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Private Diplomats, Mediation Professionals, and Peace Activists: Can Non-governmental Actors Bring Peace to Civil Wars?

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“Private Diplomats, Mediation Professionals, and Peace Activists: Can Non-governmental Actors Bring Peace to Civil Wars?”

A Dissertation

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the
University of New Orleans
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

Doctor in Philosophy
in
Political Science

by

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*This dissertation is dedicated to all women and men who search for peace in the face
of adversity, violence, and indifference.
And to Lukas and Finn – may you be inspired to be peace-seekers, too.*

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Abstract

This dissertation investigates how actors without the means of state power can affect the behavior of warring parties in order to end civil conflicts. Drawing on the intervention and mediation literature, I propose a theoretical framework that presents causal mechanisms for various forms of non-state conflict management to contribute to conflict resolution. The research distinguishes between direct mediation, capacity-building, and problem-solving approaches, and analyzes the approaches' potential contributions to shorter wars and more sustainable peace. On the one hand, non-state actors can be substitutes for governmental or inter-governmental mediators. They derive legitimacy from long-standing relations with the conflict parties, and their claims to neutrality are more believable than those of powerful states with strong national interests. Further, a confidential and deliberate process can lead to more stable agreements. On the other hand, NGOs and others can prepare or enhance ongoing high-level negotiations by giving parties the tools they need to engage with each other constructively, and by improving attitudes and changing perceptions.

The data collected for this dissertation allows me to test hypotheses for the sample of African internal conflicts (1990-2010) with econometric means. Results confirm that non-state conflict management is a significant precursor to high-level mediation. I find further that conflict dyads that experience non-state conflict management in one year are significantly more likely to end in the following year. Unofficial diplomacy is significantly related to lower conflict severity, as well as to a more stable post-conflict peace.

The findings challenge the common assumption that governments are the only actors in international relations that matter. In fact, non-state actors make important contributions to conflict resolution, and conflict parties as well as governmental mediators should consider cooperating with them in their search for peace.

Conflict management, non-state actors, civil conflict, interventions

Chapter 1 - Introduction

Puzzle and research question

The civil war in Mozambique ended in 1992 after the religious organization Community of Sant'Egidio successfully mediated a peace agreement between the government and the rebel group Renamo (Crocker et al. 1999). In 1996, a consortium of academic and professional conflict management organizations conducted problem-solving and reconciliation workshops for rebel and government representatives in Liberia's ongoing war (Carter Center 1996). During one episode of Burundi's protracted civil conflict from 1995-1998, more than 30 nongovernmental and intergovernmental organizations were active in various conflict resolution programs (Hara 1999). These are some examples of the increasingly common involvement of non-state actors in conflict management. A growing number of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), academic groups, religious institutions and other non-state actors are active in mediating civil conflicts, claiming that their initiatives will help end hostilities, negotiate peace, and contribute to reconciliation. Their approaches range from mediating peace negotiations to peace education for children, from media training to problem-solving workshops for government and rebel representatives. Considering the relative powerlessness of non-governmental entities, I ask whether - and how - conflict management by non-state actors can contribute significantly to the resolution of civil conflict. This dissertation project poses the questions: Do non-state conflict management initiatives have measurable effects on conflict dynamics, including conflict severity, duration, outcome and the durability of post-war peace? And which non-state actors' attributes or approaches have the strongest effects?

The engagement of International Alert (IA), a conflict resolution organization based in the United Kingdom, in Sierra Leone's civil war illustrates my motivating questions: The Revolutionary United Front (RUF) emerged in 1991 in response to corruption, weak state structures, and increasing ethnic tensions. Initial RUF success on the battlefield and widespread atrocities against civilians committed by both sides soon engulfed the country in war. Both before and after a military coup in April 1992, any openings for talks between the two sides were ignored (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia). Only in late 1994 did the government begin to call for peace talks and employed the United Nations' good offices to open small-scale contacts. The RUF rebel commander Foday Sankoh, however, rejected the UN's efforts.

At the same time as official mediation efforts fell on deaf ears, International Alert began its unofficial diplomacy in Sierra Leone. They managed to hold preliminary talks with government representatives and RUF commanders in 1994 and even organized (together with the Nairobi Peace Initiative, another conflict resolution NGO) a conflict resolution workshop for RUF representatives (CEWS 1999). From this initial work grew a more substantial involvement for IA. The organization acted as mediator when RUF took hostages in April 1995. And in preparation for formal negotiation it provided technical assistance to the rebels, who had little knowledge of official diplomacy (Posthumus 1999b). While IA has been criticized for taking a partisan approach to its advisory role instead of being an honest broker, even critics acknowledge the organization's contribution to the facilitation of high-level mediation (Sorbe et al. 1997).

Why was International Alert able to engage the rebels where the United Nations and others could not? And how can groups like IA be successful? They managed to convince

rebel leaders that negotiations were preferable to continued war, and with their help negotiations ended in a peace agreement (which, however, did not bring the desired long-term peace and stability – Sierra Leone experienced renewed war in 1997). In this dissertation, I consider the qualities that make non-state actors like International Alert attractive conflict managers. Then I propose causal pathways how these attributes and activities are linked to specific conflict outcomes.

Despite the growing number of non-governmental peace efforts (more than half of the conflicts included in this dissertation research experience some non-state conflict management as defined here), current research has yet to address in any systematic matter how successful non-governmental initiatives are in ending civil conflict in Africa. Almost twenty-five years after the end of the Cold War, which opened space both for internal conflicts to receive international attention and for more non-governmental actors to carve out niches in peace-making activities, this dissertation applies rigorous academic methods and systematically evaluates the contributions of non-state conflict management to conflict resolution.¹

In this dissertation I analyze how conflict resolution initiatives by non-state actors affect processes and outcomes of civil wars. To this end, the project collects new data on NGO mediation and mediation training in 37 African civil conflicts since 1990. Generalization of statistical findings across diverse cases is always problematic, but focusing on one geographic region gives me confidence that any findings can be applied at least across this part of the world. And the African continent has experienced a higher

¹ Conflict resolution, conflict management, and mediation are distinct concepts, with mediation being one form of conflict management, and resolution of the conflict the ultimate goal. Both policy papers and academic writing often use the terms interchangeably.

proportion of internal conflicts than other regions, especially since the end of the Cold War. Considering the continuing need for conflict management and peace-building in Africa, a study of peacemaking on the continent is timely and important, even if conclusions and policy prescriptions drawn from studying a geographically restricted sample cannot automatically be applied beyond the region. It makes sense to analyze African conflicts separately from other regions, because of a number of characteristics shared by many countries of the continent: a history of European colonization, often combined with arbitrarily drawn territorial borders and ethnic distinctions; slow rates of post-independence development; weak political institutions, often depended on patrimonial structures; scenes for proxy wars between the super powers that were ignored once the Cold War ended.

Statistical models assess whether non-state conflict interventions lead to high-level mediation by governments and intergovernmental organizations; whether they change the duration or severity of conflicts; and whether a peace spell following an episode that saw NGO mediation will be more durable than peace following an episode that did not see non-state conflict management.

This study integrates different non-state conflict resolution efforts (mediation, capacity-building, and problem-solving) into a theoretical framework for the study of mediation, civil war duration, conflict severity and the chances for a durable peace.

The contribution of the research is threefold. First, it adds to the debate about the supremacy of the state in international relations. Confirmation of the hypotheses underlines that a more complete and more accurate model of civil war interventions, and international relations in general, demands a theory that acknowledges non-state actors'

contributions. System-level or state-level theories are unable to comprehensively explain the dynamics of conflicts and interventions. My research shows that even a third-party government's decision to diplomatically intervene in an internal conflict may be impacted by non-state actors, specifically their preparatory conflict management. The rate of success of official mediation is also impacted by NGO initiatives (more wars end in a negotiated agreement if they see non-state conflict management). While states remain the dominant actors in international relations, non-state actors have a large enough independent effect on civil conflicts that theories ignoring them are incomplete.

Second, the dissertation fills a gap in the existing literature on mediation, while at the same time connecting the research program on diplomatic interventions to the field of conflict resolution. Theories on weak mediators, those that consider the question, among others, why actors without the trappings of state power are invited to mediate, are bolstered and expanded. To my knowledge, this is the first time that the mechanisms of specific non-state interventions are considered quantitatively. The study also provides new data to account for the causal pathways. Data collected for this study will be useful to address additional questions related to non-state conflict management. For example, one might develop models that test which type of organization would be most appropriate to engage in peace-making initiatives at specific times during the course of conflicts.

Third, there are a number of policy recommendations that can be drawn from the study. Parties involved in a violent conflict, who have resisted non-state intervention, should be more open to such initiatives. Especially rebel groups with little experience in negotiation and non-violent bargaining can benefit from training and advice. The

government side should encourage such engagement, as peace agreements that are signed by informed and able opponents tend to be more stable.

NGOs and other non-state conflict managers benefit from cross-sectional comparisons beyond internal project evaluations. My models consider which type of organization and which approach may be more effective. For the sample I find a strong association between religious organizations and conflict termination, which indicates that cultural legitimacy and insider status might be more important to conflict parties than expertise and neutrality. I further confirm that capacity-building is a useful tool. Preparing belligerents for negotiations is a task that NGOs are better equipped to execute than governments, but that can enhance government interventions. The findings validate the current emphasis on capacity-building over direct mediation by outside groups.

Non-state conflict management is a precursor to official mediation led by governments or IGOs. That means that high-level mediators should coordinate with NGOs to assure conflict parties are well-prepared for successful negotiations. My statistical models show a stronger relation between non-state conflict management and mediation by intergovernmental organizations than mediation by third-party governments. They also do not find a significant relation between preparatory training and governmental mediation. Governments that intervene in conflicts have different motivations to do so than IGOs, but they nevertheless should consider coordination with groups providing advice and capacity-building in order to bolster the chances of mediation success.

Overall, the study's results can contribute to decision-making processes within organizations and governments and potentially make peace-making efforts more effective. At the same time, the results indicate that non-state interventions should be carefully

planned, and be coordinated (e.g. capacity-building for negotiation has a positive effect on conflict termination if it is followed by mediation).

In the context of internal conflicts, finding even weak effects indicating that a conflict may be a little shorter, or a little less brutal, because of certain conflict-management initiatives is noteworthy - in reality these results point to ways to save lives.

How non-state actors contribute to conflict resolution

A mediated process may have a number of advantages for the conflict parties over unmediated negotiations: First, mediators assist parties in overcoming problems of asymmetric information (Kydd 2003, Princen 1992, Zartman and Touval 1985). Second, third parties change the cost of conflict, either by increasing the costs of continuing conflict or by providing incentives for cooperation (Beardsley et al. 2006, Quinn et al. 2006, Zartman and Touval 1985). And third, they provide help for the implementation of peace agreements and security guarantees (Bercovitch 1997, Svensson 2007, Walter 2002). Touval and Zartman (1985) consider a number of activities mediators use to address the key obstacles to conflict resolution (information, costs, commitment): facilitation enables communication between opponents, for example by acting as go-between or by providing a neutral space for a meeting. Formulation refers to mediators putting forward settlement terms or outsiders helping parties developing compromise solutions. They generate thinking “outside of the box” in order to change the cost analyses of the opponents. And lastly, mediators may manipulate: they can apply pressure on one or both sides to come to an agreement or they can guarantee its implementation. In most cases, only states have the leverage to provide guarantees regarding the implementation of a mediation outcome (Walter 2002, Beardsley 2013). But non-state actors have distinct advantages that can

make them the more effective mediator choice. Figure 1 illustrates how their unique attributes fit within the larger mediation framework.

Figure 1: Non-state conflict management in negotiation stages

	Negotiation stages		
	<i>Before</i>	<i>During</i>	<i>After</i>
Core Problem	<u>Information</u> - no existing lines of communication - no neutral space - meeting is concession (bestows legitimacy)	<u>Costs</u> - uneven playing field - reluctance to explore compromise (may be held against party by opponents or supporters)	<u>Commitment</u> - lack of trust - other side might renege
Mediator contribution	<u>Facilitation</u> - create space - initiate communication	<u>Formulation</u> - develop framework for solution - propose solutions	<u>Manipulation</u> - provide incentives - security guarantees
Non-state actors' advantage	<u>Legitimacy</u> - knowledge of place - interaction does not bestow legitimacy to opponent - neutrality, no vested interest	<u>Innovation / Confidentiality</u> - expertise - new ideas - creative approaches - not bound to protocol - no enforcement threat - less time pressure - no posturing	<u>Grassroots engagement</u> - reconciliation <i>(not part of current research project)</i>

While the literature acknowledges potential effectiveness of “weak” mediators (Dunn and Kriesberg 2002, Beardsley 2009, Boehmelt 2010), the specific activities by non-state actors and how they influence conflict dynamics remains underexplored. In this dissertation I propose theoretical models that link individual non-state actors’ attributes and approaches to changes in and outcomes of conflicts, as summarized in Figure 2 (next page).

Considering the advantages in leverage state mediators have, high-level diplomacy has been found to lead more reliably to conflict termination than unofficial diplomacy (Boehmelt 2010). The occurrence of mediation by states of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) is therefore an important development in a conflict, one that, as I propose, becomes more likely with the involvement of non-state conflict managers. They

prepare the way for high-level mediation in cases where state actors were reluctant to get involved, or shame third-party governments into action by going where they do not. They get conflict parties ready for negotiations, increasing the likelihood of success, and in turn the likelihood that states and IGOs will take over the process. And they help belligerents to acknowledge each other's grievances, change confrontational to cooperative mindsets and build willingness towards a negotiated settlement.

Figure 2: How non-state conflict management lead to outcomes

Non-state activity	effects	Outcome
Direct mediation	putting conflict on states' agenda prepare ground	Mediation by states and IGOs
Capacity building	give parties tools for negotiations, build confidence	
Unofficial interaction	improve attitudes clarify red lines	
Direct mediation	unconventional approaches and low-pressure process lead to success	Conflict termination
Capacity building	prepare for negotiation that ends war	
Unofficial interaction	reduce tension, build trust	
Direct mediation	negotiation rounds interrupt fighting gestures of goodwill	Decline in severity
Unofficial interaction	personal connections changing perceptions	
Direct mediation	less time-pressure and more confidentiality more focused on resolution of underlying issues expertise, local knowledge	Sustainable peace
Capacity building	familiarity with conflict-resolution mechanisms applicable to post-war conflict situations (alternatives to violence)	
Unofficial interaction	trust, collaborative spirit, personal connections	

Bringing out the end of a violent conflict is the professed goal of most conflict management efforts. I consider various causal pathways that link non-state conflict resolution to conflict termination. Mediation by non-state actors can directly lead to peace,

or more indirectly, capacity-building and unofficial interaction can increase the likelihood that high-level mediation will occur, which in turn can end the war.

Besides ending a conflict outright, lowering its death toll should be counted as a successful conflict management outcome. Rounds of negotiations are often accompanied by short-term ceasefires that could lower the overall battle-death count. Participation in conflict management initiatives can motivate opponents to show gestures of good will. Also, confidence-building measures may positively affect belligerents attitudes towards each other, lowering the level of animosity.

Lastly, post-conflict stability is an important measure of conflict management success. The unique attributes of non-state peacemaking can lead to better agreements, better chances that the agreements are honored in the short term, and lower probabilities of relapse into war. The empirical chapters of the dissertation will explore the various pathways in more detail. Figure 3 (next page) provides an overview of the hypotheses proposed in the following chapters. Necessary for testing them are a stringent definition of non-state conflict management and a clear understanding of the non-state actors and activities included in my analysis.

Conceptualizing non-state conflict management

Definition

Considering the increasing number of non-state conflict management initiatives, the time is ripe for a more systematic approach to their evaluation. Beyond individual case studies, quantitative measures should be able to test assertions about the impact non-state conflict resolution can have on civil conflicts. The reviewed literature (Chapter 2) suggests that non-state conflict management can have both direct and indirect effects on civil wars. I

formulate testable hypotheses below, but first I put forward my definition of non-state conflict management, T2+:

Figure 3: Summary of Hypotheses

Argument	Hypothesis	Expectation	Chapter	Support
<i>Direct effects of T2+</i>				
High-level negotiations	H1	<p>High-level negotiations are more likely in conflicts that experience T2+ than in those that do not, all else being equal.</p> <p>NGOs training initiatives will be more strongly associated with the onset of high-level mediation than other T2+ efforts (direct mediation or problem-solving workshops), all else being equal.</p> <p>Onset of high-level negotiations will be more likely if NGOs led by former heads of state conduct T2+ than if religious T2+ organizations (or none) are active, all else being equal.</p>	3	<p>Yes</p> <p>Partial</p> <p>No</p>
Termination	H2	<p>A civil conflict that experiences T2+ is more likely to end in a given year than a conflict that does not, all else being equal.</p> <p>A conflict that experiences direct mediation by T2+ organizations will be more likely to end in a given year than a conflict that does not see T2+ mediation, all else being equal.</p> <p>A conflict that sees T2+ led by religious organizations will be more likely to end in a given year than a conflict that does see T2+ led by professional NGOs, all else being equal.</p> <p>A conflict that experiences T2+ led by former heads of state will be more likely to end in a given year than a conflict that sees T2+ led by religious NGOs, all else being equal.</p>	4	<p>Yes</p> <p>No</p> <p>Yes</p> <p>No</p>
Outcome	H3	<p>A negotiated settlement of a civil conflict is more likely to occur if the conflict episode sees T2+ diplomacy, all else being equal.</p> <p>Among conflicts that end in a negotiated settlement, those that experience T2+ will be shorter than those that do not, all else being equal.</p>	4	<p>Partial</p> <p>Yes</p>
Severity	H4	<p>A dyad year in which T2+ mediation happens will be lower in intensity (number of battle-related deaths) than dyad years that do not see T2+, all else being equal.</p> <p>A civil conflict dyad that experiences T2+ training in one year will subsequently decrease in intensity (number of battle-related deaths).</p> <p>The duration of conflict management initiatives and the conflict's intensity level will be negatively correlated.</p>	5	<p>Partial</p> <p>Partial</p> <p>No</p>
<i>Post-conflict effects of T2+</i>				
Durable peace	H5	<p>Conflicts that experience T2+ will be less likely to see new outbreaks of conflict</p> <p>Number and duration of T2+ initiatives will be negatively correlated with renewed outbreak of violence conflict termination.</p>	6	<p>Partial</p> <p>Yes</p>

Any conflict management initiative that is led by an individual or organization not directly tied to a government or an intergovernmental organization (although they may receive funding from official sources) and targets the leadership level – current negotiators and those who advise them - of parties in an ongoing conflict.

This definition includes the classic track-two diplomacy tools of problem-solving workshops and similar meetings of conflict parties on neutral ground, but also negotiation training and support, as well as actual mediation. I argue that these are the initiatives that aim to directly influence conflict parties' relations with each other: they are either programs where opponents come face-to-face, or where one side is prepared for high-level meetings.

Many recent NGO initiatives place less emphasis on outsider intervention and, instead, consider how they can prepare locals for conflict resolution (Ramsbotham et al. 2011). One reason is that especially in internal conflicts power disparity between government actors and rebels can block the search for a solution (Babbitt 2009). For example, the non-profit diplomatic advisory group Independent Diplomat (ID) was founded explicitly to address the lack of experience and knowledge of non-governmental actors in regards to official diplomacy's ways, means and culture. Another incentive for local ownership is the need for deep knowledge of the local conflict context, something outsiders rarely have (David Smock, USIP, phone interview August 15, 2013). Because of the theoretical and operational focus on capacity building I include training (for persons on the decision-making level) into my definition of non-state conflict management.

Earlier assessments of interactive conflict resolution have excluded grassroots efforts or diaspora consultations with the argument that “most dialogues do not have the

objective of directly affecting the interaction of parties” (Fisher 1997). This leads me to exclude peace-building measures on the grassroots level (e.g. summer camps for children from populations in conflict). That being said, I do not want to belittle the importance of grassroots peace building. In fact, recent research indicates that initiatives on the local level are essential for peace: Autesserre’s (2010) study of the failure of the international peace building in the Democratic Republic of the Congo from 2003 to 2006 claims that the top-down approach adopted by governments, donors and most NGOs left the DRC’s transition to peace susceptible to violent eruptions caused by conflicts at the local level. She advocates a bottom-up peace building approach to complement existing top-down strategies. In the process of my search for track-two+ diplomacy (which she would group under “top-down approach”) I noted many organizations engaged in the kind of bottom-up work Autessere deems necessary for sustainable peace. In fact, one interviewee pointed out that “We just did a desk review to identify NGOs that currently have a regional focus in the Horn of Africa alone and found over 140 organizations” (Mark Rogers, Life and Peace Institute, email from April 2, 2013). I omit these initiatives from my study of non-state conflict resolution because of their long-term focus. I look instead at projects that try to end on-going fighting. However, a full picture of the effects non-state actors can have on civil conflicts, especially in regards to the research question of when peace agreements succeed or fail, will only emerge when grassroots efforts are included in models of peace making.

Mediation efforts undertaken by individuals connected to the United Nations, the OSCE or other intergovernmental organizations are not included in my coding, either. They are track-one diplomacy, not track-two, because intergovernmental organizations are a collective of individual member nation states.

There are a number of other non-state actors involved in conflict management initiatives, as Diamond and McDonald's (1996) model of nine tracks of diplomacy indicates. Some of those are subsumed under my definition, e.g. churches, as long as their projects target the leadership level of a conflict party. Others, like the media and business, are excluded. I argue that media reporting can exacerbate or alleviate conflicts, and there are many projects that target issues of incitement. But the media's role primarily is to report on conflicts, less so to actively engage a government or rebel group in conflict management. Business representatives may play a role in mediation.² If business activities are threatened by conflict, business leaders have a tangible interest in ending the ongoing violence. And especially in countries that are economically dependent on only a few industries these corporations will have access to some or all parties in the conflict and they may have considerable influence. Government and rebel leaders may listen to them. But they can also be the source of conflict, as they are in the Niger delta where the activities of foreign oil companies have incited violence from local groups. And the interests that lead to corporations or company owners asserting their influence are not always centered on the ideas of conflict resolution and peace making. Corporations may in fact exacerbate conflicts if they favor one side in the conflict (e.g. Global Witness 1998). This dissertation looks only at actors whose explicit goal – in fact their “mission statement” – is to resolve conflicts.

A new dataset

Large-*N* studies of non-governmental conflict management efforts are rare. They rely on datasets compiled from public sources (e.g. Bercovitch 1999 uses Keesing's

² A good example is “Tiny” Rowland, the CEO of the British multinational corporation Lonhro, who acted as go-between in Mozambique, and even provided transport for rebel leaders to negotiations (Vines 1998).

Archives, the New York Times, the London Times and Reuters). But most track-two efforts, like problem-solving workshops, do not make front-page news. I believe by expanding the available data with information collected from other sources, namely case studies of non-state conflict management and information gathered from NGO practitioners, I can more comprehensively analyze non-state conflict management.³

Research of third-party interventions that includes non-state actors as interveners has in the past primarily relied on two data sources: Bercovitch's (1999) International Conflict Management (ICM) dataset and Regan et al.'s (2009) Diplomatic Interventions in Civil Wars. Both datasets include individuals or non-governmental organizations. The difference between these existing sources and my new dataset is threefold: first, ICM and Regan et al. have higher thresholds in regards to annual battle deaths. They include conflicts that exceed 1,000 or 200 fatalities, respectively. Additionally, ICM includes civil wars only when they create the threat of interstate war. Considering that today most conflicts are internal and often low-intensity – but go on over many years and are responsible for much death and destruction – I find it important to include low-intensity conflicts into any analysis of war.⁴

Second, non-state conflict management listed in the databanks is limited to actual mediation events. DeRouen et al.'s (2011) Civil War Mediation (CWM) dataset includes low-intensity conflicts, but, like the other existing datasets, only counts mediation. I argue

³ I will still miss cases of secret conflict management, especially if they did not lead to results that parties and organizations are comfortable publicizing. This can introduce selection bias towards successful initiatives. On the other hand, a possibly incomplete sample should underestimate the significance of interventions.

⁴ Following the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Database Codebook (UCDP 2011a), I include conflicts between a government and domestic opposition that results in at least 25 battle-related deaths a year (Gleditsch et al. 2002, Themnér and Wallensteen 2013).

that if we want to broaden our understanding of how NGOs and others can contribute to peace, we need to assess a fuller range of their activities.

And third, Bercovitch as well as Regan et al. and DeRouen et al. rely solely on news sources for the information included in their data. Another noteworthy effort is the UCDP Managing Intrastate Conflict (MIC) Dataset (Melander and von Uexküll 2011). It includes low-intensity conflicts and has a broader understanding of conflict management than other data collections. Specifically, it includes references to non-state mediation. Many of the NGO efforts included in their data are also part of my data. However, the MIC data rely on media coverage alone to identify relevant events, missing most capacity-building exercises. MIC code NGO conflict management (as defined here) in 13 of the conflicts I study; I find it in 20 conflicts.

Data collection

While I believe that the broad palette of NGO activities warrants attention and study, this dissertation focuses on the subset of what I call track-two plus (T2+), as defined and elaborated above. Looking at each conflict individually I executed a number of web searches to identify organizations that have been active in conflict management in each specific conflict (a coding example is included in the appendix). To do so I used three online search engines: LexisNexis Academic, The New York Times Archive, and Google Scholar. The former pick up those initiatives that receive some public attention; the latter allows me to filter through academic writings in search for case studies of mediation and conflict management. I also found several practitioners' efforts at mapping the NGO conflict resolution field, including Carter Center (1996), Mekenkamp et al. (1999), Herrberg and Kumpulainen (2008) and Fisas (2010). I consulted these sources for each conflict. Once I

identified a list of organizations that were active at any time during the conflict, I referred to their websites and online material to determine whether the work falls under my definition of T2+. Where detailed reports of relevant projects were not available I contacted organizations directly by email and/or phone, requested annual reports and conducted interviews whenever possible. However, the response rate was low, and some organizations were no longer operational or I could not find any contact information, making the sample potentially incomplete. Another limitation is that a number of NGO efforts are confidential by nature and those active in these initiatives are not at liberty to discuss their work (though my focus on past conflicts made it easier for organizations to share some information with me). Furthermore, academic organizations and individuals are underrepresented. Individuals active in conflict management who are connected to academic institutions often are seconded to other organizations for the time they work on a particular conflict. Individuals who mediate on the basis of their personal connection to one particular leader and without institutional support will only be listed if the effort was successful or at least garnered some attention by media or academics.

Despite the difficulties in data collection I believe that I have a representative sample. It includes religious, professional and academic organizations; local and international ones; some with large operational budgets and some individuals. One might wonder if such disparate groups can usefully be compared. For example, international organizations have advantages over governmental mediators that are different from local peace efforts. While the foreign group may draw legitimacy from its expertise, track-record and/or neutrality, the domestic conflict manager is a cultural insider who has to live with the results of any peace process (Wehr and Lederach 1991, Svensson 2013). While these

are important distinctions, I argue that the main advantages of non-state conflict mediation are present in all cases, for example that engagement with the enemy does not bestow legitimacy on the opponent. A list of all organizations included in the study can be found in the appendix, descriptive statistics of the data follow below.

Examples

I divide the types of T2+ initiatives included in the dataset into four categories: 1) direct mediation, 2) mediation support, 3) problem-solving workshop and high-level dialogue, and 4) training and capacity-building, although it is important to note that they are not always mutually exclusive. Later in this section I use initiatives in the civil conflict in Sudan to illustrate the different approaches. “Direct mediation” refers to assisted negotiations, where an outside party supports the process (Zartman and Touval 2007). The form the support can take varies from facilitation of talks to formulating solutions. The conflict parties either meet face-to-face, or the mediator shuttles between them, but both sides agree on the role the third party is playing in the bargaining process.

NGOs’ efforts are coded as “mediation-support” if they happen in the facilitation stage, attempting to move belligerents to the negotiation table, or if they happen concurrent with ongoing negotiations, but without the NGO as the designated mediator. This includes helping to set terms for negotiations, for example by acting as a go-between for rebels and government actors. It further includes logistical support, e.g. providing a location for the opponents to meet. In some cases, NGOs have acted as witnesses to official negotiations.

The third category, “problem-solving workshops and dialogue sessions,” is at the core of what Joseph Montville describes as track-two diplomacy: “unofficial, non-structured

interaction” (Davidson and Montville 1982, 155) with the goal of changing the psychological dynamics of a conflict. Essential to these initiatives are confidentiality or even secrecy – anything can be said without exposure to the media or even constituencies at home. Examples are retreats for leaders, simulations in which parties may take on the role of the other side, and structured discussions in which parties have to hear each other out and acknowledge (though not accept) the other’s position.

“Capacity-building” is often characterized by its unilateral approach. While some negotiation workshops train both government and rebel leaders at the same time, most training initiatives focus on one side. In my coding for this category I also include efforts to reconcile different factions of a rebel movement, in cases where organizers see this reconciliation as an essential step towards finding a unified position for subsequent negotiations with the government, and thus towards an end to the conflict. It also includes support to one side of the conflict, for example by providing research to a conflict party in preparation for negotiations (e.g. Independent Diplomat’s work in gathering relevant insights regarding the diplomatic circumstances and options for actors like the Polisario Front in Western Sahara).

The long-lasting civil conflict in Sudan has experienced all four types of non-state conflict management approaches.⁵ In 1995, former US president Jimmy Carter acted as mediator and secured a ceasefire between the government in Khartoum and rebels in South Sudan (van de Veen 1999). He communicated with both sides and put forward his

⁵ The war over South Sudan’s secession and the conflict in Darfur have the same identifying number in the UCDP/PRIO dataset. I focus here on Darfur, but include an example of direct NGO mediation in the North-South conflict because there is none for Darfur – the African Union and Sudan’s neighbors were relatively quick to offer mediation in Darfur, while NGOs focused on other T2+ approaches.

own proposal – a conditional, short-term cessation of violence to allow for a public health campaign – which was accepted by government and opposition.

Providing support for other actors' mediation efforts, the Community of Sant'Egidio participated as observers in the 2006 Abuja peace talks between Khartoum and Darfur rebel groups. They made clear that in this case they would “not be taking part in any direct mediation,” leaving it to the African Union (Catholic Herald 2005). Instead, they acted as observers of the process. Demonstrating that NGOs often use a mixed approach in their work, Sant'Egidio used the insights gained from the observation of earlier rounds of talks to subsequently train participants and prepare them for the next negotiation date (Catholic Herald 2005).

In 2011, the Sudan Task Force at George Mason University's School of Conflict Analysis and Resolution brought together representatives of various groups active in the Darfur region with Sudanese civil society actors in a problem-solving workshop “designed to complement the official negotiations [...], offering a forum for mutual conflict analysis and creative problem solving that avoids the constraints and pressures often associated with formal negotiations” (<http://scar.gmu.edu/sudan-task-group/11766>, accessed March 12, 2014).


Lastly, the conflict in Darfur experienced a substantial number of capacity-building initiatives. A partial list includes: a 2007 initiative by the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue “aimed at building greater coherence within the opposition movements [...]. The overall aim of the HD Centre's initiative was to allow for the SLM factions to re-unite in order to facilitate the comprehensive participation of the SLM in the process” (HD Centre 2007); a July 2008 training workshop on conflict resolution and peacebuilding by the Mediation

Support Project, organized a for the Sudan Liberation Movement, SLM (<http://peacemediation.ch/tailor-made-trainings/sudandarfur>, accessed March 12, 2014); a 2009 workshop developed by George Mason University’s Sudan Task Force with the “purpose [...] to open the channels of communication, reconcile differences, foster a better understanding, and promote common ground among the movements, as a prelude to the future negotiations with the Government of Sudan” (<http://scar.gmu.edu/sudan-task-group/11766>, accessed March 12, 2014).

Descriptive data

In the time period under observation – 1990-2010 – I count 76 T2+ efforts in 21 African civil conflicts, executed by 44 different organizations. Sixteen conflicts did not experience any T2+ efforts. 37 rebel groups participated in the NGO initiatives. Figure 4 shows the distribution of initiatives over the time under observation.


Figure 4: Number of T2+ initiatives over time



The overall number of new T2+ activities per year increases from 12 in the period 1990-1995 to 26 in the following 5-year interval, before decreasing again to 19 for 2000-2010.

The conflict with most non-state conflict management efforts is the war in Sudan, which is also the longest-lasting conflict in the sample. I code 16 T2+ initiatives in Sudan. Burundi follows with 15, then Uganda with 11. The other conflicts experience one to four initiatives each. Figure 5 illustrates the approaches used in the different conflicts. Nine of the efforts in Sudan concerned the break-away region of South Sudan, six the conflict in Darfur and one was more general capacity-building for the government. Nine of the T2+ initiatives in Uganda targeted the LRA.


Figure 5: T2+ initiatives by conflict



I code 26 cases of direct mediation, 11 cases of mediation support, 10 problem-solving workshops, 18 instances of negotiation training and 11 cases where NGOs used a mixed approach (see Figure 6). The emphasis shift from direct intervention by third parties towards capacity building becomes clear when the non-state approaches are tabulated with the years of activity: From 1990 to 1999 I code five instances of preparation/training, but 23 direct negotiations led by non-state actors (see Figure 4; the numbers include mixed

approaches). From 2000 to 2010, there are ten instances of direct mediation and 21 projects focusing on capacity building.

Figure 6: T2+ Approaches




24 of the 76 NGO efforts were led by organizations or individuals affiliated with a religion.⁶ The Catholic lay organization Community of Sant'Egidio alone is responsible for 11 peace initiatives. Other religiously motivated groups or initiatives included in the sample are inter-faith committees in Sierra Leone and Liberia, the Swedish Life and Peace Institute, Norwegian Church Aid, Pax Christi, and local church leaders in Guinea, Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Groups led by former heads of state (Carter, Nyerere, Moi) executed 14 initiatives; eight of those were direct mediations. Religious groups initiated 11 of the 26 direct mediations. Figure 7 shows the distribution of different activities for religiously motivated organizations.

⁶ There are a few individuals on my T2+ list. I included former heads of state if they worked independently from an intergovernmental organization, as well as other individuals when there was information about their activities (e.g. the Bishop of Bissau, Settimio Ferrazzetta, mediated in the 1998 crisis in Guinea-Bissau.)

Figure 7: T2+ approaches by religious organizations

("mixed approach" is broken down to individual activities)



Roadmap

The dissertation is divided into seven chapters and proceeds as follows: the next chapter contains a review of the relevant literature, placing my questions and subsequent analyses into the fold of existing research. My work draws from a number of different research programs, including literature of third-party interventions in civil wars, peace durability, non-official diplomacy and mediation. The civil war literature has produced interesting research on the influences outsiders have on internal wars, including on civil war duration and the stability of post-conflict societies. The mediation literature looks closer at non-violent intervention methods, with a focus on the identity of mediators and their contributions to the search for a settlement. Both civil war and mediation scholars increasingly use large-*N* studies to test their hypotheses. The research program on tracks of diplomacy is smaller and primarily based on case studies.

Instead of a separate theory chapter, I introduce arguments, theoretical models and testable hypotheses in the empirical chapters 3 through 6, immediately followed by the empirical tests. An overview of all hypotheses can be found in the appendix.

Chapter 3 focuses on the relation between non-state conflict management initiatives and the onset of high-level mediation. I argue that non-official diplomacy as defined in the dissertation will happen at times concurrent with, in place of, or in sequence with mediation by states or intergovernmental organizations. I consider which NGO activities are associated with the onset of high-level mediation and whether the subset of organizations led by former heads of state are particularly likely precursors for high diplomacy.

Chapter 4 considers the effect NGO mediation has on conflict termination and outcome. If the *raison d'être* of T2+ organizations is to end wars, then their success can be measured by the rate at which conflicts in which NGOs intervene come to an end. Separately, I consider whether non-state conflict management is positively related to the specific outcome of peace agreements.

Chapter 5 tests whether non-state conflict management decreases conflict severity. A decline in the number of battle-related deaths can be a direct outcome of an intervention, for example when a mediation initiative is accompanied by a temporary ceasefire. Or, as I hypothesize in this chapter, NGO efforts at changing the parties perception of each other and improving relations could show effects in that the conflict slowly becomes less deadly. One sub-hypothesis considers the potential importance of number and duration of T2+ programs for conflict severity.

Chapter 6 analyzes potential long-term effects of NGO mediation, proposing that non-state conflict management during an ongoing conflict will make subsequent peace more durable. Previous literature has found conflicting evidence regarding the long-term success of mediation. Often mediation leads to some sort of agreement that eventually falls apart. My theory posits that mediation processes involving T2+ should be more stable than those without T2+ because of the unique contributions of non-state peace making. I test whether terminated conflicts that at some point experienced non-state conflict management are less likely to return to war than those conflicts not seeing T2+ and whether the number and duration of NGO efforts are significant predictors for peace stability.

All empirical chapters end with a summary of the findings therein and an overview of the implications drawn from them. The concluding chapter (chapter 7) reviews the results and lays out in more detail the dissertations' contributions to theory and practice.

An astounding number of non-state actors are involved in dispute resolution. Most internal conflicts see at least some conflict management activity spearheaded by NGOs, churches, and others. This dissertation acknowledges this reality and proposes a theoretical framework that relates unofficial diplomacy to conflict duration, severity and other conflict dynamics. The tests of the hypotheses drawn from this framework are an important extension of research programs introduced in the literature chapter.

Chapter 2 – Literature

Introduction

There are several research programs that lend themselves to addressing the role of non-state actors in conflict resolution: the literature on third-party interventions in wars; mediation and conflict resolution; and non-state actors in international relations. While drawing on all of these areas, this study is primarily grounded in the literature dealing with third-party interventions, specifically third-party interventions in civil wars. This research program has contributed much to the understanding of the influence outsiders have on conflict dynamics. Recent work deals primarily with civil conflicts, which are the predominant form of conflicts in the post-Cold War world. This literature systematically addresses the important questions of whether interventions by third parties shorten the duration of conflicts, how they influence conflict dynamics like the severity of fighting, and how third parties can make peace more sustainable. However, scholars in this tradition have paid little attention to third parties that are not states or intergovernmental organizations. I address this gap in the literature, among others by drawing on case study approaches favored by conflict resolution and early mediation scholars.

This chapter proceeds as follows: The section following the introduction reviews the literature on civil wars and the factors impacting their duration, outcome, severity, and the potential re-emergence of violence after the conflict parties sign an agreement. The next section focuses on third-party interventions, one element found in previous research to have an effect on civil war duration. The fourth section addresses one particular type of third-party interventions: mediation, with a focus on non-state actor conflict resolution.

This section also considers the issue of non-state actors in international relations theory and practice. Particular emphasis is given to literature discussing the conditions under which non-state actors are likely to be engaged in conflict management. The section reviews previous concepts of track-two diplomacy and place it in the larger literature. The conclusion addresses the inter-connection of the different strands of research as well as the gaps my dissertation aims to close.

Civil wars

Definition

A civil war is “armed combat taking place within the boundaries of a recognized sovereign entity between parties subject to a common authority at the outset of the hostilities” (Kalyvas 2006). While the phenomenon of civil war is hardly new, scholarly interest in it has expanded significantly since the end of the Cold War. Comparative studies of ethnic conflict received new relevance with the wars in the Balkans and sub-Saharan Africa during the 1990s (Gurr 2000, Mueller 2000, Gagnon 2004). Further, the continuing decline in state-to-state conflict led international relations researchers to shift their focus from inter-state to intra-state conflicts.⁷ The boom of studies of civil wars has tackled the causes of civil war (Collier and Hoeffler 2004, Blimes 2006, Hegre and Sambanis 2006, Jakobsen et al. 2013; see Dixon 2009a for a synthesis of the pertinent quantitative literature), determinates of participation in the conflicts (Kalyvas and Kocher 2007, Humphreys and Weinstein 2008), termination (see Dixon 2009b for an overview) and, in a

⁷ In 2012, the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) recorded only one inter-state war – between Sudan and South Sudan – but 23 intra-state, and eight internationalized armed conflicts. Thirteen of those conflicts were in Sub-Saharan Africa (UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset v.4-2013).

large number of studies, duration (Balch-Lindsay and Enterline 2000, Elbadawi and Sambanis 2000, Collier et al 2004, Regan and Aydin 2006, Kirschner 2010).

