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NGOs and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean: A Case Study of Haiti

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NGOs and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean:
A Case Study of Haiti

An Honors Thesis

Presented to

the B.A in International Studies Program

of The University of New Orleans

In Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirement for the Degree of

Bachelor of Arts, with Honors in International Studies

By Anna Marie Walter Pineda

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Acronyms

CEPAL	Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
IHRC	Interim Haiti Recovery Commission
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IO	International Organizations
LAC	Latin America and the Caribbean
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
MINUSTAH	United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti
NGO	Nongovernmental Organization
ODA	Official Development Assistance
PDNA	Post Disaster Needs Assessment
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UN ECOSOC	United Nations Economic and Social Council
UN ESCAP	United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific
US	United States
USIP	United States Institute of Peace

ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the roles played by Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) in addressing the broad issue of poverty and development by focusing on the Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) region. A new and intricate interplay of the profit, public, and non-profit sectors has arisen as the importance of NGOs has grown throughout the Global South. NGOs, now at the heart of economic development in LAC, are actors in what has been called a global civil society and have demonstrated an immense breadth of specified knowledge and adaptability. The main objective of the paper is to explore whether, and to what extent, NGOs can strengthen the capacity of states to effectively and fairly govern, and promote sustainable development. What can NGOs do to improve states in Latin America and the Caribbean? NGOs are placed within the progressive spectrum of development, while uncovering the need for a balanced approach to the complex topic of development. Consequently, NGOs carrying out capacity building objectives can be seen to support the involvement of local actors and communities while serving as interlocutors between the state and civil society. Haiti is used as a case study because it provides a unique and extreme example of the role that NGOs can play in promoting the public sector.

Key words: NGOs, Latin America, sustainable development, capacity development, Haiti.

Introduction

Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) has been subject to much scrutiny under the broad research and policy umbrella of development theories, state capacity, foreign aid, and consequently, the localized work of non-profit organizations. Regions in the so-called ‘Third World’ or ‘Global South’¹ such as LAC have remained at the epicenter of debates about global inequality. Why are some countries poor, and what can be done about it? The region, then, is an important site for discussing the possible roles that states, foreign aid, and Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOS) can play in addressing the broad issue of poverty and development, albeit recognizing the vast differences between individual countries in the region.

The international community has witnessed an explosive increase in the numbers and influence of NGOs which has added a new component to the previous bipolar world of the public and private sector. A new and intricate interplay of the profit, public, and non-profit sectors has arisen since the 1970s beginning with the perceived decline of state capacity in the Third World. Lindenberg (1999) points out that this decline left a vacuum that NGOs have attempted to fill as evidenced in the 1990s by the exponential increase in the numbers of NGOs that were granted consultative status within the United Nations Economic and Social Council (UN ECOSOC). NGOs are now at the heart of economic development in Latin America. They are actors in what has been called a global civil society and have demonstrated an immense breadth of specified knowledge and adaptability when it comes to people-to-people grassroots work. They have also received their share of criticism.

¹ These terms will be used interchangeably to refer to poor countries in LAC, Africa, and Asia that have been center to development debates, policies, and projects.

This thesis provides a critical and theoretical investigation into the role played by NGOs in the ‘development’² of the Third World. The main objective of the paper is to explore whether, and to what extent, NGOs can strengthen the capacity of states to effectively and fairly govern the country and promote sustainable development. I will argue for a balanced approach to development in which NGOs consider adopting capacity development objectives that recognize the importance of being active in communication with the state, as they represent civil society. Suggestions for the inclusion of NGOs in the wider debate of sustainable development will be given based on the exploration of the historical context of LAC and the various development theories discussed.

The first section of this paper will provide a basis for defining NGOs, the roles they traditionally assume, and their place in the historical context of LAC. The second section will delve into three key areas within development theories and debates in which NGOs have figured prominently; namely, governance, social mobility, and institutional strength. The third section of this paper introduces the idea of ‘capacity development’ and suggestions for the roles of NGOs in promoting ‘good governance’ in LAC. Capacity development refers to the inclusion of civil society, NGOs, and the state in the governance of a nation, and is therefore considered to lead to the objective of sustainable development. The final section will be dedicated to Haiti as a case study in relation to the role of NGOs there. Haiti provides a unique and extreme example of the relation between NGOs and a non-existent public sector.

² Development as referenced in this paper does not suggest a model of development which assumes ‘developing’ countries will follow the same development path of ‘developed’ countries.

I. What is an NGO?

In its most basic understanding, a Nongovernmental Organization, as the title implies, is an independent organization that distances itself from government. NGOs rely on outside funding in order to run their programs and staff; however, they are also not-for-profit. Despite being non-state actors, NGOs are not separate from politics or economics and may even work in partnership with governments (Meyer 2). In practice, “non-governmental organizations are not non-governmental. They receive funds from overseas governments or work as private subcontractors of local governments” (Petras 13). The term Nongovernmental Organization has also frequently been paralleled as not only representing and actively supporting civil society (Pearce 224), but as being part of civil society itself, as seen by the United Nations (Otto, 1996; Annan, 2004), since they aim to “empower” the poor to fight for their own rights. A definition for civil society, while ambiguous and varied, will be defined here as being a society, separate from the public and private sectors, but in constant relation with the state. NGOs are often seen as being part of the private sector simply because they do not belong to the public sector, and consequently are believed to be increasingly important players by many in today’s globalized world, partly because of the spread of neo-liberal ideologies and a smaller state, and partly because they are simply seen as more efficient in fulfilling international public demands (Pearce 223). It is the norm however that NGOs prefer not to be defined as such but rather as a third kind of actor; as *autonomous* organizations, or even a *third sector*. For the purposes of this paper, NGOs will be considered a third sector, separate from the public or private sector.

A. A Brief History of NGOs in Latin America

The history of NGO activities or bilateral aid can be traced back to the 1940's Bretton Woods conference, where representatives of forty-four countries met to discuss the allocation of global monetary aid against the backdrop of the Second World War (Moyo 10). The United States took the lead and began forming partnerships with NGOs (then called "private voluntary organizations") in order to coordinate war relief activities in Western Europe and the Global South (Meyer 9). The Rockefeller and Ford Foundations at that time began investing in research in LAC and "helped initiate many of Latin America's top private NGOs in the early 1960s" (25).

