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RACIAL DIFFERENCES IN THE GENDER GAP

A Thesis

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the  
University of New Orleans  
in partial fulfillment of the  
requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts  
in  
Political Science

by

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May, 2006

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## Abstract

The gender gap is a political phenomenon that has been observed in the electorate since the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980, with women being more Democratic and liberal than men. Many studies have examined its existence among the white public, but little has been done to document its presence among blacks. This study examines the gender gap among whites and blacks and compares the results in order to see if there is a gender gap that exists among blacks and if it is similar to that for whites. Bivariate and multivariate analyses conducted for both blacks and whites find that the documented gender gap among whites is more pervasive than that for blacks, largely because blacks are more united in their Democratic partisanship and liberal attitudes. However, there are also significant gender differences among blacks that usually are similar to and at times different from those among whites.

## Chapter1: Introduction and Literature Review

### Introduction

The gender gap is an often discussed topic in the field of political science. The election of Ronald Reagan as president in 1980 marked a turning point in history, as it was at this time the gender gap was first noticed among researchers, with women tending to vote significantly more Democratic than men. Successive years of elections and survey research data have shown that this is not a passing fad, but something that appears to have its roots in the changing dynamics of women's place in the world. Women are now more likely than men to be Democrats and hold liberal positions on a variety of issues. There have been several attempts to document and explain the causes of the gender gap; however, none have fully described this phenomenon to a satisfactory degree. The explanations that have been posited look at and describe research that has been conducted with mostly or totally white samples, thereby neglecting the potential gender gap that may exist among minority groups. This study remedies that problem by taking a large sample of blacks, comparing the findings for them with the findings for whites and finding that while the gender gap among whites is more evident, there does exist a gender gap among blacks on some issues.

### Literature Review

#### *Significance of the Gender Gap*

The gender gap (typically understood as the partisan difference in voting behavior between men and women) was not a feature of political commentary prior to Ronald Reagan's election in 1980 (Kaufmann and Petrocik 1999). Prior to the 1980 presidential election there was no

significant gender gap observed in the electorate, although women tended to be, in contrast to the current findings, slightly more likely to favor Republican candidates in the 1950s and 1960s (Stetson 1997). Since then the term “gender gap” has primarily been used to refer to the growing difference in voting behavior between men and women, particularly the higher propensity for women to vote Democratic. Often this term is also used to refer to the higher proportion of women that identify themselves as Democrats (Trevor 1999). It is also used to refer to women’s more liberal views on a variety of social and political issues (Welch and Sigelman 1989). Because issues of representation among citizens are so fundamental in a democracy, whether men and women speak with different voices is a particularly important question when it comes to politics (Schlozman et al. 1995). In addition, gender differences may take on additional significance because of women’s rising levels of political participation (and women simply constituting a larger pool of eligible voters) and because of the greater attention they may pay to particular issues and government policies. As a result, even small gender differences in policy choices may no longer be inconsequential, especially if they occur across a wide array of issues around which coalitions can form (Shapiro and Mahajan 1986).

### *Historical Background*

The potential importance of gender as a politically relevant category in the electorate was almost completely ignored in the literature prior to the 1980s, when the gender gap was first observed in the electorate (Mattei and Mattei 1998). Since these earlier days of survey research, such differences were (or were thought to be) small and inconsequential. Survey data conducted in the 1970s showed that women, as compared to men, tended to be less politically efficacious, to be less politically interested, to have less political information, and to be less likely to vote (Tedin, Brady, and Vedlitz 1977). Men and women tended to exhibit similar aggregate patterns

and trends in voting and political partisanship, although women tended to be less politically active and interested in politics (Shapiro and Mahajan 1986). It was said that women were less politically expressive because the environment of the housewife or the menial sort of employment available to most women did not encourage participation in politics or provide stimulation to gather and discuss politically relevant information (Tedin, Brady, and Vedlitz 1977). As such, survey research once seemed to demonstrate the existence of a disparity in citizen participation with men more, and women less, likely to take part in political life (Schlozman, Burns, and Verba 1994). Since then, however, disparities in education levels have diminished and women now participate in the work force at a significantly higher level than in earlier generations, all the while making great strides in most other socioeconomic correlates of participation as well (Trevor 1999).

As the gender gap in terms of political participation has narrowed, a new type of a gender gap has emerged in the area of political attitudes and beliefs. Public opinion surveys have found women tending to take a more liberal stance than men on political issues (Day and Hadley 1997). A study in which 20 issues were considered found that women were significantly more liberal than men on 15 of these issues and the gaps were largest on support for spending to aid the unemployed and on war and peace issues (Cook and Wilcox 1991). Another study similarly concluded that the two largest contributors to the gender gap in approval of President Reagan were the issues of defense spending and social welfare (Gilens 1988). Women have also been found to be more supportive of regulatory activities, as women have shown more support for speed limit controls, fines for people who do not wear seat belts, jail terms for drunk drivers, and banning cigarette advertising and sales (Shapiro and Mahajan 1986). The greater liberal stance of women on these issues is consistent with the notion that women are socialized to emphasize

connectedness (Trevor 1999), and because of this they stress feeling at one with their surroundings, peace, domestic tranquility, and safety for all.

### *Explanations for the Gender Gap*

The discovery of a narrowing gender gap in terms of participation, and the newfound gender gap with regard to political attitudes and beliefs, has led researchers to formulate and test many theories and hypotheses to account for this new gap. While none have been successful at thoroughly explaining the causes for the gender gap, each offers a piece of the puzzle. These theories, while not mutually exclusive of each other, explain different facets that compose the gender gap. These theories include childhood socialization, autonomy, feminist ideology, different views of finances and the economy, and the attitude and salience hypotheses.

The attempt to connect socialization and childhood gender differences to participation has occasionally drawn the attention of researchers (Trevor 1999). The socialization perspective assumes that adult political attitudes are learned in childhood, whereby girls are encouraged to engage in appropriate role-playing, which usually includes conformity, passivity, and concern with domestic activities; and boys are encouraged to be leaders, to be aggressive, self-reliant, and to display traits conducive to economic achievement (Tedin, Brady, and Vedlitz 1977). As a result of these early socialization processes, lower participation levels among women were a standard characteristic of the early years of survey research (Trevor 1999). Since these early days, prior to the beginning of the second wave feminist movement in the 1960s, two processes have been operating which have reduced this pattern of differences in political involvement between men and women. The first has to do with the fact that increasing numbers of women are entering the workforce, while at the same time, the gradual process of women's "liberation," achieving particular momentum in the early 1970s, has stressed the fundamental equality of men



and women (Andersen 1975). The general pattern now for many of these differences in participation has been one of increasing similarity rather than difference between men and women with each succeeding generation (Trevor 1999).

The increase in women's educational level and participation in the workforce, along with the growing acceptability of the women's movement has led women to achieve independence from men (Carroll 1988). Rising divorce rates since the 1960s, coupled with the increasing average age of first marriage have led to an increase in divorced, single, and also widowed women who may have very different material interests (and ultimately voting preferences) than those of married women (Manza and Brooks 1998). Carroll's autonomy explanation of the gender gap stresses the importance of this newfound independence in allowing women to consider their interests separate from those of men. She demonstrates this by showing that women who were either economically (defined as well-educated and in professional or managerial occupations, or single, divorced or separated, or widowed) and/or psychologically (defined as favoring egalitarian relationships between the sexes) independent of men were significantly less likely to vote for Ronald Reagan in 1980 and to approve of Reagan's performance as president in 1982, than were women who were dependent on men for either their economic security or psychological well-being. It is this type of twofold independence that is said to enhance receptivity to feminist ideas and to lead to the emergence of feminist ideology.

Having a feminist ideology has proved to be strongly related to political values, to basic orientations, and ultimately to issue preferences (Conover 1988). It is further possible that being a liberal and egalitarian may increase one's chances of becoming a feminist, as the relationship between feminism and values and policy preferences has been found to be reciprocal (Cook and Wilcox 1991). Cook and Wilcox found this in their reexamination of Conover's 1988 work.

They state that developing a feminist consciousness may lead to more egalitarian values and policy preferences, but that feminists are also recruited among more liberal and egalitarian women and men. The feminist ideology associated with modern gender role orientation may also increase efficacy, by stressing that women can be competent in nontraditional areas such as politics (Hughes and Peek 1986). This notion fits well with the evidence that the gender gap came of age in the early 1980s, when those who grew up during the women's rights movement of the 1960s were first able to express their political opinions at the ballot box. Thus, feminist consciousness increased to such a degree that by 1980, there was a noticeable and persistent gap (Howell and Day 2000).

Financial and economic matters have also been found to have differential effects on men and women. It has been found that men consistently use more economic evaluations than women (Welch and Hibbing 1992). Men, but not women, often judge the administration's party on the basis of their family's finances. This was the finding of a study of voting behavior in presidential elections in the years, 1980-1992, in which it was reported that evaluations of personal finances did not matter for women in all four elections, but did matter for men in three of them, those in 1980, 1984, and 1992 (Chaney, Alvarez, and Nagler 1998). As these were the three elections out of the four in which a president was up for re-election, this indicates that men who felt their personal finances were getting worse blamed the incumbent. However, even more than men, women do consider perceptions of the national economy in their voting decisions, such that women are slightly more likely to vote sociotropically (Welch and Hibbing 1992). This may be the case because of the internal socialization of traditional gender roles, where men are taught to be the economic breadwinners of their families and women are taught to have greater concern for others and the society at large.

In spite of the foregoing theories and hypotheses, it has yet to be fully explained how men and women come to identify as partisans and select their preferred candidates for office. Two hypotheses have been put forth to answer this question. The attitude hypothesis maintains that the gender gap in voting and party identification results from differences in the underlying political preferences of men and women, while the salience hypothesis suggests that, beyond differences in underlying political attitudes, men and women weigh issues differently when evaluating parties and candidates (Kaufmann and Petrocik 1999). This was found to be the case in the idea of militarism, where the authors found no significant gender gap in their original bivariate analysis, but later concluded that gender differences in the structure of thinking belied men's and women's militarism after introducing a series of demographic and attitudinal variables (Conover and Sapiro 1983). These authors found that identifying as a Republican increased militarism among men, but not women, and that higher levels of education depress militarism among women, but not men. In addition, having identical views on issues was found to impact approval of President Reagan differently for men and women, particularly on issues having to do with the military, foreign policy, and the environment (Gilens 1988). At different times, both hypotheses appear to account for variations in the gender gap as it was noted that attitude differences between men and women largely explained the gender gaps in party identification and vote choice in 1992, while issue salience was a substantially larger component of the gender gap in 1996 (Kaufmann and Petrocik 1999). Thus, it appears as though the gender gap encompasses more than just having dissimilar political attitudes; it also includes a different way of using these attitudes to provide a basis for political action, while illustrating the fallacy of assuming that what is normal behavior for men is normal for women too (Welch and Hibbing 1992).

### *Race and the Gender Gap*

The gender gap as previously discussed is based almost exclusively on observations of the white electorate (Lien 1998), leaving a hole in academic circles as to whether and how a gender gap might arise among blacks. Until recently most voting analysts have largely ignored variations in the partisan preferences of blacks, viewing them for all practical purposes as homogeneous (Welch and Foster 1992). As will be seen changes are occurring among the black community that are beginning to foster differences of opinions among its members, as blacks become more diverse like whites with regard to educational and income disparities. These things may eventually surpass the importance of race in structuring blacks' political attitudes and become primary cleavages in their belief systems, thus causing various gaps among them including a gender gap.

Race has arguably come to have a large influence on politics in the United States in the last few decades (Weakliem 1987), since its rise from being a predominantly regional concern in the pre-New Deal period (Carmines and Stimson 1989). In the years afterwards and particularly as the Civil Rights movement began to acquire national attention, its influence on politics became even greater. This occurred as the feelings among blacks were greatly affected by the political and social events of the 1960s, such as the Civil Rights movement, the ghetto revolts, and the Black Power movement (Welch and Combs 1985). As the Republican party was moving to the right on race in 1964, the national Democratic party, pushed hard by the Civil Rights movement, was moving to the left, and these differences between the parties have done nothing but harden over the years (Kinder and Sanders 1996). As a result, the ideological differences between the parties on racial issues have become much larger since the 1950s, and black voters have shifted further towards the Democrats (Weakliem 1987). The dramatic switch in the positions of the

parties expressed so vividly in the 1964 election served to induce predictable alterations in the partisanship of American voters, both black and white (Kinder and Sanders 1996). Blacks still remain staunchly loyal to the Democratic party (Tate 2003), with black Democrats being far less likely to defect from the party in the polling booth by voting for Republican candidates than are white Democrats (Lublin 2004).

It is a long-standing presumption in political sociology that social and demographic characteristics structurally locate individuals in ways that expose them to particular political influences, creating distinctive political interests and outlooks (Kingston and Finkel 1987). Racial differences appear critical in understanding political behavior (Reese and Brown 1995). Among blacks, group identity - a feeling of solidarity with ingroup members with whom one habitually interacts, lives in proximity with, and shares a history with - is found to be notably strong (Thornton and Mizuno 1999). Group solidarity is only one aspect of blacks' social attitudes, but it is especially important in shaping a variety of other attitudes and in influencing behavior, with most black Americans saying that they feel some sense of solidarity with other blacks (Bledsoe et al. 1995). Judged by the criterion that their fate is linked to the fate of fellow blacks, a large majority of black Americans manifestly feel a sense of racial identification, with approximately three quarters of them saying that what happens to blacks in the country as a whole affects their lives (Sniderman and Piazza 2002). It is because of this racial unity among the black population that race has emerged as a "single, profound line of cleavage" (Kinder and Sanders 1996).

The racial divide is imposing, but there are serious disagreements within each group as well; among blacks and whites alike, opinion is very far from monolithic (Kinder and Sanders 1996). A potential indicator of cleavage within the black community may be the erosion of the "we"

feeling among blacks that was so prevalent in the 1960s and the early 1970s (Welch and Combs 1985). The development of a more genuinely multiracial society is blurring the line between black and white and the increasing income, and lifestyle differences between poor and middle-class blacks may undermine their sense of collective identity and fate (Bledsoe et al. 1995). It would not be surprising if attitudes of blacks divided along income or educational lines, since within the larger society, class is a major predictor of political attitudes and behavior (Welch and Combs 1985). While it has been found that controlling for class differences, it is race, not class, that is dividing contemporary American society over racial policy and that the racial divide in political aspirations and demands is really racial (Kinder and Sanders 1996), there are reasons to suspect that this may be changing.

