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**A PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS OF OTHERNESS IN NIETZSCHE'S *THUS SPOKE
ZARATHUSTRA***

by

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A Thesis Submitted to the Honors Council

For Honors in Philosophy

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For Patrick, Mukta, Parker, Taylor, Emily, Greg

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Abbreviations

The following abbreviations are used throughout this paper. When citing a work by Nietzsche, numerals refer not to pages but to his own section (and sometimes subsection) numbers.

BGE	<i>Beyond Good and Evil</i>
D	<i>Daybreak</i>
GM	<i>On the Genealogy of Morals</i>
GS	<i>The Gay Science</i>
TSZ	<i>Thus Spoke Zarathustra</i>
UM	<i>Untimely Meditations</i>
WP	<i>The Will to Power</i>

Abstract

Bertrand Russell infamously characterizes Nietzsche as a philosopher concerned solely with the flourishing individual. Several crucial passages of Nietzsche's *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, however, outline rich encounters Zarathustra has with the Other. In this paper, I argue that Russell's characterization of Nietzsche is egregiously reductive. In order to demonstrate this, I offer an in depth analysis of otherness in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* by examining the many different kinds of relationships the individual can have with the Other. I then turn towards other works of Nietzsche to furnish the compelling, yet imprecise insight concerning otherness that Zarathustra gives us. Finally, I compare my account of otherness with orthodox interpretations of other key Nietzschean concepts to check its compatibility. All of this is to conclude that Nietzsche's account of otherness throughout his work is robust and undeniably rich. While there are many areas of seeming tension, he ultimately sets forth many reasons for individuals, who are perhaps concerned solely with their personal flourishing, to substantiate relationships with the Other. In doing so, I argue, the individual can become aware of new avenues to flourish more fully.

Introduction

What is the role of the Other in the well-lived life? The question of how one ought to situate oneself to the Other is an important ethical question in philosophy—after all, we live the overwhelming majority of our lives with and around other people. This question is at least as old as Aristotle’s analysis of friendship in Book IX of *The Nicomachean Ethics*, in which he outlines how friendship supplements the well-lived life. Other developments in understanding otherness in the history of Western thought include Hegel’s master-slave relationship introduced in *The Phenomenology of Spirit*. Much has been written about the psychological impacts of otherness on the individual in more recent years, especially in twentieth century French philosophy (e.g., Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, and Lévinas). When having a conversation about philosophical otherness, these thinkers come to mind in the history of philosophy. Nietzsche does not.

For the sake of clarity, I want to define terms before advancing any precursory arguments. “The Other” is a term used primarily in philosophical and literary circles to signify a substantial relationship with another person, drawing particular attention to the ways in which other people can shape one’s life. “Otherness” is not everything external to the individual (including things like objects or the earth); it is the quality of being human and external to the individual. Furthermore, it is undeniable that one’s existence will contain other people; for the sake of this paper, “otherness” is also a quality that a person or collective can possess that entails the possibility of deliberate, substantive engagement, e.g., conversation or collective activity.

In *Individual and Community in Nietzsche’s Philosophy*, Julian Young hopes to change the scholarly impression of Nietzsche as someone who cannot meaningfully contribute to a conversation concerning otherness. Young’s work compiles a series of essays written by multiple

different authors that fundamentally ask: “Does Nietzsche value the community *as well as*, the exceptional individual, and if he does, does he value one more highly than the other?” (Young 12). The various contributors respond quite differently to this question. Young himself explains in the introduction to this work that Nietzschean scholarship too often reductively fixates on his philosophy of the Overman and the will to power. This scholarly focus leads otherwise perceptive readers (including Bertrand Russell) to think that Nietzsche cares solely about the flourishing individual, essentially disregarding the role of community in Nietzsche’s philosophical tasks. Young disagrees with Russell and his sympathizers; he believes that community is of crucial importance to Nietzsche’s thought and the hope he has for a philosophy of the future, a core task in Nietzsche’s work.

Young’s focus and my own are fundamentally different in two respects. First, whereas Young’s focus is on collectives, I am focusing on individual-to-individual interaction. In other words, whereas Young is concerned with the community, I am concerned with the Other. Second, Young cares about the scholarly placement of Nietzsche’s concept of community in his overall thought. I am concerned with the ethical value Nietzsche attributes to the Other not — or not solely — for the sake of Nietzschean scholarship, but to gain insight into the value of the Other for the individual. I think, however, that Young’s intuition is accurate, i.e., that there is something uniquely interesting to say generally about otherness in Nietzsche’s philosophical works. It is undeniable that Nietzsche aims much of his philosophical attention at the individual in his work, yet this focus (in both Young’s and my own view) neither overshadows nor obfuscates the value of the Other in the life of the flourishing individual that Nietzsche depicts in

his work. Instances of otherness in his texts, while sparse, *do* exist in prominent and pivotal moments in his writing.

It seems that there is something particularly valuable to be gained in a Nietzschean analysis of otherness. After all, if there is a distinct value of otherness in Nietzsche's thought, something many have deemed to be fixated on the individual, there is something very compelling to say about the value of otherness for those seeking a well-lived life. Suppose we take this interpretation of Nietzsche as someone whose thought is saturated with individualistic underpinnings to be true; there will be a baseline statement we can make about the value of otherness even for the individual primarily concerned with her self-cultivation.

In order to explore otherness in Nietzsche's thought, I will specifically turn to his work, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, [Hereafter TSZ] due to its existential and literary nature, making it especially conducive to my goals. Through an analysis of otherness in TSZ, this thesis grapples with the contradictory depictions of the Other throughout Nietzsche's work. This paper is topic-based through a figure-based lens; I hope to gain insight into the overarching ethical question of what it means to live well given the condition of otherness through an analysis of Nietzsche's work. While it is clear that Nietzsche believes the Other can uniquely frustrate methods for individual self-cultivation, ultimately I believe that the Other, in Nietzsche's view, enables the exceptional individual to prosper more fully and genuinely. Furthermore, Nietzsche seems to suggest that certain qualities and realizations are possible only with a deliberate relationship with the Other. As such, I argue that the Other has a distinct and worthwhile role in the life of the flourishing individual. This thesis will similarly address reductive interpretations

of Nietzsche's philosophy with respect to otherness by grappling with the problems that arise in interpreting Nietzsche's work when one takes otherness seriously in his thought.

In chapter one, I analyze key narrative moments of otherness in TSZ in order to provide direct, substantive instances of the core content in this paper. This is for the sake of (i) providing strong examples worthy of investigation and (ii) giving reasons to take otherness seriously in Nietzsche's thought for anyone potentially sympathetic to the interpretation of Nietzsche as a thinker concerned solely with the individual.

In chapter two, I explain the philosophical significance of the conceptualizations of otherness introduced in TSZ. I supplement these conceptualizations with passages from some of Nietzsche's other works in order to more fully understand and appreciate them. Doing so substantiates Nietzsche's conception of otherness and raises potential areas of concern with respect to how this conception may not fully adhere to other Nietzschean concepts.

In chapter three, I address the problematizations of core concepts in Nietzsche's philosophy that arise from the insight into otherness gained in chapter two. Doing so not only enriches my account of Nietzsche's conception otherness, but also (i) situates otherness within Nietzsche's thought as something of value and (ii) enables us to reconsider some key Nietzschean concepts in a philosophically productive manner.

Diving into Nietzsche's thought can be unexpectedly difficult. He deliberately avoids traditional philosophical writing styles. I strongly believe that everything Nietzsche claims must firstly be taken as an experiment, i.e. an idea he proposes to see where its implications take him. While this is particularly helpful in terms of providing engaging and provocative ideas, it makes forming an exhaustive interpretation of the entirety of his thought not only impossible, but also

fruitless. For this reason, I offer in this thesis an account of Nietzsche's concept of otherness not to say definitively that Nietzsche must be interpreted in this light, but in order to present a feasible, well-founded vantage point upon which we can analyze other aspects of Nietzsche's work in a dynamic and ultimately rewarding manner.

Chapter One: Key Moments of Otherness in Zarathustra's Journey

It is as tempting as it is reductive to characterize TSZ as the journey of a flourishing individual. While Zarathustra's journey is individually fascinating, the influence of others on his task is undeniable. Additionally, it is certainly the case that Zarathustra's speeches contain much of the philosophical content in this work, yet the overarching narrative plays an equally important role in the interpretation of this landmark text in Nietzsche's philosophical career. Thus an in-depth analysis of the literary progression of TSZ is paramount to understanding the full extent of the role the Other plays in Nietzsche's philosophy. As Lampert states in his interpretation of TSZ, the work chronicles Zarathustra's understanding of his task and his *transformation* into a new philosopher (Lampert 1986, 4). As such, it is worthwhile to catalogue the key moments that radically transform Zarathustra along his journey. This chapter explores four key moments in TSZ that problematize traditional interpretations of otherness as insignificant in Nietzsche's philosophy. In doing so, I hope to provide contextualization of the value of Otherness present in Nietzsche's work for the sake of subsequent chapters. I hope also to demonstrate concretizations of the conceptualizations of otherness that Nietzsche introduces in this text in order to elucidate their content in the following chapter.

Deciding on the key moments worth including in this chapter proved to be extremely difficult. Part of this difficulty stems from Nietzsche often shrouding his true meaning in the speeches of Zarathustra (particularly in part three of the work) and the other part stems from the fact that Zarathustra's own understanding of his task changes over the course of the work. The starting point is unequivocal, however: after several years in solitude, Zarathustra descends from

the mountain at the very beginning of TSZ with a clear goal in mind of telling of the coming of the Overman to the people of the Motley Cow.

Both Zarathustra's mission and the means by which he attempts to accomplish it drastically change over the course of the work through encounters with various figures. And each stage in the development of his task is paralleled by a change in his relationship with the Other. As such, the literary trajectory of Zarathustra's relationship to the Other mirrors the transformation of his understanding of his task. Furthermore, what Zarathustra gains from the different relationships to the Other throughout this narrative offers probing insight into the value of otherness in TSZ: namely, that otherness deepens, expedites, and furthers Zarathustra's mission in a way that he would have been unable to accomplish alone. The following four moments in Zarathustra's journey make it clear that the Other is the true catalyst for Zarathustra's personal progression into a philosopher of the future. In each moment, I share (i) general introductory comments that guide how to think about the value of the piece, (ii) an in-depth account of the moment and the significance of any literary subtleties, and (iii) the significance of the moment in Zarathustra's development of his philosophy of the future and how it causes him to resituate himself towards the Other.

1.1: The Initial Descent

In Zarathustra's initial descent, Nietzsche demonstrates the value of solitude, Zarathustra's love of humankind, and the first stages of his mission. Zarathustra's initial descent in the prologue is the first significant action of the work. It marks Zarathustra's change from a solitary thinker into a bestower of wisdom and also shows Zarathustra as an educator in his

relationship to the Other, thus marking Zarathustra's first motion towards becoming a philosopher of the future.

TSZ begins with Zarathustra's ten years in solitude. The specific purpose of Zarathustra's time spent in solitude is extremely significant: "He entered solitude not to redeem his own soul, but to ponder the redemption of mankind" (Lampert 1986, 17). Zarathustra's solitude is not self-serving, but a personal cultivation for the Other: i.e. even in solitude, he has a direct relationship to humankind. This is similarly apparent with the first words that Zarathustra speaks: "Greetings, Great Star! What would your happiness be, were it not for those whom you illuminate!" (TSZ I, Prologue 1). In this exclamation to the sun, Zarathustra makes clear that his own satisfaction in solitude is meaningless without eventually sharing it. Nietzsche further draws the distinction between Zarathustra's solitude and ascetic isolation with his description of Zarathustra's conversation with the old man who he encounters while walking down from his cave—namely, that the old man's solitude is a religious escape from humankind and that Zarathustra's is a development of wisdom for humankind. In this way, Nietzsche nuances Zarathustra's solitude by describing the ways in which others act as a primary motivator for Zarathustra to begin his project of actualizing the Overman on earth, even while he is alone.