However, NGOs in Latin America did not begin taking root until President John F. Kennedy's 1961 Alliance for Progress. The Alliance for Progress, which looked to protect US economic interests in Latin America while at the same time promote democratic freedom in the region, proved to be inconsistent and did nothing to deter (or some say even encouraged) an unstable political atmosphere in the region (Michaels 77). Not only did the Alliance for Progress push for agrarian reforms, which in turn helped organize peasant groups (Meyer 24), but the political and economic transition of the late 1960s and 1970s in the region left a humanitarian and economic vacuum in society that NGOs were sought to fill as an effective alternative. NGOs were seen as active in providing humanitarian support to populations affected by the plethora of military dictatorships (especially in Central America), and human rights violations (Petras 10).

Around the same time in the 1950s and 60s, Latin America served as the stage for the birth of Liberation Theology. This movement within the Catholic Church was relatively strong in the region, and demonstrated to have noteworthy influences in early NGOs

considering that the Church had been a significant pillar of civil society in Latin America since the region's early colonial history. Progressive Christians at the time, notably priest Gustavo Gutierrez from Peru who named the movement, were partial to Marxist ideology and consequently "heavily influenced the ongoing discourse on resistance to global hunger, injustice, and oppression" (Martin 69). The movement was propelled by an increased awareness of social injustice in Latin America, and Gutierrez and other liberationists were committed to eradicating this institutional injustice against the poor through direct action. Therefore, in order to promote this type of activism, followers of liberation theology sought to implement development projects through the work of nonprofits or NGOs (83). Since the root of the problem was seen to be catalyzed by paternalistic development policies imposed by the Global North on the Global South, NGOs were seen as appropriate vehicles for achieving a different kind of sustainable development while learning not to rely on state institutions. During this time, various Christian-based communities began forming charitable organizations in the region that went on to achieve NGO status and are still active today. Through this phenomenon emerged postmodern development theories which changed the region's social fabric with the idea that the salvation of the poor was not going to be found within the state, or internationally for that matter.

While some view the emergence of NGOs as the only noble alternative to the social injustices suffered in Latin America, others see this shift as a strategic and inevitable adjustment stemming from the ideas of market liberalism which was being imposed onto Latin American countries by the North and other monetary international organizations.

In the 1980's, Latin America was subject to vast structural adjustment reforms imposed by the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and previously by US-led programs such as the Alliance for Progress. Neoliberalism was introduced as valuing private initiative at the expense of collective responsibility. Thus, "private, non-state organizations, [NGOs] fit well with the new policy agenda of decentralization and privatization" (Howell and Pearce 203). This increased interest in NGOs was experienced against the backdrop of the Latin American debt crisis of the 1980s, as well as the 1978-1994 authoritarian-to-democratic regime change in the region (Meyer 17).

In Latin America "the presence and actions of [NGOs] have been particularly affected by the changes that have taken place in the region over the past two or three decades, which have profoundly altered the political, economic, social and cultural contexts in which they traditionally operate" (Balbis 2). The political transitions, religious bases, international cooperation, implementation of neo-liberal policies, and state decentralization have defined the scope of action of these organizations. Finally, the validity of NGOs as important international players, focusing on securing basic human needs on an international level was achieved through official definition and recognition of NGOs by the UN in the 1990s.

B. North or South NGOs

From the perspective of the Global South, there are key differences between NGOs based in the North or the South. Northern NGOs are defined as having their headquarters in the donor state and use their funding for work in the recipient state. Southern NGOs are thus often viewed as representing the heart of local civil society as well as supporting

grass-roots organizations. Within the context of an increasingly globalized world, this distinction becomes important as NGOs are seen to represent civil society, as well as provide “international public goods” (Meyer 3).

The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) have notoriously geared the international demand for these public goods, namely poverty eradication, better access to health care, and improved education. Accordingly, Northern NGOs have advanced their functions from primarily emergency relief to long-term development organizations, partly by aiming to build civil society, and in many ways replace the state (Marcussen 406-407). NGOs have received increasing amounts of Official Development Assistance (ODA) throughout the years, and simultaneously, bilateral aid from Northern donors to Southern NGOs has been subject to much suspicion as it is believed the behavior of Southern NGOs are biased by the strategic interests of their donors (Nancy and Yontcheva 3).

This paper will mainly focus on development NGOs, and in addition, the distinction between North and South NGOs will become relevant to the argument as we will discuss the idea that foreign donors aim to work through Southern NGOs in order to strengthen institutions for better governance (Meyer 3), as will be seen in the case of Haiti. However, it must be noted that a new trend has emerged since the 1990’s which shows a general flow of bilateral funds going directly to Southern NGOs, rather than being funneled through Northern NGOs (7).

C. Roles of NGOs

One prevailing view of NGOs among both endorsers and critics is that they (at least claim to) represent civil society. The idea of the importance of civil society has received much attention from many sectors and has contributed to the view that NGOs can strengthen and help protect the sphere of society. This widespread concept suggests that they have a facilitating role of empowerment whereby they transfer “power on to those who have none” (Petras 224). While some argue that the services NGOs deliver in the Global North are simply a type of social welfare, many countries in the Global South view them as “part of social transformation” (Pratt 97). Nonetheless, much can be said about whether NGOs truly encompass this objective.

Many believe that they provide services more efficiently than the state while they “contribute to strengthening the development model offered by the private sector” (Pearce 223). Unlike other actors in the institutional scene, NGOs tend to identify themselves as non-government, independent, and sometimes as part of the *Third Sector* in recognition of, but separate from, the State and the market (Balbis 9). The appearance of a Third Sector alludes to the ability of NGOs to mediate between civil society, the state, and the market. It is important to note, however, that some regard the boundaries between these sectors as blurred (2001). While NGOs are seen to fill in the gaps of state responsibility and provide public goods, they may also work in line with the corporate sector that has an interest in constructing a more efficient society in order to enhance profit to business opportunities. However, they can relate to the state in three different ways: first, by complementing it; second, by opposing it while representing local groups; and third, by reforming it by creating awareness of social issues at the state level, or

working with governments directly to improve policies (Marcussen 418). Yet, the effectiveness of NGOs is most often seen in cooperation with the state rather than in opposition to it.

