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The Indian Political Movement with Special Reference to the Menominee Tribe

John L. Martin

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At its meeting on June 9, 1978, the Faculty of Lawrence University awarded Honors in Independent Study, magna cum laude, to John Martin for his thesis "The Indian Political Movement with Special Reference to the Menominee Tribe." The members of the examining committee were:

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THE INDIAN POLITICAL MOVEMENT

WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO

THE MENOMINEE TRIBE

by

John L. Martin

A Thesis Submitted in Candidacy for Honors
at Graduation from Lawrence University

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The American Indian movement of the 1960's and 1970's marks the first time in three generations that a large number of Indians were politically active. Indians participating in the movement were either formally involved in one of three national organizations, one of innumerable tribal organizations, or uninvolved in any such organization formally. The general movement was tribalistic-nationalistic. It was tribalistic since tribal identity, autonomy, and recognition of treaty rights was sought. The movement was nationalistic since participants sought a national Indian identity and common goals regarding the Indians' relationship with the federal government.

We will be concerned primarily with the factors contributing to the formation of the Indian movement. Given the complexities of the movement and the lack of available detailed scholarly information, we will be forced to make generalizations, sometimes taking the form of conjecture where there is an extreme paucity of information. Our case study of the Menominee Indians' part in the movement will allow us to examine variables more specifically and will offer cogency to the generalizations made on the larger Indian movement.

Our analysis will show that the government policies which brought small economic and political improvements on Indian reservations in the

1960's raised Indian expectations to unrealistically high levels. The improvements also carried dominant societal values posing threats to tribal values. As a result of these threats and expectations, a social movement developed for the poverty stricken and politically alienated Indians. We will also show that the media and government policies created a situation conducive to collective action.

For the Menominee Indians, there were the additional policies of Indian land sales and termination of reservation status which increased alienation and contributed to the formation of a locally based organization. While Menominee protests were effective at the state and local level in achieving tribal goals, the Menominees were dependent on litigation and skillful lobbying at the national level. The larger Indian movement was also dependent on such tactics.

Among the specific questions for the Indian movement which we will attempt to answer are: What created Indian alienation? What kept the alienated Indians politically inactive prior to the 1960's? What events and policies made the period conducive to collective behavior? What additional strains were placed on the Indians in the sixties? How did government policies lead to relative deprivation (i.e., the gap between expectations and capabilities)? What was the belief pattern that spread among the Indians? How did it develop? What were the most immediate strains leading to participation in the movement and to collective outbursts? How were Indians mobilized for collective action? Why did Indian collective behavior take its particular forms? What was the relationship between the movement and the collective outbursts? What effects

did the collective outbursts have on the general public, on the movement, and on federal policy? And finally, how did the President and Congress respond to the demands of the movement?

These questions will also be answered for the Menominees. More specific questions will be formulated about the Menominees when we reach the chapter on the Menominees' participation in the Indian movement.

In answering the above questions we will rely on theories of collective behavior (Smelser), political alienation, and relative deprivation (Gurr). Thus, before beginning the analysis of the Indian movement, we will establish a theoretical construct. We will review Smelser's structural approach toward a theory of collective behavior, develop a theory of political alienation, and outline Gurr's theory of relative deprivation.

There are two readily apparent advantages in using the framework provided by Smelser in his classic work on The Theory of Collective Behavior. First, we will be following a chartered course that will put us on common ground with other researchers of collective action. Second, we will be following a well-organized pattern for analysis which will allow us to more easily formulate and apply certain hypotheses.

According to Smelser, "collective behavior is guided by various kinds of beliefs -- assessments of the situation, values, and expectations" which also involve a belief in "the existence of extraordinary forces -- threats, conspiracies, etc. . . ., which are at work in the universe."¹ Such beliefs also involve an assessment of the consequences of successful action.²

Collective behavior includes two distinct types of behavior -- the social movement* and the outburst. Social movements "denote a wide variety of collective attempts to bring about a change in certain social institutions or to create an entirely new order."³ All social movements have political implications. Movements may be either norm or value oriented. This distinction will be clarified when we identify the components of collective action.

An outburst may take the form of a panic, a craze, or a hostile outburst. Since there were no incidences of panic or craze in the beliefs and actions of the Indian movement we will be concerned ^{only} with the hostile outburst in this paper. A hostile outburst is "simply mobilization for action under a hostile belief," which involves hysterical and wish-fulfillment beliefs.⁴ A hostile outburst may or may not be a part of a social movement. For individuals mobilized for hostile behavior, structural strains and the generalized belief pattern may be value or norm oriented.

Smelser identifies four major components of collective behavior.⁶ Each component identified is inclusive of all below it, but not vice versa. Each is in order of importance to the integration of social order.

*Smelser prefers the use of the terms norm-oriented movement and value-oriented movement to social movement. According to Smelser, social movements are guided by general principles such as peace and humanism.⁵ However, since most academicians use "social movements" to encompass the phenomena of value and norm-oriented movements, we too will use the term in traditional sense. This definition requires that a large number of individuals must actively be pursuing group goals.

1. "Values state in general terms the desirable end states which act as a guide to human endeavor; they are so general in reference that they do not specify norms, kinds of organization, or kinds of facilities which are required to realize these ends."⁷

2. Norms are the specific regulatory principles required for the realization of values. They are the "ways in which the value patterns of the common culture of a social system are integrated in the concrete action of its units in their interaction with each other."⁸

3. Mobilization of motivation specifies "who will be the agents in the pursuit of valued ends, how the actions of these agents will be structured into concrete roles and organizations, and how they will be rewarded for responsible participation in these roles and organizations."⁹

4. Situational facilities refer to the "means and obstacles which facilitate or hinder the attainment of concrete goals in the role or organization context."¹⁰

Structural strains on any of the above requires adjustments. However, certain conditions must first exist for potential participants in collective behavior to exert pressure for adjustments.

These general conditions, which constitute the value-added process are (1) structural conduciveness, (2) structural strain, (3) growth and spread of a generalized belief, (4) precipitating factors, (5) mobilization of participants for action, and (6) operation of social control. The path to collective behavior usually, but not necessarily, follows these stages chronologically.

This value-added process and the components of social action thus establish a general framework for this paper. We will have frequent occasion to refer to more specific points from The Theory of Collective Behavior.

By discussing political alienation as a special type of strain (in terms of Smelser's theory) we should be able to formulate hypotheses on the relationship between political alienation and collective behavior.

Because the concept of alienation is many-faced and confusing, we must carefully define political alienation. In offering a definition we can identify four important components of political alienation. These components are derived in part from Seemen's classic definition of alienation.¹¹ (Henceforth, the term alienation in this paper shall refer only to political alienation.)

(1) Powerlessness is the expectation held by the individual that as a member of a certain group he is incapable of influencing decisions in the political arena through legitimate political channels.

(2) Meaninglessness refers to a lack of understanding of the political norms of the society, often resulting from conflicting group social norms and society wide political norms.

(3) Normlessness reflects a belief that to achieve a given goal an individual as a member of a certain group must go outside the societal norms. (This is similar to Durkhiem's concept of "anomie.")

(4) Isolation refers to group assignment of "low reward" value of goals and beliefs that are typically highly valued in the dominant society.

Implicit in our definition of alienation is that there is an attitude among the alienated that changes within the political system are necessary and that the political system is biased against the alienated

group. Thus individuals as members of a group are alienated from political institutions, groups, leaders, and processes. That is, they are alienated from all the parts of the political system. For this reason structural strain is inherent in our definition of political alienation.

Contrary to some interpretations there is no reason to believe that a "positive relationship" must have once existed for political alienation to occur.¹³ Alienation exists when a group is under the political control of the alienating agent, regardless of whether there was once a positive relationship. For instance, in modernizing societies a tribe may suddenly come under the forced control of the central government and become alienated. In this case it is impossible to say that a "positive relationship" existed prior to the onset of alienation.

Political alienation may take either an active (i.e., attempts to overthrow the system) or an inactive form (i.e., political nonparticipation). Several authors have assumed that the alienated are always "apathetic."¹⁴ However, given our definition, alienation may continue even when a group is actively attempting to overthrow the system. These activities, while usually breaking "the rules of the game," may be within the "rules of the game" but outside traditional political channels (e.g., marches, mass demonstrations, and public nongovernmental hearings).

Koff has suggested that nonparticipating alienated individuals "must be considered potential supporters of revolutionary movements."¹⁵ On a more general level they must be considered as potential participants in collective behavior. For collective action to occur we know that certain conditions (Smelser's value-added process) must first exist. For

the alienated to unite and become active there must be the crystallization of a certain type of generalized belief, and precipitating factors leading to mobilization for collective action.

In terms of Smelser's theory, strain is inherent to the concept of political alienation. (Strain is defined as an impairment of the relationships among, and consequent inadequate functioning of, the components of action.) However, when a group remains inactively alienated we can assume that a situation nonconducive to collective behavior exists. Gurr's theory of relative deprivation is useful in identifying the conditions which make political activation likely.¹⁶ In the course of the paper we will have occasion to frequently make reference to these social, political, and economic conditions.

Relative deprivation overlaps the concept of political alienation. Both involve a dissatisfaction with the political system and assume a certain amount of powerlessness in achieving goals. However, relative deprivation, "defined as perceived discrepancy between value expectations and value capabilities,"¹⁷ does not imply that a group necessarily feel powerless in changing the political system through legitimate channels. Our concern with Indian relative deprivation extends only to the point where Indians perceive powerlessness.

Together the theories of collective behavior, relative deprivation and political alienation provide a useful theoretical framework. The Theory of Collective Behavior identifies the complex components of collective behavior and their interactions. Gurr's theory of relative

deprivation is more useful in identifying the relationship between specific types of strains and specific courses of collective action. Relative deprivation easily fits into Smelser's broader theory. Gurr's relative deprivation represents a particular type of strain (and often a precipitating factor) under certain conducive conditions. These strains, which contribute to a generalized belief, can be used to predict the likely types of collective action. Our theory of political alienation also fits within the framework of Smelser's theory. It helps to explain, primarily through generalized belief patterns, why collective behavior does not occur when strains exist. For our analysis, the application of the theory of alienation will establish a foundation for studying the development of the Indian movement. Having established a theoretical framework, we can now turn our attention to the background information on Indians and Indian policy.

CHAPTER TWO
FEDERAL INDIAN POLICY AND INDIAN ALIENATION

In this chapter we will describe very briefly the history of federal Indian policy and the general political, social, and economic conditions of Indians prior to the development of the Indian social movement. This will allow us to establish the nature of Indian alienation. Also, it will define the long lasting strains that Indians tried to eliminate through the social movement.

We must begin by identifying Indians as a minority group. In 1960 the Bureau of Census recorded a total of 545,000 U.S. Indians (i.e., persons who identify themselves as Indians).¹ In 1970, Indian population rose to 792,000.² The increase was due to both a high birth rate and improved census data gathering techniques. The percentage of Indians living on reservations between these years fell from 73 percent to 60 percent.³ As of 1968 the Bureau of Indian Affairs reported 290 Indian reservations representing approximately the same number of tribes.⁴ One hundred of these tribes contained less than one hundred Indians.⁵ Geographically ninety percent of Indian reservation land lies west of the Mississippi River.

The discussion on the B.I.A. (Bureau of Indian Affairs) that follows describes the agency prior to the beginning of the American Indian social movement. The B.I.A. dealt with all the political, social

and economic aspects of reservation Indian life except medical services. Until 1975 the B.I.A. had no formal responsibility toward Indians off the reservations.

For the Indians, the B.I.A. performed legislative, judicial and executive functions. There were very limited inputs from Indians for the planning and implementation of B.I.A. policies. While the Bureau had substantial freedom to change its policies, it rigidly followed the course set down by Congress and the President.

The B.I.A. continues to be headed by a commissioner who is appointed by each new president and must meet with Senate approval. As head of the Bureau, which is within the Department of the Interior, the Commissioner is most immediately responsible to the Assistant Secretary of Public Land Management and is ultimately responsible to the Secretary of the Interior. Until 1975, within the B.I.A. bureaucracy, under the authority of the commissioner there were two administrative area officers and sixty Indian agencies and minor installations on the reservations.

Until the 1930's very few Indians were employed in the Bureau. Even by 1960 the number of Indians employed had not increased substantially.⁶ The positions Indians typically filled were in the lower administrative echelon.⁷

With only one notable exception (John Collier, 1934-41) since the B.I.A.'s incorporation in 1849, the commissioners until 1965 followed policies of assimilation and were responsive only to white or "marginal" Indian entrepreneurs interested in exploiting reservation land, natural

resources, or Indian workers. The policies set forth by Congress were consistent with these interests.

Despite the fact that Indians have long been America's poorest citizens, Congress and the President failed to respond to Indian needs. There are three major reasons for this. First, fiscal conservatism, particularly after World War II, could not justify the appropriation of aid for the "assimilating" Indians. Second, and closely connected, such assistance was seen as hindering assimilation by rewarding the Indians for "tribal" behavior.⁸ Third, there were few cases where tribes were able to organize for lobbying efforts in Congress. Congress had virtually no organized opposition to its policies until the mid-fifties.

Before discussing the specific political, social, and economic conditions on reservations and how they have been affected by B.I.A. policies it will be useful to first outline the congressional and executive policies which have largely determined B.I.A. policies. The background information is important because of the significance of these policies for Indians in the sixties and seventies.

Congressional assimilation policies found their strongest statement in the 1887 Dawes General Allotment Act which remained in effect until 1934. Under the act tribal land was parcelled to individual Indians who then lost their special reservation Indian status and accompanying rights. During this period reservation lands were reduced from 138 million acres to 48 million acres.

The Dawes Act was revoked with the passage of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934. B.I.A. Commissioner Collier was primarily responsible for the passage of this legislation. It ended land parcelling and sought to give the Indians the right and the power to organize. It also sought to give Indian leaders more political and economic responsibility. Collier and Congress interpreted the act in two different ways. While Collier saw the act as strengthening tribal solidarity, Congress interpreted the act as a way to help Indians use their own culture as a spring board for assimilation. By 1939 it was clear that the act was a failure, lacking funding and congressional and Bureau support. The Indian Reorganization Act was successful only in preventing land parcelling and in providing for a limited increase in decision making power for certain tribes (not including the Menominees). For instance, the Navajos were allowed to establish their own form of government.

After World War II, with an increased congressional concern about "big government," Congress began to consider reducing the size of the B.I.A. by turning some of its functions over to other agencies. Certain conservative House and Senate members also considered dissolving the bureau altogether.⁹ They envisioned following from this act rapid Indian assimilation and a reduction in the federal budget.

During this period the conservative assimilationist from Utah, Senator Arthur V. Watkins, wielded considerable influence on the Interior and Insular Affairs Committee's Indian Affairs Subcommittee. His power was increased between 1952 and 1954 as Chairman, when the Republicans

controlled the Senate. Watkins' attitudes are accurately summarized by McNickle:

It was his view that Indians could not hope to have an identity separate from the mainstream of American life, and that those who encouraged such hopes by helping Indians to develop their communities were doing a mischief. He regarded the Indian programs of the Roosevelt Administration as misdirected social experiments that perpetuated the illusion of a future for Indians as Indians. He looked to Congress as the agency to deliver the Indians out of bondage and free their property from governmental surveillance.¹⁰

While Watkins and Congress took no major action to change the structure of the B.I.A., two measures were passed in 1953 which were to have a profound effect on reservation Indians. The first, Public Law 280, transferred to certain states jurisdiction over criminal and civil law on the reservations. Also, Indian tribes were granted the power to exercise police powers within reservation boundaries, except for a few cases where Indian tribes had requested otherwise. The second legislative action was Concurrent Resolution 108 stating to be "the sense of Congress that at the earliest possible time federal control and supervision of tribes should be terminated."¹¹ This resolution was thus a denunciation of treaty obligations.

In 1954 Congress moved to implement the termination policy. A termination bill (Public Law 83-399) was passed in a near unanimous vote. It provided for termination of federal control and supervision of the Menominees of Wisconsin, the Klamaths of Oregon and several smaller tribal groups. These tribes and groups were judged to be most prepared for termination on account of their satisfactory socioeconomic status in

comparison to other tribes. This legislation will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter four.

The secretary of the Interior "in full accord with the Congressional mandate, moved purposefully to abandon trusteeship even where Congress had not legislated."¹² Land was allowed to pass out of Indian ownership at an accelerating rate. Between 1953 and 1957 eight million reservation acres were sold.¹³ The parcels sold were usually the most desirable. This policy proved to be short-lived, however. In 1958 the new Interior Secretary, Fred Seaton, announced that the land parcelling and sales would cease and that no tribe thereafter would be terminated without its consent.¹⁴ Further, according to Seaton the thrust of Indian policy was to be re-directed for health, education, and economic development.¹⁵ Seaton's announcement followed an intensive lobbying effort by the N.C.A.I. (National Congress of American Indians - characterized on pages 24-27). The N.C.A.I. lobbied for the protection of tribal assets and against termination policy. Despite the stated changes in policy, no action was taken to improve reservation conditions.

John Kennedy and his Interior Secretary, Udall, continued the policy rhetoric of Seaton. Kennedy made no substantial attempt to improve political, social or economic conditions on reservations. Also, while Udall admitted that termination was a mistake, he and Kennedy refused to support an attempt to delay termination. There was no formal disavowal of termination.

In summary, we have seen that Congress, the President, and the B.I.A. did not permit Indian self-determination and did not seek to substantially improve political, social and economic conditions for the Indians. Congress and the executive followed policies of assimilation and policies which benefitted the exploiters of Indian lands.

Because reservations have been under the control of the B.I.A. the depressed conditions on reservations can be viewed largely as a product of B.I.A. policies and their effects on reservations. The important factors for analysis are politics, education, employment, and health. This review will provide a background necessary to demonstrate political alienation.

Through the mid-sixties the B.I.A. effectively controlled tribal politics on all but a few reservations, although the B.I.A. did require that all reservations have a tribal constitution and elected leaders. For most tribes these leaders had to meet with B.I.A. approval. Further, since the B.I.A. controlled all reservation funds most leaders were not able to make policy decisions without B.I.A. approval.

Leaders were usually marginal-elites who were more willing and more capable than most Indians to act as intermediaries between the white bureaucracy and the largely dissatisfied Indians.¹⁶ (Most Indians seem to have had a low respect for these leaders since they tended to shunt traditional tribal values.) These leaders rarely faced opposition because no one else was willing to serve as intermediaries. Also, the number of marginal-elites in tribes was small (i.e., less than five percent of the

population.)¹⁷ Nonmarginal-elites probably would not have met the B.I.A.'s approval even if elected.

The few tribes (e.g., Navajo, Apache) having some self-government were identified in 1948 and 1961 Presidential reports as having the most effective tribal governments.¹⁸ Self-government was identified as a "potent weapon" which was invariably more effective in implementing B.I.A. programs.¹⁹ However, neither Congress, the President, nor the B.I.A. acted to increase self-determination.

The federal government also did not seek to improve depressed economic conditions on reservations, which left Indians with an average income lower than that of any other American ethnic group. Average Indian income in comparison to whites was thirty-five percent in 1959 but rose to fifty-one percent by 1968.²⁰ Unemployment averaged 18.5 percent in 1959 on reservations according to the U.S. Census, which counts only those actively seeking work.²¹ The B.I.A. estimated real unemployment at thirty-three percent in 1973.²² Since measured Indian unemployment improved slightly after 1966, it seems that real unemployment was probably slightly higher in the early sixties. Unemployment has remained above fifty percent on several reservations.

Industrialization, often seen as a solution to employment problems, has not occurred on or near reservations because of location problems, "poor Indian attitudes," and the lack of a skilled labor force. Prior to the mid-sixties the Bureau did little to encourage economic development.²³

Employment-wise the B.I.A.'s primary goal was to train Indians as farmers, thereby providing a path to assimilation. Yet, the percentage of Indians employed in farm labor dropped over sixty percent between 1920 and 1970.²⁴ The B.I.A. did offer substantial reservation employment in service programs.

