set of propositions including principles, proofs, and conclusions. Here, it seems to me, they conclude correctly that nothing borrowed from religious belief or theology can enter in. To admit the contributions of faith into the process of proof would be to destroy the philosophical character of the undertaking and to turn it into theology or at the least, into an extension of religious belief.²⁴

One may also consider philosophy, or a particular philosophical position, in terms of its development, that is, in terms of the process or inquiry whereby it is discovered. In the positive sciences it is possible for one to work backward from a given hypothesis and to search for evidence which might verify that hypothesis. So too, *mutatis mutandis*, in the course of developing a philosophical point it may be that, in the moment of discovery, a particular issue was first suggested to the philosopher by some nonphilosophical source. If so, there seems to be nothing to prevent the philosopher from then working backward, as it were, to search for philosophical evidence which might or might not lend support to the original proposal.²⁵

Thus for the Christian it may be that in certain instances some revealed datum serves as a leading question or working hypothesis for his philosophical inquiry. While as a believing Christian he will continue to assent to this datum or believe in it, he may now decide to investigate it as a possible object of rational or philosophical demonstration. If he succeeds in finding rational evidence which supports it, then and to that extent his procedure will be strictly philosophical in the moment of proof. In other words, in the moment of proof his procedure cannot be described as Christian philosophy. But since in the moment of discovery it was his religious belief that first suggested this particular issue to him as a possible subject for philosophical investigation, one might refer to such a procedure as Christian Philosophy in the order of discovery.²⁶

This would seem to be one way in which a particular philosophical inquiry might be described as Christian in its moment of discovery, without necessarily being described as or changed into theology, I might add, even in that same moment of discovery. In its moment of proof, however, it would be pure philosophy, not Christian Philosophy. And in this same rather qualified sense I would be willing to admit not only that there are Christian philosophers, but that there can be such a thing as

Christian Philosophy—that is, in the moment of discovery.²⁷

This distinction seems to parallel more or less one offered some decades ago by Gilson himself, when he distinguished between philosophy considered concretely (or as it exists in the mind of the philosopher), and philosophy considered abstractly (or in terms of its essence). He then argued that philosophy is not Christian when it is viewed simply in terms of its essence, but that it is Christian when considered as it exists concretely in the Christian who philosophizes. I would accept this distinction, but in the way just indicated. Philosophy as it exists concretely in the mind of the Christian who philosophizes may be described as Christian in its moment of discovery of certain points, though not in its moment of proof even of those points. In other words, this distinction would seem to justify our speaking not only of Christian philosophers, but also of Christian Philosophy in its moment of discovery.²⁸

An additional question could be raised. If philosophy can be Christian in its moment of discovery, is it intrinsically Christian when it is so viewed? Or is this not merely like naming it Christian because the people who are practicing it happen to be Christian? There has been some disagreement with respect to this on the part of those who have applied the distinction between moment of discovery and moment of proof to the issue of Christian Philosophy. Here I will only speak tentatively. It seems to me that, as regards its moment of discovery, if a particular point was first suggested to a believing philosopher because of his religious faith, that same religious faith does enter into our philosopher's initial discovery of the point under examination, and in an intrinsic way. Hence I would suggest that if this way of philosophizing can be called Christian in its moment of discovery, it can also be regarded as intrinsically Christian, but once again only in its moment of discovery, not in its moment of proof.²⁹ This would seem to follow to the extent that one is willing to include the moment or process of discovery within one's understanding of philosophy.

Moreover, it appears to me that on various occasions the procedure actually followed by Aquinas and many of his medieval predecessors and contemporaries in developing particular philosophical points could be described as Christian Philosophy in this same way. For surely neither Thomas nor anyone who has been a believing Christian from birth first demonstrated truths such as God's existence or God's providence before believing in them. Rather, having been instructed in the faith and having professed belief in God and many like truths, our believer would only subsequently be introduced to philosophy in the formal sense. At that point a medieval believer or, for that matter, a contemporary believer, might well wonder what philosophy has to say about some of the things he has already believed, and he might regard some of them as working hypotheses or as possible subjects for philosophical inquiry. He would be influenced, therefore, in the order of discovery by his religious belief and would practice Christian Philosophy. If he

eventually succeeded in demonstrating any such conclusion philosophically, that demonstration would not be Christian Philosophy, but pure philosophy.

