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AN AGONIZING EVOLUTION: A HISTORY OF THE TEXAS
NATIONAL GUARD, 1900-1945

DISSERTATION

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By

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The National Guard in America began in the Revolutionary War. The Texas units resulted from the earlier concept and emerged in 1835 to resist Mexican oppression. Following achievement of statehood, Texas militiamen served in the Mexican War, the Civil War, and the Spanish-American War. As the twentieth century began, Texans had a long history of service in reserve military organizations in spite of a prevailing attitude of contempt for citizen soldiers held by influential regular army officials.

In the first four and one-half decades of the twentieth century, the Texas National Guard evolved from a disorganized group of neglected and inexperienced local units into a viable infantry division that significantly contributed to American military efforts when activated into federal service.

Following service in the war with Spain, the militia fought a political battle for its life against Lindley Garrison, secretary of war, who supported the large regular

army concept. Congressman Charles Dick of Ohio, pushed a bill through Congress that upgraded the militia into the National Guard. The professional military establishment fought it and tried to destroy the National Guard. President Woodrow Wilson supported the militia concept and helped save the movement. Problems with Mexico, arising from murders and invasions of American territory by the bandit Pancho Villa, pointed out the correctness of Wilson's support. The guard was mobilized and helped prevent a rush to war between America and Mexico.

The Texas militiamen returned from the border service in time to be remobilized for action in World War I. The Texas and Oklahoma National Guard were merged to form the Thirty-sixth Infantry Division that trained at Camp Bowie, Texas. The division travelled to France in the summer of 1918 and engaged the German Army in brief but fierce combat, winning praise from Allied leaders and numerous honors.

During the period between the wars, the Texas National Guard constantly grew in quality and quantity. This growth occurred in a period of widespread pacifism resulting from reaction to loss of lives in World War I. Congress indicated its support by appropriating increased aid for the militia movement and the regular army adopted a tolerant attitude toward the citizen soldiers.

The Great Depression added to the intrinsic military and patriotic feelings of the Texas guardsmen and membership grew in quality as the movement became selective of recruits who needed to join in order to receive federal drill pay during the economic calamity. Therefore, when aggressor nations began expansion, the Texas guardsmen were reasonably prepared for activation.

The Texans returned to federal service in November 1940 and reported to a new Camp Bowie near Brownwood, Texas. After maneuvers in Louisiana in 1941, the division received a new commander, Fred Walker, and began a two-year training period prior to overseas shipment.

The Second Battalion of the 131st Field Artillery was split off, sent to Java, and became known as the Lost Battalion after its capture by Japanese forces. These Texans were assigned forced labor on a Burma-Siamese railroad project that proved fatal to many. The battalion remained prisoners until liberated in 1945.

The balance of the division led the first invasion of Europe and fought valiantly through Italy, suffering extensive casualties because of inept Corps and Army military leadership. The Thirty-sixth Division led a second invasion in 1944 through France and Germany, and ended the war in Austria. The Texans' combat record earned everyone's respect and completed the agonizing evolution.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS	
Chapter	
I. INTRODUCTION: THE AMERICAN MILITIA EXPERIENCE, 1775-1900.	1
II. TRANSFORMATION BY TRIBULATION.	23
III. CALLED TO GLORY: 1917-1919	56
IV. MAINTENANCE BY MILITANCY AND CALAMITY	78
V. CONTINUING CRISIS: 1939-1940	108
VI. MISSION: MOBILIZATION.	123
VII. WATCHFUL WAITING AGAIN	133
VIII. A DIVIDED DIVISION	149
IX. LOST BATTALION: MILITARY UNIT, POLITICAL PAWN	167
X. THE SAD, SAD ROADS: ASIA	196
XI. THE SAD, SAD ROADS: EUROPE	217
XII. CONCLUSION	253
APPENDIX.	260
BIBLIOGRAPHY.	262

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Figure	Page
1. Locations of the activated Texas National Guard units on the international border, 1916	54
2. Thirty-sixth Division action in northeast France, 1918	77
3. Island of Java, Netherlands East Indies.	179
4. South Pacific area	195
5. Burma and Thailand	210
6. Thirty-sixth Division action in Italy, 1943-1944	241
7. Thirty-sixth Division action in France and Germany, 1944-1945.	252

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION: THE AMERICAN MILITIA EXPERIENCE, 1775-1900

National defense in the United States has long occupied the attention, time, lives, and treasure of American citizens. Foremost in our early history is the symbol of the colonial Minuteman who stood ready to lay down the tools of his trade and take up his weapons to defend his family and community. That tradition has continued down through the decades in this nation's infrequent occasions of national emergency.

The peacetime equivalent of the Minuteman in the twentieth century has been the National Guardsman. Although the vocations such individuals pursued differed considerably from times past, modern civilian guardians of national defense, sometimes called "weekend warriors," have responded to the call of patriotism and service. Men and women from farms, factories, offices, stores, and classrooms regularly have left their places of employment for training and on occasion said farewell to their communities to enter active service. The story of national defense prior to World War II has been that of a relatively small regular army cadre and a sizable National Guard force. The service these citizen soldiers rendered made for a strong defense posture for the

nation. Many of the people involved have been Texans. Their story is worth telling.

The National Guard of the United States is a singular military organization that serves both state and national governments. Unless activated into federal service, the Guard remains under the direct command of the state or territorial governor. This executive may call the organization to temporary active duty within the confines of his political boundary to serve in various functions that range from impeding riots to guarding property following natural disasters such as storms or floods. When activated by the national government, the National Guard then becomes an integral part of the United States defense system and receives the same equipment and compensation as the regular force. It also adheres to the same rules and regulations while in federal service.

The recognition of the National Guard of the United States, which included the Texas unit, paralleled and contributed to the increasing role of the national government in diverse sectors of American citizens' lives. Just as the federal government assumed more responsibility and control over the populace, so it absorbed more responsibility and control over the National Guard. This control consequently conferred an undeniable legitimacy on the organization.

The Texas National Guard, like all state forces, traces its lineage back to the first American militia, the Minutemen

of the Revolutionary War period. Despite this heritage of useful service, many American leaders throughout the nation's history have expressed disillusionment with the militia. George Washington, though a colonel of Virginia militia when appointed commander in chief of the Continental Army, preferred regular troops.¹ Alexander Hamilton, a strong advocate of federalism, argued against the concept of a state-commanded force by stating in the Federalist Papers

The states, to whose lot it might fall to support the necessary establishments, would be as little able as willing for a considerable time to come to bear the burden of competent provisions. In this situation, military establishments, nourished by mutual jealousy . . . would be the engines for the abridgement or demolition of the national authority.²

With the passage and ratification of the Constitution of the United States, the concept of a state-controlled militia again came to the forefront; hence the Second Amendment, which reserves the right to maintain a separate militia, gave the movement a new opportunity to serve America.

Within two years following ratification of the Constitution, Secretary of War Henry Knox presented to President Washington a plan for a militia of the United States. Primarily, the scheme included the concept of universal military training.

¹Russell Frank Weigley, History of the United States Army (New York: MacMillian Co., 1967), pp. 92-140.

²Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, John Jay, The Federalist Papers (New York: The New American Library, 1961), p. 163.

Washington forwarded the plan to Congress for its consideration on 21 January 1790.³

Knox prefaced the plan with a statement favoring a citizen reserve: "An energetic national militia is to be regarded as the capital security of a free Republic, and not a standing army." The plan proposed to include all male citizens between eighteen and sixty who would be divided into three categories: youths of eighteen, nineteen, and twenty years of age would be designated as the Advanced Corps; men from twenty-one to forty-five, the Main Corps; older citizens from forty-six to sixty, the Reserved Corps. The required time spent in training each year varied from thirty days for the Advanced Corps to four days for the Main Corps and only two days for the Reserved Corps.

According to the Knox plan, the Advanced Corps would act as a military school for the young men who would serve as defenders of the community in an emergency. The national government would be responsible for clothing all members of the Advanced Corps. Officers would receive pay while non-commissioned officers and enlisted men would not. The government also would furnish arms that the militiamen would return to the regimental quartermaster upon completion of their tour. Cavalrymen would be responsible for their horses and saddles, but the government would furnish feed for the

³Annals of Congress, The Debates and Proceedings of the Congress of the United States (Washington: Gales and Seaton, 1834), vol. 1:1113.

animals. Upon completion of his tour, the young male would receive a certificate that would be required as a qualification for exercising his rights as a citizen.⁴

In the event of a rebellion or invasion, the Advanced Corps would be subject to order by appropriate authority to any point in the United States for a period not to exceed one year. While on active duty, the militiamen would receive the same pay and equipment as the regular army. The Main Corps, encompassing the majority of the militia, would constitute the country's principal defense. To insure their necessary competence when required, the Main Corps would be supplied with the latest available weapons. The Reserved Corps would be called to active duty to facilitate the inspection of their arms. The second group would be activated for additional service only for the defense of the states.⁵

Congress debated the Knox plan but failed to pass it. It substituted the National Defense Act of 1792 that created the first organized militia in the United States. In contrast to the Knox plan, this law simply stated that every able-bodied white male citizen between the ages of eighteen and forty-five would be enrolled in the militia. Under the act, militiamen

⁴Annals of Congress, The Debates and Proceedings of the Congress of the United States (Washington: Gales and Seaton, 1834), vol. 2:2146-2150.

⁵Annals of Congress, vol. 2:2150-2153.

received no pay except when on field service, and, moreover, furnished their own rifles and other military equipment.⁶

Within six years, the national government began to appropriate funds to support the militia system. The Congress passed and President John Adams signed into law an act to provide arms to the militia. The law directed that the national government use federal funds to purchase 30,000 rifles to be resold to the States for use by their militia. The president was to determine the sale price. Furthermore, all unsold arms were to be used by the militia when called into national service. Since heretofore the burden of furnishing weapons had fallen on the individual militiaman, the act served to aid the movement.⁷

Thomas Jefferson, in keeping with his states' rights philosophy, preferred the militia to a standing army. With the end of Jefferson's first year in the presidency, the regular army had dissipated to 248 officers and less than 4,000 men.⁸

By 1803, the Congress acted to bring uniformity to the various state units. The measure directed the adjutant-general of the militia of each state to make a report to the president giving the enrollment of the state unit, plus the quantity and condition of the arms and equipment. Furthermore,

⁶U. S., Statutes at Large, vol. 1.

⁷U. S., Statutes at Large, vol. 1.

⁸Weigley, History of the United States Army, p. 104.

the act directed the secretary of war to give instruction and guidance in order to produce a uniformity of the various state units. The measure charged the secretary with presenting an abstract of information about the states to the Congress on the first Monday of February each year. The act directed that each militiaman be constantly furnished with arms and equipment and that the citizen soldier be required to attend all musters and training drills. Finally, the uniformity extended to the leadership of each state unit: they were required to maintain a quartermaster-general, each brigade must maintain one quartermaster of brigade, and each regiment must have a chaplain.⁹

By 1808, the Congress gave the president extended powers to "reorganize, arm, and equip according to law, and hold in readiness to march at a moment's warning" detachments of the militia. State governors might accept any group of volunteers that continued in service for six months. The measure directed that militia officers be in command of detachments and that the units be kept on active duty no longer than six months during which time they be entitled to the same pay, rations, and allowances as the regular army. The act authorized the president to call into active service part of a detachment if he deemed it necessary and proper because of emergencies of the nation. Finally, the measure included an appropriation

⁹U. S., Statutes at Large, vol. 2.

of one million dollars for support of the detachments while on active duty.¹⁰

Within a month the national legislature made additional provisions for arming and equipping the militia. The congress appropriated \$200,000 for arms for the reserve force. The act authorized the president to buy sites and have erected arsenals capable of manufacturing arms to be distributed to the militia.¹¹

Militiamen occasionally failed to justify Congressional confidence and frequently panicked under stress of combat. John C. Calhoun, congressional leader during the War of 1812 and late secretary of war during the Monroe Administration, considered the militia virtually useless. The force, he said, must be used in conjunction with regular troops and only for garrison duty or light field duty; nothing more.¹² During the War of 1812, however, Congress reiterated that militiamen on active duty were entitled to the same pay, rations, and equipment provided for the regular army. The measure also made provisions for collecting fines from citizen soldiers convicted by a court-martial.¹³

The question of benefits for survivors of militiamen killed while on active duty arose during the first war with

¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹Ibid.

¹²Weigley, History of the United States Army, p. 140.

¹³U. S., Statutes at Large, vol. 2.

the Seminole Indian tribe. A new act provided that the widows and orphans of militia personnel killed on active service after 1 September 1817 be entitled to half pay for five years and pensions as then allowed by law for the survivors of regular troops. This arrangement paralleled the allowance made for militiamen killed while on active duty during the War of 1812.¹⁴ Andrew Jackson, who had found the citizen soldiers useful at the Battles of Horseshoe Bend and New Orleans, referred to the militiamen as "the bulwark of our defense . . ." in his first inaugural address.¹⁵

In time, the United States Congress outlined rules for conduct which paralleled the rules for the regular army. The concept of discipline and field exercises observed by the regulars now applied to the militia.¹⁶ No subsequent measure concerning the militia passed Congress until March 1836. In the interim, events in the Mexican province of Texas captured the interest of many people in the United States. Those ensuing encounters affected the perception of Texans for some time to come regarding a citizen soldierhood.

Anglo settlers first came to Texas under the leadership of Stephen Fuller Austin. After several years of deteriorating relations between the colonists and the Mexican government, armed conflict erupted in early October 1835 near the Texas

¹⁴U. S., Statutes at Large, vol. 3.

¹⁵Daily National Intelligencer, 5 March 1829.

¹⁶Weekly Telegraph and Texas Register, 10 October 1835.

town of Gonzales. This episode led the settlers to create the first Texas militia.¹⁷ By November, Texas leaders had begun to draft a "Plan and Form of the Provisional Government." Article Ten of the military section stated that "all able-bodied men over sixteen and under fifty shall be subject to military duty." Henry Smith, provisional governor, wrote to the Legislative Council on 16 November 1835 entreating them to lose no time in organizing a viable militia.¹⁸ The resulting organization garnered glory by the defense of the Alamo in which all of the approximately 187 Texans perished and the subsequent Battle of San Jacinto which resulted in 600 Mexican soldiers killed, 200 wounded, and 700 captured, including the Mexican commanding general, Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna.¹⁹ Two Texans died in the latter battle and less

¹⁷Ibid., Baltimore American, 12 November 1835.

¹⁸Weekly Telegraph and Texas Register, 21 November 1835.

¹⁹Several works describe the two battles. The two most recent which apply to the Alamo are Walter Lord, A Time to Stand (New York: Random House, 1961) and Lon Tinkle, Thirteen Days to Glory (New York: Doubleday, 1958). A contemporary but biased account of the trauma of the Alamo by Santa Anna appears in the 10 May 1836 issue of the Baltimore American, p. 2. The latter battle is covered in Frank X. Tolbert's The Day of San Jacinto (New York: Random House, 1959), and eyewitness accounts by participants include "The Journal of Dr. N. D. Labadie," Texas Almanac, 1859 (Galveston: Richardson and Co., 1859), pp. 54-55 and Sam Houston's report by letter to President David G. Burnet on 25 April 1836, Amelia Williams and Eugene C. Barker, eds., The Writings of Sam Houston, 1813-1863 (Austin: University of Austin Press, 1938), 1:416-420. A recently published account written by a Mexican participant at the Battle of the Alamo is Jose Enrique de la Pena, With Santa Anna in Texas; A Personal Narrative of the Revolution, trans. and ed. Carmen Perry (College Station: Texas A & M Press, 1975).

than thirty received wounds.²⁰ Santa Anna signed an agreement with Texas President Ad Interim David Gouverneur Burnet known as the Treaty of Velasco on 14 May 1836 in which Mexico recognized the independence of Texas.²¹

Americans observed the Texas-Mexico conflict with great interest and sometimes became involved.²² The United States Congress, meanwhile, continued to enact legislation affecting the militia. This action proved helpful during the Second Seminole War as the federal government called militiamen of several southern states and the territory of Florida to active duty to aid regular troops in the Indian conflict.²³

The United States found the militia useful within ten years when Congress authorized President James K. Polk to utilize all military and naval forces, including the militia, to prosecute the war with Mexico, which began in 1846. The lawmakers limited the militia's active service to six months in any one year but reiterated that militiamen must be furnished with the same equipment, rations, and pay as the regular troops.²⁴

²⁰Houston to Burnet, cited above.

²¹Baltimore American, 17 May 1836; 23 May 1836.

²²Walter Lord, A Time to Stand, pp. 42-49. The author points out that many Americans in 1835-1836 virtually considered Texas an American protectorate.

²³U. S., Statutes at Large, vol. 3.

²⁴U. S., Statutes at Large, vol. 9.

Following the Mexican War, the militia remained inactive for several years. Then in the first days of the American Civil War, Congress again authorized the call to active duty of militiamen. Significantly, the legislators did not limit the active duty period to a given number of months as previously practiced, but instead outlined that the militia continue in federal service until released by the president "provided that such continuance in service shall not extend beyond sixty days after the commencement of the next regular session of Congress" unless the legislators passed an additional measure allowing it.²⁵

Civil War legislation also removed the restriction on sending militiamen to other states and territories. In early 1862 Congress passed a measure that forbade mustering into active duty any volunteers or militiamen on terms or conditions that limited their service to a specific state or territory. At last the legislators had begun to regard the militia as a national force while on active duty with the federal government.²⁶ Within months Congress put limitations on the length of service by passing another law that specified the maximum length as nine months.²⁷

Following the Civil War, lawmakers moved to amend the original Militia Act of 1792 to eliminate the specification

²⁵U. S., Statutes at Large, vol. 12.

²⁶Ibid.

²⁷Ibid.

of white males only. This action resulted from the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which was then in the process of being ratified.²⁸ On the same day, 2 March 1867, the legislators disbanded the militia forces of Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas. Any militia force was prohibited in these states until Congress chose to lift the ban.²⁹

Within three years, the Congress repealed the prohibition and the right to organize, arm, and activate militia returned to the former rebel states when they had completed the reconstruction process. Subsequently, following the return of Texas to statehood, the state legislature passed a militia bill that authorized the creation of a new volunteer military organization. This measure paralleled the original national Militia Act of 1792 and separated the men of Texas into two categories: the State Guard, which contained the Volunteer companies, and the Reserve Military, composed of males within the ages of eighteen and forty-five who did not belong to a volunteer company. Excluded from liability were preachers, teachers, judges, justices of the peace, and law enforcement officials. Any male could pay

²⁸U. S., Statutes at Large, vol. 14.

²⁹Ibid.

fifteen dollars to the state treasury and have his name removed from the Reserved Military list. As before, the state governor served as the commander in chief. At the request of local authorities, the chief executive could declare martial law in a troubled county and send state troops to aid civil officials. Costs of the militiamen's service on active duty would be borne by the county or counties requiring assistance.³⁰

By the end of 1870, the Adjutant-General reported to the governor that nearly 90,000 men had been enrolled in the Reserve Militia and over 3,500 Texans had joined the State Guard. Less than one hundred had taken advantage of the clause to avoid service by paying a fee.³¹ Within two years, however, cooperation and interest by the populace had declined. At the end of 1871, the Adjutant-General reported that the state militia contained less than 75,000 men.³²

The state legislators omitted the militia force from the list of state agencies to receive appropriations in 1873. The following year the lawmakers again ignored funding for the organization. The force had no weapons until the federal

³⁰ Texas, Journal of the Senate, 11th Legislature, 1870, p. 879.

³¹ James Davidson, Report of the Adjutant-General of the State of Texas, 1871 (Galveston: Newsbook and Job Office, 1871), p. 5.

³² Ibid.

government furnished over one thousand cavalry guns to aid the Texas militiamen.³³

Moreover, events soon occurred which jeopardized the entire American militia system. In 1875, United States Secretary of War William Belknap ordered General Emory Upton to travel to the Orient and Europe to view firsthand the military systems of various countries and cultures. Upton had graduated from the United States Military Academy in 1861 just as the American Civil War began and, after establishing a brilliant record in the Union Army, finished the conflict as a brevet major general. The secretary instructed Upton to take no more than eighteen months and to submit monthly reports to the Adjutant-General of the army. General William Tecumseh Sherman, commander in chief of the army, also advised Upton about what to seek in his travels.³⁴

³³Texas, Journal of the Senate, 13th Legislature, 1874, p. 694; William Steele, Report of the Adjutant-General of the State of Texas, 1874 (Galveston: Newsbook and Job Office, 1874), p. 3. From its earliest beginning, Texas had a state police force known as the Texas Rangers that had statewide jurisdiction. This body distinguished Texas from the other states that had to rely on county officials for law enforcement and a militia when called into service for statewide law enforcement. See Walter Prescott Webb, The Texas Rangers, A Century of Frontier Defense (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1935), p. 21.

³⁴Emory Upton, The Armies of Asia and Europe: Embracing Official Reports on the Armies of Japan, China, India, Persia, Italy, Russia, Austria, Germany, France, and England (New York: D. Appleton, and Co., 1878; reprint ed., New York: Greenwood Press, 1968), pp. iii-ix.

The general's findings led him to suggest various changes in the United States Army structure, all of which he submitted to Secretary Belknap upon his return. Among other things, Upton suggested that the American system should assign officers to staff and line posts alternately. Officers should be reviewed frequently for efficiency, with an examination required to qualify for promotion. He recommended a school for enlisted men, a system of Reserve Officers Training Corps, and, finally, a War College for officers to study "the art of war and the higher branches of their profession."³⁵

In his first work, Upton mentioned the militia only briefly in his coverage of the English Army. The main thrust of his discussion pointed out that the English militia served for local defense but could be ordered to serve anywhere in the British Isles and as garrison for the Mediterranean forts. Officers' commissions came directly from the Crown, while instruction and recruitment remained under the direction of regular army generals controlling the various military districts in Britain. Upton's indication of the differences between the British and American militia systems was only a harbinger of his assault on the reserve force concept.³⁶

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Ibid., p. 253; Weigley, History of the United States Army, pp. 288-289.

Upton began his attack on the militia in his second book by pointing out the near uselessness of the citizen soldiers in the Revolutionary War. In reaching this conclusion, he quoted from writings of Generals Phillip Schuler and Richard Montgomery, who both opposed the militia, and mentioned George Washington's letter to the president of the American Congress in which the former commander of the Revolutionary War army observed: "To place any dependence upon the Militia is assuredly resting upon a broken staff."³⁷

The author recounted the concern with which Revolutionary-era Americans regarded standing armies, then considered the law of 8 May 1792 which created the uniform militia. The general expressed his contempt by stating that "a mere glance at the military edifice proposed by this law shows that its foundations were built on the sands."³⁸

Upton presented a review of the militia from 1802 through the Civil War and blamed the reserve force for the states retaining the right to appoint officers to command militia units and argued that these inexperienced leaders remain in charge when the force received mobilization orders.

³⁷Emory Upton, The Military Policy of the United States (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1904; reprint ed., New York: Greenwood Press, 1968), pp. 14-15.

³⁸Ibid., p. 85.

He stated that "more than half a century later, we reaped the bitter fruit of this system at the battle of Bull Run."³⁹ In the War of 1812, he continued, governors of Massachusetts and Connecticut refused to furnish their portion of the 100,000-member militia authorized by the congressional measure of 10 April 1812. Upton reached the conclusion that "the governors were thus able to paralyze, for the time being, the military power of their respective states, and defeat the plans of the General Government."⁴⁰

The British, according to Upton, also had little respect for the America militia because they permitted captured militiamen to return home while the regular army prisoners were confined to a camp in Montreal. The author further recalled several instances during the conflict when the militia proved to be a liability to the American regular army.⁴¹

The general pointed out that the recurring success of the American forces during the Mexican War, in relation to the War of 1812, could be attributed to two major points: the difference of the character of the adversaries and the quality of the regular army. He stressed also that the supplementary troops represented mostly volunteers rather

³⁹Ibid.

⁴⁰Ibid., p. 96; U. S., Statutes at Large, vol. 10.

⁴¹Upton, Military Policy of the United States, pp. 98-105, 109-124.

than the militia. In describing the Battle of Buena Vista, Upton gave some small credit to the militia and volunteers who comprised almost 90 percent of Zachary Taylor's forces. He emphasized, however, that Taylor gave the regular army artillery credit for winning the battle and pointed out that the volunteers had completed, at this point, eight months of intensive training and had become virtually regular troops.⁴² The Uptonian concept influenced American military leaders for over thirty years, and one military historian later argued that "Upton had planted the seed of a powerful idea, that of adequate preparedness . . . it was he . . ." who really raised the banners of the new age.⁴³

Meanwhile in Texas, the Adjutant-General reported to the governor that during the 1870s approximately forty volunteer companies had become part of the militia. The organizations sustained themselves by paying rent on their armories and furnishing their own uniforms. During this period, the militia consisted of four white infantry regiments, one black infantry regiment, a cavalry regiment, and two artillery battalions.⁴⁴

⁴²Ibid., p. 209.

⁴³Walter Millis, Arms and Men (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1956), p. 141.

⁴⁴John B. Jones, Report of the Adjutant-General of the State of Texas, 1880 (Galveston: A. H. Belo and Co., 1880), p. 5.

To obtain more efficiency within the state military force, the new Adjutant-General, William H. King, recommended to the chief executive an improved plan of organization that would force a review of the roll of the Texas militia every two years and restructure the state military unit to include a division composed of from two to four brigades. He suggested appointing a major general to command the division and brigadier generals to lead the brigades. King proposed that the militiamen attend a training camp annually from three to five days, plus regular inspections of the local units and alteration of the existing statutes that allowed minor officials to activate the militia companies. The general recommended that henceforth only the governor be authorized to call out the state troops.⁴⁵

State military leaders attempted to maintain interest in the militia by drill competitions held in Houston in May 1884 between units from Texas and neighboring states. The legislators continued to ignore the needs of the militia. Not only did the lawmakers refuse to appropriate funds for the armory rents or uniforms, but they also made no provisions for the annual training camps. Instead, private citizens donated money to pay the militiamen's expenses.

⁴⁵William H. King, Report of the Adjutant-General of the State of Texas, 1882 (Galveston: A. H. Belo Co., 1882), p. 3.

Despite the legislature's reluctance, interest in the state force increased to the point that the Texas Volunteer Guard underwent reorganization on 15 October 1886. The restructured force contained five white infantry regiments, one black infantry battalion, a cavalry regiment, and an artillery battalion.⁴⁶

William H. Mabry became the Adjutant-General in 1891 and the following year proposed establishing a permanent area near the state capital for the annual training. The state accepted his suggestion and designated a site that later became known as Camp Mabry.⁴⁷ Two years later, the state force included an aggregate total of three thousand officers and men in sixty-four local units. By the end of 1896, however, the total had diminished to less than twenty-five hundred militiamen in forty-eight elements.⁴⁸

On the national scene, the Spanish-American War gave the reserve force an opportunity to disprove some of General Upton's contentions. Congress passed an act which allowed any militia unit to join the army as a body. The militiamen

⁴⁶William H. King, Report of the Adjutant-General of the State of Texas, 1886 (Austin: Triplett and Hutchings, 1886), p. 4.

⁴⁷William H. Mabry, Report of the Adjutant-General of the State of Texas, 1892 (Austin: Ben C. Jones, Co., 1892), p. 5.

⁴⁸William H. Mabry, Report of the Adjutant-General of the State of Texas, 1894 (Austin: Ben C. Jones, Co., 1895), p. 4; William H. Mabry, Report of the Adjutant-General of the State of Texas, 1896 (Austin: Ben C. Jones, Co., 1897), p. 5.

responded rapidly and within a few weeks over 120,000 from the various states' militia forces had volunteered en masse.⁴⁹ Many of the activated units served with distinction, especially in the Philippines. The insurrection in the islands that followed the war proved longer and more difficult than the formal conflict with Spain. Secretary of War Elihu Root, who normally opposed the reserve force concept, praised the Philippine service of the militiamen.⁵⁰

As the nineteenth century drew to a close, the militiamen could look back over more than one hundred years of service and tradition, some of which were commendable, some not. The militia leaders and their allies in the Congress of the United States had accomplished much for the reserve units. The Uptonian concept of disbanding the guard and replacing it with a large standing army loomed up to threaten the future of the militia. As the new century began, the guardsmen soon would be fighting for their very existence.

⁴⁹Weigley, History of the United States Army, p. 271; U. S., Statutes at Large, vol. 16.

⁵⁰Weigley, History of the United States Army, p. 298.

CHAPTER II

TRANSFORMATION BY TRIBULATION

In the early years of the twentieth century, several major events altered the concept of the militia system in Texas and the rest of the nation. Between 1900 and 1917 the militia fought a political battle for its survival against a hostile regular army that was supported by a popular secretary of war. A turning point in this struggle occurred in 1916 when the guard received a call to active duty following the mass murder of several American citizens in Mexico and a brief invasion of the United States.

During the year 1900, the Texas Volunteer Guard underwent reorganization after the War Department authorized its strength at three thousand officers and men. The federal government allocated \$1,000,000 for arms and equipment. Texas' share of this appropriation amounted to \$32,000 of arms, uniforms, and equipment, which proved ample to sustain the existing force.¹

Local militia units reflected varying quality. Groups of young men who desired to form a unit usually made

¹Records of the Adjutant-General's Office, 1780-1917, order 47, 3 March 1900, Records Group 94, National Archives, Washington, D. C.

application to the state Adjutant-General for permission to organize a company. Former non-commissioned officers or enlisted men who had served in the regular army or other militia unit frequently acted as officers of the new organizations. The essential requirements turned on obtaining the means of renting an armory and gathering enough young men who wanted to become members of the local militia.²

The state government offered little aid to the struggling new units. The Texas State Legislature appropriated only \$5,000 for the militia for the six months ending 1 August 1901, and more than \$2,000 of this allocation was expended on mobilizing the citizen soldiers for the reception of President William McKinley's visit. Unlike some other states, Texas appropriated no funds for either summer training camps or for transportation to and from the exercises, and the state granted no financial assistance for armory leases, active duty pay, or payment for drills attended. Municipalities occasionally appropriated funds to aid the local militia units. The Waco, Texas, city council allotted \$45 per month for armory rent and other expenses for the town's two infantry companies and the one battery of artillery. Moreover, Adjutant-General Thomas Scurry advised

²Lee Johnson, personal interview, Oral History Collection, North Texas State University Library, OH 313:17.

Governor Joseph Sayers in 1902 that Texas railroads had furnished free travel for volunteer troops going to and from summer camps in 1901 and 1902, but warned that the carriers could no longer furnish unpaid movement to the citizen soldiers since the state legislature had recently limited the free pass to railroad employees.³

Civil authorities activated several units of the Texas Volunteer Guard in 1901 and 1902, but appropriated insufficient funds to pay the militia for these actions. Consequently, the Adjutant-General requested that the governor ask the legislature to allot \$1,992 to reimburse the various units. The state also allocated no money to purchase land for the Texas Guard headquarters. As a result, a concerned group of Austin citizens requested permission to charge gate fees on one day of the 1902 encampment and for sham battles to be staged for the entertainment of the paying guests; proceeds would be used to purchase additional land for the state militia camp.⁴

On the national scene, Congressman Charles Dick of Ohio introduced his bill on 23 January 1902 for increasing the

³Thomas Scurry, Report of the Adjutant-General of the State of Texas, 1901-1902 (Austin: Austin Printing, 1902), pp. 6-10; National Guard Association of the United States, The Nation's National Guard (Washington: National Guard Association of the United States, 1954), p. 28.

⁴Scurry, Report of the Adjutant-General, 1901-1902, the money repaid the Austin group for \$5,500 raised by subscription for the camp land acquisition, pp. 6, 7, 11, 35.

efficiency of the militia. The proposal, known as House Bill 11654, emerged from the Committee on Militia on 20 March. Dick presented it to the House on 27 June 1902, but other congressmen moved to delay consideration. On 30 June, Dick asked the House to suspend the rules in order to consider his proposal.⁵ The bill contained twenty-seven sections and outlined a new departure for the militia.

First, the measure stated that the militia would "consist of every able-bodied male citizen of the representative states, territories, and the District of Columbia." All foreign born males who planned to become naturalized citizens would be included also. The age range covered eighteen to forty-five. The members would be divided into three classes: the National Guard, the National Volunteer Reserve, and the balance to be the Reserve Militia. Dick's proposal exempted most civil and military officials. It gave the president authority to call to active duty the militia of any state or territory for up to nine months and provided for courts-martial for those who refused to obey the president's call. The secretary of war would be authorized to issue military equipment to the various states and territories for their units.

The bill further authorized the secretary to set up annual inspections of the units and allowed for payment,

⁵U. S., Congress, House, Congressional Record, 57th Cong., 1st sess., 1902, 35, pt. 1:967, 3104, 7547, 7594, 7706, 7732.

transportation, and subsistence of the militiamen who attended the summer camps for instruction or for those who attended regular army schools. The proposal would require all National Guardsmen to attend twenty-four meetings or drills throughout the year in addition to the summer camp and authorized the secretary of war to assign regular army officers to assist and instruct the militia units.

Dick's measure proposed the creation of another force of 100,000 men who had previously served in the regular or volunteer American armies or in the organized militia. This group, to be known as the National Volunteer Reserve, could be activated by the president. Representative Henry De Lamar Clayton of Alabama questioned the provision that created the National Volunteer Reserve because he wondered if the National Guard would remain the second line of defense behind the regular army. Dick introduced a letter from Secretary of War Elihu Root outlining the administration's interpretation of the proposal. The secretary regarded the bill as subordinating the National Volunteer Reserve to the National Guard and went on to express his unqualified support of the measure.⁶

After extensive debate and statements, the bill passed the House on 30 June 1903. The Senate received the proposal on 1 July and referred it to committee.⁷ The measure

⁶U. S., Congress, House, Congressional Record, 57th Cong., 2nd sess., 1903, 36, pt. 1:125-128.

⁷Ibid., pp. 778-782.

returned to the Senate from the Committee on Military Affairs on 9 December 1902. After amendments removing the proposal for the National Volunteer Reserve and changing some of the wording of the other provisions, the bill passed the upper house on 14 January 1903.⁸ The House agreed to the Senate amendments on 19 January and the president signed it into law two days later.⁹

Two years later the Texas House of Representatives began consideration of a state militia bill. Throughout the early part of 1905, the Military Affairs Committee labored over the proposal and by late spring presented House Bill 480 to the main legislative body. This proposal provided that the Texas militia would be divided into two classes: reserve and active. The committee borrowed a concept from the original federal Militia Act of 1792 by providing that all able-bodied males of the state between eighteen and forty-five would automatically be members of the reserve militia, but contained provisions exempting certain officials. The active militia, designated the Texas National Guard, would be composed of the existing state militia organization, and future units that would be organized. Since the plan incorporated a complete restructuring of the unit, the authors

⁸Ibid., p. 965.

⁹U. S., Statutes at Large, vol. 32.

provided for the reappointment of all officers and the reenlistment of all enlisted men. A similar bill had progressed through the upper house and the two bills merged into one militia bill in the House-Senate Conference Committee. The Speaker of the House signed the compromise bill and forwarded it to the governor who signed it; it became law on 1 July 1905. Because of apathy in the ranks, many members refused to reenlist under the new law.¹⁰

In 1907 the War Department ruled that subsequent to 21 January 1908 each National Guard regiment must have twelve companies, and each company must include a minimum enlisted strength of at least fifty-eight men. The federal agency pointed out that "minimum enlisted strength" referred to the table of organization instead of actual numbers. For example, a company of the Texas National Guard infantry should have fifty-eight sets of equipment on hand regardless of whether the company contained fifty-eight active members or not. The Texas Adjutant-General, James O. Newton, interpreted the War Department order to mean that the militia was expected to have the necessary equipment for whatever overall organization the state chose

¹⁰Texas, Journal of the House, 29th Legislature, regular session, 1905, pp. 411, 469, 732, 739, 740, 958, 1241, 1247, 1316, 1427.

to claim. Another problem lay in member apathy and population mobility. Units faced disbandment when members moved from the area and no replacements could be found.¹¹

The Texans attended summer camp for eight days in July 1907, but because funds were limited the troops received pay for only part of the time. Regular army officers, assigned by the War Department, also participated in the exercise to aid in training the citizen soldiers. One of the regular officers, Captain O. B. Rosenbaum, remarked in his report to the War Department about the low pay received by the militia. The officer pointed out that many members were paid "a mere pittance . . ." and were attending camp at great financial sacrifice. Rosenbaum reminded the War Department that expecting patriotic feelings or military concern with such low pay was impossible.¹²

After the summer camp, the Texas National Guard faced action by the War Department because of lack of equipment and personnel to maintain a division size organization. Adjutant-General Newton and Governor Thomas Mitchell Campbell discussed the situation and called a meeting with Major General William Stacy, the

¹¹James O. Newton, Report of the Adjutant-General of the State of Texas, 1907-1908 (Austin: Austin Printing Co, 1908), pp. 4-6.

