

Issues Arising In The International Missionary Council Study On The Christian Enterprise In China

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This paper raises questions of method believed to be important for studies of other countries and for denominational studies of sufficient comprehension to involve differing areas and types of missions and churches.

The China Study of the International Missionary Council is working under the provisional title, THE CHRISTIAN ENTERPRISE IN CHINA, 1900-1950. It will probably include a brief section dealing with developments since 1950, in so far as we know them, but separated from the main text in order to emphasize the sharply differing type of information and understanding available to us for these latter years.

What is the aim of this study? Basically, to *understand* more broadly and adequately than any person or group now understands, or would be likely otherwise to understand, the work and life of the Protestant missions and churches in China during recent decades. The impulse to undertake the study arose from factors such as these:

- (1) The catastrophic cessation of missionary effort in and around the year 1950;
- (2) The extraordinary confusion of that period, both in events and in men's minds;
- (3) The moral need to grasp the meaning of the sharp change in the Christian position in China, the home of the second or third largest

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Protestant constituency in the Asian half of the world's people, long a prime area of missionary concern, and now the first major mission area to pass under communist rule;

(4) Perplexity or dissatisfaction over writings individual, controversial, or hortatory in nature, sometimes casual or dominated by a particular moment or phase of the total scene, and varying widely in quality;

(5) An earnest desire to know whether the experience in China can and should be instructive for Christian policy in other situations, including those in which opposition or restriction threatens or may threaten the continuation of missionary effort.

It was natural that in the crisis of 1949-1951 and immediately thereafter, many missionaries and others should direct their thought, speech, and writing, occasionally their study also, to the circumstances of the communist triumph and its contemporary consequences. It was also natural that not a few should attempt to follow with devoted interest the experience and the responses of Christians under the new regime, as they repudiated and were deprived of missionary aid. It was likewise to be expected that persons of these interests or other persons should pour forth admonitions and appeals of many sorts, based upon what they felt to be the failures or the warnings of China. Some such items are admirable in temper and in content, notably Victor Hayward's booklet, *Ears to Hear*, and elements of David Raton's *Christian Missions and the Judgment of God*. One of the best preliminary interpretations, establishing a plea for further study which encouraged the present effort, is Stanley Dixon's article on "The Experience of Christian Missions in China" (*International Review of Missions*, July, 1953).

Those responsible for planning the study now underway felt that concentration upon the events of 1949 and thereafter was likely to be self-defeating, failing to comprehend either Christian or general factors in the dimensions of time, change, and growth. On the other hand, a general narrative of Protestant enterprise since 1807 does not fit present needs. We have the important *History of Christian Missions in China* by Professor Latourette, carried to 1927 and naturally directing its attention, for that span of time, to missions rather than to churches. We now need a study that comes up to date, concerned deeply with the churches developing from and alongside the missions, and aimed at understanding the recent and contemporary situations. 1900 appears to be the most suitable time-


line for the beginning, though the treatment should be analytical and interpretative rather than chronological.

The study is directed toward the Protestant enterprise of missions and churches, these two intertwined and interdependent, in many instances, to such a degree that neither is intelligible without knowledge of the other and of the interrelationships. Some attention will be given to the Roman Catholic undertakings, both factually and in their own interpretations of the entire situation, for possible suggestions, confirmations, comparisons, or contrasts.

Even more important is an adequate understanding of the Chinese setting and the Chinese human environment or material in which the Christian factors worked and lived. This Chinese human and total environment largely defined the problems for the Christian enterprise, and not merely resisted but continually influenced and sometimes seemed to overwhelm the visible missions and churches. It was immense, complex, and changeful. To attempt to take a true account of this setting in all its aspects is bold indeed, covering ranges such as the economic-social-political and the cultural-religious-educational. In the political framework alone, the changes run from the Manchu Empire in the Boxer Period and the late reforms; through Sun Yat-sen, Yuan Shih-kai, and the warlords; on to the new Kuomintang and the Communist Party with all their vicissitudes of the 'twenties', 'thirties', and 'forties'; through the Japanese encroachments and their consequences; and all these with the additional international factors operative throughout.