The racial divide is not a mask for class differences; it is rooted in race itself, in differences of history (Kinder and Sanders 1996). Kinder and Sanders even acknowledge that as blacks make their way to the middle class, like other members of the middle class, they may come to appreciate the virtue in conservative policies. There has indeed been speculation that the growing economic gulf among segments of the black community would lead to increased diversity of opinion; that upwardly mobile middle-class blacks would become more conservative and attuned to economic interests different from those of those of the black lower classes (Welch and Combs 1985). While such a increase in conservatism among blacks has not consistently been found, blacks have begun to fracture along income and educational lines. Welch and Combs (1985) found that those with more income and education were more liberal on spending for education, and those with more education were also more liberal on spending for health care. While not necessarily in the direction that would have been predicted from the given knowledge on white public opinion, it is certainly the beginning of a split among blacks in the area of

socioeconomic status. In addition, and more in line with previous research on whites, it was found that blacks with higher incomes are 15.3% less likely than those with lower incomes to support affirmative action, while those with more education are 16.6% more likely than those with less education to support affirmative action (Clawson, Kegler, and Waltenburg 2003). Because of increasing economic diversity blacks may be less supportive of black interests and black candidates than in the past, thus causing one of the last truly cohesive voting blocs in the United States to splinter (Bledsoe et al. 1995).

While black opinion may indeed splinter along the lines of socioeconomic status, it is also a truism that race and gender are two of the main dimensions of social stratification in contemporary American society (Kane 1992). Indeed, it has been found that since the 1980s, women are more likely to self-identify as Democrats, vote Democratic in elections, and hold more liberal views on a variety of social and political issues (Trevor 1999; Welch and Sigelman 1989). While these findings are based almost exclusively on observations of the white electorate (Lien 1998), there are also reasons to expect that they might translate to the black community as well. Feelings of racial solidarity have been found to connect blacks with one another on policy issues, such as affirmative action and Food Stamps (Kinder and Sanders 1996). But it is also known that black men and women differ in terms of their feelings of racial solidarity. Black men were found to score higher on a racial solidarity scale than were black women; controlling for the effects of the other variables in the model, the male-female differential was 1.4 points on the 0-24 scale (Bledsoe et al. 1995), a small, but nonetheless significant gender effect. It is also thought that black women may form weaker racial identities than black men because they are less likely to perceive themselves as victims of racial discrimination (Welch and Sigelman 1991).

In addition to having less racial solidarity than black men, black women may be more likely than white women to consider themselves feminist (Mansbridge and Tate 1992). Mansbridge and Tate posit two reasons for this phenomenon. First, black women's structural positions have forced them into economic independence from and educational equality with black men. And secondly, black men and women understand more clearly than whites what it is to be structurally oppressed, and the need to work through a political movement to mitigate or end that oppression. Gender consciousness is an awareness of one's self as having certain gender characteristics and an identification with others who occupy a similar position in the sex-gender structure (Chow 1987). Perhaps, it is greater income and education that allows black women to unite more with white women in feminist causes, as the most politically active professional black women, along with the most politically active professional white women, were most likely to support Anita Hill during the Clarence Thomas nomination hearings (Mansbridge and Tate 1992).

However, race, gender, and class are neither additive nor parallel, but interactive forms of oppression; they intersect in ways that create not simply more oppression for working-class women of color but profoundly different oppressions for women of various races (Smith 1995). Insofar as domestic service has been a primary source of employment for black women in the United States, class and racial oppression in the workplace has been structured and experienced as the exploitation of one group of women by another group of women (i.e., privileged white women in relation to their domestic employees) (Smith 1995). In addition, gender-specific strategies tend to be highly individualistic, in part because gender in the United States does not create territorial communities of women that may be developed (Smith 1995), whereas blacks who do live in territorial communities score higher on the racial solidarity scale than those who do not (Bledsoe et al. 1995). A broader perspective is needed to understand the development of



feminist consciousness among women of color who are subjected to cross-group pressures (Chow 1987), as black women are, and who are often told to choose between race and gender solidarity, and often feel they must choose race (Mansbridge and Tate 1992). The very character of gender relations tends to mitigate the recognition of gender oppression and discourage the development of a commensurate solidarity (Smith 1995).

The main theoretical perspectives that have been traditionally used to explain the gender gap among whites can also be expected to pertain to blacks also, but in a more limited manner. The socialization explanation that states that adult political attitudes are learned in childhood, may not equally apply to blacks. Because more black children than white children grow up in a single parent home, where the female is usually the head of the household, these children cannot be expected to be socialized in the same way than children from two parent homes are. The single parent household, usually run by the mother, exposes more children who are black to a strong dominant female influence. In this way, female children may not learn traditional gender roles, and instead lead to adult women who are themselves less traditional and more masculinized. In the same way, male children, growing up with only a single mother's influence, may themselves become more feminized. It is because of this that the socialization perspective may apply less to blacks and more to whites.

Carroll's autonomy thesis, however, can be thought to lead to a greater divergence of opinion among blacks than among whites, because of its basic tenet which states that women's independence from men is what is responsible for the gender gap. While white women achieve their autonomy from white men primarily through their increasing success in the workforce, black women who are also gaining on black men have additional things that lead to their independence. In addition to their growing success in the workplace relative to men, as stated

previously, there are a lot more black, single parent homes led by women than there are among whites. In these situations, women increasingly have to rely on themselves, which can lead to different opinions, from those of men. Similarly, because of the decreased marital rates for blacks, black men also are left without a significant other, presumably a woman, whose influence can liberalize their own attitudes, thus causing an increased gender gap among blacks than that for whites.

Having a feminist ideology is believed to cause women to become more liberal than men, at least among whites. Among blacks, however, this could prove to be a double-edged sword and lead to conflicting expectations. While some black women are socialized differently from men, and tend to be more independent from men than white women, which would tend to lead women to have a feminist ideology, it is not clear that this ideology will cause black women to be more liberal than black men. As previously mentioned black women tend to feel pulled in two directions; towards other women because of their same femaleness, and also toward black men, because of their same blackness. Black women who consider themselves feminists, may feel a connection to black men because of their shared racial oppression, a connection that has not been established among whites. As a result, while being feminists, these women may put more of their emphasis on racial issues, uniting them with men, leading their feminist preferences to the back burner.

Financial and economic matters can expected to affect both black women and men and white women and men differently also. More often than women, men use economic evaluations in coming to judgments about the world around them. This is expected to be the case because it is often still the man's role to be in the charge of the family's finances. Because of this, they are more aware of the financial situation of their families, and as a result, more likely to know when

their financial situation is becoming better or worse, and when it is worse, to punish the incumbent party, who they are likely to hold responsible. Women, on the other hand, are more likely to use the national economy as their measuring stick as to how they perceive economic conditions. Among blacks often times women tend to be increasingly in charge of such matters, because of the smaller gender gap in earnings among blacks compared to whites, and also because of their greater tendency to be single heads of household. In these respects it is expected that black women will be more aware of their family's finances, and more likely to blame those who they deem to be responsible. As a result, based on this hypothesis, blacks should exhibit less of a gender gap than whites.

The attitude hypothesis which states that the gender gap in voting and party identification results from differences in the underlying political preferences of men and women can be expected to affect both blacks and whites similarly. The reason behind this similarity is because the route from which political attitudes travel to becoming full fledged identification with a particular party and specific voting behavior is expected to be the same for both blacks and whites. The key difference between the races is the path by which one forms these attitudes, which the forgoing hypotheses describe. Such as the case for the salience hypothesis, which assumes that men and women weigh issues differently when evaluating parties and candidates. Again, the key difference is how one forms their political attitudes, not the way they translate into evaluations of parties and candidates.

Inquiry into the black gender gap has only been investigated by a limited number of researchers, as a result of the paucity of research and data on this topic and what little research has been conducted has yielded conflicting findings. A number of studies have been conducted that show that there is no gender gap among blacks. On the issue of military spending, there was

found to be a lack of a gender gap among blacks, in contrast to the findings for whites (Welch and Sigelman 1989). Welch and Sigelman suspect that this is due to the fact that blacks may appreciate the routes toward upward mobility provided by the military for the postwar generation of blacks and also because relative to their male counterparts, black women have been more likely than white women to pursue military careers. Similarly, gender was not significantly related to black primary participation. Black women were no more likely to be aware of the primary, to participate, or to report that they usually voted in presidential primaries than black men (Tate 1991). Nor was gender significantly related to vote choice in the 1984 presidential election. Black men were just as likely to vote for the Democratic candidate, Walter Mondale, as were black women, in contrast to the eight point gender gap that was found among whites (Welch and Foster 1992). It has also been observed that few opinion differences existed between black men and women on a series of issues ranging from military spending to social welfare (Walton 1985). For the vast majority of blacks it is thought that race is no doubt a more salient basis of political differentiation than gender (Welch and Sigelman 1989).

Other researchers, in contrast, have found a gender gap among blacks that at times differs from the gap found among whites. Studying the registration data for the 1992 election cycle, it was found that black women were 3.7 percent more likely to become registered than black men, compared to only a 2.6 percent difference among whites, with white women being more likely to become registered (Lien 1998), although this finding does not control for gender differences in eligibility, the main one regarding felon disenfranchisement, which affect many more black men than black women or whites in general (Uggen and Manza 2002) need to find the citation when I am in Metairie sometime next week) Other research has found that in 1980, black women were more likely than black men to vote for Jimmy Carter, while black men were more supportive of

John Anderson (Welch and Sigelman 1989). In addition, it has been reported that when controlling for age, education, income, and religion, contrary to the authors' expectations, the gender gap in party identification was somewhat larger for blacks than for whites, with women more likely than men to call themselves Democrats (Welch and Sigelman 1992). On affirmative action, an issue of primary concern to blacks, a gender gap was also found, with black men more in favor than black women, the direct opposite of what was found for whites (Lien 1998). Also, issues connected to civil rights or minorities rank higher among the issue priorities of black men than black women (Schlozman et al. 1995). A gender gap among blacks was also found on abortion attitudes, with black men significantly less supportive of legal abortion than black women (Hall and Ferree 1986). The data sources for these studies included a variety of techniques to increase the number of blacks sampled, such as using the General Social Survey's (GSS) 1982 and 1987 oversample of blacks, combining multiple years of black respondents together, collecting original data through exit polls, and utilizing the 1992 Current Population Survey, which had a large enough sample that many blacks were included.

## Chapter 2: Hypotheses and Data

### Hypotheses

I hypothesize that there will be a gender gap among black Americans, as there are some male/female differences that cross racial and ethnic lines, but it will not be as large as the gender gap for white Americans. In the past, researchers have had only limited success in finding a gender gap among blacks, lending credence to the notion that blacks are a distinct, unified racial category. However, the breakdown of racial solidarity among blacks, particularly among black women, and the increasing class and socioeconomic differences among blacks in general should allow the black population to more closely mirror the white population and develop a similar, although narrower, gender gap. Black women should therefore be more Democratic and liberal than black men, as is the case among whites.

### Methods and Data

Using data from both the 1996 American National Election Study (ANES)<sup>1</sup> and the 1996 National Black Election Study (NBES)<sup>2</sup>, I will examine the gender gap separately for whites in the NES and blacks in the NBES in order to see if the gender gap for blacks is similar to the one already established in the literature for whites. This will be done with data from both 1996 surveys in order to capture the mood of the country during the same time period, and because 1996 was the last year in which such an extensive survey has been conducted among blacks. In total there were 1544 white respondents in the ANES and 1216 black respondents in the NBES, thus enabling such a detailed analysis of opinion to be conducted with large sample sizes.

Employing dependent variables which have an obvious liberal-conservative tilt to them, crosstabulations for both whites and blacks will be run separately to gain a general idea of the percentage gap between men and women of both races on these issues. Following the crosstabulations, Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions will be run for those dependent variables in which there are seven response categories, including guaranteed job and good standard of living, government aid to blacks, the seven-point crime reduction scale, rating the women's movement, party identification, and ideology. Ordered Logit will be used for those dependent variables with between three and five response categories, including death penalty, defense spending, change in welfare policy, number of immigrants permitted to come to the U.S., federal spending on food stamps, and laws to protect homosexuals from job discrimination. Logit will be used for dichotomous dependent variables, including immigrant government services, 1992 two-party presidential vote, and 1996 two-party presidential vote. All of these dependent variables will be examined in both bivariate and multivariate analyses.

The main independent variable of interest is gender, with other variables hypothesized to affect the selected dependent variables controlled for. These control variables include age, income, religiosity, marital status, and education. Gender is measured as 0 = male, 1 = female. Age is an interval variable that measures the respondent's age. Income is an ordinal-level variable, measuring family income before taxes in the year 1995 and ranging from 1 = least income to 11 = most income. Religiosity is an ordinal variable, measuring frequency of attendance at religious services and ranging from 1 = least often to 5 = most often. Marital status is a dummy variable coded 0 = not married and 1 = married. Education is an ordinal variable measuring highest grade of school or degree completed and ranging from 1 = least education to 7 = most education. Region is a dummy variable coded 0 = non-south and 1 = south, with south

including the original 11 Confederate states, with the exception of Texas, plus Delaware, Maryland, Oklahoma, West Virginia, and Washington D.C. South is not strictly inclusive of the 11 original Confederate states because of how region was coded by the ANES (See the Appendix for exact question wording and more detailed coding information.)



