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The German Army at a Crossroads of Modernization

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THE GERMAN ARMY AT A CROSSROADS OF MODERNIZATION

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree

MASTER OF ARTS

in

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Abstract

This thesis examines the German civil-military relationship and the challenges the country is facing amidst modernizing reforms to the German armed forces. Over the last quarter of a century, new international security threats have manifested and continue to transform requiring Germany to adapt its military and defense policies in order to effectively protect itself and serve as a capable ally to other member states of international organizations such as NATO and the EU. The adaptations and reforms required of Germany have led to concern that the cornerstone civil-military relationship concepts are at risk. In this thesis I identify the major changes to the armed forces and security policy, evaluate their threat to the civil-military relations in Germany and explore Germany's role in current global security challenges.

Chapter One

Introduction

The modernization of the German *Bundeswehr* in recent years has been the subject of fierce debates both within Germany and in the international arena. The problems and challenges have arisen from international demands, as well as domestic reforms, which continue to place demands on the German army in a variety of areas, such as public support, questions about the role of the German army in international affairs and the future reform of a modernized German military establishment.

Germany is one of the richest countries in the world and is seen therefore as both a regional and global power. When thinking about the role that Germany currently plays in global politics it can be hard to remember that just seventy years ago, the end of World War II left the country in ruins and divided into two antagonistic states. As far as development is concerned, the economic and political growth Germany (namely West Germany) achieved in the decades immediately following the war is noteworthy. Within twenty years, West Germany re-established its democratic government and ensured economic stability. What sets Germany apart from the rest of the global powers is its defense policy, structure of the military and the unique constitutionally grounded relationship it has with the German people. In the last century, the world has gone through a number of geopolitical transformations, especially when it comes to geopolitics. We are now in an age of globalization and national borders are not as solid as before. The dissolution of national borders and the depth of transnational alliances have set the stage for a competitive and potentially unstable geopolitical future.

In Germany's case, a global economic and political power has not yet attained the role of a military power in the world order. After the Cold War a combination of the

German government's interest in taking on a more active role in global defense and a call from Germany's allies, such as the United States and other NATO member states, for Germany to take on a larger role in the realm of global defense has catalyzed a number of changes within Germany's defense policy and the structuring of its military, the *Bundeswehr*. The restructuring and transformation is aimed at modernizing the *Bundeswehr* in order to keep up with the rest of the global powers and to ensure that Germany can retain at least an economic hegemonic role.

When the *Bundeswehr* was established in 1955, the concept of *Innere Führung* was enacted as an attempt to connect the *Bundeswehr* with the German people and eradicate any gaps between the military and civil society. *Innere Führung* translates roughly to leadership and civic education and utilizes the idea of the citizen in uniform to form a relationship between the military and German society. The concept was largely successful due to the structuring of the *Bundeswehr* as conscription military, which allowed for *Bundeswehr* personnel to be citizens in uniform rather than a force of professional soldiers. In 2011, as a result of the transformation process the *Bundeswehr* was restructured to be volunteer-only with the intent of creating a professionalized military, which poses a potential risk to the established civil-military relationship. Since the end of World War II, the German people have maintained a pacifist perspective on international intervention by the *Bundeswehr*. They have generally approved of humanitarian and peacekeeping missions mandated by the United Nations, but combat missions such as occurred in Afghanistan, are deeply frowned upon. Germany is in a tricky spot between adhering to international pressures to transform and modernize their

military, and maintaining the close relationship between the *Bundeswehr* and the German people.

Military and defense reform are complicated, vast and take years to enact. Since 2003, global events have occurred that I hypothesize, may change German opinion of the *Bundeswehr* and their international involvement, setting the stage for more support. Today, the world is threatened by attacks from terrorist groups and now there is the devastating and overwhelming migrant crisis throughout the world, many of who are seeking refuge and asylum within Germany. The reforms set forth for the *Bundeswehr* and Germany's defense policy are more important now than ever.

Thesis

In the following chapters I attempt to answer a number of questions, including: *What does it mean to modernize a military? How far is the German government willing to go? How far are the German people willing to be pushed? How do the current global crises affect the German public's opinions on the Bundeswehr's increased international involvement?* To answer these questions, I will provide a history of the *Bundeswehr* since 1955, including an examination of the concepts of *Innere Führung* and Citizen in Uniform, and their crucial role in both the establishment of the *Bundeswehr* and in the relationship between the military and the German people. Military experts in the Adenauer government developed the concept of "inner guidance" in 1950. After the founding of the two German states, Adenauer decided that Germany needed to build an army, but was well aware of the pacifist tendencies among West Germans so soon after the disastrous years of World War II. After assuring the support of the American occupation authorities, the experts met at a monastery between Cologne and Bonn and

worked out the details of how to launch the army.¹ The concept of "inner guidance" refers to the consciousness of the German soldier as a citizen in uniform, in other words a democratic commitment to the new republic, rather than a closed cadre of soldiers, who in the past took an oath to the Kaiser, or most recently, to Hitler.²

I will then move on to address what it means for Germany to modernize its military, summarize the reforms from the White Paper 2006 on German Security Policy and the future of the *Bundeswehr*, and examine public reception to those reforms. Lastly, I will discuss the current global events, and the role that Germany and the *Bundeswehr* play.

Germany's recent history has played a significant role in the *Bundeswehr's* relationship with greater civil society, and in my opinion the relationship played a crucial role in the rebuilding of the country, its reunification and its transnational relationships since World War II. That said, the policy decisions Germany makes and the sacrifices that it is willing to make, whether it is failing to meet some of the international demands, or increasing the gap between the *Bundeswehr* and the German people will have an impact on Germany's relationship internally and internationally and could have serious implications in the future for Germany's regional and global hegemony.

Research Significance

The broader impact and significance of my research has everything to do with a transitional geopolitical climate. The implications that can be drawn by the international community calling upon Germany to increase its defense spending and modernize its military in order to actively engage in international conflicts, include but are not limited to, the potential for a change in the world order and the role that Germany will take, or

not take as a global power. Considering Germany's modern history, the need for a connection between the *Bundeswehr* and the German people runs deep and is seen as a necessity. It can be argued that the close civil-military relationship, which differs from that which defines other powers, such as the United States, has helped to contribute to the rebuilding of German democracy and its stabilization not just as a country, but also as a regional and global player. Germany has the power to decide the role that it wants to take in the future, but it will be a balancing act between international demands and maintaining positive relations with its multigenerational pacifist public. The actions and sacrifices that Germany chooses to make in the coming years to modernize and transform the *Bundeswehr* will have an influence on domestic, European and world politics and relations.

Chapter Two

History of the *Bundeswehr*

Establishment of the *Bundeswehr*

At the end of World War II, the allied forces consisting of the United States, Great Britain, France and the Soviet Union, made the decision to completely demilitarize Germany and divide it into two. West Germany would operate under the supervision of the Western Alliance and East Germany under that of the Soviet Union. By default, East and West Germany aligned with their supervising powers, creating an apparent cultural and political division between the countries.

With the Cold War brewing, the two Germanys served as a strategic buffer zone between east and west. The Western Alliance saw the opportunity to rearm West Germany in order to create back-up defense forces against the Soviet Union. The idea of rearmament was not popular in West Germany, but Chancellor Konrad Adenauer recognized the rebuilding of the German army as a point of negotiation for the country with the Western Alliance. Adenauer engaged in negotiations with the supervisory powers in order to achieve sovereignty in exchange for the development of German armed forces. In addition to creating a more robust defense force for the Western Alliance, a major goal was to create a common European Defense force, although the French National Assembly vetoed this idea.

On February 26, 1954 the West German *Bundestag* contemplated the concept of reinstating the armed forces. To do so, the German Basic Law would have to be amended, the act for amendment passed 334 to 144.³ As a result, three amendments, quite controversial at the time were made to the Basic Law:

The scope of exclusive legislative jurisdiction of the Federation were extended to include defence including compulsory military service of men who have completed their 18th year of age and protection of the civilian population (Article 73);

The constitutional amendment procedure was facilitated in particular with respect to international treaties serving the defence of the Federal Republic (Art. 79 para. 1 sentence 2)

Treaties on the EDC were declared compatible with the Basic Law (Art. 142a) (Uhde 2013).

President Theodor Heuss signed the law in to effect on March 26, 1954. Just a few months later at the Nine Power Conference in London from September 28 – October 3, 1954 Germany was invited to “accede to the Brussels Pact and to NATO”.⁴

The Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) joined NATO and the Western European Union in May 1955. Six months after joining NATO and the WEU, on November 12, 1955 the new German armed forces came into being (they would not officially be called the *Bundeswehr* until the passing of the Legal Status of Military Personnel Act of April 1956) and on November 21, 1955 the first 101 volunteers were appointed.⁵ The proposed “plan was to place under NATO command 12 Army divisions within three years and, one year later, 22 air wings as well as naval forces equipped with 172 ships and boats”.⁶ The total allotment of troops was set at 500,000, with an additional 105,000 troops for national territorial purposes.⁷

Although the re-establishment of the German armed forces was at the request of its allies, the Federal Republic made sure to create the *Bundeswehr* founded on principles that reflected the country and ensured integration into greater German society. In order to do this, a distance had to be created between the new military and those of the past, namely the Wehrmacht of the NAZI era. The core concept on which the *Bundeswehr* was built is *Innere Führung*, which establishes the role and obligations of the soldier while

providing for their rights as citizens (directly tied to the concept of the citizen in uniform). Crucial to *Innere Führung*'s role in the *Bundeswehr* is that, "conscience was to take precedence over obedience where orders contravene the law and diminish human dignity".⁸ This both allowed and encouraged German soldiers to operate on a basis of morality and ethics. The concept of *Innere Führung* and the citizen in uniform created a checks-and-balances system for the armed forces and served as a mechanism to prevent the military from operating independently from the rest of the country by ensuring its integration into German society.