¹²Ibid., p. 251

division commander, Brigadier General Thomas Scurry, the First Infantry Brigade commanding officer, Colonel Julian M. Byrnes, the Inspector-General, and Major Churchill Towles, the First Cavalry Troop commander. The conference produced a decision to reduce the organization of the Texas National Guard from a division to a brigade. Accordingly, the Adjutant-General issued orders that directed the change in organization. The move forced several officers to retire from the militia for lack of positions in the reduced organizational structure.¹³

The Texas legislature offered scant encouragement to the militia by appropriating only \$5,000 annually for the years 1907 and 1908. The allocation provided monthly pay of \$8 to infantry companies, \$12 to cavalry troops, and \$16 to artillery batteries. With these meager funds the various units paid rental on armories, purchased equipment, and provided maintenance. The Adjutant-General noted that the funds barely covered one-fourth of the actual expenses but raised the militiamen's hopes for more liberal allowances from the lawmakers in the future.¹⁴ While the legislative appropriation aided the local units, these funds insufficiently sustained the company and battery officers who had to pay the majority

¹³Newton, Report of the Adjutant-General, 1907-1908, pp. 4-6, 117-121.

¹⁴Ibid., pp. 3-5.

of the local expenses themselves. The officers' discouragement increased as the numbers of enlisted men joining the local units declined.¹⁵

A subsequent federal law, which amended the Militia Act of 1908, directed that the various states' National Guard organizations would conform within two years to the structure, armament, and discipline of the regular army or face being disbanded. The amendment altered the provision for mobilizing the militia for nine months to allow the president to call the citizen soldiers out for any period of time required, provided that the chief executive specified the length of the active duty tour.¹⁶

Provisions of the amendment soon began to achieve fruition in the Texas military unit. Adjutant-General James O. Newton reported to Governor Thomas M. Campbell that the state militia was armed, uniformed, and equipped for full field service, as required by the War Department. This new status included regulation marching shoes that the regular army issued to the National Guard for the first time.¹⁷

The Citizens Encampment Committee of Austin continued to serve as an interest group in aiding the Texas National

¹⁵Ibid., pp. 3-4.

¹⁶U. S., Statutes at Large, vol. 35.

¹⁷James O. Newton, Report of the Adjutant-General of the State of Texas, 1909-1910 (Austin: Von Boeckmann-Jones, 1910), p. 4.

Guard to expand its headquarters and training area. During the 1909 summer camp, the committee again received permission from the state to charge admission to the grounds from private citizens wishing to view the sham battles performed by the training guardsmen. The committee also raised funds by franchising refreshment booth locations within the campgrounds. The money realized from the committee's efforts purchased seven and one-half acres of land within the grounds which the group conveyed by warranty deed to the state. The Austin group also obtained an option to purchase fifty-one and one-third acres adjoining the grounds. In earlier years, the state had leased this area to complete the drill ground. Now, through the efforts of interested Austin citizens, the state held an option to purchase and the Adjutant-General earnestly advised the legislature to allocate funds to exercise the option. The federal government joined in the acquisition endeavor by appropriating \$5,000 for the state to purchase another two hundred acres that adjoined the encampment area.¹⁸

Moreover, the national government allotted \$20,000 for transportation and \$5,000 for provisions to be used exclusively for financing the summer encampment. The War Department

¹⁸Camp Mabry Records, file 273, Retained Records Section, Texas Army National Guard Archives, Camp Mabry, Texas.

advised the state that the money was furnished with the understanding that Texas would pay the balance.¹⁹

In 1911, the state legislature slightly increased the allocation of funds to the Texas National Guard; the appropriation that year totaled \$10,000 for armory rents and expenses. The monthly dollar division then became \$15 for each infantry company, \$22.50 for each cavalry troop, and \$35 for each artillery battery. The Adjutant-General stated that the amount appropriated remained inadequate and requested that the governor ask that the funding be raised to \$20,000 annually.²⁰

Meanwhile, the United States Army began to take some steps toward accomplishing the task assigned it by Congress. Regular officers performed two inspections each in 1911 and 1912. The first examination, occurring in the spring of each year, was to decide if the organizations were armed, uniformed, and equipped according to War Department regulations. The second inspection, which came in the summer, served to determine the efficiency of the state's National Guard.²¹ Texas National Guard officers availed themselves

¹⁹Records of the Adjutant-General's Office, 1780-1917, letter 8 May 1910, Records Group 94, National Archives, Washington, D. C.

²⁰Henry Hutchings, Report of the Adjutant-General of the State of Texas, 1911-1912 (Austin: Austin Printing Co., 1913), pp. 6-7; Adjutant-General, General Order no. 76, dated 25 September 1911, Texas National Guard Archives, Camp Mabry, Austin, Texas.

²¹Hutchings, Report of the Adjutant-General, 1911-1912, p. 5.

of the opportunity offered by the War Department for militia officers to attend service schools. Cavalry and artillery officers from Texas trained at Fort Riley, Kansas; advanced artillery officers received instruction at Fort Sill, Oklahoma.²²

Fortunately for the National Guard, the federal government began to increase the militia funding substantially. By 1912, the United States Congress appropriated over four million dollars for the militia of the several states. The combined appropriations of all the states failed to equal the federal appropriations. Of this amount, Texas received \$107,363.80.²³ Moreover, in 1912 Congress considered a military bill that would pay 25 percent of the regular army allowance to National Guard enlisted men and 15 percent to militia officers.²⁴ The Adjutant-General pointed out that many guardsmen had reached the point of losing interest in the militia if no payment for drills and summer camp was forthcoming, but Congress failed to enact the proposal.²⁵

²²Ibid., pp. 4-5.

²³William H. Riker, Soldiers of the States, The Role of the National Guard in American Democracy (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1957), p. 123.

²⁴U. S., Congress, House, Committee on Military Affairs, Military Appropriations: Report to accompany HR 1117, 62nd Cong., 2nd sess., 1912; various congressmen introduced bills for National Guard pay in every session of Congress from 1910 to 1916, Riker, Soldiers of the States, p. 75.

²⁵Hutchings, Report of the Adjutant-General, 1911-1912, p. 6.

Within a short time, national and international events occurred that influenced the future of the National Guard. By late 1915 and early 1916, several incidents forced the regular army and the National Guard into a confrontation. First, a battle developed between Secretary of War Lindley M. Garrison and Congressman James Hay of Virginia, chairman of the House Military Affairs Committee. Garrison agreed with Upton's concept of the National Guard and discounted its effectiveness. During the New Year holidays of 1915-1916, the secretary prepared himself for the House Military Affairs Committee hearings that were to begin soon after the first of the year. His aides advised newsmen that Garrison planned to tell Congress that his program had evolved by first consulting past and present military experts in America and then preparing a defense policy using their advice as a basis. Second, the War Department would enroll and give basic training to one-half million men. Third, the defense agency would build up a reserve force of one-half million men within six years. Fourth, it would make every effort to make army service attractive in order to raise a viable volunteer peacetime army, start universal military service immediately, establish cadet officer units attached to regular military regiments to produce reserve officers, and build up an army reserve program. Garrison's plan, for all practical purposes, ignored the National Guard.²⁶

²⁶Washington Post, 30 December 1915.

While Secretary Garrison prepared to deal with Congress, events in Mexico started to affect American policy. Mexico had been in a state of revolution and counter-revolution for some time. With the start of violence in northern Mexico in 1915, many American mining companies had evacuated their employees. By 23 November 1915, General Alvaro Obregon, de facto government secretary of war, advised the North American firms that they could resume work and guaranteed the safety of their personnel and property.²⁷ On 4 January 1916, Charles Watson, general manager of the Cusiheirachic Mining Company, travelled to Chihuahua to determine if it would be safe to resume operations. The Mexican authorities approved resumption of mining and gave Watson a personal passport for himself and a general passport for his party. A large force of de facto government troops made a round trip to the Cusi mines and Watson regarded the operation as safe.²⁸

That same day, Representative Isaac Sherwood of Ohio spoke to the House of Representatives regarding both the Mexican border situation and the national defense. He pointed out that during the two-year period of 1914-1915

²⁷Diplomatic Papers, Mexico, 1915, Foreign Relations of the United States (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1929), p. 954.

²⁸Diplomatic Papers, Mexico, 1916, Foreign Relations of the United States (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1931), p. 658.

over one hundred and fifty-three American citizens had been murdered on the southwestern border of the nation, but questioned the expansion of the regular army. Sherwood pointed out that Nelson A. Miles, whom the congressman regarded as "the greatest living soldier of the United States," had served as a corps commander in the Army of the Potomac when he was only twenty-five years of age and had become the most successful of the Indian fighters in the post-Civil War period. The congressman related that Miles had travelled to Europe and personally inspected every one of the various armies of the powers and therefore had more firsthand knowledge of machinery necessary for war than any other military leader in the United States. The Ohioan stated that General Miles regarded Garrison's plan, called the Continental Army Plan, not as a product of the secretary of war but as an offspring of the United States Army War College. Sherwood declared that the plan was designed to destroy the National Guard and pointed out that the National Guard of the United States opposed the Continental Army Plan.²⁹

Sherwood reviewed the various groups around the nation who had expressed opposition to the Continental Army plan: farmers, labor unions, Women's Christian Temperance League, and Claude Kitchen, the minority leader of the House of

²⁹U. S., Congress, House, Congressional Record, 64th Cong., 1st sess., 53, pt. 3:458-461.

Representatives. The congressman quoted Thomas Jefferson, James Garfield, and Charles Sumner, all of whom opposed standing armies in the United States. He then requested that the House not increase the existing regular army, which Sherwood said was costing the American taxpayers over one hundred million dollars per year. Instead, he proposed to reduce the military establishment by one-half to fifty thousand men for a savings of fifty million dollars per year. This savings could then be used to improve the National Guard so that if war should come to America the militiamen would be the chief reliance.³⁰

Two days later, on 6 January 1916, Secretary Lindley Garrison testified before the Military Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives. Among other things, the secretary stated that in no way would federalization of the National Guard solve the nation's military problem; that the militia would have to expand from 129,000 men to 400,000 men to effect an adequate defense posture. He affirmed his belief that if the National Guard should be paid, it must come from the states. Instead, Garrison advocated his Continental Army Plan that would raise 400,000 men by three-year increments of 133,000 each. These men would be drawn by volunteer method if possible from the existing congressional districts. They would serve three years on active duty and

³⁰ Ibid.

three years in the Organized Reserve in a manner similar to the European systems that Upton had inspected. The secretary included a provision for selecting men by quota from districts that did not furnish the required number of volunteers.³¹

That night Elihu Root, former secretary of war under Presidents William McKinley and Theodore Roosevelt, and founder of both the Army War College and the General Staff, told members of the New York State Committee for National Defense, "I do not believe that an effective national army can be made of forty-eight different armies who look to forty-eight governors, surrounded by political influences, as their commanders."³²

Two days later, Garrison testified again before the Military Affairs Committee. He stated that President Wilson supported the Continental Army Plan and tried to discourage the committee from increasing the National Guard under the existing regulations. He asked the congressmen to federalize the National Guard, if possible. Several members of the committee raised questions about the future of the National Guard should the Continental Army Plan be adopted. Garrison refused to admit that the Continental scheme would destroy

³¹U. S., Congress, House, Committee on Military Affairs, Hearings on Preparedness, 64th Cong., 1st sess., 6 January 1916, p. 17.

³²New York Times, 7 January 1916.

the militia and insisted that the state military units were of little use until they were brought under federal control. The secretary said that he regarded the Continental Army Plan the final test for a volunteer force and that, if it failed, compulsory service was the only alternative.³³ In a day when most citizens considered serving their country an inescapable duty, the secretary of war advocated a peacetime draft and the destruction of the state military units. All things considered, Garrison had picked an unlikely platform from which to expound his views.

Meanwhile in Mexico, American firms cautiously resumed their mining operations. On 10 January 1916, Frank E. Stevenson, secretary of the Cusi-Mexican Mining Company, met with Charles Watson, also an officer in the Mine and Smelter Operators Association of Mexico, to discuss association business. Watson told Stevenson that he and fifteen American workers were leaving shortly for the Cusi mines. Since the Mexican bandit Pancho Villa had threatened to kill all Americans he found in Mexico, Stevenson asked Watson if a Mexican military escort was to accompany the Americans. Watson replied that the authorities had told him that it was unnecessary.³⁴

³³U. S., Congress, House, Committee on Military Affairs, Hearings on Military Preparedness, 64th Cong., 1st sess., 8 January 1916, p. 29.

³⁴Diplomatic Papers, Mexico, 1916, pp. 657-658.

Later that same morning, Watson boarded a train headed for the Cusi mines. The cars carried two sets of miners who worked for the firm: one car contained sixteen Anglos and another carried twenty Mexican employees. Three hours later the vehicle arrived at Santa Ysabel. While the train halted at the depot, two armed Mexicans rode by on horseback and carefully surveyed the train. Before leaving the area, they asked some of the Mexican passengers if the train contained any soldiers. The passengers told them that no soldiers were present. Within a short time the train pulled out of the station heading west. After travelling about five miles, the engineer saw another train ahead which had been derailed. The train stopped dead on the tracks and the Americans detrained to determine the cause of the problem. Thomas B. Holmes, an American miner, heard a volley of rifle shots and looked around to notice a group of several men approximately fifty feet away who were standing shoulder to shoulder with rifles shooting directly at the Americans. The Americans began running toward the Santa Ysabel River which ran alongside the track. Holmes noticed that Robert McHatton, another American miner, fell but could not tell if he had been wounded or simply tripped. Ahead of Holmes, Watson continued down the track toward the River but the bandits seemed to be concentrating their fire against him. Holmes seized the opportunity to run down the grade and fall into a group of

bushes about 100 feet from the rear of the last car. He lay still but could see the Mexican riflemen shooting at Watson's fleeing figure. Holmes realized that the Mexicans were no longer shooting at him. He crawled as far from the train as he could while staying in the undergrowth. At one point he heard single shots and volleys from the rifles but heard no sounds from his Anglo companions. He escaped and walked to Chihuahua City, arriving at approximately 7:30 on the morning of the eleventh.³⁵

In Washington, meanwhile, General Hugh Lennox Scott, the United States Army Chief of Staff, told the Military Affairs Committee that the United States would need an army of nearly two million men in the event of war. Short of universal military training, Scott stated that the Continental Army Plan was the most workable solution to the nation's military problems.³⁶

Later on the day that Holmes reached Chihuahua City, Congressman Hay talked with President Wilson at the White House. At this point news had not arrived of the atrocities at Santa Ysabel. Hay told the president that he disapproved of the fundamental suggestions of the Administration's preparedness program. Hay later told reporters that he

³⁵Washington Post, 13 January 1916.

³⁶U. S., Congress, House, Committee on Military Affairs, Hearings on Military Preparedness, 64th Cong., 1st sess., 11 January 1916, p. 87.

avored passage of a military pay bill under a contractual agreement with state soldiers who would draw pay from the federal government that would require them to serve in the regular army in time of war. War Department officials told reporters that Hay's announcement did not surprise them, though Hay recently had drawn up a tentative bill that included the Continental Army Plan.³⁷

The following day, 12 January, Assistant Secretary of War Henry Breckenridge testified before the Military Affairs Committee, and under questioning of Hay admitted that President Wilson opposed any form of compulsory military service. However, Breckenridge called Hay's proposal to recruit the regular army in wartime by drafting the National Guard both impractical and inadequate.³⁸ Later that day, word arrived of the Santa Ysabel murders. The United States Customs Collector Zachary Cobb, located in El Paso, relayed the information to Secretary of State Robert Lansing. Cobb said that informants told him the murderers were led by a Villa-bandit chief named Pablo Lopez.³⁹

³⁷Washington Post, 12 January 1916.

³⁸U. S., Congress, House, Committee on Military Affairs, Hearings on Military Preparedness, 64th Cong., 1st sess., 12 January 1916, p. 96.

³⁹Diplomatic Papers, Mexico, 1916, p. 652.

At 2:15 A.M. on 13 January 1916, the train that had been dispatched to retrieve the bodies of the Americans pulled into El Paso. On board were about twenty Mexican soldiers and ten Americans who were armed under permission of the Mexican authorities.⁴⁰ Secretary Lansing wired Special Agent John R. Silliman, the American representative to the de facto government of Venustiano Carranza, to request that the Mexican government immediately chase and punish the murderers. Three weeks later Lansing still complained that nothing was being done.⁴¹

Garrison and his generals carried their proposals to the public in speeches to various defense groups. The secretary and General Leonard Wood, commander in chief of the Department of the East, both spoke to a group of New York bankers at the Astoria Hotel on the night of 17 January.⁴²

The following day, Garrison presented the Continental Army Plan to the Senate Military Affairs Committee and encountered less opposition than he received from the House group. Within the next three days Generals Wood, Scott,

⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 655.

⁴¹ Ibid., pp. 663-664.

⁴² New York Times, 18 January 1916.

and Tasker Howard Bliss, assistant chief of staff, all testified before the Senate committee and pleaded for the Continental Army Plan.⁴³

Presently, Hay advised Garrison that the Military Affairs Committee would not accept the secretary's plan under any circumstances, but would devise its own plan. The committee proposed to strengthen the National Guard by converting it into a federal reserve. The national government would equip, train, and pay the militia and reserve the right to qualify state commissioned officers for equal commissions if called to active duty. Hay discussed the committee's plan with President Wilson and, after receiving no rejection, announced the proposal publicly.⁴⁴

The secretary of war immediately and vehemently opposed the committee's plan. Wilson apparently wanted a compromise between the two factions, but Garrison proved adamant in refusing and Hay advised the president that the War Department plan was unacceptable to the Military Affairs Committee of the House. Wilson faced the option of passage of a bill of some merit or passage of no defense bill of any kind. The

⁴³U. S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Military Affairs, Hearings on State of Military Preparedness, 64th Cong., 1st sess., 18 January 1916, pp. 57-91.

⁴⁴Walter Millis, Arms and Men (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1956), pp. 217-222.

president chose to support the congressional plan and Garrison resigned.⁴⁵

In Mexico, Pancho Villa started a chain of events leading to a second international occurrence and the only invasion of the continental United States in recent times. The incident began when Villistas killed Edward Wright, a native of Houston, Texas, and kidnapped his wife, Maude. The abduction and murder occurred in an area of Mexico where the Carranza government ostensibly maintained a large garrison to protect American citizens. The bandits took Mrs. Wright prisoner on the night of 1 March 1916. They forced her to ride with them until they reached Jimenez where her captors met with Villa and his larger force. The Anglo woman heard Villa tell his troops that he intended to attack Columbus, New Mexico. The force continued toward the international border, killing Americans encountered on the trail. Some members of the Villa force told Mrs. Wright that they did not follow the bandit chief out of love but out of fear that he had instilled them. She noticed that the officers and a personal guard known as the "Dorados" protected him at all times. This elite guard camped and rode separately from the main body. Up until 8 March 1916,

⁴⁵Weigley, History of the United States Army, p. 346; Washington Post, 11 February 1916; for an in-depth and excellent account of the Hay-Garrison confrontation, see John Gary Clifford, The Citizen Soldier (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1972), pp. 122-129.

Villa had worn civilian clothes and had ridden a small mule. However, as the bandit leader prepared for the attack he emerged dressed in trim army uniform and mounted one of the three sorrel horses that had been unriden during the march north. The group left Baco Grande late on Wednesday, 8 March, and crossed the border near Columbus during the early morning hours of 9 March. The attack began before dawn and Mrs. Wright soon could see the buildings of the town burning. Within a short time, the American soldiers stationed at Columbus regrouped and counter-attacked with machine guns. After a brief firefight, the Mexicans began to retreat. In the confusion, Villa set the Anglo woman free.⁴⁶

First accounts indicated that at least seven Americans were killed and several more wounded. The attackers burned the railroad depot and several other buildings. The American soldiers pursued the bandits across the border for a distance of about fifteen miles before giving up the chase. A body count indicated that twenty-three bandits died in the fight.⁴⁷

The following day, General Fredrick Funston, commander of the army forces at Fort Sam Houston, Texas, telegraphed

⁴⁶New York Times, 10 March 1916; an interesting account of the attack as told from the American side is in Herbert M. Mason, Jr., The Great Pursuit (New York: Random House, 1970), p. 24.

⁴⁷Diplomatic Papers, Mexico, 1916, p. 481.

the Adjutant-General that immediate pursuit of Villa into Mexico would prevent additional raids. He pointed out that the Anglo woman prisoner reported that Carranza forces fled at the sight of the Villa troops. The new secretary of war, Newton D. Baker, who had been in the cabinet only three days prior to the Columbus raid, joined with General Hugh Lennox Scott, the army chief of staff, in drafting a telegram for Funston. The message, approved by the president, ordered the army commander to organize a military force to cross the border and pursue the bandit gang that had attacked Columbus. The wire ordered American troops to withdraw as soon as the Mexican government could assume the task of pursuing the raiders, or the Americans could also withdraw if the outlaw group was known to be dissolved.⁴⁸

Earlier, the War Department had authorized a school for all Texas National Guard Infantry officers and selected sergeants from all over the state to be held at Camp Mabry from 9 May through 16 May 1916.⁴⁹ Even before the participants left their home stations to travel to Austin, rumors circulated that the Texas Guard would be activated for duty in Mexico. One week before camp was to open, an Austin newspaper reporter questioned Adjutant-General Henry Hutchings

⁴⁸Mason, The Great Pursuit, p. 70.

⁴⁹Militia Bureau, Records relating to National Guard units, order 37, 10 January 1916, Record Group 407, National Archives, Washington, D. C.

about a report that Funston had recommended more than once that the president activate the National Guard. General Hutchings refused to comment. The news reporter noticed the increased activity at the Adjutant-General's office and questioned the general about this. Hutchings assured the newsman that the activity was connected with the approaching officers school.⁵⁰

Actually, the War Department had advised the Texas general to expect the order at any time. The order finally arrived by telephone from Washington on Tuesday, 9 May 1916, at 10:20 A.M., and within an hour the governor directed the mobilization of the entire Texas National Guard. The officers school, which began on the morning of 9 May, was immediately disbanded and the participants ordered to report to their home stations. Guard headquarters notified all local commands to assemble the units and report to San Antonio by train beginning on 11 May. A board of army officers from Fort Sam Houston began to plot camp-sites for the militia and regular troops that would soon arrive.⁵¹ Within three days 158 officers and 3,572 enlisted men assembled from the Texas National Guard at Fort Sam Houston. Simultaneously, the

⁵⁰Memorandum, 9 May 1916, Adjutants-General File, Retained Records Section, Texas Army National Guard Archives, Camp Mabry, Texas.

⁵¹Austin Statesman, 2 May, 10 May 1916.

Arizona and New Mexico National Guard units were mustered for active duty.⁵² Wilson ordered General Hugh Scott to go to El Paso to confer with General Alvaro Obregon, the Mexican secretary of war. Scott set himself the task of persuading Obregon to agree to allow General John J. Pershing's force of regular army troops to remain, unmolested, south of the border until President Wilson ordered them withdrawn. Obregon resisted.⁵³

In Washington, meanwhile, the Columbus raid prompted congressional action. The Hay preparedness bill passed both houses of Congress and the president signed it into law on 3 June.⁵⁴

While Pershing pursued Villa, General Obregon threatened invasion of the United States and spoke of capturing San Antonio, Texas, within two weeks. Scott advised Wilson to activate the balance of the militia and station them on the international border. Wilson disapproved of this approach because he feared it would provoke the Mexicans. Scott told the president that lack of troops on the border served as a temptation to the Mexican military

⁵²Ibid.

⁵³Hugh Lennox Scott, Some Memories of a Soldier (New York: Century, 1928), pp. 526-527; Clarence C. Clarendon, The United States and Pancho Villa (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1961), p. 27.

⁵⁴U. S., Statutes at Large, vol. 39.

forces. Scott realized that the American militiamen were untrained but did think them capable of serving as an occupational force to free the trained regular army men for action. As Obregon's threats became more severe, Wilson heeded Scott's advice and mobilized the balance of the guardsmen. The press claimed that Wilson was playing for time to allow the remainder of the Guard to arrive on the Mexican border before declaring war on Mexico.⁵⁵ Four days later, the same newspapers reported that Mexico had begun arming her border citizens for war.⁵⁶

The second group of guardsmen soon began arriving at the border, joined the Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona troops already there and set about the task of erecting tents, digging trenches, and searching homes of Mexicans living on the Texas side of the Rio Grande River for weapons.⁵⁷

Secretary of War Newton Baker attempted to expand the regular army's ranks to its full allotted strength with a call for volunteers. The available young men failed to respond to his appeal in any numbers of consequence.⁵⁸

⁵⁵Scott, Memories, pp. 522-523; Austin Statesman, 27 June 1916.

⁵⁶Austin Statesman, 1 July 1916.

⁵⁷"With the Guard in Texas," Review of Reviews, 54 (1916): 168-169.

⁵⁸Millis, Arms and Men, p. 230.


By 5 July 1916, events indicated that additional regular troops would be unnecessary since over thirty thousand activated National Guardsmen had arrived in the area and the acting Mexican president, Carranza, sent a polite note to Wilson indicating that he wished to avoid a war.⁵⁹ Within a brief interval, the thirty thousand swelled to over one hundred thousand federalized guardsmen who were stationed at various places along the border from Brownsville, Texas, to Yuma, Arizona.⁶⁰ Several units were understrength and had difficulty in filling their quotas. However, the men who did report served at least one purpose: hesitation on the part of the Mexicans. General Scott recounts in his memories that "after the militia once appeared where numbers could actually be seen, we heard no more talk of taking San Antonio."⁶¹

The regular army, versed in the Uptonian concept of scorning the militia, found itself in the position of having to depend on the National Guard for necessary volume. Most of the available United States Army forces served in distant locations such as Hawaii, the Philippine Islands, and the Panama Canal Zone. This situation left only approximately

⁵⁹See map on the following page for locations of activated Texas National Guard units. New York Times, 20 June 1916.

⁶⁰Scott, Memories, pp. 522-523.

⁶¹Ibid.



Source: author

twenty-four thousand regular troops available in the continental United States. Moreover, this figure included supply and medical personnel; hence, less than twenty-thousand regular troops were present for use against Mexico and young Americans had shown no desire to join the colors in this time of crisis.⁶²

Critics of the National Guard wrote several articles in contemporary magazines about the inefficiency of the activated citizen soldiers.⁶³ The anti-militia writers failed to mention that eight years previously the Congress had directed the regular army to bring the National Guard into a state of semi-readiness. Furthermore, the critics declined to speak to the question of what other means were available to raise over one hundred thousand men on such short notice. The Mexican government, which earlier had armed its citizens along the international border, did not know the regular army had contempt for the National Guard. The Mexicans only saw over one hundred thousand Guardsmen facing them across the Rio Grande and decided it would be safer to deal with Pancho Villa than the United States of America. Without the volume of the National Guard, perhaps the episode would have ended differently; it is possible another Mexican War could have resulted.

⁶²Mason, The Great Pursuit, p. 84.

⁶³For a complete list of the articles, both pro and con, see Elizabeth J. Sherwood and Estella E. Painter, eds., Readers Guide to Periodical Literature (New York: H. W. Wilson Co., 1919), 4:2018-2019.

CHAPTER III

CALLED TO GLORY: 1917-1919

As the Texas guardsmen returned from the Mexican border duty, events in Europe indicated additional active service for the citizen soldiers. The 1916 mobilization had proved extremely useful to the regular army as well as to the National Guard. The fallacy that large numbers of citizens would volunteer for active service at the first sign of crisis was exposed as incorrect by Secretary of War Baker's inability to raise a volunteer army during the campaign against Pancho Villa; this circumstance altered the opinion held by many citizens against conscription or drafting soldiers. The action on the Mexican border served as a practice session for the mass mobilization that would come in 1917. Priceless training resulted for large numbers of officers and men; deficiencies became apparent and received correction. Finally, the action against the Mexican bandit accustomed the American public to the concept of a large military build-up and the governmental regulations that would prove necessary when America entered the European War.¹

¹Walter Millis, Arms and Men (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1956), pp. 229-233.

Even as the National Guard prepared to return home from the Mexican border, Germany began unrestricted submarine warfare against shipping suspected of carrying Allied material. Shortly after Wilson's second inauguration, the German undersea boats sank eight United States vessels, killing dozens of American crewmen.² American newspapers reported the sinkings on 17 March 1917 and in a related article claimed that unofficially a state of war existed between the United States and Germany. Four days later the cabinet urged Wilson to call Congress into immediate special session to declare war on the Central Powers.³

Wilson soon responded to his aides' advice; he halted demobilization of the National Guardsmen still on active duty and recalled approximately one-third of the reserve force to federal service. Within a week, the president asked Congress to declare war on Germany and her allies.⁴

It soon became clear that voluntary enlistments would be of insufficient numbers to expand the army to the strength necessary to fight a war. Consequently, Congress passed legislation authorizing the president to conscript

²Charles Allan Tansill, America Goes to War (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1938), p. 655.

³Washington Post, 17, 21 March 1917.

⁴U. S., Congress, Senate, Congressional Record, 65th Cong., Spec. sess., 2 April 1917, 55 pt. 2:102.

not only civilians into the army, but also the entire National Guard for the duration of the emergency.⁵

Wilson exercised his authorized powers by issuing a proclamation calling the balance of the National Guard into federal service.⁶ To remove the guardsmen from any possible state control completely, the president drafted or "called" the reserve force to active duty effective 5 August 1917.⁷

No training camp of a size necessary to accommodate the militia and conscripted Texans existed in the state. To alleviate this problem, a delegation from the War Department arrived in Fort Worth, Texas, to inspect proposed locations for a mobilization training camp. City officials suggested two sites near the city. Before the military group could view the locations they encountered Colonel Holman Taylor, a veteran of the Mexican expedition against Villa, who was in the city recruiting doctors for the United States Army Medical Corps. At the colonel's suggestion, the officers visited another area just west of the city and tentatively selected the site. Early in June the War Department announced the locations of sixteen

⁵U. S., Statutes at Large, vol. 40.

⁶Presidential Proclamation, U. S., Statutes at Large, vol. 40.

⁷Telegram, Newton Baker to James E. Ferguson, 31 March 1917, Adjutants-General File, Retained Records Section, Texas Army National Guard Archives, Camp Mabry, Texas; see appendix for facsimile.

mobilization training camps including the post to be constructed in Fort Worth.⁸

Fort Worth citizens, like persons in the other fifteen municipalities that were to receive camps, were thrilled. A local newspaper announced that \$250,000 would be spent constructing the camp and estimated that the soldiers would consume over \$13,000 worth of food each day. The city leaders offered every cooperation to the War Department, and the North Texas Traction Company promised to run a streetcar line directly from downtown to the new camp.⁹

Throughout June and early July local newspapers speculated on when construction would begin. Finally, on 16 July, the War Department officially named the post Camp Bowie after the fallen hero of the Alamo. Construction began one week later, and on 26 July four troops of the First Texas Cavalry arrived to guard the new post. The troopers, ". . . hardened and bronzed from sixteen months of campaigning on the Rio Grande . . ." furnished the Fort Worthians the first indication of the thirty thousand soldiers who would ultimately inhabit the camp.¹⁰

⁸Ronnie C. Tyler and Leonard Saunders, How Fort Worth Became the Texasmost City (Fort Worth: Amon Carter Museum of Western Art, 1973), p. 168; Fort Worth Star-Telegram, 11 June 1917.

⁹Fort Worth Star-Telegram, 12 June 1917.

¹⁰War Department, National Guard and Special Camps, Plans and Photographs (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1917); Fort Worth Star-Telegram, 16 June, 17 June, 29 June, 23 July, 26 July, 27 July 1917.

The War Department announced on 21 August 1917 that Camp Bowie was the first of the new camps to be completed. Three days later General E. Saint John Greble stated that in addition to the Texas National Guard units, Oklahoma National Guardsmen and conscripted soldiers from both states would train at the camp. On 24 August Greble began forming the various Texas and Oklahoma National Guard units into the United States Army Thirty-sixth Infantry Division. On that date he assumed command of the post by signing General Order no. 1 at the headquarters tent on the new reservation.¹¹

The new division consisted of several elements: the Seventy-first Infantry Brigade composed of the 141st and 142nd Infantry Regiments and the 132nd Machine Gun Battalion; the Seventy-second Infantry Brigade made up of the 143rd and 144th Infantry Regiments, the 131st and 133rd Machine Gun Battalions; the Sixty-first Field Artillery Brigade composed of the 131st, 132nd, and 133rd Field Artillery Regiments; the 111th Trench Mortar Battery, the 111th Field Signal Battalion and the 111th Engineers. Many of the new units were combinations of old Texas and Oklahoma National Guard elements. The 141st Infantry was formed by merging the First Texas with the Second Texas Infantry

¹¹Fort Worth Star-Telegram, 27 July 1917; Ben Franklin Chastaine, Story of the Thirty-sixth, The Experiences of the 36th Division in the World War (Oklahoma City: Harlow Publishing Co., 1920), p. 7.

Regiments while the 142nd Infantry resulted from consolidating the Seventh Texas Infantry Regiment with the First Oklahoma Infantry Regiment. The 143rd Infantry came into being by joining the Third Texas Infantry and the Fifth Texas Infantry Regiments, and the 144th Infantry emerged from the consolidation of the Fourth Texas Infantry and the Sixth Texas Infantry Regiments.¹²

Activated guardsmen continued to arrive throughout the summer and into the autumn. Units unable to fill their ranks with volunteers received conscripted civilians. The officers began forming the new soldiers into an infantry division.¹³ Some of the units filled their ranks with any men available. Governor James Ferguson appointed Henry Sadler of Gatesville to organize Company L of the Sixth Texas Infantry. Sadler could get only eighty-seven recruits and needed one hundred. To fill out the allotment, he asked for volunteers from the Gatesville Reform School. School officials offered the young male inmates their freedom if they would serve in the local National Guard unit that Sadler was forming for federal service. When several

¹²Department of the Army, The Army Lineage Book, Volume 2: Infantry (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1953), pp. 409-415.

¹³Fort Worth Star-Telegram, 7 September 1917.

of the prisoners agreed to serve in exchange for their freedom, the unit filled its quota.¹⁴

Camp Bowie was completed but the army had no uniforms or equipment for the men arriving for training. Some recruits wore their civilian clothes until they were worn out and did not receive a full issue of army clothing until months later. The units that had served on the border had rifles; other sections had none. The artillery batteries had no field pieces, the signal battalion had no communication equipment, and the engineer sections had no building supplies. The troops lived in the pyramid-type canvas tents designed to accommodate eight men in each. In the beginning, the tents had neither floors nor heat. The hospitals, offices, mess halls, latrines, and stables were wooden structures. Blankets and quilts were unavailable when the weather became cold in the fall of 1917. The Red Cross collected civilian blankets from all over Texas and shipped them to Camp Bowie to relieve the problem. As the soldiers continued to arrive, up to twelve persons crowded into the eight-man tents. The latrines did not have hot water installed in them until January, and the men suffered under cold water showers. Federal authorities assigned regular army officers to the division who replaced National

¹⁴Lee Johnson, personal interview, Oral History Collection, North Texas State University Library, OH 313:17.

