

The Power of Culture in Diplomacy: The Case of U.S. Cultural Diplomacy in France and Germany

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Abstract

Cultural diplomacy represents a facet of diplomacy that has not been utilized completely in building better diplomatic relations and, although it could serve as a linking bridge toward better relations, it has been underestimated, if not neglected. Foreign positive perceptions of the United States declined considerably especially during George W. Bush administration, as a result of various actions taken by the United States in the international arena that were unpopular. Anti-Americanism reached its peak in Europe because of the U.S. unilateral decision to proceed with the war in Iraq while the transatlantic rift between traditional partners such as the United States and the Franco-German Axis seemed irreparable. Increasing America's soft power by more effective cultural diplomacy has seemed to be the only way to remedy U.S. negative perceptions since national image and perceptions are better managed through culture. American culture is not only prominent but it also contributes to U.S. attractiveness. U.S. world attractiveness is undoubtedly facilitated by the rapid spread of the English language as the international common language. But how is the power influence exerted by the U.S. culture and the English language (Anglophony) formulated in France and Germany? Is U.S. cultural diplomacy effective? This article, while it sets out to explore U.S. cultural diplomacy in France and Germany, also reflects on important aspects and challenges that culture in diplomacy faces.

Keywords

cultural diplomacy, soft power, cultural imperialism, language, power influence

Introduction

Cultural diplomacy is defined as the “exchange of ideas, information, art and other aspects of culture among nations and their peoples in order to foster mutual understanding.”¹ Culture, which is said to be the whole complex of distinctive spiritual, material, intellectual and emotional features that characterize a society or social group, includes not only arts and letters, but also modes of life, the fundamental human rights, value systems, traditions, and beliefs.² It consists of “language, ideas, beliefs, customs, taboos, codes, institutions, tools, techniques, works of art, rituals, ceremonies, and symbols.”³ “Every culture represents a unique and irreplaceable body of values since each people’s traditions and forms of expression are its most effective means of demonstrating its presence in the world.”⁴ Culture is “both a function and source of identity.”⁵ Language is the most salient feature of the culture of a people. It is the most “inherent characteristic of a nation.”⁶ According to a Greek professor of linguistics, George Babiniotis, “there is no other way, more direct, more substantial, no shorter way to get to know a people than by learning their language. The language of a people is the way they conceive, classify and express the world. Every national language is another taxonomy of the world, another approach, a total of choices that give a distinctive value to each language, the value of the collective expression of a whole nation.”⁷

Sir Anthony Parsons, a distinguished British diplomat, pointed out some of the advantages of using culture as an instrument of diplomacy. “It is dazzling obvious,” he said. “If you are thoroughly familiar with someone else’s language and literature, if you know and love his country, its cities, its arts and its people, you will be instinctively disposed, all other things being equal, to buy goods from him rather than from a less well known source, to support him actively when you consider him right and to avoid punishing him too fiercely when you regard him as being wrong.”⁸

According to Zbigniew Brzezinski, U.S. world cultural attractiveness is, *inter alia*, facilitated by the rapid spread of the English language as an international common language.⁹ Thus, it could be argued that the dissemination of the English language in non-Anglophone countries facilitates U.S. soft power, that is, its ability to get what it wants through attraction rather than coercion or payments. In this context and in view of the crisis in transatlantic relations experienced during the Iraqi war, it is interesting to examine the power influence exerted by the English language and American culture in France and Germany. To investigate the effectiveness of U.S. cultural diplomacy is also undoubtedly intriguing.

First of all, it is to be noted that there has been an increase in English language knowledge in both France and Germany. As illustrated in the chart below, from the German unification in 1990 to December 2005 when the last Eurobarometer survey with regard to Europeans and their languages took place (EB 64.3), English language knowledge in both countries has increased.¹⁰




Figure 1: The English language knowledge tendency in France and Germany

¹ Milton C. Cummings, *Cultural Diplomacy and the United States Government: A Survey* (Washington, DC: Center for Arts and Culture, 2003), 1.

² Mexico City Declaration on Cultural Policies, World Conference on Cultural Policies, Mexico City, July 26–August 6, 1982, http://portal.unesco.org/culture/en/files/12762/11295421661mexico_en.pdf/mexico_en.pdf.

³ Merriam Webster’s Collegiate Encyclopedia (2000), s.v. “culture.”

⁴ Mexico City Declaration on Cultural Policies, World Conference on Cultural Policies, Mexico City, July 26–August 6, 1982, http://portal.unesco.org/culture/en/files/35197/11919410061mexico_en.pdf/mexico_en.pdf.

⁵ Bill Ashcroft and Pal Ahluwalia, *Edward Said*, 2nd ed. (London and New York: Routledge, 2009), 85.

⁶ George Babiniotis, “The Greek language: its contribution to basic concepts of the European civilization,” <http://www.babiniotis.gr/wmt/webpages/index.php?lid=2&pid=7&catid=M&apprec=23>.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Anthony Parsons as quoted in Martin Davidson, “The British Council in China: cultural relations between the UK and China,” http://www.britishcouncil.org/new/PageFiles/9532/new-MD_speeches_CulturalrelationsUKandChina_Three%20Gorges%20MuseumChongqingChina_Jan09.pdf.

⁹ Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Choice: Global Domination or Global Leadership?* (New York: Basic Books, 2004), 185.

¹⁰ Eurobarometer survey 64.3, <http://zacat.gesis.org/webview/index.jsp>.