Beginning in 1952 the B.I.A. also had a voluntary relocation program. It contributed to an increased urban Indian population of 50,000 between 1950 and 1960.²⁵ Indians in urban areas maintained higher incomes, but incomes were still below average. Those Indians with college educations were also unlikely to live on reservations because of the lack of jobs. Thus, cultural conflict existed between tribal values (e.g., commitment to the reservation and the tribe) and job opportunities.

Education is another problem area which created cultural conflict and increased alienation on reservations. Particularly prior to the mid sixties educational facilities and equipment were poor.²⁶ Also, teachers were overwhelmingly white (e.g., 85% in 1968) and characteristically had short tenures on reservations. Cultural problems posed by these white teachers and their teaching methods represented the greatest problems. Consequently the overriding difficulty for Indian students was "comprehending the meaning and significance of words in relation to culture."²⁷ Correspondent to this was the problem of the Indian child's self-concept.

Since World War II Indian education has increasingly been provided by states. By 1964 fifty-four percent of Indian schools were state supported and thirty-eight percent were federal schools (fifty percent of

which were B.I.A. schools).²⁸ According to researchers on Indian education, Indians had very limited control over these schools.²⁹

In the field of health, statistics show a gross difference between Indian and white conditions. Figures indicate that reservation health conditions improved substantially between 1959 and 1970, although Indians still lagged behind whites (see Appendix 4).³⁰

Having provided this background, we can now identify the nature of alienation by summarizing the political, social, and economic conditions of Indians. Within the B.I.A. structure the Indians could not influence the policies which to a large extent controlled their lives, and which they were dissatisfied with (powerlessness). Further, because of isolation from the federal government and the B.I.A., and Indian unwillingness to assimilate, meaninglessness prevailed. That is, there was a lack of understanding of federal government norms resulting in part from conflicting social norms and society-wide political norms. For example, those Indians having career goals in harmony with those of the dominant white society found that they had to leave the reservation and sacrifice certain tribal values to achieve their goals (normlessness). However, for the majority of Indians in poverty and feeling powerless, there was a "low-reward value" for the values and goals of the dominant society (isolation).

There were several factors which prevented politicization for alienated Indians: (1) the futility of political activity, (2) the threatening consequences of political activity, and (3) the absence of spurs to interest and participation.³¹ First, given the complex structure of the

B.I.A., its long existence, and previous congressional legislation, political activity of any kind was perceived as futile. The complex bureaucratic web and previous Indian failures (dating back to the nineteenth century) in effecting policies led to this feeling of futility. Second, there were threatening consequences which might have resulted from collective action, since Indian reservations were dependent on the federal government economically and for their very existence. Specifically, reservation Indians were dependent on the government for the provision of social services and for the continued existence of their reservation. With land allotments and sales still within memory, they continued to be a very real threat. Third, because of the stability provided by the B.I.A. and Congress there were no immediate spurs to activation. Theorists on social movements and relative deprivation agree that there must be real or perceived changes in a group's environment, or changes in their comparative position to other groups to spur individuals to political action.³² For half a century there had been no major changes in the political, economic or social conditions of the Indians, although it is possible that hopes may have been raised unrealistically by the Indian Reorganization Act. Further, since substantial out-migration did not occur until the early sixties Indians had a limited basis for comparing the relative improvements between life on the reservation and in the cities. We shall see that by the mid-sixties these factors became less important as a situation developed which was highly conducive to collective action.

In reviewing the long term nature of this Indian alienation, several hypotheses may be formulated. However, these are beyond the realm of empirical assessment in this paper, since information from many situations would be required. Our first hypothesis is that alienated groups (Indians) having failed to participate are going to experience meaninglessness to a greater extent than groups recently alienated. If individuals do not understand the political system, inactive alienation can only decrease the understanding of the political system over time, since they would neither seek political information nor gain such information from participation. Second, in reference to structural conduciveness, having been powerless for a long time groups (Indians) are less likely to be able to visualize themselves in positions of power for negotiating changes. And third, increased dependency on the government lessens the chance of active participation in that it prevents groups (Indians) from attempting changes through illegitimate behavior. The possible political punishments and withholding of benefits could prevent collective action. Thus for most Indians "the levels of value expectations and salience had declined to what was attainable within the confines of reservation life under white control."³³ This is not to say that Indian dissatisfaction did not continue, however.

Clearly, not all Indians have been alienated. Many marginal-elites achieved "career success" in American society and exerted pressure for changes on reservations through legitimate political channels. However, these Indians have almost always been marginal-elites, since the dominant

societal values they adopted were usually in conflict with certain tribal values.

Many of these nonalienated marginal-elites belonged to the N.C.A.I. (National Congress of American Indians). The N.C.A.I. was formed by marginal-elite types in 1944. Prior to 1962 this was the only active national Indian political organization. The N.C.A.I. provided the roots for the Indian social movement. However, it cannot be considered a social movement since it did not draw mass support, nor did it actively pursue normative or value-oriented goals. The N.C.A.I. until the mid-sixties had very limited success in effecting Indian policy, for reasons which will be made clear in the proceeding discussion.

In 1962 the organization represented sixty-two tribes.³⁴ The annual conference, which was the only meeting, attracted three to four thousand participants. There were two unique qualities about the membership:³⁵ (1) their relatively high economic status and (2) their status as cultural "marginals" within tribes. Many of the N.C.A.I. members were official tribal leaders who had the acceptance of the B.I.A.³⁶ Also, there was a high representation of B.I.A. employees within the N.C.A.I. Thus the organization was looked upon favorably by the Bureau.³⁷

The goals of the N.C.A.I. in the early sixties were moderate in comparison to the goals of the Indian movement beginning in the mid-sixties. The three main N.C.A.I. goals were (1) increased tribal self-determination, (2) protection and reinforcement of treaty rights, and (3) reversal of the policy of termination. The membership did not imagine

these goals being achieved quickly, but rather envisioned a drawn-out process of pressuring for incremental improvements.³⁸

The methods of the N.C.A.I. reflected a philosophy of working within the system. The major tactic was lobbying within Congress; including testifying at congressional hearings and exacting congressional promises (e.g., for no more termination without tribal consent). It also assisted tribes in bringing law suits, usually relating to treaty violations. The N.C.A.I. never considered protest activity.

Since the N.C.A.I. had only one full time officer (Executive Secretary) the lobbying effort was not particularly intense. However, frequently (approximately ten times a year in the fifties) tribal delegations, with the N.C.A.I.'s assistance, flew to Washington, D.C. to lobby for tribal interests.³⁹ Through the 1950's law suits increasingly became a pronounced strategy. By 1962 this was announced to be the primary strategy in challenging government policies and specific tribal rights.⁴⁰ Another formally announced strategy was to make Indians aware of their rights. Before the N.C.A.I. could implement this strategy, the "War on Poverty" programs began to greatly increase Indian awareness of their rights.

The goals and the methods caused membership to be limited for several reasons. First, there was no chance for grass-roots participation and satisfaction. Politically alienated Indians, unlike marginal-elites did not believe that desired changes could be made through legitimate

political channels. Also, the leadership did not seek mass membership, although representation from more tribes was sought. As a lobbying organization the N.C.A.I. apparently did not believe that mass membership would be helpful in achieving goals. Second, even if mass membership had been sought it would have been limited by the way in which many Indians perceived the N.C.A.I. as a marginal-elite organization often identified with the B.I.A. For instance, by 1964 the National Indian Youth Council (N.I.Y.C.) frequently accused the N.C.A.I. of not representing the "true Indians."⁴¹

Primarily because of its membership, its goals and its tactics the N.C.A.I. had limited power in its dealings with Congress, thus giving little incentive for Congress to change its policies. In this regard, we will first examine the real power possessed by the N.C.A.I., then examine congressional responses to N.C.A.I. pressures.

The N.C.A.I. had no inducements to offer politicians and only limited constraints against politicians. The N.C.A.I. lacked both electoral and financial inducements and constraints. Law suits did represent an effective constraint available to the N.C.A.I. but it could only be used under certain circumstances (e.g., treaty violations).

The tactics outlined above show the N.C.A.I. to be primarily dependent on persuasive techniques. Used alone (without constraints or inducements) persuasive tactics are only successful if there are not counteracting pressures operating on the decision-makers.⁴² This counteracting pressure was present in Congress. There were assimilationists opposed to self-determination and in support of termination. Also, white entrepreneurs encouraged the breaking of treaty rights.

The main way in which the N.C.A.I. had power was through the status of its members and its moderate goals and methods. That is, Congress is likely to acknowledge groups willing to work within the system and whose members seek individual success within dominant societal channels.⁴³

Congress and the President seemingly worked to create the illusion that action would soon be taken to help Indians. Between 1940 and 1960 helping the Indian was seen as a means toward an end -- the assimilation of the American Indian. Still, even during this period Congress and the President occasionally made minor concessions to the N.C.A.I. For instance, the N.C.A.I. was able to extract an informal promise from Congress in 1954 that no tribes would be terminated without their consent. Also, an H.E.W. Indian Division of Health was created in 1955 by Congress, under pressure from the N.C.A.I. It provided vastly improved health services on reservations.⁴⁴ The minor rewards and the promises led N.C.A.I. members to believe that reform through legitimate political channels was possible.

In summary, given the moderate goals and methods of the N.C.A.I., membership remained limited, thus preventing the development of a social movement. N.C.A.I. power against Congress was weak causing Congress to respond to pressures only with symbolic actions.

CHAPTER THREE

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE INDIAN MOVEMENT

We are now in a position to discuss the factors *which contributed* to the development of the Indian movement; i.e., structural strain, structural conduciveness, generalized belief pattern, and precipitating factors.

The government policies, particularly the "War on Poverty" programs of the mid- and late 1960's, heightened Indian alienation and strain. This alienation and strain eventually led to collective behavior. In the analysis that follows we will first briefly review the government programs and policies; second, discuss the heightened alienation and strain; and third, examine these government programs as precipitating factors.

Government programs and aid for Indians increased manifold with the passage of the "War on Poverty" programs in 1964.¹ By way of the Office of Economic Opportunity Act reservation, Indians were for the first time included as beneficiaries of poverty programs intended for non-Indians as well. An Indian branch was established within the O.E.O.

sharing the same formal goals of all O.E.O. anti-poverty programs -- the stimulation of local initiative through the organization of community action agencies, the development of remedial programs, the improvement of delivery services to the poor, the utilization of existing resources through the coordination of public and private services and the improvement of employment capability and general economic well being. The initial objective of the I.C.A.P. (Indian Community Action Program) was the encouragement of indigenous participation and the concomitant stimulation of local leadership development.²

One of the most important facets of the O.E.O. programs was that Indians were finally given the opportunity to control their own programs. Yet, because the tribal government usually acted as the sponsoring body for the programs, many persons claimed that old "establishment" ideas were supported. Several studies support this view for the tribes analyzed.³ Still, many Indians, who had been without any power in planning and implementing tribal programs, found themselves with more power than they had ever had before. For instance, the C.A.P. (Community Action Program) programs were required to have poor persons serving in one-third of the agency positions. Also, because the O.E.O. program leaders were not subject to the control of an agency comparable to the B.I.A., Indians found it easier to successfully pressure for change.

Numerous well-funded education programs were implemented. Head Start seems to have been effective in the immediate in improving capabilities and in raising expectations. But elementary and secondary educations were not similarly improved. A more important change in education was the new availability of college educations. By 1967 over two thousand Indians were attending college and universities on government scholarships and grants.⁶ In 1970 28.8 percent of Indian high school graduates went on to college as opposed to 15.6 percent in 1960.⁷ Yet because of the poor education available on reservations there was a college drop-out rate of sixty percent, mostly due to academic failures during the first year.⁸

There were similar failures with vocational training programs. They improved employment only slightly (see Appendix I) and may have

contributed to the slight rise in average reservation income. During the period from 1960 to 1970 "the Indian unemployment rate declined by 4.5 points and labor force participation rose by four points during the decade."⁹ But Indian status relative to whites did not improve, with ratios between black, white and Indian unemployment varying less than ten percent.¹⁰

With better job training and higher expectations and aspirations, Indians migrated to urban areas in greater numbers in the late sixties than in any other time. The number of Indians in urban areas increased from 165,000 in 1960 to 340,000 in 1970.¹¹ Urban migration was encouraged by the Voluntary Relocation Program which was started in 1952. Under this program the B.I.A. paid for Indian moves and frequently set up jobs for the migrating Indians. The B.I.A. made no attempt to help Indians already in urban areas until 1962, when job placement centers were established in twelve urban areas.

Indians, like ~~most~~ ethnic urban migrant minorities, ~~did not~~ fare well socioeconomically.¹² Also, Indian urban migrants frequently experienced "severe culture shock and a direct threat to . . . identity."¹³ A natural development from this was . . . that migrants . . . sought out others experiencing similar feelings. Thus Indians of many tribes frequently united (particularly in the sixties) in urban enclaves.¹⁴ Yet, it is clear that many of these Indians still identified with their tribal reservation and returned frequently to it. Many Indians migrated to the city with no intention of staying for more than one or two years.¹⁵

Reservation housing programs improved housing conditions, but still left the Indians far behind whites.¹⁶ A 1973 B.I.A. survey found that of 107,000 Indian families more than 66,000 needed housing assistance.¹⁷ But government subsidized housing frequently broke up traditional tribal housing patterns. It is not uncommon to now see new housing on reservations in a suburban style.

O.E.O. programs made legal services available to the Indians which they had never had before. These services were available to the elected leaders and to any other individuals. Legal aid programs allowed many law suits to be brought against the government, usually charging treaty violations.

Also, significant in the 1960's was that B.I.A. policies toward reservations did not change with the implementation of O.E.O. programs. Thus while new government programs allowed Indians to implement their own programs, and raised their expectations, Indian frustration was intensified by the alienating B.I.A. structure.

Before discussing specific strains, it is first necessary to outline the beliefs and goals espoused by the national political leaders, since they also contributed to rising expectations. Promises of improvements on Indian reservations became frequent in the early 1960's. In 1961 Interior Secretary Udall emphasized that socioeconomic and political improvements on reservations were top priorities for the Kennedy Administration.¹⁸ A greater tribal self-autonomy was to follow according to Udall. Such action was not forthcoming. Similar policy statements and failures followed in

the Johnson and Nixon administrations. Nixon's promises were more strongly worded, beginning in 1969. Nixon was the first President to promise improved political, social and economic conditions for reservations in a State of the Union address.¹⁹ He formally renounced termination. According to Nixon the fundamental goal of any new legislation was "to strengthen the Indians' sense of autonomy without threatening his sense of community."²⁰ With this out-flow of unkept promises it didn't take long for Indians to become distrustful, although hopes still seemed to be rising since minor improvements were occurring. The promises most affected the young who were not accustomed to this rhetoric. Gurr agrees that in the long run people may become accustomed to frustration, so that action becomes very unlikely.²¹ It is in this sense that broken promises most affected the young, who were unaccustomed to such frustrations.

The government promises, the improved educational opportunities, and job training led young Indians to believe that drastic improvements were forthcoming. Also, Indian political self-control over O.E.O. programs, minor socioeconomic improvements, and the availability of legal services led many Indians to believe that they could have power over their futures and the policy decisions affecting their futures. These effects were most profound among the young who were the center of attention for the majority of the O.E.O. programs, and who were most easily influenced. Even where young Indians felt that marginal-elites were substantially controlling the programs the young Indians, having higher aspirations and having had a taste of power in influencing local O.E.O. decisions, increasingly believed

that these leaders could be replaced and that the established federal system from which they were alienated could be reformed.

The political reforms and the social and economic improvements did not come as expected. Thus the government programs were perceived as failures. The frustration and dissatisfaction resulting from the perceived failures of government programs existed in a lesser form prior to the existence of the programs, as our discussion on alienation has shown, but intense dissonance resulted from the new aspirations.²²

During this period cultural strains were also intensified. Despite the expectations and aspirations Indians found that it was nearly impossible to make it in both the tribal society and the dominant white society. The jobs Indians were being trained for (in vocational programs and in colleges) were rarely available on or near reservations.²³ Indians were forced to decide between life on the reservation in poverty or to sacrifice tribal values for possible success in the dominant white society. Similar strains were imposed by the housing programs, where new housing was not constructed so as to continue ^{traditional} tribal housing patterns.²⁴ Also, lower-middle class families who purchased such housing were frequently perceived as new marginal-elites, since previously only the marginal-elites had been able to afford this type of housing.²⁵ These internal cultural conflicts may be defined as normative role strains, since there was ambiguity on the normative rules of conduct governing behavior.²⁶ In regard to this Indian cultural strain, Anthony F. C. Wallace states that "the [tribal] culture is internally distorted; the elements are not harmoniously related but are mutually inclusive and interfering. For this reason alone, stress continues to rise."²⁷

While these cultural strains threatened tribal solidarity, the threat was even greater from termination. This threat was particularly severe since it represented a threat to tribal existence. The Indian fear of termination is readily apparent in a review of Indian conferences since 1962. Throughout the sixties and early seventies government policies were often viewed as bribes for termination or veiled attempts at termination.²⁸ For example, the N.C.A.I. refused to endorse a 1967 bill to stimulate industrial development on or near reservations, because they believed that it was the first step toward termination.²⁹ In reference to threats to the very existence of groups, Coser emphasizes that increased unity and activation are the logical outcomes.³⁰

In this chapter we have thus far identified three immediate primary strains: aspirational relative deprivation, cultural discontinuities, and a threat to tribal existence. There were also long-run strains, as discussed in Chapter two.

Many of these same strain variables positively affected the structural conduciveness for the expression of grievances. A situation highly conducive to Indian collective behavior existed in the late 1960's and early 1970's.

We will examine this situation in terms of three aspects of the structural conduciveness identified by Smelser: "a) the structure of responsibility in situations of strain; b) the presence of channels for expressing grievances; and c) the possibility of communication among the

aggrieved."³¹ A fourth component omitted by Smelser is a perception of power variable. These four variables will be discussed in turn.

The structure of responsibility in the late sixties increased the likelihood of collective action; i.e., the federal government was identified as the responsible agent for the failures of government policies. According to Smelser when these agents are easily identified the political environment is more conducive to collective actions.³²

Given the political alienation previously discussed, it is apparent that legitimate political channels for the expression of grievances for Indians were not perceived as being open, thus increasing the likelihood of collective behavior, which is more likely when legitimate channels are perceived as being blocked. If channels were not blocked a group would not find it necessary to use the nonsystem behavior of collective action. (Behavior outside the system is outside legitimate political communication channels and institutions.)

The black social movement and the youth movement in the early sixties began to open up nonsystem channels for the expression of grievances. Social movements and nonviolent protests became relatively accepted forms of political action. The black social movement and its nonviolent political outbursts were tolerated and were accepted as permissible pressure tactics by a sizable minority in the American public, including many political officials (e.g., congressmen's support of the black protestors). The movement also appeared to be somewhat successful in achieving goals. These factors created a situation conducive to Indian activation.

By the mid-sixties communication among the aggrieved Indians was made considerably easier. First, frustrated and dissatisfied Indians were often brought together by such programs as I.C.A.P. and job training programs. Indians also served in O.E.O. leadership positions where complaints were frequently directed to them. Indians in these administrative roles could increase the Indian awareness of these difficulties. The common identity and physical proximity of Indians at the tribal level allowed easy communication of information and common dissatisfactions.

Urban migration also increased communication between tribes. Inter-tribal communication was made easier by Indians living in enclaves, who lived away from reservations for only short periods.

The media also played a vital role in which communication was made easier. It was possible for all Indians to be aware of the protests of one tribe (e.g., Washington State tribal fish-ins and the Menominee Indian protests between 1970 and 1972). This enhanced the spirit of pan-Indianism. Thus for the Indian movement easy communication substituted for physical proximity.

A fourth aspect of structural conduciveness, omitted by Smelser, is a perception of power variable. A group's real or potential power against political agents affects structural conduciveness. For instance, if individuals have control over some highly valued resource it would seem that collective behavior is more likely to occur with such a powerful bargaining resource. In the end, however, it is the perception of power, rather than the power itself, which affects the structural conduciveness.