It is necessary to consider the specific conditions for the inception of Zarathustra's most significant project in his initial solitude: his philosophy of the Overman. Zarathustra's philosophy of the Overman is precisely the wisdom he gains in solitude that he feels the need to share with humankind. In many ways, this philosophy of the Overman is a natural affirmation of the world in the wake of the death of God¹: "Thinking himself to have solved the problem of the

¹ This is evidenced by Zarathustra's conversation with the old man during his initial descent. After an unfruitful exchange, Zarathustra exclaims that it is unfortunate the Old man is not aware that God is dead,

meaning of the earth, the problem that became acute with the death of God, he must now return to mankind, for if mankind can have no God, it can still have a future” (Lampert 1986, 17). In his solitude, Zarathustra conceptualizes the Overman as the meaning of the earth, i.e. the way for humankind to maintain loyalty to the earth given the death of God. Zarathustra thus descends from his solitude and leaves the old man for the Motley Cow, a town full of citizens to which Zarathustra hopes to speak on the Overman in order to spread his newly gained wisdom. In doing so, it is apparent that Zarathustra believes that spreading the philosophy of the Overman is a way for him to impact the culture of humankind in such a way so as for all to affirm the earth as vehemently as he does.

Zarathustra faces unique challenges when he arrives at the Motley Cow—how will he be able to share his wisdom with people whom he has not interacted with for a decade? It is obvious that Zarathustra feels the need to share what he has gained during his time in solitude: “Behold! I am overburdened with my wisdom: like the bee that has gathered too much honey, I need hands outstretched to receive it” (TSZ I, Prologue 3). Zarathustra’s intent to bestow his wisdom is clear, yet his means for doing so are not up until this point. Zarathustra adopts different strategies starting in part one in order to successfully “outstretch” his wisdom. Lampert labels Zarathustra as a herald when he first arrives in the town and starts speaking to the crowd below the tightrope scene (Lampert 1986, 13). This is because his first attempt at convincing the crowd of the coming of the Overman is to foretell of the Overman and what he will accomplish: “Behold, I teach to you the Overhuman! The Overhuman is the sense of the earth” (TSZ I, Prologue 3). Unfortunately for him, the crowd’s response is laughter; his wisdom is neither received nor

demonstrating that this thought is something behind him. What is ahead of Zarathustra is the sharing of the wisdom of the Overman for the townsfolk of the Motley Cow.

welcome². Despite Zarathustra's attempts to bestow his wisdom and tell the crowd of the need for a philosophy of the future in the Overman³, the crowd is unmoved and Zarathustra's education attempts are ultimately a series of failures.

The initial descent is still significant, however, because it displays Zarathustra's love for humankind and his hope for them to eventually accept his vision for philosophy. It is particularly noteworthy that the extension of Zarathustra's wisdom is portrayed as a natural consequence of attaining this wisdom, as if Zarathustra's only meaningful choice upon attaining it was the means by which to share it, not necessarily what he individually should do with it for his own intellectual satisfaction. The Other thus plays a crucial role in Zarathustra's ability to satisfy what he deems as his mission (as of now). Furthermore, Zarathustra's understanding of his mission in the initial descent transforms from one of solitude for the sake of understanding the importance of the Overman to one as herald who shares with others the forthcoming of the Overman to satisfy the purpose of the earth. This transformation enables Zarathustra to speak to the crowd in the Motley Cow and to pursue the further development of his philosophy.

Paralleled in this transformation in Zarathustra's mission is an equally radical transition in Zarathustra's relation to the Other. While initially he relates to the Other as a container for his wisdom merely in solitude, by the time Zarathustra reaches the Motley Cow, he is an educator, attempting to insight hope for the Overman in all he talks to. In the initial descent, we see the

² The response is laughter all three times that Zarathustra attempts to give the speech. Lampert notes that Zarathustra minorly changes each attempt in order to successfully sway the crowd. Despite these changes in strategy, all three attempts are ultimately failures.

³ Graham Parkes, the translator I am using for the English version of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, translates *Übermensch* as 'Overhuman.' In doing so, it seems to me that he wishes to make the term gender-inclusive. Throughout my writing, I translate *Übermensch* more literally as 'Overman' because I believe that Nietzsche only thinks men are capable of achieving this status. In doing so, I am not trying to defend or permit Nietzsche's many layers of misogyny; rather, I find it problematic to prevent room for valid feminist criticism of Nietzsche by altering his own terms for him.

Other as a means for Zarathustra to spread his wisdom and to understand fully the Overman as the meaning of the earth. It is not until he encounters the tightrope walker that Zarathustra experiences the next radical shift in his relationship to the Other.

1.2: The Fall of the Tightrope Walker

In Zarathustra's encounter with the Tightrope walker, Nietzsche demonstrates the value of the Other as a motivator and Zarathustra's vigor for community. Zarathustra's attempts to speak to the townsfolk of the Motley Cow are failures because none of the townsfolk share his enthusiasm for or understanding of the Overman. This eventually leads to Zarathustra paying more deliberate attention to the tightrope walker, who in turn radically shifts Zarathustra's understanding of his own mission from one of being an educator to one of being a persuader in need of allies to actualize the coming of the Overman. This showcases Nietzsche's understanding of the Other as possibly becoming the Overman and the true potential for the Other to help Zarathustra in the process of understanding his mission.

After all three of Zarathustra's unsuccessful speeches to the townsfolk of the Motley Cow in the prologue, the tightrope walker falls from the scene above Zarathustra and the crowd. While Zarathustra is speaking to the gathered crowd, a tightrope walker is attempting to cross the tightrope. When he gets half way across, however, a jester starts following him and eventually jumps over him, which causes the tightrope walker to fall. Despite this apparent failure of the tightrope walker, he is an important figure for Zarathustra because he is the only person so far to accept Zarathustra's teaching: "When Zarathustra had said this, the dying man answered no further; but he motioned with his hand, as if he were feeling for Zarathustra's hand to thank him" (TSZ I, Prologue 6). When the tightrope walker falls, he lands right next to Zarathustra, who

(unlike the rest of the townsfolk of the Motley Cow) is not taken aback by his fall and chooses to speak to the tightrope walker. The tightrope walker expresses his sadness in his failure to cross and his concern about the afterlife given his impending death. Specifically, he expresses his dread in the possibility of going to Hell. Zarathustra responds to this concern by saying “all you are speaking of does not exist: there is no Devil and no Hell” (TSZ I, Prologue 6)⁴. Zarathustra reassures the tightrope walker’s further fears that his life is then useless by explaining to him that he lived dangerously in attempting to cross the rope, a task that none of townsfolk of The Motley Cow would have even attempted. The tightrope walker is thankful to Zarathustra for enabling him to accept his life and the dangerous way he chose to live it, as is shown by a grateful motioning of his hand towards Zarathustra before eventually passing away.

This brief conversation before the tightrope walker’s eventual death leads to an important realization for Zarathustra. For Lampert, it enables Zarathustra to focus his attention: “Zarathustra is after all able to give the gift of his teaching- not to all but to one” (Lampert 1986, 27). The tightrope walker sparks a radical change in Zarathustra’s understanding of his mission. Whereas thus far, Zarathustra has only been unsuccessful speaking to groups, he is finally able to have someone receive his teaching through individual attention. For this reason, Zarathustra decides to alter his mission from that of foretelling the Overman to gathering disciples to bring about the Overman. The need for this change is exacerbated by Zarathustra’s inability to sway the crowd towards his teaching. This is no minor change—Zarathustra uses this realization as motivation for founding the Isle of the Blessed, which constitutes nearly all of part two of TSZ. In this way, Zarathustra begins his transformation from an educator into a persuader.

⁴ This claim is not anomalous; it is merely a reformulation of the edict God is dead.

In creating the Isle of the Blessed, Zarathustra hopes *to create* the Overman at this point in his journey. Realizing the fruitlessness of heralding the Overman to unsuspecting townspeople, Zarathustra ventures away from the Motley Cow to see if he can make the Overman in a community of like minded individuals, as he makes clear early on in part two of TSZ: “Could you *create* a God?... Then do you speak to me of any Gods! But you could surely create the Overhuman. Perhaps not you yourselves, my brothers! But into fathers and forefathers of the Overhuman you could re-create yourselves: and may this be your finest creating!” (TSZ II, 2). Here Zarathustra plays with the idea of potentially developing the Other into the Overman, effectively becomes the persuader, one enticing the Other towards developing himself (or his descendants) into an Overman.

The significance of this transformation is further evidenced in the content of Zarathustra’s speeches. Lampert writes, “This new intention provides the essential introduction to the speeches of part one: they aim at winning a few select friends for the new teaching” (Lampert 28). Zarathustra has extremely compelling speeches in part one, including “On the Friend” and “On Free Death,” as a means of drawing those whom the speeches would move towards himself. Zarathustra is ultimately successful at recruiting fitting people, which culminates in their collective departure from the Motley Cow at the end of part one to Isle of the Blessed, where Zarathustra hopes to bring about the Overman.

The parallelism between Zarathustra’s understanding of his mission and his relationship to the Other in the fall of the tightrope walker offers insight into a new potential value of the Other. Whereas before he was the educator who spoke to all, now he is a persuader, collecting followers to aid him in the coming of the Overman. Zarathustra gathers followers to help him in

his task of bringing about the Overman because he realizes that he cannot accomplish it alone. It is important to understand the Isle of the Blessed not as a place of ideological complacency, but for the undoubted purpose of accomplishing Zarathustra's task: "Zarathustra's blessed isles are not a final resting place but the dwelling place of his disciples, his hopes for a new future" (Lampert 1986, 83). This is a crucial stage in Zarathustra's transformation into a new philosopher because it marks his desire to be with others in bringing about a new philosophy. In this way, the Other is something that can help flourishing individuals complete tasks foundational to their personal excellence. Zarathustra is gathering disciples not for the sake of his happiness, but in order to aid him in the task of bringing about the Overman. Similarly, the departure of the set of individuals comprising the Isle of the Blessed indicates the potential value of community for Nietzsche—perhaps a group of dedicated, like-minded individuals can bring about something impossible to do individuated. Thus, the fall of the tightrope walker demonstrates the potential value of the Other as a persuader and a community member in TSZ.

1.3: The Encounter with the Soothsayer

Zarathustra's encounter with the Soothsayer showcases the Other's capacity to challenge an individual as an enemy. Zarathustra leaves for the Isle of the Blessed with his new disciples and spends the first half of part two educating them. Before part three begins, however, Zarathustra leaves his disciples for solitude once again, this time for redemption—so how did Zarathustra get to this point? In large part, it is due to another transformation in his understanding of his mission, one away from his disciples and towards redemption from what the Soothsayer brings to Zarathustra's attention concerning the shortcomings of his philosophy. In this transformation of philosophy, Zarathustra changes his situation to the Other from a

persuader to an actualizer, realizing the need to bring about the Overman by himself. Nietzsche portrays the most compelling instance of the role of the Other as an adversary for striving towards an otherwise unreachable goal.

Zarathustra first encounters the Soothsayer in II.19, where the Soothsayer utters a prophecy immediately upon seeing Zarathustra: “and I saw a great mournfulness come over humankind. The best became weary of their works. A teaching went forth, and a belief along with it: ‘All is empty, all is the same, all has been!’” (TSZ II, 19). Right from the outset of his appearance, the Soothsayer foretells of a profound hopelessness, i.e. that all action is pointless. This is entirely antithetical to Zarathustra’s project, one fundamentally of creation. Zarathustra’s reaction to this prophecy is expectedly strong: not only does he wander around after he finishes speaking with the Soothsayer, the nightmare he has later in this section is a direct consequence of this encounter.

The nightmare⁵ itself symbolizes the necessary outcome of Zarathustra’s project as it is now: “what transforms him and causes his grief, his three-day fast, and his nightmare is this single matter: how to preserve his teaching from extinction in the coming age of nihilism” (Lampert 1986, 136). The Soothsayer foretold of the ultimate failure of Zarathustra’s teaching, i.e. that in its current state it will fade into nothingness with the passing of time.

