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A Marxist Critique of Alasdair MacIntyre's After Virtue

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A MARXIST CRITIQUE OF
ALASDAIR MACINTYRE'S AFTER VIRTUE

A THESIS

PRESENTED TO

THE FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
OF THE UNIVERSITY OF NEW ORLEANS

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT

OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF ARTS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE

BY:

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Becoming conscious of the social nature of our lives and the historical basis upon which that nature is constructed marks the sine qua non of all social science. Such a conclusion results from accumulated life experiences which enable us to have some understanding of the real pattern of our being.

With this in mind, I would like to thank all of the many people who contributed in one way or another to the development of this thesis. In particular, I especially thank my parents whose steady support and encouragement have aided me in innumerable ways. This thesis is dedicated to them.

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ABSTRACT

Alasdair MacIntyre asserts in After Virtue that contemporary moral discourse is only arbitrary assertion of the will. Appeals to reasoned arguments have been replaced by expressions of preference, attitude and feeling -- in short, by "emotivism." MacIntyre locates this moral breakdown in the Enlightenment philosophers' failed attempt to replace Aristotelian teleology with a rational justification for morality.

MacIntyre's analysis fails because he does not show whose interests are served through the assertion of arbitrary will or whose interests were served when the supposed "objective" standard of the Middle Ages prevailed. He does not acknowledge the preeminent role played by the material relations of production and exchange in the construction of a society's moral standards.

A class analysis suggests that emotivism originated in the overthrow of feudal society by the newly developing industrial class of free traders. The concept of the "free individual" facilitated the organization of production on the basis of wage-labour. The ensuing class struggle led to the dominance of emotivism in contemporary moral discourse.

MacIntyre's revised version of the Aristotelian

concept of the telos cannot establish a rational basis for morality. Without structural changes designed to eliminate class divisions, emotivism cannot be supplanted. It can only be suppressed by means of instruments such as MacIntyre's version of the telos. It is because MacIntyre fails to analyze emotivism as the product of class struggle that he advises us to prepare for "the new dark ages which are already upon us" (MacIntyre, After Virtue, hereinafter referred to as AV, p. 263).

I. INTRODUCTION

MacIntyre claims that contemporary moral philosophy, constituted mainly by liberal individualism and Marxism, has suffered a major catastrophe. The various concepts and philosophies we draw upon in everyday moral discourse "were originally at home in larger totalities of theory and practice" (AV, p. 10). The social contexts of these totalities gave their relevant concepts and philosophies a specific role and function. Ignorance of this will likely result in ahistorical conclusions with questionable application for present-day problems. MacIntyre directs this accusation at contemporary philosophers, many who use all past concepts and philosophies within the context of a single debate. But this leads to an unintelligible abstraction from their original social and cultural milieus. The complexity of this history is underestimated as is the ancestry of such arguments. Instead of looking for that history only in philosophers' writings, we should be seeking "those intricate bodies of theory and practice which constitute human cultures" (AV, p. 10). Unable to grasp the contextual framework in which philosophical theories and practices arose, we are consequently left with mere "fragments of a conceptual scheme, parts which now lack those contexts from which their significance derived" (AV, p. 2). The language of morality, MacIntyre concludes, is thus in a grave state of disorder; "we have

-- very largely, if not entirely -- lost our comprehension, both theoretical and practical, or morality" (AV, p. 2).

MacIntyre insists that what passes for moral discourse in the modern world is sheer arbitrary assertion without moral criteria. Characteristically, this type of discourse is devoid of conceptual commensurability in moral arguments -- there is no common measure by which to evaluate them. In this respect, in order to subject moral arguments to a process of rational discrimination and deliberation requires that all participants possess a shared understanding with regard to the usage of moral concepts and their respective meanings in light of that usage. Usage and meaning of moral concepts would therefore be in agreement. This is not the case, however, in contemporary argument. As a result, moral superiority among rival premises is left to the discretion of arbitrary variables such as personality, verbal eloquence, and charisma. What is certain is that the stronger and psychologically more adroit will prevail. Nonetheless, these arguments do purport to appeal to impersonal criteria which are independent of the preferences and attitudes of the speaker and listener. Thus, even if the practice of moral argument is a masquerade for the stronger will, there still remains in this culture the aspiration to be rational. What these moral arguments lack, therefore, is a uniform standard recognized by all

as possessing singular authority upon which their relative claims of moral fact and truth can be weighed and deliberated on a rational basis. In lieu of such a standard, morality in the modern world is simply emotivism -- the doctrine that "all evaluative judgments and more specifically all moral judgments are nothing but expressions of preference, expressions of attitude or feeling, insofar as they are moral or evaluative in character" (AV, pp. 11-12). Emotivism asserts that moral argument is simply a mask for personal preference. Moreover, moral argument has always consisted solely of personal preferences, for no objective and impersonal moral standards can be justified.

MacIntyre objects to the emotivist theory of meaning for three reasons. First, if emotivism is to elucidate the meaning of a certain class of sentences by referring to their function when uttered, then identification of the types of feelings or attitudes in question must be possible. MacIntyre claims that emotivists are unable to do this. All attempts to classify the relevant types of feelings and attitudes wind up in an empty circularity. "'Moral judgments express feelings or attitudes,' it is said. 'What kind of feelings or attitudes?' we ask. 'Feelings or attitudes of approval,' is the reply. 'What kind of approval?' we ask." This is either followed by silence or the circular response given is that of "moral approval" (AV, pp. 12-13). The reliance on a moral

standard thus undercuts the emotivist argument.

Second, emotivism fails because it characterizes as equivalent expressions of personal preference and evaluative expressions. The former are seen by MacIntyre as consisting of arbitrary decisions while evaluative expressions involve matters of fact. They "derive their distinctive function in our [my emphasis] language in key part from the contrast and difference between them" (AV, p. 13). Thus statements which command the listener to do something without any reason are contextual in that the parameters necessary for a correct decision depend only on the relationships which are apparent within that context. For example, a private will follow a general's orders simply out of respect for the general's authority. On the other hand, statements which command the listener to do something for a reason can be evaluated on the basis of impersonal criteria which are independent of the relationship between speaker and hearer. Utterances of personal preference are therefore dependent upon who utters them in what particular context. Evaluative expressions, on the contrary, are not dependent on the speaker or the context of utterance for their "reason-giving force" (AV, p. 13).

Third, MacIntyre claims that emotivism is more appropriate as a theory of the usage of sentences than as a theory about the meaning of such sentences. In this sense, emotivist theory should examine the purpose or

function of moral utterances and not claim that judgments such as "'This is right' or 'This is good'" mean the same as "'I approve of this; do so as well' or 'Hurrah for this!'" or any of the other attempts at equivalence suggested by emotivist theorists" (AV, p. 13). As a theory of usage, therefore, expressions of feeling or attitude should be understood not as a function of their meaning but rather of their use on particular occasions.

Nevertheless, emotivists may claim that in making judgmental assertions, an agent still expresses his feelings or attitudes and thus attempts to influence others. If so, then the meaning and use of moral expressions have therefore become "radically discrepant with each other" (AV, p. 14). Thus, "to a large degree people now think, talk and act as if emotivism were true" (AV, p. 22). MacIntyre cannot accept such a conclusion. In response to the emotivists' assertion that all attempts to provide a rational justification for an objective morality have failed, MacIntyre claims that genuine, objective and impersonal moral standards can be justified.

In this thesis, I will first summarize MacIntyre's argument. I shall then demonstrate that without a class analysis, MacIntyre is unable to see that the origin of emotivism lies in contradictions arising from the development of the material forces and relations of production and exchange. Because his argument is not historical, he incorrectly understands emotivism as a

problem of metaphysics rather than as a product of social contradictions. I will thus argue that the rejection of Aristotelianism, the basis of the "Enlightenment Project," and the popular recognition of emotivism are the product of the evolutionary development of class struggles rather than the result of unsolved problems in the realm of ideas. A materialist perspective will show that a coherent analysis of social reality first requires insight into the overall structure of production in a society. This will include an analysis of the technological development of the productive forces, the operational mode and organizational structure of production, and the relationship of labourers to the means of production and the product of their work. Specific attention must be focused on whether a distinction is made either legally or through custom between those who own and control the means of production and those who perform the direct labour. In light of such distinctions, it is then necessary to determine whether the economic conditions which support the existence of these groups are such that a hostile opposition exists. Only then can we analyze the class basis upon which the legal, cultural, and ideological forms of reality in a society are constructed. Without such a perspective, all attempts to establish an objective framework for rational discourse will fail. Through the method of class analysis, however, the conclusion is reached that an appeal to objective criteria can be

attained only with the elimination of class divisions. I conclude therefore that MacIntyre's solution to emotivism fails, because he does not address the class basis of his proposed teleological society. His resurrection of the Aristotelian telos is thus a tool for suppression, not liberation.

Emotivism entails the obliteration of any genuine distinction between manipulative and non-manipulative social relations (AY, p. 28). It applies standards of normative rationality with sociological and psychological generalizations. MacIntyre therefore defends not only a philosophical analysis of our present predicament but also a sociological hypothesis about the major characters of our contemporary cultural setting.

Major characters embody the "moral and metaphysical ideas and theories" of their culture. "Characters are the marks worn by moral philosophies" (AY, p. 28). The moral constraints of their roles are more defined relative to other social roles, because they are representatives of a culture. Thus, other people use characters as standards by which to understand and evaluate themselves.

MacIntyre contrasts the invention of a nondescript individual who acts in the context of a particular history

II. MACINTYRE'S ARGUMENT

But though reason is undoubtedly the source of the general rules of morality, and of all the moral judgments which we form by means of them, it is altogether absurd and unintelligible to suppose that the first perceptions of right and wrong can be derived from reason, even in those particular cases upon the experience of which the general rules are formed. These first perceptions, as well as all other experiments upon which any general rules are formed, cannot be the object of reason, but of immediate sense and feeling (Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, p. 470).

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MacIntyre contrasts the intentions of a nondescript individual who acts in the context of a particular history

of actions, beliefs, experiences and interactions with that of a character such as a Catholic priest. The priest officiates at Mass and performs other rites and rituals which presuppose the beliefs of Catholic Christianity, but personally he may lack faith. Thus, while the nondescript individual may act in accord with the beliefs in his mind or heart, the requirements of the character (the priest) are imposed from outside.

Public officials and other office holders thus do not necessarily constitute characters. Instead, the character is a type which stands out in a given historical epoch. The distinction of a character from a nondescript individual, therefore, is the extent to which he or she is "an object of regard by the members of the culture generally or by some significant segment of them" (AV, p. 29). Thus, to the degree that characters legitimate a mode of social existence, the requirements of the role and the personality of the individual fulfilling that role must fuse. Hence, the character furnishes a cultural and moral legitimacy for a mode of social existence.

Three main characters are commonplace in the sociology out of which emotivism springs. First is the rich aesthete whose cynicism will not allow his overindulgence in pleasure to satiate him. Second is the therapist who is the most liable to be deceived by the claims of his therapeutic theories which are part of the emotivist moral fiction. Third is the manager or bureaucratic expert

whose fictive claim to control certain aspects of social reality is merely a mask for the manipulation of human beings. Each character believes his or her respective claims are rational. But according to MacIntyre, each personifies the emotivist thesis which sees no distinction between manipulative and non-manipulative social relationships. Moreover, each provides the modern emotivist culture with its moral definitions.

The aesthete seeks personal satisfaction. He thinks his social context is populated by similar solipsistic wills, each seeking personal gratification. But while the aesthete's wealth relieves him from the necessity of work, it preoccupies him in a restless search for ways to employ it. So to fend off the boredom of a life of leisure, he contrives plans by which to manipulate the behavior of others in a manner responsive to his wishes.

On the contrary, both the therapist and the manager treat ends as given; they are concerned only with techniques to do their jobs effectively. In their roles they do not and, MacIntyre claims, are unable to engage in moral debate (AV, p. 30). Thus they restrict themselves to the realms in which rational agreement is possible. These realms of agreement, from their point of view, are the realm of fact, the realm of means, and the realm of measurable effectiveness. Hence in their eyes and in the eyes of those who see them in a similar manner, they remain uncontested figures whose interpretations are

"value-free" and "neutral" based in fact and steeped in incontrovertible evidence. However, their claims to effectiveness and hence to authority are essentially cultural fictions, for they lack any rational criteria of judgment. Bureaucratic authority which appeals solely to its own effectiveness is mere power. Manipulation, therefore, constitutes the predominate mode of social relations. And to "a disturbing extent our morality will be disclosed as a theatre of illusions" (AV, p. 77).