Guard officers with no military experience. Frequently, these actions created bitterness among the activated guardsmen. When the rifles did arrive, they were the older Springfield 1903 type. Later, in 1918, some new Springfield rifles, Model 1917, arrived but the entire division did not receive weapons until just before leaving for France.¹⁵

General Greble and his staff travelled to France to view the war first-hand and returned in December 1917. They soon began training the men in the methods expected to be used in combat. Experienced British and French officers joined the Texans to instruct the soldiers in techniques developed in the first two years of the conflict. They taught machine-gun operation, automatic rifle action, the use of bayonets, grenades, and mortars, and how to defend oneself against gas attack. The men dug trenches to simulate actual battlefield conditions; the foreign officers led the new soldiers in mock attacks and taught them problems related to trench warfare. As part of the drill the men lived in the trenches in helmets and gas masks for days. During this training, the troops worked on day and night field problems. Patrols travelled into "no man's land" in front of the trenches. The artillery

¹⁵Chastaine, Story of the Thirty-sixth, pp. 11-19.

laid down barrages over the men's heads to accustom them to hearing shells pass in the sky. Occasionally, men were killed in accidents. In May 1918, ten men and an officer died as a result of a mortar shell explosion; the accident occurred within sight of about one-fourth of the division and hampered morale for weeks.¹⁶

The division paraded several times for the division commander. On 11 April 1918, the entire group passed in review in downtown Fort Worth for the governors of both Texas and Oklahoma. During this same time period all regimental commanders attended a school at Fort Sam Houston, Texas, for a period of six weeks. Many troopers considered this an indication that the division would soon be going to France. In late May, authorities halted trench warfare training and began open field battalion maneuvers. Since this occurred after the regimental commanders returned from their school, many guardsmen regarded this change as an indication that the Allies would soon abandon trench warfare for a big push.¹⁷

In July 1918, the Thirty-sixth Division, less the 143rd Infantry, boarded trains for Camp Mills, New York. Shortly

¹⁶Ibid.

¹⁷Ibid., Vester Ballard, personal interview, Gatesville, Texas, 10 March 1978; Fort Worth Star-Telegram, 12 April 1918.

thereafter the division moved to ports at Halifax, Nova Scotia, Hoboken, New Jersey, and Newport News, Virginia. The 143rd Infantry travelled directly from Fort Worth to Newport News. The troop ships, mostly old cattle boats, began steaming out of the ports on 15 July and started arriving in France two weeks later. Some of the units debarked at Brest, Bordeaux, and Le Harve, while others left their ships at Saint Nazaire. Upon arrival, the division received a new commander. Exercising its right under the Dick Act of 1903, the army replaced General Greble, an elderly professional officer, with Major General William Robert Smith, a younger regular army officer. This action fulfilled standard operating procedure and the men of the Thirty-sixth Division did not resent it. They wanted the best leadership possible.¹⁸

The Sixty-first Field Artillery Brigade transferred from the division for additional training; later the unit received assignment to Camp Coetquidan, an artillery training sector in Brittany. The American First Army assumed command of the division engineers, the 111th Engineer Regiment, and attached this unit to the American First Corps.¹⁹

¹⁸Chastaine, Story of the Thirty-sixth, p. 28; Lee Johnson, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 313:21.

¹⁹Chastaine, Story of the Thirty-sixth, p. 28.

The military situation of the Allied armies in France at the time of the Thirty-sixth Division's arrival was one of guarded optimism. German resistance had begun to weaken in certain areas. Within weeks after the division's landing in France, the Saint Mihiel offensive, conducted from 12 September to 16 September, accomplished the reduction of the German salient and presented the opportunity to implement the converging offensives which the Allies had determined as the overall grand strategy. One facet of the strategic push included an Allied attack set for late September in the area between the Meuse River and the Argonne Forest. The principal objective of the attack was the Carnigan-sedan-Mezieres railroad, upon which the German forces in the area principally depended for their supplies. Capture of the supply carrier would place the enemy forces in the region west and northwest of Sedan in a precarious position.²⁰

The Allied armies faced what was known as the Hindenburg Line on the Meuse-Argonne front that stretched from Bois de Foret through Cunel and Romange to the heights near Granpre. From here the line extended across an area facing the French Fourth Army just north of the Aisne River. The Allied attack plan involved simultaneous assaults by the American

²⁰American Battle Monuments Commission, Thirty-sixth Division, Summary of Operations in the World War (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1944), pp. 6-7.

First and French Fourth armies toward a line from Granpre through Vouziers and Machault to Bethienville. The military planners hoped to force the Germans' withdrawal from the Argonne Forest, which would allow the link-up of the American and French forces at Granpre. Subsequent to this, the combined armies planned to advance to a line extending from Stendy through Le Chesne to Attigny. This action would flank the Hindenburg Line, enable the combined armies to strike north, sever the German supply line, and force the enemy to retreat beyond the Meuse River.²¹

By the middle of September, General Henri Phillipe Petain sought American aid from General John J. Pershing. The American commander, though needing fresh troops for the American action proposed for 23 September, acquiesced and designated the Second Division and the Thirty-sixth Division as the units to be transferred to the French command. The American army notified the two divisions of the change. On 26 September the Thirty-sixth and Second troops boarded trains at Bar-sur-Aube and moved to Poncancy, between Epernay and Chalons-sur-Marne, to set up headquarters and await further orders.²²

²¹Ibid.; Chastaine, Story of the Thirty-sixth, p. 142.

²²Department of the Army, The United States Army in the World War, 1917-1919, 17 vols. (Washington: Department of the Army, 1948), 1:50-51; 9:228; Thirty-sixth Division Operations, p. 4.

The Allied attack began on 26 September and within eight days the American First Army pushed ahead approximately twelve kilometers to capture forward positions in the high ground near Cunel. German entrenchments stalled the French forces five kilometers south of Saint Entinne-s-Arnes, near Blanc Mont. Late on the evening of 1 October the Second Division passed through the shattered village of Somme-Py and relieved the French forces located in a line of former German trenches just north of the village.²³

The German maintenance of their positions near Rheims depended on retaining control of Blanc Mont, the dominant high ground between the Py River to the south and the Arnes River on the north. German loss of this upper ground would compel their withdrawal to the Aisne River.²⁴

With the Thirty-sixth Division in reserve, the Second Division prepared to attack Blanc Mont on 3 October. The crest of the hill, laced with German earthworks, lay approximately three kilometers northwest of the Americans' point of initial attack. The incline, which the enemy machine gun emplacements controlled, presented an obstacle course of the highest order for the Second Division as it worked

²³United States Army in the World War, 14:51; Captain James Mills Hanson, "The Battle of Blanc Mont," Independent, 104 (October 1920): 150.

²⁴Thirty-sixth Division Operations, pp. 6-7; United States Army in the World War, 14:51.

its way through the lines of barbed wire woven among patches of pine trees and thickets.²⁵

The French Second Artillery Brigade fired on the attack area for approximately five minutes prior to the assault. About daybreak, the Second Division troops moved through an open area between their trenches and the woods at the base of Blanc Mont. The German machine-gunners and riflemen opposed the advance with intense fire, but the attacking wave pressed onward and before noon the Americans secured the crest of the hill. The division had sustained approximately 15 percent casualties in its front line regiments but had captured sixteen hundred prisoners and several machine-guns. After regrouping, the American troops renewed the assault at 1600 hours and captured one and one-half kilometers of additional front before being halted. The division persistently fought throughout the night and by the morning of 4 October the Second had secured its positions. The attack began anew at 1300 hours with limited success; it gained only five hundred meters because the extended front of the Americans ran so far ahead of their French allies on each flank. The Second Division held its position as its comrades on either side attempted to gain comparable ground.²⁶

²⁵Chastaine, Story of the Thirty-sixth, p. 89; Hanson, "Battle of Blanc Mont," p. 151.

²⁶Chastaine, Story of the Thirty-sixth, p. 74.

Meanwhile, the Thirty-sixth Division began to move on the night of 4 October into a position to relieve the Second Division. The Seventy-first Brigade of the Lone Star Division, composed of the 141st and 142nd Infantry regiments, moved by truck to the vicinity of Somme-Suippes. The next day this unit marched to an assembly point just north of Somme-Py. During the night of 6 October and the morning of 7 October elements of the Seventy-first Brigade moved into position with the Second Division along the front that ran from one kilometer northwest of Medeah Farm to one kilometer southwest of Saint Entienne.²⁷

Because of the inexperience of the men of the Thirty-sixth, the commander alternated the lead units of the Seventy-first Brigade by battalions with the more experienced battalions of the Second Division. All day on 7 October the Seventy-first became accustomed to the front lines, and that night it received orders to attack the opposing forces on the following morning.²⁸

At 0515 hours on 8 October, as the dawn began to illuminate the French countryside, the Seventy-first Brigade left its Second Division comrades in reserve, moved out of its emplacement and attacked the German positions. The

²⁷Ibid.; Hanson, "Battle of Blanc Mont," p. 173.

²⁸Thirty-sixth Division Operations, p. 8; Chastaine, Story of the Thirty-sixth, p. 80.

142nd Infantry Regiment on the left side of the brigade front encountered strong enemy resistance and sustained heavy casualties. In the fight that ensued, the unit not only fought its way through Saint Entienne, but it took 208 prisoners in the process. By 1030 hours, the 142nd had battled its way across the Arnes River and halted in front of German trenches stretching five hundred meters north of the river. The regiment had suffered over eight hundred casualties in the action.²⁹

The 142nd's advance was unequalled by units on its left and right. The 141st Infantry, on the right brigade front, jumped off at the same time as the 142nd. Although this unit suffered fewer casualties, approximately five hundred killed and wounded, it did not gain as much territory as its sister regiment. Consequently, the 141st was in an extended position; the Germans counter-attacked and the regiment withdrew to a line even with the 142nd.³⁰

The remainder of the Thirty-sixth Division completed the relief of the Second Division on the night of 9 October and the morning of 10 October 1918. By 1000 hours on the tenth, the Texans had assumed formal command of the division front. The Second Division moved to a rest area near

²⁹Thirty-sixth Division Operations, p. 8; Chastaine, Story of the Thirty-sixth, p. 80.

³⁰Chastaine, Story of the Thirty-sixth, pp. 160-161; Hanson, "Battle of Blanc Mont," p. 174.

Somme-Suippes for regrouping, leaving the Second Field Artillery Brigade and the Second Engineers under the command of the Thirty-sixth Division.³¹

Elements of the Seventy-first Brigade probed the enemy defenses early on 10 October, but found the German resistance still present in strength.³² Within a short time, however, allied aviators reported that the Germans were beginning to fall back. The French Eleventh Corps, which had assumed command of the Texans, issued orders that afternoon for the Thirty-sixth Division to attack and pursue.³³

Shortly before 1700 hours the Seventy-second Brigade, composed of the 143rd and 144th Infantry regiments, passed through the lines of the Seventy-first Brigade and attacked in the direction of Machault and Cauroy. The assault achieved only a small advance. Consequently, headquarters ordered a new attack. The French Eleventh Corps instructed the French Seventy-third Division, located on the right of the American Thirty-sixth, to attack northwest toward Attigny. The Americans received orders to conform to and

³¹Ibid.; Thirty-sixth Division Operations, p. 8.

³²Chastaine, Story of the Thirty-sixth, p. 167; Hanson, "Battle of Blanc Mont," p. 174.

³³Thirty-sixth Division Operations, p. 9; Lawrence Stallings, The Doughboys, The Story of the AEF, 1917-1918 (New York: Harper and Row, 1963), p. 287.

maintain liaison with the advancing French forces. The Seventy-second Brigade, supported by the Seventy-first Brigade was to lead the American attack parallel with the French Seventy-third Division.³⁴

Thirty-sixth Division headquarters issued the field order instructing that the charge would begin at 0930 hours on 11 October. Accordingly, the Seventy-second advanced the next morning with the 143rd on the right and the 144th on the left of the attack front. The brigade progressed against heavy machine-gun fire, battled its way through Marchault, and set up its line north of town.³⁵

At 0100 hours on 12 October 1918 division headquarters ordered the Seventy-second Brigade to continue the advance. Five hours later, the two regiments plunged on again and by nightfall had pushed forward to Hill 167 northwest of Vaux Champagne. In a single day the brigade had covered nearly thirteen miles across open ground under heavy German artillery fire. As some Texans prepared defense lines on a ridge northwest of Vaux Champagne, others sent

³⁴ Thirty-sixth Division Operations, pp. 9-11; Hanson, "Battle of Blanc Mont," p. 175.

³⁵ Thirty-sixth Division Operations, pp. 11-12; Jimmy M. Skaggs, "Lieutenant General John A. Hulen: Portrait of a Citizen Soldier," Texas Military History, 8 (1970): 139.

out patrols that scouted the immediate area and reached the south bank of the Aisne River.³⁶

The Seventy-second pushed its lines forward to the river and remained in place without opposition. Patrols across the river relieved the monotony of inaction. The French Fourth Army command was jubilant with the Texans' rapid advance under fire and transferred the Thirty-sixth Division to the position of lead division with the French Eleventh Corps.³⁷ Under orders of the Eleventh Corps, the Thirty-sixth relieved the French Seventy-third Division on its right on 22 October 1918; the Texans now occupied the extreme right position of the Eleventh Corps front. The French command now instructed the Thirty-sixth to prepare to attack across the Aisne River.³⁸

General William Smith, the division commander, worked for several days planning the next assault. Finally, at 0100 hours on 27 October, the division headquarters issued orders for the attack with the Seventy-first Brigade placed in the forefront. According to the plan, the Second Field Artillery units in the area would support the push, and Second Division engineers would furnish men trained in

³⁶Thirty-sixth Division Operations, p. 12; Stallings, The Doughboys, p. 288; Hanson, "Battle of Blanc Mont," p. 175.

³⁷Ibid.

³⁸Hanson, "Battle of Blanc Mont," p. 175.

wire cutting to aid each front line platoon. The objective was Forest Farm, a German strong-hold in the bend of the Aisne River just south of Rilly-aux-Oies.³⁹

The Second Division artillery and the French artillery laid down a curtain of cannon fire that began at 1610 hours and continued for twenty minutes. With the 142nd Infantry on the right and the 141st on the left, the brigade moved forward at 1630 hours behind a rolling artillery barrage. The Texans attacked the German defenders at Forest Farm head-on and within thirty minutes stormed the strong-point, killing or capturing the entire enemy force. Brigade members rapidly prepared defenses and sent several reinforced patrols forward. By nightfall, these scouting expeditions had cleared the brigade front up to the town of Rilly-aux-Oies.⁴⁰

The French Eleventh Corps began the relief of the Thirty-sixth Division on the morning of 28 October 1918 and the Texans started their movement to the Triaucourt sector, approximately thirty kilometers southwest of Verdun, to be placed in the American First Army reserve. The division remained here through 11 November 1918.⁴¹

³⁹Thirty-sixth Division Operations, pp. 15-17; Stallings, The Doughboys, p. 288.

⁴⁰Thirty-sixth Division Operations, pp. 17-18; Hanson, "Battle of Blanc Mont," p. 175; Chastaine, Story of the Thirty-sixth, pp. 229-235.


⁴¹Thirty-sixth Division Operations, pp. 18-19; Hanson, "Battle of Blanc Mont," p. 175.

The United States Army credited the Thirty-sixth Division with freeing several villages and towns, advancing over thirteen miles under fire, taking over eight hundred prisoners, capturing dozens of cannon and hundreds of machine-guns, and seizing over ten million dollars worth of German ammunition. Members of the division received two Congressional Medals of Honor, thirty Distinguished Service Crosses, and nearly one hundred and thirty Croix de Guerres. The Texans paid a substantial price: 2,561 casualties.⁴² Further recognition came after the war when French citizens placed a marble shaft on the Blanc Mont ridge to equate the Thirty-sixth Division with the Second Division in the liberation of the area.⁴³

Division veterans could point with pride to a battle record that compared favorably with divisions that had spent much more time in combat. Just as the United States' effort in the European War of 1914-1918 must be calculated in factors other than time relative to the other national combatants, the contribution of the Lone Star Division must be measured in achievement against the enemy, losses sustained, and overall accomplishment, days spent in combat notwithstanding.

⁴²Chastaine, Story of the Thirty-sixth, p. 184; Hanson, "Battle of Blanc Mont," p. 175; Skaggs, "General Hulen," p. 139.

⁴³Stallings, The Doughboys, p. 289.



Source: Lawrence Stallings, The Doughboys, The Story of the AEF, 1917-1918 (New York: Harper and Row, 1963), p. 282.

CHAPTER IV

MAINTENANCE BY MILITANCY AND CALAMITY

One historian has described the years between 1919 and 1939 in the United States as a time of widespread opposition to all forms of militarism. "At no time," he states, "in our history had the hold of pacifism been stronger than in the interlude between the first and second world wars."¹ Despite this broad feeling in the rest of the nation, the Texas militia during the twenty years between the wars grew, improved, and ultimately achieved an all time high in both numbers of members and efficiency in military skills. This contradiction of rising militia expertise in a period of pacifism occurred because of an internal factor described by historian John Hope Franklin as intrinsic southern militancy² and an external factor known as the Great Depression.

On 1 January 1919, Brigadier General William D. Cope became Adjutant-General of the State of Texas and immediately

¹William E. Leuchtenburg, The Perils of Prosperity, 1914-1932 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959, p. 104.

²John Hope Franklin, The Militant South (New York: Random House, 1963), p. 74.

faced the problem of preparing for federal inspections of local armories, although none had been expected because of the war in Europe. The state troops still remaining in Texas had begun preparing for mobilization when word arrived of the armistice. Consequently, few armories were available for the unmobilized troops. General Cope found his problem complicated by an oil field boom in north Texas which put all buildings in the area at a premium. Moreover, an influenza epidemic had placed many guardsmen on the sick list.³

To facilitate the inspection, the new Adjutant-General ordered the state divided into northern and southern sections and appointed representatives in each section to coordinate efforts of preparing for federal inspections. Despite Cope's attempt to organize a situation that appeared fluid at best, several deficiencies surfaced during the federal check. Some guardsmen failed to appear at the appointed time, unit records proved incomplete, few units held completed plans for mobilization, morale proved poor, and many units existed above or below the strength authorized by the War Department.⁴ All in all, the first post-war year of the Texas National Guard got off to a rather bad start.

³William D. Cope, Report of the Adjutant-General of the State of Texas, 1919-1920 (Austin: Knape Printing Co., 1921), pp. 7-8.

⁴Ibid.

In Washington, D. C., the Congress began considering H. R. 5227, the appropriation bill for fiscal year 1920. Recognizing the contribution of the National Guard in the late war, the legislators expanded the allocation for the militia to more than \$4,000,000 for training camp expenses and \$5,000,000 for armory drill pay. Section 69 of the measure amended the National Defense Act of 3 June 1916 to bring the National Guard into a parallel with the regular army. This provision included an alteration in the number of years for which a recruit could join. Heretofore, guardsmen joined for a total of six years: three years in an active unit and the balance in the National Guard Reserve. The act allowed recruits to join the National Guard for three years just as new members of the regular army. Further, the measure allowed guardsmen serving six-year enlistments to be given the opportunity of cancelling their old contract of six years and re-enlisting for only three years.⁵

In January 1920, General Cope received a letter from the Chief of the Militia Bureau of the War Department authorizing the Texas Militia to change from an infantry division, known during the war as the Thirty-sixth Division, to the First Cavalry Division. The table of organization indicated three cavalry brigades of three cavalry regiments each, one

⁵U. S., Statutes at Large, vol. 41.

field artillery regiment, one aeronautical squadron, and supporting units of quartermaster, medical, engineering, and signal corps. Brigadier General John A. Hulen received promotion to Major General and assignment as commander of the new division. He soon set about the task of converting the various infantry units into provisional cavalry units. Throughout the spring and early summer of 1920, the Texas National Guard underwent transformation. Units stood in inspection by federal officers, became reorganized, received federal recognition, and in some cases suffered disbandment.⁶

In its next session, Congress further amended the National Defense Act of 3 June 1916 to declare that the composition of the Army of the United States would consist of the regular army of the nation, the National Guard while on federal active duty, and the Organized Reserve. Guardsmen gleefully noted that the organization had been placed in the number two position ahead of the Organized Reserve. Texans also found pleasure in a section that encouraged the National Guard and Reserve units to preserve and maintain "the names, numbers, and other designations of units . . . that served in the World War . . . as far as practicable." Section 74 indicated the increased control the federal

⁶Militia Bureau, Adjutant-General's Office, Records relating to National Guard units, order 34, 17 January 1920, Record Group 407, National Archives, Washington, D. C.; Cope, Report of the Adjutant-General, 1919-1920, p. 9.

government intended to exercise over the state units by outlining more strict qualifications for National Guard officers than had been previously demanded. Moreover, Section 111 authorized the president to "draft" the National Guard in case of national emergency for the duration of a war or a crisis.⁷

A subsequent act increased the appropriations for National Guard training camps to nearly \$6,000,000, approximately \$7,500,000 for armory pay, which was a 50 percent increase over the previous year, and over \$8,000,000 for clothing and equipment.⁸

By autumn of 1920, however, the leadership of the War Plans Division of the War Department had changed their collective minds and notified the Texas Adjutant-General that the bureau intended to convert the Texas National Guard back into an infantry division. Accordingly, on 5 November 1920, several high-ranking militia officers from Texas and adjoining states met at Fort Sam Houston near San Antonio, Texas, to discuss plans for the reorganization. In line with the act of 4 June 1920, the Texans decided to designate the Texas organization the Thirty-sixth Infantry Division if the War Department agreed. The federal bureau concurred and on

⁷U. S., Statutes at Large, vol. 41.

⁸Ibid.

14 December 1920 the Adjutant-General issued orders restructuring the Texas National Guard for the second time in ten months.⁹

As the new year of 1921 began, the Texas Militia contained sixty-nine separate units with a total paper strength of over fifty-seven hundred officers and enlisted men. Guard leaders in the Lone Star state found, however, that interest had started to lag in the post war years. Members moved from former homes and units discontinued regular drills, and as a consequence many local organizations disbanded. Hence, the Adjutant-General considered his task primarily "the creation or rather the recreation of the 36th Division." Brigadier General Thomas D. Barton, upon becoming the new Adjutant-General on 20 January 1921, began the reconstruction process by sending inspectors to check on the various local units and ordered those indicating little interest disbanded.¹⁰

On 8 March 1921, the new Adjutant-General, Major General John A. Hulien, the Thirty-sixth Division commander, and several ranking officers met at Fort Worth, Texas, to discuss plans for reorganization. The conference resulted in a state-wide plan for restructuring the Texas National Guard.

⁹Militia Bureau, Records relating to National Guard units, order 371/r, 1 October 1920, Record Group 407, National Archives, Washington, D. C.

¹⁰Thomas D. Barton, Report of the Adjutant-General of the State of Texas, 1921 (Austin: Von Boeckmann-Jones, 1922), p. 5.

First, the leaders divided the state into two sections by drawing a line down the ninety-eighth meridian. They assigned the Seventy-first Infantry Brigade the western section and the Seventy-second Infantry Brigade the eastern area. Next, the officers divided each brigade area into two sections with the 141st Infantry Regiment being assigned the southwest quadrant, the 142nd Infantry Regiment the northwestern area, the 143rd Infantry Regiment the southwestern section, and the 144th Infantry Regiment the northeastern quarter of the state. Barton assigned an organizer to each regimental area. These four men were veterans of the original Thirty-sixth Division; their task included touring their areas and beginning the effort of organizing units that would fulfill War Department requirements for two infantry brigades. Work progressed slowly. Not until early summer did a new unit undergo formation. The organizers remained steadfast, however, and the movement gained momentum.¹¹

Meanwhile, Congress continued to respond to National Guard pleas for increased funding by appropriating over \$6,000,000 for summer training camps for fiscal year 1922 and approximately \$10,000,000 for pay of armory drills.¹² The increased funding plus the Texas National Guard

¹¹Ibid., pp. 5-15.

¹²U. S., Statutes at Large, vol. 42.

organizers' efforts began to achieve fruition. When the Texas militia leadership met in Austin on 3 December 1921, everyone agreed that the movement had progressed well. The organizers exchanged ideas and methods and the leaders began plans for forming the Sixth-first Field Artillery Brigade as an integral part of the Thirty-sixth Division just as it had been during the world war. Under provisions of the National Defense Act of 3 June 1920, Governor William P. Hobby recommended ten officers for appointment to a board that would decide on locations and designations of local units. The United States Army assigned a regular army officer to meet with the state officers to complete the board. The group met in Austin, Texas, on 19 May 1921 and assigned various units their locations and designations. The table of organization remained essentially the same as it had been during the wartime active duty period.¹³ The Adjutant-General received approval of the organization as proposed on 24 June 1921. During the summer of 1921, the Texas National Guard conducted two training camps. Attendance proved slight because some units had not received federal recognition.¹⁴

The War Department accelerated the recognition process in the first months of 1922. On 1 January 1922, federally

¹³Barton, Report of the Adjutant-General, 1921, pp. 8-9.

¹⁴Ibid., pp. 10-15.

recognized units totalled thirty-one and aggregate strength had diminished to approximately twenty-four hundred officers and men. Within a few months, however, the Thirty-sixth Division contained seventy-eight units that had received federal recognition with a total strength of over sixty-six hundred officers and men.¹⁵ Congressional cooperation continued as appropriations for fiscal year 1923 reached over \$8,000,000 for funding of training camps and \$11,000,000 for armory pay.¹⁶

In Texas, improvement in the quality of training paralleled the increased quantity of participation and increased Congressional funding. Adjutant-General Barton advised Governor Pat M. Neff that Major General John L. Hines, regular army commander of the Eighth Corps area, had told him the Texas summer camp was the "best ordered National Guard camp he had ever seen."¹⁷ Moreover the number of unit disbandments decreased; in the first eight months of 1922 only five local units in Texas suffered removal from the active roster.¹⁸

¹⁵Thomas D. Barton, Report of the Adjutant-General of the State of Texas, 1922 (Austin: Von Boeckmann-Jones, 1923), pp. 35-36; Department of the Army, The Army Lineage Book, Volume 2: Infantry (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1953), pp. 409, 411, 415.

¹⁶U. S., Statutes at Large, vol. 42.

¹⁷Barton, Report of the Adjutant-General, 1922, p. 36.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 37.

Despite the increased interest by the membership and expanded appropriations by the national legislature, the Texas National Guard still did not own one of its armories. The local units leased the buildings in which they held their meetings. The Adjutant-General became concerned about the types of buildings the local organizations occupied since the state militia issued each unit approximately \$16,000 to \$150,000 worth of United States Government property for which the State of Texas was responsible.¹⁹ Some congressmen hoped to gain appropriations for armory construction. House Bill 13793 arrived in the United States House of Representatives from the Ways and Means Committee early in 1923. Unfortunately, the bill passed the Congress without funding armory construction and without increasing the militia appropriation from the previous year.²⁰

The congressional action proved a harbinger for the Texas National Guard. The expansion, that had swollen the Thirty-sixth Division so rapidly, now began to diminish. Two reasons explained the slowdown: the division had reached its authorized strength set by the War Department and the rapid expansion had absorbed the majority of available funding. With the competition for funds, the Adjutant-General ordered units to become more selective in recruiting,

¹⁹Ibid., p. 57.

²⁰U. S., Statutes at Large, vol. 42.

and the Adjutant-General's office became more restrictive in its relations with the local companies. In keeping with the new policy, General Barton ordered the disbandment of thirteen local units that proved unsatisfactory in the early months of 1924. Fortunately, twelve of the disbanded units shortly were reorganized at new locations and eleven new companies were formed, resulting in an overall gain in numerical strength.²¹ The quality improved in other and more notable ways. Barton notified Governor Neff that the federal inspections of 1924 reflected an increase in the efficiency of local units: 27 percent received very satisfactory ratings in 1924, twice the percentage of the units receiving the rating the previous year.²²

The Thirty-sixth Division did not attend summer camp as a complete unit in 1924. Instead, the various components met for training at different locations. The Seventy-first and Seventy-second Infantry Brigades received training at Fort Crockett, a regular army coast artillery post near Galveston, Texas, in July. During the same month, the division air service served for fourteen days at Ellington Field located eight miles south of Houston. The

²¹Thomas D. Barton, Report of the Adjutant-General of the State of Texas, 1924 (Austin: Von Boeckmann-Jones, 1925), pp. 23-24.

²²Ibid., pp. 22-26.

Sixty-first Field Artillery Brigade met at Camp Stanley, Texas, near Leon Springs during August.²³

General Barton also concerned himself in 1924 with considering a permanent camp site for the Thirty-sixth Division. Among the locations considered were Camp Mabry at Austin and sites near Brownwood, Galveston, Corpus Christi, and Palacios. The latter, located in Matagorda County, proved to be the most desirable from every viewpoint: transportation, climate, soil composition, availability of land, and cost. Since no funds had been appropriated by the state for a permanent camp, the people of Matagorda and adjoining counties had already begun to raise money by public subscription. General Barton advised the governor that the fund raising in the coastal area was near completion and he expected the titles to the land for the camp to be presented to the state by the end of 1924.²⁴ The Adjutant-General also announced that two members of the Texas National Guard had been selected for appointment to the United States Military Academy at West Point. One appointee, Roger M. Ramey of Denton, Texas, later became famous.²⁵

²³Ibid., pp. 26-28.

²⁴Ibid., pp. 32-36.

²⁵Ramey became a full general in the United States Air Force. Ibid., pp. 40-41; Edward Jablonski, *Airwar* (Garden City: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1971), pp. 161-162.

Congress, at this point under the influence of President Calvin Coolidge's austerity program, began to cut down on appropriations for the militia. Allocations for summer training camps fell below \$10,000,000 for fiscal year 1925, as did the funding for armory drill pay.²⁶ As Congress cut back on appropriations, efficiency of the Texas National Guard continued to improve. The new Adjutant-General, Brigadier General Mark McGee, assumed office on 24 January 1925 and within months reported to Governor Miram A. Ferguson that the percentage of local units receiving very satisfactory ratings increased from 27 percent in 1924 to 52 percent in 1925. McGee credited the improvement to the dedication of local commanders and the upgrading of the armories.²⁷

The Texas National Guard again received summer training separately in 1925. Infantrymen met at Camp Mabry, artillerymen attended Camp Stanley, air servicemen received training at Ellington Field, and the engineer section met at the new post at Palacios.²⁸

The Militia Bureau of the War Department advised the Texas Adjutant-General in early 1926 that the total authorized

²⁶U. S., Statutes at Large, vol. 43.

²⁷Mark McGee, Report of the Adjutant-General of the State of Texas, 1925 (Austin: Knappe Printing Co., 1927), pp. 2-4.

²⁸Ibid., p. 5.

strength of the Texas organization was 8,230.²⁹ This authorization did not adversely affect the militia in the Lone Star state. Brigadier General Dallas J. Matthews, who became Adjutant-General on 5 December 1925, reported to the governor the following year that because of federal restrictions the state militia had not increased in quantity but continued to advance in the pursuit of increased efficiency. The local units that received very satisfactory ratings increased from 52 percent in 1925 to a new high of 54 percent in 1926.³⁰ During this same time period, Congress continued to decrease the allocation of funds to the National Guard. Appropriations for training camps fell to \$9,670,000 while funding for armory pay rose above \$10,000,000 again.³¹

Because of a variety of causes, southern militancy, economic conditions, esprit de corps, and other reasons, the efficiency of the Texas National Guard continued to improve. The Adjutant-General reiterated the idea that

²⁹Militia Bureau to General Matthews, 20 January 1926, Adjutant-General's File, Retained Records Section, Texas Army National Guard Archives, Camp Mabry, Texas.

³⁰Dallas J. Matthews, Report of the Adjutant-General of the State of Texas, 1926 (Austin: Knape Printing Co., 1927), p. 9.

³¹U. S., Statutes at Large, vol. 44.

improved attitudes of company commanders and improvement in the local armories contributed to the upgrading.³²

The citizens of Matagorda County presented the deed to the land for the campsite near Palacios in early 1926. That same year the national government appropriated funds for the construction of permanent improvements at the new post and work began before the end of the year.³³ The new campsite served the entire Thirty-sixth Division, except for the aero squadron, in 1926. The guardsmen received little training during the camp, however, as rain fell for twelve of the fifteen days the men were there. The air service continued to train at Ellington Field.³⁴

By August 1927, the total strength of the Texas National Guard reached 9,286 officers and enlisted men. Once again the ratings increased; this time to a new high of 68 percent of the units receiving very satisfactory marks. Also in the summer of 1927, an additional camp near Mineral Wells, Texas, became part of the expanding militia facilities in the Lone Star state. The land for the post came from contributions of local citizens in Palo Pinto County.³⁵

³²Matthews, Report of the Adjutant-General, 1926, p. 9.

³³Ibid., pp. 10-11.

³⁴Ibid., pp. 13-15.

³⁵Robert L. Robertson, Report of the Adjutant-General of the State of Texas, 1927 (Austin: Capital Printing Co., 1928), pp. 11-12.

In 1928 Congress reversed the appropriations by allocating less than \$10,000,000 for training camps and raising the funding for armory drill pay to above \$10,000,000.³⁶ The Texas guardsmen met again at the new post at Palacios. Unlike the previous year, no rainfall disturbed the Thirty-sixth Division as it received the annual two weeks of training.³⁷

The Texas National Guard personnel rolls decreased in 1928. Congressional failure to expand funding controlled the growth of the militia in Texas. Brigadier General Robert L. Robertson, who assumed the post of Adjutant-General in January 1927, warned local units that his office would be ruthless in disbanding any company that did not strive to improve its efficiency.³⁸ Robertson decried the limits placed on the National Guard by congressional action but claimed the competition actually improved the program. He pointed to the armory inspection reports as evidence to support his contentions and reviewed the increase of very satisfactory units from 68 percent of the total force to 81.25 percent in 1928.³⁹ Most Texas guardsmen attended

³⁶Robert L. Robertson, Report of the Adjutant-General of the State of Texas, 1928 (Austin: Capital Printing Co., 1929), pp. 11-12.

³⁷Ibid.

³⁸Ibid., p. 23.

³⁹Ibid., pp. 25-26.

summer training at the camp near Palacios, while others met at the post in Palo Pinto County. The latter camp received the name Camp Wolters in 1928 after the Fifty-sixth Cavalry Brigade commander, Brigadier General Jacob F. Wolters. Robertson reported to the governor that both camps proved highly successful.⁴⁰

In 1929 the National Guard appropriation for summer training camps received less than \$10,000,000, while the funding for pay to members for armory drills rose to a new high of \$11,500,000.⁴¹ That year the membership in the Texas National Guard increased. This growth resulted from a revised table of organization that allotted more positions for additional guardsmen. The overall efficiency unaccountably diminished, however, from 81.25 percent to 56 percent.⁴² Just as in the previous year, the Thirty-sixth Division received training at Camp Palacios and the detachment of cavalry trained at Camp Wolters.⁴³

On the national scene, however, ominous vibrations far removed from the militia sector began to appear. In the

⁴⁰Ibid., pp. 27-28.

⁴¹U. S., Statutes at Large, vol. 45.

⁴²Robert L. Robertson, Report of the Adjutant-General of the State of Texas, 1929 (Austin: A. C. Baldwin and Sons, 1930), pp. 5-6.

⁴³Ibid., pp. 7-8.

summer of 1929, commercial building contracts drastically declined; residential construction for 1929 fell about \$1,000,000,000 from the previous year. Business inventories climbed and then tripled over the 1928 level. The stock market ignored these warnings. It rode "on the impetus of half a dozen years of steady increase, and paid little attention to the indexes."⁴⁴ Throughout September and October of 1929 investors expected the problem to disappear. But on 23 October stock prices fell drastically, putting pressure on credit traders. The following day a new high in sell orders arrived and the market dropped sharply. Bankers, economists, Treasury Department officials, and President Herbert Hoover all reassured the investing public. Prices stabilized for the balance of the week. Over the weekend, however, people evidently reappraised their positions and "gave the forces of fear and liquidation time to do their work." When the market opened on Monday the slide became near panic.⁴⁵

The tumbling economy caused Congress to look with a critical eye at all expenditures. Peacetime defense costs came under close scrutiny. As Congress considered the

⁴⁴Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Crisis of the Old Order (New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1957), p. 157.

⁴⁵Ibid., pp. 158-159.

appropriation bill for the military for fiscal year 1931, many militia leaders fearfully watched for slashes. But the legislators continued the major funding for the guardsmen at the level of the previous year: nearly \$10,000,000 for summer camps and \$11,500,000 for armory drill pay.⁴⁶

In Texas, the efficiency of the local units resumed its upward movement in 1930: 88.3 percent of the local companies received very satisfactory ratings.⁴⁷ As in the past, the Thirty-sixth Division continued to receive its training at the Palacios post, now named Camp Hulen after Major General John A. Hulen, the division commander. Hulen was the logical choice for the honor. A veteran of thirty-nine years service in the Texas National Guard and Volunteer Militia, Hulen had served on active duty during the Spanish-American War, the Mexican Border crisis, and the World War. He had received the Silver Star citation for bravery in combat during the Philippine Island campaign in 1899 and the Distinguished Service Medal and Crois de Guerre of France for service during the European War.⁴⁸

⁴⁶U. S., Statutes at Large, vol. 46.

⁴⁷Robertson, Report of the Adjutant-General, 1929, p. 43.