Duration

Brandt et al. (2008) give three explanations for the preoccupation with civil war duration: civil wars tend to last longer than inter-state wars, so that they accumulate over time, leading to a higher number of overall wars in the world; longer duration of conflicts exacerbates their overall destructiveness and increase casualty rates; duration and outcome are intimately linked and the longer a war lasts the less likely is a decisive victory of either side.

A number of factors have been identified in the literature as determining the length of civil wars, including characteristics of the conflict parties, the conflict itself, and the involvement of outsiders. According to Collier et al. (2004), lower opportunity costs in low-income countries will spur unrest and contribute to longer wars. They also find significant effects of rebel financial opportunities, in particular lootable natural resources, which can sustain rebellions long-term. Geography can be an important factor: control over terrain that is difficult to access gives fighters safe havens (Fearon and Laitin 2003). Similarly, rebels with access to bases in neighboring countries can regroup easily (Salehyan 2009). Cunningham (2006) explains the variation in duration with the number of veto players who have to approve a potential settlement: the more parties are involved, the more difficult are negotiated outcomes.⁸

⁸ Shirkey (2012) puts forward a similar argument regarding interstate wars: when states enter an ongoing conflict they will prolong it by introducing new issues to be bargained over.

Besides physical factors, psychology may influence the length of conflicts. Elbadawi and Sambanis (2000) argue that identity-driven wars last longer than those that are motivated by political considerations alone. In ethnically heterogeneous countries appeals to ethnic identity may be a good recruitment tool for insurgents. The correlation between ethnic motivation and war duration has been confirmed by other studies, e.g. Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2007). A related argument proposes that uncertainty about the opponent's commitment to a peaceful solution can prolong strife (Walter 2002, Kirschner 2010). In ethnic confrontations, fear of the other groups may be particularly difficult to dispel. Outside support and monitoring can help to overcome information and commitment problems, thus potentially leading to conflict resolution and more sustainable peace (Walter 2002). Other effects of third-party interventions are discussed below.

There are no consistent results regarding the effect the intensity of the conflict has on war duration, but one study finds a curvilinear relationship, implying that very high and very low levels of atrocities are correlated with shorter wars than moderate levels of atrocities (Kirschner 2007). Extreme violence may lead to war fatigue and an increased interest in ceasefire and peace negotiations on the part of the receiving party. Conversely, it could entrench the adversaries and make finding common ground much harder.

Outcome

Many studies point to the interconnectedness of conflict duration and outcome (e.g. DeRouen and Sobek 2004, Brandt et al. 2008, Cunningham et al. 2009). DeRouen and Sobek's (2004) competing risks analysis shows that the probability of a rebel victory is exceedingly small at the beginning of a war, but increases substantially over time. The dynamic is the opposite for government victory: as the war drags on, the chance for

military victory decreases for the government. Longer conflicts sow doubts in the government's strength, and give rebels time to mobilize support.

As mentioned above, Brandt et al. (2008) find that a decisive victory on either side becomes less likely over time. This finding leads to an interesting conclusion: the less likely a victory of either side becomes, the more likely is the development of a "hurting stalemate" – and the more probable are some sort of negotiations (the increased likelihood of conflict termination by treaty supports this argument, DeRouen and Sobek 2004), possibly with third-party mediation.

Besides conflict duration itself, how a conflict ends depends on the opponents capabilities, regime type, rebel identities, and help from outside. State capacity should be associated with government victory, but results are mixed: DeRouen and Sobek (2004) do not find that army size has a significant effect on government victory, but Mason et al. (1999) and Brandt et al. (2008) find support for the hypothesis. The literature is more consistent regarding rebel capability. Rebel capacity relative to government forces increases the likelihood of a military rebel victory and shortens the conflict duration (Gent 2008, Cunningham et al. 2013).

Democratic states face greater constraints in dealing with rebellions. In fact, previous research argues that democracies are more likely to lose wars against weaker opponents because of the expectations (and casualty sensitivity) of their citizens (Merom 2003).

Addressing identity issues that have seen little mention in the civil war outcome literature, Svensson (2007a) explains that negotiated settlements are less likely if one

party's demands are grounded in religious beliefs because compromise is impossible on indivisible issues.

Outside influences can affect conflict outcomes, too. Military support for one side can tip the balance of power in favor of the supported party. Gent (2008) proposes that support for the challengers will make rebel victory more likely. DeRouen and Sobek (2009) show that involvement by the United Nations increases the likelihood that a conflict ends in a truce or treaty.

Severity

Civil war severity is less studied than duration. Yet even within the small body of literature the conceptualization of severity varies. Some authors rely on battle deaths counts (Lacina 2006, Heger and Saleyan 2007, Lujala 2009), others focus on civilian deaths (Azam 2002, Valentino et al 2004, Kalyvas 2009), or the occurrence of atrocities and genocide (Krain 1997, Harff 2003). These varying definitions may account for divergent findings. There is some agreement that regime type, military quality and natural resources deposits are contributing factors to the number of violent deaths in a civil conflict.

The structure of the state at war seems the most important determinant for civil war severity. Of all countries that experience civil war, conflicts in democracies are associated with fewer battle deaths (Lacina 2006). Heger and Saleyhan (2007) argue that the comparatively larger size of the ruling coalition in a democracy will constrain leaders. Also, smaller governing coalitions usually have more to lose and are thus more likely to go along with increased government repression in order to (politically and physically) survive. This finding supports Harff's (2003) results that regimes built on the support of a small ethnic group are most likely to escalate an internal conflict to genocide.

Besides the internal balance of power prior to the conflict, third-party involvement during the war may affect the severity of conflicts. Specifically, military assistance to the government and the increased military advantage this brings has been linked to more battle deaths (Lacina 2006).⁹ Similarly, as rebels gain strength relative to the government, battles become more intense and more people die (Heger and Saleyhan 2007).

One way to sustain a rebellion is the extraction of lootable resources. There are two theories in which natural resources might be linked to conflict severity: if “greed” is the primary motivation for civil conflict, then fighting should be spatial and temporally limited, but difficult to end (Addison, Le Billon and Murshed 2003). However, violence against civilians in the extraction zone might be particularly brutal if rebels are not reliant on them for support and are only looking out for their personal short-term gain (Weinstein 2007). Lujala (2009) finds that conflicts in areas where drugs are grown is less bloody, while diamonds, oil or gas within the conflict zone are associated with more battle deaths.

Sustainable peace

Some factors that play a role in determining the level of violence during an ongoing conflict have been found to also affect the probability of an eventual truce to hold. Although in most internal conflicts the warring parties sign peace agreements at some point, a substantial percentage of these conflicts descend into violence again within five years (Licklider 1995). Thirty-six per cent of African civil conflicts from 1990 to 2010 experienced a relapse into violence after the fighting had stopped. Some wars see only a brief interruption in the fighting for a month or a year. Others seemingly end for good, just to re-start years afterwards. Because of an increasing awareness that peace after conflict is

⁹ I did not find any analysis of the potential impact of non-violent interventions on civil war severity.

fragile and often does not last, conflict resolution practitioners, diplomats and researchers have widened their focus beyond the matter of getting warring parties to sign an agreement. What are the factors that make some ceasefires permanent and others fall apart, some conflicts end for good and others reemerge?

It may be that the willingness or capability for peace are just not there (Zartman 1985); there may be spoilers who have an interest in continuing war – especially in conflicts that were fought by more than two parties (Stedman 1997, Doyle and Sambanis 2000). Meddling neighbors (Downs and Stedman 2002) or the availability of lootable resources can fuel continuing violence (Collier and Hoeffler 2002, Doyle and Sambanis 2006). Studies have explored whether conflicts over more intractable issues, namely identity, are more likely to resume, with some empirical evidence to support the hypothesis (Doyle and Sambanis 2000). Gurses and Rost (2013) find support for their hypothesis that government discrimination against ethnic groups involved in prior conflict has a significant effect on reemergence of violence. The intensity of the fighting preceding any agreement could influence the durability of any peace: on the one hand, higher death tolls will make reconciliation with the other side more difficult (Doyle and Sambanis 2000). Conversely, extreme violence could lead to war weariness and to a stronger commitment to a durable peace (Fortna 2004a).

According to Walter (2002) durable peace is a three-step process: first, belligerents have to be willing to sit down and negotiate; second, they have to find an acceptable compromise solution; third, the negotiated agreement has to be implemented. Some wars end without a peace agreement when one side wins outright. Studies have found that these decisive victories lead to more stable peace (Licklider 1995, Fortna 2004a, Toft 2010).

Military stalemate and compromises may leave parties wondering whether they can win the next round on the battlefield. In this case, they will be less committed to upholding any agreement.

Badran (2014) posits that peace agreements are more strongly correlated with sustainable peace than military victory if they are designed strongly, i.e. if they contain detailed structural and procedural provisions. Regarding the content of peace plans, certain mechanisms, power-sharing agreements in particular, have been found to increase the chances of a successful implementation (Hartzell and Hoddie 2007, Mattes and Savun 2010).¹⁰ Proponents of power-sharing mechanisms argue that joint government responsibilities require a collaborative spirit. Thus, belligerents need to change their confrontational approach and develop a positive sum perception of political interactions (Hartzell and Hoddie 2007, 318).

The process of a negotiated agreement will be correlated with its success, too. Opponents may sign a pact that in the moment seems to address all their concerns, but one or more parties might renege after the signing ceremony. Reneging may occur when the signatory has not spoken for all factions in his party, or has overstepped his mandate or conceded too much. DeRouen and Chowdry (2013) propose that outside mediation will decrease the risk of new conflict following a peace agreement. The authors explain that mediation in the negotiation phase can enhance the chances of success in the implementation phase by alleviating mistrust between the parties.¹¹

¹⁰ Yet, DeRouen, Wallenstein and Lea (2009) do not find that power-sharing provisions lead to longer-lasting peace.

¹¹ Conflictingly, Quinn et al.'s (2013) study of mediation in ethnic intrastate conflict in Africa finds that while mediation in a crisis leads to formal agreements, there is no statistically significant correlation between

Even if a successfully negotiated treaty officially terminates a war, sustainable peace also needs success in the implementation stage. Walter (2002) argues that in civil conflict settings requirements of demobilization and disarmament from the side of the rebels leaves them extremely vulnerable to government surprise attacks during the early implementation period. Walter finds that agreements that include third-party security guarantees and credible third-party enforcement mechanisms will increase the probability that peace treaties will survive. Mattes and Savun (2010) add that third parties can help overcome information asymmetries that might threaten the stability of agreements. Research on United Nations peacekeeping missions concurs that peace is more durable if the UN is involved in the implementation phase (Fortna 2008, Doyle and Sambanis 2000, Gilligan and Sergenti 2008).

Many failed, and most successful, peace agreements were brokered by outsiders (Doyle and Sambanis 2006). Autesserre (2010) explains the bad track record of international mediators in regards to long-term conflict resolution with a misguided international peace-building culture that focuses on national-level conflict resolution and rushed elections. A third-party intervention may lead to a short-term truce, but the peacekeeping intervention's commitment will be questioned if too few resources (human or personnel) are allocated (Doyle and Sambanis 2006, Beardsley 2013). In some cases, domestic interests of the states involved in the peacekeeping effort may trump the needs of the country in transition (Zartman and Touval 1996).

mediation and long-term conflict resolution. See also Beardsley (2012) and below for more on mediation's short- and long-term effects.

This review of the literature makes one thing clear: third parties – from mediators of all stripes to United Nations peacekeeping forces – are common, and often necessary to bring about and implement peace agreements (though they rarely do a good job at the implementation phase). Guaranteeing peace agreements (Walter 2002) is one of many types of third-party interventions in ongoing conflicts.

Third-party intervention in civil wars

A third-party intervention is an action by a foreign actor who is not a primary party to a conflict. According to Regan (2000, 9) “intervention is the use of one state’s resources in an attempt to influence the internal conflict of another state.” This definition underlines the initial focus of the literature on state interventions, but Regan mentions the possibility of a non-state intervention, for example actions taken by intergovernmental organizations. Research on third-party intervention has primarily focused on biased military and economic intervention in times of active fighting (e.g. Regan 2000, Cunningham 2010). But interventions may happen at any time: before a violent conflict breaks out (Regan 2010), when parties are looking for a peace-broker (Bercovitch and Schneider 2000), and after a peace treaty has signed (Walter 2002). They can occur on either side of the conflict, or as neutral interventions.

The latter are often considered under the category of “diplomatic interventions” (Regan et al. 2009). This subset of interventions includes third-party mediation attempts, international forums, and the recall of ambassadors. While most of the diplomatic interventions in their dataset are state-driven, they include mediation by non-state actors. Most studies to-date, however, focus exclusively on states as intervener (e.g. Regan 2000, Gleditsch and Beardsley 2004, Cunningham 2010).

Major – and intertwined - questions addressed in the literature on third-party interventions include who intervenes and why (Carment and James 1996, Regan 2000, Findley and Teo 2006, Aydin 2010), and especially whether interventions shorten conflicts or maybe prolong them (Balch-Lindsay and Enterline, 2000, Elbadawi and Sambanis 2000). Most interventions - at least publicly acknowledged ones – are conducted with the expressed goal to end an ongoing conflict; to end the violence, avert humanitarian disasters, etc., but they do not always succeed in this. A number of studies find that outside interventions in fact tend to prolong civil wars (e.g. Balch-Lindsay and Enterline 2000, Regan 2002). However, Regan (2002) points to the possibility of endogeneity. Interventions may not prolong wars after all, but instead interveners choose to intervene in particularly protracted conflicts that are unlikely to end without external intervention. Type and timing of the interventions matter: United Nations peace-keeping interventions, a special type of third-party intervention, decrease the expected time until a truce or treaty (DeRouen and Sobek 2004). Balch-Lindsay et al. (2008) limit their observations to military interventions and find that interventions make military victory by the supported party more likely. Balanced military interventions make a negotiated outcome much less likely and favor continuation of the fighting. When we consider that those states that intervene in conflict have their own interests that not necessarily include a speedy end to the war, findings that military interventions prolong wars are less surprising (Cunningham 2010).

Regan and Aydin (2006) argue that diplomatic (primarily mediation) attempts are positively correlated with shorter civil wars. They also calculate that economic interventions can substantially shorten conflicts if they are used in connection with diplomatic interventions. As for the timing of interventions, Regan and Aydin explain that

diplomatic interventions are most effective in the “middle stages” of a conflict.¹² Further information about mediation as a conflict management mechanism can be gleaned from the literature on mediation and conflict resolution.

Mediation and other conflict management

Defining mediation

Mediation, the most common conflict management strategy in international conflicts, is defined as

“a process of conflict management, related to but distinct from the parties’ own negotiations, where those in conflict seek the assistance of, or accept an offer of help from, an outsider (whether an individual, an organization, a group, or a state) to change their perceptions or behavior, and to do so without resorting to physical force or invoking the authority of law” (Bercovitch 2007, 167-168).

As in the intervention literature, questions regarding mediation fall into three categories: What are the motives of the mediator? What are the motives of the conflict parties to accept mediation (Bercovitch and Schneider 2000, Greig and Regan 2008)? Is mediation successful in ending the conflict?

Defining track-two diplomacy

Besides direct mediation, non-governmental groups also undertake other conflict management and conflict resolution efforts, including “track-two diplomacy.” The concept of track-two diplomacy was introduced in 1981 by Joseph Montville and refers in its basic form to “unofficial, non-structured interaction” (Davidson and Montville 1981, 155).

Montville analyzes conflicts from a psychological perspective and suggests that unofficial

¹² This finding is not helpful for policy prescription, as we only can know post hoc when a conflict is in this phase. It also contradicts Regan and Stam (2000) who find that mediation efforts in interstate conflicts shorten disputes if they happen early or late in the conflict, but may have little effect in the intermediate part.

efforts, from cultural exchange programs to problem-solving workshops in a non-threatening environment, could support official diplomatic efforts by exposing adversaries' common humanity. Definitions of the concept vary. Çelik and Blum (2007, 53), for example, define track-two diplomacy as "informal attempts, involving small numbers of individuals, with the [...] objectives of changing perceptions, beliefs and attitudes."

An ambitious effort to develop a systematic framework for track-two diplomacy was undertaken by the Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy (Diamond and McDonald 1996). The authors' main argument is that one label is not enough for all unofficial diplomatic activities, so they split the field of track two into nine streams, including conflict resolution professionals, business, religion, media, training, etc. They furthermore insist that track-one diplomacy, the official government interaction, is only one track among many and has no hierarchical priority. Important as a first attempt to bring order in the track-two world, Diamond and McDonald's framework nevertheless did not catch on. One may debate whether the nine categories are necessary and helpful. Furthermore, the classification of official diplomacy as just one of nine equally important tracks is questionable or maybe even naïve. Montville (1981, 155) was very clear that track-two diplomacy cannot replace official diplomacy: "reasonable and altruistic interaction with foreign countries cannot be an alternative to traditional track-one diplomacy, with its official posturing and its underlying threat of the use of force." Thus, track two has to be understood as complementary to track one. Unofficial and official efforts may address the same conflict simultaneously or sequentially. Other extensions of the concept introduce "track 1.5", or "private diplomacy" (Herrberg 2008), non-governmental organizations (NGOs) with the

goal of conflict-resolution (pursuing it with a variety of mechanisms), who closely interact with track-one official diplomacy.

Classic track-two modes of operation often are centered on problem-solving workshops (developed by John Burton and advanced by Herbert Kelman, see Fisher 1997), facilitations (Edward Azar was a pioneer) or human relations seminars (Leonard Doob). Examples include: Burton's workshops with representatives of Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore in the 1960s which developed a framework for settlement of the conflict (Burton 1969), Azar's forums with British and Argentine delegates in the 1980s (Azar 1990), and a number of initiatives in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (e.g. Kelman 1992, 1995). Workshops bring together participants from conflicting parties and challenge them to change their perceptions about the conflict (Smock 2002). A negotiation phase follows the workshop, with the goal of finding novel solutions. Agreements are not binding, but can inform official negotiations at a higher level if breakthroughs are reached in the track-two process. Participants of problem-solving workshops often are – or become – part of the official negotiation team of their party. Single and comparative case studies find that workshops and similar track-two methods can build the foundation needed to embark on official peace-making efforts – they improve attitudes, increase understanding, and consider practical measures - or they can provide blueprints for negotiated settlements (Fisher 1997). Daniel Lieberfeld's (2002, 355) study of track-two diplomacy in South Africa (1984-1990) concludes that "Track-two talks are credited with chancing the political risks and rewards of official talks by legitimizing the negotiation option and desensitizing each side's constituents to talks with the enemy, [and] by building latent support for track-one negotiations, ..."

Mediator entry

Bercovitch and Schneider (2000) develop an expected-utility model that examines the identity of mediators and which factors determine the choice of mediators. They find that the mediation market is dominated by powerful states (almost 50 percent of all mandates). A state's power and influence make it a sought-after mediator. This finding is easily explained if we understand mediation as a process of bargaining that can be influenced by resources/leverage. Third parties can change the costs of conflict to the conflict parties, either by increasing the costs of continuing conflict or by providing incentives for cooperation (Zartman and Touval 1985, Carnevale 1986, Smith and Stam 2003, Schrodtt and Gerner 2004, Wilkenfeld et al. 2005, Beardsley et al. 2006, Quinn et al. 2006, Rauchhaus 2006). They can also provide help for the implementation of peace agreements (Young 1967, Lake and Rothchild 1996, Bercovitch 1997, Svensson 2007b). Another form of leverage is information. Mediators can assist parties in overcoming problems of asymmetric information (Zartman and Touval 1985, Kydd 2003, Princen 1992). But in order to do so, the mediator has to have access to more information than the parties themselves. Usually, that requires superior intelligence capabilities.

Neutrality of the mediating party is not a prerequisite: in fact it is found to be of little importance for a mediator (Kydd 2003). Zartman and Touval (2001) explain that a mediator with close ties to one of the parties may be more motivated and thus more effective. An example of his mechanism is the involvement of the diaspora in conflict resolution. Baser and Swain (2008) argue that the diaspora can contribute to third-party mediation, not despite of, but because of their personal ties to conflict parties and local knowledge.

While resources and clout make some states attractive mediators, they are not always eager to act as such. Successful mediation raises a mediator's reputation; therefore mediation is more likely in crises that promise resolution (Greig 2005). Consequently, the longer a conflict has lasted already, and the more intractable it becomes, the less willing outside governments are to get involved and risk mediation failure (Touval and Zartman 1985, Bercovitch and Langley 1993). A high level of violence is a sign of conflict intransigence, but the potential damage to the outsider's reputation for failing to address the humanitarian crisis outweighs the risk of failure. Thus, increased conflict severity is correlated with mediation onset (Greig 2005, Beardsley et al. 2006, Beardsley 2010).

Entry for non-state mediators

The focus on power and the negligence of neutrality, a characteristic more often ascribed to NGOs than to states, makes the mediation market harder to penetrate for non-state actors. Transnational organizations are rarely chosen as mediators (29 out of 723 mediation mandates were given to NGOs, 38 to individuals) (Bercovitch Schneider 2000). Maundi et al. (2006) support this view. They analyze mediation processes in internal African conflicts, focusing on the premediation phase (considering who is being invited to mediate) and conclude that in the case studies they performed,

“there has been a pronounced dominance of Track One entry. Those who have attempted entry have generally been either states or regional organizations, those who have achieved entry have all been officials and those who have succeeded in their mediation have all been state actors” (p.198).

More comprehensive examinations of mediation events find that non-state actors do mediate, but not often. Oeberg et al. (2009) find that five percent of the instances of early conflict prevention in ethnic crises (1990-98) they observe are conducted by “prominent

individuals”, e.g. leaders of the Catholic Church. DeRouen et al.’s (2011) dataset of civil war mediation events shows six percent of cases include NGO and private mediation.

If leverage is so important, why might conflict parties opt for what has been dubbed “weak mediators” (Beardsley 2009) like non-governmental actors? The choice of mediator depends on both the supply and the demand side of the mediation market. First, those third parties that could exercise leverage described above may not be interested in getting involved. Since the end of the Cold War, the majority of conflicts have been intra-state rather than inter-state.¹³ Zartman (2007, 9) refers to the “absence of established systems of order and consensus on solutions” which leaves decision-makers uncertain about their own interests, legitimacy, and how they may be affected by post-Cold War conflicts. When they do decide to intervene, the warring government could see offers from outside states to mediate in the conflict as undermining their sovereignty or bestowing international legitimacy on an enemy they refuse to recognize. NGOs may be less threatening to sovereignty and more willing to get involved in conflicts that major interveners do not care about.

Second (still on the supply side of mediation), there are more “weak mediators” available today than in the past. The field of non-governmental conflict resolution has expanded tremendously since 1990.¹⁴ The changing nature of war, and the international

¹³ From 1988-2008, UCDP/PRIO counts 11 interstate wars with combined 25 conflict years, and 123 intra-state conflicts with 818 conflict years (Gleditsch et al. 2002).

¹⁴ A side note on the motives of non-state mediators: Many of these organizations are based in the developed world but pursue projects in conflict zones in the Global South. While the motivation for this engagement will differ for individual participants, globalization has contributed to the spread of knowledge about hitherto lesser-known regions and wars at the same time that many citizens in industrialized societies developed post-material values (Inglehart 1971) that make paying attention to problems beyond their borders and trying to address them (by actively working to remedy them or by contributing to international causes) less unusual.

system in general, opens up previously blocked opportunities for non-state actors in the security realm. States have never been the only actors in international relations, and increasingly non-state entities encroach on previously government-controlled foreign relations. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are a prime example. They participate in multilateral negotiations (Betsill and Corell 2008), and organize campaigns to address local or international issues, from debt relief (Donnelly 2002) to human rights violations (Burgerman 1998). Many intergovernmental organizations today allow for access to their decision-making processes for NGOs (Willets 2000, Joensson and Tallberg 2010). However, states remain the primary force in international relations, for the most part. The fact that non-state participation varies by issue areas indicates that national governments remain in control: they allow non-state actors to play a role when it is beneficial for them, or at least not detrimental to the states' interests, and keep them out of areas deemed essential to national security. Steffek's (2010) comparison of non-governmental organizations' access to international institutions finds that non-state actors have easy access to organizations dealing with issues in the areas of environment and human rights, while access to security issues is medium to low, and access to finance matters is lower even. He argues that states have little incentives to open up areas of "high politics" to civil society organizations. His case study of NATO confirms that the need for secrecy inhibits cooperation with non-state actors, but he also finds that a shift in NATO operations following the Cold War to include post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization – areas that are less sensitive to intelligence breaches and where NGOs may have valuable expertise to offer – has led to slightly more interactions. Mediation by non-state actors was rare during the Cold War, although it did occur. Examples include the Vatican mediating between Argentina and Chile (Princen

1992) and the International Red Cross' involvement in Africa (Forsythe 1985). Today the presence of NGOs addressing conflicts is widespread enough that Crocker et al. (1999) refer to them as a "third tier of actors beyond states and international organizations" (p. 6-7).

Increasing numbers of relevant conflicts and more NGOs tackling conflict resolution beg the question how the individual organizations decide where to become active. Many track-two organizations depend on donations for funding; this may make them more interested in conflicts that are attractive to potential donors. Individual contributions may be more forthcoming if supporters have heard of the conflict before. Rich individual donors may have an interest or attachment to a specific country or region. However, the opposite could be true, too: track-two activity could be more likely in lesser-known conflicts, those that do not attract a lot of attention from states.

The third set of reasons why conflict parties opt for weak mediators falls into the demand category. Sometimes conflict parties may prefer the services of a mediator with little power. This preference can be based on "devious objectives" when a party uses negotiations as a stalling tactic to improve its currently weak chances on the battlefield (Richmond 1998). Or, more constructively, mediators are expected to fill less power-bound functions like acting merely as messengers between opponents, organizing meetings or acting as witnesses (Burton 1969, Fisher 1972, Kelman 1992). They can make proposals or encourage the parties to see the issues from new perspectives, thus opening their minds to new avenues of problem solving (Burton 1969, Zartman and Touval 1985, Kelman 1992). Little leverage to push parties towards a solution can be an asset if parties are reluctant to participate in talks that may commit them to something they are not ready for. Further,

conflict parties may not see non-political, non-governmental organizations as a threat (Maundi et al. 2006). Dunn and Kriesberg (2002) explore the special contributions international NGOs may bring to the table: some organizations have a long-term presence in conflict zones, for example to provide humanitarian or development aid. Thus, they develop a deeper understanding of culture and place, and trust can grow between the organization and conflict parties who may be wary of outside intervention.

Most interactive conflict resolution (ICR) activities target the most intractable conflicts (Fisher 2007). Rothman and Olson (2001, 289) point out that the post-Cold War conflicts are often identity-based and “resistant to traditional interest-based conflict resolution methods.” The authors advocate for interactive conflict resolution approaches instead. Austerre (2010) explains that today’s civil wars are often rooted in local, micro-level motivations (see also Kalyvas 2009), but are addressed by international actors on the macro (national or regional) level alone. Non-state conflict management might be more agile in adopting the low-level approach proposed by Austerre, potentially making NGOs more common peacemakers on that level. Non-state actors are more flexible in their approaches and not bound to traditional diplomatic protocol (Bercovitch and Schneider 2000). Transnational non-state organizations, can “afford to be more creative and less inhibited in the policy positions they advocate” (p. 148).

Deep knowledge of people and place also increases credibility, another significant mediator characteristic (Maoz and Terris 2006). Mediation scholars underline the importance of trust and legitimacy for successful mediation processes (Lederach 1995, Bercovitch and Kadayifci-Orellana 2009), but the basis of the legitimacy differs, e.g. in some cases a cultural insider is preferable, in another an outsider embodying a moral principle

(Bercovitch and Kadayifci-Orellana 2009).¹⁵

Wehr and Lederach (1991) develop the concept of insider-partial mediator, contrasting it with the outsider-neutral model of mediation. Insiders bring “connectedness and trusted relationships” (p. 87) to the mediation process, and the fact that they will not leave the conflict zone after the successful or failed process gives them credibility. Such mediation is not an invention from the outside, but a shared experience in which all involved have a stake.¹⁶ The authors find that in the case of the Esquipulas process in Nicaragua an insider-partial mediation led to a tentative agreement, which then was solidified by an outsider-neutral mediator.

Non-state actors, however, are not entirely beyond reproach. Ron and Cooley (2002) point out the institutional pressures and competition over resources can subvert NGOs’ good intentions, for example leading to redundancies in some issue areas. They are highly dependent on donors – often governments or large foundations - who in turn may exert tremendous influence on the NGOs agenda or project implementation (Helms 2003). NGOs have furthermore been criticized for their lack of accountability (e.g. Jordan and van Tuijl 2000), although in the area of conflict resolution non-governmental mediators should be accountable to the mediation parties.

Mediation success

As important as the choice of a mediator is, the question is relevant primarily in the context of mediation success. Factors found to influence the outcome of mediation efforts include third-party resources (Bercovitch and Gartner 2006, Richmond 1998), mediator

¹⁵ Bercovitch and Kadayifci-Orellana (2009) point out that religious leaders often combine the positions of cultural insider and moral guide, making them attractive mediators.

¹⁶ See Svensson (2013) for an overview of potential policy implications.

rank (Bercovitch and Houston 1996), and timing of the initiative (Regan and Stam 2000, Zartman 1985 and 2000). Interestingly, though non-state actors are uncommon mediators, their success rate is comparable for nation-states and NGOs, 39% and 34% respectively in the Bercovitch and Schneider (2000) sample.

How do authors define mediation success? Based on a popular dataset often employed for statistical analysis of mediation events, the International Conflict Management Project (Bercovitch 1999), they usually place mediation outcome in four categories: unsuccessful, ceasefire, partly successful, and fully successful (e.g. Bercovitch and Schneider 2000, Berber 2010, Boehmelt 2010). Beardsley (2012) warns against a short time horizon: he finds that while almost half of mediated conflicts end in some negotiated agreement, half of mediated crises relapse into conflict (the same number as unmediated crises). Mediators, particularly those with power and resources, may provide artificial incentives for participation in a peace process to the parties. Thus, the author finds significant variation in long-term success for heavy-handed mediation vs. lighter forms of conflict management.

A clear definition of mediation success is not only academically rigorous, but it will influence conclusions and policy prescriptions. One goal is to assess effectiveness of different actors. Crocker et al. (1999, 8-9) point out that the effectiveness of different mediating actors depends on the definition of mediation, too:

“if the definition of mediation includes a broad array of actions to build a constituency for peace, then many organizations, including nonofficial actors, are important to the mediation effort at every phase of the conflict cycle. If, on the other hand, the definition includes an ability to mobilize international resources and political will and to offer incentives and threats to warring

parties to change their behavior, the state actors will be the principal players with nonofficial organization operating at the margins.”¹⁷

The expectations and assessments of success are thus different for government mediators – who might hope to end their effort with the signing of an official peace agreement, while “weak” mediators could be satisfied when their initiative leads to a schedule for further talks. In fact, track-two diplomacy and other conflict management initiatives often explicitly see their role in this supporting role (Fisher 1997).

Methodologically, a preference for one track or another should be accounted for in statistical models.¹⁸

Boehmelt (2010) presents the first large-N study examining the effectiveness of different tracks of diplomacy. His theoretical framework distinguishes between track one (official diplomacy), track 1.5 (public or private interaction between official representatives of conflict parties mediated by a non-governmental actor), and track two (unofficial, informal interaction between members of conflict groups).¹⁹ He does not take into account the timing of efforts, but simply tests whether track one, track two, or combined efforts are most successful in ending the conflict. Boehmelt finds that both are effective tools of conflict resolution, although track one more so, and that combined efforts are best. Boehmelt’s study looks only at high-level negotiation, leaving out interactive

¹⁷ The statement reflects a debate about competing paradigms in mediation. The structuralist approach sees conflicts as a rational cost-benefit process that can be influenced by outsiders with incentives and threats. A key concept is Zartman’s “hurting stalemate”: when neither side believes it can win, they will be open to negotiations. The social-psychological approach emphasizes communication and dialogue between the conflict parties with the goal to change perceptions and attitudes. Interactive conflict resolution is anchored in the latter approach.

¹⁸ The only quantitative study of track-two effectiveness (Boehmelt 2010) employs a selection model to account for the selection bias whether mediation happens at all or not, but does not distinguish whether track one or track two are more likely in certain cases.

¹⁹ His empirical study, however, combines track two and track 1.5, which diminishes the contribution of the research.

conflict resolution, training and other track-two efforts. Effectiveness is measured according to the Bercovitch mediation dataset.

But considering the lack of resources and leverage NGOs bring to their peace-making efforts, and given the fact that many track-two projects target parties in particularly antagonistic settings, measuring “success” by noting whether a track-two initiative leads to an end of a war might be misleading. Rouhana (2001) insists that in order to measure track-two effectiveness we need to acknowledge that track two has different goals than official diplomacy. The successful cases collected by Fisher (1997) include those that contributed to “policy formation,” those that “increased understanding” or “improved attitudes” and those that led to a “framework for settlement” (pp. 189-191). Conflict management by track-two diplomacy is often an inter-mediate step from conflict to peace.

Multiparty mediation

Simultaneous or sequential efforts at official and unofficial peace making are common, though the superiority of several mediators over a single one is not unchallenged. Some scholars and practitioners caution against a proliferation of conflict management initiatives. They argue that too many cooks may indeed spoil the meal. The literature on multi-party mediation has considered the effect of several mediators in a conflict, but primarily for state-led interventions (Boehmelt 2010, Beber 2010b).

There are several reasons why mediations may be more successful when there is more than one third party. Hampson (1996, 233) points out that “third parties need other third parties” to move mediation forward. Usually, and particularly in protracted, complicated conflicts, parties need help in all three areas of negotiation - communication,

formulation and manipulation (Touval and Zartman 1985), but few outsiders can provide all-around assistance. Multi-party peacemaking can be a way of burden sharing, both monetary and reputational. Especially for non-state actors, sustained diplomatic efforts can be expensive; sharing these costs with other peacemakers can be beneficial. There is always the risk that a peace effort fails, and even the potential that the mediator is blamed for the failure. The blame will be diminished if there is a group of mediators instead of just one.

More is not always better, though. Kriesberg (1996) outlines several ways in which multiplicity of peace initiatives can hamper effectiveness of all of them. Conflict parties, in particular those that have limited capacities, may try and fail to pay attention to all ongoing mediation efforts, draining their resources in the process. At the same time, mediators have their own preferences and priorities. Thus, several simultaneous efforts can send mixed messages. They might also encourage “forum shopping” (Lefler 2012). Additionally, different efforts involving different people may produce contradictory results that can confuse official negotiators when they are passed along. Also, intermediaries compete for resources in their home constituencies. Mediators may resist cooperation with each other because they are not willing to share any possible credit for the potential successful peace settlement.

While initial tests find that the larger the group of mediators the more effective they are in ending war, the strong positive statistical relationship disappears when Beber (2010b) takes into account a potential endogenous relationship (because mediators may jump onto the bandwagon when an agreement is in sight). Boehmelt (2011) theorizes an inverted U-shaped relationship between the number of interveners and the effectiveness of

mediation efforts. His analysis of mediation interventions in inter-state wars finds that “both very small and very large groups of interveners perform worst in settling disputes peacefully” (p. 877).

There is more to multi-party mediation than how many actors are involved. The interplay of different conflict management initiatives is much more dynamic. The theoretical framework developed by Crocker et al. (1999) asserts that depending on the conflict cycle – measured by the level of violence – track-one and track-two initiatives should have varying levels of success in gaining access to conflict parties and in resolving the conflict. In particular, at times of rising tensions and casualty levels parties may resist entry of major powers because it might commit them to a formal process of negotiations. Meanwhile non-governmental actors could establish some direct communication between parties without these unwanted pressures. Crocker et al. also hypothesize about the most effective sequence of multi-party mediation. When the level of violence is on the rise and track-two initiatives may have a comparative advantage in gaining access, they can prepare conflict parties for high-level negotiations. Therefore, Crocker et al. propose simultaneous track activities during low levels at the lower ends of the escalation curve and sequenced efforts during the times of heightened conflict. Other scholars concur that a sequence of track two followed by track one is most promising for conflict resolution (Montville 1991, McDonald 1991, Kriesberg 1996). For ongoing wars it is difficult to determine at what stage of the conflict cycle the parties find themselves, making prescriptions often very difficult. But a systematic study of the occurrence and sequencing of past conflict management efforts by multiple actors is an important step in determining which conflict resolution mechanisms are most promising.

Outsiders can alleviate the disadvantage of being played out against each other if they agree on a joint course of action (Kriesberg 1996). Case studies of conflict management efforts that were coordinated (Congo and Macedonia, Lund 1996; Tajikistan, Iij 2001) and those that were not (Rwanda, Yugoslavia and Zaire, Lund 1996; Nagorno Karabakh, Betts 1999) indicate that the former are more successful in bringing the conflict to a close.

Selection effects

Important in the context of mediation, in general, and non-state intervention, in particular, are considerations regarding selection bias. When assessing the success of initiatives, one has to be aware of the fact that mediation efforts are not random. The issues at the center of many of the internal conflicts in this inquiry are intractable and hardly open to compromise (Olson and Pearson 2002). Melin and Svensson (2009) find that in contrast to inter-state wars, belligerents in civil wars accept mediation only “in the most difficult circumstances” (p. 264, see also Greig and Regan 2008). Disputants handing mediation authority to an outsider could signal weakness (Beardsley et al 2006), and they resist losing control over the process. Thus, they only do so when their own previous efforts have failed. When rebels face a government, significant power disparities – in military might, international recognition and potential support – will make it unlikely that the nominally stronger side will agree to mediation, especially if doing so might bestow legitimacy on the opponent. For the same reason, fewer governments will offer to act as mediator. Non-state armed groups feel less restrained by international norms and are more likely to break agreements (Gartner and Bercovitch 2006). On the other hand, the longer a conflict

endures – the more violent it is or the more protracted – the more likely it will attract an increasing number of mediation attempts (Regan and Stam 2000).

Other selection variables depend on the intervener: a state is more likely to intervene in a neighboring country, fearing spill-over or contamination (Regan 2000, Saleyhan and Gleditsch 2006). Major powers will be more likely to intervene in conflicts where they see their national interest threatened. Studies of mediation events that suffer from selection bias may find no significant conflict resolution effect for mediation (or even a negative effect) – creating the puzzle why mediation has become such a common conflict management tool (Gartner 2011, 2013). To counter this bias, some studies include all disputes, whether they experienced mediation or not (e.g. Regan and Stam 2000), or use methods taking into account a selection and outcome stage (Beardsley 2008, Beber 2010a, Boehmelt 2010, Gartner 2011).

Conclusion

This chapter has provided an overview of the distinct yet interconnected research programs of civil conflict and mediation. Internal wars are hardly ever fought without any outside influence, from military intervention on behalf of one side to attempts at peacemaking between the opponents. The scientific study of civil conflicts has acknowledged the importance of taking third-party interventions into account and the mediation literature explores the many facets of non-violent interventions.

The subset of non-state diplomatic interventions has, until now, received little attention in quantitative studies of conflict processes, for lack of relevant data as well as neglect to include non-state actors into theoretical models. As summarized above, individual and comparative case studies of multi-party mediation indicate that non-state

conflict management can be a useful tool for conflict resolution, especially when used in coordination with high-level negotiations. Track-two diplomacy has distinct advantages over mediation led by governments and is available to belligerents under different circumstances. Non-state conflict management is increasingly common in internal conflicts, but its effectiveness has not been studied systematically or in a way comparable to other third-party interventions.