As a result, there is no rational basis for our morality. There is merely a contest of wills in an assertive and counter-assertive irresolvable polemic. In this regard, MacIntyre is not saying that debates go on indefinitely "- although they do - but also that they apparently can find no terminus" (AV, p. 6). If our contemporary moral philosophy is characterized by unfounded assertions and consequently by interminable argument, then how was moral language and philosophy understood in an "ordered" form when "objective" criteria existed?

MacIntyre's claims rest on an analysis of societies which existed prior to academic history. Earlier societies contained hierarchies which bound individuals to their social roles and ordered their social practices. Such societies embodied the "conception of a whole human life as the primary subject of objective and impersonal evaluation, of a type of evaluation which provides the

content for judgment upon the particular actions or projects of a given individual" (AV, p. 34). One's identity was determined by one's membership in different social groupings. Village, tribal and familial affiliation defined one's social role and relationship to others. One who lacked such a role was a stranger or an outcast. Since life was ordered to a given end, it was possible to determine objectively whether or not individuals achieved their ends.

This conception of a whole human life is absent in the contemporary assumption that the individual is distinct from the roles he or she plays. The modern self is thus cut off from boundaries located in roles and practices. It lacks a social identity and the view of human life as ordered to a given end. Questions asking "What is the good for man?" have been discarded because no answer is possible. The modern self therefore rejects the notion of teleology, the notion that we all are born with a designated purpose. Consequently, our lives become unintelligible and disjointed. But the self, MacIntyre asserts, is not entirely distinct from particular social roles. It is not the project of virtually open or endless possibilities (as per the early Sartre). At the same time, however, the self is more than just the roles it plays (cf. Goffman).

How did the modern emotivist self emerge and what were the root causes of the disorder in moral philosophy? How

did we lose a moral standard from which to judge and to act? The disorder arose, MacIntyre states, because our predecessor culture did not solve its philosophical problems. Specifically, the culture of the Enlightenment failed to develop an independent rational justification for morality. The subsequent breakdown of this Enlightenment project is at the root of our current predicament. MacIntyre asserts that the culmination of this project was first presented in a book which at once was "the outcome and the epitaph of the Enlightenment's systematic attempt to discover a rational justification for morality" (AV, p. 39). The book was Kierkegaard's Enten-Eller (known by its English translation as Either/Or).

With Kierkegaard, the question of principles and standards for one's life arise out of a radical choice. One of two possible options was imperative for all of us. The first option is the ethical way of life consisting of attendant distinctions between good and evil. The second option is the aesthetic way of life in which the self is lost in the immediacy of present experience. "The choice between the ethical and the aesthetic is not the choice between good and evil," MacIntyre explains "it is the choice whether or not to choose in terms of good and evil" (AV, p. 40). Principles possess authority independent of attitudes, preferences, and feelings in the ethical dimension and are thus not arbitrary. How one feels

serves as the guide in the aesthetic. Though Kierkegaard favored the choice of the ethical, he could give no reason for its adoption other than as an arbitrary consequence of the imperative of radical choice.

MacIntyre traces Kierkegaard's dilemma to the influence of Kant, who saw the basis of the ethical life not in the passions but rather in practical reason. For Kant, reason

lays down principles which are universal, categorical and internally consistent. Hence a rational morality will lay down principles which both can and ought to be held by all men, independent of circumstances and conditions, and which could consistently be obeyed by every rational agent on every occasion" (AV, p. 45).

Kant insisted that all true expressions of morality have a categorical imperative which enjoins us. In this sense, fundamental concepts or 'categories' must be applied to the contents of possible sensory experience in order to form objective judgments. Morality, therefore, cannot be based on our desires for happiness or pleasure, for these desires are not consistent or categorical. Moreover, in order to do what God commands, we must have an independent moral judgment to know what God commands. Thus morality is not rooted in the passions or in the divine but rather in the consistent universality of practical reason.

Kant's attempt to base morality on reason alone fails, MacIntyre asserts. We cannot with good reason consistently will that everyone should act in a certain manner. A

maxim such as "'Always eat mussels on Mondays in March'" is equally as valid as maxims such as "'Always tell the truth'" and "'Always keep promises'" (AV, pp. 45-46). And even if we restrict Kant's categorical imperative to the moral sphere by asserting: "'Always . . . treat humanity . . . as an end, and not as a means'" (AV, p. 46), no good reason exist to favor this imperative over one which asserts: "'Let everyone except me be treated as a means'" (AV, p. 46). This inability to base morality in reason led Kierkegaard to conclude that we simply must choose.

Kant's location of morality in reason, however, arose out of an earlier project by Hume who sought to base morality in the passions, not reason. For Hume, morality was a part of practical philosophy that consists of rules and precepts to guide our passions and actions. He observed that morals excite our passions and influence our affections. Reason, for Hume,

is the discovery of truth or falshood. Truth or falshood consists in an agreement or disagreement either to the real relations of ideas, or to real existence and matter of fact. Whatever, therefore, is not susceptible of this agreement or disagreement, is incapable of being true or false, and can never be an object of our reason. Now 'tis evident our passions, volitions, and actions, are not susceptible of any such agreement or disagreement; being original facts and realities, compleat in themselves, and implying no reference to other passions, volitions, and actions. 'Tis impossible, therefore they can be pronounced either true or false, and be either contrary or conformable to reason (Hume's Ethical Writings, pp. 185-86).

Reason alone, Hume wrote, can never prevent or

produce action, it can only direct our judgment toward or away from the causes and effects of action. By detecting the relation between cause and effect, our actions are subsequently altered, by either an aversion or propensity towards an object. Reason is thus subsequent to the impulse and impulse is only directed by the former. And only a contrary impulse can prevent volition. Therefore, because "reason can never immediately prevent or produce any action by contradicting or approving of it, it cannot be the source of moral good and evil, which are found to have that influence" (Hume's Ethical Writings, p. 186).

Nonetheless, Hume recognized that general rules are invoked in moral judgment. Such rules help attain those ends which the passions set before us. Hume's claims, however, are historically restricted. They rest on the passions particular to a complacent heir of the Glorious Revolution of 1688. Hume, therefore, covertly uses a standard for moral principles.

Reliance on the passions suffers accordingly when Hume and his contemporary Adam Smith invoke sympathy rather than a moral standard as a bridge to remedy the defects of action arising out of interest and utility. Interest and utility could lead one to break promises when the promises no longer serve the agent's interests. Why therefore keep promises that no longer serve our interests if breaking them would result in no other ill consequences? One answer is that of sympathy or 'fellow

feeling'. "But the gap of course is logically unbridgable," asserts MacIntyre, "and 'sympathy' as used by Hume and Smith is the name of a philosophical fiction¹ (AV, p. 49).

MacIntyre concludes that these philosophers fail to vindicate the Enlightenment project.

Just as Hume seeks to found morality on the passions because his arguments have excluded the possibility of founding it on reason, so Kant founds it on reason because his arguments have excluded the possibility of founding it on the passions, and Kierkegaard on criterionless fundamental choice because of what he takes to be the compelling nature of the considerations which exclude both reason and the passions (AV, p. 49).

As a result, this culture's failure to provide the foundation for moral discourse and action that religion could no longer furnish led to philosophy's decline from its central cultural role to a marginal academic discipline.

These philosophers were unable to provide a rational vindication of morality because they all shared the same historical and social background. This background, MacIntyre asserts, possessed an internal incoherence in its moral beliefs, an incoherence which ensured the failure of any common project. All "agree to a surprising degree on the content and character of the precepts which constitute genuine morality" (AV, p. 51). For Kierkegaard, the radical choice was not which ethics to live by -- to him this was a given -- but rather whether or not to live by the ethical way of life. Similarly,

once morality was based upon reason, Kant felt one's moral duty was clear. And for Hume, though moral judgment arose out of the passions, certain general rules must be invoked to help us attain the ends the passions set before us. But, as MacIntyre indicated earlier, the passions underlying Hume's rules were particular to a complacent heir of the Glorious Revolution. All these philosophers, therefore, possessed a congruence in their precepts of morality which flowed from a shared Christian perspective or weltanschauung (AV, p. 51).

These philosophers further agreed that a rational justification of morality would characterize some feature or features of human nature. Rules of morality would then "be explained and justified as being those rules which a being possessing just such a human nature could be expected to accept" (AV, p. 52). Their separate projects of constructing arguments which would move from premises about human nature to conclusions about the authority of moral rules and precepts failed, however, because they lacked any conception of a true end for man.

The shared intellectual background of these philosophers was characterized by the secular rejection of both Protestant and Catholic theology and the scientific and philosophical rejection of Aristotelianism. The latter had as its foundation a moral schema with the purpose of correcting and improving untutored human nature. This morality was rooted in Aristotle's

teleological scheme which sought to transform man-as-he-happens-to-be into man-as-he-could-be-if-he-realized-his-essential-nature. Required of this perspective was the view of man as a rational being, some conception of the human telos or man-as-he-could-be-if-he-realized-his-telos, and the moral precepts enabling this transformation. Likewise, these moral precepts were found in a rational ethics which presupposed an account of potentiality and action, an account of the essence of man as a rational animal, and an account of the human telos. Such an account had been present in the theistic beliefs of Christianity, Judaism, and Islam. As such, the teleological injunctions expressed divine law. The theological injunctions of sin replaced the Aristotelian concept of error. Negating salvation in this world, man's true end was directed toward another. Yet,

the threefold structure of untutored human-nature-as-it-happens-to-be, human-nature-as-it-could-be-if-it-realized-its-telos and the precepts of rational ethics as the means for the transition from one to the other remains central to the theistic understanding of evaluative thought and judgment (AV, p. 53).

When this structure was abandoned, however, essential natures and teleological features available for study in the physical universe could no longer be recognized through rational deliberation. The rejection of any teleological view or the perspective of man-as-he-could-be-if-he-realized-his-telos thus rendered the Enlightenment project disabled from the start. As such,

the Enlightenment philosophers were left to work with only the remaining two elements of the teleological structure consisting of "a set of injunctions deprived of their teleological context" and "a certain view of untutored-human-nature-as-it-is" (AV, p. 55). These moral injunctions were originally based in a scheme to correct, improve and educate human nature. Now that this view no longer seemed valid, neither did the moral injunctions.

The Aristotelian tradition rests on the central idea that man has an essential nature guiding his development. Man then has a purpose which is clear and indisputable in this tradition; moral and evaluative statements could determine what is good and what is bad, what is true and what is false. Everything and everyone had a specific purpose or function. When this notion is abandoned, "it begins to appear implausible to treat moral judgments as factual statements" (AV, p. 59).

As "bizarre and improbable" (AV, p. 3) as the dissolution of a previous framework may appear, MacIntyre insists that only a very few can recognize the catastrophe at hand. This is so because the catastrophe has not been recognized as a catastrophe. But if his thesis is correct, then "we are all already in a state so disastrous that there are no large remedies for it" (AV, p. 5).

III. DISAGREEMENT ON THE NATURE OF MORAL DISAGREEMENT

But the old idealist conception of history, which was not yet dislodged, knew nothing of class struggles based upon economic interests, knew nothing of economic interests; production and all economic relations appeared in it only as incidental, subordinate elements in the "history of civilisation" (Engels, Socialism: Utopian and Scientific, pp. 44-45).

MacIntyre believes that the inability of modern man to agree on a concept of the nature of man that can serve as a standard for behavior is rooted in the demise of the Enlightenment rejection of the Aristotelian idea of the telos. And subsequent to this demise moral utterance has been put to uses at the service of arbitrary will. MacIntyre, however, refuses to address the question of whose arbitrary will has been served. He claims this "is not my task" (AV, p. 110). However, it is his task to address this question if he wishes to explain why there is no common standard for moral discourse in modern society.

MacIntyre believes that only ideas determine historical development. He ignores the real origin of ideas, moral or otherwise, rooted in the social relations that arise out of the mode of production and exchange of a society. Without analyzing these structures his subsequent explanation of the rejection of Aristotelian teleology falters as does his understanding of modern emotivism. His reactionary advice to prepare for the new dark ages, as a consequence, will not provide a solution

to the problem of emotivism.

To search for a common standard by which to judge and to act, social relations must first be structured upon a common program. Such a program would require the mutual participation of all in the socially directed processes of production. Arbitrary discrimination would be supplanted by collective appraisal of abilities and needs. The social product would be distributed on the basis of social rather than private considerations. And advancement of workers' interests would constitute the common grounds upon which rational deliberation would be conducted. Such common grounds do not exist in emotivist society today, and they did not exist during the Enlightenment.