To offer but two other illustrations, this description seems to me to capture quite well Augustine's usage of philosophy in Bk. II of his *De libero arbitrio*. There, after recalling explicitly that he believes that God exists, Augustine proposes to demonstrate this by rational argumentation or, if you will, philosophically. Indeed, within that context this is his way of carrying out the admonition that one should first believe and then seek to understand. Again, this would be one way of interpreting Anselm's procedure in the *Proslogion*. After calling upon God for assistance, Anselm now wishes to understand that which he believes—that God exists as Anselm believes, and that God is that which Anselm believes him to be. It is only then that he presents his well-known if much controverted "Anselmian" argument for God's existence. Moreover, one could view the entire *Proslogion* as one continuing illustration of this same procedure.³⁰

It also seems to me that in works such as his *The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy* Gilson has shown that a number of particular points first entered into human consciousness as a result of belief in the Judeo-Christian revelation. To the extent that some of these points eventually served as objects for philosophical inquiry by Christian thinkers, they may be regarded as additional illustrations of what I would describe as Christian Philosophy in the order of discovery.

One of the great strengths in Thomas's approach—at least in my opinion—is the clarity with which he himself distinguishes between faith and reason, and between faith and philosophy. To me it is important for today's interpreter of Aquinas, and for that matter, for today's believing Christian who would also be a philosopher, to preserve this distinction as clearly as possible. This does not necessarily mean, of course, that one will always sharply distinguish between purely philosophical writings and purely theological writings. Thomas himself often combines philosophizing and theologizing within the same work. But it does mean that one should be consciously aware of what one is doing when one reflects upon such issues—that one should know when one is accepting something for religious reasons or on faith, and when one is attempting to establish a point philosophically.

Granting all of this, however, I must also acknowledge that the situation is often more complicated in practice than my previous remarks may have suggested. It is not always simply a question of distinguishing between the order of discovery and the order of proof. To illustrate, how are we to describe seemingly philosophical inquiries which rest upon and presuppose data supplied by and only by religious belief—for instance, an intricate philosophical discussion of the relationships between the divine persons within the Trinity, or a similar discussion of the distinction between nature and person as applied to the mystery of the Incarnation? Can such investigations be described as philosophical, properly speaking, or perhaps

as Christian philosophy, or perhaps only as straight theology?

Even concerning such cases different possible situations may be envisioned. For example, it might be that the philosophical inquiry itself presupposes the truth of the religious beliefs which have been assumed, and that there is no conceivable way in which such a truth or truths can be demonstrated philosophically. In this event it would seem that such investigations go beyond the realm of the purely philosophical, and even beyond the realm of Christian Philosophy in the order of discovery. In other words, in such cases it seems to me that one is in fact practicing speculative theology, not pure philosophy, and not Christian Philosophy. Here, to use a metaphor taken from Aquinas himself, the water of philosophy will have been transformed into the wine of theology.³¹

Another possible situation comes to mind. Suppose that one's philosophical investigation is directed to articles of religious belief, and articles of faith in the strict sense—that is, those which cannot be demonstrated philosophically—but in such fashion that the philosophical inquiry does not rest upon or presuppose in any way that the articles of faith are true. Could such an inquiry be described as philosophy? And if so, could it be called Christian Philosophy? For example, suppose that one were simply interested in determining whether one article of faith was logically compatible with another, without necessarily committing oneself to accepting the truth of either as a presupposition for one's investigation, and without having any hope or intention of demonstrating the truth of either. It would seem that this kind of inquiry could be undertaken by the nonbeliever as well as by the believer. In what sense, if at all, should such an enterprise be called Christian Philosophy?

Since no revealed premise is necessarily accepted as true, it would seem that such an enterprise would not presuppose either faith or theology, at least in any intrinsic way. Hence it seems that it should not be described as theology but as philosophy in some sense. Still, since the subject-matter under investigation is, according to our hypothesis, distinctively Christian, would this be enough for us to describe this particular kind of philosophizing as another instance of Christian Philosophy?

I would think not. One should not immediately conclude that because a particular philosophical inquiry is about an article or articles of Christian belief, the philosophical inquiry itself is Christian. To make such an inference would be somewhat like moving immediately from the objective genitive (a philosophy of Christianity in that it is about Christian beliefs) to the subjective genitive (a philosophy of Christianity in the sense that it is exercised by some one who is Christian, and in a distinctively Christian way). This would be no more justified than for us to conclude that because a philosophy of literature or history is about literature or about history it is necessarily and intrinsically literary or historical in itself.