More particularly, in 1990 the percentage of English language knowledge in France was 29.4 percent while, in November-December 2005, it was 34.9 percent. There was a 5.5 percent increase in France whereas there was an increase as high as 25.3 percent in Germany. In 1990, English language knowledge was 26.9 percent in the unified Germany (this percentage is slightly lower than that of France in the same year because of the extremely low percentage of English language knowledge in East Germany, 14.5 percent, while it was actually 39.6 percent in West Germany). In November-December 2005, English language knowledge in unified Germany amounted to 52.2 percent, 43.5 percent in East Germany, and 57.1 percent West Germany, respectively.¹¹ Thus, the actual increase in English language knowledge was 29 percent in East Germany whereas there was 17.5 percent increase in West Germany.

In May-June 2005 when another Eurobarometer survey (EB 63.4) took place, which examined, inter alia, English language knowledge, the percentage of English language knowledge was 33.2 percent (336 out of 1012) in France, and 47.6 percent (723 out of 1520) in Germany, respectively. Actually, this Eurobarometer meant to examine the European citizens' knowledge, and opinions on issues such as the European Union policies (its foreign policy, security policy, etc.), their fears concerning the loss of their national identity and culture, as well as their fears regarding the future of their national language within the European Union. Another issue examined was their attitude toward U.S. role in major international issues such as world peace, the fight against terrorism, the fight against poverty, environment protection, etc. More specifically, by dividing the respondents of this Eurobarometer survey 63.4 into two categories English-speaking and non-English speaking and checking their perceptions and attitudes toward the U.S. role in world peace, the fight against terrorism, world poverty, environment protection, etc., what became evident was that those French and Germans who spoke English as a foreign language did not have a more positive opinion and attitude toward the United States than those who did not speak English (see Tables 1, 2, 3, & 4 below). What is more, in certain cases they were even more critical (see Tables 1, 3, & 4 below). For instance, of the 336 English-speaking French, only 41 people (12.2 percent) answered that the United States plays a positive role in world peace. On the contrary, of 676 non-English speaking French 117 people, that is, 17.3 percent stated that U.S. role in world peace is positive. In Germany, of the 723 English-speaking Germans, only 132 people (18.3 percent) view U.S. role in this issue as positive whereas of the 797 non-English speaking Germans, 187 people (23.5 percent) felt that the U.S. role is positive [Appendix A].

Similarly, when the attitude of the French and Germans with English language skills with regard to an E.U. foreign policy being independent of that of the United States was examined, this was not positively affected by the language factor (see Table 5).

Furthermore, the English-speaking French and Germans were not afraid that their national language would be less spoken in the European Union of the then 25 member states or that their national identity and culture would be lost (see Tables 6 & 7).

But why does the power influence exerted by the United States through the English language and their culture not produce the desirable effects?

First of all, the fall of the Iron Curtain and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, that is, the lack of dread, as well as the inability to quantify "soft power" diplomacy achievements resulted in the elimination of the United States Information Agency (USIA) cultural programs and to its merging into the State Department and essentially, to its abolition.¹² The mission of the USIA, which was founded in 1953 as an independent foreign affairs agency within the executive branch of the U.S. government and which was known overseas as the United States Information Service (USIS), was "to understand, inform, and influence foreign publics in promotion of U.S. national interest, and to broaden the dialogue between Americans and U.S. institutions, and their counterparts abroad."¹³ The closure of the USIA America Houses in Germany, whose aim was to "re-educate" the German people after the World War II so that Germany would become a democratic state again, is one such typical post war change.¹⁴ Having fulfilled their aim, several of the numerous America Houses (only in the early 1950s there were as many as 36 Houses) had to be closed because of financial reasons.¹⁵ Some of them could be saved by the financial support of the German Government and they were transformed into "German-American Institutes".¹⁶ It is interesting that Germany was more interested in maintaining them than the United States. Thus, today there are only 10 German-American

¹¹ Eurobarometer survey 63.4, <http://zacat.gesis.org/webview/index.jsp>.

¹² Cynthia Schneider, "There's an Art to Telling the World About America," *Washington Post*, August 25, 2002, <http://www.nyu.edu/brademas/pdf/schneider.pdf>.

¹³ United States Information Agency's Office of Public Liaison, "USIA: An Overview," <http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/usia/usiahome/oldoview.htm#overview>.

¹⁴ Kerstin Fickel, "Amerika Häuser und Deutsch-Amerikanische Institute in der BRD," http://www.bibliothek-saur.de/1999_2/194.pdf.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Kerstin Fickel, "Amerika Häuser und Deutsch-Amerikanische Institute in der BRD," http://www.bibliothek-saur.de/1999_2/194.pdf.

Institutes left.¹⁷

In France, there is only one United States-France bi-national center, the Franco-American Institute in Rennes, founded in 1961 by the United States Embassy in Paris and the City of Rennes in order to strengthen the friendship and mutual understanding between the United States and France.¹⁸ Interestingly, in its November-December 2005 newsletter, the Franco-American Institute made an appeal for funding, complaining that “unfortunately, Art and Culture are rarely amongst the top priorities of national governments, but we strongly believe that peace and liberty can only be achieved if we better understand each other, if we fight against ignorance and prejudices, if we share and confront views in talking about them through art and books. These are the reasons why we strongly believe in our work here at the Institute, a small and creative community which thrives by exchanging and sharing our cultures, achieved with your help and support.”¹⁹ Thus, the Franco-American Institute staff asked people in Rennes to write down why they appreciate the Institute in order to present it to American and French foundations and Institutions.