To seek an understanding of the Chinese environment on the way to a study of the Christian Enterprise raises appalling difficulties in fact and interpretation, in method, in proportions and in space. But study of these Chinese factors is imperative. If one could imagine an inquiry theological and ecclesiastical, or universally human, independent of a particular locus in space, time, society, and culture, it could not deal adequately with the Christian Enterprise in China.

Needless to say, the missionary factors are also complex as to church and nation of their origin, as to their programs and locations in China, and in their changes from 1900 to 1950.



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II CRITICAL AND SELF-CRITICAL APPROACHES

A. Preliminary Note on Certain Common Judgments or Assumptions

1. *There was a widespread and vulgar assumption that the conquest of China by the Communists and the establishment of a communist regime was due to Christian failure, or corresponded to Christian failure.* Perhaps in an ultimate sense this is true. If western, missionary, and pre-communist Chinese factors had all given free course to the Spirit of Christ, there would have been no communism as we know the latter. But that is doctrinal supposition, far from historical actuality. Also, one thinks a once of the historic churches of Russia, of Germany, of Italy, of Poland. Did they prevent the triumph of communist, national-socialist, or fascist regimes? In those countries almost all the people were baptized Christians, and the culture and the leadership were prominently Christian. In China, on the other hand, the total Christian constituency was about one per cent of the population, and the culture and the leadership had never been more than tinged with Christianity. The political and military course of the communist power, and the decline and collapse of the opposing old regime, do not seem to have been significantly affected by, or to have been capable of important influence by, any Christian factor present or realistically imaginable. To assume that a Christianity ten times as extensive in China, and ten times as pure, would have altered the historic course of power, is completely visionary. The whole range, quantitative and qualitative, within which we can think, or even dream, of Christian accomplishment in China, is quite irrelevant to worldly power. Let us quietly dismiss any idea that Christianity could or should be weighed in Chinese scales against communism, a movement of political and military power. Secondary relations of these two disparates, Christianity and Communism, will appear later in our discussion.

2. *The sense of disaster was and is impressive.* Possibly the feeling of crisis and catastrophic event was too easily equated with the judgment of failure. We all know the ignorant assumption that interruption of work by overseas missions meant the disappearance of the Christian faith from China. But let us ask further as to the nature of the failure or disaster. Can it be seen essentially in the expulsion of missionaries by the communist regime? Or does the failure rest in the repudiation or partial repudiation of missionaries by the churches in China? Does the disaster consist more truly in the apparent acceptance of the communist regime by the Chinese Christians, with more readiness or less protest than many Christians

outside China approve of? Or is the sense of failure rather the product of stock-taking in a mood of discouragement at the jolting end of an era, by those now excluded from daily contact with their Chinese brethren, who see the mass of the lump and not the life in the leaven? This stock-taking tallies the weaknesses long present and frequently discussed, no longer balanced by the “feel” of spiritual life in the ongoing enterprise.

3. *But what do we mean when we speak of failure?* What is failure in the Christian undertaking? In one sense it must all be failure when sinful men are set before the will and purpose of God in Christ. Failure implies a standard of success, a dubious concept for the work of the Church in the world. And yet we all feel a real difference between growing churches and disintegrating churches, between those throbbing with life and power and those which show none. Our terms of failure are success simply mean that some churches are relatively satisfactory and others are relatively unsatisfactory, according to our poor lights. But satisfactory to whom, and relative to what? Is there a known and agreed and realizable standard of what a church should be in this actual world; and, in particular, of what a missionary enterprise and a recently developed church in a missionary situation should be? Perhaps we shall be driven toward a working statement of that sort, in order to make clear the implications of judgment or opinion necessarily involved in the present study.

B. Criticisms Raising Important Issues.

This is the heart of our subject. Although the criticisms cited are made, some of them, from the outside and by hostile opinion, they are generally accepted in some degree by thoughtful Christian opinion, that of missionaries in particular. Often stated in extreme forms, whether by communists or by other opponents, and accompanied by falsehood or distortion in detail, they point to serious weaknesses or situations that are reckoned as weaknesses. Moreover, as you will readily notice, certain of the criticisms arise from within, and are motivated by high Christian purpose.