## Chapter 3: Bivariate Crosstabular Analysis

### Bivariate Crosstabular Analysis

The gender gap is a political phenomenon that while having been observed over the past twenty-five years, has yet to be fully explained and documented, particularly among minority groups. The typical findings for whites are replicated here, as it has been found that women are indeed more liberal than men; blacks, however, are relatively more united across gender lines. In each issue area in which there was an observed gender gap among whites, it was the women who were more liberal than men. White women were also more likely than men to vote Democratic, and to self-identify as Democrats and as liberals. Blacks, being more liberal than whites on every issue discussed, more leftist in the areas of party identification and ideology, and more Democratic in their 1992 and 1996 presidential votes, had very few gender gaps. Indeed, the only issues in which there were observed gender gaps among blacks were on the questions of party identification, death penalty, and the number of immigrants permitted to come to the U.S. Black women were more liberal on only two of these three issues: party identification and death penalty. On the question of immigration, it was black men who were more liberal than black women, showing a reversal of the usual pattern. These results indicate that previous research on mainly white respondents describing women's more liberal nature can only be applied to blacks in a very limited number of instances.

In the area of party identification, blacks tend to be more Democratic than whites, as over 80% of blacks self-identify as Democrats, while fewer than 60% of whites do (see Table 1a). In addition, both blacks and whites exhibit gender gaps, as women of both races tend to be more Democratic than their male counterparts. Close to half of black men describe themselves as

strong Democrats, while slightly less than half of black women do, resulting in a five-point gender gap. Whites also show the same pattern. While substantially fewer whites call themselves strong Democrats, only 15% of men and 22% of women, among those who do there is also a seven-point gender gap, with once again women more so inclined than men. At the Republican end of the spectrum, there is virtually no gender gap among blacks, but there exists a gender gap among whites. Men are four to five points more likely than women to identify with varying degrees of Republicanism. The findings indicate that the primary area of cleavage among blacks is in their differing levels of attachment to the Democratic party, with women more attached than men, while among whites a different picture emerges. Among whites, the major cleavage and resulting gender gap occurs because men and women belong to different parties, with most women in the Democratic fold and men evenly divided between the parties.

TABLE 1a—Party Identification

	Blacks		Whites	
	<u>Men</u>	<u>Women</u>	<u>Men</u>	<u>Women</u>
Strong Democrat	44%	49%	15%	22%
Weak Democrat	17	24	19	22
Independent Democrat	20	13	12	15
Independent	11	7	9	9
Independent Republican	5	3	14	9
Weak Republican	2	2	16	14
Strong Republican	2	2	15	10
	101%	100%	100%	101%
Number of cases	448	742	684	843
Tau C =	-.089 (p = .004)		-.134 (p = .000)	
r =	-.083 (p = .004)		-.120 (p = .000)	

Since the 1960s ideology has become more correlated with party identification than in previous decades, especially among whites. Indeed, a bivariate regression for each race shows that ideology and party identification are more highly correlated among whites than among

blacks. Because of this, blacks are considerably more likely than whites to place themselves in the most liberal categories and are also more likely to call themselves extremely conservative (see Table 1b). While liberalism is traditionally correlated with being a Democrat, both black men and women are four times more likely than whites to call themselves extremely conservative and even so remain steadfastly in the Democratic ranks and opposed to conservative Republican presidential candidates. This is an interesting finding and may be a result of blacks being more likely to interpret conservative as referring to social and religious conservatism, rather than to racial and economic conservatism. These two factors, social and religious conservatism, are known to drive blacks' partisanship and vote choice. As a result, blacks are similarly distributed along the ideological spectrum and therefore display no gender gap. Whites, on the other hand, have few respondents in the two most extreme response categories where negligible gender gaps are observed. The major gender differences are to be found among the more intermediate categories. In the two intermediate liberal categories, there is a combined eight-point gender gap between men and women, and in the moderate category, there is a seven-point gender gap between men and women. In both cases women are more likely than men to call themselves liberal or moderate. In the two intermediate conservative categories there is a combined sixteen-point gender gap among men and women, with men more likely than women to call themselves conservative.

TABLE 1b—Ideology

	Blacks		Whites	
	<u>Men</u>	<u>Women</u>	<u>Men</u>	<u>Women</u>
Extremely liberal	19%	16%	1%	2%
2	8	14	8	11
3	17	15	11	16
Moderate	11	11	27	34
5	19	25	25	15
6	12	9	25	19
Extremely conservative	14	11	3	3
	100%	101%	100%	100%
Number of cases	434	720	568	628
Tau C =	-.027 (p = .405)		-.153 (p = .000)	
r =	-.025 (p = .402)		-.127 (p = .000)	

In the 1992 presidential election (see Table 1c), between the incumbent Republican ticket of George H. W. Bush and Dan Quayle and Democratic challengers Bill Clinton and Al Gore, in the two-party results, almost half of all white respondents reported voting for the Republican incumbents, while over 90% of all black respondents reported voting for the Democratic challengers. Because blacks had so much unity in their support for the Clinton/Gore ticket, there is no evidence of a gender gap in their vote choice. Whites, on the other hand, who were more diverse in their vote choice, differed markedly along gender lines in their vote. Women were ten points more likely than men to report voting for the Democratic ticket, while men were more likely to support the outgoing Republican incumbents.

TABLE 1c—1992 Presidential Vote

	Blacks		Whites	
	<u>Men</u>	<u>Women</u>	<u>Men</u>	<u>Women</u>
Bush	7%	6%	51%	41%
Clinton	93	94	49	59
	100%	100%	100%	100%
Number of cases	258	489	411	535
Tau C =	.008 (p = .661)		.099 (p = .002)	
r =	.016 (p = .656)		.100 (p = .002)	

	Blacks	
	<u>Men</u>	<u>Women</u>
Bush	6%	6%
Clinton	78	86
Perot	6	2
Other	2	1
Don't Know	2	3
Refused	6	3
	100%	101%
Number of cases	308	534

Probability of Chi-Square .006

The 1996 presidential election saw incumbents Bill Clinton and Al Gore, running as the Democratic ticket, winning re-election over Republican challengers Bob Dole and Jack Kemp. Both blacks and whites reported voting in higher percentages for the Democratic ticket than they had in 1992 (see Table 1d). As in 1992, in the two-party results, blacks did not have a significant gender gap in their presidential vote choice; only 3% of black men and 2% of black women reported voting for the Republican challengers. Whites, however, were more divided in their support of the Democratic ticket. Majorities of both white men and women supported Clinton/Gore, but women were more likely than men to report voting for the Democratic incumbents, which as a result gave rise to the observed gender gap of twelve points, two points larger than what had been seen in the 1992 presidential election.

TABLE 1d—1996 Presidential Vote

	Blacks		Whites	
	<u>Men</u>	<u>Women</u>	<u>Men</u>	<u>Women</u>
Clinton	97%	98%	52%	64%
Dole	3	2	48	36
	100%	100%	100%	100%
Number of cases	188	368	424	501
Tau C =	-.014 (p = .279)		-.119 (p = .000)	
r =	-.051 (p = .232)		-.121 (p = .000)	

	Blacks	
	<u>Men</u>	<u>Women</u>
Clinton	83%	90%
Dole	3	2
Perot	2	1
Other	4	3
Don't Know/Refused	8	5
	100%	101%
Number of cases	219	403

Probability of Chi-Square .131

In running the analysis for presidential vote in the years 1992 and 1996, a substantial gender gap among blacks was observed among those who responded that they voted for the two major party candidates. Response rates among black women were 67.3 percent and 49.8 percent in 1992 and 1996 respectively, while among black men the comparable rates were 59.0 percent and 43.7 percent. This leaves a response rate gender gap of 8.3 points for 1992 and 6.1 points for 1996. Because it was possible that this gap was due to the fact that only respondents who voted for the two major party candidates were included, thus leaving out those who voted for other candidates or did not know or refused to answer the question, a second analysis was conducted only among blacks in order to try to explain this response rate gender gap.

This second analysis includes all response categories that were both included and omitted from the previous analysis. The response rate gender gap still exists in spite of the addition of

the previously omitted response categories, but is reduced by approximately one-quarter in each instance; for 1992 it remains at 5.6 points, while for 1996 it remains at 4.7 points. While this only accounts for one-quarter of the observed gender gap, it may be the case that other factors are causing this gender gap that are not readily observed within the sample. Such factors as men's anti-system feelings, felon disenfranchisement, and perhaps the fact that there were overall more women than men surveyed may also be contributing to this gap. The new analysis, while not thoroughly explaining the variation in response rates in presidential voting does, however, produce some interesting new findings that warrant further discussion.

Presidential voting has previously been found to not cause a gap among blacks, as nearly equal percentages of women and men were found to support both the Democratic and Republican presidential tickets. This originally was coded as a dichotomous variable thus leaving out those who voted for another candidate or responded by saying that they did not know who they voted for or refused to answer the question. With the addition of these categories to the analysis, however, it is the case that there is an observable gender gap among blacks in presidential vote choice. In both 1992 and 1996, while there remains no significant gender gap among blacks in their support for the Republican tickets of those years, there is a significant, observable gender gap in support for the Democratic ticket in 1992 and one that approaches significance in 1996. Women were eight and seven points more likely than men to vote for the Democratic ticket in 1992 and 1996 respectively. Men who at first glance were just as likely to vote Democratic as women now find themselves more dispersed among the additional categories. Black men were more likely to have reported that they voted for Ross Perot, or some other candidate, or to have refused to answer, than were black women. It is this that accounts for some of the gender disparity in response rates among blacks.

Women self-identify as Democrats more often than men among both races, with the larger gender gap occurring among whites. This white gender gap occurs because of differences in the partisan affiliation of men and women, while the black gender gap is primarily the results of men and women's differing levels of attachment to the Democratic party. In the instance of ideology, black men and women are virtually indistinguishable from each other, while in contrast, the findings for whites show that women are more liberal than men. This may perhaps be a result of differing images that are conjured up between the races when asked about their ideological makeup. It is possible that among blacks there is a unifying theme of both a preference for racial liberalism and social conservatism, which ties them together, that is not a factor among whites, who are guided by other images in their ideological composition. Also, in the area of two-party presidential vote choice, among blacks, men and women appear at first glance to have very similar candidate preferences. It is only when all of the response categories are included that a gender gap among blacks in presidential vote is observed, with women more likely to vote Democratic than men. Among whites, there is a definite gender gap in two-party presidential vote choice as women are more likely than men to vote Democratic by a significant margin. It is believed that if all response categories were included for whites as they were for blacks, this gender gap would only increase, because of men's greater tendency to vote for Ross Perot and other candidates.

Women of both races have been found to be both more Democratic and more supportive of Democratic candidates than their male counterparts. In the arena of issue positions a different picture emerges, as a divergence of opinion is observed between blacks and whites. Blacks are found to be more liberal than whites on each issue examined, and also to exhibit more unity in their positions. Whites, on the other hand, are found to be generally more conservative, and



exhibit more and larger gender gaps than do blacks, with white women being more liberal than white men. This is to be expected among whites because white women generally are more liberal than white men. However, among blacks, in spite of their similar ideological makeup, on some issues there does exist a gender gap, as no one has a perfect issue constraint system within themselves because one's own personal experiences can cause a deviation from one's stated ideological preference.

Recent evidence suggests that the death penalty is unfairly and disproportionately applied to blacks, and because of this we may expect to see racial and gender gaps in attitudes toward capital punishment. Blacks are more likely than whites to hold liberal opinions in their opposition to its continued legality and use (see Table 1e). Accordingly, there also exist significant gender gaps among both races, with women more liberal than their male counterparts. Among those who most strongly favor the use of the death penalty, there is a ten-point gender gap among both blacks and whites, and in both cases it is the men who are most conservative and in favor of the ultimate punishment. In contrast, among those who most strongly oppose the death penalty, there is a fourteen-point gender gap among blacks, while there is a five-point gender gap among whites; similarly in both cases, it is the women who are most liberal and opposed to government-sanctioned murder. Therefore, the results are mixed, with a larger gender gap among whites in regards to strongly favoring the death penalty, while the gender gap is larger for blacks in opposing the death penalty, although it is the women of both races who hold the more liberal attitudes.

TABLE 1e—Attitudes Toward the Death Penalty

	Blacks		Whites	
	<u>Men</u>	<u>Women</u>	<u>Men</u>	<u>Women</u>
Favor strongly	48%	38%	68%	58%
Favor not strongly	12	12	14	19
Oppose not strongly	19	17	8	10
Oppose strongly	20	34	9	14
	99%	101%	99%	101%
Number of cases	265	467	616	727
Tau C =	.140 (p = .000)		.109 (p = .000)	
r =	.132 (p = .000)		.104 (p = .000)	

Defense spending is another area in which blacks are disproportionately affected, as higher military spending tends to reduce available funds for domestic programs. Again blacks are the more liberal of the two races under analysis (see Table 1f). Similar percentages of both blacks and whites favor a decrease in defense spending, although white women slightly more so. The main racial difference occurs in the categories of increasing spending, where more whites are located, and keeping spending the same, where more blacks are located. While nearly identical percentages of blacks can be found in each response category, indicating an inconsequential gender gap, among whites there is a noteworthy gender gap, with white women more liberal than white men. Men are nine points more likely to give the conservative response, by advocating an increase in defense spending, while women are more evenly divided between keeping spending the same and holding the liberal position of favoring a decrease. Women are three points more likely than men to favor keeping spending the same and six points more likely to favor a decrease.

TABLE 1f—Attitudes Toward Defense Spending

	Blacks		Whites	
	<u>Men</u>	<u>Women</u>	<u>Men</u>	<u>Women</u>
Increased	19%	22%	39%	30%
Kept the same	54	52	32	35
Decreased	27	26	29	35
	100%	100%	100%	100%
Number of cases	299	515	636	699
Tau C =	-.024 (p = .500)		.099 (p = .001)	
r =	-.024 (p = .494)		.090 (p = .001)	

Crime, an area affected by poor schools and high unemployment rates, in which those most affected are black, is again a realm in which blacks are substantially more liberal than whites. Black men and women both favor addressing social problems at nearly equal numbers. However, among whites, while women are significantly more liberal than men (see Table 1g), the results are not emphatically a confirmation of the hypothesis of women's more liberal nature, as only one of the two tests of statistical significance reaches the .05 threshold. Women are more likely to be found in each of the three liberal response categories, addressing social problems, while the conservative end of the scale has less clear results. In the two least conservative positions, men are more likely to favor convicting criminals, while in the most conservative response category there is actually a one-point gap with women more likely than men to most strongly favor convicting criminals. The results indicate that women are both more likely to have more polarized responses and simultaneously lean in the liberal direction, while men are more inclined to be in the moderate to moderately conservative response categories.