Major concerns surrounding rearmament centered on the involvement of former Wehrmacht personnel in the establishment of the new military forces. Many Germans wanted a clean separation from the World War II era and that included the employment of individuals who had served under the regime. In an attempt to curb these concerns, Adenauer called for the creation of a selection board for anyone applying to be a colonel or higher, as a way to screen personnel on an individual basis on their involvement in the atrocities during the NAZI period. Although some remained unsettled, the former officers and higher ranked personnel from the Wehrmacht were necessary for structure and training of the newly established forces.

With the Second Federal Border Guard Act of May 1956, the Federal Minister of Defense was given the authority to convert border guard units into the *Bundeswehr*. Roughly 58% (9,500) of the border guards opted to become soldiers in July 1956.⁹ Despite conscription and the conversion of the border guards, *Bundeswehr* growth was slow. It did not reach 400,000 troops until 1963 and the last of the twelve proposed army

divisions was not placed under NATO control until 1965; the process took significantly longer than the projected three years.¹⁰

The *Bundeswehr* served as a defensive ally for fellow NATO members, serving under the organization's strategy of "massive retaliation". Despite Germany's renouncement of "nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, the *Bundeswehr* was equipped with carrier systems for nuclear warheads at the insistence of its NATO allies".¹¹ Eventually NATO shifted their strategy to one of "Détente" or flexible response. Throughout NATO defense strategy developments such as the hair directive of 1971 and the NATO double-track decision of 1979, the German forces remained reliable allies, despite unease and uncertainty amongst the troops.¹² At the end of the day, integration of the conscript defense forces into German society was considered successful.

The *Bundeswehr* in a Unified Germany

By 1989 and the fall of the Eastern Bloc, the *Bundeswehr* finally reached 500,000 personnel. On October 3, 1990 the Germanys reunited after a period of forty-five years of division. Upon reunification, 90,000 military and 47,000 civilian personnel from the East German National Volksarmee (NVA) joined the 500,000 military and 170,000 civilian *Bundeswehr* personnel.¹³ Officially, the NVA disbanded just one day earlier on October 2, 2015, but the *Bundeswehr* absorbed the people, weapons and supplies. Post-reunification, global security threats shifted and the combination of reunification and the increase in military personnel put Germany in a place which no longer allowed them to evade international military involvement.¹⁴ It became necessary for the *Bundeswehr* to undergo reforms, the most principal change being shifting from a defense army to, "a

mobile and flexible military force for operations, while retaining its capacity for national defense”.¹⁵

The *Bundeswehr* continued to go through processes of transformation and restructuring, often with specific end goals in mind. In the early 1990s, troops were divided into Crisis Response Forces (CRF) and Main Defense Forces (MDF), but with lack of funding, *Bundeswehr* personnel decreased from 370,000 to 340,000.¹⁶ While this period of transformation was necessary, the ever-changing global security threats and the *Bundeswehr's* involvement in the Balkans demonstrated to both Germany and its allies that further reorganization and reforms were necessary.

Germany's new role in global defense resulted in involvement in international conflicts in Somalia, Cambodia and Afghanistan, but the German public remained reluctant to support these operations. In 1994, a pivotal legal decision by the German Constitutional Court quieted complaints by two of the country's parliamentary groups, that the *Bundeswehr's* involvement in these international conflicts was unconstitutional. The court cited Article 24 of the German Basic Law stating that the *Bundeswehr*, “may enter into a system of mutual collective security with a view to maintaining peace” and ultimately ruling that, “it is permissible for *Bundeswehr* military personnel to take part without limitation in international peace missions beyond NATO territory provided that such missions are given a UN mandate”.¹⁷ In order for the *Bundeswehr* to take part combat operations, each case must be reviewed and approved by the *Bundestag*, the German parliament (this is where the term parliamentary army comes into play).

Innere Führung

The driving forces for decisions made by states is a combination of maintaining international relationships aimed at acquiring power, security and wealth and their doctrine. According to NATO, doctrine is the “fundamental principles by which military forces guide their actions in support of objectives”.¹⁸ While NATO’s definition is directed at a state’s military, it can be applied to the decisions of the state on a larger scale. It is essentially the values by which the state operates in order to achieve a particular goal. Doctrine connects theory and implementation, and works hand-in-hand with the state’s ideology.¹⁹

The relationship between doctrine and ideology is tied together by the culture of the nation and the region. While culture is a subjective term and the task of constructing a definition has historically been no small feat,²⁰ in the context of this thesis, the culture, and consequently ideology and doctrine held in Germany, in regards to international involvement and policy-making, have been dictated by the nation’s history, past decisions and relations. The constructs and policy developments are a reflection of the culture, ideology and doctrine that emerged in response to the events, which transpired during the Weimar Republic and more devastatingly, the Third Reich.

Most theory on civil-military relations focuses on the relationship between the military and the government, and strives to answer, “how civil-military relations sustain and protect democratic values”.²¹ Due to the *Bundeswehr*’s status as a parliamentary military, aspects of the mainstream civil-military relations theories can be applied to the German armed forces, but in Germany these relations are not just between the military and the government, but with German society as a whole.

Samuel P. Huntington claims that civil-military relations are, “the principle institutional component of military security policy”.²² These relations provide a necessary “balance between social values and military function to effectively respond to societal imperatives (social forces and ideologies) on one hand and functional imperatives (security threats) on the other.”²³ For the German *Bundeswehr*, this balance is carried out through *Innere Führung*, which rests at the core of the *Bundeswehr* and dictates the civil-military relationship embedded into German society.²⁴ There is no English translation of *Innere Führung* that truly encapsulates the essence of the phrase, although the widely accepted translation is to leadership and civic education. Per the Federal Defense Ministry, it is best explained as the military being tightly bound with society and its values. The idea is that by minimizing the gap between greater society and military institutions, a mutual understanding, greater adaptability and overall effective security measures will be successfully realized.²⁵

Innere Führung allows for a distinct differentiation between old and new, and serves as a mechanism that is intended to prevent the military from operating independently from the state and greater German society. The differentiation clearly has to do with the word "Führer," which carries such heavy baggage from the Nazi period. Inner guidance has to do with individual conscience, as opposed to outward blind obedience to a leader. The term amounts to a moral force, not of professional soldiers, but of citizens in uniform who are entitled to the same rights and moral obligations as non-military personnel. One of the main goals of *Innere Führung* is to integrate the military into society and create a harmonious relationship between the two. As a method of integration, leadership under *Innere Führung* “means that in mission accomplishment, the

way commanders lead must take account of the prevalent social and political conditions experienced by military personnel”.²⁶ Additionally, the concept of a citizen in uniform together with continuous civic education and training cultivates a force that requires soldiers to constantly re-evaluate their role as an individual in both the military and German society. This acknowledgement of one’s role and place results in, “the necessary assuredness and the ability to make sound judgments” in both combat and non-combat situations.²⁷ The *Bundeswehr*’s philosophy of *Innere Führung* enables the preservation of the citizen in uniform by granting the rights to, “active and passive franchise, the rights to information, and free expression of opinion, and the rights of free association and petition”.²⁸

Huntington argued that to “create a democratic army, an ideologically motivated force embodying subjective rather than objective civilian control” would “reduce the fighting effectiveness of the new army”.²⁹ While Huntington’s argument sounds logical, the *Bundeswehr* and *Innere Führung* reflect more closely Morris Janowitz’s theory on constabulary forces. For Janowitz, the military that serves more as a national police force and is integrated in society proved to be more effective both in operations and with civilian control.³⁰ *Innere Führung*’s integration of the military into civil society adheres to Janowitz’s assumptions and the idea that, “only those soldiers who respect the same set of values as their society are capable of defending that very society”.³¹

At the time of the establishment of the *Bundeswehr*, *Innere Führung* was carried out through the practice of conscription. All males over the age of 18 were required to complete a term of military service. One main reason the conscription method worked for the *Bundeswehr* in the mid-twentieth century was that it was established as a defense only

force, as is written in the Basic Law, Article 87a. The extent of the *Bundeswehr's* jurisdiction was aiding police forces in times of defense or tension, but only under the direction and discretion of the *Bundestag* or *Bundesrat*. The period of divided Germany's beginning in 1945 was a period of redevelopment and rebuilding. In order to establish the country as strong, trustworthy and eventually once again sovereign, economic, political and eventually defensive stability needed to be achieved. After ten years picking up the pieces of the horrific war, both domestically and internationally and relying on foreign militaries and governments to protect the country and its people, it was time for Germany to take a stand and declare who it wanted to be and where it wanted to sit in the world order. The use of *Innere Führung* as the foundational concept upon which the *Bundeswehr* was to be established, demonstrated to the German people, as well as the rest of the world, the role the country would take on internationally.

A number of scholars argue that the civil-military relationship in Germany is at risk and that this increasing gap is a consequence of the engagement in international combat missions such as in Kosovo in the 1990s and more recently, in Afghanistan.³² Another factor, which can be perceived as having a negative effect on the civil-military relationship, is the shift, beginning in 2011, from conscription military to volunteer-only forces.³³ This shift raises the foundational question of whether this is an attempt to maintain a positive relationship during a period of reform and perhaps an increase in international combat missions, allowing for the justification that members of the armed forces chose to enlist. Citing Thomas E. Ricks, Tomas Kucera discusses “a civil-military cultural gap” in the United States after the abolishment of the draft due to a decrease in interaction between civilians and military personnel.³⁴ This tie leaves us to question if the

same could happen in Germany. Kucera argues, “soldiers should accept civilian values and integrate with society, otherwise they are alienated from the society and from the interest which they should defend.”³⁵

Chapter Three Modernization

What is Modernization?

Governments, militaries and policies are in a constant state of transformation. As things work, or do not work, institutions and law makers attempt to make adjustments or improvements. Although transformation can be categorized as progress, it can often happen too little too late. The German *Bundeswehr* has been continuously transforming since its inception, but now it is enacting great reforms to ideally close the policy and capability gap between itself and the militaries of its allies.