MacIntyre's failure to use a class analysis explains his understanding of the abandonment of the telos as purely an ideological abstraction. But the secular rejection of Protestant and Catholic theology along with the scientific and philosophical rejection of Aristotelianism were no mere products of theoretical discourse. An analysis of changing social and economic conditions must be undertaken before we can understand the motives behind the three philosophic projects he associates with the Enlightenment. Only then will we understand why moral disagreement arises.

The concept of the telos could hold sway in classical Greece because a large part of that society was effectively prevented from participating in the political

life of the community. Hume recognized this in his critique on the notion of an "original contract."

The republic of Athens was, I believe, the most extensive democracy, that we read of in history: Yet if we make the requisite allowances for the women, the slaves, and the strangers, we shall find, that that establishment was not, at first, made, nor any law ever voted, by a tenth part of those who were bound to pay obedience to it; Not to mention the islands and foreign dominions, which the Athenians claimed as theirs by right of conquest (Hume's Ethical Writings, p. 261).

Citizenship, as such, existed solely among the male owners of property, the so-called "free" men of Athens. Mechanics and labourers, and much less slaves, were not accepted into the full community as "citizens"; they were thus not educated to the realization of their telos, for "it is quite impossible, while living the life of a mechanic or hireling, to occupy oneself as virtue demands" (Aristotle, p. 184). To maintain and perpetuate this subjugation by one class over society, it was necessary to promote a standard by which some semblance of rational and non-arbitrary deliberation in social matters could be identified and understood as possessing the requisite authority. What better way to enforce a standard based on class rule than to assert that this standard arose out of a metaphysical component, the telos? Adorned with both natural and mystic properties, the telos explained why some men were slaves and others not, why some were successful while others failed. A teleological standard provided stability and granted legitimacy to those holding

power in classical Greece.

A similar practice was embodied in the Negro slave codes of the antebellum American South.² Conduct of the southern aristocracy was conditioned by its relationship with its direct source of income: slave-labour. The concept of "man-as-he-could-be-if-he-realized-his-telos" was replaced by the idea of "man-as-he-must-be-if-he-shall-maintain-his-slaves." As Genovese wrote of the plantation South, "The master-slave relationship permeated Southern life and influenced relationships among free men" (Genovese, p. 13). Phillips also observed that "in virtually every American community where it [i.e. slavery] existed at all, the institution was first established by custom alone and was merely recognized by statutes when these came to be enacted" (Phillips, p. 489). Social relationships and legal statutes were thus developed subsequently to the implementation of the mode and relations of production based on slavery.

Both the standard of the American slave codes and the teleological standard were held in strict observance so long as class rule was maintained and the organizational stability of society went unchallenged. And in both the plantation economy of the American South and in the slave economy of ancient Greece, change in social status and relationship to the existing productive processes was limited. In this sense, the mode of production gives rise to the variety of relations and positions within a society

and conditions the relative movement of individuals in these relationships. Production on the basis of class stratification thus necessitates the use of ideological tools, such as the telos, to maintain this selfsame mode of production. Concepts of justice, rights, and freedom are therefore parametrically determined and thus conditioned by the necessities of a society's system of production.

Marx recognized and understood the implications of class rule fully when explaining to the General Council of the First International in 1865 the futility of relying on appeals to abstract justice. On the contrary, it was a duty to themselves and to their fellow workers, insisted Marx, to confront the unrestrained power of their capitalists brethren. Not only should the workers attempt to alleviate the detrimental effects of the system but, moreover, their goal should be to abolish the wages system itself (Marx, Value, Price, and Profit, pp. 53-62). Marx was not speaking from a one-dimensional view of history rooted in idealist theory; instead, his judgment was informed by a historical perspective rooted in the real lives of men and women, in the structures and relations of production. Marx's perspective was not blind to the real basis for what passed as "law," "justice," and "the good" in bourgeois, or any previous, society, - hence his reproach:

To clamour for equal or even equitable retribution on the basis of the wages system is

the same as to clamour for freedom on the basis of the slavery system. What you think just or equitable is out of the question. The question is: What is necessary and unavoidable with a given system of production (Marx, Value, Price, and Profit, pp. 39-40)?

His perspective clearly recognized the primacy of the mode of production as the determining factor which constituted behavioral and ideological standards prevailing in any society. As such, that class which controlled the means of production must necessarily establish its "law," its conception of "justice" and the "good" as the appropriate standard to be followed.

MacIntyre, on the contrary, uses an emotivist argument to reject this notion:

Marx was of course mistaken in supposing that such disagreements over justice are merely secondary phenomena, that they merely reflect the interests of rival economic classes. Conceptions of justice and allegiance to such conceptions are partly constitutive of the lives of social groups, and economic interests are often partially defined in terms of such conceptions and not vice versa (AV, pp. 252-53).

No argument follows to substantiate these claims which suggests that MacIntyre's analytical approach itself may rest on an emotivist basis. Without any evidential support offered to back up his claims, he chooses instead to base their validity simply on the negation of Marx -- that is, the negation of a theory which is rooted in historical experience.

The root of MacIntyre's problem can be found in his infatuation with the intentions of individuals. Behaviour, for MacIntyre, cannot be characterized independently of

intentions. Moreover, the intentions themselves cannot be characterized independently of the settings which give them an intelligibility. More specifically, he is interested in primary intentions such that if the individual had a contrary intention, different action would follow. Such intentions would link the agent with his intended actions. MacIntyre states,

we need to know both what certain of his beliefs are and which of them are causally effective; and, that is to say, we need to know whether certain contrary-to-fact hypothetical statements are true or false. And until we know this, we shall not know how to characterize correctly what the agent is doing (AV, p. 207).

He presents the example of a man working in his garden. The question for MacIntyre hinges on whether the man's primary intention is to put the garden in order for the winter or to please his wife by taking exercise. Depending on which intention is primary, only then can we understand and explain the behaviour in question.

Intentions, thusly understood, have to be ordered both causally and temporally with references to settings and to descriptive terminology. Furthermore, such research depends upon the correct identification of the agent's beliefs; lacking this, no understanding or explanation of the agent's activities is possible. Concludes MacIntyre, "And what would be utterly doomed to failure would be the project of a science of, say, political behavior, detached from a study of intentions, beliefs and settings" (AV, p. 208).

This fixation with intentions, however, is constructed upon the vicissitudes of personal opinion, for what other manner can we gauge a subject's "true" intentions and hence classify correctly his beliefs? Explanation and understanding of his behaviour will be no more forthcoming should our gardener inform us that his primary intention is to serve God! Potentiality and thus behavior can only be understood in relation to the objective basis of the physical means at one's disposal, the definite pattern of social relations and knowledge of the physical environment in which a person operates, in addition to the past behavioral patterns of such an individual. Comprehension of one's essence is, therefore, not objectively possible. As such, one can readily see wherein the scientific rejection of Aristotelianism lay.

Consequently, our understanding of this gardener cannot be left to rest solely on his individual intentions. The task of explanation will require examination of his specific relationship with regard to his objective material conditions of production and exchange. Material attachments and their relationship to the productive structure, therefore, must take precedence before comprehension of any moral bonding is possible. "Individuals producing in society," states Marx, "-- hence socially determined individual production -- is, of course, the point of departure" (Marx, Grundrisse, p. 83). Intentions have meaning only within the context of

practical human activity; as such, they are the product of reflective thought and thus are secondary to social life. Preexisting social forms create the conditions in which intentional human activity either reproduces or transforms these historical relations.³ Marx rebuffs this one-sided concern with intentions and follows with a discourse on the approach to be taken; he writes:

In the social production of their life, men enter into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will, relations of production which correspond to a definite stage of development of their material productive forces. The sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which rises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the social, political, and intellectual life process in general. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness (Marx, "Preface to A Critique of Political Economy," p. 389).

Two aspects from this methodological exposition must be explained before the centrality of the concept of class can be understood. The "material productive forces" include human labour-power and the technical state of development of the means of production. On the other hand, the "relations of production" are constituted by the economic ownership of the productive forces. And ownership in this sense implies effective control. When this ownership of the means of production is not held in common, an opposition is created. Thus the key condition

underlying the concept of class is "the direct relationship of the owners of the conditions of production to the immediate producers" (Marx, Capital, Volume III, Ch. 47, p. 927).

The hostile opposition of millions of families living under economic conditions that separate their mode of life with its specific interests and peculiar culture and education from other similarly constituted groups of people characterizes the concept of class. As Engels noted, "these warring classes of society are always the products of the modes of production and exchange -- in a word, of the economic conditions of their time" (Engels, p. 45). Thus, from the point of departure of individuals producing in society (i.e. the structure of social relations within the material economic structure) as the real basis of scientific study coupled with an understanding of the dialectic of class opposition, we can then proceed to explain the transformation of structural and ideological forms. States Marx,

Just as our opinion of an individual is not based on what he thinks of himself, so can we not judge of such a period of transformation by its own consciousness; on the contrary, this consciousness must be explained rather from the contradictions of material life, from the existing conflict between the social productive forces and the relations of production (Marx, "Preface to A Critique of Political Economy," p. 390).

Had MacIntyre's analysis been formed from such a perspective rather than the speculative idealism he pursues, we would derive a different and fuller accounting

of the Enlightenment project and its rejection of Aristotelianism. To this I now turn.

IV. THE DAWN OF THE AGE OF REASON & THE LOSS OF 'OBJECTIVE' STANDARDS

Every form of society and government then existing, every old traditional notion was flung into the lumber-room as irrational; the world had hitherto allowed itself to be led solely by prejudices; everything in the past deserved only pity and contempt (*Evils, Socialism, Utopian and Scientific*, p. 127).

MacIntyre takes us back nearly 300 years to eighteenth-century Europe engaged in formulating a rational justification for morality. He thinks that the Enlightenment had little to do with French cultural history: in fact, he says, France was "the most backward of the enlightened nations" (27, p. 37). The French looked toward English models, which in turn were overshadowed by the achievements of the Scottish Enlightenment. The French Revolution thus did not have major implications for the alteration of eighteenth-century morality and did not play a central role in the Enlightenment. No mention is made of the 'Rights of Man' arising in this 'Age of Reason' nor of the new bourgeois class's assertion that everything must now be subjected to the new moral standard of abstract "reason." Rather, the French Revolution was "an attempt to enter, by political means this North European culture [i.e. that of the eighteenth-century Scottish, English, Dutch, Danish and Prussian intellectuals] and so to abolish the gap between French ideas and French social and political life" (27, p.

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37).

English, Scottish and German thinkers including Hume, Smith, Kant and Mozart in addition to the less well-known Adam Ferguson, John Millar and Lord Monboddo are all part of this vibrant north European culture. These contributors to the "Enlightenment Project" were "at home in the social world" as opposed to the French intelligentsia who were "a group at once educated and alienated." And yet, "most of the eighteenth-century French intelligentsia ha[d] the will to belong to it [i.e. north European culture], in spite of the differences in their situation" (AV, p. 37). The primary responsibility for the Enlightenment, therefore, was actually rooted in the secularized Protestant northern European culture interested in formulating a justification of moral belief.⁴

Prior to this Enlightenment undertaking, the word 'moral' was not in the language asserts MacIntyre. Beginning, however, with the period from 1630 to 1850, the word 'morality' came into usage to designate that sphere "in which rules of conduct which are neither theological nor legal nor aesthetic are allowed a cultural space of their own" (AV, p. 39). With the "moral sphere" distinguished from these latter spheres, the project of an independent rational justification of morality thus became not only the concern of philosophers but was central to European culture itself. The failure to deal with this "problem" then culminated with the reduction of all

justification of morality into Kierkegaard's concept of ultimate choice. This, we remember, entailed the choosing by each of us of either the deontological standards of the ethical way of life or the submission to the passions in the aesthetic way of life. And since no reason could logically serve as a first principle, this contradiction confirms the failure of the Enlightenment Project to provide a rational vindication of morality. And "from henceforward the morality of our predecessor culture -- and subsequently of our own -- lacked any public, shared rationale or justification" (AV, p. 50). In such a situation, Aristotelianism with its standardized conception of human nature understood as naturally guiding us toward our specific and certain aims and goals -- our telos -- could not survive.

MacIntyre's account of the Enlightenment and the rise of emotivism makes no mention of the overthrow of feudal society by the new industrial class with its assemblage of free-traders. His account owes little if anything to the bourgeois severance of the political and social domination of the feudal aristocracy. And nothing is spoken of the subversion of Church authority by this confident new class and its replacement with state authority rooted in nationalism. The Enlightenment turns merely on the separation of the moral from the theological, legal, and aesthetic spheres. But to see this distinction is not to explain how or why it developed. This transformation in

belief systems is not seen as having its basis in class conflict with a contending class attempting to impose its own belief system upon society and succeeding in its task. Instead, this is simply interpreted as the passage from a society where objective standards for morality prevailed to one where emotivism took root and individual personal preference became the order of the day.