Finally, while I have defended at least one qualified way in which philosophy

might be described as Christian in its pursuit of particular points—in its moment of discovery, and while I have rejected some other ways in which philosophy itself might be called Christian, I do not wish to leave the impression that I have examined all possibilities. I definitely have not, and by limiting myself in large measure to an approach inspired by the principles of Aquinas, have tried to free myself from any obligation to consider all possible alternative candidates for the title Christian Philosophy. This I shall leave to others.³²

I would suggest that, as other possible candidates for the description Christian Philosophy are considered, certain precisions introduced by Aquinas may be helpful. Thus one may ask, does a proposed Christian Philosophy preserve with clarity the distinction between faith, on the one hand, and philosophy viewed as a rational enterprise, on the other? Secondly, does it hold out the possibility of maintaining with some clarity the distinction between theology and philosophy, and between the theological and philosophical components of a particular enterprise? If the answer to each of these questions is affirmative, does the association of any putative Christian Philosophy with Christian religious belief point to something that enters into and even serves to define its way of philosophizing as distinctively Christian? If the answer to either of the first two questions is negative, then one may doubt that one is dealing with philosophy in any proper sense. If the answer to the last question is negative, then one may doubt that the enterprise under consideration deserves to be called Christian in any proper sense, granted that it may be described as philosophy.

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NOTES

1. For the Proceedings of the first meeting see *Bulletin de la Société française de Philosophie* 31 (1931). See in particular pp. 40-49 (Gilson's presentation), pp. 49-52 (Bréhier's presentation), and pp. 52-59 (running debate between them). Also see the important interventions by Jacques Maritain (pp. 59-72), L. Brunschvicg (pp. 73-77), and the discussion between Gilson and Brunschvicg (pp. 77-82). An interesting letter from Maurice Blondel is also published there as an appendix (pp. 86-92). For the second meeting see *Journées d'Etudes de la Société thomiste*, Vol. 2: *La Philosophie chrétienne* (Juvisy: Editions du Cerf, 11 Septembre 1933). For a bibliography of other discussions of this issue during the years 1931-33 see pp. 165-69. For an interesting report about this meeting prepared before the appearance of the published proceedings see F. Van Steenberghe, "La Ile Journée d'Etudes de la Société Thomiste et la notion de 'philosophie chrétienne'," *Revue néoscholastique de philosophie* 35 (1933), pp. 539-54. Already at this point in the discussion Van Steenberghe had taken a strong position: there are indeed Christian philosophers, but there is no such thing as a Christian Philosophy when this expression is taken in a formal and rigorous sense (see p. 554). Also see M. Nédoncelle, *Is There*

a *Christian Philosophy*, Twentieth Century Encyclopedia of Catholicism, Vol. 10 (New York: Hawthorn Books, 1960), Ch. V ("The Debate of 1931"), pp. 85-99.

2. For an effort to trace the development of Gilson's thinking on this matter see my *Metaphysical Themes in Thomas Aquinas* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, forthcoming), Ch. I, section 1. For some critical reactions to Gilson's interpretation of Aquinas, see Ch. I, section 2. For a good résumé of his long disagreement with Gilson concerning the general issue of Christian Philosophy and the proper interpretation of Aquinas concerning the same see Van Steenberghen, "Etienne Gilson, historien de la pensée médiévale," *Revue philosophique de Louvain* 77 (1979), esp. pp. 493-505.

3. What I have in mind here is the manner in which he carefully distinguishes between the way of philosophy and the way of faith, for instance, in his rebuttal of the Averroistic theory of the intellect in his *De unitate intellectus contra Averroistas*. There, while noting that this particular theory is indeed at odds with Catholic faith, Thomas states his intention of showing that the Averroistic interpretation is against the principles of philosophy. See *Sancti Thomae Aquinatis Tractatus de unitate intellectus contra Averroistas*, L. Keeler ed. (Rome: Pontificia Universitas Gregoriana, 1957), pp. 2-3. Again, his writing of philosophical opuscula and of detailed Commentaries on Aristotle shows considerable concern for the work of the philosopher. Finally, his careful presentation of a distinctive subject-matter, methodology, and level of verification for each of the theoretical sciences manifests the same concern for the integrity of the philosophical sciences. See his *Expositio super librum Boethii De Trinitate*, B. Decker, ed. (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1959), Qu. 5, art. 1; Qu. 5, art. 3; Qu. 5, art. 4; Qu. 6, art. 1; Qu. 6, art. 2.