As Cynthia Schneider points out, “September 11 found U.S. public diplomacy apparatus underfunded, undervalued, and demoralized.”²⁰ After 9/11, the U.S. unilateralism in the 2003 invasion of Iraq spurred anti-Americanism worldwide and, especially, in Europe where bi-national centers, apart from those mentioned above, operate in only two other countries: Spain and Greece. Interestingly, in France, as it was mentioned before, there is only one bi-national center operating in the region of Bretagne, while the 10 bi-national centers that are left to operate in Germany are mostly the result of the Germans’ interest in keeping them.

Examining the cultural activities of the aforementioned bi-national centers from 2003 to 2008, one can observe that the Franco-American Institute in Rennes did not organize cultural events specifically related to the Iraqi war and the transatlantic rift. This, however, does not apply to the bi-national centers in Germany. The German-American cultural institutes organized a series of events such as lectures, discussions, book presentations, etc. that focused on the Iraqi war, the transatlantic relations, anti-Americanism, the European Security Strategy, the U.S. neoconservative foreign policy, etc. (see Tables 8 & 9).

All these cultural events follow the political events, that is the transatlantic rift, after the Iraqi war. Public diplomacy and its linchpin, cultural diplomacy²¹, should aim at “building long-term relationships that create an enabling environment for government policies.”²² Cultural diplomacy “is not a bandage to be applied after the damage is done.”²³ This is not to say that the work over time done by these institutes is to be neglected. However, if someone studies carefully the work done by the United Kingdom and its main public diplomacy organization, the British Council, he or she can infer that Britain conducts systematic and long-term cultural diplomacy (cf. *Strategy Plan 2010, Transatlantic Network 2020*), while the British Council itself assesses and regularly measures the quality of its work (cf. *Annual Reports*). Also, the Foreign Commonwealth Office assesses the British Council’s impact and value for money. Britain provides an unrivalled expertise in this field.

However, one should not ignore that, as Joseph Nye cautions, “soft power—like all power—must be taken in context;” that is, U.S. “cultural features may be attractive in Asia but repulsive in the Middle East.”²⁴ According to Shirley Williams, “Europe’s military strength, that is, its ‘hard power’ may be derisory, its ‘soft power,’ however, is formidable indeed.”²⁵ Nye argues that the European Union has tremendous soft power both in terms of individual nations and as a block of nations.²⁶ European art, literature, music, fashion, and cuisine have always acted as cultural magnets. The majority of the most widely spoken languages in the world are European: English, Spanish, Portuguese, Russian, German, and French. As David Graddol argues, “within Europe there are several countries with colonial histories and aspirations to protect their language, culture and

¹⁷ These German-American Institutes are located in Stuttgart (Deutsch-Amerikanisches Zentrum/James F. Byrnes Institut Stuttgart), Freiburg (Carl-Schurz-Haus/Deutsch-Amerikanisches Institut e.V. Freiburg), Heidelberg (Deutsch-Amerikanisches Institut Heidelberg), Tübingen (Deutsch-Amerikanisches Institut Tübingen), Munich (Bayerisch-Amerikanisches Zentrum München), Nuremberg (Deutsch-Amerikanisches Institut Nürnberg), Hamburg (Amerikazentrum Hamburg), Saarbrücken (Deutsch-Amerikanisches Institut Saarbrücken), Kiel (Amerika-Gesellschaft Schleswig-Holstein e.V. - Kennedy Infozentrum Kiel) and in Cologne, the recently reopened Amerika Haus e.V. Nordrhein-Westfalen. See United States Diplomatic Mission to Germany, “German-American Cultural Institutions,” <http://germany.usembassy.gov/germany/gaci.html>.

¹⁸ The Franco-American Institute of Rennes, http://www.ifa-rennes.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2&Itemid=15&lang=en.

¹⁹ The Franco-American Institute of Rennes, “Newsletter November-December 2005,” e-mailed to author, November 10, 2005.

²⁰ Cynthia Schneider, “There’s an Art to Telling the World About America,” *Washington Post*, August 25, 2002, <http://www.nyu.edu/brademas/pdf/schneider.pdf>.

²¹ U.S. Department of State, Advisory Committee on Cultural Diplomacy, *Cultural Diplomacy: The Linchpin of Public Diplomacy*, Report of the Advisory Committee on Cultural Diplomacy, September 2005, <http://iwp.uiowa.edu/about/CulturalDiplomacyReport.pdf>.

²² Joseph S. Nye, “The New Public Diplomacy,” <http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/nye79/English>.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Joseph S. Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (New York: Public Affairs, 2004).

²⁵ Shirley Williams, “Soft Europe must come into its own,” *Independent*, April 13, 2003, <http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion/commentators/soft-europe-must-come-into-its-own-594266.html>.