The term modernizing is a bit troubling since it is not entirely clear what is meant in the scope of a military. An evaluation of the *Bundeswehr* would leave many with the assurance that it is in fact “modernized”, and while in terms of technology and what its structure looks like, it is a modernized military force. That being said, the *Bundeswehr* is an institution founded primarily for defense, not for international offensive combat missions, and definitely not for the type of ever changing warfare that many of Germany’s allies have encountered in the last half-century.

For the purposes of this paper modernizing the *Bundeswehr* refers to the restructuring of the institution itself and the policy changes that transition the *Bundeswehr* from being a purely peace-building institution to an armed force that is fully equipped and willing to take part in international missions as needed by its allies, whether it be NATO, the European Defense Council or individual countries such as the United States. The new policies essentially expand the *Bundeswehr*’s mandate and aide in the preparation of the troops to take part in such potential missions. Aspects of the *Bundeswehr* are being held on to, such as *Innere Führung* but now what it means to be a

German soldier and to be a part of the *Bundeswehr* has a different meaning and a different expectation. Modernizing the *Bundeswehr* means making it look and act (within reason) as their allies do, it is a way to elevate it in the world order in means of defense and increase its credibility as a physical ally willing send competent troops.

Why is Modernization Matters

Much like with people, relationships between nations are nothing short of crucial. When these relationships are positive, the parties involved are referred to as allies. The assumption is that alliances are formed based on a commonality of a goal, interest, ideal or enemy. With that said, there is a mutual understanding that, “I’ll scratch your back if you scratch mine”. As an old adage in foreign policy goes, “nations do not have permanent friends, only permanent interests”.

During Germany’s period of division East and West German alliances developed almost naturally by default. East Germany aligned with the Soviet Bloc and eventually became a part of the Warsaw Pact. West Germany then aligned with the Western alliances of the United States, Great Britain and France; eventually finding its place as a member of NATO.

At the end of the Cold War and after the fall of the Soviet Union, East and West Germany were reunited, a new government was established, but the East German Volksarmee was absorbed into the West German *Bundeswehr*. After reunification Germany retained its alliances and position in NATO.

Throughout the Cold War, West Germany provided political and financial support to its allies, namely the United States. This policy and approach worked during a period where no boots were on the ground, but as new conflicts arose, political backing and

economic support proved to not be enough for Germany's allies. Post-reunification, tragic and violent armed conflicts arose throughout the world in Rwanda, the Balkans, Israel and Palestine, and in the Middle East during the Gulf Wars. Germany's defense policy maintained that the *Bundeswehr* would only get involved in NATO and UN mandated missions as a humanitarian force. That policy sent troops to Kosovo in the mid-1990s during the Serb-Kosovar conflict. While carrying out their peace-building mission, the deployed troops engaged in armed combat for the first time since the *Bundeswehr's* establishment in 1955. What Germany gained from that mission was the knowledge that the *Bundeswehr* was not as equipped for armed combat as it should be.

As previously discussed above, Germany traditionally only provided economic and political backing to its allies during times of conflict. As the global political climate shifted, so did the opinion of Germany's allies. Providing funding demonstrated limited support, while its allies were risking lives, Germany was hiding behind its pocketbook.

Germany had seats on the European Defense Council, as well as NATO, but had the inability to demonstrate efficiency and aptitude in armed conflict. As conflicts continued to unfold and escalate, Germany's allies decided to call on Germany to modernize its forces to a level that would prove the country to be a viable ally if need be.

By the time of reunification, Germany had once again established itself amongst the world powers. The array of armed conflicts that occurred post-reunification sparked a desire by Germany to become more involved in global defense and policy. The mechanism through which the country could maintain their foothold would be by modernizing the *Bundeswehr*. The changes to come would not only prepare Germany for

involvement in future combat missions, but also demonstrate to its allies and the world that it was ready and fully capable to do so.

The White Paper 2006

The German Federal Ministry of Defense's White Paper 2006 publication outlines the country's security and defense policies for the future. Prior to this publication, the last White Paper was released twelve years earlier. According to a press release by the German Missions in Australia, the drafting of the newest White Paper has just finished and is on track to be released mid-2016. While the 2006 White Paper does not account for many current instances or situations, which have occurred in the almost ten years since its publication, the information included outlines many aspects of the recent modernization process of the *Bundeswehr* and is therefore a significant document in the context of this thesis.

The White Paper 2006 is divided into two parts, the first focusing on German security policy and the country's memberships in various international organizations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Union (EU), United Nations (UN) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The second part focuses on the *Bundeswehr*, changes within the armed forces, and its role in German security policy. At the point of the White Paper's publication, global security issues had been transforming to where international terrorism and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) served as the front-runners in terms of security risks for Germany and the international community as a whole. The overarching goal of the German security policy was to develop a multi-lateral, inter-ministerial networked security system aimed at taking preventative measures to address potential threats domestically and

internationally. The importance of international partnerships and alliances is a core concept throughout the publication, the German government acknowledges that Germany's security and development is linked to that of Europe and the entire world. The country's intentions to remain a capable ally to other members of its various international organizations are outlined and emphasized, as is its collaborative movement toward peace.³⁶

NATO, the EU and the UN have all transformed to adapt to new challenges and risks and their member nations are expected to follow suit, Germany's adaptation reforms included the transitioning of the *Bundeswehr* into an expeditionary organization.³⁷ The country's security policy, as outlined in the 2006 White Paper, heavily emphasizes networked security systems and claims it is the most effective and encompassing strategy to modern security threats.

According to the publication, Germany's international partnerships, specifically the country's membership to NATO, are fundamental to German security policy and therefore it is imperative that the transatlantic relationship with the United States be continuously deepened and fostered.³⁸ In addition to the active role that Germany plays in NATO, it is also a prominent member of the European Union and aims to pursue the strengthening of European stability, as well as a stronger partnership with Russia. Aside from the country's role in the two separate organizations, the White Paper stresses that NATO and the EU are complementary to one another and that it will remain Germany's policy to cultivate a deeper relationship between the two in order to, "lead to closer cooperation and greater efficiency, avoid duplication and fortify European and transatlantic security".³⁹ In summation, the White Paper identifies the necessity of

focusing on conflict prevention at root causes, exacerbating networked security both inter-ministerial within Germany and through regional and global partnerships and alliances.

The second portion of the 2006 White Paper is dedicated specifically to the *Bundeswehr*. In this document, the German government outlined five major aims of the *Bundeswehr*:

1. To guarantee the capacity for action in the field of foreign policy
2. To contribute towards European and global security
3. To maintain national security and defense
4. To provide assistance in the defense of our allies
5. To foster multinational cooperation and integration (White Paper 2006, p 9).

The *Bundeswehr's* central task is defined as being national and collective defense and its mission is influenced by the values, goals and interests put forth in the German Basic Law. As a consequence of the radically changed security risks, internal and external security has become severely intertwined therefore supporting Germany's policy for networked and collective defense. The publication dictates the primary tasks of the *Bundeswehr* as international conflict prevention, supporting Germany's allies, protecting Germany and its people, rescue and evacuation in the event of disaster, partnership and cooperation, and subsidiary assistance.⁴⁰ Internal terrorist threats would traditionally be handled by the land authorities, but the outlined security policy of this publication permits the deployment of *Bundeswehr* personnel should the situation necessitate and asserts that the federal government wishes to expand the constitutional framework for the use of the armed forces.⁴¹

The mission and tasks central to the German armed forces are imbedded into the German Basic Law. In 1994, the constitutional court ruled it legal for the *Bundeswehr* to

be deployed out of area for the purposes of collective security (Article 24 (2) of the Basic Law).⁴² This ruling provides the *Bundeswehr* with the legal backing to participate in international security and prevention operations in concert with its allies and defense partners. In order for troops to be deployed to out of area operations, permission must be granted to the *Bundeswehr* by the *Bundestag* on a case-by-case basis. The specifics and parameters of the relationship between the armed forces and parliament are clarified in The Parliamentary Participation Act. The scope of *Bundeswehr* employment is explicitly outlined in Article 24 (2), Article 87a (2), (3), (4) and Article 35 (2), (3) of the German Basic Law. The *Bundeswehr* has been reorganized to encompass three groups of forces: response, stabilization and support. As of the White Paper 2006, the goal for 2010 is to have a total of active personnel will be 252,500 with 2,500 reservists and 75,000 civilians.⁴³

Essential to the armed forces is the concept of *Innere Führung*, and its relationship with conscription. According to the White Paper, “*Innere Führung* stands for the realisation that the capability to act on security matters requires a successful interchange between politics, society and the military”.⁴⁴ This philosophy gives military personnel an identity and a recognizable place within German society. *Innere Führung* together with universal conscription ensure that the *Bundeswehr* is anchored in society.

Article 24

(2) With a view to maintaining peace, the Federation may enter into a system of mutual collective security; in doing so it shall consent to such limitations upon its sovereign powers as will bring about and secure a lasting peace in Europe and among the nations of the world.

Article 87a

(2) Apart from defence the Armed Forces may be employed only to the extent expressly permitted by this Basic Law

(3) During a state of defence or state of tension the Armed Forces shall have the power to protect civilian property and to perform traffic control functions to the extent necessary to accomplish their defence mission. Moreover, during a state of defence or a state of tension, the Armed forces may also be authorized to support police measures for the protection of civilian property: in this event the Armed Forces shall cooperate with the competent authorities.

(4) In order to avert an imminent danger to the existence or free democratic basic order of the Federation or of a Land, the Federal Government, if the conditions referred to in paragraph (2) of Article 91 obtain and the police forces and the Federal Police Force prove inadequate, may employ the Armed Forces to support the police and the Federal Border Police in protecting civilian property and in combating organized armed insurgents. Any such employments of the Armed Forces shall be discontinued if the Bundestag or the Bundesrat so demands.

Article 35

(2)(...) in order to respond to a grave accident or a natural disaster, a Land may call for the assistance of police forces of other Laender of personnel and facilities of other administrative authorities of the Armed Forces, or of the Federal Border Police.