1. *The churches lacked responsible independence.* Recognizing important exceptions of a “sect” character, seriously weak in other respects, the churches were not, in fact or in feeling, adequately self-reliant vis-a-vis Chinese society and vis-a-vis the missions. In some measure this lack is attributed to paternalism and guardianship of missions, with or without invidious sense of superiority on their part. The subject is not simple. The situation varied greatly from case to case. If Christian interests accept completely the old goal of self-government, self-support, and self-propagation, that would seem to carry the automatic elimination of any

mission relationship, however marginal and supplementary in nature. Is it right and consistent, then, to desire to continue any form of mission aid or cooperation, and at the same time condemn church and mission for failure to achieve complete independence in all its life and work? Is it right and possible to seek and to demonstrate to all a true self-reliance and self-determination, while providing the opportunity for some assistance from overseas in such form as not to weaken the material and the spiritual reality of self-reliance? It seems to be clear that missionaries did not adequately realize the unhappy position of their Chinese colleagues who felt the continual strain of needing the financial and other aid of the missions, in order to face their Christian tasks, and, at the same time, of resenting their dependence upon foreign aid ultimately resting upon forces outside Chinese society. When the attacks upon the missionary factor became too damaging to the churches, character destroying in their nature and overpowering in their volume, it was usually necessary for Chinese leaders to accept the inevitable shift to the advantages and the perils of Chinese society alone. Often they found a great relief in doing so, deliverance not only from some of the terrifying pressures of the moment but also from one major portion of the strain of the past. Any fair consideration of the subject must, of course, take account of the high degree of responsible self-direction existing in some mission-related churches before 1950, and of the considerably satisfactory forms of cooperation or transition worked out in others before 1950, in some cases long before 1950. But the ultimate problem remains as to whether partnership of missions can be combined with true spiritual independence for a comparatively young and small church in an immense ocean of non-Christian society.

2. *The missions and the churches lacked relation to Chinese culture.* They were too western in attitudes, practices, and forms. Negatively, this resulted in the charge of cultural imperialism and the lack of Christian morale through inability to deny or refute the charge. Positively, the churches and missions failed adequately to express themselves in Chinese ways, to appeal to Chinese sentiment, to enable their constituencies to feel both Christian and at home in Chinese culture. A full investigation and discussion would bring out much *pro* and *con*, but in the end would probably conclude that much more effort should have been made, and earlier, on the cultural line. The whole range of language, publication, music, art, architecture, and social customs is here involved. In particular, missionaries in considerable numbers were insufficiently concerned with the Chinese language and Chinese ways of living, keeping unconsciously too great a barrier to intimate personal and spiritual relations with their Chinese constituency, and requiring from Chinese friends too much westernization

in language and customs as the price of what the missionary could give. Once again, the subject is not an easy one. Especially in the cities, those Chinese who were readily accessible to the missionary or who tended to draw near to him, were often seeking English and modernization, and too casually confused them with Christianity.

The old Chinese culture was rapidly changing, even disintegrating, much more from secular forces than from Christian contacts. The problem can hardly be stated as relating Christianity to Chinese culture, but rather is the compound problem of relating Christianity to differing or transitional cultures, according to region, date, and social group in question. Should the churches and missions try to relate themselves to the older Confucian tradition; to a modernized form of the same -- sometimes hard to locate outside the mind of a particular critic; to the quasi-democratic nationalism of Sun Yat-sen and *The Three People's Principles* -- which were Chinese orthodoxy for a generation; to the critical scientism and humanism of the influential school of Hu Shih; to a popular nationalistic Marxism of idealistic or reformist type; or to revolutionary communism? Protagonists of every one of these cultural trends has denounced the Christian enterprise for slow and inadequate adjustment to it. Moreover, each trend required a different sort of adjustment on the several levels of intellectual leadership, of tolerably well-educated followers, of schoolboys, of the barely literate but awakening groups, and of the illiterate, lagging farmers of the interior, which last were by far the most numerous. The farm folk were still influenced, according to time and region, by the old amalgam of animism with Buddhism and Taoism in rural superstition. There were also, especially in certain regions, important bodies of Buddhists and of Moslems. Sensitiveness and effort in the cultural area were indeed demanded, but much more than their own stupidity and indifference blocked the road to significant accomplishment for missionaries and for Chinese Christians alike. What could and should be done in cultural adaptation within the complex Chinese situation or any other at all comparable?