After Zarathustra wakes from his dream and shares his concern with his disciples, Zarathustra’s most loved disciple offers a favorable interpretation of the nightmare. For this disciple, Zarathustra’s dream symbolizes the overcoming of the Soothsayer’s nihilism. Zarathustra’s shaking head at the end of II.19 shows he understands this favorable interpretation

⁵ Several details of this nightmare are fascinating and worthy of individual investigation, but for the sake of time are not elaborated upon here.

to be utterly false, despite his seemingly eager acceptance of this interpretation and invitation for the Soothsayer to dine with his group. While this disciple may seem like a failure, he did enable an important realization for Zarathustra: “But the way to the new possibility is at least suggested, for it is precisely his beloved disciple’s misinterpretation of his nightmare that leads Zarathustra to understand it” (Lampert 1986, 139). Despite his initial dismay and confusion with respect to the Soothsayer’s prophecy, Zarathustra is still hopeful precisely because his disciple’s misinterpretation of the dream enables Zarathustra to fully understand it himself. The section ends with the reader’s attention on the impact of both the Soothsayer and Zarathustra’s most loved disciple on Zarathustra himself.

In addition to his effect on Zarathustra, the Soothsayer is an individually interesting figure. He bears an uncanny resemblance to Zarathustra—both figures are prophets and both base their beliefs in a probing honesty about existence, yet their respective responses to the conditions of existence are radically different. Whereas Zarathustra affirms life and the earth, the Soothsayer rejects them. For this reason, I believe it is no accident that the Soothsayer’s prophecy so shakes Zarathustra.⁶ Zarathustra understands the Soothsayer as someone who is an enemy worthy of both making room for at dinner (which Zarathustra does twice in the timeline of the work) and someone whose prophecy he must take seriously and ultimately reject through an improvement in his own philosophy.

This passage leads to the most substantial change in Zarathustra’s mission. Due to both the Soothsayer and his most loved disciple, Zarathustra comes to realize his philosophy as lacking thus far. He transforms from a persuader to an actualizer, understanding the burden to

⁶ And that the Soothsayer is the first person Zarathustra comes across in part four.

bring about the Overman as one belonging to himself. No longer does Zarathustra think his disciples are capable of grasping his wisdom and aiding him in bringing about the Overman on earth. The chapter following the Soothsayer⁷ is perhaps the most pivotal section in the entire work, laying the ground for Zarathustra's doctrine of eternal return, which is the effective addition to his thought that enables him to affirm the 'it was' of the Soothsayer, i.e. the Soothsayer's pessimism. The Soothsayer and the beloved disciple both pave the way for part three of TSZ, which is truly the core of the work in the sense that it entails the realization of the eternal return.

Here Nietzsche outlines an extremely compelling value of otherness. While it is true that the Soothsayer compels Zarathustra towards solitude, in this solitude Zarathustra develops the doctrine of the eternal return (which ultimately enables him to reaffirm his teachings in the face of the Soothsayer's prophecy). In this way, the Soothsayer is the enemy and friend of Zarathustra that forces his thought to these new heights. Similarly, the beloved disciple is the character who enables Zarathustra to strive to actualizing these heights. Thus, we see the value of the enemy for Zarathustra—a true rival who pushes Zarathustra to accomplish what would be impossible without him. In this way, the Other is both capable of showing the individual new possibilities and enabling him to achieve them.

1.4: The Cave Gathering

Zarathustra's gathering in part four demonstrates the full role of the Other in bringing about the Overman. The plot of part four is unique and truly the "Great Noon" of TSZ. Zarathustra invites several near-Overman figures to his cave after the period of solitude that

⁷ II.20, "On Redemption."

enables him to come to the Eternal Return. Part of what makes the cave gathering so significant is the obscure nature of the fourth part itself.

The publication history of part four of TSZ is relevant to understanding the full significance of the literary progression of the book. Nietzsche initially only sent this part of his work to a network of close friends. That is to say for Nietzsche, the work is finished (in a certain sense) with the ending of part three. Zarathustra conceives of the eternal return, which enables him to affirm the ‘it was’ of the Soothsayer. While it is true that Zarathustra achieves what he set out to do when he left the Isle of the Blessed, it is obvious that Zarathustra’s journey can easily continue: “He has achieved his happiness prior to part IV, his work, that which most concerns him, still lies ahead of him at the end of part IV” (Lampert 1986, 288). As Zarathustra himself says, “What does happiness matter... I have long ceased striving after happiness: I am striving after my work” (TSZ IV, 1). In this way, the “fourth and last part” is a natural consequence of the third part. Happiness is a shallow and transient goal for Zarathustra—he is attempting to accomplish something that will enable him to flourish, not merely to feel happy. This is true in the sense that after Zarathustra philosophizes the eternal return, the work of the great noon still has to be done, i.e., Zarathustra still needs to gather the superior men⁸ of the world as it is and continue working towards the actualization of the Overman. Just like in the beginning, Zarathustra’s happiness is not his final resting place—his task is yet to be carried out.

Unlike the previous three key moments, there is no transformation in Zarathustra’s understanding of his task here. By the end of the third part, Zarathustra has all the wisdom he

⁸ E.g. a set of kings who understand and seek out greatness, yet refuse to be great themselves—characters that have one Nietzschean virtue, yet lack a cohesive excellence.

needs to accomplish his task; he has merely yet to do so. The fourth part is still interesting, however, because here we can witness Zarathustra's final, satisfactory relationship with the Other. It is clear that while Zarathustra finds blatant flaws in all of the men he invites to his cave, he is also happy with what good qualities they *do* possess. Moreover, with the flaws that exist in these men, Zarathustra is capable of reinvigorating his enthusiasm for his task, now able to realize the work that still needs to be done. In this way, the Other in this section is a pointer to the Overman, even if he is not the Overman himself. This is perhaps the single most valuable thing that Zarathustra, a man hoping to actualize the Overman, can hope for. Here we finally understand just how invaluable the Other is in TSZ—the Other at all times is furthering and empowering Zarathustra to accomplish his goal.

1.5: Concluding Remarks

TSZ follows the timeline of Zarathustra's task and his relationship with the Other. They parallel each other in that Zarathustra's task radically changes whenever he resituates himself towards the Other. In the initial descent, Zarathustra transitions from solitude to an educator in hopes of bestowing his wisdom of the Overman on the townsfolk of the Motley Cow. Then, in the fall of the tightrope walker, Zarathustra realizes the need for him to bring about the Overman himself through the gathering of select disciples. Because of the tightrope walker, Zarathustra understands his role of bringing about the Overman not in terms of his foretelling the event, but in how he himself can actualize it. When Zarathustra encounters the Soothsayer, he is struck with the need to thoroughly change his philosophy in order to avoid its extinction. The reformation of his thought in this section leads him back into solitude, where he conceives of the eternal return, the philosophical crux of Zarathustra's transformation into a new philosopher, someone able to

affirm the earth and create new values despite the knowledge of pessimists and the death of God. Finally, in the cave gathering, Zarathustra continues his attempt to bring about the Overman through the gathering of the world's superior humans. These persons, while lacking in one sense, convince Zarathustra of the need to continue his task and self-betterment for the sake of accomplishing his project.

At all points along his journey, the Other points Zarathustra farther along his task towards truly affirming the earth through the creation of the Overman. While the Motley Cow crowd, the tightrope walker, and Zarathustra's most beloved disciple challenge Zarathustra to reformulate his task, the Soothsayer and the superior men of earth force Zarathustra towards the actualization of his project. While we ultimately do not see Zarathustra achieve the actualization of the Overman on earth within the storyline of TSZ, it is clear that the four moments analyzed above further Zarathustra along his path towards becoming a new philosopher and give him the tools to accomplish his task in due time.

I must make an important clarification point at this moment. While it is certainly the case that otherness supplements Zarathustra in his journey, it is not entirely determining of the outcomes of his task. This is to say that Zarathustra is individually responsible for actualizing the Overman on earth. He certainly would not have been able to do this task without the Other, who gave him both the awareness needed to reformulate his philosophy and the motivation to better himself. Yet Zarathustra ultimately understands the need for himself to accomplish his mission individually. This detail perhaps offers the most compelling insight into the value of otherness in the life of a flourishing individual; the Other enables Zarathustra to cultivate the understanding of his task and his philosophy more genuinely and thoroughly than he would have been able to

do alone. In this way, the Other invigorates and permits Zarathustra to manage his project individually. Herein lies the value of looking away from oneself that Zarathustra performs in the beginning of part three (on his way to the solitude in which he conceptualizes the eternal return). Otherness enables Zarathustra to see *much*, i.e. more than he can see in his cave alone, despite his brilliance and zeal for worldly affirmation. The Other is the catalyst for Zarathustra's transformation into a new philosopher precisely in the sense that the Other provides the tools for Zarathustra to attain new heights individually.

In addition, these key moments draw attention to the value of friends, pupils, communities, and enemies for the flourishing individual. In the following chapter, I will dive into the specific philosophical content of each of these conceptualizations of otherness introduced in this chapter. I will use the key moments discussed above and other works by Nietzsche as a foil of said conceptualizations in order to demonstrate the abstract philosophical value of otherness as a key part of Nietzsche's overarching thought. In doing so, I hope to pave the way to problematize traditional interpretations of Nietzsche's conceptualizations of power and self. Finally, while focusing on the place of otherness in Nietzsche's thought, I hope to catalogue the unique values of otherness in his work in order to characterize all the potential roles of the Other for the flourishing individual.

Chapter Two: Nietzschean Conceptualizations of Otherness

We now have a rudimentary understanding of the key moments of Otherness in TSZ and their significance within the text. In this chapter, I will elaborate on these key moments to expound their philosophical significance. First, I will address some preliminary objections to my account of otherness by reconciling the key moments with other negative depictions of otherness that are not uncommon in Nietzsche's writing. Then I will tease out the four mentioned relationships with the Other that happen in TSZ. Finally, I will supplement these four subsections with another conceptualization of otherness that is introduced elsewhere in Nietzsche's work, but does not correlate directly to one of the key moments I articulate in chapter one.

2.1 The Herd and The Rabble

Perhaps the single most disparaging image of otherness in Nietzsche's work belong to that of the herd. In "Festivals of Recognition," Higgins reconciles the many positive and negative depictions of human collectives in Nietzsche's work. She is correct to note that "the negative tone of many of Nietzsche's comments about human groups is conspicuous" (Higgins 78). This is to say that the "negative tone" of these depictions is prominent enough that it could lead some to conclude that Nietzsche devalues either the Other or true community. There are many places throughout the middle works of Nietzsche that provide some context for this claim. Ultimately, however, I do not believe that (i) these depictions substantiate any potential interpretation of Nietzsche that could characterize him as someone concerned solely with the flourishing individual⁹, or that (ii) they are mutually exclusive with an account of the intrinsic value of

⁹ Consider the instances of otherness mentioned in the previous chapter. While it is true in a certain sense that there does seem to be an aspect of instrumentality in how the flourishing individual relates to the Other, there is certainly reciprocity in every relationship. Zarathustra exercises care in the individuals he

otherness in Nietzsche's thought. Regardless, given the conspicuous nature of these portrayals, it is necessary to understand their origin and purpose within Nietzsche's thought.

I will specifically address the images of the herd and the rabble that appear in different contexts and capacities in Nietzsche's texts. Higgins' characterization of the herd is, "the constraining influence of the collective upon the individual" (Higgins 78). I think that generally this is an appropriate description. As she notes, Nietzsche at times asserts that individual self-assertion that acts in a way contrary to custom is fundamentally at odds with the community (D 9). Nietzsche's comments on the moral context of this idea corroborate this assertion: "Morality trains the individual to be a function of the herd and to ascribe value to himself only as a function" (GS 116). From these passages, the herd can be understood as a social collective that is passively swayed by whatever common, contingent ideologies and beliefs are prevalent in society. From these two quotations, one can also understand why the herd so concerns Nietzsche—it seems that its growth is self-perpetuating. As the herd grows, so does its influence, which in turn enables it to assert itself even more strongly on those seeking to separate themselves from its influence.

The term "herd" has a connotation of domestication, which is absolutely Nietzsche's intention. In the beginning of his essay "The Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life," Nietzsche writes:

Consider the herd grazing before you. These animals do not know what yesterday and today are but leap about, eat, rest, digest and leap again; and so from morning to night and from day to day, only briefly concerned with their pleasure and displeasure,

interacts with and they often benefit from the relationship too. As such, Nietzsche does not care *solely* about the flourishing individual.

enthralled by the moment and for that reason neither melancholy nor bored (Nietzsche UM II, 1).

Here Nietzsche is not describing humans; he is attempting to draw a distinction between living forgetfully (like animals) and “unforgetfully” (like the historical scholars of his time).