TABLE 1g—Seven Point Crime Reduction Scale

	Blacks		Whites	
	<u>Men</u>	<u>Women</u>	<u>Men</u>	<u>Women</u>
Address social problems	34%	29%	9%	13%
2	7	8	8	9
3	8	8	9	10
4	9	10	23	22
5	9	12	14	10
6	11	6	15	14
Convict criminals	24	27	22	23
	102%	99%	100%	101%
Number of cases	414	703	661	805
Tau C =	.031 (p = .349)		-.054 (p = .065)	
r =	.023 (p = .444)		-.052 (p = .046)	

In attitudes toward the role of government in guaranteeing a job and good standard of living for all, which hints at a racial tone as blacks are more likely to be unemployed and living below the poverty line, the findings suggest that generally blacks are more liberal than whites, and that white women are more liberal than white men (see Table 1h). Blacks do not exhibit a gender gap, as black men and women are equally liberal on this issue, with both more liberal than whites. Among whites, there is a five-point gender gap at each end of the scale, with women more likely to agree with the liberal position of governmental intervention, and men more likely to agree with the conservative position of letting people get ahead on their own. The more moderate categories have less of a gender gap to them, but still lean in the direction of women being more liberal than men.

TABLE 1h—Guaranteed Job and Good Standard of Living

	Blacks		Whites	
	<u>Men</u>	<u>Women</u>	<u>Men</u>	<u>Women</u>
Provide jobs	32%	30%	5%	10%
2	7	8	7	8
3	13	13	9	11
4	14	17	21	23
5	14	14	21	20
6	7	7	21	17
Get ahead on own	12	11	16	11
	99%	100%	100%	100%
Number of cases	336	582	628	775
Tau C =	.003 (p = .936)		-.144 (p = .000)	
r =	.000 (p = .994)		-.128 (p = .000)	

Another implicitly racial issue that many people believe benefits blacks more than whites concerns whether a woman on welfare who has another child should be given an increase in her welfare check. Some have proposed a change whereby a woman would not receive an increase in her benefits for each additional child. Here, too, blacks take the more liberal route, being less likely than whites to favor such a change (see Table 1i). While blacks are obviously more liberal on this issue than whites, there are no significant gender gaps among either race. This is surprising, as on most issues, while there has not been a significant gender gap among black respondents, there has been one among white respondents.

TABLE 1i—Welfare Reform

	Blacks		Whites	
	<u>Men</u>	<u>Women</u>	<u>Men</u>	<u>Women</u>
Favor strongly	37%	39%	50%	54%
Favor not strongly	11	14	18	16
Oppose not strongly	20	14	19	16
Oppose strongly	32	33	13	14
	100%	100%	100%	100%
Number of cases	275	487	594	735
Tau C =	-.020 (p = .594)		-.028 (p = .335)	
r =	-.024 (p = .511)		-.020 (p = .463)	

The Food Stamps program is yet another program that is thought to benefit more blacks than whites. As such attitudes toward Food Stamps funding repeat the familiar pattern, that blacks are both more liberal and moderate than whites, who once again hold down the conservative fort, particularly white men (see Table 1j). Blacks are ten points more likely than whites to give the liberal response and favor an increase in such spending, and also approximately twenty points more likely to give a moderate response, favoring keeping spending the same. Whites, on the other hand, are more than twice as likely as blacks to favor a decrease in spending. There is no gender gap among blacks. Among whites, there is a gender gap, as women are more likely to favor both the liberal position of increasing spending, and the moderate position of keeping spending the same. Men, in contrast, feel that spending should be decreased.

TABLE 1j—Federal Spending on Food Stamps

	Blacks		Whites	
	<u>Men</u>	<u>Women</u>	<u>Men</u>	<u>Women</u>
Increased	20%	22%	9%	12%
Kept the same	61	59	40	43
Decreased	19	20	51	45
	100%	101%	100%	100%
Number of cases	297	520	690	830
Tau C =	-.012 (p = .718)		-.075 (p = .005)	
r =	-.012 (p = .725)		-.072 (p = .005)	

The same pattern is evident in attitudes toward government aid to blacks, an area obviously of more concern to blacks than whites; blacks are considerably more liberal than whites, while only among whites are women not so much more liberal, but rather than less conservative than men (see Table 1k). Blacks do not exhibit a gender gap, presumably because this is an issue that unites black men and women, as both are substantially more liberal than whites. However, among whites, there is a gender gap with women more liberal than men. In the two most liberal response categories, favoring government intervention, the percentage of women outnumbers that of men by four points. In the three conservative response categories, believing that blacks should help themselves, the percentage of men outnumbers that of women by a combined total of ten points. The single largest gender gap is in the moderate response category, where there is a six-point gap, as women are more likely than men to situate themselves here. So among whites, not only are women more liberal than men, they are also more moderate than men, who mostly oppose government aid to blacks.

TABLE 1k—Government Aid to Blacks

	Blacks		Whites	
	<u>Men</u>	<u>Women</u>	<u>Men</u>	<u>Women</u>
Help blacks	32%	31%	3%	6%
2	6	7	3	4
3	13	13	10	9
4	12	17	20	26
5	15	15	22	19
6	7	6	22	17
Blacks help themselves	15	12	20	18
	100%	101%	100%	99%
Number of cases	337	576	642	769
Tau C =	-.026 (p = .485)		-.097 (p = .001)	
r =	-.027 (p = .421)		-.092 (p = .001)	

Laws prohibiting discrimination in the workplace should have their most devoted fans in those segments of the population that have faced discrimination in the past. In this instance those laws are designed to protect homosexuals from such discrimination and do indeed find their most ardent supporters among both blacks and white women, while the least discriminated against group in American history, white men, are found to demonstrate the least support for these laws (see Table 1l). Blacks are more likely than whites to be strongly liberal and strongly favor such laws. A gender gap was not to be found among blacks, as black men and women feel similarly on the issue, with more than half of men and women strongly in favor of such laws, a number that is greater than among white respondents. As is the case with blacks, the most common response category among whites is the most liberal position. Whites also are more likely than blacks to choose one of the more moderate “not strongly” response categories, indicating that whites’ sentiments about this issue are apparently not as strong as those blacks have. In contrast to blacks, quite a strong gender gap was found among whites. Women are more likely to hold the most liberal position and strongly favor job protection for gays. White



men, on the other hand, are in the majority in each of the other three response categories, showing their conservative streak relative to women once again.

TABLE 11—Laws to Protect Homosexuals from Discrimination

	Blacks		Whites	
	<u>Men</u>	<u>Women</u>	<u>Men</u>	<u>Women</u>
Favor strongly	53%	54%	34%	45%
Favor not strongly	18	15	26	24
Oppose not strongly	11	10	14	12
Oppose strongly	19	21	27	20
	101%	100%	101%	101%
Number of cases	268	465	578	722
Tau C =	.003 (p = .938)		-.128 (p = .000)	
r =	.010 (p = .787)		-.114 (p = .000)	

The women’s movement should also count women and blacks among its biggest fans. Perhaps because of the similarities between the women’s rights movement and the Civil Rights movement, both blacks in general and white women show the most support for the women’s movement (see Table 1m). Blacks show more support than whites for the women’s movement and have an observed gender gap of ten points among those who most strongly support the movement, with black women more in favor than black men. Among whites, there is a gender gap of eleven points among those who most strongly support the movement, with women more supportive than men. There is no gender gap to speak of among blacks at the low end of the scale, indicating the most opposition to the movement. Whites, on the other hand, have a small gender gap at the lowest ranges of support, with men more in opposition than women.

TABLE 1m—Actual Feeling Thermometer Scores for the Women’s Movement

Feeling Thermometer Rating	Blacks		Whites	
	<u>Men</u>	<u>Women</u>	<u>Men</u>	<u>Women</u>
81-100	25%	35%	18%	29%
61-80	33	30	24	23
41-60	33	25	41	35
21-40	5	5	12	10
0-20	4	5	6	4
	100%	100%	101%	101%
Number of cases	286	501	605	743
	Tau C = .093 (p = .012)		.144 (p = .000)	
	r = .067 (p = .060)		.130 (p = .000)	

Attitudes about the ideal number of immigrants that should be allowed into the United States, which taps into respondents’ feelings toward groups that are different from themselves, show blacks slightly more accepting of others than whites (see Table 1n). Blacks are more likely than whites to be either extremely liberal or extremely conservative on this issue, while overall, whites are more likely to favor the conservative position of a decrease in allowable immigrants. In contrast to all previous findings documenting a gender gap among whites, where none exists among blacks, here there is not a gender gap among whites, while there is a gender gap among blacks that approaches the usual standard of statistical significance. While there is only a small margin of gender differentiation here, it is striking because this gap runs opposite to what one might expect. It is the black men rather than the black women, who by a combined six-point margin, hold the more liberal opinion of favoring an increase in allowable immigrants, while the women are a combined six points more conservative in calling for a decrease.

TABLE 1n—Number of Immigrants to the U.S.

	Blacks		Whites	
	<u>Men</u>	<u>Women</u>	<u>Men</u>	<u>Women</u>
Increased a lot	5%	2%	2%	2%
Increased a little	8	5	4	3
Kept the same	42	41	39	36
Decreased a little	16	20	28	32
Decreased a lot	29	31	28	27
	100%	99%	101%	100%
Number of cases	280	503	608	746
Tau C =	.065 (p = .085)		.023 (p = .448)	
r =	.067 (p = .059)		.018 (p = .497)	

Related to the number of immigrants that should be allowed into the United States, the question of immigrant government services taps into what the U.S. government should do for these immigrants once they arrive here. Consistent with the previous findings, blacks who are generally already more inclined to accepting immigrants into the national community are also slightly more likely than whites to favor allowing immigrants to immediately collect government benefits (see Table 1o). However, overwhelming majorities of both races tend to give the more conservative response by expressing the point of view that immigrants should have to wait at least a year before being able to collect such benefits. Both blacks and whites are united on this issue, with no significant gender gaps occurring among either race. This is, undoubtedly, because men and women of both races recognize that the more that is spent on government services for immigrants, the less money there is to support the programs that long-time residents of the United States use.

TABLE 1o—Immigrant Government Services

	Blacks		Whites	
	<u>Men</u>	<u>Women</u>	<u>Men</u>	<u>Women</u>
Now	19%	20%	12%	13%
In a year	81	80	88	87
	100%	100%	100%	100%
Number of cases	279	497	605	742
Tau C =	-.014 (p = .615)		-.013 (p = .458)	
r =	-.018 (p = .618)		-.020 (p = .460)	

Confirming the original hypothesis, the findings indicate that for both blacks and whites, whenever there is a significant gender gap, it is the women who are more liberal than the men, with only one exception: in their support for larger numbers of immigrants entering the U.S. black men are more liberal than black women. The lack of a gender gap, for the most part, among blacks shows that there is more consensus within the black community than there is in the white community and that perhaps blacks are still united by their fight against the white man in the area of civil rights and racism. While blacks of both genders are more liberal than their white counterparts, black and white women are much more similar in their attitudes than black and white men. Perhaps women are more united by the feminist movement than first thought.

## Chapter 4: Multivariate Analysis

### Multivariate Analysis

Gender is not the only personal quality that could be influencing respondents' political attitudes. Several control variables are introduced in order to estimate the unique effects of gender on the dependent variables. The control variables are age, income, religiosity, marital status, education, and region. All of these are known to have effects on the various dependent variables selected. It has been found that older age is associated with greater conservatism in the population at large (Welch and Sigelman 1992; Hasenfeld and Rafferty 1989), although older people have also been found to be more liberal on some issues and to vote more Democratic in some elections (Binstock and Day 1996). People of higher socioeconomic status—indicated here by income and education—tend to be more conservative (Welch and Sigelman 1992), and less likely to support redistributive policies (Glynn et al. 1999), a staple of liberalism. Religiosity also marks a difference in party preference (Kaufmann and Petrocik 1999), with those who are the most religious more supportive of Republican candidates and generally more conservative. Marital status, too, has an effect because when compared to single adults, married individuals tend to be more conservative and more likely to be Republican (Weisberg 1987). It was also found that the pro-Democratic influences associated with the never married also induced them toward the liberal side in all predispositional domains examined (Miller and Shanks 1996). Region is also included because it is an established fact that southern states are more conservative than average (Erikson, McIver, and Wright 1987).

Building upon the results in the bivariate crosstabular analysis, this section seeks to assess whether any of the previously observed gender gaps remain when relevant control variables are

introduced: those that have been identified as influencing political attitudes. The findings here indicate for the most part that the bivariate gender gaps found do stand the test of the added controls and retain their significance with a few exceptions. Among whites, women are indeed more liberal than are men on the issues where a gender gap survives. However, the bivariate relationships showing that white women are more Democratic and are more likely to vote Democratic melt away once controls are introduced. This indicates that it is not gender, per se, that leads women in a Democratic direction, but rather other variables are producing this effect. Among blacks the only gender gap that remains in the multivariate analysis is that for party identification; black women remain more Democratic than black men when controlling for other factors.