⁴⁸Ibid., pp. 48-49; General Order no. 9, Adjutant-General's File, Retained Records Section, Texas Army National Guard Archives, Camp Mabry, Texas.

When Captain William Warren Sterling of the Texas Rangers became Adjutant-General on 22 January 1931 he found the Texas National Guard in a "high state of efficiency." The state military leader reported to the governor that because of the economic depression, then in existence following the stock market crash, the money paid to the eight thousand members of the Texas National Guard for armory drills and annual training came as an important supplement to their incomes.⁴⁹

Local units had no trouble keeping their rosters at full strength because of the pay. Sterling declared that nearly every unit had a waiting list of potential recruits. Turn-over within the ranks had drastically diminished. In 1930, for example, nearly 20 percent of the enlisted men attending summer camp had less than two months service; by 1931, the percentage at Camp Hulen had fallen to less than half that of the preceding year. In the brigade that met at Camp Wolters, the number of recruits within the organization constituted less than 4 percent.⁵⁰

Despite economic pressure for retrenchment, Congress continued to maintain the level of National Guard appropriations of the previous years.⁵¹ The following year, Sterling reported that Texas received approximately \$1,500,000

⁴⁹William W. Sterling, Report of the Adjutant-General of the State of Texas, 1931 (Austin: Knappe Printing Co., 1932), p. 10.

⁵⁰Ibid., pp. 10-11.

⁵¹U. S., Statutes at Large, vol. 46.

from the federal government for expense money to maintain the state militia at its level of eight thousand officers and men. The state militia leader emphasized that the overall character and stability of the personnel continued to improve. Unit commanders used the economic conditions of the time as a recruiting tool and carefully selected new members from waiting lists; hence, the commanders strove to continually upgrade their organizations. The state office encouraged the unit leaders to pressure less desirable members to accept discharges and replace them with members of the highest level of morality on the waiting lists. The turnover continued to fall dramatically. When the Thirty-sixth Division attended summer camp in 1932, the percentage of men who had less than two months service totalled 1.43 percent, the lowest in the history of the Texas militia. Moreover, the percentage of the members attending summercamp was the highest in the history of the state organization.⁵²

All the foregoing contributed to the Texas militia continuing to operate at a high rate of efficiency. Over 83 percent of the local units received ratings of very satisfactory during the federal inspection of the armories. Attendance at drill during the first eight months of 1932

⁵² William W. Sterling, Report of the Adjutant-General of the State of Texas, 1932 (Austin: Knape Printing Co., 1933), pp. 17-19.

reached 95.5 percent of officers and 82.3 percent of enlisted men, the highest attendance rate ever recorded in the Texas militia.⁵³ Sterling also praised the patience of owners of buildings leased for Texas National Guard armories because the state, in its economic stress, had been forced to pay the rent in script from March 1932 until September 1932.⁵⁴

By the summer of 1932 Congress had responded to the economic problem. House Bill 11897 proposed slashing the appropriation for National Guard summer camps from \$10,000,000 down to \$8,000,000. The armory drill pay remained at the previous level of \$11,500,000.⁵⁵

In January 1933 two unrelated events occurred which affected the Thirty-sixth Division. First, Brigadier General Henry Hutchings became Adjutant-General of Texas on 18 January. Two weeks later, Adolph Hitler became Chancellor of Germany.⁵⁶ Just prior to these occurrences, membership in the Texas National Guard had reached nearly eighty-two hundred men. With this number, the Lone Star militia ranked sixth in the United States; in federal

⁵³Ibid., p. 19.

⁵⁴Ibid., p. 17.

⁵⁵U. S., Statutes at Large, vol. 47.

⁵⁶Henry Hutchings, Report of the Adjutant-General of the State of Texas, 1933 (Austin: Knape Printing Co., 1935), pp. 8-9; William L. Shirer, Rise and Fall of the Third Reich (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1960), p. 184.

appropriations received for aid to the National Guard, however, the state ranked fourth.⁵⁷ The 73rd Congress reflected the mood of the New Deal concept of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, who assumed office on 4 March 1933, by expanding the federal funding circulated via the National Guard. In 1933 the appropriation by Congress for the militia reached nearly \$10,000,000 for training camps while the allocation for armory drill pay reached an all time high of nearly \$16,000,000.⁵⁸

Later that year, the Roosevelt influence could clearly be seen in an amendment to the National Defense Act. The new act altered the defense measure of 3 June 1916 and the subsequent act of 11 July 1919 by revising the composition of the Army of the United States. The regular army remained first in the defense structure, followed by a newly created concept: the National Guard of the United States. Third in line came the National Guard while on active duty with the federal government. The arrangement indicated the new president's view of the defense posture: a new "federalized" National Guard had emerged to replace the state dominated unit as the number two line of defense in the military

⁵⁷U. S., Congress, House, Congressional Record, 72nd Cong., 1st sess., 47, pt. 2:1589.

⁵⁸U. S., Statutes at Large, vol. 47.

structure of the United States. In addition, Section 2 amended the previous laws to state that henceforth "all policies and regulations affecting the organization, distribution . . . and training of the National Guard" would be prepared by committees of appropriate branches or divisions of the War Department General Staff. Section 71 defines the composition of the National Guard and the National Guard of the United States. The state units would consist of voluntary members of the militia subject to state orders. The National Guard of the United States emerged as a reserve component of the Army of the United States and subject to the control of only the federal government.⁵⁹

Essentially, this alteration placed the guardsmen in the position of being subject to immediate call to active duty in case of a national emergency. The amendment also directed that all activated National Guard units would retain their state unit identity. This section had no effect on the Texas organization since it had requested and received permission to retain the active duty table of organization for use while still a state unit. The training areas of the state organization remained unchanged throughout 1933 and 1934 with the Thirty-sixth Division meeting

⁵⁹U. S., Statutes at Large, vol. 48.

at Camp Hulen and the cavalry brigade attending camp at the post near Mineral Wells. The training remained virtually the same.⁶⁰

The second session of the 73rd Congress cut back on the funding for the maintenance of the National Guard. For the first time in years the training camp appropriations fell below \$9,000,000 and armory pay allocation decreased to less than \$12,000,000.⁶¹

As the year 1936 began, several events occurred that would influence the Texas National Guard in the future. Brigadier General Carl E. Nesbitt received appointment as the new Adjutant-General on 15 January.⁶² In another part of the world, Italian and Ethiopian soldiers battled along the frontier between Ethiopia and Somaliland. In Europe, residents of the Saar Basin voted in January to unite with Nazi Germany. Within two months, the German dictator, Adolph Hitler, rejected and renounced the disarmament sections of the Treaty of Versailles and announced to the world that Germany planned to increase its military strength

⁶⁰Hutchings, Report of the Adjutant-General, 1933, p. 11.

⁶¹U. S., Statutes at Large, vol. 48.

⁶²Carl E. Nesbitt, Report of the Adjutant-General of the State of Texas, 1935 (Austin: Lone Star Printing Co., 1937), p. 9.

In the United States, meanwhile, Congress passed the first of the Neutrality Laws of the 1930s.⁶³

Nesbitt reported to the governor that the strength of the Texas National Guard totalled over eighty-three hundred officers and men, and pointed out that the Lone Star state was one of only six states that possessed an infantry division within its militia.⁶⁴ Also in 1935, the state legislature passed an act creating the Texas National Guard Armory Board. This group was to be composed of the three most senior officers of the state militia and was charged with the responsibility of constructing, renting, controlling, maintaining, and operating all National Guard armories in the state of Texas. The measure authorized board members to cooperate with national authorities in order to obtain federal funding for construction of new armories.⁶⁵

In Washington, D. C., Congress passed an appropriations bill that indicated the funding for summer training continued to decline to less than \$8,500,000; allocation of funds for armory drill pay resumed its climb to nearly \$14,000,000.⁶⁶

⁶³John E. Wiltz, From Isolation to War, 1931-1941 (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1968), p. 49.

⁶⁴Nesbitt, Report of the Adjutant-General, 1935, p. 9.

⁶⁵Texas, Journal of the Senate, 44th Legislature, regular session, 1935, chapter 184, p. 462.

⁶⁶U. S., Statutes at Large, vol. 49.

As the year 1936 progressed world conditions grew worse. In Europe, Hitler decided to send German troops into the Rhineland, which had been declared a de-militarized zone by the Versailles Treaty. German soldiers marched into the area on 2 March. William L. Shirer, an American newsman on the scene, discovered that Hitler had issued orders for the troops to withdraw at the first sign of resistance by the French; France offered no overt opposition.⁶⁷ Within two months, Addis Ababa, the capital of Ethiopia, surrendered to Italy. Benito Mussolini, the Italian dictator, quickly annexed Ethiopia. In July, General Francisco Franco led Spanish rebel forces in an attack on the Spanish republic and a civil war began.⁶⁸ Italy and Germany aided the rebel leader, and by October this rapport between the two dictators led to the agreement known as the Rome-Berlin Axis.⁶⁹

In keeping with the Neutrality Act of 1937, enacted in early January, the Roosevelt administration announced an embargo on arms shipments to either side in Spain, which pleased the isolationist and pacifist movements then widespread in the United States.⁷⁰ The Spanish Civil War apparently had little effect on the attitude

⁶⁷William L. Shirer, Rise and Fall of the Third Reich (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1960), p. 291.

⁶⁸Wiltz, Isolation to War, p. 53.

⁶⁹Shirer, Third Reich, pp. 297-298.

⁷⁰Wiltz, Isolation to War, p. 57.

Congress maintained toward the National Guard as the appropriation for fiscal 1937 remained approximately the same as the year before.⁷¹

In 1937 world conditions grew more baneful. On 30 January, Hitler announced the "withdrawal of the German signature" from the Treaty of Versailles,⁷² and continued his acceleration of the armament of Germany. On the other side of the globe a clash between Japanese and Chinese troops at the Marco Polo Bridge, a railway junction west of Peiping, indicated an intensification of strained relations between the two Asian countries that had grown progressively worse during the 1930s. The Roosevelt administration considered beginning an embargo on scrap iron to Japan as a means of attempting to control Japanese aggression.⁷³

The deterioration of world conditions prompted Congress to review the funding for the National Guard. The 75th Congress, therefore, raised the allocation for the reserve military force for fiscal 1938 to \$9,000,000 for training camps and over \$14,000,000 for armory drill pay.⁷⁴ By October 1937, President Roosevelt had called for a

⁷¹U. S., Statutes at Large, vol. 49

⁷²Shirer, Third Reich, p. 299.

⁷³Wiltz, Isolation to War, pp. 58-59.

⁷⁴U. S., Statutes at Large, vol. 50.

"quarantine" against aggressor nations "to protect the health of the community against the spread of disease." Despite the speech, or because of it, Japanese bombers attacked an American gunboat, the U.S.S. Panay, and three American oil tankers on the Yangtse River twenty-seven miles north of Nanking; three Americans died in the assault. The United States government protested but quickly accepted the Japanese apology.⁷⁵

In 1938 the deteriorating trend continued and indeed gained momentum. By March, Hitler had forced the bloodless annexation of Austria.⁷⁶ The German dictator next turned his attention to the Sudetenland of Czechoslovakia, a mountainous region of mostly German people along the German border that had been separated from the defeated Imperial Germany in 1919. In September, Hitler demanded the annexation of the Sudetenland by Germany to unite the German speaking people. British and French leaders hurried to Munich, Germany, to confer with Hitler and presently agreed to the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia.⁷⁷ Within six months, Hitler invaded Czechoslovakia on the pretext of settling "disturbances" that he had secretly ordered created.⁷⁸

⁷⁵Vital Speeches of the Day, vol. 4, no. 1:2-4.

⁷⁶Shirer, Third Reich, pp. 331-334.

⁷⁷Ibid., pp. 399-420.

⁷⁸Wiltz, Isolation to War, p. 70.

On 1 September 1939, German troops invaded Poland. Immediately, the stunned British and French governments demanded the withdrawal of the invaders. When Hitler ignored the demands, Britain and France declared war on Germany and World War had begun.⁷⁹

The 1930s, which had begun in an economic crisis and an atmosphere of pacificism, ended with the world involved in what became the largest war in history. Throughout the decade the Texas National Guard, oblivious to the pacificism that existed elsewhere, continued to grow and improve. Members often belonged to the Texas organization for the drill pay as much as patriotism. Ironically, the economic conditions that proved so devastating for the rest of the American society served as an aid for the National Guard movement. With sound strength, better than average training, and a devotion to duty, the Texas National Guard stood ready for action in time of national emergency.

⁷⁹Shirer, Third Reich, pp. 597-613.

CHAPTER V

CONTINUING CRISIS: 1939-1940

As the Japanese became increasingly more aggressive in the South Pacific area during the 1930s, the Netherlands East Indies colonial government became concerned about its security. This feeling of hopelessness grew when the Germans conquered the mother country and turned to fear as an invasion by the Nipponese Army became probable.

Even as early as 1939, an American travelling in Java, the main island of the Indies, found the consensus of the Javanese to be that the take-over probably would come as soon as Japan conquered China. The colonial government that year considered possible attack of such gravity that it devoted more than half the annual budget to defense appropriations.¹

After steadily being drawn into the Allied cause, the United States became involved in planning the defense of the Far East in late 1940. In December, United States Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Harold R. Stark instructed American Asiatic Fleet Commander Admiral Thomas C. Hart to open discussions with the British and Dutch supreme

¹Marc T. Greene, "Lifblood of the Netherlands," Asia, 39 (December, 1939):708.

commanders in the Far East. Stark assumed that the two countries would be allies of the United States in the event of a Pacific war, but he also contemplated that the Dutch might be reluctant to participate because of fear that the Japanese might react. The naval leader cautioned Hart to commit the United States to no particular military or political decisions. Stark considered the American-British staff conference, scheduled to begin soon after the first of the year in Washington, to be the appropriate time for major decisions and commitments.²

The Washington conference³ evolved from American progressive inclination toward active involvement in the war. Originally, American interests had entailed only the sale of small numbers of aircraft and munitions to Great Britain, but by late 1940 had escalated to result in half of America's production of airplanes and war materials being sent to the British. With Britain's funds exhausted, President Roosevelt introduced the Lend-Lease bill to supply war materials for Allies according to need rather than repayment ability. Consequently, the American-British conference constituted a

²U. S., Congress, Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack: Hearings, 79th Cong., 1st sess., 1946, pt. 4:1929.

³The conference lasted from 29 January to 27 March 1941, and was referred to as ABC-1 by the United States Army conferees. Conferences at Washington, 1941-1942, and Casablanca, 1943, Foreign Relations of the United States (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1968), p. xxiii.

meeting of inextricably intertwined allies coordinating military plans of the two countries around the world in the event of the United States actively entering the war.⁴

The conference members agreed that the Allies would concentrate on the defeat of Germany and Italy first; if Japan entered the war, Pacific action would be limited until resolution of the European war. The Allies disagreed on one major point: the British felt their naval base at Singapore symbolized the empire's strength and it should be held at all cost. The British conferees insisted that the United States commit a large portion of its fleet to the South Pacific. The American representatives refused, pointing out that loss of the United States bases in the Philippines would also be a blow to American prestige. The representatives agreed, however, that in order to concentrate on the European theater, loss of the Asian bases might be unavoidable. The American delegates advised the conference that the United States expected no increase in her Far East forces.⁵

Meanwhile, the Japanese attempted an economic invasion of the Netherlands East Indies. American Consul General Walter A. Foote reported from Batavia, the colonial capital, that Japan had approached the Dutch authorities with the

⁴Ibid.; U. S., Statutes at Large, vol. 55.

⁵Richard M. Leighton and Robert W. Coakley, Global Logistics and Strategy, 1940-1943, 4 vols. of sub-series, The War Department, United States Army in World War Two (Washington: Department of the Army, 1955), 4:52-54.

proposition of joint exploitation. The Nipponese wanted to participate in the harvesting of the natural resources of the colony and simultaneously to promote trade and economic relations between the Netherlands colony and Japan. The Japanese also suggested that the Dutch colonial government allow unlimited immigration of Japanese nationals despite the Netherland's policy regarding quotas, allow Japanese medical personnel to practice without restriction, and insure that all applications or requests of Japanese nationals be treated in a friendly spirit. They further requested permits for exploration in areas the Dutch government reserved for itself. The Japanese asked permission to fish in East Indian waters, to begin air service between the Dutch colony and Japan, and to abolish all restrictions on navigable areas and tonnage for Japanese ships. Finally, the Japanese wanted to install a cable from the colony to the Nipponese mainland and revoke the Dutch prohibition of the Japanese language in communications between the two peoples. Foote promised to ascertain the reaction of the Netherlands authorities and cable the information to the American State Department the following day.⁶

Consul Foote informed Secretary of State Cordell Hull the next day that the Netherlands government rejected the Japanese proposals as unthinkable, thus forming no foundation

⁶Diplomatic Papers, Far East, 1941, Foreign Relations of the United States (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1956), 4:25-26.

whatsoever for further negotiations.⁷ The Netherlands minister to the United States, A. Loudon, called on Stanley K. Hornbeck⁸ and advised him that the Japanese and Portuguese were considering establishment of an airline from Japan to Portuguese Timor. Should these talks achieve fruition, the Dutch feared they would be subjected to Japanese aircraft over fortified areas of the Dutch Indies. Both the British and Dutch governments had tried unsuccessfully to persuade the Portuguese to avoid agreement with the Japanese, Loudon said. The Netherlands minister solicited American assistance in influencing the Portuguese.⁹

Two weeks later, on 8 February 1941, Joseph Grew, American ambassador to Japan, telegraphed Hull regarding intensified Japanese encroachment in the South Pacific. Grew felt that Great Britain could not then nor in the future spare enough naval power to defend Singapore, which Grew regarded as vital to the defense of the area. Grew reminded Hull that the morale of the Far East British forces, the Dutch, and the Nationalist Chinese depended almost entirely upon the hope of ultimate American aid.¹⁰

⁷Ibid., 4:27-28.

⁸Stanley K. Hornbeck served as political relations advisor to Secretary Cordell Hull.

⁹Pearl Harbor Hearings, pt. 6:2918.

¹⁰Ibid.

Admiral Stark's suggestion of conversations between Allied Far East commanders resulted in a conference at Singapore during the week of 22-27 April 1941, and included Americans, British, and Dutch.¹¹ The British again proposed that the defense of Singapore be the keystone of the plan; once again the American representatives disagreed. Colonel Allen C. McBride, the United States military delegate, conveyed his impressions to Major General George Grunert, commanding general of the Philippines Department, at the conclusion of the conference. Grunert reported to the War Department that McBride had discouraged the British from expecting that additional forces would be ordered to the Philippines, that American planning went south of Manila, or that increased United States forces would use Luzon as an offensive base. Grunert pointed out that Great Britain presumed the United States Asiatic Fleet was at the disposal of the British commanders for almost total devotion to the defense of Singapore.¹²

The Netherlands charge d'affaires, W. V. Van Boetzelar, requested in Washington that the United States join the Dutch and British governments in making a declaration to Japan. Should the Nipponese make additional major moves

¹¹The Singapore conference was also known as ABDA. Conferences at Washington, 1941-1942, p. xxiii.

¹²Mark Skinner Watson, Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations, 4 vols. in sub-series, The War Department, United States Army in World War Two (Washington: Department of the Army, 1950), pp. 394-395.

to the south, the United States, Britain, and the Netherlands would conclude that their interests were affected. If the United States government wanted to take alternate action, Van Boetzelar added, the Dutch would gladly consider any suggestion; the State Department demurred.¹³

Some United States government civil servants urged limited action to show the American concern. Despite Washington's reluctance to make a formal statement, Hornbeck wrote and forwarded a paper to the War Department recommending three-fourths of the United States fleet be kept at Hawaii to insure Singapore's security. He further suggested sending more planes and submarines to the Philippine Islands and additional war material to China, Singapore, and the Netherlands East Indies. Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall opposed the suggestions, saying a collapse in the Atlantic would be fatal to the American cause. He continued by stating that while a collapse in the Far East would be serious, it would not be fatal.¹⁴

On 3 May 1941, Dutch authorities announced that future exports from the Indies to Japan might be reduced below previous figures; the Nipponese immediately requested a review of the situation. The Dutch consented on the

¹³Diplomatic Papers, Far East, 1941, 5:141.

¹⁴Watson, Prewar Plans and Preparations, p. 397.

condition that the Japanese cease further expansion of their companies in the Indies, the Dutch reserve full freedom to carry on the war against Germany, the Dutch make no promises regarding rubber or tin, and the colonial government determine the amounts of commodities to be released for shipment to Japan.¹⁵

The Netherlands foreign minister, E. N. Van Kleffens, called on Sumner Welles, American Undersecretary of State, to say that morale in the Netherlands East Indies remained high and defensive measures taken had impressed him. The foreign minister expressed confidence in the colony's ability to repulse any invader in every respect except in numbers of aircraft. When Van Kleffens asked about the reinforcement of bases in the Philippines, Welles told the minister that urgent requirements of the United States defenses dominated the priorities. The Dutch official requested anti-aircraft artillery, small arms ammunition, and bombers, and gave the undersecretary his opinion of recent Japanese economic proposals in which he stated that he feared the Japanese would use the rupture of negotiations as an excuse to threaten the Dutch. Nevertheless, the minister did not expect the Japanese to launch an open attack on the Indies in the immediate future.¹⁶

¹⁵Diplomatic Papers, Far East, 1941, 5:141-142.

¹⁶Ibid., 5:250-251.

While statesmen discussed the unsteady situation, the United States Atlantic Fleet expanded at the expense of the Far East naval force. From 2 January 1941 to 12 July 1941, the navy transferred from the Pacific to the Atlantic three battleships, one aircraft carrier, eight cruisers, seventeen destroyers, and fifteen auxiliary vessels. No ships were transferred to the Pacific from the Atlantic.¹⁷

President Roosevelt desired that some restraint be placed on Japan to indicate the United States' displeasure of Japanese policies. The president moved to prevent the use of American financial facilities and to restrict trade between the two countries. Six weeks earlier on 14 June Roosevelt had issued an order freezing the assets of belligerent European countries.¹⁸ The new announcement, Executive Order no. 8832, placed Japan in the frozen assets category in an attempt to bring under control all import-export trade negotiations and transactions that involved Japanese nationals or interests. The action also included freezing the assets of China.¹⁹

Following Roosevelt's action, E. N. Van Kleffens called on Acting Secretary of State Sumner Welles. The

¹⁷Pearl Harbor Hearings, pt. 6:2918

¹⁸Federal Register, vol. 6, no. 109, doc. no. 415359, 14 June 1941.

¹⁹Diplomatic Papers, Japan, 1931-1941, Foreign Relations of the United States (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1955), 2:266-267; Federal Register, vol. 6, no. 109, doc. no. 415384, 26 July 1941.

minister noted that his government would not appease the Japanese; he wanted to know what steps the United States would take if this policy resulted in hostile action by Japan. Welles reminded the minister that the two countries had conferred through their military representatives and for the moment he could only say that the situation was uppermost in the mind of the American government.²⁰

In contrast to the Americans, the British government assured the Dutch of assistance. On 1 August 1941, the British ambassador to the United States, Sir Neville Butler, told the Netherlands minister, Van Kleffens, that the entire Far Eastern situation had been reviewed and His Majesty's government would guard the rights and possessions of the Dutch as far as possible. The ambassador gave his assurance that Great Britain would do everything in its power to help if the Japanese attacked the colony. Aid would be based on two things: the British would decide the appropriated time and type of action, and any British movement would depend on steps taken by the American government.²¹

The British encouragement emboldened the Dutch to issue the following statement:

The authorities /Netherlands East Indies government/ feel that the occupation of Indo-China is a direct threat to the Netherlands Indies and

²⁰Diplomatic Papers, Far East, 1941, 4:350-351.

²¹Ibid., 4:281, 282.

that under the circumstances any exports that would materially add to Japan's potential power would not be in the interest of the Netherlands Indies. Resumption of normal relations is possible only after the removal of this threat.²²

The Dutch announced that oil could not be exported to Japan unless the Japanese government publicly declared they would not invade the Dutch colony and the Nipponese troops would not continue the occupation of Indo-China.²³ The Japanese quickly responded. Eiju Amau, Japanese minister for foreign affairs, conferred in Tokyo with the Netherlands minister, General J. C. Pabst, on 23 August 1941, and entreated the Dutch to make no move harmful to the relations between the two countries. Amau urged the colony to honor all contracts with Japan, and assured the Dutch minister that the Japanese occupation in no way jeopardized the Dutch Indies. When Pabst requested a public declaration, the Japanese stated that public opinion was so aroused over the Dutch attitude that it would be impossible at that time.²⁴

Meanwhile, A. Loudon pressed the American State Department for assurance of aid should the Japanese become aggressive toward the Dutch. The minister reminded the secretary that the Allied military conferences were complete and were

²²Diplomatic Papers, Far East, 1941, 5:271.

²³Ibid., 5:281-282.

²⁴Ibid.

approved by the Dutch. The Netherlands government anxiously awaited the United States government's approval of the conference plans.²⁵

While the Dutch sought pledges from their allies, the British strongly and publicly discussed the United States' commitment to the defense of the South Pacific. Duff Cooper, special envoy from the Crown to Singapore, arrived at Batavia, Java, on 19 September. When questioned by newsmen about the base at Singapore being used by American forces, Cooper coyly replied that ". . . no agreement existed on paper, but the answer is obvious." When asked if ". . . the ABDA front was merely wishful thinking," Cooper retorted, ". . . emphatically no. It is a fact."²⁶

This publicity distressed American military men. Admiral Hart complained to the Navy Department about British Air Chief Marshal Earle Brooke-Popham, who had visited him in Manila for brief discussions regarding patrol bombers. When Brooke-Popham returned to Singapore, however, he implied to the press that extensive talks had occurred. Obviously upset, Hart said, ". . . the fanfare of publicity which accompanied the above visit and which the British always seek to give to our talks with them in

²⁵Diplomatic Papers, Far East, 1941, 4:389.

²⁶Pearl Harbor Hearings, pt. 10:5227-5228.

the area is unwise." The American admiral believed that early conversations which constituted only the first steps toward realization of a viable and ongoing Anglo-Dutch-American alliance against Japanese expansion should have no publicity.²⁷

The Dutch became increasingly apprehensive. At the Singapore conference, the British had outlined a proposal to form a defense against Japanese expansion, but this plan had not developed to Dutch satisfaction. The British vaguely promised to help, but based their pledge on the action of the United States. The Americans remained non-committal. Furthermore, needed war material available only from the United States had arrived in limited quantities. Consequently, when the Dutch Navy observed a build-up of Japanese forces in late November, 1941, near the Pelew Islands east of the Philippines, the Netherlands government became alarmed and sought advice from their allies. When the Dutch suggested a joint statement declaring the area between the Pelews and the Dutch colony a defense zone of the United States and Great Britain, the two larger countries declined to join in the announcement. The American Chief of Naval Operations and the British Admiralty discounted the information about the Japanese build-up. The American Navy regarded the Dutch proposal as political and

²⁷Diplomatic Papers, Far East, 1941, 4:505.

hesitated to become involved. The British pointed out that a joint statement might disturb current United States-Japanese diplomatic negotiations and suggested the Dutch issue a unilateral declaration to cover the colony's own shores. This attitude soon changed.²⁸

On 5 December, a British reconnaissance plane spotted a large Japanese convoy between Malaya and Siam. When the pilot tried to approach the group, Japanese planes from the accompanying aircraft carrier quickly forced the British plane to leave the area. The Allies, upon receiving the information, began to take a more aggressive stance. The British War Office advised Brooke-Popham that assurance of American help had been promised should the Japanese invade another part of Siam, the Dutch East Indies, or attack the British military in the area.²⁹

The Netherlands East Indies War Department advised the American consul general that they had intercepted and decoded a communication from the Japanese ministry of foreign affairs in Tokyo. The message included a code in weather reports that would be used to keep the Japanese in the Indies abreast of current event; East wind, rain, would indicate war with the United States; North wind, cloudy,

²⁸Pearl Harbor Hearings, pt. 10:4874.

²⁹Ibid., pt. 10:5082-5084.

war with Russia; and West wind, clear, would signal war with Britain. The consul forwarded the information to the State Department, but cautioned that such messages had occurred frequently since 1936; he transmitted the telegram on 6 December 1941.³⁰

Americans repeatedly warned the Dutch that they would not defend the Netherlands East Indies. Indeed, as noted above, during the Washington Conference in January 1941, and the Singapore Conference, two months later, the United States' delegates pointed out that her own bases in the Philippines might be lost and that plans existed to enlarge the Far East Fleet or to reinforce the bases. Moreover, the Americans declined to join the Dutch in issuing a warning against the Japanese that they would move against Japan if the expansion continued. In fact, the United States found itself in no position to threaten Japan, since during this time period American leaders were forced to transfer ships from the Far East Fleet to the Atlantic Fleet to coincide with agreements reached at the Washington Conference.

³⁰ Diplomatic Papers, Far East, 1941, 4:713.

CHAPTER VI

MISSION: MOBILIZATION

In 1940 the federal government ordered the National Guard to active duty for one year. Mobilization orders for the Thirty-sixth Division directed the Texans to report to a new Camp Bowie being built near Brownwood, Texas.

By the summer of 1940, world conditions had become extremely unstable. Japanese forces occupied much of China's territory, and wishing to insure the complete isolation of the Chinese people, Japan insisted that the British close the Burma Road.¹ In Europe, Germany overwhelmed the French defenses and forced France's surrender. Great Britain waited across the English Channel for the expected German invasion and prepared for the Battle of Britain. The Italian Army, meanwhile, finalized plans for the invasion of Egypt.²

¹The Japanese blockaded all of China's coast, and the only Chinese access to the sea was over the Burma Road that ran from Lashio, Burma, to Kunming, China. F. F. Liliu, A Military History of Modern China: 1924-1949 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956), p. 207.

²Winston S. Churchill, Their Finest Hour, The Second World War, 6 vols. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin and Co., 1948), 2:224, 256, 319, 469.

In the United States, the citizens carefully watched world events as the American Congress debated the proposed Selective Service bill. The proposal, also known as the Burke-Wadsworth bill, was discussed throughout the summer, and if it became law would introduce the first peacetime military draft and mobilization in the nation's history. A congressional joint resolution on 27 August 1940 authorized President Franklin D. Roosevelt to mobilize the Organized Reserve Corps and the National Guard. On 14 September 1940 Congress approved the Selective Service bill and sent it to the president, who signed it two days later.³

Since Roosevelt wished to increase the strength of American forces as quickly as possible, he issued orders for the mobilization of several state National Guard units throughout the country. The Texas National Guard was included in the callup.⁴

The problem was that Camp Bowie, near Brownwood, Texas, had not been completed. As early as 12 November over three hundred members of an advance guard had arrived but the

³U. S., Statutes at Large, vol. 54; New York Times, 15 September 1940, 17 September 1940; Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1947), p. 347.

⁴Adjutant-General's Office, order 325, 4 November 1940, M-C-M, Record Group 407, National Archives, Washington, D. C.; Dallas Morning News, 29 November 1940.

facilities remained incomplete because of adverse weather conditions.⁵

The cavalry contingent received orders to report to Fort Bliss, near El Paso, Texas. This post was complete and presented no problem for mobilization of the cavalry. Therefore, cavalry guardsmen held their last regular drill on Sunday 17 November 1940 and reported back to the armory the following morning for activation into federal service. The activation orders had not actually arrived in Texas. Officers told the enlisted men that the order awaited President Roosevelt's signature. When he signed the order, they said, the War Department would notify Eighth Corps Headquarters at Fort Sam Houston, near San Antonio, Texas, of the exact date that would be "M" day or mobilization day. The cavalrymen expected to spend about ten days in their home station prior to movement to Fort Bliss. This time would be spent in physical examinations of the guardsmen by regular army medical officers.⁶

Infantry and artillery units would report on 25 November 1940 and the companies continued to enlist recruits in order to bring the units up to required strength prior to "M" day. Some men joined to stay with their boyhood friends who were being activated. Since America seemed to be moving

⁵Dallas Morning News, 17 November 1940.

⁶Ibid.

closer to involvement in the world conflict, these young men wished to serve with people they knew and trusted.⁷

Some infantry units found themselves over-enlisted and had a surplus as they prepared for mobilization. Moreover, some units received word to cut back on enlistments because of lack of quarters at Camp Bowie. The excess men received transfer to other units.⁸

The weather did not cooperate with the planned mobilization. Rain that had fallen on south Texas for weeks continued. This situation created concern about finishing construction of the camp in time for the arrival of the Thirty-sixth Division. Contractors reported that work was already a week behind schedule and told newsmen that they hoped to have the facilities completed by 2 December 1940. The regular army members already on hand at Camp Bowie numbered about seven hundred.⁹

Major William E. Ryan, Contracting Quartermaster for Camp Bowie, recommended to Major General Richard Donovan, Eighth Corps commander, that the arrival of the Thirty-sixth Division be delayed for ten days. Ryan reported that he

⁷George Burns, personal interview, Oral History Collection, North Texas State University Library, OH 176:2.

⁸General Order no. 37, 21 November 1940, Adjutants-General File, Retained Records Section, Texas Army National Guard Archives, Camp Mabry, Texas.

⁹Dallas Morning News, 24 November 1940.

had studied the camp and could see no possible way to complete the post facilities on schedule. The major pointed out that seasoned troops, accustomed to primitive conditions might not be materially handicapped if sent to the post on schedule. He expressed concern, however, over the hardships the lack of facilities would cause for the inexperienced guardsmen. The regular army officer felt the Texans could be better cared for at their home armories.¹⁰

Accordingly, General Donovan announced to the press on 26 November that the mobilized guardsmen would spend an additional thirteen days at their home armories, and the Thirty-sixth Division now received instructions to report at the new post on 11 December 1940.¹¹

The day following Donovan's announcement, the cavalrymen departed for Fort Bliss by train. On the depot platform newsmen heard guard members discussing being mobilized for the period of one year. "We won't be coming back in a year," they said. "We may be back in five years."¹²

¹⁰Dallas Morning News, 25 November 1940.

¹¹Adjutant General's Office, order 370.5, MC-C-M, 25 November 1940, Record Group 407, National Archives, Washington, D. C.

¹²Dallas Morning News, 27 November 1940. This statement proved prophetic. The division returned to deactivated status on 13 October 1945, almost five years to the day from activation. Department of the Army, The Army Lineage Book, Vol. 2: Infantry (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1953), pp. 408-409.

The Contracting Quartermaster announced that he had requested permission to purchase an additional two thousand acres for the Camp Bowie reservation. This additional acreage, if approved by the War Department, would raise the total acreage of the post to eighty-five thousand acres. The officer also announced that the facilities were approximately 85 percent complete.¹³

Weather still hampered the work and a week later the Army notified the press that despite this "satisfactory progress" was being made on the camp facilities including paving of sixty-eight miles of roads within the boundaries of the military reservation. The Thirty-sixth Division commander, Major General Claude V. Birkhead, arrived to inspect the post and announced that construction neared 90 percent completion.¹⁴

Some units began to report to the post for duty as the rain continued. The weather, however, was only one of the problems faced by the military leaders. Dallas police reported an "almost constant stream of prostitutes from the north bound for Brownwood" were passing through the state.¹⁵

¹³Dallas Morning News, 30 November 1940.

¹⁴Ibid., 8 December 1940.

¹⁵Ibid., 13 December 1940.

Most units, however, remained at their home stations. Members of the 131st Field Artillery Battalion in Plainview, Texas, continued to meet daily at their home armory for two months before being ordered to report to Camp Bowie.¹⁶ Headquarters Battery of the same battalion remained at Decatur for about thirty days before reporting.¹⁷ Battery D, from Wichita Falls, Texas, did not report to the new post until January 1941.¹⁸

The General Staff of the Thirty-sixth Division arrived in Brownwood on 15 December just as the weather turned bitterly cold. Mayor Wendell Mayes and other city dignitaries met the group and the mayor made a brief speech of welcome.¹⁹

When the units finally reported for duty at the new camp, the men found their surroundings to be quite primitive. What served as company streets and sidewalks were actually trails through the mud. The housing consisted of leaky tents.²⁰ The press reported that arriving soldiers received

¹⁶P. J. Smallwood, personal interview, Oral History Collection, North Texas State University Library, OH 166:5-9.

¹⁷Elmer Ray Milner, "The Lost Battalion: Second Battalion, 131st Field Artillery, 1940-1945," unpublished thesis, North Texas State University, 1975, p. 10.

¹⁸Keith Naylor, personal interview, Oral History Collection, North Texas State University Library, OH 72:1-2.