²⁶ Joseph S. Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (New York: Public Affairs, 2004).

economic activities worldwide—such countries include France, ... and Germany²⁷ or as Zbigniew Brzezinski better puts it, there are active geostrategic players, that is, “states that have the capacity and the will to exercise power or influence beyond their borders in order to alter—to a degree that affects America’s interests – the existing geopolitical state of affairs.”²⁸

France and Germany fall into the above category and the United States’ ineffective exercise of power influence through their language and culture is better explained by factors such as the two continental states’ bulk of power in economic, political, and cultural terms. They are the two most influential countries of the European Union. Despite their differences, in the context of the European Union there is a strong cooperation between the two. France is the European Union’s largest country by area²⁹ and a nuclear power.³⁰ It has the third largest number of nuclear weapons (warheads) in the world³¹ and the largest number of nuclear power plants in the European Union.³² It is a charter member of the United Nations (UN) and holds one of the five permanent seats of the U.N. Security Council.³³ It is also a member of numerous international organizations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the World Trade Organization (WTO), the Group of Twenty (G-20), the Group of Eight (G-8), etc.³⁴ Germany is Europe’s largest economy, the world’s fourth largest economy by nominal gross domestic product (GDP) and the fifth largest economy in purchasing power parity (PPP).³⁵ It is the second largest exporter and the third largest importer of goods in the world.³⁶ Although it is not a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council, it is a member of all major international organizations: UN, NATO, OECD, G-20, G-8, etc.³⁷ As far as culture is concerned, both countries have enjoyed a significant role as centers of high culture not only in Europe but also worldwide. More specifically, France has featured some of the world’s most influential writers and thinkers such as Descartes, Pascal, Rousseau, Voltaire, Balzac, Baudelaire, Sartre, and Camus, to name a few.³⁸ Moreover, it has given the art world the works of Renoir, Monet, Cezanne, Gauguin, Matisse, etc.³⁹ Germany is also known as “*das Land der Dichter und Denker*” (the land of poets and thinkers).⁴⁰ Famous German philosophers include Immanuel Kant, Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Karl Marx, Friedrich Nietzsche, etc.⁴¹ Furthermore, as birthplace of Johann Sebastian Bach, Ludwig van Beethoven, Johannes Brahms, and Richard Wagner, among others, Germany’s gift to classical music is unquestionable.⁴² What is more, both France and Germany export their national culture and language to other countries (c.f. Organisation internationale de la francophonie, Goethe Institut).

In this strong cultural context, it is inevitable that both French and Germans have developed strong national and cultural identities. As aforementioned, both French and German people who speak English as a foreign language are not afraid that their national identity and culture will be lost within a supranational organization such as the European Union (see Table 7). Moreover, as foreign language learning is concerned, they adopt a utilitarian approach. When English-speaking French and German people were asked about the reasons why they think it is important that young people should learn a

²⁷ David Graddol, “Global English, Global Culture,” in *Redesigning English: new texts, new identities*, edited by Sharon Goodman and David Graddol (London: Routledge, 1996), 192.

²⁸ Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives* (New York: Basic Books, 1997), 40.

²⁹ “EU member countries: France,” http://europa.eu/about-eu/countries/member-countries/france/index_en.htm.

³⁰ “Nuclear Weapons: Who Has What at a Glance?” <http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Nuclearweaponswhohaswhat>.

³¹ Ibid.

³² “Nuclear power plants in Europe,” *European Nuclear Society*, <http://www.euronuclear.org/info/encyclopedia/n/nuclear-power-plant-europe.htm>.

³³ “Country Profile: France,” *Library of Congress*, <http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/France.pdf>.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ “Germany,” *The CIA World Factbook*, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gm.html>.

³⁶ “Country Comparisons: Exports,” *The CIA World Factbook*, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2078rank.html>. Also “International Trade Statistics,” The World Trade Organization, http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres10_e/pr598_e.htm.

³⁷ “Country Profile: Germany,” *Library of Congress*, <http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/Germany.pdf>.

³⁸ “EU member countries: France,” http://europa.eu/about-eu/countries/member-countries/france/index_en.htm.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ “German culture,” <http://www.germanlanguageguide.com/german/culture/>.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² “EU member countries: Germany,” http://europa.eu/about-eu/countries/member-countries/germany/index_en.htm.

⁴³ Mark Leonard, *Public Diplomacy* (London: Foreign Policy Centre, 2002), 49, also at <http://fpc.org.uk/fsblob/35.pdf>.

⁴⁴ Eurydice, “The information network on education in Europe,” in *Key Data on Teaching Languages at School in Europe* (Eurydice: 2005 Edition), 35.

⁴⁵ Law No. 94-665 of August 4, 1994 relative to the use of the French language, <http://www.dgflf.culture.gouv.fr/droit/loi-gb.htm>.

⁴⁶ “France: Language Research,” U.S. English Foundation Research, <http://www.usefoundation.org/foundation/research/olp/viewResearch.asp?CID=59&TID=1>.

⁴⁷ Law No. 94-665 of August 2, 1994 relative to the use of the French language, <http://www.dgflf.culture.gouv.fr/droit/loi-gb.htm> For the Toubon Law in the French version, see Loi n° 94-665 du 4 août 1994 relative à l’emploi de la langue française, <http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=LEGITEXT00005616341&dateTexte=20110215>.

foreign language, the culture associated with the language was listed as the ultimate reason among French respondents; the Germans did not consider it as an important reason either (see Table 10).

In addition, the status attributed to English as a foreign language within the national education system and the existence of an institutional framework for the protection of national language use, as is the case with France, seem to be some other factors accounting for the ineffective power influence exerted by the English language and culture.