Cooperation is not, however, limited to the state or local markets. NGOs have long since been seen as a worthy tool by international entities to carry out new ideologies in practice. The global shift in political and economic theories, especially since after World War II, has shed a new light on the potential of NGOs. By actively funding NGOs, entities like the World Bank view NGOs as “efficient non-State actors in an era of anti-Statism” (Pearce 223). This idea is directly tied to a neo-liberal thinking of reducing the size of the state. By allowing and supporting NGOs to fill in gaps left by the state, and strengthen civil society in this time of transition, a smaller, less influential state is ensured while other players focus on establishing a market based on neo-liberalism (Marcussen 420). Strong criticism has been directed towards this trend as the role of NGOs as facilitators between the state and civil society has been misused and extended as “brokers between local organizations, neoliberal foreign donors (World Bank, Europe, or the United States) and the local free market regimes” (Petras 12). This flow in direction is viewed as promoting the idea of self-help common to the rhetoric of the corporate sector within the civil society they are representing. Many see this as counteracting the concept that NGOs, at their core, function to represent the invaluable rights of those populations most marginalized and ignored by the state. Nonetheless, while this inclination is believed to be significant or not, NGOs have entered as a vital component of the discussion of international development.

While the role of NGOs is built around the belief of fomenting the growth of social capital, the transfer of technical expertise has been known to be funneled through their work as a “major source of development from the informal sector” (Pratt 95). This goes in line with the role of NGOs as purveyors of various social services. Beginning with small-scale programs, this model of international development has been recognized as a characteristic approach which has been exported and widely used (95). Development plans have long since focused on the distribution of basic skills within society using the rhetoric of direct action for the common good. NGOs have been viewed as especially skilled in this respect as they are committed to working with communities in the exchange of expertise. These exchanges however are regarded in two very distinct ways by critics. While some see this idea of development as more sustainable and in line with human rights and equity by widening the “narrow aims and provisions of specific services” (98), this kind of technical cooperation can be seen by some as a North to South, one-way exchange which alludes to a controversial and paternalistic type of development.

Donors also view NGOs as able to offer innovative solutions to issues concerning sizeable sections of the population while establishing direct relations with the communities of interest. Their participation in a continuous dialogue with the communities are seen as favorable for donors and their investments as NGOs are regarded as maintaining an advantageous “cost/efficiency ratio of their actions,” and keeping a solid “sense of responsibility and the way in which they account for their actions” (Balbis 16). Insofar, they have entered as new actors in the development scene with great encouragement as they are “channeling an increasing share of development

assistance” for the past two decades (Nancy and Yontcheva 3). The donor-NGO relationship has become more solid as donors are progressively moving towards directly funding NGOs or their projects instead of going through the traditional channels of aid. Providing aid through the state has become less appealing for donors as governments are seen as being less effective, and more prone to corruption. Donors believe NGOs remain faithful to the various humanitarian causes and see them as direct means of helping the most marginalized populations (Petras 223). Therefore, they are seen to have a great comparative advantage over the state and the market, with a consistent focus on innovation, and greater flexibility. However, as NGOs are receiving more and more funding from institutional donors, many concerns have been raised about the influence of the interests of donors on the behaviors of NGOs.

The numerous doubts surrounding this issue revolve around the fear that NGOs are “being used as implementing and executing agents by bilateral or other donors” (Marcussen 415). Still, many acknowledge that the increased funding to NGOs has pushed for a more systematic record of accountability of projects, evaluation of their impacts, and financial transparency. Being that these organizations are considered evermore as significant players in the development scene, they find themselves necessitating a greater focus within their fields, and increasing their professionalism. Consequently, as many NGOs have grown and widened their overall impact, leaving behind their micro-scaled focus, some fear they “risk of soon becoming rather heavy, by professional, aid bureaucracies” (416). Whereas NGOs have grown as strong and natural partners for donors, and are steadily appreciated as empowering civil society in the developing world, some suggest that donors have ulterior motives aimed at playing into

the neo-liberal rhetoric perceived as being imposed on the South by the North. A false direction is seen to be taken by NGOs as they are “playing a forceful role in the neo-liberal game, further eroding the state - a game, which they would harshly criticize under other circumstances” (420).

The role of NGOs as brokers between the private and public sectors, both locally and internationally, has remained under significant scrutiny. Much can be discussed about the correct ratio of responsibility between the state, the market, and now the so called ‘Third Sector’, namely NGOs. The many development theories of the Global South can be used to discuss the appropriate paths to take, and while NGOs are growing in this scene, a ‘Third Sector’ is in many ways still new and has not established a firm footing within this dynamic. These organizations are certainly evolving, but their novelty deems them liable to the historical, political, and cultural environments in which they operate. Thus, the next section of this paper will examine the historical context of Latin America in relation to NGOs in order to identify their current standing and future direction.

II. Development Theories

The growing importance of NGOs as international players in the development scene prompts their inclusion in the literature of contemporary development theories that guide states, international organizations, and the market. Their importance is seen by the significant percentage of bilateral aid they manage: 12.55%, and growing annually (Bradshaw and Schafer 98). Development must no longer be seen as a bipolar exchange between the private and the public sector, but should be viewed as a concerted effort of all three sectors, the third being civil society. John Clark (1992) describes this mutual cooperation and responsibility:

“Governments can create laws and reallocate a country’s resources. These are important functions, but only partial requirements for any development strategy. Wealth creation and entrepreneurship are vital ingredients [...] Similarly, social innovation and voluntary action are required to attune the state and the private sector to people’s concerns, to make the state and its institutions more accountable, [...] and to ‘fill in gaps’. An effective civil society is needed (some call it the ‘Third Sector’) [...] Healthy development requires the combined and concerted effort of all three sectors, each contributing its share, and each influencing and being influenced by the other” (153).

By focusing on good governance, social mobility, and institutional strength, this section will provide a strategic overview of the literature on development theories, with a focus on developing a framework for clarifying the roles of NGOs within the understanding of development. Furthermore, these considerations will be motivated by the attempt to understand the workings of NGOs and the state, while including the importance of a participatory civil society. As stated previously in this paper, NGOs are to be seen as a bolt inside the mechanisms of the trilateral players of society and their respective roles. The relationship between NGOs and the state is seen as vital as NGOs must define their place within this relation; there is no ignoring the state.