¹⁹Dallas Morning News, 15 December 1940.

²⁰Milner, "The Lost Battalion," p. 10.

galoshes, wool uniforms, hot meals, and heated tents.²¹

Disappointedly, the troops found they would keep their pre-mobilization weapons and equipment which dated from the First World War.²²

As the troops arrived in camp they also received assignment to begin intensive training exercises: "squad training, platoon exercises, company, battalion, regimental, and division exercises."²³ The men noticed that the training took on a new urgency and they "could soon sense the seriousness of the situation."²⁴

In the training exercises, however, everything was simulated. "The enemy was 'supposed' . . . the guns were wooden."²⁵ Often the men failed to realize their equipment was inadequate because they did not know what modern armies used. Many who went overseas in the early days had been issued trainer gas masks, Springfield 1903 rifles, and other obsolete equipment. Some members of the Thirty-sixth

²¹Dallas Morning News, 17 December 1940.

²²Milner, "The Lost Battalion," p. 10.

²³141st Infantry Regiment Association, Clifford Peek, Jr., ed., Five Years, Five Countries, Five Campaigns (Munich, Germany: F. Bruckmann KG, 1945), p. 9.

²⁴George Killian, personal interview, Oral History Collection, North Texas State University Library, OH 56:5.

²⁵Peek, Five Years, p. 10.

Division had no rifles issued them until they were on board ship to go to the Pacific.²⁶

Artillerymen did not fire their guns during practice because of lack of ammunition. The field guns most batteries used were seventy-five millimeter cannon French Model 1897 which had been modernized by replacing the wooden wheels with rubber tires.²⁷

In July 1941 the Thirty-sixth Division participated in the Louisiana Maneuvers, the largest concentration of American troops in one given area since the First World War. In this exercise, the Third Army matched its military skills with the First Army.²⁸ Even on maneuvers, however, the guardsmen used simulated equipment. One unit of the Thirty-sixth Division received assignment to serve as an anti-tank unit, but the men had no anti-tank guns. The Texans removed driveshaft cowlings from an abandoned truck and mounted these on axles with wheels and called their improvised weapon an anti-tank weapon. As umpires and scorers watched, the guardsmen would aim their "gun" at a tank, often an army truck with "tank" printed on the side and yell "bang." The umpires would then decide if the gun had successfully

²⁶P. J. Smallwood, personal interview, Oral History Collection, North Texas State University Library, OH 166:7.

²⁷Milner, "The Lost Battalion," p. 13.

²⁸Peek, Five Years, p. 10.

disabled or destroyed the tank. The militiamen called this type of exercise "broomstick toy soldier training."²⁹

Many men considered the Louisiana Maneuvers, which lasted four months, "more of an endurance test than training."³⁰ The training did serve one purpose; it toughened the former guardsmen for the ordeal that lay ahead. The men saw only "forced marches, dust and heat, mosquito and chigger bites, long dusty columns of trucks, shirts wet and caked with dirt and tired feet. Always tired feet."³¹

In 1940, just as in 1916 and 1917, the federal government relied on the National Guard to furnish the necessary manpower to expand the regular army. Once again, as in previous mobilizations, the guardsmen were regarded as tolerable necessities.

²⁹Milner, "The Lost Battalion," p. 13.

³⁰P. J. Smallwood, personal interview, Oral History Collection, North Texas State University Library, OH 166:9.

³¹Peek, Five Years, p. 10.

CHAPTER VII

WATCHFUL WAITING AGAIN

As the Thirty-sixth Division participated in the military maneuvers in Louisiana, the United States Army reached the same conclusion that it had in 1918: regular army officers should command troops in combat.¹ Consequently, on 13 September 1941, Brigadier General Fred L. Walker received a War Department telegram ordering him to assume command of the Texas Division. Walker, a former guardsman who had become a regular army officer, became apprehensive about the assignment because he knew the close-knit feelings of the reserve units included resentment of outsiders. By taking command and replacing the National Guard division commander, Walker suspected that a great deal of animosity would be directed toward him. However, he accepted the order in good spirit and took his aide-de-camp, Captain Earle G. Wheeler, with him to his new assignment.² Walker's concern proved

¹See Chapter III, p. 7.

²Wheeler later became a full general and ultimately chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

correct in one respect; Brigadier General Claude V. Birkhead, the National Guard commander of the Thirty-sixth Division, bitterly resented being replaced and told Walker that he would not be welcomed by the division. This allegation proved incorrect as most members welcomed improved leadership.³ Most Texas Division members agreed that if this meant retiring National Guard officers and replacing them with experienced regular army officers, the ultimate result of better leadership and lives saved would be worth the sacrifice. Major General George V. Strong, Eighth Corps commander, recommended strongly to Walker that he replace the entire complement of National Guard officers as soon as possible. Walker stalled his superior and decided to keep the competent officers regardless of their background, regular or guard.⁴

By 1 October, the Louisiana maneuvers had ended and the Texans started for their home base of Camp Bowie at Brownwood, Texas. General Walker considered this something of a homecoming as he had reported to Fort Sam Houston, near San Antonio, Texas, as a new second lieutenant thirty

³Fred L. Walker, From Texas to Rome (Dallas: Taylor Publishing Co., 1969), pp. 1-10.

⁴Ibid., pp. 15-17.

years before and had grown to love and respect the state and its people.⁵

On the return trip from Louisiana to Texas some of the Thirty-sixth Division members overdid their celebration and destroyed a farmer's property at a bivouac stop-over.⁶

In November 1941, the Thirty-sixth began the transformation from a square division of four infantry regiments to a triangular division of three infantry regiments. This resulted in the 144th Infantry Regiment being split up among other units and the 131st Field Artillery Battalion being dispatched to the South Pacific.⁷ Simultaneously, the Thirty-sixth Division commander reassigned the officers of the remaining units. This move resulted because of the intimacy that remained between officers and enlisted men that had been carried over from the pre-mobilization days. Walker had been concerned about commanders leading men, with whom they had been reared and in some cases were related, into combat.⁸

⁵Adjutant-General's Office, WD AGO form 616, Record Group 337, National Archives, Washington, D. C.

⁶Clifford H. Peek, Jr., ed., Five Years, Five Countries, Five Campaigns (San Antonio: 141st Infantry Regiment Association, 1945), p. 10.

⁷Adjutant-General's Office, T/O, letter 320.2, 30 January 1942, MR-M-C, Record Group 337, National Archives, Washington, D. C.

⁸Elton E. Geeslin, personal interview, Dallas, Texas, 6 December 1978. This respondent, who finished the war as a major, commanded "D" Company, 143rd Infantry Regiment throughout the conflict after serving several years in the National Guard.

By 9 February 1942, the transformation of the Thirty-sixth Division had been completed and the unit received orders to transfer to Camp Blanding in the northeast section of Florida. This proved to be a massive undertaking since the motor units of the division included over two thousand vehicles of various types. When planning the move, Walker separated the motorized movement into six sections of over three hundred vehicles each. Even with this separation, each column stretched out to about eight miles.⁹

The move began near daybreak on 14 February 1942; rain began to fall as the division pulled out of Camp Bowie. The convoy stopped for the night at Terrell, Texas; rain continued to drench the soldiers. The following morning almost four hundred vehicles became stuck in the black mud of east Texas. Winch trucks tried to free the jammed vehicles without success. Non-commissioned officers tied ropes to the truck bumpers and long rows of men tugged the carriages out onto the paved roadway. The Thirty-sixth Division reached the second bivouac site in Louisiana five hours late but was back on schedule the next morning and reached the third camp area, near Jackson,

⁹Adjutant-General's Office, letter 370.5, MSC-C-M, 8 February 1942, Record Group 337, National Archives, Washington, D. C.

Mississippi, on time. The Texans camped the next two nights at Montgomery, Alabama, and Ponticello, Florida, respectively and arrived at Camp Blanding on 21 February 1942.¹⁰

The War Department transferred men out of the Thirty-sixth Division to other units and assigned raw recruits to the Texas unit for training. On 4 March 1942, the division received over four thousand new soldiers who hailed, for the most part, from the northern part of the United States. Walker assembled the new arrivals a few days later and gave them a brief review of Texas history; he also told the men to adopt the Texas spirit and to learn from the Texans.¹¹

The Thirty-sixth Division commander had hoped that the Texans would be among the first units to go overseas. On 18 April 1942, however, Brigadier General Mark Wayne Clark, chief of staff of the army ground forces, visited the division and advised Walker that he and his troops would be sent to South Carolina for additional maneuvers. The Texas division leader wrote in his journal that "there is some shenanigan going on behind the scenes and it looks

¹⁰Peek, Five Years, pp. 10-11.

¹¹The typescript of the address is in the Adjutants-General file, sub-divided Fred L. Walker, Texas Army National Guard Archives, Camp Mabry, Texas.

like the 36th is being shoved around."¹² Apparently, the division would endure the same fate in World War Two that it had suffered during the first global conflict: remain in the United States until the war had nearly ended.

The Thirty-sixth received its first amphibious training while at Camp Blanding. The men learned new ways to cross streams, to swim loaded with full field equipment, and to engage in field exercises that included the use of live ammunition. Marches increased in length up to twenty-five miles per day with full field packs and rifles.¹³

As the division continued to train and the men gained more and more experience, the War Department transferred many of them to other units. The Thirty-sixth, therefore, frequently received more new recruits; over eleven hundred arrived for assignment to the Texas division on 22 May 1942. Despite this, Walker still hoped to receive an overseas assignment by 1 July.¹⁴

In June Walker attended a demonstration of air-ground liaison and cooperation at Fort Benning, Georgia. Also present were division commanders from all over the United States. While in Georgia, the Texas Division commander learned that Mark Clark had been promoted to major general

¹²Walker, Texas to Rome, p. 72.

¹³Peek, Five Years, p. 12.

¹⁴Walker, Texas to Rome, p. 87.

over Walker, who had seniority. This did not concern the Texan leader as much as the impression Clark had conveyed that the Thirty-sixth Division would not be sent into combat in the near future. Walker questioned the decision and concluded that Clark or somebody else planned to give other units priority over the Texas division.¹⁵

The impression Clark had given to Walker proved correct. By 6 July, the Thirty-sixth Division began another motor march from Camp Blanding to North Carolina for maneuvers. The Texans received extensive training in the rural areas of the eastern state that reached a climax in an exercise on the Pee Dee River. Following this, the Eighth Corps commander told the men of the Thirty-sixth, "this is your last dry run. The next time you will face a real enemy."¹⁶ While in North Carolina, Walker received a note of appreciation from Clark who previously had gone to North Africa.¹⁷ Apparently watchful waiting would be the assignment of the Texans in 1942 just as in 1917.

By 14 August 1942, the maneuvers had ended and the Thirty-sixth Division boarded trains for Camp Edwards, Massachusetts. The movement required forty trains. The

¹⁵Ibid., p. 91.

¹⁶Peek, Five Years, p. 12.

¹⁷Walker, Texas to Rome, pp. 99-101.

Texans now enjoyed occasional weekends in New York, Boston, and Buzzards Bay.¹⁸

The Texas division participated in landing exercises at Martha's Vineyard, an island off the Massachusetts coast. The men marched all night and then boarded boats on the shore for the assault. After the landing, the Texas soldiers went forward in combat formation through unfamiliar terrain. General Walker reflected on what significance the training would have for the division in the future.¹⁹

In October the Texas division commander learned that selected members of the unit had been assigned to travel to New Hampshire to receive mountain training and to attend schools to learn the Norwegian language. This action proved to be a deception designed to convince German agents that the Texans had been selected to invade the Scandinavian country. The enlisted men passed around rumors about an impending assignment to the South Pacific.²⁰

The Texans who remained in Massachusetts found the weather much colder than they had experienced in their home state. The winds were no more brisk but the intense cold

¹⁸Adjutant-General's Office, letter AGF 370.5/4, GNGCT, 10 August 1942, Record Group 337, National Archives, Washington, D. C.

¹⁹Walker, Texas to Rome, p. 116.

²⁰Walker, Texas to Rome, pp. 118-119; Elton E. Geeslin, personal interview, Dallas, Texas, 10 December 1978; William Jary, personal interview, Fort Worth, Texas, 2 December 1978. Jary is a former member of the Thirty-sixth Division, intelligence section and author of a book on old Camp Bowie.

prevented the men from being able to function as well as the army expected. Even the division commander noted in his diary that the Texans were not going to get much training accomplished in such severe weather.²¹

Time passed and the Texas division remained at Camp Edwards. Other divisions, some of which had been mobilized subsequent to the Thirty-sixth, received overseas orders and shipped out. The Texans continued to train and await further instructions; many now began to believe the division would endure the same fate it had in the earlier conflict. General Walker anxiously considered the problem and entered the question in his journal: "I wonder if we are ever going overseas?"²²

The Thirty-sixth Division remained at Camp Edwards and continued to train up through December 1942 and into January 1943. The men, however, began to show signs of restlessness. Two Texans on leave checked into a Boston hotel and promptly had a fight. Officers became concerned about the morale of the division when one of the troopers engaged in a fight and cut another man's ear off.²³

²¹Walker, Texas to Rome, p. 125.

²²Ibid., p. 133.

²³Elton E. Geeslin, personal interview, Dallas, Texas, 10 December 1978; Ibid., p. 142.

On 17 January 1943, Walker received notification that the Thirty-sixth Division's departure for overseas had been postponed for a fifth time. The Texas commander again expressed concern for his troop's morale as the continued training and marching seemed only to frustrate the men further.²⁴

In February Walker received a message from the War Department stating that plans to ship the division overseas had been postponed again. The verbal message alerted Walker to the possibility of a movement to another post within the United States. Walker placed little confidence in the announcement of a move; the latest warning was the sixth alert the Texas commander had received and noted in his journal: "We may never move from here."²⁵

Within two weeks, however, the latest report proved to be correct. On 19 February 1943, the Thirty-sixth Division moved to Camp A. P. Hill, Virginia. Elements of the unit were detached for special assignment. The 142nd Regimental Combat Team travelled to Lomesville, Virginia, for additional instruction. The War Department soon aborted the movement and caught some elements still in Massachusetts, while others had arrived in various sections of Virginia. Within a week, Walker, who could get no firm

²⁴Walker, Texas to Rome, pp. 150-151.

²⁵Ibid.

nor reliable information from Washington, D. C., on the telephone, drove to the capital to call on War Department leaders personally.²⁶ He hoped to determine what the army planned to do with his Texans. No official could give the division commander any definite information. One general told Walker privately that the movement had been stopped because the Thirty-sixth Division might be sent overseas in the near future. What Walker feared most apparently would not happen. The Thirty-sixth Division seemingly would not spend the Second World War in the United States. Corroboration of the assignment arrived on 3 March 1943 when Walker got a call to prepare for overseas assignment. The following day the Texas commander flew on army transport to New York City to prepare for his division to pass through the port of New York.²⁷

Some members of the division who had previously travelled to North Africa on secret missions returned to their outfits with firsthand information about the war.²⁸ This knowledge proved beneficial in preparing the Texans for what lay ahead.

²⁶Adjutant-General's Office, letter AGF 390.4, GNGCT, 18 February 1943, Record Group 337, National Archives, Washington, D. C.; Walker, Texas to Rome, p. 118.

²⁷Walker, Texas to Rome, pp. 153-158.

²⁸Peek, Five Years, p. 12.

As the division prepared to move from their old posts to the port of embarkation, Walker noted that seventy-five members of the Thirty-sixth Division had deserted. With a certain amount of Texas pride, the division commander entered a note in his journal that "all these deserters came to us as replacements from states other than Texas. Thank God patriotism, a sense of loyalty, and a devotion to duty are still considered virtues in that state."²⁹

The Texans continued their preparations for overseas shipment by disposing of accumulated items now considered unnecessary, then boarded trains and headed for New York.³⁰ The division trains began arriving at the piers at 0630 hours on 1 April 1943. The troops immediately began to detrain and port authorities assembled the division and assigned the men to their designated ships. The last train arrived at 2200 hours carrying the 143rd Infantry Regiment and by midnight all the Thirty-sixth Division troops were aboard ship.³¹

The division vessels consisting of United States Army transports Brazil, Argentina, Gibbons, Barry, and Hawaiian Shipper sailed out of New York harbor on the morning of 2 April 1943 and joined their convoy of fifteen other ships

²⁹Walker, Texas to Rome, p. 177.

³⁰Elton E. Geeslin, personal interview, Dallas, Texas, 6 December 1978.

³¹Walker, Texas to Rome, p. 181.

plus the escorts of battleships and destroyers. The Thirty-sixth Division was finally on the way to the war! Twenty-five years before, the first units of the same division had sailed out of the same harbor enroute to the earlier war.³² The men had to adapt to small compartments, seasickness, and only two meals per day. They amused themselves by playing poker, dice, and chess. Some Texans kept close watch on another ship in the convoy that, according to rumor, carried female soldiers of the Women's Army Corps.³³

By 12 April, the Texans had spotted lights from Tangiers on their right and additional lights from the Spanish coast on their left. The following day the Thirty-sixth Division arrived at Oran, French Morocco and debarked about 1800 hours.³⁴ The Texas division again left behind personal items on the ship when they boarded trucks and headed for a staging area near Assi-ben-Okba.³⁵ Within a week the division boarded the "40-and-8" railway cars for the ride to its new post near Magenta, located about eighty miles south of Oran. Because of the inadequacy of the French railroad, the Thirty-sixth Division could not all

³²Adjutant-General's Office, Recapitulation Sheet, 2 April 1943 (a), Shipment 1090-B, WD AGO Form 616, Record Group 337, National Archives, Washington, D. C.; Peek, Five Years, p. 12.

³³Peek, Five Years, p. 12.

³⁴Walker, Texas to Rome, p. 188.

³⁵Peek, Five Years, p. 13.

board at one time. In fact, five days of shuttling service were required before all the troops arrived at the new post.³⁶

Walker had feared the Thirty-sixth Division would be placed under the command of George S. Patton, the volatile general who had been in North Africa almost from the first American invasion. By early May, however, Clark told the Texas commander that the division would become part of his Fifth Army and that he had asked General Eisenhower specifically for the Texans.³⁷

Some members of the 141st and 142nd Infantry Regiments transferred to help in the battles still being fought in Tunisia against the German Afrika Korps. Later, elements of the division moved to Arzew, Algeria, for additional amphibious training. The Texans learned that Arzew was famous as the home of the "dancing girls." The men discovered later that the girls no longer lived there.³⁸

On 16 May 1943, the Thirty-sixth Division began another movement by rail and truck to the Marmora cork forest located six miles east of Rabat.³⁹ The following month, a significant portion of the division received assignment to guard and haul prisoners-of-war and their rations from Casablanca

³⁶Walker, Texas to Rome, p. 189; Ibid.

³⁷Walker, Texas to Rome, p. 196.

³⁸Peek, Five Years, p. 14.

³⁹Walker, Texas to Rome, p. 197.

to Mateur, Tunisia. This assignment occupied over three hundred of the group's vehicles and large number of the troops. Walker noted in his journal that "all this immobilizes the 36th Division."⁴⁰

By 26 July, the 141st Infantry Regimental Combat Team departed to join the 143rd for amphibious training. This transfer left little of the Texas division in the camp and Walker felt that "there is something in the wind."⁴¹

The Texans ran "Operation Cowpuncher" in August, which was the last dry run prior to the assault on Italy.⁴² At last, almost three years after mobilization, the Thirty-sixth Division began preparing for the Italian invasion. In the First World War the Texas division entered the battle areas just weeks before the armistice. This time, the men said, things would be different; the Texans would lead the first large scale invasion of Europe.

The division personnel waterproofed their vehicles, gathered their equipment and weapons, and prepared to leave North Africa. About noon on 5 September 1943, the convoy of the Thirty-sixth Division, including attached specialists, began to pull out of the Oran harbor. By 1700 hours, the ships, U.S.S. Carroll, U.S.S. Jefferson, U.S.S. O'Hara,

⁴⁰Peek, Five Years, p. 14; Ibid., p. 204.

⁴¹Walker, Texas to Rome, p. 215.

⁴²Peek, Five Years, p. 14.

U.S.S. Arturus, H.M.S. Thruster, and H.M.S. Orontes, were in the Mediterranean Sea steaming for Bizerte where the balance of the convoy joined them.⁴³

When the transports had cleared the harbor, officers produced orders and maps; each man now received his personal assignment. The division was to begin landing on Salerno beaches south of Naples near Paestum on 9 September 1943. The troops studied the maps and photographs. The final briefing occurred on the morning of 8 September. Most of the men attended church services, then slept on the deck or cleaned their weapons. In the afternoon the ships' loud speakers announced the surrender of Italy to the Allied Forces. The Texans began to relax. Then the speakers began again and warned the soldiers that large numbers of Germans were present in Italy and probably waiting in Paestum. The announcers closed their message with "there is no change in orders. Go in shooting."⁴⁴

⁴³ Peek, Five Years, pp. 14-15; Walker, Texas to Rome, p. 228.

⁴⁴ Peek, Five Years, p. 15; Elton E. Geeslin, personal interview, Dallas, Texas, 10 December 1978.

CHAPTER VIII

A DIVIDED DIVISION

In less than a year following mobilization of the Texas National Guard, the federal government separated the Second Battalion, 131st Field Artillery Regiment, from the Thirty-sixth Division and ordered the unit to the Philippines, which meant that division members became among the first American soldiers to be sent overseas in World War Two. The battalion had reached a point west of Hawaii when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor and the War Department ordered the convoy, of which the battalion was a part, to return. President Franklin D. Roosevelt countermanded the order and instructed the convoy to proceed. The Texans eventually landed in Java, one of the islands in the Dutch East Indies, just as the Japanese began their invasion of the Netherlands colony. On Java, the unit earned the title "Lost Battalion."¹

Soon after returning from Louisiana, General Fred Walker alerted the Second Battalion, 131st Field Artillery

¹Dallas Morning News, 5 March 1942. This was the first time the battalion had been called by this name.

for assignment and offered older guardsmen in the battalion an opportunity to transfer to another unit.²

On the evening of 10 November 1941, the Second Battalion boarded two trains at Camp Bowie. One train left that night; the second departed the next day. Unit officers advised the men that their destination was the Philippine Islands.³

The battalion detrained at Fort McDowell, Angel Island, San Francisco, California. The troops, processed and inoculated for overseas travel, left for a short tour of the city. While on leave in San Francisco, Lawrence Brown and a friend met a veteran soldier who told them ". . . where you guys are going, I'm glad I'm not there anymore."⁴

On 21 November 1941, the battalion boarded the United States Army transport Republic at Pier Fifty-seven.⁵ When

³J. B. Heinen, Jr., a Dallas resident, a graduate of the Agricultural and Mechanical College of Texas and a commissioned officer in the Texas National Guard, personal interview, Oral History Collection, North Texas State University Library, OH 174:4; Frank Fujita, personal interview, Oral History Collection, North Texas State University Library, OH 59:4-9.

⁴Lawrence Brown, personal interview, Oral History Collection, North Texas State University Library, OH 178:10; Frank Fujita, personal interview, Oral History Collection, North Texas State University Library, OH 59:4-9; Keith Naylor, personal interview, Oral History Collection, North Texas State University Library, OH 72:4-9.

⁵Alfred Brown, personal interview, Oral History Collection, North Texas State University Library, OH 188:16-20; P. J. Smallwood, personal interview, Oral History Collection, North Texas State University Library, OH 166:12.

the ship steamed out of San Francisco Bay, it joined the Pensacola Convoy, so named because the U.S.S. Pensacola, a cruiser, accompanied the vessels.⁶

While the Republic joined the convoy, the Texans became seasick. Frank Fujita noticed that ". . . everybody, including the captain of the ship, became seasick." Alfred Brown, a rural young man whose experience with a large body of water had been rather limited in North Texas, watched the ground swells just outside San Francisco and compared them to small hills. He expressed amazement that the approximately six-hundred-foot long Republic was being tossed about by the waves. Presently, Brown went below deck to the galley for supper and saw troops regurgitating in all areas of the ship. As Brown passed through the "chow line," he discovered another reason for the men's sickness; the cooks were serving sauerkraut and weiners. Brown looked at the food on his tray and wondered how he possibly could eat it. He sat down and slowly and carefully ate every bite. Then he went up on a gun turret, allowed the wind to blow into his face, and watched the movie

⁶Since the departures of military vessels were not announced in the press, it was necessary to rely on official army historians for facts involving the Pensacola Convoy. The Fall of the Philippines cites a radio message dated 12 December 1941, from General George C. Marshall to General Douglas MacArthur, to point out that the seven vessels in the convoy were the United States Army transports Holbrook, Republic, Meigs, Bloemfontein, Admiral Halstead, Farmer, and Claumont. Aside from the Second Battalion, the convoy carried a field artillery brigade, ground crews for the Seventh

Waterloo Bridge being shown on a lower level of the deck. Brown managed to retain the food and never experienced seasickness.⁷

Keith Naylor suffered nausea the first night because of the San Francisco ground swells and the evening meal, but he recuperated the next day. Lawrence Brown was not so fortunate. A navy boatswain told Brown to get in the middle of the ship where the pitch and roll were less severe. Brown looked, but ". . . never did find the middle of that darn ship."⁸

The Republic docked at Honolulu on 28 November and stayed two days. The troops went into the city on four-hour passes; half the battalion went ashore in the morning and half from four in the afternoon until ten in the evening. Many persons on shore leave noticed armed soldiers on alert. Uell Carter, an Amarillo used car salesman who enlisted to enjoy the beer socials once a month, paid meetings, and a

Bombardment Group, seventy crated aircraft, 500,000 rounds of .50 caliber ammunition, five thousand bombs, and miscellaneous equipment. Louis Morton, The Fall of the Philippines, 7 vols. in sub-series, War in the Pacific, United States Army in World War Two (Washington: Department of the Army, 1953), 4:146.

⁷Frank Fujita, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 59:4-9; Alfred Brown, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 188:12-14.

⁸Keith Naylor, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 72:4-9; Lawrence Brown, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 178:11.

two-week encampment each summer, saw armed troops on the docks and on tops of buildings. To his inexperienced eyes " . . . they looked like they were ready for an attack." B. D. Fillmore, a Jacksboro resident, like so many of his friends had joined for the two-week summer encampment. As he went ashore he too wondered about the security display when he saw " . . . a machine gun set up on one of the squares with sand bags around it." C. A. Cates, a Decatur commissioned officer, had graduated from the Agricultural and Mechanical College of Texas with a commission as a second lieutenant. He had regarded membership in the National Guard seriously and tried to convince the enlisted men of the gravity of the world situation and their roles in it. Consequently, when he noted several barbed wire entanglements, a large number of military police, and mounted machine guns at busy intersections, he was more impressed than the enlisted men. When George Lawley from Lubbock, who enlisted because he felt it was "the patriotic thing to do," went into Honolulu, he also observed large numbers of military police on duty. P. J. Smallwood went ashore with the second group from four o'clock until ten o'clock in the evening. As Smallwood returned to the Republic, he saw machine gun nests and soldiers racing around in jeeps. Smallwood surmised that the city " . . . was very definitely under

martial law." While ashore, Keith Naylor passed the railroad depot and noticed that the station, railroad tracks, and water supply facilities were under armed military guard.⁹

The Republic received fuel, fresh water, and fresh vegetables during the men's tour of the city. Later, with the troops back on board and the loading of supplies complete the Republic steamed out of the harbor to rejoin the convoy. The crew recognized an addition to the convoy, the subchaser U.S.S. Niagara. Alfred Brown heard that this ship was a converted yacht donated to the navy by the eminent Dodge family. Soon out of Honolulu, some members of the battalion manned their respective battle stations while others scrubbed down decks and stood watches. In addition, the troops exercised every day as part of their physical training.¹⁰

Two days after the Republic's departure from Hawaii, on 2 December, the navy placed the ship on alert. Uell Carter especially regretted the alert because several new movies were scheduled to be shown on deck after dark; after the navy's directive, the troops could not even strike a match

⁹Uell Carter, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 56:7-10; B. D. Fillmore, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 162:7-9; C. A. Cates, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 185:9-12; George Lawley, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 164:10; P. J. Smallwood, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 166:12; Keith Naylor, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 72:4-9.

¹⁰Frank Fujita, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 59:4-9; P. J. Smallwood, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 166:15-18; B. D. Fillmore, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 162:7-9; Alfred Brown, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 188:12-14.

on deck after sundown. In spite of the alert, the Republic still flew the American flag from the mast, and flags were displayed on both sides of the ship. One night, a few days out of Honolulu, the watch saw a great many ships passing in the darkness, headed in the direction of Hawaii. The watch reported the sighting and signalled the ships in international code; the ships did not reply. Cates was on deck at the time and personally spotted several ships.¹¹

On 7 December, the ship commander called all the troops to their battle stations and advised them that the Japanese had bombed Pearl harbor. Cates recalled spotting the mysterious fleet a few nights earlier that did not answer the American ship's signal. In view of the position of the two convoys at that particular time, Cates believed that he had witnessed the Japanese fleet enroute to Hawaii to launch the surprise attack.¹²

Sitting on the deck playing poker with some friends, Smallwood heard the announcement of the infamous attack. Shortly thereafter, he and his friends were ordered to begin chipping paint off the deck and others started painting

¹¹Uell Carter, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 56:7-10; Glenn Pace, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 134:6-12; C. A. Cates, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 185:9-12.

¹²Frank Fujita, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 59:4-9; C. A. Cates, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 185:9-12.

the ship battleship gray. As the paint detail worked, the ship's crew opened cases of machine guns and began to mount them on the rails.¹³

Glenn Pace and some of his friends painted over the American flags decorating the sides of the ship. Pace thought to himself as he worked, "Well, I'll never make it home." His more optimistic friends attempted to encourage him. George Messer from Port Arthur said, "Glenn, don't worry. They don't have a bullet over there with your name on it." An acquaintance from Denison, Texas, told Pace, "We'll knock those Japanese out in no time. They can't see ten feet in front of them." Horace Chumley, who had joined the guard to get technical training, discussed the war with his companions and they all wondered if they would ever return to Texas. Several of the men in Alfred Brown's group stated that America and her allies would defeat the Japanese in two weeks. Brown disagreed and said, "No, its going to be a long, hard one war."¹⁴

Later that day, some of the men, referring to Frank Fujita, asked if there was a Japanese on board. Fujita

¹³P. J. Smallwood, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 166:15-18.

¹⁴Alfred Brown, Personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 188:16-20; Horace Chumley, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 199:8-9; Glenn Pace, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 134:6-12.

felt he should answer the charge himself. He told the group of men that there was no Japanese on board; to his knowledge there were only Americans on the Republic. He conceded that there was one sergeant on board who was half Japanese by ethnic descent, if that information was significant. The men understood and said nothing more.¹⁵

Jack Moss did not have time to worry about the war or Japanese on board ship. As part of a gun crew, he brought the artillery pieces from the hold onto the deck for additional fire power. Because of the movement of the ship and the inexperienced troops, the project required almost three days. Robert Gregg and some of his friends supplemented the navy gun crew. At a later date, the navy tried to arrange for the artillerymen's permanent transfer to the Republic, but the army would not permit the change.¹⁶

The Pensacola convoy, still proceeding toward the Philippine Islands, now under Japanese attack, received a naval message ordering the convoy to Suva in the Fuji

¹⁵Frank Fujita, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 59:4-9.

¹⁶Robert Gregg, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 69:3-6; Jack Moss, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 45:4-5.

Islands.¹⁷ Keith Naylor, on deck when the Republic reached Suva, recalls that the convoy remained in port only a few hours before steaming out to sea again. This brief visit is corroborated by Frank Fujita, who noticed that the men were not allowed to go ashore, but the ship " . . . just took on fresh fruit and water and left immediately."¹⁸

¹⁷On this point, the official United States Army historians differ. One volume of the series, The United States Army in World War Two, Global Logistics and Strategy 1940-1943, cites 8 December as the date that the Joint Board (early version of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) followed the navy's suggestion and ordered the convoy back to Hawaii; Roosevelt recalled this order on 9 December. A subsequent volume in the series, The Fall of the Philippines, states that the decision of the Joint Board to order the convoy back was not made until 9 December and withdrawn the following day at the president's request. The latter work is probably correct since the sources cited are the minutes of the board for 9 December and minutes of the Army Chief of Staff meetings of 10 December 1941. Richard M. Leighton and Robert W. Coakley, Global Logistics and Strategy, 1940-1943, 4 vols. of sub-series, The War Department, United States Army in World War Two (Washington: Department of the Army, 1955), 4:149; Louis Morton, The Fall of the Philippines, 4 vols. of sub-series, War in the Pacific, United States Army in World War Two (Washington: Department of the Army, 1953), 1:145-146.

¹⁸Morton in Fall of the Philippines disputes the short stay in Suva and states that the navy ordered the convoy to the island on 9 December, and gave no additional instructions until 12 December, when it advised the convoy to proceed to the ultimate destination, Brisbane, Australia. On explanation of this inconsistency is that the convoy in fact did leave Suva soon after arriving to return to Hawaii. This is substantiated by Global Logistics and Strategy, which states that the navy ordered the convoy back to Hawaii on 8 December and changed the orders one day later. If this is the case, the convoy would have travelled in a circle. Uell Carter calculated that the vessels did sail in a circle because each night as he went on deck he noticed that the ship's bow pointed in a different direction. Leighton and Coakley, Global Logistics and Strategy, 4:149; Morton, Fall of the Philippines, 1:146; Uell Carter, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 56:7.

Nevertheless, the navy ordered the convoy to sail to Brisbane, Australia. As they neared their destination, war ships bristling with guns and camouflaged with war paint raced toward the convoy. The men of the battalion did not know if the approaching vessels were friend or foe. P. J. Smallwood and his friends fearfully watched the oncoming ships and realized for the first time the full significance of the war. Fortunately, the ships were friendly.¹⁹

When the convoy reached Brisbane on 22 December 1941, it met almost insurmountable difficulties. J. B. Heinen saw that the Republic's captain had " . . . one helluva time getting into Brisbane because the harbor wasn't deep enough." Finally, the vessel docked satisfactorily, and the battalion landed in Australia. Since the men of the Pensacola convoy were the first American soldiers to land in Australia, the officers felt that marching the troops from the ship to their bivouac area, the Ascot Race Track, would boost the Australians' morale. The shortest distance from the ship to the race track approximated one mile, but the route of the march went up one street and down another to impress the native population. The bands played, flags waved in the breeze, and the troops began to march. Smallwood heard the cheering as he walked. Occasionally, an Australian shouted, "Oh, the

¹⁹P. J. Smallwood, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 166:15-18.

Yanks have come to save us." Smallwood viewed this confidence as ironical because each American's equipment consisted of a trainer gas mask, a 1903 rifle with only four rounds of ammunition, a pair of old canvas leggins, and a British-type World War One helmet. Smallwood thought the Americans were quite comical looking.²⁰

All the troops did not participate in the parade; some of them busily unloaded the equipment from the Republic. As soon as the men had removed all the vehicles and gear from the ship, it departed for the United States.²¹ The Americans stored their equipment in an assigned warehouse. While moving the battalion gear into storage, one of the men discovered that a partition separating the American storage area and the adjoining warehouse did not extend to the ceiling. Upon investigation, they learned that the Tiger Beer Company of Malaya leased the other side of the building. Carter and his friends discovered that they could easily slip over the divider and sample the Tiger Beer. The personnel found that they could not complete the equipment's transfer into the warehouse because someone had left the battalion truck's keys in San Francisco.²²

²⁰J. B. Heinen, Jr., personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 174:22-24.

²¹Ibid.

²²Uell Carter, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 56:10-14.

Meanwhile, the troops that marched to the Ascot Race Track discovered some interesting things about their hosts. First, the Americans learned that when teatime arrived the Australians stopped all activity, regardless. Glenn Pace, setting up camp at Ascot, solicited help from some of the Australians to hold the ropes until the Americans could stake the guy ropes. A cook rang the bell for tea, and the Australians released the ropes and left, causing the tents to collapse on the Americans. Next, the newly arrived men found that Australians preferred mutton to beef. The Americans loved the local people but everyone agreed with George Burns' statement, " . . . We couldn't hardly go that lamb."²³

Except for the Australians' choice of meat and their devotion to teatime, the Americans liked the country and its people. When Fillmore went into Brisbane, he found that the Americans did not need money. The native population insisted on feeding the visitors and buying their beer. As W. L. Starnes walked down a street in Brisbane, some Australians stopped him and invited him into their home for a visit. On one occasion, Americans ordered meals in a restaurant, only to find that the Australians had paid the bill.²⁴

²³Glenn Pace, personal inte-view, Oral History Collection, OH 56:10-14.