3. *The Christian Enterprise was at fault in its relation to the political order.* Although the "unequal treaties" had been completely abolished by agreement in 1943, and had been disintegrating in desuetude for decades before that, with no significant bearing upon Christian interests as such since 1920 or thereabouts, the total history of the introduction of Christianity in the nineteenth century and the protection of foreign rights and interests in China made the Christian Enterprise vulnerable to the charge of associating with imperialism, serving imperialism, and deriving support from imperialism. In the period of Japanese aggression.

Christians and other Chinese interests had not only been more tolerant of British and American rights and interests, but had relied upon them as a means of protection and counterweight against the active enemy. But the ideologies of Sun Yat-sen, Chiang Kai-shek, and the communists all combined in their appeal to national feeling against the memory of long weakness in the face of foreign activity in China. To what extent could and should missionaries have earlier dissociated themselves and Christianity from any form of protection by outside authority? And what results might have flowed from earlier, more general, and more consistent efforts in that direction?

Missions and Christian interests generally are criticized for not supporting, with prayers, cultivation of loyal obedience and good citizenship, the government in power; also, for not actively supporting demands for reform by or in that government; and, by others, for not anticipating and supporting moves toward needed revolution, which, if successful, demands to be maintained against all pleas for radical change. It would not be simple to find the right course in *one* such situation. To do it for the Manchu regime in varying phases, for the confusion of civil war and rival regimes from 1911-1926, for the new Kuomintang and for the communists, to say nothing of the puppets of the Japanese, was beyond human wisdom. The great majority of missionaries might have their opinions about the regime of the moment, but considered that their business was something very different from politics; and many of them had religious or practical convictions that they ought, as Christian workers or as alien missionaries, to have nothing to do with public affairs. Alert Chinese attacked any foreign activity contrary to their own particular political bent, and especially that of missionaries as unwarranted interference by persons who had no business in such matters. Those Chinese who wanted Christian support of any sort were contemptuous of Christian otherworldliness and indifference to the state. Most of the Christian Chinese, in company with most of their fellow-countrymen, were passive and suspicious of government and officials. Another charge against Christianity was that of failing to speak with prophetic voice against the evils of government and on behalf of revolutionary change which promised to sweep them out.

The major case in point for several of these varied criticisms was the attitude of Christian interests toward the Kuomintang in its rise to power from 1923-1928, strongly assisted in the earlier years of that period by Russian Communist elements; then during its years of power and its years of decline and disaster. Mission interests, with some lag and difficulty, followed the lead of a growing number of Chinese Christians to support the Kuomintang in the name of nationalism and reform,

despite a period of confusion caused by the communist tactics. In many provinces, the period 1928-1937 was the best in modern China, and Christian interests generally approved the relatively better order and gains in education despite the secular trends of the latter. For the most part, the communists appeared as harsh disturbers and obstacles to national progress, though the Kuomintang failed to live up to its promises and the general hopes. The long, varying, exhausting struggle against the Japanese placed Chiang and his Party in the place of patriotic defenders against cruel and greedy foes. Yet the deterioration was pervasive and there were strong undercurrents of discontent, by no means all of them associated with the craftily waxing communists. Christians tended to prefer the Kuomintang government to the harshness of the communists and their known relations with Russia, and yet to be increasingly dissatisfied with it for corruption and for ineffectiveness. The requirements of national interest and national feeling, even as recognized by Stalin and Molotov as late as the treaty of August, 1945, looked to support of Chiang against the Japanese and for national unity. Can those who blame Christians for tardy recognition of communist trends determine on just what grounds and at just what moment and with what line of action Christian interests should have withdrawn allegiance to the National Government and have transferred either active support or passive adjustment to the advancing communist power? On the other hand, could and should the Christians have been more "prophetic" in demanding and assisting radical reform within the Kuomintang? Some efforts were made in that direction, but were always subject to the suspicion that they were a form of political attack, designed to hamper the Government and to assist the communists. Indeed, public criticism of the Government was generally difficult, and private criticism was psychologically almost impossible in view of the attitude taken by the chief men. Rather, Protestants were chided for failing to enter into active political opposition to communism as did Archbishop Yu-pin and the prominent Roman Catholic dallies.