4. For this in Augustine see, for instance, *De Genesi ad Litteram* IV, ch. 32, 49 (J.-P. Migne, *Patrologiae Cursus Completus. Series Latina* [Paris, 1844-1864], Vol. 34.316-17 [PL 34.316-17]), English transl. *St. Augustine. The Literal Meaning of Genesis*, Ancient Christian Writers, No. 41 (New York, N.Y.: Newman Press, 1982), p. 139; *Enarrationes in Psalmos* 41, 6-8 (PL 36.467-69). Cf. *Confessions* X, ch. 6, 8; and *Sermo* 126 (PL 38.699). Concerning the first two texts see Gilson's remarks in his *The Christian Philosophy of St. Augustine* (New York: Random House, 1960), p. 19 and nn. 34, 37. For Anselm see his *Reply to Gaunilo* VIII, Latin and English in *St. Anselm's Proslogion With A Reply on Behalf of the Fool by Gaunilo and The Author's Reply to Gaunilo*, M. J. Charlesworth, tr. (Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1965), pp. 186, 187. Though Paul's text is frequently cited by Aquinas, it will be enough here for me to mention his Commentary on Paul's *Letter to the Romans*. For this see *S. Thomae Aquinatis in omnes S. Pauli Apostoli Epistolas Commentaria*, Vol. 1 (Turin: Marietti, 1929), c. 1, lect. 6 (pp. 21-22).

5. For Justin see his *Dialogue With Trypho*, cc. 8 and 7, English translation in *Saint Justin Martyr*, T. B. Falls, tr., *The Fathers of the Church* (New York: Christian Heritage Inc., 1948), pp. 160, 159. For Justin's appeal to the Stoic teaching about an all-pervading Logos in order to account for the pagans' discovery of some truth before the coming of Christ see his *First Apology*, ch. 46 (*ed. cit.*, pp. 83-84); *Second Apology*, cc. 8, 10, 13 (pp. 127-28, 129-30, 133-34). On this in Justin see H. Chadwick, in *The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), Ch. 9, pp. 160-66; R. A. Markus, in A. H. Armstrong-R. A. Markus, *Christian Faith and Greek Philosophy* (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1960), pp. 143-44.

6. For this see his *De libero arbitrio libri tres* II, cc. 2-3, *Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum*, Vol. 74 (Vienna: Hölder, Pichler, Tempisky, 1956), pp. 41-42. On Augustine's usage of the text from Isaias see the brief but helpful discussion by F. J. Thonnard in *Oeuvres de saint Augustin VI. Dialogues Philosophiques III: De l'Ame A Dieu, De magistro, De libero arbitrio* (Paris: Desclée,

De Brouwer et Cie, 1952), pp. 514-17. For Anselm see, for example, the closing remark in *Proslogion* I: "For I do not seek to understand so that I may believe; but I believe so that I may understand. For I believe this also, that 'unless I believe, I shall not understand'." See Charlesworth, *ed. cit.*, p. 115. For Charlesworth's discussion of faith and reason in Anselm see pp. 30-46, including some major objections to Karl Barth's well known interpretation (pp. 40-44). As Charlesworth rightly points out, extreme interpretations of Anselm can make him out to be a rationalist, on the one side, or a fideist, on the other. In fact he appears to be neither. Also see J. Hopkins, *A Companion to the Study of St. Anselm* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1972), Ch. II ("Faith and Reason"). The recommendation first to believe and then to seek to understand admits of a twofold application, both in Augustine and in Anselm. It may be directed to naturally knowable truths, such as God's existence; or it may be directed to one's subsequent effort to penetrate more deeply into that which one can only believe.

7. Among Boethius's theological treatises the one frequently referred to as the *De Hebdomadibus* does not apply philosophical reasoning to a distinctively Christian topic, but rather concentrates on a fundamental metaphysical problem: How may substances be good in their essence (*in eo quod sint*) without being good of their essence (*substantialia bona*)? For the Latin text and an English translation see Boethius, *The Theological Tractates. The Consolation of Philosophy*. H. F. Stewart and E. K. Rand, transl. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1958), pp. 38-51. For a more recent English translation see that offered by myself in J. F. Wippel-A. B. Wolter, *Medieval Philosophy From St. Augustine to Nicholas of Cusa* (New York: The Free Press, 1969), pp. 97-102. On the authorship of the theological treatises and the *Consolation* see H. Chadwick, *Boethius. The Consolations of Music, Logic, Theology, and Philosophy* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), pp. 174ff. On Boethius's logical works see the same, pp. 108-73. Also see Eleonore Stump, *Boethius's De topicis differentiis. Translated, with Notes and Essays on the Text* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1978).