(3) If the natural disaster or accident endangers the territory of more than one Land, the Federal Government, insofar as is necessary to combat the danger, may instruct the Land governments to place police forces at the disposal of other Laender, and may deploy units of the Federal Border Police or the Armed Forces to support the police. Measures taken by the Federal Government pursuant to the first sentence of this paragraph shall be rescinded at any time at the demands of the Bundesrat, and in any event as soon as the danger is removed.

Table 1: *Bundeswehr Employment per the German Basic Law* (German Basic Law Art. 24(2), Art. 87a(2,3,4), Art. 35(2,3))

The importance of conscription to the *Bundeswehr* is heavily emphasized in the White Paper, as is the Federal Government's intention to preserve the practice (although it is important to note that conscription ended in 2011). The conscription process was an integral part of the civil-military relationship in Germany. It not only guaranteed the personnel necessary for potential operations, but also allowed for a well-rounded armed force as a result of the various backgrounds and wide range of education the conscripts embodied. In the 2005 Coalition Agreement, the intent of the Federal Government to continue the conscription was outlined and at the time of this publication, the Federal Minister of Defense called for an increase of conscripts by more than 6,500 in one year.⁴⁵

According to section 3.6 of the White Paper, many of the reforms set forth have a financial basis. Since reunification, defense spending continued to be cut and the restructuring of the *Bundeswehr* is aimed at creating the most cost effective and efficient force as possible. Joint operations with Germany's European and transatlantic alliances will help to ease the financial burden of the *Bundeswehr* and contracting with the private sector will ease the strain on *Bundeswehr* personnel.⁴⁶

The *Bundeswehr* recognizes that, "only Nations with a strong defense industry have the appropriate clout in Alliance decisions" and therefore intends to expand the industry within Germany.⁴⁷ The idea is that by minimizing the outsourcing of defense technology, Germany will be able to build up the domestic industry and consequently gain decision-making leverage within NATO. Reiterating one of the main thematic threads of the White Paper 2006, section 3.7 on Armaments emphasizes collaboration and the deepening of partnerships between nations and alliance organizations. In this section, it is made clear that the Germany and its armed forces are willing to develop partnerships

with nations both in and out of NATO, as long as they hold common goals and defense policies.⁴⁸

The last section in Chapter Three of the White Paper 2006 focuses on the restructuring of the *Bundeswehr*. According to this section NATO and the EU determined deficiencies in the defense strategies of member nations and urged those states to take the necessary steps to eradicate those deficiencies.⁴⁹ For the *Bundeswehr* this meant developing restructuring and procurement strategies, which would lead the German armed forces to both meet international alliance and defense demands, as well as falling within budgetary constraints. After the enactment of the restructuring set forth in this document, the majority of the *Bundeswehr* will consist of stabilization forces with a goal of having the capability of deploying up to 14,000 troops in up to five operations at one time.⁵⁰ To meet the operational requirements of Germany's partner organizations, the *Bundeswehr* is proposed to provide up to 15,000 troops to the NATO response force, up to 18,000 to the European Union Headline Goal and up to 1,000 troops to the United Nations Stand by Arrangement System.⁵¹ The cumulative goal for the year 2010, as outlined by the White Paper is 327,500 *Bundeswehr* personnel consisting of 252,500 military personnel and 75,000 civilian posts.⁵² Of military personnel, troops will be divided into three categories of force: 35,000 response forces, 70,000 stabilizations forces and 147,000 support forces.⁵³

Chapter Four of the White Paper 2006 details the current operations in which the *Bundeswehr* is involved, as well as their justifications. As of 2006, the *Bundeswehr* was involved in ten operations in Europe, the Middle East and Africa operating under NATO

missions, EU missions, UN missions, African Union (AU) missions, or against international terrorism.⁵⁴

NATO	EU	UN	AU	International Terrorism
KFOR- Kosovo Force (Kosovo)	EUFOR- EU Force (Bosnia and Herzegovina)	UNMIS- UN Mission in Sudan	AMIS- African Union Mission in Sudan	Active Endeavour- Mediterranean region under North Atlantic Treaty Article 5
ISAF– International Security Assistance Force (Afghanistan)	EUFOR RD Congo – EU Force (Democratic Republic of the Congo)	UNMEE – UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea		Enduring Freedom-based in Djibouti, Horn of Africa
		UNOMIG- UN Observer Mission in Georgia		
		UNAMA- UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan		
		UNIFIL- UN Interim Force in Lebanon		

Table 2: *Bundeswehr* Operations Abroad (White Paper 2006 p. 73)

The detailed transformation process of the German armed forces is described in Chapter Five of the White Paper 2006. The goal of the transformations was to create an armed force, which is capable of achieving constant adaptability to changing security situations and operational needs.⁵⁵ All areas of the *Bundeswehr* were subjected to transformation reforms including the improvement of concept development and experimentation, network-enabled operations, force categories and the expansion of military capabilities. The capabilities of the *Bundeswehr* are set to include command and control, intelligence collection and reconnaissance, mobility, effective engagement, support and sustainability and survivability and protection.⁵⁶ In order to reach the proposed capabilities, the *Bundeswehr* would need to tighten communications and

networking to maximize joint operability; optimize the collection and analysis of situational information through the *Bundeswehr's* Military Intelligence Organization; achieve sufficient mobility capabilities; display force, spatial, temporal and informational adequacies; provide support to personnel taking part in domestic and international operations; and ensuring the protection and safe transport of personnel and materials.⁵⁷

The transformation of the *Bundeswehr* outlined in the White Paper is laid out to adhere to policies set forth by NATO and the EU.⁵⁸

The organization of the Federal Ministry of Defense and the *Bundeswehr* is intended to streamline duties and administrative tasks. In the context of the Army, Air Force and Naval forces, the aim of the command organization is to increase force capability and operation flexibility while achieving maximum effectiveness.⁵⁹ The Joint Support Services are configured to minimize strain on the various branches of the armed forces by providing services such as logistical support, military intelligence, military police and joint training through a centralized source; the Armed Forces Office.⁶⁰ Similar to the Joint Support Services, the German Joint Medical Service, provide an array of health services to all areas of the armed forces, with the exception of a handful of specialized forces and institutes within the armed forces.⁶¹ Other offices under the Federal Ministry of Defense consist of the Federal Defense Administration, which is required by German Basic Law Article 87b to operate independent of the armed forces; the military legal system containing a civilian structure; and the availability of chaplain services for personnel.⁶²

While the organizational and capabilities structure of the German armed forces and its related offices is crucial, as is the recruitment, retention and composition of its

personnel. Civilian personnel cuts as a result of budget cuts account for 80% of personnel reductions in the *Bundeswehr* since 1991 and at the time of the publication of this document, there remained 177,000 civilian employees with further reductions projected to leave 75,000 civilians by 2010.⁶³ Outlined in Chapter Seven are ways in which the *Bundeswehr* attempts to increase recruitment, namely of temporary volunteers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) who offer a wide spectrum of experiences and education; by balancing the income discrepancy between East and West German personnel; offering a supplemental stipend for foreign deployment; the offering of comprehensive benefits for personnel who took part in foreign operations; and the family and work harmony provided by employment in the *Bundeswehr*.⁶⁴ As of 2006, the *Bundeswehr* consisted of regular and temporary volunteers of various vocations and ages, which were closely monitored and kept in harmony; Basic and Extended Service Conscripts, which aid in easing the training obligations of the *Bundeswehr* through the wide-range of educational achievements of conscripted personnel; reservists, numbering up to 100,000; and civilian personnel.⁶⁵

It has been almost ten years since the publication of this White Paper and the 2016 White Paper will not be made accessible until mid-2016 with a more updated Germany Security Policy and Military organization. Despite the lack of publicly accessible government documents deliberately outlining the contemporary security policy within Germany, overt changes, such as the end of conscription prove that the policies in Germany have continued to adapt as security threats and challenges transfigure.

Public Reception

The reforms published in the White Paper 2006 were aimed at ensuring the operational capabilities of the *Bundeswehr* in potential situations for the future. The reforms, which began in 2003, were implemented shortly after the start of Germany's involvement in NATO operations in Afghanistan. Since the end of World War II, Germans have maintained a pacifist attitude when it comes to involvement in international conflict.⁶⁶ According to the 2007 Global Peace Index (GPI), Germany ranked as the twelfth most peaceful nation out of the 121 analyzed.⁶⁷ Between 2005 and 2007, *Bundeswehr* reforms were being carried out and the nation's involvement in the NATO ISAF mission continued to grow. The reforms, while maintaining *Innere Führung* and trying to preserve the citizen in uniform led to a shift in the capabilities of the *Bundeswehr*, which caused it to cross over into uncharted territory operationally, but also in terms of social perception and acceptance. The response of the German public to the reforms is tied together with the views on Germany's international involvement at the time.

According to a poll conducted in 2005, 80% of Germans polled held a positive view of the *Bundeswehr*, 60% believed that the German armed forces had a positive impact internationally, and only 34% opposed NATO's ISAF in Afghanistan.⁶⁸ In the same survey, 53% of those questioned, supported keeping conscripted service for the *Bundeswehr*, which according to the White Paper 2006 was cornerstone to the goal of *Innere Führung*.⁶⁹ Despite the high support for the continuation of conscription, just one year earlier, of the 150,000 Germans up for conscripted service, 80,000 objected to military service.⁷⁰ While these numbers demonstrate overall support for the *Bundeswehr*, its involvement in international missions was not met with as much positive backing.