The European Union supports multilingualism, a policy that, according to Mark Leonard, the French pursued and strove for when they realized that if the French language “were not to be the first foreign language learned around the world, it was important to ensure that more than one foreign language would be learned.”⁴³ While in most E.U. countries the learning of English is mandatory at a particular stage of compulsory education, as is the case with Germany, in France, the status of English within the national education system does not differ from that of the other languages included in the curriculum; it is optional.⁴⁴ In addition, in France there is a law (*Loi n° 94-665 du 4 août 1994*) that stipulates that the French language comprises a key element in the personality and heritage of France,⁴⁵ and it lays down its compulsory use in specific fields so as to guarantee the French citizens’ right to use their language in certain circumstances of their daily lives.⁴⁶ Thus, French is the language of instruction, work, trade, public exchanges, etc.⁴⁷ This law, which is widely known as the *Toubon Law*, named after the French minister of culture who introduced it, also mandates, with few exceptions, the compulsory use of the French language in all the broadcasted audiovisual programs.⁴⁸

Furthermore, the policy of “cultural exemption” that permits E.U. member-states to restrict cultural imports of non-European audiovisual products and the practice of dubbing audiovisual products as an ethnocentric adaptation of the “foreign” to the target country’s cultural values, as a process of eliminating “foreignness” and mitigating the power of the source country’s cultural images, contribute greatly to the moderation of the power of the English language and U.S. culture.⁴⁹ More specifically, in 1989, in an effort to protect and promote the European cultural identity, the European Union passed the *Television Without Frontiers* directive,⁵⁰ which requires that E.U. member-states reserve a majority (51 percent) of entertainment broadcast transmission time for programs of European origin.⁵¹ France, which lobbied the hardest to pass the E.U. directive, has since implemented the most stringent quotas within its national system.⁵² France also imposes quotas on broadcasted musical works under a related law (*Loi n° 94-88 du 1er février 1994*⁵³), which requires that a minimum percentage of French language songs be played on radio and television.⁵⁴ As far as Germany is concerned, the E.U. *Television Without Frontiers* directive is also “playing a particularly prominent role.”⁵⁵ Although there are no official quotas to which the broadcasters must adhere, as is the case with France, *Article 6 of the Interstate Broadcasting Agreement* of 31st August 1991 (as amended by the *Sixth Act to Amend the Interstate Broadcasting Agreement*) stipulates that “television broadcasters shall reserve the greater part of total time scheduled for the transmission of feature films, television plays, series, documentaries, and comparable productions for European works in accordance with European law.”⁵⁶

For the French, “cultural products and services—films, TV programs, books, music, etc.—in addition to offering entertainment, are ideological items that embody social values and messages, and consequently influence the organization of entire social systems.”⁵⁷ Thus, “borderless information and the entertainment media are increasingly being viewed not as

⁴³ Mark Leonard, *Public Diplomacy* (London: Foreign Policy Centre, 2002), 49, also at <http://fpc.org.uk/fsblob/35.pdf>.

⁴⁴ Eurydice, “The information network on education in Europe,” *Key Data on Teaching Languages at School in Europe* (Eurydice: 2005 Edition), 35.

⁴⁵ Law No. 94-665 of August 4, 1994 relative to the use of the French language, <http://www.dglf.culture.gouv.fr/droit/loi-gb.htm>.

⁴⁶ “France: Language Research,” *U.S. English Foundation Research*, <http://www.usefoundation.org/foundation/research/olp/viewResearch.asp?CID=59&TID=1>.

⁴⁷ Law No. 94-665 of August 2, 1994 relative to the use of the French language, <http://www.dglf.culture.gouv.fr/droit/loi-gb.htm> For the Toubon Law in the French version, see *Loi n° 94-665 du 4 août 1994 relative à l’emploi de la langue française*, <http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=LEGITEXT00005616341&dateTexte=20110215>.

⁴⁸ However, some exceptions are provided for musical works and original version films. See Law No. 94-665 of August 4, 1994 relative to the use of the French language, <http://www.dglf.culture.gouv.fr/droit/loi-gb.htm>.

⁴⁹ “Cultural exemption” or else known as “cultural exception.” See “Activities of the European Union: Audiovisual and Media policy,” http://europa.eu/pol/av/index_en.htm.

⁵⁰ For more information on the TVWF directive, see: http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/audiovisual_and_media/l24101_en.htm.

⁵¹ Karen Rinaman, “French film quotas and cultural protectionism,” <http://www1.american.edu/ted/frenchtv.htm>.

⁵² *Ibid.*

⁵³ For more information on this law, see: <http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000363209>.

⁵⁴ “France: Language Research,” *U.S. English Foundation Research*, <http://www.usefoundation.org/foundation/research/olp/viewResearch.asp?CID=59&TID=1>.