In the following chapters I will develop and test hypotheses that help analyze the effects non-state conflict management has on civil wars and how these initiatives relate to other peacemaking efforts.

I set out to measure track-two/NGO conflict management success both as a direct contributor to “ending a conflict” and its indirect effects, including the potentially stronger durability of peace agreements. I believe that track-two diplomacy is common enough and its approaches promising enough that it should be included in models of third-party interventions in civil wars.

Chapter 3 focuses on the role non-state conflict management can play in bringing about high-level mediation. The theoretical model I develop here draws from the mediation literature as well as accounts of NGO diplomacy that study how non-state actors can further the goal of peace.

Chapter 3 – Direct impacts of T2+: Onset of high-level mediation

Introduction

This and the following two chapters quantitatively explore the direct impacts non-state conflict management has on the dynamics of ongoing civil conflicts in Africa. In this first empirical chapter I consider the relationship of non-official mediation and official diplomacy. I test my hypothesis, introduced below, that high-level mediation is more likely in conflicts that also see non-state conflict management. For example, in the current episode of the Ugandan civil war the only official mediation round between the government and the Lord's Resistance Army (the 2006-2008 Juba talks) was co-facilitated by South Sudan and the Community of Sant'Egidio. In the five years preceding the Juba talks a number of non-governmental actors worked hard to get the parties to the table, e.g. the Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative fostered contacts to the LRA (Ochala 2004), and the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue acted as messenger (HD 2004). My theoretical framework proposes that efforts by non-state actors to nudge parties towards a negotiation process will lead to the onset of high-level mediation more often than random chance would predict.

The theoretical model developed in this chapter explains how and in which cases non-state conflict management is related to the occurrence of high-level mediation. It addresses both the possibility that conflicts that attract one form of conflict management will be more likely to experience the other, too; and the option that track-one and track-two diplomacy are sequential, with non-state engagement paving the way for third-party state interventions. The latter dynamics should be particularly pronounced if NGOs are involved in mediation training and capacity-building for rebel party leaders. Some non-

state conflict management initiatives are implemented with the explicit goal of preparing one or both sides for negotiations, e.g. International Alert's 1995 pre-negotiation work with the parties of the Sierra Leone civil war that included compiling existing peace accords and other material related to peace-building (CEWS 1999). My empirical models will test whether such training and preparation initiatives systematically lead to high-level negotiations in African civil conflict dyads for the time period 1990-2009.

I then explore how the type of organization may affect the occurrence of high-level mediation. A number of conflict resolution NGOs are led by former heads of state, e.g. The Carter Center by former US president Jimmy Carter, Conflict Management Initiative by former Finnish President Maarti Ahtisaari, and the Nyerere Centre by former Tanzanian president Julius Nyerere. Considering the existing links between these individuals and the governments of their own and other countries, as well as intergovernmental organizations, I expect initiatives by these NGOs to be particularly strongly correlated with subsequent track-one diplomacy.²⁰

I find support for my hypothesis that track-two diplomacy is a predictor for the onset of high-level mediation by third-party states or intergovernmental organizations. A specific form of NGO conflict management – training for conflict resolution – is found to have a statistically significant effect on the probability that intergovernmental organizations or foreign governments will start a mediation process. I cannot, however, confirm that NGOs led by former heads of state have a particularly strong effect on the chance that high diplomacy will happen. On the contrary, results indicate that this subset of

²⁰ These former government officials using unofficial diplomatic tools are often referred to as “Track 1.5” diplomats (Boehmelt 2010).

non-state conflict managers may act instead of, and not complementary to other third-party mediators.

The chapter is divided into six sections. After this introduction I lay out my argument as it pertains to the relationship between non-state conflict management and government-led mediation and draws hypotheses from the theory. Then I introduce the data for this chapter. After I define my unit of analysis and my dependent variable I give an overview of the control variables included in my statistical analysis. The fourth section lays out the methodology I apply in order to test my hypotheses. I then test my hypotheses and present the results in the fifth section of the chapter. The conclusion section addresses the theoretical and practical implications of the findings presented in this chapter.

Argument

Non-state conflict management advantages: track two instead of track one

Mediators play a number of roles, often subsumed under the terms facilitation, formulation and manipulation (Touval and Zartman 1985). First, they may entice belligerents to start a negotiation process, help them communicate with each other and provide a neutral space to get together. Second, they can help the parties find common ground and solutions. They may propose settlement terms, or create a framework for the parties to develop their own. And third, mediators may use leverage to pressure one or both sides to come to an agreement or to guarantee its implementation. Leverage is a function of resources available to the mediator, his or her capability, and the pre-existing relationship between the conflict parties and the mediator (Melin 2013).

States are usually the only third parties that have the leverage to guarantee a mediation outcome (Walter 2002, Beardsley 2013). But non-state actors can be vital in

facilitation and formulation. Backchannel and other communication between conflict parties facilitate dialogue. Problem-solving workshops and dialogue sessions straddle the facilitation and formulation phase, aiming to build trust, but potentially also leading to agreements. Negotiation training and other support activities similarly prepare the way for a settlement without having it as an explicit goal. Direct mediation, on the other hand, occurs only in the formulation stage and its success can be measured by whether it leads to an end of the conflict.

Because reliable information about the other side is important during any bargaining process, some non-state actors have a distinct advantage. Svensson (2013) points out that local actors like religious or civil society leaders know much more about the conflict situation and the people involved than any outsiders. He adds that these insider mediators have little incentive to misrepresent available information or to bluff, because they will have to continue to live and interact with the conflict parties, no matter the outcome of the peace process.

Despite a general lack of leverage, sometimes conflict parties prefer the services of a “weak mediator” (Beardsley 2009). Non-state conflict management often grows out of long-standing relations in the country at war. For example, the parties in Mozambique, deeply distrustful of each other, could agree on the intermediary of the Community of Sant’Egidio, which had been engaged in humanitarian work in the country for many years (Gianturco 2010). The facilitation phase is characterized by a need to build trust. Thus, a weak, neutral mediator might be more desirable than a strong one who enters the process with her own agenda. In intractable conflicts, coaxing the parties to the negotiation table is difficult. Especially when they are reluctant to commit to a formal process, a low-key,

informal non-state initiative can be preferable to arm-twisting by a major power.

Agreements arrived at without external pressure can prove to be more sustainable in the long run (Beardsley 2011). And even if the meeting ends without an outcome document, it will have contributed to the clarification of positions, the better understanding of the other side's red lines, and possibly to some human interaction with the opponent that can make future interactions easier.

Not mutually exclusive: track two and track one

When governments give up on difficult negotiations or when the parties lose trust in the current mediator or the process, they may turn to another mediator, state or non-state. The civil war in Burundi for example saw direct mediation efforts by the United Nations and African Union in 1998-1999 followed by a lengthy mediation process spear-headed by former presidents Nyerere and Mandela in 1999-2000 (Melander and von Uexküll 2011).

T2+ can also lead to T1. Choosing non-state mediation at one point in the conflict cycle does not mean that official mediation will not be an option in the future. Governmental mediators who were reluctant to get involved in a particular conflict may be more willing to engage with the parties after T2+ has paved the way. When belligerents consider their options of conflict management, and more specifically the identity of an outside mediator, they may choose a NGO mediator over a third-party state for the NGO's advantages outlined above or because they do not have another choice. Conflict resolution by foreign governments is not always available – particularly in intractable, long-lasting conflicts in countries of little strategic importance few outside governments feel compelled to get involved (Regan 2000). However, actions by the T2+ actor can change the equation by affecting the opponents' attitudes – making them more willing to give negotiations a try

– and by bolstering the parties’ abilities – leveling the playing field and making successful negotiations more likely.

T2+ initiatives can target one side or all sides of a conflict. NGO initiatives targeting sides separately prepare individuals and groups for high-level negotiations by giving them the tools they need to engage constructively in the peace process. This preparation work can generate innovative ideas how to address the underlying incompatibilities (Zartman and Touval 1985, Kelman 1992). It can also give participants the confidence to enter into high-level negotiations with their opponents, diminishing the fear that the stronger party will manipulate the process to their advantage. In the conflict between Khartoum and South Sudan, for example, a number of organizations implemented projects that had the goal of preparing the rebel groups for high-level negotiations: In 2002, The Carter Center trained government officials and rebel leaders in negotiation techniques; in 2004 and 2005 the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue engaged several rebel groups in negotiation preparation; in 2005, the Centre for Conflict Resolution in South Africa conducted a workshop for SPLM and SPLA representatives trying to bridge differences and develop a joint platform for the rebel groups. These efforts paved the way for direct talks between the belligerents.

Informal dialogue and problem-solving workshops involving more than one conflict party give opponents space for non-threatening personal interaction in which to improve belligerents’ attitudes towards each other and the conflict, and to change a zero-sum-mindset into a more collaborative and constructive approach. Reduced tensions can express themselves in new openings for negotiations. These were the ideas behind the

workshops held by the George Mason University Sudan Task Force for representatives of six different Darfur rebel factions.

Examples of parallel mediation by different tracks include the peace process in Ivory Coast, where the Community of Sant'Egidio participated in the peace talks on the request of the host nation Burkina Faso (Giro 2013) and Burundi where the same non-state actor held secret negotiations with the parties when the official talks in Arusha stalled (Hara 1999).

Considering the multitude of ways that T2+ can benefit high-level mediation I expect official diplomacy to be more likely when T2+ occurs in a conflict:

H_{1a}: High-level negotiations are more likely to take place in those conflicts that experience non-state conflict management than in those conflicts that do not, all else being equal.

“All else being equal” refers to the factors that have been found in the literature to affect the dynamics of civil war explored in this research, in this section the chances that a war experiences diplomatic efforts to bring it to an end. I control for these factors by adding them as independent variables to my statistical models.

More and more frequently, T2+ is an explicit precursor to high-level mediation. I expect one type of T2+ intervention – capacity-building – to be more closely linked to mediation by state actors than others. These efforts should precede high diplomacy. For a number of T2+ initiatives, the possibility of subsequent high-level mediation is a positive side factor, but not their explicit goal. But pre-negotiation support and mediation training are meant to prepare groups for subsequent peace talks. For example, the Mediation Support Project (MSP) describes its work as follows: “The Mediation Support Project (MSP) offers tailor-made trainings for NGOs, states, international organisations, and negotiating

parties” (<http://peacemediation.ch/tailor-made-trainings>). Therefore, these initiatives should be related strongly to the subsequent onset of governmental mediation efforts.

H_{1b}: NGOs training initiatives will be more strongly associated with the onset of high-level mediation than other T2+ efforts (direct mediation, mediation support or problem-solving workshops), all else being equal.

Depending on the individual’s or organization’s connections to and relationship with the realm of high diplomacy, T2+ can also have an advocacy effect, bringing a forgotten conflict into third states’ consciousness. Groups led by a former head of state will be particularly good at generating government will and resources. There are several of those groups working in the field of conflict management and related area, including two organizations – Club de Madrid and The Elders – comprised of several former dignitaries.

An example of the impact former presidents can have is the Tunis Summit of 1996: The 1996-2001 violent crisis in Zaire saw an early intervention by The Carter Center in March 1996 when the conflict was one among several discussed during the Tunis Summit (INN 1996). A number of talks with foreign dignitaries and negotiations between the conflict parties under mediation of South Africa followed in 1997. Because of their intimate knowledge of international diplomacy and personal connections to current world leaders, I expect T2+ activities by organizations around former presidents to lead more often to high-level mediation than initiatives by other organizations.

H_{1c}: Onset of high-level negotiations will be more likely if NGOs led by former heads of state conduct T2+ than if religious T2+ organizations (or none) are active, all else being equal.

Data

Sample of cases

Datasets compiled and made available by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) build the basis of my own data collection. From armed conflicts that appear in the *UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset v.4-2011, 1946 – 2010* (Gleditsch et al. 2002, Themnér and Wallensteen 2011) I include those conflicts that take place in Africa during the time period 1990-2010 and that are coded as internal conflicts (Type 3 or 4 according to the codebook, UCDP 2011).

A research focus on African civil conflicts in the time period 1990-2010 makes sense practically as well as theoretically. The end of the Cold War and the advent of technological globalization saw an explosion of the number of international NGOs, including in the field of conflict resolution. This evolution coincided with a declining interest of the remaining super-power in the internal affairs of previously propped-up allies and the eruption or exacerbation of a number of civil wars, particularly in Africa. Limiting the time under observation to the post-Cold War era allows me to hold these systematic variables constant. My geographical focus on Africa also has the practical advantage of keeping a number of regional factors of importance, like membership in regional organizations, constant. Furthermore, the continent has experienced many violent wars in the last 25 years, and still does. A thorough study of conflict resolution in the region might lead to helpful insights for future policy. Although this dissertation is limited to one region and a relatively short time period, it has larger implications: the NGO peace-making field has grown exponentially in the last 25 years and it is time to move beyond case studies in analyzing its effectiveness. There are few quantitative studies of track-two diplomacy (see

Boehmelt 2010 for an exception, who compares the effectiveness in mediation outcome of different tracks of diplomacy),²¹ and none to my knowledge that addresses its relation to the onset of high-level mediation (Chapter 3), conflict duration (Chapter 4) - a common test for other types of interventions - or conflict severity (Chapter 5).

UCDP's definition of conflict is based on these requirements: the use of armed force, a minimum of 25 battle-related deaths per year per dyad, the participation of at least one government of a state as a primary party, and a stated incompatibility (parties fight over either territory or the replacement of the current government). UCDP codes a conflict episode as ended when the number of battle deaths does not reach 25 in a given year. However, should the same incompatibility lead to renewed fighting, UCDP codes a new episode with the same conflict ID. My sample thus includes 75 conflict episodes for 37 conflicts in 27 countries. This produces 262 observations. Eight episodes started before January 1, 1990; 10 were still ongoing by December 31, 2010. See the appendix for a list of all included conflict episodes and the participants.

Unit of analysis

This chapter uses the conflict dyad year as its unit of observation.²² Dyads warrant consideration because 14 conflicts in my sample involve more than one rebel group at some point during the active fighting phase. The same country can face several distinct

²¹ The study differs in three important ways from my own: the author's definition of track two diplomacy only includes mediation events, the information about mediation events is collected using only news media sources, and the effectiveness of mediation is measured by whether parties reach a stable peace settlement.

²² When considering the exact timing of T2+ in relation to high-level mediation, a monthly unit of analysis would be preferable to the annual count. However, for many of the NGO initiatives in my sample, in particular those efforts that took place in the early 1990s, exact dates when the initiatives began are not available. Organizational reports, one of my main sources, often just list the NGO's initiatives by year. In such a small sample, losing many observations due to missing information about the main variable of interest would make further statistical analysis impossible.

insurgencies at the same time, which are coded as separate conflicts by UCDP (e.g. there are currently two active rebel movements in Ethiopia). But even conflicts about the same incompatibility (territory or government-control) can be fought by a number of rebel groups, either over time (Niger's government faced challenges from three different rebel movements in the 1990s) or simultaneously (e.g. Sudan's conflict in the Darfur region has the same UCDP ID as the conflict over South Sudan's independence). Mediation might attempt to end a conflict that is fought by a number of groups, but more often face-to-face talks will bring together one band of rebels with the government, excluding other opposition organizations. Information about conflict dyads comes from UCDP's dyadic dataset (Harbom et al. 2008, Uppsala Conflict Data Program - Date of retrieval: 2014/02/15 - UCDP Database: www.ucdp.uu.se/database, Uppsala University).

The yearly unit of analysis has limitations, as illustrated in the 1998-1999 crisis in Guinea-Bissau: Both state and non-state actors intervened to end the violence in this confrontation between the government and a military junta. Fighting erupted on June 7, 1998. Mediation offers by third-party governments were initially not accepted (Massey 2004: 85), but already in June 1998 the bishop of Bissau, Settimio Arturo Ferrazzetta, began to talk to both sides of the conflict. Official mediation under the auspices of the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries and later also the Economic Community of West African States followed in July. While this brief glimpse into the conflict suggests that the non-state mediator paved the way for high-level mediation, my data cannot pick up the T2+-T1 sequence.

Dependent variable: high-level mediation

The dependent variable for this chapter is the onset of high-level mediation. I use the UCDP Managing Interstate Conflict in Africa Dataset, MIC (Melander and von Uexküll 2011), and include those instances of conflict management in my data that a) are conducted by representatives of governments and intergovernmental organizations, and b) are coded as direct, face-to-face talks of the conflict parties. I do not consider shuttle diplomacy, bilateral talks between one party and a foreign government/organization or unilateral calls for peace by outsiders.


The MIC data end in 2007. I complement my high-level mediation data for the years 2008-2010 with information from the Civil War Mediation (CWM) dataset (DeRouen et al 2011, version April 2013).

Descriptive data

My sample consists of 100 conflict dyads and 133 dyad episodes. This results in 354 dyad years. According to the information from MIC and CWM data, there were 72 high-level mediation events for 43 dyad episodes in my sample. As Figure 8 shows, 22 of these instances are government-led mediation; 15 are in the hand of intergovernmental organizations; 35 times governments and IGOs work simultaneously. 23 dyads see more than one face-to-face mediation by governments or intergovernmental organizations; 79 see none at all.²³


²³ Small inconsistencies in the summing up of dyad years are the result of incomplete data on official mediation for a few conflict dyads.

Figure 8: High-level mediations (track one) by mediator



Non-state conflict management is present in 38 dyad episodes (see Figure 9). 22 of those also see track-one diplomacy. In 31 dyad years T2+ and track-one diplomacy occurs in the same year; 26 dyad years experience T1 after T2+ happened the year before.

Figure 9: Occurrence of conflict management



Controls

My hypotheses posit that T2+ will be positively related with the onset of high-level mediation. Other conditions affecting the likelihood of T1 efforts depend on both circumstances within the country at war and on the strategic interests of potential mediators. Factors can have contradictory effects at times, for example conflict duration: Once a conflict has been ongoing for a long time and positions are entrenched, mediators are reluctant to get involved (Touval and Zartman 1985, Bercovitch and Langley 1993). Finding a solution to an intractable conflict enhances the reputation of the mediator – but the more intractable, the more likely becomes failure, which is detrimental to the mediator’s prestige. Thus, long-lasting wars will attract fewer official mediation attempts. At the same time, Greig and Regan (2008) find that in civil wars conflict parties are more willing to give negotiations a chance when the conflict has lasted a long time.²⁴ I include the logged number of months the conflict dyad episode has lasted to measure *conflict duration* and expect longer-lasting civil war dyads to be more amenable to mediation.

High levels of *intensity* may urge powerful outsiders to try to bring an end to ongoing violence (Quinn et al. 2006). Previous literature finds that in interstate wars mediation efforts are more common (Beardsley 2010) and more often accepted (Greig 2005) if the fighting results in high casualty numbers. However, a high death rate also signals intractability, which makes third parties cautious. I control for the effect of conflict intensity by including the UCDP variable for conflict intensity (minor war, if the battle-death rate is between 25 and 999 for the dyad year; war if it is at least 1,000).

²⁴ A demand for a mediator and a simultaneous reluctance on the part of powerful states opens opportunities for non-state mediation.

Considering earlier findings that identity conflicts should be harder to end, outside mediators should be reluctant to become active in ethnically divided societies. I include a measure of *ethnic fractionalization* (from Alesina et al. 2002), expecting a lower probability of face-to-face mediation under official auspices for higher values of ethnic fractionalization.

Separatist conflicts are often less open to compromise than those centered on grievances about the central government. Groups that have the goal to divide the country will have few incentives to negotiate with the government, and the government will be particularly concerned about bestowing legitimacy to the separatists, thus avoiding high-level mediation (Melin and Svensson 2009). I recode UCDP's incompatibility variable into a dichotomous variable for territorial issues and hypothesize that those conflicts about territory will be less likely to see high-level mediation.

Comparative strength of the opponent is an important factor in civil war duration (Cunningham et al. 2013). Similarly, it will influence leaders' willingness to look for alternatives to the battlefield. If one side is much stronger than the other, the weaker party will be more open to negotiations. And while the stronger party could bank on a military victory, it probably prefers a negotiation, especially while it has the military leverage to bear on the bargaining process. My models include Cunningham et al.'s (2013) measures of *rebel strength parity* (rebel forces equal in strength to the government's forces) and *rebel superiority*. I expect the former to have a negative impact on the probability that high-level mediation occurs; and the latter to have a positive effect.

The government's calculus will furthermore be affected by the diversity of threats it faces. If the government negotiates with one challenger, rewards given to this group may

lead other rebels to increase their demands (Cunningham 2006, Clayton and Gleditsch 2014). At the same time, a state that has to respond to more than one rebel group at the same time might be more open to negotiation with at least one rebel actor in order to concentrate military assets where it thinks them most effective. I add the number of ongoing dyads in a country year to my model.

Military interventions on one side of the conflict affect the just discussed balance of power and leverage. They can give an impetus to the other side to press for negotiations. I code an overt third-party military intervention in the cases where the UCDP conflict data note a second state-participant on either side. I expect mediation by third states to be more likely if military interventions occur.

Democracy within a country is often correlated with stronger ties within the international community. Thus, more democratic governments may be more open to offers of (or pressures towards) mediation by third parties. Higher Polity scores should thus indicate more frequent occurrences of high-level mediation.

To account for the strategic considerations of potential mediators I include three measures. First, I code a dichotomous variable that is 1 if the country in conflict is a *former colony of either Great Britain or France*. I limit colonial ties to these two countries because almost all African countries were colonies of European powers, but only the United Kingdom and France have shown both the power and the interest in continuing influence in their former colonies (see for example France's ongoing engagement in the Central African Republic). Second, I include the *logged population* (data from the World Development Indicators) as a proxy for country size. Larger countries are more interesting strategically, not last because they are a larger possible market for imported goods from the potential

intervener. And third, Lujula's (2009) variable for *gemstone and hydrocarbon production* indicates whether a country is producing natural resources of interest to other countries. For all three indicators I expect high-level mediation to be more likely for larger values.

Lastly, my models also include two variables relating to earlier track-one diplomacy: one regressor measures the *time since the last high-level mediation* attempt, the other is a variable counting the number of previous *track-one diplomacy* in the dyad episode. It will have an effect on the probability of high-level mediation if governments or IGOs made an effort to end an internal conflict before. The more outsiders have tried to bring a conflict to an end, the more likely they will either continue or someone else (like an intergovernmental organization) will take over. But the longer it has been since an earlier attempt at conflict resolution, the more reluctant outsiders will be to get involved. The time since the last mediation should be negatively correlated with the onset of high-level mediation.

For more information on the operationalization and sources of all variables, refer to the codebook (appendix 5) and the summary table (appendix 6).

Methodology

Logistic regression

When testing whether official mediation events are correlated with non-official diplomacy, my dependent variable – onset of governmental mediation – is binary. I therefore employ logistic regression models (Greig 2005 uses probit estimator; Boehmelt 2009 uses logit). Because of the temporal correlation of observations in the same conflict (e.g. ethnic composition of a state remains unchanged from one year to the next; level of violence in one year will depend on the death rate in the preceding year etc.) I cluster the

standard errors on conflict dyad.²⁵ I test both whether non-state conflict management in one conflict episode is associated with governmental conflict management in the same episode, and whether T2+ and T1 occur in the same year more often than randomly expected. Then I use the lagged T2+ variable to analyze whether non-state conflict management in one year is positively related to official mediation in the following years.²⁶

As I elaborate above, official mediation can also lead to T2+, for example earlier failed attempts of third-party governmental mediation may discourage further official mediation, which in turn can open opportunities for non-state actors. I consider the potential endogeneity with a seemingly unrelated recursive bivariate probit regression, but do not find evidence of endogeneity. The results are reported in the appendix.

Previous literature has argued that chances for mediation change over time. In particular, third-party governments will become less inclined to intervene diplomatically in civil wars the longer the conflict has already lasted. To account for a possible time-dependency, I include the time (in years) until high-level mediation happens, as well as cubic splines (Beck, Katz and Tucker 1998).²⁷

Logistic regression also determines whether particular types of T2+ approaches (capacity-building versus direct mediation) and organizations (those led by former

²⁵ As robustness checks, and in order to account for the effects of multiple simultaneous dyads I also run the models with standard errors clustered on country and on conflict episode. Coefficients and p-values are comparable to those reported here.

²⁶ Aside from a couple of exceptions mentioned below I lag the T2+ variables by one year for two reasons: First, while problem-solving workshops and other dialog sessions have long-term goals that may not fit into this time frame, mediation and capacity-building should show effect within one or two years. Second, the size of the sample and the loss of information resulting from repeated lags makes any findings unreliable.

²⁷ A likelihood ratio test comparing the model including splines and a count variable and one model without time variables shows that the variables accounting for time are not jointly significant. I continue to include them because I consider a measure of time theoretically important and because of the potential non-linear effect of time. Results do not change significantly without the variables in the models.

presidents) are correlated with higher probabilities of official mediation. The next section uses the proposed methodology to test the earlier developed hypotheses.

Testing and discussion

Non-state conflict management and high-level mediation

Table 1 presents the results for the logistic regressions.

Table 1: High-level mediation, results of logistic regression

	(1) Logistic regression: high-level mediation in dyad episode	(2) Logistic regression: high-level mediation in dyad year
T2+ (in dyad episode)	2.06*** (0.61)	
T2+ (previous dyad year)		0.98*** (0.35)
Previous official mediation in episode		1.16*** (0.27)
Separatist conflict	-3.05** (1.42)	-1.80** (0.76)
Ethnic fractionalization	1.88 (1.36)	0.81 (0.73)
Conflict intensity	-0.13 (0.48)	-0.62 (0.48)
Conflict duration in months, logged	0.43*** (0.15)	0.07 (0.13)
Rebel parity	-2.01** (0.93)	0.31 (0.61)
Rebel stronger than government	0.18 (1.70)	1.47** (0.73)
Veto players	0.06 (0.23)	0.16 (0.19)
Military intervention same year	1.27** (0.57)	0.73 (0.57)
Polity score	0.09 (0.08)	0.13*** (0.05)
Population, logged	-0.27 (0.30)	0.06 (0.18)
Former colony of UK or France	-1.04 (0.95)	-0.36 (0.18)
Gems or carbon production	0.94 (0.69)	0.63 (0.43)
Time since last high-level mediation	-0.26 (0.30)	0.39 (0.48)
Constant	2.08 (4.49)	-3.02 (2.78)
<i>N</i>	322 (96 clusters)	322 (96)
Frequency of T2+	148	59
Wald chi ²	51.80***	91.73***
Log pseudolikelihood	-145.03	-127.15

Note: Coefficients, with robust standard errors clustered on conflict dyad in parentheses.

Three cubic splines are included in the model, but not reported

*Significant at the .1 level, **significant at the .05 level, ***significant at the .01 level

The Wald χ^2 statistics is significant in all models. I reject the null hypothesis that the variables' effects are jointly indistinguishable from zero. In Model 1, the main variable of interest, non-state conflict management is positive and statistically significant. Those conflicts that experience T2+ at any time during the ongoing violence are more likely to also see official mediation at some point during the same conflict episode. The results lend support to hypothesis 1a, postulating that official and unofficial diplomacy occurs in the same conflict episodes.

If the dependent variable is the onset of high-level mediation in a dyad year and the regressor is determined as T2+ in the same dyad year, the coefficient for T2+ remains positive and statistically significant. A dyad that experiences T2+ in a given year is likely to also see T1 in the same year. When I use the lagged T2+ variable in the model, the variable of interest is positive, and the coefficient is statistically significant at the .01 level (Model 2). I confirm that T2+ is a precursor to official mediation, as well as occurring simultaneously with governmental and intergovernmental mediation. Subsequent models will shed more light on the dynamics of the T1-T2+ relationship. But first I consider the results for the control variables included in the models so far.

The onset of high-level mediation is less likely for separatist conflicts than for conflicts about governmental control. The coefficient for separatist conflicts is negative and statistically significant. This finding confirms earlier literature on the subject. The measure of ethnic fractionalization, however, is not statistically significant in any of the models. Conflict intensity and dyad episode duration do not display statistical significance, either. The relation of these conflict dynamics and possible third-party interventions is not straightforward – as conflicting findings in earlier research suggests.

The hypothesized relationship between rebel superiority and mediation onset is also confirmed: in those conflicts where rebel groups are much stronger than government troops, outside governments are more likely to offer mediation services, or are more likely to be accepted as mediators. I had proposed that in those dyads where rebel forces are of comparable strength to the government face-to-face mediation by third parties should be less likely. This proposition finds support in the statistically significant coefficient for rebel parity in Model 1, but the variable is no longer significant in Model 2. Military intervention as a proxy for changes to the balance of power from the outside is positive but not significant.

As expected, higher democracy scores are associated with a higher probability of high-level mediation. My measures of strategic importance of the country at war do not return statistically significant coefficients.

The more official mediation attempts dyads see during a conflict episode, the more likely they are to see another attempt at high-level conflict management in the same episode. The variables meant to capture effects of time are mostly not statistically significant. The coefficients of the constant, which represents the baseline probability that high-level mediation occurs, is positive in one and negative in the other model, and not significant in either. It remains unclear whether governments and intergovernmental organizations become less or more willing to mediate internal conflicts given that they have not mediated until now. Similarly, the coefficient for time since the last high-level mediation is inconsistent and none of the time variables is statistically significant. The results of the simultaneous equation model (see appendix 8) are comparable to the logistic

regression and also show a positive and statistically significant relationship between T2+ and the onset of high-level mediation.

Because the results of logistic regressions are not easily interpretable I present predicted probabilities for my main variable of interest and some the covariates that show statistical significance, based on Model 2: Table 2 compares the predicted probabilities for the onset of high-level mediation in a dyad year given that T2+ occurs in the same dyad year.

Table 2: Predicted probabilities for the onset of high-level mediation

- Dichotomous variables set to mode value, others to mean -

Variable of interest	no/minimum value	yes/maximum value	Magnitude of change in baseline probability
T2+ in preceding dyad year	0.16	0.34	+112%
Separatist conflict	0.16	0.03	-81%
Rebel forces stronger than government	0.16	0.46	+188%
Democracy score	0.08	0.43	+438%

Table 2 is based on coefficients from Model 2

For those conflicts that see T2+ the probability of experiencing high-level mediation rises from 16% to 34%, more than doubling their chances for (inter)governmental peace intervention. The table also includes the predicted probabilities for a change in democracy level, rebel strength, and type of conflict (separatist or not). The chances of seeing official mediation decline by 81%, from 16% to 3%, for conflicts where the rebels' goal is secession compared to conflicts with other incompatibilities. If the rebel forces have a military advantage over the government, the probability of high-level diplomacy almost triples, from 16% if rebels are weaker or equal to the government's forces to 46%. As hypothesized, the government will consent to talks much more willingly if it faces a strong

opponent. Lastly, more democratic countries are much more open to external diplomatic intervention. As the Polity score changes from the minimum level (-8) to the maximum (8, the full Polity Scale goes from -10, hereditary monarchy, to +10, consolidated democracy), the likelihood a conflict dyad will see high-level mediation increases fivefold, from 8% to 43%.

Collaborators

I now consider whether non-state conflict management is more likely to coincide with intergovernmental mediation efforts or third-state government intervention. To do so I create two dummy variables – one for high-level mediation conducted by intergovernmental organizations, and one for mediation by outside governments.²⁸ I use specifications as in Model 2, because I most interested in finding out whether T2+ is followed by T1, but replace the dependent variable “onset of high-level mediation” with the new variables in turn. Interestingly, there are no mediation initiatives by intergovernmental organizations in any of the separatist conflicts in my sample. Because the variable is dropped in the regression I rerun the models without accounting for the conflicts’ incompatibility. Table 3 present the results.

Lagged T2+ is positive and statistically significant at the .01 level for IGO mediation, at the 0.1 level for third-states governmental conflict management. Predicted probabilities based on the separate models show that high-level diplomacy in the multilateral setting is three times as likely when T2+ precedes it (6% and 24% likelihood), while the probability that governmental third-party mediation begins is 15% and 27% respectively depending

²⁸ A multinomial logit would be a more efficient approach; however, observations can take on both values (intergovernmental and governmental mediation) in the same dyad year.

on whether T2+ occurs. These findings indicate that the effects of T2+ on high-level mediation onset differ by type of official mediator. NGOs seem to path the way for intergovernmental organizations, but less so for conflict management by third-party governments.

Table 3: Onset of high-level mediation by mediator identity

	(3) Logistic regression: intergovernmental mediation in dyad year	(4) Logistic regression: third-state governmental mediation in dyad year
T2+ (previous dyad year)	1.60*** (0.39)	0.75* (0.42)
Previous official mediation in episode	0.80*** (0.24)	0.54*** (0.14)
Separatist conflict		-1.27* (0.73)
Ethnic fractionalization	-0.06 (0.88)	0.23 (0.70)
Conflict intensity	-0.12 (0.47)	-0.61 (0.49)
Conflict duration in months, logged	0.19 (0.46)	0.09 (0.14)
Rebel parity	1.23* (0.65)	0.37 (0.72)
Rebel stronger than government	2.60*** (0.91)	1.13 (0.81)
Veto players	0.26 (0.25)	0.16 (0.19)
Military intervention same year	0.52 (0.71)	0.26 (0.47)
Polity score	0.09* (0.05)	0.11** (0.05)
Population, logged	0.28 (0.24)	-0.01 (0.97)
Former colony of UK or France	-0.63 (0.59)	-0.26 (0.42)
Gems or carbon production	1.40*** (0.44)	0.70* (0.41)
Time since last high-level mediation	-0.19 (0.46)	0.12 (0.48)
Constant	-8.31** (4.11)	-1.80 (2.86)
<i>N</i>	321 (95 clusters)	321 (95)
Frequency of T2+	59	59
Wald chi ²	115.04***	87.56***
Log pseudolikelihood	-94.29	-125.91

Note: Coefficients, with robust standard errors clustered on conflict dyad in parentheses.

Three cubic splines are included in the model, but not reported

*Significant at the .1 level, **significant at the .05 level, ***significant at the .01 level

The control variables for the most part are consistent with the previous models.

However, discrepancies between Model 3 and Model 4 point to interesting differences

among the two options of international mediation. Variables accounting for rebel strength are statistically significant in the expected directions for intergovernmental mediation, but not significant for governmental mediation. This result suggests that multilateral organizations stand ready to mediate when belligerents (or the international community) want them to do so. That rebel capability has no influence on the occurrence of governmental mediation by outside governments could be a sign that in these cases considerations on the supply side of mediation are more important (however, among variables measuring general strategic importance only gemstone and petroleum production is significant in both models).

Capacity-building for high-level mediation

I now analyze how different NGO approaches and organizational types affect the probability of face-to-face negotiations mediated by IGOs and governments. 27 dyad years in 13 conflict episodes had NGO-led capacity-building exercises for conflict parties. Using logistic regression I explore whether NGO training is significantly related with high-level mediation. I add a dichotomous variable for NGO training and, in order to compare it to other NGO activities, also dummy variables for direct mediation by NGOs, mediation support, and problem-solving workshops.²⁹ The T2+ variables are lagged one year in order to tease out the temporal relation of official mediation and capacity-building. The lagged training variable is significant.

²⁹ Reference category: no T2+.

Table 4: T2 + approaches and onset of high-level mediation

	(5) Logistic regression: any high-level mediation in dyad year	(6) Logistic regression: third-state intergovernmental mediation in dyad year	(7) Logistic regression: third- state governmental mediation in dyad year
T2+ training, lagged one year	1.64* (0.87)	3.37*** (1.05)	0.73 (0.87)
T2+ mediation, lagged one year	0.87 (0.64)	1.57* (0.92)	1.44** (0.57)
T2+ mediation support, lagged one year	0.49 (0.75)	0.37 (0.87)	-0.99 (0.69)
T2+ dialog, lagged one year	-0.99* (0.53)	-0.59 (0.60)	-0.67 (0.87)
Previous official mediation in episode	1.48*** (0.30)	1.20*** (0.43)	0.52*** (0.18)
Separatist conflict	-2.10 (1.69)		-1.82 (1.56)
Ethnic fractionalization	0.14 (1.01)	-0.10 (1.03)	-0.19 (1.00)
Conflict intensity	-0.62 (0.65)	0.43 (0.67)	-0.41 (0.51)
Conflict duration in months, logged	0.06 (0.22)	-0.17 (0.26)	0.11 (0.20)
Rebel parity	0.90 (0.93)	1.95** (0.94)	0.13 (0.80)
Rebel stronger than government	2.69*** (0.70)	3.69*** (1.18)	1.08 (1.33)
Veto players	0.45 (0.28)	0.57 (0.49)	0.28 (0.22)
Military intervention same year	0.87 (0.83)	0.22 (0.08)	0.28 (0.82)
Polity score	0.15 (0.09)	0.07 (0.08)	0.13 (0.09)
Population, logged	-0.05 (0.16)	0.60 (0.37)	-0.20 (0.26)
Former colony of UK or France	-0.53 (0.59)	-1.17** (0.59)	-0.68 (0.58)
Gems or carbon production	1.16** (0.48)	1.52*** (0.59)	1.40*** (0.50)
Time since last high- level mediation	0.85 (0.61)	0.15 (0.53)	-0.18 (0.63)
Constant	-2.16 (3.98)	-14.12** (7.07)	1.27 (4.18)
N	197 (59 clusters)	197 (59 clusters)	197 (59 clusters)
T2+ training	17		
T2+mediation	35		
T2+mediation support	17		
T2+ dialog	21		
Wald chi ²	147.58***	154.08***	77.16***
Log pseudolikelihood	-77.97	-55.13	-80.57

Note: Coefficients, with robust standard errors clustered on conflict dyad in parentheses. Three cubic splines are included in the model, but not reported. *Significant at the .1 level, **significant at the .05 level, ***significant at the .01 level

As hypothesized, NGO training is positively related to the onset of high-level mediation. The coefficient for T2+ mediation is not statistically significant. Mediation support is no longer significant either, probably because these activities happen by definition in the same year than high-level mediation. The variable accounting for problem-solving workshops is significant and negative. I expect such initiatives to have a longer time horizon and build towards negotiations much slower than the other types of T2+. Thus, a one-year lag may not be enough to measure the impact of this particular category.³⁰

I once more consider the probabilities that a dyad experiences IGO intervention or intervention by third-party governments I see that T2+ training in one year is positively related to the onset of IGO-led high-level mediation in the following year (Model 6). It is highly significant at the .01 level. The results are somewhat different if the dependent variable is the onset of governmental mediation (Model 7). Specifically, capacity-building is no longer statistically significant – but direct mediation is. It seems track-one diplomacy by states happens more often parallel or consecutive to T2+ mediation, and less often building on NGO preparation. Another interesting distinction between the two models is that the dummy variable for former French or British colonies is positive and significant in the model for intergovernmental organizations, but not in the model for governmental mediation. While Britain and France are only two of many different mediators included in the second model, they both hold a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council (a major intergovernmental mediator) and may use their influence there to push for diplomatic interventions in their former colonies.

³⁰ When lagged by two years, the coefficient of the problem-solving variable is positive (though not significant), and the number of observation drops to 129.

Former presidents

In hypothesis H1c I propose that NGO efforts led by former heads of state should be particularly effective in leading to high-level mediation. But when I replace my T2+ variable with one variable accounting for non-state mediation by former presidents, one variable for efforts by religious groups, and one for other organizations/individuals/networks (no T2+ in the dyad year is the reference category), the coefficient for former presidents is not significant.³¹ The one for religious organizations, however, displays positive statistical significance at the .01 level (Model 8). When parsing my sample into mediation attempts by outside government (Model 9) and intergovernmental organizations (Model 10)³² respectively, religious organizations remain statistically significant and positive in both. Former presidents are only significant in the model for intergovernmental mediation – but the coefficient is negative. Table 5 shows the results.