8. See, for instance, the various logical writings by Boethius, as well as his *Consolation* and, for that matter, among his "theological treatises", the *De Hebdomadibus*. Also see Anselm's *De Grammatico* which may be regarded "purely as a philosophical manual providing training in dialectic and having no ostensible connection with theology" (Hopkins, *op. cit.*, p. 5). Also see Abelard's logical works. Cf. M. Tweedale, *Abailard on Universals* (Amsterdam-New York-Oxford: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1976), pp. 11-13.

9. For Van Steenberghe see "Etienne Gilson, historien de la pensée médiévale," pp. 496, 503. Throughout his career Van Steenberghe has maintained that while there are Christian philosophers, there is no such thing as Christian philosophy when this expression is taken in the strict sense. See p. 497, n. 15. Cf. n. 1 above. The formula "christiana philosophia" employed by Augustine in his *Contra Julianum* IV, 14, 72 (PL 44.774) is surely being used there in the broader sense—as Christian wisdom. Cf. Van Steenberghe, p. 503.

10. For this in the *Summa contra gentiles* see I, 7. See *Sancti Thomae de Aquino Expositio super Librum Boethii De Trinitate*, B. Decker, ed. (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1959), Qu. 2, art. 3 (p. 90): "Utrum in scientia fidei quae est de deo liceat rationibus philosophicis et auctoritatibus uti."

11. *Op. cit.*, p. 94:3-11.

12. *Op. cit.*, p. 94:15-18. The precise relationship between Thomas's usage of *sacra doctrina* and *theologia*, especially in ST I, qu. 1, aa. 1-10, has long been contested among Thomistic commentators. For a good survey of this and for some interesting personal reflections, see J. Weisheipl, "The Meaning of *Sacra Doctrina* in *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 1," *The Thomist* 38 (1974), pp. 49-80. Here it will be enough for me to stress the importance of Thomas's distinction between two kinds of theology. There is one, he writes, in which divine things are not considered as the subject of the science but rather as

principles of the subject of that science. Such is the theology which philosophers pursue, which is also known as metaphysics. As Thomas had already indicated in this same text (*In De Trinitate*, Qu. 5, art. 4), this science has as its subject being as being (*ens in quantum est ens*; Decker edition, p. 194:26-27). Thomas contrasts this with another theology or divine science which considers divine things themselves (or God himself) as the very subject of the science. This is the theology which is given to us by Scripture. Farther on in this same article, Thomas refers to this as "theologia...sacrae scripturae" (p. 195:24-25). See p. 195:6-11.

13. *Op. cit.*, p. 94:19-21: "Si quid autem in dictis philosophorum invenitur contrarium fidei, hoc non est philosophia, sed magis philosophiae abusus ex defectu rationis." The literature concerning the doctrinal controversies at the University of Paris leading to the condemnations of 1270 and 1277 is considerable. For an introduction to this and for further references see my "The Condemnations of 1270 and 1277 at Paris," *The Journal of Medieval and Renaissance Studies* 7 (1977), pp. 169-201. Among the many studies of these controversies to appear since the completion of my article, two should be noted especially: F. Van Steenberghe, *Maître Siger de Brabant* (Louvain: Publications Universitaires/Paris: Vander-Oyez, S.A., 1977), especially Ch. III: "Entre les deux condamnations (1271-1276);" R. Hissette, *Enquête sur les 219 articles condamnés à Paris le 7 mars 1277* (Louvain: Publications Universitaires/Paris: Vander-Oyez, S.A., 1977). Hissette continues to make important contributions to our knowledge of the circumstances surrounding these events. See in particular his "Etienne Tempier et ses condamnations," *Recherches de Théologie ancienne et médiévale* 47 (1980), pp. 231-70. Perhaps I should mention in passing that I remain unconvinced by his ongoing efforts to prove that none of the propositions condemned by Tempier in 1277 was directly (rather than indirectly) aimed at Thomas Aquinas. See most recently his "Albert le Grand et Thomas d'Aquin dans la censure parisienne du 7 mars 1277," in *Miscellanea Mediaevalia* 15 (1982), pp. 226-46.

14. *Op. cit.*, p. 94:21-26.

15. *Op. cit.*, pp. 94:27—95:7. Thomas's words regarding the first usage merit quotation: "Primo ad demonstrandum ea quae sunt praeambula fidei, quae necesse est in fide scire, ut ea quae naturalibus rationibus de deo probantur, ut deum esse, deum esse unum et alia huiusmodi vel de deo vel de creaturis in philosophia probata, quae fides supponit."