⁵⁵ Council of Europe/ERICarts, *Compendium of Cultural Policies and Trends in Europe*, “Country policy profile: Germany: 4.2.6 Media pluralism and content diversity,” <http://www.culturalpolicies.net/web/germany.php?aid=426>.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

⁵⁷ Karen Rinaman, “French film quotas and cultural protectionism,” <http://www1.american.edu/ted/frenchtv.htm>

positive forces for integration but as divisive mechanisms that threaten national and cultural sovereignty.⁵⁸ The French feel obliged to maintain and protect their cultural environment (their system of symbols, images, words, concepts, stories, and values) with the same conviction that one may hold for his or her physical environment.⁵⁹

Moreover, as each country cultivates a different tradition of translating audiovisual products, and the decision as to which audiovisual translation mode to choose is by no means arbitrary but stems from several factors, such as historical circumstances, traditions, the technique to which the audience is accustomed, the cost, as well as the position of both the target and the source cultures in an international context, the translation practice adopted for audiovisual products by both France and Germany is dubbing and not subtitling.⁶⁰ Subtitling, which consists of the written rendition of the source text speech, whether dialogue or narration, into the target language, “allows viewers to access the original speech.”⁶¹ Effectively, it empowers viewers who have some knowledge of the source language to monitor and criticize the translation.⁶² It is the “form that alters the source text to the least possible extent and enables the target audience to experience the foreign and be aware of its ‘foreignness’ at all times.”⁶³ In addition, this exposure of the viewers to a foreign language has been found to promote the target audience’s interest in other cultures.⁶⁴ Dubbing, on the other hand, reduces the amount of processing effort required on part of the audience and is the most effective method to translate programs addressed at children or viewers with a restricted degree of literacy.⁶⁵ However, “the transmission of culture-specific terms and values in dubbed audiovisual texts is a highly problematic issue.”⁶⁶ “In principle, the re-voicing of the dialogue allows for an easy domestication of the original text, including the replacement of source cultural references by their naturalizing counterparts” of the target culture.⁶⁷ It is considered to be an ethnocentric adaptation of the “foreign” to the target country’s cultural values and the method that modifies the source text the most. There is no doubt that any form of audiovisual translation chosen “ultimately plays a unique role in developing both national identities and national stereotypes.”⁶⁸

What also becomes evident is that, although U.S. culture permeates the globe, it, as Joseph Nye claims, “does not always flow into other societies unchanged—nor does it always have political effects.”⁶⁹ As Nye argues, “the ideas and information that enter global networks are ‘downloaded’ in the context of national politics and local cultures, which act as selective filters and modifiers of what arrives.”⁷⁰ Others such as Stephen M. Walt claim that the United States “cast a cultural and ideological shadow on the rest of the world” and therefore, other states use strategies to counter it.⁷¹

As the world’s only superpower, the United States is “viewed as the driving force behind globalization.”⁷² Although globalization has economic roots, one can no way ignore its broader cultural and political dimensions.⁷³ A “negative effect of globalization is cultural assimilation.”⁷⁴ In fact, globalization is said to be “nothing more than the imposition of the American culture on the entire world.”⁷⁵ Cultural imperialism, Americanization, or Coca-colonization are some of the terms used to describe this phenomenon.

If cultural imperialism is conceived either as the forceful imposition of one nation’s culture on another country, or as the voluntary acceptance of a foreign culture by the people of another nation, the findings of our research show that the French and German people who speak English as a foreign language are not instinctively disposed to adopt a more positive attitude toward the United States and in certain cases, they are even more critical of the United States rather than their co-nationals who do not speak English; in that, Nye is confirmed when he argues that soft power does not stem only from the

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Josephine Dries as quoted in Agnieszka Szarkowska, “The Power of Film Translation,” <http://translationjournal.net/journal//32film.htm>.

⁶¹ Mona Baker, ed., *Routledge Encyclopaedia of Translation Studies* (London and New York: Routledge, 2009), 16.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Agnieszka Szarkowska, “The Power of Film Translation,” <http://translationjournal.net/journal//32film.htm>.

⁶⁴ Mona Baker, ed., *Routledge Encyclopaedia of Translation Studies* (London and New York: Routledge, 2009), 16.

⁶⁵ Ibid, 17.

⁶⁶ Ibid, 18.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Mona Baker and Braño Hochel, “Dubbing,” in *Routledge Encyclopaedia of Translation Studies*, edited by Mona Baker (London and New York: Routledge, 1998), 76.

⁶⁹ Joseph S. Nye, *The Paradox of American Power: Why the World’s Only Superpower Can’t Go It Alone* (New York: Public Affairs, 2002), 80.

⁷⁰ Ibid, 80.

⁷¹ Stephen M. Walt, *Taming American Power: The Global Response to U.S. Primacy* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2005), 36.

⁷² Joseph S. Nye, “Globalization and American power,” <http://www.theglobalist.com/storyid.aspx?storyid=2431>.

⁷³ Global Envision, “Americanization or Globalization?” <http://www.globalenvision.org/library/33/1273>.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

language use.⁷⁶ The importance of the role of culture in diplomacy and international relations is hereby reversed in that the United States seem to be not successful in exerting power influence through their culture. However, other countries, in our case two significant great powers, seem to have indeed resisted by protecting their own national culture and identity, which prove to be not malleable at all.

Appendix A

Table 1: English-speaking and non-English speaking French and Germans’ attitudes toward U.S. role in world peace. May-June 2005 (EB63.4: QA33a.1).

In your opinion, would you say that the United States tend to play a positive role, a negative role, or neither a positive nor negative role regarding peace in the world?

Country		Positive	Negative	Neither	DK	Total
France	English Speaking	41	256	36	3	336
		21.2%	76.2%	10.7%	.9%	100.0%
	Non English Speaking	117	406	116	37	676
		17.3%	60.1%	17.2%	5.5%	100.0%
	Total	158	662	152	40	1012
		15.6%	65.4%	15.0%	4.0%	100.0%
Germany	English Speaking	132	516	70	5	723
		18.3%	71.4%	9.7%	.7%	100.0%
	Non English Speaking	187	482	109	19	797
		23.5%	60.5%	13.7%	2.4%	100.0%
	Total	319	998	179	24	1520
		21.0%	65.7%	11.8%	1.6%	100.0%

⁷⁶ Joseph S. Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (New York: Public Affairs, 2004).