Only 29% of Germans fully supported the *Bundeswehr*, with 79% claiming they were happy with the work being done by the armed forces.⁷¹ The majority polled believed that the *Bundeswehr* should protect Germany against external threats, but believed that Germany should focus its attention on domestic issues; a reported 35% supported executing an active foreign policy.⁷²

The reluctance of the German people to become involved with international conflicts could have been due to a number of reasons, ranging from a true culture of pacifism to a lack of security concerns.⁷³ In 2006, Minister of Defense, Franz-Josef Jung expressed concern that the German public may not fully understand the current and potential security threats to the nation.⁷⁴ The changes in global security challenges left nations, such as Germany to navigate the unknown and develop policy in preparation of situations, which had not previously been encountered. The support demonstrated by the German people toward the *Bundeswehr*, reflects the good deeds and intentions of the armed forces, such as delivering humanitarian aid and assisting in case of natural disasters. The *Bundeswehr* was created in a way that emulated the German culture and perspective; the reforms published in the White Paper did not overtly impose on that essence, leading to the continuation of support of the *Bundeswehr* as an institution. As the German government attempted to prepare to take on future challenges and assert itself as a capable ally, the German people also were thrown into an unfamiliar situation. Reluctance of international involvement had been the trend since the end of World War II, supporting combat operations abroad and inserting themselves into conflicts which were not their own, would have be an remarkable shift in German societal norms.

In 2010, the *Bundeswehr* underwent another set of reforms to help reduce the cost of the operation of the armed forces. The major components were: eliminating conscripted service, reducing military and civilian personnel, closing thirty-one and downsizing ninety *Bundeswehr* bases, reducing personnel within the Defense Ministry, and cutting defense projects by billions.⁷⁵ As of 2014, the *Bundeswehr* had 5,000 soldiers deployed in international operations, yet the German public's attitude toward international involvement remained similar to that between 2005 and 2007.⁷⁶ In a survey conducted by the Federal Foreign Office, two-thirds of those polled were against more international involvement.⁷⁷ In another poll, only 20% of Germans believed Germany should take on more responsibility within NATO and 58% expressed their belief that conflicts should be solved through diplomacy and money rather than military force.⁷⁸ Almost a decade after the initial surveys, the German public's resistance to engage in international conflicts lingers.

The reforms set forth by Karl-Josef Jung and Thomas de Maizière have targeted the increase of capabilities and economic efficiency of the armed forces and the Ministry of Defense. The former Ministers of Defense attempted to make changes while trying to preserve the constitutional relationship between the German people and the *Bundeswehr*, but as new challenges emerge and the *Bundeswehr* adapts to tackling them, the civil-military relationship is also transitioning and adapting to the new roles being taken on by Germany and its armed forces.

Chapter Four

The *Bundeswehr* Today

9/11 and the New War on Terror

The terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001 marked a shift in global security and the types of threats to nation states. In response to the devastating attacks, the United States and its allies took up arms against terrorism to reinstate world security. Fourteen years after the attacks, troops from around the world remain deployed and engaged in conflict and rebuilding missions in Afghanistan and Iraq, and have support missions and intelligence units across the globe. The War on Terror has expanded to encapsulate terrorism in all its guises throughout the world. As a member of NATO, Germany has been involved in anti-terror strategies from the beginning, the country's military involvement has been a careful balance between supporting and defending its NATO allies and aligning with the views of domestic public opinion. The fight against terrorism is comprehensive and does not solely rely on military force. Countries around the world partake in domestic and international operations in order to combat and prevent terrorist threats.

After the attacks on 9/11, the United States called upon the North Atlantic Treaty Article 5, which requires all NATO states to come to the aid of any member who invokes the article. An attack on one, in other words, is an attack on all. In December 2001, German parliament approved *Bundeswehr* contribution to NATO's International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan.⁷⁹ The German chancellor at the time, Gerhard Schröder, originally gained German public support for his stance against the invasion of Afghanistan but was forced to undergo a vote of confidence for then supporting the German contribution to the mission.⁸⁰ Two years later in 2003 the United States rallied

for support for the war in Iraq, which is also known as “Operation Iraqi Freedom”. After the country’s involvement in Afghanistan, Germany chose to withhold support to the United States for a war in Iraq.⁸¹ The sentiment expressed in Germany and the rest of Europe was that the United States was ignoring the concerns of its allies, while making unilateral decisions.⁸² Despite the variances in strategic opinions, Germany intends to provide ceaseless support to NATO and its other allies in the international fight against terrorism.⁸³

After initial deployment for Operation Enduring Freedom in 2001 to dislodge the Taliban, the *Bundeswehr* took over the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in the Kunduz province in Afghanistan, as well as the ISAF Regional Command (RC) North in Mazar-i-Sharif in the northern part of the country in 2003.⁸⁴ The role of the German armed forces during this time was to support reconstruction in the region, under a very ambiguous mandate; this resulted in the *Bundeswehr* providing neither direct security nor reconstruction.⁸⁵ As of 2014, there remained 1,800 *Bundeswehr* soldiers deployed in Afghanistan under ISAF.⁸⁶

In addition to the troop contribution in Afghanistan, NATO nations also partook in establishing a number of groups and offices to aid in the war against terrorism. In 2004, NATO established the Defense Against Terrorism Programme of Work (DAT-POW) to carry out a wide range of projects to combat terrorist activities.⁸⁷ Projects are aimed at ensuring the capability to protect against chemical, biological, nuclear and radiological attacks; maintaining up-to-date and secure technology; and the maintenance of infrastructure.⁸⁸ The Centre of Excellence-Defense Against Terrorism (COE- DAT) analytical and advisory board was created in 2005, to which Germany continues to

contribute both financial and personnel support.⁸⁹ Additionally, there is also a NATO Terrorism Threat Intelligence Unit, as well as a NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence. The global strategy against fighting terrorism has been through comprehensive networked defense, between individual nations, alliances, as well as international organizations such as NATO, the UN, the EU and OSCE.

Within Germany, defenses against terrorism have also been developed and continue to adapt to changing security threats and conditions. In Berlin, there is the Joint Counter-Terrorism Centre (GTAZ), which services as an operational communications platform for the cooperation of forty domestic security agencies.⁹⁰ Staying true to the country's emphasis on networked security, the GTAZ is operated by the cooperation of representatives from agencies such as the Federal Office for Protection of the Constitution, Military Counter Intelligence Service and criminal police offices of federal states. As a mechanism to improve communication between types of agencies of GTAZ, two analysis units have been created; the Intelligence Information and Analysis Unit (NIAS) and the Police Information and Analysis Unit (PIAS), which work together to form working groups aimed at counter-terrorism.⁹¹ To effectively battle terrorist threats, domestically and internationally Germany has employed an approach encompassing the use of military forces through NATO, police forces, economic and civil components to ensure the safety of its people and those of its allies.⁹²

Today, Germany continues the fight against global terrorist groups such as the Islamic State. In an attempt to assist affected areas, such as Iraq, the *Bundeswehr* has provided Iraqi military and Kurdish fighters with arms and is in the process of training the fighters to protect themselves against terrorist infiltrations.⁹³ As the Islamic State

strives to gain more territory and recruit members from all over the world, Germany and its allies continue to adapt their counter-terrorism strategies to address and predict potential attacks.

On Friday November 13, 2015, a horrifying terrorist attack was carried out in Paris, France at six different locations throughout the city, almost simultaneously. The attacks left at least 129 dead, hundreds wounded and at least 100 in critical condition.⁹⁴ In response, over 150 raids have been carried out in France and Belgium.⁹⁵ The international community has shown unwavering support to France and the United States and Germany have claimed to stand in solidarity with France in the aftermath of this event.⁹⁶ While the fight on terror has not ceased, this attack has revitalized international collaborative conversations to adequately respond and effectively fight international terrorism. The global response to this devastating attack and the repercussions that will follow continue to unfold. NATO nations, including Germany have demonstrated willingness to comprehensively support France during this time, including but not limited to military support.

Cyber Security and Cyber Warfare

The world has grown increasingly smaller with the use of the Internet, but it has exposed vulnerabilities in both the spheres of civil society and government. IT networks have improved the collaboration between government agencies and transnational partnerships. The accessibility to information has exponentially increased, and economic possibilities broadened. While the Internet has had many positive influences on the world, it also has the potential to pose multiple security threats. Cyber norms and policies continue to be developed and the more extensive presence of cyber security threats has

required states and international actors to establish cyber security protocol in attempts to counter ever-increasing cyber threats.

Cyber attacks are of great risk because they are low risk and high reward to the perpetrators but high risk to the targets. Individuals, corporations and governments can all be targets of cyber crime but attacks on government and state entities can be particularly dangerous because attacks on a network that houses military, transportation, telecommunication or to the power grid information could have wide spread and devastating impacts.⁹⁷ NATO's Tallinn Manual, a nonbinding document compile by experts on cyber security defines a cyber attack as, "a cyber operation, whether offensive or defensive that is reasonably expected to cause injury or death to a person or damage or destruction to objects".⁹⁸ Cyber threats range from cyber crime, which is a broad term and can target any entity or individual; to cyber terrorism, aimed at inciting terror on a group or state; to cyber warfare, which is characterized by a state targeting the IT networks or cyber security of another state.⁹⁹

In addition to working with international organizations such as the EU and NATO, Germany is a part of a bilateral cooperative with the United States regarding cyber security and regulation. The goals of this partnership are to ensure internet freedom and regulation, enhance partnerships in the private sector as well as with other nations in the hopes of creating cyber regulatory norms for government while maintaining freedom and innovation.¹⁰⁰ The two countries are working together to expand communication on cyber security to more effectively fight cyber crime and detect potential threats.¹⁰¹ Borders do not confine cyber space and therefore the development of solutions to ensure global security must also be transnational.