16. *Op. cit.*, p. 95:8-15.

17. For my effort to trace Gilson's developing views concerning this see the reference in n. 2 above. For Gilson's effort to set forth a number of issues whose full philosophical development during the medieval period was due to the positive influence of Christianity see his *The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy*, Gifford Lectures 1931-1932 (London: Sheed and Ward, 1936/repr. 1950), *passim*. The notes of the French original (*L'Esprit de la philosophie médiévale* [Paris: J. Vrin, 1932], 2 vols.) have been considerably shortened in the English version. For his criticism of any attempt to present Thomas's philosophy by following the philosophical order see his *The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas* (New York: Random House, 1956), p. 442, n. 33. This translation is based on the fifth edition of Gilson's *Le thomisme*. A sixth French edition appeared in 1956 (Paris: J. Vrin). For Gilson's efforts to define his understanding of Christian Philosophy during his earlier discussions see cc. 1-2 of *The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy*. The historical justification for this expression ("Christian Philosophy") is, in Gilson's eyes, the presence in the Fathers and medieval scholastics of certain philosophical positions which are found in their writings for the first time in this precise form. See, for instance, in addition to the general thesis of *The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy*, Gilson's *Christianity and Philosophy* (New York-London, 1939). In *The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas* (p. 441, n. 20), Gilson refers to his *Christianity and Philosophy* in the following terms: "The basic idea in

this book is that the phrase 'Christian philosophy' expresses a theological notion of a reality observable in history." Cf. his "La possibilité philosophique de la philosophie chrétienne," *Revue des sciences religieuses* 32 (1958), p. 168. On the need for an intrinsic relationship between revelation and reason for a philosophy to be Christian see *The Spirit...*, pp. 35-37. While granting with J. Maritain that this involves both objective aids and subjective reinforcements, Gilson has concentrated on the former because such can be discovered by historical investigation. See *L'Esprit...*, (2nd ed. Paris: J. Vrin, 1948), pp. 439-40, n. 80; *Le thomisme*, 6th ed., pp. 42-43. As Gilson sees it, both history and the words of Aquinas indicate that a true philosophy could not in fact be constituted without the help of "revelation, acting as an indispensable moral support to reason..." (*The Spirit...*, pp. 40-41). On the point that Thomas was not a pure philosopher but a philosophizing theologian see *Elements of Christian Philosophy* (Garden City: Doubleday, 1960), p. 12; "Thomas Aquinas and our Colleagues," in *A Gilson Reader*, A. Pegis, ed. (Garden City: Image Books, Doubleday, 1957), p. 289; *The Philosopher and Theology* (New York: Random House, 1962), pp. 194-95.

18. For the point that philosophy, insofar as it is worked out by the theologian and employed in his theologizing, thereby becomes a part of theology, see *Elements of Christian Philosophy*, p. 289, n. 36. Also see p. 42: "Since the philosophy that is in the *Summa* [*Theologiae*] is there in view of a theological end, and since it figures in it as integrated with that which is the proper work of the theologian, it finds itself included within the formal object of theology and becomes theological in its own right. For the same reason, the order of exposition has to be theological." See *The Philosopher and Theology*, p. 198: "It matters little whether the truths at stake be accessible to natural reason or escape it; taken in its most comprehensive meaning, Christian philosophy transcends the distinction of scholastic philosophy and scholastic theology. It designates the use the Christian makes of the philosophical reason when, in either one of these two disciplines, he associates religious faith and philosophical reflection." On Gilson's recommendations for today's Thomist see pp. 213-14: "Whatever the outcome, the art of being a Thomist will be acquired and perfected in this undertaking, namely, philosophizing, as only a Christian can, *within faith*" (p. 214). For certain pedagogical consequences, see "Thomas Aquinas and Our Colleagues," *passim*. Thus Gilson finds Thomas Aquinas holding (1) that young people are not fit to study metaphysics; (2) that youth ends at fifty; (3) that the ancient philosophers used to allot the later parts of their lives to the study of metaphysics (p. 286). In order to save Thomas from inconsistency in terms of his personal career, Gilson suggests that Thomas did not recommend against having young people study revealed theology, including whatever metaphysics and ethics it might contain (see pp. 289ff.). Without suggesting that philosophy should be taught everywhere (including nonreligious educational institutions) in this way, Gilson does suggest that "if we wish to introduce Christian students to metaphysics and ethics, to teach them the relevant parts of his [Thomas's] theology will be to provide them with the best short cut to some understanding of these disciplines" (p. 292). Also see p. 297, n. 10. To return to the historical issue, another way of illustrating Gilson's point is indicated by his contribution in 1950 to the *Congressus scholasticus* in Rome. There he strongly stressed the point that the originality of medieval philosophies is largely due to their being included in and developed within theological syntheses ("c'est dans sa fonction théologique que la pensée philosophique est alors devenue créatrice..." pp. 137-38). Therefore the future of scholastic philosophy is connected with its intimate association with theology (p. 142). See "Les recherches historico-critiques et l'avenir de la scolastique," *Scholastica ratione historico-critica instauranda* (Rome: Pontificium Athenaeum Antonianum, 1951), pp. 131-42. Similar thoughts are found repeatedly in Gilson's *Introduction à la philosophie chrétienne* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1960). See for instance, p. 114; p. 152 ("Le philosophe chrétien... théologise, et le théologien ne se prive pas de philosopher"); p. 215 ("la théologie produit de la métaphysique, puis la métaphysique se flatte de se passer de la théologie dont elle dérive; elle s'aperçoit bientôt qu'elle ne se