MacIntyre is unable to understand the particular characteristic of the bourgeois epoch as that of a constant revolutionizing of the means of production. In contradistinction from previous historical epochs, the bourgeois mode of production rested upon an uninterrupted disturbance of all social conditions leaving everlasting uncertainty and agitation in their wake. Transformation of the labour process and its material conditions depends first on the formal subsumption of the labour process to capital. The key distinction here in relation to the feudal labour process is that the capitalist is the manager of production and directs the labour process for the sole purpose of using money to make more money. The labour process thus becomes the "instrument of the valorization process, the process of the self-valorization of capital -- the manufacture of surplus-value" (Marx, Capital, V. I, Appendix, p. 1019). This is followed by the real subsumption of labour under capital with the production of relative surplus-value.

Capitalist production attains its specificity at this

point transforming the labour process and its actual conditions to a technological basis. Socialized labour comes into being with the division of labour in the workshop. Machinery and the conscious use of the sciences are applied to the development of technology to increase the value of surplus-labour resulting in an increase in the scale of production. The capitalist, in his drive for the maximization of profit, constantly aims to have as much unpaid labour as possible in the final product. This, as Marx indicated, is achieved "only by producing for the sake of production" (Marx, Capital, V. I, Appendix, p. 1038). Hence a constantly repeated revolution takes place in the mode of production, in the productivity of the workers and in the relations between workers and capitalists (Marx, Capital, V. I, Appendix, p. 1035). As Marx and Engels stated it in the Manifesto,

All fixed, fast-frozen relations, with their train of ancient and venerable prejudices and opinions, are swept away, all new-formed ones become antiquated before they can ossify. All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned, and man is at last compelled to face with sober senses his real conditions of life and his relations with his kind (Marx & Engels, The Communist Manifesto, p. 12).

MacIntyre, however, attributes the demise of "objective" standards to the mere separation of the moral sphere from the theological, legal, and aesthetic. The eighteenth-century philosophers, therefore, were engaged in an unsuccessful project from the start, for the moral injunctions they inherited were incompatible with an

expressly designed discrepant conception of human nature.

As a consequence, MacIntyre tells us nothing with regard to the French Revolution as a symbol of class conflict. Rather than understand France as being at the forefront of the Enlightenment Project, he likens it to a cultural backwater whose alienated intellectuals "have to wait for the nineteenth-century Russians before they find any counterpart elsewhere" (AV, p. 37). Such a conclusion, one might say, initially suggests a preference for Burke's Reflections on the Revolution in France over that of Paine's Rights of Man though we find out later that Burke too is part of the problem (cf. AV, p. 222). Indeed, MacIntyre's interpretation of the initial stages of the French Revolution as an attempt by French intellectuals "to enter by political means this North European culture" (AV, p. 37) is totally devoid of a social analysis of contending classes attempting to impose their rule. Further, there is no mention of the conflicting modes of production which gave rise to these contentious classes. And rather than view the previous feudal belief system for what it was -- an imposition of the will of the Church and the landed aristocracy -- he rather implies that this was a harmonious time in which an "objective" standard prevailed.

It is true that North European culture had already experienced the bourgeois revolution in the Netherlands in the sixteenth century. So too had it undergone the two

seventeenth-century revolutions in England and been affected by the American revolution in the eighteenth century. But what sets off the French Revolution from these others, and thus from North European culture in general, and what gives it special importance in terms of the Enlightenment is that these other revolutions ended in what Soboul calls a conservative compromise which safeguarded "the supremacy of wealth beneath the cover of 'bourgeois freedom'". This was not so in the French Revolution, when "equality in law took first place before everything" (Soboul, p. 7). Thus while North European culture rested on a compromise between the bourgeoisie and the aristocracy, the French Revolution struck a mortal blow at this construction of a social hierarchy based on wealth. And in the area of political liberty, the French Revolution not only allowed the Protestant and Jew to live in the community but also by creating a civil constitution in 1792 "gave every citizen the right to live without religion" (Soboul, p. 11).

But what is most significant about the French Revolution than any other at the time is that it swept away the last vestiges of feudal society and with it the feudal system of production and exchange. In its place "the French Revolution unreservedly proclaimed free enterprise and freedom of profit, thereby opening the way to capitalism" (Soboul, p. 9). This is the defining characteristic of the Enlightenment, and the consolidation

of this project by the French Revolution is what characterizes its significance and preeminence. And the dramatic nature of the class struggle in France is owed to the contradictory nature between the obstinacy of the aristocracy hesitant to give up its privileged feudal orders and seignorial rights of control over the peasantry and the firm opposition of the masses to any perpetuation of privilege based on class distinctions. Thus the events in France during and following the 1789 Revolution were not only of direct symbolic value to the Enlightenment but, moreover, these events portend the future direction this struggle was to take. Rather than consisting solely in an ideological abstraction of secularized Protestant north European culture seeking a justification of moral belief, the consolidation of capitalism and its mode of production, therefore, is seen as central to an understanding of the Enlightenment.

The fallacy of MacIntyre's analysis lies in not recognizing the predominance of the productive forces over the cultural. Attacks on the feudal hierarchy could not be sustained until small traders could establish themselves outside of the closed medieval guilds so as to attain some distance from the power of the Church and the landed nobles.⁶ Marx and Engels located the origin of this independent trader in the person of the chartered burgher, a product of the earliest towns -- the chartered boroughs (Marx & Engels, The Communist Manifesto, p. 9). The

burgher's capital, secured through trade and usury, was to lay the foundation for industrial capital and transform him and others like him into a class-for-itself -- the modern bourgeoisie. The burgeoning bourgeoisie flourished once the manufacturing system took hold and supplanted the guild-masters. As such, the "division of labor between the different corporate guilds vanished in the face of division of labor in each single workshop" (Marx & Engels, The Communist Manifesto, p. 10). With the colonization of America and the subsequent trade which resulted in addition to the East Indian and Chinese markets, the replication of the chartered burgher and his transformation into a unified class was inevitable.

It is this transformation in the mode of production which explains the subsequent ideological conflict. The contradictions in the different modes of production divided society forcing an assertion of claims and counter claims only to be resolved in favor of the newer more productive forces. The productive ability to create ever more goods would necessarily come into conflict with society's legal arrangements. Thus when the latter became a "fetter" on the new productive forces, revolution was inevitable.

The old feudal relations of production were hierarchically structured on established roles which subjugated serfs to their 'natural superiors under God' and journeymen and apprentices to the guild master. Hence

while serfs laboured in a mode consistent with the feudal organization of agriculture, journeymen and apprentices became artisans within the guild structure of medieval towns. Seeking to maintain these relations, the feudal organization of the countryside combined with the guild organization of the towns to prevent capital formed by usury and commerce from turning into industrial capital. This in combination with the restricted access to markets granted by early town formations solely to guilds became antiquated and a hindrance to the newly developed forces of manufacturing with its own conditions of production. But as Marx observed, there is always "one specific kind of production which predominates over the rest, whose relations thus assign rank and influence to the others" (Marx, Grundrisse, pp. 106-7). In this respect, the feudal mode of production concerned only with immediate use-value could not compete with organized capital producing solely for the attainment of exchange value. Thus, concluded Marx and Engels, "the feudal relations of property . . . became so many fetters. They had to be burst asunder; they were burst asunder" (Marx & Engels, The Communist Manifesto, p. 14).

Corresponding to the development of the bourgeoisie, there grew an ever-increasing number of proletarians. Uprooted from their lands and forced onto the labour-market, these proletarians, on pain of starvation, entered into "free" competition with other landless peasants in

the sale of their labour-power. The dissolution of the bands of feudal retainers was hastened by royal power itself in its drive for absolute sovereignty. In conjunction with this, the enclosure movement of the latter fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries facilitated the expropriation of the agricultural population. It is here that the common lands, which the serfs were co-proprietors of, were usurped by the great feudal lords themselves.⁷ The Reformation added to this expropriation, for when the property of the Catholic Church was taken over in the sixteenth century, it was sold off to speculating farmers and townsmen who forcibly evicted the previous sub-tenants and confiscated their holdings (Marx, Capital, V. I, Ch. 27, p. 882). The significance of this expropriation of Church lands was the loss of the previous legitimation of feudal property. As Marx noted:

The property of the church formed the religious bulwark of the old conditions of landed property. With its fall, these conditions could no longer maintain their existence (Marx, Capital, V. I, Ch. 27, p. 883).

With the legitimation of feudal property now mortally wounded, this expropriation of lands and land transfers quickened rapidly following the Glorious Revolution of 1688. The crown lands were either given away, sold cheaply, or annexed to private estates, Marx tells us, all without "the slightest observance of legal etiquette" (Marx, Capital, V. I, Ch. 27, p. 884).

The result of this expropriation of people from the

soil casting them out onto the labour-market as "free and rightless proletarians" was two-fold. Firstly, legislation appeared which treated these peasants as 'voluntary' criminals assuming that it was within their powers to go on working under the old conditions which were no longer present. Secondly, a general forcing down of wages resulted due to the large reserve army of labour created for the needs of industry (Marx, Capital, V. I, Ch. 28, pp. 896-904). In such circumstances, applying the notion of the telos to masses of "free labourers" would have constituted a hindrance to the myth of their freedom.

It is here that wage-labour reveals itself as the modus operandi of capitalism. From henceforth, the relations between "free men" would be conducted in the manner of cash payment for labour rendered. Thus, if we must speak of the "project" of securing a rational justification for morality during the Enlightenment, it must acknowledge its origin as arising out of the establishment of a class of workers dependent on wages for their livelihood, for "the sale and purchase of labour-power is," admits Marx, "the absolute foundation of capitalist production . . ." (Marx, Capital, V. I, Appendix, p. 1005). He adds:

Without a class dependent on wages, the moment individuals confront each other as free persons, there can be no production of surplus-value; without the production of surplus-value there can be no capitalist production, and hence no capital and no capitalist (Marx, Capital, V. I, p. 1005)!

Wage-labour is thus the origin of emotivism, for it is in this manner that all feudal, patriarchal, and idyllic relations lose their force. In instituting wage-labour as the basis of its new relations of production, the bourgeoisie

has pitilessly torn asunder the motley feudal ties that bound man to his "natural superiors," and has left no other bond between man and man than naked self-interest, than callous "cash payment." It has drowned the most heavenly ecstasies of religious fervor, of chivalrous enthusiasm, of philistine sentimentalism, in the icy water of egotistical calculation. It has resolved personal worth into exchange value, and in place of the numberless indefeasible chartered freedoms, has set up that single, unconscionable freedom -- Free Trade. In one word, for exploitation, veiled by religious and political illusions, it has substituted naked, shameless, direct, brutal exploitation (Marx & Engels, The Communist Manifesto, p.11).

The wage-labourer must now confront the capitalist as owner of the means of production who can hire and fire him at whim so long as his extraction of surplus-value remains constant in relation to any would-be competitors. Under these conditions the worker discovers that the period of time for which he is "free" is the period of time in which he is forced to sell his labour-power. It is understandable why the capitalist feels secure in this relationship and "smirks self-importantly and is intent on business" while the wage-labourer "is timid and holds back, like someone who has brought his own hide to market and now has nothing else to expect but -- a tanning" (Marx, Capital, V. I, Ch. 6, p. 280). Telling the workers that they were "free" on the one hand and that it was

their specific telos on the other which drew them to labour in such conditions would therefore have been contradictory and counterproductive to the consolidation of bourgeois power.

Lacking a class analysis, it is understandable how MacIntyre fails to see that the supposed "objective" and "impersonal" ethical standards of feudal and pre-feudal societies were in essence the product of individual decisions and wills which united as a class to maintain dominance and rule. Moreover, this omission in his analysis is responsible for his crediting of the Enlightenment Project as a purely intellectual phenomenon undertaken to secure a justification for moral belief rather than the product of capitalist development. As a result, French cultural and political life plays no major role in MacIntyre's account of the Enlightenment. A class analysis, however, would have demonstrated to him that the successful challenge of the French bourgeoisie over the landed aristocracy and the Church both symbolized and fueled the subsequent project of formulating a social philosophy to justify the newly ascendant relations of production and exchange. Devoid of such an analysis, the abandonment of Aristotle and the subsequent decline into emotivism are, therefore, reason enough for MacIntyre to chastise the Enlightenment philosophers for not solving their "problems."