The bivariate results for party identification indicate that there are significant gender gaps among both blacks and whites (see Table 2). Women of both races are more Democratic than their male counterparts. The multivariate results show that the relationship between party identification and gender for blacks is still upheld and retains its strength even with the additional controls. The predicted mean for blacks on the partisan identification scale is 2.222 among men, while among women it is 1.981, when other variables are held at their means (see Table 18), showing that the main difference among black men and women is not in their partisan affiliation, but rather in their strength of attachment to the Democratic party. Age also has an impact upon blacks' partisan affiliation, as those who are older tend to be more Democratic than those who are younger. The situation for whites differs markedly, however. While in the bivariate

TABLE 2-OLS Regression Coefficients for Republican Party Identification

	Black	White
Bivariate Coefficient	-.239** (.086)	-.501*** (.106)
Adjusted R-squared	.0056	.0137
Number of Cases	1204	1527
Probability of F	.0055	.0000
Multivariate Model		
Female	-.224* (.094)	-.192 (.135)
Age	-.021*** (.003)	-.003 (.004)
Income	.003 (.020)	.116*** (.029)
Religiosity	.026 (.036)	.200*** (.056)
Married	-.069 (.100)	.149 (.157)
Education	-.010 (.034)	.129** (.046)
South	-.140 (.090)	-.201 (.134)
Adjusted R-squared	.045	.078
Number of Cases	938	983
Probability of F	.0000	.0000

<sup>a</sup>p<.1; \* p<.05; \*\* p<.01; \*\*\* p<.001

Note: see appendix for coding scheme

TABLE 18-Predicted Values and Predicted Probabilities Illustrating the Gender Gap among Whites and Blacks \*

Whites

	Males	Females	Difference
Ideology 1= extremely liberal to 7= extremely conservative	4.675	4.323	.352
Death Penalty favor strongly	.665	.566	.099
favor not strongly	.163	.194	-.031
oppose not strongly	.080	.106	-.026
oppose strongly	.092	.134	-.042
Defense Spending increased	.378	.290	.088
kept the same	.357	.361	-.004
decreased	.265	.349	-.084
Seven Point Crime Reduction Scale 1= Address Social Problems to 7= Convict and Punish Criminals	4.693	4.393	.300
Job and Good Standard of Living 1= Government Provide Jobs to 7= Get Ahead on Own	4.747	4.418	.329
Laws to Protect Homosexuals from Discrimination favor strongly	.298	.423	-.125
favor not strongly	.246	.250	-.004
oppose not strongly	.143	.118	.025
oppose strongly	.313	.209	.104
Actual Feeling Thermometer Scores for the Women's Movement	60.008	62.908	-2.900

Blacks

Party Identification 1= strong Democrat to 7= strong Republican	2.222	1.981	.241
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Relative Feeling Thermometer Scores for the Women's Movement	.140	.224	-.084
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\*Only the models that were significant and included significant gender gaps are presented

results, the relationship between party identification and gender is twice as large among whites as it is for blacks, once controls are introduced, the relationship between gender and partisanship becomes statistically insignificant for whites. Only income, religiosity, and education are significant. Lower income and less education are positively associated with being Democratic and these factors partially account for the observed gender gap. Religiosity, however, is positively associated with being Republican and since women are more religious than men, this cannot account for the observed gender gap.

While blacks continue to have a significant gender gap in their partisan affiliation, even when controls are introduced, in the area of ideology there is no significant gender gap among them (see Table 3). The gap that does exist among blacks falls along the lines of primarily education and region, as those blacks who are least educated and live in the South tend to be the most conservative. Whites have a gender gap that remains as strong in the multivariate results as it is in the bivariate results, indicating that the controls do nothing to diminish the gender gap. Women have a predicted mean of 4.323 on the 1-7 ideological scale, compared to men, whose predicted mean is 4.675 when other variables are held at their means, showing that women are more likely to be liberal than men are (see Table 18), a statistically significant, but small difference. Education is a factor for whites just as it is for blacks, however it runs in the opposite direction. Among whites, the most educated tend to be the most liberal, in contrast to previous findings showing that those with more education lean in the conservative direction and the stated findings

TABLE 3-OLS Regression Coefficients for Conservative Ideology

	Black	White
Bivariate Coefficient	<i>Model</i> <i>Insignificant</i>	-.351 <sup>***</sup> (.079)
Adjusted R-squared		.0153
Number of Cases		1196
Probability of F		.0000
Multivariate Model		
Female	-.127 (.134)	-.352 <sup>***</sup> (.096)
Age	-.003 (.005)	.004 (.003)
Income	-.054 <sup>a</sup> (.028)	.036 <sup>a</sup> (.021)
Religiosity	.083 (.052)	.276 <sup>***</sup> (.040)
Married	.060 (.143)	.086 (.113)
Education	-.215 <sup>***</sup> (.049)	-.088 <sup>**</sup> (.033)
South	.371 <sup>**</sup> (.129)	-.020 (.096)
Adjusted R-squared	.0471	.0896
Number of Cases	920	789
Probability of F	.0000	.0000

<sup>a</sup>p<.1; \* p<.05; \*\* p<.01; \*\*\* p<.001  
 Note: see appendix for coding scheme

for blacks. Religiosity is also a factor for whites, as those who are among the least religious tend to be the most liberal. Neither of these factors account for the gender gap, however, since it is women who are both more religious and less educated, relative to men.

Voting in the 1992 presidential election produces no significant gender gap among blacks in either the bivariate or multivariate models (see Table 4). Blacks are pretty unified in their selection of the Clinton/Gore ticket. The only significant result in the multivariate model for blacks is marital status, whereby those who are married were more likely to vote Republican than the unmarried. Approaching significance is income, whereby those who have higher incomes were, oddly enough, among the most likely to vote Democratic. Among whites a gender gap is observed in the bivariate analysis, but disappears into the land of insignificance once the controls are introduced. The key variable that is responsible for the observed gender gap is income, whereby those who are with higher incomes were among those who most supported the Bush/Quayle Republican ticket. Also significant but not related to the gender gap is religiosity, as the most religious also tended to vote Republican

The year 1996 saw the Clinton/Gore ticket up for re-election. Blacks once again have no significant gender gap in either the bivariate or multivariate results (see Table 5). Indeed the whole multivariate model is insignificant demonstrating the unity that blacks had in their vote choice. Whites, on the other hand, exhibit a gender gap in the bivariate relationship, but once the controls are introduced, the relationship disappears, as there are other factors responsible for the gap. Income and education are the main players in this model, as those who earn the most money and are the most educated are the ones who gave more support to the Republican party

TABLE 4-Logit Coefficients for 1992 Presidential Vote for Clinton

	Black	White
Bivariate Coefficient	<i>Model</i> <i>Insignificant</i>	.406** (.132)
Number of Cases		946
% Correctly Classified		55.60
BIC'		-2.632
Probability of Chi-squared		.0021
Multivariate Model		
Female	.397 (.343)	.110 (.169)
Age	.024 <sup>a</sup> (.013)	-.007 (.005)
Income	.142 <sup>a</sup> (.079)	-.091* (.037)
Religiosity	-.160 (.143)	-.245*** (.069)
Married	-.884* (.359)	-.123 (.192)
Education	.018 (.132)	-.082 (.057)
South	.089 (.346)	.109 (.167)
Number of Cases	631	646
% Correctly Classified	93.50	61.30
BIC'	32.196	10.358
Probability of Chi-squared	.0737	.0000

<sup>a</sup>p<.1; \* p<.05; \*\* p<.01; \*\*\* p<.001

Note: See appendix for coding scheme. Note: The positive BIC's indicate a poor fit of the model as a result of the inclusion of insignificant control variables.

TABLE 5-Logit Coefficients for 1996 Presidential Vote for Dole

	Black	White
Bivariate Coefficient	<i>Model</i> <i>Insignificant</i>	-.495*** (.134)
Number of Cases		925
% Correctly Classified		58.16
BIC'		-6.817
Probability of Chi-squared		.0002
Multivariate Model		
Female	<i>Model</i> <i>Insignificant</i>	-.226 (.171)
Age		.005 (.005)
Income		.131*** (.039)
Religiosity		.282*** (.073)
Married		.238 (.200)
Education		.136* (.059)
South		-.136 (.174)
Number of Cases		644
% Correctly Classified		65.22
BIC'		-20.277
Probability of Chi-squared		.0000

<sup>a</sup>p<.1; \* p<.05; \*\* p<.01; \*\*\* p<.001

Note: see appendix for coding scheme

candidates. The effects of both of these factors in this election are even stronger than they were previously in the 1992 election. Religiosity, once again, is also a significant predictor of vote choice; however once again it cannot account for the gender gap since it is the women who are more religious.

The death penalty, seen by some as cruel and unusual punishment, is an issue that typically divides men and women because of its violent nature. As such, in both bivariate analyses, women are more liberal than men in their opposition thereof (see Table 6). Blacks' significant gender gap in the bivariate analysis, however, disappears when controls are introduced, leaving an insignificant model. Whites, on the other hand, retain gender gaps in both analyses. The strength of the relationship between gender and the death penalty diminishes slightly in the multivariate analysis, but is still healthy. For men the predicted probability of strongly favoring the death penalty is .665, while for women it is .566 (see Table 18). This evidences a nearly ten-percent gender gap in probabilities once the other variables in the model are taken account of, with women being more liberal than men. In addition, the predicted probability of strongly opposing the death penalty for men is .092, while among women it is .134, showing that women are more in opposition than men are, although generally both favor the death penalty. Of the control variables that help explain the initial gender gap, religiosity has the greatest effect, as the most religious are also among the most likely to oppose capital punishment. Besides religiosity, income is also significant as those with least income are also more likely to oppose the death penalty. Education, while related to death penalty attitudes, is not responsible for the gap.

TABLE 6-Ologit Coefficients for Opposition to the Death Penalty

	Black	White
Bivariate Coefficient	.363** (.139)	.445*** (.111)
Number of Cases	752	1343
Craig and Uhler's R-squared	.009	.012
BIC'	-.222	-8.926
Probability of Chi-squared	.0089	.0001
Multivariate Model		
Female	<i>Model</i> <i>Insignificant</i>	.421** (.142)
Age		-.004 (.004)
Income		-.070* (.031)
Religiosity		.179** (.059)
Married		-.220 (.165)
Education		.112* (.048)
South		-.105 (.140)
Number of Cases		871
Craig and Uhler's R-squared		.041
BIC'		10.889
Probability of Chi-squared		.0000

<sup>a</sup>p<.1; \* p<.05; \*\* p<.01; \*\*\* p<.001  
 Note: see appendix for coding scheme

Defense spending is something that is seen as taking funds away from domestic spending programs. As such there is no gender gap among blacks in either the bivariate or multivariate analysis, as both black men and women benefit disproportionately from the social programs that military spending detracts from (see Table 7). Whites, however do exhibit a gender gap in both analyses, as white women are known to profit from these social programs more so than white men. Among whites, women have a predicted probability of .349, while men have only a .265 predicted probability of wanting such a decrease (see Table 18). In fact, once the control variables are introduced, the coefficient for gender actually goes up, indicating that the gender gap was being minimized by the lack of a control for other variables. Although blacks do not have a gender gap, whereas whites do, a similar pattern can be seen among both races as the same control variables affect both blacks and whites in the same way. Among both blacks and whites, while unrelated to the gender gap, it is the most educated and those who live outside the south who are more likely to favor a decrease in defense spending. In addition, among whites age also plays a role in attitudes as those who are younger are also more likely to favor a decrease.

Crime reduction is another issue that divides whites along gender lines, but not blacks. Blacks have no gender gap in the analysis as men and women have similar opinions on how to best to reduce crime (see Table 8). The major lines of division among blacks come in the areas of income, education, and age as those with higher incomes and the most education favor addressing social problems as the best way to deal with crime, while older blacks favor catching, convicting, and punishing criminals. Whites, on the other hand, do have an observable gender gap in both analyses that once again increases when other variables are controlled for. Women



TABLE 7-Ologit Coefficients for Decreasing Defense Spending

	Black	White
Bivariate Coefficient	<i>Model</i> <i>Insignificant</i>	.335*** (.101)
Number of Cases		1335
Craig and Uhler's R-squared		.008
BIC'		-3.820
Probability of Chi-squared		.0009
Multivariate Model		
Female	-.029 (.156)	.404** (.131)
Age	-.007 (.005)	-.012** (.004)
Income	.056 <sup>a</sup> (.034)	-.016 (.028)
Religiosity	-.114 <sup>a</sup> (.061)	-.095 <sup>a</sup> (.053)
Married	-.092 (.164)	-.151 (.152)
Education	.188*** (.056)	.146*** (.045)
South	-.332* (.153)	-.412** (.131)
Number of Cases	691	871
Craig and Uhler's R-squared	.067	.052
BIC'	4.269	.906
Probability of Chi-squared	.0000	.0000

<sup>a</sup>p<.1; \* p<.05; \*\* p<.01; \*\*\* p<.001

Note: see appendix for coding scheme

TABLE 8-OLS Regression Coefficients for Catching, Convicting, and Punishing Criminals

	Black	White
Bivariate Coefficient	<i>Model</i> <i>Insignificant</i>	-.208* (.104)
Adjusted R-squared		.002
Number of Cases		1466
Probability of F		.0456
Multivariate Model		
Female	.216 (.163)	-.306* (.131)
Age	.013* (.006)	.002 (.004)
Income	-.062 <sup>a</sup> (.034)	.009 (.029)
Religiosity	.044 (.062)	.023 (.054)
Married	.162 (.174)	.224 (.151)
Education	-.427*** (.060)	-.260*** (.045)
South	.221 (.157)	.423*** (.129)
Adjusted R-squared	.0944	.0519
Number of Cases	892	949
Probability of F	.0000	.0000

<sup>a</sup>p<.1; \* p<.05; \*\* p<.01; \*\*\* p<.001  
 Note: see appendix for coding scheme

have a predicted value of 4.393, while men have a predicted value of 4.693 on the 7-point crime reduction scale when other variables are held at their means, indicating that women are more liberal on this issue in their greater support for addressing social problems (see Table 18). As among blacks, education has a similar impact among whites: more education leads to a more liberal perspective. In addition, region also has an effect among whites, as those who live outside the south are more likely to favor the more liberal option, although neither of these variables are related to the gender gap.

The role of government in guaranteeing a job and good standard of living is at the heart of the liberal-conservative dichotomy. Liberal ideology leads its believers to favor an increased role for government in helping citizens, while the alternative, conservatism believes in a more limited role for government. Blacks are extremely united on this issue as there is no gender gap in either the bivariate or multivariate analysis, nor does any other significant variable emerge as a predictor of black attitudes, which leaves a totally insignificant model (see Table 9). There appears to be no dissension among blacks on this issue. The picture changes dramatically when white attitudes are examined, as there is a significant gender gap here. The predicted mean for women is 4.418 when other variables are held at their means, while that for men is 4.747, indicating that women are more liberal than men in their belief of a role for government in this area (see Table 18). The strength of the relationship between gender and governmental involvement weakens somewhat in the multivariate analysis, but remains significant. Those who have lower incomes, who also tend to be women, are more in favor of governmental intervention, and this is what causes the weakening of the original bivariate relationship. Age, too, is related to opinions about the size of government as younger citizens are more in favor of an increased role for government.