A. Good Governance

For international organizations which focus on governmental accountability, governance is considered ‘good’ when a state’s institutions are democratic, transparent, have an effective rule of law, and are enduring (United Nations; Governance). The International Monetary Fund (IMF) also emphasizes good governance as a conditional state of affairs when working with member countries in projects of technical assistance and financial support (IMF, The IMF and Good Governance). Monetary organizations, in this logic, view economic policies, market integrity, and welfare as indicators of good governance. Bilateral and multilateral relationships consider a symbiotic connection between local, national, regional, and global actors as vital for real contributions to development. Good governance is traditionally viewed to be obtained by strengthening local accountability mechanisms, in this context, within civil society. NGOs have appeared as central to this rhetoric discussion as there has been much debate as to “whether the creation of local governance structures is a better way of improving local capacities than external agencies carrying out direct service provisions themselves” (Pratt 107). The key question here within development circles has been what role, if any, do NGOs play in aiding the practice of good governance by shedding light on the needs of civil society. Should NGOs, by means of their specialized understandings of different issues, assist with effective suggestions for the state on behalf of civil society?

The ‘third wave’ of democratization in the LAC began three decades ago, and since then the region has made great strides toward governing democratically. However, according to Mainwaring and Scully (2008), only Chile, Costa Rica, and Uruguay have achieved stable and effective democratic governance in the region (114). The authors

emphasize that in order to achieve this standard of democratic governance the region must “[maintain] reasonably high-quality democratic practice, [promote] economic growth, [provide] citizen security, and [address] the serious social problems (poverty, income inequality, poor social services) that afflict, albeit to very different degrees, Latin American countries” (113). While previously, neo-liberal reforms in LAC have promoted a shrinking of the state, it has become apparent that an effective state is crucial to the democracy standard, economic performance, and overall development of a country.

Large parts of LAC have been historically steered towards a type of governance, and follow a certain theory of development which includes drastic cuts in social welfare. The confidence invested in these reforms revolve around the idea of achieving good governance and “are linked to a wide range of processes of change and reform that have profoundly affected the economy and market, the State, social entities and the cultural patrons of countries in the region over the past two decades” (Balbis 9). However, an imbalance favorable for the private has been created sector which allocates a greater need for NGOs as they assist the often ignored civil society.

This inclusion of NGOs as important driving forces of development, while recognizing the State as the foremost managers of development, has politicized them by implying their responsibility to a political process (although not necessarily to do with the formal political system). A political process in this sense means the exercise of creating an inclusive, pluralistic political participation of the public, and building an effective bridge of communication between different sectors of society in order to direct state policies. The objective then becomes an upward social mobility which is enduring and divergent of superficial micro-scale projects.

B. NGOs and Hopes for Upward Social Mobility

According to a recent report by the World Bank, during the last decade LAC experienced a 50% increase in the number of people who are part of the middle class (Ferreira, Messina and Rigolini 1). This grand achievement in terms of income ascension of a generation is unfortunately clouded by the report's conclusion that intergenerational social mobility is still very limited in LAC (7). Restricted social mobility and issues of social exclusion in the region persist due to unequal income distribution (Azevedo and Bouillon 5). Cases of inequality hamper economic growth (Ortiz and Cummins 33), propel social exclusion, and political instability. The ability of government to make gains in this area leaves much to be desired. This has implications for NGOs as they are known for promoting community empowerment (Ulleberg 17).

An all-encompassing approach to development recognizes the interrelatedness of economic, political, and civil institutions of a country. Because of this interrelatedness, it is important to consider the extent of civil liberties and their influence on both economic and political decision-making. The evolving roles of NGOs have been reassessed by the 'south,' suggesting a need for "advocacy and social change" instead of the 'northern' focus on "service delivery and welfare provision" (Pratt 97). There is a movement underway where development NGOs are shifting their work from actions of 'charity' to actions of 'solidarity', and are broadening their objectives to the fulfillment of wider societal goals, setting them apart from other assistance institutions.

Restrictions on social freedoms due to inequalities must be met with governmental and organizational policies which "emphasize equality of opportunities through the development of human and social capital rather than short-term attempts to

equalize outcomes” (Azevedo and Bouillon 44). NGOs should also strive to follow this dogma as they attempt to achieve a truly sustainable development. Finally, the inevitable instability brought upon by transition periods of social mobility must be met with a confidence in governance. The imagined virtuous cycle illustrated here requires a solid communication between civil society and government in order to acquiesce with the needs of the climbing populations or to bring isolated populations into light; this is where the work of NGOs comes into discussion. Only then can a true economic development start to form in a nation. However, an introduction of public participation at a significant scale will only occur if there are reforms to existing institutions, and not through a duplication of NGO service-based projects.

C. Institutional Strength

Institutional strength and *good governance* might go hand in hand but their characteristics are markedly defined. According to Kaufmann et al. (2002) good institutions are made by voice and accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, regulations, rule of law, control of corruption. The author also makes a convincing argument to say that better governance leads to better economic growth, and not the other way around.

Levitsky and Murillo (2011) argue that “[m]any formal institutions in Latin America and other developing states are ‘born weak’,” (5) as “many Latin American constitutions have exhibited patterns of serial displacement” (3). As we have seen, the political economy of LAC has seen the familiar inclination and patterns found in the policies and programs of countries in the Global South aimed at decentralizing and

reducing the reach of the State, and heightening the participation of the private sector in the management of the economy. These trends have been directly or indirectly triggered by structural adjustment reforms which have been notably penetrating in the region. Still, the institutional strength of the state has a long history of providing weak results in suppressing poverty and income inequality in LAC.

As Birdsall (1994) notes in her comparative analysis of inequality and growth in LAC, governing elites in the region implemented economic and trade policies which ignored the well-being of those with the lowest incomes. As the poor benefitted relatively little from such policies, inequality inevitably grew. Birdsall continues on to propose that slow growth in Latin America is caused by high inequality which acts as a constraint on growth (365). By relating the consequences of historical and contemporary governance, the predicted progress of countries in the Global South can be traced, and the importance of the institutional strength can be linked to the overall improvement of civil society.

Institutional strength in this argument does not designate any specific institutional model. Levitsky and Murillo (2009) explain institutional strength as having two vital characteristics: enforcement and stability. These are interchangeable components which do not necessarily occur simultaneously or at all in governance. Enforcement is present when formal rules shape the behaviors of society. Stability is defined as the durability of institutions in time and changes in political and social environments. The authors argue that one major problem in most of the Global South is that institutions with enforcement capabilities or stability have been unsuccessful in being established. That is to say that in the Global South there has been a routine of disregarding written rules which make both democracy and economic growth difficult to maintain. Rules tend to be ignored in society

when the state lacks the capacity to monitor them. Societies functioning within an environment of weak institutions are disposed to inequality as disadvantaged populations are often poorly informed of their rights and do not hold constant expectations of state behavior. Levitsky and Murillo warn that countries may be locked in a cycle of institutional weakness.