²⁴B. D. Fillmore, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 162:10; W. L. Starnes, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 186:16-17; Horace Chumley, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 199: 12-14.

Everyone was not so cordial to the Americans. One Australian told Glenn Pace, "We don't need you Yanks over here. We just need your weapons." Pace told him, "I didn't ask to come over here, and if there's any way that you can get me home, you can have every bullet I've got."²⁵

The battalion spent Christmas in Brisbane, and most of the men visited Australian homes for the holiday meal of mutton. Three days later the Second Battalion returned to the dock and boarded one of the ships that has also been in the Pensacola convoy, the Bloemfontein. After the loading operations had been completed, the battalion commander instructed the unit to go ashore. As the men began to leave the ship, still further orders arrived advising them to return to the vessel. The second loading was final, and the men remained on board. While the troops waited on the Bloemfontein, Australian taxi drivers drove up alongside the ship and conducted a brisk business trading whiskey for American watches and money. The troops acquired a large supply of whiskey and began to celebrate. The army then ordered the battalion to proceed to Java to provide ground forces for the Nineteenth Bomb Group from Clark Field in the Philippines. The battalion commander desired to apprise the men of the new orders, and an officer instructed the soldiers to "fall in."

²⁵ Glenn Pace, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 176:13.

Carter noticed that the whiskey bartered to the troops was almost consumed, and when the battalion commander ordered the men to meet formation, " . . . very few were able to fall in. They just fell out." Colonel Blucher S. Tharp, the battalion commander, became angry. He told the troops, still sober enough to understand, that the unit was going to Java to help the air corps.²⁶

The Bloemfontein cast off on the night of 28 December 1941, and slowly sailed out of Brisbane harbor. Smallwood was somewhat apprehensive about the Bloemfontein since the vessel had followed the Republic across the Pacific with a large line running from one vessel to the other. Consequently, Smallwood considered the ship to be a slow steamer, and possibly to have weak engines. When the Bloemfontein cleared the mouth of the river down from Brisbane harbor, however, " . . . all hell broke loose . . . the stern went into the water and this ship was really a runner." Smallwood blissfully watched the ship achieve a speed of eighteen to twenty knots in a short time.²⁷

The battalion travelled up the eastern coast of Australia around the Great Barrier Reef to the Gulf of Carpentaria. Frank Fujita, standing guard on deck, observed

²⁶Lawrence Brown, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 178:18; C. A. Cates, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 185:14-15; Uell Carter, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 56:10-14.

²⁷P. J. Smallwood, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 166:21.

that " . . . everybody started going beserk again on ship." A large group of vessels had been spotted ahead of the Bloemfontein. The Americans ascertained from the approaching vessels' signals that the ships were friendly, and the Bloemfontein proceeded on to Port Darwin on the northern coast of Australia. The battalion remained on board at Port Darwin, and within a few hours the Bloemfontein hoisted anchor and headed northwestward to Java.²⁸

A few days after leaving Port Darwin, a sailor advised Alfred Brown and his companions that Japanese submarines had attacked and possibly sunk an Allied ship only forty miles ahead. Following this conversation, Brown and his friends remained on deck with their life preservers on.²⁹

While on watch several nights, Fujita noticed the beauty of the area as the ship passed through the Lombok Strait between Bali and Java. One day out of Surabaya, Java, the convoy commander placed the ship on alert because a Japanese submarine was following the convoy. Suddenly, an enemy torpedo struck the tanker S.S. Liberty directly in front of the Bloemfontein.³⁰ Smallwood and his associated were shooting dice on deck when they heard the general quarters alarm. Though scared, Samllwood enjoyed watching

²⁸Ibid.

²⁹Alfred Brown, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 188:21.

³⁰Frank Fujita, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 59:10-14.

the action by the United States Navy. "The cruisers moved back and the tin cans /destroyers/ came in. They were really hitting at everything. We had a torpedo off the bow and one off the stern. But no one got hit but the submarines."³¹ The following day, 11 January 1942, the Japanese invaded Borneo, largest island of the Dutch East Indies, and the Second Battalion landed at Surabaya.³²

For years the regular military establishment had ignored the National Guard except when directed by Congress to work with the reserve force. However, when the regular troops in the Philippine Islands required reinforcements, the group selected to supplant the professional were not regular soldiers, though several regular units remained in the continental United States. Instead, the War Department turned once again to the organization it earlier had tried to destroy: the National Guard. Moreover, the authorities took the singular approach of dividing an infantry division and ordering the separated unit, the 131st Field Artillery Regiment, Second Battalion, to the area most vulnerable to attack.

When the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor and the Philippine Islands within six weeks of the artillerymen leaving Texas, the Navy Department ordered the convoy to return to

³¹Smallwood stated later that he was unaware of the sinking of the S. S. Liberty. P. J. Smallwood, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 166:25.

³²Ibid.

Hawaii; President Roosevelt countermanded this order and sent the American troops westward to defend an area declared dispensible in military conferences throughout 1940 and 1941. This presidential determination to send Americans into an expendable area of a theater already determined to be of secondary importance resulted in the Texas National Guardsmen being committed to a fruitless misuse of their military services and placing their lives in unnecessary jeopardy.

CHAPTER IX

LOST BATTALION: MILITARY UNIT, POLITICAL PAWN

On Monday following the Pearl Harbor attack, President Roosevelt addressed a joint session of Congress requesting a declaration of war. Later that day, Roosevelt telegraphed the congressional assent to Prime Minister Winston Churchill and added, "Today, all of us are in the same boat with you and the people of the Empire and it is a ship that will not and cannot be sunk." Churchill answered Roosevelt on 9 December 1941 by proposing a conference to discuss the "whole war plan in the light of reality and new facts."¹

After receiving the president's approval, Churchill sailed for America on the battleship H.M.S. Duke of York. The prime minister received press reports and official communiques that indicated an enraged American nation would be devoted entirely to Japanese destruction. Churchill feared American preoccupation with Japan, in which case Great Britain would be forced to fight Germany and Italy alone. The British leader and his staff hoped that they could convince Roosevelt and his advisors that the Japanese defeat

¹Conferences at Washington, 1941-1942 and Casablanca, 1943, Foreign Relations of the United States (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1968), p. 210.

would not cause the collapse of Hitler, but destruction of Hitler would mean the annihilation of the Japanese war effort.²

As the British prime minister's ship steamed across the Atlantic, General George C. Marshall ordered Brigadier General Dwight D. Eisenhower to Washington. On the morning of 14 December 1941, Marshall outlined the situation. The Japanese attack, he explained, impaired American naval expectations and it would be months before they could participate in large operations. In addition, the reinforcement of weakened Hawaiian forces should take priority in the Pacific. Marshall finished his critique by stating what everyone must have known--the Philippine Islands faced disaster. The commanding general wanted Eisenhower's recommendation for action. After studying the situation, Eisenhower advised Marshall to give all possible help to the Philippines and the Dutch East Indies, but suggested the main effort be toward saving Australia as a base from which to operate. Marshall agreed with this assessment.³

One week later, the British delegation arrived in the United States for the Washington conference that had the code name Arcadia. From 22 December 1941 to 14 January 1942,

²Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War: The Grand Alliance (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Co., 1948), 3:641-643.

³Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1948), pp. 14-22.

these leaders of the free world discussed their formal objectives. They formed a Combined Chiefs of Staff and issued a joint memorandum outlining the destruction of Nazi Germany as the major objective. An entry in a subsequent section of the message indicated a secondary role for the Allied war program in the South Pacific. The Combined Chiefs of Staff agreed that only the necessary force required for the safety of prime interests in other areas should be taken from the attack against Germany.⁴

The Dutch began a publicity campaign during the Washington conference designed to sway American public opinion to their save-the-Indies viewpoint. On 3 January 1942, the Netherlands government in Batavia praised General Douglas MacArthur's stand in the Philippine Islands, reiterated the necessity of defending the Indies, and pressed hard for their South Pacific islands. The Dutch stressed that if the colony fell, Japanese forces would be released to operate elsewhere, possibly on the west coast of the United States. The colonial government declared that the outcome of the war depended upon saving the Dutch East Indies.⁵

The Dutch announced two days later that Major General George Brett and Admiral Thomas Hart, both of the American military establishment, had assumed roles as deputy

⁴Conferences at Washington, 1941-1942, p. 210.

⁵New York Times, 4 January 1942.

commanders in the Far Eastern unified command, and that United States air and naval reinforcements would be forthcoming.⁶

On 11 January, Shiela Graham, noted American columnist, joined the campaign and led an article on the Indies with the statement: "The Netherlands are good payers as well as fine fighters." Graham pointed out that the Dutch paid 100 percent in cash for all war materials they received from America. A New York Times feature writer, Hanson Baldwin, soon joined the campaign with two articles insisting on reinforcements for the Dutch.⁷

On the following day in New York, Colonial Lieutenant Governor H. J. Van Mook reemphasized that sufficient American reinforcements could hold the Indies. Van Mook presently went to Washington and conferred with President Roosevelt. Upon emerging from the White House, the Netherlander told reporters that he had been given much encouragement regarding attempts to strengthen the defense forces in the South Pacific.⁸

Meanwhile, the Japanese, after heavy aerial bombardment, invaded Borneo, the largest island of the Dutch East Indies; on the same day the Second Battalion, 131st Field Artillery landed on the main island of Java. The Bloemfontein docked

⁶Ibid., 6 January 1942.

⁷Ibid., 11 January 1942.

⁸Ibid., 19 January 1942; 20 January 1942; 21 January 1942.

at Surabaya, Java, on the afternoon of 11 January 1942. The decorated sampans and barges impressed the Second Battalion men. The United States Navy destroyers remained at anchor next to the Bloemfontein, which eased the anxieties of the American soldiers. When the troops left the ship, Lawrence Brown thought to himself, "Oh, my Lord! What have we run into here? Can't talk their native language, can't understand them." Uell Carter, however, was fascinated. He considered Surabaya picturesque. Street cars ran down the center of the wide boulevards which were " . . . lovely, scenic green gardens with flowers."⁹

An officer assigned P. J. Smallwood and Horace Chumley to the crew unloading supplies from the ship. The men had understood that the cargo on the Bloemfontein was ammunition, but while unloading the cargo, they discovered that canned milk filled the ship's holds. Chumley's section completed its task late the following night. Shortly thereafter, the Dutch officers accompanied the men into Surabaya to an exclusive hotel for dinner. The array of silverware on each side of the plates overwhelmed the Texans. One of the men gathered up the excess flatware while another held a

⁹Uell Carter, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 56:14; Lawrence Brown, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 178:21; P. J. Smallwood, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 166:26; Frank Fujita, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 59:15.

linen table cloth as the silver dropped in. This behavior shocked the Dutch officials and waiters.¹⁰

While the dock detail had been unloading the ship, the balance of the battalion boarded a narrow gauge railroad car and travelled several hours to Malang, a community in the mountains. Dutch school buses waited for the men of the Second Battalion as they detrained. The Texans boarded the buses for Singosari Airfield, approximately seven miles away. The men arrived late on the night of 11 January and welcomed the Dutch cook's greeting of hot coffee and pastries.¹¹ The battalion officers assigned the troops to permanent-type barracks normally used by the Dutch military forces.

¹⁰On another occasion, Frank Fujita and six other Americans entered a Dutch canteen and watched various Dutch military men entertain several Royal Air Force people. Fujita noted that the Dutch and British " . . . were very ceremoniously drinking . . . with little thimble size glasses . . . and the Texans got a bottle apiece, sat down at the table and threw the cap away and started drinking out of the bottle . . . /the/ Dutchmen and Englishmen /'s/ eyes liked to have popped out. They had never seen anybody who could drink like the Texans." The aristocratic Dutch were appalled, and as Lawrence Brown found out later, they " . . . wouldn't have a cotton-picking thing to do with us." P. J. Smallwood, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 166:26-29; Horace Chumley, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 199:17-18; Lawrence Brown, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 178:21-24; Frank Fujita, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 59:15-20.

¹¹Frank Fujita, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 59:15-20; Uell Carter, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 56:14-19.

Slits at the top of each wall provided ventilation for the buildings; tile roofs covered the barracks. Open ditches running through the camp constituted the only sanitary facilities. To the Americans, the rooms inside the barracks resembled horse stalls. Since they had neither bunks nor bedrolls, the artillerymen found hay in a nearby field and made beds on the floor. The men of the battalion quickly utilized the one luxurious facility, the showers.¹²

The Second Battalion acted initially as ground crews for the Nineteenth Heavy Bombardment Group. This air unit had been forced to leave the original ground sections at Clark Field when fleeing the Philippines. As the existing runways proved too short for the large bombers, the officers immediately assigned men to lengthen the landing strips by using native labor. Rocks gathered from a nearby river provided the base while small stones in the uneven areas made a smoother runway. Simultaneously, other members of the battalion became ground crews for the Boeing B-17 bombers. They refueled the aircraft, cleaned and oiled the .50 caliber machine guns, and loaded the airplanes with bombs. Within a short time, artillerymen were able

¹²Frank Fujita, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 59:15-20; Uell Carter, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 56:14-19; C. A. Cates, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 185:17-18; Robert Gregg, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 69:9-11.

to remove, repair, and replace the aircraft engines; air corps sergeants accomplished these tasks by giving instructions and acting as cadre in training the battalion troops.¹³

The artillerymen had great respect for the flyers. The army used the large cumbersome planes as heavy bombers, fighters, and transports. The ground crews noticed that when the planes landed from missions the flyers jumped out and kissed the ground; large holes from anti-aircraft fire were frequently in the American aircraft wings. When Glenn Pace asked a flight crew member if the damage could be repaired before take-off time, the flyer said, "Heck, no, we're fixing to go."¹⁴

Not all the artillerymen served the air corps as ground crews. The gun sections dug pits and set up their artillery pieces. The four gun sections of Battery D utilized the first several days at Sinosari to clean the cosmoline packing grease off the cannon. Within a few days, the cannon tubes pointed skyward and served as anti-aircraft weapons when the first Japanese air raid occurred on 5 February 1942.¹⁵

¹³Uell Carter, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 56:14-19.

¹⁴Robert Gregg, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 69:9-11; Glenn Pace, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 134:17.

¹⁵The men of the battalion differ on the details of the first air raid. George Burns saw seventeen bombers

Frank Fujita served as machine gun sergeant and guarded the runway. Scorning a fox-hole for his position, he requisitioned two .50 caliber machine guns from burned B-17 bombers, and, by using makeshift tripods, mounted the weapons on the back of a jeep. Fujita's anti-aircraft jeep could scurry around the base and evade the attacking planes. On the first occasion that Fujita fired both guns simultaneously, however, the vibration virtually dismantled the jeep. After the first raid, the Japanese planes came over almost daily, usually around noon, and flew one bombing run over the field.¹⁶

Churchill, in the meantime, posed a question about the British troops stationed in the Dutch colony. Could evacuation be accomplished should it become necessary? After the successful removal of troops from Dunkirk, the British increasingly considered this means of saving the

attack the field with the cook shack just inside the gate being the primary target, "One bomb hit right in that cook shack . . . one bomb hit in a building where they had been unloading condensed milk off a ship and storing it You can imagine how the condensed milk was scattered there." Starnes and Fillmore disagree; they saw seventeen planes that attacked the field and destroyed the barracks. All agreed, however, with Fillmore who said, "After that first one air raid you always kind of walked around with one eye up in the air." P. J. Smallwood, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 166:29; Keith Naylor, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 72:14-17; George Burns, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 176:21-22; W. L. Starnes, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 186:22; B. D. Fillmore, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 162:16.

¹⁶Frank Fujita, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 59:21-31.

Empire forces in the Indies. British Field Marshal A. P. Wavell, supreme commander of the Allied South Pacific forces, appraised the Netherlands East Indies military situation and cabled Churchill that the Dutch colony could be held only by air and naval superiority, which the Allies lacked. Because of this incapability, Wavell suggested abandoning the Indies. At that time the Japanese occupied all the islands except for Java, the main colonist island. The field marshal recommended to Churchill that efforts be concentrated toward saving Australia and Burma, which Wavell considered vital for the prosecution of the war against Japan. The British commander regarded the loss of Java as a potentially harmful blow but not mortal to the war effort. Churchill agreed with Wavell's proposal that the current British troops in the Indies not be evacuated because of lack of necessary sea power, but he did order that reinforcements enroute to the area be diverted to Australia.¹⁷

Unaware of the American-British decision to concentrate on saving Australia, the Dutch continued their publicity campaign. General Heim ter Poorten, commander in chief of the Dutch forces, said the colony would be defended to the last man and called upon America for additional planes

¹⁷Winston S. Churchill, The Hinge of Fate, The Second World War, 6 vols. (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Co., 1948), 4:140-142.

and anti-aircraft artillery. Newsweek Magazine joined the campaign with articles extolling the resoluteness of the Dutch and describing how they had altered their beautiful islands to repel the Japanese. Cecil Brown, a Columbia Broadcasting System correspondent enroute to Australia from Singapore, wrote that the survival of Java depended upon American and British aid. Brown said the Netherlands felt that both Allies had not failed the Dutch, but also themselves.¹⁸

Shortly before the invasion of Java, the United States Army Air Corps ordered the Nineteenth Bomb Group to abandon the Indies and fly to Australia. The flyers suggested that the Second Battalion accompany them, but the army had other plans because " . . . they sent a General Barnes¹⁹ from Australia to Java to give . . . " the men a speech of encouragement, saying , " . . . to boost the morale of the Allied people on Java it would be necessary for the American troops . . . to stay and . . . make a show of trying to fight."²⁰

¹⁸ Newsweek Magazine, 2 January 1942, pp. 15-16; 16 February 1942, pp. 21-22; 2 March 1942, pp. 14-15.

¹⁹ Julian F. Barnes, General in the United States Army Air Corps, who accompanied the convoy from the United States, was the highest ranking American military officer in Australia.


²⁰ Uell Carter, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 56:22-27.

With the aircraft leaving Singosari Airfield, the Second Battalion again became artillerymen. The Dutch told the Americans that the high command planned to deceive the Japanese by racing vehicles around the island to give the appearance of mass troop movement.²¹ The action, called a motor march, continued for several days. The unit " . . . drove all day and bivouacked at night." Finally, the truck convoy went into bivouac at a race track near Garoet.²²

Battery E had been left at Singosari Airfield to store all the battalion equipment. Before the work could be completed, however, the Japanese landed and the battery moved into combat position near Surabaya. The Japanese landed 92,000 troops in the area defended by 105 Americans and 5,500 British and Australian forces. George Killian found a motorcycle and rode out to survey the situation. He saw Japanese soldiers slowly moving through the underbrush and thought, "What are they creeping along for; everybody knows they're there." Killian looked at the soldiers closely and said to himself, "They sure are small and"

²¹W. L. Starnes, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 186:30; Robert Gregg, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 69:14-18.

²²Keith Naylor, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 72:19-22.



Source: New York Times, 3 March 1942.

they sure are dirty." Killian speeded through the Japanese to return to the American position.²³

Captain Hollis Allen, Battery E commander, ordered Frank Fujita to take a group of thirty-one men to a Dutch Army emplacement and guard the approach to the city. An English-speaking Dutch marine sergeant went outside the enclosure and soon returned saying, "Sergeant, there's a bunch of American troops coming down the road." Fujita ran outside and peered at the approaching soldiers. Rumors had been circulating that 20,000 American troops were enroute to reinforce the island. To Fujita's dismay, however, the oncoming troops were Japanese. Fujita yelled, "Americans, hell. Open fire." The Japanese retreated to a close village and Fujita's section opened fire on the village with their artillery pieces, killing several enemy soldiers before exhausting their ammunition supply. The section then made a brisk attempt to escape the Japanese.²⁴ The battery regrouped and the commander ordered every man to save himself. Carter and Killian drove to the nearest docks and commandeered a Dutch boat for voyage to Australia. They

²³George Killian, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 56:22-27; Frank Fujita, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 59:21-31; Hollis Allen, The Lost Battalion (Jacksboro: Herald Publishing Co., 1949), p. 68.

²⁴Frank Fujita, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 59:21-31.

found no food or water on board; while the Americans searched for provisions, Japanese planes bombed and sank the boat.²⁵

Fujita and a companion, Ben Keith, decided to retreat to the mountains. At dusk they stopped at a house and inquired about spending the night. The occupants, three women and two girls, fed the Americans and gave them lodging for the night. The next morning the women anxiously knocked on the door and said, "Please, please, you must leave . . . or you will get us killed . . . the Japanese are here." Fujita looked out the window and saw the yard filled with Japanese soldiers. "One was at the front door . . . it so happened that we had picked a house that was directly across from the railroad station." Fujita and Keith calmly walked out the door and through the group of Japanese soldiers who looked at the Americans and then moved out of their way. The two Americans strolled through the front gate and headed for the edge of town. Once out of sight of the house, the artillerymen began to run. They asked everyone they met, "What's going on?" But they received no answer. Finally, one man told them, "Don't go. They're killing everybody . . . Japanese are paying the natives five guilden a head to point out anyone

²⁵Uell Carter, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 56:29-31.

trying to get out of town." The Americans reversed their direction and returned to town. Presently, they recognized the International Red Cross building and went inside, where they found the Red Cross representative busy in his preparations for departure. They requested aid in getting transportation out of town. When the Red Cross representative discovered they were Americans, he refused to talk with them saying, "They'll kill me if they see me talking to you." Fujita became furious and said, "okay you son-of-a-bitch, if you're not going to help us, at least take a letter. We'll write a letter, and you take it and mail it so our folks back in America will know, at least as of this date, we were safe." The representative refused.²⁶

While the Netherlands East Indies public relations campaign progressed, the Japanese Army continued to advance. Allied forces, especially the Australians, had little respect for the Dutch military men. An Australian intelligence officer requested information from Dutch headquarters about enemy troop movements and was advised that the information was unavailable since the morning newspaper had not yet been delivered.²⁷

²⁶Frank Fujita, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 59:32-37.

²⁷Lionel Wigmore, The Japanese Thrust, Australia in the War of 1939-1945, 7 vols. (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1957), 4:501.

Lieutenant Governor Van Mook, having returned to Java, raised criticism of American failures. He admitted some Dutch blame, but felt that the majority of the censure should be placed on the United States. Van Mook posed a question to the news reporters: if the Japanese could conquer the Indies from one thousand miles away, should not the Americans be able to send enough aid to save the colony from nearby Australia? Other reporters joined this renewed publicity campaign four days later when the United States Army Air Corps ordered the American bombers to Australia. One reporter said the planes abandoned Java in its greatest hour of need. A leading British newspaper criticized the United States for failing to reinforce the Dutch before and soon after the beginning of the Pacific war. The newspaper pointed out that the Dutch had counted on the reinforcements, and in many instances had paid for them in advance.²⁸

The Japanese continued to rout Allied forces. The Dutch transferred the military headquarters from Batavia to Bandung, located inland and more isolated from enemy attack. Leaving their families, Van Mook and several other officials fled by plane to Australia. The lieutenant governor of the collapsing colony made no attempt to hide his bitterness toward the Allies, especially the Americans.²⁹

²⁸New York Times, 8 March 1942; 10 March 1942.

²⁹Newsweek Magazine, 16 March 1942, p. 25.

On 7 March, the Japanese penetrated the Bandung perimeter and effective resistance in the Dutch colony ended. Just prior to being overrun, the Bandung radio station broadcast its final message that Americans received at 7:55 A. M. New York time: "We are now shutting down. Good-bye until better times. Long live the Queen." The following day Java, the last unoccupied island of the Dutch colony, formally surrendered.³⁰

Shortly after arriving at the Garoet Race Track, the Second Battalion received news of the Dutch capitulation. An officer told George Burns and several others that the American unit was also surrendering, but that the evacuation ships were ostensibly located off the east coast of Java. Burn' group decided they had two options. "We had a choice of trying to make it down there /to the ships/ if we could get transportation . . . otherwise, the ones that stayed there would still stay organized in a unit." The officers warned the men that confinement could last for three months, six months, or even for a year.³¹ Burns thought to himself, "My goodness, we'll be out of here in six months."³²

³⁰New York Times, 10 March 1942.

³¹Confinement ultimately lasted forty-one months and nine days. Clyde Fillmore, Prisoner of War (Wichita Falls: Nortex Offset Publications, Inc., 1973), p. 15.

³²George Burns, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 176:26.

Some of the men decided to attempt to reach the coast. Jack Moss drove a group in his truck to the intended evacuation area, but found no boats or planes with which to escape. Moss' group stayed in hiding for several days until an American officer, advised by the British Army of the group's location, came to the men and persuaded them to surrender.³³

Keith Naylor and two other Americans joined a group of Australians and travelled to the southern coast looking for an escape route. The Australians soon capitulated and were joined by the other two Americans. This left only Naylor who finally surrendered about 1 April 1942.³⁴

One group did manage to escape. Glenn Pace with a group of Americans from Dutch headquarters reached Batavia and got on board the last ship to leave, the Abad-De-Kirk; the ship arrived at Perth, Australia, after being attacked by Japanese planes and submarines.³⁵

Fujita and Keith from Battery E were still free. After leaving the Red Cross building, the Americans noticed that the natives avoided them. Finally, one Dutchman offered to

³³ Jack Moss, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 145:11-14.

³⁴ Keith Naylor, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 72:27-33.

³⁵ Glenn Pace, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 134:22.

take the two artillerymen home for the night. Furthermore, he said, "I got some American cigarettes . . . I'll give you a 'Dutch wife' apiece and we'll come back tomorrow and surrender." The Americans accepted the offer and accompanied the Dutchman to his home. They were disappointed to find later that a "Dutch wife" was a pillow Dutchmen placed between their legs while asleep in the tropics to prevent perspiration from creating a rash.³⁶

The battalion waited at the race track for further instructions. Although the Japanese had given orders to Allied survivors to preserve their equipment, the battalion officers ordered the men to destroy all usable items. Lawrence Brown's group systematically ruined all the mechanisms of the rifles and guns. W. L. Starnes, who had been driving a new 1941 Oldsmobile command car, drained the water and oil out of the vehicle and ran the engine until it became inoperable.³⁷

Several days later, a Japanese officer came to the race track to confer with the battalion officers. The appearance of the Japanese officer astounded George Burns.

³⁶ Frank Fujita, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 59:37-38.

³⁷ Lawrence Brown, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 178:32-34; W. L. Starnes, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 186:32.

He thought, "People like that conquering people like us?" Scrutinizing the commander closely, Brown exclaimed, "My Lord of Mercy. We surrendered to that guy?" The Japanese ordered the battalion to proceed from the race track to a tea plantation, Ondernehmig Waspuda, in the mountains.³⁸

Lieutenant Wade Hampton from Decatur gave money to Alfred Brown with instructions to purchase whiskey for the men. Brown procured several bottles of Haig Original Scotch Whiskey from natives that had raided a liquor warehouse. Some of the men became drunk; others spent their time playing poker. Lieutenant Henien, who had aided in directing the motor march and had lost sleep for several days, went to bed.³⁹

After one week of occupation, the Japanese moved the battalion from the tea plantation to Batavia by train, and then marched the men three miles to a native camp called Tanjong Priok, which lay approximately two hundred yards from the docks. Occasionally, the Japanese permitted the men to work on the Batavia docks on a volunteer basis. Many volunteered for work to relieve the boredom and hopefully to find other means of supplementing their

³⁸George Burns, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 176:30; C. A. Cates, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 185:29; Lawrence Brown, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 178:32-34.

³⁹Clyde Fillmore, Prisoner of War, pp. 18-19; Robert Gregg, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 69:30.

meager rations. Essentially, the diet consisted of an exceedingly poor quality of rice that had been swept up from the warehouse floors. The men cooked their rations by filling burlap bags with the grain and placing the bags into barrels of boiling water.⁴⁰ A Japanese halted one group unloading canned sweet cream to lecture the captives on stealing food. The officer told the prisoners that they could not steal from the Japanese because the Asians were too smart. As the man turned to walk away someone from the ranks of prisoners threw an empty sweet cream can out behind him.⁴¹

The Japanese Army incarcerated approximately 1,200 prisoners at Tanjong Priok, and the guards counted the inmates each morning and again at bedtime. Except for Battery E, the battalion remained intact. Strange as it may seem, some of the men were allowed to keep their weapons. Uell Carter possessed an automatic pistol, and others retained different types of rifles; many of the soldiers still held hand grenades. Carter did not consider using the weapon because of prison rumors that American forces soon would recapture the island. Carter thought " . . . it would be a few days here 'till our bunch got

⁴⁰ B. D. Fillmore, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 162:100.

⁴¹ Ibid.

things straightened out, and so we were just having ourselves a lark"⁴²

After five weeks at Tanjong Priok, the battalion travelled a short distance to a Dutch Army camp formerly the base of the Netherlands Indies Tenth Bicycle Regiment.⁴³ The new prison, known as Bicycle Camp, impressed the Americans with its Banyan trees, paved streets, and stone barracks. The quarters were arranged six on each side of a center street; each unit could house approximately three hundred men. The sanitary facilities at Bicycle Camp were excellent, relative to Tanjong Priok: Dutch-type latrines with no commodes, only a hole and a place for one foot to be placed on each side. The men bathed in large concrete vats filled with water by first soaping themselves and then dashing the water over their heads native style.⁴⁴

⁴²Robert Gregg, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 69:32-35; Uell Carter, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 56:33; Horace Chumley, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 199:32.

⁴³There is disagreement on mode of travel. Naylor states that the trip was on foot, Clyde Fillmore says by train, and P. J. Smallwood says by truck, Keith Naylor, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 72:34; Clyde Fillmore, Prisoner of War, p. 18; P. J. Smallwood, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 166:44.

⁴⁴J. B. Heinen, Jr., personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 174:45; C. A. Cates, personal interview, Oral history Collection, OH 185:32; Horace Chumley, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 188:45; Keith Naylor, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 72:36-48; Alfred Brown, personal interview, Oral History Collection,

At Bicycle Camp, the Second Battalion discovered survivors of the U.S.S. Houston, that had been sunk off the east coast of Java on the night of 28 February 1942. The artillerymen found the sailors in rags as they had escaped from the sinking ship with only the clothes on their bodies and had remained in the water for several hours before rescue. Consequently, the men of the Second Battalion shared clothing with the Houston crew.⁴⁵

Americans encountered Japanese brutality and humiliation for the first time at Bicycle Camp. The guards forced the Americans to cut their hair close to the scalp Japanese style. Soon after the battalion arrived, the prisoners learned that their captors expected them to sign a pledge of allegiance to the Japanese Army, but the American officers ordered the men not to sign. When the Japanese found the men refusing to sign the pledge, they placed the prisoners under the sun and seated them with their legs crossed, their arms folded, and allowed no movement. The men sat in this position for several hours. As it became apparent that the Japanese would ultimately kill the prisoners that refused to sign the pledge, the

OH 188:52; P. J. Smallwood, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 166:46, 57.

⁴⁵Clyde Fillmore, Prisoner of War, p. 19; Robert Gregg, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 69:45; B. D. Fillmore, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 162:42.

American officers ordered their men to comply with the Japanese demand.⁴⁶

The guards required prisoners to maintain a watch at the end of each building. Whenever a Japanese soldier came near the barracks, the sentry would cry, "Ki o tsuke attention," and all the American occupants would stand at attention until the Japanese passed by. Then the sentinel would give the command, "Yasuma as you were." George Burns found that "We had to treat them the Japanese like gods. We had to salute them even if it was a one-star private. We had to bow to them if a prisoner wore no hat or cap."⁴⁷

The Bicycle Camp roster included many different nationalities: British, Indians, Australians, Dutch, and Americans. The prisoners not on work detail played volleyball and basketball. At times the Americans and Australians competed against each other in basketball championships.⁴⁸

⁴⁶Lawrence Brown, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 178:42; Clyde Fillmore, Prisoner of War, pp. 22-23.

⁴⁷Alfred Brown, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 188:62; George Burns, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 176:37. For explicit descriptions of torture see Clyde Fillmore, Prisoner of War, p. 24, and George Burns, pp. 38-40.

⁴⁸Clyde Fillmore, Prisoner of War, p. 21; Robert Gregg, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 69:49.

A number of men secreted small radios which apprised the prisoners of events of the outside world. Often the radios received transmissions from station KFI in Los Angeles, California. One American civilian captured in Java had an artificial leg. Later, when the other radios had been confiscated, this prisoner concealed a radio in his hollow prosthetic leg.⁴⁹

The Japanese transferred the men of Battery E to the Jaarmarket /yearly market/ at Surabaja, and instructed the prisoners to bow or salute. Personnel of Battery E decided they would not acquiesce to this requirement. Before testing the rule, however, the Americans witnessed another Allied prisoner beaten with clubs for refusal to bow. After this action, "They /the Japanese/ didn't have trouble from then on. Everybody bowed or saluted." A short time later Battery E personnel were moved by train from Surabaja to Bicycle Camp.⁵⁰

Six months after arrival at Bicycle Camp, the Japanese ordered the first group, composed of 191 Americans and 88 Australians, to report to the docks. Some of the men had been assigned numbers and they felt the selection for shipment was determined by the individual's number. In any case, the

⁴⁹The civilian, a Sperry Instruments representative, maintained the radio, undetected, until the end of the war. Horace Chumley, personal interview, Oral History Collection; OH 199:40.

⁵⁰Frank Fujita, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 59:42.


first group left the camp on 2 October 1942 for an unknown destination.⁵¹

Some Second Battalion members considered the unit to be ill-fated. A reasonable case can be presented to support such a claim. The Second Battalion was one of the first National Guard units to be mobilized, and it was selected for overseas shipment, ostensibly because of its achievement while on maneuvers. Battalion members argue, however, that the record was accumulated by using simulated weapons, firing imaginary ammunition.

After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered the Pensacola Convoy, of which the Second Battalion was a part, to return to Hawaii. President Roosevelt's intervention prevented the convoy's return and committed vital American forces to an area that Winston Churchill and other Allied military leaders regarded as second priority. The United States Army, with unfathomable logic, selected the Second Battalion for ground crews of the Nineteenth Bomb Group, despite the fact that the convoy contained nearly 5,000 soldiers, many of them United States Army Air Corps ground crewmen. Later, when the bombers prepared to abandon the island and fly to Australia, the flyers requested that the Second Battalion be allowed to accompany them. The army refused, saying that American

⁵¹Clyde Fillmore, Prisoner of War, p. 31; P. J. Smallwood, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 166:62.

military presence was necessary for Allied forces' morale. This assertion is weak. General Julian F. Barnes, who went to Java to explain the necessity for the Americans to remain, did not elaborate on how one American unit, that contained less than five hundred men, could sustain the Allied armies' morale. The Netherlands East Indies government apparently was not extremely impressed with the Americans' efforts; the island capitulated shortly after the invasion. Furthermore, the battalion's presence did not elevate the Dutch leaders' morale enough to prevent them from fleeing to Australia. The facts indicate that no Allied government concerned itself with the American units' location, least of all the Netherlands Indies forces which were unable to maintain basic military information about the enemy forces that were attacking them at point blank range. The United States Army apparently regarded the battalion as an expendable pawn, which it utilized to convince the Allied forces that America had not abandoned the Dutch colony. The battalion, relinquished by its military leaders and forced to assent to the Dutch capitulation, essentially vanished intact into the murky world of Japanese occupied territories, hence the designation, the Lost Battalion.



Source: World Map, National Geographic Society.

CHAPTER X

THE SAD, SAD ROADS: ASIA

Nine days after leaving Bicycle Camp, the first group of men from the Second Battalion arrived at Singapore and the second section departed from Batavia for Singapore. Japanese prison camp abuse proved less brutal than the Singapore voyage. The Japanese Navy had forced the prisoners into the holds of the ships with only a few square inches of space allotted to each man. Captives suffered from intense heat and rancid air. Guards occasionally allowed prisoners on deck for food, water, or latrine call. The latrines, wooden outhouses on each side of the vessel, extended out over the water.¹

Upon arriving at Singapore, the Japanese removed the captives from the ships and marched them to Changi Barracks prisoner-of-war camp, formerly a British Army post. The camp contained stone barracks, three stories high with red tile roofs, paved roads, parade grounds, and lovely palm trees. Soon the Japanese assigned to the Americans the

¹Clyde Fillmore, *Prisoner of War* (Wichita Falls: Nortex Offset Publications, Inc., 1973), p. 32; W. L. Starnes, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 186:49.

task of clearing a rubber plantation for garden space. The work was not difficult and some battalion members felt that " . . . relatively speaking, everybody had kind of a resort deal at Changi."² The Americans bought tobacco from natives who came through camp, and supplemented their diet by stealing chickens and ducks from the British and coconuts from the palm trees.³

The presence of numerous Indian guards [Sikhs] who earlier had been allies, plus the British officers' insistence on saluting, provoked the Americans. Battalion members refrained from saluting even their own officers after leaving Java and certainly refused to salute Allied leaders. This resistance caused an incident when a United States soldier refused to salute an English colonel and British military police placed the American in confinement. The Second Battalion commander quickly demanded and received the American's release.⁴

The men maintained some contact with the outside world while in Changi by means of a radio the British possessed. Those who listened to broadcasts relayed the information to others in the camp.⁵

²Clyde Fillmore, Prisoner of War, pp. 33-35; Alfred Brown, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 188:71; Jack Moss, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 45:24; J. B. Heinen, Jr, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 174:69.