V. THE DEVELOPMENT OF EMOTIVISM FROM A MATERIALIST PERSPECTIVE

The materialist conception of history starts from the proposition that the production of the means to support human life and, next to production, the exchange of things produced, is the basis of all social structure; that in every society that has appeared in history, the manner in which wealth is distributed and society divided into classes or orders is dependent upon what is produced, how it is produced, and how the products are exchanged (Engels, Socialism: Utopian and Scientific, p. 46).

The concept of a moral tradition in modern society is an alien concept. We lack any clear criterion or "any clear consensus, either as to the place of virtue concepts relative to other moral concepts, or as to which dispositions are to be included within the catalogue of the virtues or the requirements imposed by particular virtues" (AV, p. 226). We thus lack any narrative unity in our daily lives. Our culture has relegated art to a "minority activity." Our economy has facilitated the movement of work outside the household and seen it "put to the service of impersonal capital." As a consequence, our work has been separated "from everything but the service of biological survival and the reproduction of the labor force, on the one hand, and that of institutionalized acquisitiveness, on the other" (AV, p. 227). In such a situation there is little room for social bonds to develop; individuals therefore are primary and society is secondary in this equation. This last point is

illustrated by contrasting the incommensurable concepts of justice of both John Rawls and Robert Nozick. Observes MacIntyre:

Not surprisingly it is a consequence of this that their views exclude any account of human community in which the notion of desert in relation to contributions to the common tasks of that community in purs[u]ing shared goods could provide the basis for judgments about virtue and injustice (AV, p. 251).

MacIntyre concludes that modern politics is engaged in a civil war where a genuine moral consensus cannot be obtained, for our society is totally devoid of any shared moral first principles (AV, p. 253). On this account he is most correct. His recommendation, however, is for the rejection of "modern systematic politics, whether liberal, conservative, radical or socialist" (AV, p. 255). Moreover, a parallel exists between present-day Europe and North America and the "epoch in which the Roman Empire declined into the Dark Ages" (AV, p. 263). Just as Romans of good will ceased to equate the continuation of civility and moral community with the maintenance of the Roman imperium, so too should such a distinction be made between the notion of community and the modern state. This is necessary, MacIntyre states, for:

What matters at this stage is the construction of local forms of community within which civility and the intellectual and moral life can be sustained through the new dark ages which are already upon us. And if the tradition of the virtues was able to survive the horrors of the last dark ages, we are not entirely without grounds for hope. This time however the barbarians are not waiting beyond the frontiers; they have already been governing us for quite

some time (AV, p. 263).

The reactionary tone of this last statement clearly illustrates that MacIntyre fears his way of life and all that it stands for is threatened. What is interesting is that he argues for the formation of local communities to sustain moral life; but was it not his main thesis that moral life had for the most part disappeared? If so, from what sections of American and European life will he draw from, and how can these communities be maintained? But is it really "moral life" which is threatened, or rather a particular mode of life -- that of the contemporary bourgeoisie in the last stages of capitalism?⁸

It is not by coincidence that the type of society MacIntyre describes as lacking shared moral first principles accurately depicts modern capitalistic society in the United States. It is here in the U.S. that art is relegated to a secondary activity and where consumerism has been institutionalized. And it is here more than elsewhere that work is put to the service of impersonal capital. It is thus understandable why the supreme value given to "free enterprise" and hence wage-labour characterize "freedom" as the freedom to exploit those without capital. And in this one aspect the standard of wage-labour is pitted against the ranks of organized and unorganized wage-labour. Though our society is devoid of a standard of first principles, the dominant bourgeois class is nonetheless able to maintain its rule through the

standard of wage-labour.

Modern American society, rooted in the primacy of private property with society organized to the service of private capital can trace its direct roots to that same society which spawned the Enlightenment. It is a fuller development of that movement which uprooted the peasants, freemen, and serfs from agriculture and transferred them "from means of production of the individual into social means of production only workable by a collectivity of men" (Engels, p. 48). As such, this inability to agree on a standard of first principles is not due to the failure of Enlightenment philosophers.

But what makes the emotivist nature of contemporary moral discourse so apparent lies in the evolutionary development of the modern proletariat. A virtual revolution has occurred in material conditions, and some notable gains have been made in the establishment of laws to protect workers relative to the early days of capitalism. Alterations have occurred in the actual conditions of the work force with the abolition of child labour to the increase in mean life expectancy of workers -- gains won through organization, struggle, and the revolutionizing of the productive forces. Though private capital still holds the upper hand in this relationship, it cannot act with its former impunity, for definite expectations accompany these gains in the objective conditions of workers.

In this respect, a certain level of material conditions and a certain conduct in social relations acquire the status of "rights," the denial of which are recognized as "facts." MacIntyre's initial criticism of Gewirth is correct in that there is no such thing as "rights" in any objective sense. On the other hand, "rights" do become part of the public consciousness and find their existence expressed in the form of definite social and political expectations and patterns of behavior. Though political equality is still illusory as long as social inequalities persist, the fact that constitutional guarantees of political equality have been won in the U.S. is indicative of the degree of struggle waged by working people. The basis for this struggle was established with the 13th, 14th, and 15th Amendments to the Constitution adopted in the wake of the Union military victory in 1865. These amendments abolished chattel-slavery, extended the democratic guarantees of the original ten amendments constituting the Bill of Rights,⁹ and extended the voting franchise respectively.

Continuing struggle on the part of workers has brought about new interpretations of these Constitutional "rights" extending the "equal protection of the law" provision of the 14th Amendment to blacks, women, Latinos, undocumented workers, youth, the handicapped, veterans, and others. Denial of these rights and other gains made by workers either through the busting of unions, the

demolition of social programs, or increasing the pool of the unemployed are actions which bring out the true nature of the capitalist state to all workers. In response to these provocations, workers recognize that they possess a collective power in equality and solidarity and are able to fight these attempts to reestablish antiquated forms of subjugation. As such, the consciousness of the proletariat as a class-for-itself is extended. Forms of subjugation which previously went unquestioned now are cast off as fetters. The class struggle thus begins anew and continues at a different level.

In this milieu, the claims of private capital must walk a careful line so as not to be exposed for the organized theft which it is. Rational justifications of the necessary conditions for capitalism -- wage-labour, reserve armies of labour, and the predominance of private property -- are not as a rule propogated to the mass public for consumption. And profit -- the unpaid labour surplus extracted in the realm of production -- must be hidden in various concealed trusts or cloaked behind a plethora of subsidiaries and management corporations. And all of these devices belie the immense concentration of wealth in this country.¹⁰ And the protection of such concentrated wealth must operate under conditions which are in no way reflected by the expressed public interests at stake. Hence, foreign military campaigns from Vietnam to Grenada and support for dictators from Somoza,

Stroessner and Pinochet to Botha, Mobutu and Baby Doc Duvalier all must masquerade as serving the interests of freedom and democracy rather than revealed for the terror network it is and the degree of repression it supports. And, yet, even here private capital is restricted more than it once was twenty or more years ago. No longer can U.S. forces openly invade the Dominican Republic or U.S. Marines occupy Nicaragua for years at a stretch without expecting tremendous opposition both domestic and foreign. And no longer can the bugaboo of communism be counted on to incite support among the masses for jingoistic campaigns abroad. Revelations of such activities, when and if they do become public, are reason enough for workers to be skeptical about the "national interests" at stake and thus reluctant to participate in protecting such interests.¹¹

This is the society in which emotivism reaches its fullest development, where subordination of a continuously evolving and expanding working class must masquerade for other than what it actually is. Private capital under these circumstances is not powerful enough to impose its rule without organized opposition. As such, the rhetoric and justification of society's rulers -- the assertion of the naked will -- filters throughout society to serve as a basis on which to judge and to act for those whose interests the system serves. It is here that the capitalist nature of the system and the primary role which

money plays in this society facilitates the breakdown of any shared rationale or conception of virtues. Any semblance of a shared morality is obliterated by encouraging intra-class as well as inter-class exploitation. As Buchanan explains,

In the labor process, the worker sells the use of his capacities, the control over his mind and body to the capitalist. Thus the labor process accustoms the worker to think of human capacities as saleable. Further, the use of money makes it possible to price and purchase all human capacities -- sexual capacities as well as capacities for industrial operations in the labor process. Finally, both the meagerness of his wage and the bourgeois ethic of "self-improvement" encourage the worker to exploit his wife and children in the way in which the capitalist exploits him (Buchanan, p. 40).

But to recognize the origin of this exploitative emotive quality in contemporary social relations as well as in contemporary argument requires the understanding which a class analysis provides. And such an analysis recognizes the primacy of the material forces and relations of production and exchange as that which gives rise to a society's conception of justice, the good, and sets standards for behavior.

MacIntyre takes Marx to task on this account for embodying the origin of ideology "in a set of law-like generalizations which link the material conditions and class structures of societies as kinds of cause to ideologically informed beliefs as kinds of effect" (AV, p. 110). This is an example of a "would-be social science" which ". . . both misrepresents the form of the actual

discoveries of social scientists and itself functions as a disguised expression of arbitrary preference" (AV, p. 110). In this manner, MacIntyre links Marxism with liberal individualism for embodying "the ethos of the distinctively modern and modernizing world" (AV, p. x). Likewise, Marx and Engels' diagnosis of capitalist society, oriented as it is in the law-like generalizations of historical materialism, is merely a symptom of our current predicament which allows the form of moral utterance to be used as a mask "for almost any face" (AV, p. 110).

What MacIntyre fails to grasp is that to the extent these generalizations are "arbitrary," they are no less conditioned by the relationship of the forces of production with the relations of production. There cannot be a mechanical predetermination of each historical struggle in any objective sense. These struggles are, however, relationally determined by the situation of ownership and control which the actors themselves possess or not vis-à-vis the means of production. We can further say that no alternative set of social relations is possible unless and until the material productive means necessary to sustain such a form of society have been developed. Thus, ideas cannot be reduced to matter, but we can say that the ideal and the material world are opposites existing within a unity in which the material is basic.

Such an understanding, however, would require a dialectical perspective which analyzes "all things and all phenomena in their continuous change, while determining in the material conditions of those changes that critical limit beyond which 'A' ceases to be 'A' . . ." (Trotsky, p. 49). As Trotsky points out, if a thing does not change, it does not exist, for time is a fundamental element of existence. When quantitative changes are negligible, as when a buyer and seller exchange a pound of sugar, we can presume for the task at hand, that "A" is equal to "A." But outside of these certain limits when quantitative changes become converted into qualitative differences, as when ice melts into water or a pound of sugar is subjected to the action of water or kerosene, we can no longer presume that "A" is equal to "A." It is in terms of process that the dialectic is understood as a series of contradictions between interpenetrating opposite elements rather than in mechanical terms. When MacIntyre speaks of law-like generalizations, he insists on a metaphysical division of reality into concrete generalizations or categories. In contrast,

dialectical thought grasps conceptual forms in their systematic interconnections, not just their determinate differences, and conceives each development as the product of a previous less developed phase, whose necessary truth or fulfillment it is; so that there is always a tension, latent irony or incipient surprise between any form and what it is in the process of becoming (Bottomore, et al., p. 122).

Rejecting the mechanical notions of the scientific

revolution and the Enlightenment, Marx's dialectic recognizes that reality is a differentiated unity which is specifically contradictory. It therefore consists of "the conflict of opposites driving reality onwards in a historical process of constant progressive change, both evolutionary and revolutionary . . ." (Bottomore, et al., p. 120). And contrary to Hegel's mystification in idealism, Marx's materialism allows him to present the general forms of motion of the dialectic in a comprehensive manner which does link ideological forms to their materialistic origins. The method to follow, therefore, consists of

a methodological commitment to the empirically-controlled investigation of the causal relations within and between historically emergent, developing humanity and irreducibly real, but modifiable nature (Bottomore, et al., p. 123).

The dialectic therefore directs scientific analysis, and explanation of the latter consists in terms of the contradictory nature of the material and social relations in which they are generated. Dialectical materialism, thusly understood, is "not a science but a philosophy and a method of thought. It is not a part of Marxism but a separate entity allied to Marxism" (Cameron, p. xii). Thus, the generalizations of historical materialism, rooted in an understanding of social and material contradictions in recognition of the fact that matter acts in dialectical ways, do not misrepresent the form of actual discoveries by social scientists. Rather,

historical materialism provides a scientific basis in which the empirical aspects of such discoveries can be tested and verified. Consequently, the theoretical generalizations arising out of this method do not function as disguised expressions of arbitrary preference; on the contrary, they describe the real moving forces of development and historical change.