Situations of institutional weakness can be broadly seen as avenues in which NGOs come in to fill a service vacuum left by the state. Countries in the Global South have populations that are socially or financially excluded by the lack of opportunities. Herein lays the definition of the Human Poverty Index introduced by the United Nations. This measure of poverty, in contrast to income measures of extreme versus relative poverty, considers the lack of basic human capacity such as malnutrition, life expectancy, disease prevention, illiteracy rates, etc. In the discussion of development, this distinction is necessary to understand the roles of the state and NGOs in order to effectually apprehend the deprivation of human life in countries of the Global South.

Understanding the gaps and limitations of the states in the Global South are vital for our purposes of creating a conceptual framework of the situation of the poor, and situating NGOs within the three sectors so far discussed. Inequality is exacerbated by common themes in the Global South. Capitalism continues to fail because of shared social, political and economic burdens such as inequality, political instability, and dead capital due to lack of ownership rights. More specifically, lack of information to the citizens and an inefficiency of the legal process of a country impede the creation of capital (De Soto 11). The obstacles the poor face in these countries are not a lack of resources but the inability to create capital. While public policy is understood as the basic

plan of action taken by the government in order to address a public need or problem, large gaps in the representation of the general civil society is apparent. Within this argument we see the importance of the quality of opportunities given to the civil society, or in other words, the general citizenry. NGOs should not limit themselves to being purveyors of tangible resources (while letting governments off-the-hook), but instead extend their actions as advocated for a fair change in policies on behalf of the populations they represent.

While the state controls the collective assets of the country, it is the civil society that ultimately gets the development wheel going. Political scientists are therefore “gradually stressing the importance of NGOs” but do not yet move away from the ‘internalist’ perspectives on development which argues for the strengthening of internal institutions (Bradshaw 11). Since the state cannot be ignored, investment in building capacity, and therefore wealth, can only happen within a functioning institutional framework. Following this logic, a true representation for the interests of civil society by NGOs recognizes a ‘ceiling effect’ that is reached by micro-scale projects. Deutsch (1961) argues that as overall improvements can be made relatively easily in the beginning phases of development, but once a certain level is reached, further development slackens when assistance from the government does not grow accordingly³. Conversely, NGO projects will fail to benefit the majority of the marginalized populations, unless they are “used as beacons to light up pathways for others—notably the State—to pursue” (Clark 152). Wider scopes of impact are being called for and as NGOs continue to follow a

³ This theory proposed by Karl W. Deutsch (1961) and supposes a limit to development as societies transition from rural, traditional societies to urban, economic livelihoods. Rapid development can be experienced by societies as it can be relatively easy for the state to make initial overall improvements, but change becomes harder as the role of the state increases with development.

dogma of cooperation with the state, their role will encompass (and is starting to involve)
a philosophy of solidarity with civil society rather than one of self-help.

III. A Balanced Effort Towards Sustainability

NGOs in LAC surged amidst the trend of authoritarian regimes in the area, in part as a response to the human rights injustices experienced during the Cold War period. At the time, NGOs were mostly characterized by their marked separation from the state while focusing their efforts on the mobilization of civil society organizations. The regional shift towards democracy inevitably changed these dynamics, gradually involving NGOs in the development of responsible public policies. NGOs started to be seen as viable alternatives for public services not provided by the state. Problems still surge, however, when the state fails to follow through with projects, is unable to sustain true democratic processes, or fails to gain the trust of its citizenry. The development theories discussed in the previous section follow the logic that good governance, stronger institutions, state capacity, and a greater representation of civil society must go hand-in-hand if economic growth is sought. As LAC has undergone periods of transition, the definition of NGOs has had to gradually change from being *anti-government* to being *separate from government*.

This next section emphasizes the need for a balanced approach to the discussion of development. First, I will provide a brief overview of the current development advancements achieved by LAC, and will point out the areas that still require attention. Second, I will introduce the proposed roles of NGOs and their involvement in capacity development. Lastly, I will suggest for the need of NGOs to widen their scope of influence. This section will act as a surmised action plan derived from the previous section on NGOs and their relation to development theories, as well as a precursor to Haiti as a case study.

A. Latin America and the Caribbean at a Turning Point

“Development requires the removal of major sources of unfreedom: poverty as well as tyranny, poor economic opportunities as well as systematic social deprivation, neglect of public facilities as well as intolerance or overactivity of repressive states.” (Amartya Sen 3)

LAC has recently been seen as a success story of achieving great strides in development. The democratization process in the 1990s has allowed the LAC region to emerge as an important economic regional block. However, structural adjustment programs implemented in the name of development have been unsatisfactory and unsustainable. Nevertheless, World Bank President Jim Yon Kim rejoiced with the latest reports in development indicators in the region by using LAC as an example of how growing opportunities for the poor can lead to economic and human development (The World Bank, 2012). The report states that great progress has been made in the last decade in LAC as “changes in government policies that emphasized the delivery of social programs alongside economic stability” (The World Bank, 2012) have helped the region start to move out of the slow growth and persistent inequality. Furthermore, LAC has met some key targets for the MDGs in areas like hunger reduction, but has lacked in others such as poverty reduction as extreme poverty has only decreased minimally in the region (UN Department of Public Information 1). However, the challenge now is to direct the pro-poor public policies and expenditures that have recently ascended to a sustainable growth that will allow the continued provision of economic and social opportunities for the citizenry (The World Bank, Latin America and the Caribbean Brief 1). Despite some recent advancement in the region, LAC remains weak in the areas of citizen rights, citizen participation, and social and economic opportunities.

LAC followed the trend of small government in which the “politicized legal systems” often favor some sectors of the population more than others (Crisp and Gwartney 5). This system generally leads to a lack of basic protective functions by the government. The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) warns that this region is susceptible to economic and social instability because of the prevalence of economic and social inequalities. Even with great improvements in income inequality—the Gini coefficient in LAC has been the lowest than any other time in the last 30 years (*The Economist*, 2012)—the region still holds the position of having the highest level of income inequality in the world (Ortiz and Cummins 7). Moreover, the UNDP stresses the need to promote an inclusive participation of civil society, as well as the need to strengthen government institutions in order to “ensure better conditions for human development”. With a few exceptions, the countries in LAC “are broadly typified as having poor service provision, limited redistribution, low citizen engagement and low trust” (The World Bank, Governance and Anticorruption). As citizens have little trust in the competence of the state, contact with the state is avoided. This limited confidence in the public sector is due to the evident inefficiency of the state which leads to poor economic results as there are few incentives for investment.