³Ibid.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Ibid.

The men from Battery E presently arrived at Changi, having left Bicycle Camp a short time after the second group. They bivouacked in an area near the other Americans, and some of the men were given passes to visit their friends. A small number of Second Battalion men remained at Bicycle Camp. Horace Chumley stayed in the Java prison because he had a foot problem. He and seven other Americans remained at the installation throughout the war.⁶

Approximately sixty Americans, including Houston crewmen and Second Battalion artillerymen, plus two hundred other Allied prisoners, left Singapore 27 October 1942. The Japanese had chosen these men, because of their mechanical or technical training, to be shipped to Japan. Frank Fujita, the American-Japanese sergeant, found himself enroute to his father's homeland.⁷

Soon after 1 January 1943, the remaining members of the American group at Changi boarded a train to Pria, five hundred miles up the Malang Peninsula. Here the men transferred to a ship; on the morning of 11 January 1943, the vessel steamed out of the harbor and headed north.

⁶Ibid.; Horace Chumley, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 199:68.

⁷Clyde Fillmore, Prisoner of War, p. 37; Frank Fujita, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 59:47.

The Americans were aboard the Dia Moji Maru, which was accompanied by another transport and a small warship. Four days later, American B-24 Liberator bombers attacked the convoy. They quickly sank the second transport which carried Dutch prisoners and Japanese civilian technicians. The flyers next turned their attention to the warship and sank it. Four bombs fell near the Dia Moji Maru, destroying lifeboats and wooden latrines. One bomb exploded at close range and fragments entered the hull killing several Australian soldiers. The Japanese attempted to battle the American planes with a small cannon located on the stern. The gun crew inadvertently traversed the barrel toward the superstructure of the ship and damaged the bridge with a cannon shell. In the next attack, one of the American bombs struck the stern, destroying the cannon, killing the gun crew, and setting the ship on fire. Seeing columns of smoke billowing up, the American pilots left the area. The Japanese extinguished the fires and began picking up survivors from the sea, then departed for Moulmein, Burma. The holes in the side of the ship created a problem; near Moulmein, the ship began to list heavily. A Japanese officer covered the deck telling the troops, "You men get on that side of the ship. There's too many on this side. It's been hit and is sinking." The prisoners ran to the undamaged side

of the vessel and the list was corrected. The ship reached Moulmein a short time later.⁸

As the ship cruised into the harbor, some Americans saw the pagoda that Rudyard Kipling mentioned in his poem "On the Road to Mandalay." The prisoners disembarked and marched through the city to a provisional prison for convicted felons where they remained for several days.⁹ While they suffered from poor accommodations, each day the prisoners of war received from the guards only two meager meals of rice and one pint of water. Many of the men contracted dysentery because of the baneful sanitation facilities.¹⁰

Within a week the prisoners boarded another train and journeyed south to Thanbyuzayat, Burma. The men detrained and met Lieutenant Colonel Y. Negatomo, who warned them to

⁸Clyde Fillmore, Prisoner of War, pp. 37-40; P. J. Smallwood, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 166:87; George Burns, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 176:64; Lawrence Brown, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 178:68; Jack Moss, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 45:29.

⁹Some of the prisoners were housed in a mortuary, and others stayed in a former leper colony. Robert Gregg, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 69:59.

¹⁰Keith Naylor, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 72:59; Clyde Fillmore, Prisoner of War, pp. 40-41.

do their jobs because the railroad would be built on the bodies of white men, if necessary.¹¹

From Thanbyuzayat, the prisoners travelled by truck to their first work camp on the railroad, 18 Kilo Camp.¹² The men found the camp at 18 Kilo representative of all work camps they would see along the railroad. Burmese natives erected bamboo huts twenty feet wide by one hundred and sixty feet long. Local builders constructed this housing by driving large bamboo shafts into the ground for uprights, then three feet above the ground lashing crossmembers to the uprights and covering these with split bamboo. This horizontal construction served as a floor and a bed. The Burmese then added a pitched roof and covered it by thatching bamboo leaves. In the elaborate camps, the huts contained six-foot aisles down the center with raised sections for beds on either side.¹³

At 18 Kilo the prisoners encountered Korean guards for the first time, but in their early relationships the Americans could not distinguish Koreans from Japanese. The prisoners soon noticed that a Japanese was always in charge of the

¹¹Clyde Fillmore, Prisoner of War, p. 43.

¹²The various camps in Burma were called kilo camps, preceded by a number. This number indicated the distance in kilos from Thanbyuzayat; 18 Kilo Camp was 18 kilos from the railhead at Thanbyuzayat.

¹³P. J. Smallwood, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 166:93; Clyde Fillmore, Prisoner of War, p. 45.

Korean guards, and some prisoners regarded the Korean guards as sub-human.¹⁴ Other captives felt the Koreans were savage because they ranked less than privates in the Japanese Army. Some Americans considered the Korean brutality a result of the guards' frustration.¹⁵

The Americans began in sections of fifty men or kumis. Originally, the prisoners' quotas consisted of one cubic meter per man per day. A captive fulfilled his quota on a grade level project by digging and moving one cubic meter; on a filling project, the prisoner procured one meter of dirt and moved it to the fill area. The Japanese furnished no equipment beyond a pick, shovel, and a burlap bag tied to the end of a bamboo pole. The prisoners enjoyed reasonably good health at 18 Kilo and could fulfill their quotas before the end of the workday. Some of the Americans warned the swift workers to slow their pace, but the latter continued to work rapidly so as to finish early. As a result, the Japanese soon increased the quota per man to one and one-half cubic meters and later to two and one-half meters. Later, during the monsoon season, guards forced

¹⁴A British medical officer described the Koreans as ". . . purely amoral coolie vermin . . . brutal by nature as well as by orders." Lionel Wigmore, The Japanese Thrust, Australia in the War of 1939-1945, 7 vols. (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1957), 4:547.

¹⁵George Lawley, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 164:41.

men to work until 0300 hours to complete their quotas. During these periods the men would frequently finish the previous day's quota only two hours before beginning a new day. The prisoners earned ten cents per day; they worked ten days and then rested one.¹⁶

The work varied; one kumi would dig a ditch one day, and the following day be assigned to unload rails. The Americans soon realized that the Japanese ignored the quality of the work. Captives neither packed nor blocked the fill dirt. They placed cross-ties upon the loose dirt, followed by rails and completed the job by filling in ballast. This type of construction usually sagged or, during the monsoon season, collapsed completely.¹⁷

Bridges, occasionally two or three tiers high, spanned rivers and gorges. The captives constructed pilings from teakwood logs, which were fifteen inches in diameter by twenty-five to thirty feet in length, by sharpening one end with a hatchet. Natives used elephants to hoist logs until the primitive pile driver could force the log into the ground; the pile driver was a five-hundred pound

¹⁶ George Burns, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 176:74-75; Jack Moss, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 45:32; B. D. Fillmore, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 162:85.

¹⁷ Robert Gregg, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 69:78; George Lawley, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 164:47.

weight with a small hole in the center. The top of the log had a hole drilled and filled with a rod several centimeters smaller in diameter than the hole in the weight. Ropes ran through pulleys from the weight to the banks; with the rod acting as a guide, the prisoners pulled the weight up by the ropes, and after counting, "ichi, mio, sanyo [one, two, three]," the men released the ropes and the weight crashed down on the end of the log, driving it into the river bed. After driving pilings, the prisoners lifted a horizontal log across the tops of the uprights and secured it with steel "U" rods. Occasionally, the unstable bridges leaned precariously. The Japanese then assigned a kumi to pull the bridge with ropes as elephants pushed on the other side. The captives then placed a small brace on the pilings, and the Japanese engineers considered the structure sound until it began to lean again.¹⁸

Elephants labored exhaustively in constructing the railroad; they pulled stumps of trees, dragged logs, and placed pilings upright. Natives contracted the elephants

¹⁸ Captain Earnest Gordon, a Scottish officer, who survived the construction of the railroad, regarded the celebrated bridge on the River Kwai as overrated; "Much has been made of the building of the bridge . . . but it was, in fact, a relatively minor episode . . . construction was finished in less than two months, but it took a year to build the railroad." Earnest Gordon, Through the Valley of the Kwai (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1962), p. 69; George Burns, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 176:80; P. J. Smallwood, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 166:109-110.

to the Japanese and rode the beasts while they worked. George Burns worked closely with several of the large animals and found that

an old elephant can get as lazy as a man. You'd have him pulling the stump, and he'd wrap his trunk around there and just grunt and go on and raise cane and bellow. /then/ The native would rap him with that . . . pick . . . and that old elephant would jerk it out before you could say scat.¹⁹

Burns also learned that an elephant could move rapidly when he saw one become frightened.

He was pulling some kind of old cart . . . and he was running down the hill to the dump with this dirt. One of the carts turned over . . . he looked around and saw that thing following him and he took off, threw the native, and they like to have never caught him.²⁰

Prisoners constantly thought of food. Often the men used their limited funds to purchase food from the natives. In the first few camps, natives circulated through the areas on payday, selling eggs, tobacco, and other commodities. Later, the men found they could eat virtually any animal if given the opportunity. One camp contained a Dutch doctor of veterinary medicine who examined the stray dogs that the men caught. If the veterinarian certified that the animals were healthy, the men ate them. Many of

¹⁹ George Burns, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 176:82-83.

²⁰ Ibid.

the captives ate python snake and found it tasteful. The prisoners considered strange food necessary for survival.²¹

Captives also regarded each day or month as time to be endured for survival. P. J. Smallwood " . . . did it one day at a time . . . I went to bed at night and tomorrow was a new ball game . . . tomorrow'd be the last day we'd be there." Robert Gregg was more general; he lived his confinement " . . . three months at a time . . . most of us felt like . . . within a short time that the Americans would come in and get us . . . I never gave up for a second that I wouldn't be going to come home." George Lawley faced his imprisonment " . . . six months at a time."²²

The Americans and British approached survival differently. Most Americans formed families of four or more in a group. These men cared for one another, and if one member became sick the other "family" members shared their meager medical supplies.²³ Captain Earnest Gordon,

²¹P. J. Smallwood, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 166:95; George Burns, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 176: 74-75; Lawrence Brown, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 178:94.

²²P. J. Smallwood, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 166:59; Robert Gregg, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 69:36; George Lawley, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 164:26.

²³The family ties still exist; at Lost Battalion survivor conventions, wartime groups tend to exclude everyone but the original family members.

who closely observed his group's behavior, noticed that many British soldiers lived by the jungle rule: " I look out for myself and to hell with everyone else."²⁴

Clandestine radios furnished additional support in the search for survival; world news progressively became more optimistic as time passed. Expected mail also sustained the prisoners. At times guards allowed captives to mail cards to their relatives.²⁵ Infrequent attempts at sabotage also lifted the men's spirits. Jack Moss, who aided in the blasting of rocks and boulders, ravelled dynamite fuses causing them to burn too fast. Moss watched from a distance as this action " . . . got rid of a few of them [Japanese]." Some prisoners stole batteries from Japanese Army trucks and hid them to use for radio power.²⁶

As the distance from Thanbyuzayat increased, the prisoner's health deteriorated. Fevers, malaria, dysentery, and beriberi became prevalent. Heinen helped treat sickness in his kumi

Now I've taken a man's temperature . . . at 109 degrees. I carried him in myself at the end of the day.

²⁴Earnest Gordon, Valley of the Kwai, pp. 74-75; Lawrence Brown, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 178:102.

²⁵C. A. Cates, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 185:88; Keith Naylor, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 72:97-98; George Burns, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 176:99.

²⁶Jack Moss, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 45:33-34.

The man would get up the next morning and go to work. At three o'clock in the afternoon . . . when I knew that his chill and fever were going to hit, he'd come out of the hole. We'd lay him down in the brush and he'd go into a coma with his chills and his fever. We had to carry him home because it'd still be with him. Then he'd get up and go to work again the next morning.²⁷

Tropical ulcers also depreciated the prisoner's health; the smallest scratch became infected in the tropical climate and deteriorated into an enlarged section of decayed flesh. Treatment constituted removal of the dying skin. Doctor Theodore Hekking, a Dutch prisoner physician, devised the method of treatment. Robert Gregg saw the doctor " . . . take what he called a spoon and just scrape that ulcer out 'til there wasn't anything left and then he'd make a compress out of boiling water."²⁸

Frequently, Burmese advised prisoners of native remedies to cure diseases. C. A. Cates contracted a mild case of cholera. On a native's advice, Cates ate charcoal made from burned rice; the charcoal ostensibly would absorb the impurities in his system. By using this remedy, Cates survived while many other cholera victims who ignored the native's advice died.²⁹

²⁷J. B. Heinen, Jr., personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 174:115.

²⁸Robert Gregg, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 69:64.


²⁹C. A. Cates, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 185:82.

When sickness became acute in a given prisoner, the doctors assigned the man to the hospital camp, although physicians avoided this action when possible because few men survived the hospitalization.³⁰ John Stivers, a United States Navy pilot from the Houston, returned from the hospital after undergoing surgery. Stivers had a brain tumor. Fortunately, a prominent Australian neurosurgeon practiced at the hospital camp. The prisoners made an instrument from a saw blade and the surgeon removed the tumor.³¹

The men soon discovered the symptoms of approaching death. When a prisoner receded into utter despair, his comrades tried to encourage a response by sympathetic means. If sympathy failed, friends insulted the despondent prisoner by " . . . calling his mother a whore and his grandmother a bitch and his daddy a drunkard . . . if he won't get angry, he won't live. You'll bury him the day after tomorrow." In the first days of the railroad, the traditional customs of burying the dead were observed. "The first man that died we tried to do it right . . . The ship's carpenter built him a nice teakwood coffin . . . but they the dead got to coming so fast and they

³⁰The men called the hospital camp, "The burial ground." Jack Moss, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 45:39.

³¹Stivers survived the surgery but died after liberation. Clyde Fillmore, Prisoner of War, p. 150; J. B. Heinen, Jr., personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 174:132.



Source: National Geographic Society.

/the carpenters/ just didn't have time to do it." As the railroad moved deeper into the jungle, the death rate increased. At 83 Kilo Camp, the burial detail interred nine deceased prisoners in one day.³²

The death rate increased substantially in the spring of 1943. The Japanese, progressively more concerned that the railway would not be completed at the appointed time, pressured the prisoners for more production. The monsoon season had begun, but in spite of the weather the Japanese continued the pressure and harassed the prisoners with the command, "Speedo, speedo."³³

By the middle of 1944, the railroad was complete. The Japanese transferred some prisoners to a camp in Siam /Thailand/ called Kanchanaburi; near this encampment the Japanese built a monument to the workers who had died in the railroad construction. Japanese dignitaries performed a ceremony at Three Pagoda Pass and dedicated a twenty-five foot shrine to the seventy thousand persons who perished on the project.³⁴

³²George Burns, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 176:93; P. J. Smallwood, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 166:115.

³³During the monsoon season, water stood under the barracks, and Cates even saw fish swimming under his bunk. C. A. Cates, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 185:80.

³⁴Clyde Fillmore, Prisoner of War, p. 97; P. J. Smallwood, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 166:123-124.

The Second Battalion, which until this time had been relatively intact on the railroad, became fragmented. Some of the men went to a camp about fifty miles from Bangkok to work on Japanese gun emplacements. Others travelled by train to Phnom Pehn, Cambodia, and later on a barge to Saigon, Vietnam, where they worked at Tan Son Nhut Airfield or at the Saigon oil refinery. Still others went to Tamarkan, Siam, and subsequently to Saigon.³⁵ A final group volunteered to act as an advance party from Tamarkan to Chungkai, Siam. The balance of the Americans at Tamarkan were never shipped to Chungkai, however, and the six Americans in the advance party remained separate from the Second Battalion members for the duration of the war. Once the Second Battalion emerged from the Burma jungle, the conditions and food improved. Prisoners worked little, and in some cases, not at all.³⁶

The Second Battalion members languidly accepted the news that the war had ended. "Men were stunned. We had been hoping for just this so long that when it did come, we could not grasp the significance of the news"³⁷

³⁵ Many of the American prisoners were present in Saigon when the Vietnamese people instigated their revolution, under Ho Chi Minh, against the French. P. J. Smallwood, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 166:165.

³⁶ Jack Moss, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 145:43; P. J. Smallwood, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 166:164-168; Lawrence Brown, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 178:117, 143.

³⁷ Clyde Fillmore, Prisoner of War, p. 125.

By the end of hostile military actions, members of the Lost Battalion lived in prisoner of war camps from Bicycle Camp and Batavia in Java, to Chungkai in Siam. Horace Chumley, who remained at Bicycle Camp the entire time, joined three Australian prisoners and commandeered four Japanese trucks. They drove the vehicles to a Japanese warehous and " . . . in Hollywood fashion" shot the lock off the door and loaded the trucks with shoes and clothing. The men transported the trucks out into the farming district of the island and traded the clothes for fresh vegetables, which they gave to the inmates of a women's prison near Bicycle Camp.³⁸

The British rescue team arrived in Java, but did not process the American prisoners. Later, a United Press reporter located the Americans and radioed the information to his headquarters. Shortly thereafter, two United States Army Air Corps C-54 Skymaster aircraft landed at Batavia to evacuate the Americans.³⁹

After receiving the news of the Japanese surrender, Alfred Brown's group travelled to Bangkok, Siam and quartered themselves in a warehouse with other Allied soldiers. American air transports arrived to ferry the former prisoners to a hospital, but the British camp commander pointed out that there were ten British prisoners

³⁸Horace Chumley, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 199:94-95.

³⁹Ibid.

to each American and accordingly instigated a quota system of evacuation. When it became obvious that the British were dominating the evacuation and the Americans were to be brought out last, United States Army Air Corps flyers refused to allow anyone on their planes except Americans and told the British they were not coming back after the Americans were evacuated.⁴⁰

P. J. Smallwood heard of the surrender while he was in Saigon. Within a few days, Smallwood saw an American airplane land at the Saigon airfield, and shortly a group of American soldiers, led by a major with an American flag on the back of his leather jacket, arrived at the camp. The officer told the prisoners that if they had a grudge against the guards and wanted to kill them, he wouldn't stop them; he reminded the liberated Americans, however, that "you'll have to live with your conscience the rest of your life." Smallwood later saw two Australians kill a guard with their bare hands.⁴¹

B. D. Fillmore went to a hospital camp near Cratchai, Siam. A Japanese Army unit bivouaced nearby, and one day Fillmore saw the Japanese soldiers burning papers and crying. Later, an Australian sergeant called the prisoners together

⁴⁰ Alfred Brown, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 188:146-148.

⁴¹ P. J. Smallwood, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 166:203-210.

and announced the surrender. Fillmore noticed that the Korean guards changed into black suits and left the area. On the following day, one of the Korean guards returned with a truck of food and began selling provisions to the prisoners. Four days later, an American officer arrived at the camp and arranged for the Americans to be sent to Saigon. Within a week, the army planes carried the men to Calcutta, India.⁴²

Lawrence Brown's group flew from Rangoon, Burma, to Calcutta. During the flight the pilot came back to the passenger compartment and asked, "Any of you guys from Texas?" The ex-prisoners all answered, "yes." The pilot then asked, "How about Decatur /Brown's hometown/?" Brown called the pilot back to his seat and saw that "this darn kid was going to high school when I left Decatur . . . to think that I'd run onto that guy in Calcutta, a major in the Air Force and he was flying me home."⁴³

All the surviving Lost Battalion members travelled to the 142nd Convalescent Hospital in Calcutta, India. Through a mix-up in urine samples, C. A. Cates stayed at the hospital longer than the others. The army medical

⁴²B. D. Fillmore, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 162:92-96.

⁴³Lawrence Brown, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 178:150.

staff released the wrong man and forced Cates to remain in the hospital until the doctors were certain that no disease was present. During his detainment, Cates progressively ate more food each day on a regular basis, which contrasted with the prisoners-of-war meals. While waiting for clearance to return to the United States, Cates met one of the bomber pilots that had bombed the three-ship convoy near Moulmein, Burma, back in 1943.⁴⁴

The prisoners who survived the captivity developed a philosophy of tolerance and gratitude; no member of the Lost Battalion sought revenge on his former captors. Cates possibly spoke for the survivors when he said, "I couldn't question my luck . . . because some of the fellows that we left back at Camp Bowie hit Salerno⁴⁵ and didn't get out . . . who had the good luck and who had the bad luck?"⁴⁶

⁴⁴C. A. Cates, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 162:appendix.

⁴⁵The first American amphibious landing on the European mainland which began on 9 September 1943; the Thirty-sixth Division led the landing. See following chapter. Official Records, Thirty-sixth Division, microfilm of records and reports, Texas State Archives, Austin, Texas.

⁴⁶C. A. Cates, personal interview, Oral History Collection, OH 185:107.

CHAPTER XI

THE SAD, SAD ROADS: EUROPE

Beginning on 9 September 1943, the men of the Thirty-sixth Division were in combat almost constantly until the end of the war. Their story would be written in blood on the sandy beaches and formidable crags of the Italian landscape before the unit plunged into the French countryside with a momentum that carried them through France to Germany and eventually to the Austrian Alps. This forcefulness met success, but at a high cost in lives. In spite of the stiff German resistance along the way and the ineptitude of military leaders in high places, the men of the Thirty-sixth persevered. By their actions, the Texas Division members removed any doubt of the loyalty, patriotism, or usefulness of the Texas National Guard in federal service. This heroic achievement gained the respect of the regular army and completed the evolution begun nearly half a century earlier.

Back at home, the people of Texas followed the details of the war through government despatches to the wire services as well as through on-the-scene reports by war correspondents to state newspapers.¹ Texans became aware that their men were

¹Ernie Pyle, the most famous war correspondent of the war spent some time with the Texans in Italy. See footnote

an integral part of the first major amphibious invasion of Hitler's Europe in September of 1943.

With plans drawn, equipment stockpiled, and troops indoctrinated to the task that lay ahead, the Thirty-sixth Division officers and men boarded the ships that formed a convoy headed for the Italian mainland. The men of the T-Patch were ready!² Shortly after midnight on 9 September the Texans climbed down the loading nets hanging from the sides of the transports into the landing craft waiting below.³ A Member of the intelligence section teasingly asked his comrades, as he climbed over the rail, in the anticipation of the tough combat conditions, if it was too late to declare himself a conscientious objector.⁴

24, p. 226. Pyle wrote for the Scripps-Howard newspaper organization, of which the Fort Worth Press was a member. Wick Fowler, a native Texan and a former member of the Texas National Guard, remained with the Thirty-sixth Division throughout most of the European War as a special correspondent for the Dallas Morning News. In later years, Fowler served the Denton Record Chronicle as correspondent in the Vietnamese War.

²Temple Daily Telegram, 12 September 1945, a series of articles by William Jary, wartime member of the Thirty-sixth Division G-2 section; subsequent citations of this series will be: newspaper, date, and (Jary).

³Clifford H. Peek, Jr., ed., Five Years, Five Countries, Five Campaigns (San Antonio: 141st Infantry Regiment Association, 1945), p. 17.

⁴William Jary, personal interview, Fort Worth, Texas, 5 December 1978.

The sea remained calm as the small landing craft circled at rendezvous points. Lanes had been cleared through the mined waters, but in the darkness the coxswain could not locate their leaders and pass through the cleared passages. Spray drenched the soldiers in the small boats and several became seasick. Finally, the boats assembled and turned toward the beaches. The invasion plan divided the beach into four sections north to south: red, green, yellow, and blue. The division mission was simple: land in six assault waves, proceed to the railroad station located twenty-five hundred yards inland, regroup, and advance on to the major objectives which was a group of hills ten miles behind the town of Paestum.⁵

Members of the 141st Infantry Regiment came ashore about 0330 hours. The first two waves landed without strong resistance and started inland, but the third wave met enemy fire from fortified positions.⁶ Shells landed on the boats trying to reach the beach and resulting fires lighted the area. The Texans advanced slowly through the German defenses of barbed wire and machine guns.⁷

Major General Fred Walker, Thirty-sixth Division commander, landed on Red Beach about 0800 hours and

⁵Fred Walker, From Texas to Rome (Dallas: Taylor Publishing Co., 1969), pp. 232-233.

⁶Temple Daily Telegram, 12 September 1945 (Jary).

⁷Ibid.

discovered some abandoned German radios still operative. The division commander set up his command post in a tobacco warehouse and sorted out the confusion arising from the landing.⁸

Several German tank counterattacks occurred during the first few hours of the invasion. Shortly after 1000 hours fifteen tanks began an assault on the 142nd Infantry Regiment command post. A single 105 mm howitzer, brought up from the beach, fired almost point blank against the armor, destroyed five of the tanks, and broke up the attack. Captain Ross Ayer, the battery commander of this weapon, had been a school teacher in Lubbock prior to mobilization.⁹

Near Walker's command post another group of enemy tanks fired on the Texans' positions. Walker called on the 151st Field Artillery Battalion, attached to the Thirty-sixth Division for the landing, to attack the German panzers; the artillerymen destroyed four tanks and the others retreated.¹⁰ These weapons were part of the Sixteenth Panzer Division, the only fully equipped German armored division in southern Italy. The force included over one hundred tanks, seventeen thousand troops, and nearly forty assault guns. The German troops were deployed in four combat teams, each containing an infantry

⁸Walker, Texas to Rome, pp. 237-239.

⁹Robert Wagner, The Texas Army, Austin, 1972, p. 15. Dallas Morning News, 6 May 1944. Wick Fowler, special war correspondent and resident chronicler of the Thirty-sixth Division, authored this article. Subsequent citations of Fowler's byline series will be: newspaper, date, and (Fowler).

¹⁰Walker, Texas to Rome, pp. 237-239.

battalion supported by tanks and artillery. Three of these teams held positions near the beach where the Texans landed. Since most of the American artillery had not been brought ashore when the panzers first attacked, the Texas infantrymen had to hold off most of the tanks with bazookas and grenades.¹¹

Several members of the Texas Division exhibited great heroism during the Salerno battle. Sergeant James Logan of Luling, Texas, won the Congressional Medal of Honor for single-handedly destroying several machine gun emplacements and sniper positions that held up his battalion. Manuel Gonzales of Fort Davis, Texas, destroyed a German "88" firing from the dunes behind the beach. When enemy machine gun tracer bullets set fire to his pack, he calmly dropped the pack, advanced through exploding grenades toward the gun, killed the crew, and then destroyed the cannon. Gonzales received the Distinguished Service Cross for this action. To gain security for the beachhead, the high ground behind the landing area had to be occupied. The Germans anticipated this action and gathered troops in the mountains to the east in preparation for a counterattack. The Thirty-sixth Division pulled back to establish a defensive perimeter; the division engineers buried seven thousand land mines and strung two belts of barbed wire around a five-mile defense area four

¹¹Martin Blumenson, Salerno to Cassino (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, U. S. Army, 1969), pp. 78-80.

kilometers from Alta Villa, a small mountain village. Enemy resistance proved costly in a six-day battle for Alta Villa. Three more "T-Patchers" received the Congressional Medal of Honor for heroism in this action.¹² The engineers called the first part of the battle Black Monday because of the heavy losses.¹³

The German attack failed and with the beachhead secure and the mission accomplished, the Fifth Army command removed the Thirty-sixth Division from the line for reinforcements and rest. In twelve days of heavy fighting, the Texans suffered more than two thousand casualties.¹⁴

The division spent almost two months of rest and receiving replacements before taking up combat positions on 15 November 1943 when relieving the Second Division in the Mignano sector near Cassino.¹⁵ The American Fifth Army faced German fortifications including mountains and rivers; it began at the Tyrrhenian Sea, then ran east to Gargliano and Mignano Gap, San Pietro, Hill 1205, then to the Sangro River. The Americans named this the Winter Line while the Germans called it

¹²The most famous of the three was Charles "Commando" Kelly. Pete Martin and Charles E. Kelly, "One Man's War," Saturday Evening Post, 217 (1944):9-22.

¹³Dallas Morning News, 25 May 1944 (Fowler).

¹⁴Temple Daily Telegram, 12 September 1945 (Jary).

¹⁵Wagner, Texas Army, p. 57; Temple Daily Telegram, 13 September 1945 (Jary).

the Bernhardt Line. These positions served to delay the Americans in order to gain time to build a more permanent defense. The second, more formidable position also began at the Tyrrhenian Sea, then along the Gargliano River up the Rapido River to Cassino and into the Apennine Mountains.¹⁶

After two weeks of patrolling, building up supplies, and completing assault plans, the Thirty-sixth Division readied for an attack on the town of San Pietro. The town was located between Mount Lungo and Mount Sammucro in a valley that runs northwest and southeast. The Texas Division front extended for about five miles running east to west; the 141st Infantry Regiment occupied the center of the line with the 142nd on the left and the 143rd on the right. The weather then changed to rain and bitter cold.¹⁷

Supplies had to be carried on men's backs to forward dumps up on the mountain slopes. Patrols ranged across the front to determine the strength of the German positions. After nightfall on 2 December 1943, over six hundred Allied cannon began to fire shells upon Mount Maggiore, a three-thousand foot prominence that dominated Mignano Gap. The cannoners expended so many rounds on the concentration that the

¹⁶Wagner, Texas Army, p. 59; Walker, Texas to Rome, p. 277.

¹⁷Wagner, Texas Army, pp. 60-61.

Texans called the Maggiore the "million dollar mountain."¹⁸ Following the barrage, elements of the Texas Division attacked before daylight. By late afternoon Maggiore fell to the Americans but the problem of supplying the soldiers proved costly. Germany artillerymen dropped shells on the newly won positions as well as the mountain supply trail. The quartermaster personnel walked and crawled for eight hours over a five-mile trail to supply the men on the mountain. Even pack mules could not travel up some of the slopes. The Texans remained on station for another seven days in rain and cold under almost constant enemy fire until relieved. Walker wrote in his journal, "Few American troops have ever had to fight under more difficult conditions in any war."¹⁹

The division commander conducted a reconnaissance flight over the combat zone in an artillery spotter plane to consider the next move that came on 8 December 1943. The 143rd Infantry, attached units of the Third U. S. Ranger Battalion, and the First Italian Motorized Battalion attacked Hill 950, Mount Sammucro, and San Pietro. The Italian troops started the assault, then quickly retreated in the face of a German counterattack; the American captured the prominent summit

¹⁸ Sergeant Richard A. Huff, ed., The Fighting 36th (Austin: 36th Division Association, 1945), p. 33.

¹⁹ Walker, Texas to Rome, p. 283.

of Mount Sammucro, but could not complete the advance into San Pietro.²⁰

Seven counterattacks occurred and relapsed on the first day in the new positions. Down below, Texas troops tried twice to break through the German lines into San Pietro; both times the attacks met stiff resistance and failed. Volunteer patrols attempted to infiltrate German positions and destroy the strong points. No patrol members returned alive.²¹

About noon on 15 December 1943, the division again assaulted San Pietro and Mount Lungo. One group attacked from the west near Mount Lungo while another entered the action from the south. Both groups encountered heavy fire from German machine guns and mortars hidden in the rubble of San Pietro.²² American tanks supported the attack but the enemy destroyed several during the first hours. The enemy positions on Mount Lungo surrendered at this point because the Germans apparently considered further occupation of the town useless and pulled back from San Pietro toward the Rapido River.²³ Ernie Pyle, the renown war correspondent, wrote about the men of the Thirty-sixth Division in this

²⁰Ibid., pp. 284-285; Gilbert Alan Shepperd, The Italian Campaign, 1943-1945 (New York: Fredrick A. Praeger, 1968), pp. 167-169.

²¹Huff, The Fighting 36th, pp. 34-35.

²²William Godfrey Jackson, The Battle for Italy (New York: Harper and Row, 1967), p. 156; Wagner, Texas Army, pp. 110-118.

²³Temple Daily Telegram, 13 September 1945 (Jary).

battle and immortalized one of the Texas casualties with his story that began, "In this war I have known a lot of officers who were loved and respected by the soldiers under them. But never have I crossed the trail of any man as beloved as Captain Henry T. Waskow, of Belton, Texas."²⁴

The Texans remained in the line, enduring the mud and cold through Christmas, and finally received relief by the Thirty-fourth Division on 29 December 1943. The Thirty-sixth Division moved back to the San Angelo area and prepared to reorganize and re-equip the troops. On the last night of 1943 and New Year's Day, 1944, a rainstorm knocked down all the Texas Division's tents; even in the rest areas, the troops suffered from the weather. When Walker checked the replacements sent to bring the division back to full strength, he found the Thirty-sixth Division now contained only about 40 percent of the original Texans.²⁵

The division commander considered the town of Cassino, the Rapido River, and the area south of the river to be the only practical route to Rome for tanks and other vehicles. Walker, therefore, directed his chief engineer, Colonel Oran Stovall of Bowie, Texas, to prepare a study of the sector. Stovall conducted the study, discussed the problems of an

²⁴Ernie Pyle, Brave Men (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1944), p. 106.

²⁵Walker, Texas to Rome, p. 293.

attack in the area with Second Corps engineers; all agreed that any assault across the Rapido would end in failure.²⁶

The town of Cassino, about ten miles east of San Pietro, sat at the bottom of a seventeen hundred foot mountain called Mont Cassino; a sixth century monastery sat on the peak. The Rapido River ran in front of Cassino and blocked the entrance to the Liri Valley and Rome, located one hundred miles to the northwest. North of the river, the German Fifteenth Panzer Division had established a series of strong points with barbed wire, mine fields, machine guns, and artillery. The enemy had removed all covering vegetation that would conceal advancing troops. On 17 January 1944, the British Tenth Corps, located to the west of the Texans facing the Rapido, had tried to cross the river but their attack had failed. The British Forty-sixth Division next attempted the crossing on the immediate left of the Texas Division on 19 January; this assault failed as well.²⁷

On 16 January 1944, the Thirty-sixth Division commander received orders from Second Corps outlining an overall plan. An amphibious force would sail from Naples and land near Anzio on the night of 21 January. The orders directed elements of the Thirty-sixth Division to cross the Rapido on 20 January

²⁶Ibid., pp. 294-296.

²⁷Wagner, Texas Army, pp. 95-100; Jackson, Battle for Italy, p. 179.

and establish an occupied zone four miles wide and three miles deep. Once the bridgehead had been secured and bridges set up across the Rapido, the American First Armored Division was to pass through the Texans' positions and attack up the Liri Valley; hopefully to join the invading force coming from Anzio. Walker wrote in his journal, "This is going to be a tough job and I don't like it."²⁸ He tried to confer with Fifth Army Commander Mark Clark and Second Corps commanding officer Geoffrey Keyes but found them uninterested. Walker's reservations about the plan rested on his experiences during the First World War when he commanded a battalion in the Third Division at the Marne River. In this action his twelve hundred inexperienced troops turned back ten thousand veteran German soldiers attacking across an unfordable river and caused large numbers of casualties.²⁹

During the day on 20 January the division completed final preparations. The 141st and 143rd Infantry Regiments were to cross the river; the former about two miles north of the area in front of San Angelo, the latter two miles south. The artillery barrage began in the afternoon and continued until thirty-one thousand rounds had been fired at the German positions. United States Army Air Corps bombers came over at 1520 hours and continued the assault. About 1800 hours

²⁸Walker, Texas to Rome, pp. 299-302.