comprend plus elle-même..."); p. 223 ("Tout l'avenir de la philosophie chrétienne dépend d'une restauration attendue, désirée, espérée, de la véritable notion de la théologie, jadis florissante au temps des grands maîtres de la scolastique..."). For these and other references as well as for a number from *Le philosophe et la théologie* see Van Steenberghe, *Introduction à l'étude de la philosophie médiévale* (Louvain: Publications Universitaires/Paris: Béatrice-Nauwelaerts, 1974), pp. 73-76. For critical comments see pp. 103ff.; "Etienne Gilson, historien...", p. 504.

19. See n. 2 above.

20. For the distinction between practical philosophy and theoretical philosophy see, for instance, *In De Trin.*, Qu. 5, art. 1 (Decker ed., p. 164:5-17). For the division of theoretical philosophy into its three parts by reason of diversity in the kind of subject studied see Qu. 5, art. 1 (p. 165:12—p. 166:9); by reason of the different kinds of intellectual operations required to discover the subject of each, see Qu. 5, art. 3; and for the different levels of termination or verification appropriate to each see Qu. 6, art. 2. For more on this see the reference given above in n. 3.

21. For this distinction see, for instance, SCG II, c. 4: "Exinde etiam est quod non eodem ordine utraque doctrina procedit. Nam in doctrina philosophiae, quae creaturas secundum se considerat et ex eis in Dei cognitionem perducit, prima est consideratio de creaturis et ultima de Deo. In doctrina vero fidei, quae creaturas non nisi in ordine ad Deum considerat, primo est consideratio Dei et postmodum creaturarum" (*Editio Leonina manualis* [Rome: Desclée and C.—Herder, 1934]), p. 96.

22. On the relative unimportance assigned by Gilson to the Aristotelian Commentaries and philosophical opuscula when compared with works of theological synthesis such as the two *Summae* see *The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas*, pp. 8, 22; *Elements of Christian Philosophy*, p. 282, n. 6; *The Philosopher and Theology*, pp. 210-11. In the last reference Gilson seems to take the *De ente* more seriously, but comments that in it "the level of theology is not far from the surface." In other words, there Gilson seems to be inclined to regard it also as a theological work. On Gilson's presentation of Aquinas's philosophy according to the theological order see the procedure he has followed in the various editions of *Le thomisme* and in *The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas*, as well as in his *Elements*. For his justification of this see *The Christian Philosophy...*, p. 442, n. 33, as well as pp. 21-22.

23. See the references given above, especially in n. 18.

24. On this distinction see G. Klubertanz, "Metaphysics and Theistic Convictions," in *Teaching Thomism Today*, G. McLean, ed. (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1963), pp. 278-81.

25. For this see Klubertanz, *ibid.*; A. Naud, *Le problème de la philosophie chrétienne. Eléments d'une solution thomiste* (Montréal: Faculté de Théologie, 1960), pp. 35-44.

26. Klubertanz, *op. cit.*, pp. 281-82; Naud, *op. cit.*, pp. 45-52. For some thoughts which are close to the proposal being suggested here also see G. Grisez, "The 'Four Meanings' of Christian Philosophy," *The Journal of Religion* 42 (1962), pp. 113ff.