This puzzling finding may be explained by the conflict management approaches taken by former heads of state: overwhelmingly, they mediate directly between the conflict parties – more than half of the Track 1.5 initiatives accounted for in this study are direct mediation. Because of the high profile former presidents still enjoy, their mediation rounds usually take place instead of and not at the same time as other mediation (particularly multilateral organizations, which often coordinate their efforts with high-profile NGOs). Religious organizations, while also conducting much direct mediation, have a more eclectic portfolio: many combine mediation with training and problem-solving workshops or

³¹ Because the main approach of T2+ organizations led by former heads of state is direct mediation, I do not lag the T2+ variables.

³² “Separatist conflict” is dropped in this model because none of the observations of separatist conflicts see any governmental mediation.

accompany ongoing mediation processes. These activities can happen simultaneously with high-level mediation.

Table 5 T2+ by former presidents and onset of high-level mediation

	(8) Logistic regression: high-level mediation in dyad year	(9) Logistic regression: third-state governmental mediation in dyad year	(10) Logistic regression: intergovernmental mediation in dyad year
T2+ by former presidents	-0.43 (0.74)	0.19 (0.67)	-2.88*** (0.60)
T2+ by religious organizations	1.41*** (0.41)	1.31*** (0.47)	2.46*** (0.52)
T2+ by others	-0.72 (0.50)	-0.02 (0.48)	0.13 (0.60)
Previous official mediation in episode	1.29*** (0.30)	0.55*** (0.16)	0.99*** (0.28)
Separatist conflict	-1.82** (0.71)	-1.23* (0.72)	
Ethnic fractionalization	0.42 (0.77)	-0.13 (0.79)	-1.20 (0.99)
Conflict intensity	-0.61 (0.45)	-0.61 (0.48)	-0.16 (0.49)
Conflict duration in months, logged	0.16 (0.15)	0.16 (0.15)	0.25 (0.19)
Rebel parity	0.09 (0.61)	0.22 (0.74)	1.01 (0.70)
Rebel stronger than government	0.56 (0.82)	0.33 (0.91)	1.27 (0.99)
Veto players	0.15 (0.20)	0.12 (0.20)	0.09 (0.28)
Military intervention same year	0.85 (0.62)	0.37 (0.49)	0.63 (0.74)
Polity score	0.16*** (0.06)	0.11** (0.01)	0.10 (0.06)
Population, logged	-0.10 (0.18)	-0.13 (0.18)	0.14 (0.23)
Former colony of UK or France	-0.27 (0.47)	-0.21 (0.45)	-0.78 (0.53)
Gems or carbon production	0.67 (0.49)	0.83* (0.47)	2.08*** (0.60)
Time since last high-level mediation	0.33 (0.48)	-0.05 (0.49)	-0.17 (0.53)
Constant	-0.52 (2.85)	0.21 (2.97)	-5.76 (3.92)
<i>N</i>	322	321	321
T2+ by frm. presidents	20		
T2+ by religious groups	46		
T2+ by others	24		
Wald chi ²	144.91***	106.61***	104.04***
Log pseudolikelihood	-123.84	-123.35	-86.27

Note: Coefficients, with robust standard errors clustered on conflict dyad in parentheses.

Three cubic splines are included in the model, but not reported

*Significant at the .1 level, **significant at the .05 level, ***significant at the .01 level

Conclusion

This chapter begins to explore some of the direct effects non-state conflict management can have on civil conflicts. I test hypotheses related to the onset of high-level mediation, and how T2+ may lead to diplomatic interventions by intergovernmental and governmental actors. I confirm a strong association between unofficial and official diplomacy, as dyads that experience T2+ are 112% more likely to also see high-level mediation in the following year. I corroborate my hypothesis that capacity-building initiatives occur in conflicts that also see an onset of mediation more often than randomly expected.

Any discrepancies between IGO and governmental diplomacy may point to a discrepancy of purpose for conflict management offered by IGOs vs. governments: Governments that consider diplomatic intervention in another country will consider first and foremost their own strategic interests, while intergovernmental organizations are often tasked with conflict management as part of their collective security mandate. As professional conflict manager, they are in more regular contact with NGOs (often because the NGOs seek contact and information) than states are, more familiar with the current efforts and more open to collaboration, e.g. by tasking NGOs to prepare conflict parties for IGO negotiations. They will thus be attuned to new openings for high-level mediation because the non-state actors may inform the IGO (or one of the many members).

My results may miss additional cases where NGO mediation is a precursor to official mediation – if the timing of initiatives is sequential, but T2+ happens early one year and T1 later the same year, my data cannot capture the order.

Defying my expectation, T2+ initiatives that are spearheaded by former heads of state are not more likely to lead to the onset of high-level mediation. This finding underlines the separate status of these actors in conflict resolution: even though officially actions by non-governmental actors, it seems that mediation by former presidents is more often a substitution for governmental action than a precursor for it.

My research has some limitations. My definition of non-state conflict management ignores many NGO activities that could have important effects on conflict dynamics, from grassroots peace-building to transnational advocacy networks. However, the sheer number of NGO conflict resolution efforts makes it impossible to account them all for all conflicts in the sample. Another concern is that my T2+ dataset is potentially biased because I might miss some initiatives, for example when NGOs have not replied to my inquiries, or if the project is still ongoing and confidential. However, as explained in the data section, I believe that I am working with a representative sample.

The next chapter will use the collected T2+ data to address the question of civil war termination and the effect non-state interventions may have on it. The literature has considered many factors that influence how long a violent conflict may last, including third-party interventions and mediation effectiveness. I expand on earlier theories to include non-state conflict management as a potentially powerful mechanism to bring civil conflict to an end.

Chapter 4 – T2+ and Conflict termination and Outcome

Introduction

The literature on civil war has given special attention to the factors that may affect the duration of conflicts (Brandt et al. 2008). Length of a war is often understood as a proxy of destructiveness. Longer wars, even if they are fought at a low intensity level, tend to impact a country deeper than short bursts of violence. As battle deaths accumulate, infrastructure is destroyed and economy activity, from subsistence farming to foreign direct investment, grinds to a halt. Conflict duration can also be interpreted as a measure of intractability of the issues underlying the ongoing fighting: the time it takes parties to agree to a ceasefire or settlement framework can represent the depth of division in the society. A long list of variables has been linked to the likelihood of conflict termination or continuation, including third-party interventions (see Dixon 2009a for an overview). In this chapter I argue that besides military and diplomatic interventions by outside governments, non-state diplomatic interventions can also affect whether and when conflicts end.³³

Non-state actors mediate between parties in civil wars, e.g. the Nyerere Center in the Arusha process in the Burundian civil conflict (Hara 1999) or the International Committee of the Red Cross / International Alert in Sierra Leone, where they negotiated the release of hostages (Sorbe et al. 1997); they provide support to ongoing high-level mediation, e.g. Initiatives of Change supported the Inter-Congolese dialog in the Democratic Republic of Congo,³⁴ or they use problem-solving workshops to change belligerents'

³³ The effects of financial or military contributions from non-governmental sources – may it be an influx of foreign fighters (Malet 2013) into a civil conflict or money collected by the diaspora (Byman et al. 2001, Collier and Hoeffler 2004) to support insurgencies - warrant their own research project.

³⁴ <http://www.iofc.org/great-lakes-project-activities>, accessed April 9, 2014.

attitudes towards each other, e.g. ACCORD's session with "representatives of the RCD rebels, unarmed political parties, ministers from the Mobutu government, the Archbishop of Kisangani and a broad range of civil society groups" (Naidoo 2000: 99), also addressing the DRC conflict. These initiatives have in common a hope to contribute to an end of a conflict, and organizers claim that the conflict will terminate sooner because of them.

Anecdotal evidence cannot determine whether NGO conflict resolution – or other forms of mediation - is the decisive factor that ends the war. Maybe the conflict simply was "ripe" to be resolved (Zartman 1985, Regan and Stam 2000) when the non-state actors became engaged. But statistical models that include controls for those variables found in the literature to make up ripeness along with measures for T2+ can help assess non-state conflict management's contribution to conflict resolution.

I find that once selection effects of non-state conflict resolution are taken into account, NGO initiatives are positively correlated with conflict termination. In the sample of cases under observation in this study, initiatives by religiously affiliated organizations are associated with the end of civil wars, while other organizations display no statistical significance. There are indications that religious institutions and professional NGOs may be more effective at different times of the conflict.

Intimately linked to the end of a conflict is the type of termination: how a conflict ends is as important as if and when (Brandt et al. 2008). Previous literature posits that the duration of a conflict and certain characteristic of the parties involved determine the outcome of the conflict (DeRouen and Sobek 2004, Cunningham et al. 2009). I test whether the presence of non-state conflict management will make a negotiated outcome more likely.

An example case where non-state conflict management contributed to an eventual peace agreement is Liberia: The civil war in Liberia proceeded in two phases, 1989-1995 and 2000-2003. Based on the annual severity threshold of at least 25 battle-related deaths (UCDP), the conflict is coded in two episodes, 1989-1990 and 2000-2003, both of which ended with the signing of a peace agreement. The opponent to the government in the first phase was the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) under Charles Taylor; in the second episode the Taylor government faced off with Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL). In the summer of 1990, the Liberian Inter Faith Mediation Council (IFMC) held consultations with both the current government and the NPFL, searching for a peaceful solution. According to outside observers, the IFMC's "proposals were adopted and articulated as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) peace plan for Liberia" (Toure 2002). In the second violent phase of the conflict, official mediators from ECOWAS sought the help of outsiders with good contacts to the rebels, namely the Community of Sant'Egidio, in order to assure the rebels continuing cooperation in the negotiation process, which the organization delivered (Scelzo 2010).

I find partial statistical support for my hypothesis that T2+ generally makes future peace agreements more likely for the subcategory of NGO training. I also confirm that conflicts ending in a negotiated settlement will be shorter if they experience T2+ during the conflict.

The chapter proceeds as follows: in the next section I present the theoretical framework linking non-state conflict management to civil war termination and introduce my hypotheses. This part also considers the importance of accounting for potential

selection effects. Section three provides an overview of the data used in the empirical tests. Then I explain the methodology used in this chapter. In the fifth section I test the hypotheses and analyze the results. Lastly, I draw conclusions from my research and point to implications for theory and practice.

Argument

Direct effects of non-state conflict management: conflict termination

Third-party interventions affect civil war duration. Previous quantitative research has shown that while military involvement prolongs violent conflict (e.g. Balch-Lindsay and Enterline 2000, Elbadawi and Sambanis 2000, Cunningham 2010),³⁵ diplomatic intercessions can shorten them (Regan and Aydin 2006). But studies on the relationship between conflict duration and interventions have focused primarily on state interventions. I test whether the finding regarding non-violent outside intervention holds true if the intervener is not a state but a non-state actor. I argue that organizations or programs designed to “resolve conflict” should make measurably increase the probability that a civil conflict ends.

The fact that it is very difficult to determine that a conflict has indeed ended for good makes testing the theoretical argument difficult. Sometimes violence flares up surrounding the same issue after many years of peaceful coexistence. The definition of conflict episodes is more straightforward: if the conflict is inactive in a year, meaning that there were less than 25 battle related deaths, the episode has ended. In practical terms, it is unsatisfactory for conflict parties and mediators alike if a conflict flares up after a period of

³⁵ However, Collier, Hoeffler & Soderborn (2004) find that military support for rebel movements shortens the duration of civil wars.

calm, but even a break in the fighting should be counted as some success for peacemaking efforts (Bercovitch and Gartner 2006).

I expect T2+ initiatives to contribute to the termination of civil conflicts in at least three ways: First, direct mediation between the conflict parties leads to a negotiated agreement. Mediation conducted by an NGO or individual between warring parties may lead to a ceasefire or peace agreement, ending a conflict, like the 1992 Rome peace agreement mediated the Community of Sant'Egidio which ended the 15 year civil war in Mozambique. As explored in preceding chapters, non-state mediators can have distinct advantages over governmental actors. Their long-standing relationship with the country at war can inspire trust on both sides of the battle-line. Similarly, professed neutrality and small personal stakes in the mediation outcome (besides a potential loss in credibility) make them prime choices for those looking for un-biased mediators.

Two, negotiation training prepares sides for direct talks. For example, the Swisspeace/Mediation Support Project holds workshops aimed at increasing negotiation knowhow in the Central African Republic. This work supports the ongoing internal political dialogue. The rationale is that if all sides accept the process as legitimate and fair and know how to formulate their needs, expectations and red lines, then an eventual outcome should be acceptable to everyone.

Three, programs designed to bring opponents together in unofficial settings can help reduce the psychological barriers to conflict resolution that hinder sincere negotiations particularly in protracted conflicts (Kelman 1992). Even if T2+ projects do not include active negotiation or preparation for high-level conflict resolution processes, their conveners hope to end wars by affecting the belligerents' attributes towards or interactions

with the other side to the effect that high-level negotiations will then be possible and an agreement can be reached. Informal dialogue contributes to humanization of the opponent (Davidson and Montville 1981). For example, a 1999 problem-solving workshop by the South African NGO ACCORD brought together rebels and government representative of the Democratic Republic of Congo. It “produced a consensus on many crucial issues and at the same time exposed the divergent perceptions and positions held by the various participants” (Naidoo 2000: 99). The same year the conflict parties signed an accord brokered by the president of Zambia and the United Nations (however, the agreement fell apart shortly after).

H_{2a}: A civil conflict that experiences T2+ diplomacy is more likely to end in a given year than a conflict that does not, all else being equal.

“All else being equal” refers to the factors that have been found in the literature to affect the dynamics of civil war explored in this research, in this section the chances that a war comes to an end. The factors will be controlled for by adding them as independent variables to my statistical model, see below.

The range of NGO conflict resolution approaches and practitioners is wide, and some types and approaches are probably more effective towards the goal of conflict termination than others. The approaches included in my analysis range from direct mediation to problem-solving workshops and negotiation training. When assessing the T2+ effect on conflict duration, direct mediation is of particular importance. Informal dialogue and capacity-building exercises do not have the same short-term goals as actual mediation rounds. Instead, these activities are meant to prepare the groundwork for conflict resolution and reconciliation in later stages of the confrontation. Mediation, like former

South African president Nelson Mandela's efforts in the Burundi civil war, or the negotiations by the local NGO Reunir that resulted in the surrender of almost 300 rebels in the Congo (Pan African News 1999), have immediate objectives, usually to bring about the end of the conflict. In that, T2+ mediation is more easily compared to high-level mediation with its short time horizons. Like track-one diplomacy, I expect NGO mediation to measurably affect conflict duration.

H_{2b}: Conflicts that experience direct mediation by T2+ organizations will be more likely to end in a given year than conflicts that do not experience T2+ mediation, all else being equal.

In regards to NGO type I expect religious organizations to command a particular respect as they call upon shared values and beliefs in countries with one dominant religion, or when the peace initiative brings together people from different religions. Local religious initiatives include the Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative (ARLPI) in Uganda, an organization bringing together Anglican, Catholic and Muslim religious personas. Their professed impartiality and integrity, stemming from their religious roles, made ARLPI members acceptable as go-between for the Ugandan government and the Lord's Resistance Army (Otim 2009).

Alternatively, in countries where the religion connected to the organization is a minority religion and has no strong ties to the government, it will have an especially strong claim to neutrality. This should allow the organization to act as a credible mediator. The Community of Sant'Egidio, a Catholic lay organization, had strong ties with the local Catholic community in Algeria, but in a country that is 99% Muslim, that does not translate to political influence (Impagliazzo 2010, CIA World Factbook 2014). Sant'Egidio organized

a dialogue among most opposition forces that led the signing of a “Platform for a peaceful political solution to the crisis in Algeria.” Similarly, the Swedish Life and Peace Institute supported the peace process in Somalia that led to regional institution building (van Beurden 1999).

H_{2c}: A conflict that experiences T2+ led by religious organizations will be more likely to end in a given year than a conflict that sees T2+ led by professional NGOs, all else being equal.

A particular subset of non-religious NGOs could confound my expectations regarding the relationship between organizational type and conflict: A number of organizations are run by individuals with pre-existing ties to track-one diplomacy (e.g. former heads of states or diplomats, examples include The Carter Center, Conflict Management Initiative, Nyerere Centre). Their connections to governmental and intergovernmental actors can be used to provide incentives to conflict parties. These mediators combine the advantages of NGOs and some of the leverage of third-party states, which could make them particularly effective in bringing about an end to hostilities.

H_{2d}: A conflict that sees T2+ led by former heads of state will be more likely to end in a given year than a conflict that sees T2+ led by religious NGOs, all else being equal.

Civil conflict outcomes

A conflict can end in a number of ways: one party may win militarily, the belligerents may agree to a ceasefire or a peace deal, or the conflict may fizzle out. Unless military preponderance by challengers to the status quo is obvious early in the conflict, the eventual outcome is unknown to participants and outsiders. Given the T2+ focus on non-

violent conflict resolution and capacity-building for negotiations, more conflicts should end in a negotiated compromise if T2+ takes place. This argument dovetails with propositions in earlier research: Cunningham et al. (2009) hypothesize that conflicts more likely will end in negotiated settlements if the rebels have access to nonviolent means. The authors argue that “nonviolent means” are present when the rebel movement has a legal political wing that may represent them in discussion with the government. However, I argue that in societies where such legal representation exists, conflict should be less common. If violence breaks out despite the fact that a legal political wing exists, this conflict is probably more intractable. Non-state conflict management that arises in response to ongoing fighting, however, can create new alternatives to violence and may change the rebels’ calculations.

H_{3a}: A negotiated settlement of a civil conflict is more likely to occur if the conflict episode sees T2+ diplomacy than if the conflict does not experience T2+.

Counterfactuals, as so often, are very difficult to construct: we do not know if a conflict would have ended in a peace agreement without the T2+ organization’s efforts. There might be something special about conflicts that eventually end in a compromise. I argue that the unobserved factors that make a conflict more likely to end in compromise solutions will be the same as those circumstances that open it up to non-violent conflict management. I therefore also test whether the time to a negotiated agreement may be shorter if NGO diplomacy takes place.

H_{3b}: Among conflicts that end in a negotiated settlement, those that experience T2+ will be shorter than those that do not, all else being equal.

Selection effects

As discussed in the literature review, mediation attempts in civil conflicts are not random events. They often occur in the most difficult-to-solve cases (Melin and Svensson 2009). Selection effects of non-state conflict management efforts in these situations are determined by supply and, though less so, demand. First, many NGOs and other potential non-state mediators may self-select the hardest cases. They spring into action alarmed by the human suffering caused by long years of war, extreme violence or atrocities. They are founded to fill a need (or have to find one in order to survive), so they go where others, like governments or intergovernmental organizations, do not. They attempt to solve those conflicts that are “forgotten” by powerful states. Previous literature has found that third-party governments become less willing to tackle intractable conflicts the longer they have been ongoing (Touval and Zartman 1985, Bercovitch and Langley 1993). This provides openings for non-state peacemakers.

Another reason why T2+ could be associated with longer conflicts is practical: NGO activities might just be longer in the making. A characteristic of most non-state conflict management initiatives is that the decision process whether an organization will approach conflict parties about the possibility of initiating any project involves internal vetting – is the situation deemed fit for the organization’s mission or approach, will the board agree, will funding be forthcoming? – and often several project management steps, like writing and securing grants, before an initiative can begin.³⁶ This process precludes NGO mediation

³⁶ High-level mediation often needs preparatory work, too. For example, a United Nations effort to solve a crisis will have to be preceded by Security Council decision that give the organization the necessary mandate.

in those conflict episodes that are short-lived, e.g. military coups that are followed by a period of stability. Second, as laid out earlier, conflict parties will only agree to mediation if bilateral efforts have failed, for fear of losing control over the process and of bestowing legitimacy to the opponent. However, these selection effects on the demand side will be weaker for non-state actors than for governments. The advantage of NGOs is that their activities do not recognize an armed non-state group in the international community and do not lead to enforceable agreements (at least not enforceable by the NGO). In order to account for the selection effects and divorce them from the process effects, the methods applied in this chapter will account for a selection stage that explores which conflicts are more likely to attract T2+ and an outcome stage analyzing the effects of T2+ on conflict duration. Alternatively, some of the models introduced below limit the sample to conflicts that experience T2+.

Data

Unit of Analysis and main explanatory variable

The unit of analysis in this chapter, as in the previous one, is the conflict dyad episode year. The universe of cases consists of African conflicts for the period 1990-2010 based on the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch et al. 2002, Themnér and Wallensteen 2011). Information about conflict dyads comes from UCDP's dyadic dataset (Harbom et al. 2008, Uppsala Conflict Data Program - Date of retrieval: 2014/02/15 - UCDP Database: www.ucdp.uu.se/database, Uppsala University). The main explanatory variable is T2+, defined and coded as presented in Chapter 1.

However, generally government and intergovernmental efforts can begin on much shorter notice than non-governmental initiatives, as long as the political will is there.

Descriptive data

The 133 conflict dyad episodes that make up the sample range in duration from one month to 20.5 years. 15 episodes were still ongoing on 31 December 2009.³⁷ The average duration of the terminated episodes is 27.8 months, and the median is 12. The longest continuous dyad was the conflict between the government in Khartoum and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) in Sudan, for which UCDP/PRIO codes a minimum of 25 battle deaths for each year between May 1983 and December 2004. Other very long dyad episodes include the war between the government of Mozambique and Renamo (1977-1992), the twenty-year civil war in Angola against UNITA (1974-1995; a new episode of fighting erupted in 1998) and the Eritrean independence movement (1975-1991). Examples of short episodes are brief but intense bouts of fighting in Nigeria against Ahlul Sunnah Jamaa and also NDPVF in 2004, or a conflict in Mali that lasted from 1990-2009, but that is divided into three separate episodes (1990, 1994, 2007-2009) against three different rebel groups. Figure 10 and 11 show the distribution of episode durations as well as the frequency of T2+.

T2+ happens in conflicts of all durations, though less frequently in those lasting a year or less, compared to NGO engagement in long-lasting dyads. 12 out of the 56 shortest conflict episodes experience T2+ during the year of active conflict.

³⁷ Conflicts that began before 1990 are included and variables accounting for conflict duration measure the total time the conflict lasted, including the months before 1990.

Figure 10: Conflict episode duration by T2+, frequency





Figure 11: Conflict episode duration by T2+, percentages




27 dyad episodes that last more than one year see at least one non-state conflict management initiative, 35 do not. And of those four conflict dyads that last longer than ten years, only one (the 1975-1995 episode in Angola) did not see any T2+ at all. Clearly, the longer a conflict lasts, the more likely is a non-state intervention, pointing to the necessity of taking into account selection effects.

Information for the outcome variable comes from UCDP (Kreutz 2010). The most common way for the conflict episodes in the sample to end is by low activity: when the number of yearly battle-related deaths drops under 25 the episode is coded as terminated. Other possible outcomes are signing of a peace agreement (37 cases) or a ceasefire

agreement (8 cases), or victory of one side (in six cases the government was declared the victor, in nine the rebels).

17 of those conflicts that end in a peace agreement (46%) experience T2+ at some point during the ongoing conflict. Seven conflicts that end in victory see T2+ (47%), three that ends with a ceasefire (38%), and 11 of those that peter out (22%). Figure 12 illustrates the relationship of conflict outcome and non-state conflict management.

Figure 12: Conflict outcomes by T2+



Controls

As discussed in the literature review, other variables explaining civil conflict duration are rebel motivation, ethnic composition of the state, number of battle deaths, comparative rebel-government strength, lootable resources, mountainous terrain, GDP, inequality, regime type, military and diplomatic interventions.

Incompatibility is the UCDP/PRIIO measure taking the value “1” if the conflict is over who controls the government, “2” if the rebellion is separatist in nature (UCDP 2011). I expect conflicts to last longer when they are separatist: groups that fight for their own country will be harder to appease and they often have already severed psychological links with their current government. This mindset will make compromise solutions more difficult. Also, separatist movements often fight on the periphery of larger countries,

making it more likely that low-level violence drags on for years. I expect those countries that have higher measures of ethnic fractionalization to experience longer conflicts, because ethnicity is at the core of group identity, potentially making rapprochement with “the other” less likely. I use the *ethno-linguistic fractionalization index* (ELF) developed by Alessina et al (2002). Similarly, I also include a measure for *religious fractionalization*, another deep-rooted identity characteristic (Fearon and Laitin 2003). The total number of *battle deaths* comes from UCDP. I divide the number by total population (information from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators) and log the result. I hypothesize that conflicts experiencing much violence will in fact be harder to end and thus last longer, because of the hardening of positions and thirst for revenge for past deaths.³⁸

While there is an expectation in the literature that countries with “lootable” natural resources, those that rebels may appropriate and use to fill their war coffers, experience longer civil wars, empirical tests often include variables for natural resources that are in fact not easy to exploit without industrial mining (Collier and Hoeffler 2004, for example, rely on the ratio of primary commodity exports to GDP). The presence of secondary diamonds, those that usually are mined with artisanal tools, are a better proxy for the concept of potential rebel loot (Gilmore et al. 2005). I expect conflicts to be longer if *secondary diamonds* are present in the conflict country. Fearon and Laitin (2003) use the proportion of a terrain that is *mountainous* as a measure of rough (accommodating to rebels) terrain. I hypothesize that countries that have more rough terrain for rebels to hide will have longer-lasting internal conflicts.

³⁸ An alternative explanation is that parties tire faster of war if it is very bloody. In this case, higher casualty rates should lead to shorter wars.

Belligerents' relative *military capability* influence both how long the parties can physically fight, and how soon they prefer to negotiate. Cunningham et al. (2013) provide measures of the *rebel strength* compared to the government's capability. I expect conflicts to be shorter if the challenger is clearly superior to the government, but longer if they are close to power parity and battlefield outcomes are less certain.

Collier, Hoeffler and Soderborn (2004) find that conflicts are shorter in richer countries. I use the average annual per-capita *GDP* (in 2000 US-\$, logged, WDI 2013) as my proxy.³⁹ I argue that the most important element of a government's *regime* categorization is the openness of the political process: if government opponents have access to legitimate political competition, violent civil conflicts, if they are a last resort, should be less common, and if they break out anyway, might not last as long. I use the country's Polity IV score (Marshall and Jaggers 2011) as my proxy and expect countries to have shorter wars if their score is higher.

Following Cunningham (2010) I code a conflict as experiencing a *military intervention* when the UCDP dataset lists external states as having a military presence in the conflict episode. In accordance with earlier literature, I expect military interventions to prolong the duration of civil wars. On the other hand, open battle support to one side can influence the balance of power on the battlefield substantially, possibly precipitating a military victory by the aid recipient. This would shorten the conflict. According to Regan and Aydin (2006), *diplomatic interventions* should contribute to shorter than expected wars. I use the *UCDP*

³⁹ The authors also find that wars last longer in unequal societies. *Inequality* is usually measured with the Gini coefficient; however, there are only very few data points available for the countries in my sample. As a proxy I try to introduce a variable that measures the level of corruption, because previous literature has established a correlation between income inequality and corruption (Gupta et al. 2002 find that high corruption leads to an increase in income inequality; You and Khagram 2004 argue that high income inequality contributes to higher levels of corruption). However, data are still only available for the time period 1996-2010.

Managing Intrastate Conflict (MIC) Dataset (Melander & von Uexküll, 2011) to construct a variable that takes the value of 1 if high-level mediation occurs during the conflict year.⁴⁰

Methodology

Conflict termination and duration: *Duration models*

Initially, I use a hazard model (also called event history or duration model) to estimate the length of violent internal conflicts. Hazard models estimate the risk of failure (a conflict ending, the onset of high-level negotiations) at a certain time, given the conditions specified, and are common in the civil war duration literature. The failure variable in this chapter is the end of the dyad episode, not the end of the conflict. As discussed earlier, the definition of conflict termination can be controversial (has the war ended for good or will it start again in a month, a year or a decade?). This research uses the Uppsala Conflict Data Program's definition of conflict episode termination – a dyad episode is coded as having ended if less than 25 battle-related deaths are counted in one year (should the threshold be reached again the following year, a new episode is coded).

There are a number of different duration models. Cunningham et al. (2009) apply a Cox proportional hazards model; Regan and Aydin (2006) use a Weibull parameterization. Choosing a parametric model necessitates an assumption about the baseline hazard, for example that the “risk” of a conflict ending is the same at all times (in which case I would use an exponential model), or that the probability of conflict resolution changes monotonically (monotonically increases, decreases, or stays flat over time: Weibull). Unlike these parametric models, the semi-parametric Cox (1972) proportional hazards

⁴⁰ Missing data for the period 2007-2010 is filled in with information from DeRouen et al.'s (2011) *Civil War Mediation (CWM)* dataset, version April 2013.

model does not require the assumption of a particular shape of the baseline hazard. The Cox model gives the hazard rate for an observation i at time t as $h_i(t) = h_0(t) \cdot \exp(\mathbf{x}_i' \mathbf{b})$, where $h_0(t)$ is the baseline hazard and \exp denotes the function of the variables included in the model. I use robust standard errors, clustered on dyad ID, to account for time-dependencies within the individual dyads. As a robustness check I also cluster on country, in case each conflict dyad has specific dynamics not necessarily dependent on the location. Coefficients and significance levels do not change.⁴¹ When testing the proportional hazard assumption of the Cox model I find that the *rho* value of the global test is significantly different from 0, indicating that the proportional hazard assumption underlying the Cox model is violated. Individual variables showing significant correlation of residuals and survival time are T2+, battle deaths and GDP. I interact these variables with a lagged time measure.

Alternatively to hazard models temporal effects can also be captured in logistic models, as long as time is included in the regression. Beck, Katz and Tucker (1998) suggest splines, a smooth function of time point dummies, as well a count of conflict years. The dependent variable is 1 if a conflict ends in a dyad year. I report the results of this model in order to compare results to the simultaneous equation model explained below. The results of the Cox model can be found in the appendix.

Seemingly unrelated recursive bivariate probit

As discussed above and in Chapter 2, the independent variable T2+ is not randomly assigned; rather the error terms of the calculations when T2+ is more likely to occur and whether a conflict ends in a year are correlated. If not addressed, selection effects will bias

⁴¹ When results are not clustered at all, results remain comparable.

any results of statistical models. The strong link of mediation with intractable conflicts will show a correlation between T2+ and longer wars. In order to address the selection effects, I employ a simultaneous equations approach that models the independent variable selection and the outcome equations at the same time. There is no such approach available for duration models, but as Beck et al. (1998) have shown, logistic regression models can be designed to take time-dependencies into account. Thus, I use a seemingly unrelated recursive bivariate probit model (Greene 2003, Kimball 2006) that has been shown to adequately take into consideration the selection effects of mediation (Beardsley 2008, Gartner 2011) and include a number of variables to control for time effects.⁴²

The first equation determines the probabilities that a conflict dyad experiences T2+. Based on the theoretical consideration that more intractable conflicts will be more likely to see non-state conflict intervention – because official mediation is less likely if success is elusive, because NGOs will choose hard-to-solve conflicts, and because opponents in entrenched conflict will be more open to low-key peacemaking efforts – the variables included in the selection stage are rebel motivation, ethnic and religious fractionalization, conflict duration and conflict severity. I expect all covariates to be positively related with the onset of non-state conflict management. I also include a count of conflict dyads simultaneously ongoing in the same country. I expect T2+ to be more likely in a dyad if several conflicts are ongoing at the same time because there are more opportunities for NGOs to become involved. This “veto player” measure is an instrumental variable: the simultaneous equation model requires at least one regressor in the first stage that is

⁴² The model is recursive, because the dependent variable of the first equation is an independent variable in the second equation. The error terms in the two equations can be correlated; thus they are described as “seemingly unrelated.”

exogenous to the second stage. I do not expect the number of additional conflict dyads to have a significant effect on the probability of conflict termination in a particular dyad. A second instrument is a decade dummy: NGO activities have generally become more frequent over time. I would therefore expect conflicts to be more likely to experience non-state conflict management in the 2000s than in the 1990s. Conflict duration, however, should not be affected by the decade the dyad fights in. Because I found in chapter 3 that high-level mediation and non-state conflict management are correlated, I also include a dummy variable for official mediation (at some point during the conflict episode).

The second stage of the model then models the factors increasing the probability of a conflict ending (see section on control variables), while controlling for factors that increase the probability that T2+ occurs. A number of variables are included in this equation that are not part of the selection stage, for example geographical characteristics of the country.

Because many NGO initiatives explicitly or implicitly prepare conflict parties for high-level negotiations, which later lead to a ceasefire or peace agreement, I include the lag of my main explanatory variable to account for a delay in the effect of non-state conflict management.⁴³ I include a logged count of the months a dyad has lasted until the year under observation as well as three cubic splines in the outcome stage equation in order to address issues of time dependence.

⁴³ The dependent variable of the selection stage has to be included as independent variable in the outcome stage. When I try to use the lagged T2+ variable in the selection stage instead of the non-lagged one, my model does not converge.

Conflict outcome: Probit and duration model with selection

Whether conflict ends in a negotiated agreement or not is a binary outcome variable, calling for a probit regression model. I include a measure for time to account for the effect of conflict duration. In order to assess whether in those conflict dyads that end in negotiated agreement T2+ initiatives accelerate the time until an agreement is reached, I then develop a selection model. While the bivariate probit described above addresses the issue of endogeneity in the independent variable, a selection model is appropriate if the sample might be non-randomly restricted. This is the case here: only conflicts that experience negotiations will be able to end in a peace agreement. In order to address this selection effect, I employ a full information maximum likelihood method that simultaneously estimates the selection and duration processes developed by Frederick Boehmke, Daniel Morey and Megan Shannon (Boehmke et al. 2006).

The selection stage determines the probabilities that a conflict will end in a peace agreement (this is the binary censoring variable); the duration model then corrects for selection bias by calculating probabilities of both uncensored and censored observations.⁴⁴ The model allows for duration dependence by using a Weibull distribution. I use variables found in the initial probit model to have a significant effect on the likelihood that a peace agreement or ceasefire agreement is signed in the selection stage of the Weibull duration model with selection.


⁴⁴ Stata utility “dursel” acquired at <http://myweb.uiowa.edu/fboehmke/methods.html>, accessed September 6, 2013

Testing and discussion

Conflict termination and T2+

The Kaplan-Meier curve, Figure 13, depicts the survival estimates (the probability that a conflict continues, given that it has lasted until now).

Figure 13: Kaplan-Meier survival estimates (probability that conflict continues)



When ignoring selection effects, conflict episodes that experience non-state conflict management have a higher probability of continuation, while those that do not experience non-state conflict management are more likely to end. For example, after 10 years of violent conflict, the probability that a conflict dyad that does not experience any non-state conflict management continues past month 120 is about 0.38; for conflicts that do experience NGO mediation the probability is about 0.6. These observations are confirmed in the results of the Cox duration model (see appendix 8), but are clarified when selection is

taken into account. The graph furthermore shows that the survival rate declines in the early months and years, but once conflicts have lasted about 4.5 years, the probability of conflict termination levels out for a while, then drops a bit and levels out again. Overall, the chances a conflict will end do not improve much after the first five years of war.

Table 6 (next page) shows the regression results for the regular probit model (1) as well as the seemingly unrelated recursive bivariate probit (2).⁴⁵

In the initial probit model the lagged T2+ variable is positive, but not statistically significant. While this result does not confirm my hypothesis, it is not surprising, if non-state conflict management is as expected more common in the most intractable conflicts. The findings are clarified when selection is taken into account (see below).

Variables significant and negative – indicating a smaller probability for conflict termination - in model 1 are incompatibility, ethnic fractionalization, mountainous terrain and number of battle deaths. As expected, separatist wars are more difficult to end than those about government control. Ethnically diverse countries experience longer conflicts, and deadlier conflicts end later. Dyads located in countries with more difficult terrain tend to fight for longer periods than those in states without mountains.

The coefficient for religious fractionalization is positive and statistically significant. The result is surprising and the opposite of the result for ethnic fractionalization (ethnic and religious fractionalizations are correlated at 0.51). Clearly, the dynamics in ethnically divided societies is different than those in religiously divided countries, at least for this sample.

⁴⁵ I report the models that use the lagged T2+ variables to allow for a potential delay between peace efforts and the end of the violence. When I run the models with the original T2+ variable, the variable of interest displays the same direction and significance.

Table 6: Termination of conflicts

	(1) Probit model	(2) Seemingly unrelated recursive bivariate probit
<i>Selection: T2+ in dyad year</i>		
Rebel motivation		-0.20 (0.28)
Ethnic fractionalization		-0.44 (0.30)
Religious fractionalization		0.93* (0.53)
Battle deaths, per capita		0.08 (0.06)
Length of conflict episode, logged		-0.0003 (0.07)
Veto players		-0.16* (0.09)
2000s		0.01 (0.14)
T2+ in previous year		1.55*** (0.28)
Official mediation in conflict dyad episode		0.91*** (0.17)
Constant		-0.17 (1.01)
<i>Outcome: conflict termination in dyad year</i>		
Non-state conflict management in dyad year	-0.19 (0.20)	-1.63*** (0.12)
Non-state conflict management in dyad year, lagged one year	0.29 (0.24)	1.05*** (0.24)
Rebel motivation	-0.79*** (0.30)	-0.67** (0.26)
Ethnic fractionalization	-1.69** (0.72)	-1.53*** (0.56)
Religious fractionalization	1.72** (0.69)	2.00*** (0.58)
Lootables	-0.14 (0.19)	-0.07 (0.13)
Mountains	-0.02*** (0.01)	-0.02*** (0.01)
GDP per capita, logged	0.11 (0.12)	0.10 (0.10)
Democracy	0.03 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)
Rebel strength parity	0.34 (0.23)	0.23 (0.16)
Rebel strength superiority	0.47 (0.38)	0.39** (0.18)
Battle deaths, by population, logged	-0.09* (0.06)	-0.02 (0.05)
Military interventions	-0.27 (0.24)	-0.13 (0.13)
Official mediation in dyad year	0.66*** (0.18)	0.67*** (0.14)
Dyad duration, logged	-0.08 (0.06)	-0.07 (0.07)
Constant	0.26 (1.15)	0.73 (0.97)
<i>N</i>	323	323
Frequency of T2+	(97 clusters / dyadid)	
Lagged T2+	83	
	58	
Log pseudolikelihood	-183.01	-297.14
Wald Chi ²	54.05***	
<i>Rho (error correlation)</i>		1***

Note: Coefficients, with robust standard errors clustered on dyad in parentheses. Three cubic splines are included in the model, but not reported. *Significant at the .1 level, **significant at the .05 level, ***significant at the .01 level

Official mediation is positively related to conflict termination, as expected. The remaining variables are not statistically significant.

The results of the simultaneous equation model differ from the ordinary probit model. In particular, the lagged non-state conflict management variable is now statistically significant, indicating that those conflicts that experience a non-state diplomatic intervention as defined here during one year, are significantly more likely to end in the next year, all else being equal. This confirms my hypothesis (H2a). The NGO initiatives included in my sample are significantly correlated with a higher probability of conflict termination. All independent variables have retained their original directionality, but superior rebel strength is now statistically significant and associated with higher chances of a war ending.⁴⁶

The selection stage yields interesting insights, too. The measure of religious fractionalization is positively related to the occurrence of T2+. This could be a function of organizations included in my research, many of whom have a religious component. The number of simultaneously ongoing dyads is statistically significant, but negative indicating that more actors in a conflict will make it less likely that one of them will work with NGOs, possibly because the NGOs have choices and only will work with one of the groups at a time. The strongest predictor for T2+ in one year is T2+ in the previous year. Also strongly related to non-state conflict management is the occurrence of high-level mediation at some point during the conflict episode. The dummy variable assigned to conflict dyads active in

⁴⁶ Selection models are particularly sensitive to specification. Leaving out random controls does not affect the results significantly. When using the lagged T2+ variable as the dependent variable in the selection stage, the model no longer converges.

the 2000s is not significant and neither are the coefficients for incompatibility, ethnic fractionalization, conflict duration and battle deaths.