Beginning in the mid-sixties participants in a social movement or a nonviolent outburst possessed constraints and inducements, as power resources, through the media. Frequently, third parties were activated for supporting the participants in collective behavior. Also, general public support was gained. Societal norms further prevented the government from reacting harshly against nonviolent collective action.

Government programs of the sixties also increased the young Indians' perception of how much power they had. Since some protests were effective at the local level in affecting local programs, young Indians may have been led to believe that protests would be effective at the national level. They saw the success achieved by blacks and youths; i.e., demonstration effect. Also, given the symbolic acts for Indians of the federal government in the late sixties, it probably appeared that Congress and the President would be more responsive to demands.³³

Having examined the strains and the structural conduciveness we find a situation highly conducive to collective behavior. We can now turn our analysis to the crystallization of a generalized belief pattern among Indians as the future participants in the Indian social movement.

According to Smelser, the generalized belief pattern, contributing to mobilization for collective action, identifies strains, identifies responsible agents, and envisions goals to relieve ambiguity. Such beliefs provide a "'common culture' within which leadership, mobilization, and concerted action can take place."³⁴

The generalized belief that developed had already existed in a weaker form for many of the marginal-elites (particularly those belonging to the N.C.A.I.). The new generalized belief pattern was stronger, since the sudden cultural strains and the aspirational deprivation were greater than had been for marginal-elites. We have already identified the immediate and long-run strains contributing to the belief pattern. Clearly, almost all of these strains identified the federal government, and more specifically Congress and the President, as the primary agents of ambiguity. Local official leaders, for many tribes, were also identified as partially responsible for the lack of political self-control that Indians had. The goals envisioned to relieve the ambiguity constituted a normative oriented generalized belief which called for (1) federal government reforms -- for the elimination or restructuring of the B.I.A. to allow tribes to have control over their own governmental affairs, including the implementation of federal programs, (2) federal recognition of treaty obligations, (3) the provision of government programs to spur social and economic development consistent with tribal values, (4) the overthrow of the local political order, where marginal-elites controlled the tribal offices, and (5) increased tribal and pan-Indian identity and pride. All Indian organization beginning in the mid-sixties sought these goals, except for the N.C.A.I. which was not opposed to the marginal-elites in local ^{tribal} offices.

This generalized belief pattern fits the norm-oriented belief pattern outlined by Smelser:

Persons who subscribe to a norm-oriented belief envision the restoration, protection, modification, or creation of social norms. More particularly they may demand a rule, a law, a regulatory agency designed to control inadequate, ineffective or irresponsible behavior of individuals.³⁵

Thus, we would expect to see a norm-oriented movement, since it is the generalized beliefs which define a movement.

Among most Indians, and particularly the young, there existed a belief calling for a reconstitution of tribal values. Indians, reacting against cultural discontinuities, sought to develop a greater Indian (or tribal) identity and pride. But these value beliefs did not call for specific changes in conduct or in the political system. Thus these beliefs did not crystallize in a value-oriented generalized belief for most Indians.³⁶

Only for a very small group of young Indians can a value-oriented generalized belief pattern be said to have existed. For instance, among some Indians, particularly young Indians, there have been attempts to return to traditional tribal values and ways of life.³⁷ These attempts have resulted in greater strain, since it has been virtually impossible for Indians to escape the conflicting values and norms of the dominant society. A value-oriented movement never developed from these beliefs.

In this chapter we identified a political atmosphere conducive to collective behavior, primarily because of improved communication channels among dissatisfied Indians, the black social movement, and the acceptance of social protest. We have also identified sources of strain, mostly emanating from government programs and policies. The generalized belief

proceeding the development and intensification of strain took a normative form, where regulatory and institutional reforms were envisioned.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE AMERICAN INDIAN MOVEMENT

Now in turning our attention to the movement itself we can identify the immediate precipitating factors, the mobilization of the movement's participants for action, and the immediate and long-range effects of the movement.

Many different national and local organizations combined to compose the American Indian movement. Common beliefs (resulting from common strains) provide a unifying force for examining the movement. Smelser agrees that it is these beliefs which define a movement.¹ Despite this unifying force it will be difficult for us to do much more than make generalizations about the movement because of the number of organizations, the number of dispersed tribes participating in the movement, and the limited statistical data and analysis available on the movement. For this reason we will use the Menominee Indian movement as a case study to provide a more rigorous treatment of the movement. The case study will also allow an empirical verification of theories on the larger Indian movement. We will now begin by looking at the movement in national terms.

Three national organizations composed by far the most important part of the Indian movement: A.I.M. (American Indian Movement), N.I.Y.C. (National Indian Youth Council) and the N.C.A.I. The three organizations were all tribalistic; that is, in support of tribal identity and autonomy. But they were also nationalistic in supporting a common Indian pride and a unified pressure bloc. Indian nationalism harnessed by tribalism does not seem to represent an inconsistency as our analysis will show. The three major national organizations will be discussed separately in terms of leadership, membership, tactics and goals, before we discuss the movement in holistic terms.

The National Indian Youth Council was formed in 1961 as an alternative to the N.C.A.I. The N.I.Y.C. claimed that the N.C.A.I. didn't represent real impoverished Indians and that it disproportionately drew its membership and leadership from the five "civilized" tribes of Oklahoma.² The N.I.Y.C., on the other hand, was composed mostly of young college educated Indians, who had grown up on reservations.³ Like the N.C.A.I., the N.I.Y.C. held annual conferences drawing several hundred Indians. The organization did not maintain strong membership ties, but rather was dependent on dedicated core leaders.⁴ The leaders interpreted treaty rights in a stricter sense than the N.C.A.I. did. They were also willing to use more radical tactics, such as protests.

Several researchers have cited the formation of the N.I.Y.C. as the beginning of the Indian social movement.⁵ But because a viable social movement must encompass political action and must involve a large number

of participants, we would be wrong in distinguishing 1962 as the first year of the Indians' social movement, although its immediate roots can easily be traced to this time.

The political movement became distinguishable when the N.I.Y.C. became larger and more active in 1966. Its first protests were fish-ins (protesting the abreggation of treaty fishing rights) in the State of Washington. Local tribal leaders had requested the N.I.Y.C.'s help in the protests.⁶ In the late sixties (1966-69) the N.I.Y.C. led many non-violent marches and demonstrations (i.e., probably twenty to thirty) on reservations throughout the western U.S., primarily protesting issues related to one particular tribe.

A.I.M. was formed in July, 1968 in Minneapolis, Minnesota. Its original leaders and members were primarily from urban areas⁷ and did not have strong tribal affiliations. For the first year, with an active membership of about fifty, A.I.M. concentrated its efforts in Minneapolis, successfully pressuring for increased Indian representation in an O.E.O. program.⁸ It also reduced the number of Indian arrests, particularly relating to public intoxication, by following the policemen who had been arresting Indians. After about a year A.I.M. began to extend its membership and scope of activities to the Sioux, who are one of the tribes closest to Minneapolis.

A.I.M. maintained a strong core leadership but did not have a strong formal organization. There was no constitution, and goals and strategies were not specifically stated. The membership linkage in most

cases was provided by a simple identification with A.I.M. tactics and general goals, although some of the larger tribes and Indian urban enclaves had A.I.M. chapters for a few years.

It appears that A.I.M. responded to immediate injustices with a core of activists who traveled to protest and to arouse reservation support.⁹ The protests took the form of marches, demonstrations, and occupations. A.I.M. staged the most and the largest protests of any Indian organizations. A.I.M.'s protests were directed against B.I.A. offices, O.E.O. offices, and whites who allegedly committed crimes against Indians.

The N.C.A.I. primarily performed the congressional lobbying role for the Indian movement, although by 1966 it had a small minority of members participating in the more radical part of the movement. These radical members, however, did not formally participate in the Indian outbursts as N.C.A.I. members. The exact role of the N.C.A.I. in the movement can best be understood after our analysis of the more radical part of the movement.

Robert C. Day, for the period up to 1971, has written what is probably the best article summarizing the specific activities of the American Indian movement. Day distinguishes two types of protest activities: obstructive and facilitative. "Obstructive tactics include challenges of government laws and practices and violations of organization rules and procedures by blocking or halting ongoing activities in some way, or by violating laws, regulations or strongly held norms and values."¹⁰ Indian activities in this category would include takeovers, fish-ins, protests blocking construction, marches, and picketing. "Facilitative tactics refer

to all nonobstructive forms of collective action."¹¹ These would include conferences, hearings, law suits, and informational, educational, and economic programs.

To show trends in the type of tactics used, Day prepares a table comparing these two types of collective action as reported in the New York Times.

TABLE I¹²
The Rate of Collective Actions by Indians
Reported in the New York Times, 1961-70

Year	Types of Collective Action				Total Actions
	Obstructive		Facilitative		
	No.	%	No.	%	
1961	0	0	4	100	4
1962	0	0	8	100	8
1963	0	0	4	100	4
1964	2	17	10	83	12
1965	2	18	9	82	11
1966	2	13	13	87	15
1967	4	17	20	83	24
1968	9	38	15	62	24
1969	16	33	33	67	49
1970*	24	42	33	58	57

*Annual figures projected on the basis of the first nine months.

The general collective action trend for the Indian movement just proceeds the trend for the black social movement, thus indicating that the black movement probably helped to create a situation conducive for Indian collective action, as we hypothesized earlier.

The table indicates that obstructive tactics increasingly became an accepted form of collective behavior. After 1970 this general trend leveled off; until 1975 when the number and proportion of obstructive tactics were halved.¹³ The number of facilitative tactics has remained

about the same since 1970.

Most protests occurred at the tribal level. A high proportion of these protests involved takeovers of such property as B.I.A. buildings, abandoned federal buildings, and parks.¹⁴ However, there were still many protests which were nonviolent. And there were a few protests which were national in scope.

It will be worthwhile to briefly consider the three most important Indian collective outbursts -- Alcatraz, the Trail of Broken Treaties, and Wounded Knee. First, they will be described, then they will be discussed together in terms of their success in activating Indians and in achieving long-range goals.

Alcatraz Island in San Francisco Bay was occupied on November 9, 1969 by forty Indians from San Francisco.¹⁵ Several of the takeover leaders had just returned from an N.C.A.I. conference to find the San Francisco American Indian Center, serving the needs of 30,000 Indians, destroyed by fire. The Indians claiming the island were members of the United Native Americans. This organization of about one hundred did not formally draw membership from outside San Francisco. The island was claimed on the basis of a treaty which gave Indians claim to U.S. land designated as "excess property." The property had been so designated in March of that year. The Indians hoped to use the property for a university, museum, cultural center, and medical center.

The occupation of the island ended after twenty-four months when federal marshals removed twenty-three remaining Indians. At times

during the occupation several hundred Indians had been on the island. Members from over one hundred tribes participated in this first truly national major Indian protest.

Alcatraz set a precedent for the style of protests to follow. The Trail of Broken Treaties culminating in the eight-day occupation of the Bureau of Indian Affairs Building occurred in late 1972, just prior to the national elections.¹⁶ The idea for the A.I.M. sponsored Trail of Broken Treaties was conceived by Robert Burnette, a former N.C.A.I. Executive Secretary who maintained close relations with A.I.M.'s leaders. Burnette claims that at the time he made his suggestion A.I.M. was having difficulty finding a cause to support. (A.I.M. had previously only responded to immediate injustices and needs.)¹⁷

The media played a vital role in publicizing the plans for the "caravans" of Indians to travel to Washington, D.C. for the Trail of Broken Treaties. The media assumed that there would be substantial participation before A.I.M. was sure of this. If the media had not believed that the protest would occur then it would not have bothered to report the protest plans. Participation was increased because the media made the success of the protest appear likely. A.I.M. leaders were also skillful in using the press. Numerous press conferences and protests were staged by A.I.M. leaders in different parts of the U.S.¹⁸

The caravan attracted 500 Indians who were primarily young, but not necessarily A.I.M. members. Once the cars and buses arrived in

Washington, D.C. on November 1, 1972 the Indians found that they had no place to stay, since several churches which had agreed to provide space for the Indians backed out under pressure from Harrison Loesch, Assistant Secretary of the Interior, Bureau of Land Management.¹⁹ In immediate response to this (as well as long-run strains) the 500 Indians marched to the B.I.A. building and occupied it.²⁰ A.I.M. leaders sought negotiations of a twenty point plan to end the takeover. The Indians demanded a speedy revision of treaties, reform of land policies that the Indians contended were squeezing their economic livelihood, intensified efforts to improve conditions for Indians, and the dismissal of three federal officials who dealt with Indian problems. A settlement was reached on November 8. It called for the Interior Secretary and presidential advisors to meet with Indians to discuss the twenty points. Another part of this settlement was that the federal government pay return transportation costs for the Indians.

The third major protest -- the Wounded Knee takeover, also staged by A.I.M., took a more violent form.²¹ One of the precipitating factors of the 1973 Wounded Knee takeover was the murder of an Indian by a white in Custer, South Dakota. Over one hundred Indians protested against the murder, eventually burning several buildings and injuring twelve policemen.

On the nearby Ogalala Sioux Reservation there had been intense internal political disputes. Dick Wilson, the Tribal Chairman, was accused of corruption; i.e., illegally taking tribal funds, not properly calling tribal meetings, and maintaining a police squad to harass his political opponents.²² There is evidence that a large number of Indians were

intensely politically opposed to the tribal chairman.²³ In response to political threats, Wilson, just prior to the takeover, ordered the arrest of any A.I.M. members entering the reservation. The Wounded Knee occupation thus seems to have been precipitated by Wilson's activities, as well as the Custer murder.

About sixty-five Indians occupied a church and store which were on the site of the 1876 Wounded Knee Massacre. The Indians demanded the ouster of Wilson and negotiations on the 1868 Fort Laramie Treaty which guaranteed that the Sioux would always have their own independent nation. In reaching a settlement the federal government agreed to investigate the treaty and the Wilson government. The treaty was found invalid and no charges were brought against Wilson.

During the occupation numerous protests occurred across the U.S. in support of Wounded Knee II. A.I.M. estimated that over 10,000 persons participated in these supportive protests.²⁴ Also, several thousand Indians traveled from across the country to support the Indians at Wounded Knee II during the seventy day siege. Black civil rights leaders Rev. Abernathy and Angela Davis also visited Wounded Knee II.

The occupation involved numerous gun battles between Indians and federal marshalls resulting in four deaths and numerous injuries. Federal marshalls made several threats to storm the buildings and tried for several days to starve out the Indians.²⁵

For the three major protests we have seen that there were immediate intense strains serving as precipitating factors. It appears that the

three protests were primarily spontaneous reactions to these precipitating factors. Even if the leadership had planned the protests in a general form, which is nearly impossible to ascertain, the membership and the potential participants were not aware of the plans. To have allowed the membership to have such information would have been risky for four reasons. First, there would have been the possibility of internal dysfunctional conflict over means. Participants would have pressured for a more or less radical form of protest, thus leading to factionalism. The spontaneous protests did not allow such conflicts to arise and did not allow individuals to question the specific means. A second problem is that interest might have been lost over time. The fact that each protest (except the Trail of Broken Treaties) can be traced to an immediate intense strain would tend to indicate that a planned protest without an immediate precipitating factor is unlikely to be successful without a strong organization. Smelser's analysis supports this view since according to his theory a precipitating factor is required. A third and obvious problem of a planned outburst made known to a loose knit membership is that the government is likely to intervene before the outburst. This happened to some extent before the Wounded Knee occupation. Despite the fact that the government did not know what would happen, they sent federal marshalls to the reservation on the basis of the large number of radical A.I.M. members traveling to the reservation to protest the Custer murder. A fourth factor is that "to be credible as protest the disturbance itself must be seen either as spontaneous, unplanned and naive outburst, or as an openly organized protest of more limited nature

that got tragically out of hand."²⁶ The relative spontaneity of the protests thus does not indicate poor organization, but rather that the protests were at least effective in their timing.

Although a particular organization led each protest, in each conflict there were also participants from outside the organization. This was possible since there were no conflicts between the different Indian organizations and because strong organizational membership ties were not established.

None of the protests were effective in achieving their stated goals. However, they were effective in activating Indians and in contributing to major changes in federal Indian policy.

For the Indian movement, and for any social movement, four indirect ends (other than the expressly stated goals) of protest activity may be distinguished: (1) making credible previously dormant power resources, (2) the activation of third parties, (3) the creation of a sense of instability, and (4) increased unity and participation among the movement's membership. (2), (3), and (4) could fit under a more general heading of the acquisition of scarce resources.

These four variables were considerably influenced by the media. The Indian geographic distribution and limited population made the Indians more dependent on the media than groups which are not so widely dispersed. Lipsky and Wilson agree that the press can play a vital role in giving power to relatively powerless groups engaging in collective action.²⁷

The media informed the general Indian population of the protest activities and the protest demands. These protest tactics were increasingly

accepted and exemplified by young Indians experiencing relative deprivation, as evidenced by the increase in the number of obstructionist activities. The conflict made viable by the media also increased Indian unity and identity by providing specific causes and by demanding support for the success of the activities.

The protest activities with the media's help were relatively successful in activating third parties. Civil rights leaders for other groups began to acknowledge the Indians' problems and thus pressure for change. Also, legal assistance organizations and fund-raising organizations for Indians formed under more moderate leaders. These organizations depended heavily on contributions from whites. The largest such organizations were the American Indians United Inc., the Native American Rights Fund, and the Indian Legal Defense/Offense Committee.

The protests and the movement itself created a sense of political instability which Congress was obliged to remedy. Since forceful governmental stances (e.g., Wounded Knee II) only increased instability by activating more participants,²⁸ Congress was forced to respond to the demands of the movement to alleviate the instability. This Indian power to create a sense of instability represents a power bargaining resource for the Indian movement.

In the late sixties the N.C.A.I. was activated to increase its pressure on Congress. The N.C.A.I. which increased its membership by 365 percent between 1961 and 1969, used the threat of protest from other organizations to pressure for change.²⁹ Former N.C.A.I. Executive

Secretary Wilkie stated that this threat gave the organization more power than it had ever had before.³⁰ The N.C.A.I. thus performed the necessary administrative function (congressional lobbying and ^{bringing} law suits) for the Indian movement. A.I.M. and N.I.Y.C. leaders, as effective protest group leaders, could not act as effective administrators. The two roles are rarely filled by one set of leaders, since protest leaders must be relatively uncompromising -- unlike administrators. In a similar vein, James Q. Wilson states that "the militant displays an unwillingness to perform those administrative tasks which are necessary to operate an organization. Probably the skills of the agitator and the skills of the administrator are not incompatible, but few man can do both well. They are conflicting role demands."³¹ Also, protest groups usually lack the expertise for policy making and law writing.³²

The N.C.A.I. provided this expertise, legitimizing the demands of the protest organizations for Congress. This was necessary since the protest organizations were considered illegitimate (i.e., most protests involved illegal activities). Congress thus was able to deal with a legitimate organization. In this regard Lipsky states that

People in power do not like to sit down with rogues. Protest leaders are likely to have phrased demands in ways unacceptable to lawyers and other civic activists whose cautious attitude toward public policy may reflect not only their good intentions but their concern for property right, due process, pragmatic legislating or judicial precedent.³³

Before discussing congressional and presidential responses to N.C.A.I. pressures and the national Indian protests it is first necessary to characterize the nature of local tribal protests and political conflicts. The tribal conflicts also had an effect on congressional actions, in demonstrating the need for tribal governmental structural changes.

Usually envisioned by the actively discontent was a replacement of the marginal-elite type leaders with more "representative" Indians and changes in the political and economic actions of the elected leaders, accompanied or preceded by major revisions in federal policy. Protest against the local leaders took many different forms. They ranged from attempts to mobilize voters to oust incumbents, to nonviolent demonstrations, and to takeovers.