27. If one concedes this, then one might think that the formula *fides quaerens intellectum* expresses well the methodology of Christian Philosophy. For a critique of any such suggestion see Naud, pp. 54-56. What I would stress is that this suggested way in which philosophy might be regarded as Christian applies only to the moment of discovery, and since here one has to do only with particular points which may be suggested to the believing philosopher by his religious belief, it does not really apply to the whole of his philosophical enterprise. If he is a genuine philosopher he will hardly confine himself to those points which are suggested to him by revelation but will explore many other points which are not.

28. For Gilson see *The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy*, pp. 36-37. Cf. *The Philosopher and Theology*,

p. 192. For a similar distinction proposed by J. Maritain see *An Essay on Christian Philosophy* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1955), pp. 15-18; *Science and Wisdom* (London: Geoffrey Bles/New York: Charles Scribner's Sons 1940/repr. 1954), pp. 79-80, 90-93, 97. Also see his intervention at the meeting of the *Société française de philosophie* cited in n. 1 above. See pp. 59-67. Maritain distinguishes between philosophy considered in terms of its nature (or essence), on the one hand, and in terms of its state or as it is historically realized in the individual philosopher, on the other. He too concedes that considered in the first way philosophy is not Christian but purely rational; but he holds that it may be Christian when considered in the second way. Gilson has accepted Maritain's proposed distinction as the theoretical counterpart of his own, which he had arrived at on historical grounds. See *op. cit.*, p. 72; *L'Esprit de la philosophie médiévale* (2nd ed., Paris: J. Vrin, 1948), pp. 439-40, n. 80.

29. Klubertanz (*op. cit.*, p. 279) remarks about philosophy in its moment of discovery: "It is in this area that I believe there can be a positive influence of the Faith upon philosophy, to render it intrinsically Christian." Naud (p. 91) rejects every attempt to make of philosophy something that is formally and intrinsically Christian. See pp. 92ff. Here Naud is particularly opposed to another aspect of Maritain's solution, that Christian philosophy also implies certain subjective aids and reinforcements for the Christian who philosophizes. It would seem to me that so long as one restricts the expression "Christian Philosophy" to philosophy in its moment of discovery of a particular point, since it is only the moment of discovery that is being so described and, according to the hypothesis, it is one's Christian faith which has proposed that point for philosophical investigation, one may describe this procedure as Christian and as intrinsically Christian. If the point in question had been suggested to our philosopher by some other means, then his discovery of this could be described neither as Christian Philosophy nor as intrinsically Christian.

30. For a helpful survey of a number of recent ways in which Anselm's argumentation in the *Proslogion* has been interpreted see A. C. McGill, "Recent Discussions of Anselm's Argument," in J. Hick—A. C. McGill, *The Many-Faced Argument* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1967), Ch. III. The discussion, of course, continues. See, for instance, G. Schufreider, "Reunderstanding Anselm's Argument," *The New Scholasticism* 57 (1983), pp. 384-409, and the references to other recent interpretations, including Hopkins' critique of the reading offered by Schufreider in his book, *An Introduction to Anselm's Argument* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1978). If, as I have suggested above in n. 6, one may apply the Augustinian and Anselmian admonition first to believe and then to seek to understand on two different levels, that is, as directed to naturally knowable truths or as directed to subsequent efforts to penetrate more deeply into the mysteries of faith, it is in the first sense that I am using it here. As I am interpreting both Augustine and Anselm in the passages under consideration, each would call upon us first to believe in a truth such as God's existence. This would correspond to the moment of discovery in which philosophy might be described as Christian. Then each would also have the thinking believer attempt to understand that which he believes, in this case, by proving God's existence. If, as I read them, each then offers philosophical argumentation for God's existence, each would be practicing philosophy, and not Christian philosophy, in the moment of proof.

31. See *In De Trinitate*, Qu. 2, art. 3, ad 5: "Unde illi, qui utuntur philosophicis documentis in sacra doctrina redigendo in obsequium fidei, non miscent aquam vino, sed aquam convertunt in vinum" (Decker ed., p. 96:18-20). On Gilson's usage of this passage see *Elements of Christian Philosophy*, pp. 289-90, n. 36.

32. See, for example, the different possibilities proposed and examined critically by M. Nédoncelle in his *Is There a Christian Philosophy?* (New York: Hawthorn Books, 1960), Ch. VI ("The Existing Options"), pp. 100-14. Note in particular his discussion of the approach inspired by M. Blondel and developed by H. Duméry.