TABLE 9-OLS Regressions for Government Letting Each Person Get Ahead On Own

	Black	White
Bivariate Coefficient	<i>Model</i> <i>Insignificant</i>	-.449 <sup>***</sup> (.093)
Adjusted R-squared		.0158
Number of Cases		1403
Probability of F		.0000
Multivariate Model		
Female	<i>Model</i> <i>Insignificant</i>	-.326 <sup>**</sup> (.117)
Age		.009 <sup>**</sup> (.003)
Income		.106 <sup>***</sup> (.026)
Religiosity		.045 (.048)
Married		.050 (.137)
Education		.044 (.040)
South		-.124 (.115)
Adjusted R-squared		.0603
Number of Cases		902
Probability of F		.0000

<sup>a</sup>p<.1; \* p<.05; \*\* p<.01; \*\*\* p<.001  
 Note: see appendix for coding scheme

Welfare reform is a notoriously conservative issue and as such it might be expected to cause a gender gap. However, the results indicate no observable gender gap among either race (see Table 10). Interestingly enough the results are nearly identical for blacks and whites in their respective multivariate models, a first and only for this study. Both age and income are significant and have similar negative coefficients among blacks and whites. For both races, those who are older and have higher incomes are more likely to favor reform, such that a woman on welfare would no longer receive an increase in her benefits if she were to have another child.

Spending for Food Stamps is yet another issue that does not divide blacks along gender lines. Both black men and women feel similarly on this issue, and as such no gender gap is observed (see Table 11). Blacks are, however, divided along income lines as those who have the highest incomes are the most likely to favor a decrease in spending. Whites exhibit a significant gender gap in the bivariate analysis, with women more likely to favor an increase in spending. This relationship disappears though once the controls are added. With the added controls, gender ceases to be a predictor of white attitudes on the issue of spending on Food Stamps. The bivariate relationship appears to be a product of the high significance of income, as it is the only significant variable in the multivariate model and wipes out the initial significance of the gender variable. Those with the lowest incomes are the ones who most want an increase in spending. This, as a result, appears to be the case as those with the lowest incomes tend to be women, thus producing the original bivariate relationship.

TABLE 10-Ologit Coefficients for Opposition to Welfare Reform

	Black	White
Bivariate Coefficient		
Number of Cases	<i>Model</i>	<i>Model</i>
Craig and Uhler's R-squared	<i>Insignificant</i>	<i>Insignificant</i>
BIC'		
Probability of Chi-squared		
Multivariate Model		
Female	-.185 (.156)	-.138 (.134)
Age	-.014** (.005)	-.011** (.004)
Income	-.081* (.033)	-.070* (.029)
Religiosity	-.012 (.059)	-.010 (.055)
Married	-.012 (.165)	-.146 (.154)
Education	.009 (.055)	.030 (.046)
South	-.259 <sup>a</sup> (.152)	-.065 (.133)
Number of Cases	644	862
Craig and Uhler's R-squared	.027	.020
BIC'	27.754	29.795
Probability of Chi-squared	.0143	.0143

<sup>a</sup>p<.1; \*p<.05; \*\*p<.01; \*\*\*p<.001

Note: see appendix for coding scheme

TABLE 11-Ologit Coefficients for Decreasing Spending on Food Stamps

	Black	White
Bivariate Coefficient	<i>Model</i> <i>Insignificant</i>	-.277** (.099)
Number of Cases		1520
Craig and Uhler's R-squared		.005
BIC'		-.517
Probability of Chi-squared		.0051
Multivariate Model		
Female	.097 (.161)	.039 (.130)
Age	-.004 (.005)	.006 (.004)
Income	.076* (.035)	.167*** (.029)
Religiosity	.071 (.062)	.026 (.053)
Married	.033 (.169)	.061 (.150)
Education	.030 (.057)	.015 (.044)
South	.268 <sup>a</sup> (.159)	.078 (.128)
Number of Cases	691	984
Craig and Uhler's R-squared	.024	.061
BIC'	31.605	-13.650
Probability of Chi-squared	.0484	.0000

<sup>a</sup>p<.1; \* p<.05; \*\* p<.01; \*\*\* p<.001  
 Note: see appendix for coding scheme

Findings about government aid to blacks parallel those for spending on Food Stamps. Blacks once again do not exhibit a gender gap on this issue (see Table 12). The only cleavage that exists among blacks is on the lines of education; those with the least education are more likely to favor aid to blacks. Whites, on the other hand, exhibit a gender gap in the bivariate results, with women more liberal and in favor of such aid than are men. The multivariate model, however, shows a similar picture to that for Food Stamps. In the presence of control variables, the relationship between gender and aid to blacks disappears, and once again income becomes the most significant predictor of white attitudes, as women tend to earn less than men. Those with the lowest incomes favor aid to blacks most, while in this instance marital status also emerges with predictive power as the unmarried favor aid to blacks more so than their married counterparts.

Attitudes toward laws to protect homosexuals from discrimination show no significant gender gap among blacks (see Table 13). The distinctions to be drawn among blacks come from differences in religiosity and education. The less frequently one attends religious services, and the more education one has, the more supportive of anti-discrimination laws one tends to be. Whites, in contrast, have a powerful gender gap that not only survives the multivariate analysis, but becomes enhanced by it. When the multivariate model is run the gender gap increases by an estimated one and one-half points to an impressive .125 gap in the predicted probability of favoring such laws, with the predicted probability for women being .423, while the same figure for men is .298 (see Table 18). As is the case with blacks, among whites, religiosity also has a significant impact, as the least frequent church attenders once again are most likely to favor such



TABLE 12-OLS Regressions for Government Allowing Blacks to Get Ahead on Their Own

	Black	White
Bivariate Coefficient	<i>Model</i> <i>Insignificant</i>	-.297*** (.086)
Adjusted R-squared		.0078
Number of Cases		1411
Probability of F		.0005
Multivariate Model		
Female	-.015 (.164)	-.154 (.107)
Age	.008 (.006)	.001 (.003)
Income	.037 (.035)	.064** (.023)
Religiosity	-.053 (.062)	-.037 (.044)
Married	.174 (.172)	.249* (.124)
Education	-.153** (.059)	-.072 <sup>a</sup> (.037)
South	.158 (.159)	.097 (.106)
Adjusted R-squared	.0068	.0223
Number of Cases	749	909
Probability of F	.0996	.0003

<sup>a</sup>p<.1; \* p<.05; \*\* p<.01; \*\*\* p<.001

Note: see appendix for coding scheme

TABLE 13-OLogit Coefficients for Opposition to Laws to Protect Homosexuals from Discrimination

Homosexual Job Discrimination	Black	White
Bivariate Coefficient	<i>Model</i> <i>Insignificant</i>	-.429*** (.102)
Number of Cases		1300
Craig and Uhler's R-squared		.014
BIC'		-10.663
Probability of Chi-squared		.0000
Multivariate Model		
Female	-.233 (.163)	-.546*** (.131)
Age	-.002 (.005)	.003 (.004)
Income	-.043 (.035)	.021 (.029)
Religiosity	.255*** (.064)	.146** (.055)
Married	-.167 (.175)	.266 <sup>a</sup> (.152)
Education	-.181** (.060)	-.067 (.045)
South	.274 <sup>a</sup> (.161)	.243 <sup>a</sup> (.130)
Number of Cases	623	843
Craig and Uhler's R-squared	.065	.046
BIC'	3.457	7.419
Probability of Chi-squared	.0000	.0000

<sup>a</sup>p<.1; \* p<.05; \*\* p<.01; \*\*\* p<.001

Note: see appendix for coding scheme

laws. As men tend to be less religious than women, this explains the increased gender gap among whites when control variables are added.

The women's movement with its similar theme of empowering those who have historically been discriminated against finds that blacks and whites have gender gaps, and in both cases it is the women who feel more warmly towards the women's movement in the bivariate analysis (see Table 14). Adding the control variables to the analysis produces an insignificant multivariate model for blacks, as these extra variables are unrelated to feelings about the women's movement. The gender gap among whites is reduced by half once the control variables are included from a margin of 5.844 points to a margin of 2.921 points, and the predicted mean predicted for women on the feeling thermometer is 62.908, while that for men is 60.008. Indeed, both religiosity and region have stronger impacts on one's feelings towards the women's movement. Religiosity's coefficient of -3.219, shows that the more one attends religious services, the more negatively one feels toward the women's movement. Age and income also are significant as those who are younger and have lower incomes are more supportive of the liberation of women. Also, surprisingly and counter to expectations, living in the South produces an increase in one's warmth towards the women's movement of 4.269 points. Income, however, is the only variable that can be said to account for the first observed gender gap.

Because of the counterintuitive findings regarding feelings toward the women's movement, that Southerners tend to feel more warmly towards the women's movement than non-Southerners, a second analysis was conducted whereby instead of using actual feeling thermometer scores, a relative feeling thermometer scale was created.<sup>3</sup> This was done to account for response bias among respondents who may be inclined to give all groups either high ratings

TABLE 14-OLS Regression Coefficients for Actual Feeling Thermometer Scores for the Women's Movement

	Black	White
Bivariate Coefficient	4.010* (1.760)	5.844*** (1.154)
Adjusted R-squared	.0052	.0180
Number of Cases	808	1348
Probability of F	.0230	.0000
Multivariate Model		
Female	<i>Model Insignificant</i>	2.921* (1.479)
Age		-.094* (.044)
Income		-.705* (.323)
Religiosity		-3.219*** (.609)
Married		-2.979 <sup>a</sup> (1.715)
Education		-.984 <sup>a</sup> (.504)
South		4.269** (1.462)
Adjusted R-squared		.0871
Number of Cases		878
Probability of F		.0000

<sup>a</sup>p<.1; \* p<.05; \*\* p<.01; \*\*\* p<.001

Note: see appendix for coding scheme

or low ratings, thereby disguising their true feelings about the women's movement when compared to these other groups. The findings here show that among both blacks and whites in the bivariate analysis women are still significantly more inclined to rate the movement positively than men (see Table 15). However, the multivariate analyses change and require further analysis when relative feeling thermometer scores are substituted for actual thermometer scores.

Whereas in the previous analysis, the multivariate model for blacks was insignificant, the model now approaches significance to where it can be interpreted and as a result, thought to represent the actual population from which the sample was drawn. In this model for blacks gender remains the only variable that is significantly related to one's feelings about the women's movement and has a similar coefficient to the one in the bivariate model with black women feeling more warmly than black men, showing that the introduction of the control variables does nothing to reduce the strength of the original relationship. Whites, too, show a difference across multivariate models. In the previous model, gender, age, income, religiosity, and region were all significantly related to feelings toward the women's movement. In this model the relationship between gender and feelings toward the women's movement becomes insignificant and the only variables related are age and religiosity. Younger respondents and those among the least religious are more likely to feel warmly towards the women's movement and because neither of these can account for the gender gap, this is a true difference between white men and women. Region is no longer a significant predictor of whites' feelings toward the women's movement. Perhaps this is a more accurate estimation of the variables that are correlated with feelings toward the women's movement.

TABLE 15-OLS Regression Coefficients for Relative Feeling Thermometer Scores for the Women's Movement

	Black	White
Bivariate Coefficient	.081* (.036)	.056** (.020)
Adjusted R-squared	.0048	.0051
Number of Cases	809	1349
Probability of F	.0273	.0050
Multivariate Model		
Female	.084* (.041)	.040 (.025)
Age	-.002 (.001)	-.002* (.001)
Income	-.007 (.009)	-.001 (.005)
Religiosity	-.003 (.016)	-.078*** (.010)
Married	-.031 (.043)	-.045 (.029)
Education	-.002 (.014)	.004 (.008)
South	-.053 (.040)	.015 (.024)
Adjusted R-squared	.0082	.0806
Number of Cases	674	879
Probability of F	.0864	.0000

<sup>a</sup>p<.1; \* p<.05; \*\* p<.01; \*\*\* p<.001

Note: see appendix for coding scheme

Immigration is considered to be something that threatens natural-born Americans' job security and cultural life. Potential evidence of this was seen in the bivariate crosstabulation in the previous section as only small percentages of blacks and whites were found to prefer an increase in the number of allowable immigrants (Table 1n) In spite of this, however, a marginally significant gender gap emerges in the bivariate regression for blacks, although none is to be found among whites (see Table 16). The gender gap among blacks indicates that it is the women who are surprisingly most opposed to an increase in the allowable number of immigrants, instead of the men. Perhaps black men welcome the introduction of more minorities into America in order to bind with them in wresting power away from whites. Again, as in the case of the women's movement, the multivariate model for blacks is insignificant, as a result of the introduction of control variables, which are unrelated to this immigration policy. Whites have no gender gap at all on this issue. The only variable that appears to have an impact on white attitudes is education, with the more educated in favor of increasingly opening our national borders to those who come from elsewhere.

Allowing new immigrants to receive government services when they arrive in the land of opportunity causes no disagreement among men and women of either race. No gender gap at all emerges on this issue, as both men and women, black and white, prefer that immigrants wait at least a year before collecting benefits (see Table 17). No variable has predictive power among blacks as both the bivariate and multivariate models are insignificant. The multivariate model for whites, itself only marginally significant, produces two variables of interest: age and income. Again, only marginally significant, the trend is for those who are older and have higher incomes

TABLE 16-Ologit Coefficients for Decreasing the Number of Immigrants Permitted to Come to the U.S.