The correlation of the errors between the selection and outcome stages, ρ , is positive. The fact that the Wald test for ρ is significant at the 0.01 level supports the choice of the model. The direction indicates that the unobserved factors leading to NGO interventions in civil conflicts have the same effects on the termination of civil wars (Thyne 2008). For example, unmeasured or unmeasurable factors like parties' resolve to fight until victory might make it less likely that NGOs initiate conflict resolution projects, because groups embroiled in the conflict will be less likely to agree to non-state conflict management under these circumstances. At the same time, this determination to continue the fight has a negative effect on the conflict termination – the war will go on.

Direct mediation and other T2+ approaches

In order to determine which conflict management approach by non-state actors is associated with conflict termination, I restrict my observations to those dyad episodes that see some T2+ during the ongoing episode. I then dissect the T2+ variable into the approaches coded – direct mediation, mediation support, training and problem-solving workshops – and run probit regressions with the end of a dyad episode as the dependent variable. I do not lag the variables, because mediations have a short time-horizon. If they are successful, they end the fighting immediately, or at least within the ongoing year. Problem-solving workshops are omitted as reference category. Table 7 reports the results.

Table 7: Conflict termination and T2+ approaches

	(3) Probit (only dyad episodes that see T2+)
T2+ direct mediation	0.03 (0.26)
T2+ mediation support	-0.07 (0.43)
T2+ training	-0.22 (0.40)
Rebel motivation	0.10 (0.74)
Ethnic fractionalization	-0.26 (1.34)
Religious fractionalization	1.26 (1.33)
Lootables	0.12 (0.27)
Mountains	-0.01 (0.02)
GDP per capita, logged	0.61*** (0.21)
Democracy	0.17*** (0.04)
Rebel strength parity	0.32 (0.27)
Rebel strength superiority	0.92** (0.46)
Battle deaths, by population, logged	0.03 (0.10)
Military interventions	-0.04 (0.39)
Official mediation	0.62** (0.25)
Dyad duration, logged	0.16 (0.13)
Constant	-4.83** (2.02)
<i>N</i>	159
Frequency of T2+ mediation	50
T2+ training	23
T2+ mediation support	23
$\chi^2(19)$	64.49***
Log pseudolikelihood	-71.58

Note: Coefficients, with robust standard errors clustered on dyad in parentheses. Three cubic splines are included in the model, but not reported. *Significant at the .1 level, **significant at the .05 level, ***significant at the .01 level

Direct mediation displays a positive coefficient, but is not statistically significant. The coefficients for the other categories do not reach significance either.⁴⁷ While the sum of T2+ projects has a measurable effect on conflict termination, as I have shown, I cannot determine which approach is driving the finding (although the directionality of the results hints at the correctness of the hypothesized positive effect of direct T2+ mediation). I now turn to the question whether religious organizations are generally more effective than other T2+ providers.

Religious organizations and former presidents

I introduce dummy variables for the organizational type – religious organization, professional organization, individuals/networks – into the restricted model. They take the value 1 if any initiative led by a religiously affiliated, a professional T2+ organization, or an individual/network, respectively, occurs in the conflict episode year. I lag the variables because any NGO effort may show its effectiveness only with a time delay. Table 8 shows the regression results (individual efforts are omitted as reference category).

Non-state conflict management provided by a religiously affiliated organization is significantly related to conflict termination. This supports hypothesis 2c. Religious groups often have long-standing relations to and a special rapport with opposing civil war parties that give them legitimacy as mediators. The variable accounting for professional organizations is not statistically significant. Positive effects by non-state actors seem to be driven by the positive effect religious groups have.

⁴⁷ Capacity-building measures have a negative coefficient. This is due to the longer-term goals of training and fits my theory that sees such efforts as being less directly correlated with conflict termination than mediation.


Table 8: Termination and organization type

	(4) Probit (only dyad episodes that see T2+) reference category = T2+ by individuals	(5) Probit (only dyad episodes that see T2+), reference category = T2+ by professional groups
T2+ by former heads of state	n/a	-0.30 (0.57)
T2+ individuals		<i>dropped</i>
T2+ by professional organization, lagged one year	-0.12 (0.45)	
T2+ by religious organization, lagged one year	1.29*** (0.48)	1.18** (0.45)
Rebel motivation	-0.15 (1.04)	-0.36 (1.07)
Ethnic fractionalization	-0.55 (1.57)	-0.48 (1.56)
Religious fractionalization	2.28 (1.59)	2.05 (1.59)
Lootables	-0.22 (0.34)	-0.38 (0.39)
Mountains	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)
GDP per capita, logged	0.45 (0.28)	0.45* (0.26)
Democracy	0.09* (0.05)	0.09 (0.05)
Rebel strength parity	0.72 (0.50)	0.66 (0.49)
Rebel strength superiority	-0.02 (0.59)	-0.12 (0.57)
Battle deaths, by population, logged	-0.08 (0.12)	-0.07 (0.12)
Military interventions	-0.48 (0.63)	-0.51 (0.51)
Official mediation	0.48* (0.28)	0.44 (0.29)
Dyad duration, logged	-0.48 (0.32)	-0.57 (0.37)
Constant	-3.08 (2.70)	-2.03 (3.09)
<i>N</i>	116	116
T2+ by religious organization (lagged)	24	
T2+ by prof org (lagged)	31	
T2+ by former presidents		20
T2+ by individuals		4
$\chi^2(18)$	160.15***	120.38***
Log pseudolikelihood	-50.85	-50.59

Note: Coefficients, with robust standard errors clustered on dyad in parentheses. Three cubic splines are included in the model, but not reported. *Significant at the .1 level, **significant at the .05 level, ***significant at the .01 level

Figure 14 shows the Kaplan Meier survival estimates grouped by T2+ organizational types. I compare conflicts that see only T2+ by religious organizations with those that experience only T2+ by professional organizations.

Figure 14: Conflict duration and types of organizations (survival rates)



The graph shows a potentially interesting dynamic. While the survival rates of those conflicts that see only T2+ by religious organizations and those that only see the work of professional NGOs are initially very close together, after a couple of years those conflicts that only experience interventions by religiously affiliated groups have a lower survival probability. For example, a conflict that has lasted 5 years and sees a T2+ initiative by a religious organization has a survival rate slightly higher than 0.5. If the sole T2+ organization is a professional NGO, the survival rate is closer to 0.75. A shift in effectiveness occurs around year 10: once wars have lasted that long, T2+ by professional organizations

is associated with higher chances that the conflict will be resolved. For very long wars, the relationship reverses itself again and conflicts that experience interventions by religious groups are more likely to come to an end.

When I isolate those efforts that are led by former heads of state from the individual-led T2+ initiatives (model 5),⁴⁸ the coefficient for former presidents is negative and not significant. This subset of T2+ does not independently bring about conflict termination - I cannot confirm hypothesis 2d.

Outcomes

I use a probit model to test my hypothesis regarding the relationship between non-state conflict management and the likelihood that conflict ends in a negotiated settlement. A negotiated settlement is identified when the UCDP Conflict Termination data codes a peace agreement or ceasefire agreement for the conflict year. The model includes control variables that have been found to affect the likelihood that an agreement will be signed (Cunningham et al. 2009): length of the conflict, ethnic composition of the country at war, the number of conflict dyads, level of democracy, wealth of the country, comparative strength of the rebel movement, and whether the rebels have legal political representation. I add three variables to account for third-party interventions: military interventions, high-level mediation, and non-state conflict management (lagged). Table 9 shows the results.

⁴⁸ Dummy variables for efforts by a) former presidents, b) other individuals, c) religious organizations; reference category is "T2+ by professional organizations"

Table 9: Conflict outcomes

<i>Negotiated agreement</i>	(6) Probit	(7) Probit
Non-state conflict management lagged one year	0.13 (0.24)	
T2+ direct mediation		0.31 (0.29)
T2+ mediation support		-0.78 (0.48)
T2+ training		0.81* (0.42)
T2+ problem-solving workshops		-0.66 (0.49)
Conflict duration, logged	-0.05 (0.07)	-0.04 (0.07)
Ethnic fractionalization	0.65 (0.46)	0.77 (0.46)
Religious fractionalization	0.06 (0.71)	-0.16 (0.71)
Democracy	0.09*** (0.04)	0.09*** (0.04)
Per-capita GDP, logged	0.33* (0.18)	0.28 (0.18)
Rebel strength parity	0.33 (0.34)	0.37 (0.34)
Rebel strength superiority	0.57 (0.71)	0.63 (0.67)
Rebel political wing	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.0001)
Battle deaths, by population, logged	-0.01 (0.05)	-0.01 (0.05)
Military interventions	0.005 (0.28)	0.18 (0.28)
Official mediation in dyad year	0.86*** (0.20)	0.92*** (0.20)
Veto Players	0.19 (0.12)	0.24* (0.12)
Constant	-3.72*** (1.30)	-3.83*** (1.41)
<i>N</i>	327 (97 clusters)	327 (97 clusters)
Frequency of lagged T2+ T2+ mediation	58	23
T2+ mediation support		50
T2+ dialog		23
T2+ training		29
Log pseudolikelihood	-105.91	-103.16
χ^2	45.52***	59.66***

Reference category for Model 6 = no T2+

Note: Coefficients, with robust standard errors clustered on dyad in parentheses. Three cubic splines are included in the model, but not reported. *Significant at the .1 level, **significant at the .05 level, ***significant at the .01 level

My lagged non-state conflict management variable is positive, but not statistically significant in model 6. Parsing out the T2+ variable into the different approaches (model 7), the coefficient for training is significant. It indicates that preparation for negotiations can

indeed increase the chances of the successful conclusion of a peace agreement. My assumption that negotiated outcomes are more likely in conflict dyads that see non-state conflict management finds support for the subcategory encompassing capacity-building. Other variables that are significantly correlated with an agreement are democracy, GDP level, the number of simultaneous conflict dyads, and (surprisingly) ethnic fractionalization.

As a final step, I then use a Weibull model with selection to test whether conflicts that are overall more likely to end in a negotiated settlement will see this outcome sooner if they experience non-state conflict management (see Table 10, next page). The selection stage of the model calculates coefficients for the probability that a conflict ends with a ceasefire or peace agreement. I include the variables found significant in the preceding probit model in this stage.

The selection stage confirms the results of earlier models that higher democracy levels and wealth as well as high diplomacy significantly increase the chances for a peace agreement in a civil conflict. The outcome stage then takes into account the selection effects when calculating the coefficients for the variables predicted conflict duration. In this stage, larger coefficients mean greater hazards (the probability of a conflict ending) and therefore shorter conflict durations. Non-state conflict management is positive and significant. As hypothesized, conflicts that experience NGO conflict management end earlier than those that do not, all else being equal. This finding holds for the subset of cases that is generally more likely to see a negotiated end to a conflict.

Table 10: Duration of conflicts ending in agreement

	(8) Weibull model with selection
<i>Selection stage: negotiated agreement</i>	
Democracy	0.06*** (0.02)
Official mediation in dyad year	0.74*** (0.15)
Per-capita GDP, logged	0.20* (0.12)
Constant	-1.95*** (0.66)
<i>Duration</i>	
Non-state conflict management, lagged	1.03** (0.47)
Incompatibility	0.70 (0.81)
Ethnic fractionalization	-0.07 (1.91)
Religious fractionalization	-2.73*** (1.02)
Lootables	-0.34 (0.62)
Mountains	0.01 (0.02)
GDP, per capita, logged	-0.68** (0.32)
Democracy	-0.14** (0.07)
Rebel parity	-0.38 (0.48)
Rebel superiority	-0.77 (0.81)
Battle deaths, by population, logged	-0.002 (0.10)
Military interventions	-0.33 (0.63)
Official mediation	0.43 (0.42)
Constant	6.74* (3.59)
<i>N</i>	323 (97 clusters)
Uncensored observations	43
Log pseudolikelihood	-286.31
<i>p</i>	1.11***
<i>Rho</i>	0.03
χ^2	32.12***

The model was estimated in Stata 12, using DURSEL

Note: Coefficients, with robust standard errors clustered on dyad in parentheses. *Significant at the .1 level, **significant at the .05 level, ***significant at the .01 level

Conclusion

I find support for my proposition that T2+ during a conflict episode year increases the probability that a conflict ends the next year. I also find that conflicts are more likely to end in a negotiated settlement if they see non-state capacity-building efforts, and that among conflicts ending in negotiated agreements those that experience T2+ will terminate earlier than those that do not. My results point to the beneficial effects of NGO peace-making efforts.

This research does not answer more nuanced questions of what it is about T2+ that contributes to war termination, although it discovers some interesting details. I cannot confirm my hypothesis that NGO mediation is particularly apt at ending war. The coefficient for direct T2+ mediation is positive, but not statistically significant. The relatively small *N* of the sample makes results for the sub-hypotheses not generalizable. The same limitation affects the findings regarding different types of organizations. For the cases in the sample, initiatives led by religiously oriented organizations have a higher rate of termination, but the survival curves indicate that professional organizations may be more effective earlier in a conflict cycle, while religious organizations are associated with higher rates of conflict termination once a conflict has continued for many years. Efforts by former heads of state, a noteworthy category of non-state actors, are not to be found to have a significant separate effect on conflict duration.

The finding that conflicts experiencing non-state conflict management indeed have a significantly higher probability of ending in a given year bolsters NGOs' claims that they can be valuable in conflict resolution. Conflict parties and interested third parties should take note that non-state diplomacy can bring about negotiated agreements sooner. The

results also should encourage more academic research on the role of non-state actors as mediators and conflict managers during civil wars.

The field of conflict management has over the last decade seen a shift towards capacity-building initiatives. My research finds that conflicts in which such training occurs will more likely end with a negotiated agreement than those wars that see no T2+ at all. This chapter shows potential for synergy between different non-state mediators. At least for the present universe of cases, religious organizations seem to have a slight edge over other organizations when it comes to their effectiveness in ending conflicts, but not at all times. For long wars survival rates are smaller when professional T2+ NGOs are active.

In the next chapter I consider whether non-state conflict management also decreases the level of ongoing violence in a conflict.

CHAPTER 5 - Direct impacts of T2+: Conflict Severity

Introduction

In 1995, the former U.S. president Jimmy Carter brokered a temporary ceasefire between the government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). The interruption of the fighting enabled the implementation of health initiatives. Despite efforts to extend the ceasefire, fighting soon resumed and the war between the government in Khartoum and the South Sudanese rebels continued for ten more years. Algeria's civil conflict continues even today, despite the 1995 Platform of Rome developed under the auspice of the Community of Sant'Egidio and signed by the most representative Algerian political parties, including the Islamic FIS.

When narrowly defining conflict management success as bringing about an end to a conflict or shortening its duration in any of the ways discussed in the preceding chapter, the examples given here will be logged as failures. Sudan's civil war did not end, and neither did the conflict in Algeria. In both cases, the annual number of battle deaths never fell under 25, which means that under the coding scheme for this dissertation, the Sudan ceasefire and the Algerian peace proposal do not register as interruptions of the fighting at all. Nevertheless, the non-state actors who designed the conflict management initiatives clearly believe that their efforts were important contributions to conflict resolution – the Carter Center, for example, mentions the 1995 ceasefire in numerous publications as a success for their conflict resolution program. Cynics might contend that NGOs need to present success stories in order to remain legitimate and to continue to receive funding. At the same time, temporary humanitarian relief is a success in itself. Getting medical supplies and food to victims of war, providing shelter to displaced populations or safe passage to

civilians that otherwise would die in the war zone are very important ways how outside organizations can help those suffering most. I argue that even those projects that aim to find a political way out of the crisis, but do not achieve the stated goal of ending the war, still have real and measurable impacts. Maybe there is a way to quantitatively measure how NGO mediation efforts that do not lead to the end of a war affect conflict dynamics.

In this chapter I draw on the literature on conflict severity and test whether non-state conflict management leads to a decrease in a war's death rate. While more academic knowledge has been accumulated about civil war onset and duration than conflict intensity, authors acknowledge that the length of a conflict is not the only measure of its seriousness. Many long-lasting conflicts are relatively low in intensity, experiencing occasional skirmishes and guerrilla attacks, but no battles – the long-standing rebellions in Ethiopia's Ogaden and Angola's Cabinda regions are example of conflicts in my sample that most years count about 25 battle-related deaths. At the same time, some short wars are extremely deadly. For example, the 1997-1999 conflict episode in the Republic of the Congo cost 4,652 lives for each year.⁴⁹ The intensity of a conflict is therefore an aspect of the conflict that is interesting both for the groups involved in the fighting and those who try to end the war. A common measure for violence is the number of battle-related deaths (e.g. Lacina 2006, Heger and Saleyan 2007, Lujala 2009). Battle-related deaths, as coded by the Uppsala Conflict Data Programme, include civilian casualties, though not indirect war deaths that are the result of disease, starvation or attacks that target civilians deliberately (UCDP 2011c: 6).

⁴⁹ These numbers are from the UCDP battle-related deaths dataset. For more information about the data see the data section of the chapter and the UCDP codebook (UCDP 2011c)

In this chapter I test whether the presence of T2+ initiatives will lead to a decrease in the rate of annual battle deaths in a given government-rebel group dyad. My argument posits that non-state interventions can lead to temporary interruptions of the fighting, lowering the average casualty rate for the year in which the project was implemented. Alternatively, they may lead to a gradual decline in violence, as unofficial diplomacy brings leaders of the opposing sides together and makes them more familiar with each other.

Research on conflict severity lags behind the study of civil war onset and duration, and this dissertation chapter contributes to the developing field. Corroborating results would have important implications for the study of civil conflict and the for conflict resolution efforts. If I show that T2+ is a statistically significant factor in slowing down the rate of violence, future research should include a measure for non-violent interventions in models of conflict severity. Practically, confirmation of my hypothesis encourages continuing non-state conflict management even if the explicit goal of conflict termination is not met – a decrease in the number of battle-related deaths, lives spared in the war, is an important success for NGOs.⁵⁰

My analysis lends support to the hypothesized negative relationship between NGO mediation and civil conflict severity. T2+ training has no statistically significant short-term effect on war intensity. The statistical models do not confirm my theory that long-term NGO

⁵⁰ There is some debate whether apparently beneficial attempts at peacemaking can have detrimental effects if they come at the wrong time. Zartman's concept of conflict ripeness demands that opponents have to find themselves in a hurting stalemate before they will seriously consider alternatives to war (1985, 2000). Lowering the number of casualties may contribute to a postponement of the necessary war fatigue, leading to lower intensity, but longer conflict. Beardsley (2012) finds that mediation that is deemed successful in bringing about an end to a conflict episode often has no long-term pacifying effect as belligerents return to war (see Chapter 6 for a more detailed discussion).

efforts that last more than one year should be associated with a noticeable decrease in the yearly battle death rate.

The chapter is divided in six sections. Following the introduction, I lay out my argument and develop hypotheses to test my theoretical model. The third section introduces the data, and the fourth section the methodology used to empirically test my propositions. In the fifth section I report the tests and results of my statistical models, and use brief cases to illustrate the casual mechanisms. In the conclusion I summarize the outcomes of my analysis and consider the theoretical and practical implications.

Argument

How non-state conflict management decreases conflict severity

The ability to shorten the duration of a conflict is one measure of success for conflict management. It sets the bar pretty high. A more sophisticated evaluation needs to look at additional ways non-state conflict management influences a conflict's dynamics. I am interested here in the relationship between non-state conflict management and conflict severity, as measured in the annual number of battle-related deaths.

Previous research has drawn parallels between circumstances influencing the chances a conflict experiences civil conflict in the first place (as well as the conflict's duration, see below) and the aspects that determine the conflict's intensity. Whether a country experiences civil war onset depends both on the grievances potential rebels feel, and on the opportunity for organized violence (Fearon and Laitin 2003, Sambanis 2004). Similarly, the intensity of an ongoing conflict depends on motivation and opportunity of the

conflict parties (Lacina 2006).⁵¹ Conflicts that arise out of deep social cleavages or are grounded in particularly hurtful grievances could lead to more ubiquitous killings. Such situations include long-standing ethnic divisions in the political and social sphere, for example where colonial powers favored one group and encouraged discrimination of another. Escalating identity conflicts often express themselves in dehumanization of the other side that encourages eradication of entire groups, as when the Rwandan Hutu propaganda referred to the Tutsi population as “cockroaches.” On the other hand, conflicts about resources or specific governmental policies may see more targeted and confined violence (towards government representatives instead of whole population groups, or towards the geographical region where the resources in question are located).

Besides the level of grievances, the opportunity for armed conflict – expressed in the level of militarization – will determine a conflict’s severity. Better-armed rebels can kill more soldiers. Better-equipped soldiers kill more rebels. Third-party support (on either side) can increase the level of militarization, as does financing through lootable natural resources. Conflict diamonds, outside military aid, resolve – these variables associated with conflict severity recall the determinants for conflict duration. In fact, the proposed reasons for variation in conflict severity are similar to those associated with conflict duration: Conflict characteristics like military capacity, identity conflict and third-party interventions influence how long a conflict lasts, and also how deadly it will be. I propose that non-state conflict management is a (non-violent) third-party intervention. Therefore I am

⁵¹ Lacina (2006: 280) points out that some factors related to the deadliness of war may be significantly different from those that lead to war in the first place. She uses the example of poverty: if countries experiencing civil conflict are generally poorer than countries that do not, low income will not account for any variation in conflict intensity.

particularly interested in the findings regarding other interventions. Previous literature has established that military third-party interventions in civil wars can intensify the conflict and increase the number of battle-related deaths (Lacina 2006, Heger and Saleyhan 2007). If military interventions have a similar effect on conflict severity as they have on conflict duration, maybe non-violent interventions that are shown to shorten the duration of conflicts (see Chapter 4 of this dissertation, also Regan and Aydin 2006) can also dampen the severity of the fighting.

Non-state conflict management initiatives can influence the conflict dynamics linked to severity on both the opportunity and, more relevant for this research, the motivation side. Whether NGOs can affect the opportunities to fight depends on their influence on third parties that supply arms or money to the belligerents. Advocacy groups may target individual governments that support one of the parties, or they attempt to convince international organizations like the United Nations to implement sanctions or embargos. These measures, when successful, can undermine the military strength of the opponents, potentially leading to a decrease in conflict intensity. Alternatively, they can upset the power balance enough that belligerents will be more open to peace talks as their military power wanes. Advocacy efforts, important and interesting as they are, fall outside of the scope of this dissertation. But non-state conflict management as defined throughout this dissertation project can change the motivation of the conflict parties in a number of ways and thus impact conflict severity.

First, some initiatives may directly interrupt ongoing fighting, putting a hold – however temporary – on the killing. Conferences and rounds of negotiations are often accompanied by temporary ceasefires or goodwill gestures like withdrawals from certain

areas or release of prisoners. For example, in August 2003, Sekou Conneh, the leader of the Liberian LURD rebels, withdrew his troops from Monrovia and committed them to a unilateral ceasefire when he decided to join ongoing peace talks in Accra, Ghana (Scelzo 2010).⁵²

Second, T2+ can be an alternative to violence, allowing for different ways of conflict resolution. Violence is costly in equipment and lives. Even with military means at their disposal, most groups will consider less costly alternatives, unless they are certain of battlefield victory. Talks and mediation efforts even in unofficial settings may warrant gestures of goodwill like ceasefires, or a new level of restraint not to jeopardize a new, fragile trust between the parties. While peace initiatives are ongoing, conflict parties may feel compelled to show some degree of good faith by conducting fewer attacks. For example, the launch of the IGAD (Inter-Governmental Authority on Development) peace committee mediation effort in Sudan in 1994 indeed corresponded with a lower death toll compared to years before (943 battle deaths in 1993 compared to 337 in 1994, UCDP/PRIO).⁵³

And third, initiatives that bring together the different sides in problem-solving workshops and similar direct, unofficial dialogue sessions might over time change opponents' perceptions of each other, softening hardline approaches and lessen genocidal tendencies. Many track-two diplomacy approaches focus on humanizing the other side,

⁵² Not all mediation efforts are accompanied by ceasefires. In most cases, ceasefires are the intended outcome of mediation, not the starting point.

⁵³ There is a valid argument that pauses in the fighting can be used by the opponents to regroup, organize, and take up the fighting after the interruption with new energy and deadlines. But the proclaimed goal is to stop or slow down the bloodshed and end it permanently. And even temporary dips in severity could decrease the overall number of battle deaths counted.

trying to move the conflict from the identity level to a discussion of interests. These programs – more often on the grassroots than the leadership level – may lead to a gradual decline in killings as adversaries get to know each other better and learn to accept the other side’s right to exist. Examples include Muslim-Christian organizations in Nigeria like the Interfaith Mediation Centre in Kaduna which “opens channels of communication between Christian and Muslim leaders, reorients militant youths toward dialogue and forgiveness, facilitates peace agreements between warring groups, and utilizes radio and television as platforms for advocating dialogue and reconciliation” (Ojo and Lateju 2010). Another example is the consultative dialogue organized by Interpeace in Rwanda which in the years 2001-2003 brought together Rwandans from all sectors and regions of the country.⁵⁴

This chapter will explore if the examples mentioned above are exceptions or part of a measurable pattern. The initiatives subsumed under my definition of non-state conflict management (T2+) may display short-term or longer-lasting effects on conflict severity. First, goodwill gestures ahead of or during mediation rounds could temporarily decrease the level of ongoing violence. While the opponents may use the outside peacemaking efforts to regroup and plan future military campaigns, the conflict intensity should be lower as long as talks of any kind are continuing. Thus, the number of battle-related deaths should be smaller in dyad years that see NGO mediation than in those that do not.

H_{4a}: A dyad year in which non-state mediation happens will be lower in intensity (number of battle-related deaths) than dyad years that do not see T2+, all else being equal.

⁵⁴ <http://www.interpeace.org/programmes/rwanda/strategy>, accessed May 21, 2014.

As rebel groups receive training in non-violent conflict management skills, they should be more open to alternatives to the battlefield. And as enemies get the chance to talk with each other in a neutral space, the hope is that they learn to accept the other side as a negotiation partner. These developments should reduce the overall level of violence of a conflict following the T2+ program implementation, even if the war does not end outright.

H_{4b}: A civil conflict dyad that experiences T2+ training in one year will subsequently decrease in intensity (number of battle-related deaths).

I argue that the longer T2+ initiatives last, the higher their impact on conflict severity. If T2+ efforts coincide with ceasefires – whether as precondition or as goodwill gesture – then they should be associated with lower casualty rates for the duration of the program; thus longer-lasting initiatives should mean fewer deaths overall. Programs aimed to improve interpersonal relationships of leaders usually take place over several weeks, months or years. The longer they last, the fewer battle-related deaths the conflict should incur. First, upticks in violence would jeopardize the continuation of the talks, thus leaders will attempt to reign in their subordinates. And second, even if the conflict does not end, the continuing violence may be on a lower level as the lessons of the T2+ sessions bear fruit.

H_{4c}: The duration of conflict management initiatives and the conflict's intensity level will be negatively correlated.

Data

Unit of Analysis

The universe of cases for my analysis remains all internal conflicts in Africa from 1990-2010; the unit of analysis is the dyad episode year. Dyadic observations take into

consideration the variety in intensity that conflicts with several active rebel groups may experience. It also helps me to compare the effect of non-state conflict management on conflict intensity in those cases where one government-rebel dyad uses T2+ and the other does not.

Information about the conflicts comes from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP 2011a). In order to be included in my models, a conflict dyad suffers a minimum of 25 battle-related deaths per year.

My 354 observations consist of 100 conflict dyads (133 dyad episodes) in 37 conflicts (75 conflict episodes). Twelve dyad episodes started before January 1, 1990; 22 were still ongoing by December 31, 2010. See the appendix for a list of conflict episodes and rebel groups involved.

Dependent variable

The dependent variable – the measure of severity of a conflict – is the number of battle-related casualties that occurred during the conflict episode year. The numbers come from the UCDP “Battle-related deaths dataset v5-2011, 1989-2010.” The dataset compiles “deaths caused by the warring parties that that can be directly related to combat over the contested incompatibility” (UCDP 2011c). Besides fighting on the battlefield, UCDP includes guerilla activities and urban warfare, military and civilian fatalities. Gathering information on battle-related deaths in an ongoing conflict is extremely difficult and potentially unreliable.⁵⁵ In striving for accuracy, the Uppsala Conflict Data Program uses several

⁵⁵ see Balcells et al. (2014) for a recent discussion of the difficulties to count war deaths in the Washington Post’s *Monkey Cage* blog: “How should we count the war dead in Syria?” May 1, 2014. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/05/01/how-should-we-count-the-war-dead-in-syria/> accessed May 13, 2014.

independent publicly-available sources for each yearly count and gives three estimates in its UCDP Battle-related Deaths Dataset (Sundberg 2008): high, low and best. The codebook points out that “Due to the lack of available information, it is possible that there are more fatalities than the UCDP high estimate, but it is very unlikely that there is fewer than the UCDP best estimate.” This research uses the UCDP’s best estimate. For more information, please consult the UCDP Battle-Related Deaths Dataset Codebook (UCDP 2011c).

Main variable of interest: T2+

I question whether the occurrence of non-state conflict management during an ongoing conflict dampens the conflict’s severity. Chapter 1 elaborates on my definition of non-state conflict management (T2+) as well as the data collection process, and provides descriptive data on T2+. Because I am interested not only in finding out whether T2+ has the hypothesized effect but also in the causal mechanism, I use different variables for the tests of sub-hypotheses 4a and 4b: When assessing whether NGO mediation is accompanied by ceasefires and other goodwill gestures depressing the casualty rate, I use a dichotomous variable that stipulates whether direct T2+ mediation and/or mediation support occurred in the conflict episode year. When testing whether T2+ leads to a long-term decrease in the number of battle deaths, I create a dummy variable that is one if the episode year experiences T2+ training, a problem-solving workshop or similar dialogue exercises. Because effects of training and dialogue will not be as immediate as lulls in violence caused by ongoing talks, I lag this variable by one year (and for robustness checks two).

Finding good, comparable measures for NGO commitment is a challenge. I collect information on the duration of individual efforts, similar to Melander and von Uexküll

(2011). I code a categorical variable where “1” stands for a one-time effort (one workshop, or one negotiation conference), “2” for an initiative that encompasses several rounds of negotiation or several meetings over one year, and “3” for multi-year sustained projects. Of the 76 T2+ efforts in my sample, 32 are one-time efforts, 16 see several meetings over one year, and 28 last longer than a year.

Descriptive data

The annual death rate for conflict dyad episode years varies greatly from 25 (the minimum to be included in the UCDP data) to 30,633. The latter observation is the conflict between Ethiopian government and Eritrean separatists in 1990. The mean annual casualty rate is 724, and the median is 200 (time period 1990-2010; for conflicts that started before 1990, only years 1990 and after are included). 51 of the 354 yearly observations (14%) count 25 battle-related deaths. 62 dyad years see 1,000 deaths or more; four years experience 10,000 deaths or more – Ethiopia 1990, both in the conflict with the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front about the latter’s secession, and the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front’s struggle with the Mengistu regime, Angola 1993, and Congo (Brazzaville) 1997. The deadliest conflict episode is the war in Sudan, which is also the longest uninterrupted war included in my sample. Only five of the 28 conflicts that last up to 12 months see a death rate higher than 100 casualties. For the most part, longer wars are associated with higher average death tolls, contradicting the proposition that maybe short wars are particularly violent. See Figures 15, 16 and 17 for visual representation.

Figure 15: Annual number of battle deaths by conflict duration




Figure 16: Annual battle-related deaths in dyad by conflict duration (months)





Figure 17: Observations by severity (Annual battle-related deaths)



T2+ occurs on all levels of severity. Noteworthy is that all six conflicts that at some point experience a year in which more than 5,000 people die see non-state conflict management at some point during the same episode, as do all except two of those conflicts that experience at least one year of more than 1,000 battle-related deaths.

I calculate the change of severity from one year to the next. In 110 of 221 cases (50%), a dyad episode year is less violent than the preceding year.⁵⁶ Of those 66 dyad episodes that experience T2+, 35 (53%) are correlated with a decline in severity from the

⁵⁶ The number of observations is now 221 (from 354) because the first year of each dyad is dropped.

previous year. Of those 58 dyad episodes that saw T2+ in the preceding year 32 (55%) experience a subsequent decline in the annual battle-death rate. Whether the decrease in severity is a function of non-state conflict management is the subject of this chapter. The next section will consider which control variables will be included in the analysis.

Controls

Studies on the deadliness of conflicts have identified a number of explanatory variables that I will include in my models as control variables.

Identity conflicts could be more violent as combatants see the other side as a threat to their own identity group's existence, thus becoming more likely to strive for eradication of the other side. I expect countries with a high *ethnic fractionalization* or high *religious fractionalization* (data from Alesina et al. 2002, and Fearon and Laitin 2003, respectively) to experience more deaths per capita during conflict.

The type of incompatibility at the center of the conflict, the motivation of the rebels, should be a determining factor of the level of violence. Secessionist wars often last longer than other types of conflicts (Fearon 2004). Groups attempting to break away from their current state will feel less restraint in using force against their enemies and civilians than those groups that hope to govern the population and military once the war is won. At the same time, separatist conflicts often are waged in the periphery of a country, limiting violence to a region. I include the UCDP/PRIO incompatibility variable which codes whether a conflict is about territory or government control and expect territorial conflicts to be more severe as measured in battle deaths.⁵⁷

⁵⁷ In large countries, secessionist wars are often fought on the periphery and express themselves as wars of attrition, with steady but low numbers of casualties. Fighting about control of the central government, on the

A more democratic government may be more restrained in its response to regime opposition. Heger and Saleyhan (2007) find that the larger coalition sizes and more stringent government constraints in democratic states lead to more restrained use of force in conflict. Thus, a higher *level of democracy*, measured by a country's Polity score, should be correlated with lower casualty rates.

Rebels that are militarily capable will see opportunities on the battlefield and attempt to use them (Lacina 2006). One expression of this relationship is that wars in which the opponents have relatively equal *military capacities* last longer (Cunningham et al. 2009) – if one side is much stronger, the other will acquiesce to negotiations more quickly. We can expect these wars between equal powers to be more severe, too. My models include dummy variables for rebels at parity to the government, and rebels stronger than the government, taken from Cunningham et al. (2013). Violence begets violence. If one side is particularly brutal at one time, the other side may look for revenge. Escalation is likely. I expect the measure of severity in one year to be positively correlated with the level of *violence in the preceding year* (higher numbers of battle-related deaths in one year will correspond to high numbers in the next year) and therefore include the lagged dependent variable into my model. Further, violence may not only be correlated over time but also across space. If there is an *ongoing conflict in a neighboring country*, this may affect the severity of the conflict (Lujala 2009). I include a dummy variable for simultaneous conflict in a contiguous country.

other hand, might be shorter, but more intense. In this case, my expectations should be reversed, and severity higher for conflicts about government control than about territory.

Lujala (2009) finds that longer-lasting conflicts have a lower average annual casualty rate and that the most intense wars are relatively short episodes of extreme violence. As my descriptive section shows, cases that make up my sample display the opposite dynamic: longer wars are also more deadly on average. To account for any temporal dynamic, I include the *length of the dyad conflict episode* (in months, logged) as a control variable.

Lujala (2009) argues that natural resources are key determinants of the number of casualties in a conflict. Lootable *resources* and the money made off them can increase the military power of rebels. They can also contribute to infighting among the rebels as the desire for personal enrichment trumps the cause of the war (Weinstein 2007). In the long term, the presence of natural resources might motivate rebels to fight particularly hard, because they fear any compromise solution will jeopardize their access to the riches – only victory assures control over the resources. Lujala finds that diamonds, oil and gas production in the conflict zone increases conflict intensity. I include a dichotomous variable that is “1” if the country at war has hydrocarbon (oil and natural gas) or gemstone production. I expect those conflicts to be more severe.

Because of my over-all focus on interventions in civil conflicts, I also include variables that account for *military interventions* (coded when a country is included in the UCDP dataset as engaging in the active fighting) and high-level negotiations (from the UCDP Managing Intrastate Conflict Dataset, Melander and von Uexküll 2011, until 2007, and the Civil War Mediation dataset, DeRouen et al 2011, for 2008-2010) and I expect outside military intervention to increase the casualty rate, because they will encourage the supported side to exploit their potential new military advantage, while diplomatic efforts should decrease the level of violence as alternatives to the battlefield become relevant.

Please see the codebook in the appendix for information about the sources for all variables and for a summary table.

Methodology

Ordinary Least Squares

For the test of hypothesis 4a, the effect T2+ may have on conflict severity, I initially use multivariate OLS regressions with robust standard errors adjusted for clustering on conflicts. The clustering controls for auto-correlation effects within observations of the same conflict. The dependent variable, yearly battle deaths, is log-transformed because of the large range of values from 25 to over 30,000. My expectation is that T2+ efforts will lead to a decrease in war casualties. I first test for immediate effects of NGO mediation by including my “direct mediation T2+” variable (model 1). The pacifying effect of problem-solving workshops, teaching of non-violent conflict resolution techniques and high-level confidence building will not be immediate, but rather need some time to evolve. I therefore stipulate the expectation that, if a conflict experiences a T2+-event in one year, the number of battle-related deaths will decline in the following year (I also test with a two-year lag).

As I have pointed out in the preceding chapters, conflicts that experience T2+ will not be representative of the all civil wars. Those cases that are interesting for and at the same time open to non-state conflict management practitioners are a particular subset of all conflicts. They are potentially longer and possibly harder to solve than other civil wars. They also could be more severe, as NGOs often have a particular interest in trying to pacify those groups that inflict the most damage and hurt the most people. For more background on the selection effects at play in the research on mediation in general and T2+ in particular, please refer to Chapter 2 and 4. Because selection effects will introduce biased

results, I rerun the OLS regressions while limiting my sample to those conflicts that at some point experience T2+.⁵⁸

Testing and discussion

Non-state Conflict Management and Conflict Severity

Table 11 (next page) compiles the results of the models reported here. Model 1 uses OLS regression to determine whether T2+ has a statistically significant effect on the logged number of annual battle deaths. The measure of T2+ is not significant. The positive sign of the T2+ coefficient indicates that in the full sample of all African civil conflict dyads under observation, non-state conflict management is more likely to coincide with higher battle-death rates. The only significant regressors are rebel motivation and the lagged dependent variable. The model finds conflicts about government control will cost more lives in a year than separatist conflicts. Separatist conflicts often happen at the periphery of a country and do involve small segments of the population, while rebellions with the goal to overthrow the government will engulf whole nations.

If a conflict experienced a high casualty rate in one year, it is more likely to see a high casualty rate in the following year. The other covariates are not statistically significant. Significance levels and direction of the coefficients remain unchanged for all variables when I use the lagged T2+ variable.

⁵⁸ I consider simultaneous equation models, specifically two stages probit least squares, 2SPLS (Maddala 1983, Keshk 2003) to address the issue of endogeneity between non-state conflict management and conflict severity. In the first stage of 2SPLS, the dependent variables are regressed on all exogenous variables. The second stage uses the predicted values for battle deaths and T2+ as regressors in separate tests for occurrence of T2+ and number of battle-related deaths respectively. Postestimation tests find that variables may not be endogenous. I therefore relegate this model to the appendix (appendix 8).