²⁹Ibid.

on 20 January, the attack teams moved into the assembly area for their boats and engineer guides who would lead them along a path cleared through the mine fields. German artillery destroyed several boats, the guides became lost in the confusion and led the infantrymen into the wrong area. Before the men could return to the proper place a new German artillery barrage killed several of the Texans. The attack, therefore, did not begin until after midnight. When the troops arrived at the river they found the banks too steep and the current too rapid for the assault boats to remain upright. Shrapnel destroyed some of the boats before they could be launched as large numbers of mortar and artillery shells fell on the crossing areas. The engineers finally installed a bridge and two companies crossed to the German side before enemy fire forced its abandonment. By morning on 21 January 1944, all elements still on the Allied side of the Rapido returned to assembly areas. The Texans on the German side dug in and prepared to hold their positions.³⁰

Keyes ordered Walker to renew the attack at 1000 hours. Walker argued against a daylight attack, but under pressure relented and agreed to another assault; he knew it would take hours to organize a new drive. The new attack started again

³⁰Peek, Five Years, pp. 37-38; Wagner, Texas Army, pp. 101-110.

later that day following another artillery barrage and once again the full assault force could not cross the water because of enemy resistance.³¹

By the morning of 22 January 1944, two battalions had crossed the river after sustaining heavy casualties and had advanced two hundred yards from the river. They came under intense fire and had to dig in. At first, the Texans overcame every counterattack. By 1700 hours, however, both battalion commanders, both battalion executive officers, and all company commanders except one were dead or severely wounded. The Texans' resistance continued until 2200 hours; after this no discharge of American weapons could be heard. Over two thousand men had died in the assaults.³²

Keyes, Second Corps commander, released the 142nd Infantry from reserve and ordered Walker to renew the attack. Walker sent Brigadier General William Wilbur, assistant division commander, to aid the 142nd in preparing for the attack. Wilbur, a veteran combat infantryman and holder of the Congressional Medal of Honor, recommended the assault be delayed until the following day. Keyes talked with Clark and telephoned Walker to rescind the order to attack.³³

³¹Walker, Texas to Rome, p. 307.

³²Wagner, Texas Army, p. 112; Erik Linklater, The Campaign in Italy (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1951), pp. 165-166.

³³Walker, Texas to Rome, p. 308; Historians disagree

The battle on the enemy side of the Rapido had been a disaster. The men who managed to escape called it a "bloody nightmare." Sergeant Charles E. Kelly, Congressional Medal of Honor winner for action at Alta Villa, told war correspondent Wick Fowler that his unit got close enough to the enemy positions to hear them talking before being driven back. One group of Texans led by Captain R. W. Dashner of Waco, Texas, cut through the German lines and found themselves behind the enemy. Having insufficient force to exploit this breakthrough, the troops fought their way back to the river and across to the American side.³⁴

Two days after the battle, Lieutenant General Jacob S. Devers, Deputy Commander in Chief of the Mediterranean Theater

on Clark's leadership ability in Italy, especially the Rapido action. Court historians such as Martin Blumenson, in his book, Salerno to Cassino, exonerates Clark. Others such as General E. D. Smith, a British officer who served in Italy and authored The Battles for Cassino (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1975), found Clark's conduct extremely questionable. Smith is supported by William Godfrey Jackson in his work, The Battle for Italy, Christopher Buckley's Road to Rome (New York: Hodder and Staughton, 1945), and Erik Linklater's The Campaign in Italy. A. Russell Buchanan, in his two volume work, The United States and World War II (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), did not really take either position. He simply reiterated that "Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson supported Clark's contention that the Rapido crossing, although costly, justified itself by withdrawing German troops at a critical time from Anzio." Buchanan did not elaborate on how other historians question the truthfulness of this concept.

³⁴Dallas Morning News, 18 March, 8, 24 May 1944 (Fowler).

of Operations, came to the Thirty-sixth Division headquarters and talked with Walker. Wilbur confronted Devers and told him, "The whole trouble is that you people in the rear do not know what goes on up here." Within a week Clark ordered Wilbur relieved.³⁵ Apparently the Fifth Army commander needed a scapegoat and, lacking the courage to accept responsibility himself for the disaster, disgraced Wilbur.

In the following month, the Thirty-sixth Division, weakened physically by the appalling losses at the Rapido and psychologically by the deaths of its battalion and company level officers and the firing of its assistant division commander, continued its mountain fighting near Cassino. On 25 January, the 142nd Infantry Regiment, spared from the slaughter of the Rapido crossing by being held in Corps reserve, moved into the San Elia region north of Cassino. Free French forces managed to cross the mountain area to the right of the Texans and gained a small bridgehead on the upper Rapido north of Cassino. The 142nd Infantry's mission was to exploit and enlarge this foothold.³⁶

Simultaneously, elements of the American Thirty-fourth Division established a hold on a hill above the town of Cairo across a shallow part of the Rapido. The Germans, however,

³⁵ Walker, Texas to Rome, pp. 308-322.

³⁶ Smith, Battles for Cassino, pp. 62-69.

had placed artillery observers on the dominant peak of the highest mountain in the area, Mount Cairo. From this unobstructed viewpoint the enemy called down artillery and mortar fire on every movement. The three battalions of the 142nd Regiment crossed the Rapido at San Elia and reached the assembly point on the German side. Enemy fire had taken several casualties including the Third Battalion commander, Major Rush Wells. From the assembly point the Second Battalion attacked toward a small mountain village called Terelle at the end of a road from Cairo. The Texans overcame German opposition in the uphill fight, but the assault failed to reach the town.³⁷

The other two battalions then moved parallel to the German lines across the slopes of Mount Cairo in order to attack Mount Castellone. Before the attack could begin, the Texans received word that the 135th Infantry Regiment had occupied the hill. The 142nd then received instructions to move up and establish defense positions on Mount Castellone.³⁸

On 9 February 1944, General Walker received orders from Second Corps to attack German positions on the mountain tops west of Cassino. The action began on 11 February and, as Walker feared, proved unsuccessful. At this point, all three

³⁷Huff, The Fighting 36th, pp. 57-58.

³⁸Ibid.; Smith, The Battles for Cassino, pp. 73-75.

infantry regiments were short of personnel and those present were exhausted from weeks in combat without relief. Despite this deficiency, the Texans continued to hold Mount Castellone under German artillery fire and severe cold.³⁹

The Thirty-sixth Division troops received supplies at night when German observers had less opportunity to place accurate fire. An Italian mule train brought the supplies from a dump area near San Michele. Each battalion required more than seventy-five mules each to bring each day's provisions. At 0400 hours on 12 February the German artillery fired a barrage that lasted over two hours; more than two thousand shells fell on the American positions. Walker considered the barrage the most intense concentration he had experienced since the German bombardment at the Marne on 15 July 1918. He regarded the shelling a harbinger of a counterattack and warned the Texans to expect an assault at dawn. The Germans attacked as he expected. The 143rd Infantry Regiment defended the Castellone hill mass, the First Battalion of the 142nd Infantry Regiment fought on Mount Castellone's peak, and the 141st Infantry Regiment covered the southern slopes. The Germans worked up the side of the mountains during the artillery barrage and attempted to infiltrate the American positions at dawn.

³⁹ Walker, Texas to Rome, pp. 326-327.

In the ensuing five-hour battle, Texans and Germans fought at close range with rifles, machine guns, and grenades.⁴⁰

Some of the Texans' weapons had frozen in the cold; despite this the defenders turned back the Nazi attack. Thirty-sixth Division artillery concentrations, that Walker previously had ordered prepared, aided in repulsing the German assault. By 1000 hours, most of the weapon sounds coming from the mountain top were American, and Walker knew the attackers were unsuccessful.⁴¹

The Thirty-sixth Division continued to hold its position until 26 February 1944 when Free French units and elements of the American Eighty-eighth Division relieved the Texans. The Texas Division had been in combat almost constantly for nearly two months and had suffered so many casualties the unit had fallen to about half its normal combat strength. The men travelled by truck to Caserta, a rest camp located seventeen miles northwest of Naples. For five days the Texans remained here. They slept a great deal, drew new sets of clothing, ate hot meals, and reveled in hot showers. Most units of the Thirty-sixth rested until 6 March 1944. At this point the Texans transferred to the Maddaloni area to receive additional training and replacements. Over thirteen

⁴⁰Huff, The Fighting 36th, p. 58; Walker, Texas to Rome, p. 327.

⁴¹Ibid.

hundred new members arrived in March, and nearly eight hundred the following month. Throughout April and early May the division continued to train.⁴²

On 2 May 1944, Walker and several aides visited Major General Lucian Truscott, Sixth Corps commander, at Anzio. Truscott outlined a plan to use the Thirty-sixth to expand an attack planned for the First Armored and Third Infantry Divisions. Within the next few days, Walker attended conferences regarding the forthcoming action. Clark visited the Thirty-sixth Division headquarters on 11 May to present Walker with the Distinguished Service Medal. He later advised the Texas Division leader that the theater commander, General Sir Harold Alexander, had been insisting he commit the Thirty-sixth Division to a more active role in the proposed Anzio drive. Clark implied that he personally preferred to keep the Texans in the Italian center area.⁴³

By the middle of May, Alexander obviously had won the argument. The Thirty-sixth would play an active role in the planned breakout of the pocket that had contained the Allied forces since the January 1944 landing. On 18 May, the division headquarters completed preparations for moving the Texans by

⁴²Wagner, Texas Army, pp. 154-155.

⁴³Walker, Texas to Rome, p. 358.

ship to the Anzio sector. Four days later, the Texas Division assembled on the beach at Anzio.⁴⁴

The attack began at 0730 hours on 23 May 1944. The Allied forces included the First and Fifth British Divisions, and the Thirty-fourth and Forty-fifth American Divisions in attack roles. Truscott kept the Third and Thirty-sixth American Infantry Divisions and the American First Armored Division in reserve. On the second day of the assault, Cisterna, a small resort town ten miles southwest of Velletri, fell to the attacking troops and Clark shifted the main thrust toward Rome. By 26 May the Thirty-fourth, the Forty-fifth, and the First Armored Divisions had begun an attack on this sector that proved to be the strong point of the German lines. Four days later the assault was faltering and another stalemate seemed probable. The Thirty-fourth and Forty-fifth Divisions continued the attack west of Velletri, while the Texas Division kept the town under seige.⁴⁵

Walker asked Stovall, the division engineer, to report on the feasibility of a temporary road being constructed over Mount Artemisio for cannon and armor. The Texas commander had a plan to break through the area if the roads could be built. Stovall reported that his personnel could build the roads.

⁴⁴Wagner, Texas Army, pp. 154-155.

⁴⁵Walker, Texas to Rome, pp. 369-372.

Before Walker could act, however, Truscott called a Sixth Corps conference and ordered the Thirty-sixth to relieve the Thirty-fourth. Walker regarded this action as the beginning of another impossible mission for the Texans and offered his proposal as an alternative. Truscott refused to listen. Later that night, Walker prepared for the move. The following morning, however, Truscott visited the Thirty-sixth command post and Walker offered his plan again. The Sixth Corps leader listened carefully and promised to telephone an answer within a hour. At 1100 hours, he called Walker and told him Clark had approved the change but warned, "You had better get through."⁴⁶

Thirty-sixth Division began its attack on 31 May over the temporary roads built by the division engineers. The 141st Infantry Regiment attacked the German defenders in Velletri, while the other two regiments climbed Mount Artemisio and entered the town from the rear. This bold action accomplished mostly in darkness, surprised the German commanders.⁴⁷

Clark and Truscott came to Walker's headquarters on 4 June to congratulate the division. About 2200 hours,

⁴⁶ Ibid., pp. 373-374

⁴⁷ Shepperd, The Italian Campaign, pp. 275-277; Eric Savareid, "On the Standards of the 36th Proudly Inscribe Velletri," American Legion Magazine, 23 (1944):24-26; Dallas Morning News, 2 June 1944 (Fowler).

the Texans reached the outskirts of Rome and received orders to move into the city. Walker ordered his men to board every vehicle available and the Texans rode through Rome early on 5 June 1944, the first division to pass through the city with all its men and equipment.⁴⁸

The Texans continued the drive and encountered German rear guards. Late on the morning of 5 June enemy anti-tank guns, mortar, and artillery fired on lead sections of the 142nd five miles north of Rome. After a fierce battle, the 141st and 143rd Regiments, along with elements of the First Armored Division, moved through the 142nd Regiment's position to continue pressure on the Germans. The Texans continued through the Lake Bracciano sector, twenty miles north of the Italian capital, meeting and overcoming frequent Nazi resistance. The division then turned west toward the coast, cleared pockets of Germans from the area and linked up with the Thirty-fourth Division at Civitavecchia, a port city thirty miles northwest of Rome. By 12 June the Texans had gained a bridgehead across the Albegna River forty miles northwest of Civitavecchia and due south of Magliano. The Texas Division continued to meet resistance, to overcome it, and to capture towns: Piombino fell on 19 June 1944.⁴⁹

⁴⁸Walker, Texas to Rome, pp. 373-388.

⁴⁹Huff, The Fighting 36th, pp. 73-81; Temple Daily Telegram, 14 September 1945 (Jary).

Two days previously, Clark had visited Walker's command post and after congratulating the division commander had advised him that he would be relieved on 7 July and transferred home to become the Commandant of the Infantry School at Fort Benning, Georgia. He ordered Walker to prepare the division to be relieved on 27 June for a return to Salerno where the Texas Division would become a part of Lieutenant General Alexander Patch's Seventh Army. The Texas leader correctly speculated that his troops would be a part of an upcoming amphibious operation.⁵⁰

Walker told his division on 26 June that he had been relieved and congratulated the Texans for their outstanding performance. Less than two weeks later, on 7 July 1944, Walker received a farewell review of the division in the same area they had invaded Europe less than one year before. The commander addressed his division for the last time and found it difficult to hold back his emotions as the men observed a moment of silent tribute to their fallen comrades. Walker said goodbye to his staff and departed.⁵¹

Throughout July, the Texans prepared for the upcoming action. By the morning of 10 August 1944, the Texas Division

⁵⁰Walker, Texas to Rome, pp. 398-402.

⁵¹Ibid., pp. 403-407; Dallas Morning News, 28 June, 13 July 1944 (Fowler).



Source: Walker, From Texas to Rome.

had loaded on board ships and sailed out into the Tyrrhenian Sea. For the next few days the ships moved north along the Italian coast.⁵²

On 13 August, a message arrived for Major General John E. Dahlquist, the new division commander. D-Day would be 15 August; H-Hour would be 0800. There would be three landing beaches designated Red, Blue, and Green. Red Beach, sandy and located in the San Raphael Bay southeast of Frejus, was the best spot. Further east, Green Beach was a possible problem area being flanked by steep cliffs on the left and rock formations on the right. Blue Beach was little more than a cove but contained a formidable rock formation that commanded the entire landing area.⁵³

By 0515 hours on 15 August the Texans had assembled on the invasion ships' decks, climbed down the rope nets into the landing craft, and moved out to the rendezvous points. As the boats circled, American airplanes dropped their bombs on the beaches. Offshore, the battleships Texas and Arkansas fired on the beach emplacements. Just before 0800 hours the boats landed. Despite the barrage German machine guns caused many casualties.⁵⁴

⁵² Peek, Five Years, pp. 55-56; Dallas Morning News, 28 June, 13 July 1944 (Fowler).

⁵³ Temple Daily Telegram, 15 September 1945 (Jary).

⁵⁴ Peek, Five Years, pp. 57-58.

The 141st Regiment landed on Blue and Green Beaches. There was bitter street fighting through the French town of Agay. The 143rd followed the 141st onto Green Beach and moved to the left of the San Raphael Road. The 142nd, assigned to Red Beach, had been unable to land. Naval demolition crews had been unsuccessful in attempting to blast away the underwater obstacles. Green Beach, therefore, became the main division landing site. In less than ten hours more than twenty thousand troops were put ashore at this point in an area less than eight hundred yards long and fifty yards deep. With the landings so confined, the Germans massed their forces. Nine hours after the initial landings, however, the beaches were secured. Shortly, Frejus, located near the beach, fell to the Texans and a large road block near Bourlouis collapsed following a spirited battle with German infantry and tanks. By noon on 17 August, the Texans had captured nearly two thousand prisoners. An advance party of the division moved ahead parallel to the Rhone Valley, cleared Digne, pressed through the Auvergne mountains to Sisteron, gaining over ninety miles in fourteen hours.⁵⁵

Other Texans, under Assistant Division Commander Brigadier General Robert I. Stack, drove on to the north through Gap and captured Grenoble. At this point the

⁵⁵Temple Daily Telegram, 16 September 1945 (Jary); Dallas Morning News, 12 September 1944 (Fowler).

division made contact with the enemy in three widely separated sectors: near Grenoble, near Digne, and near Gap. On 23 August, eight days and two hundred and fifty miles from the landing area, the Thirty-sixth Division opened another attack. The plan included provisions for blockading the German escape routes, trapping the enemy, and destroying his forces. Elements of the Texas Division attacked and severed Route Seven at a point seven miles north of Montelimar. In the following eight-day battle, the Thirty-sixth Division artillery fired over thirty-seven thousand rounds at the retreating Germans. Additional battalions increased the total of expended artillery rounds to over seventy-five thousand. This action contributed to substantial German losses of personnel. When the German resistance in the Montelimar region collapsed, the Thirty-sixth Division turned north toward Lyons, the third largest city in France.⁵⁶

The Texans travelled eighty miles in three days and reconnaissance parties reached the outskirts of Lyons on 2 September 1944. Only liaison groups in contact with the Maqui, or Free French underground, entered the city. Dahlquist ordered patrols to check the area and learned the Maqui had cleared the Germans from the areas before the bridge sites of the Rhone River that ran through the city. The division

⁵⁶ Temple Daily Telegram, 16 September 1945 (Jary); William Jary, personal interview, Fort Worth, Texas, 10 December 1978.

established road blocks east and northeast of Lyons as division engineers removed explosives from the bridges. A spirited battle developed near the river between the Maqui and the Milice, the Vichy police who had collaborated with the Germans. When the Texans entered the area, large numbers of townspeople came out of hiding to cheer the arriving troops. The Thirty-sixth Division left the Maqui to apprehend the remaining enemy and continued after the retreating Germans.⁵⁷

The Americans passed through various French towns in their pursuit, sometimes gaining forty miles per day. By 16 September 1944, the Texas Division had liberated Luxeuil, the First World War home of the American volunteer flying group, L'Escadrille La Fayette.⁵⁸

With the capture of Luxeuil, the Thirty-sixth Division began a drive to the east across the Vosges Mountains between the Belfort Gap and the Saverne Pass. During the drive, Lieutenant James Holloway of Dallas, Texas, led four hundred men past German sentries, overpowered the guards before they raised an alarm, and captured three hundred Germans still asleep in their barracks. The division reached the Moselle

⁵⁷ Huff, The Fighting 36th, pp. 109-110.

⁵⁸ Ibid.; Today in Luxeuil a plaque honoring the Thirty-sixth, Third, and Forty-fifth Divisions is mounted on the town hall wall below the table praising the American flyers from the earlier war. Author's visit, June 1978.

River on 19 September ahead of the other units in the Sixth Corps. After a brief skirmish on the east bank of the river, the Texans prepared to cross. No boats were available and only one crossing site existed. If the Texans waited for equipment the enemy could bring up additional defenders. Since the terrain was so formidable, the mayor of Raon-Aux-Bois offered to act as a guide. The first units managed to cross under moderate fire and established a bridgehead on the enemy side of the river. As additional elements of the division crossed and expanded the perimeter, the Germans retreated.⁵⁹

A hilly, wooded area faced the Texans east of the Moselle. The 141st Regiment moved south and east to seize Saint Ame while the 143rd Regiment turned north to assault Jarmenil and widened the perimeter to ten miles. In the center, small trails through the hills confronted the division. Though the bridgehead now appeared secure, the Texas Division spent seven tedious and dangerous weeks clearing enemy resistance from the Vosges foothills between Vologne and the Meurthe River in order to establish a base from which to launch an attack over the Vosges passes. By 12 October, however, an area east and south of Valogne had been cleared.⁶⁰

⁵⁹ Temple Daily Telegram, 16 September 1945 (Jary).

⁶⁰ Huff, The Fighting 36th, pp. 119-120.

Three days later the division and attached units attacked toward Laval and Bruyeres. German resistance had collapsed by 18 October 1944.⁶¹

The weather in the mountain area turned from rain to snow and reminded the Texans of Italy. Progress was slowed, moreover, by German land mines throughout the forest area, but by Armistice Day the Texas Division overran La Houssiere and Vienville. The Texans continued ahead across the Meurthe River toward Saint Marie Pass. German defenders fought savagely at Have Mandray, but by 24 November 1944 the division defeated the resistance. The Texas troops now faced Saint Marie Pass, a twenty-nine hundred foot obstacle with only a single passage as wide as an automobile across the mountain. Members of the Thirty-sixth Division flanked the German defenders by climbing the heights and coming in from the rear. The Texans raced into the town of Saint Marie, capturing German soldiers riding bicycles in the streets.⁶²

The German command now possessed a crumbling front. The Texans had broken through the Saint Marie Pass, Strasbourg had fallen, and to the south the French Army had breached the Belfort Gap. As November ended, the division

⁶¹Ibid.; Dallas Morning News, 14 October 1944 (Fowler).

⁶²Temple Daily Telegram, 16 September 1945 (Jary).

reached the Alsace Plain and soon captured the southern area of Selestat, the largest city in Alsace between Calmar and Strasbourg.⁶³

The Germans now found themselves in a pocket with only bridges across the Rhine River remaining to serve as avenues of retreat. On 4 December, units of the Texas Division began patrols seeking a crossing site on the Ill River. Their fellow Texans captured Saint Hippolyte and Bergheim. Two days later, the division completed its mission of clearing the entire Vosges area. The following day German counter-attacks struck the division and the battle raged for several days. The Texans resisted severe artillery bombardments and infantry and armor attacks. German losses mounted, and by 14 December the enemy plan to break through the Thirty-sixth Division's positions stalled.⁶⁴

The Texas Division, after being in almost continuous combat for one hundred and twenty-two days, was relieved and assigned to garrison Strasbourg and patrol the Rhine. When the Texans retired from the city on Christmas Day 1944, they had been in battle for over four months, captured nearly twenty thousand prisoners, and killed or wounded a greater number.⁶⁵

⁶³Huff, The Fighting 36th, pp. 138-140; Dallas Morning News, 10 December 1944 (Fowler).

⁶⁴Temple Daily Telegram, 16 September 1945 (Jary).

⁶⁵Huff, The Fighting 36th, p. 150.

The relief proved short. At midnight on New Year's Eve, the Germans launched another counterattack south of Bitche. The next day units from the division moved to fill the gaps in the American lines. By 6 January 1945, German attacks in the Bitche area had halted, but the division received orders to travel to Haguenau to bolster the line there. Following a spirited battle, in which the Texans prevented a German breakthrough at Weyersheim, the enemy began to move troops toward its rear on 21 January. Five days later the Americans attacked on a broad front hampered by the melting of a twelve-inch snowfall. The battle remained undecided for several days. The Moder River overflowed its banks washing away some bridges, and throughout the following month the Thirty-sixth Division held a static line of defense along the river from Oberhoffen to a point west of Haguenau. Regiments rotated behind the lines for rest.⁶⁶

On 7 March 1945, the Allied army crossed the Rhine at Remargen. In the Haguenau sector the Texas Division received two assignments: to break the German line at Moder to allow the American Fourteenth Armored Division to go through; and to break the Siegfried Line and seize Bergzabern. On 15 March, elements of the division attacked the German defenders. Three days later, the 141st Regiment moved into

⁶⁶Huff, The Fighting 36th, pp. 151-172; Peek, Five Years, pp. 91-95; Dallas Morning News, 15 December 1944 (Fowler).


Soultz near the Lauter River, the last obstacle before the Siegfried Line. On the following afternoon, the Thirty-sixth Division crossed into Germany in two different sectors. A twelve hour march into the foothills west of Rechtenback brought units of the division into position before Grassberg by noon on 20 March. The attack continued through Bergzabern. Members of the Texas Division moved east from Bergzabern the morning of 23 March, seizing Kappellen and Barbelroth. Before dawn on 24 March, elements of the Thirty-sixth had captured Liemersheim on the Rhine and the ferry sites. Within a week all the Texans had assembled on the west side of the Rhine. On 1 April, the Texans assumed control of the Kaiserslautern-Zweibrucken area; duties included setting up control points and patrols. Three weeks later the Texans were back in the pursuit. After being attached to the Twenty-first Corps, the Thirty-sixth Division relieved the Sixty-third Division at Landsberg, three hundred miles from Kaiserslautern, and began the task of following and clearing out remaining resistance behind the Twelfth Armored Division. The Texans moved eastward against light resistance, and by the morning of 5 May 1945, they had reached the Inn River Valley in Austria.⁶⁷

⁶⁷Huff, The Fighting 36th, pp. 173-190; Temple Daily Telegram, 17 September 1945 (Jary).

At 1830 hours 5 May the troops received orders to halt in place and await instructions. Soon word came; the war in Europe had ended. On 7 May, Reichsmarshal Hermann Goering, the number two Nazi, surrendered to General Robert Stack, assistant commander of the Thirty-sixth. On Memorial Day, less than a month after the German surrender, the division assembled to hear an address by General Dahlquist. He remembered the accomplishments of the Texans from Salerno to the Austrian Alps and paid tribute to the six thousand members of the Thirty-sixth Division that had met death.⁶⁸

From the Salerno beaches, the Texans had travelled a great distance in time, miles, and lives. From the day they splashed ashore up through the assaults on countless Italian towns and mountains, the heartbreak of the disastrous Rapido Crossing, the breakthrough at Velletri, and the liberation of Rome, the Texas troops had established a record of determination and heroism. With the Rivera landing, the race across France and Germany, crossing of enemy-held rivers under fire, and the seizure of high Nazi officials, the division members proved themselves to be dashing and innovative as well. Without question, the original nucleus of the Texas National Guard had served as catalyst to form a fighting unit that had gained everyone's respect.

⁶⁸Huff, The Fighting 36th, pp. 190-198; Peek, Five Years, pp. 114-116; Temple Daily Telegram, 17 September 1945 (Jary).



Source: Peter Young, ed., Atlas of the Second World War
(New York: Berkley Publishing Co., 1977), 236-246.

CHAPTER XII

CONCLUSION

When hostilities ceased, the men of the Thirty-sixth Division could look back with pride at accomplishments unparalleled in the American army of World War II. Their record in both European and Pacific Theaters of Operation had truly earned the respect of everyone.

The fight for recognition and respect had been long and bitter. Beginning in the early years of the twentieth century, militia supporters fought to preserve the concept of a citizen defense force against a hostile professional military establishment and sometimes against their own state legislatures.

Regular army supporters claimed the guard used politics in the struggle for survival because of the actions of public servants such as Congressman Charles Dick of Ohio. No one except politicians came forward to offer significant help. Dick and his allies in Texas and elsewhere fought to retain the status of the part-time soldiers and insure the protection of the guard. It was only after an extended battle in the Congress that the proposal to upgrade the militia to the National Guard became law. Not even passage of the Dick Act guaranteed survival. The perpetual

animosity between regulars and guardsmen became intense in 1915 when the professional military leaders attempted to destroy the effectiveness and role of the National Guard. Only the intervention of a practical President Woodrow Wilson helped preserve the movement.

The American military establishment would have been unable to meet the challenge of Pancho Villa's invasion and the subsequent Mexican crisis without the National Guard. Even the army chief of staff admitted that the presence of the activated guardsmen served as a factor in halting the rush to war by a foolhardy Mexican government. Despite the willing service by the guardsmen, respect of the regulars was not forthcoming.

In the interim period between the world wars, the regular soldiers grew less apathetic in the professional-novice relationship, but the guardsmen still sought recognition. The remaining apathy indicated little respect.

The ultimate rise to respectability for the Texas National Guard began during the administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt. Under the president's leadership, Congress passed legislation revising the composition of the United States Army and its relationship to the guardsmen. Ironically, the economic conditions that devastated American society served as an aid for the National Guard movement when citizens sought supplemental paychecks through paramilitary

service. The training they received as guardsmen kept the reserve force in semi-readiness for the crisis now known as the Second World War.

By the summer of 1940, world conditions had reached such a point of instability that the American government called the guardsmen to active duty just as it had in 1916 and 1917. General Fred Walker, the professional soldier assigned to command the Texans, possessed an admiration for the guardsmen indicative of the respect that some regulars held for the reserve force; he encouraged newly assigned recruits to emulate the National Guard veterans. But his views found few allies in the military establishment. The period of shuffling the Texans from post to post in the United States, while the war continued, caused some of the men to become violent in their frustration. The retention of the Texans in the United States implied a lack of confidence in the "National Guard" division. Other divisions, less well trained, received combat assignments. The Texans gained the finest training available under the leadership of Walker, who had served in combat in the first global conflict. Despite this excellent conditioning, five alerts or warnings of impending orders for overseas duty arrived for the Texans; all proved groundless until 1943, almost three years after activation.

Another indication of the disregard for the Texans was the commitment of the separated artillery unit assigned

to the Pacific area. This group became merely a pawn on the chessboard of international politics. The strategy of assigning those soldiers the task of supporting an ally of dubious integrity in a hopeless situation when they could have been evacuated appears questionable at best. Not until the end of the war did the world fully realize the fortitude and heroism of those Texans, the Lost Battalion, that undeniably earned them the respect of most Americans.

Once the balance of the Texas Division entered combat, it began the bloody, heroic task of making the immense contribution toward defeat of the enemy. In the dreadful Italian campaign, the Texans endured rain, snow, wind, mountains, and the determined Germans. Despite overwhelming odds, the sons of Texas never faltered, and failed only once: at the Rapido River. This blot on their record occurred because of top-brass ineptitude rather than lack of daring on the part of the Thirty-sixth. Fifth Army commander Mark Clark overruled the mature advice of General Walker and plunged the Texans into the certain hell of a heavily defended position where most of the officers and men of two infantry regiments were carelessly slaughtered. The consensus of most military historians is that the actions of Clark is at best incompetent and at worst criminal. Following the action, when the assistant division commander of the Texas units complained, he was fired and disgraced.

With true fidelity, however, the Texas Division continued after the Rapido debacle under the excellent leadership of General Walker and significantly contributed to the liberation of Rome.

Clark later displayed his contempt for the Texans' contribution by firing Walker. Fortunately, the division received assignment to the Seventh Army where the Texans' talents were appreciated. Under a new division commander, who also recognized the brave and innovative qualities of the Lone Star Division, the men compiled a magnificent record in western Europe.

The United States learned from the evolution of the Texas National Guard, as well as other guard units. These organizations now are considered the second line of defense behind the all-volunteer professional army. During the Korean conflict and the Berlin Crisis, the American government unhesitatingly activated National Guard units, including the Forty-ninth Armored Division that had succeeded the Thirty-sixth as the main unit of the Texas National Guard.

The agonizing evolution to respectability for the Texas guardsmen covered nearly half a century; the purchase price included service on the sandy stretches of the international border with Mexico, the deadly beaches, frigid mountains, and dreadful rivers of Italy, the inhospitable battle areas of France, Germany, and Austria, and the

ghastly jungles of southwest Asia. The ultimate payment for respect was made in the coin of the realm of war-- the blood, toil, sweat, and tears of those who responded to the patriotic call of their country, many of whom filled thousands of Texas graves in American military cemeteries around the world.

Not Message P4 Letter	<h1>TELEGRAM</h1>	Time Filed
<small>Should mark on X opposite of service desired. WRITE THE MESSAGE AS TRANSMITTED AS A RATE TELEGRAM</small>	NEWCOMB CARLTON, PRESIDENT.	GEORGE W. E. ATKINS, FIRST VICE-PRESIDENT

The following message, subject to the terms back hereof, which are hereby agreed to
 GOVERNOR STATE OF TEXAS
 AUSTIN TEXAS

258AC 187 GOVERNMENT
 WASHINGTON D C 7 PM MAR 31 1917

IN VIEW THE NECESSITY OF AFFORDING A MORE PERFECT PROTECTION
 AGAINST POSSIBLE INTERFERENCE WITH POSTAL COMMERCIAL AND MILITARY
 CHANNELS AND INSTRUMENTALITIES OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE STATE OF TEXAS
 BEING UNABLE WITH THE REGULAR TROOPS AVAILABLE AT HIS COMMAND TO
 SECURE THE FAITHFUL EXECUTION OF THE LAWS OF THE UNION IN THIS REGARD
 THE PRESIDENT HAS THOUGHT PROPER TO EXERCISE THE AUTHORITY VESTED
 IN HIM BY THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS AND TO CALL OUT THE NATIONAL GUARD
 NECESSARY FOR THE PURPOSE PERIOD I AM COMMA IN CONSEQUENCE COMMA INSTRUCTED
 THE PRESIDENT TO CALL INTO THE SERVICE OF THE UNITED STATES FORTHWITH
 COMMA THROUGH YOU COMMA THE FOLLOWING UNITS OF THE NATIONAL GUARD OF
 THE GOVERNOR STATE OF TEXAS AUSTIN

THE STATE OF TEXAS COMMA WHICH THE PRESIDENT DESIRES SHALL BE ASSEMBLED
 AT THE PLACES TO BE DESIGNATED TO YOU BY THE COMMANDING GENERAL COMMA
 SOUTHERN DEPARTMENT COMMA FORT SAME HOUSTON TEXAS COMMA AND WHICH SAID
 COMMANDING GENERAL HAS BEEN DIRECTED TO COMMUNICATE TO YOU COLON
 SECOND THIRD AND FOURTH REGIMENTS TEXAS INFANTRY AND FIRST SEPARATE
 BATTALION TEXAS CAVALRY NATIONAL GUARD.

BAKER
 SECRETARY OF WAR
 658 PM

Adj General:
Let it be done
Jac. E. Ferguson

Source: Adjutant-General's File, Camp Mabry, Texas.

WD 325 (11-5-40) M-C

WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON

325.4521

November 20, 1940

Honorable W. Lee O'Daniel,
Governor of Texas,
Austin, Texas.

RECEIVED

NOV 22 1940

EXECUTIVE DEPT.


Dear Governor O'Daniel:

In order to strengthen the common defense, the President has thought it proper at this time to exercise in part the authority vested in him by Public Resolution Number 96, 76th Congress, approved August 27, 1940, to order from time to time any or all members and units of all reserve components of the Army of the United States into active Federal service.

He has, accordingly, given his signature to Executive Order Number 8594, November 16, 1940, a copy of which is inclosed. In accordance therewith and as indicated in my telegrams of November 16 and 20, 1940, all Federally recognized elements of the following units of the National Guard of the United States of the State of Texas, and all personnel of both the active and inactive National Guard assigned to such units, are ordered into the active service of the United States as of, and from the dates indicated.

56th Cavalry Brigade-----November 18, 1940
36th Division-----November 25, 1940
111th Observation Squadron-----November 25, 1940

Sincerely yours,



Secretary of War.

Inclosure.

Source: Adjutant-General's File, Camp Mabry,
Texas.

HEADQUARTERS, 36th Infantry Division HEADQUARTERS, 36th Division (Formerly) (Organization)		ASSIGNMENT		CHARACTER OF DUTY	PERIOD COVERED	CHARACTER OF DUTY	STATIONS AND MOVEMENTS	PERIOD COVERED	CHARACTER OF DUTY
OHQ or army	Army corps	Division	Brigade or wing						
2nd (att) (r)vd		NATO (r)vd							
5th (r)vd		IV (att) (r)vd							
7th ETO (r)vd		V (r)vd							
6th AG		VI (r)vd							
7th									
NATIONAL GUARD									
San Antonio, Tex., Home Station	(P)	11-25-40	12-14-40						
Camp Bowie, Tex.	(T)	12-14-40	6-1-41						
Brownwood, Tex.	(T)	6-1-41	6-13-41	Maneuvers					
Camp Bowie, Tex.	(P)	6-13-41	8-4-41						
Manfield, La., Sabine Area	(T)	8-6-41	10-1-41	Maneuvers					
Camp Bowie, Tex.	(P)	10-2-41	2-15-42						
Camp Blanding, Fla.	(P)	2-19-42	7-8-42						
Wadeboro, N.C.	(T)	7-9-42	8-15-42	Maneuvers					
Camp Edwards, Mass.	(T)	8-17-42	4-1-43						
NIFE (Shipment 1090-B)		4-2-43	4-2-43	APO 36 N.Y.					
Oran, Algeria, N. Africa (Rabat)		4-13-43							
Italy									
France		8-15-44							
Germany									
Austria									
Marseille, France									
"ADMIRAL CAPPS" (Ship. RE7392-A)			12-5-45						
HRPE		12-15-45	12-15-45	INACTIVE					

W. D. A. G. O. Form No. 016
February 1, 1941

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