	Black	White
Bivariate Coefficient	.238 <sup>a</sup> (.136)	<i>Model</i> <i>Insignificant</i>
Number of Cases	802	
Craig and Uhler's R-squared	.004	
BIC'	3.640	
Probability of Chi-squared	.0809	
Multivariate Model		
Female	<i>Model</i> <i>Insignificant</i>	.113 (.128)
Age		.006 (.004)
Income		.012 (.028)
Religiosity		-.073 (.053)
Married		.087 (.148)
Education		-.152 <sup>***</sup> (.044)
South		.171 (.128)
Number of Cases		883
Craig and Uhler's R-squared		.026
BIC'		23.838
Probability of Chi-squared		.0013

<sup>a</sup>p<.1; \* p<.05; \*\* p<.01; \*\*\* p<.001

Note: see appendix for coding scheme



TABLE 17-Logit Coefficients for Making Immigrants Wait at Least a Year for Government Services

	Black	White
Bivariate Coefficient	<i>Model</i>	<i>Model</i>
Number of Cases	<i>Insignificant</i>	<i>Insignificant</i>
% Correctly Classified		
BIC'		
Probability of Chi-squared		
Multivariate Model		
Female	<i>Model</i>	-.150
	<i>Insignificant</i>	(.216)
Age		.012 <sup>a</sup>
		(.006)
Income		.086 <sup>a</sup>
		(.046)
Religiosity		-.030
		(.088)
Married		.215
		(.244)
Education		-.079
		(.072)
South		.056
		(.209)
Number of Cases		878
% Correctly Classified		87.24
BIC'		35.131
Probability of Chi-squared		.0907

<sup>a</sup>p<.1; \* p<.05; \*\* p<.01; \*\*\* p<.001

Note: see appendix for coding scheme

to be more in favor of making immigrants wait to reap the goods of America than are those who younger and have lower incomes.

Once again the basic hypotheses are confirmed; there is a larger, more pronounced gender gap among whites than there is among blacks. Among whites, women are more liberal on a variety of issues and in their general ideology than are men. Previous studies indicating that among whites, women tend to be and vote more Democratic than men need to be re-evaluated, based upon the results presented here. While there is a partisan gender gap among whites, the cause of this gap is apparently due to other factors, primarily income, that distinguish women from men. It is these factors that lead to the observed gender gap in partisanship and vote choice among whites, not gender, per se. Blacks, on the other hand, while not having any significant ideological differences between men and women, do exhibit a gender gap in party identification, with women more likely to be Democratic than men. This is not to say that blacks will not develop a cleavage amongst themselves along gender lines in the future, however. Some gaps among the control variables are occurring and as time goes on, blacks may also fracture along the great gender divide, particularly as the nation moves forward and addresses the racism concerns that continue to by and large bind the black community together.

## Chapter 5: Conclusion

### Conclusion

Black unity expresses itself quite clearly throughout this study, as there are significantly fewer gender gaps among blacks than for whites. Whites generally have larger and more significant gender gaps than do blacks. On issues in which there was a gender gap, with only one exception, it was the women of both races who were more liberal than the men. This comports well with the previous research conducted on the gender gap, including the limited research conducted on blacks and the gender gap, which has found significant gender gaps among whites, but has had only limited success in finding similar results for blacks. The two main surprises of this research were finding that white women are not significantly more likely to be and vote more Democratic than white men in the face of statistical controls, and that higher income affects blacks and whites differently in their 1992 presidential vote choice, leading blacks to vote more Democratic and whites to vote more Republican.

#### *The Gender Gap among Whites*

The bivariate results show significant gender gaps among whites in the areas of party identification, ideology, presidential vote choice, and a host of political issue attitudes including traditional use of force, social service program, and minority rights issues. Women are more Democratic, and more liberal generally and specifically on the issues of death penalty, defense spending, crime reduction, government guarantee of a job and good standard of living, government aid to blacks, federal spending on Food Stamps, laws to protect homosexuals from job discrimination, and actual and relative feelings toward the women's movement. In contrast, there are no issues on which men are more liberal than women. On the issues of welfare reform

and immigration policy there exists no significant gender gap, indicating that there still do remain some issues on which no gender gap has emerged among whites.

The multivariate results for whites show that the majority of these original bivariate relationships do hold up with the addition of control variables that had the possibility of altering the significance of these relationships. In only one instance did the bivariate relationship retain roughly the same strength in multivariate analysis as was originally observed. This was for the case of ideology. The relationship between gender and ideology retains its original strength, with women more liberal than men. The suspected reason for this is because religiosity and education are also significant predictors of ideology among whites, and these apparently cancel each other out, as women's greater religiosity and lesser educational levels, simultaneously pull women in two different directions.

There were some issues in which the addition of control variables decreased the strength of the original bivariate relationships. On the issues of death penalty, government guarantee of a job and good standard of living, and actual feeling thermometer for the women's movement, decreases were noted in the strength of the original bivariate relationships. For these issues, it appears that gender was covering up for some differences that were due to other factors. Each of these issues have different control variables that are related to attitudes toward them, but the common thread among the three, and what seems to be causing the strength of the original relationships to decrease, is income. As women have lower incomes than do men, it is not surprising that for each of these issues, income is positively related to giving a conservative response, thereby making women seem more liberal when income is not taken into account. Indeed in running each of these three multivariate models again, this time excluding income, the strength of the relationship between gender and each issue increases. This confirms that

differentials in the earnings of men and women are part of what is driving the gender gap on these issues.

In addition there were also three issues in which the addition of control variables increased the strength of the original bivariate relationships. For defense spending, crime reduction, and laws to protect homosexuals from discrimination, increases were noted in the strength of the relationship between gender and each issue. For these issues, it appears that not including the control variables masked some of the gender differences in attitudes. Once again, each of these issues has different control variables that are related to attitudes toward them. Additional multivariate models were run, dropping individual control variables, in an attempt to determine which one was responsible for causing the increase in the strength of the original relationship, and the results were inconclusive. In these instances it must be an undetermined combination of controls that is allowing gender to exert a more powerful effect on the issues in question.

In instances where gender became an insignificant predictor of attitudes after adding controls, there were in each case different control variables at work. Of these control variables, income, when significant, is consistently behind the original bivariate relationships and helps account for the gender gap among white men and women. Education, when significant, tends to have mixed results, as more education tends to lead to liberal attitudes in specific issue areas, while at the same time leading to more Republicanism, conservatism, and pro-Republican voting behavior. Although women are more religious than men, religiosity, in contrast, leads to Republican voting behavior, and a conservative ideology both in general and on specific issues, with the sole exception of death penalty attitudes. In these circumstances, it appears that the different ways that the control variables affect both men's and women's lives are the true reasons behind of each bivariate gender gap. For the issues of party identification, presidential vote choice,

government aid to blacks, and federal spending on Food Stamps, gender, while a significant predictor of attitudes in the bivariate analysis, ceases to be so in the multivariate models for each issue.

The literature on the gender gap frequently touts that women are more likely to be Democratic than men. While this is true in the initial bivariate analysis, once controls are introduced, the results suggest that the gender gap is attributable to social differences in women's and men's lives rather than to some inherent difference between the sexes. It is more likely that differentials in income and education are at the root of this gap. The fact that women are more likely to have both lower incomes and less education than men, and these characteristics are positively associated with self-identifying as a Democrat may be two things contributing to the bivariate gender gap. The other pertinent variable, religiosity, is less clear as women tend to be more religious and this is positively related to self-identifying as a Republican, which women are not more likely to call themselves. It appears that income and education exert a stronger pull on women in the Democratic direction than the effects of religiosity in their pulling of women in the Republican direction.

Women are also well known in the literature for their greater support of Democratic candidates for office, particularly the presidency, than men. The bivariate analysis and actual vote count following our every-four-year trip to the polls bear this out. The multivariate analysis, however, shows a contradictory story, as gender is no longer a significant predictor of presidential vote choice, once the control variables are introduced. Income again becomes a significant predictor of vote choice, and pulls women in the same direction as it did for party identification: toward the Democrats. Again, the most religious were also the most likely to vote Republican, and in the case of the 1996 election, the most educated also voted more Republican.

Income again, may be pulling harder and influencing women's partisan choices, more so than the other significant variables.

Federal spending on Food Stamps and government aid to blacks, two issues that drum up images of government helping those whom conservatives believe should be helping themselves, are issues in which women's more liberal stance disappears once controls are added. It is the familiar effect of income that lies behind the gender gaps on these two issues also. Higher incomes are significantly related to having conservative opinions on many issues, particularly those that involve giving aid to a subset of the population. This is undoubtedly the result of the resentment that many higher income citizens, who are, once again, more often men, feel toward subsidizing these groups through the higher tax burden that they must carry. Also, in the case of aid to blacks, marital status has a significant effect, with those who are married also holding conservative attitudes on this issue, believing that blacks should help themselves.

While the relationship between gender and actual feelings toward the women's movement remains significant in both the bivariate and multivariate analyses, in the case of relative feelings toward the movement, the relationship loses its original bivariate significance in the multivariate analysis. The variables most related to these relative feelings are age and religiosity. Older citizens and those who are most religious tend to feel more coldly towards the women's movement than those who are younger and less religious. These results are odd because women are both more religious and tend to live to older ages than do men, and yet both are correlated with feeling more coldly, so these control variables cannot be masking women's more liberal feelings in the bivariate analysis, because both are associated with more conservative feelings toward the women's movement.

### *The Gender Gap among Blacks*

Among blacks, the bivariate results, for the most part, show an absence of gender gaps, in striking contrast to whites, who exhibited gender gaps on most issues in this analysis. Black men and women tend to feel similarly on the majority of issues in this study. The only issues in which a significant gender gap was observed were party identification, death penalty, and actual and relative feelings toward the women's movement, in addition to a borderline significant relationship between gender and the number of immigrants permitted to come to the U.S. On these issues it is the women who are the more liberal, with the exception of the number of immigrants permitted to come to the U.S. In this particular instance black men are more liberal than black women and are more in favor of increasing the allowable number of immigrants. This confirms the limited findings establishing a lack of a gender gap among blacks when compared to whites and shows that blacks are more united along gender lines than are whites on the major issues of the day.

The multivariate analyses conducted among blacks show that in the face of additional control variables, the majority of these bivariate relationships do not hold up. As was the case with the white sample, there are other variables underlying the original perceived gender gaps on these issues. The only issue in which the original bivariate relationship remained significant was that of party identification. Black women remain significantly more likely to be Democratic than black men, even when the controls are added, in sharp contrast to what was observed for whites. However, it is not the case that men are more likely to self-identify as Republican than women are. Rather black women's attachment to the Democratic party is stronger than the attachment felt to the Democratic party by black men, as both are nearly equally likely to call themselves some measure or form of Democrats, with men slightly more likely to call themselves



Independents. The remaining original significant relationships no longer exist once examined using a multivariate model; the models become insignificant and as a result unable to be interpreted

While the relationship between gender and actual feelings toward the women's movement loses its significance in the multivariate model due to the inclusion of control variables, the relationship between gender and relative feelings toward the women's movement approaches significance, and is close enough to have interpretable results. In contrast to the identical model for whites, which sees gender losing its significance, in the model for blacks, gender retains its significance and is the only variable to do so, with women feeling more warmly than men. This contrasts sharply with the results for whites, which not only found gender to be insignificant, but also found age and religiosity to be significant predictors.

As mentioned, the bivariate results, for the most part, show an absence of gender gaps. However, this is not to say that blacks are a monolithically unified group. Even in the absence of a large number of gender gaps, as demonstrated for whites, there are indeed areas in which blacks are becoming more diverse in their opinions and attitudes, like whites. Of the 16 multivariate models run, while only two have significant gender gaps, a total of eight of the models show emerging cleavages among blacks that are unrelated to gender.

The most prominent of the gaps occurring in five of those eight cases and worth mentioning is along the lines of education. In the areas of ideology, defense spending, crime reduction, government aid to blacks, and laws to protect homosexuals from discrimination, there are significant gaps among blacks based on their educational level. As is usually the case among whites, for blacks, having an increased level of education produces significantly more liberal attitudes on these issues and undoubtedly others not analyzed in this study. As such, the future

events of this may lead to, down the road, more observable and prominent gender gaps among blacks. This may become the case because while white women are outpacing white men at every educational level, except the doctoral, thus having a liberalizing effect on them, among blacks, black women even farther outpace black men at every educational level, including the doctoral. This should increase black women's liberalism when compared with black men, and as a result may increase gender differences in social and political attitudes among blacks.

### *Implications*

All indications are that the gender gap among whites is a stable American phenomenon that will continue to influence the way that politics are conducted and experienced in the United States. Because politics and the issues are experienced differently by men and women, the two parties will have to continue to tailor their political messages to the demographic group that is most receptive of and responsive to them. However, among blacks the lack of a clear gender gap attests to their unity on the issues. The results in this study indicate that blacks are still solidly in the Democratic fold and that this is not necessarily a product of blacks' agreement with the Democratic party platform. Blacks do exhibit ideological cleavages on some of the issues examined, but because of the Republican party's past and continuing hostility toward public policies of interest to black Americans, the Democratic party is able to take advantage of the situation and effectively make blacks an electorally captured group (see Frymer 1999), thereby limiting the real choices of blacks in the political arena.

Future research should include more issues that have great importance in this day and age, but which could not be included in this study, as they were not asked of respondents in both surveys. These include those that inquire of respondents' attitudes towards gun control, and abortion, two very divisive issues of the day. It is more likely that there are significant relationships between

these and gender, especially among blacks, on these issues. Such were the findings of a previous study conducted by myself, which because of a much smaller sample of blacks than that used here, could not produce acceptable levels of statistical significance, at least in the case of abortion. In addition, it would also be prudent to examine other election returns, in particular those for senatorial and congressional elections and perhaps local and state elections to see if gender gaps happen to emerge in these races that can withstand the addition of control variables. It may be the case that there is something particular to presidential elections, or even to Bill Clinton and Al Gore that would not be the case in more localized elections, or even presidential elections without these two particular candidates. In addition, it would be useful to assess how much guidance and direction each demographic variable provides in constructing the political attitudes of men and women of both races. Also, the surveys used for this study are somewhat dated (1996), so now in the year 2005 there may be more or different gender gaps among both blacks and whites. The events of September 11<sup>th</sup>, 2001 may have altered Americans' views of defense spending and immigration policy, so therefore more recent data should be used to assess this. In addition, more recent data with blacks would help determine if blacks' unity is breaking down, thereby allowing different subgroups of the black population to become more concerned with non-racial issues, which may lead to differences of opinion, resulting in additional gender gaps.

#### End Notes

1. The American National Election Study provides information on the attitudes and political preferences of the American electorate during the 1996 presidential election, and contains both pre- and post-election components. Making use of a stratified random sample, a total of 1,714 interviews with voting-eligible Americans were conducted during the pre-election component, 1,534 of whom were reinterviewed for the post-election component. The 1996 American National Election Study was conducted by the Center for Political Studies of the Institute for

Social Research and distributed by the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR).