Three primary reasons for the political turmoil, relating to conduciveness, are (1) the marginal-elite status of the leaders, (2) the powerlessness of the leaders, and (3) a general public misunderstanding of the powers possessed by the local leaders, who were under the watchful eyes of the B.I.A. These will be discussed in turn.

As shown earlier the local leaders were predominantly marginal-elites usually having met the approval of the B.I.A. Thus Indians often did not perceive the elected leaders as legitimate representatives of the tribe. Given Indian alienation, low voter turn-out for elections tends to indicate that Indians felt the elections useless or that Indians were indifferent. This caused a legitimacy problem for the leaders.

Voting Record of Indians in Tribal Elections*

Year	Eligible ³⁵ to Vote	Voted	% Voted
1958	24,460	9,180	37
1960	27,400	11,363	50

*B.I.A. sample from approximately 18% of 250 tribes.

Reservations were also conducive to conflict since in the face of increased demands for economic benefits and political power most tribal elected leaders had very limited power to meet demands. (Our later discussion of the Menominees will support this view.) Leaders did not have the political authority to change the structure of the local political system, nor did the local leaders have social or economic reform powers.

Accusations of council corruption and nepotism were frequent and there is evidence to support the accusations. Yet, corruption is virtually impossible to document, because of the very limited number of formal legal charges brought against the leaders. Given the fact that councils performed many roles (i.e., legislative, executive, and administrative) and that the leaders were closely allied with the B.I.A. -- the only check on corruption -- it is easy to see why there was corruption. Rather than presenting a sketchy presentation of council corruptions, the Menominee case study will provide a much more systematic example.

There was a general public misunderstanding in that Indian activists demanded more from the local leaders than they were physically capable of supplying. That is, it was unrealistic to expect the elected leaders to make major political, economic and social changes. The limited

capabilities of the leaders were probably difficult to understand for the previously inactive alienated Indians, since they had a limited understanding of the political system.

The local leaders also had very little power with which to fight or appease discontents. This is readily apparent because of the limited resources and political power possessed by the local leaders. There was also a lack of institutionalized authority to prevent challenges to the political system. Gurr agrees that the more defenseless a group is "the more readily is violence attributed to it and aggression directed against it."³⁶

Elected leaders frequently did possess limited power resources, when the B.I.A. favored incumbent leaders, by way of the minimal checks on them. Thus, constraints through corruption (e.g., Wilson's police squad) was one form of power. The B.I.A. also worked to help incumbents. According to Josephy, B.I.A. workers "dragged heels, sabotaged directives, and engaged in politicking against young Indian policy-makers and their restructurings."³⁷ Persuasion was another resource which may have been effective, where leaders could successfully convince older inactive alienated Indians of the illegitimacy of the protestors.

Through the late sixties and early seventies officeholders in most tribes appear to have become less conservative -- adopting the moderate goals (outlined on page 36) of the Indian movement. (Again because of the large number of tribes this is nearly impossible to prove empirically.) It thus seems that marginal-elite leaders were relatively defenseless against

the pressures, because of the forementioned lack of power.

Despite the fact that conflict at the local level was unlikely to result in major political reforms the conflicts were functional in the development of the Indian social movement. First, as members of the Indian movement actively pursued goals at the local level, more inactive alienated Indians were activated for political action since reforms appeared to be achievable. As more people became activated, the chance for success (regarding more "representative" leadership) at the local level increased. Also, participation at this level contributed to a generally improved political awareness, specifically regarding the B.I.A. authority structure and congressional policy. This in turn led to increased participation in the national organizations and in national protests.

The reservation protests were functional in counteracting the belief that the Indian movement was primarily urban in its origins. (National political officials had frequently tried to blame urban Indians for the national protests.)³⁸ Also, since there was a visible conflict between the entrenched marginal-elite leaders and the activists, and since many of these conservative leaders were ousted in elections, Congress and the President were provided with substantive proof that a majority of the Indians were dissatisfied with government policies and capable of expressing that dissatisfaction.

Congress and the presidents first responded to the demands of the Indian movement in symbolic ways. President Nixon, along with certain

senators (particularly presidential aspirant Robert Kennedy), promised that action would be taken and that they were committed to helping the Indians. President Nixon formed the Vice-Presidential Committee on Indian Affairs. Also, numerous study projects were commissioned by the government.

Congress did act in 1968, passing the Indian Civil Rights Act, which clarified the rights and duties of tribal courts and their relationship with federal courts. The act also guaranteed the civil rights of individual Indians, as previous black civil rights measures had done. However, until 1972 Congress did not act to increase real federal aid from the mid-sixties level nor did Congress recognize the claims of more than a few tribes in disputed treaty rights cases. Also, President Nixon's plan for self-determination (1970) was blocked in the bureaucracy of the B.I.A., despite Commissioner Bruce's support of self-determination. However, from 1969 Bruce was able to relax the rigid B.I.A. structure by not interfering as much in tribal elections and decision making.³⁹

Congress only began to take substantive action when legislators supportive of the Indian movement were appointed to the Indian Affairs Subcommittee in 1972. New subcommittee members Congressman Meeds and Senator Abzourek were supporters of the Indian movement and played vital roles in enacting Indian legislation. The 1972 Indian Education Act appropriated \$390.3 million for reservation children. The bill was also designed to give Indians greater control of their schools. Beginning in 1974 more money was funneled through the B.I.A. to reservations. In 1974 most of the nineteen million dollar increase in the Interior budget went to the B.I.A. The most important pieces of legislation for Indians were

the Menominee Restoration Act (1973) and the Self-Determination and Education Act ~~Assistance Act~~ (1975).

Self-determination recognized each tribe's right to direct its own destiny, while maintaining the special trustee status. With self-determination four new tools were provided to the tribal governing bodies: (1) grants to tribal councils, (2) contracting of B.I.A. programs, (3) tribal planning and designing of programs that the bureau continues to operate, and (4) personal options, where tribes have options for making use of federal employees.⁴⁰ Tribal governing bodies have full power over tribal affairs, including B.I.A. service contracting which requires no formal proof of tribal support. The fact that the officials making application are elected by the tribe is sufficient proof of support.⁴¹ Thus the burden of proof for turning down contract applications rests with the bureau. The act also gave tribes the right to form their own school district, substantially supported with B.I.A. funds.

The passage of the Self-Determination Act marks the achievement of the primary goal of the Indian movement. Increased federal aid, although not as much as desired, also satisfied an important goal. Thus our study of the Indian movement essentially ends here because of the changes in the generalized beliefs (which encompassed the goals), the structural conduciveness, and structural strains. The major changed factors of conduciveness relate to the Self-Determination Act, the beginning of a period relatively inconducive to protest, and changes in Indian poverty programs which gave the Indians more self-control and were less likely to cause aspirational

deprivation. With the passage of the Self-Determination Act the goals of the Indian movement were altered dramatically and the number of collective outbursts dropped fifty percent in the next year.⁴² The emphasis turned primarily to treaty and land claims disputes. This trend, which started in the mid-sixties, toward treaty claims has meant an increased reliance on litigation. Since the early sixties the courts have increasingly ruled in favor of the tribes in claims and in damage suits against the federal government. In part, because of this success, Indian organizations have increasingly relied on the courts rather than on protest. The goals the Indian organizations have sought (e.g., federal fulfillment of treaty obligations and protection and reclamation of tribal assets) since the passage of the Self-Determination Act are much easier achieved in the courts. Congress and the presidents have shown that they are unwilling to recognize Indian claims of treaty violations, while tribes have fared well in the courts.

In this chapter we have identified the different parts of the movement and the roles they played. Protests at the reservation level and at the national level appear to have been mutually reinforcing. Both contributed indirectly to the achievement of major Indian goals, for which the N.C.A.I. played an important administrative role. In only rare cases were the immediate and extreme goals of protests achieved. Congress, at first, only responded to Indian demands in symbolic ways, but began to take substantive action as the political activation of discontents increased.

CHAPTER FIVE

BACKGROUND TO THE MENOMINEE PARTICIPATION IN THE INDIAN POLITICAL MOVEMENT

Now, in turning our attention to Menominee participation in the Indian movement at the tribal level we will be able to deal in more specific terms with the nature of Indian involvement in the movement. This case study will reinforce both the significance of empirical observations made in previous chapters and the utility of the basic theoretical position of this thesis.

Before beginning our analysis it will be helpful to first provide an historical background of the Menominee Tribe. Up until the 1800's the Menominee Indians were hunters and rice gatherers living in what is now northeastern Wisconsin and the upper-peninsula of Michigan. It has been estimated that their population never exceeded 5,000.¹ White encroachment in the mid 1800's led to the signing of a treaty which created the 300,000 acre Menominee Indian Reservation. At this time the land was virtually useless to whites. 65,000 acres of the reservation were later given to the Stockbridge Indians.

In the late nineteenth century the Menominee Reservation faced several threats to its existence. First, lumber entrepreneurs in the 1870's

sought the wood from the densely forested reservation. Second, the General Indian Allotment Act of 1887 threatened to parcel-out the reservation. But the Menominees successfully averted these threats, unlike Wisconsin's seven other tribes.

The timber resources possessed by the Menominees led to the establishment of a saw mill and sustained yield logging on the reservation in 1908. The Indians were dependent on the B.I.A. for the operation and management of the lumber corporation.² The Menominees also established their own telephone and power companies and maintained a school and a hospital with the assistance of Roman Catholic missionaries.

Compared to other tribes the Menominees had a remarkable amount of political autonomy:

Retaining traditional features of open discussion and consensual decision making, the Menominee evolved a form of elective self-government sufficiently responsible to the community, given the usual handicaps of B.I.A. administration, so that in 1934 they saw no need to avail themselves of the self-government provisions of the Indian Reorganization Act.³

Yet the Menominees had their problems; inner-tribal political disputes were frequent and poverty was prevalent on the reservation.⁴ But still in 1938 the Merriam Report designated the 2,500 Menominees as constituting one of the tribes most ready to sever ties with the government.⁵

Having provided this background we can now turn our attention to the more recent Menominee Indian political troubles. In the recent Menominee movement there were two stages of organizational participation: the moderate D.R.U.M.S. (Determination of the Rights and Unity of Menominee Shareholders) organization (1970-73) and the relatively radical Warriors

Society (1975). However, one thesis can explain both occurrences of collective behavior. Our thesis is that collective behavior was primarily a result of strains created by the federal government. The relevant federal actions were new policies which gave tribal leaders limited political power and economic resources, and poverty programs which created Indians' relative deprivation. The precipitating factors for D.R.U.M.S. were the sale of Menominee lands and intense relative deprivation, while for the Warrior Society the precipitating factors were new political structural strains and intense relative deprivation.

The specific questions we shall attempt to answer for the Menominees are: What were the effects of termination, the "War on Poverty," the subsequent cut-backs, and the Menominee land sales? How did Menominee County operate during termination? What were the precipitating factors for D.R.U.M.S.? How did it organize? How did the larger Indian movement affect it? Why was it able to maintain a strong formal organization? Why was it able to stage planned nonviolent protests? What were the direct and indirect consequences of the protests? Then, what were the effects of restoration? Why did the new tribal governmental structure create strains and why was relative deprivation intensified? And, what role did the Indian movement play in the Warrior Society?

The Menominees' political problems began when they were selected for termination in a B.I.A. report of 1951, along with four other tribes.⁶ Congressional policy expert Gary Orfield cites two reasons why the Menominees were selected. (1) "They were one of only three tribes requiring virtually no federal subsidies -- paying for their own schools, a

hospital and even the salaries of most B.I.A. employees." And (2) in a court case against the federal government the Menominees were awarded 8.5 million dollars as a trust fund to be held by the federal government.⁷ The next step toward termination came two years after the B.I.A. report and the law suit victory.

House Concurrent Resolution 108 (1953) set forth the general policy of termination in an "unnoticed amendment" made by Utah Senator Arthur V. Watkins (Republican).⁸ The amendment stated that Indians should be "freed from federal supervision and control from all disabilities and limitations specifically applicable."⁹ Termination was viewed as the quickest and most economically feasible way to assimilate the American Indian into the dominant society.¹⁰ The bill represented a policy set forth in the Republican Party Platform of 1953 and a general policy whose roots can be seen developing from just before World War II when Congress adopted a stronger assimilationist stand.

The first attempt to terminate specific tribes was made in 1953, as an amendment to H.R. 2828 which designated a \$1,500 allotment from the tribal trust fund to each Menominee. The original bill was introduced by Congressman Melvin A. Laird, whose district included the reservation. The Menominees, in a near unanimous vote, had approved the distribution of five million dollars from their trust fund.¹¹ While Laird's bill passed the House in due time an unexpected development occurred in the Senate. Arthur Watkins, Chairman of the Interior and Insular Affairs' Indian Affairs Subcommittee, amended the bill such that termination of reservation status would accompany the dispersal of tribal funds. Conveniently,

Watkins' termination plan would take effect just before the next presidential election.

Watkins sought Menominee support of termination so that his amendment would stand a better chance of passage. Thus on June 20, 1953 Watkins spoke at the reservation for forty-five minutes, answering only a few questions. He stated that he would not allow per capita payments unless the tribe supported termination and that termination was in fact inevitable.¹² "The small community of terribly poor people," according to Gary Orfield, "was offered a Hobson's choice -- either vote against termination and receive no payments or vote in favor and accept an unknown future."¹³ In relative ignorance of what lay before them, a small tribal meeting voted in support of termination in Watkins' presence.

A month later, Watkins rejected a Menominee attempt to write their own bill. Further, he ignored a larger and near unanimous tribal vote which rejected the policy of termination.¹⁴ This vote was ignored entirely by Congress as well, since no one used this Menominee vote as reason for not terminating the tribe. Thus in 1954 the termination bill passed 403 to 4. It provided for termination of federal supervision of the Menominees and three other tribes.

Termination, which was planned for 1958, provided for the immediate closing of tribal membership rolls, payment of the \$1,500 per capita allotment, and the end of special services accorded to reservations. The Menominees were held responsible for the development of a termination plan, under the direction of the Secretary of the Interior.

Laird and the State of Wisconsin convinced the B.I.A. and Congress to put off termination until April 30, 1961, but failed to reverse the policy of termination. The Menominees also engaged in direct attempts to change the policy. In 1961 the Menominees sent a special delegation to Washington, D.C. to lobby for making termination an eight-year trial experiment.¹⁵ But Congress having tired of the Menominees, and having President Kennedy's support in carrying through termination, refused to recognize the Menominee protests.


The State of Wisconsin established the Menominee Indian Study Committee to recommend guidelines for the State and the tribe. Professors from the University of Wisconsin-Madison, under the direction of Doctors David W. Ames and Burton R. Fisher, were commissioned by the committee to study specific problems of termination. Several reports were developed by this group. The most relevant report to our paper is an article appearing in Human Organization in 1958. Ames and Fisher detailed five primary potential problems which would face the tribe after termination. These included (1) mill (the chief reservation employer) bankruptcy, (2) land alienation, (3) economic insecurity and lack of opportunities, (4) not enough time to prepare and adjust, and (5) intra-tribal factionalism making the termination plan unworkable.¹⁷ Ames and Fisher also

emphasized that a joint termination plan drawn up by "elite" Menominees and a prestigious law firm would be "nothing more than interesting or even dangerous exercises, ultimately acceptable neither to the Menominees nor to the American conscience."¹⁸

The plan was a complex lengthy legal document which "99% of the Menominees didn't understand."¹⁹ Since the plan was presented to the Menominees only nine days before the deadline set by Congress there was little time to examine the specific provisions of the document. Thus approval was granted with minimal disagreement.

After this Menominee vote and the good grace of the Wisconsin Legislature the reservation became a separate county -- Wisconsin's poorest and smallest. Under the plan certain services (i.e., hospitals, schools, courts and police) were to be shared with adjoining Shawano County, where the Menominees had no vote.

To handle tribal assets (i.e., the tribal mill and the Menominee lands) a Massachusetts Voting Trust was established. The trust adopted the following structure:



The name Menominee Enterprises Inc. was given to the trust. Under the trust plan a provision was made such that certificate holders would vote every ten years on whether or not to abolish the Voting Trust. A majority vote of those holding stock would be required for abolishment. Trustees were originally elected for jogged terms; one would be up for election in each of the first seven years. The corporation plan distributed to 3,280 Menominees one hundred shares of non-negotiable stock and a bond with a face value of \$3,000 paying four percent interest and reaching maturity in the year 2000.²⁰

The F.W.T.C. (First Wisconsin Trust Company) held the voting power for stock owned by minor and incompetents. Given the high tribal birth rate, a fairly low median life span in the tribe, and tribal apathy in elections the F.W.T.C. held tremendous power in controlling the M.E.I. and thus the whole county.²¹

There was a county government, but the M.E.I., controlling the land and sawmill, had more power than county officials. Also, there were no major disputes between county officials and the M.E.I. County officials, in fact, supported the major M.E.I. policies.²² In the literature on the Menominees there has been no disagreement that the M.E.I. was by far the dominant political force in the county.

After termination, Menominee County economic problems were severe. The M.E.I. was forced to pay 85-95% of the county's taxes. Also, in 1963 at the advice of experts, the M.E.I. sought to increase profits by reducing the mill work force. This added to a soaring county unemployment rate of over 25% -- varying by season.²³ At this time the mill had already operated for twice its life expectancy. The economic hardships of termination also forced the closing of the tribal hospital and utility company. There were no significant reactions to these closures, thus supporting the assertion that there was intense Menominee inactive alienation.

What in fact kept the county from bankruptcy was emergency funds and regular social welfare aid provided by the state and federal governments; seven million in state funds and twelve million in federal funds between 1961 and 1973. Menominee elected leaders lobbied in the Wisconsin congressional delegation for aid, but the direct assistance to the county

government and the M.E.I. was always just enough to avoid bankruptcy.

After termination and throughout the sixties the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources played an important and controversial role in the county. It limited timber cutting in the Menominee forest, as Harlan had suggested, more on the basis of conservatively protecting the forest as naturalists, rather than on the basis of the long term economic interests of the tribe.²⁴

With the governor's consent, the Department of Natural Resources, at the time of termination, also declared that Menominees were subject to state law regarding hunting and fishing rights. This was in violation of treaty rights with the federal government. The matter was challenged in court and was finally decided in the U.S. Supreme Court in *Menominee Tribe of Wisconsin vs. United States*, 391 U.S. 404 (1968). In 1968 the court ruled that Menominees' hunting and fishing treaty rights still existed since Public Law 280, which terminated the tribe, did not specifically state Wisconsin's treaty obligation ceased with termination.

Because of the county's severe economic problems, numerous studies were undertaken to find alternative sources of revenue. A major report in 1967 was written by Ernst and Ernst under the commission of the U.S. Commerce Department.²⁵ Like so many government reports predating this private one, economic feasibility was the sole criterion in the suggestion that a resort area be developed and that land be sold. Social and political considerations were entirely absent. The Ernst and Ernst

plan also called for the construction of a wood veneer plant, but the M.E.I. lacked the capital to make such an investment.²⁶

To raise county revenue land sales and developments were made by the M.E.I. during the 1960's, mostly in partnership with N. D. Isaacson, a Wisconsin lake developer.

The leasing of summer home-sites was first attempted by the M.E.I. in 1962. From 1962-65 only eight of the lake front lots were leased.²⁷ In 1966 the M.E.I. began negotiations for a formal partnership with Isaacson. A larger area of 5,170 acres (ninety percent of which as marshland) was planned for development. The partners were to split profits evenly. The developer promised to generate at least six million dollars in sales and a minimum of 2.1 million dollars in profit for the period 1968-72.²⁸

Orfield believes that the economic plight of the Menominees gave the M.E.I.

no option but to sell some of their assets to non-Indians. The Menominees who worked for the overburdened corporation found it necessary to make hard decisions, hurting other tribal members, in order to avoid rapid bankruptcy. After years of struggle . . . the corporation would go bankrupt or the tribal members would lose control of their land.²⁹

Also accentuating the problems was that the M.E.I. was unable to take advantage of revolving B.I.A. loan funds because of termination.³⁰ Thus, they were in no position to plan other developments, such as a wood veneer plant. Also, popular opinion disallowed development of a tourist trade and like all other tribes the Menominees could not attract industry.³¹ The M.E.I.'s only alternative to land sales was to put pressure upon the

state and federal governments for more aid. But certain congressmen had allegedly already assured leaders that aid would decrease.³²

In support of the land sales the M.E.I. emphasized that the sale of the 2,500 recreational home sites was necessary for economic solvency.³³ George Kenote, M.E.I. President, noted that revenue from the sale of land (representing 2.2% of the county) and from property taxes could provide economic stability.³⁴ Kenote stated that the property taxes from the lake front property would meet sixty-five percent of the county taxes.³⁵ But he failed to account for the additional services required for the property owners when he made his calculations.