Table 2: English-speaking and non-English speaking French and Germans' attitudes toward US role in the fight against terrorism. May-June 2005 (EB63.4: QA33a.2).

In your opinion, would you say that the United States tend to play a positive role, a negative role, or neither a positive nor negative role regarding the fight against terrorism?

Country		Positive	Negative	Neither	DK	Total
France	English Speaking	129	154	46	7	336
		38.4%	45.8%	13.7%	2.1%	100%
	Non English Speaking	277	250	100	49	676
		41.0%	37.0%	14.8%	7.2%	100.0%
	Total	406	404	146	56	1012
		40.1%	39.9%	14.4%	5.5%	100%
Germany	English Speaking	265	356	93	9	723
		36.7%	49.2%	12.9%	1.2%	100%
	Non English Speaking	322	330	119	26	797
		40.4%	41.4%	14.9%	3.3%	100%
	Total	587	686	212	35	1520
		38.6%	45.1%	13.9%	2.3%	100%

Table 3: English-speaking and non-English speaking French and Germans' attitudes toward U.S. role in the fight against poverty in the world. May-June 2005 (EB63.4: QA33a.4).

In your opinion, would you say that the United States tend to play a positive role, a negative role, or neither a positive nor negative role regarding the fight against poverty in the world?

Country		Positive	Negative	Neither	DK	Total
France	English Speaking	27	259	39	11	336
		8.0%	77.1%	11.6%	3.3%	100%
	Non English Speaking	81	449	97	49	676
		12.0%	66.4%	14.3%	7.2%	100.0%
	Total	108	708	136	60	1012
		10.7%	70.0%	13.4%	5.9%	100%
Germany	English Speaking	79	483	144	17	723
		10.9%	66.8%	19.9%	2.4%	100%
	Non English Speaking	131	474	152	40	797
		16.4%	59.5%	19.1%	5.0%	100%
	Total	210	957	296	57	1520
		13.8%	63.0%	19.5%	3.8%	100%

Table 4: English-speaking and non-English speaking French and Germans' attitudes toward U.S. role in the protection of the environment. May-June 2005 (EB63.4: QA33a.5).

In your opinion, would you say that the United States tend to play a positive role, a negative role, or neither a positive nor negative role regarding the protection of the environment?

Country		Positive	Negative	Neither	DK	Total
France	English Speaking	21	289	19	7	336
		6.2%	86.0%	5.7%	2.1%	100%
	Non English Speaking	62	491	64	59	676
		9.2%	72.6%	9.5%	8.7%	100.0%
	Total	83	780	83	66	1012
		8.2%	77.1%	8.2%	6.5%	100%
Germany	English Speaking	40	583	83	17	723
		5.5%	80.6%	11.5%	2.4%	100%
	Non English Speaking	93	569	96	39	797
		11.7%	71.4%	12.0%	4.9%	100%
	Total	133	1152	179	56	1520
		8.8%	75.8%	11.8%	3.7%	100%

Table 5: English-speaking and non-English speaking French and Germans' attitudes toward E.U foreign policy being independent of that of the United States. May-June 2005 (EB63.4: QA32.5).

The E.U foreign policy should be independent of the U.S. foreign policy.

Country		Tend to Agree	Tend to Disagree	DK	Total
France	English Speaking	304	26	6	336
		90.5%	7.7%	1.8%	100.0%
	Non English Speaking	555	65	56	676
		82.1%	9.6%	8.3%	100.0%
	Total	859	91	62	1012
		84.9%	9.0%	6.1%	100.0%
Germany	English Speaking	661	46	16	723
		91.4%	6.4%	2.2%	100.0%
	Non English Speaking	689	58	50	797
		86.4%	7.3%	6.3%	100.0%
	Total	1350	104	66	1520
		88.8%	6.8%	4.3%	100.0%

Table 6: English-speaking and non-English speaking French and Germans' attitudes toward the fear of their national language being used less and less in the E.U. May-June 2005 (EB63.4: QA16.3).

Some people may have fears about the building of Europe, the E.U. Please tell me if you, personally, are currently afraid or not of your language being used less and less?

Country		Currently Afraid	Not Currently Afraid	DK	Total
France	English Speaking	106	223	7	336
		31.5%	66.4%	2.1%	100.0%
	Non English Speaking	304	345	27	676
		45.0%	51.0%	4.0%	100.0%
	Total	410	568	34	1012
		40.5%	56.1%	3.4%	100.0%
Germany	English Speaking	233	479	11	723
		32.2%	66.3%	1.5%	100.0%
	Non English Speaking	375	400	22	797
		47.1%	50.2%	2.8%	100.0%
	Total	608	879	33	1520
		40.0%	57.8%	2.2%	100.0%

Table 7: English-speaking and non-English speaking French and Germans' attitudes toward the fear of losing their national identity and culture. May-June 2005 (EB63.4: QA16.6).

Some people may have fears about the building of Europe, the E.U. Please tell me if you, personally, are currently afraid or not of the loss of national identity and culture?