Nevertheless, the depiction of the herd seems to be at the core of his reason for using the term to describe humans collectives in later contexts. Given the above depiction, the herd can be understood as an indeterminate collective that is domesticated (in so far as the individual becomes simpler and more tame by belonging to it), embodies an extremely shallow affirmation of life, and lacks any depth of personality or defining characteristics of self.

When Nietzsche applies the descriptor “herd” to people, I believe that it can only be understood in a moral context. The places in Nietzsche’s canon where “the herd” appears most frequently are *Daybreak* and *Genealogy of Morals*, both of which critique or expound upon morality. A careful understanding of the two works substantiate this claim. In Book I of *Daybreak*, Nietzsche argues that Western civilization has imbued ethical significance and moral weight into the world that naturally does not belong. This act generates customs and moralities that exist to align themselves to accord the will of the individuals that created them (D 9). Put simply, Nietzsche contends that morality is a set of values that is embedded in a cultural system, yet presents itself as external to this system for the individual. Moral systems fundamentally repress individuals seeking self-assertion because those who strictly adhere to the morality (more often than not) believe that they benefit from its set of values. Thus, individuals who adopt a set of values that radically differ from what a specific morality might deem as good are often ostracized or feeling themselves to have “acquired a bad conscious” (D 9). Consider *Daybreak* 9:

“Let us not deceive ourselves as to the motivation of that morality which demands difficulty of obedience to custom as the mark of morality!... the individual is to sacrifice himself - that is the commandment of morality of custom” (D 9). The created customs of a time, in Nietzsche’s view, constrain the individual to the point where individualized action becomes an excessively difficult project in the face of the herd’s influence.

We see something similar in *Genealogy of Morals*, where Nietzsche tackles the question of the origin of Western morality. He talks of a “slave morality,” or a system of values based in the origin of persecution, such as Christianity, a morality originating from the Jewish tradition. It seems that for Nietzsche, the underpinnings of Christianity lead to the collectivization of individuals:

Wherever there are herds, it is the instinct of weakness that has willed the herd and the prudence of the priest that has organized it... the strong are as naturally inclined to *separate* as the weak are to *congregate*; if the former unite together, it is only with the aim of an aggressive collective action and collective satisfaction of their will to power, and with much resistance from the individual conscience; the latter, on the contrary, *enjoy* precisely this coming together (GM III, 18).

Christian morality values collectivization due to its origins, in Nietzsche’s eyes, as a means of survival. In contrast to the weak who desire congregation, the strong, those desiring a separation from the herd, gather specifically to live more fully, i.e. to satisfy their will to power. Higgins’ analysis of this key passage offers further clarification: “their individuality and individual resolve are largely subsumed by the agency of the undifferentiated mass; even in the case of the leaders among them, the dominant approach to the world is to huddle together instead of taking personal

risks” (Higgins 79). Nietzsche's deep distrust of the crowd and what is common can be understood in this light.¹⁰ What is common for Nietzsche is the dominant morality, which emerges from Christianity. We get passages that disparage what is common because what is common in Nietzsche's world is the oppression of the individual by the customs and traditions of Christianity. Given the origins of Christianity, one can understand why collectivization is encouraged in it: gathering together was encouraged even in Nietzsche's time because in its origin, it was a sign of strength as a means of survival. Despite the fact that Nietzsche lives in a time much after the origins of Christianity, however, the urge to collectivize persists. Nietzsche fundamentally wants his readers and those in his era to reconsider which moralities they should adopt. As such, he points to specific shortcomings of the singular kind of morality that is Christianity—namely that, christianity, as something that encourages collectivization, oppresses those seeking independence and an individual cultivation of their uniqueness.

From these passages, it is clear that the cultural monopoly of a single morality, and the supremacy of the Christian morality in particular, leads to the creation and flourishing of the herd. I believe that Nietzsche uses the term “herd” deliberately with the descriptors from the beginning of “Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life” in his reader's mind because they fall in line with many of his criticisms of Christianity. In Nietzsche's view, Christianity oppresses the individual to make her simpler and unoriginal, a shallow affirmer of existence, and entirely uncritical. Despite his many disparaging comments on the herd, it seems that Nietzsche presents an even more deprecatory description of the rabble.

¹⁰ This is to say that Nietzsche offers unfavorable depictions of “the crowd” and that which is “common,” which are not identical to “the herd,” but bear a fundamental similitude and warrant to same analysis that follows. Confer *Beyond Good and Evil* 43 and 273 for specific textual examples that disparage these forms of otherness.

The term “the rabble” appears in somewhat similar contexts, but is ultimately a more specific group than the herd. Whereas the herd is a collective of those belonging to a singular morality, the rabble are, to use Higgins’ words, “a pack of losers” (Higgins 79). In “On the Rabble,” section 6 of part two in TSZ, Nietzsche offers an inflammatory, yet somewhat imprecise conceptualization of the rabble: “Many a one who turned away from life only turned away from the rabble: he did not want to share the well and flame and fruit with the rabble... thus have I lived for long, that I might not live with the power- and writing- and pleasure-rabble” (TSZ II, 6). The rabble seems to be the petty aristocrats or naive intellectuals whom Nietzsche finds to be both physically repulsive and unjustifiable content with their existence. As Higgins more simply puts it: “they are a collection of self-satisfied dolts who crave status, pleasure, and influence without aspiring to improve themselves” (Higgins 80). Thus, the rabble are a much more specific group than the herd and seem to belong to a specific class or subculture Nietzsche finds particularly problematic.

Regardless of whether we are analyzing the herd or the rabble, however, I believe that neither problematize my aim of substantiated the relationship with the Other within Nietzsche’s thought. For Higgins, these conceptualizations do not precondition the impossibility of a meaningful community in Nietzsche’s work: “These negative views of human groups may reflect or even motivate Nietzsche’s preference for regular solitude. However, we should not conclude that his considered view is that human groups are inherently at odds with the kind of individuals he admires, those whose individuality is robust and pronounced” (Higgins 80). I want to say further that neither human groups *nor engaging with the Other* are inherently at odds with the kinds of individuals Nietzsche admires or urges his readers towards becoming.

Even if, however, one finds herself ultimately unsympathetic to the view that these disparaging collectives do not preclude an account of otherness in Nietzsche's thought, I believe that neither the herd nor the rabble truly have otherness. The defining characteristics of these two collectives are *lacks*—the individuals belonging to them are fundamentally defined not by what they have, but what qualities they do not have. It is only the lack of individual assertion and unique drive that provides the basis for the individuals belonging to the herd or the rabble. As such, both collectives contain no otherness because there is nothing substantive for the individual to engage with. There is no substantive self that differs from Christianity (or another set of customs or values) in the herd with which a flourishing individual can meaningfully interact. Thus, these collectives do not belong in my account of otherness for they lack the quality.

2.2 The Educator

In Zarathustra's initial descent, he situates himself to the Other as an educator. Within TSZ, this is usually portrayed as him either "outstretching" his hands or "overflowing" with graciousness. Nietzsche writes much in his early and middle period works to garnish these compelling, yet somewhat equivocal images. Specifically, in "Schopenhauer as Educator," Nietzsche offers a conception of the educator as someone who (i) helps guide individuals away from the herd and its pervasive influence, (ii) encourages and raises his mentees to a more genuine self through a cultivation of their uniqueness, and (iii) enables a more hearty and deliberate affirmation of the earth.

In "Schopenhauer as Educator," Nietzsche talks about the impact of Schopenhauer's work on his life and his views on the philosophy of education. Nietzsche reveals some key insight into the highest value of education early on in the work: "Your true educators and

formative teachers reveal to you that the true, original meaning and basic stuff of your nature is something completely incapable of being educated... your educators can be only your liberators” (UM III, 1). The educator is fundamentally incapable of teaching or dictating to her students what their true natures are. Nietzsche envisions the educator as someone who *liberates* in so far as she can provide for her students the means to find their true natures¹¹. Yet from what exactly are the students being liberated? While Nietzsche does not give it this name in the work, it is clear what the answer is: the herd. Consider the following passages:

It was thus truly roving through wishes to imagine I might discover a true philosopher as an educator who could raise me above my insufficiencies insofar as these originated in the age and teach me again to be *simple* and *honest* in thought and life (UM III, 1).

All of this [that Christianity causes] engenders a restlessness, a disorder in the modern soul which condemns it to a joyless unfruitfulness. Never have moral educators been more needed (UM III, 1).

In this first of these two passage, Nietzsche talks about the many “insufficiencies” of his age, which he believes have grotesquely developed from modern thought. A specific example of this is the influence of Christianity on Nietzsche's life. The modern soul leads the individual to a “joyless unfruitfulness,” an unfortunate condition of Christianity in Nietzsche’s age. As a young man, Nietzsche wanted someone who could “raise” him above these embedded customs and practices of his time, i.e. enable him to overcome the contingent phenomena of his era that he deems bad. Educators and true creators have never been more needed for Nietzsche precisely because Christianity (and modern thought) has the problem of making the individual tend

¹¹ An understanding of the Nietzschean self is tangentially relevant here and will be discussed further in chapter three.

towards an existence that is fundamentally unproductive to her flourishing and the qualities that make her unique. Education has the power to prevent this from happening by enabling one's mentees to harness their uniqueness, effectively separating them from the herd. It is clear that Zarathustra thinks of this as his mission at various points in *TSZ*, but most obviously in the prologue: "To lure away from the herd—for that have I come. The people and herd shall be angry with me: Zarathustra wants to be called a robber by the herdsmen" (*TSZ* I, Prologue 9). Zarathustra hopes to be a true educator, someone capable of "robbing" individuals from the herd. This is so that they can overcome the qualities of the herd and help him along his quest to actualize his projects.

Guiding his mentees away from the herd is intrinsically valuable—but Nietzsche does so also to enable the possibility for their independence. Separating one's mentees from the herd conditions genuine personal development. This concept is best understood through an analysis of the garden metaphor that Nietzsche frequently turns to in his early and middle works: "That is the secret of all culture: it does not provide artificial limbs, wax noses or spectacles—that which can provide these things is, rather, only sham education. Culture is liberation, the removal of all the weeds, rubble and vermin that want to attack the tender buds of the plant" (*UM* III, 1). The word "culture" here is a suitable, yet imperfect translation for our purposes. It can be more aptly understood as proper cultivation of an individual, or the process of true education that Nietzsche is describing. Only a false or "sham education" would yield costume pieces, or artificial and ultimately hollow tools to improve one's life. Education enables the individual to remove the weeds, or embedded customs of one's time, that frustrate personal development. The metaphor Nietzsche is constructing here becomes clearer in later works, where he describes the individual

as a garden: “Woe to the thinker who is not the gardener, but only the soil of the plants that grow in him” (D 382). Education enables one to be the cultivator of his garden, i.e. someone that is able to identify and pluck the weeds that could potentially harm the organic development of the plants he genuinely wants to grow in his self.

We see the value of education in a nuanced scenario in TSZ: “One repays a teacher poorly if one always remains only a student... You revere me; but what if your reverence should some day collapse? Be careful lest a statue fall and kill you!... You had not yet sought yourselves: then you found me... Now I bid you lose me and find yourselves” (TSZ I, 22). In one of his final comments of the first part of TSZ, right before leaving for the Isle of the Blessed, Zarathustra warns his disciples against revering him too greatly. While this may seem odd for a prophet to do, his intention in doing so is clear—he wants his disciples to “find themselves,” or use his teachings not as absolute wisdom to which they must strive, but as tools to conduce their respective capabilities and virtues.

Developing one’s self has some especially significant consequences. Nietzsche hints in “Schopenhauer as Educator” that education can kindle a fuller appreciation of life and the earth in one’s pupils: “I know of only one writer whom I would compare with Schopenhauer, indeed set above him, in respect of honesty: Montaigne. That such a man wrote has truly augmented the joy of living on this earth” (UM III, 2). After several passages similar to those cited further above, Nietzsche goes on to articulate why figures like Schopenhauer, Montaigne, and Goethe have had such an impact on him: they have engendered cheerfulness and honesty within him. These types of thinkers for Nietzsche “must love what is most living and, as sages, incline in the end to the beautiful” (UM III, 1). Nietzsche seems to suggest here that the personal development that comes

from true education enables the individual to more fully appreciate their existence and its richness.