An M.E.I. stockholders' vote was held in the fall of 1967 which endorsed the economic development zone for the lake venture. Kenote took this as a sign of approval for the sales.³⁶ Thus, consent of two-thirds of adult Menominees for land sales, as required by the tribal constitution, was never given.

According to D.R.U.M.S., the Menominees did not understand the exact nature of the development until late 1968.³⁷ This is not surprising given the tribal inactive political alienation, which kept people ill-informed. No researcher of the Menominees' problems has yet to disagree that the vast majority of Indians were ignorant of the specific activities and problems of the tribal corporation.

During the sixties there were only a few relatively minor incidents of organized Menominee political activity. These were led by C.A.A.M.P. (Citizens Association for the Advancement of the Menominee People) which formed in 1962 to pressure for restoration. C.A.A.M.P. was directed

by Connie Deer, mother of future D.R.U.M.S. leader Ada Deer. The organization did not have a formal membership, regular meetings, nor any stated goals besides restoration.³⁸ The leaders of C.A.A.M.P. did discuss with lawyers the possibility of bringing a law suit against the federal government for terminating the tribe, but no action came from this.³⁹ There were only two occasions when C.A.A.M.P. took political action. In 1964 the organization circulated a petition calling for restoration. The petition signed by over 800 Menominees was sent to President Johnson, but was ignored by him. The only other significant C.A.A.M.P. activity was 1968 protest, which about twenty Indians staged at the ground breaking ceremonies for the Visitor's Destination Center (for potential land purchasers). This indicates that as early as 1968 land sales represented a serious strain which could cause politicization.

In this chapter we have seen that through the 1960's the Menominees remained largely in a state of inactive political alienation. The Indians were dissatisfied with the leadership, but apparently felt powerless (alienated) in affecting the political system on all but a few occasions. This Indian inactive alienation is indicated by the fact that between 1961 and 1970 eligible Menominees voting in elections ranged from three to thirty-five percent and averaged twenty-three percent.⁴⁰ Also, there was virtually no political conflict in the county. That the leaders were considered marginal-elites is indicated by the almost total lack of tribal

support the leaders had when they faced opposition beginning in 1970 and by the support almost all of the M.E.I. officers received from the F.W.T.C. in tribal elections. Ames' and Fisher's article, which was discussed previously in the context of political alienation, supports the assertion that for the 1950's marginal-elites held office and that the general Menominee population was dissatisfied and alienated.⁴¹ By all indication, this situation persisted in the sixties.

CHAPTER SIX

D.R.U.M.S.

The same basic strains and structural conducive factors which contributed to the national Indian movement were also relevant for the D.R.U.M.S. movement. These strains included relative deprivation, resulting from federal poverty programs, and cultural strains, resulting from the same programs and increased urban migration. Unique strains for the Menominees were created by Menominee County land sales, the M.E.I. structure, and a high degree of racism encountered by Menominees. We will now discuss the nature of these strains which led to collective behavior.

It seems that federal programs had the same effects on the Menominees, as on Indians in general, in creating rising expectations and cultural strains. In Menominee County the total federal expenditure annually for poverty programs increased from \$96,000 to \$528,000 between 1962 and 1970.¹

County officials were given predominant control of the I.C.A.P. (Indian Community Action Program). But apparently the general population was either allowed more participation than in most other tribes or the officials made decisions popular to the Menominees. This is indicated by

the fact that, unlike in most other tribes, there were no Menominee charges against the elected leaders for having too much control over the programs. Even after the development of the D.R.U.M.S. movement there were no such accusations. We can hypothesize that the I.C.A.P. helped Menominees, like Indians in general, to believe that they could have more political autonomy.

Vocational training for Menominees seems to have involved more than half the working age residents.² But the programs were not very effective. In a survey of the Menominees taken by the B.I.A. in 1973 it was found that only forty-five percent of the respondents were employed in professions related to their training.³ The report also indicates that vocational training programs encouraged urban migration, since the jobs Indians were trained for were unavailable in or near the county.⁴ Unemployment in the county was reduced only briefly by these programs between 1965 and 1968.⁵

Between 1964 and 1970 a total of 130 federally funded houses were built.⁶ This represented twenty-four percent of the total county housing stock in 1970. New housing construction for the Menominees, unlike that for many other tribes, did not cause cultural strains.

In the field of education, the Menominees had a Head Start Program from 1964-72, like most other tribes. However, from 1961 primary and secondary educational services were shared with Shawano. The problems which characterized most Indian schools also characterized the schools the Menominees attended, e.g., a high drop-out rate, discrimination in the schools, and low academic achievement levels.⁷

The increased availability of federal educational assistance funds did allow a few Indians to attend college. This is particularly significant when one considers that the primary leaders of the D.R.U.M.S. movement were colleged educated and that in 1970 no one living in the county had a college degree despite the fact that some Menominees had degrees.⁸

Educational and vocational programs seem to have encouraged urban migration among the Menominees. The migration rate was higher than that for Indians nationally.⁹ Figures indicate a substantial net migration from Menominee County of twenty-nine percent between 1960 and 1970 (see Appendix 4).¹⁰ The doubling of the Milwaukee Indian population during the 1960's supports the suggestion of urban migration. It is likely that out-migration of youth was particularly high because of the paucity of youth in census categories for Indians aged 15-29 within the county.¹¹ Ancillary B.I.A. information indicates that there was a considerable amount of commuting and short-term migration between the county and urban areas.¹²

Socioeconomic conditions for Menominees were better outside of the county, but still below the level of whites.¹³ Only sixteen percent of out-of-county Menominees were below the poverty line as opposed to thirty-nine percent within the county. For Menominees in Chicago and Milwaukee average per capita income in 1970 was \$2,799, and only \$1,514 within the county.¹⁴

These figures indicate that there were probably cultural strains where Indians had to choose between a better economic life outside the

county and life in the Menominee homeland. Also, urban Indians probably encountered more racism simply because they had more contact with whites. Sylvia Weber (Restoration Committee Chairman) and Gordon Dickie (an unofficial leader) both asserted that urbanization had this effect.

Additional strains were created by O.E.O. and C.A.P. 1969 program cutbacks which were particularly severe in Menominee County, as reported by the Bureau of Indian Affairs.¹⁵ The cutbacks contributed substantially to unemployment. The B.I.A. reports that "the very sharp curtailment of the O.E.O. funded C.A.P. programs contributed significantly to the welfare load which increased \$259,000 in 1970."¹⁶

We can see that for the Menominees, as for other tribes, federal poverty programs led to a relative deprivation where hopes were raised, but where major improvement did not occur. Government program cutbacks in 1969, just prior to the D.R.U.M.S. movement, further intensified these strains. Cultural strains were also imposed on urban Indians, who had been encouraged by poverty programs to leave the county.

Racism represented another strain. It is difficult to demonstrate the extent of it since no sociological studies relative to racism have been undertaken for the Menominees and adjoining counties. However, common sense tells us that since the Menominees shared services with Shawano there was increased contact between whites and Indians, which would seem to indicate an increase in racism experienced. Both Ada Deer, D.R.U.M.S. leader, and the D.R.U.M.S. publication Freedom with Reservation stated that racism was severe during termination.¹⁷ For instance, Menominees have indicated that

administrators and teachers in the Shawano schools took blatantly racist actions. Also, there was no attempt to incorporate Indian materials into courses.¹⁸ Another problem occurred in health services. For a short time the Shawano ambulance service refused to enter Menominee County.¹⁹ Racism is clearly indicated by the threat of a one hundred member vigilante group to "shoot-out" members of the Menominee Indian Warriors Society who occupied the Gresham Novitiate in 1975.²⁰ Generally, it would thus seem that more racism was experienced after termination because of increased Indian-white contact. This type of strain tends to increase group solidarity making more likely the occurrence of collective behavior.

For the Menominees the land sales were the most intense strains leading to political activation. The land sales can also be viewed as the precipitating factor for the norm-oriented D.R.U.M.S. movement which developed. This is indicated by the intensity of opposition against the sales once the Menominees realized that land was being sold and not just leased.

The Menominees' land provided the primary source of identity and the only real tribal meeting place for the dispersed tribal population. The land sales were thus perceived as a threat to the continued existence of the tribe, as D.R.U.M.S. activists said. In regard to threats of this severity, Coser emphasizes that increased unity and activation are the logical outcomes.²¹ Also, "conflict with another group [the invading white property owners'] leads to the mobilization of the energies of group members and hence to increased cohesion of the group."²² That the

Menominees were firmly committed to the communal holding of land is indicated by their successful efforts during the years of allotment and B.I.A. sales (1880-1957) in holding all of their land.

The land sales seem to have been perceived as being more threatening to out-of-county Indians, as demonstrated by their early rallying against the sales. The first D.R.U.M.S. supporters, who were primarily from urban areas, labelled the sales an invasion of whites, representing an almost irreversible trend leading to the disintegration of the tribe.²³ The sales may have been more threatening to out-of-county Indians, since they were already experiencing severe cultural strains living away from their homeland. Thus the sales intensified an identity problem for them. Participation in D.R.U.M.S. may have helped to relieve these identity strains simply by bringing urban Menominees together. For county residents this participation may not have been as important since the cultural strains they experienced were not as severe.

The M.E.I. structure and operating procedures caused strains for Menominees both in and outside of the county. A description of some of their policies will demonstrate this.

The most significant aspect of the M.E.I. structural set up for D.R.U.M.S. was the power held by the F.W.T.C. It held and voted the stock of all minors and incompetents, who in 1961 constituted sixty percent of the tribal population. Even in 1970 the F.W.T.C. still held fifteen percent of the stock.²⁴ Further intensifying the stock problem was that Menominees receiving state public assistance were forced to husband their

stocks and bonds in order to receive welfare assistance. (A 1971 court decision ended this policy.)²⁵

A second problem is that M.E.I. officers did not encourage tribal participation in decision-making. This is unlike the situation prior to termination where the General Council (consisting of all adult Menominees) had to approve the decisions of the elected Advisory Council. Although the General Council's approval was a "formality" and few people attended the meetings, the Advisory Council had to remain responsible to the General Council.²⁶ The M.E.I. did not have such checks operating upon it.

The alienating effect of the trust can be seen in the percentage of votes cast by the F.W.T.C.;²⁷ i.e., eighty percent in 1961, 92.8 percent in 1966, and over 40 percent in every election.²⁸ Between 1961 and 1969, with only three exceptions all M.E.I. officers had F.W.T.C. support.²⁹

Besides the particular strains making likely the development of a generalized belief and eventually collective action, the national movement contributed to the activation of the Menominees. It increased the likelihood of collective action by creating a structurally conducive situation. The national movement showed that collective action could be effective. For the Menominees it specifically provided models for action. Protest became a legitimate form of political action for many Indians.

The most immediate precipitating factor for the D.R.U.M.S. movement was a dispute between a future D.R.U.M.S. organizer and the M.E.I.³⁰ In early 1969 Connie Deer, at a M.E.I. stockholders meeting, requested a detailed breakdown of the one million dollars costs of sales for the

Legend Lake project. When her request was refused her family sought the help of Wisconsin Judicare, an O.E.O. and state funded legal-aid program, primarily serving the Indians of northern Wisconsin (85% of the cases through 1973 were for Indians).³¹ With the assistance of Joseph Preloznik, Director of Wisconsin Judicare, the M.E.I. was forced by the local circuit court to publicize the figures.³²

Shortly after Deer and Judicare's action several Menominees in Chicago organized a meeting to discuss M.E.I. affairs and how they might affect their policies, particularly the land sales policy. In March of 1970 Ada Deer started organizing in Milwaukee. Deer is the daughter of the former C.A.A.M.P. leader and sister of Connie Deer. It is interesting to note that the first meeting in Milwaukee was held at the home of non-Menominee anthropologist Nancy Oestriech Lurie. At this meeting, as in most D.R.U.M.S. meetings, was Preloznik of Judicare.³³ These first few meetings were attended by only a few Indians from Menominee County.

In late March the Chicago and Milwaukee groups unified as D.R.U.M.S. and elected two slates of officers. It was not until April, 1970, that the groups made an attempt to organize in Menominee County. The first county meeting, which was not well attended, was disrupted by twenty-five millhands deputized by the M.E.I. to break-up the meeting and by death threats left on car windshields.³⁴ A suit by Judicare citing obstruction of the First Amendment prevented the M.E.I. from again taking such flagrantly illegal actions against D.R.U.M.S. Although job threats were allegedly made against mill workers, by the end of the summer D.R.U.M.S.

was active in the county.³⁵ Total D.R.U.M.S. membership was about ninety at this time.

D.R.U.M.S. stated goals reflect the tribal (rather than national) orientation of the organization and the moderation of its goals compared to segments of the Indian movement, such as that represented by A.I.M. D.R.U.M.S.' goals were general enough that the leaders left some room for negotiation. The specific goals, as outlined in a D.R.U.M.S.' newsletter of 1970, were as follows:

1. Restore control over the corporation and its assets to the Menominees.
2. Stop the sale of land to non-Menominees.
3. Build socially and economically sound programs that will not destroy the land and the culture of the Menominees.
4. Work to improve educational opportunities for Menominee children.
5. Encourage Menominees to participate in decisions affecting their land, their culture, and their future.
6. Work to keep the treaty rights to hunt, fish, and trap exclusively for Menominees.
7. Elect representative leaders who will be responsive to the needs and desires of the Menominees.
8. Reopen the tribal rolls so that our children will once more belong to the Menominee tribe.³⁶

The long range goal was restoration to tribal status.

D.R.U.M.S. appears to have been extremely well organized. Gamson's theory on The Strategy of Social Protest is instructive in this context. Writing about the problems of organizations, Gamson states that the most frequent difficulties are (1) the transformation of an involuntary association into a managerial structure, and (2) the establishment of a unity of command.³⁷ D.R.U.M.S. was successful in overcoming these hurdles.

There was only one minor power struggle in the leadership of the organization, which occurred just prior to the full achievement of their primary goals. This represented a slight breakdown in the unity of command.

D.R.U.M.S. also meets the criteria of being a bureaucratic type of challenging group, since it had (1) a constitution, (2) a formal list of members, and (3) three levels of officers: chapter heads, and rank and file.³⁸

D.R.U.M.S. thus maintained a more formal organization than the national organizations. This organization was important in maintaining cohesion and in preventing the internal division which is so difficult to avoid.

Other conditions existing to increase and maintain membership included the possibility to find a renewed Menominee identity and unity, special participatory satisfaction from weekly discussion meetings and non-violent protests, and satisfaction from law suits, which were directed primarily against the M.E.I. As will be shown later, incentives and benefits changed as the focus became Congress and the President in 1972.

Judicare's role cannot be over-emphasized since in the first two years of its existence D.R.U.M.S.' power was almost entirely through protest. According to Lipsky, an organization of this type requires lawyers to deal effectively with policy-makers and to work through the courts.³⁹ In the course of this chapter this role will be clarified.

The 1970 D.R.U.M.S.' protests, involving from twenty to one hundred Menominees occurred at the Legend Lake Visitor's Destination Center. Fourteen of these weekend protests were held in the summer and fall.⁴⁰ D.R.U.M.S. protests, none of which were hostile outbursts,

were carefully planned, unlike the national protests. That is, D.R.U.M.S. protest strategy was well-defined for all its members. Also, since the protests it staged were more acceptable within the national political environment and were legal, spontaneity was not required as it was in the national protests.

D.R.U.M.S. protests had four immediate effects. They (1) discouraged potential land buyers, (2) gained media attention to D.R.U.M.S.' causes, thereby increasing D.R.U.M.S. public support, (3) began to wear at the M.E.I.-Isaacson partnership, and (4) politicized other Menominees.

How did the M.E.I. respond to the protest? George Kenote, M.E.I. Director, labelled D.R.U.M.S. "a left-wing non-reservation movement seeking to destroy the tribe for personal economic gain."⁴¹ Kenote was on good terms with surrounding county newspapers and drew their support in defending M.E.I. actions and in criticizing D.R.U.M.S.⁴² Kenote wrote articles, as well, for such papers as the Milwaukee Journal.⁴³ The M.E.I. even printed a twenty page pamphlet, written by Kenote, which was distributed to the Menominees. The pamphlet responded to D.R.U.M.S. arguments. Kenote emphasized the political necessity of the trust and the futility in attempting to reverse termination.⁴⁴ D.R.U.M.S.' leaders have asserted that these articles activated more Menominees. Further, by all indications, the M.E.I. publicity never spurred individuals to actively support the M.E.I. In response to the D.R.U.M.S. challenge, according to the D.R.U.M.S. publication Freedom with Reservation, the M.E.I. also threatened mill workers

participating in D.R.U.M.S. with their jobs.⁴⁵ There is no evidence that suggests the M.E.I. ever carried out the alleged threats, but personal interviews have shown this to be a perceived threat which prevented political participation.⁴⁶

Though usually only threatening legal action against D.R.U.M.S. activists, Kenote did bring a disorderly conduct charge against seven Menominees in 1970, when on one occasion D.R.U.M.S. protestors blocked traffic and allegedly did minor damage to cars at Legend Lake.⁴⁷ This was the only time that D.R.U.M.S. was ever accused of being involved in any form of violent protest. The charges against the protestors were quickly dropped when the Green Bay Branch of the American Civil Liberties Union and Judicare sent seven lawyers to represent the seven defendants. Another significant arrest was made in the summer of 1971 when Lloyd Powless and Laurel Otradevec were arrested for breaking a court order in picketing at the Menominee County Legend Lake Sales Office.⁴⁸ Again the charges were dropped. After these arrests the number of persons participating in the protests increased. Thus these arrests seemed to have had the effect of intensifying the commitment of D.R.U.M.S. members, who perceived injustices worsening.

With the election on whether to continue the Voting Trust occurring in December, 1970, D.R.U.M.S. started a new tactic in the fall of 1970. They started a campaign to contact, and obtain proxies from Menominees. Also, law suits were brought against the validity of the M.E.I. trust structure. Judicare succeeded in delaying the vote until

April, 1971, to allow time to obtain proxies, but the court ruled that a fifty-one percent majority vote of those eligible to vote was still required and that only the F.W.T.C. could vote the shares of minors and incompetents.⁴⁸

In seeking proxies D.R.U.M.S. sent monthly newsletters berating the M.E.I. and explaining D.R.U.M.S. issues. Also, it sent members to personally discuss the matters with shareholders. Freedom with Reservation reports that for volunteers "the most gratifying experience lay in the literally thousands of personal contacts D.R.U.M.S. members made with other Menominees."⁴⁹ The campaign thus served to solidify the organization, giving individual satisfaction to D.R.U.M.S. members and politicizing others.