Table 11: Severity of conflicts, measured by battle deaths in year, logged

	(1) OLS: all T2+	(2) OLS, T2+: approaches (reference: no T2+)	(3) OLS, conflicts with T2+: all T2+	(4) OLS, conflicts with T2+: approaches	(5) OLS, conflicts with T2+: longest efforts, lagged
any T2+ in dyad year	0.11 (0.19)	---	-0.21 (0.23)	---	---
T2+ Mediation + mediation support	---	-0.08 (0.20)	---	-0.43* (0.22)	---
T2+ Training lagged one year	---	-0.09 (0.47)	---	-0.37 (0.40)	---
T2+ Problem-solving lagged one year	---	0.01 (0.34)	---	<i>reference category</i>	---
Long-term T2+, lagged one year	---	---	---	---	-0.25 (0.23)
Medium-term T2+, lagged one year	---	---	---	---	-0.14 (0.52)
Ethnic fractionalization	-0.47 (0.46)	-0.49 (0.50)	-0.11 (0.26)	-0.03 (0.28)	-0.19 (0.29)
Religious fractionalization	0.36 (0.54)	0.46 (0.52)	2.08*** (0.42)	2.07*** (0.47)	2.09*** (0.45)
Rebel motivation	0.80* (0.30)	0.84** (0.32)	1.45* (0.57)	1.56*** (0.56)	1.44** (0.54)
Rebel parity	0.57 (0.38)	0.56 (0.40)	0.87* (0.48)	0.81** (0.39)	0.90* (0.48)
Rebel stronger	-0.08 (0.25)	-0.003 (0.26)	-0.16 (0.33)	-0.11 (0.31)	-0.19 (0.37)
Democracy	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)
Gems and carbon	0.33 (0.32)	0.31 (0.33)	0.25 (0.22)	0.16 (0.25)	0.26 (0.26)
War in neighboring country	0.19 (0.26)	0.18 (0.26)	0.09 (0.23)	0.10 (0.20)	0.11 (0.24)
Military interventions	-0.13 (0.34)	-0.10 (0.33)	-0.64 (0.48)	-0.50 (0.41)	-0.64 (0.47)
Official mediation	-0.18 (0.20)	-0.16 (0.21)	0.04 (0.24)	0.06 (0.18)	0.04 (0.24)
Length of dyad episode, logged	0.03 (0.13)	0.04 (0.14)	0.06 (0.17)	0.06 (0.18)	0.07 (0.17)
Battle deaths, lagged	0.48*** (0.07)	0.48*** (0.07)	0.34*** (0.11)	0.32*** (0.10)	0.35*** (0.11)
Constant	1.06 (0.85)	0.98 (0.95)	-0.29 (1.15)	-0.36 (1.30)	-0.35 (1.10)
N	197 (59 clusters on dyads)	201 (60 clusters)	116 (29 clusters)	116 (29 clusters)	116 29 clusters
Frequency of T2+ T2+ mediation/support T2+ training T2+dialog Long-term T2+ Medium-term T2+	63	41 14 18			33 9
R ²	0.41	0.41	0.46	0.47	0.46

Note: Coefficients, with robust standard errors clustered on country in parentheses.

*Significant at the .1 level, **significant at the .05 level, ***significant at the .01 level

Model 2 dissects the T2+ variable into the different approaches taken by NGOs, namely direct mediation and mediation support,⁵⁹ training, and problem-solving workshops (the last two variables are lagged one year; the reference category is dyad years without any T2+). Both the variable accounting for mediation and mediation support and the variable accounting for previous T2+ capacity-building are now negative, although they remain not significant. The lagged problem-solving variable is positive. I would expect any positive impact of dialogue and problem solving workshops to be more difficult to determine statistically as socialization effects will take root slowly and will express themselves in different ways in individual conflicts. When I lag the problem-solving variable two years, it is statistically significant and negative, showing that certain T2+ efforts are associated with lower casualty rates in later years. The control variables remain unchanged.

Models 3 and 4 repeats the regressions performed in Model 1 and 2, but use a sample that is limited to those conflict dyads that experience non-state conflict management at some point during the ongoing episode. In Model 3, the variable of interest, the general dichotomous variable for T2+ in a given dyad year, is now negative, but still not statistically significant.⁶⁰ A number of control variables reach acceptable significance levels, namely religious fractionalization, rebel motivation, rebel strength parity and lagged battle deaths. Religious fractionalization is positively related to higher conflict severity, indicating that conflicts in countries divided by religion tend to be more violent. When the rebel group

⁵⁹ I combine the measures of direct mediation and mediation support because they both describe roles T2+ organizations play in the direct interaction of conflict parties, with expected immediate effects on conflict severity. This juxtaposes with the longer-term expectations mediation training/capacity building and long-term goals of dialogue.

⁶⁰ Again nothing changes when the lagged T2+ variable is used.

is equal in strength to the government, the dyad will be more violent. This is a matter of military capacity (rebels can kill more people so they will), but also of uncertainty: if no side is clearly dominant, both sides will try to win on the battlefield. Incompatibility and lagged battle deaths remain positive and significant in these models.

Ethnic fractionalization is not only not significant, but its coefficient is unexpectedly negative. Lacina (2006) finds a negative effect for ethnic polarization on conflict severity. Maybe extreme violence related to identity issues happens at certain points of the fractionalization index, possibly in very divided societies and in those countries where only one minority ethnic group faces off with the majority. I consider a curvilinear effect by including the squared ethnic polarization index, but the variable remains not significant.

The signs for rebel superiority, gems and carbon production, democracy and war in a neighboring country are as hypothesized - positive for natural resources and neighboring war, negative for dominant rebel strength and democracy - but not significant. Military interventions and official mediation are not statistically significant, either, and the signs for the coefficients are opposite of what I had expected. The theoretical expectations that third-party military support will exacerbate violence, but diplomatic interventions will abate it need clarification. If military interventions are changing the balance of power in a conflict they may give incentives to the suddenly weaker party to look for alternatives to military confrontation. Official mediation by governments or international organizations is often prompted by escalation of conflict, creating endogeneity for my model.

Among all dyads that see T2+ at some point during an ongoing episode, I compare in Model 4 whether those dyad years that see T2+ mediation/mediation support, or saw T2+ training in the previous year, are more likely to see lower casualty rates than those years

that do not. Both coefficients are negative, but only the mediation variable is statistically significant at the .01 level.⁶¹ NGO mediation is indeed related to a lower number of battle-related deaths – years in which NGOs are active as mediators or supporting mediation see fewer deaths than those years that do not experience T2+ mediation.

Taken together, Models 1-4 show some support for hypothesis 4a, but little for hypothesis 4b: The restricted OLS models find statistical significance for NGO mediation, confirming my proposition that years that see direct mediation organized and supported by T2+ actors will experience a drop in the number of battle deaths. Capacity-building for belligerents has no immediate effect on conflict severity. The coefficient for T2+ training is only significant when lagged two years, indicating a potential delayed effect – however the temporal and cross-sectional limitations of my sample are too severe to draw meaningful conclusions from this particular model.


Duration of T2+ initiatives and conflict severity

I now single out one characteristic of T2+ efforts that I expect to have a particularly strong effect on conflict severity. My theoretical expectation is that NGOs that display a strong commitment to resolving a conflict will be most effective in building the trust and willingness to compromise necessary to depress the level of violence. Examples of such long-term strategies include the continuing support of the Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative in Uganda, which has acted as a go-between for the government and the Lord's Resistance Army since 2002, Interpeace' consultation exercise in Rwanda (2001-2003) cumulating in a mediation forum on the national level, and the Collaborative Peace Building

⁶¹ The reference category in Model 4 is “problem-solving.” T2+ training is negative and significant when lagged two years. However, the number of observations in that model is only 86 (with 20 individual dyads).

Program of the West Africa Peace Network, which from 1998 through the end of the conflict in Sierra Leone led dialogue among a broad range of actors in that country's society. Figure 18 shows two scatter plots of conflict severity as a function of conflict duration, one for dyad episode years that experience long-lasting T2+ efforts, the other for those episode years without sustained commitment.

Figure 18: Duration of current dyad episode (months)



Conflicts that do not experience long-term non-state conflict management see a stark increase of the annual casualty rate over time (when the most egregious outlier, Ethiopia 1990, is omitted, the slope is not as pronounced, but still noticeably steeper than the one accounting for long-term T2+). Conflicts in which NGO conflict management happens still see their number of annual battle deaths go up over time, but less noticeably.

In Model 5, I replace the T2+ variable in the restricted OLS model with a dummy variable that is “1” if the most sustained T2+ effort in preceding dyad episode year is a long-term initiative rather than a single workshop or mediation round. Using the lagged variable is important, because otherwise I include in my count of long-term efforts the first year of such a project. Only a continuing activity past the first year, however, will prove to the conflict parties, that the organization is serious about their long-term commitment. I also include a dummy variable for medium-length NGO initiatives (more than one-off effort, but not longer than one year), which leaves those one-time mediation rounds as reference category.

The main explanatory variable is negative, but not statistically significant. Neither is the coefficient for the shorter T2+ initiatives. Similarly, when I use a variable counting the T2+ efforts in a given dyad year, or the cumulative number of NGO efforts in a dyad episode, the coefficients are consistently negative and consistently not significant. I cannot reject the null-hypothesis that long-term T2+ efforts have a statistically significant negative effect on conflict severity. The control variables perform as in earlier models.

My statistical models do not adequately address the problem of endogeneity. Maybe instead of T2+ bringing about a decrease in severity, a decrease in severity opens the door to T2+ activities. The lack of reliable instrumental variables prohibits me from using instrumental variable regression to address the matter. In the following pages I give examples of T2+ in ongoing conflicts that had the hypothesized impact on conflict severity.

Illustration – the cases of Somalia, Chad, Algeria and Uganda

Somalia and Chad

In order to highlight the potential effects of T2+, I initially present two cases that do not experience any non-state conflict management during the time under observation.

First, the conflict between the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia and Al-Shabab is coded by UCDP as active since 2008 and has not ended in 2013. Second, the government of Chad has faced many insurgent groups over the years. I focus here on the years 1992-1994, when four different groups challenged the government. Because both the Somali and Chadian conflicts did not experience any T2+ in the time under observation, I use them as a baseline for the subsequent examples of conflicts that see T2+.

Table 12: Annual Battle deaths in Al-Shabab – Somalia government dyad (2008-2012)

Year	Annual Battle Deaths
2008	1292
2009	1403
2010	2069
2011	1938
2012	2622

Table 13: Annual Battle deaths in Chad (1992-1994)

group	year	1992	1993	1994
CNR		115	25	25
CSNPD		33	30	105
FNT		25	25	31
MDD		726	40	-----

The Somali case shows that, as described above in the descriptive statistics section, conflict severity as measured by battle-related deaths tends to increase over time. The Chadian conflict illustrates how low-level violence often continues over several years, with occasional spikes in the death rate. I expect the pattern to be different if non-state conflict management occurs. The following two examples show how T2+ can correlate with decreases in conflict severity.

Algeria

The first multiparty elections in Algeria were held in December 1991. The Islamist Salvation Front (Front Islamique du Salut/FIS) won a majority of votes and was poised to win the elections in the next round when the army cancelled the electoral process, effectively took over government control, and banned the FIS. Insurgency ensued. A number of Islamist groups joined forces in their fight against the regime, including the Armed Islamic Movement (Mouvement Islamique Armée/MIA) and Takfir wa'l Hijra. FIS formed its own militant wing, the Islamic Salvation Army (Armée Islamique du Salut/AIS). Another militant collaborative that developed in 1992 was the Armed Islamic Group (Groupe islamique armée/GIA), a group that rejected democracy outright.

Table 14 shows the number of annual battle-deaths for the years 1992-1998 by insurgent group. The most deadly year overall is 1995, when 3,978 battle-related deaths occurred. The conflict severity escalates steadily in the years 1992-1995, and then drops notably in 1996 before climbing again, more than doubling from 1997 to 1998. For AIS separately, the death rate increases from 228 in 1992 to 1341 in 1994, then decreases slightly in 1995 and most dramatically in 1996. While the conflict dyad is still coded as active in 1996 and 1997, it is at the low end of the intensity scale. GIA's severity curve sees

several spikes of casualty numbers in 1995, 1998 and (though much lower) in 2001. The GIA-government dyad is overall more deadly.

Table 14: Annual Battle-Deaths in Algeria (1992-1998)

year group	1992	1993	1994	1995 – Platform for Algeria	1996	1997	1998
AIS	228	775	1341	1000	25	40	-----
GIA	-----	25	1000	2978	1059	1284	3024
Total	228	800	2341	3978	1084	1324	3024

One explanation for the dyad-level variation in severity is that the FIS-allied AIS understood violence as a last resort and reacted with armed struggle against the government after the democratic path to power was blocked, while GIA saw the entire Algerian society as its enemy. Starting in 1993, GIA began deliberately targeting civilians. The army responded with increasingly brutal counterattacks.

While the groups disagreed about the use of violence, they still shared some goals and did not fight each other. But GIA refused to talk to the government, while FIS (and later AIS directly) favored a negotiated settlement. No agreements were signed with either group, however the efforts towards a peaceful end to the conflict will have influenced its deadliness. An important initiative was the Platform for Algeria mediated by the Community of Sant'Egidio in Rome, 21-22 November 1994 (Impagliazzo 2010) that brought together political parties including the FIS in a forum. The goal was trust-building between Algerian interlocutors, and to devise a framework for a peaceful way out of the crisis. The Platform for Algeria was signed January 13, 1995, among others by the FIS. The T2+ effort did not lead to a peace deal, or even an official ceasefire. Rupesinghe (1998: 180)

calls it a “lost opportunity.” Indeed, AIS fought for another three years. But after the Rome document was signed, the number of deaths in the AIS-government dyad declined dramatically, suggesting that the group’s preference for non-violence was supported and encouraged. Thus, I argue, the non-state intervention made a measurable impact on conflict severity.

Uganda

The conflict between the Uganda government and the Lord’s Resistance Army has been active since 1988, with very brief interruptions in 1993, 1999 and 2007. The average annual death toll for the period 1990-2013 as counted by UCDP is 331. Table 15 shows the yearly battle deaths for the LRA-government dyad (2000-2008) and notes the years in which conflict management took place.

Table 15: Annual Battle deaths in LRA – Uganda government dyad (2000-2008)

Year	Annual Battle Deaths	Official mediation	T2+
2000	164		
2001	110		
2002	1010		X (ARLPI)
2003	644		X (ARLPI)
2004	1610		X (Bigombe, HD, Okumu)
2005	695		X (ARLPI, Bigombe)
2006	221	X	X (ARLPI, Sant’Egidio)
2007	<25	X	X (Pax Christi, Sant’Egidio)
2008	53	X	X

An official peace process under the auspices of South Sudan’s vice-president occurred from 2006-2008. Unofficial diplomacy both preceded and accompanied these

high-level talks. A local effort of traditional religious leaders, the Acholi Religious Leaders' Peace Initiative (ARLPI) formed in the late 1990s. The group focuses on building a public consensus for peace and national advocacy, and also has played a role as intermediary between the Ugandan government and the LRA leadership (Lacey 2002; Rodrigues 2002). 2004 was a particularly active year for T2+ in Uganda: Betty Bigombe, a former Ugandan government official who had been in charge of talks with the LRA in the 1990s, started her own personal peace initiative (McLaughlin 2005). Her mediation, though it did not lead to an agreement, is credited with preparing the groundwork for the subsequent Juba talks.⁶² Concurrently with Bigombe's effort, the Geneva-based Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue acted as intermediary (HD 2004), as did Washington Okumu, a Kenyan professor (Mucunguzi 2004). The Community of Sant'Egidio accompanied the Juba Talks 2006-2008 as observers and advisers (survey response).

The LRA has been accused of using the official peace process to buy time. They are still active, spread across a vast region and the conflict is coded as ongoing. But one change in conflict dynamics is obvious: the average number of annual battle-deaths has declined significantly since the combined efforts of official and unofficial mediation in 2006-2008: from 1990-2005 the average conflict severity is 455; since 2006, the number is 84. The decreasing death toll can partially be attributed to intense military pressure by the Ugandan government that dispersed the rebels (although it should be noted that a major offensive in 2002 was not accompanied by a sustained drop in violence). But the attempts at peaceful conflict resolution also contributed to the lower intensity. A number of

⁶² Bigombe's profile as a *Tanenbaum's Peacemakers in Action* <https://tanenbaum.org/peacemakers-in-action-network/meet-the-peacemakers/betty-oyella-bigombe/>, accessed May 14, 2014

ceasefires accompanied the talks, e.g. in September 2004, and in August 2006 (Nyakairu 2004; UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia). And the T2+ activities in the 2000s, especially Bigombe's 2004 renewed mediation efforts that paved the way for the Juba talks, contributed to the official process that lowered the death toll.

Conclusion

My proposition that T2+ initiatives generally contribute to a decrease in a conflict's casualty rate cannot be confirmed; I find no statistically significant relationship between the combined measure of non-state conflict management and annual battle-related deaths. However, when I look at T2+ categories separately, my analysis shows that certain NGO efforts at certain times can have an effect on conflict severity. Specifically, mediation-related activities (direct mediation and support for direct mediation) have a statistically significant negative effect on the annual number of battle-related deaths. The measure for T2+ capacity-building and training is only significant when lagged two years – this makes sense because such initiatives have longer-term goals of preparing groups for mediation and peace; however, the sample is too small at this point of the analysis to be confident in the findings. I cannot confirm my hypothesis that sustained commitment to resolving a conflict, measured by either duration of individual T2+ initiatives or the number of efforts, have a dampening effect on the yearly battle death count.

Cross-sectional and cross-temporal limitations of my data make any findings tentative. It is also difficult to entangle the possible endogeneity between third-party interventions and conflict severity – are conflicts less bloody because of peace initiatives, or can peace initiatives only take place when violence is declining? Or maybe a previously unmeasured third factor is in fact responsible for both phenomena: both a decrease in

intensity of fighting and the acquiescence to mediation could be driven by a change in attitude in the belligerents. A group that truly wants to end a war may both agree to T2+ and stop killing so many enemies. If statistical models really get at the matter of interest is always a nagging question. Including control variables that have been found in the literature important to conflict severity helps minimize potential omitted variable bias. But “will for peace” is unmeasurable. I cannot conclude with certainty that there is not an unobserved factor missing from my analysis. I argue, and find support in my illustrative cases, that even if the endogenous relationship remains problematic, at the least non-state conflict management can support and hopefully expand existing will for an end to the violence.

The results of my study are interesting for T2+ organizations. They indicate that non-state conflict management can have effects on conflict dynamics beyond preparing groundwork for official negotiations or ending conflicts. Initiatives that may look on first sight as doing little to end a war, may nevertheless contribute to a decrease in intensity of the war. This finding underlines the humanitarian impact non-violent third-party intervention can have.

This dissertation chapter contributes to the literature on conflict severity. While research on civil war duration has taken note of the negative and positive effects outside intervention can have, increasingly including third-party interventions beyond military support to one or both sides, little has been said about foreign contributions to conflict severity (Lacina 2006),⁶³ and nothing, to my knowledge, about non-violent interventions. I

⁶³ The fact that the level of violence is correlated across borders in previous research (Lujula 2009) points to the impossibility of studying “internal” war in a vacuum without taking into account outside influences.

do not only expand previous models to accommodate my primary interest of non-state conflict management, but I show that diplomatic third-party interventions have a dampening effect on ongoing violence.

The question I turn to next is how sustainable any T2+ successes (or peace-making efforts in general) are. Preceding chapters have defined T2+ success as contributing to an end of a conflict episode. But many conflicts in my sample see lulls in violence and may even have an end to the conflict episode coded, only then to re-enter the sample. The next chapter will explore how non-state conflict management may affect the sustainability of peace and whether T2+ initiatives in one conflict episode make it less likely that a country lapses back into civil conflict after some truce was found.

CHAPTER 6 – T2+ and the durability of peace

Introduction

Chapter 3 through 5 have explored the direct impact non-state conflict management has on specific conflict dynamics. This chapter will now consider whether T2+ during an ongoing conflict can affect developments beyond the official end of the war. Implemented with the goal of ending a violent conflict, do the effects of T2+ linger and make sustainable peace between government and rebels more likely? The work of the Community of Sant'Egidio in Mozambique is a good example of a sustainable peace agreement mediated by a non-state actor. Negotiated from 1990 – 1992, the General Peace Agreement was honored by all parties until at least October 2013.⁶⁴ The Rome process was the last of many attempts to end the war that began in 1975. South Africa mediated earlier negotiations in the early 1980s; Zimbabwe and Kenya were joint mediators in 1989-1990 (Msabaha 1995). There are a number of reasons why the Sant'Egidio initiative succeeded where more powerful actors failed, including a changing world and regional order. But characteristics of the NGO mediator and the process are credited, too: the Community had a long-standing relationship with Mozambique, growing out of humanitarian relief work (Gianturco 2010: 33). The respect all sides felt for the Catholic lay organization and its undoubted neutrality made it acceptable as a go-between and mediator. Msabaha's (1995: 227) assessment of Sant'Egidio's role stresses advantages that only NGOs can bring to the table:

“The community's evenhanded goodwill, its concern for the affective and technical dimensions of asymmetry, its long-standing efforts to build relationships, and its honest search for solutions made it

⁶⁴ The rebel group RENAMO staged some ambushes in October 2013 when its headquarters were attacked by government security forces, but no general breakdown of the peace was determined as of January 2014 (Felimao 2014).

invaluable to the negotiations. The community was present before it was needed, and possessed a patience that outlasted the parties' proclivity for delays.

The long duration of the negotiations have been criticized (Posthumus 1999a), but not rushing the process was key for the building of trust and interpersonal relationships, central to Sant'Egidio's conflict resolution strategy (Bartoli 1999). These relationships continue after peace agreements are signed, making returns to violence a little less likely.

Even if NGO efforts at conflict resolution do not result in a peace agreement, T2+ initiatives during the war can prepare conflict parties for post-conflict collaboration: The Woodrow Wilson International Center's Burundi Leadership Training Program was implemented from 2002 to 2008. Workshops trained key Burundian leaders in problem-solving and negotiation, among other skills. One of the developers of the program, Howard Wolpe, formulates the goals of the initiative:

"We hope and expect that BLTP participants, for years to come, will collaborate with one another in stabilizing the Burundian transition and in guiding the country's post-war economic, social and political reconstruction."⁶⁵

The research for this dissertation chapter aims to determine whether T2+ projects like the Burundi Leadership Training contribute systematically to the sustainability of peace, making relapse into violence less probable. Generally, T2+ during the war does not show a significant negative effect on the reoccurrence of armed conflict, but when the different approaches of T2+ organizations are considered separately, I find that while mediation support (work in conjuncture with official diplomacy) is significantly and positively related to renewal of violence, direct mediation by T2+ actors has a negative sign. I furthermore find that both the number of NGO initiatives and the extent of their

⁶⁵ <http://www.wilsoncenter.org/the-burundi-leadership-training-program>. The conflict in Burundi is coded as terminated at the end of 2008 (UCDP).

commitment, measured with the duration of individual programs, have significant effects on the durability of the post-conflict peace.

The chapter proceeds in six sections. Following this introduction I develop a theoretical framework for the research question. In section three I present the data used to test my propositions, beginning with a detailed discussion how peace can be defined; section four describes the methodologies applied. The fifth section presents the results of my statistical analysis. In the last section I point to potential weaknesses in my design and tests, consider rival explanations and summarize the practical and theoretical implications of the research.

Argument

How non-state conflict management during ongoing civil wars improves the chances for stable peace

Previous literature has pointed to a number of factors that will determine whether a conflict ends for good – after victory of one side, a negotiated settlement or disintegration of the rebellion – or whether violence will restart after an interlude of inactivity. The determinants fall into three categories: characteristics of the preceding conflict, including the issue at the heart of conflict (identity wars tend to reemerge, Doyle and Sambanis 2000) and the severity of the fighting (Doyle and Sambanis 2000, Fortna 2004); the type of conflict termination, with decisive victories contributing to more stability (Licklider 1995, Fortna 2004a); and the post-conflict climate. Certain institutions, like power-sharing mechanisms, have been found to make peace more sustainable (Hartzell and Hoddie 2007, Mattes and Savun 2010). Furthermore, third parties are often crucial for the successful implementation of peace agreements (Walter 2002). In fact, outsiders, both state and non-

state, can help create an environment conducive to durable agreements in the negotiation, the bargaining and the implementation stages of a peace process. Third parties may act as go-between for the parties, preparing them for negotiations (Burton 1969, Kelman 1992). As mediators during peace talks, third parties can overcome mistrust and help craft a fair agreement that addresses the underlying issues and considers institutions that will incorporate all conflict parties (Dunn and Kriesberg 2002).⁶⁶ Once a treaty is signed, third parties can continue to act as intermediary in order to limit information asymmetries, oversee and guarantee its implementation, and, if they have the resources, even enforce it (Doyle and Sambanis 2000, Fortna 2008, Gilligan and Sergenti 2008, Mattes and Savun 2010, Walter 2002). While enforcement is generally reserved for states and intergovernmental organizations, non-state actors can play an important role in this stage, too, e.g. as experts (for example assisting the demobilization process), trusted advisers and public watchdogs who might shame conflict parties who do not fulfill their obligations.

This study does not deal with NGO actions in the implementation stage per se. The contributions to post-conflict stability and peace building by non-governmental organizations are manifold and impressive (see Barnes 2006, Zaum 2009 for examples) but they fall outside of the scope of this dissertation. Here, I argue that initiatives that have been carried out during the conflict and before a peace agreement was reached (or the war ended in victory of one side or in a stalemate) can have effects that being felt beyond the end of violent conflict.

⁶⁶ Mediation has been touted as a successful tool to find non-violent solutions to conflicts, but recently the long-term benefits of mediation have been questioned: Beardsley (2012) points out that although half of all interstate crises in his sample that experience mediation end in an agreement (three times as many as when the crises is unmediated), half of mediated conflicts reemerge (and 50% of non-mediated crises).

There are three ways in which non-state conflict management during the ongoing conflict may contribute to a more sustainable peace. One, actions taken by organizations can create or reinforce the circumstances necessary for a successful peace agreement. Two, the unique relationship NGO mediators have with conflict parties can develop an atmosphere of trust among all sides that make an immediate revocation of terms of agreement less likely. Three, conflict resolution initiatives during the conflict may have beneficial side effects that make a breakdown after the end of fighting less likely.

The first category includes a number of ways for NGOs to contribute to durable peace. As other mediators, conflict management organizations can act as go-between for the parties and thus help prepare the groundwork for negotiations. They may even be more effective in bringing reluctant parties to the table as they often have long-standing contacts, making them sometimes more trusted than others. For example, in 1994/1995, International Alert facilitated contacts between RUF rebels in Sierra Leone and the international community (Sorbe and Wohlgemut 1997; see also the case of the Community of Sant'Egidio in Mozambique in the introduction of this chapter). Especially when earlier interactions were non-political, instead related to aid and assistance, all conflict parties will more readily accept the good intentions of the NGO than claims of neutrality by a neighboring state.

T2+ work with individual groups in conflicts where several opposition groups operate may nudge parties towards compromise. Some NGOs execute training programs in conflict resolution and negotiation techniques to rebels (e.g. Mediation Support Project) or use other means to level the diplomatic playing field (e.g. Independent Diplomat helps those with little understanding of international diplomacy to navigate the places and

protocol of high diplomacy). Once groups feel more empowered and less disadvantaged, they are more willing to consider negotiations. In cases of splintered rebellions, initiatives can lead to unification of opposition groups and consolidation of their positions, making it easier to negotiate with the government (e.g. in 1993 the Carter Center discussed with Sudanese rebels groups SPLA and SPLA-U the possibility of reconciliation).

NGOs can also help draft agreements that solve the underlying issues of the conflict and include provisions that help to avoid a return to war. Certain non-state mediators or advisers are particularly qualified to help in the drafting of agreements as the organizations often have legal and diplomatic expertise or a strong background in research across cases that allow them to apply lessons learned. For example, the United States institute of Peace (USIP) is active in mediation and facilitation, but also conducts extensive research in the areas of rule of law and post-conflict reconstruction, among others, and provides training in these areas.

In the second category fall both personal characteristics of the mediator and particularities of the track-two process. Again, NGOs local knowledge and connections are an advantage: knowing the opponents' red lines and their possible limitations in their negotiation mandate better than other outsiders, they can help avoid pressuring groups to sign agreements that are non-implementable. Because most NGO work happens away from the media spotlight, both conflict parties and mediators may feel less pressured for immediate results, which can draw out the negotiation process, but at the same time lead to more thought-out and thus sustainable agreements. For example, during the long Burundi peace-process, Nelson Mandela, then South Africa's president, oversaw a mediation round that ended with a signed peace agreement, but other mediators criticized that groups did

not have enough time to air grievances and discuss the terms of the agreement (Van Eck 2007). The accord was subsequently violated.⁶⁷ As mentioned in the introduction, the Community of Sant'Egidio's Rome Process in the Mozambique civil war was criticized for taking too long, but the resulting agreement has lasted.⁶⁸ The NGOs' non-political nature and professed neutrality can further help overcome reluctance to accept certain provisions that seem preferential to the opponent – the unofficial mediator should have no interest in taking advantage of one side.

The third category of non-state conflict management effects on the chance for lasting peace is less straightforward. One goal of track-two initiatives is the evolution of a collaborative spirit among participants and the preparation for coexistence. Conflict management like problem-solving workshops makes conflict parties more familiar with each other and changes the perceptions opponents have of each other. Those representatives of government and rebels who participate in the initiatives included in this study are leaders themselves, as well as negotiators or advisors. People on this level within their organization's hierarchy are likely to play important roles in a post-conflict setting. Most non-state conflict management projects bring them in personal contact with representatives of the other side. This socialization will make it easier for individuals to enter into power-sharing arrangements in unity governments, a possible outcome of a peace agreement. Mediation training and preparation for high-level negotiations transfers

⁶⁷ Another example: in 2012 the Karen rebels of Myanmar/Burma denied having signed a ceasefire with their government after rank-and-file members protested the agreement; they also claimed to have been pressured to sign a document, Fuller 2012.

⁶⁸ Mario Giro, a Sant'Egidio mediator, points out in an analysis of the peace process in Cote d'Ivoire that "International negotiations often fail because rivalry between mediators is compounded by haste and an overriding need to succeed, unwittingly fueled by public opinion. Those who should be facilitating the dialogue become hostages to their own impatience for success" (Giro 2010:276).

skills to them that will help them to deal peacefully with inevitable conflicts in a post-war society.

From these theoretical considerations I draw my first testable hypothesis:

H_{5a}: Non-state conflict management measures during an ongoing conflict will make post-conflict peace more durable, all else being equal.

My theoretical framework points to several potential causal pathways how non-state conflict management may relate to peace durability. The driving factors of successful NGO mediation could be the character of the organization (expertise, local knowledge, neutrality) or the character of the interaction (confidential, low-pressure). If the NGOs' influence is primarily on the personal relationships of leaders of opposing groups and if increased personal interaction between leaders prepares the ground for a more peaceful post-agreement political environment, then the content of non-state conflict management initiatives is less important than the fact that they happen at all, and preferably over a long period of time. The more opportunities for socialization between the groups there are, the stronger the impact of non-state conflict management on the post-conflict environment should be.

H_{5b}: Number and duration of non-state conflict management initiatives will be negatively correlated with renewed outbreak of violence after the conflict officially ends.

Data

Definition of peace

When can we declare a peace agreement to be successful, a conflict truly ended? After the signing ceremony? After a year without fighting? After five years or ten? The

Uppsala Conflict Research Database includes many conflicts that experience more than one episode, meaning that the number of annual battle deaths fell below 25 for one year or longer, but at some point rose again to over 25. Some of these conflicts may continue through the years on a very low intensity level below 25 annual battle deaths, e.g. the government of Chad against various rebel groups 1989-1994, then again 1997-2002. Some end with a negotiated agreement, e.g. the peace agreement between the Malian government and Azawad rebels in 1992 – the conflict resumed 1994. And others end in victory of one side only to start again at a later point, e.g. Rwanda 1994. If the definition of peace insists that a conflict may never reemerge, studies of peace durability become impossible – that fighting has ceased until today does not preclude it from restarting tomorrow. The literature has used varying measures. Doyle and Sambanis (2000) declare peace building successful if the peace holds at two years after the agreement (they use 5 and 10 year peace stability as robustness checks). DeRouen and Chowdry's (2013) study defines peace as stable if it lasts at least five years. Fortna (2004b) points out that these cut-off points are arbitrary. She argues that a continuous measure for duration (in her models she uses months since the agreement was signed) is less random and allows for the comparison of cases without judging the quality of a peace. Other authors also using the time since an agreement was signed as their measure of comparative success include Hartzell and Hoddie (2003) and Mattes and Savun (2010). I concur with the reasoning that underlies the use of duration models and consider them; however, the necessity to employ a simultaneous equation approach forces me to primarily use logistic models with a fixed definition of peace agreement success – peace is judged to be stable if it prevails at least two (five) years.

Unit of analysis

The universe of cases includes all civil conflicts in Africa for the time period January 1, 1990 until December 31, 2009. The unit of analysis for this chapter is the post-conflict episode dyad year. Dyadic observations are preferable to conflict episodes because in a number of conflicts the government faces more than one adversary and sometimes agrees a ceasefire with one but not another rebel group. Peace agreed between two actors can also cease at distinct times within the ongoing conflict. The data come from the UCDP Conflict Termination dataset (Kreutz 2010).⁶⁹ The analysis includes all terminated conflict dyads as observations. Previous literature often distinguishes between different outcome categories, limiting cases to those civil wars that ended in peace agreements (Hartzell and Hoddie 2003, Mattes and Savun 2010, Hultman et al 2013). This makes sense if the research question addresses the details of a negotiated agreement, e.g. whether power-sharing provisions are an effective way to stabilize a truce. I am interested in the effects of T2+ that happens before the conflict terminates, during the ongoing fighting. I therefore include all conflict outcomes. Once a dyad ends hostilities – due to a negotiated settlement, victory of one side or low activity – I code my dependent variable “peace spell” in yearly observations until the conflict reemerges or the dyad is right-censored in December 2009. Several authors prefer monthly post-conflict observations to yearly counts (Hartzell and Hoddie 2003, Mattes and Savun 2010, Hultman et al. 2013). While counting peace from the month it starts to the month it breaks down is more precise than counting years, I do not believe that the monthly observations add information beyond that to my model as I have no

⁶⁹ Because the data set codes a new dyad even when rebels rename their group the data may underestimate the reoccurrence of conflict in some dyads.

explanatory variables that vary by month. I therefore rely on yearly post-conflict observations.⁷⁰

Descriptive data

The sample includes 102 conflict dyads and 134 dyad episodes. 17 government-rebel group pairings see more than one episode of activity during the time under observation: ten fight two rounds, two fight three, three dyads see four episodes of violence, and two fight six times between 1990 and 2009. Overall, 25% of dyad episodes (34) that end experience an eventual return to war. 14 dyads are still active at the end of 2009; eight of those were relapses of earlier dyads.

The average duration of conflict activity in a terminated dyad episode is 2.3 years (median = 1).⁷¹ Those dyads that return to war do so on average after 4 years of peace. 45 cases end in a negotiated settlement (ceasefire or peace agreement). Three of these 45 cases relapse into war, while one of those 15 that end in outright victory returns to war (Ugandan government vs. ADF). 75% of those dyads that experience a relapse into violence were coded as terminated because of low activity.

Eight of the 34 dyad episodes that experience non-state conflict management in the active dyad return to war (see Figure 19 and 20).

⁷⁰ The appendix includes histograms at the monthly unit of analysis. It shows very clearly that peace agreements tend to fall apart early – most between 12 and 24 months, none later than six years after the initial episode ends (appendix 7).

⁷¹ The mean number of post-conflict peace years until 31 December 2009 for the conflict dyads included in my models is 8.1 (median = 7). Average duration of peace spells is commonly used in the literature to describe comparable data sets. However, it is less helpful here: this sample is limited to dyads active in the years 1990-2009. The time frame is too short to talk about average peace duration. 71 of the 118 episodes that ended before 2009 ended in the last decade (2000-2008), 17 ended only after 2005.

Figure 19: Number of dyad episodes returning to war by non-state conflict management





Figure 20: Percent of dyad episodes returning to war by non-state conflict management



Just looking at the descriptive data, conflicts that experience some form of T2+ during the ongoing conflict are slightly, though noticeably less likely to relapse into

significant fighting after a conflict episode has ended. But other factors besides NGO conflict management will contribute to a more sustainable peace.

Controls

For a definition and description of my main variable of interest – track-two plus – and a discussion of the data collection process, please see chapter 1. My models further include the following control variables that have been found in the literature to affect the durability of peace agreements (see also the appendix for information about the variables and summary statistics):

Just like some conflicts are harder to end, certain characteristics can make post-conflict peace more or less durable. Identity conflicts may turn violent more often than those about interests, they might last longer – and they could be more likely to resume (Licklider 1995, Doyle and Sambanis 2000). Therefore I include Fearon and Laitin's (2003) measure of *ethnic fractionalization* into my models, expecting higher ethnic fractionalization to be correlated with shorter post-conflict periods. Conflicts about territory are often more intractable than those about government control. They are inherently zero-sum, but at the same time can continue over many years without necessarily to threaten the central government. I add UCDP's *incompatibility* measure that is coded 1 if the conflict issue is territory, 2 if it relates to government. The former should be associated with more frequent breakdowns of peace.

Some research shows that deadlier wars are more likely to reemerge, possibly because the social fabric has been damaged irreparably and different groups in a society cannot bear to live with those who killed people of one's kin. However, a more costly war, measured by battle-related deaths, might also increase war fatigue and decreasing the

chances of a new outbreak of violence. Another measure of cost is the *duration* of the war. Again, there are two contradictory expectations: on the one hand, a long war may condition the population to a life under the gun and increasing the probability that some group will return to violence at the first sign of conflict. On the other hand, people will be weary of war and possibly disinclined to join new rebellions. I include a count of dyad episode months (logged) as well as the logged number of overall *battle deaths* per dyad (from UCDP) in the models.

In order to pinpoint the effects of non-state interventions during ongoing conflict, I need to control for other third-party interventions. I include one dichotomous variable for any *high-level mediation* in the previous conflict episode (from the UCDP Managing Intrastate Conflict dataset) and one for *military interventions* (coded 1 if UCDP/PRIO codes outside governments as involved in an ongoing civil conflict).

How the conflict ended is an important predictor of how successful the subsequent peace will be. A variable “agreement” is coded 1 if the episode ended in a negotiated agreement for a ceasefire or peace deal. Another, “victory” is 1 if the fighting ended in a decisive victory (I change the categorical UCDP Conflict Mediation Database “outcome” variable into dichotomous variables for peace agreement and victory). As the literature finds, civil wars that end with a settlement imposed by a victor are in fact more stable than a negotiated agreement (Licklider 1995). *Power-sharing* provisions have been found positively correlated with longer periods of peace (Hartzel and Hoddie 2003); therefore agreements ending a conflict episode that include power-sharing stipulations are coded 1. Additional variables measure whether the parties agreed any “uncertainty reducing provisions” (Mattes and Savun 2010), here understood as stipulation of a *joint*

implementation mechanism, and whether they include an *amnesty* provision in their peace deal (DeRouen and Chowdry 2013). These provisions should make a peace more likely to last. Information for peace agreement variables comes from Högbladh's (2011) UCDP Peace Agreement database.

Third-party guarantees are an important contribution to the sustainability of peace. The involvement of the *United Nations* in the form of peacekeeping operations have been found to extend the durability of peace agreements (Fortna 2004b, Doyle and Sambanis 2006), thus my models include a dichotomous variable that reads 1 if a UN mission (observer or full peacekeeping) is present. Information from the UN Peacekeeping website, <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/>. I expect post-conflict stability to last longer if the UN has a peacekeeping presence.⁷²

If the country that emerges from a civil conflict can limit the development of new grievances, the risk of reemergence of fighting should be smaller. Economic development will increase rebels' opportunity costs (Walter 2004), making it less likely that people will (re)join the fighters. Measures for development in my models are yearly per capita *gross domestic product* and *life expectancy*. Better development indicators should be correlated with fewer relapses into violence. The information comes from the World Development Indicators. The presence of lootable natural resources also influences the calculus of past and future rebels. I use Gilmore et al.'s (2005) information on secondary (artisanal, thus easy to mine) diamonds and hypothesize that those countries in which *lootable natural resources* are present will be more likely to see a return to war. Previous research finds a

⁷² Recent research on UN peacekeeping points out that UN mission vary tremendously in their mandate and commitment level. Kathman (2013), for example, introduces a measure of UN troop numbers and distinguishes military personnel from police and observer missions.

correlation between the level of *democracy* in a country and the stability of peace (Hartzell et al. 2001, Walter 2004). Concurrently, I propose that more democratic countries, as measured by the Polity IV indicator (Marshall et al. 2010), should be at a lesser risk of new war.