2.3 The Persuader

As Zarathustra realizes the futility of trying to educate everyone he comes across in the Motley Cow, he begins to act as an enticer in order to see who is worthy of his wisdom and attention. As I mention in Chapter One, Zarathustra's many extremely compelling speeches in part one of *TSZ* can be understood as a means of winning followers to his side. As he says at the end of part one, right before going off into a brief period of solitude before rejoining his disciples on the Isle of the Blessed: “*Dead are all Gods: now we must want the Overhuman to live’ – may this be at the Great Midday our ultimate will*” (*TSZ I, 22.3*). Zarathustra's continued use of “our” is a tool to persuade his listening disciples towards bringing about the Overman. This should not strike us as bizarre that a prophet would want to do so. After all, the Other is necessary if there is to ever truly be a philosophy of the future. This crucial realization forces Zarathustra to resort to several different strategies in hopes of winning some of these listeners to his side. The result is a relationship with the Other where Zarathustra acts as a persuader.

Nietzsche uses extremely compelling lines to bring those sympathetic to his task ultimately to his side. He especially entices his readers towards his argument in two noteworthy places in his middle works. The first is in *The Gay Science*, when Nietzsche is trying to elaborate on his famous edict “God is Dead:”

Indeed, we philosophers and ‘free spirits’ feel, when we hear the news that ‘the old god is dead,’ as if a new dawn shone on us; our heart overflows with gratitude, amazement, premonitions, expectation. At long last the horizon appears free to us again... at long last

our ships may venture out again... all the daring of the lover of knowledge is permitted again; the sea, *our* sea, lie open again (GS 343).

Nietzsche offers a strikingly similar passage in *Beyond Good and Evil I*, when he is talking about the possibility of overcoming the effects of morality on philosophy thinking. Nietzsche writes, “let us open our eyes and keep our hand firm on the helm! We sail right *over* morality, we crush, we destroy perhaps the remains of our own morality by daring to make our voyage there... Never yet did a *profounder* world of insight reveal itself to daring travelers and adventurers” (BGE 23). While both of these passages serve different purposes in their respective works, I believe they share a fundamental similitude.

Nietzsche acts as an enticer in the above passages towards his readers in order to persuade them towards his newly broadened tasks of philosophy. There are four notable characteristics that the two above passages share that demonstrate Nietzsche’s desire to persuade us to become sympathetic to his vision for philosophy. (1) He liberally employs the first person singular (e.g. “we,” “us,” and “ours”) or the “royal we” because he wants his readers to envision the task he presents as one also belonging to them. (2) He uses a less strictly philosophical style in favor of a more prosaic style to lure his readers into taking what he writes to heart as opposed to merely reasoning through or superficially evaluating his words. (3) The content of this style, the image of the sea, lends itself well to the imagination of possibility and the openness available to all who join Nietzsche in his exploration of thought. (4) This sea imagery is also conducive to fostering the desire for impassioned exploration on the part of Nietzsche’s readers.

Nietzsche entices those willing to listen to him towards a new sea of possibilities. Given that God is no longer the metaphysical center of the philosophical universe and his robust

critique of morality, he urges thinkers to explore the newly uncharted conceptual territory to their heart's content. In doing so, he is bringing about his hopes for philosophy, that it can overcome the weights (e.g. Christianity) that have historically restricted it. It is only through this enticing that these can be dropped and that Nietzsche himself can be hopeful for the future of philosophy.

2.4 The Enemy

Zarathustra's encounter with the Soothsayer offers him a unique chance to overcome the shortcomings of his philosophy that exists up until part three of TSZ. The Soothsayer, as an enemy, sparks in him the desire to alter radically what has been the motivating philosophical task of his life—actualizing the Overman on earth. Nietzsche, contrary to Christian morality which encourages its followers to not have enemies by loving everyone equally, embraces the value of the enemy for the individual. We get most of his insight into this rich relation to the Other in *The Gay Science* and other sections of TSZ (that happen at various places in the work in addition to part two where the section on the Soothsayer is).

In *The Gay Science*, Nietzsche presents the enemy as a relation to the Other belonging to nobility. Early on in this work, he writes:

An easy prey is something contemptible for proud natures. They feel good only at the sight of unbroken men who might become their enemies and at the sight of all possessions that are hard to come by... They are doubly obliging toward their *peers* whom it would be honorable to fight if the occasion should ever arise (GS 13).

Nietzsche thinks of the enemy fundamentally differently than we may be tempted to think of it. The enemy is not any foe with whom one might disagree or quarrel. A true enemy, for Nietzsche, is an equal, someone capable of challenging and even overcoming the individual. Nietzsche

bases his conception of the enemy in nobility—much how nobles would not have considered the weak to be their rivals, individuals should not consider those far beneath them to be true enemies. Enemies are “hard to come by” in the sense that finding an equal and someone worthy to challenge oneself is a privilege: “To be able to afford a secret enemy—that is a luxury for which the morality of even elevated spirits is usually not rich enough” (GS 211). In this passage, Nietzsche suggests that having an enemy is a luxury in so far as even “elevated spirits” have difficulty being able to afford an enemy.

What the enemy ultimately offers the individual is a means for improving herself: “Some people need open enemies if they are to rise to the level of their own virtue, virility, and cheerfulness” (GS 169). Perhaps in order to attain qualities that fully benefit one’s life, one must have an enemy. Right before this passage, Nietzsche talks about Napoleon, one of the few people (i.e. not Nietzsche’s Zarathustra) Nietzsche claims lived a near-Overman life. Nietzsche suggests that Napoleon was able to achieve this status due to an enemy in his life.

We can further supplement our understanding of Nietzsche’s conception of the enemy by turning elsewhere in TSZ. Just as Nietzsche does in *The Gay Science*, Zarathustra tells his disciples to respect and feel gratitude towards their enemies: “If you have an enemy, do not repay his evil with good: for that would put him to shame. But rather prove that he has done something good for you” (TSZ I, 19). By “prove he has done something good for you,” Zarathustra means that one must better herself. Indeed, the enemy encourages *striving*: “Assured and beautiful as [divine strivers], let us be enemies too, my friends! Divinely we want to strive *against* each other!” (TSZ II, 7). The enemy motivates self-overcoming and flourishing in a way that solitude and other relationships with the Other cannot. On the rarity of enemies in TSZ,

Zarathustra says: “For the worthier enemy, O my friends, shall you save yourselves: therefore you must pass many things by—especially many of the rabble, who yell in your ears about folk and peoples” (TSZ III, 12.21). Here Zarathustra implores his disciples to *pass by*, or disinterestedly ignore those lesser than them. It seems that striving and growing can only happen for Zarathustra with true enemies. As such, we are left with an understanding of the enemy that fundamentally encourages the individual to improve herself.

2.5 The Friend

Whereas the enemy motivates the individual to improve herself, the friend aids her in the process. The many near Overman figures that Nietzsche befriends and invites to his cave in part four of TSZ demonstrate the capacity for the friend to actualize the individual’s will to power and aid the individual in completing tasks foundational to their flourishing. It is clear both in other works of Nietzsche and parts of TSZ that Nietzsche thinks very highly of friendship. While he carefully nuances what he means by his conception of friendship, he nonetheless values it highly; it is perhaps even the highest relationship with the Other for Nietzsche.

There is a seemingly peculiar duality between the friend and the enemy. Zarathustra encourages his disciples to consider the following in part one of TSZ: “One should honour even the enemy in one’s friend. Can you step up close to your friend without going over to him? In one’s friend one should have one’s best enemy. You should be closest to him in your heart when you strive against him” (TSZ I, 14). In the same way that Zarathustra encourages his disciples to find enemies worthy of their time, he wants for them to find friends that are worthy of his disciples’ attention. They cannot “step up close” without “going over to him,” or lose one’s sense of self in the friendship. We see something else in this passage that bears similitude to the

enemy—friendship encourages self overcoming and striving against. So where exactly does the difference between the two relations to the Other arise?

Friendship seems to hold a higher place in Nietzsche's thought than one's relationship with the enemy. Nietzsche writes early on in *The Gay Science*, "In antiquity the feeling of friendship was considered the highest feeling, even higher than the most celebrated pride of the self-sufficient sage—somehow as the sole and still more sacred sibling of this pride" (GS 61). Even higher than the solitude of a wise individual is her capacity for friendship. Indeed, Nietzsche calls it "the highest feeling" of the Greeks (specifically referencing the ancient Greeks of Plato's dialogues). Nietzsche says something similar even earlier in the same work:

"Here and there on earth we may encounter a kind of continuation of love in which this possessive craving of two people for each other gives way to a new desire and lust for possession—a *shared* higher thirst for an ideal above them. But who knows such love? Who has experienced it? Its right name is *friendship*" (GS 14).

Here Nietzsche again describes friendship as something rare and for higher individuals. He also describes it as a form of *love* for a higher "ideal above [the individuals themselves]." It seems that friendship is stronger than what the enemy can bring to the individual because it enables collective actualization of genuine self-betterment with the Other.

A careful examination of the final song of TSZ and the aftersong of *Beyond Good and Evil* offers insight into the overarching purposes of these works through the lens of friendship. Indeed, the concluding sections to both of these works shows just how highly Nietzsche values friendship and how central it is in his thought.

In the final section of TSZ, Zarathustra calls for children, which is reminiscent of Zarathustra's first speech in part one, "On the Three Transformation," where he calls the final transformation of spirit "the child" (TSZ I, 1). The child is the final transformation of the spirit and the it represents for Nietzsche "innocence... a beginning anew, a play, a self-propelling well, a first movement, a sacred Yea-saying" (TSZ I, 1). It seems that when Zarathustra calls for children here, he is imploring refined individuals, ones capable of creation, to his task. Lampert writes further on why Zarathustra calls for these kinds of individuals at the end of TSZ: "Part IV ends with Zarathustra rising like the morning sun from behind dark mountains, rising to the Great Noon that he will celebrate with his children, those on whom he will shine with the teaching loyal to the earth, those for whom the teaching of eternal return will be light and easy" (Lampert 1986, 311). The child thus also symbolizes those sympathetic to the context of Zarathustra's message, that the earth must be affirmed. The child is fundamentally a refined spirit ripe for Zarathustra to use in the early stages of actualizing his philosophy of the future.

Zarathustra thinks of this act as the "end of the beginning," the final piece of preparation for his work: "Well then! The lion came, my children are near, Zarathustra has ripened, my hour has come:- This is my morning, *my* day is beginning: *Rise up now, rise up, you Great Middy!*" (TSZ 4, 20). As I mentioned in chapter one, part four of TSZ chronicles all the preparation Zarathustra does to conceive of the philosophy of the future—but he is yet to do so, which is precisely why he calls for and needs the "children" of the world to aid him.

Nietzsche writes *Beyond Good and Evil* directly after TSZ. The final section of *Beyond Good and Evil* nicely compliments much of what Nietzsche writes in the final section of TSZ. *Beyond Good and Evil*'s final chapter, "aftersong," is only three pages but is left as a full chapter

of the work, drawing a conspicuousness to itself. In it, Zarathustra longs for friends: “*Looking all day and night, for friends I wait: For new friends! Come! It’s time! It’s late!*” (BGE Aftersong).

Nietzsche seems to place a bold significance on finding new friends given that the culminating idea of these two works is the value of friendship. Lampert, in his interpretation of *Beyond Good and Evil*, writes the following about this key passage:

Beyond Good and Evil’s aftersong depicts the singer in the ‘midday’ of his life and in a summer garden, resting in a ‘restless joy,’ ‘standing and peering and waiting,’ all expectation for friends who are now to come. The work of the afternoon awaits him upon their arrival, just as Zarathustra’s work in part 4 of Zarathustra awaited him after the chapter entitled ‘Midday’ (Lampert 2001, n.p.).

Lampert aptly points out that the end of *Beyond Good and Evil* is during *the midday* of Nietzsche’s project, which started with the end of TSZ. Lampert clearly states the similarity between these passages: “Nietzsche’s task at the end of Zarathustra and at the end of *Beyond Good and Evil* is the same: he is a wise solitary awaiting the arrival of allies won to his task by his books... Only then can the new temple be built; only then can a new day dawn” (Lampert 2001, n.p.). These two passage are similar in that they both “await on the arrival of allies,” or require true friends to see to the accomplishment of a crucial task.