As D.R.U.M.S. staged this campaign the M.E.I. reacted severely. They continued to seek to persuade Menominees and the public that D.R.U.M.S. was not a representative organization. According to the M.E.I., D.R.U.M.S. consisted of outside agitators and V.I.S.T.A. workers, who were "militant revolutionaries."⁵⁰ George Kenote predicted social and economic disaster if the Voting Trust were dissolved.⁵¹ He said that the trust was required since the Menominees did not possess the maturity to manage the corporation directly.⁵²

The responses of the M.E.I. to D.R.U.M.S. makes more sense when we consider the power possessed by the M.E.I. Like the elected leaders in most tribes, M.E.I. officers were relatively powerless against local activists. The M.E.I. lacked electoral legitimacy because Menominees did not believe marginal-elite officers were representative nor that the

M.E.I./F.W.T.C. structure was satisfactory. This lack of legitimacy gave the elected leadership very little persuasive power against challengers. The M.E.I. also lacked economic and political power. Kenote believed that depressed economic conditions left the leaders no choice but to sell land. And the M.E.I. was powerless to offer any kind of economic or social rewards to Menominees which would relieve general discontent. M.E.I. officers could not remove the F.W.T.C. from the trust, stop the sale of land (because of the contract), nor reopen the tribal rolls. Yet these policies were identified with the M.E.I. The voting trust could also have been dissolved without M.E.I. interference because of the 1971 vote on whether to discontinue the trust.

The M.E.I.'s only constraints against participation in D.R.U.M.S. appear to have been the threat of dismissal of mill employees and the threat to arrest protestors. With the greater legal muscle of D.R.U.M.S., no one was ever fired for having membership in D.R.U.M.S. and the arrests backfired on the M.E.I. by activating more Menominees for participation. Realizing their own limited power and the power possessed by D.R.U.M.S. the M.E.I. officers tried cooptation in early 1971.

They decided to enlarge the Voting Trust to eleven members. This action was taken without D.R.U.M.S. pressure to follow this particular course. Along with this measure came a warning to Menominees not to dissolve the trust.⁵³ The rationale apparently was that discontented Menominees would believe that with the extra representation they would no longer feel powerless in controlling tribal affairs. Given the strength

of D.R.U.M.S., M.E.I. officials must have realized that the seats would almost surely be taken by D.R.U.M.S. candidates. This "cooptation" was a "process of absorbing new elements of [the] organization as a means of averting threats to its stability of existence."⁵⁴

In the special March vote for filling two of the four newly created positions, D.R.U.M.S. candidates Ada Deer and Georgia Ignace were elected. But then a series of D.R.U.M.S. defeats followed. A federal court ruling in the same month reaffirmed the validity of the trust.⁵⁵ And in the election on whether to continue the Voting Trust, on April 3, 1971, D.R.U.M.S. received a majority (i.e., 119,320 to 118,516 shares) but failed to receive the required fifty-one percent of the 315,800 shares. In the vote the F.W.T.C. "gang-voted" its 48,000 shares to continue the trust. Thus, the F.W.T.C. ignored the discontent of a large majority of the Menominee people.

The losses in 1971 "may well have snuffed the life out of an organization less well structured." But instead a new strategy was laid out for protests across the state. D.R.U.M.S. demonstrations were staged at Legend Lake, Milwaukee, Green Bay and Appleton against land sales and the trust structure. Large protests on Memorial Day at the First Wisconsin Trust Company and on July 4 at Legend Lake drew state and national attention. Also, D.R.U.M.S. leaders James White and Ada Deer were in contact with national Indian leaders.⁵⁶ In the summer of 1971 these leaders testified on Senate Concurrent Resolution 26 to repudiate the policy of termination. D.R.U.M.S. further found a new resource -- money, following

contributions by Buffy Sainte-Marie (Indian folk singer and activist), Vine Deloria, Jr., and the Robert F. Kennedy Youth Project. This shows that the protests were effective in activating third parties which were required for effective pressuring at the national level.

The D.R.U.M.S. protest which brought the most attention to the plight of the Menominees and most enhanced D.R.U.M.S. support was a 220 mile march from Keshana (in Menominee County) to Madison, Wisconsin, beginning in September. The protest leaders provided press releases, which together with the march, attracted national press attention. Simultaneous to the march, letters detailing Deer's Senate testimony were sent to Wisconsin State Legislators, major state office holders, the Wisconsin congressional delegation, and all members of the U.S. Senate and House Committees on Interior and Insular Affairs.

Preceding the march and after a demonstration at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, Governor Lucey and certain department heads met with Menominee leaders. Eight requests were outlined by D.R.U.M.S.:

(1) the Governor take the lead in helping the Menominees persuade Congress to reverse termination, (2) the state initiate an immediate investigation into the ecological impact of Legend Lake, (3) the state investigate the discriminatory practices of School District No. 8, (4) the state initiate a medical clinic in the county, (5) the state help the Menominees obtain money for an alcoholism treatment program in the county, (6) the government begin whatever legal tactics . . . necessary to force return of the \$1,200,000 worth of Menominee bonds assigned by Menominee to the Department of Health and Social Services, (7) the state promote a sound economic development and housing program in the county, and (8) the Governor himself visit Menominee County in order to inspect conditions himself. (sic)⁵⁷

Governor Lucey praised D.R.U.M.S. for "their reasonable requests and peaceful petitioning."⁵⁸ This overshadowed the previous charges of the M.E.I. It also made D.R.U.M.S. a more acceptable organization within mainstream society, and gave a shot in the arm to the organization. Menominees began to feel that they could affect policy even above the local level.

The goals at the local level were easier to perceive being achieved than those at the state or federal level. For this reason, it appears that at the state level D.R.U.M.S. relied on momentum established from protest at the tribal level. The reaction was against specific threats (land sales) at the tribal level, while at the state and national level an ideal condition was envisioned (restoration). This is consistent with Smelser's value-added process where the negative perception precedes the positive perception.⁵⁹

D.R.U.M.S. had further success at the local level in November, 1971. Four D.R.U.M.S. candidates were elected to four open trust positions. Despite the 42,000 F.W.T.C. shares voted for M.E.I. sponsored candidates, the lowest D.R.U.M.S. candidate out-pollled the nearest M.E.I. candidate by 50,000 shares. Sylvia Weber, an election winner, stated

The Menominee people were united in their feelings. It's a few of our leaders and whites outside the power structure wanting to maintain control in Menominee County that gave the indication of disunity.⁶⁰

Shortly after the election Ada Deer became the chairwoman of the trust. A moratorium on all land sales became effective immediately, since

D.R.U.M.S. controlled the M.E.I. Simultaneously, a suit was brought by 162 Menominees with the assistance of Judicare to void previous land sales. Circuit Court Judge Duffy ruled partially in favor of D.R.U.M.S. stating that approval had not been given as pursuant to Article XII of the M.E.I.'s Articles of Incorporation. But the Wisconsin State Supreme Court reversed the decision of the lower court, ruling that the trust had the right to sell land since it held and voted the stock of all Menominees.⁶¹

The M.E.I.-Isaacson partnership was dissolved in 1972. M.E.I. Board Chairman Dodge emphasized that D.R.U.M.S. opposition "caused considerable expense in the sale of the lots" and was the primary reason for bringing an end to the partnership.⁶² The official dissolution document stated that the partners wished to bring an end to all confrontation and conflict.⁶³ As compensation Isaacson was given 312 lots or one half of those remaining. Isaacson further paid the M.E.I. \$250,000 and was responsible for correcting all environmental damage.

Following these successes, and the national attention D.R.U.M.S. protests attracted, the Menominees finally gained congressional support for restoration. Congressman Obey of Wausau, Wisconsin, acted as the spokesman for a group of legislators in presenting a bill for restoration on April 20, 1972. The legislation was drafted by lawyers of the Native Americans' Rights Fund. Considerable input came in the writing of this legislation from discussions at D.R.U.M.S. chapter meetings.

At the federal level Ada Deer was the Menominee most responsible for D.R.U.M.S.' success. She gained important support at an early stage

from Melvin Laird, Lloyd Meeds, who in 1973 became Chairman of the House Indian Affairs Subcommittee, and the Republican party which issued a statement in support of restoration in their 1972 national platform.⁶⁴

In March of 1972 the Menominee Delegation to Achieve Restoration was organized to lobby in Washington. The members, with one exception, were all D.R.U.M.S. members. The one exception was Richard Dodge, Chairman of the M.E.I. Board of Directors and D.R.U.M.S. sympathizer. Congressional hearings on restoration were tentatively set for the late fall in Congress, but were postponed until May of 1973. Freedom with Reservation emphasizes that at this point morale began to fluctuate and D.R.U.M.S. ran into financial difficulties. It is apparent that the battle at the federal level had to be fought by a few leaders.⁶⁵

At the federal level, lobbyists were needed. As shown earlier this task can rarely be filled by those who are at the same time protest leaders. However D.R.U.M.S. nonviolent protests, which ended in 1972, allowed leaders to act in both positions. Also, as discussed previously, the leaders had excellent administrative skill even at the tribal level. D.R.U.M.S. leaders were able to use the previous protests as a power resource in negotiations. (This is very similar to the role the N.C.A.I. played for the larger American Indian movement.) Previous protests demonstrated tribal support and showed that the Menominees were willing to resort to protest in the future.

To meet the financial demands of the lobbying effort the "National Committee to Save the Menominee People and Forests, Inc." was established to raise funds. The organization was directed by LaDonna Harris, President

of the American Indian Opportunity and Philleo Nash, former B.I.A. chief and an original member of the M.E.I. Voting Trust. In May, 1972, funds from the Akbar Foundation also allowed James White to work full-time with a secretary in Menominee County for D.R.U.M.S.' cause. Further funds for lawyers and official D.R.U.M.S. leaders were also provided by the Campaign for Human Development.⁶⁶

In the spring of 1973 restoration hearings were held in Menominee County and in Washington. Among those testifying in support of restoration were Vine Deloria, Edward Kennedy, Philleo Nash, and Gary Orfield.⁶⁷ The Restoration Act passed in near unanimous votes and was signed into law by President Nixon in December, 1973.

The passage of the Restoration Act marked the uncompromised achievement of a goal held by almost every Menominee. It was the primary long-range goal that the D.R.U.M.S. organization had been working for since 1970. The act also meant the end of the termination threat for other tribes.

The Restoration Act qualified the Menominees for all the benefits available to federally recognized tribes. Thus the Menominees were again eligible for special Indian services such as medical care, education, social services, highway construction, and economic assistance for businesses. Further, since Menominee County was returned to federal jurisdiction, the Menominees were no longer required to pay taxes to the state and the tribal corporation was given tax exempt status within the Menominee homeland. A provision was also made to return the M.E.I. completely to Menominee control.

Probably the most important part of the legislation was the degree of self-determination given to the Menominees. The Menominee elected leaders, unlike elected leaders in almost every other tribe, did not need to be approved by the B.I.A. The elected leaders were also allowed to implement Indian service programs ordinarily implemented by the B.I.A. The leaders did not need any proof of support to receive B.I.A. funds to implement tribal programs. It is clear that the Menominee Restoration Act thus set the stage for the Self-Determination and Education Act, which was passed in June, 1975.

In this chapter we have seen that besides relative deprivation resulting from government programs, there were immediate strains resulting from land sales and the political structure in the county. In response to these strains D.R.U.M.S. was formed as an extremely well-organized non-violent protest group. It drew substantial support in seeking to relieve the ambiguity at the local level and in seeking federal restoration to tribal status. D.R.U.M.S.' early success at the local level against the powerless local leaders drew national support because of its non-violent media-attracting protests. Then with the assistance of activated third parties, and using previous protests as a bargaining resource, D.R.U.M.S. leaders successfully pressured for restoration in Congress.

The Menominees are representative of other tribes in that officially elected leaders generally lacked power and Indians generally experienced similar strains and had similar goals. Our case study also shows that protests and effective lobbyists were both necessary for success.

CHAPTER SEVEN

THE MENOMINEE INDIAN WARRIORS SOCIETY

For the Menominees, after the passage of the Restoration Act optimism was very high. Tribal solidarity had been reaffirmed through participation in the D.R.U.M.S. movement which successfully protected the Menominee lands and which therefore assured continued tribal existence. Further, the Menominees had a desirable amount of political autonomy, coupled with expected forthcoming socioeconomic improvements. Optimism was particularly high since the original members of the Restoration Committee were all former D.R.U.M.S. leaders (Ada Deer, Sylvia Weber, and Shirley Daly). But intense aspirational relative deprivation resulted, as can be evidenced by the hostile outburst which climaxed the strains on Indians. The 1975 outburst was a takeover of the Gresham Novitiate near the reservation, by a group calling themselves the Menominee Indian Warriors Society.

Immediately after restoration, because of the changed political status, alienation was reduced at the tribal level. The Menominees believed that they had substantial control over their own political affairs and that expected federal assistance would relieve social and economic difficulties on the reservation. Also, Menominee alienation toward the

federal government was reduced, since there was less federal interference under the politically more autonomous system and since Congress had responded to Indian demands.

Despite the political autonomy and the high expectations, a situation existed which was conducive to a collective outburst on the Menominee Reservation. Already, in Chapter Three we have seen that protest was a relatively well-accepted form of political action and could be used effectively as a power bargaining resource. For many participants in the Indian movement, protest had even become a legitimate form of political action.

The Menominee situation was also conducive to a collective outburst since the power given to local leaders under restoration created a situation where difficulties could be attributed to the actions of these leaders. This was unlike the old reservation environment where the local leaders lacked such autonomous decision-making power. Thus, for the Menominees the responsible actors were physically closer and appeared to be less formidable against collective action than former responsible actors; i.e., Congress, the B.I.A., and the First Wisconsin Trust Company.

On the reservation communication among the aggrieved was open. They all lived in one relatively small area and were unified by their common identity as Menominees. For young Indians the pan-Indian movement also probably acted as a unifying force. Even if young Indians were not actively involved in the movement it still provided an identity and served as a model. This laid a foundation for communication and collective action.

The structural political changes were not nearly as effective as it was generally believed they would be.¹ In fact, they created strains leading to increased political alienation and collective behavior. There are four reasons for the failures. (1) The elected leaders were given too much unchecked power. (2) The revised political system proved to be open to corruption. (3) The tribal government lacked financial resources to keep constituents satisfied. And (4) as the tribe was given a greater degree of self-determination, different interpretations of traditional tribal values developed which caused tribal political conflict. These will be discussed in turn. The specific strains will be identified according to the components of collective behavior identified by Smelser.

There were virtually no checks on the Restoration Committee's authority. The General Council, which many Menominees said was required, would have placed an important check on the Restoration Committee, but the Restoration Act did not make such a provision.² Also, there was no attempt to amend the tribal constitution to reinstitute the General Council.³

The few Restoration Committee tribal meetings which were held after restoration and prior to the takeover were disruptive. On several occasions minor violence (i.e., pushing and shoving) occurred and the elected leaders were either ousted from, or walked out of, tribal meetings.⁴ In these meetings, characteristically, the leaders were accused of not adequately seeking approval for specific plans (e.g., the hiring of a city manager and the sale of tribal assets).⁵ Leaders claimed that policy

matters had been brought to the public forefront but that no concern was expressed at the time the decisions were made. Both arguments bear some weight. Restoration Committee employees, related to the elected committee members, were chosen without public approval.⁶ And in many cases, because of limited tribal political participation, Menominees did not stand up against policy decisions until after the policy effects were felt. For example, nobody protested the decision to hire a city manager, until one was already selected.⁷

Another problem with the amount of power possessed by the elected leaders was that under the restoration legislation committee members were not required to show proof of tribal support in contracting for B.I.A. services. The Restoration Committee not only controlled normal reservation business, but acted as the governing body for the State of Wisconsin sponsored Community Action Program and substantially controlled the activities of the M.T.E. (Menominee Tribal Enterprises), which replaced the M.E.I. The Restoration Committee's roles thus ~~were~~ legislative, executive, bureaucratic, and corporate. The committee therefore wielded tremendous authority on the reservation. Thus for discontent Menominees the Restoration Committee was the identifiable agent of virtually all reservation ills. However, as shown above there were no clear communication channels on the reservation to express grievances or to influence decisions.

The second factor causing strain was alleged political corruption. Prior to the takeover of the Gresham Novitiate by the Menominee Indian Warriors Society charges of corruption were frequently levied

against the Restoration Committee. The greatest alleged corruption against the Restoration Committee was in its hirings and firings. It was charged, as it was in the late 1960's, that Indians working for the mill or for any tribal service agencies were not able to criticize local politicians for fear of losing their jobs.⁸ (While it is nearly impossible to document, interviews show that there were several claims of such firings.) Nepotism also represented a severe problem. Corruption on the Restoration Committee was made easy by the limited checks operating on it. The alleged corruption and the methods of decision making represented normative strains, since regulatory rules were at issue.

The third factor which created political instability and strain was socioeconomic problems. Improvements were particularly slow. The expected flow of federal funds was not forthcoming. Unemployment remained above twenty-five percent despite improved Indian job skills and better educations provided by anti-poverty programs.⁹ Health and housing conditions continued to improve only slowly. Also, in 1974 there was a \$240,000 reduction in federal aid to the Menominees.¹⁰ The Restoration Committee was blamed for many of these failures.¹¹ It was difficult to understand the economic difficulties faced by tribal leaders for Indians who had been alienated as nonparticipants for almost their entire lives. The fact that the new leaders, who were former activists, counseled moderation and patience was dissatisfying for young Indians, many of whom had participated in the D.R.U.M.S. movement. The socioeconomic failures

produced strain on the "mobilization for motivation" which "involves a relation between responsible performance in roles and the rewards which accrue thereby."¹² The perception of what actors are responsible creates the strains which are of interest and not the actors who are actually responsible. Local leaders thus bore the brunt of the blame, although Congress shared part of it. For the young Indians it appeared that the tribal leaders were performing no better than the previous leaders had during termination.¹³ Once again feelings of powerlessness and normlessness thus returned. These feelings were intensified by the realization that the high expectations would not be fulfilled.

The fourth factor relates to conflicting interpretations of traditional tribal values. In large part because of the pan-Indian movement, many Indians sought a return to more traditional values, as the N.I.Y.C. (National Indian Youth Council) and A.I.M. (American Indian Movement) urged. However, there were many different interpretations of tribal values. For instance, Ada Deer in mid-1975 accused her young political adversaries of being out of touch with tribal values, because they had not known the tribe before termination.¹⁴ Conversely, the young Indians said that the tribal values did not allow women to serve in leadership positions and that the General Council was required.¹⁵ Also, the young Indians felt value strains as they were forced to choose between life on the reservation where there was little room for economic optimism or life off the reservation, where identification and ties with the tribe would

inevitably be reduced. These strains represent conflicts of values. Smelser, in this regard, emphasizes that "changes in the relative position of one group will open these cleavages."¹⁶ We may predict that the failure to rise to an expected position may also open cleavages. Wilson and Geschwender have both theorized that this factor is important in activating a group for political action.¹⁷ For young Menominees this failure existed. By way of the pan-Indian movement and restoration they expected a successful return to more traditional values and a larger say in tribal affairs, but found that their position did not change.

We will now consider the generalized beliefs that developed from the strains. Since a hostile outburst as a part of a political movement is the event we are studying, we will focus on the hostile beliefs "which involve removing some agent or object perceived as a generalized threat or obstacle."¹⁸ Five stages are involved in the creation of hostile beliefs as the table below shows.

Value-Added in the Creation of Hostile Beliefs¹⁹

Stage 1:	-Facilities	-Mobilization	+Mobilization	+Facilities
Strain	Stage 2:	Stage 3:	Stage 4:	Stage 5:
giving	Anxiety	Generalized	Generalized	Generalized
rise to		belief that	aggression:	belief in
ambiguity		agents are	the desire to	omnipotence
		responsible	attack and	
		for anxiety	thereby remove,	
		producing	destroy, pun-	
		state of	ish, or restrict	
		affairs	responsible	
			agent	

In the diagram (+) and (-) indicate whether the belief pattern is positive or negative.

We have already identified the sources of strain (stage 1) and the resulting anxiety (stage 2). Regarding stage 3, for many young Indians the elected Restoration Committee members were identified as the actors responsible for the political inadequacies. The violence and personal verbal attacks which occurred in tribal meetings reflects the desire of certain Indians to remove the Restoration Committee members. The spread of this belief appears to have occurred informally since there were no identifiable persons who served as organizational leaders in spreading this belief.

For stages four and five our analysis becomes much more difficult because of the paucity of available information. For instance, while persons interviewed for this paper expressed doubt that the Gresham takeover was planned more than one day in advance, it is impossible to prove.²⁰ However, it is certain that if there were advance plans there were only a few people aware of the plans.