Methodology

Previous literature suggests two methodological approaches to determine the factors that increase the probabilities of a sustainable peace. When the dependent variable is dichotomous, stating whether a peace is stable at a certain time, researchers have used logit regression (e.g. Doyle and Sambanis 2000, DeRouen and Chowdry 2013). Most recent research on post-conflict peacebuilding employs duration models, both parametric Weibull (Hartzell and Hoddie 2003) and Cox proportional hazard models (Fortna 2004b, Mattes and Savun 2010, Gurses and Rost 2013).

Duration models

Event history models have the advantage that I do not have to determine an arbitrary point in time at which peace is deemed sustainable, as I have to do for logistic regressions. Instead, the dependent variable is the end of a peace spell, if and whenever it occurs, and the model determines which factors contribute to an earlier or later failure. The unit of analysis for this method is the post-conflict dyad year (dyad information from UCDP Dyadic Conflict Termination Dataset Version 1-2010) and a failure is noted for the year in which the count of battle-related deaths exceeds 25 again. There are a number of duration models that have been used to assess peace durability, particularly the Weibull parametric model and the Cox proportional hazard model.

Parametric duration models require an assumption regarding the shape of the baseline hazard rate; the Weibull model assumes that the hazard rate is monotonically changing over time. Hartzell and Hoddie (2003) point out that the failure event for peace agreements is indeed time-dependent: the longer a peace has lasted, the less likely should be a violation of the agreement, all else being equal. Weibull models can be more efficient for smaller samples (Fortna 2004b). Contrary, Mattes and Savun (2010) argue that there is no strong theoretical expectation about the shape of the hazard rate, thus one should prefer the Cox semi-parametric model (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004). Most control variables are static because they refer to events during the previous conflict episode (e.g. the cumulative number of deaths for the episode, or whether T2+ took place), but some explanatory variables can vary over the time, including Polity score, GDP per capita or the presence of United Nations peacekeepers. Gurses and Rost (2013) point out that parametric models can deal better with these time-varying covariates.

I run a Cox proportional hazard model and then test the proportional hazard assumption. The global test of all covariates shows that ρ is significantly different from 0, suggesting serious time correlation. Ten of fifteen independent variables have significant ρ values, too. Because the proportional hazard assumption is violated I will continue with a parametric Weibull model instead.

Logistic regression and bivariate probit

For the logistic regression models I create three dummy variables: the first one measures a return to war at any point until 2009; the second one is positive if the dyad sees new violence within 2 years of the end of the preceding episode; the last is coded 1 if a

conflict reemerges within five years of peace.⁷³ Because I expect the probability of renewed conflict to change over time – the longer peace lasted, the less likely should renewed violence become – I include the peace year count as a time variable into the model. Including cubic splines and a count of post-conflict years leads to comparable results – the same variables are statistically significant that are significant in the logistic or Cox models. I specify robust standard errors clustered on conflict dyad to account for autocorrelation across multiple pairings of the same opponents.

As I have shown in earlier chapters, non-state interventions is more common in certain conflicts and using duration models that do not take into account the selection effects at play might underestimate the importance of T2+. Because there are no simultaneous equation models specifically for event history data, I return to the logistic approach. I run a logistic regression that includes a number of variables meant to capture time effects – a count of peace years and cubic splines (Beck et al. 1998). The dependent variable, as in the duration models, is the end of a peace spell when and if it occurs. The results should mirror the results of the hazard model.

Then, as in earlier models (see Chapter 4) I develop a seemingly unrelated recursive bivariate probit model to account for potential endogeneity of instances of T2+ during violent conflict and post-conflict peace durability. In the first stage I include variables measuring the intractability of the conflict: conflict duration, number of battle deaths, ethnic fractionalization and maximum number of conflict parties during the conflict

⁷³ The time frame for my sample is too small to use a robustness check of 10-year peace spells; none of the 44 dyads that live peaceful for 10 years or longer experience a return to war. The longest peace that ultimately fails lasts seven years. Doyle and Sambanis (2000) code civil war as recurring if at least 1,000 people have died in new violence. My sample includes only four cases of renewed conflict that rise to the level of major war (1,000 battle-related deaths), and only one case where 1,000 casualties occur in one year.

episode. As discussed, the likelihood of NGO intervention should be higher for more intractable cases. I expect non-state conflict management to be more frequent the longer a conflict, the higher the country's ethnic fractionalization, and the more rebel groups exist. The number of veto players is the instrumental variable for this model: as more groups enter the fray, chances that one particular rebel group will match with a non-state conflict manager will decline, as results in earlier chapters have shown. At the same time, more simultaneous dyads in the past should not affect present peace sustainability within a specific dyad. I also include official mediation in the first equation as track-one and track-two diplomacy are often correlated. The second equation of this regression models the factors increasing the probability of a peace ending, while controlling for factors that may have affected the probability that T2+ occurred during the active conflict.

Testing and discussion

T2+ contributes to longer peace spells

Duration models

I graph the cumulative hazard (Figure 21) as well as the survivor function (Figure 22) by non-state conflict management, presenting the probability a peace endures given that it has lasted until a given time and whether the conflict dyad experienced T2+.⁷⁴

Figure 21 shows a small advantage for those dyads that previously saw NGO intervention: dyads with T2+ have a slightly higher chance of survival at any point, once the

⁷⁴ Looking at the Kaplan-Meier curve it seems as if no peace fails in the first two years after conflict termination (the survival function is 1). However, 25 of 312 dyad peace spells (8%) fail in the first two years.

two-year mark has passed. The hazard rate climbs in the first seven years after the end of a conflict from 0 to 0.048, and then remains steady.⁷⁵

Figure 21: Nelson-Aalen cumulative hazard estimate for peace ending





Figure 22: Kaplan-Meier survival estimates for post-conflict peace



⁷⁵ The non-monotonic form of the hazard rate advises against using a Weibull parameterization. But because the Kaplan-Meier curve is flat for any analysis time larger than 7, and because the Cox model is not superior, I stick with Weibull.

The fact that a return to violent conflict becomes more likely over time, at least in the first seven years – the probability of peace failing is close to 2% at two years and about 3.8% at five years – is slightly counterintuitive, but could be explained by this dynamic: after a conflict ends, both sides take a wait-and-see approach for a year or two, refraining from returning to violence, but then they will display increasing impatience if the root causes of the conflict are not addressed, or agreements not implemented as envisioned. After about seven years the hazard rate stabilizes. The result for the p parameter in the Weibull regression is larger than 1, indicating an increase of the hazard rate over time. This finding is inconsistent with the literature – we would expect peace to become more stable over time – but can be explained with the limited time frame of the sample. Table 19 presents the results of the Weibull regression.

The variable accounting for non-state conflict management in the preceding dyad episode has a positive coefficient (a hazard rate larger than 1), indicating that conflict dyads that have seen T2+ are more likely to return to violent conflict.⁷⁶ The measure is not statistically significant. In fact, only three variables are statistically significant: the incompatibility measure, outcome in victory by one side and the Polity score. All three perform as expected: conflicts that are about government control are much less likely to see a relapse into war than separatist conflicts. Resounding victories lead to more stable peace. And as democracy levels rise, a return to violence becomes less probable. The other controls do not show any statistical significance. Notably, like T2+, official mediation displays a positive coefficient.

⁷⁶ The result contradicts the hazard rates depicted in figure 2. The Kaplan Meier function does not take the covariates into account.

Table 16: Duration of post-conflict peace spell

	(1) Hazard model (Weibull)
<i>Duration</i>	<i>Coefficient</i>
T2+ in dyad episode	0.62 (1.12)
Official mediation	0.64 (0.82)
Military intervention	1.74 (1.52)
Dyad duration, log	0.60 (0.43)
Battle deaths, logged	0.11 (0.41)
Rebel motivation	-4.19*** (1.48)
Ethnic fractionalization	-1.52 (1.83)
Negotiated settlement	-0.25 (0.93)
Victory	-5.89* (3.20)
Power-sharing provisions	1.00 (4.46)
Amnesty provision	-0.27 (1.89)
Joint implementation oversight	-2.39 (2.39)
UN mission	-2.33 (4.88)
Lootables	-1.03 (1.64)
GDP per capita, logged	0.36 (0.93)
Life expectancy	-0.05 (0.06)
Democracy score	-0.30* (0.16)
Constant	0.68 (5.36)
<i>N</i>	841 (85 clusters: dyads)
	Failures: 34
Wald Chi ²	81.50***
Log pseudolikelihood	-118.09
<i>p</i>	1.46

Note: Coefficients, with robust standard errors clustered on country in parentheses.
*Significant at the .1 level, **significant at the .05 level, ***significant at the .01 level

Logistic regression

The results of the main logit regression are presented in Table 15.

Table 17: Likelihood of conflict recurrence

Logistic regression	(2) Return to violence at some point	(3) Return to violence within 2 years	(4) Return to violence within 5 years
T2+ in dyad episode	0.19 (0.71)	1.67** (0.83)	-0.15 (0.67)
Official mediation	0.71 (0.64)	2.22** (1.04)	1.40** (0.58)
Military intervention	0.35 (0.81)	-0.41 (0.87)	0.23 (0.73)
Dyad duration, log	0.59* (0.33)	0.63 (0.44)	0.65*** (0.24)
Battle deaths, logged	-0.07 (0.24)	-0.57** (0.28)	-0.29 (0.18)
Rebel motivation	-2.40*** (0.72)	-4.05*** (1.16)	-2.31*** (0.58)
Ethnic fractionalization	0.13 (1.44)	4.20 (5.05)	-0.23 (1.46)
Negotiated settlement	-0.94 (0.73)	-0.93* (0.56)	-0.26 (0.61)
Victory	-2.41 (1.56)		
Power-sharing provisions	0.06 (1.66)	0.67 (1.20)	-0.85 (1.15)
Amnesty provision	-1.57 (1.03)		-2.00** (0.97)
Joint implementation oversight	0.48 (1.10)	-2.24** (1.00)	0.70 (0.93)
UN mission	-2.43 (1.98)		-1.22 (1.26)
Lootables	-1.07 (0.74)	-0.95 (1.08)	-0.64 (0.56)
GDP per capita, logged	0.44 (0.36)	0.10 (0.38)	0.40 (0.28)
Life expectancy	0.04 (0.04)	0.19*** (0.07)	0.06* (0.03)
Democracy score	-0.09 (0.07)	-0.14*** (0.05)	-0.08 (0.06)
Constant	-6.50*** (2.45)	-10.08** (5.05)	-3.98* (2.05)
<i>N</i>	841 (85 clusters)	841	841 (85)
Wald Chi ²	428.74***	.	165.57***
Log pseudolikelihood	-97.51	-40.31	-88.96

Note: Coefficients, with robust standard errors clustered on country in parentheses.

*Significant at the .1 level, **significant at the .05 level, ***significant at the .01 level

Three cubic splines and a count of peaceful years included in models and not reported.

Once again, non-state conflict management is not statistically significant, but displays a positive sign, indicating that dyads that see T2+ during a conflict episode are more likely to see a reemergence of conflict after the end of the violence than those dyads that do not see T2+. Model 2 tests the factors that may contribute to a breakdown of peace at any point. The results are similar to the ones reported for the event history model. The main explanatory variables retain their directionality, although some controls – not statistically significant in either model – switch their sign. Significant in model 2 are the logged duration of the conflict dyad and the incompatibility measure. Separatist conflicts are more likely to reemerge than wars about government control. The longer a conflict has lasted, the more likely is the outbreak of new violence, hinting at the perpetuation of rivalries.

Defying expectations, peace grows weaker over time; the longer a peace spell lasts, the more likely is a new dyad episode. The count of peace years is statistically significant at the .01 level and positive. This result mirrors the finding of larger than 1 for the p -value in the Weibull duration model.

The cubic splines included in the model are statistically significant, confirming the existence of time effects. The coefficients for the splines reflect the form of the hazard function (Figure 21): the first spline has a positive coefficient, because return to war is likely to occur in the early years; the second spline is negative as peace becomes more stable.

Subsequent models drop the variable for victory outcome because my sample includes no cases of conflicts ending in victory that see new conflict within two or five

years of the preceding episode.⁷⁷ Similarly, no dyads that agree on amnesty provisions or invite a UN peacekeeping force into the country experience new war in the first two years after the war. After a variable is dropped automatically, I exclude it from the model and run the regression again. The results when the dependent variable is new conflict within 24 months are comparable to model 2. T2+ is still positive, although now statistically significant (model 3). Again, this points to the fact that non-state conflict management may be most common in intractable conflicts, those, that are quick to resume after brief intermissions. When expanding the time horizon – dependent variable is now new conflict within five years – the model only converges when some of the time variables are taken out. The results are included in Table 2 (model 4). Additionally to those variables found significant in model 2, the factors that are significantly associated with lower probabilities that a peace fails within five years are amnesty provisions in negotiated peace agreements and the time since the conflict ended. T2+ is also negative in this model, but not significant.

Bivariate probit

I run the seemingly unrelated recursive bivariate probit regression and find the results less changed than anticipated (see Table 16).

Coefficients have not changed direction. Non-state conflict management remains positive and is now statistically significant.

⁷⁷ There is some correlation in the variables accounting for institutional provisions (powersharing and joint implementation is correlated at .30), and between outcomes (negotiated agreements and termination by victory are correlated at -.45). Agreements and joint implementation are correlated at .56. If I delete variables individually, the signs of the coefficients do not change.

Table 18: Likelihood of conflict recurrence: Seemingly unrelated recursive bivariate probit

Results of the second equation DV: Peace failure	(5) Return to violence at some point
T2+ in dyad episode	1.96*** (0.31)
Official mediation	0.31 (0.30)
Military intervention	-0.31 (0.39)
Dyad duration, log	0.24* (0.12)
Battle deaths, logged	-0.20** (0.10)
Rebel motivation	-0.80** (0.36)
Ethnic fractionalization	0.68 (0.72)
Negotiated settlement	-0.50 (0.32)
Victory	-0.83 (0.76)
Power-sharing provisions	0.17 (0.36)
Amnesty provision	-0.64* (0.33)
Joint implementation oversight	0.50 (0.37)
UN mission	-0.99 (0.78)
Lootables	-0.32 (0.40)
GDP per capita, logged	0.19 (0.17)
Life expectancy	0.03* (0.09)
Democracy score	-0.03 (0.03)
Peace years	1.21*** (0.20)
Constant	-3.93*** (1.04)
<i>N</i>	841 (85 clusters)
Log pseudolikelihood	-443.50
Rho	-1***

Note: Coefficients, with robust standard errors clustered on country in parentheses.
 *Significant at the .1 level, **significant at the .05 level, ***significant at the .01 level
 Three cubic splines included in models and not reported.

Official mediation, too, remains positively (though not significantly) associated with higher probabilities of peace failing. Possibly non-state conflict management as measured

in this dissertation project – which focuses on initiatives targeting the leadership of conflict parties – has truly similar negative effects on post-conflict stability as track-one diplomacy has (Beardsley 2012). But I am very aware of the limitations of my data, including a very short potential peace period and little variation on the dependent variable, return to war. By looking at the sub-categories of T2+ closer, I hope to establish whether there are some approaches that may still be beneficial to long-term peace.

Because postestimation tests⁷⁸ reveal that the instrument used in the regression is weak and because others are not available I return to simple logistic regression.⁷⁹

Model 6 in Table 17 includes dummy variables for the individual categories of T2+ approaches: direct mediation, mediation support, training and problem-solving workshops. The reference category is “no T2+ in this dyad episode.” The only statistically significant T2+ variable is the dummy for mediation support. Its coefficient is positively related to a relapse into war. Mediation support is the T2+ activity most closely affiliated with high-level diplomatic negotiations. Thus, this finding confirms research that sees mediation as effective in the short-term, but counter-productive in the long run. T2+ mediation, contrarily, is negative in this model. Its significance comes close to acceptable levels (p -value of 0.104). While in my research high-level mediation is very consistently related to higher probabilities of peace failure, NGO mediation, when it happens, seems to contribute to a more sustainable peace.

⁷⁸ Endogeneity test after Two Stages Least Squares cannot reject the null hypothesis that the first stage variables are exogenous.

⁷⁹ Similarly to earlier chapters, I attempt to run the logit regression for the sub-sample of cases that experience T2+, but the model does not converge, even after dropping a number of variables.

Table 19: T2+ and approaches

Logistic regression	(6)
<i>DV: end of peace spell</i>	<i>Coefficient</i>
T2+ training in dyad episode	-0.19 (1.09)
T2+ mediation	-1.81 (1.11)
T2+ mediation support	3.97** (1.73)
Problem-solving workshops	0.31 (1.00)
Official mediation	0.42 (0.90)
Military intervention	-0.86 (1.44)
Dyad duration, log	0.54 (0.36)
Battle deaths, logged	-0.05 (0.27)
Rebel motivation	-2.43*** (0.70)
Ethnic fractionalization	-0.82 (1.16)
Negotiated settlement	-0.11 (0.77)
Victory	-2.45 (2.05)
Power-sharing provisions	-0.84 (2.38)
Amnesty provision	-2.73** (1.33)
Joint implementation oversight	0.62 (1.21)
UN mission	-2.39 (2.56)
Lootables	-0.95 (1.02)
GDP per capita, logged	0.46 (0.45)
Life expectancy	0.03 (0.04)
Democracy score	-0.08 (0.06)
Peace years	2.87*** (0.51)
Constant	-5.46** (1.04)
<i>N</i>	841 (85 clusters)
Wald Chi ²	456.09***
Log pseudolikelihood	-80.96

Note: Coefficients, with robust standard errors clustered on country in parentheses.
 *Significant at the .1 level, **significant at the .05 level, ***significant at the .01 level
 Three cubic splines included in models and not reported.

Capacity-building during ongoing conflict is negative, but not statistically significant, while the coefficient for problem-solving workshops is positive.

Number and duration of T2+ initiatives

In order to tease out whether the number and duration of T2+ initiatives matter, I include new variables in a logit regression. The first is a count variable for the number of T2+ initiatives that took place in the preceding dyad episode. The variable measures from 0 to 7. The second is the duration of the longest-lasting effort in the preceding conflict episode (0 = no T2+, 1 = one-time effort, 2 = project runs up to one year, 3 = multi-year effort). And lastly, I interact the two variables. Table 18 shows the results of this and the following bivariate probit model.

The negative coefficients for the duration and number of T2+ efforts indicate that more initiatives, as well as longer-lasting ones, are more beneficial for sustainable peace than shorter, or fewer T2+ efforts. The variables are not statistically significant. The interaction term of them is significant, and it is positive, meaning that as more and longer efforts combine, they may have the opposite of the desired effect and contribute to renewed violence. However, this model does not address the endogeneity between dyads that are inherently prone to repeated conflict episodes and the intractability that attracts T2+. A bivariate probit model confirms the results – and returns statistically significant coefficients for number and duration of efforts (model 8). I can note some cautious support for hypothesis 5b.

Table 20: Number and duration of T2+ initiatives

DV: end of peace spell	(7) Logit model	(8) Seemingly unrelated bivariate probit; second stage
No. of T2+ initiatives in dyad episode	-1.66 (1.64)	-0.35*** (0.19)
Duration of most sustained T2+ effort	-0.94 (1.11)	-0.35* (0.19)
Interaction of number and duration of initiatives	0.85 (0.59)	0.37*** (0.13)
T2+ in dyad episode	1.59 (2.36)	2.65*** (0.51)
Official mediation	0.15 (0.75)	-0.01 (0.32)
Military intervention	0.46 (0.91)	-0.17 (0.25)
Dyad duration, log	0.58 (0.37)	0.23* (0.14)
Battle deaths, log	-0.03 (0.23)	-0.16 (0.10)
Rebel motivation	-2.72*** (0.67)	-1.06*** (0.36)
Ethnic fractionalization	1.25 (2.03)	1.00 (0.72)
Negotiated settlement	-0.89 (0.72)	-0.47* (0.25)
Victory	-2.09 (1.73)	-0.95 (0.88)
Power-sharing provisions	0.84 (1.56)	0.54 (0.50)
Amnesty provision	-2.14* (1.17)	-0.86** (0.41)
Joint implementation oversight	0.73 (1.02)	0.47 (0.40)
UN mission	-1.71 (1.57)	-0.63 (0.57)
Lootables	-1.27 (0.92)	-0.56* (0.03)
GDP per capita, logged	0.53 (0.41)	0.31 (0.20)
Life expectancy	0.06* (0.04)	0.04** (0.02)
Democracy score	-0.16** (0.07)	-0.08** (0.03)
Peace years	2.82*** (0.48)	1.25*** (0.19)
Constant	-8.76*** (3.24)	-4.87*** (1.15)
<i>N</i>	841 (85 clusters)	841 (85 clusters)
Wald Chi ²	259.37***	
Log pseudolikelihood	-81.76	-439.80
<i>Rho</i> (error correlation)		-1***

Note: Coefficients, with robust standard errors clustered on country in parentheses.


*Significant at the .1 level, **significant at the .05 level, ***significant at the .01 level

Three cubic splines included in models and not reported.

The interpretation of coefficients for interaction effects is not straightforward.

Therefore, I plot the interaction of my two variables of interest – duration of T2+ efforts and number of T2+ initiatives in a dyad episode (Figure 23).⁸⁰

Figure 23: Marginal effects of the interaction between T2+ duration and number of T2+ efforts (based on Model 7)



The shaded areas show the different predicted values for the probability of peace failing/war returning in a post-conflict dyad year. The darker the area, the higher is the likelihood of renewed violence in a dyad. As the regression results show, the probability that a dyad relapses into war declines with an increased number of T2+ initiatives during the preceding conflict, e.g. those conflicts that saw two T2+ efforts are at a 3-4% risk of

⁸⁰ Postestimation commands in Stata are not available for the seemingly unrelated bivariate probit; I use the logit predictions instead.

peace failing, while those that saw four initiatives are at a 1-2% risk. The duration of the most-sustained T2+ effort in a dyad episode has a similarly positive effect on peace durability. For example, those dyad episodes that see only one-off initiatives vary in their chance of conflict reoccurrence from 1-11%, but those that see multi-year projects have a 1-6% risk of new war. The combined effect of the interaction is small, yet clear: combining long-term effects and larger number of projects has a positive effect on conflict durability. For example, an episode that experiences two T2+ one-time initiatives has a 4% chance of seeing a new conflict, but when in an episode that experiences two initiatives at least one of project runs longer than 12 months, the risk of conflict decreases to 3%.

I end with a few interesting takeaways regarding some control variables: the most consistent predictor for a high probability of renewed conflict is the incompatibility measure. Separatist conflicts are more prone to reemergence of conflict. Few variables measuring post-conflict institutions are statistically significant across models. The regressor for amnesty provisions is consistently related to longer-lasting peace spells, while other measures seem to contribute less reliably to sustainable peace. Democracy is a decent predictor for durable peace. The proxies for quality of life, however, perform surprisingly. When they are significant, they are in an unexpected direction: higher GDP is in some models related to higher probabilities of new violence after a conflict has ended. This finding does not necessarily mean that less economic development will mean a better peace – it could be an indication for a need to focus on change in GDP in a country over time instead of absolute numbers. People may not rejoin an insurgency because of their government's low economic performance; but if a country at the lower end of the GDP scale sinks even deeper into poverty, this might motivate people to rebel.

Lastly, the results for the measures for time are quite puzzling. The constant term is negative and significant, indicating that if no covariates are taken into account, over time peace should become more stable. But the count of peace years for dyads has a positive coefficient, which suggests that as the duration of a non-violent spell gets longer by one year, the probability of renewed conflict increases. The splines show that the risk of new conflict changes over time. Early on the hazard that a dyad returns to war is high, later it decreases, and after a long peaceful time the risk for war increases again.

Conclusion

The end of a violent conflict is often a short-term relief. Making a cease-fire last and a peace deal stick is difficult, and many countries relapse into war – conflict dyad episodes analyzed in this chapter see a recurrence of significant violence in 29% of the cases. Non-state conflict management during an ongoing conflict can prepare parties for a time after the fighting. Problem-solving workshops, negotiation preparation and other training is positively related with more durable peace. My statistical models do not allow me to ascertain that non-state conflict management will always be related to durable peace. But they indicate that NGO mediation, in particular, is linked to sustainable post-conflict calm. When T2+ mediation occurs in an ongoing conflict, the following peace is more likely to hold than if it does not occur. Contrarily, high-level official mediation remains positively related to higher risks of conflict renewal, as Beardsley (2012) finds. My results thus hint towards a way of avoiding the mediation dilemma when mediation ends a conflict in the short term but is related to the breakdown of the peace that follows: T2+ mediation may help to resolve conflicts in a more sustainable way than track-one diplomacy.

Both a larger number of T2+ initiatives and longer-lasting efforts are associated with smaller risks of war reoccurrence. However, many long T2+ efforts are a symptom for particularly fragile dyads that are prone to renewed violence.

My theory suggests that the content of T2+ initiatives might be less important than their duration, and some results of my statistical models, while not conclusive, support the view that longer-lasting efforts are more effective than shorter ones (and more is better, to a point) indicate that in fact substance matters. But even though only direct mediation and T2+ training are ever statistically significant that these approaches are related to longer peace spells while others do not cautions me against accepting the notion that type of intervention does not matter at all.

Still, the statistical methods employed do not allow me to determine with certainty whether NGOs contribute to a peaceful post-conflict environment through their help to forge a better, fairer peace, or whether their main contribution is the socialization of conflict-party leaders. Duration of the longest-lasting T2+ initiative in a given dyad episode remains a crude measure of NGO commitment. My models do not include a control for NGO initiatives that happen after the conflict has ended. However, I do include a variable for United Nations mission. I argue that this captures both official and non-official post-conflict reconstruction efforts as the UN often works in tandem with local and international NGOs. The United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations highlights on its website that “The work of CSOs (local and international) can often complement that of a peacekeeping operation.⁸¹” For example, the UN Development Assistance Framework 2013-2017 for Liberia states that the a goal for the UN is “strengthening capacity of people of Liberia

⁸¹ http://www.un-ngls.org/spip.php?page=article_s&id_article=843, accessed October 14, 2014

through CSOs to engage in consultation, advocacy and outreach activities related to national reconciliation.”

Even if I take into account peace-building efforts that happen after the conflict ends by including a control for UN peacekeeping, the variable for T2+ remains significant.

A major limitation of the data, beyond the small sample size and short time period under observation, is the relatively short duration of and potential post-conflict period. The longest peace spells are 19 years, but most are much shorter because I only consider conflict dyads that ended in the time period 1990-2009. There are only few cases of dyads relapsing, which cautions against generalizing from this sample. Lastly, the appropriate methods for some models require instrumental variables that are difficult to identify.

The results of this chapter have implications for both theoretical models of civil war processes and practical efforts to end conflict. I find evidence that events during the war will influence the chances of peace. Particularly, I point to the impact third-party interventions can have. Previous literature on sustainable peace has focused on third-party guarantees during the implementation phase of peace agreements, but less so on the far-reaching effects of interventions during the conflict. I have analyzed how non-state conflict management can contribute to a more stable peace. Practically, my findings show the initiatives included in my analysis do not only decrease the duration of civil conflicts, but that they also potentially contribute to a more sustainable peace.

This chapter concludes the empirical section of the dissertation. In the following pages I will revisit the questions posed at the beginning of the project, summarize my findings and consider the larger implications of the study.

Chapter 7 – Conclusion

Revisiting the research questions

This dissertation set out to shed light on non-state actors in conflict management. It is motivated by the question how actors without the resources and influence available to governments may intervene successfully in internal conflicts. I put forward a theoretical framework based on the literature on mediation by weak actors in which I propose that the advantages NGOs and other non-state conflict managers bring to the table arise from unique characteristics of these groups, as well as the activities undertaken by them. Some non-state actors derive their legitimacy from long-standing relations with one or more of the conflict parties. Their claims to neutrality are more believable than those of powerful states with strong national interests. And their inherent lack of enforcement power allows opponents to explore creative solutions without the fear of being forced to sign a premature agreement. Regarding the activities undertaken by non-state actors, the data collected for the dissertation project distinguish between mediation services, capacity-building, and unofficial dialog. Non-state mediators can be alternatives to governmental actors. In this role they are particularly attractive if third-party states are reluctant to get involved in dispute resolution, or if one party is concerned that governmental mediators would bestow legitimacy on the opponent. Negotiation training and other capacity-building measures, as well as problem-solving workshops and similar dialog-focused interactions are complementary to other diplomatic interventions, and I expect them to enhance the success rate of official conflict resolution. The preceding empirical chapters have tested hypotheses derived from the larger theoretical context. I have focused on outcomes that are measurable and directly attributed to T2+. This concluding chapter summarizes

findings, considers the implications for theory and practice, and points to future research avenues.

Summary of findings

T2+ and high-level negotiations

Conflicts that see T2+ are significantly more likely to also see official mediation at some point during the same conflict episode. The finding that T2+ and high-level mediation frequently occur in the same conflicts indicates that the two tracks of diplomacy are complementary to rather than exclusive of each other. It also indicates that the two types of conflict management are attracted to (or by) similar circumstances. This is important when scholars consider the selection effects of mediation – similarly to the endogeneity between mediation and difficult-to-solve conflicts (Gartner 2011, 2013), T2+ is more common in intractable conflict settings. Studies need to pay attention to the non-random occurrence of conflict management; if they do not, findings that mediation correlates with longer conflicts can lead to the faulty conclusion that mediation causes longer conflict duration.

I confirm that non-state conflict management is more than a companion to (inter)governmental mediation; it is a precursor: The probability of high-level mediation in a year more than doubles if a conflict dyad experiences T2+ in the preceding year. This result shows that NGO conflict management can move a conflict towards serious negotiations.

When considering how T2+ may fulfill this task, I find partial support for my hypothesis that capacity-building measures will lead to the onset of high-level mediation. While the proposed relationship is confirmed for mediation led by intergovernmental organizations, it is not true for mediation by third-party governments. The discrepancy can

be explained with the different modes of operation of IGOs and governments.

Intergovernmental bodies are by definition collaborative enterprises and they are more often open to coordinate their efforts with other groups (which can also help preserve limited resources), while governments, should they decide to take on the role of mediators, do so for their own gain and are not as interested in cooperation with others. Direct mediation by non-state actors is also a significant precursor to high-level mediation, supporting my proposition that conflicts previously ignored by the third parties become more interesting after non-state actors have brought attention to them. Other categories of T2+ show no significant effect on the probability of high-level mediation occurring.

Potential official actors deciding whether to get involved in a conflict as mediators seem to take their cue primarily from preceding mediation attempts and to a lesser extent consider whether NGOs may have prepared the belligerents for talks (by the time a government considers whether such activities may have happened, they probably already have decided to become engaged in the process).

I expected to find a significant positive relationship between T2+ activities led by former high-level state officials and subsequent high-level mediation. However, I find the opposite effect, at least for the subset of third-party governmental mediation. This result indicates that former heads of state who take on the role of mediator do so in place of, rather than in concert with, current government officials, while religious organizations more commonly prepare parties for track-one diplomacy.

T2+ and conflict termination

The results in Chapter 3 show that the phenomenon of non-state conflict management is not random across conflict dyads. Rather, it occurs more frequently in

intractable, long-lasting conflicts. In order to address these selection effects, models in Chapter 4-6 model endogeneity or limit the sample to conflicts that at some point experience T2+. I find that dyads that experience non-state conflict management in one year are significantly more likely to end in the following year. This result confirms an important proposition about conflict termination: T2+ can indeed contribute to the resolution of internal conflicts.

None of the T2+ categories included in the analysis have an individual positive effect. I had expected direct mediation to make a unique contribution towards conflict termination, but I cannot confirm the hypothesis. There are two possible explanations for the lack of findings. One, the effects of T2+ might be indirect and therefore difficult to measure. If the main contribution of T2+ in general, and T2+ mediation in particular is to pave the way for high-level mediation (see the findings in Chapter 3), then models including individual approaches lose predictive power. Two, the effects may be subtle and accumulate over time. For example, NGO mediation may be preceded by problem-solving workshops and/or accompanied by negotiation training. Even in the categories included in the analysis there may be variation that cannot be accounted for with my limited data.

The type of organization shows more distinction. Religiously affiliated groups have a statistically significant effect on conflict termination, while the coefficient for professional groups is not significant. Survival graphs that ignore other covariates indicate that dyads that see T2+ by religious organizations last on average shorter than those that see T2+ by professional groups, but once dyads have lasted 10 years, their survival rate is slightly lower when T2+ is provided by professional organizations. Contrary to expectations, the subset of T2+ providers led by former heads of state has no noticeable advantage when the

dependent variable is conflict termination. Similarly to the non-findings regarding NGO mediation, I expect a mixture of data weaknesses (the number of T2+ efforts executed by this specific subset of organizations is not large, and gets smaller in the restricted models) and a possibly indirect causal pathway ($T2+ \rightarrow T1 \rightarrow$ conflict termination) to account for the lack of results.

Capacity-building initiatives are significantly related to negotiated agreements. This result is in accordance with the findings regarding onset of high-level mediation: T2+ training leads to high-level mediation, and high-level mediation often is a necessary precursor to peace agreements. I confirm my expectation that those conflict dyads that eventually reach a negotiated agreement to end their dispute will do so sooner if there is T2+ in the conflict episode. Overall, I find convincing support that T2+ can contribute to conflict duration that is shorter than it would be without non-state conflict management.

T2+ and conflict severity

The results regarding the relationship between T2+ and conflict severity are encouraging, too. The coefficient for non-state mediation is negative and significant, supporting the proposition that during ongoing mediation conflicts become less violent, sparing lives. Dyad years in which non-state actors mediate, or support mediation activities, see a significant decline in the number of battle-related deaths. I do not find such a relationship for other T2+ initiatives, even when they last longer than a year. The results signal that a drop in the battle-death rate is less likely a long-term trend and more likely a temporary relief caused by conflict parties sitting down to negotiations.

T2+ capacity-building is significant when lagged two years, which indicates the possibility that training initiatives have a delayed effect on the conflict's intensity.

However, this could also pick up the pathway from negotiation training in one year to negotiations in the next – which in turn are associated with lower levels of deadly violence. Because the two-year lag leads to the loss of many observations, I cannot be confident in my findings. With a more complete sample I would expect a significant effect for an interaction term of lagged training and non-lagged mediation.

T2+ and sustainable peace

The most important, though still tenuous, finding with regards to the prospects for long-term peace is that while track-one diplomacy is consistently associated with higher risks of peace failure, NGO mediation is related to more sustainable peace. This finding supports the proposition that non-state actors have certain advantages over state actors and can be the more effective mediators. The expertise many conflict resolution NGOs bring to the table, combined with their uncontested neutrality, will help the parties to address root causes of the conflict instead of pushing them towards a superficial agreement. Further, confidential meetings away from the media spotlight allow for a more deliberate, less time-pressed negotiation process than diplomatic summits. This in turn assures that any agreement signed will be thoroughly vetted by both sides.

I also find some support for the hypothesis that long-term engagement by NGOs will contribute to a more stable post-conflict situation. Both duration and number of T2+ initiatives are significantly and negatively related to the probability of renewed conflict. The socialization occurring during long-term T2+ initiatives prepares belligerents for peaceful conflict resolution in the post-conflict setting.

Returning to the causal pathways suggested in the introduction I find that this dissertation research supports five out of eleven mechanisms. Figure 21 highlights them:

Figure 24: How non-state conflict management lead to outcomes

Non-state activity	effects	Outcome
Direct mediation	putting conflict on states' agenda prepare ground	Mediation by states and IGOs
Capacity building	give parties tools for negotiations, build confidence improve attitudes	
Unofficial interaction	clarify red lines	
Direct mediation	unconventional approaches and low-pressure process lead to success	Conflict termination
Capacity building	prepare for talks → lead to mediation	
Unofficial interaction	reduce tension, build trust	
Direct mediation	negotiation rounds interrupt fighting gestures of goodwill	Decline in severity
Unofficial interaction	personal connections changing perceptions	
Direct mediation	less time-pressure and more confidentiality more focused on resolution of underlying issues expertise, local knowledge	Sustainable peace
Capacity building	familiarity with conflict-resolution mechanisms applicable to post-war conflict situations	
Unofficial interaction	(alternatives to violence) trust, collaborative spirit, personal connections	

Direct mediation is valid alternative to mediation by governments and intergovernmental organizations, particularly with a long-term solution to a conflict in mind. Further, it becomes clear is that capacity-building takes a special place in a framework for non-state conflict management. These findings have consequences for both scholars and practitioners.

Implications

Implications for theory

My dissertation research both supports previous literature on mediation and expands our knowledge of non-state actors in international relations. For example, studies

of multi-party mediation propose that conflict resolution is most effective when non-state conflict management occurs before high-level negotiations (Crocker et al. 1999). My work confirms this earlier finding, elaborates on the potential mechanisms behind the T2-T1 sequence, and provides the data to test the relevant hypotheses. With that I contribute to the literature on non-traditional diplomacy, which to-date primarily consists of case studies. The project deepens the theory by studying what precisely it is about non-state conflict management that makes it effective. The data compiled for the dissertation, while limited, will be useful for testing of many other mechanisms (see next section).

My interest in non-state conflict management grows out of the larger question: what roles non-state actors can and should play in international relations? If non-governmental organizations and individuals can influence events in areas previously restricted to states' high diplomacy, theoretical frameworks that ignore participants beyond state governments are missing important facets of politics. This dissertation shows that unofficial diplomacy actors contribute to conflict resolution. They both work with third-party states that intervene in civil conflicts, e.g. when they prepare conflict parties for high-level mediation, and they act instead of governments, e.g. when the conflict parties prefer a weak mediator. Theories on third-party intervention in civil war need to be aware that states' decisions whether to become engaged in conflict resolution can be influenced by whether NGOs have laid the groundwork for negotiations. When considering which state-led mediation efforts may be more effective, in the short and particularly the long term, scholars should also take into account concurrent T2+ efforts that have their own independent and interactive effects on conflict outcome and sustainable peace. Omitting T2+ from the analysis may give more credit to official mediation than deserved – or too little of the synergy of T1 and T2 is

ignored. Going beyond the field of conflict resolution and mediation, I argue that research in other areas of international relations should be similarly mindful of non-state actors impacts on the outcome variables.

Implications for practice

An expansion of our understanding of conflict management is important for the development of effective conflict resolution practices. The main finding is that T2+ has an impact on conflict resolution, independent from official diplomacy. This is encouraging news for non-state conflict managers who find support for their assertion that they can help to bring conflicts to an end. But beyond this general endorsement, more nuanced findings point to at least three potential practical policy prescriptions. First, non-state conflict management is a precursor to high-level mediation, so those conducting T2+ should use their access to conflict parties to prepare them for direct negotiations. In this way, a sequence of T2+ → T1 can effectively lead to conflict resolution.

Second, sometimes non-state conflict management is superior to high-level mediation. Earlier work has pointed to the dilemma that mediation often ends conflicts in the short-term, but is also associated with recurrence of war (Beardsley 2012). My analysis of the impact T2+ has on peace durability finds support for the existence of the mediation dilemma, but also indicates solutions to the problem: non-state conflict management does not fall into the same pitfalls as governmental mediation. I suggest reasons for the difference, including a mediation environment with less publicity, less time pressure, and more focus on long-term solutions. Governments and intergovernmental mediators may learn from non-state mediators. Alternatively, T1 and T2 actors should cooperate closely in

mediations so that with a mix of leverage and low-key dialog both immediate violence can be brought to an end and long-term solutions will be found.