Friendship is the hope for Nietzsche’s philosophy of the future. Zarathustra acts as an educator and an enticer for the sake of gathering friends for his philosophy. In this way, I do not find it unusual that Nietzsche thinks so highly of friendship—it indeed seems to be the highest form of otherness in his work in that it enables the flourishing individual new means to accomplish significant projects. Herein lies a peculiar lesson about the value of the Other—if

friendship can enable both Zarathustra and Nietzsche to more adequately tackle a project that is fundamental to their lives, then the Other can make happen tasks that enable the individual to flourish more fully.

2.6 The Neighbor

The neighbor is neither a relationship with the Other that I introduce in chapter one, nor a particularly disparaging image of the Other presented in TSZ. Nonetheless, an understanding of Nietzsche's conception of the neighbor brings to light *how* Nietzsche thinks about ways in which the individual can situate herself towards the Other. Nietzsche fundamentally believes that relating to the Other as a neighbor, an inherently Christian act, is a fruitless project.

In *The Genealogy of Morals* III, 18. Nietzsche talks about how morality can train the individual to feel good or bad about certain actions she performs. He does this to raise a nuanced critique of pity and how it relates to the neighbor:

The most common form in which pleasure is thus prescribed as a curative is that of the pleasure of *giving* pleasure... by prescribing 'love of the neighbor,' the ascetic priest prescribes fundamentally an excitement of the strongest, most life-affirming drive, even if in the most cautious doses (GM III, 18).

The desire to relate to the Other as a neighbor is fundamentally based in an exceedingly shallow desire for pleasure as an escape from pain. Nietzsche believes that Christianity engenders a deep depression in all those who follow it, something that leaders of the religion further pry on by offering maxims such as "love thy neighbor." This command is one born of pity, which in Nietzsche's view is very detrimental to the individual and the Other. In addition to the fact that

pity belittles the suffering of the Other (thus preventing her from overcoming it), it also gives a “good conscience” (i.e. false sense of moral justification) to the individual.

The neighbor is an inherently destitute relationship to the Other. From its Christian origin in pity, it fails to benefit either individual involved and at worst betrays their capabilities to live more fully. It is clear in this description that Nietzsche believes relating to the Other should be beneficial for the individual, as we have seen with the many substantive relationships one can have above. Furthermore, there is potentially something to lose should the individual relate to the Other haphazardly for the purpose of “feeling better about oneself.” Perhaps in doing so, one encourages the morality of the times to take further root in herself and loses the ability to strive for independence or personal flourishing.

2.7 Concluding Remarks

The above conceptualizations of Otherness form a cohesive account of the value of otherness within Nietzsche’s thought to the individual. Certain ways of relating to others, including neighborhood and belonging to the herd, yield nothing for the individual concerned with her flourishing. Yet other relationships with the Other, including friendship, have the potential to be beneficially life-altering. In the following chapter, I will test my account of Otherness against key Nietzsche concepts that have the potential to complement my above work thus far.

Chapter Three: Rethinking the Nietzschean Concepts of ‘Self’ and ‘Will to Power’

Chapters one and two substantiate an interpretation of otherness within Nietzsche’s thought. The purpose of my interpretation of Nietzsche’s work is to offer insight into the topic of otherness. That my interpretation should ultimately be compelling, however, depends upon its ability to be aptly situated with respect to other key Nietzschean concepts. As I have preemptively shown in chapter two, many seemingly mutually exclusive ideas concerning otherness can, in fact, form a cohesive picture within Nietzsche’s thought. There still appears, however, to be two relevant areas of potential conflict in Nietzsche’s work that I have yet to explore: Nietzsche’s conception of self and his conception of will to power. In this chapter, I will offer (i) an explanation of how otherness relates to each topic and what the potential areas of concern are, (ii) a nuanced conceptualization of both of these topics given my interpretation of otherness, and (iii) interesting points gained from these areas of concern that enrich both my account of otherness and our understanding of these topics.

3.1 Self

Nietzsche’s conceptualization of self is extremely relevant to my overarching task. My interpretation of otherness within Nietzsche’s thought may cause one to ask how Nietzsche conceptualizes the self. After all, individuation conditions otherness. Additionally, if we are to take seriously the project of asking what the Other can eventually add to the life of the flourishing individual, we must have an understanding of Nietzsche’s conception of self upon which the Other can add something. An analysis of the self in Nietzsche’s work is similarly relevant given the potential unease we may have regarding the seemingly limited theoretical space for the role otherness in orthodox understandings of the Nietzschean self. At the very least,

if we intend to make any open, honest concluding remarks about the value and role of the Other in the lives of flourishing individuals, we must have a solid understanding of what Nietzsche means when he says ‘the self’.

We can see potential areas of conflict should Nietzsche conceptualize the self in specific ways. For instance, as Katsafanas notes in his essay “Kant and Nietzsche on Self Knowledge,” “a typical view of Nietzsche on self-knowledge is that ‘the mind is utterly opaque’” (Katsafanas 110). If it’s truly the case that Nietzsche views something so fundamental to the self as indeterminable, perhaps the self is too dense for the Other to impact meaningfully. In a similar sense, if self-knowledge is truly a fruitless project given the ‘opacity of the mind,’ then surely the development of the self with the Other is frustrated in ways I have not yet considered. To answer these questions, I will address how Nietzsche understands self-knowledge in order to bring to light how he conceptualizes the self in the contexts of different works. Ultimately, I believe that Nietzsche’s reconceptualization of self away from a traditional Western conception allows for a much richer understanding of the individual that enables new possibilities for personal development with the Other. While this reconceptualization is philosophically productive in my view, it also leaves room for specific limitations in self-knowledge that can be misunderstood in a rather egregious manner, i.e. as utterly opaque. Indeed, one of the fundamental reasons for this characterization of Nietzsche's self knowledge as opaque is that he takes issue with subjectivity (i.e. the active conscious activity of the mind) as the core of the self.

Nietzsche makes it very clear in his middle works that his conceptualization of self is radically different from a traditional Western one. Katsafanas presents an unadorned conception of Nietzsche’s self: “Nietzsche argues that we can attain self-knowledge by- as he puts it-

looking away from ourselves” (Katsafanas 110). For Nietzsche, self-knowledge requires a careful examination of things ‘away from,’ or external to, oneself. Nietzsche’s comments on the role of education in self-knowledge in “Schopenhauer as Educator” (UM III) yield a more vibrant description this crucial idea.

In “Schopenhauer as Educator,” Nietzsche offers a vague, yet compelling notion of the self whilst talking about the role of education in one’s personal development. Nietzsche begins the essay with a very humanistic and individualistic tone: “We are responsible ourselves for our own existence... No one can construct for you the bridge upon which precisely you must cross the stream of life, no one but you yourself alone” (UM III, 1). As we saw in the previous chapter, Nietzsche understands good education as something capable of cultivating one’s uniqueness. The above line, one of many excerpts with individualistic underpinnings in the beginning of the work, provide the substance for the brief, yet robust comments Nietzsche gives on selfhood in this essay. For him, an individual must herself decide how to navigate the difficult conditions of life—after all, she is the one fundamentally living her own life. Precisely because this is the case, the project of self-knowledge is truly invaluable, i.e. one has the potential inherently within the task of self-knowledge to cross the stream of life in a more decisive manner.

It is in Nietzsche’s description of an individual’s movement towards her cultivation of uniqueness that we first encounter evidence of his rich conceptualization of self. In order to describe the process of attaining self-knowledge, he writes shortly after the previous quotation:

“Let the youthful soul look back on life with the question: what have you truly loved up to now, what has drawn your soul aloft, what has mastered it and at the same time blessed

it? Set up these revered objects before you and perhaps their nature and their sequence will give you a law, the fundamental law of your own true self” (UM III, 1)

This passage seems to be the most concrete advice Nietzsche gives on how to become self-knowledgeable. If the young person desires truly to gain knowledge of self, she must consider the aspects of her life that are external to her body. Note particularly the latter part (after the colon) of this passage—Nietzsche instructs the young soul curious as to how she ought to find her true self towards what she loves. It seems that for Nietzsche, something perhaps unnamable that pours out of one’s being manifests itself in things like the activities one enjoys or the skills one has mastered. In this precise way, the activities which “draw you soul aloft” or enable one’s flourishing in a distinct way provide unparalleled insight into the “fundamental law of your own true self,” or the basis of what constitutes one’s self. Here we can begin to understand what Katsafanas truly means by his characterization of the Nietzschean self as external: namely, that which flows out of you can be understood as a direct symptom of your selfhood. Nietzsche continues in this passage to say that “everything bears witness to who we are, our friendships and enmities, our glance and the clasp of our hand, our memory and that which we do not remember, our books and our handwriting” (UM III, 1). If it is truly the case that the things outside of our physicality, such as the activities we enjoy, constitute (at least in part) who we truly are, then it surely means other things similarly play a role in the making of our self. Nietzsche certainly agrees, claiming that our style, capacities, and even other people share a role in defining the self. Herein lies the potential compatibility between Nietzsche’s conception of self and otherness—if the friend truly can ‘bear witness to who we are,’ then perhaps the Other can be understood as someone capable of developing the individual not merely

in a mediate manner, but truly directly, i.e., perhaps the Other can be part of self-knowledge, not merely a means to obtain more self-knowledge

Regardless of its immediate relevance to otherness, Nietzsche does explicitly say what he believes the self to be in this context. He writes, “Your true nature lies, not concealed deep within you, but immeasurably high above you, or at least above what you usually take yourself to be“ (UM III, 1). Even early on in his quest to reconceptualize the self away from earlier Western thought, he makes sure to differentiate his notion of self from a traditionally Western one. Whereas we may be inclined to think of the self as internal, i.e. within oneself (and potentially requiring internal investigation to reach any sort of self knowledge), it is in fact external. It seems further that Nietzsche implores us to consider the self as something *above* us, i.e. something farther away from what we may be tempted to deem as our true self to which we must strive. While Nietzsche’s comments on self in “Schopenhauer as Educator” are compelling and indeed paint a vivid picture of the self, they lack a desirable lucidity. Furthermore, they fail to address the issue of the opacity of his conceptualization of self that some of his critics maintain. In order to adequately address these concerns, we will turn to Nietzsche’s comments on the self in *Genealogy of Morals*.

In *Genealogy of Morals*, Nietzsche explores the origin of “the good,” i.e. the set of values that Christianity deems to be positive. Within this context, Nietzsche explains how Christianity (as a morality) has come to misunderstand the self in its condemnation of its opponents. He employs a gripping analogy in GM 13 in order to illustrate this.

In GM 13, Nietzsche talks about the nature of lambs and birds of prey (hunted and hunter) as an analogy of moral culpability within a Christian metaphysical doctrine. He writes,

“that lambs dislike great birds of prey does not seem strange: only it gives no ground for reproaching these birds of prey for bearing off little lambs” (GM 13). It seems utterly fair to say that lambs dislike birds of prey, who eat them. Yet Nietzsche claims it is absurd to argue that birds of prey dislike lambs (after all, their life depends on the number of lambs available to eat). It would be an even more egregious claim for Nietzsche, however, to say that the bird of prey needs morally to choose to become a lamb. To do so is “to demand of strength that it should *not* express itself as strength” (GM 13). Nietzsche believes that this demand is absurd in that it first betrays the true nature of the strong to will for their weakness and second is an altogether incoherent demand¹². As he writes, “popular morality separates strength from expressions of strength... There is no ‘being’ behind doing, effecting, becoming; ‘the doer’ is merely a fiction added to the deed—the deed is everything” (Nietzsche GM 13 pg 481). Nietzsche explains that for “lambs”, the desire to separate strength from expressions of strength is advantageous, because it makes birds of prey ultimately morally culpable for their “birdness,” when in fact there is no birdness outside of the bird of prey’s expression of self as strength (i.e. eating lambs). This is all to illustrate that Nietzsche believes a problem of Christianity is that too often those that follow it believe that they choose to *be* a certain way, i.e. that Christians have a fundamental, internal decision to be Christian and adopt its set of values as their selves. Nietzsche finds this deeply problematic, not because he believes individuals should not strive towards what they deem important (the opposite is more likely true), but because he believes that our existence is one where we do not ultimately decide what our true nature is. Truly, there is not “doer” beyond

¹² One may take issue with the first point mentioned here—that it is not wrong to demand of the strong to behave in a way that is beneficial to the weak. Indeed, this is a fundamental principle of democracy. My goal in this chapter, however, is not to defend Nietzsche’s remarks on his critique of morality, but to show how this critique nicely supplements our understanding of his conceptualization of the self.