Rejecting the materialist perspective of Marxism, MacIntyre thus goes on to praise Nietzsche for his "historic achievement to understand more clearly than any other philosopher . . . not only that what purported to be appeals to objectivity were in fact expressions of subjective will, but also the Nature of the problems that this posed for moral philosophy" (AV, p. 113). As such, Nietzsche's moral philosophy is counterposed as the only other "genuine theoretical alternative" to MacIntyre's own philosophy (AV, p. 110). This is so, asserts MacIntyre, because Nietzsche was able to successfully critique all of the new rational secular foundations for morality arising out of the Enlightenment project and perhaps even of all previous morality. But because Aristotle's thought was at the core of what was repudiated from the fifteenth to the seventeenth centuries and because this is what set the stage for Nietzsche, the defense of the Nietzschean position hinges on the question of whether "was it right in the first place to reject Aristotle" (AV, p. 117)? With this, MacIntyre undertakes the key task of his book by

attempting to vindicate Aristotle's ethics, "or something very like it" (AV, p. 118).

VI. RESURRECTION OF THE IDEAS OF THE FOUNDING OF CLASS SOCIETY

In no other country has there been such rejection of the class struggle as in the land of "unlimited opportunity." The denial of social contradictions at the highest level of development led to the denial of the existence of the logic of contradictions in the sphere of theoretical thought. Just as in the sphere of politics it was thought possible originally to be convinced of the correctness of a "great program" by some of "clever politicians" and finally would be reconstructed in some "national movement," so in the sphere of thought it was thought possible that Aristotelian logic, "regress to the level of 'common sense' and... for the solution of all questions... (AV, pp. 43-44).

MacIntyre's idea of a society of heroic virtues such as early Greek society as depicted by Plato in the Republic and the Statesman and Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics and Politics is a highly structured and ordered society. In addition to particular duties of particular stations in such states or orders, there was also the necessity of the necessary actions required to perform these duties and privileges. Of especial importance is the way in which the heroic virtues were tied together with the social structure. "Morality and social structure are in fact one and the same in heroic societies. There is only one set of social bonds. Morality as abstracted entities does not yet exist" (AV, p. 113). Thus we do not have to judge are not left to speculation or individual preferences; they are matters of

VI. RESURRECTION OF THE TELOS OR THE MASKING OF CLASS RULE

In no other country has there been such rejection of the class struggle as in the land of "unlimited opportunity." The denial of social contradictions as the moving force of development led to the denial of the dialectic as the logic of contradictions in the domain of theoretical thought. Just as in the sphere of politics it was thought possible everybody could be convinced of the correctness of a "just" program by means of clever syllogisms and society could be reconstructed through "rational" measures, so in the sphere of theory it was accepted as proved that Aristotelian logic, lowered to the level of "common sense," was sufficient for the solution of all questions (Trotsky, In Defense of Marxism, pp. 43-44).

MacIntyre gives us an account of heroic societies such as early Greek society as depicted by Homer in the Iliad and the Odyssey and of those described in the sagas of Iceland and Ireland. In these societies, every individual has a given role and status in a highly-structured and ordered social framework. In addition to particular duties and privileges attaching to each status or order, there was also an understanding of the necessary actions required to perform these duties and privileges.

Of especial importance is the way in which the heroic virtues were tied together with the social structure. "Morality and social structure are in fact one and the same in heroic society. There is only one set of social bonds. Morality as something distinct does not yet exist" (AV, p. 123). What to do and how to judge are not left to speculation or individual preference; they are matters of

social fact. Thus to define a particular social role is also to define those virtues attached to that role which enjoins the person who occupies the role. Questions of choice may arise within the framework, but the framework is a priori and cannot be chosen. The heroic self contrasted with the self as conceived by modern philosophers cannot be detached from a particular standpoint and is thus unable to judge the standpoint from a removed perspective. To aspire to free morality from all particularity as conceptualized in the modern self, therefore, is an illusion, for the virtues can only be possessed as part of an inherited tradition (AV, pp. 126-7). Consequently, in juxtaposing the claim of an objective standpoint on the part of heroic societies to that of Nietzsche, MacIntyre claims that an incompatibility exists between the two because: "What Nietzsche portrays is aristocratic self-assertion; what Homer and the sagas show are forms of assertion proper to and required by a certain role" (AV, p. 129). Nietzsche is faulted, therefore, for projecting the milieu of nineteenth-century individualism onto the Homeric past.

By the fifth century B.C.E., social transformation had resulted not only in conflict between different sets of virtues but, moreover, rival conceptions of particular virtues coexisted. Forms of the Homeric view of virtue survived, but the standpoint was no longer defined by those same Homeric values. Consequently, "the conception

of a virtue has now become strikingly detached from that of any particular social role" (AV, pp. 132-3). Thus, while his Homeric predecessor lacked rival conceptions by which to question the life of his community, conflict between virtues provided the fifth-century Athenian with standards by which to inquire into the justness of particular practices and policies. His understanding was still possible, however, only because of his membership in the community.

What characterized these different and rival sets, attitudes, and definitions of the virtues is that they were exercised within the shared context of the city-state and the agon. The agon was understood as a contest which by the fifth-century in Athens took the forms of Olympic games between city-states, debates in the assemblies and law courts, conflicts in Greek tragedy, and the dialogue form of philosophical argument. What each of these areas of Greek life provided were a context by which the different conceptions of justice, and hence each rival set of virtues, of each city-state (e.g. of democratic Athens, aristocratic Thebes, or military Sparta) could compete for supremacy. This, argues MacIntyre, was a response to an incoherence attributable to the loss of an Homeric framework. In fact, it was this context which pitted the relativistic virtue conceptions of the sophists against the harmonious and idealist perspective of Plato.

The synthesis between these conflicting perspectives

is found in the Sophoclean protagonist. In this regard, he stands midway between the epic hero and that of the modern individualist in his relationship to his community and his social roles. The Sophoclean protagonist "is not only what society takes him or her to be; he or she both belongs to a place in the social order and transcends it" (AV, p. 143). In Sophoclean tragedy, this transcendence of the limitations of social roles is achieved through moral conflict which cannot rationally be resolved. What was lacking was a bridge "between the acknowledgment of authority, of a cosmic order and of the claims to truth involved in the recognition of the virtues on the one hand and our particular perceptions and judgments in particular situations on the other" (AV, p. 143). But the specific and dramatic narrative form in which his or her life unfolded and the way in which conflict was handled had first to be known. Thus, to adopt a stance on the virtues is to adopt a stance on the narrative character of a human life. As such,

If a human life is understood as a progress through harms and dangers, moral and physical, which someone may encounter and overcome in better and worse ways and with a greater or lesser measure of success, the virtues will find their place as those qualities the possession and exercise of which generally tend to success in this enterprise and the vices likewise as qualities which likewise tend to failure (AV, p. 144).

Consequently, the presupposition supporting this Sophoclean schema rests on the belief in an objective

framework which lends truth or falsity to our judgments and which enjoins us to pursue certain ends.

Two aspects of this Sophoclean schema emphasize the nature of its dramatic encounter. First, more than the fate of emotivist individuals are involved in this encounter in that the individual confrontations portend a definite outcome for the entire community whose fate hangs in the balance. Second, contrary to the Homeric framework, the "self transcends the limitations of social roles and is able to put those roles in question" (AV, p. 145) while remaining accountable to the way in which the moral conflict was handled.

MacIntyre's protagonist in his confrontation with modernity is Aristotle. What he seeks to unite are Aristotle's perspective on the virtues with the forms of narrative appropriate to human life. These narratives, however, in addition to MacIntyre's perspectives on the virtues, are not static; they build upon experience and yet are central, or should be, for our ability to reason morally. We can see the influence of Reinhold Niebuhr on MacIntyre in his blending of history with a perspective of transcendence as witnessed in his statement:

For it is central to the conception of such a tradition that the past is never something merely to be discarded, but rather that the present is intelligible only as a commentary upon and response to the past in which the past, if necessary and if possible, is corrected and transcended, yet corrected and transcended in a way that leaves the present open to being in turn corrected and transcended by some yet more adequate future point of view (AV, p. 146).

The present, from this perspective, is not necessarily superior to the past. Progress, however, understood as a flourishing of the tradition, occurs only when such a tradition is unified and in good order.

MacIntyre thus proceeds to resurrect Aristotle's teleology while altering it to become historical. He does this first by discarding Aristotle's metaphysical biology which presupposed a fixed conception of human nature. Secondly, he discards the location of the polis as the only forum of social and political forms through which the virtues could be cultivated for the education and moral development of the self. Lastly, Aristotle's moral psychology which viewed tragedy as resulting only as the product of the protagonist's flaws rather than as a conflict between different conceptions of the good is discarded. On this last point, MacIntyre replaces Aristotle's unity of the virtues which left no room for conflict or tragedy with a Sophoclean perspective which introduces conflict into moral discourse. This is necessary, for "it is through conflict and sometimes only through conflict that we learn what our ends and purposes are" (AV, p. 164).

What is kept of Aristotle is threefold: First, there is the maintenance of a cogent elaboration of the Aristotelian concepts of "voluntariness, the distinction between the intellectual virtues and the virtues of character, the relationship of both to natural abilities

and to the passions and the structure of practical reasoning" (AV, p. 197). Second, an Aristotelian view of pleasure and enjoyment are retained such that the activity achieved and the activity enjoyed are one and the same. And third, evaluation and explanation are linked, as with Aristotle, such that to identify certain actions as manifesting a virtue or failing in this regard is not only to evaluate actions but also to explain why certain actions were performed in lieu of others. Thus, human action is still premised upon an inclination to act formed by the cultivation of the virtues. And the centrality of the virtues is maintained in their evaluation of the good for mankind.

The virtues, however, require a specific background in order to function properly. This background should consist of three features: 1) an account of a practice; 2) an account of the narrative order of a single human life; and 3) an account of a moral tradition. Upon this background, the virtues should function as standards of guidance.

Virtues will primarily be exercised in the context of practices -- though they are not limited to practices. Lacking the virtues, only external goods could be recognized with competitiveness as that society's exclusive feature. Thus it is only through the exercise of virtues that goods internal to practices can be recognized. And by a "practice," MacIntyre means

any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative human activity through which goods internal to that form of activity are realized in the course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of activity, with the result that human powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the ends and goods involved, are systematically extended (AV, p. 187).

Thus bricklaying and throwing a football are not practices, but architecture and the game of football are. Standards of excellence and obedience to rules are required. And to accept the authority of such standards is also to accept "the inadequacy of my own performance as judged by them" (AV, p. 190). Yet practices have a history, and thus the standards are not immune from criticism. Nevertheless, "we cannot be initiated into a practice without accepting the authority of the best standards realized so far" (AV, p. 190). Only in this manner can we realize the difference between internal and external goods. The latter are mere objects of competition with winners and losers. Internal goods, however, though the outcome of competition to excel, portend a good "for the whole community who participates in the practice" (AV, pp. 190-91). Thus virtue, in this sense, constitutes

an acquired human quality the possession and exercise of which tends to enable us to achieve those goods which are internal to practices and the lack of which effectively prevents us from achieving any such goods (AV, p. 191).

In the society that pays allegiance to the virtues,

there will also be a telos transcending the limited goods of practices. Such a telos will give an order to the good of a whole human life conceived as a unity. This unity of a human life consist in the unity of a narrative quest. And such a quest continuously seeks to determine both what the good life for man is and what virtues are necessary to answer this question. In seeking the good, therefore, other goods will be ordered. In this respect, the purpose and content of the virtues must be understood as enabling us to define what is appropriate to our quest for the good. MacIntyre states,

The virtues therefore are to be understood as those dispositions which will not only sustain practices and enable us to achieve the goods internal to practices, but which will also sustain us in the relevant kind of quest for the good, by enabling us to overcome the harms, dangers, temptations and distractions which we encounter, and which will furnish us with increasing self-knowledge and increasing knowledge of the good (AV, p. 219).

The self conceived in the context of a narrative consists of two aspects. First, everyone is the subject of a singular unique history. Second, the narrative of any one life is "part of an interlocking set of narratives" (AV, 218). Moreover, though we live our lives in the context of teleology and unpredictability, "there are constraints on how the story can continue and that within those constraints there are indefinitely many ways that it can continue" (AV, p. 216). Thus, the self finds itself as part of a definite history in that it inherits a specific past, an ongoing tradition. Both the narrative

self and the practices it is engaged in are also part of a larger moral tradition which has been channeled onto the present. This tradition consists of an "historically extended, socially embodied argument, and an argument precisely in part about the goods which constitute that tradition" (AV, p. 222). And as with goods internal to practices and with the narrative unity of the self, what sustains and strengthens such a moral tradition is the exercise or not of the requisite virtues.