2. The National Black Election Study provides information on the attitudes and political preferences of the Black electorate during the 1996 presidential election, and contains both pre- and post-election components. Making use of a stratified random sample, a total of 1,216 interviews with voting-eligible blacks were conducted during the pre-election component, 854 of whom were reinterviewed for the post-election component. The telephone survey was carried out by Market Strategies in Southfield, Michigan and distributed by the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR)

3. The relative feeling thermometer score was calculated by finding each respondent's personal mean for all groups that appear across studies (the military, the federal government, blacks, whites, labor unions, big business, people on welfare, Hispanics, Christian fundamentalists, gay men and lesbians, and the Christian Coalition), subtracting it from their score for the women's movement, and dividing this by their personal mean [(score-mean)/mean].

4. The data for the NBES are weighted, except in the Logit and Ologit analyses, because of the difficulty of using weighted data in Stata.

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## Appendix

### Exact Question Wording for Whites (NES) and Blacks (NBES) and Coding Information

#### Party Identification

NES--Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what?

Would you call yourself a strong Republican or a not very strong Republican?

Would you call yourself a strong Democrat or a not very strong Democrat?

Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican Party or to the Democratic Party?

NBES--Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what?

Would you call yourself a strong Republican or a not very strong Republican?

Would you call yourself a strong Democrat or a not very strong Democrat?

Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican Party or the Democratic Party?

Coded 1= strong Democrat to 7= strong Republican

#### Ideology

NES--We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives. Here is a seven-point scale on which the political views that people might hold are arranged from extremely liberal to extremely conservative.

Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you thought much about this?

NBES--In general, when it comes to politics, do you usually think of yourself as a liberal, a conservative, a moderate or what?

Do you think of yourself as a strong liberal or a not very strong liberal?

Do you think of yourself as a strong conservative or a not very strong conservative?

Do you think of yourself as more like a liberal or more like a conservative?

Coded 1= extremely liberal to 7= extremely conservative

#### 1992 Presidential Election

NES--In 1992 George Bush ran on the Republican ticket against Bill Clinton for the Democrats, and Ross Perot as an independent candidate. Do you remember for sure whether or not you voted in that election?

Which one did you vote for? (If voted for president in 1992)

NBES--In 1992, George Bush ran on the Republican ticket against the Independent Ross Perot, and against Bill Clinton for the Democrats. Do you remember for sure whether or not you voted in that election?

Which one did you vote for? (If voted for president in 1992)

Coded 0= Bush, 1= Clinton, Perot was dropped from the analysis

### 1996 Presidential Election

NES--If R voted for candidate for president in 1996: Who did you vote for?

NBES--In talking to people about elections, we often find that a lot of people were not able to vote because they weren't registered, they were sick, or they just didn't have time. How about you--did you vote in the elections this November?

How about the election for President? Did you vote for a candidate for President?

Who did you vote for? (If voted for president in 1996)

Coded 0= Clinton, 1= Dole, Perot was dropped from the analysis

### Death Penalty

NES--Do you favor or oppose the death penalty for persons convicted of murder?

Do you favor/oppose the death penalty for persons convicted of murder strongly or not strongly?

NBES--Do you favor or oppose the death penalty for persons convicted of murder?

Do you favor/oppose the death penalty for persons convicted of murder strongly or not strongly?

Coded 1= favor strongly, 2= favor not strongly, 3= oppose not strongly, 4= oppose strongly

### Defense Spending

NES--Some people believe that we should spend much less money for defense. Suppose these people are at one end of a scale, at point 1. Others feel that defense spending should be greatly increased. Suppose these people are at the other end, at point 7. And, of course, some other people have opinions somewhere in between at points 2,3,4,5, or 6.

Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you thought much about this?

NBES--Should federal spending on military and defense be increased, decreased, or kept about the same?

NES data recoded to match NBES data where 1= increased, 2= kept about the same, 3= decreased

### Seven Point Crime Reduction Scale

NES--Some people say that the best way to reduce crime is to address the social problems that cause crime, like bad schools, poverty and joblessness. (Suppose these people are at one end of a scale, at point 1.) Other people say the best way to reduce crime is to make sure that criminals are caught, convicted and punished. (Suppose these people are at the other end, at point 7.) And, of course, some other people have opinions somewhere in between at points 2,3,4,5 or 6. Where would you place yourself on this scale or haven't you thought much about this?

NBES--Some people say the best way to reduce crime is to address the social problems that cause crime, like bad schools, poverty and joblessness. Suppose these people are at one end of a scale, at point 1. Other people say the best way to reduce crime is to make sure that criminals are caught, convicted, and punished. Suppose these people are at the other end, at point 7. (And, of course, some other people have opinions somewhere in between at points, 2,3,4,5, or 6.) Where would you place yourself on this scale?

Coded as stated in questions

### Job and Good Standard of Living

NES--Some people feel the government in Washington should see to it that every person has a job and a good standard of living (Suppose these people are at one end of a scale, at point 1.) Others think the government should just let each person get ahead on their own. (Suppose these people are at the other end, at point 7.) And, of course, some other people have opinions somewhere in between, at points 2,3,4,5, or 6. Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you thought much about this?

NBES--Some people feel the government in Washington should see to it that every person has a job and a good standard of living. Suppose these people are at one end of a scale, at point 1. Others think the government should just let each person get ahead on their own. Suppose these people are at the other end, at point 7. (And, of course, some other people have opinions somewhere in between at points, 2,3,4,5, or 6.) Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you thought much about it?

Coded as stated in questions

### Welfare Reform

NES--Some people have proposed that a woman on welfare who has another child not be given an increase in her welfare check. Do you favor or oppose this change in welfare policy? Do you favor/oppose this change strongly or not strongly?

NBES--Some people propose that a woman on welfare who has another child not be given an increase in her welfare check. Do you favor or oppose this change in welfare policy?

Do you favor/oppose this change strongly or not strongly?

Coded 1= favor strongly, 2= favor not strongly, 3= oppose not strongly, 4= oppose strongly

#### Federal Spending on Food Stamps

NES--Should Federal Spending on food stamps be increased, decreased, or kept about the same?

NBES--Should federal spending on food stamps be increased, decreased, or kept about the same?

Coded 1= increased, 2= kept about the same, 3= decreased; those who volunteered in the NES that spending should be cut out entirely were coded as decreased.

#### Government aid to Blacks

NES--Some people feel that the government in Washington should make every effort to improve the social and economic position of blacks. (Suppose these people are at one end of a scale, at point 1.) Others feel that the government should not make any special effort to help blacks because they should help themselves. (Suppose these people are at the other end, at point 7.) And, of course, some other people have opinions somewhere in between, at points 2,3,4,5, or 6. Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you thought much about this?

NBES--Some people feel the government in Washington should make every effort to improve the social and economic position of Blacks. Suppose these people are at one end of a scale, at point 1. Others feel that the government should not make any special effort to help Blacks because they should help themselves. Suppose these people are at the other end, at point 7. (And, of course, some other people have opinions somewhere in between at points, 2,3,4,5, or 6.) Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you thought much about this?

Coded as stated in questions

#### Homosexual Job Discrimination

NES--Do you favor or oppose laws to protect homosexuals against job discrimination?  
Do you favor/oppose such laws strongly or not strongly?

NBES--Do you favor or oppose laws to protect homosexuals against job discrimination?  
Do you favor/oppose such laws strongly or not strongly?

Coded 1= favor strongly, 2= favor not strongly, 3= oppose not strongly, 4= oppose strongly

## Rating the Women's Movement

NES--I'd like to get your feelings toward some of our political leaders and other people who are in the news these days. I'll read the name of a person and I'd like you to rate that person using something we call the feeling thermometer. Ratings between 50 degrees and 100 degrees mean that you feel favorable and warm toward the person. Ratings between 0 degrees and 50 degrees mean that you don't feel favorable toward that person and that you don't care too much for that person. You would rate the person at the 50 degree mark if you don't feel particularly warm or cold toward the person. If we come to a person whose name you don't recognize, you don't need to rate that person. Just tell me and we'll move on to the next one.  
How would you rate the women's movement?

NBES--Now I'd like to get your feelings toward some of your political leaders and other people, events, and organizations that have been in the news. I'll read the name of a person, event, or organization and I'd like you to rate it using something called the feeling thermometer. You can choose any number between 0 and 100. The higher the number, the warmer or more favorable you feel toward that person, event, or organization; the lower the number, the colder or less favorable. You would rate the person at the 50 degree mark if you feel neither warm nor cold toward them. If we come to a person, event, or organization whose name you don't recognize, you don't need to rate that person, event, or organization. Just tell me and we'll move on to the next one. Our first event is the women's movement.

Coded as stated in questions

## Immigrant Government Services

NES--Do you think that immigrants who come to the U.S. should be eligible as soon as they come here for government services such as Medicaid, Food Stamps, Welfare, or should they have to be here a year or more?

NBES--Do you think that immigrants who come to the U.S. should be eligible as soon as they come here for government services such as Medicaid, Food Stamps, and Welfare, or should they have to be here for a year or more?

Coded 0= as soon as they come here, 1= have to be here a year or more

## Number of Immigrants Permitted to Come to the U.S.

NES--Do you think the number of immigrants from foreign countries who are permitted to come to the United States to live should be increased a lot, increased a little, left the same as it is now, decreased a little, or decreased a lot?

NBES--Do you think the number of immigrants from foreign countries who are permitted to come to the United States to live should be increased a little, increased a lot, decreased a little, decreased a lot, or left the same as it is now?

Coded 1= increased a lot, 2= increased a little, 3= left the same as it is now, 4= decreased a little, 5= decreased a lot

## Age

NES--What is the month, day and year of your birth?

Month and year of R's birth was subtracted from month and year of interview. If year of birth was NA or refused but age of respondent was given by informant in the household listing, then age from household listing was used. Actual age= 18-96, 97= 97 years or more

NBES--Build age by subtracting the months and year from respondent's birth from month and year of interview. Actual age= 17-90, 91= 91 years or older

Coded intervally as stated

## Income

NES--Please look at page 21 of the booklet and tell me the letter of the income group that includes the income of all members of your family living here in 1995 before taxes. This figure should include salaries, wages, pensions, dividends, interest, and all other income.

[If uncertain: What would be your best guess?]

1. A. None or less than \$2,999
2. B. \$3,000-\$4,999
3. C. \$5,000-\$6,999
4. D. \$7,000-\$8,999
5. E. \$9,000-\$9,999
6. F. \$10,000-\$10,999
7. G. \$11,000-\$11,999
8. H. \$12,000-\$12,999
9. J. \$13,000-\$13,999
10. K. \$14,000-\$14,999
11. M. \$15,000-\$16,999
12. N. \$17,000-\$19,999
13. P. \$20,000-\$21,999
14. Q. \$22,000-\$24,999
15. R. \$25,000-\$29,999
16. S. \$30,000-\$34,999
17. T. \$35,000-\$39,999
18. U. \$40,000-\$44,999
19. V. \$45,000-\$49,999

20. W. \$50,000-\$59,999
21. X. \$60,000-\$74,999
22. Z. \$75,000-89,999
23. AA. \$90,000-\$104,999
24. BB. \$105,000 and over

NBES--Which of the following income groups includes the income of all members of your family living here in 1995 before taxes? This figure should include salaries, wages, pensions, dividends, interest, and all other income. [If uncertain: what would be your best guess?]

1. Up to \$10,000
2. \$10,000-\$15,000 [14,999]
3. \$15,000-\$20,000 [19,999]
4. \$20,000-\$25,000 [24,999]
5. \$25,000-\$30,000 [29,999]
6. \$30,000-\$40,000 [39,999]
7. \$40,000-\$50,000 [49,999]
8. \$50,000-\$75,000 [74,999]
9. \$75,000-\$90,000 [89,999]
10. \$90,000-\$105,000 [104,999]
11. \$105,000 and more

NES data recoded to match NBES data

#### Religiosity

NES--Do you go to religious services every week, almost every week, once or twice a month, a few times a year, or never?

NBES--Would you say you go to church or place of worship every week, almost every week, once or twice a month, a few times a year, or never?

Coded 1= never, 2= a few times a year, 3= once or twice a month, 4= almost every week, 5= every week

#### Marital Status

NES--Are you married now and living with your (husband/wife)-- or are you widowed, divorced, separated, or have you never married?

NBES--Are you married now and living with your (husband/wife)--or are you widowed, divorced, or separated?

Coded 0= not married, 1= married

## Education

NES--What is the highest grade of school or year of college you have completed?

IF R HAS COMPLETED FEWER THAN 13 YEARS OF EDUCATION:

Did you get a high school diploma or pass a high school equivalency test?

IF R HAS COMPLETED MORE THAN 12 YEARS OF EDUCATION:

What is the highest degree that you have earned?

NBES--What is the highest grade of school or year of college you have completed? (READ CODES 1-9 ONLY If NECESSARY)

1 grade school (grades 1-8)

2 some high school, no degree (grades 9-11)

3 high school degree

4 some college, no degree

5 Associate's/2 year degree

6 Bachelor's/4 year degree

7 some graduate school

8 Master's degree

9 Doctorate/Law degree

Recoded 1= least education to 7= most education

## Region

NES--1996 Census Region - Interview Location

For Panel respondents, this is the region of R's interview location in 1996.

1. Northeast (CT, ME, MA, NH, NJ, NY, PA, RI, VT)

2. North Central (IL, IN, IA, KS, MI, MN, MO, NE, ND, OH, SD, WI)

3. South (AL, AR, DE, DC, FL, GA, KY, LA, MD, MS, NC, OK, SC, TN, TX, VA, WV)

4. West (AK, AZ, CA, CO, HI, ID, MT, NM, NV, OR, UT, WA, WY)

NBES--Region coded from respondent's given state of residence

Coded 0= non-South, 1= South

## Gender

NES--R's sex is:

NBES--Sex of respondent (by observation)

Coded 0= male, 1= female



## Vita

Christy Duffel was born in New Orleans, Louisiana and received her A.G.S. from Delgado Community College, and her B.G. S. from the University of New Orleans.