Greater alertness to need for fundamental change in the social and political order; that can be urged upon the Christian Enterprise; But there still is today, with all the advantages of hind sight, no easy recipe to reconcile the needs of (a) proper devotion to primary Christian vocations and freedom from political involvements; (b) due obedience, respect, and support for government as the organized community which maintains order, schools, and other indispensable services; (c) the prophetic functions of reforming criticism. To the extent that any of these three needs is significantly met in time of public crisis, the other needs are likely to be

neglected or worsened and with sharp, perhaps paralyzing differences in conscientious judgment among responsible Christians.

4. *The Christian Enterprise lacked adequate theological concern and understanding.* It did not direct a sufficiently large part of its personnel and effort to the enlargement and nurture of the Church. The schools, medical work, and other services had their general and their Christian uses, but they absorbed too large a part of the national and missionary workers and of total strength. In understandable response to great needs, to public demand and willingness to cooperate in payment of fees, and to the desires of staffs and Christian constituency, these services tended to expand beyond the power of the leaders to maintain in and through them an effective Christian witness proportionate to the total effort made. Important elements of the missionary body and of the Chinese Christian workers tended to be social-minded rather than religious-minded, ethically concerned rather than theologically and devotionally concerned. Such tendencies may be interpreted as outworking's of the felt needs of a crowded and ill-provided society, and also of the pervasive Confucian tradition with its emphasis on human relations and its indifference toward full religion.

This great complex of criticisms involves the religious background of missionaries, and their motivation and objectives in going to China. It also involves the Chinese scene and influences the powerful playing in and through the Chinese Christian constituency. There seems to be widespread support within missionary circles for this type of judgment upon the Christian Enterprise. It must be weighed, however, against the services rendered in witness and in Christian development by the schools and hospitals, even their importance for direct evangelism in not a few instances. Extreme concentration upon evangelistic and church effort in the narrower sense would lend weight to the differing criticism of otherworldliness and lack of concern for basic human needs. Is the true judgment this, that the faults of institutionalism all too frequently appearing in schools and hospitals should have been earlier and more resolutely tackled by turning over to private Christian hands or to government such schools and hospitals as could not be adequately staffed and conducted with clear and effective Christian witness. Further, that the positive effort should have been made in those missions and related churches which tended to be weak in their working emphasis upon the church as the ongoing community of faith, to develop and assign a larger part of their best personnel to that service; and that sounder and more thorough theological teaching should have been undertaken and persistently developed throughout the working staff of the Christian Enterprise?

5. *Christianity was presented as a remedy for the nation's ills, but accomplished nothing substantial; while the communists effectively tackled them.* For many years it had been true that some of the more alert and more sensitive of Chinese youth were keenly concerned over the backwardness, ignorance, and poverty of China; over its selfish men of wealth and power. Some missionaries and Chinese pastors and teachers pointed to the advanced development of "Christian" nations, and also to the schools, hospitals, and all means of betterment evidenced in Christian activities in China. Christianity was stated in terms of moral challenge, the means of rooting out from individual lives the greed, self-indulgence, and indifference to the needs of others so conspicuous among those prominent in Chinese society. This view never prevailed over the essential Christian message. The slogan of the cooperative evangelistic movement was "China for Christ!" -- not "Christ for China!" But frequently the statement of the Christian apologetic had something of the utilitarian in it, something for individual and national welfare, which tended to confuse and to obscure the true message. Furthermore, those who took seriously the utilitarian hope might easily be disillusioned when individual and general poverty continued, when the nation persistently stumbled in weakness and the government in corruption -- headed by persons among whom advertised Christians were prominent. The number of Christian schools and hospitals did not increase, while those not Christian did increase. The number of notable communities of Christian love and character, even of notable individuals widely known for their transformed lives, did not seem to substantiate the hopes held out or seized upon.

On the other hand, the communists claimed to have the root-and-branch method of stamping out all public evil and all power to exploit; to have the record of bringing Russia from rural backwardness and poverty to leadership of the world in a single generation; and to have the appeal and the effective instruction and discipline to draw the youth into revolutionary fellowship of devotion to the common good. Moreover, the communists did this without religion, and even asserted that it was possible to achieve human well being through the proper application of science only if man renounced religion. The communist claims, their vast organization, their massive propaganda to which no counter-question could be asked, their immense resources drastically employed, their demonstration of disciplined devotion for meager material reward of the common soldier and political worker, -- all these made Christianity seem a feeble flicker before the great task of saving the people. Communists and their supporters made the comparisons on their own ground, and Christians fell into a mood of helpless failure -- unless they had a clear enough grasp of their faith to

know the true ground of Christianity, which many lacked, or did not have with sufficient definiteness and vigor to state convincingly to others.