Transnational security measures and cooperation are imperative to the prevention of cyber attacks and cyber warfare, but so are internal collaborative partnerships, which is why Germany continues to develop its own cyber security. One mechanism established by the German government in 2011 is the Nationales Cyber-Abwehrzentrum (National Cyber Defense Center), which works to maximize the cooperation between agencies in the prevention and response of cyber threats.¹⁰² Goals of Germany's international cyber policies are to optimize potential freedoms through Internet use, prevent cyber attacks, maximize economic opportunities and improve diplomatic and international communication.¹⁰³ Essential to an effective cyber policy is finding a balance between regulation and freedom, and collaborative work to prevent attacks through innovative military capacities.¹⁰⁴ Similar to the federal government's establishment of GTAZ for counter-terrorism, the Joint Internet Centre (GIZ) promotes cooperation and working groups between various federal ministries such as the Federal Criminal Police Office and the Military Counterintelligence Service.¹⁰⁵ GIZ operates to monitor the online activities of extremists and potential terrorists in order to identify and intercept possible threats.¹⁰⁶ The creation of these various offices within the federal government ensure the application of cyber-security policies and while providing the opportunity for the adaptation of responses as threats manifest and transform.

Adapting to cyber security threats and demands is a relentless task, which can be difficult to sustain. The German Defense Ministry is in the process of writing the White Paper 2016 on German security policy, and in doing so, an expert workshop on cyber-security was held in recent months in attempt to develop the best cyber security policy possible.¹⁰⁷ While the *Bundeswehr* tracks and monitors cyber threats through the

Bundeswehr IT centers, the construction and adoption of cyber warfare policies is ongoing.¹⁰⁸ Currently in effect are the international rules on cyber warfare published under former minister Thomas de Maizière, adhering to the NATO Tallinn Manual which advises that cyber conflict must abide by international law and the international laws of war.¹⁰⁹

Cyber security, whether it is an individual attack, cyber terrorism or cyber warfare is of high priority in German and international security spheres. Cyber threats can be very volatile and have the potential to be devastating on various levels. Developing effective and comprehensive cyber and defense policies remain in the early stages, as cyber threats pose a relatively new global security challenge. The German military and government, in partnership with international organizations continue to work to improve policy and adapt as threats escalate.

Ursula von der Leyen

During each term of Angela Merkel's chancellorship, she has appointed a new Federal Defense Minister amidst the extensive reforms to the *Bundeswehr*. In 2013, at the beginning of her third term, Merkel appointed Ursula von der Leyen to Federal Minister of Defense, and appointed former minister, Thomas de Maiziere as her Federal Minister of the Interior. Von der Leyen, a member of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) has the reputation of being a radical reformer. This reputation and her political resume set the stage for von der Leyen to drive home the reforms set in place during the previous decade.

Before entering politics, Ursula von der Leyen studied economics, completed a doctorate in medicine, served as a research assistant in Epidemiology and completed a

Masters in Public Health.¹¹⁰ In addition to her professional career, she is also a married mother of seven children. She has been criticized as both a mother and a politician, but despite push back, von der Leyen has held a number of roles in both local and federal government and is now the first female Federal Minister of Defense in Germany. Leading up to her appointment as the Federal Minister of Defense, von der Leyen was active in her local government in Hannover, served on the Land Parliament in Lower Saxony, then as the Minister for Social Affairs, Women, Family Affairs and Health of Lower Saxony.¹¹¹ Transitioning into the federal realm in 2004, von der Leyen continues to be a member of the CDU Presidium, was appointed by Merkel as the Federal Minister for Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth in 2005, and began her tenure as a member of the Bundestag and was then Merkel's appointee as the Federal Minister of Labour and Social Affairs in 2009. Her ambitions, drive and success in previous positions have led many to speculate that she could potentially be Merkel's successor as Chancellor. Von der Leyen's main objective as Federal Minister of Defense is to reform the *Bundeswehr*, a process that had been ongoing for almost a decade when von der Leyen took office in 2013.

Von der Leyen and the armed forces are faced with a number of obstacles, the most prevalent being functional and financial shortcomings. In September 2014, a series of transportation mishaps occurred while trying to deliver arms to security forces in Iraq and revealed the dilapidated state of many of the *Bundeswehr's* air transportation vehicles.¹¹² German defense specialist Thomas Weigold said that equipment shortfalls are a result of a policy, which maximized the use of military equipment with little accumulation of spare parts, leading to the German Air Force using planes that have been

in operation for up to fifty years.¹¹³ Online news magazine *SpiegelOnline* reported that only one of four submarines is operational, 110 of 180 Boxers are deployable, two of thirty-three helicopters operational, and these numbers do not clarify whether the equipment is fully or partially operational.¹¹⁴ Due to its shortcomings in capabilities, Germany was unable to meet the 2014 NATO Defense Planning Process target and as a result would have been unable to assist its NATO allies should the situation arise.¹¹⁵ NATO urges member states to spend at least 2% of their annual GDP on defense, in 2014 Germany only spent 1.29% of GDP but according to some government sources, Germany plans to increase defense spending by 6.2% in the next five years.¹¹⁶

Despite political opposition and equipment deficiencies, Defense Minister von der Leyen appears motivated to continue the modernization of the *Bundeswehr* and increase international involvement. According to former Commissioner for the Armed Forces, Hellmut Königshaus, since von der Leyen entered office, there seems to be a shift in the attitude of the *Bundeswehr* and the defense minister is more open and receptive to concerns regarding the state of the *Bundeswehr*.¹¹⁷ Von der Leyen is an avid supporter of coalition and partnerships and firmly supports NATO as an active alliance. She strives for a more unified Europe and stands steadfastly behind international law. In an article published in *The Guardian*, Joachim Koschnicke identified von der Leyen as, “one of the more popular politicians” but her seemingly radical reforms and opinions could result in stark opposition, even from within her party.¹¹⁸

Since her appointment in 2013, Ursula von der Leyen has taken steps toward further reformation of the German armed forces. She is facing criticism as well as, practical obstacles such as a lack of functional equipment, a stressed defense budget, and

a severe deficit of volunteers since the end of the conscription in 2011. Despite these setbacks, perhaps one of the most drastic steps has been the launch of an attractiveness campaign to attract young Germans to join the military. The objective of this campaign is to improve the work-life balance of military personnel. Many of the *Bundeswehr* reforms were focused on structure and efficiency; von der Leyen seeks to reform the personnel/personal aspect of the *Bundeswehr*. In order to do this, the armed forces will be made more family-friendly and she seeks to appeal to young people to join the German professional army and therefore must make it competitive and comparable to companies aiming to do the same. The specifics of von der Leyen's reforms for attractiveness will be discussed in the following chapter.

In line with the objectives outlined in the White Paper 2006 for the *Bundeswehr*, von der Leyen has been vocal about European and transatlantic defense partnerships. In March 2015, at the tenth Brussels forum, von der Leyen called for a European army as a way to increase stability, as well as European and transatlantic security.¹¹⁹ After asserting that Western countries and their democratic values are a target for groups such as the Islamic State, she displayed the needs to cultivate deeper alliances through the already established organizations of the EU, NATO and the OSCE; this includes partnerships between these organizations.¹²⁰ Von der Leyen believes in the need for a unified European army to ensure stability and support the already unified market and currency, and the openness of borders and the migration between them. The final point of her statement in Brussels was the progress that the *Bundeswehr* has already made toward these goals, such as the Franco-German Brigade, a German decision of the Dutch airborne brigade (and potentially the same with a naval component) and a naval

partnership with Poland.¹²¹ Von der Leyen's goals of reform of the *Bundeswehr* are not confined to the German armed forces, but rather stretch across European and transatlantic borders to reform collective security policies.

The Attractiveness Campaign

The role that conscription played in the *Bundeswehr* was two-fold. It maintained the *Bundeswehr's* integration into German society, but also it ensured a number of personnel each year. The German armed forces during the period of conscription were not large in the scope of global militaries, nor for the size of Germany but conscription allowed for personnel numbers to be maintained. Adhering to the demands of the people, the Germany became the first country in the world to allow individuals to abstain from mandatory military service based solely on personal objections and beliefs; those of conscription age could opt out of military service and fulfill their civil service obligation through other means, such as working in a hospital residence for the elderly. While acceptable to the German public, the result was a dip in numbers for annual *Bundeswehr* inductions. Maintaining *Bundeswehr* personnel numbers would become even more difficult for Germany in 2011 with the repeal of conscription. The set of reforms and restructuring under which compulsory military service was removed, left the *Bundeswehr* with a standing army of roughly 175,000; a 30% reduction from the 250,000 before the 2010 reorganization reforms.¹²²

The end of conscription meant the transition of the *Bundeswehr* to a volunteer-only force, and the development into a professional armed force. Since the introduction of the *Bundeswehr*, few military personnel were considered professional soldiers, but in order to ensure the maintenance of numbers and fruitfully carry out operations falling

under the recent reforms, Germany needed to find a way to increase enlistment rates and retain those recruits. Compared to other German employers, the *Bundeswehr* does not pay very well, is dangerous, and is not very family-friendly. It is understandable why the *Bundeswehr* may not appeal to many young German men and women, not to mention the ongoing political reluctance to engage in international missions. While many of the reforms were aimed at operational and fiscal efficiency, none was targeted at improving the lives of military personnel. Upon her appointment to office, Federal Minister of Defense Ursula von der Leyen saw a need to develop a mechanism to increase recruitment and retention of military personnel. Von der Leyen's solution was to launch a campaign aimed at increasing the attractiveness of the *Bundeswehr* as an employer. The result was; "*Bundeswehr in Führung Aktiv. Attraktiv. Anders.*". Von der Leyen's proposed plan was published and is accessible through the *Bundeswehr* website. The document outlines eight topics and twenty-nine measures of resolve as a way to improve the personnel aspect of the *Bundeswehr*, as well as a potential timeline for the accomplishment of each task.

The first topic is the Leadership and Organizational Culture of the *Bundeswehr*. Overall, this topic is aimed at creating the *Bundeswehr* to be a positive and motivating workplace through command structure and good leadership. In order to accomplish this goal, the three methods proposed contain some form of training; the first is an Action Program titled "Good Leadership Structure", carried out through a leadership school; the second is titled "Good Leadership from the Start", a training program in concert with the Center for *Innere Führung* to teach about modern leadership from the very beginning of one's military service; the third is Coaching the Top Staff which is aimed at teaching

command staff how to take an active role in modeling and developing the new leadership culture of the *Bundeswehr*.

The second topic, Mobilizing Potentials focuses on personnel management and recruitment for the *Bundeswehr*. Ideally the *Bundeswehr* will work with potential recruits to offer them positions based on their talents, interests and aptitude. Also a tool in recruitment will be E-recruiting with access to job postings and eventually online registration and application to the *Bundeswehr*. The agenda also calls for a quicker reaction time to applicants. The new plan outlines that interested men and women will receive a response within one week of their application and their entry and placement process will be of high priority. For those who do choose a career in the armed forces, opportunities for further training and development that will add to the value of the individual in both the *Bundeswehr* and the private sector will be made available and highly encouraged. Hand in hand with continuous training and development is the strengthening of the internal labor market. Strengthening the internal labor market aims to retain personnel in the armed forces. It will allow for more flexibility for employees to move to different departments and jobs while remaining in the *Bundeswehr*.

Improving the balance between work and family is the third point of improvement for the *Bundeswehr*. The ultimate goal is to make the military more family-friendly through flexibility and support of family members. First on the agenda is to close the childcare gaps by increasing childcare facilities and tailoring their operating hours to the shifts of *Bundeswehr* personnel. Additionally, the *Bundeswehr* will provide central support to families regarding relocations, and on other necessary topics relating to service, family and social concerns; with the goal of directly connecting *Bundeswehr*

families with the relevant contacts and information as quickly as possible.

Acknowledging the difficulties *Bundeswehr* families encounter during periods of deployment, military personnel will be provided with free communication through phone and Internet during their operational tours. Unfortunately, this does not yet apply to those in naval divisions at sea, but according to the agenda, strides are being taken to extend this opportunity to naval personnel in the future.

Topic four address Working Autonomy within the *Bundeswehr*. This includes a long-term time account, which will allow personnel to build something of a savings account for paid-time off with the flexible options of using it for things such as childcare, personal wellness or in times of emergency. There will also be opportunities for personnel to work remotely; the *Bundeswehr* plans to provide 3,000 laptops and 3,000 tablets and smart phones for this purpose.¹²³ Working remotely will ideally reduce burdens on commuters, which at the time of this publications accounted for 38% of *Bundeswehr* personnel.¹²⁴ Part-time operations will be encouraged when possible for up to 1,000 military personnel and 10,400 civilian employees.¹²⁵ The part-time opportunities will also be made available during periods of maternal/paternal time. Personnel will have the option to reduce their weekly hours and effort will be made to ensure they are close to their homes, with the exception of periods of operations or training.

Career paths within the *Bundeswehr* will be diversified with more promotional and development opportunities, as well as longer times at each post. Maximizing time spent at each posts creates stability for *Bundeswehr* families with the ability to create relatively long-term plans and successfully prepare for relocations. The *Bundeswehr* aims to become more transparent with personnel, creating a trusting bond between

management and employee. One mechanism of transparency will be an online portal with service information and opportunities; allowing personnel to stay informed and apply for positions in which they are interested.

A large part of any job is staying healthy and the *Bundeswehr's* six point of reform strives to achieve that. Falling under the subject of health is making the *Bundeswehr* a healthier workplace by creating wellness management projects for physical and mental health. Proposed projects are stress management and prevention, assistance in abstention from smoking and addiction prevention, and sport and fitness options.

A necessity in both the wellness of personnel and increasing the attractiveness of the *Bundeswehr* as an employer is modernizing the available housing accommodations. Attempts for modernization will help *Bundeswehr* personnel feel at home and comfortable in their military accommodations. 750 million Euros have been designated for this modernization process and improvements will include new light and modern furniture, and each room will come standard with a television and refrigerator.¹²⁶ Additionally, Internet will be made available wherever possible in housing accommodations with priority given to those at training schools.

The last topic of reform set forth by the agenda is titled "Anchoring the *Bundeswehr* in Society". In order to do accomplish this, three solutions are set forth; the presentation of an annual award for "*Bundeswehr* in Society", a national Day of the *Bundeswehr* which will allow military personnel to interact personally with German citizens, and the erection of exhibitions in various locations which would demonstrate the locations unique history and services of that particular locale.

Many of the reforms set forth in *Bundeswehr. Aktiv. Attraktiv. Anders.*, were set to begin in 2014 and 2015 through pilot programs. Although it is still too early to gauge the success of the campaign, Federal Minister of Defense Ursula von der Leyen said the *Bundeswehr* has the most recruits since the end of conscription.¹²⁷ Von der Leyen's campaign to transform the *Bundeswehr* into an attractive and competitive employer in Germany is designed to yield long term results that will ideally benefit military and civilian personnel, their families, the *Bundeswehr* as an institution, all while maintaining and deepening the relationship between the armed forces and German society. Critics and individuals from opposition political groups support the agenda but display hesitation while emphasizing that there is much more work to be done and that it will be a costly process.¹²⁸

German-Russian Relations, the Ukraine and Syria

Relations between Germany and Russia are politically, economically and culturally complex. At the end of World War II, Soviet troops occupied (some would say liberated) eastern Germany and in some circles, they are seen as the heroes. During the period of German division the Soviet Union served as the supervisory power over the German Democratic Republic (GDR). The Soviet Union's role in the economic development of the GDR resulted in lasting partnerships after German reunification and the fall of the Soviet Union. It has been the overt stance of German politicians that Russian integration into Europe is necessary and historically political and economic policies have been enforced to support this belief. The current political climate between Russia and Western countries, as well as the conflict in the Ukraine and now in Syria are

hindering the integration process and negatively impacting the relationship between Germany and the Russian Federation.

According to the German *Auswärtiges Amt* (Federal Foreign Office) website the German-Russian relationship was founded on close and open exchange of political ideas, close economic ties, culture and education exchange and broad civil-society discussion. As of 2008, Germany and Russia began a “Modernization Partnership” aimed at strengthening their relations and cooperation in regards to law, health and demography, energy efficiency, transportation infrastructure and education.¹²⁹ The driving force for positive German-Russian relations are common interests, such as human rights, regular consultations regarding policy between the countries and strong economic partnerships.¹³⁰

Recently, German-Russian relations have become strained in light of Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the current conflict in the Ukraine. Politically, relations have been deteriorating since 2011 and the implementation of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s Eurasian Union project, which has resulted in a trend in Russia to gain control of civil-society and the reliance on internal resources rather than American and European partnerships.¹³¹ These trends have led Russian foreign and domestic policies to stray from the fundamental principles upon which German-Russian relations were built. In response to the changes in Russian political policies, German policy has also seen a shift taking into account the realities of the situation in Russia.¹³²

In addition to a decline in the political relationship between Russia and Germany, the economic partnership has also been negatively affected. Although Russia is not Germany’s leading export or import country, in 2014 Russia accounted for 2.6% of

Germany's total exports and 4.21% of its imports.¹³³ In 2015, trade between Germany and Russia dropped by 35%.¹³⁴ Russia's annexation of Crimea and involvement in the Ukraine have led to the imposition of economic sanctions in lieu of military involvement by NATO and European Union member nations, including Germany. Historically in situations with Russia as they are in now, such as in 2008 when Russia tried to take control of Georgia, Germany has reverted back to maintaining the economic relations rather than maintaining a firm stance, but as of now the German government remains strong-handed toward the sanctions on Russia.¹³⁵ This stance demonstrates the shift in German-Russian relations, as well as Germany commitment to supporting its allies.

German civil-society is often seen as sympathetic to Russia,¹³⁶ but polls conducted in 2015 reveal that opinions on Russia and what should be done in dealing with current situations vary greatly. According to a Pew Research Poll published in June 2015, only 27% of the reported Germans support Russia, and 23% have favorable views of Putin.¹³⁷ When asked about the crisis in the Ukraine, 29% of the Germans surveyed saw Russia as primarily responsible for the conflict in the Ukraine and 86% of those surveyed viewed the country as some sort of threat to its neighbors, either minor or major.¹³⁸ The survey also revealed that 71% of Germans polled support Economic Aid to Ukraine, only 19% favor NATO supplying the Ukraine with arms and 38% surveyed believe that Germany should use military force to defend a NATO ally in serious conflict with Russia.¹³⁹

Despite political and economic strains between Germany and Russia, both nations aim to end the crisis in Syria. The war in Syria began as a political uprising in 2011 against President Bashar al-Assad's regime; by 2013 it was an all out civil war.¹⁴⁰ More

than 250,000 people have been killed and to complicate matters, the Islamic extremist group, the Islamic State has entered Syria and gained control of northeast parts of the warring country.¹⁴¹ As a result of the civil war and Islamic State recruitment and attacks, violence in the region has escalated and over four million people have fled Syria seeking asylum, creating a global humanitarian and migrant crisis.¹⁴²

In recent months, the pressure on world powers to intervene in Syria has been growing and in September 2015, Russia launched air strikes targeting Islamic State territories in Syria.¹⁴³ Many western governments have criticized Russia's actions in Syria, and have accused Russia of targeting opposition fighters supported by the United States and other western countries.¹⁴⁴ Despite Germany's alliances in the west and lack of support for the al-Assad government, German officials have said that the al-Assad government and coalition with countries such as Russia, Iran, Iraq and Turkey are imperative for the resolution of the civil war in Syria.¹⁴⁵ Germany's historical relations with Russia has allowed them to continue be strategically placed between the global east and west.