These problems are complicated by concerns about sustainability, government account ability, and the implementation and coordination of public policy institutions. There is still a need to further engage local communities and actors in order to work towards international interests of economic sustainability.

B. How Can NGOs Engage in Capacity Development?—A Plan of Action

NGOs in LAC have encountered a turning point in their missions as they are increasingly viewed as an important part of the private sector. NGOs are moving beyond their initial gap-filling initiatives and into capacity building roles. *Capacity development* is considered to be a forward-moving process, and not a state of being. More specifically, capacity development is understood as a “non-linear development process that is influenced by internal and external factors” (Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation). Capacity development is considered to be encompassing of the individual, organizational, and state level, and is therefore considered to have a long-term blueprint of sustainable development (Ulleberg 17). *Capacity* is defined by the OECD-DAC Governance Network as “the ability of people, organizations, and society as a whole to manage their affairs successfully.” Capacity development therefore is defined as “the process by which people, organisations and society as a whole create, strengthen and maintain their capacity over time” (OECD DAC). As we can see, capacity development is linked to the broader question of governance which searches for a balance of involvement amongst different sectors of a country.

As many Latin American NGOs are involved in participatory processes (Meyer 133), they have also “become active participants in newly democratic states in Latin America” (134). The roles of NGOs in the process of capacity development have been of much debate, and LAC provides an optimistic space for the creation of these new roles as the region undergoes these transitive phases. Previously, external actors have pushed LAC into the habit of neoliberal downsizing of the public sector. As Mitlin et al. suggest a new concept has emerged where the strengthening of civil society does not suffice, and the

concern for a sustainable development invites the strengthening of the state and its institutions as it acknowledges that a more complex interface between civil society and government is necessary. Capacity development assigns the state the leading role in promoting governmental and social action to the development process and places NGO actors as either “demanding accountability, or as a development agency strengthening the state” (Ulleberg 14). Finally, capacity development is seen as a “key process because the sustainability of development assistance is increasingly linked to local actor’s capacity to mobilize resources, provide valued services and advocate for and deliver their own programs” (CHF 1).

The effectiveness of the work of NGOs is therefore directly tied to the effectiveness of the state and the society as a whole. Issues of project coordination, transparency (both for the state and NGOs), complementarity, and “dedication to the overall processes of development” (Pratt: 98) are only able to be achieved through a balance of this link. A balance among these actors can be influenced by NGOs in various points:

- Greater citizen participation encouraged by NGOs strengthens the foundation for democratic processes.
- NGOs and the greater demands from the state by civil society can steer policies from being imbalanced and favoring only some, to encompassing the needs of all its citizenry.
- NGOs are able to work with a wide range of individuals and organizations which in turn fosters the development of human capacity as well as the development of society’s ability to carry out important social security functions.

- NGOs carrying out capacity building objectives have seen a transition towards focusing on issues of governance and civil society, and the need to meet international public interests.
- NGOs have seen a need to shift from the widely criticized project-based approach to a more long-term support involving the strengthening of local actors and communities while serving as interlocutors between the state and civil society.
- The ability of NGOs to simultaneously work at many different levels creates a synergy for a sustainable collective capacity development sensitive to cultural and political contexts.
- Enhanced participatory processes by way of NGOs in LAC are directly correlated to a balance between the public and private sector which in turn creates a sustainable political and economic balance.

It is important to reiterate that NGOs are only one of the many players making up the complex interplay of sustainable development. They are not to be expected to solve the problems of development nor are they a holistic solution to the practice of good government and capacity development. Despite their efforts being limited to their scope of action, NGOs and their changing roles are important within the struggle of achieving a richer fabric of civil society and sustainable development in the LAC. NGOs can serve to sponsor new social contracts between citizens and the state.

IV. Haiti—The island with many names

Haiti might be known in the world as “the land of the black Jacobins,” “the world’s first black republic,” “the first independent nation in Latin America and the Caribbean,” or “the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere.” These various titles have made Haiti a unique unit for analysis; however, the title that concerns us in this paper is Haiti as “the Republic of NGOs,” a label tied to its reputation as a ‘fragile’⁴ or ‘failed’ state. 80% of Haiti’s population lives under the poverty line and 54% live in “abject poverty” (CIA, 2011). Haiti is one of 8 countries with the lowest rating in terms of both economic and political institutions (Crisp and Gwartney 4). The island also has a long history of corruption, has suffered through decades of dictatorships, has experienced 34 coups and suffered through poorly executed international interventions. This has impeded the emergence of a successful and nationally owned governance system in Haiti. Proper good governance institutions are seen as vital in ‘fixing’ the Haitian fragile state.

Haiti has received large amounts of foreign aid assistance from NGOs, and many have tried to fix the black Caribbean nation. Since the devastating earthquake the country suffered on June 12, 2010 that destroyed much of Port-au-Prince, NGOs flocked in and now the population has learned to look to NGOs for every basic need rather than to its own government. NGOs are taking the role of the government in the country as Haiti is not strong in its national self-governance. Many argue that Haiti lacks a strong, participatory, and self-sustainable civil society and it will only cause more problems when the current NGOs leave the country.

⁴ Cammack and Macleod (2006) define a fragile state as those “where the state power is unable and/or unwilling to deliver core functions to the majority of its people: security, protection of property, basic public services and essential infrastructure” (qtd. in Heine and Thompson 4).

Haiti provides a clear example of how poor institutional formation produces poor international and local coordination. As Heine and Thompson (2011) argue, “one reason international cooperation has failed in the past is because donors started from the premise that Haiti is a state like any other, whereas it is not” (10). The problem of poor coordination, inefficiency, and the poor allocation of foreign aid faced by NGOs requires the government to step in as a coordinating tool, but this has not fully happened. This section will argue that the strengthening of Haiti’s policies, and a change in the policies of the external institutions involved in Haiti (NGOs, UN, etc.), may provide Haiti with the empowerment and agency it needs to finally take off as a sovereign, strong state on its way to positive and sustainable development.

A. Haiti at an imbalance—The construction of a vicious cycle

The 7.0 magnitude earthquake Port-au-Prince suffered was the biggest and latest disaster Haiti had suffered in a long list of other setbacks. Even before the earthquake, the country had already been through food riots, governmental instability, and hurricanes, setting the stage for the full blow of the devastation the earthquake brought. Until recently, two-thirds of the Haitian population depended on agriculture (CIA, 2011). However, because the sector was already vulnerable due to the frequency of natural disasters, it was completely wiped out after the earthquake. The country’s GDP contracted 5.1% in 2010, and all government buildings were lost, while government officials either fled the country or died in the rubble (CIA, 2011). This left foreign donors to fend for themselves with the disaster relief, unable to assist or be assisted by the

government which was practically non-existent. Ultimately, 250,000 lives were lost amidst the rubble and the spread of cholera in the aftermath of the earthquake.

More than a year after the earthquake, there are still over a million Haitians living in “temporary” camps that are now looking like more permanent fixtures as time goes by. The aid relief efforts have been much criticized, not only for the slow clean-up of the rubble and the lack of progress to “build back better”, but also because there has been a harsh “exposure of the failures of the NGO aid system, and the international community's long-standing use of the country as a laboratory for cashing in on disaster — both of which have been wreaking havoc on this country since long before the earthquake” (Doucet, 2011). However, this criticism of “the absence of aid harmonization” fails to recognize the “lack of Haitian ownership of aid programs, the need for greater emphasis on capacity building, institutional reform,” (Thompson 132) and the often wide disconnect between the local cultural and political contexts and the agendas of international actors. This calls on the need for a greater participation of civil society.

Haiti has more foreign NGO’s per capita than any other nation in the world, with about 10,000 NGOs actively working in the small country (Blake, 2010). In fact, foreign aid has frequently made up the majority of the Haitian national budget in the past, comprising nearly 80% in 1997 (Smith 27). However, the legacies of suppression, political instability, and relentless poverty have given way to past failures of foreign aid and intervention in Haiti.

Another explanation of the failure of foreign aid throughout the years has been the large fluctuation of donor funding in response to Haitian political changes. As Crane et al. (2010) point out, “When adverse political events took place, donors often sharply

limited the share of development assistance channeled through the Haitian state, sometimes circumventing the state altogether, supporting NGOs and using implementing partners instead” (139). The reasoning was that it was counterproductive to help state institutions when they were acting undemocratically or repressively. In such cases, NGOs are considered more efficient as they provide a fairer representation of the population and are much more productive. The current situation of the island is driven by its weak state capacity as NGOs “have become more or less institutionalized as service providers in Haitian society” (Ulleberg 22). While it seems that Haiti has become stuck within this polarized debate and vicious cycle, a need for a balanced approach and “cooperation of the state, civil society and the international community” is ever more apparent in order to direct its future towards sustainable development (23).

B. Haitians as insiders—Breaking in to a virtuous cycle

Haitians have been ‘outsiders’ in their own country when it comes to political and economic participation. Moreover, they have lately been outsiders in the reconstruction process too. Attempts to reestablish control have been difficult since almost every government building was destroyed and “nearly one in five civil servants died” (*The Economist*, 2011). The earthquake left both the physical and political infrastructures of the country in ruins. Since the earthquake, the Haitian government and its civil society has been more or less in the shadows of the foreign NGOs who have taken over the “build back better” process Haiti is in now. On top of that, there continues to be allegations of fraud and distrust from the Haitian citizenry in the functioning of these organizations and the national government.

In the short term, NGOs typically carry out post-disaster services normally provided by the state, especially when government capacity is so reduced. In the long term, however, a different strategy must be adopted and “NGOs should [engage] in building state capacities to ensure sustainability and government responsibility” (Ulleberg 23). However, frequently NGOs may remain skeptical of the idea of working closely with local governments. Without a better synergy of governance “the ‘two-track’ problem will persist, especially in fragile or failed states, but it is possible to restore a certain balance between them” (iiep 23).

After the earthquake, MINUSTAH (the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti), which has the objective of stabilizing Haiti after its difficult transition to democracy (Heine and Thompson 5), prepared the Action Plan for National Recovery and Development of Haiti and a post-disaster needs assessment (PDNA). While the wide-ranging plan proposes big steps in the reconstruction and development of Haiti, it does not “provide a critical examination of pre-existing plans in all sectors; nor do they put state-building at the forefront of efforts to ignite progress. In many instances, these plans do not explicitly address the weaknesses of the Haitian state or how those weaknesses might be rectified” (Crane et al. 3). The plan also sets unrealistic goals and priorities risking the mismanagement of aid, highlighting the importance of greater input from the Haitian government.

This can be further seen with the scant real opportunities for involvement given to the Haitian government in the recovery process. A joint Haitian government and donor commission, namely the Interim Haiti Recovery Commission (IHRC), was established in order to manage foreign aid funneled into the country. The plan mainly serves the

purpose to ensure that the correct projects are approved that will comply with the Haiti development plan, and set the correct priorities for the country, aiding the Haitian government in the process in order to build its capacity while monitoring corruption. While it is co-chaired by the prime minister of Haiti and the former U.S. President Bill Clinton, the commission has been criticized as being inefficient and it regards the Haitian leadership as disposable in its decision making process. The failure to truly involve the Haitian government in these important decisions only goes to prove that Haiti has once again taken a back-seat to the determining decisions of its country.

The reconstruction process in Haiti now has been privatized, and taken-over by foreign NGOs. This “NGO invasion” is a recurrence from historical times of what Bolton calls a “globalized and removed system of governance that is developing in Haiti” (Bolton 11). Strengthening the governance sector as well as the fostering of a stronger representation from the civil society are critical elements in the long-term development of Haiti. NGOs must develop less myopic objectives for Haiti and help foment a more empowered state in order for sustainable development to unfold.

In order to begin a virtuous circle in the development of a nation, Sumantra Bose (2004) provides us with key points nations should follow early on. First, he points out that there should be a political organization set up which has broad legitimacy critical to state building. Second, there should be effective mediation between interest groups (i.e. civil society groups, NGOs, the private sector, and the state). Finally, a sharing and dispersion of power is necessary. Having failed in all three accounts, Haiti was subjected to leaving its fate in the hands of foreigners, taking a backseat to the appointment of its own national identity.

With over half of its annual budget coming from outside sources, Haiti's government relies on formal international economic assistance for its financial sustainability (CIA, 2011). Foreign aid and Northern NGOs are therefore filling a gap that should be filled ideally by the Haitian government. In the long-run, aid can help Haiti, but it cannot fix Haiti. Without governmental presence, paired with the democratic notion of participation from civil society, this help is not sustainable and will reproduce dependency.

The Peace Brief by USIP (2010) provides an example of microfinance in Haiti. While NGOs filled that gap in the Haitian economy, it is still "necessary for the government to pass laws, create the infrastructure and provide the environment for further development rather than perpetuate dependency on foreign implementing organizations" (Peace Brief 2). In the highly influential book "Poor Economics", Banerjee and Duflo (2011) provide a more inclusive argument in which they stress that aid alone isn't effective for economic growth; government is needed to pave the way for effective aid allocation. Poor aid allocation has been greatly criticized as a cause of the slow reconstruction of Haiti after the earthquake. It is attributed to the lack of a coordinating tool, ideally the Haitian government.

Haiti, nonetheless, is not a doomed country, and just as many Haitians see the earthquake as an opportunity to build a better Haiti, the international community and the Haitian government should also take advantage of the immense foreign involvement in the country. It should be seen as an opportunity for a new start in terms of building a stronger nation, and not one famously known for being submissive and cursed. As Crane et al. (2010) points out, Haiti does have some advantages it can build on. First, Haiti is

not part of a conflict-ridden region. Second, it has no ethnic clashes or rifts (but plenty of competing political factions). These two advantages give Haiti a more manageable environment to work with. Strong institutions can be better implemented when there is greater cohesiveness among the population.

Mark Schuller (2007) in his report for *The Journal of Haitian Studies*, and many other critics of NGOs, recommend a better coordination among the foreign aid institutions and NGOs in order to remove duplicate projects and create an easier system to share information. They also stress the importance of aligning any work with governmental development policies. Strengthening the government's ability to provide justice, security and align its de jure and de facto powers is vital for this to happen.

In Haiti's situation, the government is needed for construction regulations in order to impede another disaster of this magnitude. Property rights will also play a major role in the rebuilding plans for the nation. The need for governmental assistance cannot be further stressed. Nothing NGOs or foreign aid institutions strive for will have effective or long-lasting effects, if the Haitian government does not have a bigger role in its own country's future. Furthermore, a legitimate government cannot exist without the concrete participation and representation of its civil society. NGOs should shift their objectives from replacing the services typically provided by the government, to holding the governments accountable by providing this much needed representation.

C. A new tone to the “Build Back Better” mantra

Haiti’s government has been criticized for not stepping in and giving a strong voice to the way the country is progressing. The Haitian government should make sure that the help provided to the country is in accordance with the plans established for Haiti’s long-term and culturally-specific development. And so should the international community.

A recent article by *The Economist* (2013) shows how high hopes for Haiti were shattered in 2012 partly due to the tropical storms the region suffered, and partly due to the unsustainability of aid that has mostly come to an end. Tropical storms severely affected the agricultural sector, and the cost of living. However, Haiti has run out of places to look to as “[m]any of the NGOs that thronged the country, and which threatened to eclipse the government, have departed” (*The Economist*, 2013). The article continues on to point out that the promise by aid agencies and NGOs to ‘build back better’ while working with the government and local populations was not so in practice. The article states that “[d]irect budget-support for the government totaled less in 2011 and 2012 than before the quake.” The Haitian government is disadvantaged by lack of implementation capacity. Therefore Haiti continues to be stuck as potential investors are “deterred by fear of social instability and lack of clarity over land rights.”

There is clearly a real need for a strong government hand which does not exist and apparently has never really existed in Haiti. Haiti’s weak institutions reflect this in the way that the country has never really had a chance to stand on its own in a united way. The problem leads to questioning how far Haiti will go in the hands of foreigners and is it really beneficial to the establishment of a strong governmental presence.

There must be a progressive realization that “it is key to implement programmes that enhance the capacity of the Haitian state itself, so that it is able to administer the external resources, provide services to its citizens and otherwise discharge normal state functions” (Heine and Thompson 11). An environment should be created where international actors (such as Northern NGOs) feel free to leave the country without the fear of having to return again shortly. In order for this to be achieved, governance on the part of all societal actors (civil society, NGOs, the private sector, and the state) needs improvement.

Any of the solutions provided for Haiti’s recovery will inevitably require the Haitian government to step up and take charge of the process towards recovery, even in the short-term, but especially in the long-term if they are intended to be sustainable. Neither government nor NGOs are the only ones to hold the burden. There must be a deeper inclusivity that begins with civil society and its mobilization which enables an environment for sustainable progress. The “build back better” motto should have significance in a much deeper level; it could just as well drive Haiti into a better and more hopeful path in terms of political and economic freedoms for its people.

Conclusion

This paper has attempted to place NGOs within the progressive spectrum of development, and has uncovered the need for a balanced approach to the complex topic of development. By considering various theoretical schools of thought on development it was possible to address the controversial question of what roles different actors in society should take in order to ensure sustainable development. Theories on governance, social mobility, and institutional strength were used to begin to sort out the real need of active involvement of the private and public sector alike. NGOs, civil society, and the state have been described as equally important for the progress of impoverished countries in the Global South. LAC provides us with an important region of the world for analysis in this issue as it has undergone transitions in its political and social environment which has prompted a refocusing of the work of NGOs from service based projects, to projects concerned with solidarity and capacity development.

Haiti was placed within this debate as an extreme example of the inefficiency of an imbalance in the accountability of the state. This absence of a capable governing state renders aid and NGO efforts ineffective and limited in the long-run. NGOs are not to be viewed as a holistic answer to sustainable development, but are nevertheless crucial when attempting to acquire a balanced and concerted effort towards an inclusive struggle towards contextually relevant progress of states. Most importantly this paper has been able to synthesize the ideal capabilities and responsibilities of NGOs, the state, and civil society in within the context of LAC.

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
APPROVAL SHEET

This is to certify that Anna Marie Walter has successfully completed her Senior Honors Thesis, entitled:

*NGOs and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean:
A Case Study of Haiti*



Steve Striffler Director of Thesis



Berthold D. Molden Second Reader

Abu Kabir Mostofa Sarwar for the University
Abu Kabir Mostofa Sarwar Honors Program

April 24, 2013
Date