In reviewing tribal activities prior to the takeover it appears that stage four, the desire to attack and remove responsible agents, and stage five, a generalized belief in omnipotence occurred simultaneously, since there were no previous indications of such belief patterns. Stages four and five may have been reached earlier for the Warriors Society leaders since it appears that they worked to, and succeeded in, gaining support on New Year's Eve -- the night before the early morning takeover.

By use of Smelser's theory we may at least consider what possible precipitating factors for mobilization were operating. Since no physical

changes had occurred on the reservation prior to the takeover, it is clear that a rumor or story exaggerating certain difficulties was spread which confirmed or justified existing general fears or hatreds, and/or which threatened to introduce sharp new deprivations. These may have related to white racism, the tribal leadership's unwillingness to take action, and/or poor socioeconomic reservation conditions particularly in comparison to those of whites.

Having considered all the factors leading to collective action we can now examine the takeover itself. On January 1, 1975 an armed group of Menominees calling themselves the Warriors Society occupied the Gresham Novitiate, which is just outside the boundary of the reservation. Since 1968 only a caretaker and his family had lived in the novitiate.

The leader of the Warriors Society was Michael Sturdevant, a participant in the Wounded Knee takeover just three months before the Gresham incident. There is no indication that more than a few of the other forty-five participants were members of A.I.M. or had been involved in similar protests. Personal interviews also indicate that only a few of the Warriors Society members had participated in D.R.U.M.S.²¹ The Warriors Society members occupying the novitiate were almost all between the ages of seventeen and twenty-eight and thus had not experienced pre-termination reservation life.²² The Warriors Society leaders, like those in D.R.U.M.S., were well-educated compared to the rank and file, yet none of the Warriors Society leaders had a college degree.²³

The original lack of specifically stated demands by the Warriors Society indicates that the Warriors Society leaders had not carefully thought through their actions. In the first days of the thirty-six day takeover the Indians demanded "return" of the novitiate and the surrounding property to Menominee title, although the property had never been a part of the reservation.²⁴ They claimed that the novitiate could be used to help the poor people on the reservation. Their ideas for specific uses changed several times. At different points the group said the building should be used as an alcoholism treatment center, a hospital, and a school. By mid-January the Warriors Society was also calling for the ouster of the elected tribal leaders.²⁵ It is very unlikely that this was a demand the group had always expected to make, since it was not announced until so late and since it was not kept as a demand.

During the takeover the Warriors Society received support from important third parties. By mid-January the Warriors Society gained support from A.I.M. National A.I.M. leaders Means and Banks came to the novitiate seeking to make the protest a national event.²⁶ The protest did attract national press attention. Other third parties who called attention to the protest by visiting the novitiate were Father Groppi and Marlon Brando. Also, several protests were held in Wisconsin in support of the Warriors Society. This attention gave weight to the Warriors Society demands and put pressure on the federal government to deal with reservation problems.

The nature of the Menominee Warriors Society outburst was remarkably similar to that of previous national A.I.M. demonstrations. First, the occupation occurred on the spur of the moment. Second, the attack was against a symbol of previous frustrations, i.e., Catholic missionaries. Third, the participants were primarily young. And fourth, the leaders were sensitive to the media and were relatively uncompromising in their attitudes. These similarities indicate that the national movement provided models for action.

In response to the takeover, Restoration Committee members charged the Warriors Society members with being out of touch with traditional tribal values.²⁷ Also, Daly and Deer said that the group was composed of poorly educated persons.²⁸ Committee members, however, said that they understood the problems encountered by the young Indians which led to the takeover.²⁹ The Restoration Committee refused to assist in negotiations. However, a group of older and politically moderate Menominees formed the Menominee People's Committee to specifically assist in the settlement of the dispute. Leaders of this group criticized the Restoration Committee for failing to assist in negotiations, for not making decisions in public, and for being unresponsive to the Menominee needs.³⁰ Ada Deer responded by claiming that the leaders of the People's Committee were former M.E.I. officers who only wished to regain their lost power.³¹ The People's Committee, which existed for only three months, was present for most of the negotiations between the Alexian Brothers, who owned the

Novitiate, and the Warriors Society. Other actors in the negotiations were Circuit Court Judge Gordon Myse and John Murtaugh, a lawyer for the Wisconsin Legal Service.

The Shawano police guarded the novitiate for the first two weeks. During this time there were several exchanges of gunfire, as well as numerous threats of organized vigilance against the Indians in the abbey. As we mentioned in Chapter Five, whites in Shawano organized a vigilante group, which threatened to storm the novitiate if the Indians did not surrender. In response to this threat Ada Deer stated that "the Menominees are engulfed by racism. This is the chief cause of the occupation. It has been conducted by frustrated Indian people with the best of motives."³² Extreme racial tensions between Shawano residents and Indians continued even after the Wisconsin National Guard took control of security operations on January 15. However, from this time until the end of the occupation there were peaceful relations between the national guard and the Indians.

The settlement called for the transfer of the novitiate to Menominee title. The Warrior Society members agreed to give in peacefully to law officers. The Indian defendants, who were leaders in the takeover, were sentenced to prison. The Alexians withdrew from the agreement in July, 1975, by choosing to hold the title to the novitiate. This withdrawal increased violence on the reservation and in Shawano, but the violence was not of a collective nature.³³

While the protest was not successful for the Warriors Society at the tribal level, the takeover appears to have had effects in Congress.

Only six months after the takeover Congress appropriated \$1.2 million for a reservation health center. Also, Restoration Committee members report that federal assistance was greater after the takeover.³⁴ We can view this increased aid as a way of relieving the socioeconomic strains which contributed to collective behavior.

In summary, for the Menominees after restoration, high expectations were created by structural political changes and signs of socioeconomic improvements. However, the political changes were viewed as failures and the expected socioeconomic improvements did not occur. Thus alienation was first reduced, but then intensified as relative deprivation, particularly for young Indians. The problems climaxed in the Gresham Novitiate takeover, which we have viewed as a hostile outburst. Our analysis shows that the outburst was encouraged by the Indian political movement.

CHAPTER EIGHT

CONCLUSION

Our analysis of the Indian political movement has heavily relied on Smelser's Theory of Collective Behavior. In discussing the nature of the strains on Indians and their relationship to collective behavior we also relied substantially on theories of political alienation and relative deprivation. The political alienation theory allowed us to establish how Indians perceived their political position prior to the movement, while the relative deprivation theory helped to explain the strains precipitating collective behavior.

We have seen that from the mid-1960's through the early 1970's intense strains on Indians resulted from federal policies and led to the development of the Indian political movement. In response to the movement, federal Indian policy was reformed.

Prior to the mid-1960's Indians were largely in a state of inactive political alienation. The B.I.A. policies and Indian poverty were primarily responsible for this alienation. The marginal-elite status of the elected tribal leaders and the tribal political authority structure also caused alienation, as our case study of the Menominees demonstrated. Thus, Indians were dissatisfied with both tribal and national policies, but apparently felt powerless in affecting policies. This alienation,

which was a long-run strain, increased the likelihood of collective behavior.

Beginning in the 1960's federal policies intensified the strain on Indians. Under the new O.E.O. programs Indians were for the first time allowed to have substantial control over certain of their own social service programs. This seemed to lead Indians to desire more tribal political autonomy. Educational and vocational training programs under the "War on Poverty" also created aspirational relative deprivation. Jobs, for which Indians were trained, simply were not available on reservations. Thus reservation unemployment caused substantial urban migration resulting in cultural strains for Indians. Education and housing programs created additional cultural strains. The threat of termination represented yet another important strain. Thus, Indian collective action was made likely by relative deprivation, cultural strains, and the termination threat. Our case study of the Menominees supports these assertions. In addition, we have seen that there were strains unique to the Menominees, as there were for most tribes.

A situation conducive to Indian collective behavior also existed between roughly 1965 and 1975. The black and youth protests had a demonstration effect for Indians in showing that such action could be successful. Further, protest became a more acceptable form of political action in the U.S., particularly for minority groups.

The national Indian political movement was encouraged by Indian urban migration which brought together Indians of many different tribes.

The media had a similar effect in partially overcoming the problem of Indian physical dispersement. This is indicated by the fact that many tribal protests were modelled after national Indian protests which drew substantial media attention. Our case study of the Menominee Warriors Society supports this assertion.

With this structurally conducive situation, and in the face of intense strains, Indians identified the federal government and the local elected leaders as the responsible agents. To relieve the strain, normative beliefs crystallized among Indians calling for: (1) B.I.A. reforms, including tribal political autonomy, (2) federal recognition of treaty rights, (3) additional economic aid, (4) the removal of marginal-elites from positions of authority, (5) and increased tribal and pan-Indian identity and pride. These beliefs contributed to the development of the Indian movement. Three national organizations (A.I.M., N.I.Y.C., and N.C.A.I.) made up the movement, along with numerous tribal organizations and individuals who were not officially attached to any organization.

We have suggested that for most Indian protests there were immediate precipitating factors, as intense strains, which led to collective outbursts. D.R.U.M.S. protests were not characteristic of most Indian protests in that there were no immediate precipitating factors and that the protests were peaceful. D.R.U.M.S. was able to stage planned peaceful protests since it had an established managerial structure and unity of command.

Most Indian protest demands were extreme and were almost never met. Yet the protests, with media assistance, were usually effective in (1) making credible previously dormant resources, (2) activating third parties, (3) creating a sense of political instability which required legislative response, and (4) increasing unity and participation in the movement. These four factors contributed to the achievement of the long-range Indian goals. Thus, the Menominee Warriors Society did not receive title to the Gresham Novitiate, but succeeded in gaining increased federal assistance for the Menominees. Similarly, the immediate demands of national protest leaders were not met, but the protests contributed significantly to the passage of the Self-Determination Act and increases in some forms of federal assistance to Indians.

This Indian success was due in part to the lobbying effort of the N.C.A.I., and in the Menominee case, the efforts of the Menominee Delegation to Achieve Restoration. These organizations played legitimizing roles for the demands of the Indian movement. Legal assistance, which was provided in large part by the federal government, also contributed to the Indians' success. Lawyers helped to write legislation, defend protesters, and to bring suits against the federal government for treaty violations and tribal land claims. From the mid-sixties, the Indian political movement increasingly used this courtroom strategy. This became the primary strategy toward the achievement of Indian goals with the passage of the Indian Self-Determination Act.

To conclude, several theories and concepts that were liberally used throughout our analysis served as a useful guide for analyzing the

history of the Indian political movement on the national level and also the events leading to the takeover of the Gresham Novitiate. They helped expose and explain the frustration and inequity which were felt by most tribal members. The evaluation of the relative and perceived deprivation of the Indians revealed the important distinction between physical and mental well-being. The study of Menominees, however, also showed "absolute deprivation" of a group may have a strong effect on human behavior. That is to say, sustained severe poverty may be a source of strain for the impoverished in a particular environment, contributing to the birth of a powerful political movement.

Appendix (1)

INDIAN POPULATION

Table 1. Characteristics of Indians on Reservations and in Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas Compared with Other Races, 1970.


	<i>Indians on reservations*</i>	<i>Indians in SMSA</i>	<i>Blacks in SMSA</i>	<i>All Races in SMSA</i>
Median family income	\$4,088	\$7,566	\$6,832	\$10,474
Number of children under 18 per family head	3.0	1.8	1.9	1.4
Median years of education (persons over age 25)	7.6	11.5	10.4	12.1
Population in poverty	54.9%	23.3%	28.2%	10.9%
Male labor force participation (age 16 and over)	50.3%	73.0%	72.0%	78.3%
Male unemployment rate (age 16 and over)	18.6%	8.4%	6.3%	3.8%
High school graduates (persons age 25 and over)	21.9%	42.5%	36.7%	55.3%

*Averages for Indians living within the boundaries of the 115 largest reservations.

SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of the Census, *1970 Census of the Population, American Indians*, PC(2)1F (June 1973), Tables 11-14; *idem*, *General Economic and Social Characteristics*, PC(1)C1 (June 1973), Tables 107-29.

Source: Levitan and Johnston, p. 5.

Appendix
(2) Years of Education, Persons 25 Years & Older, 1970



1. The two major sources of data on Indians, the U.S. Bureau of the Census and the Bureau of Indian Affairs, use different definitions and methods of collecting their statistics. The census counts all Indians who identify themselves as such. The Bureau of Indian Affairs ignores those who do not live on or near reservations. This difference makes cross-checking, interchanging, or comparing the two sets of data impossible. A glance at the basic head count for 1970 in a few states suggests the scope of the problem:

State	Census	BIA
Arizona	94,000	115,000
Oklahoma	97,000	81,000
Washington	31,000	16,000
California	88,000	38,000
North Carolina	44,000	5,000
Minnesota	22,000	11,000
25 nonreservation states	105,000	0

Since each source provides information unavailable elsewhere, it is necessary to use both, whatever problems of confusion and apparent inconsistency this may entail. Though the subsets are far from exact, the census classifications for rural Indians occasionally may be used in approximating conditions among Indians on or near reservations.

- From Levitan and Johnston, pp. 35 and 381.

POPULATION BY AGE AND SEX
Menominee County - 1965, 1970

Age Group	1965a/			1970b/		
	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female
All Ages	2,735	1,417	1,318	2,607	1,314	1,293
0-4	430	207	223	360	169	191
5-9	490	255	235	424	231	193
10-14	363	185	178	419	197	222
15-19	272	138	134	252	131	121
20-24	141	61	80	125	55	70
25-29	126	62	64	109	49	60
30-34	136	70	66	127	64	63
35-39	107	55	52	123	60	63
40-44	115	67	48	94	44	50
45-49	120	67	53	114	68	46
50-54	129	72	57	106	48	58
55-59	96	57	39	120	66	54
60-64	75	45	30	88	48	40
65-69	49	26	23	69	39	30
70-74	39	25	14	31	16	15
75+	33	17	16	46	29	17
Age Unknown	14	8	6			


a/ Household Survey, Wisconsin Division of Health and U.S. Public Health Service, 1965

General Population Characteristics, Wisconsin, PC (1)-B51 Wis. 1970 Census of Population.

Source: Menominee County, 1968-72, WI Bureau of Health and Statistics, (Madison, 1973), p. 35.


Appendix (4)

POPULATION PYRAMIDS
Menominee County, All Indians and Wisconsin, 1970




Source: Menominee County, 1968-72, p. 11.

MENOMINEE COUNTY 1970



WISCONSIN INDIANS 1970



WISCONSIN 1970

Appendix (5)

Table 1

POPULATION OF MENOMINEE COUNTY, ALL INDIANS AND WISCONSIN
1950, 1960, 1965 and 1970

Year	Menominee County	All Indians	Wisconsin
1950	<u>a/</u> 2,948	12,196	3,434,575
1960	<u>a/</u> 2,606	14,297	3,951,777
1965	<u>b/</u> 2,735	<u>c/</u> 16,616	<u>d/</u> 4,154,000
1970	2,607	18,924	4,417,731

a/ Derived from reservation population for Shawano and Oconto Counties reported in the decennial census.

b/ From special Menominee County census.

c/ Estimated


d/ Estimate - Wisconsin Public Health Statistics, 1965

Source - 1950, 1960 and 1970 population: U.S. Census

Source: Menominee County, 1968-72, addendum.

Appendix (6)


BIRTH RATES : FIVE-YEAR AVERAGES
 Menominee County, All Indians and Wisconsin - 1963-1967, 1968-1972



Source: Menominee County, 1968-72, p. 48.

Appendix (7)

MEDIAN AGE AT DEATH : FIVE YEAR AVERAGES
 Menominee County, All Indians and Wisconsin - 1963-1967, 1968-1972



Source: Menominee County, 1968-72, p. 56.

Footnotes

Chapter 1

Introduction and Theoretical Framework

¹Neil J. Smelser, Theory of Collective Behavior (New York, 1962), p. 8.

²Ibid.

³Ibid., p. 9.

⁴Ibid., p. 226.

⁵Ibid., p. 273.

⁶Ibid., pp. 38-43.

⁷Smelser, p. 25.

⁸Ibid.

⁹Ibid., p. 27.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 28.

¹¹Melvin Seeman, "On the Meaning of Alienation," American Sociological Review, XXIV (1959), 783-91.

¹³K. Kenniston, The Uncommitted Alienated Youth in American Society (New York, (1970), p. 394, in Steven Koff, "The Political Use of the Concept of Alienation," in Alienation: Concept, Term and Meaning, ed. Frank Johnson (New York, 1973), p. 284.

Chapter 1, continued

¹⁴Koff, p. 273.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 278.

¹⁶Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel (New Jersey, 1970).

¹⁷Ibid., p. 37.

Chapter 2

Federal Indian Policy and Indian Alienation

¹Sar A. Levitan and William B. Johnston, Indian Giving; Federal Programs for Native Americans (Baltimore, 1975), p. 1.

²Ibid.

³Ibid., pp. 2-3.

⁴Answers to Your Questions About American Indians, Bureau of Indian Affairs (Washington D.C., 1968), p. 15.

⁵Sar A. Levitan and Barbara Hetrick, Big Brothers Indian Programs -- with Reservations (New York, 1971), p. 9.

⁶William A. Brophy and Sophie D. Aberle, The Indian: America's Unfinished Business (Norman, Oklahoma, 1966), pp. 180-85.

⁷Ibid.

Chapter 2, continued

⁸D'Arcy McNickle, Native American Tribalism: Indian Survivals and Renewals (New York, 1973), p. vi.

⁹Brophy and Aberle, p. 182.

¹⁰McNickle, p. 103-4.

¹¹Wilcomb E. Washburn, The American Indian and the United States, A Documentary History (New York, 1973), pp. 2232-36.

¹²McNickle, p. 111.

¹³Ibid.

¹⁴Quoted in Oliver La Farge, "Termination of Federal Supervision: Disintegration and the American Indians," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, CCCXI (1959), 45.

¹⁵Ibid.

¹⁶Since we will frequently refer to marginal-elites in the proceeding discussion it is necessary to define our use of the term. Stonequist, in refining a definition of marginaliy first made by Park, states that it is produced by social and cultural conflict between different groups. The marginal man is "posed in psychological uncertainty between two (or more) social worlds, reflecting in his sould the discords and harmonies, repulsions and attractions of these worlds, one of which is often 'dominant' over the other." (p. 362)

Chapter 2, continued

All Indians would qualify as marginals by this definition, since they all face some of these cultural conflicts. Thus it will be useful to further qualify the definition according to how it has been used in most literature on Indians. The term has traditionally been used in reference to those who have adopted dominant societal achievement patterns and who have succeeded to a greater degree in the dominant society than most Indians. Also, "marginals" generally adopt more dominant societal values and norms than most Indians. Because of these orientations, "marginals" are likely to envision Indian integration and equality in the dominant society, while other Indians have a stronger identification with the tribe, and envision the continuation of separation from the dominant white society, although with improved political, social and economic conditions. The feature which most clearly distinguishes "marginals" is that they are perceived as being out-of-touch with tribal values and being wealthier than most Indians.

It is clear that the term "marginal" has been applied inaccurately in Indian literature, compared to Park's and Stonequist's definitions. Hence, we will opt for the term marginal-elite, instead of "marginal."

Indian marginal-elites are unlikely to be politically alienated, since they are not alienated from the entire

Chapter 2, continued

political system. Feelings of powerlessness, normlessness, isolation, and meaninglessness cannot be strong given the fact that marginal-elites are attempting to improve their status within the dominant society and through legitimate channels. Marginal-elites are likely to feel that the system is biased against them because of their racial or ethnic status, but this alone does not create alienation.

Everett V. Stonequist, The Marginal Man: A Study in Personality and Culture Conflict (New York, 1937), quoted in Noel P. Gist, "Cultural Versus Social Marginality," Phylon, XXVIII (1968), 362.

¹⁶Murray L. Wax, Indian Americans: Unity and Diversity, (New Jersey, 1971), pp. 240-45.