Third, of those approaches considered here, capacity-building has consistently positive effects for conflict management. This finding lends support to the ongoing development in conflict resolution practice of moving away from outside solutions towards supporting local solutions. Giving conflict parties the tools to solve their conflicts rather than expecting third parties to find solutions for them is not only the politically correct approach, it is noticeably effective.

Future research

While presenting a stand-alone project that introduces a refined theoretical framework for conflict management by non-state actors and provides important insights into the phenomena, the completed dissertation opens opportunities for a long-term research program. I am considering extension of the research both in depth, to learn more about T2+, and width, to learn about the interplay of T2+ with other conflict management activities.

The present research focuses on the effectiveness of T2+ in ongoing conflict. It leaves for the future considerations regarding the entry of T2+ actors into the mediator role. I am interested in studying the internal decision-making processes of T2+ organizations and how organizational considerations may influence the influence decisions in which conflict a group may decide to become active. Another topic yet to explore is whether cultural insiders (local peacemakers) or neutral outsiders (international organizations) are more effective conflict managers. Further I want to analyze whether local T2+ actors use different approaches than outsiders.

I find in my dissertation that the T2+ leads to T1, and that the relative effectiveness of certain T2+ categories may change over the duration of a conflict. Matters of timing and sequencing deserve closer examination. In-depth comparative case studies are better suited to approach such questions, and I am hoping to tackle this task in the future.

While some of these research questions can be approached with currently available information, others will benefit from an expansion of the data set compiled for the dissertation. I plan to collect data across more geographical regions so that the findings for African civil conflicts may be tested against situations in other countries. I also will revisit the conflicts included in the current sample and code T2+ both before and after episodes of violent conflict. This will provide the means to test hypotheses regarding long-term effects of T2+ interventions.

Concluding remarks

Wars are messy. Every conflict has its own history, trajectory and outcome. A “conflict dyad” consists of people: people with their individual motivations, grievances, willingness to accept risk, and disposition to violence or compromise. When considering the multitude of differences between the conflicts included in the sample for this dissertation research, the assumption that I can draw generalizable conclusions from them seems preposterous. When I contacted organizations working in track-two diplomacy during the coding process, I encountered skepticism – occasionally even criticism – for throwing over thirty distinct conflicts in more than twenty unique countries into one pot, expecting to see enough commonalities to find statistical significance and from that to deduct support for my theory.

Of course a quantitative approach loses detail, uses abstraction, and results cannot without further adaption be turned into policy prescriptions for individual cases. But even skeptics use abstraction. On a smaller scale, organizations compare diverse situations in which they have been engaged in conflict management activities in order to record best practices for future initiatives or to avoid making mistakes twice. I compare my cross-sectional study to their program evaluations and lessons-learned approach: for the sample employed certain T2+ groups/approaches are shown to be more effective than others.

Practitioners may find a study of all African civil wars 1990-2010 too broad, but quantitative scholars worry about generalizability based on a thus limited sample. Even if its focus is narrow, however, the findings of the dissertation are important both for the region under observation and beyond. They show that NGOs can prepare the ground for high-level mediation and increase the chances that negotiations will end in a peace agreement; they lead to a decrease in the level of violence; and they make peace more stable. Even marginal effects are significant when talking about civil conflicts, because they mean some lives were spared.

The results may be weak, but they are essential stepping-stones towards broader examinations of the impacts of non-state actors in general and non-state conflict management specifically. Thus, these findings can provide guidance for future work.

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Appendices

APPENDIX 1: List of conflict episodes included in analysis: Africa 1990-2010

Country	Episode ID (UCDP)	Rebel groups	StartDate1 (conflict start) MM/DD/YYYY	StartDate2 (episode start) MM/DD/YYYY	EpEndDate (up to 2010) MM/DD/YYYY
<u>Algeria</u>	191.1	Takfir wa'l Hijra AIS GIA AQIM	06/01/1991	12/09/1991	ongoing
<u>Angola</u>	131.1	FNLA UNITA	11/11/1975	11/11/1975	12/31/1995
Angola	131.2	UNITA	11/11/1975	05/02/1998	04/04/2002
Angola	192.1	FLEC-R	05/18/1991	06/03/1991	12/31/1991
Angola	192.2	FLEC-R FLEC-FAC	05/18/1991	01/01/1994	12/31/1994
Angola	192.3	FLEC-R FLEC-FAC	05/18/1991	01/01/1996	12/31/1998
Angola	192.4	FLEC-R FLEC-FAC	05/18/1991	01/01/2002	12/31/2002
Angola	192.5	FLEC-FAC	05/18/1991	01/01/2004	12/31/2004
Angola	192.6	FLEC-FAC	05/18/1991	01/01/2007	12/31/2007
Angola	192.7	FLEC-FAC	05/18/1991	01/01/2009	12/31/2009
Burundi	90.2	Palipehutu	10/18/1965	11/26/1991	12/31/1992
Burundi	90.3	CNDD Frolina Palipehutu-FNL CNDD-FDD	10/18/1965	10/18/1994	09/07/2006
Burundi	90.4	Palipehutu-FNL	10/18/1965	03/01/2008	12/04/2008
<u>Central African Republic</u>	222.1	Military faction Forces of F. Bozize	05/27/2001	06/01/2001	12/31/2002
Central African Republic	222.2	UFDR	05/27/2001	11/27/2006	12/31/2006
Central African Republic	222.3	CPJP	05/27/2001	12/07/2009	ongoing
<u>Chad</u>	91.4	Islamic Legion MPS MDD CNR CSNPD Milit. fact. B. Abbas CSNF	07/01/1966	03/03/1989	12/31/1994
Chad	91.5	FARF MDJT	07/01/1966	10/30/1997	12/31/2002
Chad	91.6	RAFD FUC UFDD AN UFR PFNR	07/01/1966	12/18/2005	ongoing
<u>Comoros</u>	213.1	MPA/Republic of Anjouan	09/03/1997	09/05/1997	12/31/1997
<u>Congo</u>	214.1	Ninjas	11/03/1993	11/11/1993	01/30/1994
Congo	214.2	Cobras Cocoyes Ninjas Ntsiloulous	11/03/1993	06/06/1997	12/29/1999
Congo	214.3	Ntsiloulous	11/03/1993	10/04/2002	12/31/2002
Cote d'Ivoire	225.1	MPCI	09/19/2002	09/19/2002	12/31/2004

		MPIGO MJP FN			
<u>Democratic Republic of Congo</u>	86.4	AFDL MLC RCD RCD-ML	01/18/1964	10/18/1996	12/31/2001
Democratic Republic of Congo	86.5	CNDP	01/18/1964	11/25/2006	10/29/2008
<u>Democratic Republic of Congo</u>	254.1	BDK	07/02/1998	02/01/2007	12/31/2008
<u>Djibouti</u>	184.1	FRUD	11/12/1991	11/13/1991	12/26/1994
Djibouti	184.2	FRUD	1/12/1991	07/24/1999	12/31/1999
Eritrea	130.1	Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement - Abu Suhail faction	12/16/1993	04/01/1997	12/31/1997
Eritrea	130.2	EIJM-AS	12/16/1993	04/04/1999	12/31/1999
Eritrea	130.3	EIJM-AS	12/16/1993	07/17/2003	12/31/2003
<u>Ethiopia</u>	70.2	EPDM EPRP TPLF Milit. fact. EPRDF	12/17/1960	06/02/1976	05/28/1991
<u>Ethiopia</u>	78.1	EPLF	09/30/1961	03/15/1964	05/28/1991
<u>Ethiopia</u>	133.3	AIAI ONLF	01/11/1964	10/13/1993	12/31/1994
Ethiopia	133.4	AIAI ONLF	01/11/1964	01/18/1996	12/31/1996
Ethiopia	133.5	ONLF AIAI	01/11/1964	01/06/1998	ongoing
<u>Ethiopia</u>	168.2	ARDUF	06/01/1975	06/01/1996	12/31/1996
<u>Ethiopia</u>	219.3	OLF	08/01/1974	07/01/1983	12/31/1992
Ethiopia	219.4	OLF	08/01/1974	01/01/1994	12/31/1995
Ethiopia	219.5	OLF	08/01/1974	01/01/1998	ongoing
<u>Guinea</u>	111.1	RFDG	09/01/2000	09/17/2000	12/31/2001
<u>Guinea-Bissau</u>	216.1	Military Junta	06/07/1998	06/07/1998	05/10/1999
<u>Lesotho</u>	217.1	Military faction	09/04/1998	09/23/1998	11/30/1998
<u>Liberia</u>	146.2	NPFL INPFL	04/12/1980	12/29/1989	09/10/1990
Liberia	146.3	LURD MODEL	04/12/1980	08/01/2000	08/18/2003
<u>Mali</u>	177.1	MPA	06/28/1990	07/21/1990	12/31/1990
Mali	177.2	FIAA	06/28/1990	10/04/1994	12/31/1994
Mali	177.3	ATNMC	06/28/1990	08/31/2007	01/22/2009
<u>Mauritania</u>	267.1	AQIM	09/15/2008	09/17/2010	ongoing
<u>Mozambique</u>	136.1	Renamo	01/01/1977	01/01/1977	10/04/1992
<u>Niger</u>	178.1	CRA	01/19/1994	05/16/1994	10/09/1994
<u>Niger</u>	212.1	FDR	03/23/1995	07/10/1995	07/10/1995
<u>Niger</u>	255.1	FLAA	10/01/1991	12/01/1991	12/31/1992
<u>Niger</u>	255.2	UFRA	10/01/1991	10/19/1997	11/29/1997
<u>Niger</u>	255.3	MNJ	10/01/1991	07/01/2007	10/30/2008
<u>Nigeria</u>	100.2	Boko Haram	01/15/1966	07/26/2009	07/30/2009
<u>Nigeria</u>	249.1	Ahlul Sunnah Jamaa	12/01/2003	09/23/2004	10/30/2004
<u>Nigeria</u>	250.1	NDPVF	06/05/2004	06/05/2004	09/20/2004
<u>Rwanda</u>	179.1	FPR	10/01/1990	10/03/1990	07/19/1994
<u>Rwanda</u>	179.2	ALIR, FDLR	10/01/1990	07/12/1996	12/31/2002
<u>Rwanda</u>	179.3	ALIR, FDLR	10/01/1990	01/28/2009	ongoing
<u>Senegal</u>	180.1	MFDC	12/01/1988	08/01/1990	12/31/1990
<u>Senegal</u>	180.2	MFDC	12/01/1988	09/01/1992	07/08/1993
<u>Senegal</u>	180.3	MFDC	12/01/1988	04/27/1995	12/31/1995
<u>Senegal</u>	180.4	MFDC	12/01/1988	03/23/1997	12/31/1998
<u>Senegal</u>	180.5	MFDC	12/01/1988	04/11/2000	12/31/2000
<u>Senegal</u>	180.6	MFDC	12/01/1988	01/01/2003	12/31/2003
<u>Sierra Leone</u>	187.1	RUF AFRC Kamajors	03/23/1991	05/04/1991	10/11/2000

		WSB			
<u>Somalia</u>	141.2	SNM SPM USC USC/SNA	01/18/1982	03/03/1986	12/31/1996
<u>Somalia</u>	141.3	SRRC	01/18/1982	05/12/2001	12/31/2002
<u>Somalia</u>	141.4	ARS/UIC Al-Shabaab Harakat Ras Kamboni Hizbul Islam	01/18/1982	10/24/2006	ongoing
<u>Sudan</u>	113.3	SPLM/A NDA JEM SLM/A NRF SLM/A-MM SLM/A-Unity Forces George Athor	07/22/1971	07/05/1983	ongoing
<u>Uganda</u>	118.3	UPA LRA	01/25/1971	01/22/1979	12/31/1992
<u>Uganda</u>	118.4	LRA ADF WNB UNRF II	01/25/1971	02/21/1994	ongoing

APPENDIX 2: List of T2+ organizations included and their activities

	Name	Religious organizations	Former head of state	Mediation	Training	Dialog	Frequency
1	Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative, Uganda	X		X	X		1
2	Ad Hoc Peace Committee, Ethiopia	X				X	2
3	African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)					X	1
4	African Dialogue Center for the Prevention, Management and Resolution of Conflicts			X			1
5	All African Council of Churches	X		X			1
6	Berghof Foundation				X		1
7	Bigombe, Betty (Uganda)			X			1
8	Carter Center		X	X	X		10
9	CECORE, Uganda			X			1
10	Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town			X	X		4
11	Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue			X	X		3
12	Community of Sant'Egidio	X		X	X	X	11
13	Ferrazzetta, Dom Settimio, Bishop of Bissau	X		X			1
14	Fondation NIOSI, Congo			X			1
15	Group of Oromo Elders, Ethiopia			X			1
16	International Committee for the Red Cross			X			1
17	Ijaw National Congress, Nigeria			X			1
18	Independent Center for Research and Initiatives for Dialogue (CIRID)					X	1
19	Independent Diplomat				X		1
20	Initiatives of Change International			X	X	X	4
21	Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy				X		1
22	Institute for Security Studies, South Africa					X	1
23	Inter-Faith Mediation Committee, Liberia	X		X			1
24	Inter-religious Council of Sierra Leone	X		X			1
25	International Alert				X	X	2
26	Interpeace					X	1
27	Life and Peace Institute	X		X			1
28	Mandela, Nelson		X	X			1
29	Mano River Women's Peace Network				X		1
30	Mediation Support Project, Switzerland				X		1
31	Moi Institute		X		X		1
32	Norwegian Church Aid	X		X			1
33	Nyerere Centre		X	X			1
34	Obasanjo Olusegun & Benjamin Mkapa		X	X			1
35	Okumu, Washington			X			1
36	Pax Christi	X		X			2
37	Religious groups in the DRC	X				X	1
38	Responding to Conflict			X			1
39	Reunir, Congo			X			1
40	Rwandan Catholic Church	X		X			1
41	Sudan Task Force, George Mason University				X	X	1
42	Synergies Africa			X		X	1
43	West Africa Peace Network					X	1
44	Wilson Center				X		2

APPENDIX 3: Coding Example

LIBERIA 146

Blurb from UCDP/PRIO Conflict Encyclopedia

Not considering the violence connected with the 1980 coup, the conflict over government power in Liberia can be divided into two main phases. The first phase is the armed conflict between the government of Liberia and the NPFL [National Patriotic Front of Liberia] and the INPFL faction [Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia, led by Prince Johnson], from 1989 to 1995, following which NPFL leader Charles Taylor became president. The second phase, from 2000 to 2003, saw Liberian President Charles Taylor fight against LURD [Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy, supported by Guinea] and MODEL [Movement for Democracy in Liberia]. The latter period was in many ways a continuation of the first phase of the conflict, but fought under new group denominations.

- (1) Mutwol, Julius. 2009. *Peace Agreements and Civil Wars in Africa: Insurgent Motivation, State Responses, and Third-Party Peacemaking in Liberia, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone*. Cambria Press: Amherst, NY.
- (2) Posthumus, Bram. 1999. "Liberia - Seven Years of Devastation and an uncertain Future," in: Mekenkamp, Monique, Paul van Tongeren and Hans van de Veen (eds.) *Searching for Peace in Africa: An Overview of Conflict Prevention and Management Activities*. European Platform for Conflict Prevention and Transformation: Utrecht, The Netherlands.
- (3) Atkinson, Philippa, and Edward Mulbah. 2000. "NGOs and Peace Building in Complex Political Emergencies: Agency Surveys from Liberia." Working Paper No. 10. Institute for Development Policy and Management. University of Manchester.
- (4) Scelzo, Vittorio. 2013. "The Peace Process in Liberia" in Morozzo della Roca, Roberto (ed.) *Making Peace: The Role Played by the Community of Sant'Egidio in the International Arena* New City: London, UK

EPISODE: 146.2 (NPFL) 146.1 (Military faction (forces of Samuel Doe))

TIME: 12/29/1989 – 09/10/1990⁸²

YEAR: 1990

- | | | |
|----|---------------|---------------|
| 1. | TRACK2: | yes |
| 2. | TRACK2NUMBER: | 1 |
| 3. | TRACK2EXACT | 1 |
| 4. | TRACK2TOTAL: | 1 |
| 5. | TRACK2START1: | June 12, 1990 |
| 6. | TRACK2END1: | June 16, 1990 |

⁸² Often the Liberian civil war is said to have lasted 1989-2003, costing 150-250,000 lives. A number of NGO initiatives happened during that decade.

7. TRACK2LENGTH1: one-time effort

8. ORGNAME1: Inter-Faith Mediation Committee (IFMC)

9. ORGTYPE1: religious: leaders of Liberian Council of Churches & National Muslim Council of Liberia

10. APPROACH1: Mediation. Brought NPFL and government delegations together

11. MAINNAME1: -999

DETAILS First meeting of group in US Embassy Freetown, invitation to second meeting on June 25 rejected by NPFL (1: 54; also Toure, Augustine. 2002. *The Role of Civil Society in National Reconciliation and Peacebuilding in Liberia*. International Peace Academy, p. 1).

EPISODE: 146.3 (NPFL)

TIME: 08/01/2000 – 08/18/2003

YEAR: 2000

1. TRACK2: no

2. TRACK2NUMBER: 0

3. TRACK2EXACT 0

4. TRACK2TOTAL: 1

Liberia 146.3

YEAR: 2001

1. TRACK2: yes

2. TRACK2NUMBER: 1

3. TRACK2EXACT 1

4. TRACK2TOTAL: 2

5. TRACK2START1: 2001

6. TRACK2END1: 2002

7. TRACK2LENGTH1: one year

8. ORGNAME1: MANO River Women's Peace Network

9. ORGTYPE1: network

10. APPROACH1: organized meetings with presidents of Mano River Union
(<http://www.blackpast.org/gah/mano-river-women-s-peace-network-2001>)

11. MAINNAME1: -999

Liberia 146.3

YEAR: 2002

1. TRACK2: yes
2. TRACK2NUMBER: 1
3. TRACK2EXACT 1
4. TRACK2TOTAL: 3

5. TRACK2START1: Summer 2002 (first contact with LURD, 4:234)
6. TRACK2END1: 18 August 2003 (signing peace agreement)
7. TRACK2LENGTH1: one year
8. ORGNAME1: Sant' Egidio
9. ORGTYPE1: religious
10. APPROACH1: go-between, help rebels
11. MAINNAME1: Mario Giro, Angelo Romano

Liberia 146.3

YEAR: 2003

1. TRACK2: yes
2. TRACK2NUMBER: 1
3. TRACK2EXACT 1
4. TRACK2TOTAL: 3

5. TRACK2START1: Summer 2002 (first contact with LURD, 4:234)
6. TRACK2END1: 18 August 2003 (signing peace agreement)
7. TRACK2LENGTH1: one year
8. ORGNAME1: Sant' Egidio
9. ORGTYPE1: religious
10. APPROACH1: go-between, help rebels
11. MAINNAME1: Mario Giro, Angelo Romano

Additional efforts:

TRACK 2+

- April 1994, February 1995: Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution (ICAR, @ George Mason University), Carter Center INN, Institute for Multi-track Diplomacy and "Friends of Liberia" are "conducting a series of problem-solving and reconciliation

workshops involving members of the warring factions and influential civilians from Liberian society.” (<http://fol.org/about-us/accomplishments>, accessed May 17, 2013)

- International Negotiation Network (INN) has acted as mediator since 1991.
- Collaboration Carter Center - Nairobi Peace Initiative (Carter Center 1996. “International Guide to NGO Activities in Conflict Prevention and Resolution”).
- Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy (IMTD) has program, but no activities during conflict years website: “IMTD’s involvement in West Africa began in the mid-1990s in partnership with the Carter Center. The initial focus was on facilitating dialogue among Liberians, beginning in 1993, when the Carter Center invited IMTD to work with them as part of The Consortium for Peacebuilding in Liberia. In 1994, Ambassador McDonald, along with three other conflict resolution experts from the Consortium, facilitated a problem-solving workshop for Liberians in Akosombo, Ghana. [...] The Consortium held its second training in 1995 in Abijan, Cote d’Ivoire, and expanded the original group to 19. Much of this problem solving workshop focused on introducing key procedural concepts into the peace process. In July 1996, then-President Jerry Rawlings of Ghana asked the Carter Center to send a team to Liberia to restart the peace process, which Ambassador McDonald.”
- Conflict Management Initiative (Private Diplomacy, CMI 2008), but “post-war state building” according to 2008 annual report
- International Alert facilitated meeting Taylor - Nigerians before 1995 Abuja agreement
- 2006: West Africa Net for Peacebuilding (WANEP)-Liberia section- together with Wilson Center organized high level reconciliation seminar (WANEP Annual Report 2006)
- WANEP was approached before peace talks to train negotiators, but declined (Doe, Sam. 2003. “When Mediation Becomes Manipulation” WANEP Annual Report 2003, http://www.wanep.org/wanep/files/ar/ar_2003_en.pdf, accessed 24 May 2013)

GRASSROOTS

- Conciliation Resources (Escola de Pau Yearbook 2010) – “support activities in civilian society”
- Friends of Liberia (5: “conducted fact-finding missions, provided relief and medical assistance, implemented community-based reconstruction projects, brought representatives of warring factions together in public forums and conflict resolution workshops, and advocated for effective policies on Liberia”): **1998-2004** – FOL administered the African Women and Peace Support Group’s project to document Liberian Women’s peace actions. The project was funded by UNOPS (UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS) and resulted in the book “Liberian Women Peacemakers,” published in English and in French in 2004. [indicates consistent grassroots activity during the coded years 2000-2003]
- Fondation Hirondelle – radio news; Dutch Interchurch aid and Oxfam – promoting peace locally; International Alert – radio programs to promote reconciliation (2: 314-315)
- Sam Doe, Christian Health Association of Liberia (CHAL) launched conflict resolution clubs in schools (23 Nov 1998, Star Radio, Monrovia – LexisNexis)
- Search for Common Ground: local media production facility (5 Oct 1999, Africa News – USAID report – LexisNexis)

- Catholic Justice and Peace Commission, founded 1989 as human rights org, has peacebuilding / conflict resolution program

OTHER

- NGOs were formally included in peace talks 2003, signed agreement as witnesses: Inter-Religious Council for Liberia, Mano River Women’s Peace Network (www.wmd.org/resources/whats-being-done/ngo-participation-peace-negotiations/history-conflict-liberia; accessed 22 May 2013)

Checklist:

Google Scholar

Liberia AND “conflict resolution”

LexisNexis (1989-2003)

Liberia AND “civil war” AND “conflict resolution”

The New York Times(1989-2003)

Liberia AND “civil war” AND “conflict resolution”

Uppsala Conflict Data Programme

Carter Center

“International Guide to NGO Activities in Conflict Prevention and Resolution” (1996)

Crisis Management Initiative

“The Private Diplomacy Survey” (2008)

Beyond Intractability website

Escola de Pau Yearbooks

“Searching for Peace in Africa” (1999)

APPENDIX 4: Codebook

Variable	Label	Source
conflictepisode	Conflict episode	UCDP
country	Location of conflict	UCDP
dyadduration_mo	Duration of conflict dyad (by episode) in months ⁸³	
dyaddurationlog	Duration of conflict dyad (by episode) in months, logged	
dyadep	Current dyad episode	UCDP
dyadepend	1 if dyad ended this year	UCDP
dyadid	UCDP dyad identifier	UCDP, Harbom et al. (2008)
dyadyears	Active dyad years	
epend	1 if dyad episode has ended	
sideb	Name of rebel group in dyad	UCDP
year	Year	UCDP
T2+ VARIABLES		Own data
anyepdy	1 if any T2+ in this dyad episode	
cumt2numb	Cumulative number of all coded T2+ initiatives in episode	
longestT2	Length of most sustained T2+ effort in episode year: 1 = one-time effort; 2 = projects lasts up to a year; 3 = long-term initiative // dyadic data: length of most sustained T2+ effort in dyad episode	
maxT2	Interactive variable of track2number and longestT2	
meddyyr	1 if any T2+ mediation in dyad year	
presdyyr	1 if any T2+ led by former head of state in dyad year	
prevt2	1 if any T2+ in previous dyad year	
pswdy	1 if any T2+ dialog in preceding dyad episode (Chapter 6)	
pswsdyyr	1 if any T2+ problem-solving/dialog in dyad year	
reldyyr	1 if any T2+ by religious organization this year	
supportdyyr	1 if any T2+ mediation support in dyad year	
t2meddy	1 if any T2+ mediation in preceding dyad episode (Chapter 6)	
t2medsupdy	1 if any T2+ mediation support in preceding dyad episode (Chapter 6)	
t2plusdyyr	1 if any T2+ in dyad year	
t2prof	1 if any T2+ by professional NGO this dyad year	
t2traindy	1 if any T2+ training in preceding dyad episode (Chapter 6)	
track2numbdyyr	Number of T2+ efforts this dyad year	
track2number	Number of T2+ initiatives in episode	
traindyyr	1 if any T2+ training in dyad year	

⁸³ Chapter 6: missing if ongoing in 2009; Chapter 3: if first date is December: coded as one month; if first date January – whole year is 12 months; otherwise subtract first date from last.

CONFLICT		
bdbest	Battle deaths in country year	UCDP
bdbestlog	Battle deaths, logged	
cumdeathsdy	Cumulative deaths in episode (Chapter 6)	
deathlog	Battle deaths by population, logged	
deathspop	Battle deaths/population	UCDP
incomp	Rebel motivation – separatist (1) vs. government (2)	UCDP
intensity	1 = minor conflict (at least 25 battle-related deaths per year, less than 1,000 over course of conflict), 2=war (1,000 or more deaths per year)	UCDP
military_int	Military intervention (0/1): 1 if UCDP codes an actor as supporting either side	UCDP
out_agree	1 if episode ends in peace agreement or ceasefire	
outcome	(0=no outcome this year), 1=peace agreement 2=ceasefire agreement w/conflict regulation, 3=ceasefire, 4=victory, 5=low activity, 6=other	UCDP, Kreutz (2010)
prevt1	Number of previous high-level mediation attempts in dyad episode ⁸⁴	MIC
rebel_par	1= rebels are as strong as government	Cunningham et al. (2013)
rebel_strong	1= rebels are stronger than government	Cunningham et al. (2013)
repolwinglegal	1 if at least one rebel group in conflict episode has legal political wing (missing data coded as 0)	Cunningham et al. (2013)
t1dy	1 if any official, direct (face-to-face) mediation in dyad episode	UCDP/MIC (2013) – until 2007
t1dyyr	1 if official, direct mediation in dyad year	MIC
t1gov	1 if official, direct mediation in dyad year by third party government	MIC
t1igo	1 if official, direct mediation in dyad year by IGO	MIC
veto	Number of parties challenging the government in year; in dyadic data: total number of dyads active in episode	UCDP
COUNTRY		
efsq	Squared ethnic fractionalization	
elf	Ethnic fractionalization index	Fearon and Laitin (2003)
ethfrac	Ethnic fractionalization index	Alesina et al (2002)
formercol	1 if former British or French colony (in 20 th century)	CIA World Fact Book 2013
gdp	GDP per capita, in 2005 US\$, Somalia estimates from UN Data (in current US\$)	WDI (2013)
gems_and_carbon	1 if hydrocarbon or gemstone production in country (CIA Factbook for missing observations)	Lujula (2009)
Lifeexpect	Life expectancy	WDI
loggdp	Per capita GDP, logged	
mtnest	Proportion of mountainous terrain	FL 2003

⁸⁴ If same effort over more than one year, each year counted as separate effort

neighbor_war	1 if there is an ongoing conflict in a neighboring state	UCDP
parcom	Polity political competitiveness score (<i>If coded -88 (transition) I use closest previous score</i>)	Polity IV
polity2	Polity score. <i>If coded -88 (transition) I use closest previous score, if -77 (interregnum, collapse) or -66 (interruption) I code as 0, same a unregulated</i>	Polity IV
poplog	Population, logged	
population	Population	WDI
relfrac	Religious fractionalization	Fearon and Laitin (2003)
secdiamonds	1 if secondary diamonds present; info for Comoros from Lujala (2009)	Gilmore et al. (2005)
PEACE		
agreement	1 if peace agreement ends episode	UCDP
co_impl	1 if agreement that ends episode provides for the establishment of a commission or committee to oversee implementation of the agreement; 0 if not, -1=no agreement	Högbladh (2011)
peacefail	1 if return to active dyad this year	
peacemonths	Count of peace months	
peacespell	Number of years since end of episode starting with year after which episode ends	
pko	1 if peace agreement has provision for peacekeeping mission	Högbladh (2011)
powershare	1 if peace agreement that ends episode includes provisions for extensive power-sharing in new government, 0= if not, -1=no agreement	Högbladh (2011)
unpko_any	1 if UN peacekeeping in country addressing any conflict	United Nations website
unpko_dy	1 if mission (observer, verification, PK) in country explicitly addressing dyad (episode dataset: during dyad episode or within two years after end) ⁸⁵	UN
victory	1 if one side emerges a victor	
yearafterend	Year of observation for Chapter 6	

⁸⁵ e.g.: Angola has PKO 1992-1997 addressing conflict with UNITA, but not FLEC. For 1992, FLEC dyad is coded 1 for unpko_any, and 0 for unpko_dy. Ethiopia-Eritrea Mission 2000-2008 means that unpko_any is 1 for those years in both countries, but not unpko_dy for any of the dyads in the dataset.

APPENDIX 5: Summary tables of variables

a) Chapter 3

N = 322 dyad years, based on Model 2

Variable	Minimum	Mean	Maximum	SD	Expected sign + = T1 more likely
High-level mediation in dyad year	0	0.24	1	0.43	DV
T2+ in preceding dyad	0	0.18	1	0.38	+
Number of previous T1 mediation in dyad episode	0	0.34	9	1.05	+ / -
Separatist conflict	0	0.19	1	0.39	-
Ethnic fractionalization	0.04	0.63	0.90	0.28	-
Conflict Intensity	1	1.18	2	0.38	+ / -
Rebel strength parity	0	0.08	1	0.27	-
Rebel strength superiority	0	0.03	1	0.17	+
Veto players	1	1.65	4	0.84	+ / -
Military intervention	0	0.13	1	0.33	+
Polity score	-8	-2.08	8	3.72	+
Population, logged	13.27	16.40	18.73	1.04	+
Former colony (UK or Fracs)	0	0.57	1	0.50	+
Gems and carbon production	0	0.60	1	0.49	+
Dyad Episode duration, months, logged	0	2.84	5.51	1.44	+ / -
Time since last official mediation	0	2.49	20	3.85	-

b) Chapter 4

N = 323, based on Model 2

Variable	Minimum	Mean	Maximum	SD	Expected sign + = termination more likely
Non-state conflict management, lagged one year	0	0.18	1	0.38	+
Episode duration, logged	0	2.84	5.51	1.44	DV
Incompatibility	1	1.81	2	0.39	-
Ethnic fractionalization	0.04	0.63	0.90	0.28	-
Religious fractionalization	0	0.48	0.78	0.23	-
Secondary diamonds	0	0.37	1	0.48	-
Mountainous terrain	0	21.37	82.20	27.54	-
GDP per capita, logged	4.41	5.60	7.68	0.80	+
Polity score	-8	-2.01	8	3.75	+
Rebel strength parity	0	0.08	1	0.27	-
Rebel superiority	0	0.03	1	0.16	+
Battle deaths by population, log	-14.97	-11.12	-5.67	1.89	+ / -
Military intervention	0	0.12	1	0.33	-
Official mediation	0	0.24	1	0.43	+
Veto players	1	1.65	0.84	4	n/a
Decade 2000	0	0.42	1	0.49	n/a

c) Chapter 5

N = 197, based on unrestricted OLS regression

Variable	Minimum	Mean	Maximum	SD	Expected sign + = higher death rate
Annual battle deaths, log	3.22	5.56	9.40	1.53	DV
T2+ mediation	0	0.21	1	0.41	-
T2+ training, lagged	0	0.01	1	0.26	-
T2+ dialogue, lagged	0	0.10	1	0.29	-
Episode duration, log	0.69	3.65	5.51	0.92	-
Incompatibility	1	1.85	2	0.36	-
Ethnic fractionalization	0.04	0.60	0.90	0.29	+
Religious fractionalization	0	0.47	0.72	0.24	+
Rebel strength parity	0	0.08	1	0.27	+
Rebel superiority	0	0.03	1	0.16	-
Natural resources	0	0.56	1	0.50	+
Democracy	-7	-2.16	8	3.58	-
Military intervention	0	0.11	1	0.31	+
Official mediation	0	0.29	1	0.46	-
War in neighbor country	0	0.75	1	0.43	+

d) Chapter 6


(N = 841, based on logistic regression, Model 2)

Variable	Minimum	Mean	Maximum	SD	Expected direction + = relapse into war more likely
T2+ in dyad episode	0	0.33	1	0.47	-
Episode duration, months, log	0	2.38	5.51	1.45	+
Incompatibility	1	1.80	2	0.40	+
Total battle deaths, log	3.22	5.99	11.75	3.22	+
Ethnic fractionalization	0.04	0.69	0.90	0.23	+
Secondary diamonds	0	0.39	1	0.49	+
Negotiated agreement	0	0.42	1	0.49	-
Victory	0	0.20	1	0.40	-
Power sharing	0	0.07	1	0.26	-
Amnesty	0	0.20	1	0.40	-
Guarantees	0	0.19	1	0.39	-
UN Peacekeeping, dyad	0	0.11	1	0.31	-
GDP per capita, logged	3.91	5.97	8.04	0.87	-
Life expectancy	31.24	51.21	70.48	6.13	-
Democracy (Polity)	-7	0.39	8	3.97	-


APPENDIX 6: Additional Figures

Chapter 6:

a) Histogram of peace months by dyads that stay peaceful / return to war



b)



APPENDIX 7: Additional Results Tables

Chapter 3: Onset of high-level mediation
-Seemingly unrelated recursive bivariate probit-

<i>Selection: T2+ in dyad year</i>	
Separatist conflict	-0.36 (0.31)
Ethnic fractionalization	-0.56* (0.32)
Religious fractionalization	1.45*** (0.48)
Veto players	-0.07 (0.11)
Conflict duration in months, logged	0.04 (0.06)
Conflict intensity	0.30 (0.23)
T2+ in previous dyad year	1.65*** (0.26)
2000 decade	0.14 (0.16)
Constant	-1.78*** (0.45)
<i>Outcome: onset of high-level mediation in dyad year</i>	
T2+ in dyad year	0.55* (0.31)
Previous official mediation in episode	0.66*** (0.15)
Separatist conflict	-0.93*** (0.15)
Ethnic fractionalization	0.36 (0.53)
Religious fractionalization	0.12 (0.59)
Conflict intensity	-0.30 (0.25)
Conflict duration in months, logged	0.07 (0.07)
Rebel parity	0.11 (0.34)
Rebel stronger than government	0.77* (0.42)
Veto players	0.09 (0.10)
Military intervention same year	0.45 (0.31)
Polity score	0.08*** (0.03)
Population, logged	0.03 (0.09)
Former colony of UK or France	-0.12 (0.25)
Gems or carbon production	0.35 (0.25)
Time since last high-level mediation	0.19 (0.25)
Constant	-1.88 (1.53)
<i>N</i>	322 (96 clusters)
Wald chi ² (27)	326.40***
Log pseudolikelihood	-260.11
Rho (error correlation)	-0.26

Note: Coefficients, with robust standard errors clustered on dyad in parentheses.

Three cubic splines are included in the model, but not reported.

*Significant at the .1 level, **significant at the .05 level, ***significant at the .01 level

In order to model the endogeneity of independent variables in a simultaneous equation approach I need exogenous regressors that affect the dependent variable in one equation and not in the other. I consider that control variables measuring the strategic importance of a country might influence the decision of potential governmental mediators, but not the decision of non-state conflict managers, and run the seemingly unrelated bivariate probit regression with

these instruments. However, the instruments remains imperfect, because if strategically unimportant countries cannot count on intervention by third-party governments, this in turn will have a potential positive effect on the probability that parties will turn to NGOs instead.

The correlation of the errors between the selection and outcome stages, ρ , is negative. The direction indicates that the unobserved factors leading to NGO interventions in civil conflicts have the opposite effects on the occurrence of high-level mediation (Thyne 2008). This finding supports the theory that official and unofficial mediation in the same year are interchangeable rather than complementary.

However, the Wald test for ρ misses acceptable significance levels. As expected, the model is not a good fit for the data because I do not have strong instrumental variables.

Chapter 4: Results of Cox proportional hazard model

	Coefficients (Cox Hazard Model)
<i>Duration</i>	
Non-state conflict management, lagged one year, interacted with time	-0.02 (0.08)
Rebel motivation	-0.85* (0.9)
Ethnic fractionalization	-0.71 (1.05)
Religious fractionalization	0.49 (1.19)
Lootables	-0.10 (0.34)
Mountains	-0.03*** (0.01)
GDP per capita, logged, interacted with time	-0.73*** (0.09)
Democracy	-0.08** (0.03)
Rebel strength parity	-0.04 (0.43)
Rebel strength superiority	0.95** (0.39)
Battle deaths, by population, logged	-0.10 (0.07)
Military interventions	-1.13** (0.56)
Official mediation	0.83*** (0.24)
Constant	-4.59** (2.12)
<i>N</i>	323 (97 clusters in dyad id)
Failures	112
Log pseudolikelihood	-366.98
$\chi^2(13)$	176.01***

*** $p < .01$. ** $p < .05$. * $p < .10$

Table entries are coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses.

Chapter 5: Results of Two Stages Probit Least Squares
 -Second stage regressions with corrected standard errors-

	Coefficients (Cox Hazard Model)
<i>Annual battle deaths</i>	
Non-state conflict management, instrumented	-74.77 (97.14)
Rebel motivation	355.70 (270.12)
Ethnic fractionalization	-342.43 (395.00)
Religious fractionalization	311.20 (480.69)
Rebel strength parity	1024.88*** (287.02)
Rebel strength superiority	179.44 (518.44)
Democracy	12.48 (25.73)
Gemstones and carbon production	386.94* (213.62)
Battle deaths, lagged	0.21*** (0.03)
War in neighboring country	173.72 (200.97)
Military interventions	-109.73 (259.98)
Official mediation	158.05 (188.79)
Dyad duration, logged	3.74** (1.54)
Constant	-795.15 (619.94)
<i>N</i>	197 (97 clusters in dyad id)
Log pseudolikelihood	-77.87

*** $p < .01$. ** $p < .05$. * $p < .10$

Table entries are coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses.

In the first stage of 2SPLS, the dependent variables are regressed on all exogenous variables. The second stage uses the predicted values for battle deaths and T2+ as regressors in separate tests for occurrence of T2+ and number of battle-related deaths respectively. 2SPLS does take into account temporal or spatial autocorrelation (I cannot cluster my standard errors on dyad id as I do for the OLS models). When I include country dummies, many variables are dropped because of collinearity.

Important in any multiple equation model is finding instruments – variables that are predictors for one dependent variable, but unrelated to the dependent variable in the second equation. I choose “veto players” as my instrument. I expect the number of individual rebel groups simultaneously in conflict with the government to have a significant effect on the likelihood of T2+ onset (the more groups are fighting, the more possible entry points for an NGO). Because the government has only a limited amount of soldiers that can fight at the same time (and the rebel groups the same pool of potential recruits), I do not expect the number of individual groups to affect the severity level. I also use a dummy variable for the decade a conflict happens, expecting T2+ to be more common in the 2000s, but conflict severity not to change depending on the year.

The Wu-Hausman test after Two Stage Least Squared cannot reject the null hypothesis that variables are exogenous at the 99% significance level – the instrumental approach is in fact not appropriate.

F-statistic for test of instruments is 13.50 – when the statistic is larger than 10 instruments are considered strong.

Vita

Christina Kiel was born in Lippstadt, Germany. She obtained a B.A. Equivalent in Public Administration from the Federal Polytechnic University of Public Administration in Bruehl/Germany in 1997, a M.S. in International Affairs from The New School in New York in 2006, and a M.A. in Political Science from the University of New Orleans in 2011.