Consequently, if the concept of a practice with goods internal to itself is combined with the mode of thinking which defines a human life as a narrative unity existing within the context of a much larger moral tradition, then we can restore "intelligibility and rationality to our moral and social attitudes and commitments" (AV, p. 259). But the goods necessary to recognize the requisite common grounds "can only be discovered by entering into those relationships which constitute communities whose central bond is a shared vision of and understanding of goods" (AV, p. 258). Only on this basis are there valid ground for the authority of laws and virtues. Thus, MacIntyre concludes, "against that tradition the Nietzschean polemic is completely unsuccessful" (AV, p. 257).

The reasons for MacIntyre's apparent self-victory are two-fold. First, the Nietzscheans will have to rebut MacIntyre's case for a renewed Aristotelian tradition and this cannot be rebutted due to the second way in which

Nietzsche is unsuccessful. Specifically, the Nietzschean 'great man' who, in his will to power, cannot enter into relationships mediated by appeal to shared standards is not an escape or a viable alternative to liberal individualist modernity. Rather, he is just "one more representative moment in its internal unfolding" (AV, p. 259). He thus "represents individualism's final attempt to escape from its own consequences" (AV, p. 259). As such, the isolation and self-absorption of the Nietzschean 'great man' which "thrust upon him the burden of being his own self-sufficient moral authority" (AV, p. 258) condemns him to a moral solipsism. And the solution to this moral solipsism is found only by entering into community relationships whose central bond is a shared vision of and understanding of goods.

MacIntyre's account of the virtues assumes a common interest which does not exist in the class-divided society in which we live. In criticizing Rawls and Nozick for not making any reference to desert in their accounts of justice (AV, 249), he admits that desert "is at home only in the context of a community whose primary bond is a shared understanding both of the good for man and of the good of that community and where individuals identify their primary interests with reference to those goods" (AV, p. 250). He does not tell us, therefore, how such a community of shared understandings can come about. More importantly, there is no explanation of how we can arrive

at a "standpoint that owes genuine allegiance to the tradition of the virtues" (AV, p. 255). To say that we need an account of a practice, an account of a narrative order of a single human life, and an account of a moral tradition is not to say just exactly how such a shared vision of what constitutes these concepts arises.

Thus, the unanswered question thrust upon us is how are we to enter into such a community which has "a shared vision of and understanding of goods"? In this regard, MacIntyre's theory is utopian, for it lacks an account of how to transform an emotivist society into a virtuous society. Ignoring material and class interests, MacIntyre's whole analysis is aimed at proving that the interminable and unsettlable character of contemporary moral debate can only be resolved through a shared vision of and understanding of goods. Thus to the extent that he tells us what is necessary to achieve the virtuous society, his approach is rooted solely in the power of ideas. As Marx said with regard to Feuerback, "He wants to establish consciousness of this fact, that is to say, like the other theorists, he merely wants to produce a correct consciousness about an existing fact; whereas for the real Communist it is a question of overthrowing the existing state of things" (Marx, The German Ideology, p. 58). He thus fails to demonstrate how the virtues can serve to alter emotivist society toward a shared vision of and understanding of goods.

Secondly, MacIntyre's usage of a Sophoclean dramatic transcendence over the limitations of social roles fails to recognize that even the most basic considered moral judgments are dependent upon one's position in the class structure. The dramatic narrative wherein the Sophoclean self is to transcend the limitations of social roles thus making it possible to put those roles into question will take contradictory forms, for MacIntyre does not intend to do away with capitalism. In making the absurd conclusion that a Marxist taking to heart Trotsky's last writings would cease to be a Marxist, he speculates that such a Marxist "would now see no tolerable alternative set of political and economic structures which could be brought into place to replace the structures of advanced capitalism" (AV, p. 262). In making this conclusion, he cannot avoid the fact that the outcome of any dramatic conflict within capitalist society necessarily will have different repercussions on the proletariat than on the bourgeoisie. A successful defeat of striking workers may lead the capitalist bosses to place more stringent restrictions on workers' activities. Such an outcome with regard to members of the proletariat, however, may lead them to conclude that more than temporary gains must be fought for; indeed, the abolition of the capitalist system itself is required. MacIntyre's perspective thus fails to consider that within capitalism there will be millions of discontented proletarians complaining that their lives are

meaningless and lack any clear conception of a narrative unity. And unlike the bourgeoisie who as a class will seek to maintain this set of relations, these proletarians will be of a different mind about how to resolve this conflict and eventually will in time opt for a revolution.

To be contented with the structures of advanced capitalism gives rise to a third problem. Without addressing the class basis of capitalist society, his resurrection of the telos and partially locating its realization in his conception of a "practice" will be utilized by the bourgeoisie to perpetuate their class rule just as the telos was used in classical Greece to justify slavery, the inferiority of women, a disdain for "barbarian" cultures, and a contempt for labour. Labour discipline will thus be imposed by criticizing those who "step out of line" as not possessing the requisite virtues. MacIntyre thus arbitrarily excludes those conceptions of the good which give preeminence to the Marxian virtues of community and solidarity realizable only by the consolidation of power by that class whose task it is to end all class distinctions, the modern proletariat.

Fourthly, MacIntyre's statement that "we need to attend to virtues in the first place in order to understand the function and authority of rules" (AV, p. 119) signals his failure to understand that the very need for a theory of virtue reveals deep though ultimately

remediable contradictions in the relations of production. As such, MacIntyre assumes that class divisions are an inevitable feature of human society. He fails to see that the problems of emotivism cannot be solved but only dissolved through the transition to a new mode of production which eliminates class divisions. Lacking such a transition, the function and authority of rules will depend, therefore, on that class which retains effective control over the means of production.

Lastly, MacIntyre's understanding of ideological transformation as arising solely out of moral conflict confirms his theory as idealistic and thus impractical. It is totally removed from the origin of conflict rooted in contradictions within the social relations of production and exchange. As such, his three-part theoretical schema can readily be used to justify the perpetuation of class rule, for no change in the economic structure is required of his theory. And by not perceiving social roles and conceptions of morality as the products of historical relations of production corresponding to a particular stage in the development of the material productive forces, his theory is thus ahistorical. It is ahistorical because he fails to demonstrate what makes a moral tradition and particular virtue concepts specific to different times and places. By the same token, his theory is non-scientific because he is unable to present a systematic account of the

transformation of morals and virtues. From MacIntyre's perspective, moral concepts are transformed only by moral conflict; as a consequence, morals are self-generating. Thus, he ends up in the same problem of circularity of which he accuses emotivists.

reflect on the concepts of morality. The "Oxford academic style" of philosophy "is barren" (AV, ix). He contends that all such claims to morality must be analyzed "only within the context of a particular genre of historical inquiry that such arguments can support the type of claim about truth and rationality which philosophers characteristically aspire to justify" (AV, p. 265). This is so, because a "moral philosophy . . . characteristically presupposes a sociology" (AV, p. 23). Dissatisfied with the conception of 'moral philosophy' as an isolated area of inquiry, he concludes that "we have to learn from history and anthropology of the variety of moral practices, beliefs and conceptual schemes" (AV, p. ix). But as to how these "moral practices, beliefs and conceptual schemes" come about, take different forms, and transform themselves, we have from MacIntyre only one clue. States MacIntyre:

The history of morality-and-moral-philosophy is the history of successive challenges to some preexisting moral order, a history in which the question of which party defeated the other in rational argument is always to be distinguished from the question of which party retained or gained social and political hegemony. And it is only by reference to this history that questions of rational superiority can be settled (AV, p. 262).

VII. CONCLUSION

MacIntyre does not wish to be associated with those philosophers who merely reflect on the concepts of morality. The "Oxford armchair style" of philosophy "is barren" (AV, ix). He contends that all such claims to morality must be analyzed "only within the context of a particular genre of historical inquiry that such arguments can support the type of claim about truth and rationality which philosophers characteristically aspire to justify" (AV, p. 265). This is so, because a "moral philosophy . . . characteristically presupposes a sociology" (AV, p. 23). Dissatisfied with the conception of 'moral philosophy' as an isolated area of inquiry, he concludes that "we have to learn from history and anthropology of the variety of moral practices, beliefs and conceptual schemes" (AV, p. ix). But as to how these "moral practices, beliefs and conceptual schemes" come about, take different forms, and transform themselves, we have from MacIntyre only one clue. States MacIntyre:

The history of morality-and-moral-philosophy is the history of successive challenges to some preexisting moral order, a history in which the question of which party defeated the other in rational argument is always to be distinguished from the question of which party retained or gained social and political hegemony. And it is only by reference to this history that questions of rational superiority can be settled (AV, p. 269).

Rational argument is thus the key element in MacIntyre's "historical" analysis. And rational superiority is to be distinguished from the party which held or usurped power. While it is true that such argument is specific to different historical and social contexts, MacIntyre is most silent as to the nature of this historical relationship. All he will commit himself to is the belief that "Moral philosophies . . . always do articulate the morality of some particular social and cultural standpoint" (AV, p. 268). Early in the book, he denounces the modern academic practice of separating out the history of political and social change from the history of philosophy for it endows ideas "with a falsely independent life of their own on the one hand and political and social action is presented as peculiarly mindless on the other" (AV, p. 61). But is he not making this exact distinction here in reference to the rational superiority of moral argument? Further, in his claim to unite the realm of ideas with their specific social contexts, he focuses most exclusively on the power of ideas and asserts that, "Every action is the bearer and expression of more or less theory-laden beliefs and concepts; every piece of theorizing and every expression of belief is a political and moral action" (AV, p. 61). The real world is thus negated for the activity of the mind where thought has a life of its own. Action from this perspective is solely directed by self-conscious

thought. We explain, therefore, man's "being" by his "knowing." But as to the origin of this consciousness, these beliefs, we are only told that they are peculiar to specific historical contexts. But such an explanation presents no basis upon which these ideas are specific to different times and places. His "historical" argument thus amounts to little more than speculative theorizing in abstract philosophy.

What gives ideas their unique character and expression and whence do they arise and why are they dispensed with? For MacIntyre, the answer to these questions lies in rational argument. But argument and hence consciousness are products of the human mind, and humanity is the product of nature. Reproduction of his existence is the first task of man; in turn, consciousness develops in accordance with his interaction with nature. Human labour or the interaction of man with the material world is, therefore, necessary for cognition. The production relationships necessary for human life thus give form to the social consciousness of the members of any particular epoch. And such epochs are to be distinguished according to the historical development of the material productive forces and their corresponding production relationships and forms of exchange. As Marx stated, "It is not the consciousness of human beings that determines their existence, but, conversely, it is their social existence that determines their consciousness"

(Marx, "Preface to A Critique of Political Economy," p. 389). Thus the social, political, and intellectual processes of life depend upon the particular mode of production of the material means of life, and it is this which MacIntyre fails to see as the basis which grounds ideas to specific social contexts.

Furthermore, it is this unity of the material base and the ideas which emanate therefrom which MacIntyre writes off as an academic dualism when he criticizes Marxism for making a distinction between "basis and ideological superstructure" (AV, p. 61). He rejects the dialectical nature of this distinction which gives them their unity within a material basis. Thus, for MacIntyre to explain moral and social conflict as the product of class struggles based upon economic interests is as foreign as heaven from earth. As Engels pointed out, the economic structure always furnishes the real basis for these class struggles. Only with this understanding can we "alone work out the ultimate explanation of the whole superstructure of juridical and political institutions as well as of the religious, philosophical, and other ideas of a given historical period" (Engels, p. 45). Only now could we explain man's "knowing" by his "being."

Omitting this perspective, MacIntyre thus begins his inquiry into emotivism as corresponding with the invention of the modern self. The "most articulate" of the philosophical spokesmen of the Enlightenment saw this

development as the achievement by the self of its proper autonomy. The self, they said, "had been liberated from those outmoded forms of social organization which had imprisoned it simultaneously within a belief in a theistic and teleological world order. . ." (AV, p. 60). But this separation of the self from inherited modes both of thought and practice in the course of a single and unified history required "a new social setting, but one defined by a variety of not always coherent beliefs and concepts" (AV, p. 61). What was thus invented, MacIntyre insists, was the individual. Thought, therefore, from MacIntyre's perspective, produces its own requirements of existence.

A materialist perspective of the development of the modern self or the "free individual," however, produces a different account from that of MacIntyre. Society beginning in the fifteenth century was engaged in the uprooting of feudal serfs from the countryside and coalescing them in cities. The new manufacturing forces of production required new patterns of work and new social relationships. This history was thus engaged in transforming the productive forces "from means of production of the individual into social means of production only workable by a collectivity of men" (Engels, p. 48). The necessity to transform labour from its feudal relations into wage-labour is what ended these idyllic relations which bound man to his "natural superiors." Thus a transition in the material forces and

relations of production formed the origin of the uprooted self. And only from this origin and its necessary production relationships did subsequent reflection articulate the ideas which philosophically defined this self. The modern individual, therefore, arises as a theoretical expression for the justification of wage-labour. The location of all moral particularity in the modern individual culminating with Nietzsche is a subsequent development arising out of and explained by the social contradictions arising out of these selfsame relations.