“doing” in the sense that there is no *subject* behind his set of actions and desires. For Nietzsche, only a conceptualization of self *as subject* enables this kind of view to appear philosophically whole. What constitutes the self is doing, effecting, and becoming, i.e. that which encompasses what is external to the self.

Here the limits of self-knowledge start to become clear for Nietzsche. Because of the fact that the self encompasses a complex system of things external to us, exhaustively describing it is virtually impossible. This is what enables Nietzsche to claim: “As if the weakness of the weak—that is to say, their *essence*, their effects, their sole ineluctable, irremovable reality— were a voluntary achievement, willed, chosen, a *deed*, a *meritorious act*” (GM 13). No one can *choose* their essence or the foundation of their selfhood because no one can fully control everything that happens external to herself. It is clear now that there are some hard limits to the capabilities of self-knowledge embedded in a Nietzschean conceptualization of self. A more detailed understanding of Nietzsche’s criticism of *the subject*, however, will add light to his concept of selfhood as opaque while ultimately keeping the task of self-knowledge as a worthwhile project.

One way of understanding Nietzsche’s conception of self is to say that “Nietzsche calls into question not the ‘self,’ but only the image of it as the center of consciousness and reason, that is, the ‘subject’ in the traditional sense” (Sousa *et al.* 131). In this light, it seems that what Nietzsche may deem problematic or “utterly opaque” is not the self (i.e., the true basis of the individual), but *the subject* (i.e., the placing of consciousness as the core of the self). Several different places in *Beyond Good and Evil* 1, where Nietzsche critiques many central ideas of Western philosophy, corroborate this idea: “There are still harmless self-observers who believe that there are ‘immediate certainties,’ for example ‘I think’... as though knowledge here got hold

of its object purely and nakedly as ‘the thing in itself,’ without any falsification on the part of either the subject or object” (BGE 16). What seems to be at the base of Nietzsche’s concern is what he calls “the seduction of words.” In using this phrase, Nietzsche seems to say that if one is to use “I think” as the basis of her self, then she has a fundamental misunderstanding about the self. He makes it clear that this is problematic in two specific ways: (i) claiming an “I” that thinks means that there must necessarily be “something that thinks” and that this must be part of the body that acts as a cause for the rest of the self, and (ii) saying that one performs an act of “thinking” implies that one is fully capable of consciously deciding what one is going to think about and what that thought will fully entail (BGE 16). Both of these are deeply problematic implications for Nietzsche because he believes that there is no internal subject behind the self and that the self can’t choose its outpourings, but in fact *is* them.

Thus Nietzsche’s critique of the subject in this section revolves around what he calls “the ego.” For him, there is no singular metaphysical manifestation of the consciousness, i.e. there is no ego at the base of any comment “I think.” He makes a complementary remark in BGE 19, where he criticizes Schopenhauer for saying “I will,” implying that there is no ego that causes an action—merely a self that the action constitutes.

What Nietzsche ultimately seems to claim is that the subject of modern philosophy is truly just the soul of ancient philosophy. Constancio, in his article “Nietzsche on Decentered Subjectivity” writes, “We can also observe that he is keen to suggest that Descartes’ dualism is merely a modern reformulation of Plato’s old ‘error,’ ‘the invention of pure spirit and the Good in itself,’ as well as Christianity’s faith in the immortal ‘soul’” (Constancio 279). Constancio’s reason for this claim lies in BGE 54, where Nietzsche writes, “At bottom, *Kant* wanted to prove

that, starting from the subject, the subject could not be proved— nor could the object: the possibility of a *merely apparent existence* of the subject, ‘the soul’ in other words, may not always have remained strange to him” (BGE 54). With this, it becomes clear that Nietzsche thinks of the subject as a metaphysical, transcendental understanding of the self with which we must ultimately dispense. Not only is the concept of the subject simply false, it also has ethical implications for the individual that bar her from truly flourishing:

The reason why Nietzsche points out that the problem of subjectivity should be traced back to the Greeks and especially to Plato's dualistic 'errors' is because the crisis of the modern subject that he wants to describe belongs to the wider crisis of the transcendent, metaphysical *values* which Plato and his 'errors' created (Constancio 281).

For Constancio, Nietzsche critiques the subject because a conceptualization of self as subject implies that the self is inherently connected with a system of transcendental values. Richard Rorty, in his essay “Habermas and Lyotard on Postmodernity,” talks about what these implications are and provides more context for the connection between the modern self to the Platonic self:

By taking the ability to do such science as a mark of something deep and essential to human nature, as the place where we got closest to our true selves, Descartes preserved just those themes in ancient thought which Bacon had tried to obliterate. The preservation of the Platonic idea that our most distinctively human faculty was our ability to manipulate ‘clear and distinct ideas,’ rather than to accomplish feats of social engineering, was Descartes’ most important and most unfortunate contribution to what we now think of as ‘modern philosophy.’ Had Bacon - the prophet of self-assertion, as

opposed to self-grounding - been taken more seriously, we might not have been stuck with a canon of 'great modern philosopher' who took 'subjectivity' as their theme (Rorty 172).

Rorty plainly outlines the similitude between Descartes and Plato—namely, that they believe the highest project of the individual (that which is closest to their conception of the self) is to explore clear and distinct ideas, which necessarily privileges epistemological and scientific forms of thinking over moral and social forms. This outcome might appear irrelevant to Nietzsche's thought, but I believe it nicely supplements many of Nietzsche's comments in the early parts of *The Gay Science*, where Nietzsche critiques scientific thinking and its grotesque focus on Truth. All this is to say that Nietzsche's distrust of the subject has a deep history in Western thought and that his conception of the self is both a distancing from the self as subject and from its basis in the transcendental, metaphysical values of Plato and Christianity. Nietzsche believes that the conception of self as subject only emerged from a set of Platonic values and has no basis in lived existence.

Through analysis of the contextualization of different critiques of the subject that Nietzsche offers throughout his middle works, it is clear he finds deep philosophical issue with the subject. But where exactly does this leave us with respect to his own conceptualization of the self? I believe that the most compelling understanding is that thinking is like other aspects of one's life (and not the central piece of it), an *outpouring* of one's being. Constancio phrases this idea as such: "Consciousness is not really opposed to the drives, the instincts, or the affects, but is rather a mere result or surface-manifestation of developments and movements that occur in the unconscious depths of our instinctual and affective life" (Constancio 280). In his criticism of the

subject, Nietzsche is not denying individual perspective, nor is he altogether discrediting contemplation. Rather, he wants to think of thinking in the same light as other instincts of the individual, all of which are ultimately “surface-manifestations” of the depths of the self. When confronted with the question or task of self knowledge, one should not fall back on her individual uniqueness or consciousness to respond in a Nietzschean fashion¹³. Rather, she should look outwards at the dynamic, ever-changing, and complex web of outpourings that comprise and further constitute her self. This leaves us with an intriguing concluding remark about the potential role of the Other in cultivation of the self for Nietzsche.

Referring back to Nietzsche’s comments in Schopenhauer as Educator, he seems to suggest that our desire for friendship can partly constitute the self. How Nietzsche conceptualizes the self inherently affects the avenues for flourishing available to the individual. Rorty points out that that a conceptualization of the self as internal conceptually lends itself to scientific and other epistemologically interesting channels. For this conceptualization of self, the Other has the potential to aid scientific understanding and better develop epistemically worthwhile discoveries. For a Nietzschean conceptualization of self, one fundamentally external, it seems that the Other can fundamentally define selfhood and conduce projects and desires that constitute the individual. Because Nietzsche conceptualizes the self as external, the project of self-cultivation on part of the individual becomes possible *with the Other*, not in spite of her. In this way, the Other is not necessarily antithetical to the self or the projects of an individual. We see this in

¹³ This should not be taken as a contradiction on Nietzsche’s part when he encourages educators to urge their students towards individual uniqueness. There is no base consciousness upon which an individual can construct unique qualities. Rather, I believe that when Nietzsche urges his readers to develop their “genius” as he does in beginning of “Schopenhauer as Educator,” he draws them away from the herd to focus on their selves, that which is external to them.

TSZ, where Zarathustra is able to lay out the foundation for a philosophy of the future due to his disciples, enemies, and friends. Indeed, there is space in Nietzsche's thought for the Other to supplement productively and uniquely the desires of the individual, should the individual situate herself deliberately and carefully to the Other for the sake of her own flourishing.

3.2 Will to Power

Nietzsche's conceptualization of self lends itself well to interesting insight into the value of otherness in his thought. While his notion of will to power may appear to be less directly relevant, reconsidering its orthodox interpretation in Nietzschean scholarship will lead to further insight into the role of the Other in the life of the flourishing individual. Nietzsche's conception of the will to power is much more potentially problematic towards my account of otherness than a misinterpretation of the Nietzschean self could have been. An orthodox interpretation of the will to power goes something like this—it is a striving towards individual flourishing that involves the supremacy of oneself over others in order to achieve the fullest sense of self-fulfilment. If we are to take this account of the will to power as true, there would be strong limits on the value of otherness for the flourishing individual. The individual would indeed have to abuse the Other in order to achieve her highest form of flourishing. Ultimately, however, I want to problematize the orthodox interpretation of the will to power and rethink the Other's conceptual placement in relation to this important Nietzschean concept¹⁴.

¹⁴ To be perfectly clear here, I believe that offering an “all stones unturned” interpretation of the will to power is a bankrupt project. It is a particularly intellectually impenetrable topic for Nietzsche. Part of the reason for this stems from the fact that the main work of his that covers this topic, *Will to Power*, was not actually compiled by Nietzsche. His sister compiled the aphoristic work from personal notes of his posthumously, thus there is an unfortunate inexactness to it. Given this and the fact that the amount of robust secondary literature on the topic is sparse relative to other Nietzschean areas of study, I cannot in good confidence offer a full conception of the will to power in the following pages. My goal here is merely to problematize the orthodox interpretation of this topic and suggest viewing it in a light that is

In order to accomplish this, we must first have a clear understanding of the reasoning behind the orthodox interpretation of the will to power. I believe that much of the motivation for this interpretation of the will to power stems primarily from an incomplete reading of the topic. Even when Nietzsche first starts to lay the conceptual groundwork for what develops into his concept of the will to power, it is clear that the will to power bears a deep similitude to one's will to live. Nietzsche writes, "The struggle for existence is only... a temporary restriction of the will to life. The great and small struggle always revolves around superiority, around growth and expansion, around power—in accordance with the will to power which is the will of life" (GS 292). In this aphorism from *The Gay Science*, Nietzsche is talking about "the struggle for existence," or the unavoidable setbacks that happen in life. Engaging meaningfully with life necessitates struggle for Nietzsche. Put simply, regardless of one's status or level of power in life, she will face obstacles. It is clear from this quotation that Nietzsche believes one who wills to live must address these struggles; after all, a will to continue living well means that an individual will strive to overcome the obstacles she faces. Will to power is the will to life in the sense that one's desire to struggle in overcoming the series of obstacles she faces (i.e. will to power) *is* at base her affirmation of life and desire towards the continuation of her existence. There seems to be nothing remotely pernicious in this formulation of will to power. Potential concerns arise, however, when Nietzsche describes the notion in other places in his work.

In the final part of *Beyond Good and Evil*, we get a much darker image of the will to power that could predicate an inherently antithetical relationship with the Other. In the following passage, Nietzsche is urging his readers to ponder the set of values a noble person might adopt to

accordant to my account of otherness to see what philosophically intriguing comments I can make if we take my account of otherness to be true.

accomplish his larger project of critiquing morality. Nietzsche sharply characterizes nobility as being indifferent towards what slaves might deem contemptible:

Here we must beware of superficiality... resisting all sentimental weakness: life itself is *essentially* appropriation, injury, overpowering of what is alien and weaker; suppression, hardness, imposition of one's own forms, incorporation and at least, at its mildest, exploitation... 'Exploitation' does not belong to a corrupt or imperfect and primitive society: it belongs to the *essence* of what lives, as a basic organic function; it is a consequence of the will to power, which is after all the will to life (BGE 259).

The superficiality Nietzsche warns us against is that of what he calls “the fundamental principle of society,” i.e. the congenial agreement upon which members of European society have agreed to “refrain mutually from injury” towards one another (BGE 259). This cultural sentiment troubles Nietzsche because it disregards an essential (non-removable without distortion) component of life. This term that most aptly seems to get at the core of this list of what is essential to life seems to be exploitation (even if it is lessened with respect to degree than a more appropriate term for Nietzsche). All of this is to say that “[a living body] will strive to grow, spread, seize, become predominant— not from any morality or immorality but because it is *living* and because life simply *is* will to power” (BGE 259). What Nietzsche appears to be doing above all in this section is separating the morally bad connotations one associates with exploitative actions from the acts themselves. Regardless of his intent, this passage clearly states that an undeniable aspect of life for Nietzsche is the subjugation of what “is alien,” i.e., of the Other. So how is this remotely compatible with an account of otherness in Nietzsche's thought?

That Nietzsche believes an inherent aspect of life is exploitation does not mean that life is entirely exploitation¹⁵. Notice that exploitation is *a consequence* of the will to power; it is not will to power itself. Notice also that Nietzsche again states that will to power is the will to life in the above passage. It is abundantly clear that Nietzsche believes the will to power is fundamentally intertwined with our will to live. Indeed, Zarathustra explicitly says in part one of TSZ (among many other places in his work), “Life is will to power” (TSZ I, 13).

I believe that addressing one final nuanced conceptualization of the will to power that Nietzsche offers earlier in *Beyond Good and Evil* will both address concerns about the exploitative nature of the will to power and further shed light on this bold, descriptive claim that life is will to power. Nietzsche implores us to think of will to power in a specific way in *Beyond Good and Evil*: “Physiologists should think before putting down the instinct of self-preservation as the cardinal instinct of an organic being. A living thing seeks above all to *discharge* its strength— life itself is *will to power*; self-preservation is only one of the indirect and most frequent *results*” (BGE 13). Thinking of will to power as discharge is particularly philosophically productive. While it is true that life is will to power and that will to power often manifests itself in exploitation, I believe that Nietzsche thinks of will to power most basically as the drive for an individual to actualize what conditions she believes will enable her to flourish. In this way, will to power is *discharge*, or a sort of gushing of self as one lives that is inseparably intertwined with life itself, i.e. one cannot live without discharge just in the way that one cannot live without her will to power.

¹⁵ It is clear that Nietzsche believes those who exploit do not deserve the moral condemnation they receive in Western culture. Ultimately, whether or not you sympathize with or abhor this comment should not impact your views on the mere descriptive element to this claim. Humans have an undeniable propensity towards violence that Nietzsche sees as a fundamental aspect of life.

Thinking of will to power as discharge clarifies Nietzsche's seeming fixation with exploitation in *Beyond Good and Evil* 259. Exploitation is a consequence of the will to power in so far as it is a manifestation (and perhaps common one) of the will to power. This implies that there are different manifestations of one's will to power and Nietzsche does, in fact, believe that there are many possible manifestations of an individual's will to power. Nietzsche seems further to think that there is a hierarchy among them:

“The will to power appears a. among the oppressed, among slaves of all kinds, as will to ‘freedom’: merely getting free seems to be the goal... b. among a stronger kind of man, getting ready for power, as will to overpower.... to ‘justice,’ i.e., to the *same measure of rights as the ruling type possesses*; c. among the strongest, richest, most independent, most courageous, as ‘love of mankind,’ of ‘the people,’... as instinctive self-involvement with a great quantum of power to which one is able to give direction... ‘Freedom,’ ‘Justice,’ ‘Love’!!!” (WP 776).

Here, in *Will to Power*, Nietzsche outlines three kinds of will to power that are embodied in their fundamental drive: freedom, justice, and love. The fact that he orders these and contains a list of long superlatives in the final of these three manifestations of will to power implies Nietzsche is ranking them. He starts off with the will to power of the oppressed, which is freedom. This makes sense within a Nietzsche framework—one who is fundamentally oppressed would seek to discharge or live simply by having her shackles removed. This form of will to power, however, is not as high of rank as the second, which wills for justice. This is the manifestation of the will to power that exploitation (and the long list of other things in *Beyond Good and Evil* 259) would fall under. It calls for overpowering and the subjugation of those around the individual as a ruler.

The final and highest form Nietzsche lists here embodies itself in love, which Nietzsche understands as the “strongest” representation of power. Love seems to be something that belongs to a refined, especially strong spirit, especially considering the descriptors he attaches to this form of the will to power: rich and independent. Near the very end of *Beyond Good and Evil*, Nietzsche offers a more intelligible explanation as to how love might be considered the highest form of will to power:

[A human being’s] characteristic high-grade *graciousness* toward his fellow men becomes possible only once he has attained his height and rules. Impatience and his consciousness that until then he is always condemned to comedy—for even war is a comedy and conceals, just as every means conceals the end—spoil all his relations to others: this type of man knows solitude and what is most poisonous in it (BGE 273).

Graciousness, something acutely akin to the love Nietzsche talks about in *Will to Power* 776, belongs only to those who have attained height, i.e. only those who developed themselves towards flourishing. Seemingly uncharacteristically of Nietzsche, he suggests at the end of this passage that impatience, or a lack of graciousness, can “spoil” an individual’s relationship with the Other. It is the mark of a high individual to know even the negative aspects of solitude, something Nietzsche normally holds in high regard. Thus, love and graciousness are a form of will to power that is reserved for the highest individuals within Nietzsche’s conception of the will to power.

Nietzsche’s conceptualization of the will to power is not at odds with my robust account of otherness in his thought and indeed offers insight into potential avenues of flourishing for the highest individuals exercising will to power. Early on in this section, we saw how the will to

power could be potentially damaging to my account of otherness. If the will to power is so central to life and the will to power is appropriation and domination of others, then the Other cannot meaningfully supplement the life of the individual, but must only be an object upon which the individual can exert his force. It is clear that the will to power is the will to live, but that will to power does not necessarily manifest itself as the exploitation of others. I believe that Nietzsche's conception of will to power is coherent with my interpretation of otherness if we carefully consider the nuances in how Nietzsche conceptualizes the will to power. Thinking of the will to power as discharge and having many different forms of discharge enables us to approach this difficult concept in a more productive manner. Indeed, the highest form of will to power is embodied with love and graciousness, something we see in Zarathustra's will to power in TSZ. Thus, while will to power can manifest itself in ways that are fundamentally antithetical to a substantive relationship with the Other, it is clear that the flourishing individual can relate to the Other in a way that is fundamentally conducive to her life should she exert her will to power in the highest way possible.

3.3 Concluding Remarks

By fully grappling with the Nietzsche concepts of self and will to power in exploring areas of tension with my account of otherness, we are left with some fascinating insights. Thinking of the self as a dynamic cycle of feedback drawn on engagement with the world and others enables for the Other to be part of an individual's definition of self, which can provide her with new means to live more fully. Thinking of will to power as discharge enables the individual to flourish with the Other, not in spite of her. Because the highest form of will to power is love, there is potential for an individual to exercise her will to power with the Other, as we see

Zarathustra do at the end of TSZ¹⁶. Both of these Nietzschean concepts supplement my account of otherness in a way that makes otherness more valuable to the flourishing individual.

¹⁶ This idea is also the foundation upon which Julian Young and his sympathizers believe community is the highest goal of Nietzsche. In his view, the collective actualization of several individual's will to power can achieve something impossible to accomplish individuated.

Conclusion

The above work makes it abundantly clear that Russell's interpretation of Nietzsche as a thinker concerned solely with the flourishing individual is blatantly false. Any understanding of Nietzsche's work that sympathizes with Russell in this regard egregiously flattens Nietzsche's rich conception of otherness that he presents in TSZ and that he embellishes in other works written around the same time. This paper, in a very Nietzschean manner, fundamentally asks what value the Other can provide to the individual seeking a path towards her own flourishing. Each chapter has shown, in very different capacities, that the Other can enable the individual to flourish in ways that she would be unable to do alone.

Chapter one does some necessary table setting for my argument. In it, I do an in depth analysis of TSZ to present (i) examples which demonstrate the centrality of otherness in Nietzsche's magnum opus and (ii) a basis of content upon which we can further unfold the significance of otherness within Nietzsche's other works. One of the key takeaways from this section (aside from the specific content each step of Zarathustra's progression into a philosopher of the future provides) is that the Other is a true catalyst for Zarathustra's flourishing. As he says in his solitude ascending a mountain at the beginning of part three, right before the crucial conceptualization of the eternal return: "One must learn to *look away* from oneself in order to see *much*:- this hardness is necessary for every climber of mountains" (TSZ III, 1). Zarathustra believes there is value in turning towards that which is external to the individual. This is because it enables the individual to see more than what solitude or an inward gaze can offer. While this task is not easy (i.e. this hardness), it seems that it is *necessary* for anyone hoping to achieve heights, or something fundamentally *above* her current self. Specifically, turning towards the

Other and engaging meaningfully with her opens new pathways towards flourishing and expedites the individual's journey along these paths.

Chapter two elaborates on the relationships an individual can have with the Other. It begins by addressing the various disparaging images of otherness within Nietzsche's work in order to nuance and build upon our conceptualization of the topic presented in chapter one. A key take away from this section is that a substantive relationship with the Other is absolutely possible in Nietzsche's view, but requires diligent work to keep the relationship conducive to one's life. Nietzsche, from the standpoint of an educator, hopes to bring his readers away from the herd. Moving away from the herd is quite difficult, but undoubtedly rewarding. As Nietzsche writes early on in *Beyond Good and Evil*: "Independence is for the very few; it is a privilege of the strong" (BGE 29). Independence is for the strong in the sense that leaving the herd is difficult. It is clear from Nietzsche's many comments on otherness that a substantive relationship with the Other is also difficult yet rewarding. Relationships like the enemy and the friend are also something reserved for the strong, i.e. those willing to work at it to make it conducive towards their existence. Yet should this difficulty be overcome, the individual can benefit from the friend ways that are foundational to her unique flourishing. In this way, a relationship with the Other can cultivate an individual's independence.

Chapter three dwells in some tension in orthodox Nietzschean concepts that arises as I substantiate relationships the individual can have with the Other in chapter two. By leaning into the areas of potential conflict that arise in the Nietzschean conceptions of self and will to power, we are able to nuance our understanding of both of these difficult topics. Conceptualizing of the self as a dynamic feedback system of feedback enables for the individual to think of the Other as

something fundamental to her selfhood. In a similar way, thinking of will to power as discharge enables for the individual to actualize projects and desires foundational to her flourishing with the Other, not in spite of her.

It is clear Nietzsche believes that there are definite limits to the value of otherness. The Other cannot, for example, construct the bridge upon which the individual must cross the stream of life (referring back to chapter three, where I drew a citation from “Schopenhauer as Educator”)—only the individual herself can do so. Put more simply, the Other can neither entirely constitute the individual’s sense of self nor hand over foolproof methods by which she can flourish. I believe further that Nietzsche sees otherness as something that the individual truly concerned with her flourishing should engage with, but not haphazardly or without reason. Doing so could lead the individual back towards the herd or frustrate self-cultivation in unanticipated ways.

Yet for individuals truly seeking to flourish, it seems that a deliberate relation to the Other is absolutely invaluable. Without the Other, Zarathustra would perhaps still be a “bullhorn prophet,” desperately trying to convey his message to unsympathetic crowds. He would have failed to find friends who could give hope for the future of humankind let alone have found good reason to leave his cave in the first place. The tightrope walker would have died an unfree death, still shackled with regret and uncertainty about the value of his existence. Zarathustra’s disciples would have been without an educator and would have lived flatter lives without the rich teachings of their mentor. Regardless of hypotheticals, it is clear that even for Nietzsche, whose writing contains unequivocally humanistic and individualistic underpinnings, the Other has a role in the well lived life. Perhaps this role is different than many would envision. It is undeniable in

Nietzsche's thought, however, that the individual who deliberately engages with the Other has something to gain by doing so.

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