6. *The Christian Enterprise was deficient in cooperation and in unity.*

It is not necessary to labor for the readers of this paper the basic fact that the tiny Christian Enterprise in China was divided into more than a hundred church bodies or mission-church organizations, many of which had no spirit or experience of cooperation, and most of which had only a vague and rudimentary sense of unity in Christ poorly expressed in certain similarities of church practice. The few unions and the considerable undertakings of cooperation among some three-fifths of the Protestants were not always greatly meaningful on the local level, though they carried high values in themselves and meant much to the leadership in them. It is grimly suggestive that both the Japanese Army and the communists have been dissatisfied with the scattered frames of the churches, and have required, for their own purposes, some attempts at coordination of policies and consolidation of leadership.

On the other hand, we cannot assume with any realism that if cooperation and unity had been much more adequately developed before 1950, all the problems of the churches would have been solved. Possibly the communists would have been harder upon a unified church, as they seem sometimes to have been upon the Roman Catholics. Possibly the communists could, at some stages, have dominated or manipulated a unified church more easily than the heterogeneous miscellany which they have tried to marshall through the Three-Self Reform Committee. We may rightly ask, did the unions actually achieved before 1950 prove to be a strong witness for the truth and the sound advantages of union? Did the National Christian Council and other forms of cooperation demonstrate clearly the merits of substantial and extensive cooperation? Does the whole China experience teach any convincing lesson in regard to cooperation and unity?

III. SOME MATTERS OF METHOD

A. *Does the China experience speak to us, or do we speak to the China experience?* It is often assumed that in some unmistakable, factual, objective manner truth and instruction spring from the experience of these fateful years for the Christian Enterprise in China. Yet the experience says such different things to different people that we must be cautious about this assumption. Moreover, “the obvious lessons” of “the missionary debacle” and the communist triumph sometimes bear photographic resemblance to

the views of the writer as habitually stated long before 1950. Can we try a few test queries to see whether in the facts of experience our common critical judgments are clearly supported?

1. Does a mission-church emphasizing the doctrine of the Church and its centrality, like the Episcopalian or the Lutheran, reap tangible fruits therefrom, visible in comparison with other churches and missions?

2. Can it be determined in observation of experience whether insistence on a high standard of training for the ministry has better results than more flexibility in standards and a more numerous ministry?

3. Can one discover factually whether a church-mission characterized by fundamentalist theology achieved better results than a comparable church-mission known for liberal theology?

4. Does a mission-church devoting a high fraction of its ablest personnel to new evangelism accomplish more over a period of years than a mission-church with diversified witness and program?

5. If association with imperialism had deleterious effects, is it possible to show that Scandinavian missions flourished beyond the measure of others comparable in size? Did the early action of American Board missionaries in renouncing extraterritoriality have observable results?

6. Since, up to about 1927, anti-imperialist feeling was directed most significantly against the British, were British missions actually at a disadvantage in comparison with those from the United States?

7. Did Protestant missionaries, who did not have standing as officials, fare much better than Roman Catholic missionaries, who for years had such status?

8. Did missionaries living on a lower scale, and with smaller funds for institutional and other work, have better or greater results from their service?

9. Did subsidies or lack of subsidies have any calculable relation to the growth of the churches?

B. *Is there any way to measure that which cannot be measured, the extension of the Gospel in the hearts and lives of men?* In order to provoke comment and critical suggestions, let us set down a number of criteria or indicators of Christian accomplishment in a missionary situation: (These might be used to compare across church or national lines).