The United Kingdom and France have also shown interest in sending military forces to intervene in Syria in the fight against the Islamic State, to which the foreign minister of Germany was openly critical and warned that it could worsen the situation.¹⁴⁶ As the debates continue on how to resolve both the civil war in Syria and how to reclaim the territories occupied by the Islamic State, Germany and other states in the region are scrambling to accommodate the hordes of refugee and asylum seekers from Syria. In Germany, Federal Defense Minister Ursula von der Leyen is utilizing the *Bundeswehr* to assist those entering Germany. Throughout the country, soldiers are helping build tents,

assemble beds and deliver food and other necessities.¹⁴⁷ The *Bundeswehr* is enacting a concept “*Helfende Hände*” (Helping Hands) to help accommodate the refugees and asylum seekers.¹⁴⁸ According to the *Bundeswehr* website, as of November 2015, eighty projects are underway with participation of 6,000 *Bundeswehr* personnel.¹⁴⁹

Germany is working to adhere to its global partnerships while advocating for what it believes is the best plan of action. German-Russian relations, founded on common interests are strained due to Russia’s deviation from those principles and actions both domestically and internationally, specifically in the Ukraine. Germany stands with the rest of the western nations in urging Russia to reform its policies and work harder to alleviate the conflict in the Ukraine. Western countries and Russia acknowledge the importance of ending the crisis in Syria but cannot come to the table to discuss a diplomatic resolution. While Germany encourages Russian involvement in developing a solution, it does not advocate for military escalation on either side, instead the country is choosing to stand in the middle calling for east and west to reconcile their differences in the interest of helping those displaced and in danger as a result of the crisis in Syria. The words of German government officials can only go so far, and in maintaining their humanitarian position, Germany is doing what it can to alleviate the situation for refugee and asylum seekers by employing the *Bundeswehr* in maximizing accommodations and services to those entering Germany.

Chancellor Angela Merkel has until recently maintained an open door policy to refugee and asylum seekers during the Syrian migration crisis. In mid-November of 2015, it was estimated that between 450,000 to 800,000 refugees would enter Germany.¹⁵⁰ Merkel did not harbor the support of many in Germany, including members of her own

party, the Christian Democratic Union and her own Minister of the Interior, Thomas de Maizière. Those opposing Merkel expressed concern that there is a lack of resources needed to effectively resettle and integrate refugees in Germany.¹⁵¹ According to a *Spiegel Online* article from November 20, 2015, Chancellor Merkel, at the G-20 Summit in Turkey less than a week earlier, alluded to a quota system for refugees entering European nations in order to better manage the influx of people. The transition of Merkel's stance on limiting the number of refugees settling Germany does not necessarily signify a change in her policy stance, but rather a practical realization of the country's resource capacity and lack of sustainability of up to 10,000 refugees entering the country each day.¹⁵²

Chapter Five Conclusion

The gray area within Germany's challenge to find a balance between adhering to international demands and maintaining the civil-military relationship between the German people and the *Bundeswehr* inhibits the ability to differentiate black and white. German history played a significant role in the establishment of the *Bundeswehr* and served as a demonstration that the reconstruction of a democratic government was proving successful. For decades after World War II, Germans were perceived as villains, a sentiment, which led to Germans carrying a historical burden that became embedded in their culture. It has been seventy years since the end of World War II, the world has changed greatly and Germany has become a well-respected nation in the international community, yet the impact of the historical burden lingers within German society and is made apparent by public opinion.

The German government has made efforts to adapt to the changing world and the changing role that Germany plays in geopolitics. The White Paper 2006, outlined reforms to the German Defense Ministry and the *Bundeswehr* in response to the changing geopolitical climate and global security threats, most significantly marked by the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001. The reforms set forth were aimed at adapting to unfamiliar security challenges and increasing Germany's capabilities as a military ally, all while operating within the confines of the German Basic Law and the core concept of *Innere Führung*. The 2011 ending of compulsory military service was a direct tug on the German civil-military relationship.

The expansion of *Bundeswehr* capabilities discussed in the White Paper 2006 was not so drastic to cause a significant wedge between the armed forces and the German

people. The shock and strain on the civil-military relationship was magnified by the simultaneous involvement in international conflict. Germany's assertion to take on more responsibility is politically positive for the country, but the seemingly sudden increase in international and military engagement, have not yet been navigated by German society. The culture of pacifism and relative isolationism of the German public is now generational; culture and societal norms do not change because policies change.

Security threats and challenges continue to evolve, as do the policies set in place to address them. Reforms presented in the White Paper 2006, as well as those which will be published in the White Paper 2016 provide mechanisms to align Germany with its allies as a positive contributing force to global, European and domestic security. While the *Bundeswehr* has modernized operationally and strategically, on the level of the soldiers and their relations with society, there is still much to do. Federal Defense Minister, Ursula von der Leyen has taken the initiative to modernize the personnel/personal part of the *Bundeswehr*. Although it is too soon to evaluate the success of her campaign to improve the attractiveness of the *Bundeswehr*, it has the potential to cultivate the societal transformation needed to adapt the German civil-military relationship to current situations. By boosting morale within the armed forces, the change in self-perception of the soldier could have an impact on greater society's perception of the soldier.

This thesis set out to discover how Germany would find a balance between the international call to do more within the global defense community, and the constitutionally bound civil-military relationship. The civil-military relationship characterized by *Innere Führung* translated to the soldier being a citizen in uniform. The

Bundeswehr reforms appeared to challenge concept of the citizen in uniform, but maybe what it means to be a citizen and consequently a citizen in uniform just needs to be redefined. International terrorism, cyber threats, complex international relations and humanitarian crises are the reality of our globalized world and the dissolution of borders and transnational partnerships define the future. The modernization of the *Bundeswehr* and the increased involvement has not swayed Germany from their moral compass and therefore it has not been unfaithful to its people. The country has remained vocal with its reservations regarding military conflicts, and modernizing the military and increased involvement does not define the global role Germany will take, but rather places it in a strategic position to assert its values and cultivate collaborative transnational relations.

¹ Bald, *Die Bundeswehr; eine kritische Geschichte*.

² Bötzel, “Innere Führung”

³ Uhde, “Establishment of armed forces”

⁴ Fritsch, “History of the Bundeswehr, part 1”

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Fritsch, “History of the Bundeswehr, part 2”

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Wiegand, “The Federal Constitutional Court”; Uhde, “Establishment of armed forces”

¹⁸ AAP-06 NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions 2015

¹⁹ Sloan, “Military doctrine, command philosophy”, 244

²⁰ Sloan, “Military doctrine, command philosophy”

²¹ Burk, “Theories of civil-military relations”, 8

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- ²² Huntington, “The soldier and the state”, 1
- ²³ McGregor, “The role of *Innere Führung*”, 2
- ²⁴ Bötzel, “Innere Führung”; Koltermann “Citizen in uniform”; Kucera, “Can ‘Citizen in uniform’ survive?”
- ²⁵ Bötzel, “Innere Führung”
- ²⁶ Ibid.
- ²⁷ Ibid.
- ²⁸ Frevert, “A nation in Barracks”, 264
- ²⁹ Huntington, “The soldier and the state”, 123
- ³⁰ Janowitz, “The professional soldier”, Kucera, “Can ‘Citizen in uniform’ survive?”, 55
- ³¹ Kucera, “Can ‘Citizen in uniform’ survive?”, 58; Klein and Külmann, “Coping with the Peace Dividend”; Gerhard Kümmel, “The Winds of Change”
- ³² Koltermann “Citizen in uniform”; Kucera, “Can ‘Citizen in uniform’ survive?”; Maull, “German foreign policy”
- ³³ Koltermann “Citizen in uniform”
- ³⁴ Kucera, “Can ‘Citizen in uniform’ survive?”, 57
- ³⁵ Ibid.
- ³⁶ *White Paper 2006 on German Security and the Future of the Bundeswehr*, 6
- ³⁷ Ibid.
- ³⁸ Ibid., 7
- ³⁹ Ibid.
- ⁴⁰ Ibid., 53
- ⁴¹ Ibid., 57
- ⁴² Ibid., 56
- ⁴³ Ibid., 69
- ⁴⁴ Ibid., 60
- ⁴⁵ Ibid., 61
- ⁴⁶ Ibid., 62-63
- ⁴⁷ Ibid., 63
- ⁴⁸ Ibid., 64
- ⁴⁹ Ibid., 65
- ⁵⁰ Ibid., 67
- ⁵¹ Ibid., 68
- ⁵² Ibid., 69
- ⁵³ Ibid.
- ⁵⁴ Ibid., 73
- ⁵⁵ Ibid., 74
- ⁵⁶ Ibid., 81
- ⁵⁷ Ibid., 82-84
- ⁵⁸ Ibid., 85
- ⁵⁹ Ibid., 91
- ⁶⁰ Ibid., 98
- ⁶¹ Ibid., 101-103
- ⁶² Ibid., 104, 110, 111
- ⁶³ Ibid., 112, 117

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- ⁶⁴ Ibid., 114
- ⁶⁵ Ibid., 115-117
- ⁶⁶ Forsberg, “German Foreign Policy”, 215
- ⁶⁷ Snyder, “Possibilities for Peace”, 184
- ⁶⁸ Snyder, “Possibilities for Peace”, 184; Riecker, “No War Please, We’re German”
- ⁶⁹ Riecker, “No War Please, We’re German”
- ⁷⁰ Snyder, “Possibilities for Peace” 184, Weimberg & Ryan, “Soldiers of Conscience”
- ⁷¹ Graw, “Deutsche sind nicht stolz”
- ⁷² Riecker, “No War Please, We’re German”; Graw, “Deutsche sind nicht stolz”
- ⁷³ Riecker “No War Please, We’re German”
- ⁷⁴ Ibid.
- ⁷⁵ AFP/dpa. "Bundeswehrreform: Viele Soldaten Unzufrieden."
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- ⁷⁸ “Umfrage Deutsche Wollen Kein größeres Militärisches Engagement “
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- ⁸⁰ Ibid.
- ⁸¹ Forsberg, “German Foreign Policy”, 215
- ⁸² Ibid., 218
- ⁸³ Ibid., 217; Federal Ministry of Defense, “Germany in NATO”
- ⁸⁴ Sangar, “The German Bundeswehr after Afghanistan”, 28
- ⁸⁵ Ibid.
- ⁸⁶ Frazcek, “A New age for German troops?”
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- ⁹¹ Ibid.
- ⁹² Kaim, “Internationale Sicherheitspolitik Nach Dem 11. September ”.
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