¹⁷David W. Ames and Burton R. Fisher, "The Menominee Termination Crisis: Barriers in the Way of a Rapid Cultural Transition," Human Organization, XVII (1959), 105.

¹⁸Report to the Secretary of the Dept. of Interior by the Task Force on Indian Affairs (July 10, 1961), 70; Report to the Committee on Indian Affairs to the Organization of the Executive Branch of Government (Oct., 1948), 16, 18.

¹⁹Ibid.

Chapter 2, continued

²⁰Levitan and Hetrick, pp. 11-12

²¹Ibid., p. 154.

²²Levitan and Johnston, p. 14.

²³Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin, Report #230,
Planning Support Group, Bureau of Indian Affairs
(Billings, Montana, 1975), p. 5.

²⁴Levitan and Johnston, pp. 11-12.

²⁵U. S. Bureau of Census, U.S. Summary, 1962.

²⁶Levitan and Hetrick, p. 139.

²⁷James Coleman et al, Equality of Educational
Opportunity (Washington, D.C., 1966), p. 450.

²⁸Statistics Concerning Indian Education, Fiscal Year
1964, U.S. Dept of Interior (Lawrence, Kansas, 1964)
Table I, cited in Brophy and Aberle, p. 141.

²⁹Levitan and Hetrick, p. 139.

³⁰Ibid., p. 62-84.

³¹Morris Rosenberg, "Some Determinants of Political
Apathy, Public Opinion Quarterly, XVIII (1953), 350.

Chapter 2, continued

³²Gurr, p. 13, and Koff, p. 289.

³³Gurr, p. 81.

³⁴New York Times, 16 June 1961, p. 34.

³⁵Wax, pp. 146-47.

³⁶Ibid.

³⁷Ibid.

³⁸For a description of the N.C.A.I. see Alvin M. Josephy, Red Power: The American Indians' Fight for Freedom (New York, 1971).

³⁹Wax, p. 147.

⁴⁰New York Times, 5 September 1962.

⁴¹Wax, p. 148.

⁴²Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge, Ma., 1965).

⁴³William A. Gamson, Power and Discontent (Homewood, Illinois, 1968), pp. 86-88. Gamson's framework for analysis is employed in discussing the power relationship. He distinguishes three types of power: inducements, constraints and persuasion. "An inducement occurs only when there is the passing of control over some resource by the influencer either directly

Chapter 2, continued

or to an authority or some broker in the transaction." Constraints are the "addition of new disadvantages to the situation or the threat to do so, regardless of the particular resources used. Persuasion refers to (1) communication media and skills, (2) reputation for wisdom, and (3) personal attraction.

⁴⁴Levitan and Hetrick, pp. 62-84.

Chapter 3

The Development of the Indian Movement

¹Two important books have been written on federal programs for the Indians. Sar A. Levitan and William B. Johnston in Indian Giving (1975) review recent government programs, but are not concerned with their social and political effects. Barbara Hetrick and Levitan in Big Brother's Indian Programs - with Reservations (1971) present an historical background on federal government programs. The authors do briefly discuss the more recent programs in terms of their social and political effects.

²Brophy and Aberle, p. 103.

³Robert L. Bee, "Tribal Leadership in the War on Poverty: A Case Study," Social Science Quarterly, L (1969), 676-687.

⁶Levitan and Johnston, p. 38.

Chapter 3, continued

⁷Ibid.

⁸Levitan and Hetrick, p. 46.

⁹Levitan and Johnston, p. 16.

¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹Ibid., p.2.

¹²Ibid., pp. 11-14.

¹³Wax, pp. 146-72.

¹⁴Ibid.

¹⁵Ibid.

¹⁶Levitan and Johnston, pp. 64-65.

¹⁷Ibid.

¹⁸New York Times, September 18, 1958.

¹⁹Richard M. Nixon, State of the Union Address
(January 20, 1970).

²⁰Ibid.

²¹Gurr, p. 80-81.

²²In reference to this phenomena Geschwender, referring
to ghetto residents, states:

Chapter 3, continued

The failures of these measures [civil rights legislation, "War on Poverty"] may lead to disillusionment. The discrepancy between expectation and reality creates dissonance. No improvement is actually experienced only hopes are. Thus, intense dissonance is combined with feelings of powerlessness that typify the ghetto dweller, and riots or explosions emerge. [Geschwender, p. 16]

Wilson and Gurr also agree that violence become more likely when achievements fall short of aspirations. [Wilson, p. 215] Further, Gurr emphasizes that economic discrepancies (which were prevalent for Indians) more than other variables are likely to intensify frustration. [Gurr, p. 71]

While Geschwender defines the "relative deprivation in terms of status discrepancy (via a reference group), Gurr uses the term in a different sense which is more helpful to us. [Geschwender, viii] As we noted before, he defines relative deprivation as "a perceived discrepancy between value expectations." [Gurr p. 37] Our discussion has shown Indian frustration to be related to expectations rather than to status discrepancy. Thus using Gurr's framework we can specify the strain as aspirational deprivation where hopes and expectations increase and capabilities remain constant. [Gurr, p. 48]

Gurr states that relative deprivation may involve demands for more material goods, for new values (involving such things as political participation), or an intensification of perviously held weak value

Chapter 3, continued

positions. "If frustrations are sufficiently prolonged or sharply felt, aggression is quite likely, if not certain to occur." [Gurr, p. 37] We may think of this aggression as collective action, since our theory of alienation has shown that frustration does not necessarily lead to violence and Smelser's theory has shown that other conditions are also required. While Gurr is able to predict likely consequences, he fails to account for the complex interactions of many different variables.

Using Smelser's theory this aspirational relative deprivations would seem to represent strain on the mobilization of motivation. Smelser says that this strain "involves a relationship between responsible performance in roles and the rewards which accrue thereby." [Smelser, p. 54] According to this definition, aspirational deprivation would not quite fit under this heading, since "responsible performance" in roles is merely a subheading under capabilities, yet there is no other heading in Smelser's theory which this phenomena would fit under. This points to a fundamental difficulty in Smelser's theory; in his efforts to identify all the components of collective action he inevitably fails to account for certain occurrences because of the narrowness of certain concepts,

Chapter 3, continued

as shown in the above example.

In summary, Gurr's theory is useful in identifying the relationship between certain types of strain and collective behavior, while The Theory of Collective Behavior is more useful in identifying complex interaction of components relevant to the development of collective action. The concept of political alienation is able to encompass all forms of strain, unlike Gurr's theory, but the alienation concept alone is too general to allow us to predict specific likely consequences of strains.

James A. Geschwender, The Black Revolt (New Jersey, 1971).

²³Brophy and Aberle, p. 190.

²⁴George P. Costile, "Federal Indian Policy and the Sustained Enclave: An Anthropological Perspective, Human Organization, XXXIV (1974), 224.

²⁵Ibid.

²⁶Smelser, 109-14.

²⁷Anthony Wallace, "Revitalization Movements," American Anthropologist, LVIII (1956), 269.

²⁸New York Times, 17 May 1967, 30:1.

Chapter 3, continued

²⁹Ibid.

³⁰Lewis Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict
(New York, 1956), p. 95.

³¹Smelser, p. 227.

³²Ibid., p. 228-31.

³³See for example Josephy, p. 280-303.

³⁴Smelser, p. 82.

³⁵Ibid., p. 23.

³⁶Ibid., p. 120-29.

³⁷Wax, p. 187-96.

Chapter 4

The Indian Political Movement

¹Smelser, p. 80.

²Wax, p. 146.

³Ibid.

⁴Josephy, p. 301-05.

⁵McNickle, p. 117, and Wax, pp. 146-47.

⁶Robert C. Day, "The Emergent Indian Protest Movement," in Howard, M. Bahr, et al, Native Americans Today: A Sociological Perspective (New York, 1972).

⁷Voices From Wounded Knee (New York, 1973), p. 60.

⁸Ibid.

⁹Ibid., and John Kostner and Robert Burnette, The Road to Wounded Knee (New York, 1974).

¹⁰Day, p. 515.

¹¹Ibid.

¹²Ibid., p. 516.

¹³In trying to extend Day's figures beyond 1970 I was not able to determine exactly how he derived his figures. However, for 1971-76 I used the New York Times Index to find a general trend.

Chapter 4, continued

<u>Year</u>	<u>Obs.</u>	<u>Fac.</u>	
1970	12	26	
1971	11	22	
1972	11	30	
1973	11	26	
1974	17*	30	* -- Seven of these obstructive inci-
1975	6	35	dents related to the Wounded Knee
1976	5	27	occupation.

¹⁴See Day, and New York Times, 9 November 1969.

¹⁵See footnote 13.

¹⁶Day, p. 510-33.

¹⁷Kostner and Burnette, pp.195-220.

¹⁸Ibid. Eight other Indian organizations supported the protest.

¹⁹Ibid.

²⁰New York Times, 1 November 1972.

²¹Kostner and Burnette, pp. 220-55 and Voices from Wounded Knee. Both sources are biased toward A.I.M.

²²Voices from Wounded Knee, p. 15.

²³Ibid., and Kostner and Burnette, pp. 225-30.

²⁴Voices from Wounded Knee, p. 92.

²⁵For the most unbiased account see New York Times articles.

Chapter 4, continued

²⁶Ralph H. Turner, "The Public Perception of Protest," American Sociological Review XXXIV (1969), 819.

²⁷Michael Lipsky, "Protest as a Political Resource," American Political Science Review, LXII (1968), 1144, and James Q. Wilson, Political Organizations (New York, 1973), p. 221.

²⁸In bargaining with protesting Indians, the government policy of "waiting-out" proved to be the most effective. Overtime the takeovers lost their media appeal, thus failing to activate more Indians for continued support. Also, as it became clear to the Indians that the government was willing to "wait-out," the conflict demands are reduced.

²⁹The largest such organizations were the American Indians United Inc., the Native American Rights Fund, and the Indian Legal Defense/Offense Committee.

³⁰Vine Deloria, Jr., Custer Died for Your Sins (New York, 1969), p. 237.

³¹James Q. Wilson, Negro Politics: The Search for Leadership (Illinois, 1960), p. 225.

³²Lipsky, 1154.

³³Ibid., 1153.

Chapter 4, continued

³⁵Brophy and Aberle, p. 33.

³⁶Gurr, p. 207.

³⁷Alvin M. Josephy, "What the Indians Want," in Leonard Dinnerstein and Frederic Cople Jaher, ed., Uncertain Americans (New York, 1977), p. 283.

³⁸See quote from Loesch in New York Times, 8 November 1972.

³⁹Josephy, Uncertain Americans, pp. 280-85.

⁴⁰Procedural Guidelines on 25 CFR 271 Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, U.S. Bureau of Indian Affairs (Washington D.C., April, 1975).

⁴¹Ibid, Key Principle #4.

⁴²See footnote 13 for Chapter 4.

Chapter 5

Background for the Menominee Indians' Participation in the Indian Political Movement

¹Nancy Oestriech Lurie, "Menominee Termination: From Reservation to Colony," Human Organization, XXXII (1974), 260.

Chapter 5, continued

²Ibid.

³Ibid.

⁴George and Lousie Spindler, "Sociolocultural and Psychological Processes in Menomini Indian Acculturation," in Culture and Society (Berkeley, California, 1955), pp. 49-50.

⁵Robert Merriam, The Problem of Indian Administration (Baltimore, 1928), cited in Lurie, 60.

⁶Gary Orfield, "Menominee Restoration: Reversal of Termination is Critical to Menominee Existence," Civil Rights Digest (Fall, 1973), 37.

⁷Ibid., 36.

⁸McNickle, p. 110.

⁹Wilcomb E. Washburn, The American Indian and the United States, a Documentary History (New York, 1973), p. 2036.

¹⁰Arthur V. Watkins, "Termination of Federal Supervision: The Removal of Restrictions Over Indian Property and Person," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, CCCXI (May, 1957), pp. 11.

¹¹Deborah Shames, ed., Freedom with Reservation (Madison, 1972), p. 7.

Chapter 5, continued

¹²Orfield, 36.

¹³Ibid.

¹⁴Ibid.

¹⁵Shames, pp. 1-14.

¹⁶Oliver La Farge, "Termination of Federal Supervision: Disintegration and the American Indians," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, CCCXI (May, 1957), 45.

¹⁷Ames and Fisher, 108.

¹⁸Ibid., 111.

¹⁹Ibid.

²⁰For a description of M.E.I. activities see Shames.

²¹Birth rate in Menominee County for 1963-66 was 40.0. Average age at death was 53.6. Menominee County, 1968-72, Wisconsin Bureau of Health Statistics (Madison, 1973), 20 and 35.

²²Personal interviews with Gordon Dickie (February 9, 1978) and Shirley Daly (April 7, 1978). The Dept. of H&E.W. threatened to cut federal aid to Shawano because of alleged racism. See Orfield, 39.

²³Shames, p. 32

Chapter 5, continued

²⁴. Cited in Robert Deer, and F. Alston, "A Case Study of a Resource Issue: The Menominee and the Wolf River," unpublished paper (Madison, 1968).

²⁵Ernst and Ernst, Technical Assistance Study of the Potential for Tourism, (Washington, D.C., 1967).

²⁶This problem of lack of capital is discussed by Levitan and Hetrick, who state that "self-determination can be achieved only when a population rises out of economic dependency." Levitan and Hetrick, p. 152.

²⁷Shames, p. 37.

²⁸Ibid.

²⁹Orfield, 32.

³⁰Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin, Report #230, Planning Support Group, U.S. Bureau of Indian Affairs (Billings, Montana, 1975), pp. 2-6.

³¹Levitan and Hetrick, pp. 164-65.

³²Milwaukee Journal, 12 September 1970.

³³Ibid.

³⁴Ibid.

³⁵Ibid.

Chapter 5, continued

³⁶Milwaukee Journal, 1 October 1967.

³⁷Shames, p. 31.

³⁸Ibid., p. 70.

³⁹Ibid.

⁴⁰The General Economic Situation of the Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin, U.S. Bureau of Indian Affairs (Washington, D.C., 1973), 32.

⁴¹Ames and Fisher.

Chapter 6

D.R.U.M.S.

¹The General Economic Situation of the Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin, 35.

²Ibid.

³Ibid.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Ibid.

⁶Ibid.

⁷Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin, Report #230, 16.

Chapter 6, continued

⁸General Economic and Social Characteristics, 1973, Census.

⁹The General Economic Situation of the Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin, 45.

¹⁰Menominee County, 1968-72, p. 10.

¹¹Ibid., p. 11.

¹²Ibid., p. 10.

¹³The General Economic Situation of the Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin, 28.

¹⁴Ibid.

¹⁵Ibid.

¹⁶Ibid.

¹⁷Ada Deer quoted in Milwaukee Journal, 20 January 1975 and Shames, p. 70.

¹⁸Personal interview with Gordon Dickie.

¹⁹Ibid.

²⁰Milwaukee Journal, 11 January, 1975.

²¹Lewis A. Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict (New York, 1956), p. 92.

Chapter 6, continued

²²Ibid., p. 95.

²³Shames, p. 69.

²⁴Ibid., p. 21.

²⁵Joseph Preloznik, "The Menominee Fight for Restoration," South Dakota Law Review, (December, 1973), 90 .

²⁶Personal interview with Gordon Dickie.

²⁷Shames, p. 21.

²⁸Ibid.

²⁹Ibid., p. 22. Between 1961 and 1971 the F.W.T.C. charged the Menominees \$214,380 for its services.

³⁰Shames, p. 70.

³¹According to the testimony of Joseph Preloznik in House Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Indian Affairs on the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs for H.R. 7421, U.S. House of Representatives (Washington, D.C., 1973).

³²Preloznik, 93.

³³Shames, p. 72.

³⁴Appleton Post-Crescent, 16 July 1970.

Chapter 6, continued

³⁵Personal interview with Gordon Dickie and Shirley Daly and Shames, p. 75.

³⁶Shames, p. 73.

³⁷William A. Gamson, Strategy of Social Protest, (Homewood, Illinois, 1973), p. 90.

³⁸Ibid., p. 91.

³⁹Lipsky, 1150.

⁴⁰For a description of these protests see Shames, and the Appleton Post-Crescent, and Milwaukee Journal.

⁴¹Milwaukee Journal, 12 September 1970.

⁴²See for instance Shawano Leader.

⁴³Milwaukee Journal, 12 September 1970.

⁴⁴Ibid.

⁴⁵Shames, 82.

⁴⁶Personal interviews with Gordon Dickie and Shirley Daly.

⁴⁷Shames, 74.

⁴⁸Ibid., 84.

⁴⁸Preloznik, 92.

Chapter 6, continued

⁴⁹Shames, p. 87.

⁵⁰Ibid., 85.

⁵¹Ibid.

⁵²Appleton Post-Crescent, 13 April, 1971.

⁵³Shames, p. 79.

⁵⁴Gamson, Power and Discontent, p. 135.

⁵⁵Appleton Post-Crescent, 19 February 1971.

⁵⁶Shames, 93-100.

⁵⁷Ibid., 91.

⁵⁸Appleton Post-Crescent, 26 October 1972.

⁵⁹Smelser, p. 124.

⁶⁰Shames, p. 87.

⁶¹Preloznik, 95.

⁶²Appleton Post-Crescent, 10 July 1972.

⁶³Ibid.

⁶⁴Orfield, 39-40.

⁶⁵Personal interview with Shirley Daly, and Orfield,
34.

Chapter 6, continued

⁶⁶Appleton Post-Crescent, 8 May 1972.

⁶⁷House Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Indian Affairs on the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs for H.R. 7421, and Senate Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Indian Affairs on the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs for S. 1687, United States Senate (Washington, D.C., 1973).

Chapter 7

The Menominee Indian Warriors Society

¹Personal interviews with Gordon Dickie and Shirley Daly.

²Personal interview with Gordon Dickie.

³Ibid.

⁴Appleton Post-Crescent, 12 December 1974 and 8 August 1974

⁵Appleton Post Crescent 5 December 1974.

⁶The following Restoration Committee employees are siblings of Shirley Daly -- Acting Chairwoman of the committee: Assistant to the Chairwoman, Director of Contracting Services, Director of Community Health Services, M.T.E. Executive Secretary, Director of Agriculture (also, the only reservation farmer),

Chapter 7, continued

and Director of Community Information and Referral Services. There was not competition for appointment for these positions.

⁷Appleton Post-Crescent, 20 April 1975 and interview with Shirley Daly.

⁸Personal interviews with Shirley Daly and Gordon Dickie.

⁹Ibid.

¹⁰Victor J. Hanby, "The New Indians and Menominee of Wisconsin," in Human Rights Case Studies V. I (The Hague, Netherlands, 1975), p. 204.

¹¹Personal interviews with Gordon Dickie and Shirley Daly.

¹²Smelser, p. 27.

¹³Hanby, p. 205.

¹⁴Appleton Post-Crescent, 5 December 1974.

¹⁵Hanby, p. 204.

¹⁶Smelser, pp. 54-55

¹⁷Wilson, p. 281, and Geschwender, p. viii.

Chapter 7, continued

¹⁸Smelser, p. 101.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 102.

²⁰Personal interviews with Gordon Dickie and Shirley Daly.

²¹Ibid., and Personal interview with William Knudson.

²²Personal interview with Gordon Dickie, and Hanby, p. 205.

²³Personal interviews with Gordon Dickie and Shirley Daly.

²⁴Appleton Post-Crescent, 2 January 1975.

²⁵Milwaukee Journal, 7 January, 1975.

²⁶Appleton Post-Crescent, 26 January 1975.

²⁷Ibid., 15 January 1975.

²⁸Ibid.

²⁹Ibid., 20 January 1975.

³⁰Ibid., 3 January 1975.

³¹Ibid., 22 January 1975.

³²Milwaukee Journal, 21 January 1975.

Chapter 7, continued

³³Acts of violence included the murder of a missionary, eleven firebombings -- within six months after the end of the novitiate takeover, and the occupation of the tribal courthouse by four Indians.

³⁴Personal interview with Shirley Daly.

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I reaffirm the honor code.



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