The feudal forms of social organization were "outmoded," but explanation for this from MacIntyre is nonexistent. The production relations change and he takes this for granted without inquiring as to why this transformation occurs. Dismissing this question, he immediately moves on to an explanation of the ideological undertaking of the Enlightenment to determine where the quest for rational superiority broke down. His analysis leads him to conclude that the modern individual is the product of a breakdown in ideas, a failure of rational argument. Specifically, this failure is to be located in the project of the Enlightenment philosophers who, operating under the joint effect of the secular rejection of both Protestant and Catholic theology and the scientific and philosophical rejection of Aristotelianism, attempted nonetheless to establish a rational

justification for morality but failed. This failure, concludes MacIntyre, was assured from the start. Eliminating any teleological notion of man-as-he-could-be-if-he-realized-his-telos left these philosophers with only the remaining two elements of the teleological framework of a certain view of man-as-he-is and certain moral precepts which were to act as the bridge to enable man to pass from one state to the other. Thus it was impossible for them to come to any shared rationale for morality, because they all rejected any view of man as having an essence which defines his true end -- the telos.

No mention is made in MacIntyre's account of the development of trade within feudal society and specifically the development of the medieval burgher operating within the first chartered towns. The development of production for exchange-value as opposed to feudal production based upon immediate consumption or use-value does not enter into his analysis. The emergence of manufacturing and the rise of a new industrial class with interests contrary to those of the feudal aristocracy is nowhere to be found in MacIntyre's "historical" analysis. The uprooting of the serfs from the countryside and their linkage with the means of production through the sale of their labour-power to the capitalists, the 16-hour work days, the employment of women and children inside the factories for most of the working day, and the intense sense of alienation which resulted therefrom is absent in

his analytical perspective. The closest we get to these factors is when he laments "the relegation of art by modernity to the status of an essentially minority activity . . ." or when "work moves outside the household and is put to the service of impersonal capital . . ." (AV, p. 227). But as to why these changes occur in the Enlightenment period, we find no mention. Indeed, MacIntyre only mentions these examples to deplore the loss of "any narrative understanding of ourselves" (AV, p. 227)! We are left to conclude that the transformation in belief systems as well as in social arrangements is directly related to the failure of rational argument, the failure of a philosophical project, as if to murmur, "If only those Enlightenment philosophers had not rejected Aristotelian teleology. . . ."

But the existing social relations were undergoing a tremendous economic and social transformation. The Enlightenment culture witnessed the advance of manufacturing and modern industry beginning with the rise of the feudal burgher who developed into the modern industrialist. Sharing his motivations and assumptions rooted in market capitalism with similar like-minded industrialists, they at once constituted a class, the modern bourgeoisie, opposed to the existing feudal relations. The death knell of feudalism was assured once manufacturing took root; the autopsy and explanation (i.e. the rational justification for the overthrow of feudal

relations) worked itself out following the fact.

Thus the central argument of my thesis is a refutation of MacIntyre's claim to historicism, for he presents no objective basis upon which to rest his claims. His explanation of the "Enlightenment Project" and the rejection of Aristotelianism fails, therefore, because it boils down to speculative philosophy. Lacking the analytical tool of class analysis rooted in a historical materialist perspective, there is no way to verify, test or confirm his speculations. He is thus left to conjecture that this philosophical catastrophe, which he alone has detected, "will have to have been of such a kind that it was not and has not been -- except perhaps by a very few -- recognized as a catastrophe" (AV, p. 3). But the emotivist individual which he traces back to the Enlightenment is no product of a philosophical catastrophe. Rather, an agrarian-based feudal economy was supplanted by a manufacturing-based capitalist economy and the changed relations of production produced the conditions in which the emotivist individual developed. His development, therefore, is not a philosophical abstraction but rather the consequence of the conditions of wage-labour. The "free individual" was thus left to fend for himself, and this struggle pitted the owners of the means of production against those who only had their labour-power to sell. The struggle between classes on the social level is therefore expressed at the theoretical

level in the form of emotivism. As a consequence, MacIntyre's resurrection of Aristotelian teleology as the solution to emotivism fails, for a shared rationale and understanding of goods cannot flourish in the class-structured relations of capitalism. Unable to see any alternative set of political and economic structures to advanced capitalism, his theory, therefore, has no more rational claim to objective criteria than the pluralistic society which MacIntyre condemns.

Pain and sorrow are not the only passions which give rise to sympathy, however; included also is "every passion of which the mind of one is susceptible" (Smith, p. 51).

2. One vivid reference first published in 1851 on these notes is *The American Slave Code* by William Goodell. An opening letter to the author from the Rev. William Jay concerning the manuscript reads in part:

"You show us the rack constructed 'according to law' we envision, at our hearts, the cruel lot

NOTES

1. In his Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith presents us with an explanation of sympathy as arising out of a transference of the misery or suffering of others onto ourselves which thus allows us to come to some conception of what the other feels. States Smith:

As we have no immediate experience of what other men feel, we can form no idea of the manner in which they are affected, but by conceiving what we ourselves should feel in the like situation. Though our brother is upon the rack, as long as we ourselves are at our ease, our senses will never inform us of what he suffers. They never did, and never can, carry us beyond our own person, and it is by the imagination only that we can form any conception of what are his sensations. Neither can that faculty help us to this any other way, than by representing to us what would be our own, if we were in his case. It is the impressions of our own senses only, not those of his, which our imaginations copy. By the imagination we place ourselves in his situation, we conceive ourselves enduring all the same torments, we enter as it were into his body, and become in some measure the same person with him, and thence form some idea of his sensations, and even feel something which, though weaker in degree, is not altogether unlike them. His agonies, when they are thus brought home to ourselves, when we have thus adopted and made them our own, begin at last to affect us, and we then tremble and shudder at the thought of what he feels. For as to be in pain or distress of any kind excites the most excessive sorrow, so to conceive or to imagine that we are in it, excites some degree of the same emotion, in proportion to the vivacity or dulness of the conception (Smith, pp. 3-4).

Pain and sorrow are not the only passions which give rise to sympathy, however; included also is "every passion of which the mind of man is susceptible" (Smith, p. 5).

2. One vivid reference first published in 1853 on these codes is The American Slave Code by William Goodell. An opening letter to the author from the Hon. William Jay concerning the manuscript reads in part,

You show us the rack constructed "according to law;" we examine, at our leisure, the cruel but

skilful contrivance of its machinery; We see the ministers of the law bind the victim on the instrument of torture; we see one feature of humanity after another crushed and obliterated, till at last an immortal man, made a little lower than the angels, and for whose redemption the Son of God shed his blood on the cross, is converted into a beast of burden -- a vendible animal, scourged at the will of its owner, and offered for sale in the market with horses and oxen (Goodell, pp. 11-12).

3. Bhaskar describes the threefold nature of Marx's materialism as derived from the Theses on Feuerbach where 'matter' is to be understood in the sense of 'social practice' as follows: 1) objectivity or externality as such; 2) objectification as the production of a subject; and 3) objectification as the process of the reproduction or transformation of social forms. With regard to the second aspect or human intentions, it must be understood in conjunction with transformative activity as two aspects of a unity (Bottomore, et al., p. 325).

4. MacIntyre speaks of the achievements of the Scottish Enlightenment in particular as overshadowing that of the English and most especially the French. But in so arguing, he implies that the secularized Northern European culture was primarily interested in formulating a justification of moral belief. The work of Ronald Meek on the contrary suggests that the major writings of most of these same scholars MacIntyre mentions was in the areas of sociology and economics which he details in "The Scottish Contribution to Marxist Sociology" by demonstrating how four prominent members of the Scottish Historical School, Adam Smith, Adam Ferguson, William Robertson, and John Millar developed Classical sociology, out of which developed the Classical political economy of David Ricardo and Adam Smith, "to a stage where it was becoming remarkably similar, at least in its broad outlines, to Marxist sociology" (Meek, p. 35).

5. Absolute surplus-value is produced by lengthening of the working day. Relative surplus-value arises from the curtailment of the necessary labour-time (i.e. the labour-time necessary for the worker's own preservation or continued reproduction as a worker), and from the corresponding alteration in the respective lengths of the two components of the working day: a) the rate of surplus-value, and b) the length of the working day (Marx, Capital, V. I, Ch. 12, pp. 429-438).

6. Craft guilds, made up of exclusive and privileged groups of artisans were, during the feudal period, granted monopoly rights to markets by the municipal authorities.

The guilds imposed minute regulations on their members controlling such matters as working hours, wages, prices, tools, and the hiring of workers (taken from the Notes in the Communist Manifesto, p. 46).

7. Marx states: "We must never forget that even the serf was not only the owner of the piece of land attached to his house, although admittedly he was merely a tribute-paying owner, but also a co-proprietor of the common land" (Marx, Capital, V. I, p. 877).

8. Traditional elements which have supported U.S. capitalism since the end of World War II are seen by many analysts to be in advanced states of decay and disintegration (cf. Mandel, 1976; Harrington, 1976; Greenberg, 1979). As Greenberg states:

American hegemony in the world capitalist system is giving way to the reappearance of intense intercapitalist rivalry and the revolt of important sections of the Third World. The domestic economic engine of American prosperity is beginning to sputter under the pressures of inescapable problems like endemic inflation, unemployment, fiscal crisis, and multiple externalities. Finally, the managerial tools of the state are not only becoming less able to manage system contradictions, but are themselves now beginning, in many respects, to both exacerbate ongoing contradictions and create new and dangerous ones (Greenberg, pp. 160-61).

9. The Bill of Rights itself has roots in the struggles of farmers in the early days of the Republic, most especially the conflict associated with Shay's Rebellion in western Massachusetts.

10. One percent of the population owns approximately twenty-five percent of the entire population's net worth, and one-half of one percent owns twenty percent. To comprehend this concentration of wealth, Simon and Eitzen ask us to consider that:

only 55,400 adults have one million dollars or more in corporate stock; only 73,500 adults have 200,000 dollars or more in bonds and debt holdings; one-twentieth of one percent of adults own twenty percent of all corporate stock, two-thirds of the worth of all state and local bonds, and two-fifths of all bonds and notes; and the richest one percent own one-seventh of all real estate and one-seventh of all cash (Simon & Eitzen, p. 7).

11. The Vietnam War was a significant turning point for such revelations as indicated by Simon and Eitzen. They write:

The Pentagon Papers, investigative reporting, and leaks from within the government had the effect of turning public opinion against the war and the government. Revealed were a number of governmental transgressions, including the manipulation of Congress by President Johnson with the Gulf of Tonkin incident; the indictment of high-ranking officers for war crimes similar to those committed by the Germans and Japanese during World War II; the deliberate destruction of civilian targets by American forces; intelligence agency suppression of information regarding enemy troop strength and sympathizers in South Vietnam; falsified reports by American field commanders regarding the destruction of enemy targets; the spraying of more than five million acres of South Vietnam with defoliating chemicals; the execution of more than 40,000 so-called enemy agents by the CIA under the Phoenix Program (most without trial); and unauthorized bombing raids against North Vietnam. From early 1969 until May, 1970, President Nixon assured the American people that the neutrality of Cambodia was being respected. Yet, Nixon had secretly ordered the bombing of so-called enemy sanctuaries in that country during that period. He was able to keep the bombings secret through the use of a double-entry bookkeeping system arranged between the White House and the Defense Department (Simon & Eitzen, p. 2).

More recently, the Iran-Contra affair has produced numerous disclosures of illegal and covert operations designed to overthrow a popularly-constituted government in Nicaragua. Current revelations show high-level involvement in blatantly illegal activities including lying to Congress, gun running in violation of an expressed prohibition by law, bombing of harbors, murder, and other terroristic activities and violations of international law.

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EXAMINATION AND THESIS REPORT

VITA

Colin S. Cavell was born and raised in Baton Rouge, Louisiana where he attended Catholic elementary and high schools before attaining a B.A. in Political Science at Louisiana State University in 1982.

Growing up in a predominately black neighborhood and under the shadow of industrial plants, including the Exxon refinery in North Baton Rouge, Colin was most interested in the social class relations of the city and especially their effect on the working class of Baton Rouge. Mr. Cavell's assumptions and overall perspective are rooted in his work and social experiences of those years.

His immediate plans are to continue his education in political science at the doctoral level this fall at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst.