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A Revolutionary Perspective on Social Movements: Fundamentalism in the Islamic World

A Dissertation

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the
University of New Orleans
In partial fulfillment of the requirements
For the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy
In
The Department of Political Science

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May 2008

This is dedicated to the
Countless Souls lost
As a direct or indirect result
Of my country's foreign policy
In the Islamic World

There are three people I need to thank and credit for helping me finish my dissertation. First, Charles Hadley who, without which I would have never been able to finish graduate school. Secondly, Christine Day who shared her humor, advise, encouragement, and positive energy during this entire process. Finally, and most importantly Marc Rosenblum whose determination, dedication, enthusiasm, patience, and his steadfast refusal to lower his standards has helped turn this dissertation into something I'm very proud of.

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Abstract

In the last two decades, we have seen a significant surge in the number of Islamic fundamentalist movements, and there has not been a concise reason as to why. The main objective of this research is to determine the causes of Islamic fundamentalism, and, in so showing that an Islamic fundamentalist movement is inherently a social movement. To determine the causes of Islamic fundamentalism it is best to employ a labyrinth analogy, and it consists of four social movement conditions. The four conditions that make up my fundamentalist labyrinth can be found in the four social movement literatures, and they include: resources associated with resource mobilization theory; opening political institutions as associated with political process theory; socioeconomic inequality associated with Marxism; and the ideas, be they religious or freedom of thought, associated with new social movement theory. Not one of the four social movement literatures acknowledges, or is able to explain Islamic fundamentalism. Taken as a whole, each plays a vital role in my fundamentalist labyrinth. Social movement theorists have excluded Islamic social movements, specifically Islamic fundamentalism, from each of their respective sub-fields because they do not fit into any one of their theories. However, by merging the different theories to form a new theory in the social movement literature, I have been able to explain the causes of Islamic fundamentalism. Furthermore, I have created the first dataset that contains every Islamic fundamentalist movement that is or has been in operation from 1970 through 2006. The fundamentalist dataset has a total N (total number of fundamentalist groups) of 16,072 and a total number of unique fundamentalist movements of 983. With this dataset I was able to determine what state-level phenomena are positively associated with Islamic fundamentalism. Finally, to solidify this I developed three in-depth case studies: Hamas, Hezbollah, and Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood.

Introduction

In the last ten years we have seen a significant surge in acts of terrorism, specifically suicide terrorism committed by Islamic fundamentalists. We have also seen a significant surge in the number of Islamic fundamentalists turning to electoral politics and experiencing relatively strong electoral success. The goal of my dissertation is to determine the causes of Islamic fundamentalism and in doing so I will show that an Islamic fundamentalist movement is inherently a social movement. This recent surge in the number of Islamic fundamentalists and fundamentalist movements makes my dissertation substantively important. Our current knowledge of Islamic fundamentalism is significantly limited and there are major voids in the literature. Islamic fundamentalist terrorist groups and political movements exert a radical form of opposition to the state and existing state institutions.

The origins of the anti-system literature reside in the writings of Sartori (1976) on party systems. Anti-system movements share a common political goal: criticizing government and the political mainstream while mobilizing disaffected individuals against the existing political system. An anti-system fundamentalist movement does this while basing its criticism in religion. Nowhere has this been more apparent in the last two decades than in the Islamic world and Islamic political institutions. There is no consensus as to what causes the rise of Islamic fundamentalism or an explanation as to why some states have more Islamic fundamentalist movements than other states. My dissertation will provide a systematic answer to this question through the lens of a social movement.

It is becoming extremely difficult to determine the point of demarcation between international relations and comparative politics and no phenomena blurs this point more than the rise and actions of Islamic fundamentalists. Currently, Islamic fundamentalism is the

greatest threat to the international community and, arguably, the negative results of liberalism, globalization, and the Americanization of global politics have facilitated their growth and success. Many of these Islamic fundamentalists have turned to global terrorism to intimidate the nation-state into complying with their rhetoric. The study of social movements is a major subfield in comparative politics, and the rise of Islamic fundamentalism is the most recent of the social movements. The global effects of Islamic fundamentalism and their acts of terror have a major impact on the global economy and the state which inherently impacts international relations. This latest threat to the harmony of the international system is created via domestic political systems and is a direct result of the foundations of comparative politics. My dissertation will further blur the point of demarcation between international relations and comparative politics by unifying Islamic fundamentalism and social movements.

To determine the causes of Islamic fundamentalism it is best to employ a labyrinth analogy. A fundamentalist labyrinth is relatively simple; there is one path that explains where fundamentalism comes from and what facilitates it. A labyrinth is often compared with maze, but a maze is a tour puzzle in the form of a complex branching passage with choices of path and direction, while a labyrinth has only a single Eulerian path to the center. A labyrinth is an unambiguous throughroute to the center and back and is not designed to be difficult to navigate. To explain what causes Islamic fundamentalism requires a labyrinth that consists of four conditions. This unambiguous throughout explains what causes and what facilitates Islamic fundamentalism; there is no ambiguity or puzzle involved in this process. My dissertation will demonstrate that each of these four conditions found within the labyrinth plays an integral part in explaining the rise and success of Islamic fundamentalism.

The four conditions that make up my fundamentalist labyrinth can be found in the four social movement literatures: resource mobilization theory, political process theory, Marxism, and new social movement theory. Not one of the four social movement literatures acknowledges, or is able to explain Islamic fundamentalism; however, taken as a whole they can.

My dissertation makes two significant contributions to the field of political science and its respective subfields of international relations and comparative politics. First, it explains in a rudimentary manner the causes of Islamic fundamentalism. The significance of this is paramount because Islamic fundamentalism is currently one of the greatest threats to the modern nation-state, secularism, Middle East peace, the global economy, the U.S. economy, and global domestic political institutions. Secondly, it shows how Islamic fundamentalist movements have the same characteristics as social movements. I am making a significant contribution to both the Islamic fundamentalism literature and the social movement literature jointly; no place in either literature is there a correlation between social movements and Islamic fundamentalism. I am the first scholar to argue that the combination of the different social movement literatures is the missing link that can accurately explain the causes of Islamic fundamentalism.

My dissertation tests the existing theories and main arguments found in the social movement literature; it is also the first large N analyses of Islamic fundamentalist movements, and, in turn, social movements. However, it does more than simply test the existing literature and existing arguments. Individually the four different social movement literatures cannot explain where Islamic fundamentalism comes from. If I were to simply test the existing literature and add a large N chapter, my results would be simple and limited. The conclusion would indicate that not one existing argument about social movements explains

Islamic fundamentalism – this is already known. Islamic fundamentalist movements are complex and multi-dimensional, and a single strand of the social movement literature cannot explain them. However, I have developed a theory that takes parts of each of the four social movement theories and combines them in such a way that they can explain the causes of Islamic fundamentalism. I argue that Islamic fundamentalist movements are inherently social movements.

This is a significant addition to the existing literature because it justifies, and acknowledges, the importance of each strand of the social movement literature. Also, it makes explicitly clear that together they can explain where Islamic fundamentalism comes from, and why Islamic fundamentalists do what they do. The different social movement literatures incorrectly dismiss their counter literatures as irrelevant. Nothing can be further from the truth; together each of the different literatures explains more than any one can individually, especially as it relates to Islamic fundamentalist social movements. Social movement theorists have excluded Islamic social movements, specifically Islamic fundamentalism, from each of their respective sub-fields of the social movement literature because it does not fit into any one of their categorizations. However, by merging those different categorizations to form a new theory in the social movement literature, I explain what causes the formation and the facilitation of Islamic fundamentalism.

The first condition found within my fundamentalist labyrinth is Marxism. Karl Marx had a legitimate argument that when the state oppresses, enslaves, and ignores the masses long enough they will revolt. What we are currently seeing in the case of Islamic fundamentalism is a revolt manifested in the significant surge of terrorist acts and the electoral success of Islamic fundamentalists. Marx was correct when he argued that

individuals get involved in collective action when their social class has reached its breaking point; they will then unite against their antagonists and forcibly change both the socioeconomic and sociopolitical intuitions (according to Marx there is no separation between those individuals who dominate economics with those who dominate politics). The socioeconomic inequality argument of Marx as being the sole reason for collective action is flawed; however, socioeconomic inequality is positively associated with the number and strength of Islamic fundamentalist movements.

It did not occur to Marx to ask what makes individuals engage in collective action; he simply assumed that collective action was a direct result of society's structural development rather than individual choice. This is a legitimate argument; however, it does not explain why Muslims join Islamic fundamentalist social movements. In this aspect the resource mobilization theorists are correct in their critique of the Marxists; resources, on both the group and state levels, are imperative for a movement's formation and success. Resource mobilization theory is the second condition found within my fundamentalist labyrinth.

Resources in the resource mobilization literature have been defined in numerous ways and they include such things as money, labor, land, capital, and technical expertise. I define resources here as money and population; however, I deviate from the traditional resource mobilization theorists to also include education and leadership as resources. Arguably, there is not a more valuable resource than that of a nation-state's educational level, especially in the Islamic world. Resource mobilization theorists assume that the actors in social movements are rational; arguably, participants in Islamic social movements are rational. Like socioeconomic inequality, resources are positively associated with the number and strength of Islamic fundamentalist movements.

The third condition found within my fundamentalist labyrinth is the political process theory. The key foundation of political process theory include the import role that political institutions play in facilitating social movements, and the idea that participation in protest activities can lead to increased representation. Many political process theorists argue that collective action arises as a result of an individual's grievances, discontent, and frustration toward their government and state institutions. This is especially true in the Islamic world because westernization, modernization, Americanization, poverty, socioeconomic inequality, and lack of democracy all help facilitate Islamic collective behavior, specifically the rise and success of Islamic fundamentalists. Furthermore, political process theory claims that social movements occur when expanding political opportunities are seized by individuals who are formally or informally excluded from the political environment. The main objective of those individuals participating in a social movement is to provoke political change; at the core of most Islamic fundamentalist movements is the desire to facilitate political change. The opening of political institutions is positively associated with the number and strength of Islamic fundamentalist movements.

The final condition found within my fundamentalist labyrinth is the new social movement theory. New social movement theorists argue that social movement participants are looking to enhance the quality of life for all sectors of society and that membership in these movement(s) falls into two categories: those who are paying the costs of modernization and those who have been marginalized by the development of the welfare state and the new middle class. Also, the rise and success of the Religious Right plays an integral part in the New Social movement literature; arguably, it is a pillar of the literature itself. The first category is the case for Islamic movements. Modernization via westernization and

Americanization are helping to facilitate the rise of Islamic fundamentalist movements. One major similarity between the European/American Religious Right and Islamic fundamentalism is that both share the idea of religion and believe in the lack of secularism in everyday life, specifically in the sociopolitical and socioeconomic institutions. Furthermore, the new social movement scholars challenge the conventional division of politics into left and right and broaden the definition of politics to include issues that had been considered outside the domain of politics; this is apparent in Islamic social movements. New social movement participants are interested in intangible goods that would enhance the quality of life for all sectors of society. This is also the objective of Islamic fundamentalists. New social movement scholars argue that current social movements are post-material movements whose foundations are ideas. Ideas, as described by New Social movement scholars are positively associated with the number and strength of Islamic fundamentalist movements.

My dissertation consists of seven chapters. Chapter two consists of an extensive literature review that looks at all the existing literature on Islamic fundamentalism, terrorism, and the predominant causes of Islamic fundamentalism. My objective in chapter three is to give a broad overview of the social movement literature; this includes explaining what constitutes a social movement, how social movements have been defined in the literature, and what major arguments, and major findings social movement scholars have concluded with. The remainder of chapter three argues that each of the four conditions found in my fundamentalist labyrinth: Marxism, resource mobilization theory, political process theory, and new social movement theory. In chapter four, I statistically test my fundamentalist labyrinth theory. I have created a unique data set that contains every Islamic fundamentalist

group that is or has been in operation from 1970 through 2006. The fundamentalist data set I created has a total N (total number of fundamentalist groups) of 16,072.

To solidify all of this, test my hypotheses, and show that Islamic fundamentalist movements are social movements, I have developed three in-depth case-study chapters: Palestine, specifically looking at Hamas; Lebanon, specifically looking at Hezbollah; and Egypt, specifically looking at the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. Each case study serves multiple purposes. First they help illustrate the results of my large-N chapter that indicates each of the social movement conditions are positively associated with the number of fundamentalist movements found within the majority-Islamic nation-state. Second, they provide evidence as to what facilitates a movement's success. Third, I evaluate the evidence found within each of the three movements as to why they should be considered social movements; I illustrate the social-movementness of these groups. Furthermore, I chose to specifically look at these three movements because each one is an important fundamentalist movement within the Islamic world; and each one offers something significantly different than the other two. First, I chose the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood because it is the oldest and most resilient fundamentalist movement in the Islamic world. Unlike Hamas and Hezbollah there is no Islamic outside ideological force facilitating, sponsoring, or endorsing the Muslim Brotherhood. However, Egypt does receive significant U.S. financial aid. I chose Hamas as my second case study because it has recently had significant electoral success and has been a major terrorist group for two solid decades. Unlike Hezbollah, Hamas is a Sunni movement and receives significant foreign aid and ideological influence from Saudi Arabia, an outside Sunni ideological force. I chose Hezbollah as my third case study because they have become the most successful Shiite fundamentalist political movement in

the Islamic world. Also, they receive massive financial aid and ideological influence from Iran, an outside Shiite ideological force. Finally, I chose these case-studies because they show the different ways Islamic fundaments movements can develop. Hamas is the result of an evolutionary process where fundamentalist movements evolve and develop over time. The formation of Hezbollah has nothing to do with movement evolution; instead it is the result of the evolution of the Shiite people and their eventual radicalization. Finally, the formation of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood has nothing to do with movement evolution, or evolution and radicalization of the Egyptian masses. Instead, its formation is the result of significant changes in the sociopolitical and socioeconomic institutions of Egypt. Each fundamentalist movement forms in a different way; the process does not matter in the eventual outcome. What matters is the presence of each of my social movement labyrinth conditions, which ultimately are facilitating Islamic fundamentalism.

Chapter One: Islamic Fundamentalism

The following chapter is broken down into six sections; first, there is a brief overview of Islamic fundamentalism and an explanation of my use of both the term and what constitutes an Islamic fundamentalist movement. Secondly, there is an inclusive review on all the existing Islamic fundamentalism literature. Third, I examine all of the current definitions of fundamentalism and conduct an in-depth linguistics analysis of the term *fundamentalism*. Fundamentalism, as a term, was created in the United States in the 1920s to describe the conservative movement of evangelical Christianity, and it translates into the uncompromising literal interpretation of scripture. In the last thirty years, fundamentalism has also come to describe Islamic radicalism and militancy. Fundamentalism is a term used mainly by Christians and the West. Thus, when the term is applied to Islam, it causes difficulties and misunderstandings in the translation, and these misunderstandings will be evaluated. Also, one of the key terms associated with Islamic fundamentalism is that of *Jihad.* According to Islam, all Muslims are expected to perform jihad; the reasons and meanings behind this will be evaluated. Fourth, I look at the terrorist literature. Terrorism is an important part of the Islamic fundamentalism literature; arguably, it is the most mainstream and well known branch of the fundamentalism literature in Western scholarship.

Following this, I look at the causes of Islamic fundamentalism. The literature gives five possible reasons as to the causes of Islamic fundamentalism; first comes the socioeconomic argument where it is assumed that worsening economic conditions, unemployment, and poverty facilitate fundamentalism. A second prevalent reason found in the literature is that the cultural tension between Islam and the West; the result of modernization, Westernization and Americanization, are facilitating fundamentalism. Third, many scholars argue that fundamentalism is the result of the Soviet Empire imploding.

Another relatively minor one, which is interconnected with the above three, is that individuals turn to Islamic fundamentalists in personal times of crisis, and to be closer to God. Fifth, fundamentalism is the result of outside phenomena such as the Palestinian refugee problem, the 1979 Iranian revolution, the radicalization of Egyptian society via the Muslim Brotherhood, or the assassination of President Sadat.

Finally, at the end of this chapter I evaluate my contribution to the literature, and argue that the Islamic world and Islamic fundamentalism has been excluded from the social movement literature, and Islamic fundamentalist movements are inherently social movements. In doing this, I lay out the foundation of my theory – my fundamentalist labyrinth and the conditions found within it. The literatures on Islamic fundamentalism and social movements are both unable to explain the emergence and success of these movements because both fail to recognize that Islamic fundamentalism is a new kind of social movement. Not one of the social movement scholars considers Islamic fundamentalism a social movement.

Currently, our greatest threat to the global community is Islamic fundamentalism. According to most Islamists, Islamic fundamentalism is a manifestation of the Islamic world's contempt toward the West. Islamic fundamentalism is reactive. Fundamentalist movements form in reaction to, and in defense against, the results and consequences of forced assimilation, modernization, technology or industrialization, globalization, Americanization, and Westernization which have penetrated the larger Islamic community. Western imperialism, Western cultural imperialism, Western economic and military domination, and the Western facilitation and domination of political regimes throughout the Islamic world that

place the needs of Western powers before the needs of their own citizens, have all culminated in the Islamist's loathing of the West.

Islamic fundamentalism, like all religious extremist movements, was born from the spiritual relationship an individual has with his God. A fundamentalist movement starts with a radical interpretation of scripture, the purification of all socioeconomic and sociopolitical contradictions to that interpretation, and the then the fundamental desire to defend their interpretation. Most religions are losing their members either to outright secularism or to relativism, which leads fundamentalists to believe their faith is being eroded and displaced.[1] Fundamentalism is an extremist effort to counteract this trend. According to Keddie (2003), most Muslims believe in the ideal of religious hegemony over everyday life and politics. Secularism is not admissible in Islam because the separation of religion and politics runs counter to Islam's claim to regulate all aspects of human life.

Numerous scholars argue that the 1970s and 1980s witnessed a reawakening of religious ideas and social movements throughout the Middle East and this led to the creation of Islamic fundamentalism.[2] The fundamentalist literature assumes that Islamic fundamentalism originated from the Islamist's literal interpretation of Islamic scripture, specifically the Quran (Jun 2002, 81).[3] Said Amir Arjomand (2004) argues that fundamentalism is the endeavor to purify pristine Islam from alien influences by returning to its scriptural foundations. Jun (2002, 75) argues that fundamentalists emphasize the priority of the community over that of the individual. Bulent Diken and Carsten Bagge Lausten (2006) argue that fundamentalists stress the need to use whatever means necessary to defend

[1] Relativism is the assumption that any given religion is culture-bound and thus relatively true or false
[2] These scholars include: Tessler and Nachtwey (1998), Wald (1993), Goldstein and Keohane (1993), White (2002), Jaber (1997) and Wickham (2002)
[3] This includes for the Sunnis (the tradition of the Profit and the sayings and deeds of Muhammad) and the Shiites (the Islamic Law).

the true faith. As a result, when looking at Islamic nation-states, it is critical that the relationships between religion and religious movements are evaluated when examining social and political phenomena and political institutions of those nation-states.

In order to return to a literal interpretation of scripture, there needs to be a total rejection of Western materialism as well as of the political, intellectual, economic, and cultural domination of the West.[4] As a result of the degradation the Islamic world faced as a result of Western materialism, there is an inner desire to revert back to Islam not only as a religion but as a system of life.[5] Hava Lazarus-Yefeh (1988) said that Islamic fundamentalist groups constitute a counter-society which has its own internal rules and norms, while seeking to establish a theocratic state.[6] R.M Burrell (1989) argues that a fundamentalist sees it as his duty to apply "Koranic truths" to the creation of a new society, and these truths become the foundation of that new society's governmental institutions.[7] In other words, it is the purpose of government is to implement the teachings of Islam. This was confirmed by James Piscatori (1986) when he looked at whether Islam is compatible with the modern nation-state;

[4] As argued by: S.H. Haq Nadvi (1981), Saad Eddin Ibrahim (1988), and Raphael Israeli (1993)

[5] Raphael Israeli (1993) quoted and then paraphrased S.H. Haq Nadvi (1981) *The Dawn of Spiritualism Mirrored in the Dawn of the XV Hijra Century Durban;* page 7 and Saad Eddin Ibrahim (April 1988) Egypt's Islamic Activism in the 1980. *Third World Quarterly. Pages 632-657* and on page 1 of his book: Muslim Fundamentalism in Israel published in 1993 by Brassey: London.

[6] Hava Lazarus-Yafeh. (1988). Contemporary Fundamentalism in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. *Jerusalem Quarterly*, Pages 27-39. The following are also characteristics Lazarus-Yafeh included in his argument as to what constitutes a fundamentalist group: harsh criticism of established religions and their hierarchies and their leaders are negatively labeled as anti-Islam. Fundamentalists have ambiguous attitudes towards science and technology (however they do not shun technology that furthers their causes such as arms and electronic devises). Fundamentalist groups lean heavily on Holy Scriptures and the Quran is the ultimate state Constitution. Fundamentalists desire a separation of their group of true believers from the rest of society in preparation for the "kingdom of God" on earth. Finally, women are to remain in their traditional role in the family and the sexes MUST be separated in education, prayer, and all public forums.

[7] R. M. Burrell (1989), Introduction: Islamic Fundamentalism in the Middle East – A Survey of its Origins and Diversity. In: Islamic Fundamentalism: Papers read at a seminar held at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London on March 10, 1988. Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland: London. Page 4-6 and 9

he found that it can be and he used the Koran and the writings and interviews of religious scholars as his major sources.

Fundamentalism, according to Jeffrey Hadden (2004), is a proclamation or reclaimed authority of a sacred tradition that is to be reinstated as an antidote for a society that has strayed. George Marsden defines a fundamentalist as "an evangelical who is angry about something."[8] Roberto Marin-Guzman (2003) argues that Islamic fundamentalism contains three basic tensions inherent to Islam itself: 1) transcendence vs. immanence of God; 2) diversity vs. unity; and 3) authenticity vs. openness (keeping the old ways vs. admitting new ones).[9] According to Youssef Choueiri (2002: 123), radical Islam is a political-cultural movement that "postulates a qualitative contradiction between Western civilization and the religion of Islam." Finally, Bassam Tibi (2002: 13) argues that Islam has become the West's leading challenger for one simple reason, and that is, Islamic perspectives are not restricted to national or regional boundaries. Islam resembles Western civilization in the sense that it is universal in both its claims and its outlook. He suggests that Islamic fundamentalism should be viewed as an ideology contributing to what he calls the "War of Civilizations" (page 16).

Islamic contention is part of what is called "Islamic activism" or the mobilization of contention to support Islamic social movements. Islamic movements, that either perpetuate or facilitate Islamic social movements, can be divided into four categories: fundamental,

[8] George Marsen. 1990. Defining American Fundamentalism, in Norman J. Cohen: The Fundamentalist Phenomenon: A View from Within, a Response from Without. Grand Rapids: University of Michigan Press. For related definitions see: Robert Brent Toplen. 2006. Radical Conservatism: The Right's Political Religion. University of Kansas Press. Also, David Edwin Harrell. 1993. American Revivalism from Graham to Robertson, in Edith Blumhofer and Randall Balmer. Modern Christian Rivals Champaign-Urbana: University of Illinois Press. Joel Carpenter. 1996. Revive Us Again: The Reawakening of American Fundamentalism

[9] The belief that God is transcendent basically means there is a surmountable distance between God and man. In Islam, Allah is perfection, power and mercy, while man is imperfect. Man is the creation of God, and due to his imperfection, he is inclined towards evil, pride, and selfishness. Given this enormous separation between God and man, all human beings must be submitted to God. This is the precise meaning of Islam (Islam equals submission, that is man's submission to Allah) Roberto Marin-Guzman (2003: 66).

moderate, liberal, or nationalist. Fundamentalist Islamist movements aim to create an Islamic state through revolution. Moderate and liberal Islamic movements want to pursue their political agendas within existing (and often quasi-democratic) state institutions. Nationalist Islamist movements demand political equality, semi-open political institutions, and are semi-democratic. The following table breaks down the Islamic political trends and explains the ideological differences between the beliefs, political teachings, and different types of Islamic movements. The movements of most interest are the fundamentalist movements; however, it is important to show how Islamic fundamentalist movements compare to Islamic moderate, liberal, or nationalist movements.

Table One: Muslim Social Movements

	Fundamental	Moderate	Liberal	Nationalist
Beliefs	Requires a strict and absolute following of Islamic beliefs and the teachings of the Koran in all aspects of life. Following strict adherence to Islamic law. Westernization and Western conditioned modernization is condemned	There is an Islamic belief system and it is in moderate levels in the public realm. Moderate levels of Westernization and modernization	Secular; Islamic law has no place in society and the Islamic belief system minimally exists in the public realms. Western beliefs as they relate to democratic ideas, freedoms of speech and press. Modernization is limitedly embraced and only is cases where socioeconomic equality is guaranteed	Secular; Islamic law has no place in society; Islamic belief system is condemned and Westernization and modernization are embraced
Government	Majoritarian democracy is a must for all states with a legal system based of Koranic teachings and Sharia law. However, religious and ethnic minorities may be excluded.	Not democratic or semi-democracy	Demands a total and transparent democracy with total equality to all people, including religious and ethnic minorities	Not democratic or semi-democratic
Teachings	Only through the teachings of fundamental Islam. Shiites Follow strict adherence to the Ayatollah Khomeini's interpretation of the Koran and Sunnis follow a strict interpretation of Islam via the Grand Ayatollahs	Following Koranic teachings are fundamental; however, this must be done in a modern context and is interpreted subjectively	Koranic teachings have no place in politics or society. Secular ideologies or values are the basis for all teachings. However, religious scholars are respected and protected	Koranic teachings have no place in politics or society. Secular Western ideologies or values are the basis for all teachings. Religious scholars are subjected to harassment
Identity	Identifies with Iran, Saudi Arabia, Al-Qaeda, or any radical Islamic movement that completely dissociates itself with anything non-Islamic.	Moderate nationalism; Identifies with Arab nation and/or nation-state; However, Islam plays an important role in both society and politics and cannot be evaluated separately	Semi-nationalist; identifies with human rights and socioeconomic and sociopolitical equality foremost	Pure nationalism; Identifies only with the Arab nation and/or nation-state

I define an Islamic fundamentalist movement as any group, political party, or issue-oriented militant movement which is non-secular in its beliefs, ideas, or dogmas. It also must encourage, sponsor, and/or condone the lack of separation of church and state within government, state institutions, education, or educational institutions. Furthermore, for a movement to be considered fundamentalist it must have socio-political objectives, and not just religious ones. The theoretical justification behind this definition of a fundamentalist movement must be broad enough to encompass multiple types of movements; this is why I used words such as *group*, *political party* and *issue-oriented militant movement*. This terminology in broad enough to catch most organized movements of people without excluding any. No fundamentalist movement is secular and a true fundamentalist movement believes in the lack of separation in government, state institutions, education or educational institutions. It is also important to note that a fundamentalist movement does not have to believe in the lack of separation in all of these. Finally, to separate religious movements from fundamentalist movements, I note that the movements must have socio-political objectives and not just religious ones. I define a social movement's success as its ability to survive, spread its beliefs, and/or influence the nation-state either positively or negatively. Success here has nothing to do with the fundamentalist movement's ability to change or influence the socioeconomic or sociopolitical structures and institutions of the state; success in its most broad interpretation simply means it has an impact. The Islamic movement is not confined to a single Muslim state; the idea that *al-Islam huwa al-hall* (Islam is the solution) resonates with particular force in Islamic politics.[10]

[10] Islam means "submission" or "surrender" to the Almighty and the one who surrenders is a Muslim. FM Denny (1994: 67) An Introduction to Islam

In the fundamentalist data set I created there is a total N (total number of fundamentalist movement-years) of 16,072. I obtained this number by taking each Islamic nation-state and counting every fundamentalist movement present for every year, and then summing the years. The total number of unique Islamic fundamentalist movements is 983.

The following two tables show the total number of fundamentalist movements each Islamic nation-state has had over the last 37 years. By just looking at the first table, a significant amount of information is being lost, and it does not explain the causes of Islamic fundamentalism. However, it is interesting to examine the average number of fundamentalist movements in each nation-state for each year (the average number of fundamentalist groups is next to the total number). The only reliable information that can be taken from table two is the nation-states with the fewest fundamentalist movements. The second table, then, gives a breakdown of the total number of unique fundamentalist movements.

Table Two: Total Number of Fundamentalist Movement-Years

Iran	1329 (37)	Oman	35 (1)
Algeria	452 (12.7)	Saudi Arabia	421 (11.3)
Azerbaijan	8	Syria	872 (23)
Bahrain	212 (5.7)	Tajikistan	168 (11)
Bangladesh	803 (22)	Tunisia	159 (4.4)
Brunei	0	Turkey	435 (11.7)
Djibouti	0	Turkmenistan	7
Egypt	616 (17)	United Arab Emirates	32
Indonesia	1125 (11)	Uzbekistan	96 (6.4)
Israel	510 (13.8)	Yemen	208 (13.8)
Jordan	434 (12)	Kazakhstan	24 (1.7)
Kuwait	22 (less than 1)	Eritrea	30 (2.1)
Lebanon	1748 (47)	Ethiopia	437 (11.5)
Libya	542 (15)	Tanzania	7
Iraq	1283 (34)	Afghanistan	728 (19.7)
Mauritania	49 (1.4)	Somalia	349 (9.5)
Morocco	224 (6)	Sudan	667 (18)
Qatar	2	Kyrgyzstan	81 (5.4)
Pakistan	1203 (32.5)	Palestine	1261 (34.6)

Table Three: Total Number of Unique Fundamentalist Movements

Iran	76	Oman	2
Algeria	35	Saudi Arabia	37
Azerbaijan	4	Syria	35
Bahrain	12	Tajikistan	9
Bangladesh	39	Tunisia	9
Brunei	0	Turkey	25
Djibouti	0	Turkmenistan	2
Egypt	45	United Arab Emirates	2
Indonesia	66	Uzbekistan	8
Israel	36	Yemen	17
Jordan	22	Kazakhstan	5
Kuwait	6	Eritrea	5
Lebanon	92	Ethiopia	7
Libya	24	Tanzania	1
Iraq	149	Afghanistan	27
Mauritania	3	Somalia	10
Morocco	10	Sudan	29
Qatar	1	Kyrgyzstan	4
Pakistan	67	Palestine	62

History of Fundamentalism

An evaluation of the linguistics behind the term *fundamentalism* is important to my dissertation because it personifies much of the misconceptions between the West and the Islam; also, it helps explain the broader cultural issues associated with fundamentalism. In the Encyclopedia of Religion (1987), there is no listing under the term *fundamentalism*; rather it is placed under the heading "Evangelical Christianity and Fundamentalism." The earlier Hastings Encyclopedia (1921) has no reference to fundamentalism either. The term was invented in the United States in the 1920s to designate conservative offshoots of evangelical Christianity; it referred to individuals and groups that believed in an uncompromising literal interpretation of the Bible, and the idea that the world has fallen into a state of spiritual decay. The term *fundamentalism* originated in the 1920 edition of the Northern Baptist periodical, *The Watchman-Examiner*, whose editor described himself and a group of conservative Evangelical Protestants as militants willing to preserve the "fundamentals" of the Christian faith from the evolutionists and Biblical critics infecting mainline seminaries and colleges (Almond et al., 2003:1). George Marsden (1990) and Ho Jin Jun (2002) argue that the term *fundamentalist* became familiar in the American vocabulary as a result of religious zealots who were interested in forcing a literal interpretation of the Bible that they started breaking away from mainstream churches and American society in the 1910s and 1920s. Asntoch Soha and Thomas Carr (2001:1) argue that the term *fundamentalism* was first used to distinguish a religious movement within American Christianity; a movement which was grounded in what was thought to be divinely sanctioned beliefs that sought to identify and exclude those who did not share those same beliefs or identity. Today, the term *fundamentalism* is frequently used to refer to Islamic extremism. With the transformation of

the term *fundamentalism* to Islam, Christian evangelism ceased to be explicitly *fundamentalist* and is now also referred to as *televangelism, evangelicalism,* or the *religious right*.

Most adherents to monotheistic religions consider extremist members to be a minority within their respective religions. Fundamentalist leaders, be they Christian, Jewish, or Islamic, believe they have the divine right to pick and choose scripture for their own self-interest or self-indulgence; they intentionally find passages that suit their immediate self-serving purposes. They often reject all previous interpretations of scripture (at times even their own) and seek to lead the flock to act on their fundamentalist, self-serving interpretation. Fundamentalism is defined as essentially reactive, militant, and restrictive. Oftentimes, it is a fundamentalist's objective to suppress alternative visions and movements within a given society, or world, and force their literal interpretation of scripture on nonbelievers. According to Bassam Tibi (2002: 20) Islamic fundamentalists believe that God's rules replace humanities rules. He goes on to argue that fundamentalism is not simply a revival of pre-modern religious worldviews, but is rather a practical policy preference. He says "Fundamentalists do not debate in intellectual clubs, or do they engage in theological controversies; religious fundamentalists are ideologues and political activists primarily concerned with political power" (page 20).

Fundamentalism is a term used mainly by Christians and the West. When the term is applied to Islam, it causes difficulties and misunderstandings in the translation. Muslim scholars have used various terms to refer to those who are Islamic extremists; however, *fundamentalism* does not translate into Arabic or Farsi. According to Roberto Marin-Guzman (2003) examples of this would include: *islah* which means reform, *salafiyys* which implies a

return to ancestors, *tajdid* is renewal, *nohda* is renaissance. Other terms have been applied to radical Islam is, *Islamtakfir* which means excommunication, *Hijra* which means flight from unbelief, and *islamiyyum* which means Islamists. This last term is the most precise linguistically and is applied to those Muslim movements which wish to revive Islam, and use violence to do so. They call themselves *islamiyyum*; however, the terms *fundamentalism* or *fundamentalist* do not translate. Youssef Choueiri (2002) argues that most Islamic writers and intellectuals view *fundamentalism* as a generic Western term, irrelevant to Islam.

One of the most important terms associated with Islamic fundamentalism is that of *Jihad. A*ccording to Islam, all Muslims are expected to perform jihad. *Jihad* is a noun; its literal meaning is *striving* or *a determined effort*. The term *jihad* is derived from the Arabic root *jhd*, which literally translates *to strive*. The active participle in Jihad is *mujahid* which means someone who strives or participates in *jihad* (Streusand, 1997). The term *Jihad* has often been translated as *Holy War* and is a concept coined in Europe in the 11th century to refer to the Crusades; there is no equivalent word in Islam. In the Middle East the term *harb* and not *Jihad* is used to describe war. Since *Jihad* derives from the Arabic root *striving*, a better translation would be *striving in the cause of God*.

The use of the Jihad to justify violent attacks against the West is an incorrect use of the word's original and religious meaning. There are two aspects of the *Jihad*: the greater *Jihad*, which is fighting to overcome carnal desires and evil inclinations; and the lesser *Jihad*, which is the armed defense of Islam against aggressors. The term Jihad has two meanings, one of which is violent. The non-violent meaning of Jihad refers to the personal struggle for virtue and morality, the struggle to follow God's will. According to John Esposito (2003), Jihad can also refer to "fighting injustice and oppression, spreading and defending Islam, and

creating a just society through preaching, teaching, and, if necessary, armed struggle or holy war." The two broad meanings of Jihad, non-violent and violent, are exemplified in a well-known prophetic quote that signified the return from a military expedition, the Prophet Mohammad said, "We have returned from a lesser Jihad (Jihad al-asghar) to the greater Jihad (Jihad al-akbar)." When asked, "O, Messenger of Allah, what is the greater Jihad?" Mohammad answered, "It is the Jihad against one's soul."

In the context of the contemporary Islamic fundamentalists' calls for suicide bombings and other terrorist attacks, use of the term *Jihad* clearly refers to the violent struggle against perceived enemies of Islam, specifically the crusading West, the Communist East, and Israel (Esposito, 2003). Islamic fundamentalist leaders claim their followers have a religious obligation to engage in Jihad, either by physically fighting Islam's enemies or by supporting those who do. Proponents of this logic ground their position in a Koranic verse in Surah 9 (al-Tawbah) verse 41: "Fight with your possessions and your souls in the way of Allah." [11] According to Vincent Cornell (2002) Muhammad said, "The first person against whom judgment will be pronounced on the Day of Resurrection will be a man who dies a martyr. He will be brought forth and God will make known to him the blessings he has bestowed on him and he will recognize them. God will say: 'And what did you do about them?' He will say "I fought for you until I died a martyr. God will say: you lie! You only

[11]Typically, *possessions* translate into *money*, and incorporate a large spectrum of outreach activity, from the metaphysical which benefits the soul to charitable giving and social welfare activities which benefit the body. To fulfill these social welfare duties, the Islamic endowments (waqf, or awqaf in the plural) are responsible for the upkeep of mosques and holy sites in contemporary Muslim societies also, they typically manage social service institutions. For dawa definition, see R. Hrair Dekmejian, Islam in Revolution: Fundamentalism in the Arab World (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1985) page 44.
According to Dikena and Lausten (2006) based on the sacred texts, one can distinguish between four forms of jihad: the jihad of the sword, that is the lesser jihad, and the three forms of greater jihad which are the jihad of the heart (moral reformation), jihad of the tongue (proclaiming God's word abroad) and jihad of the hand (works in accordance with God's will) (also see James Turner Johnson, "The Holy War Idea in Western and Islamic Traditions" 1997.

fought that it might be said about you, he is courageous. And it was as he said. Then he will be ordered to be dragged along on his face until he is cast into hell fire." What makes this quote significant is how it shows the manipulation Islamists use while recruiting rank-and-file members, specifically for suicide attacks. Muhammad said "The first person against whom judgment will be pronounced on the Day of Resurrection will be a man who dies a martyr. He will be brought forth and God will make known to him the blessings he has bestowed on him and he will recognize them." Islamic fundamentalist recruiters quote the first half of Muhammad's statement and ignore the second half, which completely changes the message. In other words, fundamentalists manipulate the message for self-serving gain. This is done in schools and Mosques controlled by fundamentalists. Throughout the Middle East, there are more than six thousand private schools founded and sustained by Islamic groups (Akhtar and Sakr, 61; al-Faruqi, 123; Bassiouni, 136). The Islamist movements whose dawa tradition has had the greatest success include Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood; each is noted for having a politically activist nature propagated through the educational system.[12]

The Origins and Causes of Islamic Fundamentalism

Scholars give five significant reasons as to the causes of Islamic fundamentalism. First, some argue that worsening economics, unemployment, and poverty facilitate fundamentalism (the socioeconomic arguments). A second prevalent reason found in the

[12] An academic study based on interviews of jailed terrorist operatives found that the "pre-recruitment social environment for members of Islamist groups like Hamas "was dominated by the mosque, religious organizations and religious infrastructure". For the Islamist groups the study found that almost 50% of members cite the mosque, Muslim Brotherhood or other religious influence as central (Jerrold M. Post, Ehud Sprinzak, and Laurita M. Denny, "The Terrorists in Their Own Words: Interviews with 35 Incarcerated Middle Eastern Terrorists," *Journal of Terrorism and Political Violence*. 2003. 174-184).

literature is that cultural tension between Islam and the West, which is result of modernization, Westernization and Americanization, is facilitating fundamentalism. Third, many scholars argue that fundamentalism is a result of the Soviet Empire imploding. Fourth, some argue that individuals turn into Islamic fundamentalists in personal times of crisis in order to be closer to God. Fifth, some of the literature explains fundamentalism as the result of the Palestinian refugee problem. Still other scholars blame the rise of Islamic fundamentalism on outside forces such as the 1979 Iranian Revolution, the radicalization of Egyptian society, or the assassination of President Sadat. Finally, there are many scholars that argue Islamic fundamentalism is a direct result of a combination of the above said reasons.

Although there are multiple arguments as to what causes Islamic fundamentalism, most scholars do not view Islamic fundamentalism as a social movement. The one exception would be those that believe the socioeconomic arguments that worsening economies facilitates fundamentalism. However, in the Islamic world, Marxism, with its atheist persona would never be legitimized; it would amount to heresy. Yet in Loretta Napoleni (2003) comparison of the roots of the medieval Christian Crusades and of the modern Islamic Jihad movement, she found that economics are the determining factor for the modern Jihad, just as it was for the Christian crusaders. Pradeep Chhibber (1996) attributes the electoral achievements of fundamentalist parties to national economic factors. Throughout the Muslim world, it was the organized Muslim extremists that kept the state's infrastructure working during periods of economic hardships or national disaster; such was the case in Lebanon, Turkey, Palestine, and Egypt. Walz (1986), Keddie (1988, 2003), Jaber (1997), Saad-Ghorayeb (2000), and Robert Mortimer (1991) all argue that political alienation incited by

economic deprivation has influenced fundamentalism. Kenneth Grasso (1995) argues that Islamic fundamentalism is the result of the social structure; specifically, its level of development, degree of urbanization, the pattern of distribution of wealth and income, and differences in patterns of consumption. Bradford Dillman (1992) argues that in many post-colonial societies a single party came to power at independence, and it was the party that brought the independence movement. However, as socioeconomic conditions worsen, fundamentalist political parties achieved significant electoral success. This has been the case in Pakistan, India, Lebanon, Palestine, Egypt, Algeria, and Turkey.[13] Almond et al. (2003) argues that the uneven distribution of economic development, natural resources, and growth rate facilitate the growth of fundamentalism. They went on to argue that recessions, depressions, inflation, strikes, unemployment, and famine may create attitudes and grievances among particular groups in the population and this leads to a rise in fundamentalism. The level of economic productivity and prosperity is one among several factors I will consider in my explanation of the emergence and growth of fundamentalist movements.

A second prevalent argument in the literature is that Islamic fundamentalism is the result of the loss of traditional Islamic culture from Westernization, Americanization, and modernization. Many scholars have explained the rise of religion as a political force on the

[13] Norman Palmer (1977) and Girilal Jain (1977) argued that Pakistanis and Indians were tired of the mounting state corruption, the growing income disparities between the top five per cent and the rest of the population, the steady impoverishment of hundreds of millions of people, the increasing unemployment, and other social and economic ills and they both predicted that there would be significant electoral shifts in both political systems. Their predictions turned out to be true. The electoral success of the fundamentalist Islami Jamoori Ittihad in Pakistan after 1990 and the election of the fundamentalist Bharatiya Janata Party, which emerged as the second-largest party in India following the national elections in 1991, have been attributed to poor and middle-class support of these parties. In both cases, the party in power lost because the fundamentalists promised to improve the socioeconomic conditionsAs argued by: Anwar Syed (1991) and Yogendra Malik and V.B. Singh (1994). Andrew Wilder (1988 and 1993) argues that women, who are considered a lower class, socio-economically and that they voted independently of their male family members for the Islamic fundamentalists (also see Iftikhar Malik 1996. and National Commission on Status of Women; 1984 Islamabad: Government of Pakistan statistics and Maleeha Lodhi (1992) who cited the failure of the PPP government between 1988 and 1990 to take any concrete steps to improve the status of women in Pakistan, as a result they turned to the extremist parties.

tensions associated either with modernization, or an ideological or general social crisis, and pressures emanating from changes in the international environment.[14] Pipe (1983) and Tibi (2002) argue that Muslims suffer from a double crisis, and this double crisis facilitates Islamic fundamentalism. First, Muslims suffer from socioeconomic and political crises deriving from the imposed integration of Islamic civilization into a world dominated by the West. Secondly, Muslims suffer from an identity crises brought on by exposure to cultural modernity. The general feeling among Islamic fundamentalists is that since the Crusades, the Western world was engaged in a campaign to destroy Islam and Islamic civilization; this has come to formation via the rise of Islamic fundamentalism and Muslims standing up to the Western world (Rudolf Zarzar, 2001:127). Numerous scholars have cited the disappearance of traditional Islamic civil society over the last century via Western imperialism as the cause of Islamic fundamentalism.[15] Almond et al. (2003), Appleby and Sivan (2003) and Wickham (2002) argue that it is imperative to not underestimate the importance of Western imperialism in the explanation the rise of Islamic fundamentalism. Thus, Islamic fundamentalists denounce cultural modernity as a virus that has befallen Islam; they see it as contributing to the weakening of Islamic civilization (Tibi, 2002: 73).

Other scholars attribute the rise of fundamentalism as a political force to the failures of modernization and Westernization, most notably the social crises that resulted. For example, Emmanuel Sivan (1985) argues that Islamic fundamentalism in the Sunni Middle East is the direct result of the failures of modern Arab politics, especially the nationalists. He

[14] Those scholars who argue this include: Mohammed Ayoob (1981); Ali Dessouki (1982); John Esposito (1980); Nikki Keddie (1988); Daniel Levine (1986); Bernard Lewis (1985); Marry Martin and Scott Appleby (1991 and 1993); Robert Mortimer (1991); James Piscatori (1986) ; Maxime Robinson (1974); Emmanuel Sivan (1984); P.J. Vitikiotis (1987)

[15] This is argued by: Leonard Weinberg and Ami Pedahzur (2004); Roger Eatwell (2004); Abdillah, Masyuri (1997); Rita Kipp (1990); Gwenn Okruhlik (2003); Ann Swidler (1995); Bulent Aras (1998); Michael Meeker (1991); and Carrie Wickham (2002).

argues that Sunni Muslim fundamentalists are justified to revolt because of alien western culture. Santosh Soha and Thomas Carr (2001; 125) argue that Islamic fundamentalists oppose nationalism because they see it as responsible for breaking up the Muslim community. Nationalism wants Muslims to forsake the worship of God for the worship of the state. In other words, Muslims are expected to submit to the will of the state rather than the will of God. One of the first scholars of radical Islamic movements, Sayyid Qutb, argues that radical Islam is largely a response to Islamic reformism and Arab nationalism.[16] On the other hand, David Johnson (2006) argues that fundamentalism seems closely aligned with nationalism, which he sees as a popular reaction against foreign cultural and religious traditions.[17] Johnson's argument, on the surface, seems to be contradicting Soha/Carr and Qutb, but he is not. He is correct, but only insofar as on the surface both movements are similar in their ability to gain popular support against foreign cultural and religious traditions.

Esposito (1980) studies the emergence of Islam in Pakistan in the 1970s. He found that it emerged from the restrictive modernization process facilitated by the nationalists, specifically the administration of Prime Minister Ali Bhutto and the social crises which were associated with it. A second example of this phenomenon is Iran. Keddie (1988) looks at the emergence of fundamentalist Islam after the Iranian revolution. She argues that it was the result of the Shah's policy of rapid modernization and Westernization that facilitated the Iranian social crisis in the 1970s. Both Esposito and Keddie finds that modernization and the

[16] Qutb's most famous books include: The Characteristics f the Islamic Conception and its Foundations (1960), Islam and the Problems of Civilization (1960), Signposts Along the Road (1964); and Under the Auspices of the Quran (1966).

[17] Nikki Keddie (1998) in "The New Religious Politics: Where, When, and Why Do Fundamentalisms Appear?" *Comparative Studies in Society and History*. Pages 696-723 argues that most comparative volumes on fundamentalism are collections, with most authors discussing one area. She Shows that the exceptions are: Mark Juergensmeyer, The New Cold War? Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular State (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993) and Brude Lawrence, Defenders of God: The Fundamentalist Revolt Against the Modern Age (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1989).

multiple social crises associated with modernization cumulated into the rise of Islamic fundamentalism. However there is no consensus on the scope and depth of these conditions. Ayoob (1980) also argues that Islamic fundamentalism can emerge after just one social crisis. Ayoob (1981) looked at Islamic resurgence in Southeast Asia in the in late 1960s and 1970s; he found that Islam reasserted itself as a political force because Muslims became disheartened due to restrictive modernization. The catalyst for their movement was in 1968 and resulted from a social crisis called the "Corregidoor Massacre" where young Muslim soldiers in the Philippine military were executed by the Philippine government for no apparent reason, other than their religion. As a result they established the Muslim Independence Movement (MIM). The MIM manifesto demanded a separate Islamic state; which led to a significant number of violent clashes between the MIM and the Philippine government.

One aspect of modernization is the growth and availability of technology. Some scholars cite the changes in government policy toward education and media development as the causes of Islamic fundamentalism. The spread of print, the rise of mass-circulation newspapers and radio, the cultural dominance of cinema and television and, more recently, the Internet has changed the mode, speed, of quality of the exchange of information and ideas throughout the world.[18]

Some have argued that the modern fundamentalist movement emerged as a response to the perceived failures of secularism and as a reaction to the local governments that postulate a separation of church and state, or impose laws that contradict the Quran (Marin-Guzman 2003: 69). Bernard Lewis (1990:60) argues that the roots of Muslim rage, and in turn Islamic fundamentalism, is the rivalry between Judaism-Christianity, their secular beliefs

[18] These scholars include: Chadwick F. Alger (1997); David Held, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt, and Jonathan Perraton (1999); Farbia Adelkhah (2000); Jon Altman (1998); and Paul Dreshc (1993).

and the worldwide expansion of both. A fundamentalist works to bring religion back to center of the state, its institutions, and makes sure it plays an active role in public policy decisions. Furthermore, secular schools and universities spread knowledge and cultivate the analytical skills that challenge and erode religious beliefs. Hence, fundamentalists are in conflict with the educational and scientific establishment.[19] Finally, some scholars have argued that the developing world's fundamentalist movements tend to have nationalist and anti-imperialist tendencies in addition to their religious ones.[20]

The third explanation for the causes of Islamic fundamentalism is the implosion of the Soviet Empire. With the end of the Cold War, Islamic fundamentalism emerged as a global security issue that posed serious challenges to state authority in the Middle East (Khashan, 2000). Specifically, Lal Khan (1994) hypothesized that Islamic fundamentalism resulted from the collapse of the Soviet Union and the spreading of capitalism throughout the Middle East. With capitalism comes socioeconomic inequality; therefore, capitalism can be seen as responsible for causing poverty, facilitating fundamentalist psychology and breeding fundamentalist movements.

International relations in the post-Cold War period are becoming increasingly less state-centered and more centered around relations among civilizations (Tibi, 2002: 10), as well as culture and religion. Mark Juergensmeyer (1993) argues that secular states are now being confronted by religious factions. He labels this phenomenon the "new Cold War" and

[19] As argued by: Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby (1993); Majid Tehranian 313-40; Majid Tehranian; "Islamic Fundamentalism in Iran and the Discourse of Development," pages 341-73; Michael Rosenak, "Jewish Fundamentalism in Israeli Education," paged 374-414; Susan Rose and Quentin Sahultze, "The Evangelical Awakening in Guatemala: Fundamentalist Impact on Education and Media," pages 415-51; Susan Rose, "Christian Fundamentalism and Education in the United States", pages 452-89; Quentin Schultze "The Two Faces of Fundamentalist Higher Education," pages 490-535; Krishna Kumar, "Hindu Revivalism and Education in North-Central India," pages 536-57

[20] As argued by: Mark Juergensmeyer (1993); John Voll 2005; Zygmunt Bauman (1996); and Gregory Gleason (1997)

argues that Islamic fundamentalists are looking for religious politics that are free from the taint of Western culture.

The demise of the bipolar international structure synonymous with the Cold War, facilitated the rise of Islamic fundamentalism (Tibi, 2002). The bipolar Cold War world was synonymous with global stability; when the Cold War ended, that global stability evaporated. During the Cold War, regional and domestic conflicts within the Islamic world were subordinated; however, with the end of global bipolarity, there is no adequate international political security structure to manage international changes which resulted in the increase of Islamic fundamentalism (Horsman and Marsshall, 1994). Tibi (2002) argues that the two superpowers effectively contained the escalation of existing conflicts and kept Islamic fundamentalism suppressed.

Hilal Khashan (1997:9-10) argues that the collapse of the Soviet Union contributed to Islamic militancy in three ways. First, the "radicals" saw in the fall of communist dogma clear proof of the unworkability of man-made laws and the limits of authoritarian oppression. Second, the breakup of Yugoslavia, a by-product of Soviet collapse, triggered the Bosnia-Herzegovina War which led to the mass execution of tens-of-thousands of Muslims; this attracted thousands of Arabs to fight on the side of Bosnian Muslims. Western governments did very little to stop Serbian ethnic cleansing; as a result, much of the Islamic world became alienated at Western apathy. Third, the end of East-West ideological rivalry created a vacuum in international relations whose balance hinged in sustaining balanced conflict. The United States found itself without a major enemy. According to Khashan the atmosphere that resulted, in which conflict between good and evil had ceased to inspire American policy makers, played up the Islamic threat inspired a revival of the East-West confrontation.

Finally, Bernard Lewis (1990) argues that Islamic fundamentalism is the direct result of the Soviet Union's invasion into Afghanistan in 1979 and the formation of the Mujahideen.

The fourth explanation of Islamic fundamentalism is interconnected with the above three; it argues that individuals turn to Islamic fundamentalism in personal times of crisis and to be closer to God. Phebe Marr (1994) argues that when facing serious socioeconomic problems, crises of cultural identity, government ineptitude, and rapid and disruptive change, the Middle East has turned increasingly to Islam for solace and solutions. Marr looks at only the spiritual and religious aspects of Islam. In this setting, Muslims are just like Christians or Jews, during hard times individuals turn to their sacred teachings and religious leaders for guidance and solace. Furthermore, this has root in the Islamic tradition where all Muslims are obligated to submit themselves to God and spread true Islam. Bernard Lewis (1990) argues that individuals are turning to Islam because it brings comfort and peace of mind to countless people, spiritually or financially.

The remaining explanations argue that fundamentalism is the result of an outside event. Some scholars have argued that Islamic fundamentalism is the direct result of the mobility and migrations of Jews and Palestinians, specifically the displacement of Palestinians after the establishment of Israel.[21] According to Hilal Khashan (1997: 13) Islamic fundamentalism resulted from the decline of Arab nationalism (Arab nationalism reached its peak in the late-1950s) and took its most significant blow after the Arabs lost the 1967 Six Day War. In fact the Egyptian Brotherhood claims that the lack of spirituality caused Egypt's defeat. However, John O. Voll (2004) argues that the birth of that modern Islamic fundamentalism began as in Egypt in 1928, with the establishment of the Muslim

[21] As argued by: Anne Barnard (2006); Carrie Wickham (1997); David Rapoport (2001); Ami Pedahzur, William Eubank, and Leonard Weinberg (2002); and Bruce Hoffman (1999)

Brotherhood, which was the result of socioeconomic inequality. Lia (1998); Sagiv (1995) Kepel (1985) argue that modern Islamic fundamentalism emerged from the 1981 assassination of President Anwar Sadat. The assassins were identified as Islamic fundamentalists, members of a group called *al-Jihad*, who hoped to spark an Islamic revolution in Egypt. *Al-Jihad* was one of a number of small, militant groups that had emerged during the 1970s as Egyptian political institutions began to open. While the members of *Al-Jihad* disagreed on specifics of program and method, they agreed on the need for the Islamization of Egyptian society. Leaders of *al-Jihad* believed that an armed struggle against a Western contaminated anti-Islamic government was a requirement of their faith. For such militants, Sadat had become the modern Pharaoh, who in Islamic tradition is the prime example of the evil ruler.[22] At the same time, throughout Egypt, Islamic fundamentalists were running medical clinics for the poor, schools, health care facilities, and a variety of other social welfare activities.

Other scholars have argued that the Islamic fundamentalism is the result of the Iranian Islamic Revolution. It has been argued that the Iranian Revolution was the first major success of Islamic extremism (which becomes fundamentalism), particularly those of Abrahamian (1982, 1989, 1993); Khomeini (1989); and Keddie (1988, 2003). Each one systematically notes the Iranian revolution's success is the direct result of the Shah's restrictive political institutions that started opening (or cracking) religious ideology, socio-economic inequality and poverty.

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[22] As argued by: Patrick D. Gaffney (1987) in Richard T. Antoun and Mary Elaine Hegland (1987); Robin Write (1987); Saad Eddom Ibrahim (1988 and 1980); John Voll (1982); Gabriel Baer in Gabriel R. Warburg and Uri M. (1983); Uri M. Kupferschmidt (1982); John Esposito (1982); Bruce Borthwick (1981); Paul Jabber (1986); Robert Bianchi (1989); Nancy E. Gallagher (1989); James Pittaway (1989); Chris Eccel (1988). For an analytical description of the backgrounds of the members of al-Jihad, see Gills Kepel, Muslim Extremism in Egypt: The Prophet and the Pharaoh, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985) and R. Hrair Dekmejian, Islam in Revolution (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1985).

Still others see the formation of Islamic fundamentalism as the result of multiple phenomena or a combination of the above stated reasons. For example, Hilal Khashan (1997: 5) argues that Islamic fundamentalism is the product of cultural and intellectual stagnation, Western colonialism, and the failure of the secular nationalist model of government. Jacqueline Ismael (1985: 139) argues that Islamic political activism (which by the late 1990s became Islamic fundamentalism) is the result of socioeconomic, sociopolitical, and sociocultural conditions of the Islamic world and the result of the failure of the Islamic state "to safeguard the community against foreign domination and exploitation." Nikki Kedie (1998: 699) argues that global trends have favored the recent rise in "religiopolitics" which are often cited when discussing particular movements. These include eight trends: globalization, economic issues, increasing migration, greater choices for women, continued growth in secular state power; education and urban growth; global cultural homogenization; and global improvements in health. Joel Beinin (112) argues that the changes in the global and regional political economy are linked to the changes in political community, culture, and identity expressed in the resurgence of Islam.

Analyses of the Causes

Each of the above theorists makes legitimate arguments; however, they are a bit short-sided. For example, Islamic fundamentalism is a relatively new phenomenon and if the Palestinian and Israeli refugee problems were what was facilitating their emergence then, Islamic fundamentalism would have existed for the last six decades. Also, states like Jordan and Syria, which have the largest numbers of Palestinian refugees, would have significantly more Islamic fundamentalist movements. Second, traditional Islamic society has been disappearing since colonization; if that were the sole reason for the emergence of Islamic

fundamentalism, then arguably these movements would have existed for over a century, which they have not. Third, if Westernization and Americanization were the root causes of Islamic fundamentalism, then fundamentalism would be much older than it is. If it were the media, then we would see significantly more fundamentalist movements in states with significant media openness and advanced media technology, this is also not the case. If it were only socioeconomic inequality, then the most economically depressed states would experience the most fundamentalist groups, this is not the case. Furthermore, if this was the case, states with the strongest economies world have the fewest fundamentalist movements, this is not that case. Also, based on the above arguments, states with the most poverty and unemployment would have the most fundamentalist movements; however, there are many examples of states with extensive poverty and very few fundamentalist movements, Eritrea for example. And while international relations were significantly transformed after the demise of the Soviet empire; I am reluctant to say this is the sole reason for Islamic fundamentalism. Finally, it were just the Americanization of the Islamic world, then one would expect to find no fundamentalist movements in states with no American influence and significant fundamentalist movements in states with significant amounts of American influence, this too is not the case.

Terrorism

Terrorism is an important part of the Islamic fundamentalism literature; arguably, it is the most mainstream and well known aspect.[23] Terrorism is as old as human inequality. One of the first documented examples of terrorism occurred in the first century BC by *Zeolots*-

[23] The word "terrorism" dates from the Jacobin government during the French Reign of Terror it was used to eliminate opposition to the French Revolution, but did not come into common usage until the late nineteenth century, when a group of Russian revolutionaries adopted the term to describe their violent struggle against the Tsar and his rule.

Sicarris, a Jewish terrorist organization dedicated to inciting a revolt against Roman rule in Judea; they murdered their victims (both Jews and Romans) with daggers in broad daylight in the center of Jerusalem, eventually creating such fervent anxiety among the population that they generated a mass insurrection.[24] Arguably, this is one of the first documented social movements. However, according to Hilal Khashan (1997: 12), the first modern organized act of political terror dates back to July 23, 1968, when members of the *Popular Front of the Liberation of Palestine* hijacked an Israeli airliner en route to Algiers airport.

Terrorism signifies acts of violence against innocents that are committed by nongovernmental actors.[25] According to Robison et al. (2006) the existing literature on terrorism largely focuses on the ideology and psychology of terrorists (Juergensmeyer 2003; Stern 2003), terrorist recruitment (Sageman 2004) and types of attacks (Pape 2005; Bloom 2005), or grand debates over the impoverished vs. privileged backgrounds on individual terrorists (Krueger and Maleckova 2003). Islamic terrorism is seen making broader multi-class appeals, using more lethal tactics justified in religious terms.[26]

The terrorism literature can be broken down into three different categories: the definitions of terrorism, the causes of terrorism, and how to combat or stop terrorism (the

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[24] See: Laqueur 1977 and Rapoport 1984, Also On the role of the Zealots and Sicarii in precipitating the Jewish revelots against Rome, see Moshe Aberback and David Aberback. The Roman-Jewish Wars and Hebrew Cultural Nationalism (2000)

[25] I must distinguish between terrorism and guerrilla warfare: this issue is relevant because historically, guerrilla groups have conducted this type of violence to further their goals. Crowley (1992) explains that guerrilla warfare is a very ancient form of warfare generally used by weaker parties that must confront superior forces. It involved harassing the enemy by avoiding direct confrontation and concentrating on slowly milking the enemy's strength and morale through ambushes minor skirmishes, raids, cutting of communications and supply lines an seek similar techniques (1992; 3). Guerrillas normally set up small military units and seek to establish liberated zones that may be used to challenge the state military. In these enclaves, guerrillas create a parallel state structure. Guerrillas use the areas they control to mount attacks against opposing state. My dissertation will consider guerrilla warfare and terrorism as one-in-the same

[25] As argued by Gary Prevost (1990); Julio Perez (1987); Hodges 1986; Bayo (1965) Blasier (1983); Tilly (1995) and Stohl & Lopez (1988)

[26] As argued by: Rapoport 2004; Hoffman 1998; Enders and Sandler 2000; Laqueur 2001; Stern 2002; and Juergensmeyer 2003

deterrence strategies). The existing literature makes it very clear that terrorism is a significantly difficult phenomenon to define; the term is inherently subjective, and the actions of a terrorist are also highly subjective. Furthermore, as we have seen in the last thirty years, terrorism and terrorists continuously evolve. Generally speaking, the targets of a terrorist attacks are not the victims who are killed or maimed in the attack, but rather the governments or their agents with whom the terrorists hope to stir a reaction. Terrorism is a matter of perception and it is seen differently by different observers; one person's terrorist is another person's freedom fighter. Reflecting the diverse nature of the concept, there is not an agreed definition within the terrorism literature.[27] Koufa (2001: 8) argues that arriving at a generally accepted definition of terrorism has been elusive because, it is a highly loaded term and its definitions are often mixed with value judgments.[28]

Definitions of Terrorism

Governments and their agents have developed practical definitions of terrorism (Feldmann and Perala 2004). For example, Benjamin Netanyahu (1986) defined terrorism as the deliberate and systematic murder, maiming, and menacing of the innocent to inspire fear for political ends. Furthermore, Feldmann and Perala (2004: 103) point out that under Title 22 of the United States Code (section 2656f(d)), the US government defines terrorism as premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against concomitant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents (US Department of State 1999). In its Terrorism Act 2000, the British government defines terrorism as the use of (or the threat to) designed to influence the government or to intimidate the public or a section of the public and made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious, or ideological cause (United Kingdom 2000).

[27] As argued by: Laqueur 1999; 5-7, 1987, 1977; Gordon and Lopez 1999, 7; Stern 1999, 11-15; Brown and Merrill 1993; Kegley 19990; 3, Koufa 2001

[28] In the United Nations Special Report on Human Rights and Terrorism

The second major category for defining terrorism is by academics that have developed precise definitions of terrorism (Feldmann and Perala 2004). For example, Walzer (2002: 5) defines terrorism as the deliberate and random killing of innocent people in order to spread fear through an entire population and force the hand of its political leaders. Bruce Hoffman (1998: 43) defines terrorism as the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence, or the threat of violence in the pursuit of political change. Charles Tilly (2004: 5) defines terrorism as the asymmetrical deployment of threats and violence against enemies using means that fall outside the corms of political struggle routinely operating within some current regime. Stern (1999: 11) and Stohl (1988: 3-5) both argue that terrorism is an act or threat of violence against noncombatants with the objective of exacting revenge and/or intimidating with the intent to influence a wider audience or to send a message. For Laqueur (1997: 143) terrorism refers to the use or the threat of ruthless violence that induces a state of fear in the victim and does not conform to humanitarian rules. Segaller (1987: 11) argues that terrorists kill one person to threaten a thousand, or to intimidate an industry, expand public insecurity, or blackmail governments into reconsidering specific policies (Feldmann and Perala 2004).[29] Albert Bergensen (2004:50) defines terrorism as the use of violence by nonstate groups against noncombatants for symbolic purposes, that is, to influence or somehow affect another audience for some political, social, or religious purpose. Gordon and Lopez (1999: 8) argue that one of the most interesting dimensions of terrorism is that the political goal of a terrorist act is not encapsulated in the act itself. Micholus et al. (1989) defines terrorism as the use or the threat of anxiety; including violence for political purposes by any individual or group, whose intent is to oppose any established governmental authority,

[29] For a discussion of the bargaining relationship between terrorist groups and local states, see Paul Pillar, Terrorism and US Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C., Brookings, 2001. pages 145-148).

and whose actions are intended to influence the attitude and behavior of a target group wider than its victims. Donald Black (2004:16) defines terrorism as self-help by organized civilians who covertly inflict mass violence on other civilians. Jeff Goodwin (2006, 2031) argues that terrorism may be defined as the strategic use of violence and threats of violence, usually intended to influence several audiences, by oppositional political groups against civilians or nonincumbents who belong to a specific ethnicity, religious or national group, social class or some other collectivity, without regard to their individual identities or roles.

These scholars argue that there are six major facilitators of terrorism and they include: political systems that restrict citizens political and civil liberties, specifically political repression (Hafez 2003), worsening economic systems (Robison et al. 2006), and the effects of modernization facilitate terrorism (Robison et al. 2006). Specifically, globalization (Lake 2002), the cultural clash between Western and Islamist values (Huntington 1996), and the pro-Israeli stance of the United States (Pape 2005) as the major causes of terrorism.

Nongovernmental terrorism is more likely in systems that restrict citizen's political and civil liberties. Political systems that deprive the population of adequate institutional mechanisms to express and channel demands are facilitating terrorism.[30] As Bueno do Mesquita (2005) pointed out, models that consider the effect of government counterterrorism policy have tended either to assume that crackdowns always increase mobilization or have ignored this effect and argued that crackdown play only a counterterrorism role that decreases violence.[31] He further argues that there has been long tradition in political science that

[30] As argued by: Ceboratev and Nef 1989, 76-88; Kegley 1990, 99-100; Crenshaw 1990; 115-24; Waldmann 1992, 289-90

[31] The increase mobilization scholars include: de Figueiredo and Weingast 2001; Rosendorff and Sandler 2004; Wilkinson 1986. The scholars that have ignored this effect and argued that crackdown play only a counterterrorism role that decreases violence includes: Bueno de Mesquita 2005; Sandler, Tschirhart, and Cauley 1983.

assumes both ideological and economic factors are important determinants of violent mobilization (for example Gurr 1970; Lichbach 1989; Muller and Seligson 1987). Samuel Huntington (1968), Douglas Bwy (1968: 20-21, 56), and Bernard Lewis (1967) suggest that terrorism results from the economic disturbances and instability that characterize modernizing societies. Their hypothesis may be forty years old; however, their conclusions are still viable and explain much of the terrorist formations. Some studies argue that periods of low growth are more likely to produce political violence (Bwy 1968; Muller and Weede 1990). Russell and Miller (1977), Krueger and Maleckova (2002), and Berrebi (2003) conclude that socioeconomics matter. Blomberg et al. (2004) found that economic downturns are correlated with increased terrorist acts. Nongovernmental terrorism results from a vigorous reaction on behalf of certain members of society who, frustrated by unendurable socioeconomic conditions, particularly social inequality and institutional degradation, decide to engage in this kind of violent activity.[32]

Suicide Terrorism

One of the emerging subfields of the terrorism literature is that of suicide terrorism. Robert Bryon and Bader Araj (2006: 1974) defined suicide terrorism as the use of explosives against one or more people by one or more attackers. The attackers enjoy organizational support and know in advance and with certainty their actions will result in their deaths. By definition, merely planning an attack does not qualify as suicide terrorism; the attacker must be en route to his or her target. Pape (2005: 198) assumes that suicide terrorism is strategically rational in the sense that it often pays. In his view, organizations engage in suicide terrorism because it helps them achieve their strategic goals relatively efficiently with

[32] As argued by: Halperin 1967 37; Laqueur 1987 159; Lopez 1988 501-5, Waldmann 1992 298

a comparatively high rate of success, little financial cost and minimal loss in life on the side of the insurgents.

The literature argues that there are three possible causes of suicide terrorism: deprivation, culture, and strategic choice. First, absolute deprivation refers to longstanding poverty and unemployment, relative deprivation to the growth of an intolerable gap between expectations and rewards (Gurr 1970; Moore 2003). Deprivation of any sort frustrates some individuals driving them to commit self-immolating acts of aggression against the perceived source of their suffering. However, not all scholars agree with this assumption and argue that the evidence does not support the deprivation theory. Pape (2005: 213) found that suicide terrorists are much more educated than the populations from which they were recruited. Furthermore, Laqueur (2004: 16) found that suicide terrorists from Egypt and Saudi Arabia have come mainly from middle or upper class families.

The second potential cause of suicide terrorism is culture and all the phenomena that are associated with culture. The idea that culture, especially religion, influences behavior dates back to Max Weber's classic essay (Weber 1958). The clash of civilizations between Islam and the West is facilitating terrorism according to Huntington (1996) and Lewis (2002). Also, Zogby (2002) argues that suicide bombers hold strongly negative attitudes only toward U.S. foreign policy toward the Middle East. Furthermore, not only is suicide terrorism associated with Islamic attacks on Christianity and Judaism, but it is also associated with attacks between Sunnis and Shiites. According to Reuter (2004: 37) and Brym and Araj (2006: 1972), the martyrdom of Hussein at the battle of Karbala in 680 was a single event in Islamic history and it is often said to have reinforced the readiness of Muslims, especially Shiites, to sacrifice their lives for the collective good in the face of overwhelming odds.

A major advance in thinking about suicide terrorism took place when scholars began to analyze it as a strategic rational political action (Harrison 2003; Madsen 2004; Sprinzak 2000). Robert Pape's study of 462 suicide bombers who attacked targets worldwide between 1980 and 2003 gives a strong empirical support to this school of thought (Pape 2003, 2005). Pape's study includes quoting the leaders of elective terrorist organizations, specifically Hezbollah, Hamas, and al-Qaeda. The core of Pape's argument is that every group committing suicide terrorism has one main objective and that is removing a foreign state from their homeland (Pape 2005; Laqueur 2004).

Terrorism Deterrence

One of the major themes running through the terrorism literature is the idea of deterrence. One of the major questions is: can deterrence stop the modern terrorists?[33] Trager (2006) argues that many prominent international relations scholars and analysts have argued that deterrent strategies have no significant role to play in countering the new terrorist threat. Richard Betts (2002), for example, writes that deterrence has "limited efficacy for modern counterterrorism." However, Trager (2006) argues that the claim that deterrence is ineffective against terrorists is wrong because terrorists are rational. Some argue that deterrence approaches are only one of several examples of strategies for counter terrorism. Other strategies include persuasion (or winning hearts and minds), economic aid and democratization, appeasement, and military force.[34] The case against the use of deterrence

[33] A deterrence strategy consists of the following two elements: (1) a threat or action designed to increase an adversary's perceived costs of engaging in particular behavior, and (2) an implicit or explicit offer of an alternative state of affairs if the adversary refrains from that behavior. This second element defines them magnitude of the political objectives sought by the coercing state. Other works that also address this issue include Barry M. Blechman and Tamara S. Cofman (1999) and Alexander L. George (1991).

[34] On persuasion see Helena Finn, the case for cultural diplomacy: engaging foreign Audiences" *Foreign Affairs*. November/December 2003, pages 15-20; Peter Peterson, Diplomacy and war on terrorism. *Foreign Affairs*,

strategies in counterterrorist campaigns rests on three pillars. First, terrorists are thought to be irrational, and therefore unresponsive to the cost-benefit calculation required for deterrence. Second, as Robert Pape (2005) argues, many terrorists are said to be so highly motivated that they are willing to die and are not deterred by fear, death, or punishment. Third, even if terrorists were afraid of punishment, they cannot be deterred because the terrorist movement cannot be turned back.

Max Abrahms (2006) analyzed the political plights of twenty eight terrorist groups; his data yielded two unexpected findings. First, the groups accomplished their forty-two objectives only 7% of the time. Second, although the groups achieved certain types of objectives more than others, the key variable for terrorist success was a tactical one: target selection. These findings suggest that (1) terrorist groups rarely achieve their policy objectives, and (2) the poor success rate is inherent to the tactic of terrorism itself. Together, the data challenges the dominant scholarly opinion that terrorism is strategically rational behavior.[35] However, this assumption of rationality contradicts some anti-deterrence scholars who insist that the terrorist is irrational, specifically Robert Pape. In my analysis, I treat the

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September/October 2000 pages 74-96; Michael Mousseau, Market civilization and its clash with terror. *International security* Winter 2002/03 pages 5-29. On economic aid and democratization see: Carol Graham, "Can Foreign Aid Help Stop Terrorism? Not With magic Bullets" Brookings Review, Summer 2002 pages 28-32; Ivo H Daalder and James M. Lindsay, "Nasty, Brutish, and Long: America's War on Terrorism" *Current History*, December 2001, pages 403-408; and Alan Krueger and Jitka Maleckova, "The Economics and the Education of Suicide Bombers: Does Poverty Cause Terrorism?" *New Republic*. June 2002, pages 27-33

[35] As argued by Robert F. Trager and Dessislava P. Zagorcheva (2006) terrorists are thought to be irrational, and therefore unresponsive to the cost-benefit calculation required for deterrence. The claim that terrorists are irrational is more commonly found in the popular press but it is also a key argument against deterrence strategies concerning terrorism generally and therefore must be addressed in any discussion of the use of terrorism deterrence and counterterrorism. The assertion that terrorist are highly irrational is contradicted by a growing body of literature that shows that terrorist groups usually have a set of hierarchically ordered goals and choose strategies that best advance them. Martha Crenshaw in Chalres W. Kegley (1990) page 117; Betts, "The soft Underbelly if American Primiacy"; Robert Pape (2003) pages 343-361; Jonathan Schachter, (2002) page 96; and Andrew Kydd and Barabra Wlater (2002) pages 279-289.

In his book Islam in Revolution, R.H. Deckmejan devotes a few pages to a psychological profile of the Arab Muslim fanatic or religious extremist. He lists a number of features: alienation, dogmatism, and inferiority complex that resolves itself in an assertion of superiority, activism/aggressiveness, authoritarianism, intolerance, paranoia, idealism, austerity, obedience, conformity, and conspiratorial tendencies (R. Hrair Dekmejian, 1985 pages 32-36)

terrorist as highly rational. Rationality is more than just a logical analysis. It also has to include one's analysis on probability via a cost-benefit analysis. A terrorist does this; for the most part, he/she understands that the only way to achieve the objective is via a terrorist act.

Writers are increasingly recognizing that terrorism is an effective coercive strategy. Alan Dershowitz (2002) argues that Palestinian gains since the early 1970s reveal that terrorism works; the use of terrorsim is an entirely rational choice to achieve a political objective. In the past several years, numerous scholars have shown that when a state rewards a terrorist group then other groups are encouraged to use terrorism.[36] David Lake (2002) adapted James Fearon's (1995) rationalist bargaining model to argue that terrorism is a "rational and strategic" tactic because it enables terrorists to achieve a superior bargaining by increasing their capabilities relative to those of target countries. Based on their game-theoretic model and case study of Hamas, Andrew Kydd and Barbara Walter (2006) concluded that terrorist groups are "surprisingly successful in their aims." According to Scott Atran (2006), terrorist groups "generally" achieve their policy objectives. As evidence, he points to Hezbollah and explains how they successfully forced the United States and France to withdraw their forces from Lebanon in 1984. Finally, Ehud Sprinzak (2000) looks at the plights of Hezbollah and the Tamil Tigers of Sri Lanka to testify to a terrorist's effectiveness.

At its root, terrorism is about justice or at least someone's perception of it, whether man-made or divine.[37] States often use force; however, they are subjected to international norms; terrorists do not abide by international laws or norms. Thus, at the minimum, I will

[36] As argued by: John Derbyshire (2000); Evelyn Gordon (2005); R.W. Johnson (2001); and Kruglanski and Fishman, "the Psychology of Terrorism", page 207; and Chomsky, "The New War Against Terror."

[37] Arguably, if violent acts do not have a political aim, then they are by definition criminal acts. There are many examples of different types of violence and quite a few of them are inherently political; including conventional war among states, terrorism is distinguished by its non-state character. States obviously employ force for political ends; however, when a state uses force internationally, it is considered an act of war; when it is used domestically it is called law enforcement, state terror, oppression, or civil war. Although states can terrorize, in this dissertation it will be assumed that they cannot by definition be terrorists.

consider any act as a terrorist act if it has the following characteristics: a fundamentally political nature, the surprise use of violence against seemingly random targets, the targeting of the innocent by non-state actors, and the discontent of international laws and norms.

The following tables break down all terrorist and suicide terrorist attacks included in my analysis. Although these two tables do not explain what is causing terrorism, they do give an exact count of all terrorist and suicide terrorist attacks during the last thirty-six years, and the nation-states in which they occurred.

Table Four: Total Number of Terrorist Attacks

Iran	134	Oman	1
Algeria	225	Saudi Arabia	81
Azerbaijan	6	Syria	28
Bahrain	18	Tajikistan	56
Bangladesh	149	Tunisia	15
Brunei	0	Turkey	1236
Djibouti	0	Turkmenistan	1
Egypt	85	United Arab Emirates	9
Indonesia	231	Uzbekistan	14
Israel	1255	Yemen	122
Jordan	84	Kazakhstan	4
Kuwait	45	Eritrea	4
Lebanon	662	Ethiopia	74
Libya	16	Tanzania	9
Iraq	7405	Afghanistan	1028
Mauritania	7	Somalia	74
Morocco	44	Sudan	42
Qatar	2	Kyrgyzstan	19
Pakistan	1026	Palestine	1929

Table Five: Total Number of Suicide Terrorist Attacks

Iran	0	Oman	0
Algeria	1	Saudi Arabia	9
Azerbaijan	0	Syria	0
Bahrain	0	Tajikistan	1
Bangladesh	6	Tunisia	0
Brunei	0	Turkey	22
Djibouti	0	Turkmenistan	0
Egypt	3	United Arab Emirates	1
Indonesia	5	Uzbekistan	6
Israel	102	Yemen	4
Jordan	3	Kazakhstan	0
Kuwait	0	Eritrea	0
Lebanon	22	Ethiopia	0
Libya	0	Tanzania	0
Iraq	568	Afghanistan	66
Mauritania	0	Somalia	0
Morocco	6	Sudan	0
Qatar	1	Kyrgyzstan	0
Pakistan	21	Palestine	49

My Contribution

A significant obstacle to theory building in Islam, Islamic fundamentalism or Islamic social movements is that the research on Islam has been multidisciplinary. Scattered among a variety of academic disciplines, publications and research on Islam tend to follow narrow sets of research questions, theoretical frameworks, and methodologies, each determined by a particular focus. Political scientists, for example, are mostly concerned with how Islam impacts the state, political institutions, autocratic verses democratic systems, and voting. Sociologists are interested in exploring the psychological and demographic roots of Islamists, terrorists, or radicals. The few sociological analyses of fundamentalists that exist are based on a very limited samples of particular groups, often only of those who have been arrested or killed.[38] Religious scholars predominantly focus on the theology behind the Koran and religious leaders, or religious scholars and their interpretations of scripture. Finally, historians tell the stories of particular Islamic groups, states, people, or national and/or ethnic differences.

The Muslim world, specifically Islamic fundamentalism, has yet to be fully integrated into social movement theory (Wiktorowicz 2004: 4). David Snow and Susan Marshall (1984) were the first to incorporate research on Islamic activism into the social movement literature.

[38] The most famous such study was conducted by Saad Eddin Ibrahim with members of two groups, Shabab Muhammad, which launched an abortive coup in 1974, and Jama'at al-Muslimin, better known as the Takfir wa'l Hijra group, which assassinated a former minister of religious affairs in 1977. Ibrahim's study was conducted with members who were still alive and in prison. His results have been published in "Anatomy of Egypt's Militant Groups," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* (1980): 423-53, and in "Islamic Militancy as a Social Movement: The Case of Two Groups in Egypt" in Ali E. Millal Dessouki. Islamic Resurgence in the Arab World (New York: Praeger, 1982), pages 117-37. Elbaki Hermassi, "La Societe' Tunisienne au miroir islamiste," *Majhreb-Machrek* 103 (January – March 1984), in which he interviewed members of the Mouvement de Tendance Islamique (MTI) in Tunisia. Ervand Abrahamian was able to interview members of the Iranian Mujahidin for his book, The Iranian Mojahedin (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989). In Iran between Two Revolutions, Abrahamian utilizes data concerning dead guerrillas for his analysis of the composition if guerrilla movements (Princeton University Press, 1982: pages 480-81). Much of the data about the much-discussed Jihad group responsible for the assassination of Sadat in Egypt was obtained from court records and newspaper articles rather than from direct interviews with members of the group.

Their analysis looked at the relationship between cultural imperialism and Islamic movements. They depicted religion as the source of a mobilizing ideologies, and organizational resources that are used to combat perceived cultural imperialism.[39] Others have argued for the more general elimination of the artificial divergence between the studies of religious and nonreligious movements (either directly or indirectly by way of example).[40] Doug McAdam, John McCarthy, and Mayer Zald (1996) argued that areas outside of the western world have "comparative riches available to social movement scholars" and went on to argue the non-western social movements should be studied more. Sidney Tarrow's (1998) decision to include a brief discussion of Islamic fundamentalism in the second edition of Power and Movement was one step; however, it was only a minor one. I find the fact that Western social movement scholars have excluded much of the Islamic world highly disturbing. However, my objection here is not to directly correct the bias of generations of social movement scholars. Rather I seek to determine the causes of Islamic fundamentalism and in doing so show that they are social movements.

[39] Numerous studies have evaluated the role religion, specifically Islam, has on one's political preferences (Palmer, Safty and Sullivan 1990; Tessler 1997; Harik 1996); Palmer (1996). Palmer, Safty, and Sullivan (1996) measured public opinion data from Egypt and observed a negative relationship between religious activism (as measured by support for religious dress, censorship, religious instruction in schools, and Islamic revival) and support for economic liberalism in such areas as price controls and subsidies. They found that religiosity (measured by piety, prayer, and ritual performance) bears no relationship to attitudes toward these issues of political and economic policy. Other studies have explored the relationship between religious piety and partisan preferences using survey data from Egypt, Palestine, and Lebanon. In each case there was a weak relationship not only between religiosity and political preferences in general, but also between religiosity and support for Islamic political movements in particular. Tessler (1997) found that in Egypt, more than one third of those classified as more pious did not support Islamic parties, whereas approximately half of those who did support these parties were not personally devout. Harik (1997, 57) found that in Lebanon, the relationship between religiosity and support for the Islamic political party, Hizbullah, was only moderately strong. Arguably, one of the most influential Islamic surveys was done by Palmer (1996); she was attempting to measure the Islamic movement in Lebanon. Her study measured the religiosity, political alienation, and political preference of 1,434 Lebanese students attending six universities and colleges in Beirut. She asked numerous open-ended questions relating to the student's preferred political party, self-identity, religion, political preferences, and preferred governmental system. What makes her study so significant is that she was able to determine that Hezbollah was able to unite popular support like no other political party.

[40] For Example: Foran 1994; Verges 1997; Tehami 1998; Wolff 1998; Munson 2001; Wiktorowicz 2001; Schatz 2002; Wickham 2002; Clark 2003; Hafez 2003.

Social Movements

Social movements do what politicians cannot, according to Meyer (1990: 263) that is, they imagine a different future. Enrique Larana et al. (1995) argue that people join social movements because they are "sick and tired of being sick and tired." Verba et al.'s (1996) understanding of social movements seems to concentrate on the unconventional manifestations of the underrepresented. Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) view social movements as a facilitator of democracy. The purpose of social movements for Melucci and Avritzer (2000) is to provide representation for the unrepresented. Dubet and Thaler (2004) stress that social movements consist of organized actors who work against the status quo. Munck (1995) defines social movements as strategic actors who operate concurrently in social and political institutional arenas against the established system. Zald and Berger (1978) argue that a social movement is the expression of, and need for, change. Powell (1986) avoids the term "social movement" altogether focusing instead on what he calls "extremist issue positions." Social movements are often viewed as a means to political representation, as a way to mobilize the public in some supportive fashion, and ultimately as a stepping stone to political legitimization.

According to Meyer (1990), social movements imagine a different future. Islamic fundamentalists also do this; they imagining a future where religion takes precedence and dominates both the individual and the socioeconomic and sociopolitical institutions within the nation-state. Most individuals who join a fundamentalist movement are "tired of being sick and tired" just as Larana et al. (1995) finds social movement participants. Also, Islamic fundamentalist movements are inherently "unconventional manifestations of the

underrepresented" just as Verba et al. (1996) found social movements. Islamic fundamentalist movements facilitate democracy. For example the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas, and Hezbollah all call for democracy, specifically, democratic institutions, constitutions, and free elections. Furthermore, most members of Islamic fundamentalist movements work against the status quo and the established political-socioeconomic systems. Powell's (1986) avoidance of the term "social movement" and instead calling the phenomenon "extremist issue positions" could very well describe Islamic fundamentalism. Arguably, there are more extreme positions than that of the Islamic fundamentalist.

Neither the Islamic fundamentalism nor the social movement literature alone is able to explain the emergence and success of these movements; both fail to recognize that Islamic fundamentalism is a new kind of social movement. Most social movement scholars do not consider Islamic fundamentalism a social movement. The one exception in the Islamic fundamentalist literature is a relatively unknown book by Quintan Wiktorowicz (2004). Wiktorowicz's book is a compilation of case studies that evaluate individual Islamic movements. While he does not address the causes of Islamic fundamentalism, he does assert that Islamic fundamentalism could be viewed as a social movement. My work differs significantly from his because he only connects Islamic fundamentalism with resource mobilization theory and does not acknowledge the other three theories. Also, there is no connection or causal relationship between social movements and Islamic fundamentalism. Based on the literature of each of the above said social movement schools theories, I derived the following five hypotheses (with eleven sub-hypothesis) to examine how specific phenomenon associated with each school of thought and Islamic fundamentalism:

H1: Socioeconomic inequality as described by the Marxist social movement theory is positively associated with the number and success Islamic fundamentalist groups present within the nation-state.

> *H1A: If there is significant unemployment in the nation-state there will be an increase in the number of fundamentalist movements within that nation-state*
>
> *H1B: If there is significant poverty in the nation-state there will be an increase in the number of fundamentalist movements within that nation-state*

H2: Resources as described by the resource mobilization social movement theory is positively associated with the number and success Islamic fundamentalist groups present within the nation-state.

> *H2A: If a nation-state's overall population's educational level increases, there will be an increase in the number of fundamentalist movements within that nation-state.*
>
> *H2B: If the total amount of U.S. aid increases within a nation-state, there will be an increase in the number of fundamentalist movements within that nation-state.*
>
> *H2C: If a nation-state's GDP were to increase, there will be an increase in the number of fundamentalist movements within that nation-state.*
>
> *H2D: If the total amount of ODA increases within a nation-state, there will be an increase in the number of fundamentalist movements within that nation-state.*

H3: The degree of openness of political institutions as described by the political process social movement theorists has an inverted-U shaped relationship with the number and success of Islamic fundamentalist movements; the number of movements should be the strongest in system which are neither highly democratic nor highly autocratic.

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> *H3A: There is a linear negative relationship between strong autocracies and fundamentalist movements. If the political system is a strong autocracy with grievous human rights violations, there will be fewer Islamic fundamentalist movements within that nation-state.*
>
> *H3B: There is a linear negative relationship between strong democracies and fundamentalist movements. If the political system is a perfect democracy with few human rights violations, there will be fewer Islamic fundamentalist movements within that nation-state.*

H4: Ideas as described by the new social movement theorists are positively associated with the number and success Islamic fundamentalist groups present within the nation-state

> *H4A: If there is a significant outside ideological force present, there will be an increase in the number of Islamic fundamentalist movements within that nation-state.*

H4B: If U.S troops are present within the Islamic nation-state, there will be an increase in the number of Islamic fundamentalist movements within that nation-state.

H4C: If the total amount of U.S. aid increases within a nation-state, there will be an increase in the number of fundamentalist movements within that nation-state.

The following hypothesis was developed from the association between terrorism and the degree of Islamic fundamentalism within an Islamic nation-state, as measured by the total number of fundamentalist movement-years present.

H5: The total degree fundamentalism in the Islamic nation-state is positively associated with the total degree of non-state induced violence within that nation-state. In other words, if the nation-state has a large degree of fundamentalism, it will have a large number of terrorist attacks.

To determine the causes of Islamic fundamentalism I will employ a labyrinth analogy. A labyrinth explanation of the causes of Islamic fundamentalism is relatively simple; there is one path that explains where fundamentalism comes from and what facilitates it. As argued in the introduction, my labyrinth consists of four conditions, each of which can found in the social movement literatures: Marxism, political process, resource mobilization, and new social movements. The following chapters will help prove that each of these four conditions found within the labyrinth are positively associated with Islamic fundamentalism.

The best way to understand this contribution to the social movement literature, as it relates to the causes of Islamic fundamentalism, is through this fundamentalist labyrinth. My theory is that the social movement conditions facilitate Islamic fundamentalism; these social movement conditions are positively associated with increases in the number of Islamic fundamentalist movements present within majority-Islamic nation-states. Furthermore, Islamic fundamentalist movements are caused by the same phenomena that facilitate social movements. This being said, Islamic fundamentalist movements are social movements. The conditions within my fundamentalist labyrinth include the resources found in resource mobilization theory, socio-economic inequality found in Marxism, political institutions and the socio-political structures found in political process theory, and the ideas found in the new social movement theory.

The social movement literature exemplifies ambiguity. It is difficult to grasp the nature, characteristics, causes, and even what constitutes a social movement. Social movements cannot be reduced to a specific insurrection, revolt, revolution, political protest, strike, boycott, terrorist attack, or any act committed by a "freedom-fighter," and they are scattered across time. They cannot be identified with any specific organization, political ideology, dogma, political party, ethnicity, religion, nationality, or country; social movements are extremely fluid, which makes the existing literature broad and ambiguous. Koopmans (1993) argues that social movements are characterized by a low degree of institutionalization, high heterogeneity, a lack of clearly defined boundaries and decision making structures, and a volatility matched by few other social phenomena. In addition, it is limited because of its

unwillingness to include Middle Eastern or Islamic movements and its inability to explain Islamic fundamentalism.

John Foran (1993) argues that when dealing with social movements, states matter, culture matters, social structure matters, accidents of history matter – everything matters. Foran's description of social movements was not designed to describe Islamic fundamentalism; however, it does so perfectly. When looking at Islamic fundamentalist movements, states, social structure, culture, as well as accidents in history all matter in the emergence and success of Islamic fundamentalist movements. Furthermore, as it relates to the shifting of political opportunities or environments; Suzanne Staggenborg (1986) shows that political environments matter. She found that when faced with either threats or opportunities, social movement members tended to band together to maximize the information and material resources at their disposal.

Both social movements and Islamic fundamentalist movements are catalysts of change; both arise in response to societal strains, conflicts, social or political injustices, or the degradation and the subjugation of individuals or groups via those in power. Significant phenomena such as economic transformations, population shifts, and social disruptions, wars, or natural disasters also can also be a catalyst for both social movements and Islamic fundamentalist movements. Furthermore, various societal/political strains, such as industrialization, modernization, urbanization, Westernization, Americanization, or economic crises disrupt social life and facilitate both social movements and Islamic fundamentalist movements.

As a result of the ambiguity of the social movement literature, it is very difficult to define social movements. German sociologist, Lorenz von Stein was the first to use the term

social movement in his discussions of mass political movements.[41] Von Stein's definition was the first definition to convey the idea of a continuous, unitary process by which the whole working class gained self-consciousness and power. When von Stein was developing his thesis, Marx and Engel's Communist Manifesto (1848) proposed a very similar argument concerning the mass-consciousness of the proletariat (Tilly 2004). They argue that all previous historical movements were movements of minorities in the interest of minorities; however, they saw new movement as the self-conscious, independent movement of the immense majority against the minority (Marx and Engels 1848: 44). Von Stein, Marx, and Engle represent the first generation of social movement theorists. Their definitions of social movements are rooted in functionalism and focus on the structural and psychological causes of mass mobilization or protest (McAdam 1982; Wiktorowicz 2004).

Subsequent generations of social movement scholars have expanded the idea of functionalism. For example, social movements have been defined as an organized mass-effort with its main goal of bringing about change, whether in relationships, norms, beliefs, or all of these. Specifically, their main objective is a fundamental change to the social order, especially its established sociopolitical institutions.[42] There is a general agreement in the social movement literature that social movements are products of social change.[43] Also, a fairly strong consensus has emerged among social movement scholars who consistently

[41] The book was titled: History of the French Movement from 1789 to the Present 1850. Also, Werner J. Cahnman (1966). Book Review: Lorenzo Von Stein: The History of the Social Movement in France, 1789-1850; Traslated by Kaethe Mengelberg. *The American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 71, No. 6. (May, 1966), pp. 746-747

[42] As argued by: Rudolf Heberle 1951 (He develops general social movement theories; but, focuses on the relationship between social movements and political parties; Clarence King (1956) he developed the first general principles analysis of selected social movements; Hans Toch (1969) study looked at theoretical approaches, placing a greater emphasis on individual motivational and perceptual processes. Lyford Edwards (1927); Crane Brinton (1965); George Pettee (1938) each attempted to develop general theories of revolution as a type of social movement theory analysis of American and European revolutions; F.W. Voget 1956, 1959

[43] This is argued by: Kyriacos Markides 1974; Cemeron 1969; King 1956; Heberle 1951; Toch 1965; Smelser 1963; Turner and Killian 1957; Rush and Denisoff 1971; Gusfield 1970

emphasize the importance of two broad factors in analyzing the origins of collective action: shifting political opportunities or environments and the formation of collective identity.

As a result of the ambiguity inherent in the social movement literature, there are numerous definitions of social movements. For example, Tarrow (1994) defines social movements as collective challenges by people with common purposes and solidarity in sustained interaction with elites, opponents and authorities. Della Porta and Diani (1999: 16) argue that social movements are informal networks, based on shared beliefs and solidarity, which mobilize, through the frequent use of various forms of protest. Herbert Blumer (1951) argues that a social movement is essentially two or more people aligning their actions around a common goal as they seek to establish a new order of life. He argues that in its beginning, a social movement is "amorphous, poorly organized, and without form; the collective behavior is on a primitive level, and the mechanisms of interaction are elementary; as a social movement develops, it takes on the character of a society. It acquires organization and form, a body of customs and traditions, established leadership, an enduring division of labor, social rules and social values."

The purpose of social movements for Melucci and Avritzer (2000) is to provide representation for the unrepresented; Islamic fundamentalism does this. Dubet and Thaler (2004) stress that social movements consist of organized actors who work against the status quo. The status quo in much of the Islamic world has been westernization, lop-sided modernization, socioeconomic inequality, and sociopolitical inequality; fundamentalists work to change that status quo. Munck (1995) defines social movements as strategic actors who operate concurrently in social and political institutional arenas against the established system; this is exactly what Islamic fundamentalists do. Powell (1986) avoids the term "social

movement" altogether focusing instead on what he calls "extremist issue positions." There is not a more extremist issue position(s) than those of Islamic fundamentalists.

In the social movement literature, Charles Tilly is considered one of the most important and influential of all social movement scholars. In his (1982; 26) first published definition of a social movement, he defines it as a sustained series of interactions between power holders and persons successfully claiming to speak on behalf of a constituency lacking formal representation. In later publications (1994: 7), he expands the definition by arguing that social movements consist of a sustained challenge to power holders in the name of a population living under the jurisdiction of those power holders by means of repeated public displays of that population's numbers, commitment, unity, and worthiness. Based on his definition of social movements, Islamic fundamentalist movements are social movements. In nation-states with significant fundamentalist groups and/or powerful fundamentalist groups there are numerous interactions between the state and the fundamentalists who claim they speak on behalf of the Muslim masses. We see this interaction with most Islamic fundamentalist movements, specifically, the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas, and Hezbollah. Each of these will be explored in detail in the proceeding chapters.

Social movements have been defined as a sustained challenge to power holders by a disadvantaged group or a population living under the jurisdiction or influence of those power holders (Tarrow 1996, 1994, 1993). We see this throughout the Islamic world; it is oftentimes members of disadvantaged groups who turn to the fundamentalists, as shown by the case studies included here. A fairly strong consensus has emerged among social movement scholars regarding the importance of the same three broad factors in analyzing the origins of collective action and/or social movements: shifting political opportunities,

indigenous social networks, and the formation of collective identity. Islamic fundamentalists do each of those three. Islamic fundamentalists are named groups of citizens who have, more or less formally, banded together to pursue or resist social change, here I took McAdam 1996 definition and exchanged the term social movement for Islamic fundamentalists. Finally, each of these classic definitions of social movements is interchangeable with that of Islamic fundamentalism.

There is a general agreement in the literature that social movements are products of social change; however, beyond this basic consensus in reference to origins, scholars of social movements differ in terms of their explanations of the movement's conception, demise, and everything in between. The most common approach used emerged out of Max Weber's writing on bureaucracy (1958, 1978, and 1981) and Robert Michels' studies of political parties (1962); Zald and Ash (1966) referred to this as the Weber-Michels model.[44] It states that as a movement becomes organized in order to meet its objectives, certain phenomena are set into motion that tends to defeat its very objectives. The movement then becomes institutionalized; it loses its ideological momentum in favor of preserving its organizational structure and adapts to the general social environment, becoming a permanent fixture in it.[45] McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald (1996:8) argue that most political movements and revolutions are set in motion by social changes that render the established political order more vulnerable and/or receptive to challenge. This is highly apparent when looking at the Islamic world. Examples of this include, the U.S. invasion of Iraq, the Lebanese civil war, the assassination

[44] Michels, Political Parties was first published in German in 1911; it was then published in English in the United States by Hearst International Library Company in 1915. According to Philip Cook (1971), at that time it seems to have had little effect on American scholars. The book was reprinted by Free Press in 1949. It has since been republished by Crowell-Collier Publishing Company (1962) and by Dover Publications (1959).
[45] As argued by: Lipsky 1968; Sills 1957; Lomax 1962; Chapin and Tsouderos 1956; Zald and Denton 1963

of Sadat, or natural phenomena such as the death of Arafat which facilitated the electoral success of Hamas.

Members of any movement, in order to qualify as such, must subscribe to a set of beliefs which are distinct from those of the wider population. Furthermore, those who subscribe to those beliefs must feel some degree of kinship with others within the movement's structure. Collective identity is a shared definition of a group that derives from its member's common interests and solidarity (Taylor 1989). Unknowingly and unintentionally, these social movement scholars are describing the membership of Islamic fundamentalist movements. The Islamists facilitate membership in fundamentalist movements by concentrating on their shared Islamic identity with the masses and manipulating their shared socioeconomic and sociopolitical status or lack thereof. Many authors argue that preexisting ties and mobilizing structures facilitate the emergence of collective action or social movements.[46] Neil Stammers (1999) argues that social movements have typically been defined in the literature as collective actions constituted by individuals who share some common interest(s) and who also identify with one another. Islamists count on this and manipulate it to their own benefit. Previous research has shown that people join collective action mainly through interpersonal ties or informal networks.[47] Since identities are created and shaped through social relations, networks play a crucial role. People engage in collective action because they share certain norms and values related to a specific area of political contention. In this way, participation in collective action is an identification

[46] For example: Gould 1995; Fernandez and McAdam 1986, 1988, 1988; McAdam and Paulsen 1993; McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 1988; Rosenthal et al. 1985; Snow, 1988 Snow, David A. (1988, 1992, 1999); Snow, Burke E. Rochford, Steven K. Worden, and Robert D. Benford (1986);

[47] As argued by: della Porta 1988; Could 1995; McAdam 1988; Snow 1988; Snow, David A. 1988, 1992, and 1999; Snow, Burke E. Rochford, Steven K. Worden, and Robert D. Benford 1986; Tarrow 1994

process.[48] Individuals with friends or acquaintances already involved in social movements are more inclined to take part in collective action.[49] As the above Islamic fundamentalist literature makes clear, the ideas encompassing Islam are fundamental in the formation, duration, and success of Islamic fundamentalist movements. They are acting just as the social movement scholars expect social movements would.

Furthermore, McAdam and Su (2002) draw attention to the difference between sociologists and political scientists; they argue that political scientists are generally cynical about social movements having any independent outcome of their own. Their argument can be summed up by the following statement, "if sociologists assume the impact of movements without testing for effects, political scientists, with few exceptions, continue to make the opposite error: assuming the ineffectuality of movements" (2002: 697). Arguably, McAdam and Sue are correct; if one is to truly understand social movements, one must merge the ideas and objectives of the political scientists and sociologists. Both political scientists and sociologists who look at Islamic fundamentalism make this same mistake. For example, political scientists have largely focused on the resource aspect of social movements. Fording (1979) finds that resources and a state's liberalism appear to be most important in predicting elite (sociopolitical and socioeconomic) reactions to social movements. Melucci and Avritzer (2000) argue that social movements are a natural result of increasing pluralism in

[48] For example Freeman 1978; McAdam 1982; Morris 1984; Calhoun 1989; Fernandez and McAdam 1989; Andrews 1991; McAdam and Paulsen 1993; Whittier 1995; Melucci 1996

[49] For example Snow 1988; Snow, David A. 1988, 1992, and 1999; Snow, Burke E. Rochford, Steven K. Worden, and Robert D. Benford (986; McAdam 1986, 1988, 1996, and 2003; della Porta 1988, 1995; Gould 1993; Kriesi 1993, 1996. Collective action is significantly shaped by social ties between participants is not a recent discovery: numerous scholars have come to these same conclusions, for example: Pinard 1968; Booth and Babchuk 1969; Oberschall 1973; Pichvance 1975; Tilly 1978; Snow et al. 1980. There have been a significant number of studies that has dealt with the processes of individual recruitment, for example: Oliver 1984; Kriesi 1988; Opp 1989; Fernandez 1990 and McAdam 1982, 1988, and 1989; Knope and Wisely 1990; McAdam and Fernandez 1990; McPherson et al. 1992; McAdam and Paulsen 1993; McPherson and Rotolo 1996; Kittss 2000; Tindall 2000; Passy 2001.

contemporary society and are beginning to replace traditional forms of political participation, such as voting.

I find that social movement conditions are facilitating Islamic fundamentalism; these social movement conditions are positively associated with increases in the number of Islamic fundamentalist movements present within majority-Islamic nation-state. Furthermore, Islamic fundamentalist movements are caused by the same phenomena that facilitate social movements. Islamic fundamentalist movements are clearly social movements, so long as the conditions within my fundamentalist labyrinth are met. These include the resources found in Resource Mobilization theory, socio-economic inequality found in Marxism, political institutions and the socio-political structures found in Political Process theory, and the ideas found in the New Social Movement theory.

Many scholars have looked at what determines a movement's success or failure; however, most existing studies are framed explicitly in terms of the movement's success.[50] Numerous scholars have looked at the consequences of social movements, which have mostly focused on the impact of movements on government policy or legislation.[51] The social movement structure has also attracted significant scholarly attention,[52] and there have also

[50] For Example: Amenta, Carruthers, and Zylan 1992; Banaszak 1996; Brill 1971; Burstein, Einwohner, and Hollander 1995; Frey, dietz, and Kalof 1992; Gamson 1990; Goldstone 1980; Mirowsky and Ross 1981; Nickols 1987; Perrot 1987; Piven and Cloward 1979; Shorter and Tilly 1971; Steedly and Foley 1979. Most of the existing studies are framed, explicitly or implicitly, in terms of success; for example; Amenta et al 1992, Banaszak 1996, Brill 1971, Burstein et al 1995, Frey et al 1992, Gamson 1990, Goldstone 1980, Mirowsky and Ross 1987, Nichols 1987, Perrot 1987, Piven and Cloward 1979, Shorter and Tilly 1971, Steedky and Foley 1979.

[51] For Example: Amenta et al. 1992; Banaszak 1996; Burstein 1979, 1985; Burstein and Freudenurg 1978; Button 1978, 1989; Constain and Majstorovic 1994;Gelb 1989; Gelb and Palley 1987; Huberts 1989; MacDougal et al. 1995

[52] Studies in this area have focused on inter-organizational structure, in the form of coalition-building: Rucht 1989; Diani 1990, 1995; Philips 1991; Hathaway and Meyer 1994; Sawer and Groves 1994; Ansell 1997, 2001. Or overlapping memberships: Rosenthal et al. 1985, 1997; Schmitt-Beck 1989; Diani 1995; Carroll and Ratner 1996; Ray et al. 2001

been a large number of historical studies or surveys on social movements.[53] The social movement literature has shown that participants in movements are more optimistic than non-participants about the prospect of sociopolitical change and about the efficacy of their participation.[54] The effectiveness of social movements depends on their ability to engage in bargaining activities with allies and opponents (Burstein, Einwohner, and Hollander 1995).

Condition One: Marxism

Building on Hegel, Marx saw history as a process wherein feudalism gave way to a capitalist order whose own development would produce a steadily growing proletariat (Bronner 1990: 247). As the capitalist system expanded, the system further enslaved the proletariat. Furthermore, in Marx's The German Ideology of 1845, The Communist Manifesto, and A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, he explicitly shows that the political, social, and economic are one in the same (Mah, 1989: 116). In other words, as the economy grows and develops, the social and political follow, this means that the state "should then be the servant of the bourgeoisie" (116). In Marx's writings, the peasantry is the most unrevolutionary of all social groups. "Brutalized by centuries of exploitation and determined to maintain a small allotment of land, peasants were incapable of forming a coherent class" (Mah, 118). In The Class Struggle in France Marx (1985) peasants, acting

[53] There have been numerous studies that look at the historical aspects of social movements, for example: Anderson (1967), Belchem 1990, Bennett 2003, Blackstock 2000, Caramani 2003, Chandhoke 2002, Farrell 2000, Glenn 1984, Jarman 1997, Keck, Margaret, and Sikkink 1998, Mirala 2000, Perez-Stable 1993, della Porta 1998, Robert 1996. The following looked at the policing, surveillance, and repression of social movements: for example see: Balbus 1973; Broeker 1990, Calhoun 1995, Earl, Soule, and McCarthy 2003, Emsley 1983, Emsly and Weinberger 1991, Fillieule 1997, Goldstein 1983, 2000, 2001, Gurr 2000, Huggins 1985, 1998, Liang 1992, Ludtke 1989, 1992, Mungere 1979, 1981, Palmer 1988, Storch 1976, Wilson 1960. For particular countries and periods, some general historical surveys of social movements as such do exist: For example see: Aminzade 1993, Armstrong 1989, Ash 1972, Birmingham 1993, Black 1969, Bright and Harding 1984, Burke 1988, Carter 2003, Castells 1983, Clark 1959, Clark, Grayson, and Grayson 1975, Fredrickson 1997, Gamson 1990, Hanagan 1998, 2002, Hoerder 1977, Hunt 1978, 1984, Kaplan 1992, Kriesi, Koopmans, Duyvendak and Giugni 1995, della Porta 1995, Tarrow 1996, Tilly 1975, 2003

[54] This includes African Americas between 1930 and 1970 (McAdam 1982), riot participants of the 1960s (forward and Williams 1970, Paige 1971, Seeman 1975) and European social movement protests in the 1980s (Finkel et al. 1989, Klandermans 1984, Opp 1988).

collectively constituted nothing more than a "sack of potatoes;" no revolution can stem from this class.

Karl Marx was correct when he argues that individuals get involved in collective action when their social class has reached its breaking point; they will then unite against their antagonists and forcibly change the sociopolitical and socioeconomic institutions of the state.[55] Hunt (1984) argues that Marxism contains two theories of the state. First, the state is completely controlled by the dominant class. Marx and Engels wrote in the Communist Manifesto, "the executive of the modern state is but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie" (Mah, 1989). Secondly, Hunt (1984: 27) calls the second theory the "parasite state." Here the state is an autonomous entity that lives off of the resources of civil society. Marx wrote in The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte that "This appalling parasitic growth enmeshed the body of French society like a net that chokes on its pores" (Mah 1989: 116). In both of these examples, the state dominates the people; they are forced to act collectively. Furthermore, Marx argues that if the state oppresses, enslaves, and ignores the masses long enough, they will revolt. He viewed the history of all society as a history of class struggles. In sum, oppressed classes would mobilize around common conditions against the power of the dominant class via socioeconomic and sociopolitical oppression and consequently, they will forcibly change those socio-economic institutions that had previously oppressed them. Thus, from Marx we see that the power of the politically powerless and economically deprived is rooted in their ability to stop the smooth flow of social life. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the acts of Islamic fundamentalists.

[55] According to Marx there is no separation between those individuals who dominate economics with those who dominate politics

Michael Burawoy (1982:59) argues that it was not the proletarianized factory workers but artisans threatened by modern industry or craft workers facing deskilling who were the backbone of the most militant struggles of the 19th century Europe. The transformation of the labor process has political repercussions beyond the factory. Gareth Stedman Jones (1975) argues that the demolition of skilled workers is fundamental when looking at England after 1850. New forms of politics emerge when workers were stripped of their control over the production and replaced by modern machinery (Burawoy 1982: 10). Patrick Joyce (1980) explored Stedman Jones's argument and showed that, where labor is transformed from a subject guiding production into a object dominated by production, there is a increase in resistance (Burawoy 1982: 10). This is exactly was going on in the Islamic world; the modernization process and the influx of Western materials facilitated the rise of Islamic militancy.

Burawoy (1982: 13) argues that enacting legislation is just one example of the state acting against the economic interests of the dominant classes in order to protect their political interests in the reproduction of the capitalist order. Marx and Engels argue that the only political interests of the bourgeoisie are to maintain the external conditions of the capitalist economy. Baran and Sweezy in Monopoly Capital (1966) argue that the significant problem in the advanced capitalist economy was not the falling rate of profit, as Marx argues in Capital, but the absorption of surplus. In the pursuit of profit, large corporations were producing more than could be consumed.

Socioeconomic inequality is an integral part of my theory; however, I deviate from Marx insofar as the fundamentalists in the Islamic nation-states are not factory workers or involved in industrialization. My theory is that it is the middle-to-lower classes are the

significant socioeconomic group who collectively seek institutional and socioeconomic change, via the fundamentalist movement. However, they are still educated and act collectively via *relative deprivation*. According to Runciman (1966), Gurr (1970), and Siddharth Chandra (2005) *relative deprivation* is the difference between the value expectation and the value capability of the individual. Chandra (2005: 303) argues that the larger the difference between these two values, the greater the resulting discontent and the likelihood that this discontent, if felt by a large number of individuals will be manifested as upheaval. Karl Marx said in Relation to Wage-Labor in Capital that "A house may be large or small; as long as the neighboring houses are likewise small, it satisfies all social requirement for a residence. But let there arise next to the little house a palace, and the little house shrinks to a hut. The little house now makes it clear that its inmate has no social position at all to maintain, or but a very insignificant one; and however high it may shoot up in the course of civilization, if the neighboring palace rises in equal of even in greater measure, the occupant of the relatively little house will always find himself more uncomfortable, more dissatisfied, more cramped within his four walls." This is exactly what is going on in the Islamic world. Education helps the masses recognize they are being deprived of socioeconomic and sociopolitical equality and freedom and they either turn to or join Islamic fundmantalist movements. The catalysts for the lower classes to collectively act are the Islamic fundamentalists who understand relative deprivation and they provide the lower classes spiritual, financial, and educational support. I base this argument on the fact that the Islamic world has, for the most part, limited industrialization.

The earliest social movement theorists, specifically Marx and Engels, saw conflict inscribed in the structure of society. It would not have occurred to Marx and Engels to ask

what makes individuals engage in collective action; they would have posed the problem as an outcome of society's structural and institutional evolution rather than one of individual choice. Resource mobilization theorists criticized Marxism for underrating the resources needed to engage in collective action, its cultural dimensions, and the importance of politics. Marx answered the question of how individuals get involved in collective action largely in historically determined terms: people will engage in collective action when their social class comes into fully developed contradiction with its antagonists (proletariat vs. bourgeoisie). In the case of the proletariat, this meant when capitalism forced them into large-scale factories where they lost the ownership of their resources. Marx dealt with a problem that has worried activists ever since, why members of a group who should revolt often fail to do so. Concerned with the problem that the workers' movement could not succeed without the cooperation of a significant proportion of its members, he developed the theories of *false consciousness* and *relative deprivation*. The traditional theories of social movements (including Marxism) were seen as relatively rare, discontents were transitory, movement and institutionalized actions were sharply distinct, and movement actors were arational if not outright irrational. The resource mobilization theorists and political process theorists dramatically challenged these assumptions.

Condition Two: Resource Mobilization

At its foundation, resource mobilization theory encompasses the idea that resources make a difference to the mobilization and success of social movements.[56] Also, the participants in social movements are inherently rational. Resource Mobilization theory is based on an elite model of power; political power is concentrated in the hands of a minority.

[56] The following scholars argued this: Oberschall 1973; Tilly 1978; McCarthy and Zald 1973, 1977; Gamson 1975; Jenkins 1981; Useem 1980; Paige 1975; Schwartz 1976; Ash-Garner 1977; Piven and Cloward 1977.

Its theorists stress the importance of political resources and institutions for movement outcomes; they suggest a link between changes in the political environment that offer social resources and the rise and success of movements. The foundation of resource mobilization theory is the belief that resources matter in the formation and success of social movements. Arguably, Gamson's (1968, 1975, and 1990) work has most forcefully put forward the basic tenets of resource mobilization theory. In particular, he highlights the necessity of a social movement to have a strong organization, which facilitates the movement's success. John McCarthy and Mayer Zald (1977) argue that resources (money and labor) are crucial to understand social movement activity; resources are necessary to facilitate social conflict, and they must be aggregated from collective purposes. But, resource aggregation requires some minimal form of organization. Anthony Oberschall (1973) echoes this, arguing that social organization and integration, rather than grievances and discontent, are most conducive to a social movements participant's behavior. Oberschall argues that the dissolution of traditional social bonds and the lack of new forms of integration are the preconditions for collective action. Thus, resource mobilization tries to explain why individuals and groups are aggrieved and why they protest when they do.

What makes resource mobilization theory different from previous explanations of social movements is that it focuses on societal breakdown(s). In order to mobilize politically, groups require resources and they must mobilize their resources, that is, use them or put them into effect. Resources can be anything from material resources, such as jobs, incomes, savings, and the right to material goods and services, to nonmaterial resources such as, authority, moral commitment, trust, friendship, skills, and habits of industry.[57] He adds that

[57] McCarthy and Zald (1977) defined resources as money, facilities, labor, and legitimacy; Tilly (1978) defines resources as land, labor, capital, and technical expertise. Freeman (1979) distinguished tangible assets such as

individuals manage their resources in completely different ways: they exchange some resources for other resources, they make up resource deficits by borrowing resources, and they recall their earlier investments. Resources are constantly being created, consumed, transferred, assembled, reallocated, exchanged, and even lost. I define resources here as money and population; however, I deviate from the above mentioned resource mobilization theorists by also including education as a resource. Arguably, there is not a more valuable resource than that of a nation-state's educational level, especially in the Islamic world. Resource mobilization theorists are correct in their critique of the Marxists; resources on both the group and state level are imperative for a movement's formation and success.

Resource mobilization theory emphasizes the relationships between the movement, its actions, the rationality of movement actors, the strategic problems confronted by movements, and the role of movements as agencies for social change. At its foundation rests the assumption that the movement's actions and, in turn, its members are rational.[58] Participants in Islamic social movements are rational, although westerners often cast Islamic tactics and supporters are inherently irrational, specifically as it relates to terrorism or suicide terrorism. However, they are utilizing what little they have for their movement's success. Islamic fundamentalists do not need instant gratification; they plan ahead and rationally think through their actions, possible results, ramifications, and they choose the plan that gives them the highest possible payoffs via cost-benefit calculations. Westerners may not agree with acts of terrorism, specifically, suicide terrorism; however, they must acknowledge that they are rational acts.

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money, facilities, and means of communication from the intangible or "human" assets that form the central basis for movements (these include organizing and legal skills, and the unspecialized labor of supporters, and their time).

[58] As argued by: Gamson: 1968, 1975, 1990; Oberschall 1973; Tilly 1978; McCarthy and Zald 1973, 1977; Jenkins 1981; Useem 1980; Paige 1975; Schwartz 1976; Ash-Garner 1977; Piven and Cloward 1977

Jenkins and Perrow's (1977: 264) study on the protest behavior of farm workers in the United States between 1946 and 1972 found that farm workers, who are a relatively powerless and a resource-poor group, were not able to organize themselves effectively. These workers needed help before they could mount an effective campaign. However, success only occurred when liberal political elites took over the struggle after which the their boycott was effective and they were able to force the farm owners to the bargaining table. This is a perfect example of the power a relatively powerless group has when they utilize their resources or gain new resources. Resource mobilization theorists have seen social movements as extensions of institutionalized actions and have restricted their focus to movements of institutional change that attempt to alter elements of the social structure (McCarthy and Zald 1977). Furthermore, they organize previously unorganized groups against institutional elites (Gamson 1975), or represent the interests of groups excluded from the political system (Jenkins and Perrow 1977; Tilly 1978, 1979).

Traditional social movement theorists have emphasized sudden increases in short-term grievances created by the "structural strains" of rapid social change led to and/or facilitated individuals to turn to social movements (Gusfield 1968, 1982). However, resource mobilization theorists have argued that grievances are secondary. Tilly (1978), Jenkins and Perrow (1977), and Oberschall (1978) argue that grievances are relatively constant, deriving from structural conflicts of interest built into social institutions and that movements form because of long-term changes in group resources, organization, and opportunities for collective action.

The main pioneers of resource mobilization theory were significantly influenced by Olson's (1968) collective action problem, and the rational actor model which underlay it.

Olson was the most prominent rational actor theorist; all the fundamental key resource mobilization texts make some reference to Olson, and many make quite explicit reference to him (Oberschall 1973; Tilly 1978; Junkins 1983). Olson outlined a concept and/or definition of a public good: as a public good is an item and/or phenomena that individuals cannot consume individually or keep to themselves. Also, it generally entails some collective effort to achieve it. Olson argues that if the benefits of a collective good cannot be withheld from non-participants, rational individuals are motivated to free ride on the contributions of others. Furthermore, he argues, that this temptation would have to be divided up among more people, and any one person's contribution would be less likely to make a noticeable difference in the outcome. Thus, participation in collective action is irrational.

What characterizes a public good is when members of a given population stand to gain something from them, whether or not they do anything to help achieve them.[59] Consequently, one would predict that no one would pursue public goods. Of all the resource mobilization theorists, Oberschall (1973) is most explicit regarding both his appropriation of the work of Olson and his critiques of it. He accepts Olson's basic model of the actor and his rational self-interested behavior. However, Oberschall invokes Olson's notion of selective incentives, which, he argues, are more than sufficient to draw a rational actor into a collective struggle. Oberschall (1973:116) argues that Olson's theory does not imply individual goods and selective incentives are not also present in group formation, yet it is precisely individual goods and selective incentives that can account for the emergence of leaders and activists.

Oberschall drew a distinction between leaders of movements and rank and file activists. In the case of rank and file, Oberschall argues, incentives are often provided or

[59] For example, a woman may join the suffragette movement and fight for the right to vote or she may do nothing and still get the right to vote because others are fighting for it. In other words, she takes a free ride and suffers no consequence

mobilized by leaders. Leaders can reward with praise or value goods, which can, under certain circumstances, punish the inactive. In other words, leaders significantly matter.[60] Furthermore, Oberschall adds to Olson's model by providing a means of examining the relationship between broad structural shifts in society and the various forms of political mobilization which sometimes accompany it. This is similar to the Oberschall (1973) critique of Olson; however he too falls short. Oberschall draws a distinction between leaders of movements and rank-and-file activists. In the case of rank-and-file, Oberschall argues, incentives are often provided or mobilized by leaders. Leaders can reward with praise or value goods, for example, and can, under certain circumstances, punish the inactive. In other words, leaders significantly matter. This is particularly true in Islamic movements, leaders are fundamental. Leaders or a ruling hierarchy indicate structure. This in turn guarantees power transition from within the movement and helps to eliminate instability. Also, a leader provides a unifying face to the movement, facilitating unity among the movement's members. Leadership would still fall under resources because the followers of a religious leader are a resource which is apparent in the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas, and Hezbollah.

Olson (1968) makes a valid point when he asserts that the benefits of a collective good cannot be withheld from non-participants; rational individuals are motivated to free ride on the contributions of others. Thus, participation in collective action is irrational. In other words, members of Islamic societies benefit from the collective actions of Islamic fundamentalists insofar as the actions bring collective benefits. Thus, it would be rational for a Muslim individual to sit back and simply enjoy the benefits the fundamentalist movements

[60] Tilly (1999, 270) argues that it is possible that the major effects of social movements will have little or nothing to do with the public claims their leaders make. The role leadership plays in movement causation has not received much attention from political process theorists; McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1988:716 argue that movement leadership is a matter of common sense not requiring theoretical analysis. Aldon Morris argues that movement leadership is an important complex phenomenon that affects the origins and outcomes of movements.

provide. However, this is not the case. Olson's collective action arguments do not take into account religion or the foundations of Islam that teach its adherents that it is their duty as citizens and as Muslims to collectively act for the greater good of Islamic society. So while resources must be present for Islamic fundamentalism to exist in a nation-state, it alone is not enough. In conclusion, the resources associated with resource mobilization theory are positively associated with Islamic fundamentalism.

Condition Three: Political Process

Political process theory is a response to resource mobilization theory. The foundation of resource mobilization theory rests on the idea that resources make a difference to the mobilization and success of social movements. Political process theory criticizes resource mobilization theory for neglecting the fact that social movements develop and act in both sociopolitical arenas and governmental institutions and significantly influence the trajectories of social movements (Eisinger 1974; Kitschelt 1986; McAdam 1999, 1982; and Tarrow 1989). Political process theorists argue that resource mobilization theory falls short because it assumes that social organization, integration, and resources, rather than grievances, discontent, and sociopolitical institutions are most important to a social movement's participants. Islamic fundamentalists would agree that the structure, organization, and resources are important to a social movement; however, their importance is conditional on the phenomena that facilitate the movement. Those phenomena are specifically the grievances, discontent, and sociopolitical institutional inequality that lay at the heart of political process theory. In other words, resource mobilization theorists are putting the cart before the horse; a movement cannot have resources until it has grievances. As previous research has shown, Islamic fundamentalists have a very long list of socioeconomic and sociopolitical grievances.

Political process theory argues that changing opportunities help explain why movements emerge at one point in time rather than another; the differences in political opportunities help explain why movements are successful in some countries or reigns and not in others. The political process model claims that social movements occur when expanding political opportunities are seized by individuals who are formally or informally organized, angry, and optimistic that they can successfully facilitate change in the existing sociopolitical structure and institutions. This is exactly what Islamic fundamentalist movements do. As the governments of Islamic nation-states open their political institutions, Islamists seize the opportunity to challenge the existing political system while facilitating collective action, doing exactly as political process theorists predict.

These challengers are often excluded from routine decision-making processes because their bargaining power is weak. The political environment is often seen as playing a crucial role in the dynamics that lead social movements to produce policy change; in other words, it acts as the catalyst.[61] The view held by the political process approach is that social movements essentially target political authorities and institutions because they are mainly aimed at provoking political change (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996; Tarrow 1998; Tilly 1984). The political process approach to social movements has stressed the role of political opportunities for a social movement's emergence, development, and outcomes.[62] Changes in the configuration of power among parties modify the structure of political alliances, which are seen as a crucial resource for social movements to reach their goals.[63] Based on all of this, Islamic fundamentalist movements form, behave, and respond to and

[61] As argued by: Barkan 1984; Goldstone 1980; Jenkins and Perrow 1977; McAdam 1982, 1983; Piven and Cloward 1979, 1983; Schumaker 1975
[62] For Example: Kitschelt 1986; Kriesi et al. 1995; McAdam 1999; Tarrow 1998; Tilly 1978
[63] For Example: della Porta 1996; della Porta and Rucht 1995; Kriesi et al. 1995; Tarrow 1998

facilitate change just as political process theorists say social movements do. Therefore, Islamic fundamentalist movements should be considered social movements through the eyes of political process theory.

Furthermore, the foundation of political process theory is the concept of a *political opportunity structure,* an idea that participation in protest activities can lead to increased representation.[64] Changing political opportunities help explain why social movements emerge at one point in time, rather than another; also, the differences in political opportunities help explain why movements are successful in some countries or regions and not others.[65] Numerous scholars were inspired by Tilly (1978, 1986, and 1995) and his argument that political opportunity structures both constrain and enable a movement's mobilization.[66] The broadest definition of political opportunity structure makes the argument tautological: Movements cannot emerge where people are unable to associate with one another for political purposes (Goodwin, 2004). Tarrow (1998, 1994) defines *political opportunity structures* as being composed of both opportunities and constraints. Eisinger (1974) and Tarrow (1998, 1994) suggest that movements tend to emerge and flourish in periods when opportunities are being expanded; they found that that people join social movements in response to political opportunities and then, through collective action, create new ones. The is exactly what happens with Islamic fundamentalist movements and why I expect to see more fundamentalist movements in the middle of the political ideological scale, and not at the two furthest extremes, perfect democracies or perfect autocracies.

[64] As argued by: Brocett 1991; Costain 1992; Della Porta 1995, 1999; these views in turn shaped the opportunities for different forms of protest: Duyvendak 1995; Kitschelt 1986; Koopmans 1995; Kriesi et al 1995; McAdam et al. 1996; Meyer 1993; Rucht 1994; Tarrow 1989, 1998. Tarrow 1989, 1993: Participation in protest activities can lead to the expansion of the repertoire of the legitimate forms of political participation.
[65] As Argued by: Koopmans and Ruchet; Shorter and Tilly (1974); Tilly (1978, 1986, 1995)
[66] As argued by: Kriesi et al. 1995; McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996; Tarrow 1998

The political process model stresses the importance of the movement's larger environment on the movement's eventual outcome; it specifically looks at protest behavior.[67] Tarrow (1998, 1994) argues that contentious politics occurs when ordinary people join forces in confrontation with elites, authorities and opponents. Contentious politics are produced when political opportunities broaden, when they demonstrate the potential for alliances, and when they reveal their opponents vulnerability.[68] According to Tarrow, increasing access to power, realignments in the political system, conflicts among elites and the availability of allies give social movement participants the incentives to act contentiously and create sociopolitical opportunities for themselves. In other words, structural conditions facilitate protests. However, Tarrow adds that protesters may not have enough solidarity and collective identity to take advantage of the opportunity; also, the authorities must also be willing to change policy.[69] Tarrow is correct; we have seen this type of behavior throughout the Islamic world. The political process model stresses the importance of the movement's larger environment on the eventual outcome of the movement; this is of the utmost importance when looking at Islamic social movements.

Protest event analysis provides a way of measuring the effects that political opportunities have on protests.[70] The view held by the political process approach is that social movements essentially target political authorities and institutions; their main objective is political change. Piven and Cloward (1979) point to the important constraining role of institutions; they maintain that protest is more likely to have a real impact when challengers

[67] For Example: Kitschelt 1986; Kriesi et al 1995; McAdam 1982; Rochon and Mazmanian 1993; Tarrow 1998
[68] The following looked at the extent to which political opportunities exist to form a movement: Kriesi et al. 1995; McAdam 1982; McCarthy and Zald 1996; McAdam Tarrow, and Tilly 2001; Tarrow 1998; Tilly 1978). Dahl 1961, 1967: Argues that moderation in politics is more effective than disruption
[69] This was stressed must forcefully by Tarrow (1989, 1993, 1998), among others (Della Porta 1996; Della Porta and Rucht 1995; Kriesi et al 1995.
[70] As argued by: Koopmans and Ruchet; Shorter and Tilly 1974; Tilly 1978, 1996, 1995

have a central role in institutions and when powerful allies have a stake in those institutions. Useem and Useem (1979) defined protest as collective actions oriented toward altering a social condition shared by a large number of individuals and are not limited to traditional forms of formal political expression. Marco Giugni (2004) looks at the effects of disruptive and violent protest behavior; he reopens the debate in the literature about whether the use of disruptive tactics by social movements is more likely to bring about policy change than the use of moderate tactics. One of his main contributions to the literature is the idea that the institutional arenas interact to place them in a better position to influence policy. Amenta, Carruthers, and Zylan (1992) found significant support for the claim that political opportunities mediate the relationship between social movements and their policy outcomes.

Protests often seem to increase during periods of reform and economic upturn. In fact, political process research emerged out of the context of civil unrest, particularly among the black population in the United States in the late 1960s (Eisinger 1973). Eisinger was interested in the use of protests among minority and deprived groups; he found that protests occur more frequently in cities where the political structure is closed and offers few opportunities for participation to minorities and deprived groups; in other words, exclusion facilitates protest.[71] Tilly, Tilly, and Tilly (1975) argue that collective action is the result of what they call "breakdown theories" which stress the role that grievance, discontent, the

[71] Previous studies have found: for example, Kelly and Snyder (1980): suggested that there is no causal relationship between the frequency and severity of violence displayed in American cities during the 1960s ad the distribution of black socioeconomic gains at the local level, either by income level or by employment and occupational changes. Feagin and Hahn (1973): looked at ghetto riots and found they led to limited reform but did lead to police policies; however, the authors do not provide systematic evidence for their argument. Welch (1975) has shown that the riots led to an increase in urban expenditures for control and punishment of rioters, which is obviously much less in their favor. Colby (1975) findings contradicted Welch: he found that riots had a positive influence on redistribution policy, though no influence on regulatory policy at the state level. Jennings (1979) found some support for a positive correlation between the number of riots and the increase in recipients of Aid to families with Dependent Children (AFDC).

feelings of frustration and deprivation has in facilitating collective behavior.[72] Gamson (1990) focuses on the effectiveness of violence; one of the major findings of his study is that the use of violence is often correlated with a movement's success.[73] Furthermore, he found that groups with single-issue demands were more successful than groups with multiple-issue demands. Incentives were all positively correlated with success; also, the use of violence and disruptive tactics were associated with success. Finally, successful groups tended to be more bureaucratized, centralized, and escape factionalism.[74]

In the Islamic world, protests often seem to increase during periods of reform and economic upturn; this has occurred in Lebanon, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Palestine, just to name a few. Eisinger (1973) may have been describing the African-Americans in the United States in the 1960s; however, his results partially explain the Islamic world and the rise and success of Islamic fundamentalist movements. As we will see, Islamic protests occur more often in

[72] As argued by: Gurr 1970; Kornhauser 1959; Smelser 1962; Turner and Killian 1957. On the other hand: "Group theories" emphasize the role of social networks, organization, resources, and opportunities. As argued by: McAdam 1982; McCarthy and Zald 1977; Oberschall 1973; Tarrow 1998; Tilly, Tilly, and Tilly 1975.
[73] The following share Gamson's conclusion: McAdam 1983; Mirowsky and Ross 1981; Steedly and Foley 1979; Tarrow 1998; Tilly, Tilly, and Tilly 1975; Frey, Dietz, and Kalof 1992; Mirowsky and Ross 1981. Gamson's findings have been backed up Mirowsky and Ross (1981) and Steedly and Foley (1979) and Goldstone (1980). Goldston (1980) reanalyzed Gamson's data and cast doubts over his findings and has pointed to a perspective on social movement outcomes that takes into account their broader political context. The effectiveness of disruptive protest and movements has been analyzed thoroughly in the aftermath of the urban riots of the 1960s in the United States (Gurr 1980, Isaac and Kelly 1981; Piven and Cloward 1993). The effects of violence in the United States in the 1960s were looked at by Hahn 1970; Mueller 1978; Isaac and Kelly 1981; Kelly and Snyder 1980; Sears and McConahay 1973).
[74] On the other hand, Snyder and Tilly 1972 found that increases in hardship do not lead to increases in protest movements. Berkowitz (1974) looked at socioeconomic changes at the neighborhood level brought about by ghetto riots between 1960 and 1970 and found no improvement, arguing against a positive effect of the violence (also see Levitan Johnston, and Taggart 1975). Piven and Cloward (1993) found that turmoil and disruptive actions do provoke policy change. A series of studies done in the 1970s and 1980s attempted to reexamine this argument: Albritton 1979; Betz 1974; Colby 1982; Hicks and Swank 1983; Isaac and Kelly 1981; Jennings 1979, 1980, 1983; Schramm and Turbott 1983; Sharp and Maynard-Moody 1991 Taft and Ross (1969) found little evidence, based on their study of violent labor conflicts in the United States through 1968, that violence would help unions achieve their goals. Snyder and Kelly (1976) reached a similar conclusion; by analyzing quantitative data on strikes that occurred in Italy, they were able to show that violent strikes were less successful than peaceful ones. Dahl (1961, 1967) argues that moderation in politics is more effective than disruption. These results contradict those obtained by Shorter and Tilly (1971), who found that the use of strikes in France had a positive correlation between the use of violence and a movement's success. Research on strike activity has gone beyond the specific question of disruption or violence to examine broader issues related to the industrial conflict (Cohn 1993; Franzosi 1994; Shorter and Tilly 1974; Snyder and Kelly 1976).

cities where the political structure is closed and offers few opportunities for participation; exclusion leads to protest. The members of Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhood, and Hezbollah would agree with Gamson (1990) that the use of violence is very effective. Furthermore, Islamic fundamentalist movements with single-issue demands are much more successful than movements with multiple-issue demands. Finally, successful Islamic movements are often more bureaucratized, centralized, and tended to escape factionalism; Hamas Hezbollah, and the Muslim Brotherhood all show this.

Many of the critics of political process theory argue that culture plays a significant part in the origins and development of social movements.[75] There have been few studies on the cultural aspects of movements except for the individual level consequences of participation in social movements and activism, on which there is a considerable amount of literature.[76] One of the central themes running through the literature on social movements during the past decade is the observation that identity is a pivotal concept in attempting to understand movement dynamics.[77] The core of all Islamic fundamentalist movements is Islamic identity. Numerous social movement studies have shown that movement participation almost always modifies and sometimes even transforms participant identities; in other words, movement identities reflect experience in a movement as much as pre-existing identities.[78] What makes many Islamic fundamentalist movements durable and successful is

[75] These critics include: Fantasia 1988; Snow et al. 1986; Goodwin and Jasper 1999; Morris and Mueller 1992; Jasper 1997; and Johnston and Klandermans 1995

[76] For Example: Abramowitz ad Nassi 1981, Demerath et al 1971, Frendrich 1974, 1977; Fendrich and Krauss 1978; Fendrich and Lovoy 1988; Fendrich and Tarlau 1973; Jennings 1987; Jennings and Niemi 1981; Marwell et al 1987; McAdam 1988, 1989, 1998; Nassi and Abramowitz 1979; Whalen and Flacks 1980

[77] For Example: Garner 1996; Darnovsky, Epstein, and Flacks 1995; Taylor and Raeburn 1995; also, insurgent identities (Gould 1995), and identity movements (Gamson 1995)

[78] Hunt and Benford 1994; McAdam 1988; Snow and Machelek 1984; Turner and Killian 1972. Melucci (1985) found that the concept of collective identity refers to the agreed upon definition of membership, boundaries, and activists for the group. Taylor and Whittier (1992) defines collective identity as a shared definition of a group deriving from common interests, experiences, and solidarity, involving a we-feeling and this is sustained

their ability to transform participants' identities. Members often join fundamentalist movements to oppose sociopolitical norms, their socioeconomic status, or to revolt against the status quo. It is after they join the Islamists that their identities are transformed into true fundamentalists. Furthermore, Muslims who participate in Islamic fundamentalist social movements do not discriminate, they welcome all participants to help with their movement and often time their basic goals consist of opening political institutions, sociopolitical equality, university education, or socioeconomic mobility. Even the most secular individual often joins a fundamentalist movement because of what they promise for him and his children. Once involved in the movement, these individuals (or at the very least their children) are often transformed into ideologues.

Political process theorists argue that changing opportunities help explain why movements emerge at one point in time rather than another; differences in political opportunities help explain why movements are successful in some countries or regions and not others. Tilly, Tilly, and Tilly (1975); Gurr (1970); Kornhauser (1959); Smelser (1962); Turner and Killian (1957) argue that collective action arises as a result of an individual's grievances, discontent, and frustration toward their government and state institutions. These

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through interaction in movement communities. As many scholars have pointed out, people engage in collective action because they share certain norms and values related to a specific area of political contention. In this perspective, participation in collective action is an identification process (For Example: Freeman 1973; McAdam 1982; Morris 1984; Calhoun 1989; Fernandez and McAdam 1989; Andrews 1991; McAdam and Paulsen 1993; Whittier 1995; Melucci 1996). Johnston, Larana, and Gusfield (1994, 14) defines collective identity as a shared definition of a group deriving from common interests, experiences, and solidarity, involving a we-feeling, constructs, activated, and sustained through interaction in movement communities (also see Taylor and Whittier 1992). Alberto Melucci (1989, 1996) sees the collective identity as the movement and the movement itself as the process. V Taylor(1989, 771): provides a concise definition of collective identity in her studies of women's movements: "Collective identity is the shared definition of a group that derives from its members common interests and solidarity. Lofland's (1995) argues that identities are developed and sustained through models of behavior, objects, and narratives combined in specific ritual forms, as well as artifacts, events, narratives, and places that have symbolic significance for sustaining an identity. Many studies have shown, individuals with friends or acquaintances already involved in social movements are more inclined to take part in collective action (for example Snow et al. 1980; McAdam 1986, 1988; della Porta 1988, 1995; Gould 1993; Kriesi 1993).

challengers are often excluded from routine decision-making processes because their bargaining power is weak. The political environment is often seen as playing a crucial role in the dynamics that lead social movements to produce policy change. This is especially true in the Islamic world because Westernization, modernization, Americanization, poverty, socioeconomic inequality, and a lack of democracy all facilitates Islamic collective behavior, specifically rise and success of Islamic fundamentalists. The intellectual and political foundations of Islamic fundamentalist's are the promise to liberate their nation's masses from the oppression and degradation they face at the hands of their state leaders, Americanization, Westernization, and modernization.

Condition Four: New Social Movements

New Social Movements is the newest paradigm in the social movement literature, and it emerged in the advanced industrial world after the social protests of the 1960s and 1970s subsided. New social movement theorists argue that recent social movements represent an entirely new form of social protest and reflect specific properties of advanced industrial societies with new goals and values.[79] According to Kriesi et al. (1995) and Beck (1986), new social movements have certain objectives in common; in particular, ecology, antinuclear, and peace movements have the common goal of criticizing and fighting the risks brought by an increasing use of technology in society, be it nuclear energy, nuclear arms, or other industrial technologies. One of the pillars to the New-Social Movement literature is that of the religious-right or extreme-right. Interesting, the connection between this aspect of the New Social Movement literature and Islamic fundamentalism is paramount. In Europe and North America the radical/religious right plays a significant role in influencing both domestic

[79] For Example: Cohen (1985: 664); Klaus Eder, (1985); Habermas 1981: 33; Kitschelt 1981: 274; Melucci 1980: 789-791; Offee 1985: 820-821

issues and national politics, very similar to that of Islamic fundamentalism. Furthermore, the radical/religious right acts as an outside ideological influence in the creation and duration of some European and North American social movements and politics.

New social movement scholars explain the emergence and nature of the recent movements by explaining grievances which they argue arise from the structural conditions of postindustrial societies. They argue that recent social movements represent an entirely new form of social protest and reflect specific properties of advanced industrial democracies. The redistributive policies of the welfare state secured a level of prosperity capable of satisfying basic human needs. Kriesi (1989) argues that in the United States, the significant degree of liberalism and dissent that the educated middle class expressed since the late 1960s led a number of social movement theorists to develop a new theory of a social movements. According to this theory, a new class of educated workers has embarked on a struggle for power and status against a still dominant old class of business owners and executives. In sum, social movements are manifestations against the structural arrangements of advanced capitalism. Also, they are a product of the ever-expanding bureaucracy of the welfare state and their participants are products of this new social order. According to George Steinmetz (1994: 182) new social movements have been explained as an outgrowth of the interests of the new middle class (Brand 1982:14; Kitschelt 1985: 278) or new class (Martin 1988); the state-sector middle class (Cotgrove and Duff 1980; Mattausch 1989: 50-52); the service class (Lash and Urry 1987: 195); the old and new petite bourgeoisie (Eder 1985); and classes located in contradictory locations between proletariat and bourgeoisie (Write 1985; Kriesi 1989) (Steinmetz 1994:183).

New social movements differ from past movements not only with respect to what or whom they direct their energies against, but also with respect to whose interests they represent. New social movements are interested in intangible goods that would enhance the quality of life for all sectors of society (Kitschelt 276; Melucci 275; Offe 819, 832). Interestingly, this is the objective of most Islamic fundamentalist movements. Arguably, membership in these movements does not follow traditional class lines but rather they fall into two categories: those who are paying the costs of modernization and those who have been marginalized by the development of the welfare state and the new middle class (Habermas 32, Kitschelt 276-8; and Offe 831-835).

Alain Touraine (1981: 24) argues that in the industrial society the struggle was between the bourgeoisie, who exercised control over the means of production, and the proletarian movement, which sought to seize control over it. Society has moved beyond that stage. According to Craig Calhoun (1993), sometime after 1968 theorists began to think and write about new social movements;[80] for example Alberto Mejucci (1988: 247) cited feminism, the ecology/green movement, and the anti-war/peace movement. Others have added the gay movement, the animal rights movement, and the anti-abortion and pro-choice movements. Pippa Norris (2002) argues that in the late 20th century in many postindustrial societies there was a tidal wave of citizen withdrawal from the traditional channels of political participation. New social movements challenge the conventional division of politics into left and right and broadened the definition of politics to include issues that had been

[80] In varying degrees they emphasize post-industrial society (Touraine 1971). The options opened by relative affluence and a growing middle class (Offe 1985). The common denominate of material sustenance has been satisfies (Melucci 1989; Inglehart 1990) and the expansion of the welfare state (Offe 1985). The key figures associated with NSM: Alain Touraine (1981), Jurgen Habermas (1987) and Alberto Melucci (1986, 1996), argue that the NSMs represent a new era.

considered outside the domain of political action (Scott 1990). This is exactly what Islamic fundamentalists do.

Reflecting what Inglehart (1977) called the "silent revolution," the new social movements reject the premises of the postwar compromise between labor and capital. Economic growth and the material rewards that it provides are no longer endorsed if they entail the destruction and the natural environment and the control of collective and personal identities. Earlier labor movements sought wage increases or social security benefits, while new social movements focus on the establishment of cooperative or alternative economic institutions where the quality of life at the workplace would increase job satisfaction and worker control. The development of a more balanced relationship between the sexes and a greater respect for the natural environment dominate the paradigm.

New social movement theorists assert that one of the most important differences between new and old movements lies in the tactics that each relies on to achieve its goals: whereas old movements operated within the established political system, new social movements shun normal channels of political action. Some new social movement scholars have focused explicitly on the effects of violence.[81] This is especially true with Islamic fundamentalists who use violence to meet their political gains. Melucci (790) argues that as the advanced industrial state increasingly regulates and invades everyday life, the goal orientation of the new social movements have shifted inward in an attempt to expropriate dominion over their own lives from a system for supervisory institutions. Arguably, political process theorists fought to secure political and economic rights from the state and other institutional actors; new social movements target their activities away from the state.

[81] For Example: McClurg Mueller (1978), Issaac and Kelly (1981), Kelly and Snyder (1980), and Sears and McConahay (1973)

Inglehart (1971, 1977) argues that the rising level of welfare in the postwar period has caused a shift in the value priorities of the younger generations socialized after war. According to this theory, the younger generations generally place a higher priority on non-materialist (or post-materialist) values than do those socialized during the periods of the depressions or the war, circumstances when material scarcity was a real threat for most people.[82] Inglehart suggests that support for traditional hierarchical and bureaucratic organizations such as political parties and churches has declined, but that the younger generation in affluent societies has become increasingly active in politics via new social movements and transnational advocacy networks.[83]

New social movement theorists argue that participation in new social movements is not based on class cleavages. They acknowledge that most participants in the new movements are members of the "new middle class," these theorists argue that their participation is not based on membership in that class; it is participation by a class but not on behalf of a class. In other words, movements organize across socioeconomic cleavages. Furthermore, new social movements are not driven by traditional materialist values such as higher wages, safer working conditions, and voting rights, but instead are motivated by qualitative values such as personal autonomy and self-actualization. Finally, they argue that structural conditions may explain their intensity and nature of the grievances which underlie a

[82] Post-materialist values are precisely the values associated with New Social Movements, this has been documented by a number of studies: Burklin 1982, 1984; Fietkau et al. 1982; Inglehart 1981; Muller-Rommel 1982, 1985; Reuband 1985

[83] According to Fred Rose's (1997) critique of Inglehart: Inglehart applies an ahistorical definition of material needs that ignores the continued demand for material goods in wealthy states. In other words, consumption still matters. In Inglehart's view human nature is defined as a hierarchy of needs that are first material and then, after those are met the individual then turns to his cultural and social needs. But material wants, as argued by Rose (1997) are far more elastic than this theory suggests. Greater material abundance has not brought the end of wants but rather an ever increasing demand for material goods. Needs, therefore, must be understood as socially defined, and they change over time. Also, Inglehart fails to recognize the intimate relationship between material interests and values among the middle class just as many new social movement theorists do.

particular movement. However, they make it very clear, unlike political process theorists; structural conditions can only provide a partial explanation of the emergence and characteristics of social movements.

The new social movement paradigm is dominated by the radical/religious right in Europe, this being the most prominent example found in the social movement literature.[84] In the decades following WWII, Western European democracies enjoyed a significant degree of social and political stability and prosperity. Betz (1993: 413) argues that this sustained economic growth, rising standards of living, the expansion of the welfare state, and the socio-political guarantee of equality and civil liberties all contributed to a social and political climate conducive to political stability while eroding support for extremist solutions on both the left via the Marxist-Communists and right via the fascists and right-wing extremists. Betz goes on to argue that the stability and consensus were short lived. There was a resurgence of ideological and political turbulence in the late 1960s, rising social conflicts in the early 1970s, and by the late 1970s, unemployment, economic problems, energy shortages, and the spread of mass protest. These conditions facilitated a profound transformation of West European politics during the 1980s, when right-wing anti-system extremists emerged with significant success. Hainsworth (1992, 1999) argues that the most striking feature of post-war, pre-millennium European politics has been the emergence of extreme right-wing parties

[84] Numerous scholars have pointed to the lack of a generally accepted definition for the radical right: Knutter 1991; Meijerink & Mudde & Van Holsteyn 1998; Mudde 1995, 2000; Mitra 1988. Furthermore, Meijerink & Mudde & Van Holsteyn (1998), Hainsworth (1992), Payne (1995) and Mudde (1995) argue that there is no consensus within the field, and most authors define right-wing extremism as a political ideology that is a combines several different features: extreme nationalism, ethnocentrism, anti-communism, anti-parliamentarianism, anti-pluralism, militarism, law-and-order thinking, a demand for strong political leader and/or executive, anti-Americanism and cultural pessimism. In 26 definitions of right-wing extremism that can be derived from the literature, no less than 58 different features are mentioned at least once. Only five features are mentioned, by at least half of the authors: nationalism, racism, xenophobia, anti-democracy, and a strong-state (Mudde 1995: 206).

and their ability to multiply both votes and parliamentary representation throughout Europe. They have emerged as significant players in national politics.[85]

The similarities between Islamic fundamentalist movements and the religious right are paramount; for example, the literature has made it clear that it is difficult to define the nature of the European extreme right.[86] Radical right-wing political parties are anti-system because of their rejection of the established socio-cultural and socio-political system. They apply racial, ethnic, cultural, linguistic, and/or religious criteria to define who belongs and does not belong. They are opposed to the social integration of minorities, immigrants, and they facilitate xenophobia, homophobia, racial discrimination, and overt racism.[87] The term radical right is used interchangeably with the terms ultra-right and extreme right and is generally applied to 20th century incarnations of organized intolerance.[88] Stoss (1988) identified four characteristics with right-wing extremism. First, exaggerated nationalism involving hostile attitudes toward other states or peoples; secondly, denial that all people

[85] For example: in France (Hainsworth 1999, Bresson 1995, Hargreaves 1994 and Schain 1999; in Austria (Schain 1999, Mayer 1998, and Hainsworth 1999); in Italy (Ferraresi 1996 and Ignazi 1997, Bull & Newell 1995, Donovan 1995, Hainsworth, 1999, Sznajder 1995, and Ruzza & Schmidtke 1995); In Belgium (Mudde and Van Holsteyn 1999 and Hans-George Betz 1993); in Germany (Atkinson 1993, Backer 1995, Betz 1991, 1994, 1993, Childs 1991, Dalton 1993, Ford 1992, Gibowsky 1995; Heitmeyer 1993, Hockenos 1993, Roberts 1992, and Stoss 1988); in Denmark (Mudde 1998, Hainsworth 1999, and Mudde & Van Holsteyn; In Sweden (Hainsworth 1999); in Switzerland (Hans-George Betz 1993). The presence of the extreme right is not, of course, confined to Western Northern Europe; for example, post-communist Eastern and Central Europe according to (Hainsworth 1999, Cox and Shearman 1999, Boulton 1990, Carter 1990, Clark 1996, Cox 1992, 1994, Engel 1999, Laqueur 1993 Bennett 1995, and Ramet 1996). The United States has also seen serge in the radical right in the last few years argues (Abanes 1996, Aho 1990, Barkun 1994, and Weinberg 1993).

[86] Hainsworth (1992, 1999) and Macridis (1989) Betz (1993, 1994) defines it as one of the most significant political developments of the past few years.

[87] As argued by: Ramet, 1996; Cosic, 1981; Kernber, 1990; Swynedouw, 1998; Ignazi, 1996; Westle & Niedermayer, 1990; Fennema & Pollmann 1998. Macridis 1989 Griffin 1995 and Fennema & Pollmann 1998: immigration has become a core element of the European anti-system fundamentalist discourse.

[88] For Example: Ramet 1996; Cosic 1981; Kernber 1990. Lipset and Raab (1970) argue that the most distinguishing mark of right-wing extremist movements is their preservative backlash character; they look nostalgically on the (sometimes imaginary) past. Recent examples of this included the Catholic Church's successful campaign to obtain a legislative ban on abortion in Poland, as explained by Kulczychi (1995), David and Titkow (1994), and Hole (1997). A second example is the Romanian Orthodox Church that Romania facilitate the legal and social discrimination and overt state-sponsored hate crimes against gays as described by McGhee (2002) Ion (1995), Matthews-Green (2000), and Rimmerman (1996).

have equal rights of life, liberty, security, freedom of religion, freedom of speech, assembly and association, and an associated denial of the fundamental equality of human worth. Third, there is a rejection of parliamentary-pluralist systems based on the principle of majority rule; and finally, a folk-ethnocentric ideology. Falter and Schumann (1998) listed ten features as the core of right-extremist thinking: extreme nationalism, ethnocentrism, anti-communism, anti-parliamentarianism, anti-pluralism, militarism, law-and-order thinking, a demand for strong political leader and/or executive, anti-Americanism and cultural pessimism.

New social movement theorists argue that social movement participants are looking to enhance the quality of life for all sectors of society. As the literature shows, membership in these movements falls into two categories: those who are paying the costs of modernization and those who have been marginalized by the development of the welfare state and the new middle class. The first category is most appropriate for Islamic movements. Much of the fundamentalist literature suggests that modernization via Westernization and Americanization are helping to facilitate the rise of Islamic movements. Furthermore, the new social scholars challenge the conventional division of politics into left and right and broadened the definition of politics to include issues that had been considered outside the domain of politics, this is apparent in Islamic social movements.

Data Sources and Variables

Again, I define a fundamentalist movement as any group, political party, or issue-oriented militant movement which is non-secular in its beliefs, ideas, or dogmas. It also must encourage, sponsor, and/or condone the lack of separation of church and state within government, state institutions, education, or educational institutions. Furthermore, for a group to be considered fundamentalist, it must have socio-political objectives, and not just

religious ones. I have created a significant data set that contains every Islamic fundamentalist movement that is or has been in operation from 1970 through 2006; a complete list of all fundamentalist movements included in my dataset is found in the appendix. This was an extremely challenging task for four reasons: first, there is no existing dataset that codes or includes all fundamentalist groups. Secondly, fundamentalism is inherently subjective; third, there is not one source that can supply all the data. And finally, there are significant language barriers. This analysis deals with over thirty states and over a dozen languages; many of the fundamentalist movements included here are extremely small with very little information on them in English, Arabic, or a language easily translated.

It has been a daunting task to overcome these obstacles, and it is still an emerging project as new movements continually form, breakup, or are eliminated via the state. I have utilized every known source that lists fundamentalist movements, terrorist groups, or Islamic political parties; however, not one source gives a complete list of every movement I have included in my data set. Most of the prominent sources of Islamic fundamentalism overlap, meaning that you find the same groups listed in multiple sources, especially the larger more well known ones. Also, most of the large anthologies of fundamentalist group lists are encyclopedia type entries that give only a brief overview. I have found that there are very few fundamentalist anthologies, and those that are in existence document the same groups – ones easily found and easily researched. If I had only included these groups my results would be highly biased. Groups that are easily researched are usually either large ones or violent ones; in other words, groups that have been in the national news for some reason. I have used every known source and taken and coded what I could from each one.

First, I used the U.S. State Department's Patterns of Global Terrorism (1970-2006 volumes); the problem with these sources is that the data are highly biased and repetitive. The U.S. State Department only looks at groups that it classifies as terrorist, and my objective here is to include all fundamentalist movements, not just terrorist ones. Also, the State Department seldom includes additional terrorist groups, and we find the same groups included volume after volume, making the data highly repetitive.

As for the fundamentalist analogies included here, the first one is: Extremist Groups: an International Compilation of Terrorist Organizations, Violent Political Groups, and Issue-Oriented Militant Movements by Jeffrey Buita (1996). Buita's volume brings together information on 200 extremist groups, including 50 in the Middle East and even fewer Islamic extremist groups in the Middle East. There are a few notable problems with Buita's anthology; first, it is over eleven years old, and it is significantly outdated. Also, he includes only the most notable and well known groups. The second fundamentalist analogy I use is, Extremist Groups Information for Students (2006) published by Thomas Gale. Gale's two volume work provides an overview and history of 150 extremist organizations worldwide that are active today. Gale's volume is much more up to date than that of Buita's; however, this volume also is limited in the sense that only the most well known groups are included. Third, I use Stephen E. Atkin's (2004) volume Encyclopedia of Modern Worldwide Extremists and Extremist Groups. Atkin's volume contains 290 organized entries that detail the most notorious and violent extremists and extremist groups that have been in operation for the last fifty years. Fourth, I use Frank Tachau's (1994) volume Political Parties of the Middle East and North Africa: The Greenwood Encyclopedia of World Political Parties. This volume contains fourteen chapters concentrating on single countries and includes an in-depth analysis

of all current and former political parties within each specific country. However, this volume also has its limitations; first, the book is almost fourteen years old, and each country included in the study has experienced significant political change. Also, fewer than 15% of the total political parties listed in the volume constitute a fundamentalist movement. Fifth, I used Hrair Dekmejian (1995) appendix in his volume entitled Islamic Revolution: Fundamentalism in the Arab World. Dekmejian's appendix lists 175 Islamist organizations on which his study was based. However, Dekmejian does not list the years in which the movements operated, and, because of this, I attempted to verify each of the 175 organizations. In doing this, I found numerous problems with his appendix. First, out of the 175 organizations, I was only able to verify 127 and included each of those in my data set that were not already in my data set. Of the 48 remaining groups I was unable to verify anyone of them existed, other than what information Dekmejian provided, specifically the organizations name and country of origin. Also, Dekmejian's volume is thirteen years old and dated. Finally, I used James Sanchez (2007) dataset compiled in a book called: Who's Who in Al-Qaeda and Jihadi Movements in Iraq and the Middle East 30,631 Key Individuals, Organizations, Incidents, and Linkages. This is a very well researched dataset; however, most of the information consisted of just individual names and was of little use.

Another main resource I used in attaining all fundamentalist data was from MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base date set located at: http://www.tkb.org/Home2.jsp. According to the MIPT terrorism website it is a "one-stop resource for comprehensive research and analysis on global terrorist incidents, terrorism-relates court cases, and terrorist groups and leaders." The data is from the RAND Terrorism Chronology and RAND-MIPT Terrorism Incident databases; the Terrorism Indictment database; and DeticicaDFI's research on

terrorist organizations. The MIPT organization is a non-profit organization dedicated to preventing terrorism on U.S. soil or mitigating its effects. MIPT was established after the April 1995 bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City and is funded through the Department of Homeland Security's Office of Grants and training.

Over a thousand references are included in the bibliography, many of which make reference to a specific fundamentalist movement either in passing, a footnote, or they were the topic of the academic source. This being the case, it is an impossible task to correlate each of the movements included in the appendix with its source, many of which had multiple sources. Recognizing these limitations, I use numerous books were used to do specific country analysis looking for fundamentalist movements.[89] Also, Google searches were

[89] These books include: Foran, John, 1994. A Century of Revolution: Social Movements in Iran: Social Movements, Protest, and Contention. University of Minnesota Press; Poulson, Stephen. 2006. Social Movements in Twentieth-Century Iran: Culture, Ideology, and Mobilizing Frameworks. Lexington Books; Batatu, Hanna. 2004. The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq. Saqi Books; Pappe, Ilan. 2006. A History of Modern Palestine: One Land, Two Peoples. Cambridge University Press; Jabar, Faleh. 2004. Shi'ite Movement in Iraq. Saqi Books; Sanchez, James. 2007. *Who's Who in Al-Qaeda & Jihadi Movements in Iraq and the Middle East: 30,631 Key Individuals, Organizations, Incidents, and Linkages*. Lulu.com; Shanahan, Rodger. 2005. The Shi'a of Lebanon: Clans, Parties and Clerics. Library of Modern Middle East Studies; Tauris Academic Studies; Rougier, Bernard and Rascale Chazeleh. 2007. Everyday Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam among Palestinians in Lebanon. Harvard University Press; Rabinovich, Itamar. 1985. The War for Lebanon, 1970-1985. Cornell University Press; Zunes, Stephen. 1999. Nonviolent Social Movements: A Geographical Perspective. Wiley-Blackwell; Sidel, John Thaver. 2006. Riots, Pogroms, Jihad: Religious Violence in Indonesia. Cornell University Press; Abuza, Zachary. 2006. Political Islam and Violence in Indonesia. Routledge Press; Sidel, John. 2007. The Islamist Threat in Southeast Asia: A Reassessment. East-West Center Washington; Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS); Eliraz, Giora. 2004. Islam In Indonesia: Modernism, Radicalism, And The Middle East Dimension. Sussex Academic Press; Vickers, Adrian. 2005. A History of Modern Indonesia. Cambridge University Press; Cassanos, Lynda Cohen. 2005. Indonesia: The Growth and Influence of Islam: in the Nations of Asia and Central Asia. Mason Crest Publishers; Library Binding; Vicziany, Marika. 2005. Terrorism and Islam in Indonesia: Myths and Realities. International Specialized Book Services; Effendy, Bahtiar. 2004. Islam and the State in Indonesia. Ohio University Press; Ramage, Douglas. 1997. Politics in Indonesia: Democracy, Islam, and the Ideology of Tolerance. Routledge; Hussain, Asaf. 1983. Islamic Movements in Egypt, Pakistan and Iran: An Annotated Bibliography. Mansell Press; Toth, James. 1999. Rural Labor Movements in Egypt and Their Impact on the State, 1961-1992. University Press of Florida Press; Hopwood, Derek. 1991. Egypt: Politics and Society 1945-1990. Routledge Press; Bashier, Zakaria. 1987. Islamic Movement in the Sudan: Issues and Challenges. Islamic Foundation Press; Johnson, Douglas Hamilton. 2003. The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars. Indiana University Press; Petterson, Donald. 2003. Inside Sudan: Political Islam, Conflict, and Catastrophe. Westview Press; Schock, Kurt. 2004. Unarmed Insurrections: People Power Movements In Nondemocracies. University of Minnesota Press; Moussalli, Ahmed. 1999. Historical Dictionary of Islamic Fundamentalist Movements in the Arab World, Iran, and Turkey: Historical Dictionaries of Religions, Philosophies and Movements. The Scarecrow Press, Inc; Kavlan, Muammer. 2005. The Kemalists: Islamic Revival And The Fate Of Secular Turkey. Prometheus

conducted for each fundamentalist movement included here for validation and reference checks. I understand this is not a perfect measure; however, it is the first large N attempt at coding Islamic fundamentalist groups and this makes it a significant addition to the political science discipline.

Outside Ideological Force

What I also add to the social movement literature is the presence of an outside ideological force. The presence of outside ideological force plays a significant role in determining how many fundamentalist movements a state will have. There are three significant outside ideological forces in the Islamic world: Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United States. Iran and Saudi Arabia do what I call, *group facilitate.* Group facilitate is when Iran or Saudi Arabia operate clandestine operations within different Islamic states via sponsoring domestic movements found within other states in order to facilitate their own interests and force other governments into compliance. The United States, on the other hand, does not group facilitate; instead, it influences the state leadership via economic and/or military aid

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Books; Howe, Marvine. 2000. Turkey Today: A Nation Divided Over Islam's Revival. Westview Press; Yavuz, M. Hakan. 2000. Islamic Political Identity in Turkey (Religion and Global Politics. Oxford University Press; Maududi, Sayyid Abula'la. 2001. Islam and Salvation in Palestine: The Islamic Jihad Movement. Dayan Center Papers. Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and Affairs: Islamic Foundation; Burgat, Francois and William Dowell. 1997. The Islamic Movement in North Africa. Middle East Monograph Series: The University of Texas Press; Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, The. 2004. Islamic Movements: Impact on Political Stability in the Arab World; I. B. Tauris; Lapidus, Ira M. 2005. A History of Islamic Societies. Pluto Press; Baker, Raymond William. 2006. Islam without Fear: Egypt and the New Islamists. Harvard University Press; O'Dea, Colleen. 2006. Tajikistan: The Growth and Influence of Islam in the Nations of Asia and Central Asia. Mason Crest Publishers; Jonson, Lena. 2006. Tajikistan in the New Central Asia: Geopolitics, Great Power Rivalry and Radical Islam. International Library of Central Asia Studies. Publisher: I. B. Tauris; Rashid, Ahmed. 2007. Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia. Penguin Book Press; Hatina, Meir. 2001. Islam and Salvation in Palestine: The Islamic Jihad Movement. Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies; Milton-Edwards, Beverley. 1999. Islamic Politics in Palestine. Library of Modern Middle East Studies. I. B. Tauris; Titus, Murray. 2005. Islam in India and Pakistan: A Religious History of Islam in India and Pakistan. Musnhiram Manoharlal Press; Saeed, Javaid. 1994. Islam and Modernization: A Comparative Analysis of Pakistan, Egypt, and Turkey. Praeger Publishers.

and the presence of U.S. troops. Theoretically, American ideological influence is inherently different than that of Iran or Saudi Arabia. American ideological inference is top-down, meaning the aid is given to the state, not individual Islamic groups or movements (unless associated with the Islamic state). On the other hand, Iranian and Saudi Arabian ideological influence is, for the most part, bottom-up; they give aid directly to groups or movements. There are a few exceptions to my argument concerning the United States and its top-down influence, specifically, the Taliban and Mujahideen in Afghanistan during the 1980s and the current aid it gives to Sunni groups in the Iraqi civil war; however, in both these examples U.S. aid was going to groups within a failed state.

The Saudi Arabian based Muslim World League (MWL) is the largest Muslim Organization engaged in *Dawah* (charitable) activities in the world (Levitt 2006: 18). Levitt (2006: 19) argues that the Muslim World League is the subject of several ongoing counterterrorism investigations in the United States as they relates to their donations to known terrorist organization like Hamas and al-Qaeda. The MWL lists its main objectives as "to disseminate Islamic *Dawah* and expound the teachings of Islam. To defend Islamic causes in a manner that safeguards the interests and aspirations of Muslims, solve their problems, refute false allegations against Islam, and repel inimical trends and dogma which the enemies of Islam seek to exploit in order to destroy the unity of Muslims and to sow seeds of doubt in our Muslim Brethren" (Levitt 2006: 19). The connections to terrorism via the Muslim World League, and in turn, Saudi Arabia are extensive. The Saudi Arabian royal family has donated hundreds of millions of dollars to Sunni fundamentalist groups throughout the Islamic world. In fact, it is not possible to separate the Saudi royal family with the state of Saudi Arabia; they are one in the same. Critics have argued that the money is coming from

royal family members and not the Saudi Arabian king. This is true; however, the King could stop it at any time. Saudi Arabia is a perfect autocracy and the autocrat has final say.

Following the success of Iran's Revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini embarked on an agenda known as *Mashru al-Thawra al-Iraniyah* (the Project of the Iranian Revolution).[90] This aimed at furthering Islam by reviving the Islamic *Ummah* (the worldwide Islamic nation) which was to be based in Iran and led by Khomeini whose objective was the spread of Islam's influence beyond the boundaries of Iran. Khomeini stressed that in exporting the revolution he did not seek to militarily invade neighboring states and did not harbor expansionist plans. He argued that his goal would be achieved by means of an "invisible force" and the path to success lay through cultivating the populace (Khomeini, 1978, 1989). The Islamic Revolutionary Guards became an integral part of the program. They were initially set up in 1979 as an internal security apparatus to consolidate Khomeini's grip on Iran and grew to become one of the strongest institutions ever produced by the revolution and a primary tool for promoting Khomeini's doctrines. His objective was carried out through overt epistemic militarized intervention, as was the case in Lebanon, and through covert epistemic, political interference, as in the case of Algeria. The Guards did not create a separate division to export the revolution; they trained and armed militant surrogates and agents in many camps and locations throughout Iran. These agents then recruited Shiite

[90] Khomeini institutionalized the exportation of revolution and creation of a global Islamic rule and outlined it in various parts of Iran's constitution. The forward of the regime's constitution reads, in part, "Given the context of Iran's Islamic Revolution, which was a movement for the victory of all the oppressed over the oppressors, it provides the ground for continuation of the revolution inside and outside the country, specifically in spreading international links to other Islamic and people's movements, tries to pave the way for the creation of unique global Ummah so the continuation of the struggle for the salvation of deprived and suffering nations can be settled." Another part of the forward, under the headline "Ideological Army", reads, "The Army of the Islamic Republic and the Revolutionary Guards carry not only the duty of protecting the borders but also ideological duty, Jihad of God and struggle to spread the rule of God's law in the world" (Abrahamian 1989,1993; Hamid, 1981; Arjomand, 1988).

militants overseas to carry out operations in both the Middle East and Europe. The Guards supported revolutionary activities, built an Islamic network, and had agents occupy positions in Iranian embassies across Europe, Africa, and Asia. Under diplomatic cover, they recruited proxies and cells for operations worldwide.

During the last twenty-seven years, the international community has seen Iran emerge as an ideological hegemon that has significantly influenced domestic politics and domestic development of Shiite Muslims. Furthermore, during the last twenty years, the international community has seen Saudi Arabia achieve the same ideological hegemonic standing as Iran but with the Sunni Muslims. Both enjoy a unique position in the world of Islam due to their strategic locations, natural resources, and historical and cultural role in the development of the Islamic civilization. In the last three years we have witnessed Iranian backed Shiites and Saudi Arabian backed Sunnis using Iraqis as cogs to achieve regional hegemony. The United States invasion or Iraq has resulted in a bloodbath with hundreds of thousands of Iraqis murdered, not by U.S. soldiers, but as a result of fifteen hundred years of Sunni and Shiite tensions that both Iran and Saudi Arabia are currently fueling to achieve regional hegemony. [91]

[91] The word *hegemony* comes from ancient Greek and refers to the dominance of one state over others in the international system; it is used in diverse and confusing ways. David Wilkinson (1994: 374) points out those translators of the Greek word *hegemony* also use *empire, dominance, supremacy, command*, and *leadership* interchangeably. Part of the problem is that unequal distribution of power is a matter of degree, and there is no general agreement on how much inequality and what types of power constitute hegemony. Hegemony is often used to refer to different behaviors and degrees of control, which obscures rather then clarifies its analysis. For example, Charles Doran (1971: 70) cites aggressive military power, while Robert Keohane (1984: 32) looks at the preponderance of economic resources. Robert Gilpin (1988: 592) uses the terms *imperial* and *hegemonic* interchangeably to refer to a situation in which a single powerful state controls or dominates the lesser states in the international system. Joshua Goldstein (1988: 281) defines hegemony as being able to dictate and/or dominate the rules and arrangements by which international relations, politics and economics are conducted. Furthermore, hegemonic states provide an international order that further their own self-interests. Robert Cox (1994: 366) argues that the term *imperialism* has meant so many things that is has become almost meaningless and feels term *hegemony* will suffer the same fate. Cox goes on to argue that hegemony is more than dominance; hegemony is a form in which dominance is obscured by achieving an appearance of acquiescence. According to Cox, hegemonic power is rare and transitory, it is never complete, and it tends to generate

Iran and Saudi Arabia have been able to exert their ideological hegemony via their epistemic influence. Iran uses its revolutionary guards and Saudi Arabia uses its Islamic charities as covers. An Islamic epistemic community is a transnational group of believers (Shiite or Sunni) with shared Islamic values and beliefs. The increasing influence of epistemic communities has had serious implications on all Muslim nation-states, specifically those states with significant gaps between the rich and poor. I argue that epistemic communities are the source of political and moral direction in a society; furthermore, they control the knowledge and information in a given society. Decision makers are likely to turn to epistemic communities under conditions of uncertainty.

In my use of epistemic communities, I rely on the work of several scholars. Haas (1992) defines epistemic communities as networks of professionals with recognized expertise in a particular field. Control over knowledge and information is an important dimension of power. Sebenius (1992) and Adler and Haas (1992) argue that members of epistemic communities are transnational groups that have a common set of principled and causal beliefs, but they also have shared notions of validity and a shared policy goal(s). Robert Keohane (1980) argues that epistemic community members are often based in several countries and share basic values on the subject in question, share causal models of the workings of the involved phenomena.

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opposition which undermines itself. Henk Overbeek (1994: 368) defines hegemony as a form of rule primarily based on consent, not coercion; Overbeek sees hegemony as a form of class rule and not a hierarchy among states. Barry Gills (1994: 369) defines hegemony as a hierarchical structure, mediated by force that dominates political entities and their constituent classes. The goal of the hegemon, according to Gills (1994: 370) is economic, and the hegemon desires to restructure the regional and/or international economic system to benefit itself and its ruling classes. George Modelski (1994: 373) argues the term *hegemony* is relatively new, and he dates its emergence between 1970 and 1973. He notes that the Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, published in 1969 has no entry for *hegemony* in its index. Modelski defines hegemony as a form of illegitimate leadership. Giovanni Arrighi (1994: 365) sees *hegemon* and *leadership* as inseparable terms and argues the hegemon leads smaller states on to the path of development.

Epistemic communities facilitate learning, negotiation, ideological development, and they deepen individual and collective societal knowledge on specific issues. The epistemic community's authority is the result of their recognized expertise and their ability to influence policy. Peter Haas (1992) says that these features distinguish epistemic communities from other groups often involved in policy coordination. Hass (1992) and Emmanuel Adler (1992: 115) argue that epistemic communities can consist of social scientists or individuals from any discipline or profession who have a sufficiently strong claim to a body of knowledge that is valued by society. J. Habermas (1984: 34) argues that the impact an epistemic community has depends on a variety of factors, including the number and strength of the social movements it can "catch" in its "net" of consensual understandings. The more extensive the reach of an epistemic community, the greater the amount of power and influence over the state that the community has; the epistemic community is involved in the negotiation of meanings and has policymakers as its goal. This is seen within the Islamic world via the United States, Iran, and Saudi Arabia. Habermas (1984) argues that epistemic communities convey new patterns of reasoning to decision makers and encourage them to pursue new paths of policymaking; this may, in turn, lead to unpredicted or unpredictable outcomes; such as, terrorism or Islamic fundamentalism.

I theoretically define a significant outside ideological force as an outside influence that meets ALL of the following criteria:

- The outside support must be in the form of financial, military, or humanitarian aid from a state and not from the state where the fundamentalist group is located.
- There must be a physical presence of the ideological force within the country via state representatives, scholars, religious leaders, state sponsored militia, military, or any group representing the ideological state. Or, the members of the fundamentalist group must be being trained within or educated within the foreign state.

- To be considered a *significant* outside ideological force, more than one group must receive the above explained influence; however, if the group is counted as three because of its size and membership, then only one group needs to be receiving aid from an outside ideological force.

- To be considered a significant outside ideological force, the phenomenon cannot be working with, for, or influenced by the state in which the fundamentalist group is working within.

- To be considered a significant outside ideological force, the phenomenon must influence a fundamentalist group for two or more consecutive years

- The United State's ideological influence is excluded from this variable because U.S. influence is captured in the presence of *U.S. troops* and *U.S. aid*

Model and Hypotheses

Model One:



H1: Socioeconomic inequality as described by the Marxist social movement theory is positively associated with the number and success Islamic fundamentalist groups present within the nation-state.

> *H1A: If there is significant unemployment in the nation-state there will be an increase in the number of fundamentalist movements within that nation-state*
>
> *H1B: If there is significant poverty in the nation-state there will be an increase in the number of fundamentalist movements within that nation-state*

H2: Resources as described by the Resource Mobilization social movement theorists are positively associated with the number and success Islamic fundamentalist groups present within the nation-state.

> *H2A: If a nation-state's overall population's educational level increases then there will be an increase in the number of fundamentalist movements within that nation-state.*
>
> *H2B: If the total amount of U.S. aid increases within a nation-state then there will be an increase in the number of fundamentalist movements within that nation-state.*

H2C: If a nation-state's GDP were to increase then there will be an increase in the number of fundamentalist movements within that nation-state.

H2D: If the total amount of ODA increases within a nation-state then there will be an increase in the number of fundamentalist movements within that nation-state.

H3: The degree of openness of political institutions as described by the political process social movement theorists has an inverted-U shaped relationship with the number and success of Islamic fundamentalist movements; the number of movements should be the strongest in system which are neither highly democratic nor highly autocratic.

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H3A: There is a linear negative relationship between strong autocracies and fundamentalist movements. If the political system is a strong autocracy with grievous human rights violations there will be fewer Islamic fundamentalist movements within that nation-state.

H3B: There is a linear negative relationship between strong democracies and fundamentalist movements. If the political system is a perfect democracy with few human rights violations there will be fewer Islamic fundamentalist movements within that nation-state.

H4: Ideas as described by the New Social Movement theorists are positively associated with the number and success Islamic fundamentalist groups present within the nation-state

H4A: If there is a significant outside ideological force present then there will be an increase in the number of Islamic fundamentalist movements within that nation-state.

H4B: If there are U.S troops present within the Islamic nation-state then there will be an increase in the number of Islamic fundamentalist movements within that nation-state.

H4C: If the total amount of U.S. aid increases within a nation-state then there will be an increase in the number of fundamentalist movements within that nation-state.

The following three hypotheses have been developed from the association between terrorism and the degree of Islamic fundamentalism within an Islamic nation-state, as measured by the total number of fundamentalist movement-years present.

H5: The total degree fundamentalism in the Islamic nation-state is positively associated with the total degree of non-state induced violence within that nation-state. In other words, if the nation-state has a large degree of fundamentalism then it will have a large number of terrorist attacks.

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The goal of my dissertation is to determine the causes of Islamic fundamentalism while showing Islamic fundamentalist movements are social movements. In the previous two chapters, I laid out my fundamentalist labyrinth that argues the causes of Islamic fundamentalism are the results of a combined presence of phenomena associated with the different social movement literatures, each being positively associated with the number of Islamic fundamentalist groups within the nation-state. Furthermore, I theorized that Islamic fundamentalist movements are social movements and the factors that predict social movements also predict Islamic fundamentalist movements. In the following chapter I demonstrate quantitatively that each of the social movement conditions is positively associated with Islamic fundamentalism.

Chapter Three: The Causes of Islamic Fundamentalism: A Quantitative Analysis

The goal of chapter three is to determine through the application of quantitative analysis the causes of Islamic fundamentalism, and determine what phenomena facilitate the number of Islamic fundamentalist movements. The main objective of chapter three is to use quantitative analysis to build on, and test, the theoretical claims in the previous two chapters. To do this, I will utilize the negative binomial fixed effects regression model, the incident rate ratio test, and a comparison of each independent variable's effect on the number of fundamentalist movements by looking at each independent variable's minimum, mean, and maximum score.[92] My findings show that each of the social movement conditions is positively associated with the number of Islamic fundamentalist movements. After this, I changed the dependent variable from the number of fundamentalist movements to the total number of terrorist acts, and then the total number of suicide terrorist acts. I wanted to determine if the conditions found within Islamic nation-states, that are facilitating the number of fundamentalist movements, are also facilitating the number of terrorist attacks, and if the total number of fundamentalist movements are positively associated with violence; my results indicate they are not.

Chapter three is divided into three sections. The first section looks at my rational behind using negative binomial fixed effects models, specifically Xtnbreg. The second section explains both my independent and dependent variables. My dependent variable is the total number of fundamentalist movements in every predominantly Islamic nation-state for the last thirty six years. Each independent variable is associated with the four social

[92] According to Stata, ***ir*** is used with incidence –rate, incidence density or person-time data. It calculates point estimates and confidence intervals for the incidence-rate ratio and difference, along with attributable or prevented fractions for the exposed and total population.

movement literature conditions. Each of the following sections contains a panel-time-series analysis that examines the number of fundamentalist movements in Islamic-Majority nation states from 1970 through 2006.

The third section includes multiple models where I determined the relationship(s) between the number of fundamentalist movements and the different phenomena associated with each of the four different social movement schools of thought. First, the resources associated with resource mobilization theorists include total population, total GDP, education/school enrollment, total ODA, and total U.S. financial aid. Secondly, the socioeconomic inequality associated with Marxism includes measures of unemployment, poverty, worker's rights, women's political rights, and total ODA. Thirdly, the political institutions associated with the political process theorist include polity, executive recruitment, executive constraints, political competition, political rights, extrajudicial killings, disappearances, torture, political imprisonment, political participation, and the Freedom House: Political Rights scale. Finally, the ideas associated with new social movement theorists include religious freedom, education, freedom of speech, freedom of movement, freedom of assembly and association, the presence of an outside ideological force, total number of U.S. troops, total U.S. financial aid, and the Freedom House: Civil Liberties scale. The indicators I have chosen in my fundamentalist social movement variables are multi-dimensional, which is why many are used more than one time in multiple conditions, specifically education, ODA, and U.S. aid. However, each indicator was run only one time per hypotheses.

Analytic Design

My data on the number of fundamentalist groups are in the form of yearly counts; therefore I use negative binomial regression, a variant of Poisson regression, which is often used to analyze event counts (Robison et al. 2006; Barron 1992; McCall and Nagin 1996; Cameron and Tivendi 1998). The negative binomial model incorporates observed and unobserved heterogeneity into the conditional mean (Long 1997). Thus, the conditional variance of my dependent variable (number of fundamentalist movements) becomes larger than its conditional mean, which remains unchanged. I used the negative binomial model because the number of fundamentalist movements must be positive therefore, the variables may be missspecified if estimated with OLS regressions (King, 1988). Poisson regressions are often used to analyze dependent variables that are event count data (Ahuja, 2000; King 1988), but Poisson models are restrictive and require the mean and variance to be equal. According to Robison et al (2006) negative binomial regression effectively controls for overdispersion by adding a stochastic component to the model (Land, McCall and Nagin 1996). If the numbers of observations within a year are not independent, the variance may be greater than the mean. If such an over dispersion exists, negative binomial models will be better (Cameron and Tribedi, 1990), but pooling multiple observations over time for each fundamentalist group violates the independence assumptions required for unbiased parameter estimates. This can be corrected by clustering data through random effects (Guo 1996) or fixed effects models.[93] The negative binomial model differs from Poisson regression by the

[93] Random effect models are used due to the clustering of the data and the correlated error structure statistical techniques, which can correct for design effects and unequal probability of selection, are necessary to achieve unbiased parameter estimates. I can use random effects models here but statistically they would be less accurate than fixed effect models; however, since dispersion or unexplained variation in individual outcomes is likely to vary across fundamentalist groups because of unidentified reasons (for example unemployment, poverty, and the presence of an outside ideological force) the random effects over dispersion model is used in all analysis. This

adding of a residual variance parameter that captures over dispersion in the dependent variable (which occurs when the standard deviation is greater than the mean) (Gardnerm Mulvey, and Shaw 1995). Designed for dependent variables that are counts of events, negative binomial models utilize a distribution that characterizes the probability of observing any discrete number of events, given an underlying mean count of events (Osgood 1999). Furthermore, negative binomial regressions are designed to handle continuous variables with distributions containing zero values and large positive skews. For example, Siddharth Chandra and Angela Williams Foster (2005) used the negative binomial regression model in their analysis of the economic conditions associated with urban social disturbances in the United States in the 1960s. They used state-level data in the social disturbances in conjunction with census data from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series to test the relationship between measures of wage inequality and measures of social disorder. They found that overall wage inequality is a significant factor in facilitating social disorder.

The main concern I have with using the Poisson model comes from one of the Poisson assumptions, specifically that which requires us to assume equality between the conditional mean and the variance of the dependent variable. Often, as in my data, the variance exceeds the conditional mean, resulting in what is called *over dispersion*. The negative-binomial model actually accounts for over dispersion. It is essentially a negative binomial model (a variant of the Poisson model) that is commonly used to deal with over dispersion parameter that varies across states. Hausman, Hall, and Griliches (1984) suggested further refinement that starts with the negative multinomial model and makes additional assumptions about the distribution of the random effect that effectively allow the over distribution parameter to vary

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type of random effects model allows dispersion to vary randomly from fundamentalist movement to fundamentalist movement.

across both regions and time. This approach, called the negative-binomial model with random effects does not work with my data. After running the Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects I was able to determine that random effects models were inappropriate; therefore, I decided to run fixed effects models. Standard negative binomial models assume that regression coefficients are fixed between groups and that error terms are not correlated, these models are inadequate for complex sampling designs, such as my fundamentalist movement data (Goldstein 1987; Lee and Bryk 1989; Raudenbush and Bryk 1986).

I used the Xtnbreg regression command in Stata; Xtnbreg is a convenience command for population-averaged models by using xtgee, family (nbreg) link (log) to obtain estimates. [94] Fixed effects models have been developed for a variety of different data types and models, including linear models for quantitative data (Mundlak 1978), logistic regression models for categorical data (Chamberlain 1980), Cox regression models for event history data (Yamaguchi 1986; Allison 1996), and Poisson regression models for count data (Palmgren 1981). Also, Benner and Tushman (2002) used Xtnbreg as a statistical test in their research, which explored the impact that process management activities had on technical innovation. Drawing on research in organizational evolution and learning, they suggest that as these practices reduce variance in organizational routines and influence the section of innovations,

[94] Xtnbreg estimates random-effects over-dispersion models, conditional fixed-effects over-dispersion models, and population-averaged negative binomial models. Here random-effects and fixed-effects apply to the distribution of the dispersion parameter, and not to the xβ term in the model. In the random-effects and fixed-effects over-dispersion models, the dispersion is the same for all elements in the same group (for example elements with the same value of the independent variables). In the random-effects model, the dispersion varies randomly from group to group such that the inverse of the dispersion has a Beta (r,s) distribution. In the fixed-effects model, the dispersion parameter in a group can take on any value, since a conditional likelihood s used in which the dispersion parameter drops out of the estimation. According to Stata the xtnbreg estimates conditional fixed-effects (fe), a maximum-likelihood random-effects (re), or a population-averaged (pa) negative binomial model for cross-sectional time-series datasets. By default, the Population-averaged model is an equal-correlation model; xtnbreg assumes corr (exchangeable).

they enhance incremental innovation at the expense of exploratory innovation. They tested this by looking a 20-year longitudinal study parenting activity and 9,000 quality program certifications in the paint and photography industries. Simons and Ingram (2003) used Xtnbreg and looked at the interdependence of institutional forms and the ecology of the Kibbutz from 1910-1997. They tested the number of explanation s of what happened to the kibbutz, using an analysis of the founding rate of the kibbutz populations. They found support for popular accounts that the kibbutz stagnated partly as a result of the development of Israel of capitalism and of alternated for structuring community relations.

Data and Variables

Dependent Variable

I have created an important data set that contains every Islamic fundamentalist movement, that is, or has been, in operation from 1970 through 2007. If the group, political party, or issue oriented movement meets my definition of a fundamentalist movement then it was included in my data set. I understand this is not a perfect measure; however, it is the first large N attempt at coding Islamic fundamentalist groups and this makes it a significant addition to the political science discipline. In order to determine what fundamentalist movements are included in my data set I sent the following conditions: first, the movement, group, political party, or issue-oriented militant movement which is non-secular in its beliefs, ideas, or dogmas. Second, it also must encourage, sponsor, or condone the lack of separation of church and state within government, state institutions, education, or educational institutions. Third, for a movement to be considered fundamentalist it must have socio-political objectives, and not just religious ones. A problem that has arisen with counting the number of fundamentalist movements is that the size of the fundamentalist movement is not

taken into account; this could have significant ramifications for the reliability of my data. To rectify this, I counted large movements (movements with over 900 members) three times. I chose 900 because most small fundamentalist movements throughout the Islamic world have less than 400 active members and medium sized Islamic movements have no more than 700 members. Furthermore, based on my findings there are virtually no differences between a small and medium sized fundamentalist movements. However, there are significant differences between a small or medium movements and that of a large movements, specifically influence, membership, resources, and power. Furthermore, I do not have reliable data on the total number of members in most fundamentalist movements but I am able to reliably determine the movements with more than 900 members. Finally, I ran all models with the total number of unique fundamentalist movements as the dependent variable and any differences in the results were put into footnotes and the complete tables are located in the appendix.

Independent Variables

I will only look at nation-states with a 40% or more Muslim population. All population statistics were obtained from the Department of State's Country Study webpage. The following two tables explain all variables included in my dissertation. The following table lists and codes all nation-states included in my dissertation, as mentioned before.[95] This will be a 37 year study covering the years from 1970-2007.[96] The second table gives a brief

[95] The following are majority Muslim nation-states and I dropped them because they were in sub-Sahharian African and are inherently different culturally and historically than the Muslim-majority states included here: Gambia (95%), Guinea (85%), Mali (90%), Senegal (95%), Niger (90%), and Nigeria (47%).

[96] I choose 1970 to be the first year in my study because of the 1979 Iranian Revolution significantly changed the phenomena I am most interested in evaluating here; specifically, terrorism, Islamic fundamentalism, and the Islamization of global politics. Arguably, after the revolution the Muslim world significantly changed and 1979 is the year credited as the birth year of both modern terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism. This, way I can evaluate ten years before the Iranian revolution and see if the above assumption is correct.

overview and coding explanation of all independent variable included here; for a complete description and coding of all Independent variables see appendix.

Table Six: Countries Included

IRN	Iran
ALG	Algeria
AZE	Azerbaijan
BAH	Bahrain[97]
BNG	Bangladesh[98]
BRU	Brunei[99]
DJI	Djibouti[100]
EGY	Egypt
INS	Indonesia
ISR	Israel
JOR	Jordan
KUW	Kuwait
LEB	Lebanon
LIB	Libya
IRQ	Iraq
MAA	Mauritania
MOR	Morocco
QAT	Qatar
PAK	Pakistan[101]
OMA	Oman
SAU	Saudi Arabia
SYR	Syria
TAJ	Tajikistan[102]
TUN	Tunisia
TUR	Turkey
TKM	Turkmenistan[103]
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UZB	Uzbekistan[104]
YEM	Yemen[105]

[97] Bahrain gained its independence in 1971.
[98] In 1947, West Pakistan and East Bengal separated from India and jointly became the new country of Pakistan, East Bengal became Easter Pakistan in 1955, but the awkward arrangement and the significant separation of the two areas left the Bengalis marginalized and dissatisfied. East Pakistan seceded from this union with West Pakistan in 1971 and was renamed Bangladesh. Because of this I will look at both Bangladesh and Pakistan starting in 1972
[99] Brunei Gained independence from the British in 1984
[100] Djibouti gained independence from France in 1977
[101] See Bangladesh footnote for explanation
[102] Gained their independence from the Soviet Union in 1991
[103] Gained their independence from the Soviet Union in 1991
[104] Gained their independence from the Soviet Union in 1991
[105] North Yemen became independent of the Ottoman Empire in 1918. The British withdrew in 1967 from what would become South Yemen. Three years later, the southern government adapted a Marxist orientation. The massive exodus of hundreds of thousands of Yemenis from the south to the north contributes to two decades of hostilities. These two countries formally unifies as the Republic of Yemen in 1990

KZK	Kazakhstan[106]
ERI	Eritrea[107]
ETH	Ethiopia
TAN	Tanzania
AFG	Afghanistan
SOM	Somalia
SUD	Sudan
KYR	Kyrgyzstan[108]

Table Seven Variables:[109]

Total Population	Population is the total population of the nation-state in question.
GDP	GDP is the gross value of all products and services produced within the nation-state per year.
Official development assistance	The ODA statistics comprises grants and/or loans to developing nation-stats and/or territories.
American Financial Aid	American Financial Aid is the total amount of American financial and military aid for each nation-state included in my dissertation and for each year (thousands of U.S. dollars)
Unemployment	Unemployment is the percentage of the population that is unemployed.
Poverty	Poverty is the percentage of the population that is living below their state's recognized poverty level.
Polity	Polity is a combined score that is computed by subtracting the polity autocracy score from the polity democracy score; the resulting unified polity score ranges from +10 (strongly democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic).
Executive Recruitment	The executive recruitment score ranges from 1 to 8. 1 being the most restricted and 8 being the most open.
Executive Constraints	The degree of checks and balances between the various parts of the government is coded on a 7-point scale which ranges from the "unlimited executive authority" (1) to executive parity or subordination" (7).
Political Competition	The competitiveness of political participation refers to the extent to which alternative preferences for policy formation and leadership roles can be pursued in the political arena.
Political Rights	Political rights data was obtained from the CIRI Human Rights Data Project. The CIRI project graded countries between 1(most free) and 7 (least free).

[106] Gained their independence from the Soviet Union in 1991
[107] Eritrea gained independence in 1991 from Ethiopia after a 30-year struggle with Ethiopia
[108] Gained their independence from the Soviet Union in 1991
[109] For a complete list of sources and an explanation of how each variable was operationalized see Appendix

Continuation of Table Seven: Variables

Extrajudicial Killings	Extrajudicial Killings are killings by government officials without due process of law. These killings may result from the deliberate, illegal, and excessive use of lethal force by police, security forces, or other agents of the state whether against criminal suspects, detainees, prisoners, or others.
Disappearances	Disappearances are cases in which people have disappeared, political motivation appears likely, and the victims have not been found. Knowledge of the whereabouts off the disappeared is, by definition, not public knowledge.
Torture	Torture refers to the purposeful inflicting of extreme pain, whether mental or physical, by government officials or by private individuals at the instigation of government officials.
Political Imprisonment	Political imprisonment refers to the incarnations of people by government officials because of: their speech, their non-violent opposition to government policies or leaders; their religious beliefs; their non-violent religious practices including proselytizing; or their membership in a group, including ethic or racial groups.
Freedom of Speech	Freedom of speech includes the extent to which freedoms of speech and press are affected by government censorship, including ownership of media outlets.
Freedom of Religion	Freedom of religion indicates the extent to which the freedom of citizens to exercise and practice their own religious beliefs is subject to actual government restrictions.
Freedom of Movement	Freedom of Movement is the freedom to travel within one's country and to leave and return to one's country is a right.
Freedom of Assembly and Association	Freedom of Assembly and Association is internationally recognized right of citizens to assembly freely and to associate with other persons in political parties, trade unions, cultural organizations, or other special-interest groups.
Political Participation	Political Participation is the right of citizens to freely determine their own political system and leadership is known as the right to self-determination.
Workers Rights	Workers should have freedom of association at their workplace and the right to bargain collectively with their employers.
Women's Political Rights	Women's political rights include a number of internationally recognized rights women have
The presence of an outside ideological force	This is a dichotomous variable that looks at if there is a significant outside ideological force present.

Continuation of Table Seven: Variables

Freedom House: Civil Liberties	Civil liberties include the freedom(s) of expression and belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of law, and personal autonomy without interference from the state. Freedom House Political Rights rates countries on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 representing the most free and 7 the least free.
Freedom House: Political Rights	Political Rights include questions such as: how is the head of state chosen? Are the elections free and fair? Are there fair electoral laws? Do those who win elections have real power? Is there a significant opposition vote. Freedom House Political Rights rates countries on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 representing the most free and 7 the least free.
Troops	Troops are the number of United States troops in each state included in my dissertation. The data consists of the number of military personal per country per year.
Secondary School Enrolment	Secondary school enrollment ratio is the ratio of total enrollment, regardless of age, to the population of the age group that officially corresponds to the secondary level of education.

The following table breaks up the above variables by their relevance to each of the social-movement hypotheses. Religious freedom, freedom of speech, freedom of movement, freedom of assembly and association could all be considered institutional variables. However, I classify them as idea variables for multiple reasons. First, religious freedom or lack thereof seems to be a major facilitator in the contention in the Islamic world and religion is a major aspect of the new social movement literature and the new social movement literature is represented by the ideas category. Freedom of speech inherently involves ideas, sharing them, printing them, reading them and the freedom of association is the ability to share those ideas. Freedom of movement facilitates the sharing of ideas. Finally, the number U.S. troops are considered an idea variable because with the troops, along comes American culture, American values, and American ideas. Local communities desire the presence of

U.S. troops for the economic benefits.[110] There are two variables that overlap multiple categories: U.S. aid and the Official Development Assistance statistic. I consider U.S. aid a resource because of the United States is giving money but it is also an outside ideological force because U.S. comes with stipulations and, as I argued before, most U.S. aid is from the top-down and this aid significantly influences the degree of Westernization and Americanization within each Islamic nation-state receiving U.S. aid.

[110] I think it is important to distinguish before moving on the difference between political institutions and state repression, both being placed in the political institutions category. I included variables measuring state repression because variables that measure the total number of individuals killed by the state or the total number individuals disappeared or tortured are perfect for measuring the degree of state repressiveness.

Table Eight: Hypotheses and Variable Categorization

Social Movement Phenomena	Variables Included
Resources	Total Population GDP Education/School Enrollment ODA U.S. Financial Aid Education
Socioeconomic Inequality	Unemployment Poverty Worker's Rights Women's Political Rights ODA
Political Institutions	Polity Executive Recruitment Executive Constraints Political Competition Political Rights Extrajudicial Killings Disappearances Torture Political Imprisonment Political Participation Freedom House: Political Rights
Ideas	Religious Freedom Education Freedom of Speech Freedom of Movement Freedom of Assembly and Association The Presence of an Outside Ideological Force U.S. Troops U.S. Financial Aid Freedom House: Civil Liberties

Table Nine: Descriptive Statistics of Dependent and Independent Variables

Variable	N	Mean	Standard deviation	Min.	Max.
Fundamentalist Movements	1165	13.6	15.9	0	130
Unique Fundamentalist Mov	1165	11.7	14.25	0	130
Terrorist Attacks	1165	12.9	141	0	3966
Suicide Terrorism	1165	.69	10.4	0	286
Freedom House Political Rts	1112	5.7	1.2	2	7
Freedom House Civil Liberties	1102	5.4	1.1	2	7
Total Number of U.S. Troops	1165	1023	8843	0	200000
Disappearances	1103	1.5	.8	0	2
Killings	1103	1.1	.8	0	2
Political Prison	1103	.64	.8	0	2
Torture	1103	.76	.76	0	2
Association	1103	.47	.63	0	2
Movement	1103	.4	.5	0	2
Speech	1103	.54	.62	0	2
Religious Freedom	1103	.27	.44	0	2
Worker's Rights	1098	.4	2.3	0	2
Women's Rights	1103	1.22	.8	0	2
U.S Aid	1124	84	341	0	6997
Polity	1165	-5.4	5	-10	9
Executive Recruitment	1165	3.5	2	1	8
Executive Constraints	1165	2.4	1.5	1	7
Executive Competition	1165	2.6	2.3	1	9
Total Population	1165	2.56e+07	3.96e+07	111000	2.21e+08
GDP	1017	3.15e+10	4.89e+10	1.07e+08	3.63e+11
ODA	1081	3.99e+08	8.57e+08	-1.26e+07	2.17e+10
School Enrolment	1070	51	28	1.3	104.04
Unemployment	1165	20.46	14.7	0	60
Poverty	1165	30.3	18.6	0	80

Results

Marxist Theory

As for the first hypothesis associated with my fundamentalist labyrinth, the socioeconomic inequality variables associated with Marxist theory, suggest a positive and significant relationship between socioeconomic inequality and the number of fundamentalist movements within the nation state. The percentage of the total population within the nation-state living below the poverty is positively associated with an increase in the number of

fundamentalist movements. Also, the percentage of the total population unemployed within the nation-state is positively associated with an increase in the number of fundamentalist movements. Given these results, we see that the socioeconomic inequality is a key predictor of fundamentalist movements. Helping to prove hypotheses number one that argues *socioeconomic inequality as described by the Marxist social movement theory is positively associated with the number and success Islamic fundamentalist groups present within the nation-state.*[111]

Table Ten: Hypothesis One Marxism

Population Total	.0010414*** (.0001391)
U.S. Financial Aid	.0001556 (.0000992)
Official Development Assistance	3.28e-06 (3.07e-06)
Outside Ideological Force	.3603364*** (.0497973)
Poverty	.0081488*** (.0027486)
Unemployment	.0112009*** (.0021746)
School Enrolment	.0029332*** (.001304)
Women's Political Rights	.0042975 (,0288608)
Workers Rights	.0009748 (.004377)
Polity	-.0023577 (.0036526)
Political Prison	-.080974 (.0320378)
Killings	-.0421961* (.0252759)
Freedom of Movement	-.1074857** (.0379116)
Religious Freedom	.0270646 (.0360475)
Freedom of Speech	.0222729 (.0319961)

Notes: *P < .10; **P < .05; ***P < .01.

[111] I also ran this model with the total number of unique fundamentalist groups as the dependent variable and both unemployment and poverty stayed positive and highly significant. However, ODA was positive and almost significant at the .06 level.

For every percentage increase in total poverty there was a .008 increase in Islamic fundamentalism. The computed IRR scores confirm these results. The model indicates that a one-standard deviation increase in the nation-state's percentage of total poverty, the expected number of fundamentalist movements by .010%. Finally, I looked at the poverty variable's effect on the number of fundamentalist movements by setting the variable at its minimum, mean, and maximum score. When the percentage of the total population living in poverty was set at its minimum, the expected number of fundamentalist movements is 3.89, down from the average of 5.06. When set at its maximum, the expected number of fundamentalist movements is 13.34, up from the average of 5.06. This shows that states with significant poverty have a significant increase in the number of fundamentalist movements.

The total percentage of the state's population living in poverty only represents half of the significant variables that make up the Marxist arm of my fundamentalist labyrinth; the second half of it consists of the total percentage of the state's unemployed population. Just as with the total poverty level, the unemployment coefficients were positive and significant. This indicates that unemployment is positively associated with an increase in the number of fundamentalist movements. As the percent of the nation-state's unemployed population increases, the number of fundamentalist movements within the nation-state also increases. The model results indicate that every percentage increase in total unemployment was a .011 significance level. The computed IRR scores confirm these results; the results imply that a one-standard deviation increase in the nation-state's percentage of unemployment the expected number of fundamentalist groups by 013%. Finally, I examine the poverty variable's effect on the number of fundamentalist movements by setting the variable at its minimum, mean, and maximum score which indicates the number of fundamentalist

movements expected at each setting. When the percentage of the total unemployed was set at its minimum the expected number of fundamentalist movements is 5.07, up from the average of 5.06. When set at its maximum, the expected number of fundamentalist groups is 9.07, up from the average of 5.06. These results are very interesting because set at its minimum, the expected number of fundamentalist movements is still larger than the mean; this indicates that unemployment has an effect on the number of fundamentalist movements.

Resource Mobilization Theory

As for the second hypothesis associated with my fundamentalist labyrinth, the resources associated with the Resource Mobilization theory, my results suggest a positive and significant relationship between resources and the number of fundamentalist movements within the nation state. Interestingly, my results indicate that only total population and education were positive and highly significant. In other words, as the total population increases so do the total number of fundamentalist movements. Also, as the percentage of the total population's education level increases so does the number of fundamentalist movements. Given these results we see that the resources are a key predictor of fundamentalist movements. Helping to prove hypotheses number two that argues: *Resources as described by the resource mobilization social movement theory is positively associated with the number and success Islamic fundamentalist groups present within the nation-state.*[112]

[112] I also ran this model with the total number of unique fundamentalist groups as the dependent variable and both total population and education stayed positive and highly significant. However, ODA also become positive and significant.

Table Eleven: Hypothesis Two, Resource Mobilization

Population Total	.0001046*** (.0001351)
GDP	2.93e-08 (4.67e-08)
U.S. Troops	2.89e-06 (9.17e-06)
U.S. Financial Aid	.0001587 (.0000982)
Official Development Assistance	3.22e-06 (3.06e-06)
Outside Ideological Force	.3592338*** (.0494209)
Poverty	.00819*** (.0027436)
Unemployment	.0111341*** (.0021174)
School Enrolment	.0029673*** (.00121174)
Polity	-.0023019 (.0036237)
Political Prison	-.0340593 (.0332401)
Killings	-.0310673 (.0254344)
Freedom of Movement	-.072046* (.0382415)
Religious Freedom	.0269641 (.0361385)
Freedom of Speech	.0487863 (.0326389)

Notes: *P < .10; **P < .05; ***P < .01.

The population coefficients were positive and significant in all regressions when I ran the model using the logged value of the total population. This indicates that the total population was positively associated with an increase in the number of fundamentalist movements. As the size of the nation-state's population increases by ten thousand, the number of fundamentalist movements increase by .0001046, this increase is relatively small. These results suggest that increases in a nation-state's population facilitate more fundamentalist movements; the computed IRR score confirms this. The IRR score implies that a one-standard deviation increase in the total population raises the expected number of fundamentalist movements by .00008%. These results indicate that as the population grows,

there will be an increase in the number of fundamentalist movements. Alone, these results do not indicate a significant amount of information; common sense tells me that the more people nation-states have the more of everything else it has, including Islamic fundamentalism. However, taken with the other variables associated with resource mobilization theory, it is apparent that resources are positively associated with fundamentalism. I looked at the total population variable's effect on the number of fundamentalist movements by setting the variable at its minimum, mean, and maximum score which indicates the number of fundamentalist groups expected at each setting. When the state's total population was set at its minimum the expected number of fundamentalist movements is 5.34, down from the average of 5.06. When set at its maximum, the expected number of fundamentalist movements is 13.8, up from the average of 5.06. These results further confirm all previous results and indicate that as the state's population increases, so do the number of Islamic fundamentalist movements.

Secondary school enrollment is also positive and significant, as expected and predicted by Marx and his theory of relative deprivation. The education/school enrollment coefficients were positive and significant. The education coefficients were significantly larger than that of the population variables. The results reveal that every percentage increase in school enrollment there was a significance level of .003. These results indicate that education was positively associated with an increase in the number of fundamentalist movements. In other words, the more educated the population, the more fundamentalist movements there will be within the nation-state. The computed IRR scores confirm this; the results imply that a one-standard deviation increase in the nation-state's secondary school enrolment the expected number of fundamentalist movements by .009%. Finally, just as

with the state's total population I looked at the education level variable's effect on the number of fundamentalist movements by setting the variable at its minimum, mean, and maximum score which indicates the number of fundamentalist movements expected at each setting. When secondary school enrollment was set at its minimum the expected number of fundamentalist movements is 4.08, down from the average of 5.06. When set at its maximum, the expected number of fundamentalist movements is 8.73, up from the average of 5.06. These results further confirm all previous results and indicate that as population and education increase, so do the number of Islamic fundamentalist movements.

Political Process Theory

The third hypothesis associated with my fundamentalist labyrinth is the political institutions associated with the Resource Mobilization theory. My results show two things; first, there are two linear relationships between perfect autocracies and the perfect democracies and the number of fundamentalist groups.[113] These findings indicate that both perfect democracies and perfect autocracies experience lower numbers of fundamentalist movements while states with opening political institutions experience more fundamentalist movements. When governments disdainfully kill or torture its citizens with no regards to basic human rights, there will be a decrease in the number Islamic fundamentalist groups. On the other hand, the more freedom of speech a nation-state has the fewer fundamentalist movements. Secondly, there is an inverted-U shaped relationship with the number and success of Islamic fundamentalist movements; the number of movements is the strongest in systems which are neither perfect democracies nor perfect autocracies. In order to prove hypotheses number three: *The degree of openness of political institutions as described by the*

[113] The definition of a perfect autocracy is obtained from the Polity IV data set that ranges from a -10 (a perfect autocracy) and +10 (a perfect democracy).

political process social movement theorists has an inverted-U shaped relationship with the number and success of Islamic fundamentalist movements; the number of movements should be the strongest in system which are neither highly democratic nor highly autocratic I ran different sets of models utilizing the Freedom House political rights data, CIRI human rights data, and the Polity IV data sets.

Eckstein and Gurr (1975. 26) defined polity as a "simple, general definition of all politics or governments as subsets of the class of authority patterns." They defined authority patterns as "a set of asymmetric relations among hierarchically ordered members of a social unit that involves the direction of the unit". The direction of a social unit involves the definition of its goals, the regulation of conduct of its members, and the allocation and coordination of roles within it (page 22 of Polity IV codebook). The original polity conceptual scheme was formulated and the initial Polity I data collected under the direction of Ted Gurr and Harry Eckstein, Patterns of Authority: A Structural Basis for Political Inquiry (NY: John Wilett and Sons, 1975). According to the authors, the Polity project has become the most widely used resource for monitoring regime change and studying the effects of regime authority. The Polity project has evolved through three earlier research phases, all under the direction of Gurr, and its most recent phase, Polity III, has updated the polity data through 1998. Monty Marshall (2005) argues that Polity IV makes a concerted effort to distinguish the regime and authority characteristics of the effective state polity from the use of organized, anti-regime armed force to challenge and, possibly reject that authority (Polity IV Codebook: 2).

Freedom House gave nation-sates a rating of between 1 representing the most free and 7 the least free. To receive a 1 on the political rights Freedom House score come closest to

the ideals associated with the purist example of democracy. For example, they have free and fair elections, those who are elected rule, there are competitive parties or other political groupings, and the opposition plays an important role and has actual power. Citizens enjoy self-determination or an extremely high degree of autonomy, and minority groups have reasonable self-government or can participate in the government through informal consensus. The Freedom House data set has significant problems and because of this I felt is was imperative I use additional independent variables that are associated with the different conditions that the Freedom House data tries to capture. I wanted to see if individually these variables are more significant than they are collectively.

Table Twelve: Hypothesis Three, Political Process

Population Total	.0010158*** (.0001352)	.0009138*** (.0001372)
U.S. Financial Aid	.0001822* (.0000985)	.0001094 (.0001004)
Official Development Assistance	3.38e-06 (3.05e-06)	4.14e-06 (3.05e-06)
Outside Ideological Force	.3376343*** (.0498413)	.3517101*** (.0490315)
Poverty	.0089459*** (.0027554)	.0088863*** (.0027659)
Unemployment	.0098839*** (.0021804)	.0083676*** (.0022119)
School Enrolment	.003315** (.0012973)	.002363** (.0012762)
Polity	-.0017713 (.003624)	_____
Polity2	_____	-.0026509 (.0006863)
Religious Freedom	.0226563* (.0367818)	.0464018 (.0374942)
Freedom of Speech	.051108 (.0336594)	.047317 (.0337191)
Freedom of Movement	-.0678742* (.0380351)	-.0477396 (.0385758)
Freedom House Political Rights	-.0297252*** (.0186641)	-.0135123*** (.0164182)
Disappearances	-.0491805*** (.0203303)	-.0412047*** (.0203916)
Killings	-.0505403*** (.0215572)	-.0399285** (.0216559)
Torture	-.109859*** (.027243)	-.0918286*** (.0275828)

Notes: *P < .10; **P < .05; ***P < .01.

I feel the Freedom House data sets are inherently flawed; they have completely ignored the Palestinian people. Arguably, no study looking at the Islamic world's social movements would be accurate if the Palestinians were excluded and arguably, all results would be biased. I can understand Freedom House excluding the Palestinians located in Lebanon, Syria, and so forth; however, they should not have excluded the ones in the occupied territories. Even if Freedom House refused to give them country-status, they should have included them in the Israeli country data. I have included the Freedom House variables and their results in the text of this chapter and not in the appendix because Freedom House

seems to be the norm in the literature when measuring civil and political liberties. The numbers of scholars who use these all encompassing data sets are significantly high.[114] As for any norm, it is imperative that it is acknowledge and tested and the dominate tools used within the field are tested; if not my results would be less credible, and it would appear as if I am hiding something. Furthermore, my results back up my hypotheses that are fewer fundamentalist movements in perfect autocracies or perfect democracies. The Freedom House results reveal that the more politically free a state is there will be a significance level decrease in the number of fundamentalist movements of .03. The IRR scores implies that a one-standard deviation increase the nation-state's Freedom House score will decrease by .04%. When the Freedom House Political Rights were set at its minimum the expected number of fundamentalist movements is 10.8, up from the average of 5.06. When set at its maximum, the expected number of fundamentalist movements is 5.26, down from the average of 5.06. Interestingly, these results contradict the above results confirming the

[114]A norm is generally defined as a standard of appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity: Marth Finnermore. 1996. National Interests in National Security, Ithaca: Cornell University Press; Page 22. According to Christopher Gelpe (1997:340) a norm is a standard that is meant to imply behavioral regularity. According to Scott Walker and Steven Poe (2002: 247) that the availability of human rights and freedom data was once a severe problem in the empirical study of human rights; however substantial challenges remain since data on many human rights issues are regularly gathered or are available for only a limited number of countries, and Freedom House has been a pioneer with this. A basic JSTOR search indicates that there are 664 articles that have used or acknowledged the Freedom House data sets. Also, there are 264 articles in Project Muse that have used or acknowledged the Freedom House date set. The following are a few examples of the norm in the literature: Ari Aisen and Francisco Jose Veiga. 2006. Does Political Instability Lead to Higher Inflation? A Panel Data Analysis. *Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking*. Pages 1379-1389. This paper shows that a higher degree of political instability is associates with higher inflation. Linda Camp Keith. 1999. The United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Does it Make a Difference in Human Rights Behavior. *Journal of Peace Research*, Pages 95-118. Her article tested whether becoming a party to this international treaty has an observable impact on the state party's actual behavior. Gilbert Valverde. 1999. Democracy, Human Rights, and Development Assistance for Education: The USAID and World Bank in Latin America and the Caribbean. *Economic Development and Cultural Change*. Pages 401-419. This article looks at the state's transition to democracy. Staffan Lindberg. 2006. The Surprising Significance of African Elections. *Journal of Democracy*, Pages 139-151. She looks at the value of elections in measuring democracy. Steven Poe and Neal Tate. 1994. Repression of Human Rights to Personal Integrity in the 1980s: A Global Analysis. *The American Political Science Review*. Pages 853-872. There cross national study explained variations in governmental repression of human rights to personal integrity in 153 country sample during the 1980s. Lind Camp Keith. 2002. Constitutional Provisions for Individual Human Rights (1977-1996): Are They More The Mere Window Dressing? *Political Science Quarterly*. Pages 111-143. Looked at the relationship between constitutions and human rights. David Cingranelli and David Richards. 1999. Respect for Human Rights After the End of the Cold War. Journal of Peace Research. Pages 511-534. Scott Walker and Steven Poe. 2002. Does Cultural Diversity Affect Countries' Respect for Human Rights? *Human Rights Quarterly*. Pages 237-263. In this paper they examine the relationship between cultural diversity and the respect for several human rights. They basically link cultural diversity to human rights.

Freedom House variable. They show that the more autocratic the state is, the fewer the fundamentalist movements there will be.

Extrajudicial killings are negative and significant, as expected. Extrajudicial killing is the killing of citizens within the perspective nation-state by government officials without due process of law. These killings may result from the deliberate, illegal, and excessive use of lethal force by police, security forces, or other agents of the state whether against criminal suspects, detainees, prisoners, or others. The model indicates that the more individuals a state kills there will be a .05 decrease in the significance level of the number of fundamentalist movements. The computed IRR scores confirm this; the results imply that a one-standard deviation increase in the number of extrajudicial killings in a nation-state the expected number of fundamentalist movements with the inclusion of the CIRI Human Rights Data Project variables decrease by .13%. Finally, I looked at the extrajudicial killing variable's effect on the number of fundamentalist movements by setting the variable at its minimum, mean, and maximum score which indicates the number of fundamentalist groups expected at each setting. When extrajudicial killings were set at its minimum the expected number of fundamentalist movements is 7.33, up from the average of 5.06. When set at its maximum, the expected number of fundamentalist movements is 3.42, down from the average of 5.06. These results confirm that the more citizens the state either murders or facilitates the murder of, there will be a significant decline in the number of fundamentalist movements.

State sponsored acts of torture were also negative and significant, as expected. State sponsored acts of torture refer to the purposeful inflicting of extreme pain, whether mental or physical, by government officials or by private individuals at the instigation of government officials. Torture includes the use of physical and other force by police and prison guards

that is cruel, inhumane, or degrading. This also includes deaths in custody due to negligence by government officials. The results reveal that the more individuals a state tortures there will be a significance level decrease of in the number of fundamentalist movements of .11. Also, the computed IRR scores confirm this; the results implies that a one-standard deviation increase nation-state's sponsored acts of torture the expected number of fundamentalist movements will decrease by .07%. Finally, I looked at the state sponsored acts of torture variable's effect on the number of fundamentalist movements by setting the variable at its minimum, mean, and maximum score which indicates the number of fundamentalist movements expected at each setting. When state sponsored acts of torture were set at its minimum the expected number of fundamentalist movements is 6.28, up from the average of 5.06. When set at its maximum, the expected number of fundamentalist movements is 5.49, down from the average of 5.06. These results confirm that the more the state tortures its citizens, the fewer fundamentalist movements.

State sponsored disappearances are also negative and significant. State sponsored disappearances are cases in which individuals have disappeared where political motivation appears likely, and the victims have not been found. Knowledge of their whereabouts is not public knowledge. In most instances, disappearances occur because of the victim's ethnicity religion or race or because of the victim's political involvement or knowledge of information sensitive to authorities. The results reveal that the more individuals a state disappears there will be a decrease of in the number of fundamentalist movements significance level of .05. The computed IRR scores confirm this; the results imply that a one-standard deviation increase nation-state's sponsored disappearances the expected number of fundamentalist movements will decrease by .087%. Finally, I looked at the state sponsored disappearance

variable's effect on the number of fundamentalist movements by setting the variable at its minimum, mean, and maximum score which indicates the number of fundamentalist movements expected at each setting. When state sponsored disappearances were set at its minimum the expected number of fundamentalist movements is 5.96, up from the average of 5.06. When set at its maximum, the expected number of fundamentalist movements is 5.01, down from the average of 5.06. These results confirm that the more citizens the state either disappears, there will be a decline in the number of fundamentalist movements. However, the decline is not as significant as it was with state sponsored killings.

Thus far, I have not proven an inverted-U relationship exists between political institutions and the number of fundamentalist movements. I have shown that two linear relationships exist between very perfect democracies/autocracies and the number of fundamentalist movements. These findings indicate that both perfect democracies and perfect autocracies experience lower numbers of fundamentalist movements while states with opening political institutions experience more fundamentalist movements. However, I suspect a much more complex relationship between political institutions and Islamic fundamentalism. I suspect an inverted-U relationship; that is, there will be more Islamic fundamentalist movements in nation-states that are not either perfect democracies or perfect autocracies. My inverted-U hypothesis is very similar to that used by Christian Davenport and David Armstrong (2004: 541) and what they call "more murder in the middle" hypothesis. The authors claim that the ends of the political spectrum are less important for understanding human rights violations then those governments that lie somewhere between theses two extremes. According to Davenport and Armstrong (2004:545) polity stands as the best comparative indicator of procedural democracy because of its incorporation of structural

constraints on political participation and contestation; it is also one of the most utilized comparative measures of democracy and the best variable to determine inverted-U shaped relationships (Jaggers and Girr 1994, 470; Ward 2002, 49). Therefore, I squared all variables associated with polity. If the polity variables have a significant positive effect and the squared term has a significant negative effect, then I prove that an inverted-U relationship exists. My polity variable was not significant. This does not necessarily disprove my hypothesis because two of the three multi-dimensional polity variables and their square terms were significant.

We have seen this inverted-U hypothesis throughout the Islamic world in the last thirty seven years within perfect autocracies. For example, in Kuwait (a perfect autocracy) a group called the *Black Brigades*, an obscure Kuwaiti Shiite revolutionary group funded via Iranian financial assistance formed in 1982 and it remained in Kuwait. It existed for just a matter of weeks before its leaders and its few members were arrested and subsequently killed. A second example of this is the *Generation of Arab Fury*, a second obscure Kuwaiti Shiite revolutionary group funded via Iranian financial assistance, whose objective was to commit acts of violence against Saudi Arabia remained in Kuwait for just a few months in 1989 before being completely eliminated via the execution of its leader and members. A second example would be that of Saudi Arabia, a perfect autocracy. Saudi Arabia has had numerous examples of very short lived, obscure fundamentalist groups that exist long enough for a meeting and then are subsequently eliminated. These include groups such as the *Liberation Party of the Peninsula* this Shiite group was active in the Eastern part of Saudi Arabia in the months following the 1979 Iranian Revolution; its members were subsequently jailed and then executed. The *Al-Haramayn Brigades* were a small fundamentalist movement that

sought to overthrow the royal family and replace it with an Islamic militant quasi-democracy; this group was active for just a few months in 2003. *Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula* was only active in Saudi Arabia for one month in 2004 before a single terrorist attack resulted in the state initiating the total elimination of everyone associated with the group or the group's members. The *Arabian Peninsula Freemen* was active for three months in 1989 before they too were completely eliminated. There are Islamic fundamentalist groups that have formed in Saudi Arabia during the course of the last year that the Saudi government is currently trying to deal with; they include *Abu Mus'ab Al-Zarqawi Battalion* and the *Islamic Peninsula Movement for Change – Jihad Wing*. These do not include the groups that get their financial support from the state whose objective is to spread Sunni Islam. Furthermore, perfect autocracies like Brunei, Qatar, Oman, Algeria until the late 1980s, or Jordan until the early 1990s have no fundamentalist groups within them.

Table Thirteen: Hypothesis Three Political Process

Population Total	.0009739*** (.0001471)	.001267 (.0001453)	.0009337*** (.0001444)	.001184*** (.00014)	.0009115*** (.0001452)	.0011508*** (.0001418)
GDP	5.13e-08 (4.76e-08)	4.35e-08 (4.83e-08)	5.44e-08 (4.79e-08)	5.90e-08 (4.86-08)	6.55e-08 (4.81e-08)	6.02e-08 (4.92e-08)
U.S. Financial Aid	.0001918* (.0000995)	.000890* (.000008)	.0001817* (.0000995)	.0001847* (.0001012)	.0001668* (.0001004)	.000089 (.000278)
Official Development Assistance	1.82e-06 (3.15e-06)	2.98e-06 (3.02e-06)	1.83e-06 (3.14e-06)	2.37e-06* (3.17e-06)	2.32e-06 (3.13e-06)	4.02e-06 (3.02e-06)
Outside Ideological Force	.3545735*** (.0508397)	.3623780*** (.0521568)	.3433839*** (.0514415)	.359800*** (.05009)	.3232988*** (.0499697)	.400189*** (.38908)
Poverty	.0084663*** (.002766)	.0079641*** (.0028967)	.0088717*** (.0027507)	.0088594*** (.0028814)	.0095129*** (.0027756)	.0090297*** (.0028881)
Unemployment	.0091122*** (.0022645)	.0092893*** (.0023405)	.0093075*** (.0022704	.0099975*** (.002241)	.0087464*** (.0033742)	.0097606*** (.0023173)
School Enrolment	.0028423** (.0012996)	.005358 (.00197)	.0026923** (.0013269)	.0052779*** (.0013269)	.001722 (.0013369)	.0040282*** (.0013297)
Women's Political Rights	.0148381 (.0306453)	.023723 (.03616)	.0108332 (.0306508)	.109022 (.39693)	.0001003 (.0306801)	-.0008937 (.031107)
Workers Rights	.0023795 (.0044366)	-.0005386 (.0048987)	.0020341 (.0044191)	-.000928 (.001078)	.001354 (.0043977)	-.001289 (.002982)
Religious Freedom	.0063941 (.0364433)	.0174676 (.035672)	.0094657 (.0363936)	.0198611 (.0358813)	.0217248 (.0367239)	.024255 (.0359817)
Freedom of Speech	.0422441 (.0328622)	.0108348 (.0318309)	.0434935 (.0330333)	.0197402 (.032172)	.0360241 (.0330065)	.0089096 (.0320534)
Freedom of Movement	-.0027663* (.0334722)	-.012246* (.001228)	-.127401* (.0012331)	.087761 (0096152)	-.0511009 (.0439088)	-.001897 (.000928)
Freedom of Association	.0513346* (.0294458)	.0647617** (.029119)	.0476174 (.0294187)	.0494709* (.0294329)	.0572531** (.0290461)	.059201** (.0290074)
Killings	-,0421407* (.023301)	-.052175** (.025405)	-.0391002* (.0233593)	-.0404736 (.0253094)	-.0393078* (.0232394)	-.0431297* (.0251439)
Political Prison	-.0723979** (.0302151)	-.0157883 (.0330794)	-.0775723*** (.0304657)	-.0269632 (.0337792)	-.0890082*** (0300131)	-.0327533 (.0327152)
Executive Recruitment	-.0160603*** (.0121487)	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Executive Recruitment Squared	_____	.0125879*** (.001302)	_____	_____	_____	_____
Executive Constraints	_____	_____	.022870*** (.0115702)	_____	_____	_____
Executive Constraints Squared	_____	_____		-.0020019*** (.0016018)	_____	_____
Political Competition	_____	_____	_____	_____	.0185365 (.0074425)	_____
Political Competition Squared	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	.0015116 (.0009545)

Notes: *P < .10; **P < .05; ***P < .01.

Concerning the multidimensional polity variables, executive recruitment was positive and significant. Executive recruitment measures the ways in which the executive comes to occupy their positions of political authority; how institutionalized, competitive and open are

the mechanisms for selecting a political leader. Executive recruitment, which was first conceptualized by Eckstein and Gurr (1975), involves the ways in which social superordinantes come to occupy their positions of political authority. In other words, how open, institutionalized and competitive are the political institutions that are used in selecting political leaders. Marshall and Jaggers (2005: 49) argue that in terms of modern democratic theory, democratic systems are defined as those polities that afford their citizens the opportunity to replace their political representatives through regularly competitive and open elections. According to Marshall and Jaggers's (2005) modern democratic theory, democratic systems are defined as those polities that afford their citizens the opportunity to replace their political representatives through regularly scheduled, competitive and open elections. These procedural dimensions of democracy have been captured by three key variables from the polity data set and they include: (1) the extent of institutionalization or regulation of executive transfers, (2) the competitiveness of executive selection, and (3) the openness of executive recruitment. The executive recruitment score ranges from 1 to 8, 1 being the most restricted and 8 being the most open. My analysis of executive recruitment provides evidence that there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between the openness of the political system and the number of fundamentalist groups. Executive recruitment is significantly positive while its squared term is negatively significant, proving that an inverted-U relationship exists between executive recruitment and the number of fundamentalist movements present within the nation-state. In other words, the relationship between fundamentalism and political institutions is nonlinear; political systems with open political institutions facilitate fundamentalism. The executive recruitment coefficient results reveal that the more political free a state is the number of fundamentalist movement

significance level increases by .013. On the other hand, the squared executive recruitment coefficients reveal that the more political closed a state is, there will be a decrease in the number of fundamentalist movements of .023. The IRR score implies that a one-standard deviation increase in the nation-state's executive recruitment score will increase by .019%. Also, the IRR scores implies that a one-standard deviation increase the nation-state's executive recruitment squared score will decrease by .02%.

Executive constraints were positive and significant and refer to the extent of institutional constraints on the decision-making powers of the chief executive. The degree of checks and balances between the veto players in the government is coded on a 7-point scale which ranges from the unlimited executive authority (1) to executive subordination (7). Under unlimited executive authority there would be only one veto player and under executive subordination there would be numerous veto players. According to Marshall and Jaggers (2005: 63) in Western democracies the executive branch is typically constrained by the legislative and judicial branches of government. In Islamic states, their executives are restrained via militaries, political parties, legislatures, and most significantly the church. Furthermore, Marshall and Jaggers (2005:63) argues that executive constraints are similar to the notion of "horizontal accountability" found in the democracy literature but it assumes that dictators may also be bound by certain institutional constraints. Limits on the chief executive may be imposed by any "accountability group" in the polity. In Western democracies the executive branch is typically constrained by the legislative and judicial branches of government. Other kinds of accountability groups are the ruling party in a one-party system, a council of nobles or power advisors in monarchies, and the military. My analysis of executive constraints provides evidence that there is an inverted U-shaped relationship

between the openness of the political system and the number of fundamentalist groups. Executive constraints are positively significantly while its squared term is negatively significant, proving that an inverted-U relationship between executive constraints and the number of fundamentalist movements present within the nation-state. As for the executive constraint coefficients, the results reveal that the more veto players in a state means there will be a significance level increase in the number of fundamentalist movements of .023. On the other hand, the squared executive constraint coefficients reveal that the more veto players in a state will cause a decrease in the number of fundamentalist movements of .002. The IRR score implies that a one-standard deviation increase the nation-state's executive constraints score will increase by .16%. Also, the IRR scores implies that a one-standard deviation increase the nation-state's executive constraints squared score will decrease by .018%.

The results of my executive constraints and executive recruitment variables were similar to that of Regan and Henderson (2002) and Fein (1995), both of which found that there would be more repression in the middle of the political spectrum and that both democracies and autocracies experience lower levels of repression while semi democracies experience more fundamentalist groups.[115] I have proven that my inverted-U hypothesis is valid and there will be a significant increase in the number of fundamentalist movements in opening political systems, just as the political process theorist predict.

New Social Movement Theory

As for the fourth hypothesis associated with my fundamentalist labyrinth, the ideas associated with the New Social Movement theory, results suggest a positive and significant relationship between ideas and the number of fundamentalist movements within the nation

[115] I also ran this model with the total number of unique fundamentalist groups as the dependent variable and all three polity variables and their squared terms became highly significant. This further proves my inverted-U hypothesis. Also, all freedom of movement coefficients became negative and highly significant.

state; specifically, religious ones or ones associated with an outside ideological force. Interestingly, my results indicate that the presences of an outside ideological force, freedom of speech, and freedom of religion are significant. Given these results we see that ideas are a key predictor of fundamentalist movements. Helping to prove hypotheses number four that argues: *Ideas as described by the new social movement theorists are positively associated with the number and success Islamic fundamentalist groups present within the nation-state.*[116]

Table Fourteen: Hypothesis Four New Social Movements

Population Total	.0010717*** (.0001408)	.0010753*** (.0001393)
GDP	1.19e-08 (4.80e-08)	1.31e-08 (4.79e-08)
U.S. Troops	3.31e-06 (9.16e-06)	2.23e-06 (9.13e-06)
U.S. Financial Aid	.0000959 (.0001013)	.0001054 (.0001013)
Official Development Assistance	2.27e-06 (3.14e-06)	2.67e-06 (3.07e-06)
Outside Ideological Force	.3555338*** (.0506571)	.3630426*** (.0497402)
Poverty	.0077294*** (.0028003)	.0078023*** (.0027546)
Unemployment	.0105782*** (.0022535)	.0106273*** (.0021848)
School Enrolment	.0034866*** (.0013569)	.0034651** (.0013525)
Women's Political Rights	.0184314 (.0017143)	.0012489 (.0043455)
Workers Rights	-.01296832 (.0011324)	.0048231 (.028907)
Polity	-.00042912* (.0042912)	-.0078499* (.0042285)
Religious Freedom	.0014164*** (.0352899)	_____
Freedom of Speech	-.018927*** (.0319494)	_____
Freedom of Movement	-.0603762* (.0379705)	_____
Freedom House Civil Liberties	_____	-.0536345* (.0217175)

Notes: *P < .10; **P < .05; ***P < .01.

[116] I also ran this model with the total number of unique fundamentalist groups as the dependent variable and freedom of movement became negative and highly significant. Also, freedom of speech became almost significant and not highly significant. Finally, the Freedom House variable also became highly significant.

The results reveal that if there is a presence of an outside ideological force there is an increase in the number of fundamentalist movements of .35. The computed IRR scores confirm these results; the results imply that a one-standard deviation increase in the presence of an outside ideological force the expected number of fundamentalist movements by 42%. Furthermore, I looked at the outside ideological force variable's effect on the number of fundamentalist movements by setting the variable at its minimum, mean, and maximum score which indicates the number of fundamentalist movements expected at each setting. When the variable is set at its minimum the expected number of fundamentalist movements is 4.61, up from the average of 5.06. When set at its maximum, the expected number of fundamentalist movements is 11.0, up from the average of 5.06. These results are very interesting because set at its maximum, the expected number of fundamentalist movements is twice as much as it is when set at the mean; this and the above statistical results indicate that the presence of an outside ideological force is a significant determinant in the number of fundamentalist movements.

There are three significant outside ideological forces in the Islamic world that operate within Islamic nation-states: Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United States. As I explained before, theoretically, American ideological influence is inherently different than either Iranian or Saudi Arabian. For the most part, the outside ideological variable only incorporates the influence of Iran or Saudi Arabia and to a minor extent other Islamic states that have met the five criteria to be considered an outside ideological force. U.S. ideological influence was excluded from this variable but captured with two additional variables: U.S. aid and the presence of U.S. troops. Not in a single model was U.S. aid or the presence of U.S. troops significant.

Religious freedom is positive and significant. Religious freedom measures the extent to which individuals living within the nation-state are able to exercise and practice their own religious beliefs without government restrictions. When governments restrict religious freedom there is an increase in the number Islamic fundamentalist movements. The results reveal that if the state restricts religious freedom then there will be a .0014 significance level. The IRR scores imply that a one-standard deviation increase nation-state's freedom of religion the expected number of fundamentalist movements .09%. Finally, I looked at the freedom of religion variable's effect on the number of fundamentalist groups by setting the variable at its minimum, mean, and maximum score which indicates the number of fundamentalist movements expected at each setting. When religious freedom was set at its minimum the expected number of fundamentalist groups is 5.81, down from the average of 5.06. When set at its maximum, the expected number of fundamentalist movements is 4.77, up from the average of 5.06. These results further confirm all previous results and indicate that as the state restricts religious freedom, individuals will turn to fundamentalist movements.

Freedom of speech is negative and significant, as expected. Freedom of speech measures the extent to which the government censors an individual's freedoms of speech and press. When governments restrict freedom of speech we see a decrease in the number Islamic fundamentalist movements by .019. In other words, in nation-states with more freedom of speech and press, there will be more ideas and thus more fundamentalist movements. The results reveal that if the state restricts freedom of speech then there will be a significance level decrease of in the number of fundamentalist movements of .09. Also, the computed IRR scores confirm this; the results imply that a one-standard deviation increase nation-

state's freedom of speech the expected number of fundamentalist movements decrease by .037%. Finally, I looked at the freedom of speech variable's effect on the number of fundamentalist movements by setting the variable at its minimum, mean, and maximum score which indicates the number of fundamentalist movements expected at each setting. When freedom of speech was set at its minimum the expected number of fundamentalist movement is 5.18, down from the average of 5.06. When set at its maximum, the expected number of fundamentalist movements is 5.42, up from the average of 5.06.

Terrorism as a Dependent Variable

To further test these results and the relationship between the degree of fundamentalism (as measured by the number of fundamentalist movements) and that of the number of terrorist and suicide terrorist attacks, I think it is imperative to evaluate the terrorist data. The terrorism data is an integral part of the fundamentalist literature and it is highly problematic to separate the two. Furthermore, it is important to assume that the more terrorist attacks a nation-state have then the more conducive to fundamentalism it is. To do this, I will repeat my analysis of by changing the dependent variable from the total number of fundamentalist movements in every nation-state for the last thirty-six years to the total number of terrorist and suicide terrorist attacks in ever predominately Islamic state for the last thirty-six years. One of the best ways to determine the degree of terrorism is to look at the number of suicide terrorist attacks; there is no greater act of terrorism than that of a suicide terrorist. I feel the number of suicide terrorist attacks will reveal a great deal of information as to what state-level phenomena facilitate such violence. I have also included the total number of fundamentalist movements as an independent variable in order to determine the relationship between the number of fundamentalist movements and terrorism. To determine

the degree of fundamentalism within a nation-state by counting the total number of terrorist attacks and suicide terrorist attacks is not a perfect measurement, but it will tell us the characteristics found within each nation-state seems to be facilitating violence. I am assuming that the more fundamentalist movements a state has, the more acts of terrorism that state will also have. As argued in Hypothesis Number Five: *The total degree fundamentalism in the Islamic nation-state is positively associated with the total degree of non-state induced violence within that nation-state. In other words, if the nation-state has a large degree of fundamentalism, it will have a large number of terrorist attacks.*

Table Fifteen: Terrorism

Number of fundamentalist groups	.0079509 (.0070204)
Population Total	-.0001** (.000032)
GDP	7.68e-08** (1.77e-08)
U.S. Troops	.0000166 (.0000157)
U.S. Financial Aid	.0006337*** (.0002611)
Official Development Assistance	-8.07e-10* (2.09e-10)
Outside Ideological Force	.3138084* (.1642867)
Poverty	.0100356 (.0067464)
Unemployment	.0041539 (.007738)
School Enrolment	.0069769* (.0040775)
Freedom of speech	.3874487*** (1245125)
Religious Freedom	-.5575162*** (.1445336)
Killings	-.1412438 (.1003568)
Political Prisoners	-.3026613*** (.1167829)
Torture	-.2110453* (.1236699)
Movement	-.107438 (.1378888)
Polity	-.0270196 (.1247045)

Notes: *P < .10; **P < .05; ***P < .01.

Interestingly, GDP, the total population, and U.S. aid were significant. My results reveal that as the size of the nation-state's population increases by ten-thousand the number of terrorist acts the significance level decreases by .000032. The IRR score also indicates a decrease in the number of terrorist attacks; as the population grows by one ratio; there is a decrease of .0001 in the number of terrorist attacks. These results partially indicate that as the population grows, there will be fewer acts of terrorism. Also, with every ten-thousand dollar increase in GDP there is increase in the number of terrorist attacks by .0000000768.

The IRR score indicates that there is no relationship. These results indicate that nation-states with larger GDPs and smaller populations will have more acts of terrorism when there is a presence of significant U.S. aid; however, financial aid from other sources has no impact.

The U.S. aid variable is highly significant and indicates that as U.S. aid increases by ten-thousand dollars there is a significance level increase in the number of terrorist attacks by .0006337. The IRR score indicates that also indicates an increase in the number of terrorist attacks, as U.S. aid increases by one ratio, there is an increase of terrorist attacks by .000366. I looked at the U.S. aid variable's effect on the number of terrorist attacks by setting the variable at its minimum, mean, and maximum score which indicates the number of terrorist attacks expected at each setting. When the total U.S. aid was set at its minimum the expected number of terrorist attacks is 1.86, down from the average of 1.89. When set at its maximum, the expected number of terrorist attacks is 4.57, significantly up from the average of 1.86. This shows that states with significant U.S. aid will have a significant increase in the number of terrorist attacks. However, the number of U.S. troops is not significant.

Interestingly, the outside ideological force variable is only almost significant. This indicates that the presence of an outside ideological force does not facilitate violence. What further makes these results interesting is that the outside ideological force variable looks predominantly at the presence of Iranian and/or Saudi Arabian presence and the U.S. aid variable looks only U.S. financial aid and with U.S. aid comes U.S. influence and conditions. I have interpreted these results to indicate that countries associated with the outside ideological aid variable (specifically Iran and Saudi Arabia) and the U.S. aid goes to different nation-states and states that receive significant amounts of U.S. aid are more prone to violence than states that receive either Iranian or Saudi Arabian ideological influence.

As it relates to the socioeconomic variables, neither unemployment nor poverty was significant. These and all previous results indicate that unemployment and poverty facilitate fundamentalism, but not violent fundamentalism. In the following case-studies I will look in more depth at these results, specifically at poverty and unemployment facilitating the number of fundamentalist groups but not violence. Polity was also not significant. As for the other significant variables, the number of state sponsored killings was also highly significant. My results indicate that as the state kills more individuals the number of terrorist attacks significance level degrees by .303.

Furthermore, my results reveal that for every numeric increase in religious freedom, there is a significance level decline in the number of terrorist attacks of .57. According to the IRR score, if the nation-state's level of religious freedom increases by one number then its ratio for terrorist attacks would be expected to decrease by a factor of .442, a significant decline. Furthermore, freedom of speech was also highly significant and the results have the opposite effects as that of religious freedom. For every significance level increase in the nation-state's freedom of speech there is a increase in the number of terrorist groups of.39. According to the IRR score, if the nation-state's level of freedom of speech increases by one number then its ratio for terrorist attacks would be expected to increase by a factor of .527, a significant increase. In other words, restrictions on religious freedom and freedom of speech both facilitate violence. Furthermore, and most significantly the total number of fundamentalist movements was not significant, disproving Hypothesis Number Five. These results indicate that the number of fundamentalist movements has a positive but not a significant relationship in determining the number of terrorist attacks a nation-state has. Furthermore, with suicide terrorism as the dependent variable the total number of

fundamentalist movements remains positive and only almost significant. However, U.S. aid is significant with the total number of terrorist attacks.

Table Sixteen: Suicide Terrorism

Number of fundamentalist groups	.0638598* (.032855)
Population Total	.0001624 (.0001352)
GDP	3.87e-08 (5.50e-08)
U.S. Troops	-.0000723 (.0004005)
U.S. Financial Aid	-.0001532 (.0011323)
Official Development Assistance	-1.18e-09 (7.99e-10)
Outside Ideological Force	.7530614 (.8278142)
Poverty	-.0231748 (.0286559
Unemployment	.285423 (.0392038)
School Enrolment	-3.468986* (1.311)
Freedom of speech	.6326107 (.5439463)
Religious Freedom	-.4542267*** (.6053126)
Killings	.8357669 (.6649852)
Political Prisoners	-1.546033** (.6340117)
Torture	.766257 (.556864)
Movement	.0396789* (.0222067)
Polity	.7522871 (.6166175)

Finally, the best way to determine the degree of terrorism is to look at the number of suicide terrorist attacks; there is not a more fundamentalist act than that of a suicide terrorist attack. I feel the number of suicide terrorist attacks is a great determiner of the degree of fundamentalism. This is not a perfect measurement but it will tell us what characteristics are within each nation-state that seems to be facilitating suicide terrorism. Interestingly, only one variable was significant, religious freedom. With every numeric increase in religious freedom, there is a significance level decrease in the number of suicide terrorism by 3.47. In

other words, the more religious freedom a state has, the fewer acts of suicide terrorism it will have, the IRR score results confirm this. Finally, I looked at the religious freedom variable's effect on the number of suicide terrorist attacks by setting the variable at its minimum, mean, and maximum score which indicates the number suicide terrorist attacks groups at each setting. When religious freedom was set at its minimum the expected number of suicide terrorist attacks is .0092, up from the average of .0064. When set at its maximum, the expected number of suicide terrorist attacks is, 0028, down from the average of .0064. This shows that states with less religious freedom will have more suicide terrorist attacks. Interestingly, U.S. aid and restrictions on religious freedom facilitate violence and not the number of fundamentalist movements within the nation-state.

Conclusion

The goal of Chapter three was to determine through the application of quantitative analysis the causes of Islamic fundamentalism and determine what phenomena exists/does not exist within the majority-Islamic nation-state that seems to be facilitating the number of Islamic fundamentalist groups. The main objective of chapter three was to use quantitative analysis to build on and support the theoretical claims in the previous two chapters. In doing so I was able to prove that there is validity to my fundamentalist labyrinth and that each of the social movement conditions are positively associated with Islamic fundamentalist movements.

As for the first condition in my fundamentalist labyrinth, the socioeconomic inequality variables associated with Marxist theory; I was able to show that unemployment has a significant positive relationship on Islamic fundamentalist movements; poverty as a positive but less significant effect, confirming the Marxist condition in my fundamentalist

labyrinth. As for the second condition in my fundamentalist labyrinth, the resource variables associated with resource mobilization theory; I was able to show that the total population also has a significant positive relationship on Islamic fundamentalism. More importantly, secondary school enrolment was also positive and significant in all models ran, as expected, and predicted by Marx and his theory of relative depravation. As for the third condition in my fundamentalist labyrinth, the political institutions variables associated with political process theory; I was able to show that they type of political institutions a state has is positively associated with Islamic fundamentalism. My results show two things; first, there are two negative linear relationships between very strong autocracies and the very strong democracies and the number of fundamentalist groups. Secondly, there is an inverted-U shaped relationship with the number and success of Islamic fundamentalist groups; the number of groups is the strongest in system which are neither highly democratic nor highly autocratic. As for the third condition in my fundamentalist labyrinth, the idea variables associated with new social movement theory; I was able to show that the presence of an outside-ideological force, specifically one from Iran or Saudi Arabia has a positive and significant relationship with Islamic fundamentalist movements. Also, I was able to show that religious freedom is positive and significant while freedom of speech is negative and significant. Finally, I was able to show that states with less religious freedom will have more suicide terrorist attacks. Interestingly, U.S. aid and restrictions on religious freedom facilitate violence and not the number of fundamentalist movements within the nation-state.

Chapter Four: Egypt and the Muslim Brotherhood

The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood is one of the oldest and most resilient of the Sunni Islamic fundamentalist movements in the world. It has for over eighty years exerted a radical form of opposition to the Egyptian state and existing Egyptian sociopolitical and socioeconomic institutions. Arguably, the Muslim Brotherhood could be considered the mother movement of all Islamic fundamentalist movements; it has off-shoots in Jordan, Palestine, Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq.[117] The Brotherhood's ideological foundations stem from its opposition to imperialism, liberal nationalism, secularism, Western Capitalism, Communism, and currently terrorism, both domestic and international within Egypt and the Greater Middle East.

This chapter has three objectives; first, it qualitatively confirms the results of the previous quantitative chapter, and it shows that each of the social movement conditions is positively associated with Egyptian fundamentalism, specifically the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. Secondly, as a fundamentalist movement, the Brotherhood has all the same characteristics as that of a social movement; however, the Brotherhood acts differently than most social movements in the sense that it has political party aspirations and seeks votes.

In order to meet each objective, I evaluate aspects of each of my fundamentalist labyrinth's conditions on both the movement and state levels and show that each are positively associated with Egyptian Islamic fundamentalism, specifically the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. Also, I show that each of the conditions associated with my labyrinth

[117] Classic studies of the Muslim Brotherhood include: Richard Mitchell. 1969, The Society of the Muslim Brothers. Also see: David Sagiv. 1995. Fundamentalism and Intellectuals in Egypt, 1973-1993; Gilles Kepel 1985. Muslim Extremism in Egypt: The Prophet and Pharaoh; Saad Eddin 1986. *An Islamic Alternative in Egypt: The Muslim Brotherhood and Sadat*. In Ibrahim Egypt, Islam, and Democracy; Hamied Ansari. Egypt: The Stalled Society; Hasan Hanafi. 1982. The Relevance of the Islamic Alternative in Egypt. *Arab Studies Quarterly*. Page 60; Gilles Kepel. 1985. Muslim Extremism in Egypt: The Prophet and Pharaoh

are significantly influenced by Egyptian state institutions, specifically the Egyptian presidency. Because of this, I evaluate each of my fundamentalist conditions under the Nasser, Sadat, and Mubarak presidencies separately. Furthermore, in Chapter Three I proposed and quantitatively proved that an inverted-U relationship exists between the openness of political institutions and fundamentalism. I was able to show that there are more fundamentalist movements in opening political systems than in either perfect autocracies or perfect democracies. The three Egyptian presidencies fluctuate between perfect autocracy (Nasser) to an opening autocracy (Sadat) and to an autocracy that fluctuates between accommodation and oppression (Mubarak), so too have the number of fundamentalist movements fluctuated within Egypt. Also, I will look at the outside ideological forces associated with Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and show that the Brotherhood itself is the outside ideological force, making it different than most Islamic fundamentalist social movements.

Furthermore, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood also acts differently than most social movements because it has political party aspirations and seeks votes. Political parties are not social movements, but oftentimes they arise as a result of a social movement; then they continue to act as a social movement and seek votes. Very few social movements seek votes, and because the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood does, it makes it an interesting case-study. Vote-seeking movements act differently than non-vote-seeking movements with respect to their relations with the general population. In this sense, and in order to receive votes, the Muslim Brotherhood provides significant humanitarian aid and spiritual guidance to the overall Egyptian population; this facilitates its electoral support. Consequently, it has had significant electoral success when allowed to participate in Egypt's politically-gilded political

institutions.[118] Finally, the Muslim Brotherhood has been a relatively peaceful movement. Except for the occasional Muslim reaction to British missionary activities, they do not currently, and have not committed, sponsored, or facilitated acts of terrorism on Egyptian soil. In this sense, the Brotherhood acts differently than both Hamas and Hezbollah, both of which will be evaluated in the following chapters.

Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood Overview

From its conception in the 1920s, the Brotherhood's members were bitterly opposed to the British occupation and the foreign domination of Egyptian politics, economy, and culture. They called for an end to Westernization, modernization, and foreign imperialism because, as they saw it, Egypt was losing its Islamic history, Islamic culture, and Islamic traditions.[119] According to Jeffrey Hadden (2004), Islamic fundamentalism stems from a society that has strayed from its Islamic identity. This is exactly what Egypt had done, and it is what facilitated the birth of the Muslim Brotherhood. The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood is a collective group of individuals whose objective were to reclaim their Islamic identity at expense of the state, state institutions, secularism, and foreign domination. The Muslim Brotherhood was, and is, a political-cultural and sociopolitical movement whose ideological foundations resulted from the contradictions between Western civilization and Islam (Youssef Choueiri 2002). R.M Burrell (1989) argues that the participants in Islamic fundamentalist movements see it as their duty to apply "Koranic truths" to the creation of a new society, and these truths become the foundation of that new society's governmental institutions. On this note, the main objective of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood is to return

[118] This does not count acts of terrorism or violence committed by rove members of the Brotherhood who were acting independently and not under the guidance and/or influence of the Muslim Brotherhood

[119] For an early look at Egyptian politics and the formation of Egypt as a modern state see: Israel Gershoni and James Jankowski. 1995. Redefining the Egyptian Nation, 1930-1945; Charles Issawi. 1954. Egypt at Mid-Century: an Economic Survey.

Egyptian society and Egyptian institutions into a literal interpretation of Sunni Islamic scripture. Also, as a movement, it considers the purpose of the Egyptian government the implementation of the teachings of Islam, while discrediting and ultimately eliminating secularism. Like all fundamentalist movements, the Brotherhood plays on, and one could argue it even manipulates, the struggles and needs that an individual Egyptian has to the Movement's benefit.

During the 1970s and 1980s, there was a reawakening of religious ideas and social movements throughout the Middle East, many of these fundamentalist movements being offshoots of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. Prior to the mid-1970s, ideas associated with nationalism dominated the greater Middle East. Like all nationalist movements, President Nasser's version of nationalism put national pride, Egyptian identity, and a unified Middle East above Islam and Islamic identity. By the late 1970s, it was apparent that Arab nationalism had failed at its promise of Arab unity and an increase in the socioeconomic and sociopolitical opportunity for the Arab people. When nationalism failed to correct the socioeconomic and sociopolitical inequality associated with modernization and westernization, fundamentalist movements like the Muslim Brotherhood became vocal about the need to bring Islam back into the institutions of Middle Eastern states, specifically Egypt. In this sense, Sayyid Qutb (1960, 1964, and 1966) is correct when he argues that radical Islam is largely a response to the failures of Arab nationalism. Furthermore, when Egypt lost the 1967 War with Israel and when socioeconomic problems grew tenfold within Egypt, Egyptians lost their national pride and felt as if God had betrayed them. Because of this, Egyptians in large numbers turned to Islamic movements that claimed nationalism and secularism facilitated Egypt's military loss and economic problems.

The image of Egypt, according to the Muslim Brotherhood, was, and is, characterized by decay and humiliation, the corruption of Islam, the abuse and disregard of its teachings, and foreign values brought in via invaders completely restricted Egyptian political, intellectual, and spiritual growth. The Muslim Brotherhood wanted Egypt restored to Islam, and it resisted Western ideologies. According to the Brotherhood, Western ideology facilitates corruption (Mitchell 1969: 233). The ultimate goal of the Muslim Brotherhood was the creation of an Islamic Order (Mitchell 1969: 234). In practice, it loosely meant a Muslim state; however, it referred to a set of legal (not political) principles which were regarded as fundamental to Muslim society whatever the particular form of political order.

Muslim Brotherhood's Ideological Force

Unlike the other case studies included here, the Muslim Brotherhood is the only one that has not been sponsored or facilitated by an outside Islamic ideological force. However, outside ideological forces do exist within Egypt and they have facilitated the Muslim Brotherhood and other fundamentalist movements, specifically being British imperialism and the United States financial assistance after the 1979 Camp David Accords. As previously argued, American ideological influence is from the top-down, meaning the aid is given to the state, rather than individual Islamic groups or movements, a phenomenon especially true in Egypt. Furthermore, the brotherhood acts as an outside ideological force having sponsored Islamic fundamentalist movements and Brotherhood offshoots throughout the Islamic world.

According to the Muslim Brotherhood's Constitution, the movement, as well as all off-shoot Brotherhood movements must meet the following objectives: [120]

> Interpreting the Quran according to the original, natural covenant; the inclusiveness of the Quran and its compatibility with the spirit of the times; similarity among the

[120] On September 8, 1945, the general assembly of the Muslim Brothers adopted for the first time a constitution for the movement. This constitution was finalized, in eight sections on May 21, 1948

> various Islamic schools of thought; defense, liberation, and development of the national treasures; raising the standard of living; social justices and social insurance for every citizen; participation in the national services; war against illiteracy, disease, poverty, and corruption; encouragement of the acts of loving-kindness; liberation of every Arab country and all parts of the Islamic homeland from foreign domination; aid to Islamic minorities everywhere; and establishment of a state with integrity that will function according to the laws and precepts of Islam, will protect Islam from within, will spread the preaching of Islam to all, and will cooperate in international endeavors (Banna 1966: 13).

The Brotherhood's idea of an Islamic state was bound by four principles: 1) the Quran is the fundamental Constitution; 2) the government operates on the concept of Islamic law; 3) the executive ruler is bound by the teachings of Islam and the will of the people; and 4) democracy is paramount in any Islamic state.[121] Founded on these four principles, the Islamic state must have a just and efficient government, be consistent with the traditions of society, and be capable of securing the general welfare of its citizens (Mitchell: 246). The Brotherhood argues that freedom in all its aspects is clearly proclaimed by Islam: freedom of thought, worship, expression, education, and possession. These freedoms, as argued by the Brotherhood, are fundamental in any Islamic state (Mitchell: 249). Islam encourages man to think freely without being subjected to fear or intimidation. Freedom of Worship, according to Islamic law, each man may accept the faith he wishes and no one can compel him to leave his faith for another. Freedom of Expression, not only a right, but it is a duty of every Muslim to say and write what he believes to be the truth. Freedom of education, Islam not only decreed the right to education, but it made it a religious obligation. According to the Brotherhood, both God and the Prophet hold learning to a divine level, and it is the true path to God. Freedom of possession, Islam has decreed that a man may own whatever pleases

[121] The Muslim Brotherhood's ideological importance extends far beyond Egypt and the Sunni Muslim world. For example, the Ayatollah Khomeini's work Islamic Government (1970) is one of the most important and influential documents written in modern times in support of theocratic rule. Khomeini bases much of what he sees as the important aspects of an Islamic state on these same three principles.

him, within the limits set by law; however, that property must be in proportion to its usefulness without excessive deprivation of luxury, and that excessive wealth must be distributed to the poor (Mitchell: 251).[122]

Interestingly, the Muslim Brotherhood's belief that freedom is paramount in any Islamic state provides great insight into the thinking of a fundamentalist movement. The Muslim Brotherhood's constitution proves to be rather insightful in understanding the mentality behind a fundamentalist movement, specifically what facilitates its emergence and success. It personifies many of the misconceptions and bias many observers have toward fundamentalist movements. Furthermore, it helps to explain some of the statistical results in chapter three, and contradicts much of the dominant assumptions concerning the restrictiveness of Islamic fundamentalism. The regression results reveal that religious freedom and freedom of speech are both highly significant. As the degree of both increase so do the number of fundamentalist groups found within the nation-state.

Resources

Resource mobilization theory argues that resources positively effect the mobilization and success of social movements.[123] Resources are needed both within the state and within the movement; because of this, I evaluate resources in a two level analysis. On the first level, I look at the resources of the movement and on the second, the resources of the state. The large N chapter indicated that resources were needed within the nation-state to facilitate the

[122] According to the Muslim Brotherhood, all wealth belongs to society and ultimately to God. Man merely utilizes it, within the limits of the law in the role of a steward. The acquisition of wealth is possible only through work of any kind of variety.
[123] This is according to: Oberschall 1973; Tilly 1978; McCarthy and Zald 1973, 1977; Gamson 1975; Jenkins 1981; Useem 1980; Paige 1975; Schwartz 1976; Ash-Garner 1977; Piven and Cloward 1977

presence of Islamic fundamentalist movements. The same is true within the movement; resources are needed to facilitate the movement's rise, success, and endurance.

As previously stated, resources were defined in numerous ways, and they include such things as money and labor (McCarthy and Zald 1977), land, labor, capital, and technical expertise (Tilly 1977), or anything from material resources to nonmaterial resources (Oberschall 1978: 280). I define resources here as money and population; however, I deviate from the above mentioned resource mobilization theorists to also include education and leadership. Egypt is rich in resources, a huge population, extensive financial means, both educational institutions and educational incentives, and after the 1979 Camp David Accords, Egypt was the recipient of significant amounts of U.S. financial aid. Also, on the group level, the Muslim Brotherhood has significant resources. It has a huge membership, many of whom pay membership dues providing the Brotherhood with massive financial resources. Furthermore, education, as a resource, plays a double role in the successes and endurance of the Muslim Brotherhood. The Brotherhood's membership is largely made up of educated or professional Egyptians. Also, they provide significant educational recourses via building and financing schools or providing educational scholarships.

Furthermore, a significant resource excluded from the large N analysis chapter was that of leadership. In chapter three, I was only interested in the national leadership and that was done via the polity data. However, on the movement level, leadership is an imperative resource. A movement with no leader will fail, and it will break apart into groups of rove individuals pressuring their own interests, very similar to what we currently see in Iraq. McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald (1988:716) argue that movement leadership is a matter of common sense not requiring theoretical analysis. Aldon Morris (1984) argues that movement

leadership is an important complex phenomenon that affects the origins and outcomes of social movements. This is further evidence that the Muslim Brotherhood has many of the same characteristics as social movements.

The Brotherhood has significantly benefited from its leadership and without which, the movement would not have formed and experienced such longevity. It is virtually impossible to separate the birth of the Muslim Brotherhood from its founder and first leader, Hasan al-Banna.[124] In 1927, after he completed his education. he moved from rural Egypt to Cairo. He saw first hand the dire conditions the average Egyptian lived in, and was shocked by the total socioeconomic and sociopolitical inequality and degradation the average Egyptian was subjected to.[125] It was then that he began to teach and preach Islam; within six months he gathered a close-knit group of followers and in March 1928 Al-Banna named his movement *The Movement of Muslim Brothers*, and defined its mission to meet the following objectives:

1. The inclusiveness of Islam was fundamental. Islam is not only a religion but also a state, prayer, and jihad, and obedience to Islam is also fundamental.
2. Islam must be restored to its first teachings. At the fifth conference of the Muslim Brothers in 1938, al-Banna stated "We must draw the rules of Islam from their original sources and understand Islam as it had been understood by the followers of the Prophet and their disciples from the generation of the good forefathers" (al-Banna; 1966: 33).
3. Pan-Islam:[126] Al-Banna clearly specified that "Every millimeter of land on which the flag of Islam waves is the homeland to every Muslim and must be defended. Al

[124] Brynjar Lia. 1998. The Society of Muslim Brothers in Egypt: The Rise of an Islamic Mass Movement, 1928-42: Hasan al-Banna was born in October of 1906, in the province of Buhayra, in the small town of Mahmudiyya, about ninety miles north-west of Cairo. He graduated from Dar al-Ulum in the summer of 1927. For a short time he considered the possibility of joining one of the annual governmental missions for education abroad, but for unknown reasons he did not do so. Instead he accepted an appointment in the state school system in the Suez Canal Zone. He remained in the school system until 1946.

[125] Hasan al-Banna. 1966. Memoirs of the Preaching and the Preacher. Cairo: Dar al-Shaha; Muhammad Shawqi Zaki. 1954. The Muslim Brothers and Egyptian Society. Cairo: The American University Press.

[126] Pan-Islamic ideology, the attempt to achieve Muslim unity, takes two forms, radical (which would eliminate borders and create a single Muslim state) and moderate (which only seeks harmony between Muslim states), while providing a survey of the tensions between these two themes going back to the 1860s.

Muslims are one nation, and the Islamic homeland is one homeland" (al-Banna; 1966: 38).

4. Islamic government. In Islam, according to the teachings of the Muslim Brothers, and al-Banna, Islamic government is a basic precept for any state within the Middle East and that government must be democratic (al-Banna;1966).

Al-Banna disapproved of the secularist policies of the nationalist government, the public involvement of women in society, the mixing of the sexes, and views of liberal intellectual leaders, he equated as a disease that afflicted Eastern nations. Writing in 1936, during the Great Depression, al-Banna argued that " the civilization of the West, proudly strong in its science, and for a period able to subjugate the world, is in bankruptcy and in decline, its political fundamentals destroyed by dictatorship, its economic system racked by crisis, its social order decaying" (al-Ghazali, 1994: 226).

Just like the nation-state where the population is considered a resource, so to is the size of the movement's membership. The larger the membership base, the larger the revenue base – members pay dues. Just as in the nation-state, the population pays taxes – expanding the state's revenue base. As it relates to membership, the following criteria were established by the Brotherhood that its members must meet before joining the movement; a candidate must be: 1) eighteen years of age; 2) honorable and upright; 3) able to understand the ideas of the Society; and 4) willing to pay monthly dues and to contribute to *zakat*.[127] Interestingly, the rules of the Brotherhood says *willing* and not *able (*Mitchell: 1969; 184). Those who could not pay were excused by the leader of the branch, after he ascertained that they were genuinely unable to do so. After contracting to live by the laws of the Brotherhood, the

[127] The term zakat is also translated as zakah or zakat and comes from the Arabic verb zaka, which involves two notions in its dictionary, the first being "to increase, to grow" and the second, "to purify." Zakat may be defined simply as the third pillar of Islam, after the professing of faith and the performing of regular prayer (salat). In a more formal and descriptive way, it may be defined as an obligatory payment of a varying rate on certain property items, fully owned and above a specified limit, given by Muslims to an Islamic authority for distribution or directly distributed to the eight rubrics specified in the Quran. (David Jonsson. 2006, Islamic Economics and The Final Jihad. Xulon Press: pages 228-229)

member then made an oath of allegiance to the Brotherhood. This was a contract with God, to uphold the message of the Brotherhood, and to fulfill the conditions of membership, which included, above all, confidence in the leadership, and willingness to obey the Brotherhood and the teachings of Islam absolutely.[128] A Brother who did not fulfill his duties or who violated the Movement's principles was subject to discipline by the branch head. If verbal appeals did not correct the shortcoming, the branch council or administration decided whether to warn, fine, suspend, or expel him. Permission to expel an active member must come from the general headquarters.

During the movement's first three years, its primary goal was the enlargement of its membership in and around Cairo. Banna and his inner-circle of followers pursued this goal by direct contact with Egyptians touring the city and countryside on weekends and vacations (Banna and his followers all had full time jobs). This recruitment was done via preaching in mosques, homes, clubs, or any other meeting place where the Brotherhood found a listener (Mitchell 1969). As the membership slowly grew, the Brotherhood took an old house as its headquarters. As a result of the contributions from the Suez Canal Company and loans from local merchants, it was able to finance the building of its first mosque in 1930; soon after it built a club for boys and then a school for girls which allowed the teachings of traditional Islam (Banna 1966 and Mitchell 1969). As a result of this, the Brotherhood's membership grew significantly, and its growing size concerned the Egyptian government and their British supporters. This was partially because the Brotherhood was educating Egyptians and calling for freedom and democracy which threatened British's subjugation of the Egyptians.

[128] The oath reads as follows: "I contract with God to adhere firmly to the message of the Muslim Brothers, to strive on its behalf, to live up to the conditions of its membership, to have complete confidence in its leadership and to obey absolutely, under all circumstances. I swear to God on that and make my oath of loyalty by hum. Of what I say, God is Witness. Richard Mitchell. 1969: page 165 The Society of the Muslim Brothers.

The first clash between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Egyptian government and their British supporters took place in 1941. The British and Egyptian governments were concerned with the movement's growing strength via its increasing membership. Also, the Brotherhood incorporated into their movement significant vocal objections to the British presence in Egypt, the Christian missionaries in Egypt, and the Brotherhood's formal stance of having sympathy with the Axis powers during WWII. The British forced the Egyptian government to cancel all licenses for the movement's publications, and their printing presses were closed on October 19, 1941.

The Brotherhood's printing press could also be considered a significant resource. Founded in 1933 at their second national conference, their printing press facilitated their ability to spread propaganda and their messages to significantly more people.[129] Having learned from the West of the usefulness of propaganda, the press was used to both spread its message and to rebut the challenges of its adversaries (Mitchell 1969: 13). In fact, the printing press and all the printed work(s) that resulted from it became the symbol of the greater Islamic movement and one of the largest projects undertaken by the Brotherhood.[130] In Chapter Three, I was able to show that there is a positive correlation between education and Islamic fundamentalism. Islamic fundamentalist movements facilitate literacy because much of their propaganda is spread via the printed word – this is also the case for Hamas and

[129] The first general conference of the Muslim Brotherhood, in May 1933 was held to brainstorm ways in which to stop the activity of the Christian missionaries who were being blatantly disrespectful to Islam. At the conference, they wrote and sent a letter to King Fu'ad outlining the Brotherhood's belief in the urgency of brining the activities of the foreign missionaries under control. The fourth general conference met to celebrate the coronation of King Faruq in 1937. The third and fifth, in March 1935 and January 1939, were important organizational sessions. The fifth conference was also the tenth anniversary of the movement and at this conference the Brotherhood indoctrinated their ideologies: Islam was seen as the total system, complete onto itself, and the final arbitrator of life in all its categories. The foundation of Islam, and in turn the Muslim Brotherhood, is the Quran and the teachings of the Prophet and finally, Islam is applicable to all times and all places.

[130] A weekly magazine called Majallay al-Iklwan al-Muslimin and later, a second one called Majallat al-Nadhir. Also the most important propaganda created by the Brotherhood, the indoctrination texts for members and the "messages" written by al-Banna to enlighten and educate the Brothers (Mitchell page 13).

Hezbollah. The reason for this is that the Egyptian state controls both radio and television and restricts the Muslim Brotherhood from freely utilizing the airwaves. As for Hamas, they too have to rely on the printed word because radio and television stations and satellites make easy targets for the state of Israel. To rectify this and to spread their beliefs, fundamentalist movements facilitate literacy. This could help explain why education is positively associated with Islamic fundamentalism.

Socioeconomics

There was a correlation between the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood and the sociopolitical and western cultural transformation that the Egyptian society experienced between the 1919 constitutional revolution and the 1930s. Changes in Egyptian class relations and class structure were the result of the Egyptian modernization process. What resulted was a new class structure with inherent inequality, one from which the Muslim Brotherhood drew its political power and support. The benefits of Egyptian modernization and Westernization were restricted to a few groups in Egyptian society, specifically the upper classes (Adams 1993). In addition, the socioeconomic and sociopolitical difficulties of the 1930s, rising unemployment, and the exclusionary policies pursued by the Egyptian ruling elite helped to contribute to the rise and success of the Muslim Brotherhood.

In addition to the new Egyptian class structure, other socioeconomic phenomena contributed to the Brotherhood's rise and success. From 1919 on, the Egyptian population increased significantly, rural to urban migration accelerated, the traditional social classes continued to decline financially as they were replaced by a new educated and westernized middle class that expanded the bureaucratic structure and institutions of the state. Industrialization created a working class that was excluded from the benefits that the new

educated Middle class experienced, specifically land ownership, education, and upward mobility. Furthermore, the landowning class continued to expand its power within Egyptian politics and society. These social changes and demographic expansion brought a new set of actors to Egypt's sociopolitical arena (specifically the educated middle class and the uneducated working class). However, the large-landowners still dominated the country and controlled its resources and the new educated middle class was the bureaucratic support that helped the landed aristocracy controls the socioeconomic and sociopolitical institutions of Egypt.[131]

The landowners enjoyed significant influence during and after the revolution of 1919. The 1919 constitutional revolution established a constitutional monarchy that significantly expanded the power and influence of the landowning elitist class. Of the eighteen member commission responsible for drafting the Constitution, eleven members were large landowners.[132] What resulted from the 1919 revolution was a parliamentary system without democracy, and its purpose was to guard the material interests of the upper classes. The Constitution protected their property and guarded their rights both socioeconomically and politically while institutionalizing the subjection of the Egyptian masses. The 1919 revolution failed to resolve two fundamental issues facing Egypt: Egypt did not attain full independence from Britain, nor was it able to eliminate the monarchy's arbitrary power. Instead, the revolution resulted in the formation of a new power block in which the revolutionary leaders (specifically, the landowners) shared power with the king and the

[131] According to Charles Issawi: The population increased from 11,287,000 in 1907 to 18,947,000 in 1947 and 26,080,000 in 1960 (an increase of over 130 percent). Parallel with the demographic change was an increase in rural-to-urban migration. Between 1917 and 1937, the population of Cairo rose from 791,000 to 1,312,000 (66% increase) and that of Alexandria fro 445,000 to 686,000 (55% increase). This means that on average, that 30,000 a year were moving from the country-side to the city

[132] Hamied Ansari. 1986. Egypt, the Stalled Society; Afaf Lurfi Marsot. 1977. Egypt's Liberal Experiment: 1922-1936; Selma Botman. 1991. Egypt from Independence to Revolution, 1919-1952

British. It was in this socioeconomic and sociopolitical environment that helped to manifest the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood and why the Egyptian masses turned toward them for guidance and salvation.

According to Youssef Choueiri (2002: 40) Muslim Brotherhood members were largely drawn from the lower-middle class, such as schoolteachers, clerks, technicians, artisans, shopkeepers, and students. After the outbreak of WWII, the Muslim Brotherhood infiltrated the police and armed forces.[133] This is the result of what Marx called *relative deprivations*. According to Runciman (1966), Gurr (1970), and Siddharth Chandra (2005) *relative deprivation* is the difference between the value expectation and the value capability of the individual. In other words, the Egyptian understands what he should have, what others have, and what he does not have.

The Nasser Years

Modern Egyptian politics began in July of 1953 when Nasser became both president and the only veto player in Egyptian political institutions. The political institutions in Egypt have for the last eighty years been ruled by autocrats; however, the degree of state control has fluctuated. Political process theory is correct as it relates to the Muslim Brotherhood; Egypt's social and governmental institutions significantly influence the trajectories of the Muslim Brotherhood (or social movements as argued by: Eisinger 1974; Kitschelt 1986; McAdam 1999, 1982; and Tarrow 1989). On July 23, 1952, a group of young army officers overthrew Egypt's constitutional monarchy in a secular military coup.[134] After a brief power struggle,

[133] According to Choueiri, during WWII al-Banna created a secret "Special Organization" which trained members to use firearms. The Special Organization developed its own rules of recruitment and instruction to the extent of becoming a separate entity. According to Choueiri (page 40) its leader, Abd al-rahman al-Sindi, often defied the orders of the Brotherhood's leadership and carried out acts of political assassinations.
[134] For a brief historical treatment of the development of secularism in Egypt see: Daniel Crecelius (1980) The Course of Secularization in Egypt. In John Esposito: Islam and Development: Religion and Sociopolitical Change; Bassam Tibi (1988) The Crisis of Modern Islam: A Preindustrial Cultural I the Scientific and

Gamal Abdel Nasser gained control of the new regime and remained its leading decision maker and veto player until his death in 1970. During his tenure as President, there was a total disappearance of oppositional movements, political parties, associations, and both individual and group freedoms. Nasser launched a significant repressive assault on all organized opposition. By the mid-1950s, all of the country's independent political groups were banned, and those that survived were forced underground. Nasser preempted the rise of opposition activism and social movements by expanding state control via subordination of potential social movement members and organizations, by eliminating most social movements, and by imprisoning many active and potential social movement participants. Furthermore, he banned all opposition groups and imposed state control over the means in which Egyptians had formally communicated and met; specifically, buildings, halls, media outlets, papers, radios, and television.[135] This helps confirm some of the large-N results in Chapter Three; specifically, some of the idea variables. For example when governments restrict freedom of speech, we see a decrease in the number Islamic fundamentalist movements. In other words, under President Nasser's restrictions on freedom of speech and press there was a significant decline in the number of fundamentalist movements in Egypt.

Nasser developed a preemptive strategy combining repression, redistribution, reeducation, and resocialization to expand his power, and it worked for a brief period of time.

Technical Age; Habib Boulares (1990) Islam: The Fear and the Hope; Halim Barakat (1993) The Arab World: Society, Culture and State

[135] Raymond Hinnebusch (1988) described the Nasser regime as "authoritarian populism," which is a regime type that emerged during the era of decolonization throughout the Middle East and Africa and is typically the product of nationalist reaction against imperialism, modernization, or westernization; which is where the citizens struggle for independence from the colonial power via large-scale mobilization of the masses. He argues that authoritarian populism often times grows out of a nationalist movement, a revolution, or a military coup by middle-class officers (as in the case of Egypt). Formation of a strong independent state, free of imperialist domination is the main objective. In addition, the state power is put in the service of economic modernization and a reformist redistribution of wealth and opportunity to the middle and lover classes, which was the backbone of Nasser's revolution.

Egyptians who disagreed or who were openly vocal against Nasser were imprisoned. He nationalized private businesses and foreign corporations and then redistributed their wealth to the new middle classes. He developed an education system where young Egyptians were taught the *Nasser way*; his regime was fundamentally a reformist one. With the massive redistribution of wealth, nationalization, state control over social and educational institutions, Nasser's program became quasi-socialist, but he stopped short of transforming Egypt into a communist state. Rather than promote radical change with organized mass support, his regime attempted to reconcile competing interests through populist ideology and massive redistribution while completely restricting Egyptian sociopolitical rights and liberties.

Nasser claimed that political parties, in the liberal era, divided the nation and weakened it from within, so Nasser dissolved all political parties in 1953. The Muslim Brotherhood was initially exempt from this ban, ostensibly on the grounds that it was not a political party but a nonpolitical religious movement (Wickham 2002: 29). But this exception was more likely a result of the Nasser's reluctance to risk a direct confrontation with the country's largest and most popular Islamic movement. This was done rather pragmatically by Nasser. He knew that there would be sociopolitical turmoil if the regime attempted to restrict the Muslim Brotherhood because of its popular support and religious pretext. Before challenging the Brotherhood, Nasser had to make sure he completely controlled the Egyptian political and social institutions and had successfully won the hearts and minds of the Egyptians.

According to political process theorists, the political opportunity thesis claims that social movements emerge as a result of expanding political opportunities. The same is true in reverse, the number of social movements decline as political opportunities are stripped.

According to Goodwin (2004) social movements cannot emerge where people are unable, for whatever reason, to associate with one another for political purposes. This is exactly the case for the social movements of Egypt during the Nasser years, including the Muslim Brotherhood. Relations between the regime and the Brotherhood quickly soured when it became clear that the Brotherhood would not acquiesce quietly to military rule. It demanded democracy and transparent political institutions. An attempt on Nasser's life in 1954 by a Brotherhood member gave Nasser the pretext he needed to ban the movement and imprison its leaders, without the risk of massive social upheaval.[136]

Resources under Nasser

According to Carrie Wickham (2002: 23) Nasser claimed to represent the oppressed *sha'b* (people); as a whole, a disproportionate share of state resources were channeled to urban, educated, and lower-middle-class youth.[137] The priority accorded them was derived less from an assessment of their needs than from their perceived strategic importance. In other words, Nasser singled out lower-middle-class youth for extra entitlements because he saw them as his greatest threat and because he sought to defuse their capacity to threaten his regime's survival. He was going to bribe them with education and monetary advancement,

[136] According to Alexander (2005) and Haus (2006) the assassination attempt on Nasser, October 27, 1954 was followed by massive celebrations throughout Cairo in celebration of his survival, the celebrations comprised mainly of the government-controlled transport unions and workers from the newly industrialized state, they went to the Brotherhood's headquarters and destroyed it as well as all satellite offices throughout Egypt were burned. On October 29, Nasser appeared at a rally held in Republic Square and launched the campaign which was to be waged during the next two months against the Brotherhood where its members were rounded up and imprisoned. On November 2, the "People's Tribunal" was created and officer members were put on trial, found guilty, and assassinated.

[137] The following were used to learn about the Nasser presidency: Aburish, Said 2004. Nasser: The Last Arab. Thomas Dunne Books; Alexander, Anne. 2005. Nasser: Life and Times. Haus Pub; Gordon, Joel. 2006. Nasser: Hero of the Arab Nation: Makers of the Muslim World. Oneworld Publications; Gordon, Joel. 2006. Nasser's Blessed Movement: Egypt's Free Officers and the July Revolution. American University in Cairo Press; James, Laura. 2006. Nasser at War: Arab Images of the Enemy. Palgrave Macmillan; Doran, Muchael, 2002. Pan-Arabism before Nasser: Egyptian Power Politics and the Palestine Question: Studies in Middle Eastern History. Oxford University Press

while restricting their civil and political rights. Nasser's policy of state distribution is often referred to as the *social contract* by which the regime provided goods and services to the public in exchange for their political support (Wickham 2002: 23).[138] To some extent the term is misleading; the arrangement was never a bargain entered into voluntarily by equal partners; instead it was a strategy of force initiated by the regime for its own purposes. The Nasser *social contract* raised living standards in several ways: it provided education, offered employment in the expanding state sector, and provided subsidized food, energy, health, and housing to lower and middle class groups. However, state employment, benefits, and services were concentrated in the cities, urban residents profiting disproportionately while many of rural population and rural migrants to the city were excluded (Gordon 2006). Because of this, the Muslim Brotherhood remained a formidable force in Egypt, and its support remained high specifically in areas ignored by Nasser. On the other hand, its support significantly declined in areas where Nasser's increased. Many urban Egyptians turned toward Nasser and supported his political domination while disassociating themselves with the Muslim Brotherhood. This was one of the major results of Nasser's *social contract.* Furthermore, as Nasser tightened his grip on the socioeconomic and sociopolitical institutions of Egypt, he institutionalized a policy of *false consciousness*, this being the second major result of the *social contract*. Nasser provided many urban Egyptians with universal education, guaranteed employment, and economic assistance to win over the hearts and minds of the Egyptians, tightening his grip on political power.

[138] The term *social contract* has been widely used in literature on Egypt: Khalid Ikram. 1981, September. meeting the *Social Contract* in Egypt. Finance and Development. Pages 30-33; Diane Singerman. 1985. Avenues of Participation: Family, Politics and Networks in Urban Quarters of Cairo. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Soon after consolidating power, Nasser reorganized universities, banned independent student unions, purged faculty and administration, and posted secret security units on campuses in order to ensure complete control over the educational process. After that, he launched a series of educational reforms to increase his authoritative control over Egyptian society. In doing so, he increased popular access to higher education. Arguably, with his total control of the educational process, he was able to ensure university students were learning what he wanted them to learn. In 1954, university tuition fees were lowered, eligibility for university scholarships was expanded, and the educational budget of universities more than quadrupled (Haggai Erich 1989).[139] Over the Nasser period as a whole, the number of students enrolled in primary education increased by 234 percent, and the number of students enrolled in higher education rose by 324 percent (Abdel-Fadil 1982: 17). Annual university enrollments climbed from 51,681 in 1952/53 to 161,517 in 1969/70. Islamic society is different than Western society when it comes to education; translating directly from the Arabic, *al-muta alliin or al-muthaqqafin* meaning the educated or cultured, they are technically not a class but a status group, defined not by occupation or wealth (Wickham 2003: 36). In other words, those individuals with degrees in higher education, no matter their socioeconomic status, ethnicity, or occupation are considered an exclusive status group by Islamic culture, and they need to be revered. Nasser knew this and manipulated this cultural tradition to his own benefit. After promising members of the middle and lower

[139] During this same time period the Ministry if Education's budget more than doubled, this raised the allocation for higher education from 14 percent to 22 percent of the general education budget for Egypt (Mahmound A. Faksh 1980: 48).

classes the opportunity to attend a university, his popularity soared, especially with the new industrialized middle class.[140]

In addition to offering a university education free of charge, the Nasser *social contract* institutionalized a policy guaranteeing every university graduate a government job. Public employment grew by about 70% from 1962 to 1970, at a time when the growth in national employment as a whole did not exceed 20 percent.[141] This expansion was fueled by the *Nationalization Measure of 1961*, which brought under state control about 80 percent of all nonagricultural activities, including all major firms of industry, finance, and construction (Ibrahimm 1982). By 1969 the state employed 450,000 graduates with a secondary school degree or above, including more than 153,000 university degree holders or roughly 60 percent of the entire pool of university graduates produced by the country. This included virtually all of the country's engineers, scientists, and agronomists, more than 87 percent of its physicians, and two-thirds of its lawyers (Ayubi 1980). As a result of Nasser's socialize and redistribution policies, his socioeconomic results were impressive; between 1955 and 1965, Egyptian growth averaged six percent a year. However, by the end of the 1960s, Egypt's economic system plummeted, bringing all economic growth to a halt. As Waterbury (1983, 1985) observed, the regime's capacity to simultaneously finance economic growth and distribution eventually become strained. This was the result of a costly and long war with Yemen and military defeat by Israel in June 1967. Furthermore, Nasser's guaranteed education and employment policies backfired and facilitated the rise of Islamic fundamentalism. Nasser's policy of *false consciousness* would transform itself into *relative deprivation*. The individuals Nasser educated realized the difference between the value

[140] For an early discussion of the "new" Egyptian middle class see: Nanfred Halpern. 1963. The Politics of Social Change in The Middle East and North Africa. Princeton: Princeton University Press
[141] See: Waterbury & Richards (1996) Nazih Ayubi (1980) Malcolm Kerr (1965)

expectation and the value capability and started to demand socioeconomic and sociopolitical change.

Nasser assumed that access to university education and total control of the educational process would cement him as a perfect autocrat. However, his heavy handed tactics in dealing with any form of political opposition generated resentment from those he educated. By the mid-1960s Nasser started to loosen his absolute control on the sociopolitical institutions. Almost simultaneously to this, students started to retreat from passivity and nonviolence and began protesting and demanding more sociopolitical freedom. By 1967 there were massive numbers of political protests (Mabro 1974). This being said, one can logically conclude that the political process theorists are correct. Specifically, Eisinger (1974) and Tarrow (1998, 1994) wrote that social movements emerge and flourish in periods when opportunities are being gained and expanded for those who had been excluded from the decision making process. Also, Tarrow (1998, 1994) argues that protests occur when ordinary people join forces in confrontation with elites, authorities, and opponents, just as the Egyptians did in the late 1960s.

Social movements are produced when political opportunities broaden for those excluded from the decision making process and when their opponents (Nasser) show vulnerability.[142] Nasser's vulnerability was transparent as a result of the regime's crushing military defeat by Israel in the 1967 War. Fundamentalists were quick to blame the defeat on the *jahiliyyah* (literally the ignorant state but in practical terms the secular un-Islamic and uncivilized state).[143] As a result of this, the Muslim Brotherhood made a triumphant return

[142] The following political process theorists all confirm this: Kriesi et al. 1995; McAdam 1982; McCarthy and Zald 1996; McAdam Tarrow, and Tilly 2001; Tarrow 1998; Tilly 1978).
[143] Even President Nasser resorted to religious explanations to account for the disaster *nakbah* that had befallen Egypt. It was God's will and Egypt's destiny to suffer such a fate, he told his fellow Egyptians. Only through a

to the Egyptian political scene. The movement's leadership blamed Egypt's military loss on secularism and insisted that if Egypt was an Islamic state with democratic Islamic political institutions, Egypt would have experienced victory. As a result of the worsening socioeconomic conditions and as a persistent national shame grew; massive numbers of individuals joined the Muslim Brotherhood movement.

The first massive political protest in Egypt that the Brotherhood facilitated occurred in February 1968. It was protesting the light sentences received by senior military officers held responsible for Egypt's defeat in the 1967 war with Israel (James 1006). Based on this, Tilly's (1975) "breakdown theories" proved correct. Tilly argued that collective action is a result of a collective grievance, discontent, and the feelings of frustration and deprivation. Egyptians felt as if they were forsaken by God and their government, specifically Nasser. However, Nasser died in 1970 leaving Egypt in the hands of his successor, Anwar Sadat. Even more so than the Nasser presidency, the Sadat presidency personifies what the social movement theorists argue. Under the Nasser presidency the number of active fundamentalist movements was small and relatively peaceful. This all changed under the Sadat presidency, there was a significant increase in the number of fundamentalist movements and their use of violence. The Islamic movement in the 1970s resulted from the contradictions and

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return to Islam could Egypt prevent future disasters and meet the challenges posed by its enemies, domestic and foreign. According to John Esposito (1984) all of Egypt's leaders since 1952 have been Muslims and have claimed to rule in a manner compatible with Islam. But while Nasser portrayed his goals as consistent with Islamic precepts (a convergence readily affirmed by clerics on the government payroll), Islam did not figure prominently in either the formation or the justification of his agenda. Nasser's rhetoric was secular, nationalist, and revolutionary in tine, emphasizing the struggle against "Zionism and imperialism" abroad and against "capitalist exploitation" at home. By contrast, Islam was central to Anwar Sadat's self-image and claim to political authority. Styling himself the "Believer-President", Sadat made a public show of his personal piety; promoted Islamic programming in the media, schools, and universities; expanded the government's support of official Islamic institutions; and used religious theses to justify the regime's policies, including the decision to go to war with Israel in 1973.

shortcomings of the modernization process and the transformation of state society of both Nasser and Sadat.[144]

The Sadat Years and Islamic Fundamentalism

Nasser died in 1970 and his successor, Anwar al-Sadat had to deal with the Israeli wars, specifically, Yum Kippur in October 1973 where Egypt suffered from another significant military defeat. He also had to deal with a stalled economy, bankrupted national treasury, and a highly discontented population. Sadat's answer was the *Open Door policy* which he initiated in 1974 and was basically a return to a capitalist economy.[145] He hoped that this would attract large-scale Arab and international investment, investment from the United States and Western Europe. However, foreign investment did not come. According to Raymond Baker (1990), the reason for this was the huge and inefficient public sector and the system of state subsidies for basic goods and services that it administered. In other words, foreign investors saw Egypt as a socialist money-pit. Sadat was between a rock and a hard-place; he had no other financial options other than make peace with Israel via the Camp David Accords, receiving a significant amount of U.S. financial aid for agreeing to the peace treaty.

Furthermore, Sadat transformed Nasser's perfect autocracy into an opening autocracy with limited political participation; this facilitated the rise of fundamentalist movements. Here we see a confirmation of the inverted-U relationship found in Chapter Three. The movement that benefited the most under President Sadat's *Open Door policy* was the Muslim

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[144] See Hrair Dekmejian (1981) in Michael Curtis (1981); in the same book, see Louis J. Cantori,(1981); "Religion and Politics in Egypt," pages 77-90. Saad Eddin Ibrahim, "Egypt's Islamic Activism in the; See Saad Eddin Ibrahim "Anatomy of Egypt's Islamic Militant Groups"; John Esposito (1980); Hrair Dekmejian (1988) in Shireen Hunter (1988).

[145] See: Beattie, Kirk. 2000. Egypt During the Sadat Years. Palgrave Macmillan; Baker, Raymond William. 1990. Sadat and After: Struggles for Egypt's Political Soul. Harvard University Press

Brotherhood. Sadat freed members of the Brotherhood from prison and allowed those in exile to return. Though still technically illegal, the Brotherhood was permitted in 1976 to publish its own newspaper, *al-Dawa*, which had an estimated circulation of 100,000 before it was shut down in 1981 (Esposito 1984; Hinnebusch 1988). Sadat also encouraged the development of Islamic student associations on university campuses, in the hope of developing an effective counterweight to the leftist groups that dominated student politics at the time (Kepel 1993; Abdalla 1985). As a result of this, membership of the Brotherhood soared and its influence on the state accelerated. The ever-increasing poverty and unemployment also worked for the movement's benefit. However, they were very vocal with their critiques of Sadat's friendly relations with the west, specifically the United States and Israel.

In the mid-1970s, President Sadat initiated a controlled retreat from the Nasser system of single party rule. This political opening began in 1975 with Sadat's recognition of alternative platforms in elections for the People's Assembly in 1976. Encouraged by the overwhelming victory of the political center, Sadat permitted the conversion of these different ideological platforms to legal political parties. However, admission to the party system was restricted to only a few actors. For example, the Political Party Law (law 40 of 1977) excluded politics parties based on class, religion, or regional affiliation.[146] According to Hinnebusch (1988), the regime's intention was to bar the Muslim Brotherhood from forming its own political party. By restricting participatory rights in this way, the regime created a new category of political actors, those groups and movements whose existence was tolerated

[146] Law 40 prohibited the formation of parties on grounds of religion, class, or geographic affiliation. In addition, it stated that partied in Egypt should not conflict with eh sharia as the principle source of legislation; the principles of the July 23 and May 15 revolutions; or the preservation of national unity, social peace, socialist gains, or the democratic socialist system, See: Mona Makram Ebeid, The Role of the Official Opposition, in Egypt Under Mubarak. Charles Tripp and Roger Owen (NY: Rutledge)

but restricted. Sadat not only confined political participation to a small and rather artificial set of political parties, but he also restricted their right to association, views, criticism of the regime, and so on. For example, criticism of the regime was to be "constructive" and was not to attack Sadat's major reorganization of Egyptian foreign and economic policy. As Hinnebusch (1988: 114) notes, when they crossed these boundaries in 1978, both the leftist National Progressive Unionist Party (NPUP) and the liberal-right New Wafd Party were banned from open political activity.[147] In the years just before Sadat's assassination in 1981, there were only three legal parties: the ruling National Democratic Party and two "loyal" opposition parties (center right and center left), both of which were headed by politicians very close to the regime and both lacking ties to any mass movement.

Sadat expanded Nasser's social contract programs and opened the country's national universities to an unprecedented number of students, and he extended the system into the provinces. He increased the proportion of students admitted to a university from roughly 40 percent of those who took the baccalaureate exam in the early 1970s to more than 60 percent in the late 1970s and early 1980s. In just a decade, the country's annual output of university graduates nearly tripled, rising from 41,916 in 1975 to 115,744 in 1985 (Beattie 2000: 32). The rapid expansion of Egypt's graduate pool placed a heavy burden on the government's guaranteed-employment scheme. Open unemployment among graduates was reflected in the lengthening queue for government jobs. Unwilling to abandon the guaranteed-employment scheme, yet unable to hire graduates right away, the government simply extended the waiting period between graduation and appointment increased from three years for the class of 1979

[147] Wafd Party translates to the: New Delegation Party *Hizb al-Wafd al-Jadid* is a nationalist political party in Egypt and is currently considered as one of the main opposition parties, and so its involvement in Egyptian politics is considered crucial in the success as well as legitimization of any political decision. It is the extension of one of the oldest and historically most active political party in Egypt, the Wafd Party was dismantled after the 1952 Revolution and reastablished in 1983. In December 2005, it won 6 seats in the People's Assembly

to ten years for the class of 1985.[148] As a result of this, these educated, jobless youth started turning to Islamic fundamentalism for their spiritual, physical, and financial needs.[149]

Under Sadat, the Muslim Brotherhood activists used communal activities at the grassroots level to reshape the political consciousness of Nasser's educated youth.[150] By focusing on impressionable young people and in areas lacking social welfare services, the Brotherhood's Islamic institutions served as functional substitutes for the inadequate welfare apparatus of the state. As previously explained, social service institutions function as an ideal tool used by Islamists to radicalize and recruit Muslim youth (Rosefsky 1997). Furthermore, the Muslim Brotherhood has been active in establishing health care facilities to meet the diverse needs of the Egyptian populace. One of the largest is the clinic in the Mustafa

[148] Nader Fergany A Characterization of the Employment Problems in Egypt. In Employment and Structural Adjustment: Egypt in the 1990s. Heba Handoussa and Gillian Porter; Heba Handoussa. 1991. Crisis and Challenge: Prospects for the 1990s. In: Employment and Structural Adjustment in Egypt in the 1990s. Heba Handoussa and Gillian Potter. Cairo: American University Press.

[149] Ragui Assaad (1993) and John Waterbury (1985) estimates that between 1977 and 1984, the state generated 55.3 percent of all new employment for Egyptians (including jobs abroad), or 70.7 percent of all new employment inside the country. Beginning around 1982, the collapse of the world oil prices led to a prolonged economic recession in Egypt. The Egyptian economy was particularly vulnerable to external shocks. Annual growth in GDP fell from an average of 9% in the decade between 1974 and 1984 to roughly 2.6 percent from 1986 to 1988, and beginning in 1986 per capita consumption growth turned negative (Richards, 1991). Owing to the rapid expansion of Egypt's education system, a growing share of the roughly 400,000 to 500,000 workers entering the Egyptian market had intermediate and university degrees. Egypt's labor force grew by 2.2 percent per year from 1976 to 1986, whereas the supply of graduates grew 7.4 percent per year (Wickham, 2002:42).

[150] The institutions of the Islamic sector, specifically the Muslim Brotherhood can be divided into three general categories: (1) private mosques; (2) Islamic voluntary associations, including welfare societies, cultural organizations, health clinics, and schools; and (3) Islamic for-profit commercial and businesses enterprises, such as Islamic banks, investment companies, manufacturing firms, and publishing houses. At the core of Islamist outreach was a massive ideological project to capture the hearts and minds of educated youth. Islamists active at the neighborhood level disseminated a particular "frame" of Islam emphasizing the obligation of all Muslims to participate in reforming society at large See: Denis Sullivan. 1994. Private Voluntary Organizations in Egypt: Islamic Development, Private Initiative, and State Control; Dale Eickelman and James Piscatori. 1996. Muslim Politics; Sami Zubaida. 1992, December. Islam, the State and Democracy: Contrasting Conceptions of Society in Egypt. Middle East Report. Page 22. Hamied Ansari. 1984, March, The Islamic Militants in Egyptian Politics. International Journal of Middle East Studies. Page 129 Private mosque building continued under Mubarak, many of which were sponsored by the Muslim Brotherhood. According to the minister of religious endowments – there were 91,000 mosques in Egypt in 1991, including 45,000 private mosques and 10,000 zawiyas. In December 1992, the Egyptian Journal Akhir as;a set the number of private mosques at 60,000. Other estimates were even higher, for example, the international human rights organization Middle East Watch estimated that as of 1993 there were 170,000 mosques in Egypt, of which only 30,000 were operated by the government. See: Middle East Watch, Human Rights Conditions in the Middle East in 1993 (NY: Human Rights Watch, 1994).

Mahmud Mosque in Cairo, which treats more than 250,000 people each year.[151] The medical service clinics are among the most widely used facilities of the fundamentalist Muslim Brotherhood organization, and they are found in more than 20,000 non-governmental mosques (Ibrahim 1988: 642). The Islamic extremists built new schools, hospitals, rebuilt the roads, provided education, job training, and day-care for the poor and deprived. Large segments of the lower socio-economic classes showed their appreciation by joining fundamentalist movement, specifically the Muslim Brotherhood. In this sense, the Muslim brotherhood acts differently than most social movements. The Brotherhood had political party objectives and ultimately sought vote-seeking and in order to achieve electoral success it had to win over the general population via providing humanitarian services.

While the brotherhood was reconstructing itself as a national political movement, many smaller Islamic fundamentalist movements were gaining ground on university campuses, and a new generation of Islamic fundamentalism began to reshape the landscape of Egyptian youth.[152] As the number of Islamic fundamentalist movements grew, their language became more confrontational toward the regime, and Sadat shifted from accommodation to repression. To further perpetuate the situation, Sadat assumed that the best way to improve the Egyptian economy and to ensure the domestic and international; future of Egypt was to make peace with Israel. In 1977 Sadat made a trip to Jerusalem. The subsequent peace treaty

[151] As argued by: Robin Wright (1981 and 1987); Patrick D. Gaffney, in Richard T. Antoun and Mary Elaine Hegland (1987). Robin Write, "Quite Revolution: Islamic Movement's New Phase," Christian Science Monitors November 6, 1987. Saad Eddom Ibrahim (1988 and 1980); John Voll (1982); Gabriel Baer (1983) in Gabriel R. Warburg and Uri M. Kupferschmidt, (1983); Uri M. Kupferschmidt (1982); John Esposito (1982); Bruce Borthwick (1981); Paul (1986); Robert (1989); Nancy E. Gallagher (1989); James Pittaway (1989); Chris Eccel (1988)

[152] Some argue that economic liberalization facilitated this trend by expanding the private wealth available or investment in communal projects, specifically: Alan Richards and John Waterbury. 1990. A Political Economy of the Middle East: State, Class, and Economic Development. Boulder Westview Press; Robert Springborg, 1988. Egypt: Fragmentation of the Political Order. Boulder: Westview Press; Richard Moench. 1988. Oil Ideology and State Autonomy in Egypt. *Arab Studies Quarterly*. Pages 186; Samia DSad Imam. 1987. Who Owns Egypt? An Analytical Study of the Social Origins of the Infitah Elite, 1974-1980. Cairo: Dar al-mustaqbal al-arabi)

he signed with Israel furthered the decline of his popularity and created significant unrest throughout the country. As a result of this unrest, in 1981, he ordered the arrest of thousands of people and placed all the country's mosques under his direct control. This was his most significant mistake, and it led to his assassination. He was assassinated in 1981 by members of the *Jihad Organization*.[153] This confirms part of the large N chapter results, specifically the results dealing with the religious freedom. When governments restrict religious freedom, there is an increase in the number Islamic fundamentalist movements. Furthermore, in the regression analysis with the total number of terrorist attacks as the dependent variable, religious freedom is highly significant. This indicates that as the state's restrictions on religious freedom increase so do the number of terrorist attacks. Sadat tried to restrict religious freedom via invading mosques. As a result, Egyptian terrorism significantly increased and Sadat paid with his life.

Mubarak and Fundamentalism

During Mubarak's tenure as president, he further opened Egypt's political institutions, and the façade of a multiparty system that Sadat created was further institutionalized during Mubarak's tenure. Under Mubarak the number of legal parties was expanded to thirteen.[154] The Mubarak regime, like the Sadat regime, was, and is, an autocracy; however, it is not a perfect autocracy. During the 1970s and 1980s Mubarak took some tangible steps toward greater liberalization of the polity. Some previously banned parties were permitted to come back and participate in parliamentary elections, and the unsanctioned Muslim Brotherhood

[153] Other prominent radical groups also operating in Egypt are the Islamic Liberation Party and the Society of Muslims. All were born with the Jihad Organization, in the crisis setting that followed the 1967 war with Israel. They are all direct decedents of the Society of Muslim Brotherhood, but they do not share the Banna wing of the Brotherhood's general objection to violence.

[154] The six major parties were the National Democratic Party, the New Wafd Party, the (increasingly Islamist) Labor Party, the National Progressive Unionist Party (also known as Al-tagammu), the Liberal (Ahrar) Party, and the newly formed Arab Democratic Party

was allowed to join legal parties and have positions in the People's Assembly (Ansari 1986; Hinnebusch 1985; Sprinborg 1989; Mustapha 1996; Korany 1998). This political liberalization did not give the Islamic movement substantive policymaking power in the political system; nonetheless, many Islamists saw formal access to the system as a tangible gain because it provided a platform for Islamic ideas and Islamic frustration.

Mubarak's vision of political reform was self-limiting from the outset; his intention was not to transform the authoritarian regime, but to preserve it.[155] The transition to a multiparty system was arguably intended to strengthen the authoritarian system by enhancing its capacity to contain and moderate dissent. Egypt has been ruled under a state of emergency nearly without interruption since June 1967 (the only exception was from 1980 to October 1981, the period just before Sadat's assassination) (Tripp 1990: 19). Under the legal provisions of Egyptian Emergency Laws, the state has the authority to monitor, arrest, and detain those suspected of activities deemed threatening to national security. They also restrict the exercise of the freedoms of speech and assembly guaranteed by the Egyptian Constitution. Although it remained technically illegal, by the start of the Mubarak era, the Brotherhood had reconstructed itself as a formal political organization and it was led by Hamid Abu al-Nase, an octogenarian veteran on the pre-1952 organization.

Under the Political Parties Law, the Egyptian Shura Council's Committee for Political Party Affairs is empowered to legalize new parties. The committee has seven members: the

[155] See: Carrie Wickham. 2002. Mobilizing Islam. Columbia University Press; Rex Brynen, Bahgat Korany, and Paul Noble. 1998. Comparative Experiences of Political Liberalization and Democratization in the Arab World (Boulder: Lynne Rienner) also see: John Entelis and Lisa Arone. 1992. Algeria in Turmoil: Islam, Democracy, and the State. *Middle East Policy* page 27 1992. Some of the opposition parties, specifically the Muslim Brotherhood proposed inviting international monitors to witness the election process (the government had once again turned down the parties' oft-denied request for judicial supervision). The government, citing its desire to protect Egypt's "internal affairs" from foreign "meddling," refused the international-monitors idea and attacked the opposition for trying to undermine Egyptian sovereignty. See *Egypt: Human Development Report, 1995* (Cairo: Institute of National Planning, 1996); Heba Handoussa and Gillian Potter, eds., *Employment and Structural Adjustment: Egypt in the 1990s* (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 1994).

chair, who was speaker of the Shura Council; the Ministers of Justice, Interior and People's Assembly Affairs; and three additional members appointed by the president. During the 1980s, the committee rejected petitions for the formation of about ten political parties. Groups whose petitions were denied could appeal the decision in an administrative appeals court.[156] Mubarak claimed that neither the Egyptian masses nor the opposition parties were mature enough to function in an open democracy. As he observed in a speech at Alexandria University in July 1992: "We are suffering from irresponsible political party activity. I understand that political party activity must be for the homeland and citizens benefit. The party that does not act for the good of the citizens and to improve their living standards – to tell you the truth – does not deserve to live. In our democracy, we exploit the citizens' simplicity. We have a high rate of uneducated people. Because of this simplicity and the high rate of uneducated people, we can infuse very dangerous ideas into the people's minds. Democracy can be soundly established when you have educated people, people who can read and write. Are you asking me to open the door wide with the illiteracy rate I have here? If this will work, please tell us"[157]

Socioeconomics

During Mubarak's presidency poverty grew faster than anytime in Egypt's history. By 1991, Egypt's national debt had climbed to a record high of $50 billion; this is greater than its entire 1990 GNP of $40 billion. Between the mid-1980s and the early 1990s, per-capita GNP fell by 10 percent, and, average real wages fell by 14 percent (Egypt: Human

[156] Robert Springborg. 1989. Mubarak's Egypt: Fragmentation of the Political Order; William Baker. 1991, Summer. Afraid for Islam: Egypt's Centrists between Pharaohs and Fundamentalists. Daedalus page 47; Iliya Harik and Denis Sullivan. 1992. Privatization and Liberalization in the Middle East; Charles Tripp and Roger Owen. 1989. Egypt Under Mubarak; Saad Eddin Ibrahim. 1988. Egypt's Islamic Activism in the 1980s. *Third World Quarterly*. Pages 632-657

[157] See: Eddin Ibrahim, 1995, December. Civil Society and Electoral Politics in Egypt. Civil Society page 4; Salwa Sharawi Goma. 1987. An Explanation of Voting Behavior: A Comparative Study of the District of East Cairo and the Governorate of Suez. In the People's Assembly Elections page 49.

Development Report, 1995*)*. At the same time, unemployment continued to rise, reaching about 20 percent, twice the level of the mid-1970s. Mubarak faced a daunting challenge to implement socioeconomic change because Egypt is still burdened with the many of the social projects created by Nasser (Al-Awadi, 2004). If Mubarak privatized the Egyptian economic infrastructure, it would involve more than three hundred public-sector corporations with a total work force of over 1.5 million, overhauling a four-million-member bureaucracy, and if families are taken into account, over 25 million Egyptians would be affected. Further complicating this is the fact that many of these Egyptians are unionized workers who are Mubarak's main supporters. In other words, the government's hands are tied. As a result of the poverty and flourishing unemployment outside of those industries controlled by the government, the Muslim Brotherhood became more popular than ever (Hesham Al-Awadi 2004).

There are more than four hundred *ashwaiyat* (slum) areas near Cairo and Alexandria and one out of every five Egyptians lives within these slums. For example, the Munira-West near Cairo covers a little more than a mile and has over a million people crowed in it (Ibrahim 1996). Interestingly, before 1992 Munira-West did not appear on any official map of Cairo. This could mean one of two things; that, the slum population grew so rapidly that the state and map makers had no idea of its existence or that the state simply wanted to keep these slums hidden. Furthermore, Munira-West did not have running water, a sewage system, a single police station, school, or hospital until the late 1990s (Ibrahim 1996). Munira-West is less than two miles from the wealthy Cairo suburb of Zamalek. The contrasts between Munira-West and Zamalek are significant. Zamalek has only a tenth of Munira-West's population but covers an area ten times as large. Zamalek has multiple schools,

technologically advanced and Westernized hospitals, multiple police stations, electricity, and sewage systems. The disparity in per-capita income is also huge: $15,000 per year in Zamalek versus $150 in Munira-West (Ibrahim 1996).

These two neighborhoods are only two miles apart, and they representing Egypt's socioeconomic extremes. In between are the vast middle and lower-middle classes which have been feeling increasingly squeezed as a result the worsening socioeconomic conditions in Egypt. A major avenue of the Muslim Brotherhood's outreach has been directed to the educated youth in the *shabi* neighborhoods of Egypt's cities and provincial towns. There is a massive movement underway in the Egyptian slums by illiterate and semi-literate parents to provide their children with higher education; those with education began to enlighten the uneducated. Consequently, the Muslim Brotherhood won supporters by providing relief from squalid conditions in Egypt's underfinanced but open-to-all universities (Hesham al-Awadi 2004). As a result of the educational assistance, humanitarian assistance, and employment assistance the Muslim Brotherhood provides, it has had relatively significant electoral success when able to participate in Egyptian elections. This makes the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood different than most social movements.

Vote-Seeking

Mubarak's approach to the increasing membership of nonviolent Islamist opposition, specifically the Muslim Brotherhood, alternated between accommodation and oppression. The Muslim Brotherhood maintained its own national and regional offices; issued public statements; and published its own journal, but it was barred from having its own political party. Although it technically remained an illegal organization, the Brotherhood was allowed to participate in the 1984 and 1987 elections as a junior partner of the *Wafd* and *Labor*

Parties, respectively, and in 1987, Brotherhood candidates also ran as independents (al-Awadi 2004: 17). In the 1980s and early 1990s, the Brotherhood ran candidates in elections for governing boards of many of the country's student unions, university faulty clubs, and professional associations (al-Awadi 2004: 21).[158] It appears that the state tolerates the Egypt's civil society organizations (CSOs) only when it needs their support for international events, such as the September 1994 UN Conference on Population and Development in Cairo, United States and/or Western European high-profile diplomatic visitors, or when it feels pressed in its fight against militant Islamism. However, once the crisis has passed or the dignitaries leave, the state turns on the CSOs and reasserts its control.[159]

The Muslim Brotherhood has dominated most of the elections dealing with professional associations in Egypt, including those of the lawyers and doctor syndicates. This is a significant indicator of the degree of alienation in Egyptian civil society has toward the

[158] Egypt today has more than 25,000 civil society organizations (CSO). These include 15,000 CSOs registered under the 1964 law; 5,000 cooperative organizations; 4,000 youth and sporting clubs; 30 professional associations; and 14 political parties.

[159] To understand both the thwarted democratization process, it is important to know something about Egyptian civil society. The first modern civil-society organization (CSO) was formed in 1821; by mid-century, budding civic organizations started by educated members of the middle class were spreading all over the country and in all spheres of life. By the 1860s, these groups were making their first timid appeals for political participation and meeting with some success, but this era of promise ended with the onset of British occupation in 1882.[159] However, civil society did not stop growing, however. Indeed, the four-decade-long absence of an independent national government left a vacuum that CSOs moved to fill. These groups founded Egypt's first modern university (1906), and established hospitals, schools, community-development centers, theaters, and sports clubs. At about the same time, modern political parties and trade unions were making their first appearance. Civil-society organizations were in the thick of the national-liberation struggle; their activists led the 1919 revolution that culminated in independence from Britain in 1922. See: Moheb Zaki, *Civil Society and Democratization in Egypt: 1881-1994* (Cairo: Ibn Khaldoun Center for Development Studies and Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 1995). Donald Reid published a few articles dealing with the Egyptian syndicates in the early 1970s and includes: The Rise of Professions and Professional Organization in Modern Egypt; *Comparative Studies in Society and History January* 1974; pages 24-57, and The National Bar Association and Egyptian Politics, 1912-1952, *International Journal of African Historical Studies.* 1974; pages 608-646. For details, see *Civil Society Yearbook* (in Arabic) (Cairo: Ibn Khaldoun Center, 1996) pages 18-51. Also see Robert Springborg1978. Professional Syndicates in Egyptian Politics, 1952-1970. *International Journal of Middle East Studies*. Pages 275-295. Many scholars have looked at town and village councils, labor unions, and other Egyptian governmental structures: See,for example, Hrair Dekmejian 1971. Egypt under Nasser: A Study in Political Dynamics; Liliya Harik 1974. The Political Mobilization of Peasants: A Study of the Egyptian Community; James Mayfield. 1971. Rural Politics in Nasser's Egypt: A Quest for Legitimacy; Amos Perlmutter. 1974. Egypt: The Praetorian State; S.E.M. Sadek. 1971. The Balance Point Between Local Autonomy and National Control

state. Taken together, the 25 syndicates (*nikabat*) have a total membership of three million and form the foundation of Egypt's civil society. Muslim Brothers members account for only 15 percent of the total membership of these syndicates; however, they have had significant success in internal-leadership elections. Rather than contest state power directly, the Muslim Brotherhood gradually appropriated public influence by running members in syndicate elections. Non-Brotherhood members voted in large numbers for the Brotherhood candidates as a protest vote against the Mubarak government.[160] Brotherhood member, Osman Ahmad Osman served as chair of the Engineers Association from 1979 to 1990 and introduced its social services programs that became the hallmark of the Muslim Brotherhood's administration for the professional associations (al-Awadi 2004: 73). As the leading voice in the Engineers Association, the Muslim Brotherhood was able to establish a private hospital, housing projects, a consumer's cooperative, a social welfare fund, group insurance, and a social club for members of the syndicate (al-Sayed 1993). Consequently, membership in the Muslim Brotherhood movement also significantly increased as their popularity within the professional syndicates increased.

As a result of the electoral success the Muslim Brotherhood had with the syndicates, the Mubarak regime launched a major counter-initiative against them in the mid-1990s. Mubarak's assault on the Muslim Brotherhood represented an abrupt departure from the reluctant toleration accorded to nonviolent Islamist groups during the first decade of his rule. In the 1990s, the state reversed its liberalization stance and imposed greater restrictions on the opposition, especially the Muslim Brotherhood. The reversal began when the regime issued

[160] Mustafa Kamal al-Sayed, 1993, Spring. A Civil Society in Egypt*? Middle East Journal* page 232; Mustafa Kamal al-Sayed. 1990. The Islamic Movement in Egypt: Social and Political Implications: in The Political Economy of Contemporary Egypt. Ibrahim Oweiss (Washington, D.C. Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, Georgetown University)

Electoral Law 206, which redrew (or gerrymandered) voting districts in a blatantly unfair way to privilege the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) candidates. The ruling party continued to receive financial subsidies from the state, and it maintained its monopoly over the radio and television during the election campaigns (al-Shourbaji 1994; Auda and Ibrahim 1995). Beginning around 1993, against a backdrop of mounting violence by Islamist militants, the regime began to denounce the Muslim Brotherhood as an illegal organization with ties to extremists groups even though it had no ties to violent fundamentalist groups. The charges brought against Muslim Brotherhood leaders suggested that the regime found them threatening, not because they were terrorists, but because they were not. I would argue that it was the Brotherhood's electoral takeover of Egypt's professional associations and its growing credibility as a moderate non-terrorist Islamic movement that forced the Mubarak to curtail its growing political power because it was a threat to his own political power.

Four factors help explain the reversal in Mubarak's liberalization. First, during the 1980s, the Muslim Brotherhood took advantage of its national platform to raise its demands for Islamic ideas, challenging the regime's policies with regards to international security, economic planning, foreign relations, use of torture, lack of democracy and human rights in Egypt (Radhi 1990, 1991; al-Tawil 1992). By refusing to play a quiescent role in parliament, the Muslim Brotherhood challenged the legitimacy of the state regime. Secondly, while the political inclusion of the Muslim Brotherhood was intended to contain its influence, by the late 1980s it had became the leading opposition force in parliament with 36 seats. Other political parties began vying for an alliance with the Muslim Brotherhood and the "Islamic alliance" that united the Brotherhood with the Labor and liberal Parties in 1987 (Auda and Ibrahim 1995). Thirdly, the legitimacy of the Muslim Brotherhood in parliament spilled over

into civil society, and its syndicate leadership became a vehicle for the expression of its political goals and a soapbox for it to criticize the regime. This also allowed the Muslim Brotherhood to mobilize financial resources to aid social and political causes, which significantly impacted their membership (Qandil 1995, 1996). Such influence was deemed threatening to Mubarak because it turned the Brotherhood into an alternative to the state. Finally, the inclusion of the Brotherhood did not result in the containment of the violent fundamentalist movements. The state's strategy during the 1980s was to isolate the militants by rewarding the Brotherhood with political access. The Gama'a and Islamic Jihad shunned parliamentary participation on religious grounds. They believed democracy was heresy because it allowed the people to rule rather than the word of God. Yet despite this fundamental objection, they did not hesitate to criticize the Brotherhood for failure to advance Islamic aims through institutional participation. Aboud Zumur, the leader of Islamic Jihad, criticized the Brotherhood for failing to secure a political party during the 1990s by pointing out that "whereas France, Germany, and Italy permit the formation of a religious party, Egypt is proud of the fact it does not permit such a party" (Ahmed 1995: 109).

In 1995 the regime detained eighty-one of the Brotherhood's leading activists, including former members of parliament, university professors, association officials, and businessmen. The defendants were tried in military courts, and forty-four of them received sentences of up to five years with hard labor.[161] Since 1995 hundreds of Brotherhood activists have been detained, and many have received prison sentences after trials in military

[161] According to al- Awadi (2004) those who received the maximum sentence included two of the Brotherhood's most influential leaders – Isa al-Iryan (former member of parliament and assistant secretary general of the Doctor's Association) and Abd al-Muni Abu-l-Futuh (secretary general of the Doctor's Association and secretary general of the Federation of Arab Doctors). Both were charged with "directing an illegal organization aiming to impede the rule of law and the Constitution. They were also charges with providing financial assistance to the families of terrorists and using their association positions to help Islamic militants abroad.

courts.[162] For a complete list of all the Muslim Brotherhood political prisoners currently in Egyptian prisons see appendix number four.

Terrorism

As the formal inclusion of the Muslim Brotherhood during the 1980s turned into outright political oppression in the early 1990s, two of the most violent fundamentalist movements in Egypt, the Gama'a and Islamic Jihad made it clear that they felt vindicated using violence because of the hypocrisy associated with the Mubarak regime. In one communiqué, the Gama'a rhetorically asked, "What has the Muslim Brotherhood, since its inception until now, achieved of the goals and objectives of Islam, the hopes and needs of the Muslims, and the duties and requirements of the age?" It added, "What is astonishing is that every time the Muslim Brotherhood rushes to issue their statements of moral condemnation, denunciation, and disavowal for all that is jihad – they call it terrorism – the more the government redoubles its constraints against them and strikes them nonstop" (Communiqué in *al-Hayat* August 8, 1995). In its publication *al-Mojahedin,* Islamic Jihad wrote, "All the peacefulness and gradualism upheld by the Muslim Brotherhood during their political struggles, and their work through the regime's legitimate, legal channels did not save them from being handcuffed, tried in front of military courts, and dragged to prisons" (al-Hayat January 28, 1996).

[162] The following all look at the way Egypt is currently treating Egyptian fundamentalism; specifically, the Muslim Brotherhood: Susan Sachs, 2000. War on Fundamentalism Silences Dissent in Egypt. International Herald Tribune. August 5*; Mona el-Tahawy*, 1999, October 23. Egypt Cracks Down on Islamist Activists. The Guardian; *United Press International* 2000, September 19. Egypt's Islamists Blast Government for Election Ban; Amnesty International. Egypt: Run-up to Shura Council Elections Marred by Wave of Arrests. May 15, 2001; Simon Apiku, 1998, November 8. Islamists Barred from Student Elections. Middle East Times; E. S. McKee. 2000, July 17. Fading Fundamentalists. Jerusalem Report; Steve Negus. 1997, April 3. Down but Not Out: The Muslim Brotherhood Keep a Low Profile, but Their Main Activity, Charity Work – Still Does On. *Cairo Times*; Andrew Hammond, 1996, December 7. Brotherhood Crisis Takes on New Proportions. Idle East Times; Roula Khalaf. 2001, March 9. *Egypt's Survey. Financial Times*.

Islamic militancy in the 1990s did not produce a targeted state response. Instead, repression was brutal, swift, and indiscriminate. State repression encompassed not only the hard-core militants of the Gama'a and Islamic Jihad, but also supporters, sympathizers, families, and, for that matter, anyone wearing a beard with a trimmed mustache (see Human Rights Watch 1993; Amnesty International 1996). The arrest numbers in the 1990s indicate that the state haphazardly arrested individuals. Between 1992 and 1997, more than 47,000 people were arrested, in 1998 and 1999 that the state released more than 7,000 of these prisoners (*al-Hayat* Aprial 27, 1999). In addition to mass arrests, the regime began taking hostages, whereby the state detained the families and relatives of suspected militants until the militants turned themselves over to the authorities or admitted to what the state told them (Human Rights Watch 1995). Those arrested were regularly mistreated and tortured. The torture was indiscriminant and state repression was heavy-handed. For the first time since 1981, the state began referring Islamists, including Muslim Brotherhood members, to military courts where justice was delivered hastily and without an appeal process. In the mid-1990s, the state adopted a shoot-to-kill policy, completely sidestepping military courts. As a result of this Egypt got under control all of their domestic fundamentalist groups. According to the polity data, during the mid-1990s Egypt was very close to a perfect autocracy and it based managed to suppress significant numbers of fundamentalist movements.

Unlike the following chapters that concentrate on Hamas and Hezbollah, the Muslim Brotherhood has condemned all acts of terrorism as counter-productive and has refused to participate in violence. In this sense, it acts like most other social movements. However, after two decades of relative peace and stability, terrorist operations began a violent Jihadist campaign against Egypt, one that began with terrorist attacks in Sinai, on October 7, 2004,

targeting Israeli tourists, killing 34 and injuring over 150 others. The Abdullah Azzam Brigades, an unknown al-Qaeda affiliate movement, claimed responsibility.[163] On April 24, 2006, the Abdullah Azzam Brigades continued its violence, a day before the Egyptian national holiday marking the handover of Sinai by Israel to Egypt, three bombs exploded nearly simultaneously in the Sinai resort of Dahab, killing at least 23 people and wounding more than 80, mostly Egyptians. Two days later, a suicide bomber blew himself up in front of representatives from the international organization Multinational Force of Observers (MFO) near the border crossing to Gaza in northern Sinai, and less than a half hour later a second suicide bomber on a motorbike attacked an Egyptian police vehicle at another location in the same area. The Abdullah Azzam Brigades get support from Al Qaeda via Saudi Arabian charities in Egypt. Muslim Brotherhood leader Isam al-Aryan claimed Egypt had reached a "boiling point" due to the lack of political reform. Furthermore, it is interesting to note that Egyptian Islamist movements quickly denied responsibility for each of these

[163] This was only the beginning of the violence that is assumed to have been either facilitated by or committed by members of the Abdullah Azzam Brigades: on March 29, 2005 an Egyptian man stabbed and wounded two Hungarian tourists in Cairo in revenge for Western policies towards Iraqis and Palestinians. This was followed soon after by the April 7, 2005 bombing near the Khan al-Khalili bazaar in Cairo, which killed three tourists and wounded 18 others. Two weeks later, Ihab Yousri Yassin, pursued by the police, launched himself from the bridge behind the Egyptian museum in Cairo and subsequently detonated a bomb, wounding seven, including two Israelis, an Italian and a Swede. Soon after this incident, Yassin's sister and his fiancée armed with guns opened fire on a tourist bus in the Sayyida Aisha neighborhood. This marked the first time that a woman had ever engaged in Islamist violence in Egypt. Sherifa Zuhur, "A New Phase for Jihad in Egypt?" *Terrorism Monitor*, Jamestown Foundation, Vol. 3, No. 10 (May 19, 2005); on July 23, 2005, two car bombs and a suitcase bomb ripped through hotels and shopping areas in Sharm el-Sheikh, killing 88 and wounding over 200, making the attack the deadliest in the Egypt's history. The bombing coincided with Egypt's commemoration of Nasser's 1952 overthrow of King Farouk. Again the Abdullah Azzam Brigades claimed it carried out the bombings. Additional claims were later made by two other groups calling themselves the *Tawahid and Jihad Group in Egypt* and *Holy Warriors of Egypt*. In the Tawahid statement the group said it was continuing its "war to expel the Jews and Christians from the land of Islam. The war has begun by targeting the axis of Zionist evil and immorality in Sinai, where Moses spoke to God (Paz, 2005): article entitled "From Riyadh/East to Sinai," by the Saudi Abu Abbas al-Aedhi

terrorist attacks and condemned them. Specifically, many members of Gama'a issued a public statement urging their followers to halt all operations and to renounce violence.[164]

In Conclusion

The goal of my dissertation is to determine the causes of Islamic fundamentalism while showing Islamic fundamentalist movements are social movements. In the previous chapters, I laid out my labyrinth theory that argues the causes of Islamic fundamentalist is the result of a combined presence of phenomena associated with the different social movement literatures, each being positively associated with the number of Islamic fundamentalist groups within the nation-state. Furthermore, Islamic fundamentalist movements are social movements and the factors that predict social movements, predict Islamic fundamentalist movements.

The oldest and most resilient of the Islamic fundamentalist movements is that of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. The Brotherhood has for generations exerted a radical form of opposition on the Egyptian state and existing Egyptian political institutions. By using the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood as a case-study, my results were threefold; first, I was able to show qualitatively that there was validity to my fundamentalist labyrinth and each of my social movement conditions are positively associated with the rise and success of the Muslim

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[164] The following all look at this newest wave of terrorism in Egypt: Stephen Ulph "Possible Terrorist Attack Foiled in Egypt," *Terrorism Focus*, Jamestown Foundation, Vol. 3, No. 11 (March 21, 2006); Murad B. Al-Shishani, "Egypt Breaks-up al-Ta'efa al-Mansoura Jihadist Group," *Terrorism Focus*, Jamestown Foundation, Vol. 3, No. 16 (April 25, 2006); Reuven Paz, "Arab volunteers killed in Iraq: an Analysis," *PRISM Series of Global Jihad*, No. 1/3 - March 2005; Mohammed Al Shafey, "Dahab Bombers Inspired by Al-Qaeda," *Asharq Alawsat*, April 29, 2006; Diana Mukkaled, "Al Zarqawi… Between Myth and Reality," *Asharq Alawsat*, May 1, 2006; Neveen Mahish and Sherine Abdel-Razek, "The guessing game," *Al-Ahram Weekly Online,* 27 April - 3 May 2006; Jailan Halawi and Salonaz Sami, 'shattered dreams," *Al-Ahram Weekly Online,* 27 April - 3 May 2006; Michael Slackman, "Peacekeepers Targets of New Sinai Attacks," *NYT*, April 27, 2006;

Brotherhood. The Brotherhood acted, formed, and had all the characteristics that the social movement scholars argue social movements have. However, the Brotherhood is different from the traditional social movement because its vote-seeking pursuits and humanitarian programs help facilitate its electoral success.

Chapter Five: Hamas as a Social Movement

The goal of my dissertation is to determine the causes of Islamic fundamentalism and in doing so I show that an Islamic fundamentalist movement is inherently a social movement. In the previous chapter I evaluated the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and was able to show that my theory not only has quantitative validity, but it also has qualitative validity as it relates to Egypt, specifically looking at the Muslim Brotherhood there. I was able to show that each of the social movement conditions is positively associated with the rise and success of the Muslim Brotherhood. The Muslim Brotherhood is the oldest and most resilient of the Sunni Islamic fundamentalist movements. Also, its doctrine is based on anti-terrorism. For contrast, I choose the Palestinian territories, specifically looking at Hamas as my second case-study. Hamas has become one of the most violent Sunni Islamic fundamentalist movements, as well as one of the most electorally successful. In this chapter, I will further prove my theory and in doing so, I will show that Hamas is a social movement; therefore, I will reconfirm the fact that Islamic fundamentalist movements are social movements.

I selected Hamas as my second case study because Palestinian issues are central to understanding contemporary Middle Eastern socioeconomic and sociopolitical structures. Also, Hamas is one of the most well known and populous fundamentalist movements, making it an important case. The following chapter has two objectives; first, to confirm the results of the previous chapters show that each of the social movement conditions is positively associated with Palestinian fundamentalism, specifically Hamas. Secondly, as a fundamentalist movement, Hamas, like the Muslim Brotherhood, is a social movement; however, Hamas acts differently than most social movements in the sense that it has formed a political party and has had electoral success. Also, Hamas is one of the most violent of all the

social movements. Most social movements, including the Muslim Brotherhood, do not commit or facilitate acts of terrorism like Hamas. As a result, my second objective is to show how Hamas acts differently than a traditional social movement, including the Egyptian and Palestinian Muslim Brotherhoods.

In order to meet each objective, I evaluate aspects of each of my fundamentalist labyrinth's conditions on both the movement and state levels, and I show that each are positively associated with Palestinian Islamic fundamentalism. To truly understand Palestinian fundamentalism, it is imperative that I evaluate the historical development of Palestinian fundamentalist movements, most of which formed from the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood, born from the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. The historical story told here is significant because it shows the development of Islamic fundamentalism through an actual example. My historical journey concludes with the argument that confirms Hamas began as predicted by the social movement scholars. Then, I explain the ideological makeup of Hamas and argue that much of its ideological foundations are found in its printed works, a significant resource for the movement. In doing so, I explain Hamas's ideological development from a resistance movement into full scale social movement.

Following this, I evaluate Hamas's relations, differences, and similarities with other Palestinian social movements. In chapter three I proposed and quantitatively proved that an inverted-U relationship exists between the openness of political institutions and fundamentalism. I was able to show that there are more fundamentalist movements in opening political systems than in either perfect autocracies or perfect democracies. The Palestinian territory has never been either a perfect autocracy or a perfect democracy, and it

has experienced significant numbers of Islamic fundamentalist movements. Also, Hamas has been a recipient of significant outside ideological Sunni influence from Saudi Arabia.

Hamas acts differently than most social movements because it has transformed itself simultaneously into both a legitimate and successful political party as well as a terrorist organization. Also, in order to achieve electoral success and to win over the hearts and minds of the Palestinian people, Hamas has become the Palestinian territories most significant provider of social services. It is nearly impossible to find the point of demarcation between the Hamas terrorist and the Hamas social service providers because they are often times the same individual. Furthermore, Hamas is able to use its overt political and charitable organizations as a financial and logistical support network for its terrorist operations (Barnard 2006). The majority of social movements, including the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, do not do this.

Introduction to Hamas

The Islamic world does not see Hamas as a terrorist organization; rather it is seen as a multidimensional social movement that is involved in wide scale political, economic, social, cultural, and charitable activities. It is also seen as a movement with an ideological network of political and social ties to political parties, organizations, and states. Additionally, it has official representatives in every Muslim state, and it has supporters throughout the Arab and Islamic world. Hamas is an organized mass-effort with its main goal of bringing about change in Palestinian socioeconomic and sociopolitical institutions, acting as predicted by social movement scholars.[165]

[165] The social movement scholars that argue this include: Kyriacos Markides 1974; Cemeron 1969; King 1956; Heberle 1951; Toch 1965; Smelser 1963; Turner and Killian 1957; Rush and Denisoff 1971; Gusfield 1970

Hamas is an acronym for *Harakat al-Muqawam al-Islamiyah*, or the *Islamic Resistance Movement,* and it is an Arabic word meaning *zeal* (Levitt 2006: 8). It is a Palestinian Islamist movement that emerged in December 1987 as an outgrowth of the Palestinian branch of the Egyptian based Muslim Brotherhood. Hamas was founded with the goals of eliminating the state of Israel and replacing it with an Islamist state in all of what was once British Mandatory Palestine and liberating all the Palestinian people from occupation.[166] To meet these objectives, Hamas was going to partake in jihad and to facilitate the Palestinian people to also participate in jihad. Hamas adopted the principles contained in the PLO's National Charter of 1968. According to the Charter, foregoing territorial parts of Palestine was tantamount to forgoing part of Islam; Palestine as a whole could be liberated only by violent jihad.

Hamas's sociopolitical strategies seek to counter what it perceives as the secularization and Westernization of Arab society, and to become internationally recognized as the sole representative of the Palestinian people, a distinction held by the PLO since the 1974 Arab League conference. Hamas' slogan, as stated in Article 8 of the group's charter, reflects the fundamental importance of violent jihad via religiously sanctioned resistance against the enemies of Islam: "Allah is the target, the Prophet is its model, the Koran its constitution: Jihad is its path and death for the sake of Allah is the loftiest of its wishes."[167] To meet their goals, Hamas employs a three-pronged strategy: (1) social welfare activity that builds grassroots support, (2) political activity that competes within Palestinian political institutions, and (3) guerilla and terrorist attacks that target Israeli soldiers and its citizens.

[166] The British Mandate Territory includes: the land that is today comprised of Israel, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip

[167] Canadian Secret Intelligence Services (CSIS), "Terrorist Group Profiler", June 2002. The report is references in Stewart Bell, "Hamas May Have Chemical Weapons: CSIS Report Says Terror Group May Be Experimenting", National Post (Canada), December 10, 2003.

Hamas's political importance is the direct result of the public support it has amassed via its grass-roots movement. This support goes beyond its religious doctrine and its supporters go beyond those who subscribe to its fundamentalist ideology and dogma. Arguably, this is the direct result of its ability to meet its own goals, specifically, its humanitarian and educational objectives. In fact, Gil Seden (1994) argues that some observers point out that hundreds of thousands of its Palestinian supporters "don't even know what the inside of a mosque looks like." Hamas relies on its political and social activists and organizations to build facilitate grassroots support for its movement, to expand its base, to fund operatives, to support or supply jobs, social services, and education, and to serve as the logistical and financial support network for the movement's terror cells. What follows is a historical journey into the development of Islamic fundamentalist movements; this process was alluded to in Chapters One and Two.

History of Fundamentalism in Palestine

Overall, the characteristics, make-up, ideology, and political discourse of Hamas reflect its organizational roots and its historic ties to the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood, which was born from the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. Interestingly, almost every Palestinian fundamentalist movement has had its beginnings as a result of the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood. The establishment of the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood was motivated by the concern that the members of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt had for the Palestinians; from 1936 to 1939 the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood supplied moral and

material aid to the Palestinian cause, eventually leading to its first successful offshoot and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood was born.[168]

The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood was able to mobilize significant resources for the Palestinian cause, most importantly massive popular support. It also utilized its educational resources by writing letters of protest to the British authorities (Britain held the Mandate for Palestine and quasi-occupied Egypt). On the occasion of the anniversary of the Balfour Declaration,[169] the Muslim Brotherhood wrote to the British ambassador in Egypt that "the cause of Palestine is the cause of every Muslim;" it warned Britain that if it continued to suppress the Palestinians, they would facilitate an all out jihad against Britain (Hroub 2000: 13).[170] It was not until 1943 that a genuine Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood organization was actually formed, the *Makarem Society of Jerusalem*; it would later become the Muslim Brotherhood of Palestine after WWII.[171] What facilitated this was arguably the establishment

[168] The Palestinian revolt between 1936 and 1939 is also known as The Great Palestinian Revolt of 1936. The first visit by the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood to Palestine occurred when two members of the organization, Abdel Rahman al-Sa'ati and Muhammad As'ad al-Hakim, toured Palestine, Lebanon, and Syria in August 1935 to spread the Brotherhood's message. There is no indication that this visit resulted in the establishment of branches of chapters of the Brotherhood in Palestine, and it appears that for several years relations between the Palestinians and the Brotherhood remained limited to the exchanges of letters expressing pleasantries and solidarity for more information about the Islamic trend at the time, see Mohsen M Saleh. The Islamic Trend in Palestine and its effects on the struggle Movement 1917-1948. Kuwait: AL-Falah Library. 1988

[169] The Balfour Declaration of 1917, in an official letter from the British Foreign Office to Great Britain's Foreign Secretary, to Lord Rothschild, who was seen as a representative of the Jewish people. The letter stated that the British government "viewed with favor the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavors to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country"

[170] Saleh (page 436); Al-Banna (page 259): For a more detailed view of the doctrines of the Muslim Brotherhood and its stand on the question of Palestine, see Abd al-Fattah El-Awaisi, The Muslim brotherhood's Conception of the Palestine Question. Cairo: Islamic House of Publishing and Distribution, 1989.

[171] See: Rabi al-Madhoon. The Islamic Movement in Palestine, 1928-1987, Shu'un Filastiniyya October 1988, pages 10 -50 (had translated). Bayan Nuwayhid al-Hout. The Political Leadership and Institutions in Palestine, 1917-1948. Beirut: Institute for Palestinian Studies. 1986; Bashir Nafi. 1988. Arabism, Islamism and the Palestinian Question, 1908-1941. Reading, UK: Ithaca Pres.; Also for the history of the Palestinian movements see: See: Olivier Roy, The Failure of Political Islam (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994), pp. 24, 77–80; Gilles Kepel, Muslim Extremism in Egypt: The Prophet and the Pharaoh (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1985), pp. 16–20; Islam, Democracy, the State and the West: A Round Table with Dr. Hasan Turabi, May 10, 1992, sponsored by the World and Islam Studies Enterprise and the University of South Florida, Committee for Middle Eastern Studies

of the state of Israel in 1948, the defeat of the Palestinians in the Israeli War of Independence, and the subsequent loss of significant parts of the Palestinian territory. However, a single Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood movement only lasted for a brief period of time because significant portions of the Palestinian territories became occupied by Israel, what was left fell under either Jordanian or Egyptian government control. This division had a significant effect on the subsequent course and effectiveness of the Muslim Brotherhood. The Brotherhood in the West Bank was soon incorporated into the Brotherhood of Jordan and in the Gaza Strip the Brotherhood was incorporated into the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood.[172]

One significant difference between the Brotherhood in the Gaza Strip and its counterpart in the West Bank after 1948 was that the Jordan Branch continued to be active in the national effort to end the Israeli occupation via jihad (Hroub 2000: 23). This reflects my inverted-U hypothesis; the Jordanian branch of the Brotherhood operated in political institutions that were not completely closed, as compared to the West Bank branch of the Brotherhood which operated in a perfect autocracy. Soon after the West Bank branch was incorporated into the Egyptian Brotherhood, both were banned and declared illegal by President Nasser. Those members who were not jailed where forced underground. After 1954, the Egyptian branch of the Brotherhood became a secret organization and almost disappeared (Abu Amt 1987). As a result, membership was reduced to only a small number of individuals. This development represented a setback in the effort to resist Israeli occupation and peacefully liberate Palestine, which was the main objective in the Brotherhood's platform. In the first half of the 1950s, disenfranchised members of the

[172] The following all give historical reference to the significance the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in the formation of the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine and in turn the formation of Hamas: Abed-Qotob, Sana (1995); Abu-Amr, Ziad. (1994); Azem, A. J. (1977); Bar, Shmuel (1998); Burgat, François, and William Dowell (1993); Cohen, Amnon (1980); Fricsh, Hillel (1994); Kramer, G. (1994); Meijer, R. (1997); Miller, Aaron David (1983)

Brotherhood in the Gaza Strip organized military cells, and two secret organizations were formed to engage in armed struggle: Youth for Vengeance and the Battalion of Justice. These movements provided the inspiration for the idea of Fateh, the Palestine National Liberation Movement (PLO). Palestinian Brotherhood members were tired of the peaceful resistance campaign and the Fateh and the PLO began focusing on the military aspects of resistance to Israeli occupation. They bypassed the doctrinaire and ideological issues that were the foundations of the Muslim Brotherhood and instead started concentrating on nationalist and not religious ideas while utilizing terrorism.[173]

In the early 1960s Fateh split from the Muslim Brotherhood. Fateh rather than the Brotherhood represented Palestinian aspirations for liberation from Israeli occupation and it championed Palestinian nationalism via armed struggle, and in time, the members of the Battalion of Justice and the Youth of Vengeance joined the Fateh. [174] The Palestinian Brotherhood followed their brethren in Egypt and operated a completely passive movement. Haled Hroub (2000: 29) argues that the outbreak of the 1967 war and the devastating and fast defeat of the Arab armies on all fronts took the Arabs and Palestinians by surprise. From a regional perspective, Egypt's defeat significantly cost it its regional standing and freed the Gaza Strip from Nasser. With the defeat of the Arab world's supreme military power, the

[173] Abdullah Abu Azza. 1992. The Islamic Movements in the Arab Countries. Kuwait: Al-Qalam Publishing House: this book is the most compete source detailing the relationship between the Muslim Brotherhood in Gaza and Fateh during the Fatah's emergence. Abu Azza headed the Brotherhood's organization in Gaza during the Israeli occupation from November 1956 to February 1957, when he was arrested by occupation authorities. Azza said that he opposed the idea of the Fateh and was instrumental in formulating the Brotherhood's position opposing it. He resigned from the Brotherhood in 1972 and later was appointed a member of the Palestine National Council, continuing to serve until the late 1980s, when he resigned to protest the resolution declaring a Palestinian state and recognizing Israel. Page 25

[174] Emile Sahliyeh. 1988. In Search of Leadership: West Bank Politics since 1967 (Washington, D.C.: Brookings) chapter 2. Also, Hillel Frisch, "The Evolution of Palestinian Nationalist Islamic Doctrine: Territorializing a Universal Religion," *Canadian Review in Nationalism* 21, nos. 1–2 (1994): 51–53. Yezid Sayigh, "The Armed Struggle and Palestinian Nationalism," in Avraham Sela and Moshe Ma`oz. 1997. The PLO and Israel: From Armed Conflict to Political Solution, 1964–1994 (New York: St. Martin's Press), pp. 23–35.

Palestinians realized they could not rely on the Arab armies for protection and had to change to a self-reliance policy, propelling the power and popularity of the PLO and Fatah.

However, both the PLO and Fatah suffered from factionalism, internal rivalry, and excessive corruption. As a result, they were unable to bring solutions to the Palestinian socioeconomic and sociopolitical problems, specifically the extreme unemployment and poverty associated with the oppression and degradation because of Israeli occupation. The inability or unwillingness of both movements to improve the socioeconomic and sociopolitical life of the Palestinians inside the occupied territories diminished their legitimacy while increasing the appeal of Islamic fundamentalism among the Palestinians. By the late 1970s the average Palestinian had enough. Tired of the excessive poverty and lack of any socioeconomic or sociopolitical mobility, they turned in great numbers to Islamic fundamentalist movements, specifically the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood.

Furthermore, both the Palestinians and their fundamentalist activists were inspired by the success of the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979 and the Islamization of Iran. As a result, the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood's popularity soared. However, by the beginning of the 1980s, the exclusive hold the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood had over Palestinian fundamentalist activists was significantly challenged. This was due to the emergence of Saraya al-Jihad al-Islami (Islamic Jihad) which embraced violent resistance to the Israeli occupation. Islamic Jihad was formed in the Gaza Strip by Muslim Brotherhood leaders who broke away from the original movement in protest against its unwillingness to committee acts of terrorism against Israeli occupation (Hatina 2001; Alexander 2002; Kolocotronis 1990). According to Hroub (2000: 32), this appeared to be a replay of the discourse launched by the founders of Fateh at the time they had split from the Muslim Brotherhood. However, the

Muslim Brotherhood faced a more critical situation this time because activists did not have to forsake their Islamic identity in joining Islamic Jihad, unlike the Fatah or the PLO. Islamic Jihad constituted a merger between Islam and terrorism; it was a way of engaging in resistance activities in the armor of an Islamic identity.[175] Numerous social movement scholars have shown that people join collective action mainly through interpersonal ties, social relations, or informal networks.[176] In other words, Palestinians engage in collective action via joining fundamentalist movements because they share certain norms, values, and a shared identification process.[177] This shared Palestinian identification process was the result of the socioeconomic and sociopolitical hardships placed on them by Israeli occupation.

At this time in the Palestinian territories, both unemployment and poverty were strangling the Palestinian people; and they were being denied basic human rights. There was a radicalization occurring among the Palestinian people, on facilitated by their socioeconomic inequality. As a result of this radicalization, there was also a significant shift in the ideological and political practices of the Muslim Brotherhood in the mid-1980s. Between 1982 and 1983, the Brotherhood began a policy of violent demonstrations as a result of Israeli occupation of Islamic mosques. In other words, the Israeli government crossed the threshold from simple occupier to a religious occupier. This occupation facilitated a significant surge in violence participated by members of even the most peaceful fundamentalist movements.

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[175] Iyad Barghuthi. 1990. The Islamization and politics of the Palestinian occupied lands (Jerusalem: Markaz al-Zahra' lil-Dirasat wal-Abhath), pp. 65–75; Thomas Mayer. 1988. The awakening of the Muslims in Israel (Giv`at Haviva: ha-Makhon le-Limudim `Arviyim), pp. 42–55; Wajih Kawtharany, Three eras in the Arab and Islamic renaissance project, *al-Mustaqbal al-`Arabi*, no. 120 (February 1989): 4–25 had translated; Abdullah `Azzam, al-Difa The defense of Muslims' lands, the most important of individual's duties. 1987. (Jidda: Dar al-Mujtama), pp. 20–21

[176] As argued by: della Porta 1988; Could 1995; McAdam 1988; Snow, David A. (1988, 1992, 1999); Snow, Burke E. Rochford, Steven K. Worden, and Robert D. Benford (1986); Tarrow (1994)

[177] As is relates to the identifying process and social movements see: Freeman 1978; McAdam 1982; Morris 1984; Calhoun 1989; Fernandez and McAdam 1989; Andrews 1991; McAdam and Paulsen 1993; Whittier 1995; and Melucci 1996

This confirms part of the large N chapter results, specifically the models with the total number of terrorist attacks as the dependent variable. When governments restrict religious freedom, there is a significant increase in the number terrorist attacks. When the Israeli government occupied Palestinian mosques, we saw a significant increase in violent fundamentalism even from fundamentalist groups with doctrines that condemn the use of violence.

To further complicate the situation, the Islamic Jihad began anti-Israeli terrorist attacks in the early 1980s, which created a new atmosphere in the Gaza Strip and united Islamists and nationalists in armed struggle. In the summer of 1985 the Brotherhood decided to revolutionize the masses and started facilitating a mass popular uprising. By 1985-86 significant numbers of Palestinians living in the occupied territories were fed-up with their socioeconomic and sociopolitical inequality, and most joined their religious brethren in the anti-Israeli demonstrations. Here there is a meeting of two of the social movement conditions, socioeconomic inequality and resources, both being positively associated with Islamic fundamentalism. Also, the Palestinians were acting just as the political process and Marxist social movement scholars predicted.

As the outbreak of the Intifada drew nearer in 1987, public anger increased significantly when the Israeli army stormed the Islamic University in Gaza where thousands of students had gathered for prayer service for four members of the Islamic Jihad who had been killed by the Israeli army. The Israeli troops opened fire on the students, wounding dozens (Schiff and Yaari 1989). The significance behind the university massacre had to do with the high esteem Islam holds for education. The Palestinians saw education as the only hope for their children and the university massacre threatened to take away the only resource

they had left, an educated youth. Consequently, even more mass demonstrations broke and by December of 1987 (Hroub, 2000: 39).

Rashad al-Shawwa, the mayor of Gaza, summed up the situation in an interview broadcast about the Israeli military raids on December 10, 1987, the third day of the Intifada: "One must expect these things after twenty years of debilitating occupation. People have lost hope. They are frustrated and don't know what to do. They have turned to religious fundamentalism as their last hope. They have given up hoping Israel will give them their rights. The Arab states are unable to do anything, and they feel that the PLO, which is their representative, also has failed" (Aryeh Shelev, 1991: 13). On December 11, 1987, the Political Bureau of the Brotherhood in Gaza met and agreed that it was the perfect moment to directly confront Israeli occupation. At the meeting, the first communiqué of The Islamic Resistance Movement (acronym in Arabic is "Hamas") was written, and those present – Sheikh Yassin, Abdul Aziz al-Rantisi, Salah Shehedeh, Muhammad Sham'ah, Isa al-Nashshar, Abdel Fattah Dukham, and Ibrahim al-Yazuri became the founders of Hamas.[178] Here, as with the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, leadership becomes a significant resource in the formation and success of Hamas.

There is one major ideological difference between Hamas and both the Egyptian and Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood movements. Hamas disputes the Brotherhood's view that

[178] Born January 1, 1929, Yassin was nearly blind and a paraplegic, he was assassinated in 1994 by an Israeli gunship. Dr. Rantisi was born in 1948 and assassinated by Israel in 2004 via a missile being fired into his moving car in Gaza . Shehedeh (born in 1953) was the head of the military wing of Hamas; he was assassinated by Israel on July 22, 2002 via a bomb dropped directly on his house in the middle of the night. Muhammad Sham'ah was assassinated on March 29, 1998. Information on death of Isa al-Nashar is unknown. Dr. Yazuri is an academic and the executive director of the Islamic Center in Gaza, he is the only one of the original founders to still be alive. Ze'ev Schiff and Ehud Ya'ari. 1989. The Palestinian Uprising – Israel's Third Front. New York: Simon and Schuster; Ahmed bin Yusef, The Islamic Movement (Hamas): An ephemeral event or permanent alternative?; The pamphlet: "The Intifada in Two Year: Characteristics and Trends. Tampa Fl: Islamic Palestine Committee. Also see: Ahmad, Hisham (1994); Israeli, Raphael (1990); al Jarbawi, Ali. (1994); Kjorlien, M. L. (1993); Lahman, Shay (1982); Legrain, J. F. (1997); Litani, Y. (1989); Maqdsi, Muhammad (1993); Mayer, Tomas (1990); Satloff, Robert (1989); Schiff, Z., and E. Ya`ari (1989)

all of Islam (or the Muslim nation) must first be brought back to the true path of Islam before it can start a violent jihad against non-believers. Hamas insists that a violent jihad must be now and not later. In other words, the degree and support of violence is a major distinction. Furthermore, most Muslim fundamentalist movements that have split from the Palestinian Brotherhood share Hamas's critique, including Islamic Jihad, Gama'ah al-Islamiyah (Islamic Group), and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. However, in the mid-1980s even the Muslim Brotherhood was supporting minimal violence, only after Israeli religious occupation and that violence subsided after Israeli forces withdrew from Palestinian Mosques and the first Intifada subsided.

The formation of Hamas coincided with the outbreak of the first Intifada.[179] In the early months of the Intifada, Hamas did not call for mass demonstrations, fearing that this might lead to a direct confrontation with the Israeli security forces, and jeopardize the movement's fragile existence before it took root among the Palestinian people. Another concern was that Hamas had limited resources, specifically financial support and group membership, as compared with that of the PLO and Fatah. Hamas therefore directed its

[179] The following all help explain the formation of Hamas: Hisham Ahmad, Hamas—From Religious Salvation to Political Transformation: The Rise of Hamas in Palestinian Society (Jerusalem: PASSIA, 1994); Emmanuel Sivan, Radical Islam (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1985), pp. 18–20, 47–49; Z. Schiff and E. Ya`ari, Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising: Israel's Third Front (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1989); Helena Cobban, "The PLO and the Intifada," *Middle East Journal* 44, no. 3 (Spring 1990): 207–233; Sabri Jiryis, A dialogue of another sort over "the dialogue" and national unity, *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, nos. 170–171 (May–June 1987): 21–29 (had translated); Y. Litani, "Militant Islam in the West Bank and Gaza" *New Outlook* November 1994; pages 11-12; Y. Litani, This is how we built Hamas, Kol Ha`ir (Jerusalem), December 18, 1992; Robert Satloff, "Islam in the Palestinian Uprising" (*Policy Focus, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy*, no. 7, October 1988); Wahid Abd al-Majid, The Palestinian uprising: The historical context, the acting forces, the course and future, *al-Mustaqbal al-`Arabi* (May 1988): 8–10 had translated); Hillel Frisch, "From Armed Struggle over State Borders to Political Mobilization and Intifada Within It: The Transformation of the PLO Strategy in the Territories," *Plural Societies* (1989/90): 92–115; Adwan, al-Sheikh Ahmad Yasin, The Palestine question between two charters: The Palestinian national charter and the Islamic resistance movement's charter: Hamas (Kuwait: Maktab Dar al-Bayan, 1989); M. I. Kjorlien, "Hamas in Theory and Practice," *Arab Studies Quarterly* 1 and 2 (1993); Barghuthi, al-Aslama wal-Siyasa, p. 66. On Fatah's link to Islam, see Matti Steinberg, "The PLO and Palestinian Islamic Fundamentalism," *Jerusalem Quarterly,* no. 52 (1989): 37–54. Mishal, Shaul, and Reuven Aharoni. Speaking Stones, Communiqués from the Intifada Underground. Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1994; Sela, Avraham, and Moshe Ma'oz, eds. The PLO and Israel: From Armed Conflict to Political Solution, 1964; New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997

followers to take only those actions that had religious overtones, such as fasting, praying, and facilitating the spiritual needs of the Palestinians. This was the reason for the relatively tolerant attitude displayed by the Israeli government toward Hamas during the first year of the Intifada, as compared with that toward the PLO and other Palestinian fundamentalist movements. Simultaneously, the PLO was having significant difficulties because of its expulsion from Lebanon in 1982, nullifying the Palestinian's military option and weakening the PLO politically in the Arab world. Also, the Palestinians in the Israeli occupied territories were trying to build sociopolitical institutions and strengthen the Palestinian civilian society without the PLO or Fatah (Ahmad 1994). Furthermore, Hamas's active participation in the Intifada threatened the PLO's hegemonic and political domination of the Palestinian arena.[180] With the outbreak of the Intifada, Hamas and the PLO clashed head-on, both claiming exclusive authority.

It was not until June 1989, eighteen months after the outbreak of the Intifada, that the Israeli government declared Hamas to be a terrorist organization, outlawing it. Hamas called on the Palestinians to cooperate in both violent and nonviolent actions. The former included throwing stones and firebombs, building barriers, clashing and/or killing Israeli security forces, attacking and/or killing Israeli collaborators and settlers. In regard to nonviolent activities, Palestinians were asked to sever their economic ties with Israel and develop local institutions that would provide the same public services to Palestinians. Hamas also encouraged Palestinians to engage in civil disobedience by disobeying Israeli laws, not paying taxes or fines, and strikes. According to Snyder and Tilly (1971), Eisinger (1973)

[180] Concerned that Hamas might fragment and weaken the Intifada effort, the PLO, specifically Arafat charged that Hamas was established with the direct or indirect support of Israel and has reiterated this accusation since the formation of Hamas, although the occurrence of such accusations seems to correlate with the amount of tension between Hamas and the PLO at any given time

description of the civil rights movements in the 1960s, this aspect of the Hamas movement is very similar. These American civil rights activists used in civil disobedience in a successful attempt to change their sociopolitical institutions. Tilly, Tilly, and Tilly's (1975) breakdown theory hypothesis argues that collective action arises as a result of grievances, discontent, and the feelings of frustration and deprivation, this is how Hamas formed.[181]

Herbert Blumer (1951) argues a social movement starts, as essentially two or more people aligning their actions around a common goal, seeking to establish a new order of life, just as Hamas. Hamas began as a small group of frustrated individuals who joined forces in order to liberate their people from an occupying force and to establish a new order of life based on Islamic teachings. Furthermore, Blumer goes on to argue that in its beginning, a social movement is an amorphous, poorly organized, and without form, but it eventually takes on the character of a society. Based on the above story on the development of Palestinian fundamentalism, one can concluded Blumer is completely correct as it relates to Hamas.

Furthermore, the purpose of social movements for Melucci and Avritzer (2000) is to provide representation for the unrepresented; this is what Hamas has done. Hamas has given a political voice to those Palestinians who have been excluded from the corrupt and foreign dominated socioeconomic and sociopolitical Palestinian institutions. Hamas has been dedicated to working against the Palestinian status quo established by the Fatah and Arafat, just as Dubet and Thaler (2004) stress for social movements.

The Ideological Foundation of Hamas

As with the Muslim Brotherhood there are two levels of resources, one on the state level and a second on the group level. One of Hamas's greatest resources on the group level

[181] As argued by: Gurr 1970; Kornhauser 1959; Smelser 1962; Turner and Killian 1957

is the literature it produces and subsequently provides the Palestinian people to read. This literature includes the Hamas Charter, political memoranda, communiqués, and most importantly the Islamist leaflets that appeared after the first Intifada (1987) began. The *Bayanat* are two-page leaflets that are mass produced and freely handed out to all Palestinians. They encouraged martyrdom by reminding young Palestinians the meaning of jihad, perseverance, and sacrifice. On a tactical level, these pamphlets have directed Palestinians on the methods of violent protest, encouraged suicide bombings, and even provided how-to manuals on how to counter Israeli attacks. Hamas has published these broadsheets in volume collections since 1991.[182] Hamas encourages and facilitates literacy, confirming the educational level results from the previous quantitative chapter. The results from Chapter Three indicate that nation-states with higher education levels produce more fundamentalist movements. Interestingly, Hamas is a perfect example of why. As previously explained, the Israeli government can easily attack television and radio stations, completely paralyzing the media infrastructure of the Palestinians. Hamas was able to combat this potential paralysis by utilizing the printing press, and they had to facilitate literacy and education in order to guarantee readership.

A Hamas pamphlet, justifying the creation of the organization, provides the following rationale:

> In the seventies there were many indications that the PLO may be prepared to accept a lesser settlement than is indicated in the Palestine National Charter. Then, in the eighties, following the outbreak of the Iraq-Iran War, the Palestinian cause was marginalized at both the Arab and international levels. And the policies of the Zionist entity have become more obdurate and arrogant with the encouragement and support of the United States of America, which signed a strategic cooperation agreement with Israel in 1981. In this period, the Golan Heights have been annexed, Israeli destroyed

[182] They are titled, "*Wathaiq Harakah Al-Muqawama Al-Islamiyah (Hamas): Min Wathaiq Al-Intfadah Al-Mubaraka"* (*Documents of the Islamic Resistance Movement "Hamas": Documents of the Blessed (Palestinian) Uprising*

> Iraq's nuclear reactor, and it then invaded Lebanon and laid siege to Beirut in 1982, which constitutes the greatest insult to the Arab umma since the 1967 war. The Islamic movement in Palestine perceives a great challenge stemming from two factors:
>
> First: the retreat of the Palestinian cause to the lower rung in the ladder of Arab priorities; second, the retreat of the Palestinian revolution (PLO) from pursuit of the strategy of armed struggle until Palestine is liberated to acceptance of the settlements that has been forced on the Palestinian people…. In the light of these two retreats, and the accumulation of the negative effects of the tyrannical and repressive Zionist occupation of the Palestinian people, and the fact that the Palestinian people inside Palestine, but not outside it, were ripe for resistance, there arose the need for a Palestinian solution based on Islamic Jihad, the first manifestations of which were found in Usrat al-Jihad in 1981, and Sheikh Ahmad Yassin's group in 1983.[183]

Hamas's Intifada activities were conducted under the direct guidance and control of Ahmad Yassin (1997). Before his assassination, he was behind the contents of the movement's leaflets.[184] Several studies on the ideology and political worldview of Hamas argue that Hamas sees the ongoing conflict in Palestine as a narrow ideological struggle between Judaism and Islam.[185] The general interpretation is that Hamas's principal motivation for declaring Jihad on Israel is the ideological conflict between Islam and Judaism. This interpretation is short-sided; a study of the literature produced by Hamas,

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[183] From the Hamas "Introductory Memorandum"

[184] According to Reuvan Aharoni (1994); Al-Sheeikh Adwin (1989); and Y. Litani (1992): Hamas often drew on images and events from the history of Islam to underscore the religious character of its conflict with Israel and also to substantiate its claim for perseverance (thabat, sumud, tamassuk) and faith (iman) in the final victory of Islam, no matter what the current difficulties of the Arab and Muslim community (umma) were. To validate its argument that Israel was bound to be defeated by Islam, the leaflets of Hamas frequently talked of Islam's great victories over its enemies in Palestine, upholding the names of Muslim military heroes: Ja`far Ibn Abi Talib, who fought Byzantium in the Battle of Mu`tah (629 c.e.); Khalid Ibn al-Walid, who commanded the Battle of Yarmuk (636 c.e.) and was called by Muhammad "the sword of Allah"; Salah al-Din, who vanquished the Crusaders at the Battle of Hittin (1187 c.e.); and the Mamluk sultan, Baybars, who defeated the Mongols in the Battle of `Ayn Jalut (1260 c.e.). Furthermore, the Khaybar affair also attracted Hamas's attention. Many Hamas leaflets concluded with the call "Allah akbar" (Allah is great) "the hour of Khaybar" has arrived, "Allah akbar death to the occupiers." Khaybar was a wealthy Jewish community in the Arabian Peninsula. According to a Muslim tradition, the Jews of Khaybar betrayed Muhammad by serving him poisoned meat that eventually killed him. The Prophet and his followers had conquered Khaybar in 628 c.e.

[185] See: Meir Litvak, The Islamization of Palestinian Identity: The Case of Hamas (Tel Aviv: The Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, 1966); Stephen C. Pelletiere, Hamas and Hezbollah: The Radical Challenge to Israel in the Occupied Territories (Carlistle, PA: U.S. Army War College: Strategic Studies Institute, 1994); and Pinhas Inbari, "The Palestinians Between Terrorism and Statehood" (Brighton, UK: *Sussex Academic Papers*, 1996).

pertaining to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, reveals that Hamas's position is more multidimensional. Hamas uses Islamic discourse to mobilize and energize the masses and to criticize official Palestinian and Arab organizations for either negotiating or supporting negotiations with Israel. However, taken as a whole and over time, Hamas has evolved its views; it no longer justifies its movement in purely ideological-religious terms where it is Muslims verses Jews (or Christians). For example, issues like fighting for one's rights, land, values, justice, and the importance of education and democracy have become fundamental in Hamas publications.

Furthermore, in the years that followed the founding of Hamas, its political view of Israel has become more sophisticated. Concerning Israel, Hamas's perspective evolved to differentiate clearly between Judaism as a religion and Zionism as a political movement. It based its policy on the premise "that the primary enemy of the Palestinian people as well as the Arab and Islamic umma is the Zionist entity and the Zionist movement."[186] Hamas saw the Zionist movement as its enemy because it was viewed as an "aggressor" rather than a religious dogma.[187]

After the June 1992 general elections in Israel the Labor Party, headed by Yitzhak Rabin, took over the leadership of Israel and promised to make peace with the Palestinians; this was done via the Oslo Agreement. The conclusion of the Oslo Agreement, and the signing of the Declaration of Principles (DOP) between Israel and the PLO in September

[186] "Hamas's interim policies in political relations" in internal Hamas memo shown dated April 16, 1995
[187] The following outlines Hamas's view of the distinction between Judaism and Zionism: The non-Zionist Jew is one who belongs to the Jewish faith, whether as a believer or do to accident of birth, but does not relate to the above ideas and takes no part in aggressive actions against our land and our umma. The Zionist, on the other hand, is one who embraces the aggressive Jewish ideology and becomes an instrument for the realization of those ideas on our land and against our umma. On this basis, Hamas will not adopt a hostile position in practice against anyone because of his ideas or his creed but will adopt such a position if those ideas and creed are translated into hostile or damaging actions against out umma and our nation (Hamas leadership interview, Filastin al-Muslima, April 1990).

1993 significantly challenged Hamas's relevance, and in turn, its existence. By 1993 Hamas movement's military activity against Israel outweighed both the Fatah and the PLO and the DOP put an end to the Intifada. In addition, the PLO's agreement to stop all hostile acts against Israel threatened to stop Hamas's freedom of military action and provoke a head-on confrontation with the PLO.

The effect of the Oslo Agreement on Hamas was reflected in the internal documents circulated among the movement's senior members, and it conveys a sense of total despair stemming from their awareness that their movement was on the brink of elimination. Hamas's most significant concern was for the future of jihad against Israel, and it decided to continue the strategy of jihad which they perceived as the ultimate source of their legitimacy. At the same time, Hamas called on its members to preserve the "unity of Palestinian ranks" and to work to bring together all opponents of the Oslo Agreement, Islamists, and secular alike.[188] This was done via humanitarian acts Hamas started to employ to ensure its existence and enhance its resources. The Hamas ruling hierarchy consists of cunning and rational political strategists; they saw the potential derailing of their movement and in order to stop it they channeled their resources to meet the humanitarian needs of the Palestinians.

The Hamas leadership explicitly forbids assassinations of all Palestinian political enemies because it did not want to alienate the Palestinian majority, another cunning decision. A series of statements by the Hamas leadership, including Sheikh Yassin, categorically rejected political assassinations.[189] Furthermore, Hamas condemned the

[188] By the end of September 1993, 73 percent of the Palestinians in the occupied territories supported the Oslo accord and the peace process. See Beverly Milton-Edwards, Islamic Politics in Palestine (London: Tauris Academic Studies (1996)

[189] See: See for example: Hamas leaflet dated September 22, 1993; Periodic statement no 108 of October 5, 1993; and the statement by Sheikh Yassin in the Jordanian paper *Al-Sabeel* on November 2, 1993 (had translated)

assassinations of Fateh figures who where killed as a result of their acceptance of the September 1993 Oslo Agreement; according to Khalid Hroub (2000: 213) it also participated in their funerals and demonstrations denouncing their assassinations.[190] Also, Hamas strongly denounced some newspapers for reporting that the movement was considering assassinating Arafat, reiterating its opposition to assassinations.[191] Hamas defines the limits of political discourse and warns members: "Discourse should not be simply for posturing; it should not be a form of flexing our muscles in competition; and it should not breed new enemies and disputes."[192] The following is an excerpt from a letter Sheikh Yassin wrote from prison – his tone is surprisingly calm and moderate:

> "No doubt the Palestinian people are agitated and unhappy today, they are pained by the ignominy, capitulation, and abasement of the Palestinian cause at the hands of a group of our own people who signed documents recognizing the state of Israel, thereby relinquishing all out lands, traditions, holy place,, and culture which Israel has usurped. To put the best face on it, let us say that they tried and failed but let them not saddle us with this error and its attendant calamities."[193]

Being isolated politically was a clear concern for Hamas; to counter this, Hamas initiated a campaign to expand its base of support and increase its membership, a significant resource. At the Palestinian level, it collaborated with other fundamentalist movements opposed to the settlement; this collaboration later developed into the *Alliance of Palestinian Forces*. At the Arab and Islamic levels, it tried to mobilize popular support and force their opposition to a settlement with Israel so that it would not become politically isolated and rendered marginal. Also, at the local level, Hamas started to build a social infrastructure to help meet the daily needs of the Palestinian people. Hamas carved out a distinctive niche for

[190] See leaflet: The Hamas Movement Condemns the Assassination of al-Saftawi as a Criminal Act" October 12, 2993
[191] See letter from Hamas in Roznamet Pakistan dated April 16, 1997 (had translated)
[192] "Al-Risala" (The Epistle) an internal Hamas document dated April 6, 1994 (had translated)
[193] Sheikh Ahmad Yassin "Letters" Al-Wasat, November 11, 1993 (had translated)

itself on the Palestinian political scene by becoming a social-service provider and by demanding the PLO to hold free general elections for a legislative body among the Palestinian people.[194] Hamas was now seen as a significant threat to both Israel and the PLO; to rectify this threat Israel started mass deportations of Islamic militants, which were facilitated by the PLO.

Hamas's escalation of its military activity was an indirect result of the presence of the 415 Hamas deportees in south Lebanon in December 1992 where they were trained by Hezbollah in the success and use of suicide attacks and the construction of car bombs (Pelletiere 2004) Hamas members were fascinated by the effectiveness Hezbollah's attacks had against Israel and the United States. Indeed, it was Hezbollah's terrorist attacks that ended the American presence in Lebanon and forced Israel to withdraw. Thus it was no coincidence that Hamas's first suicide operation was carried out shortly after the deportees had returned to the occupied territories. What further alienated Hamas and helped facilitate the second Intifada was the May 1996 ascendancy of a right-wing government in Israel in, led by Benjamin Netanyahu. Netanyahu's government sponsored a major shift in Israel's approach to the Oslo process and resumed building settlements in the occupied territories, once again radicalizing the Palestinian people.

Hamas and Other Palestinian Movements

[194] Statement issued by Hamas Political Bureau on April 26, 1994. Ismali Haniyah, a prominent member of the Hamas leadership in the Gaza Strip, justified the demand for political participation: "Taking part in the elections will guarantee us a legitimate political presence when the election is over. We will be sure to be informed about and participate in the making of laws by the elected council under which civil society will be governed"[194] (page 66: March 2, 1996), Sheikh Yassin, the spiritual guide of Hamas, may be regarded as the principle theorist of non-isolationism the movement. In his letter from prison cited above, the debate about the participation in elections and came out in favor of participation: "If the council shall have the authority to legislate, why should we not practice opposition within this council as we do in the street? We can demonstrate that Islam has a presence which must be reckoned with and not leave our foes an unchallenged opportunity to do as we please." Yassin letter dated October 3, 1993. and included in Al-Wasat, November 11, 1993

The PLO is the umbrella movement of all the Palestinian resistance movements, groups, and factions, and it has been dominated by Fateh, the strongest and most powerful group, which was led for decades by Yasser Arafat.[195] The Hamas Charter treats the issue of relations with Palestine resistance organization more as a moral than a political issue (Hroub 2000: 110). Under the section "Patriotic Movements in the Palestinian Arena," the Charter explains that there is mutual respect between Hamas and all Palestinian movements as long as they do not throw allegiance to either the "Communist East" or the "Crusading West," and expresses readiness to cooperate with Israeli occupation (Hamas Charter). Hamas initially expressed some reservations in its Charter about recognition of the PLO. In the wake of the Oslo and Cairo Agreements, these reservations culminated in the accusations of a total sellout on the part of the PLO and a Hamas declaration that the PLO no longer represented the Palestinian people or its aspirations.[196] Hamas made it clear that its attacks on the PLO were not directed at its members or the movement itself, but rather at its corrupt and imperialist leadership.[197] The Charter described the PLO membership as being "as close as it could be to

[195] Steinberg Matti. "The PLO and Palestinian Islamic Fundamentalism." *Jerusalem Quarterly*, no. 52 (1989): 37–54; Usher, Graham. "Arafat's Opening." *New Statement and Society* 8, no. 381 (December 1, 1995); Ya`ari, Ehud. Strike Terror: The Story of Fatah. New York: Sabra Books, 1970; Kassim, Anis F. "The Palestine Liberation Organization's Claim to Status: A Juridical Analysis Under International Law." *Denver Journal of International Law and Policy* 9, no. 1 (1980): 19–30. Any discussion of Hamas's relations with the PLO is really a discussion of Hamas's relations with Fateh. There have not been distinct differences in Hamas's policy toward the PLO and Fateh. Consequently, formal relations between the PLO and Hamas used to be reflected in the field as the mode of conduct between Fateh and Hamas, which were often characterized by patterns of tension and rivalry and sometimes even physical clashes

[196] On April 6 and 13, 1994, shortly before the signing of the Cairo agreement on the establishment of a self-governing Palestinian authority in Gaza and Jericho, two suicide operations were carried out in `Afula and Hadera, two Jewish towns in Israel, by the Battalions of `Izz al-Din al-Qassam, Hamas's military wing. Publicly, these operations were portrayed as avenging the massacre in Hebron of thirty Palestinians by a Jewish settler on February 25 of that year. Although this argument was directed to the Palestinian people, these operations also were aimed at enhancing Hamas's bargaining position regarding the anticipated PLO based PA, by pressuring Arafat to communicate with Hamas and seek political coexistence.

[197] Hamas also spoke out about interpersonal social relations, especially during the Intifada. Its leaflets condemned deviant behavior and corruption, encouraged economy, and condemned spendthrift behavior. It warned against establishing monopolies and raising prices. One leaflet even discussed traffic problems and appealed for observance of traffic rules. For examples of leaflets containing detailed of social and educational

the Islamic Resistance Movement. After all, did it not include among its membership the fathers, brothers, relatives, and friends of Hamas members? How could a good Muslim turn a cold shoulder to his father, brother, relative or friend? We have but one homeland, one affliction, one shared destiny, and one shared enemy." The Charter then addressed the PLO's "secularist line," criticizing it severely while attempting to leave the door ajar for some future development. "The day that the PLO shall adopt Islam as a way of life, we shall be its soldiers and fodder for the flame with which it shall consume the enemy."[198]

In the mid-to-late 1990s the Palestinian territories were going quasi-democratic with the PLO forming the Palestinian National Council (PNC). The Hamas leadership realized it needed to compromise. Hamas had four conditions before joining the PNC: that the PLO had to stop making concessions; that there should be no legitimization of the "Zionist" presence in any part of Palestine; that Palestinian organizations be allocated seats commensurate with the actual size of their membership; and that real democracy should be practiced with respect to freedom of expression for leadership in the discharge of its responsibilities.[199] The PLO rejected Hamas's democratic aspirations. It maintained that Palestinian elections would be very difficult, if not impossible, to hold. Furthermore, Hamas demanded seats proportionate to the actual size of its movement. The seats were divided among three categories: factions in the resistance movement and other organizations inside Palestine, popular organizations and associations outside Palestine, and independents. Hamas belongs to the first category, but in that category Fateh is the largest organization and 40 seats were assigned to it. The second largest organization is the PFLP, which had 15 seats. The PLO proposed that Hamas should

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messages on various issues. See Periodic statements no. 14 of April 1988, no 22. of June 1988, no 36 of February 25, 1989, and no. 86 of May 7, 1992

[198] The Hamas Charter

[199] The text of the Hamas Memorandum to the PNC, dated April 6, 1990

have a number of seats somewhere between the Fateh and the PFLP, which would have made it the second largest organization in the PNC. According to Hamas, the remaining seats (over 400) would be controlled directly or indirectly by Fateh (Ghosheh 1995). Hamas refused to accept this compromise because the only government that was acceptable to the Palestinian people was a total and transparent democracy. It could also be argued that this was simply more Hamas rhetoric, and it was only interested in self-serving seat numbers and not the Palestinian people, reflecting the results of the last year and Hamas's actions.

Hamas has significant ideological differences with the PLO. The ideology of Hamas is a synthesis of Islamic religious ideals and Palestinian nationalism. Hamas states its intent to establish an Islamic state in Palestine, and its literature draws heavily upon Islamic ideology and Koranic verses. The PLO charter, on the other hand, is a semi-secular movement with a call to Palestinian nationalism. Hamas is a more efficiently run organization than the heavily bureaucratized and overly structured PLO with its corrupt leadership. Hamas, as with the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, has a significant and active leadership, a major resource. As for the financial aspect, Hamas receives significant amounts of religious donations specifically from devout Muslims in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states.[200]

Hamas' main rival within the Palestinian terrorist movement is the smaller and significantly violent Islamic Jihad.[201] The Islamic Jihad considers Hamas a copycat

[200] Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states contribute to the PLO before it sided with Iraq during the Gulf war. Hamas also supported Iraq in the war but was much less conspicuous because it was so closely identified with the Palestinian population in the territories. Hamas wisely avoided open confrontation with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states.

[201] Islamic Jihad (Al-Jihad Al-Islami fi Filstin) originated in the 1970s among Palestinian students in Cairo, notably Fathi Shiqaqi, a former leftist who grew disillusioned with the secular Palestinian movements and joined the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. By the mid 1970s, he had rejected the teachings of the Brotherhood, which held that the destruction of Israel must await an "internal jihad" to reform and unify the Islamic world, and embraced the 1979 revolution in Iran as a model of action. Hamas, in contrast, remains committed to the

movement who was utilizing its hard work and military operations that it had sown years before the Intifada began.[202] The relationship between Hamas and Islamic Jihad warrants attention because of the close identity of the ideologies and political agendas of the two movements, as well as their common Islamic fundamentalist foundations. Throughout the 1990s, there were no real ideological differences between them.[203] However, they differ on two fundamental points; first, Hamas demands total democracy and transparency; the Islamic Jihad does not. Secondly, Hamas provides significant social service to the Palestinian people; the Islamic Jihad provides minimal social services. Islamic Jihad made little effort to develop a social and educational infrastructure or to attract a mass following. The Hamas Charter describes the relations of Hamas with Islamic Jihad in general as follows: "The Islamic Resistance Movement regards the other Islamic movements with respect and appreciation. Even if differences arise in one perceptible or viewpoint, there is agreement between them on several other perspectives and viewpoints. If their intentions are pure and if they are true to God, Hamas regards these movements as an exercise of independent judgment in theological matters provided that their conduct remains within the confines of Islam" (Hamas Charter).

The Palestinian territories have a large number of Islamic fundamentalist movements. Unlike Egyptian political institutions and presidential power, the political institutions found

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Muslim Brotherhood. Although a number of other radical Palestinian Islamists inspired by the Islamic Republic in Tehran adapted the name Islamic Jihad as a cover for terrorist activity, the faction started by Shiqaqi is one that flourishes today (others include Islamic Jihad-al-Aqsa Battalions established in Jordan in 1982 by followers of Sheikh As'ad Bayyud al-Tamimi; Islamic Jihad – The Temple, a faction of the Fatah movement which emerged in the early 1980s; and the Islamic Jihad Squad, and Islamist offshoot of the Palestinian Popular Liberation Force (PPLF) started by Ahmad Muhanna in the 1980s).

[202] The following were used in reference to the Palestinian Islamic Jihad: Ziad Abu-Amr, 1994. Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza: Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic Jihad. Indiana University Press; Meir Hatina. 2001, Islam and Salvation in Palestine: The Islamic Jihad Movement. Moshe Dayan Center for Middle East Affairs; Beirut; Yonah Alexander. 2002. Palestinian Religious Terrorism: Hamas and Islamic Jihad. Transnational Publishers; and Jamilah Kolocotronis. 1990. Islamic Jihad: An Historical Perspective. American Trust Publications

[203] For example see the interview with Islamic Jihad's former secretary general, Fathi al-Shikaki in Al-Sharq al-Awsat March 17, 1995 (had translated)

within the Palestinian territories have never experienced a perfect autocracy, nor have they experienced a perfect democracy. This being said, my inverted-U hypothesis concerning opining political institutions, proven true in Chapter Three, is further validated with Palestine. The following table compares the total number of fundamentalist movements, terrorist attacks, and suicide terrorist attacks in both Egypt and the Palestinian territories. Interestingly, if we control for population, Egypt has eight to ten times more citizens than the Palestinian territories but less than half of the number of Fundamentalist movements. This helps to validate my theory that each of the social movement conditions is positively associated with Islamic fundamentalism.

Table Seventeen: Comparison of Egypt and Lebanon

Year	Number of Fundamentalist Movements in Egypt	Number of Fundamentalist Movements in Palestine	Number of Terrorist Attacks in Egypt	Number of Suicide Terrorist Attacks in Egypt	Number of Terrorist Attacks in Palestine	Number of Suicide Terrorist Attacks in Palestine
1970	12	19	0	0	0	0
1973	17	23	0	0	0	0
1976	15	28	0	0	0	0
1979	16	30	0	0	2	0
1980	18	31	0	0	1	0
1985	14	34	0	0	7	0
1988	16	39	6	0	0	0
1991	14	32	1	0	2	0
1994	13	29	16	0	5	0
1997	18	27	2	0	1	0
2000	16	31	0	0	167	0
2001	16	33	0	0	326	7
2002	15	33	1	0	432	16
2003	16	34	0	0	164	6
2004	19	33	3	0	351	9
2005	23	39	7	2	479	9
2006	23	42	2	1	26	1
2007	26	52	2	0	16	0

Hamas Electoral Success and Charitable works

Long before democratization became a dominant foreign policy aspect of the United States, with respect to the Middle East, Hamas had advocated democratization and the creation of a transparent government open to all people for over a decade. Hamas argues that if Palestinian democracy is to be successful, it must be inclusive and embrace all segments of Palestinian society, including Jews and Christians.[204] This is very similar to the arguments of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. Since its establishment, Hamas recognized the possibility of using Western democracy as the means for gaining influence and power. Hamas spokesmen have constantly declared that the movement will not exploit democracy in order to rise to power and to implement a tyrannical Islamic regime. In this sense, Hamas acts differently than most social movements. It has transformed itself from a social movement into a relatively successful political party.

Inside the Palestinian territories there are significant numbers of mosques, schools, orphanages, summer camps, and sports leagues sponsored by Hamas. Hamas' objective is to engage in incitement and radicalization of society, facilitating individuals to die as martyrs.

[204] Al-Zahhar, a prominent Hamas member in the Gaza Strip, studied the results of 23 elections at institutions in the West Bank and Gaza Strip over a twelve-month period in 1991-92. The institutions included the Nablus, Qalqilya, and Ramallah chambers of commerce; the Union of Jerusalem Electricity Company Employees; the Teachers Training Institutes in Ramallah and Qalandia; the College of Arts at Jerusalem University; the student union at Hebron University, the polytechnic, the Arab College for the Medical Professions, the West Bank Engineers' Union; and the unions of employees at al-Najah University and the Maqasid Charity Hospital. The institutions in the Gaza Strip included the Union of UNRWA Employees, the chamber of commerce, the Medical Society, the Society of Engineers, the Society of Lawyers, and the Accountants Society. According to the aforementioned study, 96,256 voters participated in the elections in the West Bank. Of the total 50.88 percent , or 48,971 people, voted for the National Bloc (which supports the resistance organizations belonging to the PLO), whereas 45.81 percent, or 44,091 individuals voted for the Islamic Bloc (which supports Hamas); the remaining votes, 3.12 percent of the total, went to independents. In the Gaza Strip, 34,221 voters participated, of whom 42.62 percent , or 18,016, cast their ballots for the National Bloc, while 42.62 percent, or 16,050 people, voted for the Islamic bloc; and independents received 4.53 percent of the total. Hamas has cited the election outcomes as evidence that it enjoys the support of 40 to 50 percent of the Palestinian public. (The results of the study were published in AL-Quds (Jerusalem) on November 10, 1992 as week as in Majallat al-dirasat al-Filastiniyya, Winter 1993. (216-217). However Jimmy Carter and his organization were highly troubled by these results (page 116).

It provides logistical and operational support for weapons smuggling, reconnaissance, and suicide bombings, and it provides day jobs for field commanders and shelter fugitive operatives. As asked by Matthew Levitt (2006:5), why did Hamas surprise everyone when it won 44.5% of the vote and became the majority party in the Palestinian legislature in the January 2006 election? His answer is rather simple; Hamas provides desperately needed social services to needy Palestinians. To help operate this complex organization and encourage financial donations, Hamas operates websites in Arabic, English, Russian, French, Farsi, Urdu, and Malay, all of which are run off computer servers in the United States, Russia, Ukraine, and Indonesia.[205]

Hamas has scored significant political successes in the last two years. On December 15, 2005, Hamas won the local elections in the Palestinian territories – this included the election of a significant number of women.[206] Also, Hamas has benefited from the internal struggles between veteran members and the younger generation within Fateh, which resulted in significant looses for Fatah in local parliamentary elections. This helped to increase Hamas's victory in the elections for the Palestinian Legislative Council in January 2006.[207]

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[205] C.S.S. Special Information Bulletin, Marketing Terrorism: Hamas Exploitation of the Eastern European Internet Infrastructure to Operate its Sites, December 2004: http://www.intelligence.org.il/eng/sib/1_05/m_t.htm

[206] The elections resulted in Women winning seats in most districts and legislative constituencies. In some cases women candidates won as a result of the quota system, but at least 32 out of the 51 seats gained in the first round of the local elections run in January 2005 were as a result of the popular vote. Nevertheless, in the polls to date, only 18 percent of candidates standing for local elections have been women – many accounted for as a result of the quota. Rates of participation in the local election polls by registered women voters, however, were encouraging with the Palestinian Central Elections Committee recording a rate of nearly 50 percent. See: Beverley Milton-Edwards. 2005, Winter. Prepared for Power: Hamas, Governance and Conflict. *Civil Wars*. Pages 311-329

[207] As it relates to democratization in Palestine see: Andoni, Lamis (Spring 1996); Eisenberg, Ethan (1996); Ghanem, As`ad; Robinson, Glenn (1997). Arnon, Reguler, "Ha-Hamas hevisa et ha-Fatah ba-bhirot ha-meqomiyot" ("Hamas defeats Fatah by a landslide in the local elections"), *Ha'aretz*, (December 18, 2005). Internet: http://new.walla.co.il/?w=//826541. In the fourth round of elections, held on December 15, 2005, Hamas won in six of the seven largest authorities. As a result of this, Hamas rules in local authorities where 1.1 million Palestinians reside compared to the 700,000 Palestinian residents that are under the authority of Fatah. One-half million people reside in authorities where independent representatives won or where neither of the two major parties received a clear majority, and some 900,000 reside in authorities that are set to hold elections in February 2006 such as Hebron, Tul-karm, Gaza City, and Khan-Yunis where Hamas won the majority here too.

Hamas candidates won about 35% of the 306 individual races and took control of nine municipal councils in December 2004 municipal elections.[208] A year later, in January 2006, Hamas won a landslide victory over the incumbent Fatah, taking control of 74 seats (out of 132, or 56%) in parliamentary elections that included both national and district lists.

Egypt viewed the electoral success of Hamas as a significant concern because it could facilitate inspiration for strengthening the Muslim Brotherhood political objectives inside Egypt. Like Egypt, the United States and the European Union took a significant interest in seeing Fateh win the majority in the Legislative Council.[209] The United States and the European Union made it clear that if Hamas won the general elections for the Palestinian Legislative Council, they would stop the supply of foreign aid to Palestine which they did.[210]

"Hamas ma'niya bil-indimam ila al-hukuma ba'da al-intikhabat al-tashri'iyya" ("Hamas interested in joining the government following elections to Palestinian Legislative Council"), *Al-Quds*, (December 19, 2005), p. 1. (Arabic); "al-Sulta tudafi'u 'an haq Hamas bi-khawd al-intikhabat" ("Palestinian Authority protects Hamas's right to participate in elections"), *al-Jazeerah*, (December 19, 2005). Furthermore, Hamas's decision to participate in Palestinian elections came only after the group canvassed its field operatives in order to measure their chances of electoral success. According to Hamas operative Yakub Abu Etzav, arrested in August 2005, this input was the forwarded to Hamas operatives in Saudi Arabia for a final decision.

[208] According to: Mark Tessler and Jodi Nachtwey (1999) Palestinian Political Attitudes: An Analysis of Survey Data from the West Bank and Gaza. *Islamic Studies*: The attitudes and behavior of ordinary citizens are increasing important in this environment. Participation in the 1996 elections was almost 80 percent. For example, reflecting, according to one observer, "a popular yearning for participation in the political process that will determine the Palestinian's future". In these elections, as in local elections and in the activities of Palestine's numerous political factions more generally, competition for support at the grassroots level is a culture that is "hospitable to democratic values and practices". Ordinary men and women, he continues, "overwhelmingly support a democratic political system and show readiness to participate in the political process. They support freedom of the press, the rights on the opposition, and the right of women to political participation"

[209] Danny Rubinstein, "Ha-pahad meha-Hamas garam le-Abu Mazen levater" ("The fear of Hamas caused Abu Mazen to waive"), *Ha'aretz*, (December 23, 2005). Internet: http://www.haaretz.co.il/hasite/ pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=661664&contrassID=1. "Fatah tuwahhid Qa'imataha wa-Munathamat al-Tahrir tatamasak bi-maw'id al-intikhabat" ("Fatah unites its list and the PLO sticks to the appointed election date"), *al-Jazeera*, (December 23, 2005). Internet: http://www.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/ C668705D-2F73-4304-A96D-22AA6B0166AA.htm

[210] Corinne, Heller, "Hamas Poll Win Threatens Aid for Palestinians", *Reuters*, (December 18, 2005). Internet: http://today.reuters.com/news/ newsArticleSearch.aspx?storyID=94307+18-Dec-2005+RTRS&srch=hamas; "Uruba tuwaqqif musa'adatiha lil-falastiniyin idha wasalat Hamas lil-Sulta" ("Europe will halt aid to Palestinians if Hamas rises to power"), *al-Jazeera*, (December 18, 2005). Internet: http://www.aljazeera.net/NR/ exeres/FAAFB196-1069-4FBE-9824-B1691F56AB78.htm; "Tahdir Amrici min musharaqat Hamas bil-intikhabat al-tashri'iyya" ("American Warning against Hamas Participation in Legislative Council elections"), *al-Jazeera*, (December 17, 2005). Internet: http://www.aljazeera.net/NR/ exeres/912E15CC-3E97-40B1-AEB3-7A4A96411BB0.htm.

In response, senior Hamas officials denounced the American and European interference in the Palestinian elections and condemned the foreign interference. It argued that the international pressure points to a "clear and biased tendency in favor of Israel."[211] What has resulted has been a literal split within the Palestinian people. Hamas now controls the Gaza Strip and the Fatah controls the West Bank.

Hamas's electoral success was a direct result of its humanitarian and social service programs that it provided the Palestinian people. In this sense, Hamas did not act like most social movements. The majority of social movements do not take on the number and scale of social programs like Hamas. Also, most social movements do not make it their objection to gain electoral success via providing humanitarian aid to individuals within their state. Hamas' concern with social issues can be found in the extensive infrastructure and institutions they have established for charitable social services, and the significant numbers of

[211] "Europe will halt aid to Palestinians if Hamas rises to power", *Ibid*; "Al-Sulta tarfud al-tadakhul al-Amrici bil-intikhabat al-falastiniyya" ("Palestinian Authority denounces American involvement in Palestinian elections"), *al-Jazeera*, (December 17, 2005). Internet http://www.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/649DD618-1358-4BE6-8ACD-0ADE8FAD1D2B.htm; "Hamas tafuzu bi-baladiyat al-mudun wa-tarfudu al-mawqif al-Amrici" ("Hamas wins in the municipalities and rejects the American stance"), *al-Jazeera*, (December 17, 2005). Internet: http://www.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/744BF036-4289-4084-9D73-FC7675066912.htm; "Liqa' al-ustadh Khalid Mash'al ma'a qanat al-Manar al-fada'iya lil-barnamaj 'madha ba'd'" ("Meeting with Mr. Khalid Mash'al on the satellite television network al-Manar for the program 'What After?'"), *The Palestinian Information Center*, (December 25, 2005). Internet: http://www.palestine-info.net/arabic/hamas/hewar/2005/khaled1.htm. On Friday, December 23, 2005, thousands of Hamas supporters marched in Gaza in protest of the criticism announced by the EU and the US on the movement's participation in the elections. The protestors called upon Abu Mazen to hold the elections as scheduled. Hamas Spokesman Mushir al-Masri said that "we came to tell the US and Bush and anybody else that labels Hamas as a terror organization that we became the choice of the whole nation." Nidal, al-Mughrabi, "Thousands Join Hamas March against US, EU in Gaza", *Reuters*, (December 24, 2005). Internet: http://thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file=/2005/12/24/worldupdates/2005-12-24T000652Z_01_NOOTR_RTRJONC_0_-229273-1&sec=worldupdates; Mash'al: Hamas ta'tazim tashkil tayar watani wase' ma'a al-fa'izin fi al-majlis al-tashri'i al-falastini al-murtaqab" ("Mash'al: Hamas aims to form wide national mainstream with the victors of the upcoming elections to Palestinian Legislative Council"), *al-Quds* (PA), (December 25, 2005), p.4. 'Abd al-Ra'uf, Arna'ut, "Hal turid harakat Hamas haqan… an tahkuma?" ("Does Hamas really want…to rule?"), *al-Ayyam* (PA), (December 25, 2005). "Berosh reshimat Hamas la-bhirot: Isma' il Haniyya" ("At the head of Hamas list for elections: Isma'il Haniyya"), *Ynet*, (December 14, 2005). Internet: http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-3184451,00.html. (Hebrew); Moshe El'ad, "Hamas ha'atractivi" ("The attractive Hamas"), *Ynet*, (December 14, 2005). Internet: http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-3183171,00.html. (Hebrew); Nizar, Ramadan, "Hamas bayna al-i'tiqalat wa-al-intikhabat" ("Hamas between the arrests and the elections"), *Falastin al-Muslima* (London), (December 2005), p.29

Palestinians who depend on the health care, vocational training, education daycare, and charitable works Hamas provides.

However, Hamas was acting rational and provided the social services it did to guarantee its survival and growth. Also, Hamas was still trying to change the sociopolitical institutions of Palestine, in this sense, still acting like a social movement. Also, these social services could be considered a resource. These activities led to a rise in Hamas' popularity and facilitated it to become one of the most important sources of influence within the Palestinian territories. Hamas has used its charities to strengthen its own standing among Palestinians at the expense of most Palestinian social movements, specifically, the Palestinian Authority, Fatah, and the Islamic Jihad. Hamas' political leader, Ismail Abu Shanab, told Jessica Stern that, before Hamas came into being in 1986, there were no social welfare facilities that that benefited the Palestinian masses. Prior to 1986, the priority was not to work on social, education, and welfare programs and Hamas changed this.[212] The charity committees, mosque classes, student unions, sports clubs, summer camps, and other organizations run by Hamas are places where Palestinian youth are recruited into Hamas. As a senior U.S. State Department official noted, funding any part of Hamas enhances the group's credibility and provides it "the, opportunity to recruit people through its charitable activities"[213]

[212] Stern, Terror in the Name of God, 41. Contrary to his claim that the focus at this time was purely social and political, not military, Palestinian author Khaled Hroub lists several "military cells organized by the Muslim Brotherhood," including: Yahya al-Ghuoul's Mujahideen of Mifraqa Group, Salah Shehadah's Group Number 44, and Mohammad Sharathah's Group Number 101, all of which conducted various attacks against Israeli interests from 1985 to 1987. See Hroub, Hamas: Political Thought and Practice, 35.

[213]The following is a list of institutions tied to Hamas, which are described as "our institutions" (Levitt, 2006: 82): in the Gaza Strip: The Islamic University; the Islamic Complex; the Islamic Association; al-Salah Association; the Young Woman Association; al-Wafa Association for the Elderly; the Orphans Center; some al-Zakah (zakat) committees; some general service committees that received new licenses, such as the Organization of the Truth and the Law. In the West Bank: al-Zakah Committee; al-Tadhoman Al-Eslami Committee; al-Tadoman Charitable Association; al-Zakah Committee in Jenin (which established a hospital); al-

Speaking in 2001, Hamas founder Sheikh Ahmed Yassin asserted that Hamas distributes between $2 and 3 million in monthly handouts to the relatives of Palestinian suicide bombers, "martyrs" killed in attacks on Israelis, and prisoners in Israeli jails. An Israeli government report found that families of Hamas activists killed or wounded while caring out terror attacks and those imprisoned for their involvement in attacks received payments of up to $5,000, representatives more than a year's pay. Therefore, it serves as an important financial incentive for Palestinians to conduct terrorist attacks.[214] By comparison, in 2005, the *al-Isah Charitable Society* provided an average stipend of $328 to the families of martyrs, $170 to detained prisoners, $201 to families of prisoners, and $508 to wounded operatives.[215]

Documents captured during Operation *Defensive Shield* revealed that the al-Tadhoman Charitable Society, a Hamas charity, provided funds for the families of Palestinians "martyred" in suicide bombings or clashes with Israeli forces. One document included a table listing all suicide bombers and other "martyrs" from the Nablus district between January and March 2002. Most were Hamas operatives, though the list also

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Aqsa Institutions; the Association of Islamic Studies and Cultures in Jerusalem; al-Zakah Committee in Ramallah interestingly, al-Qaeda cells in Europe operated in a remarkably similar fashion, recruiting disaffected Muslim youth from neighborhood soccer teams, substance abuse programs, jails and radical mosques. Seem for example, Sebastian Rotella, "A pool of Militants: Europe Holds Fertile Soil for Jihads," Los Angeles Times, December 5, 2001. For state department conclusions, see U.S. House Committee on Financial Services, Testimony of E. Anthony Wayne, Assistant Secretary for Economic and Business Affairs, Department of State, "The Hamas Asset Freeze and other Government Efforts to Stop Terrorist Financing," September 24, 2003, http://financialservices.house.gov/media/pdf/092403eaw.pdf

[214] For example, in 2005 the average monthly salary for an average worker in the Gaza Strip was $372 and $516 for an average worker in the West Bank. For Yassin estimate, see Lee Hockstader, "Palestinians Find Heroes in Hamas; Popularity Surges for Once-Marginal Sponsor of Suicide Bombings," Washington Post, August 11, 2001. For Israeli report, see MFA, "Hamas Use of Charitable Societies to Fund and Support Terror." For the Author interview with Israeli intelligence analyst, Jerusalem, Israel, June 2002

[215] Wages extrapolated from average daily wage of Palestinian workers in the territories and multiplied over a thirty-day period. From Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, Labour Force Survey (January-March 2005), Round (Q1/2005): Press Conference on Labor Force Results (Ramallah: April 28, 2005), www.pcbs.org/press_r/LaborQ1_05E.pdf. Averages were calculated by averaging the distinct payments to specific individuals or families. Larger payments were made to groups of persons or families, but these had to be excluded as the number of families each payment was disbursed to was unknown. C.S.S. Special Information Bulletin

included operatives from the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and various Palestinian security organizations. The last column of the table describes the circumstances of the terrorist operation carried out by each qualifying operative, making clear that the members of both al-Tadhoman and the Union of Good fully understand that funds from their charities were used as rewards for the families of suicide bombers. Interestingly, the ages of the terrorists in this list ranged from 15 to 42, the average age was 25.9 years old.

The network of social services that Hamas set up enabled it to keep in touch with the concerns of the poor and working classes and to influence their religious conduct, political choices, and beliefs. The individuals directing these societies won the trust of the public, particularly when the public compared them to the corruption found in the PLO/Fata and Islamic Jihad. A *Reuters* article concerning Islamic charitable activities reported that a 1994 charity event organized in the Gaza Strip by a Hamas affiliate, the Islamic Reform Society, had raised $200,000 for the society's charitable projects. According to *Reuters*, many people who were not Hamas supporters nevertheless chose to make their donations through Islamic societies indirectly affiliated with the movement. It quoted one person who had donated $8,000 as saying that, although he did not like Hamas, he had given it money because he trusted his donation would reach its intended target. Another contributor said that he was a follower of Fateh but politics had nothing to do with charitable activities; he added that it was his religious duty to donate part of his income to charity and would give money to whomever he thought could be trusted with it (*Reuters*, 1994).[216]

[216] A second area, in which Hamas was active, was in the provision of social justice on the basis of the Shariah. This is another example of the importance of leadership and how is a necessary aspect of the rise and success of fundamentalist movements. This area concerns almost exclusively the activities of Sheikh Yassin before and during the Intifada and up to the time of his arrest in May 1989. During the 1980s, Sheikh Yassin became a

Education as a Resource

Hamas saw education as a significant resource, and it was considered imperative for the future of their movement to ensure Palestinian education. Education suffered considerably due to the repeated strikes during the Intifada, and schools were closed for months at a time between 1987 and 1993 (Hroub 2000: 238). Hamas differed from the PLO during the Intifada on the subject of declaring general strikes affecting schools. The PLO insisted on the participation of all students in the general strike, which led to the closing of all schools, whereas Hamas excluded educational establishments from general strikes and called on students to attend classes.[217] In order to compensate for the time lost by students due to the prolonged closure of their schools, Hamas devised the temporary solution that used mosques in various regions as substitutes for local schools which were put under the supervision of educational committees. Evening classes were held with teachers adhering to school criteria, not religious criteria. There are separate articles in the Hamas Charter that explicitly deals with the education of future generations and the role of Muslim women. For

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very prominent religious figure in the Gaza Strip. He acquired the reputation of being an honest, fair, and upright individual that spares no effort to help people, and of being unstinting with his material and moral support. This reputation won him enormous respect. People began to come to him to arbitrate and resolve their disputes, and they accepted his judgments. A 1988 Agency France Press (AFP) reported on the delays in Israeli courts, the loss of Palestinian trust in them, biased anti-Palestinian rulings, and the effect of the collective resignations by police in protest of the poor status of justice in the Gaza Strip, and the report argues that these are the reasons why Hamas had to deal with the Palestinian's legal issues. Hamas leaders were carrying out the role of the police and the courts by handling small torts, personal real estate, and financial disputes among the population of Gaza. The performance of these judicial functions by Muslim fundamentalist, according to AFP, was not a cause for concern among the supporters of the PLO, who saw Hamas as undertaking the function of adjudication and social regulation during troubled times. This situation gave Hamas a measure of moral authority in the Occupied Territories, especially if one considers that it was not Hamas's duty to administering justice. Carried in the Jerusalem daily. *Al-Quds*, November 16, 1988; Ziad Abu 'Mmr Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza (Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 1994 page 70

[217] In its Periodic statement no. 45 on July 21, 1989, Hamas appealed to students to attend classes; the statement's heading read: "Read, in the name of they God, the Creator. Learning and studying are a sacred right that we safeguard; no one outdoes us in this regard." Meanwhile, the Unified National Leadership release no. 42 called on all teachers and students to go on strike; according to the *Jerusalem Post*, July 31, 1989, many Palestinians ignored the unified National Leadership's leaflet because the prevalent sentiment of the population tended to support Hamas's call for schools to remain open.

example, the Charter says: "Building Muslim society is a necessity in the struggle for liberation." "Muslim women have a role in the liberation struggle that is no less important than the role of men; woman is the maker of men, and her role in guiding and educating the generations is a major role." This role, as Hamas conceives it, is to educate children and prepare them for "their contribution to the jihad that awaits them." Again, as explained before, Muslims see the importance of education differently than the West. This is especially true with the Palestinians. Hamas's views on education endeared the movement to the Palestinian people. However, their desire to facilitate literacy and education was rather self-serving, as previously explained.

The Outside Ideological Force

During the last twenty years, the international community has seen Saudi Arabia achieve an ideological hegemonic standing with Sunni Muslims, specifically Hamas. Saudi Arabia exerts its ideological hegemony via their Islamic charities that act as epistemic influence. An Islamic epistemic community is a transnational group of believers (Shiite or Sunni) with shared Islamic values and beliefs. I argue that epistemic communities are the source of political and moral direction in a society, because they control the knowledge and information in a given society. Decision makers are likely to turn to epistemic communities under conditions of uncertainty. Haas (1992) defines epistemic communities as networks of professionals with recognized expertise in a particular field. Control over knowledge and information is an important dimension of power. Based on this, Hamas is a recipient of significant outside ideological and financial aid from Saudi Arabia whose charities act as an epistemic community.

One of Hamas's largest benefactors is the Saudi Arabian based Muslim World League (MWL). The MWL is the largest Muslim Organization engaged in dawa (chartable) activities in the world (Levitt 2006: 18). The MWL is the subject of several ongoing counterterrorism investigations in the United States as it relates to their donations to Hamas and al-Qaeda. The MWL lists its main objectives as "to disseminate Islamic *Dawah* and expound the teachings of Islam. To defend Islamic causes in a manner that safeguards the interests and aspirations of Muslims, solves their problems, refutes false allegations against Islam, and repels inimical trends and dogma which the enemies of Islam seek to exploit in order to destroy the unity of Muslims and to sow seeds of doubt in our Muslim Brethren" (Levitt 2006: 19). The connections to terrorism via the MWL, and in turn Saudi Arabia, are extensive.[218] The Saudi Arabian royal family has donated hundreds of millions of dollars to Sunni fundamentalist groups throughout the Islamic world. It is not possible to separate the Saudi royal family with the state of Saudi Arabia – they are one in the same.

According to Levitt (2006), a senior U.S. official assessed that as much as half of Hamas's income comes from Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabian financial aid is not considered an outside ideological force, it is considered a resource. However, this is a perfect example of the difficulty of separating the two independent variables, and it shows how they overlap. In this case, each is positively associated with Hamas. Israeli intelligence calculated in 2002

[218] Quote from Michael Dumper, Islam and Israel: Muslim Religious Endowments and the Jewish State (Washington, DC: Institute for Palestinian Studies, 1994) 1-2. The nature of the MWL's ties to terrorism is extensive and includes both senior officials and branch offices. A senior MWL official in Pakistan, Wael Hamza al-Jiaidan, is listed as a specially Designated Terrorist by the US Treasury Department. And in March 2002, the northern Virginia officers of both the MWL an done of its subsidiaries, the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO), were raided by a Treasury Department task force searching for evidence that the groups were raising or laundering funds for al-Qaeda, Hamas, or Palestinian Islamic Jihad (MWL objectives listed at :About the Muslim World League, http://www.arab.net/mwl/about.htm (March 2003). For treasury designation of Wal Jiaidan, see U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control, Terrorism: What You Need to Know About U.S. Sanctions, Washington DC, August 1, 2005. For IIRO and MWL raids, see Judith Miller, "Raids Seek Evidence of Money-Laundering, *New York Times* March 21, 2002. For information on the Muslim World League's ties to terrorism, see U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Subcommittee on International Trade and Finance, Testimony of Matthew Levitt, Charitable and Humanitarian).

that between 40 and 50 percent of its total operating budget came from Saudi Arabia. This financial support comes from a variety of sources, including the Saudi Arabian government, the personal accounts of the royal family, and from the Saudi Arabian socioeconomic elite. Whatever the source, it boils down to the fact that this money (specifically sent to Al-Qaeda and Hamas) would not have been possible without the approval of the Saudi regime.[219] According to the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Saudi Arabian government turned a blind eye to the flow of funds to movements like Hamas that mix both charitable and terrorist activity in Israel.

Saudi Arabia saw Israel as an occupying state that constantly used excessive force against Palestinian freedom fighters; virtually the opposite image from Americans who saw them as terrorists (Cordesman and Obaid 2005). As early as 1994, Palestinian sources noted that "the widespread belief is that Hamas has received money from the government of Saudi Arabia" such support, according to Levitt (2006: 189) was believed to have continued after the Persian Gulf War as a way of punishing the PLO for its support of Iraq during the first Gulf War. In January 1999, Palestinian security officers reported that Hamas' Orphan Care Society in Bethlehem received $35,000 from Saudi Arabia without informing the Palestinian Ministry of Endowments (Abu-Amr 2006: 88).[220] In 1997, the Italian press reported that Palestinian officials complained that "Riyadh's help to Hamas has grown; over 140 billion lira has been collected in Saudi Arabia."[221] In 2003, during a congressional hearing, it was

[219] The U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Public Affairs, Written Testimony of David D. Aufhauser, General Counsel, Before the House Financial Services Committee Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, September 24, 2003. Also see Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "The Financial Sources of the Hamas Terror Organization" July 30, 2003: http://israel-mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAHOnmu0

[220] See the C.S.S. Special Information Bulletin: Spotlight on a Hamas Dawah Institution in the West Bank: A File of Palestinian Preventive Security Documents Identified the Bethlehem Orphan Care Society as Hamas Affiliated. January 2005: www. Intelligence.org.il/eng/sib/1_05/dawah.htm

[221] Guido Olimpio. February 27, 1997. Palestinian Sources – Saudis Increasing Funding to Hamas. Milan Corriere della Sera.

reported that the Saudi royal family established a royal edict for the creation of special accounts for humanitarian assistance to Palestinians called "Accounts 98."[222]

Among the documents seized by Israel was a letter of thanks from the head of Hamas affiliated Charities addressed to Saudi officials, including King Fahd, thanking his regime for its support for the orphans of martyrs and for fighters wounded in the Intifada. Furthermore, the Saudi Committee for Support of the al-Aqsa Intifada, a government committee established in September 2000 and headed by Saudi Interior Minister Prince Nayef bin Abdel Azis, reportedly raised more than $100 million in its first two years of operation, much of which went directly to Hamas. The Committee's website declared that it provided $5,333 to the family of every Palestinian killed in the Intifada, total disbursements of $133 million as of May 2002.

Hamas and Terrorism

For Hamas, the goal of military action, or terrorism, is necessary to liberate Palestine. In 1992 Hamas formed its military wing, the Martyr Izzidin al-Qassam Brigades. The military wing of Hamas operates cells under the control of four or five relatively independent geographical commands. An Israeli journalist by the name of Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, who follows Hamas, estimates that the full time membership of the Qassam cells may be as few as 60 to 100 due to arrests and deportations over the past two years. That estimate seems low in view of the wide pattern of Hamas attacks, but the secrecy of the Qassam cells make it very difficult to determine actual numbers. The cells are also thought to have become more

[222] U.S. House Committee on Financial Services. The Hamas Asset Freeze and Other Government Efforts to Stop Terrorist Funding. September 24, 2003. Also, Canadian intelligence identified Saudi Arabia as a crucial source of Hamas's foreign funding: A 2002 Canadian Secret Intelligence Service (CSIS) intelligence report, Terrorist Group Profiler: Hamas.

proficient in disguising their operations and the size of their memberships. Sheikh Yassin said that "Hamas's policy is one of realizing the goals of the Palestinian people. If these goals are achieved by peaceful means, then there would be no need for other sorts of action."[223]

In an interview with *National Geographic*, Miriam Farhat, who was elected to Parliament as a member of Hamas in January 2006, admitted that it was she who instilled in her son the desire for martyrdom and "brought them (her sons) up to become martyrs, to be martyrs for the name of Allah." Her martyred son Muhammad's old bedroom was adorned with posters of martyred Palestinians and featured a photo of Mohammed on the computer screensaver. Furthermore, a female adherent of radical London preacher Sheikh Omar Bakri Mohammad, speaking to a group of Muslim women at a conference said that: "It's important that our children have a passion for jihad. Make sure that you nurture your children. A Muslim woman will say to them (the children): we don't have friendship with the kufr (infidel). We want to put fear into the hearts of the enemy. We want to make sure that our children carry the spirit of jihad in their hearts."[224]

Academics, journalists, politicians, foreign governments, policy makers, and international institutions, specifically ones in the Islamic world, oftentimes downplay the role that the Hamas social welfare network plays in radicalizing society and financing, supporting, and facilitating Hamas terrorism.[225] For the most part, they subscribe to the myth that Hamas

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[223] Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, *Al-Quds Press* May 7, 1997 (translated)

[224] Interview by Lisa Ling, "Female Suicide Bombers: Dying to Kill," *National Geographic Explorer*, 2004. For Sheikh Mohammad, see Mark Huband, "Radical Muslims Turn to Words of War: Tensions Between Older and Younger Followers of Islam have Complicated Attempts to Reduce the Rise in Extreme Attitudes since the attacks of September 11, 2001" *Financial Times*, January 20, 2005.

[225] A Tel Aviv University study on Palestinian suicide bombers found that no single psychological profile describes the wide variety of Palestinian suicide bombers, researchers Shaul Kimhe and Shmuel developed a series of prototypical categories that combine both clinical and social psychological causes. Their primary findings found that whatever the typology off the potential terrorist (religious fanatic, nationalistic fanatic,

charity is disconnected from Hamas terror. For example, the International Crisis Group issued an April 2003 report which, while condemning Hamas terror attacks, implicitly concluded that the social welfare services provided by humanitarian organizations associated with Hamas are some how legitimize the movement overall.[226] Along these lines, the *Washington Post* had a column that argued Hamas is a nationalist movement engaged in social work, the perpetrators of Palestinian suicide and other attacks should be described in the press as militants or gunmen, while those who execute attacks in the name of al-Qaeda should be identified as terrorists. The *Boston Globe* had a very similar column arguing much the same: "tag Hamas, for example, as a terrorist organization is to ignore the more complex role it plays in the Middle East".[227] On the other hand, the United State's State Department said that "as long as Hamas continues to rely on terrorism to achieve its political ends, we should not draw a distinction between their military and humanitarian arms, since funds provided to one can be used to support the other." The Treasury Department was clearer still: "No matter how terrible the plight of the Palestinian people, there can be no justification for

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avenger, or exploited) that every type requires, according to the researchers, "a social environment that is supportive of such an attack; media that disseminates the information among the supportive population; spiritual leadership that encourages such attacks; and financial and social assistance for families of suicide terrorists after their death." Together, these conditions create a comprehensive social environment that may be referred to as the culture of suicide terrorists that has been created within Palestinian society (Shaul Kimhi and Shmuel Even, "Who Are the Palestinian Suicide Terrorists?" Strategic Assessment (Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies), Tel Aviv University, September 2003)

[226] ICG April 2003 report from International Crisis Group "Islamic Social Welfare Activism in the Occupied Palestinian Territories: A Legitimate Target?" Middle East Report, no 13 (2003), http://www.intl-crisis-group.org/projects/showreport.cfm?reportid=933

[227] For the *Washington Post* column, see Michael Getler, "The Language of Terrorism", Washington Post, September 21, 2003. For a rebuttal of this column, see U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Testimony of Matthew Levitt, "Untangling the terror Web: the need for a strategic understanding of the crossover between international terrorist groups to successfully persecute the war on terror," October 22, 2003. For the Boston Globe column, see Christine Chinlund, "The Ombudsman; who should Wear The Terrorist Label?" *Boston Globe*, September 8, 2003.

the killing of innocents. In our view, toleration of such terror by anyone is nothing short of complicity."[228]

The terrorism literature scholars argue that there are three major facilitators of terrorism, and they include political systems that restrict citizens political and civil liberties, worsening economic systems, and the negative effects of modernization. All of them are present in the Palestinian territories, and they seem to be helping facilitate terrorist attacks. However, one could argue that most of the sociopolitical restrictions, poverty, and lopsided Westernization and modernization are the direct result of Israeli occupation. Hamas has been one of the most active fundamentalist movements when it comes to using suicide terrorism, specifically against Israelis. When it comes to the Palestinians, Pape's (2005) assumption that suicide bombing is strategically rational in the sense that it often pays off for the movement facilitating the attack, does not work when dealing with Hamas. The Israeli counter-attacks do not benefit the Palestinians and have led to the assassination of most of the leadership in both Hamas and the Islamic Jihad. However, suicide terrorism is the only strategic option the Palestinians have in countering the state of Israel. This partially explains the popularity of the strategic choice hypothesis in the terrorism literature, specifically Harrison, 2003; Madsen, 2004; and Sprinzak, 2000.

The Conclusion

The Islamic world does not see Hamas as a terrorist organization but as a multidimensional social movement. Hamas seeks to counter what it perceives as the secularization and Westernization of Palestinian society, and to become internationally

[228] For the State Department, see U.S. House Committee on Financial Services, Testimony of E. Anthony Wayne, Assistant Secretary for Economic and Business Affairs, Department of State, "The Hamas Asset Freeze and Other Government Efforts to Stop Terrorist Financing," September 24, 2003. For the Treasury Department, see U.S. House Financial Services Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Testimony of David Aufhauser, General Counsel, United States Department of the Treasury, September 24, 2003.

recognized as the sole representative of the Palestinian people. Hamas's political importance is the direct result of the public support it has amassed via its grass-roots movement. This support goes beyond its religious doctrine, and its supporters go beyond those who subscribe to its fundamentalist positions. Because of this, Hamas has emerged as the largest and most successful fundamentalist movement in Palestine and one of the largest Sunni fundamentalist movements in the Islamic world.

In order to prove that my fundamentalist labyrinth has validity and that each social movement condition is positively associated with Palestinian fundamentalism and that Palestinian fundamentalist movements are inherently social movements, I evaluated many different aspects of the Palestinian territories and Palestinian fundamentalism. First, I looked at aspects of each of my fundamentalist labyrinth's conditions on both the movement and state levels, proving that each are positively associated with Palestinian Islamic fundamentalism. Secondly, I told the historical story of Palestinian fundamentalism, its formation, development, and duration. The historical story I tell here is significant because it shows the development of Islamic fundamentalism through an actual example. Third, I explained the ideological makeup of Hamas and argue that much of its ideological foundations are found in its printed works, a significant resource for the movement. Fourth, I evaluated Hamas's relations, differences, and similarities with other Palestinian social movements. I was able to show that there are more fundamentalist movements in opening political systems than in either perfect autocracies or perfect democracies, validating my inverted-U hypothesis. Fifth, I looked at how Hamas has been a recipient of significant out-side ideological Sunni influence from Saudi Arabia. Finally, I looked at how Hamas acts differently than most social movements on three interconnected levels; first is has

transformed itself into a legitimate and successful political party and terrorist organization. One the second level, in order to achieve electoral success and to win over the hearts and minds of the Palestinian people, Hamas has become the Palestinian territories most significant provider of social services. And on the final level, Hamas commits significant acts of terrorism. However, the Hamas' actions may be different than a traditional social movement, but its desire to survive and its goals are the same. In the following chapter I evaluate Lebanon, specifically looking at Hezbollah.

Chapter Six: Hezbollah

Surely the party of God (Hezbollah) shall be triumphant.
– Surat al-Ma'idah, 55, The Quran

Hezbollah has become the most significant Shiite social movement in the Islamic world, second only to the 1979 Iranian revolution. In the United States and Western Europe, Hezbollah is seen as a terrorist movement. However, according to the Islamic world, Hezbollah is considered a significant social movement and a major political party with humanitarian endeavourers sustaining an entire population – the Lebanese Shiites. Hezbollah was formed in the 1980s as a radicalized Shiite military movement with the main objective of removing Israeli forces from Lebanese soil. By the late 1980s it had transformed into a major Lebanese Shiite social movement. By the 1990s it had developed a significant social service apparatus and formed a legitimate political party. By the beginning of the new millennium, Hezbollah matured into a significant Middle East strategic player capable of influencing states, conflict, and peace within the greater Middle East.

Israeli-Islamic conflicts have dominated the greater Middle East for over six decades. Hezbollah has been the only Islamic entity, with the exception of the Palestinians, to continue armed conflict with Israel. Israel's withdrawal from southern Lebanon on May 24, 2000, was regarded as a significant victory by Hezbollah. Israel's withdrawal enhanced Hezbollah's regional reputation and simultaneously strengthened its commitment to the use of military force, working within Lebanese political institutions, and to continue its humanitarian/social service endeavors. Furthermore, Hezbollah's self-described victory over Israel in its 2006 war makes it the only Arab/Muslim group, movement, or state to ever defeat Israel, catapulting it into a phenomenon celebrated throughout the Islamic world. As a result of its

humanitarian endeavors, and perceived victories over Israel, Hezbollah has become the largest and most successful movement in the history of Lebanon; its membership numbers are estimated to be more than 200,000.

The goal of my dissertation is to determine the causes of Islamic fundamentalism and in doing so I show that an Islamic fundamentalist movement is inherently a social movement. In the previous two chapters I was able to show that each of the social movement conditions found in my fundamentalist labyrinth is positively associated with the rise and success of Egyptian and Palestinian fundamentalist movements. In the following chapter I have two objectives; first, I show that the same social movement conditions found in my fundamentalist labyrinth are positively associated with Lebanese fundamentalist movements, specifically Hezbollah. Secondly, Hezbollah behaves just as the social movement scholars predict for social movements; therefore, Hezbollah is a social movement. However, Hezbollah acts differently than most social movements. As compared to Hamas and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, Hezbollah acts the most unlike a social movement. However, it is still a significant fundamentalist movement.

To meet the above objectives and to truly understand the formation and success of Hezbollah, it is imperative that I evaluate the historical development of the Shiite people, the circumstances that have facilitated their collectivization, and the manifestation of Shiite fundamentalism. The historical story I tell here is different from the one I told concerning Hamas. With Hamas, I was able to show how Islamic fundamentalist movements evolve and develop from other fundamentalist movements. With Hezbollah, the historical story has very little to do with the evolution and development of fundamentalist movements. Instead it is the evolution and development of the Lebanese Shiites. In other words, I present two

different historical explanations for the causes of Islamic fundamentalism. After this, I evaluate the formation and ideological foundations of Hezbollah. In doing so, I further confirm the validity of my inverted-U relationship and show that there are more fundamentalist movements in opening political systems than in either perfect autocracies or perfect democracies. Lebanon has never been a perfect autocracy or a perfect democracy, and it has overtime experienced a significant number of Islamic fundamentalist movements. After this, I evaluate the ideological influence Hezbollah has been subjected to via Iran. Finally, I show three ways in which Hezbollah acts differently than most social movements. First, it has formed a political party and has had significant vote-seeking success. Secondly, I evaluate the social services Hezbollah provides to the Lebanese Shiite community and explain how their social service apparatus has catapulted its political success. Finally, Hezbollah has the weapons capability and military technology equal to many developing states – no social movement has such advanced weaponry.

This being said, Hezbollah is still a social movement, and it has many of the same characteristics of a social movement. No other social movement in the history of Lebanon has organized and institutionalized itself as well as Hezbollah. Also, Hezbollah has managed to attract a massive following and has significantly changed the Lebanese sociopolitical institutions and established norms. Hezbollah is another example of my labyrinth analogy where we have all of the social movement conditions being positively associated with the formation and success of Hezbollah. What follows is the historical explanation for the causes of Lebanese Shiite radicalization and ultimately Lebanese Shiite fundamentalism, specifically Hezbollah.

The History of the Shiite Lebanese

Lebanese Shiites have endured centuries of socioeconomic and sociopolitical oppression and degradation at the hands of both the Lebanese Sunnis and Christians. Lebanese Shiite settlements have been facing persecution since the Eleventh Century; however, Shiite fundamentalist movements did not come into being until the 1970s. This presents an interesting quagmire and helps address the main objection I have here, e determination of the causes of Islamic fundamentalism. To do so, it is imperative that I tell the historical story of the Shiite Lebanese because it shows their development and radicalization, which ultimately leads to the creation of Hezbollah. Furthermore, in 1970s each of my fundamentalist labyrinth conditions were present and positively associated with Lebanese fundamentalism. By the 1970s, Shiite desperation had reached its climax and the presence of the PLO ignited nine hundred years of built-up hostility.

From the eleventh century on, the Shiites found refuge in the area of Jabal Amil (South Lebanon) and the Biq'a Valley.[229] Initially, the Shiites settled in the lower parts of Mount Lebanon and the coastal cities. However, with the downfall of the Fatimids and with the military expeditions launched by the Mamluks between 1291 and 1305, the Shiites were expelled from these areas.[230] The Shiite lands were confiscated by the Mamluks (Sunnis) because the coastal cities were constituted vital trade centers and they needed the Shiite lands to facilitate more trade, to in turn generate more wealth. Following this, the Shiites were

[229] The Biq'a Valley is also translated *Beqaa* and *Bekaa*. The Romans called the Biq'a Valley the "Breadbasket of the Empire" and today it remains Lebanon's most important farming region. It is located about 19 miles from East Beirut. The Valley id between the Mount Lebanon to the west and the Anti-Lebanon Mountain ranges to the east. The Valley is relatively small; it is about 75 miles in length and on average 10 miles wide.

[230] The Fatimids claimed to be decedents of Fatima, the daughter of Muhammad and wife of Ali, the fourth caliph and Shiite Imam. These were Shiite missionaries who attempted to spread Shia Islam throughout the Middle East; Lebanon was only one of many areas where they extended their short rule. The term Mamluks translates from Arabic into "owned" also (mameluk, mameluke, or mamluke) was a slave soldier who was converted to Islam and served the Muslim caliphs and the Ayyubid sultans during the Middle Ages. Over time they became a powerful Sunni military caste, and sized as much land and power as possible between 1250-1517.

expelled from the mountains because they overlooked the coastal roads, and according to the Sunnis, the Shiites attacked their trading routs from above. As a result of this land confiscation and forced relocation, the Shiites ended up in the lower parts of Mount Lebanon and the Biq'a Valley (Ahmad Hamzer 2004: 9).

Under Sunni Ottoman rule over Lebanon (1516-1922), the Shiites lost even more land and were stripped of any sociopolitical authority and independence they had by the expanding Christian Maronite and Drunze communities (Hamzer 2004: 9). As a result of this, the Shiites were left with the some of the most rural land in Lebanon. Furthermore, the Shiites faced significant discrimination at the hands of the Ottomans (Sunnis) and the Christians. Unlike the Christians and Sunnis, who had their own court systems, the Shiites were placed under the jurisdiction of Sunni courts where they faced significant discrimination within the law.[231] It was not until the 19th Century that a localized institutional political system emerged. In 1841 the Ottoman governor of Beirut introduced the first formal Lebanese political institution with the establishment of the Creation for the Mountain Council (Shanahan 2005: 25).[232] However, the only significant and lasting decision the Council would make was that it divided, what would become Lebanon, into two sections – one dominated by Sunnis and one by Christians. The Shiites were forced under the jurisdiction of one of the two sections.

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[231] For the pattern of Lebanese Shiite settlements see: Kama; Salibi (1988) A House of Many Mansions (London: I. B. Tauris); Philip Hitti (1967) Lebanon in History: From the Earliest Times to the Present (London: Macmillan); Wajih Kawtharani (1994) The Political and Social Trends of Mount Amil (Beirut: Bahsun Press); Ahmad Rida (1963) The Opening of South Lebanon, 1788-1840 (Cambridge; Harvard University Press). For the discrimination Shiites face see: Iliya Harik. 1972 Fall. The Ethnic Revolution and political Integration in the Middle East. *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies;* pages 313-324; Albert Hourani (1947) Minorities in the Arab World (Oxford: Oxford University Press); Leila Meo (1956) Lebanon, Improbable Nation: A Study in Political Development (Bloomington: Indiana University Press)

[232] According to Rodger Shanahan (2005: 25): The Council for the Mountain was established purely for the purpose of hearing complaints about, and creating a new schedule, for the levying of taxes. It represented the first attempt to gain a consensus about a single political issue from all the major confessional groupings. The Council membership consisted of three Druze, three Maronites, three Sunni, one Shiite, one Greek Catholic, and one Greek Orthodox. The Council only existed for a brief period of time,

After the fall of the Ottoman Empire, Lebanon became a French colony and France became the Christian Maronites protectorate (Jaber 1997: 9). During this time, France expanded Lebanon to the South, the Biq'a Valley, and part of the coastal plain, which all belonged to Syria. After the fall of the Ottoman Empire, the French sought a mandate over Syrian territories that had been part of the Ottoman Empire. The European San Remo Conference of 1920 gave France the right to assume mandatory rule over the Ottoman land that would become modern Lebanon (Shanahan 2005: 29). In other words, the borders of modern-day Lebanon did not exist until the 1920s. The newly encompassed Syrians, specifically, the Sunni Muslims, considered themselves Syrian and did not wish to be part of Lebanon, especially a Christian dominated Lebanon. The Syrian Shiites had faced the same degradation and land confiscation that the Lebanese Shiites had faced and never associated themselves with Syrian nationalism. The Maronite Christians courted the Syrian and Lebanese Shiites and were correct in their assumption that the Shiites would not want to be part of a Sunni-dominated Lebanon. They forged an alliance with the Christians and in 1926 France permitted the Shiites to establish their own religious courts and practice their religion freely, as a reward for their alliance (Jaber 1997: 9). As a result of WWII, France was unable to govern its colonies and Lebanon was granted its independence.

Effects of Imperialism

Lebanon's political structure after its independence was based on the National Pact (al-Mithaq al-Watani) of 1943, which vested legislative, executive, as well as military positions proportionality with the demographic size of the country's recognized sectarian groupings. The Maronite Christians, then the largest of the sectarian sects, according to the official census of 1932, were accorded the presidency. The Sunni Muslims, the second

largest sectarian sect, were given the premiership.[233] Finally, the Shiite Muslims, the third largest sect, were given the speakership of the Parliament, a relatively powerless position compared with those granted to the Christians and Sunnis.[234] According to Hala Jaber (1997:10), even at the time, suspicion was cast on the validity of the census, and the Christians refused to allow another.[235]

The National Pact never took into account changing demographics. The Shiites had increased from being the third largest community in the 1930s to Lebanon's largest single sectarian group by the 1970s. This steep rise the in the Shiite population threw Lebanon's political system and institutions into deadlock. Hamzer (2004: 13) argues that the Shiite population increased from 100,000 to 250,000 between 1921 and 1956; it had remained proportionally stable at about 19% of Lebanon's total population. Between 1956 and 1975, however, the Shiite population tripled, from 250,000 to 750,000, boosting their proportional size to almost 30% of the total population. As a result of the National-Pac, the sociopolitical institutions were inherently inflexible and not designed to accommodate demographic changes (Rania Maktabi 1999). According to Samir Kahalaf (1973: 117) the population of Beirut tripled between 1952 and 1964 as a direct result of the Shiites leaving their farms and

[233] The first French census was carried out in 1921, to gauge the demographic makeup of the newly mandated territory. The people recorded in this census were recognized then for the first time as Lebanese (Rania Maktabi. 1999. The Lebanese Census of 1932 Revisited. Who are the Lebanese? *British Journal of Middle East Studies*. Pages 225-240

[234] There are eighteen different religious groups in Lebanon; the major ones are the Shiites, Sunnis, Christian Maronites, Greek Orthodox, and Drunze Muslims. The following explain the Lebanese political system and were used here: Nezih Richani. 1998. Dilemmas of Democracy and Political Parties in Sectarian Societies: The Case of the PSP in Lebanon. Palgrave Macmillan; J.B. Odeh. 1984. Lebanon: Dynamics of Conflict a Modern Political History. Zeb Books; Leila Meo. 1976. Lebanon, Improbable Nation: A Study in Political Development. Greenwood Press; Meir Zamir. 2000. Lebanon's Quest: The Road to Statehood, 1926-1939. I.B. Tauris: Raghid el-Solh, 2004. Lebanon and Arabism: National Identity and State Formation. I.B. Tauris; Rodger Shanahan, 2005. The Shi'a of Lebanon: Clans, Parties, and Clerics. Tauris Academic Studies; Eyal Zisser. 2000. Lebanon: The Challenge of Independence. I.B. Tauris; and Carole Dagher. 2002. Bring Down the Walls: Lebanon's Post-War Challenge. Palgrave Macmillan.

[235] According to the 1932 census, out of the total population of approximately 793,000, the Shiites numbers just 155,000 (Shanahan, 2005: 31).

moving to the southern suburbs of Beirut for employment.[236] This rural-to-urban migration further complicated the changing demographic situation within Lebanon. Prior to the late 1950s, Beirut had been a Christian majority city. By the 1980s, the Shiites had become Lebanon's largest single secular community with almost 1,400,000 people, surpassing both the Maronite and Sunni populations, which were estimated at nearly 800,000 (Hamzeh 2004: 13).

Unlike Egypt and the Palestinian territories, pre-civil war Lebanon had experienced elections and competitive electoral politics, both parliamentary and presidential; however, these elections and the electoral procedures where inherently restrictive toward the Shiites. In the three decades from independence in 1943 until the outbreak of war in 1975, nine parliaments and five presidents were elected.[237] The parliamentary framework of modern elections in Lebanon was established in the 1926 Constitution. Elections were held regularly during the French Mandate period with the exception of interruptions during WWII. Throughout the Mandate period, two-thirds of the parliament was elected on the basis of universal male suffrage (women first voted in the 1950s); French authorities appointed the remaining one-third. The practice of appointment ended at independence in 1943 (Landau 1961; Suleiman 1967, Salem 1965). In the period between independence and the outbreak of the Lebanese Civil War in 1975, Lebanese electoral law remained the same. Seats in parliament were apportioned on the basis with the Christian-Sunni-Shiite ratio, based on the 1932 census figures.

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[236] Samir Khalaf and Per Kongstad. 1973. *Urbanization and Urbanism in Beirut: Some Preliminary Results*. Found in: L. Carl. Brown, From Madina to Metropolis. Princeton: Darwin Press.

[237] Political life in Lebanon has never been organized around the role of political parties. The pre-Civil War era (1943-1975) was characterized by the inability of the state institutions, especially the parliament, to allow for greater party representation. Nevertheless, in 1968 elections saw the highest percentage of party members winning parliamentary seats, a maximum of 30%. In the 1972 elections, this percentage dropped to 28%, and in the 1968 elections, it rose slightly too about 30%.

The Shiites at that time were significantly underrepresented in census figures. For the most part, they lived in the rural and less developed areas of Lebanon and counting them with the best intensions of accuracy would have been difficult. However, the Christians and Sunnis were not seeking accuracy in the 1932 census and wanted to make sure the Shiites were significantly undercounted. Arguably, the reason for this was because each Lebanese district was allocated legislative seats based on the size of the district's total population. Further complicating this was the fact that the Lebanese parliament was a candidate-centered electoral system rather than a political party-based electoral system. This meant that the Lebanese political party system was highly decentralized, and it encouraged candidates to band together in lists, although they technically ran as individuals. Voters, regardless of their political affiliation, ideological beliefs, or religion, voted for all seats in their district, meaning that the majority religious group within the district won the legislative seats. To make sure Shiites were underrepresented, many districts were gerrymandered to intentionally make Shiites a minority within the district, guaranteeing more Christian or Sunni legislative representation. This was made easier with the significant numbers of Shiites migrating to Beirut; all the Christians had to do was gerrymander city districts helping Christians and Sunnis stay in the majority. Furthermore, there was no unifying agent to bring the Shiite population together as a voting bloc; individual candidates had to attract votes on their own, stripping the political party of any real significance. What resulted was a majoritarian type democracy where the Shiites were excluded from most decision making authority and subjected to the will of the Christians and Sunnis. Being the minority in the legislature meant Shiites were being continuously outvoted on legislation that was designed to restrict their socioeconomic and sociopolitical mobility.

Paralleling the political inequality, the Shiites were bureaucratically and economically oppressed. The Shiites were also under-represented in the bureaucracy. According to Hamzeh (2004: 12) Lebanese population and employment statistics show that in the 1946, 40% of the highest posts in the civil society were occupied by the Maronites, 27% by the Sunnis, and only 3.2% by the Shiites. This meant that within Lebanon's political and social and bureaucratic institutions the Shiites were not accorded a political and economic role commensurate with their numerical size. Furthermore, Lebanon experienced significant economic growth after the 1950s. The growth was lopsided and resulted in slow socioeconomic development for the Shiites, who where treated as a lower-laboring and agricultural class. The Shiites belonged to the most socioeconomically disadvantaged social group within Lebanon. They lived in the less-developed, most rural areas, or the ghetto regions within Beirut. Because of this, they had inadequate education, limited sanitation and healthcare, high unemployment, and they faced significant discrimination within and outside of the Lebanese political and social institutions (Hamzer 2004 and Haril 1972). In comparing the Shiites with that of the Christians and Sunnis, who were overrepresented among the urban elite, within universities, and in every professional filed within Lebanon, the Shiites were overrepresented among the poor and the lower working classes (Picard 1993).

As a result of 900 years of institutionalized degradation and discrimination that the Shiites experienced at the hands of the Sunnis and Christians, there was a massive amount of built-up rage that was waiting for a catalyst to spark it. That catalyst was the presence of the PLO in southern Lebanon. According to Anne Barnard (2006); Carrie Wickham (1997); David Rapoport (2001); Ami Pedahzur, William Eubank, and Leonard Weinberg (2002); and Bruce Hoffman (1999), Islamic fundamentalism directly resulted from the displacement of

the Palestinians. As it relates to the formation of Shiite fundamentalism, the displacement of the Palestinians did not create or facilitate Lebanese Shiite radicalization – it simple perpetuated it.

The PLO and Israel

A Palestinian refugee population has lived in Lebanon since the creation of the state of Israel in 1948. Unlike Egypt, where there are no Palestinian refuges, there is a significant presence of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. These Palestinians could be considered an outside ideological force because they meet many of the criteria used to define a *significant ideological force*. Specifically, the PLO was *an outside military and ideological force within Lebanon and was not working with, for, or influenced by the Lebanese state*. As a result of the Arab-Israeli wars, specifically the Six Day War in 1967, the number of Palestinians increased in Lebanon to 350,000 (Jaber 1997; 13). By the early 1970s, Lebanon became the PLO's only base, following its expulsion from Jordan for facilitating the Jordanian civil war 1970-1971. Tens of thousands of well armed Palestinian guerillas moved to South Lebanon in 1971.[238] Initially, the Shiites had sympathized with the Palestinian cause, and many of them joined the Palestinian movement. In fact, in the aftermath of the 1948 Arab defeat, Sayyid Abdul Husayn Sharaf al-Din organized a guerrilla group named al-ja'fariyyah.[239] This group consisted of Shiite and Palestinian students who were trained to launch attacks at the Lebanese-Israeli boarder against Israeli solders and settlers. However, this partnership was short lived because of the violence and degradation the Lebanese Shiites were being

[238] Ritchie Ovendale. 1992. The Origins of the Arab-Israeli Wars. London: Longman. The Cairo Argument was reached on November 2, 1969 and West Beirut between the PLO and Lebanon concerning the presence of PLO resistance fighters within Lebanon. The agreement allowed Palestinian terrorists (freedom fighters) in southeast Lebanon – it allowed the Palestinians to carry out armed struggle against Israel from South Lebanon,

[239] A cleric born and educated in Iraq, he was an active participant in the Lebanese Shiite nationalist movement. IN 1920 he headed the delegation to Damascus to argue for an independent greater Syria (Lebanon and Syria would be one state). He was one of the first major public Shiite scholars: Rodger Shanahan; The Shia of Lebanon: Clans Parties and Clerics. 2005. Tauris Academic Studies: New York

subjected to by the militant Palestinians. The control that the PLO had over South Lebanon made the Shiites fear that the PLO would take control of their land and transform it into a Palestinian state. On the Israeli side, the Palestinian military presence in South Lebanon was a direct threat to Israel's northern settlements. In response to the Palestinian presence, Israel invaded South Lebanon in 1978, and it occupied areas as far north as the Litani River for the purpose of creating a "security zone" that would prevent direct attacks by Palestinian militants.

According to Hala Janer (1997: 7) Israel's invasion was the brain-child of Ariel Sharon, the Minister of Defense in Prime Minister Begin's government. Sharon's objective was to drive the PLO from Israel's northern border and push them into Northern Lebanon. Israel called their campaign *Operation Litani*. However, thousands of Shiites died and more than a quarter of a million became displaced persons and relocated to the southern suburbs of Beirut (Hamzer 2004: 16). The southern suburbs of Beirut were once a middle class, residential district, but as the numbers of Shiites grew, the population expanded into areas that were not designed for living. The Shiites began to squat and to build makeshift communities in places such as the city dump and Beirut's common sewer. The suburbs gained a reputation as the Shiite's slums, commonly referred to as the "Belt of Misery" (Janer 1997: 145). As a result, the previous Christian and Sunni residents were forced to relocate to different areas of Beirut, creating even more animosity between the three major religious groups.

On March 19, 1978, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 425 which called for the unconditional withdrawal of Israeli troops and the deployment of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) along the Lebanese-Israeli border (Hamzer 2004; 16) .

The PLO agreed to cease its military activity, and Israel partially withdrew, handing over Shiite land to the Christian Maronite militia, further antagonizing the Shiite-Christian relationship. Hamzer (2004:16) argues that by 1982, the storehouse of Shiite grievances had overflowed. However, Israeli withdrawal was short lived; Israel invaded for a second time during the summer of 1982. This second invasion was called *Operation Peace for the Galilee,* and this time the Israeli military occupied significant parts of Beirut at the Christian militia's request. This caused significant damage and life loss to the Shiite population in Southern Lebanon and Beirut. The invasion of Beirut led to the killing of 18,000 individuals and the wounding of more than 30,000 Shiites (Ovendale 1992). The invasion of 1982 and the subsequent Israeli occupation of South Lebanon helped facilitate the birth of Hezbollah. The Shiites felt that Israel was targeting them as a community (Wright 1988). The Lebanese-Israeli accord brokered by the United States and signed on May 17, 1983, left South Lebanon under complete control of Israel, further propitiating the displacement and radicalization of the Shiites. The Shiites viewed this as an Israeli land grab facilitated by the United States.

Interestingly, few months after Israel's invasion in 1982, there was very little Shiite opposition or resistance to the invasion. They were grateful to the Israelis for freeing them from the violence and terror facilitated by the Palestinians. The PLO had become a state within a state and its members were accused of rape, torture, murder, extortion, and so on. Therefore, it can be assumed that the removal of the PLO from the South appeared to be of mutual benefit for both the Israelis and the Shiites. The Shiite change in attitude occurred rather rapidly as they became aware that Israel was not going to leave Southern Lebanon, despite having achieved its main objective of driving the Palestinians from Lebanon. Why is this? The only logical reason Shiites could conclude was an Israeli land-grab of some of the

richest farm areas in the Middle East (Schiff 1985).[240] In early 1983, the Israeli Defense issued the first draft of their plan to form the "Organization for a Unified South." The plan was in effect similar to one used in the West Bank, whereby the Israeli military established bases in every village or town and administered control on a small scale, these military forces were called the *National Guard*. In 1948, David Ben-Gurion, the founder of the State of Israel, spoke about creating a Christian state in Lebanon which would form an alliance with Israel. This, according to Hala Jaber (1997: 16-17), was Ariel Sharon's plan and it further perpetuated the Lebanese civil war. It has been estimated that during the Yitzhak Rabin's government 1974-77, the Maronite militias received $150 million from Israel (Jaber 1997 and Hamzer 2004). Also, the Israelis would encourage the Christian militia to join the National Guard.

During 1983-1984, Israeli forces isolated South Lebanon from the rest of the country by blocking all passages to Beirut. This had a significantly negative impact on the economy of South Lebanon. The Shiites' livelihood depended on the sale of their fruit and vegetable produce to Beirut and northern Lebanon. This forced the Southern Lebanese into further poverty and many lost their farms. As a result, membership in Shiite military resistance movements increased.[241] Furthermore, Israeli raids were carried out in villages suspected of harboring resistance fighters. Anyone who was suspected of knowing or being related to someone within the resistance was arrested. The resistance organization was formed called

[240] When the Zionists had presented the territorial demands at the Versailles Peace Conference in 1919, they originally asked for Israel's northern boarder to include all of Southern Lebanon and end at the Litani River (which in the 1978 invasion they occupied Lebanon up to the Litani river).

[241] Terrorism, National Liberation, Or Menace? Strategic Studies Institute Monographs, U.S. Army War College. Pages 29-35; Hussein Agha. 2004, September 23. "A note on Hezbollah" in *Hezbollah and the Lebanon-Israel border*, bitterlemons-international 2004, at http://www.bitterlemons-international.org/previous.php?opt=1&id=57; Gary Gambill. 2002. Hezbollah's Strategic Rocket Arsenal. *Middle East Intelligence Bulletin.* at www.meib.org/articles/0211_l2.htm.

the *Lebanese National Resistance* (LNR) and was dominated by *Amal*, which was the largest and most organized violent Shiite resistance movement.

Amal evolved from the first Shiite mass-movement in Lebanon, *Movement of the Deprived*, which was formed in 1974. The *Movement of the Deprived* was a mass protest movement aimed at forcing the government to address the lack of social services provided to Shiites (Shanahan 2005: 107). In 1975 Amal became the military arm of the *Movement of the Deprived*. According to Shanahan (2005: 107), Amal was initially trained by the *Palestinian Fatah Movement*. Both movements were formed by Imam Musa al-Sadr. The *Movement of the Deprived* was the first Shiite mass movement and helped mobilize Shiites to become politically aware, and in turn, they became more politically active. They began demanding that the Lebanese government grant the Shiites full political recognition and reform the socioeconomic and sociopolitical institutionalized inequality within Lebanon. By the late 1970s al-Sadr transformed himself into a Shiite national hero and was seen as the savior of the Lebanese Shiites. However, in August of 1978, al-Sadr disappeared on a visit to Libya. His disappearance was blamed on the Israelis, PLO, and the Lebanese Christians.[242] As a result, he was turned into a martyr, and the movement significantly militarized itself, and Amal was born. This being said, each of the social movement conditions is positively associated with the birth of Amal. First, the Lebanese Shiite population was experiencing significant socioeconomic inequality. Secondly, as a result of a charismatic and dedicated leader, the population of the movement increased significantly, and it developed an organizational structure. Thirdly, Lebanon was not a perfect democracy or a perfect autocracy, indicating the Shiites had some sociopolitical freedom, and in turn started

[242] In Rodger Shanahan's appendix (2005: 189) he writes that the Libyans claimed al-Sadr collected his luggage in Rome after a flight from Libya, but most observers believe that he disappeared in Libya.

demanding more. Fourthly, there was a presence of an outside ideological force, the militant members of the PLO.

To further complicate this situation, Bashir al-Gemayel, who was elected president (he was a Christian) in 1982, was killed in an explosion on September 14, 1982. His death was avenged by Christian militias that entered the Sabra and Shatila Palestinian refugee camps in Beirut's southern suburb and between September 16-18; with machine-guns, they killed at least 1,500 Palestinians (Palmer-Harik 2004: 35). During this, Ariel Sharon's troops blockaded the refugee camp and stopped the Palestinians from fleeing, while ensuring that the Christian militants were allowed to leave after the massacre.[243] Hamas has been very vocal concerning its defense of the Palestinian presence in Lebanon and has condemned the removal of Palestinians from Lebanon. Also, they have argued that Palestinians in Lebanon have "suffered more calamities, slaughter, and torture than any where else."[244]

Furthermore, Israel turned on the Shiite clerics who were leading the resistance.[245] Religious leaders were deported from their own country, or they were assassinated. As a result, the Shiite resistance began to employ a deadly weapon, young Shiite fighters who volunteered to drive vehicles packed with explosives into Israeli targets, simultaneously killing themselves. These became the first suicide terrorist acts and are a qualitative example

[243] As argued by: Zeev Schiff and Ehud Yaari. 1984. Israel's Lebanon War; Israel's Prime Minister, Ariel Sharon was taking defensive measures in 2001 to avoid being brought to trial in a Belgium court on charges of alleged involvement in the Sabra and Shatila Refugee Camp massacres raised by 40 relatives of victims. In February 1983, Israel's Kahan Commission of Inquiry found that Israel was not directly responsible for the massacre, but determined that Sharon bore personal responsibility. He then resigned his portfolio but stayed in the cabinet. In late spring of 2002, it was determined by the Belgian tribunal that the case against Sharon was not admissible on grounds that he it s present exerting his function as head of state. Because of his stroke and ill health, he will never be brought to justice.

[244] Hamas Periodic Statement no 32. of November 25, 1988. Also in Hamas Periodic Statement no. 27 of August 3, 1988 where Hamas condemns the Sabra and Shatila massacre.

[245] According to Rodger Shanahan (2005. The Shi'a of Lebanon: Clans, Parties, and Clerics) the function of clerics in the Shia community are significantly different than those of the Christian and Sunni communities. They act neither as an ordained priesthood not as intermediaries between believers and God. Rather, their main function is as scholars of jurisprudence. In other words, they act as interrupters of the shari'a as found in the Quran and the sunna (which is the teachings of the early Imams, handed sown through the generations).

of the quantitative results from Chapter Three. In Chapter Three, it was shown that there is a positive correlation between state interference with religious freedom and terrorism. Also, there is a positive correlation between the restrictiveness of religious freedom and Islamic fundamentalist movements indicating that there should be a significant increase in Lebanese fundamentalist movements, and there was.

The Birth of Hezbollah

When Israel launched its invasion in June of 1982, Lebanon's leading Shiite clerics were in Tehran, attending the annual Islamic Conference. Iran immediately volunteered to help the Shiite population living in southern Lebanon and the Iranian Guards, or the "Quds Brigades" (Jerusalem Brigades), were immediately dispatched to Lebanon and the Shiite fundamentalist movement began.[246] However, Hezbollah was not officially established until 1985 when its Manifesto was officially written and the movement's policies and objectives were institutionalized. Hezbollah's "Open Letter to the Downtrodden of Lebanon and the World" formally declared the existence of the Movement. According to the Manifesto, Hezbollah had several objections and views on foreign and domestic relations. First, the Ayatollah Khomeini's teachings would be the foundation of Hezbollah's political, social, and military doctrines. Secondly, Hezbollah outlined its objection to the state of Israel, on the grounds that it occupies Muslim lands. Thirdly, it states Hezbollah's opposition to colonization and imperialism, specifically the American imperial ambitions in the Middle

[246] According to Ahmad Hamzer (2004: 25) the founding members of Hezbollah had tried several different, such as Islamic Amal, the Islamic Movement, Islamic Jihad, and the Revolution Committees. When no agreement was reached concerning the name, a committee of nine traveled to Iran to seek the opinion and permission of Khomeini over the new name. His instructions were to adopt a new name that would unite all Islamists. The new formation took the name of Hezbollah – the Party of God – after a verse in the Quran: "those who accept the mandate of God, his profit and those who believed, LO! The Party of God, they are the victorious" (Surat al-Ma'ida, 5:56).

East and for its support of Israel. Fourthly, it explains how the current Lebanese political system is flawed, and argues that the current political system and its "sectarian privileges" are the root causes of Lebanon's problems. The Hezbollah Manifesto states that "We are not at all interested in any projection for political reform within the framework of the rotten sectarian system" (Hezbollah Manifesto). It then goes on to say: "We urge adoption of the Islamic system on the basis of free and direct selection by the people, not the basis of forceful imposition, as some people imagine" (Hezbollah Manifesto).[247]

In its manifesto, Hezbollah defines itself as a movement struggling for the faithful Lebanese who believe in Islam, resistance, and the liberation of Lebanon.[248] According to Hezbollah, their movement restores Islamic culture, political, and religious unity, which had been destroyed by the various philosophical doctrines of Western culture; specifically, the Americanization and Westernization of the Islamic world. Hezbollah contends that Western culture has encouraged Muslims to pursue their own interests rather than God's, and the spiritual needs of the greater Islamic community. Hezbollah blames the United States for all the region's catastrophes, describing it as the foremost enemy of all Muslims around the world: "We shall proceed to fight the vice at its very root, the first roots of such vice being the United States." It goes on to say that the United States is the "mother of all malice." Arguably, Hezbollah's resentment towards the United States resulted from the fact that it backed Israel and vetoed all the United Nations attempts at forcing Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon in 1982. "Israel attacked our country, destroyed our villages, slaughtered our

[247] Text of the "Hezbollah's Open Letter to the Downtrodden of Lebanon and the World" Translated in Norton, Amal and the Shi'a. page 67

[248] Nasrallah, interview Al-Wasat, May 13, 2000. See also: Hezbollah: Identity and Goals. September 6, 2000. www.hizbollah.org Shaul shai, "terror in the name of the Imam - twenty years of Shiite terrorism 1979-1999" (Herzliya - IDC, Israel, 2001) pp. 23-28. Al-Nabulsi, "Will Lebanon become an Islamic republic?" http://www.elaph.com/ElaphWeb/ElaphWriter/2006/8/170391.htm, as quoted in http://www.memri.org.il/memri/LoadArticlePage.asp?language=Hebrew&enttype=4&entid=2037

children and dishonored our sanctity, they unleashed criminals who practiced massacres against us and the United States continues to support Israel and prevent us from deciding our destiny" says Hezbollah in its manifesto.[249]

Without Iran's financial and spiritual assistance, Hezbollah would have never succeeded. Iran's objection was to spread its Islamic revolution within Lebanon with the ultimate aim of establishing a Lebanese Shiite regime. Hezbollah was initially dependent on Iranian for support; however, over the last 25 years the movement has become largely self-sufficient due to its institutionalization and a significant increase in the size of its membership. Still to this day, Hezbollah members receive military training in Iran, specifically in guerilla warfare, intelligence and terrorism. The acquisition of Iranian knowledge and practical skills has transformed Hezbollah into a quasi-Iranian brigade in Lebanon.[250] Hezbollah's initial goal was to launch a revolt against the Israeli occupation. In this sense, Hezbollah formed differently than most social movements, including Hamas and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, as it relates to launching and then facilitating military activities. However, Hezbollah's military operations evolved into a massive social movement that unified the Shiite Lebanese through their collective identity.

The one phenomenon associated with the creation of social movements that perfectly mirrors the formation of Hezbollah is that of collective identity. According to many social movement scholars, for a social movement to succeed it is fundamental that the movement's

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[249] According to Joel Beinin (2003) (The Israelization of American Middle East Policy Discourse. Social Text. Duke University Press): Even among Islamic radicals there is significant dissent from bin Laden's views; specifically from Hezbollah. President Bush's addition of Hezbollah to the official list of terrorist organizations on November 2, 2001 was applauded by Israel and its supporters. (Press release of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, November 14, 2002, page 139 for web address). Yet, Sheikh Muhammad Fadl Allah, the spiritual leader of Hezbollah, condemned the attacks on September 11 and argued tin the Lebanese press that they ware incompatible with the Koran, and the Muslim code of Jihad (page 136).

[250] Shimon Shapira, Hezbollah between Iran & Lebanon, United Kibbutz Red Line publisher, p. 125 and Shaul Shai, Terror in the Service of the Imam, 20 years of Shiite Terror. The International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism; Yoram Schweitzer, "Iranian Transitional Terrorism", www.ict.org.il, 24 May 2001.

participants share a collective identity.[251] Members of any movement, in order to qualify as such, must subscribe to a set of beliefs which are distinct from those of the wider population. Furthermore, those who subscribe to those beliefs must feel some degree of kinship with others within the movement's structure. This is what Hezbollah has successfully used to its benefit, the shared identity of Shi'ism; specifically, their shared experiences with sociopolitical and socioeconomic oppression and degradation. As a result, Hezbollah's membership significantly increased. Hezbollah gave a voice to a group who had previously been silenced within Lebanese sociopolitical and socioeconomic institutions. Previous research has shown that people join collective action mainly through interpersonal ties, or informal networks.[252] Since identities are created and shaped through social relations, the preexisting Shiite networks played a crucial role in the formation of Hezbollah. The Shiites engaged in collective action because they shared certain norms and values related to a specific area of political contention; specifically, a shared depravation and a shared hatred for the Palestinian and Israeli occupation. Arguably, the ideas encompassing Islam are fundamental in the formation, duration, and success of Islamic fundamentalist movements. Hezbollah subscribes to a set of beliefs which are distinct from those of the wider Lebanese Christian-Sunni population.

Syria and War

Hezbollah is well-armed, well-trained, and equipped with highly sophisticated weaponry which is capable of reaching a significant portion of Israel. Currently, Hezbollah is estimated to have some 13,000 rockets and missiles. These include the SA-7 surface-to-air

[251] For example: Gould 1995; Fernandez and McAdam 1986, 1988, 1988; McAdam and Paulsen 1993; McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 1988; Rosenthal et al. 1985; Snow, 1988 Snow, David A. (1988, 1992, 1999); Snow, Burke E. Rochford, Steven K. Worden, and Robert D. Benford (1986);
[252] As argued by: della Porta 1988; Could 1995; McAdam 1988; Snow (1988); Snow, David A. (1988, 1992, 1999); Snow, Burke E. Rochford, Steven K. Worden, and Robert D. Benford (1986); Tarrow 1994

missile and the Fajr-5 surface-to-surface rockets. In May 2000, the Israel Defense Forces withdrew from Lebanon terminating eighteen years of occupation. Moreover, after 2000 Syria has taken an active role in arming Hezbollah and the Palestinian Intifada.[253] Syria lost the Golan Heights to Israel during the 1967 Six Day War, and it has remained a point of contention ever sense. For the Syrians, Hezbollah remains the only bargaining chip with which they have to pressure the Israeli government into returning their strategic plateau (Luft 2002). Unlike Iran, Syria does not have an ideological connection with Hezbollah; their interest with the Hezbollah is self-serving. After 1990, Syria has been an important source of support for Hezbollah's terrorist and guerrilla activity against Israel. Iran has given Hezbollah the ideological legitimacy and all the political, financial, and some of military support it needs. However, without Syria's military, strategic, and logistic support, Hezbollah could not have achieved its current military status. Syrian assistance has helped transform Hezbollah into a regional partner with Syria and the operational arm of the Syrian army in its confrontation with Israel.[254] This odd alliance between Hezbollah and the secular Ba'thist

[253] The Saudi proposal, which first came to light in mid-February, "offered Israel full normalization with the Arab world in exchange for a full withdrawal from all territory occupied . . . since 1967." Yet, Syria did not want to give up "its bargaining card in future negotiations" by promising normalization before Israel withdrew from the Golan Heights. Hence, although Syria joined twenty-one other Arab League states in endorsing the proposal, Hezbollah "rockets began flying over the border two days later." Moreover, Hezbollah's leadership was quick to denounce the very notion of a compromise solution soon after the Saudi proposal surfaced. In early March, Husayn al-Khalil, Nasrallah's political assistant, warned the Palestinians against "falling in the trap of truces and entering the game of polarization," calling on them to "stick to their rights and not to get involved in the games of international politics" ("Ra'd: Resistance Has Right to Support the Palestinians," al-Nahar, March 12, 2002). Then, on March 24, three days before the Arab Summit opened, Nasrallah called for the continuation of the Palestinian armed struggle, declaring that the "conflict must end with the liberation of Palestine from the river to the sea." He also called for a national conference "to resist the settlement" of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. See Hasan Nasrallah, interview by Hiyam Shahud, London al-Majallah, March 24, 2002; and Jubran Tuwayni, "Lebanon's Role" Beirut al-Nahar, March 21, 2002

[254] For the strategic and military relationship between Syria and Hezbollah see: Gary Gambill and Ziad Abdelnour, "Hezbollah: Between Tehran and Damascus," Middle East Intelligence Bulletin 4, no. 2 (February 2002), at www.meib.org/articles/0202_l1.htm; Eyal Zisser, "The Return of Hizbullah," Middle East Quarterly 9, no. 4 (Fall 2002),at www.meforum.org/article/499; Yossi Baidatz, "Bashar's First Year: From Ophthalmology to a National Vision" (Washington, D.C.: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2001); Ely Karmon, "A Solution to Syrian Terrorism," Middle East Quarterly, vol. 6, no. 2 (June 1999), pp. 23-34; Gambill, "Hezbollah's Strategic Rocket Arsenal," and Lenny Ben-David, "Iran, Syria, and Hizballah-Threatening Israel's

regime in Syria, which killed 20,000 Syrian Muslim Brothers in 1982, has resulted from two inherent enemies coming together to defeat a common enemy.[255] During the rule of Bashar Al-Assad, a significant change occurred in the relationship between Syria and Hezbollah; with the power transition from father to son. Hezbollah became Syria's strategic partner in Lebanon. Political alliances are sometimes formed by states with little in common besides converging foreign policy goals, as in the case of the Hezbollah-Syrian military alliance.

As it relates to Israel, Hezbollah has been the only non-Palestinian Arab/Islamic movement or state to continue an armed struggle against Israel via the weapons provided by Syria and Iran. Furthermore, Hezbollah has become an influential terrorist force in the West

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North," Jerusalem Issue Brief, vol. 2, no. 3 (Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, July 17, 2002). According to the "IDF Intelligence Chief Views Hezbollah-Syria Ties, PA Chaos, Saudi Stability". *The Jerusalem Post*, July 26, 2004. Hezbollah has acquired a considerable quantity of arms from Iran and Syria and has deployed them in Southern Lebanon in field cells exclusively controlled by the organization (Hezbollah land). The Head of Israeli intelligence, Maj.Gen. Farkash, has stated that the organization has approximately 13,000 short-range rockets, about 500 medium-range rockets and several missiles with a range of 115 - 215 km/s. The organization sees these weapons as a means of deterrence against Israel and has even defined its policy on the issue. Amos Harel, "Hezbollah's Terror Factory in the PA", Ha'aretz, 11 January 2005 and "Syria After Lebanon, Lebanon After Syria?" International Crisis Group, Middle East Report, N°39 - 12 April 2005, at http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/middle_east_north_africa/ arab_israeli conflict/lebanon/39_syria_after_lebanon_lebanon_after_syria.pdf

[255] During the 1980s Hezbollah killed hundreds of people in terrorist attacks against Western targets: the bombings of the U.S. embassy in Beirut in 1983 and 1984; the twin 1983 suicide attacks on U.S. and French peace forces in Beirut. In a 1998 interview, Mustapha Tlass, the ex-Syrian minister of Defense, boasted that he gave the green light to the Islamic organizations to act against the American and French forces in Lebanon. However, he said, facetiously, he did not permit operations against the Italians because he was enamored of the Italian film star, Gina Lolobrigida. During the 1960s two highly contrasting groups emerged in Syria. First, the Baath (Renaissance) Party, its motto is" Arab unity from the Atlantic to the Gulf" The secular trend gathering steam in Syria along with other factos discussed below, spurred the Society of Muslim Brothers to revolt in the provincial city of Hamah in April 1964. The government permanently outlawed the fellowship after the Syrian army crushed the rebellion. Air force General Hafiz al-Assad, a Ba'athist, came to power a few years after that incident, after Syria had suffered a second defeat by Israel in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. Destabilization of his government became the Muslim Brotherhood's goal and a series of assassination attempts against Baath party professionals, government figure and security agents. In 1976, a protest against the assistance provided by the Assad government to Christian militias struggling against a Muslim-leftist coalition in Lebanon was launched and three years later, in June of 1979, in a direct challenge to Assad, the Brotherhood struck again, killing 83. The following year, they faced significant crackdowns by government forces. The final straw for the Ba'athist regime was a three week long revolt staged by the Brotherhood in 1982: these armed fundamentalist held off army regulars until Assad ordered heavy artillery to level the whole sections of the city where the fighters were concentrated. After this attack, bulldozers razed the area and rapidly repaved it. Ever since this incident, the Syrian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood has kept a low profile (See: Patrick Seale. 1988. Asad: The Struggle for the Middle East (Berkeley: University of California Press); Umar Abd-Allah (1983) The Islamic Struggle in Syria (Berkeley: University of California Press); Fred Lawson (1982, November-December) Social Basis off the Hamah Revolt. MERIP Report).

Bank and Gaza, and it has established a network of terrorist cells and training camps in Lebanon with the assistance of the Syrians. In addition, according to Israeli intelligence sources, in 2004, Hezbollah financed terror cells that operated in the Palestinian territories with a sum ranging from $750,000 to $1.5 million a year. During 2005, Hezbollah succeeded in increasing the level of terrorism by raising the sum paid for facilitating suicide attacks committed by either Hamas or Islamic Jihad to $100,000, while in the past the amount was only $20,000.[256] Hezbollah members have also attempted to infiltrate Israel in recent years. Since November 2000, Israelis have uncovered several cells of Israeli Arabs recruited by Hezbollah for intelligence and terrorist missions within Israel itself.[257]

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[256] " IDF Intelligence Chief Views Hezbollah-Syria Ties, PA Chaos, Saudi Stability". *The Jerusalem Post*. July 26, 2004. Zohar Palti and Matthew Levitt . "Special policy forum report Hizballah's west bank foothold". June,18 2004. Nasrallah Speech , Al-Manar, October 30, 2004 , see also: http://www.intelligence.org.il/sp/1_05/hezbollah.htm (had translated): Hezbollah set up a network of terror cells in these areas, instructed them, on several cases from their Lebanese training camps, on how to carry out attacks, manufacture weapons, guerilla techniques, and pushed them to perpetrate attacks. In addition, according to Israeli intelligence reports, in 2004, Hezbollah financed approximately 70-80% of the terror cells in the field amounting to 1,500,000 dollars a year. Hezbollah was also involved in smuggling weapons to the Palestinians.

[257] One of the earliest examples of such infiltration occurred in 1996, when Hussein Mikdad, a Lebanese Shiite terrorist, blew himself up while trying to make a bomb in his room at an east Jerusalem hotel. He had entered Israel a few days earlier with a forged British passport. A member of Hezbollah, Mikdad had served as accountant to Shaykh Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah, the organization's spiritual leader, before being chosen for terrorist training. Since 1996, at least two other Hezbollah operatives have attempted to infiltrate Israel and gather information on behalf of both the organization and Iran. In 1997, Hezbollah member Stefan Smirks, a German citizen and convert to Islam, was arrested in Israel following a tip-off from German intelligence. Similarly, Lebanese-British citizen Jihad (or Gerard) Shuman was arrested in January 2001 while attempting to enter Israel in order to take photographs of potential targets. See Isabel Kershner, "The Changing Colors of Imad Mughniyah," Jerusalem Report, March 25, 2002. The first terrorist cell was uncovered in November 2000, when seven residents of the Western Galilee village of Abu Snan were arrested "on charges of spying for Hezbollah and plotting to abduct Israeli soldiers on its behalf." In June 2001, three Israeli Arabs from Yafi'a and Kfar Kanna were indicted "for plotting to steal weapons from an IDF base and send information to Hezbollah." In September 2001, four Israeli Druzes in Rama and Daliat al-Carmel were arrested "on charges of smuggling weapons into Israel from Lebanon." In June 2002, Israeli citizen Nissim Nasser, a Lebanese Jew, was "indicted on charges of spying for Hezbollah"; specifically, he had attempted to provide the organization with photographs and maps of Israeli targets for large-scale terrorist attacks. In July 2002, "Israeli officials announced that they had uncovered a Hezbollah plot to kidnap Israelis abroad," an operation devised by an Israeli Arab who had moved to Lebanon in 2000 and become a Hezbollah operative. Also that month, Israeli authorities arrested "four Arab Israelis who smuggled weapons and transmitted intelligence to Hezbollah in return for drugs." All quotes from Gary Gambill, "Hezbollah's Israeli Operatives," Middle East Intelligence Bulletin 4, no. 9 (September 2002); available online (www.meib.org/articles/0209_l2.htm). See also Arieh O'Sullivan, "Hezbollah Recruiting Israeli Arabs," Jerusalem Post, February 19, 2002

Martin Kramer (1996) argues that Hezbollah is a political movement which sees politics as an inseparable part of religion and every act of violence has a clear and rationale objective, and it always weighs benefits against costs.[258] In other words, Hezbollah is politically rational and would do nothing to jeopardize its support base, specifically, the Lebanese Shiite community, because they are Hezbollah's most important resource.

Significant Outside Ideological Force

Following the success of Iran's Revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini embarked on an agenda known as *Mashru al-Thawra al-Iraniyah* (the Project of the Iranian Revolution).[259] This aimed at furthering Shiite Islam by reviving the Islamic *Ummah* (the worldwide Islamic nation), which was to be based in Iran and led by Khomeini, whose objective was the spread of Islam's influence beyond the boundaries of Iran. Khomeini stressed that in exporting the revolution, he did not seek to militarily invade neighboring states and did not harbor expansionist plans. He argued that his goal would be achieved by means of an "invisible force" and the rout to success lay through cultivating the populace (Khomeini, 1978, 1989). The Islamic Revolutionary Guards became an integral part of the program. They were initially set up in 1979 as an internal security apparatus to consolidate Khomeini's grip on Iran and grew to become one of the strongest institutions ever produced by the revolution and

[258] This article was published in *Heartland - Eurasian Review of Geopolitics,* 2-2005, July 2005, (http://www.eheartland.com.)

[259] Khomeini institutionalized the exportation of revolution and creation of a global Islamic rule and outlined it in various parts of Iran's constitution. The forward of the regime's constitution reads, in part, "Given the context of Iran's Islamic Revolution, which was a movement for the victory of all the oppressed over the oppressors, it provides the ground for continuation of the revolution inside and outside the country, specifically in spreading international links to other Islamic and people's movements, tries to pave the way for the creation of unique global Ummah so the continuation of the struggle for the salvation of deprived and suffering nations can be settled." Another part of the forward, under the headline "Ideological Army", reads, "The Army of the Islamic Republic and the Revolutionary Guards carry not only the duty of protecting the borders but also ideological duty, Jihad of God and struggle to spread the rule of God's law in the world" (Abrahamian 1989,1993; Hamid, 1981; Arjomand, 1988).

a primary tool for promoting Khomeini's doctrines. His objective was carried out through overt epistemic militarized intervention, as was the case in Lebanon, and through covert epistemic, political interference, as in the case of Algeria. The Guards did not create a separate division to export the revolution; they trained and armed militant surrogates and agents in many camps and locations throughout Iran. These agents then recruited Shiite militants overseas to carry out operations in both the Middle East and Europe. The Guards supported revolutionary activities, built an Islamic network, and had agents occupy positions in Iranian embassies across Europe, Africa, and Asia. Under diplomatic cover, they recruited proxies and cells for operations worldwide and their most successful attempt at exporting the Iranian Revolution was through Hezbollah.

A large section of the Iran's Intelligence Ministry (one of Iran's largest bureaucracies) is focused on terrorist activities and espionage abroad; specifically in Lebanon via Hezbollah. *The Islamic Propaganda and Communications Organizations* is a massive part of the Intelligence Ministry in the Iranian foreign bureaucracy and is present in dozens of countries and has hundreds of millions of dollars in its budget. Besides laying the groundwork for exporting terrorism and fundamentalism, it is engaged in recruiting Muslims for the regime's terrorist squads, including Hezbollah. The rise and sustenance of radical Islamic groups would not have been made possible without financial and military assets of Iran. Hilal Khashan (1997: 7) said that shortly after the triumph of Iran's Islamic Revolution in 1979, Islamic fundamentalism came into hostile contact with the West as members of the Revolutionary Guards occupied the US embassy in Tehran taking numerous Americans hostages. Following this, Iran's fundamentalist epistemic communities in Lebanon launched, on October, 23 1983, two separate attacks against US Marines and French troops in Beirut,

killing more than 300 individuals. Soon after, these epistemic communities transformed themselves into Hezbollah. In the aftermath of these two suicide attacks, a wave of Western hostage-taking and airline hijackings dominated the Western psyche and media coverage.[260] It is in this atmosphere of commotion that the first writings on militant Islam appeared in print. Bernard Lewis claimed that the Iranian revolution demolished the division of the Islamic world into Soviet and American spheres of influence and proved that Islam can stand on its own between the two superpowers without committing itself to either of them. Lewis (1990) argued that all Muslims especially admired this aspect of the revolution.

> We do not wish to impose Islam on anyone we hate those who impose their beliefs and regimes on us and we do not want Islam to reign Lebanon by force. But we confirm that we are convinced by Islam as an ideology and as a system and call on everyone to make its acquaintance and to follow it Sharia (law) as we call upon them to adopt it as a religion and to abide by its teachings whether on the personal, political or community level (Khomeini, 1988).

The origins and development of Hezbollah represent a successful example of Iran's efforts to export its Islamic revolution beyond its boarders. Hezbollah declared its allegiance to Iran and the Ayatollah Khomeini; however, it is not a monolithic body totally subservient to Iran. Rather it is a coalition of Lebanese Shiite clerics each of whom have their own views and networks of followers as well as ties to Iran's clerical establishment. Iran has been one of the most consistent sources of external support for Hezbollah in terms of bureaucratic

[260] Other examples of Iranian backed attacks in Lebanon include: In April 1983, A truck loaded with explosives blew up in from of the American embassy in Beirut. Sixty-one were killed and 120 injured. On October 23, 1984 The headquarters of the U.S. Marines in Beirut was destroyed in a suicide attack by Iran's terrorist surrogates, resulting in 241 deaths. In March 1984, William Buckley, an American citizen living in Lebanon, was abducted by Iranian terrorist surrogates. He was secretly taken to Tehran, were he was killed in 1985 by the Revolutionary Guards. December 3, 1984 Peter Kilburn, a librarian at the American University of Beirut, was abducted by Iran's terrorist surrogates and killed in 1986. May 22, 1985 Michel Seurat, a French writer, was kidnapped by Mullahs agents in Lebanon. He was murdered three years later by the hostage-takers. June 1985, A TWA Boeing 127 was hijacked en rout to Rome and was diverted to Beirut. One of the passengers on board was a diver in the U.S. Navy and was executed by the hijackers. On July 31, 1989 Colonel William Higgins, an American officer working for the United Nations in Lebanon, was abducted and executed by the Iranian regime's agents.

links, operational support, finances, and political guidance. However, as Graham Fuller (1990) has noted, "Iran provided Hezbollah with material, ideological, and spiritual support but directed it not towards Shiite political goals in Lebanon but Iran's geopolitical enemies Israel and the United States." Iran provides Hezbollah with approximately $100 million annually and supplies it with an array of arms, mostly via the Damascus airport. Hezbollah's operational infrastructure was developed, almost entirely, with extensive Iranian backing. This aid included financial support, transportation of weapons, and training the organization's activists.[261] The Iranian Revolutionary Guards are still deployed in Lebanon and still provide support to Hezbollah. This support includes both financial and military support; the Iranians have significantly built up Hezbollah's military and operational capabilities.[262]

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[261] In addition to the Iranian aid, over the years, Hezbollah has strived to establish additional financial sources all over the world as follows: Fundraising in Lebanon and worldwide: Hezbollah raises millions of dollars a year in Lebanon and around the world (particularly among the Shiite Muslim communities). The money in Lebanon is raised through the "Assistance to the Islamic Resistance Fund", which belongs to Hezbollah. Worldwide, the fundraisers operate through charitable funds and local Shiite community centers. Legitimate business activities: Alongside commercial companies that belong to Hezbollah or to its charitable organizations, Hezbollah activists are also involved in an array of legitimate business activities, such as the oil trade, real-estate, and small businesses. Criminal activities in Lebanon and worldwide: Hezbollah activists are involved in two main fields – narcotics and counterfeiting. The organization's activists also deal in cigarettes, car theft, and credit card fraud. Receipt of part of the Lebanese government's budget: Hezbollah's parliamentary faction, government ministers, and representatives in the municipalities are able to obtain Lebanese government funding for financing projects within the Shiite population centers in Lebanon. "Terrorist and organized crime groups in the tri-border area (TBA) of South America", *Federal Research Division, Library of Congress*, July 2003. See also http://www.canadafreepress.com/2006/hagmann071806.htm; http://www.adl.org/learn/extremism_in_the_news/Islamic_Terrorism/Hezbollah_Mahmoud_Kourani.htm; *Police link Ecuador drug ring to Hezbollah - Authorities bust operation suspected of financing Muslim group* (http://msnbc.msn.com/id/8312121); "Paraguay: Daily Reports More Evidence of Barakat's Contributions to Hezbollah", *Asuncion ABC Color (Internet Version)* Tuesday, May 28, 2002; "Romanian Intelligence Report Cites Hezbollah, Islamic Liberation Party Activity" *Bucharest Ziua in Romanian* 13 Feb 02 p.7 (ZIUA Wednesday, February 13, 2002)

[262] Over the years, large quantities of top-quality weapons have been transferred to Hezbollah, including: advanced anti-tank missiles, katyusha rockets, cannons and various anti-aircraft missiles, SA-14 and SA-7 shoulder missiles, small-scale naval warfare equipment, ultra lights, UAVs, and advanced weapons systems such as ground-to-ground long range rockets. Iran financed Hezbollah with approximately $100 million in the 1980s (Wege, 1994: 158). Taheri (1994:116), Wege (1994:158) both noted that Iran used bank accounts in Austria and Switzerland to transfer funds to Hezbollah. In 1989 the amount was reported to be between 3 and 10 million per-month. See: Tally Kritzman. 2000, August 29. "Arrest of Hezbollah Supporters in the U.S.A: Successful anti-terrorist action or a drop in the bucket?". International Institute for Counter Terrorism. http://www.ict.org.il/articles/articledet.cfm?articleid=129. See also: Zohar Palti and Matthew Levitt. Special policy forum report Hezbollah's west bank foothold, June,18 2004; Zvi Bar'el, 'Nothing like spending the war

Iran began charting a more pragmatic course in international relations after the death of the Ayatollah Khomeini and vowed it would no longer export terrorism and make a considerable effort to work within international institutions. The ideological change in Iran's top leadership was mirrored in Hezbollah's leadership (Richard Norton 1991). After the death of the Ayatollah Khomeini and as soon President Rafsanjani consolidated his power as the Iranian President, he called for openness and the relaxation of Iran's relations with the West. Simultaneously, Hezbollah's leadership urged the party to seek a foothold in the Lebanese political system and to reach out to political leaders outside the fundamentalist camp (Martin 1990; Martin 1997). Hezbollah's leadership held that it was impossible for them to wage jihad against the West when Iran itself was calling for a truce. They advocated rapprochement with other fundamentalist and non-fundamentalist movements and favored emerging into the mainstream of Lebanese politics. Hezbollah rationalized its decision to enter Lebanon's parliament by arguing that its members had been elected by the people and had not been appointed by the government. After 1992, Hezbollah argued that working from the inside the Lebanese political institutions allow it to influence change and monitor events.[263]

However, as Iranian politics change so does Hezbollah. For example, when the right-wing ideologue, Ahmadinejad became President, he helped facilitate the Second Israeli-

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in Beirut,' Haaretz, February 19, 2003. In his book "*Axis of evil – Iran, Hezbollah and Palestinian terrorism*", Shaul Shai calculated the number of attacks carried out by Shiite terrorists and Iranian entities between 1980 and 1999. According to the information, 260 terrorist attacks were carried out in the international arena (excluding terrorist attacks in Lebanon and the Iran/Iraq war) with the following distribution: Kidnapping hostages – 67 attacks; hijacking/blowing up airplanes – 12 attacks; detonating explosive devices and vehicle bombs – 82 attacks; assassinations – 97 attacks

[263] Schweitzer, Y. "Suicide Terrorism: Development and Main Characteristics" in Countering Suicide Terrorism, ICT & ADL, 2002; Shay, S. Terror in the Service of the Imam – 20 Years of Shi'ite Terrorism. The International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism, The Interdisciplinary Center, Herzliya. 2001, pp. 65-66; Danny Stone, TV series "100 Years of Terror" – Chapter 4 – The Hezbollah and Acts of International Terror; Shay, S. & Schweitzer, Y. "Al Aqsa Intifada Strategies of Asymmetric Confrontation", Faultlines Writings on Conflict Resolution. Bulwork Books and The Institute for Conflict Management, 2001

Lebanese War. It is interesting that Nasrallah makes sure to emphasize that Hezbollah is primarily an independent Lebanese movement with only a religious affiliation to Iran. However, the leadership contradicts itself. In an interview he gave to the Iranian newspaper *Al-Sharq*, Ali Akbar Mohtashemi[264] addressed the relationship between Hezbollah and Iran. He stated that "Hezbollah is part of the Iranian ruler-ship; Hezbollah is a central component of the Iranian military and security establishment; the ties between Iran and Hezbollah are far greater than that those between a revolutionary regime with a revolutionary party or organization outside its borders."[265]

During the last twenty-seven years, the international community has seen Iran emerge as an ideological hegemon that has significantly influenced domestic politics and Shiite Muslim movements worldwide. The most successful Shiite movement that it has facilitated has been Hezbollah. Iran has exerted its ideological hegemony via their epistemic influence. Iran uses its revolutionary guards as covers to spread its ideological influence. An Islamic epistemic community is a transnational group of believers with shared Islamic values and beliefs. Iranian epistemic influence has been the source of political and moral direction of Hezbollah, and, in turn, it has influenced and changed Lebanese society. Sebenius (1992) and Adler and Haas (1992) argue that members of epistemic communities are transnational groups that have a common set of principled and causal beliefs, but they also have shared notions of validity and a shared policy goal(s). In this sense the Iranian Revolutionary

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[264] One of the founders of Hezbollah, former Iranian ambassador to Syria and Lebanon, and former Iranian Minister of Interior

[265] Regarding Nasrallah's statement that his organization maintains ties with Syria and Iran, but is independent,seehttp://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3307177,00.html. Mohtashemi interview can be found in http://www.memri.org.il/memri/LoadArticlePage.asp?language=Hebrew&enttype=4&entid=2037 A similar description was published in "Al-Sharq Al-Awsat" in May 2006. The newspaper quoted an Iranian figure who told a group of Western statesmen in London that Iran attributes great importance to Hezbollah and that the organization "is one of the elements of our strategic security. It serves as an Iranian front line of defense against Israel. We do not agree that it needs to be disarmed"

Guard's objective was the spreading of the Islamic Shiite beliefs. Haas (1992) defines epistemic communities as networks of professionals with recognized expertise in a particular field. The Iranian Revolutionary Guards consist of many types of individuals. They are not only armed individuals, but they are also a network of professors, doctors, and engineers who have control over knowledge and information and are sharing that knowledge with Shiite movements world wide. Iranian sponsored epistemic communities facilitate learning, negotiation, ideological development, and they deepen individual and collective societal knowledge on Shi'ism. J. Habermas (1984: 34) argues that the impact an epistemic community has depends on a variety of factors, including the number and strength of the social movements it can "catch" in its "net" of consensual understandings; in other words, the more extensive the reach of an epistemic community, the greater its power and influence. Hezbollah's military, ideological, social, and political successes have been the direct result of Iranian ideological influence. Based on all of this, it can be logically concluded that the resources and ideological support Iran provides is positively associated with Lebanese fundamentalism, specifically Hezbollah.

Leadership as a Resource

Hezbollah, like Hamas, is headed by a collective leadership, leadership being a significant resource on the movement level.[266] Aldon Morris (1984) argues that movement leadership is an important and complex phenomenon that affects the origins and outcomes of social movements. Hezbollah's leadership is a very complex phenomenon that has facilitated its origins and has had a major impact on its development and success. Hezbollah is led by a seventeen member Shura Council which is elected by the Shiite Central Council, an assembly

[266] For the structure of Hezbollah see: Nasrallah interview, *Al-Wasat* May 13. 2000; Hezbollah: Identity and Goals: www.Hizbollah.org; Hamzeh 1993, 2000, 1997a, 1997b, 2004; Martin Marty and Scott Appleby (1993), Fundamentalism and the State; Jeffrey Goldberg. 2002, October 14. In The Party of God, *The New Yorker*

of almost two hundred party founders, for a period of three years (Hamzer 2004: 45). The council consists of fifteen Lebanese members and two Iranian members representing Iran's interests within Hezbollah. The leadership apparatus consists mostly of clergy, along with a few lay members.[267] The Council is responsible for the movement's operations on each of its three levels (social, political and military) and it is aware of all the movement's activities, and it is responsible for running all of the Hezbollah's components. Decisions made by the Council are reached either unanimously or by majority vote. In case of deadlock, matters are referred to *Wali al-Faqih Ali Akbar* in Iran who is the supreme jurist (Hamzah 1993). Also, the Council's decisions are always implemented. The actual operation of the party is entrusted to a General Secretariat headed by a General Secretary and his deputy. These are usually members of the Supreme Shura Council (Hamzer 2004: 48).

The next level of Hezbollah's leadership consists of four Organs. The first Organ is the Politburo. The Politburo consists of 15 members and consists of the Enforcement, Recruitment, and Propaganda offices. This Organ plays a significant role in the reinforcement of Hezbollah's doctrines and contributes extensively to the recruitment of Shiites to join Hezbollah and control the Hezbollah media empire.[268] The second organ is

[267] The lay members or the non-Ulama have to demonstrate faith in the fields of health, social affairs, and finance and information services. Until 1989, the ratio of clerics to laity in the Shura Council's makeup was six to one. When the party opened up to increased representation of the laity's rank and file after the 1989 Ta'if Agreement, the ratio become four clerics to three laity. However, the 2001 election of the Shura Council represented a shift back to a six-to-one ration in favor of the clerics. The current Shura Council was elected in August of 2004 and the previous elections took place in July of 2001. The majority of the members currently on the Shura Council have been serving on the Council alongside Nasrallah since the early 1990's. Currently, all of its members, except the head of the Jihad Council Imad Mugniyah, are religious scholars.

[268] See: Hamzer, 2004: 58-61: the research and propaganda section runs two radio stations, *Sawt al-Iman* (Voice of Faith) and *Sawt al Nidal* (Voice of Struggle), and one television station called *al-Manar* (the Beacon). In addition, there are two publications: *al-Ahed* (the party's main mouthpiece), which appears weekly, and the *al-Bilad*, which appears monthly. Hezbollah operates a media empire, in comparison to other terror organizations. The leaders of the organization, who are aware of the power of rhetoric and the media on public opinion and the enlistment of activists, operate a number of mass media means: Al Manar (The Beacon) television - The main mouthpiece of the organization which is televised via satellite to millions of viewers worldwide. In December

Jihad al-Bina' (Holy Reconstruction Organ) and it provides all of the social service support associated with Hezbollah (Hamzah 1993).

The third organ is the Security Organ and is divided into three sections. The Party Security section is in charge of protecting party leaders and members. The Central Security section operates a network of surveillance and intelligence-gathering operations inside and outside the Lebanon. The Operational Security section concentrates on the planning of international security, specifically against Hezbollah's enemies.[269] The fourth organ is the Combat Organ, which is composed of two main sections: the Islamic Resistance (*al-Muqawamah al-Islamiyyah*), and the Islamic Holy War (*al-Jihad al-Islami*) (Hamzah 1993). While the first one was in charge of suicidal attacks against Western and Israeli targets, the second one leads more conventional attacks against Israeli troops in south Lebanon. The Combat Organ is under the direct supervision of the Shura Council. *Al-Muqawamah al-Islamiyyah* is not an independent combat army; rather, it is composed of members who are combatants in times of need, combatants who return to their normal occupation when not required. This makes it virtually impossible to attack Hezbollah's soldiers, and in order to do so Hezbollah's enemies would have to strike significant numbers of the population, as shown last year in the Israeli-Hezbollah War. The following two pages contain two diagrams; the first shows the structure of Hezbollah's leadership hierarchy and the second shows the interconnectedness of Iranian ideological and financial assistance to Hezbollah and its leadership hierarchy.

2004, France banned the station's broadcasts by satellite in France, a week later; the United States also declared that the station was broadcasting propaganda in support of terrorism.

[269] Al-Shira (1992, 12-13), Al-Ahed (1992, 5), Faksh (1993, 77) argue that Iran donated $90 million to the Security Organ of Hezbollah. However, after 1989 Iran cut its financial assistance to Hezbollah to upwards of 90%, the party's leadership has lowered the activity of this organ to the minimum requirements needed for the protection of the party leaders

Hezbollah's Internal Structure



***The Above diagram is based on A. Nizar Hamzeh's diagram. Hamzeh, Nizar. 1993. Lebanon's Hezbollah: from Islamic Revolution to Parliamentary Accommodation. *Third Word Quarterly*.

Iranian Ideological Influence with Hezbollah



Humanitarian Aid and Electoral Success

During the last fifteen years of elections, Hezbollah put a significant amount of effort and money in wooing the lower socioeconomic Lebanese class. The Hezbollah hierarchy correctly assumed it would have mere success with more social services it provides. In this sense, Hezbollah is acting differently than most social movements. Most Shiites feel that Hezbollah has provided valuable services, and it has ranged from employment and education to provision of public utilities, to distribution of food, and the construction of houses, hospitals, and clinics. Furthermore, the Financial Aid Committee of Hezbollah, which works closely with *Muasassat al-Shaheed* (The Martyr's Foundation), spent over $90 million from 1982 to 1986 on the needs of dependents of persons killed or wounded in fighting the Lebanese civil war and Israel (Harik 1994 37-38).

Through its community-action networks, mosques, schools, job training centers, hospitals, and clubs Hezbollah has been able to mobilize tens of thousands of Shiites to its cause. Also, Hezbollah has managed to increase its membership via its *Al-Hawzat al-'ilmiyyah* (circles of learning) where it goes into the community and recruits young and poor individuals to join the movement. A movement's size and membership numbers is a significant resource. Furthermore, Hezbollah has its Holy Reconstruction Organ which provides significant social-service support. For example, Hezbollah's Islamic Health Committee has established numerous hospitals, clinics, civil defense centers, and pharmacies, free of charge to the Lebanese masses. SPIHC (1989) pointed out that in the hospital (*Dar al-Hawra'*) for women and children, over 59,255 women and 10,490 children are examined and treated every year. Hezbollah maintains that the Lebanese government does not care about the socioeconomically deprived population within Lebanon. Because of this,

Hezbollah has had to tackle poverty itself and in doing so, it embarked on and succeeded in an ambitious enterprise to build an entire social welfare infrastructure for the Shiite community. Furthermore, it is currently in the process of rebuilding that social welfare infrastructure because it was destroyed during last year's Israeli-Hezbollah war. The following tables show the extent of Hezbollah's humanitarian aid:

Table Eighteen: Hezbollah's Humanitarianism 1983-1987[270]

	Location	Date
Hospitals		
1. Khomeini Hospital	Ba'albek-Biqa	1986
2. Dar al-Hawra' for women and children	Beirut-southern suburbs	1986
Infirmaries (Mustawsaf)	*Beirut-Southern Suburbs*	
1. al-Imam al-Rida	Madi str.	1983
2. al-Imam al-Hasan	Farhat str.	1985
3. al-Imam al-Husayn	al-Karamah str.	1985
4. al-Imam al-Sadik	Beir Hasan	1985
5. Sayyid al-Shuhada</TD	Burj al-Barajnah	1985
6. al-Imam Ali	Laylaki str.	1986
7. al-Imam al-Khui	Khaldah Blvd.	1986
8. al-Sayyida Zaynab	al-Jinah	1987
Infirmaries (Mustawsaf)	*South Lebanon*	
1. al-Imam Hasan Bin Ali	Tayrdabbah	1985
2. al-Imam Husayn Bin Ali	Ayteet	1985
3. al-Imam al-Mahdi	al-Ghaziyyah	1986
4. al-Imam al-Hadi	Khurbat Sulum	1986
5. al-Imam al-Rida	Ayn Buswar	1986
6. Mobile Infirmaries	Servics 12 villages next to the Israeli security belt zone	1986
Infirmaries (Mustawsaf)	*Biqa*	
1. Mustawsaf Mashghara	Mashghara	1985
2. Mustawsaf Suhmur	Suhmur	1985
3. Mustawsaf Ayn al-Tinah	Ayn al-Tinah	1986
Dental Clinics	*Beirut-Southern Suburbs*	
1. al-Ghubairi Clinic	Al-Ghubairi Main str.	1987
2. Harat Hurayk Clinic	Harat Hurayk Main str.	1987
Pharmacies		
1. al-Shaheed (the Martyr) 1	Beirut-Burj Abu Haydar	1985
2. al-Shaheed 2	Southern Suburbs	1987
3. al-Shaheed 3	Southern Suburbs	1987
Civil Defence Centres		
1. Main Headquarters	Soutehrn Suburbs--Beir al-Abed	1985
2. Branch 1	Southern Suburbs—al-Sheyah	1986
3. Branch 2	Beirut--Burj Abu Haydar	1985
4. Branch 3	South Lebanon—Ayn Buswar	1986
5. Branch 4	South Lebanon—Khurbat Sulum	1986
6. Branch 5	South Lebanon—al-Ghaziyyah	1987

[270] The information contained in this table came from the reports concerning Hezbollah's Islamic Health Committee services during the Civil War and right after. *Al-Ahed*. August 1989. Also see: Nizar Hamzeh. 1993. Lebanon's Hezbollah: From Islamic revolution to Parliamentary Accommodation. *Third World Quarterl*

Table Nineteen: Projects Implemented by Hezbollah from 1988-2002[271]

Type	Under Construction	Built and/or Rehabilitated
Schools	11	24
Private Homes	3	9640
Small businesses/shops	0	800
Hospitals	3	2
Infirmaries	5	3
Mosques	44	56
Cultural Centers	5	3
Agricultural Centers	7	0

As a result of the significant aid Hezbollah provides the Lebanese Shiite community, it has become the most successful political movement in the history of Lebanon. Hezbollah's victory in the May - June 2006 elections raised its representation in the Lebanese Parliament to 11 representatives and 25 additional representatives in its coalition bloc with the country's other main Shiite party, the Amal Movement. Every election, since 1992, Hezbollah has formed an impressive and organized electoral campaign with headquarters swarming with volunteers.[272] Hezbollah's electoral campaigns are grass-roots movements composed of party members and thousands of party workers; both males and females volunteer their time and work day and night contacting voters and transporting them to voting centers.

[271] Figures found in Ahmad Nizar Hamzeh 2004: page 50-51. Data was originally obtained from the Holy Struggle Construction Foundation: Its Twelfth Spring: 1988-2000 (Beirut: Jihad al-Bina, 2002)

[272] During the 1992 and 1994 elections it was reported that they were under the direct supervision of Iran (Dekmejian 1997; al-Hudd 1993; al-Bayan 1994; al-Habashi 1994). Furthermore, it was also reported that a number of Iranian secret intelligence specialists supervised the election. As it related to the 1992 elections, Nizar Hamzeh (1993) reported that Hezbollah's security apparatus was active monitoring every move inside and outside the polling booths. She said that Hezbollah's security interfered numerous times with voters, making sure they had the correct ballot cards and forcibly made voters vote for Hezbollah candidates. Furthermore, the same reports cited by Hamzeh (1993) said that Hezbollah's Security bribed employees in government departments in various electoral districts to release hundreds of identification cards of dead people, which were used for voting by Hezbollah's members. Whether these reports are true or not, the fact remains that no Lebanese political party or traditional leader has ever created as effective an electoral machine as that of Hezbollah.

Up until 2006, Hezbollah refused to accept a cabinet position or even cast a vote of confidence for a government because, as the movement saw it, it was bound by God's laws, not human laws. Politically, Hezbollah argued that it stayed out of the Lebanese cabinet because it would have to defend decisions that might be unfavorable or contradictory to the party's interest. Such decisions include ending the resistance to Israel, disarming the party and their Islamic Resistance movement, and peace negotiations and normalization with Israel. This all changed after the 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah War. After 2006, the Hezbollah leadership changed the movement's platform and decided to take part in the Lebanese cabinet. Musawi (the current General Secretary) said the party's decision to take part in the Cabinet did not mean less focus on its goals as a resistance group: "There is no conflict between taking on more political responsibility on the internal political arena and keeping up the resistance work. The group will maintain its resistance, and its readiness to face any Israeli aggression as long as the Zionist danger is there." Nizar Hamzeh (2007), a Lebanese Hezbollah expert, argues that the party cannot afford to be left out of the cabinet because it is under international pressure to disarm and it needs to be in the center of what is going on. It would be very dangerous for them not to participate.[273] Therefore, it can be argued that Hezbollah is acting rationally, just as the resource mobilization theorists predict for social movements.

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[273] Report by Javad Montazeri "In Interviews With Experts 'Extended' Discusses Iran and the Developments in Lebanon," *E'temad* (reformist daily published in Tehran), March 14, 2005; Michael Herzog, "The Hezbollah Conundrum," The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Watch, No. 981, March 29, 2005, at http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05. php?CID=2286; "Fadlallah Tells Al-Nahar: The Shiites Are Not Sectarian and Not Inside a Shell, But They Have Priorities; Weapon of the Resistance Is Necessary and Will Be Removed Once Danger of Israeli Aggression Is Over", Al-Nahar, March 25, 2005; "Lebanon, a New Stage" program, featuring an interview with Ibrahim Amin al-Sayyid, head of Hezbollah's Political Council, by Ghassan Bin-Jiddu, in Beirut - Al-Jazirah, March 10, 2005; Ra'uf Shahuri, 'Plan B in the Battle of Disarming Hezbollah,' Beirut Al-Anwar, 27 May 27, 2005; Adnan El-Ghoul, Nasrallah reveals Hezbollah's strategy of political alliance, , June 6, 2005; Majdoline Hatoum, 'Hezbollah: Politics, resistance don't conflict,' Daily Star, June 18, 2005.

Part of the reason for Hezbollah's political domination in the Lebanese parliament is that Lebanon has a candidate-centered electoral system and not a political party-based electoral system. This means that the Lebanese political party system is highly decentralized, and Hezbollah has managed to dominate it because it is a party-centered movement. Prior to Hezbollah, the Lebanese parliament was highly chaotic and a strong executive emerged, like most individual-based electoral systems. Hezbollah has changed this by facilitating organization and coalition-building within the parliament, hence decreasing the power of the executive. This is inherently different from both the Egyptian and Palestinian political party systems, both of which are political party based. In this sense, Hezbollah's organization and structure is a major resource when compared to the other political parties in the Lebanese political system.

Hezbollah urges that Lebanon must adopt an Islamic government; however, it insists that an Islamic government cannot be imposed by force. The question of implementing an Islamic government has been tied to the idea of majoritarian democracy where the majority rules. Hezbollah sees a majoritarian democracy as a perfect political system because it is guaranteed electoral victory because it represents the religious majority within Lebanon. Hezbollah's Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah said: "I do not wish an Islamic state by force or violence, rather we prefer to wait for the day that we succeed in convincing our countrymen – by means of dialogue and in an open atmosphere – that the only alternative id the founding of an Islamic state" (Shanahan, 2005: 126). According to Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) social movements facilitate democracy. I do not think they were taking about the majoritarian democracy Hezbollah supports; however Hezbollah has facilitated democracy and transparent democratic institutions within Lebanon. Furthermore, as argued

by Shaykh Qasim: “If Islam becomes the choice of the majority, only then will it be implemented. If not it will continue to coexist with others on the basis of mutual understanding, using peaceful and political means to reach peaceful solutions and that is how the case should be to the non-Islamists as well” (Hamzed, 2004; 29).

Based on the historical story I told concerning Lebanon’s history and the formation and success Hezbollah has had with vote-seeking, it can be concluded that Lebanon has never been a perfect autocracy and as a result of this, it has had significant and consecutive numbers of fundamentalist movements. The number of fundamentalist movements reached its peak during the Lebanese civil war. This being said, my inverted-U hypothesis concerning opining political institutions, demonstrated in chapter three, is further validated with Lebanon. The following table compares the total number of fundamentalist movements, terrorist attacks, and suicide terrorist attacks in Egypt, the Palestinian territories, and Lebanon.

Table Twenty: Comparison of Lebanon, Egypt, and Palestine

Year	Egypt	Palestine	Lebanon	Terrorist Attacks in Egypt	Suicide Terrorist Attacks in Egypt	Terrorist Attacks in Palestine	Suicide Terrorist Attacks in Palestine	Terrorist Attacks in Lebanon	Suicide Terrorist Attacks in Lebanon
1970	12	19	15	0	0	0	0	8	0
1973	17	23	22	0	0	0	0	12	0
1976	15	28	47	0	0	0	0	16	0
1979	16	30	53	0	0	2	0	13	0
1980	18	31	53	0	0	1	0	16	0
1985	14	34	66	0	0	7	0	80	10
1988	16	39	74	6	0	0	0	29	2
1991	14	32	64	1	0	2	0	6	1
1994	13	29	38	16	0	5	0	14	0
1997	18	27	29	2	0	1	0	2	0
2000	16	31	25	0	0	167	0	2	0
2001	16	33	25	0	0	326	7	8	0
2002	15	33	25	1	0	432	16	21	0
2003	16	34	25	0	0	164	6	10	0
2004	19	33	25	3	0	351	9	3	0
2005	23	39	25	7	2	479	9	23	0
2006	23	42	26	2	1	26	1	9	0
2007	26	52	27	2	0	16	0	1	0

In conclusion

The development of the Hezbollah includes six different stages: First; the *Creation Stage* (between 1975 and 1982): during this stage, different Shiite movements formed and worked independently within the context of the Lebanese civil war and attacked more organized and centralized Sunni and Christian factions. Second, the *Establishment Stage* (1982 and 1983): during this stage there was extreme violence and significant acts of terrorism toward not only toward Sunnis and Christians but also toward Israeli occupation forces. During this stage Iran took an active role in financing and organizing the different Shiite movements. Third, the *Consolidation Stage* (between 1983 and 1985): during this stage the ideological framework of Hezbollah was established and small Shiite movements

started merging together; Iran expanded its financial and ideological interference while providing significant weaponry. Fourth, the *Expansion Stage* (between 1986 and 1991): during this stage Hezbollah started its humanitarian campaign toward the Shiite masses negatively affected by the civil war and began to institutionalize itself. The radical violence continued simultaneously, peaking at the end of the 1980s. Fifth, the *Institutionalized Stage* (between 1992 and 2000): during this stage Hezbollah institutionalized itself and integrated itself into the Lebanese political system while also institutionalizing its charitable institutions. Sixth, the *Regional Actor Stage* (Between 2001 and present): during this stage Hezbollah become a significant actor in the Islamic world, much of this is the result of its military success over Israel. Finally, Hezbollah's organizational structure is based on three different branches that sustain each other: military, political, and social service provider.

The goal of my dissertation is to determine the causes of Islamic fundamentalism and in doing so I show that an Islamic fundamentalist movement is inherently a social movement. In the previous two chapters I was able to show that each of the social movement conditions found in my fundamentalist labyrinth is positively associated with the rise and success of Egyptian and Palestinian fundamentalist movements. In this chapter I was able to reconfirm these results as it relates to Lebanese fundamentalism, specifically Hezbollah, which has become the most significant Shiite fundamentalist movement in the Islamic world. However, as compared to Hamas and the Egyptian and Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood movements, Hezbollah acts significantly less like a social movement. But, Hezbollah is still an important case-study in the sense that it helps show how each of my fundamentalist labyrinth's social movement conditions are positively associated with Lebanese fundamentalism. Also, the historical story I told here is important because it shows the evolutionary development of the

Lebanese Shiites, which ultimately leads to their radicalization and then the formation of Hezbollah. This historical story is different from the one I told concerning Hamas. With Hamas, I was able to show how Islamic fundamentalist movements evolve and develop from other fundamentalist movements. With Hezbollah, the historical story has nothing to do with the evolution and development of fundamentalist movements but instead the evolution and development of the Lebanese Shiites. Finally, I evaluated three ways in which Hezbollah acts differently than most social movements; first, they have formed a political party and have had significant vote-seeking success. Secondly, Hezbollah provides social services to the Lebanese Shiite community and this social service apparatus has catapulted its political success. Finally, Hezbollah has the weapons capability and military technology equal to many developing states – no social movement has such advanced weaponry, including Hamas and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood.

Chapter Seven: Conclusion

In the last two decades we have seen a significant surge in the number of Islamic fundamentalist movements, and there has not been a concise reason as to why. I began this project with the goal of determining the causes of Islamic fundamentalism, and, in so showing that an Islamic fundamentalist movement is inherently a social movement. I have done so. Each of the social movement conditions found in my fundamentalist labyrinth is positively associated with Islamic fundamentalism. In other words, I have been able to determine what phenomena exist within the nation-state that facilitate Islamic fundamentalism. Based on this, it is safe to assume that my dissertation is substantially important.

To determine the causes of Islamic fundamentalism it is best to employ a labyrinth analogy, and it consists of four social movement conditions. The four conditions that make up my fundamentalist labyrinth can be found in the four social movement literatures, and they include: resources associated with resource mobilization theory; opening political institutions as associated with political process theory; socioeconomic inequality associated with Marxism; and the ideas, be they religious or freedom of thought, associated with new social movement theory. Not one of the four social movement literatures acknowledges, or is able to explain Islamic fundamentalism. Taken as a whole, each plays a vital role in my fundamentalist labyrinth. Social movement theorists have excluded Islamic social movements, specifically Islamic fundamentalism, from each of their respective sub-fields because they do not fit into any one of their theories. However, by merging the different theories to form a new theory in the social movement literature, I have been able to explain the causes of Islamic fundamentalism.

Furthermore, I have created the first dataset that contains every Islamic fundamentalist movement that is or has been in operation from 1970 through 2006. The fundamentalist dataset has a total N (total number of fundamentalist groups) of 16,072 and a total number of unique fundamentalist movements of 983. With this dataset I was able to determine what state-level phenomena are positively associated with Islamic fundamentalism. Also, with each case-study I was able to show three different ways in which fundamentalist movements form. Hamas is the result of an evolutionary process where fundamentalist movements evolve and develop over time. The formation of Hezbollah has nothing to do with movement evolution; instead it is the result of the evolution of the Shiite people and their eventual radicalization. Finally, the formation of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood has nothing to do with movement evolution or evolution and radicalization of the Egyptian masses. Instead, its formation is the result of significant changes in the sociopolitical and socioeconomic Egyptian institutions. Each fundamentalist movement forms in a different way; the process does not matter in the eventual outcome. What matters is the presence of each of my social movement labyrinth conditions, all of which ultimately are facilitating Islamic fundamentalism.

The first condition found within my fundamentalist labyrinth is Marxism. Karl Marx was correct when he argues that individuals get involved in collective action when their social class has reached its breaking point; they will then unite against their antagonists and forcibly change both the socioeconomic and sociopolitical intuitions. Thus, from Marx we see how the power of the politically powerless and economically deprived is rooted in their ability to stop the smooth flow of social life. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the acts of Islamic fundamentalist movements. Socioeconomic inequality is positively associated

with the number and strength of Islamic fundamentalist movements. Specifically, high percentages of unemployment and poverty are positively associated with Islamic fundamentalism. This was confirmed with the fundamentalist movements in Egypt, Palestine, and Lebanon. A significant aspect of Marxism is his theory of *relative deprivation*. This is exactly what is going on in the Islamic world. Education helps the masses recognize they are being deprived of socioeconomic and sociopolitical equality and freedom, and they either turn to or join Islamic fundmantalist movements as they did in Egypt. On the other hand, the catalysts for the lower classes to collectively act are the Islamic fundamentalists who understand relative deprivation and who provide the lower classes spiritual, financial, and educational support.

The second condition in my fundamentalist labyrinth consists of the resources associated with the Resource Mobilization theory. Resources are positively associated with Islamic fundamentalism. At its foundation, resource mobilization theory encompasses the idea that resources make a difference to the mobilization and success of social movements. I define resources as money and population; however, I deviate from the traditional resource mobilization theorists to also include education and leadership as resources. Arguably, there is not a more valuable resource than that of a nation-state's educational level, especially in the Islamic world. In other words, the higher the education level within the nation-state, the more fundamentalist groups is existence. This was confirmed in Egypt, Lebanon, and Palestine. Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood each facilitate literacy and education.

The third condition in my fundamentalist labyrinth is the degree of openness of the political institutions associated with the political process theory. The key foundations of

political process theory includes the importance that political institutions play in facilitating social movements, and the idea that participation in protest activities can lead to increased representation. Many political process theorists argue that collective action arises as a result of an individual's grievances, discontent, and frustration toward their government and state institutions. This is especially true in the Islamic world because Westernization, modernization, Americanization, poverty, socioeconomic inequality, and lack of democracy all help facilitate Islamic collective behavior, specifically the rise and success of Islamic fundamentalists. I was able to show that both perfect democracies and perfect autocracies have fewer fundamentalist movements while states with opening political institutions have more fundamentalist movements. Also, when governments disdainfully kill or torture their citizens without regard to basic human rights, there will be a decrease in the number Islamic fundamentalist movements. On the other hand, the more freedom of speech a nation-state has, the fewer fundamentalist movements it has. There is an inverted-U shaped relationship with the number and success of Islamic fundamentalist movements; the number of movements is the strongest in systems which are neither perfect democracies nor perfect autocracies. In other words, there are more fundamentalist movements in the middle of the political spectrum. This was verified in the Sadat and Mubarak presidencies in Egypt, the Palestinian territories, and Lebanon, the latter experiencing the most Islamic fundamentalist movements and happening to have the most open political institutions as compared to Egypt and Palestine.

The final condition in my fundamentalist labyrinth are variables associated with the new social movement theory. There is a positive relationship between the presence of ideas and Islamic fundamentalism. New social movement theorists argue that social movement

participants are looking to enhance the quality of life for all sectors of society and that membership in social movements fall into two categories: those who are paying the costs of modernization and those who have been marginalized by the development of the welfare state and the new middle class. Also, the rise and success of the Religious-Right plays an integral part in the new social movement literature; arguably, it is a pillar of the literature itself. The first category is the case for Islamic movements. Modernization via Westernization and Americanization are helping to facilitate the rise of Islamic fundamentalist movements. One major similarity between the European/American Religious Right and Islamic fundamentalism is that both share the idea of religion and believe in the lack of secularism in everyday life, specifically in the sociopolitical and socioeconomic institutions. Furthermore, the new social movement scholars challenge the conventional division of politics into left and right and broaden the definition of politics to include issues that had been considered outside the domain of politics; this is apparent in Islamic social movements. New social movement participants are interested in intangible goods that would enhance the quality of life for all sectors of society. This is also the objective of Islamic fundamentalists. Furthermore, the radical/religious right acts as an outside ideological influence in the creation and duration of some European and North American social movements and politics. There are three significant outside ideological forces in the Islamic world that operate within Islamic nation-states: Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United States. Each is positively associated with Islamic fundamentalism. Religious freedom also plays an important role here; not only when governments restrict religious freedom do we see an increase in the number Islamic fundamentalist movements, but we also see a significant increase in terrorism. This was reconfirmed under the Sadat and Mubarak presidencies when both restricted and occupied

religious institutions. This was also seen in both Lebanon and the Palestinian territories when Israeli troops occupied mosques.

My dissertation makes significant contributions not only to the field of political science and its respective subfields of international relations and comparative politics but also to sociology, religious studies, and Islamic studies. I have added what could become a significant theory to the social movement literature; the first large-N analysis in the Islamic fundamentalism literature; and, I have married the social movement literature and the Islamic fundamentalist literature, further blurring the point of demarcation between international relations and comparative politics in the political science literature. The implications of my study are paramount because Islamic fundamentalism is currently one of the greatest threats to the modern nation-state and international politics. Finally, there are two broader implications from my dissertation; first, we now know what state-level phenomena are positively associated with Islamic fundamentalism. This, in turn means we, as a global community, can start the process of combating the violence and terrorism associated with Islamic fundaments movements. Secondly, I have provided a positive analysis of the Islamic world and hopefully facilitated greater cultural and religious awareness.

Appendix One: Variables and Coding

Total Population[274]	Population is the total population of the nation-state in question.
GDP	GDP is the gross value of all products and services produced within the nation-state per year.
Official development assistance[275]	The ODA statistics comprises grants and/or loans to developing nation-stats and/or territories.
American Financial Aid	American Financial Aid is the total amount of American financial and military aid for each nation-state included in my dissertation and for each year (thousands of U.S. dollars)
Unemployment[276]	Unemployment is the percentage of the population that is unemployed.
Poverty	Poverty is the percentage of the population that is living below their state's recognized poverty level. Again, the World Bank's data on unemployment and poverty is very limited and arguably, racist. To rectify this, I have used the CIA World Fact Book From 1989-2005 http://www.theodora.com/wfb/abc_world_fact_book.html. For data prior to 1989 I used numerous sources and they

[274] Population, GDP, and ODA statistics were obtained from the World Bank Development Statistics. The World Bank draws on a Varity of sources for the statistics published in the World Development Indicators. They include the World Bank, the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, and from country reports to the World Bank. Bank staff estimates are also used to improve correctness or consistency. For most countries, national accounts estimates are obtained from member governments through World Bank economic missions. Most social data from national sources are drawn from regular administrative files, special surveys, or periodic census. The World Bank argues that considerable effort has been made to standardize the data, but full comparability cannot be assured, and care must be taken in interpreting the indicators. Data coverage may not be complete because of special circumstances for economies experiencing problems affecting the collection and reporting of data. However, the World Bank did not have any accurate statistics for the Palestinian territories; to obtain the Palestinian data I used the Palestinian Bureau of Statistics: All Palestinian data can be found at: http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/

[275] The World Bank got the ODA data from the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development/Development Assistance Committee (OECD/DAC) list of aid recipients. However, grants, loans and credits for military purposes are excluded. Also excluded are aid to more advanced developing and transition countries as determined by the DAC

[276] The world banks data on unemployment and poverty is very limited and arguably, racist. It does an excellent job at collecting data from the Christian world but seems to ignore the Muslim world. Also, data that existed in the World Bank data set was incorrect; the World Bank collects the data based on what the specific nation-states report. It is a known fact that states do not report accurately

[277] These books and articles include: Farrukh Iobal. 2006. Sustaining Gains in Poverty Reduction and Human Development in the Middle East and North Africa. World Bank Publications: NY, NY; Wassim Shahin. 2000. Earnings Inequality, Unemployment, and Poverty in the Middle East and North Africa. Greenwood Press; New York; M. El-Ghonemy. 1998. Affluence and Poverty in the Middle East. Rutledge Press; Michael Bonine. 1997. Population, Poverty, and Politics in Middle East Cities. University of Florida Press; World Bank. 2004. Unlocking the Employment Potential in the Middle East and North Africa: Toward a New Social Contract. Iranian data was obtained from: Fatemi, Khosrow. November 1980. *International Journal of Middle East Studies*. The Iranian Revolution: It's Impact on Economic relations with eh United States. Pages 303-317; James Scoville. October 1985. The Labor Market in Pre-Revolutionary Iran. Economic Development and Cultural Change. Pages 143-155; the following link looks at Iranian unemployment: www.phil.frb.org/money_in_motion/lessons/MonetaryPolicyGrades9-12.pdf; Algerian data was obtained from: Meredeth Turshen. November 2004. Armed Violence and Poverty in Algeria: A Mini Case Study for the Armed Violence and Poverty Initiative November 2004. Center for International Cooperation and Security. Pages 1-18. www.smallarmssurvey.org/files/portal/spotlight/country/nafr_pdf/mideast-algeria-2004.pdf; Abbi Kedir and Andrew Mckay. February 2005. Chronic Poverty in Urban Ethiopia" Panel Data Evidence. International Planning Studies. Pages 49-67. http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/routledg/cips/2005/00000010/00000001/art00004?crawler=true. World Bank Data article: wbln0018.worldbank.org/.../de9638da553fbfbf8525678a0070b1af/94da822c24124e0b85256b22005c3e4b?
Stefan Dercon. September 2000. Changes in Poverty and Social Indicators in Ethiopia in the 1990s. Found at: www.economics.ox.ac.uk/members/stefan.dercon/CHANGES%20IN%20POVERTY%20AND%20SOCIAL%20INDICATORS.pdf; Asmamaw Enquobahrie. March 2004. Understanding Poverty: The Ethiopian context: Paper was presented at the Gambian AAPAM Roundtable Conference in Gambia: unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/AAPAM/UNPAN025674.pdf; Terrazas, Aran Matteo. June 2007. Beyond regional Circularity: The Emergence of an Ethiopian Diaspora. www.migrationinformation.org/Profiles/display.cfm?ID=604; Francis Teal. March 2000. Employment and Unemployment in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Overview. Center for the Study of African Economies: University of Oxford. www.csae.ox.ac.uk/conferences/2000-OiA/pdfpapers/teal.PDF
Banglades Uemployment ratesee:http://banglapedia.search.com.bd/HT/U_0017.htm www.indexmundi.com/bangladesh/unemployment_rate.html; http://www.airninja.com/worldfacts/countries/Bangladesh/unemployment.htm
Iraq: CIA Reports: Iraq Eonomic Data 1989-2003: https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/general-reports-1/iraq_wmd_2004/chap2_annxD.html www.einnews.com/iraq/newsfeed-iraq-unemployment; Human Development Report. 2006. http://hdr.undp.org/hdr2006/statistics/countries/data_sheets/cty_ds_BRN.html; Bahrain: Eradicate Extreme Poverty and Hunger. http://hdr.undp.org/hdr2006/statistics/countries/data_sheets/cty_ds_BRN.html
Brunei: http://www.populstat.info/Asia/bruneig.htm; Tanzania: International Monetary Fund. September 2004. Tanzania: Poverty Reducton Strategy Paper Progress Report. https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2004/cr04282.pdf; Tanzania: https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2004/cr04282.pdf; Also used was the United Nations

	include numerous books and articles concerning Middle Eastern poverty and unemployment.[277]
Polity	Polity is a combined score that is computed by subtracting the polity autocracy score[278] from the polity democracy score[279]; the resulting unified polity score ranges from +10 (strongly democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic).[280]

Unemployment and poverty statistics at: http://unstats.un.org/unsd/cdb/cdb_series_xrxx.asp?series_code=29999; Palestinian Data: http://www.mena.gov.ps/part3/economy.htm; http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/Portals/_pcbs/mdgs/c82ccc8f-341b-487b-9ed3-eff0c0604887.pdf; Onn Winckler. 1997. Rapid Population Growth and the Fertility Policies of the Arab Countries and North Africa. Middle Eastern Natural environments. Pages 444-466. http://environment.yale.edu/documents/downloads/0-9/103winckler.pdf

[278] An eleven point Autocracy scale is constructed. The operational indicator of autocracy is derived from coding of the competitiveness of political participation, the registration of participation, the openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment, and constraints on the chef executive using the following:

Authority Coding
Competitiveness of Executive Recruitment (xrcomp)
(1) Selection +2
Openness of Executive Recruitment (xropen)
Only if xrcomp is ceded selection (1)
(1) Closed +1
(2) (2) Dual/designation +1
Constraints on Chief Executive (xconst):
(1) Unlimited authority +3
(2) Intermediate category +2
(3) Slight to moderate limitations +1
Regulation of participation (parreg)
(4) Restricted +2
(3) Sectarian +1
Competitiveness of Participation (parcomp):
(1) Repressed +2
(2) Suppressed +1

[279] The democracy indicator is an additive eleven-point scale (0-10). The operational indicator of democracy is derived from coding of the competitiveness of political participation, the openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment, and constraints of the chief executive using the following:

Competitiveness of Executive Recruitment (xrcomp)
(3) Election +2
(2) Transitional +1
Openness of Executive Recruitment (xropen)
Only if xrcomp is election (3) or transitional (2)
(3) Duel/election +1
(4) Election +1
Constraint of Chief Executive (xconst):
(7) Executive parity or subordination +4

Executive Recruitment	Executive recruitment involves the ways in which social superordinantes come to occupy their positions of political authority; how institutionalized, competitive and open are the mechanisms for selecting a political leader. Democratic systems are defined as those polities that afford their citizens the opportunity to replace their political representatives through regularly scheduled, competitive and open elections. These procedural dimensions of democracy have been captured by three key variables from the polity data set and they include: (1) the extent of institutionalization or regulation of executive transfers, (2) the competitiveness of executive selection, and (3) the openness of executive recruitment. The executive recruitment score ranges from 1 to 8. 1 being the most restricted and 8 being the most open.
Executive Constraints	Executive Constraints refers to the extent of institutional constraints on the decision-making powers of the chief executive. The degree of checks and balances between the various parts of the government is coded on a 7-point scale which ranges from the "unlimited executive authority" (1) to executive parity or subordination" (7).
Political Competition	According to Marshall and Jaggers (2005: 68) the polity dataset measures two dimensions of political competition: (1) the degree of institutionalization, or regulation, or political competition and (2) the extent of government restriction on political competition. Participation is institutionalized or regulated to the extent that there are binding rules on how political preferences are organized and expressed. The competitiveness of political participation refers to the extent to which alternative preferences for policy formation and leadership roles can be pursued in the political arena.

(6) Intermediate category +3
(5) Substantial limitations +2
(4) Intermediate category +1
Competitiveness of Political Participation (parcomp)
(5) Competitive +3
(4) Transitional +2
(3) Factional +1

[280] All data was obtained from the Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2004. Principle Investigators: Monty Marshall (Center for Global Policy at the George Mason University) and Keith Jaggers (Colorado State University). 2005. Center for Global Policy. School of Public Policy: George Mason University. www.cidcm.umd.edu//polity

Political Rights	Political rights data was obtained from the CIRI Human Rights Data Project.[281] The CIRI project graded countries between 1(most free) and 7 (least free).[282]
Extrajudicial Killings	Extrajudicial Killings are killings by government officials without due process of law. These killings may result from the deliberate, illegal, and excessive use of lethal force by police, security forces, or other agents of the state whether against criminal suspects, detainees, prisoners, or others.[283] Coding Scheme: Political or Extrajudicial Killings are: (0) Practiced Frequently (50 or more) (1) Practiced Occasionally (From 1-49) (2) Have not occurred (Zero)
Disappearances	Disappearances are cases in which people have disappeared, political motivation appears likely, and the victims have not been found. Knowledge of the whereabouts off the disappeared is, by definition, not public knowledge. In most instances, disappearances occur because of the victim's ethnicity religion or race or because of the victim's political involvement or knowledge of information sensitive to

[281] CIRI Human Rights Data Project: The Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Dataset contains standards-based quantitative information on government respect for 13 internationally recognized human rights for 195 countries, annually from 1981-2004. It is designed for use by scholars and students who seek to test theories about the causes and consequences of human rights violations, as well as policy makers and analysts who seek to estimate the human rights effects of a wide variety of institutional changes and public policies including democratization, economic aid, military aid, structural adjustment, and humanitarian intervention. The CIRI Human Rights Dataset: Contains measures of government human rights practices and contains measures of specific human rights practices and it describes a wide variety of government human rights practices.

[282] They based political rights on the ability for people to participate freely in the political process, including the right to vote freely for distinct alternatives in legitimate elections, compete for public office, join political parties and organizations, and elect representatives who have a decisive impact on public policies and are accountable to the electorate.

[283] In most cases, the US State Department and Amnesty International indicate cases of political killings by explicitly referring to these killings as "political". A victim of politically-motivated killings is someone who is killed by a government or its agents as a result of his or her involvement in political activities or for supporting (implicitly or explicitly) the political actions of opposition movements against the existing government.

[284] Often, victims are referred to by governments as "terrorists: and labeled a threat to national security. Knowledge of the whereabouts of the disappeared is, by definition, not public knowledge. However, while there is typically no way of knowing where the victims are, it is typically known by whom they were taken and under what circumstances. In many instances,

	authorities.[284] The Coding Scheme: Disappearances: (0) Have occurred frequently (50 or more) (1) Have occurred occasionally (From 1 to 49) (2) Have not occurred (Zero)
Torture	Torture refers to the purposeful inflicting of extreme pain, whether mental or physical, by government officials or by private individuals at the instigation of government officials. Torture includes the use of physical and other force by police and prison guards that is cruel, inhumane, or degrading. This also includes deaths in custody due to negligence by government officials. The Coding Scheme:[285] Torture is (0) Practiced frequently (50 or more) (1) Practices occasionally (from 1 to 49) (2) Not practiced (Zero)
Political Imprisonment	Political imprisonment refers to the incarnations of people by government officials because of: their speech, their non-violent opposition to government policies or leaders; their religious beliefs; their non-violent religious practices including proselytizing; or their membership in a group, including ethic or racial groups.[286] The Coding Scheme Are there any people imprisoned because of their political religious or other beliefs?[287] (0) Yes and many (50 or more) (1) Yes, but few (From 1 to 49) (2) None (Zero)

victims are taken under false pretense, such as having been taken away for questioning due to suspicion of some political action that is in oppositions to the government.

[285] The coding scores above are based on the number of instances of torture (persons tortured) that occurred in a country during the year in question and only in that year

[286] A "political of consciences" is someone that was imprisoned because of his/her beliefs. A political prisoner is a prisoner of consciences. They also include prisoners that are imprisoned as a result of their religious beliefs, or practices. CIRI treats both political prisoners and prisoners of conscience as the same.

[287] Total Prisoners = New Prisoners taken + Old Prisoners still being held – Old Prisoners no longer being held

Freedom of Speech	Freedom of speech includes the extent to which freedoms of speech and press are affected by government censorship, including ownership of media outlets. Censorship is any form of restriction that is placed on freedom of press, speech or expression. Expression may be in the form of art or music. There are different degrees of censorship. Complete censorship denies citizens freedom of speech, and does not allow the printing or broadcasting media to express opposing views that challenge the policies of the existing government. Coding Scheme: Government censorship and/or ownership of the media are: (0) Complete (1) Some[288] (2) None[289] (9) Not mentioned
Freedom of Religion	Freedom of religion indicates the extent to which the freedom of citizens to exercise and practice their own religious beliefs is subject to actual government restrictions. Citizens should be able to freely practice their religion and proselytize (attempt to convert) other citizens to their religion s long as such attempts are done in a non-coercive, peaceful manner. Does the government respect rights including the freedom to publish religious documents in foreign languages? Does religious beliefs affects membership in a ruling party or a career in government? Does the government prohibit promotion of one religion over another and discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief? Does the government restrict the teaching or practice of any faith? Does the government discriminate against minority religious groups? Coding Scheme: There are restrictions on some religious practices by the government: (0) Yes

The coding scores above are based on the number of political prisoners held by the government ruling the county one is coding. This indicator is not merely based on the number of political prisoners taken in a given year, but rather the number of political prisoners held in a given year

[288] Some censorship means the government places some restrictions yet does allow limited rights to freedom of speech and press.

[289] No censorship means the freedom to speak freely and to print opposing opinions without fear of prosecution. It must be noted that none in no way implies absolute freedom, as there exists in all countries some restrictions on information and/or communication

	(1) No (9) Not mentioned
Freedom of Movement	Freedom of Movement is the freedom to travel within one's country and to leave and return to one's country is a right. There are governments that do not allow citizens to travel within their own country of birth or that restrict the movement of certain groups based on political or religious grounds. There are countries that do not allow citizens to leave. There are countries were even if one is allowed to leave there are restrictions on the duration of the stay abroad. Citizens can lose their property and other assets if they leave for a very long time; some citizens have to get permission to leave, and others, when they leave, are not allowed to return or if they are allowed to return the government makes it very difficult. Coding Scheme: Domestic and Foreign Travel is: (0) restricted[290] (1) Generally unrestricted[291] (2) Not mentioned
Freedom of Assembly and Association	Freedom of Assembly and Association is internationally recognized right of citizens to assembly freely and to associate with other persons in political parties, trade unions, cultural organizations, or other special-interest groups. This variable evaluates the extent to which freedom of assembly and the association are subject to actual governmental limitations to restrictions (as opposed to strictly legal protections). Coding Scheme Citizens' rights to freedom of assembly and association are: (0) Severely restricted or denied completely to all citizens[292] (1) Limited for all citizens or severely restricted or denied for select groups[293] (2) Virtually unrestricted and freely enjoyed by practically all citizens[294]

[290] ZERO: A government receiving a ZERO restricts all citizens' freedom of movement or restricts the movement of a significant number of citizens based on their ethnicity, gender, race, religion, political convictions, or membership in a group.

[291] ONE: A country receiving a ONE provides for freedom of movement for most or all of its citizens. It must be noted that generally unrestricted does not mean the absence of all restrictions and complete freedom of movement. In many countries, there are minor prohibitions or restrictions imposed on this right

Political Participation	Political Participation is the right of citizens to freely determine their own political system and leadership is known as the right to self-determination. Enjoyment of this right means that citizens have both the legal right and the ability in practice to change the laws and officials that govern them through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of universal adult suffrage. Coding Scheme: Political Participation is: (0) Very limited[295] (1) Moderately free and open[296] (2) Very free and open[297]
Workers Rights	Workers should have freedom of association at their workplace and the right to bargain collectively with their employers. In addition, they should have other rights at work. The 1984 Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) agreement of the World Trade Organizations requires reporting on worker rights in GSP beneficiary nation-states. It states that internationally recognized worker rights include: (a) the right of association; (b) the right to organize and bargain collectively; (c) a prohibition on the use of any form of forced or compulsory labor; (d) a minimum age for

[292] ZERO: a government receiving a ZERO routinely denies or severely restricts all citizens' freedom of assembly and association or restricts this right for a significant number of citizens based on their gender, race, religion, or other criteria

[293] ONE: a government receiving a ONE typically places some restrictions on assembly and association for all citizens, or severely restricts or denies these rights to particular groups.

[294] TWO: a country receiving a TWO provides for freedom of assembly and association virtually all its citizens. It must be noted that this in no way implies absolute freedom to assemble and associate. Even in the freest democracies there are minor prohibitions or restrictions imposed on these rights; particularly if they credibly threaten national security, public safety and/or order, or if the exercise of these rights infringes unduly on the rights of others

[295] In a state receiving a score of ZERO, the right to self-determination through political participation does not exist either in law or in practice. The government systematically retaliates against citizens who seek to possess this right through intimidation, threats, violence, arrest, detention, and other coercive methods of control

[296] In a state receiving a score of ONE, citizens have the legal right to self-determination. However, in practice there are some limitations that inhibit citizens from fully exercising this right fully. Instances where government respect for citizens' right to self-determination is described as "somewhat limited," "partial." "not fully guaranteed," will be coded as a ONE.

[297] In a state receiving a score of TWO, citizens have the right to self-determination under the law, and exercise this right in practice through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of universal suffrage. The electoral process is transparent and fair. There are no allegations of vote tampering, electoral fraud, and official intimidation of citizens/opposition political parties that can be corroborated by independent election observers.

	the employment of children; and (e) acceptable conditions of work with respect to minimum wages, hours of work, and occupational safety and health. Coding Scheme Worker's rights are: (0) Severely Restricted[298] (1) Somewhat Restricted[299] (2) Fully Protected[300]
Women's Political Rights	Women's political rights include a number of internationally recognized rights these rights include: The right to vote The right to run for political office The right to hold elected and appointed government positions The right to join political parties The right to petition government officials Coding Scheme: Regarding the political equality of women: (0) None of women's political rights are guaranteed by law. There are laws that completely restrict the participation of women in the political process (1) Political equality is guaranteed by law. However, there are significant limitations in practice. Women

[298] A county will be coded a ZERO if the government did not protect the rights of almost all private workers rights to freedom of association at the workplace. Governments that restrict unions from political activity; governments that also fail to act in the face of employer discrimination of workers trying to organize or specific attacks on unions. Also, the government does not protect the right to bargain collectively.

[299] A state having one or more of the following it will be coded a ONE: Many public employees are not allowed freedom of association at the workplace or are not allowed collective bargaining rights. Teachers of doctors are not allowed freedom of association at the workplace or are not allowed collective bargaining rights. There is forced or compulsory labor (defined as work or service exacted under the menace of penalty and for which a person has not volunteered). If children under the age of 14 are working. Discrimination in hiring or treatment. There is no minimum wage. Sympathy strikes are not allowed. Strikes for political reasons are not allowed. There is one union allowed per industrial sector, territorial jurisdiction, or occupational classification, but that union operates independently from government authority.

[300] A state should be coded a TWO if it meets ALL of the following conditions: The government protected the rights of the vast majority of workers in the private sector to freedom of association at the workplace. The government protected the right to bargain collectively for the vast majority of workers in the private sector and includes private sectors workers right to strike. A country wills till have a TWO id police, military, firefighters, or emergency workers are not allowed to strike. And no other significant problems regarding protections of worker's rights were mentioned.

	hold less than five percent of seats in the national legislature and in other high-ranking government positions (2) Political equality guaranteed by law. Women hold more than five percent but less than thirty percent of seats in the national legislature and/or in other high-ranking government positions (3) Political equality is guaranteed by law and in practice. Women hold more than thirty percent of seats in the national legislature and/or in other high-ranking government positions.
The presence of an outside ideological force	This is a dichotomous variable I created that looks at if there is a significant outside ideological force present. To be considered a significant outside ideological force ALL of the following criteria MUST be present per each year: • The outside support must be in the form of financial, military, or humanitarian aid from a state and not from the state where the fundamentalist group is located. • There must be a physical presence of the ideological force within the country via state representatives, scholars, religious leaders, state sponsored militia, military, or any group representing the ideological state. Or, the members of the fundamentalist group are being trained within or educated within the foreign state. • More than one group must receive significant influence; however, if the group is counted as three because of its size and membership then only one group needs to be receiving significant aid from an outside ideological force. • The outside ideological force cannot be working with, for, or influenced by the state in which the fundamentalist group is working within. • For the outside ideological force to be considered significant if must influence a fundamentalist group for two or more consecutive years

Freedom House: Civil Liberties[301]	Civil liberties include the freedom(s) of expression and belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of law, and personal autonomy without interference from the state. The more specific list of rights considered vary over the years. Countries are graded between 1 (most free) and 7 (least free). Civil Liberty questions are classified in four categories. Each survey question is answered with a number of raw points between zero (no, absolutely false) and 4 (yes, completely true). Usually, the sum of these raw points is used to calculate a country's Civil Liberties Rating. The survey team may make small adjustments for factors such as extreme violence that cannot be reflected in survey questions.[302]
Freedom House: Political Rights	Countries are graded between 1 (most free) and 7 (least free).[303]

[301] Source: Freedom House. 2005. Freedom in the World 2005: The Annual Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties. Available at: FreedomHouse.org. New York: Freedom House

[302] The civil liberty questions:

1. Freedom of expression and belief: measures freedom of press, religious freedom, and freedom of cultural expression
2. Association and Organizational rights: measures freedom of assembly and organization, the ability to create trade unions and other free private organizations
3. Rule of law: Ascertains if there is an independent judiciary, protection from political terror, and equal protection under the law
4. Personal autonomy and individual rights: includes free private discussions, property rights, personal autonomy, and personal freedoms

[303] The following are the questions associated with the Freedom House political rights scale:

1. Is the head of state and/or head of government or other chief authority elected through free and fair elections?
2. Are the legislative representatives elected through free and fair elections?
3. Are there fair electoral laws, equal campaigning opportunities, fair polling, and honest tabulation of ballots?
4. Are the voters able to endow their freely elected representatives with real power?
5. Do the people have the right to organize in different political parties or other competitive political groupings of their choice, and is the system open to the rise and fall of these competing parties or groupings?
6. Is there a significant opposition vote, de facto opposition power, and a realistic possibility for the opposition to increase its support or gain power through elections?
7. Are the people free from domination by the military, foreign powers, totalitarian parties, religious hierarchies, economic oligarchies, or any other powerful group?
8. Do cultural, ethnic, religious, and other minority groups have reasonable self-determination, self-government, autonomy, or participation through informal consensus in the decision-making process?

Troops[304]	Troops are the number of United States troops in each state included in my dissertation. The data consists of the number of military personal per country per year. Data has been obtained from the Global U.S. Troop Development, 1950-2005.[305]
Secondary School Enrolment	Secondary school enrollment ratio is the ratio of total enrollment, regardless of age, to the population of the age group that officially corresponds to the secondary level of education. Estimates are based on UNESCO's classification of education levels. Secondary provides general or specialized instruction at middle, secondary, or high schools, teacher training schools, vocational or technical schools; this level of education is based on at least four years of instruction at the first level.

[304] Dataset was compiled my Dr. Tim Kane, Research Fellow, Center for Data Analysis, The Heritage Foundation

[305] website: www.heritage.org/research/nationalsecurity/troopdb.cmf

Appendix Two: Unique Groups as Dependent Variable

Hypothesis One: Marxism

Population Total	.0007277*** (.0001631)	1.000728
U.S. Financial Aid	.0000193 (.000115)	1.000019
Official Development Assistance	5.92-06* (3.51e-06)	1.000006
Outside Ideological Force	.4674005*** (.0577304)	1.59584
Poverty	.0073815*** (.0029839)	1.007409
Unemployment	.0166113*** (.0025079)	1.01675
School Enrolment	.006033*** (.0014485)	1.006051
Women's Political Rights	.0392059 (.0351259)	1.039985
Workers Rights	-.0017028 (..004901)	.9982987
Polity	-.0050991 (.0043614)	.99649139
Political Prison	.0084847 (.0368259)	1.008521
Killings	-.0354128 (.0292921)	.9642422
Freedom of Movement	-.0803545* (.0441738)	.9227892
Religious Freedom	.0500086 (.0423628)	1.05128
Freedom of Speech	.0640035* (.0379194)	1.066096

Notes: *P < .10; **P < .05; ***P < .01.

Hypothesis Two: Resource Mobilization

Population Total	.0007625*** (.00016)	1.000763
GDP	8.33e-08 (5.31e-08)	1
U.S. Troops	3.14e-06 (8.56e-06)	1.000003
U.S. Financial Aid	.000032 (.0001136)	1.000032
Official Development Assistance	5.61e-06** (3.47e-06)	1.000006
Outside Ideological Force	.4634161*** (.0574529)	1.589495
Poverty	.0075836*** (.0029653)	1.007612
Unemployment	.0160083*** (.0024373)	.0024767
School Enrolment	.0062856*** (.001423)	1.006305
Polity	-.0045804 (.0043056)	.9954301
Political Prison	.0228405 (.0378395)	1.023103
Killings	-.0378825 (.029178)	.9628261
Freedom of Movement	-.0757751* (.0441027)	.9270246
Religious Freedom	.045059 (.0422123)	1.04609
Freedom of Speech	.0709265* (.0381243)	1.073502

Notes: *P < .10; **P < .05; ***P < .01.

Hypothesis Four: New Social Movements

Population Total	.0012506*** (.0001645)	.0012304*** (.0001638)
GDP	7.51e-08 (5.78e-08)	8.46r-08 (5.81e-08)
U.S. Troops	-2.25e-06 (9.66e-06)	-1.55e-06 (9.72e-06)
U.S. Financial Aid	.0000177 (.000124)	.0000503 (.0001248)
Official Development Assistance	3.81e-06 (3.76e-06)	4.19e-06 (3.70e-06)
Outside Ideological Force	.3555338*** (.0506571)	.367800*** (.060197)
Poverty	.0084732** (.0032711)	.008573** (.0032205)
Unemployment	.0185884*** (.0027548)	.0186926*** (.0026824)
School Enrolment	.0074567*** (.0015747)	.0073571*** (.0015792)
Women's Political Rights	.0002785 (.0017645)	.0245883 (.037462)
Workers Rights	-.0090786 (.0009176)	-.0017832 (.0049525)
Polity	-.0007081 (.0052594)	-.0003363 (.0052317)
Religious Freedom	.0431137** (.0449701)	_____
Freedom of Speech	.0008386* (.0390537)	_____
Freedom of Movement	-.1266609*** (.0463356)	_____
Freedom House Civil Liberties	_____	-.029231** (.0264882)

Notes: *P < .10; **P < .05; ***P < .01.

Hypothesis Three: Political Process

Polity Variables

Population Total	.0007271*** (.0001649)	.0010971*** (.0001724)
U.S. Financial Aid	.0000316 (.0001151)	.000795 (.0001257)
Official Development Assistance	5.81e-08* (3.50e-06)	2.91e-06 (3.78e-06)
Outside Ideological Force	.4606825*** (.0581662)	.4164054*** (.0404815)
Poverty	.0079388** (.0030051)	.0094938*** (.0032654)
Unemployment	.0164339*** (.0025846)	.016868*** (.0028151)
School Enrolment	.0063741*** (.0014691)	.0070899*** (.00145103)
Polity	-.0047815 (.0043501)	_____
Polity2	_____	-.000733 (.0009573)
Religious Freedom	.0383089 (.0411846)	.0424891 (.047479)
Freedom of Speech	.0142223 (.0410733)	.01218913 (.0412773)
Freedom of Movement	-.1213392*** (.0468029)	-.1127868*** (.0477281)
Freedom House Political Rights	.0005265 (.0229986)	-.0046229 (.0200294)
Killings	-.0329742* (.0255133)	-.050563* (.0299616)
Torture	-.0213006** (.033846)	-.0159055** (.390052)

Notes: *P < .10; **P < .05; ***P < .01.

Hypothesis Three: Political Process

	Exrec	Exrec-Squared				
Population Total	.000728*** (.000171)	.0007554*** (.0001675)	.0010949*** (.0001714)	.0010603*** (.0001748)	.0009478*** (.0001441)	.0009512*** (.0001437)
U.S. Financial Aid	.0000666 (.000114)	.0000387 (.0001145)	.0001012 (.0001226)	.0001064 (.0001234)	.0001065 (.0001129)	.0001074 (.0001128)
Official Development Assistance	4.10e-06 (3.58e-06)	4.69e-06 (3.57e-06)	2.90e-06 3.77e-06	5.57e-06 (3.80e-06)	6.12e-06* (3.63e-06)	6.21e-06 (3.63e-06)
Outside Ideological Force	.4787494*** (.0586843)	.487487*** (.0495989)	.440967*** (.047985)	.429001*** (0500189)	.4141337*** (.0558368)	.4156351*** (.0556862)
Poverty	.0077217*** (.0029878)	.0076399*** (.0030129)	.0091843*** (0032263)	.0075819** (.0032992)	.003377*** (.0022337)	.0033609** (.0022327)
Unemployment	.014927*** (.0025861	.0158765*** (.0025702)	.0171081*** (.0027784)	.0177083*** (.0028232)	.0140407*** (.0022696)	.013996*** (.0022733)
School Enrolment	.0063417*** (.0014283)	.0061918*** (.0014354)	.0069154*** (.0015509)	.0081693*** (.0015633)	.0043908*** (.0013134)	.0044131*** (.0013095)
Women's Political Rights	.0315135 (.0367708)	.0224587 (.0367416)	.0235056 (.0392037)	.0088022 (.025693)	-.0089885 (.0344629)	-.0080137 (.0343447)
Workers Rights	-.0000301 (.0049129)	-.0005386 (.0048987)	-.0013117 (.0050016)	-.0018728 (.000878)	-.0014547 (.0050575)	-.0014009 (.0050572)
Religious Freedom	.0286023* (.0428189)	.0319412 (.0424704)	.0322565 (.0462838)	.0332154 (.0452226)	.040414 (.0389702)	.0398854 (.0389089)
Freedom of Speech	.0561845 (.0386068)	.0474379 (.0380653)	.0175027 (.0404864	.0254491 (.0401669)	-.0148472 (.0349133)	-.0152799 (.0349325)
Freedom of Movement	-.0447993*** (.0448532)	-.0443387*** (.045279)	-.1197671*** (.0466831)	-.087660*** (.0098761)	-.0627478** (.0436489)	-.0620482*** (.0437431)
Freedom of Association	.0810361** (.0358506)	.079316** (.0358973)	.0668489* (.0361924)	.0672267* (.0361954)	.0741782** (.0357923)	.075214** (.0357371
Disappearances	-.0150776 (.0298667)	-.082197 (.0298717)	-.0204052 (.0299149)	-.0200756 (.0298911)	-.0210778 (.0297593)	-.0205262 (.0297492
Killings	-.0575254* (.0316718)	-.0447721* (.0270646)	-.0568608** (.0289533)	-.0423884 (.0314921)	-.0464668* (.0255919)	-.0464413* (.0255912)
Torture	.0392728 (.0414281)	-.0021423 (.0351396)	-.0207869 (.0389424)	-.095322** (.0391982)	-.0935278** (-.0935278	-.0948934** (.0390744)
Executive Recruitment	.038524*** (.014344)	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Executive Recruitment Squared	_____	-.003019*** (.0013415)	_____	_____	_____	_____
Executive Constraints	_____	_____	.0107128** (.0142839)	_____	_____	_____
Executive Constraints Squared	_____	_____	_____	-.0003637*** (.0020456)	_____	_____
Political Competition	_____	_____	_____	_____	.0069663*** (.0087201)	_____
Political Competition Squared	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	-.007289** (.3735376)

Notes: *P < .10; **P < .05; ***P < .01.

Appendix Three: Fundamentalist Data Set

Groups Name	Year Founded	Year Ended	Leader	Membership	Group Location	Year	Number of Terrorist acts	Number of Suicide Attacks
1920 Revolution Brigades[306]	2003	Current	Al-Zawba'I, Hatim	Unknown	Iraq	2004 2006	1 1	0 0
28 May Armenian Organization	1977	Mid-1990s	Al-Baghdadi, Abdullah and Nikolas Leonidis	Inactive	Turkey	1977	2	0
313[307]	2003	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Pakistan	2003	1	0
Abdullah Azzan Brigades[308]	2004	Current	Unknown	Relatively Small	Egypt	2005 2006	4	1
Abu Al-Abbas[309]	2004	Inactive after 2004	Unknown	Less than 20	Iraq	2004	1	0
Abu Al-Rish Brigades[310]	1993	Current	Unknown	Unknown	West Bank	2005 2006	1 14	0 0
Abu Bakr Al-Siddiq Fundamentalist Brigades[311]	2004	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Iraq	2004 2006	2 1	0 0
Abu Bakr Salafi Brigades	2004	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Iraq	2005	6	
Abu Bakr as-Siddiq Saddiq Salafi Brigades	2004	Current	Unknown	Unkn0wn	Iraq	2005	2	
Abu Hafs Al-Masri Brigade (Al-Qaeda in Europe)	2003	Current	Bendouda, Richard and Serhane ben Abdelmajid and Abdennabi	Unknown	Spain/ England	2004 2005	5 4	1 4

[306] This is a Sunni Islamic group in the Iraqi insurgency
[307] An anti-Shiite terrortist group that is composed of a number of other terrorsit groups that have been banned in Pakistan
[308] Al-Qaeda affiliated group;
[309] Fatah Hawks: Militant offshoot of the al-Fatah movement
[310] Militant offshoot of the mainstream al-Fatah movement, usually the groups is/was involved in simple shootings and motor attacks against Israeli settlers or soldiers in the Gaza Strip
[311] Also known as Salafist Brigades of Abu Bake al-Siddiq

			Konjaa					
Abu Hafs El-Masri Brigades[312] (Saudi Arabia)	2002	Current	Al-Qaeda Affiliated	Small	Egypt Iraq Indonesia	2003 2004	Violent Violent	Many Many
Abu Mus'ab Al-Zarqawi Battalion	2006	Current	Unknown	Less than 100	Saudi Arabia Lebanon	2006	1	0
Abu Nayaf al-Afghani (Al-Qaeda in Europe)	2004	Inactive after 2004	Unknown	Unknown	Spain	2004	1	0
Abu Nidal Organization [313]	1974	Current	Isa, Zein and Tawfiq Musa and Luie Nijmeh	Inactive 400	Palestinian Syrian Lebanon Iraq (Syria, Libya, Iraq)	1976 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994	3 11 5 4 8 15 16 3 12 3 2 2 2 1 1	0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Abu Zubaydah[314]	2000	Current	Al-Qaeda affiliated	Very Small	Jordan Palestine Saudi Arabia		Violent	
Achik National Volunteer Council (ANVC)	1995	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Bangladesh			
Al-Ittihad al-Islami[315]	1967	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Eritrea Somalia	1996 1997 2002[316]	1 1 1	0 0 0
Aden Abyan Islamic Army[317]	1994	Inactive after 2002	Al-Atwi, Saleh Haidara and Usam Al-Masri	30	Yemen	1998 2002	1 1	0 0

[312] Group is named for an Al-Qaeda commander: Abu Hafs el-Masri (from Egypt)

[313] Abu Nidal Organization is the name by which Western intelligence and law-enforcement agencies refer to the umbrella organization compromising the Fatah Revolutionary Council and other Palestinian terrorist groups all headed by Sabri Khalil al Banna. Also known as Arab Revolutionary Brigades, Arab Revolutionary Council, Fatah Revolutionary Council, Revolutionary Organization of Socialist Muslims

[314] This a obscure Al-Qaida affiliated military training committee

[315] Also known as the Islamic Union and/or Islamic Unity

[316] According to CNN and the United States State Department Al Ittighad al-Islami is on the top of the list of suspects for the Israeli owned hotel bombing in Kikambala, Kenya in November 2002, I will assume here that this group is responsible for this terrorist act.

			and Zein al-Abideen					
Afgan Arabs (Mujahideen)	1986	Inactive after 1992		Large[318]	Afghanistan[319] Saudi Arabia Yemen Algeria Egypt Tunisia Iraq Libya			
AL-Ahway Brigades[320]	2005	Current	Aber, Yhayb Hamud Farhan and Sami Saud Hamas Al-Ma'azizi and Ali abd-al-Wahid Bani	Unknown	Iraq	2005	1	0
Al-Ahwaz Arab People's Democratic Front[321]	2005	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Iran	2005	4	0
Al-Ali Bin Falah	2001	2001	Unknown	Unknown	Yemen	2001	1	0
AL-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades[322]	2000	Current	Abayat, Atef and Alaa al-Hams	Unknown	Palestinian Israel	2002 2005 2006	6 14 100	2 0 1
Al-Arifeen Squad (The Holy Men)[323]	2002	Current	Unknown	300	Pakistan	2002 2005 2006	3 3 2	0 0 0
Al Asalah[324]	2002	Current	Ghanim Al-Buaneen	Small	Bahrain			
Al-Badr[325]	1970	Inactive after 2002	Afghani, Shahbaz and Janisar Akhtar and Ahmed Hamza	300	Pakistan	2002 1971 1972	1 Many[326]	0

[317] Its main objective is the overthrow of the Yemeni government and removal of the West, specifically the United States from Yemen. Also known as: Aden Islamic Army, Army of Mohammad and the Jaish Aden al-Islami, Islamic Aden Army, Islamic Army of Aden, Islamic Army of Aden-Abean (IAAA), Jaysh Adam, Muhammad's Army

[318] Because of group size and/or membership; group will be counted three times

[319] The major consequence of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the 1980s was the formation of the cadre of Afgan Arabs willing to carry on war with the West. Volunteers came from all over the Muslim world to perform Jihad against the Soviet Union. These volunteers started arriving in 1986, partly stimulated by Saudi Arabian Airlines (state owned) giving 75% discount flights to Peshawar, Pakistan, for joining the Mujahideen. The nationalities of the Mujahideen are as follows (as estimated by the British Intelligence Source: 5000 Saudi Arabians; 3,000 Yemenis; 2,800 Algerians; 2,000 Egyptians; 400 Tunisians; 370 Iraqis; and 200 Libyans

[320] Also known as Calamities Brigades, Horros Brigades, al-Ahwal Horroes Brigades. This is a Sunni group

[321] London based separatist group dedicated to the independence of Iran's Khuzestan region (home to the majority of Iran's ethnic minority)

[322] Their goal is the creation of a Palestinian state

[323] Also known as al-Arifeen Squad and Lashkeri-Jaiba (The Holy Men)

[324] Al Asalah is the political wing of the Islamic Education Society. The group promotes a hard-line interpretation of Islam which rejects much of Bahrain's modernism as well as encouraging religious observance.

Al-Bara Bin Malek Brigades[327]	2005	Current	Al-Ansari, Abu Doujana	Unknown	Iraq Jordan	2005	MANY	MANY
Al-Braq[328]	1978	Inactive after 2002	Qureshi, Qureshi	Unknown	Pakistan	2002	1	0
Al-Borkan Liberation Organization[329] (the Volcano Organization)	1984	Inactive after 1985	Unknown	Inactive	Italy Libya (Palestinian)	1984 1985	2 1	0 0
Al- Dulaymi Tribe[330]	2003	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Iraq			
Al-Fahd Al-Asward Forces	2006	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Palestinian	2006	1	0
Al-Faruq Forces[331]	2003	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Iraq	2003	Violent	
Al-Faruq Brigades (Media Commission for the Mojahedin in Iraq)	2003	Current	Al-maghribi, Abd al-Azim	Unknown	Iraq	2003	1	0
Al-Fatah	1957	Current	Arafat	Over 10,000[332]	Palestinian (Saudi Arabia Israel)	2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1993 1991 1990 1989 1988 1987 1986 1985 1982 1981 1980	3 33 21 19 56 14 3 1 1 1 3 6 6 9 8 3 2 6	0 2 4 4 15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

[325] Group was formed by the Pakistani Inter-Service Intelligence (Pakistan's version of a secret service)
[326] This group was accused of participating in the massacre of 10,000 ethnic Bengali intellectuals in East Pakistan (Bangladesh) during the Pakistani Civil War
[327] This is a specialized cell of suicide bombers
[328] Translates into *The Lightning*
[329] This in anti-liberation group that carried out assassination attacks against Libyan diplomats in Europe in the mid 1980s. Sources accuse the PLO leader Yasser Arafat of being behind the group. Libya provided a large amount of money to the PLO.
[330] A powerful Sunni movement based in Anbar province but spread throughout central Iraq and Baghdad – members include American backed government individuals and Iraqi Mujahideen
[331] Iraqi Ba'thist resistance force
[332] Because of group size and/or membership; group will be counted three times

						1979 1978 1977 1976 1975 1974 1973 1972 1971 1970	6 7 2 1 2 1 2 2 5 3	0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Al-Fatah Uprising[333]	1983	Current	Muragha, Sa'id Musa	1,000	Palestinian Jordan Lebanon Syria (Syria)	1990	1	0
Al-Fath al-Mubin Troops	2006	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Palestinian Israel	2006	1	0
Al-Fuqra	1980	Current	Hashemi, Mubarak Ali Jilani	3000	Pakistan			
Al-Fursan Brigades (Knights Brigades)[334]	2005	Current	Al, Dubrani, Khalid al-Ghafur	Unknown	Iraq	2005	1	1
Al-Gama'a Al-Islamiyya[335] (Islamic Group)	1977	Current	Abdel-Rahman, Hamdi and Rifa'I el-Dawalibi and Fouad el-Dawalibi	500	Egypt Afghanistan Lebanon (Iran)	1998 1997 1996 1995 1994 1993 1992	1 2 2 8 14 7 3	0 0 0 1 0 0 0
Al-Haramayn Brigades[336]	2003	Inactive after 2003	Unknown	Unknown	Saudi Arabia	2003	1	0
AL-Imam Ali Brigades	2006	Current	Unknown	100	Iraq	2006	1	0
Al-Intiqama al-Pakistani (Revenge of the Pakistani People)[337]	2002	Inactive after 2002	Unknown	Unknown	Pakistan	2002	1	0
Al-Islah	2005	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Somalia	2005	1	0

[333] Al-Fatah Uprising was founded as a mutiny within al-Fatah against the PLO leader Yasser Arafat's autocratic leadership.
[334] The Knights Brigades was led by Saddam Hussein's former adviser Khalid Abd al-Ghafur al-Dubrani before his assassination in 2004.
[335] This is a highly decentralized group. The group developed after President Sadat released any members of the non-violent Muslim Brotherhood from prison. Members who rejected its non-violent stance fragmented off into a variety of violent Islamic groups. Their main objective if a violent jihad and the overthrow of President Mubarak's regime and the establishment of an Islamic state
[336] Also known as: al-Haramain Brigades (Two Mosques Brigades)
[337] Also known as: Revenge of Jihadi, Revenge of the Pakistanis, Revenge of the People of Pakistan

Al-Islambouli Brigades of Al-Qaeda[338]	1995	Current	Islamboui, Muhammad	Unknown	Pakistan	2004	3	3
Al-Ittihadd al-Islami (Islamic Union)	1980	Current	Aweys, Sheikh Hassan Dahir	2,000[339]	Somalia Ethiopia	1996	2	0
Al-Jama'a al Salafia	2003	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Iraq		Violent	
Al-Jam'iya al-Salafiya al-Mujahida[340]	2003	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Iraq		Violent	
Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya (al-Jihad)[341]	1977	Current	Abdel-Rahman, Hamdi and Rifa'I Ahmed Taha and Fouad el-Dawalibi	500	Pakistan	1995 2005 1997 1996 1981	1 1 1 1 1	1 0
Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya	1977	Current	Unknown	Small	Afghanistan Egypt		Violent	
Algerian Renewal Party[342]	1989	Current	Unknown	Very small	Algeria			
Al-Haramain Foundation[343] (Saudi Arabia)	2003	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Saudi Arabia Somalia Indonesia Pakistan Tanzania		Violent	
Al-Hasan al-Basri-Brigade	2005	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Iraq	2005 2006	Violent Violent	Many Many
Al-Jamieen[344] (Saudi Arabia)	1994	Current	Saudi Government	Unknown	Saudi Arabia			
Al-Jihad Brigades	2005	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Iraq	2005	1	0
All Tripura Tiger Force	1990	Current	Unknown	600	Bangladesh			
Al-Madina[345]	2002	Inactive after 2002	Unknown	50	Pakistan	2002	3	0

[338] It is assumed that this group is an offshoot of the International Justice Group
[339] Because of group size and/or membership; group will be counted three times
[340] Sunni group
[341] Sunni group
[342] The PRA is a small moderate Islamist party. The party is resolutely antisocialist, actively endorsed economic liberalism and foreign investment, it spoke out against the importation of "foreign models" of development.
[343] Originally founded as a Saudi charity and has sense converted into a terrorist movement
[344] Group has been accused of being controlled by Saudi intelligence

Al-Majd Brigades	2006	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Palestinian	2006	1	0
Al-Mansoorain[346]	2003	Current	Lone, Firdaus and Omar Mukhtar	Unknown	Pakistan	2003 2004 2005 2006	1 1 3 2	0 1 0 0
Al-Mendar Islamic Society (Islamic National Tribune)[347]	2000[348]	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Bahrain			
Al-Muhajiroun (The Emigrants)[349]	1983	Current	Uknown	Unknown	Saudi Arabia			
AL-Nasireen	2002	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Pakistan Kashmir	2002 2003 2004 2005	2 1 1 2	0 0 0 0
Al-Mawaz	1999	Inactive after	Unknown	Inactive	Pakistan	1999 2000	1 1	0 0

[345] Al-Madina is a Kashmiri militant group responsible for terrorist acts against the Indian-controlled Kashmir. The group's goal is the accession of Kashmir to Pakistan.
[346] Kashmiri militant group responsible for terrorist acts against the Indian-controlled Kashmir. The group's goal is the accession of Kashmir to Pakistan.
[347] This is the political wing of the Al Eslah Society and is associated with the Muslim Brotherhood
[348] Unsure of the Date of formation; however they won four seats in Bahrain's 2006 general election, down form eight in 2002 so I placed the date of formation in the mid 1990s
[349] This is an Islamist group that campaigns for a world Islamic state.

		2000						
Al-Qaeda (Jihad, the Base)	1980s	Current	Bin Laden	50,000[350]	Global Afghanistan Algeria Azerbaijan Bahrain Bangladesh Egypt Eritrea Iran Jordan Lebanon Libya Mauritania Pakistan Qatar Somalia Sudan Tajikistan Tanzania Tunisia Turkey UAE Uzbekistan Yemen (Saudi Arabia)	1995 1998 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006	1 2 1 3 2 11 6 1 4	0 2 1 3 1 8 0 1 1
Al –Nawaz	1999	2000	Unknown	Unknown	Pakistan	1999	2	
Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula	2004	Current	Bin Laden	Unknown	Saudi Arabia	2004	5	2
Al-Qaeda Organization in the Islamic Maghreb[351]	1996	Current	Unknown	300	Algeria	2000 2003 2004 2005 2006	1 1 3 7 15	0 0 0 0 0
Al-Qaeda Organization in the Land of the Two Rivers	2004	Current	Zarqawi	Unknown	Iraq	2004 2005 2006	10 198 6	2 92 3
Al-Qanoon[352]	2002	Current	Hai, Qari Abdul	300	Pakistan	2002	1	1
Al-Quds Brigades[353]	1970	Current	Unknown	1,000	Palestinian Israel Lebanon Syria (Iran)	2002	1	1

[350] Because of group size and/or membership; group will be counted three times
[351] Formerly known as the Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC) is a violent Sunni extremist group
[352] This group demands an end to Pakistani enslavement to the United States and the resignation of President Musharraf

Al-Sadr Brigades[354]	1978	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Lebanon Syria	1988	1	0
Al-Sahaba Soldiers	2006	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Iraq	2006 2007	Violent Violent	
Al-Saiqa[355]	1966	Inactive after 1985	Al-Ma'ayta, Mahmud and Isam al-Qadi and Muhammed Khalifah	500	Lebanon Syria Palestinian (Syria)	1975 1979 1981 1984 1985	1 2 1 1 1	0 0 0 0 0
Al-Taeff al-Mansoura[356]	2006	Current	Unknown	Small	Egypt	2006	1[357]	
Al Taqfeer Wal Hijra[358]	1960s	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Lebanon Syria Egypt			
Al-Tawhid	2004	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Iraq Kurdistan			
Al-Tawhid Jordan[359]	1995	2000	Unknown	Unknown	Jordan			
Al-Ittihaad al-Islami (AIAI)[360]	Late 1980s	Current	Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys	Large over 2,000[361]	Ethiopia Somalia			
AL-Umar Mujahideen[362]	1989	Inactive after 2002	Ganai, Manzoor and Mast Gul and Jamshed Khan	700	Pakistan	2002	1	0
Al-Umma Movement (Mouvement	1989	Current	Unknown	Less than 300	Algeria			

[353] This is the armed wing of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad
[354] The al-Sadr Brigades was formed after the mysterious disappearance of Lebanese Shiite spiritual leader Iman Musa al-Sadr
[355] Translated as the Storm or the Thunderbolt
[356] Also known as The Victorious Sect. This group espouses Salafi-Taufiri, a Jihadist ideology that identifies anyone with whom disagrees with them as infidels and are considered potential terrorist targets
[357] This was an attempted attack: 22 Islamic militants belonging to this group were arrested by the Egyptian government for planning attacks against tourists, a gas pipeline in Cairo, and Muslim and Christian religious leaders
[358] May also be referred to as al-Takfir Wal Hijra which is an Egyptian founded in the 1960s and later reemerged in the 1990s in Syria and Lebanon
[359] In 1995 this movement was a major supplier of Jihadi volunteers to the Bosnian Mujahideen – there is no relationship with other groups with similar names
[360] Also known as *Islamic Union* and *Islanic Unity*. This organization seeks to create an Islamic state in Somalia and Ethiopia.
[361] Because of group size and/or membership; group will be counted three times
[361] Also known as the Lebanese Resistance Detachments and the Movement
[362] Goal is to liberate the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir and merge them with Pakistan
[363] The Movement el-Oumma has declined to participate in elections and its members have engaged in very few public activities.

el-Oumma)[363]								
Al Wefaq[364]	Mid 1990s (1995)	Current	Unknown	1,500[365]	Bahrain			
Al-Zulfikar	1977	Current	Bhutto, Mir Murtaza and Iluas Siddiqi	Inactive	Pakistan Afghanistan Libya Syria	1981	1	0
Albanian Mujahideen	2003	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Iraq			
Ali Bin Abu Talib Jihad Organization	2005	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Iraq	2005	1	0
Ali ibn Abi Talib Brigade	2005	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Iraq	2005 2006	Violent Violent	
Amal[366] (HOPE)	1975	Current	Berri, Nabih and Musa Sadr	Unknown	Lebanon (Syria) (Iran 1979-1982)	1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1992 1998	4 6 3 4 3 3 14 5 10 8 5 2 1 1	0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Alliance for a Free Kabylie	1990s (1992)	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Algeria			
AMAL (The Islamic Action)[367]	1982	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Iraq (Iran)	Violent		
Ansar al-din[368]	2004	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Iraq	2004	1	0
Ansar-e Hezbollah	1992	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Iran			
Ansar al-Islam[369] (Supporters of	2001	Current	Ghul, Hassan and Mullah Krekar	500	Iraq	2002 2003 2005	2 2 1	0 1 0

[364] Bahrain's Largest and most popular political party
[365] Because of group size and/or membership; group will be counted three times
[366] Also known as the Lebanese Resistance Detachments and the Movement of Hope. Also known as Afwaj al Muqawama al Lubnaniya or the Lebanese Resistance Detachments; this is a Shia group. Iran financially supported this group until 1982. Islamic AMAL is a splinter group from AMAL and most of these defectors were later absorbed into Hezbollah
[367] AMAL is a separate group from the Lebanese AMAL group. The version is based in Iraq and is a Shiite group who sought to over throw the Ba'thist Regime in Iraq
[368] Also known as the Supporters of Islam
[369] An Islamic fundamentalist group with headquarters in the Kurdish area of Northern Iraq

Islam)								
Ansar al-Jihad (Supporters of Jihad)	2004	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Iraq	2004	1	0
Ansar al – Sunnah Army (Followers of the Tradition)	2003	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Iraq	2003 2004 2005	1 2 90	1 2 14
Ansar al-Sunnah Army	2005	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Iraq	2005 2006	Violent Violent	Many Many
Ansar Allah	1994	Current	Tufaili, Sobhi	Unknown	Lebanon	1994 2003	2 1	2 0
Anti-Communist Command	2000	Inactive after 2000	Guterres, Eurico and Eggi Sudjana	Unknown	Indonesia	2000	1	0
Anti-Imperialist International Brigade[370]	1986	Inactive after 1988	Shirosaki, Tstomu	Inactive	Lebanon	1986 1987 1988	4 6 3	
APO's Revenge Hawks	1989	Inactive after 1989	Unknown	Unknown	Turkey	1999	3	0
APO's Youth Revenge Brigades	1999	Inactive after 1999	Unknown	Unknown	Turkey	1999	1	0
Arab Commando Cells	1984	Inactive after 1984	Unknown	Inactive (very small)	Libya Lebanon (Libya)	1984	1	0
Arab Communist Organization[371]	1974	Inactive after 1977	Murad, Faris and Na;al Haytham	Unknown	Lebanon Syria	1974 1975 1977	5 6 1	0 0 0
Arab Communist Revolutionary Party[372]	1980	Inactive after 1991	Unknown	Inactive	Jordan	1990 1991	1 1	0 0
Arab Fedayeen Cells	1986	Inactive after 1986	Unknown	Inactive	Lebanon	1986	3	0
Arab Liberation Front[373]	1969	Inactive after 1986	Ahmad, Abd al-Rahim and abd al-Wahhab al-Kayyali	500	Palestinian Iraq Israel (Iraq)	1975 1980 1986	1 1 1	0 0 0
Arab Nationalist Youth for the Liberation of Palestine[374]	1974	Inactive after 1974	Unknown	Inactive	Libya Palestinian	1973 1974	3 4	0 0

[370] This is an anti-imperialist group formed by the Japanese Red Army (JRA)
[371] This is a Communist/Socialist movement/group. Dropped from large N but included in terrorism data
[372] This is a Community/Socialist movement/group. Dropped from large N but included in terrorism data
[373] This is a secular, leftist, Palestinian nationalist terror group founded by Iraqi Ba'athist party members
[374] This group was founded my Muammar Gaddafi to support the Palestinian people. Also known as: Arab National Youth Organization, Arab Nationals Youth Organization for the Liberation of Palestine, and Seventh Suicide Squad

Arab Revenge Organization	1984	Current	Unknown	Inactive	Lebanon	1984	1	0
Arab Revolutionary Brigades	Early 1980s		Unknown	Unknown	United Arab Emirates			
Arab Revolutionary Brigades	Early 1970s	Current	Unknown	400	Iraq Libya Syria			
Arab Struggle Movement for the Liberation of Ahvaz[375]	2006	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Iran	2006	2	0
Arabian Peninsula Freemen	1989	Inactive after 1989	Unknown	Inactive	Saudi Arabia	1989	1	0
Arbav Martyrs of Khuzestan	2005	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Iran	2005	4	0
Armed Berber Group (ABG)	1998	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Algeria			
Armed Islamic Group[376]	1992	Current	Abdallah, Ahmed and Mourad Sid Ahmed and Rachid Oukali	100	Algeria	1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 2001	8 24 19 4 2 5 2	0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Armed Youth of Cherikha-Ye Fadayee	2005	Inactive	Unknown	Inactive	Iran	2005	1	0
Armed Islamic al-Qaeda Movement of Fallujah	2003	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Iraq		Violent	
Armenian Red Army	1982	Inactive after 1982	Evingulu, Penuemin	Inactive	Turkey	1982	1	0
Armenian Resistance Group	1995	Inactive after 1995	Unknown	Inactive	Turkey	1995	2	0
Armenian Revolutionary Army[377]	1970	Inactive after 1985	Unknown	Inactive	Turkey	1970 1983 1984 1985	1 2 3 1	0 0 0 0
Armenian Secret Army for the	1975	Inactive after 1997	Agopyan, Agop and Montye Melkonian	Inactive	Lebanon Turkey	1975 1976 1978	3 1 6	

[375] This is an ethnic terrorist group campaigning for the independence of Iran's Arab minority

[376] The Groupe Islamique Arme' (GIA) the GIA sought to create an Islamic state in Algeria and took a leading role in the insurgency and civil war

[377] This group is In the United States; However, it protest Turkish actions against the Armenians

Liberation of Armenia[378]						1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1991 1997	9 14 10 8 18 5 4 1 1 1 1 1	
Army for the Liberation of Kurdistan	1981	Inactive after 1981	Unknown	Inactive	Lebanon	1981	1	0
Army of Ansar al-Sunna	2004	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Iraq		Violent	
Army of Muhammad	2004	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Iraq		Violent	
Army of the Conqueror	2004	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Iraq			
Army of the Followers of Sunni Islam[379]	2004	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Iraq	2004	1	0
Army of the Partisans of the Sunnah	2005	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Iraq	2005 2006 2007	Violent Violent Violent	Many Many Many
Army of Palestine	2002	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Lebanon	2001	1	0
Asbat al-Ansar (Band of Partisans)	1990[380]	Current	Al-Saadi, Ahmas Abd al-Karim and Adullah Shreidi and Hisham Shreidi	300	Lebanon	1995 1999 2000 2002 2003	1 2 1 1 2	0 0 0 0 0
Association of Combatant Clerics[381]	1988	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Iran			
Association of Muslim women	1980	Mid 1990s	Unknown	Unknown	Iraq (Iran)			

[378] The ASALA's operated mainly out of bases in Beirut. Their main objective was to increase awareness of the Armenian genocide and further the cause of Armenian Independence

[379] Also known as Jaish Ansar al-Sunnah

[380] The exact year of formation is unknown – it is someplace in the late 1980s or the early 1990s, to be safe I put its establishment in 1990

[381] The Association of Combatant Clerics also translates as the Assembly of Combatant Clerics and is a relatively moderate pro-reform Iranian political party and should not be confused with the Combatant Clergy Association which is a conservative political party

Association of Muslim Women	1970	Current	Unknown	Large[382]	Iran			
Aum Shinrikyo Aleph	1984	Current	Asahara, Shoko	More than 3000[383]	Indonesia			
Women's Association	1980	Mid 1990s	Unknown	Unknown	Iraq (Iran)			
Women's Association	1970	Current	Unknown	Large[384]	Iran			
August 23 Movement	1982	Inactive after 1982	Unknown	Inactive	Lebanon	1982	1	0
Azerbaijan Islamic Party[385]	1992	1996[386]	Unknown	Small	Azerbaijan			
Baath Battalions	2003	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Iraq		Violent	
Babak Khoramdin Organization	1992	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Iran			
Badr Forces	2001	Inactive after 2001	Abayat, Atef	Unknown	Israel West Bank	2001	1	0
Badr Brigade	2005	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Iraq		Violent	
Bahraini Mujahideen	2003	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Bahrain			
Baloch Liberation Army	2002	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Pakistan	2003 2004 2005 2006	1 8 19 17	0 0 0 0
Baloch Student's Organization	1967	Last active 1979	Khair jan Baluch	Unknown	Pakistan			
Balochistan Liberation Front	1964	Current	Jumma Khan	Unknown	Pakistan			
Bani Halai Tribe	1996	Inactive after 1996	Unknown	Unknown	Egypt	1996	1	0
Bangladesh Nationalist Party[387]	1978	Current	General Ziaur Rahman	Large	Bangladesh			

[382] Counted as three
[383] Counted as three
[384] Counted as three
[385] Political party funded by Iran and supports an Islamic state in Azerbaijan
[386] The party was banned in 1996; all leaders were arrested and accused of espionage for Iran
[387] The party views Islam as an integral part of the sociocultural life of Bangladesh.

Bangladeshi Mujahideen	2000	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Bangladesh			
Banner of Islam	2006	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Iraq	2006	1	0
Battalion of the Look-Out for Iraq	2005	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Iraq	2005	1	0
Battalions of the Faith	1994	1998	Unknown	Unknown	Saudi Arabia			
Battalion of the Martyr Abdullah Azzam (Al-Qaeda in the Levant)	2004	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Egypt Jordan Syria	2004 2005	1 3	0 0
Battalions of the Ahwaz Resurgence[388]	2005	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Iran			
Belmokhtar Group (Groupe Islamigue Armee)	1996	Current	Abdelouadoud, Abou Belmokhtar, Mokhtar	300	Algeria			
Biplobi Communist Party (Revolutionary Communist Party)[389]	1971	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Bangladesh			
Black Brigade	1985	Inactive after 1985	Unknown	Unknown	Lebanon	1985	1	0
Black Brigades[390]	Early (1980s)	Inactive	Unknown	Inactive	Kuwait Iraq (Iran)			
Black December	1973	Inactive after 1973 1997[391]	Unknown	Inactive	Pakistan	1973	2	0
Black Friday	1988	Inactive after 1988	Unknown	Inactive	Turkey (Iran)	1988	1	0
Black Hand	1983	Inactive after	Unknown	Inactive	Lebanon	1983	2	0

[388] Sunni Mujahideen movement
[389] This is a Communist political party/movement
[390] This is an obscure Kuwaiti Shiite revolutionary group active in Iraq and Kuwait with Iranian financial assistance. Also known as the Black Brigades of Lebanon (BBL), Christian anti-Muslim Organization, and the Lebanese Black Brigades
[391] Not heard from between the years of 1973 and 1997

		1983						
Black June[392]	1976	Inactive in mid 1980s (1988)	Unknown	500	Palestinian (Iraq)	Violent		
Black Panthers[393]	1988	Current	Ikmail, Ahmed Awad	100	Palestinian	2005	1	0
Black September[394]	1971	Current	Iyad, Abu and Mohammad Oudeh	Inactive	Jordan Palestinian Lebanon	1971 1972 1973 1981 1984 1985 1986 1988	3 64 12 1 1 10 1 2	0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Block of the Faithful (Gush Emunim)[395]	1974	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Israel			
Borok National Council of Tripura	2000	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Bangladesh			
Brethren (Battalions) of the Faithful		Current	Unknown	Unknown	Saudi Arabia			
Brigade of Ansar al-Tawhid wa-Sunna[396]	2006	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Iraq	2006	1	0

[392] Black June was an Iraqi state-sponsored group with the revolutionary aim of destroying Israel and establishing a Palestinian state by force.

[393] The Black Panthers (named for the animal and not the Black Nationalist group) this is a vigilante group loosely affiliated with al-Fatah

[394] Also known as the Black September Organization. The BSO was a clandestine group created by al Fatah for the limited purpose of avenging the suppression and expulsion of the PLO form Jordan.

[395] This political-religious movement was established to help occupy the territories that were seized by Israel in the Six Day War (1967). The movement attached religious messianic significance to the consequence of that war; initiated Jewish settlement projects in the territories and protested official policies to curb Jewish settlement or any attempt to reach an agreement with the Palestinians and Arab states involving the return of the territories.

[396] Supporters of the Monotheism and the Prophet's Tradition; also known as Ansar al-Tawid wa al-Sunna Brigade. Supporters of Monotheism and the Profits Supports of the Tawhid and Sunna Brigades

Brigade of al-Husayn the Lord of the Martyrs	2005	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Iraq			
Brigades for the Defense of Holy Shrines[397]	2004	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Iraq	2004	1	0
Brigade of the Horrors of the Secret Islamic Army	2004	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Iraq			
Brigades of Abu Ubaydah al-Jarrah	2005	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Iraq		Violent	
Brigades of Hayzun al-Jihadiyah	2005	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Iraq		Violent	
Brigades of Islamic Rage	2004	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Iraq		Violent	
Brigades of Imam al-Hassan al-Basri	2004	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Iraq	2005	1	0
Brigades of Martyr Ahmed Yassin	2004	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Iraq	2004	1	0
Brigades of the Mujahidden in Iraq	2004	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Iraq	2004 2005	2 1	0 0
Brigades of Mohhammed bin Abdullah	2004	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Iraq		Violent	
Brigades of the Victorious Lion of God	2004	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Iraq	2004	1	0
Brigades of the 1920 Revolution	2005	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Iraq		Violent	
Children of Iran Party	1999	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Iran			

[397] Also known as: Squadrons Defending Holy Places

Committee for the Security of the Highways	1998	Inactive after 2001	Unknown	Unknown	Israel	1998 2001	2 2	0 0
The Combatant Clergy Association	1977	Current	Ali Khamenei Motahhari	Unknown	Iran			
Communist Workers Movement[398]	2001	Inactive after 2003	Unknown	Inactive	Turkey	2002 2003	1 1	0 0
Committee for Solidarity with Arab and Mideast Political Prisoners (CSAMPP)[399]	1984	Late 1980s	Unknown	Inactive	France (Iran and Lebanon)		Violent	
Committee for Relief in Kosovo (Saudi Arabia)	1990s	2000	Unknown	Unknown	Saudi Arabia		Violent	
Committee to Support the Afghans (Saudi Arabia)	Early 1980s	Mid 1990s	Unknown	Unknown	Saudi Arabia			
Committee for the Defense of Legitimate Rights in Saudi Arabia	2003	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Saudi Arabia[400]			
Crescent Star Party[401]	1998	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Indonesia			
Dar al-Ifta al-Sunni (Sunni Juridical Office)	Early 1970s	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Lebanon (Saudi Arabia)			
De Fes	1994	Inactive	Falah, Tarik and	Inactive	Morocco	1994	1	0

[398] The Communist Workers Party is a Communist/Socialist movement/party. This groups was dropped from large N but included in terrorist data

[399] This was the cover name for a pro-Iranian Lebanese cellular group which engaged in an anti-French bombing campaign for the limited end of pressuring the French government to release George Ibrahim Abdullah, the leader of the Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Factions arrested in France in 1984 for his group-s attacks on U.S. and Israeli diplomats.

[400] Group is now in exile in London, England

[401] The Crescent Start Party is a moderate Islamist political party.

		after 1994	Redouane Hammadi and Stephane Idir					
Death Squad of Mujahideen of Iraq	2004	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Iraq	2004	1	0
Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine[402]	1969	Current	Hammad, Abd al-Karim and Nayef Hawatmeh and Qais Abdul Karim	500	Palestinian (Syria and Libya)	1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1984 1985 1988 1992 1994 2002 2004 2005 2006	2 2 1 3 1 1 1 2 2 7 1 1 3 4 4 6	0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan	1945	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Iran			
Democratic Revolutionary Front for the Liberation of Arabistan[403]	1980	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Iran (Iraq)	1980[404]	1	0
Democratic Unionist Party[405]	1990	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Egypt Sudan			
Denouncers of Infidels[406]	1970	Late-mid 1970s	Unknown	Unknown	Egypt			
Deobandi-Wahabi	Mid 1980s (1985)	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Pakistan (Saudi Arabia)	Violent [407]		
Dhi Qar Organization	2006	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Iraq	2006	1	0
DHKP/C Revolutionary Left	1994[409]	Current	Karatas, Dursun and Bedri Yagan	1000	Turkey	1991 1992 1993	27 8 3	0 0 0

[402] The PDFLP id a Marxist-Leninist Palestinian Secular Nationalist Movement
[403] This group was sponsored by Iraq to cause instability is Iran
[404] On May 30, 1980, five men calling themselves the Democratic Revolutionary Front for the Liberation of Arabistan walked into the Iranian Embassy in London and took the occupants captive.
[405] The DUP is closely related to the Sudanese party of the same name. Its major purpose seems to be to organize Sudanese residents in Egypt
[406] In 1970 Sadat co-opted several leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood into the Egyptian political system. As a result, members of the Muslim Brotherhood broke off and formed more radical short-lived groups.
[407] According to Karmon (2006) the Deobandi-Wahabi is a militant Sunni group who is highly anti-Shia and receives significant financial support from Saudi Arabia.

Revolutionary People's Liberation Party[408]						1995 1996 1998 1999 2000 2001 2003 2004 2005 2006	8 1 2 6 3 3 6 1 1 1	0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Divine Wrath Brigades	2004	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Iraq	2004	2	
Dukhtaran e-millat (Daughters of the Faith)	1987	Inactive after 1995	Unknown	Unknown	Kashmir	1995	1	0
Eagles of National Unity	1972	Current	Unknown	Inactive	Yemen	1972	1	0
East Turkistan Liberation Organization	2002	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Kyrgyzstan	2002	1	1
Egypt's Mujahideen	2005	Current	Unknown	Small	Egypt	2005 2006	1	
Egypt's Revolution[410]	1984	Inactive after 1989	Sulayman, Mahmound	Unknown	Egypt	1984 1985 1986 1987 1989	1 1 1 1 2	0 0 0 0 0
Egyptian Islamic Jihad	Late 1970s	Current	Al-Rahman, Sheikh Al-Zawahiri, Ayman	200	Egypt Afghanistan	1993 1998	1 1	0 0
Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement	1980	Current	Amer, Shaikh Khalil and Abul Bara' Hassan Salman	Unknown	Eritrea Ethiopia Sudan	2003	1	0
Eritrean Liberation Front	1960	Inactive after 1991	Adem, Mohammeed and Adem Akte and Idris Galaydos	Inactive	Eritrea Ethiopia (Syria and Iraq)	1970 1971 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1986 1991	5 1 5 7 2 1 1 1 1	0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Eritrean People's	1970	Inactive after	Unknown	Inactive	Eritrea Ethiopia	1987	1	0

[408] The DHKP/C is a Marxist, anti-Western party/movement. This group was dropped from my large N but included in terrorist data

[409] There is a date discrepancy here because it is a splinter group of Devrimci Yol which was itself a splinter of the Turkish People's Liberation Party.

[410] Egypt's Revolution is also known as Nasserist Revolution which advocated militant nationalism in the tradition of the former President Gamal Nasser.

Liberation Front		1987						
Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Army[411]	1972	Current	Unknown	Inactive	Ethiopia[412] Sudan	1986 1987 1988	1 1 1	0 0 0
Executives of Construction Party	Mid 1990s	Current	President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani	Unknown	Iran			
EYAL (Fighting Jewish Organization)	1995	Inactive after 1995	Raviv, Avishai	Inactive	Israel West Bank	1995	1	0
Fadaeeyan-e-Eslam (Devotees of Islam)[413]	1930s	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Iran	1998 1999	1 1	0 0
Fadayan – Majority Faction	1980	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Iran			
Fadayan – Minority Faction	1980	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Iran			
Fallujah Mujahdeen	2004	Current	Adbullah, Abu	Over 2500	Iraq	2004	1	0
Fatah Wing	1998	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Sudan			
Fatah-RC[414]	1974	Inactive since the early 1990s (1992)	Unknown	Unknown	Palestinian Iraq Syria Libya[415]	Violent [416]		
Fatah	Early 1960s	Current		Over 2,000	Palestinian			
Fedateen Khalq (People's Commandos) [417]	1979	1987	Unknown	Unknown	Iran	1987	1	0

[411] Leftist organization, anti-monarchy group and it called itself the first political party in the country
[412] Because of group size and/or membership; group will be counted three times in Ethipoia
[412] Also known as the Lebanese Resistance Detachments and the Movement
[413] This group is also known as: Fedayeen-e-Islam Mohammadi Hanif, Devotees of Pure Mohammedan Islam, Islamic Commandos, Fedayeen Islam, and Volunteers of Martyrdom for Islam
[414] The Fatah-RC was considered one of the most dangerous and active Palestinian terror organizations in the 1980s. Thee Fatah-RC was also known as the Arab Revolutionary Council but chose to claim credit for its actions under the names of the Arab Revolutionary Brigades, the Revolutionary Organization of Socialist Muslims when claiming attacks on British targets, Black June when claiming credit for attacks on Jordanian targets, and the Black September Organization.
[415] Its headquarters were in Baghdad from 1974-1980, then they moved to Syria, then Libya and been located there ever since.
[416]It is assumed that the Fatah-RC committees 44 major terrorist acts between 1980-1987, of which 11 were assassinations, seven bombings and one car bombing.
[417] Leftist Movement

Federation of Armenian Revolutionaries	1985	Inactive after 1985	Unknown	Inactive	Lebanon	1985	1	0
Forqan (proof)[418]	1978	Mid 1980s (1985)	Unknown	Unknown	Iran			
Fighting Ansar of Allah	Unknown	Active	Uknown	Unkown	Saudi Arabia			
Fighting Islamic Group in Libya	1995	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Libya			
Fighting Vanguard[419]	Late 1960s	Mid 1980s	Unknown	Unknown	Syria	1970s	Violent	
First Army of Muhammad	2004	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Iraq		VERY	Many
Force 17[420]	Early 1970s (1973)	Early 1990s (1995)	Unknown	Unknown	Palestinian		Violent	
Forces of Unity	2003	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Sudan			
Free Aceh Movement (Aceh Security Disturbance Movement)[421]	1970	Inactive after 2005	Abdullah, Bakhtiar and Ai Tiro, Hasan and Husaini Hasan	Inactive (5,000)[422]	Indonesia	2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000	2 3 3 10 17 1	0 0 0 0 0 0
Free Papua Movement	1963	Inactive after 2001	Kwalik, Kelly Mawen, Berardus Onde, Willem	Unknown	Indonesia	1990 1995 1996 1999 2000 2001	1 1 1 1 1 1	0 0 0 0 0 0
Free People of Galillee	2003	Inactive after 2003	Unknown	Unknown	Israel	2003	1	0
Free Salafi Group	1998	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Algeria	2006	1	0
Freedom Movement of Iran	1961	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Iran			
Front for the	Late	Inactive	Husan, Hasri	3,000[423]	Indonesia	2000	1	0

[418] The Arabic word furqan literally means proof, and when it is used with the definite article, al-furqan, it refers to the Quran.
[419] This is the secret cell of the militant members of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood.
[420] Force 17 was originally intended as a personal security force for Yasser Arafat and other PLO leaders, Force 17 eventually became one of the PLO's elite units and functions in various areas of operational activities under the direct guidance of Arafat.
[421] Goal is to establish an independent Islamic kingdom in the province of Aceh
[422] Because of group's size and/or membership, group will be counted three times

Defenders of Islam	1990s	after 2001	Shihab, Habib Usman, Alwi			2001	1	0
Front of Justice and Revenge	1986	Inactive after 1986	Unknown	Small	Lebanon			
Front for the Liberation of Lebanon from Foreigners	1977	Inactive after 1983	Unknown	200	Lebanon	1980 1981 1982 1983	1 6 4 3	0 0 0 0
Front for the Liberation of the French Somali Coast	1975	Inactive after 1975	Unknown	Inactive	Somalia	1975	1	0
Front of Justice and Revenge[424]	1986	Inactive after 1986	Unknown	Inactive	Lebanon	1986	1	0
Generation of Arab Fury	1989	Inactive after 1989	Unknown	100	Iran Saudi Arabia Kuwait[425] (Iran)	1989	2	0
Greater Israel Movement[426]	1967	1980	Unknown	Unknown	Israel			
Great East Islamic Raiders Front (IBDA-C)[427]	Mid 1970s (1975)	Current	Unknown	Small	Turkey		Violent [428]	
Green Brigade of the Prophet	2004	Current	Unknown	Small	Iraq		Violent	
Green Cells	1987	Inactive after 1987	Unknown	Inactive	Lebanon	1987	1	0
Grey Wolf[429]	1969	Current	Colonel Alparslan Turks	26,000[430]	Turkey	Violent [431]		
Groupe Islamique Combattant	Late 1990s (1998)	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Morocco	2003	1	0

[423] Because of group's size and/or membership; the group will be counted three times
[424] Leftist Nationalist
[425] However, attacks are centered against Saudi Arabia
[426] This movement/party was founded in 1967, following the Six Day War, in order to promote the case for Greater Israel. This movement initiated the renewal of Jewish settlements in Hebron.
[427] The IBDA-C is a Sunni Salafist group that advocates Islamic rule in Turkey and considers Turkey's present secular leadership to be "illegal". This is a particularly radical organization and is ideologically opposed to virtually every other Islamic movement; however, it does cooperate with the other groups.
[428] The IBDA-C prefers to carry out activities that involve little personal risk, such as throwing Molotov cocktails. Members of the group are encouraged to and launch their own attacks independently.
[429] Or Gray Wolves; this was originally a student group organized to oppose Marxist-Leninist students in the universities in Turkey
[430] Because of size – this group and/or movement will be counted as three
[431] In 1976 they turned into a right-wing death squad and by 1980 the group was reported to have committed 694 political murders

Marocain								
Group of the Martyrs Mostafa Sadeki and Ali Zedeh	1993	Current	Unknown	Inactive	Iran	1993	1	0
Guardians of the Friends of the Prophet (Siph-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP)[432]	1985	Current	Maulana Mujibur Rehman Inqilabi	Small	Pakistan	Violence		
Guardians of the Islamic Revolution	1980	Inactive after 1989	Unknown	Small Inactive	Rome London (Iran)	1980 1987 1988 1989	1 1 2 2	
Guardians of the Islamic Revolutions	1979	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Iran			
Guardmen of Islam	1980	Inactive after 1984	Unknown	Inactive	Iran	1984	1	0
Hamas	1987	Current	Al-Zahhar, Mahmud Ghousheh, Ibrahim Hanud, Mahmud	Greater than 1000	West Bank (Iran and Saudi Arabia)	1988 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006	1 1 3 5 13 6 5 4 3 1 20 34 59 206 183 36	0 0 0 0 4 4 4 1 0 0 9 11 8 6 3 0
Haq Movement for Liberty and Democracy	2005	Current	Ali Rabea Shaikh Lsa Al Jowder	Unknown	Bahrain			
Harakat al-Islah wal-Tihaddi (The Movement of Reform and Challenge)[433]	1998	1999	Abd al-Nasir	Unknown	Jordan (Saudi Arabia)		Violent	
Harkat-i-Islami-yi Afghanistan (Islamic Movement of	Early 1990s (1992)	Current	Ayatollah Muhammad Asif Muhdini	Unknown	Afghanistan			

[432] The SSP is a Sunni sectarian party/movement that has been involved in terrorist violence against the minority Shia population in Pakistan. The SSP is an offshoot the Jamiat-e-Uleme-e-Ialam (JUI), a major Sunni political movement/party. The SSP's objective is to have Pakistan be decaled a Sunni state.

[433] This was a very small violent group that derived from Neo-Wahhabiyyaism sponsored from Saudi Arabia. See: http://haganah.us/harchives/003973.html

Afghanistan)								
Harakat al-Shuhada al-Islamiyah (Islamic Martyrs Movement)	1996	Inactive after 1998	Ahmed, Abdallah Al-Hami, Mahummad Khaleefa	Unknown	Libya	1998	1	0
Harakat ul-Jihad-I-Islam (HUJI)	1980	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Pakistan			
Harakat ul-Mudjahidin (HUM)[434]	2002	Current	AL-Ghabra, Mohammed Azhar, Maulana Khalil, Farooq	300	Pakistan	2002 2004 2005 2006	1 3 1 1	0 1 0 0
Harakah al-Isamiyyah (The Islamic Movement)	Civil War Years	Civil War Years	Unknown	Unknown	Lebanon	Violent		
Harakat al-Jihad al-Islami fi-Filastin (Movement of Islamic Struggle in Palestine)	Civil War Years	Civil War Years	Unknown	Very Small	Violent	Lebanon Palestine		
Harkat Ul-Ansar	1993	Inactive after 1995	Khalil, Fazlur Rehman, Matiur	Inactive	Pakistan	1994 1995	1 1	0 0
Harakat il-Jihad-I-Islami-Bangladesh[435]	2000	Current	Unknown	Over 3,000 members[436]	Bangladesh	2000	1	0
Hawk Brigades	2005	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Iraq	2005	1	0
Helpers Party	1936	Mid 1970s (1975)	Jamil Da'bul	Uknown	Lebanon			
Heritage Revival Society[437]	Mid 1980s (1985)	Mid 1990s (1995)	Unknown	Unknown	Kuwait			
Hezb-e Azadi-ye Afghanistan (Freedom Party of Afganistan)	1997	Current	Pahlawan, Abdul	Unknown	Afghanistan	2006	1	0
Hezbe	Mid	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Afghanista			

[434] HUM was formerly known as the Harakat ul-Ansar. HUM was originally established to fight in Afghanistan against the Soviet occupation, the HUM has become an international network of fighters for Islamic causes all over the world.

[435] Group is also known as: Movement of Islamic Holy War

[436] Group counts as three

[437] Heritage Revival Society was a Sunni Islamist organization that pursued a generally quietist political platform emphasizing social reforms.

Wahdat (The Islamic Party of Afghanistan)[438]	1980s (1985)				n			
Hezb-i-Islami Afghanistan	Mid 1980s	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Afghanistan			
Hezb al-daawa al-Islamiyya (Al-Daawa Party)[439]	1970s (1974)	Current	Al-Daawa	Thousands[440]	Iraq Iran	Violent		
Hezbollah	1982	Current	Al-Mughassil, Ahmad Al-Nasser, Abdelkarium Al-Yacoub, Ibrahim	Over 1,000[441]	Lebanon (Iran and Syria)	1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005	8 36 29 14 22 10 12 3 9 3 6 2 8 6 1 5 0 0 1 0 2 1 1	4 1 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hezbollah Bahrain	1996	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Bahrain (Iran)			
Hezbollah Gulf	1996	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Saudi Arabia			
Hikmatul Zihad	2004	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Bangladesh		Violent	
Hizb al Dawah al-Islamiyyah (Party of Islamic Call)	Civil War Years	Civil War Years	Unknown	Unknown	Lebanon			

[438] The Hezbe Wahdat is also known as the Wahdat. The HW is the largest Shia group in Afghanistan.
[439] The Al-Daawa Party is a Shiite party/movement
[440] Upwards of 200,000 Shiites ended up in political exile in Iran, over the course of the 1980s and 1990s many of these exiles joined the Iran-based al-Daawa, which accepted Khomeini's clerical rule; Group counts as three in Iran and one in Iraq.
[441] Group counts as three

Hizb-I-Islami Islamic Party	Mid 1970s (1974)	Current	Hikmatyar, Gulbuddin	Unknown	Afghanistan	2004	2	0
Hizb-I Islami Gulbuddin (HIG)[442]	1977	Current	Unknown	Unknoen	Afghanistan Pakistan		Violent	
Hizb el Nahda	1980s (1983)	Current	Rashid AL-Ghannushi	Unknown	Tunisia			
Hizbul Mujahideen[443]	1989	Current	Butt, Abdul Dar, Majeed Dar, Ahsan Dhar, Ahsan	100	Pakistan	2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006	1 2 4 1 2 7 9	0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Hizb ut-Tahrir[444]	1953	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Bangladesh Lebanon			
Hizb ut-Tahrir-Egypt	1950s	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Egypt			
Hizb ut-Tahrir (The Party of Liberation)[445]	1953	Current	Judge Sheikh Taqiuddin al-Habhani	Unknown	Jordan West Bank Syria Iraq Turkey Lebanon Sudan			
Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami (Islamic Party of Liberation)[446]	1952	Current	Unknown	Over 5,000[447]	Uzbekistan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Pakistan Syria Turkey Indonesia			
Hizb-1-Wahdat	1980s (1982)	Current	Khalili	Unknown	Afghanistan			
Holders of Black Banners	2004	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Iraq		Violent	

[442] Goal of group is to liberate Afghanistan from the influence of foreign forces
[443] Largest Kashmir militant group and supports the liberation of Kashmir and its accession to Pakistan
[444] Hizb ut-Tahrir is dedicated to what it sees as the political unity of Muslims through the re-establishment of the caliphate, destroyed in 1924 by disbelieving colonialists, the removal of what it sees as neo-colonialist western control of the Islamic world, and a return to government based on Islamic law.
[445] The group argues that all Muslims should abolish national boundaries within the Islamic world and return to a single Islamic state, known as the "Caliphate"
[446] Their platform and actions fit within an "Islamic globalization" which is an alternative mode of globalization based on radical Islam. They have called for a jihad against the United States and its allies, and moderate Muslim states. The purpose of this jihad is to find and kill the kufar (non-believers).
[447] Because of size and/or membership groups is counted as three

Holy Jihad Brigades	2006	Current	Unknown	100	Palestinian	2006	1	0
Holy War Society	Civil War Years	Civil War Years	Unknown	Unknown	Algeria			
Holy Warriors in Egypt	2005	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Egypt	2005	2	
Ikhwan (Brotherhood)[448]	Early 1990s (1992)	Current	Unknown	Small	Saudi Arabia			
Imam Hussein Brigades	2005	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Iraq	2005 2006	3 1	0 0
International Justice Group[449]	1995	Inactive after 1995	Unknown	Inactive	Egypt	1995	1	0
Iran Liberation Front	1986	Current	Manuchehr Ganji	Unknown	Iran			
Iran Baluchistan	2004	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Iran			
Iranian Democratic Party of Kurdistan (KDIP)[450]	1945	Current	Alyar, Awat Ghassemlou, Abdoul Hassanzadeh, Mustapha	1,800	Iran			
Iran Women Society	1989	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Iran			
Iranian Mujahideen	1980	Current	Unknown	Large[451]	Iran			
Iran Prosperity Party	1999	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Iran			
Iran Independence Party	1999	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Iran			
Iraqi Democratic Front	1982	Current	Unknown	Inactive	Iraq	1982	2	0

[448] These Militant disciples of Wahhabi theologian, Muhammad bin Abd al-Wahhab, constituted the military formations used by Abd al-Wahhab, constituted the military formation used to create the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia during the 1920s. Suppressed by the government of the new state in the mid-1930s, they provided the inspiration for contemporary proponents of strict social and cultural practices in the kingdom, who resurrected the movement under its old name in the early 1990s.

[449] Gama's al-Adela al-Alamiya

[450] Also Known as: Kurdish Democratic Part of Iran; Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran, Revolutionary Leadership, Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran, Revolutionary Command

[451] Counted as three

The Iraqi Hezbollah	2003	Current	Unknown	300	Iraq	Violence		
Iraqi Legitimate Resistance	2004	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Iraq	2004`	1	0
Iraqi Liberation Army	1980	Inactive after 1981	Unknown	Inactive	Iraq	1981	1	1
Iraqi National Resistance	2005	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Iraq	2005	1	0
Iraqi Revenge Brigades	2005	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Iraq	2005 2006	1 1	0 0
Islam Devotees Society	1989	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Iran			
Islami Chhatra Shibir[452]	1941	Current	Unknown	Golam Azam	Bangladesh	2001	1	1
Islami Inqilabi Mahaz	1997	Inactive after 1997	Unknown	Unknown	Pakistan	1997	1	1
Islami Okiya Jote (IOJ) Islamic United Front	1990	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Bangladesh			
Islamic Action in Iraq	1984	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Iraq Iran	1984	4	0
Islamic Action Front in Jordan[453]	1992	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Jordan			
Islamic Action Organization	1961	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Iran Iraq Syria	1984	1	0
Islamic Action Society[454]	Mid 1990s (1995)	Current	Shaykh Shaykh Muhammad	Unknown	Bahrain			
Islamic al-Waqqas Brigade	2004	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Iraq	2004	1	0
Islamic Amal Movement (Harakat Amal al-Islamiyyah)	1982[455]	Current	Husayn al-Musawi	Unknown	Lebanon			

[452] ISC is one of the more radical Islamic political parties in Bangladesh and has expressed solidarity with the Taliban regime in Afghanistan.
[453] IAFJ is the political wing of the Muslim Brotherhood Association in Jordan
[454] The Islamic Action Society is the party that calls for public demonstrations and political seminars focusing on the issues affecting the majority Shia, who have been ruled by the minority Sunnis.

Islamic army of Aden (IAA) (Aden-Abyan Islamic Army)	1998	Inactive after 2001	Unknown	Unknown	Yemen	1998	1	0
Islamic Army in Iraq	2004	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Iraq	2004 2005 2006	13 11 13	0 5 1
Islamic Association	1980	Mid 1990s	Unknown	Unknown	Iraq (Iran)			
Islamic Association	1979	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Iran			
Islamic Call (to faith) Party[456]	1968	Current	Unknown	Unknown (rather large)	Iraq Iran	1985 Violent	1	1
Islamic Civilization Party	1999	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Iran			
Islamic Community[457]	1964	1990	Unknown	Unknown	Lebanon	Violent		
Islamic Coalition Society	1990	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Iran			
Islamic Congress	1970	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Palestine			
Islamic Front[458]	Early 1970s	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Lebanon			
Islamic Front for Iraqi Resistance	2005	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Iraq	2005	1	0
Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain (IFLB)[459]	Late 1960s	Current	Ali al-Mafoudh, Aheikh AL-Jamry, Mansur	500	Syria Bahrain Iran			
Islamic Front for the Liberation of Palestine[460]	1986	Inactive after 1990	Unknown	Unknown	Lebanon	1990	1	0

[455] Islamic AMAL is a splinter group of AMAL and most of the Islamic AMAL members left the group and joined Hezbollah in 1980s; however the group still exists but is very small

[456] Also known as the Hizb al Da'wa al Islamiyya this is a Shiite party whose goal was to overthrow the Ba'thist Regime in Iraq and create an Iranian style Islamic Republic

[457] This is a Sunni Militant movement

[458] Coalition of Sunni and Shiite shaykhs

[459] This is a Shiite group seeking to create an Islamic revolution in Bahrain under Iranian state sponsorship.

[460] For the most part this is a secular group and/or movement

Islamic Front in Syria	1980	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Syria			
Islamic Glory Brigades in the Land of the Nile	2005	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Egypt	2005	1	1
Islamic Great Eastern Raiders Front	1970s (1972)	Current	Mizabeyoglu, Salih	100	Turkey	1994 1998 1999 2000 2001	2 1 8 3 2	0 0 0 0 0
Islamic Holy War Organization (Munazzamal al-Juihad al-Islami	Early 1970s	Unknown after 1995	Unknown	Very Small	Lebanon			
Islamic International Peacekeeping Brigade	1998	Current	Unknown	400	Azerbaijan Turkey (Saudi Arabia)		Violent	
Islamic Iran Solidarity Party	1998	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Iran			
Islamic Iran Participation Front[461]	1998	Current	Mohammad Reza Khatami	Unknown	Iran			
Islamic Jihad Brigades	2005	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Iraq	2005	1	0
Islamic Jihad Group[462]	2004	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Uzbekistan	2004	3	3
Islamic Jihad in the Hijaz[463]	Mid 1980s (1985)	Inactive (1992)	Unknown	Unknown	Lebanon Saudi Arabia (Iran)	Violent		
Islamic Jihad Jerusalem	1998	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Palestinian	1998 2001 2003 2004 2005	1 1 2 11 9	1 1 2 0 0
Islamic Jihad Group	2004	Current	Unknown	Small	Uzbekistan	Violent		

[461] The Islamic Iran Participation Front is a reformist political party; however the party still backs Islam but insists on an Islamic democracy

[462] Islamic Jihad Union is also known as the Islamic Jihad Group

[463] Also known as Hezbollah in the Hijaz; this group is an Iranian state-sponsored movement based in Lebanon and they have the revolutionary goal of overthrowing the Saudi Arabian monarchy in favor of an Iranian-style Islamic republic.

Uzbekistan								
Islamic Guidance Party	1990	1996	Unknown	Unknown	Iran			
Islamic Labor Party	1999	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Iran			
Islamic Labor Welfare Party	1999	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Iran			
Islamic Liberation Organization	1974	Inactive after 1985	Unknown	Inactive	Egypt Lebanon Libya Jordan Palestine	1974 1985	1 1	0 0
Islamic Liberation Party (Hizb al-Tahrir al-Islami)	1990	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Uzbekistan Tajikistan Kyrgyzstan Kazakhstan (Saudi Arabia)			
Islamic Liberation Party[464]	1953	Current			Palestinian Jordan Syria Lebanon (Saudi Arabia)			
Islamic Martyrs Movement Abdallah Djeallah	1996	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Libya			
Islamic Jihad	Early 1970s (1972)	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Libya			
Islamic Liberation Party	1963	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Jordan Syria			
Islamic Meetings[465]	1975	1990	Unknown	Unknown	Iraq			
The Islamic Movement	Civil War Years	Civil War Years	Unknown	Very Small	Algeria			
Islamic Movement for Change	1995	Current	Al-Shuwaykhat, Jafaar	Unknown	Saudi Arabia Syria (Iran)	1996	2	0
Islamic	2004	Inactive	Unknown	Unknown	Iraq	2004	1	0

[464] The original Islamic Liberation Front was created in 1953 in East Jerusalem as a splinter group from the Muslim Brotherhood. According to its platform, its mission is to reinstitute the Islamic Caliphate was destroyed in 1924 and to institute Muslim religious law and to liberate the Islamic Ummah from foreign influence. It must be emphasized that the ILF is a moderate party that communicates its messages via non-violent methods.
[465] Sunni Group

Movement of Holy Warriors		after 2004						
Islamic Movement of Iraqi Mujahideen	2004	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Iraq	2004	1	0
Islamic Movement of Algeria (MIA)[466]	1989	1989	Unknown	Unknown	Algeria	1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1988 1987	1 1 1 1 1 1 1	
Islamic Movement of Kurdistan	1998	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Kurdistan			
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan[467]	1998	Current	Khojaev, Jumaboi Yuldeshev, Tohir	700	Afghanistan Iran Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Pakistan Tajikistan Uzbekistan	1999 2001 2005	4 1 1	0 0 0
Islamic National Front[468]	1970	Current	Dr. Hassan al-Turabi	Large[469]	Sudan	Very Violent		
Islamic Party of Egypt	Unknown	Inactive after 1994	Unknown	Unknown	Egypt	1994	1	0
Islamic Party of Liberation (Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami)[470]	1953	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Jordan Syria Egypt Libya Tunisia			
Islamic Peninsula Movement for Change – Jihad Wing	New Group (2005?)	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Saudi Arabia			

[466] The MIA led a campaign against the Algerian regime form 1992-1987.

[467] The group's original goal was the overthrowing of the government of Uzbek President Islam Karimov and replacing it with an Islamic state in Uzbekistan. The group changed its name in 2001 to the Islamic Party of Uzbekistan and its new objective was the creation of an Islamic state in all of Central Asia, which would include all of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and China's Xinxiang province.

[468] Ruling Party

[469] Group will be counted three times

[470] This group believes it can achieve its utopian state in three steps. The first involves educating Muslims about its philosophies and goals. In the second step, the Muslims would then spread these views among others in their countries, especially members of the government, the military and other power centers. In the third and final step, they believe its faithful will cause secular governments to crumble because loyalists will then lie solely with Islam – not nationalities, politics, or ethnic identifications. See: http://www.freemuslims.org/news/article.php?article=1276

Islamic Rage Brigade	2004	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Iraq	2004	1	0
Islamic Renewal Movement	1995	Inactive after 1995	Unknown	Inactive	Jordan	1995	1	0
Islamic Republican Party[471]	1989	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Iran			
Islamic Renaissance Movement	Mid 1990s (1995)	Current	Lahbib Adam	Small	Algeria			
Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP)[472]	1990	Current	Unknown	Said Abdullo Nuri	Uzbekistan Tajikistan			
Islamic Resistance Movement	1970	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Lebanon			
Islamic Resistance	Civil War Years	Civil War Years	Unknown	Unknown	Lebanon (Iran)	Violent		
Islamic Resistance Brigades	2004	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Iraq	2004 2005	1 1	0 0
Islamic Resistance Party	2001	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Tajikistan			
Islamic Revival Movement (Mouvement de la Nahda Islamique (MNI)[473]	1990	Current	Abdallah Djeallah	Unknown	Algeria			
Islamic Revolution Party	1980s	Mid 1990s	Unknown	Unknown	Iraq (Iran)			
Islamic Revolution Party	1979	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Iran			
Islamic Revolutionary Organization	Before 1994	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Saudi Arabia (Iran)			

[471] The IRP was the political party of the pro-Khomeini clergy; however, the conservatives and radicals within the party could not work together and compromise and as a result the party fell apart.

[472] A year before the fall of the USSR, Muslims established the last Soviet political party in Astrakhan, the IRP. The IRP mandate explicitly states that the party is opposed to ethnic nationalism and aims at being the political expression of all Muslims of the USSR. The ideology of the party is very similar to that of the Muslim Brotherhood: to establish an Islamic state by combining da'wat (predication) with political action.

[473] The MNI was exclusively identified with its founder and leader, Abdallah Djeallah. His decision to transform his association into a political party came in the early fall of 1990, following the rejection by the FIS of Mahfound Nahnah's call for Islamic Alliance, which Djeballah supported.

Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)[474]	1979	Current	The State of Iran	4,000[475]	Iran Lebanon			
Islamic Salvation Front[476]	1989	Current	Belhadj, Ali Cherif, Rashid Haddam, Anouar	4,000[477]	Algeria	1992	3	0
Islamic Shashantantra Andolon[478]	2002	Inactive after 2002	Karim, Syed Fazlul	5,000[479]	Bangladesh	2002	2	0
Islamic Society[480]	1986	Current	Unknown	Inactive	Lebanon	1986	1	0
Islamic Society Movement (Mouvement de la Societe Islamique)[481]	1990	Current	Mangound Nahnah	Unknown	Algeria			
Islamic Society of Philanthropic Projects	1970s	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Lebanon Syria (Saudi Arabia)			
Islamic Squadrons for the Liberation of Iraq	2005	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Iraq		Violent	
Islamic State of Iraq	2006	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Iraq		Violent	
Islamic State of Iraq	2006	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Iraq	2006	77	11
Islamic Struggle Movement (Harakah al-Islamiyyah al-Mujahidah)	Civil War Years	Civil War Years	Unknown	Very Small	Violent			

[474] The IRGC was created by the 1979 Iranian Constitution with "defending the Islamic Revolution and safeguarding its achievements"
[475] Counted as three
[476] Also known as: Armee Islamiquede Salut (AIS), Army of Islamic Salvation, and the Islamic Salvation Army. The FIS was initially created as a network of small, independent mosque groups
[477] Counted as three
[478] This is an alliance of numerous small parties in Bangladesh. The ISA is opposed tot eh current secular rule in Bangladesh and their objective is the enforcement of Sharia in the country
[479] Counted as three
[480] Also referred to as the Islamic Coalition and is based on an organization of extremist Sunni Muslim factions based in Southern Lebanon
[481] The acronym is HAMAS. HAMAS is the political expression of the national nonpolitical association for Guidance and Reform.

Islamic Tendency Movement[482]	1979	1987	Unknown	Unknown	Tunisia			
Islamic Tunisian Front	1995	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Tunisia			
Islamic Unification Movement	1994	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Lebanon			
Islamic Unity Front (Islami Oikko Jot)	1985	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Bangladesh			
Islamic Unity Front (IUF)	2001	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Kurdistan			
Islamic Youth[483]	1969	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Morocco			
Israeli Arab Movement	Unknown	Inactive after 1999	Unknown	Unknown	Israel	1999	1	1
Ittihad-i-Islami Bara-yi Azadi Afghanistan (Islamic Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan)	Early 1980s (1982)	Current	Abdul Rasul Sayyaf	Unknown	Afghanistan (Saudi Arabia)			
Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh[484]	1998	Current	Islam, Siddiqul Rahman, Maulana	Unknown	Bangladesh	2005	2	0
Jaish al-Taifa al-Mansoura Amry of the Victorious Community	2003	Current	Al, Al-Haj Osama, Abu	Unknown	Iraq	2005	3	0
Jaish a-Mohammad (Army of Mohammad)	2000	Current	Ahmed, Maulana Azhar, Maulana Jabbar, Maulana	100	Pakistan	2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006	2 1 1 1 1 19	1 0 0 0 1 0

[482] The Nahdha (Resergence) seeks to replace existing secular governments in Tunisia with an Islamic regime under which religious and political affairs would be governed via Islamic law.

[483] This is one of the most active Islamic movements in Morocco. It seeks to overthrow the monarchy and establish Islamist political system.

[484] Also known as the Awakened Muslim Masses of Bangladesh and Jama'Atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB). The goal of the group was/is to create an Islamic state based on the Sharia via an Islamic revolution.

Jaish ul-Muslimin	2004	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Afghanistan	2004 2006	1 1	0 0
Jama'ah a-Islamiyyah (Islamic Association)	Early 1970s	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Lebanon			
Jama'at al Fuqra (Group of the Poor)[485]	Early 1980s (1982)	Current	Unknown	200	Pakistan			
Jama'at-I Islami (Islamic Party)	1941	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Pakistan			
Jama'at al-Tabiligh (Society of Transition)	1970	1975	Unknown	Unknown	Egypt			
Jamaat-e-Islami Bangladesh[486]	1978	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Bangladesh			
Jama't al-Muslimin[487]	1978	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Egypt (Saudi Arabia)			
Jamaat ul-Fuqra	2002	Current	Jaish Mohammad	Unknown	Pakistan	2003	1	1
Jamiat Islami (Islamic Society)[488]	1968	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Afghanistan			
Jamatul Majahedin Bangladesh[489]	2005	Current	Al-Ghalib, Muhammad Islam, Siddiqul	10,000[490]	Bangladesh	2005	12	4
Jamiat-I Ulama[491]	Early 1980s (1982)	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Pakistan			
Jamiat-i-	2001	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Afghanista			

[485] This is a small Sunni Islamic group/movement the group is also known as the Jihad Council of North America and also the Muslims of the Americans. Members live in approximately 97 small communal cells, isolated from surrounding society and attempting to live according to the precepts of an austere form of Fundamentalist Islam.

[486] Jamaat-e-Islami Bangladesh is the largest and most influential Islamic political party in Bangladesh because of this it will be counted three times

[487] The group's popular name in: al-Takfir wal-Hijrah. This group has adopted the Saudi Ikhwan ideas in all their extremism, including the idea of settling in the desert to found a pure Islamic society (Hijrah).

[488] The Jamiat Islami is the oldest Islamic political party in Afghanistan. It has a communitarian ideology based on Islamic law but is also considered moderately progressive

[489] Their goal is the removing the country's secular government and impose a Taliban inspired Islamic theocracy in its place

[490] Because of group's size and/or membership it will be counted as three

[491] Party was formed to help fight the Soviets in Afghanistan

Khudamul Quran[492]					n			
Jamiat Ul-Majahedin	1990	Current	Basit, Sheikh Salah, Mohammed	Unknown	Pakistan	2003 2004 2006	3 1 7	0 0 0
Jammu and Kashmir Islamic Front	1995	Current	Baig, Nilal Jehangir, Arif	Inactive	Kashmir[493]	1995 1996 2006	1 2 2	0 0
Jeay Sindu and Muttahida Movement	2001	Inactive after 2001	Hussain Altaf	Inactive	Pakistan	2001	1	0
Jemaah Islamiya (Islamic community Islamic Group)	1993	Current	Anshori, Abdullah Bashir, Abu Bun Hur, Zulkifi	300	Indonesia	2002 2004 2005	1 3 1	1 1 1
Jenin Martyr's Brigade	2003	Current	Unknown	100	Palestinian	2003 2005	1 1	1 0
Jewish Defense League[494]	1984	1992	Meir Kahane	Small	Israel			
Jewish National Front (Hayil)	2004	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Israel			
Jihad Brigades	Before 1987	Inactive after 2004	Unknown	Unknown	Jordan Iraq Palestine	1987 1991 2004	1 1 1	0 0 0
Jihad Pegah (Jihad Base)	2005	Current	Unknown	Small	Irag			
Jihad in Sweden	2005	Current	Fahlen, Andreas Ganjin, Nima	Inactive	Sweden AL-Qaeda	2005	1	0
Jihad Pegah (Jihad Base)	2005	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Iraq	2005	2	2
Jordanian Free Officers Movement[495]	1974	Inactive after 1977	Unknown	Inactive	Jordan	1974 1977	1 1	0 0
Jordanian Islamic Resistance	1997	Current	Unknown	100	Jordan	1997	1	0
Jordanian Muslim	Early 1950s	Current	Unknown	Large	Jordan			

[492] Also known as the Association of Servants of the Quran
[493] JKIF was formed by Pakistan's intelligence agency
[494] This party/movement called for the expulsion of all Arabs from Israel, arguing Jews and Arabs cannot coexist.
[495] Nationalist/secular group/movement. Dropped from large N and kept in terrorist data

Brotherhood								
Jordanian National Liberation Movement[496]	1972	Inactive after 1972	Unknown	Inactive	Egypt Jordan	1972	1	0
Liberation Party of the Peninsula[497]	1978	1979	Unknown	Unknown	Saudi Arabia			
Jordanian Hamas	1988	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Jordan			
Jordanian Mujahideen	1980s	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Jordan			
Jordanian Revolutionary and Military Committee	1983	Inactive after 1983	Unknown	Inactive	Jordan	1983	2	0
Jordanian Democratic People's Party	1989	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Jordan			
Jund al-Sham (army of the Levant: Soldiers of Greater Syria)	1999	Current	Al-Sahmarani, Ghandi Sharqiyah, Muhammad	30	Afghanistan Lebanon Syria West Bank	2005	2	1
Jund Allah (Soldiers of Allah)[498]	1970	Mid 1970s	Unknown	Unknown	Egypt			
Jund Allah Organization for the Sunni Mujahideen in Iran	2005	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Iran	2005	1	0
Jundallah[499]	2005	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Gaza/West Bank	2005	1	
June 16 Organization[500]	1987	Inactive after 1989	Unknown	Inactive	Turkey	1987 1989	1 1	0 0
Junud Allah (Soldiers of	1970	1977	Unknown	Very Small	Egypt		Semi-Violent	

[496] Nationalist/secular group/movement. Dropped from large N and kept in terrorist data

[497] This Shiite organization was active in the eastern province of Saudi Arabia in the months following the Iranian Revolution. I Believe is also called the Liberation Party of Jazirah (Hizb Tahrir al-Jazirah (Liberation Party of Jazirah) – Dekmejian (1995) did not have Liberation Party of the Peninsula but did have Liberation Party of Jizirah and both were active and suppressed right after the Iranian Revolution

[498] In 1970 Sadat co-opted several leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood into the Egyptian political system. As a result, members of the Muslim Brotherhood broke off and formed more radical short-lived groups.

[499] This is a new radical Islamic group and it is assumed they have close ties with al-Qaeda and the group consists of mostly former Hamas and Islamic Jihad members. Others feel this new group is a split from Fatah.

[500] Leftist movement/party; dropped from large N but included in terrorist data

God)								
Jund al-Haq (Soldiers of Truth)	Civil War Years	Civil War Years	Unknown	Unknown	Lebanon		Violent	
Justice and Charity (AL Adi Wal Ihsane)	1981	Current	Arslane, Fathallah Chibani, Abdallah	Unknown[501]	Morocco			
Justice Commandos for the Armenian Genocide[502]	1975	Inactive after 1983	Unknown	Inactive	Lebanon	1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983	1 1 4 9 2 5 1	0 0 0 0 0 0 0
KACH	1971	Current	Federman, Noam Kahane, Rabbi Marzel, Baruch	100	Israel	1988 1991 1992 1994 1998 2002 2005	1 1 1 1 2 1 1	0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Kahane Chai	1990	Inactive after 1995	Ben-Gvir, Itamir Federman, Noam Kahane, Binyamin	100	Israel	1993 1995	1 1	0 0
Kamtapur Liberation Organization	1995	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Bangladesh			
Karbala Brigades	2004	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Iraq	2004	1	0
Kata'ib al-Junayd al-Jihadiyah (Junayd Judaist Brigades)	2005	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Iraq	2005	1	0
Khaibar Brigades	1985	Inactive after 1985	Unknown	Inactive	Lebanon	1985	3	0
Kifaya (Enough)[503]	2000	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Egypt			
Knights of the Storm	2005	Active	Unknown	Unknown	West Bank	2005	1	0
Komando Jihad (Holy Way Command)	Mid 1970s (1975)	Inactive after 1981	Unknown	Inactive	Indonesia	1981	1	0

[501] Exact size in unknown; however, this is the largest Islamic group in Morocco, attracting primarily high school and university students as well as many civil servants

[502] JCAG was dedicated to establishing an independent Armenian state

[503] This is a grassroots coalition which draws its support from across Egypt and opposes President Mubarak's presidency and the possibility that he may transfer power directly to his son

Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia	1995	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Indonesia			
Kurdish Democratic Party	1946	Current	Barzani, Massoud Barzani, Mustafa	Unknown	Iraq	1998	1	0
Kurdish Islamic Unity Party	1995	Inactive after 1995	Unknown	Inactive	Turkey	1995	1	0
Kurdish Patriotic Union	1994	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Turkey	1994	3	0
Kurdistan Freedom Hawks	2004	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Iraq	2004 2005 2006	9 7 19	0 0 0
Kurdistan National Union	Unknown	Inactive since 1987	Unknown	Unknown	Iraq	1987	2	0
Kurdistan Workers Party	1974	Current	Bayik, Cemil Kalkan, Duran Ocalan, Abdullah Ocalan, Osman	Over 1,000	Turkey	1980 1989 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2003 2004 2005 2006	10 1 1 5 23 5 25 2 2 2 11 4 3 13 13	0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (Army of Jhangvi)	1996	Current	Ajmal, Muhammad Asif, Choto Basra, Riaz	Less than 300	Pakistan	1997 1998 2001 2002 2004 2005	1 1 1 4 3 1	0 0 0 0 1 0
Lashkar I Jhangvi	1995	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Libya	1996[504]	1	
Lashkar-e-Taiba (Army of the Pure)	2000	Current	Iqbal, Zafar Kashmiri, Maulana Saeed, Mohammed	300	Pakistan	2000 2001 2002 2003 2005 2006	1 3 10 2 3 9	
Lashkar-I-Omar	2001	Active last 2001	Hai, Qai Abdul	Unknown	Pakistan	2001	1	0
Laskar Jihad (Army of Jihad)	2000	Active last 2002	Thalib, Jafar	10,000[505]	Indonesia	2002	1	0

[504] It claimed responsibility for an assassination attempt against Gaddafi in 1996 which failed.
[505] Counted ass three

Lebanese Arab Youth	1977	Active last 1977	Unknown	Inactive	Lebanon	1977	4	0
Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Faction	1979	Active last 1986	Unknown	Inactive	Lebanon	1981 1982 1984 1985 1986	1 5 2 1 1	0 0 0 0 0
Lebanese Islamic Resistance Front	Civil War Years	Civil War Years	Unknown	Very Small	Lebanon			
Lebanese Force[506]	1975	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Lebanon	1975	Violent [507]	
Lebanese Liberation Front	1987	Current	Unknown	Inactive	Lebanon (Syria)	1987 1989	3 1	0 0
Lebanese Mujahideen	1980S	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Lebanon			
Lebanese National Resistance Front[508]	1982	Active last 1990	Unknown	Inactive	Lebanon	1983 1984 1985 1990	2 1 3 1	0 0 2 0
Lebanese Revolutionary Socialist Movement[509]	1975	Active last 1974	Unknown	Inactive	Lebanon	1974	1	0
Lebanese Resistance Detachments	1985	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Lebanon			
Lebanese Socialist Revolutionary Organization [510]	1973	Active last 1974	Unknown	Inactive	Lebanon	1973 1974	1 2	0 0
Legitimate Command	1996	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Sudan			
Liberation Battalion	1987	Current	Unknown	Inactive	Lebanon (Syria)	1987	1	0
Liberation Party	1970s	Active last 2003	Unknown	Unknown	Israel	2003	1	0

[506] Lebanese Force is a former militia during the civil war (it is currently a political party) which fought on the side of the Christians
[507] Violent during the civil war years
[508] LNRF is a Communist/Socialist party/movement. Dropped from large N analysis but included in terrorism data
[509] LRSM is a Socialist party/movement. Dropped from large N analysis but included in terrorism data
[510] LSRO is a Socialist party/movement. Dropped from large N analysis but included in terrorism data

The Liberation Party[511]	1974	1975	Salem Rahhal and Saleh Serrya	Very small				
Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (Al jam'a Al-Islamiyyah al-MMuqatilah Bo-i-Libya)[512]	1995	Current	Unknown	300	Libya			
Libyan Jihad Movement	1980	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Libya			
Libyan National Democratic Movement	1979	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Libya			
Libyan National Movement	1980	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Libya			
Libyan National Salvation Committee	1981	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Libya			
Lions of the Truth Brigades	2006	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Iraq	2006	1	0
Lord's Resistance Army	1992	Current	Joseph Koney	Unknown	Sudan		Violent	
Martyr Abdallah Azzam Brigades (Saudi Arabia)	2004	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Iraq		Violent	
Martyr Al-Hakim (Saudi Arabia)	2004	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Yemen Saudi Arabia Iraq Afghanistan			
Martyrs for Allah (Saudi Arabia)	2004	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Syria Iraq Saudi Arabia			

[511] Founded by two Palestinians in 1974 only to be crushed by the State the same year – the group was blamed for an attempts coup d'ate known as the "incident for the Technical Military Academy"

[512] Group also known as: Libyan Fighting Group, Libyan Islamic Group, Fighting Islamic Group, and Muslim Brothers

Mattyr Umar (Saudi Arabia)	2004	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Iraq Saudi Arabia Yemen			
Mahdi Army	2003	Current	Unknown	Small	Iraq (Iran)			
Mehdi Army	2003	Current	Al-sadr, Moqtada	Unknown	Iraq	2004	4	0
Marada Brigade[513]	1975	Current	Unknown	3500[514]	Lebanon	Violent		
Mahir Cayan Suicide Group	1975	Active last 1975	Unknown	Unknown	Turkey	1975	1	0
Majlis al-Islami al-Shi al-Ala (Shiite Council)	Early 1970s	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Lebanon (Iran)			
Majmuat Husain al-Intihariyyah (Husayn Suicide Squads)	Civil War	Civil War	Unknown	Unknown	Lebanon (Iran)	Violent		
Martyr Abu-Ali Mustafa Brigades[515] (Red Eagles)	2001	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Palestinian	2006	1	0
May 15 Organization for the Liberation of Palestine	1979	Active last 1985	Unknown	Unknown	Iraq	1981 1982 1984 1985	3 2 1 1	0 0 0 0
Military Wing of the Greater Syrian Army	2005	Current	Unknown	Inactive	Qatar	2005	1	1
Millat-E-Islami	1970	Last active 2003	Unknown	Unknown	Pakistan			
Milli Gurtulush[516]	1989	Current	Mahammad Hatemi Tantekin	Small	Azerbaijan			
Militant Clerics	1989	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Iran			

[513] This is a Maronite Christian faction in the Lebanese civil war which turned into a political party after 1990.
[514] 3500 was the height of its membership (during the civil war years) from 1975-1990 the group will be counted as three
[515] The Abu-ali Mustafa Brigades operates under the direction of the PFLP. The PFLP is a Marxist-Leninist Palestinian secular nationalist movement
[516] Translates to the National Development Party

League								
Mohajir Qami Movement (Real Mohajir Qami Movement)	1992	Active last 1998	Ahmed, Afaq Khan, Aamir	Unknown	Pakistan	1998	1	0
Mohammed's Army	2000	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Yemen	2000	1	0
Muhammad's Army	Mid 1980s (1983)	Active last 2002[517]	Al-Dik, Khalili Hawshar, Abu	Unknown	Jordan	1991	6	0
Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group[518]	Early 1990s	Current	Rachid Bendouda Taeb Bentizi Abdennabi Kounjaa	Unknown	Morocco Turkey Egypt Afghanistan (Saudi Arabia)		Violent	
Mosque Society	Early 1970s	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Saudi Arabia			
Movement for Democracy	1991	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Libya			
Movement for Democracy in Algeria[519]	Mid 1990s (1995)	Current	Ahmed Ben Bella	Small	Algeria			
Movement of the Disinherited[520]	1974	1991	Unknown	Unknown	Lebanon	1975	Violent	
Movement for Islamic Change	1995	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Saudi Arabia	1995 1996	1 1	
Movement for the Struggle of the Jordanian Islamic Resistance	2000	Active last 2000	Unknown	Unknown	Jordan	2000	1	0
Movement of Islamic Action on Iraq	1982	Current	Unknown	Inactive	Iran Iraq	1982	1	0
Movement in Youthward Brothers in	1971	Active last 1971	Unknown	Unknown	Palestinian	1971	1	0

[517] In 2002 most members and leaders were imprisoned by the Jordanian government
[518] This group is dedicated to the creation of an Islamic state in Morocco. The group actively supports al-Qaeda's terrorsit objectives
[519] Moderate Islamic Party
[520] This organization was successful in recruiting some of the Shiite masses by advocating armed struggle.

War of the Palestinian People								
Movement for the Liberation of Bahrain[521]	1981	Inactive after 1987	Unknown	Inactive	Bahrain (Iran)			
Movement for National Reform	1994	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Algeria			
Movement for the Social Peace	1992	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Algeria			
Muadh Ibn Jabal Brigade	2005	Current	Sahar, Abu	Unknown	Iraq	2005	2	0
Mujahadi Bayi Al-Maqdid Brigades (Fighters if Jerusalem Brigades)	2005	Current	Unknown	Unknown	West Bank	2005	1	0
Mujahedin-e-Khalq People's Mujahideen of Iran	1963	Current	Rajavi, Maryam Rajavi, Massoud	500	Iran Iraq	1975 1976 1981 1987 1992 1994 1996 1998 2001	1 1 1 1 3 2 1 7 2	0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mujahideen Army	2004	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Iraq	2004 2005	3 1	0 0
Mujahidin (Fighters)	1979	Mid 1990s	Unknown	Unknown	Iraq (Iran)			
Mujahideen Division Khandaq	2000	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Indonesia	2000	1	0
Mujahideen in Iraq	2004	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Iraq	2004 2005	1 1	0 0
Mujahideen Kompak	2001	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Indonesia	2001	1	0
Mujahideen Message	2003	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Afghanistan	2003	1	0
Mujahideen Shura Council (Shura Council of the Mujahideen of Iraq)	2005	Current	Al-Baghdadi, Abdullah Al-Iraqi, Abu Maysarah Al-Muhajir, Abu	Unknown	Iraq	2005	2 83	0 0
Mujahideen of Ninveh	2005	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Iraq	2005	1	0

[521] The MLB was an Iranian sponsored Shiite group/movement whose main objective was creating an Iranian-style Islamic Republic in Bahrain.

Munazzamat al-Adalah al-Thawriyyah (Revolutionary Justice Organization)	Civil War Years	Civil War Years	Unknown	Unknown	Lebanon (Iran)	Violent		
Munazzamat al-Tahrir al-Islami (Islamic Liberation Organization	Civil War Years	Civil War Years	Unknown	Small	Lebanon Palestine	Violent		
Munazzamat al-Mustadafin fil-Ard (Organization of the Oppressed on Earch)	Civil War years	Civil War Years	Unknown	Unknown	Lebanon (Iran)	Violent		
Muqawamat al-Mu'inah (Resistance of the Faithful)	Civil War Years	Civil War Years	Unknown	Unknown	Lebanon (Iran and Syria)	Violent		
Muslim Artists and Writers	1989	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Iran			
Muslim Brotherhood	1928	Current	Hassan al-Banna	More than 3000[522]	Egypt			
Muslim Brotherhood	1950	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Libya			
Muslim People's Republican Party	1979	1981	Unknown	Unknown	Iran			
Muslim Society Takfir Wal Higrah[523]	Early 1970s	Inactive after 1981	Unknown	5,000	Egypt			
Muslim United Army	2003	Current	Ramzi, Asif	Inactive	Pakistan	2003	1	0
Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (United Council of Action)[524]	2001	Active	Unknown	Unknown	Pakistan			

[522] Counted as three

[523] Also known as Jama'at al Muslimin and is a Sunni Muslim purist and revolutionary splinter group of the Muslim Brotherhood that advocated total rejection of the contemporary Egyptian social and political system in favor of a fundamental state

[524] The MMA is a coalition opposition, formed after Pakistan became part of the "Global War on Terror". The coalition is united against the current government of President Musharraf because of his support for the United States.

Muttahida Qami Movement (United National Front)	2001	Active last 2001	Hussain, Altaf	3,000[525]	Pakistan	2001	4	0
Nadeem Commando	Early 1990s (1992)	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Pakistan			
National Awakening Party[526]	Mid /late 1990s	Current	Alwi Abdurrahman Shihab	Unknown	Indonesia			
National Conciliation Party[527]	Early 2000	Current	Rafaat AL-Agroudy	185	Egypt			
National Council of Resistance of Iran	2004	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Iran			
National Democratic Alliance	1989	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Sudan			
National Front for the Liberation of Egypt	1988	Active last 1988	Unknown	Unknown	Egypt	1998	1	0
National Front for the Salvation of Libya (NFSL)	1981	Last active 2000	Abu Zeid, Ali AL-Kikhya, Mansour	Unknown	Libya			
National Democratic Front	1976	1980	Unknown	Unknown	Yemen			
National Front for the Salvation of Libya	1981	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Libya Sudan			
National Islamic Movement (Jumbish-i-Milli)	Early 1990s	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Afghanistan			
National Liberation Army of Iran	1987	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Iran			

[525] Counted as three

[526] The National Awakening Party is the third-largest political party in Indonesia. The party's base of support is strongest in the rural areas of Java, and draws from the constituency that formerly supported the conservative Muslim organization Nahdlatul Ulama. The PKB differs substantially from Nahdlatul Ulama, though, in that while it supports a role for Islam in government, it does not share the NU's support for an explicitly Islamic Republic/

[527] The National Conciliation Party presses for reaching a solution to the Palestinian issue and standing against all imperialistic schemes.

National Liberation Front of Tripura	1989	Current	Debbarma, Biswamohan Jamatiya, Nayanbasi Koloi, Mantu	1,500[528]	Bangladesh	1998 2001 2002 2003 2005 2006	1 3 4 14 4 2	0 0 0 0 0 0
National Mandate Party[529]	1970	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Indonesia			
National Movement for the Restoration of Pakistani Sovereignty	2002	Last active 2002	Unknown	Inactive	Pakistan	2002	1	0
National Rally for Democracy[530]	Late 1990s (1998)	Current	Unknown	Small[531]	Algeria			
National Revolutionary Command	1986	Current	Unknown	Inactive	Lebanon	1986	4	0
National Religious Party	1956	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Israel			
National Salvation Party[532]	1972	1981	Unknown	Thousands[533]	Turkey			
Nationalist Group for the Liberation of Palestine	1970	Last active 1972	Unknown	Unknown	Palestinian	1972	1	1
Nationalist Kurdish Revenge Teams	1999	Last active 1999	Unknown	Unknown	Turkey	1999	1	0
Ninawa Mujahideen in the City of Mosul	2005	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Iraq		Violent	
Nusantara Islamic Jihad	1999	Last active	Unknown	Unknown	Indonesia	1999	1	0

[528] Counted as three
[529] The MNP is a moderate Islamist political party
[530] The RND is a member of a three party political alliance, called the Presidential Alliance created in 2005 and compromises the parties known as the Movement for the Society of Peace (formally Hamas) and National Liberian Front (FCN)
[531] Will be counted as 3 after 1995
[532] The NSP was virtually a reconstruction of the Party for National Order (PNO), which was outlawed in May 1971. During the 1970s this was the third largest political party in Turkey. The ideology of the party aimed at eliminating secularism and establishing a theocracy in Turkey.
[533] Counted as three

Forces		1999						
Ogaden National Liberation Front	1984	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Ethiopia Somalia	1999	1	0
Omar Bin Al-Khattab Brigades	2005	Current	Unknown	Unknown	West Bank	2005	1	0
Oromo Liberation Front[534]	2000	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Ethiopia Somalia	2000 2002 2004	1 2 1	0 0 0
Pakistani Harakat ul-Mujahidin (HUM)	1990	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Violent			
Pakistan Muslim League[535]	1962	2002	Unknown	Unknown	Pakistan			
Pakistan Muslim League[536]	2002	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Pakistan			
Pakistani Mujahideen	2002	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Pakistan			
Palestine Liberation Front	1959	Last active 1990	Zaidan, Muhammad	Unknown	Palestinian Lebanon Libya Tunisia	1981 1984 1985 1988 1990	2 1 3 1 1	0 0 0 0 0
Palestine Liberation Organization	1964	Current	Arafat, Yasser		Palestinian	1970 1971 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1990 1991	2 1 3 2 1 2 1 5 15 3 1 1 2 2 17 1 1 2 1	0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Palestine	Late	Current	Al, arian, Sami	1,000[537]	Palestinian	1988	6	0

[534] OLF is a ethnic separatist guerrilla group
[535] The PLM is a centrist conservative Islamic political party.
[536] The Original Pakistan Muslim League was eliminated by President Musharraf and has sense splintered into three different parties all with the same name
[537] Because of size – count as three

Islamic Jihad	1970s (1978)		Awda, Sheikh Musa, Bashir Saadi, Luay		Lebanon Syria Israel	1989 1990 1993 1994 1995 1998 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006	1 7 2 2 2 2 18 14 9 8 54 115	0 0 0 0 2 0 5 8 4 1 7 3
Palestinian Popular Struggle Front[538]	1967	Last Active 1989	Dergarabedian, Elias Gharbiah, Bahjat	Inactive	Palestinian Lebanon Jordan Syria	1970 1989	1 1	0 0
Palestinian Resistance	1980	2006	Unknown	Inactive	Palestinian	1980 1994 2006	1 1 1	0 0 0
Palestinian Revolution Force General Command	1985	Last active 1987	Unknown	Unknown	Palestinian	1975 1985 1986 1987	1 2 4 8	0 0 0 0
Parbatya Chattagram Jana Sanghati Samity (United People's Party)	1972	Current	Larma, Jyotirindra	Unknown	Bangladesh	2005	1	0
Partisans of Holy War	1987	Last active 1987	Unknown	Inactive	Lebanon	1987	1	0
Partitions of the Iranian People of Hormuzgan	1979	Last active 1983	Unknown	Unknown	Iran	1983	1	0
Partisans of the Sunni	2005	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Iraq	2005	1	1
Party of Islamic Call	1980s	Mid 1990s	Unknown	Unknown	Iraq (Iran)			
Party of Islamic Call	1980	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Iran			
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan	1975	Current	Unknown	Inactive	Iraq	1980 1985 1987	1 1 2	0 0 0
Pause and Identify[539]	Early 1970s	1980	Unknown	Unknown	Egypt	Violent		
Paykar	1979	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Iran			

[538] The (PSF) was a very small Palestinian organization that was set up right before the Six Day War in 1967 in the West Bank. The organization attempted to mediate between the PLO/Fatah and Syria and the Palestinian organizations under its patronage, without much success.

[539] Part of the group that killed Sadat (Dekmejian: 225)

People's Democratic Army	1992	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Tajikistan			
People's Democratic Party	1970	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Sudan			
People's Democratization front for Oman	1992	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Oman			
People's Liberation Army	1978	Current	Unknown	3,000[540]	Bangladesh	2005 2006	1 3	0 0
People's Liberation Army of Kurdistan[541]	1984	Last active 1999	Kalkan, Duran Ocalan, Abdullah Ocalan, Osman	1,000	Turkey	1998 1999	3 6	0 0
The People of the Call	Civil War Years	Civil War	Unknown	Small	Algeria			
People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran[542]	1965	1979	Unknown	Unknown	Iran			
Peoples Mojahedin of Iran	1980	Current	Unknown	Large	Iran			
People's Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak	1977	Current	Unknown	500	Bangladesh	2006	1	0
People of Hadith (Ahl al-Hadith)	Early 1970s	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Saudi Arabia			
People's Mujahideen of Iran	1980	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Iran			
People of the Vanguard	Civil War Years	Civil War Years	Unknown	Unknown	Algeria			
Peykar Organization for the Fight for the Freedom of	1975	Last active 1982	Unknown	Inactive	Iran	1982	1	0

[540] Counted as three

[541] The ARGK was established as the military wing of the PKK, a leftist nationalist terror organization. Groups dropped from large N analysis but included in terrorist data

[542] The ideology of the PMOI was to interpret Shiism as a revolutionary belief system and to activate these beliefs through class struggle and mobilization of the impoverished masses against internal feudalism and foreign imperialism

the Working Class[543]								
PKK Kongra-Gel (Kongra Gele Kurdistan)[544]	2003	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Turkey	2004 2005	21 1	0 0
Polisario Front[545]	1973	Last active 1988	Unknown	Inactive	Algeria Mauritania	1976 1977 1980 1981 1985 1986 1987 1988	1 4 4 1 4 3 2 1	0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Polisario Front[546] (Frente Popular Para la Liberation de Saguia el-Hamra y Rio de Ora)	Late 1970s (1978)	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Morocco			
Popular Front for Armed Resistance	Late 1960s (1968)	1973	Unknown	Unknown	Pakistan			
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine	1967	Current	El-zibri, Mastafa Habash, George Mallash, Abdel	800	Palestinian Lebanon	1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1980 1981 1982 1984 1986 1987 1988 1989 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 2001 2002 2003	14 1 3 2 9 1 7 3 2 1 1 1 1 3 2 1 3 1 1 1 1 2 1 5 6 3	 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 1

[543] PEYKAR was an anti-Shah, leftist offshoot of Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK).
[544] The PKK id a nationalist/separatist and/or Socialist movement/party. Dropped from large N but included in terrorist data
[545] The Polisario is committed to the liberation of the Saharawi people
[546] The Polisario Front is a Saharawi national liberation movement that seeks to build a stats in what is now southern Morocco.

						2004 2005 2006	9 16 14	1 0 0
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – General Command	1968	Last active 1993	Jabril, Ahmed	300	Lebanon Syria	1970 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1978 1985 1987 1988 1989 1990 1993	1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2	0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman[547]	1974	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Oman			
Popular Resistance Committees	2000	Current	Arqan, Mahmoud Samhadana, Jamal	Unknown	Palestinian	2004 2005 2006	5 22 25	0 0 0
Popular Revolutionary Resistance Organization	1987	Last active 1987	Unknown	Inactive	Lebanon	1987	1	0
Protectors of Islam Brigade	2005	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Iraq	2005	1	0
Progressive Democratic Tribune[548]	2002	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Bahrain			
Prosperous Justice Party[549]	1998	Current	Nurmahmudi Ismail	Unknown	Indonesia			
Prosperous Peace Party[550]	1970	Current	Ruyandi Hutasoit	Unknown	Indonesia			
Punishment Brigade for the Al-Jaafari Government	2006	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Iraq	2006	1	0
Purbo Banglar	2003	Current	Chowdhury, Mofakkar	Unknown	Bangladesh	2003 2005	6 8	0 0

[547] This militant offshoot of the Popular Front foe the Liberation of Oman and the Arab Gulf.
[548] The Progressive Democratic Tribune is a political outfit launched by the underground National Liberation Front in 2002
[549] The Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera or PKS) is known for is public opposition to political corruption. The party is closely associated with Islamic teachings, but according to its leadership it does not promote the mandatory implementation of sharia. Many of its campaigns are based on conservative religious teachings, such as opposition to selling pornography.
[550] The prosperous Peace Party is a Christian-democratic based political party

Communist Party[551]			Malitha, Abdur			2006	14	0
Rahanwein Resistance Army	1995	Current	Hassan Mohamed Nur Shargudud	4,000[552]	Somalia			
Reform Star Party[553]	1970	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Indonesia			
Renaissance Party	Early 1980s	Last active 1992	Rashid al-Ghannushi	Unknown	Tunisia			
Renaissance Movement	Civil War Years	Civil War Years	Unknown	Very Small	Algeria			
Revenge of the Hebrew Babies	2002	Last active 2002	Unknown	Inactive	Israel	2002	1	0
Revival Party[554]	1980	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Israel			
Revolutionary Action Organization of the Arab Resistance Front	1990	Last active 1990	Unknown	Inactive	Lebanon	1990	1	0
Revolutionary Organization of Socialist Muslims[555]	1974	Last active 1985	Unknown	Unknown	Syria Libya Iraq	1984 1985	4 4	0 0
Revolutionary Outburst Movement	1993	Last active 1993	Unknown	Inactive	Lebanon	1993	1	0
Revolutionary People's Front	1979	Current	Unknown	1,500[556]	Bangladesh	2003 2005	1 1	0 0
Revolutionary Reople's Liberation Party (Devrimci Sol (Revolutionary Left)[557]	1978	Current	Unknown	Small	Turkey	Violence		
Righteous Arrows Battalions	2005	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Iraq	2007	1	0

[551] The PBCP is a Maoist organization dedicated to ridding Bangladesh of class exploitation and establishing a Communist government.
[552] Counted as three. Dropped from Large N analysis but included in my terrorist data set
[553] The reform Star Party is a Islamist reformist political party
[554] The Revival Party was founded in 1980 to protest the Camp David Agreements
[555] This is a Communist/Socialist party and/or organization. Not included in large N analysis but included in terrorist data
[556] Counted as three
[557] The DHCP/F was originally a splinter faction of the Turkish People's Liberation Party. Since the late 1980s this group has committed terrorist acts against retired Turkish security and military officials

Saad Bin Abi Waqas Brigades	2005	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Iraq	2005	1	0
Saif-ul-Muslimeen (Sword of Muslims)	2003	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Afghanistan	2003	1	0
Salafi Cult	1740	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Morocco Saudi Arabia			
Saraya al-Jihad al-Islami (Islamic Holy War Brigades	1970	Current	Unknown	Unknown	West Bank			
Salafia Jihadia	Mid 1990s	Current	Fizazi, Mohamed	700	Morocco	2003	1	0
Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC)	1993	Last active 2002	Unknown	700-4,000	Algeria	Violent [558]		
Salafist Party	Mid 1990s	Current	Ghanim al Buaneen	Unknown	Bahrain			
Salah Al-din Battalions	2000	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Israel West Bank	2000 2005 2006	1 1 1	0 0 0
Salafiyyun (The Pious)	Early 1970s	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Saudi Arabia			
Salafuyya Group	1991	Current	Abu Mus'ab ads al-Wadoud	Small	Lebanon	Violent		
Sami Al-Ghul Brigades	2006	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Israel West Bank	2006	1	0
Saraya al-Shuhuada al-Jihadiyah fi al-Iraq (Jihadist Martyrs Brigades in Iraq)	2004	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Iraq	2004	2	0
Sarata Usud al-Tawhid (Brigades of the Lions of Monotheism)	2004	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Iraq	2004	1	0
Saudi Hezbollah[559]	1987	Current	Sheikh Hashi al-Shukus Sheikh Abdulrahman al-Hubail	Small	Saudi Arabia (Iran)	1987	1	0

[558] The GSPC hardly ever accepts responsibility for attacks.

[559] Saudi Hezbollah espouses Khomeini's principle of vilayat-e-faqih, and most members practice the teachings of Iran's Supreme Leader. The followers distrust the Saudi ruling family and government. The truck bombing

Screaming the Truth	2006	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Iraq	2006	1	0
Secret Organization of Al-Qaeda in Europe	2005	Current	Unknown	Unknown	England	2005	4	4
Shahin (Falcon)	1992	Last active 1992	Unknown	Unknown	Iran	1992	1	0
Shalhevet Gilad		Last active 2005	Unknown	Unknown	Israel West Bank	2005	1	0
Shas – Sephardo Association of the Observers of the Torrah	1984	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Israel			
Shurafa al-Urbum (Honorable of Jordan)	2001	Last active 2002	Unknown	Unknown	Jordan	2002	1	0
Sipah-E-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP)	1985	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Pakistan			
Solders of Justice[560]	Early 1980s (1982)	Inactive after late 1980s (1988)	Unknown	Unknown	Lebanon Saudi Arabia (Iran)	1988 1989	1 1	
Socialist Labor Party[561]	1986	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Egypt			
Societies of Propagation	1995	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Saudi Arabia			
Society of Denouncement[562]	1970	Mid 1970s	Unknown	Unknown	Egypt			
Soldiers of the Prophet's Companions	2005	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Iraq	2005 2006	2 2	1 0
Sons of the South	1984	Last active 1984	Unknown	Inactive	Lebanon	1984	1	0

in June of 1986 of the Khobar Towers apartment complex in Dhahran, were 19 members of the US Air Force personal were killed and hundreds of Americans were injures, has been the main terrorist attack by Shia radicals in Saudi Arabia. The government cracked down on Saudi Hezbollah as a result.

[560] This is an Iranian state-sponsored Shiite group based in Lebanon whose goal was the overthrowing of the Saudi Arabian monarchy in favor of an Iranian-style Islamic Republic

[561] The Socialist Labor Party was originally a social party; since 1986 the party has undergone a major ideological change turning into an Islamic party.

[562] In 1970 Sadat co-opted several leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood into the Egyptian political system. As a result, members of the Muslim Brotherhood broke off and formed more radical short-lived groups.

Stern Gang	1940s	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Israel			
Society of Transmission	1970s	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Pakistan (Saudi Arabia)			
Society of Transmission of the Call	1970s	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Pakistan Morocco (Saudi Arabia)			
Society of the Ulama	1970	Early 1990s	Unknown	Unknown	Iraq (Iran)			
Sons of the South	1984	1984	Unknown	Small	Lebanon			
South Maluku Republic (RMS)[563]	1998	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Indonesia	2002	1	0
Southern Sudan Independence Movement	1991	Current	Machar, Riak	Inactive	Sudan	1995	1	0
Squadron of Fatimah the Pure Martyr (Saudi Arabia)	2003	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Iraq		Violent	
Squadron of Muhammad ibn Maskamah (Saudi Arabia)	2005	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Iraq		Violent	
Squadrons of Abu Bakr as-Siddiq	2005	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Iraq		Violent	
Squadrons of Al-Qaqa	2005	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Iraq		Violent	
Squadrons of Hayzun	2005	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Iraq		Violent	
Squadrons of Orphans and Martys	2004	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Iraq		Violent	
Squadrins of the Lions of the Arabian	2004	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Iraq		Violent	

[563] RMS is a Indonesian Christian separatist group that seeks independence

Peninsula (Saudi Arabia)								
Struggles for the Unity and Freedom of Greater Syria	2005	Current	Unknown	Small	Lebanon (Syria)			
Supporters of the Sunni People	2005	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Iraq	2006	1	0
Supporters of the Call	Early 1970s	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Pakistan (Saudi Arabia)			
Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA)[564]	1954	Current	Unknown	Thousands[565]	Sudan		Violent	
Sudanese Mujahideen	2000	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Sudan			
Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood	1970	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Sudan			
Supreme Islamic Revolutionary Council in Iraq	1970s	Mid 1990s	Unknown	Unknown	Iraq (Iran)			
Support al-Aqsa Vivison	2005	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Iraq		Violent	
Supporters of Shariah	1999	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Yemen Egypt			
Survivors of Fire/Hell (al-Najoun min al-Nar)[566]	1980	Current	Unknown	Unknown	West Bank Egypt (Saudi Arabia)		Violent	
Swords of the Righteousness Brigades	2005	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Iraq	2005	1	0

[564] The SPLA is a guerrilla group comprising non-Muslim tribal peoples living in the southern parts of Sudan who oppose the policies of the central government

[565] Counted as three

[566] Their main enemy is the secular Arab regimes rather than Israel; because of this, they took no part in the Palestinian uprising and maintain no links with Hamas or Hezbollah. See: hppt://haganah.us/harchives/003973.html

Syrian Muslim Brotherhood	1920s	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Syria			
Syrian Mujahideen	2003	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Syria Iraq			
Syrian Islamic Front (al-Jabhah al-Islamiyyah fi Suriyya)	1980	Current	Unknown	Unknown[567]	Syria			
Syrian Social Nationalist Party[568]	1930	Last active 1985	Sa'adeh, Antun	Inactive	Lebanon Syria	1985	3	0
Tabriz Militant Clergy Association	1989	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Iran			
Tadjik Party[569]	1990	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Tajikstan Pakistan			
Takfir wa Hija	Early 1970s	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Iraq	2005	1	0
Takif Wa al-Hjira[570]	Early 1970s[571]	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Algeria Egypt Lebanon Morocco		Violent	
Taliban	1994	Current	Dadullah, Mullah Hakimi, Latifullah Khan, Naqiblah	Thousands[572]	Afghanistan	1995 1996 1998 1999 2001 2003 2004 2005 2006	2 2 1 1 1 22 75 102 158	0 0 0 0 0 0 1 5 12
Tanzim	1993	Current	Abayat, Atef Barghouti, Marwan	Unknown	Israel West Bank	2003 2004	1 2	0 2
Tanzim al-Jihad (Jihad Organization)	1970	Inactive after 1995	Unknown	Very Small	Egypt Afghanistan Sudan			

[567] According to Hrair Dekmejian (1995: 110) the ISF included numerous smaller Islamic fundamentalist groups; however, he does not distinguish which Islamic groups he hass included. Because of this I will count the ISF three times.
[568] The SSNP is a Socialist/nationalist party. Dropped from large N analysis but included in terrorist data
[569] Also known as the Party of Islamic Renaissance (PIR)
[570] It's name translates into English as "rejection of sins and exodus" and is regarded as one of the most fundamentalist of al Islamist groups
[571] There is some controversy over this: some suggest that the group was founded in the early 1970s in Egypt others argue it split from the Egyptian Islamic Jihad in the 1980s. I will assume here that it emerged in the early 1970s as a result of the opining of the Egyptian political institutions.
[572] Counted as three

Tawihid and Jihad (Holy Struggle)	Late 1990s (1998)	Current	Al-Ja'af, Mohammed Al-Loheibi, Salah	Unknown	Iraq	2003 2004 2005	7 22 1	1 4 0
Tawahid and Jihad Group in Egypt	2005	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Egypt	2005	2	
Tawid Islamic Bridges	2004	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Egypt	2004	1	0
Tawid wal Jihad (Unification and Holy War)[573]	2004	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Egypt	2005 2006	1 3	0 0
Tehrike-e Jaafria (TEJ) Pakistan[574]	1980	Mid 1990s (1995)	Allama Arif Hussein	Unknown	Pakistan	Violent		
The Call[575]	Late 1970s (1978)	Early 1980s (1982)	Unknown	Unknown	Kuwait Saudi Arabia			
The Army of Mohammed [576]	1994	Last active 2000	Unknown	Unknown	Yemen	2000	1	1
The Islamic Liberation Party[577]	1953	Current			Lebanon Syria Iraq Palestinian Turkey Pakistan Uzbekistan	1974 1999 2000	1 1 1	
The Group for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vise	2005	2005	Unknown	Unknown	Iraq	2005	1	0
The Holders of the Black	2004	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Iraq	2004	1	0

[573] On April 24, 2006 three bombs exploded nearly simultaneously in the Sinai resort of Dahab. The Cairo daily Al-Ahram claimed that a preliminary investigation into the terrorist attacks pointed to Tawhid wl Jihad, a new terrorist organization with connections to al-Qaeda.

[574] The TEJ is a Sunni Religious movement whose violent acts are directed toward Shia.

[575] The Call was an underground Shiite political organization was active during the late 1970s and early 1980s. Its program called for the overthrow of the existing regimes in these two states and their replacement with Islamic republics modeled on the Islamic Republic of Iran.

[576] Also known as the Army of Aden-Abyan

[577] The Islamic Liberation Party was a Palestinian movement that opened branches on Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, the UK, and France. In the 1980s it began operating in Turkey, India, Pakistan, and in the 1990s Uzbekistan. Although the party has not been involved in the uprising against Israeli rule in the West Bank and Gaza since 1967, it has committed mild acts of terrorism elsewhere. For the most part, the party argues that Muslims currently live in Dar al-Kufr (the Disbelievers), because they are governed with laws other than the revelation of Allah. Their objective seems to be the spreading of Islamic law and teachings.

Banners								
The Victorious Sect (Al-Taefa Al_mansoura)[578]	2001	Active	Unknown	Unknown	Egypt	2006	1	
al-Takfir Wa al Hijra (Denunciation Repentance of Infidel and Migration)[579]	1970	Mid 1970s	Unknown	Unknown	Egypt			
Thunderbolt (Sa'iqa al)	1968	Inactive after 1976	Unknown	Unknown	Palestinian Israel (Syria)	1976	1	
Tigers of the Gulf	1995	Current	Bin Laden	Large	Saudi Arabia	1995	1	
Tigray Peoples Liberation Front	1976	Last active 1988	Kinfe, Ato Tella, Fresseha Zenawi, Meles	Unknown	Ethiopia	1976 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988	2 2 1 1 1 1 1	0 0 0 0 0 0 0
TKEL/L (Turkish Communist Labor Party)[580]	1990	Last active 2000	Unknown	1,000	Turkey	1999 2000	1 1	0 0
Tradition and Law	Civil War Years	Civil War	Unknown	Unknown	Algeria			
Tunisian Combatant Group	2000	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Afghanistan			
Turkish People's Liberation Army[581]	1971	Last active 1980	Unknown	Inactive	Turkey	1971 1972 1979 1980	3 2 1 1	0 0 0 0
Turkish Mujahideen	2003	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Turkey			
Turkish	1982	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Turkey		Violent	

[578] The Victorious Sect's members are mostly from the shanty-towns of Torah and Al-Zawya Al-Hamra, northeast of Cairo. The group espouses Salafi takfiri, a Jihadist ideology that identifies anyone with whom they disagree as infidels and therefore potential targets.

[579] In 1970 Sadat co-opted several leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood into the Egyptian political system. As a result, members of the Muslim Brotherhood broke off and formed more radical short-lived groups (Sidibe 2006).

[580] The TKEP/L is a Communist/leftist party/movement. Party dropped from large N analysis but included in terrorist data

[581] TPLA is an anti-Globalization /leftist party/movement. Party dropped from large N analysis but included in terrorist data

Hezbollah								
Turkish Liberation Jihad	1991	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Turkey			
Turkish People's liberation Front (THKP-C)[582]	1971	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Turkey	1971 1977 1979 1991 1992 1999	1 1 1 3 1 1	0 0 0 0 0 0
Tunisian Combatant Group (TCG)[583]	2000	Current	Maaroufi, Tarek Ben Hassine, Saifallah	Unknown	Tunisia			
Ubdad al-Rahman (Worshippers of the Compassionate)	Early/mid 1970s	Mid 1990s	Unknown	Unknown	Lebanon			
Uganda Democratic Christian Army	1990	Current	Unknown	Inactive	Sudan	1993	2	0
Ummah Liberation Army	1999	Current	Al-mahdi, Sadiq Nuradeen, Umar	Unknown	Sudan	1999 2000	1 1	0 0
Ummah Movement	Civil War Years	Civil War	Unknown	Unknown	Algeria	Violent		
Umma Party[584]	1983	Current	Unknown	185	Egypt			
Umma Party (Sudan)	1970	Current	Unknown	Large	Sudan			
Unified Unit of Jihad (United Company of Jihad)	1993	Last active 1993	Unknown	Inactive	Algeria	1993	1	o
Union of Peaceful Citizens of Algeria	1994	Last active 1994	Unknown	Inactive	Algeria	1994	1	0

[582] The THKP-C is a Communist/socialist party/movement. Party dropped from large N analysis but included in terrorist data

[583] The TCG is a radical Islamic fundamentalist group with affiliation with Al-Qaeda. The TCG has not committed any terrorist acts; however in 2002 they were suspected of plotting to attack the US Embassy as well as other Algerian, and Tunisian diplomatic interests in Rome.

[584] This is a small Egyptian political party that presses for promoting the a socialist democracy and adapting the Islamic sharia as the main source of legislation

United Achik National Front	2004	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Bangladesh	2006	1	0
United Arab Revolution	1986	Last active 1986	Unknown	Inactive	Kuwait	1986	1	0
United Nasserite Organization	1986	Last active 1987	Unknown	Inactive	Lebanon	1987	1	0
United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan [585]	1996	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Syria			
United National Liberation Front	1964	Current	Meghen, Rejkumar Singh, Arambam	3,500	Bangladesh	2005 2006	2 2	0 0
United Organization of Halabjah Martyrs	1989	Last active 1989	Unknown	Unknown	Iraq	1989	1	0
United People's Democratic Front	1998	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Bangladesh	2005	1	0
United Tajik Opposition	2001	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Tajikistan	2001	1	0
Unity, Justice and Equality front in Mauritania	1977	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Mauritania	2007	1	0
Union of Islamic Call	Civil Way Years	Civil War	Unknown	Unknown	Algeria	Violent		
Usbat al-Ansar (Band of Supporters)	1988	2005	Unknown	Unknown	Lebanon Palestine	1995	Violent [586]	
Usbah al-Hashimiyya (The Hashemite League)	Mid 1970s	1983	Unknown	Unknown	Egypt			
Usd Allah	2004	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Iraq	2004	1	0
Vanguards of the Islamic Conquest	Early 1990s (1992)	Last active 2002	Al-Zawahiri, Islamboui, Khaled	Unknown	Egypt			
Vanguard Society of Islam	1975	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Morocco			

[585] Also known as the Northern Alliance (Jabha-yi-Muttahid-I Islami-yi-Milli Bara-yi Nijat-I Afghanistan).
[586] This Palestinian Group was outlawed by the Lebanese judiciary in 1995 for the assassination of a rival cleric

Welfare Party	1983	1998[587]	Ahmed Tekdal	Unknown[588]	Turkey			
World Islamic Jihad Group	1998	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Yemen	1998	1	0
Yemeni Islah Party[589]	1990	Current	Sheikh Abd al-Majid al-Zindani		Yemen			
Yemeni Mujahideen	1993	Current	Unknown	Unknown	Yemen			
Yemen Islamic Jihad	1990	Current	Saley al-Atwi Taria al-Fadhli	Around 200	Yemen Libya Afghanistan (Saudi Arabia)			
Yisrael Beiteinu (Our Home)[590]	1997	Active	Unknown	Unknown	Israel			

[587] The Welfare Party was ban in 1988. The ban was upheld by the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights on February 13, 2003 (see case of Refah Partisi and Others V. Rurkey)
[588] Party and/or movement will be counted as 3 because of size and/or membership numbers
[589] 3,000 Yemeni volunteers participated in the war in Afghanistan and after returning home they found refuge and support from the Yemeni Islah Party.
[590] Yisrael Beiteinu is a right-wing extremist political party that takes a hard line toward Israeli Arabs and Palestinians and they believe an absolute Jewish state based religious teachings

Appendix Four: List of Muslim Brotherhood Members Currently Detained by the Egyptian State

1. Usama Muhammad Amin Hassan, Damietta governorate, detained April 10, 2006
2. Hussam al-Sayyid al-Tamimi, Damietta governorate, detained April 10, 2006
3. `Abd al-Nabi `Ali `Abd al-Nabi, Bahariyya governorate, detained July 7, 2006
4. Ahmad Husain Awad Ghazlan, Bahariyya governorate, detained July 17, 2006
5. Bilal al-Sayyid al-Sadiq Muhammad, al-Sharqiyya governorate, detained August 13, 2006
6. Abdullah Muhammad Muhammad `Attiyya, al-Sharqiyya governorate, detained August 13, 2006
7. Al-Sayyid `Abd al-Hadi Muhammad Faraj, al-Sharqiyya governorate, detained August 13, 2006
8. Muhammad al-Sayyid `Abd al-Salam al-Shinnawi, Cairo governorate, detained August 16, 2006
9. Kamal Muhammad Hassan Suliman, Kafr al-Shaikh governorate, detained August 19, 2006
10. Hamada Muhammad Ism`ail Ahmad Sa`ad, Kafr al-Shaikh governorate, detained August 21, 2006
11. `Abd al-Qadir Salama Hassan Suliman, Kafr al-Shaikh governorate, detained August 21, 2006
12. Ahmad `Abd al-Mun`im Yunis, Bahariyya governorate, detained August 25, 2006
13. Khalil Muhammad Yusif, Bahariyya governorate, detained August 25, 2006
14. `Abd al-Nassir al-Sayyid `Ali, Bahariyya governorate, detained August 25, 2006
15. Yasir Fu'ad `Abd al-`Alim, al-Sharqiyya governorate, detained September 13, 2006
16. Nassir Salah `Attiyya, al-Sharqiyya governorate, detained September 13, 2006
17. Al-Sayyid Ahmad al-Damardash Muhammad, al-Sharqiyya governorate, detained September 13, 2006
18. Naji `Abd al-Halim al-Sayyid `Attiyya, al-Gharbiyya governorate, detained September 17, 2006
19. Mahmud Fu'ad al-Sayyid al-Shami, al-Gharbiyya governorate, detained September 17, 2006
20. Mahir Muhammad al-Malwiji al-Hawari, al-Gharbiyya governorate, detained September 17, 2006
21. Muhammad Mus`ad al-Sayyid `Ali Abu al-`Izz, al-Gharbiyya governorate, detained September 17, 2006
22. Khalid `Abd al-Hakim Alwan, Fayum governorate, detained October 7, 2006
23. Muhammad Sayyid `Urabi, Fayum governorate, detained October 7, 2006
24. Muhammad Rajab Muhammad, Fayum governorate, detained October 7, 2006
25. Imam Muhammad Muhammad al-Ads, Giza governorate, detained October 9, 2006
26. Muhamad `Abd al-Halim, Manufiyya governorate, detained October 12, 2006
27. Usama `Ammar, Manufiyya governorate, detained October 12, 2006
28. Abu-Bakr `Ali Salih al-Qutt, Manufiyya governorate, detained October 12, 2006
29. Salih `Uthman al-Nahrawi, Manufiyya governorate, detained October 12, 2006
30. Majdi `Abd al-`Aziz Shama, Manufiyya governorate, detained October 12, 2006

31. Ashraf Kamal Mustafa, Manufiyya governorate, detained October 12, 2006
32. Majdi Dandan, Manufiyya governorate, detained October 12, 2006
33. Ahmad al-Khayat, Manufiyya governorate, detained October 12, 2006

According to the same lawyer, the following members of the Muslim Brotherhood were held on charges of "belonging to an illegal organization" as of October 18:

1. `Issam al-Din Muhamad Husain al-`Irian, Case Number 533/2006, Giza governorate, detained May 18, 2006 (Head of Political Committee)
2. Muhammad Muhammad Mursi al-`Ayyat, Case Number 533/2006, al-Sharqiyya governorate, detained May 18, 2006 (Head of Parliamentary Committee)
3. Ahmad Ibrahim Ahmad al-Halawani, Case Number 688/2006, Cairo governorate, detained June 19, 2006
4. Mustafa Muhammad Salim Mustafa, Case Number 688/2006, Cairo governorate, detained June 19, 2006
5. `Abd al-Ra`uf `Abd al-Mawla Hassan, Case Number 688/2006, Cairo governorate, detained June 19, 2006
6. `Abd al-Qadir `Abd al-Hamid Mahjub, Case Number 688/2006, Giza governorate, detained June 19, 2006
7. Khalid al-Shimi Muhammad Abu al-Dahab, Case Number 688/2006, Giza governorate, detained June 19, 2006
8. Kamil Faruq Kamil Mayhub, Case Number 688/2006, Qalyubiyya governorate, detained June 19, 2006
9. Tariq `Abd al-Fattah al-Sayyid `Abd al-Majid, Case Number 688/2006, Qalyubiyya governorate, detained June 19, 2006
10. Muhsin Ramadan `Abd al-`Ail, Case Number 688/2006, Bani Suaif governorate, detained June 19, 2006
11. Mahmud Badri Ahmad, Case Number 688/2006, Miniyya governorate, detained June 19, 2006
12. Sayyid `Abd al-Majid Bakhit, Case Number 688/2006, Assiut governorate, detained June 19, 2006
13. Muhammad Mahmud `Abd al-Rahman Sayyid, Case Number 688/2006, Suhaj governorate, detained June 19, 2006
14. `Abd al-Salam As`ad Ibrahim, Case Number 688/2006, Suhaj governorate, detained June 19, 2006
15. `Ali Hamid Muhammad al-Balshi, Case Number 688/2006, Manufiyya governorate, detained June 19, 2006
16. Zidan Hassan Zain al-Din Shaltut, Case Number 688/2006, al-Gharbiyya governorate, detained June 19, 2006
17. Ahmad Muhammad Swailan `Ali al-Alfi, Case Number 688/2006, al-Gharbiyya governorate, detained June 19, 2006
18. Sa`id al-Shawadfi `Abd al-Latif, Case Number 688/2006, Suez governorate, detained June 19, 2006
19. Muhammad Muhammad `Abd al-Mun`im al-Dasuqi, Case Number 688/2006, detained June 19, 2006

20. Na`im Awad Mustafa Nu`man, Case Number 688/2006, Damietta governorate, detained June 19, 2006
21. `Adil Muhammad Rada Sharaf, Case Number 688/2006, Damietta governorate, detained June 19, 2006
22. Fathallah Muhammad Sa`ad al-Najjar, Case Number 688/2006, North Sinai governorate, detained June 19, 2006
23. Muhammad `Abd al-`Ail `Ali Ziyada, Case Number 688/2006, North Sinai governorate, detained June 19, 2006
24. `Abd al-Nassir `Ali Abdullah Abu-`Alw, Case Number 688/2006, Alexandria governorate, detained June 19, 2006
25. Ra'fat `Ali al-Sayyid `Abd al-`Aziz, Case Number 688/2006, Marsa Matruh governorate, detained June 19, 2006
26. Mustafa Ahmad `Abd al-Mu`ti al-Muslimani, Case Number 688/2006, al-Bahariyya governorate, detained June 19, 2006
27. Muhammad Sufi `Abd al-Wahid, Case Number 688/2006, al-Fayum governorate, detained June 19, 2006
28. Mus`ad Mahmud Mus`ad, Case Number 688/2006, al-Fayum governorate, detained June 19, 2006
29. Hassan Muhammad Hassan Sayyid Ahmad al-Haywan, Case Number 1164/2005, al-Sharqiyya governorate, detained October 17, 2006.

Appendix Five: Terrorist and Suicide Terrorist Data

Year	Indonesia Number of Terrorist Attacks	Indonesia Number of Suicide Attacks	Tajikistan Number of Terrorist Attacks	Tajikistan Number of Suicide Attacks	Uzbekistan Number of Terrorist Attacks	Uzbekistan Number of Suicide Attacks
1970	0	0	0	0	0	0
1971	0	0	0	0	0	0
1972	0	0	0	0	0	0
1973	0	0	0	0	0	0
1974	0	0	0	0	0	0
1975	0	0	0	0	0	0
1976	0	0	0	0	0	0
1977	1	0	0	0	0	0
1978	0	0	0	0	0	0
1979	0	0	0	0	0	0
1980	0	0	0	0	0	0
1981	1	0	0	0	0	0
1982	0	0	0	0	0	0
1983	0	0	0	0	0	0
1984	1	0	0	0	0	0
1985	0	0	0	0	0	0
1986	3	0	0	0	0	0
1987	0	0	0	0	0	0
1988	0	0	0	0	0	0
1989	0	0	0	0	0	0
1990	0	0	0	0	0	0
1991	1	0	0	0	0	0
1992	0	0	0	0	0	0
1993	0	0	1	0	0	0
1994	0	0	0	0	0	0
1995	0	0	4	0	0	0
1996	3	0	4	0	0	0
1997	0	0	6	0	0	0
1998	4	0	16	0	0	0
1999	14	0	0	0	4	0
2000	27	0	10	0	0	0
2001	70	1	9	1	1	0
2002	48	1	1	0	0	0
2003	9	1	1	0	0	0
2004	23	1	0	0	8	5
2005	19	1	1	0	1	1
2006	7	0	3	0	0	0

Turkmenistan Number of Terrorist Attacks	Turkmenistan Number of Suicide Attacks	Algeria Number of Terrorist Attacks	Algeria Number of Suicide Arracks
0	0	0	0
0	0	0	0
0	0	2	0
0	0	0	0
0	0	0	0
0	0	0	0
0	0	0	0
0	0	1	0
0	0	0	0
0	0	0	0
0	0	0	0
0	0	0	0
0	0	0	0
0	0	0	0
0	0	0	0
0	0	0	0
0	0	0	0
0	0	0	0
0	0	0	0
0	0	0	0
0	0	0	0
0	0	0	0
0	0	0	0
0	0	2	0
0	0	6	0
0	0	9	0
0	0	31	0
0	0	12	0
0	0	4	0
0	0	2	0
0	0	81	0
0	0	14	0
0	0	8	0
0	0	4	0
1	0	5	0
0	0	7	0
0	0	12	0
0	0	15	0
0	0	20	1

Year	Kyrgyzstan Number of Terrorist Attacks	Kyrgyzstan Number of Suicide Attacks	Kazakhstan Number of Terrorist Attacks	Kazakhstan Number of Suicide Attacks	Libya Number of Terrorist Attacks	Libya Number of Suicide Attacks
1970	0	0	0	0	0	0
1971	0	0	0	0	0	0
1972	0	0	0	0	1	0
1973	0	0	0	0	0	0
1974	0	0	0	0	0	0
1975	0	0	0	0	0	0
1976	0	0	0	0	0	0
1977	0	0	0	0	1	0
1978	0	0	0	0	2	0
1979	0	0	0	0	2	0
1980	0	0	0	0	2	0
1981	0	0	0	0	1	0
1982	0	0	0	0	0	0
1983	0	0	0	0	1	0
1984	0	0	0	0	2	0
1985	0	0	0	0	1	0
1986	0	0	0	0	0	0
1987	0	0	0	0	0	0
1988	0	0	0	0	0	0
1989	0	0	0	0	1	0
1990	0	0	0	0	1	0
1991	0	0	0	0	0	0
1992	0	0	0	0	0	0
1993	0	0	0	0	0	0
1994	0	0	0	0	0	0
1995	0	0	0	0	0	0
1996	0	0	0	0	0	0
1997	0	0	0	0	0	0
1998	2	0	1	0	1	0
1999	0	0	0	0	0	0
2000	0	0	0	0	0	0
2001	3	0	0	0	0	0
2002	3	0	1	0	0	0
2003	2	0	0	0	0	0
2004	1	0	2	0	0	0
2005	2	0	1	0	0	0
2006	0	0	0	0	0	0

Egypt Number of Terrorist Attacks	Egypt Number of Suicide Attacks	Sudan Number of Terrorist Attacks	Sudan Number of Suicide Arracks
0	0	0	0
1	0	0	0
4	0	0	0
0	0	1	0
2	0	0	0
0	0	0	0
5	0	0	0
4	0	0	0
0	0	0	0
3	0	0	0
0	0	0	0
0	0	1	0
0	0	1	0
0	0	2	0
21	0	0	0
5	0	5	0
6	0	4	0
2	0	2	0
6	0	4	0
2	0	1	0
4	0	1	0
1	0	1	0
6	0	1	0
15	0	0	0
16	0	0	0
5	0	2	0
5	0	6	0
2	0	0	0
2	0	2	0
0	0	1	0
0	0	0	0
0	0	2	0
1	0	2	0
0	0	0	0
3	0	0	0
7	2	1	0
2	1	2	0

Year	Somalia Number of Terrorist Attacks	Somalia Number of Suicide Attacks	Tanzania Number of Terrorist Attacks	Tanzania Number of Suicide Attacks	Tunisia Number of Terrorist Attacks	Tunisia Number of Suicide Attacks
1970	0	0	0	0	0	0
1971	0	0	0	0	0	0
1972	0	0	0	0	0	0
1973	0	0	0	0	0	0
1974	0	0	0	0	0	0
1975	1	0	1	0	0	0
1976	2	0	0	0	0	0
1977	0	0	0	0	0	0
1978	0	0	0	0	0	0
1979	0	0	0	0	1	0
1980	0	0	0	0	0	0
1981	0	0	0	0	0	0
1982	0	0	1	0	1	0
1983	0	0	0	0	0	0
1984	1	0	0	0	1	0
1985	0	0	0	0	2	0
1986	0	0	0	0	0	0
1987	1	0	0	0	4	0
1988	0	0	0	0	0	0
1989	0	0	1	0	0	0
1990	3	0	0	0	0	0
1991	3	0	0	0	2	0
1992	3	0	0	0	0	0
1993	20	0	1	0	1	0
1994	13	0	0	0	1	0
1995	4	0	0	0	1	0
1996	6	0	0	0	0	0
1997	1	0	0	0	0	0
1998	1	0	1	1	0	0
1999	1	0	1	0	0	0
2000	0	0	1	0	0	0
2001	1	0	0	0	0	0
2002	0	0	0	0	1	0
2003	2	0	0	0	0	0
2004	1	0	2	0	0	0
2005	4	0	0	0	0	0
2006	2	1	0	0	0	0

Morocco Number of Terrorist Attacks	Morocco Number of Suicide Attacks	Turkey Number of Terrorist Attacks	Turkey Number of Suicide Arracks
0	0	13	0
0	0	22	0
0	0	0	0
2	0	4	0
0	0	1	0
0	0	9	0
0	0	15	0
0	0	18	0
0	0	15	0
0	0	29	0
1	0	10	0
0	0	3	0
0	0	5	0
0	0	3	0
0	0	1	0
5	0	4	0
5	0	5	0
1	0	6	0
0	0	11	0
1	0	12	0
1	0	8	0
0	0	30	0
0	0	19	0
0	0	19	0
1	0	15	0
1	1	8	0
0	0	8	0
0	0	2	0
1	0	86	1
0	0	304	11
0	0	110	0
0	0	64	3
0	0	35	0
6	5	78	2
0	0	105	3
0	0	80	1
0	0	80	1

Year	Lebanon Number of Terrorist Attacks	Lebanon Number of Suicide Attacks	West Bank Number of Terrorist Attacks	West Bank Number of Suicide Attacks	Israel Number of Terrorist Attacks	Israel Number of Suicide Attacks
1970	8	0	1	0	3	0
1971	3	0	0	0	3	0
1972	14	0	1	0	19	0
1973	12	0	0	0	0	0
1974	13	0	0	0	13	0
1975	24	0	0	0	9	0
1976	16	0	1	0	7	0
1977	8	0	0	0	10	0
1978	5	0	1	0	15	0
1979	13	0	2	0	30	0
1980	16	0	1	0	12	0
1981	42	1	0	0	7	0
1982	26	0	0	0	6	0
1983	36	5	0	0	3	0
1984	34	0	0	0	10	0
1985	80	10	7	0	45	0
1986	61	1	0	0	27	0
1987	41	0	0	0	32	0
1988	29	2	0	0	31	0
1989	18	3	0	0	27	0
1990	8	1	3	0	23	0
1991	33	0	2	0	15	0
1992	3	0	0	0	11	0
1993	14	0	1	0	15	0
1994	9	0	5	0	24	4
1995	4	0	5	0	11	0
1996	5	0	2	0	10	5
1997	2	0	1	0	6	1
1998	11	0	31	1	20	1
1999	7	0	10	0	14	0
2000	2	0	167	0	19	0
2001	8	0	326	7	85	18
2002	21	0	432	16	108	42
2003	10	0	164	6	74	16
2004	3	0	351	9	27	7
2005	23	0	479	9	76	3
2006	9	0	26	1	414	5

Ethiopia Number of Terrorist Attacks	Ethiopia Number of Suicide Attacks	Eritrea Number of Terrorist Attacks	Eritrea Number of Suicide Arracks
3	0	0	0
2	0	0	0
1	0	0	0
0	0	0	0
5	0	1	0
8	0	0	0
8	0	0	0
4	0	0	0
1	0	0	0
0	0	0	0
0	0	0	0
0	0	0	0
0	0	0	0
2	0	0	0
1	0	0	0
1	0	0	0
2	0	0	0
3	0	0	0
2	0	0	0
0	0	0	0
0	0	0	0
0	0	0	0
0	0	0	0
2	0	0	0
1	0	0	0
3	0	0	0
3	0	1	0
2	0	0	0
0	0	0	0
2	0	0	0
2	0	0	0
0	0	0	0
3	0	0	0
4	0	1	0
3	0	2	0
0	0	0	0
9	0	0	0

Year	Iraq Number of Terrorist Attacks	Iraq Number of Suicide Attacks	Iran Number of Terrorist Attacks	Iran Number of Suicide Attacks	Bahrain Number of Terrorist Attacks	Bahrain Number of Suicide Attacks
1970	0	0	3	0	0	0
1971	0	0	0	0	0	0
1972	0	0	4	0	0	0
1973	0	0	2	0	0	0
1974	0	0	1	0	0	0
1975	1	0	3	0	0	0
1976	2	0	1	0	0	0
1977	0	0	2	0	0	0
1978	2	0	18	0	0	0
1979	1	0	9	0	1	0
1980	3	0	0	0	0	0
1981	3	0	2	0	0	0
1982	2	0	1	0	0	0
1983	3	0	9	0	0	0
1984	3	0	6	0	0	0
1985	4	0	0	0	0	0
1986	1	0	2	0	1	0
1987	5	0	4	0	0	0
1988	0	0	1	0	0	0
1989	2	0	1	0	0	0
1990	0	0	0	0	0	0
1991	1	0	4	0	0	0
1992	10	0	4	0	0	0
1993	3	0	2	0	0	0
1994	8	0	3	0	0	0
1995	7	0	0	0	1	0
1996	4	0	1	0	10	0
1997	1	0	0	0	1	0
1998	4	0	7	0	1	0
1999	4	1	0	0	0	0
2000	4	0	0	0	0	0
2001	3	0	3	0	0	0
2002	14	0	0	0	0	0
2003	147	25	6	0	0	0
2004	849	65	0	0	0	0
2005	2356	286	25	0	0	0
2006	3966	191	11	0	3	0

Jordan Number of Terrorist Attacks	Jordan Number of Suicide Attacks	Kuwait Number of Terrorist Attacks	Kuwait Number of Suicide Arracks
12	0	0	0
6	0	0	0
6	0	1	0
0	0	0	0
2	0	1	0
0	0	1	0
1	0	1	0
2	0	2	0
0	0	2	0
0	0	0	0
0	0	1	0
0	0	0	0
0	0	1	0
4	0	5	1
4	0	0	0
2	0	6	1
0	0	2	0
1	0	5	0
2	0	3	0
0	0	0	0
4	0	0	0
9	0	1	0
2	0	6	0
1	0	1	0
2	0	0	0
1	0	0	0
1	0	0	0
2	0	0	0
7	0	0	0
0	0	0	0
1	0	0	0
1	0	0	0
3	0	2	0
1	0	3	0
0	0	1	0
6	3	0	0
1	0	0	0

Year	Qatar Number of Terrorist Attacks	Qatar Number of Suicide Attacks	Saudi Arabia Number of Terrorist Attacks	Saudi Arabia Number of Suicide Attacks	Syria Number of Terrorist Attacks	Syria Number of Suicide Attacks
1970	0	0	0	0	0	0
1971	0	0	0	0	0	0
1972	0	0	0	0	0	0
1973	0	0	0	0	0	0
1974	0	0	0	0	3	0
1975	0	0	0	0	2	0
1976	0	0	0	0	3	0
1977	0	0	0	0	1	0
1978	0	0	0	0	0	0
1979	0	0	0	0	1	0
1980	0	0	0	0	1	0
1981	0	0	0	0	1	0
1982	0	0	0	0	0	0
1983	0	0	0	0	1	0
1984	0	0	0	0	2	0
1985	0	0	3	0	0	0
1986	0	0	0	0	2	0
1987	0	0	1	0	0	0
1988	0	0	0	0	0	0
1989	0	0	3	0	1	0
1990	0	0	0	0	0	0
1991	0	0	1	0	0	0
1992	0	0	0	0	0	0
1993	0	0	0	0	0	0
1994	0	0	1	0	0	0
1995	0	0	3	0	0	0
1996	0	0	1	0	1	0
1997	0	0	2	0	0	0
1998	0	0	0	0	0	0
1999	0	0	0	0	0	0
2000	0	0	4	0	0	0
2001	0	0	5	1	0	0
2002	0	0	6	0	0	0
2003	0	0	12	5	0	0
2004	1	0	15	3	1	0
2005	1	1	21	0	1	0
2006	0	0	3	1	1	0

Yemen Number of Terrorist Attacks	Yemen Number of Suicide Attacks	Oman Number of Terrorist Attacks	Oman Number of Suicide Arracks
0	0	0	0
1	0	0	0
0	0	0	0
0	0	0	0
0	0	0	0
0	0	0	0
0	0	1	0
0	0	0	0
0	0	0	0
0	0	0	0
0	0	0	0
0	0	0	0
0	0	0	0
0	0	0	0
0	0	0	0
0	0	0	0
0	0	0	0
1	0	0	0
0	0	0	0
1	0	0	0
0	0	0	0
0	0	0	0
5	0	0	0
4	0	0	0
9	0	0	0
6	0	0	0
0	0	0	0
2	0	0	0
10	0	0	0
38	0	0	0
12	0	0	0
3	0	0	0
12	3	0	0
5	1	0	0
2	0	0	0
2	0	0	0
6	0	0	0
6	0	0	0

Year	Bangladesh Number of Terrorist Attacks	Bangladesh Number of Suicide Attacks	Pakistan Number of Terrorist Attacks	Pakistan Number of Suicide Attacks	Afghanistan Number of Terrorist Attacks	Afghanistan Number of Suicide Attacks
1970	0	0	1	0	0	0
1971	0	0	6	0	0	0
1972	0	0	0	0	0	0
1973	1	0	0	0	1	0
1974	0	0	2	0	0	0
1975	2	0	0	0	0	0
1976	0	0	4	0	0	0
1977	1	0	1	0	0	0
1978	0	0	4	0	0	0
1979	1	0	3	0	4	0
1980	0	0	0	0	0	0
1981	0	0	1	0	1	0
1982	0	0	3	0	4	0
1983	0	0	4	0	3	0
1984	0	0	3	0	1	0
1985	0	0	4	0	1	0
1986	0	0	12	1	2	0
1987	0	0	26	0	2	0
1988	1	0	34	0	6	0
1989	1	0	15	0	2	0
1990	0	0	4	0	2	0
1991	0	0	11	0	1	0
1992	0	0	2	0	2	0
1993	0	0	1	0	4	0
1994	0	0	1	0	1	0
1995	0	0	9	1	2	0
1996	2	0	8	0	3	0
1997	0	0	5	0	0	0
1998	0	0	48	0	4	0
1999	4	0	31	0	0	0
2000	0	0	33	1	0	0
2001	15	1	47	0	3	0
2002	10	0	80	2	65	2
2003	17	0	69	2	149	0
2004	24	0	84	5	147	1
2005	45	4	163	2	207	16
2006	25	0	314	7	409	47

Year	United Arab Emirates Number of Terrorist Attacks	United Arab Emirates Number of Suicide Attacks	Mauritania Number of Terrorist Attacks	Mauritania Number of Suicide Attacks	Azerbaijan Number of Terrorist Attacks	Azerbaijan Number of Suicide Attacks	Djibouti Number of Terrorist Attacks	Djibouti Number of Suicide Attacks
1970	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1972	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1973	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1974	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1975	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1976	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1977	3	0	2	0	0	0	0	0
1978	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1979	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1980	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0
1981	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1982	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1983	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1984	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1985	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
1986	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1987	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1988	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1989	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1990	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1991	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1992	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1993	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1994	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
1995	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1996	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
1997	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1998	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0
1999	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
2000	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2001	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0
2002	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
2003	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
2004	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
2005	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
2006	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

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