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Book Review

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quiring omission of substantive matters to which the student ought to be exposed. It places a burden of teaching professional responsibility on many teachers who are not sufficiently interested or experienced in the field. This method may suffer because of a lack of satisfactorily prepared materials in most substantive and adjective law courses. Finally, its worth is unproved because no means have been devised for determining whether it achieves its objectives, i.e. helping students recognize and solve professional responsibility problems.

A brief mention was also made of perspective courses, those which depart from the conventional organization along lines of legal doctrine, which slice into the body of legal phenomena at a different angle than do the substantive courses. A fourth idea advanced was co-curricular activities, those which have an educational function but are not credited toward degree requirements.

After considering the advantages and disadvantages of all the methods, the consensus of opinion of the conference was that the pervasive approach was substantially preferable.

The book as a whole gives insight into the four dominant approaches that can be adopted. The editor has provided an invaluable aid to the prospective lawyer who will encounter problems of professional responsibility in his practice of law.

Reviewed by Donald W. Pritchard*

THE NOMINALISTIC PRINCIPLE by Eliyahu Hirschberg, (Bar-Ilan University, Ramat-Gan, Israel, 1971), 138 pp.

MR. HIRSCHBERG'S BOOK focuses on the complex view of the law toward changes in the value of money. He develops the view by a thorough study of the nominalistic principle which states that a franc is a franc, a pound is a pound, and a dollar is a dollar no matter to what extent it has either appreciated or depreciated. The legal theory is that private parties are presumed to have intended to contract according to the nominal value of money; if this was not their intent they would have so stipulated.

Modern legal theory uses three theoretical approaches to the problem of the extent of a monetary obligation: nominalism, metallism and valorism. The general opinion is that the modern capitalist economy could not have developed without the nominalistic principle. Nominalism was the dominant principle in private law long ago, but did not come to the forefront of public law until the period spanning World Wars I and II.

The author explains that, according to the metallistic theory, a unit of money is identical with a certain quantity of a given metal.

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As long as metallism prevailed, nominalism could not come to the front in theory or in practice.

For centuries monarchs and states financed their operations by paying their debts in debased coins. That principle is still operating at the present time. Since the turn of the century, the value of money has constantly changed. The nominalistic principle is followed world wide but is even more strictly adhered to in Anglo-Saxon countries.

The author also explores some alternative approaches, such as the valoristic approach. This modern theory emphasizes the purchasing power of money while disregarding its metallic cover. Another alternative approach is revaluation, primarily an emergency law. It attempts to solve the problem created by the breakdown of nominalism. Mr. Hirschberg spent much time describing the German revaluations that followed the rampant inflation that occurred after World War I. The German revaluation achieved fame as it was the most important deviation from the nominalistic principle in the twentieth century.

Mr. Hirschberg's research monograph has presented an excellent analysis of the monetary problems that have persisted for centuries and that are still with us today.

Reviewed by Robert A. Richardson*

THE PROFESSION OF LAW by Patterson & Cheatham, (Foundation Press, Inc. 1971), Mineola, New York, 489 pp.

The Profession of Law, written by Professors L. Ray Patterson and Elliott E. Cheatham, provides a useful resource tool in an area too long neglected in American legal education. For many lawyers, the failure of their law school courses to consider the responsibilities of lawyers as members of their profession may contribute to a failure to give sufficient thought to these responsibilities at any time in their legal careers. The book to be reviewed focuses attention upon these responsibilities, not only in the oft-discussed context of the courtroom, but throughout the broad spectrum of the lawyer's duties.

As the authors state, their work engages in a search for the basic responsibilities and standards of the profession. It inquires as to what standards and what organizations will best enable the profession to carry forward its varied responsibilities. These questions are considered in the context of various roles and situations in which a lawyer may find himself. Topics included are: (1) fundamentals (roles, realities and standards); (2) the lawyer at work (trial, consultation and compromise in the legislative, judicial, private and administrative processes); (3) the judciary; (4) the lawyer and client; and (5) the structure of the profession.

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