1. Growth in church membership, both in net additions and in ratio to an earlier base. Query, is the total population in the field of this church a relevant factor? Also, does the ratio of missionaries to membership and to total population have relevance, and if so, what?
2. The number of national Christian workers: (a) ordained men well trained; (b) ordained men not well trained; (c) other evangelistic and church workers; (d) teachers; (e) health social workers. Also, the church's program of recruiting and training workers.
3. The quality of the Christian community, including the quality of individual transformations.
4. Outstanding leadership.
5. Indigenization, as shown by significant expression in Chinese form, whether original or adapted: (a) theological thought; (b) devotional material and practices; (c) religious education; (d) liturgy and forms of worship; (e) architecture; (f) painting; (g) literature; (h) music.
6. Responsible independence in terms of without aid from self-reliance, with or without aid from missions. This may be seen in financial support in organized self-direction and self-discipline, and in evangelistic outreach. Where aid from missions is received, the ratio of effort and accomplishment by nationals to the mission contribution in personnel and funds is certainly significant.
7. Concern for the general community and service to it. Schools, hospitals, literacy campaigns, sanitation, home and family life co-operatives, and economic betterment, neighborhood, cooperation democratic procedure, wise and honest use of resources, recreation.

C. Can one compare church-missions in a test of objectives and theologies and policies and effectiveness, as the Episcopalian with the Baptist, European missions with British and with American, the Methodist or Presbyterian with the China Inland Mission or the Christian and Missionary Alliance? We must point out the variables other than the element in the forefront of inquiry, and ask whether any factual or dependable result is possible. Here is a check-list of variables, thinking of the China situation:

1. Population in the area occupied.
2. Other churches in the same area, competitive or cooperative.
3. Strength of non-Christian faiths and practices.

4. Degree of anti-Christian prejudice.
5. Organized restriction or hostility.
6. Disturbance by war, revolution, inflation, or natural disaster.
7. Economic and cultural levels.
8. Ratio of urban to rural situations.
9. Rate of literacy in population.
10. Provision of governmental or other non-Christian schools.
11. Membership.
12. Number of ordained missionaries, their training and experience.
Same for other missionaries.
13. Theological tradition and outlook.
14. Number of ordained national workers and their training. Same for other workers.
15. Provision of church buildings and other significant property and equipment.
16. Provision of funds, by local contribution and by mission.
17. Number, type, size, and effectiveness of schools maintained.
18. Similarly for hospitals and other institutions.
19. Program for recruiting and training workers.
20. Share in literature and other cooperative work.
21. Degree and quality of evangelism outside church areas.
22. Degree and quality of nurture, and development of witness through Christian community.
23. Standards of instruction before and after baptism.
24. Age and continuity of the work and policy of the mission and church.
25. Degree and age of responsibility of the Chinese church.

In view of so many variables, disregarding for the moment many others such as density of population, geographic location, and distance from centers of modernization, can a real comparison be made on the basis of one factor? Of several factors?

D. *Other far-ranging questions*; Can we learn anything significant from the general and the Christian experience with communist factors in South and Central China from 1923-1927 and in pockets thereafter, in Kiangsi Province and adjacent areas from 1928-1934, in Shensi and adjacent areas from 1935-1945, in Sinkiang and Mongolian borderlands at any time?

Just how can the study and/or comparisons or interpretations of the Roman Catholic experience be most fruitful?

In judging the Protestant Enterprise in China, what comparisons should be made with other fields? The number of missionaries per million of population; per 10,000 Protestant Christians? The development of the national ministry in numbers and in training? Are the most genuine comparisons those with other fields of great mass, of high culture and great pride of culture, of weak non-Christian religions, of foreign interference but not colonial government? Where are such fields? In any case, suggestions for useful comparisons are in order.

Finally, recognizing the intangible nature of spiritual growth, the hidden complexities as well as the visible multiplicity of the Christian undertaking, and the elaborate variety of the human material and environment in China, can we know what we are talking about, can we judge justly and speak truth? The differences of individual knowledge, interpretation, and inference are boundless. They fill great categories of opinion or judgment, such as those of Chinese Christians, of missionaries, of the general Chinese public, of communists and their echoes, from all of which we may learn something, at least as to the nature and locus of the issues. It would seem that a composite of interpretation and judgment, with emphasis on the concerned Christian and missionary understanding, facing as thoroughly and adequately as possible the ascertainable facts and learning humbly from them, is the most promising effort of the human mind upon this problem. We can be certain that real knowledge of the whole and right judgment of any part belongs to God alone.