Country		Currently Afraid	Not Currently Afraid	DK	Total
France	English Speaking	93	241	2	336
		27.7%	71.7%	.6%	100.0%
	Non English Speaking	296	348	32	676
		43.8%	51.5%	4.7%	100.0%
	Total	389	589	34	1012
		38.4%	58.2%	3.4%	100.0%
Germany	English Speaking	187	518	18	723
		25.9%	71.6%	2.5%	100.0%
	Non English Speaking	346	428	23	797
		43.4%	53.7%	2.9%	100.0%
	Total	533	946	41	1520
		35.1%	62.2%	2.7%	100.0%

Table 8: Cultural events related to the political events organized by the Deutsch-Amerikanisches Zentrum Stuttgart in 2003.

Index Number	Date	Title of the Cultural Event	Title of the Cultural Event Translated in English	Type of Cultural Event
1	5/2/2003	Feindbild Europa-Feindbild USA?	Stereotypes of Europe - Stereotypes of USA	Speech/Discussion
2	12/3/2003	Der Westen am Ende? Transatlantische Beziehungen heute	The West at its ends? The transatlantic relations today	Speech/Discussion
3	9/4/2003	U.S Policy Toward Iraq and the Kurdish Question		Lecture/Discussion
4	8/5/2003	Altes Aurope/Neues Europa und die USA	'Old' Europe/'New' Europe and the USA	Panel Discussion
5	18/6/2003	Der Irak Krieg/die Medien	The Iraqi war/the Media	Speech/Discussion
6	8/7/2003	Aktuelle Fragen der Transatlantische Beziehungen	Current issues in transatlantic relations	Luncheon/Discussion
7	9/7/2003	Der Irak-Krieg und die deutsch-amerikanischen Beziehungen	The Iraqi war and the German-American relations	Speech/Discussion
8	9/9/2003	September 11, 2001 and German-American Relations Today: Moving Forward as Partners		Lecture/Discussion
9	18/9/2003	Europa blickt auf Amerika - und umgekehrt?	Europe looks to America and vice versa	Book Presentation/Discussion
10	23/9/2003	Europäische Union and USA: Sicherheitspolitische Partner oder Konkurrenten?	European Union and USA: Partners or rivals in security policy?	Speech/Discussion
11	10/10/2003	Die Rolle der NATO in den europäisch-amerikanischen Beziehungen	NATO's role in the European-American relationship	Discussion
12	15/10/2003	Neue Gefahren für den Westen: Was tun gegen Terroristen und Schurken?	New hazards for the West: what must the West do against terrorists and villains?	Speech/Discussion
13	27/10/2003	Transatlantische Missverständnisse? Der 11.9. als Wasserscheide	Transatlantic misunderstandings; 9/11 as a dividing line	Speech/Discussion
14	5/11/2003	Life with Soldiers in Iraq: A Reporter's Perspective		Lecture/Discussion
15	8/11/2001	Das Verhältnis USA-Europa Sicherheitspolitische	USA-Europe relations: the security policy	Informative Event

Table 9: Cultural events related to the political events organized by the Deutsch-Amerikanisches Zentrum Stuttgart in 2005.

Index Number	Date	Title of the Cultural Event	Title of the Cultural Event Translated in English	Type of Cultural Event
1	25/04/2005	40 Years with the U.S.		Speech/ Discussion
2	12/05/2005	Die transatlantischen Beziehungen: Chancen und Risiken	Transatlantic relations: risks and opportunities	Speech/ Discussion
3	07/06/2005	Wertegemeinschaft oder clash of civilizations - was verbindet Deutschland mit den USA?	Peaceful coexistence or clash of civilizations - What binds Germany to the USA?	Speech/ Discussion
4	06/07/2005	George W. Bush's Außenpolitik auf christlich-konservativer Basis	George W. Bush's foreign policy on conservative Christian basis	Speech/ Discussion
5	18/07/2005	Another Transatlantic Rift? Zur Rolle der Religion(en) in den USA	Another Transatlantic Rift? The role of religion in the USA	Speech/ Discussion
6	22/09/2005	Amerikas Heilsmission - Gefahr oder Segen für die Welt?	America's mission to save the world - blessing or curse?	Speech/ Discussion
7	03/11/2005	Die transatlantischen Beziehungen in der Krise	Crisis in transatlantic relations	Speech/ Discussion
8	06/12/2005	Gottes auserwähltes Land: Wie Religion und Glaube die amerikanische Politik prägen	GOD's beloved country: how religion and faith shape U.S politics	Speech/ Discussion

Table 10: Reasons why it is important that young people learn other languages at school or University. November-December 2005 (EB64.3:QA4).

For what reasons do you think it is important that young people learn other languages at school or University?

Reason	France	Germany
To understand what life is like for the people in other countries	27.7%[3]	35.4%[5]
To improve their job opportunities	75.5%[1]	86.6%[1]
Because the language is widely spoken in Europe	21.2%[7]	35.1%[6]
Because the language is widely spoken around the world	47.2%[2]	52.5%[2]
To be more tolerant and accepting toward people from other cultures	26.0%[4]	41.1%[3]
Because of the culture associated with the language	13.0%[10]	21.0%[7]
To be multilingual	19.8%[8]	36.0%[4]
To be able to communicate with family or friends in a region where the language is spoken	23.7%[5]	20.9%[8]
To feel more European	18.1%[9]	14.0%[9]
To feel more comfortable when going on holiday to a region where the language is spoken	22.9%[6]	32.1%[7]

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